Disputing the Floodplains : Institutional Change and the Politics of Resource Management in African Wetlands [1 ed.] 9789004185371, 9789004185326

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Disputing the Floodplains

African Social Studies Series Editorial Board

Martin R. Doornbos, Institute of Social Studies the Hague Carola Lentz, University of Mainz John Lonsdale, University of Cambridge

VOLUME 22

Disputing the Floodplains Institutional Change and the Politics of Resource Management in African Wetlands

Edited by

Tobias Haller

With a foreword by

Elinor Ostrom

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2010

On the cover: A commercial fisherman in the Kafue Flats floodplain, Zambia, photograph by T. Haller. This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Disputing the floodplains : institutional change and the politics of resource management in African wetlands / edited by Tobias Haller. p. cm. — (African social studies series ; v. 22) Includes index. ISBN 978-90-04-18532-6 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Water resources development— Africa. 2. Floodplain management—Africa. I. Haller, Tobias. II. Title. III. Series. HD1699.A1D57 2010 333.91’7—dc22 2010012768

ISSN 1568-1203 ISBN 978 90 04 18532 6 Copyright 2010 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Brill has made all reasonable efforts to trace all right holders to any copyrighted material used in this work. In cases where these efforts have not been successful the publisher welcomes communications from copyright holders, so that the appropriate acknowledgements can be made in future editions, and to settle other permission matters. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

CONTENTS List of Illustrations ............................................................................ List of Maps, Tables and Graphs .................................................... Foreword ............................................................................................. Preface ................................................................................................. Chapter One Institutional Change, Power and Conflicts in the Management of Common-Pool Resources in African Floodplain Ecosystems: An Introduction .................................. Tobias Haller Chapter Two Between Water Spirits and Market Forces: Institutional Changes in the Niger Inland Delta Fisheries among the Somono and Bozo Fishermen of Wandiaka and Daga-Womina (Mali) ........................................................... Sabrina Beeler Stücklin and Karin Frei Chapter Three Tax Payments, Democracy and Rent-Seeking Administrators: Common-Pool Resource Management, Power Relations and Conflicts among the Kotoko, Musgum, Fulbe and Arab Choa in the Waza-Logone Floodplain (Cameroon) .................................................................................... Gilbert Fokou Chapter Four Lost Control, Legal Pluralism and Damming the Flood: Changing Institutions among the Musgum and Kotoko of the village Lahaï in the Waza-Logone Floodplain (Cameroon) ................................................................ Gabriela Landolt Chapter Five From Integrated Slope Management to Fragmented Use: Common-Pool Resources, Institutional Change, and Conflicts in Pangani River Basin, of Same District (Tanzania) ........................................................................ Gimbage Mbeyale

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Chapter Six Ujamaa-Policies, Open Access and Differential Collective Action: Common-Pool Resource Management, Institutional Change and Conflicts in the Rufiji Floodplain (Tanzania) ....................................................................................... Patrick Meroka Chapter Seven “We had cattle and did not fish and hunt anyhow!” Institutional Change and Contested Commons in the Kafue Flats Floodplain (Zambia) .................................... Tobias Haller and Sonja Merten Chapter Eight Promise and Reality of Community Based Natural Resource Management in Botswana: Common-Pool Resource Use and Institutional Change in Ikoga, Okavango Delta (Panhandle) ......................................................................... Roland Saum Chapter Nine Between Open Access, Privatisation and Collective Action: A Comparative Analysis of Institutional Change Governing Use of Common-Pool Resources in African Floodplains .................................................................. Tobias Haller List of Contributors ........................................................................... Index ....................................................................................................

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Fig. 1. Flooding cycle of floodplains. Photographs by Tobia Haller ............................................................................................... Fig. 2. Common-Pool Resources in floodplains. Photographs by Tobias Haller ............................................................................ Fig. 3. Iteshi-Teshi Dam, Kafue Flats, Zambia. Photograph by Tobias Haller ........................................................................... Fig. 4. Collective fishing event in Gomina, Niger Inland Delta, Mali. Photograph by Sabrina Beeler .......................................... Fig. 5. Fishing canal, Kotoko, Logone floodplain, Cameroon. Photograph by Tobias Haller ...................................................... Fig. 6. Arab Choa Cattle herd in the Logone floodplain, Cameroon. Photograph by Tobias Haller ................................. Fig. 7. Modern irrigation scheme Pare Mountains, Same District, Tanzania. Photograph by Tobias Haller .................... Fig. 8. Recent settlement of Pare agriculturalists in the Pangani Floodplain, Same District, Tanzania. Photograph by Tobias Haller ............................................................................ Fig. 9. Maasai Woman with child in the Pangani Floodplain area, Same District, Tanzania. Photograph by Tobias Haller Fig. 10. Maize field in the Rufiji floodplain with a temporary settlement (dungu). Photograph by Tobias Haller .................. Fig. 11. Human-Wildlife conflicts in the Selous Game Reserve Area, Rufiji floodplain, Tanzania. Photograph by Tobias Haller ............................................................................................... Fig. 12. Waiting for collective fishing event and co-ordination ritual among the Ila, Kafue Flats, Zambia. Photographs by Tobias Haller .................................................................................. Fig. 13. A fish-trader woman in Lusaka. Photograph by Tobias Haller .................................................................................. Fig. 14. Commercial fishermen in the Kafue Flats using shade-cloth draw nets with very small mesh size. Photograph by Tobias Haller and Sonja Merten ........................................... Fig. 15. A large herd of cattle being moved to the Kafue Flats (kuwila). Photograph by Tobias Haller ..................................... Fig. 16. School kids in the Okavango Delta, Panhandle, Ikoga area, Botswana. Photograph by Tobias Haller .........................

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LIST OF MAPS, TABLES AND GRAPHS Maps Map 1: Location of studied floodplains ........................................ Map 2: Mali Niger Inland Delta and location of Wandiaka and Daga-Womina ........................................................................ Map 3: Waza-Logone floodplain and location of research area ................................................................................................... Map 4: Pangani River Basin, Same District and location of floodplains and villages ................................................................ Map 5: Rufiji Floodplain and lakes, location of villages and the Selous Game Reserve ............................................................. Map 6: Kafue Flats, flooded areas and location of ethnic groups .............................................................................................. Map 7: Location of Ikoga and the Okavango Delta within Ngamiland District and Botswana ............................................. Map 8: Management zones of the villages involved in CBNRM in NG 24 .........................................................................

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Tables Chapter One Table 1: Overview of floodplains, ethnic groups, researchers/ departments and main funds ...................................................... Table 2: Downstream environmental and economic impacts from dams in floodplains and inland wetlands (taken and adapted from Adams 2002: 4–5) ................................................ Chapter Two Table 1: Notion of property according to customary and national law (Wandiaka) .............................................................. Table 2: Access to resources and payment (Wandiaka) ............ Table 3: Comparison of past and present fishing techniques (Wandiaka) .....................................................................................

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Chapter Three Table 1: Ethnic distribution of resource users in the Logone floodplain ........................................................................................ Table 2: Changes in relative prices between 1980 and 2003 (Prices in FCFA) ............................................................................ Table 3: Estimated price differences of cattle .............................. Table 4: Estimated salary of basic administrators in the last 25 years in FCFA ........................................................................... Chapter Five Table 1: Population and Population density in the study villages ............................................................................................. Table 2: Price changes between 1990 and 2005. (Prices in US$, Exchange rates 1$=TZS 980–1,000) ................................. Table 3: Number of active streams and water channels ............ Chapter Six Table 1: Fishing techniques and equipment in the two-floodplain lakes and Rufiji River ........................................ Table 2: Overview of ethnic composition and livelihood strategies of the ethno-professional groups in the Rufiji Floodplain and adjacent areas ..................................................... Table 3: Coffee price and production development, share of coffee and tourism in GDP .......................................................... Table 4: Changes in relative price for common-pool resources and agricultural products in Rufiji District .............................. Table 5: Demographic development in Rufiji area between 1978 and 1988 ................................................................................ Chapter Seven Table 1: Ethnic composition Mbeza .............................................. Table 2: Common property regimes in the fisheries, according to season among the Batwa and Ila of Mbeza ......................... Table 3: Development of Copper prices between 1960 and 2000 .................................................................................................. Table 4: Changes in relative prices in Lusaka between 1986 and 2004 .......................................................................................... Table 5: Profits of fish traders according to place of sale (converted from Zambian Kwacha to US$) in 2002 ...............

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list of maps, tables and graphs Chapter Eight Table 1: IUCN area classification of the Okavango Delta ......... Table 2: Ethnic composition Ikoga (central village) ................... Table 3: Changes in relative prices between 1980s and 2002/3 .............................................................................................. Chapter Nine Table 1: Basic characteristics of the chosen African floodplains ...................................................................................... Table 2: Characteristics of pre-colonial common-pool resource institutions ...................................................................... Table 3: Overview of institutional change in colonial and post-colonial times ........................................................................ Table 4: Average income in US$ in 2002–3 ................................. Table 5: Changes in prices for common-pool resources, minerals and cash crops and salaries (administrators) in Zambia, Mali, Cameroon, Tanzania and Botswana between 1980/2 and 2000/3 ......................................................................... Table 6: Evidence of decline in common-pool resources in 6 African floodplains since 1980s ............................................... Table 7: Overview of different common-pool resources and case related variables .....................................................................

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Graphs Chapter One Graph 1: Ecosystem interactions in African Floodplains .......... Graph 2: Modeling change ..............................................................

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Chapter Three Graph 1: The change from traditional to colonial political structure in the Logone floodplain .............................................

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Chapter Five Graph 1: A sketch of the ecosystem of the study area (Upstream-Downstream) ............................................................. Graph 2: Changing from local to state leadership in Pare villages, Pangani River Basin .......................................................

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Graph 3: Stakeholders interaction and power relations ............ Graph 4: Power relations and conflicts among key stakeholders in the lowlands ............................................................................... Chapter Nine Graph 1: Development of HDI in floodplain countries ............ Graph 2: The relation of institutional change (Ensminger), design principles (Ostrom) and degradation of common-pool resources ............................................................... Graph 3: Sustainability related to property-collective action and price-pluralism/absence-presence of the state matrix .....

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FOREWORD

DISPUTING THE FLOODPLAINS: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE POLITICS OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN AFRICAN WETLANDS Elinor Ostrom Tobias Haller and his colleagues address an important set of questions facing contemporary social scientists trying to understand patterns of institutional change particularly in Africa. Many social scientists have written important static analyses of the problems facing resource users. Static analyses, using frameworks, theories and models will continue to be an important approach to understanding how the current structure of a resource problem affects individual behaviors of those confronting that situation. Will the situation involve high levels of conflict, be destructive of the resource or will it involve cooperative efforts to find means to sustain the resource? For social scientists, trying to develop and utilize over-time analyses has turned out to be more difficult than using static theories. We do not have the physical markers that natural scientists can use to obtain reliable measures of key variables in order to study very longterm processes. Archaeologists have been extremely helpful in giving social scientists a sense of the important traces that existed in earlier civilizations. What we lack, however, is a good method for doing careful research with respect to the changes in structure and outcomes in more recent historical times. Anthropologists and historians have written individual case studies that are of considerable value. Without serious efforts to compare historical case studies, however, it is difficult to obtain theoretical results that then can be tested by other scholars. The collection of papers in this book helps us understand resource management processes over time within multiple settings in five African countries. The focus is primarily on floodplain resources, but includes parallel resource problems related to fisheries and open pastures. Each of the chapters is well worth a serious read.

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Chapter Nine is a particularly valuable contribution to the study of institutional change. Haller provides an excellent synthesis of the work of the eight scholars who have contributed chapters in this book. While he draws on existing theory, he also extends our theoretical understanding of how diverse communities, at multiple levels, cope with resource problems over time. Haller reinforces earlier findings that no abstract form of governance works in all circumstances. Instead of adopting panaceas, we need to understand the complexity of different social-ecological systems and of the importance of developing governance systems to fit particular multi-scale environments. Elinor Ostrom Indiana University and Arizona State University

PREFACE African floodplain wetlands are important regions for local livelihoods and are of special interest for conservation organisations. Most of the resources are Common-Pool Resources (CPR) such as fisheries, wildlife, pasture, forests and water. They were managed in common property regimes and are now managed by different regimes, mostly controlled by the state. This book will present the results of eight researchers who were investigating institutional change in six African floodplain areas, which include Mali (Internal Niger Delta), Cameroon (Waza-Logone Floodplain), Tanzania (Pangani River Basin and Rufiji Floodplain), Zambia (Kafue Flats) and Botswana (Okavango Delta). All these areas are resource-rich pockets in semi-arid environments due to seasonal inundations. All eight researchers were working with the same theoretical background and methods. All of them focus on the common property theory and New Institutionalism in economics, social anthropology and political science dealing with institutional change and conflict. This allows us to do a comparison of institutional change. The main goals of the research outlined below are twofold: First, the project looks at the work of Elinor Ostrom (1990), which is a major critique of Hardin’s famous Tragedy of the Commonsparadigm. Her institutional approach served as a tool for data collection and discussion. The six regions were chosen because most of the resources in these areas (fish, timber, pastures, wild products, wildlife, and agricultural land) were or are being held as common property and are characterised by extreme seasonal variations in natural conditions throughout the year. Also, they are amongst the wetlands and their adjacent territories. Moreover, the socio-cultural setting of these wetlands is very heterogeneous: Agro-pastoralists, agro-fishermen, transhumant fishermen, nomadic pastoralists and peasants all have to co-ordinate access to or dispute over these resources (Moorehead 1989, Thomas 1996). These characteristics make the African inlandwetlands, and the common-property-institutions that developed there, interesting cases for the re-evaluation of common property theory based on comparative studies, an approach which is supported in the new literature (Ostrom et al. 2002).

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Second, the project deals with the changes in local institutions and the conflicts, which are characteristic for these areas today. We also try to investigate how the institutional change contributes to the degradation of common-pool resources taking place in many of the areas studied. As theoretical background, the New Institutionalism (North 1990, Ensminger 1992, 1998) is used, which analyses changes in institutions in the context of interaction between external (economic, demographic, socio-political and technological) and internal factors of a local setting, analysing strategies of different actors and actor groups. We will especially focus on the changes of institutions and of bargaining power stemming from political, economic and demographic (immigration) factors. In many of the contexts studied in this research project, newcomers with different political and economic power profit from their relationships with government officials and from ineffective governmental control of the wetlands and reshape conditions of access according to their interests. This contributes to institutional change and conflicts between and within user-groups (conflicts between old and young men, between men and women, between the politically powerful and the weak). One of the main features of the comparative study is an historic perspective. Common property institutions, which were operating by the end of colonial times and their transformation, eradication or reemergence until today, are studied. At the heart of many of the local problems is the institutional weakness of the state and its interest in large scale changes in the environment by alternative uses of the wetlands for irrigation and hydropower can be witnessed. In many of the areas, dams have been built to harness the agricultural and hydropower potential, altering the ecological setting of the floodplains. These changes again have repercussions on the institutional change going on in all these areas. Several hypotheses are being tested in this volume in the papers as well as comparatively in the conclusion: One of the major hypotheses is that state control since colonial times has lead to de facto open access of the common-pool resources with negative consequences to sustainable use. This happened because African states underwent an economic crisis and were not able to maintain their institutions, as they had dismantled local institutions for the sustainable management of the common-pool resources during state control. We offer new insights for scholars from economic and ecological anthropology, geographers, human ecologists, political scientists and scholars inter-

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ested in political ecology and critical analysis of human-environment relations and conservation in fisheries, wildlife, water, land, pasture management: We continue to look at the tragic problem of open access including more hypotheses and results as follows: Some traditional rules remain, if they give access to a rent for powerful people. However, maintaining these institutions does not lead to sustainable use (rent hypothesis). There is a problem in the relations between local people, the state and new user groups who immigrate into the floodplains. Immigrants use the notion of citizenship to get free access or restrict access to local people, while the state is physically not present to enforce its institutions (the presence–absence of the state-paradox hypothesis). As African countries undergo economic crisis, we have one case (Botswana) that does not suffer in the same way and where commonpool resources are not a source of cash. Therefore, we discuss the hypothesis that the national economic performance has an influence on the intensity of the use of common-pool resources (economic performance hypothesis). Legal pluralism is an important issue in these areas: We will not find a clear move from common property to privatisation as others predict (Woodhouse et al 2000), but we will have paradoxically common-pool resources being open access and being privatised at the same time, depending on situations and actors and their strategies. These strategies are based on ideologies, discourses and narratives, which are resources for legitimacy during the contest over the commons.

Areas, ethnic groups involved and participants of the research projects are listed below: — Mali: Internal Niger Delta, Bozo and Somono Fishermen (Sabrina Beeler (PhD) and K. Frei (MA), Dep.of Social Anthropology, Zurich, Funds: Dep.of Social Anthropology, Zurich — Cameroon: Waza-Logone, Kotoko and div. Pastoralists (G. Fokou (PhD), Uni Yaounde, G. Landolt (MA), Dep.of Social Anthropology, Zurich.) Funds: NCCR North South, IP6 — Tanzania: Pangani River Basin, Pare and Maasai (Gimbage Mbeyale (PhD) Uni Dar es Salaam) Rufiji Floodplain, WaRufiji (P.Meroka (PhD), Dep.of Social Anthropology, Zurich), Funds: NCCR North South, IP6 — Zambia: Kafue Flats, Ila, Tonga and Batwa (Tobias Haller, Associate Professor in Social Anthropology, Institute of Social Anthropology University of Bern, Switzerland Funds: Swiss National Science Foundation

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— Botswana: Okavango Delta, Hambukush and Bayai (R. Saum MA) Dep.of Social Anthropology, Zurich.Funds: Dep.of Social Anthropology, Zurich We acknowledge the support of the NCCR North-South, IP6, for research conducted in Tanzania and in Cameroon, the Swiss National Science Foundation gave funds for research in Zambia and the Department of Social Anthropology supported research in Mali and in Botswana. The NCCR North-South (Research Partnerships for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change) is one of twenty National Centres of Competence in Research established by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF). It is implemented by the SNSF and co-funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the participating institutions in Switzerland. The NCCR North-South carries out disciplinary, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research on issues relating to sustainable development in developing and transition countries as well as in Switzerland. http://www.north-south .unibe.ch The papers were presented at a conference in 2005 at the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Zurich and have been revised completely from their original versions. All authors have finished their research between 2005 and 2006 and have finalised their MA, PhDs and Post-Docs between 2006 and 2008. Bern, February 2010

Tobias Haller Institute of Social Anthropology University of Bern Switzerland

CHAPTER ONE

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, POWER AND CONFLICTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF COMMON-POOL RESOURCES IN AFRICAN FLOODPLAIN ECOSYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION Tobias Haller1 1. Introduction African floodplain wetlands are important regions for local livelihoods and are of special interest for conservation organisations such as the World Conservation Union (IUCN). These ecosystems are interesting because the inundation patterns in an otherwise semi-arid environment make them resource-rich pockets, in which availability of resources varies during the season and between seasons. Most of the time these areas become resource rich after the water recedes. According to scholars and to many conservation NGOs like IUCN and WWF, these wetlands are under high pressure from resource use. The dominant narrative is that as these are resource rich areas in a povertyridden environment, they have to be protected. Such a conservationist view has also been underlined by the RAMSAR treaty2 to many such areas in Africa, indicating the need for management and in rhetoric,

1 The author was still with the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Zurich, when he managed the project leading to this publication. However, final work on the papers was done after he became Acssociate Professor at the University of Bern. The author of this paper as the editor of this volume acknowledges support from the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North–South: Research Partnerships for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change, co-funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the partner institutions. 2 The name of an Iranian city where in 1971 a first meeting was held for the protection of water birds in wetlands that resulted into a convention for the protection of wetlands (such as floodplains) first for birds, later on for wetlands ecosystems as a whole. This initiative lead to an international organisation covering most countries in the world. The RAMSAR convention defines wetlands as areas of marsh and shallow water, seasonal or non seasonal (for full definition see www.RAMSAR.org or Roggeri (ed.) 1995: 11).

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the need for state partnerships with NGOs, foreign donors and the local people (Hughes and Hughes 1992, Roggeri (Ed) 1995). Some of these views express the ideology of pure nature to be protected and the discourse of participatory development for a sustainable use of natural resources.3 First, the narrative of resource overuse by local people and others is matched with the evidence—or produced evidence—of the decline of these resources. Second, these resources are perceived as being natural in the sense that the state to be preserved is seen as natural but not cultural landscape and as natural, but not culturally made biodiversity. In this sense the problem lies with the perception of what nature is and with this basic perception, which excludes culture (see Neumann 1998, Escobar 1999, Brockington 2002, Igoe 2004, Haller 2007b, Haller and Galvin 2008). However, earlier overviews of small-holder subsistence based societies in Ecological Anthropology have come to the same conclusion, summed up in the statement by Roy Ellen that “pure nature does not exist” (Ellen 1982). This then means that if we deal with the state of common-pool resources, and the use of these resources, the way they are used regulated by local institutions has to be the key to understand the status of floodplain ecosystems and their transformations (Haller 2007b). These ecosystems consist partly of common-pool resources: fisheries, wildlife, pasture, forests and water, which have been managed by

3 It needs to be acknowledged that IUCN in its wetlands programme has in recent years strongly opted to a view that integrated humans and acknowledges to a certain degree the landscape services they provide. However in a mid-term report on wetlands in Southern Africa area participatory approaches and partnerships with local people are mentioned but no clear reference is made to human-made environments (see: http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/sadc_wetlands_conservation_project_review .pdf ). The same is the case with the overall IUCN Wetlands Programme and especially the Integrated Wetland Assessment Toolkid by Spingale-Baginski et al. 2009 (see: http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/sadc_wetlands_conservation_project_review.pdf. While IUCN and researchers collaborating with IUCN in different programms acknowledge that wetland values and threats encompass biological, economic and livelihood aspects and that wetland responses must address these factors simultaneousely and especially their interconnectedness or that the complexities of these ecosystems include the interplay between local livelihood systems and institutions, no clear statement is made that these ecosystems have been man influenced biological settings or ecosystems. We acknowledge that IUCN supports decentralisation and participation in the management of these ecosystems in partnership with local people but there is no clear hint in which biodiversity and landscape of wetlands as they should be protected are the product of locally man made environments.

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local groups through common property regimes and local institutions (rules, norms, and regulations). These institutions were developed in pre-colonial times by these groups and were still partly operating during colonial times. Some of them (see Mali and Cameroon) were integrated and formalised at some stage in pre-colonial states (Fulbe Groups in Mali see Moorehead 1989, Beeler and Frei this volume, Kotoko Sultanat in Cameroon, see Fokou this volume). As the reader will see (see chapters on Mali and Cameroon), these regimes were formalising some indigenous rules but kept them rather flexible in use. These institutions were developed in pre-colonial times by these groups and were still partly operating during colonial times. Today, however, common-pool resources are managed by different regimes in the form of legal pluralism, but usually controlled by the state, which has somewhat dismantled local rules and regulations. In many, but not all of these floodplains, common-pool resources are under pressure and there are signs of degradation: Pasture areas show signs of erosion, fisheries and wildlife stock are declining, and forests and water resources are less available. At the same time, conflicts over access to resources occur in these areas, which become more and more attractive for seasonal immigrants interested in commercial use of the commons and who feel legitimised as citizens of the state to have access to these national resources. In order to analyse if there is a general trend in common-pool resource management and the manner in which it is related to institutional change in Africa, a comparative research project was initiated at the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Zurich, called African Floodplain Wetlands Project (AFWeP) in 2002. African floodplains were chosen because of their vital interest in the conservation discourses and for having similar ecosystems for comparison. Second, in all these areas we have good anthropological and ecological data on which further ethnographic research could be based. Third, in all these areas there are initiatives of governments and NGOs to address management problems. In many of them there were so called co-management or community management initiatives. In addition, all these areas showed a considerable number of conflicts and conflict resolution mechanisms that can be compared. The eight researchers who have now contributed to this researchproject have contributed their papers to this book, covering the following countries and floodplains: Mali (Inner Niger Delta), Cameroon (Waza-Logone), Tanzania (Pangani River Basin in Same District and

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Rufiji Floodplain), Zambia (Kafue Flats) and Botswana (Okavango Delta, Panhandle area)4 (see map 1). (see Box with research team). All the papers that are presented in this volume deal with mentioned issues and indicate that the landscapes in which the researched groups live are to several degrees man-made landscapes and areas of high biodiversity: Composition of grasslands, fishery species, wildlife and soil are part of human-ecosystem interactions. In fact humans are an important part in this web, based on material, physical and energybased cycles. But it is not this, which drives these case studies. It is the question of how humans in these areas organised to manage these transformed systems. Coming back to the resource questions, there are some obvious but some not so obvious results. It is not an easy task to assess the status of these resources: soil erosion, composition of species and animal counts, annual catches etc. are all difficult measures because they can be wrong, inaccurate and biased. Presently, we do not have other information at hand, so the best way to assess more clearly the status of a resource is, to include available and critically evaluated research data and to use local knowledge and expertise to look at trends apparent from the changes. This presents a much more complex picture, depending on the different resources found in different locations: The basic message from the case studies is that in most areas studied, common-pool resources are really under pressure, but the kind of pressure has to be studied carefully. One of the major aims of the AFWeP was to analyse the transformation of the way commonpool resources have been managed on the local and then on the government level. There were two sets of basic research questions that we were addressing:

4 All of the eight did fieldwork in similar floodplain ecosystems with a major research design developed at the University of Zurich. Research concept and co-supervision of different PhDs and MAs, together with the three universities, was done by the author. PhDs were done in cooperation with the NCCR North-South, IP 6 Livelihoods and Institutions Programme (the lead of IP6 was by Department of Human Geography, University of Zurich, Switzerland). Between the 14th and the 16th of February 2005, a conference and a workshop were held in Zurich, with a view to presenting the results of the research team. This reader now includes the completely revised papers that were presented at the conference.

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Map: by Corinne Furrer

Map 1: Location of studied floodplains. Table 1: Overview of floodplains, ethnic groups, researchers/departments and main funds: – Mali: Internal Niger Delta, Bozo and Somono Fishermen (Sabrina Beeler and Karin Frei Dep. of Social Anthropology, Zurich, Funds: Dep. of Social Anthropology, Zurich (both), – Cameroon: Waza-Logone, Kotoko Musgum and div. Pastoralists (Gilbert Fokou, University Yaounde, Gabriela Landolt, Dep. of Social Anthropology, Zurich.) NCCR North-South (research program) – Tanzania: Pangani River Basin, Pare and Maasai (Gimbage Mbeyale Uni Dar es Salaam) Rufiji Floodplain, WaRufiji (Patrick Meroka, Dep.of Social Anthropology, Zurich), NCCR North-South (research program) – Zambia: Kafue Flats, Ila, Tonga and Batwa (Tobias Haller, Dep.of Social Anthropology, Zurich and Institute of Social Anthropology, Berne), – Botswana: Okavango Delta, Hambukush and Bayai, Dep. of Social Anthropology, Zurich.

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tobias haller A) Is an observable change in common-pool resources a result of the institutional change? B) Is there a clear tendency of common property regimes to be transferred into privatisation, if resources become scarce?

The first research question is based on the response to the tragedy of the commons’ paradigm (Hardin 1968), arguing that overuse of resources is not based on the fact that common property regimes fail but that such systems have been changed and that this change leads to incentives for overuse. The second question addresses the issue that if resources become scarce, enclosure will be the inevitable consequence, leading much more to the tragedy of the commoners than to the tragedy of the commons (Woodhouse et al. 2000). In this volume we will show that institutional change leads to overuse because common property institutions are dismantled and led to de facto open access situations, often based on state intervention and ineffective state institutions. Of course states and their governments and different administrators act not only on the national but as well on international and on local level. However, we will equally show that there are very different, often paradoxical, dynamics leading to open access and privatisation constellations, both of which give incentives for unsustainable use and conflict. As we have pointed out above, we believe that for this comparative study, a New Institutionalist analysis offers support to explain these outcomes. It exposes external factors relevant to institutional change causing changes in relative prices. These prices are strong triggers for internal dynamics, including bargaining power of actors and ideologies as a means to legitimise institutional choice and setting. These two internal aspects—power and ideology— however, shape the concrete institutional setting, choice of actors and the distributional outcome. These processes often are accompanied by conflicts; conflicts, which can either lead to an increase in resourceuse problems, or can be an opportunity to develop new institutional settings. As indicated we were using the New Institutionalism in economics, anthropology and political sciences (Ostrom 1990, Becker and Ostrom 1995, Ostrom et al. 2002, Ensminger 1992, 1998, Ensminger and Knight 1997, Acheson 1989) as a major theoretical guideline. Institutions (rules, norms and regulations) are seen as important, for they structure access and use of common-pool resources among different actors because they make resource users and use predictable. The institutional approach of Elinor Ostrom (1990), served as a tool for data

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collection and discussion of common-pool resource use and management in the very similar ecosystems of the African floodplains. These similar ecosystems and the common-property-institutions that developed there are interesting cases for a re-evaluation of the common property theory, on the basis of a comparative study. Such an approach is supported in the new commons literature (see, for example, Ostrom et al. 2002, Agrawal 2003). In addition, an historical approach was adopted to analyse the changes in local institutions and the conflicts which are characteristic of these areas today. The research group tried to investigate how institutional change contributes to the degradation of common-pool resources that is taking place in many of the areas studied. Institutional changes stemming from the relations between external (economic, demographic, socio-political and technological ) and internal factors of a local setting were analysed in order to determine strategies of different actors and actor groups. We also focused on bargaining power stemming from political, economic and demographic (immigration) factors and on the question of which ideologies are used in conflict situations to legitimise access and use of commonpool resources. This approach is based on the work of Jean Ensminger (Ensminger 1992, 1998, Ensminger and Knight 1997). Specifically we have tried to assess how the institutional set up has changed since the time just before colonial control, then during colonial control, as well as during different stages of independence. In this main introductory section gives an overview of African Floodplains (chapter 2) and then discuss basic theoretical issues regarding the management of the commons (chapter 3) then leading to an overview of New Institutionalism (chapter 4) and its application on the issue of the management of the commons (chapter 5). This will then finally lead to a state of the art on institutional setting in floodplain areas (chapter 6). Chapter 7 then presents the hypothesis discussed in all the case studies on which an overview is given in chapter 8. 2. African Floodplains—an overview Several IUCN reports regard African wetlands as ecosystems of major importance for livelihoods, protection and conservation. Wetlands harbour resources that are very important for a large number of ethnic groups, differentiated by their economies. This project focuses on so-called inland wetlands in semi-arid areas (Stevenson and Frazier

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1999: 12), which are found in floodplains (Hughes and Hughes 1992). Regions like the Internal Niger Delta in Mali, the Okavango Delta in Botswana, but also floodplains like the Hadejia-Jama’ra in Nigeria, the Logone and Chari floodplains in Northern Cameroon, the Pangani and Rufiji rivers in Tanzania, and the Kafue Flats in Zambia, all offer a highly diversified resource base for local communities. In semi-arid areas especially, they represent the major engines of natural resource reproduction and resilience in adjacent ecosystems. They are able to buffer variations in the environment, yet are at the same time also highly chaotic. Nevertheless, inundations and retreat of water fosters a diversity of unique life, compared to adjacent dry-lands (Scoons 1991). These resources represent the major livelihood basis for large groups of people, through fisheries, pastures, wildlife and irrigated or naturally flooded farming. Floodplains vary in size and flooding patterns as well as flood variability to which plants, animals and humans must adapt. Geo-morphological, hydrological and ecological processes make floodplains unique resource reservoirs: during and after flooding water is captured underground that affects a lager area. 2.1. Hydrological specificities and water regimes of floodplains in Africa As Drijver and Marchand (1985) point out the four major rivers Nile, Zaire, Niger and Zambezi have 70% of Africa’s total surface water volume. These are then the largest water basins, in which the largest floodplains can be found. However, there are many smaller river systems in Africa that have locally important floodplains, especially in semi arid areas with 1000 mm annual rainfall and lower. For floodplains to establish, flat, sediment basins are needed. There are, according to Welcome, three different types of floodplains: a) Coastal deltaic floodplains with saltwater up to 200 km upstream, b) fringing floodplains with lateral flood zones bordering rivers and c) internal deltas, in which the main river divides into different branches flowing over an alluvial plain (Welcome in Thompson 1996: 6). Some of these rivers branches rejoin the same river (Niger Delta); others do not (Okavango Delta). According to Drijver and Marchand there are also intermediary forms such as the Kafue Flats that can be seen as a “large fringing floodplain with a small internal delta (Drijver and Marchand 1985).

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Rainfall patterns and distribution is the most important factor for floodplain hydrology, vegetation and human use possibilities. Floodplains, especially those in dry or semi dry areas often receive their water from large bodies of water upstream. They are fed by areas of rainfall which are hundreds of kilometres away from the floodplain itself; rainfall patterns again are dependent on the position of the Inter-Topical Convergence Zone (ITCZ). As the ITCZ moves with the position of the sun, and brings rains in often heavy thunderstorms, Africa has more or less precise rainy and dry seasons. The rainfall pattern that matters is not only local rainfall, but rainfall usually upstream of a floodplain, bringing large amounts of water for overspill, often after the main rainy season month in a specific area. In addition, despite the clear distribution during an annual period, there is a great deal of inter and intra-seasonal rainfall variability and water that flows downstream. There can be considerable drought years in all the areas or temporally fewer floods or larger floods depending on the rainfall pattern upstream (see also Thompson 1996: 7f ). Such episodes are said to have increased since the 1960s, especially in West Africa and the Sahel region, where at least three droughts have occurred in the 20th century (ibid.). However, Southern African areas also have experienced severe droughts over the last 30 years. In Zambia’s Southern Province, for example at least two to three severe drought years have led to important food shortages (Haller 2007a). Adding to this problem is that rainfall in all the areas covered in this volume are located in areas of often lower than 900 mm annual rainfall and are also highly variable, not only between years but as well during single year. This affects the flooding pattern of rivers, depending on whether the major water for floods stems from local rains or from rainfall, which falls in other areas further upstream, as is the case with most of the floodplains discussed in this study. This means that high floods often do not coincide with the peak of the rainy season, but might come with one or two month of delay (Thompson 1996 for an overview of the literature, Thompson and Polet 2000). In the Kafue Flats, for example, the flood peaks between February and March, while heavy rainfall can be expected between January and February (see Burke et al. 1994, Haller 2007a). Similar situations occur in floodplains with one major upstream area; however, several peaks can occur when floodplains are alimented from more than just one upstream area (Thompson 1996). Additionally, high evaporation rates might lead to a lower inflow in

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floodplains with an annual rainfall of less than 1000 mm, because of high temperatures (Grove 1985). All these factors have an effect on the flooding pattern of floodplains. There is ample literature from the 1980s and 1990s that deal with the differential flood patterns areas bordering the rivers (Denny 1993, Mumeka 1992, Drijver and Marchand 1985). Rainfall pattern is just one of several factors that are important to floods: climate, geomorphological setting, sediments, soil and vegetation all contribute to the respective flooding pattern, making it a variable and completely changing environment from one year to the other. Although floodplains appear to be flat, there is an important micro-topographical feature to floodplains with several zones: the first being the river channel and its anabranches, often meander, and have permanent water with high peaks during the season. The second distinct floodplain zones are new channels and ponds, lagoons and lakes, as well as oxbows and marshes that are alimented by the main river channels (Drijver and Marchand 1985). One of the extreme features are internal deltas that are created by such constellations, constituting of several subchannels forming deltas, such as the internal Niger Delta (see Drijver and Marchand 1985, Beadle 1981). Some of these dry out during the year, others remain under water. This second features makes floodplains, especially in dry areas, important resource areas for fauna and flora and therefore, hotspots with a high diversity and availability of natural resources (Haller 2007a). Further zones are higher banks and levies that are not inundated. Water might spill over, but they are the areas close to main river channels that often remain dry and where settlements can be found. The fourth zone is the floodplain proper that can vary in size, but is only inundated temporarily; however, it is very flat and consists of alluvial soil. Areas that are inundated regularly are free of shrubs and trees, while small relief changes can often lead to changes in vegetation. Small depressions can lead to seasonally or permanently water-logged areas after the water retreats (ibid., Thompson 1996: 13ff.). Generally, floods then depend on how high the water in the main channel can be held back and how and when it overflows the main river itself. However, local rains and floods in flat areas also contribute to floods. In the Kafue Flats, for example, floods partly stem from local, seasonal rains that meet on the flats with water overflows from the main river channel. This then, is when in the Kafue flats the highest inundation level is reached (Haller 2007). Therefore,

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a small rise in the main rivers can lead to large inundation and vice versa (Mumeka 1992). One of the features on which hydrologists have spent much interest is how much the inflow into a floodplain is related to the outflow. Loss of infiltration and evaporation can be very high. Scudder et al. (1993) state that only between 4% and 1% of the inflow in the Okavango Delta becomes outflow. This however varies highly with the other examples such as the internal Niger delta and the Kafue Flats where a much higher level of outflow to inflow compared with the Okavango Delta is reached. Nevertheless, water can take several months to flow from one end to the other. One of the reasons for this is that in most floodplains there is a very low slope and water often flows very slowly. Some of these floodplains are, therefore, said to have regulatory affects for rivers such as is the case with the Sudd floodplain of the Nile. Finally these patterns have an important effect on the flora and fauna of floodplains: Most vegetation close to the river channels and in permanently wetter areas are floating vegetation mats of hyacinth and papyrus, while further from the river, grasses such as Echinochloa spp. and Vussia spp. are dominant and are adapted to inundation. Especially after the floods, rich pasture areas with species important for cattle can be found (see Drijver and Marchand 1985, Ellenbroek 1983, Haller 2007 for more details). Water and flora contribute to a rich environment of fauna, partly so called wild fauna, partly domesticated fauna such as cattle. One of the major features of African floodplains is that they are extremely rich in fish (see Welcome 1979). The different species: breams, catfish, sardine-like fish and others have adapted themselves to the flooding pattern. Some migrate into tributaries for reproduction, others make nests in the shallow water or the riverbeds. Ponds and lagoons become densely populated with fish after the water retreats. These fish find rich food in the warm water, because they feed on insects that have fed on plankton and bacteria. Similarly the rich grasslands have this effect on herbivores like antelope and others attracted by pastures. While fish attract other animals such as birds, the grass vegetation attracts herbivores of the antelopes and other animals as well as carnivores. Humans also have strongly contributed to the ecosystem of the floodplains that show distinct material, energy and physical cycles as can be shown in the example of the Kafue Flats (see graph 1).

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Fig. 1. Flooding cycle of floodplains: After local rainfalls and water discharge from higher areas, rivers in floodplains overflow and inundate large areas. After the water retreats floodplains are resource rich landscapes including oxbows and rich pastures. Photographs by Tobias Haller. Solar energy

Secondary consumers

Birds (pelican, eagle, cormorant)

Primary consumers, secondary producers:

Various fish (bream, catfish, mudfish) Crustacea, molluses insects

Reptiles (crocodiles)

Birds (goose, ducks, crane, etc.)

Mammals (lion, wild dog, hyena, otter, etc.)

Humans

Mammals 1 lechwe, wildebeest, zebra, buffalo, hippo, cattle Termites

Primary producers

Algae

Sedges

Waterlillies

Grasses

Decomposers: bacteria and fungi

Source: Haller 2007a after Handlos 1982, Drijver and Marchand 1985.

Graph 1: Ecosystem interactions in African Floodplains.

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2.2. Human interaction and water management in floodplains Before we will discuss basic elements related to institutions that are important for this volume, we must come back to some other elements that in the New Institutionalism are labelled “external.” This is a complex matter and we can only provide a small overview of the literature discussed in this respect. However, increased human use and interaction with floodplains as resource rich areas in the last 40 years have been contributing to massive changes in these ecosystems. There are climatic changes (chapter 2.2.1.), high technology use of water in the areas through dams for hydropower production and irrigation (chapter 2.2.2.), as well environmental economic and conservation approaches that try to mitigate problems stemming from controversial claims to floodplain resources over water, land, and fauna and flora to be conserved (chapter 2.2.3). There is the basic economic and ecological argument that benefits from leaving floodplains as they are, do make available a much more stable resource base than could happen with large dams for hydropower and irrigation. These attempts in which numerous conservation organisations, national and international organisations, governments and companies are involved and are often labelled Integrated River Basin Management Schemes. Classics in this realm are upstream/ downstream conflicts between national users or between countries to come to terms with divergent, strategic future options for the use of floodplains. One of the basic issues here is intensive use (irrigation for higher agricultural output–commercial or for food security) or extensive use (traditional use systems, cattle ranching, conservation, fisheries etc.) (see also chapter 5.2.4.). In this sub-chapter (2.2.). I will summarise such issues before returning to the traditional management of common-pool resources and to institutional change in chapter 5.3. 2.2.1. Floodplains and climate change One of the major sources dealing with these issues is the RAMSAR organisation that has issued some information on wetlands and climate change in general and floodplains specifically (RAMSAR 2002):5 In general terms, climate change will affect wetlands and floodplains in conjunction with a range of global and regional problems related 5 http://www.ramsar.org/cop8/cop8_doc_11_e.htm, accessed on 17th of August 2009.

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Fig. 2. Major common-pool resources in floodplain areas are fisheries, pastures, wildlife and fertile land and water for irrigation. Photographs by Tobias Haller.

to water issues. Therefore, it is important to see general trends, then to focus on the particular settings. Necessarily in all settings, higher temperatures and change in rainfall (too high or too low) will affect biological systems and their components because breeding seasons are changed as the hydrological system is changed. These become more unstable, showing extreme variability between and within seasons. In floodplains in semi-arid areas, the increase of temperature and increased evapotranspiration changes not only breeding habits of fish, but biochemistry and composition of sediments, fire events or events of extreme floods as well. In semi arid zones in Africa especially, elevated temperatures will lead to high evaporative losses and as rainfall is decreasing, run-off water will be reduced in the Volta in Western Africa, Rufiji and Ruvu in Eastern Africa and Zambezi as well as in Orange in Central and Southern Africa. However, on inland wetlands, such as floodplains, little information is available. The RAMSAR report of 2002 further claims that evaporation for the floodplains is as crucial as is the effect on the rich fauna, especially on “avifauna,” in areas like Okavango and the Kafue Flats. On the Zambezi River a reduction of up to 20% of rainfall, 25% evaporative losses and up to 40% less run off is expected. These changes

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will have an effect on fisheries as less water and higher temperatures will have a negative effect Desanker and Maadza et al. (2001) have further indicated that there are other issues: fire, changes in animal migratory patterns and changes in distribution of sicknesses will be caused by higher temperatures. For semi-humid areas an increasing desertification is expected with a change in fauna and flora. As we will indicate in this volume, such a process has already happened and is illustrated in Mali, Cameroon, Tanzania (Pangani) and Zambia. In the latter case however, local informants were able to indicate these changes on the ground. The report then recommends adaptation options as in larger protected areas with a corridor to mitigate these stresses, integration of the management of land, water and marine areas, water control structures for wetlands and a structure to be able to do “high priority management actions in wetlands (…).” (Desanker and Magadza et al. 2001, USGCRP 2000, Burkett and Kusler 2000, in RAMSAR 2002: point 267). One issue that we address in this volume, but not addressed elsewhere is the link between climate change and accessibility to floodplains (see papers in this volume on Kafue Flats (Haller and Merten) Waza Logone (Fokou, Landolt) and Pangani (Mbeyale)). This has to be understood in the interplay with dams that exist in many floodplain areas. 2.2.2. Creation of dams and their consequences Climate change is just the most global human impact that has sometimes more indirect consequences at the local level for floodplain areas. Direct impacts that stem from national level development policies are the construction of dams for hydropower production and large-scale irrigation: The most important organisation dealing with these issues is the World Commission on Dams (WCD) created in 1998 after a workshop held in Gland, Switzerland in 1997, supported by the World Bank and the World Conservation Union (IUCN) led by the South African Minister of Water Affairs. At that time the members chosen worked on different issues on regional and specific case studies to come up with the general report in 2000 (see also full report 2000 published by Earthscan). The whole initiative focuses on the contradictory cost-benefit evaluation of large dams. On the one hand, irrigation and hydropower provide important economic benefits, but on the other hand upstream-downstream conflicts (national or transnational), increased national debt burden (for the construction of dams) resettlement, ecosystem and biodiversity loss (i.e. invasion of alien

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species by flood changes) must account for negative impacts on livelihoods and health for local and regional people up- and downstream. The WCD noted that increasingly rivers have been much fragmented by dams. This is a worldwide process that is especially obvious in Africa. One of the often cited case studies illustrating high social and human costs is the one by Elisabeth Colson and Thayer Scudder on the resettlement of the Gwembe Tonga people in Zambia, to give way for the Kariba dams (Colson 1971, Scudder 1973) and the dislocation of different ethnic groups in the Volta-River Basin (see Chambers 1970). In giving an overview the WCD stated that there are five major points in the whole debate: – There are considerable benefits from dams – The price to be paid had in many cases had been acceptable because the costs in social and environmental terms (people displaced, less water for people downstream, change in ecosystem features) needed to be considered. – There is a clear lack of equity in such large infrastructures for many have to bear risks and few who profit; there is a need to compare alternatives of water and energy development. – These different interests have to be brought together in order to come to terms. – Negotiating outcomes will improve the effectiveness of water and energy projects upon which the key stakeholders can agree (WCD 2000: 7).

In principal, the problem turns around the contradictory issue that on the one hand the high lack of electricity and irrigation for agricultural production (some large scale) is in conflict with the increasing water needs for local livelihoods and an increasing threat for biodiversity, crucial for food security such as the fisheries. While in the 1970s there was a boom on the permission and construction of dams and for many countries—especially poorer countries—dams represent a high percentage of the national budgets. The report does not specifically mention Africa, but selected case studies from Zambia and South Africa indicate that African cases are involved in the study. The WCD indicate that many dams studied have been falling short with their single target goals to deliver water for irrigation, hydropower flood control, while costs often have been increasing. Also increasing are problems from sediment building, high risk and bad sanitation issues and CO2 building (dam lakes that create these gases from rotting vegetation). In addition there are the high costs of habitat, ecosystem and livelihood

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losses. Up to 80 million people have been replaced because of large dams worldwide and many more have suffered from downstream consequences, especially in fisheries and in difficult health conditions. The report also underlines that new approaches for a participatory management of theses issues have fallen short due to the limited scope of involvement of local people. The commission has offered a series of key values that resemble official declarations the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the Rio Conventions on Environment and Development. Key values include equity, efficiency, participatory decisionmaking, sustainability and accountability. At the same time, the WCD has developed a rights and risk negotiation agreement. All evolves around the issue of having all stakeholders agree on procedures. However, the reports of the WDC, especially those dealing with African downstream contexts that affect floodplains (see Adams 2002 on Senegal), indicate the difficulty in dealing with the agreement issue and propose lessons learned from such complex issues. Adams argues that in particular communities that depend on fisheries, agriculture and pastures suffer tremendously from dam construction. When upstream resettlement issues come up (see de Wet 2002 for an overview), proponents of dam construction argue that high gains are made, not only from hydropower and irrigation, but as well from fisheries created in the new lakes. Adams provides an overview of the local level impacts dams have in general for downstream communities and people living in floodplain areas. He argues that dams have often been assessed with direct costs compared to direct benefits, while proponents of dams mostly overestimate benefits and underestimate costs to riparian environments and people. He concretely speaks of floodplain environmental impacts, loss of natural resources, loss of production opportunities and dislocations. While he argues that costs to the economy of local people (agrarian loss, loss in fisheries etc.) could be quantitatively calculated, socio-cultural costs are not integrated and these include identity, freedom, mobility and the so called “impacts of modernity” and knowledge. Often local people link their identity and their well-being to a specific livelihood which is endangered by dams. He also introduces the question of power into the debate: the feeling of local people being powerless in such a constellation is represented by local people, versus government representatives and felt within local communities and interest groups. He claims that one also needs to

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look at the way women, children and the old-aged are affected differently by these developments. Specifically, he focuses on gender differences and argues that men and women within a household are affected differently, because a household is not a single unit. This is especially the case when it comes to the issue of benefit sharing for compensation or how the local economy, which is differentiated by gender, is affects people differently. Adams provides a table that is very useful for this volume. We have added in italic the points we found being complementary from our experience in African Floodplains. Table 2: Downstream environmental and economic impacts from dams in floodplains and inland wetlands (taken and adapted from Adams 2002: 4–5). Environmental Impact

Economic Impact

Social Impact on Interested/Affected Party

(changes in) flood volume and timing (extent and duration) of floods

Negative impact on all aspects of the ecosystem such as flood recession agriculture, reduction of fish catches, pastures

For most local households: reduced food production, less crops for sale, reduced trade, poverty and debt, lowered level of nutrition (children and women as well as vulnerable households, reduced access to fish. Seasonal Immigration of powerful economic groups (commercial users, traders) → reduction of access to remaining common-pool resources

Groundwater level and temporal and special dynamics of floods

Shallow groundwater and lowered drinking water quality for humans and livestock, reduced quantity of drinking water

Poor health and sanitation, different impacts on gender (looking for drinking water), out-migration

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Table 2 (cont.) Environmental Impact

Economic Impact

Social Impact on Interested/Affected Party

Reduced silt deposit, reduced reproduction of floodplain ecosystem functions (productivity and diversity)

Lowered agricultural productivity through increased water saturation/salinity

Reduced yields in agriculture, reduced income and poverty, poor health, less pasture or common-pool resources especially for vulnerable people

Changes in ecosystem functions, be it riparian forests or grasslands, → increase of shrubs, invasion of alien species

Negative impact on flows (less availability of high quality land, fish, pasture and wood

Less economic benefits for subsistence and trade, especially vulnerable households

Changes in stable channel patterns, and implication for channel infrastructure (water quantity, quality, temperature, composition (chemistry etc.), unpredictable low or very high flows (reservoir drawdown or dependence on unexpected water demand for hydropower or irrigation

Loss of property

Increase in poverty (see above)

Flood control

Positive impact Urban households, from reduced risk to business owners and infrastructure, especially employees urban (but if there is a high flood, then even more damage)

Insect or mollusc disease vector abundance (Malaria and other insect transmitted sicknesses (in waterlogged areas or created by the change)

Negative impact from increased incidence of disease (e.g. malaria, schistosomiasis for humans: theileriosis for cattle and wildlife)

Source: Adams 2002: 4–5, italics by Haller.

Poor health conditions especially for women and children, cattle diseases etc.

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Adams provides a differentiated, gender related picture that of course can be differentiated further. He stresses that under pre-dam conditions, local resource users such as floodplain farmers were experienced in the variation of the floods that could make these rich ecosystems a risk for them. One case in point are peasants in the Sokoto Valley, Nigeria, who did intercropping on their fields, using different crop varieties in one field in order to buffer risks. In addition, a mix of rice varieties were sown in the same fields to manage risks from extreme flooding or dry situations. Traditional farmers knew the quality of the soil and how it changes under flood conditions. Furthermore, farmers used to spread risks by doing rain-fed and flood recession farming as well as irrigation that enabled rolling adjustments. And last but not least, farmers have different economic activities to spread risks (Adams 2002). In the AFWeP study cases we describe ethnic groups, which are specialised in certain activities. But our data also suggests that these groups do not follow just their specialisation. The Ila in the Kafue Flats in Zambia are a specific case in which pastoralist activities are the basis of their economy, but at the same time fishing and hunting is very important for their livelihoods. They have developed a great variety of institutions to regulate these activities (see Haller 2007a, Haller and Chabwela 2009, Haller and Merten in this volume). Therefore, people who combine farming, fishing and herding and reduced reproduction of these resources or related resources (pastures) reduce their livelihood opportunities and make their households and the different interest groups within and outside the households much more vulnerable (Adams 2002: 9). Adams also provides examples of reduced gains from dams for agriculture in the Sokoto River after the construction of the Bakolori Dam in 1978 (Senegal ). In three villages where the author did the survey, peak water flows were 50% lower in the years after the building of the dam. Yields from rice fields were more than four times lower than before the dam, in one of the three villages. Of 19,000 ha cultivated in the area, 7,000 ha for rice and 5,000 ha for dry land agriculture were lost because less water reached the area. Farmers compensated with millet and sorghum, which is not so well adapted to potentially waterlogged soils. Irrigation agriculture as another strategy is only possible for richer more specialised farmers with motorised pumps. Another problem listed in the table can be illustrated with an example from the Sotoko Valley, where sudden releases of high amounts of water for “technical reasons” have destroyed many fields (A. Adams 1999). With regard to fisheries, lowered floods can reduce

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the migratory pattern for fish to breed; if the peaks are not happening, fish cannot move to regions where they breed or are trapped in waterlogged areas. Several other authors mention water related conflicts in the Senegal River Basin (see Horowitz and Salem Murdock 1991, Salem Murdock and Niasse 1996). In other African floodplains such problems could be reported from Logone, Cameroon (Beenech 1992, see Landolt, see Fokou this volume, Loth et al 2004), in the Pongolo floodplain, South Africa (Judd 1972), in the Kafue Flats, Zambia (Haller 2007, Haller and Merten 2008, Haller and Merten this volume). Inner Niger Delta in Mali (LoweMcConnell 1985, Beeler and Frei, this volume), and in the Sokoto River, Nigeria (Adams 1985). Changed flooding regimes also have had an impact on the coordination of ethnically specialised groups such as in the Inner Niger Delta among herders, fishermen and agriculturalists. The have developed a sequential resource use pattern, based on food and receding water (see also Logone area, Senegal River basin). First, herders will use the time of flood decrease to move their cattle to the grass fields or in some cases to fields where crops have been harvested as well as in areas, where fishermen have had their activities stopped, due to reduced water. If these coordinating activities are changed to coincide with too low or too high floods, it will be difficult for these local groups to coordinate themselves. With regards to pasture, the following problems emerge in general: reduced area of pasture important for cattle leads to reduced carrying capacity in the floodplain, thereby reducing the value of hinterland grazing when the carrying capacity of the dry season/wet season system is curtailed; Fertility is reduced, there is less grass cover, highly nutritional grass species are replaced with less nutritional species (see also Haller and Merten in this volume), the risk of overgrazing on the less highly valued flooded areas and the transmission of diseases that have no vector in the flooding seasons (for example ticks that transmit theileriosis or East Coast Fever,) emerge as dilemmas (see Haller 2007a, Haller and Merten this volume). 2.2.3. Benefits and costs of technological change in floodplains and conservation These external changes are highly complex and have a tremendous impact on floodplain ecology and consequently on local livelihoods. A long standing debate then arises between two set of arguments, which are important here:

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Fig. 3. Iteshi-Teshi Dam, Kafue Flats, Zambia: In many floodplain areas, large dams have been build in order to use water for hydropower production or irrigation. The impact on floodplains are lack of water and change in flooding patterns, leading often to a reduction in the reproduction capacity of common-pool resources. Photograph by Tobias Haller.

First, we stress that the economic benefit of wetlands and particularly floodplain, not only for local use but for a larger society, is greater than hydropower use or purely agricultural activities. Specifically, there is the argument that by economic evaluation studies the extremely high costs of degradation can be shown (Schuyt 2005). Schuyt argues in an overview paper that policy makers do not understand the economic value of floodplains and that conservation of these wetlands is an alternative, especially if wider use or damage is considered. This is so because the natural wealth of wetlands are underestimated and therefore wrong use systems are applied, which then give even lower overall economic benefit. Comparing four cases in Uganda (Nakivubo Urben Wetland), Nigeria (Hadejia-Nguru), Lake Chilwa (Malawi) and the Zambezi Basin, benefits from recession agriculture, fisheries, grazing, gathering (different grasses etc.) as well as gains for tourism, natural products and medicine including biodiversity and water services (purification of ground water etc.) are calculated. In the Zambezi Basin gains from uses other than hydropower and irrigated agriculture are higher than US $200 million per year, a figure higher than gains realised by hydropower per annum.

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Second, and related to the first argument, this narrative and discourse links to the demand for more conservation measures that come from IUCN, WWF, RAMSAR and local as well as foreign governments (see Dugan, Ed 1990, IUCN 2000 for policy recommendations). Such approaches are partially linked to River Basin Management schemes, in which macro and micro-level issues of water management between countries (trans-border water management) and between different national and regional stakeholders (commercial farmers, cities, irrigation schemes, hydropower schemes, etc. are discussed). In Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi, the Zambezi River Basin Management Scheme is one example, which has been partially repeated on a lower level with different attempts by the IUCN and later by the WWF in the Kafue River area; the last attempt was called Partners for Wetlands (Haller 2007a). This approach called Integrated River Basin Management tries to deal with the integration of all stakeholders looking to find new institutional arrangements. Different interests and lack of human and institutional capital makes such an approach a challenge in the African contexts (Scudder 1988, Varis and Lahtela 2002; see also Jaspers 2003 for an overview) and, we would argue, that this case is especially due to different bargaining power of the actors. Therefore, issues of upstream-downstream problems and of a more participatory approach are today being implemented with mixed results. One of the major debates with regard to dams are initiatives that have been labelled “The Return of the Water”—meaning that more water shall be released from dams in order to keep conservation and livelihood goals intact (see Loth (Ed.) 2004 for the Waza Logone Area, where the IUCN has successfully negotiated more release of water from the Maga-Dam and the related rice irrigation scheme. Such approaches are important for the restoration of floodplains, but might also produce unexpected results as changes in the institutional setting and local adaptation to changed flooding patterns vary (see Fokou in this volume). In this wider context of conservation, Integrated River Basin Management and “the Return of the Water” quests to enlarge already existing protected areas is repeatedly made. This is not the place to make a large review on protected areas, but to make some major comments on the link between the problem of institutional change, livelihoods and protected areas in floodplains. On most African floodplains there are protected areas ranging from national parks and game reserves to biosphere reserves. Many of these—in fact all protected areas discussed in this volume—have been set up during colonial times on the basis

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that African nature has to be protected from local users. This ignored completely not only that these groups had a long history of use of these ecosystems, but that they had in fact transformed them and that they had established institutions to manage them (for an overview of literature see Haller and Galvin 2008a,b). Therefore, these areas were constantly enlarged and managed as a “fortess” (see Hulme and Murpree (Eds) 2001, Brockington 2003, Brockington et al. 2008). As in the 1980s, when the basic crisis of these areas, badly protected by the state, was recognised, a new paradigm of community conservation and co-management schemes was set up in order to involve local people in a more participatory approach. However, the involvement of local people was marginal and did not meet their needs (Haller and Galvin 2008a, b). As protected areas were more and more enlarged, local resources users lost access to pastures, fisheries and wildlife (ibid., see all cases in this volume). Therefore, we came to the conclusion that the mainstream view on these environments still carries the colonial view legacy of the ecosystems as pure nature; Africa as the Garden Eden that still has forests and wildlife, which are threatened by the overuse from the local population. This view is also necessary because it is this ideology that legitimates conservation funds and gains from tourism, especially trophy hunting. Literature from anthropology and human geography has challenged this view since the mid 1990s. One of the basic works is Fairhead and Leach’s “Misreading an African Landscape” (1996) in which the authors try to indicate that small forests on the savannah are not remains of a larger tree cover, but in fact created by local people and that often more people means more human-created forests. Most of the protected areas today in Africa have been used by local people since before colonial times and thus also represent cultural landscapes, making the view of the wild Africa a colonial construction that also served to expel people from these areas (for a more general overview, see Neumann 1998, Hulme and Murphree (Eds) 2001, Beinart and McGregor (Eds) 2003, Basset and Crummey (Eds) 2003, Haller and Galvin 2008a, b, Galvin and Haller (Eds) 2008). Generally speaking, human use has left its traces in the change of the ecosystems all over the continent. Colonial narratives of a wild Africa to be protected stems from this colonial narrative based on ideology that pure nature exists and on the discourse that it needs to be protected. We have argued in different publications and in line with the above mentioned literature that African ecosystems are not only cultural landscapes, but also the

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result of pre-colonial rules and regulations (Haller 2007b, Haller and Galvin 2008a,b). Coming back to the overview paper of Schuyts, there is one basic disagreement. The argument that wetlands like floodplains are degraded because lack of property rights lead to unsustainable use seems to specifically ignore that local institutions and specific property rights had been established in these areas long before colonial and post-colonial times. These might be missing today due to institutional change, but this process has to be taken into account. Other literature that also indicates the value of different economic sectors makes this point (for fisheries see i.e. Welcomme 1979, Remane (Ed) 1997, Bene et al. 2003a,b, Haller and Merten 2008; for wildlife (Marks 1976, Gibson 1999, Emerton 2001, Hulme and Murphree (Eds) 2001; Little 1984, McCabe 1990, overview on African pastoralism see Homewood 2008, on floodplains in general DeMotts et al. 2009, Mvula and Haller 2009, Haller and Chabwela 2009). In this volume we add to the study of such pre-colonial institutions, but we also argue that if there is an absence of clear property rights this is a result of an historical process of institutional change; it is one of the roots of the problem and not the principle absence of such rights combined with overpopulation and poverty. This is why we further argue that before discussing wise use and economic benefits that an historical and anthropological analysis of what kind of institutions were in place before colonial times is important. 3. Theoretical Background When environmental issues are at stake, analysis often focuses on the way renewable resources are managed or mismanaged by local people. Adams (1990) showed that the respective discussions centred in the past on the issue of mismanagement and led to the initial approaches to environmental conservation—approaches that were biased by the view that local inhabitants in so-called Third World countries are at the centre of the problem. Or to put it polemically: While white men in Africa were hunters, Africans were regarded as poachers (ibid.). Other studies on Africa take the view, for example, that forests are being cut down by a growing population extending their agricultural production (see Fairhead and Leach 1996). Most of these works draw attention to colonial bias, which was still dominant among resource

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use planners until the 1990s. Perhaps one of the most important contributions to the view that local inhabitants ruin their resource base was the article by Garrett Hardin entitled the “Tragedy of the Commons,” published in 1968. In this work, the links between resource management and institutions are important, for the article focuses on a crucial issue regarding sustainable resource management, i.e. property rights. Hardin attacked the property rights regime—a regime found largely in Third World countries—which he called common property. For Hardin, common property resources were free or open access resources: no one feels responsible to look after the regeneration of a resource such as a pasture (or a fishing ground, forest, wildlife population, etc.) as long as it does not belong to him or her personally. Even more problematic for Hardin was the fact that people who restrain themselves from maximum use of a resource in order to let it regenerate are on the losing side. There will always be other users consuming as much as they can, and the “conservationists” will be left with nothing. This constellation is the “prisoner’s dilemma” in game theory, in which even those who want to conserve the resource base go for maximum use. Hardin perceived this as a tragedy, for he did not see a way out for local users. He saw them as unable to create rules— institutions—to regulate resource use at a level that does not lead to resource destruction. For him, the only solution was in the control of common property resources by a central government or—as advocated by neoclassical economists—transformation of the commons into private property (Acheson 1989, Feeney et al. 1990). The tragedy bias was already present in colonial discourse and was actually bundled by Hardin. But it led many governments to take resource rights and responsibilities out of the hands of local groups and to legitimise this move by pointing out that existing overuse of forests, wildlife, fisheries and pastures was the result of this tragedy. Many authors subsequently showed that Hardin had misinterpreted common property as an open access system, and they demonstrated that cases where resources were not part of any property system (i.e. open access) were indeed very rare. Most of the time resources scattered over wide ranges, and not concentrated in one spot, are owned by a local groups, village groups, lineages, or kinship groups. These resources belong to no one but the members of a particular group (Acheson 1989). Access was allowed only for members of the group, and outsiders who asked permission for access would either receive it or be denied. Anthropological research has also shown that such groups of users usually have rules and norms regulating the amount

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of consumption of resources (time scales, quotas, technical regulations, etc.). Additionally, there are monitoring and sanctioning boards (councils of elders, priests, young men, i.e. warrior, age classes). Close face-to-face interaction in a small-scale society, where social control is everywhere, can also be regarded as a monitoring and sanctioning device (Feeney et al. 1990, Ostrom 1990, Becker and Ostrom 1995, Agrawal 2003). It then becomes an important and very interesting task to determine in a particular community how local resources were and still are governed by what the present paper refers to as institutions—regulatory devices that define who is allowed to use what kind of resource at what time and under what circumstances. But the challenge of “overuse syndromes” must also be dealt with, although it can be proven that institutions operate in a community or on a larger societal level. It is then necessary to show historically— and usually in societies with no written records—what kinds of rules operated, for example, to govern the use of pastures, and why such institutions no longer work today. There are demographic, technological, economic and political aspects to be considered in such an analysis. The expansion of the Western world in different stages is one of the most important milestones in this analysis. A second milestone was the time when colonies allegedly became independent. Newly governed entities, in colonial and post-colonial times, had to face new institutions established in writing and therefore formalised by state law and controlled by governments. This dual existence of so-called customary law and government laws and regulations is at the heart of ambivalence and insecurity, where theories of institutions, and particularly the New Institutionalism, can provide insights and help mitigate syndromes of resource overuse. 4. New Institutionalism: Methodological individualism and the role of transaction costs The term “New” Institutionalism implies an “Old” school of thought. This is usually brought up in connection with economists such as Veblen, Commons, and Mitchell. Veblen’s position in particular (see Veblen 1919) was that institutions generally play an important role in economic actions, but he never clearly defined this role. His position seems to be more an assumption that rules in a society are important for economic decisions, and that the portrait of the individual

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“Economic Man” must be rejected, as it does not explain economic evolution and technological transformation. Generally, individual conduct is shaped by relations of an institutional nature, by means of which Veblen suggested an alternative to the theory of the rational individual being able to calculate everything (Hodgson 1993). But the role of institutions in the decisions of actors was never systematically presented by the old school of institutionalism (ibid.). An initial step towards a new approach to institutions can be found in Ronald Coase’s theory of the firm (Coase 1937). Coase tried to show why this form of capitalist economic organisation was important. In the structure of a firm, transactions are organized by rules, at costs lower than the costs that would ensue if each and every individual member of the working force were to be hired separately; (the role transaction costs play in the new theory will be discussed later). To put the New Institutionalism in a general theoretical context to explain patterns of resource use, the focus must be on two important points: methodological individualism and the role of transaction costs. Platteau’s explanations of the first point are useful and put the New Institutionalism into a wider perspective (Platteau 2000). When Karl Marx was examining institutions in terms of the dialectical interplay of productive forces and production, enumerating in the latter property arrangements such as institutional rules for property rights assignments, he placed them at a societal level. In the contradiction between productive forces and these institutional relations, adjustments are made in a process by which change takes place in the form of a revolution. In this way, social rules are newly defined but expressed in material terms as a productive force. Boserup (1965) also emphasises population growth by showing that, even in pre-capitalist societies, growth did not lead to a decline in agrarian output. On the contrary, she argues, it led to the use of intensified techniques and new institutional arrangements. With population growth, more intensive patterns of land use are employed, even in pre-capitalist systems. Thus, it is no surprise that in an agrarian system with annual cropping, private property rights relating to land are found, while in long-fallow agriculture this is not the case (Boserup 1965, Platteau 2000). For Marx and Boserup, the view is a collective one, but this is not the case with the New Institutional Economics (NIE), as expressed by one exponent of New Institutionalist thought. Platteau states that NIE provides “bourgeois” answers to Marxist questions. NIE shares with Marx the view that institutions are useful at one point in time, but come into conflict during future developments. NIE assumes that

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it is not the supra-individual level that is important; rather, analysis needs to be done at the individual level. So for NIE and for other New Institutionalists as well, the basic assumption is that the individual is rational, sometimes rationally bounded, and is a self-interested actor who attempts to secure his/her outcome. However, this does not bring us back to the old neo-classical point of view. What is of interest in the action-choice framework of NIE is the idea that individuals seek the best possible outcome, and institutional change comes about through the aggregation of decisions taken by bounded rational actors (North 1990, Ensminger 1992, Gibson 1999, Platteau 2000). Given her microeconomic foundation, Boserup is closer to the NIE than Marx (Platteau 2000). The ways in which such institutions evolve and change, and the influence they have on the economic strategies of individuals and groups of actors, are issues debated by different theories in economic history, political science and anthropology. Different approaches can be subsumed under the label of New Institutionalism (Olson 1965, North and Thomas 1973, North 1990, Ostrom 1990, Ensminger 1992, 1998, Bromley 1992, Becker and Ostrom 1995, Ruttan 1998, Gibson 1999). Institutions are seen here as formal and informal “rules of the game,” such as constraints, norms, values and rules. These give incentives to groups and individuals, and also structure human action and interaction, especially in economic activities, collective action, and in sustainable resource use. They help individuals form expectations about the conduct of others and thereby enable coordination and cooperation. Institutions such as property rights systems or laws are developed by the state (formal institutions) or by local communities, where they are embedded in their culture (informal institutions; North 1990, Ostrom 1990, Ensminger 1992, 1998). An important aspect in explaining how institutions operate is illustrated by the work of economists such as Douglass North (1990). He not only states that institutions matter for economic activities (Old Institutionalism), but that if they work properly, they reduce transaction costs. These are the costs that arise when two people engage in an economic transaction, which is, as Ronald Coase (1937) has shown, costly. To make a transaction, one has to have information about product quality and about the behaviour of other actors. One also has to monitor trading partners and sanction them when they cheat. All these activities are costly because they consume time and resources (North 1990).

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5. Common-pool resources, common property institutions and New Institutionalism 5.1. Common-pool resources and common property regimes There is considerable confusion about terms in the relevant literature. Many authors in the past talked about common property resources, which is, in fact, the wrong term. According to Gibson, McKean and Ostrom (2000) and Ostrom et al. (2002) resources and their physical properties do not themselves lead automatically to a specific system of property or regimes for its management. The latter are human inventions, which cannot automatically be derived from physical properties, but from claims and decision–making over resources by actors. Private property rights are clearly specified and exclusive to the owner, and it is argued that investments are made only under this condition. But the main problem, McKean argues, is that this view overlooks an important fact regarding resources as goods. In the view of economists there are only two types of goods: private goods and public goods defined by two sets of dimensions: whether potential users can be excluded from their use (excludability) and whether using a proportion of a good reduces the supply that remains (subtractibility or rivalry of a good). While purely public goods are non-excludable and non-subtractable, private goods have both characteristics. The problem is that there are more types of goods, which are overlooked by this dichotomy: There are club goods (excludable but not subtractable; e.g. the festive atmosphere at a party) and common pool goods (e.g. fisheries, pastures, wildlife etc.). While ignoring club goods is no problem so far because of their non-subtractable nature, ignoring common pool goods can be problematic. By definition, common pool resources are goods that can be defended only at considerable cost, but are subtractable in consumption. Therefore most natural resources we consider when debating the problem of overuse of resources are common pool goods. The problem is that they are as subtractable as private goods, but restriction is difficult to achieve. However, the exclusion of other users is very important for otherwise it seems unlikely that anything will be invested in the protection or maintenance of such a good. Therefore there is a need for institutional design in order to ensure excludability and address the problem of subtractability, for example in a common property regime. If this is not possible, an open access constellation prevails, making common-pool resources nearly uncontrollable and

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very likely to be depleted. It is therefore very problematic to refer to common property as open access, as has been done by economists (ibid., see also McCay and Acheson 1987, Berkes 1989, Acheson 1989, Ostrom 1990, Feeney et al. 1990 for critiques of economic approaches). If we have a common pool as well as a common property regime, it is not a non-property but a shared property. This is reflected in the definition McKean gives for common property regimes: (Thus) common-property regime is a property-rights arrangement in which a group of resources users share rights and duties towards each resource. Oddly, the term common property seems to have entered the social science lexicon to refer not to any form of property at all but to its absence—non-property or open access resources to which no one has defined rights or duties (Gordon 1954, Scott 1955, Demsetz 1967, Alchian and Demsetz 1973; in McKean 2000: 29–30).

Therefore, common property arrangements for the management of common-pool resources refer to access rights for a specific group of users who hold rights in common. Even more concretely, one could argue that common property can be defined as shared private property (ibid.). McKean argues that an important part of the confusion stems from the use of the adjective pair “public” and “private” in order to label three domains: For kinds of goods (public and private goods), rights (public and private rights) and bodies which own things (public entities/governments and private entities/firms/ individuals). Economists see the privateness of a good and as a physical given, based on the excludability and subtractibility of a good. The privateness of a right leads to clarity and security for its holder. However, the body holding this right does not necessarily have to be a single individual. A private body represents itself, while the general population is represented in a public body. It is important to understand these differences because publicness and privateness of goods, rights and bodies are often mixed up. The first problem starts with mixing goods and owners up: Public entities not only produce public goods but also private goods, while private entities do not always only produce private goods. In addition, goods and rights get mixed up because private rights are created for public goods and private rights for public or common pool goods can be claimed. The latter refers to the problem that infinite rights can be given to a finite resource, such as happens with common-pool resources. Thirdly, rights and owners are mixed up in the following

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way: it is often thought that private entities hold private and exclusive rights and public bodies hold public rights. Here McKean writes: In fact, public rights (rights of access and use that do not include the rights to exclude others from such use) are generally held by private entities because public bodies have awarded such rights to citizens. Similarly, public bodies hold both public rights (say, the use of an assembly hall or a courtroom that is also open to all citizens as observers) as well as private rights (say, to the use of individual legislator’s offices, staff and equipment) (McKean 2000: 31).

