Discrimination, corruption and moral decline : the historical background of the Muslim Hui uprising in Yunnan, China, 1856-1873

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DISCRIMINATION, CORRUPTION AND MORAL DECLINE:

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MUSLIM HUI UPRISING IN YUNNAN, CHINA, 1856-1873

JIANPING WANG

The Harry S Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace The Hebrew University of Jerusalem • May 1995

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MAP OF YUNNAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

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• Provincial Capital • Town of Prefecture or Region • Tow^ of County or Town M Spot of Mining Conflict 1 Mountain River

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OS 721 CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS INTRODUCTION A NOTE ON SOURCES

’ • .

I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT^OF HUI MUSLIMS,[N VLJNNAN

iv ■ v viii

1

The Origin pf Yunnan Hui Hui Under the Ming and Qing Dynasties YunKan Society in the Klineteehth Century The Fall of the Qing . .Qpium ^nd Corruption of tiie Officialdorn'^

‘ '

‘ Rebellions and Secret Societies " Religious Diversity and Decline in the Hui Commuhf^ '

isJamic'Tradition and Education 'Hdi Assimilation . ■

■

IL THE’ DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUI-HAN CONFLICT

10

Origins of Interethnic Tension

Radicalization of the Struggle The Role of the Empire The Hui-Han Mining Rivalry

Historical Background The Incidents at Xiyi and Shiyang III. THE DAWN OF THE UPRISING

16

The Folksong Incident Mining Incidents The Kunming Massacre Anti-Hui Imperial Discrimination The Failure of Hui Mediation Attempts Cui Shao-zhong Lin Ze-xu The Role of Local Officials

CONCLUSION NOTES BIBLIOGRAPHY

24 26 31

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

34

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS As a guest research student at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem from October 1993 to

January 1994, I was privileged to work on this project at the Harry S Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace. The Hebrew University's exceptional facilities helped augment my previous research in China and Sweden. I thank the Columbia

Foundation and Dr. Raphael Israeli, Prof. H. Z. Schiffrin, Dan Bitan, Avi Simon and Dalia

Shemer of the Truman Institute. A deep debt of gratitude goes to Steven V. Mazie of the Truman Institute's publications department for his patient, expert editing of the entire manuscript 1 also express my appreciation to the^Jnstitute of History of Religion at the

University of Lund and to my supervisors Prof. J. Olsson, Prof. J. Hjarpe and Dr. C. Dahlgren for supporting my work in Israel. For the Chinese material I collected for the

paper, I thank Ma Xing-dong and Li Rong-kung who kindly helped me purchase books on Islam in Yunnan; to the Library of the Institute of World Religions in Beijing; and to a

number of other helpful library staffs in China. Many people.have helped bring this paper

to life; I regret if I have left anyone out. Any mistakes in the text are my responsibility.

Jianping Wang

May 1995

INTRODUCTION A significant uprising, known to the West as the Panthay Rebellion, broke out in China's

Yunnan province in the middle of the nineteenth century. The Hui Muslim revolt began

during the decline of the late Qing empire, an-era when the imperial authority's unjust

administration of ethnic and religious affairs was’at its peak. Rather than alleviating tension, mediation attempts' by Chinese imperial officials only intensified economic, political, social, cultural and religious cleavages between the Hui and Han peoples of

Yunnan. The Hui-Han rivalry, which had sprung from disputes over mining operations

and land ownership, grew stronger as Chinese society deteriorated and the empire be­ came corrupt. Violence continued intermittently for over half a century; by the conflict's

end/ it had affected the lives of five million of the province's eight million people. Previous studies of this Muslim revolt in Yunnan have received little attention among

academics in mainland China, perhaps for political reasons. In the West, details of the Panthay rebellion were reported by missionaries and travelers who witnessed the revolt

and its eventual failure. The earliest accounts of the event, appearing in the 1930s and 1940s, were' published in a handful of Hui-sponsored books; others, later edited by historians, were found in official archives and mandarins' private journals.

The most importaht study’of the Hui uprising written before the Cultural Revolution was conducted by Prof. Bal Shou-yi, whose four-volume Huiming Qiyi [Uprising of the Hui people] appeared in 1953. Volumes 1 and 2 contain narratives written by uprising

participants and eyewitnesses, articles from local newspapers, documents of Tu

Wen-xiu's Tall regime, and the private writings of some officials involved in suppressing the Hui.

In Yunnan and Peking of the early 1960s, the academic debate over Tu Wen-xiu's

uprising was reignited. Many scholars began to question Prof. Fan Wen-Ian's claim that Tu's rebellion. In its later stages, had reverted to treachery and terror.^ Soon, however, the academic discussion was interrupted by the political campaigns of-the mid-1960s

vi

Hui Uprising in Yunnan

and the subsequent drama of the Cultural Revolution, which lasted into the mid-1970s.

Studies into the uprising by mainland Chinese academics were delayed for over a dec­

ade.

Off the mainland, however, scholars continued to study the revolt. In Taiwan in 1967 Prof. Wang Shu-huai published Xiantong Yunnan Hutming Shibian [The Mohammedan

uprising in Yunnan, 1856-1873]. Drawing on Bai's book and historical sources from Western missionaries and Japanese scholars, Wang recounts and analyzes the Yunnan Hui rebellion of the nineteenth century. His study explains the religious, political, social

and economic roots of the conflict, as well as the importance of rivalries over silver mines and the massacre of Kunming. After the end of the Cultural Revolution and the death of its leader, Mao Tze-dong, a

few papers on silver .mine.rivalries appeared. Two young scholars in Yunnan, Ma Xing-dong and Zhou Lu, proposed that,the Hui-Han rivalry over mining was one of the

most important reasons for the Hui uprising later- in,the nineteenth century. But the most noteworthy breakthrough came from Jing De-xin, a research worker at the Institute of

History in the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences. In Yunnan Huiming Qiyi Shiliao

[Historical data of the Hui uprising in Yunnan], Jing collects new material on the revolt not found in Prof. Bai's earlier study. And in Du Wenxiu Qiyi [Uprising of Tu. Wen-xiu]

the author describes the social context of Tu's uprising and outlines reasons for its erup­ tion.

- . ■

.

.

Although Western descriptions of the Panthay rebellion were published much earlier

than Chinese written' sources, most are second-hand narratives, fragmented and plagued with errors. A few academic works on the subject were written in the 1970s and 1980s.

Alice Bihyun Can Wei's Ph.D. dissertation, "The Moslem Rebellion in Yunnan, 18551873," (University of Chicago, 1974) analyzes the failures of policymaking and leadership

during the Tali Muslim regime. Other scholarship on the uprising includes-T'ien Ju-k'ang's Moslem Rebellion in China, A Yunnan Controversy (Canberra, 1981), which fo­

cuses on Liu Dao-heng's mission to London, and D. Gladney's "Islamic Heterodoxy and

the Panthay Rebellion in Nineteenth Century Yunnan," (Journal of Chinese Religions 1989, no. 17, 93-99) which concentrates on the impact of Tu's-revolt on sect-splitting and efforts to reform the Yunnanese.Hul.^

Studies of the Panthay rebellion by both Chinese and Western researchers have-suf­ fered from several major shortcomings. No author to date has offered a complete picture

of the historical background on the eve of the uprising In Yunnan. Nor has any writer portrayed the important pre-revolutionary relationship between the-Hui and Han

communities. Additionally, scholars have nearly always cited the. mining rivalry as the most important element in triggering the Muslin> revolt. My survey of the historical ma­

vii

Hui Uprising in Yunnan

terials, especially the Hui sources, reveals that the roots of the Hui uprising were numer­

ous and varied. While the mining rivalry was indeed one aspect that helped hasten the revolt, it was neither the conflict's source nor its fundamental root A number of elements

building for many years contributed to the violent interethnic clashes. The predominant and precipitating cause seems to be the deterioration and corruption of Chinese society, not only within the imperial administration but also in the Hui community. /

A NOTE ON SOURCES Western references on the nineteenth-century uprising in Yunnan include recordings of missionaries', m&'chants' and diplomats' narratives, as well as reports by Yunnan Hui in

the early 1900s. E. Rocher'sla Province Chinoise du Yunnan and J. Anderson's A Report

on the Expedition to Western Yunnan are two important Western sources. Other references are found in articles in The Moslem World, The Chinese Recorder and The Chinese Review. M. Broomhall's Islam in China (London, 1910) includes a chapter on the

Yunnan rebellions, and T. L. Bullocks wrote a paper on Panthay rebellion? As a Frenchman who worked in the customs office of the Qing empire during China's period of rebellion, war and disorder, Rocher was well placed to write the best Western

account of the uprising. In 1871, the Chinese government charged Rocher with the task of transporting French ammunition purchased by the empire from Fuzhou to Yunnan. After arriving in Kunming, the provincial capital, he met with imperial officials, Hui

leaders (including Ma Ru-long and Ma De-xin) and Hui and Han gentry. On the eve of

the revolt's failure in 1873, he left for Amoy, where he later wrote his book on the basis

of notes he took in Yunnan. The chapter covering the Panthay rebellion in Rocher's book is the most detailed of the Western works in this field.** But the Chinese references

remain the most comprehensive sources of the Hui uprising in Yunnan.

Chinese materials include the recordings and writings of Han authors and those of

their Hui colleagues. The two types of sources, not surprisingly, often offer widely differing accounts of events leading up to the uprising. The Hui typically perceive

themselves as victims of Qing discrimination who had no choice but to take up arms and rebel. They usually omit the fact that more Han people than Hui died in the conflict and

that a large number of Han died at the hands of Hui radicals. But many Han authors also have their own agenda. These writers, particularly Imperial officials, present the false

accusation that Hui led the massacres in Yunnan, and that the government's role was only in quelling the rebellion.

