Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India 0199461171, 9780199461172

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Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780199461172 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.001.0001

Title Pages (p.i) Displacement and Exile (p.ii) (p.iii) Displacement and Exile

(p.iv) Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in India by Oxford University Press YMCA Library Building, 1 Jai Singh Road, New Delhi 110 001, India © Oxford University Press 2016 The moral rights of the author have been asserted First published by Oxford University Press India in 2016 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the Page 1 of 2

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Dedication

Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780199461172 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.001.0001

Dedication (p.v) For Suparna and Sumit (p.vi)

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Tables

Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780199461172 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.001.0001

(p.ix) Tables 1.1 Resettlement of Refugees in New Townships 28 1.2 Resettlement of Refugees in Different Types of Land 29 1.3 Movements of Refugees in East India between May and July 1951 30 1.4 Nature of Exodus for Fear of Passports Regulations 31 1.5 Influx of Displaced Persons from East Pakistan (January 1953 to February 1957) 32 1.6 Number of Refugees in West Bengal, 1971 Census 33 1.7 Refugee Influx in West Bengal and Other States as Noted in the Ministry of Rehabilitation Report, 1946–71 34 1.8 Scheduled Caste Population in Different Parts of ‘Hindu Bengal’ 38 1.9 Scheduled Caste Population in Different Parts of ‘Muslim Bengal’ 39 1.10 District-wise Distribution on Scheduled Caste Population in West Bengal (in Percentage) 44 1.11 Migrant Families in the Districts of West Bengal by Community, 1955 45 1.12 Zone-wise Details of Mass Desertion from Dandakaranya between February 1978 and July 1978 70 1.13 Refugee Settlement on the Left Bank of the Ganges 80 2.1 Details of Influx and Reverse Flows of Sri Lankan Refugees (1983– 2002) 94 2.2 Camp Population of Sri Lankan Refugees in Tamil Nadu, 2002 98 (p.x) 2.3 Sri Lankan Returnees Assisted by the UNHCR (1987–90) 109 2.4 Arrival of Sri Lankan Refugees in India (June 1990–April 1991) 111 2.5 Internally Displaced Persons in Sri Lanka 121 2.6 Tamil Camp Refugees Arrived in India up to 1996 123 2.7 Registered and Unregistered Refugees in Camps in 2007 126 3.1 Trends in Refugee Influx (Month-wise) in Eastern India 167

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Tables 3.2 Distribution of Refugees in Various States in India (till 15 December 1971) 179 3.3 Influx of Refugees vis-à-vis Host Population 181 3.4 Total Number of Refugees Returned from West Bengal to Bangladesh (as on 17 September 1971) 187 3.5 Interception of Illegal Immigrants: From Bangladesh to West Bengal (by the State Police/Mobile Task Force/ BSF) 194 A.1 Chronological Statement of the Influx of Migrants from Erstwhile East Pakistan into India 208 A.2 Number of New Migrants (in Lakhs) 208 A.3 Resettlement Villages in Dandakaranya, 1963–4 210 A.4 Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees in Tamil Nadu Camps as on 1 June 2011 211 A.5 Internally Displaced in Sri Lanka (Till April 1998) 213 A.6 Changes in the Percentage of Population of the Hindus, Muslims, and Others in West Bengal, 1951–2001 213 A.7 Variations in Hindu and Muslim Population in West Bengal Districts between 1951 and 2001 214 A.8 Muslim and Hindu Population in East Bengal/East Pakistan/ Bangladesh (in Thousands) 216

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Maps

Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

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(p.xi) Maps 1.1 Some Entry and Transit Points for Refugees in West Bengal in 1947 24 1.2 The Location of Dandakaranya in Central India 49 1.3 Cooper’s Camp in Ranaghat, Nadia 63 2.1 Location of Refugee Camps in Tamil Nadu, 2002 95 2.2 Areas of Population Displacement in Sri Lanka 97 2.3 A Special Camp in Tamil Nadu 139 3.1 East Pakistan: The Four Sectors, 1971 172 3.2 Areas of Infiltration from Bangladesh into West Bengal 190 (p.xii)

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Photographs

Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780199461172 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.001.0001

(p.xiii) Photographs 1. Refugees Leaving for Sealdah Station by Barisal Express on 19 March 1950 xxi 2. The Cooper’s Camp xxiii 3. A Refugee Camp in Vellore District xxv 4. Sri Lankan Military Personnel Demining Land xxvii 5. Refugees Crossing the Banpur–Darshana Border on 17 April 1971 xxix 6. Exodus of the Displaced xxxi (p.xiv)

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Abbreviations

Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780199461172 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.001.0001

(p.xv) Abbreviations AIADMK All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam ASI Archaeological Survey of India BSF Border Security Force BJP Bharatiya Janata Party CHT Chittagong Hill Tracts CMDA Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority CPI Communist Party of India CPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) CRG Calcutta Research Group CVF Citizen Volunteer Force DMK Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam ENLF Eelam National Liberation Front EPRLF Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross Page 1 of 3

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Abbreviations ICSSR Indian Council of Social Science Research IDP internally displaced person IDPAD Indo-Dutch Programme for Alternatives in Development IPKF Indian Peace Keeping Force LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MOR Ministry of Rehabilitation MP member of parliament NGO non-governmental organization NSA National Security Act NHRC National Human Rights Commission NVBKP Nikhil Vanga Bastuhara Karma Parishad OAU Organization of African Unity OfERR Organization for Eelam Refugees Rehabilitation (p.xvi) PLOTE People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam POTA Prevention of Terrorist Act POW prisoner of war PUCL People’s Union for Civil Liberties PUDR People’s Union for Democratic Rights RRAN Resettlement and Reconstruction Authority for the North RRC Relief and Rehabilitation Committee SAARC South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation SC scheduled caste Page 2 of 3

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Abbreviations SEDEC Social and Economic Department Centre SHRC State Human Rights Commission SLBFE Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign Employment ST scheduled tribe TELF Tamil Eelam Liberation Front TELO Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization TMC Trinamool Congress UCCR United Central Council for Refugees UCRC United Centre for Refugee Council UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees

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Acknowledgements

Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780199461172 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.001.0001

(p.xvii) Acknowledgements While working on this book I have received suggestions and comments from a large number of friends in Kolkata, Dhaka, Chennai, Colombo, and Delhi. For my work in Kolkata I owe a great deal to the late Prafulla Chakrabarty, Bijoy Majumdar, and the residents of Cooper’s Camp. Manpreet Janeja, Anindya Dey, Sumit Dey, and Prama Mukhopadhyay helped me in collecting research materials. Thanks to Saktidas Roy, the chief librarian at the archive of the Ananda Bazaar Patrika, for allowing me to consult media reports and offering some valuable photographs for use. My affiliation with the Centre for the Study of Social Sciences, Calcutta, for this work was extremely rewarding as it offered me access to their library and to the newly established archive. Sohini Ghosh read the manuscript and offered comments for editorial improvements. In Dhaka, I received much needed intellectual support from Imtiaz Ahmed, Meghna Guha Thakurta, Mahbub Ahmed, Anwarullah Chowdhury, and B.K. Jahangir. Nurul Huda accompanied me to several places where I interviewed freedom fighters. I could not have completed my work in Bangladesh without the support of these friends. When I first visited Tamil Nadu in connection with my work, I had no idea that the Government of India imposed restrictions on the entry of outsiders into the refugee camps located in different parts of the state. I was told by the Tamil Nadu state government officials to obtain permission from the Department of Rehabilitation of the Ministry of Home Affairs in New Delhi. I was aware of the problems in obtaining such permission, but decided to submit my papers to the Home Ministry. I am grateful to the officials at the Home Ministry who granted me an unexpected permission, especially to those who showed keen interest in my work and facilitated official (p.xviii) procedures. As I began my work in Chennai, I came in contact with an organization called OfERR or the Organization for Eelam Refugee Rehabilitation. OfERR was actively working in Page 1 of 3

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Acknowledgements refugee camps, keeping records, helping family members to reunite, and counselling traumatized refugees. The coordinator of OfERR, C. Chandrahasan, pointed out that the camp refugees were people without history; the story of their trauma, their experience back home, their journey to India, and their trials and tribulations in the camp needed to be studied. I began my work among the Tamil refugees in 1998 with help from OfERR. I owe a special debt to Chandrahasan for sharing his views on Sri Lankan politics and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Some of my ideas began to take shape during the several rounds of conversation that I had with Chandrahasan. Surya Kumari, Samuel, Nadeshalingam, and Palam of OfERR narrated their harrowing experiences in Sri Lanka. Florina Benoit of Loyola College, Chennai, helped me during my fieldwork in camps. Florina kept an eye on all kinds of details, and translated and transcribed my conversations with the refugees. I thank Sudha Ramalingam of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) for allowing me to consult her unpublished reports on the special camps. After the first exodus of refugees in 1983, scholars were allowed to visit the camps. During this time the late S. Vethakan of the Department of Statistics, Madras Christian College, carried out a detailed study on the conditions of the camp refugees. I have learnt a great deal from Vethakan’s survey and advice. Thanks to Sumit Sen, Abdul Kalam, V. Suryanarain, the late M.N. Chitra, and Zubeida Banu of Madras University, and C.T. Kurien, V.K. Natraj, Anata Giri, and Nirmal Sengupta of the Madras Institute of Development Studies, and Xavier Gladstone of Loyola College for academic support. In Colombo, Ramanie Jayatilaka, Chandanie Liyanage, and other faculty members at the Department of Sociology, University of Colombo, offered help in many ways. The Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) sponsored a part of this study under their Indo-Dutch Programme for Alternatives in Development (IDPAD). There were other team members in the project studying refugeerelated issues in different parts of the country. I am grateful to Willem van Schendel, Kathinka Sinha (p.xix) Kerkhoff, and Gautam Chakma. As a member of the research team I was doing research in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. I completed writing several sections of this book while I was a visiting fellow at the following places: Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford; South Asia Studies Centre in Kyoto University, Japan; and the Institute of Ethnology, Munich. I benefitted from my discussions with colleagues at these places, especially for their comments in seminars. My colleagues at the Department of Sociology, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University, were always ready to respond to any queries that I had. In particular, I acknowledge my debt to André Béteille, Virginius Xaxa, P.D. Khera, and my students, too numerous to name.

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Acknowledgements Finally, let me thank the library staff at the following places who retrieved many materials for my work: Ratan Tata Library, Delhi; Centre for Studies in Social Sciences Library, Kolkata; and the Refugee Studies Centre (RSC) Section at the library of Oxford University. (p.xx)

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Illustration

Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780199461172 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.001.0001

Illustration (p.xxi) (p.xxii) (p.xxiii)

Photograph 1 Refugees Leaving for Sealdah Station by Barisal Express on 19 March 1950. The first few months of 1950 were the peak period of the refugee exodus. This kind of rush to take trains to reach Calcutta began in the early 1950s. It is reminiscent of the journey undertaken by the refugees from West Pakistan to India in August 1947. Source: Ananda Bazar Patrika, 19 March 1950.

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Illustration (p.xxiv) (p.xxv) (p.xxvi) (p.xxvii)

Photograph 2 The Cooper’s Camp. It became a sanctuary for the underprivileged displaced Bengalis from East Bengal. In the 1950s most refugees were living in crowded godowns that had been used to store materials during World War II. Source: Author’s personal collection.

Photograph 3 A Refugee Camp in Vellore District. The huts for the refugees were constructed in separate locations, away from the residential areas of the local villagers. Source: Author’s personal collection.

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Illustration (p.xxviii) (p.xxix) (p.xxx) (p.xxxi)

Photograph 4 Sri Lankan Military Personnel Demining Land. Repatriation in 1991–2 took place before demining large tracts of village land. Source: Author’s personal collection.

Photograph 5 Refugees Crossing the Banpur–Darshana Border on 17 April 1971. It was a different kind of journey for the refuges—they trekked long distances before reaching the border and carried with them some of their belongings. Source: Ananda Bazar Patrika, 17 April 1971.

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Illustration (p.xxxii)

Photograph 6 Exodus of the Displaced. Women and children were the first to arrive from East Pakistan. The male members stayed back to look after household property or to take part in mukti juddha (Liberation War). Source: Ananda Bazar Patrika, 7 May 1971.

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Introduction

Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780199461172 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.001.0001

Introduction Abhijit Dasgupta

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.003.0001

Abstract and Keywords Three points merit attention in a study on refugees in India. First, the Partition of the country or the fragmentation of India’s colonial state structure at the moment of decolonization triggered large population movements. Second, India is not a signatory to the major international agreements on displaced people, the United Nations Convention (1951) and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967). Finally, the Indian state’s treatment meted out to refugees has not been consistent. As the study shows, state responses to cross-border displacement have varied, both regarding different groups of displaced people and regarding the same group over time. This chapter studies state–refugee relations against this backdrop and within a specific theoretical and conceptual framework. Keywords:   refugees, displaced, post-colonial state, Partition, ethnic strife, South Asia, Liberation War, 1971

Mass exodus of refugees in the Indian subcontinent began at the time of Partition in 1947. Both Pakistan and India became prominent countries involved in sending and receiving refugees. Some 70–80 lakh (7–8 million) Hindus and Sikhs arrived from West Pakistan to India and a little over 80 lakh displaced persons from East Pakistan sought asylum in India between 1947 and 1971. The influx of Partition refugees in eastern India continued for a little over two decades. The crisis took a new turn when in 1971 some 1 crore (10 million) Bangladesh Liberation War refugees reached West Bengal, Tripura, and Assam. Since then, the flow has not stopped. In 1983, the refugee crisis resurfaced, this time in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu, which became a sanctuary for Page 1 of 14

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Introduction displaced Tamils from Sri Lanka. In this context, three case studies included here are: (a) the ‘Partition refugees’ from East Pakistan to West Bengal, (b) ‘Tamil refugees’ from Sri Lanka to India, and (c) ‘Bangladesh Liberation War refugees’ from East Pakistan to West Bengal. This study highlights some emerging issues in the discourse on population displacement. Among them are the agency and voices of people who flee across an international border, the identities they forge for themselves, their contributions to their new surroundings, and the ways in which their interactions with states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are mediated by local circumstances. The study examines the following questions: 1. Who is a ‘displaced person’ or ‘refugee’ in India? 2. What are the causes of population displacement? (p.2) 3. How does the state receive/rehabilitate/repatriate displaced people, or stop unwanted immigration? 4. How do local populations react to the arrival of displaced persons from another country in the short and the longer run? 5. How do displaced people contribute to the economic, social, and cultural development of their new environment? These questions have been examined with the help of the three case studies. The reader will find that each case is in itself highly complex. In the case of Partition refugees and refugees from Sri Lanka, displacement did not take place at one particular moment in time but often occurred in several ‘waves’ and involved people with different backgrounds, skills, and expectations. These people soon found themselves in local situations, which could vary from state-run refugee camps to relatives’ homes. They arrived among host populations who either welcomed them as brothers and sisters or looked upon them as undesirables and tried to get rid of them. Cross-border displacement also turned people into beneficiaries (or targets) of the state and the NGOs. In short, displacement implies a host of different individual experiences. Three points merit attention in a study on refugees in India. First, the Partition of the country or the fragmentation of India’s colonial state structure at the moment of decolonization triggered large population movements. As the new states of Pakistan and India came into being, out of the rubble of what had been British India and 500-odd princely states, millions of cross-border migrants were on the move. In some areas, for instance, Punjab, there was a swift, bloody, and almost complete exchange of people. In other areas, for example, Bengal, displacement was a long-drawn process that stretched over decades and is still going on. Partition looms large over the study of displaced people in India.1 This is not only because of the unprecedented numbers involved but also because state formation and cross-border migration took place simultaneously. Definitions of citizenship developed gradually and remained contested. This was Page 2 of 14

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Introduction particularly clear in the east, where the provinces of Bengal and Assam were bisected to form the new entities of West Bengal and Assam (India) and East Bengal (Pakistan). Here, it remained possible for years to define citizenship in terms of either religious community (p.3) or territorial location. It was not until five years after decolonization that efforts were made to pin down people’s citizenship unequivocally. Passports and visas were introduced in 1952, giving territoriality the upper hand. But in this region of South Asia, citizenship continues to be negotiable to an unusual degree, as was demonstrated by the Indira–Mujib Pact of 1972 and the current discussions on ‘indigeneity’ in Assam.2 Second, India is not a signatory to the major international agreements on displaced people, the United Nations Convention (1951) and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967). By not signing these international agreements, India has retained certain autonomy in dealing with refugees. There are at least three aspects of the state autonomy that need to be addressed: first, autonomy from powerful hegemonic states; second, autonomy from the protocols of the international organizations; and third, autonomy from the internal pressures, from the civil society and the NGOs. The state deals with the refugees on a case-by-case basis, by using certain provisions in the Indian Foreigner’s Act of 1946. As a result, the study of cross-border displacement in this part of the world is full of conceptual pitfalls. Definitions vary; while some groups of people who cross the border are welcomed as citizens joining the nation, others receive only state (and United Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR]) support as refugees, and yet others are treated as migrants without official residence or citizenship. Many stay as undesirable ‘illegal immigrants’ or ‘infiltrators’. The freedom that a non-signatory state enjoys in choosing a label that appears most convenient at the time of arrival not only landed displaced people in administrative quagmires but also hampered serious comparative research into cross-border displacement. Finally, the treatment meted out to refugees in India has not been consistent. As the study shows, state responses to cross-border displacement have varied, both regarding different groups of displaced people and regarding the same group over time. Many displaced people were ignored by the states in whose territory they found themselves, while others remained at the receiving end of policies which covered the entire range from an occasional handout to rigorous institutionalization. Newcomers were often put into camps that might have been short-lived or of long duration (Ahmed, Dasgupta, and Sinha Kerkhoff 2004: 3– 5). (p.4) This study explains how the voices of the marginalized sections of the society, for example, the outcastes, tribes, and urban poor, were muted in different ways once they arrived in the country as refugees.

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Introduction Three key concepts that have been examined here are ‘exile’, ‘agency’, and ‘location’. The concept of exile has been used here to refer to both exile from one’s homeland and from one’s ‘habitat’. The latter is particularly relevant in the context of rehabilitation and resettlement. Habitat includes lifestyle, values, learned habits, skills, and such non-discursive knowledge, those operating beneath the level of rational ideology. The study on the state–refugee relations includes voices of the refugees or the question of agency. In the case of Partition refugees, we have noted that they were not merely mute spectators, indifferent to actions taken by the state; rather their voices on contentious issues, whether forcible closure of camps or deportation and eviction, were loud and clear. They were the catalyst of change. Instead of looking at them simply as victims, we need to see how refugees can initiate actions on their own for rehabilitation and resettlement and resist those who use coercive power against them. Although the question of agency has been discussed at length in the literature on refugees in India, the concept is still relevant in the study of complex relations between the state and refugees. One of the objectives of this study is to examine refugees in different locations, so that meaningful comparisons can be made. The location where refugees seek asylum can be friendly, as was the case initially with the Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil Nadu. It can be hostile, as was the case with the Partition refugees in West Bengal. A friendly location can turn hostile over a period of time, as noticed in Tamil Nadu after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination. The three case studies mentioned earlier have been discussed in the context of exile, agency, and location. The dynamics of the state–refugee relations can hardly be studied without examining life in camps, a space meant for temporary shelter. Small huts, school buildings, abandoned government buildings, cyclone shelters, prison-like forts, and similar such places can be converted into camps. Some camps have a long life, as was the case with the camps in Tamil Nadu; some are meant for shorter duration, like the camps for the refugees from Bangladesh. Camps are sites where dispute and dissent take place on a regular basis, as is the case (p.5) of the camps where Partition refugees received shelter. The camp is also a place where community life gets reconfigured with complex power relations. It can be a site that conjures fear in the minds of those who live there. This, indeed, was the case when a cholera epidemic broke out in the camps for refugees from Bangladesh. Ethnographic data collected in camps have been used to deal with theoretical and conceptual problems. Secondary sources, too, have been used to highlight the internal dynamics of camp life. South Asian countries have defined and redefined refugees, keeping in mind their broader political and economic objectives. With regard to the refugees in India, I have not used the 1951 UN Convention definition of a refugee which states that a refugee is one who:

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Introduction As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951, and owing to wellfounded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.3 Several scholars have pointed out the lacuna in the 1951 definition. The Convention definition took note of only five different causes of displacement; the definition as such is too narrow and Euro-centric. In 1967, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted by the UN to address refugee issues in different parts of the world. Some writers are of the view that the scope of the definition is still too narrow and leaves out many who, under all practical purposes, should come under the purview of the term ‘refugee’. This is why Mathew Gibney prefers a term like ‘asylum seekers’ to refugee as it allows us to deal with those who are like refugees but the Convention definition excludes them. The Convention definition emphasizes that it is one who is outside one’s own country, unable to return for the risk of persecution, the risk arising because of one’s political opinion, race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group. Gibney observes, The emphasis on refugees as persecuted people reflects the Convention’s origin in the early Cold War period. The Western states (p.6) responsible for its creation viewed refugees—not least for ideological reasons—as a product of oppressive, totalitarian regimes, like that which existed in Nazi Germany and those forming the communist states of Eastern and Central Europe, that preyed on certain sections of their citizenry. Refugees were seen thus as a product of certain kind of political rule in which the normal responsibilities of a state to its citizens were deliberately and directly violated. (2004: 6) Gibney further argued that the general description of refugees as pointed out by Hannah Arendt (1968) captures the reality in a succinct manner. Arendt observed that refugees in state-centric terms are individuals for whom the normal bond of trust, loyalty, protection, and assistance between a person and his or her government is broken or does not exist. If we follow Arendt’s description, then the women who have fled Afghanistan to escape the Taliban, Iraqis displaced by the war in Iraq, Zairians escaping the Ebola virus, Libyans caught in crossfire, and Bangladeshis fleeing to avoid starvation, death, or cyclone are to be treated as refugees. However, if one goes by the Convention definition then most of these groups have to be left out (Gibney 2004: 7). The term needs to be understood in this broader sense. There are some epistemological problems too. Nyers (2006), for instance, observes that the Page 5 of 14

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Introduction Convention definition includes the human capacity to reason (‘well-founded’), which is held in tension with the emotion (‘fear’) that motivates an individual’s flight. There seems to be a paradox in the Convention definition—it appears that the expectation to be a refugee and to possess a fearful subjectivity are one and the same thing. He adds, ‘This alleged symmetry, we shall see, has enormous implications for refugees especially in terms of how they are or are not recognized as active, visible, and vocal subjects’ (2006: 47).4 To avoid controversy, Sammadar (1999) prefers a neutral term like ‘migrant’ which, in his view, takes care of the terminological complexities.5 Some writers are of the view that there is a need to shift focus from ‘persecution’ to ‘protection’. The relationship between the individual and the state in normal circumstances is governed by the obligation of protection by those who govern, which is linked with some form of social contract and political trust. This is why Shacknove (1985) points out that it is the lack of protection rather than the existence of persecution that is the primary determining feature of a refugee-like (p.7) condition. However, persecution can be seen as one manifestation of the absence of protection, perhaps the most crucial one. This is similar to Arendt’s view that persecution means that one’s rights go unprotected. Protection, then, has broader connotation, and includes a broader range of meaning of breach of contract and trust. The Convention definition certainly fails to capture the complexities in South Asia (Gibney 2004: 5–9). Perhaps this was the reason that prompted India not to become a party to the Convention. In the case of 1947 refugees, I have used the term ‘Partition refugees’ in a conventional sense to include all those who left their homeland either for fear or for other reasons, such as to claim citizenship rights in India. In the official literature they are referred to as ‘evacuees’, ‘migrants’, ‘displaced’, and at times as ‘refugees’. In the case of refugees from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, again I have used the more generic term ‘refugee’. I should like to add that in the case of Bangladeshis who were crossing the border after 1971, I have used the term ‘economic refugees’ or ‘infiltrators’, since they constitute a special category. Both the terms have considerable political ramifications, which I have discussed in Chapter 3. According to some authors, in South Asia the term ‘refugee’ may not be suitable for different groups of people.6 This is why Myron Weiner (1993) observes that the problem with the terminologies can be resolved by classifying the displaced people in South Asia under three broad categories: (a) rejected people, as it was the case with the Hindus and Muslims at the time of Partition in the subcontinent, Burmese Indians, estate Tamils of Sri Lanka, and so on, (b) political refugees from repressive regimes, for example, flight of Bangladeshis to India, Afghans to Pakistan, Tibetans to India, and (c) unwanted migrants, like Bengalis in Assam, Nepalis in Bhutan. Weiner’s three categories can hardly be kept in water-tight compartments; one does find a number of overlapping categories in the South Asian context. Oommen, like Weiner, prefers terms like ‘outsiders’, ‘foreigners’, Page 6 of 14

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Introduction and so on, in addition to the ideal type ‘refugees’.7 He points out that the South Asian situation is extremely complex and this is why one general term is not adequate to deal with the complexities. The official position on the question of definition of a refugee in India is somewhat ambiguous, as refugees in the country are treated like ‘foreigners’ under the Foreigner’s Act of 1946. That refugees are (p.8) different from foreigners is a well-known fact and needs no clarification. I have discussed in detail in Chapters 1 and 2 how some of the basic rights which are denied to refugees are enjoyed by foreigners, and by no stretch of the imagination can refugees be equated with foreigners. This creates more confusion as far as the state and the refugees are concerned. This was probably the only option left, since India never endorsed the 1951 Convention definition and the 1967 Protocol. India is moving towards its own laws for refugees, but those may be in conflict with its neighbouring countries’ laws, which is why the South Asian countries met on many occasions to create a legal framework for the entire region (Oommen 2012: 138–45). In this respect, the Organization of African Union has set an example by framing the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.8 The Cartegana Declaration on Refugees is yet another example that shows how in 1984, 10 Latin American countries framed laws for their region (UNHCR 1984). By not signing the international treaties and without framing laws for refugees, the Indian state enjoys autonomy in dealing with refugee-related issues. Those who support this standpoint are of the view that different situations demand suitable strategic actions. For instance, Tibetan refugees are different from refugees from Myanmar or Bangladesh. This, then, would be discriminatory, since one group is denied some basic rights while the others enjoy them. Moreover, surveillance, policing, and even incarceration of refugees can go on in the absence of suitable laws. These points have been explained at greater length in Chapter 2.

The South Asian Context A study on the refugees in India is important in the context of contemporary South Asian politics. The study of regional political complexities can contribute to a better understanding of the population displacement that is taking place from time to time. But the slow development of refugee studies (or displaced people studies) in South Asia, as compared to other parts of the world, is a wellknown fact. No attempt has yet been made to study population displacement in the context of complex South Asian politics. Perhaps the only exception is the initiative taken by the Calcutta Research Group (p.9) (CRG) in bringing out books and papers which not only enriched our understanding of refugees in India but also of the entire South Asian region.9 The lack of a strong body of analytical and comparative knowledge of cross-border displacement is a serious weakness in our understanding of the societies of South Asia. Obviously, the Page 7 of 14

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Introduction sheer number of people in these societies, whose lives have been touched by cross-border displacement, is staggering. Many tens of millions are involved, even if we disregard the effects of displacement on the ‘second’ and ‘third’ generations. The behaviour of displaced people has had an enormous impact on these societies—politically, economically, and culturally—and yet we are far from understanding it in a comprehensive way.10 There are several issues in the study of refugees in South Asia that merit our attention. The number of displaced persons in South Asia has been increasing; as a result, over the last six decades cross-border displacement in the region has included a large number of different ethnic and religious groups—Assamese Muslims, Sindhis, Tibetans, Burmese, Sri Lankan Tamils, Afghans, Nepalis, and Kashmiris. Today, every South Asian metropolis is home to large communities of displaced people. For example, in Karachi, communities of Mohajirs (Partition immigrants from India) live side by side with later arrivals, mostly illegal, such as Burmese Rohingyas, Afghani Pashthuns, and Bihari Muslims (see Ahmed et al. 2004; Ghosh 2007; and Samaddar 2003). In Delhi, besides displaced Punjabis from Pakistan, one can find Afghanis, Bangladeshis, Burmese, and Tibetans. It needs to be emphasized that different groups of displaced people, although varying in size, make far-reaching political impact. The size of the group and the political impact that they make are not necessarily related. In some parts of the subcontinent (for example, Tripura, Sindh, and Bodoland in Assam) violent confrontations today can be related to struggles for hegemony between sizeable and powerful groups of Partition migrants and local populations. But the ‘antiforeigner’ movement in Arunachal Pradesh takes a stand against miniscule groups of displaced Hajong and Chakma people from erstwhile East Pakistan. Most displaced people in South Asia have been able to make their voices heard only at the local level; some have managed to project their cause well beyond that. The most successful ones have been those who have forged links with international organizations (p.10) concerned with human rights, refugee issues, or indigenous peoples. The best example is provided by displaced Tibetans in India who have been players on the world political scene for decades. One more point about South Asian refugees merits careful consideration. The treatment meted out to displaced people in postcolonial South Asia has raised many questions. State responses to cross-border displacement have varied, both regarding different groups of displaced people and regarding the same group over time. The state never followed consistent policies towards the refugees. At times refugees received relief and rehabilitation immediately after arrival and on many occasions these basic necessities were denied to them.

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Introduction One can cite other reasons for why it is important to examine the close links between the development of modern states in South Asia and cross-border displacement. First, large-scale displacement lay at the very foundation of the states in the region and became a crucial symbol in the nation-building that power elites proceeded to construct. An adequate understanding of the organization of the states of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh needs to take account of how these states dealt with large numbers of immigrants and emigrants as they were taking shape, and how displaced people interacted with state structures that were contentious and were, therefore, more malleable than usual. Some Partition migrants joined the power elite; they found themselves in important positions in the new state bureaucracies—at the helm of political parties or in charge of armed forces. This happened in both regulated and unregulated ways. An exchange of certain categories of state personnel between Pakistan and India was organized by allowing them to opt for a position in the other state. These ‘optees’, who arrived at the time of Partition, took the place of their counterparts who travelled in the other direction. They took charge of tasks at all levels and in all branches of government (see Rahman and van Schendel 2004). Some displaced people joined the state on an individual basis. The influence of these newcomers on state formation and state policies in South Asian countries has never been studied, let alone compared. Second, early experiences with population displacement around Partition shaped the ways in which these states responded to later cross-border displacements, which emerged from various causes and (p.11) were often unanticipated. In the second half of the twentieth century, major displacements resulted from communal rioting (for example, in eastern India and East Pakistan in 1950 and 1964), war (Bangladesh and Sri Lanka), invasion (Tibet and Afghanistan), ethnic cleansing (Rohingyas from Burma and Nepalis from Bhutan), and development policies (the Kaptai hydroelectric project in Bangladesh, and the Narmada and Farakka projects in India). How do the states respond to such flows arriving in their territory? This needs to be understood as part of a regional history in which displacement established itself as a tool of statecraft. Third, it is difficult to study relations between the South Asian states without referring to the issues of displacement. Cross-border displacement became a constant theme, and often an irritant, between South Asian states. Two chapters in this book show how recent cross-border population flows have complicated the relationship between Sri Lanka and India, and India and Bangladesh. Such flows have also strained relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, and of late between Bangladesh and Myanmar. In almost all the places in South Asia where violent ethnic clashes are taking place, one finds large-scale displacement. The number of such places is on the rise. Inter-state relations in South Asia have been delicate ever since decolonization, and attempts at forging regional cooperation have often been scuppered unexpectedly. Over the years, unresolved issues emerging from cross-border population flows have played an Page 9 of 14

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Introduction important role in souring relations between these states. This is why Samaddar writes, In South Asia, post-coloniality has brought even more cataclysmic and rapid breaks. These have made the traditional distinctions by Western social science literature between migrant and refugee, economic reason and political reason, volition and compulsion, largely ‘irrelevant’. Also has become irrelevant the notion that the migrant ‘opts out’, while the refugee is ‘pushed out’. The refugee/migrant is now a pawn in the cold and low key wars in South Asia where the states, the refugees/migrants are pouring in. (1999: 68–9) The nature of the states in the South Asian region has been changing over the years. The states of South Asia have been described as ‘fearful states’ whose ruling elites have ‘failed to manage the problems of (p.12) nation-state building, wealth generation and distributive justice’, and who have responded to challenges to their authority ‘with coercion rather than compromise’ (Ali 1993: 247). In many cases, the violence of state-making has created circumstances which compelled groups of South Asian citizens to flee across the border and rebuild their lives in another society. In this way, displaced people can be regarded as participants in, and not just victims of, processes of state formation in twentieth-century South Asia. Their perspectives on these processes are valuable and need to be documented. For all these reasons, population displacement needs to be understood through careful contextualization of experiences and identities, and by listening closely to the voices of the displaced and those among whom they settled. Distinct local scenarios unfolded in which the social strategies of the displaced people played a vital role. In many parts of South Asia, the contributions of newcomers from across the border have been essential elements in new developments in terms of economy (contributions to trade, food aid, refugee labour, artisan activities, farming), social change (educational standards, competition, networking), politics (vote banks, creating a new political style), and culture (linguistic variety, cultural plurality, lifestyles).

Refugees and Coercive Measures of the State After fleeing from home, refugees enter into a ‘receiving’ state which manages relief, rehabilitation, and repatriation. In order to implement its policies the receiving state may use coercive power.11 At times, the coercive actions can also be exercised in a subtle way. The case studies in this book will highlight both open and subtle use of coercion by the state against refugees. In the case of the Partition refugees, the use of these coercive measures began when refugees asserted their ‘rights’ for relief and rehabilitation. The state machinery was used to control their agitation. By closing refugee camps, terminating doles, refugees were coerced to move to the new resettlement colony called Dandakaranya. Page 10 of 14

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Introduction Those who deserted the resettlement camps and colonies had to face punitive action. The deserters from Dandakaranya who settled down in Marichjhapi in Sundarbans, for example, encountered repressive action of the state. As we turn our focus from Partition refugees to Sri Lankan refugees, we notice a (p.13) near repetition of the use of the same coercive power. At the time of repatriation in 1987, many refugees were asked to return to Sri Lanka without ‘informed consent’. The repatriation in 1991 was more coercive as refugees were sent back to areas where war was on. Movement of some refugees was controlled by using provisions in the archaic Foreigner’s Act. Special camps were opened to incarcerate refugees, and to keep them under strict surveillance. The case of the women migrants from camps would show how surveillance was carried out by the police and the local-level administrators on a day-to-day basis. For the use of coercive power the support of the local power structure is indispensable. In the case of Partition refugees, the West Bengal government and the Congress politicians ensured implementation of coercive actions. Close liaison between the two was required in closing down camps and deporting refugees to Dandakaranya. The centre received cooperation of the state in forcing the refugees to move out of West Bengal. In Tamil Nadu, the centre initially encountered opposition from the local political groups, but situations changed after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. Repatriation, incarceration, and surveillance took place in connivance with the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), the ruling party in the state where local power structure is weak and lack direction, as was the case with West Bengal at the time of influx of refugees in 1971, the centre established its control by dismissing the local government and imposing president’s rule. It is often said that if violence is the problem, then humanitarian action is presented as a moral remedy. This, indeed, was the case as far as the 1971 refugee crisis was concerned. The state–refugee relations took a new turn with the influx of nearly 1 crore refugees in West Bengal and other north-eastern states. During refugee crises, humanitarian actions pay rich dividends, as at the time of the 1971 influx. I shall be dealing later with the question why humanitarian concern is considered as the opposite of coercion. Now, let me briefly state how the next chapters have been organized. Chapter 1 examines in greater detail, the case of the Partition refugees, and issues and questions regarding who the Partition refugees are, how many had arrived and what the state did for their relief and rehabilitation. The chapter deals at length with the relations between the state and the displaced outcastes, tribals, and the urban poor. (p.14) In order to study the complexities in the relations between the state and the displaced marginalized sections of the Bengali society, three different sites have been selected. They are: Dandakaranya resettlement colony in central India, Cooper’s Camp located in the Nadia district, and Marichjhapi, an island, situated in the Sunderbans in West Bengal. The theory of the autonomy of the state, the question of loss of social capital, active and passive Page 11 of 14

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Introduction resistance, and so on, have been discussed in the final section of this chapter. Chapter 2 discusses the case of the Sri Lankan Tamil refugees who arrived in Tamil Nadu in 1983 after an ethnic strife in the island. This case study shows how policies towards refugees were influenced not only by local-level politics but also by India’s relations with Sri Lanka. The state policies towards these refugees remained inconsistent, and this has been explained with the help of a detailed study of repatriation of refugees in 1987 and 1991. From the early 1990s, Tamil refugees were under surveillance, and several refugees were incarcerated in special camps. This raised important legal and ethical questions about the state–refugee relations which have been examined in some detail in this chapter. Besides dealing with these issues, the chapter also includes discussions on everyday life in camps, construction of identity, reconfiguration of community life, and third-country asylum. Chapter 3 deals with the refugees of Bangladesh Liberation War who began to arrive in West Bengal and other northeastern states from April 1971 onwards. Nearly 1 crore refugees sought asylum in India. It was an unprecedented crisis. This study shows that there was a shift in the state policy at the time of the 1971 influx; the refugee crisis was considered as a ‘humanitarian crisis’. The following issues have been examined with the help of primary and secondary sources: What were the factors that caused this massive displacement? How did this crisis bring the communities together? What was the nature of relationship between the refugees and the hosts? Why did the refugee question emerge after the Liberation War? Besides, the chapter includes discussions on ‘economic refugee’, ‘infiltrators’, and ‘environmental refugees’. And, finally, the Conclusion revisits some of the theoretical and conceptual issues in the light of the findings in Chapters 1, 2, and 3. It critically examines the debates on ‘agency’, ‘location’, and ‘citizenship’ in the context of three case studies. Let me briefly add the methods that I followed in collecting data at different locations. My fieldwork sites included Cooper’s Camp in (p.15) Nadia, several squatter’s colonies, and ex-camp sites in Kolkata. In Tamil Nadu, I carried out fieldwork in refugee camps in the following four districts: Vellore, Pudukottai, Tiruvallur, and Thoothukudi. The Tiruvallur camp was located near Chennai. Other camps were located in the central and southern parts of Tamil Nadu. I interviewed men and women from different age groups, and refugees from different communities. I travelled to several areas in West Bengal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh to collect material for this study and interviewed mediapersons, bureaucrats, and politicians. In addition to my own field data, I used a good deal of unpublished official reports in Kolkata, Dhaka, and Colombo. Unpublished reports of the UNHCR in these cities were also useful. Finally, I should like to add that without the use of the reports published in the media (both English and vernacular) it would have been difficult for me to find the thread to hold the stories together.

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Introduction Notes:

(1.) An elaboration of some of these points can be found in Ahmed, Dasgupta, and Sinha Kerkhoff (2004). (2.) The Indira–Mujib Pact was an agreement between the prime ministers of India and Bangladesh, which stated that Bangladesh would not be held responsible for persons who had illegally migrated to India before the birth of the new republic prior to 25 March 1971. This was also the cut-off point enshrined in the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act of 1983 which is in force in Assam. Under this Act, the Government of India agreed to detect and deport foreign nationals who entered Assam after that date. In April 2000, however, an accord between the government in Delhi, the state government of Assam, and the major political parties in Assam pushed that date back to 1951, causing a storm of protest and further confusion. (3.) The Refugee Convention, 1951, Article 1A (2), available at http:// www.unhcr.org/4ca34be29.pdf. (4.) A good deal of literature is now available that deals with this problem. See Gibney (2004), Nyers (2006), and Shacknove (1985). (5.) Samaddar (1999) and (2003). (6.) See Chimni (2003: 443–71) and Datta (2013: 48–51) for more discussions on this point. (7.) Both the terms have considerable political ramifications which I have discussed in some detail in Chapter 3. (8.) For lack of refugee-specific laws and the consequent difficulties of providing protection to individual asylum seekers in India, a group of jurists with P.N. Bhagwati as convenor drafted the Model National Law on Refugees in November 1996. Working under the umbrella of the Informal Regional Consultations on Refugees and Migratory Movements in South Asia, the group focused on the establishment of a regulatory process of refugee status determination. The draft Model Law was presented at a seminar in New Delhi in May 1997, which was attended by delegates from the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) nations. Following consultations and incorporation of suggestions, the Model Law was formally adopted in Dhaka on 11 November 1997. The next annual meeting of the regional consultations, held in Kathmandu on November 9 and 10, 1998, unanimously decided that the Model Law should be harmonized with country-specific legislative and judicial requirements with a view to formally proposing it to the respective governments of the region. The final draft of the proposal is under consideration by the SAARC countries.

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Introduction The Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the OAU Convention of 1969, expanded the definition of the term ‘refugee’ to cover ‘every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination of events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his [or her] country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his or her place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his [or her] country of origin or nationality’. (9.) Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group, now known as the Calcutta Research Group (CRG), brought out several books, journals, and research papers on refugee-related issues, besides contributions to peace studies, human rights violation, and gender discrimination. Some of their publications particularly relevant to this work are Samaddar (1997) and (2003) and Bose (2000). (10.) For a study on the decisive influence of cross-border refugees on the politics of the Indian state of West Bengal, see Chakrabarti (1999). Likewise Pakrasi (1971) explains the impact of Partition on the family structure, and van Schendel (2007) examines its effects on the lives of the people at the border areas of West Bengal and Bangladesh. (11.) For a detailed discussion on the use of coercive power against the refugees by the state, see Arendt (1968) and Malkki (1996).

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Residues of Partition

Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780199461172 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.001.0001

Residues of Partition Displaced Bengalis in West Bengal Abhijit Dasgupta

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.003.0002

Abstract and Keywords This chapter examines some aspects of state–refugee relations in West Bengal in the wake of 1947 Partition, and explains the factors that led to conflict between a monolithic state and some marginalized sections of the Bengali society. It deals at length with the state policies towards refugees belonging to the scheduled caste (SC), scheduled tribe (ST), and the urban poor. Three different sites have been selected for the study of state–refugee relations: the Cooper’s Camp in Nadia district, Dandakaranya in central India, and Marichjhapi in the Sundarbans. Keywords:   Partition refugees, Harijans, evacuee, transit points, rehabilitation, resettlement, Dandakaranya, Sunderbans, squatter’s colonies, unionization of refugees

‘Comrades, everything here belongs to you. Make sure there are no clashes over who secures what. Come, this way. Avoid friction.’ ‘But the door is locked,’ somebody shouted. ‘Let us break in,’ said someone else. ‘Yes, yes, let’s break in…’

—Manto (1994: 91) This chapter deals with some aspects of state–refugee relations in West Bengal, and examines the factors that led to conflict between a monolithic state and some marginalized sections of the Bengali society. It deals at length with the state policies towards refugees belonging to scheduled castes (SCs), scheduled Page 1 of 68

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Residues of Partition tribes (STs), and the urban poor. This is followed by an account of the changing urban landscape in West Bengal, ghettoization of the outcastes, and their deportation from their ‘habitus’. The loss of social capital, active and passive resistance, and the phenomenon of agency are some of the other themes that feature here. Three different sites have been selected for the study of state– refugee relations: Cooper’s Camp in Nadia district, Dandakaranya in central India, and Marichjhapi in the Sundarbans. The story of the displacement of upper caste Hindus, or of the bhadralok or elite Bengalis, has occupied the centre stage in the discourse on population displacement. This discourse needs to be (p.18) re-examined in the light of information that is now emerging on the displacement of SCs, STs, women and children, and the urban poor or those who were on the margins of our society at the time of Partition. Their story needs to be juxtaposed with the conventional discourse for a better understanding of the dynamics of population displacement. This chapter aims at doing so. Let me first explain some problems with the labels that the Government of India used for the refugees from East Pakistan, and the methods followed in counting them.1

Partition Refugees: Who Are They? The Indian state remained inconsistent and ambiguous in defining the term ‘refugee’. In the official literature, terms like ‘displaced’, ‘evacuee’, and so on, were used more frequently than ‘refugee’. In 1948, when mass exodus was happening in full swing, the Government of West Bengal defined a ‘displaced person’ in the following way: A displaced person is one who has entered India (or who left or who was compelled to leave his home in East Pakistan on or after October 15, 1947) on account of civil disturbances or on account of setting up of the two dominions of India and Pakistan. (Department of Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation, Government of West Bengal 1998: 10) Later, three specific clauses were added. It was decided that a ‘displaced person’ would be one, who in the opinion of the competent authority: (a) was a resident of East Bengal but on account of communal disturbances occurring after 1 October 1946, left East Bengal and arrived in West Bengal on or before 31 December 1950; (b) further, owned no land in West Bengal; and (c) affirmed in an affidavit filed in the office of the competent authority that he would not return to East Bengal (Department of Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation, Government of West Bengal 1998: 1). The label ‘displaced person’ was politically less sensitive than terms such as ‘refugees’ and ‘evacuees’, so initially, it was used extensively in the official literature. The label was tagged in most of the official acts, for example, the Displaced Persons Claims Act, 1950, and the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Act, 1954.

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Residues of Partition Although the second definition covered a wider area, 1950, as a cut-off year, became controversial because Bengali refugees were (p.19) crossing the border in large numbers even after 1950. The chief minister of West Bengal, B.C. Ray, added a new dimension to the controversy when he said that from the point of view of the central government the term ‘refugee’ carried a special meaning. Refugees, as far as central government was concerned, were the ones displaced from their homes by major communal disturbance. (The Statesman, 25 January 1950) If we follow the chief minister’s statement, it becomes obvious that some of the Bengali displaced persons who were ‘victims of the communal violence’ were refugees. Then, what prevented the state to use the label ‘refugees’ for these displaced people? Communal disturbance was just one of the factors that forced Hindus to leave East Pakistan. The chief minister overlooked several other factors that were working in a complicated manner in displacing Bengalis. So, there was a need to distinguish between a refugee and a displaced person. The definition of a refugee for relief and rehabilitation by the government was reformulated later. According to an official notification issued in 1954, a ‘refugee’ or ‘displaced person’, for the purpose of relief and rehabilitation in West Bengal, would be someone who was ordinarily a resident in the territories now comprising Pakistan, and who arrived between 1 June 1947 and 31 December 1954, on account of civil disturbances or fear of such disturbances in the aftermath of the Partition of India, and was willing to take up permanent residence in the state of West Bengal in the Union of India. The definition included several other important provisions. First, it stated that in the case of persons ordinarily residing in the district of Noakhali or Tipperah, the time of leaving such places would be 1 October 1946 (in order to include all those who were affected by the Noakhali riots) (Department of Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation, Government of West Bengal 1998:1–3). The following documents were accepted as proof of a person’s identity as a refugee: (a) for persons who arrived till March 1951, the records of the census of 1951 was considered relevant, because these persons voluntarily declared themselves as refugees during the census operations; (b) for persons who arrived between March 1951 and October 1952, the ‘border slips’ were accepted as proof; (c) for those who came afterwards, up to the end of 1954, the relevant documents of proof were migration certificates.2 (p.20) Migration certificates were introduced with the ulterior motive of drawing a distinction between the ‘citizens’ and the ‘noncitizens’ or ‘migrants’ whose citizenship status would be decided later. Government officials, such as the district collector, had power to declare a person as a refugee even in the absence of adequate documents. For instance, if, for some reasons or the other, a person failed to declare himself as a refugee during the census of 1951, or did not obtain the ‘border slip’ or ‘migration certificate’ or had lost them, the refugee rehabilitation commissioner or the Page 3 of 68

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Residues of Partition district officer had the power to declare such a person a ‘refugee’ on the basis of an affidavit supported by circumstantial evidence. If proofs were considered inadequate to establish one’s status as a refugee then the same officials had the right to decline relief and rehabilitation to them. At one point, terms such as ‘refugee’, ‘displaced’, ‘evacuee’, and so on, were dropped. The state officials began to refer to refugees as ‘migrants’. Those who sought asylum in India between 1964 and 1971 were called ‘new migrants’ and those who arrived between 1946 and 1958 were described as ‘old migrants’ (Department of Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation, Government of West Bengal 1998:1). The migrants were treated like refugees after their arrival in India. It was not clear how the migrants were different from the refugees. This is another example to show how official definitions were lacking in clarity. By separating the ‘old migrants’ and the ‘new migrants’ by their year of entry, the government had excluded many who came between 1958 and 1964 (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). The state used terms such as ‘displaced’, ‘refugee’, and ‘migrant’ according to its convenience, as we shall see later in this chapter. This is why there was an indiscriminate use of these terms in the official literature. Even in the demographic data collection exercise with the help of the census, clarity was missing. In the official census reports, a person was defined as a refugee if he or she was born in East Bengal. This definition excluded the year of arrival and members of a refugee household who were born in West Bengal, for example, children of a refugee couple born in India or a spouse of a refugee who lived in West Bengal. The definition included all those who were born in East Bengal no matter whether they arrived before or after Partition. Ambiguities and inconsistencies in the official definition made relief and rehabilitation work all the more difficult.3 But this (p.21) was done with the ulterior motive of establishing an ‘effective’ border over which the state would have the power to control any unwanted intrusion in future. In this chapter I have avoided all these official nomenclatures. The term ‘Partition refugee’ is used here in a purely literary sense. It means someone who was driven from home for fear of attack or persecution or for other similar reasons, and includes those who voluntarily opted for citizenship in India, irrespective of their year of arrival. The Convention definition is not entirely appropriate here as the definition includes voluntary influx. The Indian government avoided the term ‘refugee’ purely on technical grounds, in order to eliminate political or legal implications, and also to have autonomy over refugeerelated matters. As opposed to the plethora of official nomenclatures, refugees defined themselves as bastuhara or one who has lost home, and also as saranarthi or one who is seeking help. By using terms like ‘bastuhara’ and ‘saranarthi’, refugees Page 4 of 68

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Residues of Partition wanted to send out a signal that they were not outsiders looking for asylum; on the contrary, they were the ‘new citizens’ of India who lost home for the creation of a new state. On many occasions they demanded that the state should drop terms such as ‘evacuees’, ‘displaced’, ‘refugees’, and ‘migrants’, which they believed were used to separate them from the ‘citizens’. So refugees contested the official labels used against them. In the refugee union pamphlets, they pointed out, time and again, that the Partition was not their creation, and they were the victims of ‘high politics’ of the state; as such, the state should look after their well-being. In the official literature one hardly finds any information on the social and economic background of refugees. Only in one report, prepared by anthropologist B.S. Guha, do we find some sketchy information. Guha (1959: 3– 15) showed, on the basis of some independent survey reports, that there were four groups of displaced Bengalis who arrived after Partition.4 First, among the displaced there was a small minority who sold their immovable property in East Bengal or exchanged property in order to acquire capital and to reinvest the same in private industries in West Bengal. They adapted to the local population within a short time. They were mostly from the middle and upper middle strata of Bengali society; they could be described as Bengali bhadraloks who emerged during British rule. (p.22) Second, there was also a fairly large educated middle class who, with drive and initiative, seized the new job opportunities offered by the government. They differed from the first group in one respect: most of them arrived in West Bengal without any capital. Many of them had to leave at short notice due to communal violence, and life was hard for them in the new environment. They occupied the lower rung of the bhadralok class. Third, there were Bengalis belonging to the lower strata who found shelter in the mushrooming colonies and gradually sunk in the social scale. Most of them were living in the suburbs and resettlement colonies, and had to manage without any assistance from the state. Finally, there were millions of displaced peasants and agricultural labourers who were outcastes or of lower Hindu castes such as Namasudra, Mahisya, Sadgop, and Rajbangshi. They ended up in camps and rehabilitation centres. Many of them were asked to leave Bengal and resettle in places like Orissa, Bihar, the Andamans, and other areas.5 The Dandakaranya project was specifically undertaken for their resettlement. The exodus of this group began from the mid-1950s, once their leader, Jogen Mondal, decided to resign from the Pakistani cabinet and move to India. This is why, in 1955, the Government of West Bengal found that less than a quarter of the total displaced belonged to the SC community (see Table 1.11 later). The influx of the outcastes that began in the mid-1950s had continued for nearly five decades. Nakatani (2011: 168) noted, how in a village in Nadia, out of a total of 188 households, 108 belonged to the Namasudra community who had left East Bengal/East Pakistan/Bangladesh from 1955 onwards. Others who had settled in the village were Malos, Tantis, Telis, and Tilis, all belonging to the SC Page 5 of 68

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Residues of Partition community. Besides, there were Mahisyas too, who came from neighbouring areas such as Meherpur, Kushtia, and so on. Namasudras arrived all the way from Faridpur district. If one moves from Nadia to border villages in the Jalpaiguri district in north Bengal, the situation would be no different. Kamarvita is located near the Indo-Bangladesh border area in Rajganj police station, in Jalpaiguri district. Official records show that before the Partition the village had only Rajbangshi and Muslim households. Most of the village jotedars (landowners) belonged to the Rajbangshi caste, while adhiars (sharecroppers) were either from the Rajbangshi caste (p.23) or from the Muslim community. But demographic change began to take place from the mid-1950s when the Namasudras looked for shelter in Kamarvita. With their arrivals, two new paras (residential locality) came into existence (Dasgupta 1981). In 1977, there were only 344 Namasudra households in the village; the number increased to 647 in 2003 (Dasgupta 2007:11). Like the village in Nadia, the Namasudras arrived at regular intervals in Kamarvita. Samaddar (1999), who examined migration in a village in Malda district, noted a similar trend. He is of the view that for nearly five decades, the influx of the Hindu SCs, especially the Namasudras in the border areas, created new zones that question the conventional notion of a ‘nation’. As far as numbers were concerned, different agencies were quoting different figures for the displaced persons. According to the Ministry of Rehabilitation of the central government, nearly 35 lakh refugees took asylum in different parts of West Bengal, about 10 lakh refugees went to Assam, Tripura, Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. The census figures showed that till 1971, the number reached nearly 74 lakh. The independent commission quoted higher numbers. I shall discuss the debates on the numbers at some length later in this chapter.