The practical implications for such an analysis are that we realize that we view private goods as being not problematic while public goods are seen as difficult. The first result is then that we see that most common pool resources are viewed as being problematic, while they are not, if we find the right level of management. Second, in separating goods from property rights we can disentangle the bad fit between the two. We can therefore have public management of goods that are best managed this way. Third, it must be possible to sort out ‘privateness’ and ‘publicness’ of owning entities because if we do not, we fall into the trap of thinking that only individual persons can handle private property. This overlooks that groups can also manage this sort of goods in the form that individuals share private rights and do so in a much more appropriate way. In other words: A group of people can be a private owner and share private rights. Definitional clarity is a prerequisite for understanding how a group of individuals might be a private owner that can share property rights and thus create a regime of common property rights for managing common-pool goods. It is a foundation on which we can begin to detect the circumstances in which common property arrangements are appropriate, desirable and even in some situations utterly essential to sound resource management (McKean 32). Basically, McKean argues that any type of combination is possible and that we have to be cautious about viewing public goods as problematic and only to be managed in private ownership rights regimes because externalities are said to be much too high. On the other hand, people want access to public and common goods, which derive from common-pool resources. The problem now stems from the fact that public goods are mostly seen as difficult and have to be converted into private goods which are not viewed as problematic. Therefore,

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administrators chop public goods into pieces, ignoring the connectedness of such resource systems. This prevents common-pool resources being maintained as productive systems because they tend to become too small. Consequently, there is a need to understand how goods, rights and owners are related to one another and just not have the separation of private and public goods, rights and owners. If we fail to do this, McKean argues, we miss the possibility to have common-pool resources managed by common property arrangements. The attempt to have public goods transformed into private leads to the destruction of common-pool resources and common property arrangements (ibid. 34). In many parts of the Third World, common property regimes have been of central importance to managing common-pool resources, but since colonial and in post-colonial times they have been “legislated out of existence.” This happened because they were never formalised—or their local traditional formalisation has not been recognised (T.H.)—or the state has nationalised these resources, as has happened to forests (McKean 2000: 34), fisheries, wildlife and pastures. Most existing rights to common-pool resources were left out in the first (colonial and post-colonial) attempts to formalize and codify property rights, and these goods were subject to privatisation and/or nationalisation programmes (McKean 2000: 34). 5.2. Common-property regimes as institutions In the case of the management of common-pool resources, Ruttan (1998) shows another interesting aspect focusing on the gains arising from co-operative institutions: She establishes the hypothesis that common property institutions follow the principle of “restraint for gain.” If users are able to agree on what rules should be operative, it becomes possible to take advantage of such renewable resources as fish stocks when they are well developed and therefore, most profitable. Because of this, very good fish catches can be enjoyed at low costs. The primary condition for this is the efficient functioning of rules. Two forms are principally responsible for the development of co-operative rules, as seen in common property institutions: Such institutions can develop under the rule of reciprocity (“reciprocal altruism”) or under a form of asymmetrical power relations (“asymmetric reciprocity”). In “reciprocal altruism” the different actors can profit from cooperation, for example, if they allow access to the resource by foreign users, because at a later time they may be able to benefit from the resources

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of those foreign users. “Asymmetrical altruism” refers to cooperation in an unbalanced situation of power relations. In this situation, cooperation may be extended by the side with less power, even when the party on this side benefits less than the stronger side, because the benefit is still greater than when there is no cooperation at all. In this context, the focus is on power relationships. As a result, power relations are a major research issue. The interesting thing about looking at this theory in analysing common-pool resource management is that it raises questions about the “Tragedy of the Commons” paradigm when having a close look at how institutions managing common-pool resources operate. Elinor Ostrom’s work illustrates this by analysing different CPR institutions and their management by local communities all over the world. Examination of successfully operating, locally developed institutions that use natural resources such as forests, irrigation water, fisheries and pastures in sustainable ways resulted in the development of eight design principles (DPs) for effective institutions (see Box). All these design principles can actually be included in the notion of transaction costs. If CPR institutions operate properly, they in fact reduce these costs. But Ostrom clearly shows that the DPs are not universal rules that guarantee success in all situations. Moreover, these are principles to be adapted to local conditions. In an article published with Dustin Becker (Becker and Ostrom 1995), Ostrom argues that institutional diversity found among local communities is often better adapted to the variability and insecurities in chaotic ecosystems (e.g. changes in fish stock populations) than strategies based on biologicalmathematical models.6 Additionally, two of Becker and Ostrom’s eight aspects (regarded as important for the building up of new institutions) are particularly relevant: – Do the actors involved have common or different interests (homogeneity or heterogeneity of interests)? – How do actors value the future in respect to the resource in question? Or to put it differently, is current resource use more important than future use (low or high discounting rate for the future)?

6 There is much debate on the concept of maximum sustainable yield in fisheries, because it is extremely difficult to define the maximum catch without overusing the fish stock. This is due to the fact that one is unable to predict the exact fish population size, as it depends on the complex interactions in ecosystems (Becker and Ostrom 1995). Ostrom and Becker argue that it is, therefore, much better to analyse local strategies of resource use before making recommendations to local people (ibid.).

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Clearly Defined Boundaries The boundaries of resource systems (e.g. groundwater, basins or forests) and the individuals or households with rights to harvest resource products are clearly defined. Proportional Equivalence Between Costs and Benefits Rules specifying the amount of resource products allocated to a user are related to local conditions and to rules requiring labour, materials and/or inputs of money. Collective Choice Arrangements Most individuals affected by harvesting and protection rules are included in the group who can modify these rules. Monitoring Monitors who actively audit physical conditions and user behaviour are at least partially accountable to the users and/or are users themselves. Graduated Sanctions Users who violate rules are likely to receive graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offence) from the users, from officials accountable to these users, or from both. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms Users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflict among users or between users and officials. Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organise The rights of users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities, and users have long-term tenure rights to the resource. Nested Enterprises (For resources that are part of larger systems) Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises. Source: Becker and Ostrom 1995: 119 from Ostrom 1990: 56f.

Economic heterogeneity and high discounting rates for the future make it very difficult to establish long-term common-pool resources institutions for sustainable use, as it is much more difficult to act collectively and develop rules for sustainable resource use in situations where everyone pursues their own interests. Additionally, when there are high discounting rates for the future, rational users seek to use up a

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resource as fast as possible, because what remains is immediately used by others. In this situation, the value of preserving resources for later use is close to zero. These two aspects lead to overuse of renewable resources (Becker and Ostrom 1995). There has been some criticism of this approach, centring especially on methodological individualism, its formalistic aspects, and its blindness to historical and social context. This criticism comes from scientists who deal with evolutionary economics (Nelson 1995) and from development studies that address problems of participation such as the “New Tyranny” (see Cleaver 2001). Cleaver points out that the rational choice theorem of methodological individualism is not suited for an analysis that helps to solve problems of participation in development. This point seems unjustified, as Cleaver’s work and the well-formulated criticism of participatory approaches show. The critical factor in development projects is the incentive (be it economic, political, social, psychological or so-called “cultural”) an individual has in relation to his/her position in the community or society. To study this carefully is one of the aims of the New Institutionalism. Secondly, it is difficult to grasp Cleaver’s critique of Ostrom’s approach to institutions. As Cleaver understands it, Ostrom opts for a formalisation of institutions that can have negative effects, for example, by excluding those who are unable to participate in a development project for financial reasons or for reasons relating to their household workforce. An additional criticism is that only formal institutions (the state or a development corporation) are the solution to the problem. However, Ostrom goes beyond drawing lessons from successful cases all over the world that do not merely rely on the “formal” side of institutions. On the contrary, she stresses that so-called informal institutions embedded in a specific culture are as successful as formal ones, or even more successful. Additionally, she opts for recognition of local and indigenous knowledge of resource flows. Cleaver is right in regard to the first principle—clear boundaries—when he maintains that these sometimes cannot be as clearly defined as Ostrom’s work suggests, especially when considering changes in the resource flows from one season to another. This can be easily incorporated in the approach, as will be demonstrated by the example of African floodplain wetlands (see below). Additionally, it is clear that distinctions between “formal” and “informal” institutions are delicate; traditional (and some would say informal) institutions can be as formalised or even more formalised than institutions built up by the state. But this critique also has already been incorporated in the analysis of examples (see below).

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Thirdly, the author of the present paper does not agree with the critique that the approach makes no reference in historical and social processes. As demonstrated in the next chapter, one major contribution to the approach draws on an historical analysis. The New Institutional Economics (NIE) as developed by Douglass North (1990) definitely has an historical approach, as North is known for his work in economic history. This in turn is the basis for the important work of the American anthropologist Jean Ensminger, who has attempted to define a new institutional economic anthropology where institutional change is the major focus. It must be stressed here, that Cleaver does not go into these theories, as only Ostrom is cited, but the approach criticised definitely has more to offer. While the author agrees strongly with the points Cleaver raises against a simplistic participatory approach in development—for example, a meeting is not yet a real sign of participation in a development project, nor is frequency of speaking up in a meeting—a wellunderstood New Institutionalism can actually provide answers to the pitfalls of participation as a New Tyranny (the title of the publication where Cleaver’s article can be found). Much interesting research has been done using this approach; for example, the article by Benjaminsen (1997) on decentralisation in Mali, Ribot and Larson (2004) and the publication by Venema and van den Breemer (1999) on negotiated co-management of natural resources in Africa. These publications present cases of successful development as well as unsuccessful cases leading to overuse of natural resources. There is also a critical stance from within the common property school, which nowadays has a very wide and important literature and a very influential association called The International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC). One of the most important scholars active in this association, but keeping a critical mind, is Arun Agrawal, apart from Elinor Ostrom, one of the most influential writers on the commons. He has addressed some critical remarks in a seminal overview of the commons’ literature hinting at two points: First he argues by comparing the work of Baland and Platteau (1996), Wade (1988) and the already cited work of Ostrom (1992), that scholars working on the commons have set up too many variables (more than 40) that are said to be relevant, leading to problems in generalisations. Second, and relevant for this set of papers, he states that very little has been done with regard to comparison between cases in order to come to relevant generalisation in the commons theory (Agrawal 2003). In this volume we are trying to address some of these issues by making reference to

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an anthropologically refined version of what we call the New Institutionalism. First of all we would argue that despite the many variables influencing common property institutions and outcomes, Ostroms design principles, if taken as principles, embody many of the relevant aspects to be addressed. If studied carefully, most of variables set up by Baland and Platteau, as well as from Wade’s study of irrigation systems can be integrated into the DPs. Even more interesting is the view that actually Ostrom has given on an empirical and also a comparative basis, a more extended version of what economists call transaction costs. It is a well-detailed setup of what transaction costs mean and gives guidelines for important elements that are all necessary to make up this characteristic. The sum is more than the added aspects, if one is missing, the whole setup can become weak and ineffective (Ostrom 1992). Ostrom has since her work been trying to refine the approach by developing a tool in order to reduce complexity in commons studies. In her book on Institutional Diversity, Ostrom proposes an Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD) in so called action arenas are defined settings in which actors depend on different constellations. Actors have properties and the situations they’re in also have their properties (Ostrom 2005). However, what is much missing in the approach of Ostrom is the analysis of power and ideology in changing contexts. This is exactly what has been done in an anthropological approach developed by Jean Ensminger (1992). 5.3. New Institutionalist Theories of Institutional Change In her book Making a Market, Ensminger presents analytical tools for discussing constellations of overuse of resources and conflicts from a New Institutionalist perspective. Ensminger has worked among the Orma, a now semi-sedentary pastoralist group in Kenya (Ensminger 1992). She looks at changes which were (and still are) taking place among the Orma as a group and deals with the incentives for different families and individuals due to a market economy and changes in political, economic and social institutions. When analysing change, Ensminger states that one has to look at the individual motivations of different actors and delve into the social constraints and incentives that influence what people are striving for. She is influenced by Frederik Barth’s processual approach: In this approach actors are involved in processes where there is constant negotiation on relationships which centre around focal points giving actors a kind of orientation. Such

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orientations can also change during transactions based on external changes and re-evaluations (Barth 1981). Ensminger draws on this idea of external changes and internal mechanisms. There are interactions between the endogenous aspects of a society in which individuals live, composed of institutions, ideology, organisation and bargaining power (see Diagram 1). Ideology consists of the way people explain the world and their values. Institutions, as Douglass North (1990) sees it (see also above definitions), are the “rules of the game” in a society, the formal and informal rules, values, norms and constraints, which provide incentives for individual action and reliability. Institutions enable co-operation. Organisation refers to a body in which people organise themselves and act collectively. Bargaining power means the ability of an actor to get something he or she wants from someone, but this is a bargaining process. The bargaining power of individuals can come from social status, wealth or the ability to manipulate ideology (Ensminger 1992: 5–7). These four endogenous spheres (ideology, institutions, organisation and bargaining power) influence one another and are themselves influenced by external factors. These external factors are the social and physical environment (changes in the socio-political structure and natural environment), population (demographic changes) and technology (technological changes), which together influence so-called “relative prices.” By this term Ensminger means externally influenced changes in prices for goods in relation to other goods (for example, a rise in cattle or fish prices compared to other goods). In the case of the Orma, lower transportation and communication costs have opened up more possibilities to trade cattle due to closer markets and slaughter-houses, and also brought higher cattle prices. Ensminger speaks of relative prices, because the decision taken by an individual depends on the value of a good in relation to another good. But on a larger scale, I would incorporate within this notion changes in the political and economic environment (pacification, new urban centres, new markets and capital); state control (laws, police, administrators); and infrastructure and transport systems (lowering costs for marketing or access by other groups.). In discussing these processes, economists and anthropologists differ. Economists tend to regard institutions as constant, while concentrating on the aspect of change in exogenous factors, such as relative prices and the outcome of individual behaviour. But anthropologists, when referring to change, tend to see relative prices as given and

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Environment Social/Physical

Population

Technology

Relative Prices

Ideology

Institutions

Distributional Effects

Bargaining

Organisations

Social/Pol/ Economic Behavior

Source: Jean Ensminger (Ensminger 1992: 10).

Graph 2: Modeling change.

focus on institutions when explaining economic action. Ensminger suggests alternating between the two poles, where both sides influence the other. The demographic-environmental-technological variables influence relative prices, which change the endogenous variables. These variables influence aspects of distribution and individual socioeconomic behaviour, which leads to exogenous variables by way of a feedback loop. One needs to see where the individual stands and which structures influence his/her motivation, and his/her relative bargaining power from case to case. Ensminger shows that individuals who gain more bargaining power in a changed situation also change the institutions, eradicate them, or create new ones (Ensminger 1992, Ensminger and Knight 1997). In agreement with Douglass North, she does not argue that the best institutions are always selected, but rather that those that survive are those which usually serve the people with the most bargaining power. Ensminger shows how pastures held as common property among the Orma are being transformed into private property. Before this process of “dismantling a pastoral commons” occurred (Ensminger), the council of elders and the sedentary local population were unable to keep the pastures from being used by nomadic pastoralists (nomadic Orma and Somali with their cattle). The reason for this was heterogeneity of interests among the sedentary village group due to different economic interests. Some of the villagers benefited from the nomads

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by obtaining cattle and milk, while others did not. The village group was thus unable to come to an agreement or to monitor the pasture collectively. In this situation, pastures were increasingly privatised and the power to exclude outsiders was taken from the council of elders and given to the government-selected chief, who had good contacts with the state and its forces and thus had much more bargaining power than the elders (Ensminger 1992). But this is only one part of the story Ensminger tells. She also shows how the enclosure did not happen automatically, but that ideology as a resource of legitimacy had been crucial. Sedentary Orma were using different sets of ideologies ranging from traditional ones (pastures shall be for people who stay with children, which happened to be the sedentary people) through ideologies of modernity (We build a village with schools and basic infrastructure and we need the pasture to maintain this), which was counteracted by ideologies of the nomads; they also participate in the modern world and have relationships with sedentary people, as well as sending their kids to school. There is obviously a need to produce legitimacy in these contexts and this is to say two things: First institutions do change due to pressure and due to changing ideologies, but there is no such thing as an automatic process in which changes in relative prices will immediately lead to changed institutional settings (high prices lead to privatisation). Such processes—and this is up to today, the innovative part of her work—have their own dynamics shaped by ideology and bargaining power. It is these last aspects, which are very important for research on resource management issues using the New Institutionalism. How is bargaining power changed or newly distributed by changes in relative prices in a specific area of resource use such as common-pool situations? Is it true that users with greater bargaining power stemming from their political or financial power (locally or through governmental institutions) are able to privatise former common-pool resources or manipulate the institutions that govern access to these resources? Additionally, it will be interesting to see what kind of strategies former users who lost their common-pool resources will pursue. One of our basic assumptions has been that they will seek scarcer resources, overuse resources, or act violently against outsiders in order to gain more bargaining power. Additionally, we argue that such processes have to be legitimized and that ideology here plays a key role in this aspect. Therefore, it is of importance to analyse ideologies used. This we will conceptualise in chapter 6.3. But before we come to this point, we try

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to give an overview of institutions and institutional change in African floodplain areas. 6. Institutions and institutional change in African floodplains 6.1. Traditional institutions in African floodplain wetlands There is a large literature on African floodplain wetlands indicating its importance for local livelihoods (Welcomme 1979, Moorehead 1989, 1997, Jeffrey et al. (Eds) 1992, Matiza and Chabwela (Eds) 1992, Adams 1992, 1996, Scudder et al 1993, Hollis et al. (Eds) 1993, Fay 1994, Roggeri (Ed) 1995, Thomas 1996, Acreman and Hollis 1996 (Eds), Breen et al. (Eds) 1997, Hilhorst and Aarnik 1999, Chaveau, et al. 2000, IUCN 2000, Moritz et al. 2002, Scholte 2003, Bene et al. 2003a, b, Loth (Ed) 2004, Adams, A. 1999, IAD 1991, Varis, O. and Fraboulet-Jussila, S. 2002, White J. 2000, Evans-Prichard 1940, Howell, P.P. and Allan, J.A. 1994, Collins R. 2002, Waterbury, J. 2002, Haller (Ed) 2005, Haller and Merten 2006, Haller 2007a, Haller and Merten 2008, DeMotts et al. 2009, Mvula and Haller 2009, Haller and Chabwela 2009). The literature listed is just an example of a much wider literature on floodplain use and management that contains information on precolonial institutions. We will mention some main features only briefly, because they will be explained in detail in the examples of this volume and further analysed in the concluding chapter. A main feature of all these floodplain examples is that these areas had been used differently by peasants, agro-pastoralists, nomadic pastoralists, and sedentary and transhumant fishermen (Moorehead 1989, 1997). The critical ecological variables are the seasonal rains that occur partly locally and partly in more remote mountainous areas, feed the rivers, and lead to rising water levels in these river systems. As a consequence, large areas adjacent to the rivers are inundated. These floods, as well as the receding of floods, give the local people different access to renewable natural resources such as fish, pastures, wildlife, gathered products, fertile soils (from transport of fertile material and water), and water for recession agriculture or small scale irrigation. The accessibility of these resources, which are held as common property by local groups most of the time, can vary from year to year. Based on this variability the different ethnic groups have developed institutions to manage the common-pool

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resources in these areas (see for example Moorehead 1989, 1997 and Fay for an illustrative example of the Inner Niger Delta). Depending on the season, there are rules by which decisions are made, e.g. who can have access to which common-pool resources, who is excluded (rules of access), etc. Those allowed access are able to use a portion of the resource, at a certain time and under certain circumstances (rules of use). Often there are no limitations on the amount, but rather duration regulations. Central to the issue of who is allowed to use these common-pool resources is the question of who the “autochthonous people” in an area are, and to whom it is possible to give or deny access to resources. In many cases these people link their authority to the spiritual world, which they claim to control. Such control is linked directly or in terms of power to the conduct of ritual activities, which are again moments for coordination and organisation (see, for example, ‘Masters of the Water’ in Inner Niger Delta in Mali: Moorehead 1989, 1997, and in this volume Beeler and Frei, Fokou, Landolt, Mbeyale, Meroka and Haller and Merten). Due to the seasonal variability of the resources in these regions, different tenure systems governing the use of resources are important. As mentioned above, most of the time these resources are held in common and use is regulated by the common property institutions of a local community. But there are situations—such as the flooding of a very large area during the rainy season—in which resources such as fish are open access resources. In this situation, all users can fish without restriction. It is only when the floods recede and the water returns to the riverbed and remains in ponds, little lakes and swamps, that the fish are again a common-pool resource of neighbouring villages. Wetlands that are too small and dry up become private property. The same is the case with individually owned fish traps such as differently sized baskets (see Thomas 1996 for an explicit example in the Hadejia-Nguru floodplain, Nigeria). We refer to the case studies for more details and to the conclusion, where a comparative analysis is given. Suffice it to state here that such rules were well established and rather complex. These different tenure systems, which match seasonal variation and the accessibility of the resources, can best be explained by the so called ‘economic dependability model’ developed by Dyson-Hudson and Smith (1978). This model predicts that resources used in open-access tenure are those that cannot be defended or do not have to be defended because they are: a) too scarce, or b) too abundant to be monopolised by a group of people

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collectively. But if the resources can be found locally in more concentrated form, they become scarcer and so it is possible to restrain access by other users. Therefore, common-pool resources are resources with specific accessibility where it makes more economic sense for local actors to bear the defence costs collectively than to leave them in private property tenure. Private property would be too expensive, due to defence costs. This tenure only makes sense if the resources are available in very high concentration. But rules of tenure must also be seen in respect to risk and insecurity. Risks in a hazardous ecosystem can be addressed by local communities with a common-pool resources tenure system. These systems offer the users a wide range of access to resources, which can minimise the risk of being without resources (so called minimax strategy, in which profit is not maximised, but a level of food production for subsistence needs is secured). Moreover, rules governing the access of foreign user groups can be seen as a minimax strategy to reduce risk. These rules offer access to common-pool resources on the basis of reciprocity for some foreign groups—if, in times of disaster, foreign groups can gain access to a local user group’s common-pool resources, profiting from the common-pool resources of the former host in times of need (see for example Thomas 1996, supported by all case studies in this volume). These examples highlight that locally developed institutions were in place in Africa before colonial and state rule. Such institutions were able to reduce transaction costs for collective action by providing clear regulations defining who is able to access the fisheries, when, under what conditions (timing for use), with what equipment and with whatrelated property rights. The conditions of reciprocal use by locals and outsiders were also defined (see especially Thomas 1996, Hilhorst and Aarnik 1999, Chaveau et al. 2000, Moritz et al. 2002, Bene et al. 2003a, b, Haller ed., 2005, Haller and Merten 2006, Haller 2007, Haller and Merten 2008, links to these issues can also be found in IUCN and IUCN related literature, see, for example, Jeffrey et al. 1992, Loth (Eds) 2004). These studies provide evidence for a basic assumption in common-pool resource management theory. Institutions regulating access to common-pool resources—often in the form of common property regimes—are of major importance for sustainable management of fisheries, because they make resource use predictable and reduce transaction costs for cooperation, buffering risks in the use of a mobile common-pool resource. This was already the case before the nation-state took over control of these resources (ibid.).

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6.2. Institutional change in African floodplain wetlands As detailed above, African floodplains are subject to environmental (climate change) and to man-made external large scale technological changes, such as dams and irrigation projects, that have been developing since late colonial and early independent times. Similarly there is a large literature on protected areas which also have limited resource areas for local use (see Neumann 1998, Hulme and Murphree 2001, Brockington 2002, Brockington et al. 2006, Brockington et al. 2008, Galvin and Haller 2008 (Eds) and based on the ideology of pure nature that African landscapes represent (see also Basset and Cummey 2003). These aspects will be dealt with in all the case studies as sources for reduction of floodplain areas, its resources and its regeneration capacity. The major effect on local institutions changes is that the value of these goods often rises due to increased scarcity. However, the same literature gives hints that we would like to explore more in our dataset. It becomes evidently clear that the institutional changes taking place in the African floodplain areas are tremendous with relation to changes in property rights: During colonial and post-colonial times, control over and responsibility for resource management were increasingly taken out of the hands of local-user groups by the state. In most cases the state now defines the rules of access to common-pool resources. It decides who, when, and how access to resources is given by distributing licenses and permits to those able to pay the highest price. The change in the formal legal framework, directing ownership on the government level for mobile resources and on a mixture of ownership by local elites and the state for more fixed resources such as pastures, is one of the major issues studied in this volume and often only hinted at in the literature. This again is fuelled by an increasing commoditisation of floodplain resources or related goods such as livestock. Monetisation and commercialisation of resources, as well as institutional rules changed by the state or influenced by powerful local and national actors with capital, have led to monopoly constellations and the overuse of former common-pool resources. There are substantial conflicts between users too, which could be shaped by ethnicity. These conflicts develop because new users from the cities are gaining access to common-pool resources. And here again there is a major external variable to be inserted into the model; scarcity is not only the result of external changes directly on the floodplain, but as well the result of increased interest in

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floodplain resources as commodities, because the state in these countries is not able maintain governance of the state’s property of common-pool resources. Woodhouse et al. 2000 and Wisner et al. 2005 (specifically Mkandawire 2005) give overviews on how, since the 1980s, many African economies have dwindled as their development path has led to bad terms of trade and to debts, while at the same time major income from cash crops, mining and other businesses have decreased. Literature and as well our case studies—explained more at length in the case studies—indicate that this economic process had two basic consequences for floodplain resources. First, as the state does not have the financial means to continue to act as a major employer, large numbers of people from urban and urban area perimeters are without work or in less productive activities, so they have to look for alternatives. In addition, local livelihoods are also under pressure because state services such as agrarian subventions and veterinary programmes are also reduced. These changes mean that floodplain resources are becoming more valuable on the market, because they are scarce and provide the promise of a relatively easy livelihood or alternative (fishing, poaching or if little capital is available, investments in livestock for sale, or investments in access to land and water on a private level. This leads to the second point. As the state lacks necessary revenues, state institutions are no longer enforceable because enforcement and monitoring is costly. We speak here of a pull factor because state property in common-pool resources becomes open access. As a consequence, overuse of resources occurs due to newcomers operating with better fishing technology (motor boats, tighter mesh nets, etc.), better guns, or bigger cattle herds. Fish and wildlife are then sold at markets and the big cattle herds, which are also sold, overgraze the pastures. These resources are no longer available for local communities, making it more and more difficult for them to cover their subsistence needs. For the most part, local people do not have the money to buy food at the local or regional markets. They are forced to switch to more marginal resources, which are then overexploited, in order to make a living. Under these circumstances anger among local common-pool resource users rises. They become willing to use violence against the newcomers and against one another in the fight over resources that are becoming increasingly scarcer (for some example see cases in Northern Nigeria, Thomas 1996, for Mali see Moorehead 1989, 1997 and Fay 1989, 1994, 2000, for Cameroon see Moritz et al. 2002, Loth et al. 2004, for the Kafue Flats see Chabwela 1992, Haller and Merten 2006, 2008, Haller 2007a, Haller and Chabwela 2009).

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Tension also rises within local communities because adoption of new technologies and the possibilities of new market options have led to the erosion of traditional monitoring structures and organisations, which once ruled the use of the common-pool resources. Literature on Mali (Fay 2000) for example but as well in other cases in our volume (see Beeler and Frei, Haller and Merten, Meroka, Mbeyale this volume) report that often young men try to violate local rules in order to get easy access to resources in order to sell them. Thereby they at the same time indicate that community institutions are challenged and that common-pool resources are now shifting from common property to open access. 6.3. Persistence of old institutions, Privatisation and Legal Pluralism Change in institutions does not always operate in terms of the eradication of older rules and values. “Old” traditions can continue to exist under certain circumstances, while others vanish totally. However, the ones that do not vanish are not necessarily unchanged. The processes of change briefly outlined above in Mali and Nigeria illustrate that locally developed institutions that were working 40 years ago are not working anymore. The reasons are that they have been altered by the powerful and have also been subject to a commoditisation process (a significant change in relative prices) that changed the institutional setting in a specific way. The hypotheses which will be tested in the project on African floodplain wetlands suggest that traditional institutions that can be capitalised will stay in place, while those that impede or hinder adaptation by local users in order to earn cash with these resources, will be rejected. Cash is needed not only for consumer goods in a globalised world, but also for the construction of social networks (marriage, etc. see Elwert 1985, 1989, Berry 1989, 1993, Haller 2001, 2002 a, b). An illustration of this process will be offered in conclusion: the Bozo fishermen in Mali and capitalisation of the institution known as manga ji. The traditional meaning of manga ji is an offering to the Master of the Water in the Bozo group from outside fishermen (a third of their catch, literally translated as “part of the water”) as a compensation for the Master of the Water, who dealt with the water spirits to maintain order. This idea of a traditional institution has been transformed completely. It remains in name, but is converted into monetary rent for many people who claim to be traditionally related to this right. This is not only true for the Masters of the Water, but also for

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other individuals and groups, and even the administrators who deal with this notion in order to obtain cash. The notion of the manga ji as monetary rent gives way to a stricter idea of territoriality as well, which had not been the case in pre-colonial times. This notion is fostered by those who are able to gain the most from the commercialisation of the fisheries, and therefore, those with bargaining power, namely some of the Masters of the Water, traders and administrators. Competition is taking place at all levels to secure funding, which can be obtained by making reference to traditional institutions or to the altered versions of these institutions. The change in the traditional meaning of manga ji clearly illustrates this tendency. All that remains of the traditional institutions is the monetary aspect. The original content and purpose has been erased completely (Fay 1994, 2000, see also Beeler and Frei, this volume). Transformations and losses of older institutions can be shown in other very different examples such as pastoralism in Kenya (Little 1985) or traditional intensive peasantry in the Mandara Mountains of Northern Cameroon (Haller 1999, 2000, 2001). In these examples, institutions that govern access to pastures, maintenance of terraced fields that prevents soil erosion, and storage of staple crop sorghum for hazardous times—sometimes embedded in religious beliefs—are given up in favour of short-term monetary gain, now essential for social life (for example, cash for bride price, school fees for children, health stations, clothes, etc.). What is striking about these examples is that other traditional institutional rules, which favour individuals with more bargaining power in order to get access to cash income, are retained despite the negative impact they have on sustainable resource use (Haller 2002). Last, it is important to have a close look at the institutional “portfolio” available to local actors. It is not only the fact that formal institutions override traditional ones. They can, of course, when largely transformed, stay at the same level side by side, and be used depending on the situation. As Fay (1994, 2000) shows in Mali, people can use governmental institutions as a reference, if they claim resource rights as citizens of a district, while in another situation they may refer to their rights as relatives of the Master of the Water of an area. Similarly, Lund (1998) shows among peasants in Niger that Islamic state and traditional kinship institutions are chosen by individuals, depending on the strategic situation, in order to claim rights to land before a court or on a local level. All these aspects involve the notion of ideology

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brought into the theoretical framework of the New Institutionalism by Jean Ensminger (1992). On the theoretical level, we can profit by enlarging the New Institutionalism with more theoretical elements that stem from Political Ecology (Blaikie and Brookfield 1994, Zimmerer and Basset 2003) and Legal Pluralism related to common property (Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann 1997). We have argued that common property that is dismantled and becomes state property will turn into open access, if the state lacks financial resources. We have, however, seen in our case studies a peculiar paradox of often having several legal frameworks, formal and informal, at the same time (see and Niasse, Garane and Varis 2004). Different actors then engage in a competition over resources by trying to use ideologies, discourses and narrative in order to legitimate access to resources. Therefore, we have different bargaining power by local actors and a competition of ideologies in order to shape the institutions the way actors perceive as most profitable. Literature on legal pluralism then suggests that what actors do is forum shopping (K. von Benda Beckmann 1994). They try to use ideologies and discourses available to make their claim in a specific situation. As economists may predict that a rise in relative prices must lead to privatisation (see also Woodhouse et al. 2000, Lesorogol 2006), we will be able to indicate that—as outlined, open access is often the better strategy, BUT that there are also privatisation strategies adopted at the same time. Ideologically, there are different levels of justification discourse in interaction with so-called local people and immigrated people, who use resources permanently, but often only seasonally: Making reference to citizenship as an actor in order to gain access to state property is a common strategy, as is privatisation of land through different activities (agriculture, tree planting etc.). Then when in competition over scarce resources, actors will try to legitimate access by making reference to a property or use right regime from which they seem to profit most, provided they can give legitimacy. Moreover, there is no such thing as “Twilight Institutions” (Lund 2007), because often the breadth of institutional possibilities and justification ideologies are set up locally. We will expand New Institutionalism on this level by discussing ideologies, discourses and narratives as we have done already with protected areas and the concept of participatory management of these protected areas.

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Based on this state of the art, one of the major aim of the AFWeP has always been to analyse the transformation of the way common-pool resources have been managed on the local and then on the government level. We had in total eight clear hypotheses during the research phase which guided the research agenda: The aim was to have a comparable set of cases from which we make conclusions about the dynamics of institutional change regarding use of the commons. After discussing Agrawal’s summary (Agrawal 2003), we decided to follow Ostrom’s DPs as a work base, not in order to check all the DPs in detail, but to address the question of how traditional institutions reduced transaction costs at large and how to come to terms with and to assess the evolution and change of common property institutions that enhanced collective action and cooperation of individual actors. Therefore, we added the following set of hypothesises, starting from Ostroms DPs, which guided the research designs. We had a major division: We wanted to know more about pre-colonial institutional settings, how they changed during colonial and later during different phases of postcolonial times, i.e. (early independence and crisis in the mid 1980s to the 1990s and beyond. Hypotheses A to C deal with institutions previously governing common-pool resources. Hypotheses D to H will focus on CPR-management institutions, problems and conflicts during colonial times and post-colonial change. A) Institutional robustness according to Ostrom’s design principles (DPs) for pre-colonial institutions: The institutional setting developed in pre-colonial times was adapted to the wetlands’ seasonality, their high risks and the fact that tenure and access to land was ruled by traditional institutions and regulations that were adapted to local conditions and corresponded to seasonal variation of water levels, all reflect Ostrom’s DPs. These institutions often had religious elements in their monitoring and sanctioning structures were based on local political structures. There are some doubts about her first principle (clear boundaries and clear membership). In a chaotic natural environment, there is the need to develop a flexible boundary model which pays attention to the rules of reciprocity for the access of foreign users, while the rules of cooperation are seen as mini-max-strategies and therefore adapted to local conditions.

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B) Forms of cooperation followed the rule “restraint for gain” embedded in political structure and legitimised by the ideology of first-comers (Ruttan 1998, Ensminger 1992). Rules of cooperation within a local group, as well as between ethnic groups, partly with the same niches of resources, can change due to shifts in local bargaining power between different groups and individuals and between reciprocal altruism and asymmetrical altruism. In more centralised groups with hierarchies, the latter rule is more probable, while in more egalitarian societies the former seems more likely. Ideology, understood as religious ideology, plays a role insofar as those who claim to be the first settlers in a resource area are also in charge of religious offices (such as the Master of Water, the Master of the Earth etc.). Often, forms of cooperation and its institutionalisation stemmed from solutions based on compromises resulting from conflicts over the control and use of common-pool resources. C) Pre-colonial sustainability is a by-product of subsistence economy (mini-max strategies), security and prestige. Economy. Most of these traditional institutions managed the locals’ resources in a sustainable way. But sustainability was the by-product of an economic calculation that functioned under restrictive socio-political and natural conditions and by the absence of the modern, monetary market economy. The primary individual and collective strategy was the need to ensure secure subsistence production, whereby markets and trade, although not completely absent, played a minor role. Mini-maxstrategies, relatively few trade incentives and at least a partly hostile political environment, indirectly led to sustainability, because the main focus was production for consumption and not a profit maximising principle. One important aspect of this economy is that in societies where individual differences matter (big-man societies), more powerful people gain prestige by well managing and distributing access to resources (Shalins 1972, Haller 2001, Löffler 2002: Löffler called this economics of merit in the context of big-men societies, but did not link this to sustainability reasoning). D) Changes in relative prices lead to institutional change increasing off-take of common-pool resources, creating winners and losers of change (Ensminger 1992 first part; Haller 2002a second part). Due to economic, political and institutional change (changes in governance such as state ownership of common-pool resources, change in relative prices, e.g. economic crises, changes in export prices, political struggle

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of elites, inadequate operation of formal institutions, immigration etc.), common-pool resources become more intensively used and overused. The reasons for this and for the scarcity of these resources are climatic, demographic and infrastructural changes (e.g. construction of large dams, big irrigation projects). However, the unsustainable use of common-pool resources is not only explained by population growth and droughts in these regions. Environmental degradation is a consequence of the increasing strain being put on common-pool resources, which have been transformed by the monetary market principle and these resources are leaving the ecosystems for the urban centres. The hypothesis to be tested is that the local user groups have, in the most cases, more trouble dealing with these changes in relative prices than groups and individuals who have already established themselves in the new markets and established power relations. E) State ownership leads to de facto open access (Feeney et al. 1990, Ostrom 1992, Haller 2002: The paradox of the presence-absence of the state is one of the most pertinent institutional changes in this context. As common-pool resources have been transferred from common property to state property, it can only be managed as long the state has sufficient financial means to do so, with its high transaction costs. It the state is no longer able to pay for these costs, state property regime fall into de facto open access. The main problem with this is that it leads to an overuse that is hard to counter on the local level, as the ideology of citizenship gives outside users high bargaining power, while the state is absent to enforce its rules or locally developed rules. F) Traditional institutions in the context of change: “Rules which pay are going to stay” (Haller 2002). On one hand, in pre-colonial times evolved so called “traditional” institutions which were compatible with the cash economy or can be transformed in this direction; open options to rent-seeking have stayed in place with the consequence that common-pool resources have been overused. On the other hand, “traditional” institutions that had a positive effect on sustainability (restrictions and control mechanisms) have been completely eradicated. Nevertheless, it is to be seen whether these latter institutions can be revitalised and be of use again for collective action and for sustainable management of common-pool resources. Only those local communities and groups who have a common interest and have relevant institutions at their disposal stand a chance of resisting the grab for resources by more powerful local and outside groups.

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G) Changes in relative prices led to changes in bargaining power, institutional settings and conflicts in wetland areas (Becker and Ostrom 1995, Ensminger 1992, Haller 2002). The economic, political and institutional changes in bargaining power between different groups and individuals has led to a range of situations: Stronger heterogeneity of interests within local use-groups: Those users who have more bargaining power than others (e.g. chiefs installed by the state, young men etc.), try to change the institutions governing access to commons in a way so they can exclude other users from the community and obtain rent from selling common-pool resources. Immigration of new user-groups (business people with capital): These new market orientated user-groups try to invest their capital in the use of the common-pool resources, having the economic power to buy rights of access from the state. They have short-term goals and are not interested in sustainable use of the commons, because they are very flexible in investing the monetary gain from common-pool resources to other sectors of the economy. Overuse of common-pool resources and of marginal areas: Because the former local users do not have the same bargaining power as the new or more powerful users, they are driven to marginal resource areas, which subsequently become overused. Conflicts over the scarce resources among the less powerful then become a problem. If there is a chance, local users take as much as possible from the common-pool resources, because they are expropriated and all the resources not taken, fall into the hands of the more powerful users. Legal pluralism and forum shopping: Because there are different formal and informal legal options to legitimate use of the commons, rise in relative prices will not just lead to privatisation, but because of differences in bargaining power and ideologies used, we have the paradox of open access and privatisation at the same time. Actors select then from the array of justification and legal level possibilities available (forum shopping see K. von Benda-Beckmann 1994). Tensions and conflicts arise between a range of actors: – local users (gender, old and young men) – the poor and the wealthy local users who have more bargaining power – local users with the new urban businessmen – different ethnic groups; the lines of conflict being ethnic

The first of the above mentioned types of conflicts is not easily seen, but nevertheless, can increasingly destabilise a community. The second type of conflict is not very intense as the more powerful users establish patron-client relationships, which are used as a buffer between them and other users. Consequently, any collective action against them becomes very difficult. The last two kinds of conflicts are seen more

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often. Conflicts over scarce resources can take on an ethnic dimension, especially in a multi-ethnic context. Foreign users have the state with its sanctioning measures and its legal system at their disposal. As a result, it is possible that conflicts become directed towards other ethnic groups, with whom there have been cooperative relations in former times. This is welcomed by urban businessmen and by the state, as both can address the ethnic character of the conflict. As such, intervention and control can be legitimised and raise public attention to the ecological and demographic aspect of the conflict they stress. H) Co-Management-approaches as a solution. The unsustainable use of common-pool resources and the resulting conflicts can only be resolved with a mixed strategy of state control (sanctioning violent conflicts, punishing new users) and a locally adapted form of decentralisation. We follow principles developed by Ribot (Ribot 2002, see also Ribot and Larson (Eds 2004) that a co-management and/or participatory management only makes sense if there is a decentralisation in which power transfer and accountable representation is ensured, based on the principle of environmental subsidiaries.. In this process, all groups and individuals claiming their right of access to commonpool resources in a region must be able to participate. Government and NGOs could enable such a process happening. Also, the seasonal availability of common-pool resources in wetlands for the different groups must be considered. The state needs to take the role of animating the user-groups to establish and develop institutions governing the use of common-pool resources, and it must encourage and accept local initiatives. In this way, a process in which all actors see themselves as co-authors of the institutions build could emerge. Ribot and Larson (Eds 2004) also show in a comparative volume, including cases from Africa, Latin America and Asia that reform processes are in many countries on the way or already implemented based on the legitimacy of development and including the paradigm of participation. Nevertheless governments and lower level administrations have problems with sharing power and being accountable to the lower level (see introduction in Ribot and Larson 2004 and the different case studies). In al cases studied in this volume there are elements of decentralisation which support these findings: especially in the context of protected areas in Cameroon (Waza Logone), Tanzania (Selous Game Reserve, Rufiji), in Zambia (Lochinvar, Kafue Flats) and in Botswana (Okavango, Panhandle area and CBNRM programmes) there is often a lack of real empowerment in the sense of lower level decision mak-

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ing and crafting of a institutional design as well as accountability. All authors included in this volume indicate that if these elements were made a political reality it could have a positive effect on resource management. We call this perception constitutionality (see Haller and Merten 2008, Haller and Merten this volume, Meroka in this volume) There should be a council (with local and state representatives) as an overseeing organisation to mitigate conflicts, as well. This council should be addressed and should function as a judge in conflicts when local groups are unable to resolve disputes by themselves. But the council should also be addressed in cases of complaints against local officials and administrators who prevent local people from building up institutions, because they fear a loss power, control and/or revenues. This set of hypotheses have been the guidelines for the researchers involved in the AFWeP, and their MAs, PhDs and Post-Docs have been oriented in this way. For the papers presented in this book, we have used a structure in which some new discussions have been included such as enlarging the concept of ideology by including discourses and narratives in the analysis. Elsewhere, this has been published already in order to analyse issues such as participatory conservation approaches to protected areas (see Haller and Galvin 2008, Haller et al. 2008) and for the analysis of fisheries in the Kafue Flats, Zambia (Haller and Merten 2008), but was initially developed for this project. For Ensminger (1992), ideology is important for actors because it explains how the world works and how it is shaped. It gives symbolic meaning and justification to actions taken (see also Haller 2008; Haller et al. 2008; Haller and Merten 2008). As a major orientation framework (see also Foucault 1972, 1982), it influences action taken. In Marxist thinking, ideologies of religious systems guide and justify action and often work as self-enforcing reference frameworks (see Plattner 1989). For the German sociologist Max Weber, the Christian protestant ideology that God will reward the hard-working man, was one of the ideologies driving capitalism (protestant work ethics, Weber [1904] 1958). But how does this happen and how does this process work? This is not the place to conduct a full literature review on Marxist and Neo-Marxist debates on ideology; but it is important to refer to the notions of “hegemonic ideologies” and “strategic aspects” in the sense elaborated by Gramsci, who argued that the state establishes a hegemonic ideology based on hegemonic power, which drives actors, even if they act against their self interest (Gramsci [1975] 1996).

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However, ideologies change and are used strategically; from another theoretical angle this can be discussed in the framework of New Institutional approaches dealing with institutional change. According to these approaches dealing with models of limited rational choice, institutions change in response to relative prices shaped by external economic, political and technological factors. In reality this explanation is insufficient. Within the framework of New Institutionalism (North 1990, Ensminger 1992), institutions are influenced by both bargaining power and ideologies. When powerful people are able to justify and legitimise their actions through ideologies, they gain acceptance and reduce the information, monitoring and sanctioning costs (transaction costs). For example, participatory conservation is an ideology that is used to legitimise or revitalise conservation efforts after broad critique of the fortress approach. Given the absence of widespread benefits for local people, it is extremely costly to develop and maintain conservation institutions; in extreme cases, these depend on physical force alone. But community conservation and co-management approaches provide the ideology that tries to show local involvement and thereby, tries to reduce transaction costs. It also justifies further donor investment and continued sacrifices on the part of local people. Foucault’s “governmentality” (1982) and Agrawal’s “environmentality” (2005) focus on the process by which people are subjugated by the state. According to these authors, this happens through internalisation of ideologies or environmental issues defined by the state (see also Scott 1998). In this volume, however we prefer to pursue Acciaioli’s analysis and critique of this approach (see Acciaioli 2008). He argues that people often use ideologies, discourses and narratives strategically to legitimise self-interested actions. Ensminger uses ideology—an evocated “worldview” as she puts it—in much the same way, advocating that ideologies can be altered, if relative prices change strongly. However, the actual path of institutional change is unpredictable. So while we are aware that there is ample room for internalisation, we see evidence of actors trying to influence the institutional design PA management in a strategic way7 in many of the cases studied in 7 However, we would like to underscore that we are aware that simple cost-benefit calculations are not easy to do, and that political costs and benefits need to be considered in addition to material ones. Moreover, the very term calculation might be misleading, as not everything can be calculated (see Gudeman 1991, McCloskey 2001).

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this volume. Therefore, we argue that ideologies are a major resource increasing bargaining power by producing legitimacy. They help to establish the institutional setting favourable for powerful actors (see Ensminger 1992, Haller 2007, Haller 2007b, Haller et al. 2008, Haller and Merten 2008). To this use of the term ideology, we add the wider concept that includes discourses and narratives. We understand ”discourse” as meaning a specific way of linking issues and rationalising topics in a logical way, either in spoken language or writing. Logic in this sense means a closed system of meaning. Discourses contain fragments of a larger framework, (ideology—or “worldview” as Ensminger frames it (Ensminger 1992)). For example, the ideology of modernity can be applied to a discourse of development in such a way that it gives positive meaning and value to any development project. On the other hand a conservation discourse can be supported by an anti-modernity ideology, which might represent a belief in the existence of imperilled pristine wilderness. A third example of a relevant ideology would be the “local traditionalism” ideology, in which nature is intimately connected to the traditional way of life. The main discourse then would be that tradition is equivalent to conservation and that old wisdom and techniques are the best way to protect nature. We use the concept of “narrative” for the explanations offered by different actors for their perception of the development of the state of things within the context of their ideologies. According to the ideology of modernity, poverty is due to lack of development and this implies that “traditional” people are “backward.” In the ideology of “pristine nature,” the “wilderness” is threatened by human development and dynamic demographic forces. In the ideology of traditionalism, overuse of resources and the increase of poverty is a result of submission to outside forces, leading to disempowerment and the loss of the traditional way of life. These narratives offer different explanations for the same phenomena. All these levels—ideology, discourse and narrative—reinforce one another and create a pool of legitimacy that aims to increase one’s own bargaining power and reduce that of others. In this way, power and financial resources can be mobilised: Discourses and narratives, then, help one to find allies and outside support. Therefore, we have used a specific structure in the papers including debates on ideologies and other further aspects. After an introduction, the papers will outline the environmental setting, historic and

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ethnographic information, pre-colonial institutional settings and livelihoods. This is followed by a chapter on background information on the political and institutional setup. Chapter 5 will in all cases deal with how access to the commons is contested and negotiated. In this chapter all authors will outline which actors are involved, how they are related to each other, what kind of institutional arrangements develop and what the emic justification (ideology) is for the specific institutional arrangements advocated by the different actors. Logically, this chapter is followed by descriptions and conflict resolution mechanisms. We will then, finally, come to the question of the impact of the institutional change on the common-pool resources and the ecosystems before we come to discussion and conclusions. 8. Overview of the case studies The case studies start with the case of the Niger Inner Delta in Mali. Sabrina Beeler and Karin Frei have done fieldwork in two villages close to each other, inhabited by Bozo on the one side and Somono on the other side of the river, both are fishermen groups. However each has a different history: While the Bozo is seen as autochthonous to the area fishing in shallow waters, the Somono have their origin as river boatsmen, settling a couple of 100 years ago and specialising in river fisheries. However, the Bozo claim to have sacrificial relationships to water spirits. In this case study, the Somono managed to obtain or achieve the position of Master of the Water, and was able to control access to fisheries by incorporating members of local Bozo-Sacrificial groups. During colonial times the French started to control the fisheries and in postcolonial times when the Malian government took over fishery regulations, the position of the masters of the water changed. As the economic situation on the national level became worse and more people became interested in commercial fisheries and more mobile with new outboard engines and light nylon nets, the masters of the water started to distribute access to outside fishermen, based on their traditional rights. The case study shows that this is leading to open access for outsiders and to rent revenue for the Master of the Water, while the Bozo village suffers from loss of access and has much less income from fisheries. However, the traditional institutions, remain in place—although in a transformed version—, because it gives access to a rent.

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Similar aspects can be shown in the second case study by Gilbert Fokou in the Waza Logone Floodplain. Here an autochthonous fishery group, the hierarchically organised Kotoko with their Islamized sultanates, regard fishing as a noble activity and looked down at Arab Choa, and Fulbe herders as well the 19th century immigrated Mousgoum agriculturalists and fishermen. The Kotoko were the ones organising and coordinating access to the pastoral areas after retreat of the water in the Logone area, so that this activity did not interfere too much with the fisheries and also to profit from trade with the herder groups. The Germans and later the French did use the Kotoko for the administration of the area, but controlled and defined fisheries, agricultural production and pastures as government resources. The basic colonial structures were taken into the post-colonial times, but the national economic crisis, of droughts and dams that were built for an irrigation scheme in the area, as well as pastures, fisheries and wildlife started to decline, due to decline of monitoring, reduction of water and increased poverty. During the 1990s, democratisation change the Kotoko lost even more power as the Musgum majority and immigrating people were claiming more access to resources. While the pastoralists are claiming free access to all the pastures after having paid a tax to the government, the Musgum do not accept Kotoko rule, as they feel that they are the majority in the area and thus have free access to fisheries, land and pastures for their animals. At the same time due to the livelihood crisis, the Kotoko started to diversify their activities to include cattle husbandry and set up arrangements with pastoral communities who herd their cattle. All these institutional and livelihood changes weaken the former institutional design as everybody uses all the livelihood strategies in place and tries to see access as open as possible. Some users try to legitimise their access by making reference to citizenship, democratisation or with having paid money to the state that does not regulate resource use due to lack of financial means. This lack also leads local state administrators to take profit from conflicts occurring over common-pool resources. They do not have an interest in keeping conflicts low, because this gives them the possibility to obtain a rent through arbitration and discussions. It is therefore a difficult setting to devise robust institutions for the management of pastures and fisheries. The paper from Gabriela Landolt that follows explores conflicts and strategies of different actors within the village in the southern part of the region called Lahai, where unclear institutions and open access

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fisheries lead to disputes between autochthonous Kotoko and Musgum people. We then leave Western Africa to move to East Africa. In Tanzania we are looking at two case studies addressing two floodplain systems. The first of the two papers by Gimbage Mbeyale addresses the situation in the economically highly dynamic northern part of Tanzania, in the Same District, where we have two small but very important floodplains in the Pangani River Basin, which surround the Pare Mountains covered with forests and include important watersheds. This area is inhabited by the Pare agriculturalists, who used to live in the mountain areas, and Maasai pastoralists in the plains. Before colonial times, the Pare groups had developed common property institutions by which they managed integral slope areas of the Pare mountains including parts of plains sections, in which the Masai were using the floodplain as dry season pastures during their large movements. Tanzania was colonised by the Germans and later on after World War I by the British. One of the main features had been that common-pool resources in Tanzania generally went under the control of the colonial state, which had a strong interest in forestry, land and wildlife. These were the resources of major interest for large plantations of white farmers, for timber production, cash crop production and for hunting reserves for white people. German and British colonial powers were eager to protect areas for these purposes, often excluding local people. After colonial times, the socialist independent movement under Nyerere installed a kind of African Socialism (Ujamaa). Ujamaa meant that people from different origins were united and settled in uniformly structured villages by claiming that all resources of Tanzania belong to all Tanzanians. The government, however, executed a resource management similar to colonial times. Control over resources was executed by different departments and fostered boundaries that were cross-cutting ecosystems and slope-resource management on which indigenous institutions had been based. At the same time coffee production became important and gave the area as well as the whole country some prosperity. After prices for coffee fell in the 1980s and after an economic crisis, Tanzania underwent changes towards liberalisation in the 1990s. Government aid and income from coffee were no longer available at the same magnitude as before. These economic changes had major effects on the local level. Some of the Pare people moved onto the floodplains where, in one case they competed with

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pastoralists and in the other case were included in irrigation schemes, which however favoured rich businessmen. In the mountain areas, people were substituting income from coffee with logging in state forests that were no longer protected. Interest groups from outside (businessmen and traders) were more and more interested in timber and in irrigated agriculture, limiting access to these common-pool resources and leading to conflicts. While conflicts with pastoralists could not be dealt with easily on the western side of the Pare Mountains, on the eastern side pastoralists and villagers close to the floodplain were trying to cooperate: This was due to the same problems they were facing at the Mkomazi Game Reserve, from which Maasai had been excluded and from which wild animals were destroying crops of the villagers. In addition, villagers in the plain tried to revitalise mountain slope management by trying to negotiate with villages on upstream forest protection and control of watershed forests important for irrigation downstream. However, more tensions and conflicts than collective action can be seen in this case, while changes in relative prices and the economic crisis have increased the open access nature of forests and rice in this water and land for irrigation. The second paper by Patrick Meroka deals with the Rufiji River Floodplain in the Rufiji District further south in the country. The area had been inhabited by a heterogeneous group of people who distinguished themselves by their livelihood activities (fishermen, agriculturalists, hunter and gatherers). Common-pool resources in the areas were under the control of leaders who were controlling and coordinating the use of the common-pool resources such as fisheries, wildlife and land. The area faced the same kind of colonial control as described for the Pangani area, only that the economic development had not been as dynamic as there were no large plantations with the exception of one which was installed later on after independence. The area considered as remote but after independence Ujamaa policy was tested in this region, dismantling local resource management based on specific livelihood activities and territories. People were settled in prestructured Ujamaa villages limiting their way of previous resource use (agriculture in the floodplain, fisheries and hunting). Especially use of wildlife was limited for local people by the installation of the largest African game reserve. The reserve originates from German and British colonial administration and caused much trouble for local people as they were expulsed from the area and were excluded from resource

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use. As the country underwent an economic crisis government control could not be upheld and game as well as fisheries became open access and an important resource for cash locally but especially for people from urban areas, responding to rising prices for fish and for game as well as trophies. However, the study reveals by comparing two village cases that there are differences: In the village closer to the Selous Game Reserve people were able to manage the fisheries including traditional institutions while they failed to manage wildlife. In the village further south and closer to an economic centre people were unable to manage the fisheries due to high pressure. But as pastoralist groups came from the north in order to use the pastures in Rufiji area, people in the second village studied acted collectively in order to profit from the pastoralists goods. It is one of the cases in which a new institutional common property setting based on local initiatives could be set up to coordinate use between peasants and pastoralists. However the whole area suffers from many conflicts over common-pool resources. The Rufiji Environment Management Project of IUCN (REMP) tried to install new institutional settings with a co-management scheme. The project was partly successful in establishing Village Committees but failed partly because of not including all the stakeholders involved by not recognising reciprocal resource arrangements and demands. Even worse the project was adding to conflicts in certain areas. Generally increased conservation policies often called as being based on participatory approaches are not beneficial to local stakeholders. As more foreign aid money is being invested into the Selous Game Reserve and conservation is improved for the use of tourist business, people suffer from high costs caused by roaming elephants and lions causing high costs. Similar issues in relation to the open access situation emerged in the Zambian case study of Tobias Haller and Sonja Merten: They did research in the Kafue Flats, Southern Province, where this resource rich area for fisheries, wildlife, pasture and water for irrigation is highly contested and involves local actors as well as outsiders, the state and NGOs/conservationists. The local groups such as the indigenous Batwa fishermen at the levies of the river Kafue, the Ila and Balundwe agro-pastoralists as well as immigrated Tonga agriculturalists and Lozi/Bemba fishermen have started to contest the resources in the floodplains. In a similar way the Kafue Flats and their surrounding areas have been cut into administrative areas and put also common-

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pool resources under different jurisdiction that were before managed by interrelated institutional settings of local territorial groups based on reciprocal arrangements for fisheries, pasture and wildlife. There are two processes which often lead to resource use problems: First, former common property regimes including ritual activities regulating the coordination of the use of common-pool resources (in fishing ponds, in specific pastoral areas or hunting areas) have been dismantled since the last 30 years. These resources are de jure now under state control. This leads to the erosion of the use of the commons for local Ila, Balundwe and Batwa groups face restrictions for wildlife, loss of control for fisheries and finally controversial incentives regarding control of land for pasture or for agriculture in irrigation. This has to do with the financial crisis in Zambia since 1975 (end of copper boom) after which prices for common-pool goods increased and made the area very attractive. Outside users now have the right as citizens to get state regulated access to the common-pool resources. As the state has no financial means to enforce its institutions these become de facto open access, which is favouring more powerful outside groups claiming to be citizens. Access to the flats resources is made even easier due to changed flooding patterns due to dams and more attractive due to loss of jobs is urban and semi-urban areas. While negotiating access to resources, outside actors are often have more bargaining power because their power is reinforced ideologically by the state because they claim to be citizens in a state that is not present (the presentabsence of the state). Attempts to give power back to the local level is not an easy task and is often is doomed to fail as local interests and external drivers are poorly understood. In the same way government initiative to privatise land in the 1990s have lead to conflicts, in which discourse of poverty alleviation are countered with ethnicity based and conservation related discourses in order to secure individual access to land for irrigation or pasture. Therefore the example shows open access and privatisation tendencies at the same time. There is a interesting case that developed from the fisheries open access problem that the paper describes and that shares aspects with the Tanzanian case: Based on the initiative of local staff of the Department of fisheries and facilitated by the researchers, a process of defining local by-laws to the state fisheries laws was started, giving all stakeholders the possibility to be part of the institution building in order to manage the fisheries. Despite some setbacks, this process shows the potential for

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constitutionality and due to balanced power relation set up in the process has the possibility to create positive incentives for decentralisation and local management. The Okavango floodplain in the Okavango Delta, panhandle area in Botswana is a special case studied by Roland Saum. The country has no similar development problems compared to Mali, Cameroon, Tanzania and Zambia. Income from diamonds gives a high national income, which—combined with a relatively homogenous leadership vested in Tswana authority—leads to higher HDI compared to the other cases. Although this wealth is not distributed equally, at least infrastructure (roads, school, water and health facilities) and cash income (direct payments, government help and remittances) is much better and higher than in the other countries. The paper illustrates the institutional processes in the village of Ikoga inhabited by Hambukushu and Bayei people engaged in fishing, gathering and small level cattle husbandry after eradication of cattle by the government due to a lung disease. The village is involved in Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) and close to Wildlife Management Areas. The village is well connected with a tarred road and has a rather well established infrastructure. But there is no high pressure on common-pool resources because most cash income stems from government help and remittances and because cattle from the area as well as fish are of no economic interest in Botswana. The only real economic potential is tourism from which local people could profit through a CBNRM scheme. However these attempts have been a challenge due to the lack of knowledge how to implement CBNRM, difficult relations with a local Trust and an NGO involved, leading to ethnic tensions between Bayei and Hambukushu based on the frustration of the stagnation in the CBNRM process. The only thing that local people can or will be able to manage is to give an area out to tourist operators, while resource management is not possible due to legislation and resource use practice related to tourism. Hunting is not allowed, fishing restricted because of recreational fishery and cattle husbandry is limited. In addition, people face problems with the increase of dangerous wildlife in the area, which on the other hand increases the attractiveness of the area as tourist destination. Nevertheless it is the only case study, where common-pool resources apart from veldt products are not overused.

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The last chapter then is devoted to the comparative analysis of the cases: From the set of hypothesis with which we were starting, we were able to verify most of them. Although we did not list all the design principles of Ostrom the paper show that for pre-colonial settings institutions were there that were adapted to the flooding patterns and were structured in a way to reduce transaction costs. These institutions were not perfect and were not always distributing common-pool resources in a fully equitable way but they were structuring and coordinating access including a large part of local populations and also outside people on the basis of reciprocity. We then show that external factors lead to changes in the relative prices of goods and services, making floodplain common-pool resources more attractive and seriously affecting local-level bargaining power and institutional change. One finding is that the state, which is taking over the management of the common-pool resources, creates de facto open access because it lacks the financial means to enforce laws and is not able to monitor or exclude immigrant users. At the same time, local rules are eroded, weakened or transformed by powerful local people. But our results go far beyond these generally known findings: We have regrouped the results of our comparison drawn from the several hypotheses above to three major elements, which embody the hypothesis stated above. A) Institutions were robust in the Ostrom’s sense but have been eroded and they have been transformed into open access and privatisation: However not all traditional institutions get eroded but those who give a rent to powerful people will—evening transformed versions— remain (rent hypothesis) B) there is a problem due to loss of state control because immigrants use the ideology of citizenship to get free access to the commons, hindering local collective action (paradox of present absence of the state). This is leading to conflict and needs to be addressed by newly defining through local and interested actors what participatory management means. C) one of the key independent variables is the economic situation of the state. We argue that interest in using common-pool resources as an alternative livelihood strategy is minimal in a country with a solid economic performance (economic performance of the state hypothesis)

The paper then concludes with discussion legal pluralism and forum shopping in the cases presented because these provide the ideological basis on which floodplains are disputed over.

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This volume is an attempt to bridge empirical and theoretical gaps not only related to common-pool resource management but as well to the debate on institutional and institutions change. It tries to deliver sound anthropological date linked with a wider economic as well as political framework, in which different approaches can fruitfully meet. We therefore provide not just case studies but case studies, which have a similar ecosystem background and are as well analysed in the same way interested to historical developments and institutional analysis. In addition, we all focus on a much differentiated look on what local groups and community means and include different actors on different scales. Conflicts then are the nucleus on which we focus because they show problems but as well indicate how they are handled and if there is room for collective action fort he crafting of new institutions or not. By this way we are able to go a step further in order have further questions asked for example under which conditions collective action leads to sound results that also match the interests of local people, which are not hampered by outside power and ideologies. This goes then much beyond what we have in the New Institutionalism framework presented by Jean Ensminger because we explore discourses and narratives that are important resources for legitimacy in the discussion processes and we are at the same time able to concrete content of what Elinor Ostrom meant by nesting enterprises. The question of institutional diversity (Ostrom 2005) has to be discussed much more on the level of political ecology and critical anthropology than with economic approaches and game theoretical models on which her Institutional Development Analysis (IDA) framework. The concept of action arena with different actors is on the one had an appealing concept but suffers from the lack of the debate on (bargaining) power and ideology as well as from perception of different actors of the work and of each other (ibid.). Only if we understand how people are related to each other, what external and internal dynamics are driving them and their power resources and how they try to produce legitimacy in specific context that we move further in theory building and further on policy level. This book tries to provide a step towards this aim by presenting detailed case studies AND a comparative analysis on how external and internal variables are related in order to understand why and how floodplains are disputed over and common-pool resources are under pressure.

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9. Acknowledgements The following persons and organisations were very helpful in discussion the project and the comparison while we were developing the project and doing research: Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University and Jean Ensminger, Caltech, Pasadena USA provided very useful critiques and support for the project. Without their theoretical input and stimulus this project would not have been able. Others also provided important inputs: Michael Bollig, Christian Lund, Thayer Scudder, Doug Wilson, Dan Brockington, Jim Igoe, Jean-Yves Priot and Gonzalo Oviedo, Jürg Helbling and staff from Department of Social Anthropology, University of Zurich, external experts form the Swiss National Science Foundation, staff from NCCR North South especially Ulrike Müller Böker and Urs Wiesmann, staff of the International Association for the Study of the Commons, Indiana University, Workshop for Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Paul Nkwi and Antoine Socpa of the Pan African Anthropological Association (PAAA) as well as IUCN Wetlands programme provided support for the development of the project. Many thanks also go to a anonymous reviewer of the whole book manuscript. Paper on the project were presented at different conferences of the IASC and the ASA as well as other major conference on management and governance of natural resources in USA, Germany, the Netherlands and in Switzerland. We will at this place not acknowledge by name all the local people, local scientists as well as administrators of different governments of Mali, Cameroon, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana with whom we were working and to whom we owe all our thanks for they did provide so much of the information gathered. Detailed acknowledgements will be made in the respective papers. References Acciaioli, G. (2008). ‘Environmentality Reconsidered: Indigenous To Lindu Conservation Strategies and the Reclaiming of the Commons in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia’, In People, Protected Areas and Global Change. Participatory Conservation in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Europe, eds. Galvin, M. and T. Haller. Perspectives of the NCCR North South, University of Bern, Vol. 3: Geographica Bernensia: 401–430. Acheson, J. (1989). ‘Management of Common Property Resources’, In Economic Anthropology, ed. Plattner, S. Stanford, Stanford University Press: 351–378. Acreman, M.C. and G.E. Hollis, eds. (1996). Water Management and Wetlands in Sub-Saharan Africa, Gland Switzerland, IUCN.

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CHAPTER TWO

BETWEEN WATER SPIRITS AND MARKET FORCES: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN THE NIGER INLAND DELTA FISHERIES AMONG THE SOMONO AND BOZO FISHERMEN OF WANDIAKA AND DAGA-WOMINA (MALI) Sabrina Beeler Stücklin1 and Karin Frei2 Abstract Over the past 50 years, considerable changes have taken place in the institutional setting of fishing activities in the Niger Inland Delta of Mali. Political, economic, technological and climatic changes have affected living conditions at the local level and consequently, the way fishing is carried out. The overlapping levels of traditional local institutions and state regulations regarding access and use of resources have created an environment, in which some individuals profit by changing or interpreting customary and state regulations in their favour. They legitimise themselves through their positions, whether these are traditional or administrative. In such a situation, sustainable use of resources is no longer guaranteed, resulting in declining fish stocks heightened competition for access to resources and conflicts between different users. These changes in behaviour patterns were analysed among two different ethnic groups, the Bozo and Somono fishermen, in two neighbouring fishing villages, Wandiaka and Daga-Womina (Gomina). The two villages are of particular interest: the latter is highly dependent on the first for access to fishing grounds, as the first retains a prerogative—both legal and traditional—on the water. This example shows that the present institutional situation has been shaped by the

1 Department of Social Anthropology, University of Zurich, Switzerland. Sabrina Beeler Stücklin holds a PhD in Social Anthropology. She is currently working for FIDES Financial Systems Development Services AG in the Research and Development Unit for Microfinance services, www.fidesgroup.org. 2 Department of Social Anthropology, University of Zurich, Switzerland. Karin Frei holds an MA in Social Anthropology and is currently working for Save the Children, an international child rights organization, in Zurich, Switzerland.

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bargaining power of individuals having access to economic or social resources or of those who know how to profit from their traditional position. This in turn increases the gap between rich and poor users of the fisheries, with the latter increasingly pushed out to marginal resource zones. It is one of the cases where some traditional institutions continue to exist, but rather have been transformed, and provide considerable cash gains for powerful people. 1. Introduction Fish has decreased considerably in the Niger Inland Delta over the past 40 years. Additionally, conflicts concerning access to and use of natural resources have increased during this period (Moorehead 1989, 1997, Ba 2008). The causes of these crises were assumed to be an increase in the population, changed climatic conditions and unregulated use of resources by local fishermen (Kuper et al. 2002). But the problems cannot be traced to such simple relations. Institutional factors have to be analysed more carefully. This paper shows that at the local level, rules (institutions) on access to and use of fishing-grounds have existed in the past among local ethnic groups, such as the Bozo and Somono. These rules developed over centuries and guaranteed sustainable utilisation of natural resources until about 50 years ago. Some of these rules still exist, but do no longer work properly. They reinforce conflicts and the degradation of natural resources. A special focus here is the way transformed traditional institutions related to resource management remain at work, providing opportunities for rent-seeking to powerful actors and at the same time these actors do not continue to perform the task of resource use co-ordination in the fisheries. 2. The research setting 2.1. Ecosystem of the Niger Inland Delta From its source in the Fouta-Djallon in Guinea, the river Niger flows on an axis from the south-west to the north-east, bridging the Soudano-Sahelian climatic zone to the south and the Sahelian climatic zone to the north. From Ké-Macina to Diré, the Niger has a length of approximately 550 km and drops only about 12 m over this length. Every year following the rainy season, the Niger inundates an area of

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approximately 40,000 km2 between Ké Macina and Timbuktu.3 This area is called the Niger Inland Delta. It is one of the most important wetland areas in West Africa (Moorehead 1989, 1997). The inundation begins in the south in August-September, and is fed by rainfall in the Fouta-Djallon in Guinea and the mountains of the Mali-Ivory coast border. Watercourses overflow progressively from south to north as the flood crest moves towards Timbuktu. Between October and December the flood reaches its full height, with floodplains disappearing under water. From January until March, flood levels fall in the main watercourses. Between April and June, water only flows in the deepest riverbeds, and the area becomes a vast dry plain. Evaporation and seepage during transit of the delta leads to the loss of almost half of the influx of water. Direct precipitation over the delta has only a minor effect on the flooding, as it varies from year to year and place to place, with annual totals ranging from 200–600 mm. The rainy season usually begins in July and lasts until mid-October in the south, and from mid-July to mid-September in the north. The delta comprises a network of river channels with levees, and low clay-based inter-tributary floodplains in between. In these areas, there are numerous ponds of varying permanence. There is also a system of small channels in which water is carried to the floodplain in the rainy season and back to the rivers in the dry season (see Daget 1956: 3–5, for a classification of the composition of the inner delta). The major characteristics of this area are the extreme variation in natural conditions between seasons, between years and between the delta and adjacent territories. The large variations in the disposal of water in the delta also cause soil fertility variations there. The floodplains are of great ecological importance.4

3 According to Quensière (1994: 55) this indication is overestimated if the amount of loss from evaporation and the postponement of the flood on its way through the delta are taken into consideration. 4 The vegetation consists of bourgoutière (Echinochloa stagnina, Vossia cuspidata, Ultricularia reflexa), whose growing cycle is in accordance with the flood, of nénuphares (Nymphea, Nymphoides indica, Nymphoides ezanno) and in the seasonally flooded plains, mainly wild rice (Oriza longistaminata). Flooded forests (Accacia kirkii) cover the marigots, which are important zones for birds; palms (Hyphaene thebaica, Borassus aethiopium) grow in the northern part. More than 350 birds are found in the delta and among the mammals are mainly the Hippopothamus amphibius and the Trichlecus senegalensis, both threatened with extinction (Hughes and Hughes 1992: 396). More than 130 fish species were found, of which at least 24 are endemic. The most frequent are Schilbe mystus, Schilbe intermedius, Brycinus leuciscus, Hydrocynus, Tilapia and Oreochromis (Quensière et al. 1994: 71).

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2.2. Location and topographical characteristics of the research villages Field research was conducted in two villages inhabited predominantly by two different ethnic groups, the Somono village, Wandiaka, and the Bozo village, Daga-Womina (Gomina).5 Both villages are situated in the Niger Inland Delta not far north of Mopti, the most important commercial town and central traffic junction of the delta. Dominant features of the villages’ environments are, on the one hand, the delta’s floodwaters, and on the other, the extremely dry conditions depending on the season (see map 2).

Map 2: Mali Niger Inland Delta and location of Wandiaka and Daga-Womina. 5 Fieldwork was carried out in both villages during the period May to December 2001.

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Approximately 2 km upstream of Wandiaka, the Niger divides into two branches and creates a vast floodplain, the delta of Wandiaka. This delta is inundated during the season of high water; it is dry and deserted during the dry season. Ponds and distributaries are characteristic for the time after the rainy season. The village itself is situated directly on the left bank of the Niger, called Debo buro (big river) in the local language, Jenaama, which carries water all through the year. The sections of the river in which fishery is carried out are called Sologou, Gomina-Debo (this section is called Gominadje by the fishermen of Gomina, whose language is Tigemaxo) and Wania-Debo. In the dry season, the river is about 50 m from the edges of the village, but reaches them during high waters and floods the plain behind the village. During high waters, several tributaries are created. One of them, the Debo na (little river), flowing from the Debo buro in the direction of the village Severi, divides the village into two parts and is navigable during the season of maximum water level. Gomina is situated around 75 m north of Wandiaka, on the eastern bank of the river Niger. The river section where Gomina lies is called Gominadje. During the dry season, the village is about 20 m east of the river, on a levee. During inundation, the village is surrounded by water. A tributary flows into the main river just a little south of Gomina. This arm forms several important ponds, where fishing is practised during inundation as well as when the water is receding. Moreover, temporary rich pastures and several ponds surround Gomina after the water has receded. These ponds are not very important for fishing activities. The topographical character of the village has changed substantially over the past five years, due to various development projects, which involved the construction of dams either for traffic, or to drain parts of the plain in order to build a new market at the entrance to the village. 2.3. Historical, ethnographic and demographic information on the village sites Under the trilogy eau, herbe, terre (Kassibo 1983), which is characteristic of the region, the ethno-professional groups share the area and production sectors. Fishery, agriculture and stockbreeding are the main economic activities. Among the fishermen we find the Bozo, Somono, and Sorogo; among the farmers are the Marka, Bambara, Sonray and

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Soninké; among the stockbreeders are the Fulani, Tamasheque and Bella. These groups reflect, on the one hand, an ancient division of labour among the indigenous people, and, on the other, the progressive colonisation of the region by neighbouring groups (Moorehead 1989, 1997, Fay 2000). The village Wandiaka is composed mainly of Somono, with a minority of residents belonging to other ethnic groups, such as Marka, Bozo and Fulani. According to a village survey in 1996, Wandiaka counts 1,350 inhabitants, for the year 1976, 539 were counted and for the year 1978, 1,140 inhabitants6 were indicated. Villagers estimated approximately 3,4007 inhabitants in 2001 (Frei 2004). The Somono, who are the dominant fishing group in the village, were founded between the 13th and 14th centuries by the king of the ancient Mali Empire. They are not a homogenous group, but are composed of various ethnic groups, mainly Islamised Bozo and Bamanan.8 Their main tasks under the Mali Empire were river transport and fishery. They possessed exclusive rights over these activities and even collected taxes on them. This income guaranteed them enormous wealth. The Somono fish in the main channel with nets and do not follow the fish. They are well known for their flexibility and diversification in terms of economic activities. The Somono of Wandiaka have their origins in different villages, the fact that they settled in Wandiaka poses the question of whether they were victims of deportations during the Ségu Empire or whether they were groups that migrated of their own volition in search of more favourable fishing grounds. The traditional resource management system that partly still exists, the local divisions of the river and the adjacent land can be dated back to the time when they settled. Tié-Bozo fishermen, some Sonray and seasonally some Fulani herdsmen, nomadic Bozo and Sonray fishermen from other areas mainly inhabit Gomina. The Bozo are said to be the first inhabitants

6

Administration territoriale, Mission de Décentralisation 1999. This figure might be overestimated. But it might also be possible that the population in the years before was bigger than the figures collected by the administration show. During my research, people first tended not to indicate all their family members for fear of tax collection. 8 Cf. Gallais 1967, Müller 1990, Sundström 1972, Daget 1949, Pageard 1961, Ndiaye 1970, Krings 1991, McIntosh 1998, Fay 1994, for a detailed description of the emergence and the composition of the Somono. 7

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of the delta. They consider themselves the “only real fishermen”. They differentiate themselves into the following sub-groups: the Tié, the Kélenga, the Sorogo and the Fuôno-Sorogo (Gallais 1967). The Bozo have specialised in fishing in shallow waters—small river channels, lakes and floodwaters—with fish traps and the construction of mud or wood dams. They follow the fish migrations and therefore, often lead a nomadic life. Nowadays, fishing is increasingly carried out with nets or fish traps. The majority of the Bozo has settled down in villages and today practice rice cultivation, which was heavily promoted by the state after the droughts in the 1970s and 1980s. Gomina used to be an ancient dry season camp of the Tié-Bozo, who lived in another village further south called Nouh-Bozo. Because of the good fishing grounds and the reduced severity of the flooding, more and more of these fishermen began to settle in their seasonal camp, and erected mud hills in order to be able to live there all year round. The levee, on which Gomina is built, was created by the construction and demolition of mud houses over a period spanning more than one hundred years. 3. Resources and livelihoods 3.1. Characteristics of the Niger Inland Delta The floodplain provides important resources. Rich soil transported by the floods fertilises the soil and creates favourable conditions for agriculture, such as cultivation of rice, vegetables and wheat. Pastoralists lead large herds of livestock through the plains. It is estimated that the delta nourishes several million head of cattle, sheep and goats in a year with sufficient flooding (Welcome 1973). Seasonal variations in water level are also of great importance for fishing. The fisheries ensured subsistence for many centuries and, over the last 60 years have become important for the country’s economy. The number of people devoting themselves to fishing is evidence of the importance of fish resources (see chapter 4.2.2.). The number of people, depending on all of the natural resources of the Niger Inland Delta is increasing constantly. In 1987 there were 500,000 people living in the delta (Moorehead 1989: 260), in 1992 Haas (1995: 62) puts the figure at 700,000 inhabitants. In the year 2001, 1,475,275 inhabitants were counted in the region of Mopti; one million of these lived in the delta. The population density is 33 inhabitants per km2.