Each side, then, blames the other for the massacres. Instead of relying on one group of authors to the exclusion of the other, I base my analysis on the balanced testimony of

parties from within both the Hui and the Han. Some Hui scholars and clergy condemned Hui abuses and distortions of Islamic doctrine; they criticized their brothers for killing

innocent Han,^ setting fire to their homes and stealing their property. And a number of Han scholars and gentry denounced the barbarity and discrimination directed against the Hut by the imperial authority and corrupt officials. A few of these Han literati who opposed the Hui massacres were killed by Han militias.

These evenhanded sources from the Hui and Han communities have been most helpful in my project. In the event of a discrepancy between accounts, I have attempted viii

Hui Uprising in Yunnan

ix

to check the sources and evaluate them for reliability. Emerging from my examination of the evidence are two main conclusions: (1) the deterioration of Chinese society greatly intensified the conflicts between the Hui and Han; and (2) the corrupt empire's discriminatory policy against the Hui people, coupled with existing inter-ethnic tensions,

precipitated widespread violence.

lAI

I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF HUI MUSLIMS IN YUNNAN , The Origin of Yunnan Hui . * * » Hui legend in Kunming holds that a community, of Arab or Turkish Muslims arrived in

China's Yunnan province during the Tang dynasty of the ninth century.^ No historical

sources have confirmed this tale. A Chinese official chronicle, however, shows that in 801

Arab and Samarkand soldiers of the Tibetan army were captured, by the Tang military on Sichuan's Yunnan border.^-Despite this, no traces of Muslim communities in Yunnan have been dated before the Mongol empire. Chinese scholars thus place the origin of the Yunnanese Hui in the thirteenth century, during the Mongol dynasty.

In-1253, when Mongol prince Kublai-and general Uriyangqadai launched a military expedition to the Tali State (937-1254), the first influx of Muslim soldiers came to Yun­ nan.^ These Muslims, having survived Mongol slaughters in their home countries, were conscripted into the Mongol armies to help conquer the Chinese empire. As the Mongols conducted their campaign in China and explored Burma, more Muslims (from Central

Asia, Persia and Arabia) arrived to fill positions as officials, soldiers and craftsmen. Many

later settled in Yunnan. In 1274, Mongol emperor Kublai Khan nominated Sayyid Ajall Shams at-Din Umar governor of Yunnan.® The Muslim leader was a noted descendant of the Prophet Mu­ hammad, and his forefather, Sofir the Amir of Bukhara; had come to China In 1070.^ During Sayyid Ajall's six-year rule of Yunnan, he helped the aboriginal peoples develop

irrigation works, open post roads. Improve agriculture'and education and restructure the administrative system. He also introduced social reforms and implemented a Confuclanist

policy of beneficence toward the local peoples. After his death, his sons Nasir al-Din and

Masud and his grandson Husain ruled Yunnan for many years. Muslim soldiers scattered around Yunnan and moved into farming communities where they built mosques and es­

tablished a system of basic religious education. Some continued to make pilgrimages to Mecca, traveling first through Burma and then sailing to the JIddah port on the Red Sea via the Indian Ocean.^® r Many Muslims participated in administrative and civil engineering work. Others

worked In commercial trades or in agriculture, handicraft, medlcaltreatment or science and technology. Introducing the world of Islam to China, they made significant contribu­ tions to the political, economic and social development of Yunnan^ The Muslim com­

munity represented a new pattern of civilization that played an essential role in integrat­

ing Yunnan, a border region, with China's inland.

2

Jianping Wang

Hui Under the Ming and Qing Dynasties Because many Muslim generals and troops had joined the Han in their overthrow of the Mongols, the newly founded Ming empire was heavily dependent upon Muslims to rule

the country. The first governor sent by the empire to Yunnan was Mu Ying, a Muslim from central China; he was succeeded by three sons. Muslims who had served under the

Mongols r^etained their favorable social position and continued to thrive in the province.

The status of Yunnan Muslims began to change, however, in the fifteenth century.''

• • First, a new majority of Han Chinese was created when the Fmpire moved a large

number of immigrants from southeastern China to Yunnan. The Han newcomers began to surpass the Muslims In the imperial examination >and in civil- services,^ posing a threat to their superior, social status. Second, the Ming royal house issued an- edict prohibiting

many Islamic practices and customs. Muslims’began to take Chinese names, wear Chi­ nese clothing and marry Chinese women. And the native dialects'of the Muslim peoples

in Yunnan—from Turkish to Persian to Arabic—were gradually displaced by Chinese. Al­ though they assimilated to a significant degree into the local society, Muslims maintained some Persian and Central Asian traditions. In dally speech, and especially In religious worship, many Arabic and Persian words were retained. But an important change oc­ curred in the Muslim minority: While preserving Islamic practices In their private affairs,

the Muslims’publicly adapted to the Chinese way of life. This crystallization of the two traditions and'cultures produced a new ethnocultural group: the Hui. •

The Hui community expanded as Muslims from other parts of China arrived in Yun­ nan during the Ming dynasty and first half of the Qing, or Manchu, dynasty. According to

Qing empire statistics, the Hui population of Yunnan on the eve of the uprising was over 800,000.^- To strengthen their position in society, the Hui assimilated further into Chi­ nese culture. Yunnan Muslims were Involved In political and military affairs on both the

provincial and imperial levels; monopolized the commercial trade with Burma and other parts of Southeast Asia in caravan transportation; and dominated such trades.as leather processing, livestock breeding,’ handicraft, and weapon and tookproductidn. They held

an advantage in running hotels, mining and ore smelting. And because they owned flat

and well-fertilized land with good irrigation facilities, Muslims found success even in agriculture. Hui were generally wealthier than Han and other ethnic groups, and their

communities flourished, especiallyin western, southern and central Yunnan.

Since Muslims occupied a high* social position Im Yunnan, and received special treat­

ment under the Ming dynasty, many Muslims became imperial officials and the Muslim

community maintained close ties with government authorities.^

In the first half of the

Qing dynasty, Hui communities retained relative Independence despite changes in their social status. Religious freedoms were guaranteed by imperial edicts.Under a com-

Hui Uprising in Yunnan

3

munity contract system similar to that developed during the Ming dynasty, Hui clergy

managed community affairs autonomously in exchange for paying taxes to the empire and fulfilling required labor services. Legal disputes between the Hui and Han were arbi­

trated by local authorities. When the imperial administration handled disputes impartially, the relationship between the Hui community and the authority remained collabor^tive.^^

But

the structures among the imperial administration, Muslim sects and the non^Mus-

lim majority began to crumble, social conflicts intensified and antipathy gradually re­

placed cooperation.

>

Throughout most of the five hundred years in which they have-’been settled in Yun­

nan, however, the Hui have maintainedTriendly relations with the non-Muslim world. In the thirteenth century, Muslim males in Yunnan (who greatly outnumbered female Mus­

lim immigrants from-Central Asia and Persia), turned to non-Muslim women for brides.

Muslim families would commonly adopt Han orphan, raise and educate them, convert them tor Islam and marry them to Muslim youths. The Yunnanese Hui thus shared a close kinship (and bloodline) with the Han and other ethnic peoples. Moreover, Hui worked

intimately with Han Chinese in many economic, commercial and social affairs. This close

relationship further contributed to a rise in Han conversion to Islam.

Although they lived in distinct communities, then, the Hui were involved »in Chinese society and understood the importance of maintaining positive relations- with their

non-Muslim neighbors. Gentry and elders from both the Hui and the Han would try to

solve disputes between their peoples peacefully. And in the event of a conflict, both sides

would appeal to the imperial authority for impartial judgment. The Hui and Han thus managed to sustain a positive, and largely harmonious, relationship for centuries. I

>

Yunnan Society in the Nineteenth Century *

The Ta// of t/)e Qing After more than a century's prosperity under the reigns of emperors from Kangxi .to

Qianlong (1662-1795), the Qing empire's power-began to wane. At the end of the eight­ eenth century, the eriiperor handed the central government's power over to one of his

-ministers. The new leader quickly established his sphere in Peking and the provinces and stripped the cabinet of its power. During this period, the empire introduced a policy of

patronage; anyone could now buy an official title or imperial post with the recommenda­ tion of an imperial official; The practice of selling offices was an attempt to offset the

deficit of the imperial treasury and to collect money for balancing the annual budget. The patronage network encouraged rampant corruption throughout the empire, causing a dy­ nastic decline characterized by "a loss of moral and administrative vigor among the bu-

Jianping Wang

4

reaucracy."^^ Such corruption in the Chinese officialdom weakened the power of-the central government and facilitated the growth of regional forces which threatened social

stability. As a peripheral province of the empire (both geographically and politically^

Yunnan suffered more from the deterioration of the imperial administration than most

other parts-of China. The economic picture was grim in early nineteenth-century Yunnan. Agricultural and mining production fell, grain shortages appeared, and many people went hungry. The Kunming region, without a good harvest for years, faced sharply rising grain prices. Even

counties and prefectures near the capital with very good irrigation systems produced only deficient rice.’^ As for mining, it had shown signs of decline as early as the middle of the

Qing dynasty. Due to the exhaustion of ore resources and the empire's exploitation of private enterprise, metal production in Yunnan fell. Many mines-were closed.

