Diogenes of Oinoanda: Epicureanism and Philosophical Debates 9789462701014

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DIOGENES OF OINOANDA / DIOGÈNE D’ŒNOANDA

ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

DE WULF-MANSION CENTRE Series

LV

Series Editors Russell L. Friedman Jan Opsomer Carlos Steel Gerd Van Riel

Advisory Board Brad Inwood, Yale University, USA Jill Kraye, The Warburg Institute, London, United Kingdom John Marenbon, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom Lodi Nauta, University of Groningen, The Netherlands Timothy Noone, The Catholic University of America, USA Robert Pasnau, University of Colorado at Boulder, USA Martin Pickavé, University of Toronto, Canada Pasquale Porro, Université Paris-Sorbonne / Università degli Studi di Bari, Italy Geert Roskam, KU Leuven, Belgium

The “De Wulf-Mansion Centre” is a research centre for Ancient, Medieval, and Renaissance philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of the Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein, , Leuven (Belgium). It hosts the international project “Aristoteles latinus” and publishes the “Opera omnia” of Henry of Ghent and the “Opera Philosophica et Theologica” of Francis of Marchia.

DIOGENES OF OINOANDA EPICUREANISM AND PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES DIOGÈNE D’ ŒNOANDA ÉPICURISME ET CONTROVERSES Edited by Jürgen Hammerstaedt Pierre-Marie Morel Refik Güremen

LEUVEN UNIVERSITY PRESS

© by De Wulf-Mansioncentrum – De Wulf-Mansion Centre Leuven University Press / Presses Universitaires de Louvain / Universitaire Pers Leuven Minderbroedersstraat , Leuven (Belgium) All rights reserved. Except in those cases expressly determined by law, no part of this publication may be multiplied, saved in an automated datafile or made public in any way whatsoever without the express prior written consent of the publishers.

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: Cover design: Geert de Koning

For Martin Bachmann ( – ), our esteemed colleague and dear friend, μνήμηϲ χάριν.

Martin Bachmann (standing on the left side) explaining the ruins of Oinoanda to the participants in the Diogenes Colloquium  September  (Photograph taken by Prof. Dr. Mustafa Hamdi Sayar, University of Istanbul).

 List of Illustrations

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  , Foreword. The Importance of Diogenes of Oinoanda

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-    , Preface  , Oinoanda. Research in the City of Diogenes

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 , The Philosophical Inscription of Diogenes in the Epigraphic Context of Oinoanda. New Finds, New Research, and New Challenges

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 , Diogenes against Plato. Diogenes’ Critique and the Tradition of Epicurean Antiplatonism

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 , Plato’s Demiurge (NF  = YF ) and Aristotle’s Flux (fr.  Smith). Diogenes of Oinoanda on the History of Philosophy

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 , Diogène d’Œnoanda et la polémique sur les meteora

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 , Virtue, Pleasure, and Cause. A case of multi-target polemic? Diogenes of Oenoanda, fr. – Smith

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 , Diogenes of Oinoanda and the Cyrenaics

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- , La critique des stoïciens dans l’inscription d’Œnoanda

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 , Diogenes of Oinoanda and the Epicurean Epistemology of Dreams

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 , Diogène, Lucrèce et la théorie épicurienne de l’imaginaire. Fragment  – De rerum natura IV –

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- , La Terre entière, une seule patrie. Diogène d’Œnoanda et la politique

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 , Diogenes’ Polemical Approach, or How to Refute a Philosophical Opponent in an Epigraphic Context

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Abbreviations used for Diogenes and other Inscriptions of Oinoanda

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Bibliography

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About the Authors

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Index of Places Index of Gods and Mythological Figures or Concepts Index of Ancient Persons, Philosophical Schools and Concepts Index of Persons of Modern Times Index of Ancient Texts

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   Fig. .

The new map of Oinoanda showing the architectural structures and building phases (K. Berner). Fig. . The well preserved section of the Hellenistic city wall from the north  (M. Bachmann). Fig. . Section of the Great Wall beside the Esplanade from southeast  (M. Bachmann). Fig. . Nicholas Milner preparing a squeeze in Oinoanda  (M. Bachmann). Fig. . Example of a three-dimensional, virtual model of an inscription fragment (K. Berner). Fig. . The depot house at Oinoanda after the construction works of  (M. Bachmann). Fig. . Donor’s names engraved in the steel cladding of the depot house (M. Bachmann). Fig. . Interior of the depot house with Diogenes fragments on the heavy-load-bearing shelves,  (M. Bachmann). Fig. . Jürgen Hammerstaedt ‘reading’ and dictating the right half of NF  I = Theol. VIII – (M. Bachmann). Fig. . Hypothetical reconstruction of the beginning section of Diogenes’ inscription in a D-model (K. Berner). Fig. . Map of Oinoanda and its environs showing the absolute frequency distribution of the inscription fragments (K. Berner). Fig. . Map of the city centre of Oinoanda showing the relative frequency distribution of the inscription fragments (K. Berner). Fig. . D model of a column from the South Stoa, the stoa that probably carried the inscription of Diogenes (N. Koch). Fig. . Reconstruction of the two-storey North Stoa and its counterpart, the single-storey South Stoa, forming the borders of the Esplanade (N. Koch). Fig. . Section through the bath house erected under Vespasian showing the sequence of rooms (M. Bachmann). Fig. . Reconstruction of the small-format Ionic temple on the rock formation Martin’s Hill (N. Koch). Fig. . Longitudinal section through the reconstruction of the main Byzantine church of Oinoanda with the reassembled spolia columns (A. Zeitler). Fig. . Detail from the outer face of the Hellenistic city wall with a small altar cut in the ashlars and recesses for oil lamps (M. Bachmann).

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Fig. . Fig. . Fig. .

Fig. . Fig. . Fig. . Fig. . Fig. .

Fig. .

Fig. . Fig. . Fig. . Fig. .

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New map of Oinoanda and its surroundings, based on the results of the survey project (K. Berner). Arrangement of Diogenes’ inscription on the stoa wall proposed by Smith () fig.  (after page ). Columns containing Ethics with a line containing one of Epicurus’ Maxims: combined scans of Diog. NF  + fr.  (Oinoanda Team). Physics block NF , found in  (Oinoanda Team). FLC Letters block fr.  III–IV = YF  (Oinoanda Team). New Maxims block NF  (Oinoanda Team). NF , belonging to the TLC Writings (Oinoanda Team). Combined scan of Old Age A-course blocks fr.  (YF , left) + NF  (YF , right) and B-course block NF  (YF A/B/C); (Oinoanda Team). Combined scan of Old Age B-course block fr.  (YF ) and Ccourse block NF  (YF ) with clearly visible scored margin (Oinoanda Team). TLC Writings NF  (upper left) combined with fr.  (Oinoanda Team). ‘Demostheneia’ inscription in Fethiye museum garden (Oinoanda Team). Reconstruction of the inscribed tomb of Licinnia Flavilla and Flavianus Diogenes (Hall/Milner/Coulton ). Two altar reliefs sculpted into the former Hellenistic city wall: YÇ , inscribed with Clarian oracle verses, and YÇ , bearing the Hypsistos dedication (Oinoanda Team).

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 The Importance of Diogenes of Oinoanda

Martin Ferguson Smith

.  The holding of a three-day international colloquium on Diogenes of Oinoanda is an unprecedented event, indicative of the growing recognition that the vast Greek inscription in which he set out the philosophy of Epicurus is a document of serious interest and importance, not just to epigraphists, archaeologists, and cultural historians, but also to those concerned with Greco-Roman philosophy. The growth of this recognition is no doubt linked to the growth in the quantity of known text: fifty years ago the pieces of the inscription found at Oinoanda numbered eighty-eight; now the total is .¹ The decision to focus particular attention at the colloquium on Diogenes’ polemics reflects the fact that he devotes what might seem to be a surprising amount of wallspace to arguments against his philosophical opponents. One might suppose that, when he decided to present his Epicurean message to Oinoanda’s people and visitors in the form of an inscription, he would have felt obliged to economise on space and cost by minimising or even omitting refutations of other systems; one might also suppose that he would have considered such refutations inappropriate, given that very few of his readers are likely to have had a special interest in or knowledge of philosophy. But frequent criticism of rival views, often as a preliminary to statement of the Epicurean position, was so marked a feature of Epicurean writings that Diogenes evidently regarded it as de rigueur. Epicurus and members of his circle engaged in such criticism, and so did his later followers Philodemus and Lucretius. In marked contrast with Lucretius, who names only four philosophical opponents and never names the Stoics, perhaps thinking frequent naming of opponents unsuited to his epic of the universe,² Diogenes in the much smaller compass of the known parts of his inscription names no fewer than twenty rival philosophers or schools. These are: Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Antiphon, Aristippus, Aristotle,

¹ See Hammerstaedt/Smith () . ² Even Epicurus is named only once by Lucretius (III ), whereas he is named at least seven times by Diogenes (fr.  III ; fr.  IV , V ; fr.  I , II  (son of Neocles); fr.  I ; NF  I ). He may have been named also, as son of Neocles, in fr.  III .

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  

Chrysippus, Cleanthes, Democritus, Diagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Lacydes, Plato, Protagoras, Pythagoras, Socrates, the Stoics, Thales, and Zeno of Citium. Some of these opponents are named in two or more places.³ Those most frequently mentioned are Democritus and the Stoics.⁴ Democritus, although commended for identifying the elements of matter as atoms,⁵ is criticised for denying free movement to the atoms,⁶ for regarding sensible qualities such as taste, heat, and cold as purely subjective,⁷ and for attaching too much importance to dreams.⁸ The Stoics are opposed for thinking that the ultimate principles are matter and god,⁹ for attaching too little importance to dreams,¹⁰ for believing that the world was providentially created by the gods for themselves and human beings,¹¹ for allowing that some souls can survive death,¹² and for regarding virtue (ἀρετή) as the moral end, instead of as the necessary means to the end, which, according to the Epicureans, is pleasure (ἡδονή).¹³ By no means all of Diogenes’ polemical arguments are brief, and it is remarkable that his criticism of the Democritean and Stoic theories of dreams, first encountered in the Physics,¹⁴ makes a second appearance in the Ethics.¹⁵ Despite his claim that the purpose of his criticisms is not to be contentious, but to defend the truth,¹⁶ he does not always represent his opponents’ views fully and fairly, but the same is true of many ancient philosophers, including critics of the Epicureans. Whether fair or unfair, Diogenes’ polemical arguments give added vigour to his work.

³ See Roskam – in this volume. ⁴ See also Gourinat  in this volume. ⁵ Fr.  II –. ⁶ Fr.  II –III . ⁷ Fr.  II –III . ⁸ Fr.  VI –; fr.  IV –V ; fr.  I –II . ⁹ Fr.  II –; fr. , as read and restored in Smith (a) and Smith (a) –. ¹⁰ Fr.  I –IV ; fr.  I –. ¹¹ Theol. VIII –XVI ; fr. –. For the meaning of ‘Theol.’ see below  and Leone  in this volume. ¹² Fr. .–; fr.  III –V . ¹³ Fr. ; NF ; fr. , including NF , for which see Smith () –, Smith (a) –, Hammerstaedt/Smith () –. ¹⁴ Fr. –. ¹⁵ Fr. . ¹⁶ Fr.  III –.

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.    Although Diogenes of Oinoanda has a mind of his own, he does not aim or claim to be an original philosopher. Moreover, despite the significant discoveries made at Oinoanda since , his work is only fragmentarily preserved. Probably we have no more than a quarter of it. And yet it is indubitably of exceptional interest and importance. How so? I shall attempt to answer the question briefly under five headings. .. Philosophy Diogenes’ lack of originality, far from being a drawback, is arguably an advantage, because he can be accepted as a reliable communicator of Epicurus’ doctrines. A further advantage is that he writes in Greek, like Epicurus, and not only preserves his master’s terminology, but also quotes some of his writings. As well as providing an informative and balanced account of Epicurean physics and ethics (more balanced, although less extensive, than the treatments of Lucretius and Philodemus), his work is eloquent testimony to the continuing existence of Epicureanism, some four hundred years after its founder’s death, as a flourishing movement for whose adherents it was a way of life, the advantages of which they were not content to keep to themselves, but were moved to communicate to others. Diogenes’ philanthropic and cosmopolitan attitudes and motives are something special, as is his utopian vision of a time in the future when human beings, living in a world free from war, social strife, and slavery, will inhabit an Epicurean heaven on earth, where “everything will be full of righteousness and mutual love” (δικαιοϲύνηϲ … ἔϲται μεϲτὰ πάντα καὶ φιλαλληλίαϲ).¹⁷ His firm faith in Epicurus as the moral saviour of humanity and his fervent sense of missionary purpose mean that his work remains very much alive today and make the inscription one of the most moving, as well as one of the most unusual, documents to survive from antiquity. .. Publication Form This is highly original. Inscriptions were used in antiquity to deliver many kinds of messages to the public, but Diogenes’ inscription is unique in presenting a complete system of philosophy. It is unparalleled too in size: in its complete state it may have contained about , words and occupied about  square metres of wallspace. Many ancient inscriptions celebrate the achievements and benefactions of wealthy and influential individuals. Although Diogenes must have been both wealthy and influential, his inscription does not recite his achievements and benefactions.

¹⁷ Fr.  I –.

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  

Instead, it is his achievement and benefaction. He is motivated by philanthropy to advertise what he calls “the medicines that bring salvation” (τὰ τῆϲ ϲωτηρίαϲ φάρμακα)¹⁸ to Oinoanda’s citizens and visitors both in his own time and in time to come. The medicines are of course the doctrines of Epicurus, which, by ridding people of their unnecessary fears, especially of the gods and of death, and by demonstrating the limits of desires and pains, enable them to achieve freedom from disturbance (ἀταραξία), the static pleasure of the mind, and to live lives as peaceful and happy as those of the gods. It is unlikely that many of Oinoanda’s residents and visitors read Diogenes’ inscription with the attention he requests in the preface to his Ethics,¹⁹ but, given that it was in a public place, they could not avoid seeing it. Its sheer bulk must have made a considerable impression on them. Even if many thought, both when the inscription was in situ and when its blocks were taken away to be re-used in new buildings around the city, that he had been a fool to waste money in having (as he himself puts it) “turned so many letters to stone”,²⁰ when he might have spent it, if not on himself, then on things that would have been of real benefit (as they saw it) to the community, the survival of his work nineteen centuries after its execution shows that his remarkable decision to publish it in epigraphical form was justified. Horace boasted that he completed a monument more lasting than bronze (exegi monumentum aere perennius).²¹ Diogenes made his work as durable as stone. It may be observed also that he cleverly managed to proclaim his message in a public place, while avoiding, in accordance with Epicurus’ advice, appearing in public himself. .. Closeness The discovery of long-lost texts is always a satisfying and exciting occurrence, and the discovery of Diogenes’ work deserves to be ranked alongside the discoveries of papyri preserved by volcanic ash at Herculaneum and by the dry climate of Egypt. The comparison with the Herculaneum papyri is particularly apt, and not only because most of those papyri are Epicurean. There is another, less obvious reason: the papyri are the very ones handled by Philodemus and his pupils; and just as the Epicurean texts from Herculaneum bring us very close to members of that circle, so those from Oinoanda bring us very close to Diogenes. After all, when we read the inscribed stones, we have the unusual experience of reading an ancient author’s writings exactly as they were seen by their first readers. It is true that the blocks no

¹⁸ Fr.  V –VI . ¹⁹ Fr.  III –. ²⁰ Fr. .–. ²¹ Carm. III ..

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longer form the wall of the stoa, but they remain close to their original home, on the ground Diogenes and his contemporaries walked. It is true too that much of the inscription is still missing, and that many of the preserved pieces are damaged, but this fragmentariness does not diminish one’s feeling of closeness to Diogenes, and indeed, as I shall now suggest, in a curious way it can actually enhance the appeal of his work. .. Fragmentariness Although it would of course be wonderful to have Diogenes’ work complete, I believe (I hope not too perversely) that part of its fascination is its fragmentary state. One consideration is the widespread human passion for ruins studied by Rose Macaulay²² and, more recently, Christopher Woodward.²³ The reasons for this passion are very varied and complex and cannot be set out here. Diogenes’ inscription is an untypical ruin in three ways. In the first place, since the stoa and its inscribed wall are not ruined on the original site, the stones of the inscription having been dispersed and re-used over a wide area of the city, aesthetic considerations hardly apply. Secondly, it is a case not just of a fragmentarily preserved structure, but also and above all of the fragmentarily preserved writings carved on it. Thirdly, unlike many fragmentarily preserved entities, Diogenes’ inscription has been becoming less and less fragmentary as more and more of it comes to light. In its fragmented, incomplete state, it presents the challenge and appeal (as well as the frustrations) of an unfinished jigsaw puzzle: there is the satisfaction of having located and fitted together certain pieces, and there is the eager anticipation, and sometimes the thrilling reality, of locating more pieces and filling in gaps. The absence of some parts of the puzzle make the parts we do have seem the more precious, and we can exercise our judgment and imagination about missing sections and the appearance of the whole. If any doubt that our age’s appreciation of fragmentariness extends to the discovery and discussion of previously unknown ancient texts, let them recall the massive amount of interest generated by the discovery in  of eleven lines of Latin verse, only four of them complete, written by Cornelius Gallus,²⁴ and, much more recently, the publication of some previously unknown lines of Sappho.²⁵

²² Pleasure of Ruins (London, ). ²³ In Ruins (London, ). ²⁴ Anderson/Parsons/Nisbet (); Capasso (). ²⁵ Burris/Fish/Obbink (); Obbink ().

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  

.. Interdisciplinarity Although in epigraphical terms Diogenes’ work is a colossus, the text, when transferred from stone to paper, is small in bulk. And yet one cannot think of many other works whose investigation combines such a broad range of important disciplines. Study of Diogenes combines archaeology, architecture, history, and epigraphy, as well as Greek philosophy and language. This interdisciplinary range, which is most closely matched, with the substitution of papyrology for epigraphy, by the texts from Herculaneum, is a notable and precious feature, helping to make work on Diogenes as stimulating and rewarding as it is challenging and difficult. Another notable manifestation of the interdisciplinary character of the work on the Epicurean inscription at Oinoanda is that, as with the Epicurean papyri from Herculaneum, full and sometimes innovative use of the very latest scientific techniques and equipment has been, and is being, made in the investigations, as described by Martin Bachmann and Jürgen Hammerstaedt in the present volume.

.    The latest work at Oinoanda, a six-year series of investigations directed with great distinction and success by Martin Bachmann, came to an end in October . But much work remains to be done there. During the  years that passed between the first discovery of Diogenes’ inscription in  and the colloquium on it in  only one scientific excavation took place at Oinoanda. That was in . It was on a very small scale, but immediately struck a rich ‘vein’ of re-used Diogenes fragments in the south portico of the so-called Esplanade.²⁶ It is not just likely, but certain, that further excavation of this area, and of nearby Martin’s Hill where many blocks of the inscription were found in the s after illegal digging by local treasure-hunters, would result in significant further additions to the text. Diogenes’ inscription is a unique and important document, and Oinoanda is a spectacularly attractive and important site. It is to be hoped that they will soon receive the renewed and enhanced attention and funding they need and merit. Jürgen Hammerstaedt is quite right to say, in his contribution to this volume, that Oinoanda fully deserves to be designated a World Heritage Site by UNESCO.

²⁶ On the excavation in  and its results, see especially Smith ().





.  I wrote the above paragraphs in May . Since then research on Oinoanda and Diogenes has continued. Much of this work has been done off the site, as participants in the survey in – analysed, discussed, and wrote up their findings. But in October  four members of the Oinoanda team made a brief research visit to the site. Their work is briefly described by Jürgen Hammerstaedt in his contribution to this volume. Among the new discoveries made was a new fragment of Diogenes (NF ), exposed by an illegal excavation, and this has been published by Hammerstaedt and myself.²⁷ This would have become the three hundreth known fragment of Diogenes, were it not that new study of a severely weathered and worn block (fr. ), discovered in , has resulted in its humiliating ejection from the inventory of Diogenes fragments! In more than ample compensation for this loss, a largely buried new fragment of Diogenes was located on Martin’s Hill during the October  visit to Oinoanda, although, since it was not possible to expose and record it, it could not be added to the inventory of Diogenes fragments. From what could be read on the unnumbered block, its text is likely to be of great interest and importance. Martin Bachmann organised and led the work at Oinoanda in , just as he had led it during the six-year survey, and we hoped and expected that, despite his other important duties and commitments, he would be involved in the Oinoanda project for many years to come. However, on  August , at a time when he was busy with the preparation and editing of material for a volume on Oinoanda, he died suddenly and unexpectedly in his office in Istanbul. All of us who were privileged to have been his colleagues and friends join his family in mourning his untimely death, which has inflicted a great professional loss as well as a great personal one. It is fitting that the present volume should be dedicated to his memory.

²⁷ Hammerstaedt/Smith ().

 Pierre-Marie Morel and Jürgen Hammerstaedt The philosophical inscription of Diogenes and the archaeological site of his hometown Oinoanda have been the object of a recent series of surveys from  to  and of ongoing further work on the various data retrieved during these campaigns. While the publication of the archaeological and architectural work, which is expected to bear not only on the understanding of the urbanistic context of this unique inscription but also on its composition, is still unfinished, the many new Diogenes fragments which were discovered during this survey and which were swiftly made available to the scientific community invite further work on the interpretation of the philosophical content of Diogenes’ inscription. To meet this demand, an international colloquium on the work of Diogenes was organized in the autumn of . The colloquium began at Galatasaray Üniversitesi in Istanbul, continued at Sitki Koçman Üniversitesi in Muğla, which is the capital of the province of Diogenes’ hometown, and finished with a memorable excursion of all participants to the ancient site of Oinoanda itself. The importance of the philosophical inscription of Oinoanda lies not only in the fact that it constitutes a precious resource for our knowledge of the Epicurean movement after Epicurus. It is also a highly interesting testimony to philosophical theory and practice of the period of the Roman Empire to which it belongs. Indeed, all the specialists of the domain agree in recognizing the importance of the philosophical content of the inscription. Its texts are far from being a simple repetitive presentation of Epicurus’ doctrine. On one hand, his unique approach of ‘publishing’ philosophy in inscribed form aims at involving common people in philosophical thinking and behaviour. On the other hand, Diogenes is well aware of the evolution of the philosophical debates and adopts a polemical position against Presocratic philosophers, Platonics, Stoics, etc. Of course, such criticisms made by Diogenes draw on the traditional Epicurean arsenal of arguments against the other philosophical schools. Epicurus himself was engaged in polemics against his predecessors and philosophical rivals.¹ His heirs developed and extended the field of the fight. Colotes, in particular, is probably one of the most vigorous Epicurean polemists of the Hellenistic period, as Plutarch’s Adversus Colotem reveals. And as far as Roman Epicureanism is concerned, Lucretius and Philodemus are deeply

¹ See, in particular, Sedley (c).



-    

involved in debates of the first century B.C.² As a matter of fact, Diogenes does not only echo such debates, but also puts forward new and original arguments, for instance against the Stoics. For this reason, it is exactly the polemical feature of the inscription which allows for a historical approach able to highlight the distinctiveness of its author in an exemplary manner. The first two contributors to the volume took part in the – Oinoanda surveys and are engaged in ongoing research based on the retrieved data. Martin Bachmann’s contribution offers a general introduction into Diogenes’ hometown of Oinoanda, followed by an account of the research activities at the site from its discovery up to the most recent survey series under the German Archaeological Institute. Special attention is given to the survey results concerning the Diogenes inscription, to the impact of the storehouse erected in , and to the still ongoing analysis of the retrieved data and the planned virtual reconstruction of the Stoa wall inscribed through the initiative of Diogenes. The description of the most recent building documentation and of the new map of Oinoanda places the Diogenes inscription into the synchronic and diachronic urbanistic context. Jürgen Hammerstaedt gives an account of the various writings and of the different courses of the blocks of the Stoa wall which the fragments of the Diogenes inscription can be assigned to and of the evidence allowing for conclusions about its complete size and its most likely date. The epigraphic overview is rounded off with a glance at other important non-philosophical inscriptions found in and outside Oinoanda, which offer some hints for a better understanding of both the intended purpose of the Diogenes inscription and its impact on later epigraphic habit at Oinoanda. Next, the most significant insights offered by some of the seventy-five new fragments found during the Oinoanda surveys are highlighted, and the results of the investigations done after the survey series on the three-dimensional scans of the inscription blocks outline the extremely important challenges for future research on and for dissemination of Diogenes’ historically unique and socially valuable cultural and humanitarian initiative. The core of the volume roughly follows the chronology of philosophers and philosophical schools addressed or hinted at in the inscription, while the last two contributions return to aspects concerning the society which Diogenes took part in and the community to which his inscription was directed. In the first section of his contribution, Michael Erler analyzes the new Diogenes Maxim (NF ) which is directed against the asymmetrical concept of ‘creation but no desctruction’ in the Platonic cosmology of the Timaeus. Start-

² See, e.g., Auvray-Assayas / Delattre () and Weisser/Thaler ().





ing from the – very rarely encountered – concept of ‘φύϲιϲ as δημιουργόϲ’ expressed by Diogenes, and through an overview of contrasting literary and non-literary ancient readings of the Timaeus, he identifies (in Middle-Platonic arguments according to which the δημιουργόϲ guarantees the imperishability of the world by his continuing πρόνοια) a response to a type of criticism which is not exclusively shared by Aristotelians, but is, besides the Diogenes Maxims, also associated with the Epicureans in other late antique testimonies. In a second section, Erler examines Diogenes’ defense of Epicureanism against the reproach that such a belief would bring damage to justice (Theol. II–VII)³ and compares further texts suggesting an Epicurean counterpart to the Platonic Kallipolis that does not need laws, gaining new insights into Plutarch’s strategy in his treatise Adversus Colotem which challenge the currently upheld classification of Colotes as a legalist. Francesco Verde focuses on the ‘philosophical use of the past’ of Diogenes in a case study of two Diogenes fragments. The attribution to Aristotle and his school (in Diog. fr. ) of the apparently sceptic epistemological view that, due to rapidly flowing change which escapes our comprehension, nothing can be the object of knowledge, has fuelled more than a century of modern scholarly dispute about the philosophical competence of Diogenes. Verde argues that the underlying thought, which can be traced back to a statement attributed by Plato to Socrates and to the ‘genetic’ reconstruction of Plato’s philosophy by Aristotle, was wrongly attributed to the Stagirite and his school as the result of a (tendentious and hostile) doxographical reconstruction which Diogenes probably owes to an Epicurean source. Furthermore, Verde compares the supposed physical vicinity of the anti-Platonic Maxim-block NF  and an anti-Stoic Maxim-block on the physical elements, as restored by Martin Ferguson Smith in the very lacunary fr. , with the joint criticism of Platonic and Stoic concepts of divine cosmogony by the Epicurean Velleius in the first book of Ciceros De natura deorum and arrives at the conclusion that Diogenes drew on an Epicurean source in the mentioned Maxims too, a source which had probably already been used by Cicero. Giuliana Leone points out that the central role assigned by Epicurus to astronomical and meteorological knowledge finds its counterpart in the extant Diogenes fragments where the μετέωρα are frequently mentioned both as a whole and in their particular aspects. She analyzes Diogenes’ polemics regarding the μετέωρα and compares the respective contexts, intentions, sources, as well as the semantic and stylistic features, with the intention of defining both the fidelity of the author to the philosophy of the Garden and the new ideas developed by him.

³ For the meaning of ‘Theol.’ see below  and Leone  in this volume.



-    

Three contributions consider, from different angles, the long-lasting controversy of whether Cyrenaics or Stoics were the target of Diogenes’ polemics in fr. . It belongs, together with fr.  and NF , to a section of Diogenes’ Ethics where the role of virtue and pleasure is discussed. Francesca Masi begins with fr. , where the role of virtue is discussed, dividing it into four sections in each of which she identifies and discusses the possible targets of Diogenes’ criticism. Subsequently she analyzes fr. , which contains a discussion of the causal relation between virtue and pleasure which had led to the tenacious debate between Martin Ferguson Smith and David Sedley on whether it is Stoics or Cyrenaics who are targeted. Dividing the fragment into two sections, Masi discusses the considerably diverging restorations of the mutilated Greek text of the first one alongside the different interpretations connected herewith. The cautious but not absolute preference given to Sedley’s anti-Cyrenaic reading leads her to explore the possibility of seeing in the whole Ethics-section a multi-targeted polemic. The criticism expressed by Diogenes against the Cyrenaics, a rival hedonist school which, however, had become extinct long before Diogenes’ time, is also the topic of Voula Tsouna’s paper. First, she discusses fr. , the only fragment in which Diogenes explicitly attacks Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic school. Also, she revisits the controversy surrounding fr.  with regard to the identity of the philosophers whom Diogenes criticises in that fragment. She reconsiders the grounds for the hypothesis that the philosophers under attack are the Stoics, as well as the basis of the rival hypothesis that they are the Cyrenaics, contributing some remarks of her own to this debate. Next, she turns to fragments that have never before been associated with the Cyrenaics, including fr. , , , , , as well as NF , , and . She argues that these fragments also engage with the doctrines of the Cyrenaics and, especially, with issues connected to their peculiar kind of hedonism. Finally, she speculates about the reasons why Diogenes occupies himself with the doctrine of a school that had stopped being active centuries before his own floruit, suggesting that he does so not only because of antiquarian reasons, but mainly because Diogenes finds the Cyrenaic doctrine philosophically challenging and has new things to add to the anti-Cyrenaic criticisms of earlier Epicurean authors. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, on the other hand, places fr.  into his systematic overview of Diogenes’ anti-Stoic polemics. At any rate, the Stoics appear to be the most regular targets of Diogenes’ criticisms regarding the following themes: principles (substance and God), nature of dreams, cosmogony, divine providence, and cosmopolitism, divination, and, in Ethics, the question of virtue or pleasure as τέλος and the limited persistence of certain souls after death. While some of these themes are dealt with in a quasi-doxographic manner, most are treated in a refutative way, especially in view of the most crucial differences between Epicureanism





and Stoicism: virtues or pleasure as telos of life, atomism or providence, virtues or pleasure as constituants of happiness. Especially in Physics, one can observe a tendency to present the Epicurean doctrine as a middle way arriving at the truth not achieved by two fallacious extreme positions (Stoics versus Democritus, Democritus versus Sceptics). In his anti-Stoic polemics, Diogenes often seems to introduce new elements into traditional Epicurean arguments. Refik Güremen analyses the epistemological background of Diogenes’ arguments. He claims that Diogenes’ joint criticism of the Stoics and Democritus can be seen as an elaborate application of a defense that the students of the Garden developed throughout its history against a reductio ad absurdum refutation of their theory of perception. According to this reductio refutation, the Epicurean theory of perception is incapable of accounting for the falsity of some obviously false perceptual experiences such as dreams. Güremen claims that Diogenes’ pursuit of rationality against superstition proceeds by showing, via his criticism of the Stoics, what is true in all kinds of perception, and via his criticism of Democritus, what is false in false perceptual experiences. Güremen argues that these two steps, jointly taken, correspond to the traditional defense of the Garden against the reductio refutation in question. Alain Gigandet focuses on the explanation of dream visions in Diog. fr.  by means of the Epicurean theory of εἴδωλα. Diogenes employs the concept of ‘first images’, images which generate paths in the soul in accordance with their form and size, facilitating the penetration of similar simulacra in the case that the original objects from which they derive are absent. This mechanism of ‘path-making,’ which had already served in the fourth book of Lucretius to explain daydreams, is a key element of Epicurean theory of the imaginary, closely linked with the ‘physics of thought’ of the Garden, as it is presented in the twenty-fifth book of Epicurus On Nature. Quite an amount of polemics contained in Diogenes’ inscription deals immediately with politics and social life. Pierre-Marie Morel illustrates how Diogenes denounces the harmful practices normally associated with political power, rejecting certain philosophical concepts (namely Stoic) of state (πόλις) and justice by means of traditional elements of Epicurean political criticism. Nevertheless, the inscription does not lack originality. On one hand it combines elements of doctrine which are not associated with each other in Epicurean texts, and on the other it evokes both the hypothesis of a Golden Age with no need for laws (fr. ) and makes a case for cosmopolitism (fr. ). In this way, Diogenes’ inscription neatly accounts for the ambivalent relationship, characterised by both mistrust and sympathy, typical for the Epicurean attitude to politics. Morel’s chapter concludes with the claim that there is some relation between Diogenes’ political views and the φιλανθρωπία which he claims for himself.



-    

In the last chapter, Geert Roskam focuses on aspects which may be considered ‘practical philosophy,’ investigating the remarkable challenge of arguing against philosophical adversaries by means of an inscription. After some general considerations about the role of polemics in Diogenes’ inscription, he identifies some specific characteristics of his polemics, which include certain limits and/or shortcomings due to the epigraphic presentation, but also important didactic, rhetorical, and argumentative strategies appropriate both for the arrangement of the inscription and for its intended readers. These observations, extracted from many unconnected and sometimes rather short fragments, are put to the test and profitably applied in a case study of the ‘Theological Physics-Sequence’ (Theol.), the sixteen columns of which offer, hopefully only for the moment, the longest continuous text by Diogenes. An investigation into Diogenes’ possible motives to grant such ample space to polemics against other philosophical views is concluded by the proposal of considering his polemical approach an efficient part of the traditional Epicurean concept of the use of philosophy as ‘medicine.’ The idea of this very first conference on Diogenes of Oinoanda first came up in a French speaking surrounding. As a consequence, a large part of it took place in the Francophone Galatasaray Üniversitesi and was held in English and French, but included contributions by scholars from Italy and Germany. We thus decided to admit these two languages in this volume too. It is a pleasant duty to express our sincere thanks to the many institutions and persons who made possible the various parts of the event whose results can now be presented in this volume: to Galatasaray University (Istanbul) for hosting the first two days of the conference and to Jean-Jacques Paul, Recteur Adjoint of Galatasaray, for his vivid interest in our colloquium; to Ömer Aygün, Professor of Philosophy at Galatasaray University, for his valuable help in organisation; to Sıtkı Kocman University (Muğla) for hosting the third conference day and generously offering the bus transfers, in particular those to the site of Oinoanda; to Professor Fahri İşik (Antalya/Burdur) for the well attended opening lecture of the conference section at Muğla University on the ‘Anatolian Character of the Lycian Civilization;’ to the Archaeological Museum of Fethiye and Emirhan Süel, deputy director at the time, for the permission to visit the site of Oinoanda with the whole group; to the watchman Sedat Atçi for overseeing the group on the hill of Oinoanda and bringing it safely back to Incealiler; and to the Consortium d’appui Paris  / Galatasaray and its Directeur, Laurent Jaffro, Directeur de l’UFR de philosophie de l’Université Paris  Panthéon-Sorbonne, for his contributions to the organisation. For further financial support, we wish to thank the Université Paris  Panthéon-Sorbonne, in particular l’UFR de philosophie de l’Université Paris  Panthéon-Sorbonne, l’Institut Universitaire de France, Le





Centre de recherche en philosophie ancienne et médiévale GRAMATA (UMR  Sphere), the Institut Français des Etudes Anatoliennes and the University of Cologne. Robert Daniel (Cologne) corrected the English of Jürgen Hammerstaedt’s and various other texts, Robert Tegethoff (Cologne) several other English contributions, while Hammerstaedt’s graduate assistants Daniel Beaujean and Ariane Busch worked on the redaction of the volume and Francesco Cacciabaudo (Pisa/Cologne) helped with the indices. Furthermore, we are very grateful to Martin Ferguson Smith for his extremely useful advice in the phase of planning, for the foreword to this volume and for helpful advice regarding Bachmann’s and Hammerstaedt’s contributions, and, last but not least, to Refik Güremen (Istanbul/Paris) for the whole initiative and its organisation. In the morning of  July  Martin Bachmann sent us his final corrections of his own contribution from Istanbul, together with several important comments on other parts of the volume. In the following days he continued his intensive exchanges and discussions with members of his Oinoanda team about a wide range of further questions and future challenges and plans for the project. His sudden death in the morning of  August , when he was working in his office, deprived his family of a loving and beloved husband, father, son, and brother, the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Istanbul, of an outstanding Deputy Director, the Oinoanda project of its farsighted, energetic, and inspiring leader, and all who had the privilege to know him well of a brilliant companion and loyal friend. As a mark of our high esteem and profound gratitude, we – the volume’s contributors as well as its editors – dedicate it to his memory.

 Research in the City of Diogenes

Martin Bachmann

.  At a congress dedicated to Epicurean philosophy, a report on archaeological research at Oinoanda is bound to appear rather marginal, even exotic. I will try nonetheless to approach the areas of interest by two paths. The first is the reconstruction of the inscription of Diogenes. Both the content and the architectural form of the inscription are of equal significance to researchers, and so the disciplines overlap here in a mutually instructive way. The contribution that the architectural historian can make is an analysis of the architectural parameters and a visualization of the original form. The second area I will focus on is the urban fabric and material culture of Oinoanda. What influence did the living environment and the perception of the citizens of Oinoanda have on the content of the philosophical inscription? On this question, architectural historians can offer no answers. What we can do, however, is generate urban development models and images that can give us a better understanding of ancient Oinoanda, and hence the cultural biotope of Diogenes.

.   Oinoanda lies in the Cabalis in northern Lycia, km north-east of the modern town of Fethiye – formerly Telmessos. Located over m above sea level, Oinoanda looks down from the ridge of a hill over a high plain some m below it. To the north it borders the ancient landscape of Cibyratis. In Hellenistic times Oinoanda formed part of a tetrapolis with Cibyra, Bubon, and Balbura. From the first century BC it was part of the Roman province of Lycia.¹ Let us first take a look at a new map of the site showing the architectural structures – to help us find our way round the ancient city (fig. ).² The urban area lies on a saddle to the south of the acropolis; the latter is not itself incorporated in the urban

¹ Brandt/Kolb () –. ² This map is an important result of the survey project carried through between  and  and was drawn and developed by Konrad Berner.



 

Fig. . The new map of Oinoanda showing the architectural structures and building phases (K. Berner).

.      



Fig. . The well preserved section of the Hellenistic city wall from the north  (M. Bachmann).

structure. The rocky massif is the promontory of a mountain range that projects northwards into the plain of the river Seki: that is, the upper Xanthos valley. Wellpreserved remains of the Hellenistic fortifications in the south part of the urban area suggest that the city possessed a circuit wall in that period. But it is in the Roman epoch that the monuments that still dominate the archaeological site today were built. These include an agora in the west of the city, which probably superseded an older, Hellenistic public square to the east – the so-called Esplanade – as the centre of the city; and in addition stoas, bathhouses, a theatre and many other buildings. Probably in the sixth century AD if not sooner, the settlement area was confined to the urban core within a new defensive circuit that excluded certain parts of the older city. The ruins of four churches attest to settlement activities during the Byzantine period – before the city was abandoned, probably in the mid-Byzantine period. The Hellenistic city wall in the southern reaches of the urban area still stands, textbook-style, to the height of the wall-walk for a length of about m (fig. ). This section includes two towers of differing ground plan. The western, polygonal tower is still in very good condition, while the eastern one was dismantled down to the foundations, apparently in antiquity. The centre of the Hellenistic city, as already mentioned, was the Esplanade – a large public square in the north-east of the urban area; it shifted to the periphery in the course of the city’s later development. In Hellenistic as well as Roman times, this spacious natural terrace was flanked by large stoas, with some peripheral urban development lying beyond it. One of these stoas must have been the place where Diogenes’ inscription was displayed. The building was demolished in late antiquity and the inscribed stones were reused – as ‘spolia’ – in new contexts throughout the city. The centre of Roman Oinoanda, on the other hand, was an agora paved with large stone slabs and flanked by monuments of the Hadrianic to the Severan period. The structures in the surrounding area are also predominantly from the Roman imperial era, for instance the theatre and two big thermal complexes which must have added to the city’s splendour. The older of these two bathhouses was erected under Vespasian and lies between the agora and the Esplanade. Like many structures at Oinoanda, this



 

building, modern for its time, was erected using the traditional techniques of Hellenistic architecture – in particular, sophisticated polygonal masonry. This dry masonry technique was retained throughout almost all of the city’s construction phases. The same applies, extraordinarily, to the big aqueduct, construction of which should be regarded as a precondition for the building of any sizeable thermal establishments. Approaching the city on its south flank, the aqueduct must be one of very few specimens of this progressive Roman amenity to be built in an archaic style – of mighty stone blocks laid in polygonal technique without mortar. After late antiquity there must have been a radical interruption in the city’s development. The hiatus was formerly thought to be connected with the incursions of the Goths.³ The most important structure from this period is the so called Goths’ Wall or Great Wall, a bulwark that cuts the Esplanade off from the remainder of the urban area (fig. ).

.   The panorama of the ancient ruins described here has probably hardly changed since , the year in which Oinoanda was discovered by a British expedition led by Richard Hoskyn. The first map of Oinoanda was drawn one year after its discovery. It is the work of Lieutenant Thomas Spratt and was published in . It is notable for the phonetic transcription of the Turkish place name and particularly for the fairly accurate survey of the structures and the topography at the site. The most important structures – such as the theatre, the Hellenistic city wall, the agora, and Esplanade, as well as a mausoleum that is worth mentioning, too – are all already recorded on this map.⁴ The history of the discovery of the site has to be distinguished from that of the inscriptions, especially of course the Diogenes inscription. Since the latter history is well known, I will not go into it here.⁵ I will only mention the names of Maurice Holleaux and Pierre Paris, who discovered the Diogenes inscription in , and Georges Cousin, its first editor.⁶ In  Rudolf Heberdey and Ernst Kalinka journeyed to Oinoanda and published a new edition in , which also contained  newly found fragments of Diogenes.⁷

³ Hall () . ⁴ Spratt/Forbes () ; reprinted in Chilton () fig. ii (after page ). ⁵ Smith () –. ⁶ Cousin (). ⁷ Heberdey/Kalinka ().

.      



Fig. . Section of the Great Wall beside the Esplanade from southeast  (M. Bachmann).

Further progress was achieved by adding drawings and measurements of all the Diogenes fragments they discovered and rediscovered. In terms of methodology and interpretation their edition far surpassed the earlier publication, so all subsequent scholarship referred to this first standard work. In the decades that followed, research into the inscription continued, though it was mainly desk-based, so that the number of discovered fragments remained at .⁸ In – Martin Ferguson Smith, then a young scholar with a special interest in Epicureanism (the philosophy expounded by Diogenes) visited Oinoanda each year. As well as rediscovering many of the fragments of Diogenes’ inscription found in the nineteenth century, he recorded  new fragments (NF –), and this

⁸ This comprises the important editions of William (), Grilli (), and Chilton (), and the commentaries of Grilli () and Chilton (). Chilton, however, treated in an appendix (pages –) to his commentary the recently published first new discoveries of Martin Ferguson Smith: NF  / YF  (fr.  III–V), NF  / YF  (fr.  I–II), NF  / YF  (fr. ), and NF  / YF  (fr. ).



 

success prompted the British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara (BIAA) to launch, in , a survey investigating the urban topography and the inscription. This project resulted in an accurate plan of the site as well as investigations focusing on individual buildings. In addition, by ,  more new fragments of the inscription had been found, although most of these were small (NF –). The growth in the number of fragments was so significant that Martin Ferguson Smith decided it was desirable to issue a new edition. It was published in Naples in . Unlike his twentieth-century predecessors, Smith based his text not on the drawings of Heberdey and Kalinka, but, wherever possible, on examination of the stones themselves and his squeezes and photographs of them. He also made use of the squeezes and notebooks of the nineteenth-century French and Austrian discoverers which he had tracked down in Athens and Vienna. In  he published at Vienna a further volume containing drawings and photographs of the stones or squeezes of them. In addition to offering a new interpretation of the textual content, he was able, on the basis of important indications in the text and study of the physical and epigraphical features of the stones, to make inferences about the arrangement of the inscription on the wall of the stoa.⁹ He proposed that it occupied seven horizontal courses, and that the lowest inscribed course contained Diogenes’ Ethics, with a continuous band of Epicurean maxims running through the margin below the columns of the treatise – maxims which, since many of them are known from other sources, help us to determine the extent of gaps in the text of the Ethics and to calculate the minimum length of the treatise. Above the Ethics was Diogenes’ Physics, and above that were various letters and, according to Smith’s reconstruction, maxims of Diogenes and then a course containing more writings of Diogenes and perhaps some of Epicurus. In structural terms, a caesura in the form of an apparently scored profile appears to separate the topmost writing, which contains reflections on old age, from the remainder of the text. This writing is carved in eighteen-line columns that occupy the top three courses of the inscription. Although the architectural parameters could only be interpreted in a very schematic way,¹⁰ Smith was able to give a rough estimate of the length of the inscription as between  and .m, and to suggest that its height was about .m with an uninscribed course at least cm high below it. In , the British survey team was having lunch in Kınık, a village in the Seki plain several kilometres from Oinoanda, when they came across three fragments of Diogenes’ inscription, two of them built into a fountain.¹¹ With this discovery

⁹ See Hammerstaedt  in this volume. ¹⁰ Smith’s reconstruction in fig. , Hammerstaedt  in this volume. ¹¹ Fr.  (YF ), fr.  (YF ), and fr.  (YF ). The latest news about YF  and  are reported in Hammerstaedt/Smith () .

.      



came the troubling realization that some of the inscription blocks had travelled further afield – which had previously been ruled out in view of the inaccessibility and impenetrability of the terrain. The archaeological investigations of the past also brought to light a series of other, non-philosophical inscription finds at Oinoanda, confirming the city’s reputation as an epigraphic Eldorado.¹² Among these are the genealogical inscriptions from the mausoleum of Licinnia Flavilla and Flavianus Diogenes (fig. ),¹³ already noticed by Spratt, and the so-called ‘Demostheneia inscription’ (fig. ), which was first edited and discussed by Michael Wörrle of the Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik.¹⁴ A decisive turning point in research into Diogenes’ inscription came in  when Martin Ferguson Smith in collaboration with Fethiye Museum conducted a first, very small-scale excavation on the site. Although exceptionally successful, the project had to be discontinued prematurely for various reasons – but not before it had revealed that part of a late Roman portico that bounded the Esplanade on the south side had been erected on a foundation consisting almost entirely of reused stones from the Diogenes inscription. Smith presented these new finds, which were first published in ,¹⁵ together with some further work on previously known Diogenes fragments, in a supplement to his  edition. This supplement was published in same series, La Scuola di Epicuro, in Naples in .¹⁶ This third volume, which is indispensable for everyone working on or citing the texts of Diogenes, mentioned preparations for a forthcoming excavation. It happened, however, that the British Institute at Ankara (as the BIAA is now called) gave up Oinoanda as a ‘British’ site by the end of . So this somewhat disparate research situation was the starting point for the new survey project at Oinoanda that commenced ten years after the excavation – in  – with an international team under the direction of the Istanbul department of the German Archaeological Institute.¹⁷

¹² See also Hammerstaedt – in this volume. ¹³ Hall/Coulton/Milner () . ¹⁴ Wörrle (), the discovery described on –; see also Smith (). ¹⁵ Smith (). ¹⁶ Smith (a). ¹⁷ The scientific programme of the research campaigns at Oinoanda was supported by the German Archaeological Institute, the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, the Gesellschaft der Freunde und Förderer der Nordrhein-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften und Künste, the Stiftung Altertumskunde of the University of Cologne, the Franz Rutzen Stiftung, the Kim Hee-Kyung Foundation (Korea), the Charlotte Bonham-Carter Charitable Trust and The Seven Pillars of Wisdom Trust (both United Kingdom) as well as by the generous private donations of John Fraser and Martin Ferguson Smith, to whom we also extend our thanks.



 

.      The prime concern of the new project was to combine investigations into the city of Diogenes with research into his inscription. Up to now not a single block has been found in its original context: all have been reused, and the exact position of the stoa that carried the inscription has to be deduced by archaeological methods. The British survey had produced a commendably accurate plan of the city, and certain important buildings had been documented by J.J. Coulton and others. However, that work had largely been conducted in isolation from the epigraphic research. How the inscriptions were integrated into their architectural and urban context was unclear, and key questions about their socio-historical meaning thus remained unanswered. The aim of the new project was therefore to contextualize the city’s rich epigraphic culture and its material culture in a way that incorporated the topography of the surrounding landscape. To this end, the scientific approaches of the disciplines of archaeology, geomatics, architectural history, philology, and epigraphy were combined.¹⁸ The methodology employed had an important function in facilitating information exchange between the disciplines involved. Since the nineteenth century, epigraphic documentation has relied on the tried and tested method of the squeeze copy. Here, special paper is laid upon the inscribed surface of a stone, dampened, and beaten into the contours using thick-bristled brushes; several hours later, once the paper has dried, it is removed. The result is a perfect negative of the inscription, which frequently is easier to read than the original because it can be held up for scrutiny in raking light from any angle (fig. ). But this documentation process has its drawbacks. A squeeze copy is not reproducible and can be examined only by one who is present to handle it. In the case of Diogenes’ inscription this problem is particularly acute because the most comprehensive collection of squeezes of the inscription is to be found in Martin Ferguson Smith’s private archive on Foula, the westernmost of the Shetland Islands, far away from Oinoanda and not easily accessible to researchers. Another disadvantage in respect of our project is that the architectural parameters are not taken into account: only the inscribed side of a given block is documented, not its entire cubature. We consequently embarked on D documentation using a stripe light scanner so as to be able to produce three-dimensional models of the inscribed stones and reproduce them at will.

Scientific cooperation partners were the German Archaeological Institute, The Hacettepe Üniversitesi (Ankara), the University of Cologne, the Karlsruhe University of Applied Sciences, the KIT (Karlsruhe), the University of Kiel, and the BIAA. ¹⁸ Bachmann (b) .

.      



Fig. . Nicholas Milner preparing a squeeze in Oinoanda  (M. Bachmann).

Another problem with the research conducted in the past was the use of heterogeneous systems in documenting the  or so fragments that lay scattered over the entire urban area. While the heterogeneity of the systems was overcome by a praiseworthy concordance list published by Martin Ferguson Smith,¹⁹ a further serious obstacle to research was presented by the complicated find situation. Some fragments were built into other structures, some lay in open terrain, some were overgrown, others had been buried by illicit digging. The precariousness of the find situation is illustrated by the fact that nearly a quarter of the  fragments discovered in the nineteenth century could no longer be found. Our project therefore introduced a geo-referenced information system to make it easier to relocate and inventory the fragments. During the inventory process it became clear how endangered the limestone fragments of Diogenes were. They were at risk from weathering and cracking and flaking; small fragments risked getting buried by erosion processes or even stolen. The project therefore made it a priority to make a drastic improvement to the conservation conditions on site.

¹⁹ Smith () – and (a) –.



 

These essential requirements defined the scope and content of the six-year survey project. The central focus was Diogenes’ inscription, which we approached by two lines of enquiry. Firstly via the microcosm of the large and small fragments of the inscription, their documentation and conservation; and secondly via the macrocosm of its original environment – the building on which it was displayed, the urban layout, and the surrounding landscape that created the socio-economic conditions for the rich epigraphic culture of Oinoanda. The macrocosm furthermore comprises the non-philosophical inscription finds from Oinoanda, which have to be considered in the same context as the Diogenes inscription. As for the city’s buildings, we studied them by means of structural documentation, documentation of architectural members, geophysical survey of subterranean walls, and three-dimensional survey of the topography. Crucial to all the work undertaken was the use of new technological methods, which ran through the whole project like a connecting thread.

.   ’  Concerning Diogenes’ inscription the two main figures in the research team were Martin Ferguson Smith of Durham University and Jürgen Hammerstaedt, Chair of Classical Philology and Papyrology at the University of Cologne. Martin Ferguson Smith is the Nestor of Diogenes research, and we were very fortunate to have him on board for the project, given his comprehensive knowledge of the inscription, its content, and the site. In Jürgen Hammerstaedt he found a dynamic and highly congenial partner who not only shared his passion for the inscription and the research, but also communicated it to the whole team. The first step consisted in systematically surveying the find-spots using GPS data and plotting them on a plan.²⁰ This facilitates the unambiguous geo-referenced identification of the inscription fragments, and allows us to create meaningful distribution models. The next step was documenting the fragments in D using a stripe light scanner. In an initially time-consuming procedure that speeded up as the project progressed, the fragments were brought into the shade inside a tent and then scanned from all sides. A high-resolution laser line scanner was used for the inscribed faces, and a somewhat lower-resolution hand-held scanner for the other sides. The result is a complete, three-dimensional, virtual model that is available for all to work with as a D pdf document (fig. ). Different raking-light situations can be simulated for better legibility, just as can be done with squeezes.

²⁰ Bachmann () –.

.      

Fig. . Example of a three-dimensional, virtual model of an inscription fragment (K. Berner).





 

We also scanned the squeezes of blocks which are still missing or whose surfaces have deteriorated since they were first recorded. These squeezes are stored in the École Française d’Athènes, the Kleinasiatische Kommission in Vienna, and in the Isle of Foula (Shetland). In cases where the squeezes had suffered distortion over the years, flattened scans were produced, to be used by CAD (Computer aided design) in the virtual reconstruction of the Stoa wall. Thanks to intensive field-walking in the course of the six-year project it was possible to supplement the  known fragments of the Diogenes inscription with a further  new finds and bring the total of known fragments to . Among the new finds are many fragments that are very small and hold little text, but there are also complete inscription blocks, some of which contain interesting and important arguments. For example, in a maxim found in  Diogenes criticizes Plato’s theory of cosmogony and notes that belief in a beginning of the world must logically imply its end;²¹ and in a new passage of the Physics, discovered in ,²² he casts doubt on the theological interpretation of natural phenomena like lightning, thunder, and celestial movements, which in his view are a matter of indifference to the gods.

.      As already mentioned, the catastrophic conservation conditions for the fragments in the terrain became obvious during the field-walking. To remedy this situation, designs were drawn up in  for a small, steel-clad, burglar-proof depot building, where the new finds and a large proportion of the known fragments could be safely stored. The chosen site was the Esplanade, because that is where most of the salvageable fragments of the philosophical inscription were to be found.²³ Transporting more than  tonnes of building material up steep mountain paths proved to be a logistical challenge, and was only managed with the help of pack animals. The burglar-proof door, weighing  kilograms, was even carried up the mountainside by hand. Once all the necessary material (including the concrete for the spot foundations) had reached the mountain-top site, construction could begin in the summer of . The depot’s heavy-load-bearing shelves also form its framework construction. The structure was prefabricated by a master metalworker from Bergama and assembled

²¹ NF ; see Erler, Verde – and Roskam – in this volume. ²² NF  = Theol. XV–XVI. The whole text sequence is analyzed by Roskam – in this volume. ²³ Bachmann () –.

.      



Fig. . The depot house at Oinoanda after the construction works of  (M. Bachmann).

on site. The depot is clad with mm thick steel panels, which all had to be welded together, along with a floor panel and the roof (fig. ). The small but highly demanding and costly construction project was only possible thanks to the extraordinarily prompt and generous response to an international appeal for donations.²⁴ The donors’ names have been engraved, and thereby immortalized, in the epidermis of the solid steel structure. Laser technology was used here too, as it was in the scanning of the ancient inscriptions (fig. ). Then began the task of salvaging the fragments of Diogenes, some weighing up to kg, from the terrain. This proved to be extremely laborious because, apart from a hoisting tripod and a support rack, only human muscle power was

²⁴ Construction of the depot building was made possible by a generous donation from the Gilbert de Botton Foundation and by substantial contributions from Martin Ferguson Smith, Gustav Kranck (Steelteam), the heritage preservation programme of the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, John Fraser, Professor Klaus Fischer (Fischer Befestigungssysteme), Centro Internazionale per lo Studio dei Papiri Ercolanesi (CISPE), the Societat Catalana d’Estudis Clàssics, the Seven Pillars of Wisdom Trust, the Istanbul Department of the German Archaeological Institute, and other individual donors.



 

Fig. . Donor’s names engraved in the steel cladding of the depot house (M. Bachmann).

available. Recovering the fragments did, however, present an opportunity to scan them from all sides and thus to complete the digital models. When work was concluded in , a total of  fragments of the inscription had been salvaged. So, more than half of all known fragments of Diogenes and nearly all the pieces at greatest risk of theft or weathering are now safely housed in the depot and are accessible for research purposes too, thanks to the comprehensive documentation (fig. ). In one notable case the removal of blocks from their find-places enabled texts to be read in full for the first time. The event occurred during the  season, when it was possible to move the stylobate blocks in the South Stoa that were partly covering three fragments of Diogenes found during the British excavation of . The largest of the three was NF , part of the ‘Theological Physics-Sequence’.

.      



Fig. . Interior of the depot house with Diogenes fragments on the heavy-load-bearing shelves,  (M. Bachmann).

Lines – and parts of lines – of each of its four columns were concealed. When the covering blocks were removed, all but the top left corner of NF , carrying the second halves of the first lines of the first column, were exposed. The stylobate block above this corner could not be moved, but fortunately there was a a gap of –cm between its base and the inscribed face of NF , and it proved possible to record the hidden text, although not without difficulty. Jürgen Hammerstaedt lay in the trench and recovered the hidden letters, partly by tracing their shape with his fingers, partly reading them with sunlight projected into the gap by extending mirrors (fig. ). He dictated the letters to Martin Ferguson Smith sitting nearby. The proceeding took about an hour, but made it possible to fill a significant lacuna in the longest known passage of Diogenes, namely the  columns of the ‘Theological Physics-Sequence’.²⁵ The storehouse does not house the entire inscription by any means. And most blocks of the inscription are still undiscovered and lie somewhere in the debris.

²⁵ Hammerstaedt/Smith () –.



 

Fig. . Jürgen Hammerstaedt ‘reading’ and dictating the right half of NF  I = Theol. VIII – (M. Bachmann).

Further archaeological work at Oinoanda should bring additional discoveries to light, save them in this way from further deterioration and provide us, at the same time, with exciting new insights.

.      The D documentation of individual fragments of Diogenes’ inscription now makes it possible to contextualize the inscribed content with the dimensional and architectural parameters. We are still in the early stages of this task, but some sections have already been tentatively reassembled. For example, several fragments have been fitted into the virtual reconstruction of the continuous ‘Theological Physics-Sequence’, nearly m long.²⁶ In preview of the virtual reconstruction of the inscribed wall, or stoa, with a section from the beginning of the inscrip-

²⁶ Hammerstaedt/Smith ()  = () .

.      



Fig. . Hypothetical reconstruction of the beginning section of Diogenes’ inscription in a D-model (K. Berner).

tion, the still remaining big gaps of are filled in with neutral blocks, which at the same time continue the structure of the wall as defined by the existing fragments (fig. ). While the position and appearance of the building are still not clear, we can arrive at some approximate hypothetical reconstructions of it thanks to the information gained so far. As this map of absolute distribution frequency shows, the stones of Diogenes’ inscription travelled quite a long way in some cases, even as far as the village of Kınık, –km away, but there is nevertheless a distinct concentration in the area of the Esplanade (fig. ). If we now look at the Esplanade area and convert the find distribution into relative frequency mode, then we see clear concentrations at the site of the South Stoa (on the south side of the Esplanade) and around the Great Wall (fig. ). We should bear in mind that this elaborate defensive circuit was probably not built until early Byzantine times, and that the stones reused in it may have been appearing in their third or even fourth context.



 

Fig. . Map of Oinoanda and its environs showing the absolute frequency distribution of the inscription fragments (K. Berner).

.      



Fig. . Map of the city centre of Oinoanda showing the relative frequency distribution of the inscription fragments (K. Berner).



 

The buildings which were found to have fragments of Diogenes built into them as spolia belong to a primary phase of recycling probably, in the fourth century AD, when the stones were reused for the South Stoa and structures adjoining it on the west side. The city’s ancient street system was then still fully in use. It was probably at this time that the Stoa of Diogenes was demolished. In all likelihood it was an imperial-era predecessor of the portico-style South Stoa.

.   In order to get a clearer idea of this building and of Oinoanda’s architecture in general, the most important structures – predominantly on and around the Esplanade – were examined in minute detail. For this purpose we used a terrestrial laser scanner, which allowed the virtual elimination of the vegetation. This method had proved successful when first tried out in , and its use was now extended to cover the entire Esplanade and significant neighbouring areas – specifically the city’s main church with architectural members from the North Stoa, the bathhouse west of the Esplanade, and a prominent rocky hill south-west of the Esplanade, called ‘Martin’s Hill’ by the British research team because of the large number of Diogenes fragments which Martin Smith had recorded on it, especially in the early s (fig. ). At appropriate places, geophysical prospecting was carried out as well to complement the results of the laser scanning. By this means we were able to arrive at a fairly exact picture of the array of furnishings on the Esplanade – for example statue pedestals, exedras, and columnar monuments. On the basis of this information, a hand-drawn plan was produced of the stones on the Esplanade. It records all the architectural structures in situ in addition to all the collapse debris masses containing architectural members and decorative elements that originated from the buildings. A great deal of supplementary information registered on this ‘stone-plan’ makes it the centrepiece of the structural documentation. Going in a clockwise direction, we documented the ruins of a temple-like heroon, the North Stoa, the complex of buildings on the east side including a possible bouleuterion, the South Stoa, the early Byzantine defensive wall, and the adjacent structures to the west that connected this district with the Roman agora. We also documented in detail all relevant architectural members, so that it is now easy to generate precise models of individual elements. Following on from this, reconstructed architectural members were re-erected at their original locations alongside structures still present in situ, so as to create a virtual ‘anastylosis’. Figure  shows an example – a column from the South Stoa, the stoa which probably carried the inscription of Diogenes, and whose architectural members were later reused in a very long, late classical portico resembling a colonnaded street.

.      



Fig. . D model of a column from the South Stoa, the stoa that probably carried the inscription of Diogenes (N. Koch).

Thanks to the minutely detailed reconstruction of the two-storey North Stoa and its counterpart, the single-storey South Stoa, it is possible to get a sense of the architectural idiom that was employed on the Esplanade and accompanied the inscription (fig. ). The architectural ensemble flanking the square opened out towards the city at an angle that enhanced its perspective effect. Diogenes’ stoa was demolished probably in the fourth century AD. Before that the North Stoa had been reduced to a single-storey structure, which may have been the direct or indirect result of an earthquake or earthquakes. The demolition of the South Stoa and its replacement with an elongated portico with liberal use of spolia may have been intentional acts, since it was presumably thought necessary to remove the inscription from the Christian city. At any rate, a large number of inscription blocks were reused in the foundations of the stylobate of a new stoa at the south side of the Esplanade. Let us turn our attention now, briefly, to other buildings in the vicinity of the Esplanade which have been investigated as part of our project and represent further characteristic features of Oinoanda’s architecture. One such building is the older bathhouse, immediately west of the Esplanade. Thanks to a recently discovered building inscription, it can be dated exactly to the common reign of Vespasian, Titus, and Domitian in AD.²⁷ In terms of design it is a simple, Lycian variant that may be considered an acculturation derivative of the Roman epoch in Asia Minor.

²⁷ YÇ ; N.P. Milner, Building Roman Lycia. New Inscriptions and Monuments from the Baths and Peristyle Buildings Ml  and Ml  at Oinoanda, in: Anatolian Studies  (), –.



 

Fig. . Reconstruction of the two-storey North Stoa and its counterpart, the single-storey South Stoa, forming the borders of the Esplanade (N. Koch).

Fig. . Section through the bath house erected under Vespasian showing the sequence of rooms (M. Bachmann).

In a sectional drawing the sequence of caldarium, tepidarium – accentuated here by an apse – and frigidarium in the entrance vestibule is clearly visible (fig. ). A bathhouse like this can only function, of course, with large amounts of water; and construction of Oinoanda’s remarkable water supply system, which we will come to in a moment, is therefore directly connected to the bathhouse. South-west of the Esplanade lies the rock formation of Martin’s Hill. Its morphology was substantially modified by the creation of rock chambers, beddings, and platforms. Collapse debris in front of the massif contains a number of architectural members and sarcophagus elements, indicating that a necropolis was located here right next to the city centre. The remains of a small-format Ionic temple tomb can be associated with an artificial platform on the highest point of the hill (fig. ). In terms of urban topography, the diminutive edifice was presumably very effectively positioned, being visible from virtually all points of the urban area. Right in front of the temple façade, beddings for

.      



Fig. . Reconstruction of the small-format Ionic temple on the rock formation Martin’s Hill (N. Koch).

a small sarcophagus (ostotheke) and a big sarcophagus can be observed. Architectural members associated with them are to be found in the mass of collapse debris east of the hill. Immediately to the west of Martin’s Hill lies the principal Byzantine church of Oinoanda, whose ruins are dominated to such an extent by building material brought over from the North Stoa that Thomas Spratt, on his visit in , believed he was looking at the “ruins of a Doric temple”.²⁸ Thanks to an intensive examination of the ruins by the Regensburg-based architectural historian Annika Zeitler, the original structure of the triple-nave church with its rows of columns has been established (fig. ). In the process it became clear that the very large architectural members had been reassembled with great care and exactly in the original arrangement. This contrasts sharply with the somewhat sloppy execution of the rest of the masonry of the church, which must belong to the early Byzantine settlement phase of Oinoanda. Now let us jump to the southern extremity of the urban area. The most prominent structure at Oinoanda is certainly the already mentioned m or so section of the Hellenistic city wall.²⁹ Given the significance of this unique polyorcetic monument, it was carefully documented stone by stone. In the first campaigns, several badly

²⁸ Spratt/Forbes () with a detailed plan of the ruins. ²⁹ Coulton () –.



 

Fig. . Longitudinal section through the reconstruction of the main Byzantine church of Oinoanda with the reassembled spolia columns (A. Zeitler).

weathered inscriptions were discovered on the outer face the polygonal tower; they had evidently been carved some time later than the construction period.³⁰ Small altars were also found cut into the stone blocks, along with recesses where oil lamps could be placed (fig. ). It appears that the big ashlar wall was fashioned into a small-scale vertical sacred topography in the Roman imperial period. Among the most noteworthy inscriptions are dedications to a supreme god – important evidence of a tendency towards monotheism in the pagan religions of the third century AD. The evidence is being further appraised by Nicholas Milner and Gregor Staab.³¹ Here, too, a laser scan was made as the basis of the structural record. The drawings of the wall elevations were prepared with great exactitude using modelled greyscale digital images. The façades of the city wall exhibit many unusual constructional features. While the outer face is built in monumental ashlar masonry, the inner sides employ the polygonal technique, which is more complex in terms of workmanship but also more economical. On the other hand, wall-walks, shooting loops, and other details conform, textbook-style, to the Hellenistic fortification technology of the second century B.C.³² During structural documentation a wide opening, originally spanned by an arch, was discovered on the south-east side. In all likelihood this was the main entrance, that is the city gate, of Oinoanda.

³⁰ Bachmann () –. ³¹ See also Hammerstaedt  in this volume. ³² Similar peculiarities are visible in the Hellenistic fortress of Kydna in Lycia.

.      

Fig. . Detail from the outer face of the Hellenistic city wall with a small altar cut in the ashlars and recesses for oil lamps (M. Bachmann).





 

.      I should now like to broaden our scope and make some brief observations about the city as a whole, and first about the Hellenistic city wall in the south. While geophysical methods have identified some further sections of the wall, there are nevertheless many indications that the Hellenistic city of Oinoanda did not form a complete defensive circuit, but instead only had elaborate architecture of this kind at the main entrances to the city. The wall’s function therefore lay more in display and prestige than in defence. It may have been erected in conjunction with the foundation of Oinoanda in the early second century B.C. as a manifestation of the new polis. The new map of Oinoanda (fig. ) not only presents the city’s monuments and topography with a considerable degree of accuracy, but also embodies the quintessence of all of the observations about the individual structures. In the development of the city there is much to suggest that the Hellenistic foundation phase displayed great continuity into the first century AD; this first phase, with the corresponding buildings, is shown in grey. The buildings of this phase are distributed right across the urban area, with a concentration in the area round the Esplanade and to the east of that. Extensive necropolises in the north-east, north-west and south-west were established in this early phase and are an indication of the original approach road to the city. In the Roman imperial era, probably from the second century AD onwards, a shift to the west occurred, with the newly created Roman agora as the city centre and with building activity in the north and south parts of the urban area. In late antiquity, a period of prosperity and expansion left its mark on large parts of the urban area – shown in yellow. In this phase many monuments were converted or pulled down, among them Diogenes’ stoa. Then, probably in early Byzantine times – also marked yellow – a new fortification circuit of reduced compass was erected to protect the core area. A small citadel built on a small hill in the south-west of the urban area probably served as a refuge fort. The urban development delineated here is much easier to understand if we widen our perspective further to take in the area surrounding Oinoanda; and so we will briefly consider the results of the survey there (fig. ). First of all there is the small fortified settlement of Kemerarası at the foot of the mountain, at the edge of the Seki plain. Kemerarası, also surveyed as part of the project, has settlement traces solely from late antiquity and especially the Byzantine period, and it may have eclipsed Oinoanda as the region’s urban centre in this phase. Several huge blocks of a Syrian-style monument not unlike the Temple of Hadrian in Ephesus – dating from the reign of Antoninus Pius³³ and adorned with a serliana

³³ YÇ  a/b (still unedited).

.      

Fig. . New map of Oinoanda and its surroundings, based on the results of the survey project (K. Berner).





 

were found next to the urban area of Kemerarası and stand in a remarkable axial alignment with the peak of the acropolis above Oinoanda and with the temple tomb on Martin’s Hill beside the Esplanade. While Kemerarası, north of Oinoanda, seems to have played a role in that city’s demise, to the south of Oinoanda there is a monument that may have been partly responsible for its rise and prosperity. It is a remarkable aqueduct that was apparently equipped with a pressure conduit of stone. A very similar aqueduct, known as the Delikkemer, exists at Patara; J.J. Coulton has already drawn attention to the links between the two structures.³⁴ The Delikkemer is exactly dated to Vespasian’s reign by a building inscription, and consequently the hydraulic engineering works of Oinoanda may also be dated to the same time, as the inscription from the bathhouse already suggests. The route taken by the water supply system – about km long – can be traced to the sources that still supply fresh water today to the nearby village of Incealiler. Several constructed facilities along the route of the water supply system testify to the importance of this amenity for the mountain city, which did not possess any water sources within its urban area. This brief overview of the city of Diogenes is of course provisional in character and should make it clear that we still have a great deal of work ahead of us. All the same it is a great opportunity to outline the research project at a congress that is devoted exclusively to the philosophy of Diogenes of Oinoanda – a new and important step in Diogenes research.

³⁴ Coulton/Stenton () –.