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3.2. Economic activities and livelihood strategies in Wandiaka and Gomina Although the Somono of Wandiaka consider and define themselves as fishermen, and most income is generated from fishery, other activities are, according to a village survey, just as important. Rice cultivation in particular plays a very important role and the Somono practise this to the same extent as the Marka. Every household in the village owns a plot of land, whereby the size corresponds to the size of the household. Somono men (291 of 386 in a village survey in 2001) indicated that rice cultivation is their main activity, 108 individuals, men and women, said that they sold large quantities of their rice harvest at the markets in Fatoma and Mopti, but income from that activity is fairly limited. They keep only a small quantity of rice to satisfy their domestic needs, until the next harvest. Only a few families store rice. Although still carried out at village level, the traditional practice of bartering (e.g. rice for fish) is no longer considered profitable. Rice cultivation does not compete with fishing activities, because a lot of fish species frequent rice plots during periods of high drought. As long as the rice is small and supple, good captures can be made by stretching nets along the rows of rice plants. The processing and sale of fish is an activity carried out by the Somono women in all households. Men bring home the fish they catch, and the head of the household decides how much is kept for domestic consumption and how much can be sold.9 Different means of selling exist: some women go to the markets on their own; others sell the fish to traders travelling from village to village. More often, however, fishermen are obliged to sell the fish to merchants at low prices, to pay off the credit they took to purchase the fishing equipment. Another important economic activity is pottery. Originally, only women belonging to the caste of blacksmiths engaged in it. In Wandiaka, both Somono and Marka women dedicate a considerable amount of time to pottery, mainly in the hot season, when no fish is available to process. Due to their past profession, the Somono are experienced river navigators. This activity is still maintained, and river transport is a

9 A lot of women complained, however, that men sold fish directly at the fishing site and kept the money for themselves instead of bringing it home. When this happens, fish for self-consumption is purchased on the market.

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lucrative activity. This is because the family of the person in charge of the fisheries, called Master of the Water, owns a large motorboat to transport people and goods to market once a week. But there are also several men in the village who practise river transport on a smaller scale, ferrying people from one bank of the Niger to the other. Richer families in the village own oxen, which they use for ploughing. Cattle are seen as a security against risks and can be sold when the need arises. Usually, the Fulani guard the cattle of the Somono; in return, they can use the milk of the cattle and they get free accommodation during their temporary stay in the village. Since the 1960s, seasonal out-migrations especially among young males have been observed in Wandiaka. This is a key strategy adopted to cope with climatic changes by which agricultural production suffers, and to cope with the high competition in the fisheries. They frequently migrate as far as the Ivory Coast, looking for work, remaining absent from their communities for periods lasting from a few months to several years. Money earned during migration is supposed to be sent home, but more often young people spend it on their own needs. Other migrations on a smaller scale take place in Mali itself. Often people who have family members in other villages spend a few weeks with them to help with agricultural work. Others work for money on plots owned by rich individuals. Here, the size and economic status of the family plays an important role, usually only better situated and large families can afford to send a member away. First, all those absent in Wandiaka constitute a lack of manpower needed for carrying out agricultural work on the family’s land. Second, migrating further away is not possible without an initial monetary input to cover travelling expenses. Thus, migration and the possibility to earn a surplus of money are usually reserved for the already privileged families. The Tié-Bozo of Gomina are less diversified in economic terms than the Somono. Their main activity is fishing. Catches are used to cover cash needs and, in general, only a small portion is kept for personal consumption. Usually, the young men of the family do the daily fishing and present the capture to the eldest of the family. He then gives the fish to the women of the household, who are responsible for cooking, processing and selling a given portion of the capture. Women catch only a specific fish with small, rudimentary fish traps (Beeler 2002). Besides fishing, rice cultivation is an important economic activity. Rice is cultivated in a perimeter constructed by the Opération Riz

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Mopti in the 1980s. In general, within the large family, the eldest delegates to certain people the task of rice cultivation. The harvest is used for family consumption and is rarely sold. In connection with agricultural work, a lot of families keep one or two pack animals. These animals are held in a cattle park at the entrance of the village and are guarded by a village Fulani herdsman, who lives there with his family. Only a few families among the TiéBozo invest in stockbreeding. They entrust the cattle to their Fulani neighbours in the village, Missira. In return, the Fulani herdsmen can keep the milk of the cattle; others are paid in cash for their work. Vegetable gardening plays a secondary role. It is practiced by women after inundation has receded, either in the plain, or in a garden financed by an NGO (Non Governmental Organization). Generally, women’s activities depend a lot on the fishing season; if catches are large, they dedicate themselves to the processing and selling of the fish. If the fishing season is bad, they devote more time to the gardens. Migration is still very important among the Bozo. Many families, or, often just a number of family members, migrate to different fishing grounds, when water starts receding from the floodplains. In general, these are fishing grounds to which they have a customary right or to which they have bought access. When the water has receded, they go back to their village. In contrast to this short-term migration, young men also effect long-term migrations. The majority stay in Mali and continue fishing. Very often they migrate to find good fishing grounds far from home, but more often, they migrate to be able to save money from their work and keep it for themselves, instead of giving it to the family eldest. With the savings, they buy goods like radios or motorbikes to bring back to their village and keep some of their savings for their marriage. 4. Background information about the political and institutional setting 4.1. Pre-independence changes 4.1.1. Pre-independence local institutions In the 19th century the area was under the control of a theocracy imposed by the Fulani, the dominant ethnic group of the region. They imposed a system of resource management on all major production systems called the Dina. The area, divided into a number of grazing

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territories was allocated to loose Fulani clan groupings, within which independent farmers and fishermen were also found. The already existing traditional institutions governing resource use, which were part of a common-pool management system concerning fishing grounds, pasture and farmland, were codified. The rules were well adapted to the specific circumstances of the ethnic and production-system diversity and the ecological variability (Moorehead 1989, 1997). The Dina did not challenge the most ancient resource-management systems concerning fishery, but integrated them into the new governance system. The traditional management system rests upon the primacy accorded to the founding lineages. The founding lineages were the owners of the resources. The heads of these lineages were called the sacrificers. According to the local belief, they derived their power from supernatural ties with the water spirits. These ties were based on a pact between the water spirits and the founding lineages: as the water spirits were the owners of the fish and everything in the water, the founding lineages had to ask them for permission to fish and, in return, make sacrifices and perform rituals for them. The powers of the sacrificers are believed to be dual: appeasing the spirits when angry, through sacrifices guaranteeing a good fishing season, and the feared ability to summon up the wrath of the spirit to do harm to transgressors. These lineages also provided resource managers, called the Masters of the Water. In the context of the Bozo we speak of the ji tigi ya (control, power over water), concerning ponds and tributaries. In the case of the Somono we have, in contrast to the Bozo, an additional political factor that plays a role in access and use rights. The rights to manage the rivers were conceded to the Somono by political powers during the Mali Empire with the function of assuring river transport and fishery for the Empire. In the context of the Somono, one speaks of the ba tigi ya (control, power over the river), which has a religious foundation. It makes reference to the cult of Faro, a water deity.10 This ba tigi ya are based, on the one hand, on the pact concluded between Faro and the ancestor of the lineage using the resources, and on the other hand, on the authority of the political sovereign. Both the ji tigi ya and the ba tigi ya are rights of territorial occupation. But in contrast to the ba tigi ya, which refers to the management of the river, and thus to permanent watercourses, the significance of

10

On the cult of Faro, see Diéterlen (1955), Takezawa (1988). Maybe this cult was met in relation with the rights to the water only later, to reinforce its legitimacy.

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the ji tigi ya, referring to ponds and tributaries, depends on the level of water. In this sense, it is not only determined by the distinction of the territory, but also by the close relations between the place, the type of technique used and the season. Fay speaks in this context of techno topes (Fay 1994: 196). According to the custom, both the ji tigi ya and the ba tigi ya are exclusive rights of exploitation and belong to a lineage. They are transmitted in the patrilineal line, following the principle of seniority. They are also transferable through matrimonial alliances as a dowry or as compensation for services rendered for the Master of the Water. The Masters of the Water were responsible for the allocation of new resources, for bringing new resources into production, the adjudication of conflicts and setting dates for important economic activities at different times of the year, such as collective fishing. The principal rule governing access was that members of the Somono communities in the village had a right of access, which was essentially free, while outsiders had to pay fees. Foreign fishermen paid one-third of their catch, called manga ji, to the Master of the Water for permission to fish.11 These revenues were distributed among the community. With the colonisation of the Sudanese zone, the French imposed a centralised government, a poll tax system, and divided the territory.12 The colonial administration grouped the Somono and the Bozo in administrative units, based partly on the Dina,13 but not taking into consideration the flexible structure of the production systems. The new territories had fixed frontiers. With this system, the notion of private and public property was introduced. Privatisation was considered the central condition for development. Land and its use were under control of the centralised government and all land that was not in use was considered to be state property.14 Fishery was seen as an

11 Contributions were mainly claimed when strangers wished to construct dams or traps in the distributaries in the floodplain, or when fishermen fishing with big nets in the main channel wished to settle down. 12 The main administrative unit was the Cercle, which was again divided into Subdivisions. Cercles and Subdivisions were again divided into Cantons among sedentary peasants and Tribus among nomads, each headed by a Chef de Canton. They were chosen by the French among the customary chiefs in the area and were considered administrative agents of the state. 13 As this repartition was based on the Dina, as interviews with old people of Wandiaka showed, it did not significantly change the organisation at village level. 14 Decret of the year 1935, article 539, Code civil français (1800–1804): „Tous les biens vacants et sans maître. . . . appartient au domaine publique“ (Benjaminsen 1997: 130).

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important economic sector, which had to be developed through more rational and efficient methods. This echoes similar approaches for fisheries in Cameroon (see Fokou this volume) and Zambia (see Haller and Merten this volume). 4.1.2. Economic changes since pre-independence The introduction of taxes during the colonial era obliged the population to use and have access to money. Instead of barter, the people now sold and bought goods with money. New market possibilities developed through new markets situated in the vicinity and because of better transport systems, and the introduction of outboard motors for boats. From the beginning of the 1930s onward, fishery became one of the most important economic sectors, whereas others like agriculture and stockbreeding were weakened, due to locust plagues and difficulties in intercolonial commerce (Fay 2000). New fishing equipment and the progressive embedding of the fishing sector within the market economy massively increased production. The export of dried and smoked fish to Ghana and the Ivory Coast began. Fishery continued to be the most important economic sector in the 1940s. At the same time, inundations during this decade diminished and slowed down the upswing; production began to decline. The causes were seen in the diminishing inundation, an increase in the number of fishermen and the use of nets with small mesh size. New regulations were introduced. But the decrease in production continued during the 1950s, even when the seasonal inundations were extremely good. Research on fishery was conducted, which recommended recognition of the local organisation of this industry, which had not been the case, up to that time. Even though production was decreasing, catches were still large and the favourable climatic conditions in the 1950s and 1960s and new, more efficient fishing equipment attracted new fishermen. New techniques employed were nylon nets, fishing hooks, lead weight, épervier (a mobile fishing net) and motorised boats. The new equipment was easier to handle and could be used individually in any place. The new industrial nylon nets, for example, which appeared in Wandiaka and in Gomina shortly before independence, were lighter and therefore did not need a large number of fishermen to pull. Because of motorised boats, navigation became easier and more intensive, but the motors and fuel chased away the fish. The new fishing techniques are used anywhere today, whereas each of the traditional techniques was used only in its specifically defined site. This implies that traditional knowledge of fishing techniques was no longer that crucial and money began

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to be more and more important for gaining access to fishing sites and equipment (Fay 1989b: 227–234). 4.2. Post-independence changes 4.2.1. Political changes since post-independence After independence in 1960, the Mali government kept the centralised structure imposed earlier by the French colonial administration. Furthermore, it claimed all natural resources, such as water, land, pastures, as national property15 and introduced a tax system to gain access to those resources with the aim of fighting the “traditional feudalities,” above all the Masters of the Water who were considered archaic and inequitable. Thereby the traditional rights of the fishermen were no longer recognised and the state only conceded use rights to local fishermen’s groups. In addition, the Service des Eaux et Forêts, created during colonial times, was charged with the organisation and control of the fishery (Benjaminsen 1997, 1999, Fay 1989b).16 The state divided the river into administrative territories, whose boundaries did not correspond with the pre-colonial territorial divisions, and their management was transferred to villages on the riverbank. Wandiaka was one of the villages responsible for the management of the awarded section. It has to be emphasised that this did not imply a transfer of goods to the village; its purpose was purely organisational. A local person was appointed by the administration. He represented the local people on the fishing committees and collected taxes at the village level. The new regulations overlapped the local, complex rules of access and use of resources and became a source of conflicts. But as this new law was not able to undermine totally the customary laws, a system of cohabitation between the two developed, and its application is the object of a compromise between the different actors involved. It is evident that this situation also leads to abuses, with winners and losers.

15

Law Nr. 63/7ANRM, 11. November 1963. This implies setting dates for collective fishing, prescribing the techniques and mesh size and fining transgressors. 16

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After 1991, criticisms of the centralised state and its abuse of power and calls for decentralisation were frequently heard.17 In 1992–93, the National Assembly adopted a law on decentralisation. This law called for co-operative management between the state and local communities, by conceding to the latter independent management of their own resources. But the tutelage of the state was still preserved (Benjaminsen 1997). The cercles18 are recognised as the lowest administrative units. Today, the control of fishery and trade is in the hands of the seminational organisation, Opération de Pêche. Local, traditional knowledge and experience related to seasonal variations and reproductive cycles of the fish play a minor role. 4.2.2. Economic changes since post-independence With the introduction of the national fishing permit after independence, anyone who could afford to purchase a national fishing permit now had the right to use resources wherever and whenever he wanted. The government confirmed the already existing de—facto open access constellation of the fishing sites, since it did not have the means to control its regulation. This is similar to developments in the Waza Logone Area (Fokou, Landolt this volume), Rufiji River Floodplain (Meroka, this volume) and the Kafue Flats (Haller and Merten this volume). The new technologies made it possible also for nonspecialised fishermen to fish intensively, without having to respect the regulations of the Master of the Water. The number of people fishing and hence, the pressure on the resource and competition increased considerably. For 1950, Gallais (1967) indicated 80,000 fishermen. The national census in the year 1987 (after the drought) indicated about 500,000 people in the region, of whom 14.4% were fishermen, 70.2% were agriculturalists and 15.4% were pastoralists (Herry 1994: 125– 126). Approximately 300,000 fishermen are estimated for 1990, of who 230,000 practise fishery as their main activity (Damman 1997: 13). The number of people carrying out fishing activities in the delta varies, 17 These criticisms are also described as paradigm shift in Natural Resource Management. Sahel orthodoxies blaming local people for causing natural resource degradation are now being replaced by alternative views of emerging paradigms in at least three areas: Range Science and Pastoral Development, Common Property Theory, and the Management of Fuel Wood Resources (Benjaminsen 1997: 122–123). 18 With a population of up to 250,000 or an area of 70,000 km2 (Cercle of Mopti), these units are still relatively large (Quensière 1994: 414).

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depending on other production systems, and has increased over the last few years. One factor in this increase is the degraded productivity of other resources, such as pasture or arable land, since the periods of drought in the 1970s and 1980s. Fishery, although also affected, was still one of the more productive activities, so that even originally non-fishing groups started to engage in it. Moreover, the devaluation of the Franc Malien in 1967, and then again of the FCFA in 1994, created economic advantages such as increased competitiveness for local products. Nevertheless, productivity fell drastically. From the 1970s on, but especially after the 1980s, the state began to make efforts to revive the fishery sector. Several trials of new regulations on access to and use of the fishing resources were undertaken and finally, a variety of studies on the fishery in the Niger Inland Delta were ordered. This new orientation and interest on the part of the state could also be due to the fact that during these years, production of cotton and peanuts fell sharply. Peanut production had been very important at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, as was cotton production at the beginning of the 1980s. But then these had to fight with losses on the stock exchange and competition on the international market (especially from soybean production in Asia and cotton subsidies in the USA, cf. Nohlen 1996: 456). The national economy had lost important revenue sources and had to look for new ways to earn foreign currency. 4.2.3. External factors leading to change The impact of the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s on the delta is seen by the local people as the disappearance of major parts of wetland zones, a reduction in fishing sites and a decrease in the duration of flooding, as locally perceived. Without favourable conditions, reproduction and renewal of fish stocks are reduced, and the fishermen have to intensify their fishing techniques to maintain a certain level of income. While the number of people fishing increased, prices for fish on local markets and for export were rising much higher than prices for other goods and services. Our own research indicates that prices for fish were rising by six times, for cattle by three, while staple food prices only doubled and state salaries as well as the cotton cash crop were decreasing one to two times between 1980s and 2000. This means that fish was being more and more attractive on a national level compared to other goods to be produced. All these factors together led to overexploitation of the fish stocks. The size of fish caught thus became smaller and some species, abundant in the years before the drought,

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disappeared totally.19 Generally, Laë et al. argue in a review paper for the FAO (2004) that also landings of fish have decreased from 90,000 metric tonnes in 1968 to 45,000 in 1989 in the central delta and that large-sized species have nearly been eliminated (Laë et al. 2004). Other external factors influencing fishing activities are the construction of the dams of Markala (1947) and Selingué (1980), which aggravated the effects of the drought. The dams diminish the duration and dimension of the seasonal inundation of the wetland zone. For the year 1954–55, the inundated zone is indicated at 43,200 km, for the year 1968–69, figures of 24,300 km2 are given and in 1985–86, the inundated zone is indicated at 17,900 km2 (Quensière 1994: 56, see also Kuper et al. 2003). Furthermore, it is assumed that the fish begin their reproductive cycle when water is released from the dams, because water levels then resemble those during the seasonal flood. 5. Description of concrete situation in Wandiaka and Gomina and the areas of negotiation of access to common-pool resources 5.1. Relationship between different actors Among the different actors in the village of Wandiaka there are first the users of the resources; the inhabitants of the village itself. Then come Fulani pastoralists passing with their herds, and an increasing number of outsiders who exploit the resources. Officially, management of the river section at Wandiaka lies in the hands of the Chief of the Somono. He is the traditional Master of the Water from the Kanta lineage group, appointed by the administration as the local person responsible for the organisation of the fishery in his river section, for collecting taxes and for representing the local level in the national fishing committees. At local level, complex property notions still play an important role. According to traditional local laws, the river is divided into two sections. Two Master of the Water of the two different Somono lineages, Kanta and Naroukmana, manage each section. The plain, tributaries and ponds are owned by the lineage of the Marka and managed by the

19 In interviews with older fishermen and in oral history accounts collected during field work in Wandiaka, it emerged that several fish species had disappeared or are only rarely caught: Auchenoglanus occidentalis, Gymnarchus niloticus, Hepsetus odoe, capitaine, Distichodus brevipinnis, Chrystichtys nigridiatus, Polypterus bichir bichir.

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village chief, a Marka himself. The land is managed as the common property of different villages. In the event that Wandiaka villagers lack land, they have the right to access land belonging to neighbouring villages, a system described as “mutual solidarity” by the villagers. The complexity of the management system is seen in the shifting of responsibilities and management structures according to different seasons and different water levels. As the people of Wandiaka say, during the rainy season the river and the plain belong to nobody. This implies that everybody has free access and the right to use resources. After the rainy season, when the water starts to retreat to the main river and, as the villagers put it, the tributary debo na (little river) “carries a lot of water,” the management of the “little river” and the ponds remaining in the flood plain is transferred to the Kanta lineage group. When the water has receded completely and only small ponds remain on the plain, its management goes back to the Marka. Generally speaking, the shift of ownership can be explained with the connection or interruption of the river with the plain, through the watercourses. The villagers define this change in ownership with the techniques that are used at given moments: As soon as this place can be fished with big nets, a technique usually employed by the Somono, it also belongs to them. But when fishing is only possible with small hand-held nets, the management rights go back to the Marka. In other words, the privileges over management and the right to use resources depend on the water level in connection with the fishing techniques used. The traditional management system with its Masters of the Water and Masters of the Land overlaps state intervention. The state divides resource areas into administrative units. In his twofold position, the traditional and the administrative, the member of the Somono lineage group of the Kanta, holding the office of Master of the Water, has access to more bargaining power than the other Master of Water from the Naroukmana lineage group, who performs only his traditional role (cf. Tab. 2). Formerly,20 the preservation of the resources was aimed at ensuring good production and reproduction. Nowadays, the Kanta Master of the Water is still concerned with good reproduction, but this attitude to protect the resource marked by his position, allows him to seek higher rents, if his water is rich in fish and he can grant access to outsiders (cf. below).

20

The word “former” is a reference to the situation before independence, when the situation in the village was not marked by his administrative role.

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The state is perceived by the local people mainly through its agents: local representatives, regional chiefs (chef d’arrondissement) and area officers (commandant de cercle). According to the villagers, this responsibility does not differ greatly from the former imperial powers. The decisions of the state agents concerning fishery are not seen as credible in the eyes of the fishermen, because most of them do not belong to a socio-professional traditional fishing group. The regional chiefs impose taxes (fishing permits) or settle conflicts. Fishing committees in each arrondissement and fishing councils in the cercle, composed of administrative authorities, representatives of the—still called by the local population—Service des Eaux et Forêts and representative of the villages, generally manage fishing activities in addition to monitoring and controlling compliance with the prohibition of certain techniques. Further, a fishing permit and taxes on different types of fishing techniques exist and everybody in possession of such a permit is free to fish anywhere. This is obviously open to abuse, as a client relationship is often established with the representatives at different levels. The structural character of free circulation is also not compatible with the traditional systems of access. As a consequence, more and more rich outsiders, especially from urban areas, equipped with modern and efficient fishing equipment, are entering the waters of Wandiaka and pushing the local fishermen, who do not have enough cash power, out into marginal regions. The fishermen of Wandiaka are not affected in the same way as other local fishermen, as they have free access to the section. This concerns above all the villages in the section of Wandiaka who are not the owners or users of the resources (Beeler 2002, Beeler 2009). Gomina is an example of such a village, whose inhabitants’ position is that of being users of the different resources. They highly depend on Wandiaka to secure access to good fishing-grounds. More and more outsiders who can pay high sums to have access to good fishing-grounds are entering the same waters in which the Tié-Bozo of Gomina are fishing. The geographical constellation of the village reflects the distinction made between the local people—villagers— and newcomers, mostly Sonray fishermen who settled around the village and have been living there for the past five to 10 or even 20 to 25 years. Besides these residents, there is a large group of fishermen who come to Gomina from December to around March-April, during the fishing season. Some of them stay in Gomina for a couple of days, others for a couple of weeks or even months. According to local

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villagers, the most evident distinction between them and the outsiders is their fishing material (as gaffs or fishing nets), which often damage each other and cause tensions. These immigrants are not Tié-Bozo, but mostly Kelenga-Bozo or Sonray. They are generally richer than the local Tié-Bozo, spend more time fishing and thus make more profit. Having more capital allows them to pay more money for access to the most productive fishing grounds, undermining customary law, hence creating friction. Gomina is not only dependent on the Masters of the Water of Wandiaka, but also on the Master of the Land of Sabe, a village south of Gomina. To cultivate land, the people of Gomina have to negotiate with the Masters of the Land living in Sabe. These Masters are Marka agriculturists. People cultivating their land in return either give kola nuts or part of the harvest to the Master of the Land, or they pay in cash. As competition over access to land for cultivation is not very fierce in the region, prices in general are not very high either. In contrast, the payment to access pasture or grass is very high. Even though the people of Gomina do not need important pastures for the village cattle that are mostly draught-tolerant. For the past five years, they have had to negotiate with the Masters of the Pastures living in different Fulani villages: Daïebe and Missira. The prices have risen continually during these years. As Gomina is a central point for access to pasture on the western side of the river (the so called bourgoutière), many transhumant herdsmen pass by the village seasonally and some Fulani families members settle down in Gomina from the beginning of the cold season (around December) to the beginning of the rainy season (around June). During this period, the men of the families lead the cattle to pastures in the north of the delta. Gomina is a central station for the annual river crossing of the cattle and hence for negotiations with the Masters of the Pasture on the western side of the river. Among the Tié-Bozo of the village, the sacrificer of the Tienta lineage plays an important role concerning resource use, even when his power and status have diminished considerably. One reason is because he is originally from the distant village Nouh-Bozo; another is the result of a loss in belief in the water spirits and the emergence of Islam. The role of the sacrificer is to negotiate the dates of the important fishing activities with the water spirits and communicate them to the Master of the Water. He must perform rituals and sacrifices to appease the water spirits, ask for good conditions for fishing, for journeys by boat

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and for the cattle river crossing. Fishermen speak of his capacity to communicate with the water spirits, his capacity to live underwater for several days and his power to find lost objects in the water, even if they are miles away from their original place. The sacrificer does not have any power over the allocation of natural resources, neither in Gomina, nor in Wandiaka. His power is merely religious. At the household level within families (usually four generations), the family eldest has the largest decision-making power and freedom of action. He decides who has to accomplish which tasks, collects any income and decides how it is to be used. More and more often, younger men are trying to deal with their own needs. Before showing the daily catch to the family eldest, they take a part of it and sell it on their own, keeping the money for themselves. Usually, this is tolerated to a certain extent, because otherwise young people would migrate to other fishing places and considerably diminish families’ cash revenues. There is now a tendency for even family elders to sell the catch on their own. Women in particular now have a very difficult position in this regard: On the one hand, they generally have to pay the costs for lots of family needs, but on the other, their opportunities to earn money are limited. 5.2. Institutional arrangements for access to and use of a particular common-pool resources Fishing is carried out according to the season, with different rules and techniques coming into play. Whereas in the past this differentiation was more marked, today we find most of the techniques all year round, and some special practices abandoned. This fishing cycle is described in brief in the following section. 5.2.1. The fishing cycle At the end of the dry season, by the beginning of the rainy season, the last collective fisheries take place in the ponds. These fisheries are announced by the owners of the ponds and have a regional character, as three villages participate. Fishermen use all kinds of techniques, especially hand-held nets. Big nets are not allowed, because they would take out all the fish in the pond at once. No payments are claimed for these fisheries. The catches belong to the fishermen. The rainy season starts by the beginning of July, when the water starts to rise in the main river channel, moves out into the tributaries and progressively fills the

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ponds with water. Agricultural work, which already had started during the dry season, continues. The plots have to be prepared for rice cultivation before the water begins to inundate the plain. As soon as the rice is sown, people dedicate themselves to fishing. Women put baskets along the border, an activity mainly carried out to obtain fish for domestic consumption. Although people indicate that at this time there are not many fish or only small fish to catch, everywhere on the river there are boats with two to three persons, throwing out nets of about 100–200 m in length, trying to catch whatever they can. Some fishers use nets with very small mesh size to catch even the small fish. During this time, no rules concerning access exist. By the end of August, the flood reaches the plain. People start to prepare for the fishing season: Nets, traps and boats are repaired. The economic situation of most of the fishermen is not favourable at this time. Those who need new equipment have to get it on credit from merchants or rich individuals in the village; some also share the equipment. During this period, the river is almost abandoned by the fishermen, the current is too strong and the fish migrate out into the floodplain, where fishing actually takes place. As in the rainy season, all kinds of techniques are used. By the end of October, when the water reaches its maximum level in the river, fishing of sardines (Brycinus leuciscus) starts. This fish spawns in the main riverbeds by the beginning of the rainy season and the young fish subsequently migrate into the floodplain. When the water starts to move back from the plain into the main channel, lines are put up from one bank of the river to the other in order to catch the sardines moving back with the water. This activity continues during the retreat of the water and, in Wandiaka, is organised by the Master of the Water of the Kanta lineage. He determines the places and the sequence in which the families are allowed to put out their fishing lines. At present, there are four families in the village who fish for sardines in this way. They own four to five lines and are allowed to fish for one day. The sequence of the days is organised in a hierarchical order, starting on the first day with the family of the Master of the Water Kanta, followed on the second day by the family of the Master of the Water Naroukmana. On the third the Marka family and on the last day the family of the Imam is allowed to fish. The moment water and fish start to retreat to the main channel, the active fishing season starts. At the same time, agricultural labour is intensified. The villagers are busy harvesting the first rice, which

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is as important to the villagers of Wandiaka as the fishing activity. So we observe the Bozo of Gomina installing dams everywhere, while the Somono of Wandiaka are still working on the fields, and fishing and fieldwork compete with each other. Several strategies are applied to meet this situation in Wandiaka, depending on the size of the households and their status in the village. Large households are able to divide the work among their members: older people and children fish, women and young people work in the fields. Others carry fishing equipment with them while working in the fields in case they encounter fish in the floodplain. Again, others employ outsiders to work in the field, while they, themselves, go fishing. Richer individuals can usually dedicate more time to fieldwork, as they are not so dependent on income from fish resources. With the beginning of the dry season, different rules go into effect: the Bozo of Gomina who install the dams, as well as the outsiders, have to ask permission and pay for fishing in the waters of Wandiaka. The Marka of Wandiaka also have to pay the Master of the Water for access, but while the outsiders and the Bozo pay in cash, the Marka usually pay in kind, with rice for example. This can be seen as a way of maintaining reciprocal relations between the different socio-professional groups of the village. For the Somono of Wandiaka, who return to the river to carry out their fishing activities, access is free. The only restriction is to respect the traditional division of the river at village level. Fishing is carried out mostly by individuals, with all kinds of equipment. By January, only ponds filled with water are left in the plain. The Marka fish in these ponds with hand-held nets. The Somono do not fish in the ponds at this time. With the beginning of the dry season, in several river sections, fishing bans are imposed, and fishing activities are restricted to specially indicated places, where fishermen from the village can fish for their domestic consumption. The aim of the ban is to guarantee good catches during the collective fishing, which takes place in these sections. The Master of the Water Kanta, who fixes the date together with the sacrificer of Gomina, announces the collective fishing. The Somono of Wandiaka is the first to enter the river. Fishing is carried out first with big nets and later with small nets (éperviers). This regulation aims to prevent conflicts, because with the épervier, it is easy to make big catches, it can be employed anywhere and further, and it chases the surrounding fish away. After one day of fishing by the villagers of

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Wandiaka, other villages are informed of the collective fishing. According to the villagers of Wandiaka, 500–1,000 fishermen participate in this collective fishing. An agent of the Service des Eaux et Forêts supervises the event and the use of the equipment (see Table 1 and 2).

Fig. 4. Collective fishing event in Gomina, Niger Inland Delta, Mali: This collective fishing event takes place in a pond every year during a two days period by the end of the dry season for village people. Only simple fishing material is allowed by the Master of the Water, who is setting the rules. After these two days, fishermen with special rights, install their bigger fishing traps and fish in the pond for a couple of weeks. These rights are now bought from the Master of the Water. Photograph by Sabrina Beeler.

5.2.2. Conditions for gaining access As shown above, the Masters claim taxes at the local level for access to the fishing sites of Wandiaka. These taxes are called manga ji in the local language (a third part of the catch). Officially, they are prohibited by the state. It is maintained, on the one hand, because the Masters are still legitimised and recognised through their origin and relations with the water spirits. But on the other hand, because it also permits individuals with rice greater bargaining power, such as the Master of the Water of the Kanta group, to gain wealth. In Wandiaka, the two parts of the river are each managed and monitored by its traditional owner. Differences can be seen in the number of outsiders obtaining access: The main difference is that the part of Naroukmana is mainly

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fished by local people, while the part of Kanta is fished by seasonal commercial fishermen. The leader of the Kanta group gives free access to the fisheries to outsiders ready to pay large sums, sometimes without considering local institutions such as rules regarding equipment or places under prohibition. While all Somono fishermen of the Naroukmana and of the Kanta lineage of the village have free access to the resources, with few exceptions, every outsider who wants to fish has to pay the manga ji. The Master of the Water allocates the place, depending on the equipment being used. In the past, a third of the catch had to be delivered to the Master, who afterwards distributed the fish in the community. Today, usually a fixed sum of money is negotiated before the fishermen are allowed to enter the water. The rules for collecting taxes become effective mainly during the productive fishing season,21 when monitoring is easier because fish are concentrated in the main river channel and ponds. During the period of high water, when “the river and the plain belong to nobody,” no management rules are effective. Access to the river is free for everybody. Similar institutions, depending on floods, can be found in Waza Logone, Rufiji, and the Kafue Flats (see papers this volume). Different prices are claimed for different techniques and different sites, varying from 0.65 US$ (500 FCFA; all indications and exchange rates as of June 30, 2001) to 65 US$ (50,000 FCFA). While collective fishing in the ponds is free, in the river, fishermen are expected to pay 1.30 US$ (1,000 FCFA). The Somono fishermen of Wandiaka also pay for collective fishing in the river, but this payment is perceived more as a collective tax at the village level, because everyone contributes the amount he can afford. Fishermen of Wandiaka also are favoured by being allowed to use big nets, whereas outsiders have to pay high rents for using such nets. People of Gomina pay up to 65 US$ (50,000 FCFA); fishermen of Wandiaka usually contribute a third of the catch. The Marka of the village also have to contribute for access to fishing sites. But according to the Master of the Water Kanta, payment is only claimed when the catch is abundant, and it usually consists of a third of the catch or even a contribution of rice.

21 The fishing season starts when the water retreats from the plain in the main river channel.

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At state level, the two villages have to pay for a national permit to have the right to fish in their own section. This payment is made collectively in Wandiaka by all Somono fishermen of the village and is valid only in the section of Wandiaka. Fishing in other sections implies the payment of individual taxes, usually higher than the collective permit. The value of the collective permit varies from 52–130 US$ (40,000–100,000 FCFA), a sum that is negotiated between the Service des Eaux et Forêts and the Master of the Water Kanta. Also in Gomina the permit is paid for collectively and the price is negotiated between the village chief and the functionaries. In general, the amount is around 130 US$ (100,000 FCFA). The permit is valid for the river section close to Gomina. 5.2.3. Monitoring and sanctioning Monitoring of the river sections is carried out by groups of young Somono fishermen. Control measures are intensified a few days before the collective fishing takes place, when it is forbidden to fish in the river. At this moment the control is important for the reputation of the Master of the Water: good control guarantees a lot of fish in the river and when fishing starts, fishermen from other villages make good catches and participate again next year. These outside fishermen make a major contribution to the income of the Master of the Water, as shown above. If any transgressors are caught in a forbidden place, they are taken to the Master of the Water of the section concerned. Their fish and equipment are taken from them and distributed between the Master, the supervisor and the collective fund of the village. If the transgressors have enough money, they can buy back their equipment. Frequently, the young men carrying out the checks demand money from the transgressors without bringing them to the Master. Thus, the transgressors remain unidentified and can continue fishing. Most local fishermen stated that only outsiders were fined. If local people break the rules, they are only rebuked. The monitoring and sanctioning carried out by the administrative agents is different. The fines are usually arbitrary, depending on the financial status of the fishermen caught. In fact, these fines should be discussed with the Master of the Water Kanta, with the aim of also sanctioning the transgressor in front of the village, but like the young supervisors, even the administrative agents more often negotiate with the fisherman and pocket the money themselves. Hence, richer fishermen are able to pay bribes and still make a profit from fishing. The following tables summarize the above mentioned.

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Table 1: Notion of property according to customary and national law (Wandiaka). Notion of villagers— Customary law

Land, plain

Notion of State— National law

Owner

Representative

Several villages

Oldest village

Management

Village Wandiaka Ponds, Lineage Marka of Chief of the ponds Village tributaries Wandiaka Almami Kampo. Wandiaka Management depends on water level: hot season— rainy season: managed by village chief, high water— retreat of water: managed by Master of the Water Kanta Main river 2 Somono lineages Masters of Water: Village sections of Wandiaka Kanta and Wandiaka – Wania-Debo Naroukmana – Gomina-Debo Sacrificer: Tienta of – Sologou Gomina

Representative Village chief Village chief

Chief of Water Kanta

Table 2: Access to resources and payment (Wandiaka). Rainy season Fishing site Limitations

Way of fishing

River, ponds

High water

Retreat of the water

Plain, bank of river Plain, tributaries, river No limitations No limitations No limitations except for except for the construction of spawning dams (bozo) [spanning?] of the lines, regulated by the Master of the Water Kanta Collective in All kind of All kinds of ponds: all kinds of techniques. techniques. techniques except Fishing of sardines Fisheries in the large nets with special nets. ponds: Individually: all handheld nets. kind of techniques

Dry season River, ponds Regulations, prohibited sites

Collective: all kinds of techniques

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Table 2 (cont.) Rainy season

High water

Retreat of the water

Privileges and payments

Strangers pay Master for construction of dams

No privileges, no payments

Strangers pay for dams and large nets, Somono: sequence of the lines in hierarchical order among the four Somono families

Access

Private property for sites where dams are constructed

Open access

Dry season

Collective: Somono enter the water first and pay a collective tax Strangers enter water after Somono and pay a fixed tax Private property Collective for sites where property dams are constructed, collective property for Somono (spawning the lines)

5.3. Ideological justification of common-pool resource access and use Access and management of the river is justified with descent and membership of a certain community. As the lineages of the Kanta and the Naroukmana of Wandiaka were the first fishing communities to settle in Wandiaka, their ownership of the river is not questioned. In claiming rent from the outsiders, the Masters refer to their traditional position. The villagers consider the contribution of the outsiders as a sign of respect and recognition of their relationship with the water and the place. Another factor, though declining, is belief in water spirits. According to local belief, communication with the spirits is practised through the sacrificer of Gomina. He offers them sacrifices for a good catch or a safe journey and he asks for the date of the collective fishery, which he then communicates to the Master of the Water of Wandiaka. According to local belief, these spirits punish violation of rules: the fish disappear or the spirits provoke accidents or other misfortunes. In the villages, belief in water spirits is shared by everybody and manifested

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through ritual sacrifices. The Masters of the Waters are thus well recognised because of these spiritual beliefs. There is also the administrative organisation of the fisheries, which is a means of legitimization for some actors. Especially people with high investment power are able to buy state fishing permits22 and refer to this level of legislation. As we have seen, the Master of the Water Kanta uses both means, depending on the situation he is in. Towards the villagers, he stresses his purely traditional role and behaves accordingly. Towards outsiders, he justifies the imposition of taxes through his traditional position, but he also refers to his administrative role, if it favours him. He justifies the large number of outsiders in his water by citing the right of free movement for everybody in possession of a national fishing permit. According to his administrative position, he is the manager of the whole river section from Nemende to Saya. Thus, he claims taxes not only from people fishing in his traditional area, but in the whole river section. In doing this, he expands his traditional sphere of influence by taking advantage of his administrative position. This strategic action is also tried out by Kotoko people in Cameroon, although less effectively (see Fokou, Landolt this volume) while in the Rufiji Floodplain and in the Kafue Flats outsiders claim the right as citizens to get access to fisheries, thus making reference to state law. In the Okavango Delta such developments do only seldom occur and if they do so, conflicts are related to complaints by recreational fishermen (see Saum, this volume). 6. CPR use and management conflicts The different conflicts have their origin usually at the institutional level, in the overlapping of different management systems and in the changes in bargaining power. They concern the different users of the resource areas. Two levels of conflict can be distinguished: groups at regional level and at local level, who share the same interests in the domain of access to and use of the resource, but who defend their interests in different ways (see also Barrière and Barrière 2002).

22 State agents are open to bribery and allow individuals who pay higher sums access and rights to fish, also with officially forbidden fishing equipment.

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At the regional level, conflicts break out between different community groups with different interests and rights of access. A critical period is the prohibition on fishing in the river preceding the collective fishing. Rich fishermen, usually outsiders, can afford to pay large sums and are, therefore, favoured by the Master from Wandiaka. The latter gives them access to places prohibited or places reserved only for local fishermen. A price is negotiated between the Master and the interested party, whose activities will be ignored by the young supervisors. This preferential treatment for rich individuals, which is more often than not in conflict with customary rules, often develops into conflicts, either between the rich and the local fishermen, or between the Master and the local fishermen, who—seeing others breaking the rules—often do the same themselves. These very reasons were cited by the fishermen of Gomina when they described the situation in 1997, when a conflict between Gomina and Wandiaka was in danger of escalating because fishermen of Gomina ignored the prohibition of the Master of Wandiaka (Beeler 2009). The village chief of Gomina had to ask the gendarmerie to intervene and ensure that the fishermen of his village respected the prohibition prior to the collective fishing. This example shows that relations between Gomina and Wandiaka are not always trouble-free. People rarely talk directly about the conflicts, more often they point to their important neighbourhood relations going back to the time of their ancestors; but a few state that the people of Wandiaka, being jealous of the fishing experiences of the Tié-Bozo, do not let them fish as they wish. The seasonally settled fishermen are another potential cause of conflict. Usually they are welcomed and given use rights on condition that they respect the rules. These fishermen often succeed economically, which causes jealousy among the local fishermen, who do not benefit from these successes. As noted by some fishermen, the jealousy often expresses itself by means of witchcraft or maraboutage, aimed at causing accidents among the outsiders, making their family members ill or destroying the catch. Although there are precise definitions of the rights of exploitation and management, disputes and rivalries occur over the ponds. The pond Poié pa, behind the village Saya, is such an example. According to the information from Wandiaka, this pond is owned by the lineage Naroukmana, but during the prohibition of fishing, a family of Saya carries out the monitoring, contrary to the notion that all ponds belong to the Marka. The pond was transferred to the Somono of Wan-

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diaka following a marriage. The woman, from the founding lineage of Saya, married a man from the lineage Naroukmana of Wandiaka, and received the pond as dowry. According to the custom, property is transferred to the children of the woman’s line. In this case, it means that the descendants, now living in Wandiaka, have rights over the pond Poié pa. At the same time, the household chief of the family in Saya, where the woman has her origins, also claims rights over this pond. The pond Ga, behind Gomina is also, according to the Marka of Wandiaka, the object of conflict: a family of Gomina, which has been fishing this pond with a large net for a long time, claims to own it, but it belongs in fact to the Marka. According to the traditional management system, during the fishing season, the lineage of the Naroukmana of Wandiaka manages the use of the ponds. They give Bozo fishermen of Nouh permission to fish in the pond Ga. These fishermen are favoured above the family of Gomina, because they are able to pay more. But by claiming ownership, this family refers to the administrative level of management rights, according to which the Somono of Wandiaka do not have rights over any ponds. Another source of conflict is relations with merchants. Fishermen depend to a large extent on credit from merchants to purchase their equipment. They pay off this credit by ceding to the merchants a fixed quantity of fish at the end of the fishing season. However, depleting fish stocks mean that the catch is often too small to pay off all of the credit. A lot of fishermen therefore complain that they get into trouble with the merchants, do not get credit anymore, or that they get into debt, because merchants give them credit at high interest rates. The fishermen of Wandiaka reported the most frequent conflicts with Fulani pastoralists. Every year, the herding of the cattle between Gomina and Wandiaka creates problems in cases where the passage route, stipulated by the Master of the Water, is not respected by the Fulani. The results are torn nets, destroyed lines and fish chased away. One case mentioned almost led to a conflict between Wandiaka and Gomina. The fishermen took the Fulani to court, on the grounds that their cattle had destroyed fishing equipment in the river. It was finally agreed that the cattle would be allowed to pass between two quarters of Gomina, where enough free space was available. On condition that nobody was allowed to build huts in that specified place, the decision was respected by all the parties. There are several other examples of such conflicts, where finally, because of their wealth, the Fulani have

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been the winners. Today, an agent of the Service des Eaux et Forêts controls cattle crossing the section of river between the two villages. Conflicts at the local level usually concern intra-household affairs or generation problems, the trigger most often being money, ideology or preferences. Young men are expected to bring all the fish they catch to the head of the household. But more often, they keep part or all of the catch for themselves, to sell on their own. As fishing activities are increasingly becoming individual affairs, no one has control over the number of fish caught, and it is easy to pocket a portion of the returns. The money earned in this way is invested in prestige objects such as radios, music cassettes or sunglasses. Migrations are also a source of conflict. In expectation of returns from young men who leave home to look for work elsewhere, heads of households support them in their adventure. But the returns often do not reach the village. This is because either the young men have not been able to find employment, or because they spend all their earnings on their own needs. The village pressure on families with members who have migrated abroad is very high. They are believed to have enough money to support poorer family members and are expected to distribute and share their alleged riches. Therefore, many families no longer reveal that a member is absent, or simply claim that the young men left without permission. Older villagers mentioned another consequence of the increased migration: due to lack of manpower, the fishery cannot take place as it did in the past.23 Conflicts about the appropriate fishing technique to be used or places were fishing is allowed also arise between villagers. As at regional level, these conflicts stem from money. Some fishermen of the village are economically more successful than others. The same mechanisms as observed at regional level also play a role in village life, even if they are less marked. The result is that the poorer fishermen in Wandiaka complain about the Master’s behaviour, while richer fishermen usually support him. Some members of the lineage of Kanta fish in the section of Naroukmana. They complain that too many outsiders fish on the Kanta side and that these outsiders destroy a lot of nets.

23 They refer to the fishery with large nets, which was carried out collectively by all members of Somono families and required a lot of manpower, as the net was heavy. But migration is not the only reason for abandoning this form of fishing: periods of drought, monetarisation, new, more easily manageable fishing techniques together with individualisation and a general change in the institutional environment all have contributed to fishing with large nets being abandoned.

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One dispute that has finally been resolved at the village level concerned the use of the épervier (throwing net technique). Fishing with the épervier is more profitable. It can be used everywhere, but at the same time it ruins the prospects of people fishing with nets because it chases fish away. The villagers of Wandiaka decided that fishing with nets always has priority over the épervier and that the latter are only allowed to enter the water when the nets are pulled out or in places were no nets are usually set. While this decision is well accepted by the villagers, outsiders ignore it. The same situation persists in Gomina, where the seasonal fishermen mostly use the épervier, whereas local fishermen use nets or fishing hooks. Local fishermen complain that the seasonal fishermen’s equipment destroys theirs. .

7. Conflict resolution mechanisms In consideration of the conflicts mentioned above, at the local level traditional conflict resolution mechanisms still exist. When a problem arises, the village chief and the village council are charged with dealing with the transgressors. A solution is sought in discussion. Usually, marabouts, the imam and the council of the elders are consulted to give advice on a fair judgement. Depending on the gravity of the case, the accused has to compensate the victim. Generally, the council decides how high a penalty should be. This is usually payable in kind, like food for example. The victim often turns down this proposition and demands payment in cash. In Wandiaka, conflicts related to fishing activities are discussed among the heads of all big Somono families ‘households, under the direction of the Master of the Water Kanta.24 Administrative arbitrators are only called in when no solution can be found at the village level. But at this level, conflicts are often solved in favour of richer individuals, who are able to bribe the agents. Decentralisation has not brought about significant changes in rights of participation for local resource users. The administration maintains its privileges in being both judge and party. People prefer to resolve their problems at the village level. They mistrust the administrative heavyweights, with whom they are not familiar and the administrative

24 Traditionally, conflicts should be resolved by the Master of the river section concerned. Nowadays, the Master Kanta alone decides, due to his administrative position.

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heads, which are indifferent and do not have a common vision of the resource areas. 8. Impact of institutional changes on common-pool resources The fishery management’s current situation is the result of intervention by various actors, e.g. the administration, the fishermen themselves, or climatic and/or environmental changes. In the wake of independence, Wandiaka benefited from the new division of territory. In the overlapping of traditional and modern rights and prerogatives, new practices developed; the Master of the Water of the Wandiaka river section knew how to benefit from his position, which was recognised by the villagers. At the same time, the state agents profited from the ignorance of fishermen concerning administrative rules and the imposition of arbitrary penalties. Villages like Gomina, which have no prerogatives on the water are at the mercy of the Masters and the state agents; they always have difficulties gaining access to good fishing grounds. The misuse of power by the traditional and modern state authorities and hence the lack of clear liability rules, affects the behaviour of all stakeholders (cfr. also Bierschenk 2001, 2003, Lentz 2006). The fishermen, who are tending towards a more individualised form of fishing, supported by new techniques which can be handled individually without too much effort, and without consideration for the rules, also no longer consider the fisheries as a common-pool resource managed by a common property regime under the governance of a traditional specialist. As one informant in Wandiaka put it: In the past, fishing was collective, but fishing activity today is unorganised, the people fish any way they want, the arrival of the administration created freedom of opinion (Frei 2004).

In fact, different local informants still cite patterns in which the customary authorities play an important role. But the totality of this behaviour has led to a destabilisation of the social order by generating tensions between the administration and the inhabitants of both villages. With the appearance of drought and a reduction in the exploitable zones, conflicts are only reinforced while resources are degraded. The introduction of cash and the market economy, reinforced by new fishing techniques, has led to a rapid change in relative prices. The new techniques no longer require special knowledge about their

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manufacture, handling and the place where they have to be used. They can easily be purchased and used by everybody. Together with rising prices for fish on local and national markets, this has led to an increasing number of people dedicating themselves to fishery, especially after the periods of drought, when it was still one of the more or less profitable activities. The local fishermen mentioned that it had become more difficult to impose the traditional rules and regulations on the growing number of people engaged in the activity. They added that they could not prohibit these people from fishing as “they were trying to earn their bread, because there are places where there is nothing except some water. We could not let these people die.” (Interview with an old fisherman from Wandiaka, 2001). But it is also said that these outsiders “mixed the things,” a situation that still continues today. Without considering the reproductive cycle of the fish and without rules regarding access, resources have depleted rapidly, as viewed by local people. This has influenced again fishing activities at the local level. The big collective fishing events, organised in the past by the village of Wandiaka, the yaya,25 were abandoned after the droughts of the 1980s.26 They were not considered profitable any longer and participation rates had decreased steadily. Our findings correspond with newer literature, which in the context of decentralisation and local governance, is critical to the adoption of local institutional design. We argue that due to changes, a situation of legal pluralism and institutional heterogeneity between villages can be found. Implementing so called customary law needs to be looked at carefully (see Cotula and Cissé 2006). Other authors argue that local institutions could be used to manage conflicts in the fisheries and in other resources by paying attention to local conceptions (Djiré and Dicko 2007). However it is crucial to analyse the historical changes and the different actors involved as well as the transformations in what has been labelled local conceptions. 9. Discussion Monetarisation and the introduction of poll taxes during colonial times implied that local people needed to have cash money. Instead of bartering, goods were bought and sold using cash. At the same time,

25 This was a collective fishing that was carried out from Mopti to Lake Debo, with all riverain villages participating. 26 Interview with an old fisherman in Wandiaka 2001.

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the fishing sector committed itself to a cash market economy. New possibilities of commercialising fish products developed, on the one hand, by markets situated nearby and, on the other, by better transport systems, e.g. the motorization of boats. Favourable climatic conditions in the 1950s and 1960s, combined with the introduction of more efficient equipment, increased the size of catches. Traditional knowledge was no longer needed to succeed in fishing, but those with enough monetary power could easily purchase the equipment and dedicate themselves to the highly profitable fishing activity. After independence, the state claimed all natural resources as its property. A fishing permit, granted by the state to every citizen who had the means to afford it, allowed free use of resources. It ignored the local regulations concerning the use of specific fishing equipment and techniques for specific time periods and fishing sites; in other words, it ignored the seasonality of the production cycle and the complexity of the ecosystem. Traditional rules based upon the ba tigi ya and the sacrificers were no longer respected by the state. Using this logic of state property, the river was divided into sections. Fishing committees were created, usually composed of administrative authorities and representatives of the villages (often former traditional Masters of the Water) to manage the activity and monitor their areas. Thus, traditional zones and management systems did not disappear completely; rather a redistribution of powers within these systems occurred. Parts of the traditional system granting access against the older right to receive the manga ji (the third part of the catch) remained, but was seen as a rent, which no longer had to be redistributed on the village level. Industrial nylon nets appeared in the course of independence and drastically changed the ways of fishing. As we have seen, techniques that demanded a lot of manpower and sustained big social events were abandoned in favour of individual fishing techniques. These new techniques could be used in all seasons, in different places such as ponds, rivers and tributaries with different water levels. In this sense, the relationship between technique and fishing site became neutral. A comparison of past fishing techniques with the current ones reveals considerable diversification. Year-round fishing is conducted with a variety of techniques at different sites, whereas in the past, each technique was used only at a specific site (see Table 3). The value of the fish resources increased and created incentives for different actors to engage in that sector. A situation of competition

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Table 3: Comparison of past and present fishing techniques (Wandiaka). Rainy season

High water

Retreat of the water

Dry season

Traditional

Traditional

Traditional

Traditional

Fishing in ponds Pabolo, lines in with nets family sequence

Nets, dams

Regional collective fishery, big nets Fishery with seven nets in village

Present

Present

Present

Present

Collective fishery: All kinds of techniques except big nets Individual fisheries: All kinds of techniques

Fisheries in ponds: Fisheries in the All kinds of ponds: techniques Handheld nets Fisheries in the river: All kinds of techniques, fishing of sardines with special nets

Collective fisheries: Big and small nets, épervier

Fisheries in the river: All kinds of techniques, fishing of sardines

Source: Frei 2004.

for access among user groups developed and finally triggered efforts towards decentralisation. But this political event, through its juridical weight, only exacerbated the situation, and rivalry over the right of resource management was aggravated. The changes in relative prices also influenced social life, the organisation of local level fishery, ideologies and preferences. The individualisation of fishing activity is reflected in an individualisation of social life. The community-based life of the fishing people, in which fishing was carried out as a family or lineage business and catches were shared among members of the lineage, diminished in favour of individual behaviour. Now personal gains became more important than the well-being of the family as a whole. More and more individuals are leaving their family for personal enrichment. Activities that are carried out alone are no longer subject to the social control of family members, and it is easier to keep the returns from these activities for one’s personal needs. The establishment of new production modes weakened familial and domestic institutions and reciprocal relationships. Even if reciprocal

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behaviour can still be seen, non-monetary institutions often underlie monetary factors. This can be seen in the maintenance of customary attitudes, such as bringing kola nuts or other presents to merchants or state agents. Such behaviour serves mainly to maintain good relations with important individuals, because they could be of help in times of need. The attitude of making personal gains is also expressed in the behaviour of the Masters of the Water. In the traditional institutions, the preservation of the resource was a positive outcome of the aim of good production and reproduction. Under the new circumstances, the Masters are concerned with high rents, and fishermen with good production and catches. If the Master of the Water Kanta is seen to be concerned with the protection of the resource prior to the collective fishing in which fishermen from the whole region participate, it is only because good catches during the event enhance his reputation, and the richness of his waters. And thanks to this reputation, the fishermen will take part the next year. The richness of the resource legitimises his claim to higher taxes from regional fishermen. In this way more outside fishermen obtain access to fishing grounds with the ultimate result that these are overused. Towards the villagers, the Masters still try to maintain the traditional institutional arrangements, with the intent of not losing their respect. It has to be stressed that the villagers of Wandiaka also profit from the status of the village as manager of the river section. Apart from the collective fishing permit, they do not have to pay the manga ji, whereby outsiders are obliged, in addition to the national permit, to pay the manga ji at the local level. But also the Masters’ strategy of not claiming the manga ji can be observed27 as favourable to certain individuals. Usually, the strategy concerns important persons from whom the Master can profit in other ways. Even if this behaviour could be described as maintaining the tradition, in reality, it is more in line with a strategic way of drawing profit from everybody. The abandonment of collective fishing at the village level (example of Wandiaka), but maintaining it at the regional level also, can be understood in these terms. As the local fishermen are not forced to

27 All of the fishermen in Wandiaka indicated that the payment of the manga ji was in the past not obligatory, but that it was a simple means of showing respect for and recognition of the master.

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contribute anything, their activity does not bring any benefit to the Master. During the regional collective fishing, he claims fixed amounts from the outsiders. Therefore, the effort to organise the local fishery is, in his eyes, not compensated with appropriate returns, which could be one of a number of reasons for abandoning that fishery. The Masters of the Water, who also occupy administrative positions, due to overlapping management systems possess increased power of negotiation with their dual roles; they maintain their traditional roles, but at the same time profit from their new positions as administrative representatives. Merchants, who maintain patron-client relations with the fishermen and agents of the administration, also possess a certain control over the resources. Urban dwellers who have easier access to capital, credit or new fishing equipment are winners in this redistribution of the power of negotiation. These actors are able, because of their monetary or administrative power, to redirect the institutions in their favour. It is not always a change in the direction of more efficient institutions, but in the direction of institutions that favour the interest and the power of negotiation of the individuals concerned. In this constellation, poor individuals, individuals with no power of negotiation, or whole villages such as Gomina without prerogatives on natural resources, are increasingly pushed out of areas rich in resources to marginal zones, where the fishermen of Gomina have to capture whatever they find—mostly small, immature, fish. Due to population pressure, fish stocks are overexploited and competition increases. Differences between villages having prerogatives on natural resources and those without are also highly visible in the appearance of the villages. Gomina looks less prosperous compared to Wandiaka or other villages with prerogatives over natural resources. This can be traced back to the richness of the Masters and certain redistribution within the village. This redistribution affirms once again the power and legitimacy of the Masters, who have the support of their village. 10. Conclusion and recommendation The results of this present paper makes it evident that the aggravated situation of natural resources in the Niger Inland Delta cannot only be explained by simple relations between increased populations, bad climatic conditions and overexploitation of resources. These factors have only triggered the current crisis affecting fisheries in Mali and

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have influenced the rise in relative prices leading to high demand for fish. Larger institutional changes have greatly influenced problems concerning tenure and management rights, following the nationalisation of natural resources and regulation of the fisheries. These also have led to higher relative prices for fish and to a weakening of traditional structures, upon which national laws, economic interests and constraints have been superimposed. Regulations transformed by these relative prices favour overexploitation of resources and enrichment of individuals with bargaining power to further transform local traditional rules and the overlapping formal and informal rules related to rent-seeking and open access for rich users. They are able to use different rules sources, be they traditional or modern statedriven, in a kind of forum shopping. The basic ideology used is, in one context, the traditional right to local governance and the traditional right to demand compensation from outside users. Therefore, at each level, actors with high bargaining power locally refer to traditional leadership and to their link to water spirits, while on the other, being the person through whom state administration and gain shall be gleaned. The fishermen themselves explain the crisis mainly with these factors cited: The state and its intervention in the traditional organisation is held responsible, but they also consider climatic conditions and the massive increase in people dedicating themselves to fishery, as factors that have led to a decrease in fish stocks. It also should be stressed that in the last few decades the economy of the fishing sector in the delta has passed from a strategy of accumulation to a strategy of risk minimisation. This implies a loss of its identity and professional character and its link to institutions that are related to ethno-professional groups. On the one hand, because the socio-professional groups who were originally only fishing now have to diversify their activities to meet their daily needs. Therefore we observed a weakening of their identity as fishermen, related to their submission to rules regarding fisheries. However, those by origin non-fishing socio-professional groups that entered the fishery sector, without compliance to local or national relevant rules, used their ethnic labels, which allowed free entry into the fisheries. As one fisherman of Wandiaka puts it: “Today, everybody can become Somono.” Fishing activities take place in a social context structured by rules that were gradually changed over the last 50 years by modifications to the production processes. The customary institutions although

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weakened, could serve the local fishermen, if applied in their strict sense with responsibility in the hands of those individuals who depend on the resources in the first place. The main problem is not only the reduction in fish stocks, but the governance of access to resources and the distribution of catches, which is becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands of influential groups and individuals with high bargaining power. The spirit of decentralisation could be compatible with a local management by giving the local communities responsibility for their own development. But certain conditions have to be met for such a project to succeed. First of all, the division of the territories has to be regulated in a sustainable manner among the different socio-professional user groups, in consideration of the seasonality of the production cycle and the complexity of the ecosystem. They must also include agreements for flexible reciprocal use (e.g. when one resource space can be used in different ways, accommodating the seasonal changes). Such a division should be based on the agreement of all groups concerned. Furthermore, the user groups have to be sensitised to their tasks, which are not only the monitoring of access and distribution of resources, but also maintaining the fertility of the resource with regard to future needs. Last but not least, local people need to learn of their possibilities for participation in local and administrative organisations and they need to recognize them. This would make it easier for individuals to protect their interests and level out the strong bargaining power of other groups or local individuals. Such organizations have to be accessible to all social strata, so that a decentralisation can be applied that favours not only those already privileged, but also the less privileged. It remains to be seen how such an approach can or will be included in the modelling approaches pursued by natural scientists. Although partly aware of cultural systems and heterogeneous interest variables among local groups, will they still focus on a group approach (Kuper et al. 2003), instead of looking more at political ecology or an economy approach with an eye to analysing interconnectedness between natural and social systems in hydrology and fisheries. We would argue that anthropologists need to start from the premises that pure nature does not exist (see Haller Introduction) and that for decentralisation and governance, local bargaining power and ideologies must be understood in order to comprehend distributional processes within societies and fisheries (see also Fokou, Mbeyale, Meroka and Haller and Merten this volume).

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Herry, C. (1994). “Démographie des pêcheurs”. In La pêche dans le Delta Central du Niger. Approche pluridisciplinaire d’un système de production halieutique, ed. J. Quensière. Paris, IER/ORSTOM/Karthala: 123–142. Hughes R.H. and J.S. Hughes, eds. (1992). A directory of African wetlands. Gland, IUCN The World Conservation Union. Kassibo, B. (1983). Histoire et sens du pouvoir dans le Korondougou. Thèse de 3e cycle. Paris, EHESS. —— (1994). “Histoire du peuplement humain”. In La pêche dans le Delta central du Niger. Approche pluridisciplinaire d’un système de production halieutique, ed., J. Quensière. Paris, IER, ORSTOM, Karthala: 81–98. —— (2000a). “Le foncier halieutique comme enjeu de pouvoir: la mise en place d’une gestion décentralisée des pêches dans le Delta central du Niger”. In Gérer le foncier rural en Afrique de l‘Ouest, eds. P. Lavigne Delville, T. Camille and S. Traoré. Paris, Karthala, URED: 283–302. —— (2000b). “Pêche continentale et migration: contrôle politique et social des migrations de pêche dans le Delta central du Niger”. In Les pêches piroguières en Afrique de l’Ouest, eds. J.-P. Chauveau et al. Paris, CMI, IRD, Karthala: 231–246. Krings, T. (1991). Agrarwissen bäuerlicher Gruppen in Mali/Westafrika. Berlin, Dietrich Reimer Verlag. Kuper, M., J.-P. Tonneau et P. Bonneval (2002). L’Office du Niger, grenier à riz du Mali. Succès économiques, transitions culturelles et politiques de développement. Montpellier, Paris, Cirad, Karthala. Kuper, M., Mullon, C., Poncet, Y. and Benga, E. (2003). “Integrated Modelling of the ecosystem of the Niger River Inland”, Ecological Modelling 164, 1: 83–102. Laë R., Williams S., Morand P., Mikolasek O. (2004). ‘Review of the present state of environment, fish stock and fisheries of the river Niger (West Africa)’, In Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on the Management of Large Rivers for Fisheries: Sustaining livelihoods and biodiversity in the new millennium, Vol. I, ed. Welcome R. and T. Petr. Rome, FAO: 199–277. Lentz, C. (2006). “Decentralization, the State and Conflicts over Local Boundaries in Northern Ghana”, Development and Change, 37, 4: 901–919. Mc Intosh, R.J. (1998). The peoples of the Middle Niger: the island of gold. Malden MA, USA, Oxford UK, Blackwell Publishers. Moorehead, R. (1989). “Changes Taking Place in Common-Property Resource Management in the Inland Niger Delta of Mali”. In Common Property Resources, ed. F. Berkes. London, Belhaven Press: 256–272. —— (1997). Structural Chaos: Community and State Management of Common Property in Mali. London, IIED. Müller, F.-V. (1990). Flexibel aus Tradition. Strategien wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Handelns im mittleren Nigertal (Mali). München, Trickster Verlag. Ndiaye, B. (1970). Les castes au Mali. Bamako, Éditions populaires. Nohlen, D. ed. (1996). Lexikon Dritte Welt. Länder, Oranisationen, Theorien, Begriffe, Personen. Reinbek (Hamburg), Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag. Pageard, R. (1961). ‘Notes sur les Somono’, Notes Africaines. Bulletin de l ‘Information et de Correspondance de l’ I.F.A.N. 89: 17–18. Quensière, J., ed. (1994). La pêche dans le Delta Central du Niger. Approche pluridisciplinaire d’un système de production halieutique. Paris, IER, ORSTOM, Karthala. Sundström, L. (1972). Ecology and Symbiosis. Niger Water Folk. Uppsala, Almqvist and Wiksell Informationsindustrie AB. Welcome, R.L. (1973). ‘A Brief review of the Floodplain Fisheries of Africa’, The African Journal of Tropical Hydrobiology and Fisheries. Special Issue 1: 67–76.

CHAPTER THREE

TAX PAYMENTS, DEMOCRACY AND RENT SEEKING ADMINISTRATORS: COMMON-POOL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, POWER RELATIONS AND CONFLICTS AMONG THE KOTOKO, MUSGUM, FULBE AND CHOA ARAB IN THE WAZA-LOGONE FLOODPLAIN (CAMEROON) Gilbert Fokou1 Abstract Natural resources in the Lake Chad basin floodplains are increasingly under pressure. This is obviously due to demographic growth and the high rate of immigration, draining thousands of people into these rich pockets of resources in a semi-arid context. However, even though climate change and demography are key factors to explain the scarcity of natural resources today, many other aspects have to be taken into consideration. Institutions constitute one of those aspects. Data from the pastoral milieu in African Sahel show that the rules of access and use of natural resources are of critical importance. During the last fifty years, changes in pastoral institutions show that the “rules of the game” can affect positively or negatively the use of natural resources in the floodplains. This paper aims to analyse the transformations of institutions for pastoral resources management in the Waza-Logone floodplain in the North of Cameroon (called yaérés) and will show

1

Gilbert Fokou (PhD) is a former PhD student of NCCR North-South-IP6 and Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Yaounde, Cameroon. He acknowledges support from the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North–South: Research Partnerships for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change, co-funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the partner institutions. Dr. Fokou is currently working as a post-doctoral researcher at the Institute of Sahel in Bamako, Mali, where he is involved in the activities of NCCR through the Transversal Package Project on Pastoral Production Systems (TPP-PPS). His main research interest is on institutions for common property resources management, environmental conflicts, and institutions and mechanisms for access of pastoral communities to natural resources and basic social services. Email: [email protected]

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how these changes have affected the use of common-pool resources among local Kotoko fishing groups, different pastoral ethnic groups and Musgum agro-pastoralists. The study indicates that since 1950 and, more precisely after independence in 1960, new formal laws imposed by the independent state have gradually replaced local institutions. As a consequence, new regulations led to a change in power relations and it became possible for “outsiders” to gain greater access to pastoral resources. Usually, interactions between groups of resource users led to violent conflicts. However, more than a struggle for resources, conflicts can be viewed as coping strategies for some users and state administrators. Analysis based on the micro-level interactions (village level) emphasises the relationships between different groups of actors participating in the negotiation for access and use of natural resources in the floodplains. The paper analyses mainly pastoral resources, but also other common-pool resources (fisheries, water) which are important for understanding the set of interactions between groups of users. This approach gives an insight to understand different levels of negotiation in a context of increasingly divergent interests. 1. Introduction The Lake Chad basin floodplains have always been an important grazing area for thousands pastoralists from Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad and Niger as well. During the dry season and after the recession of water, animals can feed on fresh pasture reserves. Precisely during that season, the number of cattle can increase to over 200,000 representing one-third of the total number of the Far North Province of Cameroon (Beauvilain 1981). Pastoral resources appear to be increasingly under pressure, diminishing the grazing capacity of the area. In certain years, pastoralists are obliged to purchase additional sources of feeding such as cottonseed cakes, cottonseed hulls, red sorghum and groundnut leaves (Moritz 2003, Loth et al. 2004). This can be interpreted as the consequence of global climate changes, or as the impact of demographic growth (due to strong immigration to the area during the last century). However, institutional analysis would rather focus on the rules for resource management. It appears that transformations of pastoral institutions have influenced the management of the reserves during the last fifty years and the changes are due to the control of resources by some actors. The purpose of this paper is to understand

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 123 how pastoral institutions in the Waza-Logone floodplain worked in the past and under which modalities they continue to function today. The analysis of a shift in power relations due to political and economical changes during the past fifty years is of critical importance. Also important is the analysis of conflicts that arise due to the implementation of new regulations. This paper is based on field research conducted between 2002 and 2006 in the Logone floodplain of North Cameroon. Data were collected among sedentary population in a Kotoko village called Kalkoussam, and neighbouring Musgum and Choa Arab villages, as well as among transhumant pastoralists from Nigeria grazing their cattle in areas adjacent to Kalkoussam. This area is located in the so-called yaéré-Damardi, north east of the Waza National Park. The village is 15 kilometres away from Logone Birni, the local administrative capital of the region. Methods used were based on many social science research methods ranging from observation in situ to household questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. These methods helped to gather information on the discourse and rhetoric of various groups of actors to understand why people react or behave the way they do. The aim of the study was to analyse interactions between different groups of resource users in the Logone inland wetland. From a micro-level analysis based on data from the village level, this study demonstrates that institutional changes affect common-pool resources (CPRs), and particularly pastoral resources in the Lake Chad Basin. Therefore various productions systems are affected and livelihood goals of different resource users are scarcely met. 2. The Logone Floodplain Ecosystem and Lake Chad Basin The large flat area on the southern shores of Lake Chad is famous for being the cradle of the Sao people, one of the most important civilisations that emerged in central Africa around the 6th century BC (Mveng 1969, Lebeuf 1973). It is also recognised for the importance of its geographical characteristics and natural resources. The area includes two important floodplains (the Logone floodplain and the Lake Chad floodplain), which are among the most important wetlands of western Africa (Drijver & Marchand 1985, GEPIS 2000). Thus, the area is at the same time characterised by the quality of its resources and the rich historical and cultural background of the users. For instance,

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the Waza National Park has been recognised as a Man and Biosphere reserve since 1979, due to its rich and varied species of animals and birds. Also, the Kotoko traditional fishermen have settled in the area for many centuries and have initiated rules and techniques for access and use of this particular ecosystem. As an area of several opportunities, the Lake Chad Basin also attracted several groups of resource users integrated in a web of historical and migratory trends.

By Corrine Furrer, based on maps from Moritz et al. 2006

Map 3: The Waza-Logone floodplain and location of research area.