Entry and Transit Points The refugees had come on foot, by train, or by boat—whatever means of transport they found to cross the border. For some, the journey was short; for others, it was long and arduous. Some had to trek mile after mile to reach West Bengal. The arrival of millions of uprooted Bengalis began to change the social and political landscape of West Bengal. They had arrived mostly at a few transit points, for example, Banpur, Petrapole, Hasnabad, and Sealdah. The transit points or interception centres also existed in places like Bashirhat, Balurghat, Malda, Cooch Behar, Raiganj, Alipurduar, Jalpaiguri, Canning, and Behrampore (see Map 1.1). The refugees waited at these points in order to collect the necessary documents that would establish them as bona fide refugees, and for receiving relief from the government. Refugees were dispersed to various camps from these transit points. The railway stations were important transit (p.24) (p.25) points for the refugees to congregate at Sealdah station, located in the north-eastern part of Calcutta, became one such important transit point for the refugees who arrived by train. They opened up makeshift camps around the Page 6 of 68

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Residues of Partition station. This was a site that offered them a sense of security, as it was a small place where hundreds of families lived next to one other. It turned into a meeting ground for relatives and friends. It looked more like a huge camp than a railway station. This was also a site of human suffering, and the worst form of degradation. This was captured well in a play by Salil Sen titled Natun Yehudi (The New Jews). According to Bagchi and Dasgupta (2003), the play portrayed how dependence on the state and voluntary agencies for two meals a day, intimidation, lack of privacy, poverty, and constant fear of eviction made the stay at the station a hellish experience. The delay in dispersing refugees from Sealdah station to camps caused accumulation of more and more human beings in a small place. Nearly 2,000 families found shelter at the station and its surrounding areas. It took several years to send refugees to camps from the railway station. In 1960, a spokesperson of the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation informed the members of parliament (MPs) that of the 479 families squatting at Sealdah station, 87 families had been dispersed and 82 families would shortly be removed. No place was available for the rest of the refugee families. There were too many families, and the task of removal was a gigantic one.6 About these transit points, U. B. Rao noted, In the official literature transit points were referred to as reception or interception centres mainly at the boundary areas. Their main function was to receive new migrants near the border and provide temporary accommodation, and food before their dispersal to transit camps. The officials at the centres scrutinized records, documents, and interrogated refugees to ascertain the authenticity of their claim. In order to ensure well-being of the refugees, each centre had necessary equipments of inoculation and vaccination. The reception centres handled large number of refugees, and the four main reception centres were located in Banpur, Petrapole, Hashnabad, Sealdah. The interception centres were spread out in places like Bashirhat, Balurghat, Malda, Cooch Behar, Raiganj, Alipurduar, Jalpaiguri, Canning, and Behrampore. (1967: 151) (p.26) The official viewpoints against the squatters at the station were summed up by Rao, who was involved in rehabilitation work. According to him, At Calcutta’s Sealdah station, where most of the people fleeing East Pakistan detrained, one encountered the problem at its worst. Refugees occupied every nook and corner of the station, resisting official attempts to dislodge them. To make matters worse the numbers were swollen by other than displaced persons who just strayed into the station premises and installed themselves wherever they could find room. The term ‘Sealdah squatters’, it must be borne in mind, applied to a floating population. No Page 7 of 68

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Residues of Partition sooner had one group dispersed, another installed itself. It was a continuous process of clearance and filling up … by the beginning of 1958 there were 1,935 families at Sealdah, comprising 6,846 persons…. It may be stated here that squatting became common not only at the railway station but also in vacant plots of land or through the unauthorized occupation of buildings. The remedies applied in such cases were parallel to those enforced at Sealdah. (1967: 152–3) It was at the Sealdah station that some of the refugees learnt their first lesson to resist arbitrary action of the state. When refugees refused to move out of the station premises in November 1956, the state police was used to disperse them. The police arrested about 300 refugees under the Bengal Vagrancy Act of 1943. Under order of a special magistrate, especially empowered under this Act, these persons were declared vagrants under Section 7(i) of the Act and ordered to be detained under Section 10(i) of the said Act, pending conclusion of final enquiries. Some of them were taken to vagrants’ homes. The Act was mainly used against the homeless and beggars in cities and towns. Challenging the state action, the refugees moved the high court which passed an order to maintain status quo. The refugees proved at the court of law that they were not vagrant but displaced and citizens of a newly independent state. Much has been written on the conditions that offered ‘agency’ to the refugees in the 1960s and afterwards. But it all began in the mid-1950s, that too among the most marginalized groups of the refugees, who took shelter in the railway station and who went for litigation against the state for redressal of their grievances.

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Residues of Partition (p.27) From Sealdah and other transit points, refugees received shelter in makeshift camps, in resettlement colonies and among relatives and friends. Some managed to stay in West Bengal, some had to go to Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar, and the Andaman Islands. Some were asked to move to a special resettlement area called Dandakaranya, located in the bordering areas of Orissa, Madhya Pradesh (now Chhattisgarh), and Andhra Pradesh. Some had to squat in vacant lands in Calcutta and its surrounding areas. The rehabilitation process was disorderly and lacked any meaningful road map. Let us take a closer look at the state policies towards the refugees, the plight of the displaced outcastes, and various lessons that one may learn from debates in the Indian parliament and the state legislative assembly. Relief and rehabilitation for the Partition refugees became a controversial topic among

Map 1.1 Some Entry and Transit Points for Refugees in West Bengal in 1947 Source: Drawn under supervision of the author. Note: Map not to scale and does not represent authentic international boundaries.

politicians and social activists.7 Politicians were divided into two groups: those who believed that the state has done enough for the refugees, and those who were bitter critics of the state policies. There were those who believed that the state of West Bengal has reached a saturation point and the refugees should go to resettlement colony in the Dandakaranya, and there were those who vehemently opposed to this. Some supported the occupation of land in the Sundarbans and others opposed it. On the question of relief and rehabilitation, the Indian parliament became the epicentre of debates which often turned acrimonious between two groups: the ruling party and the opposition. The debates had begun after the first general elections in 1952 and continued for about two decades. The same was the

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Residues of Partition situation at the state assembly where the Congress, the ruling party, was at loggerheads with the Communists who were in the opposition.

Influx and Counting the Refugees In March 1951, when a member of the parliament sought an answer to a query on the number of displaced persons from East Pakistan living in West Bengal, the minister for rehabilitation replied that approximately 32.79 lakh Hindus travelled by train from East Bengal to India, and approximately 17.88 lakh Hindus went back to East Bengal by train, resulting in net influx into India of about 14.91 lakh Hindus. Subsequently, about 1.24 Muslims returned to India.8 For (p.28) the first time the MPs were informed about the returning Muslims.9 The number of returnees, both Hindus and Muslims, was rising because of the Nehru–Liaquat Ali Pact which was signed in 1950. The exodus of displaced Hindus from East Pakistan in 1947 was less in number as compared to their counterpart in the west. It was pointed out at the constituent assembly debates in February 1949 that a little over 68,000 persons sought refuge in West Bengal. The displaced persons were dispersed to different makeshift camps opened up in nine districts. The state administration used land for rehabilitation not only in the border districts like Nadia, Murshidabad, and Jalpaiguri, but it had also sent refugees to districts far away from the border like Burdwan, Midnapur, Bankura, and Howrah. By October 1950, a few more townships came into being exclusively for the refugees (see Table 1.1). The minister of state for rehabilitation, A.P. Jain, informed that the following six new township schemes for refugees have been finalized in West Bengal: (a) Fulia, (b) Habra, (c) Goyeshpur, (d) Bansdroni, (e) Garia, and (f) Jirat.10 The new townships would accommodate 6,880 refugees families. Table 1.1 Resettlement of Refugees in New Townships Place

Families

Fulia

1,000

Habra

1,600

Goyeshpur

2,580

Bansdroni

500

Garia

700

Jirat

500

Total

6,880

Source: Government of India, Constituent Assembly Debates, 16 March 1950, p. 1403.

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Residues of Partition It appeared from the deliberations in the constituent assembly and debates in the newly formed parliament that the central government was expecting a smallscale exodus of Hindu Bengalis from East Pakistan because communal tensions were brought under control in 1950–1. According to the Ministry of Rehabilitation Working Report, 1950–1, till the end of 1950, a little over 14 lakh refugee families were (p.29) resettled in the western and eastern sectors either on the land left by the Muslims (58 per cent) or on private land (38.2 per cent). This was an open admission of the fact that very little effort was made to resettle refugees from West and East Pakistan on state-owned land (see Table 1.2). Table 1.2 Resettlement of Refugees in Different Types of Land S. No.

Families Settled

Per cent

1.

On government acquired land

2,499

1.78

2.

On khasmahal land

2,778

1.98

3.

On Muslim evacuee land

81,611

57.99

4.

On private land

53,826

38.25

Total

1,40,714

100.00

Source: Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, Government of India (1950–1: 22). As mentioned earlier, after the signing of the Nehru–Liaquat Ali Pact, optimism grew and it was hoped that the exodus would come to a halt, and Hindus and Muslims would return to their respective places. A great deal can be learnt from the constituent assembly debates of 1951 on the question of ‘return’ and end of exodus. In 1950 and 1951, prime minister Nehru informed the constituent assembly that ‘considerable progress has been made in the implementation of the agreement, although much still remains to be done’.11 Two cabinet ministers had been working for the implementation and had consistently kept the position under review. The flow of returning migrants, in both directions, had been progressively increasing.12 The following figures would give an idea about the nature of flow of population in both directions:

1.

From West Bengal to East Pakistan (From 9 April 1950 to 4 November 1950)

2.

Hindus

Muslims

11,58,715 (returnees)

656,982 (displaced)

From East Pakistan to West Bengal

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Residues of Partition

(From 9 April 1950 to 4 November 1950) Hindus

Muslims

18,26,276 (displaced)

5,19,523 (returnees)

(p.30) The data presented in the parliament showed more Hindus moving towards West Bengal. As compared to this, the number of Muslims who were moving from West Bengal to East Pakistan was smaller.13 So, initially the Pact had only a minimal effect on the flow of refugees. Nehru reminded the House that it was too early to say whether all returning migrants would stay back permanently. The prime minister made it clear that some of them were trying it out and if conditions did not suit them they would return.14 The number of returnees began to increase in the early months of 1951, but later the number of refugees far exceeded the number of returnees (see Table 1.3). It was quite clear then that the 1950 Pact had little effect on the uprooted Bengalis.

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Residues of Partition

Table 1.3 Movements of Refugees in East India between May and July 1951 For the Week Ending On:

From East Bengal to West Bengal

From West Bengal to East Bengal

Hindu Refugees

Muslim Returnees

Hindu Returnees

Muslim Refugees

6 May 1951

20,479

12,795

34,280

12,689

13 May 1951

26,552

12,374

37,409

12,247

20 May 1951

25,070

12,462

39,490

13,747

27 May 1951

27,188

12,140

40,191

12,886

3 June 1951

30,123

12,565

37,123

13,134

10 June 1951

32,110

12,789

34,258

12,291

17 June 1951

33,490

11,941

29,163

11,563

24 June 1951

44,825

11,929

29,146

10,949

1 July 1951

32,943

9,671

21,408

8,571

8 July 1951

37,911

11,173

26,190

11,613

15 July 1951

36,582

12,891

27,938

12,448

22 July 1951

26,096

11,941

23,197

12,619

29 July 1951

29,643

10,044

20,086

12,161

Total

4,03,012

1,54,715

3,99,879

1,56,918

Source: Government of India, Constituent Assembly Debates, 1951, p. 1470.

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Residues of Partition Although some refugees were going back and forth, by the end of 1951, the minister of state for rehabilitation informed that about 70 lakh refugees were seeking shelter in the western zone, and in the east (p.31) the number reached 20 lakh (Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India 1952: 35). The influx, according to the minister, was coming to a halt. This perception of end of influx by the centre proved wrong when, in the early 1952, the number of displaced seeking refuge in West Bengal began to increase. A large number of factors created panic in the minds of the Hindus in East Pakistan after 1951. One such factor was the plan of the Indian government to introduce passports for those who wished to cross over. Hiranmay Bandyopadhyay (1970) explained how exodus began to rise due to fear that the new rule would seal their fate once and for all. The rise in the number of displaced from mid-1952 can be found in Table 1.4. Table 1.4 Nature of Exodus for Fear of Passports Regulations Month

Year 1952

July August

11,600 7,800

September

10,654

October

31,753

November

1,715

December

755

Total

64,277

Source: H. Bandyopadhyay (1970: 195). Initially, the Ministry of Rehabilitation began collecting data with meticulous details. The month-wise data of arrival were published in the official report. There were ups and downs in the influx that took place between 1953 and 1957, as can be seen in Table 1.5. For instance, in some months in 1956, there was a sharp increase in the number of refugees as a result of new restrictions imposed at the entry points by the central government like issuing migration certificate after scrutiny. From the beginning of 1953, the exodus never came to a halt. The new rules of the state to control inflow of refugees, and the communal riots in different parts of East Pakistan led to a new influx of the displaced in West Bengal. This was recorded by the state government on a monthly basis (Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India 1952: 37).

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Residues of Partition

Table 1.5 Influx of Displaced Persons from East Pakistan (January 1953 to February 1957) Month

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

January

6,164

4,769

17,058

19,206

2,005

February

7,582

6,792

24,983

50,593

2,470

March

9,756

7,035

30,187

55,381

1,266

April

8,870

6,849

19,376

22,752

..

May

7,882

7,685

20,738

30,493

..

June

6,123

7,300

23,816

29,754

..

July

6,268

6,989

25,271

38,033

..

August

5,330

8,612

15,412

47,065

..

September

3,774

11,289

10,966

16,411

..

October

5,336

11,824

16,148

5,344

..

November

4,041

13,232

13,342

2,265

..

December

4,997

25,555

21,734

2,329

..

Total

76,123

1,17,931

2,39,031

3,19,626

5,741

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Annual Report, 1958, p. 39.

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Residues of Partition (p.32) Right from the early 1950s, the Indian state took over the stupendous task of counting the millions of displaced people for relief and rehabilitation. The counting continued intermittently for nearly four decades, since the information was required for rehabilitation and resettlement of millions of Bengalis who crossed the border. Many writers have questioned the methods adopted by the census officials for counting the refugees. For example, Anil Singha (1995) noted that it is not clear from the official data to ascertain exactly how many displaced persons had arrived in West Bengal between 1947 (the year of Partition) and March 1971 (the cut-off year for census operations). Different reports quote different figures. Broadly, three main sources of information on the number of displaced Bengalis are: (a) census reports, (b) official reports published from time to time to ascertain the magnitude of the problem, mainly the reports of the Ministry of Rehabilitation of the Government of India (hereafter MOR reports),15 and (c) reports of the independent commissions.16 Numbers were quoted by politicians or presented at the time of parliamentary and legislative debates. Media reports too covered (p.33) information on the number of displaced. We may take a closer look at the first three sources. Data on displaced persons were collected since 1951 in the census. All those born in East Bengal were recorded as ‘refugees’ in the census. By classifying refugees in this manner, the1971 census estimated (the last census count of Partition refugees) nearly 59 lakh refugees residing in West Bengal. One can get district-wise break up in the census figures. The three districts that received maximum number of displaced persons was 24 Parganas, Nadia, and Bankura (see Table 1.6). The first two were border districts, the third one located in southwest Bengal that offered sanctuary to the refugees. Table 1.6 Number of Refugees in West Bengal, 1971 Census District

No. of Refugees

Percentage

Total (North and South) of 24 Parganas

16,50,000

28.05

Calcutta

9,00,000

15.30

Cooch Behar

4,42,000

7.51

Dinajpur

2,92,500

4.97

Jalpaiguri

2,49,000

4.23

Burdwan

2,40,000

4.08

Bankura

14,15,750

24.07

Hoogli

1,59,000

2.70

Howrah

1,44,000

2.44

Murshidabad

1,35,000

2.29

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Residues of Partition

District

No. of Refugees

Percentage

Malda

1,27,500

2.17

Medinipur

63,000

1.07

Birbhum

15,000

0.25

Purulia

975

0.02

Total

58,81,725

100

Source: Directorate of Census Operations, West Bengal (1971). In 1971, the MOR, the main organization which carried out the counting on behalf of the central government, noted that in all 38.41 lakh displaced persons reached West Bengal from East Pakistan. It stated that by 1950 the flow from West Pakistan almost came to an end but it continued in the eastern region. Between 1946 and 1971, West Bengal had 38.41 lakh displaced people and its neighbouring (p.34) states like Assam, Bihar, and Orissa received a total of 13.33 lakh. The MOR findings then contradict the census reports and showed that by 1971 about 35 lakh displaced persons crossed over to West Bengal. Two government organizations were then quoting two different figures.17 The difference was to the tune of 24 lakh, a large discrepancy indeed. West Bengal was not the only state that bore the brunt of refugee influx. The MOR data showed how refugees arrived in other eastern Indian states over the years (see Table 1.7). Table 1.7 Refugee Influx in West Bengal and Other States as Noted in the Ministry of Rehabilitation Report, 1946–71 Year

Number of Refugees(in Lakhs) In West Bengal

Other States

Total

1946–52

25.18

5.73

30.91

1953

0.16

0.15

0.31

1954

1.04

0.17

1.21

1955

2.12

0.29

2.41

1956

2.47

3.34

5.81

1957

0.04

0.02

0.06

1958 (till 31 March)

0.01

0.00

0.01

1958 (1 April to 31 December)

0.04

0.00

0.04

1959

0.05

0.01

0.06

1960

0.09

0.01

0.1

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Residues of Partition

Year

Number of Refugees(in Lakhs) In West Bengal

Other States

Total

1961

0.1

0.01

0.11

1962

0.13

0.01

0.14

1963

0.14

0.02

0.16

1964

4.19

2.74

6.93

1965

0.18

0.26

0.44

1966

0.04

0.04

0.08

1967

0.05

0.19

0.24

1968

0.04

0.08

0.12

1969

0.04

0.06

0.1

1970

2.23

0.18

2.41

1971 (up to 25 March 1971)

0.07

0.02

0.09

Total

38.41

13.33

51.74

Source: Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India (1981: 39). (p.35) For a comprehensive report, the West Bengal government appointed a Refugee Rehabilitation Committee (RRC) in December 1978 with members acquainted with refugee-related problems. According to the RRC, the number of the displaced in the state of West Bengal reached nearly 80 lakh, which was much higher than the census figures (Government of West Bengal 1981: 1–10). The RRC added that some 2.1 lakh lived in the squatter’s colonies since 1950. If they are added in the estimation then some 76.5 lakh or roughly 80 lakh refugees lived in West Bengal at the time of the completion of the RRC report in 1981. The RRC found the MOR estimate faulty on many counts. First, the influx of roughly 6 lakh between 1964 and 1971, often quoted in the central government reports, is not in conformity with reality as more people had looked for shelter in West Bengal. Second, the MOR head counts missed out huge number of squatter’s colonies located in different parts of the state. Many displaced persons who did not have access to camps or who took shelter in houses left vacant by evacuee Muslims or government barracks and building, and who squatted in open lands were not included in the final counting. The MOR, according to RRC, took note of little over three-fourth of total refugees in the state (Government of West Bengal 1981: 2). Census surveys left out many unauthorized colonies, camps which stood in the way of recording the actual figure.

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Residues of Partition Like independent commissions, the figures quoted by the politicians either at the time of the legislative assembly debates or in the parliament were higher than the MOR figures. For example, on 30 July 1964 a prominent Congress leader, Atulya Ghosh, pointed out that up to the end of 1963 a total of 48.64 lakh refugees from East Pakistan had entered West Bengal, out of which only a small fraction of 1.54 lakh went outside the state. Ghosh added that they were overcrowding the cities and rural areas and disrupting normal life. However, in tune with the central government, Ghosh said, ‘West Bengal fully agreed with the Union government’s stance that only those who were prepared to go out of the state could receive rehabilitation benefits. This decision was taken because West Bengal had virtually reached a saturation point in regard to the availability of land and other resources for rehabilitation’ (The Statesman, 12 June 1955). Ghosh was not the lone member in the state Congress to voice concern over refugee influx. Several Congress MPs made the (p.36) same point at the time of the parliamentary debates, and in the state legislative assembly.18 The MOR, by quoting figures that were far less than the actual number, probably wanted to convey to the concerned persons that the refugee situation was not so alarming in the eastern sector. Therefore, fewer funds were required for relief and rehabilitation work. The resources were used on a war footing to meet the refugee crisis in the western sector. The ruling party and its leadership realized that refugees in the western sector were going to be the crucial vote banks for them. The displaced people from West Pakistan did not disappoint the ruling Congress party for its generosity. The Congress did dominate the politics of Delhi city after Partition, mainly with the support of the refugees. In the first parliamentary elections held in 1952, it won 49.4 per cent of the popular votes and the Jana Sangh managed to secure 25.9 per cent, even after using the plight of the refugees as their main plank for the election. In 1957, the Congress did even better, and won 54.3 per cent of the votes cast. The Jana Sangh secured 19.7 per cent only. Dipankar Gupta noted that ‘the fact that the refugees had left a Muslim dominated West Punjab may have taken the communal pressure off them. It is also true that the Congress worked hard to provide relief and rehabilitation to the refugees’ (1996: 38).19 The relief and rehabilitation turned into an appeasement policy by the centre towards refugees in Delhi and other parts of western India. As compared to the eastern sector, the gravity of the mass exodus in western India was blown out of proportion. Expenditure data on relief and rehabilitation work will help in explaining the point of preferential treatment to the refugees in western India. Till the end of 1960s, only a sum of 94.60 crore was available for the economic rehabilitation of refugees in West Bengal. In the western wing 69.78 crore were spent on relief, 14.32 crore on education and 47.40 crore for medical facilities. In addition, 115.37 crore more were available for economic rehabilitation of West Pakistani refugees. Besides, 191 crore had been paid to them as compensation. Together, they all add up to a total of 380.47 crore.20 So, in effect, the western sector received four times Page 19 of 68

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Residues of Partition more for relief and rehabilitation than their counterpart in the east. This discriminatory policy, as many scholars have argued, was one of the reasons for alienating the refugees from the ruling Congress party in the state of West Bengal which became the main theme in Prafulla (p.37) K. Chakrabarti’s work (1999). By the end of the 1960s, the refugee support base in the state went out of the hands of the Congress. The refugees with their organizations and day to day struggles for a dignified living came into the political limelight. This development offered the Left opposition parties a chance to gain the support of millions of uprooted Bengalis. They did not waste the opportunity; the Left parties and their numerous organizations of workers and peasants joined the refugees in their struggle for a better life in West Bengal.21 Refugee influx after 1950s had adversely affected the demographic structure of many districts in West Bengal. District-wise variations of refugee population can hardly be found in the official literature. A survey showed some patterns in the movement of displaced Bengalis from various districts in East Pakistan to West Bengal. For example, refugees from Jessore mostly reached Nadia, 24 Parganas and Calcutta; refugees from Kushtia mostly arrived in the district of Nadia and refugees from Dinajpur tried to settle down in West Dinajpur and Jalpaiguri. It is clear that the movement from all the western districts of East Pakistan was towards the adjacent districts. However, the displaced from central or eastern parts of East Pakistan remained in Calcutta and 24 Parganas. Refugees from North Bengal districts tried to remain in adjacent districts in West Bengal. For instance, refugees from Mymansingh went to Cooch Behar and Jalpaiguri districts. Similarly, refugees from Rangpur reached Cooch Behar, Jalpaiguri, and the neighbouring state of Assam in large numbers. Thus, most refugees preferred to move into contiguous or close-by districts, and they remained within a radius of 100 miles. It was noted in a survey in 1950 that the total number of migrant families in Nadia went up to 84,913. The district demographic structure began to change as refugees arrived. They came in the following manner: 42 per cent from Kushtia, 12.6 per cent from Faridpur, 11.6 per cent from Jessore, 10.7 per cent from Dhaka, and the rest from other areas. Neither the census nor any official survey took note of this kind of spatial dislocation (J. Chatterjee 2007: 120–1).

Unwanted Harijans Although studies are now available on the Partition and the displacement of population in eastern India, very little is known about (p.38) the uprooted untouchables or SCs and STs, particularly those who sought refuge in various camps in West Bengal. Who were these displaced untouchable castes? Why did they flee? How has the Indian state dealt with their problems of rehabilitation? In a study on the Hindu and Muslim population in Bengal, published just before Partition, S.P. Chatterjee (1947) pointed out that in 1941 the SC population was little over 71 lakh in Bengal, and if the province had been partitioned on the basis of religion, then some 44 lakh SCs will live in ‘Hindu Bengal’ or West Page 20 of 68

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Residues of Partition Bengal (62 per cent of the total population) and the rest in East Bengal (S.P. Chatterjee 1947: 27). Chatterjee made use of the census data but made his divisions of ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim Bengal’ as per the overall population structure in the province, different territorial claims made by the two communities, and the likely territorial division that was envisaged by the Radcliffe Commission. Let us take a closer look at the SC population in Bengal districts as compiled by Chatterjee on the basis of the 1941 census (see Tables 1.8 and 1.9) (S.P. Chatterjee 1947: 5–10).22 Table 1.8 Scheduled Caste Population in Different Parts of ‘Hindu Bengal’ District

Percentage

Population

Burdwan Division

41.40

18,35,038

Jalpaiguri

7.45

3,25,504

Rangpur (parts)*

2.69

60,532

Dinajpur**

13.48

3,02,218

Malda

2.99

67,003

Calcutta

2.46

55,228

Murshidabad

6.03

1,35,216

Nadia

2.50

56,148

24 Parganas

6,82,708

Khulna

9.35

4,12,527

Faridpur*

6.77

3,00,420

Bakerganj*

3.85

1,70,136

Hindu Bengal (Total)

100.00

22,42,136

Source: S.P. Chatterjee (1947: 27). Notes: * Became part of East Pakistan. ** Divided into two halves, one remaining with West Bengal, the other joining East Pakistan. (p.39) As the tables indicate, 44.31 lakh SCs lived in Chatterjee’s ‘Hindu Bengal’. One should add that this was Chatterjee’s imagined ‘Hindu Bengal’. Let us look at the SC population in Muslim Bengal (see Table 1.9). Table 1.9 Scheduled Caste Population in Different Parts of ‘Muslim Bengal’ Page 21 of 68

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Residues of Partition

District

Population

Percentage

Rangpur

3,50,737

12.77

Bogura

61,303

2.25

Pabna

1,14,728

4.17

Dinajpur**

91,578

3.34

Rajshahi

54,531

1.98

Mymensingh

3,40,676

12.40

Dacca

4,09,905

14.94

Faridpur

5,27,496

19.22

Bakerganj

4,27,667

15.57

Tipera

2,27,643

8.29

Noakhali

81,817

2.98

Chittagong

57,024

2.08

Chittagong Hill Tract

283

0.01

Muslim Bengal (Total)

27,45,388

100.00

Source: S.P. Chatterjee (1947: 27). Note: ** The district was divided into two halves, one remaining with West Bengal and the other joining East Pakistan. The actual division of Bengal did not take place the way Chatterjee imagined ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim Bengal’ (S.P. Chatterjee 1947: 5–12).23 However, it is important to note that the Muslim part in Chatterjee’s study remained almost intact with East Pakistan and many areas were carved out from ‘Hindu Bengal’ and added latter to ‘Muslim Bengal’, for example, Rangpur, parts of Dinajpur, Khulna, Faridpur, and Bakerganj. This, then raises the number of SCs in East Pakistan to over 27 lakh. A small fraction of this gigantic SC population left East Pakistan during the early part of Partition but mass exodus began to accelerate from the early 1950s and reached its peak in mid-1950s. For various economic and political reasons, the SCs were waiting patiently before joining the caste Hindu’s westward journey. They wanted their leader Jogen Mondal to take a call (Usuda 1977: 39).24 (p.40) Let us first explore the political reasons that prompted them to stay back. Numerically, in pre-Partition Bengal, the most significant SCs were the following castes: Namasudra, Rajbangshi, Muchi, Dhoba, Dom, Hari, Kaura, Lohar, and Mal; population of each exceeded 1 lakh. Out of these castes, the Namasudras and the Rajbangshis were residing in large numbers in East Page 22 of 68

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Residues of Partition Bengal. The Namasudras formed a numerically substantial group in the districts like Faridpur, Bakerganj, Khulna, and Jessore and the Rajbangshis were dominant in the North Bengal districts of Rangpur, Jalpaiguri, Cooch Behar, and Dinajpur. The primary occupation of both these castes was land husbandry although many Namasudras in East Bengal were fishermen. Commenting on their caste occupation, N.K. Bose wrote: In Bengal, and especially in East Bengal, wherever there are rivers and canals, one finds members of the Namasudra caste. Hindu society has always despised this agricultural caste and has gone to the extent of treating its members as untouchables, and making them live in separate hamlets on the fringes of the village. Besides agriculture, navigating boats was also a traditional occupation of the Namasudras. (1994: 161) Risley considered the Namasudras a non-Aryan caste of Bengal and similar to those of Chandals or scavengers. In Risley’s The Tribes and Castes of Bengal (1892) one finds no reference to Namasudras, as they were all included under the heading of ‘Chandals’. The same can be noted in the account of James Wise (1883). Rajbangshis were peasants like the Namasudras (S. Basu 1994: 43–65). They had distinct cultural mores which were common among many tribes in north Bengal and Assam. They claimed Kshatriya status at the time of the 1911 census. In East Bengal they were residing in the districts of Rangpur, Sylhet, Rajshahi, and Dinajpur. The demand for Partition brought about new political alignment. In a letter published in a daily, Jogen Mondal, the well-known SC leader, expressed his reservation against Partition in the following way: … the caste Hindu leaders who had so vehemently criticized Dr. Ambedkar for his ‘Thoughts on Pakistan’ and Mr. Jinnah for his proposal for the transfer of population, appear now themselves to (p.41) advocate those very proposals…. I want to make it clear that the scheduled castes are opposed to the proposal for the Partition of Bengal. (S. Bandyopadhyay 2001: 184) On the question of dividing Bengal, Mondal observed, The division of the province into Hindu and Muslim Bengal (was) not a solution to the communal problems. It would check the growing political consciousness and ruthlessly crush the solidarity of the scheduled castes in Bengal…. While the scheduled castes in eastern Bengal … (would) be at the mercy of the majority community (Muslim), the scheduled castes in West Bengal (would be subjected to perpetual slavery of caste Hindus. Hence the scheduled castes of this province (could) not be a party to such a mischievous and dangerous move. (Usuda 1977: 37–9)

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Residues of Partition Furthermore, on specific matters pertaining to the division of Bengal districts, Mondal added, The scheduled castes are in a majority in many areas and as such their voice should prevail…. In order to assess the views of the Hindus, it is necessary that the views of the 62.5 per cent non-Muslim population should be correctly ascertained. (Usuda 1977: 43–5) The demand for an independent state of Bengal, which Mondal had in mind, was proved to be too unrealistic. It became clear in the early months of 1947 that the Partition of Bengal was inevitable. In the event of Partition, Mondal wanted the SCs to stay back in East Pakistan. He made his point in the following way: After the fall of the Fazlul Haq Ministry in March 1943, with a party of 21 scheduled caste MLAs, I agreed to cooperate with Khaza Nazimmudin, the then leader of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party who formed the cabinet in April, 1943 … the principal objectives that prompted me to work in cooperation with the Muslims was, first, that the economic interests of the Muslims in Bengal were generally identical with those of the scheduled castes. Muslims were mostly cultivators, labourers, so were members of the scheduled castes…. Secondly, the scheduled castes and Muslims were both educationally and economically backward. (S. Bandyopadhyay 2001: 158) (p.42) Besides political reasons, the SCs whose primary occupation was land husbandry in East Bengal, found it difficult to leave their only source of livelihood all of a sudden. They lacked resources that could have seen them through during the initial period of resettlement. Hence, there was hesitation. Second, as mentioned earlier, Jogen Mondal’s call to the SCs to remain in Pakistan did influence his followers to give up the idea to go to India. Mondal’s acceptance of a cabinet berth and Jinnah’s assurance to the SCs of safe life in East Pakistan helped in giving confidence to many SCs. Third, in East Bengal, the districts where SCs lived in large numbers, for example, Faridpur, Barisal, Khulna, Jessore, and Rangpur, were not riot prone areas at the time of Partition. Therefore, fear of communal riots did not force them out (S. Bandyopadhyay 2001: 159). Finally, the influence of popular peasant uprisings, like the Tebhaga, that took place just before Partition offered solidarity to the Muslims and the SC peasants in several districts, like Dinajpur, Murshidabad, and Jalpaiguri. The bond was too strong to be weakened by the campaign of the political parties especially by the Hindu Mahasabha for the Hinduization of Bengal.25 However, the Khulna massacre in 1952 was a watershed, an eye-opener to Jogen Mondal, leader of the downtrodden in East Pakistan. Widespread communal violence convinced Mondal that East Pakistan was not a safe place for

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Residues of Partition untouchables anymore. Communal frenzy left no section of the Hindu community untouched. This is why Mondal wrote in his resignation letter: It is with a heavy heart and a sense of utter frustration at the failure of my life-long mission to uplift the backward Hindu masses of East Bengal that I feel compelled to tender resignation of my membership of your cabinet … to my utter regret it is to be stated that after Partition, particularly after the death of the Quaid-E-Azam, the scheduled castes have not received a fair deal in any matter. (The Indian Commission of Jurists Committee 1965: 356) Heartbroken, Mondal’s sojourn with the Muslim League came to an end. He asked his SC followers to leave East Pakistan. At one point the exodus was so sudden and so large in number that on 31 March 1955, during a parliamentary debate, N.C. Chatterjee, an MP from West Bengal, tried to draw attention of the prime minister by saying, (p.43) You know in the districts of Khulna, Barisal and Jessore, in one compact block, there are 14 lakh Namasudras living. They have started to move…. That is something which must be stopped. (S. Bandyopadhyay 2001: 191) Chatterjee was subsequently joined by other members from West Bengal in highlighting the plight of the SCs. Shyma Prasad Mukherjee, leader of the Jana Sangh, presented their story at the parliament on several occasions. The other prominent Bengali intellectual who upheld their cause in public meetings and in the parliament, was scientist Meghnad Saha. Being a refugee and one from a downtrodden family, Saha fought for the refugees, and considered it as his important mission in life. Throughout the 1950s the influx of SC population continued, their number increased rapidly for over one-and-a-half decades. This can be ascertained by the fact that between 1951 and 1971, the SC population increased in several districts in the state of West Bengal. Table 1.10 District-wise Distribution of Scheduled Caste Population in West Bengal (in Percentage) 1951

1961

1971

Cooch Bihar

40.15

46.90

47.03

Jalpaiguri

25.72

30.80

34.02

Darjeeling

5.86

13.19

12.57

West Dinajpur

17.09

21.64

23.10

Maldah

14.54

13.38

16.48

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Residues of Partition

1951

1961

1971

Murshidabad

11.64

12.32

12.27

Nadia

16.72

20.44

21.20

24 Parganas

22.86

24.28

22.61

Calcutta

4.85

4.33

3.78

Bardhaman

26.68

24.45

24.51

Birbhum

29.77

29.14

30.00

Bankura

31.19

29.60

28.22

Purulia

-

14.77

14.9

Medinipur

14.37

12.98

13.57

Haora

13.76

14.71

12.31

Hugli

20.59

18.95

19.08

Chandernagar

10.93

-

-

West Bengal

18.93

19.73

19.90

Source: Directorate of Census Operations, West Bengal (1951, 1961, and 1971). Neither the centre nor the state government made any attempt to count the number of displaced SCs separately in the camps and colonies in West Bengal and outside. The only source of information that is available to date is the report prepared by the census officials on the percentage of SC population in the districts of West Bengal. From the census, one gets to know that between 1951 and 1971, the SC population increased at an alarming rate in the border districts like 24 Parganas, Nadia, Malda, Murshidabad, West Dinajpur, Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling, and Cooch Behar (see Table 1.10). For instance, in Cooch Behar the percentage of SC population increased from 40.15 in 1951 to 47.03 in 1971, in Jalpaiguri it increased from 25.72 in 1951 to 34.02 in 1971 and in Nadia the percentage increase was from 16.72 to 21.20 during the above-mentioned period. The sudden increase of SC population in various districts was primarily a result of mass exodus of the SCs. However, the central government maintained silence towards the displaced SCs in Bengal. This is intriguing, particularly in view of the fact that special rehabilitation measures for the ‘Harijans’ were taken up in the western zone (Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India 1951: 25). If we compare the census data with the official figures published in 1955, then we can safely conclude that the SCs were latecomers (see (p.44) Table 1.11). In

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Residues of Partition 1952, out of the total displaced persons, only 21 per cent belonged to the SC community, 2.6 per cent were STs and 76 per cent were the upper caste Hindus.

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Residues of Partition

Table 1.11 Migrant Families in Districts of West Bengal by Community, 1955 Serial No.

District

Upper Caste Hindu

Scheduled Caste

Scheduled Tribe

Others

Total

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

Burdwan

20,740

3,785

…

91

24,616

2

Birbhum

1,833

776

23

23

2,655

3

Bankura

189

99

296

…

584

4

Midnapur

5,690

325

…

43

6,058

5

Howrah

15,610

1,164

…

53

16,827

6

Hugli

10,652

1,463

…

…

12,115

7

24 Parganas

79,362

20,944

94

164

1,00,564

8

Calcutta

73,927

1,681

25

445

76,078

9

Nadia

55,591

28,707

260

355

84,913

10

Murshidabad

8,053

5,746

625

…

14,424

11

West Dinajpur

14,567

6,592

6,146

…

27,305

12

Malda

5,660

5,997

3,072

147

14,876

13

Jalpaiguri

14,061

6,397

23

115

20,596

14

Darjeeling

2,037

1,388

…

…

3,425

15

Total

30,7972

85,064

10,564

1,436

4,05,036

Source: Government of West Bengal, Report on Refugees, 1955, p. 7. Page 28 of 68

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Residues of Partition By the end of 1952, the upper caste Hindus began to move towards cities and towns, whereas the SCs and STs went to rural areas and new satellite towns like Ranaghat, Krishnanangar, West Dinajpur, Jalpaiguri, and Cooch Behar. Compared to caste Hindus, both the SCs and STs were small in number (Table 1.11). During the constituent assembly debates in 1949 the minister of state for rehabilitation announced that the Harijans belonged to the rural and backward sections of our society. They were in need of prompt and adequate relief. A separate section in the Ministry of Rehabilitation was necessary to deal with their cases. This is why in the ministry, a ‘Harijan Cell’ began to function from March 1956 for (p.45) the West Pakistani refugees. Nearly 5.5 lakh Harijan refugees arrived, and their place of origin was as follows:

1.    Harijans from West Punjab

3,50,000

2.    Harijans from Sind

1,50,000

3.    Harijans from Bhawalpur and NWFP

30,000

4.    Harijans from other areas

20,000

He added that by March 1949, special care was taken for them.26 As mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Rehabilitation decided to set up a separate ‘Harijan Cell’ in the rehabilitation office, which started functioning from 15 February 1948. According to the official report, The East Punjab government temporarily allotted 50,000 acres of agricultural land in 570 villages to 4,900 Harizan [sic] families … (p.46) Some 4000 refugees from Bhawalpur were settled on land in the fertile tract of Ganga Colony at Sri Ganganagar in Bikaner state … three hundred one-room houses for Harizans were under construction in Ahmedabad … About 3000 Harizan refugees were able to secure employment in Ahmedabad. (Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India 1951: 26) Subsequent reports published by the Ministry of Rehabilitation referred to more such steps that were undertaken for the Harijans in the western zone. For example, it was noted in the 1952–3 report: In respect of housing, the Board has itself implemented eight schemes at Delhi, Ajmer, Beware, Ahmedabad and Bombay under which 2,203 oneroom tenements have been constructed at a cost of Rs. 36.99 lakh to provide housing to displaced Harijans…. The Board also helped to secure employment for 8,802 families and assisted in the resettlement of 17,273 families on agricultural land and through their efforts loans amounting to Rs. 8.27 lakh have been granted to 4,112 families of Harijan craftsmen and Page 29 of 68

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Residues of Partition artisans, and 20 cooperative societies have been established. (Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India 1953: 21–2) Resettlement of Harijans became an extremely crucial issue in view of the fact that Gandhi became the chief spokesperson for their rights. Segregation of Harijans in the resettlement plan drew the attention of the MPs. This is why on 16 April 1960, the relief and rehabilitation minister was asked whether the Harijans had been segregated in camps and rehabilitation centres: Q. Whether it is also a fact that there are certain colonies specifically allotted to the scheduled castes (sweepers) community people? RM … in a part of Kalkaji and Lajpat Nagar a block of tenements have been exclusively allotted to displaced persons belonging to scheduled castes. Q. May I know whether there was an agreement between the government and scheduled caste displaced persons about the payment of the cost of the houses provided to them? A. So far we have never allotted a single house to anybody free of cost.27 (p.47) Many MPs openly criticized the policy to sell houses to the SCs who had hardly any money to pay. In the western sector, the centre took care of the problems of the SCs; the story was quite different as far as eastern India was concerned. The state used both coercion and control while dealing with the SC refugees in West Bengal. By control, I mean all the steps taken by the state to stop influx. Migration certificates were one such instrument of control, which was introduced in September 1956 in India. In order to tighten its requirement, Nehru reported that a more stringent control method will be introduced to force the displaced Bengalis to obtain passports in East Pakistan to come to India. The announcement that 1955 was the cut-off year for relief and rehabilitation for the refugees was another method to control mass migration from East Pakistan to West Bengal. By far, the most effective method of control was constant vigil and patrolling at the border areas to make border-crossing a difficult proposition.28 One important coercive step that was undertaken while dispersing refugees was to send them to new resettlement colonies located outside West Bengal. By 31 August 1955, the government had sent 444 families from West Bengal to Orissa and the Andamans (Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India 1956: 27). There were agricultural or non-agricultural families and accordingly assistance was offered keeping in mind their occupations. The rehabilitation minister pointed out in the parliament that the policy of the government was to accommodate and rehabilitate displaced persons within Bengal, Assam, Orissa, and Bihar.29 The number of refugees in West Bengal reached 28 lakh by 1955, the state, as noted by some politicians, had reached a ‘saturation point’. The newly coined term ‘saturation point’ became popular among all those who were Page 30 of 68

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Residues of Partition in favour of sending refugees outside West Bengal for resettlement. In response to the demand for rehabilitating refugees in contiguous states like Assam and Orissa, the minister replied, In the neighbouring provinces of Assam, Bihar and Orissa … the number of displaced persons there is already fairly large. So with a view to meet the increasing influx from East Pakistan, we have to locate other areas for them, these may not be in the vicinity of West Bengal.30 (p.48) He added, There is already a fixed quota for Andamans. That quota has not yet been exhausted. We can send about 4,000 families to Andamans and we have already been able to send about 1000.31 It was obvious, then, that the centre was contemplating a new resettlement plan for the refugees in West Bengal.

Three Sites: The State and SC Refugees Three sites of state–refugee encounters can be identified in order to follow the nature of coercive strategies against marginalized sections of the society. These sites are: (a) Cooper’s Camp, a refugee camp located near Ranaghat railway station in Nadia district, (b) the resettlement colony, Dandakaranya, located in parts of Orissa and Madhya Pradesh, and (c) Marichjhapi, a small island located in the Sundarbans region of 24 Parganas. In these three locations, the displaced SCs, mostly Namasudras, were involved in resisting the state against forced deportation and eviction. When a parliamentary committee visited Dandakaranya for inspection, the members were informed that most of the displaced persons resettled there belonged to the Namasudra and Paundra Kshatriya caste, recognized as SCs in West Bengal. During the parliamentary debate in 1955 Nehru informed that … it appears that what are called scheduled castes or Namasudras are coming over in considerable number. Why they should be coming in such large numbers is difficult for us to say.… Deteriorating economic condition, feeling of insecurity for the future and other causes must have been operating there for the last few years.32 These latecomers went to camps and colonies for shelter and to eke out a living. They settled in large numbers in Cooper’s Camp. Prafulla K. Chakrabarti writes, More than 70 per cent of the entire camp population were Namasudra agriculturalist.… They were excellent cultivators and fishermen. In the suffocating atmosphere of relief camps they found life completely (p.49) insupportable. They missed the wide fields and the broad streams. In the relief camps where they lived huddled together, they were seized with a Page 31 of 68

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Residues of Partition killing despair which was heightened by the perception that they were unwanted in their own land and that they would be transferred to alien lands and settled in difficult terrain unfit for cultivation. (1999: 209)33 (p.50) In Dandakaranya, on many occasions it was pointed out that most of the resettlers were SCs, mostly Namasudras and Paundra Kshatriyas.34 And as far as Marichjhapi is concerned, Mallick (1999), Mondal (2002), and Bepari (2013) pointed out that barring a few the settlers refugees were outcaste Namasudras. The Namasudras began to cross the border in large numbers from 1954 onwards. After the arrival they realized their trauma was far from over as the government drew up a plan to deport them to Dandakaranya. Dandakaranya, was formally inaugurated on 5 September 1958, was completed at a cost of Rs 100 crore. The Namasudras in Cooper’s Camp came in contact with the harsh realities of life. Both Hiranmay Bandyopadhyay (1970) and Chakrabarti (1999) described at length the inhuman condition in Cooper’s Camp.35 The camp came into limelight in 1954 when a report of the Committee of Ministers for the Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons in West Bengal, noted that the size of Cooper’s Camp is too large and disadvantageous from the point of view of both administration and inmates (see Map 1.3). The Committee suggested that a substantial number of refugees Map 1.2 The Location of Dandakaranya be shifted to other smaller in Central India camps (Government of India 1954: 36–7). Cooper’s Camp Source: Drawn under supervision of the attracted refugees because of author. its proximity to Ranaghat Note: Map not to scale and does not railway station, close to the represent authentic international border areas. The large tract of boundaries. agricultural land surrounding the camp offered an opportunity to the refugees to work as agricultural labourers. The camp was located in a place which was used by the British army at the time of the World War II to store food and ammunition. Page 32 of 68

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Residues of Partition Several large godowns were built for this purpose. These godowns were later used by the refugees for shelter. The Committee of Ministers was told that many families remained there for a considerable time and had refused to move to rehabilitation centres elsewhere even when they were offered rehabilitation benefits. The Committee noted, The recalcitrant families should be dealt with firmly and ejected from the camp if they refuse to fall in line with the dispersal programme of the authorities. (Government of India 1954: 23) The report suggested suitable measures to move the refugees out of Cooper’s Camp. The Committee, however, was against sending the camp refugees to other states. Thus it noted, (p.51) Ordinarily, under these circumstances, a considerable proportion of the displaced persons should have been sent to the states other than West Bengal, but as our comments in a subsequent section will show, the rehabilitation of East Bengal displaced persons in states outside West Bengal has presented several difficulties and we are convinced that, except in respect to Andamans, efforts in this direction will not yield any substantial result. We have, therefore, to find ways and means of resettling these persons in West Bengal as best as possible under the circumstances. We understand that the acquisition of about 13,000 acres of land is under contemplation and the acquisition of this land should be completed with the utmost speed. There are, however, about 27,000 acres of evacuee land lying unoccupied. This matter should be investigated further for utilizing the land for rehabilitation of displaced persons. In addition to the 40,000 acres of land which may thus be available, we suggest that all possibilities for developing and reclaiming land which is at present unfit for cultivation should be explored. A scheme for the reclamation of land in SonarpurArrapanch and Bagjola areas has recently been sanctioned and it is anticipated that about 30,000 to 35,000 acres of land may thus become available for resettling the displaced persons. This land, when reclaimed, will be particularly suitable as it lies in the vicinity of Calcutta. The feasibility of reclaiming any additional areas of land in a similar manner at reasonable cost should also be examined and additional reclamation schemes prepared in the light of such examination. (Government of India 1954: 35) The committee went a step ahead and suggested other ways to identify land for rehabilitation. It noted that about 2.5 lakh acres of agricultural land were originally reported as evacuee property. These lands could be used for rehabilitation. It also took note of the fact that in view of the heavy influx of displaced persons from East Bengal into West Bengal and the difficulties experienced in rehabilitating this large number of displaced persons in West Page 33 of 68

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Residues of Partition Bengal, efforts should be made to settle the displaced persons in the neighbouring states of Bihar and Orissa, if not in West Bengal. Assam and Tripura had received migrants directly from East Pakistan and the number of displaced persons in these states was rising. These states were likely to experience more influx of refugees. Under these circumstances, the question of rehabilitation in these states could be ruled out.36 (p.52) The state was not bound by the recommendation of the commissions. This is why, in spite of the recommendation of the Committee of Ministers, refugees were dispersed to different states for resettlement where suitable land was identified for them. States agreed to take them only when they found land. Land found in other states for resettlement in this manner was far from adequate. Therefore, there was a need to find a large tract of land. In July 1957, the relief and rehabilitation minister reported that a high-level committee was appointed to examine the possibility of developing a large tract of contiguous areas in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa for the resettlement of displaced persons form East Pakistan. The area would be about 80,000 square miles and it would be a long-term project. The minister was asked whether in view of the natural desire of the refugees to be in West Bengal, the government could consider their rehabilitation in the Sundarbans.37 The minister gave no assurance about resettlement in West Bengal, instead with great fanfare, the minister announced a plan to send the refugees to Dandakaranya in central India (see Map 1.2). That this was not going to be voluntary became quite apparent when the government had set a target on the number of refugees that they planned to take to the Dandakaranya area and decided to set a deadline for this.38 Experiments with resettlement plans yielded little results, since desertion on a mass scale was reported from many areas in the Dandakaranya resettlement colony. The deserters reached West Bengal in large numbers from the states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Orissa. Because of large-scale desertion one MP said, ‘I would suggest no refugees should be taken from West Bengal.’39 Another MP noted that dispersal of refugees was a result of the failure of the government to resettle the refugees in the state. He said, In 1957 the minister promised that he would legalize the colony speedily. In the last three years only 80 colonies have been legalized out of 140 colonies. He assured that he would make arrangements for the employment of 9,000 persons by giving financial aid to 19 factories. For that scheme money had been sanctioned…. Only 2,000 refugees have been employed out of the 9000.40 Very little was done to recover land in West Bengal. Was there enough land for the purpose of rehabilitation in West Bengal? The (p.53) fact-finding committee of the central Ministry of Rehabilitation sought information relating to Page 34 of 68

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Residues of Partition availability of land from the government of West Bengal. Besides evacuee land, it was pointed out that 26,000 acres of land were uncultivable waste which could have been used for rehabilitation purposes. These figures were provided by none other than the then rehabilitation commissioner of the government of West Bengal.41 This certainly explored the myth of land scarcity in the state of West Bengal. There were two other issues raised by many observers. First, why was no attempt made to take over land under the Land Acquisition Act? And second, why were no steps taken to introduce land reform measures expeditiously? The state government’s position regarding land scarcity was hardly tenable. An early implementation of the land reforms acts would have given the state thousands of acres of surplus land which could have been used for rehabilitation.

