Diplomacy and its Discontents 9781442631748

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Diplomacy and its discontents

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Diplomacy and its discontents JAME S EAYR S UNIVERSITY O F TORONTO PRES S

© Universit y of Toronto Press 1971 Toronto an d Buffal o Printed in Canada ISBN 0-8020-1807-6 (cloth ) ISBN 0-8020-6121-4 (paper) Microfiche ISB N 0-8020-0126- 2 LC 73-16381 1

To Arthur Blanchette an d Ed Ritchi e

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Preface In 196 5 I was invited to give the Alan B. Plaunt Memorial Lectures at Carleton University. 'As a subject,' its president proposed , 'I would sugges t Canada's international relations or some fairly broad aspec t of them. The audience s are usually o f a kind not very appreciative of detailed scholarly exposition ... They usually include a large number of senior government people.' It happened tha t th e date set for th e first o f the two lectures coincided with tha t for a banquet commemoratin g the centennia l anniversar y of the Rideau Club; to tha t event, not mine , th e 'large numbe r of senior government people' fo r whom I' d gathere d my thoughts ineluctably gravitated . But Ottawa is like a drum - albei t a kettle-drum - and word of what I'd sai d quickly passe d around. For foreig n policy-makers especially that word was not t o thei r liking. A former assistan t under-secretary of state fo r external affair s fel t oblige d t o publish a rebuttal: T o th e intellectual wh o refuses t o serv e the state because he fear s he may be defiled by his service to the state , I say, "Go hang yourself, brave Crillon; we fought at Arques, and you were not there." ' A former ambassador to the Soviet Unio n reveale d that the lectures stirred in him 'a strong revulsion,' an d advised the practitioner of foreign affair s o n no accoun t to read them: 'The y will only rais e his blood-pressure, without givin g him th e slightest help, either moral or practical, in the exercise of his exacting, ofte n exasperating but essentia l and rewarding profession.' A former prime ministe r and secretar y of state fo r external affair s too k them t o tas k fo r asserting that public service is uncongenial fo r th e inquirin g mind : 'On e migh t as well say that th e footbal l squad i s no place fo r the honour studen t i n English because "the environmen t is alien."' (It wa s not fo r literature that Lester Pearson received his Nobel Prize - nor for logic either.)

viii Preface

These unflatterin g attentions fro m prominen t person s helped t o produc e a modest but stead y demand fo r my lectures after the y were published in 1966 a s Right and Wrong i n Foreign Policy. Eventuall y they went out o f print. Meanwhile I'd bee n developing, in essays, articles, and a series of radio talks published i n 196 7 a s Fate and Will i n Foreign Policy, a number of related issues to which my brief Plaunt Lectures had not pai d full attention . The University of Toronto Press agreed t o re-issue the lectures in the com pany o f a selection o f this other work . This book i s the result . For onc e it is unnecessary to offe r th e limp apologi a that despit e the grotesque disparity of the items making up one's collection the y ar e brought to gether by a point of view or united by a common sensibility. For thes e discourses do hold t o a single theme - th e decay of diplomatic method, dip lomacy an d its discontents - with a tenacity tha t eve n their autho r has found disconcerting. Recalling Camus' definition of th e intellectual as 'someon e whose min d watches itself,' I have asked myself as well as I can whether what I have written is wholly i n the spiri t o f free an d disinterested inquiry . Am I, perhaps, in the grip of some ignoble obsession, my judgment - a s one correspondent has alleged - warped by 'mixed privat e and public angers'? Anyone free o f public anger was either aslee p throughout th e sixtie s or responsible for what went on in them. But I nurse no personal animu s that I know of. Long ago and far away I applied to th e Department of External Af fairs for employment, an d was offered - to o late for my acceptance - a job as a junior foreig n servic e officer. S o I have no grievance on that scor e though there' s another episode requiring explanation. The attentive reader of my stricture s upon foreig n office s fo r withholding diplomatic files may detect i n them the ton e o f one who believes himself t o have been badly treated by authority; an d the attentiv e reader would be right. It was not just a matter of being denied access to the files - thoug h denials persisted fo r twent y years, and were on occasion ludicrous. (In 195 8 th e Department of External Affairs refuse d t o allo w me to rea d documents relating to its founding fifty years before; when my articl e appeared bereft o f this important material , the official concerne d offered hi s congratulations and assurance that none o f the papers in his custody woul d 'significantly chang e the conclusions o f your research.') There i s more to it than that . As a condition of access to a collection in the Public Archives of Canada I was required to submi t my notes t o the Department of External Affair s t o be 'vetted' for 'security.' The frai l apparatu s of its Historical Division collapsed beneat h th e weight of this responsibility: instea d o f censoring, it confiscate d all my note s - o f press clippings and other paper s in the public domain as well as of those that were not - fo r sequestration i n perpetuity. Month s of work were wasted.

Preface ix

Hell hath no fur y lik e a scholar scorned . Bu t tha t too wa s long ago and far away . Policy ha s changed for the better since . The Department has made amends, showering upon me like manna its most precious memoranda. I bear it no grudge, harbour no ill-will. To its present director o f Historical Division and its present under-secretary of state - th e officials wh o have worked t o achieve a new deal for students of Canadian foreign polic y - I gratefully dedi cate thi s book. Those practitioners of diplomacy wh o thin k I exaggerate its discontents , or treat th e craf t o f states too roughly , I do not chid e fo r trying t o exten d the limits of the immunity t o which the y fee l entitled . I only declar e to the m that elsewhere I have written of my ow n profession just as critically as of theirs. The library of th e Canadian Institute of International Affairs ha s provided m e with courteous and efficient service , often beyon d th e cal l of duty; I am grateful fo r the help of its former librarian , Madelaine Grant, her successor , Jane Barrett, and Elizabeth Fox . M y thanks t o Heather Wright for secretarial assistance ar e long overdue but warml y conveyed. To th e University of Toronto Press I tender my appreciation of deft an d expert assistanc e at every stage in the productio n o f my book, with especial thanks to Rik Davidson for his interest an d support, an d to Jea n Wilson for editing s o rapidly an d meticulously a rather unruly manuscript . June 197 1 Toronto J

E

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Contents Preface vi

i

PART I TH E DELIQUESCENC E OF DIPLOMACY

1 Th e clearin g of the chancerie s 3 2 Th e ambassador a s hostage 9 3 Th e corresponden t an d the diploma t 1 4 'Rall y roun d th e file , boys!' 3 5 'Live , and let Nelson Eddy live ' 4 6 A foreign policy fo r beaver s 4 7 Principle s fo r receivershi p 4 8 Trade , not brai d 5 9 Th e sellin g of th e think-tan k 6 10 Th e deliquescenc e o f diplomac y 6

PART I I FAT E AN D WILL IN FOREIGN POLIC Y

1 Lef t an d right 8 2 Th e vital centr e 9 3 Ignoranc e an d knowledge 10 4 Blindnes s and previsio n 11 5 Inerti a and innovatio n 12 6 Forc e an d impotence 13 7 Weaknes s and powe r 14 8 Stupidit y an d power 15

PART II I RIGH T AN D WRONG IN FOREIGN POLIC Y

1 Th e way s of statecraf t 16 2 Th e way s of keeping fait h 17 3 Th e words o f world politic s 19 Acknowledgments 19

7 3 1 5 9 9 2 9 1 2 2 2 3 5 6 6 5 8 2 9

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Part I THE DELIQUESCENCE OF DIPLOMACY

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1 The clearing of the chancerie s Readers of Lawrence Durrell's Esprit d e Corps, written t o while awa y the lon gueurs of a posting in some distant dreary capital, may recal l his tale of th e evening when th e entire diplomatic colon y i n Belgrade were invited by th e British ambassador t o a party o n a raft, specially constructed fo r th e gala event, which a t the height o f the ensuing revelry slipped its moorings and edged fro m shore . 'Th e lighted raf t hun g like a fire-fly o n th e smoot h surfac e of th e rive r an d the n slowl y began to move downstream i n the cal m night air , the candle s flutterin g softly , the band playing, and the corp s dancing or smoking or gossiping, thoroughly a t peace.' It was an enchanted moment , an d th e ambassador was congratulating himself upo n his social triump h whe n he remembered - th e sweat starting out o n him as he did so - tha t only a few miles distant th e rive r Sava met th e swiftl y flowing Danube forming by thei r confluence a whirlpool int o th e vortex o f which th e accredite d representatives of forty states , together wit h thei r ladies, were being inexorably drawn. That i s one, possibly to o drastic , way o f reducing the diplomat surplu s now afflicting mos t o f the countrie s of th e world, including our own . There ar e other ways . One has just been put forwar d in Britain by th e Review Committee on Overseas Representation.1 This committee , compose d o f a businessman (Sir Val Duncan, its chairman), a retired senior foreign offic e official (Si r Frank Roberts) , an d an economist an d dôppelganger diploma t (Andrew Shonfield), was invited by th e foreign secretary 'to review urgently the function s and scal e of the Britis h representationa l effor t overseas.. . in th e light o f decisions on foreig n an d defence policy .. . the balanc e of payments, 1 (Cmd . No. 4107, HMSO , London 1969 )

4 Diplomacy and its discontents

and th e changin g international rol e which these impl y fo r the Unite d Kingdom.' It responde d b y producing a state pape r as candid in its analysis and as radical in its recommendations as any since th e Trevelyan-Northcote report on civi l service reorganization more tha n a century ago . The Duncan Report find s th e British foreig n servic e over-staffed an d underemployed. One reason for th e clutte r is the indiscriminate openin g of embassies in almost al l of th e fift y o r sixty ne w states entering international societ y since 1945 . Another reaso n is the assumptio n that while one mission may be smaller than another, al l belong to th e same species. This the Duncan Repor t rejects. Why, it asks , should th e spectru m o f diplomatic activity , and hence the scal e of administrative complexity, b e the sam e in the embassy at San José a s it is in the embass y a t Washington? Accordingly it recommend s dividing overseas missions into tw o differen t categories. The comprehensive mission may continue to run the gamut - hand ling inter-governmental relations, advising on foreign policy , helping one' s nationals t o clinc h a deal or be release d from jail, purveying intelligence, influ encing foreign opinion. Bu t th e comprehensiv e mission should b e confined t o what i s termed Britain' s 'area of concentration' - western Europe and North America - where , it is forecast, most o f the important diplomati c busines s of the seventies will be done; to th e Soviet Union; an d to China . The selectiv e mission is, with som e exceptions, suited t o th e hundred o r so other state s relegated to the comparative obscurity of the 'outer area.' There British vital interests may be adequatel y looked afte r b y small, highly special ized mission s concentrating o n a particular aspec t of policy - trade , aid, defence, o r whatever it may be . There will be som e countries , conceivably a fair number , where no missio n at all is required. This is not becaus e (as in the American diplomatic tradition ) the local ideolog y is thought to emi t an offensive smell , but rathe r because nothing goe s on in 'Barataria' (the Dunca n Report's fictiv e polit y of marginal importance - a device not without hazar d when new states keep coming on the scene with names like Zimbabwe, Namibia and, for al l anyone ca n tell, Barataria) worth th e troubl e an d expense of maintaining a mission there , even on a 'selective' scale. But i t is not just tha t ther e ar e too man y missions. The chanceries are overcrowded. Too many people pus h to o many pens across too man y pieces of paper, filling the m with worthless messages. The Duncan committee woul d ruthlessly demobiliz e servic e attachés . The y propose a n immediate twenty-five pe r cent cutback in the Britis h defence staf f at Washington, they se e little nee d fo r attachés i n western European capital s which ca n be reached by ai r from Whitehal l in an hour, they think the y do

The clearing of the chanceries 5

more harm tha n goo d i n those region s east o f Suez fro m whic h militar y power has been withdrawn . The committe e als o has it in for th e embass y flack, known more decorously a s the information officer . 'I t will be desirable to curtail, quit e severely, the attemp t t o project Britain's images and policies by the written word (hand outs or press releases).' These reform s the conventiona l foreign service officer ca n and will applaud . Ever since the Britis h ambassador in Lisbon complaine d i n 184 0 that his attachés had nothing bette r to do than to read his despatches like newspapers, he has resented the intrusio n of military officers , pres s officers, agricultural advisers, and s o on down a lengthening list o f specialis t usurpers. It is when th e conventional foreign service officer reache s chapter 4 of the Duncan Report ('political work'), with it s annex J ('the evaluation and control o f politica l reporting'), that hi s applause is stilled. For i f the analysi s is judged correct , if the recommendation s are carried out, he ma y follow th e military an d press attaché int o oblivion . The Duncan Report call s into question hi s principal raiso n d'être: the necessity an d worth o f the despatche s he send s back fro m abroad . These despatches, when the y ar e not mer e duplicates of what i s contained i n the great newspapers of record, fall int o two kinds. There is the accoun t of what th e diplomat has been told, or asked, to conve y to his government. Such a despatch i s irreplaceable - a reporter or a businessman being an unreliable channel of communication - but no t necessarily indispensable. Too often th e network i s clogged with gossip. 'It may not b e without significanc e that when , during my fortnightly intervie w with th e secretar y of state i n his office a t noon today , I ventured to bring up th e subject of the Chicago drainage canal , Mr Acheso n betraye d even more asperit y than i s his wont ... ' The studen t o f diplomatic histor y - th e history, in A.J.P. Taylor's phrase, of what one file cler k said to anothe r file clerk - wil l know how much of the archives is filled wit h twitter of this type; there i s no reaso n to believ e that this sid e of the thirty-yea r rule the proportion change s for the better . As with cybernetics, so with diplomacy : garbag e in, garbage out . Distinct fro m reportin g what on e foreign offic e wishe s to tel l another i s the diplomat' s appraisa l of events. He tries to tak e the measure of a man, t o discern th e force s in a society. These he may wish to follo w up by a magisterial 'Whithe r Baratería?' - if only t o draw the fact of his existence t o the attention o f his superiors who might otherwis e be oblivious to it. The fledg ling foreign service officer write s his 'Whithe r Baratería?' for the sam e reason that th e assistant professor writes his 'Political Culture in Central America' except tha t with th e FS O it is 'circulate or perish.'

6 Diplomacy and its discontents

Before m e is a diplomatic calenda r fo r June 1964 . A typical wee k begins with Sovie t aviation day on the 24th, moves on to proclamation o f the independence of the Malagasa y Republic on the 25th and is followed in quick suc cession by th e Buddhis t Festival of Pson on th e 27th and Canadian Army Day on th e 28th. Not al l these event s will feature entertainment as diverting as Polk-Mowbray's evening on the Sava, but eve n so they hardl y provid e a milieu suited t o first-rat e political analysis . 'The intensity an d isolation o f embassy life an d entertainment,' writes one who knows them well , 'the formalities an d protocol, al l contribute t o the diplomat's lassitude. Young British diplomat s soo n lose their curiosity, usuall y after thei r thir d posting , and achieve a lack lustre expression, an immunity t o new experienc e and new people, an d above all an absence of zeal.' 2 It i s upon suc h dispirited cohorts , a t an annual cost o f 105. 8 millio n pounds sterling, that th e British government relies for judgment a s to wha t makes the world go round. But for not muc h longe r - i f Sir Val and his colleagues have thei r way . 'There are inherent difficulties i n evaluating the political reportin g work carried ou t by our diplomatic posts abroad. The nature of this work militate s against any effective appraisal i n absolute term s or any precise assessmen t of its cost effectiveness.' Tha t muc h th e authors of the Duncan Report ar e obliged t o concede. Common sense , as distinct fro m cos t effectiveness , coul d have led the m to conclud e that diplomatic despatche s are these day s over-priced. The smallest possible 'selective ' mission - tw o diplomatic officers t o compose th e cables, a clerk to encipher and decipher - run s $30,000 a year. That i s a good deal more tha n annua l subscriptions to thos e leading newspapers and journals of opinion fro m whic h an y foreign offic e ca n glean what it needs to know abou t the background of world events. 'The truth i s that on e derives far more news from th e press' - s o wrote Lloyd George' s private secretary in 1917 - 'tha n from ever y other source , and every day in the clu b on e sees the lon g rows of high foreign official s going to the notice board to find out wha t is really happening.'3 L.B. Pearson has testified that 'ther e are foreign correspondent s of newspapers whose despatche s can be a s full, shrew d an d useful a s any diplo mat's. Sometimes the y ar e based on an even greater knowledge and broader experience o f the country - and its people - abou t which the y ar e both 2 Anthon y Sampson, Anatomy o f Britain Today (Hodde r an d Stoughton, London 1965), 31 8 3 Quote d i n J.R.M. Butler, Lord Lothian (Macmillan , London 1960) , 66

The clearing of the chancelles 7

writing.'4 It is said tha t during the New York newspaper strike th e qualit y and quantity o f diplomatic reportin g around th e world diminished percep tibly: withou t Th e New York Times t o tell the m wha t to say, the diplomat s fell silent. 5 The diplomat more tha n the journalist i s inclined to be pro-junta. Everything conspire s to make him so. He cannot, consistentl y with protocol, hob nob with the opposition , especially i f it is under house arrest . He gets only one sid e of the story - ofte n the losing side . These impressions he faithfully convey s to headquarters. It is not tha t headquarters would be no worse off without them . It would be better off without them . Vietnam an d Biafra ar e each in their way the product s of th e occupational hazard s of diplomatic reporting from th e scene . So much would common sens e lead one to conclude . Bu t Sir Val Duncan and his colleagues are not conten t wit h common sense . They have devised a scientific test, of sorts. Taking advantage of a rupture of diplomatic relation s wit h a number of other countries, resulting in the closin g down of missions overseas, they have assessed what advers e effects, i f any, have followed. They fin d i t made no difference. The United Kingdom got along without th e missions, a s it had got along with them . The recipients of their advic e were not paralyze d by being deprived of it. 'Th e user departments in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office made it plain that their main functions of action, decision , and policy making had bee n little affecte d b y th e withdrawal of the posts in question.' What lessons does the Duncan Report contai n fo r the government of Canada? With sixty-seven missions in the field , from Mosco w to Montevideo, plus nineteen consula r establishments, Canada is wildly over-represented overseas in relation t o her needs . In earlier years those needs were constitutional rathe r tha n political. The Canadian diplomat wa s a pawn in the game of East Block versus Downing Street, eac h new embassy a milestone alon g the road fro m colon y t o nation . Our right of legation was first exercised i n 192 7 by exchanging ministers with the United States. But this was a step towards status, not substance . 'The qualifications for a successful diplomat in Washington,' wrote ou r first secretar y soon afte r his arrival, 'are, in order of importance, (1) a good head fo r liquor and (2) a capacity fo r producing, orally an d on paper, polite guff a t a moment's notice. This,' he added, 'I found tryin g at first, but i t is 4 Diplomacy i n the Nuclear Age (S.J . Reginald Saunders, Toronto 1959) , 16 5 "Th e bulk of political reportin g is still spo t reporting, also known as translating Le Monde.' Diplomacy for the '70s: A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State (GPO, Washington 1970) , 468

8 Diplomacy and its discontents

becoming mechanical.' 6 It was much th e sam e in London. 'N o one here has any ide a as to what th e Canadian attitude is,' Pearson wrote afte r represent ing Canada for th e firs t time , 'o r even if there i s a Canadian attitude. Bu t I was reluctant to sa y that, so I chatted amiabl y fo r 1 5 minutes.' 7 There i s a motto fo r a Canadian foreign office , bu t i t would have to b e disguised in Latin : Home quadrantum suaviter garriebam. Thereafter mission s proliferated lik e toadstool s i n the dew . All parties agreed tha t mor e mean t better. 'I s there an y likelihood,' asked Mr Martin of Mr Gree n in 1960 , 'o f an y mission being established i n Baghdad?' Replied Mr Green to M r Martin: 'This is a mission I would lik e very much t o hav e established, and there ar e others too.' 8 But he di d not explai n ho w our vital interests are served by having our men i n Baghdad, nor what rol e othe r tha n sym bols of Canada's conspicuous consumptio n ar e played b y a score o f exotic missions in our numerou s 'outer areas.' Recent tribulation s o f the diplomatic profession - th e fire-bombing of our embassy i n Austria, the kidnapping of the US ambassador in Brazil - ar e usefu l reminders that mission s these day s are not s o much mile-stone s a s mill-stones, hostages rather tha n statu s symbols . A radical reorganization o f th e Departmen t o f External Affairs, undertaken i n the spiri t of the Duncan Report, coul d d o much t o improv e th e machinery o f our diplomac y an d th e qualit y o f our foreig n policy. Mos t of it s postings ar e expendable. Much of its work is redundant. Many of its official s are unnecessary. The nam e is 'External,' not 'Eternal. ' [September 1969 ]

6 Hum e Wrong t o Mrs G.M. Wrong, July 1927 , Wrong Papers 7 Quote d i n John R . Beal , The Pearson Phenomenon (Longmans , Toronto 1964) , 55 8 Canada , House o f Commons Debates, 1 5 July 1960,6377- 8

2

The ambassador a s hostage Into eac h life som e rai n must fall, but to o muc h is falling int o the diplomati c life. The modern ambassado r is under severe occupational stress . Admittedly, most profession s are tense thes e days, and academic s are fond o f singling out their ow n as one o f special strain. But eve n the don , dissolvin g in self-pity as he face s th e fusillad e of chalk an d insult by which his classroom's abou t t o be 'liberated,' might conced e that hi s predicament pales by comparison wit h th e problems of the diplomat . The don has tenure, the diplomat ha s immunity, both privileges are under attack. But while the traditiona l defences against violations of academic free dom - blacklisting the offending institution, solidarit y amon g colleagues - are still secure against meddlesome governor s (if not agains t mettlesome students) , the traditiona l defence s against violations of diplomatic immunit y are in contrast crumbling . For the y consis t solel y of whatever resources of restraint and courtesy a community may muste r out o f its sense of civic virtue and enlight ened public policy. Of such resources the world today is running out - faste r even tha n of gas, or of gazelles. Last week' s kidnapping of .the West German ambassador to Brazil - unlik e his colleague the ambassado r to Guatemala, Mr Von Holleben a t least emerged from hi s ordeal alive - remind s us once mor e of the trul y savage levels to which we have allowed internationa l comity t o descend . Peoples whom som e anthropologist s persis t in calling primitive put u s to shame in this respect, for amon g them th e rules of diplomatic immunit y are invariably observed . By one aboriginal cultur e after anothe r - Arunta of Australia, Maoris of Oceana, Indians of North America - th e person an d mission of the triba l envo y ar e held sacred . Their ambassadors , writes an authority ,

10 Diplomacy and its discontents

'were received with every mark of honor an d respect, perfumed with incense , presented wit h flowers, and well lodged an d entertained. An y insult or indignity offere d the m was a sufficient caus e of war.' There was a time when such hallmarks o f civility were stamped a s well on countries calling themselves civilized. But i t was long ago and fa r away. In 1708, the Russian ambassador in London wa s arrested at th e instigation of merchants to whom he owed money. He was quickly released , apologies were tendered, those harassing him were punished. Bu t the ambassador , unmollified b y thes e amends , had lef t i n a huff, and nothing woul d do but tha t Lor d Whitworth, British envoy at St Petersburg, be accredited for th e specia l mission of conveying to Peter th e Great in public audience the expression of the queen's regre t an d sorrow. This episode was related in Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice in 193 2 as if such punctillious apologie s were still standar d operating procedure among chancelleries, as if the molestatio n of an envoy was still an unheard of outrage. Neither were true. The image of the diploma t a s effete pushe r of cookies , dilettante o f drawing-room and boudoir, obscured the exten t t o which hi s had already become a dangerous profession. Four main hazards now haunt th e diplomatic life . One is to b e posted t o a war zone an d get caught in th e cros s fire, like the U S vice-consul killed by a terrorist bomb i n Cyprus in 1956 , or the membe r of the U S embassy in Saigon killed in a Viet Cong attack i n 1965 , or the US military attaché kille d b y sniper fir e i n Amman a few days ago. Another i s to be singled out b y a crank or fanatic with som e grievance, real or imagined, against the diplomat' s government . A Soviet minister t o Poland wa s gunned down in 192 7 by a Russian monarchist; a Spanish diplo mat was shot in the street s of Mexico City by a Cuban who had fought agains t Franco; the American ambassador t o Japan was stabbed by a student i n 1961 ; some aggrieved individual se t fire t o th e Canadian mission i n Vienna in 1969 . A third sourc e of danger to the diploma t is where a foreign government fails, for one reason or another, t o provide him with protection, to whic h he is entitled b y th e la w of nations, an d so becomes accomplice in , even instigator of, his harassment. Communist governments, with their equivocal attitude t o internationa l law and secretive style of politics, are notorious offenders . In eastern Europe , the line between legitimate political reporting and espionage i s drawn by th e authorities erratically an d without warning ; the experience o f a junior Canadian diploma t who , driving from Berli n to Warsaw in 1947 , wa s imprisoned by th e Russians for a fortnight, i s unusual only fo r the duratio n o f his detention.

The ambassador as hostage 11

Third world governments , with thei r revolutionary ideologie s an d antiimperialist hang-ups , often tur n a blind ey e while mob s vent their frustratio n on representatives of white, neo-colonialist powers . And th e most persisten t an d systematic violation s of diplomatic immunit y take plac e i n Washington, DC, New York City, and along Route 40 (the high way in between), where African an d Asian envoys endure affronts, abuse , and muggings. But i t is the fourth, and latest, hazard whic h i s most dangerou s of all - th e risk o f being kidnapped b y guerrillas, terrorists or other outlawed oppositio n groups. This tacti c holds th e gravest peril no t just for the perso n of the ransomed diploma t bu t fo r the futur e o f the diplomati c system . The outbreak bega n in August 1969 , with th e abductio n o f the America n ambassador t o Brazil . That thi s case seems to b e the first o f its kind i s not be cause of th e sanctit y o f embassies, i t is because of lack o f organization an d flair among those underground movements which stan d t o gain by trading captured diplomat s fo r prisoners and pay . Now the y hav e been show n i t can be done. Political kidnappin g wil l become a s common - an d as successful - a s political hijacking . And the useful ness of the diploma t a s his government's public ey e abroad will be at an end . Already it is ending. To the blinker s which have always shielded th e dip lomat fro m realit y - th e cronyism of the diplomatic corps , the diplomat' s desire to thin k wel l of the regim e at whose pleasur e he remains, the circum spection require d by protocol - must now be added the screen of security. In capital afte r capital , embassies are being hermetically seale d s o as to protect thei r inmates . 'Ambassador s no longer wander around o n their own, ' a despatch fro m th e fiel d reports . 'Securit y men accompan y the m t o socia l functions, shoppin g trip s an d diplomatic appointments . The daily itinerarie s of ambassadors are kept a s secret as possible, and officia l limousine s alternat e their routes while takin g ambassadors between their office s an d homes.' In US embassies, one officia l ha s revealed, regulations are so strict tha t 'we tel l each othe r wher e we're going and what we're plannin g to d o only o n a "need t o know" basis.' Such working conditions bree d paranoia - hardly a n aid to dispassionate analysis. It is by n o means confined t o th e missions of West Germany and th e United States , th e countrie s thu s far singled out . 'Representative s of all Socialist countrie s ar e in danger anywhere in Latin America, ' a Czechoslovak embassy officia l ther e ha s stated; while a Latin American diplomat, chatter ing with fright , told a reporter: 'Th e guerrillas are out t o get us, host govern ments may refus e t o help us, other embassie s may be servin g as lookouts fo r the guerrillas, and any one who looks a t us sideways on the stree t ma y be

12 Diplomacy and its discontents

planning t o kill us. How do I know you aren't talkin g t o me merely to lay a trap?' If the diplomat mus t now be described as an honest ma n sent to cower abroad for his country, his usefulness is clearly at a close. He might just as well stay home. His government will learn more of the turbulent world by reading the daily papers . The foreign corresponden t is today a more reliable purveyor of intelligence than th e diplomat - not because he is braver, but because his employers, given th e choic e between their scoop and his safety, will choose th e scoo p ever y time . Ottawa planners of Canadian representation abroad , please note well. [June 1970] 'An honest ma n sent to die abroad for his country.' Sir Henry Wotton's defi nition of the diplomat had it 'lie,' not 'die.' But that wa s in the seventeenth century, when th e person o f the envoy was held i n scrupulous regard not onl y in the law of nations but i n their practice too. We practise differently today . Not tha t the law allows us to. The prime duty of all governments to protect the diploma t an d succour him i n danger survives in international affair s not a s some quaint reli c of the past but i n a recent affirmation. 'The receiving state shal l treat him with due respect,' recites the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 'and shall tak e all appropriate step s to prevent any attac k upon his person, freedom or dignity.' Such was the pledge of forty-five governments - amon g them th e government of Canada. The government of Canada failed t o prevent an attack upo n the person and freedom of J.R. (Jasper) Cross , United Kingdom trade commissioner in Montreal. (The dignity of Jasper Cross, being an aspect of his character, lay beyond th e reach of his abductors.) The government of Canada therefore had an especial obligation t o put hi s safety before every other consideration . It chos e t o put i t somewhere else. 'Clearl y thes e ar e unreasonable demands,' the secretary of state fo r external affairs declare d of the kidnappers ' terms for the releas e of their hostage. 'I need hardly say that this set of demands will not be met.' Ransoms demanded by kidnappers always appear unreasonable to thos e who are asked t o pa y them. Kidnappers run grave risks, they must play for high stakes ; their tim e runs out quickly, they mus t use their fleeting power while the y can. So the kidnappers of Jasper Cross set a steep price for his release. Steep; but i n only one of their demands exorbitant. The government coul d not i n good conscienc e tel l the FLQ the name of its informer; that would have amounted to tradin g one life fo r another. (Trading one hostage fo r anothe r

The ambassador as hostage 13

would hav e been a n ethical exchange; but Canadia n ministers, less chivalrous than Latin , did not voluntee r to put themselve s i n Mr Cross's place. ) None o f the othe r demand s lay beyond th e pale o f a reasonable propitiation where a man's life hangs in the balance. Hunted me n at bay must bargain for abeyanc e o f the hunt. Without saf e passag e to a n asylum, the abductor s could no t deal ; the logic of this demand the government recognized onl y afte r the famil y of Jasper Cross had endure d five times th e expiration of a deadline for hi s murder. Postal workers if re-hired for the occasio n coul d have been fired whe n i t passed. $500,000 in bullion i s less than th e $700,000 demande d by Guatemalan terrorist s - who killed thei r hostag e whe n the y didn' t get it. What of the demand - copie d fro m th e Tupamaros of Uruguay - for publicity fo r FLQ ideas? At length th e government gave in on this. The broadcas t on Thursday nigh t of an FLQ manifesto, an d its reproduction i n the press , has done more good tha n harm. Locating th e lunatic fringe help s the vital centre find itself . Any societ y doe s well to know th e mind s of those who would subvert it. The mos t vexin g of the FLQ demands was that twenty-thre e convicted terrorists be sprun g from Canadia n prisons for sanctuary in Cuba or Algeria. A bitter pil l t o swallow; yet othe r governments had swallowe d it. Brazil released fiv e prisoner s to secur e the freedo m of the Japanese counsu l Vénérai in March 1969; fifteen prisoner s to secur e the freedo m o f the American ambassador in September 1969 ; fort y prisoners to secur e the freedo m o f th e West Germa n ambassado r i n June . Onl y las t mont h th e government s o f Bri tain, Wes t Germany, an d Switzerlan d surrendere d the hi-jacker s in thei r custody t o secur e the freedom o f passengers held hostage b y Palestinian guerrillas. Defying th e kidnappers, by contrast , ende d onl y in tragedy. Guatemala refused t o releas e twenty-five prisoners t o secur e the freedo m of the West German ambassador; Count von Spreti was murdered. Uruguay refuse d t o release 15 0 prisoners to secur e the freedo m of an American technical assistanc e expert; Dan Mitrione was murdered. All these precedent s were at the disposal o f that inner circle o f federal cabinet minister s an d senior civil servants upon whom, durin g their meetings throughout th e week in the new east block operation s room , th e burden of decision ha d devolved . If Jasper Cross was not t o be sacrificed at the alta r of Canadian national pride, experience pointed t o appeasement . Expediency pointe d th e sam e way. One thing for a government with thou sands of political prisoner s - or political criminal s - to balk at releasing a few; Canada's twenty-thre e would have just abou t cleane d ou t th e cells . Once in Cuba or Algeria they would no longer be a drain on th e taxpayer , a strain on

14 Diplomacy and its discontents

their guards, an inducement t o mor e abductions . The FLQ might have botched their getaway ; there's many a slip between Dorval and Havana, Dorval and Algiers. Maybe Castro or Boumedienne could be induced t o send the m back . Such arguments, if heard, made no headway a t all. Neither Ottawa nor Quebec City were disposed toward s an appeasement which migh t mak e i t appear tha t th e FLQ were right t o depict it s jailed murderers and robber s as no more guilty of a real crime than th e victims of Soviet o r Greek o r Brazilian tyranny. They feare d as well for th e safet y of th e realm . To give in would give rise to a n orgy of kidnapping and lawlessness. Diplomats would toppl e t o ter rorist attack s lik e falling dominoes. Ther e mus t be no surrende r to blackmail . That i s called paying the Dane-gold; But we'v e proved it agai n and again, That i f once you hav e paid him th e Dane-gold You neve r get rid of the Dane. Buoyed by suc h homely folk-wisdom, the government refused t o give in. Its reward fo r such holy obstinacy was the kidnapping, minutes after th e fina l deadline passed, of the Quebec minister of labour. To plac e th e welfare of society ahea d of the welfar e o f Jasper Cross (and now th e welfar e of Pierre Laporte) i s justified onl y i f we could be as sure of the impac t o f the releas e of the FLQ political criminal s upon th e nationa l in terest as we are of th e impact o f bullets upon th e brain . No such certaint y exists. To combat evi l the prim e minister has embraced evil. A leader who , however somberly, sacrifices the lif e o f an individual to an y political abstrac tion is a leader who on e da y may sacrific e hetacombs o f kulaks for th e sak e of some cherishe d principle . His followers will find themselve s not i n th e happy valle y of the just society , rathe r in the canyo n o f totalitarian rule . If Jasper Cross is crucified, we cannot fairl y charg e the governmen t of Canada with his killing; the FLQ's done that. But our government's decision may remin d us of another centurie s ago. 'I am innocent o f this man's blood; see to it yourselves.' Pilate's ghost stalked it s operations room las t week . [October 1970 ] J.R. Cross , Esq. c/o British Embassy Bern, Switzerland Dear Mr Cross, It would be entirely understandable if you ar e consigning all mail post marked Canada this Christmas unread to your waste basket. Even so, I write (as many Canadians must be writing) to sa y how relieve d and thankful w e are

The ambassador as hostage 15

that you hav e emerged fro m you r ordeal safel y an d fit an d been reunited with your family . That is some ligh t ami d our encirclin g gloom. Not lon g before your abductio n I' d discusse d in a column th e collaps e of the traditional defences against violations of diplomatic immunity - defence s consisting 'solely of whatever resources of restraint an d courtesy a communit y may muste r out o f its sense of civic virtue and enlightened publi c policy.' What I didn't understan d was how shor t i s the supply of civic virtue and enlightene d public policy i n Canada. I shared th e prevailin g parochialism an d smugness which betraye d us into believing that it could no t happen here. It seeme d strang e that it was happening at 129 7 Redpath Crescent. Your house i n Montreal used to belong to m y parents-in-law, so that the concern of my younger children, who ofte n stayed there , was first arouse d by thei r being able to imagine so vividly th e route taken b y your kidnappers - u p the ston e steps to the front door, past th e tiled foyer , through th e panelled hall , u p the broadloomed staircas e - the newel post carve d in the shape of an owl's head to th e bedrooms beyond. Your abductor s confess to having been unnerve d by this unaccustomed opulence . Not sufficientl y unnerved , alas, for the m t o have dropped thei r guns and run. More striking for me at th e time was the od d symbolis m of your case . A Joyce o r Nabakov could have a field da y - th e house high o n Mount Royal under th e cross , your name itself, your initials J.C., the threa t o f double-cross, indeed o f crucifixion. 'I am innocent o f this man's blood; see to it yourselves.' The words of Pontius Pilate seeme d to reverberat e down th e ages . On hearing that our government had turne d down th e demands for your releas e I quoted them i n an articl e arguing as forcefully a s lay within my powe r the cas e for negotiating you r freedom. It appeare d t o me then, it appear s to m e now, that th e case for negotiating your freedom was unassailable, expedientially an d ethically. About th e ethic s of the case , you maintaine d a t your press conference in London earlie r this month a discreet restraint. About expediency, you see m to shar e th e view of the government of Canada. 'If you let these chap s go to Cuba,' you argued , 'what guarantee is there tha t I would then b e released?' The guarantee, surely, is the terrorists ' vested interest in preserving kidnapping as an instrument of credible bargaining for the future . To welch on the dea l is to degrad e the tech nique. But th e techniqu e i s highly prized . No terrorist group, accordingly, has broken it s word abou t its hostages - no t for reasons of honour, for reasons of power. You the n raise d the issu e of the rol e of the media . 'There's been a lot of talk abou t journalistic responsibility,' you sai d at your press conference. 'But people have a responsibility t o th e kidnapped, the chap in there ... ' Ame n to that.

16 Diplomacy and its discontents

During your harrowing sojourn in the Avenue des Récollets ou r press bore this responsibility badly . Its speculation abou t whethe r you r messages had hidden meanings was either despicabl e or stupid. Believe , if you can , it was stupid only - th e result of what a recent report o n our mass media calls 'the archaic perceptions o f cop-shop journalism.' (It's tru e that the London Times ran one of your notes ove r the captio n 'I s Mr Cross indicating he is under duress?' bu t then Lanctot an d Carbonneau weren't likely reading the Times.) I feel oblige d to declar e and defend my ow n record in this regard, for I wrote an d spoke about the crisi s while you were still a prisoner. What I wrote was meant t o help you; it didn't help, but couldn' t har m you. On three occa sions I was asked to tal k on television . One was the da y afte r you r abduction ; I refused, knowing that seventy per cent of kidnap murders are committe d within fort y hours of the kidnapping. Another was the da y you were released; I refuse d again , knowing that until you wer e safe silenc e was golden. The thir d occasio n was the day following the murde r of Pierre Laporte. This tim e I agreed. I planned t o try t o plead with the audienc e to bring pressure on the government to bargain for your release. These ar e some notes I made to keep me to this theme: 'Don' t dissipate opportunity in academic or philosophical discussion . One life ha s been taken. Another remain s in the balance. Appeal to the government, to th e Prime Minister, to put asid e false pride , all considerations of prestige and face . Not t o becom e slave of policies wellintentioned, but poorly though t through . Result s count.' I spok e alon g these line s as best I could. My words were lost i n the editing . I don't blame the producer for cutting them out , though I felt badl y that they' d been cut out . Mercifully i t turned out the y weren't needed. You may have heard of a move to admi t you an d your wife t o th e Companionship o f the Order of Canada. All here see m enthusiastic, in the manner of hosts solacin g themselves for having been so beastly t o thei r guests. Personally I don't care for th e spectacl e of committees of senior public servants solemnly bestowing awards of state o n one another. What we in this country owe you an d yours is not decoration s but damages. As a taxpayer I'd gladly help foo t th e bill. It's obviousl y impossible t o work out th e amoun t of compensation owin g to a person obliged for sixt y days to 'liv e each day a s if thy last' in the mos t starkl y literal meaning of that line fro m th e ol d hymn. But £1000 each day comes close t o what the Londo n literary agents are saying your story' s worth t o the m an d what th e foreign office won' t allo w you t o sell your stor y for . I'd make them 60,000 guineas, not pounds. Guineas have class. So have you. Respectfully yours , James Eayrs [December 1970 ]

3 The correspondent and the diplomat In th e beginning, we find th e corresponden t and the diploma t a t loggerheads. 'The beginning' is the nineteenth century , and the second hal f o f it at that. It' s only a hundred years, and then onl y in Britain and America, since the opinio n of the public begins to matter very much t o thos e wh o conduct foreig n policy on its behalf. And onl y when publi c opinion matter s to th e policy-makers does the correspondent begi n to matte r t o th e diplomat. He matters because it is by what he writes that publi c opinion i s informed and influenced , for bette r or for worse. In the beginning, the diplomat though t i t for the worse. And with goo d reason. Look a t th e role o f the press in the tw o wars by which th e long nineteenth-century peace was broken: Britain's war in the Crimea, America's war with Spain. The officia l histor y o f The Times o f London exaggerates the paper' s part when it claim s that The Times 'mad e the war' in the Crimea. 1 But onc e th e war got unde r way, The Times mad e its conduct very difficult fo r diplomats . It was the firs t war when correspondent s took t o th e fiel d t o telegrap h t o their paper s their first-han d accounts of the ebb and flow of battle, the con duct o f campaigns, the incidence of casualties. Their despatches mad e lurid reading and boosted circulation . They dismaye d the Foreign Office . 'I f we could get such information,' a British diplomat lamented after readin g an especially forthcomin g account, 'i t would be worth thousand s to us.' 2 (Pounds or lives he didn't say.) Th e secretar y of state for war warned al l the Londo n 1 Th e History of Th e Times, II , The Tradition Established, 1841-84 (Printin g House Square, London 1939) , 190 2 Quote d in Olive Anderson, A Liberal State at Wa r (Macmillan, London 1967), 72

18 Diplomacy and its discontents

editors of the dange r of publishing militar y informatio n i n the despatche s of their correspondents . ' I have only t o appeal t o your patriotism,' he told them, 'to ensure a rigid supervision of all such [despatches]. ' If tha t wa s what h e really thought , h e was sorely disappointed. Th e Times publishe d it s despatches . The diplomats damne d its correspondents. Bu t no one put the m i n jail. During America's war with Spain , the press was hardly diplomatic. That' s putting it mildly. It was the firs t wa r when the press drove its government int o a war it didn't want. The ace illustrator o f the New York Journal, ordere d t o draw war pictures from Cuba , complained t o his proprietor that i t was an impossible assignment , sinc e ther e wa s no war in Cuba. William Randolph Hears t thereupon cable d his celebrated reply: 'Yo u furnis h th e pictures and I'll furnish th e war.' And he did. When Admiral Dewey's battleships sailed int o Manilla Harbor an d blew out o f the water what on e historian has called 'th e collection o f marine antiquities tha t passe d for th e Spanish fleet, ' Hears t ran an exultant headlin e 'HO W DO YOU LIKE THE JOURNAL'S WAR?'3 That wa s an exaggeration only i n the sens e that it was as much Pulitzer's war a s Hearst's. When an y of you nex t wi n a Pulitzer Prize for news reporting, awarded (according to th e citatio n o f its first recipient ) fo r 'strict accuracy, terseness, the accomplishment o f some public good commandin g publi c attention and respect,' you ma y find i t useful t o remembe r that your prize money derive s from a n estate accumulate d by one whose journalistic creed was 'Never be content wit h merely giving the news.' If news didn't exist, i t would b e necessary to inven t it. A reporter from Pulitzer' s New York World accordingl y invented th e new s of Spanish atrocitie s in Cuba: Blood o n the roadside, blood i n the fields, blood o n the doorsteps, blood , blood, blood ! Th e old, th e young, the weak, the crippled - al l are butchered without merc y ... 4 There wasn't a shred of truth i n any of this. Bu t its purpose wasn' t t o purve y the truth. It s purpose wa s to provide a pretext fo r intervention. At th e end of his list o f fabricated atrocities, th e ma n fro m Th e World aske d a question o f his 800,000 readers: 'Is there n o nation wise enough, brave enough, stron g enough t o restor e peace in this bloodsmitten land? ' It was a rhetorical question, both he and the y knowing th e answe r already. There was such a nation. It was their nation . The United States o f America soon invade d Cuba - no t for the last time . 3 Quote d i n Thomas A . Bailey, A Diplomatic History o f th e American People, 3r d ed. (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Ne w York & London 1946) , 514 4 Quote d i n ibid., 498

The correspondent and the diplomat

19

During this hey-day o f yellow journalism the diplomat forme d his image of the correspondent . Naturally it was far from flattering . Journalis m an d jingoism had becom e al l but synonyms . The diplomat, accordingly, regarded the correspondent no t merely a s a rival but a s something o f a saboteur. He was in any case a rival. Tension betwee n the tw o was built into their respective professional objectives. The highest testimonial a foreign ministe r could earn - s o Bismarck observed as early as 1883 - was distress in the world of journalism. 'Happy the people,' Walter Bagehot remarked, 'whose annal s are vacant, but wo e to the wretched journalists that have to compose and write articles therein.' But ther e is more to it than that. It's no t just that their jobs seemed more competitive tha n complementary, the correspondent prospering at the diplomat's expense. It's tha t their professional styles differ so , their life style s differ so . In temperament, in attitude, in outlook, i n ethos, the corresponden t and th e diplomat ar e at opposite extremes , inhabit differen t worlds. To th e correspondent , publicity is always welcome. It i s his life's work t o create it. Often as not h e i s its subject as well as its creator. A well known Toronto evenin g newspaper - not the Telegram - i s famous for what's called 'Star-man news': 'STAR MAN REACHES SOUTH POLE'; 'STAR MAN FINDS GERDA MUNSINGER I N MUNICH.' To th e diplomat , publicity is deadly, the ai r that kills. It nip s negotiations in the bud, it withers treaties on the vine. The diplomat shuns the limelight: th e very word (he recalls with a shudder) derives from news photography durin g its formative phase. Or tak e thei r attitud e t o time . (I mean the concept 'time, ' not th e weekly newsmagazine.) The correspondent works to deadlines. He's accustomed to immediate results: file today , in print tomorrow, feed-back the da y after. The diplomat als o has his deadlines. But his product take s a lifetime to produce, and even then he can' t b e sure. (Dean Acheson took to woodworking as a hobby because , as he says , you kno w when you've made a table or a chair, but ho w ca n you tel l with a foreign policy?) As with th e professiona l style, so with th e life style . The correspondent lives flamboyantly , floridly , i f not i n fact, in fancy. He takes for his model his master, who use d to live like a monarch: Hearst, secluded in a castle mids t his magpie treasures; Pulitzer, shuttling the Atlantic in a yacht th e siz e of a liner; Northcliffe, killing salmon o n three continents ; Thomson, killin g competitor s on four. The diplomat, in contrast, tolerates rather than relishe s all this. Ostentation an d display, like chandelier s and wine, are but th e props of his profes sional stage, on which h e appears only to sig n state papers or to honour officia l visitors. His real work is done elsewhere: a retreat in Whitehall, perhaps, where the routine's auster e enough - a procession of papers and callers, broken by a quiet lunch a t The Travellers' and a walk in St James's park .

20 Diplomacy and its discontents

Their demeanou r of work an d of life bein g so drastically different , the correspondent an d the diplomat confron t on e anothe r in a posture of mutual antipathy. Th e diplomat, George Kennan has written, sees his task a s a menial task, 'tidying up the messes other people have made, moderating the passion s of opinionated individuals. ' Is it any wonder that this 'weary sceptic' (as Kennan well describes him) shoul d s o deplore the correspondent ? Who makes more messes than the correspondent? Wh o is more opinionated? An d s o the diplomat take s of th e corresponden t a jaundiced view, seeing in him the distillation o f all that in human nature which is most extroverted, most thick-skinned, most pushing, most pre-occupied with th e present, least given to a sense of historical proportion , least inclined t o be animated by any deeper and more subtle philosophy o f human affairs, an d - by that same token - leas t inclined t o look deeply into the realities o f international life. 5 From suc h a creature the diplomat di d not fee l he had much t o learn. The Foreign Office official 6 wh o took on the job o f bringing up to date Satow' s classic Guide t o Diplomatic Practice note s only wit h disapproval what he describes as 'a growing tendency .. . to substitut e for the discree t exchange of notes, tendentiou s press conferences and abuse over the air'; he resolutely refuses t o sull y the pages of the classi c by offerin g t o fledglings of the foreign service hints on how to exploit th e new techniques o f open diplomacy . But thi s was to act like King Canute at low tide.7 It was to act, moreover, contrary t o the precept which diplomatist s ar e taught a t an early age - tha t which holds statecraft to consis t in the constructiv e acceptance o f th e inevitable. For wha t could be more inevitable than th e growing influence of th e press upon th e conduc t o f foreign policy? The corresponden t might b e an interloper in diplomacy, a meddler, a trifler, a trouble-maker. But ther e he was on the doorstep, indee d with his foot i n the door. And behind hi m were a host o f others - rud e and cheeky chap s fro m Path é an d Movietone news, roistering photographer s wit h flashguns, boisterous broadcaster s with micro phones. Whatever could you d o with them ? One' s first impuls e (if one was a diplomat) wa s to confiscat e thei r horrid apparatu s and throw the m al l in jail. But you couldn't do that, much a s you might wan t to - no t in Britain or America. So what wa s to be done? Well, there was always friendly persuasion ... 5 'Histor y an d Diplomacy as Viewed by a Diplomatist,' in Stephen D. Keitesz and M.A. Fitzsimons, eds., Diplomacy i n a Changing World (Universit y o f Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1959), 10 6 6 Si r Nevile Bland 7 No t really . Canute went through the motions of obduracy so as to impress upon his courtiers the futilit y o f stubbornness.

The correspondent and the diplomat 2 1

A harsher name for tha t is the managemen t o f news. If you wan t th e ver y model o f a modern new s manager, you wil l find hi m i n the perso n o f the foreign office pres s officer. Old-fashione d foreig n office s didn' t have press offi cers, for old-fashione d foreig n office s didn' t manage news. The Great Wa r is the turnin g point. The firs t impuls e o f the Foreig n Offic e i n 191 4 was to cen sor the news , not t o manage it. That worked fo r a while, but no t fo r very long . 'As the war went on,' the officia l Foreig n Offic e historia n tell s us, 'grave objections were felt t o th e exercise o f censorship by th e Foreig n Offic e .. . and late i n 191 5 a radical change was made.' For th e arbitrar y hand o f th e censo r there wa s substituted wha t th e officia l historia n call s 'gentle guidance.' This is how he say s it worked : The Press Bureau continued t o sen d th e Foreig n Offic e copie s o f dangerous or doubtful despatches , and it was often possibl e .. . to telephon e t o an y given newspaper that the y wer e abou t t o receiv e a message on thi s or that subject , but tha t i t would b e better tha t the y shoul d no t publis h it , o r a part o f it, for the followin g reason, th e tru e stat e o f affairs bein g ... 8 The diplomat found thi s device much to o usefu l t o allo w it t o lapse with the end of the war. The management of news was here t o stay . Henceforth the diplomat woul d mee t th e correspondent o n the correspondent's ground , using the trick s of the correspondent' s trade , even hiring correspondents t o d o his own trad e - o n the theory tha t i t takes one to know one . This practice has developed mos t full y i n the United States where toda y th e gentleman who meets the pres s on behalf o f the White House o r the State Department is, more ofte n tha n not , himsel f a sometime gentlema n of the press - a Jim Haggerty, or a Pierre Salinger, or a Douglass Cater. He is the voic e of his master, to whom h e has sold his pen, his brain, his soul . Sometimes, though , the maste r himself ma y try t o manag e news on his own behalf. An obviou s technique i s to win the favou r o f th e corresponden t by flatter y an d patronage. Trying to mak e lapdogs out o f watchdogs ca n be a risky business, because the watchdog's apt t o bit e th e hand tha t feed s it. But when i t works i t works wonders, and some statesme n are prepared t o run th e risk. It worke d wonders , fo r example, fo r th e prime minister o f Canada when, in 1923 , Mackenzie King decided t o tak e with him t o a n Imperial Conference the respecte d edito r o f the Winnipeg Free Press, John W. Dafoe. Mackenzie King was elated whe n Dafoe accepted : ' I confess, ' he wrote privately, 'that this has given me a feeling o f security with respect t o a fair an d just represen 8 Si r John Tilley, The Foreign Office (G.P . Putnam's Sons, London & New York 1933), 282

22 Diplomacy and its discontents

tation o f Canada's position, which I have not thu s far wholly enjoyed.' 9 Dafoe was a bit uneasy , as well he might hav e been, about a possible conflic t between his role as correspondent an d his new found role as an unofficial member of the delegation. Bu t this soon wore off. Mackenzie King had every reason to be pleased with th e experiment. Not onl y was his position a t the conference sympathetically reporte d in the Free Press, he acquire d in Dafoe a degree of admiration fe w other newspaperme n in Canada felt fo r him. 'M y regard for King,' Dafoe himself confesse d years later, 'which is quite considerable , dates largely from 1923.' 10 Encouraged by thi s success, Mackenzie King sought t o repea t it a few years later by directly approachin g the editor of the Toronto Globe. ' I shoul d be th e last t o wish The Globe o r any newspaper to sacrific e the slightes t degree of independence' - s o the Prime Minister of Canada commenced his attempte d seduction but I think I have seen enough o f public affairs t o know that a Government's influence ca n be much greater in the cause s it has at heart where it has a press that is sympathetic and in whose co-operation i n furthering its ends and policies it is possible t o count. Similarly, I believe it to be true that a great public journal can be vastly more influential in causing to prevail many of the views and opinion s o f its editorial contro l wher e it has the confidenc e and co-opera tion o f a Government in offic e .. . After all , we have not onl y common ideals to advance, but commo n enemies to fight . I believe, Mackenzie King concluded, 'tha t an increase of confidence between u s would mean not onl y adde d persona l joy, bu t adde d power to the caus e each o f us has very much a t heart.'11 The Globe's editor , W.G. Jaffray, di d not respon d to this, perhaps because he derived little personal joy fro m Mackenzi e King's embraces, perhaps because the prim e minister's offe r consiste d merel y of a trip to Ottawa t o tal k thing s over. He might have done better with a n offer o f a royal commissionership. (The visito r to Canada cannot fai l t o be astonishe d not onl y at the number of royal commission s created in this country, but als o at the numbe r of journalists appointed a s royal commissioners. ) Mackenzie King's assertio n tha t 'a great public journal can be vastly more influential... where it has the confidenc e and co-operation o f a Government in office' i s nowhere bette r demonstrate d - or more disastrously - tha n in the relationship betwee n th e British government and the London Times during 9 Kin g to Si r Clifford Sifton, 30 Aug. 1923, Kin g Papers 10 Quote d i n Ramsay Cook, 'J.W. Dafoe at the Imperia l Conference, 1923,' Canadian Historical Review, XLI, no 1 , Mar. 1960, 2 1 11 Kin g to W. G. Jaffray, 1 2 Aug. 1929, King Papers

The correspondent and the diplomat 2 3

the years before the Second Worl d War. It's no t just tha t The Times stoo d editorially fo r everything that may now be seen, with benefi t of hindsight, as the wrong policies - fo r appeasing Hitler, for ostracizing Churchill, fo r firin g Vansittart. W e all make mistakes. No, The Times' offenc e i s graver by fa r than that. It i s so grave tha t its official histor y ca n only hint a t th e gravity: The Editor an d [hi s assistant] relie d for thei r knowledg e of the Continent les s upon [their ] Correspondent s than upon certai n personal sources , and thus th e foreign polic y pursue d by Th e Times afte r th e crucia l year o f 193 6 became increasingly indebted .. . [to] th e Editor's ministeria l friends, Baldwin, Chamberlain an d Halifax ... 12 There i s one thin g worse than a n editor who prefer s th e view s of ministers who happen t o be his friends to th e views of journalists who happen t o be his correspondents. That is an editor wh o suppresses the despatche s o f his correspondent a t th e wishes of his ministerial friends. Thus far from his calling did Geoffrey Dawso n fall . The officia l histor y o f The Times passe s over this sordid episode in silence, as an authorized biograph y o f Judas Iscariot migh t ski m lightly ove r the rathe r awkwar d bit abou t th e thirt y piece s o f silver. Harold Nicolson, wh o used t o work fo r th e Foreign Office, wrot e at this time a widely rea d book o n diplomacy, i n the course o f which he addresse d himself to th e problem o f obtaining, as he put it , 'a satisfactory adjustmen t between the need s and rights of a popular Press and th e requirement s of discretion.' No trac e of the travail s of Th e Times darken s his sunny dispensation . The advantage s of a free Press,' he wrote serenely in 1939 , 'ar e so immeasurably greater than it s disadvantages that thi s particular problem of democrati c diplomacy nee d not caus e anxiety. I t i s little mor e tha n a minor inconvenience.'13 Few people toda y - correspondent s or diplomats - can think the matter should b e left a t that. Even those of us who would like t o think it shoul d b e have to concede tha t it's a counsel of perfection - a distant sta r by which to plot our life's ideals, not a reading light b y which t o earn our daily bread. And there ar e many who don't like t o think i t can be left a t that - who would resolve th e tensio n betwee n th e corresponden t an d th e diplomat b y having the correspondent plac e himself a t the disposa l o f the diplomat . 12 Th e History o f n e Times, IV, The 150th Anniversary an d Beyond, II , 1921-1948 (Printing House Square, London 1952) , 905 13 Diplomacy, 3rd ed. (Oxford, London, New York, Toronto 1963), 99-100

24 Diplomacy and its discontents

Not al l who are willing to compromis e th e freedo m of the press are warriors in the Cold War. They include , for example, s o sturdily independent a spirit a s Conor Cruise O'Brien wh o range s himself squarel y agains t th e ma t caelum position - 'le t the sky fall,' th e philosophical counterpar t o f 'publish and be damned.' If decei t is acceptable t o wi n a war, why should i t not b e equally acceptable , say, to preserve the peace? Or to ensur e a greater measure of social justice or social stability ? Ho w many lies [O'Brie n ask s rhetorically] migh t not justifiably have been tol d t o aver t Hiroshima?14 Or, we may ask (improving on his rhetoric), t o aver t the deat h o r mutilatio n of one tiny child ? An d we answer, if there's any humanity lef t i n us, as he answers: whole system s of mendacity . So the simpl e formul a 'diplomats lie, correspondents catc h the m out' is none to o helpfu l here. Of course diplomat s lie . We need no wise owls to tel l us that. Deceit i s commonplace i n foreign policy. An d s o what els e is new? Just this. Today, an d never more s o than today , honesty's th e best policy. The requirements of security, contrary to what diplomat s tel l us, do not con flict with th e requirements of truth . Diplomats tel l us otherwise; some correspondents tel l us otherwise. An d I cannot prov e them wrong . The proposition tha t honesty's the best polic y i s not t o be established by som e mathematical formula with th e infallibility o f a computer. All I can do is to invok e some lessons of history - hypothetica l history a t that. And appeal t o your intuitions - which ar e known t o be highly developed. Let's look closer at th e O'Brien scenario . He asks us to lie to aver t Hiroshima - short-han d fo r a hundred thousan d dead , unspeakable sufferin g fo r as many mor e again . And looking bac k i n horror we are willing liars in that cause . But wha t sor t o f falsehood migh t have spared those lives? None tha t I can think of, and I've though t hard . What about th e truth ? On 1 6 July 1945 , th e first explosio n o f an atomic bomb too k place in the New Mexican desert. I t was witnessed by a correspondent, Willia m Laurence of The New York Times. But Laurenc e was no ordinar y reporter, poised fo r the scoo p o f a lifetime. He was under contrac t t o the government, sworn to utmost secrecy , and included among th e witnesses only s o as to recor d th e even t for posterity an d to b e better prepared t o draf t th e press release once th e bombs had falle n o n Japan. And so, the detonatio n ove r and the ghastly clou d subsided , he filed no stor y of thi s news not fi t t o print . Bu t what i f he had? Suppose , instead o f the delphi c mes 14 Writers and Politics (Pantheon Books, New York 1965) , xvi i