Accompanying the economic downturn were massive deficits throughout the prov­ ince and the empire. Yunnan survived only with financial help—large grants surpassing ten thousand taels of silver a year—from other provinces.’^ jhe Qing empire, which had

to meet the huge financial burdens of its military, foreign reparations and trade deficits,

continually increased taxes and thereby imposed additional hardships on its population. The government increased the toll tariff, boosted taxes on salt, liquor and tea and im­ posed a variety of other levies. Many families went bankrupt and died in debt.^® The

provincial authority made no effort to lighten the tax burden and in fact steadily increased taxes. Moreover, the local administrations at every level imposed extra fees in an effort to extort the lower classes.

Opium and Corruption of the Officialdom Taking advantage of Yunnan's subtropical climate—but contributing to the decline of the Qing empire—farmers in border areas often cultivated opium crops. Between 1821 and 1850, Chinese from all social strata became addicted to the drug, including many impe­

rial officials of all ranks. The authority banned the sale and consumption of opium and attempted to confiscate the drug, but its officials colluded with smugglers, accepting large

bribes.^^ Opium poisoned not only the minds and bodies of addicts but also their inter­ personal relationships. The highly efficient Chinese empire had been founded on Confucianist principles such as courtesy, loyalty and honesty, but these gave way to baser, ma­

terialistic impulses. This epidemic of opium addiction—which also penetrated the Hui

community—helped loosen the Qing rulers' reins on the Yunnan province. In this deteriorated moral climate, imperial officials became greedier and more op­ pressive of the peasantry. Graft and embezzlement touched every aspect of imperial ad­ ministration. According to one policy, for instance, only the empire could distribute and

Hui Uprising in Yunnan

5

sell salt. To increase its profits^ local officials mixed salt with three or four times the amount of lime and clay. They would then force each household to buy the tainted mix­

ture. The exploitation enraged people and sparked a multi-ethnic group rebellion in Tali and Chuxiong.’ As political corruption increased, the gap between the rich and poor greatly widened

in Yunnan. Exploited by the empire and local authorities, many peasants, gentry and landlords fell into bankruptcy and hpmelessness. Unemployment in Yunnan was so seri­

ous that many landless, homeless peasants crowded into towns and mjnes looking for

work. But jobs were scarcp and social outrage continued to grow. Economic polarization even within Hui communities sharpened. A few Hui owned all the arable land In most villages and often built luxurious homes. Meanwhile, most Hui villagers became ten­ ant-peasants on these landlords' properties.^®

In addition to the economic crisis, Yunnan endured a number of natural disasters

during this period. Flood, drought, earthquake and pestilence all struck the countryside and exacerbated the province's social divisions.^^ The state's attempt to offer emergency relief failed in the /ace of its financial crisis and bureaucratic corruption. The series of

natural disasters helped send professional classes into bankruptcy and were an omen of

the disaster soon to befall the dynasty.

Rebellions and Secret Societies *

1

Rebellions against the empire's cruel exploitation and tyrannical policies broke out not only in Yunnan province but in many other parts of China as well. The White Lotus. Soci­

ety rebelled in central China; the Brotherhoods, Triad gangsters and other bandit groups staged In the South; and Nien Party organizations spurred demonstrations in th^ East Uigur Muslim forces—led by the Khoja family and Mohammed All of Khokand—had al­

ready drawn imperial military forces to its rebellions in the northwest and thereby exac­

erbated the state budget deficit. Because the empire's military forces were busy suppressing rebellions around the

country, local authorities assumed de facto responsibility for regional security. But local authorities, also enfeebled by waning financial and political means, turned to untrust­

worthy gentry and tyrannical landlords to organize militias. The result—Increasing insta­ bility and a loss of central control over the social classes—contradicted the aim of China's totalitarian regime. The situation soon degenerated into chaos and gave rise to the birth

of self-defense organizations. Secret and underground societies grew in size and strength as security deteriorated. Yunnan's problems were particularly serious, as an imperial offi­

cial testified in a memoir to the emperOr in 1845:

6

JtanpingWang

The afflictions of bandits and robbers in Yunnan have worsened....The security de­ partment in Yunnan has become lax in recent years, allowing bandits and robbers

,to prevail. Crime is worst in the Guannan, Yongchang and Tengyue Regions and in

Wenshan county which is affiliated with the Kaihua Region. It is terrible also in Mengzi county of the Ami prefecture, in Jianshui and Xier counties of the Linan

Region, and in Shizong and Qiut>ei counties in the Guangxi prefecture.

On the eve of the Hui Uprising, small-scale revolts had already weakened the em­ pire's hold on Yunnan. Yi and Han rebellions had erupted in Daguan, Huize, Xuanwei,

Fuyuan, Guishan, Luxi and Lunan counties. In southern Yunnan, rebellions had broken

out in Guanyi (Jianshui county), Panxi (Huaning county), and in Kaiyuan and Qiubai counties.^^ In western and northeastern Yunnan, more revolts staged by Hui and other ethnic groups against the local authorities flared up in response to the government's

treatment of the Hui-Han conflict, as is detailed below. One significartt uprising, the Taiping Movement, began in Guangxi (a neighboring province of Yunnan) in 1850. The movement spread to Yunnan and across the country, shocking the Chinese empire. Brothers Qi Cai-shun and Qi Cai-yun led a Yi peasant uprising in Zhennan county in 1853; in the safne year, the struggles of the Zhuang and Nong peoples against the empire in Guangxi reached the Kaihua prefecture (Guangnan

and Qiubei counties), and moved on to eastern Yunnan (Shizong and Luoping counties). In 1855 a multi-ethnic rebellion encompassing the Yi, Hui and Miao peoples took place

in Yaozhou. The rebels occupied the Jinsha River Valley and surrounding areas, and launched the prelude to Li Wen-xue's Great Yi Uprising near Mt. Ailao. The Yunnari authority was powerless in the face of sweeping restlessness and violence.

Religious Diversity and Decline in the Hui Community The original Muslim population in Yunnan—including Persians, converted Mongols, Arabs and members of a number of Turkish tribes—displayed a wide diversity of religious tradi­

tion. The differences were especially pronounced during the Ming and early Qing dynas­ ties, when Hui groups were scattered around Yunnan and entangled with their non-Muslim neighbors. Some communities adhered strictly to Muslim law; some followed

the Koran more loosely; and others abandoned Islam altogether. Early Hui ranged from orthodox Sunnis to heretic Sufists. A few Hui dedicated their lives to studying classic

Confucian works and passed the imperial examination. As the literati, they served in the

imperial administration and became immersed in Chinese literature, religion and phi­ losophy.

Hui Uprising in Yunnan

7

Islamic Tradition and Education The early Hui settlements in Yunnan continued to teach and follow Islamic law, particu­

larly in larger communities. Every Hui village had a mosque, and Hui miners built mosques at their work sites to perform religious rituals. Most Hui adhered to Koranic dietary restrictions; they strictly avoided pork and ate meat only if butchered according to

Islamic requirements. Weddings and funerals were conducted in the Muslim style of Central Asia. Religious holidays were celebrated, and the Hejira calendar regulated relig­ ious life even as the Chinese lunar calendar was employed for daily life. Children were given Arabic names from the Koran, and boys were circumcised between the ages of

seven and 13. If non-Muslim spouses were to be married into the community, they were

pressured to accept Islam or at least to observe Hui customs. The Muslim Hui minority lived in homogeneous communities surrounded by'a Con­ fucian ist majority. Confucianism was the official religion in the Chinese empire, and Bud­ dhism and Taoism enjoyed special status from the authorities. Islamic institutions were

protected by the empire, but received no governmental financial support. Hui in Yunnan

used their own funds to build and maintain mosques, support madrasas, and pay their clergy.

■

. .

The leadership of the Muslim religious community was divided into two groups. The first, a mosque management committee consisting of elders and pious Muslims, was

charged with leading community meetings and settling admmistrative, financial and day-

to-day af®rs of the community mosque. The committee would invite a new teaching akhond or select a new imam, appoint clergy like khutba, mu'adhdhin and mujawirrin and set their salaries. The second aspect of the structure was comprised of clergy who han­ dled religious matters in the mosque and the religious education of madrasas. The two

elements usually operated independently but their duties occasionally overlapped. For In­

stance, the clergy and pious Muslims conducted community religious functions and jointly supervised the religious life of the community. But the dual leadership was not well suited to handle conflicts between the Hui and Han. Neither side was able to represent

the Hui in encounters with Han and the Chinese authority: Hui religious education was divided into three levels. In the primary level, 4-year-old

children were sent to mosques to study the basic verses of the Koran. The textbooks cov­ ered the Arabic alphabet, basic Arabic words, verses from the Koran and simple grammar. They also included instruction on prayer, performance of ritual ablutions, and recitation

of the witness formulation. In the middle level, studies included systematic Arabic gram­ mar, general Persian grammar and instruction in religious doctrine. In the third level, the khalifas (religious students) studied the commentaries on the Koran, Islamic law, hadiih

science, kalam (discourses), Islamic philosophy, rhetoric and classic Persian poems. All

8

Jianping Wang

texts at this level were original Arabic and Persian works written by authors from the Middle Ages.

To complete the courses at the third level, a khalifa studied many years. After he passed the examination organized by several prominent akhonds, he became qualified to serve a Hui community as an akhond himself. The madrasas in Yunnan had retained

contacts with the madrasas in northwestern China, and many Hui youths traveled there for religious studies under the guidance of famous akhonds. Some Muslim scholars and

students from other parts of China, even from Central Asia, came to Yunnan to teach and

study.