Dandakaranya The Dandakaranya mega project for resettlement of Bengali refugees was planned in the late-1950s. While the parliamentarians were debating the feasibility of resettling refugees in West Bengal, the centre went ahead with the Dandakaranya project. All the refugees in Cooper’s Camp were told to move to Dandakaranya. In all, 45,000 families were identified to be deported to Dandakaranya from West Bengal. The Dandakaranya Development Authority was constituted in the year 1958. For the project, land was acquired in the district of Bastar in Madhya Pradesh and Koraput in Orissa (see Map 1.2). The mythological significance of the place was described in one of the official publications under the heading ‘Dandakaranya Project’ in the following way: The Ramayana contains several beautiful episodes describing Rama’s sojourn in the Dandakaranya forest where the demon Dandaka held sway. Here Rama spent thirteen years in exile with his wife Sita and his brother Laxman and it was from here that Sita was forcibly taken away by Ravana, the king of Lanka. It was on the banks of the gentle river Tamasa in the south of Dandakaranya that Rama lived, and as legend has it, the first stanza of the ancient epic was also written here. (Dandakaranya Development Authority 1959: 1)42 (p.54) This mythological place of Rama’s exile was found to be an ideal site for the resettlement of the Bengali refugees. The story from the Ramayana possibly dissuaded many refugees than attracted them because the official described it was an ideal place for living in exile. Why Dandakaranya was selected for resettlement? The question was raised time and again by the MPs on the floor of the parliament. The rehabilitation minister pointed out that about 45,000 will have no shelter in West Bengal, no land was available for their rehabilitation in the state. During the parliamentary debate the rehabilitation minister said, Now these 45000 families come to roughly about 2 lakh persons. Even if you take about 3 to 4 acres as an economic unit in West Bengal you want

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Residues of Partition about 2 lakh acres of land. I still hold and maintain that West Bengal has reached a saturation point.43 The state government was asked to close down the camps before sending refugees to Dandakaranya. The deputy minister of rehabilitation, P.S. Naskar, informed the parliament that steps to close down the camps for displaced persons from East Pakistan were undertaken by the ministry and dispersal of the refugees would proceed according to the plans taken by the states of Bihar and Orissa. In Tripura, all the 14 camps had been closed by April 1959, and in all 27,200 inmates were dispersed from camps in the above three states during the year ending June 1959. Only 6,238 were living in camps in Bihar and Orissa in 1959. In the case of West Bengal, however, the progress was slow. Only 43,000 persons left, the state government closed down 27 camps. Various attempts were made for the dispersal of refugees from camps in West Bengal. It was reported that those who refused to cooperate with the plans had to face punitive actions by the state.44 The payment of dole had been scrapped. In response to these observations an MP asked the minister, It is quite clear now that the target date laid down for closing all the refugee camps in West Bengal could not be adhered to—it has failed—may I know whether those refugees who had participated in the Satyagraha and to whom the doles had been stopped will now be given the doles again?45 (p.55) The deputy minister replied by saying, Certain refugees participated in the agitation against law and order in the State and they were convicted. Instructions were issued by the state government to stop their doles, but certain arrangements have been made by the state government to give them some relief in kind including by way of giving money or clothes.46 It was quite evident then that the dispersal plan was far from voluntary in nature. By setting a deadline and threatening to close the camps, the Ministry of Rehabilitation hardly gave an option to the refugees. The target date set by the government became the centre of controversy in the parliament. The rehabilitation minister was asked in the parliament, what exactly was the objective basis for fixing the target date as 30 June 1959 for sending refugees to Dandakaranya project? In response, the minister for relief and rehabilitation said that owing to unforeseen circumstances, it was difficult to keep the earlier target date. The minister said that by 30 June 1959, the government would close the camps and step up the dispersal programme, come what may, and a new date was agreed upon.47 Let us look at some other points of objection raised against the project by the MPs.

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Residues of Partition By the middle of 1960, the central government had spent a whopping 68 crore of rupees for the Dandakaranya Resettlement Project which meant for the resettlement of 22 lakh refugees.48 The parliamentary sessions in the mid-1960s were marked by heated exchange of views on this grand resettlement project, the brain child of rehabilitation minister, Mehr Chand Khanna. The issue rocked the parliament on several occasions. The members pointed out lacunae in the project plans. First, it was implemented in haste. But the government maintained that in the early 1960s, when number of refugees in the eastern region went up to 40.81 lakh, this was the only hope to solve the gigantic problem of resettlement with a reasonable time-frame. By setting a date to close down the camps, the government ruled out the possibilities of negotiations. On 2 May 1962, the rehabilitation minister informed the parliament, All the camps have been closed, first we gave them 60 days notice, extended to 90 days and again extending to 150 days and then it came to nearly a year. My idea is to show as much consideration and (p.56) sympathy to these unfortunate people as possible. It is not for me to say how many would like to go there, but according to the government of West Bengal about 30000 refugees might go there during the session.49 Dandakaranya was a rugged terrain for refugees; reclamation of land from forest was an uphill task for them. An MP asked the minister: May I know whether it is a fact that the displaced persons so far transferred to Dandadkaranya from West Bengal found to their disappointment that the promises made at the time of the transfer are not redeemed and they are faced with the situation of no land, no jobs, no home and not even a plough to cultivate the land with and, if so, what steps have been taken to improve the conditions there before pressurizing refugees in West Bengal to move to Dandakaranya?50 The minister concluded by saying that all aspects of resettlement were fully taken into consideration, and he added that huge sums of money were being spent on this project, especially to reclaim land. ‘Our expenditure,’ the minister said, ‘up to date comes to about 100 crores.’51 The minister also pointed out that the question of rehabilitating refugees there from West Pakistan does not arise as by then all the refugees in the western wing were resettled in different parts of the country.52 So if the refugees refuse to move there, it would be a colossal waste of funds. He observed that the main reason behind slow and disappointing movement was misleading propaganda by some political parties against their going to Dandakaranya, besides aversion of the displaced persons to settle in areas far away from West Bengal. Moreover, many camp dwellers had taken up new occupations during the long stay in camp; they were reluctant to leave their occupation and to go to Dandakaranya. He refused to accept the fact that the Bengali refugees would miss their habitat in Dandakaranya. But it was an Page 37 of 68

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Residues of Partition unfamiliar terrain for the refugees, in many respects different from land in Bengal. The climate was different, land was barren. There were no rivers for the fishing community. All in all, it was a dreadful experience for some refugees who went there. A detailed plan was chalked out to rehabilitate refugees in Dandakaranya (see Appendix). In accordance with the plans, several (p.57) villages came up in the resettlement area. From the beginning, some refugees felt out of place in the rugged terrain of Dandakaranya. They were looking for an opportunity to run away from the settlement camp; desertion was used as a mode of protest. Let me cite some examples to show the nature of desertion. Jatin Mondal tried twice to leave. In 1971, he tried to go to Bangladesh after Mujib came into power. He hoped that he would get back his ancestral property. He went as far as Bongaon in West Bengal but gave up his idea to cross the border. Local residents in Bongaon discouraged him saying that there was no possibility of getting back property under the new regime. Jatin returned to Dandakaranya but authorities in the camp drove him out of his house because he deserted his place. By punishing him the camp officials wanted to set an example. Jatin lived for eight– nine months with his neighbours. After some time he had to give a written statement that he would not go to other places for resettlement, but he broke his promise in 1977. This time he left for the Sundarbans. Refugee leader Satish Mondal promised him and others a safe and secure life in the Sundarbans. They boarded the train for Howrah and reached Hasnabad. Jatin and other refugees swam across the Ichamati River as government officials confiscated all the boats in order to stop refugees from reaching the Sundarbans. After some time, refugees who reached the other side of the river took possession of the boats and ferried across the refugees and took them to Marichjhapi. In Marichjhapi, Jatin found refugees surviving by selling firewood. Life was hard there as they were under constant threat of forcible eviction. He stayed in Marichjhapi for two months and returned to Dandakaranya. Like Jatin Mondal there were many who tried to run away from the new resettlement colony.53 Here is another example of a deserter. Haripada Biswas, another refugee, narrated his story by saying that some refugee leaders distributed leaflets and informed the refugees in Dandakaranya that they could return to West Bengal because the Left Front had come to power and they would protect the refugees. Refugee leaders were trying to convince them that they were driven out by the Muslims in East Pakistan, time had come to grab the land belonging to the Muslims. If this was not possible, they will be able to settle down in the Sundarbans and the West Bengal government would not stand in the way. Many refugees sold their belongings at throwaway prices, (p.58) and travelled by train to reach West Bengal. They did all this in spite of warning from the camp officials that if they left, they would have to forego their claim to stay in the resettlement area.54 Page 38 of 68

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Residues of Partition Like Jatin and Haripada, thousands of refugees defied the official order and undertook their journey to West Bengal. They assembled in Hasnabad and lived there for a few days in makeshift camps, and waited for their final destination— Marichjhapi. Chief Minister Jyoti Basu asked the refugee leader to see him for discussions so that there could be some satisfactory solutions. He was not in favour of desertion of Dandakaranya. But by then the refugee leaders decided to go to the Sundarbans for resettlement (Basu 2002). I will return to the Marichjhapi episode in the latter part of this chapter. In mid-1960s, the Dandakaranya Project remained incomplete; road infrastructure was poor. No attempt was made to make uncultivable land cultivable, no loan was offered to the refugees. Moreover, in West Bengal, the Namasudra and Paundra Kshatriya castes were recognized as SCs. In Madhya Pradesh, they were denied SC status. The Orissa government recognized only Namasudras as SCs but not the Paundra Kshatriyas. This had created difficult conditions for them in the newly resettled areas as refugees were denied the benefits of affirmative action. The refugees also informed about the difficulties they experienced while living in peace with the local communities. The local inhabitants looked at the refugees as land grabbers. Land acquisition policy alienated the sons of the soil, as a result law and order problems made life unbearable in many resettlement colonies. In such situations, desertion became a form of protest. Refugees had deserted Dandakaranya in large numbers the way they had deserted camps earlier in Bihar, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh. From 1950 onwards, over 28,000 displaced persons were sent to Bihar, out of who 9,500 deserted relief and transit camps, and about 3,200 left rehabilitation centres. Except Betia in Bihar, displaced persons had deserted most other camps en masse. Some of the deserters, subsequently, had been rehabilitated in rural agricultural colonies in the Purnea district. Efforts to rehabilitate displaced persons in Orissa were more problematic. Over 15,000 or almost 50 per cent deserted the relief camps. In addition, about 8,000 deserted rehabilitation centres. Desertion cases were also reported from this camp from (p.59) time to time, and the state government, in view of their previous experience, expressed its inability to settle any more displaced persons permanently in the state. Likewise, 500 families of jute growers were sent to Nainital Tarai region in 1952, and settled down in the wasteland reclaimed by the Uttar Pradesh government. Each family received land, but harsh conditions in Nainital forced many to leave. The Andaman Islands were the only place which hardly any refugees deserted. These islands have been particularly popular with the displaced persons from East Bengal because of the agro-climatic conditions. In all, 663 families had been sent to the Andaman Islands till the mid-1950s and a batch of 184 families were expected to be sent later.55 In Tripura, the government had spent Rs 12.77 crore. Desertion was then an old mode of protest, a form of passive resistance as James Scott

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Residues of Partition (1985) noted in the agrarian context in rural Malayasia. Scott, with the help of ethnography, showed how desertion became a symbolic form of protest. He says, Desertion, as we have noted, may achieve something where mutiny may fail, precisely because it aims at self-help and withdrawal rather than institutional confrontation … the massive withdrawal of compliance is in a sense more radical…. What everyday forms of resitance share with the more dramatic public confrontations is of course that they are intended to mitigate or deny claims made by superordinate classes…. (1985: 32) Let us return to the point made earlier on the displacement from habitat. Bengal was the natural ‘habitat’ of the refugees. The plan to resettle them outside displaced the refugees from their habitat or habitus (Bourdieu 1977). Several writers have noted the effects of the loss of habitus on the displaced Bengalis. Hiranmay Bandyopadhyay (1977), for instance, noted that deportation to Dandakaranya meant a loss of their ties with kinsmen, neighbours, and cultural roots. Samar Sen (2004) observed that in Dandakaranya they lost their ‘dal, bhat, mach’ (lentils, rice, fish), an integral part of their daily life. According to Chakrabarti (1999), in Dandakaranya they missed wide green fields, the river, and their festivals. Exile from this habitus turned out to be as painful as exile from homeland. In spite of desertion, the central government went ahead with its plan of sending refugees out of the state of West Bengal. Between (p.60) 1957 and 1959, 13,000 families were sent out of West Bengal. In 1957 alone, 7,000 were deported from West Bengal, and in the following year it came down to 4,000 families, and in 1959 only 2,000 families moved out.56 The data clearly shows that the refugees ignored the deadline for them to move to Dandakaranya set by the Ministry of Rehabilitation. Like desertion, open defiance of official orders too became a popular mode of protest in the resettlement colony.

Scheduled Castes in Cooper’s Camp Refugee camps were the only shelter available to those who arrived from the mid-1950s. Some of the populated refugee camps, for example, Cooper’s and Dhubulia, were mostly inhabited by the SC refugees. Detailed accounts of some of these camps can be found in the writings of Hiranmay Bandyopadhyay (1970) and Chakrabarti (1999). Poor facilities in camps, and deaths due to starvation and disease featured prominently in Hiranmoy Bandyopadhyay’s book Udbastu (The Uprooted) (1970: 117–50). Bandyopadhyay noted that refugees in Cooper’s Camp lived under constant fear of deportation in an unknown land. But for some, camp life was a blessing in disguise because here they learnt the skill to resist authoritarian policies of the state. Passive resistance in the form of satyagraha was another weapon to protest against repressive policies of the state. At times, they came out on the street for demonstrations and picketing. Unhygienic living conditions in camps, inadequate and irregular supply of food, Page 40 of 68

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Residues of Partition water and cash doles, misbehaviour by the government-appointed officials infuriated camp dwellers. Initially, protests in camps were spontaneous and nonviolent. However, in course of time, with politicization and unionization, these movements took the form of active resistance in an organized manner. Several tactics were adopted as a part of active resistance, for example, picketing and demonstrations in front of the government offices, gherao (not allowing officers to go out of their office before their demand was met), obstructing the railway line in order to stop trains from moving. Chakrabarti (1999) carried out intensive fieldwork in Cooper’s Camp. His study showed how this camp became an epicentre of political activity of the refugees, and how some of the leaders from here made their mark in state politics. (p.61) Cooper’s Camp, located in Nadia district, came into existence in March 1950 to accommodate nearly 40,000 displaced persons (see Map 1.3). The camp population went up gradually, reached its peak in May 1950 when it rose to over 3 lakh. At a later stage, about 6,300 families had found shelter there and in nearby villages. This camp site covered an area of nearly 2.5 square miles. For years, the residents of the camp were in conflict with the officials and it was in this camp that refugees resisted the government plans to send them to Dandakaranya. Here, they voiced their protests against deportation without ‘informed’ consent. Cooper’s Camp today offers sanctuary not only to Partition refugees, but also to those displaced who arrived here at different points of time. For example, Dr Sukharanjan Haldar was only 13 years old when he arrived in Ranaghat Cooper’s Camps in 1952. He lived in a village under Nazipur P.S. in Barisal district. As communal riots broke out, he moved from Khulna to Barisal and then to Bongaon in West Bengal. There were five members in the family, all fled together. Haldar pointed out communal riots, loot, and arson made life difficult in Barisal. They hardly had a choice but to leave. In Cooper’s Camp, the family was dependent on government dole, now they have other sources of income. Jagadish Roy lived in a village in Gopalganj, Faridpur. His family left East Pakistan in 1952. He said, As the Bengali month Bhadra was approaching, we heard that from the end of Ashwin, one would require a passport to go to India. How can we get passport? We were too poor and ignorant. It was now or never situation. We decided to leave. First we arrived in Sealdah station, from there we were sent to Ultadanga camp and then on to Ranaghat. I have four members in the family, and I received government dole. Jagadish now owns a plot in Cooper’s Camp and sells vegetables for a living. Unlike Sukhoranjan or Jagadish, Narain Biswas, a 65-year-old local doctor, arrived in Ranaghat Cooper’s Camp in July, 1964. He described at length about the devastating Khulna riots. He lived in Damda village under Damuria P.S. He said,

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Residues of Partition Nearly 3000 people were killed in the riot. I saw at least 200 dead bodies. It was difficult to leave ancestral property all at one go. Some of the members of the family stayed back. It was difficult for them to (p.62) carry on. Then six more family members joined us in 1968 and five more in 1969. Now only some distant relatives are living there. Biswas visits Khulna once in two–three years. Pijus Biswas arrived here in 1975. He crossed the border in the mid-1970s purely for economic reasons. Life was hard for them in Bangladesh, it was hard to get work. Out of sheer desperation he left Bangladesh. His son found a part-time job which helped the family to pull on. These different cases only prove that Cooper’s Camp today is a melting pot of refugees who reached here at different time and stayed on. The resistance movement of refugees in Cooper’s Camp gained momentum with the support of the left parties (Chakrabarti 1999). As mentioned earlier, in July 1958, it was decided by the central government to close all relief camps in West Bengal by July 1959. It was decided that out of 45,000 families in camps, 10,000 families would be absorbed in West Bengal and the remaining 35,000 would be resettled outside West Bengal including in Dandakaranya. The repatriation of camp families to Dandakaranya did not materialize the way the administration wanted it. The agriculturist families in the camps were given two months’ notice from July to September 1958 to exercise their option either to move to Dandakaranya for rehabilitation or to leave the camps on receiving a grant equal to six month’s cash doles. Some families did not take the one-time cash payment offered by the government, and went to Dandakaranya. Some families took six months’ dole, but did not move to Dandakaranya. Thus those who refused to go to Dandakaranya posed problems for the government. And then there were those who neither took the dole nor went to Dandakaranya but continued their stir. The residents of the Cooper’s Camp narrated their experiences. An example is given below. Ratish Mallick, a camp political activist and a Namasudra caste leader, said, The living condition in Cooper’s Camp was deplorable. During the wartime a few godowns were constructed for storing military food and equipment. These godowns later were used for dwelling purposes. In each godown nearly 40 to 100 families lived. In all, 70,000 refugees lived in the camp in the mid-fifties. Most of them belonged to Namasudra caste and were peasants. The rooms were small, dark and (p.63) (p.64) lacked ventilation. Refugees were told to keep the doors shut but heat, suffocation and attacks of hyenas at night made life miserable. Deaths from diseases like cholera, malaria were high. Infants were particularly vulnerable. But death cases were hardly reported because families wanted doles of deceased members. Children were cremated quietly.

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Residues of Partition Mallick pointed out, I encountered rude behavior from the camp officials. My dole had been stopped and I was told to go to Calcutta to register my name again for doles. I refused to do that and organized the camp inmates against the highhandedness of the officials. The inmates of the camp realized the need for collective resistance. At this time they came to know about the UCRC, an organization of the refugees. Many prominent politicians, mostly belonging to the left parties, came forward in support of their demands. In 1955–6 the UCRC held its fourth convention in the Cooper’s Camp.57

Map 1.3 Cooper’s Camp in Ranaghat, Nadia

Mallick, in course of time, Source: Department of Refugee Relief became a prominent communist and Rehabilitation, Government of West leader. Gauranga Das, another Bengal (1998). inmate of the Cooper’s Camp, who was particularly active among the Namasudras since the mid-1950s, described the struggle in the camp in the following way: In the early fifties, in Cooper’s Camp, the refugees were living in wretched conditions in rice godowns. There was no privacy. Many had died from cholera and malarial fever. They did not even have a place for cremation. Government-sanctioned dole was far from adequate. Moreover, rude behaviour of local-level government officials made their lives miserable. Nearly forty thousand took shelter in six rice godowns and quite a few in make-shift camps. Most residents of Cooper’s Camp belonged to the Namasudra caste. During the initial stages, caste solidarity helped us in dealing with the crises. I was selected as the spokesman for the Namasudras. During the first few agitations in camps I learnt my lessons in organizing and leading protests. I was disillusioned with the Congress programmes for rehabilitation. In the late fifties I decided to join the CPI Page 43 of 68

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Residues of Partition and I have been an active member of the party since then. We launched our first symbolic protest against the central government by showing black flags to prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru when he visited the camp. Picketing, demonstrations in front of government offices for more doles were common. I shouldered the responsibilities of taking my (p.65) comrades in camps to marches and rallies in Calcutta. Camp members established links with the district-level and state-level politics through me. I also had to act as the link person between the government and the camp.58 Sushil Mondal arrived in the camp in October 1952 from Faridpur. He remained politically active all through his stay in the camp. He pointed out that the decision to send refugees to Andamans was opposed by all. He said, In 1958–9 authorities identified 400 families for sending them to Andaman islands and each family was promised land and relief assistance there. The government managed to persuade only 75 families to go there. In 1959, the proposal to close the camp and to send the residents to Dandakaranya had been mooted out. The government had to give up the plan of deportation because of the stiff resistance from the camp refugees.59 Namasudra leaders like Ratish Mallick, Gauranga Das, and Sushil Mondal gave new directions to protest in camps and brought the camp agitatational politics into the arena of wider politics. They were joined by many women protesters. Very little is known about the refugee women’s resistance in camps and outside.60 Hiranmay Bandyopadhyay noted that the displaced Bengali women took an active part in protest marches, and gheraos; they also took part in large numbers in public meetings (1970:119). The women in Cooper’s Camp never missed an opportunity to put forward their grievances whenever the women’s rehabilitation minister Renuka Roy visited the camp. Chabi Mandal said, We used to tell the minister that being a woman how can you ignore us and our children. We left East Bengal for honour and dignity. Here we have lost all including a square meal a day.61 Monica Das, popularly known as Monidi, a political activist, pointed out, It was the Communist Party which helped in organizing the camp residents, ‘Cooper’s Camp Bastuhara Samiti’ which was formed with their help. A separate organization of women activists came into (p.66) existence in 1952. They demanded rehabilitation of all camp families and welfare programmes, relief to women living in permanent liability homes. In 1961, when the government stopped sending doles, the women along with men came out openly to protest. For political causes women in the camp travelled long distances; I myself have been to Delhi many times.62

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Residues of Partition These narratives also highlight the fact that the camp was an arena of active politics. They tell us how these protests helped the displaced in snatching some material benefits and in gaining recognition as political activists. As mentioned earlier, camp protests entered a new phase in 1958–9 when the refugees were told by the central government to move to Dandakaranya. Abani Biswas described how he resisted the officials when they planned to send him to Dandakaranya in the following way: They threatened us saying that those who are staying back would receive no doles, no land to build houses, and the camp would be closed once and for all. They created factions among the residents of the camps. Some were paid money to influence us, but many families stood like rocks. The left politicians supported us. The state officials failed to move us from here.63 Protests all over the state forced the government to abandon the plan to forcibly deport displaced Bengalis to Dandakaranya. As noted earlier, the decision to send the refugees from West Bengal to Dandakaranya and other areas were discussed in the Indian parliament on several occasions. The left leaders extended support to the refugees against deportation. We reviewed some aspects of the parliamentary debates earlier to point out how the struggling refugees drew moral support from some of the parliamentarians who were vociferous in demanding ban on deportation. In the mid-1960s, the central government agreed to the demands of the refugees. Camp refugees received financial assistance for rehabilitation, and they were granted plots to build houses. Those who refused to move to Dandakaranya or those who returned from there were treated equally for assistance. Two-and-a-half square miles in Cooper’s Camp, which offered shelter to thousands of refugees, became a site for resistance by the outcastes. Refugees, through their (p.67) resistance, helped in resolving many contentious issues and gaining their recognition as free citizens of the country. Refugee camps in West Bengal numbering 100 to 150 were scattered all over the state—some small with 25 to 50 families, some big with over 200 families or more. The central government in the mid-1960s decided to amalgamate most of the small camps into big camps keeping in view the road conditions, proximity to railway stations, and availability of electricity and water. The rehabilitation minister announced in 1964, We have recently taken an important decision about Ranaghat camp, i.e., Cooper’s Camp. It was decided to convert it into a rehabilitation colony. Another camp with 2400 families called Bagjola is facing uncertainty because of court injunction.64

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Residues of Partition Refugees finally achieved their goal—Cooper’s Camp turned into a full-fledged colony. In the late-1990s, it became a municipal area, refugees enjoyed the right to elect their representatives. In 1977, when the Left Front came into power, the camp refugees expected a better deal, for example, land-ownership rights. But they were let down and this triggered political change and a new political equation. Here, the old and the new generation of displaced Bengalis forged an alliance with the Congress. The voters in the camp expressed their dissatisfaction with the left politics when they stayed away from the 1978 panchayat elections. The Front promised local self-government in the form of municipality to the Camp but it never materialized. Since 1978, the residents of the camp boycotted all elections in order to draw the attention of the ruling party. In 1998, out of desperation, a camp committee went to Delhi and met the prime minister and government officials. The central government agreed to pay Rs 7,000 to each household and house plot and recommended that the area be recognized as a municipality. The godowns that offered shelter to thousands of Bengalis were demolished. The land was surveyed and plots were identified for distribution. The camp was declared as a notified municipality area in July 1996. The election for 12 seats in the newly formed municipality offered an opportunity to express political views. The election turned the camp into a battleground between the CPI(M) and the Congress. (p.68) Nearly 30,000 electorates exercised their franchise. The Congress won 10 out of 12 seats, they lost one by a margin of one vote in one constituency. Tapan Biswas, a camp resident, pointed out, The CPI(M) made promises but never kept them. We have been let down by the left parties. The youth who belonged to a new generation turned their back against the left. They suffered most for lack of educational opportunities and employment.65 Sulochon Biswas, a youth leader said, Not only in Cooper’s Camp, the CPI(M) has been rejected in all the excamp sites. They made only false promises.66 Unlike Dandakaranya, the change came about in Cooper’s Camp through electoral ballots. A shift in political allegiance came about in the camp. The Congress at the centre finally emerged as the chief benefactor by granting them rehabilitation in the ex-camp site. All that happened in Cooper’s Camp between 1977 and 1996 went unnoticed as it was hardly reported in the press. Refugees were trying to settle their scores with the left. The encounter between the refugees and the left turned into an open clash in the southern part of West Bengal, in an island in the Sundarbans called Marichjhapi.

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Residues of Partition From Dandakaranya to the Sundarbans The third site for the study of resistance of the outcastes is Marichjhapi, a small island in the Sunderbans, the southern portion of the Ganges lying in between Hugli on the west and the Bangladesh part of the Sunderbans on the east, and the Bay of Bengal on the south. F.E. Pargiter’s A Revenue History of the Sunderbans (1934) described how in Sunderbans men and animals lived for nearly 200 years. I have mentioned earlier how two refugees deserted Dandakaranya and reached Marichjhapi for resettlement. Mass desertion of Dandakaranya began in February 1978. There were many factors that forced the Bengali settlers to flee from Dandakaranya. Saibal Gupta, a former chairman of the Dandakaranya Project, observed that one has to look at the chairman’s reports to find out reasons behind mass desertion (1999: 3–10). Let me point out the factors that alienated refugees in (p.69) Dandakaranya. First, in many areas land allotted to the refugees was uncultivable waste. No irrigation project was undertaken for crop production; as a result refugees had to depend on rainwater in arid agro-climatic conditions. They had to deal with drought and pest attacks, from time to time, with limited resources. Second, settlers had complained about encroachment of their lands and forcible cutting of their crops by the adivasis. The dispute between the settlers and the adivasis over the ownership of land remain unresolved for a long time. Adivasis rightly claimed their pound of flesh once the forest land was reclaimed for resettlement. No attempt was made to settle their demands. Rath (2006) has dealt with the problems of the adivasis in Dandakaranya and explained that the state ignored the adivasis, and this turned out to be the reason behind their resentment. Eventually, the area became a breeding ground for social unrest and armed naxalite movement. Third, from time to time, camp leaders spoke about the possibility of going back to West Bengal, especially to the Sundarbans area where land was available for reclamation. Ram Chatterjee, minister of civil defence in the West Bengal government, accompanied by refugee camp leader Satish Mondal, visited Malkangiri zone in November 1977 and addressed two public meetings at Karwi Shibir. They visited Paralkote zone in January 1978 and addressed meetings. The minister probably gave hope for resettlement in Sundarbans, and immediately after his visit, Karwi Shibir refugees began to leave Dandakaranya. Moreover, the SCs in Dandakaranya were denied benefits under the affirmative action programme. Like West Bengal, the states of Orissa and Madhya Pradesh did not recognize the Namasudras and Paundra Kshatriyas as SCs, which restricted their access to jobs. Finally, one other factor that forced the refugees out of Dandakaranya was their nightmarish experience in 1977 when drought-like situation prevailed, many had to starve as they hardly grew any crop on their land. Refugees felt a sense of loss like never before. It was around this time that the call ‘Sundarban Chalo’ (March to Sundarbans) found many takers; nearly 15,000 families had left (see Table 1.12).

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Residues of Partition Refugees had deserted the resettlement sites after selling off their agricultural produce, personal belongings, household articles, and in most cases even government properties like bullocks, agricultural implements, construction materials, and the like. In the mad rush (p.70) of desertion, almost all their belongings had been sold at throwaway prices; they spent the money on transportation to reach West Bengal.

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Residues of Partition

Table 1.12 Zone-wise Details of Mass Desertion from Dandakaranya between February 1978 and July 1978 Zone

No. of Families in Position as on 1 February 1978

Desertion from 1 February 1978 to 13 July 1978

Village

Karwi Shibirs

Total

Village

Karwi Shibirs

Total

Malkangiri

8,334

4,204

12,538

6,304

3,799

10,103

Umerkote

4,297

4,297

408

Paralkote

7,631

8,001

3,573

Kondagaon

1,003

1,003

6

Total

21,265

25,839

10,291

– 370 – 4,574

– 255

3,828 –

4,054

408

6 14,345

Source: Dandakaranya Development Authority (1979: 5).

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Residues of Partition Let us examine the series of events that finally led to an open clash between the state and the refugees in Marichjhapi. In April 1978, about 30,000 refugees arrived in Marichjhapi from Dandakaranya to begin their life all over again, and they had built huts, marketplaces, a school, a health centre, and so on. The island had no drinking water; refugees had to cross a river to go to another island to fetch water. On 20 August 1978, the police stopped the Marichjhapi residents while they were trying to get water. The entire island was cordoned off by the police, and the boats used for commuting were destroyed. After a few weeks, the economic blockade of the island forced the refugees to retaliate which led to 30 deaths in police firing. On 31 January 1979, once again the police fired on refugees and destroyed huts and forced refugees to flee the island. From the point of view of the state government, firstly, the occupation of land by the returnees was illegal as the island was protected under the Forest Act of 1927. Secondly, they were not refugees any more, as they were resettled in other states. Both the points were contested at the court of law by the refugees; the final judgement which came out in 1979 went in favour of the state. Thereafter eviction began, and the refugees were forcibly repatriated to Dandakaranya.67 Manoranjan Bepari, who lost his father and brother in Marichjhapi encounter, narrated the unfolding of events in the following way: (p.71) On April 18, 1978, thousands of refugees assembled at Hasnabad to begin their journey to Marichjhapi, a 20-mile long island in the Sundarbans. On August 19, 1978, the police attacked the settlers, destroyed their boats, and imposed Section 144, and blocked the entire island which led to severe shortage of food and drinking water. Some died of starvation. On January 31, 1978, the police tear-gassed and continued destruction and demolition for nearly three months. (2013: 37) According to Bepari’s estimate, 2,000 refugees had lost their lives. From early May 1979 forced deportation began, refugees were sent back to Dandakaranya.68 The left parties seemed to have forgotten all the promises that they had made to the refugees before assuming power in 1977. The left parties won the election in West Bengal in 1977 and the Left Front, with the CPI(M) as its main ally, came into power. By this time, a number of leaders from the displaced SC population made their mark in politics and received berths in the cabinet. However, the problems of the displaced SCs did not receive the kind of attention that they deserved. Only one commission was constituted to look into the matters pertaining to their rehabilitation.69 The displaced Bengalis in colonies and camps, in cities and rural areas, in far-off places, were waiting for a new rehabilitation policy, jobs, and educational opportunities. The priority list of the

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Residues of Partition Left Front did not include refugees and their problems. The recommendations of the RRC were ignored.70 The insensitivity of the Left Front towards the displaced SCs became clear when the refugee returnees were evicted from the Sundarbans. The incident exposed different sides of the state–refugee relations. When persuasion failed to make the refugees abandon their settlement, the West Bengal government ordered police action on 26 January 1979, and an economic blockade began with 30 police launches.71 According to the state government, the settlement in the island posed a serious threat to the environment and ecology and the lives of wild animals were at stake, and the state government was not going to tolerate such a settlement. A notification stated that the refugees were ‘in unauthorized occupation of Marichjhapi which is a part of the Sundarbans Government Reserve Forest, violating thereby the Forest Acts’ (Mallick 1999:172). It is (p. 72) debatable whether the CPI(M) was concerned about ecology or merely feared that this would have been a precedent for an unmanageable refugee influx with consequent loss of political support from the middle-class Bengalis. The judiciary too had an important role in this episode. On 27 January 1979, when the government prohibited all movement into and out of Marichjhapi under the Forest Preservation Act of 1927 and also promulgated Section 144 of the Criminal Penal Code, making it illegal for five or more persons to congregate at any given time, the refugee supporters appealed to the Calcutta High Court, which ruled against interference in the refugees movements and in their access to food and water. The government continued their blockade in defiance of the high court order. Since the police union was under CPI(M) control, the court order had been effectively bypassed in this instance. Though refugees died of starvation and disease, they did not give up. When police actions failed to persuade the refugees to leave, the state government ordered more repressive measures. The settlers returned to Bengal with the hope that the new government in power would be sympathetic towards them since some of the Left leaders were strongly opposed to the Dandakaranya Project, and suggested the Sundarbans as a site for resettlement. The incident alienated displaced Namasudras in West Bengal who stood firmly in support of the left parties before its victory in 1977. A witness to Marichjhapi massacre observed, The Marichjhapi refugees did not ask for money from the government, nor did they squat on other people’s property, they had only wanted the government’s scrub and marshy wastelands. So I ask, what harm did the Marichjhapi refugees do to the Left Front government? Caste Hindus lived in the other squatter colonies, and there were only scheduled castes

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Residues of Partition (Untouchables) at Marichjhapi. Is that why there is no space for the people of Marichjhapi in this state? (N. Chatterjee 1990: 298) The Marichjhapi incident has been discussed by scholars from different perspectives. Nilanjana Chatterjee, for instance, noted that the episode needs to be juxtaposed with the earlier squatter’s movements to understand shift in the left policies towards the refugees. She observed, (p.73) But while the earlier colonies were suburban and their creators mainly middle-class and upper caste, the squatters of the late 1970s were primarily Namasudra peasants who settled on a remote island in the Sundarbans reserve forests on the Ganga–Brahmaputra delta. As far as the central and state governments of India were concerned, these squatters were no longer ‘refugees’, but ‘deserters’ who were defiantly rejecting the state’s much celebrated rehabilitation plan for them in Dandakaranya, in pursuit of a reckless hope of settling themselves in West Bengal. They therefore lacked the excuse their predecessors had been able to use to justify their act of protesting the government’s failure to provide them with any suitable shelter. (1990: 381) Mallick (1999) draws our attention to the inherent conflict between the outcaste refugees and the upper caste and elites in West Bengal. In his view, the West Bengal government followed an appeasement policy towards the middle-class Bengalis. His detailed study critiqued the Left Front policies towards the refugees in Marichjhapi. The action of the Left Front showed that it was biased towards the upper-caste urban middle class or the bhadraloks because on displacement-related issues on several occasions the Front protected their interests. Another important viewpoint can be found in the writings of Annu Jalais (2005). She examines the environmental question and the debates surrounding the Sundarbans as a habitat of man and tiger. According to her, human beings and tigers lived in the Sundarbans for decades but the question of the violation of the Forest Act was never raised. Then why victimize the refugees? She goes on to argue that the ruthless killing of the refugees made the tigers of the Sunderbans ‘man-eaters’, since the tigers here never ate human flesh although they killed human beings. These different perspectives do help us in understanding an extremely complex episode. If we turn our focus to the state–refugee relations, then Marchjhapi offers us many more lessons. It was a turning point in the history of state–refugee relations as it showed that the state can go to the extent of using massive coercive power in dealing with the refugees. The use of physical force on this scale never happened before. Second, the incident also exposed a nexus between the state and the media. Mondal’s account (2002) highlighted this nexus, as he noted how a detailed report of a social activist was withdrawn after the publication of the first part, because the media reporting had antagonized Page 52 of 68

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Residues of Partition the left (p.74) parties. In a subsequent study (2005), Mondal’s coverage of the media report explored other aspects of this nexus, for example, under reporting deaths, police atrocities and so on. Nilanjana Chatterjee, too, noted that the Ananda Bazar Patrika assured chief minister Jyoti Basu, ‘If not all, most people in West Bengal agree with you that the Marichjhapi refugees should return’ (1990: 311). If one follows the legal battle that took place over this issue, then one can notice that at the final stage the judiciary too became a part of this nexus. The lower court judgment went against the state, as it pointed out, The respondents were restrained from interfering with or creating any obstruction to the supplies of essential commodities such as drinking water, milk, medicine, including disinfectants, foodstuff, clothes, etc., to the petitioners and other inhabitants of Marichjhapi. The respondents were also restrained from interfering with the petitioners’ and other inhabitants’ right to ingress and egress from Marichjhapi. (Saumen Guha 2010: 15) The final judgment on the case overturned the earlier order without making any substantive observation. The condescending tone of the judgment is clearly noticeable: In my opinion, this application is totally misconceived. This land belongs to the government. This is a reserved forest within the meaning of Indian Forest Act 1927. So far as the land is concerned the admitted position is that the petitioners have no legal right to the said land in any capacity whatsoever. However, the position remains that these persons are really refugees. Their plight is unfortunate. They are the victims of incidents and decisions over which they had no control in the sense that they have not become refugees out of their own choice. Accordingly, I merely express my desire that in dealing with these persons, the government will act with restraint, sympathy, and charity. (Saumen Guha 2010: 17) The state was neither restraint nor charitable towards the refugees as it used force to send the refugees back to Dandakaranya. Finally, it would be quite pertinent to take a look at a confidential record of the home office on the speech delivered by Jyoti Basu on the 4th annual conference of the United Centre for Refugee Council (UCRC) held at Cooper’s Camp on 9 December 1957: (p.75) Jyoti Basu in his speech stated that the present conference was a historical and significant meeting of the refugees, and not an ordinary meeting, and he bitterly attacked the present government for its callous and indifferent attitude in matters of refugee settlement. He also urged upon the government to arrange for settlement of refugees within West

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Residues of Partition Bengal. There was no need, in his opinion, to send them out of Bengal … he bitterly criticized the Dandakaranya scheme.72 It was Basu, who as chief minister, was at the helm of political affairs when the Marichjhapi incident took place in 1978. Before concluding this section, let me add that in all these episodes the role of the women refugees has not been discussed adequately. Women who went through trauma and segregation after arriving in West Bengal were the victims of the Partition, arrived with no adult male members in the family. These were the single women with or without children, widows, women too old and weak, women who were victims of the events of the Partition. These women were sent to ‘permanent liability camps’ (or PL camps). They were seen as ‘permanent liability’ by the state because they were going to depend on doles for the rest of their lives. Refugees called these camps mahila sibir or fortress of the women. These camps took the women out of the public space since outsiders had no access to the segregated PL camps. These were the women who suffered in silence, lost their loved ones in East Bengal, and lost opportunity to live like others in camps. PL camps still exist with the second and third generation women and their dependents. Those who managed to get jobs had left. Some of the women from these PL camps joined widows in Brindaban for spending last few years of their lives (Bagchi and Dasgupta 2003: 187–94). However, this is just one side of the story. Partition and uprooted existence in camps brought many women into the political arena where they learnt to take part in active resistance, I have mentioned briefly about some of these women. They joined protest movements in camps and outside. Hiranmay Bandyopadhyay (1970) cited many examples to show how women came out to protest in district headquarters or in Calcutta for better living conditions in camps. Their participation was encouraged by the UCRC and the Communist Party. Various small and large-scale movements brought women into the centre stage of refugee struggles. Changing circumstances (p.76) in camps reconfigured the traditional role of the women. Almost all the political parties in the state were trying to tap the new reservoir of political support by opening up various mahila samitis or women’s associations.

Displaced Tribals The story of the unsettled lives of the marginal sections of the Bengali society after Partition would remain incomplete without an account of the tribals and the urban squtters.73 We know far too little about the plight of the displaced tribals, especially those who are known as STs, for example, the Santhals, the Hajongs, and the Garos who were displaced first from the northern districts of East Pakistan at the time of Partition and later during the mid-1960s, at the time of the Indo-Pak War. Over 9,000 Hajongs, Kachains, and Koches entered the former Garo Hill district of Assam (now Meghalaya) from Mymensingh and Page 54 of 68

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Residues of Partition Rangpur districts since 1950. Once the communal tensions began to spread in the north in 1955–6, they had very little option but to leave their ancestral homes and enter Assam. On 23 February 1956, The Statesman reported that more than 60,000 tribal people crossed over to the Garo Hill district of Assam in the past few weeks, with heart rending accounts of economic and religious oppression. According to the same media report, It is for the first time since Partition that such a large number of tribals belonging to the Christian faith have been forcibly ejected from their ancestral homes and lands in Pakistan. Most of these refugees belong to the Garo tribe living in the border areas of East Pakistan’s Mymensingh district, which has a 100-mile border with the Garo Hill district of Assam. (The Statesman, 23 February 1956) From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, the northern part of East Bengal remained tense. The war in 1964 became a threshold point that caused massive displacement. Very little is known about this war-related displacement. The condition of the tribal areas at the time of Partition is also less known. According to Ellen Ball, the international border between Mymensingh (East Pakistan) and the Garo Hills (India) has hardly received any attention in the Partition literature. Documentation about the situation in this area is scarce, and only a few elderly Garos (p.77) had any clear recollections of the events of 1947. Anthropologist Robbins Burling writes: … it was, at first, a quiet border, for it escaped the ghastly violence and exchange of population that occurred in the rest of Pakistan and western India, and it remained relatively easy to cross. (1997: 65) Other sources suggest a picture of a rather unsettled border. Although the newly established border between Mymensingh and the Garo Hills had escaped the gruesome violence of 1947, it was far from a peaceful border and remained unsettled for many years to come (Ball 2000: 249–56). Ball observed that the Partition, the departure of the British, and the bloodshed during communal riots triggered feelings of insecurity among the lowland Garos. They doubted whether they would have a future in Pakistan. They wanted to stay with the people in the Garo hills with whom they had many similarities. The shift of power in favour of the Muslim population had influenced the minds and circumstances of these lowland Garos profoundly; they were unsure of their future as members of a minority community (The Indian Commission of Jurists Committee 1965).74 The displaced tribals were mostly Christians. The media in different countries reported widely on the story of their displacement because, by the end of February, 80,000 refugees had crossed into Assam. The exodus of Christians in large numbers led some foreign correspondents to go to Tura, where the fleeing refugees were received and housed in camps. It was reported in the media that Page 55 of 68

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Residues of Partition when some 3,000 refugees were fleeing from villages close to the border, they were ambushed on the way and fired upon, and only 1,500 managed to cross the border. Many of these injured were treated for gunshot wounds in Tura hospital (The Indian Commission of Jurists Committee 1965: 151). Those who crossed the border on that day informed that a large-scale shooting by the Pakistani police or the East Pakistan Rifles had killed many, and many more were injured. Ganendra Hajong described his experience in the following way: On February 6, 1964, Muslims, Ansars, Pakistan police, and E.P.R. armed with weapons entered our village, group by group, and looted our paddy, rice, cattle, and other things. Then they drove us out of our houses and took our houses by force and gave them to Muslim (p.78) deportees from India. After a few days, we received news that there was firing by E.P.R. on a group of people who were leaving Pakistan. The government officers were saying, ‘Hajongs, Garos and Dalus have no faith, they must leave Pakistan’, then they started looting in our village and in nearby villages. Having no alternatives left, we decided to leave Pakistan. (The Indian Commission of Jurists Committee 1965: 156) Susendra Areng, another displaced person, pointed out, Our village was somewhat away from the border area so we were spared by the police or Ansars but Muslims always troubled us. They tried to harass us in various ways. They used to let loose their cattle and damage our crops. They used to occupy our land forcibly and unlawfully. Suddenly, Muslims who were our neighbours, armed with spars, sticks, and other weapons attacked our village. They were shouting ‘You must go to India, Pakistan is not for you.’ They looted paddy, rice, cattle and other household belongings. (The Indian Commission of Jurists Committee 1965: 159) These narratives clearly show that underprivileged tribals paid a heavy price for the Partition of the country. There is a need to re-examine the discourse on the population displacement in West Bengal, in the light of information that is now available on the plight of the SCs and STs and other deprived sections of the society. Written in vernacular, their voices are now coming out, and occupying an integral part of the new discourse on the population displacement.