The correspondent and the diplomat 2 5

sages crackling across to Washington an d Potsdam i n code - 'Th e light i n [Lit tle Boy's] eye s discernible from here t o High-hold an d I could hav e heard his screams from her e t o my farm' - suppos e there' d been banner headlines and detailed despatches . Might not th e High Command i n Tokyo, already divided on whether t o figh t on in a hopeless cause , have been swaye d toward s surrender? Might not Hiroshim a have been averted ? The questions can't be answered. But the y ca n certainly b e asked. Thirteen year s later another explosion shook th e desert - thi s one a hundred time s more destructive than th e destroye r of Hiroshima. N o correspondent witnessed th e explosion - no t because it was forbidden but because it was routine. Atomic testing had becom e a minor attractio n fo r tourists , a minor inconvenience for th e gambler s at Vegas. All the sam e there wa s a story here . The explosio n wa s designed to ascertai n how fa r from th e scen e the tremor s of the blas t might b e detected. Much depends on the outcome . I f not ver y far - a few hundred miles at most - th e opponents o f the proposed treat y to outlaw th e testin g of nuclear weapons could argu e that th e Soviet Union would violate the treat y by clandestin e testing underground. But if the tremor s could be detected a t a safe distanc e - sa y a thousand mile s or more - thi s argument was unconvincing an d th e chance s for a treaty improved. The officia l repor t of the test, put ou t by th e Atomic Energ y Commission, stated tha t the explosio n had no t bee n detected more tha n 20 0 miles away. But at th e tim e o f the explo sion, seismographical stations in Rome, i n Tokyo and , as it happened, i n Toronto, had registere d its effects. A sharp-eyed correspondent in Washington, intrigued b y th e discrepancy , followed u p the stor y an d discovered not onl y that th e blas t had registere d in these foreign cities , but tha t i t had bee n picked up a s well by n o fewe r tha n twent y U S stations, one a s far awa y as Fairbanks, Alaska - 260 0 miles fro m th e scene. But the evidence had been suppressed . The correspondent, I.F. Stone, publisher of the one-man independent I.F. Stone's Weekly, tol d th e stor y in his newspaper. The Atomic Energy Commission sai d only tha t ther e had bee n an 'inadvertent' error. Which of the m better serve d the national interest: the AEC by lying, I.F. Ston e b y publishin g the truth ? That questio n ca n be answered. James Reston o f The New York Times ha s confessed that he knew for ove r a year tha t th e Unite d State s was flying high altitud e plane s (the U-2) over th e Sovie t Union from a base in Pakistan to photograp h military and particularly missil e activitie s and bases, but th e New York Times di d not publis h this fac t until one of th e plane s was shot dow n in 1960 . Was this a correct judgment? I think i t wa s ... 1S 15 Th e Artillery o f th e Press (Harper & Row, New York 1967) , 20

26 Diplomacy and its discontents

Bully for Reston an d The New York Times. Bu t consider . The new s was suppressed unti l th e first plan e was shot dow n - until , tha t is to say, pilot Powers was in Soviet custody , unti l Khrushchev walked ou t o f the summi t conference injustifiabl e anger, until th e infant détente la y strangled in its cradle. Might it not hav e been i n the best interest o f the United States, an d the res t of us, had th e fact s been published when they firs t becam e known, so compelling the abandonmen t or at least the re-examinatio n of so risky and provocative a policy? My fina l exampl e is very recent an d clos e t o home . Last month a correspondent of the Montreal S tar, Mr Gerald Clark, published a despatch whic h state d that Canadian officer s i n the [Internationa l Control] Commissio n [i n Vietnam] are betraying their trus t b y actin g as informants for U S intelligence agencies. They are passing on thei r first-han d experienc e of North Vietnam: o n th e effectiveness o f US bombing attacks, and o n othe r matter s of military signi ficance. A harsher wa y o f putting it i s that the y ar e functioning as spies when they ar e supposed to b e serving as international civil servants.16 It's hard t o imagine a Canadian correspondent writing something more offensive t o a Canadian diplomat tha n th e words I've just quoted. Over th e image of Canada - th e image by which Canadia n diplomats would like thei r country t o be known t o th e world - the y pour a bucket of tar; to which is added just for good measur e a bale o f feathers. For years , the Departmen t of External Affairs a t Ottawa has insisted that Canada's intimate allianc e with the United State s in no way impedes the performanc e of her internationa l assignments, in no way impairs her reputatio n for impartiality, in no way erodes her effectivenes s i n mediation. Th e Clark despatch make s a mockery of thi s contention. S o once agai n the diplomats are angry with th e correspondent , who i s charged with al l the ol d familiar charges: indiscretion, irresponsibility, mischief-making. And worse: with lying . And even worse: with treason, or something clos e to treason . Only th e last is worth discussing . Certainly thei r anger isn't: foreig n office s are quick t o anger, especially at the expense o f correspondents who d o thei r job an d do i t well. As to lying, it is of course the diplomat s wh o ar e lying, not the correspondent : notice , in this case, the government issues its denial first , mounts its investigation second. But a s to treason ? Here we are talking o f th e national interest , and it's stil l too soo n to tell. In the shor t run , to be sure, the disclosures of correspondent Clar k are damaging. But in the long run i t may 16 "The y ar e Functioning as Spies,' Toronto Telegram, 1 2 May 196 7

The correspondent and the diplomat 2 7

prove otherwise. Th e momentary embarrassment of the Department o f External Affairs ma y tur n ou t t o be very cheap tuitio n if it learns the proper lesson : that prolonged an d intimate association of Canadian and American officials i s not invariabl y beneficial for Canadian policy. These example s prove nothing. Bu t the y rais e doubts. President Lyndon Johnson , frustrate d i n his efforts t o win Walter Lippmann, the greatest of the correspondents , over to his side, once remarke d with evident exasperation : 'Ever y time I pull my chair nearer that guy, he pulls his further away. ' That this was the appropriate response the president did not , does not, will not understand . But not al l presidents. President Johnson' s predecessor understoo d it very well. Asked in the sprin g of 196 2 what h e thought o f the correspondent s of the Washington press corps, John Kenned y replied: 'Wel l I am reading them mor e and enjoying them less.. . They ar e doing their tas k .. . And I am attempting t o d o mine. And we are going to live together fo r a period, an d then go our separat e ways.' [September 1967 ] Among journalists, as among thieves, there is little scope for honour - thoug h there i s much honesty . Th e correspondent's occupatio n require s him t o be an ingrate. Loyalty ca n never be his strong point. He bites the hand tha t feeds him. H e will not tak e 'no' for an answer, still less will he tak e 'n o comment.' He insists upon confirmatio n or denial. He insists upon openin g u p precisely those issues which thos e in charge fervently want closed. H e is a trouble-make r for th e policy-maker. Such a paragon o f a reporter has his beat in the Heavenly Kingdom; down below in history's cunnin g passages it is hard to keep this faith. Some earthly correspondents do not eve n try. There ar e even thos e who say they shoul d no t try . 'The responsible government official an d the responsibl e reporter,' according to James Reston, 'when they d o their bes t work ar e allies with on e another.' 17 So cosy a liaison i s nearly always harmful to th e press. 'Scotty ought t o try harder,' a colleague writes of Reston's work, 'to share the news with th e paying readers.' It may also harm th e nation . A loggerhead relationship between the corresponden t and the bureaucrat is hardest t o maintai n in matters of national security, for th e defence correspondent, more than other correspondents , feels oblige d t o fee d hi s columns with morsel s of information supplied by cronie s within government. But cronyism brings its day o f reckoning, if the corresponden t is any good a t all . 17 Th e Artillery o f th e Press (Harper & Row, New York 1967) , 10 8

28 Diplomacy and its discontents

For on e of the best a day of reckoning soon dawned . B.H. Liddell Hart , when militar y corresponden t fo r th e Daily Telegraph i n Britain during the 1920s, enjoyed th e ru n of the War Office. No visitor's pas s for him, n o nee d to clear interviews beforehand. Tea was proffered, sympath y expected . Fo r a while, Liddell Hart accorded his hosts sympatheti c treatmen t i n his dispatches. Then a critical articl e appeared: the army had no armour, no armour was a scandal. The War Office retaliate d b y withdrawing his privileges; then, relenting, offered t o restor e them o n certain conditions . ' I came to th e con clusion,' Liddell Hart wrote in his memoirs, 'that these would be fettering . So from tha t time onwar d I never went to th e War Office agai n ... I found that this abstentio n mad e little o r no differenc e t o me in the matter o f keeping informed.'18 Indeed it did not. Liddel l Hart practised his profession of scrutinizing the profession o f arms with mountin g authority an d influence; when he died in January 1970 , statesme n on both sides of the hill paid homage to th e man who, te n years before America n pundits, had see n the nee d to limit wa r in the nuclear age. He had earne d these tribute s entirely o n his own terms, being entirely his own man. An instructive contras t i s provided by on e of his American colleagues . Phil G. Goulding covered military affair s i n Washington for the Cleveland Plain Dealer from 195 0 t o 1965 . Gouldin g patrolled hi s Pentagon bea t on the buddy system , swapping discretion fo r secrets. A favourite buddy was Cyrus Vance, McNamara's right-hand man . Junkets a s well as secrets were part of the pay-off : 'We renewed our 195 7 acquaintanceshi p o n a professional reporter-official basis , advanced it afte r h e became secretary of the army , and eventually became friendly enough so that i n the fal l o f 196 3 h e agreed t o take m e with him on a personal inspection tri p of the arm y in Hawaii, Okinawa, Korea and Taiwan.' Goulding was already a veteran of thi s massageparlour circuit, having navigated it tw o years earlier in the compan y o f th e chief of nava l operations . About th e purpose o f these junkets (though no t abou t who paid fo r them) Goulding is frank enough : 'Thes e private trips were quite worth whil e - no t so much in the production o f news stories en route a s in gaining additiona l military background an d developing friendships and professional association s for th e future. ' Bu t ther e is no suc h thin g as a free lunch , let alon e a fre e round-the-world tour . 'On somethin g like the Vance trip I behaved circumspectly, passing up hard spo t "inside" stories which would cause trouble for our host... Some information , received in confidence as a courtesy t o Vance, or because we were with Vance, we kept i n confidence indefinitely.' Thu s 18 Memoirs, I (Cassell, London 1965) , 12 0

The correspondent and the diplomat 2 9

Goulding practised wha t Reston preached . I t helped creat e a military-media complex n o less dangerous to democracy tha n tha t military-industrial comple x which President Eisenhower warned about i n his farewell address. It i s plain t o see , and may have been plai n for the Plain Dealer to see , that Phil Goulding was in the wrong profession. He did not sta y in it. After a long party, he recalls, 'at perhaps 1 in the morning, I mentioned t o Cyrus that it might b e interesting t o work in the Department o f Defense.' Later tha t week the telephone rang . Later tha t month th e defence correspondent became acting secretary of defense fo r public affairs . To move fro m th e visitor's sid e of a Pentagon des k to th e chai r of the ma n behind i t is not lik e switchin g fro m th e Plain Dealer to th e Post ; it is more lik e a priest changin g places with his confessant, a surgeon with his patient ether ized upo n a table - a different world , not a different job. The reporter is expected t o tel l it like it is. The information officer i s expected t o tel l it lik e his government wants it heard. How seldom thes e desiderat a coincide, how often the y diverge , are divulged in Goulding's recollection s o f fou r year s as top flack in th e Pentagon, U S commissar of mendacity. 19 The tyr o PRO got of f to a bad start . 'The plane did not ente r the prohi bited zon e aroun d Perrelatte': suc h was the tex t o f his first press release. Not only had i t entered, it had take n pictures of the French atomi c energy plant . Hence his second pres s release: 'There was no intent t o overfl y an y prohibite d zone.' Maybe de Gaulle believed it; more likely not . Then cam e the Palomares caper . A B-52 had crashe d in Spain, on e of its H-bombs was missing. For eight y days, while US troops and diver s searched the area , the Pentagon kept sayin g 'No comment.' An information officer , asked why Geiger counters were being used, replied 'What are Geiger counters normally used for? ' This gave awa y to o much . 'W e sent a n immediate message to th e ai r force commander, ' Goulding recalls, 'to gag his gabby information officers. ' A year later anothe r hydrogen bomber crashed , this time in northern Greenland. Our Department of Transport Ai r Traffic Contro l Centr e in Moncton gav e the sho w away . Goulding comments: 'Despit e an agreement between two governments that nothing woul d be said yet, despite tota l silence i n Denmark, at Thule, at Plattsburgh, throughout th e State Department an d throughout th e Pentagon, th e news of the crash poppe d out . I t had not occurre d to us to as k Moncton, New Brunswick, to keep still; indeed, we had been unaware that ther e was a Moncton, New Brunswick.' 19 Confirm o r Deny: Informing th e People o n National Security (Harpe r & Row, New York, Evanston & London 1970 )

30 Diplomacy and its discontents

The arroganc e of ignorance . Goulding's mos t saddenin g revelation is how he an d his staff strov e to discredit Harriso n Salisbury's despatche s fro m Nort h Vie t Nam exposing a s a lie the U S line tha t onl y militar y target s were being bombed. 'Eac h of the Salis bury pieces was duplicated an d distributed within th e government for line-byline analysis... Scores - possibly hundreds - of individuals in the Pentagon par ticipated.' But they coul d no t scuppe r th e Salisbury statements, which simpl y told th e truth . Goulding describes this failure as 'a national disaster. ' It was no nationa l disaster, only a personal traged y for thos e wh o like himself ha d straye d so far from th e newsman's cod e a s to tr y t o betray a reporter in the field . 'It is incredible,' J.K. Galbraith remarks of them, 'that journalists, scholars, publicists , should join u p with thei r natura l enemies to espouse secrecy and reticence.' It is more tha n incredible, it is despicable. Bu t th e hacks an d flacks of censorshi p are backing a losing cause . 'Those who ar e candid almos t alway s survive. Thos e who see m for a time most successfu l i n suppressing the trut h eventuall y get buried by thei r efforts . We should be more grateful tha n we are,' Galbraith concludes, 'fo r whoeve r arranged things this way.' 20 Not eve n the military media comple x ca n manage al l of the new s all of the time . [August 1970 ] 'It's all here: th e story of our time - with th e bark off.' S o Lyndon Johnso n boasted o f the papers of his presidency embalmed in their buckra m boxes at his Texas mausoleum. Yet to discover the extent o f the rot beneath th e bark how President Johnson systematicall y an d stealthily embroile d his country in a war he'd promise d t o avoi d - a n historian woul d have been oblige d to wait for twent y years or more. Thanks t o th e U S Defense Departmen t fo r compil ing the record , thanks t o The New York Times fo r publishing its compilation , we can now read all about it . A cliché t o write o f L.B.J. 'large r tha n life, ' but s o he is - eve n in his undoing. The Vietnam Archive exposes him a s a titan o f mendacity, bestriding the narrow world like a colossus of deceit. He and his courtiers emerge fro m the secre t documents lik e character s in an amorality play, performers of grand guignol o n a global stage . Here is assistant secretary of defense John T. McNaughton outlining o n 3 September 196 4 ho w the United States coul d provok e North Vietna m int o reprisals to which th e Americans would the n respon d by bombing: 'Th e actions, i n addition to U S U-2 recce of DRV, US jet recc e of Laos, T-28 activity 20 Th e Observer, 2 8 Nov. 196 5

The correspondent and the diplomat

31

in Laos would be by way of an orchestration .. . to provide good grounds for us to escalate ... ' Here i s assistant secretar y of state William Bundy anticipating o n 1 8 February 196 5 ho w th e administration' s plo t t o provoke a wider war could pos sibly miscarry : 'W e might wel l find th e Soviets - or even the Canadians sounding us out o n whether w e would sto p our attack s in return for som e moderation i n VC activity. This is clearly unacceptable.' Here is McNaughton again, defining on 2 4 March 196 5 American goals in the war to come : '7 0 per cent - t o avoid a humiliating U S defea t (to ou r reputation a s a guarantor). 2 0 per cent - t o keep SVN (and th e adjacent) territor y from Chines e hands. 1 0 per cent - t o permit the people o f SVN to enjo y a better, free r wa y of life .. . NOT - t o "help a friend" ... ' (S o much fo r a deluded Prime Minister Pearson who te n day s later was to assur e his Philadelphia audi ence that the motives of their government 'were honorable, neithe r mea n nor imperialistic,' that 'its sacrifices... were not mad e t o advanc e any selfish American interest'; so much fo r a deluding President Nixon wh o a s recently a s April of this year told his countrymen tha t 'neve r in history hav e men fought fo r less selfish motives - no t fo r conquest, no t fo r glory, but onl y fo r the right of people fa r away t o choose th e kind o f government they want.' ) And her e i s policy plannin g councillor W.W. Rostow blurrin g on 1 6 November 196 4 th e squali d nature of the enterpris e by his flatulen t philosophiz ing: ' I know well the anxietie s an d complications o n our sid e of the line . But there ma y be a tendency t o underestimat e .. . that limited bu t rea l margin of influence o n the outcom e whic h flows fro m th e simpl e fact tha t a t thi s stat e of history w e are the greatest power in the world - if we behave like it.' It wa s said of the servant s of Weimar tha t b y makin g peace the y ha d stabbed German y in the back . It ma y be said of these servant s of Washington that by making war they ha d stabbe d Americ a in the stomach . It i s as if the bases t of th e Borgias , to whose misdeed s limits were set onl y by th e inadequacy o f the weapons at thei r disposal, had been abl e t o trad e their primitiv e poisons and daggers for the murderou s equipment o f the tech netronic state . Not eve n the Borgias could have been more brutal . They cer tainly coul d no t hav e been more blind . In its attempt t o preven t further publicatio n o f the documents, th e Nixo n administration say s of The New York Times tha t it 'has prejudiced the defenc e interests o f th e United States.' In a sense that charge is true. Henceforth, a s a direct resul t of The Times' disclosures, it will be harder for a n American government to interven e by forc e in foreign countries, harder to g o to wa r on a lie, harder t o kill and maim o n behalf o f a fictive 'fre e world. ' It wil l not b e so easy fo r Washington to selec t option s base d upo n deception , t o manag e vio-

32 Diplomacy and its discontents

lence with the old impunity. The disclosures do not guarantee - ala s - tha t there wil l be no more Vietnams. But they mak e them les s likely now . The y have certainly frustrate d on e of the Johnson administration' s war aims: 'To emerge from crisis without unacceptabl e taint fro m method s used. ' Was all this, then, new s not fi t t o print? Did The Times, b y publishing , debase the standar d displayed dail y on its masthead? 'All the News that's Fit t o Print' implies there's new s that's not. Such was its creed for many years. The New York Times i s wiser now, it's learne d its lesson well. All the new s is fit t o print, if it's new s of government. Concealment a s often a s exposure proves harmful to th e people. It i s not th e dut y of the press to conceal , it is the duty of the press to reveal. Only those whos e reputations suffer b y it s revelations now dare to disagree. 'Publish and be damned' has become 'publis h and be praised.' Damned or praised, the journalist has been taken off th e horns o f his dilemma. His course is clear. 'In what way can one's highest loyalt y b e given to one' s country?' Alan Patón asks , and offers thi s reply: 'Surel y in only one way, and that is when one wishes with al l one's heart an d tries with al l one's power t o make it a better country , to make it more just and more toleran t and more merciful , an d i f it is powerful, more wise in the us e of its power.' By seeing in the Pentagon Papers news that's fit to print, Th e New York Times has passed this test with flying colours - th e colours not o f a yellow journalism, but o f th e red badge of courage . [June 1971 ]

4

'Rally round the file, boys!' No one loves a commissar, or ought to . At his best he is a pitiable creature , robbing Peter t o pay Paul - the quintessential bureaucratic act. At his worst, a hateful creature, beating Paul and Peter up. As with th e collecto r o f nightsoil i n a medieval town, suc h admiration a s his activities arouse stems onl y from th e feelin g tha t someon e has to do the dirty work . Here is why commissar s crave secrecy. Custodianship o f society's secret s is their balm of Gilead, their sourc e of psychic satisfaction . Armed with his security clearance , only th e bureaucrat can look i n the file, only th e bureaucrat can read the magic messages. This exalts him over those who can't. For thos e wh o can't wish they could . Secrets ar e fascinating. In times of turmoil their fascination becomes obsessive; but i t flickers in tranquil time s as well. It ma y be seen in the individual who will not believ e what he reads in his newspaper, being addicted t o inside dope. I t ma y be seen in the diploma t who fall s most eagerl y upon data acquire d by espionage, thinking blac k intelligence more beautiful . Access means prestige, so the bureaucrat sets about augmenting it. Firs t he add s to hi s store o f secrets. For thi s purpose he wields a rubber stamp, or rather several rubber stamps. He narrows the arcan e circle of those wh o need to know. Ideally, he alon e would be cleared for to p secret , bu t a s a second best he admit s a privileged few. There is no roo m in the circl e fo r outsiders . An outsider, however loyal or reliable, might stumbl e on the topmos t secre t of the m al l - tha t th e fil e i s as bare of real secrets as was the emperor of real clothes, tha t th e magic messages contain opinion s n o less commonplace tha n his own . All bureaucracies are secretive, some more so than others . Canada' s i s more secretive tha n most . Totalitarian capital s apart , only officia l Canberr a comes

34 Diplomacy and its discontents

close t o matching that special air of furtive reticenc e which marks the Ottawa mandarins off fro m othe r men . One wonders why this shoul d be so. Perhaps we have inherited the English vice; as Edward Shils observes, it i s in Britain more than in other democracie s that 'the citizenry and all but th e most aggres sively alienated of the elite do not regar d it a s within thei r prerogative to un mask the secret s of the government.' Perhaps it is because of the trial s of trying to ek e out a civilized existenc e in that 'sub-Arctic lumbering town transforme d by a stroke o f Victoria's pe n into a cockpit o f malodorous polities' tha t th e senior members of its bureaucracy huddle so exclusively together in their private retreats - th e fishing camp at Five Lakes, the card room at the Rideau Club - keeping their ow n company, and secrets , more closely than i s natural. Or perhaps it all goes back to tha t grey morning of 6 October 1945 , whe n th e prime minister of Canada was told by an agitated under secretary that 'a most terribl e thing had happened.' The Gouzenko affair cas t a pall over Canada, out fro m unde r which w e have not come . The Report o f th e Royal Commission on Security,l s o far from helpin g to shak e it off, pushes us back into th e murk of administrative secrecy o f which othe r countrie s are working free. 'The administrative process is surrounded by to o muc h secrecy. The public interest would be better served if there were a greater amount of openness.' 'Disclosure is a transcendent goal.' These quotation s ar e not fro m th e Mackenzie Report. They ar e from th e Report o f the Fulton committe e on the British civil service (June 1968 ) an d the US Freedom of Information Act (July 1968) . The author s of the Mackenzie Report (June 1969 ) ar e far from sharin g this philosophy. They have forgotten nothing sinc e the Gouzenko affair. The y have learned nothing, either . International politics fo r them i s still the politic s of col d war - 'detente^ ' they not e in passing, 'has its dangers for security' still a zero-sum game in which secret s lost by on e side are always a gain for the other. The notion that security can be subversive, that counter-espionage ca n be counter-productive, is basic to deterrence ; but their moss-back minds have ye t to grasp it. The notion tha t secre t intelligenc e is likely t o be bad intelligenc e and hence harmful to the nation's interest - since , being classified, it is not subject (as Richard Goodwi n put s it) 'to the kind o f debate and discussion and contradiction an d challenge which brings us closer to the truth' - has also yet t o cross those minds . In its place we find the unsupported assertio n - unsupported becaus e insupportable - tha t 'classifie d informatio n is of considerable importanc e t o 1 Abridge d (Queen's Printer, Ottawa 1969 )

'Rally round the fue, boys!' 3 5

Canadian perception o f the international scene. ' Leaving aside how importan t is 'considerable importance,' that is just not true . Far worse than the report' s naïvet é is its insensitivity t o what i s really precious. As between th e secret s of the fil e an d the secret s of the soul , the com missioners unhesitatingly rall y round the file . Where there ar e grounds for doubt abou t a n individual's loyalty an d reliability, 'suc h doubts must be resolved in favor o f the state.' Of the ethi c expressed by Dean Acheson's ' I do not inten d t o tur n m y back o n Alger Hiss,' the commissioners are heedless; of the view that thes e may b e the noblest word s ever uttered b y a public servant they woul d b e incredulous . Instead, they enjoi n teachers to ra t o n their students . Th e state, s o far from stayin g out o f the bedrooms of the nation , i s to hide unde r its bedsprings. Telephones shoul d b e tapped , mail opened, eavesdropping is splendid if 'authorized personally an d individually by the head o f the securit y service.' The personal touch, the secre t service with a heart. It i s scant consolatio n t o remember that people wh o listen a t keyholes ge t only earache . While the state should snoo p o n the public, the public can't watch th e state. 'W e would view suggestions for increase d publicity with som e alarm.' The Fulton commissioners, in contrast, reserve their alar m for the way bureaucrats may hide incompetenc e behin d thei r veil of civi l service anonymity. 'W e think tha t administratio n suffer s fro m th e convention that only th e ministe r should explai n issues in public and what his department is or is not doin g about them. ' J.K. Galbraith , with experienc e in both camps, tell s it like it really is: 'A man who will clam up because he i s afraid tha t wha t he say s will later be quoted i s too crave n to have anything worth saying . The public offi cial who lower s his voice and pleads for stric t confidence is invariably getting ready t o sa y something repugnan t to the public interest ...'2 The crownin g irony i s that a report written by commissar s for commissar s should tur n out i n the end t o be a subversive document. Any universit y student wh o read s it, an d is worthy o f his subsidy, will be less eager than before to see k a career with th e public service, let alone wit h th e secret service . Of course ther e wil l always be recruits. But, as Rebecca West points out , 'th e wrong people wil l get in. There ar e people whose special joy i t is to b e the wrong people, who get in.'3 The quality o f government will suffer . The publication o f the Mackenzie Report, n o less than its preparation, is a disservice to the 'security' of Canada - thoug h no t in the way its authors will imagine. [July 1969 ] 2 The Observer, 28 Nov. 196 5 3 'Unexplaine d Mysterie s of th e Vassall Affair,' Th e Sunday Telegraph, 2 8 Apr. 196 3

36 Diplomacy and its discontents

Turn t o the most recen t volum e of diplomatic document s published yearly by the U S Department o f State,4 and you wil l find beginnin g o n page 68 a top secret 'Memorandum of Canadian-United States Defence Conversations held in Ottawa i n Suite E, Chateau Laurier Hotel, December 1 6 and 17 , 1946.' Here is a state paper t o mak e James Bond, had he come acros s it a t th e time, steady his hand wit h a double bourbon . A n American delegation, gleaming with brass and expertise, is trying to persuade ou r civi l servants to accep t a US plan fo r northern defenc e against the Soviet Unio n - radar , bases, mapping, patrols, th e lot . The Canadians are clearly worried. They don' t want to provoke th e Russians. They don' t want to snu b the British. They don' t want t o alarm th e public. Yet a t George Kennan's masterl y assessmen t o f Soviet intentions , Genera l Lincoln's high-pressur e presentation o f Soviet capabilities , L.B . Pearson, Ar nold Heeney , and the res t can only murmu r their misgivings. Their mai n misgiving is how th e proposed militar y measure s may be concealed fro m publi c view. 'The cabinet,' Heeney tells the meeting , i s 'anxious to have as much civilia n "cover" for defence projects as possible.' Pearson points ou t tha t 'th e entire problem was of far greater internal political im portance i n Canada than in the United States. ' The Americans say that's our tough luck . In any case it would be impossible t o 'civilianize ' their to p priority . 'Goose Bay,' declares US Colonel Van Devanter, is 'the only suitabl e base fo r very heavy bombardment group s and in fact coul d b e said to be th e mos t important all-roun d strategic air base in the Western hemisphere .. . intended fo r offensive purposes. ' A Canadian historian, while duly thankfu l fo r thi s stat e department version, may suspec t it does ou r statesme n les s than justice. He will wish t o chec k its record agains t our own . When he tries , he will soon b e reflecting o n Sir Walter Raleigh's dictum : 'Whosoever , in writing a modern history, shal l follow truth to o nea r the heels, it may haply strik e out hi s teeth.' The Department o f External Affairs , lik e th e US State Department , publishes a selection o f its documents. It s program is moving with al l deliberate speed - th e speed o f a heavily tranquilized snail . The most recen t item t o be printed, while not lackin g interest - i t describes a meeting at which 'th e Portuguese delegate made a most impassione d address, lasting for more tha n hal f a n hour, durin g the greater portion o f which he was shrieking at the top of his voice' - i s dated 1 0 May 1919 . 4 Foreign Relations of th e United States, 1946 (U S Government Printing Office , Washington 1970 )

'Rally round the file, boys!' 3 7

What happens if the Canadian historian, findin g nothing usefu l i n External Affairs' books , asks to se e the files ? He gets what might be called 'th e Nightingale treatment.' In 187 8 Florenc e Nightingale applied t o the India Office t o stud y it s data on famin e in Madras and Bombay. The applicant , already legendary as 'the lady with th e lamp,' received the followin g reply: 'To open th e records of a public office t o th e fre e inspectio n o f a private individual, however distinguished fo r character an d ability, would constitute a very inconvenient precedent.' 5 Though no t i n any way a Nightingale, I've had th e Nightingale treatment. 'Your desire,' wrote the under-secretar y of state for externa l affairs t o m e in 1965, 'is to be given personal access to classifie d file s - a privilege (not a right) in contravention of established governmen t policy an d the regulation s for th e protection o f such information. I would venture to sugges t that scholar s fo r centuries have written history wit h authority an d truthfulness without having access to secre t files.' Buzz off, buster. But th e time s they ar e a-changin'. One by one , like washing flying from the line with a storm breaking, the arguments used by bureaucrat s to kee p their file s inviolat e are being blown away. Fifty-year, thirty-year, twenty-year rules, prescribing the period tha t mus t elapse between the writing of a document an d its release, are more and more difficul t t o justify. There's the argumen t that th e file s contai n information of value to ou r rivals. That may stil l be tru e of personnel files cataloguing th e quirk s and foibles of public servants and useful t o would-be blackmailers. It's no t tru e of the rest. What with persona l diplomacy and kitchen cabinets , foreign office s don't get the really important secrets . Governments read each other's mail, crack eac h other's code. If they don't - in an era of nuclear weapons and second strike strategies - the y should . There's th e argumen t that to ope n th e file s will damage their quality. What diplomat would the n expres s his mind i n perfect candour? But tha t argument works both ways. When a diplomat know s he is to b e read in a decade, it con centrates his mind wonderfully. 'The only peopl e with seriou s grounds for objection,' writes J.K. Galbraith - a former diplomat himself, he knows whereof he writes - 'ar e those who , reflectin g the oldest desire s of public servants and especially of those concerne d with foreig n policy , would like to have a license for decorou s inaction or error.' 6 5 Quote d i n Cecil Woodham-Smith, Florence Nightingale (Constable , London 1950) , 544-5 6 Th e Observer, 28 Nov. 1965

38 Diplomacy and its discontents

And there' s the argumen t that th e recent past i s too hot t o handle. Wait, the historian i s told - 'the impatient youn g historian' to a former Dominio n archivist - unti l th e dust settles . Otherwise his dentition wil l suffer, a s Raleigh duly warned . Why study th e Test Ban Treaty o f 196 3 whe n there' s th e Halibut Treaty o f 1923 ? Why? Because the time s they are a-changin', their tempo' s speeding up. To grub in the archive s of fift y year s ago, even of thirt y year s ago, has become a n antiquarian activit y - a papyrus approach in an electric age. 'No wonder,' writes the biographer of FDR, 'that in recent years doctoral candidate s in history have tended more and more to choose dissertation topic s dealing with the recent past.' All this is gradually impressing itself upon a changing guard. The ne w undersecretary a t External Affairs , th e head o f its historical division , are full o f goo d will and good intentions . That i s a revolution in itself. But ther e has to be a catch. There is. Call it Catch 007 . If External seem s willing now, Security is not. Th e event s of October have led to stricte r security check s all along the line . The schola r wanting to loo k in the file s has to b e fingerprinted, investigated, ideologically fumigated , cleared to top-secre t by federa l fuzz. Watching the muniment s room o f the natio n is Constable Dudley Do-Right, RCMP . Nor i s he dispose d to le t th e schola r in . 'W e would vie w suggestions for increased publicity with some alarm,' states the repor t o f the Roya l Commission on Security. Yearly publication of documents 'should go far to mee t th e legi timate need s of researchers, and thu s minimiz e requests for acces s to files. ' The person who wrote that has never written history. So where ar e we? Where we've always been. Helpful solution s to th e access problem must be imposed from above , for n o bureaucracy presides willingly at the d e classification o f it s own secrets . The prim e minister is fond o f quoting Acton o n power. He should tr y quoting Acton o n access: 'T o keep one' s archives barred against the historians is tantamount t o leaving one's history t o one's enemies.' And to th e US State Department . [February 1971 ] The stat e has no place in the bedrooms of the nation , bu t journalists have a place i n the affair s o f state - a s peeping Toms a t the window-blinds of government. Citizens should help, not hinder, such voyeurs - loan the m ladder s if need be - fo r on their gratificatio n a just societ y depends . Keepers of, an d peepers at, official secrets had thei r up s and downs last week. Bad news for th e secretive being good new s for th e rest of us, let's look at good new s first - how a London judge and jury gave the back of their hand s to th e Official Secret s Act .

'Rally round the fue, boys! ' 3 9

This cumbrous legislation i s the secrec y fetishist' s favourit e reading, causing him to drool : 'Ever y person who obtains , collects , records or publishes, o r communicates t o an y other perso n an y secret official cod e word , or pass word , or any sketch, plan , model, article , o r note, o r other documen t o r informatio n that i s calculated to b e or might be o r is intended t o be directly o r indirectl y useful t o a foreign power is guilty of an offence' - punishmen t for which ma y be up t o fourteen year s in jail. Under this act (which dates from 191 1 and has a diamond jubilee in August) a journalist wa s prosecuted last year. His alleged offence was obtainin g and publishing in his newspaper a confidential documen t of th e Britis h mili tary mission i n Lagos o n th e progres s of th e Nigerian-Biafran war. Counsel fo r th e accuse d place d his defence upon th e highest principle . 'Journalists and the pres s have a n unfettered freedom to exercis e thei r ow n judgment a s to what the y should publis h however embarrassin g it may be t o civil servants and ministers of the crown . They ar e employees of the people , and it is not fo r them to tur n round an d say: "Yo u wil l embarrass us, therefore yo u mus t no t publis h an d if you d o we will persecute you."' The judge, moved b y this appeal, reminded th e jury in his summing up that freedom o f the press takes precedence over the state' s right to privacy. 'An opi nion-forming mediu m lik e th e pres s must no t b e muzzled. The warning bark is necessary t o help i n maintaining a free society . I f th e fang s of th e watchdo g ar e drawn, all that will ensue is a whimpering, possibl y a whine, but n o bite.' The jury, deliberating briefly , brought i n a verdict o f 'not guilty.' The Times, commenting o n the case , remarked tha t th e sectio n o f the act under which charge s had been lai d ought t o be repealed, and reproached th e prosecuting attorney-general fo r ' a seriou s error of judgment.' All so very different fro m ou r ow n Dominion dear , where authority look s with favou r upo n more , not less , stringent safeguard s for the secret s o f th e state. 'We have given some thought, ' confess th e roya l commissioner s o n security i n their 196 9 report , 't o the ideal conten t o f an Official Secrets Act.' Should a n ideal ac t be drawn, as the London Times recommends , 'in the interests of more ope n an d publicly accountabl e government? ' Not a t all. 'In ou r opinion, suc h a n act shoul d protec t al l classified information fro m an y unauthorized dissemination , whether o r not th e purpose i s prejudicial to th e interests of the state.' Only a press ofPravdas coul d pu t u p with that. 'Fifty-year, thirty-year , twenty-yea r rules, prescribing the period tha t must elaps e between th e writing of a document an d its release, are more an d more difficul t to justify.' I t may be so, but th e British prim e ministe r ha s imposed nothin g shor t of a 100-yea r rul e - o n all cabinet paper s relating to the abdication o f Edward VIII . Historians mus t wai t unti l 2036 .

40 Diplomacy and its discontents

Why? In deference to th e feeling s of the duk e and duchess? Not eve n the ageless Windsors can hope t o last so long. Besides, in .4 King's Story ('th e fault la y not i n my stars but i n my genes'), th e duk e has already told his side of it - if only t o help finance his exile; it's fittin g that the other sid e be told. In deference, then, t o th e prince of Wales who, given today's divorce rate, could well face Edward's fate, could be the wors e for ful l disclosur e of the precedent? I think I hear Charles responding to that one : 'Com e off it, chu m chuck tha t bosh!' Nor i s there an y juicy gossip left . Details of the dram a that swirle d throug h Giro's and the Kit-Kat Club, Belvedere and Balmoral, ultimately throug h Buckingham Palace and Downing Street, have long since come out i n the wash of court tittl e tattle . In any case, historians aren't al l that intereste d in court tittl e tattl e - former prime minister Baldwin telling Vincent Massey that 'he would like t o have Mrs S. sent to th e towe r and beheaded,' or the impressio n th e bachelor kin g made o n bachelor King ('his hair quite thic k an d golden. He has lost th e dissipated loo k ...') . Historians are more interested in how th e crisi s affected cabine t government, party politics, th e British Commonwealth, church an d state, Britain and Germany. These ar e important questions , historians have the need and right t o know thei r answers. Barring some geriatric miracle they won' t kno w them i n their lifetime. They mus t console themselve s with a letter fro m Plin y th e Younger which, being more than 2000 years old, lies beyond th e Official Secret s Act o f Rome : 'An author had begu n a reading of a work of exceptional candor . U p came the friends of someone I won't name , begging and praying him not t o rea d the remainder; such is the sham e people fee l a t hearing about their conduct , thoug h they fel t non e at th e time of doing what they blus h t o hear. The author complied with their request . But th e book , like their deeds, remains and will remain. It will always be read, and all the mor e for this delay, for information withheld onl y sharpen s men's curiosit y to have it.' [February 1971 ]

5

'Live, and let Nelson Edd y live' 'Our information abroa d has long been stumblin g through a stunning sor t of chaos.' This causti c commen t an d others critica l o f Canada's propaganda in foreign part s are recorded, wit h th e ai r of a man who has made a discovery comparable t o Dr Leakey's Zinjanthropu s skull , in To Know and Be Known, 1 the repor t o f the tas k forc e on government information. Bu t this find i s not a t all remarkable. There is no reason t o be surprised. There is not eve n reason, as will be shown, to b e alarmed. To convey to th e outsid e worl d a coherent, credible , and flattering account o f what government is doing lies beyond th e powe r of any propagandist. Among ministeries of propaganda (commonly called ministries of information) are only varying degrees of ineptitude. It i s an error to ascrib e these t o poor administration. Poo r administration ma y make bad propaganda worse. But th e best propagand a is no substitute fo r poor foreig n policy. There are some thing s government can't do . One of them is to fool al l of the peopl e all of th e time . Totalitarian governmen t think s i t can. Its propaganda ministry, strainin g every fibr e o f its monolithic being , rams its message down the throa t of th e foreigner, numbs his mind with som e lurid image. But th e effect s o f thes e wear off. The victim throw s up , regains his senses of discrimination. The visage of Svengali fades, leaving behind it onl y a figure of fun, like Lor d HawHaw, or a font o f entertainment, lik e Toky o Rose . If th e totalitarian propagandis t tries to rap e the masses, the liberal propa gandist trie s to seduc e the masses. He does no t hit peopl e ove r the head wit h 1 (Queen' s Printer, Ottawa 1969 )

42 Diplomac y an d its discontent s

the blun t instrumen t o f a big lie. H e resorts instea d t o th e technique s o f friendly persuasion . A s in courtship, s o in propaganda: Cand y is dandy, bu t liquor i s quicker. Th e task forc e chides our Canadian liberal propagandist for his Whitman Sampler way s of wooing foreign friends: 'Print is still kin g ... It is as though television, film, and other audio-visua l techniques and aspect s of contemporary technolog y ha d simpl y never come int o existence . It i s enough to make on e suspec t that federal officials ar e still sendin g stuffed moose-head s to London.' It i s not quit e s o bad a s that. What our federa l official s are doing is sending stuffed trailer-truck s t o Ouagadougou - a caravanserai of Canadiana designed to sho w francophon e African s that, contrary t o what the y ar e told, Quebec is not th e Biafr a o f Canada. But that's beside the point. Suppos e our propagandists perform a s primitively a s the tas k forc e says they do . Does this matter as much a s the tas k forc e says it does? Consider th e Unite d States Information Agency. Never has USÍ A bee n so fully packed , so free an d easy on th e draw . American propaganda has com e a long way since th e earl y fifties, when McCarthy's minions ransacked USÍ A libraries for subversive literature by Thoreau an d Hemingway. It has come some way since the early sixties, when ambassador Galbraith complained t o President Kenned y from New Delhi that its radio programming consisted 'o f utterly irrelevant broadcasts about th e progress of the grass silage industry, tedious and execrably written scripts on the American economy, o r diatribe s against communism . The latter,' Galbraith added , 'are perhaps the dreariest feature o f all. I cannot hear them without pausin g to conside r whether th e Communists have something, an d Ed Murrow may well be turnin g me into a security risk.' 2 No one toda y ca n reproach th e members of the American propaganda community fo r indifference to th e latest technique s of mass communication . The United State s pavilio n at Expo is one example of their handiwork. Another i s 'The Silent Majority, ' a fifteen-minute televisio n fil m hastil y distrib uted afte r the November moratorium t o 10 4 countries in twenty-three languages in an attempt t o persuade thei r people tha t Americans are still behin d their president' s polic y fo r Vietnam. For shee r technica l bravura and dexterity, American propaganda is the best in the world. Yet fo r al l the ceaseles s flow of words and symbols , for al l the mixed media wizardry and McLuhanite gimmickry, the image of th e United States , which i t is the propagandist's duty t o cherish an d to burnish, has never been more besmirched . Just a s there are stains no detergen t can remove, so there 2 Ambassador's Journal (Houghton, Mifflin, Bosto n 1969), 109

'Live, and let Nelson Eddy live' 43

are deeds no propaganda ca n efface. President Nixo n di d his best, timing th e announcement o f his decision t o abstai n fro m biological warfare t o coincid e with th e revelation s about th e Song My massacres. But no counter-offensive is likely t o obliterate , let alon e diminish , th e impact o f the confessio n o f Paul Meadlo, former private, US army: 'An d we was going to pu t the m i n the hootch, and well, we put the m i n the hootch, and then we dropped a hand grenade down ther e wit h them . And somebody tol d us to bring them ove r to the ravin e ... So we threw ours in with the m .. . And so we started pushing the m off an d we started shootin g them. ' A propaganda machine i s not som e kin d o f Laterna Magika through whic h Goya' s 'Disaster s of War' may be shown t o th e world as Tom an d Jerry cartoons . Th e truth wil l out, an d it has . A great power drive s its soldiers to butcher children ; middle powe r butch ery i s confined t o sea l pups. We who liv e in a middle powe r may ruefull y give thanks fo r this . Still, as the tas k force remarks, The campaig n against seal hunting in the Gulf of St Lawrence has been one of the mor e persistent tarnishers o f the Canadian image.' Perhaps th e new breed of public servant recommended by the task forc e the career information servic e officer - wil l be able to offset the nasty thing s said abou t u s last week by Mis s Alice Herrington in a quarter-page advertise ment i n The New York Times attackin g Canadians and their governmen t for allowing the ice of the gulf to become eac h year 'a crimson patchwork, strew n with the skinles s remains of what onc e were harmless, intelligent mammals that have died a n agonizing, unbelievably cruel death.' More likely he will not . The card s are stacked agains t skille d apologist s fo r butchery, whether o f human being s or animals. The attitud e o f the attentive public, suspicious by now of super-publicist s sent t o li e abroad fo r thei r country , is no longer a willing suspension o f disbelief . Let u s admit tha t the Canadian propagandist, whethe r IS O or FSO, has an easier tim e tha n his colleague i n the USÍA. He toils on behalf of a largely peaceable kingdom. Only exceptionally is he require d to hide o r justify crimes of state. His main job i s to projec t a favourable image of our countr y so that we may get more tha n our fai r shar e of skilled immigrants and wealthy tourists . At thi s work th e tas k forc e pronounces him no good. It reproache s the Canadian propagandist's persistent inabilit y 't o correct a cliché imag e ... tha t is both irritating to Canadians and hardy as a weed. This is the Canada of Ros e Marie and Maria Chapdelaine, lan d o f ice, snow, Mounties, Eskimos, an d no t much else.' It looks t o a new propaganda agency, which i t wants to cal l Information Canada, to eradicate this unflatterin g image once an d for all, substituting an image which doe s justice t o second-century Canada and all the mod , hip , swinging, with-it, talented, creativ e people who live here.

44 Diplomacy and its discontents

The tas k forc e has a characteristically forthrigh t wor d or two fo r thos e who think thi s game's not wort h th e candle. 'It may be argued, "So, okay , th e government information services are a mess." So are a lot o f things . Anyway , it's bette r t o have a whole bunc h o f innocent bunglers in government infor mation tha n on e super-efficient propagand a machine.' Addressed to Canada's foreign propaganda , this argumen t is exactly right . Nor, in that context , doe s the tas k forc e offe r an y rebuttal. It fail s to grasp to what exten t a nation' s image is shaped no t b y propaganda but serendipity , not b y words but deeds . So to th e author s o f To Know and Be Known I say: 'Live, and let Nelson Eddy live . And i f the tourist s tur n up o n Dominion Da y with skis , just switc h on the artificia l snow machines.' And I commend t o the m a book which ough t not t o have escaped the task forc e bibliography - Danie l Boorstin's The Image.3 Here, with on e word changed , i s its key passage : 'Wha t ails us most i s not wha t we have done wit h Canada, but wha t we have substituted fo r Canada. We suffer primaril y no t fro m our vice s or ou r weaknesses, but fro m ou r illusions . We are haunted, no t b y reality , but b y thos e image s we have put i n place o f reality.' Or so it would be if the tas k forc e had it s way. [December 1969 ]

3 (Atheneum , New York 1962 )

6

A foreign policy for beaver s Government White Papers - not t o be confused wit h coloured books , so called for th e cover s (blue, green, orange, yellow) between which foreign ministries since th e mid-seventeenth century have inserted tendentious selections of diplomatic documents, hoping to bathe thei r statecraf t in the least unfavourabl e light - ar e rarely noted fo r precision o f language and elegance o f style. It would be surprising if they were . Posing as enunciators of policy, White Papers are really device s for concealment , an d what the y conceal is change. 'Pronouncements about fundamenta l policy change s are made to appea r as vigorous endorsements of previous policies,' writes Anthony Sampso n (th e well-known anatomis t o f Britain) of how it' s don e a t Whitehall, wher e whit e papering is a highly develope d art form . 'Obscurity i s encouraged to avoi d offending previou s ministers and officials.' 1 Th e proces s by which the y ar e composed - more accurately , assembled - add s to their muzzines s and murk. 'They are written from on e department t o another , ful l o f mandarin language, and in the process of fooling the public , one suspect s that civi l servants begin to foo l themselves.' Given these characteristic s of the genre, Foreign Policy for Canadians 2 the government's statement of our new external policy, in the making since Prime Minister Trudeau took offic e - i s by no means a discreditable document , especially if one make s the sor t of allowance D r Johnson did for th e lad y parson, judging not th e tediu m o f her sermon s but i n admiring wonder tha t a being so handicapped coul d preac h a t all . 1 Anatomy of Britain Today (Hodde r and Stoughton, London 1965) , 299-30 0 2 (Queen' s Printer, Ottawa 1970 )

46 Diplomacy and its discontents

A conscientious effor t ha s been made to communicat e simpl y an d directly , with a minimum of jargon and officialese. It i s true that here an d ther e th e prose simpl y collapses under th e weight o f its argument, like a soufflé lef t to o long in the oven . 'All this produces complex difficultie s of targeting for any government wishing t o se t its objectives and assign priorities intende d t o dea l with specific issues arising, preferably before they becom e critical ' must mea n 'It's harder tha n yo u think, ' while 'Th e correct focu s can only b e achieved if all the element s of a particular policy questio n ca n be looked at i n a conceptual framework which represents the main lines of national policy a t hom e and abroad' translates as 'Don't forget anything important. ' 'Implications' a weasel-word much i n demand by bureaucrats nervous in the vicinity o f a conclusion - appear s often i n these pages. Wit, grace, passion, poetry, d o not . 'Diligent but uninspired, ' a pedagogue might comment , 'mus t do better nex t time. C plus.' Higher marks go to th e government for rounding boldly o n the mos t cher ished concept s of its predecessor - th e more so because their staunches t defenders ar e members of the sam e party and even of the sam e cabinet . Th e chimera of 'influence' - fo r which Paul Martin paid so stiff a price by costl y participation i n European defence - is no longer to be pursued. Abandoned also is the searc h for a role. Gone, i f not forgotten , is the Mackenzie KingPearson obsession t o be cast as 'helpful fixer ' - variously known as golden hinge, linch-pin, bridge, or interpreter - whe n Great Powers start to quarrel . There is no natural, immutable or permanent rol e for Canada in today's world,' the White Paper asserts. 'Roles and influence may result from pursuing certain policy objective s - an d these spin-off s can be of solid value to international relation s - but the y shoul d no t be made th e aims of policy.' Here is more tha n th e beginning of wisdom; it is a great leap forward. In place of roles and influenc e w e are to loo k i n future t o ou r vital national interests , more decorously described by th e White Paper as major themes of policy. Six of thes e ar e then discerne d and accorde d th e dignit y of capital letters: Economic Growth, Social Justice, Quality of Life, Peace and Security, Sovereignty and Independence, Harmonious Natural Environment. (A minor flaw of this conceptual framewor k is treating Quality o f Lif e and Harmonious Natural Environment as separate and equal: alon e o f the six categories they canno t possibl y conflict. ) The most significan t decision con veyed by th e White Paper i s to ran k the m i n that orde r of importance . Priorities are crucial; abstract priorities, less so. Everything depends o n how the y ar e applied, on what ma y be deduced.

A foreign policy for beavers 47

Ranking Socia l Justic e ahea d o f Peace an d Security naturally encourages the belief tha t we will be working from no w on to expe l th e torturers of Greece from thei r membershi p in NATO. But Mr Sharp has alread y argue d tha t Social Justice i s better serve d by keepin g the m i n NATO. Mr Sharp i s entitled t o tha t belief, a s we are entitled t o ours ; but h e must no t b e surprise d when th e overwhelming reaction to suc h pervers e manipulation of th e nationa l priorities is cynicism and contempt . At leas t one o f th e si x stands so far as stated. Economi c Growt h come s first an d foremost - no t necessaril y a t the expense o f Social Justice bu t a t the expense o f Social Justic e if necessary. The mos t urgen t application i s the polic y fo r southern Africa . Her e th e Department o f External Affairs display s al l the delicac y o f feeling it showe d for a delegation of dons desiring economic sanction s imposed agains t Sout h Africa b y servin g them Johannesburge r Rieslin g at dinner. 'Total rejection o f race discrimination and continuin g trade with white regime s in southern Africa' is not fo r it a n easy choice t o b e made in favour o f th e first , but rathe r a clash o f 'competing national objectives , very closely balance d as to importance. ' And i t opts for trade . Even a s an abstract goal, th e selectio n o f Economic Growt h a s national policy objectiv e Number One leaves much t o b e desired. Social philosopher s on th e leadin g edge of though t i n every developed country are singing song s in praise of standing pat . Untrammelled dedicatio n t o enlargin g gross national products and raisin g per capit a income i s under attack no t o n mora l grounds alone bu t ou t o f star k expediency. Th e youn g in age and young in heart ar e more an d more repelle d by th e life-style s of materialism. For who m shoul d our foreig n policy fo r th e seventie s be fashioned i f not fo r them ? The y wil l have t o liv e with th e results. One returns again to th e notio n o f style , for styl e is sometimes policy it self. The cove r of th e White Paper catche s and holds its spirit perfectly . A glossy colou r photograp h o f faces in a crowd - quit e obviously , an Expo crowd: well-dressed , well-fed, well-mannered, attentive on-lookers at som e outdoor entertainment . And tha t is how th e planner s of our foreig n policy se e our plac e amon g the peoples - curiou s yet distant spectator s a t the pavillions of the nations, in the world, yet no t quit e o f it, caring little abou t its suffering, sharin g nothin g of its squalor, a temperate zon e o f affluenc e amids t the wretche d o f th e earth . What Auden wrote o f other well-meanin g and ineffectual folk applie s t o th e White Paper makers ' vie w of ou r lif e an d time :

48 Diplomac y and its discontent s

They atten d al l the lecture s o n post-war problems, For they d o mind, they honestly wan t to help; yet, As they notic e th e earth in their morning papers, What sens e do the y mak e of its folly an d horror? 3

[June 1970 ]

3 ' A Healthy Spot,' in Collected Shorter Poems, 1930-1944 (Fabe r and Faber, London 1950), 145

7

Principles fo r receivershi p Arnold Heeney and Livingston Merchant, embarking upon thei r assignmen t 'of working out acceptabl e principle s which woul d make it easie r to avoid divergences in economic an d other policie s of interest' to Canada and th e United States , wer e not dispassionat e parties. They di d not approac h thei r task a s academics or commentators. They wer e neither supra-nationa l nor supernatural. They were flesh-and-blood representative s of their respective governments. Their work 1 is accordingly to be judged by differen t standards . There is no suc h thin g excep t i n name as a Heeney-Merchant (or Merchant-Heeney) Report. There is, rather, a Heeney product an d a Merchant product. The Heeney product i s to be judged fo r its contribution t o th e promotion o f Canadian national interests . The Merchant product is likewise to b e judged for it s contribution t o th e promotion o f United States national interest . In what follow s - a n assessment of the Heeney product - it is contended that 'Principles for Partnership' (the titl e o f the report which Arnol d Heeney signed fo r Canada) is not a contribution i n the Canadia n national interest. So far fro m that , the principles which i t enunciates are for u s not principle s for partnership a t all ; they ar e rather principles for receivership, where what is received i s our sovereignty , where the Unite d State s government is the receiver-general. Most of the critica l commentary of the Heeney-Merchant Report ha s centred on its paragraph 8 1 - indee d o n one of two sentences in paragraph 81 : 1 Canadaandthe United States: Principles for Partnership (Queen' s Printer, Ottawa 1965 )

50 Diplomacy and its discontents

It i s in the abidin g interest of both countries that , whereve r possible, diver gent views between th e tw o government s be expressed and if possible resolve d in private, through diplomati c channels . Later o n I shall have some critica l things to sa y about thi s formulation. Bu t first I want t o commen t o n a lesser-known but t o m y mind n o less importan t passage, in paragraphs 6 and 7. This is a statement of the fram e o f mind o f th e authors of the report , and supplies, I believe, th e ke y t o understandin g the ideology o f Heeney-Merchantism - why Arnold Heene y and Livingston Merchant cam e to hold certai n truths self-evident: 6 .. . Our method ha s been essentially tha t o f a dialogue betwee n two friends who have serve d togethe r in both capitals and have had th e good fortune to have represented thei r respectiv e governments, each fo r two term s in the country o f the other. 7 Ou r personal friendship , our associatio n i n the pas t in the joint affair s o f Canada and the United State s and our common concer n fo r the mainte nance and strengthening of the partnership between our tw o countrie s have greatly facilitate d ou r present undertaking . The y hav e also contri buted t o our work, and to this Report, a n informal and personal quality which w e believe is not inappropriate . I believe it is highly inappropriate . The Heeney-Merchant exercise is not a form o f brotherly love. The tw o ambassadors are not Kiwanian s or Shriner s engaged in confraternal celebratio n in Miami or Montreal. They ar e parties t o a negotiation, o f which th e outcom e i s their extended communiqué . Friendship may not b e fatal to a negotiation, bu t i t is rarely beneficial t o it. Harold Nicolson's wor k o n diplomatic metho d no w seems to me much misguided,2 but her e he gets it right: 'Diplomacy , if it is ever t o be effective , should be a disagreeable business... It would be interesting to analys e how many fals e decisions , how man y fata l misunderstandings, have arisen from such pleasant qualitie s as shyness, consideration , affabilit y or ordinary good manners.' Let u s next look briefly at the tw o term s of Arnold Heeney's ambassiat e in Washington. They yiel d clue s to explain why he so uncritically endorsed th e concept of Canadian 'partnership' with th e United States . The first term run s from 195 3 t o 195 7 - th e early Eisenhower years . Armistice in Korea had remove d a major irritan t from what Heeney and Merchant cal l 'the multilateral context. ' Vietnam was but a name. Quemoy and 2 Se e below, 62ff

Principles for receivership 51

Matsu were dangerous enough, but Dulle s coul d stil l josh about his off-shor e island i n eastern Lake Ontario , settin g th e Rideau Club to giggling. The lon g polar watch pumpe d col d cas h into our economy . Al l things, if not brigh t and beautiful, wer e at least benig n an d bland. Then cam e a second ter m - 195 9 t o 1962 . Heene y now represented a different government , and spok e fo r a different mood . His mission a s a middle power's middl e ma n between John Diefenbaker an d Howard Green, John Kennedy an d Dean Rusk, while no t perhap s mission impossible , was highly exacting. In the end i t failed . Reflecting o n th e failur e o f his mission, Heeney blamed anti-Americanis m among his political masters . Anti-Americanism was for him a n un-Canadian activity. He could no t gras p that Diefenbake r had become prim e minister precisely by playin g upon a widespread popular concern tha t Liberal s if re-elected would be insufficiently alert t o what Dief in his campaign had calle d 'the depredations o f Texas buccanneers. ' The Texans who entertained the Heeneys in the gilde d salons o f Fort Worth seemed not a t al l like buccanneers , only like plutocratic Canadians. The countrysid e round Dalla s recalled th e south ern Manitoba o f Heeney's boyhood. How unnatura l to be a t odds with so like-minded a partner! The metapho r o f partnership is well suited t o the er a of the ascendanc y of Texas in American national politics : 'partner, ' or, rather, 'pardner ' (a s in 'howdy, pardner'), is a familiar greeting around ranch an d corral . The metaphor o f partnership springs unopposed int o th e Heeney-Merchant Report. Th e metapho r no t onl y figure s i n the title ; it is used throughout th e text, never with an y justification or explanation. Th e author s assume that Canada an d th e United States are partners in some commo n enterprise , the terms of which ar e never disclosed, th e natur e of which i s never discussed. What is a partnership anyway? 'A n association,' according to m y diction ary, 'an association o f tw o o r more persons for th e carryin g on o f a business, of which the y shar e th e expenses , profit an d loss.' What, then, is the busines s of Canadian-American relations? What is this commo n enterpris e in which we are engaged? There ar e some o f our mutua l activities, I concede, fo r which th e metapho r of partnership i s not to o misleading . Take continenta l defence , for example . The busines s in which w e ar e jointly engage d is deterring Russians from nu clear attack . We share, very unequally, in the cost s of thi s enterprise. We share, roughl y fifty-fifty , i n the profits - successfu l deterrence . I t is an enterprise of unlimited liability , fo r if it fan s we both stan d t o los e not just ou r shirts but ou r homelands . The metapho r o f partnership works well enoug h i n describing our joint efforts t o prevent a Soviet bombe r attac k o n North America. Notice tha t i t

52 Diplomacy and its discontents

does not wor k s o well in describing ou r joint efforts to prevent a Soviet missile attack. And that it doesn't wor k a t all in relation t o th e threa t o f Chinese aggression. If we are not ye t partner s in defence of North America against China, we are certainly no t partner s in the business of selling wheat t o China. Nor may our respectiv e concerns with Cuba be meaningfully described in terms of partnership. Nor yet ou r respective concerns with Vietnam. In fact, so small a fraction of our affair s wit h othe r countrie s fits the metapho r of partnershi p that its retention i n public discussion o f the Canadian-American relationship is a disservice to understanding. How is it possible tha t th e distinguished compan y of North American statesmen who, followin g the Heeney-Merchant lead, persist in discussing the affair s of Canada and th e United States in terms of neighbourhood an d partnership could get thei r terms so wrong? It's no t becaus e they're ill-informed . They're ofte n very well-informed. It's no t because they're ill-intentioned . They have the best intentions in the world. It i s that the y vie w the subjec t from th e vantage point o f who the y ar e and what the y do . They ar e politicians and statesmen, not politica l scientist s and historians. Their job i s different. Their perspective is different. Their assumptions are different. Their questions ar e different. It's no t surprisin g that they com e u p with different answers . The job o f politicians and statesmen is to keep communitie s together a s going concerns. This job involve s them i n what ma y be called, politely, sociall y necessar y deceptions. That is, they tel l lies. No more often tha n the y have to, perhaps, but a s often a s they have to . Civilization being what Keynes once sai d it is - ' a thin an d precarious crust erected b y th e personalit y an d will of a very few and only maintaine d by rules and conventions skillfully put togethe r an d guilefully preserved' - th e keepers of civility resort t o th e perpetuation of myth an d the fabricatio n of fable . They canno t allo w themselves the luxury of pursuing truth a t whatever cost. The cost - not to themselves but to the society in their charg e - may be too great. Their tas k i s not t o expose realit y to view. Often it is to hide i t from sight. The job o f th e political analys t is, or ought t o be, very different. It i s not his job t o kee p communitie s fro m falling apart or from fallin g out. I t is to understand what holds them together . I f he does his job wel l he is bound t o be an unpopular figure. Always he i s prying open old wounds. Always he i s re-opening precisely thos e issues which hi s society would prefer t o remain closed . To th e policy-maker he must seem to b e a trouble-maker. He is an ingrate. He bites the hand that feeds him.