           New Finds, New Research, and New Challenges

Jürgen Hammerstaedt*

. , ,        Located in the mountains of northern Lycia, the ancient Greek town of Oinoanda, which overlooks the Seki plain to the east and the Fethiye-Antalya highway to the west, is known not only for its archaeological remains, but also for its many important inscriptions. The most famous of these inscriptions was commissioned by its citizen Diogenes. His own words may serve to introduce it:¹ So (…) observing that these people (scil. my contemporaries) are in this predicament, I bewailed their behaviour and wept over the wasting of their lives, and I considered it the responsibility of a good man to give [benevolent] assistance, to the utmost of one’s ability, to those of them who are well-constituted. In another fragment Diogenes gives his reasons for delivering his advice and thought in an inscription:² Having already reached the sunset of my life [and] being almost on the verge of departure [from] the world on account of old age with a [fine] hymn [that praises] the fulfilling of [my desires], I decided, before being overtaken by death, to help now those who are well-constituted. Now, if only one person or two or three or four or five or six or any larger number you choose, sir, provided that it is not very large, were in a bad predicament, I should address them individually and do all in my power to give them the best advice. But since, as I have said before, the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague, with their false notions about things, and their number is increasing (for in a mutual emulation

* The author thanks Dr. Robert Daniel (University of Cologne) for having corrected the English style of his contribution and Martin Ferguson Smith for his extremely valuable remarks. ¹ Fr.  II –III  (translation of Smith ). ² Fr.  II –VI  (translation of Smith , modified by Hammerstaedt , – = Hammerstaedt/Smith , –).





they catch the disease from one another, like sheep), and, [moreover], since it is right to help [also] generations to come (for they too belong to us, though they are still unborn), and since, besides, love of humanity prompts us to aid also the foreigners who come here – now, since the remedies in written form reach a larger number of people, I decided to use this stoa to advertise publicly the [medicines] that bring salvation, medicines, which we ourselves have put [fully] to the test. Diogenes is already an old man and wants to grant salvation to as many persons as possible, including later generations and visitors from abroad. This is why he commissioned the inscription on the wall of a stoa in his home-town Oinoanda of three fairly extensive philosophical treatises, some letters and philosophical maxims. His philosophical inscription is one of the very few Epicurean texts of the Imperial period that have survived. The only other ones known to us are the fragmentary excerpts from the book On Fate, written by an otherwise unknown Epicurean named Diogenianus and transmitted in the Praeparatio evangelica of the fourth century AD Christian writer Eusebius.³ We also owe the Imperial Period the transmission of the three famous Epicurean epistles to Herodotus, Pythocles and Menoeceus and Epicurus’ forty Principal Doctrines in the tenth book of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Philosophers. The research of Martin Ferguson Smith has assigned the  discovered blocks and fragments of Diogenes’ inscription to several treatises and writings on different courses of the stoa wall. The criteria for Smith’s disposition (fig. ) included the height of the blocks, the varying size of the letters, the ‘pagination’ of the texts on the stone courses, and of course the content. The lowest course contained an ethical treatise, described in its title as ἐπιτομή (abridgement), written in fourteen-line columns of small letters (about .cm high). The treatise helps us to find a right balance between the feelings and needs of body and soul. As a result, Diogenes stresses the importance of the affects and sensations of the human body and limits the concern about the affects and feelings of our soul.⁴ On the same blocks, in the spacious margin below the columns of the Ethics, a continuous fifteenth line of ethical maxims is carved in letters of medium size (about .cm).

³ The excerpts of Eus. Praep. Ev. IV  and VI  are separately edited in Gercke () –. See also Isnardi Parente (a); Hammerstaedt (). ⁴ Fr. –, NF , , , –, , –, and .

    



Fig. . Arrangement of Diogenes’ inscription on the stoa wall proposed by Smith () fig.  (after page ).

Fig.  shows a small fragment of Epicurus’ second Principal Doctrine,⁵ whose complete text ran: Death is nothing to us; for what has been dissolved is without sensation, and what is without sensation is nothing to us. Most fragments of this continuous line belong to already known Principal Doctrines and/or Vatican Sayings of Epicurus. Thus they offer an important criterion for the original order of several Ethics blocks, especially in cases where the texts of the columns themselves do not directly link up. The second course, counting from the bottom, started with an introduction to the whole inscription⁶ and continued with a treatise on Epicurean physics. Each column

⁵ Diog. NF  + fr. . ⁶ Fr.  and , quoted above. For the diverging opinions held by Martin Ferguson Smith and me about the function of this introduction, see Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –). Two further blocks bearing single columns of eleven lines in medium-size writing, which were assigned to Diogenes’ Directions to Family and Friends (fr. –),





Fig. . Columns containing Ethics with a line containing one of Epicurus’ Maxims (combined scans of Diog. NF  + fr. ).

contains fourteen lines of small letters, but, unlike in other courses, paragraphoi are not used for punctuation (Fig. ).⁷ The extant fragments of Diogenes’ Physics polemicize against the doctrine of elements of Presocratic and later non-Epicurean philosophers,⁸ namely the Stoics.⁹ Moreover, Diogenes rejects wrong ideas about gods. So he shows that apparently supranatural phenomena, like dreams,¹⁰ and visions, as well as astronomical and celestial processes,¹¹ are generated by purely physical causes without involvement of the gods.

may have been in the same course as the Physics or the Old Age C-blocks (Smith , –). ⁷ Fr. – and NF  +  (= Theol. III–XI), –,  (=Theol. I–III),  (=Theol. XIV–XVI), and . ⁸ See Roskam – in this volume. ⁹ See Gourinat – in this volume. ¹⁰ Fr. , see Gourinat – and Güremen –, , and  in this volume. ¹¹ Fr. – (see Leone – in this volume); Theol. XV–XVI.

    



Fig. . Physics block NF  (found in ).

The third course also contained fourteen-line columns written in small letters (fig. ).¹² These are epistles written by Diogenes to his philosophical sympathizers and friends.¹³ We gain from these Fourteen-Line-Column (FLC) Letters some very valuable pieces of information about the life of Diogenes himself. He was in contact with other Epicureans in Athens, Chalcis in Euboea, Thebes and Rhodes (fr. –).

¹² NF  may have been in the third course with the FLC Letters too, despite being somewhat taller. It contains in a twelve-line column (to the right of some line ends of the preceding column, and followed by a  line with the address ἔρρωϲθε in smaller letters) the end of a letter either by Diogenes or by (pseudoepigraphic?) Epicurus. Size and writing are unparalleled, so that the position in the inscription remains uncertain (see Hammerstaedt/Smith , – = , –). ¹³ Diog. fr. –. A further, still inaccessible block, which seems to have immediately preceded the famous description of Epicurus’ shipwreck in fr. , was spotted in October ; see Hammerstaedt/Smith () .





Fig. . FLC Letters block fr.  III–IV (YF ). The arrow points to an asterisk which marks the beginning in col. IV  of the conversation (διάλεξιϲ) between Theodoridas and Diogenes about the infinite number of worlds.

To Rhodes he would travel in order to escape the rough winters of his home town Oinoanda. Epicurus had probably been the first to establish such a network of philosophers, actively maintaining his connections with Lampsacus and Mytilene after having founded his κῆποϲ at Athens shortly before B.C. Diogenes followed Epicurus’ example, too, by publishing his own letters and philosophical maxims and by calling his Ethics treatise an ἐπιτομή (abridgement) – in sharp contrast to its prolix diction! While Epicurus had bought a piece of land in Athens for his philosophical community, Diogenes used the stoa in his home-town to propagate his philosophical opinions.

    



Diogenes differs from Epicurus, however, in addressing explicitly non-Epicureans outside his community¹⁴ through the inscription in which he imparts the controversial and much maligned Epicurean doctrine with great didactic ability, variously combining shorter and longer, simple and complex, texts that treat different aspects of his philosophy.¹⁵ It has been assumed¹⁶ that part of the same third course contained the philosophical Maxims¹⁷ whose author was probably Diogenes himself.¹⁸ They were written in letters of medium size. The individual maxims are rather short. No maxim exceeds the surface of a single block, and sometimes two maxims are accommodated on the same block.¹⁹ This is the case with the most recent block of the Maxims to be found (fig. ), brought to light in October . The first five and a half lines contain a single maxim whose text was restored by the editors in nearly the same fashion:²⁰ It is right that the virtuous person has achieved [renown] and is considered [wholly] deserving of the appellation (virtuous); [for indeed] he is truly good.²¹ The text which follows in lines – is disputed, but contained beyond doubt a further, different maxim: Farming often is a cause of damage [to the body (or: to our physical condition)], but certainly not of [groundless] feelings [of ] distress and [fears].²² ¹⁴ Frischer ()  and – emphasized, quoting Diog. Laert. X b (Usener, Epicurea : ϲχολὴν καταϲκευάϲειν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὥϲτ’ ὀχλαγωγῆϲαι· καὶ ἀναγνώϲεϲθαι ἐν πλήθει, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἑκόντα), that Epicurean teaching is normally limited to members of the Epicurean community (cf. Hoffman , ), while Diogenes of Oinoanda is in this regard an exception (Frischer , – n. ); see also Smith () –. ¹⁵ For the literary and rhetorical technique of Diogenes see Hammerstaedt (a), and Roskam in this volume. ¹⁶ Smith () . ¹⁷ Fr. –; NF –, –, –, –, , . ¹⁸ Smith () –; (a) . ¹⁹ Fr. , , and . ²⁰ NF ; edition, translation and commentary in Hammerstaedt/Smith () –. ̣ ’ ὄ̣[νομα ἀν]|ῆκεν ὁ ϲπου̣δ[αῖοϲ καὶ] | προϲηγορίαϲ [πάντωϲ] | ²¹ Smith’s translation of δικαίωϲ ἐπ ἠξίωται· v κ[αὶ γὰρ δή] | ἐϲτιν ὡϲ ἀλ[ηθῶϲ ἀγα]|θόϲ. Hammerstaedt restores in line  προϲηγορίαϲ [τοιᾶϲδε] and translates this with: and is considered deserving of [such] appellation. ²² Hammerstaedt’s translation of πολλά[κιϲ μὲν] | βλάβηϲ αἴτ[ιόν ἐϲτι] τὸ γεωργεῖν̣ [ϲώματι], | οὐ μέν̣ τοι̣ [καὶ κενῶν] | λυπῶν κ̣ α[ὶ φόβων]. Smith restores πολλά[κιϲ μὲν] | βλάβηϲ αἴτ[ιόϲ ἐϲτι] | τῷ (instead of τό, as it stands on the stone) γεωργεῖν̣ [χειμών], οὐ μέν̣ τοι ̣ [καὶ κενῶν] | λυπῶν κ̣ α[ὶ φόβων] and translates: [Stormy weather] is often a cause of damage [to] farming, but not [also] of [groundless] feelings of distress and [fears].



Fig. . New Maxims block (NF ).



    



Fig. . Block belonging to the TLC Writings (NF ).

A further group of writings in ten-line columns of medium-sized letters (.cm) was probably in the fourth course. It comprises several epistles. Some fragments of these Ten-Line-Column (TLC) Writings seem to belong to letters of Diogenes himself,²³ while others are part of a supposed letter of Epicurus to his mother.²⁴ In TLC Writings NF , which was found in , Diogenes promises to complete the Epicurean education of some women, probably of younger age (fig. ). The first philosopher to have openly admitted women into his philosophical community had been Epicurus himself. Also a treatise by Diogenes on Old Age has been recognized.²⁵ It probably occupied the top of the inscription. Several ancient writings dealt with old age, but apart

²³ Fr. –, fr. +NF , fr. –, NF – and –. ²⁴ Fr. –, and ; Gordon () – questioned the authorship of Epicurus but she was not unanimously followed, cf. Smith (a) – and the elaborate remarks in Smith () –. ²⁵ Fr. –, and NF –, , , –, –, , –, –. See Hammerstaedt (b).





from some significant excerpts of a work by a certain Iuncus,²⁶ only Cicero’s Cato maior de senectute and two treatises dealing with special aspects of this theme, namely Plutarch’s An seni res publica gerenda sit and Musonius’s What is the best supply for old age (τί ἄριϲτον γήρωϲ ἐφόδιον), have been preserved completely. The disposition of Diogenes’ treatise on Old Age differs from that of the other writings on the wall. The columns, written in large letters (up to cm high), consist of eighteen lines each and extend down three stone courses of the wall (see fig.  and ). The lowest of these three courses exhibits at the bottom a roughly carved band which serves as a margin to separate the treatise on Old Age from the rest of the inscription (fig. ). The scored margin was certainly not meant to be seen on the stoa wall and probably served to sustain a border of stucco.²⁷ Since the lowest course of the inscription contains quotations of many maxims already known from the indirect tradition of Epicurus’ Principal Doctrines and Vatican Sayings, it is possible to estimate the horizontal extension of the whole inscription by comparing the fragments with the entire maxims. Smith concluded that the inscription was at least m, but more probably about .m long.²⁸ In his reconstruction (see fig. ) the seven inscribed courses were . m high. They contained at least . words. In that case the Diogenes inscription is the largest known inscription of the ancient world. At least three quarters of it still await their discovery in the ruins and rubble of Oinoanda. The date of the inscription has not yet been fixed with absolute certainty. Martin Ferguson Smith dated it in his complete edition of  to the years of another famous inscription. The so-called ‘Demostheneia’ inscription (see fig. ) reports the foundation of quadrennial games at Oinoanda in AD. Before Smith, the communis opinio, established at the end of the nineteenth century by Hermann Usener, had considered the inscription as a work of the last decades of the second century AD or the first decades of the third.²⁹ After Smith, Luciano Canfora recycled a theory which had been already rejected much earlier by Alfred Körte and Theodor Gomperz.³⁰ Nevertheless he believed that a certain person whose name ‘Karos’ is

²⁶ An edition and German translation of his excerpts transmitted in Johannes Stobaeus is offered in Sigismund (). ²⁷ See Bachmann  in this volume. ²⁸ Smith () . ²⁹ Usener () . See Smith () . ³⁰ Körte (). Still earlier, in his unpublished annotations in a draft version of the edition of Heberdey/Kalinka (), Theodor Gomperz ventured an identification with Lucretius, but immediately abandoned this idea. For a survey of Canfora’s numerous articles on this question, see Smith (a) .

    



Fig. . Combined scan of Old Age A-course blocks fr.  (YF , left) + NF  (YF , right) and B-course block NF  (YF A/B/C).³¹

Fig. . Combined scan of Old Age B-course block fr.  (YF ) and C-course block NF  (YF ) with clearly visible scored margin.³² ³¹ In addition, remains of lines – of the right column were found by the French epigraphists in  and a drawing of them was made by the Austrians in . Since then the fragment (HK ) has disappeared and not been rediscovered. ³² Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –).





Fig. . TLC Writings NF  (upper left) combined with fr. .

mentioned in one of the letters of Diogenes is the same as ‘Lucretius Carus’ and concluded therefore that the inscription dates from Ciceronian times (middle of first century B.C.). This has always been regarded as very unlikely, and has become still more unlikely with the discovery of a new fragment in . The new fragment (NF ), which belongs to the TLC Writings, fits with another stone (fr. ), and is part of a letter of Diogenes (fig. ). The father of the addressee is called Mettios Phanias. The Roman family of Mettii became famous at the end of the first century AD when C. Trebonius Proculus Mettius Modestus (PIR M ) became legatus Augusti pro praetore provinciae Lyciae et Pamphyliae sometime between AD and . His grandson Mettius Modestus held the same position between AD and . The mention of a Mettius thus served Diogenes to show to his contemporaries his high social standing. It is hoped that further finds and observations in future work at Oinoanda will allow us to date Diogenes’ inscription more precisely. New archaeological criteria may be of help as well as pertinent historical and prosopographical information supplied by fragments of the Diogenes letters that still await discovery.

    



.     ’         There is a good possibility that some future information emerging from yet undiscovered parts of Diogenes’ letters can be connected with names and data known from the many non-philosophical inscriptions which have been found during the last  years in Oinoanda and surroundings. Alan Hall started to work on them in the s and after his death was succeeded by Nicholas Milner from London. The latter is now preparing the first complete edition together with my colleague Gregor Staab from Cologne. There are many persons named Diogenes in these inscriptions, but it has not yet been possible to identify any of them with Diogenes the Epicurean.³³ There can be no doubt, however, that still undiscovered parts of the philosophical inscription and data provided by new non-philosophical inscriptions will increase our knowledge about this singular person and his role in the life and society of Oinoanda. It is true that Diogenes explicitly did not engage in politics (fr.  I  οὐ πολειτευόμενοϲ).³⁴ But this does not mean that his activities did not bear on the civic life of the town. His highly unusual inscription, in terms of content and appearance, not only competed with neighbouring buildings and other notable inscriptions at Oinoanda; it also set a precedent in the area for a number of later inscriptions of remarkable extent and content. So it may be that Diogenes’ inscription was a reaction to the ostentatious euergetism of the already mentioned ‘Demostheneia’ inscription which records extensively the foundation of a musical agon by C. Julius Demosthenes in AD³⁵ and seems to have been carved by the same stonemason who engraved several sections of Diogenes’ texts. The inscription was first seen in  at Kemerarası on the plain beneath Oinoanda, but was damaged later by locals before the remnants were brought to the garden of the museum in Fethiye (fig. ). Further inscriptions concerning this festival and other ἀγῶνεϲ (competitions) which were later established witness the zeal and pride of their founders and of the winners in second and third century Oinoanda.³⁶ Diogenes’ inscription was certainly still present in the mind of the public when a huge genealogical inscription was carved in two stages beween the end of the

³³ Smith () –. ³⁴ See Morel – in this volume. ³⁵ Edition with German translation, commentary and interpretation of this important document in Wörrle (); different readings in Smith () –. ³⁶ Hall/Milner ().





Fig. . ‘Demostheneia’ inscription in Fethiye museum garden.

    



second and the start of the third century AD on a tomb building first owned by Licinnia Flavilla and then by Flavianus Diogenes. Inscribed on at least three sides of the building (fig. ), the texts connects the two persons genealogically with Lycian high society.³⁷ Our Diogenes had pursued the same objective by naming the prominent addressees of his letters. The many more blocks that are buried in the rubble of the collapsed grave monument probably contain more valuable information about the social elites of Oinoanda, and perhaps about the philosopher’s family and relatives. It is remarkable that one of the very few other ancient inscriptions about philosophical issues was carved at Oinoanda probably in the third century AD (fig. ). It offers a famous Clarian oracle about the nature of the highest god in expanded form with cultual provisions. Some of the terms have the flavour of Neoplatonism.³⁸ At the same time the relief of the inscription has the form of an altar and probably stood in the right position to catch the first rays of the sun in the morning. Just below it, a similar dedication honours Zeus Hypsistos.³⁹ On other parts of the same disused Hellenistic defence wall⁴⁰ we discerned for the first time in  dedications to Apollo and the Highest God (fig. , above). They may be dated to an earlier period, one of them probably to the early first century AD.⁴¹ It is noteworthy that the aforementioned dedication (YÇ ), probably carved in the third century, adorns the cult of Apollo with philosophical terms. Was this in response to Diogenes’ Epicurean inscription? As well as the Epicurean inscription of Diogenes, I have already mentioned inscriptions concerning cult and religion, others attesting the broad importance of musical and athletic competitions at Oinoanda, and an important inscription that connects genealogically the local elites with Lycian and Greek dynasties. To these one may add several interesting building inscriptions that provide evidence for the public and private construction policy at Oinoanda. Such a distinctive epigraphic habit at Oinoanda suggests to me that Diogenes conceived of his own inscription as a direct counter-proposal to the established behaviour and conventional self-representation by the local social elites of his time.⁴²

³⁷ Hall/Milner/Coulton (). ³⁸ YÇ ; Hall (); Merkelbach/Stauber, SGO //. ³⁹ YÇ  = CIG  n². ⁴⁰ See Bachmann  with fig.  in this volume. ⁴¹ YÇ  (still unpublished). ⁴² See also Hammerstaedt (a).





Fig. . Reconstruction of the inscribed tomb of Licinnia Flavilla and Flavianus Diogenes (Hall/Milner/Coulton ).

    



Fig. . Two altar reliefs sculpted into the former Hellenistic city wall: above left YÇ , inscribed with Clarian oracle verses; below right YÇ , bearing the Hypsistos dedication.

Inscribed on a wall of the stoa in the centre of Oinoanda, the enormous inscription, which in spite of the epigraphic traditions that it reflects is unique and without parallel in the ancient world, must have attracted the attention of passers-by not only because of its vast size and monumental appearance but also because of its content. Diogenes explicitly addresses foreign travellers,⁴³ and there can be little doubt that this unusual inscription was well known throughout the region. As long as the ⁴³ Fr.  V –;  I –II  (see below );  III –.





inscribed wall of the stoa was intact, it will have affected the neighboring architecture and probably also the life of the town in general.

.          Since the archaeological work of the – survey has been described in the preceding chapter,⁴⁴ it is appropriate for me to confine myself here to some general remarks about the  new fragments discovered during the survey and about our work on the Diogenes inscription.⁴⁵ Some of the new fragments are very tiny, but quite a number of them are of a good size. The new finds have resulted in considerable additions to nearly all parts of the inscription. Two blocks (NF  and ) extend the longest known continuous passage, the ‘Theological PhysicsSequence’ (Theol.), to  columns.⁴⁶ Other fragments give further evidence of Diogenes’ interest in actual philosophical themes and social challenges of his time. For example, NF  adds to the anti-Delphic polemics of fr.  two further moral arguments which had previously only been known from the Swindlers unmasked, a pamphlet written by the Cynic author Oenomaus of Gadara (probably second century AD).⁴⁷ And NF  (Ethics)⁴⁸ emphasizes, after its rather conventional demonstration how easily the material needs of our body can be fulfilled, the social utility of such an Epicurean lifestyle,⁴⁹ extending the outreach of its positive effects from the narrow borders of a like-minded philosophical community to the whole of society – as the whole inscription of Diogenes is doing! Indeed we have seen in fr. +NF ⁵⁰ the evidence for Diogenes’ close contacts with other members of the Lycian aristocracy and we may assume that the presumably young women whom Diogenes intends to teach in Epicureanism (NF )⁵¹ are members of the upper class. On the other hand, several new maxims confirm Diogenes’ ability to sum up larger philosophical concepts, adapting them efficiently

⁴⁴ Bachmann – in this volume. ⁴⁵ For an additional Maxims block (NF ) found in  see above  with fig. . ⁴⁶ Fully edited and translated in Hammerstaedt/Smith () –. See Roskam – in this volume. ⁴⁷ Oenom. fr. , ed. Hammerstaedt (). See Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –). ⁴⁸ Continued in NF . Additions to the text of NF  IV +  I – in Hammerstaedt/Smith () . ⁴⁹ See also Hammerstaedt (b) –. ⁵⁰ See above  with fig. . ⁵¹ See above  with fig. .

    



to the simple minds of his mainly rural readership.⁵² New parts of his treatise Old Age play down the physical inadequacies of elderly people, using rather burlesque comparisons, including elephants and, perhaps, camels (fr.  + NF ), and the somewhat surprising argument that the impediment caused by gaps in the teeth can be countered – with a pleasant taste! – with a liquid diet (NF  + fr. ). After the end of each season of the survey and before the beginning of the next season, Martin Ferguson Smith and I published together all the new fragments in the periodical Epigraphica Anatolica. While preparing these publications, each of us first worked independently. When in a second stage we began to exchange our Greek texts, we were often surprised by considerable divergencies not only in our restorations but also in our readings! At the end, after months of intensive exchanges by email, our mutual frank criticism often led to new and much more convincing solutions. The proceeding was a sort of Epicurean ϲυζήτηϲιϲ (joint research) for which I am deeply grateful to my colleague and friend.

.          The Oinoanda survey directed by Martin Bachmann ended in , but work continues on the many retrieved archaeological and architectonical data, on the Diogenes fragments and on the texts of many other inscriptions which have been found or studied on the site. The D scans of all available Diogenes fragments and of the squeezes of lost or unavailable fragments of the inscription have enabled us for the first time to make certain kinds of systematic measurements that previously were nearly or completely impossible. The first such steps were taken in  by Bianca Hinzer, who participated in the last two seasons of the survey, in her thesis in Greek Philology written for her first State examination at Frankfurt University under the direction of Prof. Thomas Paulsen and my external supervision. The most important results of this research, which focused on the D scans of fragments of the Physics, Ethics, and FLC Letters,

⁵² On NF , see Erler and Verde –; on NF , Tsouna  in this volume. Also remarkable is the expression of idle hope into (a better) future in form of the short selfapostrophe ἕ[̣ ωϲ] ἂ̣ν ἔτι μοι γένηται τόδε καὶ τόδε (until such and such a thing still happens to me) in NF  and the comparision of death with a μορμολυκεῖον in the uncovered lines of NF  (Hammerstaedt/Smith , – = , –).





were elaborated and published by her and me.⁵³ Vertical measurements revealed that the space between lines in the columns of Ethics (–mm, average .mm) is significantly greater than in Physics (–mm, average .mm) and FLC Letters (– mm, average .mm). As a result, some ‘small-letter fragments of uncertain position’ can be attributed to specific writings in the inscription with high probability.⁵⁴ The different height of blocks belonging to the same course of the inscription,⁵⁵ and especially of their upper margins,⁵⁶ prompted the tacit assumption in Martin Ferguson Smith’s reconstruction that the upper and lower edges of these courses did not exactly line up. The surprising frequency of unevenness in the upper and lower surfaces of blocks in the Diogenes stoa wall measured by Bianca Hinzer brought up the issue of the criterion for the exact alignment of those blocks which do not have a strictly square or rectangular shape and cannot be connected with neighboring blocks by means of overlapping columns of writing. It could be confirmed that in each course of the inscription it was the tops of the columns (i.e. the tops of the first lines) rather than the tops of the stones that were horizontally alligned. Further observations, especially on fr.  III–IV (YF ), led to the conclusion that the scribe exactly defined the regular horizontal trace of the first lines of the columns while he added the next lines without such a pre-alignment. In the single fifteenth line of the same block the vertical position of the end of one Epicurus maxim, probably Sent. Vat. , differs considerably from the beginning of another maxim which draws on Epic. Ep. Men. –. The latter starts about mm lower. The reasons for this

⁵³ Hammerstaedt/Hinzer-AlHasan (). ⁵⁴ The mm line-distances of fr.  and NF  point to Ethics, leaving Physics as a rather remote possibility and excluding almost certainly the FLC Letters, which in the case of NF  Hammerstaedt/Smith ()  (= , ) had still been taken into account as an – admittedly less likely – possibility besides Ethics. On the other hand, the extremely small line-distance of  mm in fr.  seems to exclude Ethics in favour of Physics or FLC Letters. The same seems to be the case with NF  (mm), in agreement with Martin Ferguson Smith’s proposed restoration and interpretation of the fragment as either part of a discussion of chance contained in FLC Letters (fr.  and ) or of the refutation of monistic theories of matter in Physics which starts in fr. . Equally, the line-distance of mm in NF  (YF ; not , as wrongly printed in Hammerstaedt/Hinzer-AlHasan ) confirms the editors’ (i.e. Hammerstaedt’s and Smith’s) decision to favour Physics and to regard Ethics as an unlikely attribution (cf. Hammerstaedt/Hinzer-AlHasan , ). ⁵⁵ Differences in height of blocks of the same stone courses, taken from Smith () –: Old Age group A: .–cm; group B: –cm; group C: –cm; TLC Writings: –. cm; FLC Letters+Maxims: – cm; Physics: –cm; Ethics: –cm. ⁵⁶ Differences in height of upper margins above the columns of writing, taken from Smith () –, with a correction in Smith (a) : Old Age group A: –cm; TLC Writings: – cm; FLC Letters+Maxims: – cm; Physics: –. cm; Ethics: –cm.

    



variation in height still need to be explained.⁵⁷ An indisputable result, however, is that the suggestion that fr.  I–II (YF ) can be combined with III–IV (YF )⁵⁸ turns out to be physically impossible. As a consequence a different sequence has been proposed: namely that fr.  I–II (YF , a stretcher whose right part is broken away), is followed, perhaps directly, by fr.  (YF ), and then by YF  (the former fr.  III–IV),⁵⁹ in a part of the Ethics concerned with pain caused by diseases. Thus YF  may have occupied in the inscription a position close to NF , which deals with a similar matter.⁶⁰ Further results of such work on the Diogenes inscriptions are given in the ‘Additions and Corrections’ chapter of the  volume which gathers our publications on the new Diogenes fragments of the decade following Martin Ferguson Smith’s ‘Supplement’ of . For example, Konrad Berner definitively demonstrated with the D scans that Martin Ferguson Smith was completely right in combining, with caution in , and with much more confidence in  and , the two pieces containing fr.  I–II (YF  + YF ) with YF  (= fr.  III).⁶¹ Fortunately, in  the German Research Foundation / Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) generously decided to fund a still ongoing research project aiming at the ‘Reconstruction of the Philosophical Monumental Inscription of Diogenes and Documentation of Its Archaeological Contexts by Means of the Web-enabled Research and Information Platform of an Oinoanda-GIS’.⁶² While the bulk of this work has to be done at our desks (or desktops) and in regular meetings of our interdisciplinary group of colleagues involved in various branches of research about Oinoanda, in October  four participants in the project carried out research in the Diogenes storehouse at Oinoanda and in the Fethiye Museum. The principal aims of this visit, which as a by-product has yielded some new inscriptions,⁶³ were to check measurements, to verify on the Diogenes blocks themselves some architectonic features previously observed on the D scans, to improve the D documentation of the inscription, and to complete the digital terrain model of the site. Special attention

⁵⁷ See Hammerstaedt/Hinzer-AlHasan () –. ⁵⁸ The combination was first suggested by Smith ()  as “not unlikely” and approved by Adelmo Barigazzi (see Hammerstaedt/Smith ,  n. ). ⁵⁹ Hammerstaedt/Hinzer-AlHasan () –; see also Hammerstaedt/Smith () –, with Martin Ferguson Smith’s sceptical remarks ( n. ). ⁶⁰ Hammerstaedt/Hinzer-AlHasan ()  with n. . ⁶¹ Hammerstaedt/Smith () –. ⁶² Rekonstruktion der philosophischen Monumentalinschrift des Diogenes und Dokumentation ihres archäologischen Kontexts durch die webfähige Forschungs- und Informationsplattform eines Oinoanda-GIS. ⁶³ Most notably NF , presented above – with fig. .





was given for the first time to pry-holes on the Diogenes blocks. The observation that nearly all of them were created during the original construction of the Diogenes stoa allows various conclusions which will hopefully improve the virtual reconstruction of the stoa wall and its inscription.⁶⁴ My great hope is, however, that such current work on the Diogenes blocks discovered up to now does not result in research on the site of Oinoanda itself having come to an end. Knowledge of Diogenes, and of his home town Oinoanda, deserves not only continuing dissemination,⁶⁵ but also further investigation and excavation on the site itself. This is a unique place and, in my opinion, certainly meets the requirements to become a World Cultural Heritage Site. Its philosophical inscription contains a message that is still of interest in the twenty-first century. In addition to its religious rationalism, which foreshadows modern European attitudes, it is explicitly directed to all nations of that time and those to come. As Diogenes puts it:⁶⁶ And not least we carve this for those who are called ‘foreigners’, though they are not really so. For, while the various segments of the earth give different people a different country, the whole compass of this world gives all people a single country, the entire earth, and a single home, the world. Even if the Epicurean philosophy propagated by the inscription nowadays belongs mainly to the history of thought, the stones still speak to us directly. The spectacular way in which Diogenes gave his advice remains fascinating especially because it lets us feel the generous humanity of its cosmopolitan author and because its monumental form makes it a paradigm for the importance of fresh and unbiased reasoning about life, death, and religious beliefs. We should appreciate this unique gift of Diogenes which is not only a challenge for interdisciplinary research by a wide range of sciences, but was explicitly directed to future generations of the peoples of all nations. If research into this unique inscription continues, hopefully including further excavation to recover its many lost parts, the Greek speaking Diogenes will finally grant to his modern Turkish home and society his complete cultural heritage – a heritage of inestimable value.

⁶⁴ Hammerstaedt/Smith (). ⁶⁵ The -minute documentary film ‘A Gigantic Jigsaw Puzzle: The Epicurean Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda’, shot at Oinoanda in September  and directed by Nazim Güveloğlu, can be viewed online at http://www.metu.edu.tr/videos/giganticpuzzle. ⁶⁶ Fr.  I –II  (translation of Smith , slightly modified in accordance with Hammerstaedt , – = Hammerstaedt/Smith , –).

   Diogenes’ Critique and the Tradition of Epicurean Antiplatonism

Michael Erler

.  It goes without saying that Plato and his dialogues were an important source for Epicurus and his school. If one considers Epicurean teaching, one could say that in most fields Epicurus’ positions are quite contrary to what Plato taught, but they always seem to be developed with an eye on Platonic positions. David Sedley is quite right when he says: “Few of Epicurus’ doctrines could not be explained in some sense as reactions against Platonism.”¹ It is of great interest therefore to understand how Epicureans handled Platonic teachings, either criticizing them or trying to integrate elements of them into their own teachings, which happened mostly in the area of ethics, but also in physics.² Now, of course, Plato’s dialogues are the most important source, but it is helpful as well to keep in mind the developments, modifications, accentuations and emphasis on special aspects that occur within the Platonic tradition, for they form the background for responses given by the Epicureans. It might help to understand better the argumentative strategies of both sides, the Platonic and the Epicurean one, if their arguments are analyzed also in view of the contemporary philosophical contexts, even if one cannot prove that they respond to each other directly. Diogenes in his monumental inscription mentions Plato or Socrates several times³ according to what we have so far. And there might be allusions still to be discovered. In what follows I would like to focus on what Diogenes has to say about Platonic cosmology in the new fragment  – and I shall argue that a passage in another fragment, , can or should be read also as an implicit reaction to what Plato has to say about the role of the wise man and his relation to the law. I am well aware that important things already have been said about those two passages – even at this meeting. I decided to nevertheless offer some footnotes to this discussion just because I think that the testimonies gain profile when read as part of an ongoing contemporary debate between Epicureans and Platonists; and in addition to this,

¹ Sedley (c) . ² Cf. Velleius in Cic. ND I – and Epicurus’ critique of the Timaeus in Nat. XIV (Leone ); see Shorey (); Verde (c) –. ³ Cf. NF . and Theol. VI (= NF  IV) – in Hammerstaedt/Smith ().



 

that one learns more about the strategies Platonists like Plutarch and Atticus apply when arguing against Epicurean positions. Of course, I do not claim to know how familiar Diogenes was with these debates. Yet, I do suggest that this approach helps to appreciate Diogenes’ inscription as a philosophically important document even more.

.   .. Platonic Maxim Let us begin with some observations that concern the newly discovered fragment  (Hammerstaedt/Smith), which carries a maxim about Plato’s cosmology.⁴

καλῶϲ Πλάτων ὁμολογήϲαϲ γενητὸν εἶναι τὸν κόϲμον, ν εἰ καὶ μὴ  καλῶϲ ἐδημιούργηϲεν αὐτόν, τῇ φύϲει δημιουργῷ μὴ χρηϲάμενο{ι}ϲ, ν κακῶϲ ἄφθαρτον ννν εἶπεν. Plato is right in claiming that the world had a beginning, although he did not create the world in the right way, because he did not employ nature as a craftsman; he was wrong in calling the world imperishable.⁵ This fragment is of interest from a doxographical point of view,⁶ but also because it testifies to the strategy which Epicureans like Diogenes or his source apply when criticizing Plato’s cosmology. I shall argue that Diogenes – or his source – tries to take

⁴ Cf. Hammerstaedt/Smith ()  (= , ). ⁵ My translation follows Hammerstaedt () . Hammerstaedt/Smith (/) translate: even if he was not right to introduce a divine craftsman of it, instead of employing nature as its craftsman, … For discussion see Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –). ⁶ Cf. Verde (c).

  



advantage of a debate about Plato’s cosmology which took place within the Platonic tradition almost from its beginning and one aspect which was brought forward by Middle Platonists like Plutarch and Atticus.⁷ At the beginning of the maxim, Diogenes tries to attract the reader’s attention by praising Plato – which might surprise a reader who is familiar with Epicurean teachings and the dispute they have with Platonists. “He did well,” or so the maxim begins, “in that he declared that the world is something which came into being and therefore had a beginning (γενητόν).” But quickly Diogenes modifies this positive judgment by expressing disappointment. For he deplores that Plato did not construct (ἐδημιούργηϲεν) the world in the right way, because he did not make use of physis as a craftsman (τῇ φύϲει δημιουργῷ μὴ χρηϲάμενο{ι}ϲ).⁸ Diogenes here of course wishes to remind the reader of the Timaeus and the famous δημιουργόϲ whom Plato talks about. After this remark the maxim culminates in criticizing Plato for claiming that the world as a γενητόν is supposed to be imperishable, which for an Epicurean is not acceptable. Therefore the maxim, it seems, is formulated to impress the reader and to be easily memorized. As far as the content is concerned, the argument – at least at first sight – seems to be traditional. Diogenes formulates an attack against the – as it has been called – asymmetrical thesis: ‘creation, but no destruction’ – which also is discussed for instance in Cicero or in Lucretius,⁹ where however it is disputed whether Stoic cosmology or Plato’s cosmology is being criticized. Arguments have been put forward by Sedley¹⁰ that Plato might be meant here, which will be confirmed when we focus on Diogenes’ remark that Plato unfortunately did not make use of φύϲιϲ as δημιουργόϲ when constructing his world. This expression ‘φύϲιϲ as δημιουργόϲ’ seems interesting because to my knowledge it cannot be found in Epicurean texts at all and is very rare in general. There are only three occurrences in Aristotle, one in Chrysippus, some in Galen and some in later commentaries;¹¹ the occurrences in Aristotle and in Galen will be interesting for us. Now, I shall argue that this expression gains profile in the context of an ongoing debate about the Timaeus in the time of MiddlePlatonism. So let us for a moment remind ourselves of this dispute within the Platonic tradition.

⁷ After I had finished the contribution, the paper of Chiaradonna () was brought to my knowledge. I am delighted to see that his understanding of the Diogenes’ passage is similar to mine, albeit for slightly different reasons. ⁸ I accept Hammerstaedt’s understanding of δημιουργεῖν (Hammerstaedt , ). ⁹ Cf. Cic. ND I ; Lucr. V –. ¹⁰ Cf. Sedley () –. ¹¹ See below, n.  and .



 

.. Interpretation of the Timaeus Diogenes’ attack against the view that the world is created but never will be destroyed is not surprising. For every Epicurean would agree that the world is something which came into being by chance and will have an end. Diogenes critique is based on the conviction shared already by Socrates in the Republic that everything that comes into being must perish.¹² He uses an argument put forward by Aristotle, who in De caelo attacks those who – obviously referring to the Timaeus¹³ – claimed that the world had a beginning, but no end, as did before him Lucretius and Cicero in De natura deorum.¹⁴ Now, prima facie, Plato indeed seems to argue in the Timaeus that the world had a beginning and was created by a craftsman.¹⁵ That is at least how Aristotle obviously read the dialogue and how the Epicureans did, who took over Aristotle’s critical argument. But it is worth noting that the Aristotelian and Epicurean way of reading the Timaeus presupposes a literal understanding of that dialogue, which by no means was the generally accepted one at that time and in the Old Academy. Almost all Platonists of the Old Academy seemed to oppose the literal interpretation of the Timaeus, which was favored by Aristotle.¹⁶ We learn that philosophers like Xenocrates, Speusippus or Crantor understood Plato’s story about the creation of the world as a narrative that should help people understand that according to Plato the world never came into being and never will perish. According to them one rather should call this a creatio continua. Reading the Timaeus that way, these Platonists were trying to come to the aid of Plato against the critique proposed by Aristotle.¹⁷ Now, this literal interpretation is not without problems – for one might ask: If there is no creation and the world exists forever, why should there be a δημιουργόϲ god?¹⁸ And most of all: Why should a creator, who in reality is no creator at all, care for a world that exists without him and without beginning and end? Obviously these Platonists had difficulties explaining what, of course, was core Platonic teaching:¹⁹ that there is a god who cares for everything that is. They had difficulties to explain the concept of

¹² Cf. Plat. Resp. VIII a. ¹³ Cf. Baltes ()  ff. ¹⁴ Cf. Aristot. Cael. I .a  ff., I .a  ff. ¹⁵ Cf. Plat. Tim. a and b. ¹⁶ Cf. Dillon () . ¹⁷ Cf. Aristot. cael. I .b ff.; the scholion to that passage refers to Xenocrates F  Isnardi Parente² and Speusippos (F  Tarán = F  Isnardi Parente), see Baltes () . ¹⁸ Cf. Dillon () . ¹⁹ Cf. Plat. Lg. X d; Phdr. e.

  

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providence if one reads the dialogue Timaeus in a non-literal way. Now it seems interesting to me that the Epicureans, amongst others, asked exactly this question, as we read in the work of the later Platonist Nemesius, De natura hominis: For they (sc. Democritus, Heraclitus, Epicurus), since they believe that this universe was formed of its own accord, reasonably say, that everything is without providence. For who – or so they ask – would watch over that which had no creator?²⁰ This question²¹ was a good starting point for the Epicureans to refute the Platonic position of accepting the existence of providence on the same grounds but with different conclusions: Since the world comes into being at random, no craftsman exists who created the world. Therefore providence does not exist. All this reads – as Baltes already saw – like a response to the Platonists’ non-literal reading of the Timaeus, which makes a δημιουργόϲ unnecessary.²² .. Atticus’ Position and Solution It seems interesting in this context that the Epicurean-Aristotelian critique has been addressed by some Middle Platonists like Plutarch and most of all by Atticus.²³ Keep in mind that Middle Platonists like Plutarch or Atticus practiced a philological reading of the dialogues and, consequently, proposed a literal reading of the Timaeus²⁴ – as did Aristotle and the Epicureans. But Atticus had yet another reason for this approach. For this reading would help him to prove that a god who cares for the world and human beings does exist; and, according to Atticus, to prove the existence of providence was the main reason why Plato composed the Timaeus.²⁵ Of course, Atticus – and Plutarch – were criticized severely for their interpretation of the Timaeus by many Platonists.²⁶ Atticus was well aware that, defending his thesis, he had to address Aristotle’s critique and to take into account Plato’s principle that whatever is indestructible must be ungenerated and whatever is generated must be destructible.²⁷ But Atticus was convinced that in the Timaeus Plato himself

²⁰ Nemesius, De natura hominis  (Matthaei): ὧν γὰρ οὐδείϲ ἐϲτι δημιουργόϲ, τούτων τίϲ ἂν εἴη προνοητήϲ; translation taken from Sharples/van der Eijk (). ²¹ Cf. parallels in Bergjan ()  n. . ²² Cf. Baltes ()  n. . ²³ Cf. Baltes () –; see also Karamanolis () –. ²⁴ Cf. Baltes ()  ff.; Erler () –; Erler () ff.; see also Sedley () . ²⁵ Cf. Atticus in Eus. Praep. Ev. XI .– = fr.  des Places. ²⁶ Cf. Baltes () . ²⁷ Cf. Plat. Resp. VIII .

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modifies the position that things which have a becoming do not have an end by adding: if this is what god wishes to happen.²⁸ Atticus here obviously refers to the passage in the Timaeus where Plato makes the god claim that things are indissoluble “save with my consent”.²⁹ Now Atticus thought it would be an offense against the god if one suggested that he could not create whatever he wanted to and keep in existence indefinitely what he had created if he wished to do so. But Atticus offers an argument which tries to respond to the critique of Aristotle and at the same time to accept the Platonic-Aristotelian principle according to which what comes into being must perish again. For him the concept of the demiurge as a craftsman is decisive. According to Atticus Plato must have thought that the world has a beginning because only in that case someone who created the world was needed – a divine craftsman, the δημιουργόϲ. Now, every craftsman, or so Atticus argues, cares for the product he produces and will see to it that this product is preserved. This is all the more true – or so Atticus concludes – when we talk about the divine craftsman of the world. The argument reads: But though competent to create and to will what is excellent, (for He is good, and the good feels no envy about anything), is He yet unable to preserve and guard what He has made? Yet surely even the other artificers are competent to do both. The builder, for instance, and the shipwright not only build new ships and houses, but are able also to repair those which are wearing away from time, substituting in them other parts in place of those which have been damaged.³⁰ According to Atticus, or so the argument goes, the mere existence of the divine craftsman qua craftsman guarantees the imperishability of his product. His craftsmanship implies that he cares for his product, i.e. it implies that he practices πρόνοια. Now, it seems to me that this argument reads like a response to the question posed by the Epicureans – as we learnt from Nemesius – whether there can be providence where no craftsman exists. But we also realize that Atticus tries to counter Aristotle’s critique according to which a world which had a beginning cannot be imperishable. Atticus insists that this is possible just because of the existence of the demiurge: Now, Atticus did not invent this argument. Seneca³¹ seems to know it and so does Philo of Alexandria. It even has been argued by Theiler and Baltes that the argument

²⁸ Cf. Procl. in Tim. III p. . ff. Diehl; in Remp. II p. .ff. Kroll. ²⁹ Cf. Plat. Tim. a; the translation is taken from Cornford (). ³⁰ Cf. Atticus in Eus. Praep. Ev. XV .; the translation is taken from Gifford (). ³¹ Cf. Sen. Ep. .: Manent enim cuncta, non quia aeterna sunt, sed quia defenduntur cura regentis. In comparison cf. Procl. in Tim. III p. .ff. Diehl.

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might go back to Eudoros, the founder of Middle Platonism.³² But this we do not know. What we do know, however, is that Atticus made strong use of it as a weapon against Aristotle, whom he accused of being an atheist and an Epicurean because he denied the existence of divine providence in the sublunar world. I suggest that Atticus’ argument is not only directed at Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s cosmology, but should also be regarded as a reaction to the debate between Platonists and Epicureans about the existence of providence, in which the figure of the δημιουργόϲ played an important role. The existence of such a debate is confirmed by Gellius,³³ who reports that the Platonist Calvenus Taurus also tried to defend the existence of providence against Epicureans and that here, as well, the existence of the demiurge played a decisive role. This is interesting because, unlike Atticus, Calvenus Taurus, as most of the Platonists, reads the Timaeus in a non-literal way and argued that there was no beginning and no destruction of the world. He therefore had to answer the question posed by the Epicureans – why should there be providence when there is no demiurge? Now, I have mentioned all this only to remind us that there was a debate about the coming in existence of the world, the craftsman and the destruction of the world, in which an interesting craftsman-providence argument played a prominent role, which was – as I suggested – developed as a weapon against the Epicureans and which provides us with a helpful background for reading the maxim of Diogenes. .. Φύϲιϲ δημιουργόϲ So let us come back to Diogenes. We now see that the maxim offers a criticism of Plato’s cosmology which is traditional and goes back to Aristotle. But it also becomes clear that the remark about φύϲιϲ as a δημιουργόϲ might gain profile when read against the background of the contemporary debates I referred to above. So let us ask what Diogenes possibly wishes to signal by suggesting that Plato as a demiurge better had made use of φύϲιϲ as a demiurge. First let us remind ourselves that in this expression φύϲιϲ is used as a nomen agens and that this is quite unusual in Epicurean texts. Of course, one might refer to Lucretius who speaks of a Venus genetrix or who uses the word creare in the context of atomism.³⁴ But in Greek Epicurean texts φύϲιϲ as nomen agens to the best of my knowledge (that all things come into being from one kind of primordial matter [sc. φύϲιϲ]³⁵) does not occur. As Diskin Clay wrote and Sedley agreed, this under-

³² Cf. Phil. Opif. mund. ; Baltes ()  after Theiler () –. ³³ Cf. Gell. IX . (Marshall) = Text  Lakmann (); Baltes () . ³⁴ Cf. Lucr. I , II ; see Clay () . ³⁵ Cf. Epicur. Nat. ..– (Arrighetti).

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standing of physis seems to be foreign to Epicurean texts³⁶ – and understandably so: There is no demiurgic power in Epicurean physics. The Epicurean world rather is governed by chance. There is a clear alternative, as recognized by Marc Aurel and others: ‘either atoms or nature’.³⁷ There is no doubt: from an Epicurean point of view the expression φύϲιϲ as a demiurge must be understood in a metaphorical sense. Second: As already mentioned above, the expression ‘φύϲιϲ as craftsman’ seems to be quite rare. It can only be found once in Chrysippus and three times in Aristotle, when he talks about the sublunar world and animals, for instance when in De partibus animalium he speaks of “the artistic spirit that designed them” (φύϲιϲ δημιουργήϲαϲα).³⁸ As Kullmann in his commentary to De partibus reminds us,³⁹ here – and in the other cases – the expression must be understood in a metaphorical sense because for Aristotle the world is not created but exists permanently. We also remember that Aristotle denied the existence of providence for the sublunar world. From this it follows: Aristotle provides an example – the only one I could find – where the expression φύϲιϲ δημιουργόϲ occurs in a metaphorical sense, and he does so in a context where no providence is accepted – i.e. the passage in Aristotle offers an example for the fact that a demiurge can exist without implying the existence of providence. Now, this is exactly what the Epicureans needed in order to respond to Atticus’ argument – according to which the mere existence of a demiurge guarantees the existence of providence, an argument which Atticus’ pupil Galen made use of when he dealt with nature. He often uses the expression φύϲιϲ δημιουργόϲ and φύϲιϲ as a nomen agens, but he does so when he is talking about the realm of πρόνοια. Otherwise he only refers to φύϲιϲ alone.⁴⁰ The maxim therefore not only uses a standard Aristotelian argument against Platonic cosmology but also hints at an Aristotelian answer against the current Middle Platonic argumentation of which Atticus is a proponent. It therefore, I suggest, should be interpreted also in the context of the contemporary debate about the Timaeus, the δημιουργόϲ, the providence and the creation of the world. Of course I do not wish to argue that Diogenes or his source responded to Atticus directly, but I do suggest considering that they made use of a reading of Plato defended by some Middle Platonists and of an Aristotelian argument

³⁶ See Clay () ; Sedley () –. ³⁷ Cf. M. Aur. X . ³⁸ Cf. Chrysipp. SVF II , p. .: φύϲιϲ δημιουργοῦϲα; Aristot. PA I .a : δημιουργήϲαϲα φύϲιϲ ἀμηχάνουϲ ἡδονὰϲ παρέχει, the translation is taken from Ogle (); GA I .a : ἡ φύσις δημιουργεῖ, III .a ; IA .a . ³⁹ Cf. Kullmann () . ⁴⁰ Cf. Gal. Elemen. . (CMG V . p. . [De Lacy] = I  Kühn]); Us. part. XI  (II . Helmreich = III  Kühn); see Kovacic () –.

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and expression to turn both as a weapon against Plato himself. This would be a strategy familiar from other Epicurean texts and vice versa applied by Platonists against Epicurus as well.

. ’   .. Diogenes’ Wise Man and the Law In the first part of this paper I argued that the structure and the content of Diogenes’ critique of Plato’s cosmology are better understood when read in the light of the contemporary debates between Platonists and Epicureans. In the second part I shall focus on a sentence of the fragment NF  + NF  + NF  + fr.  + NF , which appropriately has been called a ‘Theological Physics-sequence’.⁴¹ In this passage Diogenes speaks about those who will be just merely because they are able to think correctly, i.e. simply because they are Epicurean wise men. Again, as I shall suggest, it will help to read this sentence in the light of a dispute between Epicureans and Platonists as Plutarch describes it in his treatise Adversus Colotem. Of course, I am not claiming here to break new ground, as many useful things have been said about this problem already.⁴² I wish to add a little footnote to this discussion: I shall argue that Diogenes’ statement about the Epicurean wise should be taken into account when discussing what the Epicureans thought about how men should live together. I shall suggest that the sentence presupposes the concept of an ideal community which functions well without laws and which mutatis mutandis can be understood as an Epicurean response to Plato’s concept of the ideal city, that is to say as an Epicurean Kallipolis. The sentence also throws light on Plutarch’s argumentative strategy in a passage which deals with exactly this problem in the treatise Adversus Colotem. Just a short reminder: The overall argument of the fragment is to show that Epicurean gods do not harm human beings, because they live a remote life without interfering with humans. They neither punish the bad nor reward the good. Therefore, Diogenes is convinced that the fear of gods does not influence people toward a just life.⁴³ In order to prove this, Diogenes distinguishes three groups of

⁴¹ See Hammerstaedt/Smith () –. ⁴² With regard to Adv. Col., Kechagia () and Corti () are helpful. ⁴³ Cf. Theol. III –IV  (= NF  III + NF  I+II) in Hammerstaedt/Smith () . Interesting in this context Plat. Lg. X b and d where a cosmological and deistic perspective is discussed (I owe this reference to the referee James Warren). For gods as fictions in order to ensure lawful behaviour and the Epicurean discussion cf. Cic. ND I  and Erler ().

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humans: a) Those who are bad and unjust. These people would not care about the gods anyway and even less would they be afraid of Plato’s underworld judges;⁴⁴ b) the ordinary people, who are just only because of their fear of the laws and of the penalties imposed by the them (τοὺϲ δ’ αὖ χυδαίουϲ διὰ τοὺϲ νόμουϲ εἶναι δικαίουϲ), and c) those wise people who do not need gods and laws in order to live a righteous life: for they are able to think correctly in contrast to ordinary people, who are righteous on account of the laws only. [τ]ῶ̣ ν δ’ ἄλλων ἀποφαίνομαι τοὺϲ μὲν φυϲικῶν ἁπ̣ τομένου⟨ϲ⟩ λό γων v μὴ διὰ̣ τοὺϲ θεοὺϲ εἶναι δικαίουϲ, διὰ δὲ τὸ βλέπειν [ὀ]ρθῶϲ v τάϲ τε ἐπιθυμίαϲ τίν’ ἔχουϲιν φύϲιν v κα[ὶ] τ̣ὰϲ ἀλγηδόIV ναϲ καὶ τὸν θάνατον (πάντῃ τε γὰρ πάντωϲ ἢ διὰ φόβον ἢ διὰ ἡδονὰϲ ἀδικοῦϲιν ἄνθρω ποι) But, as for the others, I declare that those of them who grasp arguments based on nature are not righteous on account of the gods, but on account of their having a correct view of the nature of desires and pains and death (for indeed invariably and without exception human beings do wrong either on account of fear or on account of pleasures).⁴⁵ The last category is the most interesting for us because Diogenes obviously considers the possibility that man can be just because of right, i.e. Epicurean, thinking. This – it seems to me – is an important statement: for it seems to contradict the opinion often held in modern and ancient times that Epicureans are legalists,⁴⁶ a view which also is presupposed by Plutarch’s anti-Epicurean polemics in his Adversus Colotem and

⁴⁴ I follow Hammerstaedt’s (, esp. p. ) understanding of the passage (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , ); for the context see Petzl (). ⁴⁵ The translation is taken from Hammerstaedt/Smith () . ⁴⁶ For Epicurus’ views of law and justice and his respect for legislation see, e.g., Philippson (); Müller (); Goldschmidt (); Alberti (); Morel ().

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especially in a passage at the end of the treatise.⁴⁷ Although helpful things already have been said about the passage, for instance by Geert Roskam () recently, I nevertheless would like to add a little footnote. .. Plutarch Let us turn to Plutarch first. At the end of Adversus Colotem Plutarch criticizes Colotes for praising those who established law in societies because they provided human life with security and tranquility of mind. For he says according to Plutarch: The men who appointed laws and usages and established the government of cities by kings and magistrates brought human life into a state of great security and peace and delivered it from turmoil. But if anyone takes all this away we shall live a life of brutes, and anyone who chances upon another will all but devour him.

τὸν βίον οἱ νόμουϲ διατάξαντεϲ καὶ νόμιμα καὶ τὸ βαϲιλεύεϲθαι τὰϲ πόλειϲ καὶ ἄρχεϲθαι καταϲτήϲαντεϲ εἰϲ πολλὴν ἀϲφάλειαν καὶ ἡϲυχίαν ἔθεντο καὶ θορύβων ἀπήλλαξαν. εἰ δέ τιϲ ταῦτα ἀναιρήϲει, θηρίων βίον βιωϲόμεθα καὶ ὁ προϲτυχὼν τὸν ἐντυχόντα μονονοὺ κατέδεται.⁴⁸ Plutarch argues that a happy life that is guaranteed only by obeying laws is unworthy of a true philosopher. According to him the Epicureans would live like beasts if there were no laws to deter them from this way of life because they always pursue pleasure and wish to gratify every desire there is: If someone takes away the laws, but leaves us with the teachings of Parmenides, Socrates, Heracleitus and Plato, we shall be very far from devouring one another and living the life of wild beasts; for we shall fear all that is shameful and shall honour justice for its intrinsic worth.

ἂν γὰρ ἀνελών τιϲ τοὺϲ νόμουϲ τὰ Παρμενίδου καὶ Σωκράτουϲ καὶ Ἡρακλείτου καὶ Πλάτωνοϲ ἀπολίπῃ δόγματα, πολλοῦ δεήϲομεν ἀλλήλουϲ κατεϲθίειν καὶ θηρίων βίον ζῆν· φοβηϲόμεθα γὰρ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τιμήϲομεν ἐπὶ τῷ καλῷ δικαιοϲύνην.⁴⁹ On the other hand, Plutarch is convinced that true philosophers like Parmenides, Socrates, Heraclitus or Plato have no need of laws to deter people from being unjust

⁴⁷ Cf. Plut. Adv. Col. D–E. ⁴⁸ Plut. Adv. Col. D; the translation is taken from Einarson/de Lacy (). ⁴⁹ Plut. Adv. Col. D–E; translated by Einarson/de Lacy ().

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or living like beasts. Plato’s followers will live a just life because they live according to the Platonic philosophy. Plutarch agrees that Plato, of course, wrote important books on the philosophy of laws. But the philosophy itself that he implanted in his pupils was much more important and admirable.⁵⁰ Now, when reading Plato’s dialogues, one cannot but agree with Plutarch. In the Republic Plato aims at showing that justice is an intrinsic good. Therefore, Plato argues, nobody will do wrong even if he or she possesses the ring of Gyges and is able to do wrong without being detected, because doing wrong would do harm to one’s own soul.⁵¹ Plato is convinced that it is possible to live according to his teachings and that this will make people feel secure and happy. Therefore written laws and traditional political institutions almost play no role in Plato’s ideal city Kallipolis. Of course, Plato agrees that this ideal community based on his philosophy is a utopia, but a utopia which can come true (εὐχή).⁵² Since Plato is well aware that not everybody is strong enough to live according to his philosophy, he offers the concept of a community – Magnesia – which is based on rules and laws which have to be accepted by all members of the community.⁵³ Now let us turn to what Plutarch has to say about Colotes’ argument, according to which laws are necessary to prevent people from devouring one another like beasts, and read it in the light of Diogenes’ statement about the Epicurean wise man. At first sight, Colotes’ statement seems to defend a strong legalist position. Modern commentators even felt reminded of what Glaucon has to say in Plato’s Republic, representing the opinion of the many.⁵⁴ For in the Republic Glaucon argues that to commit injustice is good if only one is strong enough to do so. Since human nature always wants more (πλεονεξία), it is natural to outlive one’s aggression and just to commit injustice when this seems helpful – especially if one carries the ring of Gyges which offers the chance not to be detected.⁵⁵ Glaucon is convinced that this behaviour is just because it is in accordance with human nature. This is the reason why laws are necessary to protect us against suffering injustice from people who are stronger than we are. But laws should not prevent us from doing injustice if we are able to. Now, despite some similarities, an important difference from what Glaucon has to say in the Republic should not be overlooked. According to Epicurus, human beings are not aggressive by nature and do not strive for power and πλεονεξία, as

⁵⁰ Cf. Plut. Adv. Col. C. ⁵¹ Cf. Plat. Resp. II c ff. ⁵² Cf. Plat. Resp. V c–d. ⁵³ Cf. Erler () –. ⁵⁴ Cf. Plat. Resp. II e–c; see Erler (). ⁵⁵ Cf. Plat. Resp. II c and X b.

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Glaucon claims, but they long for security and happiness.⁵⁶ Otherwise, the cradle argument which tries to prove that by nature all humans strive for ἡδονή would not be valid.⁵⁷ Of course, Epicureans accept the importance of laws. But as the statement by Diogenes shows, for Epicureans they are the second best solution when one wishes to create a society of people who feel secure and happy.⁵⁸ As we read in Diogenes and in other Epicurean texts, laws are necessary when speaking about common people and how to deter them from injustice. This is the option Colotes obviously is addressing in the fragment, but, as we learn from Diogenes, there is an even better option or possibility: namely that people act according to Epicurean philosophy, guided by their φρόνηϲιϲ alone. This is what Diogenes says and this is what already is hinted at in Κυρία δόξα : There would be no advantage in providing security against our fellow-men, so long as we were alarmed by occurrences over our heads or beneath the earth or in general by whatever happens in the boundless universe.

Οὐθὲν ὄφελοϲ ἦν τὴν κατ’ ἀνθρώπουϲ ἀϲφάλειαν καταϲκευάζεϲθαι τῶν ἄνωθεν ὑπόπτων καθεϲτώτων καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ γῆϲ καὶ ἁπλῶϲ τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ.⁵⁹ Obviously Epicurus is saying here that laws cannot protect us against fear inside men caused by ignorance of disturbing phenomena like for instance death or pain. Even if you carry the ring of Gyges, you cannot be sure not to be detected. This kind of security only can be provided by Epicurean φυϲιολογία: It would be impossible to banish fear on matters of the highest importance, if a man did not know the nature of the whole universe but lived in dread of what the legends tell us. Hence without the study of nature (φυϲιολογία) there was no enjoyment of unmixed pleasures.

Οὐκ ἦν τὸ φοβούμενον λύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων μὴ κατειδότα τίϲ ἡ τοῦ ϲύμπαντοϲ φύϲιϲ, ἀλλ’ ὑποπτευόμενόν τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺϲ μύθουϲ· ὥϲτε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυϲιολογίαϲ ἀκεραίουϲ τὰϲ ἡδονὰϲ ἀπολαμβάνειν.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Cf. Epicur. Sent. , , ; see Vander Waerdt (); Mitsis () ff. ⁵⁷ Cf. Brunschwig (). The question of whether the Epicurean wise man will obey the laws is dealt with as well by Roskam (). ⁵⁸ Cf. Epicur. Sent. –; Cic. Fin. I –. ⁵⁹ Epicur. Sent. ; translation by Hicks (). ⁶⁰ Epicur. Sent. ; translation by Hicks ().



 

For even if human life is protected by walls and institutions and laws, he or she will be afraid of irritating phenomena, death or pain if she or he is not able to understand what phenomena that concern humans, like pain or death, really mean. As Hermarchus says: If all humans recognized the benefit that results from justice, laws would not be needed.⁶¹ Epicureans are convinced that it is possible and necessary to live according to their philosophy in order to be secure and happy. A society based on laws, it seems, is a second best solution – as far as ordinary people are concerned. This is the background – or so I think – of Diogenes’ statement, which is important for two reasons. First: It not only shows that the Epicureans are no absolute legalists, but they are legalists the way that Platonists are. Bear in mind that Plato as well propagates a city, Kallipolis, where laws are not needed. Like Epicurus, he is convinced that not laws, but his philosophy can provide people with a happy life. This is why in the Republic he does not discuss laws or political institutions at all – for they are not needed. But Plato as well is aware that for common people laws are necessary. For them he created Magnesia, where laws are the fundament of social life. We now realize that, like Plato, Epicurus propagates a social Utopia, an Epicurean Kallipolis, so to speak, where – as Diogenes says in fr.  – fortifications are not needed and all humans are happy.⁶² That is to say, Plato and Epicurus in view of their political utopias both are no legalists. Of course, Epicurus does not believe that justice is something intrinsically good or should be chosen for its own sake⁶³ – as Plato does. The Epicureans rather accept justice because of its consequences, a position which Plato ridicules in the Republic. And of course, their understandings of what philosophy should be are worlds apart. But these differences should not prevent us from realizing that both agree that the philosophy which they propagate would allow everyone to live a happy and secure life in a community where laws are not needed. And this brings me to the second point: For Diogenes’ statement teaches us something about Plutarchs’s argumentative strategy.⁶⁴ For obviously his polemic against Colotes works only because he leaves out the Kallipolis option. For only then he could turn Epicureans into legalists and could criticize them as such. Plutarch could easily have Colotes respond to this critique by pointing to the concept of Epicurean Kallipolis, which functions without laws and resembles the concept that Plato propagates but this would destroy Plutarch’s argumentative strategy. Perhaps Colotes neglects this aspect because he feels that in a treatise which is dedicated to

⁶¹ Cf. Hermarch. fr. .. (Longo Auricchio). ⁶² Cf. Long (), esp. –. ⁶³ Cf. Epicur. Sent.  and . ⁶⁴ Some of Plutarchs’s argumentative strategies are discussed by Roskam () –.

  



king Ptolemy an argument about philosophical rule without laws and government might have been out of place.⁶⁵ Be this as it may: Diogenes’ statement about the Epicurean wise man should warn us not to isolate the quotation of Colotes and turn Epicureans into legalists as Plutarch does and modern interpreters want them to be. Diogenes rather teaches us once again that, despite the grave differences, Epicureans sometimes are closer related to Plato than Platonic polemics want us to see. Diogenes’ fragment not only throws light on an element of Epicurean political thinking. It indeed helps to understand better the strategy of argumentation which Plutarch pursues and which misled some modern interpreters by suggesting that Epicureans are legalists. In fact he is – like Plato – a utopian anti-legalist. To conclude: I have interpreted two passages of Diogenes’ inscription which deal critically with Platonic teachings, one openly, one in a more complex manner. These passages might be seen as standard statements of an orthodox Epicurean. I hope, however, to have shown that the statements gain interest when seen as part of a debate between Platonists and Epicureans. This would prove Diogenes to be an interesting author in that respect also.

⁶⁵ Cf. Westman () –.

’  (  =  )  ’  (.  ) Diogenes of Oinoanda on the History of Philosophy

Francesco Verde*

.  The purpose of this contribution is very limited: its aim is to better understand how Diogenes of Oinoanda does the ‘history of philosophy’,¹ that is what use he makes of the past. While, to my knowledge, no specific and detailed study on Diogenes’ sources has yet been published, scholars have already expressed authoritative opinions on this issue. In this paper I will not produce a completely original contribution on this subject, but I will try to reconstruct the debate in order to reach conclusions as accurate as possible about Diogenes’ philosophical use of the past.² It is well known that in his fragments we find a large number of (direct or indirect) citations of other philosophers with whom Diogenes regularly vies and often polemicizes. To achieve the proposed goal, I will consider two ‘case studies’: two fragments, one much discussed, the other recently published and edited. These are respectively the ‘famous’ fr.  Smith, which attributes the doctrine of flux to Aristotle, and NF  (YF ) discovered in , where Diogenes, referring explicitly to Plato, criticizes the figure and action of the Demiurge of the Timaeus. I will divide this contribution into two distinct sections: in the first part, I will deal with the fragment about Aristotle; in the second part, with the fragment containing a reference to Plato. For both fragments – and the Aristotelian one in particular – I will briefly recall the different positions that scholars have endorsed with regard to the interpretation and contextualization of these texts.

* I wish to thank Tiziano Dorandi, Jürgen Hammerstaedt, Pierre-Marie Morel, Emidio Spinelli, Jun Yeob Lee, and the referee James Warren for their always generous, useful, and relevant comments. ¹ I am aware that the use of the term ‘history of philosophy’ is quite controversial in ancient thought. However, I take this word as a synonym for ‘philosophical use of the past’. As recently clarified by Sedley (), in antiquity the history of philosophy was part of philosophy, and for a philosopher to understand in a certain way a philosophical tradition “was integral to the task of achieving a correct philosophical alignment” (). The same line is followed by Ju () . On the same topic see too Mansfeld () . This, as we shall see, also applies to the Epicureans and Diogenes of Oinoanda. On the same issue (but in Aristotle), a very balanced view is offered by Cardullo () –. ² Cambiano () – writes very interesting pages on the use of the past in ancient philosophy.



 

.  ’  First of all, these are the Greek text and the English translation of fr.  provided by M.F. Smith in his critical edition of the Oinoanda inscription, published in :³ [ἄλ]I [λοι δὲ οὐκ ἄ]ν̣τικρυς οὐ-

[κ ἀνανκαῖα]ν̣ φυσιολογίαν [ἀποκαλοῦσι]ν̣, αἰσχυνό[μενοι τοῦθ’] ὁ̣μολογῆ [σαι, ἑτ]έρ̣ ῳ ̣ δέ τινι ἐγβολῆς χρῶνται σχήματι.



II





III

ὅταν γὰρ ἀκατάλημπτα φάσκωσιν εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, τί ἄλλο̣ φασὶν ἢ ὅτι μὴ δεῖ φυσιολογεῖν ἡμᾶς; v τίς γὰρ αἱρήσεται ζητεῖν ἃ μήποθ’ εὕρῃ; Ἀριστοτέλης οὖν v καὶ οἱ τὸν αὐτὸν Ἀριστ̣ο̣τέ̣ λει ν̣ομί[̣ ζ]οντες Περίπατον οὐδὲν ἐπιστητόν φασιν εἶναι· ῥεῖν γὰρ αἰεὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ δι’ ὀξύτητα τῆς ῥεύσεως τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐκφεύγειν ἀντίλημψιν. v ἡμεῖς δὲ τὴν μὲν ῥεῦσιν αὐτῶν ὁμολογοῦμεν, οὐ μέντοι καὶ τὸ οὕτως ὀξεῖαν αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν ὥστε μηδενὶ χρόνῳ τὴν ἑκάστου φύσιν καταλημπτὴν αἰσθήσ̣ [εσιν εἶναι]. καὶ γὰρ οὐδα[μῶς ποτ’ ἂν] εἴσχυσαν εἰπ̣ [εῖν οἱ τῇ]

³ Smith (). Greek text: –; English translation: .

’  (  =  )  ’  (.  )



δόξῃ τῇδε̣ [χρώμενοι],  τὸ δὴ οἷον φέ[ρουσι, τοτὲ]

μὲν εἶναι τόδε̣ [λευκὸν] καὶ τόδε μέλαν̣, [ἄλλοτε] δὲ οὔτε τοῦτ[ο λευκὸν οὔ]τ’ ἐκεῖνο μέλ[αν, εἰ μὴ πρό] τερον ᾔδεισαν̣ [τὴν λευ]κοῦ τε καὶ μέλ̣ [ανος φύ]σιν. v καὶ τοῖς ἐ[φεκτικοῖς] δὲ λεγομένοις [φιλοσόφοις], ὧν δὴ Λακύδ̣[ης ὁ Κυρη||ναῖος] (I) [Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science [as unnecessary], being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find? Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle (II) say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible (III) by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of ] the view under discussion have been able [to say] (and this is just what they do [maintain]) that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if ] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black. And the so-called [ephectic philosophers]. Of whom Lacydes [of Cyrene] … The text is rather complex; for this reason it is important to understand the broader context (a polemical one, as we will soon see). Diogenes seems to be compiling a sort of doxography,⁴ by reporting the opinions of some philosophers about the science of nature, views which he evidently disputes. Since the opening lines of fr.  prove

⁴ We cannot rule out the hypothesis that in his compilation Diogenes – possibly like Lucretius (see Évrard , and Mansfeld , –) – is following an Epicurean tradition based on the Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς φυσικούς (Diog. Laert. X ), perhaps a summary of Epicurus’ On Nature Book XIV and XV (Sedley , ). See also Ernout-Robin () – ; Chilton () , and Montarese ()  and –. On Montarese’s book see the significant remarks in Dorandi’s review ().



 

that this fragment follows immediately after fr. ,⁵ it is important to keep in mind that in this latter text Diogenes refers to the opinion of some philosophers and, in particular, Socrates or perhaps even the Socratics,⁶ who believe that the science of nature and the investigation of celestial phenomena are basically useless and superfluous pursuits. The science of nature (τὸ δὲ̣ [φυσιο]λογεῖν) and the study of μετέωρα are genuinely Epicurean fields, as is confirmed (at least) by Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus and Letter to Pythocles.⁷ The criticism of Diogenes falls within the broader context of the Epicurean rejection of the figure of Socrates. This rejection is very clear at least up to Zeno of Sidon; subsequently, the critical and negative attitude of the Epicureans towards Socrates diminished, especially thanks to Philodemus.⁸ If Smith’s integrations of the closing lines of fr.  are correct, after the ‘Peripatetic section’ – which we will be discussing shortly – Diogenes speaks about the so-called Ephectic philosophers.⁹ Diogenes mentions Lacydes of Cyrene¹⁰ because either () he dealt with these philosophers or () was “a prominent representative”¹¹ of such thinkers. Lacydes was the scholarch of the Academy after Arcesilaus in /BC (according to Diog. Laert. IV  = T a Mette) or in /BC, according to the evidence from Apollodorus’ Chronica (FGrHist  F  = T a Mette) in Philodemus (Acad. Hist. XXVII – Dorandi).¹² Unfortunately, little is known about Lacydes’

⁵ See Smith ()  n. . ⁶ In fr.  one finds the expression οἱ π̣ [ερὶ Σω]κράτην, which I would not translate simply as the Socratics (Smith , ). In what have become ‘classic’ studies on this issue, Radt (a; b) reached the convincing conclusion that this formula (οἱ περὶ + acc. nominis proprii) indicates either only an individual philosopher (in this case Socrates) or an individual philosopher and his followers (i.e. Socrates and the Socratics). For this formula on the Sceptic side, see Spinelli () . I should point out, moreover, that in the De Stoicis (col. XIII  Dorandi) Philodemus calls Σωκρατικοί those Stoics who are very close to the Cynical tradition (see Dorandi , –). See also Leone  in this volume. ⁷ See now the very detailed study on the Epicurean meteorology by Bakker (). ⁸ See Riley (), the ‘classic’ study by Kleve (), and Long () –. On the less hostile image of Socrates in Philodemus, see Clay (); see also Ranocchia () –. More generally, for an extensive and detailed study on the Epicurean critique of Socrates in general, from Epicurus to Zeno of Sidon (–), and in Philodemus (–), see the Introduzione in Acosta Méndez-Angeli (). ⁹ For this definition cf. at least Diog. Laert. I , IX –, and Sext. Emp. PH I . See also Grilli ()  (and n. ), who approves the integration ἐφεκτικοῖς. ¹⁰ Let us keep in mind that the integration Λακύδ̣[ης] is by Sudhaus () . This integration may depend on the fact that in the previous lines Sudhaus (see below) amended “Aristotle” into “Arcesilaus”; however, it is also possible that this correction suggested the reconstruction of the name of Lacydes. ¹¹ Thus Smith ()  n. . ¹² See Dorandi () – and () –.