The Changing Urban Landscape With the arrival of refugees in West Bengal, the urban landscape in Bengal began to change. A large number of new satellite towns came into existence mainly in the surrounding areas of Calcutta. The main inhabitants of the satellite towns were the refugees. Even in Calcutta, new fringe areas became densely populated with refugees. The vacant land within the city was taken over by the squatters, the problem of squatting by refugees came up at the state assembly

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Residues of Partition debates on several occasions. The state came out with Eviction Act in 1952 to deal with the squatters. (p.79) Massive exodus caused unprecedented demographic change in Calcutta and its surrounding areas. This is why Partha Chatterjee writes, By 1951, however, as much as 41.27 per cent migrants in Kolkata proper were from East Pakistan, compared to 18.44 from Bihar. In 1961, more than half of the migrants living in the urban areas of 24 Parganas (a region which included the industrial belt north of the city) consisted of refugees from Pakistan. Not surprisingly this rapid, enforced, and wholly chaotic demographic revolution had a massive impact on the economic, cultural, and political character of the city. (1990: 29) Nilanjana Chatterjee too noted similar developments. She points out, … the 1951 census found only some 33.2 per cent of Calcutta’s inhabitants to be city-born. The rest, including a small group of non-Indians, were migrants. (1990: 70) Many areas in the eastern side of the Ganges River were sparsely populated when the refugees arrived. The vast stretch of agricultural land on the banks of the river attracted the refugees. Both government-sponsored colonies and squatters colonies offered shelter to the newcomers. Places like Barrackpore, Khurdah, Dum Dum, and Panihati became new satellite towns, the state government recognized them as urban municipalities. As many as 104 government-sponsored colonies came up along with 254 squatters colonies on the eastern side of the Ganges River (see Table 1.13). The vast open land on the western side of the river too became popular with the asylum seekers. The western bank, the traditional centres of colonial power of the Portuguese, the French, the British—had better infrastructure, for example, roads and houses. By the time the refugees arrived, the small towns like Chinsura, Chandannagore, Hoogly, and Srirampur were more populated than the eastern bank.75 Nevertheless, nearly 100 new refugee colonies came up in these areas too. Changes were particularly noticeable in the new district towns, for example, Ranaghat, Krishnanagore in Nadia, West Dinajpur, Jalpaiguri, and Cooch Behar. They became sanctuaries for millions of (p.80) refugees. Agricultural land close to these areas was used by the refugees. The rate of growth of urban population was phenomenal in the state of West Bengal during the first two decades after Partition. It was evident that the urban and rural landscape of Bengal had begun to change once and for all. In some areas refugees took initiative to give a shape to new suburban areas. For instance, Barrackpur turned into new suburb with the arrival of the refugees. An entire Hindu family of a village in East Pakistan called Barachpur Page 57 of 68

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Residues of Partition took shelter in the outskirts of the city. An energetic refugee leader Haripada Biswas took an active part in rehabilitating 1,000 refugee families. The colony adopted the (p.81) principles of cooperative management in running common sites like schools, hospitals, temples, recreation centres, and so on without any assistance from the state. The new Barackpur colony developed and became a model colony. Today this is one of the prosperous localities in the vicinity of Calcutta (H. Bandyopadhyay 1970). Table 1.13 Refugee Settlement on the Left Bank of the Ganges New Urban Location

Government Pre-1950 Sponsored Colonies Squatters’ Colonies

Post-1950 Squatters’ Colonies

1. Kanchrapara

2

2

4

2. Halisahar

3

2

–

3. Bhatpara

2

1

–

4. Garulia

3

–

–

5. North Barrackprore

4

4

6

6. Bararrackpore

2

–

4

7. Titagarh

–

1

1

8. Khardah

7

3

–

9. Naihati

–

–

–

10. Panihati

7

12

14

11. Kamarhati

3

3

4

12. Baranagar

4

4

3

13. Barasat

2

–

3

14. New Barrackpore

1

–

–

15. North Dum Dum

3

1

4

16. Dum Dum

–

2

–

17. South Dum Dum

–

32

12

18. South Suburban areas

9

–

5

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Residues of Partition

New Urban Location

19. Urban Municipalities Total

Government Pre-1950 Sponsored Colonies Squatters’ Colonies

Post-1950 Squatters’ Colonies

52

67

60

104

134

120

Source: CMDA Report, 1965, p. 13. Displaced Bengalis discovered land in many areas close to Calcutta. These lands were owned by handful of zamindars (landlords). In order to capture these lands, the displaced persons adopted squatting methods or occupied the vacant lands with makeshift tents, and then began construction of temporary tin-roofed houses for their stay. At the time of squatting, refugees encountered resistance from the zamindars who used thugs and anti-socials to take possession of their land. In most cases the clash between the squatters and the anti-socials turned violent. Squatting became a powerful tool in the hands of the displaced to launch protests against the landlords and the state. In the rural areas, the displaced targeted the unused and uncultivable lands owned by the absentee landowners, mostly uncultivable and unutilized land (H. Bandyopadhyay 1970). The draconian state legislation which was called the West Bengal Eviction Act (1952), aimed at closing down squatters colonies and became a subject for acrimonious debates among the members of the state legislative assembly. The move to evict squatters was bitterly opposed by the non-Congress members in the assembly. In spite of opposition in 1952, the West Bengal government passed the Eviction Act to stop land-grabbing by the refugees.76 In 1957, certain amendments were passed. For instance, in the earlier Eviction Act it was mentioned that the state will have the right to evict unlawful occupants of land but in such evictions alternative arrangements will have to be made for the displaced by giving them another plot of land. In the 1957 amendment this clause was removed, instead it was mentioned that only loans will be offered to evicted refugees for the purchase of land. The opposition leaders urged the government to differentiate between different types of land used for squatting (J. Basu 2002: 38). They argued those who were squatting on the wasteland of a zamindar may be allowed to stay after offering compensation to the owner but those squatting on the land of the poor landowners, whether a Hindu or a Muslim, should be asked to vacate so that the owners could get back their land. The same principle should be (p.82) followed in the case of evacuee land occupied by the squatters. The evacuee land should be handed over to the Muslim returnees. Chakrabarti explained how squatter’s movement had begun in Calcutta and its surrounding areas in the following way:

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Residues of Partition The refugees were hesitant, panicky. They were afraid that they would get mixed up with the adventurist movement of the CPI resulting in police firings and deaths. So the NVBKP leadership decided to make a test case. They inspected a strip of fallow land at Sodepur (about 16 kms from Sealdah), collected a group of refugees living in its environments, and founded the first real squatters colony at the place which they called Deshbanndhunagar. On the Lakshmi puja day in 1949 the second and the biggest squatters colony was established at Naihati. It was named Bijoygarh. (1999: 64) A single spark had started a prairie fire. The news of the establishment of squatters colony had spread to other refugee-dominated areas and hundreds of colonies came up in various parts of the city and suburbs. Refugees were preparing for the struggle by distributing leaflets, explaining in great detail the issues involved, and the government’s reaction. Series of meetings took place in refugee colonies to convey the message of the refugee union to every refugee home. Daily meetings in squatters colonies were held where future course of action was chalked out (Chakrabarti 1999). Initially, the refugees offered support to the Congress for safety, security, and compensation. In the 1950s, the Indian National Congress enjoyed overwhelming majority in the state legislative assembly. In the opposition, there were Hindu fundamentalists represented by the Hindu Mahasabha and there were members from the communist party. Initially, the displaced Bengalis extended support to the Congress for security and rewards. After the traumatic experience of leaving their ancestral home, the refugees wanted a safe and secure life in West Bengal. They realized that the Congress was in the best position to ensure their safety and security as it was the ruling party in the state as well as at the centre. At the same time, they hoped for rewards in the form of compensation from the Congress and other assistance for rehabilitation since the Congress at the centre was generous towards the West Pakistani refugees in giving compensation and other assistance. The inability of the Congress (p.83) government to offer compensation or to solve the problems of rehabilitation alienated displaced Bengalis. From the early 1950s, it was quite evident that the Bengali refugees were not treated at par with their counterpart in western India (Chakrabarti 1999: 203). In the early 1960s, the communists found a solid support base among the displaced Bengalis. The steady rise in the left movement in West Bengal led to the Congress debacle in the state legislative assembly elections in 1967. Refugees played a crucial part in this political transformation. Anil Chandra Singha, a refugee who joined the Communist Party in the early 1960s, explained the role of the refugees in this transformation in the following way:

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Residues of Partition The enactment of Eviction Bill in 1957 gave us a unique opportunity to expose anti-refugee policies of the Congress government. The UCRC members sought help from the Communist Party. Active members of the UCRC joined the CPI in large numbers. It was clear that left-minded UCRC members were going to play a crucial role in West Bengal politics. At the time of food movement in 1966, the refugees learnt the first lesson of carrying out a battle on the street with the communist party workers. They came out in large numbers. The communist leaders were quick to realize the potential support base in thousands of refugee camps and colonies. Within a short time a large number of party members were recruited from these camps and colonies. And from the point of view of the refugees who were desperately looking for some kind of political identity, this was an ideal opportunity to assert themselves politically. The support of the refugees shifted from the Congress towards the communists. (1995: 39) Singha narrated only some aspects of a very complicated story of the shift towards the left parties. Another refugee leader, Bijay Majumdar, who rose to the higher echelons of the left party from the refugee masses, pointed out: Our family arrived from East Bengal with high expectations but we were disillusioned when we realized that nothing could be achieved without struggle. It was the Congress which was responsible for letting us down. We realized that the refugee problems could be solved only with the help of the communists. I was closely associated with communist leaders like Ambica Chakrabarti, Ranen Sen, Somnath Lahiri, Jyoti Basu and Bhawani Sen. By taking part in politics in the (p.84) post-Partition period I got back my lost identity—my political identity which I cherished in East Bengal.77 Several refugee leaders echoed Singha’s and Majumdar’s views while narrating their political experience. Nearly 19,000 refugee families managed to permanently settle down in 133 squatters’ colonies. The area occupied by such colonies was about 200 acres. Refugees wanted the authorities to know that they were not asylum seekers, but free citizens in an independent state and they had the right to live in India, like other citizens in the country. Those who divided the country should now look after the displaced. By forcibly occupying the land, they were questioning the state policy in a situation that called for radical reforms. The struggle often turned into violent clashes between the displaced and the police. The identity of the Bengali refugees as active political actors gradually gained prominence in West Bengal in the 1960s and 1970s. The political movement of the refugees took a new turn with unionization. In 1948, an attempt was made to form a union of the refugees, the Nikhil Banga Bastuhara Karma Parishad (All Bengal Refugee Council for Action). Right from its inception, the union had two groups—those who wanted permanent Page 61 of 68

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Residues of Partition rehabilitation of refugees without antagonizing the Congress at the centre and in the state and those who wanted it at any cost. The latter group consisted mostly of left-minded leaders. In 1949, the left leaders virtually took over the leadership of the Council, except the post of the president which was occupied by a Hindu Mahasabha sympathizer. In early 1949, the Council organized meetings and demonstrations of fellow refugees in Calcutta. The turnout in these meetings showed the enormous popularity of the new association. With the formation of the union, many protest movements were launched in an organized manner. Moreover, the unionization had set in motion the process of radicalization of the refugees since many union members were actively involved with the left parties. The union kept the members informed about its activity through leaflets, handouts and the like. In 1955, the UCRC was formed and it marked a new beginning in the struggle of the refugees. From 1955, most protests, marches, and demonstrations of the refugees were organized under the leadership of the UCRC. Prafulla Chakrabarti (1999) explained at length the (p. 85) nature and objectives of this new union, and what the unions did for the refugees. In the 1950s and 1960s, the union was the main source of strength for millions of displaced Bengalis in West Bengal. Under the leadership of the Refugee Council, movements were launched for forcible occupation of fallow lands in Calcutta and in its surrounding areas. In the early 1950s, these movements were spearheaded by many groups of refugee organizations in West Bengal. The movements offered much needed solidarity to the left leaders; at the same time they alienated those who were close to the Congress and other political parties. The unionization offered solidarity to the refugees. The refugees managed to discover their own space in the ideological war that was going on between the Left that stood for working class unity and secularism, as opposed to the right-wing politics of the Hindu Mahasabha. The Congress followed the middle path. The refugee union like the UCRC began to subscribe to the ideologies of the Left. The UCRC supported the demand for land. Anil Singha noted that as per the 1951–2 crop survey data, the state had cultivable waste land to the tune of nearly 9.42 lakh acres. The refugees at the most possessed 2 lakh acres of cultivable wasteland, the remaining land was owned by the state (Singha 1995: 23). The UCRC pointed out that with execution of irrigation schemes, big and small, and development of scientific agriculture, it was not possible to maintain a rigid distinction between cultivable wasteland and uncultivable wasteland. Many of the beals (small ponds), as classified by Ishaque Committee Report, could be turned cultivable by the execution of the irrigation scheme. This was an example to show how displaced people were trying to make a case for redistribution of cultivable wasteland. A detailed calculation was done in order to show the government how the displaced families could be resettled in West Bengal at a lesser cost than their resettlement in Dandakaranya; and how this would benefit West Bengal’s economic growth (Singha 1995: 27). They raised Page 62 of 68

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Residues of Partition slogans against the Congress Party for following anti-refugee policy. More and more refugees actively joined the movement under the Left-dominated UCRC. The Left parties made an all-out effort to bring the union under its organizations. Bringing refugees into the arena of national struggle was one of the objectives of the CPI in the 1960s. Bhowani Sen, a CPI leader, observed: (p.86) The refugees in West Bengal have come out in a mighty struggle against the bankrupt rehabilitation policy of the government. Through numerous demonstrations, meetings, and conferences, the refugees have convincingly demonstrated their strong opinion against sending of the refugees outside West Bengal against their will. (1971: 37) The trials and tribulations that the SCs, STs, and urban poor went through after the Partition have not yet been studied systematically. Their story, as I explained here, in many ways, is different from that of the upper caste Hindus. Much can be learnt by juxtaposing their story with the conventional discourse for a better understanding of the dynamics of population displacement. Notes:

(1.) All those who arrived in India as a result of Partition were included in the labelling exercise. It also included those who arrived in West Bengal in 1946 due to the Noakhali communal riots. (2.) With the introduction of migration certificates, the Union government decided to extend first preference to families that lost one or more members in communal riots. Second, the government also included those who were uprooted from their ancestral homes and were living in different relief camps in East Pakistan. The third category included all those who were anxious to migrate to India because of a persistent sense of insecurity or fear of persecution. (3.) The Refugee Rehabilitation Committee highlighted the issue in its report (Government of West Bengal 1981: 1–5). (4.) Guha, a trained physical anthropologist, undertook the job on the advice of the West Bengal government. (5.) Prafulla K. Chakrabarti has discussed this in greater detail (1999: 102–16). (6.) The observation was made by the deputy minister for rehabilitation, P.S. Naskar, in parliament on 22 February 1960 (Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, Oral Answer, pp. 2025–6). He pointed out that on an average, till 1960, 700 families had been dispersed from Sealdah station. (7.) The debates on relief and rehabilitation went on for about one and a half decades. Debates on relief and rehabilitation began first in the constituent assembly on 9 December 1946, when a special ministry under the name of the Page 63 of 68

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Residues of Partition Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation came into being with A.P. Jain as the minister. Its tenure came to an end on 24 January 1950. Later on, the parliament, for a little over two decades, became the forum for discussion on refugee-related issues. The parliamentarians were discussing a host of issues pertaining to the displaced persons in the western and eastern parts of India. The rehabilitation minister, Mehr Chand Khanna, became the chief architect of the rehabilitation policy in the country. Refugee-related issues were debated also at the West Bengal state assembly for nearly two decades (1952–71). (8.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, 1951, p. 2029. (9.) Till today no reliable date is available on the Muslim evacuees. Neither India nor Pakistani officials collected information on the displaced Muslims. (10.) Mentioned by A.P. Jain at the Constituent Assembly Debates on 3 February 1949. (11.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, 1951, p. 438. (12.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, 1951, p. 439. (13.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, 1951, p. 439. (14.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, 1951, p. 470. (15.) Annual Reports of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, from 1965 onwards contain detailed figures on refugee influx in West Bengal and programmes for rehabilitation and resettlement. (16.) Independent committee reports, for example, the reports of the Committee for the Refugee Rehabilitation, the Estimates Committee reports, Committee of Ministers’ report, and so on, are also important sources of information. See Bose (2000) for more on the numbers. (17.) The report by the Refugee Rehabilitation Committee (RRC) of the Government of West Bengal (1981: 2–5). (18.) During the parliamentary debate, the rehabilitation minister said, ‘I feel that Bengal has reached the saturation point. It reached the saturation point long ago.’ Many Congress MPs shared an identical view at the parliamentary debates. The rehabilitation minister added, ‘Now these 45000 families come to roughly about 2 lakh persons. Even if you take round about 3 to 4 acres as an economic unit in West Bengal you want about 2 lakh acres of land. I still hold and maintain that West Bengal has reached saturation point’(Government of India, Parliamentary Debates 12 April 1960, p. 11314). The rehabilitation minister was of the opinion that 2 to 3 acres of land per family could be required for resettlement. But this would be equivalent to little more than 6 to 9 bighas of Page 64 of 68

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Residues of Partition land. How many in rural West Bengal owned that kind of land? A peasant household having 2 to 3 bighas of land is considered as self-sufficient. (19.) See also V.K.R.V. Rao (1955) to know more about relief and rehabilitation measures undertaken for the refugees in Delhi. (20.) Renuka Roy quoted figures of expenditure in 1954–5 and 1956–7 (2003: 94). During 1954–5 the central government had spent Rs 153.39 crore for the displaced from West Pakistan and only Rs 70.29 for those from East Pakistan. In the next year the western sector received Rs 237.35 whereas it was Rs 109.85 for the east. Expenditure items included grants, loans, housing, compensation, and so on. (21.) P. Chakrabarti writes, There was a remarkable swing of the migrants towards the Congress when they arrived in West Bengal. In order to understand this swing towards the Congress and finally away from it, it is necessary to bear in mind the configuration of political parties and the allegiance of East Bengali Hindus. It was fear as well as hope that transformed them suddenly into staunch supporters of the Congress as soon as they reached West Bengal. (1999: 329). Chakrabarti explains how political change came about in West Bengal when the refugees joined the Left forces in the state. (22.) Chatterjee made use of 1931 census data to explain the portions that should ideally remain with India, and the areas that may be added to Pakistan. (23.) See also J. Chatterjee (1999) and van Schendel (2002). (24.) Jogen Mondal’s biography, written by Jagadish Mondal in 6 volumes, deals with the chequered life of the leader. (25.) Sunil Sen (1972) raises this issue in the context of Tebhaga peasant movement in north Bengal in 1947. (26.) Government of India, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Proceedings, 9 March 1949, p. 1401. (27.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, Oral Answers, 16 April 1960, pp. 11954–5. (28.) Migration certificate was introduced on 1 September 1956. A measure of this kind made things worse for those who needed to leave East Pakistan urgently for social and political reasons. (29.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debate, 7 June 1955, p. 2946. Page 65 of 68

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Residues of Partition (30.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debate, Oral Answer, 25 July 1955, p. 2947. (31.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debate, Oral Answer, 25 July 1955, p. 2948. (32.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debate, Oral Answer, 24 March 1955, p. 1395. (33.) Prafulla Chakrabarti (1999: 5) interviewed the outcastes in Cooper’s Camp and explained how the state actions alienated them. (34.) In West Bengal these castes were regarded as SCs, but in Dandakaranya, neither Orissa nor Madhya Pradesh listed these castes as SCs. This became a chief source of discontent among the settlers. (35.) As the rehabilitation commissioner, Bandyopadhyay (1970) observed camp life from close quarters. His moving account covered almost all aspects of life in camp. (36.) This was a detailed report with recommendations for all-round development of camp refugees. The recommendations of the Committee were overlooked by the Ministry of Rehabilitation when plans for the Dandakaranya Project were undertaken. (37.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, 11 April 1960, p. 11274 (pointed out by CPI MP Aurobindo Ghosal). (38.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, 12 April 1960, pp. 11318-–20. The rehabilitation minister, Mehr Chand Khanna, took part in the debate and spelt out the government plans for resettlement in Dandakaranya. (39.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, 12 April 1960, p. 11325. (40.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, 12 April 1960, p. 11274. (41.) Besides Bandyopadhyay (1970), Anil Singha (1995) maintained that land was available in West Bengal where resettlement plans could be drawn with less resources than what the government thought of spending for Dandakaranya. He was referring to the findings of the Rehabilitation Commissioner, Hiranmoy Bandyopadhyay. (42.) British officials noted that Dandakaranya, a region in east-central India extended over an area of about 35,600 square miles, and included Abujhmar Hills in the west. It includes parts of Chhattisgarh, Orissa, and Andhra Pradesh. (43.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, 12 April 1960, p. 1120.

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Residues of Partition (44.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, 12 April 1960, p. 1125. (45.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, Oral Answer, 22 February 1960, pp. 2025-–6. (46.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, Oral Answer, 22 February 1960, p. 2027. (47.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, Oral Answer, 22 February 1960, p.2028. (48.) Saibal Gupta (1999) presents an account on expenditure incurred on the project, and offers an insider’s view of the Dandakaranya Project. (49.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, Oral Answers, 2 May 1962, p. 1978. (50.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, Oral Answers, 6 May 1962, p. 2014. (51.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, Oral Answers, 6 May 1962, p. 2015. (52.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, Oral Answers, 6 May 1962. (53.) Personal correspondence with Prafulla C. Chakravarthy, Kolkata, 2 January 2000. (54.) Personal correspondence, Kolkata, 2 January 2000. (55.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, 9 September 1958, p. 5816. (56.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates. 9 September, 1958, p. 5817. (57.) Interview, Cooper’s Camp, 3 June 1998. (58.) Interview, Cooper’s Camp, 7 June 1998. (59.) Interview, Cooper’s Camp, 5 April 2001. (60.) Several articles on the role of women in refugee movement can be found in Bagchi and Dasgupta (2003). See also Chakrabarti (1999). (61.) Interview, Cooper’s Camp, 23 April 2001. (62.) Interview, Cooper’s Camp, 27 April , 2001. (63.) Interview, Cooper’s Camp,30 April , 2001. (64.) Government of India, Parliamentary Debates, 4 July 1966, p. 11214. Page 67 of 68

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Residues of Partition (65.) Interview, Cooper’s Camp, 3 May 2001. (66.) Interview, Cooper’s Camp, 7 May 2001. (67.) For a detailed study on the situation in Marichjhapi, see Ross Mallick (1999), Nilanjana Chatterjee (1992) and Jagadish Mondal (2002 and 2005). (68.) Bepari (2013) covers a wide area on the oppression of Dalits in West Bengal. The book deals with his day-to-day struggle for survival, and explores the lives of Namasudras in West Bengal under successive political regimes. (69.) The Refugee Rehabilitation Committee (RRC) was set up in 1978 under the chairmanship of Samar Mukherjee. The report dealt with the ex-camp sites, permanent liability camps, rehabilitation of non-camp displaced persons, squatters’ colonies, development of refugee colonies, and so on. (70.) Barring a few, most of the recommendations of the RRC were ignored. It was more like an open and shut case. (71.) Refugees got trapped in the blame game between the centre and the state. The state government expressed its inability to do much without cooperation from the centre. (72.) File No. 1304–57, pp. 136–29, copy of the IB officer’s observation on the 4th Annual Conference of the UCRC, dated 9 December 1957. (73.) Burling (1997) and Ball (2000) were among the few anthropologists who have studied the lives of the Garos. (74.) The report of the Indian Commission of Jurists Committee (1965) deals with the issue at length. It was a fact-finding committee which brought out 2-volume report on the crisis. (75.) Chaudhuri (1983) offers an overview of changes in the urban areas. (76.) Jyoti Basu (2002) gives more background information. He dealt with this in his speech at the state assembly. (77.) Interview, Calcutta, 26 January 2005.

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Three Decades in Exile

Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780199461172 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.001.0001

Three Decades in Exile Sri Lankan Tamils in India Abhijit Dasgupta

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.003.0003

Abstract and Keywords In this chapter the state–refugee relations have been examined in the context of repatriation of refugees to Sri Lanka on two occasions: in 1987 after the signing of the Peace Accord between India and Sri Lanka, and in 1991 after the assassination of the former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. The issues relating to policing and surveillance have been discussed with reference to women migrants in refugee camps. And finally, state policy for the incarceration of refugees in special camps has been analysed. This chapter examines the inconsistent policies of the Indian state towards the Tamil refugees. Keywords:   repatriation, LTTE, camps, local politics, IDPs, Indian Foreigner’s Act, 1946, migrants to the Middle East, special camps, resistance, third-country asylum

Camps can very aptly be divided into three types corresponding to three basic western conceptions of life after death: Hades, Purgatory, and Hell…. All three types have one thing in common: the human masses sealed off in them are treated as if they no longer existed, as if what happened to them were no longer of any interest to anybody, as if they were already dead…. —Arendt (1968: 143) Sri Lankan Tamil refugees began to arrive in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu from 1983 onwards, after an outbreak of ethnic riot on the island. The government hardly had time to deliberate on the exodus, and the relief and rehabilitation of the Tamils; the state policy towards them remained ambivalent. Page 1 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile Neither the central nor the state government had made any elaborate plans for relief and rehabilitation of the refugees. The central government had predicted that they would return shortly, but this was proved wrong. The government realized the need to make long-term plans. The Home Department of the Tamil Nadu state government dealt with relief and rehabilitation with assistance from the centre. In this chapter, first, state–refugee relations have been examined in the context of repatriation of refugees to Sri Lanka on two occasions: in 1987 after the signing of the Peace (p.93) Accord between India and Sri Lanka, and in 1991 after the assassination of the former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. Second, the issues relating to policing and surveillance have been discussed with reference to women migrants in refugee camps. Finally, state policy for the incarceration of refugees in special camps has been analysed. Let me first examine the inconsistent policies of the Indian state towards the Tamil refugees. Indian state policy towards displaced Tamils remained equivocal, right from the day they arrived in India. In a country like India, where the dynamics of local politics may be different from the centre, the former often forces the latter to toe its line. This was exactly the case with the Tamil refugees. Let me begin by explaining some aspects of local politics, community responses, and their effects on the Sri Lankan Tamil refugees now living in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu.

Refugees in Tamil Nadu Mass exodus of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees began from mid-1983 after an ethnic riot in Colombo.1 Within a short time the riots had spread to almost all parts of the country where Tamils lived, especially to the north and northeast of Sri Lanka. Between 1983 and 1987, 1,40,000 refugees sought asylum in Tamil Nadu. In 2002, 67,000 refugees were living in camps (see Table 2.1). Let us consider some basic facts. How many Tamil refugees had sought asylum in Indian camps and outside? What has the state done for their relief and rehabilitation? How could one explain the changing refugee–host relations over time? And what legal and ethical issues have emerged with the state policy of repatriations? According to official reports, between 1983 and 1987, about 1.5 lakh refugees arrived in Tamil Nadu to escape ethnic violence in Sri Lanka. Out of these, 45,000 refugees were repatriated between 1987 and 1989 (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2002: 125). The next exodus took place between 1989 and 1991, especially after the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka. Many Tamil civilians were caught in the crossfire between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan army. Most of these refugees were repatriated in 1991–2, after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.2 The final influx began in April 1995 and it coincided with the declaration of (p.94) Eelam War III.3 The refugee influx continued till the end of the war between the Sri Lankan army and the LTTE in 2009. The story of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees, therefore,

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Three Decades in Exile revolves around three large-scale displacements, and repatriations on two occasions (see Table 2.1). The journey of the refugees from the northern tip of Sri Lanka to Ramanathpuram is arduous and risky (see Map 2.1). An excellent account of the journey of Tamil refugees can be found in Amal Raj’s study (1991). He writes: Once a family decides to leave, it usually treks around jungle trails often avoiding the minefields, sometimes walking at a stretch for 21 days before reaching the seashore from where boats can take him to India. Women and children have to survive a night’s ordeal in the rough sea. Once they reach the northern most point of the island in Sri Lanka, boats can ferry them to the Indian side. Touts trade in tears. Middlemen charge as much as Rs. 1000 per head for a journey which would ordinarily cost Rs.150. Boats meant for ten often load forty. Ejected by the country of their birth, tossed on the waves, refugees survive the journey only if they can get away from the very vigilant Sri Lankan naval petrol. If they are caught, the young among them would be taken to the south for punishment. Occasionally, the restless sea demands its pound of flesh, gulping in an overcrowded boat. Boatmen often become greedy and in the middle of the sea (p.95) (p.96) they ask for more gold. Death of children is a regular occurrence…. Everything is forgotten once the refugees see the Indian shore. (Raj 1991: 3) For those who travelled from the east coast, from places like Batticaloa, Trincomalee, and Amparai, the journey was longer and risky as they had to cross several barricades, check posts, and dense forests (see Map 2.2). Table 2.1 Details of Influx and Reverse Flows of Sri Lankan Refugees (1983–2002) Inflow

Outflow (State Sponsored)

Outflow (Private)

Phase I 24 July 1983 to 1987

1,34,053 45,281

13,516

1,22,078 54,188

75,578

Phase II 25 August 1989 to 30 April 1991 Phase III 31 July 1996 to 25 February 2002

22,350

Nil

5,032

22,350

Nil

5,032

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Three Decades in Exile

Inflow

Total

Outflow (State Sponsored)

2,78,481 99,469

Outflow (Private) 94,126

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (2002: 127). Information about the influx and repatriation is now available in the reports of the Ministry of Home Affairs in India. A simple calculation of the official data in Table 2.1 will show that out of a total of 2,78,481, only 1,93,604 refugees left either at the time of state-sponsored repatriations or privately. If one takes a total time span of three decades (1983–2013), then the calculation of the number would be like this: since early-1980s, 3.03 lakh refugees arrived (from 24 July 1983 to 21 July 2010), out of which about one lakh refugees were sent back in two phases (1987–9 and 1992–5). Another 1 lakh had left India for Sri Lanka or to a third country on their own with valid travel documents. By the end of 2010, India had about one lakh Tamil refugees, 70,000 of them lived in refugee camps, and the rest with friends and relatives or in rented flats (see Appendix Table A. 4). After their arrival, refugee camps had been constructed in almost all the districts in the state. In 2002, a little over 64,000 refugees were staying in camps. The camp population did fluctuate from time to time depending on the political situation in Sri Lanka. In some districts, as many as thirteen different locations were used to open up camps, and in others there were just one or two locations (see Map 2.2). In 2002, Tamil refugees were living in about 111 camps located in different parts of the state (see Table 2.2).4

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Three Decades in Exile

Table 2.2 Camp Population of Sri Lankan Refugees in Tamil Nadu, 2002 No.

District

No. of Camps

No. of Families

Total No. of Persons

1.

Kancheepuram

1 88

98

2.

Tiruvallur

2 1,031

4,148

3.

Vellore

8 1,109

4,210

4.

Tiruvannamalai

13 1,095

4,158

5.

Tuticurin

4 397

1,534

6.

Villupuram

2 372

1,482

7.

Dharmapuri

10 988

3,810

8.

Salem

8 813

3,181

9.

Namakkal

2 424

1,540

10.

Coimbatore

9 990

3,788

11.

Erode

4 1,254

4,835

12.

Trichy

2 804

3,017

13.

Karur

2 552

2,128

14.

Perambalur

1 70

287

15.

Pudukottai

3 840

2,997

16.

Dindigul

7 831

3,160

17.

Madurai

4 1,382

5,177

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Three Decades in Exile

No.

District

18.

Sivaganga

7 1,035

3,339

19.

Virunagar

6 902

3,341

20.

Ramanathapuram

1 523

1,578

21.

Tirunelveli

8 753

2,778

22.

Triptnukudi

3 373

1,553

23.

Kanniyakumari

4 330

4,308

Total

No. of Camps

No. of Families

111 16,956

Total No. of Persons

66,447

Source: OfERR (2003: 7).

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Three Decades in Exile Since 1991, procedures for registering refugees became more stringent; all landing ashore in India were first checked by the Indian Navy, and then by the Special Branch at Mugandaraya Chatram. The police at Danushkodi then conducted enquiries and completed registration procedures. They were brought to the Mandapam camp where they received food and relief assistance. Those who had arrived recently were sometimes quarantined under police custody at the Mandapam Camp, since they were suspected of having links with the LTTE. In 1991, the Indian government ordered that the (p.97) (p.98) suspected refugees should be quarantined for 30 days. Three special camps came into existence for Sri Lankan Tamil militants and their families. In the Chengalpet district, a special camp had 4,097 persons or 1,070 families who allegedly had links with militant groups like the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), and Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). Some 80 LTTE (p.99) cadres were sent to Tippu Mahal Special Camp at Vellore in North Arcot Ambedkar district. Another twenty seven LTTE cadres were detained at the Melur Special Camp in Madurai district, which looked like a prison.5 In fact, special camps were meant to restrict movements of refugees and to keep constant surveillance on them. As mentioned earlier, camps were located in different districts in Tamil Nadu. Some were constructed at the outskirts of villages, and some were in abandoned houses and schools. Most had just basic amenities and were in deplorable conditions. The worst camps were in cyclone shelters. Thousands of refugees were asked to move into the cyclone shelters, located in the coastal areas. Adele Balasingham gave a vivid account of these camps. In her words: The cyclone shelters are roomless circular structures, dotted along the Eastern coastal belt of Tamil Nadu. They are located here for shelter for the surrounding villagers should cyclone lashes the coastal area, sweeping across Tamil Nadu as they did soon after the death of Indira Gandhi in 1984. After living through this frightening episode of Nature’s fury, which uprooted everything that stood in its way and flooded the area with filthy waist-deep water, as it swirled and whirled its way across Chennai, I could well appreciate the necessity of shelters, but while they were appropriate for temporary, emergency accommodation against cyclonic winds and rain, they were absolutely inadequate for permanent refugee accommodation. My heart sank when I walked into the building, swarms of flies were everywhere. The roomless shelter had become a maze of ragged and colourful saris. It is one of the ironies of human life that, despite the commonality of situations of collective living, the people always revert to their basic social cell—the family. So in a desperate attempt for privacy, each family had cordoned off a small area—sometimes a small area of a few square feet—by tying their least needed saris together and hanging them as a de facto wall, separating themselves from their neighbour. Behind these veiled walls, families of five, six, seven, eight, perhaps even Page 7 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile more, the very old, the newly married and the newborn would stake their claim to survive. Smoke and fumes from kerosene cookers of make-shift wood stoves made the place eerie as well as unhealthy and dangerous. (2001: 94) Here is another description of a camp in a hall: (p.100) Twenty five families in all are inside the hall and another 45 outside. The houses of those inside are something like this–plastic sacks used for packing cement have been cut and stitched to make up for walls that are not more than seven feet high. All conceivable human activity takes places either inside the enclosures that are no bigger than six feet by six feet or adjacent to the building, in the open where the families share bathrooms. (Frontline, 18 July 2007)6 The description of these camps fits quite well with the metaphors that Hannah Arendt (1968) used in the context of the Jewish refugees as Hades, Purgatory, and Hell. Just like the Jews, the refugees here were kept in isolation, segregated from the civilians, as if they never existed. One can cite more such examples which would show that the asylum seekers hardly had any access to basic necessities; the camps were in deplorable conditions. The lucky ones received shelters in huts in the village, where they at least had open fields and fresh air. The state tightened its grip over camp and non-camp refugees since 1991 by introducing different kinds of checks and control. Movement of the noncamp refugees on camp refugees who lived with friends and relatives or in rented houses was closely monitored. According to the UNHCR estimate, by the end of 1990s there were 40,000 people living outside government-run refugee camps in Tamil Nadu, mostly

Map 2.1 Location of Refugee Camps in Tamil Nadu, 2002

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Three Decades in Exile with friends and relatives, some Source: OfERR (2003). were surviving on remittances Note: Map not to scale and does not from family members settled in represent authentic international western countries. The boundaries. plantation Tamils, mainly from up-country Sri Lanka lived with relatives, while those from north-east Sri Lanka depended on money from relatives abroad. Some were gainfully employed or had set-up businesses. The refugees outside camps did not receive any assistance from the Tamil Nadu state government or from the centre (Suryanarain 1986: 54). Following the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement in July 1987, the Indian government asked all the Sri Lankans living outside refugee camps to register with the district collector (the highest ranking administrative officer in a district). Initially, Sri Lankan Tamils outside camps were given visas for three to six months and they were able to obtain extensions from the collector’s office after producing a clearance certificate from the police. A person residing for more than three months was also expected, in addition, to obtain a tax clearance certificate from the Inland Revenue Department. Immediately after (p.101) the killing episode in Chennai of some EPRLF members in June 1990, the Tamil Nadu government renewed its call for registration of refugees who lived outside refugee camps. After Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, the Tamil Nadu government issued a public notice on 28 June 1991, requiring all Sri Lankan Tamils living outside refugee camps to register with the nearest police station within seven days with details such as name, address, and occupation. Owners of houses and lodges providing accommodation for Sri Lankan Tamils were also ordered to give details about their tenants within seven days. The deadline for registration was extended later by two weeks, and finally it was extended up to 1 October 1992. Those who had already registered but changed their place of residence were also advised to provide their new addresses. The government made it clear that those who did not register would be removed to special camps for eventual deportation from Tamil Nadu. In order to control the influx, the central government began deporting as many refugees as possible. In 1991, both the central and the state government decided to send back as many camp and non-camp refugees as possible to Sri Lanka. As a punitive action against them, the second repatriation of refugees began in 1992, from Rameswaram to Trincomalee in eastern Sri Lanka. Many were asked to leave Tamil Nadu in spite of refusing to sign the consent form. For many, repatriation meant nothing but movement from camps in India to welfare centres or camps in Sri Lanka, because condition in most of the areas was critical. Many human rights activists objected to forcible repatriation and a case was registered at the Madras High Court. In spite of protests and objections, repatriation went on as planned.7 Page 9 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile In 1992 all the preparations for a state-sponsored repatriation were completed. Special ferries were used to take them back. Following the international protocol some refugees were asked to sign consent forms. However, it was reported in the press that the haphazardly arranged repatriation led to more complications. The three primary conditions before repatriation like security and safety at the place of destination, voluntary nature, and dignity were hardly followed. The repatriation was unsafe since there was intense fighting on the island. It was also involuntary because refugees refused to give consent. At the time of Eelam War III in 1995, heavy fighting broke out between the LTTE guerrillas and the Sri Lankan army, and it continued till the end of (p.102) 1996. According to one report, in almost two years of Eelam War III, 4,500 guerrillas, 1,500 Sri Lankan soldiers, and 12,000 civilians were either killed or disappeared (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1991, 1994a). The war caused the third large-scale exodus of the refugees from Sri Lanka. Army offensives in Jaffna and Killonochi in the autumn of 1996 led to more displacement. Tense situations and incessant skirmishes between the Sri Lankan army and the LTTE forced many Tamils to leave. Since 1995, a large number of Tamil refugees began to arrive in Rameshwaram and camp population began to rise again. Most of these newcomers were living in camps or shanties, segregated from their neighbours in the villages. They were neither allowed to enter other neighbourhoods nor had permission to leave camps. Strict surveillance was maintained in each camp. A camp refugee was allowed to go outside the camp only between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. In 1991, more measures were introduced, camp refugees were separated according to their place of origin in Sri Lanka. A major dislocation took place in the life of the camp refugees when they were separated district-wise. Refugees from Jaffna were segregated from the refugees from Mannar. Refugees who had settled down in the south were asked to move to the north. Dislocations caused hardships and forced the refugees to begin their life all over again in a new camp. Between 2006 and 2010, as the Sri Lankan army launched its final assault, the last exodus of refugees took place. Influx slowed down during the last phase of the war in Sri Lanka. Tamil refugees kept away not only from the local Tamils but also from the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In many parts of the world, refugee problems have been looked after by the NGOs. Timely interventions by NGOs have saved many lives in Africa, and more recently in the Balkans and the Middle East. Even in India, voluntary organizations played an important role in the relief and rehabilitation of refugees from Bangladesh, Tibet, and Afghanistan. But NGOs, including the UNHCR, have been barred from entering refugee camps in Tamil Nadu or carrying out any programmes for the refugees. Many refugees had approached the UNHCR Chennai, to obtain permission to stay as a refugee or to get visa or for locating untraceable family members. In the absence of official permission to work among the refugees, the UNHCR could do little but refer (p.103) all these cases to the Refugee Rehabilitation Page 10 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile Department of the Government of Tamil Nadu.8 When an NGO entered the camp with some foreign observers, the secretary sent a letter addressed to the commissioner of rehabilitation, the superintendent of police (Q Branch), the district collectors, and SPs, stating, I am directed to invite your attention to the government instruction cited and to state that in spite of the above instruction it has come to the notice of the government that recently foreign voluntary organizations visited the refugee settlement in Vilupuram and other districts with members of a local voluntary organization, and interviewed the refugees without the permission from the government. The government is also of the view that the interference of members from foreign organizations may jeopardize the functioning and security measures that are adopted in the camps. I am therefore to request you to reiterate the instructions that cited above to all ‘camp officers’/‘revenue officials’/‘police staffs’/that non-government agencies (both Indian and foreign) should not be allowed inside the camp premises and interview the refugee without the permission of the government and also inform them that any deviation from the above instructions will be viewed seriously in future and severe disciplinary action will be taken against them if found responsible for such lapses on their part.9 The note made it clear that the camps were under surveillance and any outsider’s entry into the camp would be treated as trespassing protected area. In a survey conducted by OfERR (the only NGO to have contacts with the camp refugees), it was noted that social and psychological problems of the refugees were as acute as their economic problems. Many refugees lost their family members before leaving Sri Lanka or their whereabouts were not known. Family members were also separated at the time of leaving the Sri Lankan shore when boats were overcrowded and were not in a position to accommodate all the members of the family. Ms Thangammal, who was living in Injampalli camp in Erode district, informed that when she was trying to get into the boat with her two sons, the boatman announced that the boat was full and that her younger son, who was standing behind her with his friends, could get into another boat tugged nearby. Her younger son did get into the other boat but never reached India. The (p.104) boat in which Ms Thangammal was travelling started moving, but the other boat developed snag and capsized, and It never reached the Indian shore. To this day, Ms Thangammal does not know the whereabouts of her younger son. For a brief period, UNHCR and some NGOs were allowed to help in locating and uniting separated family members and their intervention helped in uniting many refugee families, but the state government decided to discontinue with this practice from the early 1990s. The assassination in 1991

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Three Decades in Exile changed the lives of camp refugees once and for all, the state used its repressive measures and there was panic and fear all around.

The Vacillating State The refugees were seen as posing to be security threats from the late 1980s, because of an intelligence report by the state government which stated that the LTTE planned to carry out subversive activities. The state, out of its humanitarian concern towards the refugees after the first influx, made arrangements for relief and rehabilitation. As stated earlier, the first influx of Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu took place from July 1983 in the wake of a sudden outbreak of ethnic riots in Sri Lanka. The state of Tamil Nadu was not prepared for a massive influx of refugees. Within a short time, 172 camps came up in different parts of the state, refugees were sent to old movie theatres, public buildings, temples, schools, and in cyclone shelters on the coastline. After registration at Rameswaram, refugees spent a few days or weeks in Mandapam camps, about 10 kilometres away from the sea shore where the British constructed camps nearly 240 years ago for transiting their indentured labourers to Sri Lanka. The same camps were being used to offer shelter to the displaced. Tamil Nadu had never been host to the refugees. However, the state government did all that was possible to meet the crisis. The state rehabilitation department took care of the task of building camps for the refugees and providing doles on time. The plight of the refugees was regularly reported in the print media. The politicians, mediapersons, and common men discussed their case with compassion; state assembly debates were charged with emotions and sympathy. The chief minister of Tamil Nadu, M. G. Ramachandran (a Sri Lankan Tamil by birth) made an all-out effort to publicize the refugee crisis (p.105) both at the centre and in the state. Some of the reports from the print media will help us in capturing the mood of the Tamil politicians and the public towards the Sri Lankan Tamil crisis in the early 1980s. In order to explain the viewpoint of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) towards the refugees, the media reported: Mr. N.V.N. Somu (DMK) was highly critical of the centre’s attitude and charged it for adopting ‘double standards’, one in dealing with the Bangladesh issue and another in dealing with the Sri Lankan Tamil problem. With quotations from the proceedings of the Lok Sabha, he sought to highlight the difference in approach and attitude of the centre towards the suffering of people in East Bengal at the hands of the Pakistan government and the genocide of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The Indian government gave all support to the liberation force in East Bengal and deputed the foreign minister to different countries besides United Nations headquarters to mobilize world opinion against suppression of human Page 12 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile rights in East Bengal. Parliament passed a resolution expressing concern over the happenings in the then East Pakistan. Why are they silent now? (The Hindu, 18 September 1985) The Tamil politicians were unanimous in pointing out that in the case of Sri Lanka, the centre remained silent when thousands of Tamils were being killed and women were raped. One of the Tamil leaders asked the centre to send the foreign minister to different countries and mobilize world opinion against the genocide of the Tamils. He also urged the centre to send troops to protect Tamils from being exterminated. In his view, the statement of the late prime minister, Indira Gandhi, in October 1987, assuring Jayewardene of non-interference in Sri Lankan affairs had given the Sinhalese the boldness to butcher the Tamil community (The Hindu, 25 September 1985). Earlier on 23 April 1986, the Tamil Nadu chief minister warned the prime minister of more exodus from Sri Lanka. In a rare gesture to show solidarity to the uprooted Tamils, an all-party delegation met the prime minister and urged her to mobilize world opinion in favour of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The DMK leader M. Karunanidhi took an extreme position by saying, ‘Separation of Tamil Eelam is the only solution’ (The Hindu, 29 September 1985). It may be mentioned that on an earlier occasion the chief minister of Tamil Nadu reacted in the following way: (p.106) The chief minister, Mr. M.G. Ramachandran, has appealed to the people of Tamil Nadu to observe a day’s fast on Tuesday, September 24, and to cooperate with the government for the peaceful conduct of the hartal on that day to express sympathy and support with the Sri Lankan Tamils…. Mr. Ramachandran said he would himself participate in the fast to be organized by the AIADMK in the city. He has asked the leaders of all political parties to make special arrangements for the fast from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. and urged government employees, teachers and the public to take part in the fast in their personal capacity or through their association. (The Hindu, 18 May 1985) According to the chief minister, the fast and hartal would help demonstrate to the world the solidarity and support of the people of Tamil Nadu towards the suffering Tamils of Sri Lanka. All of us are taking efforts to help them find a peaceful settlement to their problem, enabling the refugees to return to their homes and live with dignity and equal rights. But the violence unleashed on the Sri Lankan Tamils even after the Thimpu talks has deeply pained us and this fastcum-hartal on September 24 is only a way to demonstrate our sentiments and support to these brethren, as decided at an all-party meeting. (The Hindu, 21 May 1985) Page 13 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile There are several aspects of these media reports which merit attention. The Tamil leaders played an active role in mobilizing support for the Sri Lankan Tamils. The objective of their active campaign was to bring local Tamils or the host community to their side. Refugees were seen as the worst victims of ethnic strife. The members of the civil society expressed their views in the following way. Ramalingam, a retired school teacher said, I persuaded my principal to keep some reserved seats for refugee students. We raised funds for their living expenses and for education. It was our duty to do so. (The Hindu, 27 April 1985) Narayanan, who kept track of developments of the Sri Lankan ethnic crisis right from the early 1980s, pointed out, Refugees were in most deplorable conditions in the transit camps. Hundreds of families shared small cyclone shelters on the coastal areas (p.107) in most unhygienic conditions, something needs to be done. (The Hindu, 17 October 1985) Selvam observed, How can we shrug off our responsibility? We are from the same ethnic stock; we too share their demand for a separate state for the Tamils. Tamil Eelam will be a reality one day. (The Hindu, 17 October 1985) It was reported in the media that the proposals to fence the Mandapam Camp area and to issue identity cards to those residing within the camp and introduction of passes for visitors were opposed by the neighbours. They were of the opinion that free movement would be beneficial from the point of view of the refugees and hosts. This was clearly an attempt on the part of the hosts to help refugees to integrate with the local Tamils. Members from the hosts demanded free school education for the children of the Tamil refugees and reservation of seats in higher education and free medical treatment. India became a safe haven for thousands of refugees who arrived in the initial influx from Sri Lanka. A sympathetic state government, hosts, and a concerned central government made life easier for the refugees, especially for those who lived outside refugee camps, because they were allowed to stay for an indefinite period in Tamil Nadu and they received permission to opt for the third country asylum. They were also encouraged to take up business to earn money for their living. They received permission to open bank accounts, a facility normally not offered to non-Indians in the country. In their banks they had the permission to receive remittances. Many non-camp refugees from Jaffna were entirely dependent on remittances from relatives living abroad. The state intervention in

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Three Decades in Exile the refugee crisis raised hopes of safe return to Sri Lanka and an amicable solution to the ethnic crisis there. In the 1980s, camp refugees mostly arrived from places like Mannar, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Kandy, Nuwara Eliya, and Colombo in order to take asylum in India (see Map 2.2). There were both Sri Lankan Tamils and Tamils of Indian origin (estate Tamils). They belonged to the Hindu, Muslim, and Christian communities. In a survey, J.P. Vijaythilakan (1985) interviewed members from nearly 480 families to get information about their occupations (p.108) back home, their camp life experience and future plans. Vijaythilakan noted that as many as 30 per cent of the sample refugees were fishermen, 20 per cent agriculturists, 15 per cent businessmen, 15 per cent office workers/ professionals, and 20 per cent belonged to ‘other’ occupational categories (Vijaythilakan 1985: 27).10 Nearly 80 per cent refugees owned land in Sri Lanka. In response to questions regarding the reasons for leaving Sri Lanka, more than 90 per cent refugees pointed out the fear of the attacks by the Sri Lankan army and the police atrocities as the chief cause of their flight. Vijaythilakan also noted that 75 per cent refugees wanted to go back to Sri Lanka once things got settled. Jaffna Tamils were more keen on going back than Tamils of Indian origin or upcountry Tamils (Vijaythilakan 1985: 27). Some aspects of non-camp refugee life had featured in Vijaythilakan’s survey. The non-camp refugees arrived mostly from Jaffna, Colombo, Kandy, and Nuwara Eliya regions. Out of 47 respondents, nearly 75 per cent were businessmen or teachers. In the case of non-camp refugees, the reasons for leaving the island were riots, insecurity, and fear of attacks from the Sri Lankan army and Sinhalese anti-socials. Some left in order to provide good education to their children. As many as 45 per cent non-camp refugees wanted to go back to Sri Lanka after the end of ethnic tension, 30 per cent preferred to stay in India, 10 per cent were looking for asylum in some other country and 15 per cent were unsure of their future (Vijaythilakan 1985: 27). I have cited Vijaythilakan’s findings in some detail since this was the only survey that brought to light some aspects of Tamil refugee life in India during the 1980s. It is particularly worth noting that in his findings it was reported that quite a few non-camp refugees wanted to stay back permanently (Vijaythilakan 1985: 28). In 1987, the Government of India asked the Tamil refugees to return to Sri Lanka after the signing of the Peace Accord between Rajiv Gandhi and J.R. Jayawardene. Ships were sent to ferry the refugees back and officials asked them to sign the consent form since the camps were going to be closed down.11 According to a spokesperson of OfERR, between 1987 and 1989 a total of 48,000 refugees were repatriated from Tamil Nadu out of which 43,000 received UNHCR assistance in Sri Lanka (see Table 2.3). Nearly half of them were sent back to Mannar district. Like Jaffna, Mannar too was a strong base (p.109) for the LTTE. The arrival of the refugees in Mannar only aggravated the strained Page 15 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile relations between the local Tamils who sided with the IPKF and the LTTE political activists.12 Repatriation is not simply an act of border-crossing or returning to one’s homeland. It means returning to one’s community, nation, and getting back one’s rights as a citizen. This broader meaning of repatriation was ignored by the state in 1987. Returning home is often seen as a reversal of displacement, signalling the end of the migration cycle. This approach highlights the territorialized notion of home. The questions that need to be posed are: Does the return to home reverse the negative experience of displacement? Does it resolve the crisis and restore normalcy? Return to home may be altogether a different proposition to some groups, they may return to a whole new world of challenges and struggles. A new relationship with the social space of home could be traumatic. In 1987, repatriated Tamils never had the ‘home-coming’ experience, on the contrary they met with unforeseen challenges once they reached the island. A large number of refugees never went home, stayed in the welfare centres. Table 2.3 Sri Lankan Returnees Assisted by the UNHCR (1987–90) Districts

Number of Persons

Mannar

22,747

Jaffna

5,968

Vavuniya

3,710

Trincomalee

3,604

Kilinochchi

311

Mullaitivu

132

Batticaloa/Amparai

96

Other districts

446

Non-registered spontaneous returnees

5,986

Total

43,000

Source: USCR (1994a: 27). In 1987, with the arrival of the IPKF to the island, the Tamils were polarized into pro-IPKF and anti-IPKF or pro-LTTE camps. Repeated clashes took place between the LTTE and other Tamil (p.110) outfits, for example, EPRLF, PLOTE, and TELO who were supporting the IPKF. The Indian military administration organized elections in the North-Eastern Provincial Council in November 1988 which was boycotted by the LTTE. Under the protection of the IPKF, the EPRLF and others took part in the elections. For the security of the provincial Page 16 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile government, the Citizen Volunteer Force (CVF), a paramilitary group, was set up. The IPKF trained them and the Sri Lankan government provided weapons and financial help. This became a major irritant between non-LTTE and LTTE militants (Suryanarain and Sudersen 2000: 39). In 1990, when a new political party came into power in Sri Lanka, the newly elected president, R. Premadasa, described the Indian intervention as interference into the internal matters of an independent state. The IPKF was asked to leave the island. The Indian state intervention was criticized both by the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. There was a convergence of interest that brought the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government together, as both wanted bilateral settlement to the crisis. The IPKF had to pull out. Suryanarain described the situation in the following way: The vacuum left by the IPKF was filled by the LTTE, which gained complete control of the northeastern region. After the IPKF left, Prabhakaran put forward two demands—the dissolution of the NorthEastern Provincial Council and the repeal of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. The government rejected the demands and the Second Eelam War broke out. A few months later Premadasa fell victim to an LTTE suicide squad. (1986: 55) The LTTE launched an attack again against several Tamil leaders. An LTTE spokesman said, … they were killed not because they held views different from that of the LTTE but because they were acting as agents of India, in short, they were traitors and collaborators. Those who took sides with these leaders were also targeted.13 The killing spree created fear in the minds of the Tamil civilians and this triggered another refugee influx on the Indian shore. Between 1989 and early months of 1991 refugees arrived continuously.