Principles for receivership 53

Is there an y wonder that ther e shoul d subsis t a certain tensio n betwee n the policy-make r an d th e intellectual ? It i s no wonder a t all . They ar e working at cros s purposes. Often the y ge t in one another's way . Sometimes the y accom plish eac h other' s ruin. In police state s the policy-maker has it all his own way. The intellectual be comes a lapdog, or els e he goes to jail. In our ow n societie s thei r confrontatio n is less crudely resolved. But, to th e exten t tha t eac h i s faithful t o his calling, it remains a confrontation . And thi s is why document s suc h a s the Merchant-Heeney Report, or th e report o f the committe e o f congressmen produced unde r Representative Tupper's leadership, can be, a t one an d th e sam e time, s o satisfying and s o disappointing. They hav e as their purpos e the promotio n o f good relations . To th e extent tha t thi s objective is realized, the policy-maker s of each countr y have reason t o be satisfied . But th e promotio n o f good relation s i s not th e sam e thing a s the promotio n o f scholarly inquiry . It ma y be an article o f fait h o f the liberal creed tha t ther e i s no necessary conflic t betwee n th e two . S o muc h the worse fo r th e libera l creed. In a frame of min d tha t is fairly describe d as mutually admiring , the friendl y diplomats sa t down t o disti l from thei r experienc e som e rule s for runnin g the North America n partnership durin g years to come . Only a mandarin like Heeney, raise d to th e highest power , could presume to reduc e to numbere d paragraphs a relationship s o convoluted an d s o volatile . But the n suc h a mandarin in the presence of th e Trinity would not hesitat e t o work ou t respectiv e spheres of jurisdiction for Father, Son , an d Holy Ghost . Heeney di d not hesitat e befor e attempting his only slightl y les s presumptuous task. One of his numbered paragraph s - number 81 - got him into trouble . Loo k at i t again : It is in the abidin g interest o f both countrie s that , wherever possible, diver gent views between the tw o governments should b e expressed an d if possible resolved in private, throug h diplomati c channels . By 'diplomati c channels' i t is fair t o assume that th e authors of this passage one a former ambassador t o th e United States, th e othe r a former ambassado r to Canada - mea n ambassadorial channels - embassy to embassy, rather tha n the personal diplomacy o f visiting ministers. Here occupational bia s gets the better o f analysis . Sometimes a diplomatic channe l aid s the flo w o f negotiation. Sometime s it does not. Conside r th e testimon y o f Richard Neustad t on th e point. He is writing, from hi s perspective as former special assistan t t o President Kennedy ,

54 Diplomacy and its discontents

of th e breakdown o f Anglo-American communication a t th e tim e of the Sky bolt missile crisis of 1962 : The Britis h embass y in Washington and ours in London tee m with ministers , counselors, an d secretarie s of assorted rank, to sa y nothing of special-purpose aides from a variety o f government departments. These spew vast quantitie s of informatio n back an d forth acros s the ocean . Bu t rarely is it information of th e sor t t o she d much light o n ministerial motives. Most members of those massive staff s dea l with officia l counterpart s who ofte n cannot comprehen d what moves their Minister , still less his colleagues. Even the minorit y o f staf fers actuall y engage d in what ou r State Departmen t term s "political" affairs that is, diplomacy - ar e mostly Foreig n Servic e Officers themselve s and deal for th e most part with Foreign Offices. But games of governance i n Whitehall and i n Washington are played routinely, day b y day , outside of and around those Offices, throug h budgetary channels, legislative channels, and promo tion channels in a party context . From thes e th e Foreign Servic e types are relatively shielded. Accordingly, they ofte n are insensitive - nobody's faul t to th e very stakes most likel y t o move Ministers from da y t o day. 3 What is true of th e Britis h embass y at one en d o f Massachusetts Avenue is just as true of the Canadian embassy a t th e other . The busines s of Canada is to o important t o pass invariably, even 'where possible,' through diplomati c channels. Budgetary channels, legislative channels, even 'promotion channels i n a party context ' may move matters more quickly to ou r advantage. So much fo r th e Heeney hypothesis o n venue. What of the hypothesis on privacy? 'It is in the abiding interest of both countries that, wherever possible, divergent views between the tw o governments should b e expressed and i f possible resolved i n private ...' Compresse d in this short statemen t are three distinc t propositions: 1 a proposition abou t propaganda; 2 a proposition abou t negotiating technique; 3 a proposition abou t diplomati c style. 1 N o justification is attempted i n th e Heeney-Merchant Report fo r th e proposition tha t it is in our 'abidin g interest' to refrai n fro m appealing to U S public opinion when th e view s of th e tw o government s diverge. But i t is easy to understan d why th e tw o ambassador s advance it as an axiom. Career diplo mats instinctively shy away from propaganda . 'Regular diplomatic officials, ' George Kennan has explained, 'tend everywher e to vie w propaganda with dis 3 Richar d E. Neustadt, Alliance Politics (Columbia University Press, New York & London 1970) , 132-3

Principles for receivership 55

taste an d scepticism . Th e professio n o f diplomacy induce s a weary detach ment, foreign t o al l political enthusiasm an d ex parte pleas. Propaganda smacked o f overt interference in the domestic affair s o f other countrie s something tha t wen t strongl y against th e grain of diplomatic tradition.' 4 It i s not surprising , then, that L.B . Pearson, reare d in that tradition fo r a quarter of a century before entering politics, endorse s the Heeney-Merchant injunction t o esche w appeal s to publi c opinion o n the par t of governments. As early as 1954 , Pearso n spok e disparagingl y of 'internationa l public relations.' Diplomacy i s more tha n monologue s at international gatherings , o r public pres s conferences , or calculated leaks to frighte n potential adversarie s or "pu t th e heat on " reluc tant friends , o r even political qui z programmes before th e microphon e o r camera. There shoul d b e more room fo r an d greater reliance o n quiet an d confi dential negotiatio n .. . If Moscow, by th e crudit y o f communist diplomati c methods, an d by it s incessant and direct appea l t o peoples ove r the heads of governments, makes this procedure difficult o r even impossible, w e shoul d keep on tryin g to restor e it. I n any event, we need no t follo w these commu nist tactic s of propaganda diplomacy in conferences and negotiation s betwee n friends.5 Pearson reiterate d this view as prime ministe r i n an open lette r t o som e 40 0 members of th e facult y o f the University of Toronto who had urge d upon hi m a more forcefu l disaffiliatio n o f Canada from U S military operation s in Vietnam tha n hi s government had s o far see n fi t t o espouse . 'Confidentia l an d quiet argument s by a responsible government ar e usually more effectiv e than public ones... Too many publi c declarations and disclosures run the ris k of complicating matter s for those concerned.' And agai n in the House of Commons o n 1 0 May 1967 : I do no t thin k tha t a s a responsible governmen t it would be wise or desirabl e or necessary for us to publicly condem n o r publicly proclai m .. . There is imposed o n us the obligatio n no t t o unless it is inescapable; otherwise I believe we would no t b e able to ac t in a way in which ou r suggestion s would b e listened t o b y th e Unite d State s government when we put the m forwar d throug h the channel s o f diplomacy . 4 Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, II, Th e Decision to Intervene (Princeto n University Press, Princeton, NJ 1958) , 19 1 5 Leste r B. Pearson, Words an d Occasions (University of Toronto Press, Toronto & Cambridge, Mass. 1970), 124- 5

56 Diplomacy and its discontents

Not t o publicly condemn o r publicly proclai m may be good manners. But is it necessarily the best policy? It run s counter to all the folk wisdom abou t squeaky wheels getting grease, about nice guys finishing last. This is not onl y true about internationa l society , it is especially true about international soci ety. The great beast o f state has too thic k a hide, to o man y other preoccupations, to prick u p its ear attentively whenever a Canadian minister sidles into one of the antechambers of power and there , quietly courteously , diffidently, decorously, recites from his confidential brief his confidential case. It ma y have been like that in the good ol d days - th e days when the State Department, a s Kennan recalls with great nostalgia, 'wa s a quaint ol d place, with it s law-office atmosphere , its cool dar k corridors, its swinging doors, its brass cuspidors, its black leather rockin g chairs , and the grandfather clock i n the Secretary o f State's office ' - and , he might have added, recalling the incumben t of that time , the grandfather figure i n the secretary of state's office. Bu t it' s not lik e that any more. The atmospher e is less that of a law-office tha n of bomber-command; the corridor s are neither dark nor cool; cuspidors are out and computers are in. And in place of Charles Evans Hughes we have Dean Rusk, of whom it is written: 'Whe n Assistant Secretaries brought him prob lems, he listened courteously, thanked them , an d let the m go; they woul d often depar t little wiser than when they came. ' Where senior American diplomats fail t o make a n impression o n so experienced a stone-waller, who ar e Canadian diplomats to succeed ? You have to go higher tha n that , speak louder than that . Higher tha n tha t mean s the president. Sometimes he is sympathetic, some times he is not. I t is reported that President Johnson once responded to th e representative of some less-developed land: 'What' s the ide a of someone lik e you askin g the leader of the Free World a chicken-shittin' question like that? ' The power of the presidency, joined t o th e personality of its incumbent, make for a n atmosphere i n which th e conversatio n is frank an d friendly only s o long as the chie f executiv e permits it t o b e so. The Heeney-Merchant Report ofte n mentions partnership; not onc e doe s it mention pollution . Tha t i s a glaring oversight. Purifying th e North American environment i s an enterprise for partnership if there eve r was one. Canadians and Americans must work togethe r a t it if the work is to be done . But tha t is not all. The appeal of government to people - government on both sides of the border to people o n both sides of the border - i s a potent weapon i n the war against waste and smog and spill. To keep it hanging on the wall is to los e th e war by default. Quiet diplomacy ha s no place in an ecological crusade .

Principles for receivership 57

So some ministers are starting to realize . In November 197 0 th e minister of energy, mines and resources addressed himself t o th e proble m of controlling trans-national pollution. 'It is to be hoped,' J.J. Greene declared, 'that the great and powerful nation which ca n afford t o travel to th e moon an d at the sam e time spend $5 0 billions a year and more fo r war will soon b e able to afford t o clea n up its stinking, fouling tons of waste before dumping it int o its friendly neighbour's back-yard. ' Words like thes e in a public speech were not, he knew, what th e Heeney-Merchant Report prescribed . But he'd give n its principles for partnership a try, and he fel t tha t they ha d let us down. He had been , he said, 'restrained, private, responsible and diplomatic. Bu t th e response to my quiet diplomac y has been rhetoric rathe r than result. ' 2 Distinc t from the Heeney-Merchant admonition t o refrai n fro m propaganda is its admonition t o negotiat e in secret . This admonition merel y betrays naivete about the negotiating process. Bargaining knows no hard an d fast correlatio n betwee n secrecy and success. Sometimes i t is good tactic s to keep th e term s of trade to th e negotiating parties. Sometimes it is good tactic s to let them out . Fred C. Iklé's How Nations Negotiate ha d bee n published fo r a year when the Heeney-Merchant Report wa s published. Doubtless such experienced negotiators fel t the y had nothin g t o learn from a n academic treatise on their life' s work. More's the pity. They coul d have learned fro m Ikl é what the y ough t t o have learned from experience - that 'no matter what preference s one might have regarding secret versus open diplomacy , on e must realiz e that each party will try t o move towar d o r press for tha t form o f negotiation fro m whic h i t expects th e best results.' 6 3 Th e Heeney-Merchant Report embodie s a n approach t o foreign policy, a diplomatic style. Foreign policy i s for professionals. Amateurs are to keep off the grass. The repor t is hostile t o participatory diplomacy . The public is to be seen and not heard . The report is partial to protocol. I n the era of the sit-in , it still turn s to Satow - tha t courtly guid e to diplomatic practic e for forme r generations. The report thu s points toward s the past; and while no t without it s charm , the past i s not th e direction tha t our foreign policy ought t o point. Some words of wisdom from th e U S State Department ar e a useful antidot e t o Heeney-Merchant antiquarianism: 6 (Harpe r & Row, New York, Evanston & London 1964) , 135

58 Diplomacy and its discontents

The communications ga p between foreign policy operator s an d th e public , especially citizen s i n the more remot e areas , intellectuals an d youth, is still widening. Negative and ofte n conflicting public attitude s are sometimes treated a s immutable instead of capable of change through program s to de velop understanding an d support. Publi c mistrust o n th e on e hand an d elitis t tendencies o n th e other ca n in combination promot e an d prolong continue d division. Internal insularity strongl y affect s th e climat e in which interaction be tween th e Departmen t and the general public take s place ... It cause s the Department of Stat e an d its Foreign Servic e Officers t o view the outsid e worl d from a detached perspective tinged wit h suspicion , defensiveness and even alienation .. ? 'Detached,' 'tinged with suspicion , defensiveness and even alienation' - tha t is a fair descriptio n o f th e perspectiv e from which th e author s of th e HeeneyMerchant Report loo k ou t upo n th e world. It i s a perspective of which th e Canadian foreign policy-making community ough t t o purg e itself a s quickly and a s thoroughly a s may be decently though t possible . [March 1971]

7 Diplomacy for the '70s: A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State (US Government Printing Office, Washington 1970) , 386

8

Trade, not braid Now th e da y is over, Night is drawing nigh, Shadows of the evenin g Steal acros s the sky . The strain s of Baring-Gould's fine ol d hymn, floatin g fro m th e Peace Towe r carillon int o th e office s o f th e East Bloc k nex t door , provide a plaintive summer evenson g for an y foreig n service officer stil l toiling a t his desk. Here is a man who, like Hemingwa y before him, has survived to read his own obituary . It may be found in Foreign Policy for Canadians 1 - th e government's Whit e Paper release d on 25 June - unde r the heading 'Organizin g for the Seventies.' Aesopian language and lurching syntax ar e clues to how grav e is the con clusion strugglin g to emerge . At length, throug h th e mur k o f the officia l pros e - Th e pac e of change render s more comple x an d urgent the problems o f planning an d implementing a coherent polic y aligne d with nationa l aims' ; 'An inte grated managemen t system canno t b e established immediatel y o r easily'; 'The new syste m must b e developed harmoniously an d above all keep it s capacit y for adaptin g to an evolving international situation' - may be read th e writing on the wall : 'Th e government has decided tha t ther e shoul d b e maximum inte gration in its foreign operations.' So the Department o f External Affair s i s to go the wa y of the army , navy and air force - no t into oblivio n bu t into homogeneity. I t has travelled far and high sinc e its humble beginning s sixty year s ago, when a deputy minister , tw o clerks and a secretary shared a n annual budget o f $14,950 and a n office abov e 1 (Queen' s Printer, Ottawa 1970)

60 Diplomacy and its discontents

a barber shop o n Bank Street. Fort y year s on, with Lester Pearson a s its minister, its placement at the federal tabl e put i t closest to th e salt. To its ranks candidates for public service most eagerly sought admission: fro m the m cam e the most powerful civil servants in the land . Nothing speaks more eloquently o f power than feelin g free t o help a rival. Towards the end of the war, top people a t 'External' began to worry about the Department o f Trade and Commerce - not because it seemed too strong but becaus e it seeme d too feeble . 'Weakness in the senio r personnel of Trade and Commerce,' the Under Secretary of State fo r External Affairs noted , 'is a matter of some concer n t o othe r department s who have to concer t polic y with them . It has also the unhappy resul t of producing a rather defensive state of mind an d something approaching an inferiority complex within th e department.' 2 Their cur e for thi s disease was to recommen d th e appointmen t of a force ful personalit y as its deputy minister . In th e event, the service s of their nominee were required elsewhere, and Trade and Commerce continued t o flounde r until rescue d in 194 8 b y C.D. Howe. Since then it s star has shone eve r more brightly, while that o f External has gone into a decline. The reversa l in their respectiv e fortunes didn't happen all at once. I n 1952 , th e question was put t o its under secretary whether h e thought 'th e tim e has arrived when External Affairs shoul d tak e over the trade commissioners.' Arnold Heeney responded archly: ' I am afraid tha t t o answer th e questio n would require a degree of diplomatic skill of which I am not capable.' 3 Today th e question might best be put th e other way around: Has the tim e arrived when th e trad e commissioners should take ove r External Affairs? A.E . Ritchie mus t truthfull y answer: It has, and they are. 4 It i s not just the new mercantilism of th e White Paper, with it s philosophy of 'trade, not braid, ' that's put Externa l in the shade. It i s as well the distress now being visited upon th e entir e diplomatic profession. One afte r another , the traditiona l missions of diplomacy ar e becoming redundant, or else next t o impossible t o perform. Negotiating is more and more the missio n o f officials of the departmen t or agency directly concerned with the subject at hand - labour , immigration, wheat, atomi c energy. They fly out fro m their capita l in large, four-engine aircraft; or bombard His Ex. by tele x fro m home base. 2 Norma n A. Robertson t o W.L. Mackenzie King, 23 Dec. 1943 , Kin g Papers 3 Canada , House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence, no 2 , 8 Apr. 1952 , 34 4 I t i s only fai r t o cit e Mr Ritchie's rejoinder: 'Yo u got m e wrong. My truthful answer is: "It hasn' t and they aren't."' However, the deput y ministe r of Trade an d Commerce has since been mad e high commissioner in London .

Trade, not braid 61

Propaganda seems pointless i n a world alread y deafened by to o muc h din . Reporting i s hard when blinkered, which th e diplomat is so heavily tha t he ca n barely make i t from ba r to buffe t withou t collidin g wit h his kind. Perhaps he has borne thes e affliction s n o worse than an y professionals faced withou t earl y warning by th e prospect o f obsolescence. Bu t his chief difficulty i s of his own making. This i s his failur e t o adjus t t o a dramatically changed international environment. A truly modern diplomacy, a n authority observes, 'must protect an d advance the national interes t no t primaril y by th e usual processes of negotiation an d communication with stabilize d states , bu t rather throug h developin g contact with an d exerting influence upon powerful but stil l largely inchoate politica l forces . This definitio n o f the diplomatic tas k puts notions o f sovereignty, protocol, non-intervention, and many othe r fami liar consideration s in a radically different framework.' 5 How fa r from making that adjustmen t are most member s of th e professio n may b e judged fro m a n aide-mémoire filche d fro m las t month's diplomati c pouch ou t o f a beleaguered nation. 'Th e ambassador of Liberia, dea n of th e diplomatic corps , presents his compliments t o thei r excellencies , the ladies and gentlemen, heads o f diplomatic missions , an d has the honor t o infor m them tha t the ambassado r o f Sweden, his excellency B o L. Siegbahn, has expressed th e desire that his tray should b e engraved on it s back instead o f on the front , as is usually done. Therefore, the ambassado r of Liberia, dean of the diplomatic corps , hereby submits this matter t o their excellencies , th e ladies and gentlemen, heads of diplomatic missions , fo r their reaction , a t their earliest possible convenience. ' Meanwhile, as the traditiona l diplomats go through th e motion s o f thei r potty protocol, like a ballet company finishin g Swan Lake in an earthquake , the commercial s are taking over. Foreign operations will centr e more on manifests than manifestoes, on bills of lading, than o n bills of rights, on 'cheap ti n trays' carrie d in the holds o f freighters tha n on sterling silver trays (whichever side engraved) presented to departing ambassadors. Being 'in trade, ' no longer a badge o f bureaucratic inferiority, i s where the actio n is. Presiding cheerfully over the dissolutio n of his own empire is the secretary of state fo r External Affairs . Bu t the n Mitchel l Sharp was always a Trade and Commerce man a t heart. 'On revien t toujours à ses premiers amours.' That i s why th e minister ca n publish s o that hi s department may perish. It i s a pleasant enough divisio n of labour - for him. [July 1970 ]

5 Waldema r A. Nielsen, African Battleline: American Policy Choices in Southern Africa (Harpe r & Row, Ne w York, Evanston, & London 1965) , 138- 9

9

The selling of the think-tan k Of al l the gimmicks for governing the countr y sol d t o a too credulou s press and publi c by Prime Minister Trudeau and his snake-oil merchants i n the Privy Council office, none i s more spuriou s than th e desig n for a n institute for research o n public policy lai d out b y Ronal d S . Ritchie. 1 Would you bu y a second-hand think-tan k fro m thi s man ? The government of Canada has just bought i t for you, a t a cost o f up t o $ 10 millions. For a politician tagge d as trendy, Mr Trudeau is badly out o f touc h wit h the haute couture of intellect. Think-tanks and futurology , so far fro m being fashionable, have become a s démodé a s knee-length skirts , as out-of-date as spats . Not just date d but discredite d as well. Futurology ha s been expose d a s fraud, think-tank s a s a frill. 'Th e whole syste m o f contractin g out ha s becom e an empty ritual, ' an American critic wrote a s long ago as 1968 , 'th e magic of chateau-cloistered expertis e is on th e wane.' 2 One reaso n fo r thei r fallin g out o f favou r is that thei r wor k i s often shoddy . Many publi c policy researc h institutes lack an y for m of quality control fo r an output largel y classified. Meant for a client's ey e alone, i t escapes detache d evaluation. In 196 8 th e U S General Accounting Offic e looke d i n on th e Hudso n Institute (alon g wit h RAN D th e mos t prestigiou s think-tank o f the m all , the on e in which th e prim e minister's aides are required t o immers e themselves fro m tim e to time ) t o fin d a major client profoundly disenchanted . 'Th e autho r di d no t have sufficient knowledge of the subjec t area, ' 'many of th e report' s assump 1 An Institute for Research on Public Policy: A Study Prepared for the Government of Canada (Queen' s Printer, Ottawa 1971) 2 H.L . Nieburg, 'The Profit and Los s of Herman Kahn,' The Nation, 1 3 May 196 8

The selling of th e think-tan k 6 3

dons were obviou s or unproved,' 'superficia l an d not o f much value, ' 'unsupported guesse s that serv e only t o distract' - suc h wer e th e disparaging remarks of th e Offic e of Civil Defense about th e researc h it had pai d Hudson t o conduc t on its behalf. 3 Another sampl e o f think-tan k though t t o com e t o ligh t i n which i t would not ordinaril y have been expose d i s revealed in the Pentagon Papers . The Institute fo r Defens e Analysis (cited i n th e Ritchi e Repor t a s 'able t o attrac t com petent staf f b y th e challeng e of th e work') prepared fo r th e Pentagon, it s principal patron , a study o f why a year and a half o f bombing b y th e U S Air Force hadn' t brought Hano i t o it s knees. 'Nort h Vietnam has basically a subsistence agricultura l economy,' ID A concluded afte r vas t investigation, 'that presents a difficult an d unrewardin g target system fo r ai r attack.' Rather tha n bomb, IDA recommended, the United State s shoul d build , and what i t shoul d build i s an 'anti-troop infiltratio n system' featurin g ' a constantl y renewe d min e field' seede d wit h '2 0 million Gravel mines per month , possibl y 2 5 millio n but ton bomblet s pe r month,' the up-kee p of which i s put a t $800 millions a year.4 The Vietna m War is the firs t t o b e waged by think-tanks ; one hopes to Go d it will be the last . But even without tha t blotch upo n thei r copy-book s the y would hav e been discredited . Think-tank finding s tend t o bias . When the Hudson Institut e prepares a report fo r th e Grumman Aerospace Corporatio n on th e futur e fo r manned car rier aircraft in th e 1980s , does i t tel l it s client tha t manne d carrie r aircraft ma y have n o futur e i n th e 1980s ? Doe s i t s o much a s allude t o th e possibility ? It does not . Instead , with th e characteristi c Hudson blend o f ingenuity and ingenuousness, it devises a series of scenario s in which manne d carrie r aircraft more tha n eve r go off int o th e wide blue yonder o f the 1980 s - i f need b e from floatin g platform s anchore d t o reef s or shoal s (a fea t mad e feasibl e by 'our tremendou s engineerin g capability an d offshore constructio n experience , combined wit h ou r fantasti c sea logistic capability'). 5 Think-tank researc h canno t b e disinterested. The institut e comes first , the client a close second , th e trut h a poor third . W e should accep t thei r findings , Kenneth Bouldin g rightly warns, 'with th e sam e kind o f reserve that, shal l we say, we migh t gree t a study o f the Reformatio n b y Jesuit s based o n unpublishe d and secre t document s i n the Vatican ; there i s the sam e combinatio n o f honest y in the valu e system an d bia s in the commitment.' 6 3 Ibid .

4 Quote d i n The Pentagon Papers (Banta m Books , Ne w York 1971) , 50 8 5 Fran k E . Armbruster,/4 Study o f th e Probable Environment of Manned Carrier Aircraft i n the 1980s: Interim Report (Hudso n Institute , Croton-on-Hudson 1970) , appendix 1 , p 4 6 Conflict an d Defense (Harpe r & Row, Ne w York 1962) , 33 2

64 Diplomac y and its discontents

If think-tan k impartiality is suspect, s o is think-tank methodology. When since th e mysti c cult s o f Pythagoreans hav e mathematics bee n s o abused o n behalf o f public policy ? Think-tank researc h run s to quantifying th e unquantifiable . 'Herma n Kahn once sai d t o me: "You'r e 98 percent right", ' a critic of his Hudson Institut e recalls: ' I wonder ho w he arrive d at tha t percentage.' 7 One might wonde r a s much abou t th e percentages peppering th e Pentagon Papers : 'U S aims: 70 % to avoi d a humiliating US defeat... 20 % - T o keep SV N (and th e adjacent ) ter ritory fro m Chinese hands . 10 % - To permi t th e peopl e o f SVN to enjo y a better, freer wa y of life.' Ho w much 'better, ' how muc h 'freer' ? Think-tank researc h runs to extrapolating trends . But extrapolatio n i s not prediction; futurology' s persisten t confusio n o f the tw o remind s Robert A . Nisbet o f a mad scientis t 'predictin g giants at ag e twenty o n th e basi s of growt h rates at ag e ten.'8 Such a confusion ma y accoun t fo r Herman Kahn's forecast o f a n economi c growth rat e of 10. 8 per cent a year fo r Japan durin g 1981- 5 - a figure tosse d off wit h th e assuranc e of on e who ha s lived throug h th e futur e h e predicts , bu t Kahn ha s been nowher e nea r it. The unscholarl y elements in [his ] work, ' writes th e Australian strategist Hedle y Bull of it, 'the tipsterism , th e appeal s to non-evidenc e an d hints o f vast studies unde r wa y at th e Hudson Institut e that woul d suppor t hi s conclusions, are not extrinsi c ... but ar e an essential part o f his equipment a s ... "a professiona l futurologist".' 9 The professiona l futurologis t lacks the powe r t o predic t bu t possesse s th e power t o persuade . Professor Howar d Perlmutter, made famou s by forecasting that som e 30 0 super-corporation s will dominat e th e global marke t o f the 1980 s while medium-siz e corporation s g o under , says managers of medium-siz e corporations ca n hardly wai t fo r his briefings t o en d s o that the y ca n get bus y o n their mergers. 'It doesn' t matte r what wil l happen,' futurologist Perlmutter declares. 'What does matte r i s what peopl e thin k wil l happen. In tha t way the y will mak e i t happen.' 10 Exactly. Tha t i s why Herma n Kahn ough t no t t o mak e oracular pronouncements tha t Japa n wil l become a nuclear weapon power . That i s why th e Canadian government ought no t t o have allowe d eight y o f its senior servant s at a seminar o f th e Institut e fo r th e Futur e a t Middletown, Connecticut, t o to y with - le t alone t o arrive at - th e conclusion tha t Quebe c will leave Confederation. The y wil l onl y hel p t o mak e i t happen . 7 Quote d i n Michael Davie, 'Shadow o f a New Bi g Brother,' Th e Observer, 1 0 Jan. 197 1 8 'Th e Yea r 200 0 and All That,' Commentary, vol. 45 , n o 6, June 1968 , 6 3 9 Survival, Jul y 1971 , 24 9 10 Quote d i n Richard Spiegelberg , '1985 - th e day of th e super-giants,' The Times, 29 Mai. 197 1

The selling of the think-tank

65

Biased i n approach, flawe d i n methodology, think-tank s hav e suffered th e final ignomin y o f redundance . Afte r a first flurr y o f infatuation , governments have turne d cool . Out-house researc h - wh o needs it? Effective publi c policy researc h mus t b e in-hous e public policy research . You hav e t o do you r own . 'Plannin g is a waste of time, ' Henry Kissinge r has testified, 'unles s it is done b y th e peopl e wh o hav e got t o execut e it . Unless you ca n get the attentio n o f th e to p policy-makers , you ar e just writin g theoretical exercises.' 11 There's enough researc h in the syste m already . That 'urgen t nee d t o see k out more data, ' of which th e Ritchie Repor t ha s managed t o convinc e th e government o f Canada, simply doesn't exist . Data i s coming ou t Ottawa' s ears , it is up t o it s chin i n th e stuff . Mor e is too much. 'Utilizin g outside expert s an d research institutes ' - Kissinger' s testimony agai n - 'add s another burde n t o alread y overworked officials . It tend s to divert attentio n fro m th e ac t of judgment on whic h polic y ultimatel y depends to th e assembl y of fact s which i s relatively th e easies t ste p in policy formation . Few i f any o f th e recen t crises.. . have been cause d b y th e unavailabilit y of data. Ou r policy-maker s do no t lac k advice ; they ar e in many respect s overwhelmed b y it.' 12 Our s are too . Producing ne w ideas - th e think-tank's raison d'êtr e - i s grossly over-valued. Policy-makers d o not nee d ne w ideas. Th e idea s necessary for good government,' Hans Morgenthau point s out , 'ar e par t o f the public record.' The basi c Canadian problem s - wha t t o do abou t th e French fact , American domination , pollution, unemploymen t - wil l not b e solved b y new ideas. The ques t fo r political novelty , th e pursui t of administrative innovation, are part o f th e disguise by whic h a n irresolute leader seeks t o concea l fro m hi s people th e exten t o f his irresolution. Wha t policy-makers do nee d i s the courag e of thei r convictions, and the right convictions . No institute o f public policy researc h - how ever lavishly funded, staffed, an d housed - i s going t o help the m there . Among th e usefu l roles whic h th e Unite d State s perform s fo r Canada is that o f social laborator y wher e inventions , as useful her e a s there, ar e tested an d prove n at n o expens e t o us . We ride fre e o n thei r researc h an d development . W e can tak e advantage o f thei r successes , avoid thei r failures . One o f thei r failures i s futurology. Years of experimen t wit h long-rang e planning, large-scale research, institut e brainstorming, think-tan k 'schloc k science,' have cause d the m t o star t callin g it off . 11 Pres s briefing, 1 6 Sept. 197 0 12 Th e Necessity fo r Choice (Harpe r & Brothers, New York I960) , 35 1

66 Diplomacy and its discontents

'The future-predicters , the change-analyst s an d trend-tenders,' writes Robert A . Nisbet, 'say tha t with th e ai d of institute resources , computers , linear programming, etc., the y wil l deal with th e kinds of change that ar e not the consequenc e o f the Random Event , the Genius, the Maniac and the Prophet,' adding: 'Ther e really aren't any ; not an y worth lookin g into.' 13 'National planning doe s not work,' asserts a contributor t o th e current issue o f The Public Interest (onc e almos t a house orga n for futurology) , 'because no large and complex societ y ca n figure ou t wha t simpl e an d unambiguous things it wants to do , or in what clea r order of priority or how t o get them done, ' and goes on to quot e Nabako v approvingly: 'Wha t we do a t bes t fat wors t w e perform trivial tricks) whe n postulating th e future , i s to expan d enormously th e specious present.'14 And another contributo r t o the same Issue calls for a n attitude o f 'utter agnosticism ' towards the claim s of longrange planners and the boosters o f bigness and growth, conceding that 'sinc e such a way of thinkin g abou t th e futur e run s counter to tha t whic h th e West has wholeheartedly espouse d sinc e th e 18t h centur y ... it will be something of a miracle if this new agnosticism comes to prevail.' 15 The intellectuals ' disillusionmen t with th e claim s of futurolog y i s taking a toll of future-oriented institutions in the United States . I n 1969 , the US State Department-disbanded its Policy Planning Council.16 Twenty year s of longfange foreig n policy predictio n by planner s freed fro m day-to-da y operationa l responsibility had show n i t t o be a waste of tim e and money. Contracts fo r Out-house research ar e drying up a s clients realiz e that think-tanks (i n th e words of an American critic ) ar e no more tha n ' a means for spendin g money while rationalizin g useless, unread an d often uncirculated results,' 'a collabora tion subsidize d by th e tax-payer ' in which i t is hard t o tel l whether th e think tank i s working for th e government or the government is working for th e think-tank.17 Canadian policy-makers, fa r from bein g warned off by thi s experience , are cojning on strong -vinfatuated-with futurolog y despit e its exposure a s a racket. Prime Minister Trudeau's keynot e speec h a t the Libera l 'thinkers confer ence' in November 196 9 wa s a paean t o technocrati c futurism , with it s allusions to 'th e refinements of our technique s fo r forecasting and planning,' t o the need fo r planning to 'operat e in a scale of time whic h i s sufficient t o per mit it t o alte r th e future, ' t o a political syste m i n which methodolog y rathe r 13 Th e Yea r 200 0 and All That,' 66 14 Aaro n Wildavsky , 'Does Planning Work?', The Public Interest, summe r 1971 , 104 15 E.J . Mishan , 'Making the Future Saf e for Mankind,' ibid., 60- 1 16 Se e below, 128-3 0 17 Nieburg , 'The Profit an d Los s of Herman Kahn'

The selling of the think-tank 67

than principle i s what divide s the voters: ' A party which shows tha t it is capable of comin g to grips with lon g range questions abou t th e futur e o f our soci ety wil l have a new clai m to th e respec t and th e suppor t of th e peopl e o f Canada.'18 The prim e minister's bemusemen t by th e claim s of futurolog y is leading to th e creatio n of future-oriented institution s in Canada. In 1969 , th e Department o f External Affairs create d its Policy Analysi s Group in response to wha t it calls 'an expression o f concern b y th e present government that the element s of Canadian foreig n policy shoul d b e settled with an orderly coherence i n a rational form , be sensitiv e to changin g conditions an d priorities, an d in tune with th e future. ' Tha t sam e year, the prime minister received a report o n th e feasibility o f settin g up a n institute 'where long-range research and thinkin g can be carried into governmental matters of all kinds.' The Ritchie Repor t concluded: 'Wit h the experienc e o f institutes an d governments in the United States an d Western Europe as a guide, there i s every reason to believ e that th e time i s now rip e for creatio n in Canada of a public policy researc h institute.' In 1971 , the prime ministe r accepted this conclusion. Minerva's owl, Hegel wrote despairingly, takes her fligh t only i n the gathering dusk, but i n Canada she can't s o much a s leave the ground . Why is our government placin g s o much fait h an d fund s in the sor t o f institution tha t elsewher e has been discredited? Partly becaus e we have yet t o shak e of f th e remainin g vestiges of a colonial mentality which , distrusting our own judgment, looks t o th e métropole fo r models. There i t is traduced by th e meretricious , like a half-wit playing Crown and Anchor a t a fair. Partly because of ou r prime minister's cast of min d which, moulded in th e cours classique fou r decade s ago, bearing still its ultra-rationalist imprint, was only i n the dangerou s years of later middle ag e exposed t o th e send-up s of American social scientism, to be by thes e bewitched. Mainly because of a conflict of interest . The governmen t sough t counse l from thos e - t o judge from th e Ritchie Report' s lis t of counsellors, onl y fro m those - who had a vested interes t i n endorsing the project. What would happen , the economis t E.J. Mishan asks ironically, i f futurology were phased out ? 'W e should hav e t o giv e up our toys ! A hundred thousan d academic s would have t o abandon thei r hope s o f statu s and recognition.' 19

18 'Technology , the Individua l and th e Party,' in Allen M. Linden, sa.,Living in th e Seventies (Pete r Martin Associates Ltd, Toront o 1970) , 6-7 19 'Futurism : And th e Worse That Is Yet t o come,'Encounter, Mar . 1971 , 9

68 Diplomacy and its discontents

But no t i n this Canada o f ours. 'Th e major component o f th e institute' s staff,' th e Ritchie Repor t promises , is likely t o be social scientists - economists , politica l scientists , historians , sociologists, psychologist s .. . The professional staff woul d have to b e backed up, o f course, by secretarial , stenographic, clerical , accounting and other sup port personnel. The y woul d need acces s to librar y an d compute r facilities . They woul d hav e to trave l ... The institute would have to see k ou t an d pay fo r research wor k don e b y outside scholar s .. . These to o woul d have t o travel.. . The institute shoul d surel y be , within a reasonable tim e .. . [staffe d by ] 8 0 t o 100 professional personnel [with ] a n annual budget of th e orde r o f $ 5 million.20 What a cornucopia o f goodies to gorge on fo r th e so-calle d 'actio n intellectuals ' in whom contract s for researc h arouse the avaric e of a magpie and th e moral s of a n alley-cat. To suc h a breed th e publi c policy researc h institute would b e in any cas e attractive, but th e kind o f action offere d b y th e campu s these day s will make i t irresistible. An almos t audibl e relief i s theirs a t movin g from th e turmoil o f the academ y into their 'suitabl e headquarters building' with its 'own distinctiv e workin g quarters': Hide me, O my saviou r hide, Till th e stor m o f life i s past. Safe int o th e have n guide, O receive my sou l a t last . What of the universitie s they wil l leave behind? Th e Ritchi e Repor t hope s to enlist only th e best talen t amon g 'highly regarde d scholars.' Pull 8 0 to 10 0 highly regarde d scholars out o f Canada's social scienc e faculties , and ther e would b e nothing worthwhil e left . Our universitie s would n o longer b e able t o perform on e of their vita l function s - principle d an d radical criticism of society . Could th e Libera l party, with it s successful recor d dow n th e year s of coopting critic s in the bud, have planned i t al l that way? [August 1971 ]

20 An Institute for Research on Public Policy, 46-7

10

The deliquescence o f diplomacy A fundamental change is taking place within world politics. It ma y b e described a s the declin e of diplomacy. Or, better, as the deliquescenc e of diplo macy - deliquescenc e in its dictionary meaning of melting away into nothing ness, fading awa y into limbo . I constru e this prediction a s the thir d instalmen t i n a three-fold attac k upon the diplomati c profession. Elsewhere I have charged it with mora l turpitude, 1 and agai n with inefficiency. 2 I n what follow s I bring against it the charg e of irrelevance. This is perhaps the gravest charge that ma y be laid. Tell a man he's immoral , and he ma y fee l a glow of satisfaction a t being thought a rogue. Tell him he' s inefficient, an d he ma y consol e himself by reflectin g tha t th e inefficient , along with th e meek, will inherit th e earth. But tell him he's irrelevan t - obsolete , redundant, no longer needed, in a word deliquesce d - an d there i s no glow, no consolation, t o be had. Deliquescence is a down trip. The deliquescenc e of diplomacy has its causes in the changin g style o f negotiation, in the changin g technique of negotiation, and in the changin g milieu o f negotiation. To th e question 'Ho w shoul d nation s negotiate?' there ar e two general sorts of answers. The firs t answe r derives from th e traditio n of classical diplomacy, and is best stated , perhaps, i n that chapte r o f Harold Nicolson's well known little book, Diplomacy,3 i n which h e describes , as so many have before 1 I n Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy; se e below, 165-9 1 2 I n Fate and Will i n Foreign Policy; se e below, 81-16 2 3 (3r d éd. , Oxford Universit y Press, London, New York, & Toronto 1963 )

70 Diplomacy and its discontents

him, th e qualities o f the ideal diplomat. Thi s is what he say s these are : 'Th e basis of good negotiation is moral influence and that influenc e is founded on seven specific diplomatic virtues, namely: - 1 Truthfulnes s - 2 Precisio n 3 Cal m - 4 Goo d Tempe r - 5 Patienc e - 6 Modest y - 7 Loyalty. ' When Nicolson praises these qualities, a s he does in lapidary language, it is not a s ends in themselves, not fo r virtue being its own reward. It i s rather because he expects the y will secure the best results, produce th e greatest payoff. His book i s really a set of variations on the them e tha t 'honesty is the best policy,' and that 'nic e guys finish first. ' The secon d answe r to th e question 'Ho w should nation s negotiate? ' is very different fro m Nicolson's answer. It i s given most baldly , most boldly, i n T.C. Schelling's Th e Strategy o f Conflict. Schellin g doe s not g o so far as to conten d that lying, imprecision, excitability, ba d temper, impatience, immodesty , fick leness - th e mirror-image opposites o f Nicolson's seve n cardinal negotiatin g virtues - ar e the keys to a successful diplomacy. H e only contend s that on occasion the y ca n be. He observes that sometime s honesty i s the best polic y and sometimes it is not. He points out tha t there ar e times when nic e guys finish first , an d times when the y finis h last. He does, however, give the stron g impression that th e world is becoming mor e and more a place in which nic e guys, if they d o not finis h last, finis h well on down th e line. And s o he advise s nice guys - th e statesmen of the western world - that if they wish to survive the sordid stratagems of their opponents, the y woul d do well not t o appear so nice. They shoul d not , he says, be above soliciting 'advic e from the underworld, or from ancien t despotisms, on how t o make agreements work whe n trust an d good fait h are lacking and ther e is no legal recourse for breach of contract.'4 If th e diplomatis t of the ol d school reads his Schelling a s perceptively as once he rea d his Nicolson, his Mona Lisa smile will be frozen on his face. This is no mere case of newcomers crowding his environment, making the workin g conditions les s pleasant. He's put u p with tha t before , he can put u p with i t again. It's a case of a new environment crowding out th e old , making it impos sible to do his job unde r any conditions, fo r the job n o longer exists t o be done . For what' s no w required of him is to be adept at techniques altogethe r of fensive t o his taste. He is required to lie, to cheat, t o dissemble and, the better to emplo y suc h measures, 'to solicit advic e from th e underworld, or from ancient despotisms.' But these ar e not th e oracles the smoot h diplomatis t ca n easily or profitably consult. He did not ente r the foreig n servic e to live a life like Tamburlane's, or a life lik e Genghis Khan's. H e can't mode l himself o n a Dillinger. or even on Bonnie and Clyde. To the exten t tha t he's consciou s of his 4 (Harvar d University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1960), 20

The deliquescence o f diplomacy 7 1

predicament, an d of its causes, a sense of his irrelevance hangs about him like a shroud. The modern diplomatist i s thus a man unde r stress. Typically he develops one or other o f three defenc e mechanisms. Perhaps he'll pretend t o himself, an d try t o get others t o believe, that nothing reall y has changed. 'What are the essentia l qualities,' asks Escott Reid, a former Canadian foreign service officer, 'whic h a diplomat mus t possess?' And h e answers as Nicolson answered: 'The first qualit y i s honesty.'5 That remar k is beyond comment , as it i s beyond belief. Or he will seek consolation i n the camaraderi e of his profession. This is the reaction of Lord Strang , the forme r head o f the Foreign Office, wh o writes in his memoirs as follows: The thirst for world domination , the belief tha t it can be attained and the abandonment o f all moral restraint in the attemp t to achiev e it [are ] par t of the environmen t in which th e Foreig n Servic e officer live s and works , and it is small wonder if he has sometimes been distressed an d revolted by it... To work in such an environment would hardly have been tolerabl e had it not bee n ... for th e comradeship , i n times good an d bad, which colleague s in the Foreig n Service affor d t o eac h other ... 6 This i s a true confession, for which th e studen t of th e subjec t is duly grateful. Diplomacy, h e learns, is a dirty business, but fortunatel y for those engaged in it the y ar e such a happy ban d o f brothers that i t hardly seem s to matter , as they hardly see m to notice . A thir d mechanis m o f defence against the stres s which assail s the moder n diplomatist, caugh t as he is in the crossfir e between the ideal s and the practic e of his profession, is to tur n agains t its ideals and revel in its practice. For thi s a certain hardness of heart, an d of nose, is required, and not al l diplomatist s possess them. One who does is Dean Acheson. The North Vietnamese, Mr Acheson remarked not lon g ago, 'don't want to negotiate. I say that's fine. I hope they stay tha t way.' 7 This is as if a surgeon, having successfully implanted th e heart o f patient X into the body o f patient Y , were to utter a prayer for it to sto p beating. The stres s of the moder n diplomatist , howeve r he may defend himself against it, is made no easier to bear by th e reflection that if he won't learn from th e underworld ther e ar e plenty o f others who will. Not just th e specialists in violence and the agents of deceit - thos e wh o staff the Pentagon, th e 5 Th e Conscienc e of the Diplomat: A Personal Testament,' Queen's Quarterly, winter 1967, LXXIV.no 4, 580- 1 6 Home and Abroad (Andr é Deutsch, London 1956) , 305 7 'Acheso n on Negotiation,' The Reporter, 2 8 Dec. 1967, 2 8

72 Diplomac y an d its discontents

CIA an d MI 5 - bu t withi n th e precincts of his own profession he will fin d those fledgling Achesons - eager and ambitious publi c servant s - who are not only willin g to lear n fro m th e underworld, but ca n teach i t a trick o r two . My firs t reaso n for predicting the deliquescenc e of diplomac y i s this change in the style o f negotiation. M y second reaso n has to d o with a change i n the technique of negotiation . The Johnson administration was often charge d with failin g t o pursue , as seriously a s it might, negotiatio n wit h Hanoi . This charge i s wide of the mark . The Johnson administratio n has been negotiating with Hanoi. Bu t the kind of negotiation engage d in is not th e kind w e used to know . It doesn' t tak e plac e aroun d green baize tables . No caraf e o f Vichy water , no demi-tasse of coffee, ai d and comfort th e discussions . Fo r th e discussant s are ten thousan d mile s apart. They communicat e b y sendin g and receiving signals. The signal s are gradations of violence. Selectio n o f targets , scale of attack, tel l the recipient what th e sender wants to say . Smooth diplomac y delivered despatches to a chancery. Rough diplomac y deliver s bombs t o a refinery - th e very rough , to a hospital . Such unholy communio n i s called tacit negotiation . Tacit negotiatio n i s negotiation withou t negotiators , foreign policy without foreig n offices, diplo macy without diplomatists . I n tacit negotiatio n yo u let your weapons do your talking. The Marines are your ambassadors. Their mortar s are your message . Asked wha t he would do in Vietnam, Dean Acheson replied : 'I would us e this question o f bombing as a military an d other tool.. . And a s you d o weaken them, an d as they d o want to stop, this particular weapon will be used less or not use d at all . You don't have to tal k t o the m abou t it , you just have to do it ...' 8 Tacit negotiation' s nothin g new . Nelson called a man-o'-war 'the best negotiator i n Europe.' There's alway s been interaction between arms and influ ence, ever since men began taking u p arm s to acquir e influence. What's new is not th e method bu t th e popularity o f the method, the pervasiveness of the method. An d its popularity an d pervasiveness derive from recen t refinements of th e method. One i s a refinement in doctrine. Eve n as recently a s the Secon d Worl d War, people though t ther e were only tw o postures - s o to speak - in which t o have international intercourse. One was a posture of peace. The othe r a posture o f war - in Hobbes' phrase , 'the posture o f gladiators.' 8 Ibid. , 28-9

The deliquescence of diplomacy 7 3

So restricted a repertoire offered littl e scop e t o taci t negotiators. Al l they could do was to transmi t variations on the theme o f 'If you don't quit now, we'll blo w th e hell ou t o f you.' The Second World War was accordingly a war of saturatio n bombing, of final solutions , o f unconditional surrenders. 'When men become locked in battle' - so said one of its most famous generals - 'ther e should b e no artific e unde r the name of politics which shoul d handicap your own men.'9 The autho r o f this dictum was General MacArthur. For attemptin g t o apply it t o his conduct o f the war in Korea he was stripped o f his command . For th e Korean War was a different sor t o f war than th e military had go t used to. I t was a limited war, a war of status quo an d stalemate, a war of sanctuary and redoubt, a war of weapons that were not fire d an d o f generals who wer e fired. The Korea n War was limited war ; the Vietnam War is escalated war. If Napoleon's soldier s carried in their knapsacks a field-marshal's baton, Johnson's chief s of staff carry in their briefcases a collapsible versio n of Herman Kahn's escalation ladder. On Escalation: Metaphors an d Scenarios10 is a handbook fo r taci t negotiators, showing how the y ma y proceed, step by step , rung by rung , from th e innocuou s posturing required by 'Solem n and Formal Declarations' (Rung 3) , through th e more provocative 'Super-Ready Status' and 'Large Compound Escalation ' (Rungs 1 1 t o 13) , and so onwards and upwards, if no one backs down, into the wide blue yonder of nuclear conflict culminating, at Rung 44, i n 'Spasm or Insensate War' - a strategist's nightmare, or a strategist's Nirvana. One is never quite sur e which . Kahn provides the cryptography for escalated war. The equipment - for sending and receiving the signals - come s out o f the arsenal s of North American democracy. These bulg e with th e merchandise of death, and of incapacitation. In escalated war, it is as important to b e able to disabl e and disfigure, to defoliate and incapacitate, as to be able to destroy and exterminate. Even more important. For i n escalated war, violence is inflicted no t insensately , indiscriminately, as on Dresden or Hiroshima, but precisely , minutely, as degrees of temperatur e are calibrated on a sensitive thermometer. Like certai n forms of high temperatur e therapy, th e patient will be cured when his body-heat's u p t o 106°.Cured-orkilled. Escalated war requires a code, it requires the mean s of transmission. It requires as well command and control , s o that th e master signaller in the Kremlin 9 Quote d i n Robert Endicot t Osgood , Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Universit y of Chicago Press, Chicago 1957) , 177 10 (Frederic k A. Praeger, New York 1965 )

74 Diplomacy and its discontents

or the White House may transmit with a minimum o f garble or of noise th e message of the moment t o his adversary. This is not a job fo r soldiers, nor is it a job fo r diplomats. It i s a job fo r political leaders . During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy was in radio-telephone contac t with the bridge of the USS John R . Pierce. (It ma y turn out tha t President Johnson wa s in radio-telephone contac t wit h th e bridge of the USSMaddox; an d he must bitterly regret not havin g been in radio-telephone contac t with th e bridge of the USS Pueblo.) Only other demand s upon his time prevented President Johnson from personall y directin g the mission of each aircraf t attackin g North Vietnam, from take-off through bomb-ru n to touch-down ; but thes e di d not prevent his selecting the target s for each night . So the foreig n offic e i s displaced by th e operation s room . One should no t blame President Johnson fo r th e falterin g moral e of his State Department. Morale was as low under Kennedy, who did what he could be revive it. But the more he tried t o breath life int o it, th e more rigor mortis set in. Kennedy seems never to have understood tha t his State Department was beyond resus citation. President Johnson, however , understood only to o clearly . Rusk was the perfect man for the job. I t consiste d not i n presiding over the nation's for eign policy: rather , it consisted in presiding, like th e last of the viceroys, over an empty palace from whic h vitality an d power had long since departed. The deliquescence o f diplomacy i s being brought about most drastically no t so much by change s in the styl e or the techniqu e o f negotiation a s by changes in the milieu o f negotiation - change s in the nature of the states system itself . People hav e been predicting the demise of the states system for so long and have been confounde d in their predictions so often - tha t i t will seem foolhardy t o offe r th e prediction once again. I know very well how daunting and how contradictor y t o my argument the evidence at firs t sigh t may appear . The states system has more tha n doubled its membership within th e last few years. It doesn' t see m at all to matter ho w tiny th e territory, how meagre the resources, how fe w the people o f these newcomers: sand-spi t or atoll, rockpile or slag-heap, they take thei r place of equal status with th e proud and the powerful. The United Nations, intended b y its charter to be the plaything o f the great powers, has become instead th e plaything of the flower-powers, manipulated by mini-states and micro-states which canno t eve n pay the rent. All this being so, it would appear that, as time goes by, th e world is going to need more and more of what it is that diplomats do, and larger numbers of diplomats to do it. But this appearance is misleading, for three reasons . The firs t i s that the very proliferation of micro-states and mini-states now adorning th e modern internationa l syste m will cause the older an d more pow-

The deliquescence of diplomacy

75

erful o f that system to tur n away in disgust and disenchantment. The y wil l renounce th e procedures, the protocol, an d the institutions b y which th e upstarts have been able to stak e out an d make good thei r preposterou s claim s upon th e rest . Here is a perfect example o f the dialectical process of socia l change: th e profession of diplomacy i s destroyed by the overproductio n of unmarketable foreig n policies , muc h as Marx believed that the professio n of capitalism would be destroyed b y th e over-productio n o f unmarketable commodities. A secon d chang e in the environment of foreign policy, i n the milieu o f negotiation, makin g for the demise of diplomacy, is the shift - alread y visible from th e nation-state t o th e urban centre a s the significan t focus o f politica l activity. By the year 2000 - som e soothsayers have said - th e United State s will be so transformed that it s life wil l be dominated by , an d centre upon, thre e massive regional enclaves. One is bounded b y San Diego and San Francisco o n th e west coast ; a second centra l enclave by Chicago and Pittsburgh; a third on th e east coast, by Boston an d Washington. (Some wa g has called the m San-san , Chipitts, an d Bowash, for short.) These gian t conurbations each contai n up wards of twenty or thirty millio n people. In many respect s their concern s will transcend in importance those o f the national state entity ou t o f which the y arise. Already they exis t i n embryo. Already they have begun to conduc t wha t may be called functiona l foreign policy - both with each other an d with comparable regions in other part s of th e world. On their agend a will be inscribe d those problems of direct and pressing interest t o thei r populations . These wil l have little t o do with th e classica l concerns of traditional diplomacy, maintaining or manipulating the balance o f power behind th e façade of the moment - th e United Nations, or NATO, or whatever it may be. They wil l have to do with problems of the pollution o f the atmosphere, problems of race relations, problems of traffi c contro l an d of drug control, problems of civilian defence, even problems of foreign ai d - th e whole absorbing paramount task of assuring the million s of lives under their respective jurisdictions the means not just to life, but t o th e good lif e - a s Aristotle said a city-state should. Fo r what I am predicting - an d it is no very startling prediction, fo r it is already taking place - i s the rediscovery and rehabilitation of the city-state, the replacement of the nation-state by th e city-state, the supplantin g oí patria by polis, or rather by megapolis, a s the significan t actor on the world stage. In thi s shape of things to come, th e fat e o f the classica l foreign office i s preordained. Its future i s limited, it s days are numbered. Only the grace with which i t leaves the scen e is yet i n doubt. I t may fold it s tent, an d silently stea l away; or else, and more likely - sinc e no bureaucracy gives up without a fight -