’  (  =  )  ’  (.  )



philosophy: Diogenes Laertius (I  = T  Mette, and ) states that he founded the New Academy, whereas Philodemus (Acad. Hist. XXI – Dorandi) says that he brought stability (στῆ[σ]αι) to the Middle Academy. In addition, Cicero in his Lucullus (Acad. II  = T Mette) tends to represent Lacydes as initially the only philosopher to preserve Arcesilaus’ thought. If we mainly follow Philodemus and Cicero, it would seem that Lacydes did not deviate much from Arcesilaus; accordingly, the Ephectic philosophers cited by Diogenes of Oinoanda could be the Academic Sceptics. It remains to be explained, however, why Diogenes mentions Lacydes and the Academics in his survey of the philosophers who have dealt with physical issues. From a passage of the Suda (λ  Adler = T b Mette), we know that, on top of his philosophical works (φιλόσοφα), Lacydes wrote a Περὶ φύσεως. Finally, from Diogenes Laertius (IV ) we learn that he probably also had some interest in geometry.¹³ The overview of the ancient philosophers who studied physics continues in fr. , where Diogenes deals with the identification of πρῶτα σώματα or στοιχεῖα suggested by Heraclitus, Thales, Diogenes of Apollonia, Anaximenes, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, the Stoics, and Democritus. Returning to the content of fr. , probably immediately after reporting the position of Socrates (and, perhaps, his followers) in fr. , Diogenes deals with those philosophers who, while not openly stating its unnecessary character (which would bring shame on its advocates), use other ways to discredit φυσιολογία and, therefore, mark it as useless. Smith saw in these thinkers a reference to the Sceptics;¹⁴ this view is plausible, although it should be borne in mind that the image of these philosophers is always ‘filtered’ by the Epicurean point of view. According to the Epicureans, the Sceptics would be regarding φυσιολογία as unnecessary by not explicitly endorsing it (even if the final result is exactly this). Indeed, the text continues, Diogenes explains just what is the trick: these philosophers do not deny that natural science is useless, but assert that things (τὰ πράγματα) are ἀκατάλημπτα (inapprehensible) and, therefore, that φυσιολογεῖν is unnecessary.¹⁵ The adjective ἀκατάλημπτα is significant; it is known that some sources attribute the authorship of ἀκαταληψία to Pyrrho.¹⁶ The reference

¹³ See Corti () –, and Lévy () –. On Lacydes’ interest in geometry see Russo ()  n. . ¹⁴ Smith ()  n. . See, more in general, Vassallo (), especially his remarks on the Epicurean anti-Sceptic attitude in Philod. Rhet. IV (PHerc. ), II  Sudhaus. ¹⁵ For Sextus Empiricus’ position on φυσιολογεῖν cf. PH I . ¹⁶ See, for example, Diog. Laert. IX  (=  A Decleva Caizzi = Sud. ε  [=  C Decleva Caizzi]); Philop. In Aristot. Cat. prooem. II  Busse (=  Decleva Caizzi). Cf. also the important evidence by Aristocles in Eusebius (Praep. Ev. XIV .– =  Decleva Caizzi = F  Chiesara): Pyrrho argued that all things are ἀδιάφορα καὶ ἀστάθμητα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτα. Useful and interesting pages on this passage have been written by Bett () ff.



 

to ἀκαταληψία, therefore, might indicate that Diogenes is referring to the Pyrrhonian Sceptics. A reference to the Academic Sceptics seems less likely, since Diogenes perhaps dealt with these after the ‘Peripatetic section’, by introducing Lacydes and the Ephectic philosophers (although the end of the column is very lacunose). A point in favour of the Pyrrhonists is found in the immediately following line, where, following on from what has just been argued, one reads: τίς γὰρ αἱρήσεται ζητεῖν ἃ μήποθ’ εὕρῃ (after all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?). The use of the verb ζητεῖν is very significant: the Sceptic way is also defined as ‘zetetic’ because of its aptitude for research, as clearly stated for instance by Sextus Empiricus.¹⁷ Immediately afterwards, Diogenes relates the position of Ἀριστοτέλης and οἱ τὸν αὐτὸν Ἀριστ̣ο̣τέ̣ λει ν̣ομί[̣ ζ]οντες Περίπατον.¹⁸ As already mentioned, these are much discussed lines; I will go through a brief history of their scholarly interpretation. William thought that the “imprudens” Diogenes wrongly attributed Heraclitus’ position to Aristotle,¹⁹ while Usener (followed by Crönert)²⁰ was already of the opinion that Diogenes would have confused Aenesidemus with Aristotle.²¹ Sudhaus proposed to read Ἀρκεσίλας instead of Ἀριστοτέλης. He argued that the original source gave the name of Ἀρκεσίλας, which Diogenes read as Ἀριστοτέλης, misunderstanding, therefore, the name written in an abbreviated form – the philosopher read ΑΡΙΣ instead of ΑΡΚ. Evidently the presence of the name of Arcesilaus was chronologically plausible, especially considering the final reference to Lacydes.²² In the article Diogenes von Oinoanda published in the Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft,²³ Philippson, referring to the fragment of Diogenes, has no doubts: “In Aristoteles irrt er sicherlich” (). To explain this error, Philippson assumes that Diogenes depends on Favorinus of Arelate (ⁿ cent. BC), who was close to Pyrrhonian and Academic Scepticism, but, according to Plutarch (Quaest. Conv. VIII ..F = T XVIII Amato), was also a δαιμονιώτατος

¹⁷ Sext. Emp. PH I : Ἡ σκεπτικὴ τοίνυν ἀγωγὴ καλεῖται μὲν καὶ ζητητικὴ ἀπὸ ἐνεργείας τῆς κατὰ τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ σκέπτεσθαι. Cf. also Gell. XI . ¹⁸ On the expression οἱ τὸν αὐτὸν Ἀριστ̣ο̣τέ̣ λει ν̣ομί[̣ ζ]οντες Περίπατον and the meaning of Περίπατος as ‘philosophical school’ attributed to this word by Epicurus (cf. Athen. VIII  B =  Us. =  Arr.²), see Grilli (), and Smith (a) . On the meaning of περίπατος as “public concourse, where Plato was accustomed to teach” (), see Fortenbaugh () –. ¹⁹ William () . On the possible union between Heraclitus and the Sceptics in Lucretius and for other bibliographical references in this field see Piazzi () –. ²⁰ Crönert ()  (addendum to page , line ). ²¹ Usener () . On Aenesidemus’ Heraclitism (cf. at least Sext. Emp. PH I – = Aenesid. B  Polito) see the two recent reference monographs: Polito (), Pérez-Jean (). Now see too Polito () –. ²² Sudhaus (). See also above n. . ²³ Supplementband  () –, esp. –.

’  (  =  )  ’  (.  )



Ἀριστοτέλους ἐραστής.²⁴ Let me just point out that Amato, in the Les Belles Lettres edition of his Œuvres, inserts – perhaps not entirely convincingly – the fragment of Diogenes among the testimonies of Favorinus (T LXV).²⁵ Later Philippson still reiterated his position, criticizing Bignone’s exegetical proposal.²⁶ There is no doubt that a turning point in this rich and heated debate was the interpretation given by Bignone, which was subsequently followed, integrated and confirmed by Capone Braga²⁷ and Pisano.²⁸ The essential point in Bignone’s exegesis is that the fragment from Diogenes depends on the Epicurean Colotes’ Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι κατὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων δόγματα οὐδὲ ζῆν ἐστιν, which – as is well known – Plutarch criticizes and discredits in his Adversus Colotem. In short, Bignone argues that the image of Aristotle in this fragment can be explained by taking into account the fact that Diogenes is directly dependent on Colotes, who, according to Plutarch, knew the young Aristotle (i.e. the more Platonizing or exoteric Aristotle) and criticized him.²⁹ The main evidence considered by Bignone is an important passage of Adversus Colotem (F–A),³⁰ where Plutarch, dealing with Plato, reports the opinion of Colotes, who says that these doctrines of Plato were followed by Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, and all the Peripatetics.³¹ These doctrines (τούτοις τοῖς δόγμασι) should be a reference to the distinction between what is known by the sense-perception and the mind and to Plato’s περὶ τὰ εἴδη πραγματεία (F).³² In the preceding pages Plutarch (C) had already argued that Parmenides, before Plato and Socrates, had clearly distinguished between what we apprehend by opinion (δοξαστόν) and what we apprehend by the intellect (νοητόν), stressing that: what belongs to the world of

²⁴ See Ioppolo () = Ioppolo () –. ²⁵ Amato-Kulien () –. ²⁶ Philippson () –. ²⁷ Capone Braga (). ²⁸ Pisano (). ²⁹ See Bignone ( []) I –. On Colotes’ work and philosophy see now Corti (), esp. chapter . ³⁰ As recalled by Berti ( [])  n. , Plutarch’s passage is listed among the collection of testimonies of the ‘lost’ Aristotle by Walzer, but not in the collection by Ross. It should be noted that R. Walzer was a student of Bignone and he was strongly influenced by his master. ³¹ [τοῦ φιλοσόφου] … λέγοντος ὅτι τούτοις τοῖς δόγμασι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐπηκολουθήκασιν Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Θεόφραστος καὶ πάντες οἱ Περιπατητικοί (transl. Einarson / De Lacy). On this passage see also Morel/Verde () n. . ³² Cf. Plut. Adv. Col. B–C for Plutarch’s evidence about Aristotle’s criticism (ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν, ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, διὰ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν διαλόγων) of the theory of ideas. See also the stimulating pages by Karamanolis () –.



 

opinion is inconstant and passes through a wide range of accidents and changes.³³ Given that even Plato has expounded this distinction even more clearly in his theory of ideas, he has afforded Colotes an opening for attack.³⁴ Of course, Plutarch does not believe that Colotes’ position is correct: he thinks that it is absolutely confused, wrong and typical of an ignorant person. Soon after, Plutarch – who also knew Aristotle’s ‘Platonic writings’³⁵ – lists a number of works (from Aristotle’s On the Heavens and On the Soul to Theophrastus’ Reply to Natural Philosophers / τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς, Heraclides, and Dicaearchus), which are totally different from Plato. In addition, Plutarch cites the case of Strato of Lampsacus who, although he was τῶν ἄλλων Περιπατητικῶν ὁ κορυφαιότατος (A =  Sharples), not only is on many points not in accord with Aristotle, but adopts views contrary to Plato himself. Through this reference to Strato, Plutarch refutes Colotes’ opinion that all Peripatetics (πάντες οἱ Περιπατητικοί),³⁶ along with Aristotle, Theophrastus and Xenocrates, follow the doctrines of Plato. Just in passing I would like to emphasize what in my view is a very significant point. If one turns to a couple of texts by Cicero (Ac. I – = B Sharples; Fin. V  = A Sharples), one realizes that Antiochus of Ascalon not only tended to distinguish the Peripatetics from Aristotle, but also considered Strato to be foreign to the Peripatos because of his doctrines.³⁷ It is necessary to adequately explain the well-known expression (which may be traced back to Antiochus) that nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem Academiam differebat (Ac. I  = F  Sedley). According to Antiochus, the ‘authentic’ Peripatos is made up of Aristotle and Theophrastus, while the following Peripatetics reflect a genuine decline. In this way, Antiochus significantly distinguished the Peripatetics (after Theophrastus) from Aristotle and, for this reason, he could reconcile Aristotle (and to some extent also Theophrastus), Plato and the Academy, before the sceptical turn of the Academy

³³ ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν δοξαστὸν ἀβέβαιον καὶ πλανητὸν ἐν πάθεσι πολλοῖς καὶ μεταβολαῖς. On Plutarch’s interpretation of Parmenides (in essentially Platonic terms), see Isnardi Parente () –, and Bonazzi (). ³⁴ ἣν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐνδεικνύμενος Πλάτων τῇ περὶ τὰ εἴδη πραγματείᾳ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀντίληψιν τῷ Κωλώτῃ παρέσχε. ³⁵ Cf. Plut. Adv. Col. C. ³⁶ I would like to draw attention to an important question: according to Westman () – and – πάντες οἱ Περιπατητικοί refers not only to the followers of Aristotle, but also to the Academic philosophers. ³⁷ Cf. Cic. Ac. I : Nam Strato eius [scil. Theophrastus] auditor quamquam fuit acri ingenio tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est; Cic. Fin. V : namque ii horum [scil. Aristoteles and Theophrastus] posteri meliores illi quidem mea sententia quam reliquarum philosophi disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur.

’  (  =  )  ’  (.  )



with Arcesilaus.³⁸ Therefore, unlike Antiochus, at least on the basis of Plutarch, Colotes considers the Peripatos faithful to Aristotle and, consequently, to Plato, while Plutarch mentions precisely Strato’s position (together with the ‘published’ works by Aristotle, Theophrastus, Heraclides, and Dicaearchus) in order to refute this thesis. Before proceeding any further, after having presented the main interpretative currents, I must return to the text of the Diogenes fragment. Diogenes attributed to Aristotle and the Peripatetics – with no doctrinal break between the two – the idea that nothing can really be an object of knowledge (οὐδὲν ἐπιστητόν φασιν εἶναι). The explanation of this position is provided immediately afterwards: all things always flow (ῥεῖν γὰρ αἰεὶ τὰ πράγματα) and it is due to the rapidity of this flux (δι’ ὀξύτητα τῆς ῥεύσεως) that things escape from our ἀντίλημψις, that is from our apprehension, a term which may have belonged to Epicurean epistemology.³⁹ The reason why all things are not knowable, therefore, is not the flux itself, but its rapidity.⁴⁰ Against the Peripatetic position, Diogenes argues that even the Epicureans acknowledge this flux (of things) – it is likely that the reference here is to the flow of simulacra that enables sense-perception (regarded as always true)⁴¹ – but not so fast. For this reason, the nature of everything may be understood by sense-perception (ὥστε μηδενὶ χρόνῳ τὴν ἑκάστου φύσιν καταλημπτὴν αἰσθήσ̣ [εσιν εἶναι]). This confirms the fact that the flux theory can work in sceptical systems as much as in rational (or dogmatic) systems.⁴² It has been argued, moreover, that the reply of the Epicureans (supporters of the idea of a slower flux) might be addressed to the Academics, who in turn used the flux doctrine for polemical purposes.⁴³

³⁸ Cf. again Cic. Ac. I , and Bonazzi (a) . ³⁹ Cf. Plut. Adv. Col. D (= Epicur.  Us.) where, in a typical Epicurean context, the word ἀντίληψις is significantly used in the sense of the apprehension of qualities; soon after, as a matter of fact, Plutarch gives the example of white/not-white. See also Konstan () on the Epicurean περίληψις. ⁴⁰ See D. Sedley’s reasonable suggestions in Smith () . ⁴¹ Cf. Epicur. Hdt. , and Nat. II col. . Leone; see further Smith ()  n. . This could validate the hypothesis that the Epicureans intend to defend their own notion of the flux, in order to safeguard the distinction of their ideas from a certain understanding of the flux in the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition. ⁴² See Vallance ()  n. . ⁴³ See Decleva Caizzi () –, who predates to the Old Academy the origin of the idea of flowing matter and its connection to the theory of flux (a criticism of this hypothesis is provided by Isnardi Parente b, –, who believes that it is impossible that the Old Academy could ever draw upon the Aristotelian notion of ὕλη). The idea that the ‘threat’ of Scepticism – which the Epicureans wished to avert – may be lurking behind the image of Aristotle conveyed by Diogenes is supported by Gigante () –. The relationship



 

Diogenes (or his source) then raises another argument against the Peripatos: those who support the rapid flux doctrine cannot maintain – as they do – that at one time this is black and this is white ([τοτὲ] μὲν εἶναι τόδε̣ [λευκὸν] καὶ τόδε μέλαν̣) and, at another time, this is not white and this is not black ([ἄλλοτε] δὲ οὔτε τοῦτ[ο λευκὸν οὔ]τ’ ἐκεῖνο μέλ[αν]), if previously ([πρό]τερον) they have not grasped the φύσις of white and black. As a result, Diogenes’ criticism is, on the one hand, that Aristotle and the Peripatetics cannot know anything because everything runs too fast; on the other hand, that, even if they were to admit that everything incessantly flows, they could not also say that a thing is white now and non-white later, since, in order to do so, they should know the nature of white, which is unknowable precisely because everything quickly flows. I believe that we are almost compelled to compare what Diogenes attributes to the Peripatos with the very renowned doctrine (d : μάλ’ οὐ φαῦλον λόγον) that Socrates explains in the Theaetetus in support of Protagoras’ homo mensura theory. After having stated that Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles and even Epicharmus and Homer – but not Parmenides (e –) – agree on the fact that everything is in motion, blended and ever-becoming,⁴⁴ Socrates argues that the non-white does not exist by itself,⁴⁵ but it is only produced when there is a meeting of the eyes with something moving in its direction. Another important text to which Diogenes’ fragment could refer is chapter  of Book I of Metaphysics, where Aristotle ‘genetically’ reconstructs Plato’s philosophy, by deriving it from the Italics (i.e. the Pythagoreans), Socrates and especially the Heraclitean Cratylus, who held that all perceptible things are ever-becoming and there can be no knowledge of them (I .a –: ἁπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ ῥεόντων καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης). Immediately afterwards, Aristotle significantly adds that Plato subsequently remained faithful to this point (I .a –: ταῦτα μὲν καὶ ὕστερον οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν).⁴⁶

between Scepticism (in its Academic as well as Pyrrhonian version) and the notion of the constant motion caused by the flux clearly emerges in a passage by Hippol. Ref. I .: ῥευστὴν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν πᾶσαν καὶ μεταβλητὴν καὶ μηδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένειν (see Krämer , ). ⁴⁴ Cf. Phaed. c, and Crat. a–c. On the relationship between Protagoras and the flux theory cf. too Sext. Emp. PH I –; on the same matter see Brancacci (). ⁴⁵ On this point, cf. too Aristot. Metaph. VI .b –. ⁴⁶ This is a significant passage (M VIII ) of the Against the Logicians (identified by Pisano , ff. supporting Bignone’s hypothesis, and then by Decleva Caizzi , – and ), where Sextus Empiricus attributes to Plato – who, along with Democritus, believed that only τὰ νοητά are true (Sext. Emp. Math. VIII ) – the theory that perceptible things are everbecoming and never being (διὰ τὸ γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἀεὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, μηδέποτε δὲ εἶναι […] ῥεούσης τῆς οὐσίας). Soon afterwards, Sextus cites Asclepiades of Bithynia, who agreed with Plato and argued that one cannot point at the same river twice because of the speed of the flow (διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς ῥοῆς). Evidently the similarity of language between Sextus and Diogenes is

’  (  =  )  ’  (.  )



Even aside from these (more or less plausible) textual parallels, I believe that any attempt to find in Aristotle a possible reference to the doctrine expounded by Diogenes is useless and basically inconclusive.⁴⁷ Since it is very difficult to attribute to Aristotle a doctrine of this kind (as Aristotle never supported the idea that nothing is knowable) or to make Aristotle a (presumed) ‘sceptic’,⁴⁸ I believe that we are faced with an authentic (and targeted) ‘reconstruction’, which certainly was not motivated by a sense of objectivity. From this point of view, not only would it be unreasonable to think that Diogenes was wrong in his ‘doxography’,⁴⁹ but, in contrast to what was asserted by Bignone, I would argue that the quotation from Aristotle in Diogenes’ fragment is not necessarily a proof of the ‘lost Aristotle’. Rather, it seems highly likely to conclude that it is a real Epicurean reconstruction, which could be based on further and previous (maybe Pyrrhonian or, more in general, Sceptical) doxographical reconstructions. Diogenes’ passage, in short, provides important evidence for the Epicurean way of reading and using the past and for the fact that Diogenes – at least as far as this fragment is concerned – probably depended exclusively on Epicurean sources. Bignone, however, should be given the merit of having drawn attention to what, in my view, remains a crucial passage of Plutarch. Of course, it is very difficult to answer the question of

remarkable; furthermore, Asclepiades is close to some Epicurean positions (see Leith ). However, it is very likely that Asclepiades uses the analogy of the river to illustrate the flow of corpuscles (ὄγκοι) through pores (see especially Vallance , –). ⁴⁷ Some scholars have drawn attention to several texts by Aristotle such as De ideis fr.  Ross (R² , R³ : Schol. in Dion. Thrac. .– Hilgard) – arguing that particular things (τὰ μὲν μερικά) constantly change and never remain the same, while universal things (τὰ δὲ καθόλου) are immutable and eternal –, Metaph. I .b – (on sense-perception), and III .b ff. Nevertheless, none of these passages support the idea that according to Aristotle nothing can be known because of the rapidity of the flux. See, more in general, Chilton () –, and G.N. Hoffman in Smith ()  (and n. ). ⁴⁸ What strikes me as less convincing is the alternative reading proposed by Chilton () –, namely the idea that Diogenes “derived his information from some first- or secondcentury Peripatetic eclectic who combined Aristotelianism not with the ordinary Scepticism of the later Academy, but a very developed Aenesidemean kind of Scepticism indistinguishable from the extreme Heracliteanism of Cratylus”. We should thus posit a non-Epicurean source, yet this seems to me very implausible for the reconstruction of Diogenes’ ‘doxography’. If anything, from the point of view of ‘historical objectivity’, Diogenes shows a strong ignorance on the Aristotelian tradition, which was very dynamic in his day (thus D. Sedley in Smith , ). On the relationship between Aristotle and Scepticism I shall refer to the interesting study by Long () –. ⁴⁹ See Grilli ()  n. . See also Sedley () , who believes that Diogenes’ presentation of Aristotle is a simple mistake; contra Roskam – in this volume who maintains that it is nonetheless a serious distortion; see also Tsouna  n.  in this volume.



 

why the Epicureans attributed the flux doctrine to Aristotle or considered Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus and Xenocrates and all the Peripatetics as upholding a common philosophical doctrine. The philosophical use of the past by the Epicureans, as we learn from Colotes – that for all intents and purposes is very different from the non-polemical biography linked to the διαδοχαί system of Philodemus’ τῶν φιλοσόφων σύνταξις (Diog. Laert. X )⁵⁰ – does not aim to be historically objective, but often adopts a hostile approach.⁵¹ As a result, setting out to find textual evidence in his works at any cost in order to validate the attribution of the flux theory to Aristotle is hardly a justified action. Or, rather, it is justified only if we start by acknowledging the existence of an Epicurean way of reading (and using) the past. Plutarch’s passage is certainly essential for understanding that according to the Epicureans Aristotle held the same doctrine as Plato. It is likely, therefore, that, for polemical purposes, the Epicureans, perhaps by taking a cue from a particularly ambiguous Aristotelian passage or maliciously reading a text by Aristotle, attributed the flux doctrine to the latter. It is clearly very hard to determine whether Colotes and Diogenes are referring to the ‘lost’ and more platonizing Aristotle and whether Diogenes depends on Colotes or the polemic dates back to Epicurus (who, in any case, also and especially knew the ‘unpublished Aristotle’).⁵² Given that we have only fragmentary texts by Diogenes, we must be cautious; a direct or indirect dependence of Diogenes on Colotes is likely, as is the fact that Colotes and Diogenes may be referring to the ‘lost Aristotle’. This, however, is only a speculative hypothesis. If we could read Colotes’ complete work, we could come up with more conclusive answers. Nevertheless, we must also take into account the fact that in Colotes – at least from what we know from Plutarch, who must have had direct access to Colotes’ work and other Epicurean writings⁵³ – we do not find any attribution of the flux doctrine to Aristotle.⁵⁴ Not possessing Colotes’

⁵⁰ For a general overview of this matter, see especially Arrighetti () –. ⁵¹ On the tradition and significance of Epicurean polemics see Smith () –, and Kechagia () –. ⁵² See the claims made by G.N. Hoffman in Smith () . Concerning Epicurus’ knowledge of Aristotle and the Peripatetics see Gigante (), Montarese () –, Verde (c) – and Verde (a). ⁵³ On this matter I shall only refer to Hershbell () . ⁵⁴ Vander Waerdt ()  n. , argues that the hypothesis that the image of Aristotle as an Heraclitean sceptic depends on Colotes is very unlikely, given that in Plutarch we cannot find any charge levelled by Colotes against Aristotle. An attack of this kind would be superfluous, since Aristotle followed the same doctrine as Plato (Plut. Adv. Col. A). If this is true, it is necessary to find another source and to conclude, with Gordon ()

’  (  =  )  ’  (.  )



entire work, is not advisable to proceed any further with this hypothesis. However, it is very strange that a doctrine of this kind is not mentioned by Colotes and is not even to be found in Plutarch.⁵⁵ If Colotes and Plutarch had mentioned this doctrine, the former might have attacked Aristotle and the Peripatetics more effectively by radically refuting their epistemology, which, according to the Epicurean, rejected the truth of sense-perception precisely because of the idea of flux.⁵⁶ Plutarch might instead have used it for polemical purposes against Colotes, by attacking his absurd way of reporting the opinions of other philosophers. If the Aristotelian flux doctrine was not in Colotes, Diogenes, at least in this case, would depend not on Colotes, but on another Epicurean source. At any rate, the fact that there existed an Epicurean way of reading the ‘history of philosophy’ seems to me to be also confirmed by the analysis of a recently discovered Platonic fragment from Oinoanda.

.  ’  The fragment on Plato’s Demiurge (NF  = YF ) was found during the excavations of  and published in the same year by J. Hammerstaedt and M.F. Smith in Epigraphica Anatolica.⁵⁷ The Greek text and the translation provided by the editors run as follows:

καλῶϲ Πλάτων ὁμολογήϲαϲ γενητὸν εἶναι τὸν κόϲμον, ν εἰ καὶ μὴ  καλῶϲ ἐδημιούρ-

, that every generation of Epicureans needed to engage with the ‘threat of scepticism’ and to develop argumentative strategies to suit their present needs. It is important, however, to recall that Diogenes might depend on Colotes, judging from what we read on Democritus in fr.  II – (κατὰ γὰρ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ὦ Δημόκριτε, οὐχ ὅπως τὸ ἀληθὲς εὑρεῖν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ζῆν δυνησόμεθα); on this passage see the well-balanced position of Smith ()  n. . ⁵⁵ Aristotle’s name, moreover, does not appear in the list of philosophers in Adv. Col. B. ⁵⁶ It is important to take into account the crucial role that the ‘criterion’ of ἐνάργεια plays in Colotes: see Concolino Mancini () –, Kechagia () –, and Corti (), –. ⁵⁷ Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –).



 

γηϲεν αὐτόν, τῇ φύϲει δημιουργῷ μὴ χρηϲάμενο{ι}ϲ, ν κακῶϲ ἄφθαρτον ννν εἶπεν. Although Plato was right to acknowledge that the world had an origin, even if he was not right to introduce a divine craftsman of it, instead of employing nature as its craftsman, he was wrong to say that it is imperishable. The fragment belongs to the Maxims which were most likely composed by Diogenes, but it is also reasonable to suppose that Diogenes collected them from another Epicurean source.⁵⁸ The source, at least in this case, cannot be Epicurus himself, given that Epicurus, as far as we know, did not directly engage in polemic with the Stoics. Diogenes’ Maxims are short texts that record statements on ethics (as well as physics). As is well-known, the maxim is a typical Epicurean ‘literary genre’, already used by Epicurus himself in his Principal Doctrines or Vatican Sayings.⁵⁹ The editors have supposed that this fragment is very close to fr. , or even follows it. After having been included in the  collection (where, however, hardly anything significant was made of it), fr.  was re-edited by Smith in .⁶⁰ It is a very interesting text, which also deals with Stoic physics in order to criticize it. Let us now consider Smith’s “plausible reconstruction”⁶¹ of the maxim. It is necessary to reiterate that as the surviving text is highly lacunose and we get very little from it, it has been very extensively reconstructed; for this reason, we must be particularly cautious in using this fragment:

οὔ[τ’ ἐστι τὰ στοιχεῖ]α τῶν π̣ [άντων θεὸς καὶ] ὕλη ν (κα̣[κῶς γὰρ ἀρχὰς] οἱ Στωικ̣ [οὶ ταῦθ’ ἡγοῦν] ται) ν ο̣[ὔτε πῦρ οὔτ’ ἀὴρ] ο̣ὔ̣[θ’ ὕδωρ οὔτε γῆ, ὡς] [δοκοῦσιν ἄλλοι, ἀλ]-

⁵⁸ See Smith () –; (a) –. ⁵⁹ See Gagliarde (). ⁶⁰ Smith (). See also Smith (a) –. ⁶¹ Smith () .

’  (  =  )  ’  (.  )



[λ’ ἄτομοι φύσεις, αἳ δή] [εἰσιν ἁπλῶς ἄφθαρτοι]  [καὶ ἀμετάβλητοι]. [The elements] of the [universe are] neither [god and] matter [(which the Stoics wrongly regard as ultimate principles) nor fire nor air nor water nor earth, as others suppose, but indivisible entities, which are absolutely imperishable and unchangeable]. If we accept Smith’s (bold) reconstruction of the text, in this maxim Diogenes criticizes the Stoic doctrine of matter, and in particular the idea that the ἀρχαί are god and matter (i.e., the active / τὸ ποιοῦν and the passive principle / τὸ πάσχον), as well as the theory that the στοιχεῖα of the universe are the four Empedoclean elements.⁶² Diogenes would have countered this position by reiterating that the authentic στοιχεῖα⁶³ are ἄτομοι φύσεις absolutely ἄφθαρτοι and ἀμετάβλητοι.⁶⁴ It is hard to establish how the text may have continued, but it is likely that Diogenes dealt with the Epicurean doctrine of the elements. The insertion of a reference to Plato near to fr. , moreover, is likely too. The tone of the Platonic fragment seems much less polemical than fr. ; Diogenes even praises Plato (καλῶϲ) for recognizing that the world was created. This is rather surprising, if one takes into account the invariably anti-Platonic attitude of the Epicureans.⁶⁵ Plato’s error (μὴ καλῶϲ), however, is to have introduced a divine craftsman and to have considered – unlike the Stoics – the world to be imperishable. Plato would have done better to regard nature as the craftsman of the world. This fragment is really important, because it confirms the polemical approach of the Epicureans towards Plato’s Timaeus. At least judging from those fragments that have been discovered and edited, Diogenes was not concerned with Plato’s doctrine of the elements but only with his cosmology in the Timaeus. We know, however, that Epicurus strongly criticized Timaeus’ theory of elementary triangles in Book XIV of his On Nature (PHerc. ).⁶⁶ If it is true that fr.  and NF  were very near, Diogenes (like the Epicureans) considered Plato and the Stoics to be very close from a doctrinal point

⁶² Cf. Diog. Laert. VII  (= SVF II ),  (= SVF II ), and Lapidge (). ⁶³ On this term in Epicurus see the interpretation by Wigodsky (). ⁶⁴ Cf. Epicur. Hrdt. . ⁶⁵ For an overview of the matter, see De Lacy (), and Bloch (). See also Erler – in this volume, and, more in general, the pioneering study by Shorey (). ⁶⁶ Epicur. Nat. XIV col. XXXVIII – Leone. See too Baltussen () –, and Verde (c) –.



 

of view: after all, much of the criticism that we find in Cicero’s De natura deorum and in Lucretius’ De rerum natura applies to Plato as much as to the Stoics.⁶⁷ As is well known, this evidence is much debated. What is particularly controversial is the notion of the “Epicurean fundamentalism” of Lucretius, according to D. Sedley’s famous statement:⁶⁸ if Epicurus never polemically engaged with the Stoics and if we believe Lucretius to be fully and exclusively following Epicurus, then the polemical passages in Lucretius’ poem must be directed only against Plato. I do not intend to enter into this difficult debate, but it seems reasonable to believe that, even if in Diogenes’ time the chief rivals of the Epicureans were the Stoics,⁶⁹ the Epicureans regarded the Stoics as being basically identical to Plato at least with respect to some important doctrinal aspects. To this must be added the fact that the Epicureans were nonetheless considered by their opponents to be very close to the philosophical positions of Aristotle: a significant example is the Platonic philosopher Atticus (ⁿ cent. BC), who offers important proof of this view.⁷⁰ I believe that in order to better contextualize Diogenes’ Platonic fragment and to identify its potential sources, it is helpful to compare it with some passages

⁶⁷ See Sedley () –. ⁶⁸ See Sedley () esp. Ch. ; for a different view, see Schmidt () –, and now Montarese () esp. Ch. . ⁶⁹ Hammerstaedt/Smith ()  (= , ), note that the verb δημιουργέω “is used three times by Diogenes in his polemic in the Physics against those who believe that god created the cosmos for his own sake or for that of human beings. Cf. NF / VI , fr.  I , II . His opponents in that passage are his favourite ones, the Stoics”. According to The Continuous ‘Theological Physics-Sequence’ (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , –), the last two quoted fragments correspond to Theol. VIII , XII , and XIII.. Among the occurrences of δημιουργέω must be added Theol. XI – (= NF  IV –) too. More in general, Theol. VIII (= NF  VI + NF  I) and IX (= NF  II) of the Theological Physics-Sequence (see Hammerstaedt/Smith , –, and ) are very clear and significant evidence for Diogenes’ criticism of Stoic providential teleology. ⁷⁰ The work of the Platonic philosopher Atticus may be given the title of Πρὸς τοὺς διὰ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους τὰ Πλάτωνος ὑπισχνουμένους (Eus. Praep. Ev. XI . = Att.  des Places), Against those who claim to interpret the doctrines of Plato with those of Aristotle. In this work Atticus also provided a comparison between Aristotle and Epicurus on theological issues, especially that of providence. On these issues, according to Atticus, Epicurus professed doctrines less shameful than those of Aristotle (Eus. Praep. Ev. XV . =  des Places). Several parallels between Atticus’ criticism of Aristotle and the Platonic fragment from Oinoanda are suggested by Chiaradonna () –. Atticus holds that Aristotle (described as τῆς φύσεως εὑρετής) is worse than Epicurus, since the former entrusts human affairs to φύσις, thereby dismissing divine care and λογισμός (Eus. Praep. Ev. XV . =  des Places). The term λογισμός is probably borrowed from the Timaeus (e.g. a : λογισμὸς θεοῦ). On the same matter see again Erler – in this volume, and Longo () too.

’  (  =  )  ’  (.  )



from Book I of Cicero’s De natura deorum. First of all, the speech by Velleius, the Epicurean spokesman, includes a severe critique of Platonic theology which – not surprisingly – is considered to be very close to Stoic theology (ND I –). Velleius criticizes, on the one hand, the craftsman god and creator of the world of Plato’s Timaeus (opificem aedificatoremque mundi Platonis de Timaeo deum) and, on the other hand, the Stoic concept of providence (anum fatidicam Stoicorum Pronoeam, quam Latine licet Providentiam dicere). In particular, against Plato Velleius argues: What power of mental vision enabled your master Plato to descry the vast and elaborate architectural process which, as he makes out, the deity adopted in building the structure of the universe? What method of engineering was employed? What tools and levers and derricks? What agents carried out so vast an undertaking? And how were air, fire, water and earth enabled to obey and execute the will of the architect? How did the five regular solids, which are the basis of all other forms of matter, come into existence so nicely adapted to make impressions on our minds and produce sensations?⁷¹ Velleius maintains that Plato’s representation is sheer fantasy: Plato invented everything and, most importantly, did not explain in a truly scientific manner how the Demiurge worked, what tools he used, how he managed to submit the four elements – already mentioned in fr.  (if Smith’s reconstruction hits the mark) – to the will of the divine architect, and finally where the five solids formed by the elementary triangles came from. Even more interesting is the passage from Book I of the De natura deorum with Velleius’ speech on Epicurean theology (ND I –): For he who taught us all the rest has also taught us that the world was made by nature, without needing an artificer to construct it, and that the act of creation, which according to you cannot be performed without divine skill, is so easy, that nature will create, is creating and has created worlds without number.⁷²

⁷¹ Cic. ND I : Quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua construi a deo atque aedificari mundum facit; quae molitio, quae ferramenta, qui vectes, quae machinae, qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt; quem ad modum autem oboedire et parere voluntati architecti aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt; unde vero ortae illae quinque formae, ex quibus reliqua formantur, apte cadentes ad animum afficiendum pariendosque sensus? (Tr. Rackham). ⁷² Cic. ND I : docuit enim nos idem, qui cetera, natura effectum esse mundum, nihil opus fuisse fabrica, tamque eam rem esse facilem, quam vos effici negetis sine divina posse sollertia, ut innumerabiles natura mundos effectura sit, efficiat, effecerit.



 

In the course of his description of Epicurean theology Velleius raises several critical points against the Stoics, who in Cicero’s dialogue are represented by Balbus. To the polemical question of the Stoics “what is the mode of life of the gods and how they pass their days?”, the Epicureans reply that their god “is entirely inactive and free from all ties of occupation” (ND I ). Within this anti-Stoic context, by emphasizing nature’s role – just like the Oinoanda fragment – Velleius asserts that the world was made by nature⁷³ (natura effectum esse mundum)⁷⁴ and that there was no need to have any fabrica or intelligent ‘process of construction’⁷⁵ to craft it. According to the Stoics, Velleius explains, the act of production of the world cannot exist sine divina sollertia. The passage continues with a strong Epicurean criticism: since the Stoics do not attribute any intelligence to nature (sine aliqua mente), like the tragic poets, they resort to god or, rather, to a sort of deus ex machina who is able to solve everything. If, instead, the Stoics correctly conceived of nature (i.e. as the Epicureans do), they would not fall into this error. Then (ND I ) Velleius describes the endless extension of space and the countless number of atoms which, separated by void, join to form the shapes and the figures of things. This conception of nature constitutes the best response to the Stoics’ idea of a sempiternum dominum and a god who is curiosum et plenum negotii. From this we understand how the critique raised by Velleius is not only directed against the Stoics, but may also include Plato. The ancient Stoics probably drew from the Timaeus their two fundamental principles of the cosmos: the active principle, which is identified with god, and the passive principle, identified with the matter.⁷⁶ It was often thought that the Stoics derived from the Timaeus especially the qualities of the World-Soul, due to the strong similarity between Plato’s World-Soul and their active principle.⁷⁷ On the basis of convincing arguments it has recently been argued that, rather than the World-Soul, it is Plato’s Demiurge, the designer of the cosmos, that stands as the true precursor to the Stoic god.⁷⁸ In my view, the Epicureans

⁷³ To understand the exact meaning of natura in this context many scholars (as SchoemannStickney , ; Mayor , ; Pease , ; Dyck , ) have referred to ND I  (= A Sharples), where Velleius describes the philosophical position of Strato qui omnem vim divinam in natura sitam esse censet. ⁷⁴ Cf. Lucr. I  (rerum natura creatrix); V  (naturaque daedala rerum). ⁷⁵ See Dyck () . This term might have something to do with the ἐκ τέχνης (by design) of Plat. Tim. d . ⁷⁶ Cf. Gourinat () –. ⁷⁷ I find strongly convincing the arguments raised by Broadie () –, on the separateness of the Demiurge and his distinction from the World-Soul in Timaeus. ⁷⁸ See Powers (). Cf. then Diog. Laert. VII  (= SVF II ): τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ

’  (  =  )  ’  (.  )



themselves believed this to be the case. We can observe a rather remarkable similarity between the passage from Cicero and the Oinoanda fragments under examination. If it is true that fr.  and NF  were near, Diogenes (or his source) intended to polemically engage with Plato and the Stoics with regard to the elements of the universe and cosmological questions. It is also likely that in the two fragments there were more extended references also to the Epicurean doctrine of the elements, just as in ND I . I believe, therefore, that we cannot rule out a close relationship between these fragments from Oinoanda – always assuming that the reconstruction of fr.  is correct – and the passages from De natura deorum. I do not wish to enter here into the vexatissima quaestio of the sources of Book I of this work (variously identified as Phaedrus’ On Gods, Philodemus’ On Piety, or Zeno of Sidon);⁷⁹ but it seems to me undeniable that the source used by Cicero is an Epicurean one. More specifically, the source of Velleius’ account of Epicurean theology (I –) – the passage in which Velleius argues that the world was made by nature – could be “a fairly recent source, perhaps one presupposing Chrysippus”.⁸⁰ Consequently, we cannot exclude the possibility that Diogenes depends on the same source as Cicero.⁸¹ Given that the polemic is an anti-Stoic one, this source cannot be Epicurus himself; it could be a later Epicurean who perhaps used anti-Platonic arguments (already employed by Epicurus?) against the Stoics. It is, in my opinion, another important proof of the fact that Diogenes closely – and possibly exclusively – followed his Epicurean sources and was very familiar with the doctrinal development of the Kepos.

λόγον τὸν θέον· τοῦτον γὰρ ἀΐδιον ὄντα διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα (emphasis added), Cleom. Cael. I . Todd (= SVF II ), and Eus. Praep. Ev. III . (= SVF II ). ⁷⁹ For an overview of the Epicurean sources of De natura deorum Book I, I will refer to Hirzel () –; Mayor () xlii–liv; Pease () –; Obbink () –, Dyck () –, and Essler (). It is well-known that the question of the sources and the dating of the work is to be examined in the light of the letter which Cicero addressed to Atticus from Tusculum (on  August BC or thereabouts), and in which he reminds his friend to send him the books of the Epicurean Phaedrus (Att. XIII ; cf. also XIII ). On the epistle, Obbink ()  n. , and –; Summers () (contra see again Obbink , –). ⁸⁰ Dyck () . See too Pease () –, and Obbink () –. ⁸¹ Of course, one cannot exclude the hypothesis that Diogenes depends on Cicero, but this possibility seems hardly compelling. In this case, we would have to assume that Diogenes read Latin, but this cannot be taken for granted.



 

.  The study of two fragments has shown that Diogenes was deeply (and perhaps utterly) faithful to his Epicurean sources. In the case of fr.  Diogenes ascribes to Aristotle the idea that nothing can be known as a result not of the flux of things itself (which is also admitted by the Epicureans), but because of its extreme rapidity. Reassessing Ettore Bignone’s hypothesis (at least partially), it is likely that Diogenes drew this information from a polemical Epicurean source, which sought to challenge the very heart of Aristotle’s epistemology.⁸² It cannot be ruled out that this source was Colotes’ polemical pamphlet; from Plutarch’s Adversus Colotem (A) we know that Colotes tended to square Aristotle’s philosophy with Plato’s. Nor can it be ruled out that the Aristotle quoted by Diogenes is the Platonizing exoteric Aristotle. At any rate, the Epicurean source certainly did not aim to reconstruct Aristotle’s thought historically and objectively. The crucial point is that in this way the Epicurean source – which maybe could be based on other (Pyrrhonian or Sceptical) doxographies⁸³ – could at the same time deny the effectiveness of the Aristotelian doctrine of knowledge and reaffirm the validity of Epicurean canonic and the consequent truth of sense-perception. From this point of view it may be worth considering Cicero Fat.  where Aristotle (together with Democritus, Heraclitus, and Empedocles) is taken to be a determinist. This may be a parallel case that might shed light on the possible source of Diogenes’ mistake; this very peculiar picture of Aristotle in Cicero’s De fato could go back to Arcesilaus’ and Carneades’ own doctrinal reconstruction of the veteres philosophi, and this would confirm the hypothesis that the Epicureans derive some significant doxographical information from Sceptical (in this case, Academic) sources.⁸⁴ NF  from the  discoveries preserves an interesting maxim in which Diogenes, on the one hand, praises Plato for having argued that the world was generated, but, on the other hand, criticizes him for having attributed to the Demiurge the ability of producing the cosmos: according to Diogenes, Plato would have been better to attribute this power to nature. Although the tone is less polemical than in fr. , this text is typical of the anti-Platonic attitude of the Epicureans. A comparison with some significant passages of De natura deorum (I  and ) shows that even

⁸² See Bonazzi (b) , who maintains that, by referring to Diogenes’ fr.  I –II , it is typical of Epicureans to criticize Aristotle for the sceptical implications of his natural philosophy. ⁸³ For a different (and perhaps not very sharable) view on that matter see Tutrone () – (= , –). ⁸⁴ See on Cicero’s passage Maso () –, and, more in general, Spinelli () and Lee ().

’  (  =  )  ’  (.  )



in this case the source could be an Epicurean one: for the Epicureans stressed the autonomous role of nature by denying both the intelligent production of the cosmos and the existence of a creator god or an active principle capable of performing this task. By attacking the intelligent cosmogony of the Timaeus, the Epicureans were at the same time criticizing the Stoics, who derived the qualities of their providential god – the perfect designer of the cosmos – from the Platonic Demiurge much more than from the World-Soul. Diogenes, then, is fully aware that the polemical strategy he deploys against other (past or contemporary) philosophical schools is all the more effective if it is based on a certain (often hostile and not at all objective) way of reading and using the past, since – as the Oinoanda inscription confirms – his only goal is to affirm the absolute legitimacy of Epicureanism at the expense of other philosophical traditions, evidently considered inferior, yet at the same time perceived as threatening, dangerous rivals.

 ’ Œ       Giuliana Leone*

.  La physique épicurienne n’a pas seulement pour objet la connaissance des principes essentiels de la réalité, atomes et vide, et des processus en réalité ‘invisibles’ (ἄδηλα) qui les concernent. La connaissance des phénomènes astronomiques et météorologiques lointains, que l’on ne peut pas rechercher directement et qui, étant non apparents, se révèlent eux aussi ἄδηλα,¹ constitue également l’une des questions centrales de la pensée d’Épicure. Le fondateur du Jardin ne s’ est pas contenté d’y consacrer des examens ponctuels dans certains livres du traité Sur la nature² ainsi que dans la présentation synthétique que l’on trouve dans la Lettre à Pythoclès. Il fournit également, dans la plupart de ses écrits, des indications méthodologiques précises sur cette question, indications qui sont parfois mêlées à des polémiques plus ou moins explicites. Comme l’indique Épicure dans la Lettre à Hérodote,³ probablement à l’occasion d’une polémique contre les astronomes eudoxiens auxquels il s’est opposé au livre XI du traité Sur la nature,⁴ l’enquête (ἱϲτορία) sur les phénomènes célestes qui n’est pas capable d’identifier quelles sont les natures que l’on observe en ces phénomènes (τίνεϲ φύϲειϲ αἱ θεωρούμεναι κατὰ τὰ μετέωρα) et qui ne connaît pas quelles sont les causes les plus capitales (τίνεϲ αἱ κυριώταται αἰτίαι), ne libère pas des peurs mais au contraire les accroît, y compris chez ceux-là mêmes qui se consacrent à l’étude de ces phénomènes. En revanche, la connaissance exacte des μετέωρα, qui fait partie des tâches propres de la φυϲιολογία, quand elle s’accompagne d’une action authentiquement purificatrice,⁵ élimine les fausses peurs et les soupçons engendrés par

* Je tiens à remercier vivement Élisabeth Roche-Grandpierre pour avoir réalisé la traduction française de ce travail avec compétence et dévouement ainsi que mon ami Michele Corradi pour sa révision attentive et ses suggestions fructueuses. ¹ Epicur. Hdt.  αἰτιολογητέον ὑπέρ τε τῶν μετεώρων καὶ παντὸϲ τοῦ ἀδήλου ; cf. Asmis () , –,  ; Verde (a) . ² Livres XI–XIII : cf. Sedley () –. ³ Epicur. Hdt. –. ⁴ Cf. Sedley (a) – ; Verde (a) –. ⁵ Cf. Epicur. Nat. XI [] .– Arr.² περὶ τῶν [με]|τεώρων τουτωνε[ί τι] | προϲεκκα̣[θ]αροῦμεν ; Pyth.  πάντα μὲν οὖν γίνεται ἀϲείϲτωϲ κατὰ πάντων κατὰ πλεοναχὸν τρόπον ἐκκαθαιρομένων ϲυμφώνωϲ τοῖϲ φαινομένοιϲ.



 

les mythes au sujet des dieux et contribue à réaliser cette imperturbabilité et cette ferme confiance qui sont le vrai τέλοϲ de cette connaissance⁶ et vers lesquelles toutes les sciences sont orientées dans le système d’Épicure. En somme, comme le précise Épicure, l’ ἱϲτορία, même si elle est approfondie, et un type de connaissance purement savante, qui en réalité ne se réduit qu’à l’ignorance, sont insuffisantes à atteindre la béatitude que procure la connaissance des phénomènes célestes (τὸ μακάριον ἐν τῇ περὶ μετεώρων γνώϲει).⁷ En effet, il est nécessaire d’en rechercher les causes (αἰτιολογητέον ὑπέρ τε τῶν μετεώρων)⁸ en conformité avec une méthode scientifique précise qui parviendrait à une exacte connaissance … telle qu’elle est capable de tendre à notre imperturbabilité et à notre béatitude (ἀκρίβειαν … ὅϲη πρὸϲ τὸ ἀτάραχον καὶ μακάριον ἡμῶν ϲυντείνει).⁹ Comme on le sait, Épicure mentionne déjà le πλεοναχὸϲ τρόποϲ ou méthode des explications multiples¹⁰ dans la Lettre à Hérodote,¹¹ pour le préciser et le mettre en application dans la Lettre à Pythoclès.¹² Ces explications multiples correspondent ainsi à la multiplicité des causes possibles de la génération des phénomènes célestes¹³ – ou, selon une analyse récente de Francesca Masi,¹⁴ à la multiplicité des ‘possibilités causales’ –. Selon cette méthode, dans laquelle l’analogie avec le monde phénoménal joue un rôle important, l’accord avec les phénomènes (τοῖϲ φαινομένοιϲ ϲυμφωνία)¹⁵ – soit avec ceux que nous observons près de nous et qui fournissent les signes, ϲημεῖα, et la non-contestation (οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρηϲιϲ) des phénomènes célestes,¹⁶ soit avec la représentation (φάνταϲμα) des phénomènes célestes eux-mêmes¹⁷ – constitue le nécessaire banc d’essai et la condition de possibilité de toutes les explications.¹⁸ Ainsi qu’Épicure le précise, cette méthode définit le genre de recherche (ἴχνευϲιϲ)¹⁹ qui s’ impose pour tous les phénomènes célestes: en effet, si l’on se réfère à la nature divine, qui n’a rien à voir avec ces phénomènes, ou si l’on recourt à la méthode de

⁶ Cf. Epicur. Pyth. . ⁷ Epicur. Hdt. . ⁸ Epicur. Hdt.  ; cf. . ⁹ Epicur. Hdt. . ¹⁰ Cf. Asmis () –; Taub () – et () –, – ; Bénatouïl () ; Bakker () – ; Verde (a) et (b) –; Masi (). ¹¹ Epicur. Hdt. –. ¹² Epicur. Pyth. – et passim. ¹³ Cf. Verde (a)  ; (b) –. ¹⁴ Cf. Masi (). ¹⁵ Epicur. Pyth. –. ¹⁶ Cf. Epicur. Pyth.  et . ¹⁷ Epicur. Pyth. . ¹⁸ Cf. Asmis ()  et  ; Verde (b) . ¹⁹ Epicur. Pyth. .

 ’       



l’explication unique, de la même façon que ceux qui s’adonnent à la vaine astronomie le font de manière absurde et inconséquente (μανικὸν καὶ οὐ καθηκόντωϲ πραττόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν ματαίαν ἀϲτρολογίαν ἐζηλωκότων),²⁰ alors la μετεώρων αἰτιολογία sera également vaine (ματαία).²¹ Mais il est également vrai qu’une application incorrecte du πλεοναχὸϲ τρόποϲ signifie que l’on tombe du même coup en dehors du champ de la science de la nature pour sombrer dans le mythe (ἐκ παντὸϲ ἐκπίπτει φυϲιολογήματοϲ, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον καταρρεῖ).²² C’est pourquoi, au livre XIV du traité Sur la nature, Épicure déclare offrir à quiconque se trouverait entraîné dans de vaines questions de ce type un remède, pour ainsi dire (οἱονὶ φάρμακον), par le moyen duquel les représentations uniques et simples (καταϲτάϲειϲ ἁπλ[ᾶϲ]) dans l’observation de la nature pourraient être libérées du trouble qui leurs est connaturel.²³ L’enseignement d’Épicure semble être pleinement repris par Diogène d’Œnoanda. En effet, dans l’inscription de Diogène, dans divers contextes et surtout dans des perspectives polémiques, on trouve de nombreux passages dans lesquels on a accès à des références plus ou moins explicites aux μετέωρα, dans leur intégralité mais aussi dans leurs aspects singuliers. Le dossier des occurrences trouvées dans l’inscription a été augmenté par les découvertes ou les redécouvertes, accomplies récemment à Œnoanda, dans le cadre du projet du Deutsches Archäologisches Institut d’Istanbul qui a impliqué une équipe internationale et prestigieuse de chercheurs. Nous possédons d’amples commentaires des différents fragments, développés au cours de ces dernières années par Martin Ferguson Smith avec la contribution, plus récente, de Jürgen Hammerstaedt,²⁴ commentaires qui ont d’ailleurs suscité des interventions critiques permettant de clarifier les points de controverse ou de soulever dans certains cas de nouveaux problèmes. Il est donc possible d’engager une étude systématique concernant l’approche de Diogène et sa contribution personnelle à la question des μετέωρα dans l’épicurisme et surtout dans le contexte précis d’un débat qui a vu progressivement les horizons polémiques de l’école s’amplifier. J’entends donc, dans le présent exposé, engager une réflexion en ce sens. Cette réflexion essaiera de retracer, à travers les textes, la polémique de Diogène sur les μετέωρα et de ranger dans un cadre unifié les contextes, les objectifs, les sources, les

²⁰ Epicur. Pyth. . ²¹ Epicur. Pyth. . ²² Epicur. Pyth.  (tr. Morel ). ²³ Epicur. Nat. XIV, col. XXIV Leone ; cf. Leone () –. ²⁴ Cf. Hammerstaedt/Smith ().



 

formes lexicales et stylistiques de cette controverse dans la mesure où celle-ci met en évidence, au même titre que la fidélité réelle au fondateur du Jardin,²⁵ des idées originales, et contribue ainsi à combler des lacunes de nos connaissances actuelles.

.   μετέωροϲ Le terme μετέωροϲ apparaît en tout trois fois dans les fragments qui nous restent de Diogène, dans la Physique et dans les Maximes : deux fois dans la forme substantivée τὰ μετέωρα²⁶ – forme dans laquelle le terme recourt constamment dans les textes d’Épicure –, et une fois comme adjectif.²⁷ Signalons également deux endroits où l’adjectif a été rajouté de manière plausible par les éditeurs.²⁸ Dans un cas, cependant, la proposition d’intégrer τὰ μετέωρα, avancée également avec de bons arguments par Nicola Pace et acceptée par Smith,²⁹ a été par la suite démentie par la découverte d’un nouveau fragment de l’inscription,³⁰ comme cela est arrivé d’autres fois. Chez Diogène, τὰ μετέωρα sont clairement les phénomènes célestes: en somme, on ne note pas cette oscillation dans la signification, qui a poussé les éditeurs et les traducteurs d’Épicure à rendre le terme dans un même fragment, quelques fois par phénomènes célestes, d’autres fois par corps célestes. Ce genre de phénomènes, que Diogène, pareillement à Épicure,³¹ attribue à l’enquête περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων,³² est déjà mentionné dans le fr.  à l’intérieur d’un passage polémique sur l’utilité de la φυϲιολογία qui suit immédiatement l’introduction programmatique à la Physique, dans laquelle Diogène, en suivant Épicure et son propre lexique, déclare avoir voulu mettre en commun les remèdes propices au salut (τὰ τῆϲ ϲωτη|ρίαϲ … [φάρμα]|κα) qu’il a expérimentés lui-même.³³ Après avoir affirmé, dans un article publié en ,³⁴ l’opportunité d’inverser l’ordre traditionnel des fr. –,³⁵ ordre qu’il a lui-même suivi dans l’édition des

²⁵ Martin Smith est convaincu que Diogène devait avoir pour le moins une connaissance de première main des œuvres d’ Épicure : cf. Smith () . ²⁶ Fr.  II – Smith ; NF  II (= Théol. XV) . ²⁷ Fr. . Smith. ²⁸ Fr. .– Smith ; NF  III (= Théol. XVI) . ²⁹ Cf. infra . ³⁰ NF  III (= Théol. III). ³¹ Cf. Epicur. Hdt.  αἰτιολογητέον ὑπέρ τε τῶν μετεώρων καὶ παντὸϲ τοῦ ἀδήλου (cf. supra). ³² Cf. fr.  III – Smith, infra ; NF  III (= Théol. X) –, infra. ³³ Fr.  V -VI  Smith. ³⁴ Smith (b). ³⁵ Contre cette hypothèse cf. Grilli () – (mais cf. les objections de Smith , –) ; Hammerstaedt () – (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , –).

 ’       



fragments de Diogène publiée en ,³⁶ Martin Ferguson Smith, dans le supplément à cette édition,³⁷ a essayé de rétablir un lien entre la colonne I du fragment  et les lignes finales du fragment , en partant du petit nombre de lettres restantes, θη (ligne ). Selon lui, s’y trouverait un éloge de la φυϲιολογία comme étant seule capable d’apporter secours ([βοη]θή|[ματα]). Non seulement cette proposition, apparemment audacieuse, s’accorderait avec la présence répétée du verbe βοηθεῖν et du substantif βοήθημα dans les fragments – précédents,³⁸ mais elle se justifierait en outre à la lumière du texte de la colonne II du même fragment . Dans cette partie du fragment, Diogène polémique contre certains philosophes (τινὲϲ τῶν φιλοϲ[όφων]) et surtout οἱ π[ερὶ Ϲω]|κράτην, qui affirment, contre les épicuriens, qu’il est superflu (περιττόν) et inutile (ἄ̣[χ]ρηϲτο[ν]) de se livrer à l’étude de la nature et de s’affairer autour des phénomènes célestes (τὸ δὲ [φυϲιο]|λογεῖν καὶ τὰ̣ [μετέω]|ρα πολυπραγμ[ονεῖν]).³⁹ Quant à la proposition de Smith, en plus des paragraphes  et  de la Lettre à Hérodote – dans laquelle, en une sorte de Ringkomposition, Épicure réaffirme que la fonction de sa doctrine est d’aider, βοηθεῖν, ceux qui ne peuvent pas examiner avec précision chacun des points de ce que j’ai écrit sur la nature⁴⁰ –, je ne peux que rappeler un passage du livre I du Περὶ Ἐπικούρου,⁴¹ dans lequel c’est Philodème qui présente Épicure lui-même comme un authentique chercheur de la nature, γνήϲιοϲ φυϲιολόγοϲ, qui a su apporter l’enseignement d’une aide réciproque, τὸ | δίδαγμα ϲυμ[βοηθεί]αϲ. En revanche, en ce qui concerne l’objet de la controverse dans la seconde partie du fragment, il faut signaler avant tout l’association, inséparable également dans la pensée d’Épicure, de la recherche des phénomènes célestes avec la science de la nature: Si nous n’étions troublés … par nos inquiétudes relatives aux phénomènes célestes … nous n’aurions nul besoin de la φυϲιολογία ;⁴² c’est ainsi, nous le rappelons, que s’ouvre la Rata sententia . Le même lien que celui qui est établi dans notre fragment entre le τὰ μετέωρα πολυπραγμονεῖν et le φυϲιολογεῖν, et qui n’est pas courant dans la prose grecque, revient, sous une forme particulière, dans la référence à οἱ παρὰ τοῖϲ Ἕλληϲι ϲοφοί, dans un passage attribué à Basile de Césarée.⁴³ Le verbe πολυπραγμονεῖν a certainement aussi une connotation positive dans la référence à la méthode inférentielle correcte concernant l’enquête sur le cosmos, dans le De signis

³⁶ Cf. Smith () –. ³⁷ Smith (a) –. ³⁸ Fr.  III  et V  ; fr.  III –. ³⁹ Tr. P.-M. Morel, dans Delattre-Pigeaud (). ⁴⁰ Tr. Morel (). ⁴¹ Col. XVII Tepedino ; cf. Tepedino Guerra (). ⁴² Tr. Morel (). ⁴³ Ps.( ?)Basil. Comm. in Is.  (PG .D–A).



 

de Philodème.⁴⁴ Dans le fragment de Diogène, toutefois, l’expression τὰ̣ [μετέω]|ρα πολυπραγμ[ονεῖν], placée dans la bouche des adversaires des épicuriens, semble avoir l’acception négative de ‘vaine occupation’ qui se trouve, par exemple, chez Philon d’Alexandrie⁴⁵ ou dans une lettre d’Alciphron le Sophiste,⁴⁶ où ceux qui s’ adonnent vainement au τὰ μετέωρα πολυπραγμονεῖν sont ceux qui rôdent dans l’Académie (οἳ περὶ τὴν Ἀκαδήμ⟨ε⟩ιαν ἀλινδοῦνται), lesquels ne connaissent et ne savent rien faire d’utile pour la vie (βιωφελέϲ). En raison de leur fonction de βοηθεῖν, science de la nature et enquête sur les μετέωρα sont, cependant, tout autre qu’ ‘inutiles’ pour Diogène et c’ était déjà le cas pour Épicure. En effet, dans la Lettre à Pythoclès sur les phénomènes célestes que Pythoclès avait réclamée, Épicure signale la conviction de l’élève, conviction qu’il partage lui-même, que ces arguments … seront utiles (χρήϲιμα ) à beaucoup d’autres.⁴⁷ La même conviction, comme l’a fait remarquer Martin Ferguson Smith,⁴⁸ est également partagée par Diogène, lequel, en prenant probablement comme modèle cette lettre d’Épicure – plusieurs fragments attestent qu’il en avait une bonne connaissance –, voulut inclure dans son immense inscription la Lettre à Antipater sur l’infinité des mondes,⁴⁹ qui avait été composée sur la demande de ce dernier.⁵⁰ Du reste, dans certains fragments que nous examinerons plus précisément, il ressort clairement que la polémique de Diogène sur les μετέωρα s’articule véritablement autour des concepts d’‘utile’ et de ‘nuisible’, bien que dans des contextes différents et selon des buts divers. Eu égard à ses adversaires, Diogène ne cache pas son propre désaccord: je rappelle, par exemple, que, dans le livre XIV du traité Sur la nature,⁵¹ Épicure fait déjà allusion à d’autres soi-disant philosophes, partisans des conceptions fausses sur les phénomènes célestes (ἐπίνοιαι ἐν τοῖϲ μετεώροιϲ), lesquelles doivent probablement remonter aux philosophies présocratiques. À propos de l’identité des adversaires de Diogène qui, cependant, sont, comme il le déclare lui-même explicitement, surtout οἱ

⁴⁴ Col. XXXIII – De Lacy; cf. De Lacy/De Lacy (). Au livre IV de son traité Sur la musique, col. CL – Delattre, Philodème évoque de manière incontestablement positive le caractère πολυπράγμων de Démocrite, en invoquant ses compétences dans le domaine de la φυϲιολογία et son goût pour l’ ἱϲτορία. Voir Delattre/Morel () –: je dois cette suggestion à Pierre-Marie Morel, que je remercie. ⁴⁵ De somn. I .. ⁴⁶ II . ⁴⁷ Epicur. Pyth.  (tr. Morel ). Cf. De Sanctis (). ⁴⁸ Cf. Smith () . ⁴⁹ Fr. –. ⁵⁰ Fr.  II –. ⁵¹ Col. XXX – Leone ; cf. Leone () –.

 ’       



π[ερὶ Ϲω]|κράτην, William⁵² avait pensé aux Cyniques, en référence à leur mépris pour l’étude des phénomènes célestes,⁵³ et aux Cyrénaïques, qui estimaient la physique inutile, ἄχρηϲτον, et – je cite la traduction de Marcello Gigante⁵⁴ – non si dedicavano allo studio della natura per la sua manifesta inintellegibilità, ma coltivavano la logica per la sua utilità (ἀφίϲταντο δὲ καὶ τῶν φυϲικῶν διὰ τὴν ἐμφαινομένην ἀκαταληψίαν· τῶν δὲ λογικῶν διὰ τὴν εὐχρηϲτίαν ἥπτοντο).⁵⁵ Cependant, selon Alberto Grilli,⁵⁶ il est improbable que les Cyrénaïques constituaient l’objet des polémiques de Diogène, excepté là où il est fait allusion à leur prédilection pour le plaisir physique.⁵⁷ À son tour, Smith, dès l’édition de ,⁵⁸ n’excluait pas de la controverse de notre fragment Socrate lui-même, rappelant que ce dernier, après un intérêt juvénile, qui avait probablement fait naître la moquerie d’Aristophane dans les Nuées, avait renié la science de la nature.⁵⁹ Dans le supplément,⁶⁰ également sur la base de certaines études récentes sur la signification précise du lien οἱ περὶ + accusatif, il substitue, à la traduction précédente the Socratics, celle plus convaincante de Socrates and his followers ; nous retrouvons une allusion explicite à la polémique contre les juges infernaux de Socrate et de Platon dans le NF  IV (= Théol. VI) –.⁶¹ La tentative de Smith⁶² d’inclure les stoïciens, les plus grands adversaires de Diogène dans l’inscription, dans la polémique du fr. , sur la base des lettres ]υπρω dans la col. I , dans laquelle il estime pouvoir repérer une allusion à Zénon de Cition à Chypre, [ἐν Κ]ύπρω, me semble, en revanche, moins convaincante. Mais il serait également juste, pour appuyer l’hypothèse du chercheur, de citer peut-être un passage de Marc Aurèle,⁶³ dans lequel l’application à l’étude des phénomènes célestes est présentée comme une occupation vaine. Il me semble que, dans la polémique de Diogène, comme dans l’œuvre de Polystrate Sur le mépris irrationnel des opinions populaires⁶⁴ – où la polémique anti-cynique, qui s’ exprime dans la glorification passionnée de la φυϲιολογία⁶⁵ par

⁵² William () . ⁵³ Diog. Laert. VI . ⁵⁴ Gigante ( [= ⁸]). ⁵⁵ Diog. Laert. II . ⁵⁶ Grilli () . ⁵⁷ Cf. fr.  Smith et Tsouna – dans ce volume. ⁵⁸ Smith () . Cf. Verde  n.  dans ce volume. ⁵⁹ Cf. Plat. Phd. a–d. ⁶⁰ Smith (a) –. ⁶¹ Cf. Morel  dans ce volume. ⁶² Smith (a) –. ⁶³ I .. ⁶⁴ Cf. Indelli (). ⁶⁵ Col. XIV -XVI  Indelli.



 

Polystrate, s’insère dans une approche anti-sceptique plus générale⁶⁶ –, un fond anti-sceptique est manifeste, comme en témoignerait aussi, dans le fr. , la mention d’Aristote comme chef de file des sceptiques.⁶⁷ De fait, si dans l’édition de , Smith avait supposé que deux ou trois colonnes devaient être perdues entre les fragments  et ,⁶⁸ dans le supplément, il en est venu à considérer que ces fragments se suivaient directement.⁶⁹

. .    Dans les fragments  et  qui font partie de la Physique, le terme μετέωροϲ n’apparaît pas. Toutefois les questions traitées appartiennent clairement à la problématique des phénomènes célestes: ceux-ci se rattachent probablement à une section plus large qui devait leur être dédiée.⁷⁰ Le fr.  se lit sur un bloc de pierre retrouvé par Smith en , auquel deux morceaux provenant de l’angle situé en bas à droite et découvert respectivement en  et , ont été réunis en .⁷¹ Le fr. , sur la formation de la grêle, identifié en  et publié en  comme le NF ,⁷² a été placé par Smith après le fr.  car les phénomènes astronomiques qui sont traités dans ce dernier précèdent les phénomènes proprement atmosphériques, comme dans la Lettre à Pythoclès et chez Lucrèce.⁷³ Toutefois, selon ce raisonnement, à la lumière de ce qu’on lit dans le NF , trouvé au moment de l’exploration de ⁷⁴ et appartenant lui-aussi à la Physique, dans lequel, comme nous le verrons plus loin, l’ordre du même développement est inversé, il serait possible d’envisager que l’ordre de succession des fr. – soit également inversé. Je crois que, face à la suggestion selon laquelle il serait opportun de laisser inchangé l’ordre des deux fragments, on peut avancer une autre considération: dans le fr. , à propos de la formation de la grêle, Diogène met en application la méthode des explications multiples, le πλεοναχὸϲ τρόποϲ (cf. l. – εἴτε … [εἴτε]),⁷⁵ qu’il introduit dans le fr.  comme étant un

⁶⁶ Cf. Indelli () – ; Gigante () – ; Gigante () –. ⁶⁷ Cf. Verde – dans ce volume. ⁶⁸ Smith () . ⁶⁹ Smith (a) . ⁷⁰ Smith () . ⁷¹ Smith () . ⁷² Smith () –. ⁷³ Smith () . ⁷⁴ Cf. infra. ⁷⁵ Cf. aussi la séquence καὶ ἄλλωϲ δέ dans le fr. . (cf. infra).

 ’       



préliminaire nécessaire⁷⁶ à l’analyse des phénomènes tels que les levers, les couchers et les éclipses des astres. Diogène passe à cette analyse aussitôt après ce préliminaire, une analyse conduite précisément selon le πλεοναχὸϲ τρόποϲ, en commençant par le soleil (ἐνδέχεται τοιγαρ|οῦν τὸν ἥλιον κτλ.);⁷⁷ malheureusement l’exposé s’ interrompt avec la fin du fragment. Concernant la présentation que Diogène fait de la méthode des explications multiples, qu’il désigne comme la méthode des explications multiples possibles (τοὺϲ | τοῦ δυνατοῦ τρόπουϲ πλεί|οναϲ),⁷⁸ un débat critique s’ est récemment ouvert, qui en souligne certaines particularités par rapport à la description qu’Épicure offre de sa propre méthode dans la Lettre à Pythoclès. Dans la recherche sur ce qui est invisible, Diogène soutient qu’il y a deux attitudes alternatives devant les explications multiples possibles qui se présentent à qui sait les voir (ἂν βλέπῃ):⁷⁹ ou on se prononce dogmatiquement pour l’une d’entre elles (περὶ τοῦδέ τινοϲ | μόνου … καταπο|φαίνεϲθαι)⁸⁰ – et celle-ci est l’attitude téméraire (τολμηρόν) de celui qui peut être comparé à un devin (μάντιϲ)⁸¹ –, ou bien on affirme que toutes les explications sont possibles (πάνταϲ μὲν ἐνδε|χομένουϲ) – et cela correspond à l’attitude exacte du ‘sage’ (ἀ⟨ν⟩δρὸϲ ϲοφοῦ).⁸² Jusqu’ici la résonnance de Diogène avec le texte de la Lettre à Pythoclès est totale, tant sur le plan conceptuel que sur le plan lexical : en effet, ἐνδέχομαι est le terme technique que l’on trouve soit dans les parties de la lettre dans lesquelles Épicure fournit des indications sur la méthode des explications multiples possibles,⁸³ soit dans les incipit qui introduisent les explications possibles des phénomènes singuliers examinés, et dans lesquels le verbe se répète dans les formules peuvent être (ἐνδέχεται γίνεϲθαι), ou peuvent se produire (ἐνδέχεται ϲυν/ἀποτελεῖϲθαι);⁸⁴ et également dans la Lettre à Hérodote τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλωϲ πωϲ ἔχειν est placé sur le même plan que τὸ πλεοναχῶϲ.⁸⁵ En outre, à propos du mouvement même des astres qui constitue aussi l’argument du fragment de Diogène, Épicure accuse de charlatanerie ceux qui ont l’habitude de donner une seule explication (τὸ δὲ ἁπλῶϲ ἀποφαίνεϲθαι);⁸⁶ enfin, l’adjectif τολμηρόν

⁷⁶ Fr.  III : ἐκεῖνο προθέντεϲ. ⁷⁷ Fr.  III –. ⁷⁸ Fr.  III – ; cf. Epicur. Pyth.  : δυνατοῦ τρόπου. ⁷⁹ Fr.  III . ⁸⁰ Fr.  III –. ⁸¹ Fr.  III –. ⁸² Fr.  III –. ⁸³ Cf. Epicur. Pyth. – et . ⁸⁴ Cf. e.g. Epicur. Pyth. , , , , , , . ⁸⁵ Epicur. Hdt. . ⁸⁶ Epicur. Pyth. .