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 125 2.1. The Ecosystem of the Logone floodplain With 11,000 km2, the Logone floodplain is the second most important inland wetland of the whole African Sahel, after the Inner Niger Delta in Mali. It is situated in the Lake Chad Basin and covers large territories in today’s Cameroon and Chad. The Cameroonian part of the floodplain, called the Waza-Logone floodplain, covers 6,000 km2. It is a large inundated area lying between the Logone River in the east and the Waza National Park in the west. It is a flat, featureless and roughly circular plain, less than 400 metres above sea level (Loth and Acreman 2004). The ecosystem of the Waza-Logone floodplain is influenced by the hydrological network of the Logone River. It forms a natural border between Cameroon and Chad, before and after its confluence with the river Chari, until the point of discharge into Lake Chad, a distance of 350 km. With the Logomatya and Lorome Mazra, the Logone drains water from seasonal tributary rivers in remote areas into the floodplain. The total area flooded yearly by these rivers in Cameroon is estimated to 12,000 km2 (Hughes & Hughes 1992). The flooding process of the plain depends on the short rainy season from June to September, with an annual average rainfall ranging from 750 mm in the south (Pouss) to less than 550 mm near Lake Chad (Loth and Acreman 2004). The level of the flooding is high between August and September and varies from one to two metres (Boutrais 1984). The annual contribution of the flood to the plain from the Logone has been calculated at 3.3 billion m3 and 8.5 billion m3 from direct precipitation (Hughes & Hughes 1992). With a soil made of black hydromorphic clays and vertisols from quaternary fluvial-lacustrine deposits, the desiccation of water is mainly through evaporation. Even though the mean annual temperature in the floodplain is 28°C, it can vary from a minimum of 16°C in December to 41°C in April. Thus, the loss of water due to evaporation is calculated as being 10.55 billion m3 per year (Hughes & Hughes 1992: 468). As in many other wetlands, the vegetation of the Logone floodplain is influenced by the depth and duration of the flooding. The area comprises the karal, which are areas partially inundated by water in the rainy season and the yaérés,2 which are permanently covered by the 2 Yaéré is a pullo (Fulbe) word meaning large floodplains. In the Logone area, this term corresponds to the large area between the Logone River in the East and the Waza

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floods (Boutrais 1984). In the yaérés, the vegetation mainly comprises perennial grasses; (Echinochloa stagnina, Vetiveria nigritana and Echinochloa spp.). After the retreat of the water, the floodplain is covered with green grasses. In areas where the annual flooding is less important, the vegetation is predominantly a woody savannah dominated by Acacia seyal, Balanites aegyptiaca, Borassus aethiopum and Hyphaene thebaica. This rich environment is attractive to thousands of wild animals. The Lake Chad Basin hosts two national parks among the most important in West Africa: the Waza and the Kalamaloue national parks. In the Waza National Park, for example, more than 30 species of wild mammals and 379 bird species have been identified (Loth et al. 2004). 2.2. Historical and ethnographic information on ethnic groups of the Logone floodplain For centuries, the south shores of Lake Chad have been considered the crossroads of people from diverse origins. The area attracted many population groups in search of better living conditions (fishermen, pastoralists, and hunters). It is also a place of convergence of various neighbouring pre-colonial empires such as the Bornou, Baguirmi and Kanem-Borno, who extended their political influence up to the Logone banks. Although people from the Kotoko ethnic group are recognised as traditional owners of the land, the area is also populated by people from other ethnic groups such as the Musgum, the Choa Arabs, the Massa, the Kanuri, the Fulbe, the Sara, and the Kabalay. Due to their demographic distribution and impact on the resources of the floodplains, interactions between the first three above-listed ethnic groups are the main focus of this paper. The Kotoko are recognised as descendants of the Sao, who developed an important civilisation on the shores of the Lake Chad in the 6th century BC. (Mveng 1969, Lebeuf 1973). After the collapse of their empire under the influence of the Kanembou, the rest of the population merged with local groups to form the Kotoko. Currently, they are subdivided into several principalities each of which is ruled by a centralised administration, led by a sultan called Mianré in the south (Logone Birni) and Mey in the northern part. With 7.7 % of the total population of the Waza-Logone floodplain (Kouokam and Ngantou National Park in the West. The word yaéré is often used and it is also the case in this paper, to designate the whole Waza-Logone floodplain (see Schrader 1986).

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 127 2000),3 the Kotoko are rather a minority group on their own land. They were converted to Islam by the Kanuri4 before the jihad of the Fulbe Moslems who dominated North Cameroon during the 19th century. However, up to now, they still believe in some local water spirits called “chiefs of the river” (mha laham). Their favourite marriage system is endogamy, but they are also exogamous and practice polygyny, as prescribed by the Muslim tradition. Their main livelihood is fishing. They consider this activity a noble “heritage” from their ancestors, while farming and cattle breeding are regarded as dirty activities. The Choa Arabs arrived in the area later than the Kotoko. Even if their presence is mentioned on the west banks of the Chari River during the 16th century, it is only in the 19th century that they immigrated into the area in large numbers searching for good pastures. They were a group of white Arabs, originating from the Choa Island in the Nile valley, who mingled with the black Sudanese during their migration towards the west (Hagenbucher 1977). The Choa Arabs are found nowadays around the Lake Chad in Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad. They are subdivided into several tribal groups without a central political government. In the floodplains, the most important subgroups are the sedentary agro-pastoralists called Salamat. But during the dry season many groups of Khawalme transhumant pastoralists, move in from Nigeria and spend up to six months in the yaérés to feed their animals on the fresh green grasses. The third group is constituted of Musgum, who immigrated only recently, but constitutes the biggest group with 35.9% of the total population (Kouokam and Ngantou 2000). Their massive arrival in the yaérés is traced back to 1920–1930 from the region of Pouss in the south. After consecutive domination by the Moslem empires of Borno and Baguirmi, most of them have been converted to Islam, but they still practice some of their local animistic rituals. They cannot really be considered as strictly pastoralists, but cattle do play a pivotal role in their social life and more specifically for the payment of dowry. They are at the same time fishermen and farmers. The most important groups of people in the floodplain are represented in the following table:

3 That data is the result of a census carried out in the Logone floodplain in 1997 by the Waza-Logone project, initiated by IUCN-Cameroon to restore the floodplain. 4 Data from an interview with Mahamat Liman Cherif, the canton head of Madiako in Logone Birni in June 2003.

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Table 1: Ethnic distribution of resource users in the Logone floodplain.5 Ethnic groups

Mobility

Livelihood strategies

Kotoko Musgum

Sedentary Sedentary

Logone floodplain Logone floodplain

Nomadic Nomadic

Logone floodplain Chari Delta (North to the floodplain) Nigeria Nigeria

Fishing, rain fed agriculture Farming, fishing, cattle breeding Choa Arabs Sedentary Farming, cattle breeding Semi-nomadic Farming, cattle breeding Fulbe

Cattle breeding Cattle or sheep breeding

Recognised place of residence

3. Common-pool resources and livelihoods 3.1. Characteristics of pastoral resources in the yaérés of Logone Although fishing and hunting can be considered as the oldest activities of the floodplain, pastoralism also has been practiced in the region for a long time. Some Choa Arab herders arrived in the area for the first time in the 16th century in search of good pastures for their cattle. Moreover, chronicles about the Musgum reveal that cattle were raised along the Logone river during the 16th or 17th century (Seignobos & Jamin 2003). Thus, for several centuries, the Lake Chad Basin had been used for dry season grazing. The availability of pastures is however, a tributary of the seasonal inundation of the floodplain. After the recession of the water, the transhumant pastoralists’ arrival is scheduled for November and January to allow animals to feed on the young shoots of grass, especially Vossia cuspidata and Echinochloa stagnina (Loth et al. 2004). This latter species, highly appreciated by the cattle, is found in depressions (ponds and canals) where the animals spend the day standing in the water. The Uudah Fulbe sheep keepers from Nigeria feed their animals on leaves of Acacia seyal and Acacia sieberiana in the woody savannah that is not inundated at that period of the year. Animals are watered in rivers and depressions which are also used for human consumption. Pastoral resources are increasingly depleting and pastoralists are forced to adopt many coping strategies based on

5 This table is based on information about resource users living or spending one part of the year in the area of Kalkoussam. This data may be different in other regions of the Logone floodplain. Source: Fokou 2008.

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 129 mobility and flexibility. Thus, they can split the family and the herd into many parts through a process called sendugo by the Fulbe. The old animals and the milking cows remain with families, while the healthiest ones take a different direction along with young herders to dry season pastures. The number of cattle per household varies according to families and ranges from 50 to 110 heads per household for nomadic and semisettled pastoralists, compared with 1 to 20 among sedentary keepers (Loth et al. 2004: 60). Additionally, the Fulbe nomads, the sedentary Kotoko and Musgum also keep small numbers of goats and sheep. Cattle keepers of the yaérés raise two types of local zebu (Bos indicus): the Arab zebus are called wadara and the Fulbe zebu are called aboore. The aboore is characterised by long horns and has an impressive sight. Recognised as the best animal for market speculations, the aboore is less adapted to the harsh living conditions of the floodplain than the wadara. The wadara is smaller than the Fulbe zebu, but well adapted to the rainy and flooding season. It is raised by sedentary groups. Among pastoral societies, milk production is of major importance for the household. It is used either for consumption or for commercial purposes. Due to the presence of transhumant pastoralists, milk production is higher in the floodplain during the dry season than in other neighbouring areas (Loth et al. 2004). Nevertheless, pastoralists unanimously agree that milk production has dropped significantly since the drought of 1984. 3.2. Economic activities and livelihood strategies Nowadays, more than 100,000 people use the floodplain area for fishing, dry season grazing and agriculture, which constitute the main livelihood sources for local people. The use of the floodplain is tributary to seasonal variation of the resources and specialisation of the users. As a pocket of resources, the Logone floodplain plays a pivotal role in the rural economy of the region. Sedentary people export fish and dry season sorghum (muskwari) to neighbouring countries such as Nigeria and Chad. The area also attracts pastoral people from other areas of Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad (Seignobos and Iyébi-Mandjek 2000). Sedentary Kotoko fish in the Logone River and in the yaérés, but their speciality is fishing in canals and ponds during the dry season, after recession of the water. When the flood is at its maximum level in September or October, they can fish wherever they please. On the other hand, when the water recedes and fish can be caught only in

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Fig. 5. Fishing canal, Kotoko, Logone floodplain, Cameroon: The traditional fishing canal technique of the Kotoko have now been more often applied in order to gain more fish and financial income. After the partly restoration of the floodplain through the Waza-Logone project from IUCN (The Return of the Water) more canals were constructed in order to profit from the new level of water. These canals now reduce fish reproduction and hinder nomads in their movements. Photograph by Tobias Haller.

depressions (around December and January), fishing activities are concentrated in reserves owned by families (Noray 2002). The Kotoko share fishing activities with the Musgum, who arrived in the area at the beginning of the 20th century.6 Their fishing technique consisting of digging canals to maximise their catches, has been recognised as a very productive fishing method for the floodplains (Drijver et al. 1995). Their catches are dried or smoked to be kept in stock. This fish can be sold on a weekly market to sustain the family needs. Among the Kotoko, farming is a marginal activity, they grow red millet in the rainy season for their consumption. Also, some of the Choa Arabs have shifted from semi-nomadism to a sedentary lifestyle, raising especially dry season sorghum, which is a very lucrative crop. Another important agricultural activity is rice cultivation, which is the specialty of people living close to Maga dam. However, crops are exposed to lack

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See more information in the study of Gabriela Landolt (same volume).

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 131 of water and destruction by birds, insects and cattle or elephants from the Waza National Park (see Bauer 2003). This is a similar problem faced by other people in the floodplains, studied in this volume, especially in Pangani River area (Mkomazi Game Reserve, see Mbeyale), Rufiji floodplain (Selous Game Reserve, see Meroka) and in Zambia (Lochinvar National Park, see Haller and Merten). In all cases it is, however, not only wild animals, but also access restrictions to the land, which are the effects of those protected areas in the floodplains. It is important to distinguish between two different types of pastoral activities in the floodplains: mobile pastoralism and agro-pastoralism. Transhumant people are Choa Arabs and Fulbe cattle breeders coming from Nigeria for dry season grazing. They can spend up to seven months, between November and July, in the floodplain, before returning to their wet season pastures. Even if pastoralism is the backbone of their economic activity, some of them are crop producers during the rainy season. Agro-pastoralists are sedentary Choa Arabs or Musgum cattle owners who combine this activity with fishing and farming. They have small stocks not exceeding 50 heads, and which are sometimes entrusted animals from the Kotoko or other families. Animals are mostly sold in the Nigerian markets of the neighbouring federal state of Borno, which is considered as “the lung of pastoral economy” in the Lake Chad Basin since pre-colonial times (Moritz 2003). Even if the total number of cattle sold weekly in the Logone floodplain is estimated at 300 animals, transhumant pastoralist households sell only a few number of cows per year for their basic needs: clothing, feeding, health care, taxes and also compensation payments following conflicts. The local economy is rather based on dairy commerce practised by Fulbe women. Farming is mostly done by the Musgum, who combine several overlapping production systems (fishing, cattle breeding and farming). While fishing is important for them (see also Landolt, this volume), they are seen by their neighbours as an agro-pastoral group whose livelihoods are based on rice and sorghum cultivation, while fishing and cattle keeping are complementary strategies. 4. The political, economic and institutional setup Institutions for CPR management have undergone several transformations in the Waza-Logone floodplain. The political setting has changed from a system conferring the leadership to the Kotoko elite, represented by village elders, to a new administration based on a

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central government. Two historical periods are clearly identified: one controlled by the local political organisation and the other by the state. In this paper, a distinction will be made between pre-independence and post-independence institutions. 4.1. Pre-independence setting Resource management in the floodplains before and during 1950s was dominated by colonial administration. European presence started in the area in 1902 when Germans, settled in the south since 1885, arrived in the Far North region of Cameroon. As consequence of their defeat during World War I, they were replaced in 1916 by the French, who received the mandate to rule this part of the country. The new administration has long relied on local political authorities. Traditionally, the Waza-Logone floodplain has been under the leadership of the Kotoko sultan of Logone Birni called Mianré. With a centralised government, he exercised power over this territory through a council of noblemen, district chiefs and representatives in villages. Each village was under the responsibility of a village head called blama, who was generally a descendant of the oldest family in the village. Later, the area was divided by the colonial administrators into nine cantons and the head of each was an intermediary between the blama at the village level and the Mianre. The Kotoko sultan was assisted by several noblemen, but in the traditional hierarchy, the position of one of them, called ngalway, was of critical importance in resource management. He was precisely the main person responsible for and in charge of pastoral activities. At the beginning of each grazing season, he was the contact person for mobile pastoralists in their negotiations for access to pasture. Other ethnic groups such as the Musgum or the Choa Arabs, considered outsiders, were excluded from the central political organisation. When the French colonial administration arrived in the floodplain, its aim was to improve the rural economy. In the pastoral domain, a new policy to improve livestock production was put in place, based on the so-called “politique de la viande.” This aimed to increase the supply of meat to urban consumers in the south (Moritz 2003). This policy was implemented through the creation of the “Service d’Elevage” or veterinary service. The purpose was to control diseases and parasites, to eradicate rinderpest and control tsetse flies, rampant in the region. This policy contributed in raising the quality and the quantity of the

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 133 meat. In the 1930s, the French administration planned to develop new infrastructures, financed by taxes levied on cash crop production (Njomaha and Pirot 2004) and pastoral activities. This was done in collaboration with local chiefs and relying on traditional tax collection mechanisms. Thus, nomadic pastoralists coming into the floodplain for dry season grazing were subject to the payment of taxes, collected by a commission comprising members of the veterinary services and local authorities from the sultanate. The funds collected were shared between traditional authorities and the colonial administration. Through this policy, the colonial administration intended to limit its interference in the affairs of the local chiefs. In fact, the collection of taxes was not a new practice in the area. The tax paid to local chiefs (djangal) refers to the haoussa appellation of the rights, for which pastoralists of northern Nigeria had to pay in order to obtain access to rangelands. In the past, before their arrival into the floodplains, nomadic pastoralists used to agree on a contract with sedentary populations (Moritz et al. 2002). They had to negotiate access and use of rangelands with local chiefs. The terms of the negotiations were for mobile pastoralists to pay taxes and tributes to the local Kotoko sultan who, in return, insured their access to pastures and their personal safety. In Logone Birni, this grazing tax called rwé kivih or “wealth grasses” was paid in kind (milk, butter, sheep, and goats) and collected by the ngalway. His role was not only to collect taxes, but also to control the implementation of the pastoral calendar in connection with fishing activities and to settle conflicts between pastoralists and the local population. His coordination function in the traditional management of the commonpool resources of the floodplain was critically important. The term djangal, which is still used today to designate grazing taxes paid by nomadic pastoralists to the municipality, is a testimony to the fact that the colonial administration did not abolish the old rule of paying taxes put in place by the Kotoko, but transformed it into a more systematic tax collection process, gradually replacing the ngalway by administrative officials. 4.2. Post-independence changes 4.2.1. Institutional transformations After the independence of Cameroon in January 1960, local chiefs were fully incorporated as auxiliaries of the new administration. They

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gilbert fokou Sous-préfet

Mianré/Sultan

District Chief

Mianré/Sultan

Nobleman

Blama Former political structure Source: Fokou 2008

Canton head

Blama Current political structure

Graph 1: The change from traditional to colonial political structure in the Logone floodplain.

were placed directly under the control of the divisional officer (souspréfet), the lowest authority in the administrative hierarchy (Moritz et al. 2002). This change had an impact on the participation of the local chiefs in the resource management because some of their privileges were taken over by the state. The “sous-préfet” has become the new “chief of the land” in the rural areas, a title formerly carried by traditional authorities. Even if this appellation is not a formal title, it however testifies the loss of power by local leaders. Pastoral affairs are handled by the municipalities and the technical service for animal husbandry. The participation of local leaders in tax collection has significantly dropped and today, they receive only 10% of the revenues. With the collapse of old management regimes, it became difficult for this leader to guarantee access to resources for immigrant pastoralists visiting his territory. Moreover, the “green revolution” policy launched in 1973 by the state to support production of crops gave priority to agricultural activities. In this process, some pastoral lands became state property through the land tenure reform of 19747 that encouraged private

7

The law 74-1 of 06/07/1974 on land tenure reform in Cameroon.

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 135 ownership. Lands that were not effectively used were considered as state property and could be used for common interest projects. This meant that areas of the floodplains formerly used by pastoralists for dry season grazing fell into the category of state property. On the other hand, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) was created in 1964 by the states of Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger and Chad. Its mission was to contribute to a sustainable management of resources in the Lake Chad area. One of the important issues was the regulation of access of pastoral communities from LCBC countries to pastures in the floodplain. In their contribution to ecological sustainability, a total of 23 artificial ponds were dug in the yaérés and 250 km of rural roads were constructed in the area to facilitate access of animals to those ponds. This institutional and infrastructural change was initiated in order to regulate and facilitate pastoral activities of various groups. Unfortunately most of the time, pastoralists moving into the floodplains complained about the amount of taxes charged by the municipalities. Since the 1970s, the municipal council of each administrative unit visited by nomadic pastoralists has to decide on the amount of taxes representing a sort of “ecological tax” foreign herders have to pay for the use of the rangelands. Those fees ranging from $1 to $2 USD per head of cattle are considered by nomadic pastoralists too high, since their Cameroonian counterparts do not pay for the same resources. Additionally, the creation of new administrative units by the state is perceived as a strategy to impose new taxes. 4.2.2. The Logone floodplain under national economic changes Lake Chad area economic activities formerly based on slave and cattle export turned to cash-crop production during the colonial period. This change resulted from the colonial policy to encourage agricultural production. For many decades, the national economy was based on coffee, cocoa, timber, groundnut and cotton exports. People were encouraged by the colonial and post-colonial administrations to increase the production of those crops. In this respect, the French administration contributed to importing, testing and diffusing new seeds of groundnuts from Nigeria and other West African countries (Njomaha and Pirot 2004). The state policy of increasing and commercialising agricultural production for export gradually pushed local people into the cash market economy. The new taxation policy of the colonial administration had the same effect on nomadic people. The transformation of

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the traditional djangal from a tribute in kind to a tax in money also contributed to push more pastoralists to the market (Moritz 2003). After independence, state efforts were focused on stepping up agricultural production through the “green revolution” policy for food self-sufficiency. In the Logone floodplain, this policy led to the intensification of rice cultivation, based on a large-scale irrigated project created in 1954 called SEMRY.8 This first project was extended and became SEMRY I in Yagoua (in 1971). It was later expanded to other regions of the floodplain and precisely to Maga (SEMRY II in 1977) and Kousseri (SEMRY III in 1978). But in order to avoid the high costs of pump irrigation, the government decided to build a dam in order to create Lake Maga (Njomaha and Pirot 2004). In 1986, the SEMRY project led to the production of more than 100,000 tonnes of paddy rice on 13,000 hectares of land in collaboration with 22,000 farmers. But at the same time, the country entered a severe economic crisis with many consequences for the rural population. It led to severe salary reductions, a retrenchment of government officials and finally a devaluation of CFA franc in 1993. Many people had no other option than relying on natural resources for their subsistence. There was more pressure on the land as the area available for agricultural production and pastures was reduced. Additionally, with low salaries, state officials turned to corruption to supplement their income. The economic crisis of the mid-1980s, which affected Cameroon and many other African countries, had many negative effects on rural population. The government embarked upon a series of economic reform programs supported by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) beginning in the late 1980s. Many of these measures have been painful for the local population. The prices of agricultural products collapsed, while the prices for pesticides inversely increased exponentially. In 2000, Cameroon became eligible for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), but the economic crisis remains, making local common-pool resources such as fisheries and pasture for cattle, one of the most important sources of cash income (Fokou and Haller 2008).

8

SEMRY: Société d’Expansion et de Modernisation de la Riziculture de Yagoua.

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 137 4.2.3. Driving external factors to institutional change in the Logone floodplain In the Logone floodplains, institutions regulating access to CPR and pastures have undergone many transformations, especially since independence. This is due to several factors, including demographic pressure, market economy, technological and political changes. The consequence of poor climatic conditions characterised in recent decades by severe droughts and a gradual reduction of the annual rainfall, have increased the pressure on the floodplain resources.The Maga dam construction in 1979 follows a relatively long period of low average rainfall, that some called the worst drought in the area’s history (Scholte 2005). In the yaérés of Logone, the Musgum became more numerous and started challenging the Kotoko management regime. On the western border, the migration of Choa Arabs from Nigeria, whose activities were concentrated on areas closed to Waza, has been restricted by the transformation of the Waza Game Reserve into the Waza National Park in 1968, in which all activities were declared illegal (Bauer 2003, Fokou and Haller 2008; see also cases in Tanzania (Mkomazi and Selous, as well as in Zambia (Kafue Flats), and in Botswana (Okavango Panhandle, see Mbeyale, Meroka, Haller and Merten, Saum this volume)). At that time, which corresponded to the beginning of the drought of 1969–1973, masses of pastoralists arrived in the interior parts of the floodplains (Seignobos 2000). In these areas with mixed social and ethnic groups and diverse patterns of resource use, the rules did not mean the same to everybody. So what happened? Although immigration constitutes a potential time bomb under the integration of conservation and development (Scholte 2003), new infrastructures are also drivers of institutional changes in the floodplains. The Waza National Park mentioned before, was created for the conservation of biodiversity. However, it contributed to the exclusion of many groups of users, especially pastoralists from a large area of the 1,700 km2 floodplain, stepping up the pressure on other areas (Fokou and Haller 2008). The most important infrastructural change was the construction of the Maga dam in 1979 to store water from the Logone River for irrigation. This initiative had significant negative impacts on the downstream environment, local people and their livelihoods. Fishing in canals dug to connect the river to the depression, demonstrated as part of local know-how of the Kotoko, was intensified during this critical period and has changed the hydrological regime, draining water from inner depressions to rivers and creeks earlier than usual

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(Loth et al. 2004). This process affects the quality of pastures and leads to overgrazing. Similar negative impacts can be seen in other cases of this volume, such as in Zambia (Kafue Flats, see Haller and Merten) and in Mali (see Beeler and Frei). However, new market opportunities opened to various groups of resource users clearly explained their attitude. Since pre-colonial times, the state of Borno in Nigeria has been the economic centre of the Lake Chad area. Even today, the major number of cattle from Chad and Cameroon are still sold in that state. However, commercial activities in the area are facilitated by the construction of a tarred road connecting Kousseri, the most important town close to the floodplains, to large cities like N’Djamena, the capital city of Chad and Maroua the main town of the Far-North region of Cameroon. One of the economic drivers of institutional change was the changes in prices for cattle and fish in local markets. Livestock keeping and fishing became important activities, while other production strategies were stagnant or decreasing.9 Between 1980 and 2003, prices for cattle were increasing, although not much by one to two-fold and three-fold for fish. Prices for sorghum increased four-fold, but the extremely high volatility of sorghum prices is due to changes in droughts and therefore not so interesting an asset. In addition, sorghum is heavy and has to be transported to towns for sale. If sold locally, the prices are much lower (see also Haller 2003), while prices for cattle and fish are increasing more steadily. For cattle, although there has been a decline in the 1990s, since then, there was a steady growth up to 2001. Table 2 also indicates that selling cattle in towns can make a 20 to 30% profit. On the other hand, salaries for administrators were decreasing or stagnating and prices for cotton (not indicated here but see Haller 2001, 2003) have been decreasing worldwide threefold from 1980 to 2000, while US-American production was heavily subsidised (UNCTAD 2003). Cameroon also experienced the downward trend between 1980 and the mid 1990s, although afterword prices rose only a little and did not match the high prices for fertilizers. As in the mid 1980s and in the early 1990s, people are not now interested in producing cotton.10

9

Price changes are controlled for the devaluation of the CFA which took place in the mid 1990ties. 10 New dates of the last three to four year indicate that prices were falling greatly and that local producers do not seem to be interested to produce cotton, while only

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 139 Table 2: Changes in relative prices between 1980 and 2003 (Prices in FCFA). Years

Cattle price (bull)

Sorghum price (per Kilo)

Fish price per sack of 100 kilo

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 – 1990 1991 1992 – 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 – 2003

127490 118905 99055 92475 93240 – 95000 77000 68709 – 60269 97697 106000 111000 98000 112000 167000 167000 – 138528

55 67 114 70 128 – 135 106 55 – 100 76 103 140 249 73 55 179 – 184

25000 25000 30000 40000 40000 – 32000 32000 35000 – 35000 40000 50000 50000 50000 50000 55000 55000 – 62100

Moritz 2003;11 Fokou 2008

Table 3: Estimated price differences of cattle. Context

Estimated prices Estimated Estimated prices of calves prices of cows of bulls (FCFA) (FCFA) (FCFA)

Rural

15/25000

50/115000

90/200000

Urban

23/35000

75/160000

125/245000

Price difference (%) 20–30

Source: Fokou 2008

in 2008 priced did recover again (see Tansa Musa: Africa.reuters.com/country/CM/ news/usnLC77735.htm). 11 Sources: Data on prices of cattle and sorghum from 1980 to 2001 are from (Moritz, 2003). Data on prices of cattle, sorghum and fish in 2003 are from our own investigations. Data on fish prices from 1980 to 2001 are from estimations with an official of the fishing department in Kousseri. Fish prices differ according to species and those mentioned in this table are prices of Alestes sp.

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Table 4: Estimated salary of basic administrators in the last 25 years in FCFA. 1980

1994

2006

115000 90000

92000 72000

92000 72000

Source: Fokou 2008

As cattle were seen more and more—together with fish—as a means of diversifying and securing livelihoods to make a living and earn cash, this change in relative prices is of great importance. Not much hope is seen in other crops due to decreasing or stagnating prices, with rising production costs and a highly volatile nature and decreasing official salaries. The process of democratisation also has played a critical role in the transformation of institutions in the floodplains. In the past, the Choa Arabs and the Musgum had to respect the rules of the Kotoko, since the latter were seen as the owners of the lands. However, since 1991, those groups, especially the Musgum, who are at the same time pastoralists, farmers and fishermen, have ceased recognising the exclusive rights of the Kotoko. In their view, Kotoko rules are only valid for the Kotoko (Drijver et al. 1995). This new perception is based on the notion of “democracy” which, to them, means the freedom to feel at home wherever they are and also the opportunity to use the resources as they please. Thus, institutions for CPR management especially pastures, have been deeply transformed in the Lake Chad Basin into more formal rules. But the most important question is how those transformations are going on at the micro-level of the village, camp or household. How do people’s interests and opportunities affect their incentive to contribute to a sustainable resource management? 5. Relationship between common-pool resources users in the Waza-Logone area In the Logone floodplain, the use of pastoral resources is basically linked to activities of the sedentary populations. Those groups have different livelihoods with different degrees of specialisation, ranging from fishing to agriculture and livestock keeping. In the past, these activities were organised through a timing imposed by the seasonal

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 141 availability of natural resources. Today, these rules have changed due to increased scarcity of resources. In some areas such as the shores of Lake Chad, dry season agriculture has been intensified on areas formerly recognised as pasture lands at that period of the year. In the Logone floodplain, Khawalme pastoralists increasingly arrive when fishing is still going on. The Kotoko people, who claim to have lived in the floodplain since time immemorial and who believe they are the rightful owners of and rulers over the land (Lebeuf 1969), have arrangements with pastoralists for access and use of resources according to their fishing calendar. But the management of those resources today involves diverse groups of actors from various origins and interests. Therefore, we will not only focus on general trends but we will also illustrate interactions for common-pool resources with fieldwork data from the Kotoko village of Kalkoussam (Sultanate of Logone-Birni) belonging to the WazaLogone area (see map 1). 5.1. Groups of actors involved in pastoral resource management Various groups with divergent interests are involved in the resource utilisation and management in the floodplain. They range from sedentary farmers and fishermen to state officials and international organisations. It is not easy to make a clear distinction between those groups of actors, when it appears that many farmers take the opportunity during the slack period of high water to fish, while other farmers keep livestock (Loth et al. 2004: 53). Although they do not keep the animals themselves, some Kotoko fishermen own cattle. Some local leaders can also be placed in several categories. Apart from their role of traditional leaders, they are active in the fishing and pastoral activities. They are also auxiliaries of the administration and members of the ruling political party. Nevertheless, actors can be classified into three different groups (Fokou et al. 2004). The first is constituted of people who depend partially or totally on the floodplains for their livelihoods. They are fishermen, farmers, pastoralists, traders and local authorities. The second group is made up of decision-makers such as administrative, municipal and military authorities, technical service officials and park authorities. The last group comprises NGOs, regional and international organisations for rural development active in the region. However, the distinction should go beyond those characteristics since access to resources

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today is sometimes based on criteria such as ethnicity, nationality and bargaining power. 5.1.1. The natural resource users in Kalkoussam Interactions between resource users in the village of Kalkoussam, where major fieldwork had been done, are focused on activities of fishermen, farmers, pastoralists and traders. Fishing is the main activity of the Kotoko. Some of them own canals and ponds, which are very productive during the dry season. Additionally the Kotoko are active in rice and red millet cultivation during the rainy season. Women are engaged in fish processing (drying) and some women have small kiosks where they sell various stuffs to pastoralists. Richer Kotoko men own cattle that they entrust to neighbouring people and to nomadic pastoralists as well. In Kalkoussam, only one family has decided to keep part of their animals in the village. The cattle of the other Kotoko are looked after by Musgum and Choa Arabs agro-pastoralists from neighbouring villages. These two groups combine cattle herding with crop cultivation, especially dry season sorghum. In Kalkoussam, fishing canals and ponds are exclusively owned by Kotoko families. Musgum from neighbouring villages have been excluded from the management of this key resource for a long time. But with the democratisation process, the Musgum are increasingly gaining power and appear as the new “masters of the land.” Pastoralists in the strictest sense are the Choa Arabs of the Khawalme tribe who settle their camps near sedentary villages during the dry season. Every year from January to June, Kalkoussam is visited by a dozen camps of Choa Arab transhumant pastoralists. The other group of pastoralists is the Uudah Fulbe pastoralists. Fulbe shepherds are regularly in conflict with authorities, who consider their activities as environmentally destructive. As foreigners, they have to pay grazing taxes to local administrative authorities. Local authorities (Sultan, canton head, and blama) are also considered natural resource users, as their livelihood strategies rely directly or indirectly on fishing or livestock keeping. Most of them, like the headman of Kalkoussam, own fishing canals, which are often a source of problems with pastoralists. At the same time, compensations and fines paid during the resolution of conflicts are one of the most lucrative sources of income for those chiefs (see Moritz et al. 2002). However, the influence of state officials has seriously reduced the influence of those authorities. Besides this distinction between the different

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 143 actors according to their activities, it appears that the differences between local and non-local actors, national and foreign, are of major importance to the understanding of interactions between groups of resource users. 5.1.2. The “hakoma” or new decision-makers group This group of actors is composed of state officials appointed in this region and the elected members of the district council. Even if they are from diverse sources of power, all of them are considered by the population as the “hakoma” or government authorities. In this group, the municipality appears as the new structure in charge of pastoral affairs. Elected by people of the whole subdivision of Logone Birni12 for five years, members of the municipal council are mandated to collect taxes and provide better living conditions to nomadic pastoralists. But most of the time, herders complain that the aim of the municipality is just to collect council fees, while nothing is done to guarantee their security and rights on the resources. These authorities collaborate with technical services in charge of agriculture and rural development (MINADER),13 environment (MINEP)14 and livestock and fisheries (MINEPIA).15 Additional to tax payment, international transhumant pastoralists are also subject to sanitary inspection conducted by veterinary services of MINEPIA. They have to issue a “laissez passer de transhumance” for international herders. Additionally, technical services collaborate with government authorities at the local level, such as the Sous-préfet and police force (gendarmes), to solve conflicts between resource users. Appointed by the department of natural conservation, the park authorities of Waza and Kalamaloue contribute to the conservation and protection of biodiversity in these natural reserves. Most of the time, they are in conflict with the surrounding populations, especially pastoralists entering the park illegally.

12 The municipality of Logone Birni covers a large territory of more than 1.441 k2 representing the major part of the Logone floodplain. 13 MINADER: Ministère de l’Agriculture et du développement rural (this department was called MINAGRI: Ministère de l’Agriculture during the field research in 2004). 14 MINEP: Ministère de la protection de la nature (this department was part of the MINEF: Ministère de l’Environnement et des Forêts until december 2004). 15 MINEPIA: Ministère de l’Elevage des Pêches et des Industries Animales (department of animal husbandary and fishing).

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5.1.3. International organisations This group of actors is constituted of organisations with technical skills and financial means, which contribute to the support of local livelihoods through specific projects. The construction of the Maga Dam in 1979 and the droughts of the 1980s have reduced the extent of flooding over the yaérés, reducing drastically the availability of natural resources such as fish and pasture. To mitigate the effects of these changes, the Waza Logone Project was initiated in the 1990s by the World Conservation Union (IUCN). The objective of the project was to improve hydrological conditions and involve local communities in the wetland management to “restore the good life” (Ngantou and Braund 1999) after the “return of the water” (Loth et al 2004). Although the full impact of the project is still awaited by the populations in Kalkoussam, the living conditions in the floodplain have been improved partly, because more water is now released from the Maga dam and population is involved to a certain extent in resource management of the floodplain. In this category, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), responsible for coordinating the rivers flowing into the lake, has also contributed to rural development in the floodplain. This organisation is of critical importance in this area where water and other resources can be extended beyond national boundaries. The LCBC has helped to put in place regulations to facilitate international trade between member countries. Those regulations concern transit taxes, trekking routes and vaccination requirements. 5.2. Relationship between different groups of actors In Kalkoussam, access to resources for nomadic pastoralists is conditioned by the fulfilment of some conditions. While the Cameroonian herders have free access to rangelands, those from Nigeria and Chad have to show a “laissez-passer” and pay council fees before entering the floodplain. Thus, their first contact is with municipal authorities in charge of collecting council fees. Most of the time, pastoralists do not trust those authorities, because they regard taxes collected as being an unreasonable charge. Some nomadic groups, with more bargaining power, have particular arrangements with tax collectors for special advantages. The mayor of Logone Birni, (2002–2007) who is of Arab origin, is regularly accused by the local population of favouring herders from his ethnic group in exchange for cash for himself.

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 145 Moreover, pastoralists and local fishermen or farmers have permanent interactions which are not always based on conflicting relations as one might suppose. Farmer-pastoralist clashes are well known in Africa where most of the time, crops are damaged by animals or pasture lands invaded by farmers (Moritz 2006). The Logone floodplain is not an exception, even though interactions in Kalkoussam are mostly between pastoralists and fishermen. Special arrangements exist between both groups, with a certain degree of good collaboration. One of the arrangements is the practice of amana (“trust”). Practised differently in each society, amana makes it possible for local farmers or fishermen to entrust their cattle to sedentary or nomadic pastoralists. In Kalkoussam, those arrangements exist between Kotoko, sedentary Musgum, Choa Arabs and nomadic pastoralists from Nigeria. However in the village, only 28% of the households are cattle owners, representing a secondary source of income. Even if commercial activities are intensified with the arrival of pastoralists, some people do not always appreciate their presence in the area, because the animals often damage crops and fishing canals. Conflicts that emerge between resources users are sometimes viewed as an opportunity for traditional and government authorities to generate additional income. As a proverb from the pastoral milieu says, “the goat grazes wherever it is tied.” Interactions between state services are often characterised by conflicts of competence and interests. Misunderstanding of the definition of user rights often leads to conflicts between the municipality and some technical service officials, like those in charge of environment protection. When the municipality receives grazing taxes, the boundary of resources and regulations for their use are not clearly defined and they sometimes used resources prohibited by other laws. On the field, they need wood to build their temporary houses called “kuzi.” They also require branches to surround animal parks in order to prevent them from roaming in the neighbourhood at night. Uudah shepherds need to feed their animals with leaves of certain species of acacias. Environmental department officials, who consider those practices as ecologically destructive, charge them heavily. The complaints of the pastoralists to municipal authorities, whom they recognise officially, lead to conflicts between council members and state officials. One of the groups, who take advantage of the arrival of pastoralists, is the traders. They are women who are more active and more

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independent during that season, because they can intensify commercial relations with nomadic people. Pastoralists visiting their village everyday are their favourite clients. They sell foodstuffs, cereals, and dried fish. During the dry season, women contribute more than 30% to household income (Fokou 2008). But, the most speculative activity in the area at that time is the commercialisation of “tamali” or supplementary animal food from cottonseed cake. In Kalkoussam, this supplementary food is sold at about $20 USD per sack of 50 kilograms and is an important seasonal source of income for a few traders (four) in the village. These examples of relationships between groups of users of the floodplains show that actors are very heterogeneous and the strategies initiated depend on the interests of individuals. 5.3. Institutional arrangements for access and use of pastoral resources in the yaéré-Damardi During the last fifty years, local institutions for access to rangelands in the floodplains have been challenged by more formal rules put in place by government authorities. The change in the political set up is only one of the factors that have contributed to weakening the power of local authorities, who lost control over the management of natural resources. However, traditional norms have not been completely dismantled. Thus at the same time, groups of resource users rely on bureaucratic and culturally embedded institutions. Each year between January and June, transhumant pastoralists grazing their cattle on dry season reserves, crowd the yaéré-Damardi close to Kalkoussam. In the past, their arrival on the floodplain was preceded by negotiations with the local Kotoko sultan of Logone Birni through the ngalway. Those nomadic populations arrived in the floodplain by two transhumance routes called “trubo,” passing through Zigague and Dabanga on the Nigerian border, where the collection of djangal or tributes for the mianré was organised. However, information about this tribute is not clear. Some informants called it tax, which means that it was an obligation for pastoralists to pay. Others, mostly the pastoralists, agree that the so-called tribute was just a “gift” without any obligation (see Seignobos and Iyebi-Mandjek 2000). Was it a tax or a gift? The constant fact from these various discourses is that access and use of pastoral resources in the floodplain were not open to all, but controlled by regulations put in place by local authorities, through

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 147 payment of a tax in kind. Moreover, pastoral trekking movements to the floodplain depended on the availability of grasses and water, itineraries of rival or relative groups, outbreaks of epizootics and relations with sedentary villagers. This historical background shows that regulations for access to the floodplain by pastoralists were structured by multi-level negotiations with authorities and local populations. Nowadays, at Dabanga or Zigague, they need a “laissez passer de transhumance” from the veterinary services testifying that their animals are in good health. Above all, they have to pay to the municipality of Logone Birni, a grazing tax or djangal for a total amount of $2 USD per head of cattle. Then on their arrival in Kalkoussam, they have to negotiate with the Kotoko fishermen for access to canals close to the village at the end of the fishing season. They feed their cattle far from the canals up to the point where the water retreats completely into the river and ponds. A few years ago, they noticed the extension of fishing canals by a family at Damardi and the animals could not find their way to watering points. They complained to the blama, who could not solve the problem, because the canal under consideration was a familial heritage and the owners did not want to negotiate with pastoralists they considered as invaders. Due to the increasing scarcity of resources, pastoralists started contesting the timing imposed by the Kotoko fishermen and their arrival in the area was scheduled when the fishing activities were still going on and frequently, their animals caused serious damage to fishing canals. Local people continued intensifying canals and on their arrival in February 2003, livestock destroyed most of the walls and fishing activities were impossible in muddy water. Many cases have been reported to the blama of Kalkoussam. It is always difficult for him to resolve such conflicts because he is himself a key actor. As member of a founding family of the village, this local chief is among the few people who own a fishing canal in the area. Since many conflicts are connected to his canal, the local authority is at the same time a plaintiff and a mediator. Most of the time, conflicts are solved “à l’amiable” or between both parties at the local level. The reason for choosing this process is that nomadic people dislike it when conflicts are reported to the authorities of Logone Birni, as the latter require a lot of money before the problem is solved. Cases of conflict resolution are illustrative of the relationships between the sedentary Kotoko and the nomadic people. When conflicts

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arise, all the members of the village are never unanimous on what decisions to take. There are generally two positions: the first generally held by fishermen, especially the canal owners, is that transhumant pastoralists should be excluded because they interfere with fishing activities; the second group argues that a local solution should be found, since both communities have lived together so long in peace and collaboration. The collaboration refers to the arrangements that some members of this group have with Choa Arab pastoralists. In Kalkoussam, those households that have cattle (28%) are in a situation of amana. They have entrusted their cattle to the care of those people with whom they need to have good relations. They are also less radical towards sedentary Arabs and especially, Musgum pastoralists, with whom cohabitation is seen to be difficult by the other households. Sedentary Choa Arabs and Musgum also keep cattle and combine animal husbandry with farming and fishing. Considered “foreigners,” up to recently, they had to follow the rules of the Kotoko elite. The diversification of their activities allowed them to gain more bargaining power when fishing production declined dramatically and the Kotoko were no longer able to maintain their leading position. Most of their capital was invested in cattle, which constitute a less risky enterprise. Cattle are a more valuable source of income, as pastures are available most of the time. Additionally, as Cameroonians, they do not need to pay any grazing tax. The relationships between these local pastoralists and their nomadic counterparts are never good. Even the sedentary Choa Arabs, who are of the same ethnic origin as the Khawalme, are not enthusiastic about their arrival. This may be due to the fact that it is more costly for local pastoralists to compete for access to pastures and water during the dry season. There are no special arrangements between the sedentary and nomadic pastoralists of Kalkoussam and resources are free to everyone. This can be explained by tradition—, none of those groups considered outsiders were owners of the land. The land is owned exclusively by the Kotoko. However, as sedentary communities like the Musgum claim more rights on the resources, they would like to exclude mobile herders. They consider the arrival of nomadic people as a “hold-up” on their own territory and try to articulate new rules to secure their livelihoods. Thus, in some Musgum villages owning livestock, local people have delimited their grazing reserves, excluding outsiders from the rich pastures near their village. Only people from their village are allowed to feed their cattle on these reserves. For those local users, transhumant

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 149 people have nothing to lose if resources decrease irremediably, because they will move to a different pastureland. Their attitude is especially enhanced by the difficulties of sedentary pastoralists to realise substantial profit from their cooperation with nomadic people, who are competing with them for the resources. Contrary to the Kotoko, they do not have fishing canals they could exchange with nomadic people in the amana institutions. Relationships of the Musgum with nomadic people are also marked by accusation of cattle theft. The Musgum are recognised in the whole floodplain as cattle raiders and many pastoralists avoid negotiating with them. Thus, institutional arrangements for access and use of pastoral resources in Kalkoussam show that in this region of the Logone floodplain many rules have changed during the last fifty years. State authorities are now responsible for regulating access to pastures by collecting taxes and monitoring the health of the herd. Nevertheless, there are many negotiations at the local level, depending on the interest of each group of users in an environment where resources are getting scarcer. 5.4. Ideological justification for access to common-pool resources by the new masters of the land in the Logone floodplain Arrangements between groups of resource users in the floodplain show that nomadic pastoralists have to negotiate access to natural resources with government authorities as well as with the sedentary population. They have to respect the rules of the Kotoko fishermen, settled on strategic sites near rivers and ponds. Even if the tribute they had to pay in the past to local authorities has been replaced by a more formal grazing tax levied by the municipality, the sultan of Logone Birni still has an influential position. Each year, he organises a general tour of his sultanate, which is an opportunity for him to show that he is still the master of the land. The question now is, to what extent are rules of the local Kotoko still respected? This issue can be examined through an analysis of the relative bargaining power of different groups of actors, when resources are decreasing. Earlier, the Kotoko had privileged rights to control certain key resources such as fishing ponds and canals as well as the distribution of lands, which have almost disappeared today. This can be explained by many factors ranging from demographic growth to climatic, political and economic changes. However, it is possible to define two main ideologies or emic representation by groups of users to justify the present situation.

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5.4.1. Tax payment as justification for open access Market economy and the new value of money have changed relationships with natural resources. The grazing tax introduced by the colonial administration simply is seen as a conversion of the old grazing right (djangal) paid to local authorities in kind by pastoralists, into a cash payment (Moritz 2003). This had the effect of pushing many pastoralists into the market economy and money gained greater value. Cattle and other goods could be bought and sold in cash. Even though barter still exists today, most of the transactions are done with money. Access to the floodplain is allowed on the payment of council fees that are considered very high by nomadic people ($2 USD/head). The consequences of these taxes on resource use are that the seasonal user rights have been transformed into property rights. After paying taxes, the nomadic groups claim that they have “purchased the floodplain” and therefore, they can use it as freely as they please. In their view, sedentary fishermen or farmers who do not pay anything, have “no right on the resources and their old rules are valid only for their selfish interests.” This opinion is usually expressed when conflicts emerge over the destruction of fishing canals by cattle. The Uudah shepherds, who have to feed small stock on the leaves of Acacia seyal and Acacia sieberiana, use the same ideology to justify their action, when they are accused by officials from the MINEP of destroying the woody savannah of the yaérés. This new “property right” is exercised by some Choa Arab pastoralists who consider that they are within their rights to dig private wells in the yaérés to water their cattle. Some families have been using the area of Abaoui (about 10 km from Kalkoussam) as their permanent dry season grazing site. The reason is that for 20 years, they have dug private wells in the area. Each year, they set up camp in the same place and therefore, people from other clans or camps have to move farther to find pastures. The case of Abaoui is just an illustration of a general process currently going on in the whole floodplain, where pastoralists are digging private wells using modern techniques (motor-pumps) to pull water out for their animals. Since they have to incur high costs to dig and restore the wells and to ensure that they are not destroyed by cattle or elephants, they prevent others from watering their cattle there (Fokou 2003). These activities of nomadic people can be viewed as a consequence of the inability of the state to control activities in remote areas. It can also be analysed as an outcome of a new ideology used by these pas-

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 151

Fig. 6. Arab Choa Cattle herd in the Logone Floodplain: As pastures are now de facto open access, nomads (Arab Choa and others) often come to the floodplain before the fishing seasons is over. Paying taxes to the states equals free access and lack of coordination between nomads and fishermen. Photograph by Tobias Haller.

toralists to justify their resource use. They shifted from a system of moral economy, where rights for access to resources were determined by a “gift” to the local authorities, to a new market system where they are asked to pay large amounts of money that they perceive as giving them property rights. 5.4.2. The notion of democracy as the right to open access The second ideology, mostly used by the sedentary populations in the Logone floodplain to justify their use of resources, is inspired by the notion of democracy. The Musgum and the Choa Arab pastoralists no longer accept the exclusive rights of the Kotoko authorities and their exclusion from resources (fisheries and pastures). The Kotoko management regime collapsed, obviously due to the effects of environmental change and erosion of local power. However, the 1990s constituted a turning point with the introduction of the democratic process and a multi-party system that eroded the supremacy of the Kotoko and gave more power to the “foreigners.” Since 1991, the Musgum and the Choa Arabs found another opportunity to challenge the Kotoko authority.

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However, the change in power relations in the area is difficult to understand without reference to the national political context of Cameroon. This political arena is marked by historical alliances between various ethnic groups and the central administration. After independence, the Kotoko community was the ally of the central government in north Cameroon. The political regime of Ahmadou Ahidjo, the first president of Cameroon, had close relationships with the Kotoko elite and state officials were recruited particularly among people from this ethnic group. When a new regime came to power in 1982, the Kotoko lost their privileges. Paul Biya’s government tried to reduce their hegemony by making new alliances with the Choa Arabs. It was not surprising that in 1991, with the return to a multi-party system, the Arabs as well as the Musgum, both considered outsiders joined the ruling party, the Cameroon People Democratic Movement (CPDM) in large numbers. The Kotoko, on their part, joined the opposition parties (Socpa 2002). As a majority group, the Arabs and the Musgum had it easier in the competition for more favourable positions. These changes led to a different perception of the domination of the Kotoko in the floodplain. Even though the Choa Arabs and the Musgum will continue to dominate the political arena for a long time, their notions of democracy are interesting for their consequences on the resource management. Democracy, for many Musgum and Choa Arabs, is more than the administration of the people through fair and transparent elections. It is rather the freedom to feel at home wherever they are, since they constitute the majority group and have the state to protect them. With this new position, they claim more rights on the resources of the area, because they are in their country and cannot longer accept the domination of a minority group. Several members of the Musgum and Arab elite are, therefore, presently engaged in investing wealth in social capital, in order to have more favourable positions as political party members, canton heads and parliamentarians (Van Est 1999). Thus, democracy has strengthened the feeling of belonging to the Logone floodplain among outsiders. 5.4.3. Open access and privatisation tendencies: A paradox or a sign of legal pluralism? Democratisation and paying taxes have contributed to the notion of being free to do whatever one wants and therefore to an egalitarian open access. Those changes led to the collapse of Kotoko management regimes and fisheries and pasture, too, became free to all, especially

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 153 for groups such as the Musgum who had been excluded before. On the other hand, there are situations where powerful users try to privatise common-pool resources, if it is possible to do so. In this area however, the privatisation is informal and can take two forms: first, it can be a strategy for powerful users trying to secure their rights over floodplain resources, which are getting scarcer. Privatisation, in that case, is a way to prevent the uncertainties of the future by guaranteeing access to resources. Secondly, privatisation can be a strategy for local administrators to generate personal income. Their gains could be more substantial if groups of users in the area rely on this type of informal institution. The reinforcement of private ownership by some groups to the resources (fishing ponds and channels, land and waterholes of pastoralists) would increase the encroachment of groups excluded by these new regulations. In a context of institutional pluralism, these regulations are not yet formally codified and lead to conflict outbreaks. Thus, informal privatisation constitutes a profitable means of accumulation for local administrators, because they will use their role of adjudicator to generate benefits. Today, sedentary and nomadic resource users no longer respect local rules of access and use of common-pool resources of the Kotoko. They claim a right to exploit fishing reserves without permission and they use forbidden techniques. They fish in other people’s ponds and let their animals damage the crops or fishing canals. Since democracy gives freedom, these people claim more rights of CPR in the floodplain. As new “masters of the land,” they would also like to craft new rules to secure their livelihoods and to leave resources open for them. This may explain why the process of digging fishing canals has been intensified along the rivers in these last few decades. The Musgum pastoralists, sensing a threat to their livelihoods from “new outsiders” who are nomadic people, create new rules for access to grazing reserves and exclude those who are not from their village. The local Kotoko are left powerless and have almost lost their privileges concerning access and control of key resources (fish, pastures). This leads inevitably to conflicts, which are often a coping strategy for many people. Open access situations due to failure of the state or unclear incentives are similar in Zambia, where the state cannot and will not enforce fishery and wildlife institutions and where local institutions are eroding. Similarly, however, tendencies for privatisation and even remaining commons regulations might hold. Local Ila and Balundwe people also feel hopeless as citizenship and free movement allows outsiders to profit from resources (Haller and Merten). The Inner Niger Delta,

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Rufiji and Pangani River Basin area also shows similar developments (see Beeler and Frei, Meroka, Mbeyale in this volume). 6. Conflicts over common-pool resources in the Logone Floodplain The most violent conflicts in the Lake Chad area in past years were connected to the hegemony of the Kotoko and the Choa Arabs (Socpa 1999), who have been engaged in a struggle for power since precolonial times. In addition to those large-scale conflicts ending sometimes in bloodshed, there are other confrontations at the micro-level, often as violent as the first type, over local resource management. Ethnically oriented or not, conflicts in the Logone floodplains are due to social, political and economic disparities. Access to resources is no longer organised by a generally accepted authority. Therefore, many conflicts emerge as each group of resource users tries to justify its access using a different ideology. There are frequent conflicts between pastoralists and farmers, pastoralists and fishermen, Waza National Park authorities and fishermen or pastoralists and between fishermen themselves (Bauer 2003, Kouokam et al. 2004). In the Logone floodplain, the most important conflicts occur between the nomadic people and the local Kotoko fishermen during the dry season and the Kotoko farmers and the Arab or the Musgum herders during the rainy season. Increasingly, there are also clashes between the Kotoko and the Musgum over the use of fishing ponds and canals. The highest number of conflicts occurs between local fishermen and Arab pastoralists from Nigeria, whose cattle cause damage to fishing canals. The drastic reduction in the fishing production and the absence of efficient mechanisms to regulate access to resources led to the construction of a large number of fishing canals in the floodplain. Almost 2,500 canals were counted in the area in 1999/2000 (Kouokam et al. 2004). In 2004, the work of a local NGO called ACEEN,16 based in Maroua showed that this number rose to more than 3,000.17

16 ACEEN: Association Camerounaise pour l’Education Environnementale, is a local NGO aiming at sensitising communities of the Lake Chad basin floodplain for a sustainable use of natural resources. It is based in Maroua, North Cameroon. 17 These data have been provided by Aboukar Mahamat, the coordinator of ACEEN.

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 155 6.1. Conflict between Kotoko fishermen and Khawalme pastoralists In the past, under the Kotoko management regime, fishing activities in canals were organised according to seasons, but today this timing is no longer respected and sedentary communities have intensified the digging of canals. These canals, which are several kilometres long, often block the usual route of livestock to the floodplain. They are left with no alternative, but cross the canals, breaking the walls with their hoofs (Kouokam et al. 2004). This is what happened in 2003 near Kalkoussam, when, due to a short rainy season, the Khawalme Arab pastoralists arrived in the area earlier than usual, while fishing was still going on. Generally at that time, ponds and canals are still covered with fresh vegetation of Echinochloa stagnina, which constitute a refuge for the fish and the best place for people to set their baskets and hooks. It is also the favourite pasture for cattle. The fishermen tried to prevent the herders from using these reserves until they had finished with their work. But the pastoralists paid no heed and the cattle entered the canals causing serious damage, bringing the fishing season to an abrupt end. When the case was reported to the headman, who is one of the owners of the canal, the villagers held a meeting to discuss how to solve the problem. Everybody agreed that the fishermen had to be compensated for the damage. However, villagers were divided by questions on the mode of compensation. One group, comprising those who owned canals, wanted the case to be reported to the sultan and administrative authorities for a more valuable compensation. Through this process, they would also like as they said, “to avoid this type of conflicts in the future by intimidating the herders with military force.” Evaluating the financial and social costs of this procedure, an opposing group pleaded for a local solution, with an immediate payment for the damage. This second solution was adopted, especially because the headman, who was the owner of the canal, had to decide on the way to solve the problem. He found it difficult “to create more problems with friends” and decided to negotiate. A few days later, the village council received the Khawalme Arab authorities for negotiations. Some pastoralists from their side were reluctant to negotiate, considering the payment of taxes as the right to go everywhere in the floodplain, even in fishing ponds. But at the end of the discussion, they agreed to pay compensation valued at $200 USD. Even though they considered this compensation higher in proportion to the damages, they preferred to settle the dispute at the local level or as it is generally said, “à l’amiable”. They

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avoid contacts with the authorities of Logone Birni, who consider pastoralists as “wealthy and stupid bush people from whom they can make a lot of money.” In the region, the aim of sedentary Kotoko owners of canals is to exclude pastoralists, because they interfere in their fishing activities. In their view, their fishing activities are still highly productive. However, if some of them still arrive in their village, they can also gain from conflicts of their own creation with the extension of canals through pastoral corridors or roads to watering points. Unfortunately, some members of village without canals and sometime owners of cattle have everything to lose with the departure of nomadic pastoralists, because they are their partners for commercial activities and also look after their cattle. 6.2. Conflict between a Kotoko and a Musgum sedentary pastoralist Conflicts in Kalkoussam do not always end with a local solution between leaders of different villages. Once, in the rainy season of 2003, livestock from a neighbouring Musgum village damaged a farm of red millet. As agro-pastoralists, the Musgum herders keep their cattle in the village during the rainy season, since their animals are well adapted to the harsh conditions of the floodplain. During that season, conflicts with farmers are frequent because it is difficult for them to prevent their animals from feeding on the crops. The farmers reported the case to the authorities of Kalkoussam, who met as usual in search of a consensus. As many contradictory points of view emerged and the cattle owner refused to pay any compensation for the damage, the farmer decided to report the case to the administrative authorities at the district level, who promised a rapid solution after common administrative procedures: field visits by technical services and deliberation of the commission in charge of conflict. On his part, the Musgum decided to contact a relative in town who was close to the local representative to the national parliament, for an intervention at the district level. Earlier, during discussions at the village level, he had argued that the damage caused was not as serious as the farmer pretended and that animals could not differentiate crops from grasses. He had accused the farmer of exaggerating the case by pulling up additional crops for a more valuable compensation, adding that this would not have happened if the farmer had protected his crops with a fence. Since both, the administrative authority of the district as well as the representative to the parliament, were from the

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 157 same political party, it was expected that they would easily find a satisfactory solution. However, this might be the reason why up to now a solution has not yet been found. Even the technical commission that had to evaluate the damage has never been on the field. 6.3. Analysis of the causes of resource conflicts Theses two cases show that the scarcity of resources and institutional changes are main causes of conflict outbreaks in the Logone floodplain. When conflicts arise between groups of resource users, they use different ideologies to justify their utilisation of resources. With their financial and social capital, pastoralists often violate rules of access to resources, because abiding by these rules can be costly for them. That is why sometimes, they are deliberately provoked, because for the pastoralists it is often worth paying the damages to farmers or fishermen who then allow the animals to feed on the crops (Kouokam et al. 2004). This opinion is shared by many farmers in the Logone floodplain—that in the pastoral culture, there are magic-religious beliefs that conflicts over the destruction of crops by cattle is vital for the herd. In Logone Birni, peasants argued that: Choa Arabs pastoralists believe that dispute on the destructive activities of their animals will accelerate the growth of the herd. That is why each year they always allow cattle roaming on farms to create conflicts, because they believe this is a means to increase the size of their herd.18

This idea is shared by many farmers in the Lake Chad Basin, but the evidence affirms that conflicts are often intentionally created by pastoralists who prefer to feed their animals on crops and pay compensations and fines. The others use their relationships to turn the situation in their favour. In this case, all the social networks are mobilised using financial, political and ethnic means. The Musgum agro-pastoralists, who are from the same political party as the administrative authority and from the same ethnic group as the parliamentarian, can use this support in case of conflicts with the Kotoko, recognised as being from the opposition.19

18 Discussion with a group of Musgum agro-pastoralists near Kalkoussam in April 2004. 19 In Kalkoussam, the entire village turned recently to the ruling party hoping to have more consideration from the state, which according with them, is punishing their people for their past support of the opposition.

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Local people also contribute to the intensification of those conflicts. Farms and canals are often created in areas reserved as pastureland such as transhumance corridors. Sometimes, farms look like traps to generate income from pastoralists. This is the impression the Khawalme Arab had in 2003, when, on their arrival in Damardi where they used to water their animals every year, they noticed the existence of small irrigated farms created by the Kotoko to grow vegetables. Pastoralists were quite surprised by the size of the farms, “which could hardly feed a household more than twice.” It is obvious that the local people knew that cattle and especially horses or donkeys would feed on those vegetables. Generally speaking, conflict appears as a coping strategy for some actors in the floodplain, especially traditional and administrative authorities. As becomes evident with the low salaries for administrators, conflicts regarded as revenue. Arbitration of conflicts involving local officials from several departments leads them to additional income in fines and taxes for conflict resolution as well as bribes that also can be gained to augment poor salaries. Some people in Kalkoussam, for example, recognise that for the administrators conflict is the “okra for the sauce.” Okra (Abelmoschus esculentus) is a tropical flowering plant belonging to the family of Malvaceae and originated in Africa. In the Lake Chad area and elsewhere in tropical Africa, okra is one of the most important vegetables and condiment. The image of okra used by people here shows that in fact administrators are not really interested in conflict resolution, but see conflicts as a resource from which they will try by any means to profit. Traditional authorities such as the sultan of Logone Birni are also cited. Nomadic pastoralists often suspect that the compensations and fines paid during conflict resolution are a lucrative additional source of income for both local populations and authorities. 7. Conflict resolution mechanisms In the Logone floodplains, there are various mechanisms for conflict resolution, ranging from customary laws to formal rules implemented by state officials. These different levels of conflict resolution depend on the gravity of the problem. Conflicts considered minor are solved at the local village level using customary laws, while severe armed conflicts or serious damage to private property are handled by adminis-

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 159 trative authorities at the district level. Today, people choose one of these options according to their interests. However, even if conflict resolution is an old issue, these dichotomous mechanisms only began during colonial times with the introduction of the arbitration system by the French administration, transferring the right to resolve conflicts between resource users to state officials. As far as customary rules are concerned, the ngalway in charge of levying taxes in the past also had the responsibility of solving problems between resource users. He was the intermediary between the transhumant people and the sultan. It is obvious that owing to the small size of the population and seasonal availability of resources in the past, there were fewer clashes among people. Also, cooperation between different groups of populations reduced conflicts. The practice of entrusting cattle to pastoralists by the sedentary groups was one of those areas of cooperation. Accepting the keep of the fishermen’s’ cattle was a means of avoiding conflicts in the ponds. The same arrangements with farmers allowed the cattle of the pastoralists to feed on their fallow farms, fertilising the soil. But when conflicts still arose, the local organisation of the sultanate had structures in place to resolve them. After independence, local conflict resolution mechanisms are entrusted to the blama and the council of elders. In Kalkoussam in particular, there are two additional members representing the sultan and the canton head. Even though he is considered an auxiliary of the administration, the blama has to report some cases of conflicts to the sultan and the canton head, which are regarded as being more influential than traditional authorities. The sultan, as the master of the land, has to make the final decision. This procedure is more or less followed today by local groups who can also choose a more formal way of conflict resolution. Usually, most people prefer to report conflicts to the administrative authorities, who have a system of conflict resolution based on arbitration. This led to the creation of a commission for conflict resolution at the district level. In Logone Birni, this commission is composed of the divisional officer, who is the president of the commission, the mayor, military officers (gendarmerie and the police), the local officer of MINEPIA (Department of animal husbandry and fisheries), MINADER (Department of agriculture), MINEP (Department of environment), the sultan, the canton head and the representatives of the conflicting farmers and pastoralists (see Kouokam et al. 2004). This commission has to follow

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administrative and legal procedures regarding agro-pastoral conflicts. Final decisions are taken after investigations by technical services in the field to determine the responsibilities of each party. In Kalkoussam, the Kotoko fishermen and the nomadic people may prefer to solve their conflicts locally, to avoid the cost of travelling to Logone Birni several times or to bribe the authorities. They also find the procedure very long and inefficient. Most of the time, the absentee Kotoko cattle owners who would like to keep good relations with their transhumant “friends,” are those who suggest this solution. For them, to report a case of conflict to the administrative authorities is an extreme option proposed by people with more bargaining power, financial means and good connections to influence the decisions at this high level. This category is constituted of the local Kotoko elite, or the Musgum and the Choa Arabs capable of using their wealth or their social position to bribe and influence the authorities. The commission for conflict settlement itself is not really efficient, partly due to external interventions of the local elite, and partly due to the nature of its functioning. As one of the members pointed out, conflicting populations are not really involved in the procedures. Most of the time, technical service officers, who are “corrupted civil servants and do not really master the local reality,” represent them. Additionally, they do not have enough means to investigate the issues. Many people agree that the methods of the commission cannot lead to a total resolution of the conflicts in the floodplain. This can explain why conflicts are still rampant in the floodplain despite these various mechanisms. 8. Impact of institutional change on the common-pool resource management Even if institutions constitute only an aspect of the range of factors influencing the state of CPR in the Logone floodplain, it is obvious that institutional changes have affected pastures as well as fisheries. The Kotoko management regime collapsed and this has led to situations of open access as well as, in certain cases, to privatisation of resources. It appears more costly for the communities to regulate access to resources collectively since people have diverse interests. To secure their livelihoods, many local people adopted diverse coping strategies according to their personal interests.

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 161 Today, more resources in the floodplain are considered as open access, mostly owing to the lack of rules enforcement by the state (for similar cases see Haller and Merten, Beeler and Frei, Mbeyale and Meroka). After the land tenure reform of 1974 in Cameroon, lands that were not effectively used became state property. Thus, the major part of the yaéré made up of fishing grounds and dry season pastures fell into this category. However, government mechanisms to regulate activities in the area were lacking. In Logone Birni, the service of livestock and fisheries is not able to provide fishing permits to the users of the floodplain. Even if taxes are collected from transhumant pastoralists, state officials are still far away from the local population. Resource users seem free to use the floodplain resource as they please, after they have paid the tax. The consequence is an explosion of fishing canals exploited by local people who would like to benefit from the return of the water into the floodplain. Those canals are increasingly owned by people of Musgum origin who reject the exclusive right of the Kotoko. Nowadays, they exploit fishing reserves without the permission of the owners in the dry season. This was the case in March 2004 at Honkol near Logone Birni, when a fishing reserve was “opened” overnight by fishermen from other villages without consulting the owners of the pond. On their own part, pastoralists no longer respect the arrangements they had in the past with the local population. Most of the time, they arrive earlier than before on the floodplain, causing serious damage to the fishing canals of the sedentary people. However, it should be noted that this process of open access is somehow limited by access to cash. It appears that those with financial means have better access to CPRs. The Khawalme Arab pastoralists always complain about the high rate of taxes they are asked to pay, which constitute a barrier to poor households who cannot afford to pay. At the same time, the Musgum fishermen, with considerable financial capital, used to bribe authorities and exploit dry season fishing reserves, using prohibited techniques. It is clear that financial conditions exclude many people from the resources. Therefore, the open access process is analysed here in terms of the impact of cash on the perception of the resource users. The payment of taxes appears to give the right to use the resources everywhere in the floodplain. Transhumant pastoralists feel they have the right to feed their cattle in fishing ponds, on the crops of the farmers or in the grazing reserves of the Musgum. The Musgum fishermen also think

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they have acquired the right to fish in the Kotoko fishing reserves, after they have paid money to the authorities. What appears in the yaérés as open access can also be interpreted as an intermediary phase to the privatisation of the resources. Even though the private property regime does not affect resources, some pastoralists believe that as soon as they have paid grazing taxes, they have the right to use the pastures as they want. They believe they have “purchased” the property right from the government and that now they can create new rules to secure their livelihoods. In this process, the Musgum sedentary pastoralists, considered outsiders by the Kotoko, are now excluding nomadic people from the grazing reserves of their village. If, in this particular case, access to resources is still somehow communal, the process of privatisation is more intensified among nomadic pastoralists. The important thing is that these privatisation forms remain informal and fluent as a form of legal pluralism. In an African national context where the state usually has highly hegemonistic aspirations, but is too weak to realise them (Breemer & Venama 1995: 6), institutional changes lead rather to an informal privatisation dominated by individuals with high bargaining power. The Khawalme Arabs, visiting Kalkoussam and its adjacent areas, have initiated many strategies for access to basic services (water). This can be viewed as a coping strategy under difficult climatic conditions. However, it leads to a change in pastoral practices in the floodplain. To use the wells they dug in the floodplain, those groups have to settle down, increasing the pressure on resources around camps and wells. To secure their livelihoods for the whole dry season, they have to exclude other groups from using the areas for pastures and watering their cattle in their wells. Thus, groups of resource users are increasingly experiencing a process of privatisation of some key resources that may finally lead to a private property regime, as is the case on the shores of the Lake Chad. 9. Discussion Are current rules working for or against a sustainable management of CPR in the Logone floodplain? An analysis of rules of access and use of pastoral resources in Kalkoussam shows that the management of CPR by the state is a failure. In Africa, natural resource legislation is generally based on European legal concepts that have little relevance

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 163 to social relations on the ground, where land and other resources are usually held by clans or families and used through complex systems of multiple rights held by different users (Cotula 2004, Haller 2009) As a result, several legal systems (statutory, and customary) coexist over the same territory, resulting in overlapping rights, contradictory rules and competing authorities. As demonstrated by Cotula (2004), this context of legal pluralism, results in confusion and tenure insecurity, which in turn fosters conflict, affects activities of resource users and discourages agricultural investment enabling elites to grab common lands. The central government has neither the manpower nor the skill required to manage resources efficiently. There is a gap between state officials at different levels of the administration and the local population. People from Kalkoussam, for instance, used to see officials in charge of fisheries only once a week when on the market day, one of them came from Logone Birni to collect taxes from fish traders. Once they enter the floodplain, nomadic pastoralists rarely meet people from the municipality or from the veterinary service. They meet only at the time of the payment of council fees or during conflict resolution. Mobile pastoralists always complain that during vaccination campaigns, medical teams are reluctant to visit their camps. This is an illustration of the frustrations of transhumant pastoralists who think that authorities really do not care about them. In this context, the state seems absent. However, this does not mean that there is an institutional vacuum in the floodplain. Many regulations have been put in place since independence. The land tenure reform of 1974 gives more power to state officials to control most of the activities. Some powers have been given to the municipality to manage pastoral activities. Although the effect has been the creation of new taxes, the state has created new administrative units to get closer to the local people. But, the new institutions are not working for the sustainable management of resources. State officials seem to have adopted the “politics of the belly” (Bayart 1993). They appear to be “active only during conflict resolution processes, which constitute opportunities to swindle money from the resource users.” As demonstrated by Fokou (2008), Fokou and Haller (2008), overlapping rights have contributed to erode existing institutions and open up access to resources. An analysis of institutional change during the last fifty years shows that local management regimes of the Kotoko have collapsed and the traditional authorities have lost their power. Even though one should

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agree with Ruttan and Burgerhof-Mulder (1999) that nomadic pastoralists or other resources users in the Logone area are not conservationists, one should also recognise that their practises, sometimes embedded in their culture, helped managing access and use of resources. One of these practises was through local conventions between various actors. The sultan of Logone Birni who received 1/3 of the taxes during the 1950s (Lebeuf 1969), can claim only 10% nowadays. This leads to a lack of interest among the local authorities and the contract between the sultan and the pastoralists is not respected any more. Traditional authorities are increasingly investing their social capital to acquire new positions. As members of the ruling political party, they have the opportunity to play a key role in the management of access to resource (co-ordination of development projects at the local level ). Populations of the floodplain have lost confidence in the state and local authorities that are struggling, in their view, only for their personal prestige. They have decided to initiate their own strategies. What they consider as a “resignation of the state” led the Khawalme Arabs to dig their personal wells to water their cattle. The Musgum pastoralists, whose resources are endangered by the arrival of nomadic people, have also decided to create their own reserves, from which they can exclude the others. Even the local Kotoko of Kalkoussam try to take advantage of the return of water to have an artificial hole only for their fishing activities, where they can exercise their management regime. It appears that the absence of the state in the management of CPR in the floodplain has led to a new institutional crafting of creating new rules to secure their livelihood. But most of the time, these rules are aimed at safeguarding resources from other users, who are adding to the pressure on CPR. These regulations based more on individual initiatives rather than on collective arrangements, are not socially inclusive. The wells of the Arab pastoralists are more for household use and other families from the same camp are not allowed to water their animals there. Some Kotoko owners of cattle used to negotiate directly with pastoralists, who looked after their animals, for access to their fishing canals. Actions are rarely based on participative management regulations to bring together people from different communities. Nowadays, co-management programmes proposed as solutions for a sustainable management of common-pool resources could be useful for the floodplain, but they remain too theoretical (Fokou and Haller 2008).

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 165 As the case of Kalkoussam shows, different groups of actors share diverse interests and responsibilities in the management of CPR. It is then necessary to recognise that communities are rather complex and heterogeneous and can not be reduced to a single group. During the last thirty years, many efforts have been made by the state to decentralize the management of resources to local municipalities. This process was strengthened in 1996 with a new constitution, creating regions and communes. However, the concrete implementation on the field is quite difficult. Even if considerable rights and responsibilities have been given to the newly elected mayors and councilors, they are still perceived by local populations as the “hakoma” i.e. the government, which “recognizes only duties and never rights.” 10. Conclusion The example of institutional analysis in the Waza-Logone floodplain shows that local management regimes have been vastly transformed during the last fifty years. This transformation has resulted from a range of factors including climatic, demographic, political and economic changes. This floodplain constitutes a resource niche exploited for fishing, dry season grazing and agriculture. For centuries, the Kotoko authorities relying on customary rules have regulated these activities. These rules were based on seasonal access to resources. In the Logone floodplain, the belief in spiritual beings “mha laham” (chief of water) and also the authority of the ngalway rendered their enforcement easier. Unfortunately, this regime has collapsed mostly due to the change in bargaining power and ideology. The Kotoko people are currently not able to maintain their leading position. They are challenged by the Musgum and the Choa Arab agro-pastoralists. This change in power relations had many driving factors, beginning in the pre-independence period when diverse institutional transformations occurred. The colonial and even the post-independence administrations relied, most of the time, on local institutions to strengthen the position of the Kotoko elite (Lebeuf 1969, Hagenbucher 1977, Tijani 1986). However, the introduction of new practices, such as formal taxes and a monetary economy, gradually contributed a transformation of local rules. But the resources of the floodplain became unpredictable after the construction of a dam at Maga in 1979 and the consecutive droughts of the early 1980s. This situation has resulted in the emergence of conflicts between the different user groups.