But Islamic education came at the expense of instruction in Confucianism and inte­ gration into Chinese culture. Hui children, unable to comprehend Islamic'principles with their shallow knowledge of Arabic, were taught an ideological theory in a non-native lan­

guage that had no apparent practical value in their daily life. Even worse, the Hui educa­

tional system propagated misunderstanding and prejudice toward other cultures and religions. -Busy with Arabic and Koranic studies, Hui children missed out on a sound Confucian education and thus remained ignorant about their country's predominant relig­

ious doctrine. Islamic education only served to separate the Hui from the Chinese society

they shared with the Han people. This lack of knowledge was reciprocal, of course; just as the Hui skipped Confucius, Han schools disregarded the Koran. As a result, neither side could appreciate or attempt bridge its differences with the other.

Hui Assimilation The-bulk of the Hui community, despite rigorous Islamic education among clerics and re­

ligious students, gradually strayed from its native religion and began to embrace aspects of the majority .Chinese culture. The Hui—though continuing to affiliate as Muslims—began

to adopt Han practices such as witchcraft, sorcery, divination and geomancyldivination by means of geographical analysis). Some Hui scholars tried to build bridges with China's non-Muslim majority by illustrating the intersections of Islamic religious doctrine with the

teachings of Confucianism. Describing the connections between the two faiths in the

early Qing dynasty, Hui scholar Ma Zhu wrote: Chinese religions are different from Islam, but the ideas are the same...’.Of the

Eastern religions, Confucianism is the most significant. Muslims study the classic

texts of Confucianism just as a craftsman uses wood to build a hall, a house, a Bud­ dhist temple, or a mosque.^'^

But Ma also saw differences between the two religions. "Confucianism," he wrote, "emphasizes this world. The Confucianist literati seek fame, cling to the material life and

Hui Uprising in Yunnan

9

desire satisfaction. They have forgotten or have given up on the world to come, so they abandon the original purpose of life/'^^ Confucianists, too, often had a distorted sense of Islamic tradition. This misunderstanding created a significant religious-and cultural barrier between the two groups—a barrier that contributed to an eventual, armed conflict^®

Corruption of Yunnan society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was not lim­ ited to imperial officials; it penetrated the Hui community as well. Like the Chinese offi­ cialdom, Hui clergy took a sharp turn away from moral leadership. In the seventeenth century, Ma Zhu excoriated irresponsible imams in Yunnan:

Their behavior differs from their speech. They inherit their positions as imam like a

corpse on the throne. They have no real knowledge, make friends with those who

flatter them, and drift apart from those who give advice. They envy those who have

more abilities than them, and hate those who do not curry favor with them...The villains who control the religious community are forcing truly righteous .and just gentlemen to leave and live in seclusion.

Stemming in part from this corruption of the clergy, opium addiction among the Hui in­

creased, and some Hui became' belligerent in disputes with other ethnic groups over

mining, trade and other economic activities. In the midst of their clergy's moral degeneration, Muslims in Yunnan found it increas­ ingly difficult to preserve their religious tradition. The Hui community, known previously

for its remarkable coherency, began to break apart. Respect for Islamic Sliari'a law, al­ ready waning among Chinese Muslims, had nearly vanished. Ma Zhu criticized this trend:

Recently, there are some families who' do not only refuse to pay zakat (alms) and disregard their Muslim brothers who are in need, but also neglect their own family members who are freezing and starving. They treat homeless people—even close relatives—as if they were strangers.^®

Ma decried the decline of Islamic observance among the Hui. "They rely on the name of Islam to conduct heresy," he wrote. "Some people give up the path of righteousness for an opportunity to profit financially. They disregard Islamic principles of kinship and friendship In blind pursuit of money and wealth."^^ With the passing of another century, the Hui became less and less religious. In marriage ceremonies and funeral services, for

instance, the Yunnanese Hui adopted customs of their Han neighbors. Hui Islamic education also deteriorated, exposing Hui childrep to the evils of a cor­

rupt society and paving the way for continued polarization of the Hui community. "Many Hui today do not receive even a basic religious education," wrote one commentator.

Islam neither looks like Islam nor like Confucianism. Such a breakdown in knowl­

edge has many adverse effects: Hui savagely oppress each other within the com-

10

Jianping Wang

munity or gang up with non-Muslims against their own religious believers. A man

without knowledge is a deprived conscience. It really is disgraceful, pitiful, despi­ cable and lamentable.^°

In Hui-Han conflicts over mining, land, salt wells and political power, some Hui clergy

introduced religious students to the Islamic concept of jihad (literally "struggle" but taught

by the Hui to mean "holy war"). These clergy advocated violence against both kafirs (believers in other religions) and Muslims who opposed their goals.^^ Following a violent incident in Yongchang in 1846, a Hui imam named Papa Huang posted notices calling for

a conscription of Hui youths. Hui who disobeyed the order had their homes demol­

ished.

Zhao Fa-yuan, a Hui who had served in the imperial army, was captured by

Muslim radicals. They allegedly cut out his heart and liver and cooked them for dinner.^^

This terrible hostility and vengeance fueled massacres committed by extremists from both sides. In the late 1840s, some Hui took a stand against these radical views. One was

Ma Zi-yun, who criticized the behavior of extremist Muslims in his hometown of Lijiang.

To make a clean break with the radical Hui, he gave up his religious tradition, ate Han food, and married a Han woman. Subsequently he visited Buddhist temples and met with monks to learn about Buddhism.^'*

11. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUI-HAN CONFLICT >

Origins of Interethnic Tension Disputes over land, mines and overland trade were significant roots of Hui-Han antipa­ thy, and helped bring on the nineteenth-century uprising. Muslim soldiers, the first group

in Yunnan to farm the land, left their Hui ofispring flat, arable, irrigated crops that were coveted by local officials and Han gentry. After Hui massacres in western Yunnan, Han

officials and gentry immediately grabbed the Muslims' property. In 1838 a Hui in Mian-

ning asked a Han official to reimburse him for an assignment he had completed in yamen. The official not only rejected the request, he commanded the Hui to give up va­

cant land near the mosque so that the empire could build a pavilion there. The Hui community ignored the order, building a screen wall to prevent the govern­

ment from occupying the land. This act of defiance enraged Chinese officials. Local

authorities signed an agreement, along with Han miners from Sichuan and Hunan, to "wipe out the Hui." The militias and Han laid siege to the Hui block, killed about 1,700

Hui, and burned their mosque and homes. Later, 170 more Hui were slain and the

town's suburbs were set afire.

Hui Uprising in Yunnan

11

In 1848, the authority arrested several Hui for planning a robbery at the salt well in the Yaozhou Prefecture. A Han investigator, alerted to reports of a secret Hui arms build­

up, was murdered by Hui forces. The killing triggered a wave of violence that proved costly to both sides. Han casualties numbered 327, with 2,680 homes burned to the ground. Hui damage included 65 deaths or injuries and 260 torched houses.

Another source of economic conflict was the Hui merchants' monopoly in trade and

local markets. In Baoshan, for instance, the Hui block was the town's most prosperous

area. Hui sold cloth, cotton yarn and native products, and held a town market every five days. Hui surpassed their Han competitors not only in agriculture but also in the mule

and horse caravan trades, engendering intergroup jealousy.^^

gyg gf j-^g uprising,

rich Hui merchants in Tengchong owned 70 percent of the shops. One affluent Hui fam­

ily (nicknamed "the Millionaires") nearly monopolized the sale of cloth, cotton yarn and jade in the region. Han merchants simply could not compete in sales volume and capital. Han also suffered from Hui attempts to rig the market. A Han merchant once pur­ chased a large piece of jade in Burma, and returned to Yunnan to sell it for a profit The

powerful "Millionaires" firm ordered local merchants to boycott him, forcing the Han to try to sell his jade in inland China. But the firm's sub-branches, located around the coun­

try, foiled his plan. After a long journey, he had to sell the jade at a low price to the Hui business. From that day he bore a grudge toward the Hui and joined a Han secret soci­

ety. When Hui-Han conflict broke out in Tengchong, he became chief of the regional Han force and vowed to fight Hui to the death.^® -

Disrespect for religious and social customs was another dimension of the Hui-Han

conflict The Han frequently mocked the Islamic dietary custom of avoiding pork and posted jokes in town suggesting that the Hui "build pigpens in the second and eighth

months" and "repair their ancestors' tombs in the spring and autumn."^^ Such scorn met with Hui anger and violence. A Han attempting to bring pork into a Hui village would often be assaulted. In the summer of 1839, one thousand Hui from Sichuan and Shaanxi-

attacked a market and killed nearly every Han pork merchant. They then set fires and

robbed Han households.'’^ The Hui and Han also expressed their mutual disdain in community sporting events. On the festive Spring Day, Hui from Badaying Village in Baoshan traveled to the neighboring village of Jinji to challenge a Han team in the Dragon

Lantern Dance. The competitions often brought the two villages to fisticuffs/’’

12

Jianping Wang

Radicalization of the Conflict Although the lives of Hui and Han were entangled in many .ways, an invisible barrier stood between the two groups. It was not an inherent irreconcilability that separated

them. Rather, their division resulted from the beliefs and actions of extremists—few but powerful—on both sides. The hostility that began from the fringes soon permeated main­

stream society, transforming each entire community into the other's enemy. Acts of re­ venge were carried out indiscriminately by both the Hui and the Han; innocent bystand­

ers paid with their lives for terrorist acts committed by their extremist brothers. Every event—no matter how seemingly Insignificant—held serious consequences for the tense relationship. With the social crisis deepening, radical religious organizations quickly emerged in

Han society. A large group of Han in Baoshan county formed the Society of Burning In­

cense In 1841. The members formed eight gangs—each with its own grandlord—which conducted massacres against the Hui in western Yunnan. The Society also struck out

against Han who refused to join in the slaughter of Hui. "If any Han hides a Hui in his

house," they said, "all of-his family members will pay the price with their lives.