 

rappelle le verbe τολμάω avec lequel, dans le livre II du traité Sur la nature, Épicure caractérise l’attitude téméraire de ses adversaires dans la polémique sur les εἴδωλα.⁸⁷ Mais Diogène ajoute de suite après – et c’est en cela que réside le point critique que j’avais signalé –, qu’il est cependant correct de dire que toutes les explications sont envisageables, mais que celle-ci est plus plausible que celle-là (τὸ μέντοι | λέγειν πάνταϲ μὲν ἐνδε|χομένουϲ, πιθανώτερον | δ’ εἶναι τόνδε τοῦδε ὀρθῶϲ | ἔχει).⁸⁸ Frederik Bakker⁸⁹ a insisté sur ce passage en soutenant que, puisque dans les textes d’Épicure, comme aussi dans ceux de Lucrèce, il n’y a selon lui aucune trace d’un ‘degré de préférence’ parmi les causes possibles des phénomènes célestes, la position de Diogène constituerait comme un écart par rapport à la doctrine du Maître, en faveur de théories astronomiques plus proches de son époque. Plus prudemment, Francesco Verde,⁹⁰ qui a mis en relief également certaines particularités de la position de Lucrèce par rapport à celle d’Épicure dans la Lettre à Pythoclès, a avancé deux interprétations possibles qui sauvegarderaient autant le ‘fondamentalisme’ de Lucrèce que l’orthodoxie avérée de Diogène: ) les positions de Lucrèce et de Diogène seraient le reflet d’une évolution de la doctrine concernant la méthode des explications multiples, évolution déjà présente dans les œuvres d’Épicure faisant suite à la Lettre, par exemple les livres du traité Sur la nature dédiés à l’étude des phénomènes célestes (XI–XIII) – et cette thèse a un précédent dans le commentaire de Graziano Arrighetti à la col.  du livre XI du traité Sur la nature, à propos des explications de la μονή de la terre;⁹¹ ) une telle évolution serait le fruit de polémiques soutenues par les épicuriens postérieurs, peut-être déjà par les représentants du Premier Jardin (Colotès?), en termes anti-sceptiques, pour défendre la méthode qui, dans la formulation de la Lettre à Pythoclès, aurait pu donner prise aux critiques des adversaires. La position critique de Pierre-Marie Morel⁹² est encore différente, en ce qu’elle identifie dans le passage de Diogène, dans lequel l’orthodoxie ne fait aucun doute, un exemple «du pragmatisme et de l’économie de la science épicurienne», ainsi que des finalités éthiques de la méthode des explications multiples, qui en dépasseraient les implications épistémologiques. Il me semble qu’on pourrait trouver un précédent de l’affirmation de Diogène, au moins in nuce, dans la Lettre à Pythoclès, là où Épicure affirme que, sur toutes

⁸⁷ Col. . Leone ; cf. Leone (). ⁸⁸ Fr.  III – (tr. P.-M. Morel, dans Delattre-Pigeaud ). ⁸⁹ Bakker ()  et . ⁹⁰ Verde (a). ⁹¹ Cf. Arrighetti (²) . ⁹² Morel () –.

 ’       



les questions résolues selon la méthode des explications multiples en accord avec les phénomènes, il y a absence totale de trouble quand on laisse subsister comme il convient ce que l’on dit de plausible à propos de ces faits (ὅταν τιϲ τὸ πιθανολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δεόντωϲ καταλίπῃ).⁹³ En effet, s’il est vrai que dans ce passage il n’est pas fait allusion à une hiérarchie des explications plausibles, l’opportunité d’une option, en vue de l’absence de trouble, semble suggérée par Épicure dans un passage de la Lettre à Hérodote,⁹⁴ dans lequel la méthode des explications multiples est introduite au sein d’une controverse avec les experts présumés des phénomènes célestes – passage qui présente par ailleurs une affinité lexicale et syntaxique avec le texte de Diogène –: par conséquent, si nous pensons qu’un phénomène donné peut se vérifier en ce mode déterminé certain (ὡδί πωϲ ἐνδεχόμενον αὐτὸ γίνεϲθαι), en reconnaissant aussi qu’il se vérifie en plusieurs façons (αὐτὸ τὸ ὅτι πλεοναχῶϲ γίνεται γνωρίζοντεϲ), nous serons débarrassés du trouble, comme si nous savons aussi qu’il se vérifie vraiment en ce mode (ὡδί πωϲ). Francesco Verde commente le passage ainsi:⁹⁵ «l’importante è sapere che un dato fenomeno si genera in molti modi … Possiamo optare per un modo, a patto che tale modalità sia comunque compatibile con i molti modi per cui lo stesso fenomeno si genera». Que cette option puisse être envisagée comme plausible et, plus encore, comme ‘hautement plausible’, est peut-être ce qu’Épicure semblerait affirmer, à travers un raisonnement par l’absurde qui se propose de démontrer l’inconsistance des thèses de son adversaire, dans la col.  Arr.² du livre XI du traité Sur la nature, si l’insertion de [πιθανώτε]|ρον que je propose au début de la l.  est acceptable: il aurait été plus plausible de dire que celle-ci (τοῦτο) est la cause (αἴτιον) (de la stabilité de la terre), c’est-à-dire l’équidistance, plutôt que celle-là (ἤ περ αὐτό), à savoir le fait qu’elle est arrêtée au milieu du cosmos … Je rappelle, par ailleurs, que le critère de la ‘plausibilité’ est invoqué également par Épicure dans sa controverse avec la doctrine platonicienne des éléments dans le livre XIV du traité Sur la nature.⁹⁶

⁹³ Epicur. Pyth. . Sur ce passage cf. Corradi (). ⁹⁴ Epicur. Hdt. . ⁹⁵ Verde (a) . ⁹⁶ Col. XXXV – Leone: en effet ils ne pourraient rien dire de plausible … (ο[ὐ]θὲν | γ[ὰ]ρ πιθανὸν ἔχοιεν [ἂ]ν λέ|γειν κτλ.) ; cf. Leone ().



 

Le fr.  commence avec l’illustration de la diversité des mouvements des astres, en particulier des étoiles fixes, soleil, lune et Grande Ourse. Smith⁹⁷ indique les passages d’Épicure⁹⁸ et de Lucrèce⁹⁹ pour les références conceptuelles et lexicales précises, mais on peut remarquer que, à la différence de ces textes, dans lesquels plusieurs causes sont invoquées comme étant possibles pour expliquer l’origine des divers mouvements des astres, Diogène semble introduire le πλεοναχὸϲ τρόποϲ seulement après une digression polémique qui suit l’exposé doctrinal;¹⁰⁰ on ne peut évidemment pas exclure que, dans les colonnes suivantes, la méthode des explications multiples soit appliquée également aux mouvements des astres. La polémique de Diogène est tournée contre οἱ πολλοί, qui ignorent (ἀγνοοῦϲιν)¹⁰¹ que certains astres se meuvent selon une orbite inférieure et d’autres selon une orbite supérieure, et supposent faussement (ὑπο|λαμβάνουϲιν)¹⁰² que le soleil est aussi bas qu’il paraît l’être, alors que ce n’est pas le cas dans la mesure où ce que nous voyons en bas, ce n’est pas le soleil lui-même, mais son apparence (ἀπό|φαϲιν) seulement.¹⁰³ Si, en effet, le soleil était aussi bas, la terre et toutes les choses terrestres auraient nécessairement pris feu (ἐν|πυρίζεϲθαι … ἔδει).¹⁰⁴ La précision de Diogène ramène à une polémique sur la vision à distance que l’école avait développée depuis l’époque d’Épicure. Celui-ci, dans la Lettre à Hérodote, déclare dignes de mépris ceux qui ne reconnaissent ni ce qui existe ou s’engendre par une cause unique, ni ce qui arrive par des causes multiples et négligent de considérer la représentation à distance (τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἀποϲτημάτων φανταϲίαν).¹⁰⁵ Dans la Lettre à Pythoclès,¹⁰⁶ Épicure invoque l’analogie avec les feux qui se trouvent près de nous et que l’on observe à distance (τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν πυρὰ ἐξ ἀποϲτήματοϲ θεωρούμενα) pour

⁹⁷ Smith () . ⁹⁸ Epicur. Pyth. – et –. ⁹⁹ Lucr. V – et –. ¹⁰⁰ D’après la reconstruction de Smith () du fr.  I –, Diogène semblerait ne donner qu’une seule explication de l’origine des divers mouvements des astres, à savoir celle des tourbillons de l’air (cf. Epicur. Pyth. ) : [οἱ δ’ ἀϲτέρεϲ, ἐπειδὴ αἱ ἀέροϲ δεῖ]|ναι φέρουϲι [κείνηϲιν τοι]|αύτην, ἅπα̣ντεϲ δονοῦν|[ται λε]ίαν, κτλ. On peut surmonter cette difficulté évidente en acceptant la reconstruction convaincante de ces lignes proposée par J. Hammerstaedt: [οἱ ἀϲτέρεϲ - - -]|ναι φέρουϲι[ν, οὐδὲ τὴν]| αὐτὴν ἅπα̣ντεϲ δονοῦν|[ται φο]ράν, κτλ. Cf. Hammerstaedt (), – (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , –). ¹⁰¹ Fr.  I –II . ¹⁰² Fr.  II –. ¹⁰³ Fr.  II –. Cf. Roskam  dans ce volume. ¹⁰⁴ Fr.  II –. ¹⁰⁵ Epicur. Hdt. . ¹⁰⁶ Epicur. Pyth.  ; cf. Sedley (a) –.

 ’       



affirmer que la grandeur du soleil et des autres astres relativement à nous est telle qu’elle apparaît. Dans ce même passage, Épicure affirme s’être occupé d’une telle question dans les livres Sur la nature et un scolie du même paragraphe de la Lettre précise que le thème était traité en particulier dans le livre XI. La polémique sur la vision à distance, qu’Épicure avait conduite contre les astronomes eudoxiens à partir de positions anti-sceptiques – comme le démontrent parmi d’autres un extrait de Lucrèce¹⁰⁷ avec lequel le passage de Diogène montre une affinité extraordinaire, en mettant en évidence une source commune probable dans l’œuvre d’Épicure, ainsi que certains passages de la polémique anti-épicurienne de Sextus Empiricus sur la représentation¹⁰⁸ –, avait été reprise par Zénon de Sidon et par Démétrios Lacon, cette fois contre les adversaires stoïciens, respectivement Dionysios de Cyrène et Posidonius, comme Philodème l’atteste dans le De signis¹⁰⁹ et comme en témoigne le livre de Démétrios Sur la grandeur du soleil.¹¹⁰ Les objections stoïciennes, parmi lesquelles la critique significative adressée à Épicure et à ses disciples pour avoir donné à tout prix leur confiance à la représentation visuelle (αὐτὴ ἡ διὰ τῆϲ ὄψεωϲ φανταϲία), avaient été reprises par Cléomède,¹¹¹ un stoïcien probablement contemporain de Diogène.¹¹² Il est possible que Diogène, dans sa polémique contre οἱ πολλοί, reprenne une thèse d’Épicure, qui n’est pas autrement signalée, comme pour répondre indirectement aux arguments stoïciens anti-épicuriens qui pouvaient circuler à cette époque. Il est intéressant de noter que, dans l’extrait en question, non seulement Diogène fait proprement usage des verbes communément utilisés par Épicure dans ses controverses et, en particulier, dans un contexte analogue situé dans la Lettre à Hérodote,¹¹³ pour souligner l’ignorance qui est souvent à l’origine des fausses suppositions sur les phénomènes lointains, mais qu’il se sert aussi d’un genre d’argumentation logique, à savoir un raisonnement par l’absurde formulé à travers une période hypothétique, construite avec ἔδει + infinitif,¹¹⁴ que j’ai pu également retrouver dans le livre II du traité Sur la nature,¹¹⁵ encore une fois dans un contexte à l’évidence polémique.

¹⁰⁷ Lucr. IV –. ¹⁰⁸ Sext. Emp. Math. VII –. ¹⁰⁹ Col. IX –XI  De Lacy. ¹¹⁰ Cf. Romeo (). ¹¹¹ Cleom. Cael. II .–. ¹¹² Cf. Algra (). ¹¹³ Epicur. Hdt. –. ¹¹⁴ Cf. aussi fr.  II – et Roskam  dans ce volume. ¹¹⁵ Col. .– Leone.



 

En outre, Diogène suit dans l’organisation de son discours l’Épicure que nous connaissons à travers le texte du traité Sur la nature, où des éléments de polémique et des indications méthodologiques se combinent avec l’exposition de la doctrine.¹¹⁶ Et c’est à Épicure qu’il a probablement emprunté non seulement le procédé analogique qui est essentiel à l’intérieur du πλεοναχὸϲ τρόποϲ,¹¹⁷ mais aussi l’image du soleil, soutenu par les vents ([ὑπό τε τῶν] | πνευμάτων αἰω[ρούμενον]), dans laquelle est saisie l’analogie avec le τρόποϲ d’une source de laquelle le feu s’écoule, tandis qu’un autre feu afflue en lui depuis ce qui l’entoure (πηγῆϲ … | … , τοῦ μὲν ἀ[πορέοντοϲ] | ἐξ αὐτοῦ πυρό[ϲ, τοῦ δ’ εἰϲ]|ρέοντοϲ ἐκ τοῦ [περιέχον]|τοϲ):¹¹⁸ en effet, la même similitude, avec la même ‘transfusion of terms’ qui se trouve dans les textes d’Épicure – pour reprendre une expression inventée par David West¹¹⁹ – à partir des éléments air/eau, et qui s’applique aussi au feu, est également utilisée chez Lucrèce,¹²⁰ pour lequel il est aisé d’imaginer une source commune.¹²¹ De plus, Diogène met en cause le vent dans le fr. .– parmi les explications possibles de la formation de la grêle (εἴτε πνεύμα̣[τι γεινο]|μένη ψυ[χρῶι]), de la même façon que dans la Lettre à Pythoclès.¹²² De même, dans le fr.  (= NF ) sur l’origine de la foudre et du tremblement de terre – qui fait partie de la section dédiée aux Maximes et qui, comme la plus grande partie d’entre elles, devait avoir une finalité éthique, à savoir mettre fin aux craintes générées par les phénomènes naturels souvent faussement associés aux dieux¹²³ –, le vent joue le rôle important qui lui est attribué, à propos des mêmes phénomènes,¹²⁴ dans la lettre d’Épicure¹²⁵ et dans le livre VI du poème de Lucrèce.¹²⁶ Du reste, comme Graziano Arrighetti et Pierre Boyancé le soulignaient déjà, presque tous les phénomènes décrits dans ces deux textes ont comme dénominateur commun la présence déterminante du vent.¹²⁷ Bourrasques et coups de vents violents (ἀ|μέτρων πνευμάτων | ἐνβολαὶ καὶ καταιγίδεϲ), ainsi que foudre, éclairs, tonnerres et grêle apparaissent aussi dans le NF  de Diogène,¹²⁸ dont nous nous occuperons plus loin, et cela certaine-

¹¹⁶ Cf. Leone (). ¹¹⁷ Cf. Leone (), sp. –. ¹¹⁸ Fr.  IV –. ¹¹⁹ Cf. West (). ¹²⁰ Lucr. V –. ¹²¹ Cf. Leone () . ¹²² Epicur. Pyth. –. ¹²³ Cf. Smith () . ¹²⁴ Cf. Leone (). ¹²⁵ Epicur. Pyth. – et –. ¹²⁶ Lucr. VI – et –. ¹²⁷ Cf. Arrighetti ()  ; Boyancé () . ¹²⁸ NF  II (= Théol. XV) –.

 ’       



ment, comme Martin Ferguson Smith le fait remarquer avec son humour habituel, en vertu d’une tradition épicurienne bien établie, et non pour faire seulement allusion aux conditions climatiques que les habitants d’Œnoanda devaient bien connaître.¹²⁹ Dans l’édition de , Smith complétait exempli gratia les lignes finales du fr. ¹³⁰ en y introduisant la neige, s’appuyant sur ce que l’on peut lire dans le fr.  (= NF ), qui devait lui aussi appartenir aux Maximes, et qu’il avait découvert en  et publié pour la première fois en ,¹³¹ deux années après l’ editio princeps du fr. . Dans ce fragment, la neige intervient dans la formation de la grêle, neige cependant membraneuse (mais membraneuse : ἀλλὰ ὑμε|νώδηϲ, –), et, conformément à la méthode des explications multiples, intervient également aussi (ὁμοίωϲ δὲ καί, ) un vent froid, mais haut dans le ciel (ἀλλὰ | μετέωρον, –). De même, la neige est associée à la grêle dans la Lettre à Pythoclès,¹³² dans laquelle Épicure explique que la première se forme quand certaines particules d’eau se trouvent les unes à côté des autres, la seconde quand ces mêmes particules sont quasiment unies entre elles: par conséquent, il est vraisemblable que la neige soit en quelque sorte introduite à côté du vent dans le fr.  de Diogène,¹³³ pour autant que la solution envisagée par Smith dans l’ editio princeps soit convaincante et cohérente avec le texte de la Lettre, à savoir que, après le vent, l’eau devrait être invoquée.¹³⁴ Cependant il ne me semble pas possible de suivre l’éditeur quand, dans le fr. , il ajoute aussi à côté des substantifs ‘neige’ et ‘vent’ les adjectifs qui, dans le fr. , leur sont liés: ici, en effet, Diogène est en train de décrire une situation particulière, à savoir la formation de la grêle en été (ἐν θέρουϲ ὥρᾳ, fr. .), et c’est seulement alors qu’il y a la neige, mais membraneuse, et que le vent est froid, mais haut dans le ciel. La situation décrite par Diogène, qui rappelle un passage d’Aristote,¹³⁵ semble accréditer l’amendement d’Usener,¹³⁶ ἔαρι – suggéré précisément par le grand philologue allemand par référence au texte d’Aristote – à la leçon des manuscrits BPF, ἀέρι, dans un passage qui se trouve à la fin du paragraphe  de la Lettre à Pythoclès: d’après la proposition d’Usener,

¹²⁹ Hammerstaedt/Smith ()  (= , ). ¹³⁰ La proposition de Smith, «sehr umfangreiche» selon Hammerstaedt ()  (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , ), n’ a pas été retenue dans Smith (a). ¹³¹ Smith () –. ¹³² Epicur. Pyth. . ¹³³ Cf. la proposition convaincante à propos des lignes – du même fragment de Hammerstaedt ()  = Hammerstaedt/Smith () . ¹³⁴ Cf. Smith () . ¹³⁵ Mete. b–a. ¹³⁶ Usener ().



 

approuvée par Bignone,¹³⁷ acceptée par Arrighetti¹³⁸ mais pas par Tiziano Dorandi, le dernier éditeur de Diogène Laërce,¹³⁹ Épicure affirmerait que les particules d’eau, quasiment jointes entre elles, produiraient la grêle, ce qui se produit surtout au printemps (ὃ μάλιϲτα γίνεται ἐν τῷ ἔαρι). S’il en était ainsi, la circonstance particulière décrite par Diogène dans le fr.  trouverait un précédent chez le Maître. Il me semble intéressant de rappeler, toujours dans le fr. .–, le lien οὐκ ἀ̣|[πει]κότωϲ que Martin Smith a ajouté dans l’édition de , suivant en cela la position d’Angelo Casanova,¹⁴⁰ là où il avait écrit, dans l’ editio princeps de , οὐ κα̣[ὶ | εἰ]κότωϲ. La différence est évidemment de taille: l’explication de la formation de la grêle, que Diogène développe et dont on ne trouve aucun précédent chez Épicure, d’après le texte plus récent, serait retenue par Diogène, et non pas rejetée, sur le plan de la ‘non absurdité’ ou, si l’on veut, de la ‘vraisemblance’. Épicure, par exemple, semble conduire la discussion à propos de l’infinité des mondes dans le livre II du traité Sur la nature de la même façon.¹⁴¹ Lucrèce nie la création de cet unique globe et de cet unique ciel en se situant sur le même plan.¹⁴² En revanche, dans le livre XI du traité Sur la nature,¹⁴³ l’adverbe εἰκότωϲ est employé dans un contexte clairement polémique pour démontrer sur la base du critère de la vraisemblance les erreurs dans lesquelles les astronomes tombent quand ils utilisent les ὄργανα dans leurs recherches. Diogène lui-même l’adoptera pour affirmer de manière polémique que ceux qui croient en l’existence d’un démiurge tombent ‘raisonnablement’ dans la suspicion.¹⁴⁴ Que la vraisemblance puisse représenter une sorte de test dans la formulation ou dans la justification des hypothèses sur les phénomènes célestes est confirmé par le NF , d’après le texte mis à jour en ,¹⁴⁵ dans lequel Diogène oppose à la conception stoïcienne de la divinité, définie comme τερατολογία et μῦθοϲ,¹⁴⁶ un discours fondé sur la nature, qui recherche la vérité et qui fait des inférences sur les ἄδηλα à partir des faits vraisemblables (φυϲικὸϲ | λόγοϲ ἐρευνῶν τὴν | ἀλήθειαν καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰ|κότων τὰ ἄδηλα ϲυν|λογιζόμενοϲ).¹⁴⁷ À mon avis, cette affirmation de Diogène

¹³⁷ Bignone (). ¹³⁸ Arrighetti (²). ¹³⁹ Dorandi (). ¹⁴⁰ Casanova (). ¹⁴¹ Col. . Leone [ὥϲπερ] εἰκόϲ. ¹⁴² Lucr. II  nullo iam pacto ueri simile esse putandumst. ¹⁴³ Nat. XI [.]  et [.]  Arr.² ¹⁴⁴ Fr. .. ¹⁴⁵ Cf. infra. ¹⁴⁶ NF  III (= Théol. X) –. ¹⁴⁷ NF  III (= Théol. X) –. Cf. Morel  et Roskam  dans ce volume.

 ’       



éclaire bien la position d’Épicure et la différence nette concernant les εἰκότεϲ λόγοι du Timée sur le cosmos:¹⁴⁸ pour Platon, en effet, ceux-ci représentent le point d’arrivée de la recherche sur le cosmos, lequel est εἰκών d’un modèle, et, en tant qu’il est engendré et soumis au devenir, les discours le concernant ne peuvent qu’être vraisemblables, parce que l’être tient à la vérité comme le devenir à la croyance (πίϲτιϲ). Pour Épicure, en revanche, τὰ εἰκότα sont le point de départ des inférences sur les ἄδηλα autour d’un discours sur la nature qui ‘recherche la vérité’ et qui a comme τέλοϲ, avec l’imperturbabilité, non pas une πίϲτιϲ quelconque, mais une πίϲτιϲ βέβαιοϲ.¹⁴⁹

. ‘ -’ Parmi les fragments de Diogène dans lesquels la polémique sur les μετέωρα se développe, ‘le dernier né’, le NF , découvert en ,¹⁵⁰ est l’unique fragment qui permet de saisir explicitement la finalité éthique de la problématique météorologique dans la pensée d’Épicure, y compris dans le traité de Diogène, grâce au large contexte dans lequel il est intégré et qu’il a été possible de reconstruire, comme un grand puzzle, à travers une série d’heureuses découvertes advenues durant les dernières années. Je n’entre pas ici dans le détail d’une histoire fascinante composée de tentatives de reconstruction textuelle et d’efforts exégétiques, de consensus et de dissensions entre les éditeurs, suivis par des confirmations et des démentis plus ou moins retentissants au fur et à mesure que les fragments étaient retrouvés. Je me contenterai donc d’indiquer la ‘theological Physics-sequence’,¹⁵¹ qui jusqu’à aujourd’hui a restitué  colonnes consécutives de  lignes chacune,¹⁵² provenant de la section dédiée à la Physique, c’est-à-dire: NF  ()¹⁵³ – NF / (;¹⁵⁴ ¹⁵⁵) – fr.  (= NF , )¹⁵⁶ – notre NF  ().¹⁵⁷ À ceux-ci, il faut adjoindre, peut-être loin d’un seul bloc actuellement perdu, le fr.  (= NF , ),¹⁵⁸ et probablement, à une

¹⁴⁸ Plat. Tim. c . Cf. Verde (a)  n. . ¹⁴⁹ Epicur. Pyth. . ¹⁵⁰ Cf. supra . ¹⁵¹ Cf. les contributions de Erler – et Morel – dans ce volume. ¹⁵² Cf. Hammerstaedt/Smith () –. ¹⁵³ Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –). ¹⁵⁴ Smith () –. ¹⁵⁵ Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –). ¹⁵⁶ Smith () –. ¹⁵⁷ Cf. supra . ¹⁵⁸ Smith () –.



 

distance non précisée, le fr.  (= NF , ).¹⁵⁹ Je me limiterai ici à une reprise de quelques points qui me semblent essentiels afin de contextualiser ce qu’on l’on lit dans le NF . Le discours de Diogène semble répondre à une διαβολή que certains adversaires auraient utilisée contre les épicuriens.¹⁶⁰ Certains soutiennent, en effet,¹⁶¹ que la doctrine épicurienne, en libérant les hommes de la peur des dieux, non seulement ne les empêcherait pas d’agir injustement, comme de fait font ceux qui ne craignent pas les dieux, mais au contraire les pousserait à être totalement injustes ; par conséquent, d’après les adversaires, non seulement la doctrine épicurienne est inutile à la vie (μὴ ϲυνφέ|ρειν τῷ βίῳ τὸ δόγμα | τοῦτο),¹⁶² mais ses conséquences plongent en réalité la vie dans un désordre complet (ἐγ δὲ | τούτου ϲυνχυθήϲεϲθαι || τὸν ὅλον [βίον]).¹⁶³ Par conséquent, à partir de ce premier passage, la polémique s’articule autour du concept d’ ‘utile’: je rappelle que déjà dans le fr.  l’accusation à l’égard des épicuriens de la part de certains des philosophes (τινὲϲ τῶν φιλοϲ[όφων]), et surtout des οἱ π[ερὶ Ϲω]|κράτην, se rapportait à l’utilité ou mieux à l’inutilité que ceux-ci attribuaient à la φυϲιολογία et à la recherche sur les phénomènes célestes. Ici, l’identité des adversaires des épicuriens est indiquée premièrement par une rapide allusion à la πρόνοια,¹⁶⁴ avant de se préciser définitivement un peu plus loin: ils disent aussi qu’ils croient en la providence … ;¹⁶⁵ enfin, les stoïciens sont explicitement mentionnés.¹⁶⁶ Dans le rejet des accusations – comme on le voit dans les livres d’Épicure Sur la nature – à travers un raisonnement qui semble au départ admettre la thèse des adversaires,¹⁶⁷ pour aussitôt après démontrer, au moyen d’un raisonnement par l’absurde, son inconsistance par rapport à ce que l’on observe dans la réalité,¹⁶⁸ Diogène distingue trois catégories d’hommes: ceux qui sont de toutes les façons injustes; les gens ordinaires qui agissent avec justice par crainte des lois et des peines qu’elles infligent; et, enfin, ceux qui entreprennent des discours fondés sur la nature (τοὺϲ μὲν | φυϲικῶν ἁ//πτομένου⟨ϲ⟩ λό|γων),¹⁶⁹ à savoir, évidemment, les disciples

¹⁵⁹ Smith () –. ¹⁶⁰ NF  II (= Théol. II) . ¹⁶¹ NF  II (= Théol. II) –: φα|ϲὶ γάρ τινεϲ κτλ. ¹⁶² NF  II (= Théol. II) –. ¹⁶³ NF  II –III  (= Théol. II –III ). ¹⁶⁴ NF  III (= Théol. V) –. ¹⁶⁵ NF  VI (= Théol. VIII) –. ¹⁶⁶ NF  II (= Théol. IX) . ¹⁶⁷ NF  III +  I (= Théol. III) – : [ϲυ]//νκεχωρημέ|νον [εἴη τ]//οῦτο. ¹⁶⁸ NF  III +  I (= Théol. III) –. Sur les stratégies rhétoriques dans les polémiques de Diogène, cf. Roskam dans ce volume. ¹⁶⁹ NF  III +  I (= Théol. III) –.

 ’       



d’Épicure,¹⁷⁰ qui agissent selon la justice parce qu’ils voient correctement la nature des désirs, des souffrances et de la mort:¹⁷¹ comme nous l’avons vu plus haut, ce genre de discours se caractérise en tant que discours basé sur la nature, qui recherche la vérité et qui fait des inférences sur les ἄδηλα à partir des faits vraisemblables (φυϲικὸϲ | λόγοϲ, ἐρευνῶν τὴν | ἀλήθειαν καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰ|κότων τὰ ἄδηλα ϲυν|λογιζόμενοϲ),¹⁷² contrairement à la τερατολογία et au μῦθοϲ des adversaires stoïciens. Il est intéressant de remarquer que, dans une contribution de , Nicola Pace,¹⁷³ en relevant dans ce passage du NF / la présence des souffrances et de la mort comme fonds des peurs qui généralement affligent les hommes et en rappelant les Ratae sententiae –, dans lesquelles ces deux termes sont associés aux phénomènes célestes, proposait brillamment d’y insérer aussi le terme τὰ μετέωρα. En réalité, comme les découvertes successives l’ont démontré, les μετέωρα sont bien présents dans la polémique de Diogène, mais plus loin, dans le NF . Le discours de Diogène sur la justice se conclut, de manière circulaire, avec l’affirmation¹⁷⁴ que la doctrine épicurienne, en tant qu’elle élimine les troubles provenant d’une notion erronée de la divinité, non seulement ⟨elle⟩ n’est pas préjudiciable, mais ⟨elle⟩ est également utile (οὐ μόνον | οὐ βλάπτει, καὶ ὠφελεῖ | δέ); au contraire, celle des adversaires non seulement n’est pas utile mais est nuisible (οὐ | μόνον οὐκ ὠφελεῖ, τοὐναν|τίον δὲ καὶ βλάπτει). En outre, la doctrine épicurienne est à la fois utile (ὠφέλι[μον]), vraie (ἀληθέϲ), et pieuse ([εὐϲεβ]έϲ).¹⁷⁵ Diogène passe ensuite à l’examen des autres thèses des adversaires,¹⁷⁶ selon lesquelles dieu serait le créateur de l’univers et pourvoirait à chaque chose, les hommes y compris, et qu’il aurait, de plus, créé le cosmos et les hommes pour luimême, voulant ainsi avoir une cité et des citoyens. Diogène détruit ces thèses par une série de questions rhétoriques répétées, en faisant apparaître les contradictions par le biais d’un raisonnement par l’absurde, se servant des armes de l’ironie et du ridicule. Il les qualifie de τερατολογία et de μῦθοϲ, et leur oppose la doctrine épicurienne, en particulier le thème de la divinité comprise comme être incorruptible et bienheureux, qui n’a besoin de rien. Pour m’être intéressée à Épicure depuis plusieurs années, et en particulier au traité Sur la nature, dans lequel, encore mieux que dans les lettres transmises par Diogène Laërce, on retrouve toutes les particularités du style de l’auteur, je peux

¹⁷⁰ Cf. Epicur. Hdt. . ¹⁷¹ NF  III +  I –II  (= Théol. III –IV ). ¹⁷² NF  III (= Théol. X) –. ¹⁷³ Pace ()  n. . ¹⁷⁴ NF  IV –V  (= Théol. VI –VII ). ¹⁷⁵ NF  V – VI /  I  (= Théol. VII –VIII ). ¹⁷⁶ NF  VI /  I  – fr.  II  (= Théol. VIII –XIII ).



 

dire que l’on peut pleinement partager les conclusions de Martin Smith.¹⁷⁷ Ce dernier, notant les caractéristiques du style de Diogène dans notre texte, ainsi que les analogies que l’on peut rencontrer dans les arguments polémiques contre la création du monde comme œuvre d’une divinité providentielle chez Lucrèce¹⁷⁸ et chez Cicéron,¹⁷⁹ estime qu’on peut difficilement douter que les argumentations ainsi que la présentation rhétorique qu’en offre Diogène proviennent d’Épicure. Le fr.  se termine sur l’idée que, si l’on souhaite au contraire soutenir que dieu a créé le monde non pour soi mais pour les hommes, cette thèse entraîne encore plus loin (ἀτοπώτερα) que la thèse précédente,¹⁸⁰ qu’on la considère du point de vue de l’univers comme du point de vue des hommes. Dans le premier cas, il faut se demander si toutes les choses dans l’univers sont appropriées aux hommes, en tant qu’elles sont créées par la divinité. Mais à ce moment précis, le fragment s’interrompt. La découverte en , par une bonne Τύχη, du NF  a permis de retrouver les lettres finales de la colonne III du fr. , une colonne entière et la moitié gauche d’une troisième colonne. C’est ici qu’apparaissent les événements propres aux phénomènes célestes ([τ]ὰ | [ἐν] το[ῖ]ϲ μετε[ώ]ροιϲ ϲυν|πτώματα),¹⁸¹ dans une longue séquence et dans un ordre inverse à celui de la Lettre à Pythoclès, mais avec la même terminologie technique. On y trouve peu de points de particuliers : Diogène s’ intéresse peu aux détails de la discussion, comme nous l’avons vu, et cherche plutôt à clarifier le rôle de la divinité dans l’univers. Sont répertoriés, dans l’ordre, la foudre, les éclairs, le tonnerre, la grêle, les vents, les mouvements et les grandeurs des astres, les éclipses du soleil et de la lune et leurs courses ainsi que les différentes longueurs des jours et des nuits. En somme, plus encore qu’à la Lettre à Pythoclès, le répertoire de Diogène et le contexte dans lequel il introduit les μετέωρα reconduisent à un passage de la Lettre à Hérodote,¹⁸² dans lequel Épicure affirme que (je cite la traduction de Pierre-Marie Morel): de plus, en ce qui concerne les phénomènes célestes, il ne faut pas croire que le déplacement, le solstice, l’éclipse, le lever, le coucher des astres et les faits du

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Smith () . ¹⁷⁸ Lucr. V –. ¹⁷⁹ Cic. ND I –. ¹⁸⁰ Fr.  III (= Théol. XIV) . ¹⁸¹ NF  I –II  (= Théol XIV –XV ). La discussion se porte ensuite sur ce qui se passe sur la terre et sur la mer, pour passer aux hommes, peut-être jusqu’à la fin du fr.  inclus. ¹⁸² Epicur. Hdt. .

 ’       



même ordre se produisent, parce que quelqu’un en aurait la charge, en fixerait ou en aurait fixé l’ordonnancement, tout en possédant la béatitude totale jointe à l’incorruptibilité. Ce qu’Épicure avait peut-être appris de Démocrite¹⁸³ et transmis à Lucrèce,¹⁸⁴ à savoir l’idée que les hommes primitifs croyaient à tort que les dieux étaient la cause des phénomènes célestes, qui les terrifiaient, sauvait à présent Diogène dans la polémique contre les stoïciens, et cela d’autant plus qu’un des arguments stoïciens sur la création et sur la providence divine était la beauté et la perfection du monde ainsi que la régularité de la disposition et des mouvements des corps célestes. Lucrèce également, dans le livre V de son poème,¹⁸⁵ nie cette perfection et démontre le contraire avec des arguments dans lesquels Hammerstaedt et Smith ont relevé des analogies et des différences avec le texte de Diogène.¹⁸⁶ Je voudrais également souligner que, conformément au développement de la discussion que nous avons menée jusqu’ici, les phénomènes célestes sont aussi considérés par Diogène en termes d’utilité et de dommage pour la vie (τί κεραυνὸϲ | ὠφελεῖ τὸν βίον … πῶϲ δ’ οὐχὶ καὶ βλάπτει ;).¹⁸⁷ Ils sont répertoriés en ce sens, une fois encore, dans une série de questions rhétoriques réitérées, avec l’anaphore du τί (à quoi servent-ils …?), série qui se termine avec l’affirmation selon laquelle certains phénomènes célestes sont inutiles (μάταια),¹⁸⁸ d’autres aussi nuisibles ([καὶ βλα]|πτικά).¹⁸⁹ En lisant ce passage, j’avoue que j’ai pensé immédiatement aux paroles que le berger adresse à la lune dans le Canto notturno di un pastore errante dell’Asia de Giacomo Leopardi (vv. –): E tu certo comprendi Il perchè delle cose, e vedi il frutto Del mattin, della sera, Del tacito, infinito andar del tempo. Tu sai, tu certo, a qual suo dolce amore Rida la primavera, A chi giovi l’ardore, e che procacci

¹⁸³ Cf.  A  D.-K. ¹⁸⁴ Lucr. V –. ¹⁸⁵ V –. ¹⁸⁶ Cf. Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –). ¹⁸⁷ NF  II (= Théol. XV) –. ¹⁸⁸ NF  III (= Théol. XVI) . ¹⁸⁹ NF  III (= Théol. XVI) –.



 

Il verno co’ suoi ghiacci. Mille cose sai tu, mille discopri, Che son celate al semplice pastore. Spesso quand’io ti miro Star così muta in sul deserto piano, Che, in suo giro lontano, al ciel confina; Ovver con la mia greggia Seguirmi viaggiando a mano a mano; E quando miro in cielo arder le stelle; Dico fra me pensando: A che tante facelle? Che fa l’aria infinita, e quel profondo Infinito seren? che vuol dir questa Solitudine immensa? ed io che sono? Toutefois le berger léopardien ne trouvera pas de réponse à ses questions. C’est, en revanche, dans τὰ τῆϲ ϲωτηρίαϲ φάρμακα rassurants de la doctrine d’Épicure que Diogène avait trouvé ses propres réponses.

, ,  .    -  Diogenes of Oenoanda, fr. – Smith

Francesca Masi*

.  In this article I wish to examine the relation between virtue and pleasure, as presented by Diogenes of Oenoanda in fr.  and . In these fragments Diogenes addresses the question in the context of a polemical engagement with some philosophical rivals. In the first text, in particular, Diogenes attacks those who identify the ultimate goal of life with virtue. By contrast, he upholds the Epicurean doctrine that happiness is the final goal towards which human nature strives, happiness equals pleasure and virtue, while productive of the final goal, does not coincide with it. In the second text, Diogenes opposes those who fail to understand that a productive relation exists between virtue and pleasure that is synchronic rather than consequential. As regards the first of the two fragments, commentators so far have all identified Diogenes’ rivals with the Stoics. As regards the second fragment, radically different interpretations have been advanced as to the identity of the philosopher’s rivals and hence as to which doctrine Diogenes might be opposing and which defending. According to Smith,¹ in this passage Diogenes is carrying on his polemic against the Stoics. In particular, Smith argues that Diogenes is accusing the Stoics of misunderstanding the kind of relation which the Epicureans establish between virtue and pleasure on account of their doctrine of fate, according to which all causes are antecedent. By maintaining that causes precede their effects in time and thus failing to realise that there are actually causes that precede their effects, causes that chronologically coincide with them and causes which follow them, the Stoics miss the fact that with respect to pleasure virtues rank precisely among those causes which chronologically coincide with their effects. When understood in these terms,

* I would like to thank Pierre-Marie Morel, Jürgen Hammerstaedt, Refik Güremen, and the other participants at the conference for their helpful remarks, suggestions and comments. I am especially grateful to Giuliana Leone for her revision of the first draft of this article and to Jürgen Hammerstaedt for his helpful and challenging criticism. Typos, errors and omissions still present in the text are due only to me. ¹ Smith (; ; a).



 

the passage in question may be seen to pursue a twofold aim: to explain the nature of the relation between pleasure and virtue; and hence to better illustrate what pleasure – the final goal for the Epicureans – actually consists in. By arguing that a synchronic causal relation exists between virtue and pleasure, Diogenes may be seeking to defend the Epicurean doctrine according to which virtue and pleasure are intrinsically linked (since life cannot be pleasant unless it is virtuous, and cannot be virtuous unless it is pleasant) – even though virtue and pleasure are not to be conflated (since virtue leads to the ultimate good but does not coincide with it). In doing so, the philosopher would also be showing that pleasure possesses a cognitive and moral character. Sedley, by contrast, offers a completely different reading of fragment . In his view, after having argued against those who identify the final aim with virtue in fr. , in fr.  Diogenes is polemically engaging with those who, while correctly identifying pleasure as the final aim and virtue as what leads to it, misunderstand the causal relation between the two. These philosophers would be none other than the Cyrenaics, who are guilty of having turned virtue into “a mere utility, an antecedent cause of pleasure, not itself intrinsically pleasant but related to pleasure more in the way that surgery or crag-climbing is”.² According to Sedley, then, by following older Epicurean sources, Diogenes in this fragment is expounding his own view of the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure, by contrast to the Cyrenaic one, ultimately showing that Epicurean “instrumentalist doctrine on the inseparability of virtue and pleasure was originally formulated as a correction of the Cyrenaics”.³ The contrasting interpretations offered by Smith and Sedley have also influenced the editorial history of the text, which I will only briefly touch upon. Fragment  was published in  by Smith in his edition Diogenes of Oinoanda. The Epicurean Inscription.⁴ In  Smith discovered a new fragment, NF , which enabled him to fill a lacuna in fr. , namely the final lines of column IV and the opening lines of column V. Smith also offered an improved reading of the third column. This new edition of fr.  was published in issue  of Anatolian Studies in . In , however, Sedley published his article “Diogenes of Oenoanda on Cyrenaic Hedonism” in PCPhS where, based on a different interpretation of the passage, he disputed specific points in Smith’s textual reconstruction of columns I–V, while in turn suggesting alternative readings and integrations of the text. In , Smith

² Sedley () . ³ Sedley () . ⁴ The fragment consists of YF , which was not rediscovered by the Austrian explorers, YF  and YF . I am indebted to J. Hammerstaedt for this specification.

, ,  .    - 



republished columns I –II  and published the text of III –VI  together with NF  in the Supplement to Diogenes of Oinoanda, accepting some of Sedley’s solutions but rejecting others, and ultimately confirming his own interpretation of the text. In  Hammerstaedt provided a new reading of certain sections of fr. , while still subscribing to the view that the Stoics are Diogenes’ opponents.⁵ Then in  Hammerstaedt and Smith published a new fragment in Epigraphica Anatolica. This is NF , in which Diogenes of Oenoanda once again polemically discusses the nature of the final goal and explicitly mentions Zeno, Chrysippus and Cleanthes. To put it briefly, in this passage Diogenes accuses the Stoics of misunderstanding the nature of Epicurean pleasure by identifying it simply with those pleasures that appeal to the masses, without realising that pleasure actually coincides with that ideal virtuous natural condition that they themselves endorse as the final goal. Diogenes therefore seeks to show his rivals that their disagreement with the Epicureans with regard to the nature of the final aim ultimately amounts to a terminological dispute: Diogenes’ opponents ought to acknowledge that what they question in the Epicureans’ doctrine is the name the latter attribute to the natural condition which they themselves regard as the best. On their part, the Epicureans can justify themselves by arguing that ‘pleasure’ is the term that is commonly used to describe this condition: (II) … pleasures, and having deceived … through so many pleasures concerning profligates the [true name(?)] of happiness. If [we partake] of each pleasure …………………………………… they … (III) not those: it is not those, Zeno and Cleanthes and you, Chrysippus, and all who follow the same path as you, it is not those pleasures of the masses that we advocate as being an end, but only these which we have just mentioned are an end. If you share the doctrine that the best and virtuous state of our nature whatever it is, that this is the end in accordance with the (IV) argument that is in harmony with us, but you hate the name of pleasure, why did you not say to us long ago: ‘Your doctrine is true, gentlemen, but you have misused the name of pleasure’? So that we might have replied to you in opposition to this: ‘It is not now that we fashion this argument concerning the previously mentioned condition as a new one, but it is normal language from the beginning (of language) among all Greeks […]’⁶

⁵ Hammerstaedt (). ⁶ Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –), NF  (Hammerstaedt’s translation).



 

The editors of this fragment have assigned it to the same section as fr.  and , on the assumption that it fills part of the gap between the two (a lacuna presumably of  or  columns). The editors have invoked a number of reasons in support of this hypothesis. It is likely that the fragment discussing the nature of the final good originally followed fr. , in which the topic is broached in the context of an analysis of the relation between virtue and pleasure. Moreover, it is most likely that this fragment came before fr. . Fragment  includes part of a quote from Sent. , which begins in a missing column: possibly, if I well understood, one of the column “that followed fr.  VI after two columns”.⁷ This quote from Sent.  may be relevant for the location of the NF: for often a correlation is to be found between the sent. quoted and the matter discussed in a previous fragment; and the topic discussed in Sent. , as well as the terms used, would appear to agree with those of the NF. Finally, the only two legible letters on the lower margin of NF  are compatible with what comes before the quote from Sent.  in fr. .⁸ The discovery of the NF with a mention of Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus would appear to provide conclusive evidence in support of Smith’s interpretation, namely the idea that in fr.  and  Diogenes is polemically engaging with the Stoics on the issue of the relation between virtue and pleasure, and the nature of the Epicurean ultimate goal. Actually, the mention of the three Stoic masters in NF , while probably confirming the presence of the Stoics within the polemical framework outlined by Diogenes, does not justify any reading of the discussion conducted in fr.  and  as a one-sided polemic. As I will endeavour to show, not only fr.  is open to several interpretations, but even fr.  presents certain ambiguities which make the identity of Diogenes’ opponents far from obvious. In the present paper, therefore, I will put forth an interpretation of Diogenes’ polemics which diverges from those provided so far. After examining the content of fr.  and  and elucidating those sections where several readings are possible, I will bring forward the hypothesis that Diogenes might be polemically engaging with different opponents – and that is to say: with rivals he addresses directly and who have sought to turn the doctrine of pleasure into a different, cruder form of pleasure; and rivals whom Diogenes addresses indirectly, and in relation to whom he feels compelled to clarify the Epicurean position.

⁷ Hammerstaedt/Smith ()  (= , ). ⁸ Hammerstaedt/Smith ()  (= , ).

, ,  .    - 



.     Fr.  may be divided into four sections. In the first section, I –, the author enunciates the topic of his discussion. After postponing the treatment of ἀφροσύνη, he claims that he wishes to focus on virtue and pleasure: [τῆς – – – – ταύ]I της οὔσης κακόνου κ[ἀ]-

κείνης. v ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ μ[ὲν] τῆς ἀφροσύνης μετὰ μ̣ ει̣ -̣ κρὸν ἐρῶ, v περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀ ρετῶν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἤδη. [… the latter] being as malicious as the former. I shall discuss folly (ἀφροσύνη) shortly, the virtues and pleasure now (Smith’s translation). According to Smith, the term ἀφροσύνη refers “to the Stoic view that all who have not attained wisdom/virtue […] are foolish/vicious, a view which Diog. mentions in fr.  IV –”.⁹ In any case, the focus of fr.  (Physics) is different from that of fr.  (Ethics). In fr.  V, in the context of an anti-teleological argument, Diogenes shows how the Stoics, while maintaining that man is a rational creature capable of foreseeing the future and leading a blessed life, believe that insanity prevents nearly all human beings from gaining wisdom and virtue. In fr.  Diogenes credits his opponents with a far less pessimistic view of virtue, as the aim which nature strives towards and something that exists and operates for man’s benefit. The use of the term ἀφροσύνη, moreover, is not enough to prove that Diogenes’ polemical target here is already to be identified with the Stoics. For among the philosophers who reckoned insanity an ill of mankind we also find some Cyrenaics, Theodorus of Cyrene, for instance, and his followers.¹⁰ In the second section, I –III , Diogenes then compares different stances: the position of those who, like himself, endorse Epicurean doctrine and that of some philosophical rivals of his outside the Epicurean circle.

⁹ Smith () . ¹⁰ Diog. Laert. II .





II





III



 

εἰ μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων τε καὶ ἡμῶν προβεβλημένον ἐπίσκεψιν εἶχεν “τί τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ποιητικόν”, ἐβούλοντο δ’ οὗτοι τὰς ἀρετὰς λέγειν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἀληθὲς ἐτύνχανεν, οὐδὲν ἄλλ’ ἔδει ποιεῖν ἢ τούτοις [τοῦθ’ ὁ]μ̣ ογνωμονοῦν[τας μ]ὴ̣ ἔχειν πράγμα[τα. ἐπ]εὶ δ’, ὡς λέγω, τὸ πρόβ[λημ]α οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν, τί τ̣[ῆ]ς εὐδαιμονίας ποιητ[ι]κόν, τί δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονε̣ῖν ἐστιν καὶ οὗ κατὰ τὸ̣ [ἔ]σχατον ἡ φύσις ἡμῶ[ν] ὀρ̣ έγετα̣ι,̣ [τ]ὴν μὲν [ἡ]δ̣ονὴν λ̣ [έγ]ω̣ καὶ νῦν̣ κ̣ αὶ ἀεὶ πᾶσιν Ἕλλησι κ[αὶ] βαρβάροις μέγα ἐνβ̣[ο]ῶν τῆς ἀρίστης δια[γ]ω̣ γῆς ὑπάρχειν τέ-̣ λος, τὰς δὲ ἀρετὰς τὰς νῦν ἀκαίρως ὑπὸ τούτων ἐνοχλουμένας (ἀπὸ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ ποιητικοῦ χώρας εἰς τὴν τοῦ τέλους μεταφέρονται) v τέλος μὲν οὐδαμῶς, ποιητικὰς δὲ τοῦ τέλους εἶναι. If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into “what is productive of happiness?” and they wanted to say “the virtues” (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not “what is productive of happiness?”, but “what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?”, I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people

, ,  .    - 



(being transferred from the place of what produces to that of the end), are in no way an end, but productive of the end (Smith’s translation slightly modified). The fact that the dispute here must at least be between the Epicureans on the one hand and some external opponents on the other clearly emerges from the contrast between the pronouns τούτων and ἡμῶν at lines  and  of the first column. However, it may be possible to draw a distinction between at least two addressees of Diogenes’ words: those he addresses directly, using the vocative case (ὦ ἄνδρες at line  of column I), and those he addresses indirectly, using a pronoun. It is certainly plausible – and seems more natural – to identify the former with the readers of the inscriptions. However, for the time being, I will only put forward the hypothesis that these people might also be opponents whom Diogenes is addressing directly and who ought to be distinguished from the second group of philosophers from whom the Epicurean wishes to distance himself. I shall return to this point in greater detail later on. The position which Diogenes attributes to the Epicureans is easy enough to reconstruct and finds confirmation in Epicurus’ writing, as well as in other Epicurean sources. This is the doctrine that the ultimate goal towards which human nature strives is happiness, happiness coincides with pleasure and that virtue is productive of this end.¹¹ Diogenes instead presents his opponents’ position in less accurate and more ambiguous terms. For us, then, it will be a matter of understanding whether this ambiguity depends on a strained portrayal drawn by Diogenes in the context of his polemic, on a tension internal to his opponents’ doctrine, or on some other factor. As one might expect, this is all relevant to the issue of identifying Diogenes’ opponents. Judging from what we read in the fragment, the philosopher’s rivals upheld two apparently conflicting theses. The first is that virtues produce happiness; the second is that virtues are the ultimate goal itself rather than what produces it. This tension might be resolved in two different ways. a. The first thesis might not be a thesis upheld by Diogenes’ opponents at all but rather one the author attributes to them. After all, the thesis is expounded within what is presented as a hypothetical polemical context. Diogenes states that, if the question to be discussed were: “What is productive of happiness?”, and if his opponents answered: “Virtues”, the Epicureans would agree with them. b. It might also be the case, however, that this tension stems from the actual doctrine endorsed by Diogenes’ opponents, who may regard virtue, on the one hand,

¹¹ Epicur. Men. ; Sent. ; Cic. Fin. I ; Diog. Laert. X ; cf. Smith ()  n. ; Mitsis () –.



 

as what leads to happiness and, on the other, as what constitutes the ultimate goal. This latter hypothesis, in turn, opens up a number of possible interpretative scenarios. Those who uphold a view of this sort: b.. might be eudaimonists like the Epicureans and may therefore maintain that the ultimate goal coincides with happiness; b.. alternatively, they may be rejecting eudaimonism and maintain that the ultimate goal does not coincide with happiness at all. The passage is open to both readings. For while it is clear that Diogenes is keen to endorse the Epicurean eudaimonist doctrine according to which the ultimate goal coincides with happiness, all he states with regard to his opponents is that they transfer the virtues “from the place of what produces to that of the end”, without explaining what their stance concerning the identification of the τέλος with happiness might be; b.. finally, Diogenes’ opponents might have initially upheld the idea that virtue is productive of the ultimate goal but have later come to argue that it instead coincides with the goal itself. According to what data is available, then, Diogenes may here be addressing b.. opponents who argue that virtue is both productive and constitutive of happiness; b.. or opponents who identify the ultimate goal of human nature with virtue, but conceive happiness as something separate from such goal, that is as a product of virtue, consequent upon it; b.. or, again, opponents who at different times have upheld the thesis that virtue is conducive towards the good and the thesis that it coincides with the good. b.. Among these possible opponents, the first may be identified as all those philosophers who identify virtue with happiness, and particularly the Stoics,¹² who contend that human nature strives to attain virtue as its own good¹³ and that virtue is at the same time productive and constitutive of εὐδαιμονία.¹⁴ b.. The second sort of opponents may instead be identified with certain Cyrenaics. We know, for instance, that Theodorus of Cyrene, while accepting the common Cyrenaic thesis that the ultimate goal coincides with a particular pleasant expe-

¹² Smith (); Sedley (). ¹³ Diog. Laert. VII  = SVF III . ¹⁴ Diog. Laert. VII .

, ,  .    - 



rience as opposed to happiness, which is given by a sum of pleasant experiences, identified the τέλος with an inner pleasure (χαρά) coinciding with the possession of wisdom.¹⁵ b.. The third sort of opponents might be the Cyrenaics in general, who, depending on what school they adhered to, upheld different views with regard to the relation between virtue and pleasure.¹⁶ In support of the first solution, it is possible to note that Diogenes’ opponents are accused of ‘disturbing’ the virtues. This personification of the virtues might be a tongue-in-cheek reply to Cleanthes’ image of Epicurean pleasure surrounded by the virtues in the form of handmaids.¹⁷ In support of the second and third solution, it is instead possible to note that the opponents are accused of transferring¹⁸ the virtues from their possibly original position as means to that of a goal. This statement might constitute a reference, within the hedonistic tradition, to the work of Theodorus, who in order to establish a closer connection between pleasure and virtue than the one posited by other Cyrenaics, such as Anniceris and his followers, inverted the relation between the two by arguing, for instance, that prudence is the chief good and pleasure (may be bodily pleasure) an intermediate state. The following section too presents a polemical picture that is far from obvious and straightforward. In the third section (III –IV ), Diogenes invites his interlocutors to accept as true what has been argued thus far.

τοῦτο τοίνυν ὅτι ἔστ’ ἀ ληθὲς ἤδη λέγωμεν

ἔνθεν ἀρξάμενοι. vv εἴ τις ἄρα ἐρωτήσαι τινά, καίπερ εὐήθους ὄντος τοῦ ἐρωτήματος, τίς ἐσIV τιν ὃν ὠφελοῦσιν αἱ ἀρ̣[ε]ταὶ αὗται, δῆλον ὅτι φ̣ή̣ σει τὸν ἄνθρωπον. v ο[ὐ] δή γε τῶν παριπταμέ-̣

¹⁵ Diog. Laert. II . ¹⁶ On Cyrenaic Ethics see Annas () –. ¹⁷ Cic. Fin. II  = SVF I . ¹⁸ Diog. fr.  III .



 

 νων τούτων οἰωνῶν, ὅ-

πως πτήσονται καλῶς, ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἑκά[σ]του ποιοῦνται τὴν πρό̣νοιαν, καταλιποῦσαι  τὴν φύσιν ᾗ σύνεισιν καὶ ὑφ’ ἧς γεγέννηντα̣[ι], ἀλλὰ ταύτης ἕνεκα πρ[άτ]τουσι πάντα καί εἰσιν α̣[ἱ ἀ]ρεταί. v ἑκάστην οὖν ε̣[ Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point. Suppose, then, someone were to ask someone, though it is a naïve question, “who is it whom these virtue benefit?” Obviously the answer will be “man”. The virtues certainly do not make provision for these birds flying past, enabling them to fly well, or for each of others animals: they do not desert the nature with which they live and by which they have engendered; rather it is for the sake of this nature that the virtues do everything and exist. Each (virtue?) therefore … I take ἔνθεν ἀρξάμενοι to mean that what has been established as true will serve as the starting point for a subsequent new argument. In particular, after having established that pleasure coincides with happiness and the aim towards which nature strives and that virtue, while productive of the ultimate goal, is not the goal itself, Diogenes may be introducing a new argument with the aim of establishing the nature of the final goal, which is to say the nature of pleasure, in the light of the instrumental function of virtue. Moreover, the term ἀρξάμενοι may be taken to refer not so much to the start of a new topic as to the Epicureans’ establishment (or foundation on a new basis) of eudaimonism – if not hedonism – against a philosophical tradition that, by misunderstanding the relation between virtue and the ultimate goal, fails to grasp the nature of this goal. If this were the case, we would again be faced with two alternatives. The first possibility would be that here Diogenes is referring to those philosophers who have identified the ultimate goal with virtue (the Stoics, for instance, but also Socrates, Plato and possibly Aristotle). In support of this first possibility it is worth noting that in the following lines Diogenes feels compelled to point out that virtue benefits men and not the birds by making them fly well, for example, or any other animal. These words might be read as an ironic shot at the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, which assigned the term ἀρετή also a neutral meaning, as the functional

, ,  .    - 



excellence of a being – be it living or inanimate,¹⁹ rational or irrational.²⁰ This remark and the digression it entails away from the main argument of the passage ought to be explained in different terms instead as a reference to the Stoics. The Stoics envisaged virtue as the outcome of the full development of a distinctly human natural faculty, namely reason.²¹ If Diogenes’ interlocutors in this passage were the Stoics, the aim of this digression might be to identify and emphasise an initial point of agreement between them and the Epicureans with regard to the nature of the ultimate goal. This possibility might find some confirmation in the content of NF . The second solution is based on the far from self-evident assumption that in the previous section Diogenes is referring to the Cyrenaics and particularly those belonging to Theodorus’ circle. Even if this hypothesis were correct, in this third section Diogenes’ aim might well be to describe the Epicureans’ attempt to establish hedonism on a new basis, by contrast to the Cyrenaics’ failure to reconcile hedonism and moral behaviour by turning virtue into the highest good. Diogenes’ following argument may have been meant to establish – once the idea that virtue is a good has been accepted – for whom it constitutes a good; in other words, the purpose of this argument may have been to reframe the question of what the goal towards which human nature strives consists in. The fourth and last section (IV –VII ) is difficult to interpret. At lines – of the sixth column, Diogenes recalls the distinction between natural and unnatural desires.  ἡμεῖν δὲ] ἀ̣π̣[οδει]-

κτέον τίνες τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν φυσικαὶ καὶ τίνες μή· καὶ τὸ σύνολον πάνθ’ ὅσαπερ ἂν εἰς τὸν πρό[We must show] both which of the desires are natural and which are not; and in general all things that are [included] in the [former category are easily attained] (Smith’s translation).

¹⁹ Plat. Resp. I b–d. ²⁰ Aristot. EN .a –. ²¹ Diog. Laert. VII  = SVF III ; Cic. Leg. I  = SVF III  est enim virtus perfecta ratio; Plut. Virt. mor. .C–D = SVF III .



 

Sedley has suggested we connect these lines to the previous ones, in such a way as to reconstruct the whole argument as follows: “virtue exists for the good of human nature, i. e. the natural human good; the natural human good must be whatever our natural desires aim for, but our natural desires aim for pleasure, therefore the natural human good is pleasure, and virtue exists for the sake of pleasure.”²² Sedley further maintains that in this passage Diogenes “has now moved from an anti-Stoic polemic into a positive argument for his own ethical position” and that, within this context, in fr.  the philosopher felt the need to distinguish his own stance from that of the Cyrenaics. In order to understand the function of this final section, it may be useful to recall that on the lower margin of fr.  we find a quote from Sent. . [οὐδεμία ἡδ]ονὴ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν κα̣[κόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ] π̣ οιητικὰ ἐνίω̣ ν ἡδ̣ο̣νῶν πο̣λλ[α]πλ[α]σ̣ ι[̣́ ους ὀχλήσεις ἐπιφέρει τῶν ἡδονῶν]. No pleasure is intrinsically bad; but the] means of achieving some pleasures [involve disturbances] that far, far [outweigh the pleasure]. As Sedley suggests, then, it may well be the case that the distinction between natural and unnatural desires in fr.  is meant to define the nature of pleasure, which constitutes the goal of life for the Epicureans. However, we cannot rule out that this classification of desires still falls within the framework of a polemical engagement and that this framework may once again be interpreted in two different ways: either in anti-Cyrenaic terms or in anti-Stoic terms. For the classification of desires here may serve either to define the nature of Epicurean pleasure against those who believe that all pleasures are to be pursued or to define the nature of Epicurean pleasure against those who believe that the Epicureans pursue just any kind of pleasure.²³ If the classification in question is envisaged in anti-Cyrenaic terms, however, we must conclude that Diogenes extended his polemic to include other Cyrenaics apart from Theodorus and his followers, given that the latter apparently favoured intellectual pleasures over bodily ones.²⁴ In other words, we would be forced to conclude that, after having argued against those who have sought to reconcile virtue and pleasure by identifying virtue as the ultimate good, and after having established what relation exists between virtue and pleasure and having elucidated the nature of the telos, Diogenes is now setting out to distinguish the Epicurean position from

²² Sedley () . ²³ NF : Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –). ²⁴ Annas () .

, ,  .    - 



an other form of hedonism, such as – for instance – the hedonism of those who maintain that all pleasures are worth pursuing and who acknowledge that virtue and pleasure often go hand in hand, yet misinterpret the instrumental relation between the two.

.          Let us now move on to consider fr. . It may be divided into two sections. I will briefly sum up the content of the first section and then focus on the second. It is difficult to reconstruct the argument of the first section (I–V ) because of the poor state of conservation of the inscription. This first section may further be divided into three sub-sections. The first subsection (which, apart from the illegible opening lines in the first column, runs from I  to II ) has been given two different reconstructions by Smith and Sedley. According to the textual reconstruction provided by Smith, Diogenes is here carrying on the discussion of the relation between virtue and pleasure that he began in the previous fragment through a polemical engagement with the Stoics. In particular, Diogenes would be drawing a contrast here between the Epicurean view, according to which a life of complete pleasure is always inseparable from virtue, to that of his opponents, who deny that they experience any pleasure or – at most – admit that what they experience is freedom from pain. The passage according to Smith’s reconstruction²⁵ would be the following: [– – – τὸ ζ]ῆν δ̣ι[̣ ὰ] πα̣ν̣τὸ̣ ς ἡ [δέως τῶν] π̣ ασῶν ἀρ̣ετῶν [αἰεὶ ἐστ]ὶν ἀχ̣ώριστον, οὔ [φασί τ]ὴ̣ν ἡδονὴν εὑρισ[κειν, μό]ν̣ον δ’ ὁμολογοῦσί [γε σοφισ]τ̣αὶ οὗτοι πολλάII [κι]ς οὐκ̣ ἀ̣πο̣Ι[̣ – – – ] [Whereas we say that] the life of complete (?) [or ‘continual’] pleasure is always inseparable from the whole body of virtues, they deny that they find pleasure, and these sophists only admit that often … not …

²⁵ Smith (a) .



 

According to Smith, the text, when reconstructed in these terms, could hardly refer to the Cyrenaics, who – like the Epicureans – regard the experiencing of pleasure as the ultimate goal. According to Sedley’s reconstruction,²⁶ by contrast, in this passage Diogenes is referring to opponents who agree with the Epicureans with regard to the fact that pleasure often goes hand in hand with virtue:  – – – – – – π̣ ασῶν ἀρ̣ετῶν

– – – – – ἀ̣χ̣ώριστον οὖ[σαν τ]ὴ̣ν ἡδονήν, εὑρισ[κομέ]ν̣ον δ’ ὁμολογοῦσι [τυχεῖν] κ̣ αὶ οὗτοι πολλάII [κι]ς οὐκ̣ ἀ̣πο̣Ι[̣ – – – ] Even these people [sc. the Cyrenaics or legislators, politicians or educators to whose attitude Diogenes is linking that of the Cyrenaics] agree as a matter of fact it is found that often they [sc. virtue and pleasure] are not ⟨far separated⟩. These philosophers could hardly be identified with the Stoics, who do not believe that there is any relation between virtue and pleasure; rather, they might be the Cyrenaics. The second subsection (II –III ) is largely illegible. Here I only wish to note a couple of things. Smith reconstructs the name of Zeno at line  of the second column: [καὶ ὁ Ζ]ή̣ν̣ω̣ν̣ α̣ὐ̣τὸς ̣ [τ]ὴ̣ν̣ [δ]ό̣ξα̣ ̣ν̣ [εἰσ]η̣ [γεῖ]τ̣αι If this reading were correct, it would certainly provide an element in support of Smith’s interpretation. However, it is extremely uncertain. From line  down, moreover, what we can read according to Smith’s reconstruction is:

ὥσ περ ε̣ἰ λ̣ εγ ̣́ ε̣[ι] ἀ̣ρ[ε]τ̣ὴν ἡδο-

νὴν εἵς, τοὺ̣ς δὲ ἀν̣θρώπους ἐπ’ αὐτὰς τρέχ̣ειν.

²⁶ Sedley ()  with n. .

, ,  .    - 



καὶ πά̣λιν ἀλλαχοῦ ταύτης ἐπιλαθόμενοι τῆς III π̣ ε[̣ ί]ν̣ης (οὐ [γ]ὰρ ε̣[ἶ]π̣ ον̣ [ὅτι] just as if he means virtue when he has said ‘pleasure’ and that men run to them. And again elsewhere having forgotten this hunger [for they did] not say that … (Smith’s translation). Diogenes here may be referring to an individual who, by calling ‘pleasure’ virtue, aims to drag men towards the virtues. This individual might be Zeno, who never referred to virtue as ‘pleasure’, if we assume that it is Diogenes himself who reduces Zeno’s virtue to pleasure and accuses him of calling it ‘pleasure’ simply with the aim of pushing men to adopt a moral behaviour. This reading may find confirmation in NF . As already mentioned in the Introduction, Smith’s solution is favoured by Hammerstaedt, who nonetheless provides a very different reconstruction and translation (fr.  II –III ): v

ὡϲ

 πέρϲια̣ εἰϲ̣̣ ἀρ[ε]τ̣ὴν ἡδο-

νὴν εἵϲ, τοὺ̣ϲ δὲ ἀν̣θρώπουϲ ἐπ’ αὐτὰϲ τρέχ̣ειν. καὶ πά̣λιν ἀλλαχοῦ ταύτηϲ ἐπιλαθόμενοι τῆϲ III ἡ̣ δ̣[ο]ν̣ῆϲ κτλ. … nachdem er wie Perseion-Früchte Lust in Tugend eingelassen hat, und die Menschen zu ihnen rennen würden. Und indem sie an anderer Stelle wiederum diese Lust vergessen …²⁷ First of all, Hammerstaedt offers a different reading and integration of the opening of line . In his view, the first three letters are compatible with the name of Persian fruits, πέρϲια̣, also known to other philosophers such as Theophrastus,²⁸ Diodorus²⁹ and Strabo³⁰ for their remarkable sweetness. According to Hammerstaedt, moreover, there is not enough space to integrate the letter iota in λ̣ εγ̣́ ε̣[ι]. The scholar also

²⁷ Hammerstaedt () – (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , –). ²⁸ Thphr. HP IV .. ²⁹ Diod. I .. ³⁰ Str. XVII . ( C.).



 

assigns a different meaning to εἵς, arguing that it might mean ‘having inserted’ rather than ‘having said’. According to this reading, in lines – of the second column, Diogenes would be referring to someone – the Stoic Zeno, in Hammerstaedt’s view – who uses pleasure as a bait to drag men towards virtue, as one might use sweet fruits. Finally, at the beginning of the third column Hammerstaedt expunges the reference to hunger, which in his view finds no place here, and restores ἡ̣ δ̣[ο]ν̣ῆϲ in place of π̣ ε[̣ ί]ν̣ης. According to this reading, Diogenes’ criticism extends to the limited use made by his opponent of the notion of pleasure. It seems to me, however, that both Smith’s textual reconstruction and that of Hammerstaedt are compatible with a different interpretation. If we assume that Diogenes is not misinterpreting his opponent’s position for polemical purposes but is rather referring to someone who actually exploits pleasure to lead people towards virtue, the reference might also be to Theodorus of Cyrene, the only philosopher who – as already noted – identified a form of pleasure (inner joy) with virtue (wisdom). Of the two reconstructions, that of Hammerstaedt – his intentions notwithstanding – more easily lends itself to an interpretation of Diogenes’ polemic from a Cyrenaic perspective. Whereas in Smith’s reading ὥσπερ ε̣ἰ leaves open the possibility that Diogenes may be consciously reducing his opponent’s position to a form of hedonism, in Hammerstaedt’s solution the reference would appear to concern someone who truly uses pleasure as a bait to drag men towards virtue. It would be difficult to identify this person as the Stoic Zeno, however, unless we are to assume that Diogenes is tacitly offering a distorted and misleading picture of his opponent.³¹

³¹ In support of this solution, it may be possible to adduce two passages from Diogenes Laertius that are extensively discussed by Gourinat – in the present volume. In the first passage (VII –), the author presents the Stoic criticism of the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure, arguing that the primary impulse of human beings is not towards pleasure but towards self-preservation, since pleasure – if it exists (εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν) – is an epiphenomenon (ἐπιγέννημα) which supervenes upon this state. For if we consider the fact that according to the Stoics a human being fulfils his nature by fully developing his rationality, and that he develops this rationality by acquiring virtue, it is reasonable to assume that, according to this line of reasoning, pleasure is an affection which supervenes upon virtue. In the second passage (VII ), Diogenes Laertius argues that the goods which supervene upon virtue are joy, cheerfulness and other similar feelings. In the light of these passages, then, it may be plausible to assume that Diogenes is accusing his opponents of using pleasure as a means to encourage men and direct their desire towards virtue. If this were so, however, we would also be forced to acknowledge that Diogenes is stretching his interpretation in two respects. First of all, in the first passage he is exploiting a simple concession which the Stoics have made to their opponents in order to attribute a hedonist doctrine to them. After all, the idea that pleasure supervenes upon the state of conservation is only assumed as a hypothesis. Secondly, in the second passage, Diogenes equates pleasure with joy or cheerfulness, when

, ,  .    - 



If we assume that Smith’s reconstruction is correct, the reference to someone forgetting his hunger might be an allusion to either the Stoics or Theodorus’ followers. Diogenes may be reproaching the Stoics for failing to take bodily needs into account. By contrast to Theodorus, who – distancing himself from the other Cyrenaics – regarded bodily pleasure as an intermediate state, Diogenes may be wishing to stress the importance of fulfilling bodily needs as a precondition for pleasure.³² Likewise, in Hammerstaedt’s reconstruction those who overlook pleasure may be identified either with Zeno’s followers – who, according to Diogenes’ representation, only pursue the kind of pleasure which promotes the attainment of virtue, neglecting other forms of pleasure – or with the followers of Theodorus of Cyrene – who, by identifying pleasure with inner joy and this joy with wisdom, neglect the bodily dimension of pleasure. Smith and Sedley also provide two different versions of the third subsection (III – V ). Its column IV proves to be very obscure. According to Smith’s reconstruction,³³ Diogenes is here addressing individuals who are casting a kind of bait through which to drag men, like birds or fish, towards the virtues.  ὥ̣ στ̣ε̣ αὐτὴν Ϲβ̣| |ρον οὐ-

δ̣ὲν κυνΛϹΟαι . v | | τωμ. κ̣ Λκ̣ οογϹ κ̣ α̣ν̣ [δ]ύ̣ναται, ὡς οὗτοι κ̣ [αθ]ίενται π̣ [ᾶ]σιν α̣ὐ̣τὴν τοῖς ἀνθρώ ποις δ̣ελ̣ ̣ έατος τρό̣πον,

such a view is not really held by his opponents at all. Of course, it cannot be ruled out that Diogenes is providing a misleading and incorrect interpretation of his opponents’ doctrine, but this would certainly limit the effectiveness of his argument. Another reason why I am reluctant to treat these passages as evidence of the fact that the opponents of Diogenes of Oenoanda are to be identified with the Stoics is that, while in the passages from Diogenes Laertius pleasure emerges as something which supervenes upon virtuous behaviour, in the inscription – according to Hammerstaedt’s reconstruction – pleasure is rather described as a bait, i.e. as a means to promote virtuous behaviour and not as a state produced by virtuous behaviour. ³² Cf. Cic. Tusc. Disp. III  = Us.  = Long/Sedley  L: For my part I cannot conceive of anything as the good if I remove the pleasures perceived by means of taste and sex and listening to music, and the pleasant motions felt by the eyes trough beautiful sights, or any other pleasures which some sensation generates in a man as a whole. Certainly it is impossible to say that mental delight is the only good. For a delighted mind, as I understand it, consists in the expectation of all things I just mentioned – to be of a nature able to acquire them without pain. – On this cf. Verde (b) . ³³ Smith (a) –.