(p.111) The Second Exodus After the withdrawal of the IPKF, 1,22,064 refugees arrived from Sri Lanka between 26 August 1989 and 31 March 1990 (see Table 2.4). Of them 1,15,240 refugees were given shelter at Mandapam and Kottapattu Camps and in temporary camps spread over 18 districts in Tamil Nadu.14 Some refugees were sent to Orissa, to Dandakaranya, where Bengali refugees were deported in the 1960s. The place became a dumping ground for the unwanted on Indian soil. The second exodus began just before the withdrawal of the IPKF. Many Tamils decided to leave the island as soon as they came to know about the Indian government’s decision to pull out. They were too afraid to confront the LTTE in the absence of the IPKF. Most of them were EPRLF political activists, those close to the IPKF, and formed paramilitary force to oppose the LTTE. Some refugees Page 17 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile took the same ship, which brought the Indian soldiers back. Thereafter, the refugee flow continued. In Mandapam Camp, over one lakh refugees arrived within one year (see Table 2.4). This time too, Tamil refugees received sympathy from the hosts because it was the Indian government’s misadventure with the IPKF which caused trouble for the Sri Lankan Tamils. Refugees were sent back to the places from where they were picked up for repatriation. Table 2.4 Arrival of Sri Lankan Refugees in India (June 1990– April 1991) Period

Families

Persons

June to July 1990

14,704

50,772

August 1990

13,876

47,508

September 1990

5,923

20,076

October 1990

821

2,076

November 1990

413

1,129

December 1990

83

193

January 1991

45

146

February 1991

14

48

March 1991

9

27

April 1991

5

7

Total

35,893

1,21,982

Source: UNHCR (1994: 19). (p.112) In many ways, the experience of the refugees who arrived at the time of the second exodus was unique. Most of them became the target of the LTTE for helping the IPKF. Pilavendran who arrived in 1991 said, The situation became worse in 1989 when the IPKF started withdrawing their troops. The LTTE supporters were looking for me since I supported the IPKF. At Kuthalam district I stayed in a refugee camp where majority of the inmates were Muslims. It was in this camp that the LTTE spotted me again and complained to the police that an LTTE member was staying in the camp and the police should arrest him. But I managed to prove that the charges against me were false. After a few weeks in police custody I was set free. Then I decided to leave the country for good. After many dislocations I reached Mannar where my family members joined me. I then left for Rameswaram with no personal belongings.15 Page 18 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile The departure of the IPKF created an ideal condition for the LTTE to eliminate their opponents and launch fresh attacks on the Sri Lankan army. Like Pilavendran, many other displaced Tamils cited their political activities and affiliations with different anti-LTTE political outfits as the reasons for fleeing from Sri Lanka. Nadesalingam had to leave Sri Lanka for getting involved in inter-group rivalries. He narrated, I became a member of the PLOT which functioned initially as a welfare organization but later it turned into a militant outfit. With the withdrawal of the IPKF in 1990 problems emerged as I was associated with the antiLTTE group called PLOT. In July 1990, I moved to Mullaitivu and stayed there for a month and after a few days I left for India with my family.16 Another refugee, Balachandran, said, The trauma began when the IPKF stationed in Trincomalee started leaving the town and other surrounding areas. In order to escape violence and harassment from the Sri Lankans, all the residents of my village took shelter in another village. Life was not safe there either. Army began killing and looting in surrounding areas. Within a span of three months I took shelter in eight different villages. By June 1990, (p.113) things went out of control, army brutality reached its peak. At this point I decided to leave for India with my wife and two daughters.17 A closer look at the series of events that took place in Sri Lanka since 1987 will show how Indian interference changed the entire complexion of politics in Sri Lanka. Refugees paid the price for the withdrawal of the troops. The Peace Accord had no time frame, as a result the new political regime asked the Indian army to withdraw before accomplishing their goals. For refugees in India, a worst crisis began to unfold when the news of the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi reached refugee camps on 21 May 1991. He was killed during an election rally in Sriperumbudur, a place near Chennai. Immediately after the incident, it was pointed out in some sections of the print media that refugees with links with the LTTE masterminded the attack. Refugees feared large-scale police repression and deportation from the country. Their life was at stake again.

Repatriation of Refugees The flip-flop on the part of the Indian state began again when Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated. Following the incident in May 1991 there were strong demands, from the central government and by the AIDMK in Tamil Nadu, for the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees. It was the same political party that supported the Tamils from Sri Lanka in the 1980s. The four accused in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination who received death sentence from the Supreme Court of India were all refugees. Perurvalam was from up-country Sri Lanka and had studied electronic engineering there. Murugan arrived in India in 1991, and was studying engineering. Nalini, a friend of Murugan, arrived in 1991. Santha, the Page 19 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile fourth accused, came to India in 1991 just before the assassination and stayed with the photographer Haribabu, who was killed on the spot. The Indian government reconsidered suitable amendments to their earlier policy of sending back refugees only when normalcy would return in the country of the refugees. In order to capture the mood of the hosts in the wake of Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, let us take a look at some of the media reports. In an interview to The Hindu an Indian official said, ‘The refugees need not wait till original habitations are safe and secure. They can go to (p.114) state transit camps such as Madhu’ (Frontline, 14 February 1992, p. 102). He expressed concern over the fact that there were over two lakh refugees in Tamil Nadu and many of them would not return until peace was restored. He said that given India’s longstanding policy against forcible repatriation, it would be difficult to send back those who were not willing to return. The central government put an end to all doubts and pointed out that the first batch of Sri Lankan refugees staying in Tamil Nadu would be returning in the first half of December 1991. Before deportation refugees were given consent forms. Of the total 53,661 refugees who filled out the questionnaire, 16,663 expressed their willingness to return to Sri Lanka, while the remaining 36,998 were not in favour of repatriation (Frontline, 14 February 1992, p. 103). The state went ahead with the plan to deport as many refugees as possible including those housed in special camps. The officers from Tamil Nadu said that this process had been completed by the end of November 1991. As far as 208 Sri Lankan government servants were concerned, it was confirmed that the Sri Lankan government was willing to receive them. Arrangements would be made for sending them back by air. There would be no repatriation of 88 ‘hard-core militants’ and 365 ‘hard-core supporters’ of the LTTE who were reportedly in the custody of the special investigation team probing the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. The arrangement for repatriation moved at a faster pace, but very little was done to ascertain whether the conditions in Sri Lanka were suitable for repatriation.18 Refugees voiced their concern against repatriation. The OfERR noted their demands in the following way and pointed out that there must be an unambiguous agreement between the Sri Lankan army and the LTTE on resolving the ethnic question, the eschewing of violence, the restoration of democracy and the rule of law, in north and northeast Sri Lanka before any such returns take place. The refugees raised the following points: 1 Tamil refugees believe that representation in the peace talks must be broadened, deepened, and made more transparent, so that all citizens may genuinely participate in their own political destiny. 2 The agreement reached between the two parties (Sri Lankan army and the LTTE) must guarantee the right of all Sri Lankans, (p.115) persons of recent Indian origin domiciled there should enjoy human rights including right to life, citizenship, property, universal suffrage and so on,

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Three Decades in Exile as well as self-determination, as described by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and upheld by international law and practice. 3 The agreement must make specific provision for the return of refugees through the inclusion of written accords that guarantee rights, safety, and security of those returning and their social and material well-being. 4 The refugees should be involved in the negotiation of such accords and in validating the social and material conditions that will make possible their return. Refugees must play an active and informed part in the return process itself. 5 Such returns can only take place on a voluntary basis, upholding international standards of safety and dignity. The hosts were talking about the refugees in different voices. In order to justify the government action an AIADMK minister said, … it was sad that there were still people in Tamil Nadu who openly raised slogans in support of those arrested in connection with the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. If they wanted to praise the culprits, they were free to do so in Jaffna, not in India. It could not be tolerated. Other than the common language, there were no similarities between Indian Tamils and Jaffna Tamils. In fact, the latter looked down upon the former…. It was true that the people of Tamil Nadu had been helping the militants over the years, but now the situation changed with their becoming mercenaries. It was time the central and state governments take firm steps. The people should realize the threat being posed to Indian unity in the form of Tamil militancy, the Khalistani movement and Kashmiri and ULFA Insurgencies. (The Hindu, 30 June 2002) The shift in the policy of the ruling party in the state is worth noticing. In the mid-1980s, it was the AIADMK which was actively campaigning for the wellbeing of the refugees. In the early 1990s, they were the first to ask for repatriation. Refugees were described by them as camp followers of the LTTE and a threat to national security. This shows that not only the central government but also the state (p.116) government kept on changing position. In the context of the World War II refugees and state policies, Hannah Arendt (1968) noted that such shifts are common since refugees lack voice, they turned into pawns in the hands of the politicians. Like the first, the second repatriation raised many legal and ethical issues. For two nights prior to their departure refugees were kept inside marriage halls at Tambaram near Chennai. The halls looked more like prisons, with policemen and officials on guard day and night. Sumakay of Trincomalee did not want to go back. She said,

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Three Decades in Exile Why are they sending us back? Has any agreement between India and Sri Lanka been reached? The Tamil Nadu government officials gave us forms printed only in English and asked us to sign them, saying we would be sent back only after the problem is solved. I readily signed. But now we are being driven out. After all, we came here to protect our lives. (Frontline, 24 April 1992, p. 83) Another refugee observed, I have Rs. 1500. We are leaving for Trincomalee tomorrow. What do we do with the Indian currency once we go to our country? Why can’t they let us out and allow us to buy lungis, saris, and ropes? Why are we treated like prisoners? (Frontline, 24 April 1992, p. 84) Refugees were asked to sign a consent form in which they declared, ‘Once again, I confirm that I wish to go back to Sri Lanka with my family members on my own accord.’ Since the contents of the form were written in English many refugees had no idea what they were asked to sign. They did what the officials had asked them to do. Language helped the state to mask its intention from the refugees. The voices of the officials were different from written words.

Map 2.2 Areas of Population Displacement in Sri Lanka Source: Drawn under supervision of the author.

The situation in the ‘uncleared areas’ or areas still under the control of the LTTE (Sri Lankan government called these areas ‘high-risk zones’) was far from normal (The Hindu, 15 June 1991). Those who were from ‘cleared areas’ were in a position to return with the support of the Sri Lankan government, but those from ‘uncleared areas’ were going to be in limbo. The LTTE showed no inclination to take the refugees back, on the other hand, they opposed the move of the Indian government. During the repatriation, the Indian officials (p.117) Page 22 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile completely ignored the condition in Sri Lanka. In the north and northeast, normal life was affected for ban of certain goods moving into the LTTE controlled area and restrictions on certain traditional occupations caused formidable hardships to the civilian populations. The objective behind the ban was to curb the LTTE activities in the north and northeast. All fertilizers containing nitrogen and urea were banned. The move affected farming as fertilizers and urea were essential ingredients for the cultivation of paddy. The ban on cement and iron made it impossible for people to repair their warravaged homes. Cement was banned because it was feared that it could be used by the LTTE to build bunkers. The economic embargo included several nonmilitary items, for example, printing paper, bicycles, spare parts of motor vehicles, tyres, shoe polish, towels, shirts, and trousers (it was not known how these last few items posed a threat to the army!). The ban on fishing caused hardships to thousands of fishermen in the coastal areas in the north and northeast. For several generations these fishermen were dependent on fishing, many of the Karwa fishermen migrated from south India in search of livelihood. The government thought that the movement of sea tigers could be curbed by imposing ban on fishing. Fishermen who were stripped of their age-old occupations found it hard to switch over to new occupations for a living. For ignoring conditions in Sri Lanka, the repatriation resulted in moving many refugees from camps in India to welfare centres in Sri Lanka. The first shipload of refugees landed in Trincomalee on 22 January 1992, with 3,383 families or 11,340 persons altogether. It was reported in the media that … several of them have been unable to return to their original homes, they were housed in transit camps where they were paid Rs. 2000 grant and free rations by the government. In Trincomalee district, for example, 200 out of 851 families were unable to return to their village and were now living in camps. In Mannar district, out of 1,116 families that returned, 315 were in camps. (The Hindu, 23 January 1992) This, then, became an organized repatriation to a high-risk zone. In a paper, Kunz (1981) observed that there are refugees who believe that their opposition and antagonism to events at home uprooted them and they are paying the price for the principle they (p.118) cherished. These refugees retain a strong bond with their homeland and they will be the first to come forward in the case of repatriation once the cause of their exile is removed. There are refugees who after leaving their homeland for a long time feel alienated from the people back home. Long periods of asylum can cause such alienation. They are less likely to have a strong desire to return if they see no change in social and political conditions that alienated them. Many Tamil refugees who were picked

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Three Decades in Exile up for repatriation belonged to the latter category who were not keen at all on returning to Sri Lanka. The non-camp refugees too were included for repatriation. Those who refused to return or to report to the nearest police station found hostile treatment in the hands of the government officials and the police. The policing on refugees began in full swing. All non-camp refugees were told to report to the nearest police station with immediate effect. An official observed that in response to the directive, 21,000 refugees reported at various police stations, which was a low turnout for the registration. According to the state government, at least one lakh Sri Lankan Tamils had settled down in different parts of Tamil Nadu as non-camp refugees but only 21,000 of them chose to register (The Hindu, 1 January 1992). Chief Minister Ms Jayalalitha had warned of strong punitive action against all those failing to report, including the possibility of deportation. They were asked to register themselves by 12 July 1991. As the state police and the intelligence branch had a thorough knowledge about the place and locations where the Sri Lankan Tamils were living, it was not difficult for the police to obtain details of these families. Police sources warned that if a family or a group was found unregistered, they would have to do a lot of explaining and the onus of proof about their credentials would rest squarely with them. On the least suspicion, the Sri Lankan Tamils were picked up for questioning, and many had to spend time in police custody (The Hindu, 1 January 1992). A voluntary organization like Asia Watch raised several objections regarding the 1992–3 repatriation. First, it noted that refugees faced direct and indirect coercion to return home, including arbitrary arrest, withdrawal of stipends, and food rations, and they were pressurized to sign forms indicating their desire to return without knowing the contents of what they were signing. Second, no international agency had access to refugee camps in Tamil Nadu to monitor whether the (p.119) registration of refugees to return was indeed voluntary. Since August 1992, the UNHCR was allowed to interview some refugees only after they had registered and moved to a transit camp for repatriation. Refugees had no reliable means of getting information about conditions in their home districts on which they could base their decision to return. They were unaware of the bombing and shelling that would make it impossible for them to return directly to their villages, and that they would end up in welfare centres. Moreover, once they reached Sri Lanka, the returnees, particularly young Tamil males, would be viewed with suspicion by both government forces and the LTTE. The safety of the returnees was compromised. Refugees did raise their voices against policing and forcible repatriation. In a statement G. Ganasekaran, General Secretary of the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF), appealed to the chief minister to intervene in the matter and urged the centre to reconsider its decision to send back the Tamil refugees to their homeland. He said a majority of the refugees who sailed back Page 24 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile to Sri Lanka a few days earlier did so in frustration. Some had felt that it was better to sign the consent form instead of facing the official pressure and policing. A solution to the ethnic problem had not yet been worked out and the Sri Lankan government was not going to ensure protection to the refugees. In such a situation it was surprising that the Indian government had decided to send back the Tamil refugees (Times of India, 1 July 1992). The Tamil Eelam Liberation Front (TELF) spokesman said that the bomb blast in Trincomalee, even before the arrival of the first batch of Tamil refugees, should have been an eye-opener to the Government of India. They should have reversed their faulty move. M.K. Eelaventhan, General Secretary of the TELF, said in a statement that the north had been under seize and the civilians had been ordered to evacuate their homes. Neither the state nor the central government took note of the situation in Sri Lanka. One more point merits attention. The Sri Lankan state had to cope with a large number of internally displaced persons who were living in the welfare centres. The number of internally displaced increased throughout the early 1990s (Chandrakantha 1994). The state failed to send the displaced back to their homes because of intense fighting between the Sri Lankan army and the LTTE. In a short account on the internally displaced, Chandrasekara observed, (p.120) My main problem is with the internally displaced people. If I compare the 50,000 in India to the number of displaced internally, who had not left the boundaries of the country but who had to leave their residences and take refuge in welfare centres or with friends and relatives, the magnitude of the problem will be apparent. We have 400,000 in welfare centres and 300,000 with friends and relatives. A further 1,200,000 have gone back to their former residences and are in the process of being resettled and rehabilitated. A further 1,500,000 have been already resettled in their original places of residence. 20,000 people have been relocated because they cannot get back to their original places of residence. So the problem of refugees is comparatively small. I feel that the emphasis the world over on internal displacement is insufficient. (1995: 43) Chandrasekera, a retired Sri Lankan civil servant, raised the enormity of the problem of the displaced with statistics released by the RRAN, a voluntary organization which showed that at the end of April 1998, nearly 8 lakh persons lived as displaced persons within the country (see Appendix Table A.5). Almost all of them were taken to state-supported welfare centres in the eastern, northcentral, and north-western provinces. Government expenditure on providing dry rations to these persons was estimated to be Rs 24.7 million (2.47 crores) per month. The most affected areas were Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Mannar, and Puttalam (see Map 2.2). Estimates by a Catholic organization, Social and Economic

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Three Decades in Exile Department Centre (SEDEC), shows a little over 10 lakh persons were internally displaced (see Table 2.5). Table 2.5 Internally Displaced Persons in Sri Lanka District

Camps

Jaffna

Persons 352 3,55,000

Mullaitivu

32 55,925

Mannar

46 1,07,050

Kilinochchi

16 44,050

Vavuniya

02 450

Batticaloa

52 3,15,735

Ampara

29 26,224

Trincomalee

29 34,134

Anuradhapura

60 27,189

Polonnaruwa

10 9,647

Colombo

12 3,489

Puttalam

59 30,595

Kurunegala

31 7,847

Total

730 10,17,335

Source: SEDEC (1991: 5). Repatriation would be a self-defeating exercise if refugees suffered from fear of persecution in their country. At the time of the 1987 repatriation, the state addressed the problem regarding safety by citing the mission of the Peace Keeping Force. The IPKF landed in the island with the mandate to provide security to all, including those returning from India. However, in 1991 safety issues of the repatriates hardly mattered. Under the UN Convention, the sending country has the obligation to ensure the citizenship rights of the refugees. In the case of Tamil refugees, long-term camp life created problems with the citizenship rights. Those who were born in refugee camps were denied citizenship upon arrival because they failed to provide the necessary documentary proof like the birth certificate. As a result, children (p.121) of many repatriates were denied admission in schools. Moreover, around 28,500 estate Tamils who were living in camps had not received citizenship, their fate was hanging in the balance. They were denied citizenship in Sri Lanka, and not recognized as Indian citizens. Repatriation of these refugees resulted in stateless existence for the rest of their life. Neither Page 26 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile did India agree to accept them as repatriates under Shirimavo–Shastri Pact, nor was Sri Lanka willing to include them as their citizens. The judicial interventions in the case of repatriation/deportation merit attention. A Delhi court, in a judgment, made it clear that the Indian policy of repatriation lacked direction. Chandra Kumar, a Tamil refugee ran away from camp and tried to board a plane to go to Italy. The immigration officer found out that he was trying to travel with forged documents. He was arrested and sent to prison, and was charged with cheating, impersonation, and forgery under Foreigner’s Act of 1946. The additional public prosecutor pleaded for his deportation in a court. Rejecting the plea for deportation the court observed that ‘Indian’ and ‘noncitizens’ are to be treated equally as (p.122) far as Article 21 (Right to Life and Liberty) of the Constitution is concerned. The very idea of deporting the convict to his country of origin where he has a well-founded fear of persecution would not be in consonance with the principle of natural justice. The judge observed, ‘How can the court become a party to the persecution of an individual? The court cannot retrograde itself to the position of a mute spectator’ (Frontline, 21 September 2011, p. 17). The main political institutions may at times work at cross purposes. In this case we could notice how administrative measures were deviating from the broad principles laid down by the judiciary. The judgment upheld the spirit of the international treaties on the right against refoulement. It looked at the position of a refugee in the light of the 1953 Convention and 1967 Protocol. Moreover, the judge went to the extent of saying that the Refugee and Asylum Seekers Protection Bill of 2006 which addressed refugee-related problems more comprehensively than the Foreigner’s Act of 1946 had not yet been passed by the parliament. In the absence of suitable legislation the refugee-related matters would remain highly contentious (Frontline, 21 September 2011, p. 18). Return of the refugees to their homeland is often described in literature as a happy occasion as this opens up the possibility to reunite with the family members and relatives, and to get back one’s moveable and immoveable property, and more importantly, the opportunity to live in one’s homeland in peace. One is reminded of the return of Jews refugees to Bangladesh after Liberation War or return of the displaced to their homeland in many European countries after the World War II. However, for Tamils it was an idyllic version of ‘return’ because those who returned after a long stay in a foreign country developed a different perception of their homeland. Bitter memories of war shaped this perception. The uncertainty of life after return created fear. Those who stayed back were not keen on welcoming the returnees.19 Some had occupied their land, some took over their other properties which they were not prepared to give up since they weathered the rough days.

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Three Decades in Exile More Refugees in Tamil Nadu Official data is now available on the arrival of refugees till July 1996 (see Table 2.6). Between August 1996 and December 1998, 5003 (p.123) more refugee families or a total of 15,148 persons arrived in Tamil Nadu. If they are added to the July 1996 figure, then the total would go up to 22,000 families or 78,000 persons in all. Since 1996, the number of refugees went on increasing, and came to a halt when the peace process began in 2002. Table 2.6 Tamil Camp Refugees Arrived in India up to July 1996 Place of Settlement

Family

Persons

Mandapam

1,662

3,979

Kottapattu

432

1,605

Other districts

14,894

57,471

Total

16,988

63,055

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (1999: 7). Ganapathi Pillai, who arrived in 1996, narrated his experience in the following way: I decided to quit my job since Sri Lankan army started harassing the Tamils and indiscriminately killing or arresting persons without any charge. On October 30, 1995, an announcement was made that all Tamils should leave Jaffna before 5 p.m. on that day. As soon as I came to know about it I packed up essential items for the family and left for Kilinochi. Fighting broke out there too. I reached the Indian shore Dhanushkodi on November 20, 1996, then went to Rameswaram with my family and completed the formal registrations, and stayed in the Mandapam Camp till November 21, 1997. The camp life was miserable, there was corruption at all levels. In Mandapam Camp there were no proper education and employment facilities. Pillai added, Many refugees pointed out that on reaching India they realized that they were unwanted here. It was quite clear from the behaviour of the officials in the camp that they would be treated like prisoners. The Indian state wanted to send signals to all those leaving the island that India is not a safe haven any more.20 The state policies towards the refugees changed with the concern for internal security in India. As politics in the island was taking a (p.124) new turn, the Indian state policy kept shifting which led to more hardship for the camp

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Three Decades in Exile refugees. In the next section, I will describe the case of women refugees in camps who were particularly hard-pressed for the rules regarding camp life. The final war in Sri Lanka in 2009 coincided with the parliamentary elections in India. Neither the central nor the state government had time to look into the problems of the refugees. As a result, all the international norms concerning protection and asylum mattered least in the country. As soon as the war broke out, refugees reached Ramnad. But the intense war hardly allowed a safe exit from Sri Lanka, many were trapped in the crossfire. Both India and Sri Lanka kept constant vigil in the sea to stop refugees. With the arrival of these latecomers the camp population increased to about 70,000. The war in Sri Lanka and elections in India took the public gaze away from the pogroms that took place on the Tamils in Sri Lanka.

Women in Camps Women from India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, and more recently Myanmar are migrating to Asia’s higher-growth countries like Hongkong, Singapore, and Malayasia to work as housemaids. The demand for them has increased because in developed countries more and more women are entering the job market as white-collar workers, and their housework is taken over by the migrants. With the new-found wealth, the oil-rich countries of the Middle East are now following the footsteps of Southeast Asia, recruiting more and more women as housemaids. This is why, in recent years, a shift in the movement of female migrant workers is clearly noticeable; the Middle East is an attractive region for the migrants. According to a report prepared by the India Ministry of External Affairs, in 2007, 2 lakh Indian women were working as housemaids in the Gulf (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India 2008: 23–31). The yearly flow of migrant housemaids which was 5,000 in 2004 increased to 15,000 in 2005. The women were recruited mostly from south Indian states like Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka. The Indian missions in the Gulf, the report noted, were constantly swamped with complaints of sexual exploitation, (p.125) physical assault, verbal abuse, long working hours, poor living conditions, and withholding of salaries and identity papers by the employers. From the early 1990s, displaced Sri Lankan Tamil women began to follow the same track, they were travelling to the Middle East in search of work (Gamburd 2000: 65–71). To study the nature of migration between 2001 and 2004, refugee women were interviewed in four different locations: in the districts of Tiruvallur (Gummidipundi Camp), Vellore (Abdullapuram Camp), Pudukottai (Thoppukollai Camp), and Thoothukudi (Thapathy Camp). The narratives collected in these camps would highlight the complications involved in ‘working’ as housemaids in the Middle East and victimization in camps. Women from different age groups were identified for the interview so that a broad spectrum of views could be obtained. They were interviewed inside the camp, sometimes in the presence of Page 29 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile their husbands. Their stories often shifted from one theme to another, often marred by emotions. From these narratives only those sections that are relevant to ‘work’ and ‘surveillance’ have been used in this section (Dasgupta 2003b). In a report prepared by the Tamil Nadu government in 2008, it was noted that some 9,071 refugees were living in camps without documents (Government of Tamil Nadu 2008: 7). Most of these refugees went to the Middle East in search of jobs, spent few years there, and then returned to camps as visitors with tourist visas valid for six months. On the expiry of six months they stayed on illegally in the camps (see Table 2.7). Table 2.7 Registered and Unregistered Refugees in Camps in 2007 S. No. Categories

Year of Counting Population

1.

Refugees with Registration in Camps

2006

50,549

2.

Refugees without Registration in Camps

2007

9,071

3.

New Arrival (January to December 2006)

2007

16,358

Total

75,978

Source: Government of Tamil Nadu (2008: 16). Let us examine the case of unregistered women returnees in the camps. Women above 18 years of age constituted one-fourth of the camp population. Within the camps they had only one major source of sustenance—the dole received from the government in cash and kind. However, doles were far from adequate to meet different kinds of household needs.21 Therefore, in order to earn money both men and women looked for work within the camp and even outside. The mandatory requirement for camp refugees to return to camp before the sunset forced men and women to look for worksites close to their camps. The refugees often found jobs in construction sites, brick kiln factories, road constructions, and the like. Jobs were few and competition to grab these jobs was fierce. Local labourers found (p.126) work more easily than refugees since they were able to spend more time at work. Local labourers often used their network to get jobs. Sometimes employers ask refugees to do the job because they could pay them lower wages. In camps, the distinction between the private and the public space often gets blurred. Many refugee women work at home because of the uncertainty of getting work outside the camp, discrimination in the payment of wage, and restrictions on time for work. The home, the private space for women and men often turn into a workspace. Jaya had been staying in Madurai Camp since 1991 with her sister and two children. Two sisters stitched at least two to three pairs Page 30 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile of shoes daily, and received on an average of Rs 150. Malini from the same camp converted her room into a grocery store to sell daily necessities to other camp dwellers. Uma, who completed ‘A’ level in Sri Lanka before arriving in Tamil Nadu, used her room for giving private tuitions to five to six schoolchildren in the camp (Dasgupta 2003b). One can cite more examples to show how the private space was being used for work. Single mothers, women who lost their husbands, or whose husbands are missing are particularly hard-pressed to use their homes for work. The state policy of restricting the movement of the refugees, economic hardships caused by the lack of assistance received from the government, and scarce employment opportunities in and around refugee camps force many men and women to take drastic steps for alternative employment opportunities. Women between the ages of 18 and 30 found a unique way in meeting their needs. Some women (p.127) in this age group, especially those who are stout and lightskinned, received offers from agents in Sri Lanka to go to Saudi Arabia or to other Middle East countries to work as housemaids. In order to get the job of a housemaid, a woman has to pay the broker. Those women who are healthy enough to undertake the journey, and willing to change their religious identity from a Hindu to a Muslim are offered these jobs (see Gamburd 2000: 99–122). They have to forego their right to stay as a ‘refugee’ in a camp. Their absence from the camp automatically leads to the deletion of their names from the list of refugees eligible for doles. In financial terms, the job offered as housemaids in the Middle East is a lucrative one since each maid earns a minimum of Rs 4,000 to Rs 5,000 a month (and sometimes more, depending on the ability of the worker and the generosity of the employer). The operational network includes a large number of actors at different points. Sri Lanka is the epicentre of the network. In Sri Lanka, large-scale migration of women workers to the Gulf began in the early 1990s. According to Gamburd (2000), in 1999, the number of female migrants from the island increased to 8,00,000. Most migrant women went abroad as housemaids, and 85 per cent of them were in the age group of 20 to 40. Saudi Arabia was the popular destination, followed by Kuwait and UAE. The Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) regulates migratory flow, and allows licensed manpower recruiting agencies to do the necessary technical work. Along with licensed agencies, Sri Lanka experienced mushrooming of non-licensed agencies, especially in the rural areas. The latter facilitated the flow of displaced Tamil women to the Gulf (Gamburd 2000: 117). The role of the agents is crucial in finalizing the deal. The main agents carry out their work in Sri Lanka. There are thousands of agencies which send Sri Lankan women to different parts of the world, especially in the labour-scarce areas in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Information about women who are interested in undertaking these jobs is collected by ‘sub-agents’ located in Page 31 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile different parts of Sri Lanka and in refugee camps. Krishnan, a sub-agent, who lived in Madurai refugee Camp, used to collect names of willing women for sending them to Saudi Arabia via Colombo. Krishnan, a refugee (p.128) from Kilinochchi, arrived in Rameswaram in 1990. In 1992, he was asked to move to Madurai Camp where he began his new occupation as a ‘sub-agent’. He described his occupation in the following way: A prospective immigrant to Saudi Arabia will have to obtain an emergency passport from the Sri Lanka High Commission at a price of Rs 310, which is valid for six months. If one wants to obtain an emergency passport within 24 hours one has to pay an additional amount of Rs 1,000 to the broker. Most women prefer an early delivery of their passport. The next major expense is the amount payable to the ‘Ceylon Agency’, a broker who arranges the deal. His commission is Rs 4,500. The air ticket from Chennai to Colombo and from Colombo to Riyadh would cost Rs 7,500. In addition one has to pay a visa fee in Colombo of Rs 100. Therefore, the total expenses can go up to Rs 14,000 or little more. Sometimes, agencies operating from Sri Lanka do not take cash, instead they demand sarees, lungis worth Rs 4,500 on their return. The employers in Saudi Arabia prefer girls and ladies under 30 years, who will be able to take up the physically and mentally challenging job of a housemaid.22 Krishnan’s job is to find suitable women from camps, to collect money for their passports, and maintain liaison with the Sri Lankan agents. For each deal he earns Rs 2,000 which the immigrant sends him after earning money in Saudi Arabia. Gamburd, in her study of Sri Lankan migrants (2000), described at length the smooth operation of the agents and ‘sub-agents’ (Gamburd 2000: 90– 120). According to her, the lack of transparency and illegal dealings makes this business similar to trafficking in disguise. Sri Lankan government hardly intervenes in the illegal involvement of private parties in sending women to the Middle East (Gamburd 2000: 103). To escape from surveillance, refugee women have to bribe the officials. Each inmate has to complete certain formalities before leaving the country. Each one of them has to obtain a clearance certificate from the ‘Q’ branch of the Tamil Nadu government.23 The superintendent of police of the ‘Q’ branch has to say that they have no objection in giving the exit permit. The exit permit is issued to a refugee once the tehsildar’s recommendation and the ‘no objection certificate’ from the ‘Q’ branch reach the collector. The ‘Q’ branch releasing note states, ‘verifications were made on the petition of the Sri Lankan (p.129) refugee seeking exit clearance to leave for Sri Lanka at her own cost. No adverse remarks against her were received by this branch, and no objection from the “Q” branch was issued’. The ‘Q’ branch official who facilitates the procedure could charge up to Rs 1,000 for sending the case and the revenue inspector or tehsildar too would ask for almost the same amount. On their return, at the Page 32 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile Chennai airport, the immigration officials would demand their pound of flesh. The refugees, on certain occasions, would take help from the UNHCR or civil liberties group like the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) or the People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) in order to avoid extortion. Refugees living close to Chennai are in a better position to seek help from these agencies. Let us look at the cases of some of the women who undertook the journey from refugee camps to Saudi Arabia and who had to deal with the problem of re-entry. Lakshmi arrived in India in 1990 from war-torn Jaffna and found shelter in Thopukullai camp. She spent three years in Saudi Arabia as a housemaid for which she used to earn Rs 5,000 per month. She had to borrow money to meet expenses for the journey to Riyadh, but repaid her loan once she started earning. At the end of the third year she obtained a tourist visa to return to India directly from Riyadh. She reached Chennai and then went to the camp to join her husband, daughter, and son. Since she obtained the visa for India for six months, her stay in India on the expiry of the visa period was illegal. She continued to live in the camp with her family, and used her savings during her stay, bribed the ‘Q’ branch official and the revenue inspector to allow her to stay inside the camp. In this way, she managed to carry on her camp life after her visa period was over. But everyone is not as lucky as Lakshmi. Asai, an inmate of Abdullapuram Camp, left for Saudi Arabia in 1996 and returned in 1998 when her two-year contract came to an end. Like Laxmi, she entered with a tourist visa with validity for six months. Before her visa validity came to an end she left for Jeddah for a period of three years. She finally returned to her camp in 2001, once again on a six-month tourist visa, and continued to live in the camp even after the validity of the visa expired. She was taken to prison for overstay and unlawful entry into camps, but she managed to come out after paying bribe to the authorities. The local ‘Q’ branch official gave her permission to continue her stay but asked her to pay a hefty (p.130) sum. Both Laxmi and Asai were aware of the fact that their entry into the camps is a violation of the laws. They had hardly any option but to violate rules and negotiate with the adverse situation. There are two sides to the employer–employee relations in the households in the Middle East. The relations with a Saudi employer are often marred by bitterness and quarrel. Housemaids often oppose long working hours, exploitation, verbal abuse, and sexual harassment. A housemaid’s job begins at dawn and continues till midnight with a short break at lunchtime. It includes cleaning the house, cooking, washing clothes and utensils, and looking after the children or elderly persons in the household who need special care. Her workload increases during the weekend when the head of the household entertains his guests. Since the nature of work, time, and so forth, are not specified in the contract with the employer, the latter gets a free hand in making the housemaid work for as long as he wants.

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Three Decades in Exile A housemaid’s options are limited against an unrelenting and manipulative employer. The employer uses different tactics to keep their housemaids under control. They pressurize the maid in connivance with the local police and administration, they stop their movement or any interactions with fellow workers, they confiscate their necessary migration documents, like passports, visa papers, and they lodge complaints with the agents in Colombo so that words of caution reach the housemaids from there. In spite of all these the housemaids do run away, stay with their friends, and sometimes return to Colombo on their own. Some suffer in silence and accept the employer’s exploitation as something beyond redemption. A meeting with other Sri Lankan or Indian housemaids gives them an opportunity to forge bond with fellow workers. Meetings can take place in ethnic food shops or on a festival day when the employer allows the housemaid a day’s break. These are the days when the housemaids express their ethnic bond by dressing in the traditional way and eating south Indian food, gossiping and, if time permits, watching a Tamil movie together. These gatherings offer an opportunity to make new friends. Besides such gatherings, technological gadgets like a mobile help many housemaids to keep in touch with other housemaids, and with the members of the family back home. Most employers discourage the use of electronic devices as it might lead to subversive activities behind their back. The housemaids (p.131) have created some space for protest and contestation. The employer’s house is just not a workplace, for some it is also a site for opposition and resistance. The employers have different ways to counter resistance. As stated earlier, an employer has many ways to settle scores with a quarrelsome maid. For instance, Jaya protested from time to time against long hours of work. Once her contract ended, her employers sent her back to Colombo and lodged a complaint with the agent. Nalini opposed lack of privacy within the household. Her passports and other documents were confiscated by the employer in order to teach her a lesson. Employers, who are unsatisfied with the services of their housemaids, may send them to Colombo from where they have to obtain a new passport to come to India. These women often get trapped in Colombo for the delay in receiving their passport and visa. In the absence of a contract with the employer, lack of association or contact with fellow Tamil women, and indifference of the local police, women workers remain at the receiving end. There are different ways to resist the whims of an employer. When a housemaid finds it extremely hard to cope with the working conditions they can complain to the agent in Colombo, in some cases they can report the matter to the local police. The members of the community who are in a similar position can also be informed of the situation. When all efforts fail, they can take an extreme step, quit their jobs and return to Colombo on their own. The employer–employee relations in some cases work harmoniously. For instance, Lata, another migrant Page 34 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile to Saudi Arabia from Thopukullai Camp, pointed out that she left along with 30 other women from the same camp. From Chennai they travelled to Trivandrum and from there to Colombo and finally to Riyadh. She left for Saudi Arabia in 1995, and paid Rs 20,000 for the fare, passport, and as fee to agents. She described her daily household chores in Riyadh in the following way: My employer had five children and I had to look after them, gave them food on time. I had to cook, clean utensils, wash clothes and clean the house, and I received Rs 4,000. The employer had grown-up children. At the end of the fourth year I decided to return to India. The employer arranged my Indian visa so that I could travel directly from Riyadh to Chennai.24 (p.132) The other form of resistance is desertion. An individual act of desertion is daring, in most cases this is accomplished with the help of friends and fellow housemaids. Desertion can lead to serious complications, for example, police investigation, impounding of passport, and even deportation on false charges. The negative effects of working as a migrant are many. The women, after leaving their husband and children for a long time, sometimes return to a broken home. Let’s take the case of Vijaya, a refugee in Topa camp. During Vijaya’s absence, her husband got married a second time to a woman in the same camp. He left the child from his first wife with a relative. By the time Vijaya returned to camp, her husband had left. All efforts to reunite the couple failed. Vijaya now looks after her daughter. Her only source of livelihood is her savings and whatever little dole she gets for her daughter. She is always at the risk of getting caught by the police for illegally staying in the camp. Such disastrous consequences often dissuade women from undertaking migrant’s jobs, and force them to look for other alternatives. However, alternatives are limited. Some women have taken extreme steps in order to eke out a living. They go to town and nearby villages to earn money as sex workers. But this job might lead to ostracization and punishment by fellow camp dwellers. Drugpeddling is another risky occupation that some women have to undertake. The journey to the Middle East has led to hardships and complications in the lives of women, and other members of the family, especially children. One immediate consequence of taking up jobs abroad is that a refugee loses her right to live in India and right to receive dole. When they return with the tourist visa, they are allowed to live in the country as long as the visa is valid, usually for a period of six months. Once the visa expires, they encounter police harassment and extortion. They end up paying large sums of money as bribe for staying in the camp. A returnee points out, ‘… once you are back you feel like a stranger … the camp members do not come forward to help you … and the sharks are all

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Three Decades in Exile around.’25 These women’s attempts to rebuild home by migrating to another country has only led to more complications.26 As compared to these migrants, the ‘ideal women’ in a camp are the ones who exemplify an ideal living, who are role models for others in the camps. The ideal that they seem to uphold is simply keeping (p.133) a high morale in the midst of adversities. The loss of husbands and elderly male members in the war force these women to act as the heads of their households. Some of them do all the household chores, look after the children, and also go out to earn extra money. Here are some case histories of women—widows who are considered as ‘ideal’ by camp dwellers. Jaya and her family had to leave their home on Mud road, in Mannar District, after her husband was killed in crossfire. A month later, with the help from her neighbours she reached Mannar. It was a difficult time for her as uncertainty clouded her mind for not having any money at hand and having to protect three children. She shielded them through the forests. She recollects with gratitude the favour she received from her neighbours who helped her with the bus fare, food, and also provided necessary protection. They even paid the boat fee for the family. She spent nearly ten years in the camp. She fell ill and was recommended surgery by a doctor. A camp refugee pointed out, ‘She refused to get operated fearing the expenses since she had two other children to look after.’27 She was unable to lift heavy loads, walk, or even perform the daily chores. The illness had deprived her of her daily wage job. However, her son worked hard to educate his two brothers. In the eyes of the camp residents, Jaya was an ideal Tamil mother. These women are seen as women of courage, struggling hard to make both ends meet. A camp resident said, ‘… against all odds they stand like rocks, look after other members of the family….’28 Another camp resident observed, ‘They personify high moral and ethical standard for other women in the camp.’ Indeed, these are exceptional women struggling with dignity. For camp residents, they know how to strike a balance between adversaries and morality. However, valorization of ideal living does not take note of the suffering that they go through in silence. The ideal womanhood often finds expression in a culture of silence, poverty, and hardships. They make an ideal ground for this culture to thrive on.29 The war in Sri Lanka reconfigured social relations, redefined the role of women in a war-ravaged society. Many women sacrificed their husbands, sons, daughters, and relatives for the cause of ‘Tamil Eelam’. These women occupied special position among the Tamils in refugee camps; they were treated with honour and dignity. These were (p.134) ‘the women from the family of martyrs’. In the mid-1980s, almost all the Tamil political outfits carried out a campaign to recruit as many women as possible into their organizations. They were not only needed in the battlefields but also to nurse wounded soldiers, to Page 36 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile carry out campaigns for their homeland. The political pamphlets valorized Tamil women and their sacrifice (Peteel 1995: 178). The appearance of Tamil women in the print media wearing military outfits and with a gun in their hands presented a new image of women. Women who sacrificed their lives as suicide bombers became martyrs, the role model for other young women. Peteel (1995:178) noted how terms like thuuwar (revolutionaries), fedayeen (guerillas), and munadaleen (strugglers) became signifiers of a reconfigured self and community in the case of Palestinian women. One can see parallels here.

Incarceration of Refugees in Special Camps A camp sometimes is seen as a space of exception, where normal juridical rules do not work. This is why Giorgio Agamben (1995) observed in his study of sovereign power and bare life that a camp is a space that is opened when the state of exception becomes rule. The state of exception or a temporary suspension of the rule of law is given a spatial arrangement. This was evident when Heinrich Himmler opened the Dachau concentration camp in the outskirts of Munich. The camp enjoyed absolute independence from every juridical control and every reference to normal juridical order. In the words of Diels, the head of the Gestapo: ‘Neither an order nor an instruction exists for the origins of the camps: they were not instituted, one day they were there’ (Agamben 1995). The camp is a hybrid of law and fact in which the two terms have become indistinguishable. The absence of a well-defined law for the refugees can create such a situation in India. In 1991, after the assassination of former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, nearly 2,000 refugees were asked to move to ‘special camps’. They were taken there because of their alleged links with the LTTE, the political outfit involved in the assassination. The Indian state made use of certain provisions in the Indian Foreigner’s Act of 1946 to establish special camps and to incarcerate the refugees there for an indefinite period.30 By doing this, the state had turned the special camp refugees into a liminal category, they were neither (p.135) ordinary refugees nor convicts under the Indian Penal Code (IPC). This section explains how the state used archaic laws in denying refugees public space and basic human rights, and how special camps resembled to the prisons in India. I have used the term ‘incarceration’ in this section to explain conditions of the special-camp refugees after taking into account a number of points, for example, surveillance, restrictions, and confinement in separate cells. My argument is that special camps are nothing but prisons in a new form. The special camp refugees remained outside the public gaze. But on 15 August 1995, on the occasion of 48 years of Indian Independence celebration, some 43 inmates of a special camp (in Vellore Fort) escaped from incarceration. The incident triggered off mixed reactions in the media, and an enquiry commission was appointed to look into this incident and to identify those who were at fault. The report of the commission revealed some aspects of relations between the state and the inmates of the special camp. The testimonies of various state actors showed how different state agencies were involved first in supporting the Page 37 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile cause of a homeland for the Tamils in Sri Lanka and then detaining those who were having alleged links with struggle for the homeland or Tamil Eelam. The special camps were at the centre of controversy for a large number of legal and ethical issues. In 1987, after the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord, Indian state policy towards Tamil freedom fighters began to change, refugees were subjected to surveillance and policing. In 1991, the Indian state opened a special camp. This action by Indian state raised several issues that merit attention. How did the state identify the refugees who had links with the LTTE and thereby posed a threat to the country’s internal security? How long can a refugee be detained or confined in a prison-like cell without trial? Can the confinement be allowed to continue without filing a charge sheet? What exactly are the rights that have been guaranteed to these refugees during confinement? As stated earlier, the Indian state made use of the Foreigner’s Act to deal with refugees with links with the LTTE. The state opened special camps after carefully manoeuvring legal provisions. In 1992, special camps were used for as many as 1,692 suspected cases (Suryanarain and Sudersen 2000: 27). In India, two acts were applicable for dealing with the refugees. These were (p.136) the Foreigner’s Act of 1946 (especially Sections 3, 3A, 7, 14) that explained their entry, presence, and departure and the Foreigner’s Regulation Act of 1939, dealing with the registration of the foreigners. After the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, in order to open special camps for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees, these two acts were used to segregate the refugees. The public department of the government of Tamil Nadu ordered the suspected Sri Lankan refugees not to leave the boundaries of the special camp as per Section 3(2) (e) of the Foreigner’s Act of 1946, and in accordance with a notification was issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. no. 4/3/56(i)f-1. It may be noted that Section 3(2) (e) of the Foreigner’s Act of 1946 only authorized the central government to pass an order restricting the movement of foreigners (Foreigners Act [1946], pp. 3–5). The act does not refer to confinement which was the sole purpose behind creating a special camp. By using these provisions for the confinement of refugees, the state took liberty to interpret and implement the Act in its own way and thus ended up creating a special category of ‘prisoners’. The state action to incarcerate led to contestation, and accordingly a petition was filed by one of the special camp refugees in the Madras High Court in 1992, challenging the order of the central government to open special camps in order to restrict the movement of the refugees. However, in a judgment, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court upheld the government decision stating that internees were not persons arrested or detained in a special camp, they were only confined to a place. The special camp, according to the judgment, can certainly be a particular place contemplated under Section 3(2) (e) of the Foreigner’s Act. Further, a foreigner is not entitled to any fundamental rights Page 38 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile like a citizen of India, hence, the petitioner, being a citizen of Sri Lanka, cannot challenge the legality of the same order. The second part of the judgment makes an important point about rights and privileges of ‘citizens’ and ‘foreigners’, and since the refugees belonged to the latter category they were automatically excluded from rights to legal redressal.31 However, by doing this the high court order bypassed many contentious issues, for example, how did the state police identify some refugees having links with the LTTE? What exactly were the rights that should have been guaranteed to these refugees during confinement? But these (p.137) contestations remained out of the public arena for lack of support for refugees from the political parties, intellectuals, even civil rights activists. Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination silenced almost all sections of the civil society in Tamil Nadu. Special camp refugees had been picked up from different refugee camps randomly. The local police raided the camps, took the refugees to local police stations and finally, sent them to special camps. The camp officials like the tehsildar sent information to the ‘Q’ branch regarding their alleged links with the LTTE.32 Mere suspicion was enough for the ‘Q’ branch to move a refugee from an ordinary camp to a special camp. Refugees who lived with relatives and friends were also picked up by the local police since they were suspected of having links with the LTTE workers or sympathizers, they too were sent to special camps. Non-camp refugees who failed to register their names with the local police had to pay the price, some of them were taken to special camps. There were others who ended up there like young men and women who arrived in India with injury and reported at the Ramnad Transit Camp for asylum. They raised suspicion of having links with the LTTE fighters. Here are a few examples of the randomness in the selection of refugees for the special camp. Nalini, a 42year old refugee arrived in India in 1990 with two children. Upon registration at Mandapam district, she was sent to Salem Refugee Camp. On 27 December 1991, she was picked up from the camp. At the time of taking her, the police official said that they were suspicious of Nalini’s past. There were no charges registered against her. She was taken to a special camp with her two children. It was just a mere coincidence that one of the prime suspects of the Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination was a young female LTTE cadre with the name of Nalini. So most of the refugees with that name was taken to special camps. Like Nalini, Kita was taken to special camp in December 1990. At the time of taking him the police official said that he would be sent to special camp since the police had received information that he was an LTTE cadre. Samuel arrived in India in November 1997. He was picked up from a camp in Trichy in October 2000. He was suspected to be a hardcore supporter of the LTTE and sent to Tippu Mahal Special Camp located inside Vellore Fort. Shiva, a 31-year-old suspect, was also living in Tippu Mahal. He arrived in India in September 1999. He failed to (p. 138) register his name on time and this was the reason for sending him to a special camp (UNHCR 2004).33 These cases only demonstrate how random the Page 39 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile decision was for sending refugees to special camps. In none of these cases the police found any proof to establish that they had connections with the LTTE. But it was an extraordinary situation that probably called for an extraordinary measure. In describing the living conditions in special camp, an inmate pointed out: No freedom, no quality food, no medical facility, cannot even talk to other inmates … entire camp is dilapidated, rain water stagnates, giving room to insects to breed … officials treat us disrespectfully, contemptuously…. We are treated like criminals in a prison. He added, I want to live with my family.… I went on hunger strike as my wife and children wanted to commit suicide. They can’t bear it any more. Though the authorities have agreed to shift us all to Chingleput Special Camp, till date they have not done so. (UNHCR 2004: 72) Allan too was picked up on mere suspicion and lodged in the Vellore Special Camp. His wife was staying outside the Mandapam Camp. In August 1999, the ‘Q’ branch arrested him on charges of being a militant, which he denied. A friend had given wrong information to the police. Allan came to India in 1998 and lived in Mandapam for a year before his confinement to a special camp. His wife informed that Allan was not an LTTE cadre, and that she was living alone, her parents and other relatives were in Batticaloa. Allan made several attempts to come out of the special camp by writing to the higher authorities, but nothing worked. The physical structure of a special camp looked more like a prison (see Photograph 3). One special camp in Chengalpattu had cells for 41 inmates. Each room was separated from the other with one common entrance and a common yard for various services (see Map 2.3). Inmates remained under lock and key. Only women who occupied the first few rooms near the main entrance were allowed to go out to buy daily necessities. Male members were allowed only to meet visitors between 4 and 5 p.m., under strict surveillance. For all practical (p.139) (p.140) purposes the camp rules and regulations governing the daily life of the inmates were similar to those of prisons in India.