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As the case of Kalkoussam shows, management of the resources in the floodplain is characterised by the paradox of the “presence-absence” of the state,20 which is more preoccupied with issues of national integrity and economic performance. Taxes are perceived as necessary for trans-boundary migration, but the central government lacks skills and human resources to manage CPR. Access to resources is more open than ever, even as both natural resources and institutions become precarious. The rising incidence of conflicts in fishing reserves, the need for supplementary food for cattle and the digging of individual pastoral wells for water supply are a testimony to resource degradation. For pastoralists of the Waza-Logone floodplain, this precarious situation can be perceived in the decrease of milk production, a direct consequence of the poor quality of pastures. Moreover, groups of resource users adopt different ideologies to justify their access to common-pool resources. Sedentary late comers such as the Musgum and some Choa Arab argue that with increasing democracy, they feel free to take control of the resources from which they were excluded before by the Kotoko. They can also use their financial capital to “purchase” access to resources (grazing or fishing rights) or to bribe authorities during conflict resolution. The management depends on a set of relationships at different levels of the social organisation. Several factors such as the interest of the household, the ethnic group, the political party and wealth should be taken into consideration. Other ethnic groups dislike negotiating with the Musgum who are considered as “invaders” and cattle raiders. But some Kotoko households, who have entrusted their cattle to the Musgum or Arab herders, have rather good relations, cooperating with them, despite the opposition of the fishermen. In case of conflict, the financial or the social capital is useful in achieving a favourable solution. Political parties and ethnic groups form the base of the social network. The consequence is that the management of resource is guided by interest groups, rather than by collective regulations. Individuals and small groups are increasingly creating new regulations to secure their livelihoods (rules on grazing reserves of the Musgum or pastoral wells of the Khawalme Arabs).

20 Discussion with Tobias Haller, Patrick Meroka and Gimbage Mbeyale on our respective case studies in Cameroon, Zambia and Tanzania.

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 167 How to manage common-pool resources in the Waza-Logone floodplain in a sustainable way? Today, the management of CPR in the yaéré is characterised by the diverse sources of power. Multiple interest groups, enjoying a wide range of rights, are currently involved in resource use in the area. Therefore, a solution for the sustainability of resources could lie in co-management arrangements. Thus, the diversity of interests and responsibilities could be reduced through a formal agreement between two or more groups. This agreement could be validated in a contractual arrangement between the different parties involved. The process of political decentralisation that is currently going on in Cameroon is a potential for co-management programmes. But, the question remains as to how such a process is possible in an area characterised by institutional and ecological dynamics, with multi-layer power relations in resource management. The trickiest fact is that local organisations have collapsed and rural associations are rather rare. Acknowledgements The author acknowledges support from the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North–South: Research Partnerships for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change, co-funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). He is also indebted to the members of the research group on African Floodplain Wetlands’ Project (AFWeP), led by T. Haller for fruitful discussions and comments on the draft of this paper. References Bauer, H. (2003).‘Local Perceptions of Waza National Park, Northern Cameroon’. Environmental Conservation 30, 2: 175–181. Bayart, J.-F. (1993). The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly. Harlow (UK), Longman. Beauvilain, A. (1981). ‘Elevage et éleveurs dans le grand yaéré (Nord Cameroun)’. Revue de géographie du Cameroun 2: 163–176. Béné, C. Mindjimba, K. Belal, E. and Jolley, T. (2000). ‘Evaluating Livelihood Strategies and the Role of Inland Fisheries in Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation: The Case of the Yaéré Floodplain in North Cameroon’. IIFET 2000 Proceedings. pp. 1–15. Boutrais, J. (1984). ‘Les unités naturelles’, In Le Nord du Cameroun. des Hommes. Une Région, eds. Boutrais, J. et al. Paris, ORSTOM.

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Breemer, H.P.M (Van den). and Venema, L.B. (1995). ‘Local resource management in African national contexts’. In Local resource management in Africa, eds. Breemer (Van den), J.P.M. Drijver, C.A. and Venema, L.B. Chichester (NY), John Wilson & Sons: 3–26. Cotula, L. (2004). ‘Can research help bridge the gap between local rules and national legal frameworks? The case of local conventions for natural resource management in the Sahel’. In Bridging research and policy, eds. Reenberg, A., and Marcussen, H.S. Proceedings of the Workshop, 2–3 December 2004, Ouagadougou. SEREINOccasional Paper No. 18: 125–132. Drijver, C.A. and Marchand, M. (1985). Maîtriser les inondations. Les aspects d’environnement du développement des plaines africaines. Commission des Communautés Européennes. Leiden, CML. Drijver, C.A. van Wetten, J.C. and Wouter, T. De Groot (1995). ‘Working with Nature: Local Fishery Management on The Logone Floodplain in Chad and Cameroon’. In Local resource management in Africa, eds. Breemer (Van den), J.P.M. Drijver, C.A. and Venema, L.B. Chichester (NY), John Wilson & Sons: 29–46. Fokou, G. (2003). Transformation des institutions de gestion des ressources de propriété collective dans les plaines de Waza-Logone (Master’s thesis). Yaounde (Cameroon), University of Yaounde 1. —— (2008). Gestion communautaire des ressources naturelles et relations de pouvoir. Etude anthropologique des changements institutionnels dans les plaines du Logone et du lac Tchad [PhD dissertation]. Yaounde (Cameroon), University of Yaounde 1. Fokou, G. Haller, T. and Zinsstag, J. (2004). ‘A la recherche des déterminants institutionnels pour le bien-être des populations sédentaires et nomades dans la plaine du Waza-Logone de la frontière camerounaise et tchadienne’. Revue de Médecine Tropicale 64: 464–468. Fokou, G. Haller, T. (2008). ‘Are local stakeholders conservationists? Livelihood insecurity and participatory management of Waza National Park, North Cameroon’. In People, Protected Areas and Global Change: Participatory Conservation in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Europe, eds. Galvin, M. and Haller, T. Perspectives of the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South, University of Bern, Vol. 3. Bern, Geographica Bernensia: 325–360. Frechou, H. (1984). ‘L’élevage’. In Le Nord du Cameroun. Des Hommes. Une Région, eds. Boutrais et al. Paris, ORSTOM: 429–444. GEPIS (Groupe d’Experts sur les Plaines d’Inondation Sahéliennes). (2000). Vers une gestion durable des plaines d’inondation sahéliennes. Gland et Cambridge, UICN. Hagenbucher-Sacripanti, F. (1977). Les Arabes dits « Suwa » du Nord-Cameroun. Paris, ORSTOM. Haller, T. (2001). Leere Speicher, erodierte Felder und das Bier der Frauen: Umweltanpassung und Krise bei den Ouldeme und Platha in den Mandarabergen NordKameruns. Studien zur Sozialanthropologie. Berlin, Dietrich Reimer Verlag. —— (2003). ‘Rules which pay are going to stay: Indigenous institutions, sustainable resource use and land tenure among the Ouldeme and Platha, Mandara Mountains, Northern Cameroon’. In Everyday Governance of Land in Africa, eds. Le Meur, P.-Y. and Lund, C. APAD-Bulletin No. 22. Hamburg and London, Münster: 117–134. —— (2009). ‘Common-Pool Resources, Legal Pluralism and Governance from a New Institutionalist Perspective: Lessons from the African Floodplain Wetlands Research Project (AFWeP)’, In Negotiating Local Governance. Natural resources management at the interface of communities and the state, eds. Irit Eguavoen and Wolfram Laube, Münster/London/New York: Lit. forthcoming. Kouokam, R. Ngantou, D. (2000). ‘Cameroon: IUCN Waza-Logone Project’. In: Ramsar Convention Secretariat. Participatory Skills: Establishing and Strengthening Local Communities’ and Indigenous People’s Participation in the Management of Wetlands. Gland, Switzerland: Ramsar Convention Secretariat, p. 62. Available at: http://www .ramsar.org/lib/lib_handbooks2006_e05.pdf; accessed on 30 May 2008.

tax payments, democracy & rent seeking administrators 169 Kouokam, R. Moritz, M. Ngantou, D. and Loth, P. (2004). ‘Conflicts and conflict management in the Waza Logone Floodplain’. In The Return of the Water: Restoring the Waza Logone Floodplain in Cameroon, ed. Loth P. Gland (Switzerland) and Cambridge (UK), IUCN. Hughes, R.H. and Hughes, J.S. (1992). A Directory of African Wetlands. Nairobi and Cambridge, IUCN/UNEP/ WCMC. Krönke, F. (2000). ‘Les principaux problèmes des éleveurs nomades Fulbé liés à la santé humaine et animale’. Sempervira 8: 30–36. Lebeuf, A.M.D. (1969). Les principautés Kotoko: Essai sur le caractère sacré de l’autorité. Paris: CNRS. —— (1973). ‘L’origine et la contribution des principautés Kotoko (Cameroun septentrional )’. In Contribution de la recherche ethnologique à l’histoire des civilisations du Cameroun. Colloques internationaux du CNRS. N° 55: 209–218. Loth, P. (Ed). (2004). The Return of the Water: Restoring the Waza Logone Floodplain in Cameroon. Gland (Switzerland) and Cambridge (UK), IUCN. Loth, P. Moritz, M. Kouokam, R. Scholte, P. and Kari, S. (2004). ‘The People of the Floodplain’. In The Return of the Water: Restoring the Waza Logone Floodplain in Cameroon, ed. Loth P. Gland (Switzerland) and Cambridge (UK), IUCN: 53–67. Loth, P. and Acreman, M. (2004). ‘Introduction’. In The Return of the Water: Restoring the Waza Logone Floodplain in Cameroon, ed. Loth P. Gland (Switzerland) and Cambridge (UK), IUCN: 3–10. Moritz, M. (2003). Commoditization and Pursuit of Piety: The Transformation of an African Pastoral System [PhD thesis]. Los Angeles (USA), University of California. —— (2006). ‘Introduction: Changing Contexts and Dynamics of Herder-Farmer Conflicts across West Africa’. Canadian Journal of African Studies 40, 1: 1–40. Moritz, M. Scholte, P. and Kari, S. (2002). ‘The demise of the nomadic contract: Arrangement and rangelands under pressure in the Far North of Cameroon’. Nomadic Peoples 6, 1: 127–146. Mveng, E. (1969). Histoire du Cameroun. Yaoundé, CEPMAE. Ngantou, D. and Braund, R. (1999). ‘Waza-Logone: Restoring the good life’. World Conservation 2: 18–19. Njomaha, C. Pirot, J.Y. (2004). ‘The need for increased rice production’. In The Return of the Water: Restoring the Waza Logone Floodplain in Cameroon, ed. Loth P. Gland (Switzerland) and Cambridge (UK), IUCN: 13–17. Noray (de), M.L. (2002). ‘Waza-Logone. Histoire d’eaux et d’hommes’. Gland (Suisse) et Cambridge (Royaume Uni), UICN. Scholte, P. (2003). ‘Immigration: A Potential Time Bomb under the Integration Conservation and Development’. Ambio 32, 1: 58–64. —— (2005). Floodplain Rehabilitation and the Future of Conservation & Development. Adaptive Management of Success in Waza-Logone, Cameroon [PhD dissertation]. Leiden (The Netherlands), Leiden University. Schrader, T. (1986). Les yaérés du Nord du Cameroun: pâturages de saison sèche ? Aspects socio-écologiques du développement pastoral dans la plaine d’inondation du Logone. Leiden, CML. Seignobos, C. (2000). ‘Elevages II: les transhumances’. In Atlas de la province de l’Extrême-Nord Cameroun, eds. Seignobos, C. and Iyébi-Mandjek, O. Yaoundé and Paris, Institut National de Cartographie ( MINREST)/ IRD. Seignobos, C. and Iyébi-Mandjek, O. (eds). (2000). Atlas de la province de l’ExtrêmeNord Cameroun. Yaoundé and Paris, Institut National de Cartographie (MINREST)/IRD. Seignobos, C. Jamin, F. (2003). La Case obus. Histoire et reconstruction. Marseille (France), Editions Parenthèses—Patrimoine Sans Frontière. Socpa, A. (1999). ‘L’hégémonie ethnique cyclique au Nord Cameroun’. Afrique et développement 24, 1 and 2: 57–81.

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—— (2002). Démocratisation et Autochtonie au Cameroun. Trajectoires Régionales Divergentes (PhD Thesis). Leiden (The Netherlands), University of Leiden. Tijani, K. (1986). ‘The Shuwa Arabs’. In Pastoralists of the West African Savannah, eds. Adamu, M. and Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. Manchester (UK), Manchester University Press: 62–73. UNCTAD (Trade and Development Board). (2003). Economic Development in Africa: Issues in Africa’s Trade Performance. New York, UN/UNCTACD. Van Est, D.M.E. (1999). ‘Fishing in Another Man’s Pond: Natural Resource Management and Conflicting Interests Among Musgoum and Kotoko in the Logone Floodplain, Northern Cameroon’ (English summary of the PhD thesis of Diny van Est: Vissen in andermans vijver: Beheer en strijdige belangen onder Mousgoum en Kotoko in de Logone overstromingsvlakte van Noord-Kameroen. (PhD thesis). Leiden (The Netherlands), Leiden University.

CHAPTER FOUR

LOST CONTROL, LEGAL PLURALISM AND DAMMING THE FLOOD: CHANGING INSTITUTIONS AMONG THE MUSGUM AND KOTOKO OF THE VILLAGE LAHAÏ IN THE WAZA-LOGONE FLOODPLAIN (CAMEROON) Gabriela Landolt Abstract In the Waza-Logone floodplain not only did specialised strategies emerge out of the century-long interaction between men and nature, but also rules (institutions) were developed, which ensured a sustainable use of the common-pool resources. The pressure (demographic growth, rising poverty and severe economic stress) on the natural resources of the floodplain increased with the colonial times, but this alone would not have forcibly led to an overuse of the natural resources such as the fisheries. This paper shows that today’s problems in resource management can not be derived directly from external factors (like economy, technology, demography and environment); but that they have to be set in relation to institutional change in order to get the full picture. The paper focuses on a study of the Kotoko village, Lahaï, where institutions regulating access to fisheries have undergone many transformations since pre-colonial times. This is due to several factors, which include demographic pressure, market economy, technological and political changes. It shows that the practise of the Kotoko fishing group excluding later immigrants from fisheries based on access to techniques declined, as prices for fish began to rise, making this common-pool resource attractive for the market and changing local institutions of access to the fisheries. Independence introduced a new administrative structure, a modern administration that should have superseded the traditional (Kotoko) administration. The traditional system could not be erased though, so that two parallel systems with different, yet overlapping rules and laws continued to exist in a form of legal pluralism. Adding to the local problems was the

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environmental changes caused by the Maga Dam, resulting in water shortage in the floodplain, degradation and diminishing the available natural resources. The people had to intensify and diversify the use of the natural resources so that the traditional restrictions on the use of the resources, especially in the fishery, came under severe pressure and began to erode. The absence of a generally respected authority and the weakness of the state administration under the democratisation and decentralisation process, allowed wealthier people to bribe the administrators to bend the rules, aggravating conflicts over access to resources, as can be shown in the case of Lahaï. 1. Introduction Lahaï is situated in the Waza-Logone floodplain in the extreme-north of Cameroon, where the Musgum and the Kotoko face increased pressure on their natural resources (pastures and fisheries). Explanations that lie to hand are global climatic change, the construction of the Maga Dam and the population growth in the area. But institutional, political and social changes also have to be considered. Over centuries, the Kotoko developed their natural resource management system (based on the fisheries) in adaptation to the seasonal variability of the resources. These institutions play a key role because they used to limit the access to resources, impose and control the access rules and sanction abuses. Hence, their transformation has had a major influence on the management of the natural resources of today. Therefore, the focus of this paper is on the Kotoko institutions and examines how they were working in the past and why and how they changed up to today. Institutional change can derive from different influences. External and internal factors such as power relations (bargaining power), political and economic changes, ideology, organisation and demographic and technical variables have to be taken into consideration (Ensminger 1992). Also important is the analysis of conflicts that arise due to the legislative insecurity. This paper is based on my field research in the village of Lahaï in the Waza-Logone floodplain carried out from April to September 2002 in collaboration with the IUCN (World Conservation Union) and with financial support from the NCCR (National Centre of Competence in Research North-South).

lost control, legal pluralism and damming the flood 173 2. The setting of the research With 11,000 km2, the Logone Floodplain is the second most important inland wetland of the whole African Sahel after the Niger Inner Delta. It is situated in the Lake Chad Basin and covers large territories in North Cameroon and Chad. The Cameroonian part of the floodplain is constituted of 6,000 km2 and is called the Waza-Logone Floodplain, which is a large inundated area between the river Logone in the East and the Waza National Park in the West. This area is a flat, featureless and roughly circular plain, less than 400 metres above sea level (Loth and Acreman 2004). The flooding process is determined by the Logone and Chari, which are the two main rivers of the Lake Chad Basin. Both of them represent approximately 95 per cent of the inflow to the lake. The availability of resources in the area varies from year to year, depending on the quantity of water they drain from remote areas. Comprehensive information about the ecosystem and the history of the Waza-Logone-floodplain has already been outlined in a previous paper of this reader (Fokou). However, it is important to note that the village of Lahaï, where the research has taken place, is situated in the south-eastern part of the floodplain. It is, therefore, closer to the Maga Dam that has been installed for rice production. Levels of rainfall are to a small extent higher in the southern part than in the northern part of the floodplain and flooding happens earlier during the seasons. Water remains longer than in the northern part. However, differences are minimal regarding vegetation and soil conditions. 2.1. Ethnographic and demographic information The settlement of the Waza-Logone floodplain goes back to the migration of the Sao people. Towards the 8th century A.D., the different Sao groups were united in politically organised kingdoms. The Kotoko are generally seen as the direct descendants of the Sao people. Therefore, this region is recognised as the land of the Kotoko. The fact that the Kotoko was a minority group on their own land should play a major role in the future (Lebeuf 1969). The Musgum arrived in the yaérés around 1920–1930 from the south (Pouss). The original political system of the peasant Musgum did not know any central power. The society is based on a patrilineal clan system, in which the clan eldest has the authority. As in the society of the

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Kotoko, the Musgum have their chefs de terre and chef de l’eau, which practise rituals and regulate the access to natural resources. The social structure, though, is much more egalitarian than in the Kotoko society (Seignobos 2000 chapter 7:17; Harkes 1993: 16). In the 19th century, with the advancement of the Arabic empires, the Choa Arabs entered the plain and gained power with the conquest of the Kotoko-states by the Egyptian Rabêh in 1894 (Lebeuf 1969: 46). The second part of the 19th century, especially, was characterised by slaving raids with the Musgum people as the most important slave reserve. The pacification of the area during colonial times (1900–1960) initiated a migration wave towards the Waza-Logone floodplain. Ethnic groups like the Musgum, Choa Arabs, Giziga, and Mofu a.o. which fled from the war-like situation in the plain to the mountainous regions, returned later to the more fertile plain (Lebeuf 1969: 48). By 1997, around 183,000 people lived in the Waza-Logone floodplain.1 After nearly a century of migration, 35.9% Musgum, 22.1% Bornu, 12.5% Peul, 11.3% Choa Arabs and 7.7% Kotoko now inhabit the Waza-Logone floodplain (see also Fokou in the same volume). 3. Common-Pool Resources and livelihoods in the Waza-Logone floodplain The Kotoko institutions are traditionally based on the fishery. However, besides the fishing grounds, the Waza-Logone floodplain provides fertile land for agriculture (rain-fed agriculture, agriculture by sinking water level or irrigated agriculture) and high quality pasture land for cattle herding, used by pastoralists, semi-pastoralists and sedentary cattle herders. (Konde 2000: 50 see Fokou, same volume). The transformations of the Kotoko institutions involve changes in the access rights to all natural resources of the Waza-Logone floodplain. This paper though will primarily analyse the impacts of institutional change in the fishing sector.

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Inquiry of the PWL (Projet Waza Logone) from 1997.

lost control, legal pluralism and damming the flood 175 3.1. Characteristics of the fishing grounds in the floodplain and Lahaï The most important fishing grounds of the Waza-Logone floodplain are the rivers Logone, Chari, Loromé Mazera and Logomatya, as well as Lake Chad, Lake Maga and Lake Lagdo. The productivity of these waters is generally estimated to be very high (CEDC 2002: 14; Adams 1992: 93). In a study of Tambekou (2000), 69 fish species were identified, in which Labeo spp. (22.02%), Clarias spp. (12.14%), Brycinus nurse (10.65%) and Petrocephalus bovei (5.92%) predominated. The availability of the fish resources depends on the migration cycle of the fishes and on the flood cycle. Some fish species survive the dry season in the Lake Chad and migrate with the rising flood upstream into the floodplain, others rest in the deeper parts of the rivers (mares) and in the depressions. Both, though, migrate with the flooding into the plain. Certain species already spawn before the flood, others wait until the depressions and the plain are covered with water. How many fish there are depends highly on the extension (duration, coverage) of the flood. The water cycle determines at what time the fishes may enter the plain, how much food they will find and how much time they will get to spawn and grow. As Lahaï is situated on the bank of the river Logone as well as at the tributary, Loromé Mazera, and has access to two major fish reserves (mares), a natural fishing canal and a depression, fishing possibilities are highly attractive. Besides using local fishing grounds, the fishermen of Lahaï seasonally migrate to external “mares” and the fishing canals of other villages, as well as far up to Lake Maga in the south and Lake Chad in the north. 3.2. Seasonal fishing in the floodplain The fishing activities depend on the flood patterns of the plain. During inundation, the fishes are dispersed, the costs to catch fish are high and the fishing activities, accordingly low. With the recession of the water in November/December, the major fishing season, “la grande pêche,” starts and the fishing canals, especially, are used. After recession of the water, when the plain gets dry and food supply difficult, the collective fishery in the ponds takes place. During the rising of the water, it is prohibited to fish at the entrance to the canals, to allow the fish to enter the plain for reproduction. At that time, fishing activities are low.

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The ecological, political and economic changes following the settlement of the Kotoko in the floodplain had a major effect on the economic activities and the livelihood strategies of the households. The dominance of the Kotoko ethnic group was strong prior to colonial times and the fishing grounds were once regarded as the holy ground of the Kotoko; they claimed to be the only people with a legitimate right to exploit these resources. When the Choa Arabs and then the Musgum settled down in the plain, they had to choose other economic niches like farming and herding (Mveng 1969). The increase in the economic value of fish and the political changes (weakening of the Kotoko institution) made it interesting and also possible for other ethnic groups to gain access to the fishing grounds. Especially the Musgum were eager to enter this economic opportunity. However, resources became increasingly scarce, especially fish; consequently, all households, regardless of their traditional roots, were forced to diversify their economic activities (see Fokou, same volume). In Lahaï, diversification is reflected in the need for all households to practise both, fishing and agriculture, and to engage in activities like small-scale stock breeding (12% of the households), tailoring (11%), trading (9%) and gardening (6%). 4. The political, economic and institutional setup 4.1. Pre-independence political, economic and institutional setting The peasant kingdoms of the Kotoko, established in the 16th century, were divided into sultanates, which were led by sultans (mare) and their notables (me). Besides these political authorities, spiritual leaders like the chef de terre, master of the land, and the chef de l’eau, master of the water, as well as the ancestors, who were seen as the actual proprietors of the common-pool resources, took an important position within the Kotoko regime. Even though the Kotoko were seen as the masters of the land, their culture and management system was based primarily on their tradition as fishermen (Lebeuf 1969). The Kotoko controlled the fisheries in the area, based on membership of a group, leadership related to the chef de l’eau and rules of reciprocity, as well as rules of use for techniques related to the Kotoko,

lost control, legal pluralism and damming the flood 177 other ethnic groups and status. In the region of Lahaï, the Kotoko fishermen of Mazera were the traditional proprietors of water and land. They imposed their rules and access rights linked to water spirits and the ritual relationship with these spirits. The Kotoko regime was based on the control of the two most lucrative activities, namely, fishing in the ponds and in the fishing canals. In the ponds, the Kotoko had the exclusive right to fish with the dragnet (tibi), the most efficient technique at that time (later further developed to the today-used tarauw), while the Musgum were only allowed to fish with the haméçons (fishhooks attached to a string and installed across the pond), a cheap, easy accessible and inefficient technique. With regard to the fishing canals, their construction and use was firmly in the hands of Kotoko families. Otherwise, the Musgum gained de facto equal rights to use natural resources. The access as well as permission or not to use techniques were effective restriction based on the fishing skills and technical knowledge giving high catches. The technical restrictions (knowledge and ability to use fishing techniques or to build fishing canals) prevented fishermen from using the water resources intensively. Besides, their unquestioned respect for the authority of the Kotoko hierarchical system reduced the costs of enforcing and monitoring the rules. As the situation under Kotoko rule showed, relative open access linked with restrictions on techniques does not necessarily imply overuse of the common-pool resources. Earlier, there was no anxiety regarding overuse of resources, for the fish were in abundant supply and could never be overexploited by the small number of fishermen, using only simple techniques. With the growing influence of the Bornu Empire in the 16th century, the Islamic beliefs spread in the Kotoko groups (Lebeuf 1969: 46). The traditional foundation of the Kotoko system, i.e. the rituals and the respect for ancestors, was partially eroded and partially fused with Islamic beliefs. But their control over the natural resources did not weaken. Institutional changes initiated the conquest of the Kotoko-states by the Egyptian Rabêh in 1894. His power was based in the Choa Arabs, who immigrated during the 19th century in this area and now took over the political leadership. A new political order (division in lamidat and lawanat), new production methods, market places and the Islamic tax (zakkat) were introduced. This predominance did not last long though; five years later, the French won over the Rabêh (Forkl 1983: 278–283; Beauvilain 1989: 18, Lebeuf 1969: 46).

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The French administration relied mostly on local political authorities. Colonial administrators divided the area into 9 cantons and the head of each of them, the chef de canton, is an intermediary between the blama at the level of villages and the mianre (sultan) (see Fokou, same volume).The function of the traditional leaders changed during the French colonisation: They often were reduced to the level of being helpers of the colonial administration and lost their traditional legitimacy, as they became responsible for collecting taxes and recruiting the workforce (Hillebrand/Mehler 1993: 445). In pre-colonial times the local barter between fishermen, farmers and pastoralists predominated. The ethnic specific division of labour required these relations in order to secure the livelihoods of the households. Only with the Fulbe and later, through the French colonial administration, did trade move to fixed market places. One decisive motivation to produce goods for the market was the introduction of the money taxes, which created the need for cash. The introduction of cash-crops, especially rice, activated the markets and increased the circulation of money. One major economic project was the rice cultivation project SEMRY (Secteur Expérimental de Modernisation de la Riziculture de Yagoua), which still plays a major role in the area today. The opportunity to accumulate power, not only through origin and descent, but also through labour and money, transformed the traditional socio-economic stratification and reduced the authority of the traditional chiefs (Hausen 1970: 184–191). In the 1950s, the piste de yaéré was built from the city of Maroua to Kousseri at the northern border of Lake Chad in order to facilitate transportation and access to the regional markets. In 1961, a centre d’achat (shopping centre or market) was established in Kousseri, to push and optimise the commercialisation of the products (Couty 1962: 89). The financial incentive, better access and the improved possibilities to commercialise products thanks to closer markets, led to an increasing number of external actors and more efficient fishing techniques. 4.2. Post-independence change 4.2.1. Institutional changes Well before independence (1st January 1960), the administration was newly structured into departments (or prefectures), districts (or sous-

lost control, legal pluralism and damming the flood 179 préfectures) and communes (Seignobos 2000). Local chiefs were fully incorporated as auxiliaries of the new administration. During the presidency of Ahidjo, the Kotoko constituted, as under the French colonial administration, the majority in the administration and were politically and economically privileged. With the monetisation and integration into the market system, new relationships developed, which increasingly replaced those based on blood relationship (Mbuyinga 1989: 321). While the Kotoko were able to preserve their control over the access rights to the fishing grounds under Ahidjos presidency, the nationalization of the natural resources in 1992, the democratization and decentralization under his successor, Paul Biya, officially abolished the traditional administrative system of Kotoko society and so also, its privileges regarding the access to natural resources. The management of the resources was now in the hands of the commune respectively, in the hands of the blamas (local administrator called chef de quartier in French) and sous-préfets. The blama, as part of the traditional administration that continued to exist and the sous-préfets as part of the state administration, represent two different legislative systems. Some of the traditional rules (or the customary law) continued to exist as well as the state laws, too, but could not be implemented due to the weakness of the state. The multi-polarity of authority and of the legislative framework led to competing and overlapping legislations, to conflicts over management policies and to insecurity in dealing with local interest groups. This legal insecurity caused a discrepancy between the nationally imposed laws and taxes in the fisheries, (which were supposed to regulate and restrict the use of the fishing grounds), and the actual execution and compliance with these regulations. The inability of the new administration system to enforce national laws and the concomitant erosion of the traditional access regulations led to a de facto open access situation. 4.2.2. Economic changes Since independence, the financial incentive to exploit the natural resources, especially fish, rose remarkably. Local Kotoko informants estimate prices for fish had increased more than ten-fold since independence. But not only have fish prices increased, there was a farreaching economic change that had enormous impact on the costs of living and the use of natural resources. In the 1980s, Cameroon suffered a severe economic crisis, with many consequences for the rural

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population. This was followed by a salary reduction for administrators, a retrenchment of government officials, and finally, a devaluation of the CFA franc in 1993. In the whole country, there was more pressure on land in the rural areas for agricultural production and pasturelands were seriously reduced. Additionally, with low salaries, state officials turned to corruption as an alternative source of income (see Gilbert Fokou same volume). 4.2.3. External factors leading to change Several external factors led to changes in the institutions regulating access to the common-pool resources, especially, the fishing grounds. The economic and political changes mentioned above, are the most important, although other external factors including demographic pressure, technological and ecological changes need to be considered as well. The demographic pressure increased with the pacification of the floodplains by the colonial powers. Ethnic groups (like the Musgum, Choa Arabs, Giziga, and Mofu a.o.), which retreated into more isolated areas (Mandara Mountains and arid areas) in order to escape slave hunters and other violent conflicts, were now able to migrate to more favourable places and thereby added to the pressure on the existing Kotoko rules. As the market economy developed, and money became more important for acquiring power in society, the political system became more democratic and decentralised after independence. This demographic pressure became a major cause of institutional change and one of the main reasons for unsustainable resource management and increase in conflicts. The means for technological capability, especially in fishery, was one of the reasons why the Musgum could not get access to the fishing grounds, or at least to challenge the monopoly of the Kotoko, during pre-colonial and early colonial times. The Kotoko knew how to fish in the canals and the ponds, the Musgum did not. The technological developments during the colonial era and the access to markets reduced the technical restrictions on the Musgum significantly. Since colonial times the number of fishing engines and fishermen increased significantly, as was the competition between Kotoko and Musgum people fishing, the later trying to undermine the traditional rule of the former. Behind ecological changes lies not only global climate changes that have caused several droughts since the 1960s, but first and foremost

lost control, legal pluralism and damming the flood 181 the national irrigation scheme SEMRY. In 1979, the Maga Dam was constructed for irrigation of the rice fields. The aim of this project was to secure food supply in the region, after the severe droughts of the early 1970s. The negative effects of the dam were that less water entered the floodplain, the natural resources became scarcer and the quality of the remaining resources, especially the pastures, deteriorated (Loth et al. 2004, Scholte 2005). In the first phase, the demographic pressure and exploitation of the natural resources remained as high as before the dam. Because of less water entering the floodplain, the quality and quantity of the resources declined, leading to increased pressure on common-pool resources such as pasture and fisheries. As a consequence, many households left the floodplains or were forced to migrate temporarily towards richer resources like Lake Chad and to diversify their economic activities. After the re-flooding of the floodplain through the Project Waza-Logone, initiated by the World Conservation Union (IUCN) and the government of Cameroon in 1994 and 1997, the productivity of natural resources seemed to increase again. However, this intervention also had some negative effects: more water meant that the people of the plain could return to rice cultivation and to the use of fishing canals enabling higher catches, but not necessarily in a sustainable way. Moreover, the “return of the water” (Loth et al. 2004) increased the floodplain’s attractiveness, which again led to a demographic increase. Some authors (Scholte 2003, Rhebergen 1998) predict, therefore, that the resources will be heavily overexploited again, not only because of the increased productivity, but also because in some areas the rehabilitation plan included the building up of infrastructure, which was not available before (see Scholte 2003 see also Fokou same volume on this point).2 5. Interaction and negotiation concerning access to fishing grounds in Lahaï One of the main objectives of the study in the southern part of the Logone floodplain was to analyse the way how the different actors negotiate access to fisheries under such constellations and what kind

2 The impact of the Maga Dam and the later re-flooding project (Project WazaLogone) on the natural resources and their management is outlined and discussed in detail by Scholte (2005, chapter 1 and 3).

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of institutional change is taking place. We were mostly interested in the question of how changing power structures influenced the legitimacy of access to fishery areas. We will deal with the different relationships between different actors. 5.1. State, national ministries and communities As explained before, it was the state that initiated the SEMRY project and built the Maga Dam in 1979. This project was not realised in accordance with the will of the floodplain people. The socio-economic impact of the dam was neglected. There was no interaction between the national authorities and the population and the negotiation took place at the national and international levels (the Font Européen de Développement, FED, was sponsoring the project). This level of the government was not concerned with the management of the fisheries. In charge of fishery policies and implementation of national laws, is the Ministère de l’Elevage, de la Pêche et des Industries Animales (MINEPIA). Since decentralisation, this Ministry has been trying to involve the local level administration with the management of the fisheries. But despite this change in governance, there is no means of implementing laws that should lead to restricted access of the fishing grounds. One of the examples where this becomes evident is the difficulty to implement sections of the fisheries laws of 1995, which forbids fishing during reproduction time (July/August). The implementation of this regulation in the national law is impossible in the area of Lahaï, due to the isolation of the region and the absence of financial means to pay personnel for monitoring and enforcing national laws. One way to mitigate these problems was attempts at decentralisation on a local level, using the so called communes, which had been created to develop the rural areas. These new organisations where new officials were created on the local level were supposed to manage local matters concerning economic, social and cultural development. The transition of authority from the state to the commune was introduced to bring local management possibilities to the villages. In reality though, the communal government influences the local institutions and the rural development in a rather negative way; communal servants can be bribed, thus undermining the functioning of local institutions. In villages like Lahaï and Zuma only very little of the state money received is invested in development matters such as education and health systems. The basic problem is that the head of the

lost control, legal pluralism and damming the flood 183 commune and his delegates become important actors because of government intervention and start to control local resource management, fix the rate of taxes and collect them. They also have the power to forbid the construction of new fishing canals and the use of unsustainable fishing methods in their district, although they do not have the legitimacy on the local level to do so. Therefore, local interest groups cannot control them and these actors are easily accessible to richer outsiders, who can buy free access to the common-pool resources. 5.2. International organisations, NGOs This group of actors is constituted of organisations with the technical and financial means to support local livelihood through specific projects. Thus, during the last decade, the World Conservation Union (IUCN), through its Waza-Logone Project, has been trying to “restore the good life,” (Ngantou and Braund 1999) in order to restore the floodplain through re-flooding activities, releasing more water out of the Maga Dam (Loth 2004). IUCN’s re-flooding project was a partial success, even though it did not resolve the actual problems, which were related to institutional change in the area. Since 2004, the IUCN has stopped working in the floodplain. Now the idea of the restoration of the plains has been taken over by NGOs like the Centre d’Etude de l’Environnement et du Dévelopement au Cameroun (CEDC) and the Association Camerounaise pour l’Education Environnementale (ACEEN), which are both eager to resolve the problem of privatisation of the fishing grounds and the use of fishing canals. 5.3. Traders The influence of traders on the livelihood of the population in the floodplain began with the development of the market economy during the colonial time. The local population started to take credit from traders in order to pay taxes, to buy modern commodities and new fishing gear. This relationship was based on the dependence of local fishermen on credit, so now the traders can take advantage of the situation by imposing very high interest rates. In the case of Lahaï, 75% of the fishermen have to take credits from the traders in order to buy fishing gear. At the same time they commit themselves to sell their creditor the right to the seasons’ future catches for a very low, fixed in advance, price. The bond between client and patron lies in the society’s traditional reciprocity system. The fisherman is morally bound to the one

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that helps him in difficult times. The dependence is further enhanced by the high social status of the creditor (mostly Alhadjis). Abuses are rare, but it occurs that a fisherman can not pay back his loan. If the relationship was built on trust, the creditor will accord some more time to pay back the debts. In rare cases, the fisherman has to face sanctions (up to imprisonment) from the state court. In any case, the indebtedness of local fishermen forces them to intensify the use of the local fisheries. 5.4. External fishermen Migration to external fishing grounds represents an essential livelihood strategy, not only for local fishermen, but also for external actors like transhumant fishermen from neighbouring states (Chad, Nigeria, Mali) and seasonal fishermen from the Yagoua City and surroundings, The transhumant fishermen come, especially, for the most lucrative fishing events, “la grande pêche” and the pond fisheries. This livelihood strategy based on the customary law of reciprocity has worked well in the Waza-Logone floodplain in the past. However, today it brings problems for people in Lahaï. Since the 1990s, external fishermen brought new and more efficient fishing gear and boats into the plain. In addition, they often have more cash than local people and, therefore, can secure easier access to the resources through local administrators in the commune. In Lahaï there are mainly seasonal fishermen from Yagoua, who stay about two months, during the grande pêche. As they move away after this time and as they do not necessarily return to the same place in the following years, they are not concerned about using the resources in a sustainable manner. Their aim is to profit as much as possible from the resources during their short stay in the plain. Consequently, it is very difficult to achieve collective arrangements to prevent conflicts or to restrict access to the resources. 5.5. New Institutional arrangements governing access to the fishery commons and its consequences With the nationalization of natural resources in 1992 and the following decentralization process, the traditional authorities lost most of their power to the modern administration. The democratic spirit that came along with it helped the Musgum majority gain an equal status to that of the Kotoko in the village of Lahaï. This pointed the way to the demise of the traditional power of the Kotoko and hence, to

lost control, legal pluralism and damming the flood 185 the collapse of the traditional (Kotoko) common-property-regime. The situation regarding the river Logone (excluding the ponds) and the floodplain today is that access is now open and the area is regarded as state property. Today people are driven to intensify the exploitation of resource units and no longer base their use of common-pool resources on the previous common property regimes, but are now dependent on de facto open access in all the areas. However, changes to be observed in Lahaï show more complexity: Kotoko have lost their authority and governance in the ponds of Lahaï and the control over the fishery in the low level waters (mares). No rituals to initiate and to coordinate the collective fishery and to calm the water spirits are performed anymore. In addition, the sultan does not have the authority to collect taxes anymore on the collective fishery. Interestingly, the collective fisheries with both the Kotoko technique (tarauw) and the Musgum technique (haméçons) still take place every year in between April and May. But today it is the recognised state official and headman (blama), who fixes the date of the collective fishery. Comparable to the practice under the Kotoko regime, the collective fishery with the haméçons is open to everybody (also non residential fishermen); the collective fishery with the tarauw, though, is limited to the habitants of Lahaï (Kotoko and Musgum). Due to lack of authority of the headman though, increasingly richer people, regardless of their ethnic identity, find it easier to have access to the northern ponds of the village, based on their higher bargaining power in determining the date of the fishery. By doing this, they set a complete open access regime, without any technological restrictions. Another basic challenge now is monitoring compliance to the restriction on fishing in the ponds between December and April. This is no longer possible, because the spiritual authority of the Kotoko no longer exists and the social control has become inadequate to prevent abuses. Poorer families, especially, abuse this rule because of food scarcity. 5.6. Ideological justification governing the access and the use of common-pool resources Historically, the Kotoko based their legitimacy to control access to the fisheries on their link with water spirits and the spirits of the land; this lasted for a long time as the ideology justifying exclusive use. The undermining of this ideology has now happened on several levels:

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democratisation with its related open access, as well as privatisation tendencies. 5.6.1. Democratisation The notion of democracy among the immigrated majority groups such as the Musgum and Choa Arabs, as described above and as described by Fokou (this volume), has led to a new understanding of resource management and to a negative reaction regarding traditional access rules. The Kotoko controlled the access to the fishing grounds as well as to the land, so that the institutional changes caused by democratic claims had about the same effect in the fisheries as in the pastures. In order not to repeat again what was already said, I refer, at this point, to the very detailed report of Gilbert Fokou. 5.6.2. Privatisation of the fishing grounds Another ideological justification is based on old and new techniques that are being used to declare private some parts of the river. A traditional technique is to build a fishing canal that has always been recognised as private property. After the construction of the dam, ninety percent of the canals could not be utilised anymore, because there was not enough water. With the re-flooding of the floodplain, though, they became lucrative again. Before 1979, few people could afford to dig a canal. But since then, the restriction of financial means is no longer effective. Many local and external people are now able to construct a canal and, because there is no law that limits the construction of canals, only taxes are imposed. Several thousand canals are now in place just in the Zina district. The consequence of such privatisation is cause for concern. The high taxes (25,000 CFA) and the high investments in a fishing canal give the proprietor a good reason to use the canal as intensively as possible, often even during the rising flood, which is the reproduction time for fish. In the last few years another fishing technique has developed that puts high pressure on the fish population. After the water recedes, an increasing number of fishermen put plants and grass in shallow and stagnant water, giving the impression of the existence of small green islands in the river. The fish, in search of quiet and nutritious sites, are attracted to these green islands, thus becoming easy to catch. These sites are identified as a kind of private property. It is a very destructive technique, as immature fish are caught, too.

lost control, legal pluralism and damming the flood 187 6. Conflicts over fishery commons The controlling Kotoko regime used to determine, enforce and monitor its rules very effectively: By dint of its monopoly on access to political institutions, its spiritual monopoly on traditional knowledge about rituals, and its economic monopoly on knowledge of fishing techniques and access to fishing grounds. Its power and unquestioned authority helped to resolve conflicts effectively and to sanction abuses. Today, the national laws regulating natural resources do not correspond to the realities or the needs of the local population and cannot be implemented effectively, because of inadequate financial means and administrational authority. Since traditional rules have eroded and cannot be enforced anymore either, it is almost impossible to resolve conflicts in a rightful and final manner. Abuses cannot always be sanctioned, because civil servants and traditional leaders are amenable to bribery. In Lahaï, I noticed conflicts over territorial limits, collective fishery, indebtedness, theft, land use rights and agricultural damage caused by transhumant pastoralists and ethnic arguments. If a conflict occurs, the parties involved normally inform the blama or the chef de canton depending on which authority is more respected. They can admonish the parties, impose fines and, if no peaceful accord is achieved, they can threaten to pass the affair further up the hierarchy to the sous-préfet in Kousseri or the sultan in Logone Birni. A process at the administrative level in Kousseri is very costly (transportation costs and process expenditures), so that normally the disputing parties prefer to find agreement at the local level. If the case gets to the sultan, it normally peters out, meaning it remains unresolved, disappears by itself or escalates again later. In the fishery, the main conflicts concern the ponds. Their significance and value has increased due to longer dry seasons (due to climatic change and the Maga Dam) and decreasing catches during the grande pêche. In the southern pond of Lahaï, the villagers of neighbouring Patmangaï try for access by arguing that, as the limit of their village touches the pond, they should be allowed to co-manage it. The debate ended up in a conflict about the history and the ancient limits between the two villages. Since 1995, the conflict over the limits remains unresolved. An attempt was made to resolve the conflict with the involvement of the chef de canton, but the two villages could not

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come to an agreement. The case was then passed on to the sultan, who has not yet pronounced judgement. But in case of another disagreement, the conflict was taken to the sous-préfet. 7. Conflict resolution mechanism and failure Despite the warlike history that the Musgum and the Kotoko shared until colonisation, the two groups lived peacefully, side by side for a long time. Since the restructuring of the administration in 1992, due to the increasing scarcity of the resources, conflicts occur more often. One of the most intense arguments took place in 2000. The roots of the conflict lay in disputes about the successor of the chef de canton of Lahaï. The title is hereditary, but he did not have a son. During the Kotoko regime, the sultan of Logone Birni could have chosen any successor without facing any resistance. But today traditional leaders cannot take decisions on their own. Yet, the sultan decided to name his son as successor to the chef de canton in Lahaï, without conferring with the population. The ceremonies of the implementation had already started when the son was violently pulled out of the chefferie by some Musgum men. The background of this behaviour lay in the distribution of an information brochure of the INADES-Formation about “Les droits & les devoirs des citoyens au Cameroun”. There it was written that in the absence of a successor, in accordance with the traditional right of succession, the people had to be involved in the appointment of a new one. For the Musgum, these words meant that the next chef de canton had to be elected in a democratic way, so that the majority of the Musgum would have the chance to elect a Musgum as chef de canton. The result of this conflict was that no chef de canton was appointed. Although this conflict is not directly about access to CPRs, it illustrates very well how the Musgum can use democratic mechanisms to develop greater bargaining power vis-a-vis the Kotoko. 8. Impact of institutional changes on the management of the common-pool resources The peculiar quality of the Kotoko institutions has been to install rules for fishing that were based on authority and a link to the spiritual

lost control, legal pluralism and damming the flood 189 world, allowing many people access to fisheries as long as this basic authority and the ritual aspects were accepted and as long as technology related privileges of the Kotoko were not undermined by other ethnic groups. However, the demographic pressure of immigration, climatic changes, disturbance of the ecosystem by the Maga Dam, political and legal structural changes of the state administration’s democratisation/ decentralisation and market mechanisms undermined Kotoko authority and their rules, which had never been designed to give answers to such pressures. Traditional rules were not respected and not adapted to the new ecological conditions any longer. These factors not only changed the Kotoko institutions, but caused their collapse. Parallel to the decline of the Kotoko regime, a modern administration was developed that tried to have greater influence on the common-pool resources management. The decentralisation of the administration in 1992 increased the control of the state in rural areas. Decentralisation also meant that the common-pool resources should be managed by the political entity of the village, (the blama). Since the beginning of the presidency of Paul Biya (1982), the Musgum had been favoured in the political administration, but with decentralisation, they could achieve more influence on the local common-pool resources management. Together with the idea of democratisation, the institutional changes in the 1990s spurred the majority of Musgum and Choa Arabs to resist the traditional rules of the Kotoko minority. The actual problem concerning the sustainable use of the commonpool resources is that the state administration could not replace the Kotoko institution. Even if national laws to manage the common-pool resources resources existed, the state did not have the means to effectively regulate activities in the plain. As result, a de facto open access situation arose, which allowed the people to use the resources as they wished and give the local administration a free hand to implement arbitrary taxes or to take bribes. As there is a legal insecurity and no authority that can be trusted, money becomes an important means for privileged access to resources. The consequences of a lack of regulative institutions and the influence of money can be illustrated by the exploding number of canals. Its impact on the common-pool resources has been far reaching: As the canals connect the plains, the depressions and sometimes the ponds with the rivers, an acceleration of the recession of the water and thus, a disturbance of the whole hydrological system of the plains is caused.

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Not only does access to productive fishing grounds depend on financial means, but additionally, these canals reduce the productivity of the remaining fishing grounds by accelerating recession of the water. The impacts of institutional change on CPRs cannot be denied, and has led to a basic reduction in size and number of the fish caught. 9. Discussion It is not possible to turn back time. The Kotoko regime collapsed, because too many conditions changed and too many factors put pressure on the functioning of their institutions. Now, the present situation of the management and the use of the CPRs in the Waza-Logone floodplain must be faced and discussed. A customary law continues to exist in the floodplain, but the efficiency of these traditional rules is weak, without a strong institutional framework to enforce and sanction the rules. This can be illustrated by the traditional interdiction of the fishery activities in the ponds from December to April: nobody would have broken this rule under the Kotoko regime, because one feared the sanctions. Today though, some households of Lahaï break the rules and fish secretly during the night, because they know that either they get away with it or the sanctions are very weak. The question is: do formal rules exist and are they supporting a sustainable resource management? Many formal rules have been written since independence, but none of them are really adapted to the local situation of the people living in the floodplain. Especially in the fishery, a wide number of restrictions concerning the time of fishing (interdiction during reproduction time of the fishes) and fishing techniques (for example the use of nets with mesh sizes less than 30mm is forbidden) exist, but have never been enforced. The state is too far away. Only on market days do civil servants from the MINEPIA and MINEF (Ministère d’Eau et Forêt) appear to collect taxes, but the ministries have no capacity to constantly monitor activities in the floodplain. There is a gap between the local resource users and the state administration. This leads to de facto open access situations and causes the arbitrary management and use of the CPRs that constitutes the reality in the Waza-Logone Floodplain of today.

lost control, legal pluralism and damming the flood 191 10. Conclusion and recommendation As the situation under Kotoko rule showed, open access with restrictions on technology and control of some areas does not necessarily imply overuse of the common-pool resources. Earlier, there was no anxiety about overuse of resources, for the fish were in abundant supply and could never be overexploited by the small number of fishermen and the technical means in use. But since independence much has changed and more factors put pressure on the ecological system, inducing people to intensify the exploitation of resource units. This becomes problematic when institutions change and when there is a plurality of rules that are not binding. There is no central authority anymore to which everyone is loyal. The traditional authority of the sultan (Logone-Birni) is replaced by several power centres, representing several ideologies and regulation systems. This legal pluralism creates uncertainty and a lack of directives in using the natural resources. The village chief determines (though consulting the elders and the chiefs of the households) when the fishing in the reserve begins and on what day the communal fishing will take place, but he has no authority to change or impose rules to adapt to the changing environment. The ancient institutions of the Kotoko have mainly been eroded by the creation of the new administration structure in 1992. The traditional authorities lost most of their power to the modern administration and the democratic spirit that came with it helped the Musgum gain a status equal to that of the Kotoko, leading to an implosion in the traditional hierarchical system. As the power distribution changed, so did the bargaining power of the different groups. New criteria emerged to gain influence in the society, such as wealth, education and political influence. Traders, wealthy men, administrators and, to a certain extent, women (because they are supported by NGO projects) gained bargaining power. The construction of the Maga Dam to irrigate the SEMRY-Project disrupted the ecosystem of the floodplain and caused severe changes in the availability of the natural resources. Even though the ecological condition of the plain improved remarkably, due to the rehabilitation program of the IUCN, the dry period seemed to stay longer and the timing and intensity of the floods are very uncertain and unpredictable, causing high losses in rice cultivation and in the fishery.

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Due to an increasing population, more people have to satisfy their needs by exploiting water resources. However this alone does not explain the overuse because the fisheries is a highly profitable business. Indicators are the increase of fishermen and pirogues seen during the fishing period. In addition, more efficient technologies are required, so that the harvest can still satisfy the needs. With the use of more efficient nets with smaller mesh sizes, smaller, immature fish are caught. If uncontrolled, this leads to a reduction of fish available during one season but also possibly for longer periods because fish that has not reproduced is caught. New equipment is expensive requiring the fishermen to take some credit from the traders every year. The resulting indebtedness forces the fishermen and cultivators to fish more intensively. Additionally, they have to sell their products at a very low price, thereby reinforcing the intensification of fishing activities. But often during the official fishing season (October, November) the activity is not satisfactory anymore, due to a general decrease in the fish population, and there is a growing incentive to fish intensively even during the reproduction period (July, August). One possible approach to resolve the problem of overuse of the fish resources of the Waza-Logone Floodplain might be to aim at poverty reduction. If the agricultural revenues were stabilised and increased, the people would not be forced to take credit from the traders. They could also afford not to fish during reproduction time or use techniques that accelerate the overuse of resources. When financial security improves, then restrictions on the fishing activities during fish reproduction time also might be easier to implement. However, such a project needs to be developed in a participatory way and needs to address the concerns of the different local stakeholders including the state and also perhaps administrative and former traditional authorities in order show positive results for the sustainable management of the fisheries and related resource uses. References Adams, W.M. (1992). Wasting the Rain: Rivers, People, and Planning in Africa. Univ. Minnesota P. —— (1996). ‘Economics and hydrological management of African floodplains’. In: Water Management and Wetlands in Sub-Saharan Africa, eds. M.C. Acreman und G.E. Hollis. Gland, IUCN Switzerland: 21–34. Beauvilain, A. 1989. Nord-Cameroun, Crises et Peuplement (tome 1 et 2). Université de Rouen.

lost control, legal pluralism and damming the flood 193 Couty, Ph. 1964. Le Commerce du Poisson dans le Nord-Cameroun. Paris, Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer. Centre d’Etude de l’Environnement et du Developpement au Cameroun (2002). Plan Directeur de Recherche pour la Plaine d’Inondation du Logone (2004–2014). Version Preliminaire. Forkl, H. (1983). Der Einfluss Bornus, Mandaras, Bagirmis, der Kotoko-Staaten und der Jukun-Konföderation auf die Kulturentwicklung ihrer Nachbarn südlich des Tschadsees. München, Minerva-Publikation. Hillebrand, E. und Mehler, A. (1993). ‘ “Kamerun” ’. In: Handbuch der Dritten Welt, eds. Dieter Nohlen, Franz Nuscheler. Bonn, Dietz. Konde, F. (2000). Gestion des Ressources Naturelles de la Plaine d’Inondation du Logone dans la Zone Rehabilitée par le Projet Waza-Logone. Université de Yaoundé, Departement de Biologie et Physiologie Vegetales. Landolt, G. (2004). Common Property Ressourcen, institutioneller Wandel und nachhaltige Ressourcennutzung. Lokale Ressourcenverwaltung bei den Musgum und Kotoko von Lahaï, in der Überschwemmungsebene des Logone im Norden Kameruns. Master thesis, University of Zurich. Lebeuf, A. (1969). Les principauté Kotoko: Essai sur le caractère sacré de l’autorité. Paris, CNRS. Loth, P. (ed.) (2004). The return of the water. Restoring the Waza Logone floodplain in Cameroon. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN. Mbuyinga, E. (1989). Tribalisme et Problème National en Afrique Noire, Le Cas du Cameroun. Paris, L’Harmattan. Ngantou, D. and R. Braund (1999). ‘Restoring the good life’, World Conservation 2/99: 19–20. Rhebergen, M. (1998). Who reaps the fruit of re-flooding? Changes and opportunities in natural resource use by Mousgoum women after re-flooding of the Logone Floodplain, North-Cameroun. Nijmegen, Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. Scholte, P. (2003). ‘Immigration: A Potential Time Bomb under the Integration of Conservation and Development’, Ambio (A Journal of the human environment), 32, 1: 58–64. —— (2005). Floodplain Rehabilitation and the Future of Conservation & Development. Adaptive management of succes in Waza-Logone, Cameroon. Ph.D thesis, Leiden University. Seignobos, C. (2000). Atlas de la Province Extrême-Nord Cameroun. Paris, IRD. Tambekou, A. (2000). Projet d’appui aux pêcheries de Lahaï. Rapport d’activités pour la période Novembre 1999–Avril 2000, Association d’Appui aux Initiatives de Développement Rural (AIDR).

CHAPTER FIVE

FROM INTEGRATED SLOPE MANAGEMENT TO FRAGMENTED USE: COMMON-POOL RESOURCES, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND CONFLICTS IN PANGANI RIVER BASIN, OF SAME DISTRICT (TANZANIA) Gimbage Mbeyale1 Abstract This paper examines and analyses institutional changes and power relations in the management of common-pool resources, particularly forests, water for irrigation and pasture among the Pare and Maasai pastoralists in Pangani Basin, Same District in Tanzania. This chapter differs from the other chapters in this volume, as the author does not only look at floodplains, but at livelihoods as well and institutional change in mountain areas, which are close to the floodplains. While the Maasai pastoralists have used the floodplain on their migration routes as rich dry season pasture, the Pare mountain peasants have only used small parts of the plains belonging to the mountain slope, they used to occupy. As these people are now moving to the floodplains close to the river, competition over resources now occurs. The analysis of political and economic changes in the history of Tanzania indicates a progressive increase of government control in the management and utilization of common-pool resources from colonial rule to the independence, specifically through Ujamaa (Tanzanian version

1 Gimbage Mbeyale (PhD) has been a PhD student of the University of Dar es Salaam and the University of Zurich, research was funded by the NCCR North-South of which he was a member. He acknowledges support from the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South: Research Partnerships for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change, co-funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the partner institutions. At present he is a Lecturer at the Sokoine University of Agriculture University, Morogoro, Tanzania; Present activities include teaching Forest Management, Socio-economic and institutional aspects in natural resource management, Natural Resources Governance and natural resource policies. He is involve in research on Management of natural resources, natural resource governance, policy, livelihoods and poverty-environment nexus.

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of African Socialism), when the government transformed traditional institution structures to accommodate the new policies and development ideology. The policy changes at the national level, which replaced traditional norms and rules of access to common-pool resources and sanctioning mechanisms, simulated change of ideology towards common-pool resources management among the Pare agriculturalists and the Maasai pastoralists. This included change in territorial boundaries, leadership and organization structures that characterised common-pool resources management in the pre-independence era, during which mountain slopes had been an integral resource area managed by respective communities. After the colonial and post-colonial period, a major problem was centered on the delineation of the socio-ecological resource boundary, where the upstream-downstream resource management changed to accommodate the new political boundaries that separated the upstream and downstream villages, resulting in the management mismatch of the common-pool resources. 1. Introduction Common-pool resources particularly forest, irrigation water and pasture in the Pangani River Basin, specifically in the Same District have been being degraded and depleted for the last four decades (IUCN 2003, Shaghude 2006, Mbeyale 2009). According to water utilization Act No. 42 of 1974 and its amendment Act No. 10, 1981, and written laws (miscellaneous) Act No. 17, 1989, and General (Regulations) Amendments, which divided Tanzania into nine hydrological basins, Pangani was identified as most seriously affected by anthropogenic activities that needed immediate attention due to serious user conflicts, degradation and lack of a comprehensive framework for management of the resources (IUCN 2003). This degradation and depletion of resources stems, not only from population growth (which in this case is an important contributing factor) and the tragedy of the commons as Hardin (1968) proposes, but mainly from institutional changes and changing socio-cultural and economic conditions that have influenced the management and utilization of its resources in the past five decades. In this case, the breakdown of local level institutional structures of the Pare and Maasai through state policies and market interference, together with other external factors, have played a crucial role in encouraging an open access situation (Mbeyale 2009). The area we are looking at is the Pangani River and the Mkomazi valley flood-

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 197 plains as well as the South Pare Mountains (SPM) in Same District (see map 4). This is a resource-rich pocket in an otherwise semi-arid area, with its resources subjected to competing claims among multiple users and resource use conflicts and the ensuing breakdown of local institutions and the failure of the state institutions to function properly. This work echoes the work of Ostrom (1990, 1999), Ensminger (1992), and Agrawal (2002), demonstrating the combination of factors that influence institutions and management of common-pool resources; access to resources, market opportunities and population growth; it also highlights the role that bargaining power and ideology play in order to justify access to resources. In these cases then, we deal not only with the increase in floodplain resources (such as pasture, land, cattle and rice), but resources in the mountain areas, such as timber, too. By comparison, the impact of the changing prices for coffee formally the major cash crop for the mountains people had triggered different institutional changes. Open access to forests resulted in upstream-downstream problems due to logging. Less income from coffee also pushed poorer farmers to move to the floodplain area formerly used by pastoralists. Therefore, unlike other cases, the Pangani example indicates that changes in other topographic areas adjacent to floodplains can have a significant impact on resource use and institutional change. Peasants see floodplain areas as open access where they can install their fields, which they then consider to be private plots. The Maasai pastoralists still consider these areas as commons. Further changes like the development of agricultural schemes and the economic crisis in Tanzania led to the rise in value of commonpool resources. Some of it was related to irrigated land and fertile land in the floodplain as well as rice, and timber resources in the mountain areas. These changes resulted in a change of behaviour and livelihood strategies of local resource users, and encouraged free rides by both locals and outsiders. External factors including infrastructure development (such as roads and irrigation schemes), economic changes resulting from the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) of the 1980s, and global economic changes, specifically, the drop in coffee prices, affecting coffee producing villages in the south Pare mountains and other parts of the country added pressure. The analysis of interactions, interests and bargaining power of different actors both in the mountain villages and floodplain villages has revealed that, together with external factors, failure of the government to control access to resources

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due to decreasing financial capacity and manpower together with corruption and mistrust between government officials and local communities, have resulted in de facto open access and the degradation of the common-pool resources. Consequently, this has increased conflicts among different actors (water users and seasonal farmers, farmers and pastoralists, forest communities and government officials and farmers of the Ndungu irrigation scheme). This chapter is based on the findings of research, funded by the NCCR-North-South research (subprogramNr.6, of the Department of Geography, in collaboration with the Department of Social Anthropology also of the University of Zurich, Switzerland; Department of Geography, University of Dar es Salaam and Department of Forest Management of Sokoine University of Agriculture, Tanzania. The theoretical approach for the study is based on Hardin’s characterization of the tragedy of the commons, which is the underlying problem of CPR management and the way contemporary scholars such as Ostrom and other researchers have tried to approach it. Primary data collection involved use of anthropological methods and socio-economic surveys using household questionnaires, key informant interviews, oral histories and participants’ observation. Secondary sources such as government reports were also used. 2. The Ecosystem and setting of the Research 2.1. Location of the research villages and the Pangani River Basin Ecosystem (Same District) The Pangani River Basin in Same District is located in the northeastern part of Tanzania, in the Kilimanjaro region, which lies 4°S to 4°45'S and 37°30'E to 38°15'E. Geo-morphologically, the Basin is constituted of two units, the highlands and the lowlands. The lowlands are comprised largely of floodplains, while on the other side, highlands are comprised of steeply sloping mountainous terrains. This research was conducted in four villages, Mvaa and Mpinji on the South Pare Mountains (SPM) while the other two villages, Maore and Ndungu, are on the floodplain, adjacent to the SPM along the Mkomazi Valley (see map 1). The highlands rise 1,500–2,400 m, while the lowlands are 500–1,000 m divided by mountain ranges, famously known as the Easter Arc Mountains (North Pare, South Pare and The Usambaras) on both sides, the eastern part and western part are two floodplains, namely, the Ruvu Valley in the west and Mkomazi Valley in the east (which includes the Mkomazi Game Reserve/National Park).

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 199

Map by Corinne Furrer based on Brockington 2002

Map 4: Pangani River Basin, Same District and location of floodplains and villages.

The temperature varies between 10°C and 28°C in the mountains while the floodplain ranges between 24oC and 34oC. Table 1 indicates population and population density in the study villages. Table 1: Population and Population density in the study villages. Village

Aspect

Mvaa Mpinji Maore

Male Female Population Households Pop./Km2 Number

Mountain 725 Mountain 630 Lowland 1,763 (flood plain) Ndungu Lowland 3,602 (flood plain) Average Source: Mbeyale 2009

840 730 1,947

1,565 1,760 3,707

310 353 746

367.4 447.36 343.88

4,768

8,470

1,977

304.13 365.7

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Graph 1 is a sketch of the flood plain ecosystem, indicating the upstream-downstream resource interaction from the mountain down to the floodplain. Both in the mountains and the floodplain, rains are bimodal. The long rains start in February and last until May (with a peak in March), while the short rains start in October to January (with a peak in November).

Source: Mbeyale 2009

Graph 1: A sketch of the ecosystem of the study area (Upstream-Downstream).

Average rainfall ranges between 500 mm to 800 mm in the lowland floodplain, while in the mountains it reaches 3,000 mm, with a mist effect at higher altitudes (Baker 2001). The area surrounding the floodplain and the mountains is semi-arid. By July, the vegetation dries out quickly as the winds increase and the humidity drops. The vegetation is largely Acacia-Savanna grassland and Acacia-Commiphora thornbush. A period of intense desiccation follows throughout August and

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 201 September, when the ambient temperature rises. This is the time when uncontrolled fires sweep through the grazing areas and many areas are completely burnt. The vegetation is greatly affected by human activities such as grazing, charcoal making, and wildfires. Altitude and rainfall are also contributing factors. The mountains are covered with forests. The largest forest block (the Chome Forest reserve) has an area of about 14,200 ha. The forests are part of the Eastern Arc Mountains known for a high level of biotic diversity and endemic taxa (IUCN 2003, Rodger et al. 2001, Lovett and Waiser 1993). The vegetation in the mountains varies with altitude and rainfall. The vegetation on the wetter eastern side of the mountains (1,250–1,600 m) is covered with sub-montane (mountain) forest dominated by Parinari excelsa. Above this, mountain forest species such as Ocotea usambarensis (Camphor), Schefflera miriantha and Rapanea melanophleos are found. On the lower parts and slopes, dryer mountain forest is dominated by Albizia gumifera, Makaranga Kilimancharica and xymalos monospora also occur (Mbeyale 2009). In the eastern part of Same District, the river Hingilili feeds into the floodplain (or Mkomazi Valley) at Maore Village, while the Yongoma River feeds the lowland at Ndungu Village (see map 1). The two rivers originate in the catchment forests in the mountains. This makes proper management and conservation of the Chome Forest Reserve and traditional forests in the mountains important for the continuous flow of water downstream to irrigation-dependent communities of the floodplain villages. The floodplain is nearly 600 km2 and floods mainly between January and March. At this time, the floodplain is used primarily for rice cultivation, and the arid areas which are now abundant with grass provide abundant grazing grounds Animals return to the floodplain from July until November, when dry season floodplain pasture is more important. In the western part of the district, along the Ruvu Valley, the flood plain is more extensive and is nearly 2,000 km2, the Pangani main river feeds into the floodplain from the upper Nyumba ya Mungu Dam. However, the vegetation cover and economic activities are more or less similar with the exception of that in the Ruvu Valley, animal husbandry is more pronounced than crop cultivation. Therefore, there is a tendency of people from the Mkomazi Valley and South Pare Mountains to out-migrate to Ruvu Valley to exploit the agricultural potential.

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The fauna found in the mountains and the basin area include butterflies, parasitic nematodes, amphibians, reptiles, birds and large mammals such as zebras, giraffe, African elephants, lions, hyenas, warthogs, impala, and monkeys. However, the large mammals are concentrated in the Mkomazi Game Reserve (Mbeyale and Songorwa 2008). The SPM forests are one of the important bird habitat areas in Tanzania which the UNDP/GEF project, in collaboration with the Forest and Wildlife departments is striving to conserve (Baker 2001). 2.2. Ethnography, history, and demography of the area Important ethnic groups that largely influence the management and utilization of common-pool resources include Pare and Maasai. They both follow a patrilineal system of inheritance and access to resources. Therefore, decision-making was dominated by a husband or head of the clan. The Pare are concentrated in the South Pare Mountain and consider themselves indigenous. It is generally believed that they migrated into the area, coming from the Taita Mountains in Kenya, resulting from overpopulation and land shortage for crop production. It is not clear when this took place. Their decision to settle on the Pare Mountains in contrast to the lowlands semi-arid areas (nyika) is attributed to the presence of better rainfall patterns, abundant water, and better conditions for crop production; above all, life was healthier, compared to nyika, where one could easily contract malaria (Kimambo 1996). Infant mortality rate was also high in the floodplain as compared to the mountains. The mountains were also a better protection against their rivals, the Maasai and the Chaga, who usually came for cattle raiding (Dannholz 1989). The Maasai are well known pastoralists in east Africa, especially Tanzania and Kenya (Anderson and Broch-due 1999, Spear and Waller 1993, Homewood and Brockington 1999, Brockington 2001). They have managed to sustain their traditional lifestyle for many decades, in spite of the influence and pressure to change, placed on them by the surrounding societies, religious groups and the government (Spear and Waller 1993, Dannholz 1989). They do not hunt for meat or farm the land, but exclusively practice animal husbandry. Cattle have a revered status in the Maasai culture and spiritual beliefs, and the community lives primarily on what their cows provide; leather, meat, dung make the walls of their huts, horns are containers, and urine for medicine, milk and iron-rich blood. Efforts by colonial and post-

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 203 colonial governments urging them to live a sedentary life failed (Spear and Waller 1993). The Maasai practice polygyny. The wives play a key role in the household economy, while the man is head of the family. Their social politics is embedded in their age-grade system, whereby young men (moran-age class) are regarded as warriors, and in most cases, they engage in cattle raiding to increase their herds (Spear and Waller 1993). Cattle-raiding is centred on their religious belief that their god, Engare, gave all the cattle on earth to the ancient Maasai, as their rightful owners. The old men are important decision-makers and look after the security of the society. They demand grazing rights in most of the national parks in the two countries and always ignore international boundaries, when moving around searching for pasture and water for their animals. They are not indigenous to this area, having immigrated from the northern part, mainly Arusha, in search of pastures. Before and after independence, they used the Mkomazi Game Reserve as their grazing area. In 1987, the government evacuated them from the reserve, and they moved to other parts of the floodplain, while some proceeded to the Rufiji Floodplains. The consequent increase in the number of livestock added to the pressure on floodplain resources (Mbeyale 2009). Other ethnic groups, which migrated to the area include the Shambaa, who immigrated as a result of the demographic pressure in west Usambara Mountains, the Hehe and Kinga from the southern highlands of Tanzania. Lumbering is their main occupation. Others, like the Chagga and Nyamwezi came to the area to work in sisal and sugar cane plantations during the colonial time and decided to settle in the area. In general, the floodplains were sparsely occupied by pastoralists, who had large herds of cattle. Most of them were the Maasai, and some Pare who were agro-pastoralists. According to the 2002 population census, the Same District had about 200,000 inhabitants, of which 75% live in the South Pare mountains and the floodplains. The population growth of Same is 1.6%, while that of the study area is 3% per year, which is above the national average 2.8%. The population density in the area is more than 200 persons per km2 (IUCN 2003). The development of the major economic infrastructure, such as the road network connecting the district to important commercial centres in the area, to a large extent, have influenced population increase in the basin. Moreover, economic

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development, such as irrigation schemes and the retrenchment of government workers, added to the population growth of the area and has become attractive for immigration. 3. Common-pool Resources and Livelihoods 3.1. Main economic activities and livelihood strategies 3.1.1. Agriculture In the mountains, both rain-fed cropping and irrigation is practised by the Pare. Main crops produced in the mountains include banana, maize, beans, cassava, ginger, cardamom, potatoes and sugarcane used mainly for brewing local beer (Denge). With the exception of the Ndungu irrigation scheme where mono-cropping is practised in rice farms, all other villages practise intercropping such as rice and banana, cassava, maize and beans. Currently, in the mountains there has been an increase in ginger cultivation that consumes a considerable amount of water. However, irrigation is more pronounced in the floodplain, where rains are not reliable. In the mountains, between 1910 and 1995, coffee was the main cash crop. The downfall of the crop shifted the economic dependence of most farmers from coffee to lumbering. This is done illegally, as the forest department stopped official timber production in 1985. Migration to the floodplain for rice farming is another strategy that the mountain people have adopted to supplement their dwindling farm income. The most important cash and food crop in the flood plain is rice, while other crops such as maize, beans, and banana are grown on a small scale for subsistence. The introduction of the Ndungu irrigation scheme in 1987–89 and market liberalization has attracted more people from both within the district and outside to engage in rice cultivation and business. 3.1.2. Pastoral activities In the lowland floodplain of the Eastern part of Same District, cattle herding is practised mainly by the Maasai and few Pare sedentary agro-pastoralists. During the dry season, grazing is done in the semiarid areas where water is scarce. Most of the areas previously used as reserve pastures for the dry season (Mlimbiko), have been converted into croplands. Milk production for sale and the sale of live animals to butcheries and weekly markets is important for the Masai household

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 205 economy (Brookington 2001). Milk production is at its peak during the rainy season when grazing is in plenty, while in the dry season milk production drops. What is produced at this time is reserved for household consumption. Milk is sold locally and also to Same Town, the district head quarters. In dry seasons and in some years of acute shortage of pastures, pastoralists often take their animals to the Mkomazi Game Reserve, despite restrictions not to enter there. They also move to the western part of the floodplain in Same District, near the Pangani main river and some take their animals down to the Rufiji flood plain which is far South (see chapter six by Meroka in this volume). 4. Background of political and institutional setup 4.1. Pre-independence era The Pare are a patrilineal society, organized under their lineage or ukoo line, led by a clan headman and a council of elders. Access to resources and ownership, therefore, follows the lineage. Their old political setup indicates that development of ethnic leadership and social organization was the result of external pressure, mainly war of conquest, slave trade and internal pressure, providing the motive for a large-scale organization. Therefore, the traditional leaders tried to bring their subjects together to support their common cause of communal commitment in all aspects of life: in war against rival groups, working in unity, mthalagambo, and farming, helping the sick and in wedding ceremonies (Kimbambo 1996, Dannholz 1989). Mfumwa was the traditional leader of the Pare. In his territory, he was supported by the Mlao, Mchili, Kigongo (these titles are equivalent to Division Executive, Ward executive officer, and Sub-village leader respectively, under the current setting) which are the councils of elders at different levels. Apart from local politics, they had a strong influence on their subjects and always were instrumental in conflict resolution. The Mfumwa territory ran from the mountains down to the floodplain, connecting the mountain and the floodplain people and the ecosystems, as Graph 1 indicates. This was important for coordinating resource utilization and management, such as allocation of irrigation water downstream, maintenance of vegetation cover and hydrology. This is a peculiar situation compared to other floodplain areas. However, it is similar

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compared to other cases in this volume in that here we are dealing with an integral ecosystem area that had been managed in the precolonial system. The Pare believed in the power of ancestral spirits and most of their rituals were performed in the forest areas, these include initiation ceremonies (mshitu wa Ngasu) and other rituals (Dannholz 1989). The Chome Forest Reserve, known by the Pare as Shengena, was believed to be the dwelling place of their God (murungu and spirits). The traditional forests (Mp’ungi) were important for social and religious functions and were located close to people’s settlements. Every clan had several sacred forests for ancestral spirits worship, as in thanksgiving after harvest, rainmaking, reproduction of livestock and blessings and curses (Dannholz 1989, Sheridan 2000). But the religious system was of central importance as monitoring devices because it was forbidden to cut trees in the traditional forests, which were often in catchment areas. Also, people were not allowed to cut trees close to the river or stream of water, because it was believed to provoke the spirit and disturb the hydrological cycle. Only traditional healers were allowed to collect medicines from the forests. When they needed the bark from a tree, they were to take it from the side facing the sun in the evening (one side only), as this insured a gradual healing process for the tree. Women were not allowed to open water from a channel, because the channel’s management was connected to the traditional religious belief that women could make water sources unclean, thus invoking the anger of the gods. Clan leaders or community elders sanctioned the violators. Non-compliance was interpreted not only as disloyalty to the community, but also to the gods to which one had to appease by slaughtering an animal, preferably a sheep. Ngasu ya mshitu for men and mabwe ya vache for women were ceremonies used to teach young boys and girls the traditional norms and rules of the society and to issues connected with the taboos of resource management. Since the people living in the floodplain originated in the mountains, they always participated in all the rituals and traditional ceremonies that were conducted there (Mbeyale 2009). The Maasai were also organized along their lineage. They moved to the floodplain in search of pastures, as the result of the land alienation policies of the German government in Arusha (the north eastern region of Tanzania), whereby the Maasai lost their grazing lands to white settlers (Spear 1997). Maasai have a stratified society based on age group and gender. Circumcision is used as a rite of passage from

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 207 youth to adulthood (boys become moran–warriors and girls, ndito, become marriageable women). Elders are the main decision makers in the society. Each clan has a Laibon (spiritual leader) to whom elders look to for advice, and in turn he, is expected to provide rain and good pasture. Their moral and social economy was based on cattle. Therefore, pasture and water are crucial for their livelihood. The Maasai traditionally protected and conserved wildlife, pasture, and trees, especially those which provided fodder for their cattle. They had rules that prohibit tree cutting and game hunting that were embedded in their religion, with corporal punishment for violators or abusers. However, when migrating from one area to another in search of pastures, they never negotiate access; they normally bypass rules and regulations of the neighbouring communities. This has brought the Maasai into conflict with many societies and governments, both during the colonial era and after independence Spear and Waller 1993). They can generally co-exist with wild animals, as their culture does not allow hunting of wild animals. Consequently, when in transit from neighbouring regions such as Arusha to other regions for selling animals or in case of acute shortage of grazing areas, they utilized the Mkomazi Game Reserve as well as the floodplain dry season pastures. They also pastured on the western floodplain grazing lands where the population of farmers is low and there are fewer farmer-pastoralist conflicts, as pastoralists are the majority (Mbeyale and Songorwa 2008, Brockington 2002). During colonial rule, the government introduced an indirect rule system, initiated by the Germans, and later adopted by the British government all over Tanganyika (Spear 1997, Nyerere 1966, Giblin 1992). In this case, they integrated traditional leadership and institutions into the colonial administration through chiefs (Mfumwa), making it easier to rule their subjects without directly confronting the local people. In this way they succeeded in exploiting the local people through the leadership, which enjoyed the people’s legitimacy (Spear 1997, Sheridan 2000). This arrangement allowed the community to continue with some traditional ritual practices, such as Mp’ungi, and Mshitu wa ngasu. It was during this period that a cash economy started to replace the barter system. The cash economy was also institutionalized and used for compensation, instead of goods or foods and drinks. In 1930, a head tax was introduced for all men aged 18 years or older, capable of physical labour. The money was to support the functions of the colonial administration (Spear 1997). The chief and his subordinates

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had to ensure that all people paid without delay. In 1951, the Chome Forest Reserve was gazetted. People started paying fees to go into the forests for various activities including grazing. The same year, the Mkomazi Game Reserve was also gazetted and all pastoralists had to have a grazing permit to be allowed to graze in the reserve. The Mfumwa was the overseer of all administrative issues, including punishing the abusers. However, the functions of the Wafumwa ceased after independence. Generally, the Maasai were marginalized politically, since their lifestyle was in constant conflict with colonial rules. 4.2. Post independence changes 4.2.1. Political and institutional changes Changes at national level: The post-independence era is characterized by a struggle to transform political and socio-economic structures of the colonial regime into a free state. This required national policy and institutional changes, which consequently influenced the socio-economic conditions and livelihoods of the people (Hyden 1980, Sheridan 2000, Maliamkono and Bagachwa 1996). As a result Area Commissioner (AC) Act (No. 18 of 1962) was passed by the parliament to replace the colonial office of district commissioner. The ACs were appointed on the basis of their membership and commitment to the ruling party (TANU). The government stressed rural development as its major objective in its transformation and development effort. This involved the establishment of nucleated village settlements (Nyere 1966, Hyden 1980) and opening up more land for cultivation. According to Sheridan (2000), forest areas and wetlands were the immediate target for agricultural expansion. Private crop buyers were replaced by government-controlled agencies and cooperatives (Ponte 2000). In the process, the government through the Native Authority Act, 1963, abolished the position and functions of the chiefs, who were considered to be instruments of the colonial administration, most of whom became political figures under the then ruling party TANU.2 This was a determined war against colonial rule and rules. (Sheridan 2000).