IV





V

 

κ̣ α̣θ̣άπερ ὄρνειθας αὐτοὺς ἢ ἰχθύ̣α̣ς δὲ̣ σύρειν ἀπο̣κ̣ εχη̣ νότας εἰς τὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν ὀνόματα, ποτὲ ]δ̣ύεται τὴν (NF ) ] ἑαυτῆς ]οια σκια[γραφ - - - -] οὐκ αἰσχυ[νεσθε δ’, ὦ ταλ]αίπωροι [ἑαυτοῖς τε καὶ] ἀλλήλοις [ἐναντιολογο]ῦντες· καὶ [γὰρ χρώμενοι] χ̣αριεντισ[μῷ παιδικῷ τὴ]ν ἡδονὴν [ἀπαρνεῖσθε], ὁμολογοῦν[τες γε ἡμεῖν ἐ]πιδεξίως [περὶ αἰσθήσεω]ς, ἵνα μὴ [ἀσφαλῶς παρ]ο̣δεύειν [τόπον κωλυθῆ̣ τε κρημν[οβ]α̣τεῖν ὑπομένον̣τε̣ ς. … is able, as these people lay it (αὐτήν) down, like a bait, for all human beings, to draw them, like birds or fish, open-mouthed to the names of the virtues, and sometimes … itself … [illusions(?). And you are] not ashamed, [you] wretched people, [of contradicting ([ἐναντιολογο]ῦντες) both yourselves and] one another: [for indeed, employing puerile] wit, [you reject (ἀπαρνεῖσθε)] pleasure, while cleverly agreeing [with us about sensation], so that you are not [prevented from] passing through [an area in safety] when you venture to limb crags (Smith’s translation).

Smith³⁴ believes that what Diogenes has in mind here is once again the Stoics and that the pronoun αὐτήν refers to something such as οἰκείωσις or φιλαυτία, noting – quite rightly – that pleasure cannot be the bait used by the philosopher’s opponents, who rejected hedonism, to drag men towards the virtues. In support of the idea that Diogenes may again be referring to the Stoics, Smith quotes a subsequent section of the fragment (V –) and invokes a passage from Cicero’s De finibus.³⁵ The editor

³⁴ Smith () . ³⁵ Cic. Fin. I .

, ,  .    - 



however further observes that the idea of using pleasure as a bait is also attested elsewhere.³⁶ If αὐτήν referred to pleasure, however, Diogenes’ polemic could acquire a completely different meaning, since we would have to assume that the philosopher is here criticising someone who uses pleasure to lead men to adopt virtuous behaviours or attitudes. This is precisely the perspective favoured by Sedley, who suggests Diogenes’ interlocutors be identified as certain Cyrenaics.³⁷ The disagreement extends to the following lines, in column IV, where Diogenes carried on his attack. According to Smith’s reconstruction, Diogenes is accusing the Stoics of being inconsistent and of contradicting one another. The reason for this is that, on the one hand, like the Epicureans, the Stoics establish sense perceptions as the basis of knowledge;³⁸ but, on the other hand, fail to adequately draw upon sense perceptions to ascertain the nature of the ultimate goal. The Stoics reject pleasure even though the senses attest to the fact that it coincides with the ultimate goal.³⁹ In other words, theirs is a performative inconsistency. The Stoics instead contradict one another insofar as one Stoic might accept the senses as the basis of knowledge, which ought to lead him to acknowledge pleasure as the ultimate goal, while another might reject pleasure and hence not lend sensory evidence the weight that it deserves. Indeed, the Stoics contradict one another because, although they all rely on the senses, they have different attitudes to pleasure.⁴⁰ Diogenes would nonetheless be willing to grant that, by rejecting pleasure but relying on the senses, his opponents will still be able to attain salvation, if only with much effort – as though through some tiring crag-climbing.⁴¹ Sedley disputes Smith’s interpretation (which according to him is based on mere conjectures – esp. as regards the terms σκια[γραφ ---], [ἐναντιολογο]ῦντες and [ἀπαρνεῖσθε]). In his view, Diogenes is here targeting the Cyrenaics, who are guilty of treating the discomfort or pain that might derive from virtuous behaviour as

³⁶ E.g. M. Aur. II . ³⁷ Ἡδονή as the word of reference for αὐτήν is exactly what Hammerstaedt proposes in ,  = Hammerstaedt/Smith () . Unlike Sedley, however, Hammerstaedt maintains that Diogenes’ opponent may be identified as a Stoic, guilty of using pleasure as a means to lead men on the path of virtue. Concerning the problems with this solution, see n. . ³⁸ Cic. Ac. I – = SVF I . ³⁹ Cic. Fin. I –; Diog. Laert. X . ⁴⁰ In support of this hypothesis, Smith refers to Cic. Fin. III  and Sext. Emp. Math. XI . ⁴¹ According to Smith () , a parallel for this image of crag-climbing may be found in Lucr. IV –: For not only would all reasoning come to ruin, but life itself would at once collapse, unless you make bold to believe the senses, avoiding precipices and all else that that must be eschewed of that sort, and following what is contrary.



 

something to be endured for the sake of a pleasure to come – like some cragclimbing to be undertaken to satisfy some need.⁴² In this case, one might object that Sedley’s interpretation is not based on an alternative textual interpretation compared to Smith’s – something which makes his suggestion somewhat less compelling. On the other hand, it also seems important to note the transition from the third to the second person plural, which leaves open the possibility that the polemical target of lines – of col. III is a different one from that of the following lines in col. IV. I will be returning to this point later on. For the time being, it is worth completing our analysis of the passage, in order to focus on the second and better preserved section of the fragment, which constitutes the real crux of the dispute between Smith and Sedley. The second section runs from V  to VIII . It may be divided into three subsections, which I will briefly outline.⁴³ In the first subsection (V –VI ) Diogenes claims that he therefore (τοίνυν) wishes expose a fallacy, which, along with another, namely the φίλαυτον πάθος, is what makes their doctrine ἀμαθές. This fallacy consists in maintaining that in the context of πράγματα all productive things precede in time the things which are accomplished. For although most productive things chronologically precede their effects, some coincide with their effect and others still follow them:

βούλομαι τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κατέχοντ̣α ὑμᾶς μετὰ  τοῦ φ[ι]λαύτου πάθους παρα[θ]εῖναι⁴⁴ πλάνον, ὃς μ[ά]λ̣ ιστα προσεν-

⁴² According to Sedley () , a better parallel for the image of crag-climbing is to be found in Sext. Emp. Math. XI : Thus, just as those creatures which climb crags in order to get a drink are driven to pleasure trough painful means, and as soon as they have satisfied their desire cease from their former pains, so too man in his pursuit of the good necessarily suffers, but on achieving the object of his desire he is also released from his suffering. ⁴³ Voula Tsouna also discusses them in her contribute to the present volume (see below –). ⁴⁴ I here accept the suggestion made by Hammerstaedt ()  (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , ), in place of παρα[κλ]εῖναι, proposed by Smith (a). According to Hammerstaedt, the space between the α and εῖναι is too small to justify the integration of κλ. Hammerstaedt’s integration also fits well with what Diogenes does in the following lines, namely illustrate the kind of fallacy into which his opponents slipped.

, ,  .    - 



φυσ[ᾷ τὸ] δόγμα ὑμῶν, ὡς ἀ[μαθ]ές.⁴⁵ ἔστιν δὲ οὗ τος· [οὐ] πάντα τὰ ἐν τοῖς [πρά]γμασι ποιητικὰ πρ[ωτ]ο̣χρονεῖ τῶν ποιουμ[έ]ν̣ων, εἰ καὶ τὰ πλείσ[θα] πέπονθε τοῦτο, ἀλVI λ’ αὐτῶν τὰ μ[ὲν πρω]τοχρονεῖ, τὰ δὲ [συν]χρ̣ο̣νεῖ, v τὰ δὲ μετα[χρο]νεῖ. Well now, I want to expose also the error that, along with the feeling of self-love, has you in its grip – an error that, more than any other, further inflates your doctrine as ignorant. The error is this: [not] all causes in things precede their effects, even if the majority do, but some of them precede their effects, others [coincide with] them, and others follow them (Smith’s translation).⁴⁶ In the second subsection (VI –VIII ), Diogenes offers some examples of things productive of pleasure which chronologically precede their effects (an incision and surgery), coincide with them (solid and liquid nutrition and sexual intercourse) or follow them (the hope of acquiring honour and fame after one’s death):⁴⁷

καὶ πρωτ̣οχρον̣[εῖ] μ̣ ὲν̣  ὥσπερ φέρει ἡ [κ]α̣ῦσις

καὶ ἡ τομὴ τὸ σ[ῴζ]ε̣ι[ν].

⁴⁵ Here I instead follow Smith’s reading in place of the ἀ[λη]θ̣έϲ suggested by Hammerstaedt ()  (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , ). As will become clearer later on, however, I assign the adjective ἀ[μαθ]ές a different meaning from Smith. According to Smith, the Stoics’ doctrine is ἀ[μαθ]ές on account of two theories that Diogenes deems unacceptable: that of οἰκείωσις and that of fate. By contrast, according to the interpretation which I will be expounding, the Stoics’ doctrine is ἀ[μαθ]ές because these philosophers have not realised that their doctrine of οἰκείωσις may be seen to coincide with the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure and because they have failed to grasp the relation which the Epicureans establish between virtue and pleasure, conflating their theory with that of the Cyrenaics. Hammerstaedt’s nonetheless interesting suggestion is to stress the significance of the verb προσενφυσ[ᾷ] and attribute to the Stoics the presumption of passing their doctrine off as true on the basis of two fallacies. Hammerstaedt himself, however, is not sure of this solution. ⁴⁶ See also Gourinat  and Roskam  n.  in this volume. ⁴⁷ Smith ().





VII





VIII



 

δεῖ γὰρ ἐνταῦθ̣[α τὸ τῆς] ἀλγηδόνο̣ς ̣ [ἄκρον] φ̣ε-̣́ ρ̣εσθαι [καὶ μετὰ τ]α̣ῦ̣τ̣α τὴν ἡ̣ [δονὴν] ὑ̣πακολουθ̣ε[̣ ῖν. συν]χ̣ρο̣ νεῖ δὲ ὥσπερ [στερ]ε̣ὰ̣ καὶ ὑγρὰ τρο[φεῖα, π]ρὸς δὲ τούτοι ̣ς καὶ̣ [τὰ ἀ]φ̣ρο̣ ̣[δεί]σ̣ ι ̣α̣. v οὐ̣ γ[ὰ]ρ̣ ἐσθίο[μεν σεῖ]τον̣ κα̣ὶ τόθ’ ἡδόμ̣ εθ̣ ̣α̣, οὐδὲ πείνομεν [οἶνο]ν κ̣ αὶ τόθ’ ἡδόμε[θ]α, ο̣[ὐ]δ̣ὲ σ[πε]ρμ̣ αίνομεν̣ [τὸ]ν γόνον καὶ τόθ’ ἡδό[με]θ̣α̣, ἀλλὰ μ̣ ὴν̣ πά̣ρα̣ ̣υ̣[τ]α ἡ πρ̣ᾶ̣[ξ]ι ̣ς ̣ [ἀ]ν[ύ]τε̣ι ταύ[τας τὰς] ἡ̣ δ̣ο̣ν̣α̣ς̀ ̣ ἡμε̣ιν̣̣͂ , [οὐ] τ̣ὸ̣ ἐσ̣ όμ[ε]νο̣ν̣ μέ-̣ [νουσα. μεταχρον]εῖ δ̣[ὲ] [ὥσ]π̣ ερ̣ ̣ [τὸ προσδοκᾶν] [μ]ε̣τὰ̣ τὴν κ̣ α̣τα̣στρο[φὴν αἱρήσειν ἔ]π̣ α̣ιν̣ον̣. καίπερ γὰρ ἡδομένων ἤδη τῶν ἀνθρώπων διότι ἔσται τις αὐτῶν μετ’ αὐτοὺς ἐπ’ ἀγαθῷ μνήμη, ὅμως τὸ ποιητικὸν τῆς ἡδονῆς αὖθις γείνεται. Examples of causes that precede are cautery and surgery saving life: in these cases extreme pain must be borne, and it is after this that pleasure quickly follows. Examples of coincident causes are [solid] and liquid nourishment and, in addition to these, [sexual acts]: we do not eat [food] and experience pleasure afterwards, nor do we drink [wine] and experience pleasure afterwards; nor do we emit semen and experience pleasure afterwards; rather the action brings about these pleasures for us immediately, [without awaiting] the future. [As for causes that follow, an example is expecting to win] praise after death: although men experience pleasure now because there will be a favourable memory of them after they have gone, nevertheless the cause of the pleasure occurs later (Smith’s translation).

, ,  .    - 



In the last subsection (VIII –), Diogenes accuses his opponents of ignoring these distinctions and of failing to understand that with respect to pleasure virtues rank among those productive things that chronologically coincide with their effects.⁴⁸

τὰς ο̣ὖν διαφορὰς ταύτας τεμεῖν ὑμεῖς μὴ δυνάμενοι, μηδὲ τὰς  ἀρετὰς εἰδότες ὅτι τῶν συνχρονούντων ποιητικῶν τοῖς ποιουμένοις χώραν ἔχουσι (συνεπιφέρονται γὰρ ἐ||[κεῖναι τῇ ἡδονῇ), πάνυ πλανᾶσθε] Now you being unable to mark off these distinctions, and being unaware that the virtues have a place among the causes that coincide with their effects (for they are borne along with [pleasure), go completely astray] (Smith’s translation). As I have already anticipated in my introduction, Smith and Sedley have come up with two diverging interpretations of this passage and, in particular, of the function of the causal classification provided by Diogenes. Smith holds that Diogenes is here referring to two Stoic doctrines: that of οἰκείωσις⁴⁹ and that of fate, according to which ‘everything occurs on the basis of antecedent causes’.⁵⁰ As concerns the first doctrine, Smith maintains that the expression φίλαυτον πάθος is a non-technical, possibly disparaging way of describing the drive towards self-conservation that, according to the Stoics, is what originally motivates human behaviour.⁵¹ As concerns the second doctrine, Smith acknowledges that the thesis that ‘everything occurs on the basis of antecedent causes’ is not equivalent to the thesis that ‘all causes are antecedent’; and that attributing a causal doctrine of this sort to the Stoics means misunderstanding their theory of causes. However, Smith also argues that “‘one should not underestimate the readiness of Epicureans, including Diogenes, to misrepresent their opponents’ position … and … the Stoic doctrine of fate … could easily have given rise to the charge that the school recognised only antecedent causes’”.⁵²

⁴⁸ Smith (). ⁴⁹ See also Tsouna –, Gourinat  and Roskam  in this volume. ⁵⁰ [Plut.] Fat. E; Cic. Fat. –. ⁵¹ Cic. Fin. III ; V ; Sen. Ep. .. ⁵² Smith ()  and (a) .



 

Sedley instead holds that Diogenes is here imputing a fallacy to those Cyrenaics belonging to Anniceris’ school, accusing them of having misinterpreted the instrumental function of virtue by regarding it as extrinsic and antecedent to pleasure, as though it were some kind of surgery to be endured in order to get rid of an illness and subsequently attain a state of well-being. In support of this thesis, Sedley invokes three main arguments: The first is that no other parallels are to be found for such a gross misrepresentation of a rival doctrine as the one which Diogenes would be offering for Stoic causal doctrine. The second argument is that Diogenes is making a point not about causes in general, but the causes of pleasure. Diogenes is not providing a new version of the Epicurean causal theory – which, unlike the Stoic, is not attested elsewhere – but is rather examining an ethical issue. Diogenes’ opponents claim that productive things are antecedent to their products and fail to understand that the virtues are simultaneous causes of pleasure. In other words, Diogenes is attacking those who acknowledge the causal function of virtue with respect to pleasure, yet envisage virtue as an antecedent cause. In Sedley’s view, it is clear that these opponents cannot be identified with the Stoics. For the Stoics did not so much question the nature of the causal relation between virtue and pleasure, as simply deny the existence of this relation. By contrast, the opponents in question may well be Anniceris and his followers, who believed that virtue is the cause of pleasure⁵³ and that it is an antecedent cause, meaning: that pleasure stems as a consequence of moral behaviour.⁵⁴ The third argument is that the φίλαυτον πάθος may be understood in the light of Cyrenaic epistemology, according to which “the only things to which we can ever have cognitive access are our own πάθη”.⁵⁵ I find the arguments and texts which Sedley invokes in support of his interpretation overall persuasive,⁵⁶ so much so that in my view – as I have already explained –

⁵³ Cic. Off. III : The Cyrenaics followers of Aristippus and the philosophers known as Annicereans located all good in pleasure, and thought that the reason why virtue should be praised was that it was the cause of pleasure. Although they have died out, Epicurus still flourishes, and he is the promoter and champion of what is more or less the same view. ⁵⁴ Diog. Laert. II : The Annicereans … allowed life to contain friendship, gratitude, honouring one’s parents, and willingness to do something for the sake one’s country – things from which, as a result of this behaviour, although the wise man will undergo disturbances, he will none the less be happy, even if just a few pleasant feelings are the consequence (περιγένηται) for him. ⁵⁵ Sedley () . On Cyrenaic epistemology see Tsouna (). ⁵⁶ Sedley’s arguments, however, are not decisive, as also Gourinat points out in his con-

, ,  .    - 



this anti-Cyrenaic reading of Diogenes’ text, once accepted as plausible for fr. , may well be extended to include fr.  as well. On the other hand, I believe that Smith’s anti-Stoic option is also possible. First of all, what Sedley regards as a gross misunderstanding of Stoic causal doctrine might actually be the outcome of an Epicurean reworking of the concept of causal chain introduced by Epicurus and further developed by Lucretius and Diogenes. In a very obscure fragment of Book XXV of his treatise On Nature, Epicurus criticises some opponents who assume that things all have their aitia in a previous movement (ἅμα ποιοῦντες πάντ’ ἀ[πὸ] τῆς προτέρας κινήσε[ω]ς τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχειν: at the same time making everything have its own causality from the precedent movement).⁵⁷ The way in which Epicurus formulates this doctrine is most interesting. It may be taken to mean that each thing has its cause in a previous movement. Yet it might also mean, given the author’s use of the expression ‘have one’s aitia’ in this book and elsewhere, that each thing receives its causal responsibility from a previous movement. While according to the first version Epicurus would be criticising someone who believes each thing to be the outcome of a previous movement, according to the second version the philosopher would be disputing the idea that the causal power of each thing derives from that of a previous movement or that each thing is made a cause by that which comes before it. In other words, whereas according to the first interpretation Epicurus’ focus is on the effect, according to the second interpretation his focus is on the causal role of each thing and its origin. Lucretius offers a less succinct formulation of the doctrine of the causal chain, one that favours the second perspective. Lucretius envisages fate as a succession of motions in which each is linked to the rest and originates from an older motion within a specific order and in such a way that one cause will follow another ex infinito.⁵⁸ In the light of these sources, it is reasonable to suppose that Diogenes felt justified in reducing Stoic causes to antecedent causes – in other words, in maintaining that, on account of the Stoic doctrine of fate, each cause in their view is activated by a previous movement and hence that all causal relations may be conceived as a temporal sequence of successive motions.

tribute to the present volume. The first one, for instance, could be disputed on the basis of fr.  Smith, where Diogenes attributes to Aristotle the view that nothing can be scientifically known (see Smith , –). I am grateful to Giuliana Leone for making me notice this point. See also Verde – in this volume. For the second and the third arguments, see Gourinat – the present volume. ⁵⁷ Cf. Epicur. Nat. XXV, PHerc.  corn.  z. .–, cf. Laursen ()  and [.] Arr.² ⁵⁸ Lucr. II –.



 

Another way of reading Diogenes’ polemic in anti-Stoic terms might be the following one. It may certainly be granted that Diogenes here is not interested in formulating a causal theory or in comparing different causal theories, but is rather focusing on an analysis of the means-end relation within a practical context. In this regard it is worth noting: ) that the expression ποιητικά was previously used to describe the means to an end; and ) that the term πράγματα may describe things in general, but also – more specifically – utilities or useful things. It may be supposed, therefore, that Diogenes is here attributing to his opponents the idea that, in a productive or practical context, tools are preliminary and extrinsic with respect to products; and that, because of this fallacy, they fail to grasp and appreciate the specific instrumental nature which the Epicureans assign to virtue in relation to pleasure. Diogenes’ opponents are precisely accused of turning all ποιητικά into things that precede their products – not of establishing a productive relation between virtue and pleasure based on the notion of causal antecedence. It is quite plausible that these rivals are to be identified with the Stoics. In this respect, two passages from the De Anima libri mantissa may be invoked, in which Alexander of Aphrodisias explains that virtue – like an art or tool – must be activated by external efficient factors⁵⁹ and that – as an art productive of happiness – it is itself extrinsic to happiness.⁶⁰ With respect to these solutions, the advantage of Sedley’s interpretation, of course, is that it applies the principle of charity and explains the doctrine which Diogenes attributes to his opponents without invoking any exegetical strain on the latter’s part. On the other hand, we cannot rule out the possibility that Diogenes did indeed strain Stoic doctrine, basing his claims on certain passages.

. ’  If the analysis conducted so far is correct, a balanced reading of fr.  and  is compatible with several different scenarios. The aim of Diogenes’ treatment of the relation between virtue and pleasure may be to distinguish the Epicurean position from the Cyrenaic: the position of those philosophers who, in response to the Epicureans, have stressed the moral component of pleasure, to the point of identifying the final goal with virtue (Theodorus and his school), but also the position of other Cyrenaics (Anniceris and his school) who acknowledge the instrumental function of virtue with respect to pleasure, yet are incapable of correctly grasping its nature.

⁵⁹ Alex. De anima libri mant. . = SVF III . ⁶⁰ Alex. De anima libri mant. . = SVF III .

, ,  .    - 



Diogenes’ analysis may equally well be directed against the Stoics, who are guilty of misinterpreting the nature of the relation between virtue and the final goal, and hence fail to grasp the nature of the Epicurean τέλος and the instrumental function of virtue in relation to it. But one – and this is my modest proposal – may also attempt to combine the two scenarios just outlined into a single picture by supposing that Diogenes had two sets of targets in mind:⁶¹ the Stoics and the Cyrenaics. The Stoics would be guilty of having failed to understand the nature of the Epicurean ultimate goal and of reducing the Epicurean position to the Cyrenaic by misinterpreting the nature of pleasure and the instrumental function of virtue. The Cyrenaics would instead stand as the term of comparison with respect to which Diogenes felt the need to clarify the Epicurean position. In support of this third interpretative perspective, it is possible to adduce both an external reason and an internal one. The external reason is given by NF , in which Diogenes directly and explicitly invokes Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, accusing them of misunderstanding the nature of Epicurean pleasure and of reducing it to that of the masses.⁶² If, however, as the editors have endeavoured to show, this fragment is to be positioned between fragments  and , it is difficult to rule out the possibility that the Stoics too may be playing a part in Diogenes’ polemics and to assume, as Sedley does, that by the end of fr.  Diogenes has completed his attack on the Stoics and is moving on to illustrate the Epicurean doctrine of the final goal, so as to distinguish it from that of the Cyrenaics. On the other hand, the mention made of the Stoics in NF  is not enough in itself to completely remove the Cyrenaics from the picture. Rather, we might suppose – as Sedley has suggested – that fr.  was conceived precisely as an attempt to distinguish the Epicurean position from the Cyrenaic and to prevent any conflation between the two. Other sources inform us that the Stoics did indeed take steps in this direction, which the Epicureans naturally opposed.⁶³ The second reason in support of this combined reading is that both in fr.  and in fr.  we find both direct interlocutors, whom Diogenes addresses in the second person, and indirect ones whom Diogenes addresses in the third person.

⁶¹ This hypothesis was suggested also by Gourinat in his talk during the Conference. ⁶² See Gourinat – in this volume. ⁶³ Cf. Cic. Fin. I  = Long/Sedley  A , where Torquatus says: But at Athens (…) there is a statue in the Ceramicus of Chrysippus seated with outstretched hand, which indicated his delight in the following little syllogism: ‘Is there anything that your hand, in its present condition wants?’ ‘Certainly not.’ ‘But if pleasure were the good, it would have a want.’ ‘I think so’ ‘Therefore pleasure is not the good’. The argument is entirely valid against the Cyrenaics, but does not touch Epicurus.



 

For instance, we have seen that in fr.  he addresses some people as ἄνδρες, at line  of column I, and afterwards he uses the pronoun τούτων and goes on to refer to these people in the third person plural. The term ἄνδρες may refer to Diogenes’ readers⁶⁴ but it may also refer to his direct rivals. As evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the vocative is a way to refer to the readers, one may certainly consider the fact that Diogenes addresses these men in a direct form and that the vocative occurs in the opening lines of the inscription.⁶⁵ However, this is by no means conclusive evidence. The pronoun τούτων in the following line clearly refers to some opponents and shows that Diogenes is already engaging in polemics at this stage of the inscription. The position of the vocative, then, is not enough in itself to rule out the possibility that the ἄνδρες whom Diogenes is directly addressing may be some opponents. Besides, this is not the only case in which the author directly addresses some unnamed opponents. In fr. , in which Diogenes is possibly discussing the boundaries of the earth – if not its shape⁶⁶ – and criticising the theory of some opponents, the accusative plural τοὺς ἄνδρας is used in line  of the first column to indicate the polemical target, which in the rest of the inscription Diogenes addresses in the second person plural, without ever mentioning any names (cf. col. I  and col. II  and ). A few lines below (col. I –), based on the occurrence of the accusative plural τοὺς ἄνδρας and on the fact that Diogenes switches to the second person plural, Smith goes so far as to posit a vocative similar to ours, ὦ [ἄνδρες], as a direct address to the author’s opponents. Moreover, it is worth noting in this regard that in NF , in the hypothetical exchange between Stoics and Epicureans outlined by Diogenes, the vocative ὦ ἄνδρες is what is used by the former to address the latter. In fr.  it might be the other way round: ὦ ἄνδρες might be the way in which the Epicureans address the Stoics. Here it could be objected that in NF  ἄνδρες is used in a completely different context, in which Diogenes mentions Chrysippus, Cleanthes and Zeno explicitly and makes no reference to any other rivals apart from the Stoics, as he instead appears to be doing in fr.  I  through the use of the pronoun τούτων.⁶⁷ However, if we grant that NF  is to be placed between fr.  and fr. , and that it belongs to the same thematic context, as Smith and Hammerstaedt suggest, it seems rather implausible that Diogenes may have addressed his readers through the use of the vocative case ὦ ἄνδρες (something that he never does elsewhere) and then have used the same vocative to address

⁶⁴ See Roskam  with n.  in this volume. ⁶⁵ I am grateful to Hammerstaedt for this suggestion he made during the conference. ⁶⁶ On fr. , see Smith () –, –, . ⁶⁷ As suggested per litteras by Hammerstaedt, who strongly disagrees with me on this point and thinks that the vocative ὦ ἄνδρες refers to Diogenes’ readers.

, ,  .    - 



opponents within the context of a polemical exchange. Furthermore, the fact that in NF  no other rivals, besides the Stoics, are to be found may simply mean that at that stage Diogenes is specifically attacking one set of opponents, but this does not rule out the involvement of other opponents. Here it may be worth recalling that in fr. , while the situation is more uncertain,⁶⁸ Diogenes would appear to switch from the third person plural in column III line  to the second person plural in column IV. I wonder whether this may not be taken to indicate a more wideranging polemic, whereby Diogenes directly addresses the Stoics (as may be inferred from NF ) – guilty of invoking Cyrenaic theses in order to misrepresent the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure or systematically reduce its originality – and in doing so sets out to illustrate the main doctrinal differences between Epicureans and Cyrenaics.⁶⁹

.  If it is plausible to suggest that Diogenes’ rivals are to be identified on the one hand with the Stoics and on the other with the Cyrenaics, in moving towards a conclusion, a new interpretation might also be made of some of the most problematic sections of fr.  and . It may be hypothesised that from the very first columns of fr.  (I –III ) Diogenes is concerned with distancing himself from the Cyrenaics and especially with opposing the hedonistic doctrine of Theodorus of Cyrene’s circle. In particular, Diogenes addresses his immediate rivals – to be identified with the Stoics, who were probably conflating Epicurean and Cyrenaic hedonism – by invoking two points of divergence between the two doctrines: the first point is that for the Epicureans hedonism is also a form of eudamonism, whereas the Cyrenaics distinguish between εὐδαιμονία and the τέλος, identifying the latter with pleasure. The second point is that although for the Epicureans, as well as for certain Cyrenaics connected to Theodorus’ circle, pleasure cannot be separated from virtue, it cannot be identified with virtue, which rather plays an instrumental role vis-à-vis the final goal. According to this interpretation, in the subsequent columns (III –IV ) Diogenes therefore seeks to explain eudaimonism

⁶⁸ On this point see also Smith ()  n. to column IV lines –. This transition from the third person to the second remains problematic for any univocal interpretation of the polemic, be it in anti-Stoic or anti-Cyrenaic terms. ⁶⁹ For other cases of multi-polemic target in Diogenes see, for instance, fr.  and fr.  (on fr.  see Gourinat – in this volume).



 

and hedonism from an Epicurean perspective, against those philosophers who have misunderstood the relation between virtue and the final goal and have therefore failed to grasp the nature of the latter – in particular, those Cyrenaics who, in an attempt to reconcile hedonism and moral behaviour, have erroneously identified the final goal as virtue. Hence, the need to address the question of the aim towards which human nature is directed and of how virtue may contribute to the attainment of such goal. In the final section of fr. , then, Diogenes would be providing a classification of natural human desires in order to explain the nature of the pleasure which man aspires to according to the Epicureans. Diogenes’ purpose would be to distinguish Epicurean hedonism both from that form of hedonism which endorses the pursuit of any kind of pleasure – as in the case of the Cyrenaics associated with Anniceris – and from that which, in order to preserve a closer relation between pleasure and virtue, attributes to virtue a function which ought to be assigned to pleasure alone. At this stage, after having attempted to defend the originality of Epicurean hedonism against possible misunderstandings or distortions on the part of his immediate opponents, and after having explained the nature of Epicurean pleasure by contrast to Cyrenaic pleasure in all its various forms, in the passage preserve in NF  Diogenes would be launching a counter-attack against the Stoics by accusing them of having de facto stolen the Epicurean doctrine and couched it in different terms. This reading of NF  might also help explain what kind of polemic is being conducted in fr. . Diogenes may be seeking to prevent two possible countermoves on the Stoics’ part: charged of having appropriated the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure, the Stoics may have retorted that the Epicurean notion of hedonism ultimately coincides with that of Theodorus of Cyrene, according to which pleasure is virtue, and that, if the Epicureans are unwilling to identify virtue with pleasure, their hedonism coincides with that of the philosophers who attribute a purely instrumental and extrinsic function to virtue with respect to pleasure. Sedley’s reconstruction of I  to II  fits this solution well, as it suggests the adoption of the position of the Cyrenaics, who posit a connection between virtue and pleasure, precisely at this stage. On the basis of this hypothesis, the first part of the fragment (fr.  II –III , III –V ) may therefore be viewed as an attempt to preclude the first objection – which is to say, of refuting the equation between virtue and pleasure – whereas the final one may be regarded as an attempt to preclude the second objection. Indeed, in the light of what has been argued so far it is possible to put forward a new interpretation of the final section of fr.  (V  to VIII ). Diogenes may be addressing the Stoics (since he uses the second person plural as in NF ), yet in order to accuse them of misinterpreting the instrumental function of virtue by erroneously attributing to the Epicureans the doctrine of the causal antecedence of virtue in relation to pleasure,

, ,  .    - 



which is actually to be attributed to some Cyrenaics.⁷⁰ In other words, the Stoics’ fallacy would lie in the assumption – based perhaps on their own doctrine of fate, as well as the Epicurean theory of atomic motion – that for the Epicureans too, as for some Cyrenaics, all causes productive of pleasure must be antecedent.⁷¹ Along with the doctrine of οἰκείωσις, this fallacy would make the Stoics’ doctrine as a whole ἀμαθές.⁷² Diogenes, then, would be accusing the Stoics of having misinterpreted Epicurean teaching, of having conflated it with that of the Cyrenaics, and hence – because of this mistake – of having failed to grasp that the ideal condition professed by them is the same as that professed by the Epicureans, and that virtue is not only compatible with pleasure but intrinsically pleasurable. When understood in such terms, fragments  and  may be seen to outline the nature of the relation between virtue and pleasure within the framework of Epicurean hedonism against the attempts made by some immediate opponents – the Stoics, accused of having plagiarised the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure – to either equate virtue and pleasure or to interpret the relation between the two as a causal, instrumental one and hence to assimilate Epicurean doctrine to other forms of hedonism. Diogenes of Oenoanda would therefore be pursuing a twofold aim: on the one hand, to highlight the problems with Cyrenaic hedonism, particularly in Theodorus of Cyrene’s moralising version; on the other hand, to make it clear that, within the framework of Epicurean hedonist doctrine, virtue and pleasure are intrinsically bound, even though they are not identical and stand in a causal relation to each other. Diogenes could be credited, then, with having illustrated what the Epicureans’ original contribution to hedonism and more generally eudaimonism consists in.

⁷⁰ Cf. Sen. Ep. .: Epicurus quoque iudicat, cum virtutem habeat, beatum esse, sed ipsam virtutem non satis esse ad beatam vitam, quia beatam efficiat voluptas, quae ex virtute est, non ipsa virtus. On this passage see Mitsis ()  n. . ⁷¹ Interpreted in this way, the kind of polemic that Diogenes is engaged in would be similar to the one in which Epicurus is engaged in book XXV Περὶ φύσεως. On this see Masi () –. ⁷² However for a different reconstruction and interpretation of fr.  col. V  – col. VI  see Hammerstaedt ()  (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , ).

      Voula Tsouna*

.   The references of Diogenes of Oinoanda to the Cyrenaics are scarce. In fact, the only known passage in which Diogenes explicitly mentions a Cyrenaic position is fr.  of his ethical treatise, in which Diogenes attacks Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic school. Moreover, forceful arguments have also been advanced both for and against the suggestion that Diogenes criticises the Cyrenaics in fr.  (including NF ), when he addresses the topic of the relation between virtue and pleasure and contrasts the Epicurean position with its Cyrenaic counterpart. In Parts One and Two of my paper I reassess the evidence concerning these fragments and try to reconstruct afresh Diogenes’ criticisms of Aristippus and his followers. In Part Three, I discuss a number of other fragments in which, I submit, Diogenes probably reacts to the doctrines of the Cyrenaics. They belong to different parts of the inscription, their physical condition varies, and they bear out my interpretative conjectures to a greater or a lesser degree. To conclude, I raise certain historical and exegetic issues in connection with Diogenes’ attitude towards the Cyrenaics. I suggest that these may be of considerable import, because they may lead us to question the widespread assumption of Diogenes’ antiquarianism: namely, the assumption that Diogenes draws exclusively from early Epicurean material but shows no awareness whatsoever of later controversies and developments of the Epicurean school.

* I read an earlier version of this paper at the conference on Diogenes of Oinoanda, which took place in Istanbul and Mugla (– September ) and was jointly organised by Refik Güremen, Jürgen Hammerstaedt, and Pierre-Marie Morel. I am very grateful to the participants for their comments. Especially, I wish to acknowledge the valuable remarks of Francesca Masi (whose paper in this volume proposes a new and attractive reading of fr. – ), Refik Güremen, Philip Mitsis, and Pierre-Marie Morel, as well as express an immense debt of gratitude to Martin Ferguson Smith whose edition of Diogenes’ inscription is the foundational stone of any further research. Furthermore, I warmly thank Jürgen Hammerstaedt and David Sedley for detailed written comments on the penultimate version of the paper, and also James Warren for discussing with me specific issues. I presented parts of my argument at the UT Knoxville Workshop on Epicureanism (March ), the Research Centre for Greek Philosophy of the Academy of Athens (April ), and the Edinburgh Workshop in Ancient Philosophy jointly organised by the University of Edinburgh and the University of St Andrews (April ), and I thank all participants for their input. Some of the material of this study has been integrated in different form in Tsouna ().



 

.           We begin with natural philosophy.¹ Assuming that Diogenes intended his readers to look first at the section of the inscription containing the epitome of Epicurean epistemology and physics, surely, the Cyrenaics must be included in the first group of philosophers who reject natural philosophy on the grounds that it is unprofitable for human happiness. … [as suppose] some of the philosophers and especially Socrates and his companions. They claim that pursuing [natural philosophy] and busying oneself with investigation of the [celestial phenomena is] redundant and useless, [and do not even] deign [to concern themselves with such matters] … (fr.  II –). As we know, many Socratics shared the diffidence of Plato’s Socrates towards the science of nature and its relevance to the good life. Although he appears aware of the views of Anaxagoras and others, he denies having had a lasting research interest in such things (Apol. c; Phd. a–d). And something similar is alleged to be true at least of two schools that sprang from his circle, namely the Cynics (Diog. Laert. VI ) and the Cyrenaics (Diog. Laert. II ). In fact, the doxographers report that the latter rejected τό τε φυσικὸν μέρος καὶ τὸ διαλεκτικόν, both physics and dialectic. Their repudiation of dialectic does not comprise the entire domain of epistemology for, in fact, the Cyrenaics invented a special vocabulary as well as effective arguments for their view that only one’s πάθη, affects, are apprehensible while the external objects cannot be apprehended. However, it is doubtful that their brand of radical subjectivism would qualify, in the eyes of an Epicurean, as a genuine theory of perception. On the contrary, Diogenes probably thought that the Cyrenaics disclaimed both topics to which his own epitome is dedicated: if the title initially restored by Smith is correct,² strictly speaking, neither Περὶ αἰσθήσεως, On sensation, nor Περὶ φύσεως, On nature, belong to the Cyrenaic philosophical agenda.³ Although the evidence on this matter is very little and indirect, it seems that Diogenes is inclined to treat the Cyrenaics on a par with three other groups of philosophers to

¹ Regarding the Greek text, I use the editions by M.F. Smith as well as by J. Hammerstaedt and M.F. Smith, unless I indicate otherwise. My translations are based on theirs, with modifications. ² [Διογένους τοῦ Οἰ]νο|[ανδέως περὶ αἰσ]θή|[σεως καὶ φύσεως | ἐπιτομή] Smith (). However, see fr.  III + NF  I – Hammerstaedt/Smith ,  and – (= ,  and –). See also Hammerstaedt ()  (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , ). ³ On the limitations of what we customarily call Cyrenaic epistemology, see Tsouna () –. A very different view is implied by Zilioli () passim.

     



whom Diogenes ascribes some sort of scepticism: seekers who assert that things are inapprehensible and therefore, a fortiori, discard natural science as well⁴ (fr.  I –); ephectics,⁵ such as Lacydes of Cyrene, Arcesilaus’ successor as head of the Academy (fr.  III –); and, very surprisingly, Aristotle and the Peripatetics, to whom the inscription attributes the view that nothing can be known because everything is continually in flux and hence escapes our perceptual apprehension (fr.  I –II ).⁶ Regardless of the justice or injustice of this latter attribution, for present purposes we should retain that, in matters of natural science and scientific knowledge, Diogenes aligns the Cyrenaics with both the Pyrrhonian and the Academic Sceptics, and also with defenders of a kind of metaphysics that precludes ἐπιστήμη, scientific knowledge, of the physical world.⁷ However, even though the Cyrenaics are no rivals of the Epicureans in matters of natural philosophy, they are perceived by the Epicureans as rivals in ethics. As I argue, the surviving parts of the inscription indicate that this holds for Diogenes as well, for he engages with Cyrenaic views on pleasure in a variety of contexts and in philosophically interesting ways. Diogenes is known to refer explicitly to a Cyrenaic philosopher only once, in fr.  II . A possibility taken into consideration by Smith is that fr.  comes quite closely after fr. .⁸ Moreover, I think that the two fragments address the same or a similar cluster of issues: notably, the relation between the pleasures of the body and those of the soul as well as the pressing question which set of pleasures has primacy over the other. Since fr.  specifies the frame of the debate, it is preferable to cite it first. [Even if I did nothing to reveal and point out the nature of ] pleasures, [still they themselves reveal] their own nature [to] us.⁹ In this manner … well … no longer. [By virtue of bodily] pleasures [the soul] also [readily] receives [those (sc. pleasures

⁴ Diogenes probably refers to Pyrrhonists: see Smith () ad loc. ⁵ See Smith’s conjecture ἐ[φεκτικοῖς] in fr.  III . ⁶ On the attribution of that view to Aristotle and a survey of the relevant literature, see Smith () –, and in this volume Verde – (esp. ) and Roskam –. ⁷ Compare Colotes, who takes seriously the Cyrenaic theory of perception and puts the Cyrenaics on a par with the other philosophical positions that he takes to be sceptical. I owe this remark to Refik Güremen. ⁸ Also, possibly, fr.  is followed by fr.  and this latter is followed by one more missing column. If so, the correct sequel of the text is this: fr. , fr. , one missing column, fr. . See Smith ad loc.; Hammerstaedt () – (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , –); Hammerstaedt/Hinzer-AlHasan () –. I thank Jürgen Hammerstaedt for these latter references. ⁹ Fr.  I – is almost entirely conjectured. According to Smith’s restitution of the text, here Diogenes refers to the self-evident character of pleasure.



 

of both recollection and anticipation) who are productive] of this (sc. ἀπονία ).¹⁰ For our nature [requires what] is better for [our] soul. Moreover, the soul has clearly more [capacities] than the body. For it [has] control of the extreme and supremacy over the other [πάθη ], as indeed we also claimed it to have [above]. [Therefore if ], paying attention to the arguments of Aristippus, on the one hand, we take care of the body [by choosing] all the pleasures deriving from drink, food, and [sexual acts] and, in general, all things that no longer [give pleasure after they have been enjoyed but, on the other hand, neglect the soul, we shall deprive ourselves of the greatest pleasures] (fr. ).¹¹ Diogenes sets up in fairly familiar terms the contrast between the hedonism commonly attributed to Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic school, and the hedonism advocated by the Epicureans. Aristippus privileges the body over the soul, recommending that we pursue bodily pleasures that can only be enjoyed at the time of their occurrence. Indeed, the sources confirm that, according to Aristippus the Elder and most of his followers, the pleasure that is of supreme positive value is bodily pleasure. This pleasure is related to some sort of physical alteration or motion (Diog. Laert. II ), and it is experienced only in the present: it is μονόχρονος, unitemporal, and does not comprise either the memory of past enjoyments or the expectation of future ones.¹² Conversely, bodily pain is of supreme negative value, and presumably it too is confined in the present: neither the memory of past pains nor the fear of future ones has genuine moral import. More than any other element of the Cyrenaic doctrine, the primarily physical nature of the τέλος, supreme good, and its presentist character are responsible for the bad reputation of Aristippus and his followers as profligates providing theoretical justification for the pleasures of the many. By concentrating on those two features, then, Diogenes exploits a well-worn theme and sharpens the difference between the hedonism of Aristippus and that of his own school. Contrary to the primacy that Aristippus gives to the body, Diogenes advances the original claim that our nature demands what is better for the soul, in other words, psychic pleasure. And although he does not formally defend it, his mention of the superior capabilities of the soul and its control over physical affects renders that position plausible. As for presentism, Diogenes appears to counter it

¹⁰ ἀπονία Tsouna. Other proposals include εὐδαιμονία or εὐθυμία: cf. Smith () ad loc. ¹¹ Fr.  III  ff. is a good conjecture by Smith. ¹² They have no moral value, the former because it exists no more, the latter because it does not exist yet and is not manifest (Athen. XII  A–B). The thesis that pleasure is μονόχρονος, unitemporal, holds for both physical and mental pleasure, and the same goes for pain.

     



with the observation that somehow by virtue of its capacity to receive bodily pleasure the soul is also able to receive not only present, but also past and future pleasures. The text is too corrupt to allow for elaborate speculation, but the basic idea may be that since the soul can experience kinetic pleasure (paradigmatically related to the body), it also has the power to experience the kinetic pleasures deriving from memory or hope. Aristippus could retort, however, that the phenomenological facts refute, or at least do not confirm, the contention that the pleasures and pains of the soul are greater than those of the body and exercise control over their bodily counterparts. In fact, ordinary people are mostly inclined to assert the opposite. Fr. , I submit, addresses precisely that worry and hence is likely to be targeted, inclusively or exclusively, at the Cyrenaics. [The soul experiences] πάθη far greater than the cause which generated them, just as [a fire] vast enough to burn down ports and cities is kindled by an exceedingly small spark. But the pre-eminence of these feelings of [the soul] is difficult for ordinary people to gauge ([δυσε]πιλόγιστος ). For since it is [im]possible, by comparing them against each other, to experience simultaneously the extremes of both – I mean of the feelings of both the soul and the body – for the reason that this seldom ever happens and, when it does happen, life is destroyed, the criterion for determining the pre-eminence of one of the two is not found. Rather, when someone encounters bodily pains, he declares that these are greater than those of the soul; on the other hand, when [he encounters pains of the soul, he says that] these [are greater than the others. For] what [is present is] invariably more convincing [than what is absent], and each person is likely], either through [necessity] or through pleasure, to confer pre-eminence on the πάθος which has hold of him. However, this matter, which is difficult for ordinary people to gauge, a wise man reasons through (ἀν[α]λογίζεται) on the basis of many factors [including] … (fr.  I –III ). As I understand it, Diogenes’ argument is this. To be in a position to easily appreciate the relative superiority of the affections of the soul over those of the body, one should be able to experience simultaneously both extreme physical and extreme mental pain and compare these experiences to each other. However, almost no one can have such an experience and remain alive. Therefore, common people are usually unable to calculate which sort of affection is greater. And since the affection experienced at present has greater persuasive force than the one that is absent, such people are usually swayed by their present experiences and declare pre-eminent whichever sort of pain they are feeling at present: in some cases this is a bodily experience and hence they pronounce bodily affections to be stronger, whereas in other cases it is a psychic one and, therefore, they claim that the affections of the soul are stronger. On



 

the contrary, the sage does not judge this matter under the influence of his current feelings, but on the basis of reasoning and of careful consideration of several factors including, notably, the Epicurean views concerning psychic experiences mentioned in fr. .¹³ We cannot be sure about the exact layout of Diogenes’ argument, because of the condition of the relevant fragments and the uncertainty regarding the order in which they were written. But it is worth to point out that the interpretation proposed above integrates Diogenes’ attack on Aristippus in a broader dialectical context, and also provides a philosophical motivation for the contents of fr. . Furthermore, assuming that Smith is correct in claiming that the central topic of fr. , , and  is the fear of pain, the anti-Cyrenaic argument that I attribute to Diogenes represents an important advance in the discussion. If, as the Cyrenaics claim, bodily πάθη were greater than mental ones and governed them, then we would have good reason to fear extreme bodily pain, for we would have no means of moderating our sufferings. But if, as Epicurus and his followers contend, the affections of the soul are greater than those of the body and comprise all temporal modes, then we need not fear physical pain because we possess the psychic resources to palliate its effects on us.

.           :  .  Notwithstanding their differences, both the Cyrenaics and the Epicureans have had to confront the question of the relation between virtue and pleasure. And both have defended the value of pleasure as the only ultimately intrinsic good, as opposed to the value of virtue which is instrumental. However, the two schools conceive of the instrumental status of virtue in different ways. While the position of the Cyrenaic sects on the matter varies,¹⁴ several of their later members appear to advance a sort of consequentialist hedonism according to which virtue or virtuous acts are not pleasant in themselves but are choiceworthy just for the sake of their future consequences (Diog. Laert. II ). In fact, not only virtuous activity but also friendship are often

¹³ Diogenes’ point is not as intuitively plausible with regard to pleasure as it is with regard to pain. For it is not obvious that extreme pleasures destroy life, whereas it is clear that extreme pains can. This remark is owed to Refik Güremen. ¹⁴ Contra Annas () and others, I believe that Aristippus the Elder remains a Socratic with regard to virtue: many sources attest that he attributes enormous value to wisdom and self-control, and there is no indication that he viewed virtuous action merely as an irksome activity that we ought to pursue for the sake of its future consequences: see Tsouna-McKirahan () and ().

     



tiresome, but, nonetheless, the wise man chooses them for the sake of pleasant feelings that will derive from them (Diog. Laert. II ). As mentioned, the Cyrenaics believe that the greatest pleasures are those deriving from the satisfaction of physical needs, notably, for food, drink, and sex. So, one might think that the virtues are bothersome ways of securing the satisfaction of such desires. On the other hand, the virtues can have nothing to do with pleasures of memory or anticipation for, as mentioned, such pleasures do not belong to the Cyrenaic moral end. In sharp contrast, Epicurus, famously and controversially, argues that virtue and pleasure are interrelated and inseparable (Men. ), so that the exercise of the virtues for the sake of pleasure is itself a pleasant act.¹⁵ Moreover, not only does virtue get practised at the same time as the pleasure that ensues from that practice, but also it clears the ground for future pleasures which, we should recall, are part of the Epicurean τέλος: psychic pleasures are greater, precisely because they comprise the pleasures of the future as well as of the present and the past. And virtue is what makes such future pleasures possible. With these preliminary remarks in mind, we now turn to the relevant part of the inscription. Having introduced the subject of the relation between virtue and pleasure in fr. , Diogenes proceeds in fr.  (including NF ) to criticise certain unnamed opponents for failing to understand what sort of cause of pleasure virtue is. The fragment has become a bone of scholarly contention for over a decade: Martin Smith restitutes and interprets the text in the belief that the unnamed rivals are Stoics,¹⁶ whereas David Sedley establishes a different text and defends the suggestion that the opponents under discussion are the Cyrenaics.¹⁷ Since I am rather inclined to accept Sedley’s interpretation, I rely on his emendation and translation of the crucial bits.¹⁸ I shall briefly go over his arguments in favour of the Cyrenaic identity of Diogenes’ opponents, air some fresh considerations concerning the debate, and also point to some difficulties that must be explained away by the defenders of each side. Evidently, the matter has not been settled yet. The analysis offered below is tentative, and all I wish to do is to develop it as best I can and provide motivation for further reflection about this topic.¹⁹

¹⁵ However, such acts derive their value from the pleasure that ensues, not from the virtue involved in their performance. ¹⁶ See Smith () and, especially, Smith (a) ad loc. ¹⁷ Sedley (). ¹⁸ Regarding the ways in which the contrasting interpretations have influenced the editorial history of the text, see the article of Francesca Masi in this volume. ¹⁹ Masi in this volume (–) maintains that a balanced reading of fr.  and  is compatible with several different scenarios, and advances the attractive suggestion that Diogenes may be targeting both the Stoics and the Cyrenaics. According to her argument,



 

I cite the crucial excerpts of the fragment: … pleasure,²⁰ which is inseparable from all the virtues … (fr.  I –)²¹ … [Prospective pleasure],²² as these people lay it down for all human beings like a snare, has the power to draw them like birds or fish open-mouthed to the names of the virtues, and sometimes [enters people’s minds and paints all kinds of illusory pictures] of itself, and the poor wretches are not ashamed [of bestowing favours on] each other, [and charming people by their] wit, [in pursuit of their own eventual] pleasure, agreeing adroitly [also to face dangers] in order to avoid [pain, like those who endure] marching [out to war and those] who endure crag-climbing (fr.  [+ NF ] III –V ).²³ Therefore, I also want to expose²⁴ the error that, along with the feeling of self-love, has you in its grip which, more than any other, further inflates your doctrine as [ignorant]. It is this: [not] all causes in things precede in time their effects, even if

Diogenes criticises the Stoics for failing to understand the nature of the Epicurean τέλος: they misinterpret the rôle that the Epicureans ascribe to virtue, with the result that they ascribe to the Epicureans a crude instrumentalism about virtue resembling the instrumentalism of the Cyrenaics. Therefore, Diogenes uses the Cyrenaics as a point of comparison with respect to which he clarifies and defends the Epicurean position. While my own limited task is to revisit the considerations in support of the rival views of Martin Ferguson Smith and David Sedley and point to certain features of their arguments, Francesca Masi proposes a new alternative reading of fr.  and . ²⁰ According to David Sedley, “Diogenes is by this point already fully engaged in his argument against the Cyrenaics about the simultaneity and inseparability of virtue and pleasure” (Sedley , ). He suggests that the subject of the sentence from I –II  may be καὶ οὗτοι and tentatively conjectures εὑρισ|[κόμε]νον δ’ ὁμολογοῦσι | [τυχεῖν] καὶ οὗτοι πολλά|[κι]ς οὐκ ἀπο[…]: Even these people agree (that), as a matter of fact, it is found that often they are not ⟨far separated⟩ […]. On this point, see Sedley ()  n. . ²¹ Fr.  I –II  according to Sedley (): […]. π̣ ασῶν ἀρετῶν | [....].ν ἀ̣χ̣ώριστον οὖ|[σαν τ]ὴ̣ν ἡδονήν, εὑρισ|[κόμε]ν̣ον δ’ ὁμολογοῦσι | [τυχεῖν] κ̣ αὶ οὗτοι πολλά|[κι]ς οὐκ̣ ἀ̣πο̣[ - – - ]; Smith (): […ἐ]κ̣ πασῶν ἀρετῶν | [....]Ι̣να̣ χ̣ω̣ρὶς τόνου | […τ]ὴ̣ν ἡδονήν, εὑρισ|[κόμε]ν̣ον δ’ ὁμολογοῦσι | [σοφισ]τ̣αὶ οὗτοι πολλά|[κι]ς οὐκ̣ ἀ̣πο̣[ - – - ]; Smith ()  restored I –II : [– - – τὸ ζ]ῆ̣ν δ̣ι[̣ ὰ] πα̣ν̣τὸ̣ ς ἡ|[δέως τῶν] π̣ ασῶν ἀρετῶν | [αἰεὶ ἐστ]ὶν ἀχώριστον, οὔ | [φασι τὴ]ν ἡδονὴν εὑρίσ|[κειν, μό]ν̣ον δ’ ὁμολογοῦσί | [γε σοφισ]τ̣αὶ οὗτοι πολλά|[κι]ς οὐκ̣ ἀ̣πο̣[ - – - ]. ²² See also Hammerstaedt ()  (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , ). ²³ This translation renders the following passage, as it is restored by Sedley () : [δ]ύναται, | ὡς οὗτοι κ[αθ]ίενται π[ᾶ]|σιν αὐτὴν τοῖς ἀνθρώ|ποις δελέατος τρόπον, | καθάπερ ὄρνειθας αὐ|τούς ἢ ἰχθύας σύρειν ἀπο|κεχηνότας εἰς τὰ τῶν ἀ|ρετῶν ὀνόματα, ποτὲ | δὲ τινῶν εἰσ[δύεται τὴν | διάνοιαν καὶ] ἑαυτῆς | γράφει παντ]οῖα σκια|γραφήματα,] οὐκ αἰσχύ|νονται δ’οἱ ταλαίπωροι |[ ---] ἀλλήλοις |[ ---]υντες, καὶ|[ ---] χαριεντισ|[---]ν ἡδονὴν |[ ---] ὁμολογοῦν|[--- ἐ]πιδεξίως |[ ---]ς ἵνα μὴ | [πονῶσιν, ὡς οἱ ἐξ]οδεύειν | εἰς πόλεμον ο]ἵ τε κρη|μν[οβ]ατεῖν ὑπομέ|νοντες. ²⁴ παρα[θ]εῖναι Hammerstaedt ().

     



the majority do, but rather some of them precede in time their effects, others [are simultaneous] with them, and others temporally follow them (fr.  [+ NF ] V –VI ). The rest of the fragment gives examples of each category of causes (VI –VIII ) and concludes: Therefore you, being unable to draw these distinctions and not realising that the virtues have their place among the causes that are simultaneous with their effects – for [they] are borne along [with pleasure – go entirely astray] (VIII –). According to Smith’s reconstruction and understanding of the entire fragment, Diogenes continues here the anti-Stoic polemic that he begun in fr. . He argues that the Stoics offer οἰκείωσις,²⁵ the natural feeling of self-love, as a bait to attract people to virtue (III – Smith). And in addition to the error related to the feeling of self-love (φίλαυτον πάθος: V ), they make another mistake, namely they believe that all causes are antecedent in time to their effects, whereas, in fact, some are contemporaneous with their effects and others follow them (V –VIII ). The pleasures of anticipation belong to this latter kind. The point of this last criticism then, Smith contends, is that the Stoics fail to grasp the interrelation and simultaneity of virtue and pleasure, because they fail to draw relevant distinctions between different sorts of causes and hence do not realise that the exercise of virtue is contemporaneous with the pleasure experienced at the same time as the virtuous activity. Now, if this is Diogenes’ argument, it misrepresents the Stoics, who, in fact, do recognise the existence of antecedent as well as simultaneous causes,²⁶ and moreover deny any causal relation between virtue and pleasure. And although Smith appeals to Diogenes’ propensity to misunderstand or willfully misrepresent his opponents, nonetheless Sedley rightly points out that such occurences are rare and that, if Diogenes’ criticism is aimed at the Stoics, it is moot: the problem is not that they consider virtue an antecedent cause of pleasure whereas it is a simultaneous cause, but rather that they believe that virtue and pleasure are not causally related at all.²⁷ Sedley’s alternative interpretation is free of these problems and also makes better sense of what is likely to be the point of Diogenes’ main complaint against his

²⁵ However, Hammerstaedt ()  (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , ), argues for ἡδονή. ²⁶ For antecendent causes, see, for instance, SVF II . For simultaneous causes, see SVF I , II , and II . ²⁷ See Sedley () –.



 

rivals, whom Sedley convincingly identifies as hedonists:²⁸ they mistakenly believe that virtue is a sort of cause that precedes its effects in the way in which cautery and surgery precede the restoration of health, (VI –), whereas, in truth, virtue is a kind of cause that temporally coincides with its pleasurable outcome. The Cyrenaics, Sedley contends, are the only group of ancient hedonists that both view virtue instrumentally and describe it as an irksome means to pleasurable ends.²⁹ Hence they are the only likely targets of Diogenes’ charge. Moreover, Diogenes has ample motivation to attack the Cyrenaics in that context, for thus he highlights the substantial difference between the crude instrumentalism of the Cyrenaics and the unique rôle of the virtues as “the skills of pleasure management both short term and long term”³⁰ ascribed to the virtues by his own school. And, crucially, he contrasts the extreme presentism of the Cyrenaics with the Epicureans’ belief that present pleasure can result from the anticipation of future goods. If a hedonist holds, as Diogenes accuses the Cyrenaics of holding, that pleasure has only antecedent causes, then one must exclude the pleasures of anticipation, as indeed the Cyrenaics do. If, on the other hand, a hedonist also recognises simultaneous as well as a posteriori causes, then he has the conceptual room for both viewing virtue as intrinsically pleasant and valuing present pleasures whose causes lie in the future. This is just what the Epicureans defend. As for Diogenes’ reference to the φίλαυτον πάθος, the feeling of self-love, Sedley interprets it pejoratively, as one of the two things that the Cyrenaics are accused of.³¹ Again, recall that the Cyrenaics account for friendship in crudely instrumentalist terms,³² as opposed to Epicurus and especially his later followers who extoll the independent value of friendship and other-concern. According to Sedley, the upshot is that Diogenes’ critique in fr.  is based on Epicurus’ own writings and provides evidence for the polemical context in which Epicurus shaped the doctrine of interrelation of virtue and pleasure. There is no space to do justice to details of the above debate. But since Smith has meanwhile responded to Sedley and reworked his own position,³³ and since, as I said, my sympathies lie with the latter’s approach, I should like briefly to address some of Smith’s responses and to single out a remark that may prove troublesome for the interpretation I favour. At the outset, let me restate the problem that I find insurmountable in Smith’s interpretation of fr.  + NF : Diogenes’ criticism in

²⁸ See the relevant part of the argument in Sedley (). ²⁹ See my preliminary remarks above, –. ³⁰ Sedley () . ³¹ Sedley () –. ³² See above, . ³³ See Smith (a) –.

     



fr.  makes sense only if the philosophers that he attacks posit some causal relation between virtue and pleasure; but the Stoics reject any such relation, whereas the Cyrenaics acknowledge it. And given their instrumentalist and presentist doctrines, on Sedley’s view, they present themselves as the only likely candidates for Diogenes’ attack. However, as Smith reconstructs the beginning of the fragment in his later edition (I –), it would seem that Diogenes’ targets are not hedonists but sophists or cheats³⁴ who “deny that they find pleasure”.³⁵ Moreover, Smith contends that, in the surviving part of the inscription, Diogenes refers only once to Aristippus (fr. ) and never to the Cyrenaics as a whole; therefore, the references in fr.  to certain philosophers in the plural appear ungrounded. Also, the conjecture σκια[γραφ] (ΙΙΙ –) which points to some cognate of the verb σκιαγραφέω, shadow-drawing, recalls the use of the corresponding noun in fr.  I – in order to criticise the Stoic view of visions.³⁶ Besides, even if the expression τὸ φίλαυτον πάθος (V ) does not refer to Stoic οἰκείωσις, a natural feeling of self-love, but has a pejorative sense, as Sedley thinks, it makes excellent sense as an accusation of the Stoics “for being selfish beasts, wrapped up in the thought of their own virtue”.³⁷ However, it seems to me that, although these objections are reasonable, none of them is decisive. In the first place, Smith’s supplemented fr.  I –³⁸ does not give good grounds for inferring that Diogenes’ rivals are not hedonists but sophists or cheats. The text is very fragmentary and many conjectures are exempli gratia; there is no antithetical conjunction in line  to underline the supposed contrast between the Epicureans, who believe in the inseparability of virtue and pleasure, and the sophists, who deny this; and the very mention of [σοφισ]ταί or, alternatively, [κλέπ]ται is little more than a conjecture and seems unsupported by the context.³⁹ Second, many sources fail to distinguish Aristippus’s views on pleasure from the hedonistic doctrines of his later followers. It is often the case that the founder of the school is credited with the sort of hedonism that was only developed by his grandson⁴⁰ or, alternatively, that the followers of Anniceris, Theodorus, and Hegesias are treated as hedonists of an earlier Cyrenaic era. Also, if fr.  concerns the Cyrenaics, as I argued above, and if the same holds for the fragments discussed in the next section, Smith’s criticism is inapplicable: Diogenes does refer to the Cyrenaics in the plural,

³⁴ See Smith’s conjecture [σοφισ]ταί or, alternatively, [κλέπ]ται in line . ³⁵ Smith (a) . ³⁶ Smith (a) . ³⁷ Jonathan Barnes (letter of  December ), cited by Smith (a) –. ³⁸ See above n. . ³⁹ See, however, Sedley’s reconstitution of fr.  I –: ὁμολογοῦσι [τυχεῖν] καὶ οὗτοι. ⁴⁰ On the strands of the doxographical tradition regarding Aristippus, see TsounaMcKirahan ().



 

he just does not identify them by name in the parts of the inscription that are known to us. Third, even if Diogenes uses some form of σκιαγραφεῖν in fr.  IV – (= NF  I –), this does not entail that his opponents are the same as in fr.  (I –), namely the Stoics. The word is quite common, the respective contexts are different, and, whatever cognate is supplied, the passage under discussion is conjectural. As for the φίλαυτον πάθος, assuming that it has a pejorative sense, it is at least as likely to refer to the sensual experiences of the self-absorbed hedonist as to the Stoic self-complaisance about virtue. A last objection by Smith, however, cannot be readily waved away. It seems intrinsically improbable, he says, that the Cyrenaics, who advocated the pursuit of the physical pleasures of the present, would believe (only) in antecedent causes. Normally, they should have been “the very last people who needed to be told what Diogenes tells his opponents in VI –VII  – that the pleasures derived from eating, drinking, and ejaculating semen are simultaneous”. It would seem more reasonable for Diogenes to reprimand the Cyrenaics for believing (only) in simultaneous causes, not in antecedent ones.⁴¹ I find this objection both fair and powerful. One way to react might be to argue that the supreme Cyrenaic pleasures, i.e., those deriving from eating, drinking, and having sex, neither entail nor habitually require the simultaneous exercise of the virtues. Another possibility is that Diogenes does not refer to a Cyrenaic causal theory, but rather to a specific faulty inference: the Cyrenaics believe that we value virtue only because it causes pleasure and, on the basis of that belief, they fallaciously infer that we value virtue only because pleasure follows from it. If this is their reasoning, then Diogenes is right to point out that they take all causes to be antecedent causes and that this is a mistake.⁴²

.       :      So far I have discussed three fragments that have been known or suspected to bear on the Cyrenaics (, , and ), and an additional one, fr. , which appears to be thematically and systematically related to Diogenes’ argument against Aristippus. In this section, however, I turn to a number of fragments that have never before been associated with the Cyrenaics, whereas I contend that they can or should be read in the light of that association.

⁴¹ Smith (a) . ⁴² Yet another possible approach is proposed by Francesca Masi in this volume: see n.  above.

     



One such group of passages touches on the topic of fr.  and : Diogenes refutes all those who believe that the mere titillation of the bare sense and the excessive indulgence to the needs of the body secure the utmost pleasure, and he argues for the standard version of Epicurean hedonism: he rejects the maximisation of pleasure and jointly determines ἀπονία and ἀταραξία, painlessness and tranquillity, as the supreme natural good. Moreover, Diogenes appears to follow a common τόπος in taking the Cyrenaics as the theoretical defenders of the crude hedonism of the many. This is suggested, for instance, by the use of the first plural regarding the pleasures advocated by Aristippus in fr. , and also also by the reference to ordinary people in fr. . Therefore, we may assume that, when Diogenes denounces self-indulgence and profligacy in favour of Epicurean pleasure, the Cyrenaics are not far from his mind.⁴³ This is almost certainly the case in fr.  III – – a fragment in the vicinity of fr. , which refers to the Socratics’ rejection of φυσιολογία and which we treated above. Having mentioned that it is the soul rather than the body that is responsible for the pain caused by non-necessary desires (I –II ), Diogenes feels sadness at the behaviour of such people and the way they waste their lives (II –) and declares: joy [of genuine value is generated not by theatres] and … [and] baths [and perfumes] and ointments, [which we have left] to the masses, [but by natural science …] (fr.  III –). Moreover, he announces in the following fragment (fr. ) that, in composing the physical treatise, he aims to refute those who reject the usefulness of natural philosophy (I –), and also to show that just one thing, the same for all, is naturally beneficial, namely ἀταραξία (I –). I infer then that the Cyrenaics probably are among his deliberate targets, both because they are opposed to the science of nature and because they are among those who believe that things other than tranquillity have real value, notably, bodily pleasures. Similarly, Diogenes may be thinking of Aristippus and Hegesias among others, when he remarks towards the beginning of the ethical treatise: [There are many who] pursue philosophy for the sake of [wealth and fame], with the aim of procuring these either from private individuals or from kings, by whom philosophy is believed to be some great and precious possession. Well, it is not in order to gain any of the aforementioned objectives that we have embarked upon

⁴³ However, this is not always the case. For instance, in NF , in which Diogenes also mentions the pleasures of the masses, his targets are not the Cyrenaics but the Stoics.



 

the same undertaking, but rather so that we may enjoy happiness having attained the goal desired by nature. What this goal is, and how neither wealth can furnish it, nor political fame, nor royal office, nor a life of luxury and sumptuous banquets, nor pleasures of delectable sexual affairs, nor anything else but philosophy alone, the one which we pursue, secures it, our argument will demonstrate as it develops (fr.  [+NF ] I –III ).⁴⁴ Evidently, Diogenes discredits philosophers of different periods, philosophical orientations, and moral reputations. But the contents of the fragment suggest that, in all probability, the Cyrenaics as well as the Stoics are among them. While the latter are sometimes accused of social and political ambition, many members of the former school have been ridiculed for serving tyrants and kings and for being mistreated by them: recall the anecdotes relating episodes of Aristippus’ life in Syracuse and those referring to Hegesias’ expulsion from Ptolemy’s court. Yet other anecdotes about Aristippus are in circulation centuries before Diogenes’ time: his love of wealth and luxury, his gluttony, and his relation to the famous Lais are doxographical commonplaces likely to be part of the inscription’s subtext. A standard criticism that Epicurean authors level against the Cyrenaics is that they opt for every pleasure and avoid every pain without rationally considering their longer term consequences. Epicurean criticisms of Cyrenaic presentism are also related to that charge: it is one thing to enjoy every day as if it were the last, as the followers of Epicurus are regularly advised to do, but quite another to seek heedlessly and day after day every particular pleasure presently at hand, without making any effort to calculate how it contributes to one’s own well-being.⁴⁵ These criticisms derive from the fact that, although both schools espouse hedonism, they have deeply different conceptions of the τέλος, the relation of pleasure to happiness, and the rôle of reason in attaining the moral end. Leaving aside the considerable variation of the views of the Cyrenaic sects, it is roughly accurate to say that, unlike the Epicureans, most Cyrenaics posit as the τέλος not happiness, but the pleasure resulting from each action. They determine the latter merely as the collection or accumulation of individual episodes of pleasure (and especially physical pleasure).⁴⁶ They foreclose concern for the future⁴⁷ and genuine concern for others. They remove

⁴⁴ See Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –): fr.  III + NF . ⁴⁵ See, for instance, Phld. Elect. II –, and also probably II –. Concerning the Cyrenaic conception of pleasure and its relation to happiness, see Diog. Laert. II –; Clem. Alex. Strom. II  (.–. Stählin); Athen. XII  A–B. Secondary literature includes Annas (), Irwin (), O’Keefe (), and Tsouna (). ⁴⁶ Diog. Laert. II –. ⁴⁷ Concerning the pleasures of anticipation see above, –.