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Three Decades in Exile The Tamil Nadu police identified a few intellectuals for incarceration in special camps. S. Sivanayagam was one of them; he was an editor of a newspaper in Jaffna before his displacement. He lived in Chennai as a refugee since 1983 and edited a journal called Tamil Nation.34 After Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination on 21 May 1991, he managed to publish three issues. He was arrested in July 1991. He was one of those who spent several months in prison and later on in a special camp. Before he was taken in custody, he made his observations on the charge sheet against him in the following way: 1. I came to India in 1983 Map 2.3 A Special Camp in Tamil Nadu clandestinely (true, but nearly a hundred thousand Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, other refugees also came Government of India (1999–2009). the same way). 2. I received various remittances from London, and they were credited to my account at an Indian bank, Besant Nagar, without permission from the Reserve Bank (practically every Sri Lankan family living outside the refugee camps— there were thousands of them—was subsisting on money received from abroad through local banks without seeking permission, and their money benefited the country as foreign exchange). 3. I did not have a valid visa (no Sri Lankan refugee had an updated visa because it was a government policy not to update the visa. Only an exit visa was given on departure. 4. The charge sheet very conveniently failed to mention that I was a registered refugee like everyone else, holding a Sri Lankan Refugee Identity Certificate for the entire family issued under the name of the collector of Madras giving personal details of the four of us. (Sivanayagam 2006: 429)

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Three Decades in Exile This is a typical case of a refugee who suddenly posed to be a security threat. Like Sivanayagam many others were taken to custody on similar charges. Due to financial reasons most refugees were unable to get counsel to represent their cases. In order to block legal redressal by those who were in a position to do so, the state government made use of the National Security Act which empowered the state to detain without trial for one year. Sivanayagam was subsequently booked (p.141) under the National Security Act (NSA). However, the NSA (1980), under which many refugees were detained allowed detention only for a year. In the case of Sivanayagam, when the year-long detention under NSA came to an end, it was decided to send him to special camp. He narrated his experience in the following way: From Madras to Vellore, back to Madras and now it was Vellore again for me…. The so-called ‘Special Refugee Camp’ at Vellore known as Tippu Mahal was situated inside Vellore Fort. Although a special camp is not a jail or prison with no warders inside, the security arrangements outside surpassed those in any of the prisons. A fact-finding team appointed by the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) termed the fate of the inmates as ‘rigorous confinement’. Their fate was worse than that of the prisoners in the sense that there was no specific duration of confinement. It was a case of indefinite incarceration. When I was taken there, I found there were nearly 200 inmates, all Sri Lankan Tamils, some of whom were languishing there for five or six years continuously. A few had lost count of the years. Some of the inmates were physically maimed persons. There was one who was totally blind. There were others who had lost their limbs. (Sivanayagam 2006: 439) This is a rare account of a special camp detainees. Two points are particularly worth noting. First, special camp was used for keeping refugees in confinement once the detention under NSA was over. Second, unlike detainees in Indian prisons, the special camp refugees were asked to stay there for an indefinite period as this kind of confinement was possible by using certain provisions in the Foreigners Act of 1946. There were many like Sivanayagam who experienced a grand manipulation of the legal system by the state. Eventually, Sivanayagam was informed by his counsel that he would be allowed to ask the High Court for permission to leave the country. The alternative could be indefinite detention at Vellore. Sivanayagam opted to move to another country, and the high court granted his plea. He moved to Singapore, and from there travelled to Africa and finally received asylum in France, and later travelled to England where he worked on his memoir which dealt with his experience in special camp (Sivanayagam 2006: 305–7).

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Three Decades in Exile (p.142) Freedom at Midnight On 15 August 1995, 43 inmates of Tippu Mahal at Vellore Fort succeeded in escaping from the camp. The incident was reported in the media in the following way: On 15th August morning, the Superintendent of Police, North Arcot, directed the in-charge of Vellore Fort to carry out roll calls. Immediately, the police official rushed to the Fort. On taking the roll call it was found that 43 inmates including 4 women were missing, only 34 were present out of a total of 76. It was found out that in Room no. 27 a cuddapah slab was removed to go to room no. 84 on the ground floor. The corner room was used to escape with a three feet by three feet tunnel that was dug with the help of pipes. (Government of Tamil Nadu 2000: 2) The report that appeared in the media described the incident like jail breaks that take place in Indian prisons from time to time. They always captured the headlines, it was no exception this time. The camps drew the attention of the media and the public when the 43 inmates of Vellore Fort Special Camp escaped. The state government ordered an enquiry to look into the incident. In a notification, it was mentioned: Forty-three inmates who were unregistered insurgent Sri Lankan Tamils escaped from the Special Camp, Tippu Mahal at Vellore Fort in North Arcot Ambedkar district, in August 1995, by digging a tunnel inside the Mahal premises leading towards the moat outside the Fort wall. On 15th August 1995, the said escape of the inmates was found out and the authorities swung into action and arranged for a man-hunt throughout the state to apprehend the escapees. Simultaneously, seven police personnel including the Superintendent of Police, North Arcot Ambedkar district, along with the Revenue Officer in-charge of the camp were immediately placed under suspension…. Nineteen escapees had been arrested from various parts of Tamil Nadu, and 22 persons are absconding still at large. Two of the escapees had consumed cyanide poison and died when accosted by the police. The 22 persons could not be traced; they had probably gone back to Sri Lanka by design or by some illicit means of transport. (Government of Tamil Nadu 2000: 4) (p.143) The Vellore Fort had two wings which were called Tippu Mahal and Hyder Mahal, the former was meant for hard-core militants and the latter for women, elderly persons, and children (see Map 2.3). Most special camps looked like Vellore Fort. Abandoned prisons and old forts were converted into special camps for refugees. The Vellore Fort was ideal for the purpose, as it had adequate space to lodge hundreds of refugees, although in 1946 the fort was declared as a protected monument under the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) and it remained under the control of the ASI since 1946. The fort is Page 43 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile covered by a 3-kilometre-long wall and has a moat with a width of 67 metres. Inside the fort two Mahals are located. The Tippu Mahal and Hyder Mahal are meant for the residence of the army. It was in the Tippu Mahal that a tunnel had been dug by the inmates to escape. In 1991–2, 163 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees were sent to Tippu Mahal and 491 were kept in Hyder Mahal. The ladies in Hyder Mahal were initially allowed to go out between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m.; later on the time was fixed between 9 a.m. and 11 a.m. The children were allowed to go to school. Outsiders visited Tippu Mahal with the written permission of the tehsildar. Roll call was mandatory on every Saturday by a staff member of the revenue office in the presence of a police officer, as in prisons in India. Let me explain how from isolation, refugees came into the limelight after the incident. The story of escape from Vellore Fort began to unfold shortly. On 19 August 1995, the Tamil Nadu government formed a one-man commission to inquire and prepare a report, and a retired judge of the Madras High Court took over the task. The terms of reference of the one-man enquiry commission covered a wide range of issues, for example, to find out the sequence of events leading to the escape of 43 inmates and to enquire whether any person or persons were responsible for the incident. The commission was also asked to enquire whether any person or persons were responsible for conceiving, preparing, planning, and assisting in the escape of the inmates, lapses and dereliction of duties in this regard on the part of the individuals and officials responsible for the maintenance and security of the special camp and deficiencies in the system that had contributed to the escape of 43 inmates. The incident of escape, its reflection in the media, and formation of an enquiry committee brought the secret handling of refugee affairs by the state into public arena. The decision (p.144) to hold public hearing offered an opportunity to citizens, civil rights activists, and refugees to express their views. A close reading of the report would show that the commission—besides looking at the issues such as lapses, conspiracies, et cetera as mentioned in the terms of reference—unearthed many unknown facts that raised questions about the legality of confinement, conditions in the special camps, and issues pertaining to human rights. In short, it opened a Pandora’s box as far as refugees and citizens were concerned. Testimonies and counter-testimonies raised several questions regarding the state policies. Government officials and concerned citizens were asked to give testimony before the commission. It was an appropriate time for the state to bring the matter to the public to show that the refugees had committed an offence again, and the decision to keep them in special camp was justified. The 55-page report of the commission dealt with various aspects of the state–refugee relations (Government of Tamil Nadu 2000: 4). The Enquiry Commission Report of the Government of Tamil Nadu went far beyond the simple exposure of the Page 44 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile guilty in the Tippu Mahal escape incident. The refugees found an opportunity to voice their side of the story. The members of the civil society too got involved in the deliberations. But the observations of the 47 witnesses from the police, revenue department, and administration did not fully lend support to the claim of the state. Some raised questions about the steps taken by the state to put some refugees in special camp. First, let us take a look at the testimonies of those who found fault with the refugees and supported the state. Several witnesses tried to explain why the LTTE should be considered as an extremist political outfit. In his testimony, a public official pointed out why the LTTE is different from others: … the LTTE cadres with their highly mechanized weapons are also trained in guerilla and jungle warfare. They appeared to be disciplined and welltrained band of military and paramilitary forces … the LTTE also own steamboats and high-speed fibre-glass boats and other mechanized transport for quick travel between Sri Lanka and the coast of Tamil Nadu. The distance between Sri Lanka and the coast of Tamil Nadu is just 20 kilometres … they can very easily and quickly enter Tamil Nadu with their own transport. (Government of Tamil Nadu 2000: 4) (p.145) The IG of the ‘Q’ branch observed: … the LTTE militants were well trained in the use of sophisticated weapons as is evident from the fact that many of these immigrants were wounded, maimed or handicapped. In fact, many of these lodged inmates in Tippu Mahal at Vellore Fort where the occurrence took place were found to have lost their limbs, eye sight, et cetera, in the course of their fierce fights with the Sri Lankan army. (Government of Tamil Nadu 2000: 5) According to the same witness, the leader of the LTTE … is hiding somewhere in the northern province of Sri Lanka and has waged a total war against Sri Lankan government … the said leader of the LTTE is the first accused in the Rajiv Gandhi murder case … the same leader has been declared as proclaimed offender by the designated court of Tamil Nadu … former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a girl Dhanu or a ‘Human Bomb’ while addressing a public meeting in Sriperumbudur. So far 41 persons have been charged for the murder … all of them are hard-core LTTE men, or their supporters or agents. (Government of Tamil Nadu 2000: 5) Besides branding the LTTE as a militant political outfit, other witnesses tried to point out why they posed a threat to law and order if they were allowed to move freely in Tamil Nadu. One of them argued,

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Three Decades in Exile If the militants are released from the special camp and allowed to move about freely in India, they would create law and order problems besides engaging themselves in political assassination…. The LTTE men in custody in the special camp at Tippu Mahal, Vellore, were receiving lots of money from outside. (Government of Tamil Nadu 2000: 6). These testimonies highlighted the official side of the story. As opposed to these narratives there were voices against state action. Some concerned citizens have questioned the Indian state’s policies towards special camp refugees and its handling of the LTTE before the imposition of a ban in 1992. According to one public witness, (p.146) … in the 80s, the LTTE cadres were allowed to have training camps in Tamil Nadu in various places … there were militant training camps, one at Kolathur in Salem district and the other at Kolli hills also in Salem district.… There were several other training camps in Tamil Nadu where Sri Lankan rebels were taught to use various types of firearms. The training camp at Mattur was locally and openly conducting training for the LTTE guerillas for about three or four years. The organizer of the camp visited Jaffna to meet the LTTE leaders and he was in close contact with the LTTE supreme Mr. V. Prabhakaran…. The Tamil Nadu government also gave them subsidy or grant to the extent of a few crores of rupees in the 80s for their training and welfare. Thus, the LTTE groups were able to get financial as well as moral support in India in their war against Sri Lanka … even after the banning of the LTTE organization in India from 1992, there are some regional political parties in Tamil Nadu openly supporting their cause of struggle against Sri Lankan government, and agitating for the lifting of ban against the LTTE. (Government of Tamil Nadu 2000: 7) It is clear from these testimonies that the commission of enquiry offered some kind of space to critique the Indian state’s policies towards refugees in special camps. Testimonies exposed the involvement of the Indian state in the LTTE activities. Some made use of this occasion to also raise legal issues regarding the confinement. As one of the public witnesses pointed out, These 43 LTTE men were not prisoners or convicts or under trials or accused of any specific offences under penal code. If this was the case then why were they kept in prison-like cells, treated like prisoners, not allowed to meet family members, friends? Outsiders were not allowed to meet them. Each one was kept in a separate cell. (Government of Tamil Nadu 2000: 10) Even the deputy general of police held a similar view. He said,

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Three Decades in Exile It is important to note that special camp is not a jail or a prison and the provisions of jail manual are not applicable to these special camps. The simple reason is that these persons in the special camps are not prisoners or convicts or under trials or accused of any specific offence under Indian Penal Code … the status of these LTTE inmates of the special camp is peculiar. Admittedly, these inmates or most of them are in rigorous confinement for five or six years continuously. (p.147) Not much action was taken by the centre to repatriate them to Sri Lanka. Obviously, this long detention made the inmates desperate and they were working out ways and means of getting out of the camp. (Government of Tamil Nadu 2000: 11) Another witness noted: The then state government had not issued or formulated any guidelines or norms or manual for the lodging of these inmates in special camps. The administration and the security of the special camps were more or less left to the local collector or local superintendent of police. (Government of Tamil Nadu 2000: 11) So, we find anti-state narratives in the testimonies of the state actors. The commission, then, besides unravelling conspiracy, raised a host of issues pertaining to legal and humanitarian concerns. The legality of confining refugees in this manner was pointed out on a number of occasions. That there was an ambiguity in the official directives in keeping refugees in this manner was noted by a number of officials in their witness. The other point that featured in the deliberations was the involvement of the Indian government and Tamil Nadu state government in training the LTTE militants in India. The close liaison between the LTTE and some prominent political outfits in Tamil Nadu came out in the testimonies. Poor living conditions, restrictions on movement, and absence of legal redressal were also highlighted by some witnesses. Thus, the commission report turned out to be one of the documents that brought the refugee-related issues to the public domain. As mentioned earlier, in the 1950s, and again in the late 1960s, when international treaties were signed for the protection of refugees, India opted out from the treaties on the ground that the situation in South Asia was complex, and these international treaties were far from adequate in protecting the displaced persons. At that time, India opted for more state autonomy in dealing with the refugees. The state autonomy did help in dealing with some exceptional crises, for example, massive influx of refugees from Bangladesh in 1971. It allowed the state to rehabilitate the Tibetan refugees, but autonomy became a source of arbitrariness as we noted in the case of the special camps for the Sri Lankan refugees.

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Three Decades in Exile (p.148) The state, in order to justify its action, often used legal codes. In the case of incarceration of refugees, an archaic Foreigners Act was used. Such actions on the part of the state often go unnoticed especially if they are aimed at a marginalized category like the refugees. The media intervention in the Vellore Fort incident brought the arbitrary state action into the arena of public discourse. Deliberations in a public forum can offer a unique opportunity to prove one’s innocence and can bring the vexed issue of detention without trial into the forefront of public discourse. The struggle of refugees in special camps created awareness against human rights violation. Gangadharan, a Sri Lankan refugee in a special camp at Poonamallee in Tiruvallur district, filed a writ petition in the Madras High Court in 2002 seeking a directive from the state government to close the camp and shift the refugees to other camps in Tamil Nadu. He also asked the authorities to complete investigation in all cases registered against the petitioner and other refugees in the camp within a reasonable time. In his public interest litigation petition, he said that he was earlier lodged in the special camp at Chengalpattu which was unfit for living with family members. The cramp rooms, lack of space for moving around, made life unbearable. When some of the inmates went on hunger strike seeking redressal of their grievances, there was lathi charge that injured many. The protesters were remanded to judicial custody. They were later granted bail. After their release on bail they were taken to the Poonamallee Special Camp. The petitioner alleged that the camp was worse than the one at Chengalpattu. The refugees were living like prisoners in the camp which could not be considered as a residence. Thus a discriminatory treatment was being meted out to the inmates of the Poonamallee Camp as compared with the other refugee camps in the state. A division bench admitted the petition and sent notice to the government (Frontline, 29 April 2010).35 The current state of affairs have been summed up by a PUCL report in the following way: Special camp inmates don’t have the meagre facilities that prisoners in regular jails do like parole, remissions, visits fromrelatives and friends, working for wages and access to a library. It is not unknown for state police to settle scores with Sri Lankan Tamils by implicating them in false cases and then using that as an excuse to put them in special camps. Their claim that the inmates are deadly LTTE cadres is false. (p.149) PUCL has been demanding that these special camps be closed as they constitute a huge human rights abuse. The Tamil Nadu police invoked the Foreigners Act to imprison them. This Act permits the state and the central government to lock up foreigners in these high-security prisons, euphemistically called special camps, and to throw away the key and forget them. Nearly 80 per cent of the criminal cases against the inmates end up in acquittals but by that time they have already spent about four years in special camps that are actually like concentration camps. (PUCL 2011: 7)

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Three Decades in Exile With the efforts of civil society organizations, the special camp refugees are now finding a space in the public domain.

Third-Country Asylum Some special camp refugees were given the option of moving to a third country for asylum, which has not always been smooth sailing for the refugees.36 Ravi, a special camp refugee, was denied entry at the Singapore airport in spite of possessing valid papers to enter the country. The tightening of rules in the receiving countries can be a hurdle in getting asylum. At the port of entry, an asylum seeker can encounter insurmountable difficulties. Ravi applied for an exit permit to go to Singapore once his brother made arrangements for his stay there and offered to bear all expenses for his travel and stay in Singapore. After a thorough scrutiny, Ravi’s plea for an exit permit was approved, and he was allowed to leave special camp with his brother. Since this was a case of individual repatriation, the UNHCR in Chennai intervened in order to ensure safe passage. On the day of his travel, Ravi was escorted to the airport by the Tamil Nadu police force. There were no hurdles at the immigration clearance at Chennai airport. However, Ravi’s ordeal began on arrival at Changi Airport in Singapore. The immigration authorities there raised objections to his entry since there was no endorsement in his passport from any bank stating that he was carrying foreign currency with him for his stay in Singapore. He was not allowed to enter as his brother’s dependent. Ravi’s appeal for immunity as an asylum seeker was denied, and he was asked to return to Chennai. At this point, the UNHCR Singapore office intervened, but the request from them too was not enough to help his case. Finally, Ravi had to board a plane to return (p.150) to Chennai. There was more waiting for him at the Chennai airport. The immigration authorities pointed out that Ravi’s return was illegal since a refugee who has been repatriated following the due process of law cannot be allowed to enter the country again. The UNHCR Chennai had to intervene once again and pleaded that it was a special case, and Ravi be allowed to return to special camp. The human rights organization, the PUCL, too was supporting him. Singapore, a signatory to the 1951 Protocol on refugees, took an intransigent position in this case.37 Not only Singapore, other countries too have dubious records of handling thirdcountry asylum seekers. For instance, in Hong Kong, the media reported the arrest of a pregnant Sri Lankan Tamil woman in a public hospital ward although she was in possession of valid papers as a bona fide refugee (South China Morning Post, 21 September 2005, p. A16). The officials pointed out that she did not have all the papers, and thus she was refused asylum. Refugees can find themselves in extremely difficult situations in a third country. Hong Kong’s refusal to admit Vietnamese boat people is now well known.

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Three Decades in Exile Let me now cite another example to show how in the name of third-country asylum, the state tried to get rid of unwanted refugees. Napolean, an ex-LTTE commander who was in-charge of the entire Mannar district in 1995, was asked to take third-country asylum. He had a chequered past in Sri Lanka. Two of his recently married brothers were shot dead by the militants. His sister, Ida Carmalita, joined the LTTE and left after serving for three years. Napolean too left LTTE and surrendered to the Sri Lankan police who used him to identify the militants. He served two years in prison and was granted amnesty by the Sri Lankan government in 1999. He escaped to India as a refugee as he was haunted by the army and the LTTE. Both the groups did not want him alive as they feared all their secrets would be out. He was arrested in India and lodged in the Mellur Special Camp in Madurai. The Indian government wanted him to leave the country and asked the UNHCR to find a third-country asylum for him and his family. The UNHCR failed to secure a third-country asylum, he was left with only one option: returning to Sri Lanka. The human rights activists pointed out that this was a clear violation of the principle of non-refoulment as laid down in the 1951 Convention. Eventually Napolean had to return to Sri Lanka (PUCL 2005: 2). (p.151) The third-country asylum is sometimes implemented after an agreement between two friendly countries, when the receiving country tries to get rid of a refugee. For instance, Chandrahasan, a refugee and a well-known politician in Sri Lanka, was deported when the Thimpu talk failed in 1984. He was sent to USA for asylum as a punitive measure for not accepting the Indian peace plan in the Thimpu talk. He refused to go to a third country, but was forced to take a flight to USA, the country that agreed to give him asylum. Chandrahasan refused to leave the airport in the United States, and began a fast unto death. The Indian government then allowed him to return and stay as a refugee in Tamil Nadu.38 But this was a high profile case. In general, state sponsored third-country asylum is carried out coercively, where the refugee voice is muted by various means. Let us take a look at the asylum cases in the European countries. Asylum of Tamil refugees in European countries remained a hot political topic throughout the 1980s. In March 1987, an extensive debate took place in the British Parliament on the number of Tamil asylum seekers in the country, and the prospects of their early return to Sri Lanka. The Home Office was asked to take appropriate action to stop inflow of Tamil refugees. A few months later, the Tamil issue sparked a similar parliamentary debate in the Netherlands, where the government announced that they would be deporting Tamils to southern Sri Lanka because the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered them as economic refugees rather than political asylum seekers. How can they be economic refugees if they were running away from the war? This decision was arbitrary. In Switzerland, the same year, the government’s announcement of a similar decision to start repatriating Tamils to southern Sri Lanka was strongly Page 50 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile criticized at the 42nd session of the Human Rights Commission. The incident of the West German–owned Honduran-registered ship, that, in August 1986, transported 155 Tamil from Germany to Canada, where they were subsequently found adrift in lifeboats off the coast of Newfoundland, appeared in the media. The report led to several months of intensive debate on their eligibility for political asylum and on Canada’s refugee policy in general. In Denmark, on the basis of the prospect of an early return of Tamils to Sri Lanka, the Danish Justice Ministry decided in Autumn 1987 to suspend the family reunification scheme for Tamil refugees. In Germany, in 1988, Bonn’s Interior Ministry began offering Tamils (p.152) families money and a one-way ticket to Sri Lanka through a special ‘voluntary repatriation’ scheme.39 These were only a few of many similar incidents in the 1980s in which Tamil refugees were involved. With the end of the Peace Process in 2006, full-scale war broke out one more time between the army and the LTTE. This time the Sri Lankan army attack was meticulously planned. Thousands of Sri Lankan army arrived near the LTTE controlled area to launch their final assault in 2009. It was so sudden that the civilians had hardly any time to escape. The military presence was backed up with arms and ammunition that the Sri Lankan government procured for the war from countries like China and Pakistan. By the end of April 2009, millions of civilians were trapped in the crossfire. Between 2006 and 2009, when the war was at its peak, 23,765 refugees reached India, and the camp population increased to nearly 85,000.40 The final phase of the war displaced countless civilians within the country who received shelter in the welfare centres. After the war, the UNHCR in Chennai began repatriation of refugees. In 2009, 800 refugees returned to Sri Lanka, and in 2010, the number went up to 2054. Till the end of September 2011, some 1,448 refugees went back with assistance from the UNHCR (Frontline, 24 May 2009).41 Refugees, mostly from camps in Tuticorin, Mandapam, and Virudhunagar, opted for the UNHCR-sponsored repatriation. With the introduction of Tuticorin-Colombo ferry service, many refugees are returning voluntarily, some are waiting for the state-sponsored repatriation. Some are staying with the hope of getting Indian citizenship. More delay would mean that they would lose their land and house once and for all. The Sri Lankan government has already taken over evacuee land for various state-sponsored programmes, and to set up military barracks. During the last few years of the war in Sri Lanka, the Indian state remained silent; no statement was issued from any agencies of the state against the army atrocities on the civilians, although the media and the human rights activists highlighted the war crimes in Sri Lanka on a number of occasions. The media in Europe came into the limelight by bringing to the notice of the general public the mass killing of Tamil civilians. The AIADMK chief, Jayalalitha, who took an anti-Eelam and anti-LTTE stance till the 1990s, and even till the outbreak of the war in 2009, passed a resolution in the (p.153) assembly in 2012, calling on the UN to declare the Sri Lankan president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, a war offender, Page 51 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile responsible for genocide. India’s abstention from voting on the 2014 UN resolution against Sri Lanka, seeking an international investigation into the alleged war crimes during the final phase of the island’s civil war, showed again how the two power centres—the centre and the state, were working at cross purposes. Although the war ended in 2009, the fate of nearly a lakh of Tamil refugees in India is still hanging in the balance.

A Long Way to Go? Theree decades of war in Sri Lanka has caused massive displacement. Some of the displaced now are staying in Sri Lanka as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Some are in Indian refugee camps, some have found asylum in various developed countries. After the war the first two groups, the IDPs and refugees are trying to return to their home. Some of them have been waiting for far too long, as long as three decades, some for shorter duration. Tamil refugees who are living in Indian refugee camps are now waiting anxiously to return. After a long life in exile, ‘home’ carries different meanings to different persons. For some it has become an imagined space, for others it means ruins and destruction of houses and buildings. No matter what they think or imagine about their home, one common theme that comes out from the refugee narratives is that they all want to return and rebuild their home. In a recent study, George et al. (2015) pointed out desparation among the camp refugees to return to Sri Lanka. They noted how an an adult camp refugee in a camp in Tamil Nadu tried to describe the situation, ‘If the Indian and Sri Lankan government and the UNHCR sit together to plan return, that will solve our problems.’ Another refugee was more emphatic as he said, ‘Come what may we now want to go home.’ And a child expresses her feelings in the following way, ‘I want to go to a new Sri Lanka with no civil war, no fighting, no bombs’ (George, Kliewer, and Rajan 2015). The right to live in one’s country with honour and dignity is a basic right guaranteed to citizens all over the world. It is the responsibility of the state to ensure this right to each and every one, irrespective of race, colour, creed, and language. The question may now be raised whether the state in Sri Lanka has succeeded in doing this. It would (p.154) be hard to deny the fact that attempts have been made to resettle displaced persons in the north and northeast. But several thousands are still living as IDPs in Sri Lanka, and nearly one lakh refugees living in camps and with friends and relatives in India. They have been waiting to return since the end of the war in 2009. Very little has been done to repatriate the refugees from Tamil Nadu. It seems refugees have a long way to go. Notes:

(1.) A few detailed accounts of ethnic strife in Sri Lanka in 1983 are now available. See, for instance, Valentine Daniel (1997), Daya Somasundaram

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Three Decades in Exile (1998), and Stanley Tambiah (1986). Rajan Hoole et al. (1990) provides an inside story of the rise of Tamil separatist movement under the leadership of the LTTE. (2.) See Dasgupta (2003: 2365–67) for an overview of the controversial repatriation undertaken by the Government of India in 1991. (3.) Eelam War I began after the spread of 1983 riots against Tamils. Eelam War II started in 1990. In April 1995 LTTE broke off talks with the Sri Lankan government and declared Eelam War III. For more, see Adele Balasingham (2001). (4.) Demographic data on camp refugees was systematically collected by the OfERR between 1983 and 2010. (5.) See People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) Bulletin, September 2006, pp. 1–6. It was an interm report on the condition of camps for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees. A 19-member team comprising people’s rights activists belonging to important rights organization in Tamil Nadu visited Mandapam camp at Rameswaram. At a later stage the team members divided themselves and visited several camps all over Tamil Nadu. (6.) ‘Lankan Refugees Live in Inhuman Conditions’, in Frontline, 18 July 2007. (7.) During the second repatriation, coercive tactics were adopted by the state. Refugees were taken to the Mandapam Camp for repatriation without consent. People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) filed a case against the Union government for forcible repatriation at the Madras High Court. (8.) The only organization that was allowed to do some humanitarian work among the refugees was called OfERR. OfERR or Organisation for Eelam Refugees Rehabilitation was founded in 1984 and since then it has been offering various kinds of help to the Tamil Refugees. Supply of food and clothing, finance and employment, education, health care, mental trauma, family break up, so on, are being looked after by OfERR. It acts as a liaison between the refugees and the governments at the centre and state. Counseling to those who suffered trauma is another important work performed by the OfERR. It receives financial support from international NGOs, charitable institutions of the British Council, and expatriate Tamils. It has also received assistance from the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister’s Refugee Fund, Jesuit Refugee Services, and other Indian NGOs. OfERR has its head office in Chennai and branch offices in Trichy, Nellore, and Erode. Proteg, or Organization for Protection of Tamils of Eelam from genocide and other violation of human rights, is a sister organization of the OfERR. It was managed single-handedly by activist C. Chandrahasan. (9.) Letter No: 217A/2001-1. Public (RH 11 Department), Government of Tamil Nadu. Page 53 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile (10.) Vijaythilakan’s survey was one of the few source materials that one gets on the refugees who reached Tamil Nadu during the first phase of influx. (11.) The IPKF in Sri Lanka promoted the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front or the EPRLF as the main rival party of the LTTE. The move polarized the LTTE and its allied parties on the one hand and the EPRLF on the other. Among the allied parties of the LTTE was PLOTE, formed in 1979 by a Tamil Tiger. Its main agenda was to form a separate socialist Tamil state—Eelam. The Democratic People’s Liberation Front is the Political Wing of PLOTE. In the 1994 election, PLOTE and Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) formed an alliance and contested in Vavuniya and Vanni Districts where they secured three parliamentary seats. (12.) See Suryanarain and Sudersen (2000) for an overview. (13.) Interview, Vavuniya, Sri Lanka, 25 January 2002. (14.) The Rehabilitation Department built huts for the refugees; many abandoned buildings, schools, and so on, were also used as camps. (15.) Interview, Chennai, 2 January 2002. (16.) Interview, Chennai, 25 January 2002. (17.) Interview, Madurai, 2 January 2002. (18.) A large part of the northern and northeast areas were under the control of the LTTE. So repatriation and resettlement to their place of origin was not feasible. (19.) The point has been described at length by Long (2009) in her unpublished Ph.D. thesis. (20.) Interview, Chennai, 27 January 2001. (21.) Doles were offered both in cash and kind. As far as the cash component is concerned, the head of the family received Rs180 per month and other adult dependents received Rs144 per month per head. The first child got Rs 90 and the rest Rs 45 per month. So a family of four—husband, wife, and two children below the age of 10—would get Rs 459 (180 + 144 + 90 + 45). Doles in kind included 12 kilograms of rice for children above 8 years and 6 kilograms for those below 8 sold at a subsidized rate of 57 paise per kilogram. So, a good portion of cash doles was needed for the purchase of food items. (22.) Interview, Vellore, 7 February 2002.

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Three Decades in Exile (23.) The ‘Q’ Branch of the Government of Tamil Nadu now looks after refugeerelated matters. It is basically an intelligence wing of the government and performs the task of surveillance and policing. (24.) Interview, Vellore, 17 March 2002. (25.) Interview, Vellore, 10 April 2002. (26.) Many writers observed a similar trend in Kerala where migration to the Middle East has led to the break-up of families. (27.) Interview, Vellore, 9 April 2002. (28.) Interview, Vellore, 10 April 2002. (29.) In literary theory, the phenomenon of silencing is well known. See, for instance, Wall (1989: 10–15). (30.) The Foreigners Act (1946) and, before that, the Foreigners Regulation Act (1939) were enacted by the British. (31.) This judgment differs from that of a later judgment passed by the court on a similar problem mentioned earlier. (32.) Tehsildars forwarded from time to time the details of all the refugees who had links with the LTTE. (33.) I am grateful to Sudha Ramalingam for sharing her findings in the UNHCR report with me. (34.) Sivanayagam’s work (2006) is a memoir that deals with various aspects of state–refugee relations. (35.) Frontline, ‘Sri Lankan Refugee Wants Special Camp in Poonamalle Closed’, 29 April 2010. (36.) See UNHCR (1994) for a detailed account on the third-country asylum as far as Tamil refugees are concerned. (37.) Details of Ravi’s case was obtained from the Chennai office of the UNHCR. (38.) Information obtained during conversation with Chandrahasan in 2002. (39.) See Long (2009) for more on this point. (40.) In 2011, only 68,606 refugees were staying in camps, out of which 41 were lodged in special camps in Kanceepuram. (41.) Frontline, ‘Every Refugee Longs to Return Home’, 24 May 2009, pp. 11–12. Page 55 of 56

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Three Decades in Exile

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Exile and Freedom

Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780199461172 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.001.0001

Exile and Freedom Bangladesh Liberation War Refugees, 1971 Abhijit Dasgupta

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.003.0004

Abstract and Keywords This chapter deals with the mass exodus of the Bangladeshi refugees in 1971. In the case of Bangladeshi refugees, the Indian state responded with alacrity in order to come to terms with a grave crisis. The state dealt with the crisis without being a signatory to the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol and it handled a gigantic problem in an efficient manner. What, then, were the policies that worked in India’s favour? The state had four broad objectives in dealing with the influx that began in 1971: first, to allow access to the refugees into the Indian territory by opening up the border; second, to involve non-state organizations in massive relief operations; third, to carry out diplomatic effort to resolve the crisis; and, finally, to intervene militarily, if necessary, to put an end to a humanitarian crisis. The chapter also focuses on the influx after 1971. Keywords:   Liberation War, Awami League, war zones, camps, UNHCR, repatriation, infiltration, economic refugees

That night on the porch, with her brother back from war, Maya believed their waiting days were over. She watched her mother spread her prayer mat, face west and thank God for his return, imagining the future rolling out in front of them as flat and endless and predictable as the Delta. How wrong she had been. —Anam (2011: 30)

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Exile and Freedom In the earlier two case studies, I have pointed out how the Indian state remained inconsistent and lacked direction in dealing with the refugees. There were series of twists and turns in the relations between the state and the refugees. However, in the case of Bangladeshi refugees, the state responded with alacrity in order to come to terms with a grave crisis. An attempt was made to show the rest of the world that without being a signatory to the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol, the Indian state can handle a gigantic crisis in an efficient manner. What, then, were the policies that worked in India’s favour? The state had four broad objectives in dealing with the influx that began in 1971: first, to allow access to the refugees into the Indian territory by opening up the border; second, to involve non-state organizations in massive relief operations; third, to carry out diplomatic effort to resolve the crisis; and finally, to intervene militarily, if necessary, to put an end to a humanitarian crisis. As refugees began to arrive, it (p.158) looked like replay of the scenes of 1943 Bengal famine and 1947 Partition. The same old familiar images, malnourished women and children, old and sick men and women, tired and exhausted after a long journey, looking for relief and shelter. Initially, the influx was a cause for concern as the number triggered panic in the minds of the politicians and bureaucrats as the Indian economy in the early 1970s was in the midst of grave crises. Rising inflation and unemployment brought the economic growth into a standstill. There was also apprehension that refugees were intermingling with the local residents with a view to settling down in West Bengal permanently. In eastern India, where the rate of growth of population was already high, refugees could cause an unimaginable problem. Third, in the early 1970s, extremist political activity in the state had almost disappeared. There was fear that refugees might sneak into the hideouts of the extremists and complicate the situation in the state of West Bengal. And finally, it was also perceived by the officials that the event might polarize the Hindus and the Muslims in the country which may cause communal tensions. Initial fear and hesitation lasted for a short time, as there was growing realization by the state officials and politicians that this was an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, and they should put to rest all fears and concerns and save lives at any cost.

An Unprecedented Crisis In 1971, the influx of about 1 crore (10 million) refugees from East Pakistan created an unprecedented situation in eastern India. The influx began since April 1971 and continued till the end of the War. The Government of India took a firm stand of offering asylum to all those who were fleeing from East Pakistan to save their lives. Refugees were arriving in West Bengal, Assam, Tripura, and Meghalaya. From early May 1971, the number of refugees began to shoot up, and from then onwards it has been an unstoppable flow of human beings: men, women and children; old and young; Hindus and Muslims; people from all walks of life began to reach the border states of India. The central government had two Page 2 of 37

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Exile and Freedom options with regard to providing relief and shelter: either to keep them in the respective states where they arrived or to ask them to move to other areas far away from the (p.159) border. The government decided to keep them in makeshift camps at the place of their arrival, and offer assistance. As a result, thousands of camps came up in the entire stretch of the border areas of West Bengal, and in almost all the border towns. The refugees came in large numbers to the city of Calcutta. The influx began in April and came to an end in early December 1971. Therefore, the refugees stayed in India only for nine months, some for a shorter period. They went back when the Liberation War came to an end in mid-December 1971. They returned to a newly independent state, their homeland Bangladesh. The sheer magnitude of the displacement of 1971 makes it a special case. At the outset, two points merit attention. First, refugee crisis reached a critical stage when the receiving state had no option but to declare war. Second, the refugees took part in the war as members of the Mukti Bahini (The Liberation Force) and Mukti Fouz (The Guerilla Squad).1 On rare occasions, refugees have taken arms to liberate their homeland. In recent years in some parts of Africa, like Rwanda, Sudan, Ethiopia refugees were involved in the battle against their enemies, but it was different in 1971. Refugees were taking part in a full scale war against an organized army to free their homeland. Massive influx forced the Indian state to find a military solution to the problem. It was an unprecedented crisis. The Indian point of view was described by P.N. Dhar, a close aide of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at the time of the crisis, in the following way: When the flow of refugees turned into a flood, it became a crisis for India. In the course of just five weeks, from 14 April to 21 May, their number jumped from a little more than 100,000 to about 3.5 million [35 lakhs]. And more were on their way. At first they came in at 60,000 a day, and then at a staggering 150,000 a day for several days before the onset of the monsoon. They were crossing over into India at numerous points over a porous border stretching 1300 miles. Most of them came on foot; others used bullock-carts, rickshaws, and country boats. The flow of refugees was simply unstoppable. The very size of the refugee problem determined the Indian response to the East Bengal crisis. Refugees became a majority in the tribal area of Tripura. Even in West Bengal, there were places where refugees outnumbered the local population: the small town of Bungaon [sic] with a population of 50000, had in the course of just (p.160) two months been submerged under a flood of 300,000 refugees. The coalition government of West Bengal, already harassed by the CPM and the Naxalites, was too weak to handle this critical situation. In fact it had to be dismissed a month later and the state brought under president’s rule. (2000: 155–6)

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Exile and Freedom Dhar noted that among the refugees, the first to arrive were some Awami League supporters and some police and military personnel who managed to escape. They were followed by Hindus who offered crucial moral and intellectual support to Mujibar Rahman. The Pakistani army wanted to start communal riots in India by targeting Hindus in anticipation that it would polarize the Hindu and Muslim communities and eventually this could lead civil unrest. Dhar noted that another group found their position in East Pakistan rather precarious. They were the ‘Bihari Muslims’ or those who migrated from west to east; they feared a backlash at the hands of the Mukti Bahini and tried to cross the border (Dhar 2000: 154).2 The central government officials met the chief secretary and the commissioner of the relief and rehabilitation department at Writer’s Building, Calcutta, to chalk out the plan. Within a short time the refugees began to reach the border villages in other states. It was reported that in a border village called Sonamura, about 40 miles from Agartala, on the Tripura–East Pakistan border, thousands of refugees arrived from Comilla district in one day. The Government of India had to take two decisions: first, to meet the entire expenditure on relief from the central funds and second, to impose president’s rule in the state of West Bengal (the state had a shaky coalition government at the time of the crisis). Almost all the political parties in the state supported the move taken by the central government. With this the central government gained the much needed legitimacy to deal with a massive humanitarian crisis.3 The media reported atrocities on the civilians by the Pakistani army and the influx of refugees on a daily basis. A Calcutta daily reported on the arrival of refugees on the first day in one of the border areas of West Bengal called Gede in the following way: The first group of East Bengal evacuees, 35 women and children with 7 men escorts, reached the border check post here, this evening, following an attack mounted by the Pakistan Army presumably aimed at (p.161) the important rail and road junction, around Chuadanga in Kushtia district. Chaudanga is about 40 miles from Gede…. They were all Muslims. The women and their escorts said that as the news of the Awami League leaders’ arrests went around Darshana and neighbouring areas, it was announced with microphones that civilians should disperse their women and children to the relative safety of the surrounding villages or to their relatives across the border. Most of those who arrived here this evening left for places like Malda and Ranaghat, after the BSF had made a list of them. (The Statesman, 5 April 1971) Several factors contributed to population displacement in East Pakistan at an alarming rate from April 1971 (hereafter, only the day and month will be mentioned, as all the events refer to the same year—1971). First, the fear of Page 4 of 37

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Exile and Freedom army onslaught was building up in the minds of the civilians after Mujibar Rahman’s speech at the Ramna Maidan on 7 March. He repeatedly mentioned the significance of the struggle in his speech. It was clear that the Awami League was heading for a collision with the Pakistani army. Mujib told the civilians in the course of his speech, ‘Khajna, tax bandho kore deben’ (stop paying rent and tax). He went on to say, ‘Ebarer sangram muktir sangram, ebarer sangram swadhinater sangram’ (the present struggle is the struggle for freedom and independence), and ‘ghare ghare durgo gore tolo’ (turn each house into a fortress). The tenor of Mujib’s speech was different from his earlier speeches; it was clear that the Awami League was demanding decentralization and more political power.4 The army retorted by saying that they would uphold territorial sovereignty of Pakistan at any cost. On 15 March, the army ordered all its personnel to report for duty, and pointed out that inability to do so would result in rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. Within a short time, the situation turned explosive.5 The army terrorized ordinary citizens by repositioning military forces in different sectors in East Pakistan. Armed forces from West Pakistan were asked to join the forces in the east. The repositioning of armed forces in different parts of the country, and import of arms and arsenals, created a fear psychosis in the minds of the Bengalis. It was evident that the Pakistani army was gearing up for a longdrawn battle against the Awami League supporters. They ensured military preparedness in the event of war with India. Pakistani army decided to terrorize civilians in cities to create panic and fear. In order to do (p.162) this it launched ‘Operation Searchlight’. Reports of army brutality came from places like Dhaka University, Rajshahi Medical College, Rangpur Cantonment, Farm Gate in Dhaka, and port areas of Chittagong. From the middle of March, the army made an all-out effort in nabbing Awami League supporters, especially young followers, in order to seal any chances of resistance. Most of the prominent Awami League leaders were living in cities like Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi, Mymensingh, Bogura, Sylhet, and in small towns, and this is why the army targeted towns and cities. The mass arrests of Awami League followers by the army succeeded in terrorizing the civilians. It was reported in the foreign media that … a new campaign of terror has been unleashed in Bangladesh, killing teachers, journalists, writers, magistrates, doctors, Hindus and Awami Leaguers. Gestapo-like are rampant; this is chiefly the work of the Razakars, a group of armed mercenaries and armed forces personnel, who carry on with the tacit approval of senior officers extortions, kidnapping of girls, raping, prostitution, and other forms of related activities. Army intelligence has prepared a list of suspects. They are classified as white, grey, and black. The ‘whites’ are to be let loose, the ‘greys’ fined and/or imprisoned, and the ‘blacks’ shot dead. Many suspects are arrested openly or called to the Cantonment for interrogation, then they are never heard of Page 5 of 37

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Exile and Freedom again. Many examples of such cases may be cited. (The Sunday Times, 20 June 1971) Pakistani army’s Operation Searchlight played havoc with the lives of the civilians. The confidential files of the Pakistani army revealed that Operation Searchlight was carried out with the following aims: (a) The operation was to be launched all over the province simultaneously. (b) Maximum number of political and student leaders and extremists among the teaching staff and cultural organizations were to be arrested. In the initial phase, top political leaders and top student leaders must be arrested. (c) The operation must achieve 100 per cent success in Dacca. For that, Dacca University will have to be occupied and searched. (d) Security of cantonments must be ensured. Greater and freer use of fire should be made against those who dare attack the cantonment. (p.163) (e) All means of internal communications were to be cut off. Telephone exchange, radio, TV, teleprinter services, transmitters with foreign consulates were to be closed down. (f) East Pakistani troops were to be neutralized by controlling and guarding kotes and ammunition of West Pakistani troops. (Raja 2012: 114–16) Operations during the daytime had the following objectives: (a) In Dacca to conduct house-to-house search in Dhanmandi houses, and houses of the Hindus in the old city. (b) To close down all printing presses in and around Dhaka. All cyclostyling machines in the university, colleges, and physical training institute and technical institute were to be confiscated. (c) To impose curfew with severity. (d) To arrest the leaders of the Awami Leagure and their associates. As Operation Search light intensified, the panic-stricken civilians began to leave East Pakistan. By terrorizing the members of the Hindu community, the army forced many to leave cities and towns. The Hindus feared serious repercussions in the event of a showdown because the members of the Hindu community were a solid support base of the Awami League. They were the chief instigators (The Guardian, 28 June 1971).6 An attack on the Hindu community was likely to flare up communal tensions in India. Hindu fundamentalists in India were up in arms with the ruling party for its indifference towards the Hindus in East Pakistan. The elimination of some Hindu activists, according to the army, would send out a signal to the Muslims that there was no need to fear, and that they should cooperate with the Pakistani army by joining the Santi Committee (peace committee). The initial Page 6 of 37

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Exile and Freedom phase of exodus began with the Hindus, in the border districts of Jessore, Kushtia, Dinajpur, Rangpur, and Sylhet. Hindus began to desert their village for a safer place in India. It was noted by a journalist in Rajshahi that the Pakistani army has painted big yellow Hs on the Hindu shops still standing in this town to identify the property of the minority, that is to say, the thousands of population that it has made its special targets. (The Times, 12 April 1971) (p.164) In a recent study, Bass has observed, … by an official reckoning, as many as 90 percent of the refugees were Hindus. The skew was the inevitable consequence of Pakistani targeting of Hindus in East Pakistan—what Archer Blood and his staffers had condemned as genocide. The population of East Pakistan was only 16 or 17 percent Hindu, but this minority comprised the overwhelming bulk of the refugees. India secretly recorded that by the middle of June, there were some 5,330,000 Hindus, as against 443,000 Muslims and 150,000 from other groups among the refugees. Many Indian diplomats believed that the Hindus would be too afraid ever to go back … as early as mid-April one of Gandhi’s top official noted, that Pakistan was systematically expelling the Hindus. The Indian government privately believed, as this aide noted, that Pakistan, by ‘driving out Hindus in their millions’, hoped to reduce the number of Bengalis so they were no longer the majority in Pakistan, and to destroy the Awami League as a political force by getting rid of ‘the wily Hindu’ who was supposed to have misled simple Bengali Muslims into demanding autonomy. (2013: 191) The figure quoted by Bass is likely to be on the higher side. During the parliamentary debates, the prime minister noted the ratio of Hindu and Muslim refugees as 60:40. It would be difficult to obtain an accurate figure as no data collection was done in the border areas where refugees arrived; it was so sudden and traumatic that all official work came to a halt in the border areas. The declaration of the War of Independence for an independent state of Bangladesh on 27 March brought to an end all speculations of a peaceful solution to the problem. The army, the police, and the civilians were polarized, some were supporting the Awami League and some sided with the Pakistani army. The stage was set for a bloody civil war. From the first week of April, the civilians started moving towards the border districts for safety. The first batch of refugees, as mentioned earlier, arrived on 2 April. They crossed the border and sought asylum in the Nadia district. On 11 April, the prime minister of Bangladesh, Tajuddin Ahmed, called the Mukti Bahini to fight for independence. As war broke out, the stream of refugees began to reach India. Initially the epicentre of the war was Dinajpur and Rangpur, eventually it spread to Pabna, Page 7 of 37