76 Diplomacy and its discontents

it will unwillingly b e reduced t o a n anachronism, whos e sol e surviving func tions are ceremonial, havin g as little to do with the conten t of policy as the Bureau of Indian Affairs o r th e Warden of the Cinque Ports. By the year 2000 it is possible that th e principal dut y o f the State Departmen t ma y be custodian ship o f the Great Seal of th e United States, whic h i s no longer affixed t o docu ments of national importanc e fo r the excellent reaso n that there will no longer be document s of national importance. Th e important document s will be signed, as the important thing s will be done, down a t Megapolitan Hall, by th e cit y governors and the urba n managers who ar e the real men of power. The Sam Yortys and the John Lindsay s of the twenty-first century will not hanke r fo r the presidency ; for thei r prerogative s as mayors of megapolis will transcend the power s of th e presidency , if any presidency is left. A thir d chang e in the milieu of negotiation whic h wil l render tranditional diplomatic activit y al l but obsolete , i f not entirel y obsolete, is the emergence of the individua l to a significant role i n world politics . The individual - an d I think of him primarily a s the ordinary guy, not as pope o r potentate o r prime minister - has fared wretchedl y i n the practice of international politics ; an d until recentl y he has not fare d ver y well in theor y either. The dominant theor y treats the individua l as a creature of the state t o which h e belongs. The international syste m is a state-system, in which th e individual, wrenched from th e contex t of th e state which gives him status , is as out o f place an d as dangerously exposed a s a pedestrian on a highway o n a rainy night . The individua l cannot su e a foreign governmen t for damages . If, while travellin g abroad, he is unjustly arreste d o r imprisoned, hi s country, no t his family or his person, is assumed to be the injured party . In affair s o f stat e he has no business to meddle. Foreign polic y i s made on his behalf. I f he doesn't like i t he has to lump it. In the United States th e rol e of the individua l in the domain o f diplomac y is circumscribed by law. The Logan Act, passed more tha n a century ag o by Congress, makes it an offence t o tr y t o negotiate wit h a foreign government. In Canada we have no such law. But conventio n n o less effectively than legislation puts the individual in his place. On the entrance t o th e East Bloc k in Ottawa i s prominently, i f figuratively, displayed a large sign. It says : 'No trespassing.' One should no t be misled by protestations t o th e contrary. Abou t a year ago - last 4 December - th e then Secretar y of State fo r External Affair s outlined wha t he conceived t o be an appropriate part fo r the individual in world affairs . H e may trave l abroad, a s a tourist. He may trad e abroad, a s a merchant. An d he may comment o n what th e Department o f External Affair s does o n his behalf, a s a journalist, o r a professor, or a writer of letters t o news -

The deliquescence of diplomacy 7 7

papers. That is as far a s it goes. And i t does not g o far enough . For ther e is another traditio n besides the states-centric tradition - one more hospitable t o individual initiative, one more responsive to individual need. This tradition sees the individual not a s an atomic particle within th e impermeable matter of the territoria l state, nor a s an object ove r which governments haggle only fo r their own advantage , nor ye t a s an auxiliary to offi cialdom. It see s the individual as the sovereig n member of the communit y of man. It is the tradition invoked by Edmund Burke when he observed that 'in the intercourse between nations we are apt t o rel y too muc h o n the instrumental part... Men are not tie d together by paper and seals.' 11 It i s the tradition invoked by thos e who, fro m thei r sanctuaries of concern, speak out against the juggernauts of state power on behalf of their innocen t victims. It is the traditio n of humanism, set against, and defying , th e traditio n of statism. It i s flower power vs nation power . This humanistic tradition - despit e many appearances to the contrary - is gradually gaining ground, at th e expens e of its rival. Its progress may b e detected in the promotion t o th e rol e of actors on the internationa l scene of otherwise unexceptional people. Here I am thinking not s o much o f those who make a career of it - thos e professiona l peace-marchers and borderwatchers who mov e in a frenzy o f well-publicized para-diplomatic activity around th e airport s of the state s system, pausing only long enough to autograph their books. I am thinking rather of th e ordinar y citizen, distinguished from hi s fellow-citizens by th e intensit y of his concern for peace and by his realization that, for th e first tim e in history, it lies within hi s power to affec t the prospect s for peace. This is not a t all because modern international societ y has become an y more moral , any more humane, any more sweetly reasonable, than what it is displacing. On the contrary , there is much evidence that, every day in every way, governments behave worse and worse. They lie , they cheat, the y dissemble, they maim, the y kil l for what the y conceive, often quit e mistakenly, to be the national interest . No, it has nothing t o do with a higher morality . It has everything to do with an improved technology. Technology , in an inspired paradox, acts as an after-burner fo r th e humanist tradition, a booster-rocket fo r th e individual whom it spring s free o f the coil s of the state s system in which he has for so long been held prisoner . Technology enable s the individual to make his mark 11 'Lette r on a Regicide Peace,' quoted i n Martin Wight, 'Western Value s in International Relations,' in Herbert Butterfield an d Martin Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations (George Allen & Unwin, London 1966) , 97

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upon event s by placing at his disposal resources previously monopolized by foreign offices . The requirements fo r setting up your ow n department of external affair s in your basement are remarkably modest. You need onl y b e reasonably literate, fairl y persistent , moderately affluent . If literate, the individual will find i n the public library more dat a abou t the state s system than was possessed, barely a generation ago, by al l the intel ligence sections of all the foreig n offices i n the world. If persistent, he ma y state his case, via television, to a n audience more vast than an y foreign offic e flack coul d eve r hope t o reach . If affluent , h e may conduct foreig n policy o n his own. A few dollars sends a cable to a foreign capital. A few more ca n summon th e might y t o the telephone . A few hundred will stake any one t o a peace mission. A few thousand wil l mount a mercy mission. The very rich, like Cyrus Eaton, may conven e their own disarmament conferences , even their own peace conferences. The day may not b e too fa r distant befor e the individual may set himself up in the sticky business of tacit negotiation. H. Rap Brown , arraigned i n the United State s for takin g a revolver across a state line, is reported t o have said: 'Just wait till I get me an atom bomb.' We will not have to wait long before th e individual , if he does not g o nuclear on his own, is able to transmit by more conventional means the violent signal s of his protest. Such changes , without question , ar e on their way. But they may not b e changes for the better. The global village, should i t come to that, may onl y offer greate r scope t o global village idiots. I would rathe r hope fo r global village Hampdens. But tha t is the expressio n o f a faith, no t o f social science . [December 1968 ]

Part II FATE AND WILL IN FOREIGN POLICY

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1

Left an d right Fate an d Will are dealt with b y Karl Marx in a famous aphorism: 'Me n mak e their own history; but the y do not mak e it just as they please. ' I have found it useful t o reformulat e the aphoris m as follows: Foreign ministers make thei r own foreign policy; but the y d o not mak e it just a s they please . By 'foreig n ministers' I mean not onl y th e political heads of foreign offices - secretaries of state , o r secretaries of stat e for externa l affairs. I mean all those personages - prim e ministers and presidents, under secretaries and foreign secretaries - who are the custodian s and executants of their countries' foreig n policies. When foreign ministers (thus understood) pick u p thei r portfolio s for th e first time , we find the m ful l o f gusto for th e task s that lie ahead. They breath e confidence an d optimism. The y tal k grandly of new brooms and new ideas, of fresh start s and fres h approaches . By the reverse s of th e pas t the y ar e undeterred; by th e failur e o f their predecessors they ar e undismayed. Uplifted and exuberant, they plung e into the fray . It doesn' t take long for this mood t o disappear . A year later, two at most , and our hero i s a changed man . His gusto has gone, his exuberance has faded, his optimism vanished. In their place we find guardedness , caution, reserve. Where the fledgling foreign minister talke d excitedl y o f possibilities an d opportunities, of initiatives to be seized and battles to b e won, the veteran dwells gloomily upon drawback s and difficulties. If he i s still at al l disposed t o con fide i n anyone outsid e th e charme d circle of his profession, it is only t o say how hard i t is to be a foreign minister, how narrow is his room t o manoeuvre, how fe w his options are , how manifol d the constraints , an d oh! how heavy. He no longer depicts himself bestridin g the narrow world; he depicts himself cabin'd, cribb'd , confin'd , boun d in. Never mind tha t th e modern foreign min-

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ister travel s in a week as far a s Franklin o r Palmerston travelle d in a lifetime. We see him a t the airport , we see him o n the jet. Literall y he is on the move : figuratively he i s in a rut. And he is the firs t t o tel l us so. 'No, gentlemen,' he dictates to th e cluster of reporters who greet him on arrival, 'I am not a magician, I am only a foreign minister. I have no panacea, I have no magic formula.' Indeed he does not. Another conferenc e over, he pauses at the ramp. 'We had a good conference, ' he says to unsee n millions, 'a very good conference , in my opinion. I was glad of this opportunity t o exchang e views with th e Premier, whom I had no t see n for too long . Our discussions were very cordial, very frank. Of course, I am not i n a position t o disclos e more a t this time.' And with tha t he i s up the ramp and into the plane. And thi s is called progress. Modesty may be a virtue. False modesty i s not. Th e experienced man of foreign affair s assuredl y is modest when reciting what he ca n do fo r us . But is he being falsely modest, unduly diffident? It coul d be much worse than that . Is he deliberatel y downgrading our expectations of his performance so that , should ou r hopes be dashed, we will not tak e it out o n him? Does he debauch the currenc y of diplomacy s o that we, the customers, will not expec t i t to bu y too much? Is his self-depreciation a self-inflicted wound - a scar to stir compassion and allay anticipation? I s his modest role - th e role in which foreig n ministers cast themselves - reall y the product of necessity, imposed b y objective limitations upon his country's powe r and his own talent? Or does he set his sights too low? Foreign policy i s the ar t o f the possible . Ho w much i s possible? Wha t have we a right to expec t o f foreig n polic y an d of foreign ministers? What part of statecraft belong s properly to Fate , an d what is left fo r Will? Machiavelli, in a famous passage, puts the proportion a t roughly fifty-fifty . 'It is not unknow n to me,' he writes, 'how many have been and are of opinio n that worldl y events are so governed by Fate an d by God tha t men cannot b y their prudence change them.' He confesses that a t time s he has felt tha t way himself. 'Nevertheless, ' he adds , 'that our freewill may not b e altogether extinguished, I think i t may be true that fortun e is the ruler of half ou r actions , but tha t she allows the other half o r thereabouts to be governed by us.' That was in the sixteenth century . In ou r own century, statesmen would have us believe that the scop e for Will in foreign policy has steadily diminished; while the scope for Fate, they say , has correspondingly increased. Instead o f 50:50, they tel l us it is 40:60; in their more pessimistic moods, eve n 20:80. I have no mathematically exact , even culinarily exact, recip e for combin ing the ingredient s of Fate an d Will in foreign policy. But i t is my purpose in these talk s t o argu e that th e statesmen of the sixtie s possess more freedom than they ar e ready to admit; and that, by the same token, th e constraint s upon thei r freedo m are not s o onerous as they would have us believe.

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Communist foreig n ministers - the y ar e more motley tha n monolithic thes e days, and getting mother by the moment - communis t foreig n ministers receive fro m thei r doctrina l legacy ambiguous advice upon this matter . In classi c Marxism - the Marxism of Marx himself, an d of Engels - freewill and determinism, freedo m and necessity, Will and Fate, are delicately balance d in a precarious equilibrium. Men make thei r own history: the y do not mak e it just a s they please. The formul a i s oracular. It permit s as much a s it restricts . Perhaps it was meant to. I n any event, a communist coul d manipulate it much as he wanted, depending on his purpose and on his temperament. I f these were such as to dispose him to th e quiet life, he coul d throw hi s weight upon th e scale of determinism. He could stres s th e power and the inexorabilit y wit h which th e juggernaut of history move d up on its predetermined track . He could stres s the sternness and the ruthlessnes s with which th e dialectic treat s those wh o do not trea t it with respect. If, on the other hand, he yearned for action, he coul d thro w his weight upon th e scale of freewill. The dialectic assures the communist ultimate victory: it does not excus e him from th e obligation to figh t t o attain it . And, if he puts his mind and heart into the fight, he can do much to attai n it . Marx himself wavered uncertainly between these polarities . Lenin , onc e he found himself, neve r wavered. He threw his weight upo n th e scale of freewill. He threw it ther e s o hard and so recklessly as to til t the Marxist balance between Fate and Will into a grotesque asymmetry. Men make their ow n history . Men make thei r ow n history just as they please. Lenin's motive in stressing so radically the voluntaristic aspect of Marxist doctrine is plain enough. He was blessed (or cursed ) with a revolutionary temperament. He was not th e sort of man to accep t with th e necessary fatalism the Marxist prescription for Russian revolutionaries. H e had n o intention o f lying content i n the lap of the dialectic, of floating like flotsa m o n the tid e of history unti l suc h time a s it beached him (more likely , his descendants) upon the shores of the promised communis t society. He had eithe r t o abando n Marxism, or to change it. Being a Marxist, he did not abando n it. He did change it . If historical materialis m means anything a t all, it means that th e world is moved not b y the deeds and misdeeds of individual men and women, not b y heroes or by villains, but b y impersonal forces and structural changes working themselves out within societ y i n a manner largely beyond influenc e and wholly beyond recall . Historical materialis m lays down its iron laws, chief amon g which i s that th e force s o f production inheren t i n a given society mus t reach full developmen t before the next stag e of social chang e takes place. Revolution in Russia required the industrialization o f Russia. Russia had t o becom e capitalist before she could become communist . That wa s too long for Lenin. He

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looked t o Will to redee m Russia's Fate. In place o f impersonal force s and structural changes, great men an d inspired leadership. To Marx, leadership was important; to Lenin , leadership was all-important. The right leader can work miracles . He ca n make a socialist revolution in a feudal society . H e can foment a proletarian revolution without a proletariat. It wasn't just theory. Smuggled into Russia as human contraband , Leni n attained power within a year. No wonder Trotsky, th e Soviet Union's firs t Commissar fo r Foreign Affairs, hi s leader's exampl e before him, confidentl y expected th e communis t revolutio n to swee p far beyond Russi a alone, into eastern Europe an d thenc e western Europe, and into the Americas soo n enough. No wonder he replied, when aske d i n 191 9 wha t his foreign ministry would do , 'W e will issue a few revolutionary proclamations an d shut th e sho p for ever. ' Who needs foreign ministries , who need s foreign policies, with capitalist societie s falling like washing fro m a clothes-line wit h a storm breaking? The stor m broke; but th e line with it s washing held. Capitalism an d the old order remained intact. And th e Bolsheviks, unprepared by thei r doctrin e for it s persistence, didn't kno w what t o do next. To their rescu e came not th e old oracles but a new leader. The theor y an d practice o f 'socialism in on e country,' Stalin's contributio n t o th e communis t canon , reasserte d the primacy of Will over Fate, o f mind ove r matter, of leadership ove r circumstance . It wa s an innovation no less daring than Lenin's, and scarcely less dramatic i n its result. For th e next te n years, between the mid-1920s an d the mid-1930s , Stalin's dictatorship drov e and cajoled the Soviet peopl e - thos e wh o survived into prodigiou s feats o f productivity. By a perverse an d wholly un-Marxia n inversion of historical materialism, human effor t wa s deployed t o create , out o f poverty an d chaos, tha t economi c bas e needed t o sustai n a socialist super structure. But th e overfulfillin g o f norms, th e overcomin g of obstacles, the overturning of barriers, proceeded onl y o n the home front . Abroad it was different . The seemin g intractacability o f events beyond th e frontier s of the Sovie t homeland ha d cause d Stalin t o urg e the comrade s to concentrat e thei r effor t within thos e frontiers . In th e caus e of domestic policy, Will came int o it s own . In th e caus e of foreign policy, Fate was given charge. The earl y fervour faded . The initial manifestations of enthusiasm - th e Bolshevik delegation, en route for Brest-Litovsk , stopping their ca r by th e firs t peasan t the y sa w so that he might join them , with ful l plenipotentiar y authority , as a bona fid e representa tive of th e toilin g masses; the designatio n o f th e first Soviet diplomatist s as polpreds, i n preference to merel y bourgeois 'ambassadors'; Trotsky's exuberant promis e to close the foreign offic e altogethe r - thes e wer e soon displace d by mor e conventiona l characteristics. 'With th e waning of th e firs t fin e careless

Left and light 85

rapture,' Harold Nicolson ha s mocked, 'th e style, the behaviour, th e externa l appearance an d the urbanit y of the representative s of Soviet Russi a approximated eve r closer an d closer to tha t o f pre-war Balkan diplomatists.' As with form , so with content . I t i s not har d t o fin d faul t with Soviet foreign policy ove r the years . But i t i s hard t o faul t i t fo r recklessnes s and irresponsibility. Amoral , yes: witness the Nazi-Soviet Pact o f August 1939 . Ruth less, certainly: witness the crushin g o f th e Hungarian uprising in November 1956. Truculent , always: witness the showe r o f notes that fell upo n th e capitals o f NATO throughou t th e 1950s , threatening their destruction . But , by an d large, rarely if ever, adventuristic. The great exception wa s Khrushchev's deci sion, in 1962 , t o plac e offensiv e missile s in Cuba. The alar m and consternatio n produced i n Washington by thi s foolhardy ac t was replicated in Moscow. Khrushchev was made t o pay for his folly with his job. For th e foreig n ministe r a s hero-figure, the Sovie t stage offer s littl e scope . But th e rol e is not unknow n elsewhere in the communis t theatre . Few political acts require greater confidenc e i n Will's capacity t o conque r Fate tha n th e declaration o f independence. Fo r declaring , then securing , the independence of his tiny country , Joseph Broz Tito has assured himself a niche in whatever Hall of Fame ma y commemorat e herois m i n foreign policy. No r is he easter n Europe's onl y candidate . Rumania's Ceausescu is another. Poland's Gomulka, stil l anothe r - thoug h th e voluntaristic quality o f Polish foreign policy ma y be more ope n t o question . There i s no questioning , however, the voluntaristic quality o f the foreign policy o f the People's Republic of China. What was it, i n the words of th e communiqué o f 27 October 1966 , whic h caused 'the guided missile t o fly normally an d the nuclear warhead accuratel y to hit th e targe t a t the appointe d distance, effectin g a nuclear explosion?' Not th e privation s and sufferin g o f 700,000,000 Chinese, not th e exertions o f scientists and technicians, certainl y not th e technica l assistanc e of Americans and Russians, but 'th e brilliant illumination o f the though t of Mao Tse-tung.' Mao's thought , credite d likewise with ever y achievement o f modern China since th e liberation , i s China's anti missile missile system, enabling her t o surviv e even the horrors o f thermonu clear war. 'On the ruin s of destroyed imperialism, ' her leaders have stated, 'th e victorious peoples will create with tremendou s spee d a civilization a thousand times higher tha n unde r the capitalisti c system.' Not eve n Nikita Khrushchev, for al l his daring and panache , was willing to conced e a s much. There operate d within th e moder n state s system constraint s so powerful that th e mighties t o f its member-governments did well to yield. 'If you have no t los t your self-control, and sensibl y conceiv e what thi s migh t lea d to,' the Soviet chairma n cable d t o John Kennedy o n 2 6 October 1962 ,

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then, Mr President, we and you ough t not no w to pull on the ends of the rop e in which you hav e tied th e knot o f war, because the more we pull, th e tighte r the knot wil l be tied. And a moment may com e when the knot will be tied so tight tha t even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, an d then it will be necessary to cut tha t knot; and what that woul d mean is not fo r me to explain t o you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose. 1 Can one imagine Chairman Mao, or Chairman Lin Piao, writing like this t o President Johnson? On e cannot imagine it; and therein lie the perils posed for man' s Fate by China's Will. To cross the spectrum , moving from th e fa r left to th e extreme right, is, it seems, to ente r upon a realm where the dichotom y o f Fate and Will in foreign policy, indee d i n any policy, has lost al l relevance. A foreign minister wh o boasts, as Hitler boasted, that he goes his way with th e assuranc e of a sleepwalker does not know , does not eve n care, whether he is the master or the servant of destiny. A foreign minister who boasts, as Mussolini boasted, that 'we fascists have had th e courag e to discar d all traditional political theories , and we are aristocrats and democrats, revolutionaries and reactionaries, proletarians and anti-proletarians, pacifists and anti-pacifists,' might just a s well have added to his litany of paradoxes 'determinists and anti-determinists.' Fat e and Will were but word s to weave into the rhetoric o f the moment, images by which t o mesmerize th e masses - or the Reichstag. 'Fate , for reasons which we cannot fathom,'Hitle r declaime d ther e on 13 July 1934, 'condemne d our people to serve as the field on which thes e politician s coul d mak e their experiment s - a s the rabbit in the hands of the vivisector... In what land were the scales of Providence more often brought int o use , and where more frequently was the verdict passed that the object weighed had fallen short o f the due weight?'2 National Socialists, however , refused to be weighed - not because they migh t be found wanting but becaus e Fate, however fickle t o their predecessors, could not b e other tha n a friend t o them . 'W e are the fortunate ones: w e have been chosen by Fate.' 'Fate in its grace gave to us men selected an d chosen.' 'Fate has granted me great successes.' Yet, just as often, it was to Will, not Fate, that Hitler ascribe d the victories of the past an d appealed fo r victories in the future. He developed this theme, in the sober fashion best calculated t o impress his audience of British and American journalists, on 4 December 1931 : 1 Quote d i n Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Bantam Books , Philadelphia & Toronto 1966), 152 2 Quote d i n Norman H. Baynes, éd., The Speeches o f Adolf Hitler, 1 (Oxford Univer sity Press, London & New York 1942) , 292

Left and light 8 7

One must not sa y ... that a people's fat e i s solely determine d b y foreig n Powers ... Weak an d bad Governments have at all times made play wit h thi s argument i n order thu s to excus e and explain thei r own failure .. . Their ple a has always been,"Anyone else in our position coul d no t hav e done otherwise" : For wha t could h e begin to d o with his people i n the fac e o f conditions whic h are fixed onc e fo r al l and have their roots i n the worl d beyond Germany' s frontiers .. . But th e foreig n minister worthy o f his trust coul d do , sai d Hitler, a great deal : The essentia l thin g i s the formatio n o f th e politica l wil l of th e natio n a s a whole: tha t i s the starting-poin t fo r political action . If this formatio n o f will is guaranteed in th e sens e o f a readiness to devot e all a people's energie s to th e attainment o f any national end , then a Government, supporte d b y thi s com mon will , can choose th e ways which lead t o succes s ... It matters not whic h problem o f our lif e a s a people we wish to attemp t t o solv e .. . Thirteen year s later, when (as Hitler migh t hav e said) Fate ha d turne d against him, his belief i n the powe r o f Will to overcom e impossible odd s assumed the proportions o f a mania, in th e clinica l sens e of th e term . He summoned fres h divisions to d o battle with th e enemy a t the gate. But the fres h division s were only phantom s o f a demented mind . Here is the occupationa l hazar d o f th e extreme voluntaris t in foreign policy . To spea k of the illustriou s de Gaulle on the heel s of so odious a company is to seem insulting ; but tha t i s far from m y intent. We move at onc e fro m th e gutter t o th e pedestal, fro m th e sewe r to th e fountain , from th e scu m t o th e sublime. Yet, al l the same , there ar e some fain t affinities . We find i n th e earl y de Gaulle a deference for destiny , a respect fo r reality , more characteristi c o f determinists than o f voluntarists. Here is the youn g offi cer writing in obvious admiration of the foreig n policy o f Louis XIV . It wa s a policy of circumstances ; it avoide d abstractions , but like d realities ; it preferred what was useful t o wha t was sublime, what wa s opportune t o wha t was resounding; for eac h particular proble m i t sought a solution whic h was by n o means ideal but practical ; it had fe w scruples regarding choic e o f means, but it s greatnes s consisted i n keeping an exact balance between th e desire d objectiv e and th e power o f the State . The cree d of a pragmatist. Thirty year s on, when d e Gaulle has become France , and France d e Gaulle, th e pragmati c strea k i s not entirel y extinguished . Her e is th e genera l addressin g his peopl e o n 2 0 Decembe r 1960 : 'Franc e mus t

88 Diplomac y an d its discontent s

espouse her time s an d adapt herself t o the circumstances, ful l o f hope, bu t brutal, that are reshaping the universe.' But th e pragmatic streak i n Gaullism doesn't ru n alone . Accompanying it , mixing with it , often overwhelmin g it, is the cree d of a voluntarist. It emerges as dominant wheneve r th e general recalls his experience durin g the Secon d World War: 'Limited an d alon e thoug h I was, and precisely because I was so, I had t o climb t o the heights, and never then t o com e down.' 3 For d e Gaulle, as for fe w others, grandeur is not a delusion but a fact. Nevertheless, when Will is elevated to suc h a height, ther e i s also th e dan ger of vertigo, of losing one' s balanc e and one's footing, of relinquishing one' s grip upon reality . 'Perhap s my mission consist s in being the last flight towards the summit s in our history. Perhaps I shall have written th e last pagas in th e book o f our greatness.' Perhaps. The voluntarist strain in Gaullism makes a strong appeal to th e leaders of newly independent state s in Asia and in Africa; an d it is easy to se e why. 'Be tween th e two coloss i wh o confront eac h othe r wit h al l the migh t o f thei r frightening power, ' Morocco's ambassado r to Paris declaimed a few years ago, 'has emerged a man who understands freedom, the self-determinatio n o f peoples, their righ t t o live and surviv e in respect for thei r ow n genius. This catalyst of th e world, which shoul d b e called Third, i s General de Gaulle.'4 Afro-Asian Gaullis m - Third World voluntarism - is not so monolithic a s all that. Consider three notabl e practitioners: Nehru, Nkrumah, Nasser. Of th e three , Nehru is infinitely th e most complex . On e might expec t th e heir t o the mantle o f the Mahatma to share his master's belief in the capacit y of Will, when based o n truth and justice, to prevail against oppression, how ever tyrannous, however powerful . 'I am convinced,' wrote Gandhi i n November 1938 , 'tha t if someone wit h courag e and vision can arise among them to lead them i n non-violent action, th e winter of their despai r can in the twinkling of an eye be turned into th e summe r of hope.'5 He is writing not o f his fellow Indian s but - alas ! - of the Jews of Europe. Here was voluntarism with a vengeance. Some o f it, o f course, rubbed off on Nehru. 'Long years ago we made a tryst with destiny, ' he tol d th e Constituent Assembl y on the eve of independence, 'and now the time come s when we shall redee m our pledge ... At th e 3 Memoirs, I , pt I , The Call to Honour (Collins , London 1955) , 8 3 4 Quote d in W.W. Kulski, De Gaulle and th e World (Syracus e University Press, Syracuse 1966), 36 8 5 Th e Jews, ' in M.K. Gandhi, Non-Violent Resistance (Schocke n Books, New York 1961), 34 9

Left and tight 8 9

stroke o f the midnight hour , when th e world sleeps , India will awake to lif e and freedom.' 6 Who but a voluntarist in politics coul d hope, as Nehru hoped , to pus h suc h a country, with it s millstone masses , its deadweight customs , its fierce antagonisms , its desperate poverty, into the modern state s system? Who but a voluntarist i n foreign polic y coul d hope , as Nehru hoped, no t merel y t o enter tha t syste m but t o convert it? In th e end, modernization an d messianism proved too daunting , the burdens of leadership too heavy, the voluntarist impulse too feeble . Co-existing uneasily with Nehru's Gandhian inheritance wa s the very different legac y of his English up-bringin g - pragmatic, doubting, world-weary , and worldly-wise. By so supple and flexibl e a mind th e simpl e verities of th e Mahatma could hardly be taken seriously . Nor were they. As early a s 1944 h e had begu n to question them . 'Th e events of the past fe w years,' he wrote, 'have been confusing, upsettin g and distressing, and th e futur e ha s become vague an d shadowy and has lost tha t clearnes s of outline whic h i t once possesse d i n my mind.' And again : 'Lif e i s too complicate d and , as far as we can understand it... too illogical.' And yet again : 'I am not prepare d to deny man y things . I just don't know! The mos t correc t attitude, if I may say so, is that of the Buddha who didn't den y it and didn't assert it.'7 With the years these thought s took deepe r hold. His biographer writes of the cautio n an d conservatism, the pragmatic adjustment to circumstance s and problems, by which Nehru's rule was marked. These ar e nowhere more clearl y eviden t than i n the speec h which he delivered to th e conferenc e of twenty-four non-aligned nation s which me t at Belgrade in September 1961 . He told the m no t t o over-estimat e thei r own importance in the schem e of things : After all , we do not contro l th e string s of the world , not onl y in the military sense but i n other sense s also ... Numbers do not creat e a force. They may create moral pressure, but no t a force. It will not mak e the slightes t differenc e to th e great military power s of toda y i f the militarily wea k countries ban d themselves together ... 8 Nehru reminde d the m o f Fate. Nkrumah spoke t o the m o f Will. 'Let us utilize ou r power an d influence,' he tol d them , 't o provide a fresh and vigorours outlook .. . We have come here to interpos e our influence between th e two existing power blocs , for we believe that th e tim e has come whe n th e fat e 6 Quote d i n Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography (Oxfor d Universit y Press, London, New York, Bombay & Toronto 1959) , 355 7 Quote d in ibid., 599, 600, 607 8 Quote d in D.C. Watt, éd., Documents on International Affairs, 1961 (Oxford University Press, London, New York & Toronto 1965) , 618

90 Diplomac y and its discontent s

and destiny o f mankind shoul d ceas e to hang so dangerously on th e desires and ambitions of the Great Powers.'9 That was more like it. That was what they'd com e to hear - a panegyric to voluntarism, not a determinist's dirge . And who more qualified to delive r it tha n a man whose statu e stood upon a marble pedestal o n which ha d been inscribed a t his direction: 'See k ye firs t the Political Kingdom and all other thing s shall be added unt o it'? Or the man whose autobiograph y ends with th e following paragraph : As a ship tha t has been freshl y launche d we face th e hazards of th e high seas alone. We must rely on our ow n men, on the captain , and on his navigation . And, as I proudly stan d o n the bridg e of that lon e vessel as she confidently sets sail, I raise a hand t o shad e my eye s from th e glaring African sun , and scan th e horizon. There is so much more beyond.10 Indeed there was. Within a decade the statu e la y shattered i n the dust , and th e captain strippe d o f his command - a victim of mutiny, and of a voluntarism too extreme , too over-reaching , even for newly independent Africa . Nehru i s dead; Nkrumah deposed; Nasser survives. His survival owes much to the distinction betwee n Nasser and Nasserism, of which th e Egyptian leader has been well aware even if others have not. In September 1956 , following their futil e confrontatio n in Cairo, Sir Robert Menzies sketched a profile of his adversary. 'So far from being charming,' he wrote, 'he is rather gauche, with some irritating mannerisms, such a s rolling his eyes up to th e ceilin g when he is talking to you an d producing a quick, quite evanescen t grin when he can think o f nothing else to do.' 11 This unflatterin g portrait reinforce d Eden's impressio n of Nasser as a cardboard dictator, a paper tyrant, who m the first gusts of popular unres t whipped u p by the approaching paratroopers would blow into oblivion. But th e intelligenc e was as faulty as the conclusio n Eden drew from it . Nasser was no light-weight, no idiot i n diplomacy. For al l his inexperienc e he knew what he was doing. The fait accompl i of 26 July 195 6 was far fro m an unthinking reflex prompted by picque an d the desir e for revenge. The Cairo newspaper AlAhram ha s disclosed, ten years after Suez , how, well in advance of the mov e against the Canal Company, Nasser's agents, working secretly in Cyprus, Malta and Aden, had obtaine d informatio n abou t British military disposition s [which ] convince d him tha t a swift an d successful Britis h strik e was not possible . 9 Quote d in ibid., 605 10 Ghana: Th e Autobiography ofKwame Nkrumah (Nelson , New York 1957) , 30 2 11 Quote d in Full Circle: The Memoirs of th e Rt Hon Sir Anthony Eden (Cassell , London 1960) , 47 1

Left and light 9 1

Before nationalizin g th e Canal, President Nasse r wrote tw o papers. Th e first evaluate d the situatio n fro m th e Egyptia n point o f view, and the secon d from th e Western one. I n the second documen t the President put t o himself such questions as "What wil l Sir Anthony Ede n do? Wha t wil l Guy Molle t do? What wül Mr Dulles do?"12 Had th e Prime Minister of Britain imposed upo n himself a comparable intel lectual exercise , his invasion fleet would neve r have been assembled, let alon e set sail. Nasser is a voluntarist in foreign policy, more s o than wa s Nehru, less so than was Nkrumah. His actions are more temperat e tha n hi s words: these , reflecting th e convention s of Arab rhetoric, are less alarming than they some times sound . On 9 January 1960 , o n the occasion of the completio n o f the first stag e of the Aswan High Dam, he tol d hi s countrymen: 'Brothe r citizens , you have laid down a new principle in the twentiet h century . This principle is that the smal l nations cannot i n any way relinquish thei r fre e will. ' Did he believe it then ? Perhaps. Does he believe it now? Most likely not . A n interviewer find s tha t th e years of power have left thei r mark , transforming 'the physically powerful , ebullient young man ... into a calmer, slower figur e .. . He gives the impressio n of a man seeking tranquility an d a way ou t o f endless problems rather tha n o f a revolutionary settin g out t o blaze new trails.' 13 His belief i n Will has waned. He has given himself ove r to Fate. Such ar e the ways of statecraft. Such i s the syndrom e of the statesman . [December 1966 ]

12 Th e Times (London), 8 Oct. 1966, 'Egypt's Agents Gave Reports on Suez' 13 Rober t Stevens and Patrick Seale, 'Nasser: We Want to be Friends with Britain,' The Observer, 5 July 1964

2

The vital centre Within the British foreign policy tradition , tw o men are often though t to personify th e role s of Will and Fate in foreign policy. Winston Churchill, sum moning in his finest hour hi s people to thei r fines t hour, is naturally revered as the personificatio n o f the voluntarist leader inspired b y fait h in himsel f and in his country t o stan d agains t overwhelming material might, an d to prevail. This is the qualit y i n Churchill tha t appeale d t o de Gaulle, drawing fro m him a reluctant tribute : 'O n top o f everything, he was fitted b y his character to act, tak e risks , play the part ou t an d out.'1 So he was. Yet Churchill, fo r al l his daring and defiance, never succumbed, as foreign ministers of the right s o often succumb, to th e temptatio n t o iden tify himsel f wit h destiny , with his country, even with his countrymen. He had been calle d upon t o give the roar : the lion's heart, a s he generously conceded , belonged t o th e people. No r was that all. Underneath th e great summons t o arms and asseveration of Will - 'W e shall defen d our island, whatever the cos t may be, we shall fight on the beaches, w e shall fight on the landing grounds ' surely the most magnificen t battle-cry in the long annals of war - ther e la y a realist's calculatio n of the odds , a sane appreciation o f the facts , marshalled by on e who, well aware of Fate, was not abashe d b y her. On 1 6 June 1940 , Mr Churchill composed a despatch t o lesse n the shoc k o f the fal l o f France for th e prim e ministers and peoples o f the oversea s Dominions. H e explaine d to the m tha t Britain's resolve to figh t on alone wa s 'not based upon mer e obstinacy or desperation,' but upo n a n assessment of 'the real strength o f our position,' which h e proceeded t o detail. Writing years later, a s his own historian, Churchill was able to comment justly: 'Al l came true.' 1 Charle s de Gaulle, Memoirs, I , pt I , The Call to Honour (Collins , London 1955) , 57

The vital centre 93

'Churchillian' has become an adjective; most find i t complimentary . Yet you would complimen t n o one by callin g him 'Attleean, ' no t leas t because there's no such word. Clement Attlee i s too comple x a character, his qualities of leadership too elusive , his style in politics to o subtle , for his name to have entered th e languag e as a synonym for anything . Still, Attlee ofte n is compared t o Churchill: sometime s disparagingly, sometimes not, alway s in contrast t o him. I f from th e panorama of thei r careers one had t o choos e a typifying frame, the contras t does seem sharp . There i s Churchill: ma n agains t the storm , bracing Britain for battle, defyin g the inevitable . And ther e i s Attlee: drive n by th e storm , ridding Britain of India, giving in to th e inevitable . With Churchill, ther e i s no surrender . With Attlee, there i s strategic surrender. Thus juxtaposed, th e contras t i s too sharp . Just a s in Churchill's polic y there ar e elements of calculation an d pragmatism which myth has all but ob scured, so in Attlee's ther e ar e elements of daring and determination whic h seem oddl y ou t o f character. The nonchalance with which Lor d Attle e recalls, fifteen year s later, the consideration s which led him t o his decision should not caus e us to forget the momentous nature of that decision - th e immensity of th e forces being tampered with, th e severit y with which he would have been judged by contemporarie s and by history ha d things turned ou t differently : I decided that th e onl y thin g to d o wa s to se t a time-limit an d say : "Whatever happens, our rule is ending on that date " ... Winston was very strongly op posed .. . The argument always is of course: "G o slo w and thing s will get bet ter." Bu t ther e ar e occasions when if you hesitat e an d go slow things get no t better bu t wors e ... Broadly speaking the thing went off well, I think ... 2 Churchill an d Attlee, each in his own, very different way, personify th e heroic traditio n i n British foreign policy . Bu t th e heroic traditio n i s the excep tional tradition . The British public no longer expects it s leaders to conque r the world. It i s enough that the y cop e wit h it . The ver b 't o cope' is a very British verb , and th e act o f copin g a very British act. The dictionary definition coming closest to our contex t i s 'to have t o do with' something o r somebody. If thi s supplie s the requisit e connotatio n o f reluctance, it will suffice . T o cop e with a situation is not t o fal l t o wit h a will; still less is it t o exhibi t zeal , enthusiasm, or any sort o f joy throug h work . To cope with a situation i s to wish it were not ther e at all; since i t is there through n o fault o f one's own, and no desire of one's own - th e next bes t thing is to tr y t o mak e lif e bearable . Such i s the spirit in which th e harassed 2 Quote d in Francis Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers (Hutchison , London 1962), 209-12

94 Diplomac y and its discontent s

housewife cope s with her naggin g brood, th e besieged storekeeper with his clamant customers, th e harried statesma n with his impacable agenda. Life is hard an d art is fleeting. It is enough to hang on. 'What did you d o in the Thirty Years ' War?' 'What did you d o in the Second Worl d War?' The cope r answers: 'I survived.' He thinks i t a considerable achievement ; and perhaps it is. Situation-coping - as distinct fro m problem-solving - come s easily to the career diplomatist. It fit s snugly into his prevailing ethos. The experience d foreign servic e officer, George Kennan has testified, 'sees the tas k of diplo macy a s essentially a menial one , consistin g o f hovering around th e fringe s of a process one is powerless to control , tidyin g up the messes other peopl e hav e made.'3 Such a man, with suc h a view, can only be scornful of Will's chances in any fight with Fate. He is among the 40:60 men - th e perennial pessimist s of diplomacy. O r else he is among the 20:80 men - the hard-time Charlies of diplomacy. The copin g style in foreign policy, characteristicall y British , characteristically Foreig n Offic e - where shoul d on e look to find it? One should loo k a t the recor d o f a British foreig n secretary whose apprenticeshi p wa s served in career diplomacy. On e should loo k a t the recor d of Sir Anthony Eden . Several times in his memoirs Lord Avo n extols what th e Japanese quaintl y call 'high posture policy ' - a policy o f bold initiatives and firm resolve conducted by men whose self-confidenc e is matched onl y by thei r competence . Such men , Eden reflecte d in 1934, afte r visitin g Berlin, Rome, an d Paris - in that orde r - ar e more often foun d in charge of dictatorships tha n of democracies; thirty year s later he wishes it were otherwise : It remains true toda y tha t i f the Western democracies are to make headway against communist an d othe r like-minde d dictatorships , the y must find me n who have the capacity , courage and experience, and give them th e tim e t o know their subject s as the dictators know it... Then the y may determine events, instead o f confusedly pursuing them.4 Of his work i n aligning Anglo-American policies in the middle east, followin g the seizure of the refinery at Abadan, he wrote (slightly misquotin g th e phrase Churchill had use d in The Gathering Storm): ' I felt that we had made a beginning which migh t chec k th e "long , dismal, drawling tides of drift an d surren3 Georg e Kennan, 'History and Diplomacy as Viewed by a Diplomatist,' in Stephen D. Kertesz and M.A. Fitzsimons, eds, Diplomacy i n a Changing World (Universit y of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1959), 107 4 Th e Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (Cassell, London 1962), 83

The vital centre 95

der."'s And of his Adriatic diplomacy fro m 195 2 to 1954 : 'Peac e is not just something tha t happens. A t time s it is necessary to tak e risks and even to increase the immediat e danger to win a lasting agreement.'6 This is Eden in heroic vein. But ther e i s this other Eden. He is a diplomatist of the old school, who seeks to cope , not conquer . He is the Eden who writes (apropos o f negotiating with th e Russians): 'The best diplomacy i s that which-gets its own way, but leave s the othe r sid e reasonably satisfied. It i s often good diplomacy t o resis t a score.'7 Or (apropos o f the Geneva Conference on Indochina): 'I t was important tha t I should no t overpla y my hand about the dangers of world war. If I were to cr y 'Wolf! Wolf!' too frequentl y and to o loudly, I would suffe r th e fat e of all alarmists in diplomacy an d not b e believed.'8 Or (apropos of arms control): 'One step at a time remain s a good maxim in world affairs; we should tr y again.' 9 Throughout his long career as foreign minister and his short caree r as prime minister, these competin g conceptions of diplomacy fough t fo r ascendancy - high-posture vs low-posture, the headstrong and the cautious, the bold stroke an d the on e step at a time, the wilfu l an d the fateful . Wil l won out . Casting aside the precepts of a lifetime, Eden plunged into his reckless and disastrous duel with the president of Egypt. He wanted, on his own admission , 'to knock Nasser off his perch.' He sent in tanks, he sent in bombers, the best part of a division. In vain. They wer e not allowe d to finis h their job. Eden neglected t o heed his own advice. He tried to conque r Nasser. He should have coped wit h him . Coping with their situation s i s far from wha t th e American public has been brought u p to expect o f its leaders. In the United States , statesmanship i s a form o f salesmanship. The statesman , like the salesman , is expected t o deliver the goods, lug the samples , flog the wares , and do whatever else is implied b y those advertisements for 'aggressive , productive young men: ca r essential' which festoo n th e pages of evening newspapers. The foreig n minister, like th e sales manager, is expected t o sho w a profit for his pains: hi s efforts t o prevent a loss greater than las t year's may be prodigious; they ma y even be successful; but the y will not b e appreciated. Foreign policy, like sale s policy, is judged for results , and for certain kinds of results - tangible , measurable, accountable, 5 FullCirde: Th e Memoirs of th e Rt Ho n Sir Anthony Eden (Cassell , London 1960) , 203 6 Ibid. , 188 7 Ibid. , 357 8 Ibid. , 124 9 Ibid. , 379

96 Diplomacy and its discontents

ascertainable. Ask any secretary of state. Oh, he may tell you, with fin e deli cacy o f feeling, that the most exquisite sensation s of pleasure are to be derived from th e subtles t manipulation o f the balance of power, a manipulation s o subtle that none but th e cognoscenti will know that it has occurred. But he will add at once, if he is honest wit h you , that the American democracy allows this impulse little i f any gratification. It i s not enoug h that foreign policy b e done. It must appear to be done. And that is why the statistics of American statecraft brea k all the records in The Statesman's Yearbook. I t i s not just that the United States is the greates t power in the world: i f she were all that powerful, why collec t forty-tw o allies? It is, rather, that alliances, treaties, and the rest are the statesman's certificate of sale. With them, he gets his commission; without them , he gets fired. What has been called 'the illusion o f American omnipotence' is thus more complicated tha n man y who have talked an d written on this theme hav e cared to concede . For i f foreign policy i s sales policy, an d the statesma n essentially a salesman, then foreig n ministers will know th e agonie s of salesmen approaching death. Behind and beyond th e most brilliant career lurches the patheti c figure o f Willy Loman, pushing his suitcases along the floor . Ther e have been plenty of Willy Lomans in diplomacy, even -1 do not say especially - in American diplomacy. But a diplomacy which believe s itself t o be omnipoten t cannot brin g itself t o believe in its tragic failures, and doesn't. American statesmanship is only partly salesmanship. It i s also engineering. For th e salesman , failure i s ineluctable. For th e engineer , failure i s unthinkable. The salesma n knows there'll com e a day when he can't carr y the sampl e case any more. No stresses-and-strain s technician plan s to retire the day his firs t bridge collapses, no hydraulics expert calculates his pension fro m th e da y his dam caves in. It's no t tha t they'r e indifferen t t o failure ; it's tha t the y don' t anticipate failure . A good engineer never needs to . The engineerin g approach t o foreig n policy ha s a number of readily identifiable characteristics , al l strongly voluntarist in nature. Chief amon g them is the certai n expectation o f success, which i s the obvers e of that unthinkability of failure I have just referred to . Related t o tha t i s reliance upon mechanisms requiring for their rational deploymen t belief in the certainties of success complicated weapon s systems, computerized gadgetry, mechanized gimmickry: the whole fail-safe syndrom e in its infinite variety. And relate d to tha t i s the belief that some swift an d spectacula r stroke may solv e problems once an d fo r all. Hence the fondnes s for the 'one-sho t solution,' for the 'crash-programme ' and th e big push and their hoped-for break-through, for crisis management, for the notion tha t injurie s t o international society may be healed by surgica l excision, or by th e replacemen t of worn-out parts, or by th e insertion of some catalytic agen t - a pace-maker for peace-makers.

The vital centre 9 7

The engineering approach t o foreig n policy i s the United States ' approach to foreig n policy. That i s hardly a cause for surprise . It i s in the United State s that the enginee r has made his most spectacula r contributions . Wh y shouldn't the min d devising the biggest dams, the talles t buildings , the longest bridges , the Manhattan Project an d Salk vaccine, Radio City an d Willow Run, th e Model T and th e Thunderbird, be capable of devising solutions t o America' s problems overseas? Such wa s President Kennedy's though t in appointing th e head o f the Ford Moto r Company a s head o f the American defence establish ment. (We are told that , had he lived, Kennedy would have appointed hi m Secretary o f State.) We see McNamara in our livin g rooms, makin g his customary televise d chalk-talk expositio n o f the latest militar y enterpris e - wit h his maps, his charts, his pointer, his rapid-fire, dead-sure delivery, he look s every bit th e model o f the mode l crisi s manager. And perhaps he is. Much of America's foreign policy, an d al l of America's defence policy , bears his trade-mark. What but a n engineering cast of mind would propose , as a solution fo r Europe' s agonizin g over nuclear weapons, the creatio n o f a sea-based flee t o f missile-firin g ships manne d by crew s of several countries? Or propose, a s a solution fo r Panamanian nationalism's threa t t o th e Panam a Canal, the building of another cana l through Nicaragua ? Or approach th e problems of arm s control a s if they wer e problems of earthquake control ? Or th e problem s of Vietnam a s if they wer e problems o f pest control ? C'est magnifique, mais ce n 'est pas la diplomatie. McNamarían voluntarism may be contrasted wit h Ruskia n determinism . It was not fo r a deterministic outlook o n foreign affairs tha t Joh n Kennedy picked Dean Rusk a s his Secretary of State. I n April 1960 , Rusk , not the n i n government service , had publishe d an article called, simply, 'The President,' which bega n with a ringing affirmation of the voluntarist creed : The Unite d States, in this second hal f of th e twentiet h century , is not a raft tossed b y th e wind s and wave s of historical force s over whic h it has little con trol. It s dynamic power, physical an d ideological, generate s historical forces; what it doe s or does not d o makes a great deal of difference to th e histor y o f man i n this epoch. I f realism require s u s to avoi d illusions o f omnipotence, i t is just a s important tha t w e not underestimat e th e opportunit y an d th e respon sibility whic h flo w fro m ou r capacity t o act and to influence and shape th e course of events . And he wen t o n t o say that whe n i n the great debat e betwee n Fat e and Will 'the emphasis o f discussion falls too heavil y for my tast e upo n th e limitation s on policy, I recall from earl y childhood th e admonitio n o f the circui t preacher : "Pray as if it were up to God; work as if it were up to you."' 10 Kennedy, when 10 Foreign Affairs, XXXVIII , no 3 , Apr. 1960, 353

98 Diplomacy and its discontents

president-elect, read the article , liked wha t h e read, and summoned it s autho r (whom h e had neve r met) t o Washington. After a single meeting, he offere d Rusk th e position of Secretary o f State in his Administration. A White House witness who shoul d kno w say s Kennedy cam e quickly t o regret his appointment o f Rusk t o what h e conceive d a s potentially th e mos t important position in the government next t o his own. The metamorphosi s from activis t t o determinist , fro m plunge r to stonewaller , from voluntaris t t o fatalist - a metamorphosis which , a s I have argued, all statesmen underg o to some degree , at some tim e - was , in Rusk, unusually rapid an d complete. He seemed burn t ou t befor e he began. Arthur Schlesinger, the n special assistan t to th e President, provides a portrait o f the Secretar y of State as vivid as it is savage: Unlike McNamara, his organizational instinc t was for service, not fo r mastery. Nurtured i n the successiv e bosoms o f the university, the Army , the government department, th e foundation , h e drew reassurance from th e solidit y o f the struc ture, th e regularity o f the procedures, the familiarit y of the vocabulary. His mind, for all its strength an d clarity , wa s irrevocably conventional . He mistrusted wha t he calle d "th e flash y o r sensational" and rejoiced in the rol e of "tedium" in diplomacy .. . He seeme d actually t o prefe r stale t o fres h way s of saying things. On e felt that h e regarded novelt y a s an effort t o shoc k o r make mischief .. . The stereo types o f diplomacy wer e his native tongue. At times one wondered whether the harshness o f life - th e seething planet of revolutionary violence, ferocity and hate, shadowed by nuclear holocaust - eve r penetrated th e screen of clichés, eve r shook tha t imperturbabl e blandness ... He had authority but no t comman d .. . Where McNamara ... would force fully an d articulatel y asser t th e interest s of [his ] departmen t i n impending foreign polic y decisions , Rusk would si t quietly by , wit h his Buddha-like fac e and half-smile, ofte n leavin g it... to the President himself t o asser t th e diplo matic interest. If the proble m wer e an old one, he wa s generally i n favo r of continuing wha t Herter or Dulles or Acheson had don e before him. I f th e problem wer e new, it was generally impossibl e t o know what he thought... Kennedy was always impressed b y Rusk' s capacity t o defin e but gre w increasingly depressed by his reluctance t o decid e .. . He wanted someone who could no t onl y mas s the Stat e Department but b e a constant sourc e o f definit e recommendations and fresh idea s ... The Secretary, he would say , "never gives me anything to che w on ... You never know what he is thinking."11 11 Arthu r M. Schlesinger, it, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy a t the White House (Houghton Mifflin, Bosto n 1965) , 434-6

The vital centre 99

He must have thought o f firing him; but, when a confidant suggeste d this solution, Kennedy replied: ' I can't do that to Rusk; he is such a nice man.' There ar e as yet n o informers at large to spil l the secret s of the Johnso n presidency; and, until there are , we will not kno w what qualitie s o f Dean Rusk's min d an d heart s o appeal to th e President a s to enable Rusk to enter upon his seventh consecutiv e year as Secretary of State. But it cannot b e the quality of Will. In that, th e Secretary has demonstrated himsel f t o be increasingly deficient, nowher e more s o than i n his testimony o n the Vietnam War before th e Senate Foreign Relation s Committee i n February 1966 . H e was asked by a member of the committe e i f he sa w any end t o th e 'corrido r we are following.' Here is his answer: 'No; I would be misleading you i f I told you tha t I thought that I know where, when, and how this matter will be resolved.' And he added : The natur e of a struggle of this sort... is, of course, substantially determine d by the other side.' 12 But it' s no t th e Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State who makes the foreign polic y o f th e United States . The President makes foreign policy . That, as Dean Rusk himself once remarked , 'is not th e whole story, [but ] i t serves very well if one wishes to dea l with th e matte r in five words. ' To say this is to say nothing o f the President's readiness to bear the burden thrust upon him by the Constitution an d by th e situation. Some, like Truman and Kennedy, have been eager to exploit th e opportunity. Others, like Eisenhower, have been content t o delegate it to som e truste d lieutenant. Here I will speak only o f Truman and Kennedy. Commenting upon th e reluctanc e of certain chief executives to ente r full y upon th e responsibilitie s of office, Dea n Acheson has said: 'If a President will make decisions, you're in luck.' He added: 'And if he makes correct decisions , you're i n clover.' Under President Truman, the American people were at least in luck. For Truma n never shirked decision-making. On the contrary , he revel led i n decision-making. He calls the firs t volume of his memoirs of his presidency 'Yea r o f Decisions,' and there i s nothing vainglorious in the title . Problems came at him in waves to swam p the mos t industrious sorcerer's apprentice, but Truma n neither flinched nor panicked. 'I have to take thing s as they come, ' he wrote to his mother an d sister - 'Mam a and Mary' - afte r abou t six weeks on the job, 'and make every decision on the basis of the fact s as I have them and then go on from there ; then forge t tha t on e and take th e next.' 'Every day,' he wrote again to 'Mam a and Mary' on 1 6 June 1945 , 'I see some notabl e of some sort, pin medals on heroes and make world shaking decisions. It seem s 12 Hearing s before the Committee o n Foreign Relations, US Senate, 28 Jan. 196 6 (U S Government Printing Office, Washington 1966), 32

100 Diplomacy and its discontents

to agre e with m e for I've gaine d twelv e pounds since last January.'13 It wa s just as well it did. For ahea d o f him la y the mos t momentou s decision s of history : to explode atomi c bombs ove r Japanese cities ; to rebuild Europe; to chec k communism in Greece; to ru n th e blockad e o f Berlin; to resis t aggression in Korea; to build, test, and stockpile thermonuclea r weapons. Hi s attitude throughout wa s one o f unruffled calm . Never has greater power been de ployed wit h mor e serenit y of spirit. John Kennedy, when president , also displayed thes e Roma n qualitie s t o good advantage . Yet, while n o less calm, no less serene, in the exercis e of even greater power i n situations no less testing, Kennedy lacked his predecessor' s unshakeable fait h i n the abilit y o f Will to se e things through. In the beginning he is as optimistic a s anyone. The inaugura l address - his first statemen t on foreign polic y a t the outset o f his presidency - reflects , in its sonorous Sorensen cadences, the voluntarist appraoch : Let both sides , for th e firs t time , formulate serious and precise proposal s fo r the inspection an d control o f arms - an d bring the absolute powe r to destro y other nation s unde r th e absolut e contro l o f all nations .. . Let us never negotiate out o f fear , bu t le t us never fear t o negotiat e .. . Rarely, if ever, has a public figure generate d greater expectations i n more loft y language. But, two years later, the initia l confidence had bee n displaced by puzzlement, optimism b y pessimism . Asked by some journalists what he con sidered t o be th e mos t valuabl e lessons o f his experience in the presidenc y thus far, John Kenned y replied : The problems ar e more difficul t tha n I had imagined the y wer e ... President Eisenhower sai d t o me o n January 19t h ... : "Ther e are no eas y matters tha t will ever come t o yo u a s President. If they ar e easy, they wil l be settle d a t a lower level." So that th e matters that com e t o yo u a s President ar e always the difficult matters , and matters that carry wit h the m larg e implications. S o this contributes t o som e o f the burden s of th e offic e .. . Secondly, there i s a limitation upon th e abilit y o f the Unite d State s t o solve thes e problem s .. . The responsibilities place d on the Unite d State s are greater tha n I imagined them t o be, and ther e ar e greater limitations upon ou r ability t o brin g abou t a favorable result tha n I had imagine d the m t o b e .. . It is much easie r t o make the speeche s tha n it is to finall y make the judgments ...14 13 Harr y S . Truman, Memoirs, I , Year o f Decisions (Ne w American Library, New York 1955), 293,294 14 The New York Times, 1 9 Dec. 196 2

The vital centre 101

As Kennedy's ter m of offic e dre w towards its tragic close, he she d muc h of his earlier optimism abou t th e abilit y o f the United States t o make its way in th e world and t o make ove r the world t o its liking. In conversatio n with his confidants, and in those extraordinarily candid an d introspective musings in public, such a s the one fro m whic h I'v e just quoted , th e President disclosed not s o much disillusionment, certainly not disenchantment , but a kind of quiet fatalism . He worked a s if it were up t o him, no doub t he prayed as if it were up to God; but h e seemed increasingl y sceptical that the exertions of either would make muc h differenc e i n the end . 'He talked mor e and more,' Theodore Sorense n ha s testified, 'about th e limitations o f power. "Ever y President," h e wrote, "must endure a gap between what he would like and what i s possible." And he quoted Roosevelt' s statemen t that "Lincol n wa s a sad man because he couldn't get it all at once. And nobody can."' 15 [December 1966 ]

15 Theodore. C.Soienxn, Kennedy (Harpe r & Row, New York 1965) , 39 1

3

Ignorance an d knowledg e In tha t passag e in The Prince wher e Machiavelli allows, more optimisticall y than som e o f whom I have been writing, that Fat e dispose s of about half of human affairs , Will disposing th e rest , he reflect s a s well upon th e measures that ma y be taken t o assur e that Fate remain s content wit h her fai r share . 'I would compar e her,' he writes, 'to an impetuous river that, when turbulent , inundates the plains , casts down tree s and buildings, removes earth fro m this side and places it on the other ; every one flees before it, an d everything yields to its fury withou t bein g able t o oppose it ; and yet thoug h i t is of suc h a kind, still when i t is quiet men ca n make provision s against it .. . So it is,' he con cludes, 'with fortune, which show s her power where no measure s have been taken t o resis t her, and directs her fur y wher e she knows tha t n o dyke s or barriers have been made t o hold her.' 1 In thi s section an d in my next, I shall discuss two o f the ways by which th e statesma n may protect himself fro m th e hammer-blows of Fate, and s o assert his Will. First he must fortif y himsel f wit h knowledge. To be ignorant is to deliver oneself entirel y over to Fate' s charge , which ofte n is unkind. Hence the acquisition of intelligence - th e gathering and assessment of information about th e international environment - i s not only logicall y the first ste p i n the foreig n policy process ; it is also th e mos t importan t step . Where knowledge i s power, 'tis foll y t o be ignorant .