     



value from what the Epicureans would call a condition of ἀπονία or ἀταραξία by describing it as an intermediate condition in which we feel neither pleasure nor pain. For these reasons, as well as some others, they reject the need to regularly perform the hedonistic calculus. And, ultimately, they downgrade the rôle of reason in moral life. Despite its sketchy and controversial character, the above outline provides, I think, the necessary background for specifying what may be Diogenes’ dialectical position in the fragments that follow. Indeed, in fr. , Diogenes concludes his argument to the effect that pleasure is the supreme good by exhorting us to reject the sophistical arguments (τοὺς σοφιστικοὺς λόγους: II –), possibly because they advocate the thoughtless hedonism of the many ([οἱ πολ]λοί: III –),⁴⁸ but make use instead of the rational calculation of pleasures and pains ([λογισμῷ χρῆσθ]αι: III –IV ).⁴⁹ Why is the calculus important? One reason is that we are not always immediately successful in our efforts. Foresight and the correct understanding of human affairs, which is comparable to the correct understanding of natural things and processes, are crucial in order to achieve greater pleasure in the end. Thus, I say, where the danger is great, so also is the fruit. Here we must turn aside these sophistical arguments, because they are insidious and offensive and have been contrived on the basis of terminological ambiguity to [lead astray] us miserable humans (fr.  II –) … [Do let us] not [avoid every pain that is present nor choose every pleasure as the many always do] (fr.  III – ). The reference to insiduous and revolting sophistical arguments, which, as the context suggests, turn people away from the rational consideration of longer term consequences but encourage them to heedlessly pursue present pleasure and reject present pain, brings to mind the well-known representation of Aristippus as a smart sophist.⁵⁰ A host of anecdotes purport to illustrate the ingenious ways in which he used language and argument to advance his hedonistic presentism and live a pleasurable life. We are not in a position to tell whether Diogenes has that

⁴⁸ I provisionally accept Smith’s restoration of III –. However, I wonder how secure are the readings of the α at the beginning of III  and of the λ at the beginning of III . ⁴⁹ This is a conjecture, but nonetheless it is clear from the context that here Diogenes talks about the hedonistic calculus. ⁵⁰ Alexis’ fr.  K.-A. [Galateia] ap. Athen. XII  E; cf. also Aristotle, Metaph. II .a  and Clem. Alex. loc. cit. (in n. ). I owe these references to David Sedley.



 

doxographical tradition in sight. But it would not be surprising if he did, and it certainly would be fitting given the topic of this fragment. Diogenes’ programmatic statements at the outset of fr.  also can be read so as to indicate an anti-Cyrenaic agenda. On the other hand (δέ), we should [investigate] now how our life will become pleasant in both the states (ἐν τοῖς καταστήμασι) and the actions (ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν). And let us first discuss the states, keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place (VI –). In another block of the inscription (cf. fr.  V –), whose position has now become uncertain because of a recent and yet unpublished discovery,⁵¹ Diogenes appears to have referred to another rival doctrine, which he now rejects by announcing his own Epicurean programme. The latter consists in investigating how to achieve lifelong pleasure in both states and actions. And the second part of the passage cited above makes clear that Diogenes is thinking of a specific sort of κατάστημα, state, namely the condition that derives from the removal of mental suffering and the restitution of katastematic pleasure – in other words, the Epicurean supreme good of tranquillity. What could be the position that he counters with his own? And who held it? If, as is likely, the rivals under discussion are the presentists mentioned earlier, they cannot be interested in both states and actions. Either they are completely indifferent to the achievement of lifelong pleasure or, at best, they are concerned only with actions and not with states. I.e., they are concerned with how to do the sorts of things that achieve immediate pleasure or avert immediate pain, but have no care at all for καταστήματα, relatively stable states, since they reject long-term hedonistic planning. Again, in either case the Cyrenaics are the most viable candidates. For since most of them disavow the overall aim of happiness claiming that the only end is the pleasure resulting from individual actions, they have no sufficient motivation to investigate how to attain a happy, pleasurable life. Alternatively, to the extent that the followers of Aristippus the Younger believe that, in addition to pleasure and pain, there is also an intermediate condition compared with a calm sea, they have no reason to be morally concerned with καταστήματα identical with that condition.⁵² For while ἀπονία and ἀταραξία are of supreme value

⁵¹ I thank Jürgen Hammerstaedt for this information. ⁵² However, they have good reason to be epistemologically concerned with the intermediate condition and the πάθη occurring in that condition: see Tsouna () passim.

     



for the Epicureans in so far as they are the greatest pleasures,⁵³ according to the orthodox Cyrenaics these states are affectively neutral and, therefore, they have no value at all. Two other fragments bear on this latter contrast, in particular the description of the Epicurean τέλος in privative terms, as well as the denunciation of presentism and the mentality of living for the day. NF  probably stood towards the end of the ethical treatise.⁵⁴ Diogenes relies heavily on Epicurus’ rejection of an affectively intermediate state in order to defend the articles of the Fourfold Medicine and specifically the third dictum, i.e., that the good is easy to get. [Life offers us for our nutrition, although] barley-bread [is sufficient] for our natural sustenance, [many] (foods) that do not involve unpleasantness when they are taken, and a bed that does not fight against the body because of hardness, and clothing that is neither extremely soft nor indeed extremely rough so that our nature would be repelled, just as if we were clothing ourselves […] [with what] pricks [our constitution]. And, in fact, these things and those much greater are easily obtained, so that if (life) becomes one of continual luxury, and to others perhaps both a beneficial redeemer in their necessity, and --- [a supporter] of the incapacitated in need (NF  I –II ). Clearly, Diogenes’ description of the pleasures of a simple and wholesome life presupposes the idea that amenities that do not cause discomfort are thereby pleasurable. Provided that a food does not provoke disgust (ἀηδία), it is pleasant enough to be taken for nutrition. A bed that does not make us physically uncomfortable is good enough to sleep on. Clothes can be pleasantly worn, if they do not prick us. And so on. The lesson is not merely the Epicurean commonplace that natural desires are easy to satisfy with simple goods, which are readily accessible and, therefore, there is no need for luxuries, whose acquisition involves anxiety and labour. Diogenes also contributes the thought, not only that pleasure begins just when discomfort is removed, but also that it is tantamount to the pleasure deriv-

⁵³ On Diogenes’ use of κατάστημα to denote Epicurean pleasure, see also NF  III – IV . Diogenes contends that the appellation of the best and most virtuous state as pleasure is in conformity with ordinary language. Note that NF  lies somewhere in the broad vicinity of fr. , somewhere in the nine or  column gap dividing fr.  from fr. ; cf. Hammerstaedt/Smith ()  (= , ). ⁵⁴ The fragment belongs to the ethical treatise. As the editors point out (Hammerstaedt/Smith , – = , –) it is likely to be part of Diogenes’ demonstration of how our life is made pleasant ‘in actions’, and it may have stood towards the end of the Ethics.



 

ing from luxur y both regarding ourselves and regarding others. If it is read as an implicit rejection of Cyrenaic pleasures, Diogenes’ remark gains additional force: the pleasures of eating delicacies, drinking rare wine, and taking part in Roman orgies are no greater but far more troublesome than those deriving from the simple luxuries of the Epicurean life. While the former require the strong stimulation of the senses (in Epicurean terms, they are kinetic pleasures of a certain kind), the latter require only the absence of pain. And they count as luxuries precisely because, contra what the Cyrenaics believe, ἀπονία is, in fact, the highest pleasure. NF , one of the monolithic Maxims probably composed by Diogenes himself, clarifies the way in which the good Epicurean enjoys the present and invites comparison with the thoughtless attitude of those who pursue immediate pleasure without having an overall lifeplan. One must make the present perfect, and not live oriented towards what remains of the future, saying: “Until such and such a thing still happens to me”. For [what] will be lacking that [needs to be the object of this yearning]? (NF ) As the editors point out,⁵⁵ Diogenes stresses the importance of fully enjoying the present, not living for some uncertain future. But it should be added that the Epicurean recommendation to live in the present has little similarity to what is usually called carpe diem. In fact, in the remaining part of his treatise On Choices and Avoidances (Elect. II –; cf. also II –), Philodemus appears to associate that latter attitude with the Cyrenaics⁵⁶ and rejects it on the grounds that heedless sybaritism brings more pain than pleasure. On the other hand, in the extant remains of On Death, he repeatedly emphasises the completeness and self-sufficiency of the pleasurable present, allowing, however, that the good Epicurean also has good hopes for the future even though he realises that they may never come to pass (Mort. XII –XIV , XVII –XVIII ; see also Elect. XXII –XXIII ). Diogenes’ maxim, I suggest, is best understood in the light of both of Philodemus’ texts mentioned above. We should strive to achieve katastematic pleasure in the present and not make our happiness dependent on future-oriented desires; for once present suffering is removed, the resulting pleasure cannot be increased and hence no future good can further contribute to it. It does not follow, however, that we ought not to have wishes and plans for the future, as the Cyrenaics contend. On the contrary, if the

⁵⁵ Hammerstaedt/Smith ()  (= , ). ⁵⁶ See Indelli/Tsouna-McKirahan () ad loc.

     



precariousness of the latter⁵⁷ and our mortality are properly taken into account, then the pleasures of anticipation become aspects or variations of the katastematic state. A final fragment, NF , deserves comment.⁵⁸ Both Cyrenaics and Epicureans believe that erotic passion for a particular person is a major source of emotional disturbance. Suffering becomes especially acute when sexual intercourse with that person is impossible. Indeed, a common theme in erotic elegy is the idea that the mere sight of the beloved inflames one’s passion, all the more when it remains unfulfilled. Now, many anecdotes indicate that Aristippus greatly indulged in sexual pleasures retaining however his self-control, whereas Epicurus is attested to recommend restraint (Diog. Laert. X ; Epicur. Vat. )⁵⁹ and Lucretius advises that, to avoid the frustrations of eros, one should opt for casual sex as opposed to sex with the object of one’s erotic desire (IV –). However, the remedy that Diogenes proposes differs from that of Lucretius and especially addresses those who believe that looking at the beloved is painful, if the latter does not offer sexual release. To fully understand Diogenes’ proposal, I submit that it is important to refer to an earlier debate between the Epicureans and the Cyrenaics on the nature of aesthetic pleasure. It is unfortunate that those who are sick with erotic passion do not realise that they derive perfect pleasure from sight, even without intercourse. On the other hand, the sexual act itself is the same, whether one’s partner has a superior or an inferior appearance (NF  –).⁶⁰ Diogenes distinguishes the pleasure deriving from the mere sight (ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως) of the beloved, presumably assuming that he/she is beautiful, from the pleasure deriving from sex. His point is, I think, that even in cases in which the object of one’s ἔρως, erotic love, is not sexually available, there is no reason to become unhappy. For, in fact, the pleasures of sex can be obtained much more easily and no worse with

⁵⁷ Hammerstaedt/Smith ()  (= , ), remark that the carpe diem theme of NF  links the new text to two other Maxims: NF , which suggests that chance plays a relatively small rôle in our lives; and fr. , which asserts that the sum of happiness consists in our disposition of which we usually have control. Compare with the Cyrenaics, for whom happiness is a mere aggregate of pleasures, and especially with Hegesias, for whom the vicissitudes of fortune make happiness virtually impossible. ⁵⁸ Hammerstaedt/Smith ()  (= , ), suggest that NF  may have been close to fr.  and other texts concerned with the desires, pleasures and pains of the body, such as fr. . ⁵⁹ According to Epicurus, the desire for sex is natural but not necessary. ⁶⁰ See Hammerstaedt/Smith ()  (= , ).



 

someone else, whether he/she is more or less attractive. But in any case, the argument continues, if sex is not possible, merely looking at the beloved also produces its own distinctive pleasures (which I take to be aesthetic pleasures). In making this distinction, Diogenes harks back to an earlier disagreement between his own school and the Cyrenaics bearing on the nature of aesthetic experience and witnessed by Plutarch (Quaest. conv. V .A–B).⁶¹ As Plutarch and other sources attest, the Epicureans claim that pleasure (and pain) are generated solely by the senses, for instance by sight (περὶ τὴν ὄψιν) or by hearing (περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν), whereas the Cyrenaics contend that these feelings are generated by one’s mind or thought (περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν).⁶² Therefore, Plutarch infers, the Epicureans cannot explain a phenomenon that the Cyrenaics can explain, namely the fact that, while we feel pleasure at the representations of characters suffering or dying, we are uncomfortable when we come into contact with such people in reality.⁶³ In other words, on the Epicurean view, aesthetic pleasures result from the unmediated effect of the object on the perceiver’s sense-organ, whereas on the alternative, Cyrenaic view they are determined by one’s conceptualisation of what is being experienced.⁶⁴ By dissociating the pleasure of merely looking at the beloved from the pleasures of sex Diogenes could answer Plutarch’s charge⁶⁵ in the following manner: regardless of the way in which the lover conceptualises what it is that he/she desires, there will be a pleasure caused by the sense alone, i.e., by sight. Regrettably, however, most people overlook that pleasure because of the pain that they feel as a result of desires involving false opinions – in this case, erotic desire involving the belief that sexual satisfaction can occur only by having sex with the particular person that one is in love with. Note the originality of Diogenes’ approach and the importance of his contribution to the controversy attested by Plutarch.⁶⁶

⁶¹ See Warren (). ⁶² They (the Cyrenaics) say that pleasures do not arise from mere sight or hearing alone. In any case, we listen with pleasure to whose imitating a lament but without pleasure to those who are doing it in reality (Diog. Laert. II ). ⁶³ In the former case, Plutarch concludes: our thought is directed appropriately at the imitations. ⁶⁴ I am grateful to James Warren for correspondence on this issue. ⁶⁵ I do not imply that Diogenes must have known Plutarch’s work. ⁶⁶ Refik Güremen pointed out to me that fr.  II may also be relevant to Diogenes’ conception of aesthetic pleasures. Regarding the text and content of NF , see also Hammerstaedt (b).

     



.  To conclude, according to my argument, Diogenes engages with the views of the Cyrenaics in several passages of his inscription, especially those concerning the doctrine of pleasure and the question how best to live the good life. If he does follow the convention of viewing the Cyrenaics as the theoretical defenders of the compulsive hedonism of the many, then they cannot be far from his mind when he contrasts that attitude with central features of the hedonism of his own school. Notably, these features include the correct and consistent use of the utilitarian calculus; the indispensable and pleasurable rôle of the virtues in the pursuit of pleasure; the superiority of the affections of the soul over those of the body, as well as the contention that the pleasures of anticipation occupy an important place in moral life; and also, the rejection of an intermediate, affectively neutral state, and the Epicurean conception of the τέλος in terms of the absence of pain or disturbance. The fragment in which Diogenes explicitly refers to Aristippus as the advocate of present bodily pleasure (namely, of the attitude that Diogenes elsewhere attributes to the many), I think lends plausibility to the reading that I sketched out above. If that reading is roughly correct, it prompts us to wonder why Diogenes occupies himself with a school that stopped being active centuries before his own floruit.⁶⁷ One possible answer derives from the so far unquestioned assumption of Diogenes’ antiquarianism. Namely, the argument might run, since Epicurus’ hedonism had been shaped crucially by comparison and contrast with the hedonism of the Cyrenaics (and especially the Annicerians, who were exact contemporaries of Epicurus), and if, as is commonly believed, Diogenes follows the school’s foundational writings in oblivion of its later developments, it is very probable that his polemic against the Cyrenaics merely echoes the criticisms voiced by Epicurus. Of course, I do not wish to question wholesale Diogenes’ reliance on the authoritative scriptures of the Garden. However, this does not exclude that he is also aware of later Epicurean trends and that he forms some of his own views accordingly.⁶⁸ For present purposes, we should recall that, so far as we know, the threefold distinction of the causes of pleasure (fr.  + NF ) has no parallel in early Epicurean literature (nor, as Sedley points out, does it occur anywhere else). The same holds for the

⁶⁷ I revisit this question in Tsouna (). ⁶⁸ Regarding several subjects, Diogenes’ treatment can be closely compared with that of Philodemus or also of Torquatus, Cicero’s Epicurean spokesman in the De finibus. For instance, Diogenes’ concern with one’s attitude at the moment of dying (NF  II –), is also one of Philodemus’ concerns in On Death. Also, so far as I can tell, the structure of Diogenes’ presentation of Epicurean pleasure is very comparable to Torquatus’ exposition in De finibus I.



 

argument explaining why laymen fail to assess the relative superiority of psychic pleasures over bodily ones (fr. ), and also for the distinction between purely aesthetic and sensual pleasures that may or may not both derive from the same object (NF ). So, an alternative or complementary hypothesis is that Diogenes engages with the Cyrenaics not (only) for antiquarian reasons, but also because he finds them philosophically challenging and has new things to say on their score. Unfortunately, the current state of the evidence makes it impossible to tell whether Diogenes’ criticisms are self-motivated or, alternatively, whether they are prompted by contemporary debates involving a revival of interest in the Cyrenaic school.

     ’ ’Œ Jean-Baptiste Gourinat*

.   Les stoïciens sont les adversaires que Diogène d’Œnoanda mentionne le plus régulièrement. On compte en effet six discussions avec mention explicite des stoïciens, plus une discussion sans mention explicite conservée (ces mentions sont détaillées ci-après). C’est beaucoup plus que pour n’importe quel autre philosophe ou école, même Démocrite. Démocrite est en effet le seul philosophe mentionné et discuté autant ou presque que les stoïciens car il est discuté quatre fois (sur les principes, sur les rêves, sur le destin et la nécessité). À l’exception d’Empédocle, mentionné deux fois (une simple mention sur les principes, un développement sur la transmigration de l’âme), et de Socrate et de Platon, également mentionnés deux fois, peut-être trois en ce qui concerne Platon,¹ tous les autres philosophes ne sont mentionnés qu’une fois: ce sont presque exclusivement des présocratiques, à l’exception d’une mention d’Aristote et des péripatéticiens, regroupés avec Lacydès de Cyrène dans le camp des sceptiques (fr. ), et d’une mention d’Aristippe (sur le soin du corps): Héraclite, Thalès, Diogène d’Apollonie, Anaximène et Anaxagore (de simples mentions sur les principes), Pythagore (une simple mention sur la survie de l’âme), Protagoras et Diagoras (discutés comme athées). Seuls trois courants sont mentionnés explicitement: les socratiques, les péripatéticiens et les stoïciens. Les stoïciens apparaissent donc comme les grands adversaires de Diogène, plus encore que Démocrite, dont il se démarque pour des raisons évidentes de proximité. Sauf peut-être Zénon (dont la mention est conjecturale),² aucun stoïcien n’est mentionné nommément, à l’exception de la mention de Zénon, Cléanthe et Chrysippe dans le NF  III –. Toutefois, cette mention ne constitue pas une vraie mention nominale des trois premiers scolarques de l’école, puisqu’elle est une forme courante

* Je remercie les participants du colloque d’Istanbul et Mugla pour leurs remarques, et tout particulièrement Jürgen Hammerstaedt et Pierre-Marie Morel pour leurs commentaires écrits. ¹ Les socratiques sont mentionnés une fois, Socrate et Platon sont mentionnés une fois ensemble à propos de leurs juges dans l’Hadès (NF  IV –), sans que ce soit un témoignage doctrinal, Platon est mentionné dans le NF  à propos du démiurge, et serait encore mentionné à propos l’existence de l’âme, mais la mention de son nom, d’ailleurs avec les stoïciens, est conjecturale (fr. .–). ² Fr.  II .



- 

d’alternative à la mention des «stoïciens» dans la littérature doxographique³ et c’est sans doute ainsi qu’il faut la comprendre aussi dans ce cas. Ce décompte statistique vaut ce qu’il vaut, compte tenu de l’incomplétude de l’inscription, des nombreuses incertitudes de lecture, et des controverses sur l’identification des adversaires visés par le fr.  qui sont, selon les interprètes, les stoïciens ou les cyrénaïques, j’ y reviendrai. Mais l’impression qui s’ en dégage ne peut être totalement fausse et est un signe assez probant de l’importance accordée aux stoïciens par Diogène. Les thèmes abordés sont les suivants: Traité physique: () les principes (matière et Dieu): fr.  et  () la nature des rêves: fr.  (repris dans le fr.  du traité éthique) () la production du monde, la providence divine et le cosmopolitisme : Théol. et fr.  () la divination: fr.  (sans mention explicite des stoïciens, l’identification est contestée) Traité éthique: () les vertus ou le plaisir comme fin : fr. –, NF  (qui appartient au même texte que le fr. ) et NF  (avec mention explicite pour le NF , sans mention explicite pour les autres fragments, l’identification est contestée pour le fr.  où le nom de Zénon est reconstitué et pour le NF ) () la persistance limitée de l’âme après la mort: fr. – () la richesse et la pauvreté: fr.  (la mention est reconstituée)

³ La mention de Zénon, Cléanthe et Chrysippe est assez fréquente chez les doxographes, ou chez d’autres auteurs, par exemple Lucien, Symposium . Elle ne prend que très rarement la forme d’une notice où chacun des trois auteurs fait l’objet d’une description précise dans laquelle les différences entre les trois auteurs sont signalées : dans les fragments physiques d’Arius Didyme, le seul cas est le fr.  sur la lune (Diels, DG ), et les autres notices fournissent des listes alternatives, par exemple Zénon, Chrysippe et Posidonius (Ar. Did. fr. ), ou Zénon, Apollodore, Posidonius et Chrysippe (Ar. Did. fr. ). La mention de ces trois noms est plutôt une autre façon de dire «les stoïciens» en désignant en bloc les trois fondateurs. On constate ainsi que, dans le fr. , qui existe dans deux versions, l’une transmise par Eusèbe, Praep. Év. XVI .–, et l’autre transmise par Stobée I  (.–), la mention des «stoïciens» dans la version d’Eusèbe devient celle de « Zénon, Cléanthe et Chrysippe» dans la version de Stobée, et que, dans la version d’Eusèbe, Arius lui-même substitue à la mention des stoïciens la mention des trois noms quelques lignes plus bas (les textes sont présentés en colonnes parallèles par Diels, DG –; voir mon commentaire dans Gourinat , – ). La mention de «Zénon, Cléanthe et Chrysippe» dans le NF  de Diogène me semble relever de la même logique : elle revient à une référence aux stoïciens.

     ’  ’Œ



Certains de ces thèmes sont abordés de manière quasi doxographique, comme quand Diogène fait la liste des principes (fr. ), mais ils sont le plus souvent abordés de manière réfutative, soit nommément soit implicitement: explicitement contre la conception stoïcienne des visions vides dans les rêves et les phantasmes, les thèses des stoïciens sur la «production » du monde et la providence, leur conception du monde comme une cité des hommes et des dieux, la survivance de l’âme après la mort, implicitement (du moins dans l’état connu du texte) quand il s’attaque à la divination et au destin, et surtout au τέλος. Ces critiques touchent à des points cruciaux de la différence entre le stoïcisme et l’épicurisme. Les questions de physique pourraient être résumées par la fameuse formule de Marc-Aurèle: «la providence ou les atomes»,⁴ et seule la question des rêves peut paraître marginale. Les deux questions discutées en éthique correspondent semblablement à des questions centrales, bien attestées comme un nœud de l’opposition entre stoïciens et épicuriens: celle du τέλος et de la place du plaisir, dont on sait que c’est le grand thème de polémique éthique entre stoïciens et épicuriens.⁵ La question de la survie temporaire de l’âme après la mort ou de son anéantissement touche à une question plus marginale pour les stoïciens, mais elle est traditionnellement identifiée comme un point de distinction entre les deux écoles⁶ et elle est cruciale pour les épicuriens, car c’est elle qui offre un remède contre la peur de la mort. Ce recentrement de Diogène sur des fondamentaux anti-stoïciens fait sa particularité: Philodème, par exemple est beaucoup moins exclusivement préoccupé de centrer ses attaques sur les stoïciens, même s’ il est, avec Cicéron, le seul antécédent d’un tel centrage sur l’opposition de l’épicurisme et du stoïcisme. Ce recentrement fait, à certains égards, miroir avec l’opposition frontale dressée par Marc Aurèle entre la providence et les atomes, et reflète un état doctrinal de l’épicurisme qui semble assez original et tardif. Il ne s’agit probablement pas d’un état ancien des polémiques entre épicuriens et

⁴ C’est la formule de Marc Aurèle IV ., dont on trouve des équivalents sous d’autres formes en IV , VI , VI , VIII , IX .–, IX , X ., XI , XII . Sur l’importance et la signification de cette formule, voir Hadot () –. Cette disjonctive ayant suscité une grande masse d’analyses, je me permets de renvoyer également à Gourinat (, – ) où l’on trouvera une discussion et un rappel des contributions les plus significatives. L’alternative entre la physique épicurienne des atomes et de l’indéterminisme et celle de la providence stoïcienne est déjà ce qui structure à bien des égards de De natura deorum de Cicéron, ce qui semble indiquer qu’elle était pour les deux écoles l’alternative principale. ⁵ Voir notamment pour les stoïciens Diogène Laërce VII –, qui mêle la fin et l’impulsion initiale, pour Epicur. Men. –, –, Cic. Tusc. III – et Fin. II , Diog. Laert. X . ⁶ Sext. Emp. Math. IX .



- 

stoïciens.⁷ Dans la physique, Diogène ajoute à ce recentrement un couple d’erreurs opposées, constituées par celles de stoïciens et de Démocrite, qui «s’est trompé» (fr.  II ; fr.  II –) mais qui, dans certains de ses propos, «a bien fait» (fr.  II –). Les stoïciens semblent être les seuls adversaires qu’il convient de réfuter, avec Démocrite. Mais ils sont beaucoup plus réfutables que Démocrite, qui a une réelle proximité avec l’épicurisme. Le rapport de filiation et de critique à l’égard de Démocrite remonte évidemment à Épicure lui-même (cf. Epicur. – Us.), mais le couplage récurrent de Démocrite avec les stoïciens comme deux erreurs opposées est à ma connaissance une originalité de Diogène. Il serait sans doute imprudent d’en tirer des conclusions chronologiques, mais on ne peut manquer d’être frappé par la singularité de Diogène sur ces deux points, qui semble appartenir à un moment assez précis de l’histoire de l’épicurisme et de ses relations avec le stoïcisme. Il importe en outre de remarquer que ce n’est pas la seule division entre écoles pratiquée par Diogène, puisque, dans le fr. , la position épicurienne est opposée à l’impossibilité de connaître, position sceptique qui, dans un étrange couplage, est attribuée à Aristote et à l’académicien Lacydès de Cyrène.⁸ Le présent article suivra un par un, dans l’ordre où ils se présentent, les points de la polémique anti-stoïcienne de Diogène.

.    .. Les principes La mention des principes stoïciens apparaît dans les fr.  et . Le fr.  contient la première mention des stoïciens dans ce qui est conservé de l’inscription. Diogène leur attribue la thèse que les «éléments» ou les «corps premiers» sont la matière et le Dieu (fr.  II –). Il a presque raison – à ceci près que la matière et le Dieu sont des principes et non des éléments chez les stoïciens, et que les stoïciens distinguent très précisément les principes des éléments (Diog. Laert. VII ). Cette mention apparaît dans une notice d’allure assez doxographique, qui ne comprend, hormis les stoïciens, que des penseurs présocratiques: Héraclite, Thalès, Diogène d’Apollonie, Anaximène, Empédocle, Anaxagore et Démocrite. L’inclusion

⁷ Reste que, traditionnellement, l’opposition varie selon les domaines : on voit par exemple chez Cicéron que la situation n’est pas la même en ce qui concerne la physique, notamment la théologie, où l’opposition des deux écoles marginalise presque les autres doctrines (Aristote est presque embrigadé dans le camp stoïcien), alors que la situation n’est pas la même avec l’éthique, où l’ aristotélisme joue un rôle beaucoup plus important. ⁸ Cf. Verde – dans ce volume.

     ’  ’Œ



des stoïciens au beau milieu de cette liste est à première vue surprenante, et en outre elle paraît imprécise. La plupart des exposés philosophiquement informés sur la question des principes commencent en distinguant les principes et les éléments,⁹ mais Diogène les assimile manifestement les uns aux autres, puisqu’il appelle «éléments» indifféremment des éléments (le feu, l’eau, l’air et la terre) et des principes (les homéomères, la matière et dieu, les atomes). Les stoïciens distinguent précisément la matière et le Dieu, qui sont des principes, inengendrés et incorruptibles, des quatre éléments, engendrés et corruptibles (Diog. Laert. VII ). Il est peu probable que ce soit par ignorance que Diogène d’Œnoanda procède à cette assimilation: cela ressemble à une stratégie volontaire. Le doxographe des Placita remarque qu’Aristote et Platon estiment qu’il y a une différence entre les principes et les éléments, mais Thalès considère que le principe et les éléments sont une seule et même chose (I .C). Il ajoute que Thalès se trompe, car les éléments sont composés (σύνθετα), tandis que les principes ne sont ni des composés ni les effets d’un processus (ἀποτελέσματα). C’est une autre version de la distinction stoïcienne et, de fait, la distinction entre éléments et principes, que les Placita attribuent à Platon et à Aristote, est une distinction stoïcienne, que les Placita semblent reformuler à leur manière. C’est une stratégie anti-stoïcienne que de ne pas l’adopter littéralement. Il n’empêche que Diogène en a retenu l’esprit, car il reproche à Héraclite de s’être trompé en disant (fr.  III –): que l’élément est le feu, car celui-ci n’est pas incorruptible – puisque nous le voyons se corrompre –, ni ne peut donner naissance aux choses. Autrement dit, pour Diogène, le feu n’est pas un élément, car il n’a pas les propriétés que les stoïciens attribuent aux principes : les éléments doivent être à ses yeux des êtres incorruptibles, et qui d’autre part, donnent naissance aux réalités (fr.  I –).¹⁰ C’est évidemment une conception épicurienne orthodoxe, mais qui est similaire aux réquisits stoïciens pour les principes. L’introduction des stoïciens dans la liste de présocratiques répond donc à une fonction philosophique précise, qui est de distinguer deux types de théorie des éléments, les éléments corruptibles et non principiels qui sont ceux du premier groupe de penseurs (Héraclite, Thalès, Diogène d’Apollonie, Anaximène, Empédocle), et les éléments véritables, inengendrés, incorruptibles et générateurs, qui sont ceux reconnus par le second groupe de penseurs (Anaxagore, les stoïciens, Démocrite). La construction de Diogène ne repose donc pas sur un

⁹ Voir [Plut.] Plac. I .C–D, et Diogène Laërce VII  (à propos des stoïciens). ¹⁰ Ici comme dans les autres citations de Diogène, j’utiliserai la traduction de Morel (), sauf quand elle n’ existe pas.

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schéma doxographique classique, tel qu’on pourrait le trouver dans les Placita ou à la limite chez Aristote, car elle a une économie bien précise. En outre, on ne trouvera pas certains des philosophes qui se trouvent dans les listes doxographiques classiques, à savoir Pythagore, Platon et Aristote (tous mentionnés par Aristote au livre I de la Physique mais aussi par l’auteur des Placita), vraisemblablement parce qu’ils partagent aux yeux de Diogène une erreur commune, celle d’inclure des principes incorporels dans leur liste. Or tous les éléments mentionnés ici sont en fait des corps premiers (fr.  I ), selon la reconstruction de Smith.¹¹ Dans l’état connu du texte, Diogène ne rejette explicitement, dans la doctrine du premier groupe de penseurs, que celle d’Héraclite, mais le NF  (qui s’intercale probablement entre le fr.  et la réfutation de Démocrite dans le fr. )¹² semble indiquer que l’argument qui vaut contre elle vaut contre toutes les autres doctrines similaires et qu’elle était probablement développée dans des parties manquantes du texte. Dans le second groupe, il réserve une place de choix à Démocrite, qui a bien fait de dire que les éléments sont des natures insécables, mais qui a quand même fait des erreurs. Nous n’avons pas trace dans les fr. – d’une critique d’Anaxagore et des stoïciens. Mais dans les six lignes très corrompues du fr. , on lit matière et les stoïc[iens]. Selon la reconstruction de Smith (a) , on pourrait comprendre que les éléments de l’univers: [ne sont ni Dieu ni] la matière, que les stoïc[iens considèrent à tort comme les principes], ni [le feu ni l’air ni l’eau ni la terre, comme d’autres le supposent, mais des natures indivisibles qui sont absolument impérissables et immuables]. La critique, absente du fr. , serait donc présente dans ce fragment, dont on peut se demander si la logique de l’argumentation ne voudrait pas qu’il ait été intercalé entre le fr.  et le fr. , ce qui anticiperait la structure de la critique des rêves, où les stoïciens et Démocrite sont renvoyés dos à dos. Cela semble toutefois exclu, puisque d’après Smith () , «the style and size of its letters show that it is a maxim». Même si le fr.  n’est pas un morceau égaré du traité physique, il est probable qu’un argument similaire se trouvait dans le traité entre le fr. , où se trouve la critique d’Héraclite, et le fr. , où commence la critique de Démocrite. Le NF , qui s’intercale entre les deux, pourrait en tout cas refléter une critique d’Anaxagore semblable à celle que l’on trouve chez Lucrèce I –:

¹¹ Smith () : πρῶτα σώματα. Cette reconstruction me paraît juste, non seulement parce que l’expression est épicurienne, mais aussi parce qu’elle rend compte de ce que sont les éléments ainsi compris, à savoir des corps. ¹² Voir Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –).

     ’  ’Œ



ces choses ne sont pas plus [indestructibles] que toutes celles que [nous voyons détruites] par le changement.¹³ On peut peut-être imaginer que Diogène introduisait là une critique semblable à celle d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise, qui accuse les stoïciens d’avoir introduit parmi ses principes un principe engendré, puisque le Dieu stoïcien, en tant que πνεῦμα, est, selon lui, engendré par la matière,¹⁴ mais cela est purement spéculatif. Pour autant que l’on puisse savoir, il n’est pas inhabituel qu’un traité de physique épicurienne commence, après quelques considérations sur le rôle de la physique, en abordant la question des éléments. Plutarque, Contre Colotès A (Epicur.  Us.), dit en effet qu’Épicure disait « au début de son traité» Sur la nature que «la nature des êtres» est le corps et le vide, et cela semble bien témoigner d’un début consacré aux éléments, et l’on peut dire que c’est à peu près ce que l’on retrouve dans la Lettre à Hérodote, voire chez Lucrèce. Mais nous n’avons pas conservé d’autre exemple de texte épicurien où l’exposé de cette doctrine commence par une réfutation des positions adverses,¹⁵ présentée selon une construction originale, et semble même se réduire à cette réfutation. Il est frappant que, dans ce contexte, les stoïciens soient les seuls philosophes non présocratiques mentionnés et que, même s’ils sont vraisemblablement critiqués dans le fr. , leur position erronée soit moins erronée que beaucoup d’autres, dans la mesure où ils ont correctement compris ce qu’est un élément ou corps premier, et ce même s’ils se trompés en l’identifiant. Ils ne sont pas dits avoir vu juste, contrairement à Démocrite, mais leur position est au moins philosophiquement tenable. .. La nature des rêves La conception stoïcienne des rêves est évoquée et critiquée dans le fr.  et elle est rappelée dans le fr.  du traité éthique. C’est une critique très manifestement approximative. Il est frappant que, comme dans le cas des éléments ou principes, les stoïciens soient à nouveau associés à Démocrite, comme s’ils étaient les deux seuls groupes de penseurs dont la théorie mérite d’être évoquée et critiquée. Diogène va même plus loin ici dans l’explicitation de cette association, puisque les stoïciens et Démocrite sont crédités de deux erreurs opposées (fr.  V –):

¹³ NF .–. Voir Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –). ¹⁴ Alex. Mixt. .–. Cf. Gourinat () . ¹⁵ Diogène écrit : ce qu’ils sont, je vais l’exposer en commençant par écarter les [autres] opinions (fr.  I –). Même le premier livre de Lucrèce, sur le même sujet, qui consacre une grande partie de ses développements à une réfutation des positions adverses, ne commence pas par cette réfutation, mais au contraire finit par elle.

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- 

Ces hommes, les stoïciens d’un côté et Démocrite de l’autre, se sont donc égarés en des sens opposés (τὸ ἐναντίον ἐπλανήθησαν) : les stoïciens privent les images d’un pouvoir qu’elles ont bel et bien, tandis que Démocrite les gratifie d’un pouvoir qu’elles n’ont pourtant pas. Sans doute à cause de cette construction, le compte-rendu et la critique de la doctrine stoïcienne sont très approximatifs, et se font, comme dans le cas des principes transformés en éléments, au mépris du vocabulaire stoïcien.¹⁶ Diogène commence par avancer que les apparitions [oniriques] ne sont donc pas des ombres vides tracées par la pensée (κενὰ σκιαγραφήματα τῆς διανοίας οὐκ ἔστι τὰ φάντασματα), comme le croient les stoïciens (fr.  I –). C’est globalement la doctrine des stoïciens, qui admettent que, dans les rêves, ne se produisent pas des représentations (φαντασίαι) imprimées par les objets extérieurs (φανταστά), mais des hallucinations (φανταστικοί) qui sont dus à des phantasmes (φαντάσματα), mouvements à vide qui se produisent dans l’âme sans qu’aucun objet extérieur ne l’imprime dans l’âme.¹⁷ Il est vrai que Diogène d’Œnoanda reproduit certains éléments de cette doctrine avec une certaine précision, notamment lorsqu’il écrit que les rêves sont des produits de la διάνοια,¹⁸ sans corrélat extérieur, qui les produise, et les qualifie de vides.¹⁹ Mais ces produits psychiques vides ne sont pas pour les stoïciens des ombres vides tracées (κενὰ σκιαγραφήματα), contrairement à ce qu’il écrit, ce sont des attractions à vide (διάκενος ἑλκυσμός), c’est-à-dire qu’en réalité ce sont des impressions que l’âme produit elle-même,²⁰ et ce sont donc des impressions de nature corporelle. Or la critique de Diogène ignore complètement cet aspect corporel des impressions qui se produisent en rêve et reproche aux stoïciens d’en faire des images qui n’ont pas de nature corporelle (fr.  I –II ): Et en effet, s’ils disent qu’elles sont ‘vides’ (κενὰ) au sens où elles ont une nature corporelle, mais d’une subtilité extrême et qui ne saurait tomber sous les sens, ils [se

¹⁶ Cette manière de réécrire doit être notée, non seulement pour elle-même, mais parce qu’elle a son importance pour l’ identification des adversaires visés dans le fr. . ¹⁷ La doctrine doit être reconstituée à partir de plusieurs sources: Diog. Laert. VII  et Sext. Emp. Math. VII  pour les rêves ; [Plut.] Plac. IV .D–F pour la distinction entre φαντασία et φανταστικόν. ¹⁸ Fr.  I –: comparer avec Diog. Laert. VII : δόκησις διανοίας οἵα γίνεται κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους. ¹⁹ Fr.  I  (κενά): comparer avec Sext. Emp. Math. VII : διάκενος. Voir aussi le texte des Placita cité n. suivante. ²⁰ [Plut.] Plac. IV .E: φανταστικὸν δ’ ἐστὶ διάκενος ἑλκυσμός, πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπ’ οὐδενὸς φανταστοῦ γινόμενον.

     ’  ’Œ

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servent] d’une mauvaise expression, [puisqu’il faudrait] les [dire] «corporelles», bien qu’elles soient subtiles. Si d’autre part elles sont ‘vides’ au sens où elles ne sont, sous aucun aspect, de nature corporelle – et c’est assurément cela qu’ils veulent dire, plutôt que la première chose –, comment le vide pourrait-il être reproduit comme une peinture (ἀναζωγραφεῖσθαι)? Qu’il s’exprime ainsi de bonne foi par ignorance ou de mauvaise foi, Diogène a assurément tort : les stoïciens ne ‘veulent dire’ aucune des deux alternatives qu’il leur prête, car ils ne visent ni une nature corporelle très subtile, ni une absence totale de nature corporelle. Ils visent une impression que l’âme produit elle-même sans corrélat extérieur qui l’imprime. Dans l’analyse qu’il donne de la seconde alternative, celle qu’il considère comme l’interprétation correcte, il a bien vu que le rêve stoïcien est sensé ne pas avoir d’objet extérieur, et il demande comment le vide pourrait produire une image semblable à celle des peintres. L’idée est que les peintres reproduisent quelque chose, et que ce n’est donc pas rien, qui est représenté par cette image. Dans tout le corpus stoïcien conservé, l’image d’une « reproduction picturale» (ἀναζωγράφησις) sans impression extérieure n’apparaît que dans un titre énigmatique de Chrysippe (Diog. Laert. VII ) et dans un fragment de Posidonius, conservé par Galien, qui explique que le récit d’un danger peut provoquer une «reproduction picturale (ἀναζωγράφησις) semblable à une sensation»²¹ et produire la peur: Ainsi, dit Posidonius, il y a des gens qui sont envahis de désir à cause d’un récit, ou qui prennent peur quand on leur crie clairement de fuir à l’approche d’un lion qu’ils ne voient pas.²² Bien qu’il ne s’agisse pas d’un rêve, mais d’une émotion suscitée par un récit, les cas décrits sont très similaires à ceux décrits par Diogène: le désir et la peur suscités par une chose que l’on ne voit pas mais que l’on imagine grâce au langage dans le cas de Posidonius ou par le rêve dans le cas de Diogène: au lion, Diogène substitue la crainte d’être frappé par une épée, et le désir suscité par un récit devient un plaisir sexuel satisfait en rêve (fr.  III–IV). Diogène semble viser une analyse très semblable à celle de Posidonius. Il avance deux arguments : l’un est que des simulacres continuent à nous arriver dans notre sommeil (fr.  IV–V), l’autre que les réactions provoquées par les rêves produisent un effet et ne peuvent donc être considérés comme vides

²¹ Galien, De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis V . (CMG V ... p. .– [De Lacy] = V  Kühn = Posidonius T  E.-K.). ²² Ibid. V ., p. .– CMG (Posidonius T  E.-K.).



- 

(fr.  IV –). Implicitement, l’argument est qu’il n’y a pas d’effet sans cause, et que du vide ne peut être cause de quelque chose. L’argument de Diogène fonctionne donc sur une notion du ‘vide’ qui n’est pas celle sur laquelle fonctionne l’argument stoïcien car l’attraction à vide de l’imagination dans le stoïcisme n’est pas l’absence de corps, elle est seulement un mouvement auto-généré de l’âme, qui a une réalité corporelle, tandis que Diogène fait en gros comme si le vide en question était l’espace inoccupé, le vide physique ou cosmologique. Le passage de Posidonius rapporté par Galien fournit la réponse à l’objection de Diogène: les visions des songes sont des impressions auto-générées par l’âme, qui ne sont pas causées par un objet extérieur, mais qui peuvent produire une image semblable à celle des peintres, précisément comme le font les peintres, en créant une illusion grâce à une image qui n’est pas l’impression d’un objet présent mais une re-présentation qui a un substrat corporel. La critique de Diogène n’a donc rien d’une critique rigoureuse, mais repose sur une déformation de la doctrine stoïcienne, déformation qui n’est pas illégitime mais veut inclure le stoïcisme dans une construction interne qui utilise des concepts propres à l’épicurisme: Diogène n’est pas précis, mais il réinterprète le stoïcisme dans le vocabulaire de son école pour mieux le discuter. Il est probable que si Diogène a besoin de déformer ainsi la doctrine stoïcienne, c’est pour pouvoir mieux l’opposer à la doctrine démocritéenne, et construire un schéma où les stoïciens n’attribuent pas assez de réalité aux images des rêves, tandis que Démocrite leur attribue trop de pouvoir (fr.  V –, cité ci-dessus p. ). La déformation que Diogène opère semble dictée par son schéma général où Épicure tient la vérité entre deux positions contraires, représentées par les stoïciens et Démocrite. C’est tout sauf un exposé doxographique. C’est une discussion philosophiquement construite, équivalente aux transformations textuelles que fait Aristote, par exemple lorsqu’il emploie le mot «matière» pour discuter des philosophes qui ne l’ont jamais employé, comme Platon. Un enjeu sous-jacent du texte est l’épistémologie de l’épicurisme et du stoïcisme, puisque, tandis que le critère stoïcien de la vérité est l’impression compréhensive et suppose une distinction entre φαντασίαι vraies et fausses, il n’y a pas de sensation fausse ni d’impression sans objet dans l’épicurisme, mais toute φαντασία est toujours causée par l’arrivée d’un simulacre.²³ Les arguments de Diogène sur les rêves font donc partie d’une stratégie épistémologique, comme le développement suivant sur la manière dont les hommes en sont venus à concevoir des maisons (εἰς ἐπίνοι̣[α]ν̣ [ο]ἰκ̣ ημάτων ἦλ̣ θον, fr.  I –). Diogène n’est pas en train de faire une physiologie des actes psychiques, mais ces développements ont pour but de répondre au scepti-

²³ Sur cette opposition basique du stoïcisme et de l’épicurisme, voir [Plut.] Plac. IV .F. Sur la représentation compréhensive comme critère, voir notamment Diog. Laert. VII .

     ’  ’Œ



cisme déjà critiqué dans le fr. , en montrant que les images et les visions sont de vraies réalités (φύσεις, fr.  I –). Ces paragraphes remplissent ainsi une fonction épistémologique relativement similaire à celle des §– de la Lettre à Hérodote,²⁴ mais la dimension de réponse au scepticisme est une originalité de Diogène par rapport à Épicure. Tous ces développements épistémologiques s’opposent à la fois à l’argument sceptique sur l’impossibilité de connaître, à la position stoïcienne qui conduit à remettre en cause la fiabilité d’un certain nombre d’ ‘images’ et de ‘visions’, et au ‘pouvoir’ excessif que Démocrite attribue aux simulacres (car celui-ci, en attribuant aux simulacres la capacité de nous parler, leur donne aussi la capacité d’être trompeurs). On voit donc se dessiner dans la division épistémologique des écoles une structure, qui n’est pas sans rappeler celle souvent pratiquée par Cicéron, où stoïciens et épicuriens sont renvoyés dos à dos, au profit d’une position sceptique qui rejette les uns et les autres. Mais il y a deux différences de taille: Démocrite prend la place des épicuriens qui, eux, se retrouvent dans la seule position dogmatique vraie, opposés aux sceptiques qui défendent l’impossibilité de connaître,²⁵ tandis que Démocrite et les stoïciens représentent deux positions épistémologiques opposées l’une à l’autre mais inégalement erronées. .. La production du monde, la providence divine et le cosmopolitisme Théol. et le fr.  font partie des arguments théologiques dirigés contre la doctrine stoïcienne et concernent le rôle du dieu comme ‘producteur’ (ποιητής) du monde et son action providentielle. La thèse stoïcienne est présentée sous la forme suivante par Diogène (Théol. VIII = NF  VI –):

Φασὶ καὶ  οἱ [νομί]ζοντες τὴν πρ[όνοιαν] ποιητήν τε ἅμ[α τοῦ] κόσμου καὶ προνοη[τικὸ]ν εἶναι τὸν θεόν. Προν[οεῖ]ν δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν

²⁴ Voir Smith () , qui souligne que les deux textes doivent être comparés, mais n’avance pas que leur fonction est identique. ²⁵ Comme je l’ai signalé en introduction, dans le fr. , la position épicurienne est opposée à ceux qui défendent l’ impossibilité de connaître, qui comprennent Aristote et les péripatéticiens (I –III ) et l’académicien Lacydès de Cyrène (III –). On remarquera aussi que, dans le fr. , Diogène avance qu’il ne sera pas possible de vivre si l’on croit comme Démocrite que tout n’existe que par convention. L’argument s’ applique a fortiori aux sceptiques (on remarque que l’argument se trouve aussi chez Plut. Adv. Col. .E–F et suit un argument contre les sceptiques).



- 

 ἄλλ[ω]ν καὶ τῶν ἀν-

θρώπω[ν].²⁶ Ceux qui croient dans la providence disent à la fois que le dieu produit le monde et qu’il en prend soin. Il exerce sa providence sur tout et notamment sur les hommes. Elle est complétée plus loin par une explication de la volonté de Dieu en «produisant» le monde (Théol. IX–X = NF  II –III ):  θεασώμεθα καὶ τί

λέγουσιν οἱ Στωικοί. v βουλόμενος, φασίν, ὁ θεὸς πόλιν ἔχειν καὶ συνπολειτευτάς, ὥσπερ εἰ πόX λιν τὸν κόσμον ἑαυτῷ κατεσκεύασεν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους συνπολειτευτάς.²⁷ Examinons aussi ce que veulent dire les stoïciens. «C’est, disent-ils, dans l’intention d’avoir une cité et des concitoyens», comme si c’était pour lui-même qu’il avait fait le monde comme une cité et les hommes comme concitoyens. La question de la providence est bien connue pour avoir été un des thèmes, sur lequel les stoïciens et les épicuriens s’opposaient. Plutarque dit que Chrysippe attaquait Épicure à ce sujet (Stoic. repugn. .D–E): Il combat surtout Épicure et ceux qui abolissent la providence, en s’appuyant sur les notions que nous détenons au sujet des dieux comme bienfaisants et philanthropes. Plutarque mentionne seulement le recours de Chrysippe aux notions communes, mais on sait par Arius Didyme que les stoïciens soutenaient que «le monde est l’endroit habité par les dieux et les hommes et aussi l’ensemble constitué des dieux, des hommes et de ce qui a été créé pour eux» et que le monde «est comme une cité constituée des dieux et des hommes où les dieux ont le pouvoir, alors que les

²⁶ Hammerstaedt/Smith () . ²⁷ Ibid. .

     ’  ’Œ



hommes leur sont subordonnés», et qu’il faut tirer de tout cela la conséquence que: le dieu qui gouverne l’univers prend soin (προνοεῖν) des hommes (fr. , – [DG ]). On trouve le même argument chez Cicéron, ND. II , qui lie la providence divine à l’argument selon lequel le monde est: la demeure commune des dieux et des hommes, ou encore la cité des uns et des autres.²⁸ Il y avait donc un argument qui liait la thèse que le monde est une cité commune aux hommes et aux dieux et que le dieu gouverne les hommes avec la thèse d’une providence divine. On sait que, de leur côté, les épicuriens attaquaient traditionnellement les arguments stoïciens contre la providence.²⁹ Les arguments que Diogène oppose aux arguments de la doctrine stoïcienne sont les suivants: Dieu, étant un vivant bienheureux, n’a pas besoin de concitoyens, et, il serait « ridicule» (γελοῖον) de penser que Dieu «cherche à avoir les hommes comme concitoyens» (fr.  I –).³⁰ Qui plus est, s’il a créé le monde pour y habiter, «je me demande, dit Diogène, où il vivait avant que le monde n’existe». Le dieu n’a créé le monde ni pour lui-même ni par sollicitude envers les hommes. Tous ces arguments sont, par rapport à ceux que nous connaissons par ailleurs, plutôt bien informés sur les thèses et les arguments stoïciens, qu’ils attaquent d’une façon qui est apparemment originale, qui est sans doute un peu tendancieuse, mais qui ne déforme que très peu la littéralité et l’esprit des arguments stoïciens. L’idée que Dieu a créé les hommes pour lui-même est l’aspect le plus tendancieux de l’argument de Diogène, pourtant présenté comme une affirmation explicite des stoïciens. Comme l’on sait par Plutarque que Chrysippe attaquait Épicure pour son déni de l’existence de la providence, il semble assez vraisemblable que la critique de Diogène fait partie d’une stratégie de contre-attaques épicuriennes répondant à une attaque stoïcienne contre Épicure. C’est donc la critique stoïcienne qui semble avoir déterminé la contre-attaque de Diogène. .. La divination: fr.  L’argument critique que veut avancer Diogène dans ce paragraphe, manque. Il mentionne un physicien qui recourt à des arguments de dialecticien pour prouver la divination. Ce physicien recourait à l’exemple d’une prédiction exacte faite par Antiphon en interprétant correctement le rêve d’un coureur à Olympie, contre l’interprétation erronée d’un autre devin. L’anecdote de l’interprétation par Antiphon est connue par Cicéron ND II : le coureur s’était rêvé en aigle, et le devin avait dit au coureur qu’il vaincrait, à quoi Antiphon répondit qu’en fait il perdrait,

²⁸ Voir Smith () . Pour d’ autres parallèles, voir Pease () –. ²⁹ Voir Cic. ND I –. ³⁰ Texte de Hammerstaedt/Smith () .



- 

parce que l’aigle, pourchassant les autres oiseaux, est toujours derrière eux. Il est probable que Diogène critiquait le recours à cet exemple et à d’autres comme argument en faveur de la divination, mais sa critique a disparu. Il peut paraître difficile de dire si la critique de la divination visait les stoïciens ou Démocrite, en l’absence de mention explicite. Il pourrait s’ agir de Démocrite, puisque Diogène le critique dans le fr.  pour avoir soutenu que les rêves sont inspirés par les dieux. Mais il s’ agissait plus vraisemblablement d’un argument anti-stoïcien, du fait que l’interprétation du rêve du coureur par Antiphon est attribuée à Chrysippe par Cicéron ND II  : comme le souligne Pendrick dans son édition d’Antiphon, «it would be a remarkable coincidence if Diogenes reporting Democritus citing Antiphon just happened to recount the same dream-story as Cicero reporting a Stoic source citing Antiphon».³¹ Plus décisive encore me paraît l’idée d’un philosophe de la nature, qui recourt à des arguments de dialecticien (fr.  I –). Étienne et O’Meara () – disent avec modération que l’identification à Démocrite est «rendue moins plausible par la mention des ‘arguments d’un dialecticien’». Mais la vérité est que cette mention, s’ajoutant au témoignage de Cicéron sur Chrysippe, fait pencher la balance en faveur des stoïciens, qui sont les dialecticiens par excellence, alors que Démocrite n’est pas un dialecticien. Il semble en outre que l’argument de Diogène ne soit qu’une prolongation de l’argument développé depuis le NF  (Theol. VIII–XII) contre la providence stoïcienne, puisque le fait que les dieux nous envoient des songes pour nous prévenir est un des arguments-clés des stoïciens en faveur du destin et de la providence. L’argumentation d’ensemble du traité depuis le NF  ne cadre pas avec l’introduction subite d’une critique de Démocrite, qui n’est pas embarqué dans les critiques épicuriennes contre la providence stoïcienne, puisqu’il a plutôt soutenu la nécessité inflexible attribuée par Épicure Men.  aux physiciens. C’ est cet argument que l’on retrouve dans le traité éthique, quand Diogène dit: une fois la divination [éliminée], quelle autre preuve du destin y a-t-il? Si en effet quelqu’un use du raisonnement de Démocrite, en disant que les atomes n’ont aucun mouvement libre à cause de leur collision réciproque, et qu’en conséquence toutes les choses paraissent mues par la nécessité, …³² Il semble clair que, dans ce passage, Diogène dissocie l’argument en faveur du destin, qui repose sur la divination de l’argument qui l’assimile à la nécessité atomique, de sorte qu’il est peu crédible que ce soit Démocrite qui est visé dans le fr. .

³¹ Pendrick ()  : passage cité par Smith (a) . ³² Fr.  I –II  (l’ argument continue).

     ’  ’Œ



.    .. Les vertus ou le plaisir comme fin On ne développera pas ici les arguments anti-stoïciens sur la fin en faveur du plaisir et contre l’identification stoïcienne de la fin à la vertu (ou à la vie vertueuse) telle qu’elle apparaît dans les fr. –, le NF  (partie nouvellement découverte du texte du fr. ) et le NF , puisque c’est une argumentation analysée par F. Masi et V. Tsouna dans leurs contributions. Mais, comme les stoïciens ne sont pas mentionnés explicitement dans ces passages et que l’identification des stoïciens est contestée pour le fr.  et le NF , il est important d’indiquer le sens général de l’argument et pourquoi, dans le fr. , je penche pour les stoïciens tout autant, sinon plus que pour les cyrénaïques. Dans le fr. , Diogène critique des adversaires de l’épicurisme qui soutiennent que la fin est la vertu, et non le plaisir. Ces adversaires, dit-il, ne se contentent pas de dire que la vertu produit le bonheur, mais ils disent aussi que la fin est la vertu, et non le plaisir, comme Diogène le pense, à la suite évidemment d’Épicure. L’opposition des stoïciens et des épicuriens sur la fin est bien connue. Mais les stoïciens ne se contentaient pas de repousser l’idée que la fin est le plaisir, ils repoussaient aussi l’idée, défendue par les épicuriens, que la première impulsion des animaux était vers le plaisir et non vers ce qui leur est propre, ce qui tend parfois à faire attribuer aux épicuriens l’idée d’une οἰκείωσις vers le plaisir.³³ L’argument stoïcien, tel qu’il est exposé par Diogène Laërce est le suivant (Diog. Laert. VII – = SVF III  = Long/Sedley  A): Ils disent que la première impulsion que possède l’animal vise à se conserver luimême, parce que la nature l’approprie à lui-même dès le début. […] La thèse de certains, à savoir que la première impulsion qui se développe chez les animaux les porte vers le plaisir, ils déclarent qu’elle est fausse. () Ils disent en effet que le plaisir, s’il y en a, est quelque chose qui se produit de surcroît (ἐπιγέννημα), lorsque la nature elle-même, ayant cherché d’elle-même ce qui est adapté à sa constitution, s’en saisit. C’est de cette façon que les animaux s’égayent et que les plantes s’épanouissent. Deux points, dans l’argumentation de Diogène, semblent répondre directement à l’argument stoïcien.

³³ Cf. Galien, De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis V . (CMG V ... p. .– [De Lacy] = V – Kühn = SVF III a).



- 

Il y a d’abord le fait que Diogène parle de l’erreur qui, avec la passion de l’amour de soi (φίλαυτον πάθος), s’empare de vous.³⁴ Il me semble que Smith a raison de penser que la ‘passion de l’amour de soi’ renvoie à l’ οἰκείωσις. Sedley () , souligne que «it would have to be admitted that φίλαυτος is not the Stoics’ own term, but a disparaging description introduced by Diogenes». Mais d’une part, Diogène n’ utilise presque jamais les termes exacts des stoïciens mais procède à une réécriture. Le fait qu’il n’utilise pas ici le vocabulaire stoïcien ne me paraît pas une objection, car, à mon avis, sauf dans le passage sur la providence et quand il utilise le terme ἀναζωγράφησις, il ne le fait pas – je ne pense pas que les termes ‘cité’ et ‘concitoyens’ utilisés dans le passage sur la providence, soient des termes techniques, et ἀναζωγράφησις est loin d’être le terme stoïcien courant dans le contexte, où Diogène l’emploie, et il me semble qu’il ne l’emploie que parce qu’il conforte sa critique en maquillant les brêmes. En outre, il n’est pas évident que le terme φίλαυτος ne soit pas un terme stoïcien, car il existe au moins un texte stoïcien où la notion de φιλαυτία est employée en liaison avec la notion d’ οἰκείωσις, ce sont les Éléments d’éthique de Hiéroclès, VII , un texte probablement chronologiquement très proche de l’inscription de Diogène.³⁵ Le second point est que, selon Diog. Laert. VII –, les stoïciens ont critiqué les épicuriens pour avoir soutenu que le plaisir est la fin en disant que le plaisir est un ἐπιγέννημα. En soutenant que le plaisir n’est pas un effet qui vient après sa cause, mais qui lui est contemporain, il me semble que Diogène répond à cet argument stoïcien du plaisir comme ἐπιγέννημα.³⁶ L’enjeu est important: si on dit que le plaisir ne vient qu’en surcroît de la conservation de soi, alors il n’est pas une fin ultime de l’homme, ni la première tendance de l’animal. L’usage que, dans ce contexte, la source stoïcienne de Diogène Laërce fait du terme ‘plaisir’ est remarquable: à l’évidence, le plaisir mentionné ici n’est pas le plaisir stoïcien, ce n’est pas l’une des

³⁴ Cf. dans ce volume Masi –, Tsouna – et Roskam . ³⁵ Hiéroclès, Elementa Moralia VII : φιλαυτία. Le terme est manifestement employé comme un équivalent de l’expression πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς οἰκείωσις employée en VII . La date la plus généralement acceptée pour le papyrus est la seconde partie du  s. de notre ère: voir Bastianini/Long () –; une datation proche est acceptée pour Hiéroclès lui-même, à savoir le milieu du  s., voir Bastianini/Long () . ³⁶ On remarquera que l’argument de Sedley ()  pour justifier la référence aux cyrénaïques repose sur un verbe voisin (περιγένηται). On notera aussi ici que la thèse, souvent avancée depuis Spengel et Arnim, selon laquelle la théorie de l’ οἰκείωσις est une théorie inventée dans le Lycée par Théophraste et ensuite récupérée par les stoïciens (voir Görgemanns , ), même si elle était vraie, ne pourrait être impliquée ici parce que, dans la version péripatéticienne de l’ οἰκείωσις telle qu’elle est présentée par Arius Didyme la recherche du plaisir fait partie de l’ οἰκείωσις (cf. Stob. II  [.– Wachsmuth]). Diogène n’est donc pas ici en train de répondre à des péripatéticiens.

     ’  ’Œ



passions irrationnelles fondamentales, et le terme est ici employé dans un sens non stoïcien, puisqu’il s’applique aussi bien aux plantes qui s’épanouissent: ce n’est donc pas un jugement erroné comme l’est la passion du plaisir. Le terme est employé ad hominem pour critiquer la doctrine épicurienne du plaisir comme première tendance naturelle du vivant et fin de l’homme. Si dans la discussion du fr.  Diogène d’Œnoanda vise les stoïciens, il ne s’ intéresse donc pas à critiquer la doctrine stoïcienne, mais à réfuter une objection stoïcienne contre la thèse épicurienne du plaisir comme première impulsion de l’animal. Dans la suite de l’argument du fr. , Diogène critique ses adversaires pour avoir fait une erreur sur la causalité (fr.  V –VI ): les agents producteurs contenus dans les [choses ne] sont [pas] tous antérieurs à leurs effets dans le temps, même si la plupart sont dans ce cas, mais les uns sont antérieurs à leurs effets, d’autres leur sont [simultanés] et d’autres leur sont postérieurs. Il me semble très improbable qu’il critique les stoïciens pour avoir dit que tous les effets sont postérieurs à leur cause,³⁷ car les stoïciens n’ont pas soutenu cette thèse, comme le souligne Sedley avec raison : toutes les causes ne sont pas antécédentes chez les stoïciens. Mais les stoïciens ont soutenu que le plaisir était dans les premières tendances de l’animal et dans la vertu un effet postérieur à sa cause, en disant que c’est un ἐπιγέννημα et ils ont attaqué les épicuriens précisément avec cet argument et sur ce point. Pour cette raison, l’argumentation de Diogène doit probablement être limitée à l’application de la division des causes au plaisir: les stoïciens se sont trompés non pas en croyant qu’il n’y a que des effets postérieurs à leurs causes, mais en croyant que tous les plaisirs sont postérieurs à leurs causes, car certains plaisirs sont concomitants de leurs causes, et c’est notamment le cas des vertus qui produisent un plaisir qui ne s’ ajoute pas de surcroît postérieurement, mais qui est exactement simultané, et qui est l’effet recherché dans la vertu. On pourrait objecter que le texte de Diogène Laërce ne fait pas du plaisir l’ ἐπιγέννημα de la vertu, mais seulement celui de l’accomplissement des activités conformes à la nature. Ce serait une objection assez forte, si Diogène était strict dans l’usage des termes et des notions, mais il ne l’est pas. Qui plus est, le terme ἐπιγέννημα est un terme rare en contexte stoïcien, mais il apparaît dans un passage, selon lequel (Diog. Laert. VII ): le bien, c’est la vertu, [mais] ce qui se produit de surcroît (ἐπιγεννήματα), ce sont la joie, l’allégresse et les sentiments semblables.

³⁷ Cf. aussi dans ce volume Masi  et Roskam  n. .



- 

Or qu’est-ce que la joie et l’allégresse? Ce sont des εὐπάθειαι, c’est-à-dire les affects raisonnables dont le plaisir est le pendant irrationnel ou déraisonnable (Diog. Laert. VII ). Les stoïciens ont-ils donc soutenu que les vertus causent un plaisir qui leur est postérieur? Si on est prêt à quelque souplesse dans le vocabulaire, comme Diogène d’Œnoanda critiquant les stoïciens, ou même comme Chrysippe attaquant Épicure, ‘oui’ est sans doute loin d’être une réponse absurde. C’est même probablement la réponse correcte. Nous ne pratiquons pas les vertus pour le plaisir qu’elles procurent, mais elles produisent par surcroît quelque chose comme du plaisir. À mon avis, la critique que l’on relève dans le NF  pourrait confirmer cette interprétation (NF  III –):

Οὐκ ἐκείνας ὦ Ζήνων καὶ Κλεάνθη v καὶ σὺ Χρύσιππε, v καὶ ὅσοι τὴν αὐτὴν ὑμεῖν ἄ [γ]ο[υ]σιν, v οὐκ ἐκείνας ἀποφαινόμεθα τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπάρχειν τ[έ]λος τὰς τῶν πολλῶν, ἀλλὰ ταύτας ἃς ἀρ̣τίω̣ ς ̣ εἰρήκαμεν, vv τέ-̣  [λο]ς ̣ μόνας.³⁸ v

Mais, Zénon, Cléanthe et toi, Chrysippe, et ceux qui vous suivent sur la même route, ce ne sont pas ces plaisirs, ce ne sont pas ces plaisirs de la foule qui constituent la fin, ce sont ceux dont nous avons parlé qui seuls constituent la fin. Il est fort possible de voir dans cet argument la première étape d’une argumentation qui se poursuit ensuite: vous nous accusez de proposer comme fin les plaisirs de la foule, et vous dites que les plaisirs que produit la vertu ne peuvent être une fin, car ils sont un produit annexe de la fin qu’est la vertu, mais nous vous répondons que les plaisirs que nous considérons comme la fin ne sont pas ceux du vulgaire, mais ce sont ceux que produit la vertu, et ils sont concomitants et inséparables de la vertu, au lieu d’en être les produits ultérieurs. Ceci est une lecture au moins plausible de la succession des arguments, et, à vrai dire ce serait un point philosophiquement plus fondamental que la querelle assez mineure que l’interprétation de Sedley implique. Les arguments de Sedley en faveur d’une critique des cyrénaïques ont une assez forte plausibilité, et sont sur beaucoup de points défendables, mais ses arguments

³⁸ Hammerstaedt/Smith ()  (= , ).

     ’  ’Œ



en faveur du rejet de l’identification des stoïciens sont beaucoup moins décisifs, et le semblent d’autant moins maintenant que le NF  a été découvert et introduit dans la séquence des arguments. Et il y a quand même des arguments assez forts en faveur de l’identification des stoïciens, compte tenu des procédés respectifs de Chrysippe et de Diogène d’Œnoanda quand ils critiquent l’école adverse.³⁹ Si les stoïciens sont la cible visée par Diogène dans les fr.  et NF , Diogène a procédé dans ce cas comme dans l’argument contre le monde providentiel et la vie comme habitation commune des dieux et des hommes: c’est parce que Chrysippe attaquait Épicure pour avoir fait du plaisir à la fois la fin de l’existence humaine et l’objet des premières impulsions de l’animal que Diogène contre-attaque en réfutant la thèse stoïcienne que le plaisir survient comme une conséquence accessoire de la conservation de soi et de la vertu. C’est donc dans ce cas la critique stoïcienne qui a déterminé la contre-attaque de Diogène. Si toutefois les stoïciens ne sont pas les adversaires des fr.  et du NF , cela signifie que Diogène accomplit pour la fin le même type de critique que pour les principes et le rêve: renvoyer dos à dos les stoïciens et les cyrénaïques, comme il l’a fait pour les stoïciens et Démocrite, mais adresser aux seconds une critique moins radicale qu’aux premiers. Quoi qu’il en soit de l’interprétation correcte du fr. , il est évident qu’il n’en reste pas moins que les stoïciens sont les adversaires principaux de Diogène sur la question du telos et du plaisir comme τέλος. Si les cyrénaïques sont introduits, ce n’est pas pour avoir contesté que la fin fût le plaisir, mais pour avoir fait de la vertu un agent du bonheur, question qui est moins décisive. .. La persistance limitée de l’âme après la mort Les fr. – critiquent encore les stoïciens pour avoir soutenu une survie partielle de l’âme du sage après la mort. Dans la critique de Diogène, ils sont sans doute associés à Platon, selon la reconstruction de Smith. D’autres critiques suivront sur Empédocle, Pythagore et Démocrite (avec qui les stoïciens seront réintroduits). Diogène leur attribue la thèse que (fr.  IV –): les âmes ne sont pas absolument incorruptibles, mais que celles des [insensés] sont détruites aussitôt après qu’elles se sont séparées du corps, tandis que celles des hommes de bien continuent d’exister, bien qu’elles aussi soient parfois détruites.

³⁹ L’argument de la mention de τόνος en fr.  I – me paraît moins convaincant que la correction de Sedley () , mais cette correction n’implique pas que l’argument ne peut pas viser les stoïciens, comme le souligne Smith (a) . Il en va de même de la mention du nom de Zénon, qui est purement conjecturale.



- 

Il s’agit d’un argument stoïcien bien connu, qui est attribué à Chrysippe par Diogène Laërce VII . L’opposition des stoïciens et des épicuriens sur ce point est aussi bien connue (Sext. Emp. Math. IX ). La critique de Diogène d’Œnoanda admet que les sages et les non-sages diffèrent par leur capacité à raisonner (même s’ils sont différents par leur aptitude à raisonner), mais trouve incroyable que cette différence implique que les sages et les non-sages n’ont pas la même mortalité (fr.  V –). Les stoïciens expliquaient cela en disant que si l’âme du sage survit, c’ est parce qu’elle est plus forte (SVF II ), mais Diogène ne rappelle évidemment pas cet argument. Quelque chose lui paraît encore plus étonnant, mais le texte qui explique ce qui lui paraît étonnant comporte un mot incomplet (fr.  V ) complété par précipitation (τ̣[ὸ προπετ]ές, Chilton) ou modération (τ̣[ὸ ἐνκρατ]ές, Smith), et un argument dont ne connaissons pas la fin (fr.  V –): Comment, si [l’âme] doit un jour (ἅπαξ) avoir la capacité d’exister séparément du corps, même, disons-le, [le plus bref instant], et … Je me demande s’il ne faudrait pas supposer que l’argument est que, si l’âme a la capacité d’exister séparément du corps une fois (ἅπαξ), on ne comprend pas comment elle reste conjointe à lui. Mais ceci reste conjectural et hypothétique.

.   Il est difficile de dire si l’ensemble des critiques de Diogène sont originales ou si elles reflètent des critiques épicuriennes du stoïcisme mal connues par ailleurs mais, en l’état de nos connaissances, elles paraissent généralement plutôt originales. Si elles paraissent au premier abord ne pas reposer sur une connaissance très précise du stoïcisme, les distorsions de vocabulaire ou d’exposition que l’on peut y trouver semblent plutôt relever de la stratégie de construction opérée par Diogène. Dans cette stratégie, l’épicurisme se trouve opposé à des philosophies différentes dans l’épistémologie, la physique ou l’éthique. Mais s’il fait face au scepticisme épistémologique comme défi redoutable, dans la physique, l’épicurisme apparaît comme une position vraie entre les deux positions matérialistes contraires que sont le stoïcisme et Démocrite, mais plus près de Démocrite, et les stoïciens sont les adversaires principaux de l’épicurisme. Dans l’éthique, l’opposition principale se joue entre le stoïcisme et l’épicurisme, même si Démocrite joue encore un rôle intermédiaire sur certains points, mais qui sont en fait des points qui relèvent de la physique dans ses implications éthiques (les rêves, le destin), et non d’une argumentation strictement éthique (la fin, le plaisir, la vertu).