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Exile and Freedom Bogura, Nogaon, and (p.165) from mid-April, almost two-thirds of the country was involved in an open war. Those who were in two minds about taking asylum in India had the fear of a famine that was going to destroy their livelihood. The loss of crop forced many to rethink their plans. The following account shows the enormity of the problem: … as the civil war in East Pakistan enters third week, officials from international relief organizations who arrived in Calcutta believe that the 75 million [7.5 crores] Bengalis might be threatened by widespread famine which would make the Biafran Tragedy pale into insignificance. Millions of Bengalis are left homeless and destitute by the war. Hundreds of thousands of refugees who have fled from the cities may, it is feared, starve to death in the countryside if they are not offered relief in the next few weeks … a serious famine is likely to begin in about 4 months and last for a year or more. Many thousands may die, certainly many more than in the refugee camps in India, and several millions could be weakened by malnutrition. (The Times, 24 April 1971) The fear of death due to starvation made the poorer sections of the society to flee. Therefore, a complex interplay of a large number of factors forced the Bengalis to flee from East Pakistan. By April 6, about 5,000 refugees had crossed over to Nadia district, and the district authorities had set up a relief camp for them at many places. About 2,800 evacuees from East Pakistan had to be accommodated in camps at Jalangi, Sheikhpur, and Uttarpara. In Mushidabad district, most of the refugees came from Rajshahi, after crossing the Padma river. Almost all the north Bengal border district towns like Murshidabad, Cooch Behar, Dinajpuar, and Jalpaiguri had to open camps for thousands of refugees in the months of April and May. A reporter, who visited border areas about 140 kilometres from Krishnanagar, found that the refugees were crossing the Padma river by boat to reach the Indian border, and within a few hours their number increased to thousands. Those who came from Dhaka reported that Damra, a village about six miles away from the city, was the transit point. As soon as attacks on civilians took place in Dhaka, the residents of the city left in fear and took shelter in Damra. The long journey for the Indian border began from there. Those who were (p.166) unable to get any conveyance began to trek hundreds of miles. The worst affected towns were located near Dhaka called Brahmanbaria and Shamsher Nagar. Air attacks by the Pakistani army on the civilians forced almost all the residents to flee from these towns. Many elderly persons and children never made it to the border, died on the way for lack of food and water. The voluntary relief organizations like the Ramakrishna Mission and Bharat Sevashram Sangha came forward with relief materials. In mid-April, the central government summed up the crisis in the following way:

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Exile and Freedom A fairly large number of evacuees, from different districts of Bangladesh, have taken shelter in West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. The Union government proposes to expand the rehabilitation ministry’s wing in Calcutta and take other necessary steps to meet the influx of evacuees from Bangladesh. According to a West Bengal government source, about 16,000 people from Bangladesh are now at 10 reception centres opened up in 24 Parganas, Nadia, West Dinajpur, and Cooch Bihar districts. More than 70,000 evacuees are staying with their relatives and friends in West Bengal. The state government’s health department has decided to send medical officers to the border districts to arrange for inoculation and vaccination to the evacuees. (The Statesman, 17 April 1971) The influx took place in other states as well; over 5,000 persons from Bangladesh entered the Karunganj subdivision of Assam’s Cachar district through the Sutar Kand border, according to a report received in Gauhati. The Assam government made adequate arrangements to provide them medical and other facilities. About 10,000 refugees had crossed over to Tripura. The chief secretary of the Union Territory Tripura told reporters that in Agartala, 3,000 refugees had been accommodated in various government camps. Meghalaya’s chief minister, Captain Williamson Sangma, said at Calcutta, in mid-April, that already over 2,000 evacuees had crossed over the border and took shelter in Meghalaya. He said there was a shortage of essential commodities in areas of Bangladesh adjoining his state, thousands of refugees were coming to Meghalaya to buy local products for essential supplies (The Statesman, 22 April 1971) (see Table 3.1). Table 3.1 Trends in Refugee Influx (Month-wise) in Eastern India Average Daily (Persons in Monthly Arrival (Persons Thousand) in Thousand) (2)

(3)

1. April 1971 (10th to 57,00 30th)

12,21,00

2. May 1971

1,02,00

31,58,00

3. June 1971

68,00

20,56,00

4. July 1971

26,00

7,97,00

5. August 1971

34,00

10,55,00

6. September 1971

27,00

8,04,00

7. October 1971

14,00

4,25,00

8. November 1971

8,00

2,17,00

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Exile and Freedom

Average Daily (Persons in Monthly Arrival (Persons Thousand) in Thousand)

9. December 1971

(2)

(3)

–

1,66,00

Total

98,99,00

Source: Singh et al. (n.d.: 82). The ups and downs in the influx of refugees were reported in the media in minute details. One media reported that on 21 April, the (p.167) influx of refugees from Bangladesh into West Bengal rose to 2,14,000. Of this number, 62,000 were living in 25 camps while 1,52,000 were living with friends and relatives (The Statesman, 27 April 1971). The majority of the refugees were women and children belonging to the Hindu, Muslim, and Christian communities. Within a short time, 45,000 more refugees reached over 20 reception centres spread over 8 districts, more than half of them took asylum in Bashirhat and Bongaon subdivisions of 24 Parganas district (The Statesman, 3 May 1971). The state government’s point of concern was that in a little over 10 days, over 2,73,000 refugees had crossed over to West Bengal seeking shelter and that, at this rate, the total would go much beyond one million (10 lakhs) soon. Neither the economy nor the government’s existing resources could cope with this problem. These refugees were coming from the neighbouring districts of West Bengal, and mainly from rural areas. The reactions of the media and the hosts after influx during the first month were discussed by Bass in the following way: The Indian press exploded with ever emotional stories, wildly estimating as many as three hundred thousand dead in the first week (p.168) of the crackdown. Respected newspapers accused Pakistan of genocide. Gandhi was slammed for inaction not just in the English press, but also in Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, and other languages all around the country. Indian politicians of all stripes launched demonstrations, demanded swift action, and denounced the government’s spinelessness. Politicians from the Communist Party of India condemned Gandhi’s timidity; the Samyukta Socialist Party demanded immediate recognition of Bangladesh … today’s powerful Bharatiya Janata Party wanted a naval blockade of East Pakistan. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the leader of the Jana Sangh—who would many years later become prime minister—denounced Pakistan for genocide in front of a vast crowd at a park in Bombay, and offered to be the first to volunteer to enter East Pakistan. The public uproar was at its most intense in West Bengal, where Bengalis were shocked at the killing of their fellows in neighbouring East Pakistan. The newspapers ran sensationalist stories of death tolls in the tens of thousands, with furious editorials condemning Page 10 of 37

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Exile and Freedom Yahya and urging Gandhi to recognize an independent Bangladesh. There were general strikes and huge demonstrations in solidarity with Mujib. (2013: 121) Jyoti Basu, the leader of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPI(M), delivered his speech in the state assembly in support of the struggle for Bangladesh, and asked the centre to extend all kinds of possible support to the freedom fighters.7 He did so in spite of the fact that China was opposing Indian intervention. Leaders like Jayprakash Narain held series of rallies in support of the Liberation War. This kind of spontaneity, cutting across party lines, was never seen earlier. By the middle of May, the number of refugees increased to a million (10 lakhs). The central government noted with concern that up to the end of July 1971, 7.23 million (72.3 lakhs) had taken shelter in India and by 15 December, at this rate an additional 2.67 million would arrive, taking the total to almost 10 million (1 crore). This proved that Pakistan’s claim of normalcy in East Pakistan was simply an eyewash. There was fear that refugees might change the social and demographic character of the states in east and northeast India. The increasing influx of refugees from the villages and towns to bordering Indian states indicated that the situation in India was indeed worsening (The Statesman, 30 May 1971).8 The Pakistani army authorities had intensified their policy of maximum terror by sending the troops (p.169) to create panic among innocent citizens, and forcing them to move to the safety of neighbouring Indian states. The influx was showing no signs of abatement. Indeed, the numbers were growing ever larger. While most of the refugees entered West Bengal, as stated earlier, thousands of others crossed over to Tripura, Assam, and Meghalaya (The Times, 9 June 1971). The problem of organizing relief was causing tremendous strain on the administrative and material resources of the concerned states. The centre’s willingness to be of as much assistance as possible had relieved the states of the financial strain, but it was quite evident that only through international effort the relief on the requisite scale could be organized. The central government had appealed to several international organizations to come forward with help but not much came out of it. The Rehabilitation Ministry informed that the total expenditure may go up to somewhere between 6 or 7 millions (60–70 lakhs) of dollars which India could hardly afford at that juncture. In a letter to the prime minister, the chief minister of West Bengal, Ajoy Mukherjee, explained the condition in the state in the following way: You are fully aware that this state has been passing through a period of political instability and economic stagnation for quite sometime. The Naxalites and the extremist elements, somewhat subdued during periods of intensive cordoning and searching with the help of Army units, have again Page 11 of 37

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Exile and Freedom started reasserting themselves and the incidence of political crimes is again on the increase. Lock-outs and closures have not yet been remedied and the unemployment situation is explosive. Indeed, all our energies have now to be devoted to maintenance of law and order and generation of employment. Upheavals in Bangladesh have come at a most in-opportune time for this state and stupendous problems thrown up by the continuing onrush of masses of humanity from across the border are now piling up without being satisfactorily resolved. If this situation is allowed to continue, I am afraid there will be a very serious breakdown of administration. (S. Chakrabarty 1978: 382–3) The chief minister informed through the media that (a) tackling the problem of sudden influx was simply beyond the capacity of the border states, (p.170) (b) although the government wanted the evacuees to go back to their country, India on its own could do little in this matter, (c) the state governments had ordered the home guards to maintain lawand-order in camps, (d) it was also decided that those who were coming over should not be shifted to other states, and they should stay near the border so that when conditions in Bangladesh became normal, they could return to their home. (The Statesman, 14 June 1971) In Assam, the situation was far more critical. There the crisis led to more complications because of the local hostility to both Bengalis in general and Bengali Muslims in particular. Immediately after Partition, the Assamese political leaders had raised their voice against the unwanted influx of ‘foreigners’ and ‘outsiders’ in the state. Between 1947 and 1950, nearly 3,00,000 refugees crossed the Assamese border. During the Anti-Foreigners Movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s, discontent over the presence of the foreigners was noticeable all over the state. The fear of being swamped by Bengalis was a popular theme in the Assamese political discourse till the late 1960s. The 1971 crisis complicated the volatile situation in the state. In West Bengal, the refugees preferred to move to areas where others had already arrived with the hope of finding their acquaintances, relatives. These areas became the high density zones of refugee population. There were several such places in the border districts of the state. An alarming number of refugees arrived in Bongaon and Bashirhat in 24 Parganas, the two popular destination points. The state police informed that about 70,000 evacuees from Bangladesh arrived in Bongaon, bringing the total number of refugees in the subdivision to about 4.50 lakh. The refugees were entering the Bongaon area from all sides and taking shelter at every available place either in the town or in the nearby villages. The pressure of the new arrival was so high that all the roads leading to Page 12 of 37

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Exile and Freedom Bongaon were virtually flooded by refugees. As a result, all vehicular traffic on the roads had come to a halt (The Statesman, 21 June 1971). All public building like schools, colleges, and so on, were occupied by the refugees, all the vacant land near the railway tracks were filled up with makeshift camps.

(p.171) The Four Sectors To understand the dynamics of displacement, one can take a look at the four different sectors in East Pakistan. Both the Pakistani army and the Mukti Bahini demarcated the four sectors for strategic purposes with army headquarters in each (see Map 3.1). The population displacement began in the western sector as soon as the war broke out.9 The western sector included areas on the southern and western side of the Padma River. The districts that came under this sector were Kushtia, Faridpur, Jessore, Khulna, Barishal, and Patuakhali. The army was well organized here, so were the Mukti Bahini. Most of these areas were located near the Indian border districts Nadia, Malda, Murshidabad. From early April the army onslaught began in the western sector, and refugees began to flee from these areas as early as the first week of April. Most of them trekked several miles, some had to cross the river to reach the border areas. The influx from the western sector continued till the end of November. The northwest sector covered areas on the western side of the river Jamuna and northern part of the Padma River. This sector included districts like Rangpur, Dinajpur, Bogura, Rajshahi, and Pabna. The Pakistani army had a strong base in the area. Here, population displacement began from the end of April. The refugees from these areas included not only caste Hindus and Muslims, but also a large number of tribals like Garos, Hajongs, Santhals, Koches, and others. Besides West Bengal districts like West Dinajpur, Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, Cooch Behar, refugees from this sector went to places like Assam, Meghalaya, and Tripura. A British journalist described the influx here in the following way: Thousands of terrified and impoverished Bengalis who have attempted to flee to India have collapsed, and died of exhaustion and starvation on the roadside in Rangpur. Penniless, exhausted and in a stupor one refugee described the tragic flight in the following way: (1) We started to walk north towards the Indian border, we saw people dying all along the way. Others were lying on the ground exhausted. The first to die were the babies, then further along the road the old and children collapsed. (p.172) (p.173) (2) Two sisters, Rohina Begum, aged 16 and Jenat Begum, aged 5, had bullet wounds in their legs and arms. Rohina said her entire family was wiped out when Pakistan troops fired on their small boat as they attempted to cross the river into India. (3) Ahmed Ali, a cultivator, aged 25, had his right leg and left arm in plaster. He said that troops entered his village and rounded up all Page 13 of 37

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Exile and Freedom the able-bodied young men they could find. They asked us whether we were Bengalis or non-Bengalis and told us to lie down on the ground. They surrounded us and started shooting bullets … they bayoneted me in the groin and crushed and stamped on my leg. (The Times, 26 August 1971) The northern sector included Mymensingh, Dhaka, and it was the most guarded area from the point of view of the Pakistani army. The Indian states of Meghalaya, Assam, Tripura, and on a smaller scale Manipur, Nagaland, and Mizoram gave asylum to refugees from this sector (see Map 3.1). The Pakistani army was too weak to move into the hilly terrain of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). The tribals in the CHT were not involved in the war in a significant way, as their demand for an independent state and its denial probably alienated the tribes in the hills.10 They were not sure whether a newly independent state would recognize them as citizens and/ or give them autonomy, one of Map 3.1 East Pakistan: The Four Sectors, their long-standing demands. 1971 They stayed away from Pakistani army because they Source: Drawn under the supervision of had nothing in common with the the author. plan of actions of the Pakistani Note: Map not to scale and does not army. Moreover, in the represent authentic international mid-1960s, CHT tribals were boundaries. affected because of the construction of the Kaptai dam. In 1965, nearly 45,000 CHT refugees moved to Arunachal Pradesh. Therefore, the hilly areas of the CHT remained somewhat quiet. The army stayed away from the hills.

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Exile and Freedom The eastern sector which included districts like Sylhet, Commilla, Noakhali, and Chittagong had moderate displacement. The refugees from this sector went to adjacent states like Tripura and Mizoram. Chittagong, the port city, had to bear the brunt of army onslaught, as it was here that defection from Pakistani army took place on a large scale. Rafiqul Islam (1996), a commander in the Pakistani army, who defected at the time of Liberation War, described how Bengali military personnel in different sectors began to organize themselves for a battle against Pakistani army. According to him, it all began in the eastern sector, especially in the port city of Chittagong. (p.174) The narratives of the victims of the war as mentioned in the Bangladesh Swadhinata Juddher Dalilpatra (Documents of Bangladesh Freedom Struggle) explored different dimensions of population displacement in the four sectors.11 Let me present a few select cases. Nilima Das, a resident of Khulna town in the western sector, stated that during the second week of May, four army personnel entered her house and took her husband with them. She heard that her husband was killed. On hearing this she left for her village with her four children. There too the family was not safe. She reached India during the end of May and stayed in a camp. She observed that displacement in Khulna began during the end of May whereas in areas like Jessore and Kushtia, displaced persons began to leave for India from the first week of April. Initially, Hindus were displaced from most of the border districts in the western sectors (Government of Bangladesh 1984: vol. 8, p. 70). Kamrul Haq was displaced from Kishoreganj, Mymensingh district of the northern sector. According to Haq, the Pakistani army reached Kishoreganj during the end of April. The news of the arrival of about 200 Pakistani army men in the town created panic in the entire subdivision. The civilians and the members of the Mukti Bahini began to flee to safer places. The army personnel asked the residents to stay back through a loudspeaker. Some did stay back. The army began to identify Hindus with the help of Jamat, Muslim League, Pakistan Democratic Party, and the Santi Committee (Government of Bangladesh 1984: vol. 8, p. 104). Anisur Raman was displaced from Baghara P.S., Rajshahi, in the northwest sector. He said, Around mid-April the members of the Santi Committee reached Gangopara where Hindus lived in large numbers. They teamed up with the local units of the Muslim League and the Jamat. They went around from village to village in order to identify anti-Pakistani civilians. Soon the army joined them. In villages the Santi Committee gave an option to the Hindus, either to leave East Pakistan or convert into Islam. The pogrom began when rajakars [collaborators] joined hands with them. (Government of Bangladesh 1984: vol. 8, p. 119) According to Hussain, who lived in the eastern sector, the Pakistani army tried to find the supporters of the Awami League from the rural (p.175) areas. The army personnel took him to their barracks and interrogated him for hours. There Page 15 of 37

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Exile and Freedom he found other members of the Awami League. The news of the killing of his comrades reached him, but somehow they managed to escape (Government of Bangladesh 1984: vol. 8, p. 119). The narratives tell us the horrid experience that the civilians were going through. The case studies indicate that the War polarized the Bengalis in East Pakistan: on one side there were nationalists, the Awami League supporters, the freedom fighters, all those who wanted an independent state, and on the other, the Muslim League, the Jamat-e-Islami and their supporters who were joined by the rajakars (nearly 12,000 of them were trained by the soldiers and received 75 taka a month and 20 kilograms of rice for helping them). Their main task was to loot and create terror with the help of the members of the Santi Committee who were in favour of status quo in East Pakistan.12 The liaison between these later groups and the army formed a lethal combination for carrying out attacks against the civilians. The Documents (Government of Bangladesh 1984) included detailed accounts of many who fell victims to the Santi Committee and rajakars. The Pakistani army embarked on a psychological warfare with their help, but the Mukti Bahini and Mukti Fouz posed as threats to these pro-army groups. These narratives also point out how an attempt was made to divide the Bengalis on the basis of their religious identity, the Hindus as pro-Awami League supporters, instigators; the Muslims as pro-Pakistanis, against division of the state. The use of civilians in the war was a calculated move on the part of the Pakistani army which was not well-equipped with heavy artilleries, arms, and ammunition. They lacked adequate manpower in the country as well. The arms and equipment that the military had mobilized from West Pakistan was short of their actual need. The army had to use resources with great care as the spectre of a war with India was looming large on their minds. In such a situation, the army went for psychological warfare with the help of the pro-Pakistani political parties, Santi Committees, and rajakars. They succeeded in creating panic in the minds of the ordinary civilians.13 Population displacement was high in areas where the army barracks were located.

(p.176) The Sites of Sufferings: Refugee Camps Very little is known about the camp life of the Bangladeshi refugees except from a few brief reports that appeared in the newspapers and journals (Mukherji 1974: 398–400). A few official reports are also available on refugee camps, but they are too sketchy to merit comments. The state government opened relief camps for the refugees once they started entering India. The mushrooming of refugee camps began to change the landscape of the border districts of West Bengal. The number of camps during the period of four months from April to August 1971 rose from 170 to 615. Camps had to be opened in schools, public buildings, dharmasalas (free resting places), co-operative stores, polytechnic institutes, and so on. In May 1971, in some subdivisions of the state, 75 per cent of the total camps were located in schools and public buildings. Camps were of Page 16 of 37

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Exile and Freedom different sizes. There were large camps where as many as 3 lakh refugees found shelter, while there were others which had only 3,000 or less. Some of the large camps were in the Salt Lake area near Calcutta or Kalyani in Nadia district. The refugees were living in camps as well as with their friends and relatives. In June, the number of refugees living in camps was 5 million (50 lakhs) as against 2.2 million (22 lakhs) living with friends and relatives. In the state of Tripura, 8.5 lakh refugees lived in camps and as many as 5.6 lakh lived outside. In Assam, 2.2 lakhs lived in camps and 89,000 were staying outside. In Meghalaya, 5.8 lakhs received shelter in camps while 77,000 lived with their friends and relatives (Luthra 1971). Sociologists in other parts of the world have explored different aspects of lives in camps (Malkki 1996). In a detailed study, sociologist Partha N. Mukherji (1974) explained what it meant to be a refugee in a camp. He showed how new community structure emerged in camps, how camp life was perceived by the displaced Bengalis and how a group of leaders tried to ensure an orderly life within the camp. At least in two respects, camps in Mukherji’s study were different from others. First, camps studied by Mukherji had only Hindu population, those belonging to the Namasudra and Pod castes. Second, they included displaced persons from the western districts of East Pakistan only, like Jessore, Khulna, Faridpur, Barishal, and Kushtia, districts in the western sector. However, most refugee camps (p.177) had mixed population in terms of religion, caste, and place of origin. Many camps in Nadia district, for example, had displaced persons from upper castes like the Brahmins, Kayasthas, and residents from far-off places like Dhaka, Commila, and Noakhali. Nevertheless, Mukherji’s three essays on refugees include detailed account on exodus, reception, and return. The state policy towards the refugees was spelt out by Mukherji in the following way: … the Bangladeshi migrants of 1971, right from the beginning were clearly and unambiguously defined as a temporary group which would be accorded hospitality by the host country only until such time as they were able to go back to their country of permanent residence with dignity. Hence, the question of their rehabilitation, integration and absorption in India did not arise. It was made abundantly clear that they were to be treated as foreign nationals. This, therefore, created a unique situation where evacuees would receive food, clothing, shelter, medical care, etc. but would not be expected to seek any occupation or engage in any economic activity. (1974: 399) Refugees had arrived empty-handed, as the families had fled after selling their agricultural produce, personal belongings, household articles and in most cases, Page 17 of 37

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Exile and Freedom even properties like bullocks, agricultural implements, and the like. In the mad rush of desertion, almost all their belongings had been sold at throwaway prices and them spent their money on transport to reach West Bengal after traumatic experience. They were tired out after long journeys on foot and via other means of transport. Some arrived with sickness and disease. Most families left behind their young/adult members for joining the Mukti Bahini as freedom fighters. In this situation, the camp refugees interacted with the government officials and newly set-up camp administrative authorities for their daily needs. They came in contact also with the local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and a few concerned individuals from civil society. Life in camps was suffocating as there were hardly any activities that kept them engaged. They were waiting with baited breath to return to their homeland. However, even in this situation, they were trying to rebuild whatever (p.178) community life they possibly could in the camps. In this time of grave crisis, they were looking for some kind of group solidarity and to rebuild family. They established network with other camps and maintained contact through their camp leaders. The political institutions of erstwhile village communities were established, for example, the institution of matabbars (the elders) and union councils. The rebuilding of family and community life helped the refugees to overcome violence, trauma that they experienced in their homeland. The reconstruction of the community life in camps offered them much needed security from smugglers and anti-socials. They rebuilt community life in camps also due to the insecurity that they faced after arrival. Border areas were popular among smugglers. Taking advantage of the distress and helplessness, some smugglers were purchasing their gold ornaments and bell-metal utensils at prices much below the market rate. Driven by hunger, refugees were selling them their cattle, goats, and fowls at nominal prices. Those who refused to sell were robbed at night. The victims did not know where to lodge their complaints. Besides, the smugglers were crafty ‘exchange agents’ who charged 25 per cent to 30 per cent commission for exchanging Pakistani currency for Indian money (The Times, 2 June 1971). They tried to rebuild their community life in order to end intrusion of the outsiders. There were critical moments in the lives of the refugees in the camps. The community life in camps was severely disrupted when cholera epidemic broke out. While describing living conditions in camps, a reporter stated, I visited a huge camp near Dum Dum Airport tonight. Living conditions are indescribable. Most of the area has been half-flooded by early monsoon rains, half of the refugees are without shelter, sanitation is non-existent, drinking water is polluted and the smell of night soil permeates the air everywhere. (The Times, 9 June 1971)

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Exile and Freedom In such a condition, with the onset of the monsoons, the cholera had spread to hundreds of camps. In the absence of healthcare facility, the vulnerable sections of the population—the aged, children, and women—paid the price. The community life was in shambles. According to an eyewitness account, hundreds of bodies were buried (p.179) in the mass graves almost every day. Epidemics in refugee camps showed how an unforeseen crisis can play havoc with the community life of the asylum seekers (Das and Dasgupta 2000). The crisis forced the refugees to stay away from the host population. This was done by reorganizing the camps (The Statesman, 4 June 1971). Besides makeshift camps, refugees who received shelter in houses of their friends and relatives, in schools and colleges, and even in unused water pipes were victims of cholera epidemic. To avoid catastrophe 10,000 refugees were sent to Mana Camp in Madhya Pradesh, some of them never went back to Bangladesh.14 They were eventually allowed to stay in Dandakaranya.

Refugees in Other States Almost all the states bordering the four sectors in East Pakistan had to deal with asylum seekers (see Table 3.2). In the early 1970s, all these states had severe economic and political problems. West Bengal, for instance, had an unstable coalition government after president’s rule. The state had to cope with the Naxalites who earlier made significant inroads in local politics. Economically, it was not doing well like the states in the north and the west. This is why there was apprehension that the exodus can put an enormous burden on the state exchequer. The state administration began relief operation with (p.180) meagre resources. Tripura, which received little over 1.38 million (13.8 lakh) refugees, had problems with the tribal communities who were opposing colonization of their land by the Bengali settlers from East Bengal. Many had arrived after 1947 Partition and settled down in Agartala and border districts of the state. Economically, it was dependent entirely on funds from the centre. The influx was a big blow to the already crippled economy of the state.15

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Exile and Freedom

Table 3.2 Distribution of Refugees in Various States in India (till 15 December 1971) State

No. of Camps

In Camps

Outside Camps

Total

West Bengal

492 48,49,786

23,86,130

72,35,916

Tripura

276 8,34,098

5,47,551

13,81,649

Meghalaya

17 5,91,520

76,466

6,67,986

Assam

28 2,55,642

91,913

3,47,555

Bihar

8 36,732

…

36,732

Madhya Pradesh

3 2,19,298

–

2,19,298

Uttar Pradesh

1 10,169

Total

825 6,797,245

10,169 3,102,060

9,899,305

Source: Singh et al. (n.d.: 81).

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Exile and Freedom The other two northeastern states that had to deal with the refugees were Meghalaya and Assam. The former was carved out from Assam and had the status of a de facto state (it was recognized as a state in 1972).16 The hilly terrain of Meghalaya had hardly any economic growth for several decades. Moreover, the political rivalry between the Garos and the Khasis vitiated its politics. Refugees from the northern sector of Bangladesh, mainly Garos and Khasis, moved to Meghalaya in the mid-1960s in large numbers.17 They were unwanted in Meghalaya, a place where tribal communities led a close community life. In the mid-1960s, displaced tribals took shelter here. Refugee influx complicated problems in the neigbouring state of Assam.18 The refugees entered Assam at the time of Partition and even afterwards. Politicians had raised voice against Bengali migrants who had settled down in Assam illegally. The influx of refugees in 1971 complicated the political situation in the state. The Assamese were the first to oppose Indira–Mujib Pact which made 1971 as the cut-off year to claim Indian citizenship. Assam remained a political trouble spot for nearly five decades on the question of intrusion of foreigners into Assamese soil. Two other states that offered shelter to refugees were Bihar and Madhya Pradesh. Bihari Muslims who were fleeing from East Pakistan went to Bihar, the state from where they left at the time of Independence. The stateless Bihari Muslims created both economic and legal problems for a least developed area like Bihar. It was not clear whether the Indian state was going to grant citizenship to them. It was only hoped that they would move to Pakistan at the end of the war. Niether the Indian government nor Pakistan took them all back as citizens, the legal status of many Bihari Muslims is still undecided.19 Table 3.3 Influx of Refugees vis-à-vis Host Population State

1911 Census Reference Local Population (Persons in Thousand)

Refugee Population (Persons in Thousand)

Assam

1,49,52

313

Bihar

5,63,93

9

Meghalaya 983

668

Tripura

13,37

14,16

West Bengal

4,44,40

74,93

Source: Singh et al. (n.d.: 82). As stated earlier, the influx caused unprecedented demographic changes in all these border states (see Table 3.3). In Tripura, refugee (p.181) population exceeded the local population of the state; population increased by 100 per cent within a span of a few months which became a cause for concern for the local Page 21 of 37

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Exile and Freedom administration. Like Tripura, Meghalaya too experienced a rise of about 68 per cent of its population. In West Bengal, there was an overall increase of 17 per cent where the chief cause of concern was the concentration of refugees in some small towns. For instance, Bongaon and Barasat had over 200 per cent increase of population. There was neither enough space nor resources in offering relief to such a large number of refugees. Some had stayed back at the time of repatriation or they returned to these areas in the late 1970s and 1980s. According to Samaddar, migration has changed the contours of local politics. He writes, Elections, distribution of resources, constitutionalism, politics, of kinship, subalternity, nothing can be free of the shadow of the migration issue here. In South Dinajpur, the pervasiveness of the issue is even more striking. Many people including politicians, administrators, grassroot leades, traders, peasants and even some security officials will tell you, ‘South Dinjapur as a district is finished; only way Balurghat can survive is if the border is opened’. Productivity is low in South Dinajpur, land is still relatively low-priced, migrants prefer North Dinajpur and areas lying farther north. For, a national highway, contiguity with Bihar orchards, irrigation projects, tea gardens, in short, all that is required for attracting migrants is very much present to the west of South Dinajpur. (1999: 185–8) (p.182) We shall return to this problem later in this chapter. In spite of demographic problems, refugee–host relationship remained free from conflict or confrontation. Media reports show that only on two occasions the hosts were up in arms against the refugees. These incidents took place in Barasat and Dum Dum. In June, refugees began to occupy almost all the vacant places including land belonging to the temples and mosques. The use of mosque premises for dwelling purposes triggered protests among the Muslim community which led to altercations. With the help of the local officials, the refugees were removed to other places (The Sunday Times, 20 August 1971). The news of the spread of cholera epidemic among the refugees had reached the local residents in Dum Dum. Out of panic, the residents asked the local authorities to seal off the border and cordon off the camps. The fear of an epidemic in Calcutta and surrounding areas, similar to the London plague, featured in the local media. With the end of the epidemic, the local residents came out in large numbers to take part in relief work (The Sunday Times, 25 August 1971). Politicians, intellectuals, well-known personalities from film world and sports came forward to raise resources for the refugees.

Two-Pronged Strategies The refugee crisis was highlighted in the international forum by the Indian politicians and diplomats. The Indian delegates travelled to Europe, USA, and the Far East to mobilize support. The Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi played a key role in informing the world about the violation of human rights in East Page 22 of 37

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Exile and Freedom Pakistan, and about the unimaginable sufferings of millions of refugees in India. In October/November 1971, prime minister Indira Gandhi visited eight countries to inform European and American governments and people about the real situation in Bangladesh, the conditions of the civilians. On 4 November 1971, she informed the parliament, Pakistan’s armed forces have been shelling our border areas, inflicting damage on life and property. Their air force has wantonly violated our air space several times and once came right up to Srinagar. Spies and saboteurs have been blowing up trains and bridges. Since March 1971, we have lodged 66 protests for border violations covering 890 incidents. (p. 183) For air violations, we have lodged 17 protests covering 50 incidents. However, these protests have had no effect and to cover up their incessant violations, Pakistani propaganda media have been putting out the story that we are engaged in an undeclared war and have mounted massive attacks with tanks and troops. This is wholly untrue.20 In an international forum she presented the Indian case in the following way: With regard to the number of refugees, our officials say there are 9,700,000. It may be that they are 200,000 fewer. But I do not think anybody can doubt the basic figure. Anybody who wants to see it is free to see. Every refugee whom we can reach (there are a large number who are not in the camps, and who live with people whom they know) and who is in a camp has a ration card. They cannot get their food without a ration card. We have over 3 million [30 lakh] Muslim refugees. The importance of Pakistan’s figure is that they are not willing to admit the people of other religions who are refugees. They are counting only 3 million Muslim refugees; they are leaving out the Hindus, Christians and Buddhists. We cannot have them out. Whatever the international opinion says, I am very definite, and so is our entire country. We have borne a very big burden with hardly any help from outside, and when we drew the attention of the U.N., we were given the answer: ‘It is an internal problem of Pakistan. We cannot interfere in it. It is an internal matter of Pakistan.’ This may be a way of looking at things. But surely you cannot expect us to accept that way of looking at things or to have respect for this kind of thought process.21 The Indian rehabilitation secretary G.S. Kahlon said in the 22nd session of the executive committee of the UNHCR in Geneva, Beginning from end of March, within a couple of months, total influx of refugees into India had gone up to nearly four million [40 lakh], and today it has crossed 9 million [90 lakhs] already, without any signs of them returning to East Pakistan at all. Average inflow per day still continues to Page 23 of 37

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Exile and Freedom be between 30,000 to 50,000 persons, and if this rate continues at this scale we may well have not less than 12 million [1.2 crore] refugees on our hands by end of this year. The government of India has made provision of 600 million [60 crore] rupees. (Singh et al. n.d.: 92) (p.184) The Indian representative to the UN informed the member states that there were more refugees from Pakistan, which would be more than the population of London (Singh et al. n.d.: 95). For the first time, India approached the world to mobilize support for the refugees. The politicians tried to reach out to almost all conceivable effective international fora in order to mobilize support and to put an end to refugee crises in eastern India. The international support was crucial for army action. This is why Jacob, a military official, wrote, The need to gain international support was vital in the preparatory stages and subsequent military operations. In March 1971, international support for the independence of Bangladesh was lukewarm. It was imperative that the international press should highlight the atrocities being committed, in order to build up support for an independent Bangladesh…. The contribution of the foreign press and the electronic media to the struggle for Bangladesh’s independence should be given due weightage. (1999: 162–3) The Indian diplomatic efforts compelled Pakistan to tell the world their version of the story. According to Pakistani diplomats, the refugee crisis was blown out of proportion, about 50,000 to 60,000 refugees went to India for asylum, but they too were returning to Pakistan.22 They pointed out that India was interfering in Pakistan’s internal affair by offering assistance to Mukti Bahini and Mukti Fouz. The Pakistani army had a right to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, Indian policy to allow the international mediapersons, independent observers, helped in informing the world about the great humanitarian crisis and sufferings of the refugees in Indian camps. For example, an independent observer like Senator Edward Kennedy wrote in the New York Times that 430 children were dying every day, and another 30,000 could die of starvation in refugee camps in India.23 His observations came as a rude shock to the American administration supporting the Pakistani army.24 The mediapersons were allowed access to refugee camps so that they get to know ground realities and report at length for the international communities. Almost all the international dailies carried detailed reports on refugees. The atrocities of the army featured in the electronic media. This made the task of the Indian government a lot more easier, the international community knew who were the (p.185) perpetrators, how innocent civilians lost life for wanton destruction by the Pakistani army. The other strategy that paid off in dealing with relief was to allow a host of national and international NGOs to offer help to refugees. The Indian state encountered an unprecedented economic crisis as the Page 24 of 37

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Exile and Freedom number of refugees kept increasing. The finance minister in his budget presented in May 1971 stated that the government had provided Rs 600 million (60 crores) for the relief of refugees, but this was too little. Thereafter, in August, the government was forced to present a supplementary demand of Rs 2,000 million (200 crores) more. Foreign observers noted that there was a need for an additional amount of about $576 million (57.6 crores). But the relief pledged by foreign countries and agencies amounted to $153.67 million (15.367 crores), of which only $20.47 million (2.047 crores) had actually reached for reimbursement. As a result, the government faced an enormous financial burden. Various programmes for economic development and social welfare had to be trimmed and additional resources had been mobilized by fresh taxation and commercial borrowing by the Indian state. India made a massive resource mobilization effort, over and above what had been provided for in the budget presented in May. The government had to seek an additional 200 crores in August and another 143 crores in December through supplementary budgets. Still, there was a need to involve organizations like the Ramakrishna Mission, Bharat Sevashram Sangha, and Marwari Relief Society, which offered much needed help. So did the international NGOs like the Red Cross, Oxfam, and Christian Aid. The five agencies—War on Want, Christian Aid, Save the Children Fund, Oxfam, and the Red Cross, had sent supplies worth a total of Rs 117 crores since the first week of April 1971. Many writers have pointed out that the decision to involve the UNHCR in relief work was also an important step. There were reasons to believe that initially India was let down by the UNHCR. It was pointed out by the Indian officials that instead of visiting refugee camps in India the high commissioner of the UNHCR went to Pakistan, where he held talks with the government on the possibility of establishing the UNHCR reception centres in East Pakistan so as promote voluntary repatriation. After his visit, the Pakistani army asked the refugees to return to East Pakistan; there were hardly any (p.186) returnees. The Indian position was spelt out by Indian foreign minister Swaran Singh to the UNHCR in the following way: ‘Only by putting the Awami League in power would the refugees return. There is no question of the refugees going back without a change of regime.’ Singh said so for the simple reason that the Awami League received overwhelming support of the Bengalis in the elections and gained legitimacy to demand self-rule. The UNHCR’s role raised important questions about the neutrality of the UN organization. The episode confirmed India’s fear of the limitations of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. However, at a later stage, from August onwards, the media and NGO’s versions of the crisis compelled the UNHCR to carry out relief work in a big way. It was the main agency in planning out repatriation at the end of the war.

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Exile and Freedom No account of relief and rescue work for the Bengali refugees would be complete without referring to the role of the Bengali diaspora in offering aid. The Bengalis in Europe, America, and Far East raised funds for the refugees. Relief materials and medicines were collected from door to door. The Bengali community in the UK, perhaps the most active of all, raised funds and offered shelter to hundreds of refugees who sought asylum there. The details of the diaspora’s rescue act are now available in the Bangladesh Liberation War Documents (Government of Bangladesh 1984: vol. 6), and especially in Faruque’s account (2010). The Bengali diaspora muted Pakistani voice abroad who was trying to call the struggle as treason, and an attack on country’s sovereignty. They did so with an active campaign in England. The events in the month of December began to unfold at a faster rate. On 6 December, prime minister Indira Gandhi, amidst thunderous cheers, announced in both the houses of parliament that India recognized the Bangladesh government. On 8 December, India expressed her desire to decline politely but firmly the proposal of UN for a ceasefire. On 16 December 1971, after a short war of thirteen days, the Indian and Bangladeshi forces liberated 150,000 square kilometres of territory. As the war came to an end, a massive operation to repatriate nearly 10 million (1 crore) refugees had begun. For the first time in South Asia such a large number of refugees were sent back to their homeland. As a first step, refugees were told to surrender their rations cards, and they were asked to collect Refugee Return Card (p.187) that entitled them to allowances in cash and kind, as well as further relief when they reached Bangladesh. Transportation was organized by the Government of India, which involved special trains, and transfer of unused relief supplies to Bangladesh for the rehabilitation for returnees (Ananda Bazar Patrika, 19 December 1971). Pakistani officials stranded in Bangladesh were sent back. Steps were taken to rehabilitate the prisoners of war (POW). It took nearly three months to send back these refugees. The last batch of 3,869 refugees in camps left for Bangladesh on 23 March 1972, exactly one year after the Pakistani army’s crackdown on Bengali civilians. With the return of these refugees, all the central and state refugee camps had been closed. About 60,000 refugees, who stayed with their relatives, began to return. On 11 April 1972, it was informed at the West Bengal legislative assembly that 77 lakh refugees went back and the remaining were on their way (see Table 3.4).25 Table 3.4 Total Number of Refugees Returned from West Bengal to Bangladesh (as on 17 September 1971) Districts

No. of Camp Refugees No. of Non-camp Refugees Total

24 Parganas

15,01,834

5,25,877

20,27,711

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Exile and Freedom

Districts

No. of Camp Refugees No. of Non-camp Refugees Total

Nadia

9,99,120

1,25,000

11,24,120

Murshidabad

3,35,121

1,38,826

4,73,947

Malda

1,34,431

2,61,012

3,95,443

West Dinajpur 13,62,639

4,43,923

18,06,562

Darjeeling

9,356

11,147

20,503

Jalpaiguri

1,84,450

4,96,492

6,80,942

Cooch Behar

4,54,207

3,58,883

8,13,090

Midnapur

1,16,274

Nil

1,16,274

Bankura

89,166

Nil

89,166

Purulia

89,746

Nil

89,746

Hooghly

Nil

14,433

14,433

Burdwan

Nil

10,535

10,535

Total

52,76,344

23,86,128

76,62,472

Source: West Bengal Assembly Proceedings, 1972, p. 321. The repatriation was completed in phases in accordance with the norms of the international treaties. With the completion of the (p.188) repatriation, India managed to achieve its goal of creating an ‘effective border’ in the eastern region to stop unwanted influx of population in future. With the signing of the Indira–Mujib Pact, the border was sealed and ‘citizenship’ was redefined in the context of territoriality. The terms like ‘citizens’, foreigners’, and ‘infiltrators’ acquired a new meaning. The war and the territorial division changed the life in the border in a significant way. Nakatani (2000), van Schendel (2007) and Samaddar (1999) explained how a new hybrid culture developed in the border region during the post-1971 phase. However, the problem of influx was far from over.

Economic Refugees or Infiltrators? The narrow definition of the term ‘refugee’ by international organizations does not take note of a special category that may be described as ‘economic refugees’. Those who leave their country under compulsion, mainly for poverty or for fear of famine or drought are often described as ‘economic refugees’. In India their number is on the rise. Many of them are now working in the country’s informal sector as housemaids, rickshaw-pullers, street vendors, constructionworkers, beedi-binders, and the like and include both Hindus and Muslims. The number of these refugees is on the rise in almost all parts of the world. Both the developed and developing countries are now trying to come to terms with the problem of influx of economic refugees which is involuntary. From the Page 27 of 37

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Exile and Freedom mid-1970s, economic refugees from Bangladesh have been crossing the border and moving into Indian states like West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and to cities like Delhi and Mumbai. These refugees are often clubbed together with ‘infiltrators’. All infiltrators are not economic refugees but some are. One has to make a distinction between the two.26 Infiltration in most cases voluntary in nature. The state used a blanket term like ‘infiltrator’ for different categories of migrants without taking note of its political ramifications. No attempt has been made to ascertain whether one is an economic refugee or one is entering the country for other reasons, often for a shorter duration. It is difficult to get reliable data on the number of economic refugees currently living in India. Politicians have entered into debates, different political groups have quoted different numbers. Let us take (p.189) a closer look at the problem. It has been pointed out by some writers that the economic refugees began to arrive in India right from 1972 because of the acute shortage of food in the country and lack of job opportunities. Economic factors had forced out many Bangladeshis during the last five decades.27 For instance, in 1974–5, flood and famine ravaged Bangladesh which caused displacement and eventually migration to India.28 Among the economic refugees and infiltrators one could find many who are like the 1951 Convention refugees, fleeing the country for fear of persecution. After Mujib’s assassination and with the change of regime, their number began to increase. For example, Monoranjan Roy left Bangladesh for fear of local police and neighbour’s harassment and was looking for secure life in India. He expressed his anger against the Ershad regime in Bangladesh, and recalled how he fled his home in Faridpur where he owned 16 bighas of land. The local police and Muslim fundamentalists had demanded 10,000 takas from him and when he expressed his inability to pay, they threatened to take away his 14-year-old daughter. Roy paid 2,500 takas to a Border Security Force (BSF) personnel for safe journey across the border for himself, his two sons, and their families. He carried with him in a leather briefcase, documents certifying his ownership of the 16 bighas of land that he never expected to see again. A person like Roy would be treated as a ‘refugee’ in any country that has signed the 1951 Convention (Ananda Bazar Patrika, 19 December 1996). A displaced Hindu from Bangladesh, who migrated in 1978, said that he was facing the problem of getting back his landed property. Land of the Hindus who deserted at the time of Liberation War was taken over Page 28 of 37

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Exile and Freedom by the local Muslim thugs. Some of the Hindus were involved in litigation for getting back their land. Hindus who left Bangladesh tend to believe that Liberation War led to the emergence of not only a new country but also a new identity, Bengali Muslims became Bangladeshis, the followers of Islam.

Map 3.2 Areas of Infiltration from Bangladesh into West Bengal Source: Drawn under the supervision of the author. Note: Map not to scale and does not represent authentic international boundaries.

Similarly, when a stateless Bihari Muslim tries to flee from Bangladesh for fear of persecution and arrives in India, he too is a refugee like Roy and others. In Dhaka, after the Liberation War, displaced Biharis received shelter in two large camps in Muhammadpur and Mirpur. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 7,00,000 Biharis were displaced in different parts (p. 190) (p.191) of the country. Most of the displaced persons wanted to move to Pakistan or to the Indian state of Bihar. Their condition became so precarious that one of the displaced Biharis observed that those who were alive and still there found it safer to live not in their houses but in the relief camp. Basant Chatterjee noted that the camp area as a whole was seething with naked, disease ridden, and black-eyed humanity, men, women, and children, all seemingly locked in a life and death struggle (1973: 110). Those who were fleeing from these camps too were refugees. From time to time, Amnesty International had reported how Buddhist refugees from the CHT had sought asylum in European countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Chowdhory (2004) noted that when Chakmas reached Tripura in large numbers in the late 1970s, the Government of India treated them like ‘refugees’.29 In the mid-1960s, the construction of the Kaptai dam displaced nearly 50,000 Chakmas who went to Arunachal Pradesh for shelter. They too were treated like refugees. These two cases show that that the number does matter in identifying a group as refugees, isolated cases do not get recognition. In order to be recognized as refugees by the Indian state, an influx of several thousands is necessary. The Government of India treated these two groups as refugees and offered them relief assistance. This is in sharp contrast to European countries or America where individuals claim refugee status, influx of groups is rare. Political tensions, communal clashes too can trigger flow of refugees from the neighbouring state of Bangladesh. Seldom they flee in a group, large enough to draw the attention of the state. The issue of infiltration is now a part of everyday political discourse in the state of West Bengal. In the 1990s, the central and the state government agencies nabbed the infiltrators from different areas and deported them. In 1992, the BSF Page 29 of 37

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Exile and Freedom planned to flush out 600,000 Bangladeshi infiltrators—those who came between 1972 and 1990 and residing in different parts of West Bengal. It succeeded in sending back only 20,500 infiltrators. Special measures were taken to check infiltration along the entire international border in southern West Bengal. The BSF also found the infiltrators going to far-off places like Delhi and Mumbai. It was pointed out by a Home Ministry spokesperson that in Delhi the illegal Bangaldeshis or infiltrators were staying in places like Sarai Rohilla, Jangpura, Seemapuri, Seelampur, (p.192) Azadpur Market, Okhla, and Yamuna Pusta, and in all about 3,00,000 of them were residing in the city (Times of India, 4 February 2003). Some of the infiltrators were found working as seasonal agricultural labourers in the border districts like Nadia. Landowners encouraged this as they had to pay less to the Bangladeshi labourers. Mohammad Abdul, a resident in North 24 Parganas pointed out: ‘About 50 Muslim families from Bangladesh, mostly masons and farmers, have come here to earn money. Everybody here earns Rs 20 to 25 per person per day, almost an impossible proposition in Bangladesh.’ Amir Ali Sheikh said he arrived in West Bengal with three sons and was happy that they were better off here than in Bangladesh (The Statesman, 23 March 1993). The BSF identified Bihari Muslims among the infiltrators, a large number of them use an entry point in West Dinajpur district to enter Bihar and travel back and forth. Besides, as I mentioned earlier, tribals from CHT were crossing the border for political reasons and moved to Meghalaya. So, the term ‘infiltrator’ is a generic term, it includes different groups migrating at different points of time primarily for better living. The terms like ‘refugee’ and ‘displaced’ are missing from the official discourse on the Bangladeshis crossing the border and entering West Bengal. All those who are crossing the border illegally are infiltrators. The official data would show the nature of the problem. In 1992, the West Bengal chief minister Jyoti Basu pointed out that between 1977 and 1992, approximately 2.36 lakh infiltrators entered West Bengal. Some of them were sent back by the BSF. Out of the total infiltrators 68,472 were Hindus and 1,64,132 were Muslims. During the same period, the state police and Special Task Force intercepted 2,16,985 infiltrators: 56,342 Hindus and 1,69,795 Muslims. Therefore, within 15 years, a total of about 4.5 lakh Bangladeshi infiltrators tried to enter West Bengal, and many of them were subsequently sent back.30 Basu adds that within the same period 5.85 lakh Bangladeshis reached West Bengal and did not return after the expiry of their visa. Therefore, in all, 10 lakh Bangladeshis reached West Bengal with the hope to stay. Infiltrators went to other states like Assam, Tripura, and Meghalaya after crossing the porous border (J. Basu 1992: 4). It was indeed quite an astonishing revelation by the leader of the Left Front since it was alleged by the right-wing political parties that the infiltrators were being used as ‘vote banks’ by the Left (p.193) parties. Basu noted that most of these infiltrators were coming to eke out a living or to have a better life (Basu 1992: 5). Page 30 of 37

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Exile and Freedom Many non-Bengali Muslims were overstaying in West Bengal too. According to a rough estimate, 50 per cent of them were ‘Biharis’ who managed to secure passports from the Bangladesh government and visas from the Indian High Commission in Bangladesh (Basu 1992: 6–7). According to a media report, they were being protected by a prominent Left Front leader who tried his best to get them enumerated in the 1991 census of Indian nationals. According to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), West Bengal had the largest number of illegal immigrants, numbering about 54 lakh, followed by Assam’s 40 lakh, Tripura’s 8 lakh, Bihar’s 5 lakh, Delhi’s 3 lakh, and Rajasthan and Mumbai’s 50,000 each (Ananda Bazar Patrika, 19 December 1996). The issue of the infiltration is being used by the BJP to discredit both the left and the Trinamool Congress.