2 TANU-Tanganyika African National Union, the ruling party in Tanzania from independence to 1977 when it was changed to CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi-Revolution Party), which continues to date.

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 209 The major turning point in the political and economic development of Tanzania came after the 1967 Arusha declaration, which aimed at transforming the country to follow the socialist ideology, by introducing Ujamaa3 policies under the leadership of J.K. Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania. Under this regime, all major means of production were nationalized. The Ujamaa-policy aimed to transform resettlement of the rural populations into nucleated village settlements, and was used as an argument by the government for the rapid improvement of such important infrastructures such as roads, hospitals and schools. In transforming the rural economy, most traditional villages and traditional livelihood strategies were changed, but unfortunately and the resource ownership and management became weak. Through the village Act No. 21 of 1975 (village registration, designation and administration), village governments were established to command and supervise all Ujamaa activities in the villages under the ruling party. More importantly, the decision-making process was based on directives from the ruling party and government from national and district levels (Hyden 1980, Sheridan 2000). Common-pool resources were used and regulated following the directives of Ujamaa policy. Traditional tenure systems were lightly respected and marginalized (Sheridan 2000). But despite trying to install equity, African socialism faced many structural difficulties, which caused the economy to stagnate (Hyden 1980, Maliamkono and Bagachwa 1990). In the 1980s to the early 1990s, structural adjustments programs (SAP), led by the World Bank and IMF, were ushered in to redress the structural imbalances and spearhead growth in the economy of the country (Bagachwa et al. 1995). At this time the private sector became involved in running the economy of the country and the liberalization of the market came into force. Multiparty democracy was another important turning point in 1995, when for the first time in a presidential election different parties were represented. After a multiparty election, the ruling party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) CCM, reduced the single party monopoly to run the government departments and political issues were separated from the mainstream of government functions. Realizing all the ill effects that had come from previous policies and its limited manpower and

3 Ujamaa- a policy based on African socialism (familihood) as advocated by J.K. Nyerere.

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financial capacity, the government recognized the need for local communities’ participation in the management of the common-pool resources. This resulted in changing all major policies that have a direct impact on common-pool resources management, including formal acts such as Land Policy (1997), Village Land Act (1999), Wildlife Policy (1998), Agriculture and Livestock Policy (1997), Forest Policy 1998 and Forest Act (2002) (see also Meroka in this volume). 4.2.2. Macro-economic and policy changes The colonial economic policies ended soon after independence while the economy of the country, centred on agriculture, was booming. However, as highlighted earlier, the economic performance of the Ujamaa policies was very poor (Hyden 1980, Maliamkono and Bagachwa 1990). It is obvious that the deterioration was caused by the government’s economic strategy that had many structural difficulties in almost all sectors of the economy. In the early 1980s, Tanzania, aiming at improving its economy, introduced market-oriented economic reforms, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which brought in several macro and sector policy changes mainly enforced by the IMF and the World Bank (Malyamkono and Bagachwa 1990, Eriksson 1993). Under SAP, all farm input subsidies, formerly provided by the government, were removed. Cooperative unions such as VUASU (combining crop producers of coffee, rice and other crops in the district), which had created an enabling environment for farmers by providing them with farm inputs (fertilizers, pesticides and insecticides, and credits), were abandoned and the market was liberalized. This reduced the bargaining power of the VUASU, while giving greater power and influence to private buyers to set crop prices irrespective of production costs. Currently in the floodplain villages, private buyers are giving loans to farmers who are in need during the cropping season, at an interest rate of 50–55%. This is not favourable for the poor farmer. Private buyers have emerged who have more bargaining power and are supported by the government officials, as the two collaborate more easily than with the local communities. In the mountain villages where coffee was an important cash crop, the fall in coffee prices had a direct impact on the household economy and also on livelihood strategies. Table 2 indicates these changes in relative prices of important goods from 1990 to 2005.

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 211 Table 2: Price changes between 1990 and 2005. (Prices in US$, Exchange rates 1$=TZS 980–1,000) Product 1990

Years 1995 2000

27.83 39.78 1.00 12.15 3.14 2.35 1.08 0.39 0.49

88.37 121.30 1.30 12.60 5.48 3.71 0.97 0.56 0.77

2005

Timber price/m3 Price on site At the market Coffee price/kg* Rice price/bag of 90kg Maize price/bag of 90kg Beans price/tin of 20kg Meat (Cow) price/kg Wild meat price/kg Fish price/kg equivalent

100.30 130.61 3.00 13.59 6.18 3.71 1.48 0.68 0.90

85.91 124.07 1.70 11.46 7.49 3.08 1.45 0.88 0.97

Source: Own survey data, and KNCU office, Moshi 2004/2005 * First class coffee

Between 1983 and 1990, the coffee price dropped from $3.00 per kg to $1.00 per kg. The price fluctuated, but reached $1.70 per kg in 2005. (Mbeyale 2008). In view of the rising production costs and the end of subsidies, the government began to discourage coffee farming in the mountains. People were then driven to exploiting the forest resources as an alternative off-farm income. The severe impact of this can now be observed in the forest (IUCN 2003).4 On the other hand, timber prices from these forests have increased from $27.83 and $39.78 per m3 on site and in the market respectively in 1990 to $85.91 and $124.07 per m3, respectively, on site and in the market in 2005. This change in relative price is a strong incentive for people to continue harvesting timber in government reserved forests, despite the risk of being arrested, as timber production in the forest was declared terminated in 1987. Emerging polices like the Poverty Reduction Strategy (URT 2000) have also failed to effectively address the environmental issues. There is more emphasis on exploitation of common-pool resources with a higher value for poverty reduction than on issues of sustainability of

4 Since 2004/5 prices for coffee are increasing again, leading for the first time to more income in coffee producing areas (Mhando 2005). This is however a recent development and as coffee needs time to produce, it will also take time for local people in the Pare area to take up coffee production again.

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resource systems or the environment. It is important that this aspect be taken into consideration, as plans to implement poverty reduction programs are underway and this has a bearing on the sustainability of common-pool resources. Policy changes and reforms have introduced management inefficiencies that expose common-pool resources to the agents of degradation. 4.3. External factors driving institutional change There are several factors that have led to institutional changes in regard to management and access to forests, irrigation water and pasture in the area. There have been successive changes that have altered internal attributes of local societies such as local institutions, ideology and power relations. These changes seem to stem from various factors ranging from the external to the local community. These include technology and infrastructure development, and conservation activities related to the Mkomazi Game Reserve. The floodplain and mountain villages are accessible by road yearround. The area is also connected to the main road leading to the major commercial urban centres such as Moshi, Arusha, Tanga, Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. Though a positive development, a tarmac road is considered to be an important factor in exposing the common-pool resources to exploitation by outsiders, especially under the current situation where privatisation and market economy dominate. There is more timber extraction in the forest, owing to a road linking the resource to the market (the construction industry is now booming in all urban centres), which leads to changing relative prices of timber and crop production especially in the mountains. In 1992, the government of Japan constructed an irrigation scheme at Ndungu Village aiming to control flooding and utilize the water resource for crop production. This attracted many people to pursue rice farming. It was an important breakthrough from utilising traditional irrigation channels to a modern water solution. More attention to the allocation of resources was required to make sure that the system operated in a more secure, economic and socially acceptable way for the majority of farmers. Things turned chaotic when the cost of farming became higher than most farmers could afford. In the absence of credit possibilities for farm inputs, it became difficult for many poor farmers to continue cultivating. This made most of the farmers either

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 213 hire out their plots or sell them to rich farmers and look for plots in other neighbouring villages where they could afford to farm. There were many restrictions as to which crop could be grown in the project, unlike during the time of traditional irrigation when farmers would diversify crop production as a strategy for food security. The irrigation facility became the property of the few richer farmers’ associations, CHAWAMPYO5 and outsiders who dictate what is to be planted in a particular season. High prices for rice and the crisis in the coffee industries also pushed Pare mountain people to floodplain areas that had been used for dry season pasture by the Maasai. Based on the notion of free access to land in the Ujamaa ideology, suddenly after the project installation, land became private property for farmers, while for the Maasai it remained common property. Further reduction of pastoral areas is caused by a protected area. This process resembles other areas where we did our studies, as protected areas often excluded local users, despite continuous use and the fact that they are cultural landscapes (see cases in Cameroon, Zambia, Botswana and also in Rufiji, Tanzania, see examples this volume). Unlike other areas, however, the Mkomazi Game Reserve (MGR) is an example of continuous fortress conservation without local involvement. If one analyses the other examples cited, where so-called participatory approaches have been used, in practice few differences can be seen. In all areas as in the protected areas, local users are excluded and have to bear the costs of conservation. The MGR is just the most obvious example. The Wildlife Department’s decision to terminate the grazing permit for the Maasai pastoralist in the Mkomazi in 1987, increased pressure on the floodplain dry season pasture land and the land available for cultivation. The Maasai pastoralists formerly using the Mkomazi as their grazing land were forced out of the reserve. The decision caused an escalation of conflicts between farming communities and the pastoralists. The basic argument for the eviction of the Maasai from the MGR was based on the assumption that the pastoralists would destroy the ecosystem without paying attention to the MGR livelihoods cost for local people, peasants and pastoralists 5 CHAWAMPYO-Chama cha Wakulima wa Mpunga Yongoma (Yongoma rice producers association).

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alike. Since MGRMGR was created, surrounding villages have grown in size, both in area coverage and in population. Together with this expansion, people’s needs have also increased. But, being in a semi-arid environment, MGR is a resource rich pocket and people are dependent on those resources (grazing lands, firewood, charcoal, timber, honey, bush meat, etc.) (Brockington 2002). Most of these plains are now within MGR and their resources legally inaccessible. At present, the efforts to deal with the existing problems and to implement the current wildlife policy prescriptions are not sufficient. This has resulted mainly from the variations between conservation views of the MGR authority, local communities and the government at the district and national levels. Mistrust has developed over time because the government coercively evicted the pastoralists from MGR without providing them with alternative grazing lands as promised, while farmers lose their crops regularly to wildlife and livestock without compensation. 5. Contesting the commons: Negotiation of access to common-pool resources in research villages and sites 5.1. New institutional arrangements on the local level for access to the commons The traditional institutional structures for common-pool resource utilization and management in the mountain and floodplain villages were formerly based on traditional laws, norms and culture of each respective clan in the Pare community. After independence, with the introduction of Ujamaa- and self-reliance policies, natural resources such as land, forests and water were controlled by the state (URT 1997). A new organizational structure was put in place, which reduced the bargaining power of the local community and was concentrated at the district level and in the village government under the directives of the ruling party (TANU and CCM) officials. Graph 2, provides comparative political administrative structures of the local community before and after independence. In this graph, it is apparent that the village leadership is largely imposed by the district council.

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 215 The organization flow chart Colonial era

The organization flow chart Post-independence era

Mfumwa (Lord/Chief)

Division Secretary

Mlao (Sub-chief)

Ward executive

Mchili (village leader)

Village Executive Officer S

Village

Kigongo (Sub-village)

Ten cell leader C

Sub-village

Source: Mbeyale 2009 Legend: Key: C: Inherited/Elected from the community District Council

S: Employed by the Local

Graph 2: Changing from local to state leadership in Pare villages, Pangani River Basin.

The seconded staff lacks the legitimacy of the local community as opposed to pre-independence, when local leaders usually had the people’s legitimacy and a wide knowledge of norms and rules of the society. The divisional secretary is an employee of the central government, while village executive officers are the employees of the district councils. The village chairman and his/her supporting staff is a voluntary, not salaried post. Before the advent of multiparty democracy in 1992, it was mandatory that a government leader at the village level be a member of the ruling party, TANU and thereafter, CCM. Thus, the village government was more responsible for fulfilling goals of the political party than accountable to the communities; therefore individuals in the community did not feel a sense of empowerment in this structure. During the post-colonial era, expansion of agricultural land lead to the encroachment of public lands, forests and pastures and to their degradation, because local rules and regulations for managing the resources were no longer in place. They became less and less effective as the political system changed the local structures as Graph 2 indicates. Through this process, the bargaining power of local actors also

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weakened, because the responsibility of managing these resources fell in the public domain and therefore, under public control, which was seen by locals as being much more difficult than customary regulations. Only the management of traditional forests remained under the village community and clan leaders. Moreover, during 1976 the administrative setting of the area was changed under Ujamaa policy. The mountain communities were separated from the floodplain communities. This division disjointed the rules and norms for the management and use of irrigation water and forests. Former rules provided that the mountain communities must protect water sources and use water in the daytime for irrigating their crops, but allow the water to flow freely downstream at night. This rule is no longer respected, as the mountain communities have their own organization and cannot be sanctioned by the downstream administration. The administration of the forest and irrigation was left in the hands of the Forest and Beekeeping Division and Agriculture Department, respectively. The village government and community members were left as overseers of the resources (Mbeyale 2009). After independence, the head tax and the fees charged for access to a protected area in the floodplain, like the Mkomazi Game Reserve, and the Chome Forest Reserve in the mountain area and lowlands during colonial time, were abolished. Reserve boundaries and other management rules remained. In 1963 Wafumwa regimes came to an end in the area (URT 1997, Hyden 1980). In the floodplain area, a scheme to reorganise villages allocated new villages to livestock-keeping communities (villages of Mheza and Makokane), where basic services such as school, water for both domestic and livestock use was provided, at least temporarily. Other Maasai communities were allocated to farming communities. In this case the Maasai and Pare with their different cultures, had to transform into a pseudo-united family as the ideology of familyhood-ujamaa advocated, and try to share their economic, cultural, and social values. This led to conflicts, as many Maasai groups had maintained a strong ethnic identity by preserving their own lifestyle, embedded in their subsistence strategy and religion (Spear and Waller 1993), while the Pare prefer sedentary agro-pastoral life. This was in conflict with Maasai pastoralists, who value livestock keeping, trying to be mobile and see cattle raiding as an important political activity. After few years, the two ethnic groups were engaging

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 217 in physically violent fights and increasingly created misunderstandings between the two. Some Pare decided to go back to their former villages to continue living with their previous communities, however, they were forced to reduce the number of animals. In farming communities, the maximum number of animals one could own was restricted to 50 head. This situation is also found on the Usangu floodplain of western Tanzania, where there is dispute between resource users, especially farmers and pastoralists (Kajembe et al., 2003a, see also further below in chapter 5.3). In 1987, when the government stopped timber production in the forests, the Maasai were prohibited from using the Mkomazi Game Reserve as grazing area, thus forcing some to move to other parts of the floodplain. This increased pressure on floodplain resources, due to the increased number of livestock in the area. In this period, most of the colonial and traditional ways of life and the management of resources were altered to favour the Ujamaa ideology, under a oneparty system in which the village governments really could not make decisions independently of the only national party. Traditional organizations and their institutions were rendered ineffective; several religious ceremonies, such as ritual for ancestral spirits linked to the forest, that earlier had been central to managing the mountain slope ecosystem, were discouraged. Christianity continued to spread after independence and convents were not allowed to participate in initiation ceremonies and forest rituals. Some clan heads, who became Christians, surrendered the traditional forests to the ownership and management of the village government. One traditional forest at Mvaa Village, formally owned by the Wangulwi clan, is now owned by the Lutheran Church Mission. Traditional irrigation furrows which used to be run under the traditional management system were handed to the village government and organized water-users associations. Moreover, during the Ujamaa era the emphasis was on crop production. More land was cleared to pave the way for agricultural production. The opening up of land for crop production encroached on the boundaries of forests, woodlands, pastures and even streams. Cooperative unions (VUASU) were initiated to create a more favourable environment for peasants to improve production by providing credits for farm inputs, and a ready market for their crops (Mbeyale 2009). The functions of VUASU reduced the cost in terms of time

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and money for individual farmers to look for fertilizers and other inputs outside the villages. This increased the profitability and reduced inconveniences. As a response to government failure to control access to commonpool resources, new so-called participatory policies have been formulated ceding power to local communities to manage resources in a participatory way; this includes land policy (1997), forest policy (1998), agriculture and livestock policy (1997). Natural Resource Committees have been were elected and have started in all villages in the study area. Additionally, water users’ associations are found more in the floodplain communities. However, the functioning of these committees and associations in which the influence of the state and NGOs remains weak, there is little incentive for the local society to cooperate with the government as expected. This development echoes changes in other floodplain areas, where the combination of taxes, state ownership of land and common-pool resources in combination with economic crisis and rise in relative prices, have led to open-access constellations, in other parts of Tanzania (in Rufiji area (see Meroka, also see Meroka and Haller 2008, Mbeyle and Songorwa)). This has happened as well in other floodplains (see in this volume, Inner Niger Delta, for fisheries (Beeler and Frei), Waza Logone area for pasture, fisheries and land (see Fokou, see Landolt), Kafue Flats for fisheries, pastures and wildlife (Haller and Merten)). 5.2. Relation between resource users This part aims to uncover the attributes, interrelationships and interests of different actors and the way they negotiate access to particular resources. These are resource users and managers sometimes referred to as stakeholders. Understanding their relative power and interests, the importance and influence that they have, the multiple hats that they wear and their networks of operation, is crucial in describing the entire system and even uncovering conflict characteristics. We first deal with the mountain areas as the first step that triggered movements to the plains and influenced institutional changes and conflicts. As described above changes since Ujamaa policy as well as in the Tanzanian economy together with a peculiar mixture of open access via Ujamaa and

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 219 closure in the context of irrigation schemes and protected areas has also changed relative prices for mountain and floodplain related goods. This is a peculiar constellation and has a unique position in the cases that we compare in this volume. However the processes have a similar logic as in the other cases: As cash needs for basic livelihoods are getting more difficult to meet in the mountains for agriculture and other revenues, farmers, local and district officials as well as traders compete over timber resources, which are highly valued. The institutional arrangement no longer exist and we have open access situations. These then lead a) to problems of erosion downstream for those farmers who do already cultivate there and to the outmigration of poorer farmers, who then have to compete with peasants and pastoralists in the plain. In these constellations institutional arrangements for access are newly structures and often drafted the way the more powerful actors want them to be. The setting however remains negotiated and contested. This chapter provides three examples of this process: 5.2.1. The case of forests in the Pare Mountains Forest resources in the mountains fall under three different management entities and regimes respectively, 1) Chome Forest Reserve, under the central government (Forest and Beekeeping Department-FBD); the largest forest with a coverage of about 14,000 ha; 2) Chongweni Forest Reserve, under the district council with a coverage of 500 ha; and 3) Traditional/ritual forests, about 13 in number, with an average area of 0.7 ha each. The main actors involved in negotiating access to resources include the village community, village government (Chairman and Natural Resource Committee), district officials at the local level (Forest Assistants/Attendants, Ward Executive Officer, Village Executive Officer), District Officials (Natural resource officer, Forest officer, Land officer), Timber dealers and GEF (Global Environmental Facility-Cross Border Biodiversity Project). Graph 3 gives the analysis of the interaction and interrelationships among the main actors in the mountain villages of Mvaa and Mpinji.

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District Officials (Local level) - Forest assistant/attendant - Ward executive officer - Village executive officer

Local Organizations - Elders council - TF leaders

District Officials (District level) - DRNO - DFO - DLO

Village government - Village chairman - VNRC GEF/Cross border

The village community

- Timber dealers - Pit sawyers

Key: Strong relationship and trust Relationship without trust Weak relationship and no trust Source: Mbeyale 2009

Graph 3: Stakeholders interaction and power relations.

Chome and Chongweni forest reserves were gazetted in 1951. From that time until 1987, the forests were important as catchment and production forests, especially for timber. These are the only reliable sources of timber in the Same District. With the help of its local staff, the Department of Forestry in the district controlled access by issuing licenses to timber dealers, both local and those from neighbouring towns of Arusha, Moshi and Tanga. The village community benefited from this arrangement, as it was possible for them to obtain their daily needs for wood such as fuel, building poles, wood for burning bricks, as well as timber, the sale of which is a sensitive issue. They also secured non-wood forest products such as medicines, wild fruits, fodder, and forest soil for their farms. Apart from securing their daily needs, they also made quick money through employment, which was readily available in the forest for different forest operations such as tree felling, pitsawing, and transportation. Similar employment was available during the coffee boom, where people were seasonally employed by the large coffee plantations. These jobs included coffee-picking and processing.

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 221 In 1987, the government prohibited timber production, for conservation purposes. It was also forbid going into the forest with any cutting equipment. Only deadfall branches were to be collected. However, collection of fruit and medicine was allowed. Since there was no alternative source for timber, timber dealers continued to harvest illegally in the forests. They used the network of pit-sawing groups in different villages to gain access to the forest. These groups had systems of monitoring the movement of forest staff in the area. Pit-sawyers and timber dealers are interdependent for their income and livelihood strategies. This interdependence has strengthened their relationship against the forest staff. Their relationship has become even stronger following the fall in coffee prices and loss of subsidies, which resulted in timber becoming a more important alternative income. The district officers have poor connections with the village communities. They give more attention to illegal timber harvesting than their cooperation with village government or VEC/VNRC against illegal dealers. In most cases, they appear when there are some rumours of illegal timber dealings, and fail to report to respective village governments when in operation. They assume more power in decisionmaking regarding issues related to the forest reserve than the village government or VEC. They are not trusted by the village government or the community. Since the forests are owned by the central government and district council, most decisions are centralized in the district. The village government or community has no power to change rules and regulations or influence decision-making regarding the management of the resource. Timber dealers have good contacts with forest attendants. They usually pay them off in order to gain access to the timber, but they have little influence over the district level officials. The 1998 forest policy gave power to the village government to work with forest officers in the management of the forest resources. Therefore, the village government, through the Village Natural Resource Committee (VNRC) or Village Environment Committee (VEC), has the responsibility of caring for the forest within their boundaries. In all the villages these committees exist, but they have stopped actual patrolling and caring for the forest for two reasons: 1) All the timber confiscated by VEC was taken by the district officers to the Same Town, and sold to timber dealers. No timber was left for the village; 2) there is no incentive for the village to have such a committee. Since the patrolling

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committee members are not compensated for the time spent in the forest, and they endanger their relationship with the rest of the community. Therefore the forests move from state regime to defacto open access. 5.2.2. The case of irrigation water and pasture along the eastern floodplain Irrigation and pastoral activities are more pronounced in the floodplain villages of Maore and Ndungu. Graph 4 indicates the relationships among key actors. The main actors being water users’ associations, officials at village levels (Project Manager at Ndungu scheme, ward and village executive officers), officials at district level (district commissioner, district director, agriculture officer, land officer, natural resource officer), village government, rice dealers, pastoralists, seasonal cultivators and CHAWAMPYO (the farmers association at Ndungu village). At Maore, farmers are divided along traditional irrigation channels. Each channel forms a users’ association (e.g. Kalinga water users’ association). This followed the failure of the village government to operate the distribution of water to all farmers in the village. In order to keep the irrigation channels, each member contributes $2, which is submitted to the association. The associations are formally registered in the village and the village government helps settle disputes among them. Formerly, it was the duty of a person appointed to distribute water to ensure that each plot received water on the appointed day. Now as the population of seasonal cultivators’ increases, it is difficult to control water distribution. Seasonal farmers hire plots from poor farmers who have failed to cultivate because they lack sufficient capital to invest in basics such as fertilizers and pesticides. Therefore, they decide to cultivate small plots for their subsistence.

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 223 NADP

PBWO

Local level Project manager Ward executive officer Village executive officer

District officials (District level) DED Agriculture officer Land officer

CHAWAMPYO

Water users associations, fx bxcultivators

Village government

Rice dealers/traders Pastoralists

Local NGO, WITO, and Ilaramatak

Outsiders Seasonal farmers, pastoralists

Key: Strong relationship and trust Strong relationship no trust Fix Weak relationship and no trust Conflict relationship Source: Mbeyale 2009

Graph 4: Power relations and conflicts among key stakeholders in the lowlands.

Seasonal farmers pay a $4 fee, which enables them to use water for one season. After paying the fee to the association, they strive to get a good harvest even if that entails stealing water from other farmers, when water is scarce. In contrast to Maore, the Ndungu Village has an irrigation scheme. This is the most productive area in the district, where the government at the district level depends on rice production. CHAWAMPYO (the farmers’ association) operates at Ndungu Village, caring for the irrigation scheme with technical assistance of the Project Manager (a government employee). Membership in the association is free to all people with farm plots in the scheme. However, people are not satisfied with the functioning of the association. This is evident in the reluctance of most farmers to join the association. The government at the district level has retained most powers, making the association dependent on the final decisions of the district officials (such as

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District Commissioner and District Director). Most farmers are not in agreement with the leadership of the association and the result has been poor enrolment. The number of potential farmers is more than 2,000 while members of the farmers’ society has only 140 members who profit. Apart from this problem of differential access to irrigated fields, there is a peculiar up-stream situation. In Ndungu Village local farmers having fields in the irrigation scheme and outside the irrigation scheme, have formed a local NGO called WITO (or coming together).6 Its members are concerned with the environmental degradation both in the floodplain and the mountains. During Ujamaa times the former upstream mountain areas with its forests and the downstream floodplain areas were managed as entire ecosystem entity during the pre-colonial common-property regime. It was separated because separate Ujamaa villages with their mountain and floodplain territories were formed. Separating the upper from the lower part of the mountain slopes has resulted in improper management of interrelated common-pool resources such as forests in their function of watersheds and irrigation water. Logging upstream creates irregular flow of water downstream, causing high floods with erosion or on the contrary, lack of water because it is not stored in the watersheds. In pre-colonial times coordination and interactions had been made through rituals in the forests linked to marriage and initiation ceremonies. Today, people upstream and downstream only meet during market days or when debating over water for irrigation and disputes over logging in watershed areas.

6 Local NGO with its headquaters at Ndugu village. It has been organized by people who originate from the mountains and have rice farms on the floodplain. They have been concerned with the degradation of the resources in the mountains where they lived before and the fear of losing the floodplain rice farm, if the current degradation trend continues.

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Fig. 7. Modern irrigation scheme Pare Mountains, Same District. Some irrigation schemes have been set up in Same District that receives water from the Pare mountains, where logging takes place, which reduces downstream water flow. In addition, the schemes are only operational with modern technology and many Pare peasant lose access to these fields because lack of maintenance and use. Photograph by Tobias Haller.

5.2.3. The case of the immigration of farmers into the Pangani floodplain pastures In the western part of the Pare Mountains, on the Pare floodplain, pressure from the mountain area due to loss of coffee as a main cash crop was so high that not all people could be accommodated on the eastern part of the floodplain and thus, the movement to the southern part. These areas however had been pastures of the Maasai and they regarded the area as common property. Basically, seasonality implied scarcity and availability of pastures. During abundance, the people moved away from the wetlands (kitivo) to the upland dry lands, where during the wet season, resources were in abundance, while in the time of scarcity, the movements were towards the rich wetlands pasture banks (mlimbiko). Such moves were more and more restricted during colonial and post-colonial administrations mainly because of the Mkomazi Game Reserve. The other examples refer to the establishment of white settlers on large plantations and later by large-scale irrigation schemes that also took away pastures. Today Maasai pastoralists also face competition when it comes to the use of the remaining pastures: As

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outlined in previous chapters, poorer Pare farmers who do no longer profit from coffee production and who have no access to irrigated fields in the eastern side of the Pare mountains now move to the western side of the mountains into the Pangani River floodplains. For the Maasai on the other hand, this meant reducing access to dry season pastures that had been already partly denied by closing the Mkomazi Game Reserve to cattle in 1988 (Mbeyale 2009).

Fig. 8. Recent settlement of Pare agriculturalists in the Pangani Floodplain, Same District Pare who do not have access to land move to the floodplain in order to profit from water and good soil conditions. These areas are however dry season grazing land for Maasai groups and this leads to conflicts between nomads and peasants. Photograph by Tobias Haller.

5.3. Ideological justification for institutional change and access to the commons There are several levels of ideologies, discourses and narrative to be found in the three setting studied: First the forestry officers on the state level officially are condemning logging, while being part of it as well. Traders argue that it is up to the administrator and local people to manage the forests and that they are just buying and selling. On the local level for those who have the possibility to use timber it has to be used before people from the outside use it. Seen that there is no

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 227 trust in the administrators of the Forestry services and seen the high interests in timber this makes perfect sense. If downstream users of water complain about the destruction of the watershed function and the fact that loggin in these forests in illegal the argument relates often to Ujamaa and the authority of villages to use the resources or that this is a matter of the forestry department and local people. Access to irrigated land in the floodplain follows a market and economy of scale logic: capturing gains from irrigation means to be able to invest at a certain moment, even if schemes had originally been implemented with the concept of a wider participation. The poorer households in the two mountain villages studied, who got no access to logging or rice cash crop farming or who lost fields there, began to move to the western side of the river basin, where the Pangani River, itself, creates some floodplains and where water and land seemed to be freely available, assured under the Ujamaa policy of free movement to different parts of the country. So the Pare household from the mountain established their houses or in most cases a second house on the floodplain, so as to have irrigated plots for rice and maize. They, however, did not negotiate with the Maasai, leading to a major conflict: While the Maasai claimed these areas to be traditional dry season pasture areas (mlimbiko), the peasants argued the land was open-access when they first came in and then was transformed into informal private property. For this discourse the farmer also received ideological support from the state and its Ujamaa policies, which considered agriculture the backbone of development in the country and animal husbandry as less important (Sheridan 2000, Mbeyale 2009). What we thus see is a paradox of open access and privatisation at the same time and therefore a akin to legal pluralism that can also be found in the cases in Cameroon, Mali, and in Zambia (see papers this volume). 6. Conflicts over common-pool resources Conflicts occur on several levels and stem from the processes described in chapter 5. In the Pare mountain areas the open access situation and the mistrust in the forest administration has spurred the community to design a strategy for access to the timber resources. In other words, there is a conflict over timber resources between local stakeholders,

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illegal timber dealers and the administration but this is a structural conflict. It is uncovered during elections, when the contestant promises to protect the interests of the village community, by giving them access to forest resources. However, in both villages surveyed, village government leaders were found to engage in some form of timber dealings themselves as are people from the administration. The village executive officer and the ward executive officer are all employees of the district. They supervise different development activities within the village or ward and are the power brokers between the local community and the government at district level. In the eastern floodplain conflicts emerge from the contact with rice dealers and seasonal farmers coming to Maore and Ndungu villages. They normally have no contact with the village government except when they pay the money to the association and the owner of the plot. This is a new challenge to the association and the village government, since they have yet to prepare a mechanism to cope with these outsiders. This, in most cases, has been the source of conflicts between these seasonal immigrants and members of the water users’ associations. When the cropping season starts, rice dealers are available to give loans to those who want to cultivate, but do not have the capital to buy seeds, to hire a tractor or to buy fertilizer. They exchange 7,000/= Tanzania Shillings (TS) for a bag of rice during harvest time. Since there is no other credit facility, a poor farmer is worse off after repaying the loan. During harvest time a bag of rice worth $15–$20, offered to the rice dealer at 7,000/= TS, takes the interest rate on the credit to as high as 50–55%. The rice dealers then pay a tax to the village government in order to continue buying rice. While local farmers become poor, seasonal farmers are able to get land from the impoverished people. Other conflicts evolve related to exclusion of poorer farmers in the Ndungu rice irrigation scheme, which has lead to a concentration of land in the hand of richer farmers. There the local association (CHAWAMPYO) has only about 140, mostly the rich peasants as members, while there are about 2000 farmers. Poor farmers say the association is for the rich farmers and government officials, because of the influence they exert on the daily functioning of the irrigation scheme. Poor farmers find it difficult to operate within the scheme, because the allocation of water is costly, and machinery provided by the project is often not available for them when needed. At the same time, they are required to pay about 45 per acre to meet the costs for water, tractor and other charges to have access to the scheme. Moreover, the asso-

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Fig. 9. Maasai Woman with child in the Pangani Floodplain area, Same District, Tanzania. The Maasai have lost access to many pastoral areas due to encroachment by conservation areas (Mkomazi Game Reserve) and by peasants who move down the mountain areas. Photograph by Tobias Haller.

ciation decides what crops will be planted. They would like to diversify their crop production and plant other crops such as maize, beans, banana, for food security, but they are not allowed. This has led poor farmers to hire out or sell their plots to rich farmers and also more and more to richer townsmen, who invest in irrigated fields. The poorer farmers are now moving to the western part of Same, into the Pangani River floodplain, where there is less competition. In addition, conflicts on the eastern side of the Pare mountains emerge between Pare farmers and Maasai because of destruction of crops by animals from the latter. This leads to violence against cattle and herdsmen creating a tense situation in the area. As pastoralism is not a very well recognized activity by the government, peasants have generally much more bargaining power than the Maasai to establish

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the combination of open-access into areas that had been pastures and privatisation of these lands (Mbeyale 2009, Mbeyale and Songorwa 2008, see also Mbonile 2005). As described, the pasture situation on the western side is competitive due to the fact that poorer farmers now compete with the Maasai over fertile and humid areas of the floodplain, especially during the dry season. This leads to by permanent conflicts between Maasai pastoralists and cultivators in the floodplain with regular clashes, physical violence als well as crop and animal damage. The Maasai themselves are grouped in informal associations, which are not recognized by the village government. However, the associations help them to organize grazing schedules for each pastoralist. Each goes out at least once monthly to graze the animals. In case an animal is lost, together they embark on a search to look for it. Cases involving stray animals lead to major conflicts. To make sure they win, they contribute money and bribe the village government officer, ward or the judiciary by giving selling milk and live animals. However pastoralists do often not trust the village government leaders. 7. Conflict management and resolution mechanisms Before independence, conflict resolution mechanisms seemed to have been more elaborate and efficient and therefore, corresponded to the robust design principles set up by Ostrom (1990); not only because of low population pressure on the resources, but also because institutional structures that were in place and the legitimacy of the local leadership played a large role in ensuring successive conflict management. This can be attributed to the traditional institutional setup that was operating in a homogeneous society. The village leaders (mfumwa) and his subordinates had both political and judicial powers. Local elders played a key role in conflict resolution and counselling of the mfumwa and his subordinates. Sanctioning mechanisms were prompt and efficient, making the transaction cost low. After independence, new institutions were put in place, convenient to the political system that was in power, abolishing the indirect rule that the colonial administration used. The current Land policy, (1997) and Land Act (1999) are important tools for conflict mitigation. Under the new policy and Act, more power is devolved to the local communities, land matters have been withdrawn from the court, and every village will have its own land committee that will deal with land issues. Land policy and Acts are the

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 231 bedrock of agriculture and livestock policies. Hence, under the current setting, it is possible to mitigate conflict characteristics that are inherent in the previous setting. The Forest Policy and act (1998, 2002) also give more power to villages to manage forest resources around them. However, the government lacks the funds and manpower to implement the policies and acts. Under the new institutional setup, formal conflict resolution starts at sub-village level. Depending on the wisdom and education of the sub-village chairman, mostly traditional norms and rules are used together with formal or statutory laws. The Village Council is the highest body in the village that also can be involved in conflict resolution, followed by the Ward Council. However, because of mistrust existing between the local communities and government officials—the latter being often accused of rent-seeking as has been illustrated, this conflict resolution mechanism is never effective or successful. Legal channels through police and the court are another option. However, delays in resolving disputes and dispensing justice are among the major problems, exacerbated by corruption. According to the data obtained in the area, it can take six months to one year to resolve conflicts, while an average of 80% of the respondents indicates that without bribery, cases become unnecessarily complicated or experience inordinate delays. Therefore, transaction costs to follow formal arbitration are extremely high and open only for people with high financial capital assets and high bargaining power. In this context, collective action is much hindered, but not impossible. In the Pangani area under study, local people take their own initiative to defend themselves. In the case of the irrigation conflicts at Maore and Ndungu, prompt decisions and actions are required to rescue a crop that can fail if water is not supplied in time. Mechanisms for resolving issues are not in place. This causes desperate farmers to fight for access to resources in critical times. The water users’ associations have their own by-laws that are functioning. If these are supported by the government and legal system at all levels, it can be possible to avoid unnecessary violent, physical conflicts. The problem is, however, if conflicts resulting from collective local action, not mediated by the state escalate, police and army forces are called in to calm down the violence, which may lead again to major state control and not to co-management schemes. Realizing these problems, the mountain communities have been active to form autonomous elders’ councils (mabaraza ya wazee) at village and ward levels. These help to advise the village and ward

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government on important issues of interest to the community. However, to function well in the current setting, they need support from the government to give them legitimacy. Downstream farmers, who believe that the traditional system was superior to the Ujamaa and post-Ujamaa regulations try to reinstall the interaction between upstream forest and downstream floodplain areas by organising themselves into the WITO. They try to establish good relationships with the village government and communities both in the mountains and in the floodplain to raise awareness of the problem. However, they lack the support of government officials, both at the district and Ward levels. They have a contradictory relationship with the irrigation scheme farmers’ association, CHAWAMPYO, because WITO accuses the association of causing environmental damage, as it collects water charges without replenishing the catchment forest. On its side, CHAWAMPYO accuses WITO of tarnishing its image before the community, because they have different interests and a rivalry relationship. The Maasai on their part tried to organise themselves in indigenous organisations (Illaramatak)7 and asked for support from international human rights movements and legal scientists.8 Government officials at the local level (village and ward executive officers) play an important role in overseeing development activities in the area, and are in most cases involved in conflict resolution. When groups within the village or neighbouring villages are in conflict, they bring them together, as they are considered to be powerbrokers. Since they are district officials, they are loyal to the district, but at the same time have to protect themselves in order to keep peace in the community. 8. Impact of institutional change on common-pool resources The last five decades indicate a sharp degradation of the commonpool resources that are of concern to both the local communities and

7

Meaning “group of pastoralists in semi-arid areas”. Swedish NGOs became interested and the Legal Department from the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, took up the expulsion from the Mkomazi Game Reserve and the problems in the Pagani floodplain. 8

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 233 the government at district and national levels. This can be observed through perception of both local people (people of 30 different households in three villages and 8 district officials) interviewed on the condition of common-pool resources for the past 50 years. The result of that research was that more than 60% of the local people interviewed stated that forests have been highly degraded, while more than 70% of government officials confirmed this. On water for irrigation, while more than 50% of the community members indicated that water flow has substantially decreased 45% of district officials were of the same opinion. Again, more that 60% of the local people indicated a sharp decrease and degradation of pastures, while about 55% of the district officials registered the same concern. However, the rest indicated that there is a slight degraded or depletion of resource. Observed as the result of weakened social systems that control access to resources or “institutions” (Kajembe, G.C. and Kessy 2000, Ostrom 1990, 1999) these systems now are responsible for controlling access and management of common-pool resources, primarily the result of political, social and economic changes of the last five decades. The obvious impacts that can be observed include; continued decrease in grazing land due to unregulated expansion of farmlands, evacuation of the Maasai pastoralists from the Mkomazi Game Reserve, degradation and deforestation through expansion of farmlands and illegal timber production. Illegal timber production continues to threaten the ecosystem of Chome and Chongweni Forest reserves. Through aerial survey, Persha (2003) estimated 310 active pit-saw sites in Chome Forest and about 930–1,550 trees logged out. Species most preferred include Camphor (Ocotea us ambarensis) and Podo-(Afrocarpus falcatus, podocarpus latifolius, Afrocarpus usambarensis). During forest surveys, considerable damage was observed, especially when illegal pit-sawyers cut trees, without considering the damage to the undergrowth. This has increased damage to the ecosystem and forest biodiversity. Moreover, there is a considerable decrease in the availability of forest products: timber for fuel, medicine, wild fruits, wild meat and mushrooms, and a general decrease in the mountain vegetation cover. Time spent collecting forest products like firewood, medicine, and mushrooms has increased from an average of 1–2 hours in 1965, to about 7–8 hours round trip in 2004. Children who used to participate in firewood collection, no longer take part because of the length of time and the distances involved, especially in the floodplain. Capitalizing on the scarcity, firewood selling is becoming an increasingly

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important business. It is purchased by those who cannot afford to collect it. Lovett and Pòcs (1993) indicated that pole cutting and firewood collection are increasingly threatening the Chome Forest Reserve ecosystem. This increases the threat to biodiversity conservation of the Eastern Arc Mountains of the SPM. Change in the hydrological cycles has resulted from clearing the mountain and floodplain vegetation, especially the catchment forests and vegetation along the river banks. Consequently, there has been unreliable rainfall and shortage of water flow downstream to the irrigation farms. There is a general decrease in the volume of water that runs down from the mountains. Table 3 indicates changes in water regime over time in the study villages. All the important rivers, Yongoma and Hingilili, do not attain the capacity they had in former days. A network of water streams that used to carry water from the forests downstream throughout the year is now only active during the rainy seasons. This also has consequences for the dry season pastures. Less water on the floodplains means fewer dry season pastures and more farming-pastoralist conflicts. In general, dry season pasture has been converted to rice cultivation as more people from outside the area have become interested in rice cultivation. This is the case on both sides of the Pare mountains. During the rainy seasons, farms are silted with sand due to the degradation of vegetation, especially on the mountain slopes. The downstream communities seem to be the immediate victims of the common-pool resources degradation that is taking place in the mountains, but they lack coordination and sanctioning power over the mountain communities. Table 3: Number of active streams and water channels. Village

Number of running streams/ water channels

Mvaa Mpinji Maore Ndungu Source: Mbeyale 2009

Number Dried up streams/ water channels

1961–75

2005

2005

23 26 19 21

12 14 6 4

11 12 13 17

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 235 Foremost on the floodplains, there are two major problems to be observed or noted. First, as pastoral use in the Mkomazi is restricted, it is not clear if the Game Reserve mandate will change due to the lack of grazing area. Certainly, one cannot argue that pastures have been degraded because of the Maasai herds, as was argued by the Game Reserve management (see Brockington and Homewood 2001). One could easily argue the contrary, namely that grass cover might change because cattle no longer use the area. Similar points have been mentioned in other contexts by Little (see Little 1996). However, on the Pangani Floodplain itself there are signs of degradation which stem more from the uncontrolled use and from reduction of pasture for the Maasai due to occupation by Pare peasants. Herders have to use the pastures more intensively or must move to more marginal areas. 9. Discussion While the colonial administration ended in 1961, the Ujamaa policies extended to the 1980s. The emerging political and economic policies of the 1980s to 1990s were moulded after the popular conventional theories of common-pool resources (Hardin 1968, Posner 1977, Simmons et al. 1996), which suggested that the common-pool resources users act independently and do not communicate or coordinate their activities in any way, with the prediction that open-access condition is a given and degradation or destruction the final result. However, the Pangani River Basin of the Same District case indicates that traditional societies of the Pare and Maasai have had their own locally institutionalized resource management systems that for decades have sustained the resource base. However, these systems have come under considerable utilization pressure from several forces, including the demographic, socio-economic, market, infrastructure development, political and policy changes that have taken place in the last 50 years (Mwamfupe 1998). It is interesting to trace the path taken by the institutional changes in the area, especially the interplay between state control, private and local people’s control of common-pool resources. In general, this case reveals that changes external to the communities, especially the economic and political changes and decisions at the macro level, have played an important role in simulating institutional changes at local levels. The power of control began drifting

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from the local administration to the government, from the time of the colonial administration where mfumwa and his subordinates acted as agents of the colonial administration under the chiefdom. However, at that time, they maintained most of the rules and norms regarding common-pool resources utilization and administration. This conforms to the argument advanced by Ostrom (1990, 1999) that when important attributes for common-pool resources management are in place, collective action for management of the resources can be possible. In this case, users had common understanding of the problems they faced, such as the upstream-downstream resource dependence, which led them to schedule water use between the two sides, and the mountain communities became responsible for the management of the forest resources. Although Rodgers et al. (2004) suggest that local communities conserved resources for a value other than the resources they contain, in this case they knew well enough how their ecosystem functioned (the mountain and catchment forests and floodplain resources). Utilization and management cannot be separated so as to maintain social, economic and administrative connectivity. Hence the administration was from upstream while the downstream users favoured crop cultivation downstream. At the same time this benefited pastoralists because the arrangement assured them dry season pasture on the floodplain. Through their leader, mfumwa, and the council of elders, had autonomy in making rules and had powers to sanction, often linked with the religious system of the Pare. Both mfumwa and the elders had political and judicial powers. Since they had legitimate leadership, they were trusted by community members. Changes at a macro level like the Ujamaa policies, where the traditional leadership was rendered impotent in 1963, URT (1997) simulated a change in the ideology of the local communities and a diversity in the attributes of users that made self-organization difficult. The disjointed downstream-upstream administration of 1978 severed users’ coordination, even if they had common understanding of their problems. The presence of government machinery that has no legitimacy at the local level along with corruption has made it difficult for users to have autonomy in making rules and trust for each other. This has encouraged a “free ride” behaviour. It is apparent in the current setting that the transaction cost of bargaining and defending their resources is too high for the poor, while for the rich, the transaction cost of defection has declined (sometimes depriving other people of access to resources) and therefore, opened

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 237 access for themselves, due to rules and sanctioning not backed by local communities, ineffective government rules monitoring and corruption by district officials (Ellickson 1991, North 1990). This can be found among the timber dealers and pit-sawyers in the mountains, when interacting with government leaders at the local and district level, and also among the rich and poor farmers in the floodplain, together with the Maasai pastoralists. Where traditional rules were relaxed during the Ujamaa era, the ruling party and government bureaucracy took over and the strict social control that had prevailed, were rendered obsolete. This has led to the loss of a sense of ownership and an openaccess situation, which eventually resulted in the degradation of the common-pool resources. Improved infrastructure, like roads that link the resources to the market, and technology development where modern irrigation schemes were introduced, attracted rich investors in the area. These are people who can easily cope with mechanized agriculture, while the poor are marginalized. This has increased the relative prices of timber over crop cultivation, especially in the mountains where the fall of coffee prices have had a greater impact on household and local economy, while on the floodplain the relative price of rice farming has gone up relative to other crops. SPM and the floodplain are fragile resources that the local communities, especially the Pare farming communities and Maasai pastoralists, have used for many decades using local social systems of control. Failure to recognize the capacities of local communities and the potential of the local institutions in the management of commonpool resources, and the shrinking government financial capacity and manpower, have made the current institutional setup fail. However, the presence of grassroots organizations such as WITO in the floodplain and MAWENI in the mountains seek to be responsible in overseeing the management of common-pool resources, and “bring back the lost glory,” to which WITO members aspire. These indicate that some efforts are being made by the local community to forge their own way in managing resources for the betterment of the collective action by local communities, and to increase the effectiveness of local governance. The emergence of these local NGO’s is based on the fact that there is a growing realization on their part that if the current degradation of catchment forests is not arrested, they are likely to lose the floodplain that is crucial to their economy and livelihood. They understand that restoration of the previous administrative structure

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that helped them have coordination between the mountains and the floodplain is important. Since the government has failed, coupled with corruption and mistrust, they believe they are more responsible to be able to rescue the situation. This development is echoed by other studies in the Pangani River Basin where Integrated Water Resource Management approaches have been used in order to analyse water conflicts. Maganga et al. (2004) and Sokile and van Koppen (2004), argue that the knowledge and use of customary laws are crucial when dealing with such conflicts and that they can only be successful if the plural legal setting is recognised (Manganga et al. 2004, see also Sokile, CS and van Koppen, B. 2004). 10. Conclusions and recommendations This example differs in some ways from other studies in this volume as the focus was not only on floodplains, but on adjacent areas that are not as far away as is the case with the other studies. Nevertheless, economic and institutional developments in the mountain areas had a major impact on resources in the floodplains normally water, land for irrigation and pastures. The notion of a mountain-floodplain slope and larger floodplain areas, managed as integral ecosystem areas based on local institutions, now adds an upstream-downstream dimension to the study in a way not found in other cases, but it resembles certain constellations. Economic changes in the mountain areas—price changes in coffee and open-access settings—can trigger interest in resources such as timber, which in turn affect watershed and water management issues. While not everybody is able to be engaged in irrigation agriculture downstream or in timber business, substitution strategies are taken up, which profit from the open-access notion of floodplain areas for agriculture and which in turn affect pastoral common property in a negative way. Interestingly, peasants can profit from development discourses, which favours peasant over pastoralists. The question now is how such developments can be mitigated. Is there hope in new participatory management models? The current shift in all-important policies related to common-pool resources in Tanzania such as Land policy, 1997, Forest policy 1998, Water policy 2000, tries to devolve more power to the local communities to participate in managing natural resources. After the long history of colonial and independent socialist state control, these are considered impor-

from integrated slope management to fragmented use 239 tant measures towards sustainable natural resource management. The adoption of these policies has already registered some successful stories of local communities’ participation in managing common-pool resources, especially where there has been effective awareness creation and implementation (Kajembe and Kessy 2000, Kajembe et al. 2003b). However, such local initiatives can only be rewarding if there is an adequate response from the government level. Collective action might also fail if this support is undermined by lack of trust the locals have towards government agencies. This is often related to the problem of reducing state activities to an extent that they cannot fulfil their duties and with low-salaried agents who are looking for rent-seeking options. In addition, reducing state capacities and low market prices for cash crops, while other prices such as timber, water, cattle and irrigated land are rising, more people from outside the area try to find access to the local common-pool resources. They profit from a situation of low enforcement and monitoring of the resources by the state and local institutions thereby creating open-access or private resource regimes, favourable for them, but lead to degradation and reduction of the common-pool resources. These reductions cannot only be attributed to local demographic change, but also to immigration of resource users that face problems or are attracted due to high relative prices and lowered costs of access and poor state monitoring. Therefore local action might lead to frustration, if Pare and Maasai experience on the one hand a reduction of land for use (large irrigation schemes, protected areas etc., and on the other hand devolve power on the local level without providing what Ostrom has called nesting enterprises in her design principles regarding robust institutions (Ostrom 1990). If local actions are not backed and legitimized at the government level, local people might have to refer to violence that again can lead to harsh intervention by the state (referring to ethnic conflicts it has to solve). In addition taking self-action that can lead to violent conflicts and harsh state control is then justified again as resource use conflict 80 fish, 38 amphibians, and 5000–10,000 insects.5 The shallow floodplains provide breeding grounds for huge numbers of fish species. Seasonal movements of fish take place in response to flood changes, as many synchronize their breeding activity in response to water levels and temperatures (Woods and Watson 2001). There are 208 aquatic and semi-aquatic species, 675 herbs and grasses and 195 woody species (Okavango Delta Management Plan 2002). “Plant communities range from submerged aquatic, through swamp grassland, to riparian forest and seasonally inundated savannah woodland” (Hughes and Hughes 1992: 615) and are a product of the various patterns of inundation and flooding. The perennial swamp is characterized by aquatic vegetation with extensive beds of papyrus (Cyperus papyrus), reeds (Pragmites spp.), water lilies (Nymphae caerula) and date palm (Phoenix reclinata). Grassland and dense sedges dominate the seasonal swamp. The fringes of the Delta support dense

3 Hughes and Hughes. 1992, Okavango River Panhandle Management Plan 2001, Scudder et al., 1993, Van der Heiden 1992, Watson 1991. 4 The Status of Southern Africa’s Savannas. Report to UNEP by the Southern Africa Savannah Research Network Coordinated by the Kings College London-University of London. Internet source: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/jwoods/savannas/refs/UNEPafr_sav. PDF 5 Although exact numbers may be questioned, they still highlight the Delta’s enormous biodiversity.

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riverine vegetation, while a mosaic of savannah and woodland covers the peninsulas and large islands. Areas on either side of the Panhandle are forested with woodland, such as Acacia erioloba and Mopane trees (Colophosermum mopane).6 The annual flood brings water of very pure quality and nourishment to the oligotrophic system. The summer rains in the Angolan highlands that are heaviest in January and February, and up to three times as high as in the Delta area, bring a flood later in the winter months (June–September). The annual flood is thus, out of phase with direct precipitation.7 Annual water inflow ranges from 7,000 to 15,000 million cubic metres with local rainfall adding approximately 30–40% onto this. Seasonal peak discharge into the Delta is between March and May and average peak water level in the Delta is around June/ July, the time during which the rest of the country suffers from a water shortage. The broadly shared perception that the Delta has become dryer and smaller over time finds no clear scientific support, but a shift of the entire Delta to the east seems to be taking place.8 The boundaries between permanent and seasonal swamps vary both seasonally and annually. Permanent swamps and seasonally inundated areas are made up of complex systems of vegetated flooded flats, channels, islands of varying size, and lagoons with surface water from 0.5 up to 4 m in depth. Drainage lines in seasonal swamps connect rivers, oxbow lakes, and seasonal as well as permanent pools. Wide, shallow floodplains (up to 500 m wide) occur between islands. Present day drainage systems are the product of continuing tectonic activity, river capture, climate change, and human channel clearing activity.9

6 See also Bock and Johnson 2002, Kuru 2000, Larson 1989, Okavango River Panhandle Management Plan 2001, Pearce 1991, Scudder et al. 1993, Van der Heiden 1992, and Watson 1991. 7 A second flood may occur during the rainy season (November–April), but only if there is much rain and if the preceding flood coming from Angola was high enough to keep the sandy soils wet (personal conversation with H. Bendsen, Participatory Planner at the HOORC in June 2002). 8 Personal conversation with hydrologists and ecologists at the Okavango Research Centre HOORC and with Mr. Moetse from Agricultural Research in early 2002. A detailed description of river flows and channels has been presented by Scudder et al. (1993). 9 See also Bock and Johnson 2002, Hughes and Hughes 1992, Okavango River Panhandle Management Plan 2001, Pearce 1991, Scudder et al. 1993, Van der Heiden 1992, and Watson 1991.

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2.3. Historic, ethnographic and demographic information The area is known as Ngamiland and comprises a broad cultural diversity in Botswana. Signs of human habitation date back as far as 100,000 years to the nomadic San hunters and gatherers. Settlements on the southern periphery of the Delta show that The Banoka10 have inhabited the area for at least 10,000 years (Tlou 2000). The settling of the first Bayei and Hambukushu on the northern, eastern and western fringes and inside the Delta since the 18th century caused the Banoka to move inside the delta (Van der Heiden 1991). The Banoka nowadays are a minority among the Bantu-speakers and most Banoka in Ikoga have intermarried with the Bayei or Hambukushu. The largest ethnic group in the area and in Ikoga are the riverineoriented matrilineal Bantu speaking Bayei, who emigrated from the Chobe-Zambesi River after 1750 when the Lozi kingdom began to expand. They lived on islands and along riverbanks and brought new technologies such as canoes and fishing nets to the area. They were the first farmers in the area and were very active in fishing and foraging. The Bayei and the River San are said to have good relationships owing to early peaceful exchange of knowledge and goods. About 100 year later, in 1850, a new Bantu group called Hambukushu arrived in the area. These were pastoral people who had been seeking refuge from some leaders, because they were collaborating with Mambari11 slave traders from Angola. Unlike the Bayei, they preferred the drier mainland, with its better grazing conditions, which had been allocated to them by the dominating BaTawana. The BaTawana, along with the Herero and Ovambo from today’s Namibia, were responsible for introducing cattle into the area. Some of the Hambukushu leaders who also came to the area were famous rainmakers, employed by the Bayei and the BaTawana at Maun to produce rain. The pastoral Setswana (also Bantu) speaking BaTawana, were the last immigrants to the area. They arrived after the segregation from the BaNgwato state towards the end of the 18th century, and soon were

10 The Banoka are also known as River San or River Bushman and refer to themselves as Xani (khoe) or Buga (khoe) (Kuru 2000). 11 Mambari were the middlemen traders between the Portuguese and the peoples of the interior who exchanged slaves for guns and other European goods. Hambukushu leaders often exchanged their own folk for the guns that were needed in the defence of African states and rulers who wished to control the new trade to increase their own prestige (Tlou 2000).

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(and have remained) the politically and economically dominant ethnic group in the region. They founded a centralized state and incorporated other ethnic groups. The new external control resulted in changes to the traditional socio-political structure of these peoples that were, until then, organised into smaller family units (Tlou 2000). Setswana speaking people in Ikoga are today in the minority. Most are employed as civil servants (e.g. teachers, policemen, social workers) and arrived after the implementation of public and social infrastructure in the village. Intermarriage is not common, but possible between all ethnic groups in the village. In the 1970s there was a last wave of refugees to the area. Several thousand Hambukushu fled from the colonial and civil wars in Angola. Most of these late immigrants were settled around newly constructed villages called the Etsha villages south of Ikoga. Until recently both Bayei and Hambukushu lived spatially separated family units in scattered communities and were very mobile river people.12 Table 2: Ethnic composition Ikoga (central village). Ethnic group

Number

Livelihood strategy

Date of arrival

BaNoka/River San Bayei

< 50 unclear due to self affiliation > 316

> 10,000 years

Hambukushu

~ 200

Setswana speaking (various)

< 25

Fishing, hunting, and gathering Riverine oriented: Fishing, hunting, and gathering, flood recession farming and small livestock farming Rainfed arable and cattle farming, hunting, gathering, and fishing Rainfed arable and cattle farming, hunting, and gathering.

After 1750

Two main periods of immigration: after 1850 and after 1970 after 1970

12 Kirkels 1992, Kuru 2000, Larson 1965, 1971, 1989, Tlou 2000, and own research.

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VanderPost (2000) examined fertility transition in Botswana since the beginning of the 20th century. Population growth rate was high, particularly since independence, but decreased again from 4.7% in 1981 to 2.4% in 2001.13 The population in the research area grew within the last decades, as a result of the ongoing immigration of refugees from southern Angola. The overall growth (ranging between 4.3 in 1981 and 3.2 in 2001) however, did not significantly affect population density in the rural parts of Ngamiland District (1.06 persons per km2 in 1991), as it has been outweighed by urbanisation14 (Okavango Panhandle Management Plan 2001). Life expectancy at birth increased to 65.3 years in 1991 but quickly decreased again to 55.6 years in 2001. HIV/AIDS is usually mentioned as the main reason for this change (VanderPost 2000). With a 40% HIV positive rate, Botswana is one of the countries in the worlds most affected by HIV/AIDS. The same change accounts for the infant-mortality rate15 that decreased from 97% in 1971 to 48% in 1991, but increased again to 56% in 2001. Total fertility rate in Botswana decreased from 6.5 in 1971 to 3.27 children in 2001 (Central Statistics Office, Government of Botswana). My census in the core village of Ikoga in 2002 revealed a total population of almost 800 people.16 The majority of the village are Bayei (41%), along with Hambukushu (26%) and people of Tswana origin (32%), (Bakgalagadi, Batawana, or Kalanga). There are estimated to be around 15–25 River San, although in their case exact numbers are difficult to estimate since many San don’t like to refer to themselves as pejorative “Bushmen,” nor is it clear as to which group one should count the children of such parentage, i.e. those who have intermarried

13 Central Statistics Office (CSO), Government of Botswana Web source: http:// www.cso.gov.bw/ 14 In 2001 over 50% of the country’s population lived in urban areas, while in 1966 it was only about 4%. The population of Maun, the economic and political centre of Ngamiland increased from 26,768 in 1991 to 43,776 in 2001, just like the population of the other two larger regional settlements with urban characteristics (public infrastructure, administrative and economic centres) did. The population of Gumare and Shakawe during the same period increased from 3,539 to 6,067 and from 2,198 to 4,389 respectively (Mazonde 2000, Parson 1984, Government of Botswana (CSO):Web source: http://www.cso.gov.bw). 15 Infant-mortality measures the numbers of newborn babies who will die before reaching their first birthday. This rate is considered an important indicator for mortality and health conditions (Vander Post 2000). 16 Official census data from 2001 was around 700, but the exact number is difficult to estimate since there are continuous movements between the village and its associated localities (e.g. cattle posts), and other villages and towns.

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(own census in 2002, Saum 2006). The village in its actual state, with its ethnically mixed population, is rather young. Before Ikoga became a centralised village, it was a small, temporarily occupied cattle post just like its associated localities. Administrative actions such as the killing and subsequent restocking of all cattle in 1995–96, public labour and financial support programmes, the construction of public infrastructure (water provision, health facilities, schools), centralisation, and constraints relating to the traditional subsistence economy, attracted people from surrounding settlements to move together into one central village. 3. Common-pool resources and livelihoods 3.1. Characteristics in the study area and state of the specific common-pool resources Plots for arable agriculture in the dry lands are de facto private property, legally registered with state Land Boards, whereas pieces of land on river banks and on islands inside the wetlands are informally acknowledged private property, but legally under open access. No intensive arable agriculture is present in the area. In addition, overuse of pasture does not seem to be a problem, because cattle herds were completely eradicated in the area by the government in 1996, after an outbreak of CBPP.17 After several years of restocking, herds are still small and pressure remains low (The Management of Communal Grazing in Botswana 1981). Signs of overgrazing are visible only in the areas near the riverbanks and close to permanent settlements. Fish in the Okavango Delta is a common-pool resource, legally under open access tenure. According to literature (Mosepele 2001) and statements from villagers, local fishery officers and researchers from the Harry Oppenheimer Okavango Research Centre (HOORC), there are currently no signs of over-fishing, decreases of fish stocks or changes in occurrence of species, based on size and age distribution. Wildlife resources similarly are not under pressure. Due to commercial hunting activities during the colonial times (protectorate era), animal numbers were decreasing, but most species are reported to have recovered quickly or have even increased after the hunting regu-

17

CBPP: Contagious Bovine Pleuro Pneumonia, a cattle lung disease.

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lations of the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) were enforced after independence. Most of the species in the Delta and surrounding areas are abundant and have become one of the most popular regions for photographic wildlife tourism. Veldt products are collected from in and around the village in the dry land forests and in the Delta and include various tree-fruits, nuts, leaves, wood, tubers etc., reeds (Phragmites sp.), thatching grass (e.g. Andropogon hiuilensis) and other products. A socio-ecological survey undertaken in 22 villages in the Okavango Delta revealed that most of the households interviewed reported the non-availability of some veld resources (Okavango River Panhandle Management Plan 2001). 3.2. Economic activities and livelihood strategies in Ikoga As in other remote rural villages in the region, the inhabitants of Ikoga base their existence to varying degrees on mixed subsistence strategies of farming, fishing, hunting, collecting wild plant foods, as well as cattle and goat herding. Remittances from family members and rents however are the biggest source of cash in the village. Although a household survey indicates that most households have cash generating activities, which refer to common-pool resources (76 out of 95) and remittances or relief aid (75 out of 95), total sums of remittance make more than 90% of cash generated from use of common-pool resources. The government contributes a substantial part to the people’s income by distributing rents and food handouts, and subsidising the sale of staples in local cooperatives. Products and services through family ties remain essential parts of the joint survival strategy. Some money can be generated by selling raw or processed commonpool resources or by participating in public labour programmes. However, most of the money still comes from remittances and old age pensions. Only a few find employment in the village, by working as low paid employees at externally owned kiosks or as teachers or policemen.18 Crafts include blacksmithing, pottery making, basket weaving, or canoe crafting. Products are usually for personal consumption, but sometimes are sold or traded for other goods. A small amount of income is generated by trading food handouts. Small businesses, such

18 The public sector and tourism enterprises with its associated businesses offer most of the jobs in Ngamiland area (personal conversation with H. Bendsen, participatory planner at the HOORC, March 2002).

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as poultry farms or vegetable gardens, are officially promoted through financial assistance policies, and although young people in Ikoga are interested in such ventures,19 very few have been realised. People practice rain-fed agriculture (sorghum, millet, and maize) with ploughs and hoes in the dry lands, as well as flood recession and irrigated agriculture (fruits and vegetables) on the river fringes and on islands. Although generally speaking, agricultural production in Ikoga has decreased. Administrative actions such as the distribution of imported subsidised staples in regional stores make it no longer interesting to invest in arable agriculture, be it for commercial or subsistence purposes. Financial assistance for ploughed areas and the distribution of implements, led in the short term to an increase in ploughing activities, but in the long run disturbed traditional cycles of traditional arable methods. Although the quality of the pastures in the wetlands or near the river is not as good as that in the dry land, the lack of surface water makes the river floodplains the focus for watering and grazing. Predators and poisonous plants like Mogau (Clematis brachiata Thunb.), endanger cattle in the wetlands. Livestock density in Ngamiland has always been lower compared to other parts of Botswana (Kirkels 1992) and diminished even more after the complete eradication of all 300,000 cattle in the district. In 2002 the total herd size had still failed to reach even half of the original size before the eradication (H. Bendsen, participatory planner at the HOORC, March 2002). Compensation for killed animals was given in cash or a combination of cash and kind. The compensation for killed cattle in the North East District was 500 Pula (P) per animal, which is less than the value of an animal today (P 700–1,500), but about 5 to 10 times higher than before the livestock eradication (P 50–100).20 Those with bigger herds were better off as they received immediate cash plus animals for restocking. The poorer households with fewer animals needed the money for immediate consumption and were left without any animals. Although low cattle ownership today does not reflect in the same way as in the past ethnic differences, as both Bayei and Hambukushu own cattle. Larger households or extended families generally own larger herds than small

19 People often blamed the Land Board’s and the Village Trust Committee’s (a sort of local government) reluctance to certificate plots for commercial development. 20 The Daily news (web source: http://www.gov.bw/cgi-bin/news.cgi?d=20020221).

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households, and households headed by women usually don’t own any cattle. Today, there are around only 30 cattle owners in the village, out of 95 households. Most households thus, remain without cattle, while others have up to 50 animals. Still, restocking takes place very fast. In 2000 there were around 388 cattle in Ikoga, in 2001 441, and in 2002 there were already 555 animals, which is an increase of more than 40% within two years (according to a Livestock Officer in Gumare, June 2002).21 Selling of cattle is currently unpopular due to market constraints, as beef from the area cannot be exported to the EU, due to the previous outbreak of the lung disease. The breeds that were given to the farmers include the traditional Tswana, as well as a foreign breed, which has not yet proved it’s adaptability to local conditions. Over 30 species of fish are caught by local fishermen, including African Pike (Hepsetus odoe), various Bream (of the Cichlidae family), Tilapia (Tilapia ruweti), and Tigerfish (Hydrocynus vittatus) (see also Larson 1989). Traditional fishing methods that are used during arriving or receding floods include Mosindo (SeYei for grass mat fishing), Ndoba (SeYei name for trapping fish inside semicircle shaped walls of soil), Senxhwa/Thikuku (Seyei/SimBukushu for basket fishing), or Godubisa ka dikgomo.22 Individual fishing with hook and line at the river fringes is possible throughout the year, but little yields during high flood when the fish are too dispersed. The more profitable gill net fishery is only practised by those few who own or have access to boats and nets. Hand-carved wooden canoes (mekoro) have become rare, because fibreglass and aluminium boats are preferred, although these are not affordable for most of the people.23 Nylon nets have largely substituted traditional hand woven nets. Fish are often smoked or salted for preservation and any surplus, fresh or conserved, is sold within the village or in neighbouring villages. Although there is only a marginally and locally confined commercial fishery in the Delta, the success of governmental measures to intensify the commercial fishery is limited (Mosepele 2001). Such efforts in Ikoga resulted in the

21 The increase in the total numbers could also partly stem from different estimation methods and from an increased local concentration of the of animals’ owners. 22 Cattle are moved around in closed ponds. Fish suffocate as the soil gets stirred up and people collect the floating fish after moving the cattle out of the ponds. 23 According to Mosepele (2001) there are around 30 boats in the village. This is a small number compared to the number of households within the core village, which is about 5 times as high, and considering that only a portion of the boat holders also have a net.

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construction of a smoking facility in the Delta and in the distribution of fishing equipment; people receive no incentives to increase their catch quotas. Sale of fish to the local rural population is very limited, because they usually do not have the money to buy fish and storing facilities are virtually absent. Potential markets in more densely populated areas of the country are too far away to be reached without incurring heavy expenses. Demand in the country for Okavango fish seems to be very low, although some lodges and a few restaurants do sell local fish. Botswana is a cattle-oriented society and meat is consumed much more frequently than fish. Thus there is no demand by outside traders for fish or fish products—even though this would be a lucrative business as fish is cheap and can be caught in large quantities. Hunting wild animals has become unlikely since the village is situated in an area zoned for non-consumptive wildlife use (photographic tourism). Outside of this area, where hunting is allowed for every citizen, licenses have to be bought, but are generally not financially within reach of the poor rural dweller. Therefore meat from wild animals is consumed very rarely and there is no legal market for bush meat. The importance of veldt products increases with the decrease of other food sources. People supplement their diet with collected honey, fruits, tubers, and nuts, with river plants such as papyrus, different products from the water lily, with palm nuts and other products from trees. Insects and larvae like the Mopane worms (Imbrassia belina) are consumed instantly or processed for later use or sale. Most of the materials for the construction of house roofs and enclosures of yards are river reeds, sedges, and grasses that are collected inside the wetlands. These veldt products are used on a personal basis or sold within the village. Some of the more valuable reeds that are collected only inside the swamps, like Lehoto (Cape Reed or Common Reed), are also sold at local markets in neighbouring villages, and sometimes even in the city of Maun, the “capital” of the Okavango Delta, lying less than 300 km east of the Panhandle area, as it is accessible by a tarred road. Other valuable products that are partly sold are the leaves of the wild date palm (Phoenix reclinata or Tsaro), used for basket weaving and various plants for dyeing.

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4. Background information about political and institutional settings since the 1950s 4.1. Pre-colonial and pre-independence local institutions From 1750 until the beginning of the 20th century, there were rules in place which regulated access to fishing and hunting grounds in the economies of the Bayei and the Hambukushu in Ngamiland, but according to Tlou (2000) largely eroded during the British protectorate period of Bechuanaland from 1885 to 1966. Before Ikoga and other villages in the research area became central villages with public infrastructure, the semi-permanent ethnic groups used to live in extended families and were scattered over a wide area. The Bayei preferred to settle close to the rivers and inside the wetlands on islands and elevations. The Hambukushu lived near their arable fields, which were cleared a certain distance from the water. This spatial separation, together with the differentiation in resource use orientation, facilitated the demarcation of clear resource boundaries. Old informants indicate based on the memories of parents the following pattern: In the past, the Bayei people were known to be the river people. They used to stay very close to the river bank sand collected the water lilies from in the river. But the Hambukushu people normally preferred to stay up in the forest, where they used to hunt some of the creatures like the Kudu, Wildebeest, and Giraffes and they were gathering wild berries. But the Bayei people were always down on the river area; they used to depend on the fishing most of the time. Even ploughing, which was their main activity, was always carried out on the river, while the Hambukushu used to plough in the forest. (Interview with a Bayei village headman, in his seventies, and fishermen in 2002).