     ’  ’Œ



Il est remarquable que les critiques de Diogène dans l’inscription soient souvent des contre-attaques contre des arguments anti-épicuriens des stoïciens. Dans ces cas, c’ est apparemment la vigueur de l’attaque stoïcienne qui détermine la nécessité de contre-attaquer pour Diogène, et l’inscription nous permet de connaître des contre-arguments épicuriens, que nous ne connaîtrions pas sans lui, mais dont il est difficile de dire si Diogène en est ou non l’auteur. Dans les autres cas, les stoïciens sont opposés à Démocrite et forment avec lui un couple d’erreurs contraires entre lesquelles se tient la vérité de la position épicurienne. Cette structure originale laisse, là encore, un rôle privilégié aux stoïciens comme adversaires principaux de l’épicurisme.

         Refik Güremen

.  The public message that Diogenes of Oinoanda wants to convey in his joint criticism of the Stoic and Democritean interpretations of dream images in fr. , , , , and  is clear.¹ He wants to undermine all superstitious beliefs about dream visions by demonstrating the weaknesses of two opposing theories. In other words, he wants to help his readers to avoid swaying between equally unreasonable² extremes when trying to make sense of their visual experiences during sleep. On the one hand, dream images do not mysteriously pop up out of nowhere as one might be led to think by the Stoics. But on the other hand, they are not what they seem to be to a dreaming subject either, as the Democritean interpretation suggests: dream images do not really talk to us, give messages, or reveal their intentions and thoughts, etc. Democritus places too much credibility in the visual experiences we have in dreams.³ These two misleading views about dream-images must be avoided if one wants to dispel all unfounded fear and anxiety, and keep one’s mind tranquil. This more or less being the moral purpose of Diogenes’ criticism of both rival theories on dream images, in what follows I will try to show that behind Diogenes’ targeting of both the Stoics and Democritus, there seems to be a form of polemical reasoning that is, in essence, a highly elaborate version of what I will show to be a stock Epicurean defense of the school’s theory of perception against its critics. I shall first explain how Diogenes’ engagement with the Stoics helps him to expound a standard yet essential Epicurean theorem on the factivity of all kinds of perception.⁴

¹ I use the editions and translations of Martin Ferguson Smith (). ² Or almost equally unreasonable, since as an atomist, Democritus was ultimately right in explaining the dream visions by εἴδωλα. ³ For Democritus on dreams and their prophetic nature see Sext. Emp. Math. IX  (DK  B ); Cic. Div. I  (DK  A ) and II  (DK  A ); Plut. Quaest. conv. V ..F–A and VIII ..A–B (DK  A ). ⁴ A clarification about the vocabulary of ‘perception’, ‘sensation’, and ‘impression’ is required. I take ‘sensation’ (αἴσθησις) to be the stimulation of the senses by the impingements of the εἴδωλα. Αἴσθησις in this sense is the passive reception of such impingements. Perception (αἴσθησις) is the apprehension and the recognition of the content of a sensation by a focusing of the thought or the senses on the appearance made by that content. Accordingly, an ‘impression’



 

I shall then explain that the refutation of Democritus takes the place it does in Diogenes’ argument because without it, his engagement with the Stoics would make the Epicurean position vulnerable to a reductio ad absurdum refutation consisting in the claim that the Epicurean theory of perception is incapable of accounting for the falsity of some obviously false perceptual experiences, such as dreams. I want to explain how his refutation of Democritus helps Diogenes foreclose that reductio. Last, I explain that this specific reductio refutation of the Epicurean theory of perception was confronted and addressed by some earlier members of the school in exactly the same spirit as Diogenes. Diogenes’ criticisms of the Stoics and Democritus stand as separate arguments against two extreme and false positions that are to be avoided, but, taken together, they complement each other in such a way that they constitute a coherent and elaborate defense against a criticism that the Epicurean school seems to have developed its own way of answering throughout its history. One point should be clarified in advance: I do not mean to claim that in his inscription Diogenes is explicitly pursuing the discussion that I sketch above and expand upon in the following pages. Nor do I claim that Diogenes is formulating his joint criticism of the Stoics and Democritus in order to answer the reductio argument directed against his school’s epistemology. I rather aim to bring out the philosophical background of his jointly targeting the Stoics and Democritus as well as the intellectual framework within which he is reasoning as an Epicurean.

.    Diogenes basically has two interrelated reasons for criticizing the Stoic doctrine. The Stoics hold that dream visions are empty and illusory representations of the mind (fr.  I–II ).⁵ This idea leads them, according to Diogenes, (a) to misrepresent the nature of dreams, and consequently (b) to be incapable of explaining the very phenomenon of dream visions.

(φαντασία) is the appearance made by the content of a sensation. Φαντασία in this sense is the immediate object of perception. These differences can be referred to the Letter to Herodotus – and –. However, there remains an unavoidable ambiguity between the terms ‘sensation’ and ‘perception’ when it comes to non-sensory dream experiences. (On this point, see note  below). This is why, throughout this paper, I use the term ‘perception’ not in the specific sense of apprehending the content of a sensation, but simply as a generic name for all kinds (sensory and non-sensory) of receptivity for simulacra. ⁵ Chrysippus might be the target here. For the Stoic distinction between φαντασία and φανταστικόν see esp. Diog. Laert. VII  (SVF II ) and Aetius IV .– (SVF II ).

        



The Stoic theory misrepresents the nature of dreams because dream visions are not actually empty illusions of the mind (fr.  I –): In fact they (sc. the dream images [R.G.]) also have [the nature] of corporeal images [and] impressions similar in form to all these visible objects which their flux [allows us to apprehend]. Fr.  gives a more comprehensive version of this same point. In this fragment, Diogenes makes two points against the Stoics by appealing to two kinds of plain experiences that we have in dreams. First, if dream images are not corporeal but just empty paintings of the mind, as the Stoics claim, how can the empty be pictured?⁶ But they obviously are pictured. Second, denying all corporeal nature to dream images deprives them of a power they obviously do possess. The fears or the pleasures that we derive from them are no less real than those we have when we are awake. The Stoic misapprehension of the nature of dreams makes their doctrine inapt for explaining the plain experience of our having dream visions that have the power of causing the same affections as the visions we have when we are awake (fr.  III –IV  and V –). Now, one might doubt whether Diogenes is doing justice to the Stoics in making these two points against them. After all, the latter are materialists and denying the physical nature of dreaming as well as its pains and pleasures does not sound very Stoic. As Jean-Baptiste Gourinat points out: “l’argument de Diogène fonctionne sur une notion du ‘vide’ qui n’est pas celle sur laquelle fonctionne l’argument stoïcien car l’attraction à vide de l’imagination dans le stoïcisme n’est pas un néant corporel, elle est seulement un mouvement auto-généré de l’âme, qui a une réalité corporelle, tandis que Diogène fait en gros comme si le vide en question était l’espace inoccupé, le vide physique ou cosmologique.”⁷ This is to say that if Diogenes takes the Stoics to be entirely denying the physicality of our dream experiences, then he obviously misrepresents them or is, at least, being inattentive. This ‘distortion’ of the Stoic position by Diogenes can be explained if we see that Diogenes is not only offering a physiology of dream experiences, but his discussion has also an epistemological context.⁸ It is true that like Lucretius, Diogenes’ priority

⁶ Fr.  II –. ⁷ Gourinat  in this volume. ⁸ This point is also made by Gourinat – in this volume.



 

is also physics. However, his discussion of the Stoics makes better sense if we take him to be using the term ‘void’ in a liberal way, not only as a literal reference to ‘physical void’ as such⁹ but rather as referring to the place that the object of a state of mind occupies, but which seems to be emptied by the Stoic doctrine. Diogenes can be said to be claiming that the Stoic position about dream experiences is incapable of accounting for the fact that a dream vision is always a vision of something and that pleasures and pains in dreams are always pleasure and pain of (or from) something. The Stoic doctrine loses sight of this ‘something’. Diskin Clay points to this rather epistemological use of the term ‘void’ when he says that “the term which Diogenes clearly took objection to was kena, illusory, or in Epicurean terms, void”.¹⁰ To be more precise about this epistemological sense of the term ‘void’, the term is especially important for an Epicurean because it alludes to the Stoic claim that dream images are non-apprehensive appearances.¹¹ From an Epicurean point of view, this thesis is false, because the Epicureans think that not everything about dreams and hallucinations is hallucinatory or illusory. For one thing, dreams and hallucinations always have a real existent cause, namely the corporeal simulacra.¹² But the existence of real causes is not the whole picture when it comes to the Epicurean conception of perception. If we take this into account, we can see that there might be a plausible philosophical reason for Diogenes’ deformation of the Stoic doctrine as underlined by Jean-Baptiste Gourinat. Diogenes’ appeal to a vocabulary of ‘picturing’¹³ and the way he recapitulates the problem with the Stoics in fr.  I –, suggest that for him the issue is not solely the physicality of the causal process producing dreams. The physicality of the perceptual causal processes is not the whole truth about perception because the cause of a perception is not necessarily a part of its content. The Epicurean idea is that when we perceive something we perceive the very proximal cause itself of this perception: we perceive a simulacrum. The question Diogenes is addressing to the Stoics can, therefore, be paraphrased as follows: “If there is really no correlative object, are you then claiming that dream visions resemble nothing? You can’t, because we all know that they resemble something.” This seems to be his emphasis in fr.  I – (quoted above).

⁹ Such a liberal use of the term can also be found in Epicurus’ notion of empty desires (κεναὶ ἐπιθυμίαι) as opposed to natural desires (Men. –; P.-M. Morel reminded me of this point). According to Julia Annas, empty desires are those which depend on empty beliefs which, in turn, are “harmful and dysfunctional for the agent” () . ¹⁰ Clay () . ¹¹ Cf. Sext. Emp. Math. VIII ff.; Diog. Laert. VII – (cf. SVF II –). See also Gordon () . ¹² Epic. Vat. ; Hdt. ; Diog. Laert. X  (Epicur.  Us.). ¹³ σκιαγραφήματα: fr.  I –; ἀναζωγραφεῖσθαι: fr.  II .

        



Diogenes’ polemic against the Stoics, therefore, is not only about the physics of the causal process producing perception in a dream. Perception, according to the Epicurean theory, is not only caused by some existent thing, but it is of this thing that causes it. The relation between the cause and the effect is such that the effect is a ‘portrait-like resemblance’ of its cause. This is to say that all perception is, in a sense,¹⁴ factive, that is, true, because it is of something that exists and this thing is in truth such as it appears (Sext. Emp. Math. VII ). According to the Epicurean view, therefore, every perceptual experience, whether sensory, dianoetic, hallucinatory or illusionary, has a perceptual core¹⁵ that is factive.¹⁶ This universal claim about the factivity of all kinds of perception is implied by Sextus Empiricus’ presentation of the Epicurean view on truth: Epicurus said that everything perceptible is real,¹⁷ and that every appearance is from a real thing, and is of the same kind as what activates the sensation, and that those who say that some appearances are true and others false are in error through not being able to separate opinion from plain experience. In the case of Orestes, anyway, when he thought he was looking at the Furies, the sensation that was activated by images was true (for the images did exist), but the intellect in thinking that they were solid Furies had a false opinion.¹⁸

¹⁴ For the factivity of sense-perception in Epicurean philosophy, see Vogt () and Miloš (). However, I have some reservations about calling the epistemic relation between a simulacrum and its perception ‘factive’, because due to its subtlety a simulacrum can never be perceived as it is in itself either by the senses or by the mind. From an Epicurean point of view, the true factivity in perception is to be found between the φαντασία caused by a simulacrum and the external object of the perception. ¹⁵ I borrow the term ‘perceptual core’ from Price () –. It is not easy to avoid all ambiguity between sensation and perception (see note  above) when it comes to nonsensory reception of simulacra in dreams. Although the senses are inactive in sleep, dreams are still experiences of some kind of a receptivity which is not sensitive. This is why I prefer the expression ‘perceptual core’, instead of ‘sensory core’, as a more generic designation for the essential passivity characterizing the human reception of simulacra in general. ¹⁶ In contemporary philosophy of perception, it is generally accepted that ‘perception’ is always factive (for some, ‘to perceive’ is a success term) whereas ‘perceptual experiences’ are not necessarily so. Every perception is a perceptual experience, the inverse is not true. On this point, see Montague (). ¹⁷ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι ἀληθῆ. Bett () translates ἀληθῆ as true but it does not make any sense to say of an object or of a fact that it is true. One can claim that this can be said of the Epicurean εἴδωλα because they are ‘true’ to the object from which they emanate. But this is not correct: not every εἴδωλον is true to its source. The stock Epicurean example of this is the ‘round tower’ case: Lucr. IV – and Diog. fr. . ¹⁸ Sext. Emp. Math. VIII  (tr. Bett ) = Epicur.  Us.



 

Just like Lucretius IV –, in the above passage, in order to explain that a good case of perception is always veridical and factive, Sextus cites an example from a bad case of hallucinatory experience. This is a perfect strategy, because bad case examples make it easier to explain that all kinds of perception have a veridical perceptual core that has to be distinguished from the doxastic component of the experience undergone.¹⁹ I conclude that in his engagement with the Stoics on dreams, Diogenes of Oinoanda is targeting this rival theory for not being able to appreciate the element of truth in dream experiences and is primarily advocating the standard Epicurean view that all perception is factive. Sextus Empiricus states this view very concisely: every perceptible is real. If something is being perceived, then it is real. Perception is sufficient to infer the existence of the object of perception. However, although the simulacra make their appearance in and through perception just as they are, this truth in perception does not guarantee the truth in mind’s perceptual judgements. The mind might not be able to judge the appearances just as they appear. As it is explained below, this point was noticed by the Epicureans and it was integrated as a part of their defense against scepticism. And this is why, I claim below, it is also the core of Diogenes’ encounter with Democritus.

.   The idea that all perception is factive puts the Epicurean in a very vulnerable position against a reductio argument at the hands of his critics. This is where Diogenes’ criticism of Democritus seems to assume the function of blocking such an attack. Despite his critical attitude towards Democritus, it should be noted that as an Epicurean himself, Diogenes is much closer to Democritus than to the Stoics. Epicureans agree with Democritus not only in assigning the εἴδωλα a causal role in the production of dreams but also in recognizing them as the correspondent reality of the dream images. However, they diverge from the Abderitan in their conception of the nature of the εἴδωλα. Democritus is reported to attribute a prophetic and divine nature to dream-images and to take them to be rational and sentient beings conveying the intentions and thoughts of the people from which they originate.²⁰ For an Epicurean, this way of explaining dream visions would be of no help, only fuelling superstitious beliefs about the gods, death, and the afterlife. Superstition is

¹⁹ For the factivity of sense-perceptions according to Epicurus see also Sext. Emp. Math. VIII . ²⁰ See note  above.

        



the principal target of the Epicurean criticism of Democritus, yet it is based on a philosophical discussion about the nature of the εἴδωλα and the psychic processes producing dreams. Although the refutation of Democritus’ belief that the εἴδωλα possess faculties of sensation, reason, and speech does not originate with Diogenes himself in the Epicurean tradition,²¹ his use of it for his own polemical agenda shows originality and indicates that he is constructing his own arguments from the Epicurean material available to him. Lucretius’ argument against Democritus is found in a different context to that of Diogenes’. Since the relevant part of Lucretius’ text is damaged, we only have the closing lines of the argument. Nonetheless, it is clearly visible from the context that Democritus’ theory is being discussed as a part of a development aiming to prove the existence of subtle and minute filmy images emanating from the surface of things. In the lost part of the text, Lucretius must be showing that being extremely fine and, consequently, invisible entities, the simulacra cannot be the kind of substance that possess the powers Democritus attributes to them. Diogenes seems to appropriate this point almost verbatim from Lucretius. However, there is no mention of any Stoic doctrine in the broader context of the lost Lucretian passage. There is also no reason to suppose that Lucretius discusses Democritus’ ‘thick’ conception of simulacra within the immediate context of dream images as a problem of epistemology. Nor does Lucretius’ discussion of Democritus seem to depend on a previous or correlative discussion of dream images as a problem of rationality in ethics and theology. Both of these characterize, however, Diogenes’ engagement with Democritus and the Stoics. Therefore, we can reasonably claim that jointly targeting the Stoics and Democritus, as two sides of the same coin, is itself a novelty of Diogenes’ own creation. In a rhetorically effective passage, Diogenes shows that his joint discussion of these theories allows him to reveal the truth about the nature of dreams (fr.  V –):²² So these theorists, the Stoics and Democritus, went astray in opposite directions: the Stoics deprive visions of a power which they do have, while Democritus endows them with a power which they do not have. In fact the nature of [dreams …].

²¹ The origin of this criticism must be Epicurus: see Plut. Quaest. conv. VIII ..A–B (Epicur.  Us.). Although the relevant part of the text is damaged, for Lucretius’ refutation of Democritus on simulacra, see Lucr. IV –. For a thorough analysis of the Epicurean ‘simplification’ of the Democritean εἴδωλα see Morel () –. This section of Morel’s work contains an extended discussion of Diogenes’ engagement with Democritus. ²² Note also his question at fr.  II : τί ο̣ὖ̣ν ἔσ̣ ̣ τιν;



 

We should note that the point of establishing this contrast is not only, nor even primarily, to reveal the truth about these two doctrines (namely, the truth that they are false for two opposed reasons). Diogenes obviously thinks that the articulation of this contrast allows him to reveal the truth about the nature of dream visions. In the previous section I tried to show that the Stoics are to be criticized, according to Diogenes, because their doctrine misses what is true in dreams. Now I want to show that, for Diogenes, Democritus is also to be criticized because his theory misses what is false in dreams. This is how they went astray, but more specifically, ‘astray in opposite directions’! In Diogenes’ argument, therefore, the refutation of Democritus has the function of demonstrating the falsity of judgments in dreams and hallucinations. Or to put it the other way around, Diogenes seems to think that Democritus makes the atomist simulacrum theory of dreams vulnerable to falsity because it asserts as true what is obviously false in dream experiences. Let me further explain. The factivity of all kinds of perception is at the heart of the Epicurean antisceptical strategy. As such, it has to be defended by all means. However, this doctrine can also prove to be the weak link in the chain since it is liable to being turned around and used to refute the Epicurean position by reductio ad absurdum as follows: [] For all x, if x is being perceived then x is real. (The Epicurean thesis.) [] Orestes perceives the Furies insistently pursuing him. [] Therefore, the Furies pursuing Orestes are real. [] But Furies (and similar creatures, e.g. Centaurs, Scyllas, Cerberus, etc) are not real: they have never existed. (The Epicurean thesis: cf. Lucr. V –.)²³ [] Therefore, the Epicurean thesis in [] is false. To defend the factivity doctrine against this attack, an Epicurean has to show that the second premise of this reductio is false. One has to demonstrate that Orestes does not really perceive the Furies that are deliberately haunting him. I assume that this is what Diogenes of Oinoanda does in using the stock Epicurean refutation of Democritean simulacrum in parallel to his engagement with the Stoics.²⁴ Democritus’ simulacrum theory cannot be endorsed because endorsing it leaves the atomist theory open to refutation, as above; hence, its distinction from the Epicurean doctrine has to be underlined against this refutation. Democritus’ conception of εἴδωλον is a burden on the atomist epistemology and it has to be ‘simplified’.²⁵ Before I explain how exactly Democritus exposes the atomist anti-sceptical strategy to

²³ On the impossibility of such creatures existing, see also Lucr. II –. ²⁴ I think therefore that the refutation of Democritus, at least in terms of its place in Diogenes’ argument, is required by the refutation of the Stoics. ²⁵ For this term see n.  above and Morel ()  n. .

        



refutation and in what way exactly Diogenes’ refutation of Democritus blocks such a refutation, I want to show how Plutarch, in Against Colotes, realizes the vulnerability of the Epicurean doctrine to the reductio outlined above. I am not claiming that Diogenes was aiming to defend his school against Plutarch, but I am assuming that Plutarch saw what was already there to be seen. In a long passage in the Against Colotes (–.B–B),²⁶ Plutarch argues for the idea that it would be better to be a sceptic than to accept the truth of the factivity doctrine because this doctrine leads the Epicureans to an inconsistency in asserting the reality of beings they themselves speak of with contempt. I quote the passage at length: [It is plainly evident and accepted by many] that one possessed by wild or sombre madness has illusions of sight and hearing, when his mind is affected and distracted by phantoms such as these: ‘These woman shapes with torches in their hand/And robed in dusky black, inflame my vision’ and ‘Breathing fire and blood/She plies her wings, my mother in her arms?’ These and many of another stagier variety, resembling the Empedoclean monsters ‘With lurching ox-feet, random arms’ and ‘Ox-creatures, fronted like man’ that they [the Epicureans] deride […], all of these they assemble from dreams and delirium and say that none is an optical illusion or false or unsubstantial, but all are true impressions, bodies and shapes that reach us from the surrounding air. That being the case, is there anything in the world about which it is impossible to suspend judgment, when such things as these can be accepted as real? Things that no artful joiner, puppet-maker, or painter ever ventured to combine for our entertainment into a likeness to deceive the eye, these they seriously suppose to exist, or rather they assert that, if these did not exist, there would be an end of all assurance and certainty and judgment about truth. […] For by putting all in the same boat their theory does more to estrange us from established beliefs than to convince us that the grotesque are real. Hence not a few philosophers, we know, would prefer the position that no appearance is true to the position that all are true, and would rather give up confidence at one sweep in all men, things, and statements encountered in their waking moments than trust as true and real a single one of these appearances that come to us in delirium or ecstasy or sleep. […] And so this doctrine of withholding judgment is no idle tale, as Colotes thinks […]; it is a settled state and attitude of grown men that preserves them from error and refuses to abandon judgment to anything so discredited and incoherent as the senses, …²⁷

²⁶ Cf. Epicur.  Us. ²⁷ Tr. Einarson / De Lacy (), slightly modified.



 

To the Lucretian assertion that “you’d rather prefer explaining everything wrongly than discrediting the senses” (cf. Lucr. IV –), Plutarch responds: “I’d rather prefer explaining nothing at all than crediting the senses as you do!” According to Plutarch, being a sceptic is a sounder position than being an Epicurean, because instead of denying as false what is plainly false in dreams and hallucinatory visions, the credit they give to the senses conduces the Epicureans to attribute reality to the weird things seen in hallucinations and dreams.²⁸ This passage might seem puzzling because Plutarch is well aware of the difference between the Democritean and Epicurean conceptions of εἴδωλον and he is making exactly the same point as Lucretius and Diogenes regarding the difference between the two.²⁹ Plutarch himself underlines that Epicurus rejected Democritean εἴδωλα as sentient living beings conveying the intentions and thoughts of the bodies from which they emanate. He also points out that Epicurus followed Democritus no farther than saying that εἴδωλα only carry the outward shapes and likenesses of the bodies that they come from.³⁰ The above passage is, therefore, puzzling because Plutarch sounds as if he is ignoring this difference and reproaching the atomist school for a position that he (otherwise) knows very well it is not endorsing. However, I think that rather than contradicting himself, Plutarch is to be seen here as claiming that it is the Epicureans who are being self-contradictory about their position on the nature of εἴδωλα. This must be especially so if he is referring this contradiction to Lucretius when he says that the Epicureans do in fact deride the Empedoclean creatures while their epistemology at the same time attributes them a real existence – because in the relevant passages of his poem Lucretius endeavours to explain the impossibility of such creatures as living beings. To be more precise, in the above passage from Against

²⁸ I do not agree with Lévy () in his interpretation of this passage. Levy thinks that Plutarch here portrays the Epicurean as a radical sceptic (despite himself ), who puts the false on the same footing as the true. He says that: “Plutarque définit un scepticisme paradoxal, reposant non pas sur la peur de se tromper mais sur la certitude que l’on ne peut jamais commettre d’erreur, en croyant que toutes les sensations sont vraies.” I don’t think that what Levy describes here as scepticism is a scepticism at all, not even a paradoxical one. What Levy takes to be the Epicurean ἰσοσθένεια consists in putting the false and the true on the same footing as true. This is plain dogmatism. Moreover, it is obvious enough that this is not the sort of sceptical position advocated by Plutarch here. Plutarch is endorsing an Arcesilean sceptical argument saying that the Epicurean theory only shakes our confidence in beliefs that we ordinarily tend to take to be true. In other words, Plutarch is advocating this sceptical position not as the portrait of the Epicurean but against him. ²⁹ See Quaest. conv. VIII ..A–B. ³⁰ On Plutarch’s testimony on Democritean εἴδωλα see Morel () –.

        



Colotes, Plutarch is claiming that the Epicureans are being self-contradictory because, despite their distance from Democritus’ ‘thick’ εἴδωλα, their epistemology forces them to attribute real existence as living beings to Empedoclean dream images. If Diogenes were to respond to Plutarch, he would say that Plutarch still mistakes them for Democriteans and that he is still missing the point, which distinguishes their theory of dreams from that of Democritus. So, in a sense, Diogenes would concede Plutarch’s criticism, but for the case of Democritus and not Epicureans as such. Plutarch’s criticism allows us to see how exactly Democritus’ simulacrum theory jeopardizes an atomist theory of perception and exposes it to sceptical attack. Diogenes puts the problem with Democritus’ theory as follows (fr.  IV –V ): On the other hand, if they [sc. εἴδωλα ] are not empty, that does not mean that they are sentient and rational and really chat to us, as Democritus supposes; for εἴδωλα which are so subtle and lack the depth of a solid constitution cannot possibly possess these faculties. I add immediately fr. , where Diogenes explains how the mind goes astray when the senses are asleep. The parallel between Democritus’ error and the mind’s error is worth noting (fr.  IV –V ): When we are asleep, with all the senses as it were paralyzed and extinguished by [the] slumber, the soul, which [alone] is awake [and yet does not realise] the symptom [of this kind] and the condition of the senses at that time, but is receiving the images that approach it, conceives an untested and false opinion concerning them, as if it were actually apprehending the solid nature of true realities.³¹ Diogenes implies that Democritus is thinking like the mind of a sleeping person.³² Both make the same mistake and what is wrong in one is wrong in the other too. Because we seem to see some rationally acting and speaking beings in our dreams,

³¹ This translation is based on the text as restored by Hammerstaedt ()  (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , ). ³² It has to be noted that the reference to Democritus’ name in fr.  VI  is only conjectural. Too much of col. VI is missing. It also has to be admitted that there is at least one good reason to think that Democritus might not be the target in this fragment. The first two columns of this fragment contain an argument for the existence of εἴδωλα, claiming that



 

Democritus takes the things seen in dreams to be the kind of thing they seem to be: living, solid, sentient, rational, speaking corporeal organisms.³³ This is the same mistake that the mind commits during sleep: The mind also takes itself to be getting acquainted with solid bodies. This is not just an analogy; it is the same epistemological error. This is therefore how the Democritean conception of simulacrum jeopardizes the atomist theory of perception. Democritus’ ideas must be refuted for the same reasons that the opinions of the mind in a sleeping body must be refuted: Trusting an atomist theory of perception to Democritus is hardly safer than trusting it to a hallucinating Orestes. They both take what they seem to see as solid bodies and claim to be perceiving them. This gives way to Plutarch’s criticisms and to the second premise of the reductio argument above. I claimed above that demonstrating the falsity of the second premise of the reductio will save the factivity of perception doctrine, and I also claimed that Diogenes’

vision, thought, and dreams are caused by the impingement of these εἴδωλα on our eyes and minds. Democritus was an atomist and it barely makes sense to target him with this argument of the first two columns. In other words, an atomist like Democritus does not need to be reminded about εἴδωλα and their causal role in vision, thought, and dreams. (This is also why it hardly makes sense [pace Morel () ] to take Epicur. Vat.  as a possible allusion to Democritus; this point can be made more convincingly if we read Vat.  together with Aetius V . [DK  A ]: Democritus says that dreams occur through the presence of εἴδωλα.) The Stoics would fit better than Democritus as the target here. However, Smith ()  and others find it reasonable to take Democritus as the target in the col. VI of this fragment. At lines – of this column Diogenes seems to assert that dreams are not godsent and that they do not have a divine nature, whereas Democritus is reported by Sextus Empiricus (Math. IX ) to believe that dreams have a divine nature. I believe that another allusion to Democritus can be found at col. IV –V  (this is the last passage quoted above). Diogenes says there that when we are asleep, the soul conceives a false opinion concerning the images it receives, as if it were getting acquainted with the solid nature of true realities. Besides being an analysis of the error of a dreaming soul, this is also a concise description, from an Epicurean point of view, of how Democritus goes astray on the nature of εἴδωλα. If fr.  does really precede fr. , and if some part of the former makes better sense as targeting the Stoics and some part Democritus, then it seems reasonable to suppose that in fr.  Diogenes makes some general introductory remarks to his joint criticism of the Stoics and Democritus in the next fragment. If this is an acceptable interpretation of fr. , then, even if the reference to Democritus’ name here is only conjectural, fr.  can reasonably be taken to make allusions to Democritus. ³³ This is how Diogenes and Lucretius represent Democritus. But I wonder whether their representation is accurate. It is one thing to say that the simulacra themselves are sentient, rational, speaking beings, and another to say that the simulacra convey the sensations, thoughts, intentions, and speeches, etc. of the persons they come from. This latter interpretation would still require quite an argument, but there still seems to be a difference between these two ways of understanding Democritus.

        



adjoining his refutation of Democritus to his engagement with the Stoics has just this function. I shall now explain how this works. The demonstration of the falsity of the second premise of the reductio would consist in showing that the verb ‘perceive’ in this premise is used inadequately. To take the example of Orestes again, what a hallucinating person like Orestes perceives is not solid creatures insistently pursuing him; therefore Orestes does not perceive such creatures. Or we can adopt the same argument for the case of Epicurus’ mother from fragment :³⁴ what she perceives is not Epicurus ‘really chatting to her’ in flesh and blood, so she does not perceive Epicurus ‘really chatting to her’ in flesh and blood. The substance of this argument consists in distinguishing the factive perceptual core of the visual experience from its doxastic component; and this is completed in two steps. First, there is an argument about the physical nature of what is really being perceived, namely the εἴδωλα; and second, there is an argument about the epistemic state of the perceptual faculty, namely the mind. We therefore have an argument from physics and another from what we would today call philosophy of mind. These two arguments have already been given, in the last two fragments quoted above. According to the argument from physics, the εἴδωλα that activate the perception do not have the substance to support the capacities attributed to them by Democritus. Although they are corporeal in their own way, they are so minute and subtle that it is physically impossible for these entities to possess the nature of a living organism. This is explicitly stated in fr.  I –II : Now these εἴδωλα do not in any way have [any] sensation, as Democritus [supposes, seeing that they are constructed] of [fine] atoms and are [perceptible] only [by the mind]. It follows that what a dreaming or hallucinating person really perceives is not what she seems to perceive. Therefore she is not really perceiving sentient, rational, speaking creatures. What she really perceives is something else. This refutes the second premise of the reductio: Orestes does not really perceive Furies insistently pursuing him. The second argument coming from ‘philosophy of mind’ depends on the distinction between sensory and dianoetic perceptions. According to this distinction, the real object of perception in dreams and hallucinations is not subject to the senses.

³⁴ Fragments  and  belong to the Letter to Mother. A helpful discussion about the authorship of this letter can be found in Smith () –. See also Smith (a)  on Gordon ().



 

Being constructed of fine atoms that cannot affect the senses that are inactive during sleep, it can only be subject to dianoetic perception (fr. ,  II –,  II –).³⁵ As the factivity of perception doctrine covers all kinds of perception, it is true that the mind of a dreaming or hallucinating person perceives something and its perception is veridical in this sense. However, during sleep, the senses are incapable of testimony in favour of or against the judgments of the mind about what it perceives. This is to say, they are incapable of transmitting any information from the sensory level about what is the case, for example, that there are no Furies and no Epicurus to be perceived. In the absence of such testimony, the mind of Epicurus’ sleeping mother is dragged to take its perception of the form of Epicurus as coming from an external solid Epicurus present in flesh and blood. The same is true for Orestes’ Furies. And, as Lucretius states (IV –), the memory is also inactivated in sleep, thus it cannot remind the mind that Furies have never existed, or that Epicurus is not around, since he is somewhere else. It follows that what such a mind reports that it perceives is not what it really perceives. Therefore, the reports of a hallucinating or dreaming mind about its experiences are false and what is stated in the second premise of the reductio above is just such a report, hence it is false. To Orestes, Diogenes would say: “It is not the case that you perceive Furies.”

.    The reductio refutation (as it is propounded by Plutarch, for instance) of the Epicurean theory of perception aims at revealing the incapacity of this atomist theory to account for the falsity of some obviously false perceptual experiences such as dreams and hallucinations. It seems that throughout the history of the school, students of the Garden before Diogenes had confronted the same kind of reductio in different dialectical contexts. Compared to these earlier Epicureans, such as Timagoras,³⁶ Demetrius Laco, and Lucretius,³⁷ Diogenes is unique in placing his discussion in a still broader dialectical context within the history of philosophy as a problem of this history itself. Besides this, Diogenes justifies the Epicurean position not only against the Stoics but also as a qualification within the atomist theory itself.

³⁵ As to the difference between the natures of the εἴδωλα perceived by the mind in dreams and those received by the eyes and provoking sight, see also Lucr. IV –. ³⁶ For the identity of Tima⟨sa⟩goras see Verde (b). For a more detailed discussion of his philosophical stance and his place in the Epicurean tradition, see Verde (b). ³⁷ To this list, we can add Epicurus himself if the Letter to Mother belongs to him. See note  above for discussion of the authorship of this letter.

        



Below, after giving some other examples of the Epicurean defense against reductio arguments, I explain briefly that this defense is at the same time a defense of the school against scepticism. Let’s start with Demetrius Laco’s answer to the objection that: ‘since everything which appears also is, and the sun appears to stand still, the sun is standing still’ (PHerc.  col. XX –). This is meant to be a reductio ad absurdum of the Epicurean position because ever ybody, including the Epicureans, knows that the sun is not standing still(!).³⁸ Demetrius Laco’s answer is the following: We will say to this what we also said before, that the sun does not appear to stand still, but is judged to so appear.³⁹ That is, we do not perceive the sun standing still, but we somehow falsely interpret the impression we have of the sun as if it were standing still. Or to put it in terms of factivity, a still sun is not what we have the perception of, simply because such a thing does not exist. A still sun is nothing but an illusion. Timagoras seems to follow the same strategy regarding the phenomenon of double vision, as reported by Cicero (Ac. II ): Timagoras the Epicurean denies that he has ever had the impression of doubled flames from a candle when he pressed his eye: the deception derives from opinion, not his eyes. If, despite the obvious experience of having double vision, Timagoras could refuse to accept that he has ever had the impression that there are two flames coming from a candle, it can only be because there is no such thing.⁴⁰ In other words, Timagoras seems to assume that in such an experience, one cannot possibly have the perception of two flames coming from a candle, such that this can only be an experience of illusion.⁴¹

³⁸ On the appearance of the sun as immobile see also Cic. Ac. II  and Lucr. IV . ³⁹ PHerc.  col. XX – (ed. Romeo ). On this fragment see also Barney () . I use Barney’s translation. ⁴⁰ A joint strategy in Timagoras’ answer to this question is to follow Epicurus’ thesis that senses are alogical, hence, they do not have any kind of propositional attitude towards their content. Senses, in other words, cannot proclaim that something is the case or not. But this side of the Epicurean anti-sceptical strategy is beyond the scope of this paper. On this point see also n.  below. ⁴¹ On Timagoras and Demetrius Laco see also Reinhardt ()  n.  and .



 

As for Lucretius, although his fourth book addresses several sceptical arguments, it is less obvious whether his immediate aim is to answer a reductio argument like Demetrius, Timagoras, and Diogenes. Nonetheless, at two points in this book he follows the same line of reasoning as the others. The first is a concluding passage (IV –) where he explains the nature of the illusions he lists at length in the preceding lines (–). He says: We experience an extraordinary large number of other illusions of this kind. It is as though all of them are conspiring to undermine our confidence in the senses. Their efforts, however, are unavailing, since the majority of these errors are due to inferences added by our own minds, which cause us to imagine that we have seen what our senses have not seen.⁴² Lucretius is making the same point as Demetrius Laco: sometimes the mind gives false judgments about what the eyes convey faithfully from the objects of their sight. This is one way an illusion can come about⁴³ when the mind takes the eyes to be seeing what is not there to be seen. The second passage is that in which he provides an explanation for the moving dream images (IV –). It is not obvious, in this passage either, whether he is answering a reductio argument or not, but it is reasonable to suppose that he is formulating an answer to criticisms addressed to atomist theories in general about their incapacity to explain such phenomena. Besides, this passage is of particular interest for us because I believe that we cannot exclude the possibility that Diogenes supports his criticism of Democritus with a similar ‘cinematographic’ account of

⁴² Translation of Smith (). ⁴³ There are at least two ways in which a visual illusion can come about and be explained in the Epicurean theory of perception. Lucretius distinguishes these two in the fourth book of his poem. The long section (IV –) where he gives examples of visual illusions can be divided in two parts. The first part falls between lines – and has its conclusion at –; whereas the second part falls between the lines – and has its conclusion at – (this is the passage quoted above). The conclusion of the first part explains illusions and the immunity of the senses from error in a different way to the conclusion of the second part. This first conclusion states that: [how things are] can be decided only by the reasoning of the mind: the eyes cannot take cognizance of the real nature of things. Refrain, then, from foisting on the eyes the shortcomings of the mind (–). The notorious ‘round tower’ case is one example for which Lucretius offers this explanation. This explanation states that although there is an error in such cases, the senses cannot be accused of making it because they are alogical, that is, they do not have a propositional attitude toward their contents; hence, they do not have a propositional truth-value. The crucial point here is that these are the cases where the content of the sensation does not actually correspond to the fact or to the object that is

        



moving and ‘speaking’ images. According to Lucretius, the appearance of moving images in dreams is just an illusion of the mind. There is no such thing. All that there is is a rapid succession of simulacra. The illusion of moving images is, in a sense, an unavoidable illusion because the succession of the simulacra takes place very rapidly at imperceptible time intervals. But this doesn’t change the fact that there is no such thing as moving, dancing, etc. simulacra to perceive. Now we can see that the stock Epicurean defense (of which Diogenes gives a highly elaborate version) against the above explained reductio refutation of the school’s theory of perception constitutes, at the same time, a line of defense in their anti-sceptical strategy. In fact, this must be even more so given that Cicero and Plutarch’s uses of the reductio arguments against the Epicureans have the purpose of corroborating a sceptical stance against the Garden.⁴⁴ If it is true, as suggested in this paper, that Diogenes follows, in his own elaborate way, his predecessors in their confrontation of the reductio arguments, it can reasonably be inferred that he must also be acquainted with this line of anti-sceptical strategy given by the school. After all, we know from his mention of Lacydes of Cyrene in fr.  that Diogenes is engaged in some way with the Academics on the possibility of knowledge.

being perceived. For instance, the eyes receive the simulacrum of a round tower while the tower itself is, in fact, square. In this case, it is the mind which commits the error about the shape of the tower because it makes a judgment about the content of the sensation to which it is related. The error has to be imputed to the mind and not to the eyes simply because it is the former, and not the latter, that makes the judgment. Otherwise, there is no such thing as a round tower as the content of the sensation suggests. This explanation is to be distinguished from that given in the conclusion of the second part, which bears on cases of illusion in which the senses have a content faithfully corresponding to the fact or to the external object that is being perceived, while the mind goes astray in its judgment about this content. These two have to be considered two distinct lines of defense against scepticism. Note that the Epicurean defense against the reductio arguments discussed in this paper seems to be limited to the second type of case. This is why I do not discuss fr.  in this paper, where Diogenes calls the suppositions of the πολλοί about the height of the sun from the ground into question (this passage has a parallel in Lucr. IV – ). As I understand it, Diogenes takes this phenomenon to be akin to the ‘round tower’ case. On fr.  and on the question of the size of the sun, see also Leone  in this volume. ⁴⁴ The reductio argument discussed so far is not particularly skeptical, but as Cicero and Plutarch’s uses of it show, it would be a useful addition to the sceptic’s toolbox. The difference between a sceptical argument proper and a reductio argument is that the former aims to establish that the dogmatists are incapable of accounting for the truth of their truth claims, whereas the latter states that they (especially the Epicureans) are incapable of accounting for the falsity of some obviously false beliefs.



 

A standard Academic sceptical argument goes as follows: () Some impressions are false. () False impressions are phenomenologically and introspectively indistinguishable from true impressions. () Therefore, there are no impressions that can distinguishably grasp the truth. Cicero rightly reminds Lucullus that Epicurus and devoted Epicureans like Timagoras do not grant the first premise (Ac. II ). As Cicero presents the debate, it is true for some visions that (A) they are impressions and they are false, and yet Epicureans deny, according to Cicero, the falsity of such false impressions. Cicero makes it sound as if the Epicureans are denying the truth of the second conjunct in (A). However, as the examples of Timagoras, Demetrius Laco, and Diogenes of Oinoanda clearly show, what is denied by the traditional Epicurean defense against the reductio arguments directed at their theory of perception is not the truth of the second but that of the first conjunct! Epicureans are not denying that the visions of a dreamer are false. In other words, they are not denying the falsity of what their critics call “false impressions”. They are simply denying that they are impressions. They are, in fact, false opinions. Falsity in a perceptual experience has to be attributed to its doxastic component because all sensations and all impressions occurring in virtue of them are true.

.  I set out to explore the philosophical debate behind Diogenes’ polemic against the Stoics and Democritus on dream visions. I first tried to show that in his polemic against the Stoics Diogenes expounds a standard Epicurean doctrine, according to which all kinds of perception are factive. Diogenes criticizes the Stoics for ignoring the factivity of mind’s perception in dreams. They miss the part of truth in dreams. After that, I tried to explain that the factivity of all kinds of perception doctrine exposes the Epicureans to a reductio ad absurdum refutation, because, as Plutarch noticed, without further clarification, they cannot exclude the reality of imaginary creatures, such as Furies, etc. I suggested that Diogenes’ refutation of Democritus provides this further clarification and that this is its function in Diogenes’ argument. The refutation of Democritus allows Diogenes to explain what the error of the mind is when dreaming. This criticism of Democritean simulacrum shows that what a dreamer perceives is never extant, solid, moving, speaking, etc. objects and that such reports are false. This excludes the reality of non-existent beings (for which the Epicureans are ridiculed). Finally, I explained that this entire discussion with

        



the Stoics and Democritus aligns with an almost traditional line of defense in the history of Epicureanism and that it constitutes an answer to a sceptical reproach against the school. According to this reproach, Epicureans would deny the falsity of hallucinatory and illusionary impressions. Diogenes formulates a highly elaborate version of the traditional Epicurean answer to this reproach. The School’s answer consists in saying that what they deny is not the falsity of such experiences, but that they are ‘impressions’.

,       ’ Fragment  – De rerum natura IV –

Alain Gigandet

. Plusieurs fragments de l’inscription d’Œnoanda, remarquables entre autres par leur longueur et leur cohérence, sont consacrés à la théorie des simulacres et à sa dimension proprement psychologique: celle qui réunit théorie de la perception et théorie de l’imagination en une sorte de doctrine générale des représentations, à la fois sensibles et mentales.¹ .. Le premier d’entre eux, qui est aussi le plus long, est le fragment , dont le début est consacré à établir la réalité des ‘apparitions’ (φάσματα) par le biais d’un premier argument qui convoque l’exemple du miroir. Ensuite, la cause de ces apparitions étant identifiée comme étant le flux des simulacres, Diogène procède à une première extension aux représentations imaginaires, puis à une seconde qui le fait passer de l’imaginaire vigile à l’imaginaire onirique. Ce dernier cas soulève la question épistémologique classique de l’illusion propre au rêve, qui est discutée sur fond de polémique à la fin du fragment  et dans le fragment . Le passage où apparaît la question que je désire poser, celle des pores et de la porosité, est le suivant:² II τὰ οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν πρα γμάτων ῥέοντα εἴδω-

λα, ἐνπείπτοντα ἡμῶν

¹ Il s’ agit des fragments , ,  et . ² Ainsi, les simulacres qui s’écoulent des choses, en venant frapper nos yeux, à la fois constituent les causes réelles de notre vision, et, dans [lacune  lignes - – - Ainsi, grâce aux impacts], l’âme reçoit ce qui est vu par les yeux. Puis, après l’impact des premiers simulacres, notre nature est devenue poreuse, et cela de telle manière que, lors même que les choses que l’on a vues auparavant ne sont plus présentes, des apparitions semblables aux premières sont reçues par la pensée … Ne nous étonnons pas non plus que cela se [produise] également quand [nous] dormons, car les simulacres affluent vers nous de la même manière à ce moment là [aussi] (Diog. fr.  II –IV  Smith, tr. P.-M. Morel, dans: Delattre/Pigeaud , ).



III





III



 

ταῖς ὄψεσιν, τοῦ τε ὁρᾶν ἡμ̣ ᾶς τὰ ὑποκείμενα α̣ἴτια γείνεται καί, εἰς [τὴν ψυχὴν εἰσιόντα,] [τοῦ ἐννοεῖν αὐτά. κατ’] ἐνπτ[ώσεις μὲ]ν̣ ο[ὖν] τ̣ὰ̣ ὑπὸ τῶν ὄψεων βλεπόμενα ἡ ψυχὴ παραλαμβάνει. v μετὰ δὲ τὰς τῶν πρώτων ἐνπτώσεις εἰδώλων ποροποιεῖται ἡμῶν οὕτως ἡ φύσις ὥστε, καὶ μὴ παρόντων ἔτι τῶν πρα̣γμάτων ἃ τὸ πρῶτον εἶδεν, τὰ ὅμοια τοῖς πρώτοις τῇ διανοίᾳ δεχθ[ῆ]ν̣α̣ι φ̣α̣σ́ ̣ μ̣α̣[τα γεννῶντα καὶ ὕπαρ] καὶ ὄ̣[ναρ. μηδ]ὲ [θαυμά]σωμεν τοῦτο γεί[νεσθαι] καὶ καθευδόντων [ἡμῶν]· ῥεῖ γὰρ ἡμεῖν ὁμοίω̣ ς ̣ τὰ εἴδωλα [καὶ] τότ̣ε.̣

Trois objectifs successifs guident le propos de Diogène : (a) dans une perspective étiologique, identifier les ‘causes réelles’ de nos impressions visuelles: ces sortes d’enveloppes des corps que sont les εἴδωλα, qui, lancées à une vitesse immense, pénètrent le corps vivant sentant en suivant la voie offerte par l’organe visuel, jusqu’à l’âme; (b) établir ainsi la thèse fondamentale de la réalité matérielle des représentations sensibles: celles-ci, bien qu’étant ‘dans l’âme’ ou ‘de l’âme’, ne sont pas à proprement parler des formations psychiques, mais des sortes d’effigies détachées de l’objet perçu, qui par leur biais se délègue pour ainsi dire dans l’organe sentant; (c) fonder ainsi une doctrine de l’unité et de l’homogénéité des représentations, sensibles et mentales, ‘objectives’ et fictives, dont le principe est énoncé dans la remarque introductive aux considérations sur les rêves. Un aspect capital de cette unification consiste dans le fait que la théorie épicurienne de l’esprit ne connaît aucune opposition entre l’imaginaire (vigile ou onirique) et la conception, entre le fantasme et l’idée, et ainsi de suite. Bien au contraire, l’étoffe matérielle des représentations étant une, les mécanismes s’éclairent les uns les autres. Lorsque Lucrèce pose la question même de la pensée, quae moveant animum res (…) et

,       ’



unde / quae veniunt veniant in mentem,³ il enchaîne significativement avec des considérations sur la formation des représentations imaginaires et le rêve.⁴ De là, par conséquent, une théorie de l’imaginaire sans imagination, les propriétés des représentations se confondant avec celles des simulacres, sans recours à un jeu d’opérations spécifiques de l’esprit autre que de simple réception. Le statut du sujet, à s’en tenir là, semble réduit à celui d’une marque vide. La double polémique menée par Diogène au fragment  fait ressortir la spécificité de cette théorie. Est rejetée, en effet, l’idée stoïcienne de représentations imaginaires dépourvues de toute ‘objectivité’, c’est-à-dire de ‘phantasmes’ qui ne seraient pas produits dans l’âme par l’impression d’un objet, mais consisteraient, sur le modèle de l’hallucination, en une sorte d’affection ou d’‘attraction’ de l’âme ‘à vide’.⁵ Mais Diogène réfute également une conception en quelque sorte opposée qu’il attribue à Démocrite, selon laquelle les représentations oniriques seraient animées d’une vie propre.⁶ Tout cela est bien connu, et, notons-le, remarquablement documenté par l’inscription de Diogène. Le point auquel je m’intéresse retient en général moins l’attention des commentateurs. Il est formulé dans la remarque qui articule le point (b) au point (c) de notre extrait, et concerne la cause ou la condition de possibilité de la répétition des représentations dans l’esprit: Puis, après l’impact des premiers simulacres, notre nature est devenue poreuse, et cela de telle manière que, lors même que les choses que l’on a vues auparavant ne sont plus présentes, des apparitions semblables aux premières sont reçues par la pensée … Diogène fait donc intervenir un processus, un mécanisme qui revient à faciliter le passage d’un certain type de simulacres en rendant la voie empruntée exactement conforme à leur taille et à leur forme. Épicure lui-même avait évoqué ce processus, en tout cas son résultat, qu’il nommait ϲυμμετρία τῶν πόρων, la ‘proportionnalité’ ou plutôt ‘l’appropriation’ ou ‘la conformité’ des pores.⁷ Le processus lui-même, en revanche, ne semble pas comporter de nom spécifique dans nos sources, je propose de le désigner par le terme de ‘frayage’, en référence à l’idée de ‘frayer un chemin’,

³ Quelles choses meuvent l’esprit (…) et d’où viennent celles qui viennent à la pensée. Lucr. IV –, tr. Kany-Turpin (). ⁴ Lucr. IV –. ⁵ Voir Aétius IV . (SVF II ) ; Sext. Emp. Math. VII  (SVF II ). ⁶ Voir Morel () –. ⁷ Epicur. Hdt.  et .



 

c’est-à-dire l’ouvrir pour soi, ‘se frayer un chemin’ et le préparer ainsi pour les autres.⁸ À l’époque où il esquissait son modèle neurologique de l’appareil psychique, Freud avait introduit le concept de Bahnung, en français, donc, ‘frayage’ (anglais : facilitation), pour exprimer le fait que «l’excitation, dans son passage d’un neurone à un autre, doit vaincre une certaine résistance; lorsqu’un tel passage entraîne une diminution permanente de cette résistance, on dit qu’il y a frayage: l’excitation choisira la voie frayée de préférence à celle qui ne l’est pas ».⁹ Ce qui retient mon attention ici, c’est (a) l’idée d’un flux qui circule à travers des obstacles; (b) le fait que là où les obstacles sont vaincus ou contournés va se former une voie privilégiée ; (c) voie qui autorise un processus de répétition. Je précise tout de suite qu’autant qu’on puisse juger, dans l’état extrêmement lacunaire de notre corpus, la συμμετρία τῶν πόρων ne semble pas résulter uniquement du mécanisme de frayage ainsi décrit. Elle peut être aussi, dans d’autres cas, une donnée de ‘nature’ liée à la constitution même de l’organisme sentant. J’y reviendrai. .. Que l’idée de ce processus remonte à Épicure lui-même est confirmé, en particulier, par le fragment suivant du Περὶ φύσεως :¹⁰

⁸ C’est la traduction adoptée par J. Kany-Turpin () dans le passage correspondant de Lucrèce qui va être étudié plus bas. ⁹ Sigmund Freud, Projet de psychologie scientifique (), cité in Laplanche/Pontalis () . ¹⁰ – [à certains plus, à certains] moins, à certains dans une mesure absolument minuscule – et, derechef, ne laissant aucune empreinte dans la composition mentale de certains – quand [des simulacres] de forme semblable à ceux qui affectent tels organes sensoriels viennent les frapper, parce que la voie leur a été frayée par ces dernières, la constitution elle-même étant ce qui a la plus grande part de responsabilité et opérant par le biais des éléments, en fonction de la différence entre les atomes et les pores préexistants. Mais le « produit développé» aussi qui … Epicur. Nat. XXV PHerc.  corn.  z.  ed. Laursen ()  = [.] Arr.², tr. J. Brunschwig, A. Monet et D. Sedley, dans : Delattre/Pigeaud () . J. Hammerstaedt propose ici une lecture et constitution différentes de ce texte au début duquel il est toutefois opportun d’ajouter, suivant l’édition de Laursen () , le PHerc.  corn.  pz.  z.  col.  (= Col. « C» pars inf.) : - – - ] . απρο|[ - – - τοῖς μ]ὲν μᾶλ|[λον, τοῖς δ’] ἧττον, τοῖς δ’ ὅλως ἐπὶ βρα[χύ] τι καὶ οὐθ̣έν (legit Daniel Delattre), τύπων πάλιν | τινῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν δια|νοητικὴν σύγκρισιν, ὁμοιοσχη|μόνων τοῖς πρὸς τὰ λο̣ι ̣πὰ αἰσ|θητήρια, παρεμπιπτόν|των ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖθεν προοδο|ποι[[η]]ηθῆναι τά γε δὴ πολ|λά, ἐχ̣ούσης μὲν καὶ αὐ|τῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῆ̣ ς (lege τὰ̣ς) | διὰ τῶν στοιχείων αἰ|τίας παρὰ τὴν τῶν | ἀτ[ό]μων διαφορὰν | καὶ τῶν προυπαρχόν|των πόρων, οὐ μὴν | [ἀ]λ̣ λ̣[ὰ] καὶ τοῦ ἀπογ̣εγ̣εν̣[νη|μέ]ν̣[ο]υ … [– - – ] en traduisant: [Notre pensée peut être influencée par les mêmes images que celles qui, venant de l’extérieur, pénètrent nos organes des sens] pour certains plus, [pour certains] moins, et pour d’autres dans une mesure insignifiante et pas du tout, alors que certaines images pénètrent à nouveau aussi l’agrégat mental, ayant une forme semblable à

,       ’



ἧττον, τοῖς δ’ ὅλως ἐπὶ βρα[χύ] τι καὶ οὐκ̣ ἐντυπῶν πάλιν τινων καὶ πρὸς τὴν διανοητικὴν σύνκρισιν (ὁμοιοσχη μόνων τοῖς πρὸς τάδε τὰ αἰσθητήρια) παρεμπιπτόντων ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖθεν προοδοποι[[η]]ηθῆναι τά γε δὴ πολλὰ ἐχ̣ούσης μὲν καὶ αὐ τῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῆς διὰ τῶν στοιχείων αἰτίας παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀτ[ό]μων διαφοράν καὶ τῶν προυπαρχόν των πόρων, vv οὐ μὴν [ἀ]λ̣ λ̣[ὰ] κα̣ὶ τοῦ ἀπογ̣εγ̣εν[νη][μέ]ν̣[ο]υ ν̣ο̣η̣θέντ̣ο̣[ς] τ̣[ ± / ]υ . συ[ . ]οιου . . [ C’est le seul texte d’Épicure à ma connaissance qui nomme, en l’occurrence par le biais d’un verbe, le processus de frayage. Le verbe προ-οδοποιέω signifie ouvrir le chemin, donner accès. Il est remarquable que cette mention du frayage intervienne ici comme chaînon d’une argumentation sur les fondements atomiques d’une donnée à la fois psychologique et morale, le fait que le sujet est responsable de ce qu’il est, conformément au propos général du livre XXV du Περὶ φύσεως, contexte assez éloigné de celui du fragment  de Diogène. Il faudra également y revenir. Le texte épicurien dont le contexte nous rapproche le plus de celui de Diogène est indiscutablement un développement de Lucrèce à propos du rêve: Cetera sic studia atque artes plerumque videntur in somnis animos hominum frustrata tenere. Et quicumque dies multos ex ordine ludis adsiduas dederunt operas, plerumque videmus, cum iam destiterunt ea sensibus usurpare,

()

celles (qui ont pénétré) les autres organes des sens, du fait que, de ce côté, la voie a été pour une grande part ouverte au préalable; (dans ce processus) c’est à la constitution elle-même qu’appartiennent les causes qui opèrent par le biais des éléments, en fonction de la différence entre les atomes et les voies préexistantes – et, bien sûr, le produit aussi …



 

relicuas tamen esse vias in mente patentis qua possint eadem rerum simulacra venire. Per multos itaque illa dies eadem obversantur ante oculos, etiam vigilantes ut videantur cernere saltantis et mollia membra moventis, et citharae liquidum carmen chordasque loquentis auribus accipere, et consessum cernere eundem scenaique simul varios splendere decores.¹¹

()

Si l’on retrouve bien dans ces vers la question des représentations mentales dans leur rapport aux impressions sensibles, la problématique et l’économie du passage, toutefois, sont sensiblement différentes de celles du fragment . Il y a ici comme une inversion ou un effet de ‘négatif’ au sens photographique du terme, par rapport au texte de Diogène. L’objet de l’analyse est le rêve, l’exemple de l’imaginaire diurne obsessif, qui introduit la thèse du frayage, constituant une sorte de cas limite qui sert à étayer la thèse selon laquelle les représentations oniriques reproduisent, répètent les événements les plus communs ou les préoccupations les plus marquantes de la vie éveillée du rêveur. Il s’agit donc de fonder une théorie de la répétition onirique en convoquant une circonstance qui se tient à la limite de la veille et du sommeil.¹² Sur cette base, le raisonnement va procéder par extension, selon une séquence qui passe de la perception sensible au rêve éveillé, puis de celui-ci au rêve nocturne. L’exemple des images obsédantes qui hantent les spectateurs assidus du cirque à l’état vigile vient à l’appui de la thèse du frayage, l’explication pouvant ensuite s’étendre aux scènes oniriques, avec l’expression ante oculos qui assure une sorte de médiation. On retrouve en définitive l’idée d’un imaginaire «réel» unifié, unifié en tant qu’il est réel, mais de manière implicite, sans thématisation de la part de Lucrèce, qui s’en tient à son propos: non seulement expliquer la matière ou l’étoffe de la scène onirique, mais encore élucider le principe physique qui préside à son contenu.

¹¹ Ainsi des passions et des métiers divers: / leurs vaines images tiennent l’esprit des hommes. / Ceux qui des jours entiers furent aux jeux du cirque / spectateurs assidus nous les montrent souvent: / alors que leurs sens ont cessé de les observer, / dans leur esprit des voies demeurent ouvertes / par où peuvent affluer les mêmes simulacres. / Ainsi, des jours durant, ces images les hantent / au point que même éveillés ils s’imaginent / avoir devant les yeux de souples danseurs, / entendre le chant éloquent et limpide des cithares, / apercevoir les mêmes rangées de spectateurs / et les décors brillants et variés de la scène (Lucr. IV –, tr. Kany-Turpin ). ¹² Il n’est pas certain que cette thèse, dans sa littéralité, soit le dernier mot de Lucrèce concernant l’explication des représentations oniriques: voir Gigandet (). Ce point est marginal ici, mais j’ y reviens ci-dessous.

,       ’



.. Il faut commencer par se demander ce que les épicuriens entendent exactement par πόροι. La traduction par pores ne comporte-t-elle pas un risque de confusion? Pour nous aujourd’hui, anatomiquement, un pore est un orifice cutané minuscule, qui correspond à une glande sudoripare ou à la glande sébacée d’un poil, c’est-àdire qu’il ouvre en fait sur une sorte de canal par lequel s’écoulent des sécrétions. La notion est donc directement associée à celle d’un vaisseau ou d’un conduit, et c’est précisément cette association qui fait problème, semble-t-il, dans le cas d’Épicure. D’une part, il est indiscutable que πόρος a fréquemment en grec ce sens anatomique, d’où le fait qu’il peut désigner, dans la littérature médicale, les veines, les artères, le nerf optique ou les divers vaisseaux par lesquels circulent les humeurs. Ce sens paraît cependant difficile à concilier avec l’expression ποροποιεῖται de Diogène et, de manière générale, avec l’idée même du ‘frayage’, puisqu’il s’ agit dans ce dernier cas de l’ouverture d’une voie, pas de la constitution d’un conduit permanent par combinaison ou recombinaison d’éléments. Le schéma qui nous intéresse est plutôt celui d’un flux formé par l’emboîtement des simulacres lancés à très grande vitesse qui percute la surface du corps et s’ouvre un passage à travers des tissus offrant des intervalles de vide. Il semble que ce que l’on retrouve alors, c’est un autre sens de πόρος bien familier aux philosophes, celui du passage, de la voie ou de l’issue, auquel réfère le terme ἀπορία. Lucrèce dit viae dans le passage cité ci-dessus. David Leith soutient, dans un article récent, que le médecin Asclépiade de Bithynie, dont les affinités épicuriennes ont souvent été soulignées, avait adopté une conception médicale des pores comme espaces vides interstitiels directement inspirée de la théorie épicurienne.¹³ Derrière cet emprunt se dessine une idée générale de l’organisme comme ensemble poreux, porosité directement liée à la présence en lui du vide. Je souscris globalement à cette interprétation, qui est corroborée par plusieurs textes des Lettres d’Épicure, que ce dernier, d’ailleurs, y décrive le mouvement des atomes eux-mêmes¹⁴ ou celui de composés particuliers comme, bien sûr, les simulacres,¹⁵ mais aussi la neige¹⁶ ou les vapeurs chaudes.¹⁷ On peut tenter de se représenter la pénétration d’un flux matériel à travers les intervalles ou interstices de vide qui se présentent en pensant à un passage ou une passe maritime, où le courant se fraye un chemin entre des bancs de sable, avec la mobilité et la plasticité

¹³ Leith (). ¹⁴ Epicur. Hdt. . ¹⁵ Epicur. Hdt. . ¹⁶ Epicur. Pyth. . ¹⁷ Epicur. Pyth. .



 

que cela suppose. Un point essentiel est en effet que les ‘premiers simulacres’ ouvrent une voie ajustée à leur taille et à leur forme, qui va par là même favoriser le passage ultérieur de flux de simulacres semblables à eux (c’est-à-dire issus des mêmes objets ou d’objets similaires). Le modèle est général, ce qui signifie notamment, comme on vient de le voir, qu’il vaut aussi bien pour la description des mouvements atomiques que pour celle des mouvements macroscopiques, ceux qui concernent les composés. Pour la question qui nous concerne, celle du rapport entre impressions sensibles et représentations imaginaires, une difficulté se présente toutefois, que David Leith semble ne pas avoir aperçue. Dans le cas des organes des sens, en effet, à commencer par l’œil, les simulacres paraissent bel et bien pénétrer par un canal, un conduit structuré qui s’ouvre sur la pupille. De même, semble-t-il, pour les flux d’atomes auditifs,¹⁸ ou dans le mécanisme du goût: Inde quod exprimimus per caulas omne palati diditur, et rarae per flexa foramina linguae.¹⁹ Lucrèce, cependant, précise bien, dans ce dernier cas, que foramina, ‘les canaux’, ne désigne rien d’autre que les intervalles entre les atomes: Semina cum porro distent, differre necessest intervalla viasque, foramina quae perhibemus, omnibus in membris et in ore ipsoque palato.²⁰ Il propose, de plus, de voir directement dans les différences de figure des atomes la cause des différences de configuration des intervalles, des passages, que celles-ci reproduisent ‘en creux’.²¹ Mais comment, au niveau sensoriel, la porosité peut-elle mettre ainsi en jeu directement les intervalles de vide entre les atomes, et pas la structure des tissus comme composés, saisie au niveau macroscopique? voilà qui n’est pas clair.²²

¹⁸ Lucr. IV –: les atomes pénètrent l’oreille par un conduit; ils sortent de même par la gorge lorsque l’ on parle. ¹⁹ Puis tout l’extrait se distribue dans les conduits du palais / les canaux sinueux du tissu poreux de la langue. Lucr. IV –. ²⁰ Dès lors qu’ils diffèrent, devront aussi varier / les interstices et voies, que nous nommons canaux, / dans tous les membres, la bouche et le palais. Lucr. IV –. ²¹ Lucr. IV –. ²² Le rôle qui revient à la συμμετρία dans ce dernier cas est bien détaillé par Lucrèce: Quand donc les atomes lisses forment ce suc fluide, / suave est leur contact […] / Au contraire, plus ils

,       ’



.. Ces considérations mènent directement à la difficulté suivante, au cœur de notre problème: quel est le sens exact de l’expression dont se sert Diogène, notre nature est devenue ou a été rendue poreuse ? Dans le cas de la vision, dont il s’agit ici, les récepteurs visuels sont poreux par constitution, d’une porosité pour ainsi dire ‘structurée’ et permanente, caractéristique du composé. Mais alors, il semble bien que la συμμετρία doive être en quelque sorte donnée, qu’elle n’ait pas besoin d’être constituée: ce que suggère en particulier le § de la Lettre à Hérodote. Et surtout, par hypothèse, les simulacres semblables, mais qui atteignent directement l’esprit, n’emprunteront pas cette voie, qu’elle soit frayée ou pas … Les choses ne me semblent pouvoir s’éclaircir que si l’on restreint justement le mécanisme du frayage à l’âme et à cette partie de l’âme qu’est l’esprit. C’est d’ailleurs littéralement ce que dit Lucrèce dans le texte que j’ai placé en parallèle du fragment : relicuas tamen esse vias in mente patentis. Le mécanisme du frayage ne peut jouer son rôle qu’au moment de la pénétration des simulacres dans l’âme et dans l’esprit, condition dernière de la sensation: autrement dit, c’ est notre nature psychique qui devient poreuse, au sens où le flux visuel y trace des voies spécifiques, non préexistantes, comme cela a été défini plus haut, préparant ainsi le passage ultérieur de simulacres semblables ténus, qui se présentent isolément, un par un. Et cela paraît bien s’ accorder avec la nature elle-même ténue du composé psychique et mental, qui le rend plus ‘plastique’ en quelque sorte. Le cas du rêve relève à cet égard du scénario général, les simulacres pénétrant un par un (singillatim) par les pores de la poitrine directement dans la mens, ignorant les canaux oculaires.²³ S’il en est bien ainsi, la théorie du frayage fournit la clé d’une difficulté considérable de la physique épicurienne de l’esprit, d’un défi qui lui est posé par l’existence même de l’imaginaire en général: la possibilité, avérée par l’expérience, que des images sensorielles se reproduisent dans la pensée vigile aussi bien que nocturne en l’absence des objets eux-mêmes.²⁴ Cela, dans la mesure où l’épicurisme (a) ignore le mécanisme de la réplication affaiblie des impressions en idées dont se dotera l’empirisme classique, chez Hume tout particulièrement; (b) choisit par conséquent

sont remplis d’aspérités, / plus leur ensemble pique et lacère l’organe. Et il précise: La volupté du goût se limite au palais. Lucr. IV –, tr. Kany-Turpin (); cf. II –. ²³ Il est vrai que Plutarque critique la théorie épicurienne des ‘proportions’ et ‘adéquations’ des pores des organes sensoriels (Adv. Col. , C). Mais j’essaie de suggérer que le problème de la συμμετρία τῶν πόρων ne se pose pas exactement de la même manière selon que l’on considère les organes des sens ou le composé psychique. ²⁴ … qu’une chose soit vue par les yeux ou l’esprit, / elle apparaît semblable, et l’on peut en conclure / qu’il faut dans les deux cas une raison semblable (Lucr. IV –, tr. Pautrat ).



 

de dissocier les deux régimes d’images-objets: celles qui impressionnent la ψυχή par le biais de l’organe visuel, d’une part; celles qui s’ adressent directement à l’esprit, soit dans le processus de pensée, soit lorsque les sens sont assoupis (rêves ou ‘rêves éveillés’, voire hallucinations), d’autre part.²⁵ Cette dissociation est certes ambiguë, mais nécessaire: on y a affaire à des simulacres rigoureusement semblables, mais qui sont reçus de deux manières différentes. La théorie du frayage, en expliquant comment le second type de réception est préparé et favorisé par le premier, fait communiquer pour ainsi dire mécaniquement et causalement les deux scènes, sensible et imaginaire.²⁶ Elle joue à certains égards, dans le cadre d’une physique de l’esprit, un rôle équivalent à celui des théories platonicienne et surtout aristotélicienne des empreintes, les τύποι.²⁷

. Je tenterai dans un second temps de prendre toute la mesure du dispositif de frayage, qui pouvait à première vue sembler ne jouer qu’un rôle limité. La thèse lucrétienne de la répétition par le rêve de l’expérience diurne la plus constante ou la plus intense trace en effet la voie d’une généralisation: dans le De rerum natura comme dans le fragment  de Diogène, la théorie du rêve ouvre une perspective sur une véritable théorie générale de la pensée. .. La répétition des représentations renvoie au pouvoir de rappeler les pensées, de les convoquer, ce qui constitue le problème général de la pensée: quae moveant animum res (…) et unde / quae veniunt veniant in mentem ;²⁸ et plus loin: quod cuique libido / venerit, extemplo mens cogitet eius id ipsum.²⁹ Pour penser, l’esprit doit avoir à sa

²⁵ Lucr. IV –. ²⁶ On mesure bien la singularité de la théorie si on la compare avec le schéma tracé par Aristote dans le De insomniis a, texte mentionné par Schrijvers (), qui pense que celui-ci a pu influencer Lucrèce. Interrogeant la rémanence des effets de la perception dans les rêves, Aristote considère que les impressions liées à la perception ne sont pas limitées aux organes des sens, et demeurent après la perception, surtout quand les choses ont été contemplées de manière assidue. ²⁷ Cf. Epicur. Nat. XXV ed. Laursen ()  = [.] Arr.² cité ci-dessus : καὶ οὐκ̣ ἐντυπῶν πάλιν (selon Laursen) ou τύπων πάλιν | τινῶν etc. (selon Hammerstaedt). ²⁸ Lucr. IV – (voir ci-dessus note ). ²⁹ Lucr. IV –, tr. Kany-Turpin (): Pourquoi, s’il nous prend fantaisie d’une chose, / l’esprit se la représente-t-il aussitôt ?

,       ’



disposition non seulement des représentations, mais les représentations pertinentes, celles qui peuvent s’associer aux pensées précédentes en fonction d’enchaînements réglés. Dans une physique de la pensée telle que la construisent les épicuriens, celleci repose sur un système de filtres et d’interceptions. Le frayage apparaît comme un rouage essentiel de ce mécanisme. .. Le corrélat pour ainsi dire noétique de cette opération est, par conséquent, l’attention, en tant que principe de la sélection des images pertinentes opérée par l’esprit. La pensée est affaire d’intérêt de l’esprit: Et quia tenuia sunt, nisi quae contendit, acute cernere non potis est animus; proinde omnia quae sunt praeterea pereunt, nisi si ad quae se ipse paravit.³⁰ Ipse parat sese porro, speratque futurum ut videat quod consequitur rem quamque; fit ergo.³¹ Or il s’avère que l’attention sélective de l’esprit est nourrie, soutenue, par une sélection objective, une sorte d’afflux prioritaire des simulacres correspondant à son attente. C’est donc le frayage qui soutient et à la fois oriente cette attention, dans la mesure où, par lui, la pensée se trouve inclinée ou prédisposée à se porter vers certaines images. On peut éclairer ce point en revenant brièvement sur un élément de la théorie lucrétienne du rêve auquel les fragments  et  font aussi allusion.³² Le rêve, censé répéter les faits marquants de la vie diurne, est une sorte de spectacle obsessionnel dont le modèle est le ‘rêve éveillé’ des amateurs de jeux du cirque. Mais un peu d’attention montre que cette doctrine concerne autant la constitution de l’imaginaire que celle de la mémoire. Lucrèce commence par citer en exemple les avocats qui continuent à plaider en rêve, les généraux à guerroyer, lui-même à composer son poème … À partir du vers , cependant, est déployée une série d’exemples de rêves animaux. Je laisse de côté la fonction de ce détour par l’animalité pour noter que le contenu de ces rêves manifeste un infléchissement de la thèse de la simple répétition. Chevaux, chiens, oiseaux, sont agités par des images qui

³⁰ Texte adopté par Cyril Bailey (et, plus tard, par Ernout et Kany-Turpin). ³¹ Mais comme [les simulacres] sont ténus, l’esprit ne peut bien voir / que ceux auxquels il est attentif: tout simulacre / passe et se perd, sauf celui auquel il s’est préparé. / Or l’esprit se tient prêt et toujours il s’attend / à voir la suite d’une chose; elle advient donc (Lucr. IV –, tr. Kany-Turpin ). ³² Lucr. IV –.