1 'Ho w Much Fortune Ca n Do in Human Affairs and How It Ma y Be Opposed,' ch. 25 (Mentor Books, Ne w York 1952) , 131

Ignorance and knowledge 103

Some statesmen , i t seems , indulg e tha t folly . Holding tha t it is best t o act first an d thin k later, and the n onl y wit h one' s blood, Hitle r professe d th e ut most scor n for his advisers, believing his intuition superio r to an y intelligenc e agency. But eve n a fascist foreig n minister cannot, an d doe s not, dispens e wit h knowledge. Wha t happens i n his case i s that his knowledge o f th e internationa l environment, blinkered b y his prejudice, i s erratic an d erroneous. Fate ha s her revenge. Prey t o conspiratoria l theorie s o f history, victi m o f paranoia, th e fascist totalitaria n purge s all dissent, sends imaginary troops t o battl e wit h imaginary enemies , and soo n i s buried in the shamble s of his state. N o regim e may dispense with intelligence . But som e regime s acquire, because of thei r ideology , faulty intelligence . Acquiring knowledge i s not onl y logicall y th e firs t step , an d practically th e most importan t step , in the foreig n policy process : i t is also a n inescapable step. All governments must collec t intelligence , just a s all individuals must breathe air . But it is possible t o avoi d collecting certai n kind s o f intelligence particularly th e kind whic h disturb s too rudel y your imag e of th e world . Here is a prime occupationa l hazar d o f th e statesman . I will retur n to it . Collecting intelligenc e involve s gathering an d assessin g information. On e can make a theoretical distinctio n between th e ac t of gathering an d th e ac t of assessing: practically , th e tw o coalesc e int o a single and inseparable activity . You d o no t gathe r informatio n i n the absenc e o f assessment . Th e dat a o f intelligence isn' t collecte d a s children pic k blueberries , or squirrels hoard acorns , indiscriminately an d at random. Yo u have to star t somewhere : bu t wher e you start depend s o n your assessmen t of what's significant, and what isn't . A fe w centurie s ago, when governmen t was less complex an d polic y les s esoteric tha n the y hav e sinc e become, whe n technolog y wa s primitive and statecraft personal , the reall y significant data o f intelligence concerne d th e humour o f th e princ e and the intrigue s of his court. Th e ideal intelligenc e operative was thus a close studen t o f human nature . He did not hav e t o b e a physicist, he di d not hav e t o be a metallurgist, he di d not hav e t o be a conten t analyst. Fro m th e ag e of Lorenzo th e Magnificent throug h th e ag e of Frederic k the Great, a country's intelligenc e need s might adequatel y b e serve d by it s ambassador i n foreign parts , if he wer e a worldly man, an d wise . Such a man wa s Sir James Harris, British ambassador t o Russi a durin g the reig n of th e Empres s Catherine. Her e i s an extract fro m on e o f his despatches, date d 1779 : On Monday , at th e masquerade given at th e Grand-Duchess ' birthday, som e time afte r He r Imperia l Majesty' s car d party, a t whic h I had assisted , was finished, M . Korsakoff cam e up t o me and , desiring me t o follo w him, conducte d me a back wa y int o th e Empress ' private dressing room , and , on introducin g

104 Diplomacy and its discontents

me, immediately retired. The Empress , after makin g me si t down, began by saying that, afte r he r ow n affairs , our s wer e those whic h sh e had mos t a t heart, an d sh e would b e happy i f I could obviat e th e obstacle s which eve r presented themselve s to her min d i n every plan sh e had forme d t o b e usefu l to us. 2 Harris remained in the empress ' chamber fo r more tha n a n hour, afte r which , as he relates , 'she dismissed me, and , it being quite dark , it was with som e difficulty tha t I found my way bac k throug h th e intricat e passages to th e ballroom.' Bliss was it in that daw n t o b e alive, but t o b e a n intelligence operative was very Heaven. Since thos e halcyo n day s the craf t o f intelligence has become steadil y more specialized , steadil y mor e crowded . The ambassador abroad, tradition ally th e sol e purveyo r of knowledge o f foreig n part s to government , has had to yiel d his monopoly t o a host of others , som e inside his embassy, some not , but al l enjoying (or claiming ) diplomatic status , stuffing th e pouche s with thei r reports, making th e traditiona l diplomati c lif e les s like wha t i t use d to be . Jos tled an d hemmed i n by specialists , the foreig n service office r ma y wel l wonder what i s left fo r him t o sa y once th e commercial , the military , the press , th e labour, the financial , the agricultural , the technica l assistance, the scientific attachés have had thei r say ; or, if something i n his own despatche s ha s escape d their notice, wonder whether hi s government can possibly fin d tim e t o rea d it . Nowhere has th e intelligenc e community proliferate d as it has in the Unite d States. The Stat e Department alon e receive s 2000 telegrams a day: sinc e seventy copie s ar e made o f each, the averag e daily harvest from thi s single sourc e comprises 140,00 0 pieces of paper. Intak e at th e Pentagon is classified: i t can' t be an y less, it probably i s much more . An d thes e ar e just th e fiel d hands . Th e threshers work bac k home: 10,00 0 people a t th e Centra l Intelligence Agency headquarters, paid fro m a budget not accountabl e t o Congress and sai d t o b e in billions. At th e State Department , 20 0 analyst s sift 100,00 0 documents a month, winnowing from thi s chaf f enoug h t o fil l 60 0 cubi c feet o f fil e drawer s a year. Is it possible t o collec t to o muc h intelligence ? Most foreign offices need more knowledg e than woul d fil l a book, but mos t couldn' t us e as much a s may b e store d b y a computer. Yo u coul d jam int o their archive s data o n every statistically identifiabl e creature i n the state s system, justifying th e effor t an d expense involved on th e grounds that, well, you neve r know. O n occasion thes e could b e justified. On th e mornin g of 2 3 November 1963 a government so 2 Quote d i n Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy, 3r d ed. (Oxfor d Universit y Press, London 1963), 62

Ignorance and knowledge 105

equipped coul d cal l fo r th e fil e o n Lee Harvey Oswald . But most o f th e tim e it wouldn't b e worth it . Even then i t wouldn't b e worth it . The evenin g papers would have it all . How much , then , i s enough? The question' s a s hard t o answe r in th e con text of intelligenc e communitie s a s it is in the contex t of military establish ments. No general ever has enough troops , no ai r marshal enoug h aircraft , no admiral an adequat e fleet. But statesme n ofte n have more tha n enoug h military equipment t o help the m i n their statecraft . In th e same way, no director of intelligenc e ever has enough operative s in the field , enough analyst s at head quarters, enough fact s i n the files . Bu t statesme n ofte n have more tha n enoug h intelligence t o help the m i n their statecraft . 'Few if any o f th e recen t crises of US policy,' Henry Kissinger has written, 'hav e been caused by th e unavailability o f data. Ou r policy-makers do not lac k [information ] ; they ar e in many respects overwhelmed by it . They d o lac k criteri a on which t o base judgments.' 3 That is something els e again . To help kee p Fate a t bay, the statesma n need s a book o f knowledge, logarithmic table s of the state s syste m with whic h t o calculat e th e ratios o f power with th e minimu m margi n for error. His margin may be minimal, bu t i t i s often very wide. It mus t shatter a voluntarist's complacency, as it afford s consolatio n to determinists, t o learn how frequentl y statecraft miscarrie s through miscalculation du e t o ignorance , how man y time s the statesma n i s taken unawares . His life i s full o f surprises , usually unpleasant . No statesma n expected a n end t o th e centur y of peace i n 1914 : th e Great War surprise d them al l by breakin g out, an d i n not bein g quickly won o r lost . Bolshevism surprise d them b y sweepin g Russia, and surprise d the m agai n by failing t o swee p elsewhere. Keynes and Smut s stoo d alon e in believing the Versailles settlement to o hars h fo r a precarious German democracy. Hitler attracted som e sligh t notoriety , but afte r th e earl y 1920 s no foreign offic e thought hi s career worth muc h attention . Statesme n o f the 1930 s hopelessl y misconstrued th e intention s o f the Nazis and the natur e of National Socialism . No government foresaw the Grea t Depression o r coul d extricat e itsel f when i n its grip. American statesmen , thoug h fearfu l o f Japan, neve r dreamed th e war would ope n b y surpris e attack upo n thei r Pacifi c fleet. The Sovie t government did not recko n with a German attack i n June 1941 , despite - perhap s because of- Churchill's warnings of its impending tim e an d place. Fe w foresaw the Cold War, the reconstructio n of Europe, the recover y of Japan, th e rearming of Germany, communism i n China, Nasser's seizure of Suez, th e downfal l of 3 Th e Necessity fo r Choice (Harpe r & Row, Ne w York 1960) , 351

106 Diplomacy and its discontents

Khrushchev. Th e lis t i s endless: eac h ite m o n it a monument t o intelligenc e failure. From thi s sorry inventory an inappropriate conclusion i s sometimes drawn . It i s that intelligence failure i s unavoidable. This tends t o b e th e statesman' s view. Naturally so : if he persuade s us, he i s off th e hook. '"The vast externa l realm,"' Dean Acheso n has written, is so complex, s o complicated, an d s o voluminous tha t w e cannot currentl y comprehend it ; nor, unti l to o muc h tim e has elapsed, grasp its full significance . This i s not wholly , or even principally, because o f man-mad e impediments t o knowledge - iro n curtains , censorship , etc. - bu t because of the obscurity and complexity o f th e molecular change s which combin e t o brin g abou t th e growth or decay o f power, will and purpose i n foreign lands. 4 And Arthu r Schlesinger, writin g not a s an historian bu t a s an apologist fo r his own brie f career i n statecraft, would have u s believe that no statesman , however well fortifie d b y knowledge, should expec t 'to penetrate a process s o cunningly compounde d no t onl y o f necessity but o f contingency, fortuity , ignorance, stupidity an d chance.' 5 I shal l conten d tha t Will , fortifie d b y knowledge , i s capable o f doin g better. There ar e three cause s of intelligence failure . The firs t i s the allege d unpredictability o f certain kind s of phenomena, certai n type s of situation, whic h alter th e course o f history. Wh o knows when som e natura l disaster - earth quake o r famine, plague or flood - ma y lay waste a countryside, tur n th e current Five-Yea r Plan int o so many worthles s piece s of paper, drop a oncepowerful natio n int o th e rank s of oblivion lik e a counter i n a game of snakesand-ladders? Who can tell when technica l malfunctio n - a defect in a firin g mechanism, a breakdown i n a communications-system - ma y wreak a holocaust o n earth, no less terrible for being inadvertent ? Who can predict persona l misfortune - th e assassination of a president, the illness of a premier - bringing chaos in its wake an d incompetence t o power? 'D o you honestly expec t us, ' the statesma n ask s reproachfully, 't o know whe n an d where thes e thing s will happen?' It i s a rhetorical question , fo r we are to answe r i n the negative . T o answer positively, w e should requir e acces s to intelligenc e of the occult . It is the kind o f knowledge furnishe d onl y by th e Old Farmer's Almanac, o r th e crystal ball , or fortune cookie s - an d about a s reliable. 4 Th e Presiden t an d the Secretar y o f State,' in Don K. Price, éd., The Secretary o f State (Prentice-Hall , Englewood Cliff s 1960) , 35- 6 5 'O n th e Inscrutability of History ; Encounter, Nov. 1966 , 16

Ignorance an d knowledg e 10 7

This is not s o at all . Consider th e phenomen a o f personal misfortune , b y which the world i s often changed . King Alexander o f Greece die d i n the au tumn o f 192 0 fro m a bite of his pet monkey , whic h happene d t o b e rabid: his untimely deat h touche d of f a train of events which le d Winston Churchill t o remark that ' a quarter of a million person s die d o f that monkey' s bite. ' In 1923 Trotsk y wen t duck-hunting : th e long wait i n the marshes caused him to contrac t a fever, thu s puttin g him hors de combat a t a critical stag e of his struggle fo r power, fro m whic h h e emerge d the loser . Trotsk y comment s retro spectively: 'On e ca n foresee a revolution or a war, but i t is impossible t o fore see the consequence s o f an autumn shootin g tri p fo r wild duck.' 6 Wh o coul d have known tha t Si r Anthony Ede n would succumb to menta l breakdow n at the height o f the Sue z crisis , causin g him t o cal l off th e war ? Or that Joh n Kennedy would b e struck dow n b y a n assassin's bullet? Each o f thes e event s is said t o have been unpredictable . Bu t tha t does no t mean tha t knowledge , relevantl y assessed an d properly applied , canno t illumi nate th e scene . We know, fo r example, tha t America n presidents are prone t o be assassinated. We know tha t th e politica l climat e in the American south west a t th e tim e o f the visit to Dalla s of President Kennedy wa s violent an d ugly, irrational an d hostile. We know tha t suc h climates ma y stimulat e un stable individuals to commi t terribl e crimes. With such knowledge a t his disposal, no on e coul d hav e been surprised by what happened . Shocked , grieved, desolated, eve n momentarily unhinged: bu t no t surprised . What happened a t Dallas, s o far from bein g beyond th e powe r o f relevant knowledge t o antici pate, was indeed anticipate d a t th e time . A month befor e th e fata l shooting , Adlai Stevenson, who wa s jostled an d spa t upo n b y a Dallas mob, telephone d to Arthur Schlesinger: ' I talke d wit h som e o f the leading people,' he told him . They wondered whethe r th e President shoul d go to Dallas, an d so do I.' Disasters, malfunctions, misfortunes canno t individuall y be brought t o th e attention o f th e policy-make r i n advance of thei r occurrence. Trends, tendencies, and dispositions ma y be . If th e statesma n is unaware of trends , of tendencies , of dispositions, i t i s not because thes e li e beyond th e zon e o f awareness . But i t may be because o f stupidity - othe r peoples' , o r his own, or both. Here is the second caus e of intelligence failure. 7 People mak e mistakes , eve n those wh o shoul d kno w better . Airlin e pilot s attempt landing s with thei r wheel s up . ('One pilot who did this recently, ' 6 Quote d i n E.H. Carr, What i s History? (Macmillan , London 1961) , 92 7 Se e also below, 'Stupidity an d Power,' 156-6 2

108 Diplomacy and its discontents

according t o The New York Times, 'sai d he had bee n unable t o hear th e con trol towe r warnings for th e "honking " in the cockpit. The "honking" he heard was warning that somethin g was wrong.') Surgeons leave sponges in the vitals of their patients . General s send their troop s t o ambush . Mariners run thei r ships on rocks. Statesmen bring their state s to ruin. It i s common t o thin k subordinate s stupid, holding superior s to b e blameless. But stupidit y i s no less common o n th e commandin g heights tha n dow n below; it only seem s to be. This fo r two reasons . The commanding height s invest thei r occupant s with a kind o f charisma, which ordinar y mortals are both loath and fearful t o disturb . There's such divinit y dot h hedg e a king, That treaso n ca n but pee p t o wha t it would. And no t king s only, but president s and premiers. Secondly, the commanding heights, because they ar e commanding, enable their occupant s to deploy a myriad o f elaborate device s to deflec t criticis m arid blame, as a decoy draws off counter-fire . The memoir s of President Eisenhower ar e remarkable in thi s respect - an d in this respec t alone . The blunders of his presidency wer e legion, but - s o Ike assures us - i t was never his fault, ever. Such inordinat e self-justi fication, suc h shameles s sloughing of responsibility, i s typical o f statesmen. John Kennedy is an honourable exception . O n 22 April 1961 , hi s Cuban intervention alread y a fiasco, the President met th e press . 'Victory has a hundred fathers,' he said , 'defeat i s an orphan.' But no t o n thi s occasion, fo r th e President fiercely insisted upon his paternity. It does not happe n often . All leaders acquire som e immunity to blame, leaders of government more than most . But they ar e not entitle d t o it. 'The state,' Charles Burton Marshall comments wisely , is only man. I t is not superman . The institution s o f political lif e d o not ad d t o the dimension s o f the human mind. They hav e no insights denied to individu als. They produc e n o wisdo m beyond th e compas s of man's mind. Th e intelli gence operating in the line s of decision an d execution i s but huma n intelligence. It has the inherent attribute s of contingency, fallibility, and subjectivity. Service to th e stat e does not brin g to th e minds of the servant s any additional endowments for perceiving the future. 8 Or even the present . Indeed i t doe s not. S o far from that , service to th e stat e ma y constitut e a handicap i n the acquisitio n of relevant knowledge. There ar e certain occupa 8 Th e Limits of Foreign Policy (Henr y Holt, Ne w York 1954) , 14-1 5

Ignorance and knowledge 109

tional hazards involved in the craf t o f intelligence. These constitute togethe r the thir d caus e of intelligence failure. None of these occupationa l hazards is more conducive to disaste r than wishful thinking . To thin k wishfull y means , in the contex t o f intelligence , hearing what on e wants to hear, seeing what on e wants to see , believing what one would like t o be true. Wishful thinkin g i s not th e sam e thing as stupid acting, though i t often leads to stupi d acts . Wishful thinkin g is found among both parts of the intelligenc e community - amon g the agents in the field, charged primarily with the collection o f data; and among those at headquarters, charged primarily with its assessment. Wishful thinkin g i n the fiel d is caused most commonl y b y th e natura l desire of the accredite d representative to want to like, and be liked by, th e government an d people o f his country o f accreditation. Only a misanthrop e enjoys being persona non grata; the caree r diplomatist, with all his faults, is rarely misanthropic. He studies the history an d culture of his posting with sympathetic understanding: why would he do it any other way? He has to spend th e nex t thre e years or so in a distant and unfamiliar land; the natural inclination is to loo k fo r th e brighter side, just as the natura l inclination, on moving into a strange and gloomy house, is to pain t it cheer y colours and install your own furniture. The grimmer the environment, the stronge r the tend ency. Then ther e are the leaders of the government, who ar e in a sense one's hosts. Again the inclinatio n i s to make th e best o f it, or them. Politicians having international reputations as butchers and carvers turn out, on clos e inspection, t o be intriguing personalities with divertin g characteristics, good fellows with a bad press . They dispens e hospitality wit h gusto ; their ladies are pleasant and perhaps pretty; as Old Owl said, reading his recipes for squirrel stew, 'It al l seems so inviting.' And th e despatche s are mines of bias and misinformation. To thin k wishfully about a foreign country is not necessaril y to thin k well of it. The reports of Nazi diplomatists stationed i n the United State s before the war breathe contemp t fo r the American people - fo r their cloddis h mate rialism, their ignoranc e o f Europe, thei r susceptibilit y t o propaganda . At th e same time th e strengt h o f isolationist sentimen t was persistently exaggerated. 'More and more pictures are appearing in the newspapers showing th e Fiihre r in the field, ' th e German military attach é cable d from Washington in the summer of 1940 . 'Th e opinion o f Senator Pitman , who has described the Führe r as a genius, is everywhere gaining ground.'9 None of thi s was true. Nor wa s it in the Nazi interest to believe it to be true . 9 Quoted in Gordon A. Craig, From Bismarck to Adenauer (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore 1958), 121

110 Diplomacy and its discontents

Erroneous intelligenc e ma y resul t a s well from th e desir e o f it s supplier t o gratify an d curry favou r wit h its recipient. To thi s end he transmit s what h e thinks th e statesma n will want t o hear, withholding tha t which h e think s will cause him displeasure . Many of th e report s reaching Washington about conditions in Vietnam are only comprehensibl e a s attempts to gratif y th e President . It i s said that afte r listening to tw o widely differing account s of a mission t o Vietnam, one furnishe d by a n optimistic general, the othe r b y a pessimistic foreign servic e officer, Presiden t Kennedy aske d them : 'Ar e you sur e that yo u gentlemen visited the sam e country?' Literally, yes; figuratively, no. Wishful thinkin g a t headquarters ca n be just a s harmful to statecraf t as wishful thinkin g i n the field . The bes t intelligenc e is useless when undul y disregarded. The totalitaria n statesman suffers mos t acutel y this occupationa l hazard, for his knowledge o f the world has to confor m to th e requirements of the loca l ideology . Sometimes i t doesn't fit , and policy goe s astray. In 1946, the Polish militar y attaché i n Washington reported t o his communis t superiors that i n his first-hand observation th e Unite d States di d not appea r headed fo r that catastrophi c economi c collaps e predicted b y doctrine an d th e party line , an d warned that i t would be unwise for Soviet policy-makers to predicate thei r action s o n the basi s of such a n assumption. Fo r thi s helpful advice he receive d the followin g reply: The method o f th e themati c treatment of th e problems touche d upo n i n your reports show s that yo u ar e falling unde r the influenc e of your environment , losing t o a considerable extent th e feelin g o f objectivity in th e realisti c evaluation o f th e situatio n an d intentions o f American policy. I t woul d be fro m al l points of view a desirable thing tha t yo u analys e events, getting at thei r source , rationally, critically, and fre e fro m th e thinkin g habits o f th e bi g capitalist world. Then you r materia l will give a true insight int o th e problem s of interes t tous. 10 Being a prudent man, General Modelski, on readin g this disconcerting message, promptly defecte d to th e west - which i s how we come to know o f the exchange. Doubtless the file s of th e Sovie t and Chinese foreign offices are ful l of simila r examples. In wester n foreign offices they ar e - on e hopes - mor e rare . But they are not unknown . John Patón Davie s was once an American diplomatist. When stationed i n China in 1944 , h e reported th e likelihoo d o f a communist victor y in th e civi l war, and suggeste d that th e United States would do well to prepar e 10 Quote d i n Zbigniew K . Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge (Harvar d Universit y Press , Cambridge 1956) , 202n 3

Ignorance an d knowledge 11 1

herself fo r thi s impending massive shift i n th e world balanc e o f power. For this servic e to his country Davie s was dismissed fro m th e servic e of his country. A board upholdin g his dismissal stated tha t his intelligence report s 'wer e not i n accordance wit h th e standar d require d of foreig n service officers and show a definite lack of judgment, discretion an d reliability.' Few o f Davies' peers and colleagues shared tha t evaluatio n - non e wer e represented on the board - but, notwithstandin g thei r protests , h e was compelled t o resign, a victim of the paranoi d style of American politics . I t ca n happen there , and has. It coul d eve n happen here . What, then, are we to say to thos e wh o still insis t tha t th e internationa l environment i s inscrutable and that statesmen, accordingly, are doomed b y Fate t o toi l i n a twilight zon e between da y an d night, illuminatio n an d darkness, knowledge an d ignorance ? We may sa y to the m tha t the y ar e misinformed. Of cours e ther e i s no perfect knowledge. W e need n o wise owls t o tell u s that. But ther e i s sufficient knowledge for successfu l foreign policy . And i t is available to an y statesman wh o i s alert to th e trend s and tendencie s of his times, who train s himself an d his subordinates not t o make careles s and stupid mistakes , who , awar e of the occupationa l hazard s o f his craft, tries dilligently t o avoi d them. A statesman whose statecraf t goes awry through ignor ance has no business pleading the inscrutability o f history o r the impermeability o f events. He does better t o pass upon himsel f th e verdict once uttered by Senator Fulbrigh t o n takin g what he cam e t o regard as a mistaken course : 'I have only myself t o blame fo r it because I should hav e been mor e intelligent , more far-seeing , more suspicious.' 11 [December 1966 ]

11 Th e New York Times, 2 4 Nov. 1966, 'Recor d of '64 Senat e Hearing on Tonkin Gulf

4

Blindness an d previsio n The makin g of plans , like th e acquirin g of knowledge, is an inescapable consequence o f living in society. Someon e onc e gav e to a book th e titl e Plan or No Plan? It i s a foolish title , for th e questio n i t poses is a spurious question, th e alternatives offered ar e false alternatives . Th e choic e i s not betwee n plan or no plan, between whether o r not t o make provision for th e future . Th e choic e is among various types of planning (partial o r comprehensive) ; among various methods o f planning (indicative o r directive); among various ranges of plannin g (short-range or long); and amon g various expectancies o f planning (sceptical o r confident, dubious or trusting) . So whoever first sai d 'W e are al l planners nowadays' was right, bu t h e didn't sa y anything profound. Me n were planners in the Stone Age . Neanderthal Man made preparations only fo r th e morning's breakfast , whereas modern man - America n Man - is so preoccupied wit h the day after th e day after to morrow tha t he migh t wel l be called Pension Pla n Man. But th e differenc e i s only o f degree . Man is by natur e a planning animal, a s he i s by natur e a politi cal animal. Politics is planning. Policy i s planning. The expressio n 'policy-planning' is a tautological expression . You have t o pla n policy: there' s just no othe r way t o do it. You can't make policy o n the cables , whatever the diplomats ma y say: you can' t make i t up as you go along. What distinguishes policy plannin g councils fro m th e othe r part s of foreig n office s i s not th e activit y o f plannin g as such, but th e time the y spen d a t it, the range they wor k t o with it, th e fait h they hav e in it. The purpos e o f planning is to improv e performance . If one knew, o r thought one knew, tha t planning would degrad e performance, one ought t o try t o d o as little o f it as possible. You canno t d o none a t all , planning bein g

Blindness and prevision 113

a part o f living. But you ca n cut plannin g t o th e bone. O n certain views of th e world thi s i s an appropriate thin g t o do . It i s appropriate for extrem e determinists . In a universe where th e planning already has been done fo r you, i n a world whos e futur e i s preordained, in an environment whose change s ar e predetermined, ther e i s logically no poin t i n piling planning on. Planning becomes a waste o f time , a pointless activity in a totally planne d creation . Such a n attitude t o lif e ofte n seem s justified by life : philosopher s as well as theologians ma y accep t it . But thei r acceptanc e i s mostly theoretical . As a life styl e it's a hard line t o practise . Does Calvinism ever if at al l lead Calvinists, believers in predestination, t o live a life withou t purpos e o r direction? Does Marxism eve r if at al l lead Marxists, believers in determinism, to le t th e dialectic do i t all? Neither Calvinists nor Marxists do anything o f th e sort . Minimal planning is also appropriate fo r apostle s o f th e irrationa l and th e absurd. If you believ e that th e worl d i s ruled b y chance , that coincidenc e is king, that event s occur a t random , that history i s all happenstance an d circum stance, then not onl y i s there n o poin t i n planning for th e future , ther e is point in not plannin g for the future . B y not plannin g you ar e likely t o lan d o n you r feet a t least som e of th e time ; by meddlin g i n so muddled a n order you wil l only reduc e your chances of success . If night doesn' t follo w day , if the su n sets in th e east, if birds don't sing in the morning , if rivers run uphill , if money bring s no interes t and power bring s no reward , then plannin g is a waste of time , a pointless activity in a pointless landscape. Once again , such a n attitud e t o lif e ofte n seem s justified by life : philoso phers as well as drifters may accep t it . Bu t i t i s not a customary stance among policy-makers. These ma y be sceptical ; the y ofte n ar e sceptical; bu t the y ar e rarely that sceptical . Dean Acheson , i n whom scepticis m i s more highly devel oped tha n in most statesmen , describe s a s 'heartening and wise advice ' th e homily tha t 'th e futur e come s on e day at a time' and, even so, 'may tak e us by surprise. ' But he recoils , al l the same , from tha t cours e o f aimles s driftin g to which s o negative and nihilist a n outlook ough t logicall y t o lead. 'Whil e it is true,' he writes, 'that th e problems of the voyage come t o th e marine r day by day , it is essential t o his success, and perhaps [t o his] survival , that he .. . prepare, as best he may , for what lie s ahead.' 1 His best ma y be none to o good : it's likel y t o be rather bad . But in the world of the policy-make r on e must d o what on e can . 'W e are never relieved,' Arthur Schlesinge r insists, 'despit e th e limits o f ou r knowledg e and th e darknes s of ou r understanding , from th e ne1 Th e Presiden t and the Secretar y o f State,' in Don K. Price, éd., The Secretary o f State (Prentice-Hall , Englewood Cliffs 1960) , 36

114 Diplomacy and its discontents

cessity of meeting our obligations.' 2 The statesma n may be a sceptic; he can not b e a beatnik. He may wait t o se e what happens; he can' t wai t for Godot . Planning is inescapable, but tha t doesn' t mea n it's popular . Only recently has it attaine d a vogue. Only very recently has its applicability t o foreig n policy been concede d b y practitioner s of foreig n policy . And stil l their concessio n i s grudging and sharpl y qualified. So long as the public philosophy is hostile t o stat e intervention in th e affairs o f society, believing that government best which govern s least, planning is bound t o be unpopular. Such a conviction, and with it planning's unpopularity, has been steadily eroded sinc e the eighteenth century , when once it held sway . Oh, you ma y still se e automobiles on American highways whose bumpers proudly proclaim thei r owners ' boast : ' I fight poverty -1 work.' But the slogan discloses only th e prejudice of their owner s - that , an d their pro found ignoranc e of the role of the stat e in what the y erroneousl y suppose t o be thei r ruggedly individualistic existence . Today, whe n th e state in capitalistic societie s hardly less than i n socialist societies intrudes into th e lives of the citizenry in every conceivable way - delivering them , educatin g them, feedin g them, housing them, transportin g them , entertaining them , burying them - plannin g is more and more commo n i n more and more ways in more an d more affairs . In time , even in foreign affairs . Bu t not a t once, and not withou t a struggle. No one disputed th e righ t o f the stat e t o conduc t foreig n policy which , of all the manifol d activities of society, seem s least appropriately left t o th e private sector. (In som e states , such as the United States, trespasser s in the domai n of diplomacy ar e liable to be prosecuted.) No , what wa s disputed wa s the propriety o f servants of the stat e tryin g to plan foreig n policy. It wa s all very well for planner s in other field s to strut thei r stuff . Geologists might projec t th e life o f mines and oilfields, demographers plot th e growt h an d compositio n o f populations, economist s anticipat e gros s national products . Thes e wer e the exact science s - more o r less exact. The quotients precise , the columns even, the conclusion s concrete. Bu t foreign policy? International politics? Ho w could on e cas t th e horoscope o f states? How could on e plan fo r a future a s inscrutable as that awaiting the state s system in twenty years' , ten years', even five years' time ? It couldn't be done. No point pretendin g it could be done . The gift o f prevision - th e privilege of the planner in less problematic kinds of policy - i s not given to th e foreign service officer. Hi s fate is to be handicapped by a form of political astigmatism , blinding him t o al l phenomena sav e those 2 'O n th e Inscrutabilit y o f History,' Encounter, Nov. 1966 , 1 7

Blindness and prevision 115

closest t o his gaze. To him, a s Charles Burton Marshall puts it, 'the long run ... can onl y b e a n aggregate of shor t runs. ' If he engages in forward planning, it is 'not because the futur e is predictable, but becaus e it is not.'3 Scepticism fo r foreig n policy plannin g was earliest and mos t easil y overcome i n totalitarian states , particularl y those embarked on civilizin g missions and wars of liberation. I f you ar e out t o conque r th e world, you nee d a certain confidenc e fo r th e enterprise : i t helps t o gai n confidence by having a plan o f attack, a time-table for aggression , a blueprint fo r occupation . Besides, if you ar e out t o contro l th e future, it is easier t o predict it . This is why the most precis e an d detaile d plan s for futur e internationa l action ar e to b e found eithe r i n the file s o f th e General Staff o r else in the programme s of th e dictators. Leaders whose goa l it is to initiat e and carr y throug h momentou s socia l and political change - leader s who fancy themselve s as civilizing missionaries and conquerin g heroes - fin d it easy, indeed find it essential, to thin k ahea d about a future les s aggressive folk fin d difficul t to fathom . Bu t wha t abou t these les s aggressive folk, thos e wh o have no grand designs even upon th e status quo, le t alon e upo n thei r neighbours ? Are they doome d alway s to wai t and see what other s wil l do first, to react t o th e action s o f their adversaries , to have only a second-strike planning capability? O r ca n they eve r hope t o strike ou t boldl y o n thei r own ? The mos t importan t o f the statu s quo power s are the United Kingdo m and the United States . Neither too k readil y or kindly t o the notion tha t plan ning in foreign policy i s at onc e a s feasible and a s productive a s planning i n any othe r kin d o f policy. They coul d do i t in war, in short burst s for a shor t time; over the long haul, they felt , it was not fo r them . Th e British, particularly, rooted i n empiricism, staunchly pragmatic , distrustful of dogma, were loath t o espous e plannin g in foreign policy wit h an y enthusiasm. The famous inaugural lecture given by Michael Oakeshott a t th e Londo n Schoo l o f Economics i n 195 1 expresses their outloo k perfectly . 'In political activit y men sail a boundless and bottomless sea . There i s neither harbou r nor shelte r no r floor for anchorage , neither startin g place no r appointe d destination . Th e enterprise is to keep afloat , on an even keel.'4 That bein g the case , as Oakeshot t said it was the case , you migh t nee d ballast , you woul d nee d seamanship . Bu t you didn' t nee d sailin g orders to tel l you where to head for ; you didn' t need manifests to sa y what yo u were carrying; you didn' t need chart s to sho w yo u 3 Th e Makin g o f Foreign Policy in the Unite d States, ' in Edward H. Buehrig, éd. , Essays i n Political Science (Indian a University Press , Bloomington 1966) , 43 4 Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Methuen , London 1962) , 127

116 Diplomacy and its discontents

how to get there. Drift on , 0 shi p of state. Drift on , 0 unio n stron g and great. I well remember, as a member of Oakeshott's audience , the rippl e of indignation runnin g through th e hall a s he proceeded to demolis h al l that Harold Laski, his predecessor in the Chair, had stoo d for . But, so far as the Foreig n Office wa s concerned, he was preaching to th e converted . 'It is well to recognize the limit s of human endeavour.' That maxim, a favourite of one o f its permanent under secretaries, could wel l stand a s an epitaph fo r most o f th e men who have occupied that great post a t one time o r another . Eventually, in the United States, even in the United Kingdom, the importanc e of planning in foreign policy ha s come to b e recognized alon g with th e diffi culty o f planning in foreign policy. Three factor s have brought abou t thi s conversion. Th e first is that other countries, almost everywhere, have become convince d tha t planning in every sector o f national life i s a means to th e good nationa l life . This has made i t difficult fo r states with anti-plannin g attitudes to hold aloo f muc h longer . The communis t example has been particularly compelling in this respect . By th e 1950s , communism had becom e a real competitor o f the west , offering glittering prizes of prestige and productivity t o those wh o looked t o Moscow, even t o Peking, for model s and fo r methods. Afte r th e successfu l launchin g of the sputnik , it became harder than ever to argu e that th e achievement s of communist technolog y ha d com e abou t despit e communist technique s rathe r tha n because of them . I t became fashionabl e fo r liberal democrats to dra w invidious comparisons between th e drif t an d aimlessness of thei r societ y an d the ster n purpose fulness o f Soviet society. The point was made - mos t stridentl y by people callin g themselves moral re-armers but no t by the m alon e - tha t if the west was to surviv e it must embrace henceforth somethin g o f the public phil osophy o f its adversary. At th e very least, the y argued , the wes t must reexamine its traditional attitude s of hostility o r indifference towards the full y planned society . The west, no less than communism , required goals to ai m at, timetables to keep to. In the United States, thos e eastern seaboard Republican internationalists whose forbear s had stoo d four-squar e against everything thei r descendants no w came t o stand for , eagerly responded t o th e call . Under th e leadership o f the McLoys, the Rockefellers , th e Wristons, task force s were assembled, panels mobilized, inventories made of national asset s from ore-bodie s to orchestras , national goals formulated, national purposes proclaimed, national interest s defined. They acquire d a philosopher, o f sorts , in Walt Whitman Rostow , whos e book, Th e Stages o f Economic Growth, sub-titled 'A Non-Communist Manifesto,' the y and he regarded as the west's answe r to th e Marxist way of looking a t the world. Certainly it stood alon e in the vaulting

Blindness and prevision 11 7

voluntarism o f it s recommendations and i n th e confidenc e o f its analysis. 'The tricks of growth,' Rostow assure d the statesme n o f the west , 'ar e not al l that difficult; the y onl y see m so , at moments o f frustratio n an d confusion. ' H e appealed t o the m t o 'dea l with th e challeng e implici t i n the stages-of-growt h ... at th e ful l stretc h o f our mora l commitment , ou r energy, and our resources.' 5 A year later Professor Rostow becam e head o f th e Policy Plannin g Council at the State Departmen t an d ther e contrived , in due course , the Alliance for Progress. There wa s also th e exampl e o f th e so-calle d ne w nations. Amon g th e fift y to sixt y politica l communitie s attaining independenc e sinc e th e Secon d World War, planning was something o f a panacea. Certainl y no on e scornfu l of planning coul d hope t o gain thei r favour ; and sinc e gaining their favou r wa s an objective o f western policy, western policy-maker s wer e obliged i f for n o othe r reason t o abando n a t least th e appearanc e of scepticism. No r was that th e onl y reason. State s sceptica l o f planning tended t o be wealthy states , sharin g thei r wealth with th e poor. To injec t larg e amounts o f capita l an d technica l assistance int o th e full y planne d economie s o f thei r recipient s required a certain amount o f planning on th e par t o f the donors . Linke d i n this way i n a continuous transfusion o f resources, the donor s insensibl y acquire d som e o f th e characteristics o f thos e whom the y wer e aiding, of which n o characteristi c was more pronounce d tha n thei r touchin g fait h i n the efficac y o f th e nationa l plan. A secon d facto r convertin g th e critic s of planning i n foreig n polic y int o advocates o f planning in foreign polic y i s the mountin g importanc e i n external affairs o f their militar y component . Amon g th e military , planning has always enjoyed a central an d unquestione d position . I n peacetime , military establishments liv e their ow n lives, little influence d or interfered wit h b y th e societ y outside. Withi n the privac y of th e map-roo m an d th e mess , th e militar y plan ned a t will, secretly t o be sure, but withou t sham e o r hindrance. I n wartime, they sallie d fort h t o pu t thei r plan s in practice. If the y won thei r war , the y enhanced th e reputatio n o f both planning and themselves . But i f they lost , it was only thei r reputatio n tha t suffered . Planning itsel f was unimpaired. What was needed wer e new plans, better plans . And th e militar y planner s would go back t o th e map-roo m an d the sand-table. In due cours e new plans would emerge. Perhaps the y migh t b e better . During the Secon d Worl d War, military plannin g was immeasurably refined by th e applicatio n o f scientific and mathematical technique s t o militar y problems hitherto left largel y t o th e intuition s of experienced (o r inexperienced ) 5 (Cambridg e Universit y Press , Cambridg e & New York 1960) , 166- 7

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officers, whic h sometime s let you down . Since the n th e militar y planner , proudly wearing his new title of 'operation s researcher' or 'system s analyst,' has never looked back . His vogue is great, his power enormous, his prestige unchallengeable. The emergenc e of th e national securit y planner to thes e dizzy heights of influence wa s made possible, and in a sense inevitable, by tw o post-wa r developments. The firs t wa s the relianc e for the nation's security upon th e deterrent capacit y o f nuclear weapons and their deliver y systems, both bombers and missiles. The problems raised by the new kind of weaponry its siting, its targeting, the correc t calibratio n o f its various components (th e problem o f the 'mix'), the relationship of deterrent to operationa l forces , the doctrines by whic h thes e force s were t o be deployed, the contrivance of effec tive systems of command an d control - suc h problems were at once so novel and s o baffling, s o esoteric and s o critical, that anyon e who seeme d as if he might kno w th e answer s was assured a hearing and foun d his talents at a premium. Likely as not, thos e who seeme d to know th e answer s were striplings from th e academies , sporting as campaign ribbons their doctorate s in quantum mechanic s or th e theor y o f games. The fiel d i n which the y professe d competence wa s that o f thermonuclear war . Since thermonuclea r war knows no practical military experience , one could no t tell , at least by th e traditiona l tests, whether th e whiz kid planners were letting the sid e down o r not. Onl y an outbreak of general war could prove them wrong : there was scant satisfaction i n that even for thei r mos t rabid critics . On the othe r hand , s o long as holocaust remaine d averted , they coul d clai m without seriou s fear o f refuta tion to have been right; for in the thermonuclea r age the court-martial s are mostly posthumous . The second , an d related, development wa s the fantasti c increase in th e price of weaponry, which placed a premium upon th e talent s of the system s analyst an d the cos t accountant . B y the middl e 1950s , the United State s was spending about $ 15 billion a year o n military equipment largel y on th e basi s of successful lobbying by its manufacturers. There wa s no plannin g in procurement, only politics . All that change d i n 196 1 when Robert S . McNamara came to the Pentagon determine d to appl y t o th e national securit y the same tech niques of cos t effectivenes s whic h he had learned as an automobile executive . In testimon y befor e a Senate committee , M r McNamara expressed his philosophy i n these words: ' I equate plannin g and budgeting and consider th e term s almost synonymous , the budget being simply a quantitative expression o f th e operating plan.' 6 6 Quoted in William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (Harper & Row, New York,Evanston,& London 1964), 169

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The Stat e Departmen t remaine d sceptical, a s state department s will. But even ther e th e reverberation s of th e McNamara revolution were felt i n time . On 1 9 September 196 2 Dean Rus k spoke a t th e inauguratio n of th e ne w departmental compute r - th e first t o be installed in any foreign offic e i n the world. This innovation in communications technique,' said he guardedly, 'represents an important contribution t o management effectiveness and will aid us in th e achievemen t of our foreig n polic y objectives. ' Exactly how , th e Secretary didn' t disclose . But th e patrons of planning could no t hav e been more dramaticall y vindicated. The thir d facto r makin g the planning of foreign policy acceptabl e t o th e mak ers of foreig n policy i s the improvemen t i n the technique s of prediction. Until quite recentl y th e statesma n had bu t tw o such technique s a t his disposal. He could rea d history, and reflec t upo n it s lessons. He could consul t his own experience, and rely upon it s intuitions. These ma y not soun d like much, bu t they wer e all he had . Learning from history an d intuiting from experience bot h involv e extrapolating fro m th e past, allowing what ha s gone before t o be your guid e to what ma y lie ahead. Machiavelli preferred th e first technique t o th e second : the wisdom o f experience is of no us e to th e inexperienced , whereas th e lessons of history ar e as varied as the librar y at one's disposal . 'As to exercis e for the mind,' he counselled his Prince, read history an d stud y th e action s o f eminent men , see how the y acte d in warfare, examin e th e cause s of thei r victories and defeat s i n order t o imitat e th e former an d avoi d the latte r .. . so that whe n fortune changes she may fin d [you] prepare d t o resist her blows, and to prevail in adversity. 7 From histor y a s a pedagogue on e may expect to o littl e o r too much . It is to expec t to o little t o believe, with Coleridge , that whatever illumination his tory provide s is but ' a lantern on the stern , which shine s onl y o n the waves behind' - useles s as a look-out, wors e than useles s as a radar. Or to believe, with Hegel, that Minerva's owl takes flight only i n the gathering dusk. These verdicts are too severe . Perhaps Clio, history's muse , is unfit t o conduc t a seminar for statesmen . But sh e is competent enoug h i n kindergarten. 'The assertion tha t me n learn nothing fro m history,' E.H. Car r has written, 'is contradicted b y a multitude of observabl e facts. No experience i s more common.' 8 But, pressed to o hard fo r much to o much, history wil l let you down . And it i s the way with statesme n t o as k of history mor e than she is in the positio n 7 Th e Prince (Mentor Books , New York 1952) , 91 8 What is History? (Macmillan , London 1961) , 61

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to provide . For mor e detail s of the futur e than the record ca n foretell; for more certaint y about th e futur e tha n th e record ma y justify. In its extreme form thi s importuning of history result s in th e elaboratio n of pseudo-historical theories o f th e ris e and fal l o f empires and civilizations ; or in affirmatio n o f infallible analogies ; or i n postulation o f fals e alternatives . But thes e ar e no t the fault s of history. They ar e the fault s of th e charlatan s who, speakin g in history's name , abuse her confidenc e and misapply her methods . Distinct fro m th e tuitio n of history i s the intuitio n of experience. Its value as a tool of prediction depends partly o n th e experience , partly on th e 'flair ' (as Delcassé put it ) with whic h th e statesma n interpret s his experience. Thes e have nowhere bee n better blended than i n the mind o f Winston Churchill, wh o was also a star pupil o f history. Churchil l possesse d i n consequence trul y phenomenal powers of prevision. As well as predicting epocha l events - th e com ing of war, the slaughter in India - he was capable o f curiously exac t premoni tions on a smaller scale . In August 1939 , informe d o f regulations to shoo t animals let loos e fro m th e zo o by air-raids , he remarked as follows: 'Imagin e a great air raid over London .. . The corpses lying about in the smokin g ashes the lion s and tiger s roaming the ruin s in search o f th e corpses . And you're go ing to shoo t them . What a pity!' Now look a t his war history. I n its third volume, written ten year s later, occurs the followin g description of th e firs t German ai r attack o n Belgrade: When silenc e came at last .. . over 17,00 0 citizen s .. . lay dead in the street s o r under th e debris . Out o f th e nightmar e of smoke and fir e cam e the maddened animals released from thei r shattere d cage s in th e zoologica l gardens. A stricken stork hobble d pas t th e mai n hotel, whic h wa s a mass of flames . A bear, dazed and uncomprehending, shuffle d throug h th e infern o with slow and awkward gait toward s the Danube .. ? The correspondent 10 drawin g the attentio n o f readers of The Times t o mi s striking parallel was then a member of the Policy Plannin g Council: hi s comment betray s professional admiration, slightl y tinge d by envy: 'As on larger matters, Mr Churchill's vision was fulfilled an d he was able to describ e reality in the sam e terms that he use d to forese e it.' This i s the sor t o f quality claime d by C.P. Sno w fo r scientists - me n who have the futur e i n their bones. Ther e aren't man y of them around .

9 Th e Second World War, III, The Grand Alliance (Houghto n Mifflin, Bosto n 1950) , 175 10 M r Henry Owen

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To avoi d blindness an d attain prevision, the modern statesma n nee d no t rely solel y upo n extrapolatio n from th e past . He may fortif y himsel f with th e technique o f th e scenario , and with th e techniqu e o f simulation . The troubl e with histor y i s that while historian s ma y repeat each other , history neve r repeats itself. Not, a t an y rate, exactly. (When Mark Twain declared 'Histor y doe s no t repea t itself, but i t rhymes,' he went abou t a s far as he coul d go. ) Even th e closes t historical parallel s are only analogues ; they are never identical . Frequently the y aren' t eve n analogous: the y ar e more lik e metaphors. An d ofte n yo u ca n search history fro m th e beginning to th e present without encounterin g any sor t of experience relevan t to the problem at hand. As, for example, th e problem of waging and survivin g nuclear war. Here's where th e scenari o can help. The writing of scenario s involves the controlled us e of the imaginatio n to invok e fictitiously th e shap e of thing s t o come. The objec t o f th e exercise is to reduc e th e incidenc e o f unpleasan t surprise. By imagining previously unimagine d situations, by thinkin g abou t the unthinkable, by postulatin g the impossible , by pondering th e imponderable , the scenaria n helps th e statesma n to choos e his course mor e surely. Simulation has only recentl y been take n u p by statesmen , but i t has long been known t o soldiers . Military manoeuvres are a classic way o f simulatin g warfare. They ar e also cumbersom e an d costly : whe n tim e is fleeting and money short , the militar y mak e d o with moc k manoeuvres , deploying to y soldiers and mode l tank s across a miniature landscape , so attaining, in a game of doubl e make-believe , a simulation of a simulated war. Since 1945 , the ste p fro m war gaming to col d wa r gaming, from military simulations t o strategi c simulations, from kriegspiel t o staatspiel, ha s been slight an d irresistible . Once th e traditiona l distinction between peace an d war had broke n down , onc e government s relied on weapons an d doctrines fo r which ther e wa s no previou s operational experience , once civilian s displaced soldiers in the makin g o f grand strategy, it was inevitable that th e technique s of simulatio n should fin d a wider application. They move d ou t briskly , from the war colleges to th e universities , from th e Defense Department t o th e Stat e Department. There the y wer e riot alway s well received. Those who relie d primarily upo n thei r intuitions an d experience for suc h glimpses of th e futur e as they migh t b e privilege d t o se e were highly sceptica l of what seeme d a t best a diverting pastime an d a t worst a n untrustworthy guide to policy . One such sceptic , a former member o f th e Policy Plannin g Council, recall s his experience i n term s which sugges t tha t while h e foun d it enjoyable, he foun d i t anything bu t profitable : On th e occasio n i n question I was one-fifth of a United State s notional gov ernment. A n admire d an d scholarl y frien d wa s the simulate d President. We

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were pitted agains t wily and determine d adversarie s in a putative confrontation growin g out o f an infiltration scrape involving a far country. W e smote them hi p an d thig h an d cam e off wit h a considerable diplomatic success . I wish the natio n might always do as well in real life ... n Though ther e is reason to be sceptical, there i s none t o be scornful . A simulation i s neither occul t no r foolish . A simulation i s a model o f a system, in thi s case the internationa l system. You ca n represent international politic s mathematically (a s in the theor y o f games) or verbally (as in the scenario) : th e simulated model differ s fro m these i n that th e mode l i s in motion. Yo u choos e up sides ; you la y down rules ; then yo u let th e player s play at statecraft , observing, recording, and interpreting the result s in th e hope o f finding something out abou t the system that could hardly be found i n any other way . Simulation, as even its defenders concede , is a crude and primitiv e techniqu e of prediction. But then th e simulated system - internationa l politic s - is also crude and primitive. The scenari o and th e simulation ar e the newes t instruments in the kit-bag of policy prediction . Lik e an y instrument they ma y b e used or abused. They are abused if the polic y planne r mistakes th e scenari o for the future , th e simulation fo r reality - i f he becomes so enamoured with his own constructed sequence o f events, or with his postulated outcome , a s to be oblivious to al l the other possibl e sequence s and al l other possibl e outcomes . But the y serv e their purpose if , in the words of T.C. Schelling , the y awake n planners 'to certain contingencies that might no t otherwis e have been take n seriously , and acquaint decision-maker s in advance with som e o f the option s tha t may be available t o the m an d with situation s that arise.' 12 A modern Machiavelli may prudently commen d scenario s and simulations t o his Prince, not a s an infallible method o f putting Fate to flight, but rathe r t o prepar e him to resis t her blows. [December 1966 ]

11 Charle s Burton Marshall, The Limits of Foreign Policy (Henr y Holt, New York 1954), 40 12 'Comment, ' in Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read , eds., Limited Strategic War (Praeger, New York 1962) , 256

5 Inertia and innovation Not leas t among the obstacle s confronting the statesma n determine d t o mak e events conform t o Will i s the cautio n o f his professional advisers. Pressing against th e innovatin g tendencies of foreig n ministers, especially fledgling foreign ministers , are the inertia l masses of bureaucracy. All too ofte n inerti a prevails and innovatio n loses. All bureaucracy's conservative, but th e conservatis m of diplomatic bureaucracy i s in a class by itself . The norma l reaction of a foreign office t o som e ne w foreign polic y ide a or some fres h foreig n policy approac h i s to want t o mak e it go away. The ethos of diplomacy i s an ethos o f suspicion - suspicio n tem pered b y scepticism , snow tempere d b y ice . The foreig n service officer i s a nay-sayer in statecraft, the abominabl e no-man of diplomacy. Hi s mission i n life i s to preserv e th e statu s quo fro m thos e who propos e t o alte r it. Where the new ide a or th e fres h approac h canno t b e banished, his impulse is to denature them. Where he canno t avoi d change, he seek s to slo w it down . He i s capable of performing quite unscrupulou s acts in the interest s of delay . He moves at the pac e o f snails . He measures his progress in inches. He employs th e tacti c of Prufrockian deliberation, takin g on e thin g at a time an d much tim e over that on e thing : Time fo r you an d time fo r me , And tim e yet fo r a hundred indecisions , And fo r a hundred vision s and revisions , Before th e takin g of a toast an d tea . I must tak e a moment t o stres s that thi s is not a n exaggerated description . My portrai t o f th e foreig n service officer ma y b e slightl y overdrawn , so as to

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bring out hi s essential feature; it is not a caricature. This is how h e reall y is; this is what he's reall y like. There's evidenc e to prove it. There's th e evidence of his critics - critic s such a s Churchill, who once remarke d that al l he eve r got fro m hi s advisers was the sum-tota l of thei r fears . There's th e evidenc e of his defenders - defender s such a s the official historian o f the British Foreign Office durin g the Secon d Worl d War who remark s with approbatio n o f th e 'habits of caution an d understatement' by which th e styl e of the Offic e wa s marked eve n during wartime, and of how ' a good dea l of the tim e an d energy of... the Permanent Under-Secretary and the Staff o f the Office wa s taken u p in efforts t o persuad e [Churchill] tha t no t al l his proposals were suited t o British interests, or adequate to mee t th e man y important factor s in a situation.' 1 And there' s the evidenc e of the diplomatis t himself , provided in his memoirs. Diplomatic memoirs are replete with grievances , among which non e recurs more ofte n tha n th e complain t o f the diplomatis t tha t his political maste r acts too precipitately , acts too boldly, indeed , that he acts at all. Historians deal kindly wit h thi s literature - to o kindly - perhap s becaus e their sympathies in the struggl e between foreign minister and foreig n servic e lie more with th e foreig n servic e than with th e foreign minister. One of their number writes disparagingly of 'the evils of abrupt and inexpert intervention by [those] whos e experienc e has been confined to th e domestic field'; another , no less distinguished, writes of the lonelines s and self-disciplin e of the foreign service officer , wh o knows that he coul d wi n much greate r approval and popularity, a t any given moment, by a liberal measure of charlatanism : by abusin g the responsibilitie s he bears, by exploiting th e ignoranc e and prejudice of others , b y inflaming rather tha n assuagin g the passions of men an d then makin g himself th e mouth piece of those passion s -2 by, t o put i t shortly, actin g more like a politician tha n a diplomatist. The tim e has come, I think, for the historians t o reduc e their bias an d regain thei r balance o n this issue. If we reproach th e politica l practitione r o f foreign polic y fo r his characteristic vices , we should no t los e sigh t o f th e characteristic vice s of the professiona l practitioner of foreign policy. Thos e of the politician - his rashness, his impetuosity, his fondness for the unortho 1 Si r Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy i n th e Second World Wa r (Her Majesty's Stationer y Office, Londo n 1962) , xxvi, xliii 2 Georg e F. Kennan , 'History an d Diplomacy as Viewed by a Diplomatist,' in Stephen D. Kertesz an d M.A. Fitzsimons, eds., Diplomacy i n a Changing World (Universit y of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1959) , 10 8

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dox solutio n an d the direct approac h - ar e known wel l enough. Thos e o f the professional deserv e to be known better . I t i s my purpose i n this section t o see to i t tha t the y are . What may th e political practitioner o f foreig n policy d o t o preven t this enthu siasm fro m bein g dampened an d his initiatives from being stifled b y th e caution o f his professional advisers ? What measures may a foreign minister tak e to ensur e that his plans and projects are not los t in th e labyrinth s of official dom o r doomed t o moulde r in the files? There ar e three course s open t o him. H e may tak e th e apparatu s as he finds it , hoping t o mak e i t responsiv e to his bidding by th e vigour of his advocacy an d th e forc e o f his leadership. Or he may attemp t t o refor m th e apparatus, hoping by som e structura l change o r institutional alteratio n t o produce a bureaucracy more cordia l t o chang e an d receptive of innovation. Or, finally, he ma y bypass th e bureaucracy altogether, hoping t o ta p othe r outsid e source s for tha t flo w o f fresh idea s without whic h policy remain s infertile and progress can't be made . The lin e o f least resistanc e is to tak e th e apparatu s as you fin d it , hopin g it ca n be mad e t o serv e you bette r tha n i t may have served your predecessors. This i s the line followe d mos t frequentl y b y Britis h foreig n ministers, not be cause the y ar e any mor e crave n or mor e laz y tha n th e foreig n minister s of other countries , bu t becaus e the Britis h syste m o f government sedulously protects th e publi c servic e from politicians who might wan t t o tinke r with it . A pioneerin g attempt t o fashio n th e Foreign Office t o his liking was that of th e Foreig n Secretar y i n the Labou r government elected i n 1929 . I t was Arthur Henderson's notio n tha t th e government should actuall y keep it s election promises i n foreign policy, particularl y it s promise t o sig n the Optiona l Clause of th e World Court, so committing th e Unite d Kingdo m t o th e com pulsory jurisdiction o f its international disputes . Knowing well tha t s o radical a break wit h traditio n woul d fin d littl e favour with th e Foreig n Office , Henderson soon summone d a meeting of its legal advisers. 'He sa t i n his chair wit h a stubbor n look,' an eye-witness recalls, and declare d tha t th e Governmen t was in favou r of signing th e Claus e with th e least possible delay . He did no t wis h to hear " a lot o f legal arguments" abou t reservations. He , in his speeches durin g the campaign , had no t spoke n abou t reservations. He had spoke n abou t signin g the Clause . If there wer e any rea l difficulties whic h the y coul d pu t up , he wa s willing t o conside r them . Bu t he expected that , when the y put the m up , the y woul d als o sugges t ways of overcoming them . Al l thi s produced a rathe r shatterin g effect , an d afte r th e

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meeting Henderso n sai d t o me : "Don' t thes e chap s kno w wha t ou r polic y is?"3 But, a s it turne d out , Henderson , no t 'thos e chaps, ' didn' t kno w wha t hi s policy was , or was to be. The government signed th e clause: but th e Foreig n Office smuggle d so many reservation s into th e fin e prin t as to mak e th e signature a meaningless gesture. Did Henderson resign in protest? Not a t all . By then h e didn't notice; or he simply didn't care. Ernest Bevin likewise cam e to th e job determine d t o deal firmly with his diplomatic advisers ; and onc e again it was the diplomati c adviser s who deal t firmly wit h him. And o f course they love d him fo r it. 'For a month o r tw o after h e firs t arrived, ' a senior Foreign Offic e officia l recalls , 'he was not very sure about us ; but thi s perio d o f hesitation soo n passe d ... There grew up between Bevin and his officials, both at home an d abroad , a relationship o f mutual confidence and esteem which had th e happiest effec t upo n th e work of the Service.' 4 The Service had reaso n to be happy. The y enjoye d what was from thei r poin t o f view the idea l division of labour. The Foreign Secretar y controlled th e styl e of policy, th e Foreign Office controlle d it s substance. Watching Ernie Bevin arrive at Potsdam, tunelessl y humming th e 'Re d Flag,' or listening to one of his fabled interventions - ' I don't like it. I don't like it . When you ope n tha t Pandora' s box , yo u will find it full o f Trojan 'orses' one might hav e supposed that, a t long last, a real change was under way. One would have been wrong. The voice was the voice of Jacob, but th e hands were the hands of Esau. Jacob was a plain man , as the Bibl e says, and Esau a cunning hunter; and it was in the cunnin g hands of Whitehall that Britis h foreig n policy remained . There i t was kept intact, safe, unaltered . It mad e so little difference whethe r Anthon y Eden o r Ernest Bevi n was in charge of th e Foreign Office tha t a n opposition criti c noted th e fac t in the House o f Commons soon afte r Bevi n took over : We were told i n the electio n fro m th e platform s of hon. Gentleme n opposit e that thei r retur n woul d create a new world .. . Well, we have now had a fortnight o f th e ne w world and certainly in the ne w worl d there ar e still some familiar speeches . The right hon. Gentleman , the Foreig n Secretary , in tha t splendid speec h he made ... which was acclaimed in all parts of the House , made me wonder whether in his spare tim e .. . he had not bee n dipping into that brillian t ol d play, "Th e Importanc e of Being Anthony."5 3 Hug h Dalton, Memoirs, I , Call Back Yesterday (Muller , London 1953) , 237 4 Lor d Strang , Home an d Abroad (Andr é Deutsch , Londo n 1956) , 29 5 5 Quote d i n Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Cassell, London 1960) , 6. The speake r was Mr Oliver Stanley .