Before independence, this Bayei headman had the authority to allocate grazing areas to the members of both ethnic groups. This was the result of the system of British indirect rule during the protectorate period. The colonial administration declared nearly 70% of the land as “tribal” land and its administration was vested in the powers of chiefs who were assisted by appointed local headmen, in this case, coming from the Bayei. The British introduced a specific pasture management in the area. Stocking rates on defined areas were limited, monitored and enforced, an older Hambukushu informant in Ikoga remembered:

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roland saum In the morning I had to make sure that I was taking my livestock to the places where my livestock was always grazing. There were rules and we had to follow these rules. People in the village were saying that one should not put cattle with other’s cattle, because the grass can get finished quickly. It was up to us when to go to our portions, which were given to us by the headmen. Others could not go there with their animals; people knew that everyone had his own portion where he can graze his animals (ibid).

The herding of the cattle was, in the past, supervised by herd boys. In this way, the state of the pastures could easily be monitored and the animal movements were controlled. Herds moved in a rotational system over a large area from cattle post to cattle post and pastures could recover until they were stocked again. Until recently there had been territorial regulations in the fishery (Tlou 2000). Access to demarcated fishing grounds was only possible after negotiation with the resident groups. People from either the Hambukushu or Bayei were fishing collectively with their own kin and had access to separate pools and channels. The conditions of the fishing grounds were monitored and estimated, before the fishing grounds were assigned to the people by the respective local authority (head of the household or compound, or local headman) after a collective meeting at the kgotla. The quantity of fish seems to have been sufficient and off take rates were obviously not in place.24 Until early independency (around the 1960s and 1970s), the collective fishery was partly coordinated by the local Bayei headmen who, in those times, had much more power than today. But the pre-colonial management of the fisheries was based on co-ordination activities of traditional healers and doctors, who—based on mystical knowledge—advised people where to go and when to catch most fish. These co-ordinators lost much power during colonial times and fishermen stopped following their co-ordination and advice. Information about pre-colonial hunting institutions is minimal. Since the early 19th century, with the dominance of the BaTawana groups hunting came under the jurisdiction of the dominant BaTawana chiefs. This allowed people to hunt small game in the entire tribal area, which included the Delta region, before independence time in a kind

24 Older people mentioned that they were fishing until they were satisfied, but usually not more than was needed for three or four days.

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of open access system. Hunting large game, however, was only possible with the permission issued by the chief’s intermediary headmen, who had the power to impose hunting restrictions. The local communities however were allowed to devise their own rules and sanctions such as designating hunting grounds. Poaching was heavily fined on the community level by fishing or hunting equipment being confiscated and fines to be paid. Failure to pay fines resulted in the poachers being forcibly incorporated into the village in which territory poaching has been done. Villagers did however give permission to fish or hunt in each other’s territory based on reciprocal access rights (Tlou 2000: 25). Ritual observance of rules for the Hambukushu and the Bayei also seem to be part of the monitoring and co-ordinating activities. Taboos and totems not only influenced social relations, but also forbid the hunting and consequent consumption of certain animals such as crocodiles and elephants (Schapera 1994, Tlou 2000). After the 1970’s, local and regional laws were replaced by national hunting laws. Cassidy 2000, (referring to Schapera) mentioned that the BaTawana chief also made rules for the felling of Mogkalo (Buffalo thorn or Ziziphus mucronata), Mogonono (Silver terminalia or Terminalia sericea), or Motlopi (Shepherd’s tree or Boscia albitrunca) trees, species that were on high demand because of their great commercial value. Rules for the burning grazing veldt and monitoring the pastures were also in place. The chief also set the date when the cutting season for thatching grass could commence and was responsible for marketing it. Local territorial and mutual agreements for quality standards were also in place. Without permission, people living in lagoons were noticed to gather outside lagoons and vice versa. According to other accounts, various plants were left until fully grown, before permission to harvest them was given. 4.2. Post-independence changes 4.2.1. Legal and formal institutional changes After independence, the laws for allocating residential and arable land were revised by the Tribal Land Act and now fell under the jurisdiction of the Land Boards. Under the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) introduced into Botswana in 1975, land has been zoned into the following sections: tribal (or communal) land (70% in Botswana, 79.2% in Ngamiland District) and commercial (for individual use) and state

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land (e.g. national parks and reserved areas, e.g. Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs)).25 Most subsistence economic activities take place on tribal land, and under the TGLP (and subsequent regulations) every citizen has the right to settle and use any of the resources attached to tribal land. Vulnerable grazing land is now openly accessible. This applies to all other natural resources except wildlife. The Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act from 1992 is the basis for reallocating WMAs or parts of it to local Community Resource Boards (CRB) for the so-called Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM). Under CBNRM, the Land Boards, the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, and the Tourism Department can grant exclusive access and management rights to wildlife and other resources in demarcated areas to any villages or groups of villages, which provide a feasible management plan (Kuru 2000). For some reasons, all villages involved in CBNRM focus on tourist activities. This seems to be the only option for the Okavango communities to gain cash from their areas, since hunting is largely prohibited or too expensive, fishing is limited to local use only and rarely for commercial sale (except on local level) and pastoral activities were also reduced massively by the cattle herd eradication. Further legal attention is given to tourism in the Tourism Act (1999), focusing on commercial wildlife-based tourism and the Joint Venture Guidelines (1999) that de facto confine the use of common-pool resources inside WMAs to commercial tourist purposes. Because of limited financial and infrastructural resources, and lack of organisational capacities, communities under CBNRM can only sublease the areas to non-resident safari companies or lodge operators. The gains from this lease are distributed amongst the communities, according to the respective management plans. Once the main emphasis is placed on tourism, the range of accessible common-pool resources for the communities usually decreases (see also Cassidy 2000). Around Ikoga, most of the areas inside the wetland, currently used by the villagers for subsistence economy, will be reserved for tourists. The Management and Utilisation Plan for Wildlife Management Areas in the tribal land zone under protection having the number NG24 25

Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) have been zoned for future use. They play a central role in re-allocating areas rich in wildlife and other common-pool resources to community based organisations (CBOs) under CBNRM, a popular conservation development approach under the viewpoint of decentralisation and empowerment.

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clearly recommends keeping cattle away from tourists (Kuru 2000), or as one villager stated: “Tourists don’t want to pay money to take pictures from cattle.” This applies also to fishing in the proximity of the proposed lodges and also to developing gardens and arable fields in the area subleased to tourist operators (see map 8). Restricted access to these common-pool resources will affect people proportionately to their current reliance on these resources. Gill net fishers and farmers who plough inside the wetland will mostly be affected and will have to seek alternative areas. This applies to the fishermen in neighbouring villages involved in CBNRM. It is possible that the pressure on the remaining resource areas will increase when access to these areas decreases. There is also the risk that poverty may increase when the loss of yields are not compensated by alternative income opportunities.

Source: Kuru 2000

Map 8: Management zones of the villages involved in CBNRM in NG 24.

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4.2.2. Major economic changes since pre-independence During the Protectorate period the population of Botswana had been almost entirely dependent upon cattle farming, subsistence crop production and wage remittances from migrant workers in South Africa (Colclough and Fallon 1983). People were forced to move from rural areas due to the introduction of hut taxes, restrictive hunting and pastoral policies, demarcation and alienation of the land, restrictions on selling cattle in South Africa, and by restrictions on Africans in trade and other commercial ventures. One of the aims of the larger British policies in colonies in Southern Africa was to create labour forces for the mines; restrictions for access to subsistence goods created the need to earn cash for tax payments were inadequate means to achieve this end. As possibilities for earning cash income in the Protectorate decreased, migrating in search of employment in South Africa became a necessity for members of many households. The need for cash broke the cycle of self-sufficiency (Hopf 1991, Parson 1984, Saum 2006).26 A survey in 1974 found rural and urban households only managed to put together a subsistence income by combining subsistence agriculture with wages and migrant remittances from South Africa. This development continued up to today and was re-enforced by the new education system providing skills for a modern cash economy, increasing the move away from a natural resource based subsistence economy (Bock and Johnson 2002). The discovery of diamonds and other minerals, increased beef exports, and massive foreign investment in mining, especially by the South African Company de Beers—being in a joint-venture with the government of Botswana—have led to an unexpected boom in Botswana’s extractive and export driven economy (see also Good 2008). Diamonds make about 84% of Botswana’s revenues and accrue about 38% of its GDP. Despite large fluctuations in the market, diamonds have been stable revenue for Botswana. However, for the purpose of this paper, it is important to state that a world market price for diamonds, such as for other minerals, does not exist because diamonds are not 26 Because large numbers of cheap labour for the mines in South Africa were needed, Bechuanaland became a British Protectorate in 1885 and was transformed into a labour reserve colonial society (Parson 1984). A regional office of the South African Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (Wenela) was established in Shakawe to recruit workers for the gold mines in South Africa. From there, they were transported to the mines by planes or buses. The local Wenela office in Shakawe functioned until 1962, but it is still active in recruiting cheap local workers in other regions.

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bought and sold on an open market, but only between diamond producers such as De Beers, diamond dealers and the manufacturers who create diamond jewellery or who sell to industry. To give a rough estimate there was a substantial boost in the early 1980s for a one carat D-flawless diamond of $66,000 USD with a drop in 1986 to $12,000 USD and its subsequent rise to today’s price of $17,000 USD.27 This is a decrease of 3.8 times the early 1980s price, but an increase of price between 1986 and 2002 of 1.4 times. We will take the latter figure for the price has been very stable since, but is about to increase again due to high demand from highly wealthy people gaining their wealth from increase of oil sales. However it is not clear if and how the financial crisis will have an effect on demand and on the diamond prices between providers and main traders. Based on the high income from diamond exports, Botswana’s GDP increased almost 2,000 % between 1965 and 1980, and has been rising since then annually by 9%. The government based on these gains tried to diversify and increase the variety in markets to diminish the dependency on South Africa (Bock 1998, Parson 1984).28 The increased national income allowed a massive opening up of the public and social infrastructure and resulted in a dramatically enlarged government apparatus. Compared to other African countries, the average annual income was more than $4,700 USD in 2002–03, meaning more than 15 times higher than Zambia, for example, for the same period. However, the increase of the GDP was accompanied by a sharpening gap between the poor masses and the rich elite.29 Still, if one compares the Human Development Index for this period, Botswana is close to 0.6, while all other countries studied in this volume have 0.5 and less (see NCCR North-South 2006). In addition, compared to other African rural areas in floodplains (see this volume), Ikoga has much more infrastructure and services like schools, roads, water and health facilities.

27 See Herald Tribune September 1991, David Lachner, see also http://priceofdiamonds.org/2008/09/01/diamond-price-comparison 28 See also http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1830.htm, 27.11.2008. 29 In 1972 there were 13,550 employees in the formal sector (28.3%) and in 1980 already 30,800 (36.9%) (Parson 1984). In the 1970s and 1980s, the poorest decile of the rural households received only 1.5% of total rural income, while the richest decile received nearly 39%. The richest 1% received nearly as high a percentage of total income as did the poorest 40% (Colclough and Fallon 1983).

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Agricultural production decreased rapidly and in 1989 the national agricultural production-index per head was the lowest of all African countries.30 This tendency has remained and Ikoga is a case in point explaining why agriculture is not really an option for local producers to earn cash. Household surveys done in the area indicate that even if there are good yields for maize or sorghum, even the best farmer is able to earn only up to 300 Pula per year ($70 USD) which is very little for a household of up to 10 people. Prices for maize, beans and sorghum were in 1982 about 4.4 Pula and then fell to 0.3 pula in the 1990s, because of increased production of crops in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Today, prices are about the same, but since inflation, they never rose to the extent as to be an incentive for local producers (Saum 2006). Fish have always been a poor man’s food and not highly valued by consumers generally in Botswana; beef is considered a more valuable source of protein. Locally fish is sold in small quantities, but mainly used for subsistence. Although there are transport facilities, there are no deep freezers or ice production facilities close by. However, people could dry fish, but seeing the low market prices in Maun and elsewhere for fish, this is not an interesting market. Prices have remained relatively low, although they have locally risen from around 0.5 to 5 Pula in the 1980s to around 5 to 15 Pula for Tilapia breams, depending on the size, while costs for fishing equipment are rather expensive. Nationally, much more money can be made with recreational tourists arriving to go on fishing tours, than if local people fished for themselves. In addition, fishing is considered to be a more and more a dangerous activity, seen the rise of wild animals since the area became protected and people fear attacks by crocodiles and hippos (Saum 2006). Only half of the rural population has directly benefited from the growth in the national cattle herd and within this category, the gains have been disproportionately captured by the richer group (Colclough and Fallon 1983, Kirkels 1992, Parson 1984). Beef today is the second biggest export, exported mainly to the South Africa Trade Union (SACU) and to the European Union under the former Lomé Trade

30 The contribution of agriculture to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) has decreased from 40% at independence to 4% in 1995.

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Agreement, where it can be sold above market rates. Still, since the early 1970s, cattle in the research area have no longer proven to be a secure means of investment. While the national cattle herd grew, an outbreak of cattle lung disease in Ngamiland led to over 30,000 head of cattle being culled. The situation worsened due to the complete eradication of all cattle in the district after the outbreak of CBPP in 1995–9631 and the subsequent closing of the abattoir in Maun, used to slaughter cattle for the Ngamiland area. According to Kuru (2000), the short term effects of the CBPP eradication increased rural income due to compensation payments by the government, while leading in the long run to a reduced agricultural output. This dynamic was enforced by public labour programmes, drought relief measures, financial assistance policies, and food handouts that increased after the killing of the animals. With regard to relative prices they have on the one side risen by a factor of 15 between the 1980s and today (from 100 to 1500 Pula) but there is on the other hand, hardly any demand for cattle from the area as cattle is only, if ever, sold privately, because the official buyers pay too little (700 Pula) and because the abattoir in Maun has been closed. Meat from Ngamiland is no longer exported to the EU, which further restricts large scale cattle herding in the area. The high prices only reflect local scarcity since the eradication, but not the national demand which attracts outsiders to invest in this sector; the insecure environment prohibits the large increase of cattle herds (Saum 2006). Therefore, in the Okavango Delta tourism that is linked to wildlife is of major importance, which is also reflected nationally. Tourism is after mining, the second-largest contributor to GNP today (around 5%). It has shown a steady increase over the past few years and is considered to be an engine of growth generating substantial employment (Rozemeijer and van der Jagt 2000). Especially valuable is not only photographic tourism, but commercial hunting in Communal Hunting Areas (CHAs); also the transfer of protected areas into CHAs, attract wealthy tourists looking for a

31 These measures can also be understood as resulting from the narrow constraints under which Botswana beef is allowed to enter the European market. The Veterinary Department demarcated a buffer zone (including Ngamiland) to the diseases (CBPP and foot and mouth disease) that would stop beef exports to the European Union. The farmers in Ngamiland thus, have to pay the toll in favour of the national meat economy (Personal conversation with H. Bendsen, participatory planner at the Harry Oppenheimer Okavango Research Centre in March 2002).

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hunting trip. The entire land area of Botswana had been re-zoned into 163 so called Communal Hunting Areas (CHAs) for the purposes of managing different types of wildlife use, but without changing the existing zoning of tribal land, state-land, or WMAs. This new layer of zoning into smaller units of production encompasses all types of land use, while the use of wild animals depends on the CHA where the animals are located (Cassidy 2000). The prices for game meat have tripled between 1980s and 2000, but local people cannot afford licenses—which cost between $200 and $4,000 USD—depending on the animals, while tourist operators make the profit from game meat and trophy hunting activities. Trophy fees are between $18,000 for an elephant and $180 for an impala. Therefore, we count an average of $5,000 USD per animal hunted.32 Participatory management of hunting areas and subleasing of areas to tourist companies can be important and effective, but often very costly in relation to lost access to natural resources (Saum 2006). Table 3: Changes in relative prices between 1980s and 2002/3. Goods

1980s (Pula)

2002 (Pula)

Agricultural products Cattle Fish Game/trophy

4.4 kg (0.3 in 1990)

4.00 kg

Diamonds Salaries

Ratio 2002/1980s

50–100 0, 5–5 500

1,000–1,500 5–15 5,000 (for hunting license and trophy fees) 12,000 US$/D-carat 17,000 US$/D-carat (1986) (2002/3) 200 1000

Data taken from Saum 2006 and further research

32

http://www.shooting.sh/shoot_ovs_botswana.shtml, 27.11.2008

0.9 15 3 5 1.4 5

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Fig. 16. School kids in the Okavango Delta, Panhandle, Ikoga area. Due to income from diamond exports and gains from tourism, more formal jobs and subsidies are available in the whole country and for people living in the hinterland, common-pool resources are of less interest. Far from being perfect in its development strategy and the fight against corruption, the Botswana government however shares a small proportion from the income with some the locals inhabitants such as the Bayei and Hambukushu, leading to relatively good infrastructure (schools, roads, water, electricity, medical facilities etc.) compared to other regions studied in this volume. In addition, local people profit from remittances. Photograph by Tobias Haller.

4.2.3. External factors leading to change Infrastructure and Technology: According to Hopf (1991), the colonial administration made little effort to develop the infrastructure. Only after independence, the ruling party (BDP) supported rural areas by developing a public infrastructure and social security system. Improvements in transportation have occurred throughout the 1990s and villages which were formerly remote have become more accessible (Bock and Johnson 2002). Classified as a Tertiary III community (Okavango River Panhandle Management Plan 2001), Ikoga offers a basic public infrastructure to its inhabitants. This is limited to a primary school, a small kgotla with offices for the village headmen and local police officers, a health post with unoccupied nurse quarters, and half a dozen water stands. An all-weather road connects the core village with the

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tarred road, which in turn connects the more populated and developed south of Botswana to Namibia, Angola, and Zambia in the north. There is neither electricity nor telecommunications and no waste management. However, the listed facilities that might be very basic for the southern regions of Botswana are much better than in all the other floodplains studied, where drinking water, schools and health facilities are often non-existent or partly broken. Apart from relatively modern infrastructure, there is new, modern fishing technology available, but often not affordable. People prefer nylon gill nets, although they are relatively expensive. These nets comply with the legal restrictions on minimal mesh sizes, which prevent smaller fish being caught. Expensive fibreglass and aluminium boats are more valued than dugout canoes (mekoro). A total of only 46 boats with outboard engines used for commercial fishery are present in the whole Delta, but there are none in Ikoga itself where 23 dugout canoes, 3 fibreglass boats and 5 aluminium boats were counted in 2001 (Mosepele 2001).33 There is one private cooling facility (powered freezer box) in the village and one concrete smoking facility that have been provided for a group of fishermen by the government in order to raise outputs. Conservation programmes and land allocation: The history of conservation in the Delta, also included in the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, began in 1962, initiated by the BaTawana who set aside part of the Delta as a game reserve. Early effects were the limitations on hunting activities and the declaration of a livestock free zone in the Delta (Kuru 2000). After several extensions, zoning into different resource use areas is as it exists today was concluded. Communal Hunting Areas (CHAs) with restricted resource use and Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) in the formerly demarcated reserved areas (zoned under TGLP) have been declared, and policies that aim to preserve wetland resources in these areas had been enacted. Ikoga is situated within a CHA that is zoned for non-consumptive use of wildlife (NG 10). Hunting is prohibited while the fishery and other commonpool resource use are not formally, but often de facto restricted, due

33 An evaluation of the Okavango Delta fishery for the Ministry of Agriculture in 2001 counted 376 dugout canoes, 168 fibreglass boats, and 45 aluminium boats in the entire Delta (Mosepele 2001). This number contrasts to the estimated 100 boats, mostly with engines, moored in the Delta by tourist operators (Okavango River Panhandle Management Plan).

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to interest in recreational fisheries. One result of the administration’s focus on conservation combined with tourism has been the effect on arable agriculture. The District Land Board ceased to allocate residential and arable plots in areas along the riverbanks, because these areas are reserved for future development of tourist facilities. Thus, although farmers in Ikoga are allowed to cultivate along the fringes of the river, they have no long-term security of tenure rights. It is difficult to employ climatic fluctuations as factors for explaining change. While older people generally mentioned a decline of rainfall, scientific data does not clearly support these congruent local perceptions. There are different reasons for diverging statements about rainfall in specific areas. In the first place, rainfall occurs locally and records and experiences at different localities may thus, be contradictory. Secondly, older hydrological data can be questioned, due to methodological problems (Scudder et al. 1993). Furthermore, traditional ways of coping with droughts (e.g. mobility) have disappeared due to social, economic, and political changes (see also Kirkels 1992 and Hitchcock 1991). Because of the resultant higher vulnerability to droughts, the people’s perception of occurrence and severity of dry periods is very subjective. 5. Negotiation of access to common-pool resources 5.1. Relationship and levels of negotiation among different actors Which actors and groups are interested in the use of the common-pool resources surrounding Ikoga? The focus on common-pool resources inside the floodplain has increased alongside the decrease of agricultural outputs. The collective fishery has always been an important component of every ethnic group, materially and symbolically, while herding and gathering activities are largely confined to plants inside or adjacent to the fertile wetlands. Since livelihood strategies in Ikoga nowadays are less determined by ethnic affiliation than by socioeconomic factors, the use of the wetland’s common-pool resources is affecting all ethnic groups. All-year gill net fishery is done mostly by Bayei and BaNoka people. The formal stage, or kgotla, for the negotiation of public concerns and common-pool resources certainly fall within above category. Kgotla is a Setswana term and designates meeting places where discussions are held and decisions taken, based upon consensus. The local court handles cases which fall under customary law, administered by the headman, assisted by his secretary,

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the kgotleg. Kgotla meetings are open to everyone in the village and assent of all people present is generally sought. Everyone, including women and regardless of ethnic affiliation, has the right to speak. Kgotla meetings are announced in advance or instantly held for various reasons: when minor cases are tried by the headman (assisted by the local police) under common law and customary law, when villagers are informed about development strategies or new laws, or when village representatives are elected, etc. Kgotla meetings are attended mostly by older people. While the kgotla is a traditional open institution, the Village Development Committee (VDC) is a closed assembly of ten publicly elected village members. It is probably the most powerful grouping in the village. The VDC members referred to themselves as being responsible for socio-economic development and as the ones who govern the village. The VDC is a relatively new body within the legal local administration and has various mandates. It functions as an interface between the village members and the central government via the local council in the neighbouring village, Sepopa. Its responsibilities are implementing public welfare and development strategies in the village, by coordinating public work projects (one of the few income opportunities in the village itself apart from becoming a teacher), and compiling lists of villagers who meet the criteria for poverty and are thus qualified for food handouts and other assistance distributed by the government. The VDC also controls the work of the headman (who is actually a civil servant) and advises the Land Board on matters of land allocation, for residential, arable, or commercial purposes. Meetings are held regularly without public participation and the VDC members are paid for attending. Another body is the Village Trust Committee (VTC), an ethnically mixed group of eight relatively young, publicly elected villagers who are active in implementing Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in the village. Ikoga, together with a number of other neighbouring villages, has been allocated NG24, an area inside the Delta that is reserved for photographic wildlife tourism. Although each village has the authority to manage its own portion of NG24, activities are concerted and coordinated by the board of trustees (Jakotsha).34 Jakotsha and its VTCs are assisted by a local NGO

34

Jakotsha is the name of the Trust and stands for the villages Jao, Ikoga, and the 13 Etsha villages.

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(TOCaDI)35 that produced the management plan for NG24. The VTC members are trying to promote the commercial use of the floodplain. The VTC of Ikoga regularly informs and consults villagers at public kgotla meetings, but attendance has diminished as many villagers have become frustrated with the slow pace of business and promised benefits have not yet been forthcoming. Another interest group in the village is a group of fishermen who regard themselves as the leaders of the permanent gill net fishery in Ikoga. The group is organised around one elderly man whose position derived from having been the middleman between the government, which implemented development programmes in the village, and the other fishermen. He is responsible for distributing implements provided by the government, such as boats, nets, and the smoking facility. There are other fishermen, who prefer to fish individually, and the individuals and fishery of the rest of village seem unaffected by the decisions of this group. This group of fishermen, as well as the individual gill net fishers, are interested in the use of the fish resource for both subsistence and commercial use. Campsites and lodges at the same time offer a unique opportunity to sell fish locally, but they also restrain access to the fish grounds. Whether or not the tourist activities in NG24 yield a profit for these fishermen depends on their negotiating abilities with the lodge operators. Under CBNRM, investors have access to floodplain areas that were protected before. Various entrepreneurs (citizens and expatriates) have already shown vital interest in working together with the VTC of Ikoga. Negotiations with potential leaseholders and visits on site are irregularly scheduled, but difficult to organise since appointees from involved ministries, the trust, and representatives of TOCaDI are also meant to participate. TOCaDI also plays a crucial role, since its steering function provides personnel and administrative support. Other important NGOs and cultural organisations active in the area are the Kamanakao Association and Mbungu Wa Kathiana. Kamanakao is the cultural interest group of the Bayei and Mbungu, a transnational (Botswana and Angola) Hambukushu cultural organisation. Both seek to preserve their languages and cultural traditions and lobby for the interests of their people.

35 TOCaDI, the Trust of Okavango Communities and Development Initiatives, is a member of the Kuru family of organisations and has its office at Shakawe.

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Tourists are also present in the area, either travelling between Angola and Namibia, and the South of Botswana and South Africa, or as visitors to the numerous lodges in the Delta. They often rent motorboats and fish recreationally in areas, which overlap the fishing grounds for subsistence and commercial fishery. 5.2. Institutional arrangements for the access and use of particular common-pool resources According to the latest studies, the institutional arrangements for the management of common-pool resources are not clear. Despite government regulations for protected areas and tourist leasing options as well as government regulations regarding fisheries and hunting, the locals face a de facto open access situation. The pre-colonial often territorial regulations as well as related meetings at the kgotla seem to have disappeared. Kgotla meetings are still taking place but not related to the management of the commons. Land rights are another issue: Exclusive user rights for arable agriculture and housing on the dry land can be inherited or be allocated by the Land Boards on request. Land allocation for flood recession farming inside or adjacent to the floodplains is informally regulated. These plots are allocated on a mutually respected “first come, first serve” basis. Cattle, donkeys, and other domestic animals are to be kept away from these plots, which prove difficult, since the animals are rarely watched. Pastures under current legislation are open access because no citizen can be denied access to any tribal land. People from Ikoga and surrounding villages are using the pastures in the dry land as well as on the river fringes and within the floodplains. Farmers let their cattle graze freely during daylight and keep them in the kraals at night. Unaccompanied herds are said to mix in when they are searching for fodder and water and stray cattle move as far as Seronga, a village at the opposite side of the river. Villagers reported that farmers from other villages would pass with their herds from time to time, without previous consultations and without reciprocal agreement. According to Kgathi, an outdated Fisheries Act of 1975 is responsible for the situation that there are currently neither regulations in the fishery, nor a national fisheries policy (Kgathi et al. undated). The Fish Protection Act gives the Minister of Agriculture the authority to regulate and limit fishing activities (Cassidy 2000). Laws and regulations concerning the fishery are very general and cover only the use

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of explosive, poisonous, and other noxious substances.36 A minimum mesh size for commercial gill nets further attempts to prevent young fish from being caught (Mosepele 2001), although it would not be illegal to fish with traditional hand woven nets that have smaller mesh sizes. There are no local informal off take limits for either individual or collective fishery. People from neighbouring villages like Sepopa or Seronga are able to fish in the same creeks and lagoons as the Ikoga fishermen. Still, there are situations in which a group that is already in a place denies access to a newcomer without reason. One informal rule says that those who have first set their nets have the right to stay there as long as they wish. Another informal rule states that nets must not be set across the streams. The collective fishery is very flexible and is organised by families and friends. The whole village participates, regardless of ethnic affiliation, and there are no designated areas for either group or family. The ponds and the cut off channels in the area of the village are constantly being inspected to determine the time for collective fishing. No authorities are consulted nor are collective meetings necessary. As there is no scarcity of fish, people from neighbouring villages such as Sepopa or the Etsha villages are usually fishing in localities near their own villages, however, they are not denied access to the fishing ground near Ikoga. People from Ikoga are also allowed to participate at the collective fishery in neighbouring villages. The use of veldt products is not currently restricted. Informants still mentioned some informal rules or habits concerning the exploitation of veldt resources. Such rules, although not clearly formulated, are quite obvious as is the case of wood, which is used for various purposes. While trees within the compounds are individual property, those in the village are common property and again those in the forest are under open access tenure. Due to the increasing population in the central village, firewood has become quite rare and cutting the big trees and the shrubs in the village would be a convenient option. Still, people don’t cut living trees and often travel for hours with donkeys and carts into the unoccupied dry lands west of the village. Because all villages lie on a north-south-axis, people from neighbouring villages are gathering within an area that is bordered in the north and south, but extends far into the western dry lands and areas reaching

36

Fish Protection Act 42. 1975.

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far into the wetlands in the east. People accept additional effort in order to conserve their close environment. Termite resistant wood for construction (e.g. Mopane) is also supposed to be cut in the forests, which are situated at a certain distance from the village. The various plant products that are used for consumption, crafts, medicine, dye and other purposes are legally under open access and pressure on plants has been reported to be on the increase, especially in dry years with bad harvests. The awareness about harvesting only after reproduction seems to be there, but compliance with rules that would restrict harvesting is not as consequent as it was in the past. The various grasses and reeds used for thatching the huts or constructing the lolwapas (palisades, enclosing the patios of rondavels) should only be cut after seeding, but as some of the species close to the village have become rare due to increased population pressure, collectors either move to less suited species or they cut he young plants before they have reached maturity. Veldt fires for clearing fields and enriching the pastures are legally restricted, but tolerated if they are set on occupied land and with permission from the respective public authority. Wild animals are today under state control. The Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) sets quotas, defines hunting seasons, and sells hunting licenses to citizens and non-citizens. Whether wildlife is de facto state property, common property (like that attempted with CBNRM approaches), or whether an open access tenure situation is being created, depends upon the government’s effort and on the means employed for enforcing this regulation. Not much can be said about the local hunting practices and agreements, since hunting is legally restricted and people don’t like to speak about it. 5.3. Ideological justification of the common-pool resource access and use Many ethnic groups with different perceptions of land and resource use a live along the fringes of the Delta (Okavango Delta Management Plan 2002). Today most settlements in the area are ethnically mixed, mainly as a result of the installation of public infrastructure and welfare schemes in centralised locations and migrations between the settlements. Most of the people no longer occupy the areas they lived on in the past. Exclusive access in referring to past occupancy is thus, difficult to justify, especially after the introduction of the Tribal Land Act in 1968. The Act declared access to tribal land and the resources attached to it as open for every citizen, regardless of his ethnic affilia-

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tion. Because of fear of tribalism and of reproducing a racist history, as well as for political reasons, questions of ethnic affiliation are often treated with care and to some extent neglected. Claiming exclusive rights to resources based on ethnic membership that was the basis of the common property regime in the past and in which reference was made to territories, would therefore be interpreted and condemned as tribalism. The ideological justification for this open access situation is based on the notion of equality. The credo “one people, one nation” is often heard in Botswana and according to Keuthmann and Vossen (2000) is built upon the self-view of the Tswana peoples and the European’s view. The effect of this notion is that both sedentary and temporary newcomers and outsiders may claim access to whatever common-pool resource they encounter on tribal land. On the other hand, they define which portion of land belongs to which categories and this then defines the actual use of the common-pool resource on this land. While tribal land has to be opened up for external users, specific areas are protected or reserved for tourism only and in these lands local people have hardly any rights. Based on CBNRM it is only possible after the establishment of a management plan to attract a tourist operator to whom the land can leased, but there is no possibility to really do what the name of the management programme implies; there is no such thing as community based natural resource management for in many of these areas, local people are not allowed to do what they want or to devise their own rules. Main revenues can be harnessed by BaTawana elites and white tourist operators. And in case some of the local communities are successful, the state of Botswana is now thinking of large payments to the central government to be redistributed later on. According to Piers Blaikie, CBNRM is a Trojan Horse for powerful actors in order to attract funds and to control the profit from the new wave of the participatory approach with little that is trickling down to the local level (Blaikie 2006). However in Ikoga, it has not even come that far, because problems had already begun, before that stage (Saum 2006). Similarly in other areas of Botswana San groups face high pressure from the government pushing ranching and CBNRM programmes, leading to the exclusion of San groups (see Good 2008). 6. Common-pool resource use and management conflicts There is little conflict and competition between local people for these resources, however, because there is no market value for fish and cattle

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in the area (Saum 2006). The only known case in Ikoga where fisheries were said to be in decline was in relation to so-called inappropriate fishing techniques by people living upstream, who were held responsible for a local decrease of fish 2002–03. Ikoga residents stated that their neighbours in Sepopa (and further upstream) were building barriers and dams that prevented fish from moving back to the main river to reproduce.37 At the same time, there are conflicts over competition with tourists and the potential to rent out the area for tourism under CBNRM. Tensions do arise in the gill net fishery between residents and recreational fishers (tourists). Both local fishermen and tourists claim access to the same fishing grounds and thus, may disturb each other. Recreational fishermen (represented by camp owners and managers) accuse the gill net fishers of overexploiting fish stocks. But this assertion is questionable, as “problems or issues relating to stock effects, as claimed by the recreational fishery, are unsubstantiated” (Mosepele 2001) and the Okavango fishery is currently underutilized. Other difficulties emerge around government protection of wildlife as tourism increases. Populations of mammals, reptiles, birds, and fish stocks are reported to be growing (ADRC 2001, Mosepele 2001). This becomes a problem for local people who are pressured by the dangers of living with wildlife, such as elephants and others, who become habituated to human settlements. Proximity of wildlife can make use of pastures and fisheries risky for people, and defending themselves and their crops against wildlife can lead to fines. Other conflicts, which could worsen in the future are related to CBNRM activities in the village and have an ethnic component. CBNRM began gradually in Ikoga and neighbouring villages around 1998. It was introduced by advisors from DWNP and by the TOCaDI Trust (Trust for Okavango Cultural and Development Initiatives), a local NGO. People from Jao, Ikoga and Etsha 1–13 were “informed” that they would be allocated portions of NG-24, a WMA rich in wildlife and flora, provided that they would present a management plan to detail the proposed use of the area. With the assistance of TOCaDI, the villages registered as Jakotsha Okavango Community Trust.38 In 2000 37 Also Mosepele (2001) stated that uncontrolled use of collective fishing methods (that were traditionally sanctioned by local authorities) might interfere with natural movements of fish in the system and cause detrimental impacts on fish stocks. 38 The name ‘Jakotsha’ comes from the names of the constituent villages: Ja (Jao), ko (Ikoga) and tsha (Etsha).

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a land and utilisation plan was submitted to the Land Board for the confirmation of the lease of part of NG24 and different land areas were allocated to the participating villages. With support from TOCaDI, the community trust has been able generate income from poling, and also from a joint venture and entrance fees from tour operators who use some of the lagoons and water ways in parts of NG-24. However, the stipulation was that the community had to negotiate with a tourist operator to establish a business through which wildlife can provide benefits. In this context, the larger project has stalled for several reasons. Repeated accusations and complaints by both Bayei and Hambukushu people about other Jakotsha villages and about villagers from the other group have created the impression that this sort of ethnic division is rather new to area, and that it comes from the frustration about the stagnation of CBNRM. It appeared that people began to accuse others, because it was almost impossible for them to discern why the CBNRM process was slow and not beneficial for them. For example, board members of the Jakotsha Community Trust accused residents of Jao (comprised primarily of Bayei) and members of Kamanakao, a Bayei cultural association, of trying to sabotage its work. The accused were said to be undermining confidence in the Trust by saying it was Hambukushu dominated, putting in danger the good relationships among member communities and dividing villages involved in CBNRM.39 The Hambukushu board members argued that relationships worsened, especially after the formation of Kamanakao cultural organisation of the Bayei. Residents of the Bayei-dominated Jao village, on the other hand, complained about poor working relations with the Hambukushu-dominated Board. Through the process of implementing CBNRM, the inhabitants of Jao, the village in the midst of the Delta, became aware of the enormous economic potential of their natural environment.40 But according to the guidelines of the management plan for NG-24 (Kuru 2000), they cannot profit from large parts of the area without the involvement and agreement of other villages. This became a source of frustration for Jao residents, who perceived that other previously uninterested

39 Daily news online, December 13, 2001 (Web source: http://www.gov.bw/cgibin/ news.cgi? d=20000724) 40 Most of the economically valuable natural resources, such as wildlife, are found in the area around Jao.

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villages suddenly wanted to control their area once it was clearly articulated as having value. When this concern was complimented with a lack of clear local understanding that the Board is intended to use the benefits for all involved villages, CBNRM inflamed conflict in the eyes of Jao residents. In addition to the lack of power to make decisions about using resources, CBNRM as a form of governance has also given rise to disagreements that have an ethnic dimension (Saum 2006). In ethnically diverse villages like Ikoga, resident ethnic groups have had different visions of what was happening in the CBNRM process. At the heart of this process is the drafting of a management plan—but in Ikoga, as in most of the involved villages, very few people knew about the concept of the management plan and neither did all Board members (Saum 2006). This lack of communication, however, is at the crux of many of the problems of implementing CBNRM in a fair, participatory manner. The Board has not developed sufficient legitimacy in the eyes of local residents and lacks a reputation for addressing problems fairly. Not unlike the other cases, the lack of knowledge about procedures and CBNRM concepts, as well as manipulation by a few key actors created conflicts in Ikoga, especially during the tender process. In the hope of generating income rapidly, the Village Trust Committee (VTC) of Ikoga wanted to sublease their allocated part of NG-24 as quickly as possible to a lodge operator. But the technical advisor, employed by the NGO TOCaDI, held off on signing contracts with potential tourism operators, because the management plan for NG-24 stipulated that a transparent tender process had to be followed before the VTC could legally enter into a contract. In the meantime, local residents and especially VTC members grew tired of waiting for the tender, which was not easily organised due to infrastructural and financial constraints as well as the lack of government assistance or effective involvement. Again, however, several VTC members did not know about these guidelines. It therefore appeared to them that the technical advisor, who is a highly-placed Hambukushu traditional leader, wanted to delay processes in the Bayei-dominated village of Ikoga (Saum 2006). In this case, lack of training and capacity building created misunderstandings and were explained with powerful appeals to ethnic divisions, which previously did not appear salient. Adding to the disputes based on ethnic background was the lack of transparency at the Board level. The villagers blame the members of the Board for pass-

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ing resolutions without prior consultation with the communities that they ought to be representing.41 There were also rumours that financial issues were not transparent and that access to information was only available through informal contacts. Board members were reluctant to raise financial issues before their communities, because they feared that public discussion of finances could increase complications.42 Furthermore, there is also disagreement between the VTC and other village-level institutions such as the Village Development Committee (VDC) in Ikoga. The VTC is a key actor in CBNRM and considers itself responsible for decentralised natural resource management. The VDC, however, is the only recognized functional entity for villagelevel development and is the more powerful body, due both to its relationship with higher ranks of the administration and because it manages food-for-work, destitute rations, and other government support schemes for local communities. VDC members understand their authority as primary, stating that, “We govern the village” and “We are responsible for development.”43 While the two committees work with different central authorities (DWNP and Department of Tourism for the trusts and the Tawana Land Board for the VDC) they are, nonetheless, expected to work hand in hand. VTC members complained about a lack of cooperation from the side of the VDC. But while the VDC is linked to the councillor at Sepopa and the regional Land Board, the VTC has NGO support and connections to additional government bodies, including the Land Board, the Department of Tourism, and DWNP. It appears that the VDC of Ikoga (at the time of the research) feared that the VTC might challenge its position in the village as soon as CBNRM generated income and jobs, and thus, would actually have the ability to disturb development as intended by the VDC. 7. Conflict resolution mechanisms Conflict resolution takes place at different levels. The village level includes both informal and formal conflict resolution. Formal conflict resolution is handled either according to customary or to common

41

Daily news online July 24, 2000 (Web source: http://www.gov.bw/cgi-bin/news. cgi?d=20000724) 42 Personal communication of R. Saum with TOCaDI employees, December 2005. 43 VDC members in Ikoga, 2002.

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law. Conflicts involving villagers from the same village are resolved informally, either face to face or at the household level. If settlement is not possible or mediation is required, cases are referred to one of the two small kgotlas in the village or directly to the main kgotla. Mediation or punishment (money, beating or other measures) at one of the small kgotlas often settles the case. When this is not possible, cases are taken to the main kgotla, the lowest formal stage for cases that fall under common law. Here, the headman makes his decision after hearing the disputing parties and the opinions of the villagers. The headman in Ikoga is not only a respected authority, but also a civil servant, empowered to deal with minor cases such as theft or beating. The local police (three officers in Ikoga) assist him by collecting evidence and by setting the appropriate sentence. Severe cases such as rape or murder are tried under customary law by higher courts in the district or sub-district centres. When official bodies such as the Land Board or any other Ministry is involved, cases must be heard at a more central level Conflicts with expatriates have to be dealt with under common law. Conflicts concerning access to common-pool resources are usually resolved by customary law. If a member of another village is involved, the issues are usually dealt with in the village, where the offence occurred. Tribal authorities can also be called upon to resolve conflicts, which fall under customary law. Sometimes the small headmen or the headmen of the village are contacted personally without meeting at the kgotla and sometimes the leader of either ethnic group is contacted for advice or informal arbitration. 8. Impact of institutional changes on common-pool resources In most parts of Botswana, range degradation and over-utilisation of reeds, firewood and handicraft materials are severe problems. This is not the case in the Okavango Delta with the exception of a few areas. Most of the common-pool resources are still abundant and in some cases have even increased. Some researchers argue that overuse in the Okavango Delta area is not an issue, because the population density is too low.44 However, there is a general concern among ecologists and

44

Personal conversations with ecologists at the HOORC in Maun in 2002.

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planners that natural resources in the Okavango floodplain and delta may be depleted in the long run, if appropriate conservation measures are not adopted. Veldt resources are under pressure due to their accessibility and market demand. A recent socio-ecological survey in the Okavango Delta revealed that most of the households interviewed reported the non-availability of resources (e.g. water lilies, medicinal plants, palm trees, building materials, and papyrus) due to an increase in their demand (ADRC 2001, Kgathi et al., undated). Over-utilization and decrease of veldt resources, such as materials for building and crafting (papyrus, reeds, grasses, and palm trees), water lilies, various fruits and other edible veldt products, and firewood is, however, an issue in Ikoga. Reasons given are usual population growth, increasing demand, indiscriminate harvesting and burning of the veldt, the expansion of tourism, climate changes, and artificial and natural changes in the patterns of the annual floods (see also Kgathi et al., undated, Musundire 1995, Van der Heiden 1992). According to VanderPost: The rapidly growing rural population exerts increasing pressure on localised resources of grazing land, ground water and natural woodlands, making overgrazing, the lowering of the water table and deforestation, environmental issues of national concern (Van der Post 2000: 78 with reference to Cooke and Silitshena 1986).

However, this statement raises the questions of whether the population growth is a contributing factor to the depletion of veldt resources, seen the low level of the population itself. In 1991, population density in Ngamiland was estimated at 1.06 persons per km2 in the rural parts and at around 1.5 persons per km2 in 1991 and 2001 in the whole district (Central Statistics Office, Government of Botswana). These numbers appear to be too low to have serious negative effects on the common-pool resources and people who are only interested in harvesting veldt when there is a real market for it. This also challenges the notion of demand. Some products are indeed sold as far as Maun, where demand for goods like thatching grass or river reed exists. But since transportation costs are too high and prices obtained insufficient to make such trips profitable, these trips are seldom undertaken. Climate change is also difficult to estimate since the quality of long time data is questionable. The tourist factor will have to be investigated in more detail, as it is not seen as contributing to the consumption of veldt products, but indirectly causing side effects. Indiscriminate harvesting

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and burning of the veld has more direct effects on the plants and standing vegetation but again, population density lowers the impact of harvesting methods, and the effect of burning is quite disputed. Factors that are often overlooked in socio-economic studies are the effects of centralised permanent settlements. Societies that are mobile and scattered use the resources less intensively than permanent settlements with hundreds or thousands of inhabitants. In such centralised villages people normally collect first those resources that are closest and only penetrate into more distant areas when the resources in the vicinity are exhausted. Therefore common-pool resources in the vicinity of the village are almost depleted, whereas those that are too far away to be reached safely and within a reasonable time stay untouched. Centralisation of settlements has at least two additional negative side effects for veldt products. The same dynamics can be applied to the pastures. In the past, the extension of grazing land was very large and overgrazing as it appears today, was less likely. According to local accounts, pastures were far removed from the main settlement so that people, who attended the cattle, were forced to stay near the pastures in temporary cattle posts. There are still cattle posts today, but if no one is available for herding, the cattle have to be kept closer to the village. Today, it is rare to find anyone who is either willing or able to look after the animals. Overgrazing in Ikoga, as in other floodplain villages, is especially visible around the village. It is not only cattle which put a strain on the resources, stray donkeys and goats also play a role. Depletion of pastures had been a lively discussion issue among environmentalists, planners, and ecologists before the CBPP eradication in 1995–96. Since then, although cattle herds are restocking, pressure on pastures has diminished and overuse may again become an issue. Especially in the vicinity of centralised villages signs of overgrazing are visible. According to various scientists, there are several indicators that suggest the animals living in and from the Okavango Delta are not overexploited. On the contrary, the availability of fish, birds, and wildlife was reported to be on the increase. Fish stocks were increasing due to the use of adapted harvesting methods, whereas the increase in the numbers of wildlife and birds was due to governmental control (ADRC 2001, Kgathi et al. undated, Mosepele 2001). Indeed, local fishermen’s estimation of fish stock points to an increased availability of fish. Seasonal fishermen in the collective fishery also did not mention a decline in fish. Whether sensible harvesting methods (the only mea-

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sures taken are the commercial nets with bigger mesh sizes and the ban on using poisonous and explosive substances), a changing water course, enrichment of the oligotrophic water with organic substances due to livestock herding in the water, or a different exploitation pattern are causing this situation, is open to discussion. The main reasons why this open access situation doesn’t lead to a decline of the resource are certainly the low prices and lack of marketing opportunities (when there is no local or regional demand people have no incentive to exploit large quantities of fish), a low population pressure, and the availability of alternative income and food sources. Local people’s estimations of the wildlife population are contradictory. Although in general people state that there are more animals since they are protected, nowadays they encounter fewer animals, perhaps due to the fact that they have escaped from people and populated villages. People are aware that uncontrolled hunting using highly effective weaponry and ignoring reproduction cycles limits off-take numbers and has negative effects on the animal population. But they fail to understand why hunting should be restricted in such a way that neither hunting for consumption, nor self-protection from dangerous animals are possible. An old villager speaks on behalf of their community members. An often heard statement is that “they (the government) should allow us to kill the dangerous animals and leave the good ones only” (Informant Ikoga village interview; Saum 2006). In addition, as wildlife is abundant hunting restrictions are seen by the local people in Ikoga as a conservation discourse of the government controlled by rich people. One informant explained that the introduction of hunting regulations reflected the self-interest of the government agents, because licenses and restriction of hunting in certain areas generates money from licences and tourism to employ civil servants in the country. Others however, argue that such regulations just harm the poorer parts of the society in the countryside. People were talking to me about hunting techniques for small game in the past, but were reluctant to talk about actual experiences. However, it was made clear that the restriction of hunting changed part of their livelihoods and lifestyle (Saum 2006). Interestingly, experts doubt that subsistence hunting could have any negative effect on animal populations. According to Bock and Johnson (2002) this is again due to the low population density in the Okavango Delta and the low-tech weaponry people are using. They argue that by weeding out old and sick animals, it may even have a positive effect on the animal population. Such arguments again illustrate a common paradigm shift that so called natural

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areas are in fact culturally influenced landscapes and that the use of common-pool resources by local people has made the ecosystem as it is today (see also debate in Galvin and Haller (Eds.) 2008). Although resource institutions are not favourable, the relatively low impact on common-pool resources—on the one hand, with open access constellations and on the other hand, conservation and ineffective tourism, are blamed by local people for their problems; as such, this should lead to overuse of the common-pool resources, as in the other cases. The reason for this overuse not taking place stems from the low population density, the low prices that people get for common-pool resources, remittances and government payments, as well as CBNRM policies which still generates hope. It is unclear how long this hope will last. In a new publication Kenneth Good illustrates how strongly Botswana focuses on diamond income and how the elite needs this income to remain in power, leaving Botswana as one of the wealthiest African nation but with major income differences and with respect to some local groups as the San with dispossession policies (Good 2008). 9. Discussion 9.1. Factors for changes in lifestyle and living conditions In the past it was raining and we were ploughing more crops, because our lives were based on ploughing. There were no jobs available. We were killing animals with spears, because at that time they were not dangerous like nowadays. We were making a better life [. . .] Today things are better, because there is money to buy food and clothes (Koikomena Mombeko interview with R. Saum in Ikoga 2002).

Mr. Mombeko’s contradictory evaluation of a common-pool resourcesbased lifestyle in the past, compared to the more recent situation with its focus on cash money and manufactured goods, is quite common among the people in the village. Older as well as younger people regret that they can’t hunt and exploit the veldt as they did in the past. Social bonds and cooperation between kinsmen and generations were stronger and more binding than today and there were better conditions for agricultural activities, overall a healthier and wealthier way of life. But almost none of the people we interviewed wanted to go back in time, to an economy that was solely based on the use of common-pool resources, which would entail letting go of the conveniences that mod-

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ernisation brought (or might bring). But can’t the people turn back to a traditional lifestyle? What contributed to these changes? A number of administrative actions had a major influence on the people’s economic behaviour. The British administration of Bechuanaland broke the circle of self-sufficiency by introducing the cash economy and migration to the South African mines was common among many of the uneducated males in the region. After independence, rapid economic and socio-economic change and changing policies increased fears of insecurity and made people turn away from indigenous cultural practices, which were now often viewed as outdated. Government’s decisions that limit the range of economic possibilities and negatively affect people’s motivation to invest in agriculture have increased dependency on the administration. People nowadays expect the government to support them in their hardships, in the same parental manner as it contributed to their difficulties. People call for jobs and secure employment and they long for improvements in public infrastructure, something, which is equated with development. Although the villagers of Ikoga and other floodplain villages in the Delta region still base their survival strategies largely on the use of common-pool resources, their focus and aspirations tend towards paid labour, while the importance of agriculture has decreased and use of the common-pool resources is judged as a temporary solution. A compulsory formal education system continues to erode locally adapted knowledge, while it aims to prepare people for a job market that is nonexistent in the Delta area. Most young educated people in the village see no future for themselves in the village and they yearn to migrate to places where they can put their knowledge to better use. It is a vicious circle. Many young people are reluctant to participate or invest in agriculture and the burden of ploughing and harvesting is often left to the older people. Less labour input means smaller yields, which from the point of view of the younger generation, is not worth the effort. Changing values are not the only reason leading to a decline in agriculture. The cattle eradication in 1995–96 resulted in a lack of tractive power for ploughing and a decreased provision of dairy products. By replacing the cattle with breeds which had not yet adapted to the environment, and the probability of having the cattle killed again without any possibility of intervening, made cattle a profitable investment. The restocking programme that followed the eradication, impoverished those who had only few cattle, but at the same time was a chance for the richer rural farmers with bigger herds as it made

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cattle and immediate cash available for investments. The various welfare schemes and financial assistance projects that escorted the killing brought some relief, but increased dependency on the government and people lost their respect for agricultural work. Cash became an essential item even for the most basic needs. Industrially manufactured goods have gained in value compared to traditionally manufactured goods. Fiberglas boats, for example, are much more in demand than hand carved wooden canoes, although most people can’t afford them. The same applies to nylon versus traditional gill nets and many other goods. School fees, the cost of transportation or changes in bride prices (cash instead of cattle) are but a few examples for the need to earn money. But the money needed cannot be generated by selling off the local natural common-pool resources. Remittances, rents, financial assistance, and drought relief projects, together with the provision and subvention of the most needed goods like staples and medical treatment, prevent the people from increasing harvesting activities for consumption and trade. Additionally, the prospect of economic development and jobs in the village through CBNRM also tempers dissatisfaction. People are prepared to accept legally limited access to common-pool resources such as wildlife and insecure land tenure rights (plots and gardens, fishing grounds and pastures adjacent and inside the wetlands) in exchange for tourist activities, hoping in return for increased cash earning opportunities. 9.2. Factors for changes in local resource use institutions The British administration of Bechuanaland increased the power of the Tswana tribes by installing a system of intermediary governance, where the local groups were suddenly under the governance of appointed headmen. However, the Tswana dominated government of the independent post-colonial state had a much stronger influence. It integrated local governance into the central system of governance by appointing the headmen to the position of civil servants accountable to the local councils via the Village Development Committees. The government centralised the system of land allocation and initiated the creation of permanent villages, through the development of social and public infrastructure. The provision of public infrastructure combined with decreased income opportunities from common-pool resources led to a centralisation of villages. People left their ancient homes and territories and are now confronted with a situation where they have

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to permanently share resources and resource territories with others. When people now speak about neighbouring communities, they refer to permanent villages and settlements and not to semi-permanent family groups that scattered over a wide area. Territorial limitations of access to common-pool resources were based on ethnic affiliation and in this respect to membership, which have eroded since new land use laws and policies (TLA, TGLP) ensured access for every citizen to tribal land and the resources attached to it. Local people lost influence over land and resource management when land and resource allocation were nationalized and transferred to various departments and offices accountable only to the central government and not the local population. How are the people within such new settlements and between villages organising access to common-pool resources under the current legislation? The people of Ikoga and other rural communities are still allowed by law to devise their own local common property management institutions, for the common-pool resources fisheries, veldt products, forests, and pastures that are currently held under open access tenure. But although the system of the kgotla and other public stages would allow collective-choice arrangements, conflict resolution, and sanctioning of those who would violate the rules under customary law, people show no interest in making such rules or may find it difficult or even impossible, due to various factors. First of all, there are no clear resource system boundaries, except for the communities that have been allocated areas under Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). Secondly, such rules would neither increase the availability of the common-pool resources nor bring other benefits to the resource users (see also DeMotts et al. 2009 for a comparison between Ikoga and a neighbouring village called Seronga). And thirdly, timeconsuming and costly devising of rules for common-pool resources makes little sense to the current resource users, since there is always the possibility that the resources may be reclaimed by the state or by any other external resource user, who can not be legally challenged when ignoring the rules. Because the people are so isolated, it is also unlikely for them to devise their own rules of access and exploitation of common-pool resources. If two or three communities agreed upon the use of fish stocks or pastures in their area, such agreements would be difficult to get accepted by the government and tourist operators in the area. Neither resource users from outside, nor any other authority

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involved in resource observation nor management (like the Department of Wildlife and Natural Parks in the case of wildlife, the Department of Agriculture in the case of fish, or the Land Boards) would support them. CBNRM might help to ameliorate this situation, if the resource users have guaranteed long-term tenure rights, and when a situation is created where multiple layers of conflict resolution, monitoring, enforcement, and governance activities are also organised in multiple layers (see also Becker and Ostrom 1995). But CBNRM focuses on commercial tourist activities and the only way to undertake such enterprises is by employing expatriate entrepreneurs. The locals are by law given the right to manage the commonpool resources, but de facto must leave the management to outsiders. This is the case because the area is under a specific legal tenure: It is tribal land, but claimed to be reserve areas—called Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs)—under government control. This means that the Land Board only can give out land again to local communities under the regime of a Community Based Organisation, if they comply with the rules of the Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). As it is a reserved area within the zone NG24, the only possibility local people have is to agree on a management plan in order to sublease the area to a tourist operator, but not on how to use the resources themselves. Their only sphere of influence seems to be during the process of working out a management plan. But to what extent the community really had the opportunity to participate is questionable (see also Rozemeijer and van der Jagt 2000). Therefore the options of devising their own community-based rules are very limited. As long as the lodges are generating jobs and income, this doesn’t disturb the people. But in Ikoga it was difficult to come to a collective action and therefore these profits cannot be realised. And even if they could once maintain a good relationship with tourist business is not an easy task, especially if the promised gains do not materialise, which puts in jeopardy the whole approach. 10. Conclusion and recommendations Despite these rather negative institutional aspects, there is no comparable negative impact on the common-pool resources to be seen in the Panhandle. Three main factors seem to be crucial for the absence of the negative effects on social stability and the state of the common-

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pool resources: the low population density, the government’s distribution of goods, money, and social infrastructure, and the absence of markets and demand for products from the research area linked to low relative prices for commercial common-pool resources products. Whether or not pressure on resources and tension between resource users would rise, once these interrelated mitigating factors might have less influence, can only be answered hypothetically, and must be subject to future research. The effects of colonial and post-colonial changes resulted in a devaluation of traditional economic practices and the break down of local common property regimes and management institutions that were long an intrinsic part of the culture of the people of the Okavango Delta and every individual ethnic group. Former rules of access based on territoriality are not applicable in ethnically mixed permanent settlements and do not make sense when there are no long-term tenure rights. At the moment the government still manages to distribute enough of its wealth to satisfy the people’s most basic and immediate needs. Together with low population density and higher potential gains from tourism, real gains from remittances and government aid, this helps to have the common-pool resources not being heavily used, even if they are in an annual open access regime. In addition, as markets are lacking and relative prices for common-pool resources are low, coupled with high access costs by a military-like monitoring and sanctioning system in some areas, these make the use of common-pool resources commercially expensive. This also reflects the government’s interest and economic capacity to protect wildlife in the Okavango Delta to harness the gains from tourism, which also helps to keep pressure on the common-pool resources such as wildlife, fisheries and pasture considerably low. But what happens when the state’s income diminishes, if the tourism business and diamond business falls into a crisis—as can be expected by the actual financial crisis—leading to a decrease in income and unemployment cuts in the welfare schemes? People are already feeling increasingly neglected by an administration that resides far away in a much more developed and economically active part of the country. This situation has the potential of developing into a future conflict when regional political forces, making use of the people’s discontent become stronger, but continue to stay excluded from the Tswana dominated government. The absence of rules might lead to conflicts among the resource users, if there is no other way of making an income than to exploit the Delta’s common-pool resources. Even

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if there is currently no great demand for local products, this might change with growing urbanisation, the rising prices of imported goods and a decrease of subsidies. The long-term tenure rights of resource areas granted to communities under CBNRM might be an attempt to prevent potential threats to the resources (over exploitation) and the people (conflicting claims over access). Under CBNRM, communities may claim exclusive access to resources; they may even devise rules that limit off-take rates. There is a chance for locals to find jobs nearby as long as they have the required knowledge about their environment; tourist facilities might also increase demand for fresh local products and handicraft. But focusing on tourist activities could prove to be dangerous, because many of the areas and the common-pool resources inside the wetlands will be reserved for tourists. In the case that locals cannot profit enough from tourist enterprises as compensation for restricted access with alternative income, conflicts are likely to evolve. Friction could arise between the tourist operators and the resource users as well as between the local resource users who have to move to more marginal resource areas, and between the local winners and losers of the new situation. Thus, the communities involved in CBNRM should have the opportunity to decide whether they want to invest in tourism or if they prefer to use the common-pool resources according to their own preferences and therefore also have the possibility to develop new or revitalise old institutions. It also depends on how much the government recognises the communities’ exclusive rights over access and whether it assists the communities in order to defend their rights. The representatives of the respective government bodies involved in CBNRM also should have an interest in local development and they should not only be accountable to their superiors, but also to the people of the communities. In view of the decreasing availability of some plants and firewood, it could be possible that the creation of rules among the villages and would bring some relief, both to the resources and to the people. In cases where there is no scarcity (like fish and water), there is currently no need to create any rules and where state law has largely prohibited access (wildlife), the creation of their own rules would make more sense. In this last case scenario it has been observed that, although they stand to gain nothing except for redistribution effects from tourism, the people are able to control their own areas.

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References Becker, D.C. and E. Ostrom. (1995). ‘Human Ecology and Resource Sustainability: The Importance of Institutional Diversity’, Annual. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 26: 113–33. Bock, J. (1998). ‘Economic Development and Cultural Change among the Okavango Delta Peoples of Botswana’, In Botswana Notes and Records, Vol. 30: 27–44. Bock, J. and Johnson, S.E. (2002). ‘The Socioecology of Change: The Okavango Delta Peoples of Botswana’, In Endangered Peoples of Africa and the Middle East, eds. R.K. Hitchcock and A.J. Osborne. New York, Greenwood Press. In Press. Blaikie P. (2006). ‘Is small really beautiful? Community-based natural resource management in Malawi and Botswana’. World Development 34, 11: 1942–1957. Cassidy, L. (2000). CBNRM and legal rights to resources in Botswana, CBNRM Support Programme. Occasional Paper No. 4. Gaborone, Botswana. Colclough, Christopher and Fallon, Peter. (1983). ‘Rural Poverty in Botswana: Dimensions, Causes and Constraints’, In: Ghai, Daram and Radwan, Samir. Etds. Agrarian policies and rural poverty in Africa, Geneva: International Labour Office. Darkoh, M.B.K. (1997). Desertification in Botswana, RALA REPORT NO. 200, Reykjavik, Iceland. (htttp:/www.rala.is/rade/ralareport/darkoh.pdf) DeMotts, R., Haller, T., Hoon, P., and R. Saum. (2009). ‘Dynamics of Common Pool Resource Management in the Okavango Delta, Botswana’. Development Southern Africa 26, 4: 569–83. Good, K. (2008). Diamonds, Dispossession and Democracy in Botswana, Woodbridge: James Currey. Government of Botswana. (1975). Fish Protection Act 42. Hitchcock, R.K. (1991). ‘Der traditionelle Umgang mit der Dürre in Botswana’, In Botswana: vom Land der Betschuanen zum Frontstaat; Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Kultur, eds. In G. Altheimer, V.D. Hopf, and B. Weimer. Münster, LIT: 239–249. Hopf, Dietrich. (1991). ‘Von der Kolonialzeit bis zur Gegenwart: Ein historischer Überblick’, In Altheimer, G., Hopf, V.D., Weimer, B. Hrsg. Botswana: vom Land der Betschuanen zum Frontstaat; Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Kultur. Münster: LIT. pp. 5–13. Hughes, R.H. and Hughes, J.S. (1992). A Directory of African Wetlands. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK. / UNEP, Nairobi, Kenya / WCMC, Cambridge, UK. Keuthmann, K. and R. Vossen. (2000). ‘Der Mythos vom grenzenlosen Land: Sprachliche Variation, Identitäten und innergesellschaftliche Grenzen in Botswana’, In Botswana—Alltagswelten im Umbruch: Facettes of a Changing Society, eds. F. Krüger, G. Rakelmann and P. Schierholz. Hamburg, LIT: 113–157. Kgathi et al. (undated). Assessing Natural Resource Scarcity in the Okavango Delta: Case Studies of Key Resources. Kirkels, M.M. (1992). Agrarian Changes in Ngamiland CSDA (Western Part), Utrecht, the Netherlands. Kuru Development Trust. (2000). Management and Utilisation Plan for NG24: Okavango Jakotsha Community Trust, Shakawe, Botswana. Larson, T.J. (1965). The political structure of the Ngamiland Mbukushu under the Rule of the Tawana, Anthropos. —— (1971). ‘The Hambukushu Migrations to Ngamiland’, African Social Research II. Local Governance for Poverty Reduction: the Case of Botswana, Country Report prepared for the Fifth Africa Governance Forum: AGF–V Maputo, Mozambique, May 22–25, 2002. Manley, R.E. and Wright, E.P. (1996). ‘The Reviev of the Southern Okavango Integrated Water Development Project’, In Water Managements and Wetlands in

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Sub-Saharan Africa. Eds. M.C. Acreman and E.G. Holis, G.E. Gland, Switzerland, IUCN: 213–224. Mosepele, K. (2001). Description of the Okavango Delta Fisheries, Fisheries Section, Ministry of Agriculture, Botswana. Okavango Delta Management Plan, Project Proposal. (2002). National Conservation Strategy (Coordinating) Agency, Gaborone. Parson, J.S. (1984). ‘The Trajectory of Class and State in Dependent Development: The Consequences of new Wealth for Botswana’. The Journal Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. XXI, 3: 39–60. Pearce, Fred. (1991). ‘The grass is always greener’, In Geographical, The Monthly Magazine of the Royal Geographical Society, Vol. XIII, No. 10: 32–35. Rozemeijer, N. and C. van der Jagt. (2000). Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in Botswana. How community based is CBNRM in Botswana? Gaborone. Schapera I. (1994). A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom: Compiled for the Bechuanaland Protectorate Administration, Münster, Hamburg, LIT. Scudder et al. (1993). The IUCN Review of the Southern Okavango Integrated Water Development Project, By the IUCN Wetlands Programme, Gland, Switzerland, IUCN. Tlou, T. (2000, first published 1985). A History of Ngamiland 1750 to 1906: The formation of an African State, Macmillan Botswana Publishing Company (Pty) Ltd. Gaborone, Botswana. Van der Heiden, L.J. (1992). ‘The Okavango Delta: current state of planning and conservation’ In Wetlands Conference for Southern Africa. Proceedings of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference held in Gaborone, Botswana, 3–5 June 1991, eds. T. Matiza, and H.N. Chabwela. Gland, Switzerland, IUCN: 109–124. Van der Post C. (2000). ‘Fertility Transition in Botswana’, In: Krüger, F., Rakelmann G. and Schierholz P. Hrsg. Botswana—Alltagswelten im Umbruch: Facettes of a Changing Society, Hamburg, LIT: 75–96. Watson, J.P. 1991. A Visual Interpretation of a Landsat Mosaic of the Okavango Delta and Surrounding Area, Remote Sensing of Environment, Vol. 35, No. 1: 1–9. Woods, J. and H.K. Watson. (2001). The Status of Southern Africa’s Savannas, Report to UNEP by the Southern Africa Savannah Research Network Coordinated by the Kings College London-University of London.

CHAPTER NINE

BETWEEN OPEN ACCESS, PRIVATISATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE GOVERNING USE OF COMMON-POOL RESOURCES IN AFRICAN FLOODPLAINS Tobias Haller Abstract This paper presents the results of the AFWeP. The major aim was to conduct a comparative, qualitative study in comparable ecological settings based on the same outline. The main interest was to analyse historical changes in the institutional design of common property regimes for the use of multiple common-pool resources (fisheries, pasture, wildlife, water forests, etc.) in complex ecosystems. Eight researchers from Swiss and African Universities conducted the fieldwork, based on the same outline in Mali, Cameroon, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana. The theoretical basis was provided by the New Institutionalism (North 1990), most elaborated in Anthropology by Jean Ensminger (Ensminger 1992, Ensminger and Knight 1997) and the early work of Elinor Ostrom on institutional design (Ostrom 1990, Becker and Ostrom 1995). We show that external factors lead to changes in the relative prices of goods and services, making floodplain commonpool resources more attractive and seriously affecting local-level bargaining power and institutional change. One finding is that the state, which is taking over the management of the common-pool resources, creates de facto open access, because it lacks the financial means to enforce laws and is not able to monitor or exclude immigrant users. At the same time, local rules are eroded, weakened or transformed by powerful local people. But our results go far beyond this generally known finding. We argue that: A) Not all traditional institutions become eroded, but those who give a rent to powerful people will remain (rent hypothesis);

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We however recognize from the comparison that our data has to be seen in a broader context of legal and institutional pluralism that fits nicely with Ensmingers model and in which ideology, discourses and narratives are important sources for legitimacy of selected institutions or a institutional pluralism. We have therefore created a matrix in which we can place all the cases studies with regard to resource sustainability and property rights/pluralism involved. 1. Introduction The seven case studies, which we have presented in this volume, have all been conducted under the same approach, which has been inspired by the New Institutionalism and similar theoretical approaches that we outlined in the introduction. Based on this theoretical framework, our major hypothesis was that external changes—here we include national and global economic changes—affect relative prices, thus influencing the attractiveness of floodplain common-pool resources and seriously impacting the locallevel bargaining power of actors trying to influence institutional change for their own benefit. We additionally argue that the state, having taken over control of common-pool resources, creates a situation of de facto open access, because it lacks the financial means to enforce its laws. At the same time, local rules are eroded, weakened or transformed by powerful local people. But our hypothesis and results go far beyond this generally known finding. We argue that: A) Rules, which pay are going to stay (rent hypothesis). Not all traditional institutions are eroded by state management of common pool resources. Some of them remain and contribute to a form of legal pluralism, because they grant access to tradeable common-pool resource goods for powerful local actors and administrators alike.

between open access, privatisation and collective action 415 B) Problems exist in relation to the ideology of citizenship and decentralisation (and in the relationship between “locals” and “immigrants” within the context of state) (presence-absence of the state hypothesis). As citizens of the state, (seasonal) immigrants regard themselves as fully entitled to use common-pool resources as they wish. Local stakeholders are not empowered or backed by the state to prevent immigrants from unsustainable use of local common-pool resources. The paradoxical situation therefore arises, that the state is absent and present at the same time. C) The economic situation of the state is a key independent variable for sustainable use of local common-pool resources (national economic performance hypothesis). This is because the economic situation influences the relative price of common-pool resources and the opportunity costs for potential immigrant users and for local people as well.

We see these three hypotheses as being of major importance in order to compare the seven case studies and come to main conclusions. These conclusions however, have to be seen in a broader context. We have discussed the model of institutional change proposed by Jean Ensminger. We have outlined which variables we see as being of major importance for the relationships between external and internal forces. During the analysis process, we have also discovered that there is a link between the degree of collective action and the property regime, as well as with sustainability of resource use and development of prices. Crosscutting these variables are issues of power, ideology and legal pluralism, insofar as legal pluralism gives the basis for disputing the outcome of institutional arrangements. This legal pluralism is then linked with the presence-absence of the state. We have developed a matrix, where we compare the case studies with respect to types of common-pool resources (fisheries, wildlife, pasture, water, timber, and agricultural land (irrigation) (see chapter 12)). This matrix will indicate that many cases display a constellation in which we found an open access situation with no collective action, high relative prices for common-pool resources and a high level of legal pluralism together with the paradox of the presence-absence of the state. There are few cases, which are sustainable and display a high degree of collective action, low prices, and low legal pluralism with present-absence of the state and still remain in the common property regime. Also in the matrix, we have cases, which have a private property and or well-enforced state property character, with high relative prices, but low collective action. These cases are not considered sustainable. Paradoxically, we

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found that some cases which are then open, communal or private/ state property at the same time. This means that these common-pool resources have come within one of these three—otherwise contradicting, categories, during the same time, but in different places. This is a puzzle, which will be discussed in this paper at the end. Research setup, research settings (areas and people involved) and methods have been explained in the introduction of this volume (see table 1) and in the respective papers. 2. Some comparable characteristics of African Floodplain Ecosystems Table 1 provides an overview of all the floodplain areas regarding some basic characteristics of the floodplains. As outlined in the introduction we have chosen a set of larger floodplains in Western (Mali, Northern Cameroon) Eastern/Central Africa (Tanzania and Zambia) and Southern Africa (Botswana) in order to have a variety of regions but as well a possibility for comparison. A special case is the selection of the Pangani River Basin, which was chosen because it represents a interesting highland-lowland case, that adds new elements of ecosystem unit to the comparison, by including the immediate link of upstream-downstream problem. We deal here with the issue of the use of forests upstream and the dynamics this creates for the areas downstream as well as the impact of small-scale out-migration from mountain area to plains. Table 1: Basic characteristics of the chosen African floodplains. Country

Name

Mali

Inland Niger Delta Waza-Logone Pangani River Basin Pangani Mountains Rufiji Floodplain Kafue Flats Okavango Delta

Cameroon Tanzania

Zambia Botswana

Floodplain area in Local annual rainfall in km2 mm 40,000

200–600

12,000 1,000

500–700 500–800 3,000

10,000 6,500 16,000

1,000 800 400–600

Source: Research team, Hughes and Hughes 1992, Acreman 1996

between open access, privatisation and collective action 417 Each floodplain has low average, but erratic annual rainfall of between 500 and 1,000 mm. The flooding of these plains stems mainly from rains in mountain areas farther away. The floodplains are thus part of a larger river basin system and vulnerable to changes upstream and downstream of this system. The annual cycle runs as follows (see also Drijver and Marchand 1985, in Chooye and Drijver 1995, for Kafue Flats in Zambia, Loth et al. 2004, for the Waza-Logone). After the dry season, the rains start, leading only to small inundations, filling a few of the tributaries. Some months later, when larger quantities of water from the mountain areas reach the floodplain, that the main river channels, tributaries, ponds and lagoons are filled and overflow toward the end of the local rainy season. As a consequence, vast areas adjacent to the rivers are inundated. After the floods, the water recedes, leaving fertile areas for agriculture and rich pastures. Topographically, we can distinguish between the main riverbed and adjacent flat areas with depressions. Water available in these depressions, even after the inundation, is important for fisheries and wildlife (Drijver and Marchand 1985, Chooye and Drijver 1995, Ellenbroek 1987, Chabwela 1992, Adams 1990).1 3. Characteristics of traditional common-pool resource institutions In all the floodplain areas, the various ethnic groups have developed institutions for the management of common-pool resources (Moorehead 1989, Loth et al. 2004, Chabwela 1992). During periods of high flood, fisheries and wildlife, for example, are open-access because they are spread widely over the area. They are therefore “subtractable,” but not excludable. Interestingly, common property regimes for mobile common-pool resources come into play during water retreat at the beginning of the dry season when fish, for example, are trapped in ponds and wildlife congregates in certain locations. They are then equivalent to common-pool goods, which are “subtractable” and difficult to exclude individuals from. However, it is possible for a group to exclude others from using the common-pool resource. At dryer times,

1 Normally forests are not important issues in floodplains, but in two researchers found the Tanzania forest in higher, sometimes mountainous zones were important for timber production and related to the floodplains studied.