Another group of Han in Baoshan established the multi-faith Ceremony of Five Mountain Emperors, held each year on the 29th day of the third lunar month. Two days prior to the ceremony, groups of eight men carried the portraits of East, South, West,

North and Center—the five mountain emperors—into the courtyard of the Longevity

'Pavilion (the Emperor's Hall). Buddhist monks and Tao priests chanted scriptures for two

days. Then; on the day of the ceremony, a procession would bring the five mountain portraits to the Temple of the-East Mountain in Southern Town.

The march passed by the gate of a mosque which housed several hundred Hui Islamic

students. As the Han procession approached the mosque, it would be met with jeers—and occasional flying fruit peels—from a group of 20-30 Hui students. These of­

fensive gestures angered the Han and led to annual fistfights between the two groups. Despite attempts by some akhonds to lock the mosque's gate during the ceremony, the Hui students always managed to make trouble with the parading Han clan. The Han took

their issue to court several times; as a result, the county magistrate arrested a .Hui initiator

of the incident and sentenced him to death. His punishment, however, did hot stop the khalifas {madrasa students) from mocking the ceremony and picking fights with its partici­ pants. As they were taught by their fundamentalist Islamic teachers, the "fight against infi­

dels will be rewarded. Violence also broke out at the Zhongyuan (Midsummer) Festival of 1843, at a cele­

bration in the Hall of Rebirth outside of Dragon Spring Cate in Baoshan Town. On the tenth day of the seventh lunar month a service was held at the Hall (where, according to

.Hui Uprising in Yunnan

13

Han custom, the dead are reborn) in which young widows wailed over their deceased husbands and young girls mourned their passed parents. On their way to the Hall of Re­ birth, the Han were often interrupted by frivolous Hui youths cracking jokes at their ex­

pense. Fights between the Hui and Han ensued.**^ In 1855, a group of female singers came to Shiyang Mine from the Yangtze River. They sang in the local tea-house and served the miners pipe tobacco and opium. The

miners, lonely and living far from their wives, began to fight over the women. In one scuf­ fle, a Hui and a Linanese'Han battled for the love of a singer. Since these two groups had

been hostile from previous mining disputes, the personal skirmish quickly turned into a group conflict. The Linanese, armed with daggers, killed several Hui miners and wounded 4'; many.

In an event the following year, a Hui bride from Ludian county was traveling to

Weixin county for her wedding ceremony. When the bride's escort passed through the Buga area, where a local Han tyrant landlord lived, Han men seized the bride and other Hui women and assailed them with obscenities. The Hui demanded that the Han land­

lord admit his responsibility for the incident. When he denied any role, Hui killed him

and his henchmen. This seemingly isolated incident sparked a massacre in the county town of Zhaotong in which about one thousand Hui died.^^

The Role of the Empire With corruption and cruelty festering throughout the officialdom, the Chinese empire lost

much of its authority to mediate disputes. Imperial officials would do almost anything to retain their privileges and preserve their power. A Hui army officer in Binchuan county,

after being dismissed by a senior Han official, secretly recruited hundreds of Hui from Si­ chuan and Shaanxi. When the matter was reported to the authority, the county magis­

trate and the Han official came to the mosque to investigate. Upon entering the gate, the official was killed by the man he had fired. Imperial troops subsequently stormed the mosque killing the Hui and his followers.'*^

During the empire's disintegration, a number of ethnic-religious groups consolidated

their forces in an effort to advance their position in the conflict In 1843 Hui and Han clashed in the Shunning prefecture and Yunzhou; about one hundred Hui in Yongchang arrived In aid of their brothers. The Han, surprised by the size of the armed Hui force, amassed daggers and spears to defend themselves. Timid local officials were powerless to avert the crisis. In one battle, the Hui injured a sub-branch chief of the Society of Burning

Incense. In response, Han gathered several thousand men and vowed to exterminate the Hui. Although the confrontation was mediated and resolved by the county magistrate, the

14

JianpingWang

authority later charged two Hui with disturbing the peace while exonerating the Han. The

authority's biased policy stirred Hui resentment and intensified the Muslim-Han rift.'*®

The Hui-Han Mining Rivalry Historical Background Yunnan's integration into China's Yuan between 1271 and 1368 brought the province's

abundant gold, silver and copper resources into the jurisdiction of the Empire.'*^ During the Ming dynasty, the Empire collected more taxes from mining of these minerals in Yun­ nan than from any other province.®® In 1460, Yunnan paid more than half of all imperial

taxes collected from silver mining.®* Mining enterprises in Yunnan began to flourish in the early Qing Dynasty, during the government's laissez faire policy toward the industry.®^ The growth of mining contributed to a decline in agriculture In some areas and a con­ comitant increase in the price of rice.

Through the late 1700s, mining was aJucrative and thriving enterprise in Yunnan. The

largest silver mines included the Shiyang and Malong quarries in the Nanan prefecture,

Bainiu in the Kaihua prefecture and Maolong in suburban Yongchang. Yongjin (in Talang) was a large gold mine, while Dongchuan, Laochang, Tangdan and Maolu (in Qiaojia) and

Wanbao in Yimen were noted for copper production.®® Almost all silver taels used in China at the time were minted in Yunnan. (The second-largest source. Canton, imported

most of its silver, while the rest of the country had none at all.®^) Accordingtothe Minis­ try of Revenue in 1770, Yunnan province sent more than 6.29 million jin of copper to Peking every year.®®

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, mining production in Yunnan

had begun its decline. Some mines, exploited for many years, had exhausted their veins

of ore..Between 1809 and 1850 the imperial court issued 39 edicts forgiving the debts of Yunnan's copper miners who were forced into bankruptcy. The Empire began to close down mines in order to save money and prevent future unemployment. This policy, however, led to immediate job losses and rioting.®® The government was powerless to

alleviate the deteriorating economic situation. Only a few large excavations—those of the Shiyang and Malong silver mines, the Bainiu copper mine and the Talang gold

mine—remained in operation. The resultant joblessness emerged as one of the roots of early nineteenth century Hui-Han conflict. Following an imperial edict in 1329 announcing that "households of Huihui (Muslims)

should fulfill the duty of corvee as other people do," some Muslims were drafted to es­ tablish mines.®7 From that time forward, particularly at the beginning of the Reign of

Kongxi (1662-1722), mining was an important part of Hui economic life. The Baiyang

Hui Uprising in Yunnan

15

copper mine in Yunlong prefecture, for example, was opened and operated primarily by Hui workers. And Yongchang's Maolong silver mine, one of the two largest in China, employed Hui from the lowest colliers to the most powerful bosses. Aside from a few Hui

involved in agriculture or the caravan trade, the two hundred Hui households at Huilong

Village of Jianshui county divided their employment between the Bainiu Mine and the ShiyangMine.^® Hui involvement in the mining industry led to disputes with Han miners over land,

ore, water and mining facilities. Exacerbated by the prevailing atmosphere of corruption, Hui-Han mining quarrels frequently erupted into violent conflicts.^^ Had local Qing offi­ cials handled the arguments in a forthright and impartial manner, much violence could

have been averted. But corrupt officials often hid the truth and distorted facts over mining incidents. They placed blame for the violence on the Hui, accusing the Muslims of trying

to precipitate a revolt. Some officials played the Hui and Han against one another to

maintain their base of power. The end of this destructive policy was the catastrophic mutual massacres of the two groups.®^

The Incidents at Xiyi and Shiyang Two cases of mining rivalry between Hui and Han, those of the Xiyi and Dongchuan mines, demonstrate that each side had occasion to treat the other unfairly. In both inci­ dents, the actions of a few miners from each side intensified inter-group violence.

The Xiyi silver mine of Gengma in the Shunning Prefecture boasted at least one thou­ sand miners on the eve of the uprising.®^ Relations had been tense between Hui and

Hunanese Han miners for some time. According to the official archive on Han-Hui rela­ tions, the Hui sold nearly all the rice eaten by the miners, maintaining their monopoly

through intimidation.®^ in 1800, after a Hui and a Hunanese had a quarrel in a Han-op­ erated tea-house, a group of Hui returned to smash the establishment's tea pots and cups. An investigation committee later determined that the Hui patron was to blame for the incident and demanded that he publicly admit his guilt The Hui rejected the arbitra­

tion, declaring that the chief of the Hunanese miners was biased against his men. That evening, Hui smashed 10 more shops run by the Hunanese; in response 180 armed Han staged an attack killing 12 Hui and executing Hui miner chiefs at the mosque.®® In contrast to the tension present at Xiyi, the Shiyang mine of Yunlong prefecture, lo­ cated 90 kilometers outside of town, had a history of peaceful interethnic coexistence.

The mine's caves were excavated by colliers from all over China—Hunan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Jiangxi and Yunnan. Hunanese miners erected a Buddhist temple at the site, the Hui constructed a mosque, and Linanese from Yunnan built a community center. The three groups maintained separate identities and lived peacefully for some time. In 1821,

Jianping Wang

16

however, violence broke out when a Linanese miner was attacked by Hui miners for defecating at the entrance of a Hui cave. In the skirmish that followed, the Han and Li­

nanese damaged the gate of the Hui cave and Hui miners destroyed the Linanese center, killing one. The next day, in a combined Linanese/Hunanese attack, 80 to 90 men—most

of them Hui—lost their lives.^ Shiyang's silver mine, with more than thirty thousand workers, was one of the largest

in Yunnan. As the mine's ore began to diminish in the 1840s, a new mine adjacent to the

old started to flourish. A Hui technician at the new mine introduced a more effective way to smelt ores, producing massive quantities of silver for many years. Han miners, who had lost their jobs at Shiyang's previous excavation, applied to join the new quarry's 1,800

employees. The Han were turned down, creating bitterness and increased tension.