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127

He might just a s well. He was reading from a Foreign Offic e brief . Finally ther e i s the example , no t ye t complete , o f George Brown. Few men, i n the lon g history o f the Foreign Office , hav e taken charg e of it wit h such eviden t determinatio n no t t o be take n captiv e by it . ' I a m the Foreig n Secretary,' George Brown declared soon afte r becomin g Foreign Secretary, but I am a n ordinary man , selected t o represen t them b y ordinar y people . An d I intend t o tal k an d behav e abou t everythin g in a way tha t ordinar y peopl e ca n understand. Why should I start wearing striped pants and behavin g like a stuffe d shirt? There' s to o muc h stripe d pants and stuffe d shir t attitud e in international relations still, and no good it' s doin g anybody . Foreig n polic y i s about people , about ho w people ar e trying to b e happy, tryin g to avoi d bein g wretched , groping forward to th e da y when on e nation's security isn' t bein g purchased by th e subjectio n o f another , whe n men wil l live with men a s their Maker intended the m t o live , not a s animals in the jungle ... When I say "striped pants," I've got nothin g agains t men wearin g stripe d pants an d black jackets if they wan t to .. . It's th e wearin g of striped pant s in the sou l I object to , an d having a Homburg hat wher e your heart ough t t o be ... 6 What a splendid cree d fo r a foreign minister! What brave words thes e are ! Ho w long, one wonders, before they hav e to be forgotten, before they have to b e eaten? Or before their autho r is compelled t o retir e from th e scene ? History teaches no t to o long. 7 Some foreig n ministers, despairing of refor m by precep t an d persuasion, attempt t o refor m by restructurin g the apparatu s of foreign policy s o as to mak e it more productive o f ideas. This approach ha s especially commende d itsel f t o American practitioner s o f foreign policy, an d finds it s clearest manifestatio n in th e creation , i n 1947 , o f th e Policy Plannin g Staf f i n the State Department . In every foreign servic e officer ther e i s a foreign policy planner , struggling to b e free . Scratch a liberal, Dicey remarke d fifty year s ago, and you'l l fin d a socialist: scratc h a diplomatist, and you'll find th e frustrate d artist o f som e grand design . Talk t o him abou t his work and , if he's a t all candid, he'll tel l you tw o contradictor y things . The firs t thin g to emerg e i s his scepticism . There's n o suc h thin g as originality i n foreign policy, he'll say . There's noth ing new under th e sun . The enterprise i s to keep afloat. What matters mos t is 6 'Wh y I Am What I Am: Georg e Brown th e Foreig n Secretary Explains Himself t o Kenneth Harris,' The Observer, 1 4 Aug. 1966 7 Fourtee n months, as it turne d out; George Brown resigned from th e Foreig n Offic e on 1 5 Mar. 196 8

128 Diplomacy and its discontents

the next twenty-fou r hours. Ideas have thei r place , but no t i n his place. Perhaps he'll compare th e planner in foreign policy t o th e boastful pilo t who reassures an apprehensive captain tha t h e needn' t worr y tha t hi s ship is moving too fas t into port . 'I know ever y rock i n this harbour,' says he, confidentl y - an d just a s he say s it, there' s a tremendous crash a s the ship shatter s on a reef. 'You see?,' he says - 'there' s one of them now. ' But beneat h thi s sceptical veneer , if you ca n only ge t at it, i s somethin g very different. If the foreig n service officer i s contemptuous o f th e idea s of others, he yearn s for the opportunit y t o produce ideas of his own. He yearns for i t because in the ordinar y cours e of his duties he has so little tim e fo r it . It's al l crisis managing and crash-programming , making policy o n th e cables , making policy a t th e elevent h hour. Th e affair s o f state ar e like an emergency ward o n a rainy night, statesme n lik e its harried internes . 'Thei r principal effort,' Dea n Acheson ha s testified, 'goes into dealin g with th e overpowerin g present, the presen t which, lik e th e Mississippi in ful l flood , absorb s the whol e energy an d though t o f thos e wh o ma n th e levies.' This i s how i t is, but thi s is not, a s Acheson says , how i t ought t o be : The trut h i s that i n foreign affairs manhour s spent i n thinking and plannin g on future actio n ar e by fa r the most profitable investment. The thundering presen t becomes so soon th e unchangeabl e past tha t seizin g it at an y moment o f its acceleration i s as dangerous as mounting a train gathering speed .. . Every birdshooter know s that yo u mus t lead your bird an d swing with its flight ... The true problem lies in determining the emergin g future and th e polic y appropri ate t o it. 8 All thi s being so, how muc h mor e satisfactor y it would be i f there coul d some how b e built int o th e polic y machin e som e haven for reflection, a meditatio n room fo r statesmen , a group of gifted foreign service personnel who , liberate d from day-to-da y chores of operation s and housekeeping, coul d spen d thei r time thinkin g about foreig n affair s i n their broadest aspect s and in thei r longest range. The Policy Planning Council, formerly the Policy Plannin g Staff, of th e American State Departmen t conforms precisely to thes e specifications . Over its twenty-year history, begu n under the chairmanshi p of George Kennan, it has attracted to it s ranks men of luminous intelligence and great abilit y - Kennan himself, Louis Halle, Paul Nitze, John Patón Davies , Charles Burton Marshall, Walt Rostow, Henr y Owen. The Council, accordin g to a former member , 8 'Th e President and th e Secretar y of State,' in Don K. Price, éd., The Secretary o f State (Prentice-Hall , Englewood Cliffs 1960) , 4 7

Inertia and innovation 12 9

remains one o f th e fe w places where ther e i s a chance t o observ e an d asses s the nation's position alon g the whole fron t o f military and foreign polic y to plac e what we are doing and tryin g to d o in the lon g sweep of history ... This job i s done i n a setting where the member s of th e Counci l ar e each en gaged o n a few critical issues and d o no t hav e to bea r th e heavy burden of day-to-day operations. 9 It sound s like a terrific idea . Here is what i s wrong with it . For th e Policy Planning Council t o be an y good, it s members have to be extraordinarily good - a s on the whole the y hav e been. But good peopl e are in short suppl y - eve n in Washington. What happens t o th e fin e mind s who are told t o repai r to th e sevent h floor of the Stat e Departmen t an d there t o brood abou t th e futur e i s that the y ar e in extraordinarily keen deman d t o act about th e present . Everything in the polic y proces s conspires t o plac e a premium upo n an d attach priorit y t o th e shor t run . Let th e future take car e of itself. Let th e futur e g o hang itself . So what happens t o th e ide a man on th e seventh floor? His phone rings . That's what happens . It' s th e Secretary o f State o n th e line , perhaps the President himself. 'There's a meeting in the Oval Room i n half a n hour,' the gruf f voic e says authoritatively. Who in such circumstances would dar e to sa y he coul d no t com e fo r any reason, let alon e that he had t o finis h reading Thucydides' account o f how Pericles put th e case for wa r against the Peloponnesians? Never mind that th e polic y plannin g councillor coul d hardl y find readin g more relevan t for th e defenc e of the policie s of th e administration : he ma y b e forgive n fo r supposing that it s chie f execu tive migh t fai l t o appreciat e its relevance. And s o he close s his book an d call s for hi s taxi. A month, si x weeks later, he return s to hi s office an d finds Thucydides ope n befor e him a t page eighty-four. H e wonders why. Secondly, th e Policy Plannin g Council is a committee. A very exalted com mittee, t o be sure , but a committee nonetheless . A committee i s no plac e fo r innovation. A committee conduce s to inertia . It doesn' t creat e ideas: i t con sumes ideas. Th e idea l committe e man,' Henry Kissinger has written, 'doe s not mak e his associates uncomfortable. He does no t operat e with idea s to o far outsid e o f what i s generally accepted. The thrus t of committee s i s toward a standard o f averag e performance.'10 If th e Policy Plannin g Council has o n occasion succeede d i n moving beyond an d abov e that standard, i t i s in spite of its format, no t becaus e of it . 9 W.W . Rostow, The Plannin g of Foreign Policy, ' in E.A.J. Johnson, éd. , The Dimensions of Diplomacy (John s Hopkins Press, Baltimore 1964), 45 10 Th e Necessity fo r Choice (Harpe r & Brothers, New York 1960) , 34 5

130 Diplomac y and its discontent s

Finally, th e Policy Plannin g Council is composed, for th e mos t part , of foreign servic e officers. Of abl e and imaginative foreign service officers, to b e sure, but foreig n service officers nonetheless . Scratch a foreign servic e officer , as I have said, an d you wil l find beneath th e veneer of his scepticism th e frus trated artis t of a grand design. But thi s is not t o sa y his grand designs are any good. He may think he has it in him, h e may think he's o n the ball : chances are he's muc h mistaken . Intellec t grown rusty with disuse , imagination grown torpid wit h slumbe r over years, will no t suddenl y spring up, lambent an d alive, to d o thei r owner' s bidding. And, afte r year s of toiling in the diplo matic underbrush, intellect an d imagination are all too likel y t o have grown rusty an d torpid . Th e trainin g and lif e o f a foreign service officer, ' Dea n Acheson remarks , are not ap t t o produce men well fitted fo r th e tas k [o f innovatin g policy] .. . The bureaucrati c routine throug h whic h foreig n service officers mus t go produces capable men, knowledgeable about specifi c parts o f the world , and excellent diplomatic operators . Bu t it makes men cautiou s rather tha n imagina tive .. . And he recall s that th e thre e grea t innovative achievements of his own tenure as Secretary o f State - th e Marshall Plan, th e Fulbright Program, and Point Four - were conceive d an d developed b y outsiders - 'me n whose trainin g and experience wer e broader than th e State Department mil l provided.' 11 Presiden t Kennedy had a similar experience. 'The y never have any ideas over there,' he complained, 'neve r com e u p with anything ne w ... The Stat e Departmen t i s a bowl o f jelly.'12 You can' t restructure a bowl of jelly. Such , a t any rate, was the conclusio n a t which Joh n Kennedy arrive d after a year or s o of vainly attempting t o squeez e out o f th e Policy Planning Council a reasonable quota o f ideas . Being incapable of dispensing with ideas , he sough t idea s from othe r sources . The profession s had let him down: perhap s th e amateurs could hel p him out . Th e bureaucracy had failed : perhaps th e academy could succeed . Fo r wher e more natura l t o look fo r ne w ideas, for creativity , for innovation , tha n t o th e grea t universities of America, the powerhouse s of its intellect? The President had but t o sna p his fingers an d the intellectuals cam e running. From Harvard , mostly, though no t fro m Harvar d only. Down the y 11 Acheson , 'The President and th e Secretary of State,' 48-9 12 Quote d i n Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr, A Thousand Days: John F . Kennedy i n th e White House (Houghto n Mifflin, Bosto n 1965), 40 6

Inertia and innovation 131

streamed, th e fres h young men of the New Frontier, bright-eye d an d bushy tailed, supremel y confiden t i n the abilit y o f their brain-powe r to get America moving again. Did they get it moving? And t o an y useful purpose ? It may be still to o soo n t o tell . Those vibran t thousand days , thos e glittering thousand nights , th e radiant company , th e vaunted style, are too clos e t o place i n historical perspective , too brigh t i n our memory fo r dispassionat e appraisal. But, when th e tim e come s for judgment, I will guess that th e experi ment wil l be judged a failure. That th e President, instead o f putting th e intel lectuals t o work o n foreig n policy, would have done bette r t o have left the m where the y were . The propositio n tha t intellectuals are sources of ideas is plausible enough . Less plausible is the proposition tha t yo u will garner intellectuals, and wit h them their ideas , by scourin g the academies . I do no t sa y it is impossible fo r an intellectual t o surviv e in the environmen t of the moder n university : I onl y say that it i s damnably an d increasingly difficul t for him t o survive . Irving Howe has drawn ou r attentio n t o th e way in which 'th e vocabulary of academic statesmanshi p - th e university should b e "pluralist" in outlook, "mod erate" in tone, "responsible " to the community, "alert" to the national inter est - helps t o blend th e university into the surrounding landscape an d thereby to ro b i t of its reason for existenc e ... The universit y becomes a place o f mediocre efficiency , a busy middlema n of culture , a training school fo r th e professions, a center o f usable research.' 13 To tur n to suc h a place fo r personnel , in preference to existin g personnel , is to exchang e King Log for King Stork . In fac t th e trade' s les s advantageous than that : all you ge t is the bureaucratic mentality without th e bureaucratic experience. To assum e that when th e statesma n turns to th e academi c man fo r help in foreign policy , h e turn s to th e intellectual typ e of academic man rathe r tha n to his own typ e o f academic man, is to assum e a great deal an d I thin k to o much. Surel y what he looks fo r is his own type - a known quantity, a recognizable quantity , someon e whos e method s he can understand, someone , there fore, he ca n trust. Applying these criteri a of selection, th e statesma n recruit s to his cause not a n intellectual but a n operator, no t a scholar but a n entrepreneur. Having at his disposal th e ful l arra y of the nation' s intellect , President Kennedy picke d a s the head o f his White House staff the dea n o f art s at Harvard University. McGeorge Bundy was exactly th e sort o f man he wanted . Kennedy tol d his friends tha t Bund y was the secon d brightes t ma n he had ever known. (Doubtles s he woul d have picked th e brightes t ha d David Ormsby13 Steady Work: Essays i n the Politics of Democratic Radicalism, 1953-1966 (Harcouit , Brace an d World, New York 1966) , 10 9

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Gore no t alread y been o n th e payrol l o f a foreign power. ) 'Bund y possesse d dazzling clarity an d spee d o f mind,' a close associat e ha s said o f him, 'a s well as great distinction o f manne r an d unlimite d self-confidence. ' I t ma y wel l b e so. Yet non e o f thes e qualities , s o desirable in a governmental trouble-shooter , are th e essentia l qualities of th e intellectual . But thi s is only par t of the problem . Not onl y doe s the statesma n prefe r a certain typ e o f mind, when h e turn s to th e academie s fo r help; he prefer s a mind wit h a certain point o f view. The close r thi s is to his own, th e bette r i t is to his liking. For th e typica l statesma n i s less tha n candi d abou t th e kind o f help he' s lookin g for . He's no t lookin g fo r criticism . He' s lookin g fo r endorsation. He doesn't wan t th e intellectua l to tel l him wha t i s wrong. He wants him to tel l th e worl d tha t al l is right. He wants the imprimateu r of intellect, no t it s condemnation. I f he is exceptionally obtuse , he wil l even deny th e intellectua l his primary role. Th e responsibl e intellectual, ' President Johnson declare d at Princeton Universit y in May 1966 , 'wh o moves between his campus and Washington knows , above all, that his task is , in the languag e of th e curren t generation, t o "cool it."' Now ther e i s news for Socrates. And here is news fo r President Johnson . The responsible intellectual wil l not mov e between his campus and Washington. He will sta y o n his campus. He will sa y to thos e who see k t o lure him fro m i t what Archimede s sai d t o th e intrudin g Roman soldier : 'D o not distur b my circles.' 14 Let us , however, assume that th e statesman does see k ou t th e intellectua l rather tha n th e operator , an d tha t th e intellectua l responds t o th e call . What sort of help i s he likel y t o b e t o th e statesma n i n his quest fo r ne w ideas in foreign policy ? This depends, t o begi n with, o n his terms of employment. I f he i s engaged half-time, part-time, he's no t likel y t o be much help. The part-time helper can not b e expected t o exert , doe s no t i n fac t exert , that cumulativ e and unremitting pressure by whic h alon e idea s are transformed into policy . 'You canno t come i n and ou t o f government, on a week-end, I'll-write-you-a-letter basis,' McGeorge Bundy has testified, 'and expec t you r opinion s t o hav e th e kind o f impact whic h i n your sens e o f virtue and o f Tightnes s you thin k the y deserve to have upon th e proces s of government... Nobody eve r mad e a lasting con tribution t o government by one visit to Washington.' 15 Or , indeed, t o Ottawa . For th e intellectua l this is bad news . He does not, o f course, expect - i f he has any worldl y wisdom a t all - tha t th e policy communit y wil l fal l al l over 14 A rejoinde r firs t suggeste d b y Han s J. Morgenthau ; see his essay, Trut h an d Power ' in Truth an d Power: Essays o f a Decade, 1960-1970 (Praeget , Ne w Yor k 1970) , 15 15 Th e Scientis t and National Policy,' in Sanford A . Lakoff, éd., Knowledge an d Power: Essays o n Science and Government (Fre e Press, New York 1966) , 42 3

Inertia and innovation 13 3

itself in admiration o f whatever panacea he happens t o tak e ou t o f his brief case, or that th e busines s of government will be abandoned so that his own project wil l receive top priority . Still, he may well expect tha t afte r a week or two, a month a t most, o f patient expositio n o n his part, the key men wil l have been convinced, th e memoranda circulated, th e proper phone call s made so that, his mission accomplished , he ca n return in triumph t o his laboratory or library. But t o expec t eve n that much is to expec t muc h too much . 'Wha t really bends the processes of government' - it is McGeorge Bundy's testimony agai n - 'i s continuous, sustained , and intensive effort, generall y uncertain a t the beginning of what its exact fina l outcom e wil l be, always responsive to th e situation a s it is, and continuously awar e of the nee d t o be on top o f that situation , and no t o f some abstrac t pla n of what it ought t o be , or was when one onc e knew it, o r would be if only th e people in Washington had mor e sense.' 16 Government, it seems , is a kind o f inert mass upon which impressio n may b e made only by constan t an d unremitting pressure, by th e reiteratio n o f ideas, by unrelenting advocacy, by constan t repetition , as in the Chinese water torture . And fo r th e intellectual nothin g coul d b e more distasteful than thi s mindless goading of th e great beast o f bureaucracy. It offend s his esthetic. I t i s alien t o his habits o f work. It run s counter t o his cast of mind. The intellectual hate s to repeat himself. Repetitio n bore s him. H e wants to get on with th e job. Th e job i s to create , not t o convert ; to innovate, not t o instruct. That is why, even within th e nativ e habitat o f the academy , the intellectual is often unsatisfactory a s a teacher. Outside hi s native habitat, i n the alie n jungle o f bureaucracy, he i s worse than unsatisfactory. He is hopeless. It woul d be hard enoug h if the mas s were merely inert, the dead-weight merely dead. But bureaucracy is not just passively uncaring of outsiders in its midst. It i s unalterably hostile towards them. Especially the diplomatic bu reaucracy. Here is no simpl e trade union exclusivity . Its baleful resentmen t of hands hired fro m collatera l pursuits is more tha n th e norma l jealousy of a profession anxiou s to kee p it s ranks free fro m the meddlin g of trifler s an d amateurs. It i s as if some invadin g trib e were attempting the destructio n of it s totem. Dean Acheson alway s writes with acerbity , but h e save s his special scorn t o pour upo n thos e 'correspondents, legislators, som e academicians, and most Ne w York lawyers over forty' t o whom 'foreig n affair s ar e an open book , though they ofte n diffe r o n the meaning of the text' 17 - implyin g clearly enough tha t th e republi c would not b e gravely imperilled if for som e reason 16 Ibid .

17 Acheson , The Presiden t an d the Secretary o f State,' 43

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the service s of these interloper s were no longer availabl e to it . The officia l history o f the Britis h Foreign Offic e observe s disparagingly of Churchill 'that th e Prime Minister... listened to o readil y t o th e opinion s o f a few advisers of whose opportunities fo r obtainin g ful l evidenc e the Foreig n Offic e wa s less sure.'18 Confronted b y a n environment as inhospitable t o his presence as it is unyielding before his argument, the wise outsider will quickly conclud e that t o help part-tim e is to help not a t all. He may return, sadder if not wiser , to th e retreat from whence h e came , where we need follo w him no longer. Or he may decide t o commi t hi s intellect full-time . He gets his leave of absence and signs on fo r th e duration . As full-time help t o government he stand s a better chance, but stil l his chances aren't to o good. Eithe r he' s accepte d b y the bureaucracy, or not. If he's no t accepted , he's n o better of f than hi s part-time associate - thoug h he costs the taxpaye r more . I f he is accepted b y th e bureaucracy, it's becaus e he's bee n won ove r to its ethos, or that he wrap s it around him a s a form of protective colouration . So the outside r becomes an insider, th e would-be fount o f innovation part o f the apparatu s of inertia. He came to stir thing s up; he stay s to cal m thing s down. There ma y be new ideas in foreign policy, but the y will not com e fro m him . So the statesma n i s unlikely t o mak e bureaucracy as he find s it into a cockpi t for innovation , o r t o be able t o make i t over for that purpose. He is unlikely, too, t o draw new ideas from outsid e help. Then wher e on earth ar e his ideas to com e from? The answe r is simple. They ar e to com e fro m hi s own mind. He has t o think the m u p himself. A statesman incapable of innovation on his own is incapable o f statecraf t o n his own. A statesman incapable of statecraf t shoul d find himself anothe r job . [January 1967 ]

18 Woodward , British Foreign Policy i n th e Second World War, xliv

6

Force and impotence Foreign minister s can make their ow n foreig n policies, eve n if they sa y the y can't. There, in a sentence, i s my argumen t thu s far. If foreign ministers are ignorant, they ca n always acquire knowledge. If the y can' t forese e the future , they ca n always plan fo r it s contingencies. I f the y can' t extrac t idea s fro m their bureaucracies , they ca n at least thin k fo r themselves . Now I must fac e a further difficulty. Suppose ou r foreig n minister t o b e as knowledgeable, as far-sighted, as imaginative, as it i s possible fo r anyon e t o be. But suppos e tha t th e countr y fo r whose foreig n affairs h e i s responsible is a weak country . Suppos e that th e resource s of his community ar e insufficien t to sustai n the sort s of policies he would lik e t o initiate on its behalf. Suppose its ore-reserves exhausted, it s gold reserve s depleted, its industry inefficient , its army ineffective; suppose it s institutions are in disarray and its people n o longer care . What then ma y a foreign minister d o t o sav e his country and his reputation? We may a s well concede a t once tha t he can' t do a s much fro m positions o f extreme weaknes s as he migh t fro m positions o f great strength. The exercis e of sovereignty' s a costly exercise . There's n o point pretendin g it isn't so . There was once a time - an d it wasn't lon g ago - when th e paraphernalia of statecraf t were few and didn't cos t yo u ver y much. France paid Rousseau a few francs weekly to represen t her in Venice - and , to judge by what he say s in his Confessions, h e overcharge d at that . Today, severa l hundred millions a year - francs , roubles , dollars, pounds - hardly begi n to pay for the equipment. For a start yo u nee d a n intelligence network . It nee d no t b e as elaborate as the Central Intelligence Agency. But i t should b e large enough t o b e able t o

136 Diplomacy and its discontents

report upo n goings-on in those parts of the world o f interest t o you. And thi s costs money, which mos t government s can ill afford t o spend . Som e spen d i t all the same - often , it must be admitted, mor e to buy prestige than t o buy intelligence. A few - a very few - buy what intelligenc e they think the y can afford. The governmen t of Ghana has just decide d i t can no longer affor d t o maintain abou t half o f its missions abroad an d has accordingl y close d down its embassies and legations in twenty different countries, including China, Cuba, Zambia, and North Vietnam. Even wealthy countrie s will hesitate, on account o f the cost , to exercis e their righ t of legation a s fully a s their foreign ministers would like the m to . In 1960 , th e Canadian foreign minister was asked i n parliament whether ther e was 'any likelihood o f any mission being established i n Baghdad.' Mr Howard Green replied: This is a mission I would like very much t o have established, and there ar e others too I would lik e t o have established, but i n getting these wishes carried out, I always run fou l of the Treasury Board.'1 Then ther e i s the bil l for propaganda . This is also steep. Even a weekly news-letter, ground out o n the embass y duplicator and sent ou t b y secondclass mail, costs something ove r the years. But fe w countries are content wit h so modest a programme. The mor e ramshackle thei r economy, it sometimes seems, the mor e elaborate their publi c relations, as if to concea l th e extent o f their dilapidation fro m th e res t of the world. And wher e th e object i s to subvert one's neighbours, rather than to keep up with one's neighbours, th e bill is really steep. Public relations becomes psychological warfare. All too easil y governments become embroile d in a kind o f arm s race of th e airwaves , in which th e weapons are shortwave transmitters and the apparatus , hardly less expensive, for jamming shortwave transmissions. It woul d be instructive to know how much th e government of th e United Arab Republic spends on radio propaganda. Economic warfare i s costlier still . In economic warfare, you tr y t o fortif y your foreig n polic y by economic manipulation s - manipulation s intended t o confound th e politics and frustrat e th e knavish tricks of enemies and rivals. And s o you hoar d currency , in the hope o f being able to dum p it o n th e market fo r foreig n exchange a t a moment calculate d t o embarras s and dismay . You hois t you r tarif f an d raise your quota. You refus e t o buy an d you refus e to sell . You giv e foreig n aid , and you withhol d foreig n aid . This is all very expensive. Too expensiv e for th e weak. The firs t foreig n policy decisio n o f th e newly independent state of Lesotho (formerl y Basutoland) was to refus e t o join i n the sanction s against Rhodesia. 'W e cannot expose [our ] precariou s 1 Canada , House o f Commons Debates, 1 5 July 1960 , 6377- 8

Force and impotence 137

economy,' Chief Jonathan explained t o Harold Wilson , 'to the dangers of economic sanctions. ' There are those who conten d tha t the British econom y itsel f is too precariou s to expose t o th e danger s of economic sanctions . An d it may be stil l to o soo n t o sa y that the y are wrong. Finally, we come t o th e fa r end of th e spectrum o f coercion, t o th e military underpinning of diplomacy, t o th e regio n where arms and influence interact. Her e is a region which no t eve n th e humblest member of the state s system has been able to leav e alone . And o f course th e deploymen t o f force, even when th e scal e is token an d th e purpos e ceremonial , i s a charge upon th e national purse , a drain upon th e nationa l economy . Moun t a guard of honour: there wil l be bills for dry cleanin g and fo r pensions. Maintain , for th e sam e purpose, a nuclear capability - th e warheads, the delivery systems, all the accessories of atomic armamen t whic h come optional a t extra cost : th e bil l will be i n billions. Ask any Britis h taxpayer . It i s by deployin g these variou s instruments of statecraft without wincin g at the effor t o r folding in the attempt tha t states acquir e th e name an d reputation o f great powers. I t i s by deploying the m withou t countin g th e cost , or seeming to - i n the spirit of IP. Morgan who, aske d by an envious friend abou t the upkee p of his yacht, replie d that i f one had t o as k about i t one couldn' t afford i t - tha t grea t powers acquire th e name and reputation of super-powers. The super-powe r club is an exclusive club. Its prospectiv e membershi p i s more tha n a hundred. Its actual membership is two. And eve n two stretche s it a bit. Only th e United State s pay s the due s with the requisit e degree of nonchalance. The Sovie t Union pays like a navvy in a night club . Oh, he'll meet the ta b alright . He'll sho w th e toff s he' s go t th e wad. So he pay s in cash and over-tips. It cost s him a month's wages. It leave s him re d of face an d breathing hard. Still, he doe s pay - an d plenty. The Soviet defence bill is $ 16 billion this year. (The Unite d States' is $70 billion. ) Now w e come t o a paradox. The parado x consist s in the fac t tha t it i s precisely th e United State s and the Soviet Union - th e big-time spenders of international society - tha t see m to be experiencing the most difficult y attainin g their respective national purposes, achieving their respective national goals . For al l their power, th e great power s seem incapable of making their wa y in the world a s they woul d like t o do. For al l their superiority , the super-powers seem incapable of making over the worl d a s they would lik e it to be . Suppose yo u wer e in the positio n o f Mr Kosygin, or o f Mr Bhreznev, or of whatever member of th e collectivit y of leadership i s currently decisive in th e making of Soviet foreign policy . Fo r wha t immediat e achievement woul d yo u wish t o b e gratefully remembere d by th e Russia n people? I would thin k a s the man who , afte r twent y years of failure , finally destroye d th e spectr e of a re-

138 Diplomacy and its discontents

militarized Reic h read y onc e agai n to lunge at the east , thi s tim e wit h atomi c weapons. Wh y then would you no t sig n a treaty prohibitin g th e proliferatio n of nuclear weapons, a s at least a first ste p toward s a secure an d peacefu l Europe? Surel y thi s is as much a goal o f Soviet polic y a s it is of an y policy . An d yet n o Soviet foreig n minister has so far seemed abl e to tak e tha t step . Conversely, what abov e everything else woul d yo u labou r t o preven t i f not th e prospect - th e incredible, almos t bizarr e prospect - o f a shooting wa r with the other great membe r o f th e communis t camp ? Yet, i n 1967 , less than twent y years after th e signin g of th e Sino-Sovie t Treat y o f Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, Communist Chin a an d Soviet Russi a are virtually a t war. Nor i s the recen t recor d o f the United State s an y better tha n this . Whatever American foreig n policy ma y have been , it was not designe d t o brin g about th e communis t take-ove r on Cuba, th e destruction o f North Atlanti c unity, leas t o f all that bitter, brutal, deteste d confrontatio n o n the rimlan d o f Asia against which ever y strategist, hawk o r dove , has warned ever y administra tion, Republican o r Democratic. Certainl y Presiden t Johnso n and his advisers, as they vie w with ill-conceale d disma y th e wreckage o f a policy which , afte r two years of air bombardment an d th e deployment o f a land arm y o f mor e than 300,00 0 men, has not ye t bee n abl e to bring a tiny Asian natio n t o surrender, may with reaso n b e tempted t o believe, with Machiavelli, 'that worldly events are so governed b y fortun e tha t me n canno t b y thei r prudenc e chang e them,' and so 'judge i t t o be useless to toi l much abou t them. ' What is it, then, condemnin g thes e grea t powers - power s judged great by every inde x sav e tha t of achievement itself - t o s o sorry a record o f failure an d frustration? Befor e tryin g to answe r that question I must firs t sa y somethin g of the natur e o f power . Adam Smit h onc e wrot e a book, which he calle d Th e Wealth o f Nations. An d there i s nothing wron g with that . The wealth o f nations, lik e th e wealt h o f individuals, may b e ascertained b y an y qualified accountant . Wealth y states, lik e wealthy individuals , are rich by virtu e o f having in their possessio n certai n assets - negotiabl e securities , marketable currencies, saleable commodities , exploitable potentialitie s - greatly i n excess of the per capita averag e in their respective societies . S o it becomes possibl e t o ran k state s on th e basi s of thei r wealth. A t on e end of the scal e you hav e the Jukes familie s o f th e internationa l system - th e problem poor , seemingl y alway s with us. At the other en d are its Rockefellers an d its Gettys, it s Lady Docker s and its Lady Batons . We know o f these individual s that, unquestionabl y wealthy a s they are , they ar e not necessaril y powerful . Wealth may be a means to power ; it is no guarantee of power. I t ma y be so among th e Kwakiutl Indians, but i t is not s o among us. Nor i s it so among th e member s of th e internationa l system.

Force and impotence 13 9

This simple perception has for to o lon g been obscured by th e notions o f geopolitics. Th e geopolitical interpretation s of international societ y ar e varied; but the y al l hold on e syllogis m to be self-evident. The power o f states , so the geopoliticians insist , is a function of their physica l strength . Physical strengt h could b e measured, more o r less exactly, by takin g inventories of it s various components. Progress in the infan t scienc e o f international politic s therefor e consisted i n making more refined an d exact calculation s of th e ratio s of power. The earl y measurements of power were crude affairs , featuring what ha s been terme d th e fallac y o f the singl e factor. In the eighteent h centur y the physiocratic schoo l fastened on th e facto r o f bullion, prescribin g the hoarding of gold a s the mean s to power . Voltaire i s said to have remarked that God is on th e sid e of the bigges t battalions, fro m whic h a later generation o f strategists derived the propositio n tha t God i s on th e sid e of the bigges t standing army. Or, as Winston Churchill once thought , on th e sid e o f the bigges t standing navy. 'For conside r these ships,' he wrot e of the Royal Navy o n th e ev e of battle in th e Firs t World War: On the m .. . floated the might, majesty , dominio n an d power o f the Britis h Empire. All our long history buil t u p centur y afte r century , all our great affairs i n every part o f th e globe , all the mean s of our faithful , industrious , active population, depende d on them . Open th e sea-cock s and let them sin k beneath th e surfac e .. . and, in a few minutes, half an hour a t th e most, th e whole outloo k o f th e worl d would be changed. 2 Geopolitics prope r got its name fro m th e identification o f power no t s o much with specia l source s of wealth or specia l kinds of weapons systems as with particular regions of the world. Among the earliest geopoliticians though h e would no t have recognized th e term - w e must place Lor d Curzon, for hi s argument that 'as long a s we rul e India , we are the greates t Power i n th e world. If we lose it , we shall dro p straigh t awa y to a third-rate power.' That was perhaps a natural thing fo r a viceroy of India to say . But Si r Halford Mackinder, who sai d muc h th e sam e thin g in more pseudo-scientific language, was not s o occupationally biase d a s was Curzon. It wa s Mackinder who developed an d publicized th e celebrate d doctrine : 'Wh o rules East Europe com mands the Heartland; who rule s the Heartland command s th e World-Island; who rule s the World-Island commands th e World.' Heady stuff for would-be conquerors. Th e line o f descent fro m Mackinder to Hitler, via the Germa n geopolitician Kar l Haushofer, is clear and direct. Nor wa s it Hitler who prove d Mackinder wrong. The Re d Army proved Hitle r wrong. 2 Th e World Crisis (Odham s Press, London 1923) , 123- 4

140 Diplomacy and its discontents

So it was that geopolitics, fa r from discredite d b y th e Secon d Worl d War, acquired a new lease on life. A new school o f geopoliticians - on e might cal l them th e neo-geopoliticians - les s doctrinaire, less ideological in their approac h than their predecessors , tightened thei r grip upon th e theor y o f the state s system. Into th e calculatio n of the migh t of nations they fe d new variables and fresh components . Firs t cam e the fuel s an d technique s of th e secon d industrial revolution: t o posses s pools o f petroleum, fields o f natural gas, iron ore , and uranium ore, was to possess the ingredient s of power. These, and industrial capacity . Abov e all , industrial capacity. For wha t had bee n demonstrated by th e Second Worl d War if not tha t victory had gone to th e biggest mass producers rather tha n t o the biggest battalions? Th e atomic bomb ma y have defeated Japan , bu t Hitler' s armie s had lost to th e arsenals of democracy. Not General Montgomery or General Eisenhower, but Henr y Ford an d Henry Kaiser had really won that war - won it on the battlefields of Willow Run and Gary, Indiana. Th e power o f states, hitherto identifie d wit h or e reserves and troo p reserves , was now identified with factor y floor space, machine too l production, kilowatt s generated , engineers graduated. Neo-geopolitics was made i n USA more exactly , made in Princeton, with som e assistance from th e University of Pennsylvania. And fo r Americans, neo-geopolitics was a comforting doctrine; for , on its reckoning, the 'balance of tomorrow' - t o use the title of one of the best known work s in its literature3 - lay securely with th e United States. Or so it seemed at th e time . The post-war generation of students of international politics wa s taught to deal a s well in less tangible components o f national power. After all, it was told, Germany had produce d tank s an d aircraft an d air-breathin g missiles even under th e terribl e pounding of th e Allied air offensive o f 194 3 an d 1944 ; ye t Germany had lost th e war. Was there no t the n somethin g more t o th e powe r of state s tha n thei r capacit y t o sen d men into battle and to keep them supplie d with foo d an d ammunition? Were not th e characte r of thei r peoples , th e quality o f their institutions , th e natur e of their idea s about society , n o less telling ingredients of power tha n ti n o r tungsten , heavy industry, ferrous metallurgy? Which, all else being equal, conferred greater power upon a state - democrati c government or totalitarian government? Dictators coul d cho p an d change witness the Nazi-Soviet Pact - but democracie s (so democrats hopefully sup posed) woul d win out i n the en d by virtue of thei r higher political moralit y and thei r mor e sturd y common sense . Did the pragmati c Anglo-Saxons (if they wer e really more pragmatic ) posses s more power tha n th e more doctri 3 Rober t Strausz-Hupé , The Balance of Tomorrow (O.P . Putnam's Sons , New York 1945)

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naire Russians (if indeed the y wer e more doctrinaire) ? These wer e the kin d of questions t o which th e post-war generation o f students o f international poli tics were encouraged to fin d th e answers . As a member o f that generation, I can recall being convinced, along with th e rest , that th e questions wer e interesting, that the y wer e relevant, that, if you pondere d the m long enoug h an d hard enough , you woul d discover correct answers. And w e were wrong. Hopelessly wrong. For th e whol e exercis e o f addin g up th e component s o f national power and reckoning the powe r of state s on the basis of which one s got th e highest scor e turne d out t o be an exercise in futility. I t trie d to quantify the qualitative, to measure the intangible . I t assumed a coefficient of reductio n where none coul d possibl y exist . It rested on a simple, yet basic , confusion of language. We thought w e were computin g the powe r of nations . What we were really doing was assessing the migh t of nations. We mistook force for power, th e par t fo r th e whole. It wa s a grave mistake. For forc e i s only on e o f the component s o f power. I t i s no longer even th e mos t important , as I shall now tr y t o show . What do we mean when w e say that th e United State s i s a powerful state ? We're not talkin g (if we're a t al l careful o f ou r terminology ) abou t th e resources at th e disposa l o f the United States. What we're talkin g about is the ability of th e United States to have its way with othe r states. Power consist s in having things your way . To have things your own way, it sometimes helps to be strong. But it doesn't alway s help. There ar e other ways of having your way besides pushing people around . Friendly persuasion, for example . And here' s somethin g else . The capacity t o push people aroun d i s not th e same thing as the abilit y to pus h people around . A mighty stat e ma y hesitate to us e its might. Whereas a state deficient in all of the usua l components o f strength may sometime s get its own way , often in the fac e o f greatly superior force. Power an d force , s o far from bein g directly correlated , may eve n be inversely correlated . It ma y so happen tha t t o ad d to your force will diminis h your power. It i s just thi s perplexing consideration which, amon g others , is causing the United States t o hesitate before takin g a decision t o deploy a n anti-missile missile system . That forc e an d power were not th e perfec t correlates all previous strategy had assume d them t o be first becam e apparen t at the tur n o f the twentiet h cen tury. British liberals derided th e siz e of th e expeditionary force sen t out t o crush th e Boer s in South Africa. It wa s like crushing a walnut with a sledgehammer. Bu t fo r a time i t seeme d a s if the walnu t was made o f iron , and th e sledgehammer fatall y flawed, as Smuts and his commandos roame d a t will

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throughout Cap e Colony, sniping , raiding, retreating, escapin g - alway s escaping. With less and les s discrimination th e imperia l sledgehammer flailed about, laying waste t o farm s and villages, livestock an d crops, i n what woul d toda y be described a s a campaign o f defoliation an d the n - a more candi d ag e than ours - wa s described as a campaign of barbarism. Smuts in his diary tell s graphically o f it s results : Last nigh t a t Zandspruit . Dam s everywhere ful l o f rotting animals ; water undrinkable. Vel d covere d wit h slaughtere d herd s o f shee p an d goats , cattle an d horses .. . But th e saddes t sigh t o f al l is the larg e number o f little lambs , stag gering fro m hunge r an d thirs t aroun d th e corpse s o f thei r dead an d mangle d mothers .. . Surely suc h outrage s o n man and nature must mov e t o a certai n doom.4 Smuts was moved b y th e bloo d o f th e lambs . But i t must b e remembered that th e Britis h were guilty o f mor e tha n mer e cruelt y t o animals . B y the tim e the Boer s surrendered, 26,000 of thei r smal l civilia n population ha d perishe d in British concentratio n camps . The due l between sledgehamme r an d walnut turne d int o a contest betwee n Goliath an d David, one t o b e repeated man y time s ove r the next fift y year s and durin g which th e going for Goliath got toughe r al l the time . His clear-cu t victories - lik e thos e o f Stalin ove r the Baltic states, Khrushchev ove r Hungary - wer e obviou s mis-matches, bringin g little credi t t o th e victor. Often hi s victories were far from clear-cu t - lik e thos e of Lloyd Georg e ove r Ireland, Stalin, again, over Finland. An d i n recent years , like a n aging heavyweight, he has begun t o lose. Franc e los t t o Algeria, the United State s t o Cuba. In Vietnam th e fight goe s on, th e outcom e stil l i n doubt. But eve n if, as is by n o mean s certain , the United State s shoul d prevail , it will not emerg e th e victor. Already its reputation fo r power ha s suffered, an d it s reputation fo r magnanimity ha s suffere d severely. A people emergin g from warfar e a s weaklings and bullie s in th e eye s of th e worl d ca n hardly b e said t o have won thei r war . So th e Goliaths of ou r tim e hav e sustaine d shatterin g an d perhaps irreme diable reverse s of thei r fortune . What has brought thes e about ? Wha t reason s are ther e fo r s o drastic a waning i n the capacit y o f might t o attai n th e goal s of policy? Whenc e derives the impotenc e o f force? It derives , I believe, from thre e fact s o f international lif e i n th e secon d hal f of our century . The firs t fact , an d th e foremost , i s the drea d of th e grea t pow ers of thermonuclea r war . 4 Quote d i n W.K. Hancock, Smuts, I, The Sanguine Years, 1870-1919 (Cambridg e University Press, Cambridge 1962) , 137

Force and impotence 14 3

That British government which authorize d it s troops to impriso n th e fami lies of thei r enemy, slaughter thei r livestock, an d burn thei r farm s had n o reason to fea r tha t som e outsid e state, rallying to th e victim s of these atrocities , might obliterate th e Britis h Isles in a devastating assault lasting a few hours, or a few minutes. Half a century late r suc h indifferenc e wa s no longe r possible . As the invadin g Anglo-French army stormed ashor e a t Port Said o n 6 November 1956 , Marsha l Bulganin threatened wha t he called , in a message t o Sir Anthony Eden , 'other means, such a s a rocket techniqu e .. . to crus h the aggressors and t o restor e peace i n the East.' Eden writes in his memoirs that his government considere d th e Soviet threat t o be a bluff which 'nee d no t b e take n literally.' 5 Hi s ambassador in Moscow, summoned t o th e Kremlin in th e early morning t o receiv e th e disconcerting news, was disposed t o trea t it not s o lightly. 'Ther e was,' as the ambassado r recalls he cabled a t onc e to London , an elemen t of bullying bluff i n it. Bu t I was afraid tha t th e Sovie t Government were working themselves up int o a very ugly mood .. . I thought the y migh t ... take some violent independent actio n agains t our force s i n the Middl e Eas t b y submarines or aircraft. 6 Even if , as Sir Anthony Ede n contends , th e Sovie t threa t played n o part i n th e British decisio n t o ceas e thei r fire , it ought t o have played a large part. I t cer tainly playe d a large part in the calculation s of President Kenned y and his advisers at th e tim e o f th e Cuba n missile crisi s six years later. 'W e have won a considerable victory,' Dean Rusk remarke d t o his deputy on 23 October 1962 . 'You an d I are still alive.' 7 The secon d fac t o f modern internationa l lif e accountin g fo r th e impotenc e of forc e an d th e weaknes s of great powers is the natur e of th e onl y kin d o f war great powers are free t o fight . This i s not bi g war, thermonuclear war . It i s little war, guerrilla war. And fo r Great Powers no experience i s more frustrating. It frustrate s no t leas t becaus e the target s are so few, and so fleeting. The American strateg y o f bombing communicatio n route s in North Vietna m would hav e worked fin e ha d th e H o Chi Minh trai l resembled the Pennsylvania Turnpike, the North Vietnamese railwa y system th e New York Centra l system . But an y resemblance i s coincidental. Th e trai l is patched, the line repaired, and th e lorrie s and th e boxcars , th e bicycles an d th e runners , flow on. In guerrilla warfare supplie s can be diverted but rarel y destroyed . 5 Full Órele (Cassell , London I960) , 555 6 Si r William Hayter, The Kremlin and the Embassy (Hodde r and Stoughton, London 1966), 146-7 7 Quote d i n Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Banta m Books, New York & Toronto 1966) , 110

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It frustrates, too, becaus e the enemy knows more abou t what' s going on . After all , it's his country. He may be a stranger from the North. Bu t his home's a few hundred kilometre s distant, a t most, he's fough t i n the delta for years , and he speaks the local dialect - i f not perfectly , at any rate better than th e young American shipped ou t thre e week s ago from Pasadena , who m he is just about t o kill . There's alway s an intelligence gap in these conflict s between great powers and thei r guerrilla opponents, i n which th e great power is invariably disadvantaged. So it was in the Boe r War. So it was in the Iris h War. So it is in the Vietnam War. The thir d fac t from which derive s the impotenc e o f force is the heightene d constraint o f opinion. Th e constrain t o f opinion's nothin g new. What little news trickled back fro m Sout h Africa outrage d British Liberals sixty years ago: had the y been fully awar e of th e extent of atrocity i t might no t hav e been permitted . Lloyd Georg e and Churchill were surely spared humiliatio n by th e Irish delegation' s yielding , in 1921 , to thei r threa t o f 'immediate and terrible war' if it did not mee t thei r terms : th e British public would no t hav e stood fo r suc h a war, and thei r threa t was but a bluff. What is new is modern journalism, and its ability to plac e the new s and images of war before a n audience of unprecedented siz e with unprecedented speed, unprecedente d accuracy , unprecedented vividness. Communications theorists ma y b e left t o debat e amon g themselve s which o f these qualitie s is the mos t decisive . The most dramatic , without question , is television. With its ability t o portra y as it happens th e helicopter-gunships firing o n the villages below, the napal m searin g the jungle, the Marine's cigarette-lighter held a s an incendiary t o th e thatch, television quite properl y receives the lion's share of praise - o r blame - fo r the publicity in which th e Vietnam War is being fought . But th e role of the newspaper, though less dramatic, has been no less telling. With such inquiring reporters as Harrison Salisbury oí The New York Times at large, governments can less easily tha n hitherto protec t themselve s by lying. If trut h is the firs t casualt y of warfare, untruth i s a principal weapon o f warfare. It i s a weapon no longer to be use d with impunity . Great powers are being compelled t o divest themselves of it by great newspapers. Even amon g th e most liberally-minde d of administrations there wil l be found hard-nose d me n prepared t o def y th e opinio n o f all those public s save that whic h need s to be placated s o that the y ma y remain in office. Ther e i s on record th e proceeding s of a meeting of adviser s of th e Kennedy administration , convened to decid e whether o r not t o recommen d th e resumption of testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere . When someone oppose d it , o n th e ground that it would no t fin d favou r wit h world opinion, John J. McCloy, then specia l disarmament advise r to th e President, exploded i n anger. '"World opinion ? I

Force and impotence 14 5

don't believe in world opinion . Th e only thin g tha t matter s i s power. Wha t we have t o d o no w i s to sho w tha t w e are a powerful nation an d not spen d ou r time trailin g after th e phantom o f world opinion."' 8 That view did not prevail . Nor di d it prevail a year later, when man y o f the sam e adviser s urged upon th e President th e wisdom o f a n immediate ai r strike agains t the Cuba n missile sites . Kennedy would no t hav e it. Surprise attack wa s not par t o f the American tradition. I t was ruled out , he said , by ' a decent regar d fo r humanity.' There i s such a thing a s world opinion , an d great powers are increasingly reluctant t o def y it . Especially reluctan t i s the greates t of all great powers. The United State s need s n o outsider t o remind i t t o pay a decent respec t t o th e opinions o f mankind. It s Declaration tell s it to . Its conscience tell s it to. It s people tel l it to. I t i s a nobler countr y fo r that. It i s a weaker countr y fo r that. [January 1967 ]

8 Quote d i n Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F . Kennedy i n the White House (Houghto n Mifflin , Bosto n 1965) , 481-2

7

Weakness an d powe r The waning capacity o f force t o attai n the goals of foreign policy provide s the foreign minister s of great powers with som e excus e fo r failure . An American foreign minister , o r a Russian, may well point t o tha t paradox o f power b y which forc e has been rendere d impotent t o exonerate his far from adequat e performance. But it does not excus e the profession a t large. The obvers e of the impotenc e o f force, which I have discussed, is the potenc y o f weakness , which I now discuss . The paradox o f power operates t o th e advantag e of small states, a s it does t o the disadvantage of the great. Great power s may aptly b e compared t o th e albatross in a poem b y Baudelaire. The albatros s is the mos t majesti c of th e birds. Well may i t tak e a certain consolatory prid e i n its magnificent dimen sions. The sprea d o f its immense wings inspires awe and wonder. But it s wings are too heavy fo r it t o tak e t o th e air . It i s immobilized b y its own weight. An d so it squats , sulle n and disconsolate, les s awesome tha n absurd, as all around i t the smaller birds - puffins an d gulls, cormorants an d terns - whee l an d dip with abandon, snatchin g foo d within it s range, sometimes from its beak. The paradox o f power has made smal l state s int o great states, middle power s into great powers. Their foreig n ministers are less justified tha n ever in seeking con solation i n fatalism an d invoking determinism i n thei r defence . When, at th e dawn of the moder n state s system, Machiavelli presented Lorenzo th e Magnificent with his classic expositio n o f the scop e fo r fre e wil l afforded b y foreig n policy t o thos e sufficiently wise and daring to tak e his advice, there wa s no suc h thin g a s great powers and smal l powers. Lorenzo's uni verse was confined convenientl y t o th e Italia n peninsula , i n which five evenly

Weakness and power 147

matched unit s of power - his own Florence, Naples, Rome, Milan, and Venice - vie d for an ascendancy as fleeting an d unstable as the patter n formed by a kaleidoscope. What went on i n other places was of no accoun t t o them . The realms of north-west Europe, shrouded in fog and mist, went their own way, forming, a s we should no w say , a regional sub-system within the state s system . The Americas , as yet undiscovered , played no par t at al l in the calculation s of statecraft. Wit h th e great civilizations of th e Euphrates and further out i n Asia, some tentativ e contact wa s being made; but i t was contact fo r trade, not fo r diplomacy. Not unti l Perry's black ship s dropped ancho r i n Tokyo Bay , three centuries later, would the lands of the fa r east enter the modern state s system . Their entry , so long delayed, proved disruptive: we are still experiencing the shock. One canno t spea k o f small states without grea t powers to compar e the m to; and th e great power i s a late arrival upon th e international scene. It is not a new species of polity, but a permutation of th e smal l state, severa l of which , more o r less digested, go to mak e it up. B y the en d o f the nineteent h century, the great powers of Europe had al l been formed , with th e Italia n principalities among the last t o disappear. The smal l states, before the Firs t World War, consisted o f thos e regions or enclaves, in and abou t the Europea n system, which fo r on e reason or anothe r had no t bee n absorbe d within th e sovereignt y of a great power. Their relations with th e great powers may be simpl y described. It wa s a relationship of vassalage. Their independence o f action depende d upo n th e wishes of the great powers - no t s o much o f any one of them a s of all of them together . For thi s was the era of the Concert o f Europe, when th e great powers managed the state s system collectively , so as to mak e sur e that thei r individua l peace and prosperity woul d not b e rudely disturbed by unrul y deeds in tin y countries . A small state, in such conditions , coul d hardly be a trouble-maker. Even its internal affairs wer e scrutinized by th e Concert lest som e instability in their capital s a popular uprising , a dynastic dispute - threate n th e stability of the system . The small stat e existe d o n sufferanc e only. But the n so did th e Concert. It was only s o long as the great powers repressed th e desire t o strik e ou t individuall y on thei r own for whatever spoil s their powe r migh t bring them tha t smal l power s could b e kept i n line. When the great powers fell out amon g themselves , th e small powers could tr y t o pla y them of f agains t each other , perhaps to thei r advantage . By the end o f the nineteenth century , th e great powers were falling out amon g themselves . The Concert of Europe gave way t o th e rivalrie s of Europe, in which th e smal l powers became embroiled. Thei r influence , in such a n environment, was great. Their influence wa s the kin d o f influenc e a blackmailer acquire s over a wealthy

148 Diplomacy and its discontents

victim - poten t while i t lasts, but likel y t o be of short duratio n an d to end abruptly i n a manner unpleasan t fo r the m both . Their power, i n such a n environment, was also great. But thei r powe r wa s the kind o f power wielde d by a pyromaniac in a fireworks factory - th e power to blow everybod y up, including himself. I t was a small state, Serbia, which ha s th e distinctio n o f having been th e efficien t caus e of the bloodbat h i n which th e ol d Europe drowne d itself, drenchin g the res t o f the world . By th e tim e th e peacemakers had finishe d thei r work, the smal l stat e had come int o it s own a s never before. What on th e ma p o f nineteenth-centur y Europe ha d bee n exceptional and aberrational became o n the map o f interregnum Europe - Europe between it s wars - typica l an d commonplace. Out of th e empire s of the defeate d powers, the ne w small state s were carved . No master che f coul d hav e so surely arouse d the appetit e o f his ravening customers with morsel s more tast y o r more tempting. Neither too smal l to b e thought worthless no r to o larg e to be thought indigestible , Czechoslovakia and Polan d lay defenceless on thei r platters , until the y wer e devoured . Their powe r con sisted i n what appea l thei r pligh t coul d mak e t o th e conscienc e o f the commu nity. But, like th e scream s of th e political prisoner dragged away t o beatin g and to torture, thei r crie s came to o late to save themselves , too late - almos t to sav e th e communit y whic h the y had sough t t o arouse . I have spoken befor e o f th e lesson s o f history. Here was a lesson th e peace makers after th e Second World War were determined t o learn , and t o apply . They sough t securit y by revivin g the concer t system o f th e earlie r nineteent h century. The four grea t powers - th e 'fou r horsemen, ' as Roosevelt calle d th e governments of Britain and France, the Soviet Union an d America - buil t th e United Nations upon th e cornerston e o f great power hegemony. They , and they alone , should hav e responsibilit y for th e safet y o f the societ y o f nations . They, and they alone , should collectivel y determin e when tha t safet y was imperilled. They, and the y alone , shoul d decid e if, when, and how tha t safet y might b e restored . They create d a Security Council fo r th e purpose , and assigned themselve s commanding an d unassailable positions upon it . They woul d protect smal l powers fro m aggression ; the pric e fo r thei r protectio n wa s that small powers, like smal l children , shoul d b e seen but no t heard . For som e smal l powers this price seemed muc h to o high . And ther e were by thi s time - th e year is 1945 - plent y o f small powers willing and able to raise a ruckus. At Sa n Francisco, wher e th e Bi g Four offere d th e draf t Unite d Nations charte r t o it s prospective membershi p o n a largely take-it-or-leave-i t basis, a few statesmen fro m th e smalle r states were almost incline d t o leav e it . The grea t powers, declaimed th e delegat e o f Mexico i n some disgust , wanted 'a world orde r in which th e mic e coul d be stamped ou t bu t i n which th e lion s

Weakness and power 14 9

would no t b e restrained'; the Australians and New Zealanders wer e even mor e outspokenly indignant . But indignatio n i s a notoriously poo r basi s for negotia tion. Against th e unite d fron t o f th e great powers it was to n o avail. Occasion ally a statesman o f th e great powers might consen t t o mee t th e smal l powers ' protest by mor e o r less reasoned argumen t - a s when th e United States ' representative, Senator Tom Connally , pointed a n accusing finger at a protestin g New Zealander an d demanded t o know 'wher e you, Mr Berendson, would .. . be toda y i f the United States had t o as k the Unite d Nations for permission t o defend you r countr y eve n before th e South Pacifi c had ru n re d with America n blood?' There wa s no good answe r to thi s rhetorica l question . Ther e wa s no good answer , either, t o Connally's still more flamboyan t intervention . 'Yo u may g o home fro m Sa n Francisco,' he tol d th e delegations o f th e smal l powers , 'and repor t tha t yo u hav e defeated th e veto. But you ca n also say , "We tore u p the Charter." At tha t point, ' the senator records with pride, ' I sweepingly ripped th e Charter draft i n my hands t o shred s and flung the scrap s upon th e table.'1 With them wer e flung as well the hopes of th e smal l power s for a n international organization i n which the y woul d contro l thei r destiny . Thei r in dignation change d mostl y t o despondency, th e delegates returne d t o thei r capitals to secur e ratification of a charter no t o f thei r makin g an d not t o thei r liking. God move s in a mysterious way. The Unite d Nations, so far from proving a restriction upo n th e freedo m o f small states, has turned ou t t o be th e princi pal asse t in thei r ques t fo r powe r an d influence . Had th e grea t powers continued thei r concer t of convenienc e into the post war era , one would no t b e speaking no w of th e potenc y o f weakness. One would b e speaking , i f at all, about th e potency o f strength . But th e Concer t fell apart , if indeed i t had eve r really existed. Instea d of great power unity , there wa s great power disagreement . The state s system quickly fractionated into its two opposin g camps . Small powers again became pawn s of Great Powers, as in the lat e nineteent h century , but thi s tim e wit h a difference. What had already, by 194 7 o r 1948 , acquire d familiarit y a s the Col d War was no mere dispute ove r trade an d commerce , territor y and spoils . I t wa s a war over principles, over the conten t o f truth , a n ideological war. When wars are fough t fo r ideas, the fighter s don't chang e sides . So it proved in the Cold War. Neither the allie s of the Soviet Union - th e Americans called them 'satellites ' - nor the allies of the United States - th e Russians called the m 'imperialis t stooges ' enjoyed eve n tha t limite d roo m fo r manoeuvre that come s fro m sellin g one 1 M y Name i s Tom Connally (Crowell , Ne w York 1954) , 265