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Exile and Freedom

Table 3.5 Interception of Illegal Immigrants: From Bangladesh to West Bengal (by the State Police/Mobile Task Force/ BSF) Year

Total Hindu

Total Muslim

Total Others

% Hindu

% Muslim

1977

1,504

2,372

422 34.99

55.19

1978

5,270

2,212

410 66.78

28.03

1979

4,543

6,970

681 37.26

57.16

1980

3,522

6,645

366 33.44

63.09

1981

3,887

8,541

193 30.87

67.67

1982

3,263

10,296

374 23.42

73.90

1983

4,434

18,549

281 19.06

79.73

1984

4,554

19,537

68 18.85

80.87

1985

6,982

20,031

62 25.79

73.98

1986

9,387

27,381

– 25.53

74.47

1987

11,997

35,083

462 25.23

73.79

1988

12,490

33,887

200 26.82

72.75

1989

11,437

32,496

104 25.97

73.79

1990

17,901

38,611

68 31.64

68.24

1991

18,304

55,237

79 24.86

75.04

Source: Gupta et al. (1994: 52).

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Exile and Freedom The problem of infiltration has been studied from different perspectives. De is of the view that factors like Islamization during the post-Mujib era, vested property act, and declaration of Bangladesh as an Islamic state pushed many Hindus out, and most of them were recorded as infiltrators (De 1993; Gupta et al. 1994: 52). De uses census data and information from the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics to support his argument (see Table A.6 in the Appendix). A detailed account of this kind of entry can be found in Samaddar (1999). From a report, he traced four ways of dispossession, and consequent migration: forced occupation, leasing-out by the government of the said property to third party, nominal occupation but legal alienation, and the extreme feeling of insecurity regarding loss of property. Social factors, according to these writers, were more important than economic factors. At the same time, Samaddar noted why Muslims were arriving in West Bengal from the border districts of Bangladesh. If infiltrators were minority Hindus running away from an Islamic state for Islamization, then why does the official data on infiltrators show that more Muslims than Hindus crossing the border? (See Table 3.5.) If minorities were leaving Bangladesh for social and political insecurity, then Muslims would have stayed back for fear of backlash in the hands of Hindu extremists in India (Dasgupta et al. 2011: 34–81). However, the census data can trigger communal problems in the state as the percentage of Muslim (p.194) population of the total has been increasing over the years and demographic changes in West Bengal districts also show an uneven growth of population (see Tables A.6 and A.7 in the Appendix). The census data (2011) on religious communities released in January 2015 showed that between 2001 and 2011, Muslim population in West Bengal grew by 1.8 per cent against the country-wide growth of 0.8 per cent (percentage-wise the total state population increased from 25.2 per cent to 27 per cent). This is going to give rise to new questions on the nature of infiltration in the state. To encourage infiltration to win elections is common among political parties. At the time of the 1987 elections in Bongaon, the Congress alleged that in order to defeat their candidate, the CPI(M) was using the Bangladeshi infiltrators. To get their support, the party issued ration cards to the infiltrators and registered their names in the electoral list. It was pointed out in the 1981 census that Bongaon’s population was 71,000, but ration cards were distributed to as many (p.195) as 2 lakh people. The constituency had more fake voters than genuine ones. This is why in a hard-hitting criticism Sumanta Banerjee writes, … along with Muslims, a lot of Hindus have also illegally entered West Bengal and other parts of India. They had been driven by fanatic Islamic persecution in some parts of Bangladesh that followed in the wake of the demolition of Babri Masjid in India. Like their Muslim counterparts, they are also staying here without valid papers. If it is a question of ‘illegal infiltrators’, why is the CPI(M) silent about the Hindu ‘infiltrators’? The BJP, true to its ideology, makes a distinction between Bangladeshi Muslims and Hindu immigrants. While they denounce the former as ‘infiltrators’, Page 33 of 37

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Exile and Freedom they sanctify the latter as ‘refugees’. Is the CPI(M) also veering round that view? (2003: 865) The infiltrators are now solid vote banks of the state political parties. In Lalbagh, Murshidabad, the CPI(M) alleged the same against the Congress candidate for using the infiltrators for the electoral gain. The Congress leaders enrolled not only the infiltrators but also 10,000 to 12,000 Bangladeshis who were asked to cross the border to cast their votes at the time of elections (Ananda Bazar Patrika, 29 June 2014). In the controversy over Hindus or Muslims, infiltrators or non-infiltrators, the genuine cause of the economic refugees for asylum, or flight for fear of persecution hardly receives any attention. Many writers have brought to our notice how land shortage skewed landholding pattern, and adverse land-man ratio led to an acute shortage of food and employment in Bangladesh (Boyce 1987). The annual exponential growth rate of population of Bangladesh during the census period 1981–91 was 2.17, more than many developing countries in the world. Famine, drought, cyclone, et cetera, in the 1980s and 1990s displaced lakhs of Bangladeshis. Environmental disasters played havoc with the lives of millions of Bangladeshis. Influx of refugees and illegal migrants is an ongoing phenomenon. More they arrive, more they change the social and political landscape of West Bengal. A recent report in a daily highlighted how the issues of ‘refugees’, ‘infiltration’ are taking centre stage in West Bengal politics. According to this report, from the point of view of the BJP’s there are two categories of Bangladeshis who have settled in West Bengal, Hindu refugees fleeing religious persecution and Muslims infiltrators. In West Bengal, the party is preparing to embrace the (p.196) former and push the latter back to where they came from. Muslims, accounting for 27 per cent of Bengal’s population, dominate around 12 Parliament seats in the bordering districts, such as Murshidabad and Malda. They invariably back the ruling Trinamool Congress and the Congress. The BJP’s promise to rehabilitate Hindu refugees, especially the numerically strong Matua community which is TMC chief Mamta Banerjee’s assured vote-banks in the border districts now tops the agenda of the BJP. This development supports the point I made earlier that the issue of infiltration is occupying the centre stage in West Bengal politics. Creating an effective border in the eastern region of the country has remained as elusive as ever. The border today is as porous as it used to be before the Liberation War. Today, territoriality is not the sole criterion for defining or redefining citizenship. Several factors are now working in a complex way to define a citizen and an outsider, a refugee and an infiltrator, a victim and an intruder. The influx of the outsiders in the state has raised new issues pertaining to the state and citizenship. The politics in the state can hardly be discussed without referring to the new realities in the border.

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Exile and Freedom Notes:

(1.) Mukti Bahini, a semi-trained armed force, was formed in April 1971 to fight against the Pakistani army. The Mukti Fouz, a guerilla unit, came into existence after a few months. A large number of Bengali military personnel deserted the Pakistani army and joined the two units. Both the forces received training from the Indian army. According to a Lt General of the Indian army, Jacob (1999), both these groups showed exceptional skill in fighting well-trained Pakistani armed forces. (2.) The Bihari Muslims were used by the army against the Awami League supporters. About 1.5 lakh Bihari Muslims were living in East Pakistan at the time of Liberation War. They realized that in the event of defeat of the Pakistani army they would be stateless, they tried desperately to migrate to Indian state of Bihar. See more on the predicament of the Bihari Muslims in Ghosh (2007). After independence they were denied Bangladeshi citizenship, although Bangladesh High Court asked the state to offer citizenship to them. Pakistan has taken nearly 10,000 Bihari Muslims as citizens. (3.) Both the left- and right-wing political parties extended much needed support to Indira Gandhi. Jyoti Basu, in his speech at the State Assembly, asked the centre to extend full support to the displaced. The refugee crisis was highlighted by the Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi in her speeches. She visited refugee camps in West Bengal and Tripura. Another chief spokesperson for the Liberation War was Jai Prakash Narain. See more in Bass (2013). (4.) For the full text of Mujib’s speech, see Government of Bangladesh (1984). It was delivered at Ramna Maidan where, according to one estimate, over a lakh people assembled. It is still considered as one of the outstanding political speeches ever delivered by a South Asian political leader. (5.) For Pakistani army’s response to Mujib’s call for action, see Raja (2012) and Quadir (2004). The army wanted to get more time for a negotiated settlement, but Mujib had set a deadline that was nether adequate for negotiation nor for army action. (6.) For a detailed account, see Bass (2013). (7.) For the full text of Jyoti Basu’s speech, see his Nirbachita Rachanabali (2002: vol. 2,114–23). It was a passionate speech in which he requested the centre to offer full protection to the refugees and to recognize Bangladesh as an independent state. (8.) After the visit of the UNHCR chief, Sadruddin Aga Khan, to East Pakistan, the Pakistani army asked the refugees to return. The Pakistani army quoted inflated figures of the returnees.

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Exile and Freedom (9.) For strategic significance of the four sectors, see Jacob (1999), Rafiqul Islam (1996). Large-scale massacre took place near the army headquarters of the four sectors. (10.) For a detailed account on Chakmas and their struggle for autonomy, see van Schendel (1994) and Chowdhory (2004). (11.) Government of Bangladesh (1984: vol. 8) deals extensively with the narratives of the war survivors. (12.) The nexus between the army and the Santi Committee, rajakars, and Jamat played havoc in the countryside. See Sarkar (1972: 79). (13.) Initially, panic succeeded in driving out Awami League supporters and Hindus. (14) These refugees were finally resettled in Dandakaranya. (15) Tripura had to deal with the tribal insurgency in some areas. Besides, the Bengali settlers encroached upon tribal land which caused tension between the indigenous Tripura residents and the settlers. (16.) Garo hills became their main sanctuary in Meghalaya. (17.) Earlier large-scale migration of Garos and Khasis from north Bengal districts took place in this region in 1964. On earlier occasions Meghalaya protested against mass migration from East Pakistan. (18.) For the complex problem of influx in Assam, see Amalendu Guha (1980). He argued that the non-Assamese migrants outnumbered the Assamese in some areas was a political myth. (19.) Initially, Pakistan agreed to take the bulk of the Bihari Muslim migrants. By the end of 1980s about 10,000 of them received asylum in Pakistan. See Ghosh (2007). (20.) Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, p. 473. (21.) Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, p. 471. (22.) Pia Oberoi (2006) discussed this problem at length in her book. (23.) First pointed out by journalist Keelwin Raffery in the Financial Times, 12 October 1971.

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Exile and Freedom (24.) See Bass (2013: 225–35) for a detailed account on Senator Kennedy’s visit to refugee camps, and his observations on the situations in refugee camps. (25.) West Bengal Assembly Proceedings (11 April 1972), Vol. 52, No. 2, p. 321. (26.) De (1993), Basu (1992), and Mukherjee (1994) described at length with different aspects of infiltration. There were right-wing politicians too who entered into the debate and showed how Muslim infiltrators outnumbered Hindus and a nexus emerged between the Left politicians and the illegal immigrants. (27.) According to De (1993), infiltration began immediately after the Liberation War, and continued for several decades. (28.) Mukherjee (1994) explained economic and environmental factors that caused infiltration. (29.) Chowdhory (2004) and van Schendel (1994) examined the Chakma displacement problems from the mid-1960s onwards when the Kaptai dam construction in the CHT caused large scale displacement. (30.) Basu was responding to the criticisms levelled against his government by the BJP for not doing enough to stop infiltration.

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Conclusion

Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780199461172 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.001.0001

Conclusion Abhijit Dasgupta

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.003.0005

Abstract and Keywords The Indian state has sovereign rights to decide who is to be considered a refugee, who should receive relief and rehabilitation, and who is to be repatriated. In the absence of international treaties and national laws for refugees, the state is the final arbitrator on all such matters. The state policies towards the refugees are often influenced by the attitude of the hosts, dynamics of local politics, and relationship between sending and receiving countries. The asylum policies to a large extent are politically constructed. This chapter revisits various theoretical and conceptual issues raised in the earlier chapters and shows their interrelatedness. Keywords:   agency, location, violence, humanitarianism, human rights, habitat

That man who is forced each day to snatch his manhood, his identity, out of the fire of human cruelty that rages to destroy it knows, if he survives his effort, and even if he does not survive it, he knows something about himself and human life that no school on earth—and indeed no church— can teach. —Baldwin (1963: 84) The Indian state has sovereign rights to decide who is to be considered as a refugee, who should receive relief and rehabilitation, and who is to be repatriated. In the absence of international treaties and national laws for the refugees in India, the state is the final arbitrator on all such matters. The state policies towards the refugees are often influenced by the attitude of the hosts Page 1 of 8

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Conclusion and regional politics, especially relationships with the countries sending the refugees. In recent years, national security policies too are playing an important role. The asylum policies, therefore, to a large extent are politically constructed. On rare occasions, as in the case of Bangladesh Liberation War refugees, the state decided to privilege humanitarian considerations over others. I have therefore argued that the Indian state oscillates between two extremes, coercion on the one hand and humanitarian considerations on the other. By doing this, the state has created more complexities and confusions. The search for common minimum policies for different groups of refugees has remained as elusive as ever. Countries that signed the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol too are deviating from the principles laid down in the treaties. In some of these countries, it is believed, that the common values shared by the citizens are different from others. As such, the state is supposed (p.200) to protect the citizens from others (refugees, foreigners, and so on). This is done by controlling the entry of the refugees. Fassin (2011) noted that the states have their own idealized view of asylum to deny entry to a refugee. He writes, … the increasing assimilation of asylum and immigration serves as a justification for the suspicion towards refugees, the paradox being that it is in the name of an idealized view of asylum that refugees are denied its protection. As their testimony is systematically disqualified, more documents, medical certificates, psychological evidence, and material proof are required, thus confirming the delegitimization of their voice. Second, the progressive recognition of intimate violence, including sexual orientation and genital mutilations, as rationales for asylum obscures the dramatic discrediting of traditional political persecution, systematically contested by protection officers and judges. This shift from the public to the private spheres is all the more effective. (2011: 1) For asylum seekers, refusal at the point of entry could ‘cost their lives or condemnation to a life barely worth living’ (Gibney 2004: 35). During the middle of September 2014, in two boat accidents in the Mediterranean nearly 700 asylum seekers lost their lives. The stringent rules imposed by the European Union to stop asylum seekers from moving into European soil are now leading to this kind of disaster. The shocking image of the Syrian boy, Alan, showed the nature of such disaster (The Guardian, 20 September 2015). Such tragedies are now common near the coastlines of southern Europe, western Australia, and in the eastern parts of Canada. Countries in Europe and America too are adopting double standards, denying some basic rights to refugees. Since 1947, India has received refugees from several South Asian countries, especially from Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. Our knowledge about their flight experience, camp life, coping strategies, and their relations with the hosts Page 2 of 8

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Conclusion is far from adequate. Some of these issues have been examined here with the help of three case studies. A few points may be emphasized with regard to the theoretical issues raised in this study. First, I have followed the state-centric approach as it offers the possibilities in finding out answers to questions concerning relief, rehabilitation, coercion, control, policing, surveillance, and the like. This approach is particularly important because India is not a signatory to international treaties for the protection of refugees. (p.201) Policies towards refugees are guided by two acts: the Foreigners Act of India (1946) and Foreigners Registration Act (1939). These acts are meant for the foreigners, as a result the state policies towards refugees shift from time to time. The statecentric perspective helps us in understanding the nature of these shifts and consequences of these policies. Second, the use of legal provisions in dealing with refugees has brought the refugee-related issues into the legal domain. Legal experts dominated refugee studies for far too long, in India and abroad. Indeed issues of asylum, nonrefoulement, repatriation, and so on, are integral part of the legal discourse, but of late, sociologists and social anthropologists have shown that these issues are not only legal, but also sociopolitical and ethical. Refugee-related issues need to be studied within a broader sociological perspective by using appropriate theoretical and conceptual framework. Third, the question of agency assumes special significance in the study of the refugees. Malkki writes on this point that refugees are often defined as speechless, this is ahistorical and flawed. This is why she writes, This abstraction uproots refugees from the political, social and historical context and depicts them as depoliticized, dehistoricized, and mute victims. (Malkki 1995: 377) The case studies in this book show that the refugees have gained agency under extreme trying conditions. This is why in the case of Partition refugees, we have noted that they were not just asylum seekers waiting at the mercy of the state. Their voice on contentious issues, whether forcible closure of camps, deportation or eviction, were loud and clear. They were the catalyst of change. In the case of Tamil refugees, I have explained how they tried to voice their dissent against incarceration in special camps, or in conveying their opposition to repatriation without consent. And in the case of Bangladesh War refugees it was observed how in an extremely adverse situation they rebuild community life. Instead of looking at them only as victims, we need to focus on how refugees initiate actions on their own in dealing with matters pertaining to relief and rehabilitation, and also in resisting those who use coercive power. In other words, they need to be studied as agents (p.202) of change. In recent years, a few studies have highlighted the relevance of the concept of agency, the most notable among them is the work on the widows of Bridaban by Jasodhara Bagchi Page 3 of 8

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Conclusion and Subhoranjan Dasgupta (2003). Prafulla K. Chakrabarti (1999) too examined this problem in his book on Partition refugees. Like men, women too gained agency in extremely adverse conditions in camps. Women’s role was reversed. Camps had less space for men, women, and children. The shrinking space, and lack of privacy had some unintended consequences, one being that they brought the women outside home, which in traditional Bengali society had hardly happened. The women came out of the four walls of the house and joined a large number of popular movements within the camps and outside. I have cited examples from Cooper’s Camp to highlight this. In the case of Tamil refugees, women became the chief earning members, some of them went as far as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait to work as housemaids in an extremely difficult situation. Some Tamil women who lost their husbands and other adult members in the family, looked after all the remaining family members. At the time of Liberation War, women shouldered the burden of looking after children and dependent members since adult male members joined the Mukti Bahini and Mukti Fouz. In the literature on refugees the women remained almost an invisible category for a very long time, their story needs to be studied systematically. Finally, the case studies point out that the significance of location can hardly be overlooked. The location within the structure of the state needs to be identified, for a better understanding of the state–refugee relations. The location where refugees seek asylum can be friendly and accommodating, as initially was the case with the Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil Nadu. It can be hostile too, as we noted in the case of Partition refugees in West Bengal who arrived in the mid-1950s or those who settled down in Marichjhapi in the late 1970s. A friendly location can turn hostile in course of time, as we noted in Tamil Nadu, after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, hosts became hostile towards the refugees. Again, in West Bengal, we noticed how the state changed its policies in favour of the refugees when they arrived from East Pakistan in 1971. Much can be learnt by taking into account different locations, and complexities therein. (p.203) Refugees at times form a liminal category. They are neither citizens nor foreigners. The liminal position often puts them in a precarious situation, they can be subjected to all kinds of control and coercion. The liminal space gives a unique identity which Turner explained in the following way: … they are neither one thing nor another; or may be both; or neither here nor there; or may even be nowhere (in terms of any recognized cultural topography), and are at the very least ‘betwixt and between’ all the recognized fixed points in the space-time of cultural classification. (1967: 97)

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Conclusion This ‘betwixt and between’ position makes the refugees a special category. At times, the public, the media, the rights activists do not get access to this exclusive liminal space of the refugees. The case of the Tamil refugees exemplifies this. Dandakaranya too, was a liminal space for the Partition refugees. However, we noted that at times the liminal space can be the centre of public gaze, as it was the case with the special camp refugees in Tamil Nadu when they attempted to escape from the Vellore Fort. This was true of refugees in Dandakaranya when they deserted resettlement colonies and went back to the Sundarbans. Refugees often break the barriers that surround the liminal space. Today the media occupies an important position in the everyday lives of the refugees. The state, at times, tries to control the media. On several occasions, the central government attempted to control the media regarding news about the refugees. For instance, in 1964, newspaper editors in Calcutta were told: For publication of news incidents in East Pakistan, it has been agreed to follow for seven days from today the following code: 1. To publish nothing but news circulated by PTI from Pakistan. 2. To publish no photographs of incidents in East Pakistan or refugees arriving from there. 3. To publish no interviews with refugees. 4. When reproducing from the Pakistan Press, always to acknowledge the sources, and 5. To publish such news of incidents in Pakistan with one-column headlines and with no display and not on Page 1. (Sen 2004: 77) (p.204) In 1971, at the time of refugee influx from East Pakistan, Bass (2013) noted that the press was not allowed access to official data on the casualties of the Hindu refugees, presumably fearing backlash in India. The media often managed to intervene in areas where the state tried to prohibit them. However, on certain occasions the media promoted the interest of the state. In 1978, as mentioned earlier, the report of a social activist about the plight of refugees in Marichjhapi was withdrawn fearing backlash in the state. The study on the Partition refugees shows that all marginalized displaced persons are not equally visible in the public arena. For instance in the 1960s, the displaced tribals are on one side of the scale, the most invisible category. They entered the northeastern states from northern districts of East Pakistan like Rangpur, Mymensingh, and Sylhet quietly went out of sight without receiving any relief or rehabilitation. They were Garos, Hajongs, Oraons, Rajbangshis, and others. The most visible group out of the three has been the urban poor who lived in railway stations and squatter’s colonies—received attention from the politicians and the media. Their story appeared in the media regularly as they were involved in the act of defiance of the laws of the land. The action against Page 5 of 8

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Conclusion the squatters often turned violent, the confrontation between the refugees and the police brought them at the centre of the state politics. Relatively less visible refugees were those who lived in camps and colonies. In Tamil Nadu, the special camp refugees remained invisible as compared to refugees in camps. The dynamics of the state–refugee relations can be studied with reference to life in camps, a space meant for temporary or long-term shelter. The camps can be a collection of huts, school buildings, abandoned government buildings, cyclone shelters, and other such places. Refugees who were trapped in the vicious cycle of violence, displacement, and trauma, camps hardly helped them to erase these experiences from their memories. Instead life in a makeshift camp where hundreds of refugees were asked to share space with no privacy, no basic necessities of life became a source of shock and anxiety. The camp life was suffocating and this is why camps became sites where contestation and dissent would take place in different ways on a regular basis, as we noted in the case of camps where Partition refugees received shelter. Camps were also a place where community life got reconfigured with complex power relations. It was also a site (p.205) that conjured fear in the minds of those who lived there. This was quite evident in the camps meant for refugees in 1971 when cholera epidemic had spread like wildfire. The relationship between the state and camp refugees may follow different trajectories. First, in the case of the Tamils, I pointed out inconsistency in state policies and shifting positions from time to time. Even in the case of Partition refugees, this inconsistency was quite apparent, especially regarding closure of camps and resettlement of refugees. A vacillating state remained indecisive, lacks sense of direction in dealing with the camp refugees. Second, from time to time the state appeared as what Ali called ‘a fearful state’ or ‘a state that has failed to manage the problems of nation-state building, wealth generation, and distributive justice’, often responded to challenges to their authority ‘with coercion rather than compromise’. Some instances of the use of coercive power against camp refugees have been examined here, for example, deportation without consent, eviction from Marichjhapi, incarceration of Tamil refugees. We have noted the use of coercive power in the case of repatriation of Tamil refugees in 1987 and in 1991–2. Many refugees were sent to high-risk areas, security in their country was far from normal. On both occasions, after repatriation, refugees received shelter in welfare centres in Sri Lanka. In the case of Partition refugees, we noticed how nearly 40,000 refugee families were asked to move to Dandakaranya. They were told to vacate camps, doles had been stopped, and protestors were taken to prison. In the case of Marichjhapi, we observed how coercive measures were used by the state to evict refugees from the island.

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Conclusion The study of humanitarism in the state–refugee relation is a less explored area. In 1971, an altogether new approach was adopted by the state in order to solve the refugee crisis. The decision to follow humanitarian approach and to resolve issues through diplomatic means were the two sides of this new approach. Humanitarianism means an obligation on the part of the state to assist refugees, give asylum, and look after relief and rehabilitation at any cost. The principal concern is to save human lives. As soon as the influx of refugees from East Pakistan began in April 1971, the state offered assistance to refugees on humanitarian grounds. With the use of diplomacy along with humanitarian ideals, the state resolved an unprecedented crisis. India (p.206) succeeded in conveying the message to the signatory states of UN Convention and Protocol that broader ideals of humanitarianism can be more effective in dealing with the refugees. In the literature on refugees, the phenomenon of loss has been discussed mostly in material terms, for example, loss of property, or in terms of loss of life, honour, dignity, and prestige. This is why with reference to Partition refugees Maitrayee Devi (1974) observed that the loss of life, prestige, and property forced the Hindus to flee from East Pakistan. In the case of Tamils too, loss of life and property considered as the main force behind flight. Very little is known about the loss of one’s family, kinship ties or community solidarity or what may be described as the loss of ‘social capital’ (Bourdieu 1977). These losses assumed significance once they began their lives in camps. The members of the broken families tried to stay together and re-establish their kinship and marital relations. In the case of the Partition refugees, the loss of community life was strongly felt by the outcastes, they tried to latch on to whatever little was left of their broken families and community life. In the case of Sri Lankan Tamils, the experience of the loss of social capital was traumatic. Family members were killed or lost their lives on their way to India when boats capsized. Like the earlier case, Tamil refugees too, tried to rebuild family and community life. The rebuilding process proved difficult when family members left in search of jobs, women tried their luck in far-off places like in the Middle East. Sometimes, refugees managed to make up some of these losses in extremely adverse situations by reconstructing community life. I pointed out how this was done in the case of refugees from East Pakistan in 1971. Several writers have noted the effects of the loss of habitat on the displaced Bengalis. Hiranmay Bandyopadhyay (1970), for instance, pointed out that deportation to Dandakaranya meant a loss of their ties with kinsmen and neighbours. Samar Sen (2004) writes that in Dandakaranya, Bengali refugees lost their traditional food that became an integral part of their daily life. Chakrabarti (1999) observes that in Dandakaranya, they missed wide green fields, the river, and their festivals. Exile from this habitat was as painful as exile from homeland. A large number of recently published literatures on Partition

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Conclusion and memories would show the significance of this point (Kaul 2001; D. Chakrabarty 2002). (p.207) At the end, let me add that some changes are now coming in the state– refugee relations. A comprehensive law to protect the refugees is under consideration by the Indian parliament. A draft bill prepared in 2006 is now ready for deliberations. Equally significant is the Protection of Human Rights Act that came into effect in 1993. On the basis of this act, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the State Human Rights Commssion (SHRC) were formed. Both these bodies had intervened in refugee-related issues from time to time. For instance, in support of the Chakma refugees in Arunachal Pradesh, the NHRC observed that in the absence of an appropriate legislation for the refugees, the Protection of Human Rights Act (1993) would be used not only against the repressive policies of the state but also against the hosts who are hostile towards the refugees. Many contentious issues are now being resolved with the intervention of the NHRC and SHRC. On the basis of the observation made by the NHRC, in 1996 the Supreme Court in a landmark judgment on the dispute between Arunachalis and Chakmas observed, Arunachal Pradesh shall ensure that life and personal liberty of each and every Chakma residing within the state shall be protected, and any attempt to forcibly evict or drive them out of the state by the organized group, such as AAPSU, shall be repelled, if necessary by requisitioning service of paramilitary or police force…. Except in accordance with law, Chakmas shall not be evicted from their homes and shall not be denied domestic life and comfort therein…. We are a country governed by rule of law. Our Constitution confers certain rights to every human being, and certain other rights to citizens. Every person is entitled to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws…. Thus the state is bound to protect the right and liberty of every human being, be he a citizen or otherwise. (S. Guha 2010: 17) The judgment goes a long way in resolving complex issues in the relationship between the state and the refugees. In the absence of a comprehensive act, refugees now have the NHRC and SHRC for a redressal of their grievances, and for the protection of their rights. India today is not only host to refugees, but also has millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs). They are now left with institutions like the NHRC and the SHRC to seek justice.

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Appendix

Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780199461172 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.001.0001

(p.208) Appendix Abhijit Dasgupta

Table A.1 Chronological Statement of the Influx of Migrants from Erstwhile East Pakistan into India Year

Number of Migrants (in Lakhs)

Old Migrants

West Bengal

Other States

Total

1946–52

25.18

5.73

30.91

1953

0.61

0.15

0.76

1954

1.04

0.17

1.21

1955

2.12

0.29

2.41

1956

2.47

3.34

5.81

1957

0.04

0.02

0.06

1958 (up to 31 March 1958)

0.01

0.00

0.01

Total

31.47

9.70

41.17

Source: Report of the Working Group on the Residual Problem of Rehabilitation in West Bengal, Government of India, Department of Rehabilitation, p. 10. Table A.2 Number of New Migrants (in Lakhs) Year

Number of Migrants (in Lakhs)

New Migrants

West Bengal

Other States

Total

(from 1 January 1964) 1964

4.19

2.74

6.93

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Appendix

Year

Number of Migrants (in Lakhs)

New Migrants

West Bengal

Other States

Total

1965

0.81

0.26

1.07

1966

0.04

0.04

0.08

1967

0.05

0.19

0.24

1968

0.04

0.08

0.12

1969

0.04

0.06

0.10

(up to 25 March 1971) 1971

0.07

0.02

0.09

Total

7.57*

3.57

11.14

Source: Ministry of Rehabilitation Working Report, 1950–1. Note: * Out of 7.57 lakh, about 6 lakh new migrants stayed on in West Bengal.

(p.209) Dandakaranya Resettlement Plans (i) Both the Central and the State Governments accepted the imperative necessity of closing the camps and of discontinuing the system of doles as early as possible because of the demoralising effect which the camps and doles have had on the psychology and morale of the displaced persons. It was decided that by 31st July, 1959, all the camps would be closed. (ii) The State Government indicated that out of 45,000 camp families it would not be able to absorb more than 10,000 families within the state. The officials would select these families, formulate schemes for their rehabilitation and submit them to the Government of India within a month. (iii) The Government of India will make arrangements for the rehabilitation of the remaining 35,000 families outside West Bengal, in the Dandakaranya area and in other states. When the families move to other States, they will be provided with shelter and work during the initial period. No doles will be given to any family disobeying government order. (iv) The resettled families may formulate schemes for their rehabilitation and submit them to the Government for consideration and sanction. (v) The camp families that ignored the official order to move out of West Bengal will cease to be the responsibility of the government. Source: Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India (1958–9: 9).

The Essential Features of the Dandakaranya Resettlement Scheme (1) (i) Balanced utilisation of the available land, i.e. afforestation, where land is suited only for forest development, whether for timber or fuel wood; or to prevent further erosion of soil. Page 2 of 13

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Appendix (ii) Cultivation of crops, appropriate to the quality of land and availability of water. (iii) Pisciculture; large and small tanks have to be provided for various purposes, and these are to be stocked with suitable species of fish, to provide valuable supplementary food. (p.210) (2) Establishment of cottage industries in accordance with the availability of raw materials, transport and marketing facilities and as may be found to be economically most advantageous. (3) Establishment of adequate educational, technical and vocational training facilities; (4) Provision of transport and communication facilities, construction of railway line across the territory, opening up of roads. (5) Exploration and development of mineral resources, which are believed to exist, to be undertaken; (6) Payment of wages to the refugees for work. Source: Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India (1957–8: 25).

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Appendix

Table A.3 Resettlement Villages in Dandakaranya, 1963–4 Zones

Number of Villages Opened

Village Houses Completed Village Houses in Progress

Number of Families Resettled

1

2

3

4

5

76

250

Kondagaon

3 242

Paralkote

45 967

1,294

2,254

Umerkote

48 1,980

1,134

2,871

Malkangiri

30 140

148

1,313

2,652

6,688

Total

126 3,329

Source: Report of the Ministry of Works, Housing, Rehabilitation (1963–4: 67).

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Appendix (p.211)

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Appendix

Table A.4 Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees in Tamil Nadu Camps as on 1 June 2011 District

Camp

Minor

Major

Total Inmates

Total

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Columbatore

4

1,175

1,066

717

423

1,892

1,489

3,381

Cuddalore

4

306

251

486

455

792

706

1,498

Dharmapuri

8

671

648

580

579

1,251

1,227

2,478

Dindfigul

7

879

934

882

715

1,761

1,649

3,410

Erode

3

1,218

1,113

1,315

1,227

2,533

2,340

4,873

Kanyakumari

4

250

279

458

475

708

754

1,462

Karur

2

465

444

623

664

1,088

1,108

2,196

Krishnagiri

3

272

248

317

319

589

567

1,156

Madurai

3

1,803

1,661

1,195

1,316

2,998

2,977

5,975

Namakkal

3

633

583

632

646

1,265

1,229

2,494

Perambalur

1

55

61

77

79

132

140

272

Pedukottai

3

841

840

921

887

1,762

1,727

3,489

Ramanathapu 1 ram

757

704

458

538

1,215

1,242

2,457

Salem

8

1,037

992

783

686

1,820

1,678

3,498

Sivaganga

6

781

808

972

965

1,753

1,773

3,526

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Appendix

District

Camp

Minor

Major

Total Inmates

Total

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Theni

2

7

8

5

8

12

16

28

Tiruvallur

2

1,413

1,128

1,020

1,333

2,433

2,461

4,894

Tiruchi

2

580

564

972

1,016

1,552

1,580

3,132

(p.212) Tirunelveli

10

589

650

805

733

1,394

1,383

2,777

Tiruppur

5

194

161

336

309

530

470

1,000

Tiruvannamal 13 ai

845

927

1,051

882

1,896

1,809

3,705

Tuticorin

3

386

382

489

498

875

880

1,755

Vellore

6

995

1,004

869

883

1,864

1,887

3,751

Villupuram

2

390

397

465

549

855

946

1,801

Virudhunagar 7

863

821

1,015

854

1,878

1,675

3,553

Special Camps Kancheepura m

1

–

–

41

–

41

–

41

Tiruvallur

1

–

–

4

–

4

–

4

Grand Total

114

17,405

16,674

17,488

17,039

34,893

33,713

68,606

Source: The Hindu, 4 September 2011, p. 14.

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Appendix (p.213) Table A.5 Internally Displaced in Sri Lanka (till April 1998) Jaffna

331,065

Kilinochchi

87,665

Mullaitivu

128,931

Mannar

68,422

Vavuniya

32,197

Trincomalee

26,542

Batticaloa

24,101

Puttalam

55,181

Amparai

4,155

Anuradhapura

15,001

Kurumegala

3,654

Pollonnaruwa

5,396

Colombo

4,876

Matale

1,251

Gampaha

7,735

Total

7,96,172

Source: RRAN Report (1999: 23).

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Appendix

Table A.6 Changes in the Percentage of Population of the Hindus, Muslims, and Others in West Bengal, 1951–2001 Census Year

Percentage of Population Hindus

Muslims

Others

1951

78.45

19.85

1.07

1961

78.80

20.00

1.02

1971

78.11

20.46

1.43

1981

76.96

21.51

1.53

1991

74.72

23.61

1.67

Source: Directorate of Census Operations, West Bengal (2001). Note: Others include: Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, including religion not stated. (p.214)

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Appendix

Table A.7 Variations in Hindu and Muslim Population in West Bengal Districts between 1951 and 2001 Districts

Census Years 1951 H*

1961

1971

1981

1991

2001

M**

H

M

H

M

H

M

H

M

H

M

Darjeelin 81.71 g

1.14

80.27

3.18

81.45

3.1

79.44

3.64

77.95

4.55

76.92

5.31

Jalpaigur 84.18 i

9.74

85.41

9.55

86.81

8.97

87.50

8.75

84.81

10.04

83.3

1.85

Koch Bihar

28.94

76.05

23.77

78.56

21.25

79.01

20.78

76.44

23.34

75.50

24.24

29.94

59.87

39.41

63.07

35.89

63.2

35.79

54.20

45.35

47.36

51.72

75.32

23.51

74.01

24.02

70.90

U. 6.30 Dinajpur D. Dinajur Malda

62.92

36.97

53.64

46.18

56.63

43.13

54.49

45.27

52.25

47.49

49.28

49.27

Murshid abad

44.60

55.24

44.08

55.86

43.46

56.34

41.15

58.67

35.39

61.40

35.9

63.67

Birbhum 72.60

26.86

72.17

27.63

70.56

29.19

68.61

30.98

66.61

33.06

64.49

35.08

Bardhma 83.73 n

15.60

84.30

15.17

82.21

17.17

81.45

17.60

79.69

19.55

78.89

19.78

77.03

22.36

74.95

24.38

75.91

23.34

75.20

24.08

74.35

24.92

73.75

25.41

Nadia

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Appendix

Districts

Census Years 1951

N24 Pargan

1961

1971

1981

1991

2001

H*

M**

H

M

H

M

H

M

H

M

H

M

73.90

25.35

75.95

23.39

77.26

22.43

77.16

22.50

75.46

24.17

75.23

24.22

72.96

26.05

72.21

26.82

69.12

29.94

65.86

33.24

S24 Parganas Hugli

86.52

13.27

87.11

12.66

86.89

12.89

85.91

13.76

84.88

14.52

83.63

15.14

Bankura

91.16

4.40

93.68

4.39

80.85

.85

89.87

5.65

87.15

6.63

84.3

57.51

93.13

5.99

92.89

4.64

91.63

5.45

90.95

5.98

83.42

7.12

Puruliya Medinip ur

91.78

7.17

92.26

7.60

90.65

7.74

89.55

8.70

86.81

10.78

83.58

11.33

(p.215)

83.45

16.22

83.31

16.36

81.81

18.00

79.50

20.10

77.46

22.22

74.98

24.44

83.41

12.00

83.94

12.78

82.90

14.75

81.89

15.74

86.60

17.71

77.68

20.27

Haora Koekata

Source: Directorate of Census Operations, West Bengal (2001). Notes: Up to 1981 the data for North and South Dinajpur is common as both the districts were under the erstwhile West Dinajpur. The figures for 1991 have been recast. Puruliya was included in West Bengal in 1956 under Bihar and West Bengal Transfer of Territories Act, 1956. Hence the data for Puruliya is available since 1961 only. *= Hindu

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Appendix **= Muslim

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Appendix (p.216) Table A.8 Muslim and Hindu Population in East Bengal/East Pakistan/Bangladesh (in Thousands) Year

Population

Muslim (%)

Hindu (%)

1901

2,89,27

1,91,13 (66.07)

95,45 (33.00)

1911

3,15,55

2,12,02 (67.19)

99,52 (31.54)

1921

3,32,54

2,26,46 (68.10)

1,01,66 (30.57)

1931

3,56,04

2,47,31 (69.46)

1,04,53 (29.36)

1941

4,19,99

2,95,09 (70.26)

1,17,47 (27.97)

1951

4,19,33

3,22,27 (76.85)

92,39 (22.03)

1961

5,08,40

4,08,90 (80.43)

93,80 (18.45)

1974

7,14,78

6,10,39 (85.40)

96,73 (13.53)

1981

8,71,20

7,54,87 (86.65)

1,05,70 (12.13)

1991

10,63,14

9,38,81 (88.31)

1,11,78 (10.51)

2001

12,38,51

11,10,79 (89.69)

1,12,79 (9.19)

Source: Census Reports (1991–2001), Reports of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Dhaka.

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References

Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780199461172 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.001.0001

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Index

Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780199461172 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.001.0001

(p.227) Index Abdullapuram Camp 125, 129 Agamben, Giorgio 134 agency, 4 Ahmed, Tajuddin 164 AIADMK. See All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) 13 Ananda Bazar Patrika 187, 189, 193, 195 Arendt, Hannah 100 asylum seekers 5 Bagchi, Jasodhara 202 Ball, Ellen 76 Bandyopadhyay, Hiranmay 31, 59, 60, 75, 206 Bangladesh Liberation War Documents 186 Bangladesh Liberation War refugees 1 areas of infiltration 190 distribution of 179 economic refugees/infiltrators 188–96 four displacement sectors 171–75 Hindu community terrorized by Pakistani army 163–4 illegal immigrants, interception of 194 influx of 166–9, 181 Operation Searchlight and 162–4 in other states 179–82 overview 157–8 prisoners of war, rehabilitation of 187 returned from West Bengal to Bangladesh 187 sites of sufferings for (or camps) 176–9 two-pronged strategies 182–88 unprecedented crisis 158–70 voluntary relief organization assistance to 166 bastuhara 21 Page 1 of 8

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Index Basu, Jyoti 168, 192 Bengal Vagrancy Act of 1943 26 Biswas, Abani 66 Bose, N. K. 40 Calcutta Research Group (CRG) 8–9, 16 camps (refugee). See also specific camps (p.228) Bangladesh Liberation War refugee 176–9 Cooper’s Camp. See Cooper’s Camp Dandakaranya 53–60 definition of 4–5 in India 14–15 Cartegana Declaration on Refugees 8 Chakma refugees 9, 191, 207 Chakrabarty, D. 206 Chakrabarti, P. K. 36–7, 84, 202 Chatterjee, N. C. 42–3 Chatterjee, Nilanjana 72 Chatterjee, Ram 69 Chatterjee, S. P. 38 Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) 173 CHT. See Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Citizenship, definition of 2–3 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 8 Cooper’s Camp 48 attracted refugees 50 location of 14, 17, 61 Namasudras in 50 in Ranaghat, Nadia 63 resistance movement of refugees in 62 SCs in 60–8 CRG. See Calcutta Research Group (CRG) Cross-border displacement conceptual pitfalls in study 3 development of modern states and 10 of ethnic and religious groups 9 state responses to 3–4, 10–11 turned people into beneficiaries 2 Cross-border migrants 2 Cross-border migration 2 Dachau concentration camp 134 Dandakaranya 12, 27, 53–60 movement to Sundarbans 68–76 rehabilitate refugees, plan for 56–7 rugged terrain for refugees 56 zone-wise mass desertion from 70 Dandakaranya Resettlement Plans 209 features of 209–10 resettlement villages 210 Das, Gauranga 64–5 Page 2 of 8

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Index Das, Monica 65 Dasgupta, Subhoranjan 202 Devi, Maitrayee 206 Dhar, P. N. 159 Displaced Bengalis, in West Bengal Bengali bhadraloks 21 changing urban landscape and 78–86 Cooper’s Camp, SCs in 60–8 Dandakaranya project 53–60 demographic structure, refugee influx and impact on 37 displaced persons from East Pakistan, influx of 32 displaced tribals 76–78 entry and transit points for 23–7 influx and counting of 27–37 interception centres 25 movements in East India (May–July 1951) 30 number of (1971 census) 33 overview 17–18 Partition refugees, 18–23. See also Partition refugees (p.229) Refugee Rehabilitation Committee for 35 resettlement in different types of land 29 resettlement in new townships 28 SC community, influx of 22–3 settlement on left bank of Ganges 80 state and SC refugees 48–53 Sunderbans 68–76 unwanted scheduled castes (harijans) 37–48. See also SC community in West Bengal Displaced Persons Claims Act (1950) 18 Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Act (1954) 18 Economic refugees 188–96 Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) 98, 101, 110–11 Eelaventhan, M. K. 119 Enquiry Commission Report 144 Exile 4 fedayeen 134 Foreigner’s Act of 1946 136 Foreigners Registration Act (1939) 136, 201 Frontline 100, 122, 148, 152 Ganasekaran, G. 119 Gandhi, R. 108 Ghosh, Atulya 35 Gibney, Mathew 5–6 Guardian, The 163 Guha, B. S. 21 Gummidipundi Camp 125 Gupta, Dipankar 36 Gupta, Saibal 68 habitat 4 Page 3 of 8

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Index Haldar, Sukharanjan 61 Harijan Cell 45–6 Hindu, The 105, 106, 107 Hindus and Muslims population in East Bengal/East Pakistan/Bangladesh 216 in West Bengal (1951–2001) 213–15 ICRC. See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) illegal immigrants 3 Indian Commission of Jurists Committee 77–8 Indian Foreigner’s Act of 1946 3 Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) 93, 109–10, 111–12 Indira–Mujib Pact of 1972 3, 180 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement (1987) 100 Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord 135 Infiltrators 3, 188–196 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 189 IPKF. See Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) Jain, A. P. 28 Jana Sangh, 36 43 Jayawardene, J. R. 108 Kahlon, G. S. 183 Karunanidhi, M. 105 Khanna, M. C. 55 Khulna massacre 42 Kottapattu Camps 111 (p.230) Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 93–4, 96, 98–9, 101, 102, 104, 109– 17, 119, 134–8, 144–8, 150, 152 Location 4 LTTE, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Madurai refugee Camp 126, 127–8 mahila samitis 76 mahila sibir 75 Mallick, Ratish 62–5 Mandapam camp 96, 104, 107, 111, 138 Marichjhapi 12, 14, 17, 48, 50, 57–8, 68, 70–5 Marichjhapi massacre 72 matabbar 178 Mellur Special Camp 99, 150 Migrants 20, 21 Bengali, in Assam 180 influx of 208 migration certificate 13 partition 9, 10 returning 29–30 unwanted 7 women 13, 93 Mondal, Jatin 57 Mondal, Jogen 22, 39, 40, 41, 42 Mondal, Satish 57, 69 Page 4 of 8

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Index Mondal, Sushil 65 Mukherjee, S. P. 43 Mukherji, P. N. 176–7 Mukti Bahini 154, 159, 160, 171, 174–5, 177, 184, 196, 202 Mukti Fouz 159, 175, 184, 196, 202 Namasudra community 22–3 Naskar, P. S. 54 National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) 207 National Security Act (NSA) 140–1 Natun Yehudi 25 Nehru–Liaquat Ali Pact 28 new migrants definition of 20 number of 208 Nikhil Banga Bastuhara Karma Parishad (All Bengal Refugee Council for Action) 84 OfERR. See Organisation for Eelam Refugees Rehabilitation (OfERR) Operation Searchlight 162–4 Organization for Eelam Refugees Rehabilitation (OfERR) 103, 108, 114, 154–5 Organization of African Union 8 Organization of African Unity (OAU) 16 Partition refugees 18–23 border slips for 19–20 coercive measures 12–13 communal disturbance 19 Cooper’s camp for 61 Dandakaranya for 203 displacement of 2 influx of 1 and marginalized displaced persons 204 migration certificate for 20 relief and rehabilitation for 27 state–refugee relations and 4–5 Paundra Kshatriya 58 People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) 98, 110 (p.231) People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) 129, 141 People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) 129 Persecution 6–7 Poonamallee Camp 148 Protection 6–7 Protection of Human Rights Act (1993) 207 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) 3 PUCL. See People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) PUDR. See People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) ‘Q’ branch 128–9, 137, 138, 145 Rahman, Mujibar 160, 161 rajakars 175 Rajbangshi caste 22–3 Ramachandran, M. G. 104, 106 Ramnad Transit Camp, for asylum 137 Page 5 of 8

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Index Rao, U. B. 25–6 Ray, B. C. 19 Refugee camps. See Camps (refugee) Refugee Rehabilitation Committee (RRC) 35 Refugee(s). See also specific refugees Arendt’s description 6 and coercive measures of state 12–15 definition in India 7–8 definition in South Asia 7 Gibney's observation on 5–6 international agreements and 3 partition of country and 2–3 Partition refugees 18–23 South Asian context 8–12 treatment to 3–4 UN Convention definition 5, 7 Refugees from Sri Lanka 2 Revenue History of the Sunderbans, A 68 Roy, Renuka 65 RRC. See Refugee Rehabilitation Committee (RRC) SAARC. See South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Sangma, Williamson 166 saranarthi 21 Scheduled castes (SC) refugees, in West Bengal in Cooper’s Camp 60–8 district-wise distribution of 44 Harijan Cell 45–6 in Hindu Bengal 38 influx of 22–3 insensitivity of Left Front 71–2 Jinnah’s assurance to 42 Khulna massacre 42 in Muslim Bengal 39 Namasudra community 22–3, 40 Paundra Kshatriya 58 Rajbangshi caste 22–3, 40 rehabilitation and resettlement of 44–8 saturation point 47 sites for 48–53 Scott, J. 59 SEDEC. See Social and Economic Department Centre (SEDEC) Sen, Salil 25 Sen, Samar 206 Shirimavo–Shastri Pact 121 (p.232) Singha, Anil 32 SLBFE. See Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) Social and Economic Department Centre (SEDEC) 120 Somu, N. V. N. 105 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 16 Page 6 of 8

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Index South Asian refugees 10 South China Morning Post 135, 150 Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) 127 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees areas of displacement in Sri Lanka 97 arrival during June 1990–April 1991 111–13 camp population of 98 displaced in Sri Lanka 213 escaping from Vellore Fort Special Camp 142–9 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement in July 1987 100–1 influx and reverse flows of 94 internally displaced persons 153–4 Madurai Camp 127–8 Mandapam camp 96, 104, 107, 111, 138 overview 92–3 refugee camps, location of 95 registered and unregistered refugees in camps 126 registering procedure for 96–9 repatriation of 113–22 returnees assisted by UNHCR 109 special camps, incarceration in 134–41 state-sponsored repatriation, preparations for 101–2 in Tamil Nadu 93–104 in Tamil Nadu camps 211–12 third-country asylum 149–53 Tippu Mahal Special Camp 99 vacillating state 104–10 women in camps 124–34 working as migrant, negative effects of 133 State Human Rights Commssion (SHRC) 207 state–refugee relations 4 dynamics of 4–5 Statesman, The 35, 76, 161, 166, 167, 168, 170, 179, 192 Sunday Times, The 162, 182 Swadhinata Juddher Dalilpatra 174 Tamil Eelam Liberation Front (TELF) 119 Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) 98, 110 Tamil Nation 140 Tamil refugees. See Sri Lankan Tamil refugees TELF. See Tamil Eelam Liberation Front (TELF) Thapathy Camp 125 Thoppukollai Camp 125 Thopukullai camp 129 thuuwar 134 Times, The 169, 173, 178 Times of India 119, 192 Tippu Mahal Special Camp. See Vellore Fort Special Camp Topa camp 132 Tribes and Castes of Bengal, The 40 Page 7 of 8

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Index UCRC. See United Centre for Refugee Council (UCRC) Udbastu 60 (p.233) UNHCR. See United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) United Centre for Refugee Council (UCRC) 64, 74–5, 83–5 United Nations Convention (1951) 3 United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 3, 8, 15, 100, 102, 104, 109, 138, 149, 150, 152, 153, 183, 185–6 Vellore Fort Special Camp 99, 137, 142–3 Vijaythilakan, J. P. 107–8 Weiner, Myron 7 West Bengal Eviction Act (1952) 81 Wise, James 40 zamindars (landlords) 81

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About the Author

Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India Abhijit Dasgupta

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780199461172 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199461172.001.0001

(p.234) About the Author Abhijit Dasgupta is Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Delhi. He has published several authored and edited volumes, including Growth with Equity: The New Technologies and Agrarian Change in Bengal (1998); State, Society, and Displaced People in South Asia (co-edited, 2004); Minorities and the State: Changing Social and Political Landscape of Bengal (co-edited, 2011); and On the Margins: Tribes, Castes, and Other Social Categories (edited, 2013).

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