In 1854, two disputes over ore ignited bloodshed in Shiyang. In the first, a Han miner borrowed one thousand silver taels from two Hui brothers. The Han repaid his loan by

selling his silver ore to the Hui at a low price. After his debt was .repaid (to the satisfaction

of the Hui), the Han told the Hui brothers that in the future they would have to purchase his ore at the market price. The brothers, enraged by the news, physically assaulted their former Han debtor. Chiefs from both sides determined that the Hui should pay the Han's medical fees, but the brothers refused. In another dispute, the same Hui brothers had lent money to a Han miner from Li-

nan. The Hui demanded repayment from the penniless Han miner and seized silver ore

as a pledge.-The Han, considering the value of his ore much higher than his debt, brought

their case to an imperial official. Cui Shao-zong, the mediator, handled the conflict poorly {See details below in "Anti-Hui Imperial Discrimination") and ruled against, the Han, who then requested the help of miners at the Linanese gold mine in Talang. The Linanese Han

sent hundreds of men to Shiyang, joined forces with the Han miners and orchestrated a massacre of Hui workers. In the clash some 180 Hui were killed and the mosque was de­

stroyed, After the slaughter Hui and Han continually fought over the mine, which changed hands five times. Linanese Han robbed Hui households and killed adults and

children. They set fire to Hui houses and looted their property. Several Hui villages around the mine met the same fate and watched their mosques go up in flames.^^ When the fierce and drawn-out confrontation finally came to a close, the mine was deserted.^^

III. THE DAWN OF THE UPRISING Waves of violence preceding the Hui uprising involved local authorities, Hui forces and Han militias; each became a medium through which the rebellion erupted in the mid-

1850s. The elements that most directly ignited the province-wide revolt were (1) The

17

Hui Uprising in Yunnan

Folksong Incident, which set off both a Hui massacre in Yongchang and Tu Wen-xiu's

uprising in western Yunnan; (2) the massacres of Hui in mining rivalries that led to Hui re­ volts in southeastern Yunnan; (3) the large-scale massacre in the provincial capital- of Kunming; and, in the background of these events, (4) Chinese imperial discrimination

against the Muslim Hui.

The Folksong Incident J

In 1845,^7 Yunnan villagers were transplanting rice seedlings on the water field outside the Han/Hui village of Banqiao.^® While they worked, a Hui youth sang folksongs with a

Han youngster working in a neighboring water field.^^ The Hui sang the traditional verse:

"The rice straw ties a sheaf of seedlings, and the fresh straw replaces the rotten." But the Han youth responded with: "A Hui drives a pig, and leads his grandson on the way."^^ The. Hui youth, angered over the insult to Islamic dietary laws,^^ struck out physically.A Han source reported that the Han was beaten to death by the Hui;^^ a Hui source, how­

ever, holds that the Hui youth was attacked by the Han.^'’ According to sources from both sides, Han then expanded the radical Society of Burning Incense and the Hui mobi­

lized their armed forces. During the fighting, the county magistrate sided with the Han and sent imperial sol­

diers to arrest Hui chiefs. Encouraged by this imperial support, Han destroyed the Hui mosque, provoking the Hui to rally a thousand men from Shunning to engage the local Han mihtias. The expanded Hui force again met with imperial resistance. It was inter­

cepted by the empire's army‘(led by the Yongchang chief), and withdrew to-Mentging Village after sustaining a few dozen casualties. Later, two imperial officials—the chief of West Yunnan and the prefecture magistrate of Dengchuan—were ordered to lead one

thousand imperial soldiers and the militias of the Society of Burning Incense to suppress Hui in Bingma and Yangyi. The Hui force was greatly outnumbered. In battles with impe­

rial troops and Han forces, Hui lost two hundred lives but managed to capture one hun­

dred officers and soldiers. By this point, the battle was no longer just a Hui-Han dispute. It had become a broader conflict pitting the Hui against the combined forces of the local

authority, Han militias and Han bandits from the gentry. Attempting to quell Hui revolts in Baoshan, the local authority and Han forces con­

ducted a large-scale Hui massacre. Around midnight on October 2, 1845, between eight and nine’ thousand innocent Hui^^ were slaughtered. The authority, in defense of the

bloodshed, later claimed that these Hui had conspired with an outside force to stir a re­ bellion; there is no evidence that such a conspiracy in fact existed/^ The Folksong Inci­ dent inflamed enmity between the Hui and Han, leading to massacres on both sides.

Jianping Wang

18

On the 25th day of the fifth month, one hundred Hut households at Shang Village were demolished, and three hundred Hui in Badaying were killed. In the seventh month, a group of one thousand Hui took revenge; they set two hundred Han households on

fire, killed villagers, seized livestock, raped women and desecrated Han graves. Soon after this havoc, the Hui began to outnumber the imperial troops in the region; the Han agreed to stop fighting an to disarm the imperial troops. But the Hui immediately violated

the peace accord, attacking and killing many unarmed soldiers. In battles between Hui and the imperial army in the spring of 1846, each side lost about one hundred men.

Mining Incidents The Folksong Incident in Baoshan was a prelude to Tu Wen-xiu's uprising in West Yun­

nan; massacres of Hui in mines, villages and towns preceded a revolt led by Ma De-xin

and Ma Ru-long in southeastern Yunnan. While the butchers in West Yunnan came from the Society of Burning Incense, the killing in southeast Yunnan was conducted mainly by

Linanese Han bandits. Many gamblers were attracted to the promise of wealth at Talang's gold mine.

One

day in 1850, a Hui merchant at the mine won a bet of one hundred silver taels from a Li­

nanese Han. Reluctant to pay his debt,, the Han and his brother planned to murder the

Hui when he came to receive his money. The Hui, wise to the plan, brought some friends with him. In the fighting, one Han was killed and two were injured.^^ Linanese vowed re­

venge. After the Mid-Autumn Festival more than five hundred Linanese bandits slipped into the mine, prompting Hui mining chiefs to consult with their Han partners and send a

joint letter to the' local authority requesting help. The letter went unanswered, and sav­

agery once again broke out. The Linanese killed the Hui merchant and his friends and cooked their hearts at a memorial ceremony for the deceased Han. Later, Linanese Han

massacred Hui men and mining chiefs. A hundred Hui died in the slaughter. In 1855, Linanese bandits raided six Hui villages, killing about a thousand. Having al­

ready occupied the mine in Shiyang, the Linanese sought to capture the quarry at Malong. Some Hui in Malong planned to cut their losses and vacate the mine, but the Han

gentry and mine chiefs beseeched them to help defend the excavation. The Hui agreed

to stay, more militias were recruited, and two of the four barracks came under Hui com­ mand. When the 1,500 Linanese bandits arrived in Malong and attacked Hui forces, they

shouted to the miners: "We kill only Hui, no harm to others!" And: "He who kills or

catches a Hui will earn a big reward!" This strategy-effectively split the mine's mixed

Hui-Han defenses. About 80 Hui were killed, while the rest fled to Luochuan. Malong fell to the Linanese Han bandits.^^

Hui Uprising in Yunnan

19

The Kunming Massacre The Linanese continued to pursue Hui forces through Linan, Chuxiohg, Guangtong and Anning. Along the way, they killed, looted and set fire to Hui houses, damaging or de­

stroying most Hui villages in these areas. Ma Ling-han, a graduate of military art from Xinxing, formed a Hui posse to ward off the approaching Linanese force. The municipal authority had an ambiguous role in the massacre: it requested both that the Linanese

withdraw from the city and that Hah militias of Kunming move in to arrest Hui chiefs.

Meanwhile, the municipality instructed Hui clergy to disband Ma Ling-han's force and expel it from the city. Imperial officials executed 30 more Hui chiefs in the city one night

in 1856. Ma, irate with the municipality's treatment of the Hui, was finally forced by the

city to pull out his forces. The following day, the Yunnan authority carried out a bloody slaughter of Hui in Kunming. Some sources estimate that the Hui death toll was two to three thousand; others place it as high as twenty thousand.®^

Anti-Hui Imperial Discrimination I

The Failure of Hui Mediation Efforts In the course of atrocities in which thousands of Hui lost their property and their lives, some members of the Hui community continued to put their trust in the imperial ad­ ministration. Preferring a nonviolent approach, these Hui made frequent appeals to Chi­

nese authorities. In the wake of the Shiyang mine incident of 1821 and mistreatment by

county and prefecture magistrates, relatives of Hui victims pleaded, in Peking for restitu­ tion.®^ They returned home empty handed. Subsequent appeals met with only slightly better results. After the Baiyang mine inci­ dent of 1822, the emperor distributed a few silver taels to each bereaved Hui family for

burying their loved ones. And when more than three thousand Hui in Mianning were slain by corrupt imperial authorities in 1839, a few officials were dismissed at the urging

of Ma Wen-zhao and other Hui. In other cases, however, the empire was deaf—and at times even hostile—to Hui pleas.