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self t o th e highest bidder : whe n th e Americans offered ai d to easter n Europe , Stalin put hi s foot down . The smal l power, whether Sovie t satellit e o r imperialist stooge, had stil l t o com e int o its own. It cam e int o its own during the later 1950s , takin g advantage of th e mutual paralysis of the grea t powers following their acquisitio n o f thermonuclea r weapons an d long-range missiles, taking advantage, too, o f th e mellowin g of Soviet policie s followin g the death o f Stalin. Bu t what was most importan t was the tremendou s swelling of their ranks, as the forme r colonie s o f th e imperial power s - mainl y o f Britain and France - brok e awa y fro m th e metropolitan country lik e floes sloughing off fro m som e great Greenland icefield and floating out int o the ope n sea . Some o f these new states were not muc h bigger than th e ice floes, and almost a s barren o f resources. In an earlier era - afte r the First World War, for example - mos t of them would hav e been held to be unfit fo r independence an d would have been mad e wards of great powers under th e mandate system create d by th e League of Nations in order t o dispose , in the words of its Covenant, of 'those colonies an d territories .. . inhabited b y peoples no t ye t abl e to stan d b y themselve s unde r the strenuous conditions o f the modern world. ' Conditions have become if anything mor e strenuou s since then: but weaknes s was no longer allowed t o serv e as a pretext for delayin g independence t o an y people wh o wished it. A General Assembly resolution , passed o n 1 4 December 1960 , mad e tha t official. Henceforward ther e coul d be n o suc h thin g a s an unviable political community , fo r viability was held t o consist i n having the existin g members of the state s system prepare d to trea t new applicant s for membershi p a s if they were viable. This they hav e bee n only to o read y to do, with th e consequenc e tha t when th e General Assembly met fo r its regular twenty-first session, i t had mor e tha n twic e a s many mem ber state s as were assemble d fo r it s first sessio n twent y years before. Amon g the firs t item s of business was the election o f the 121s t member o f the Unite d Nations. The 121s t member i s Barbados. It has an area of 16 6 square mile s and a population o f 250,000. If th e presence o f such tin y state s within th e state s system i s not altogethe r grotesque, i t i s their membershi p o f the United Nation s tha t save s them from ridicule. For i t is the United Nation s - onc e revile d by the small power s as robbing the m o f even that sligh t degre e of independence o f mind an d spiri t t o which they fel t themselve s entitle d - tha t has enabled th e small powers t o come int o their own. More exactly, i t is the General Assembl y - tha t General Assembly which , i n spite of , indeed , in defiance of, th e Charter cam e in tim e to be entrusted wit h th e work o f security restoratio n an d of peace supervisio n which the Securit y Council , becaus e of the rivalr y of its permanent members , had proved unabl e to perform. In the General Assembly, all states - larg e or

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151

small, strong o r feeble, with 20 0 million peopl e o r 200 thousand peopl e - become, i n one aspec t o f their being , identical. They eac h have one vote. In th e Assembly, the might y ar e put dow n fro m thei r seats , and thos e o f low degree exalted. Littl e wonde r tha t nearl y all new nations mak e membershi p o f th e United Nation s the firs t an d most importan t tas k o f foreign policy. O f fift y or sixt y ne w nations attaining independence in the last te n years, only on e Western Samoa - has declined, on grounds of economy, t o accept a membership tha t would have been hers for the asking . The humbles t nation of all the world , when cla d i n the armo r o f a righteou s cause, is stronger than all the hosts o f error.' With this recklessl y extravagant quotation Presiden t Kennedy complimente d the Irish nation, when he spok e to it s parliament in Dublin on 28 June 1963 . Th e Iris h parliamentarians, well accustomed t o blarney, may not hav e treated this proposition to o seriously , and well they migh t not . Righteou s causes have no mor e afforde d protectio n to humble nations than di d the ointmen t wit h which primitiv e tribes in Afric a smeared themselve s in the belief tha t i t would repe l th e bullets of the whit e invaders. If the desir e t o liv e quietly at peace with one' s own an d with one' s neighbours ma y be accepte d a s a righteous cause, the histor y o f our time s is a history o f the frustratio n of that desire by ruthles s and unprincipled bully states. In the long run, perhaps, the y do not prevail . But in the long run, alas, their victims do not surviv e to enjo y th e victories of righteousness . To man y of the smal l new nations of the moder n world, such gloomy re flections see m wholly ou t o f place . They hav e preferred t o believe, as an article of faith, that power doe s flow fro m th e righteousness of their cause , and that it flow s with sufficien t strength an d force t o enabl e them t o prevai l against more conventionall y armoure d rivals . The righteou s caus e in which the y placed thei r trus t was the caus e of what the y describ e variously as positive neutralism, or positive non-alignment. Their emphasi s i s always on th e posi tive, to contras t thei r positio n from th e old-fashione d neutralit y of the states of pre-war Europe. Certainl y the fate of th e little neutra l states over-run by the Wehrmacht in April 194 0 inspires no fait h i n the powe r o f righteousness . Even thos e neutrals which escape d tha t fat e - Swede n and Switzerland - endured sever e restrictions upon thei r autonom y i n order to survive . One author ity describe s the m a s 'rather like smal l sailboats, which use d the mor e powerful elements to driv e them obliquel y alon g their course , tacking whe n necessary and constantl y trimmin g their sail s to gai n the greatest advantage from th e wind bu t neve r pressing too clos e t o it nor venturing into the ope n sea. ' This is not a t all how th e navigator s of positive neutralis m were prone to describe their feat s o f navigation . Recall Kwam e Nkrumah: 'W e fac e th e hazards of th e

152 Diplomacy and its discontents

high sea s alone .. . I proudly stan d o n the bridg e of that lone vessel as she confidently set s sail... and scan the horizon. There is so much mor e beyond.' What gave them th e confidenc e to embar k was their belief tha t the y wer e setting ou t upon a civilizing mission. Seeing themselves in this role, they strongl y objected to th e notion, sometime s put abroa d by thei r critics, that the y wer e in any sense uncommitted o r uncaring. 'We are committed u p t o th e hilt,' the prime minister of Ceylon told th e General Assembly. 'We are committed t o preserv e decency in dealings between nations.' And th e prime minister of Tanganyika: 'We do care , passionately, about th e development of justice, of well-being, and of peace, throughout th e world.' It was one thing t o espouse such righteous causes, another t o tr y t o corner the market. All too ofte n the positive neutralists implied, if they di d not say outright, tha t the y an d they alon e were fit custodians of international morality. That ne w nations, just because they were new, that smal l states, just because they were small, that black peoples, just because they wer e black, were somehow nobler , fairer, better, than the rest . These ar e separate contentions, requirin g separate examination. The argu ment fro m colou r - black superiorit y - is a racist argument, no less potent for that, perhaps more potent for that, but hardly requirin g reasoned refutation. Colour confer s neither superio r wisdom nor superio r morality. Ther e i s something t o b e sai d for th e argumen t from newness . To be a new nation i s to have had littl e tim e i n which to engag e in the iniquities o f modern statecraft . Bu t history soo n take s care of that . Finally, the argumen t from smallness . 'We small nations,' remarked th e prime minister of Trinidad not lon g ago , 'have only ou r principles.' That ma y be so, but i t does not mak e the m principled . There i s no evidenc e that smal l states are more virtuous than grea t powers. They ma y lack the instruments for doing wrong on the grand scale, so that the great crimes of our century - aggressio n and genocide - lie beyond thei r reach. But there' s n o virtue in necessity. Nor ar e small states necessarily virtuous. Their agent s are among the most spectacula r violators of the Geneva Conventions: Nort h Vietnam condoning, without visibl e remorse, the decapitation of civilians , Egypt engagin g in poison ga s warfare. This is not t o sa y small state s are any more delinquent tha n th e great powers. It's just tha t they'r e no t noticeably bette r behaved. Not enough , at any rate, to brag about it. If President Kennedy was being more rhetorical tha n analytica l in telling his Irish audience that thei r smal l country, like small countrie s everywhere, derived power from righteousness , he was correct in telling them tha t it migh t derive power fro m ideas . 'W e need men who ca n dream of things tha t never were,' he said, 'and as k why not.' And he went on to suggest that 'it matters

Weakness and power 15 3

not how smal l a nation i s that seek s world peace and freedom.' It s contribution ma y be great, however small its size. Force i s the monopoly o f the great powers, for all the good i t does them. But great powers enjoy no monopol y over ideas. The foreig n minister of a small state may not b e able to summo n a gunboat i n aid of his diplomacy, to carr y a big stick let alon e to brandish it . But he ca n carry a brief-case well enough, and stoc k i t with proposals . Even mor e tha n grea t powers, smal l state s ma y exploi t thi s sourc e of power. Great powers, just because they hav e more than thei r fai r shar e of th e wealth o f this world, are not inclined t o innovation excep t t o protect and add to wha t i s already theirs. They ar e fearful o f change, which fo r the m i s for th e worse. Opportunities for progress are best ignored , temptations t o tr y new ways are best resisted. The known present , unsatisfactory as it may be , seems preferable t o a future filled with uncertainty . They ar e solaced b y th e statu s quo. For smal l states it is all very different, or ought t o be. They hav e no vested interest sav e in changing the syste m that treat s them so shabbily. Change for them i s for th e better. Opportunities for progress are to b e seized, temptations to tr y ne w ways to be yielded to . An uncertain future, uncertai n as it may be , seems preferable t o th e present s o unsatisfactory for them . They ar e solaced by th e prospec t o f change. Having little t o lose, and much to gain, the smal l states of the state s system are the natural innovators within th e states system. The smaller th e state, th e more acceptable its innovation, for its suggestions more tha n thos e of greater powers are likely to b e disinterested an d directed towards the general welfare. This point wa s made by Pope Paul VI when he addresse d the General Assembly of th e Unite d Nations in his capacity a s temporal leader of Vatican City, the tiniest stat e of all. 'We have nothing t o as k for,' he tol d hi s fellow delegates . 'We have at most a desire to expres s and a permission to request : namely, that of serving you i n s o far as lies within Our competence , with disinterest , humility an d love. That,' added th e pontiff, with exquisite irony , 'is so simple that it may seem insignificant to thi s Assembly, which i s accustomed to dealing with most important and most difficul t matters. ' No message could have been more significant - excep t perhaps that which Paul proceeded to place befor e its members. 'If you wish to be brothers,' he told them , 'la y dow n your weapons.'2 Left t o thei r ow n devices, great powers will never accep t this advice. A great power neve r goes into a disarmament conference intending to lay dow n its weapons. It goes there intending to increase its armed force vis-à-vis that of 2 Th e New York Times, 5 Oct. 196 5

154 Diplomacy and its discontents

its rivals. The gap between their preachin g and their practice, betwee n their declared purpos e an d their rea l purpose, has grown so wide and persiste d fo r so long that toda y thei r government s sometimes don' t even bother t o concea l their cynicism an d their insincerity . 'It' s gotten t o the point,' Dean Rus k has conceded, where, in our conversations , we've been able to refe r t o th e argument s by th e numbers. He would make an argument - th e [Soviet ] Ambassado r or Foreig n Minister - an d I can say: "Well , you kno w our position o n that. Thi s is Argument Numbe r Five. Shall I repeat it, o r shal l we save tim e and go on?" An d they'll smile and say: "Well , we'll perhaps go on t o some other subject." 3 It lie s within th e powe r of small state s to preven t great powers going on to som e othe r subject . They ca n compel them to stic k with th e subjec t at hand, whatever it may be - th e spread o f nuclear weapons, the testing of nuclear weapons, th e demilitarizatio n o f outer space. They ca n compel the m to negotiat e seriously , rather tha n b y rot e and ritual. If serious negotiation o n Plan A produces no agreement , they ca n compel the m t o conside r Plan s B and C. The methods by which th e small powers may hope to coerc e th e grea t consist in their persistenc e an d determination, thei r fertilit y of devic e and idea , and thei r readines s to invoke th e sanctio n o f public opinion. Th e motive for the smal l powers wanting to compe l th e great is the motive o f self-interest, than which non e i s more effective . S o long as the great powers remain deadlocked o n disarmament, th e interests of small power s are bound t o suffer . Stalemate ma y sui t the stron g but i t i s intolerable for th e weak. It perpetuate s their misery, it intensifies their danger . Those terrible weapons that moder n science has given you,' Pope Paul reminded thei r custodians , 'long before the y produce victims and ruins, cause bad dreams , foster bad feelings , create night mares, distrust and sombre resolves; they deman d enormous expenditures ; they obstruc t project s of solidarit y and usefu l work ; they falsif y th e very psychology o f peoples.' 4 The responsibilit y borne b y smal l state s for th e peace and prosperit y o f the state s system, s o far from being small, is really very great. There i s much for the m to do , much which onl y the y can do. And it is not unrealisti c to expect them to be equal t o the challenge. They hav e not don e to o badl y in the recent past, for i t is out o f th e briefcases of th e foreig n ministers of smaller powers that many o f its significant initiative s originate. It was Lester Pearson 3 Quote d in Our Generation Against Nuclear War, II , no 3 , 40. Rusk made thes e remarks in a CBS interview in Jan. 1963. 4 Th e New York Times, 5 Oct. 1965

Weakness and power 15 5

of Canada who contrive d the United Nations Emergency Force; Adam Rapacki of Poland wh o develope d the ide a of disengagement in central Europe; Frank Aitke n o f Ireland who first proposed a non-proliferation treaty; Osten Undén of Sweden who firs t suggeste d the formatio n of a non-nuclear club ; Per Haekkerup of Denmark who firs t exposed , lik e th e chil d i n th e fabl e o f his countryman, the nudit y of NAT O doctrine . All this being so, the foreig n minister s of smaller countries have little t o excuse them whe n the y tel l us, as they ofte n do , tha t thei r hands ar e tied b y Fate, that nothin g ca n be done. Either the y deceiv e themselves, or they de ceive us, or they disclos e b y thei r admissio n tha t the y d o not understand what makes the modern world go round. For an y or all of these reason s their usefulness t o u s is at an end. They shoul d mak e way, or be made to mak e way, for thos e who ar e ready, at long last, to allo w Will to tak e charge . [January 1967 ]

8

Stupidity an d powe r Suppose, fo r a change, we judge statesmen no t fo r effor t bu t fo r result . (We all know Dea n Rusk put i n a sixteen-hour day , no on e accuse s Andrei Gro myko o f slacking. ) Statesmen o f the super-powers , if they don' t deserve an 'F' fo r failure, can' t b e rated higher tha n a dismal 'D. ' They'v e foule d thei r environment. They've squandere d patrimonie s which , prudentl y invested, could have made th e lives of thei r nations , an d of thei r neighbours, decent , prosperous, an d secure. Much is written lately o f the excruciating aspects o f power - it s agony, its arrogance, its impotence. A chapter shoul d b e save d fo r th e stupidit y o f power . It i s hard t o tel l whic h fron t has been allowe d t o sag more - th e foreign or domestic. I t is hard t o tel l which super-powe r has messed thing s u p more - th e Russian o r American. The failur e o f super-power statesmanshi p i s not th e whol e story o f world politic s i n the sixties , bu t i t may serv e to su m it u p i n half-adozen words . What follow s are comments o n American folly . That i s because Americans obligingly pu t thei r foll y o n th e record , allowin g us to accoun t fo r i t a s well as make a n inventory o f it. The Russian s ar e more secretive . Bu t while the y ma y conceal thei r motive s they canno t concea l thei r record . I t i s no les s messy tha n their rival's . Khrushchev's infantil e attack upo n th e United Nations in 1960 . The reckless gamble that h e could pu t missile s into Cuba and get away with it . His breach wit h his Communist Chinese ally. The elementar y blunder s in farm and factor y management . The brutal silencing of artist s and intellectuals. Thes e add up t o a policy a s erratic and destructive of Russian powe r an d prestige a s might b e wished b y th e mos t bitte r anti-Sovie t emigré. And Khrushchev's suc cessors haven't don e muc h better . I s 'F' for failure to o harsh a grade for leadership which firs t arm s the Arab states, let s the m off their leash , stand s by mut e

Stupidity and power 157

and ingloriou s while th e Israel i air force shoots up billions of roubles' wort h of sophisticated Sovie t weapons , the n re-arm s the Arabs for anothe r round ? Or fo r a leadership which , unable to tel l liberal communism fro m socia l fascism, send s th e Red Army into Czechoslovakia, tippin g the scale s of power the othe r wa y an d forfeiting respect throughout th e world? Khrushchev a t least had chutzpah goin g for him; the mos t tha t ma y be said of th e vapid stewardship o f Brezhnev and Kosygin i s that it has survived. Nor doe s stressin g super-power stupidity imply small-powe r sapience. On the contrary . Small-power statecraf t of th e sixtie s is marked b y rancou r and short-sightedness. Tin y federation s fail , sandcastle sovereignties clutter u p th e system. Delegation s fro m micro-state s harangue the Unite d Nations with maxi speeches, sending it t o sleep . From on e of th e tinies t state s comes one o f th e sorriest policies : Vatica n City is keen o n arms control, no t s o keen o n birt h control. 'Th e Church i s consistent wit h herself when sh e considers recourse t o the infecun d periods t o be licit, while at th e sam e tim e condemning, a s being always illicit, th e us e of means directly contrar y t o fecundation , even if such use is inspired b y reason s which ma y appea r honest an d serious. ' These word s are the operativ e par t o f Paul's encyclica l Humanae Vitae, which migh t mor e aptly be called Humanae Mori; for , unless rescinded, unles s ignored, i t will lead millions t o untimely death . Historians deal harshly wit h th e Eisenhower presidency . But Ike didn't leave America i n such bad shape . The United State s in 196 0 wa s at peace wit h he r enemies an d i n reasonable harmony wit h her friends . Neither his predecessor nor th e thre e president s which followe d coul d clai m as much. In 1960 , ne w weapons systems - th e underground Minuteman missiles, the undersea Polaris submarines - were coming into service , placing American security o n a firmer foundatio n o f assure d destruction capability. De Gaulle, restive i n NATO, had ye t t o ren d it s fabric . Cuba could stil l be lived with. Th e Soviets were truculent , but tha t wa s nothing new . China was inscrutable, but the familia r mushroom clou d wa s still t o clim b above her deserts . As the world outsid e seeme d tranquil , so the land withi n seeme d calm . Students sallie d fort h o n raids, but o f women's dormitories , no t deans ' offices . The ma n from Do w was welcome o n th e campus . Down south , th e Negro plodded patientl y toward s his rights. A desegregated Woolworth lunch-counte r seemed a major blow fo r freedom . To b e poor wa s an un-American activity. Poverty happene d i n other countries , frankly known a s 'backward.' The air was fresh, the river s ran pure . Borne by a strong curren t in favourable weather, th e pruden t oarsma n rests on his oars, conserving strength for treacherou s waters ahead. That was not how, i n 1960 , Joh n Kennedy could hope to wrest th e presidency fro m

158 Diplomacy and its discontents

its heir-apparent, Richard Nixon. Instead he had t o tal k u p a storm, and he did. When th e presidency became his, he did not le t th e stor m o f talk subside . 'Let th e word go forth fro m thi s tim e an d place, t o frien d an d fo e alike, tha t the torch has been passe d to a new generation of Americans - bor n i n this century, tempered by war , disciplined by a hard an d bitter peace, proud of our ancien t heritage. ' 'Let every nation know , whether i t wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet an y hardship, suppor t any friend , oppose an y foe, to assur e th e surviva l an d th e succes s of liberty.' A bluster inaugural from th e pulpit. Bu t it wasn't bluf f - unfortunately. From tha t pulpit, like Teddy Roosevel t befor e him, JF K preached 'no t th e doctrine o f ignoble ease, but th e doctrine o f th e strenuous life.' The strenuous life wa s more cheapl y le d in Roosevelt's time . Kennedy's cost billion s of dollars and millions of limbs. Who would now sa y it was worth them ? The Kennedy styl e of Sturm und Drang was not dictate d b y expedienc y alone. It cam e naturally to one who, a s an undergraduate, precociously excoriated appeasement , lambaste d Englan d a s a nation o f sleep-walkers , seized on Churchill a s his hero. Bu t where in the earl y sixties was the scop e fo r th e Dunkirk spirit ? Where was the Luftwaffe , wher e was Goering? There wa s no Goering, there wa s only Gagarin. The Kennedy qualit y o f grace under pressure required pressure for th e grace to show . Th e presiden t raise d th e pressure in the White House basement , as retired teacher s raise mushrooms o r baby alligator s in theirs. His hero called the Second World War 'the unnecessary war.' Kennedy's thousan d day s were crammed with unnecessar y crises. Within a hundred day s came the first , and least necessar y o f all. Those wh o were ther e hav e since tol d o f how Kenned y listened, with mountin g scepticis m and foreboding , to his advisers as they assure d him tha t th e Cuban masses, groaning under oppression, would ris e against Castro when th e tin y ban d of exiles waded ashor e a t th e Bay of Pigs. After th e fiasco , filled with remorse , Kennedy wa s aghast a t his own credulity. 'All my life,' he tol d himsel f bitterly , 'I've known bette r tha n to trus t th e experts.' But before his thousand day s were out h e truste d the m again. It wa s on their assuranc e of the need, an d their estimat e of success, that he sen t Americans to figh t o n fa r more swamp y soil. The scen e o f his searing humiliation wa s also th e venue of his famous victory. The Cuban missile crisis , like tha t o f the Ba y of Pigs, was a crisis by hi s choice an d of his making. I t take s two t o tangle . Had Kennedy followe d th e advice of his Secretary o f Defense, he would hav e accepted th e mov e a s a fait

Stupidity and power 15 9

accompli: ' A missile i s a missile,' McNamara argued, 'it makes n o great differ ence whether yo u ar e killed b y a missile fire d fro m th e Sovie t Unio n o r fro m Cuba.' 1 Ha d Kennedy followe d th e advic e of his ambassador t o th e UN , he would hav e bargained his way out : Adla i Stevenson suggeste d withdrawing American missile s from Turke y an d Ital y in exchange fo r a Soviet withdrawa l from Cuba , throwing Guantanam o int o th e dea l if necessary. Instead he chos e to compe l th e Russians to withdraw throug h fea r o f all-out thermonuclea r war . Kennedy's statecraf t i n those fatefu l fourtee n days - th e meticulous attention t o detail , th e carefu l selectio n (onc e th e general strategy had bee n determined) o f th e leas t provocative mov e an d counter-move , th e studiou s avoidance of th e temptatio n t o corne r his opponent an d to cro w once he backed down , above al l the vaunted grac e unde r pressure - i s greatly admire d b y every student o f crisi s management. H e rates, in their estimation , a n 'A ' or ' A plus. ' I n crisis management nothing succeed s like success . Yet a child i n the kinder garten o f strategi c studies migh t devis e without difficult y a score o f scenario s wherein th e Cuba n missile crisi s could easil y have culminated no t i n a dazzling success for Kennedy's statecraf t bu t i n disasters ranging from a brief but blood y bout of city-swapping (Pittsburgh fo r Omsk fo r Chicago - U S backs down ; Pittsburgh fo r Omsk fo r Chicago fo r Leningrad - USS R back s down) t o a n apocalyp tic frenz y o f destruction afte r whic h n o student s of crisis management would be aliv e t o grade the fina l competitio n i n risk-taking. 'If th e Soviets contro l spac e the y ca n contro l earth , a s in past centuries the natio n tha t controlle d th e seas dominated th e continents.' 2 This mindless maxim, reminiscen t o f th e raving s of som e demente d geopolitician , was Joh n Kennedy's campaig n pitc h fo r th e aerospac e vote. It le d a s well to hi s decision to rac e th e Russian s to th e moon . Statecraf t i n the sixtie s knows n o mor e disastrous error. The Russians could - an d did - declar e 'no contest' when the y wanted t o drop out, leavin g the United States (as Eisenhower's Commissio n on Nationa l Goals had explicitl y warned it would be) 'drive n b y nationalist competition int o extravagant programs which would diver t funds an d talent s from program s of equal importance.' Worst o f all, in the lon g run, was the mandat e give n by th e spac e pro gramme t o technetroni c expertise . It encourage d confidence i n th e capacity of an élite o f 'organization-oriented , application-minded intellectuals ' (as one of their number 3 admiringl y described it ) t o guid e America's foreig n an d 1 Quote d i n Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Bantam Books , New York & Toronto 1966), 31 2 Quote d i n Erlend A. Kennan and Edmund H . Harvey, Jr, Mission t o th e Moon: A Critical Examination o f NASA an d th e Space Program (Willia m Morrow, New York 1969), 74 3 Zbignie w Brzezinski

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domestic policies with th e sam e cool assuranc e of succes s shown fro m count down t o splash-dow n b y th e wizards of Mission Control. Jus t a s the United States might surpas s Russia's achievement s in space by spendin g more mone y and applying more science , so it might counte r insurgenc y abroad b y spendin g more mone y an d applyin g more socia l science . But Saigo n was not Houston . Anyon e no t bemuse d b y technetroni c trick s knows that . Applied socia l scienc e counselle d denyin g shelte r t o th e Vietcong . GI's, obeying orders , touched thei r Zippo s t o th e thatch. Watching yet anothe r Vietnam village burn on television - th e vignette typifies our times - Arthu r Miller suddenly sa w the light. 'How is it,' he aske d himself, that w e never see Vietnamese peasants burnin g down thei r ow n houses ? Thi s is not a s ridiculous as it sounds when w e recall th e Yugoslavs , the Russians , and , if a dim memory i s not mistaken , the American s during the Revolutio n wh o destroyed building s to den y the m t o th e enemy. Frankly, I am amazed that ou r Psywar people haven't though t o f this. Here we are, pumping blood an d money into a fight t o help thes e people retain thei r freedom , an d w e can't even find a native pyromaniac, let alon e a patriot, t o fir e hi s own roof . Since it i s we and not th e Vietnamese who are burning down their ow n houses, it ca n mean onl y that the y don' t shar e ou r urgency and woul d much rather live where the y have always lived and wor k the lan d the y hav e always worked, Vietcong or no Viet cong.4 A simpl e perception, blindingly true. But suc h perceptions lie beyond th e ken of technetronic expertise . Lyndon Johnso n was not, an y more tha n Joh n Kennedy, wha t yo u coul d cal l the gullible type. He brought t o th e presidenc y his Texan's scowling distrus t of th e 'overbre d smart alecks who liv e i n Georgetown an d thin k i n Harvard.' But onc e he picked his man he stuck with him, for the reaso n the Lon e Range r stuck with Tonto - th e scout's abilit y t o heed th e warning signals in the pitch of a coyote's howl, th e footprint s near a dry creek . W.W. Rostow ha d mor e tha n th e Indian' s sensitiv e ear or eagle eye at work for him . A t hi s disposal lay al l the paraphernali a of technetroni c socia l scienc e - conten t analysis , factor analysis, operations research, war gaming, computer simulation - wit h which it s practitioners imagine themselves able t o confound the cunnin g of history, t o frustrat e th e knavish tricks played o n statesme n b y events. In spite o f them all , really because of them all , he paid n o heed t o th e warning signals from Vietnam . They fille d th e sk y like thunderheads an d lightning, but Rostow , porin g over his charts of pacified areas, his tables of 4 Th e Ag e of Abdication,' Th e New York Times, 2 3 Dec. 196 7

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161

the latest body-counts, wa s impervious to th e gathering storm . Wit h the sam e airy assuranc e with which h e had earlie r told th e statesme n o f the wester n world tha t 'the tricks of growth ar e not al l that difficult ; they onl y see m so , at moments o f frustratio n and confusion,' 5 h e devise d those sequences of search-and-destroy, those patterns of targetting, which h e pledged t o his president would wi n the war in nothing flat. The trick s of victory i n Vietnam were no t al l that difficult; the y onl y seeme d so , at moments o f frustratio n and confusion. S o the bombs bega n to fall . Thre e year s later, with a n expeditionar y force o f half a million me n mire d in the mu d an d th e home fron t seething , a frustrated an d confused Lyndon Johnso n wa s driven fro m th e presidency , his Great Society a shambles . Richard Nixo n ha s history o n his side, for it has become th e lot o f Republican presidents t o en d th e wars of their Democrati c predecessors . O n his side as well is an adviser more promisin g than LBJ's . Well awar e of th e hubri s t o which technetroni c expert s s o readily succumb , Henry Kissinger knows th e limits o f gimmickry i n foreign policy. I n an essay written whil e stil l a Harvard don, lon g before becomin g Nixon' s Numbe r 1 , Kissinger warned th e intellec tual presuming t o advis e the policy-maker agains t turning into 'a promoter of technique.' So far from that , the intellectual's missio n i n Washington 'is t o demonstrate th e overwhelmin g importance o f purpose ove r technique.' 6 On Vietnam, Kissinger had writte n little, but a few words ca n speak volumes. In guerrilla warfare, he noted , 'th e guerrilla wins if he does no t lose ; th e conventional arm y loses if it does not win.' 7 That mad e star-crosse d fro m th e start th e Kennedy commitmen t t o counter-insurgency , for in such operation s the conventionall y arme d United States had stacke d agains t it all the odds . Th e Marines might stor m th e beache s but the y woul d fin d n o enemy there , onl y (as one eye-witness reports) ' a dozen gigglin g Vietnamese schoolgirls wh o sought ou t th e Leathernecks with garland s of yellow dahlia s and red gladioli.' The enem y lay inland, deep in the elephan t gras s where he had prepared , with exquisite care , his pits an d trap s and ambush . An od d couple . The Harvard scholar, nuclea r metaphysician, a Hamlet among th e strategists , rendering in convoluted pros e an d Dr Strangelove accent hi s abstruse speculation abou t th e ways of states. The California politicia n pouring in his elocutionist voice a bland and oily rhetori c upo n America' s sea of trouble . Yet i n their conceptio n o f leadershi p th e od d coupl e though t a s one. The y believed in a presidency o f prophylaxis, i n the politic s of prevention . 5 Th e Stages o f Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridg e University Press, Cambridge & New York 1960) , 166- 7 6 Th e Necessity fo r Choice (Harpe r & Brothers, New Yor k 1960) , 352- 3 7 Th e Vie t Nam Negotiations,' Foreign Affairs, XLVIII , no 2 , Jan. 1969 , 21 4

162 Diplomacy and its discontents

The questio n befor e America is whether i t ca n muster th e dedication an d creativity before th e worst has happened.' 'One of the criteri a by whic h I will measure success will be th e extent t o which problem s can be solved before they reac h crisis proportions.'8 Yet clos e t o th e worst, if not th e worst, had alread y happened. By the end of 1969 , thei r slate , so far fro m bein g clean, was smeared by slim e and blood . And no w s o are their hands . Early i n 196 9 Kissinge r met a t th e White House with a delegation o f college students. He pleaded fo r thei r patience while he worked t o end th e war. 'Come back here i n a year. If nothing has happened , then I can't argu e for patience.' His year is up. His game is up. [December 1969 ]

8 'Preface, ' Six Crises (Doubleday, New York 1969) , x

Part III RIGH T AN D WRONG IN FOREIGN POLIC Y

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1

The ways of statecraf t It i s more tha n fou r hundre d year s since Machiavelli advised his Prince i n what ways he shoul d kee p faith , an d in what way s not. Durin g this time, th e scop e for wrong-doin g in foreign polic y ha s greatly expanded; an d of its expansio n governments have not bee n reluctan t t o take advantage . In their dealing s with other governments, and with othe r peoples , thei r behaviou r is characteristicall y bad. It i s deceitful. It i s treacherous. I t i s cruel. Deception i s central t o mos t o f the technique s o f statecraft. Consider nego tiation. I am not concerne d wit h th e whit e lie , the half-truth, th e repressio n of what on e really thinks. Without suc h mild deceptions , ther e coul d b e no diplomacy a t all . No, I am thinking o f th e grand guignol o f negotiations. O f Japanese minister s smiling and bowing at thei r American colleagues even as the Imperia l Fleet steamed toward s Pearl Harbor. Of the British refusa l t o disclose t o thei r closes t all y thei r plan s for th e imminen t invasio n of Egypt. Of Andrei Gromyko's assurance to th e presiden t o f the United State s tha t n o strategic missiles had bee n sen t t o Cuba, while locke d i n a safe te n fee t fro m where the y talke d wa s indisputable evidence that Gromyko wa s lying. Of th e first ministe r o f Kenya promisin g the British tha t onc e independent , Kenya would work fo r federation i n east Africa - a promise, Jom o Kenyatta late r gleefully tol d hi s countrymen, he had neve r intended t o keep . Th e example s fill a book. No on e government, no type o f government, has a corner o n th e market. Great power s do it . Small powers do it. Even middl e power s do it . Consider propaganda . Not al l propaganda is deceptious - thoug h muc h of it is . But al l propaganda is tendentious. Governments do no t wis h to tel l th e world o f their shortcomings . I n deciding wha t t o tell th e world - th e truth as one see s it, part of that truth , what i s known t o be untrue - expedienc e pre-

166 Diplomacy and its discontents

vails over ethics. What matters is not th e trut h o f the messag e but th e credibility o f the message . And th e estimat e o f the credibilit y of th e messag e is determined b y th e estimate of the gullibility of the masses . At on e extrem e i s the assessmen t of fascism . The masse s are craven an d gullible. They lac k th e independenc e of mind an d spiri t to denounc e as false anything bearing the hallmark o f authority. The greater the falsehood, th e more readily acceptable as fact, once stampe d wit h th e imprimatu r of state . Propaganda t o b e credible should b e a compound o f monstrous untruths. And Hitler an d Goebbels made it so. At th e other extreme is the assessmen t of liberal democracy. It think s no t of masses but o f the man in the street - Bagehot' s bald-headed gentleman at the bac k o f the bus . Of his intellectual discrimination it takes a lofty view . It believes he ca n distinguish not merel y between truth and falsehood, but amon g shadings across the spectru m of veracity. Propaganda to b e credible should b e scrupulously fai r an d rigorousl y unbiased. Some governments today clin g to th e techniqu e o f the Big Lie, practising without remors e a sort of psychic genocide . A few - a very few - tr y t o be fair . Most fal l i n between. Their apparatu s for persuasion, usually called ministries of information, migh t bette r be calle d ministrie s of mendacity. They accep t with zea l th e job o f putting out version s of events they kno w t o b e untrue. Never before have so many statesmen wit h s o little scrupl e been engage d in the deceptio n o f so many people . Deceit i s commonplace in foreign policy. Betraya l no less so. Treachery, i n private ethics, i s a grave offence . You d o no t flatte r a ma n by callin g him Judas . Jean Genet , castin g perversely about fo r way s of soilin g the mora l precepts of a society fro m whic h h e i s so spectacularly alienated, settles unerringly upon betraya l which forms , with thiever y and homosexual ity, his satanic trinity o f categorical imperatives. Treachery, i n foreign policy, i s not suc h a grave offence. Consider thre e cases, in an ascending order o f moral difficulty. The betraya l of Abyssinia, in 1935 , wa s easily done. A remote country . A people alleged t o be o f inferior race. Benighted creatures , they wer e thought to be scarcely capable o f knowing whether the y wer e betrayed o r not. 'N o interest in Ethiopia, o f an y natur e whatever, is worth th e lif e of a single Canadian citizen.' So said Ernest Lapointe i n Quebec City, with Mackenzi e King nodding approva l at his side. That was one judgment, and it happened t o prevail. But it was not th e only judgment. The next day , fro m th e rostrum o f the Palais des Nations at Geneva, the delegat e o f Haiti uttered another : 'Grea t or small, stron g or weak, near or far, white o r colored, le t u s never forget that

The way s of statecraft 16 7

one day we may be somebody's Ethiopia. ' But on thi s occasion , a s on man y others, it was not eas y to appl y t o foreig n policy eve n so diluted a version of the Golden Rule. 1 The betraya l of Czechoslovakia, i n 1938 , wa s less easily done. The opera tion was delicate an d tricky . It involve d the dismembermen t of a state at onc e an all y an d a friend. Her e was a civilized countr y i n the hear t o f Europe, free , white and - dating its independence to the Peace Treatie s - almos t twenty-one . Canada considered it remote : Lapoint e cable d franticall y fro m Genev a to insist that 'immediate cause of war namely minorit y problem s in Eastern Europ e not o f a nature to enthuse ou r people.' Britain and France foun d it to o clos e for comfort . Gratefully their government s fell upo n th e doctrin e o f nationa l self-determination: wasn' t Sudetenlan d ful l o f Germans? But tha t wa s dangerous doctrine: wasn' t Scotlan d ful l o f Scotsmen, Algeria of Algerians? No, th e justification fo r the betrayal of Czechoslovakia had t o be foun d elsewhere . We all know abou t Munich , so we al l know what it was. The sacrific e of Czechoslovakia wa s said t o be a small pric e for peace. (That it had bough t no t peace bu t tim e t o prepare for war is an argument contrived afte r th e event. ) There wa s no more ecstati c endorsation o f th e deal tha n th e Canadian. 'On the ver y brink o f chaos,' Mackenzie King cabled t o Chamberlain, 'wit h passions flaming and armies marching, th e voic e of Reason has foun d a way.' Again thi s judgment prevailed, though no t fo r very long. But it was not th e only judgment. Out i n Winnipeg, one of the greatest of Dafoe's editorial s asked rhetoricall y 'What's the Cheering For?' A fre e peopl e ha d bee n handed over t o a tyrant: that , said Dafoe, 'is the situation ; and those who thin k i t is all right will cheer fo r it.' Almost everybod y did.2 The betraya l o f large number s of Rumanians, Hungarians, and Bulgarians, in 1944-5 , consigned agains t thei r will to th e kin d o f people's democrac y favoured by Stalin, was assented t o by th e United State s and the Unite d Kingdom government s as the pric e t o b e paid fo r appeasin g the Soviet Union. What was done a t Moscow and a t Yalta differe d i n degree of wrong-doing from wha t was done a t Munich: what wa s betrayed o n thi s occasio n wa s not s o much a people alread y under the yok e o f the Re d Army as the ideal s for which th e war had ostensibl y bee n fought . The Atlantic Charter makes painful readin g when se t beside transcript s of allie d negotiation s four year s later. Of wha t then wen t o n Winston Churchill has left a dramatic account: 1 Se e my In Defence o f Canada, II, Appeasement an d Rearmament (Universit y of Toronto Press, Toronto 1965) , ch. 1 , 'War in Africa ' 2 Se e ibid., ch. 3, 'Appeasement,' 61 ff.

168 Diplomacy and its discontents The moment wa s apt fo r business , so I said [t o Stalin ] : "Let u s settle abou t our affair s i n th e Balkans . Your armie s are in Rumani a and Bulgaria . We have interests, missions , an d agents there. Don' t le t u s get at cros s purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russi a are concerned, how woul d it d o fo r yo u t o have ninety pe r cen t predominance in Rumania , for us to hav e ninety pe r cen t of th e sa y in Greece, and g o fifty-fifty abou t Yugoslavia?" During the translation , Churchill wrote out th e percentage s on a piece of paper. His account continues : I pushed thi s acros s to Stalin , who had b y the n hear d th e translation . Ther e was a slight pause . Then h e too k hi s blue penci l and mad e a large tick upon it , and passe d i t bac k t o us . I t was all settled i n no more tim e tha n i t take s to se t it down ... After thi s there wa s a long silence . The pencille d pape r lay in th e centr e of the table . At lengt h I said: "Migh t i t no t b e though t rathe r cynica l if it seemed we had dispose d o f thos e issues , s o fateful t o million s of people , i n suc h a n offhand manner ? Le t us burn th e paper." "No. Yo u keep it, " sai d Stalin. 3 The peopl e o f smal l states, with a faith more touchin g tha n reasoned , believe such inequitie s to be th e failin g o f great powers only. That i s not alway s true. A former American minister to Canada has recorded his shock on learn ing how cheapl y th e Department of External Affair s appeare d to value the liberty o f th e Baltic countries in 1942 . H e was told b y th e permanen t head o f that department tha t 'nobod y [i n London o r Ottawa] worrie d abou t Finland, and tha t Estonia , Latvia, an d Lithuania was a small price to pa y t o convinc e Russia of Britain's trust an d earnestness...' He remarked that 'what th e Britis h Government was suggesting and what [th e Canadia n government] wa s endorsing could certainl y not b e reconciled wit h th e Atlantic Charter.' 4 Bu t th e Canadian government, or at an y rate the Canadian prime minister , did not hol d the Atlantic Charter i n such high regard . 'To me,' wrote Mackenzie King in his diary, 'it is the apotheosi s of the craz e fo r publicity an d show.' 5 I have written o f deceit, and o f treachery ; I shall writ e now o f cruelt y in foreign policy . Cruelty i s not confine d t o the maiming and killing of innocent people though w e know onl y to o wel l how ofte n government s practise this kind o f 3 Th e Second World War, VI , Triumph an d Tragedy (Houghto n Mifflin , Bosto n 1953) , 227-8 4 Nanc y Harvison Hooker, éd., The Moffat Papers: Selections fro m th e Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1956), 381 5 J.W . Pickersgill, éd., The Mackenzie King Record, 1, 1939-1944 (Universit y of Toronto Press, Toronto 1960) , 233

The ways of statecraft 16 9

cruelty. Those who passed indifferentl y by tha t certain travelle r between Jerusalem an d Jericho wer e cruel i n their behaviou r - thi s is the point of the parable - eve n though the y wer e not guilty o f his wounds. The ethi c tha t i t is wrong to b e crue l is more widel y accepte d toda y tha n ever before. Few o f th e world' s religions , fe w of its ideologies, remai n unaf fected b y it . The injunctio n to love one's neighbour has been sen t boundin g across th e world's communication s systems . Only abou t half it s inhabitants have neve r heard o f Jesus; and o f the m mayb e half hav e heard o f Gandhi. All the same , the scal e an d scop e o f cruelty in statecraft ar e greater today tha n ever before. Why is this so ? Twentieth-century wa r i s increasingly a n instrument of doctrina l convic tion. Doctrinal war , more tha n wa r fought fo r gain, or t o pre-emp t attack , is likely t o be tota l wa r an d brutal war. Crusades are notorious fo r thei r cruelty . 'I implor e you,' Martin Luther wrot e t o a friend, 'if yo u rightl y understan d the Gospel, d o no t imagin e tha t it s cause can be furthere d withou t tumult , distress , and uproar. 6 Luthe r mean t th e gospel o f the New Testament, but hi s words apply t o othe r gospel s and t o othe r testaments , to Lenin's an d Mao's, Wilson's and Johnson's - t o all who wield great power linke d t o an idea. 'Bismarc k fought "necessary " wars,' an historian7 has noted, 'an d kille d thousands . The idealists of the twentieth-centur y figh t "just " wars and kill millions.' When wars are fought fo r ideals, everyone gets hurt. The distinctio n be tween soldie r an d civilia n becomes obliterated . The battlefiel d i s everywhere: in village huts, a market square , a smart restaurant , an embassy compound . Terrorism beget s yet mor e savag e terrorism; reprisal yet mor e insensat e reprisal. We know thi s warfare well , from ou r newspaper s better tha n fro m ou r history books . None kno w i t better tha n Alber t Camus knew it ; he wrote in 195 6 of th e anguis h o f guerrilla war: 'Anguis h a s we fac e a future tha t close s u p a little ever y day, a s we fac e th e threa t o f a degrading struggle, of an economi c disequilibrium tha t may reac h th e point where n o effor t wil l be able t o revive ...' 8 To reviv e what shattere d country ? Camus meant Algeria . But he could just a s well have mean t Irelan d fort y years earlier, Vietnam te n year s later. Clemenceau onc e wrote o f 'the grandeur and misery o f war.' Guerrilla war is devoid o f grandeur. There i s only miser y - an d cruelty. As Camus is the laureat e of guerrilla warfare, so Auden is the laureat e of the nuclea r age, the ag e of anxiety. I n 194 7 h e wrot e o f th e barbarit y whic h had alread y settle d upo n a n atomically arme d America , a barbarism unlike an y the world had eve r known : 6 Quote d i n Robert Endicot t Osgood , Limited War: The Challenge t o American Strategy (Universit y of Chicago Press , Chicago 1957) , 67- 8 7 A.J.P . Taylo r 8 Resistance, Rebellion, and Death (Alfre d A . Knopf, New York 1961) , 133- 4

170 Diplomacy and its discontents

... the new barbarian is no uncout h Desert-dweller; he doe s not emerg e From fi r forests: factorie s breed him; Corporate companies , college town s Mothered hi s mind, and many journals Backed his beliefs ... 9 And, o n th e occasio n o f th e twentiet h anniversar y of th e ordea l o f Hiroshim a and Nagasaki: 'Our world wil l be a safer place an d healthier plac e whe n w e can admit tha t ever y time we make a n atomi c bomb w e corrupt th e moral s o f a host o f innocent neutron s below th e ag e of consent.' 10 As t o safety , Auden is no authority : strategist s better tha n poets may determine whether w e really would al l be safe r b y unilaterall y dismantling th e apparatus of deterrence by whic h w e believe ourselves preserved. But a s to ethics, Auden is as good a guide as any strategist , possibly mor e reliable . Surely he i s right t o forc e ou r attentio n upo n the pligh t o f the innocent . Wh y do we punish a kidnapper more condignly tha n a robber, even sometimes a murderer? It i s because we abhor, and properl y abhor , th e crim e o f holding innocent lif e as hostage. By what sor t o f reasoning, then, doe s ou r societ y no t onl y condon e but indulg e in th e holding a s hostage th e live s of millions of innocents ? The issue has been posed i n this way: 'Nuclear-missil e weapons hol d ou t the prospect o f conflict which ma y b e neither subjec t to restrain t nor mean ingfully describe d a s defensive. Can suc h a war b e justified? Can ther e b e a moral sanctio n fo r threatenin g t o tak e a measure which, i f circumstances ever required carryin g it out, coul d fin d n o justification?' O n 2 2 October 1962 , speaking on televisio n with al l the emphasi s a t his command, th e presiden t o f the United States uttered th e followin g words: 'I t shal l be the polic y o f this nation t o regar d any nuclea r missile launched fro m Cuba against any natio n i n the Western Hemisphere as an attack b y th e Sovie t Union o n th e Unite d States , requiring a full retaliator y response upo n th e Sovie t Union. ' By what mora l law, by wha t sacre d text , by th e precep t o r exampl e o f what saintl y figure , i n response t o wha t prompting s of his own conscience , could John Kennedy dar e to serv e a national interest by riskin g the mutilatio n of mankind? If you pu t thi s question t o a statesman, he will have an answer - o f sorts . He will say tha t i t is not a fair question . If yo u pu t i t t o a strategist, he will lecture you o n th e distinctio n between 'action' policy an d 'declaratory' policy. Action policy , he will tell you, i s what 9 Th e Age o f Anxiety (Rando m House, New York 1946) , 19 10 Th e Corruptio n o f Innocent Neutrons,' The New York Times Magazine, 1 Aug. 1965

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a government intend s t o do. Declaratory polic y i s what i t says it intends t o do , very likely withou t intendin g to d o it. The President's statement , he will assure you, i s declaratory policy , not actio n policy . This answe r is hardly more satis factory tha n th e statesman' s answer . It doe s no t explai n how th e distinctio n between actio n polic y an d declaratory policy , whic h th e enem y i s not sup posed t o understand , will be readily apparent t o thos e wh o ar e not th e enemy . Nor doe s i t answe r the questio n o f th e ethica l righ t of an y statesman i n any circumstances to indulg e for whatever reaso n i n such dir e and dreadful threats , action o r declaratory a s the cas e may be . So what happen s i f you pu t th e questio n t o a moralist? U p to now , th e moralist ha s asked t o be excused. He has no answe r to th e question . H e has not eve n considered th e question . ' I fin d mysel f profoundl y i n anguish,' an American scientist ha s lamented, 'ove r th e fac t tha t no ethical discours e o f any weigh t o r nobility ha s been addresse d to th e problem o f nuclear weapons . What are we to thin k o f such a civilization, whic h ha s not bee n abl e t o tal k about th e prospec t o f killing almos t everybody , except in prudential and game-theoretical terms?' 11 Not withou t reaso n have moral philosophers an d theologians shie d awa y from question s o f thi s kind. The predicament s thus pose d ar e so macabre, so horrific, tha t t o appl y t o the m the traditiona l apparatu s of ethical discussio n results only i n black humour an d sick jokes. Ou r playwrights , frustrated be cause reality i s so much mor e luri d than an y plot s the y ca n devise, have created th e theatr e o f th e absurd . We are still waitin g for our mora l philosopher s and theologian s t o creat e a n ethics of th e absurd. The wor k ma y have alread y begun. At th e meeting s last year of th e Ecumenical Council o f the Roman Catholi c Church , the committee charge d wit h formulating position s fo r th e Church i n the modern worl d was faced with th e task o f contrivin g som e ethical precept s for nuclea r warfare. The committe e could no t reac h agreement . One of th e formulations causing its members t o set the tas k t o on e side wa s the following : Although, afte r al l the aid s for peacefu l discussion s have been exhausted , it may no t b e illicit, when one' s rights have been unjustl y hampered, t o defen d those right s agains t such unjust aggression by violenc e and force , nevertheless, the us e of arms, especially nuclear weapons, whos e effect s ar e greater tha n ca n be imagined an d therefor e canno t reasonabl y be regulated by men, exceeds all just proportio n an d therefor e mus t be judged before Go d an d man a s most wicked. 11 J . Robert Oppenheimer, quoted i n Nuel Phari Davis, Lawrence and Oppenheimer (Simon an d Schuster, New York 1968) , 329-30

172 Diplomac y an d its discontent s

This may not see m a n extreme positio n fo r those wh o profess devotio n t o th e gentle carpente r o f Galilee. Bu t i t was too extrem e fo r som e o f th e mor e worldly Churchmen o n th e Council. 'It i s important to mak e clear, ' one of the dissenters argued, 'that ther e ma y well exist object s which, i n a just war of defence, are legitimate target s for nuclea r weapons, even of vast strengt h ... To attac k a ballistic missil e o r a satellite missile i n the oute r atmospher e woul d be a legitimate ac t of defence, and with just proportion dul y preserved might require th e us e of a weapon o f vast power... The Counci l should not condem n the possessio n an d use of these weapons a s essentially an d necessaril y evil.' 12 At th e deliberation s o f thes e divines , solemnly debatin g the moralit y of a nuclear anti-missil e system, one does no t kno w whethe r t o laugh or weep. They recal l recondit e discussio n within th e thirteenth-centur y church . They recall a s well Oppenheimer's image of moralit y a s a flying trapeze, 13 an d Kierkegaard's compariso n o f the ma n o f faith t o a n acrobat. But funambulism is not enough . I f we keep ou r balance , if we keep ou r faith , i f indeed we keep our sanit y throughou t th e ethica l inanitie s of the atomi c age , it is not b y acrobatics but b y a n operation o n th e inne r ear of conscience, renderin g us impervious to height, an d to the depths below . Suppose w e assume, with Niebuhr , that withi n th e immoral societ y whic h i s the state s system ther e dwell s a moral mankind . Ho w should w e react? Shoul d we accept it s inequities with resignation , or with indignation ? Ought w e t o come t o term s with i t or ough t w e to declar e war on it? Is it a condition t o b e borne o r a situation t o be changed ? The literature of political theor y provide s two tradition s in which t o fin d an answer . They ar e usually describe d a s the realis t tradition an d th e idealis t tradition. I shall accep t thi s terminolog y fo r convenience , but s o as not t o over-simplify I shal l identif y th e principa l strain s which occu r in each . Plato's Thrasymachus, aske d t o defin e justice, replie d tha t it conform s t o the interest s o f th e stronger . Here we have the firs t tw o strain s of th e realist tradition. I will call it brutal realism. The bruta l realis t i s a realpolitiker o f an extreme kind . Ethics, he insists , have n o place i n politics. Migh t makes right. What is good fo r th e stat e i s good. Characteristically, the bruta l realist takes pleasure in his brutal realism. He prides himself o n his tough-mindedness. His nose i s hard. H e enjoys the com pany o f hawks . 12 Th e Times (London) , 1 1 Nov. 196 4 13 Th e Flying Trapeze: Three Crises for Physicists (Oxfor d University Press, London, New York, & Toronto 1964 )

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17 3

The bruta l realist i s not s o fashionable a figure a s he use d t o be , perhap s fortunately; specimens ar e hard t o find . Bu t not tha t hard, for ther e i s at leas t one ol d State Department hand, still a n important figur e i n the Washingto n policy community , who wave s his brutal realis m about lik e a bull-fighter's cape. Som e month s ago , Mr Dean Acheson recalle d wit h eviden t satisfaction how lightl y mora l considerations weighed with those , amon g whom h e was one, who in 194 9 too k th e decision t o produce th e hydrogen bomb : A respected colleagu e advised me tha t i t woul d be better tha t ou r whol e nation an d people shoul d peris h rathe r tha n b e a party t o a course so evil as producing tha t weapon . I told him tha t o n th e da y o f Judgment his view might b e confirmed an d tha t he wa s free t o g o forth an d preac h th e necessit y fo r salvation. It wa s not, however, a view whic h I could entertai n a s a public servant. 14 Here i s the authenti c voic e of th e bruta l realist: rasping in tone , sardonic in debate, crushin g in rejoinder, sure that he i s right. To belon g in the realis t tradition on e doe s not hav e to be a brutal realist . There i s another strain , which w e may cal l sceptical realism . The sceptica l realist is no discipl e of Thrasymachus, proclaimin g the might y t o b e righ t and throwin g th e wea k t o th e wolves . Still less is he a disciple o f Nietzsche, extolling a n anti-ethi c o f forc e an d violence. He is realistic not becaus e he is sadistic, but becaus e he i s sceptical. He i s sceptical o f th e suppositio n tha t if his own government deal t impec cably wit h others , thos e other s woul d dea l impeccabl y with it . A unilateral declaration o f moralit y woul d caus e th e res t t o tak e advantag e of such a curiosity a s a government determine d to mak e it s foreign polic y confor m t o wha t is right. Machiavelli, often though t t o b e a brutal realist, is for thi s reaso n a sceptical realist . He does advis e his Prince 'no t t o kee p fait h when i t would b e against his interest': but thi s i s counsel not o f perfection bu t o f necessity. 'I f men wer e al l good,' he immediatel y concedes , 'this precept would no t b e a good one ; but a s they are bad, an d would no t observ e thei r fait h wit h you , s o you ar e not boun d t o keep fait h with them.' 15 He is sceptical, a s well, of th e suppositio n tha t moral judgments ma y b e made wit h confidenc e i n such a welter of confusion . Th e skei n o f history i s so tangled, the motive s o f statesme n s o mixed, the caus e of event s so obscure, that rarely is he sur e o f what i s right an d wha t i s wrong. If a gifted historian 16 can tric k ou t s o obvious a villain as Hitler i n such a way a s to exonerat e hi m 14 'Ethic s in International Relations Today,' Th e New York Times, 1 0 Dec. 196 4 15 Th e Prince (Mento r Books, New York 1952) , 101- 2 16 Again , A.J.P. Taylor

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from responsibilit y fo r th e Second Worl d War, with how muc h les s assurance does on e approach th e more morall y ambiguou s figures of our times . Lenin , for example . O r Neville Chamberlain. Hard a s it is to judge the statesman , i t is harder stil l to judge his statecraft. 'There is no standar d o f righ t an d wrong applicable t o conflict s of political in terests,' wrote the permanen t head o f the British Foreig n Offic e i n 1912 . 'Was Alexander right o r wrong in invading the Persian Empire an d erecting on it s ruins the foundation s o f a flourishing Greek civilization ? Was William III righ t or wrong in putting a n end t o th e reig n of James II? Is Great Britai n right o r wrong in holding dominio n ove r India?' 17 There i s no shortag e o f simila r examples in our ow n day. In th e conflict s ove r Kashmir, over Berlin, over Rhodesia, over Vietnam, each disputan t is convinced o f th e justice of its cause, and views the struggl e as one betwee n goo d an d evil , right an d wrong. The sceptical realis t views the struggl e as one between tw o conflictin g conception s of right . It has been sai d that when John Kennedy was president, i t was his habit to as k not whethe r a proposed cours e o f action was good o r bad, right o r wrong; he asked instead: 'Ca n it work? Can it help? Ca n it pass?' Such ar e the concerns of the sceptica l strai n in the realis t tradition . I now tur n to th e idealist tradition , where agai n two strain s are found. One is brightly hopeful, blithely optimistic . I will cal l it th e strai n of liberal idealism, for i t carries within itsel f tw o o f th e tracer s of liberal thought: belie f in th e sweet reasonablenes s of mankind , and belief in the certai n improvement of mankind. Keyne s has told o f how h e an d his young friends a t Cambridge at the tur n of the centur y believed so passionately 'i n a continuing moral progress, by virtu e of which th e human rac e already consists o f reliable, decen t people, influenced by trut h an d objective standards,' 18 an d Stephen Spende r relates in his autobiography ho w he was taught at school of th e terrible things whic h had happened i n the past: tortures , Court o f the Sta r Chamber, Morton's Fork, Henr y VIII's wives, the Stam p Tax, the Bosto n Te a Party, slavery, the Industria l Revolution , th e Frenc h Revolution , Bismarck , the Boer War. Weighing in the scal e of human happiness against these wer e the Re form Act , Wilberforce, Mr Gladstone, Hom e Rule, Popular Education , th e United States , Health Insurance , the Leagu e of Nations. If the histor y book s were illustrated , the y gav e th e impression tha t th e worl d had bee n moving steadily forwar d in the pas t thousand s of years, from th e vague to th e defined, 17 G.P . Gooc h an d Harold Temperly , eds., British Documents on th e Origins of th e War, 1898-1914, VIII, Arbitration, Neutrality an d Security (HMSO , London 1932) , 54 9 18 Essays an d Sketches in Biography (Meridia n Books, New York 1956) , 25 3