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when these common-pool resources gather in a small place, they are managed as private property (see also Thomas 1996). The same model applies for water. This resembles the economic defendability model (Dyson-Hudson and Smith 1978, Eggertson 1996).2 Pasture is another resource, which is not mobile, but also depends on seasonality. At times of high flood, pasture is not accessible. During the dry season, it is managed under a common property regime. Forests in adjacent areas are managed by common property systems, during the whole season. Apart from these environmentally related characteristics, common property institutions reveal four additional characteristics in pre-colonial times: membership and ethno-professional groups (see also Moorehead 1989), cultural embedment (religion) of institutions (reduction of transaction costs), co-operation based on asymmetrical altruism (Ruttan 1998) and reciprocity (Thomas 1996), and restraint for gain (not conservation) (Ruttan 1998). A) In all cases, access to common-pool resources is organised on the basis of membership, often along kin, village or clan-group lines. Similarly, ethnic groups are often so-called ethno-professional groups who view themselves as having access to common-pool resources as members of fishermen’s, pastoralist or hunter-gatherer group. Resource areas are organised this way and are a basic set-up for common-pool resource institutions. In most cases, warfare has been an important means of defending common-pool resources against other groups. B) Legitimacy for control, monitoring and sanctioning are backed by the religious ideology of the first-comers and by special religious links with the spiritual world. In order to be able to use common-pool resources collectively, ancestral spirits or other spiritual beings have to be given ritual offerings. If this is not done, sickness, wild animal attack (crocodiles, etc.), bad catches and low yields are the result. This internalises the monitoring and sanctioning process based on low costs and backed by physical control and fines. Rituals help to coordinate common-pool resource use by a collective group. C) In most groups, first-comers claim more control over and take more common-pool resources. However, they also grant access to other groups. Distribution is therefore not equal, but access is granted in an orderly manner by the more powerful (Ruttan 1998). These political systems vary: We find highly centralised groups (HC), competi-

2 This is related to issues of tenure and transaction costs. Eggertsson (1996), mentions variables that lead to exclusion and includes physical characteristics of a resource, techniques of enforcement, inputs for exclusion, etc.)

between open access, privatisation and collective action 419 tive groups (big men leaders) (CG), segmentary groups with ritual leaders (RL) and segmentary, acephalous groups (AG). In many cases there are reciprocity rules between groups governing access to common-pool resources.3 D) Rules are not for conservation, but are based on gains to be made from the imposition of restrictions (for example, wanting fish in ponds to grow) and stem from institutionalised conflict resolution (solutions to previous conflicts over who may use common-pool resources, when and how they may be used). Rules are often about coordination and include timing and closure as well as gear and never the amount of resource taken. The set of rules includes conflict resolution mechanisms. Table 2: Characteristics of pre-colonial common-pool resource institutions. Membership/ Cultural ethno-professional (religious) groups embedment of institutions

Asymmetrical altruism and reciprocity

Restraint for gain and coordination

Yes (water spirits Yes (RL), (third contacted by of fish catch) sacrificer and Master of the Water) (Bozo, Somono); Sanctions: bad catches, sickness

Yes, coordination of collective fishing

Internal Niger Delta, Mali Bozo, Somono (Fulbe, Mandingo)

Yes (fishermen; others not mentioned, nomadic pastoralists, farmers)

Waza Logone. Cameroon Kotoko, Musgoum, Arab Choa, Fulbe

Yes (fishermen, Yes (water spirits farmers, nomadic contacted by pastoralists) ritual specialists for fishing, Sultan as political power for religious matters and pasture use) Sanctions: bad catches, sickness

Yes (HC) (Kotoko fishermen, Sultan), traditional taxes

Yes, coordination of collective fishing, Kotoko have fishing canals, co-ordination with pastoralists

3 To give an example: A group will allow another group to use a fish pond, if it is clear that in the future the visitors will also accept request from the previous host for access to its own fish pond.

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Table (cont.) Membership/ Cultural ethno-professional (religious) groups embedment of institutions

Asymmetrical altruism and reciprocity

Restraint for gain and coordination

Pangani River Basin, Tanzania Pare, Masai

Yes (Pare organised in village farmer groups with territorial slopes)

Yes (Major Yes (RL) (Leaders God in the have more power forest, water in community use regulated in village slope areas, Masai no killing of wildlife except predators) Sanctions: sickness

Yes, coordination of use of timber and/or use of sacred forests

Rufiji Floodplain, Tanzania, different Warufiji-groups

Yes (seven different groups exist) each of them resource use specialists (farmer, fishermen, hunters and gatherers)

Yes (ancestral sprits, contacted by ritual for hunting and fishing). Sanctions; crocodiles in lakes, attacks by lions)

Yes (RL) (Leaders have more power in community

Yes, coordination of use of fisheries in floodplain lakes, hunting areas

Kafue Flats, Zambia, Batwa, Ila, Balundwe

Yes (Batwa fishermen, Ila/Balundwe transhumant pastoralists but also fishing and hunting)

Yes (ancestral spirits, contacted by ritual for hunting and fishing, notion of spiritual ownership). Sanctions; crocodiles, sickness, bad catches)

No (Batwa = AG Yes (Ila = CG), Ila leaders (big men) control common-pool resources with ritual specialists

Yes, coordination of access to and use of fisheries in river sections, ponds, wildlife in hunting areas, pasture (cattle camps)

Yes (totemic systems, ritual leaders)

No (Baiai and Hambukush = AG)

Yes, coordination between kin groups

Okavango-Delta, Yes (Baiai Botswana, Baiai, fishermen, Hambukush hunters Hambukush, pastoralists)

Source: Haller 2002, 2007, Haller, Ed. 2005, Beeler and Frei, Fokou, Landolt, Meroka, Mbeyale, Saum, Haller and Merten all this volume, Secondary sources: Mali: Moorehead 1989, Kassibo 2000, Fay 2000, Cameroon: Loth, et al. 2004, Zambia: Smith and Dale 1968, Rennie 1982, Jeffrey, et al. 1992

between open access, privatisation and collective action 421 4. Institutional change in colonial and postcolonial times On the one hand, we do not want to give the impression that these institutions have been static or were the best solutions before the colonial era. On the other hand, it seems that they were functional, compared to the problems these areas are facing today. Most of these institutions have been altered or abolished since colonial times, and especially during the period following independence. A summary is provided in Table 3. The major characteristic of changes in colonial times is that there is not much difference between indirect (British) or direct rule (French). Both colonial powers tried to subjugate and pacify local people, install a system of taxation (inclusion in monetary system), and manipulate local power structures so as to have leaders under their command. The colonial masters altered local power structures (i.e. introducing chiefs among the Ila in Zambia). New laws regulating fishing, hunting, use of land and pastures, water and forests were introduced. This was the first step in making local people lose their sense of ownership and possibility of defence. At the same time, new demands were created and common-pool resources were opened to other user groups under protection of the colonial state. All the countries in the study became independent between 1960 and 1966 and inherited a colonial system of statehood with the central notion of citizenship. But there were two distinct developments: In all the former French colonies and in Botswana, a capitalist system was established, that had major anti-democratic tendencies. Tanzania and Zambia, on the other hand, developed into African Socialist systems. But in both systems common-pool resources were managed to a greater or lesser extent as state property, depending on the effectiveness of local laws and regulations. One major aspect is that as long as they had licenses or titles, all citizens were permitted access to commonpool resources without local consultation (socio-political change). In addition, floodplain areas experienced a demographic increase, partly of local origin, but often the result of immigration (between 2% and 4%, exception: Botswana). Major ecological and development-related technological and, infrastructural changes were also important. Floodplain areas have been lost or changed by dams (hydropower, irrigation), droughts, new roads (infrastructure) and the establishment of protected areas. This further emphasises the notion that local leaders and local people have lost ownership.

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Table 3: Overview of institutional change in colonial and post-colonial times. Pacification, common-pool Citizenship Ecological Development Increase in (S=socialist, changes schemes and demography, Taxation resource as protected population state property/ c=capitalist) areas densities formal laws/ licenses/ titles 2%, 33 p/km2

Internal Niger Yes Delta, Mali

Yes (fisheries)

C

Yes No (Droughts)

Waza Logone. Yes Cameroon

Yes (fisheries, taxation of pastoralists)

C

Yes (Droughts. Less water from major upstream rivers)

3%, 5 p/km2 Yes (Maga Dam, irrigation scheme), Waza Logone Park

Pangani River Yes Basin, Tanzania

Yes (state forests and state water management, pasture management)

S (Ujamaa) Strong anti-ethnic notion

Yes (Droughts Less water from major upstream rivers)

Yes (many upstream dams for irrigation), Mkomazi Game Reserve

Rufiji Floodplain, Tanzania

Yes

Yes (fisheries, S (Ujamaa) wildlife, forests) Strong anti-ethnic notion

No

3%, 5 p/km2 Yes (irrigation schemes, New roads, Selous Game Reserve

Kafue Flats, Zambia

Yes

Yes, fisheries, wildlife, Later (land and pasture)

S (Humanism) Strong anti-ethnic notion

Yes (Droughts Less water from major upstream rivers)

Yes (dams for 2%, 17 p/km2 hydropower, irrigation schemes) three protected areas, ADMADEsystem

OkavangoDelta, Botswana

Yes

Yes (land zoning, wildlife)

C

No

No 1,5%, 1 p/ New CBNRM km2 schemes

3%, 33 p/km2

Source: AFWeP research group (see references table 3)

5. Changes in relative prices and open access Economically, most of the countries depend on one or two cash crops or minerals to finance state activities. This sector has experienced major changes in relative prices, especially in the 1980s when prices

between open access, privatisation and collective action 423 for exports fell while prices for oil, transport and manufactured goods were on the rise. In 4 of the 5 countries studied, there was a decline in prices for cash crops and minerals (see Table 5). This led to less state income and increasing unemployment, low payment of formal sectors and a loss of agricultural subsidies. The HDI for most countries except Botswana (diamond export) is 0.5 or lower (see Graph 1). 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5

BOTSWANA CAMEROON MALI TANZANIA ZAMBIA

0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2002

Source: Based on UNDP data, compiled by NCCR North South 2006)

Graph 1: Development of HDI in floodplain countries.

Most significantly, the average income in 4 of the 5 countries is very low, while in Botswana it is between 8 and 18 times higher (Table 4).4 Interestingly, prices for common-pool resources and common-pool resource-related products (fish, cattle, game, timber) also rose compared to agricultural goods, cash crops and formal salaries (see Table 5). Prices went up for cattle and fish in many cases, because of a decline in herd sizes due to cattle disease (southern/eastern Africa), for fish because of scarcity and high demand in urban centres among the poorer consumer segments. Demand for wildlife also increased among the more affluent. Staple foods generally remained low in price due to food aid and the financial policies pursued by the governments. 4 We use the figures which refer to the time when the main research was done but we are aware of changes in average income for examples for Zambia.

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tobias haller Table 4: Average income in US$ in 2002–3.

Country

Average per capita annual income in US$

Botswana Cameroon Zambia Tanzania Mali

4,736 560 300 270 250

Source: Nohlen 2004

Table 5: Changes in prices for common-pool resources, minerals and cash crops and salaries (administrators) in Zambia, Mali, Cameroon, Tanzania and Botswana between 1980/2 and 2000/3 (numbers indicate how many-fold 1980 prices increased up to the period 2000–2003)*. Prices for major goods

Cattle (bull)

Fish

Wildlife Timber

Staple Food

Zambia (Kafue Flats)

80

17

20

–

9 (maize)

–1

–

2

Tanzania Pangani

7.5

6.8

6.6

22

12 (rice, irrigation)

–

–2

–2

Tanzania Rufiji

6.5

90

6.5

32

6.5

–

–2

–2

Cameroon Waza Logone

1.3

2.4

1.5

–

–2

–3

–1.25

Mali Inland Niger Delta

3

6

–

–

2

–

–3

–2

Botswana Okavango Delta

15

3

100

–

0.9

1.4

–

5

Country (Floodplain)

–

Minerals (relevant for area, not from area)

Cash Salaries Crops

Source: Research and papers Haller, Meroka, Mbeyale, Fokou, Saum, Beeler, Frei, Landolt 2002–2005, Nohlen 2002, *Example: The price for a unit of fish in Zambia in 2003 was 17 times higher than in 1980 compared to maize (9 times), copper (–1 times), salaries (2 times)

between open access, privatisation and collective action 425 These changes in relative prices are the result of external changes and have had the following consequences: Not only have local institutions been more or less dismantled by the state, but at the same time formal state institutions have ceased working. This is based on push and pull mechanisms. Push factors—due to loss of income from state-dependent economies, people in urban and peri-urban areas as well as people depending on agricultural subsidies are being forced to seek alternative livelihood strategies. There is also a stronger interest in common-pool resources as an informal commercial sector (for outsiders, locals and administrators). More users are opting for commercial cattle husbandry, fisheries, trade, poaching, illegal logging, and irrigation agriculture. Pull factors: due to the loss of local institutions and inadequate management by the state, costs for access to commonpool resources have fallen dramatically. In these areas, the state generally lacks the financial means to carry out monitoring and sanctioning duties that it used to do at the beginning of the post-colonial era due to loss of income. Therefore there have been cuts in the state budget for fisheries and wildlife sectors as well as other departments. One illustration of this is the case of Kafue Flats in Zambia, where the local Department of Fisheries is understaffed and does not have the money to afford adequate transportation for monitoring. In some cases in Cameroon, Tanzania and Zambia, we are also dealing with a style of informal privatisation process in which common-pool resources can be controlled by powerful individuals, excluding formal commoners. 6. Consequences for status of common-pool resources It is often difficult to assess the changes in common-pool resource status locally due to a lack of formal quantitative data because in many of these African nations, no funding is available for producing hard data. However, older data and estimates are available, in addition to evidence from local users and local administrators. Table 6 summarises the findings. It is apparent that in most cases there has been a considerable decline in common-pool resources, with the exception of Botswana (Okavango Delta).

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Table 6: Evidence of decline in common-pool resources in 6 African floodplains since 1980s. Floodplain

Status of common-pool resources

Kafue Flats

Fishery: less catches 25%–75%, from 10 to 2 thousand MT, loss fish species, wildlife: loss from 100,000 to 20,000 animals, pasture: loss of 50%, less valuable grass Rufiji Fewer catches of fish and forests loss 50%, loss of wildlife 25%–50% Pangani Loss of pastures 25%–50%, loss of forests 50%, problem of water management downstream Waza-Logone Loss of fish catches 25%–50%, size much smaller, loss of pasture (unclear how much) Inner Niger Delta Lowered catches by 50% as well as smaller species of fish Okavango Delta No decline in catches, no loss of species Source: Own research between 2002 and 2005 (based on village surveys, interviews with local resource users and administrators; official data from fishery, wildlife and forestry departments of local national universities in Zambia, Tanzania, Cameroon

We have outlined the changes happening in all these areas and one part of the decline in 4 of the 5 countries can be attributed not only to manmade environmental changes, but also to the institutional weakness of open-access constellations, as we have outlined. However, the picture is much more complicated than just stating that open access is the major problem. Major differentiations must be made. There are three specific lessons to be learned from our study, and we would like to discuss them further. Not all institutions erode in the same way. Open access might not be the sole problem. The peculiar relationship between immigrants, local users and the state is at the heart of the problem. The case of Botswana illustrates the importance of the economic performance of a country in relation to common-pool resource use and institutional change. 7. Differential change in local institutions: Rules which pay are going to stay We have outlined in previous chapters the facts showing how local traditional institutions have been dismantled by state law, leaving local users with no sense of ownership. This is true for many of the examples, but in our sample, there are cases in which traditional institutions or transformed versions of such institutions are still in place, or

between open access, privatisation and collective action 427 institutions survive in an area because the pressure is not as high as in other areas. In the first case, manipulated traditional institutions become a rent for powerful people. These people, therefore, have an interest in the institutions remaining in place or being transformed to continue to be used for rent-seeking purposes. One of the most striking examples of institutional resistance is the case of Mali, where Bozo and Somono Masters of the Water are still in place. Ritual specialists perform rituals for the water spirits and Masters of the Water still initiate collective fishery activities, but most of the coordination function of the institutional control regime that the Bozo and Somono used to fulfil, has eroded. At the same time, the basic institution that allows the Masters of the Water have one third of the catch, called manga ji, remains valid. The manga ji is now regarded as a form of rent by the Masters of the Water. Administrators profit from this situation. They leave the “old rules,” because they can get payment from the Masters (Fay 2000, see Beeler and Frei this volume). In Cameroon, fishing is still done in canals and the local Kotoko are seemingly in control of the fisheries. But research among the Kotoko in two village settings revealed that, the Sultan and local ritual masters are no longer really in control of these activities (see Fokou this volume, Landolt this volume). The drastic increase in the digging of fishing canals has been done by powerful people among the Kotoko and other user groups, legitimizing this old institutional setting linked to new technology, because it generates a great deal of profit (ibid.). Another case is the Ila in Zambia (Chiefdom Nalubamba), among whom old rules on giving out cattle camps (matanga rule) are maintained by local first-comer groups, currently controlled by the local opponent of a chief. He has opted to keep this rule as a traditional way of handling pasture management. In the old system, a family had to give one head of cattle in return for a long-term usufruct right of access to a cattle camp and therefore to pasture. However, the opposition leader wants to change the rule of paying one head of cattle into a rent of one head of cattle per family, per season (Haller and Merten this volume, Haller 2007). Apart from these remaining transformed institutions, there are cases where rules still persist, because the area is too far away from commercial centres and local communities are still relatively homogeneous. We have two cases in our sample. Among the Rufiji groups

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in Tanzania, which are far away from commercial centres, in the lake of Mtanza Msona fishing is still done the old way, because the villages are homogeneous enough to protect their lake and still perform rituals intended to appease crocodiles (Meroka this volume). This was also true of the fisheries in the tributary sections of the Kafue Flats in Zambia until six or seven years ago. Most of the commercial fisheries concentrated on the main river and the tributaries could still be used in the traditional way, controlled and regulated by ritual specialists (Haller and Merten 2006, 2008 and this volume). There are numerous examples of traditional rules being violated. Most of the collective fishing rules and rituals as well as coordination of pasture use among the Kotoko has been completely eroded. Immigrant Musgum no longer feel obliged to follow the rules of the Kotoko. There is now no regulation between fishermen and pastoralists anymore. The latter pay a tax and then feel free to do what they want. They have—as they put it—“bought” the pasture areas by making these tax payments (Fokou this volume). Similarly, rules in Tanzania in the Pangani River Basin and in the Rufiji area close to commercial centres have been eroded completely. In the Kafue Flats of Zambia, traditional closed periods and rules regarding collective fishing and gender-related types of equipment are no longer respected. Neither the institution forbidding fishing at sacred spots in the river, where bream (tilapia) breed, nor restrictions on types of equipment as respected by the Batwa, are in use any longer. In the tributaries of the same area, collective fishing events still in use 6 years ago are being violated by young men fishing ponds with nets, before collective fishing takes place (Haller and Merten 2008). The Zambian Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) is trying to set up a participatory wildlife management scheme on the basis of the previous ADMADE policy of its predecessor (see also Gibson 1999), giving financial incentives to three chiefs and to some local scouts. However, this has failed to stop poaching in the area (Haller and Merten 2006, and this volume). 8. Open access and citizenship: The paradox of the presence-absence of the state If we are indeed facing an open access problem, the main question we have to answer in this context is: Why are local actors not able to solve

between open access, privatisation and collective action 429 these problems and act collectively, especially if the state is absent and we are dealing with small scale groups (see Olson 1965). The main answer is that these “local” groups are not just acting on their own, but have to deal with outside interests. These and local interests have been dealt with since independence mostly, but not always, by the state. Now this imposed management system is imploding and demand for co-management or community management is rising, incorporating the idea of giving back more power to the local level. But the local level is often unable to act collectively in this situation because the actors have become very heterogeneous and, especially in the case of actors from outside, some actors are very powerful. They often argue that they are citizens of the state and empowered to use common-pool resources as they want by virtue of their citizenship, while the state is, at the same time, absent. We have labelled this situation, “presenceabsence of the state.’’ The case of fishing in Zambia illustrates this situation (Haller and Merten 2008, and this volume). Local people in the Kafue Flats are very aware of and angry that immigrant fishermen are using destructive techniques like mosquito nets, that closed periods are being violated and that fishing in spawning areas is taking place. But if Ila, Balundwe and Batwa groups want to take action against seasonal commercial fishermen, they are told by these people that as citizens of the state they are not to be told what to do. One option for the so-called “local” groups and actors would be to use violence, but the seasonal fishermen are sometimes highly aggressive young men.5 Neither does it take long for a repressive military unit to arrive when such a conflict breaks out. Therefore, local collective action is hindered because the state has opened up the Kafue Flats’ fisheries, but is unable to enforce its own laws, while local rules have been dismantled or are not being respected by outsiders.6

5 We do not want to takes sides here. That young, mobile, commercial fishermen in the seasonal camps are often drunk and that there is a violent atmosphere is a common fact known by immigrants, locals and administrators. All these interviewees mentioned this problem on several occasions. Visiting such camps in the afternoons has always been a problem for the research team because many fishermen were drunk (Haller and Merten, research 2002–2004). 6 In refering to such examples, it is not the authors’ intention to take sides and claim that “outsiders” do not have the right to use these resources. Outside users have always been part of common property regimes (reciprocity rules) but local people had control over common-pool resources.

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Similar situations occur in all the settings we have studied. In Mali and in Cameroon, systems of democratisation and of decentralisation have given access to a wider group of people who are citizens of the state or newly created districts or communes. These people then claim to have the right to use the resources as they please (Beeler and Frei, Landolt, Fokou all this volume). In Tanzania we have a similar setting, especially since Ujamaa “villagisation,” which set up units irrespective of ethnic identity and fostered the idea that all the resources in Tanzania are for Tanzanians (Meroka this volume, Mbeyale this volume). 9. Role of national economy as a factor shaping interest in local common-pool resources Our studies suggest that one of the main differences between the cases discussed also stems from the economic performance of the state. This becomes evident if we compare Botswana with the other cases. Despite the loss of local institutions among the Bayai and Hambukush, there is no strong interest in the common-pool resources of their area. This is because Botswana has much more favourable economic and institutional conditions that favour much better economic performance. This can be seen in comparisons of the HDI and average annual income. Up to now, Botswana has had a solid income from the sale of diamonds. This has not led to a politically unstable system like in Sierra Leone or in oil-exporting countries (see Nigeria). Despite the limited control local people have over their resources through a Community Based Natural Resource Management System (CBNRM),7 there is no outside interest in the common-pool resources of the Okavango Delta. Population density is low and in the urban centres most people have a formal job. The only interest in the area of the Okavango Delta is tourism. The CBNRM gives local people the possibility of making a profit, but only if they get organised. Local people are also not really interested in local resources for commercial reasons, for some of them get money from the state or remittances from relatives working in towns. The contrary is the case with all other case studies where we have economically very weak states who cannot afford to manage the 7 The control is limited because their land lies within a zone that forbids the use of much common-pool resources, and because there are now hardly any cattle in the area.

between open access, privatisation and collective action 431 common-pool resources with their institutions, therefore the resources come under de facto open access. Having stated such obvious conclusions, there are still certain puzzles to be solved. Permanent open access is not the only aspect in this context leading to unsustainable use of the resources. In fact we have many cases in which there are many rules at stake at the same time; this is referred to a legal pluralism constellation. This in turn is linked again to low levels of collective action. 10. The problem of legal pluralism As we outlined above, all regions display a major heterogeneity of legal frameworks. Resource regimes that were formerly oriented to manage different resources inclusively, within one territory or one ethnic group, have become overlaid with different normative orders after various wetlands came under colonial and post-colonial control. Apart from different regulations emanating from the historical phases, regulations vary for each resource, sometimes overlapping within the same formal legal framework. In all the wetlands studied, wildlife and fisheries as well as land and water management are controlled by separate authorities or departments. The case of Kafue Flats in Zambia illustrates this. Fisheries fall under the Agricultural Department, while wildlife is under the Zambian Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). The latter has a much more police style / military structure than the former. Water is regulated by yet another department and law set, while fisheries management is under a different office with its own regulations. If, for instance, fishing communities and agro-pastoralists develop an interest in fishing in the Kafue River Basin, all these departments and their respective formal laws and regulations are relevant. The area is close to national parks and game management areas within the Kafue River Basin, which is also used for hydropower. This means that all these state parties are involved, but act under different and contradicting jurisdiction. For example, in National Parks and Game Management Areas, Departments of Fisheries and Wildlife often contradict each other. The same is true with water management in which different departments are involved with different interests (water affairs for hydropower, environmental departments, wildlife and fisheries, veterinary department, agricultural departments, etc.). This often creates conflicts, because jurisdictions

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are not coordinated and do not take customary law into account. But apart from this plurality of overlapping and competing traditional and modern laws and the pluralism within modern law, overlapping claims on the level of customary or ‘pseudo customary law’ exist (see Cutshall 1980). What is “customary” is a contested issue and often relates to the rights of being the first immigrants to an area (see also debates in Kuba and Lentz ed. 2005, Evers ed. 2006 and Lund ed. 2007). This is the case with the management of pastures in Zambia among the Ila of the Chiefdom Nalubamba, where in the context of a proposed irrigation scheme, a conflict about which customary law determines different stakeholder claims to control the use and allocation of pastoral lands (Haller 2007, Haller and Merten this volume). To add to the complexity, we not only have customary laws and their interpretation, and formal legal pluralism, but there are several international environmental and development regulations and laws (protected areas, RAMSAR sites, different conventions, etc.). To complete this complicated picture, we have international rules for economic cooperation and structural adjustment programmes. Aid such as poverty reduction programmes and new credit facilities are often made subject to conditions that influence national regulations on governance, agricultural and health policies. Foreign NGOs and governmental development organisations also intervene. On the national and local level there are regulations set up by NGOs or legal frameworks set up by the state, but supported by NGOs in a way that enact or interpret formal laws in a specific way. We therefore, have sorts of semi-autonomous fields (Moore 1978) and polycentric constellations (Ostrom 1999) of often overlapping and contradicting levels (see Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002). One case in point is in Zambia, where inheritance laws were created that should prevent widows being “robbed” of the late husband’s cattle by his relatives. This has especially been the case from a formal legal point of view among the Ila and Balundwe groups of cattle owners. Traditionally at funerals, cattle of the late leader of an extended family will be widely distributed among relatives and some of it kept by the new head of the family, who takes the position of the deceased. This was done in order to keep this part of the herd as a collective property of the extended family. The new inheritance law labelled these distribution and social security mechanisms as robbery of individual property of cattle that shall be given to the widows and the children (sons). The possibility now to claim cattle as private property triggered a shift in the perception of ownership from kin and

between open access, privatisation and collective action 433 extended family group to individuals and this has had an impact on the demand of pastoral areas: As cattle are no longer a group property, more individuals hold their personal cattle and want their own cattle camp, leading to more pressure on pastoral areas, as more camps have to be assigned. This case illustrates the complexity of institutions and the possibilities for forum shopping that this provides. Widows and sons often try to get individual cattle via this law, while older men and more traditionally oriented younger men who profit from the control of larger herds try to argue for the traditional rules of group ownership in cattle (Haller 2007). Generally, this means that in conflict situations; often these situations occur when access, use and distribution of common-pool resources are contested, because they became scarce or economically more interesting; different actors use different legal frameworks and related ideologies. In addition, such constellations can also be labelled as “open moments” (Lund Ed 2007), in which actors try to control resources; they are worth considering, because of special situations, when formal and informal institutions do not operate and new ones emerge in “twilight” (Lund Ed 2007). Such moments could be situations of crisis (hunger, drought or war) or new laws bringing about opportunities for change. Since the 1980’s, legal frameworks in Africa have often changed in connection with structural adjustment programmes geared to decentralisation and privatisation (see Woodhouse et al. 2000, Ribot 1999, Ferguson 1999, Ribot and Oyono 2006, Haller 2007). All these contexts make for often unpredictable changes in governance, because different actors have a huge array of tools at their disposal for legitimizing the way in which things are accomplished, and for controlling common-pool resources for their own use. All these elements within the legal framework fuel specific forum shopping as they not only provide impressions of legality, but deliver the discourses and narratives underscoring actors’ positions or undermining the positions of adversaries. 11. Discussion What does this study now tell us regarding the institutional changes in African floodplain wetlands? We can rule out strong ecological differences as well as strong cultural aspects making a difference in our

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case studies. There have been differences in the way common-pool resources have been organised in the past, but in most cases local institutions stemmed from powerful local people trying to control resources, yet continuing to grant access to common-pool resources to others in the community and other groups. This was based on clear rules and on coordination, which was one of the major services they provided. It was not done in order to protect resources or promote sustainable use, but so as to have the maximum and most profitable control over common-pool resources. After the colonial and the postcolonial states took over control of common-pool resources through formal laws, local institutions were set aside and open access constellations occurred as it became too expensive to manage common-pool resources in the state regime. Based on the Ensminger model, we see that there are external factors and changes in relative prices that are leading to push and pull dynamics, and increased interest in commonpool resources for “immigrants” and “locals.” Open access or informal privatisation is the most interesting regimes for powerful commonpool resource users. However, we see that not all local institutions are being eroded: Rules which pay are going to stay, although in a transformed version and often in co-existence with formal institutions in a kind of pluralistic legal system. Actors are able to use this strategically in a form of legal multiplicity (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002, Benda-Beckmann, von F. 2002). Theoretically, it is the concept of bargaining power that Ensminger uses in her approach, which is crucial here. Actors with high bargaining power opt for institutions that provide them with the highest profit possible. A second major issue of this paper is the peculiar character of the role, which the state plays in the context of institutional changes in common-pool resource management. We called this the paradox of the presence-absence of the state, meaning that the state is absent regarding the management of common-pool resources, although it claims to control these resources. All the while new users from all over the country claim that as citizens of the state, district or province they have a right to use local common-pool resources under state rule, because they have licences, etc. But they do not really have to subscribe to state law, because the state is absent on the level of resource use and they do not have to submit themselves to local legal systems. This corresponds with the model of Ensminger, who refers to bargaining power and ideology as internal assets that influence local institutional change and distributional effects. (Ensminger 1992, Ensminger and

between open access, privatisation and collective action 435 Knight 1997). It is this constellation that makes collective action difficult. As Olson in his seminal work argues, collective action is only possible among a homogenous, small group (Olson 1965). This is partly true, but does not tell the whole story. Collective action is not possible because of increased heterogeneity of interests and because the possibility to act collectively at a local level is made problematic because the state is present and absent at the same time. Therefore, group size matters little. What counts is heterogeneity and low bargaining power by those who have a long-term interest in the resource (high discounting rate of the future, see Becker and Ostrom 1995). However, we have to be aware of the local-immigrant dichotomy. Historical processes have turned immigrants into locals and all the histories we have revealed in our settings show that locals were immigrants themselves at one time. The major point is whether we are dealing with people staying in an area and becoming locals or if we are dealing with seasonal, unstructured immigration, where it is difficult to come to robust arrangements. Last but not least, our data suggests that the economic performance of a nation state is important. If this coincides with robust formal institutions, under which money is invested to create a sound infrastructure, reliable jobs and state services and the state has additional monetary resources to manage and monitor common-pool resources so that common-pool resources do not become an important informal sector or a substitute for jobs in the formal sector, then citizens and the state will prosper. We have tried to summarise some of the findings in the model that Ensminger proposes in order to link the different variables and themes and we indicate how they are related to other theoretical issues proposed by Ostrom. As we outlined in the introduction, we intended to link Ensminger’s model with Ostrom’s design principles. This is appealing because Ensminger gives us a framework for analysis of institutional change, while with Ostrom’s design principles we can try to assess the outcome for resource use. In the following model adapted from Ensminger, we propose a linkage, which includes feedback loops impinging on external factors leading indirectly to changes in relative prices, as well as direct impacts on relative prices. First, there is a need to see the process in a larger framework, which is illustrated in Graph 3. It is important to see that external factors are a complex web of issues, ranging from globalised markets, notions of modernity,

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statehood management and conservation (legislation), as well as the historic and political evolution of those diverse paths of development strategies followed by the state. In addition, environmental, demographic and technological/infrastructural factors are of relevance. This is leading to an increase in prices for cattle and pastoral land, fish, wildlife, timber, water and irrigated land, which then leads to pressure on the internal box in Ensminger’s model (institutions, ideology, bargaining power and organisation, see chapter 1 this volume). There are different pathways evident. Due to an ideology of citizenship, external user groups and a loss of traditional and formal institutions, the bargaining power of local people is weak; an open access situation prevails on the institutional level, while in others we find tendencies to rent seeking and privatisation. These tendencies are backed up by ideologies, discourses and narratives related to modernity versus Traditionalism, by which actors try to link up with what we call “legitimacy resources.” The ideologies and discourses displayed have to be examined carefully, because one has to see if we are dealing with an on-stage or an off-stage discourse. For example, making reference to the ideology of the traditional way of life against modernity by using an ethnic, traditionalist discourse in the case of keeping the pasture as common property in the Kafue Flats by an opposition leader to a local chief is clearly the on-stage discourse which covers the off-stage interests of that opposition leader. Not keeping the common property regime in place is in his interest, but he is fighting a local chief ’s interest in transforming the pasture into an irrigation scheme, by which he would lose land on which he has land titles and where he wants more land titles. So the only way the opposition leader can get support from the rich cattle owners against the chief is fighting to keep the “traditional” common property regime in the short run, in order to privatise the land in the long run. (see Case Study 7, Kafue Flats by Haller and Merten). This example indicates that ideology is of crucial importance for the institutional setting and how it changes. When we have a changed institutional setting, this then leads to changes in distributional effects and to changes in economic and political behaviour. There is an unbalanced distribution coming from this change, which is also leading to institutional design that is not robust according to the principles of Ostrom. Boundaries become unclear or too restricted, cost-benefit relation is not maintained, there are no conflict resolution possibilities that are working well and there is no effective

between open access, privatisation and collective action 437 monitoring or sanctioning. Most importantly, local people often do not have the possibility to organise and decide by themselves how the resources shall be used and there is a high degree of inequality with regard to bargaining power. In addition there are strong political aspects at stake, especially land issues for non-mobile common-pool resources. The resulting economic and political outcome is unresolved permanent conflict over all common-pool resources, and in the case of mobile common-pool resources, a lack of collective action. Most importantly, due to the weak institutional setting and the high interest in commercial common-pool resources, a degradation of the resources is taking place. This in turn is an indirect feedback on the external level (state level), but most importantly on the relative prices themselves, which again increase scarcity triggering a positive8 feedback loop (see Graph 2, adapted from Haller 2007). - Resource rich pocket in semi-arid environment - Pacification, - Weak state control of CPR by formal laws - Conservation - Urban markets - Low prices cash crops and minerals - Crisis of the state, Loss of agrarian subsidies, Droughts, Poor yields/Sickness

Demography: Increase in population, especially due to immigration, also by seasonal immigrants

Unequal distribution

Institutions Weak; Open access, Transformed Commons or Privatisation (rent aspect)

Organization: More individualised, smaller units Heterogeneous interests

Bargaining power High for local leaders, traders and immigrants

Ideology: Citzenship vs. Local-religious Modern vs. backward „traditionalists“

Relative prices for CPRs is high

Technology: Dams, modern transport and infrastructure (tarmac roads, dirt roads, rail) make area close to urban centres, new nets and boats, guns, cooling facilities, trade networks etc

CPRInstitutions not robust Importance of politics (control of land)

Permanent conflicts unresolved Increase of CPR extraction by all stake-holders Problem of collective action

Degradation of CPRs

Graph 2: The relation of institutional change (Ensminger), design principles (Ostrom) and degradation of common-pool resources.

8 We use this term in the context of the ecosystem theory in which positive means that a feedback loop reinforces a respective development, which leads often to the collaps of ecosystems. Negative feedback would mean a corrective feedback which would lead to a state of a previous equilibrium again (Odum 1980).

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tobias haller 12. Conclusions and recommendations

We have argued and indicated in Graph 2 that the economic performance of a nation state is important, because it is linked to external factors that change relative prices, in this case often increase the value of commercial common-pool resources, leading the way to non-lineal internal changes. We cannot predict that high prices lead to privatisation at any time, but due to power and ideological issues, related to individual short term interests (discounting the future), it can lead to open access or to remaining a commons (although transformed into a rent-seeking form). We therefore, have to come back to our initial question of how institutional change affects sustainability in floodplains; there are a number of important interrelated factors, which have to be looked at. These are tenure issues: de facto open access, based on weak state ownership, commons, privatisation from effective state ownership, the degree of collective action, (from none to substantial collective action-people organising to manage resources.) Other variables are relative prices of common-pool resources, ranking them from high to low in their development (changes in relative prices) and/or if there is a high degree of legal pluralism (in the sense that there are many different opportunities for forum shopping available to powerful people), which is linked to a high presence-absence of the state constellation. These variables can be set up in a matrix in which the cases can be placed. However, this exercise is not as simple as that. We will not just locate the major floodplain cases, but their respective resources and in some cases the different village settings (see Tanzania Rufiji area), as these differences are illustrative. An overview is given in Table 7. This should be looked at before we move to the matrix, is that some resource cases have a multiple character. They are open access AND private property, depending on specific constellations. This is the significant additional lesson learned from this project: In contrast to Woodhouse et al. (2000) we not only oppose to the prediction that African commons will be enclosed as a single trend, but we suggest in addition that our data indicates that there is evidence of simultaneous paradoxical constellations of open access and privatisation, depending on competing interests of actors involved.

between open access, privatisation and collective action 439 Table 7: Overview of different common-pool resources and case related variables. Country

Resource case

De Common Private facto property property/ open effective state property

Mali NiFish Cameroon LoFish LoPast Tanzania PaTim PaWater PaPast

yes yes yes yes no yes

no no no no yes no

RuFish1 RuFish2 RuWild RuPast KaFish KaWild KaPast OkFish OkWild OkPast OkVeld

yes no no no yes yes yes yes no no yes

no yes no yes no no yes no no no no

Zambia Botswana

yes yes yes no no Yes (for cultivation) no no yes no no no yes yes yes yes no

Collective action

RelaLegal Presencetive pluralism absence price of state

no no no no yes no

high high high high low high

high high high high mid level high

high high high high mid level high

no yes no yes no no Yes/no no no no no

high low high low high high high low high low* high

high mid level mid level mid level high high mid level low mid level mid level mid level

high mid level mid level mid level high high mid level low mid level mid level mid level

Taken to the matrix (Graph 3) this gives the following picture: It is important to see that we have defined the upper middle part as being the area with the highest sustainable use (grey) where as the lighter the grey becomes, the less sustainable common-pool resources are used. White would mean no sustainable use. The matrix shows us graphically that the majority of cases of today’s common-pool resources are unsustainably managed. Because they are open access, there is no collective action, prices are high, legal pluralism is high and at the same time the state and its governments are paradoxically present, but absent. Most fisheries cases (with one exception), timber, veldt products, wildlife and pasture fall into this category. We have placed three cases at the right of Graph 3—(Privatisation/ effective state property). These latter cases show unsustainable use, but are privatised. The price is high, but users are interested in a quick turnover. This is the case with some areas in the Kafue Flats pastures

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tobias haller SUSTAINABILITY

Collective action PaWa

Price low

RuFish2

RuPast OkFish

OkFish

OkPast RuWild

OkVeld RuFish 1 NiFish LoPast No collective action

KaFish

De facto open access

KaPast

PaPast KaPast KaWild LoFish

Legal pluralism/ Present-absence of State PaTim

Common property

OkWild KaPast PaPast PaLand

Price high

Privatisation/ effective state property

Graph 3: Sustainability related to property-collective action and price-pluralism/absence-presence of the state matrix.

(giving out many cattle camps and interest in privatisation leading to heavy stocking of cattle) and in the Pangani area (agricultural land and pasture after major reduction of pastoral land). On the upper right, we have due to effective state property or private property, wildlife cases in Rufiji and Okavango that are sustainable, only because there a relatively high price available from tourism; thus the state is interested in revenues linked to the protection of animals. In this case there is medium level legal pluralism and presence-absence of the state. However this solution is not sustainable for the long run, because as soon as tourism money fades away, there will be no money available for this fortress conservation that requires high government expense and heavy local cost (as in wild animals roaming and killing in the villages). It is only in the upper part of Graph 3 where we have the common property cases, there is a start with collective action; prices are low, and there is a medium to low level of legal pluralism. These three cases; one in the Rufiji village of Mtanza-Msona fisheries where traditional conservation measures have been revitalised; the second in the other village in Rufiji, Mbunju-Mvuleni, where people have come to terms with negotiating access to pasture for Barabaig pastoralists (Meroka, this volume); the third is in the Pangani Pare Area, where downstream people are trying to get watersheds protected (Mbeyale

between open access, privatisation and collective action 441 this volume). In all three cases, the pressure on the resource is not so great, prices are relatively low and gains can be made with the investment done by local actors. Therefore, we cannot simply assume that a nation state that is performing well will automatically protect it resources, used or not used, or that poorer households always destroy common-pool resources, if they feel the need to augment their livelihoods. Nevertheless, good general economics coupled with sound formal institutional arrangements of the state can lower pressure on common-pool resources, although this can change rapidly. Consequently, it is not advisable to rely on economic development alone. Strengthening local institutions or their development under a principle of subsidiarity (backed up by the state) could extend strong incentives for local collective action (a sense of ownership) for “locals” and immigrants alike through, for example, a process of developing state-recognised by-laws on the use of local common-pool resources. In two of our case studies, such initiatives have been taken up as a result of our research, with interesting results in a very challenging background (Kafue Flats and Rufiji). The main task for sustainable common-pool resource management in the African floodplains is not to exclude the state, but to try to achieve local empowerment by state-level actors granting security rights. This in turn poses the problem of how to incorporate external users and ensure participation of heterogeneous user groups. References Acreman, M.C. and G.E. Hollis, eds. (1996). Water Management and Wetlands in Sub-Saharan Africa, Gland Switzerland, IUCN. Adams, W.M. (1990). Green Development. Environment and Sustainability in the Third World. London: Routledge. Becker, D.C. and E. Ostrom. (1995). ‘Human Ecology and Resource Sustainability: The Importance of Institutional Diversity’, Annual. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 26: 113–33. Benda-Beckmann, von F. (2002). ‘Who is afraid of legal pluralism?’ Paper presented at the XIII Conference of the Commission on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism, Chiang Mei, Thailand. www.jlp.bham.ac.uk/alphabetic.htm Chabwela, H.N. (1992). ‘The Ecology and Resource use of the Bangweulu Basin and the Kafue Flats’ In Managing the Wetlands of Kafue Flats and Bangweulu Bassin, eds. R.C.V. Jeffrey, H.N. Chabwela, G. Howard, and P.J. Dugan. Gland, IUCN: 11–24. Chooye, P.M. and C.A. Drijver. (1995). ‘Changing Views on the Development of the Kafue Flats in Zambia’. In Tropical Freshwater Wetlands. A guide to Currents Knowledge and Sustainable Management, ed., R. Roggeri. Dordrecht/Boston/London, Luwer Academic Publishers: 137–143.

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Drijver, C.A. and M. Marchand. (1985). Taming the floods: Environmental aspects of floodplain development in Africa. Centre for Environmental Studies. Leiden University. Centre for Environmental Studies. Leiden, Leiden University. Dyson-Hudson, R. and E. Alden Smith. (1978). ‘Human territoriality: An ecological reassessment’, American Anthropologist, 80: 21–41. Eggertson, T. (1996). ‘The economics of control and the cost of property rights’, In Rights to Nature Ecological, Economic, Culture, and Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment, eds. S. Hanna, C. Folke and K.-G. Mähler. Washington, DC, Island Press: 157–175. Ellenbroek, G.A. (1987). Ecology and productivity of an African wetland system. The Kafue Flats, Zambia. Geobotany 9. Ensminger, J. (1992). Making a Market. The Institutional Transformation of an African Society. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Evers, S. et al. eds. (2005). Competing Jurisdictions. Settling Land Claims in Africa. Leiden/Boston: Brill. Fay, C. (2000). ‘Des poissons et des hommes: pêcheurs, chercheurs et administrateurs face à la pêche au Maasina (Mali)’. In Les pêches piroguières en Afrique de l’Ouest, eds. J.-P. Chauveau et al. Paris: CMI, IRD, Karthala: 125–166. Ferguson, J. (1999). Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt. University of California Press, California. Gibson, C.C. (1999). Politicians and Poachers. The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Haller, T. (2001). ‘Common Property Institutions and Relations of Power: ResourceManagement, Change and Conflicts in African Floodplain Wetlands Project’ submitted to the Swiss National Science Foundation in May 2001. Accepted in August 2001. —— (2002). ‘Common Property Resource Management, Institutional Change and Conflicts in African Floodplain Wetlands: Presentation of a research project and reflections on institutional change and conflicts’. The African Anthropologist, 9(1): 25–35. Haller, T. eds. (2005). African Floodplain Wetlands Project, The Common Property Resource Digest. Quarterly Publication of the International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP), Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Issue No. 74. www.indiana.edu/~iascp/digest.html Haller, T. and S. Merten (2006). “ ‘No capital needed.” De facto open access to Common Pool Resources, Poverty and Conservation in the Kafue Flats, Zambia’. Policy Matters 14: 103–113. —— (2008). ‘ “We are Zambians—don’t tell us how to fish!” Institutional Change, Power Relations and Conflicts in the Kafue Flats Fisheries in Zambia’. Human Ecology 36, 5: 699–715. Hughes, R.H. and J.S. Hughes, eds. (1992). A Directory of African Wetlands. Gland, IUCN. Jeffrey, R.C.V., H.N. Chabwela, G. Howard and P.J. Dugan eds. (1992). Managing the Wetlands of Kafue Flats and Bangweulu Bassin. Gland, IUCN. Kuba, R. and Lentz, C. eds. (2005). Land and the Politics of Belonging in West-Africa. Leiden/Boston, Brill. Loth, P. ed. (2004). The return of the water. Restoring the Waza Logone floodplain in Cameroon. CML, CEDC, IUCN. Gland: IUCN. IUCN Wetlands and Water Resources Programme, Blue Series. IUCN. Lund, C. ed. (2007). Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa (Development and Change Books). London, Blackwell Publishing. McKean, M. (2000). ‘Common Property: What It Is, What It Is Good For, and What Makes It Work?’, In People and forests: Communities, Institutions, and Governance, eds. C. Gibson, M. McKean, and E. Ostrom. Cambridge, MIT Press.

between open access, privatisation and collective action 443 Meinzen-Dick, R. and R. Pradhan. (2002). Legal Pluralism and Dynamic Property Rights. CAPRi-Working Paper no. 22. IFPRI. Washington. www.capri.cgiar.org/ wp/capriwp22.asp Moorehead, R. (1989). ‘Changes Taking Place in Common-Property Resource Management in the Inland Niger Delta of Mali’, In Common Property Resources, ed. F. Berkes. London, Belhaven Press: 256–272. Moritz, M., Scholte, P., Kari, S. (2002). ‘The demise of the nomadic contract: Arrangement and rangelands under pressure in the Far North of Cameroon’. Nomadic Peoples 6, 1: 127–146. Nohlen, D. (2004). Taschenwörterbuch der Dritten Welt. Hamburg, Rororo-Verlag. North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Odum, E. (1980). Grundlagen der Ökologie. Stuttgart: Thieme Verlag. Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Ostrom, E. et al. eds. (2002). The Drama of the Commons. National Research Council, Washington D.C., National Academy Press. Rennie, J.K. (1982). ‘Traditional Society and Modern Developments in Namwala District’. In Proceedings of the National Seminar on Environment and Change: The Consequences of Hydroelectric Power Development on the Utilisation of the Kafue Flats, eds. Williams, G.J. and G.W. Howard. Lusaka, The Kafue Basin Research Committee of the University of Zambia: 35–46. Ribot, J. (1999). Decentralisation, Participation and Accountability in the Sahelian Forestry: Legal Instruments of Political Administrative Control, Africa 69, 1: 23–65. Ribot, J. and P.R. Oyono. (2006). ‘The Politics of Decentralisation’. In Towards a New Map of Africa, eds. Wisner, B., Toulmin, C. and R. Chitiga. London, Earthscan: 205–228. Ritchie, J. and L. Spencer (1994). ‘Qualitative data analysis for applied policy research’, In: Analysing Qualitative Data, eds. A. Bryman and R.G. Burgess. London, Routledge: 173–194. Ruttan, L.M. (1998). Closing the Commons: Cooperation for Gain or Restraint? Human Ecology, 26(1): 43–66. Stevenson L. and F. Frazier. (1999). ‘Review of wetland inventory information in Africa’. In: Global Review of Wetland Resources and Priorities for Wetland Inventory. Finlayson, C.M. and A.G. Spiers (Eds.). Supervising Scientist Report 144, Canberra, Australia. Smith, E.W. and Dale, A.M. (1968). The Ila-speaking Peoples of Northern Rhodesia (First edition, 1920). New York, University Books. New York, Vol. I and II. Thomas, D.H.L. (1996). ‘Fisheries Tenure in an African Floodplain Village and the Implications for Management’, Human Ecology 24, 3: 287–313. Woodhouse, P., Bernstein, H., Hulme, D. (2000). African Enclosures. The Social Dynamics of Wetlands in Drylands. Trenton, Asmara, Africa World Press.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Sabrina Beeler Stücklin, Ph.D. in Social Anthropology, University of Zurich, Switzerland. She did fieldwork in Mali and is currently working at the Research and Development Department of FIDES Financial Systems Development Services AG, Switzerland, a microfinance company. Her research focuses on vulnerability, risk management and other topics related to economic anthropology. Gilbert Fokou, Ph.D. in Social Anthropology, University of Yaounde, Cameroon. He is a post-doctoral researcher at the Swiss Centre for Scientific Research in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire and does research within the NCCR North-South. His main focus is on institutions for common-pool resources management, environmental conflicts, extensive pastoral production systems, and access for pastoral communities to natural resources and basic social services. He collaborates with the Swisspeace Foundation, Switzerland. Karin Frei, M.A. in Social Anthropology, University of Zurich, Switzerland. She is currently working for Save the Children, an international child rights organization, in Zurich, Switzerland. Tobias Haller, Post Doc (Habilitation) and Ph.D. in Social Anthropology University of Zurich, Switzerland. He is Associate Professor at the Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Bern, Switzerland and lecturer at the ETH Zurich, Switzerland. He did fieldwork in Cameroon and Zambia and has specialised in economic and ecological anthropology (common-pool resource management, New Institutionalism and local perception of environment, peasants and agro-pastoralist, fishermen, oil exploitation, protected areas and community based natural resource management). He has published People, Protected Areas and Global Change (NCCR Bern, 2008) and Fossil Resources, Oil Companies and Indigenous Peoples (Lit) as well as in journals such as Human Ecology, Environment and Development, Development Southern Africa, Food Policy, Human Organisation, Journal of International Development.

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Gabriela Landolt, M.A., in Social and Cultural Anthropology at the University of Zurich, Switzerland. Her basic focus is on natural resource management and institutional change, in Cameroon. She was working at the African Studies Coordination Centre, University of Zurich and prepares research on resource problems focusing on the management of pastures in the Swiss Alps. Gimbage E. Mbeyale, BSc. (Forestry) and MSc. (Forest ResourceEconomics) both from Sokoine University of Agriculture, Morogoro, Tanzania and Ph.D. (Natural Resources Governance), University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. He does research for the NCCR North-South programme and is lecturing at the Department of Forest Mensuration and Management, Faculty of Forest and Nature Conservation, Sokoine University of Agriculture. His research focuses on resource use conflicts, natural resource governance, assessment of the performances of Community based forest management (CBFM). He has published in the Journal of International Development and others. Patrick Meroka, Ph.D. in Social Anthropology, Zurich University, Switzerland. He did fieldwork in Tanzania (Rufiji District, Southern Tanzania). His research has focused on common pool resources and conflict management. His current research interest includes new institutions and markets development, sustainable rural development and bio-fuels cultivation from an anthropological perspective. He has published in the journal Environment and Development and different chapters in readers on common property issues. Sonja Merten, Ph.D. in epidemiology, Institute for Social and Preventive Medicine, University of Basel, Switzerland. She is doing research in Zambia and is affiliated at Swiss Tropical and Public Health Institute, Basel, Switzerland. She did extensive research in Southern Africa in the field of public health, on food security, livelihoods and HIV/ aids. She has published in Human Organisation, Food Policy, Human Ecology, and other peer reviewed journals. Roland Saum, M.A. in Social Anthropology, University of Zurich, Switzerland. He did research in the Okavango Delta on common-pool resource management. He is currently working as a teacher in the public school system in Switzerland. He has published in Development Southern Africa.

INDEX Acheson, J., 6, 26, 31 Act; see also law fisheries act, 336, 392, 324 land act, 210, 230, 277, 281, 286, 324, 345–379, 394 wildlife act, 210, 278, 324 African floodplains, 7–12, 42–45, 45–47, 416f. Agrawal, A., 7, 27, 37, 50, 56, 197 Agriculture, 204, 222, 256, 313 Arab Choa, 59 animals antelope, 11, 250, 282, 306, 311, 314, 316, 322, 335 crocodiles, 250, 254, 263–264, 282, 289, 311, 318, 320, 342, 379, 384, 418, 428 elephant, 62, 131, 150, 202, 250, 254–255, 260, 273, 276, 283, 290, 294, 311, 379, 386, 396 fish species, 84, 175, 255, 264, 294, 309–310, 331, 367 lion, 62, 202, 250, 255, 260, 283, 290–291, 311 Balundwe, 62–63, 153, 302–303, 305, 307, 312–314, 316–317, 319, 323–325, 332, 348–349, 429, 432 Barabaig, 247, 255, 259–260, 266, 280, 283, 291–292, 440 bargaining power, xvi, 6–7, 23, 39–41, 48–49, 51–53, 56–57, 63, 65, 78, 94, 100, 105, 116–117, 142, 144, 148–149, 160, 162, 165, 172, 185, 188, 191, 197, 210, 214–215, 229, 231, 239, 285, 288, 291, 296, 302, 304, 354, 356, 413–414, 434–437 Batwa (see also Twa), xvii, 62–63, 263, 301–305, 307, 313–315, 317–319, 323–325, 332, 335–336, 338–339, 348–349, 351, 428–429 Bayei, 64, 363, 369–371, 374, 377–379, 389, 391, 397 Beeler, S., 3, 21, 43, 47–48, 58, 85, 95, 106, 138, 154, 161, 218, 263, 276, 427, 430 big men, 51, 308, 316, 352 Botswana administration, 389 colonial administration, 377f.

conservation, 388f. economy, 382f. government, 383 history, 369f. institutions (formal), 385f., 392f. state, 362, 379 tourism, 376, 380, 385 Bozo, 47, 58, 77–78, 80–83, 86–88, 99, 107, 316, 427 Brockington, D., 2, 24, 45, 67, 202, 207, 214, 235 by-law, 231, 339, 350–352 Cameroon administration, 134, 182f. colonial administration, 132, 178f. conservation, 137, 143 economy, 135f., 179 government, 134, 182f. history, 126f., 132f., 176f. institutions (formal), 134. state, 134, 182 cash crops, 208, 331f. cattle, 204, 259f., 312f. change climate change, 13–16, 92, 180–181, 331 economic change, 89, 91, 135f., 210f., 269f., 326f., 382f. environmental change, 17–19, 92, 137, 272 institutional change, 38–42, 42–45, 133f., 178f., 208f., 268., 331 relative prices, 92, 139, 210–211, 296f, 271, 326–328, 368, 422f. technical change, 21, 222–223, 272f., 330–331, 387 chief, 41, 94–95, 102, 106–107, 109, 132–134, 142, 147, 178–179, 191, 207–208, 266–267, 304, 308, 316–319, 322, 324, 332, 334–335, 341, 344–347, 349, 351–353, 355–356, 363, 377–379, 427–428, 436 citizenship, xvii, 49, 52, 59, 65, 153, 295, 414–415, 421, 428f., 429, 436 collective action, 29, 44, 50, 52–53, 61, 65–66, 231, 236–237, 239–240, 246–247, 286f., 287, 289, 291, 293, 296–297, 353, 408, 414–415, 429, 431, 435, 437–441

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colonial time Botswana, 377f. Cameroon, 133, 178f. Mali, 88f. Tanzania, 207, 266f. Zambia, 324f. co-management, 3, 24, 37, 54, 56, 62, 164, 167, 231, 245, 247, 279, 293, 350, 357, 429 common property, 30–33, 34–38 common-pool resources, 30–33, 439 definition, 30–33 fisheries, 129, 201, 250, 175f., 254, 310, 313, 372, 375 land, 200–202, 250, 255 pasture, 128–129, 255, 309f., 374–375 timber (forests), 200–201, 211–212 veldt products, 372, 376 water, 200–201 wildlife, 201–202, 250, 254, 258, 311f., 313–314, 372, 376 community management, 3, 429 conflict (fisheries, pasture, wildlife, water), 105f., 154f., 187, 227f., 284f., 399f. conflict resolution, 109f., 158f., 188, 230f., 292f., 343f., 350f., 399f. constitution, 165, 241 constitutionality, 55 dam, 15–21 Iteshi-Teshi, 331 Maga, 137, 181 debt, 15, 46, 107, 136, 184, 270, 276, 327 decentralisation, 91, 151, 186, 240 democracy, 140, 151–153, 166, 186, 209, 215 demography, 81f., 173f., 202–203, 250f., 273, 369–370, 307f. design principles (Ostrom), 35 discourse, xvii, 2–3, 23–24, 26, 49, 55–57, 63, 66, 123, 146, 226–227, 238, 281–282, 345, 347, 403, 414, 433, 436 economic activities Inland Niger Delta, 84f. Kafue Flats, 312f. Logone, 130f., 176 Okavango Delta, 373f. Pangani, 204f. Rufiji, 256f., 269f. economic development, 61, 209, 330, 390, 406, 441

ecosystem Kafue Flats, 305f. Logone (also Waza Logone), 125f. Niger Inland Delta, 78f. Okavango, 366f. Pangani, 198f. Rufiji, 249–250 enforcement, 46, 161, 165, 239, 245, 294, 355, 408 elders, 27, 40–41, 97, 109, 131, 159, 191, 205–207, 230–231, 236, 257–258, 262, 265, 269, 273, 281–282, 289, 291 Ensminger, J., xvi, 6–7, 29, 37–41, 49, 51, 53, 55–57, 66–67, 172, 197, 355, 413–415, 434–436 ethnic identity, 185, 216, 251, 304, 345, 347, 430 ethnicity, 45, 63, 142 ethno-professional groups, 81f., 126, 202f., 176, 370, 250f., 261, 307f., 314–315 Feeney, 26–27, 31, 52 fishing, 85f., 92–93, 94f., 102f., 129f., 129f., 155f., 175f., 179f., 182f., 184, 245f., 257f., 263f., 277f., 289–290, 310f., 318f., 336f., 348f., 355f., 372, 375, 392f. floodplains (see also ecosystem and resources), 5 Niger Inland Delta, 5, 80 Logone (also Waza Logone), 5, 123f. Kafue Flats, 5, 305 Okavango, 5, 366f. Pangani, 5, 198 Rufiji, 5, 248 Waza-Logone, 5 Fokou, G., xvii, 3, 15, 21, 23, 43, 59, 89, 91, 105, 117, 136–137, 141, 146, 150, 163–164, 173–174, 176, 178, 180–181, 186, 218, 240, 263, 276, 295, 427–428, 430 Frei, K., xvii, 3, 21, 43, 47–48, 58, 82, 110, 138, 154, 161, 218, 263, 276, 427, 430 Fulbe, 3, 59, 126–129, 131, 142, 178 game reserve, 23, 61, 266, 388 gender, 18, 20, 206, 313, 351 governance, xiv, 46, 67, 87, 110–111, 116–117, 182, 185, 237, 246, 329, 363, 398, 406, 408, 432–433 Haller, T., xiii–xiv, xvii, 2, 9–11, 15, 20–21, 23–25, 42–48, 51–53, 55, 57,

index 62, 89, 91, 117, 131, 136–138, 153, 161, 163–164, 167, 218, 248, 259, 263, 267, 270, 272, 276, 279, 282–283, 285–286, 290, 294–295, 304, 308–312, 314–315, 318–320, 322–325, 331, 333, 335, 338, 340–343, 349–352, 355, 365, 404, 427–429, 432–433, 436–437 Hambukushu, 64, 369–371, 374, 377–379, 391, 397–398 Hardin, G., xv, 6, 26, 196, 198, 235, hunting, 258, 278f., 313f., 322f., 335f. ideology, 104f., 149f., 394f., 185f., 226–227, 281f., 342f. Ila, xvii, 20, 62–63, 153, 301–305, 307–309, 312–320, 323–325, 331–335, 339, 344, 346, 348–349, 352, 421, 427, 429, 432 immigrants, xvii, 3, 65, 96, 171, 228, 274–275, 289, 301–305, 310, 326, 335, 339, 348, 352, 356–357, 369–370, 414–415, 426, 432, 434–435, 441 immigration, xvi, 7, 52–53, 121–122, 137, 189, 204, 239, 274, 325–326, 335, 357, 371, 421, 435 independence Botswana, 379f. Cameroon, 133f., 178f. Mali, 90f. Tanzania, 209 Zambia, 326 infrastructure, 16, 39, 41, 64, 133, 137, 181, 197, 203, 209, 212, 235, 237, 249, 290, 331, 339, 361, 363, 370, 372, 377, 383, 387–388, 394, 405–406, 409, 421, 435 institutional change, colonial and post colonial, 421f., 426f., 437f. Inner Niger Delta (fisheries), 91, 97 Kafue Flats (fisheries, wildlife pasture), 324f., 333f. Logone (also Waza Logone, pasture, fisheries), 133f., 141f., 184f., 160f., 188 Okavango (fisheries, veldt, wildlife, pasture), 379f. Pangani (wildlife, pasture, water/land, timber), 207, 218f., 225 Rufiji (fisheries, wildlife pasture), 266–269, 274f., 277 institutional pluralism, 153, 414 institutions colonial, 88f., 133f., 207–208, 266f., 378., 266f.

449

customary/traditional, 86f., 98f. 132f., 176f., 206f., 262f., 317f., 377–378, 419f. definition, 27–29, 33 formal (see also formal laws), 90–92, 97f., 133f., 208–210, 266f., 324f., 379f. informal, 153 norms, 146, 176f. pre-colonial, 86f., 132f., 377f., 176f., 206., 262f., 317f., 419f. post-colonial, 133f., 208–210, 268f., 333f., 379. irrigation, 136–137, 181, 213, 222, 272f., 332, 344f. impact (of institutional change), 110f., 161f., 189f., 232f., 294f., 352f., 425f. IUCN (World Conservation Union), 1, 7, 15, 23, 42, 44, 62, 67, 144, 172, 181, 183, 191, 196, 201, 203, 211, 246, 250, 287–288, 293, 298, 365–366 Kotoko, xvii, 3, 59–60, 105, 122–124, 126–127, 129–133, 137, 140–142, 145–149, 151–158, 160–166, 171–174, 176–177, 179–180, 184–191, 263, 316, 427–428 Landolt, G., xvii, 15, 21, 43, 59, 91, 105, 131, 218, 263, 276, 295, 427, 430 landscape, cultural, 2, 24, 213, 266–267, 282 law, 413–414, 412, 431–433 colonial, 267, 422 customary, 96, 103, 111, 158, 179, 184, 344, 390, 400, 431 fishery, 90, 324, 335, 336, 182, 267, 278, 203, 317, 324, 335–339, 392 formal, 122, 231, 246, 422, 434 land, 134, 292, 407 national, 103, 179, 182, 187 state, 105, 179, 204, 410, 426 traditional, 93, 214, 264, 265 wildlife/hunting, 266, 267, 278, 203, 213, 325, 379 water, 196 leader, 61, 101, 134, 141, 156, 176, 178, 187–188, 205–206, 215–216, 228, 230, 236–237, 253, 262–263, 265, 267, 269, 275, 292, 307, 314, 319, 324–325, 331–332, 334, 344–346, 348, 352–353, 369, 391, 398, 400, 421, 427, 432, 436 legal pluralism, 47–49, 171, 431, 432f.

450

index

livelihood, 84f., 129f., 174f., 204f., 256f., 312f., 373f. Lund, C., 48–49, 67, 432–433 Maasai, xvii, 60–61, 195–197, 202–204, 206–208, 213, 216–217, 225–227, 229–230, 232–233, 235, 237, 239–240, 259 maize, 204, 227, 229, 252, 255–256, 259, 272, 303, 307, 312–313, 317, 327, 331, 334, 344, 374, 384 Mali administration, 90, 93f., 109 colonial administration, 88f. economy, 84f. government, 90 history, 81f. institutions (formal), 88, 90, 92 state, 90, 92 market, 38–39, 46–47, 51–53, 81, 84–85, 89, 92, 110–112, 129–131, 135–138, 150–151, 163, 171, 177–180, 183, 189–190, 196–197, 204, 209–212, 217, 224, 227, 235, 237, 239, 248, 259, 271, 275–276, 295–296, 334, 337, 339–340, 361–363, 375–376, 382–385, 395, 401, 405, 409, 435 Mbeyale, G., xvii, 15, 43, 47, 60, 117, 131, 137, 154, 161, 196, 201–203, 206–207, 211, 216–217, 226–227, 230, 260, 274, 280, 430, 440 Meroka, P., xvii, 43, 47, 55, 61, 91, 117, 131, 137, 154, 161, 205, 210, 218, 240, 248, 251–253, 257, 259, 261, 263–264, 266–267, 269–270, 272–273, 275–277, 279, 282–283, 285–286, 290, 428, 430, 440 Merten, S., 15, 20–21, 25, 42–44, 46–47, 55, 57, 62, 89, 91, 117, 131, 137–138, 153, 161, 218, 263, 276, 295, 304, 311, 319–320, 322, 325, 335, 338, 340–341, 343, 349–352, 355, 427–429, 432, 436 monitoring, 27, 46–47, 50, 56, 59, 95, 101–102, 106, 117, 149, 177, 182, 185, 206, 221, 237, 239, 247, 252, 255, 270, 272, 279, 289, 293, 295–296, 298, 303, 309, 318, 325, 338, 341, 351, 354–355, 357, 379, 408–409, 418, 425, 437 Musgum, 59–60, 122–123, 126–132, 137, 140, 142, 145, 148–149, 151–154, 156–157, 160–162, 164–166, 172–174, 176–177, 180, 184–186, 188–189, 191, 428

narrative, xvii, 1–2, 23–24, 49, 55–57, 66, 226, 281–282, 347, 414, 433, 436 national park (see protected areas) New Institutionalism (also New Institutionalist approach), xv–xvi, 6–7, 13, 27–29, 30f., 36–38, 41, 49, 56, 66, 413–414 NGO, 1–3, 54, 62, 64, 86, 141, 154, 183, 191, 218, 224, 237, 240, 245–246, 277, 285–286, 290, 293, 298, 302, 342, 390–391, 396, 398–399, 432 nomads, 40–41, 129, 283, 291 norms, 3, 6, 26, 29, 39, 146, 196, 206, 214–216, 231, 236, 265, 278, 346 North, D., 29, 37, 39–40, 56, 354, 413 open access, 91f., 152f., 218–222, 227, 230, 320, 329, 327f., 422f., 428f. opposition, 152, 157, 166, 293, 304, 324, 332, 334, 344–347, 353, 427, 436 Ostrom, E., xv, 6–7, 27, 29–31, 34, 36–38, 50, 52–53, 65–67, 197–198, 230, 233, 236, 239, 295, 301, 353–354, 408, 413, 432, 435–436 Pare, xvii, 60–61, 195–197, 202–206, 213–214, 216–217, 225–227, 229, 234–237, 239, 440 participation, 36–37, 54, 109, 111, 117, 134, 210, 227, 239, 279, 302, 390, 441 participatory management, 17, 49, 54, 65, 238, 246, 282, 386 party, political, 141, 152, 157, 164, 166, 215 pastoralists, 128f., 141, 204f., 225–226 peasants, 128, 204 policy forestry, 210, 238 land, 210, 238, 327, 345 lifestock, 132, 210 water, 238 wildlife, 210 political ecology, xvii, 49, 66, 117 post-colonial time, 90f., 135, 208., 324f. post-independence Botswana, 379f. Cameroon, 133f. Mali, 90f. Tanzania, 208f., 268f. Zambia, 324f. power (see also bargaining power), xvi, 6, 17, 33–34, 38, 41, 43, 52–55, 57, 59–60, 63–64, 66, 87, 91, 95–97, 105, 110, 112, 115, 122–123, 132, 134,

index 142–144, 146, 151–152, 154, 163, 165, 167, 172–174, 177–178, 180, 182–184, 187, 191, 195, 206, 210, 212, 218, 221, 223, 228, 230–231, 234–236, 238–239, 245, 247, 267, 269, 278–279, 285–286, 292–293, 301–302, 308, 312, 317, 324–325, 329, 352, 355, 364, 377–379, 398, 404–406, 413, 415, 421, 429, 438 pre-independence Botswana, 377f. Cameroon, 132f., 176f. Mali, 81f., 86, 91 Tanzania, 205f. Zambia, 315f. private property, 26, 28, 30–32, 40, 43–44, 158, 162, 186, 213, 227, 265, 354, 372, 415, 418, 432, 438, 440 privatisation, 47, 88, 152f., 186f., 212, 227, 230, 270, 327f., 344–346 property rights, 150 protected areas Lochinvar, 307, 317, 331 Mkomazi Game Reserve, 208, 217 Okavango Delta, 385f. Selous Game Reserve, 247, 254, 259, 267, 272 Waza-Logone, 123–124, 137 punishment, 207, 291, 320, 323, 400 regulations, 3, 6, 25, 27, 43–44, 50, 58, 77, 89–92, 111–112, 116, 122–123, 144–147, 153, 163–164, 166, 179, 196, 207, 215–216, 221, 232, 240, 246–247, 263–264, 266–268, 274–275, 278, 284–285, 288, 291, 293–296, 313, 325, 333, 335–337, 341, 343, 351–352, 378, 380, 392, 403, 421, 431–432 religion ancestors, 127, 176f., 206, 319f., 481 animals (crocodiles, 263), 290, 320 gods, 203 ritual masters, 85, 87, 176, 320f. rituals, 87, 127, 206–207, 320f., 379 spirits, 84–85, 87, 127, 177, 206, 262–264, 308f., 318–322, 481 spiritual leaders, 207, 320f. resources Kafue Flats, 305f., 309f. Logone (also Waza Logone), 141f., 174f. Niger Inland Delta, 78f. Okavango, 367–368 Pangani, 201–202, 204f., 256f. Rufiji, 250, 254f. Ribot, J., 37, 54, 433

451

rice, 20, 23, 61, 83–86, 98–101, 130–131, 136, 142, 173, 178, 181, 191, 197, 201, 204, 210, 212–213, 222–223, 227–228, 234, 237, 252, 256, 258, 269, 272, 280, 292, 344 road, 64, 135, 138, 156, 197, 203, 209, 212, 237, 247, 249, 273, 290, 326, 330, 337, 342, 376, 383, 387–388, 421 rules, xvii, 3, 6, 25–29, 33–35, 39, 43–45, 47–48, 50–52, 65, 78, 87, 90, 97–99, 101–102, 104, 106, 110–112, 116, 121–122, 124, 137, 140–141, 146, 148–150, 153, 157–159, 161–166, 171–172, 176–177, 179–180, 186–191, 196, 206–208, 215–216, 221, 231, 236–237, 241, 246, 264–266, 268–269, 274–275, 277, 279, 282, 285, 287–289, 294–297, 301, 303, 316, 319, 324, 339–340, 346, 348, 350–351, 353, 355–357, 361, 377–379, 393–395, 407–410, 413–414, 419, 427–429, 430–434 Ruttan, L., 29, 33, 51, 164, 418 sanctions, 101f., 184, 190, 285, 320, 323, 338, 340, 379 Saum, R., 64, 105, 137, 276, 372, 382, 384–386, 395–396, 398, 403–404 scouts, 279, 289–290, 333, 336, 341–343, 349–350, 356, 428 Somono, xvii, 58, 77–78, 80–82, 84–85, 87–88, 93–94, 99, 101–102, 106–109, 116, 316, 427 state property, 46, 49, 52, 88, 112, 134–135, 161, 185, 275, 281, 284, 294–295, 394, 415–416, 421, 439–440 structural adjustment, 209, 270, 302, 327, 329, 432–433 subsidies, 92, 210–211, 221, 327, 329, 410, 423, 425 Tanzania administration, 214f., 268 colonial administration, 207–208, 266 conservation, 208 economy, 210f., 269f. government, 208f., 215f., 268f. history, 202f., 250f. institutions (formal), 208, 217–218, 268f. state, 208f., 215f., 268f. tourism, 259, 269f. tax, 88, 131, 133, 135, 142, 177, 207, 257 trade (traders), 141f., 183, 323, 326–330

452

index

traditional institutions, 418f. Inner Niger Delta (fisheries), 84–85, 87f. Kafue Flats (fisheries, wildlife pasture), 318f. Logone (see also Waza Logone), 132f., 176f. Okavango (fisheries, veldt, wildlife, pasture), 377f. Pangani (wildlife, pasture, water, timber), 204f. Rufiji (fisheries, wildlife pasture), 256f. traditional technology baskets, 313, 319 canal, 130, 147, 177 channel, 153 fisheries, 130, 177, 257, 318f., 321, 331 nets, 113, 177, 257 spear, 113, 314 weir, 258, 319 transaction costs, 28–29, 34, 38, 44, 50, 52, 56, 65, 231, 296, 339, 341, 353–354, 418 transport bicycle, 274, 331

car, 331, 349 lorry rail, 437 Tswana (Setswana, Batawana), 369f. Ujamaa, 209, 215, 278 village government, 209, 214–217, 219, 221–222, 228, 230, 232, 239, 269, 275–276, 281, 283, 290–292, 294 war, 205, 208, 309, 370, 433 water management, 13ff., 222f., 238 WaRufiji, xvii, 251, 262, 279–280, 316 witchcraft, 106, 348 Zambia administration, 326, 333f. colonial administration, 324f. conservation, 325, 340f. economy, 325f. government, 325f. history, 307f. institutions (formal), 302, 325f. state, 325f.

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