After an 1845 massacre in Jinji Village in which hundreds of Hui perished, for exam­

ple, an imperial official from the province turned down requests for restitution and moved militias to slaughter more Hui residents. According to Hui sources, about two

thousand Hui households were destroyed in the massacre (see "The Folksong Incident" above). Tu Wen-xiu continued to make appeals to the authorities until viceroy Hu Chang-

ling sent a deputy chief to Yongchang to investigate the killings. After being bribed by lo­ cal officials, the envoy falsified his report and described the Hui as the real bandits.

lianpingWang

20

imperial commissioner, to

'

P

ethnic-religious groups in general

j^hed Hui hopes of finding a their grievances through the imperial

handed official of the empire, bn and the Hui in particular. Lin s pol^

peaceful solution to

“nti'X^seemingly exhausted, the Hui turned to force an

wanted to trust. ^^e 1850 tragedy in the Talong

administration. Peace u P launched an uprising against t e emp

authorized to issue a ruling in the case. Talang county declined the Hui appe ,«„d bandits. While officials wrangle

county .had a very. Linanese

g

hexpelled the remaining Hui from the

ove

-- —' -- -

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the continuing violence. M.for thestagery:

military arts in the Ami prefecture, offered an expla

Han-ignore the most

Violence occurs because gentry and important tenets of their

^^e two sides had not held differences peacefully; if

®

grudges;- if during ^^J/XnConstantly limited to their groups' parochial interX SJXaglne how this violence could have occurred.

’

This line of thought found suppo^^

hS

Ld M, D.-»n,. K« P-h-

*±j“X*g in . »»l" P'-»r 1"

-1—

, Hui Uprising in Yunnan

21

In another event, as Hui survivors of the Baiyang and Bainiu massacres fled to Huilong and tried to arouse support for acts of revenge, Ma De-xin advised Ma Ru-long, his stu­ dent in the mosque:

Muslims are the minority in China. If we fight against Han we will lose in the end.

The only things we depend on for our survival are respect for morality and law. Immoral and illegal behavior is prohibited by Confucianism and by Islamic doctrine.

If we act virtuously and observe the laws, even though others do not, we can ap­ peal to the law and go to court. If we break the laws, what do we rely on for protection?®^ •I But as the conflicts between Hui and Han became more intense—and it became clear

that the Chinese "legal" authorities were no protection at all—such conciliatory murmurs were drowned out by the hawkish cries of hardliners. The empire ignored Hui gestures of

civility and compromise. The voice of reason and moderation in the Hui community only .produced further delay, indifference, and discrimination from the imperial administra­ tion.

Cui Shao-zong Cui Shao-zong, both a magistrate of the Nanan Prefecture and an imperial authority in .charge of the Shiyang mine, embodied the authority's vacillating, capricious approach to the Hui-Han dispute. In an argument between two Hui brothers and a Han over the Shi­

yang mine (described above in "The Hui-Han Mining Rivalry"), Cui first supported the Hui, beating and jailing the Han. But when Linanese attacked the mine, and local Han

militias in the mine revolted, Cui began to cooperate with the Linanese and helped them -confiscate Hui property. After the Han killed the Hui brothers, destroyed the mosque and slew about four hundred Hui, Cui fled to the prefectural town.®^

Ordered by Peking to rally local militias and imperial troops to take back the mine, Cui again changed sides. He turned to the Hui and assembled a 150-man force to re­ claim the mine; executed two Han who had participated in the original Linanese attack; and was promoted to a higher post.®^ As the Linanese gathered one thousand men in

Talang gold mine and prepared to attack Shiyang again, Cui fled for safety. After easily . reoccupying the quarry, the Linanese promised Cui that they would begin to pay mining

taxes. Upon hearing this news, Cui immediately recognized the Linanese right to the mine. He was Indifferent as to who the mine's owners were as long as they paid taxes

and thereby helped him retain his official post.

When the Hui once again reclaimed Shiyang, after fierce fighting, Cui denounced the takeover and commanded Hui forces to give up the mine. Soon the Linanese Han re-

Jianping Wang

22

gained the mine, and looted and set fire to Hui villages in neighboring areas.

Violence

raged on between Hui and the Linanese Han, resulting in heavy Hui losses. The Linartese

force followed fleeing Hui from Nanan to Chuxiong. Cui Shao-zong, promoted again by the empire, had become the magistrate of Chuxiong prefecture. In yet another two-faced

move, he stationed five hundred Hui youths to defend the town while secretly sending an

official to contact the Linanese. Cui had the town gate opened and assisted the Linanese force in its assault on the town's Hui residents. The Linanese slaughtered every Hui in

sight. Fearing Linanese revenge for his past role in helping Hui against them, he gave the

Linanese three thousand silver taels and promised to increase Hui suppression. By helping the Han spill Hui blood, Cui saved his own life.®’

Lin Ze-xu Lin Ze-xu becathe viceroy'of Yunnan and Guizhou during the intensification of the

Hui-Han conflict in the mid-1800s. Han units posed a formidable challenge to Lin's power. Their local militias intercepted prisoners being escorted to the provincial capital

for trial; killed government soldiers; set fire to the county yamen; raided the jail and re­

leased prisoners; slaughtered a hundred Hui; and killed several Hui candidates for the

imperial examination. They also blocked a key bridge and severed commercial and communication links in the region. As the militia force began to threaten the power of the authority, Lin moved six thou­

sand imperial soldiers to Baoshan to wipe them out Under great military pressure, the

officials and gentry of Baoshan turned over Han responsible for the Hui slaughter; Lin

hanged one hundred of them and banished three hundred more. Compared with the methods of his predecessors, Lin's handling of the Hui-Han conflicts seems evenhanded

and impartial. But his manner did not always mitigate Hui-Han violence, and was often negligent. For example, Lin executed many Hui learned men and gentry in the forgery of the socalled "White Silky Letter Written in Blood." Over one hundred West Yunnan members

of the Hui gentry signed a letter to Lin demanding that the murderers of Hui victims in Yongchang be punished. But Lin was in western Yunnan when the letter arrived in his

yamen in Kunming, and Han provincial officials attached the signature list to a counter­ feited letter—written in blood—indicating that the Hui gentry were preparing a clandes­ tine rebellion against the empire. Han officials sent the letter to Lin, who then promptly

ordered the arrest of the Hui gentry. Lin executed 76 Hui and banished more than a hundred, all on the basis of the forged document.^®

Lin's connection with the officialdom and bureaucracy influenced his decision to

blame local militias and bandits for conducting Hui massacres when in fact local officials

' Hui Uprising in Yunnan

23

of West Yunnan were responsible. The truth emerged later when Sheng Jue-cheng, chief of the Society of Burning Incense in Baoshan, admitted to carrying out the massacre or­ dered by top Baoshan officials.^^ Lin also forced Hui landowners to sell their property to Hah landlords at sharply discounted prices. And he banished two hundred Hui house­

holds—all of which had fled the Baoshan massacre and returned home after the conflict had subdued—to Guannai Mountain, a distant site teeming with communicable subtropi­ cal disease.

'

,

The Role of Local Officials During the Folksong Incident of Baoshan and the massacres of Shiyang Mine, local offi­

cials had sided with the Han in suppressing the Hui. But it was not until 1856 that the

provincial authority—led by governor Su Xing-a, judicial chief Qing Sheng and retired

deputy defense minister Huang Cong—openly ordered Hui slayings in Kunming and pub­ licly defended Han militias. And it was only after the watershed of the Kunming massacre

that the Hui gathered their forces into a cohesive uprising against the provincial authority.

When Manchu official Su Xing-a was governor of northwestern China's Shaaxi prov­ ince, he ignited the wrath of local Hui by suppressing their revolts. Afraid of reprisals, Su fled immediately from the Luzhou revolt of Sichuan (where he subsequently developed

heart palpitations and the emotional disorder neurasthenia, becoming dependent upon servants).^^ Qing Sheng, also a Manchu official, had a reputation for cruelty and was once

discipline^ by the imperial court for torturing prisoners to death.-^^ And Huang Cong, a Han official who lived in Kunming after retiring from his imperial post, maintained exten­ sive contacts with Han gentry and advocated setting up a strong Han militia force to

counter the Hui. He became the leader of the provincial militias. After the slaughter in Kunming, provincial yamen instructed officials at all levels to

suppress Hui rebellions and execute Hui civilians, in areas where Hui and Han had lived

harmoniously for centuries, some officials were reluctant to carry out the anti-Hui decree and many Han were unwilling to kill their friendly Hui neighbors. But rumors circulating among the two communities produced'mutual distrust and, eventually, savage attacks.^'* The ensuing genocide ignited Hui revolts throughout the province and ended hopes of a

peaceful settlement to the conflict. Even the most conciliaitory, passivist element of the Hui community took to arms and joined the Hui uprising, which would last over 18 years

and shake the foundations of China's imperial leadership.

Jianping Wapg

24

CONCLUSION The foregoing account of early nineteenth-century Yunnan and Chinese society on the

eve of the Hui uprising suggests that a social quake among Yunnan's Muslim minority was inevitable. The most important factors in igniting the rebellion seem to be the following:

•

Inter-group jealousy. Muslims had a long history as rulers and social elites in Yunnan

society before the Qing dynasty. The provincial governorship had been in Muslim

. hands for almost two centuries, and the Hui occupied many important posts in Yun­

nan's administration. Despite the Ming empire's attempt to limit Hui influence in the fifteenth century, Muslims in Yunnan enjoyed many advantages in political, economic

and social life, and the development of Muslim communities continued to progress.