The ways of statecraft 17 5

the savag e to th e civilized , the crud e to th e scientific, th e unfamiliar to th e known. I t was as though th e nineteent h centur y had bee n a machine absorb ing into itself a t on e end humanity dresse d i n fancy dress , unwashed , fierce and immoral , and emitting at th e othe r moder n men , in their hygienic houses , their zea l for reform , their ai r of having triumphed b y mechanical , economi c and scientifi c mean s over the passionate, superstitious, cruel, and poeti c past. 19 For th e futur e o f internationa l politics suc h a n outlook wa s heartening. Every da y in every way international politic s woul d get better an d better. It s inequities stemmed fro m som e mere malfunction o f th e system , no t fro m some inheren t defec t o r fatal fla w i n human nature . I n a speech t o th e Con gress on th e ev e of war i n 1917 , President Wilson forecast what th e futur e surely held i n store : 'W e ar e at th e beginnin g of a n age in which it will be insisted tha t th e sam e standards of conduc t an d of responsibility fo r wrong shal l be observed among nations and thei r governments that ar e observed among th e individual citizens of civilize d states.' Only a liberal idealis t coul d ris k s o reckless a prediction. Tw o decade s later, nations and thei r government s stoo d silently by whil e Italia n airme n dropped mustar d gas on Ethiopia, and Nazi troopers kille d Jew s on German streets. Muc h worse woul d follow . The strai n of liberal idealism accordingly has weakened i n the west ; bu t elsewhere flows more strongl y than ever . Leaders of newly independen t states in Asia and i n Africa d o no t accep t realpolitik a s real. Its characteristic deceptions, betrayals , cruelties, they constru e not a t al l as characteristic, bu t a s a species o f deformity. For th e deformatio n of international society the y blam e the shackle s of colonialism . Whe n these ar e cut awa y the syste m wil l be transformed. But wha t i f the shackle s are cut awa y an d the syste m remains ? If nation s are free d bu t kee p o n fighting ? Ther e i s still no nee d t o despair . Colonialism has given way t o neo-colonialism . Its shackle s ar e less visible but n o les s deforming. And i n time these , too , ca n be cu t away . And the n th e da y will dawn . The secon d strai n in th e idealis t traditio n I will call pharisean idealism . (Luke's Pharisee , you wil l remember, 'prayed thu s wit h himself: " O God, I give the e thanks that I am not a s the res t of man, extortioners, unjust , adult erers ...'") Pharisean idealists, like liberal idealists, are optimistic. Ther e are such thing s a s right an d wron g in foreign policy, fo r i s not thei r foreig n polic y nearly alway s right? Pharisean idealis m in recent years has been practise d most spectacularl y b y the Unite d States government; and o f all Americans, John Foster Dulle s has 19 World Within Worlds (Hamis h Hamilton, London 1951) , 1

176 Diplomacy and its discontents

the most celebrate d reputation fo r pharisean statement . Bu t th e pharisea n idealism o f which hi s speeche s ar e so perfect a n epitome b y n o mean s ceases with his death. On e of President Johnson' s addresse s dealing with American policy i n Vietnam provides an exquisite example : For centurie s nations hav e struggled among each other . Bu t w e dream o f a world wher e disputes are settled b y la w and reason. And w e will try t o make it so . For mos t o f history me n hav e hated an d killed on e another i n battle. But we drea m of an en d t o war . And w e will try t o mak e it so . For al l existence most me n hav e lived in poverty .. . But w e dream o f a world wher e all are fed and charge d with hope. An d w e will help t o mak e it so.20 And a month later , explaining wh y he foun d i t necessary to sen d troop s int o Santo Domingo , th e President declared : 'Thi s is required o f us by th e values which bin d u s together,' and went on - o r rather, his speech-writer went on to quote th e great Bolivar: '"The veil has been torn asunder , we have already seen th e light , and it is not ou r desir e t o b e thrus t bac k i n darkness."' 21 The Pharisee o f whom Luk e tell s u s may hav e been a hypocrite, an d pharisean idealism may be hypocritical. Bu t i t does not hav e to be , and i n its American manifestations ther e i s usually no hypocris y a t all . When Conor Cruise O'Brien writes tha t th e fac e of Adlai Stevenson a t th e Unite d Nations , 'with its shiftily earnes t advocate' s expression, ' was 'the ingratiating moral mas k which a toughly acquisitiv e society wear s before th e world i t robs,' 22 he gets it al l wrong. The piou s utterance s tha t 1 have quoted ar e not a t al l a façade behind whic h a cluster o f cynical manipulator s go about thei r dirt y business . Dirty busines s it may be, but i t is not though t t o b e so and it is characteristic of pharisean idealis m tha t it is thought not t o b e so. What cause d th e loo k o f pain tha t from tim e t o tim e crosse d th e features of Adlai Stevenson when defending th e Unite d State s a t the Unite d Nation s was not hi s hatred o f hypoc risy: it was his distaste fo r th e insensitivit y o f his political masters , whose voic e he had allowe d himsel f t o become. When McGeorge Bundy remark s that 'mea sured agains t th e recor d o f others... the break-down in the relatio n between what w e do an d what w e believe seems less severe in the Unite d State s than i n any othe r majo r nation,' 23 ther e i s no reaso n t o thin k hi m insincere . He really believes it. That may be the problem . 20 The New York Times, 8 Apr. 1965 21 The New York Times, 4 May 1965 22 Writers and Politics (Pantheo n Books, New York 1965) , xiv 23 'Th e Battlefields of Power and the Searchlight s of th e Academy,' in E.A.J. Johnson , éd., The Dimensions o f Diplomacy (John s Hopkins Press, Baltimore 1964), 8

The ways of statecraf t 17 7

Between realis m o n the one hand - whethe r bruta l or sceptical - and idealism o n the other - whether libera l or pharisean - i s no easy choice . We face no t a n embarrassment o f riche s bu t a n option o f difficulties . Still, 1 would no t b e th e goo d Canadia n I like t o thin k I am if I did no t tr y t o ope n up a middle way . Let u s call it practical idealism . The practica l idealis t know s th e ways o f statecraf t well. He knows thei r deceptions, thei r betrayals , thei r cruelties . He knows ho w pitiles s are their laws. He cannot hop e t o d o away with them . H e cannot, accordingly , share the outloo k o f the libera l idealist. H e cannot hop e to b e exempt fro m them . He cannot , accordingly , shar e th e outloo k o f the pharisea n idealist . But th e practica l idealis t knows just a s well how muc h wrong-doin g may be don e b y statesme n whos e mora l mandat e is too permissive . He will on thi s account refus e t o allo w raison d'état t o be thei r guide . They ar e not t o be trusted wit h s o dangerous a doctrine. I t lead s straight t o massacr e and geno cide, t o tota l wa r with terribl e weapons . And s o the practica l idealist , his idealism at once prompte d an d tempere d by hi s realism, cling s to a more stringen t ethic in international lif e tha n ma y be warrante d b y th e fact s of internationa l life. I f internationa l morality di d not exist , he woul d fin d i t necessar y to inven t it; for he know s tha t i f international moralit y di d not exist , people migh t no t exist . Practical idealis m ma y b e foun d i n the though t o f Ernst Troeltsch who , knowing how obviou s ar e the philosophica l difficultie s of th e concep t o f natu ral law, urged its acceptanc e in a last despairing effort t o sav e Weimar democ racy fro m fascism. 24 I t ma y als o be foun d in Freud, to who m ethica l system s are shocktroops o f th e reinforcement s called up b y cultur e for battle against the aggressiv e instincts o f mankind. Imagine, then , a meeting o f th e cabinet . A crucia l foreign polic y decisio n is to be taken - whethe r o r not t o run the blockade o f Berlin, send troop s to Korea, sen d troop s t o Vietnam. Various divisions of labour take place. Th e Prime Ministe r worries about nationa l unity . The Finance Minister is concerne d at th e cost . Th e Defenc e Minister i s anxious about logistics . The Secretar y o f State fo r External Affair s fret s abou t effect s o n friend s and foes . But ther e i s no Secretary o f State fo r Conscience t o spea k u p to as k two crucia l questions : Is it good? I s it right ? Lacking a Secretary o f State fo r Conscience i n the organizatio n o f ou r government, we should , a s practical idealists, insis t that his function b e performed by statesme n whose portfolio s bea r mor e prosai c titles . Otherwise we are in trouble. [Novembe r 1965 ] 24 Th e Idea s o f Natura l Law and Humanity,'in Otto Gierke, Natural La w and th e Theory o f Society, 1500-1800 (Cambridg e Universit y Press , Cambridg e 1950) , 220- 2

2

The ways of keeping faith 'In every system o f morality, whic h I have hitherto met with , I have always remark'd, tha t th e author proceed s for some tim e in the ordinary way of reasoning .. . when o f a sudden I am surpriz'd to find , tha t instead o f the usual copulations o f propositions, i s and is not, I meet wit h n o proposition tha t is not connecte d wit h an ought, o r ought not. Thi s chang e is imperceptible, but is, however, of the last importance.' So David Hume complained tw o centuries ago. It i s a fair complaint , an d I am anxious no t t o giv e you caus e to reproach m e with it . Let m e therefor e announc e that I am changing gears. Before, they wer e (more o r less) in neutral: now, they ar e engaged. They ar e shifting from th e is and is not t o th e ought an d ought not. Before , I attempted to describe th e ways of statecraft. Now, I am concerned with th e ways of keeping faith. What ought w e to expec t o f moral ma n caught in the coil s of th e inequitous state s system ? A criti c o f the polic y o f appeasement practise d by th e government s of th e United Kingdom an d th e Dominions before the Secon d Worl d War wrote of its practitioners: 'On e coul d not blam e them, on e could no t admir e them, on e could no t admir e anybody.' 1 Why not blam e them? I s it just because they did their best? Are statesme n t o be excused thei r follie s if they ac t in good faith ? Are w e t o judge them fo r effor t i n a world which usuall y judges for result? What i s so special abou t statesme n that when thei r plan s miscarry and thei r statecraft goe s awry we are not t o cal l the m guilty men ? 1 Th e Mist Procession: The Autobiography o f Lord Vansittart (Hutchinson , London -1958), 529

The ways of keeping faith 17 9

A theologica l answe r holds tha t statesmen , bein g instruments of God, ar e beyond reproac h b y lesser mortals . Thu s th e Professor o f Religion a t Princeto n University open s a discussion o f the ethics o f intervention - b y which h e mean s Suez, and the Bay of Pigs, and Santo Domingo , an d Vietnam - b y observing: 'Religious communities need t o stan d i n awe before people nowaday s calle d political "decision-makers, " o r rather befor e th e majest y o f top-mos t politica l agency. Political decisio n an d actio n i s an imag e of th e majest y of God.'2 A secula r version of thi s doctrine require s not s o much deferenc e to th e makers of policy a s compassion fo r them . It i s not th e divinit y o f thei r posi tion bu t it s poignancy whic h entreat s our indulgence . Those who ask this of us are usually thos e se t in authority ove r us: naturall y so, for the y stan d t o profit b y ou r forbearance, just as they stan d t o los e by ou r condemnation . And s o they sa y to us: 'Look - yo u do not know , yo u cannot know , how it is. You d o no t understan d th e agon y o f takin g decision s i n an imperfect world . If you knew , if you wer e one of us , you woul d no t judge s o harshly.' Or els e they say : 'Unles s you hav e been on e of us , you hav e no righ t t o judge so harshly.' They ma y eve n say : 'Unles s you have been on e o f us , you have n o right t o judge a t all.' What ar e we t o mak e o f specia l pleadin g such a s this? Is it simpl y self-pity? Is it, less simply, par t o f th e defensiv e fortification by which statesme n see k t o protect thei r nich e i n history? O r i s it a genuine manifestation o f th e poignanc y of power ? Much depend s o n circumstance , much depend s on personality . Certainly in reading thos e portion s o f Mackenzie King's diar y where he compare s hi s lot a s prime ministe r o f Canada t o Christ's agon y i n Gethsemane, one's inclinatio n (if not to o offende d b y th e blasphemy ) i s to recal l Harry Truman's advice : 'If you can' t stan d th e heat, ge t the hell ou t o f th e kitchen.' But this is not reall y very helpful. Cooks are temperamental creatures ; some o f th e bes t chef s give notice a t th e crucia l stage o f the preparatio n of a banquet. Bu t a prime minis ter wh o quit s in th e middle of some grav e internationa l crisis just becaus e h e finds th e awfulnes s of takin g decisions too heav y to b e borne doesn' t deserv e our gratitude, and doesn' t ge t it either . But perhap s the advic e is harsh a s well as unhelpful. Power ha s its poignan t aspects. Those who dispos e o f it can never do th e perfec t thin g with it . Always the policy-maker i s robbing Peter t o pay Paul, th e poor t o pa y the veterans, the old t o pa y th e young, th e far m t o pa y th e factory , the Maritimes to pa y Ontario. (Or , o f course, th e othe r wa y around. ) Nor , it i s said, can he d o th e gen2 Pau l Ramsey, The Ethic s of Intervention, ' Th e Review of Politics, XXVII, no 3 , July 1965,28 7

180 Diplomacy and its discontents

erous thin g wit h it . Behaviour admired i n individuals - kindliness , compassion , benevolence - i s not permitte d t o statesmen . A n individual who gives everything t o th e poor, who live s his life b y th e Sermo n o n th e Mount, may b e as admired a s he i s hard t o find . But a statesman who guide d hi s statecraft b y the Sermon o n th e Mount would bankrup t hi s country withi n a week, invit e aggression within a month, accomplis h th e destructio n of his country withi n a year . If th e professio n o f statecraf t is unlike other professions , shoul d w e the n not judge th e statesma n b y mor e lenien t standards? A physician whos e patien t dies throug h malpractic e o r neglec t face s an inquest o r a suit for damages ; an engineer whose bridg e collapses throug h fault y mathematic s o r throug h to o much san d an d to o littl e cement face s a royal commissio n o r a penitentiary sentence. Bu t the statesma n whos e policie s brin g ruin to a nation doe s no t even as k forgiveness. There is , he says , nothin g t o forgive. Why thi s should b e is hard t o understand . No doubt th e purely politica l leader cannot perfor m th e purely perfect act . Bu t ther e ar e no purel y politica l leaders, just a s there ar e no purel y perfect acts . These exis t a s constructs an d abstractions only ; the y ar e not foun d i n this world. Fo r analytica l purpose s we may separat e th e publi c figure and th e privat e man. Bu t ther e i s always a private ma n i n every public figure ; an d ofte n h e bursts throug h t o tel l th e pub lic figure wha t t o do. Not eve n the most dedicated , the mos t ruthless , the mos t public-centred, the power-hungries t of statesme n ca n always keep his emotion s from intrudin g upon , an d giving final for m to , hi s statecraft . Nor i s it desirabl e that he should . In 1946 , th e British government entered int o negotiation s wit h Ne w Zealand. I t neede d foo d badly , an d had ver y little t o pa y fo r it. The ministe r in volved has sinc e recalle d what happened : I expecte d a bargaining sessio n a s difficult a s any other . Instead , the leade r o f the Ne w Zealand delegatio n opene d th e proceeding s i n word s I shall neve r for get. "W e have not com e t o as k you, 'Wha t ca n you give? ' We have come t o ask , 'What d o you need? ' When you stoo d alone , you preserve d ou r freedo m fo r us . Now tel l u s what butter , wha t meat , what grain s you need, an d - whateve r th e sacrifice ma y be for the New Zealand peopl e - w e will supply it." 3 And the y did . Som e year s later, the New Zealanders were th e beneficiarie s o f magnanimity i n statecraft. In 196 2 th e delegates to th e Common Marke t discussed th e probabl e effects o f British entry upon Ne w Zealand's economy . 3 Rt . Hon . Hilar y Marquand , quoted b y Harol d Wilson , Unite d Kingdom , House o f Commons Debates, DCXLV, col. 6155 , 3 Aug. 196 1

The ways of keeping faith 18 1

These wer e thought t o be disastrous , but th e foreig n minister o f France remained unmoved . 'Wha t obligations, ' asked M . Couve de Murville, 'hav e we towards New Zealanders?' Th e foreig n minister of Belgium answered: 'Th e fact tha t twic e i n our lifetim e their me n have com e ove r t o b e killed fo r free dom.' M. Couve de Murville was unimpressed. 'Wh y ar e we bound,' he persisted, 'to do anythin g for them?' 'Because, ' M. Spaak replied , 'because we are sitting around thi s tabl e organizing their ruin.' 4 For n o good reason , then , theologica l o r secular , are statesmen exemp t from judgment. Bu t ho w ar e they t o be judged? What i s the criterio n o f guilt? Not, certainly , failure. The histor y o f foreig n policy i s replete wit h failures , o f which som e ar e ignoble an d others magnificent . Churchill's failur e t o prevent appeasement; Attlee's failur e t o preven t partition; Hammarskjold' s failur e t o prevent war - thes e ar e magnificent failures . In each cas e th e statesma n con cerned trie d t o do th e righ t thing . He is not guilt y just becaus e he di d no t succeed. Not th e failur e o f his enterprise, but th e pursui t of th e wrong enterprise, ought t o brin g upon th e statesman th e wrath of others . An d he pursue s the wrong enterprise through askin g th e wrong questions. I n th e preceding sectio n I wrote o f th e cree d o f th e sceptica l realist, of which I was critical; and o f th e creed o f th e practica l idealist , of which I was not. Th e sceptica l realis t asks : 'Will i t work? Wil l i t pass? Will it help?' To th e practica l idealist, th e las t o f these question s i s of th e firs t importance , an d he ask s it i n an amended form . Not just : 'Wil l it help?' but: 'Wil l i t help t o reliev e human suffering , her e an d now?' The statesma n who treat s this question cynically , or to who m i t seem s irrelevant, or t o whom i t never occurs, has broken fait h wit h th e politica l com munity which i s his trust. He doe s not deserv e its admiration, and he shoul d not escap e it s blame. Political obligatio n i s for Machiavelli a problem fo r peopl e a t th e pinnacl e o f power: h e i s concerned wit h th e way prince s keep faith . Bu t what o f peopl e lower down ? Wha t of thos e wh o serv e the Prince an d execute his commands ? How may the y kee p faith ? 'A diploma t i s an honest man sen t t o li e abroad fo r his country.' Thi s weary pun , no w mor e tha n thre e hundre d years old, ma y not flatte r th e pro fession, but i t convey s well enough it s occupational hazard . I t i s striking how few o f it s members protest agains t the sor t o f thing s it require s them t o do . This i s not a t al l because wha t the y ar e required t o d o i s always clean an d 4 Quote d i n Nora Beloff, The General Says N o (Pengui n Books, Harmondsworth 1963 )

182 Diplomacy and its discontents

decent. Rathe r i t is because the whol e etho s o f th e professio n is designed to quell the mora l sensibilitie s of its members. It i s as though foreig n office s hav e built int o thei r basements some sor t of low temperatur e chamber where fledgling foreign servic e officers deposi t thei r conscience s on recruitmen t for redemption onl y o n retirement. By then the y ar e too deepl y frozen t o tha w out i n time. Satow's Guide t o Diplomatic Practice tell s how t o write despatches an d warns against accepting bribes (though no t agains t accepting gifts). Bu t it offers n o hints t o th e junior diplomatist o n how t o go about expressing to his superiors his qualms about hi s country's policy . These ar e dangerous thoughts whic h th e seasone d diplomatist wil l long since have learned to suppress. For, a s Satow cautions , 'those in whose hands is placed th e supreme direction o f foreig n relation s are alone able t o decid e which shoul d be th e main object o f state policy.' 5 Diplomacy i s not a n art but a craft. Its practitioners, with lovin g attention to detail , take satisfactio n no t i n creation but i n workmanship. If the objec t of thei r labou r turn s out t o be some hideous gargoyle, that is not thei r fault . They are executants of th e design s of others . These ma y b e squali d a s well as grand. The moder n diplomatist i s fortunate in having little tim e for brooding. If there wer e not s o many cable s to rea d and despatches t o draft an d partie s through whic h t o whirl, he migh t go quickly t o pieces . Even so the strai n is great. Occasionally i t shows . The local equivalen t of Satow's Guide i s Cadieux's The Canadian Diplomat. This contribution t o th e literature by th e present Under Secretary of State fo r External Affair s allude s to ' a certain tenseness, a n uneasiness, which ca n be occasionally glimpse d beneath th e unruffle d exterio r of the diplomat, whos e profession consist s in a curious blending of freedo m an d o f restraint, of th e changing and o f th e stable , o f splendou r and o f simplicity , o f crest s and hol lows, o f coming an d going.'6 M. Cadieux is himself to o muc h a diplomat t o explain just what he i s getting at in this mysterious passage, but wha t he really means is this: th e diplomatis t i s a tragic figure. An artis t compelled t o b e a n artisan, a painter forbidde n to paint , a poet wh o mus t spend his most creativ e hours grinding out th e gibberish of state . Not fo r a moment i s any foreig n servic e officer o n thi s accoun t entitle d t o our sympathy . Th e traged y of his position,' Louis Halle has written, 'i s implicit 5 4t h ed . (Oxford Universit y Press, London 1957) , 99-100 6 Marce l Cadieux, Th e Canadian Diplomat: A n Essay i n Definition (Universit y of Toronto Press, Toronto 1963) , 11 0

The ways of keeping faith 18 3

only. Since th e measur e of traged y is always th e qualit y o f th e victim , the implicit traged y i s realized onl y t o th e exten t tha t th e diploma t represent s intellectual and mora l distinction . Most career diplomats, lik e mos t o f u s others , have n o ai m except t o ge t on with thei r careers. ' But ther e ar e exceptions . Consider Adlai Stevenson again . As a politician hi s career is among th e select compan y o f magnificen t failures . As a diplomatist it was a tragedy. 'For six weeks I had t o si t ther e i n th e Unite d Nations,' Adlai Stevenson tol d a friend soo n befor e his death, 'an d defen d th e polic y of m y countr y i n Sant o Domingo althoug h i t was a massive blunder from beginning to en d .. . Thos e six weeks too k severa l years off m y life.' 7 My othe r exceptio n i s a Canadian. In 193 8 Lorin g Christi e was the secon d ranking member of th e Departmen t o f External Affairs. Like on e o r tw o other s who hav e climbed t o th e to p o f that greasy pole, he was a man o f profoun d and eve n passionate sensibility, which h e went t o great lengths to conceal . What happened a t Munich was too muc h fo r him t o bea r i n silence, an d he poured ou t hi s feeling s i n a letter t o a friend: I have been reflecting on wha t I have to d o t o ear n my keep . I am a member of on e of these sovereig n creatures - Canada . I am paid b y the othe r members , the peopl e o f Canada, to hel p manag e and express thei r creatur e i n its relation s with th e others . Th e ultimate test o n m y des k is: "Wil l thi s 'save ' the peopl e of Canada ? Will it advantag e them?" The chai n o f responsibility allow s no escape fro m this . I a m not a t th e momen t recoilin g fro m having to mes s around i n th e filth y mug's gam e which i s called "diplomacy" and "internationa l relations. " 1 am simply illustratin g .. . I have see n th e insid e o f thi s creature ; I have had t o con coct an d eve n mout h hi s gibberish; I know ho w los t thes e monsters are ... I do not ye t kno w what th e job o f being one o f thei r servant s will eventually do t o me ... 8 Those who serv e th e stat e a s warriors are largely spare d thes e emotiona l stresses and strains . They ar e protected b y thei r trainin g an d thei r ethi c which , more tha n i n an y othe r profession , cultivat e th e idea l o f unquestioning obedi ence t o highe r command . The y ar e protected a s well by th e natur e o f thei r mission. The diplomatis t ma y well experience malais e whe n require d t o exe cute policie s which see m t o him likel y t o resul t in war; for th e onse t o f war is to him a signification o f his failure. But t o th e militar y th e onse t o f war 7 A s quoted i n th e Globe and Mail (Toronto) , 1 5 July 1965 . Stevenson's remark, made in th e presence of David Schoenbru n t o Averel l Harriman, evoked an officia l denia l from th e White House. 8 Christi e Papers, Dept of External Affairs, Ottawa

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signifies opportunity , no t failure . It enable s the militar y t o serv e the stat e in the traditiona l way . The motto of the Strategic Air Command notwithstand ing, war i s its profession . Even so , the military servan t of th e stat e is not wholl y fre e o f ethica l dilem mas. The mos t discipline d warrio r may confron t th e issu e o f conscientious ob jection. I t doe s not happe n often . After all , th e soldie r is trained t o kill . He is a professional a t cruelty . He does not bal k a t bloodshed . T o be sur e ther e ar e exceptions. Genera l de la Bollardière resigned his comman d i n Algeria because , as he said , he was a paratrooper, no t a Gestapo torturer . Bu t suc h me n are rare. The bombers o f Hiroshima an d Nagasaki (leaving aside th e curiou s cas e of Major Eatherley ) see m marvellousl y untroubled . Th e airme n wh o dail y scourge th e village s of Vietnam have ready replie s to thos e who exhibit con cern on thei r behalf : this , they say , is war, and war, they say , is hell. There i s a stor y tha t at th e tim e o f Suez, when th e Soviet Unio n threatene d th e Unite d Kingdom wit h nuclear bombardmen t i f the Egyptia n operatio n wa s not aban doned, President Eisenhowe r calle d his Strategic Air Commander t o orde r an attack alert . 'Ver y good, Sir,' came th e instan t reply . 'Which side?' General LeMay was a real professional. The amateu r warrior, unused t o th e crueltie s of war, is less able t o ris e t o such heights - o r to sink t o such depths . And since muc h militar y powe r is today provide d by amateur warriors - civilia n soldiers conscripted b y the state - thei r situatio n is worth attention . Civilized societ y make s provisio n for conscientious objection . Tha t migh t be more strongl y put. Civilize d society demands conscientious objection . I t holds tha t whe n a citizen find s he has to disobe y th e stat e in order t o obe y his conscience, he i s the better citize n fo r obeyin g his conscience . When conscientiou s objection become s a virtue, so that th e conscientiou s objector i s in a sense th e idea l citizen , it i s because societ y hold s a s valid tw o basic assumptions. First, tha t th e defectio n of a small number of conscientiou s objectors will no t imperi l the safet y o f the state . Second , tha t th e society , being civilized, will not ac t i n such a way a s to provok e conscientiou s objectio n on a large scale. Neither o f thes e assumption s can today b e held wit h muc h assurance . The behaviour o f state s in the moder n state s system, characterized b y deceit , b y treachery, by cruelty , is precisely of a kind t o provoke large-scale protest among an y morall y sensitive citizenry. And small-scal e defection ma y have the graves t consequences. When a nuclear physicist goes over t o th e enemy , taking his secrets with him, th e entir e balance of power may b e changed. Whe n a civilia n soldier refuse s t o embar k fo r a theatre o f war because th e wa r t o hi m seems evil, his refusal ma y touc h th e nationa l nerve, causing it t o fail ; or touc h the nationa l conscience, causing it t o stir .

The ways of keeping faith 18 5

That public s more than statesmen ar e morally fastidiou s about foreig n policy was the confiden t belie f of those libera l idealists who survive d the First World War. Throughout this instrument,' said Woodrow Wilson of the Leagu e of Nations, 'we are dependent primarily and chiefly upon one great force, and that i s the moral force of the public opinion o f the world - th e cleansing and clarifying an d compelling influences of publicity.' And Lord Robert Cecil : The grea t weapon we rely on is public opinion .. . and if we are wrong about that, then th e whole thing i s wrong.'9 It turne d out the y were wrong about that . Public opinion betwee n two world wars was not cleansing ; it was not clarifying ; and if it compelle d a t all , it compelled a s often a s not i n the wrong direction. Expecte d t o exer t a constructive influence upon th e conduc t o f foreign policy, public opinion proved instead to be fitfu l an d gullible, fickle and craven. When the nee d was to rearm, the publi c clamoured fo r disarmament. When the nee d was for belligerence, th e public was pacifist. When the need was for defyin g th e dictators , the publi c was for appeasing dictators. Has it done much better since ? That, I suppose, is a matter o f opinion; m y own is that it has not don e much better since. There i s as much gullibilit y abou t as ever; and ther e i s something else . We seem to have developed an addiction t o violence, a morbid fascinatio n with crisis. Albert Camus has noted th e reactio n of people durin g the Hungarian Revolution: the y spare d 'neither applaus e nor virtuous tears before returning to their slipper s like footbal l enthusiast s afte r a big game.'10 The week must be crammed with catastrophe , s o that at its close th e hour ma y have seven days. A new form of public protest has recently appeared amon g us. It operate s in a twilight zon e between violence and non-violence. Its technique s ar e varied, sometimes very daring. The protestants paddl e tiny boat s where great powers prove their nuclea r prowess. They clin g to the hulls of atomic submarines . They marc h on missile bases and lie on track s in front o f troop-trains. They withhold taxes . They bur n draft cards. Norman Morrison has burned himself. Of thei r effectivenes s it may be too soo n to speak. Their ranks , we know, are few. They consis t o f knaves, and fools, and heroes - i n what proportio n who ca n tell? They ma y give aid and comfort t o th e enemy. They ma y give the President sleeples s nights. But will they chang e his mind?

Hey, Hey, LBJ! How many kids did you kill today ? 9 Quote d i n Hans J. Morgenthau./to/ífící Among Nations, 3r d ed. (Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1960) , 26 0 10 Resistance, Rebellion, and Death (Alfre d A. Knopf, New York 1960) , 157

186 Diplomacy and its discontents

If thi s cruel rhyme i s representative of their attitude , on e would thin k not. They may mortify; the y wil l not convert . Nor wil l they reach, save as irritating noises , the ear s of th e man i n the street. He has neither tast e nor temperamen t no r tim e fo r such shenanigans ; he is preoccupied wit h secon d car s and second mortgages . He is likely t o look upon th e protestant s fo r peace a s shrill and sour and cranky, outside th e mainstream o f national life , offerin g nothin g o f relevance to th e making up of his own mind . Foreign policy, i n societies like ours , is meant to be an expression o f th e contents of that mind - biased, addled , empty a s it may variously be. Only when i t is straightened ou t wil l foreign policy straighte n out . But ca n we wait so long? If, a s I have argued, neither th e publi c service nor th e publi c at large is specially equipped, an d therefore speciall y obligated , t o confron t statesme n with thei r wrong-doing, can no one do the job? Someone can . The intellectual . There ma y stil l b e Canadians who smil e or snigger at this suggestion. I suppose the m t o be in the sam e condition o f arrested development as Canadians forty year s ago who though t a professor was 'a man who plays the pian o i n a house o f meretricious entertainment.' All of you will share my convictio n tha t the intellectua l i s uniquely a custodian of the nationa l conscience . Al l of yo u will be more interested i n discussing the difficultie s th e intellectua l face s in carrying out thi s assignment than in arguing over whether o r not i t is properly his to carry out. There ar e as many ways of defining intellectuals as there ar e intellectuals to define themselves . I like th e definition Camus once jotted dow n i n his notebook: 'A n intellectual i s someone whose mind watches itself.'11 An intellectua l breaks faith when he allows his mind t o giv e up th e watch, t o go off duty . No kind o f intellectual ha s more spectacularl y broken fait h tha n the scien tific intellectual . The scientist has lugged Pandora's box int o his laboratory and left th e lid open fo r years on end. Only a fiend coul d knowingly do this : an d it is fitting tha t th e Arch-Fiend i n Hochhuth's drama is not a Nazi politician , not a storm-trooper, not eve n Eichmann, but a doctor: Brain tissue fro m a pair o f Jewish twins, two kid s from Calais , preserved in formaldehyde. Rather interestin g comparativ e sections . 11 Notebooks, 1935-1942 (Modern Library, New York 1965) , 28

The ways of keeping faith 18 7

I brought th e specime n wit h me fo r a girl who's takin g a first cours e in histology ... 12 In th e presenc e of such a monster we are in the presenc e not o f sin, but o f Absolute Evil. I t knows no guilt. It knows no shame . But ther e i s another kin d of scientist wh o knows both guilt an d shame . Typically he invent s and produces weapons of mass destruction. Typically h e is a physicist, a nuclear physicist . It i s not hi s intention t o d o wrong and, at the beginning, he was not con scious of doing wrong. One is struck by th e gusto, the enthusiasm , th e almos t school-boy exuberanc e of the scientist s o f the Manhattan Project, working t o perfect a product t o kill on e hundred thousan d people . Only th e dee d itself shocked the m int o recognition . The n guil t fel l o n them like radioactive rain . Many o f those who had cheerfull y worked on the atomi c bomb shran k fro m work on th e hydrogen bomb. A majority on a scientific committee advise d the President no t t o mak e th e hydrogen bomb: suc h restraint, they argued, might hel p t o end th e arm s race. A minority flatly proclaime d tha t 'thi s weapon i s an evil thing.... We think it i s wrong on fundamental ethica l ground s to initiate developmen t o f such a weapon.'13 But their protest wa s ignored. The work went forward . Thermonuclear weapons were designed, built, tested, massproduced. It coul d no t have been don e withou t scientist s to do it. Enough cam e forward, their mora l burde n lightened b y a minute divisio n of labour. 'Men work on gyromechanisms,' Ralph E . Lapp has written, 'on micro-miniaturized electronics, on plasma physics . It i s easy to forge t th e monstrou s machines of destruction t o which thei r work is a contribution.'14 Fragmentatio n is the mothe r of amnesia . But i n the subconsciou s guilt remains, never t o b e driven out. 'I n som e sort of crude sense which n o vulgarity, no humour, no overstatement can quite extinguish,' one of their number has testified out o f the depth s o f his torment, 'th e physicists hav e known sin ; and this is a knowledge whic h the y cannot lose.' 1? No wonder the dramatists have had a field da y with physicists : Brecht, and Durrenmatt, and now a play based o n the transcrip t of th e proceedings in the cas e of J. Rober t Oppenheimer , than whic h n o stage drama could b e more bizarre, or poignant . 12 Th e Deputy (Grov e Press, New York 1964) , 7 0 13 Quote d in Robert Gilpin, American Scientists an d Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton Universit y Press, Princeton, NJ, 1962) , 94 14 Kill and Overkill: Th e Strategy o f Annihilation (Basi c Books, New York 1962) , 2 1 15 Quote d in Gilpin, American Scientists an d Nuclear Weapons Policy, 25- 6

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First cousin s to the scientific intellectuals , often coming fro m thei r ranks, are the defence intellectual s - tha t group of scholar-strategist-consultants (not necessarily in that order ) who, it has been said, prowl th e corridors of the Pentagon a s Jesuits moved through th e court s of Vienna and Madrid three centuries ago. Their professio n is to think abou t the unthinkable - abou t th e circumstances in which nuclear wars might be fought, about the consequence s of nuclear wars being fought. It i s not a pretty subject . But ca n one fairl y b e charged with lacking moral scruple just for thinkin g o f such things? Herman Kahn's lectures on thermonuclear wa r were treated a s Hitler's Mein Kampf ought t o have been treated (but, alas , was not): a n 'evil and tenebrous book,' someone called it; 'a tract on mass murder: how to plan it, how to commi t it , how to get away with it , how to justify it.' 16 I add at once that no reading of the book undertake n wit h an y intellectual discrimination could possibl y sus tain s o perverse an interpretation of its thesis and its purpose. All the same , preoccupation wit h the problems of nuclear war, while no t itself morally reprehensible , tends to make thos e s o preoccupied somewhat deficient i n moral sensitivity. All too easily , all too frequently , they succumb to th e sicknes s of brutal realism in its most sadistic and disagreeable form. Consider the sor t of scenario on which th e members of the Hudson Institute are wont t o sharpen thei r wits: The military balanc e of power has changed and U S forces become so vulnerable that after a Soviet first strik e a t U S forces the U S no longer has a devastating second strike capability. A t that poin t th e Soviet s warn that fo r every Soviet cit y w e destroy, the y wil l demolish fiv e o f its American counterparts. The ultimatum concludes: "Yo u know better than we do what kind of country you wan t to have when the war is over. Pick whatever major citie s you wish to be destroyed an d we will destroy them." 17 The exercise consists i n figuring out what Washington does next. The game is called 'Urba n Renewal.' I recognize, of course, the need to allow to intellect the freest possibl e play an d the widest possible latitude . But surely its prolonged attention t o these sort s of problems is not ver y good fo r the human spirit. It may not be so very good fo r the human rac e either. But wha t o f the rank-and-file, run-of-the-mill, intelligentsia - thos e o f us who work well within thes e oute r limits of science and strategy? Our moral dilemmas are less spectacular. But the y ar e no less troublesome. 16 Jame s Newman, in Scientific American, CCIV, no 3, Mai. 1961,197-8 17 Quote d b y Frances Fitzgerald, 'Herma n Kahn: Metaphors and Scenarios,' New York Herald Tribune Magazine, 4 July 1965 , 4 1

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One temptatio n i s to enter the servic e of the state. It is a temptation t o be resisted . I do not inten d t o demean the public service in any way, or to diminis h the importanc e o f what it does. I am told tha t th e life o f the civi l servant is deeply satisfying. Dean Acheson testifie s that 't o everyone who has ever experienced it the retur n from publi c life to private life leave s one feeling flat and empty.' It may well be so. I take his word for it. But th e public service is no place for th e intellectual. Th e intellectua l can not d o it justice. The environment is alien. Particularly the environment in which foreig n policy i s made. An intellectual, displace d from his proper preoccupation t o advis e governments on foreig n policy , tends characteristically t o under- or over-react. He under-reacts if, as is likely, he i s unduly deferential in the presenc e of power . Arthur Schlesinger tell s in his memoirs of the Kennedy presidency of his fail ure t o protest agains t the Bay of Pigs operation despit e a strong premonitio n of disaster: One's impulse t o blo w the whistle o n this nonsens e was simply undone by th e circumstances of the occasion . I t is one thing , for a special assistant like myself, to tal k frankl y i n private to a president; and anothe r fo r a college professor, fres h t o government, to interpose his unassisted judgment in open meeting against such august figures as the Secretarie s of State and Defens e an d th e Joint Chief s of Staff. 18 Or else, and just a s likely, he i s unduly scornful of events and circumstances , ignoring or belittling their capacit y t o frustrate hi s favourite project. 'A s he could mould th e printed wor d to suit his ideas,' Hans Morgenthau points out , 'so he now expects the rea l world t o respond to his actions. Hence his confidence i n himself, his pride, his optimism'19 - his over-reaction. Hence also his almost invariabl e record of failure. The history o f recent international rela tions is strewn with th e litter of the schemes of intellectuals-turned-policymakers, or of intellectuals-turned-policy advisors: schemes contrived in haste, put forwar d in conceit, an d abandoned, as soon a s may be decently possible , by th e professional s in government who know fro m har d experienc e wha t policy-making i s all about. But th e intellectual a s policy-maker not onl y make s a mess of policy; he largely destroys himself a s an intellectual. 'I t is only knowledge freely acquire d that is disinterested,' Walter Lippmann wisely remarke d many years ago. 'When 18 A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy i n the White House (Houghto n Mifflin, Bosto n 1965), 255 19 'Th e Sweet Smell of Success,' The New York Review of Books, 30 July 1964 , 6

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those whose professio n it is to teac h an d to investigate become th e makers of policy, become politician s an d leaders of causes, they are committed. Nothin g they sa y can be relied on as disinterested. Nothing the y teac h ca n be trusted as scientific.'20 I t is a harsh verdict, but fair . So if the intellectua l i s to remai n a useful criti c o f foreign policy , retain ing his capacity fo r detached analysi s and informed condemnation , h e must stay out o f government. He must als o stay out o f the consultin g business. A mind whose functio n it is to keep watch on itself canno t functio n properl y when rented out t o special pleaders. The practice i s too commo n fo r comfort, too commo n fo r com ment. A conspiracy o f silence muffle s th e activitie s of what on e authority ha s described a s 'a new kind of condottieri, mercenaries of science and scholar ship hooded wit h doctorate s and ready for hire o n studies to contrac t speci fication.'21 Th e intellectual should kee p his distance from thos e wh o want t o buy his thoughts. Keepin g his distance will help him keep his principles and , in keeping his principles, he keeps faith . If th e intellectual experience s the crudes t kind of degradation when he delivers his mind t o someone else' s payroll, o r to someon e else' s charge , he is exposed t o degradatio n at its deadliest when he is self-employed. Then i t is that he may allow his capacity fo r moral protest t o serve himself mor e tha n the community. An article lavish in its praise for th e first of the American teach-in s describes its origins in 'an idea which permitte d th e concerne d professiona l t o envision himself a s the conqueror , no t o f governments, but rathe r o f his own sense of impotence.' 22 Motives are always mixed, and it is foolish t o expec t simon-purity. But when the motive of protest become s primarily therapeuti c it places in jeopardy tha t sense of moral discrimination whic h i t is the firs t duty of the intellectual t o develop. He develops instead a craving for protest . The time come s when any cause will do. Unscrupulous parties flourish the appropriate symbol s an d imagery before him, sure of his response. Moral protest become s mora l pot. Th e intellectual, hooke d b y the needs of his addiction, n o longer i s able, no longer cares, to distinguis h right from wrong. Here is the ultimate i n trahison des clercs. Confronted i n the precedin g section wit h a dilemma of my own devising, I sough t escap e through th e device, so typically Canadian , of the middle way . This time ther e i s no such exit. 20 Th e Deepes t Issue of Our Time,' 15 June 1936 , i n Clinton Rossite r an d James Lare, eds., Th e Essential Lippmann (Rando m House, New York 1963), 388 21 Gerar d Piel , quoted i n The New York Review o f Books, 5 Aug. 1965, 1 1 22 Mar c Pilsuk, The Firs t Teach-in : An Insight into Professional Activism,' in The Correspondent, n o 34, spring-summer 1965 , 6

The ways of keeping faith 191

Before th e intellectua l ar e two life-styles, and two alone . One is the life style of detachment. The other th e life-style o f commitment. On e has to choose. My late teacher , Harold Innis, knowing better tha n anyon e else how heavily mined and menaced are the slope s of commitment leadin g away fro m th e ivory tower , begged the intellectual to remain within its precincts. I used to thin k thi s good advice . Now I think otherwise. It is the intellec t of commitment which i n spite of all my cautionary tale s I must finally commend to you. Not just because it is in short suppl y - althoug h i n Canada, God knows, it is in short supply . But rather because it alon e enables the intellectual to do his job. A detached min d may keep watch upon itself, but i t watches over wasteland. Only a mind ethicall y anaesthetized , morally lobotomized, remains detached fro m wha t statesme n are doing to our world. [November 1965 ]

3

The words of world politics 'He hath sounded forth the trumpet tha t shall never call... readjustment.' Such is the battle hymn o f a republic whose campaigns in southeast Asi a are turning out s o badly that none of its officials dar e admit in public what is going on. If truth i s the firs t casualt y in war, language is the second . Our political discourse is currently infected by th e same disease that felled German afte r Worl d War II when the language of Goethe an d Rilke collapse d beneath the burden of guilt th e Third Reic h passed on to its inheritors, who only wanted to forget . For twelv e years there had seeped into thei r vocabulary the pronouns of the holocaust. Jew , Pole, an d Russian had become synonymous with lice, roach, and vermin. Words had lost thei r way in a language which, in George Steiner's phrase, had gotten th e habits o f hell into its syntax. It was moreover pulped by lies. So far we've not bee n called upon t o ratiocinat e a genocide. Yet afte r a quarter century of nuclear deterrence, after a decade of evil war on th e periphery, th e language of our politics i s sick, sick, sick. Its words are blunted a t their cuttin g edge, their powe r to discriminate diminished. What Steiner wrote of German in 195 9 w e may write of English in 197 1 : 'It will no longer perform, quite a s well as it used to, its two principal functions: th e conveyanc e of humane order which we call law, and the communicatio n o f the quic k of the human spirit , which we call grace.'1 The responsibility for the purity o f language, wrote Thomas Mann when the Nazis took awa y his honorary doctorate , 'doe s not have merely an estheti c 1 'Th e Hollow Miracle,' in Language and Silence: Essays on Language, Literature and the Inhuman (Atheneum , New York 1970) , 101

The words of world politics 19 3

sense. The responsibilit y fo r language is, in essence, a human responsibility.' 2 Politicians a s well as artists have a duty t o discharg e it. Politicians discharg e it best by combattin g th e evasions of bureaucracy. Where the bureaucrat says 'readjustment,' th e politician shoul d admi t 'retreat. ' Where the bureaucrat says 'protective reaction,' the politician shoul d speak of 'bomb attack,' and specify the tonnag e and the target. Where the bureaucrat says 'unemployment' - or even more evasivel y 'redundancy' - th e politician shoul d insist that men and women can't find jobs. Do politicians discharg e their dut y to spea k plainly o f such matters? Consider how L.B. Pearson commemorate s the Battle o f Vimy Ridge. (No one who call s a selection o f his speeches Words an d Occasions properly objects to scrutin y of the words he chooses t o mark occasions.) 'Onl y by collective action fo r collective defenc e with collectiv e strength unde r collective contro l can there be maximum deterrence against aggression.' 3 What is being perpetrated here is totalitarian pros e - Pentagon or Kremlin, it doesn't matte r which - a prose, as Norman Mailer says of it, that 'does not define , does not deliver.' The reluctance t o define , the hesitation t o deliver, are readily explained . Pearson's clutc h of 'collectives' conceal a reality too unpleasan t t o be shown without wrap s - except b y risking public indignation. 'Collective actio n through a strong and cohesive coalitio n fo r policy an d defence' i s a euphemism for th e strateg y which threaten s millions o f innocents with slaughte r so savage, so gross, that it s survivors would envy the dead - a perfect example of Orwellian Newspeak, which 'differe d fro m mos t al l other language s in that its vocabulary grew smaller instead of larger every year.'4 The failur e of our political discours e to defin e an d to delive r is reflected in the prevailing low estate of rhetoric. Rhetoric ha s come t o mean bad rhetoric. Thus, an historian writes that the oratory o f Huey Long was 'eloquent but shameless ' - seemingl y uncaring that i t can't b e both at once. 'Th e swelling anaphoras of a Southern Congressman, ' observes John Illo (a student of rhetoric in its true sense), 'are not eloquen t bu t ludicrous , raising irrepressible images of toad s and swine ... But such is the tradition o f vacant and meaningless political orator y i n America, and such the profusion o f the universally accepted an d discredited rhetori c of advertising, that the public nod s and acquiesces.' 5 2 A n Exchange of Letters (Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1937 ) 3 (Universit y of Toronto Press, Toronto 1970) , 265 4 Georg e Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (Pengui n Books, Harmondsworth 1954) , 249 5 'Th e Rhetoric o f Malcolm X,' in Peter Spackman an d Lee Ambrose, eds., The Columbia University Forum Anthology (Atheneum , New York 1968) , 260

194 Diplomacy and its discontents

Is this the traditio n o f political oratory i n Canada? I've referre d to th e rhetoric of L.B. Pearson and (by implication only ) to th e rhetoric o f J.G . Diefenbaker. What of the rhetori c o f Pierre Trudeau? Has he done anythin g 'to purify th e dialect of the tribe?' One of many sycophant s praise s his speeches as 'models of steely lucidity.' That evaluatio n seem s extravagant. (I refe r t o speeche s made in English; I can' t judge those he makes in French.) Trudeau does not indulg e in totalitaria n prose - thoug h utterance s like 'I f we accept parliamentar y democracy as a political syste m we must also accept th e basic rules which govern this system' have been compared b y Robert Fulfor d wit h th e quotations o f Chairman Mao for thei r 'shee r mind-numbing obviousness.'6 Trudeau indulges in 'lady prose.' Just a s Pentagon prose i s spoken fa r beyond th e Pentagon, so lady prose is spoken by gentlemen as well as ladies. 'Lady prose,' a critic writes of it , 'can be so arch it would curdle a shark's blood . Lad y prose is icky prose . Lady pros e is genteel. Lady pros e is next t o impossibl e to read.' And nex t to impossible t o listen to , eve n if Liberals pay $50 fo r the privilege. Here is their reward: 'It has long been th e habit of the Chamber of Commerce to publish it s views on what policies the government should adopt . "Adopt " is probably the righ t word, as the paternity of government policies is often diffi cult to identify. ' The rhetoric o f Pierre Trudeau is remarkable only fo r its ability t o move so rapidly between the soporifi c and th e scatological. Along with all these trial s and tribulations, th e language of politics has lately t o endur e what Illo calls the verbal sniffling an d stumbling of th e New Left. That ma y be an improvement on the ranting of the Old Left, but no t a marked improvement. The New Left's lexicon o f 'freak' an d 'rip-off,' 'like ' and 'dig, ' is limited, its unwitting anacolutha of 'uh' and 'you know' are a feeble fertilize r for th e greenin g of America. 'A childlike , breathles s sense of wonder,' writes Charles A. Reich, childlik e and breathless, 'thi s is the qualit y that Consciousness III supremely treasures, to which i t gives its ultimate sign of reverence, vulnerability, and innocence, "O h wow.'" 7 Oh wow. 'Languages have great reserves of life,' George Steiner assures us. They can absorb masses of hysteria, illiteracy an d cheapness. Bu t ther e come s a breaking point.'8 I t may be closer tha n w e think. We are at the bedsid e of a language not fa r awa y from death . Unles s we insist on higher standard s of political discourse , probe th e pollution o f its vocabulary, we will be more than bedside witnesses; we shall have hastened it s demise. [March 1971 ] 6 'O n Trudeau's Speeches,' Saturday Night, Aug. 1969,17 7 Th e Greening of America (Rando m House , New York 1970) , 263 8 Th e Hollow Miracle,' 101

The words of world politics 19 5

Browsing through som e of those massive tomes recording for posterity th e speeches of the chie f executive s of the United States, I'm struc k by how shal low so many of their oration s appea r on second sight. Why does the prosing of the presidents , in our tim e especially, leave so much to be desired? Why has no president since FDR been able to us e words to ris e to a n occasion, much less soar above it? Harry Truman gave 'em hell while whistle-stopping, peppered his talk with pungent homilies ('the buck stops here'), but his state papers yield few remarks worth keeping for more than their historic interest. Eisenhower was a captive of his teleprompter, intoning flat and fatuous phrases about 'peace with justice,' 'a just an d lasting peace'; cut adrif t fro m speech-writer s his syntax lurched and wobbled like Ulysses Grant's when in his cups. Ike's rhetoric i s platitude tempered by incoherence, LBJ's a relentless barrage of banality. 'Her e in this slim volume,' Norman Mailer comment s of a collection o f Johnson's speeches , is a 'cove of presidential prose whose waters are so brackish that a spoonful is enough t o sicken the mind fo r hours,' 'a prose which stir s half-heard crie s of the deat h by suffocatio n of Western civilization.'9 The speeche s of President Kennedy are vastly over-rated. Does it contai n anything, a critic asks acutely of what i s generally acclaimed a s the nobles t utterance of them all , 'that a commencement addres s does not? Indeed , the inaugural displayed th e meaningless chiasmus, the fatuou s o r sentimental metaphor, the callo w hyperbaton, o f a valedictory.'10 On th e speeche s of President Nixon, finally , ther e i s no need t o dwell : a n oily blend of sentiment and cant, slicking America's sea of trouble. Even the speaker, like Willie Loman on the skids, knows he hasn't got it any more . Do not suppos e that thi s steady decline in the standard s of political declamation - I'v e trace d it at the White House but they've gone downhill in Downing Street a s well as Sussex Drive - reflect s onl y a lessening calibre of leadership. Alfred Kazi n observes that 'now, when power seem s more centralized than ever but whe n American presidents are less imposing than ever , Texas-California commoner s betraying all their hesitation an d salesmen' s ambition, Roosevelt seem s more personable because he was the last gentleman in the White House.'11 That's not just snobbish, it's wa y wide of the mark. Roosevelt talke d goo d lik e a president shoul d becaus e there were som e things he didn't have to talk about . Two things in particular - global develop9 Cannibals and Christians (Dia l Press, New York 1966) , 4 9 10 Joh n Illo, The Rhetori c of Malcolm X,' 261 11 Th e Confidence o f FDR,' TheNew York Review of Books, 20 May 1971,3

196 Diplomac y an d its discontents

ment, nuclear deterrence. Both have been high o n the agend a of his successors. Both have helped debas e their word s - an d deeds. People use d t o be rich or poor, regions were once prosperou s o r depressed, nations advanced or backward. Then th e development intellectual s too k over. Poor peopl e emerge d as under-privileged, depressed regions as development areas, backward nations became under-developed countries, the n - 'under developed' being thought too blunt - less-developed countries. 'An d so we find in the literature,' writes the Swedish economis t Gunna r Myrdal, 'a flori legium of euphemisms,' 'the use of increasingly evasiv e terms.' 12 Why? To hide increasingl y unpleasant facts. 'The tricks of growth are not all that difficult, ' W.W . Rostow, doyen o f the development intellectuals, used to assure the statesmen of the western world, 'they only see m so, at moment s of frustration an d confusion.' 13 I f it were only true . The trouble, a s we've learned since then, is that frustration and confusion must be measured not i n moments but i n decades. Two decades of 'development' go by. The rich get richer and the poo r get children. The vocabulary of global growth is deployed s o as to obscur e these stark statistics. What are the developing countries i n the parlanc e of development? Brazil, Tanzania, Burma, Pakistan. But they ar e not developing , they are sliding towards ruin. What are the developin g countries in the rea l world? The United States, th e Soviet Union, West Germany, Japan. Terms such as 'newly developing countries,' 'emergent countries,' 'newly emerging countries,' 'lesser developed countries, ' Myrdal has pointed out , 'ar e used in connection wit h a tendency t o de-emphasize the actua l differences between the rich and the poor countries . And the y thu s become misleading. All these term s express an escapist attitude.' 14 Is any a s escapist as the ter m devised for President Nixon's lates t message to th e Congress on foreign aid ? There th e wretched of the earth ar e concealed as 'the lower income countries,' and here is what the president says about thei r future: Toda y the lower income countrie s are increasingly able to shoulde r the major responsibilit y fo r their ow n security and development.' 15 That wil l be news in Dacca. Strategic discourse i s likewise disfigured by euphemis m an d evasion. 'The language in which th e strateg y of deterrence is being discussed,' Fred Charles Iklé, an American scholar, has written recently , 'tend s to obscure th e fact that this strateg y i s based on a scheme o f totally unprecedente d cruelty . Variou s 12 Asian Drama, III (Pantheon, New York 1968) , 184 1 13 Th e Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridg e University Press, Cambridge & New York 1960) , 16 6 14 Asian Drama, III, 184 2 15 Unite d State s Informatio n Bulletin , 21 Apr. 197 1

The words of world politics 197

abstractions and metaphors help t o insulate th e design against the innocent s who ar e its target. Owing to these metaphors , a scheme that would have been rejected a s abhorrent in the Dark Ages by kings and the commo n peopl e alik e appears to reflec t th e humane ideas of modern civilization.' 16 Here we are, cogs in the mos t frightfu l apparatu s of destruction, where every citizen of every city i n two continents - if he understands what the human condition has become - lives in fear o f being reduced to fly-as h o r a pulp of rotting sores . And we block out th e horror by a gabble of 'ilities' capability, survivability , penetrability, credibility , viability , destructability. 'The "ility" suffix,' Russel l Baker observes of it, 'seems peculiar to those who deal with deat h o n the grand scale. It may be that "ility" helps lighten th e sombre cast of their thought , fo r "ility" has a light, gay, skipping sound.'17 Herman Kahn, doyen o f the defence intellectuals, helps lighten th e sombre cas t of his thought b y what he is pleased to cal l thermonuclear humour. Thermonuclear wa r is not a joke,' Capability Kahn explains humorlessly, 'but professional o r serious discussions of thermonuclea r war can include humor , at least in Europe or the United States. For various reasons,' Kahn concedes , ' "thermonuclear humor " might be inappropriate or in bad taste in a talk by an American in Asia ,..'18 So audiences in Tokyo o r Nagasaki are spared the scatological referenc e t o city-swapping as 'a tit-for-tit' exchange. Fo r suc h exquisite sensibility , O Lord make us truly thankful . Joking abou t th e apocalypse, Kahn claims, induces the right attitud e of mind: 'Peopl e in a state o f horror ar e not goo d analysts. ' One might ponde r that proposition profitabl y for hours. Perhaps if more people had been in a state o f horror we would not no w be quivering at the starting tape of yet another lap of the most dangerou s arms race of them all. 'The language of a community has reached a perilous state when a study of radioactive fall-out can be entitled "Operatio n Sunshine." ' To this remark the British critic D.J. Enright takes strong exception. Noting that in ancient China the drowning of unwanted babies was called 'bathing the infants,' th e branding of criminals 'affixing th e golden seals,' Enright see s euphemism as essential to existence. ' I am not ye t s o lost in lexicography,' he quotes fro m Dr Johnson, 'as to forge t tha t word s are the daughters of earth, an d the thing s are th e son s of heaven.' The daughters of earth ar e tough, says Enright, 'they can take care of themselves.' 19 16 Every Wa r Must En d (Columbi a University Press, New York & London 1971) , 129-30 17 'Behin d th e Mask of th e Ility Boys,' The New York Times, 2 1 Sept. 1967 18 Thinking About the Unthinkable (Avo n Books, New York 1962), 282-3 19 'Spea k Up!', The New York Review of Books, 1 2 Oct. 1967. (The remark about 'Operation Sunshine' is George Steiner's, whose Language and Politics Enright was reviewing.)

198 Diplomacy and its discontents

No. They canno t tak e car e of themselves. They nee d nurture and respect . Instead the y ar e degraded and debauched. God did not comman d his flock: Thou shal t not destroy , tho u shalt not waste.' Christ did not singl e out for his especial grace and favour littl e dink s and slopes and gooks. Tho u shal t no t kill.' 'Suffer littl e childre n t o come unto me.' Escapist words are more than symptomati c of a sick society, the y mak e its sickness worse. These noun s to o nonchalan t b y half, these verb s overly evasive, conceal reality fro m thos e responsibl e for it. They wh o use a vocabulary of escape will with mor e impunity resor t t o evi l for, as Emerson understood , 'words and deed s are quite indifferent mode s of the divin e energy. Words are also actions, an d actions are a kind o f words.' [May 1971 ]

Acknowledgments I a m grateful t o th e Canadia n Broadcasting Corporation for permission to reprint th e firs t seve n sections of Part II firs t publishe d by CB C Publications in 1967 a s Fate an d Will i n Foreign Policy. The firs t tw o section s of Part III were first publishe d b y th e Universit y o f Toronto Pres s in 196 6 as Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy. The Deliquescenc e of Diplomacy' (section 10 , Part I) and 'Stupidit y an d Power' (section 8 , Part II) firs t appeare d in Saturday Night, whil e 'The Correspondent an d th e Diplomat' (section 3 , Part I) firs t appeare d in the Canadian Forum. With the exceptio n o f 'Principle s for Receivership,' which is based on a lecture delivered at th e University of Western Ontario, th e remainin g sections firs t appeare d as columns in the Montreal Star and/o r the Toronto Star. I a m grateful t o th e editor s of thes e variou s publications for permissio n to include the m i n this book . JE

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