The advantages held by Hui,Chinese—particularly because they were those of a mi­

nority-engendered jealousy and enmity from other social groups. •

Competition over Agricultural Resources. Because Muslim immigration to Yunnan

spanned three dynasties and Muslim soldiers were stationed all over the province,

Muslim communities were widely scattered geographically. As their numbers grew, many Muslims moved to areas with plentiful water sources and fertile soil. These new

communities often sprung up near Han agricultural settlements. As a result, the Hui

and Han began to compete over land, water and other resources. This competition paved the way for animosity and conflict. •

Hui Assimilation. Religious observance varied widely among Hui communities, and dissipated over time. A few Hui gave up their religious roots entirely and actively as­ similated into Chinese culture and society. Hui communities themselves were often polarized, with pious Muslim clergy on one side and a secular, sinicized gentry on the

other. With the decline in religious values and the concurrent rising corruption of

Chinese society, Hui communities began to deteriorate morally. This phenomenon

created a Hui element that was prone to violence and, subsequently, a burgeoning conflict between the Hui and Han. •

Mining Disputes. The mineral resources in Yunnan were very important to the Chi­ nese empire, especially the province's abundant gold, silver and copper ores. Yunnanese Hui became successful In mining and refining ores. This Hui achievement in­

spired great resentment on the part of other ethnic-religious groups in the mining in­ dustry. Insignificant conflicts at the quarries often turned violent, especially in the ab­ sence of a legitimate and competent government authority.

Hui Uprising in Yunnan

•

25

Religious Intolerance. As a distinct ethnic-religious group, the Yunnanese Hui lived within discrete communities and many preserved their customs and traditions. But

while Yunnanese Hui became accustomed to living in Chinese society, many native Chinese never got used to the idea of sharing their country with a Muslim minority. Some Hui scholars and broad-minded clergy tried to promote mutual understanding

between adherents of Islam and Confucianism—and to work toward a peaceful reso­ lution of Hui-Han conflicts—but their scholarship bad limited practical value. The

ideas either were not understood/or were not accepted by the majority of Hui. Any advances made by the Confucian literati were erased by the hostile sentiments incited by corrupt officials against the alien religious people. To make matters worse, the Chi­

nese imperial system made no attempts to mend the differences between the two

cultures. This neglect fostered increased bloodshed. •

The Deterioration of Chinese Society. In the first half of the nineteenth century, China

was in profound socio-economic Crisis and the imperial administration could no longer mediate disputes between its peoples. This failure of leadership exacerbated social

conflict and ignited anti-government protest. Rebellions like the Taiping Movemerit gave expression to pent-up dissatisfaction with the injustice of Chinese society. And the Muslim uprising in Yunnan—which would claim thousands of lives between 1856 and

1873—was a natural outgrowth of imperial discrimination and mistreatment.

Jianping Wang

26

NOTES

1.

See Fan Wen-Ian, Zbongguo Jindai Shi lA modern history of China!.

2.

In his account of the uprising's roots, T'ien holds that "economic factors iay at the heart of the conflict" He writes that although at base it was neither a racial nor a religious conflict "religion and 'the violation of religious practices were an added cause" of the revolt See p. '9:

3.

Marshall Broomhall, Islam in 'China: A Neglected' Problem (New York; Paragon Reprints, 1'966). Bullock's paper was presented at the Peking Oriental Society on March 1,1887, and published in The Chinese Review 16, no. 2 (1887): 83-95.

4.

See "A Private Recording of the Mohammedan Rebellion in Yunnan," in Yunnan Huiming Qtyi Shiliao [Historical data of the Hui uprising in Yunnan], ed. Jing De-xin, trans. Li Yao-shang (Kunming; 1986),

386-449. See Wang Yun-fang, "Investigation of the Mosques in the Kunming Region," tn Yunnan Huizu Shehui Lishi Diaocha [Investigations of society and history of Hui in Yunnan], vol. 1, (Kunming; 1985), 99.

5. •6 '

Ouyang Xiu and Song Qi, "Biography of Nanchao State," in Xin Tangshu [A new history of the Tang dynasty], vol. 20 (Beijing; Chinese Printing House, 1975), 6277. Originally written in the North Song dynasty (960-1126).

7.

Song Lian, "Biography of Mongke Khan," in YuansH [History of the Yuan dynasty!, vol. 1 (Beijing: Chinese Printing House, 1976), 47. Originally written in the early Ming dynasty (1368-1644).

8.

Ibid., vol. 10, 3063-65.

9.

See Ma Zhu, Qingzhen Zbinan [Guide of Islam: written in the 1680s, originally printed in Chengdu in 1885]*, (Xianyang: 1989), 26; Liu Fa-xian& Xianyang Wang Fu Dian Congji [Merits of Prince Xiangyang in paci^ng Yunnan], (Kunming: 1684); "Genealogical Tree of Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din," in Yunnan Huizu Shehui Lishi Diaocha, vol. 2,13-44; "Preface to the Genealogy of Zheng," in Lun Zheng He Xia Xiyang [On Zheng's voyages in the Indian Ocean), (Beijing, 1985), 22-24.

10.

Wang Da-yuan, Dao Yi Zhi Lue [Geographical sketch of islands and islets], (Shanghai, ri.d.), 30. Wang a mid-14th century mariner, recorded the Hajj route taken by Yunnan Muslims. Emilii Bretschneider cited Wang’s data in his Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources, vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 1967), 300. See also "Geographical Recordings," in Ming Shi [History of the Ming dynasty).

11.

Yang Zhao-jun, ed., Yunnan Huizu Shi [A history of Hui In Yunnan], (Kunming: 1989), 183.

12.

Muslim garrison troops and farming stations, for instance, served as basic administrative units in some

13.

areas. See recordings of the Kangrding-'placed the event in 1843 (Zhang Ming-zhai, "Personal Experiences," 82), but three others cite 1845.

68.

Most references mention Banqiao, but one locates the event at a fair in the" Northern Mountain Temple of Baoshan Town (see Weng Mei-hu's interview, dted in Yunnan Huizu Shehu} Lishi Diaocha, vol. 1, 126). Weng's work—completed over a century after the event—^eems to be in error. It is unclear why folksongs about rice seedlings would be sung at a fair.

69.

The Hui youth's name was Ma Da and the Han's was Wan Cui-lin, a military graduate. See ling De-xin, Du Wen~xiu Qiyi, 33-34. " • . >

70.

These words are found in a few sources. See "Family Background of Tu Wen-xiu and the Massacre in Yongchang," interviews by Weng Mei-hu (1958); "Investigation of the Hui Community in Baoshan County," in Yunnan Huizu Shehuj Lishi Diaocha, vol. 1, 3, 48; Li Bing-yaun, "The Reasons for Conflicts Between the Hui and Han in Baoshan county of Yongchang and the Revolution Launched by Tu Wen-xiu," in Huiming Qiyi, vol. 1, 5. Wen^s interviews reveal anotiier line to the song: "Small intestine coils small intestine, (use the knife to) slay the Hui one by one." Hui in China are very protective of their dietary restrictions and take great offense at the mere mention of pork. See Francis L.K. Hsu (1971), 196-97 and Pillsbury (1973), 127.

71.

A Han source describes the incident differently. "Eight Huis from Shaaxi and Yunnan came to Banqiao Town in Baoshan to teach martial arts to other Hui. At dusk one day the eight Huis sang folk songs in a tea-house, mocking the Han patrons. A fist fight ensued and many Han were Injured." See Sheng Yu-hua, "Hui-Han Yongchang Conflicts," in Yunnan Huiming Qiyi Shiliao, 63-4.

72.

See Zhang Ming-zhai, "Personal Experiences."

73.

See jing De-xin, in Tu Wen-xiu Qiyi, 33.

74.

This seems to be the most reliable estimate. It Is the appraisal provided by Jing De-xin, an expert in the history of the uprising. One Han source reported only 500 Hui deaths; see Sheng Yu-hua, "Brief Recording," 64-73.

Jianping Wang

30 75.

Even Han sources acknowledged that the authority's story was a fabrication. See Jing De-xin, Du Wen-xiu Qiyi, 33-4 and Sheng Yu-hua "Brief Recording," 63-4.

76.

"Recording of Rivalries Over the Mines in Talang and Nanan," in HuizusW Lun/i, 250.

77.

.ibid., 250-251.

78.

Ibid., 255.

79.

See Jing De-xin, Du Wen-xiu Qiyi, 64.

80.

Yunnan Huiming Qiyi Shiliao, 2,12,16,19,48-50.

81.

Ibid., 251.

62.

"A Brief Account of the Poxi Incident," 45-46.

83.

Ibid., 48.

84. '

Ibid., vol. 2, 49.

85.

Zhou Lu, "Study of Mining Rivalries," 253.

86.

■

,.

He was awarded the official hat with peacock feathers. Wu Qian-jiu, "Hui in Yunnan," cited in Ma

Lian-kai, "Yunnan Rebellion," in Chuiaong Shizhuan Xuebao, 45. 87.

Zhou Lu, "Study of Mining Rivalries," 254.

88.

Wu Qian-jiu, "Hui in Yunnan," in Ma Lian-kai, "Yunnan Rebellion," 46.

89.

Ma Yuan, >"Lin'Ze-xu and the Letter Written tn Blood on White Silk," Yunnan Huizu Shebui Lishi

Dioacba, vol. 4 (Kunming: 1987), 71. 90. ‘91.

Zhang Ming-zhai, "Personal Experiences," 83-4.

-The Strategy of Quelling the Yunnanese Hui Bandite Examined by the Emperor, Volume Three," in

Huiming Qiyi, vol. 1,316. 92.

93.

WenzongShilu [Recording of Emperor Wenzong], vol. 196,12. See also QingShifu.

The conflict in Wuding is a vivid example. See "An Account of the Event in Wuding," in Huiming Qiyi, vol. 2,17-32.

Hui Uprising in Yunnan

3T

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•

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‘

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■ ' ‘ "Manuscripts written at the end of the Qing dynasty; .

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