 

mettent en scène leurs principales pulsions : émulation, prédation, peurs diverses. L’introduction de ces exemples répond par conséquent à une question sous-jacente: qu’est-ce que le rêve répète ou prolonge de l’expérience vigile? Le ‘plein’ du vécu habituel, ou les tensions et les lacunes qui sous-tendent et travaillent ce plein? La formulation des vers –, en particulier, me semble autoriser la seconde lecture. Ainsi, à la fin, le rêve des rois livrant bataille se mue-t-il en un cauchemar où ceux-ci se voient emprisonnés et égorgés; l’angoisse et la culpabilité des uns les conduit à des aveux parfois fatals, la terreur des autres se projette dans les images d’une chute vertigineuse; enfin, le rêve d’incontinence est suivi d’effets physiques, introduisant significativement au cas de l’ ὀνειρωγμός, le rêve érotique de l’adolescent accompagné de pollution nocturne.³³ Ce déplacement vers le moteur des désirs et des phobies assure, du coup, la cohérence de l’ensemble. L’esprit, dans le rêve, continue à suivre le fil de son désir, qui nourrit l’attention spécifique aux objets qui lui correspondent: la scène du rêve n’est ni un décalque ni un prolongement de celle de la veille, car le principe de répétition y est lui-même subordonné à un principe d’intérêt mû par l’affect. L’exemple en miroir du poète poursuivant son œuvre dit assez que l’effectivité de ce principe doit être étendue à la pensée vigile. Là se dessine en creux, peut-on remarquer, la place problématique du sujet psychologique épicurien. .. La pensée repose également sur le pouvoir qu’acquiert l’esprit de mettre à distance la présentation ou l’impression sensible, de s’ extraire de l’immersion spontanée dans l’expérience présente. Comment concevoir l’ ἄδηλον, cet invisible que dévoile la physique atomiste, sans un écart réglé aux données des sens? Le biais de cet écart est la variation des formes, d’où le fait que, au sein de cette physique mentale, Lucrèce comme Diogène associent directement l’imaginaire fantastique et le rêve à la pensée éveillée.³⁴ Pour un épicurien, bien entendu, le fondement de ce pouvoir ne réside pas dans une ‘faculté’ de l’esprit, mais dans une série de propriétés objectives des images susceptibles d’être interceptées par celui-ci (à commencer par la capacité de se mélanger du fait de leur extrême ténuité, qui les rend fragiles et malléables). Dans cette perspective, le rêve se présente une fois encore comme un mécanisme exemplaire, d’où toute initiative du sujet est absente. Mais une indication de Lucrèce dans le texte du ‘rêve éveillé’ que j’ ai cité³⁵ pour commencer semble montrer que le processus du frayage joue un rôle décisif dans ce cas aussi.

³³ Voir Diog. fr.  III –IV ; constitution du texte différente proposée par Hammerstaedt ()  (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , ). ³⁴ Lucr. IV – ; –. ³⁵ Lucr. IV –, voir ci-dessus – (et la traduction in n. ).

,       ’



Le cas limite guide une fois de plus vers un problème général, la faculté qu’ont les représentations imaginaires de se superposer à celles de la perception actuelle sans se confondre avec elles, point sur lequel a insisté de nos jours la Phénoménologie. Possibilité essentielle pour la pensée de pouvoir se transporter ‘ailleurs’ sans perte du lien actuel au monde. Ici non plus, pas de référence aux diverses modalités d’une visée de la conscience, mais au fait que les simulacres qui pénètrent l’esprit par les voies qu’ont ouvertes les images sensibles sont d’une texture plus ténue que ces dernières. L’empirisme de l’âge classique retrouvera ce thème, mais sans l’explication physique sous-jacente: ce qui distingue les idées des impressions originelles, c’ est la force et la vivacité moins grandes avec lesquelles «elles frappent l’intelligence et font leur chemin (make their way) dans notre pensée et conscience».³⁶ On relèvera dans cette phrase de Hume la transposition plus ou moins métaphorique, consciente ou non, du vocabulaire psychologique épicurien de la voie et du passage. .. On trouve encore chez Diogène des indications concernant deux conséquences majeures de cette doctrine, l’une épistémologique, l’autre éthique. (a) Je passe rapidement sur la dimension épistémologique. Elle s’inscrit globalement dans le fait que, pour les épicuriens, la physique de la sensation corrobore le principe canonique de vérité de toutes les impressions sensibles, qui les promeut au rang de critère. Dans le cas de la théorie des πόροι, le principe de sélection explique les variations constatables dans la perception d’un même objet par des sujets (ou même les variations de cette perception au cours du temps chez un même sujet: le miel doux au bien portant, amer au malade). On peut donc répondre à l’objection sceptique ou rationaliste-platonicienne de la «subjectivité» des sensations que ce sont bien à chaque fois des propriétés objectives des corps qui sont perçues par les différents sujets, en fonction de leur réceptivité propre, c’est-à-dire de la structure particulière des passages qui assurent en eux la pénétration des simulacres. (b) C’est encore sur ce mécanisme de sélection lié à la συμμετρία τῶν πόρων qu’Épicure appuie son argument éthique sur la responsabilité du sujet à l’égard de sa nature présente, de ce qu’il est devenu, et donc de sa capacité à créer et conserver une bonne disposition (διάθεσις) par rapport aux événements qui l’affectent.³⁷ La question du rêve resurgit sur ce terrain, on le voit dans le fragment  de Diogène.

³⁶ D. Hume, Traité de la nature humaine, livre , première partie, section . ³⁷ Voir Epicur. Nat. XXV ed. Laursen () – = [.] Arr.² = Long/Sedley  C () ; cf. Masi ()  (T ) et ()  (T ).



 

Épicure assurait que celui qui conduirait sa vie conformément aux préceptes de sa doctrine ne serait en proie au désordre de l’âme (διαταραχθήϲῃ) «ni en état de veille, ni en songe».³⁸ L’enjeu éthique du rêve recroise la question du sujet, par le biais, encore, du mécanisme de frayage. La vie de l’insensé n’est pas seulement un aveuglement, elle est un chaos mental, une maladie du désir enchaîné à des objets vides, que Lucrèce dépeint de manière saisissante à la fin du chant III.³⁹ D’une certaine manière, en détournant une vieille métaphore platonicienne, on peut dire que cette vie malade est elle-même un rêve. Mais si l’esprit est purgé de son ignorance, il peut conserver au sein même du rêve sa juste appréhension des images:⁴⁰ les simulacres émis par les dieux, par exemple, lui apparaîtront dans leur vérité, affranchis des attributs effrayants que leur adjoint la religion, et il jouira sereinement du spectacle de leur beauté et de leur béatitude. La constitution ou l’institution épicurienne du sujet est pratique, éthique. Elle relève d’une sorte de manipulation mentale. La fonction de vérité du rêve est, dans le paradoxe (car son expérience immédiate semble plutôt menacer l’identité personnelle), d’attester celle-ci de manière pratique. Il faut rendre hommage à la lucidité philosophique de Diogène, qui, à la suite de Lucrèce, a remarquablement perçu ces enjeux de la physique des simulacres.

³⁸ Epicur. Mén. . Cf. Platon, République IX d–b. ³⁹ Lucr. III –. ⁴⁰ Le début du fragment  de Diogène suggère une idée comparable.

  ,    Diogène d’Œnoanda et la politique

Pierre-Marie Morel L’inscription de Diogène d’Œnoanda témoigne d’un intérêt réel pour le fait politique, avec une double intention polémique: dénoncer les travers de la pratique politique elle-même et de ceux qui y consacrent leurs principales occupations; rejeter certaines conceptions philosophiques des fondements de la cité ou du juste, au profit d’une conception alternative du δίκαιον. Cette attitude n’est pas nouvelle. Elle est déjà celle d’Épicure. On retrouve d’ailleurs chez Diogène les principaux thèmes de la vision traditionnelle de la politique que l’on identifie chez les épicuriens antérieurs: en premier lieu, la critique de l’activité politique et du pouvoir (fr. , fr.  + NF , fr. , fr. ) ; mais aussi, au travers de la confrontation avec les stoïciens, une formulation très polémique du problème de la justice, en lien avec le thème de la peur des dieux et la critique du providentialisme. Cette critique tient une place centrale dans le long fragment NF  + NF / + fr.  + NF , désigné par J. Hammerstaedt et M.F. Smith par le titre ‘Theological Physics-sequence’.¹ Cependant, l’inscription est loin d’être dépourvue d’originalité. D’une part, elle rassemble des éléments doctrinaux jusque-là dissociés, entrecroisant des thèmes que les épicuriens précédents n’avaient pas clairement reliés entre eux. D’autre part, elle évoque un âge d’or hypothétique (fr. ), et même une forme de cosmopolitisme (fr. ). Or ce sont là deux éléments dont on ne trouve pas de trace dans les textes épicuriens antérieurs, parmi ceux qui sont aujourd’hui disponibles en tout cas. Je dois bien entendu assigner des limites à mon propos, car le thème général de la politique comprise comme «organisation de la vie en commun» est en un sens partout présent, étant donné que la réflexion sur les conditions d’une vie collective harmonieuse est une question centrale de l’éthique épicurienne en général. Par ailleurs, pas plus que dans la tradition stoïcienne, il n’y a pour les épicuriens de ‘philosophie politique’, spécialisée et autonome: le τέλος ultime de toutes les activités humaines est le bonheur, à savoir l’absence de trouble psychique ou ataraxie. Une politique qui se voudrait autonome pourrait bien valoir comme ensemble de compétences techniques et pragmatiques en vue de l’administration des cités par les politiques professionnels, mais elle ne pourrait pas constituer par elle-même une philosophie politique. Sans doute même échouerait-elle à constituer une bonne politique, c’est-à-dire une politique conforme au juste, car il revient manifestement à des hommes véritablement sages d’indiquer ce qui est juste dans les cités, à l’instar

¹ Voir Hammerstaedt/Smith () –.



- 

des premiers législateurs évoqués par Hermarque dans sa généalogie des systèmes politiques et législatifs.² Si donc il y a une politique philosophique et légitime – une question sur laquelle, du reste, nous devrons revenir –, elle est en principe assumée par l’éthique et constitue l’un de ses prolongements, par simple extension des dogmes généraux de l’épicurisme à la communauté des citoyens. Il n’en demeure pas moins que les épicuriens, là-même où ils distinguent différentes formes de vie en commun et font la promotion de l’amitié par opposition à la sphère politique, s’estiment manifestement concernés par la rectitude des lois et l’organisation des cités. Ils estiment visiblement que la vie dans la cité n’est pas sans incidences (négatives ou positives) sur la recherche du bonheur. Ils sont donc conduits à s’ interroger sur la politique comprise comme science ou technique de l’organisation et de l’administration, si possible juste, de la cité. L’inscription de Diogène témoigne bien de ce rapport ambivalent, fait à la fois de méfiance et d’intérêt, qui caractérise l’attitude épicurienne à l’égard de la politique. Plusieurs fragments abordent en effet les questions du gouvernement des sociétés humaines, de l’attitude du sage face à l’organisation proprement politique, et du δίκαιον. Ce sont ces textes que j’examinerai ici. Sur ce point comme sur beaucoup d’autres, on le verra, l’inscription de Diogène montre une grande vigueur polémique.³ Je laisserai de côté le problème de la sociabilité au sens large (la genèse des communautés humaines et le fait même de leur existence), problème que l’on trouvera par exemple évoqué, au travers du τόπος de la découverte des techniques, dans le fr. . Commençons par la critique de la politique et par la méfiance à l’égard de la vie publique. Le thème du λάθε βιώσας, du vivre caché,⁴ est un des plus fameux de la littérature épicurienne concernant la politique. G. Roskam y a consacré une étude⁵ qui constitue désormais l’ouvrage de référence sur la question. Je ne vais donc pas ici reprendre les étapes antérieures de ce dossier. Je rappellerai simplement que, depuis un certain temps déjà, la critique spécialisée s’est accordée pour nuancer le rejet épicurien de la politique.⁶ La perception de l’attitude des épicuriens à l’égard de la politique a sans doute subi un effet de durcissement sous l’influence des polémiques antiques, celles de Cicéron, de Plutarque et d’Épictète notamment, qui les accusent d’incivisme. La réalité des textes est autre. D’ une part, Épicure ne prône pas le refus

² Hermarque ap. Porph. Abst. I  (fr.  Longo Auricchio). ³ Dimension signalée par Roskam (a) –. ⁴ Epicur.  Us. ⁵ Roskam (a). ⁶ Salem () ; Long/Sedley () ; Brown ().

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

de toute forme de vie sociale. Il confronte les différentes sphères de sociabilité, non pas pour éliminer la sphère proprement politique, mais pour montrer que la sociabilité restreinte qui est propre à l’amitié est sans aucun doute la plus sûre.⁷ L’amitié n’a probablement pas à se substituer à l’administration politique, dès lors que celle-ci est juste. D’autre part, il élabore une réflexion originale et consistante sur les conditions d’organisation d’une cité juste, et sera suivi sur ce point par un certain nombre de ses disciples, directs ou indirects, au premier rang desquels Hermarque, dans sa description des sociétés humaines. Il me semble même qu’Épicure, dans les Maximes capitales  à , parce qu’il récuse un paradigme de la justice – modèle sans doute platonicien – qui serait idéal et atemporel, se montre attentif au devenir historique des cités et aux variations légitimes de la justice instituée.⁸ L’un des points qui restent les plus difficiles à démêler est l’aporie de la désobéissance aux lois,⁹ qui serait selon Épicure envisageable dans certains cas, si le sage est certain de ne pas être découvert.¹⁰ C’est toutefois une question sur laquelle je n’aurai pas à me prononcer ici. Diogène d’Œnoanda prend en tout cas ses distances par rapport à la vie publique dès la présentation même de son inscription, c’est-à-dire là-même où il en donne une justification « politique» au sens large, puisqu’il la destine en premier lieu à ses concitoyens. Le fr.  est, de ce point de vue, la première pièce à verser au dossier de la politique de Diogène (fr.  I –). … καὶ οὐ πολ̣ [ει] τευ̣ όμενος, διὰ τῆ[ς]

γ̣ραφῆς καθάπερ πρ̣[άτ]τ̣ων λέγω ταῦτα, δε̣[ι]κ̣ νύειν δὲ πειρώμεν̣ος ὡς τὸ τῇ φύσει  συμφέρον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀταραξία, καὶ ἑνὶ καὶ πᾶσι τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν. … et même si je ne prends pas part aux affaires publiques, j’affirme ces choses par l’intermédiaire de cet écrit comme si j’agissais, m’efforçant de montrer que ce qui

⁷ Morel (). ⁸ Morel (). ⁹ Vander Waerdt () ; Seel (). ¹⁰ Plut. Adv. Col. D.

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est utile à notre nature, c’est-à-dire l’absence de trouble, est la même chose pour un seul et pour tous.¹¹ Diogène commence par se placer dans la position typique du sage épicurien: il ‘ne fera pas de politique’.¹² Il tiendra un discours éminemment publique, mais d’une tout autre nature que le discours strictement politique, puisqu’il s’adresse à tous. Épicure procède d’ailleurs de manière comparable au début de la Lettre à Ménécée, lorsqu’il proclame que la recherche du bonheur et la pratique de la philosophie s’imposent à nous quel que soit notre âge. Le NF ¹³ (qui vient se placer à la suite du fr. ), établit du reste un lien direct entre le caractère universel de la destination de l’inscription et le thème de l’indifférence de l’âge. On peut même penser que le refus de ‘faire de la politique’ prend une connotation plus radicale à l’époque de Diogène qu’à celle d’Épicure. Dans un contexte d’extension de l’Empire, où le rapport du citoyen au pouvoir politique est encore plus distendu qu’à l’époque d’Épicure, l’expression οὐ πολ̣ [ει]τευ̣όμενος peut signifier que le sage ne se soucie d’aucune forme de participation au pouvoir, qu’elle soit directe ou indirecte: si le véritable pouvoir politique est devenu pratiquement inaccessible, parce que trop lointain, c’est peut-être alors toute forme de vie publique qui se trouve ainsi rejetée. La signification et la sincérité de cette abstention de la politique méritent assurément d’être interrogées :¹⁴ le sage doit-il exclure absolument toute forme de charge au service de la cité?¹⁵ Quoi qu’il en soit, il ressort de ce fragment que la philosophie épicurienne n’est pas « politique » au sens où elle chercherait dans l’organisation du pouvoir et de la cité une solution pratique effective, mais qu’elle n’est pas pour autant une affaire strictement privée, car elle s’adresse à tous. La suite du fragment le justifie en deux temps : d’une part, les hommes souffrent collectivement de leurs maux, comme par contagion (col. IV); d’autre part, Diogène lui-même se présente comme ayant de l’humanité, comme étant bienveillant à l’égard des hommes en général, y compris les étrangers de passage (col. V). Il est en tout cas très clair que la critique de la politique se justifie par une mise en garde face à l’appétit de pouvoir et la cupidité en général, comme chez Lucrèce,¹⁶ ainsi qu’on le voit dans le fr. , mais aussi dans le fr.  – fragment dans lequel

¹¹ Fr.  I –. Traduction P.-M. Morel, ici et à la suite, dans Morel (). ¹² Diog. Laert. X  (Epicur.  Us.). ¹³ Hammerstaedt/Smith ()  (= , ). ¹⁴ Roskam (a) –. ¹⁵ Voir sur ce point Besnier () qui estime que certains épicuriens ont probablement été confrontés à la nécessité de soumettre ce principe à une casuistique de l’action publique. ¹⁶ Lucr. III –. Voir Fowler ().

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Alexandre fait figure de ‘paradigme négatif ’.¹⁷ Étant donné le mauvais état du fr. , je me contenterai de citer le fr. : (I) … se mettent à la philosophie en vue de …,¹⁸ pour se les procurer auprès des particuliers ou des rois (ὡς ἤτοι παρ’ ἰδιωτῶν ποριούμενοι ταῦτα ἢ βασιλέων), qui tiennent la philosophie pour une importante et estimable acquisition. Ce n’est donc pas pour que nous revienne l’un de ces avantages dont on a parlé que nous nous adonnons à cette activité, mais afin de (II) trouver le bonheur en atteignant la fin que l’on recherche par nature. Ce qu’elle est, et qu’ on ne peut se la procurer ni par la richesse, ni par la réputation publique, ni par le pouvoir royal (μήτε πλοῦτος αὐτὸ δύναται παρασχεῖν, μήτε δόξα πολειτική, μήτε βασιλεία), ni par une vie relâchée, ni par les banquets somptueux, ni par un choix de plaisirs sexuels, ni par quelque autre moyen, tandis que la philosophie (III), qui est ce que nous recherchons, peut nous la fournir, voilà ce que nous allons montrer.¹⁹ C’est donc la philosophie, et non la politique, qui mène au τέλος. Il n’est pas impossible, par ailleurs, que l’exhortation à la tranquillité (εὐθυμίη), dans la tradition ouverte par Démocrite,²⁰ ait implicitement pour effet la méfiance à l’égard de la pratique publique, de l’affairement politique, si l’on émet l’hypothèse que c’est de cela qu’il s’agit, dans le fr. , sous l’expression μὴ πολλὰ πράσσειν.²¹ L’hypothèse peut se justifier si l’on pense aux ‘occupations’ que désigne πρᾶγμα dans le fr. , sur lequel je vais revenir plus loin, mais que nous pouvons lire dès maintenant:

τὸ κεφάλαιον τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἡ διάθεσις, ἧς ἡμεῖς κύριοι. χαλεπὸν στρατεία̣  κἀν ἑτέρων ἀρχῇ. vacat τὸ ῥητορεύειν σφυγμοῦ καὶ ταραχῆς γέμον, εἰ πεῖσαι δύναται. τί οὖν μεταδιώκομεν πρᾶ-

¹⁷ Roskam (a) . ¹⁸ Smith () suggère : « de la richesse et du renom». ¹⁹ Fr.  I –III . Voir Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –). ²⁰ Voir notamment Démocrite  B  DK. ²¹ Voir en ce sens Smith () , à propos du fr. .



- 

 γ̣μα τοιοῦτον, οὗ τὴν

[ἐ]ξο̣ υσίαν ἔχουσιν ἄλλοι ; Ce qui préside au bonheur c’est la disposition, chose dont nous sommes maîtres. Le service militaire est rude et il se fait sous le commandement d’autres gens. L’art oratoire, s’il a le pouvoir de convaincre, est chargé d’émoi et de trouble. Pourquoi donc poursuivons-nous de telles occupations, qui sont au bon vouloir d’autres que nous?²² Enfin, le NF , qui vient se placer à la suite du fr.  et renforce la thématique de ce dernier, inclut une adresse aux citoyens (I –),²³ ce qui est au moins un indice du sens civique ou de la sollicitude de Diogène. Il se perçoit lui-même comme citoyen, et plus encore comme concitoyen. Il parle aux habitants de sa cité pour le bien de leur âme, même si, comme nous le savons, il s’adresse aussi aux étrangers de passage, aux générations futures et d’une manière générale au grand nombre,²⁴ comme il sied à un φιλάνθρωπος. En outre, Diogène dénonce dans le fr.  les effets de la tyrannie, faisant implicitement sienne la prescription d’Épicure: le sage ne fera pas le tyran.²⁵ Ce fragment est très mutilé, tout au moins dans Smith (), mais la mention des ‘tyrans’ ne fait pas de doute. Moins dramatiquement, et plus généralement, le fr.  déjà cité met en garde contre toute situation qui nous place sous le pouvoir d’autrui, comme faire son service militaire et s’exposer aux effets de la rhétorique. Se tenir à bonne distance de la vie publique, mépriser le pouvoir politique et dénoncer les vices de ceux qui s’y adonnent n’empêchent pas de s’interroger sur la nature même du juste. Le texte continu le plus long de l’inscription²⁶ est précisément consacré à l’un des problèmes majeurs de la politique épicurienne, à savoir le rôle que joue la crainte du châtiment dans la détermination des hommes à adopter une conduite juste.

²² Fr. .–. ²³ Voir Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –). Voir peut-être, également, fr.  I  ;  III . ²⁴ Voir fr.  V. ²⁵ Diog. Laert. X  (Epicur.  Us.). ²⁶ Théol. (NF  + NF – + fr.  + NF ). Voir Smith () –; Smith (a) –; Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –) ; Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –); Hammerstaedt/Smith () –. Traduction française de l’ensemble (sauf NF  = Théol. XV–XVI): Morel () –. J’adopte ici la nouvelle numérotation des colonnes, selon Hammerstaedt/Smith () –. Voir aussi Roskam – dans ce volume.

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Commençons par rappeler les deux textes de référence sur ce point, à savoir les deux maximes d’Épicure sur la crainte du châtiment pour les délits ou crimes commis (Epicur. Sent. –):²⁷

Ἡ ἀδικία οὐ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν κακόν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν φόβῳ, εἰ μὴ λήσει τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων ἐφεστηκότας κολαστάς. L’injustice commise est un mal, non pas en soi, mais du fait de la crainte suscitée par le soupçon qu’elle puisse un jour ne pas échapper à ceux qui ont charge de punir de tels actes.

Οὐκ ἔστι τὸν λάθρα τι ποιοῦντα ὧν συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι πιστεύειν ὅτι λήσει, κἂν μυριάκις ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος λανθάνῃ· μέχρι γὰρ καταστροφῆς ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ λήσει. Il n’est pas possible que celui qui fait en secret une des choses à propos desquelles on a mutuellement passé un contrat visant à ne pas faire de tort ni en subir, soit certain que cela restera inaperçu, même si cela passe inaperçu des milliers de fois dans le présent. Jusqu’à ce qu’il soit mort, en effet, impossible de savoir si cela restera encore inaperçu. Je laisserai ici de côté la question de la nature même et du statut en quelque sorte ontologique de la justice, dont les Maximes capitales montrent qu’elle n’a pas d’existence par soi mais dérive toujours d’une situation concrète. Il est indiscutable en tout cas que ces textes constituent le socle de la politique de Diogène d’Œnoanda: il connaît les Maximes capitales, qu’il cite à plusieurs reprises en marge inférieure, et mentionne même certaines de celles qui portent précisément sur la justice. Ainsi, la Sent. , selon laquelle la justice fait nécessairement partie d’une vie belle et plaisante, est citée après le fr. ; la Sent.  est peut-être en marge du fr. . Venons-en au texte de Diogène d’Œnoanda,²⁸ que je vais résumer dans un premier temps. Sa dimension polémique est manifeste. Il commence par une réponse à des critiques, probablement stoïciennes,²⁹ concernant l’efficacité de la conception

²⁷ Pour les traductions d’ Épicure, je reprends ma propre traduction, dans Morel (). ²⁸ Pour le commentaire, voir, outre Smith (), Smith (). ²⁹ Si l’on en juge par l’attaque anti-providentialiste du fr.  (Théol. XII–XIV), mais aussi du fr. . Sur la critique des stoïciens dans l’inscription, voir Gourinat, dans ce même volume.

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épicurienne du respect des lois et de la conduite juste. La thèse épicurienne critiquée est manifestement que la peur des dieux ne contribue pas au respect des lois. Le cœur de la réponse de Diogène, à mon avis, est aux colonnes III–IV (= NF  III + NF  I–II): les sages sont justes, non pas du fait des dieux (διὰ τοὺς θεούς), mais du fait de la rectitude de leur jugement concernant les désirs, les souffrances et la mort; les gens ordinaires, s’ils se conduisent de manière juste, le sont quant à eux du fait des lois (διὰ τοὺς νόμους) et à cause de la peur des châtiments. Seule une minorité serait raisonnable du fait des dieux et non du fait des lois, et encore cette disposition manque-t-elle de constance. La col. V apporte un argument de fait supplémentaire: les peuples les plus superstitieux – les juifs et les égyptiens – sont aussi les plus sanguinaires. La col. VI introduit une distinction entre les dieux des μῦθοι, associés ici aux juges de l’Hadès de Platon et de Socrate, et les dieux véritables. La col. VII porte un coup de plus à la position stoïcienne, en montrant, non seulement qu’elle n’est pas fondée, mais encore qu’elle repose sur une doctrine qui elle-même est néfaste, puisqu’elle est cause de troubles, sans doute parce qu’elle introduit les dieux dans les affaires humaines. La col. VIII (NF  VI + NF  I), en effet, aborde le thème de la providence divine et la question du rôle que les stoïciens lui assignent dans la conduite du monde. Les références pertinentes au Portique sont données, par exemple, dans Smith (). Je rappellerai simplement l’une des formulations du cosmopolitisme propre aux stoïciens, celle que Diogène semble avoir ici à l’esprit, et qui vise sans doute moins à prescrire un type donné d’organisation politique ou à se prononcer sur le fondement de la justice instituée qu’à caractériser le κόσμος lui-même:

λέγεσθαι δὲ κόσμον καὶ τὸ οἰκητήριον θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ⟨καὶ τὸ ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων⟩ καὶ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γενομένων σύστημα. le monde est aussi appelé la demeure des dieux et des hommes et aussi le système des dieux et des hommes et de ce qui a été créé pour eux.³⁰ Dans le texte parallèle de Cicéron,³¹ le lien entre la téléologie cosmique et l’obéissance aux lois est plus clair: la communauté des dieux et des hommes, pour lesquels – hommes et dieux tout ensemble – le monde a été produit, s’explique aussi par le fait que les hommes … se servent de la raison et vivent selon le droit et la loi (… ratione utentes jure ac lege vivunt). Les deux textes en tout cas se rejoignent en ce qu’ils

³⁰ Arius Didyme fr..– (DG ) ; Long/Sedley  L; SVF II . ³¹ Cic. ND II .

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

semblent commandés par une même ligne doctrinale probablement définie par Chrysippe.³² Il serait absurde et même ridicule (Théol. XII ), objecte Diogène, que des dieux veuillent agir pour les hommes (Théol. IX), avoir des hommes pour concitoyens (Théol. IX–X et Théol. XII = fr.  I), et qu’avant d’avoir institué une cité, ils aient dû vivre dans l’errance et la solitude (Théol. XIII = fr.  II). Je ferai cinq remarques à propos de ce texte: (a) Tout d’abord, il devient ici très clair que, chez Diogène d’Œnoanda, les questions politiques sont toujours liées à des enjeux polémiques qui, par ailleurs, dépassent le cadre strictement politique. C’ est dans le contexte d’une critique du providentialisme stoïcien, et en réponse aux critiques des stoïciens,³³ que se trouvent abordés les thèmes de la crainte du châtiment et celui du fondement de l’ordre social. Il est à mon avis assez significatif que Diogène construise la première partie du texte sur un système rigoureux d’opposition de causes, marqué par l’usage répété de διὰ avec l’accusatif. Ce n’est pas διὰ τοὺς θεούς que les hommes du commun se soumettent aux lois, mais bien διὰ τοὺς νόμους, c’ est-à-dire du fait de la contrainte imposée par les lois elles-mêmes. Les sages sont justes pour d’autres raisons, qui tiennent fondamentalement à la tranquillité de ceux qui se saisissent d’arguments fondés sur la nature, comme permet de le voir Théol. III (NF  III + NF  I) –:³⁴ [τ]ῶν δ ἄλλων ἀποφαίνομαι τοὺς μὲν φυσικῶν ἁπτομένου⟨ς⟩ λόγων (…). Il s’agit donc, comme à propos de l’apparition des techniques dans le fr. , d’indiquer la cause et l’origine véritable des faits et des comportements, d’un côté en exceptant les dieux ou les demi-dieux, et de l’autre en montrant que ce sont, ou bien les circonstances et le besoin (fr. ), ou bien les hommes eux-mêmes, qui sont responsables des inventions et des actions. Nous nous situons donc dans la double perspective de la Kulturgeschichte et de la cosmologie, étroitement liées l’une à l’autre depuis Démocrite,³⁵ et non pas dans une optique ‘politique’ au sens étroit ou spécialisé. La politique et la question du juste ne sont qu’un chapitre, voire une digression, dans un exposé qui, assurément, les dépasse, pour se fonder de facto, sur le plan des causes objectives, plutôt que de jure, sur le plan de la norme juridique et morale. (b) Du point de vue politique, la préoccupation majeure de Théol. reste d’expliquer le juste et le fonctionnement des sociétés humaines, sinon d’une manière pleine-

³² Schofield () . ³³ Sur cette stratégie de la contre-attaque, je renvoie à la communication de J.-B. Gourinat. ³⁴ Hammerstaedt/Smith ()  (= , ). ³⁵ Voir notamment Démocrite,  B  DK.



- 

ment positive, tout au moins avec une certaine neutralité. Même si le sage a des mobiles de conduite juste qui lui sont propres, Diogène ne se désintéresse nullement d’expliquer le fait social comme, avant lui, Épicure, Hermarque et Lucrèce.³⁶ Ce texte n’est donc pas à verser au dossier de la critique de la politique ellemême: il s’agit avant tout de rejeter une certaine conception – téléologique et théologique – de celle-ci, au nom d’arguments qui ne sont pas tous strictement politiques. (c) L’allusion aux juges de Socrate et Platon est peut-être une manière subtile d’impliquer la tradition platonicienne dans la polémique. Diogène d’Œnoanda, en bon épicurien, ne croit pas aux jugements infernaux.³⁷ Le passage cache peutêtre l’argument suivant: que l’on parle des vrais dieux³⁸ ou bien des prétendus juges de l’Hadès, comme ceux auxquels croient Platon et Socrate, le résultat est le même. Dans aucun des deux cas, la crainte des dieux ne sera une garantie contre l’injustice: dans le premier cas, parce que les vrais dieux – les dieux épicuriens – ne sont pas à craindre; dans le second, parce que, de fait, elle est inefficace. Diogène d’Œnoanda ajoute un argument assez elliptique (Théol. VI –), qui signifie sans doute que les fables³⁹ sur les dieux et les enfers seront moins efficaces que les lois elles-mêmes. Il y a d’ailleurs, dans l’inscription, d’autres raisons de donner un sens polémique à la mention de Platon et de Socrate, par exemple si l’on associe Platon et le Timée au providentialisme critiqué par Diogène, comme le NF  invite à le faire. (d) Je note également la dimension épistémologique de la charge, dans Théol. X, qui fait allusion à la méthode d’inférence telle qu’elle devrait être conduite, à savoir en harmonisant les assertions sur les réalités non apparentes aux phénomènes perceptibles: Mais cette fable n’est de toute évidence qu’un fatras d’inepties, arrangé pour gagner l’attention des auditeurs, et non pas un argument de physique, cherchant la vérité et concluant sur les réalités non apparentes à partir des faits vraisemblables!⁴⁰

³⁶ Je considère en effet, à la suite de Campbell () –, que la position de Lucrèce n’est pas ‘primitiviste’, parce qu’elle ne consiste pas à recommander le retour à un âge révolu. ³⁷ Smith () , cf. fr. . ³⁸ Smith () : « ‘the real ones’, as opposed to the divine beings fabled to operate in a non-existent Hades ». ³⁹ Notons qu’à la col. X, en NF  III , c’est manifestement la doctrine critiquée, celle des stoïciens, qui est présentée comme un μῦθος. ⁴⁰ Théol. X = NF  III –. Voir aussi Leone  avec n.  et Roskam  dans ce volume.

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Il se confirme que la polémique a de multiples facettes, portant là encore, non pas strictement sur la problématique politique, mais plus largement sur la capacité à produire des arguments, tout à la fois fondés sur la connaissance de la nature et conformes à la méthode épicurienne d’inférence. Les stoïciens sont donc présentés comme de mauvais physiciens: c’ est leur ignorance de la physique, aggravée par leurs fautes méthodologiques, qui est à l’origine de leur méconnaissance des réalités politiques. (e) Qu’en est-il finalement des hypothèses concernant les sources épicuriennes de ce texte? M.F. Smith⁴¹ estime qu’il est impossible d’être catégorique sur ce point du fait, notamment, de la perte des traités théologiques d’Épicure. Certains arguments utilisés par Épicure contre Platon peuvent fort bien, estime-t-il, avoir été réutilisés par Diogène contre les stoïciens. Il mentionne, par ailleurs, plusieurs passages de la généalogie d’Hermarque.⁴² Certaines formules, dans ce texte, semblent en effet annoncer la section sur la punition ou châtiment (ζημία), notamment en I –, passage qui signale par exemple l’efficacité de la crainte des lois sur les gens ordinaires. Le § évoque d’ailleurs le caractère sacrilège ou impie (ἀνόσιος) de l’acte injuste. On peut assurément donner un sens assez large ou emphatique à ἀνόσιος, ou encore, en suivant les observations de Porphyre, le comprendre par référence, non pas aux dieux eux-mêmes, mais à l’intérêt global de la vie organisée (I , ): les épicuriens appellent ‘sacrilège’ l’acte qui contrevient à l’intérêt commun. Il n’en demeure pas moins que ce texte est un point de convergence intéressant entre les deux problématiques qui sont étroitement entrelacées dans Théol.: la question du juste et l’attitude envers le divin. Cette impression se renforce dans la suite du fragment d’Hermarque, lorsqu’il est question d’instituer des purifications expiatoires (I ). Il est toutefois très peu probable que le texte d’Hermarque soit l’unique source d’inspiration de Diogène: la problématique de la providence en est absente, ainsi que la polémique antistoïcienne. Je n’ai pas non plus trouvé chez Philodème de passage susceptible de constituer une source indiscutable du fragment de Diogène. On peut, il est vrai, penser au passage du De pietate⁴³ qui évoque les bienfaits et les maux que les dieux sont susceptibles d’envoyer respectivement aux bons et aux méchants. Toutefois, indépendamment des problèmes doctrinaux que pose ce texte et notamment de son rôle dans l’exégèse de la Lettre à Ménécée (–), il développe un argument qui ne concerne qu’indirectement la problématique centrale de Théol. Dans ce dernier, il ne

⁴¹ Smith () . ⁴² Porph. Abst. I –. ⁴³ Phld. Piet. – Obbink.

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- 

s’agit pas seulement de la crainte des dieux en général, mais de son pouvoir pratique, par comparaison avec celui des lois, et de son prétendu fondement cosmologique et providentialiste. Le texte qui me semble le plus proche de la problématique de Diogène est le passage du De finibus de Cicéron où Torquatus évoque la crainte de la punition divine chez les méchants et où il affirme cependant que la crainte de la punition légale et celle de la réprobation publique – chez l’homme ordinaire en tout cas – sont les mobiles les plus efficaces de la conduite juste.⁴⁴ Quant aux hommes sains d’esprit, c’est la vera ratio – comme les dispositions du sage dans Théol. – qui les conduit à la justice, à l’équité et à la bonne foi.⁴⁵ À la différence de Diogène, toutefois, Torquatus ne se situe pas explicitement dans une perspective polémique et ses observations ne concernent pas la question du providentialisme. Deux hypothèses semblent donc s’ imposer: ou bien celle d’une source perdue, ou bien celle selon laquelle le texte de Diogène serait une compilation et un réarrangement de thèmes préexistants en fonction des impératifs polémiques du moment. Je crois que rien ne permet de trancher. On sait, par ailleurs, que l’un des éléments les plus importants de la conception épicurienne du juste est la théorie du contrat, en vertu duquel une communauté politique donnée définit ses propres règles de justice pour empêcher les torts mutuels. Nous l’avons vu dans la Sent. . La Sent. , en marge du fr.  de Diogène, va dans le même sens:

Ὅσα τῶν ζῴων μὴ ἐδύνατο συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἄλληλα μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐθὲν ἦν δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἄδικον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὅσα μὴ ἐδύνατο ἢ μὴ ἐβούλετο τὰς συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι. Pour tous les vivants qui n’ont pas pu établir de contrats visant à empêcher qu’ils se fassent mutuellement du tort et qu’ils en subissent, il n’y avait rien de juste ou d’injuste. Il en va de même aussi pour tous les peuples qui n’ont pas pu ou n’ont pas voulu établir les contrats visant à empêcher de faire du tort et d’en subir.

⁴⁴ Cic. Fin. I . ⁴⁵ Cic. Fin. I : Invitat igitur vera ratio bene sanos ad iustitiam, aequitatem, fidem. Sur l’invocation de la vera ratio à l’appui de la défense des vertus épicuriennes dans l’exposé de Torquatus, je renvoie à Morel (a).

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Le thème du contrat apparaît explicitement chez Diogène dans le fr. , l’un des plus fameux de l’inscription, le «Golden Age fragment» selon l’expression de M.F. Smith: [τὴν μὲν οὖν σοφίαν οὐ πανταχοῦ κομι]I οῦμεν, ἐπεὶ πάντες μὴ δύνανται. δυνατὴ̣ν δὲ αὐτὴν ἂν ὑποθ̣ώ̣ μ̣εθ̣ α̣, 



II





τότε ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ τῶν θεῶν βίος εἰς ἀνθρώπους μεταβήσεται. δικαιοσύνης γὰρ ἔσται μεστὰ πάντα καὶ φιλαλληλίας, καὶ οὐ γενήσεται τειχῶν ἢ νόμων χρεία καὶ πάντων ὅσα δι’ ἀλλήλους σκευωρούμεθα. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἀνανκαίων, ὡς οὐκ ἐσομέν̣ω̣ν ἡμ̣ [εῖν τότε δούλων] καὶ̣ γ̣ὰρ ἀ[ρόσομεν αὐτοὶ] καὶ σκάψο̣[μεν, καὶ τῶν φυ]τῶν ἐπιμελ̣ [ησόμεθα], καὶ ποταμο[ὺς παρατρέ]ψ̣ομεν, καὶ τὰ̣[ς φορὰς] ἐπιτηρήσο̣[μεν] μεν ἃ μὴ τῶ[ - ] μενοι καιρο[ - ], καὶ διακόψει ̣ [κατὰ τὸ] δέον τὸ συνε[χῶς συνφι]λοσοφεῖν τοι ̣α̣[ῦτα· τὰ] γὰρ γεωργή[ματα ὧν ἡ] φύσις χρῄζει ̣ [παρέξει] (I) …, puisque tous n’en sont pas capables ⟨de sagesse?⟩. Mais supposons qu’elle soit possible: alors, véritablement, la vie des dieux passera chez les hommes. Tout sera, en effet, rempli de justice et d’affection mutuelle, et il n’y aura plus besoin de fortifications ni de lois, ni de tout ce que nous machinons pour nous protéger les uns des autres. En ce qui concerne, d’autre part, les besoins qui sont satisfaits par l’agriculture, étant donné que (II) nous n’aurons pas, [alors, d’esclaves], nous sèmerons et labourerons nous-mêmes, et nous cultiverons les plantes, nous

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- 

détournerons les fleuves et prendrons soin des [récoltes] … et de telles [activités] interrompront, [selon] ce qu’imposent les circonstances, la pratique continue des échanges philosophiques. En effet, les activités agricoles [nous procureront] ce dont notre nature a besoin. Inscription en marge inférieure du fr. : [πᾶν ζῷ]ο̣ν̣ οὐ δύναται συνθήκην̣ [ποιεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι] [Tout être vivant] n’est pas capable d’instituer un contrat [sur le fait de ne pas se faire de tort ni en subir]. M.F. Smith⁴⁶ rappelle que nous ne trouvons aucun passage parallèle dans la tradition épicurienne, même si la φιλαλληλία évoquée par Diogène n’est pas sans faire penser au rôle prépondérant de la φιλία chez Épicure. Il note par ailleurs que si Diogène prévoit que l’humanité tout entière deviendra sage, il va au-delà des thèses du Maître. Il conclut néanmoins à l’orthodoxie globale du fragment, dont l’originalité tiendrait principalement à une adaptation de l’épicurisme traditionnel à l’air du temps.⁴⁷ Comme je l’ai dit plus haut, il est extrêmement difficile de se prononcer sur l’originalité absolue des thèses de Diogène, pour des raisons matérielles évidentes. Il est également difficile de savoir jusqu’où va exactement l’optimisme «social» de Diogène d’Œnoanda. La mention des esclaves, ici, est une conjecture de l’éditeur, que l’inscription ne permet pas de corroborer.⁴⁸ J’insisterai sur trois points : le rapport entre justice et lois dans le fragment, la dimension polémique implicite du texte et le problème du statut de l’Âge d’Or envisagé. (a) Alors que dans les maximes d’Épicure la justice (δικαιοσύνη) dérive du contrat, elle se réalise ici hors contrat. L’absence de lois signifie en effet absence de contrat, comme le montre bien le texte d’Hermarque, qui, pour montrer que nous n’avons pas de rapport de justice avec les animaux, associe directement le fait d’avoir établi un contrat (ποιήσασθαί τινα συνθήκην), l’extension des relations juridiques ⟨à telle ou telle catégorie de population⟩ (τὸ δίκαιον ἐξάγειν) et le fait de faire participer à la loi

⁴⁶ Smith () –. ⁴⁷ Smith renvoie au compte-rendu par David Sedley de Smith () dans Sedley (b) –. ⁴⁸ Gregor Staab, de l’université de Cologne, a récemment donné des arguments dans le même sens et proposé la restauration suivante pour  II  ὡϲ οὐκ ἐϲομέ||νων ἡμ̣ [εῖν ἄνευ πόνων]: parce qu’ ils (sc. ces produits agricoles dont nous avons besoin) ne nous arriveront pas [sans fatigues].

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(κοινωνῆσαι νόμου).⁴⁹ Ce texte me semble d’autant plus intéressant que la maxime très mutilée qui se trouve en marge du fr.  – si elle n’est pas la Sent.  d’Épicure – pourrait fort bien s’en inspirer. Je ne sais pas si Diogène se situerait dans le camp des ‘naturalistes’ ou dans celui des ‘conventionnalistes’, deux camps dans lesquels Épicure est alternativement placé par les commentateurs contemporains.⁵⁰ Je constate en tout cas qu’il ne subordonne pas l’existence de la justice à celle des lois. Là encore, il semble plus proche d’Hermarque, qui évoque la possibilité de se passer des lois, dans le cas – bien peu probable – où chacun verrait de lui-même (αὐθαιρέτως) où se situe l’intérêt mutuel.⁵¹ Je reviendrai néanmoins sur ce point, car la position de Diogène n’est sans doute pas incompatible avec celle d’Épicure. En tout cas, l’insistance sur l’agriculture et sur la satisfaction des besoins naturels est conforme à la tradition de la réflexion épicurienne sur l’économie, une tradition indiscutablement naturaliste, comme le montre le traité de Philodème sur la question.⁵² (b) Sur le deuxième point, il est clair que Diogène d’Œnoanda prend position dans un débat très ancien, que la plupart des écoles philosophiques ont affronté. Il ne s’agit pas seulement de critiquer indirectement le pouvoir politique en estimant que, sous le règne de la sagesse, la justice et la concorde rendraient inutiles les lois et les remparts. Il s’agit aussi, très probablement, de rappeler que les contrats ne sont qu’un pis-aller, un mal nécessaire dans les sociétés que nous connaissons, parce qu’un âge d’or qui verrait le règne de la sagesse les rendrait inutiles. Comme je l’ai dit, je ne sais pas si l’intention de Diogène est ‘naturaliste’ – de fait, elle semble placer la justice en dehors des contrats de respect mutuel – ou bien si elle relève d’une sorte de ‘contractualisme’ par défaut. Je pense en tout cas qu’elle implique, dans la parfaite continuité de la tradition épicurienne, une critique d’une conception du pouvoir politique qui en ferait l’unique principe d’harmonie sociale. Corrélativement, il y a probablement, chez Diogène, un souci de se démarquer des conceptions

⁴⁹ Hermarque ap. Porph. Abst. I .–. ⁵⁰ En réalité, Épicure dépasse une telle opposition, en montrant que le juste peut être à la fois naturel – parce qu’il est régi par le principe naturel de l’utile à la communauté – et conventionnellement déterminé, dans la mesure où il n’existe nulle part ailleurs que dans les institutions humaines effectivement réalisées. Je renvoie sur ce point, pour plus de détails et d’arguments, à Morel (). ⁵¹ Hermarque ap. Porph. Abst. I .. ⁵² Philodème, L’Économie (Sur les vices, livre IX). Voir Tsouna () –. V. Tsouna me signale que le texte de Diogène d’Œnoanda pourrait garder une trace des débats internes au Jardin concernant l’agriculture. Pour Philodème, en tout cas, l’administrateur-philosophe ne devra pas se consacrer lui-même aux travaux agricoles, afin de préserver la tranquillité de son activité proprement philosophique. Voir Phld. Oec. XXIII – et Tsouna () – . Je renvoie également, sur le rapport des épicuriens à l’économie et à la gestion des biens matériels, à Morel (b).



- 

concurrentes de l’Âge d’Or, celle d’Hésiode ou celles des philosophes. Je prendrai deux exemples: Platon et Posidonius. Comme dans le Politique de Platon,⁵³ où il n’y a pas de πολιτεία sous le règne de Kronos, l’utopie de Diogène exclut que la loi instituée régisse les relations entre les hommes. Toutefois, à la différence de la version platonicienne, la béatitude sociale imaginée par Diogène se passe de tout gouvernement divin. De plus, elle implique le travail de l’agriculture, alors que cette dernière est inutile sous le règle de Kronos, dans le dialogue platonicien.⁵⁴ Dans la version de Posidonius, telle qu’elle est rapportée par Sénèque,⁵⁵ nous sommes très loin d’une bienveillance mutuelle qui rendrait le pouvoir politique inutile: la royauté exercée par les sages permet de contenir la violence et elle défend le faible contre le fort. Cet âge n’est bienheureux que parce que, dans un premier temps, le chef savait commander et les sujets obéir. Ce n’est donc pas une période très paisible, même si ce n’est qu’une fois la monarchie transformée en tyrannie à cause de la corruption croissante qu’il fallut des lois. Je crois donc que le tour négatif de la description de Diogène d’Œnoanda – l’Âge d’Or est en grande partie décrit par ce qu’il ne contient pas – n’est pas sans rapport avec une intention polémique implicite – l’Âge d’Or n’est pas ce que d’autres croient qu’il est. (c) Il est communément admis, me semble-t-il, que l’Âge d’Or en question est un âge futur, ou à venir.⁵⁶ M.F. Smith évoque ainsi un temps où la vie des dieux passera véritablement chez les hommes.⁵⁷ Je ne suis pas si certain, à vrai dire, qu’il s’agisse véritablement d’un temps à venir. La syntaxe de la col. I semble l’impliquer, du fait notamment de la conjonction τότε et du futur dans la principale, puis dans les propositions suivantes. Pourtant, si l’on souligne dans la conditionnelle l’expression de l’éventuel,⁵⁸ et si l’on considère que τότε n’a pas nécessairement un sens temporel et peut simplement marquer la conséquence, le

⁵³ Plat. Plt. e. Voir aussi Lg. IV c–b. ⁵⁴ L’intérêt de Diogène d’Œnoanda pour l’agriculture s’est trouvé tout récemment confirmé par la découverte, en octobre , d’une pierre portant une maxime qui constitue désormais le NF . Voir Hammerstaedt/Smith (). Le texte évoque, selon la restauration adoptée, les dommages causés à l’agriculture par les intempéries (M.F. Smith), ou bien les dommages – peut-être pour le corps – que causeraient les travaux agricoles (J. Hammerstaedt). Dans les deux cas, l’ idée est que ce type de dommages ne causent pas de peines psychiques. ⁵⁵ Sen. Ep. , – ; Posidonius fr.  EK. ⁵⁶ Comme je l’ai moi-même d’abord pensé dans mes notes à ma traduction de Diogène d’Œnoanda, dans Morel () . Voir également Roskam (a) ; Long ([ =] ) . ⁵⁷ Smith () : «Here he looks forward to the time when ‘truly the life of the gods will pass to men …’ ». ⁵⁸ Marqué par l’ emploi de ἂν et le subjonctif, si on lit bien ὑποθ̣ώ̣ μ̣εθ̣ α̣.

  ,   



futur de la principal peut aussi s’entendre comme un futur d’inférence, un futur hypothétique.⁵⁹ Il ne s’ agirait donc pas de décrire ce qui arrivera quand la sagesse règnera, mais ce qui arrivera dans l’ hypothèse où la sagesse règnerait. Le texte parallèle d’Hermarque déjà cité va même plus loin dans ce sens, car la syntaxe y marque clairement l’irréel.⁶⁰ Par ailleurs, l’idée d’une attente d’un âge à venir me paraît particulièrement difficile à concilier avec la conception épicurienne du temps vécu. Non seulement Épicure indique que nous ne devons pas vivre dans l’attente du futur parce que nous ne le maîtrisons pas,⁶¹ mais Diogène d’Œnoanda lui-même, d’après le NF ,⁶² nous incite à vivre véritablement dans le présent, et même dans un présent accompli, au lieu de vivre en vue de l’avenir. J’en reproduis les sept premières lignes, qui sont les moins mutilées (NF .– ):

τὸ παρὸν δε[.]ῖ ποιεῖν τέλε[.]ι [ο]ν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἀπολειπόμενον  ζῆν λέγοντα· « ἕ[ως] ἂν ἔτι μοι γένηται τόδε καὶ τόδε.» Il faut rendre le présent parfait, et non pas vivre en se tournant vers le futur, en disant: «jusqu’à ce que telle ou telle chose m’arrive» … Le fr.  n’a certainement pas pour message l’attente et l’espoir d’un futur censément meilleur. Il considère bien plutôt une hypothèse, parfaitement fondée dans la tradition épicurienne, qui permet d’envisager les conséquences sociales d’une sagesse partagée, dans une vie de plaisir réglée par les préceptes du Jardin. Un dernier point, enfin, attire l’attention: l’apparition, dans le fr. , d’une doctrine que l’on peut assimiler à une forme de cosmopolitisme.

⁵⁹ Roskam (a) , souligne la méthodologie hypothétique du fragment. ⁶⁰ si tous étaient capables de voir et, pareillement, de se rappeler l’intérêt, ils n’auraient nul besoin de lois en supplément (εἰ δὲ πάντες ἐδύναντο βλέπειν ὁμοίως καὶ μνημονεύειν τὸ συμφέρον, οὐδὲν ἂν προσεδέοντο νόμων), Hermarque ap. Porph. Abst. I .. ⁶¹ Epicur. Men. . ⁶² Hammerstaedt/Smith () – (= , –).



- 

(I) … temps … et nous avons imaginé cela [pour que], même en demeurant chez nous nous [soyons en mesure d’exposer] les bienfaits de la philosophie, non pas certes [à tous les] gens d’ici, [mais] à ceux d’entre eux qui sont ordonnés dans leurs propos. Et [cela], nous ne l’avons pas moins fait pour ceux (II) que l’on dit étrangers, mais qui en réalité ne le sont pas. Car si l’ on considère chaque section de la Terre, à tel peuple appartient telle patrie, mais si l’ on considère l’ étendue globale de ce monde-ci, la Terre entière est pour tous une unique patrie, et le monde une unique maison (καθ̣’ ἑκάστην μὲν γὰρ ἀποτομὴν τῆς γῆς ἄλλων ἄλλη πατρίς ἐστιν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν̣ ὅλην περιοχὴν το̣ῦ̣δε τοῦ κόσμου μία̣ π̣ άντων πατρίς ἐστ̣ιν ἡ πᾶσα γῆ καὶ εἷς ὁ κόσμος οἶκος).⁶³ Diogène explique ici que l’inscription s’adresse à ceux de ses concitoyens qui sont bien disposés à en recevoir le message, ainsi qu’il l’a indiqué dans les fragments  et . Il rappelle également qu’elle s’ adresse aux étrangers, au nom de l’idée selon laquelle le monde serait notre patrie ou notre demeure commune. Surtout, il prend acte, tout à la fois, de la diversité des peuples et de l’unité de la «patrie» qui rassemble tous les hommes au-delà des frontières instituées. Le fragment  s’adresse du reste à tous: Grecs et barbares (II –). Comme le montre M.F. Smith dans son introduction de ⁶⁴ et dans ses notes, Diogène se réfère à un topos qui, s’il est bien identifié dans les textes des périodes hellénistiques et impériales,⁶⁵ a des racines antérieures. Le fragment  DK de Démocrite, signalé par Smith, en est une belle illustration: pour un homme sage, la Terre tout entière est accessible, car la patrie d’une âme bonne est le monde tout entier.⁶⁶ L’importance de la figure de Démocrite dans l’inscription de Diogène est un indice fort de rapprochement. L’analyse de Theol. a montré, en tout cas, que Diogène rejetait fermement le type de cosmopolitisme auquel adhèrent les stoïciens. Il est peu probable qu’il admettait par ailleurs le cosmopolitisme cynique, par lequel Diogène de Sinope se déclare ‘citoyen du monde’,⁶⁷ sans doute parce qu’il n’est en réalité citoyen d’aucune cité. Quoi qu’il en soit, Diogène ne fait ici qu’expliciter et adapter aux préoccupations de son temps un thème dont on peut déjà déceler les prémices dans la tradition épicurienne antérieure. L’idée d’une patrie cosmique qui n’annule pas les cités

⁶³ Fr.  I –II . ⁶⁴ Voir notamment Smith () –. ⁶⁵ Voir par exemple Epict. I ., et surtout III ., où l’on trouve, à propos de Diogène de Synope, la très claire formule πᾶσα γῆ πατρίς. ⁶⁶ ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ πᾶσα γῆ βατή· ψυχῆς γὰρ ἀγαθῆς πατρὶς ὁ ξύμπας κόσμος. Démocrite ap. Stob. III . (DK  B ). ⁶⁷ Diog. Laert. VI . Cf. Luc. Vit. Auct. .

  ,   



particulières est, en effet, tout à fait compatible avec la thèse défendue dans les Maximes capitales  et  d’Épicure. Celles-ci établissent que le droit positif varie selon les cités, les époques et les circonstances, mais aussi que la prénotion du juste est, dans son principe, la même dans tous les cas : est juste ce qui est utile à la communauté concernée. La justice commune n’annule pas les contrats particuliers, mais garantit leur conformité à un critère invariable. En ce sens, comme le disait V. Goldschmidt, Épicure cherche dans l’intérêt réciproque «un fondement naturel au droit positif».⁶⁸ Une autre piste pourrait également être suivie pour saisir les implicites de ce fragment: celle d’une justification proprement cosmologique et physique du cosmopolitisme. Les termes employés dans le fragment , en particulier περιοχή et ἀποτομή, évoquent en effet ceux de la Lettre à Pythoclès, au début du passage sur la cosmogonie: Un monde est une enveloppe de ciel enveloppant les astres, la Terre et tout ce qui apparaît, qui constitue une section, prélevée sur l’illimité, se terminant par une limite ténue ou dense …⁶⁹ Il s’agit manifestement de termes techniques de la cosmologie épicurienne. Mon hypothèse interprétative sera dès lors la suivante: Diogène, par l’intermédiaire de cette terminologie, suggère qu’une patrie particulière n’est qu’une ‘section’ de la patrie cosmique et son existence est aussi contingente que celle d’un monde particulier dans l’univers illimité, pris ici comme ‘enveloppe’. Sur l’essentiel, enfin, l’inscription de Diogène est par elle-même une justification de son cosmopolitisme éthique. Le cosmopolitisme bien compris n’est que l’autre face de la sollicitude de Diogène lui-même à l’égard de ses lecteurs: non pas seulement ses concitoyens, mais quiconque lira l’inscription d’Œnoanda. Sur ce point, la différence entre le propos de Diogène et celui de Lucrèce me paraît claire: Diogène s’adresse à une communauté, voire à plusieurs communautés formant des cercles concentriques, tandis que Lucrèce œuvre avant tout au salut individuel de son lecteur.⁷⁰ La Sentence vaticane  d’Épicure, en représentant la danse de l’amitié

⁶⁸ Goldschmidt () . ⁶⁹ Κόσμος ἐστὶ περιοχή τις οὐρανοῦ, ἄστρα τε καὶ γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα περιέχουσα, ἀποτομὴν ἔχουσα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ καταλήγουσα ἐν πέρατι ἢ ἀραιῷ ἢ πυκνῷ …, Épicure, Lettre à Pythoclès, §. L’arrière-plan de cette cosmologie est abdéritain et le terme ἀποτομή se retrouve dans la cosmogonie de Leucippe, ap. Diog. Laert. IX  (DK  A ). Chez Diogène d’Œnoanda lui-même, voir le terme ἀποτομὰς en Théol. V = NF  III . ⁷⁰ Voir Fowler (), –: «if men became Epicureans, they would stop killing each other and bring peace to the world. But in many ways the De Rerum Natura seems still focused



- 

autour du monde et en déclarant qu’elle appelle à la béatitude, va plutôt dans le sens des intentions de Diogène. Quoi qu’il en soit, chez ce dernier, l’appartenance à la communauté visée a pour condition un certain état de l’âme chez le lecteur ou l’auditeur : la présence ou l’absence des dispositions psychiques nécessaires à la bonne réception de la doctrine épicurienne. Le cosmopolitisme de Diogène est sans aucun doute moins universaliste qu’électif ou sélectif : il s’ adresse à chacun, pour autant que son âme soit favorablement disposée. En ce sens, il n’est pas ‘populaire’. L’intérêt de Diogène d’Œnoanda pour la politique est nécessairement paradoxal: critiquer la politique et se retirer de la vie publique, cela suppose encore que l’on traite de politique. Il est en cela parfaitement fidèle à la tradition ouverte par les maximes d’Épicure. Le débat sur la justice et les communautés humaines a par ailleurs une dimension fortement polémique, qui souligne l’importance de la question politique aux yeux de l’auteur de l’inscription. Il reste cependant difficile d’identifier les éléments véritablement originaux de l’inscription, sur ce point comme sur beaucoup d’autres. Il me semble impossible de prouver que Diogène d’Œnoanda, en politique, a réellement innové sur le contenu, au-delà du nécessaire aggiornamento imposé à la doctrine par l’esprit d’une époque nettement postérieure à celle d’Épicure. Je crois toutefois que le génie de Diogène, à propos de la politique tout au moins, se trouve dans la manière dont il procède. Celle-ci se caractérise par deux opérations: d’une part, le réarrangement d’éléments doctrinaux antérieurement séparés; d’autre part, une reformulation du dogme épicurien grâce à un style renouvelé. Celui-ci témoigne à la fois de la culture philosophique de Diogène, de son habileté polémique et de son élégance littéraire. Il tient aussi à sa manière singulière de mettre en scène son propre civisme, qui est un aspect de sa φιλανθρωπία. Celle-ci semble être une disposition tout à la fois éthique et politique, puisqu’elle l’amène à se tourner vers ses semblables pour les soulager de leurs maux psychiques, dans une perspective à la fois morale, civique et cosmopolitique. L’originalité, en l’occurrence, est moins dans la théorie politique elle-même que dans l’attitude d’un philosophe-citoyen à l’égard de sa cité. C’est sans doute dans cette porosité subtile entre les préoccupations éthiques du philosophe et la sollicitude du citoyen que Diogène d’Œnoanda manifeste le mieux sa personnalité philosophique et peut-être aussi son humanité.

upon individual salvation, how an individual Epicurean might survive in a hostile world. And the answer is the same as it has always been : stay away from politics.»

’  ,           * Geert Roskam

.    In the famous introduction to his Physics, which was perhaps also introductory to the whole inscription,¹ Diogenes explains his honourable motivations in some detail. Having observed that the great majority of people is badly off, he decided to come to their rescue and cure as many of them as he could (including foreigners and even future generations). His stoa, then, is not the result of his self-regarding ambition but should be seen as a sincere attempt to reach and cure a large number of people (fr.  V –). And since the general epidemic disease is caused by erroneous convictions, by a ψευδοδοξία περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων (fr.  IV –), the cure obviously requires the correction of all these errors that interfere with true Epicurean happiness. Therefore, Diogenes’ therapy cannot but be a polemical one. Polemics are no doubt one of the most important characteristics of the whole inscription. Many fragments indeed show traces of a polemical attitude, and as such fully justify the special focus of this book. Yet it remains important to keep in mind a more general perspective. In Epicurean philosophy, we often find a dynamic interaction between a destructive ἔλεγχος and a constructive νουθέτησις,² and it is dangerous to separate these two poles from each other. Epicurus and the other ἄνδρες of the Garden frequently engaged in sharp polemics, and were followed in this by later generations,³ but their attacks in principle had a positive aim, that is, they cleared the way for correct opinions and thus for happiness. In Diogenes of Oenoanda, the same fundamental attitude can be found. His repeated polemical attacks are not merely negative. In his own words, he attacks

* I am much indebted to M. Erler, A. Gigandet, R. Güremen, J. Hammerstaedt, F. Masi, Ph. Mitsis, P.-M. Morel, and V. Tsouna, all of whom discussed several topics with me that directly relate to this contribution. I greatly benefited from all of them and no less enjoyed the pleasures of συμφιλοσοφεῖν with them. ¹ This is the view of Smith () ; cf. (b)  and (b) . Other scholars have taken different positions, and Smith’s view was recently challenged by Hammerstaedt; see Hammerstaedt/Smith () – for a good discussion and further literature. ² Roskam (b) . ³ On the history of Epicurean polemics, see esp. Kleve (); cf. also Kechagia () –.





his philosophical opponents not out of contentiousness, but in order to safeguard the truth (fr.  III –: οὐ φιλο[νεί]κῳ πρὸς αὐτοὺς πά[θει] χρώμενοι, τὴν δ’ ἀλ[ήθει]αν σωθῆναι θέλον[τες]). This opposition between φιλονικία and φιλαλήθεια is traditional. It can be found, for instance, in the Platonist Atticus, who more than once points out that his opponent Aristotle is driven by φιλονικία (Eus. Praep. Ev. XV . and .) whereas he himself is eager to speak the truth (XV .) in a peaceful context, surrounded by fellow members of the Platonic school (XV .). The same idea occurs in Philodemus’ De oeconomia. Philodemus there argues that the Epicurean philosopher will especially earn his income through his philosophical talks (col. XXIII –), which are characterised as truthful (ἀληθινῶν), devoid of any spirit of competition (ἀφιλο[ν]ε[ί]κων), and untroubled ([ἀτ]αράχων) (col. XXIII – ). And, quite interestingly, Philodemus goes on to oppose these philosophical discussions to the discourse of the sophists (col. XXIII –). Different philosophical traditions thus appear to sing basically the same refrain, for just like the Platonists (cf. also Alcin. Didasc.  [.–]), Epicureans such like Philodemus could define their own identity as a philosopher by contrasting it with sophistic concerns. And this observation is relevant for Diogenes of Oenoanda as well, since he lived in, and reacted against, a world in which such sophistic competition was omnipresent.⁴ Diogenes, too, claimed to be led by a concern for the truth rather than by a spirit of contentiousness. In this light, it should not come as a surprise that his criticism of wrong opinions is usually followed by the correct Epicurean alternative. I shall soon come back to this. Here it suffices to underline that Diogenes’ polemics cannot be separated from his exposition of the Epicurean truth. These are two sides of the same coin.

. ’ ,    By focusing in this collection of studies on Diogenes’ philosophical polemics, we thus risk neglecting the most important half of his message. Moreover, our focus even implies a second limitation. In fact, Diogenes’ polemics were not confined to his philosophical predecessors. He no less often criticises widespread opinions and popular customs. It has often been argued, for instance, that his attacks against erroneous opinions concerning dreams and oracles are not merely theoretical issues

⁴ Diogenes has even been connected with the so-called ‘Second Sophistic’ (see esp. Gordon ; cf. also Bendlin ), although his purposes and interests strongly differed from those of virtuoso speakers such like Polemon or Aelius Aristides; cf. Hammerstaedt (a) –.

’  



that belong to the world of the school, but topics with a much broader, contemporary relevance.⁵ The same holds true for his criticism of contemporary euergetism and his intelligent modification of the euergetic practices, which has likewise received much attention.⁶ An interesting case is also his rejection of common visual representations of the gods, such as the statues of an angry Nemesis (fr.  II –). The relevance of this argument in the contemporary context of Diogenes’ Oenoanda has recently been revealed by the discovery of a pedestal for a statue of this goddess, of Roman imperial date.⁷ Finally, we should recall that Diogenes addresses young men in his treatise on Old age and probably refuted their unjustified charges against all the disadvantages of old age (see esp. fr. .–). If that is true, nearly the whole of the work may have been of a polemical nature. Throughout the whole inscription, then, popular convictions are often examined and rejected. All of them illustrate the widespread ψευδοδοξία περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων mentioned at the outset, and all of them should be abandoned in order to gain true understanding and true pleasure. For indeed, as Diogenes reminds us, we should avoid to suffer the same things as the multitude (fr. .–). This is also part and parcel of Diogenes’ polemical stance. Next to that, we find a great number of fragments that contain philosophical polemics. More precisely, the following philosophers are attacked by Diogenes:⁸ Pythagoras: Heraclitus: Empedocles: Anaxagoras: Democritus: Diagoras: Protagoras: Socratics: Aristippus: Plato: Aristotle:

fr. .; .;  I  and III –; cf. NF .–;  II –; .–;  II –V ;  II –;  II –III ;  II –;  IV –V ;  V –;  I –II ;  II –III ;  II ;  II –III ; fr.  II –; fr.  II –; NF .–;  I –III ;

⁵ See, e.g., Clay () –; Gordon () –; Warren () ; Bendlin () –. ⁶ See Roskam (a) –, where further relevant literature can be found. On Diogenes’ view of politics, see also Morel in this volume. ⁷ Staab (); Smith () . ⁸ See also Gourinat  in this volume.



Lacydes: Stoics:



 III ;  II –;  I –IV ;  V –; .;  III –V ; .; Theol. VIII –XVI ; NF  III –IV .

Next to these passages, a few other may be mentioned where Diogenes’ opponents are unnamed or where the reconstruction of the text is hypothetical: Empedocles or Anaxagoras: NF ; cf. also fr. .– as reconstructed in Smith (b) ; Democritus:  VI – (hypothetical apostrophe [ὦ Δημόκριτε] in  VI );  II – (where the reading [Δημόκριτος ὁ Ἀ]βδ[ηρείτης] is quite bold; cf. Évrard [] ); Plato:  III –V ; . (probable text reconstruction);  III –; Cyrenaics and Cynics [?]:  I –; Stoics:  I –III ; fr. . (as reconstructed in Smith [b] : οἱ Στωικ̣ [οί]). The Stoics may also have been mentioned in fr.  IV – ([Στω]ικούς) and  I  (οἱ Στ[ωικοί]), but in both cases, the reading is hypothetical. In fr.  I –, Smith’s reconstruction of Στωικοί is wrong (as admitted in Smith , ). Unclear cases, finally, are the [φυσικός] in fr.  I – (Democritus?, or the Stoics?) and τοὺς ἄνδρας in fr.  I  (Xenophanes?, the Stoics?). Especially controversial is fr.  V –VIII .⁹ We thus find a wide range of targets, from the earliest thinkers up to one of the leading philosophical schools in Diogenes’ own day (the Stoics). Nearly always, Diogenes attacks famous predecessors, the only exception being Lacydes. In this way, he joins an age-long tradition of philosophical polemics, and we may presume that the great majority of his arguments can also be traced back to earlier Epicurean sources, most notably to Epicurus himself.¹⁰ He never attacks new or recent philosophical insights: even the Stoic doctrines which he mentions are traditional, and later evolutions (such as the heterodox views of Panaetius or Posidonius, or those of contemporary Stoics) are never mentioned. Nor do we find polemical discussions with fellow Epicureans. In this respect, Diogenes markedly differs from Philodemus.¹¹ Only in the Letter to Dionysius can be found a few vague traces of some disagreements

⁹ According to Sedley () Diogenes here attacks the Cyrenaics, whereas Smith () – and (a) –, Grilli () , and Hammerstaedt ()  (=Hammerstaedt/Smith , ) are thinking of the Stoics. In any case, Smith’s text reconstruction [ὦ Στώα]κ̣ ες in fr.  V  is rightly criticised by Grilli () , and is abandoned by Smith himself in () . See also the contributions of Masi, Tsouna, and Gourinat in this volume. ¹⁰ Cf. Smith () –. ¹¹ For a more general comparison between both Epicureans, see Smith (b).

’  



between the Epicurean communities (fr.  II –), but these apparently have to do with a concrete situation, rather than with doctrinal dissension or discord concerning the correct interpretation of Epicurus’ views. And this absence can be explained by the character and purpose of Diogenes’ inscription: after all, technical inner school polemics hardly contribute to the cure of the epidemic ψευδοδοξία in Oenoanda.

.    ’   It is only after having examined the broader framework in which Diogenes’ philosophical polemics should be placed, that we can now turn to his concrete polemical approach. This I shall do in the remainder of this article. I shall argue that Diogenes always takes into account the proper character of his medium and his target readers while carrying on his polemics. He makes use of well-known strategies that occur in the previous Epicurean tradition (and more generally in the polemical traditions of the different philosophical schools), but adapts them where necessary to the specific focus and nature of his own project. The specific epigraphic context entails its own opportunities but also imposes its limitations. As a result, some traditional strategies fade into the background (section .), whereas others are greatly stimulated (section .), and yet others are strategically adapted to this context (sections . and .). .. What We Do Not Get a) One of the more striking differences between Diogenes of Oenoanda and Epicurus is the tone that is used. Epicurus was not afraid of expressing his radical ideas in an extremely provocative and shocking way. He frankly declared to spit upon what is honourable (προσπτύω τῷ καλῷ) and upon those who vainly admire it, whenever it does not bring any pleasure (Athen. XII  A = Epicur.  Us.). He did not hesitate to ridicule famous politicians and generals, such as Epameinondas, who received the nick name ‘iron guts’ (Plut. Adv. Col. A–B = Epicur.  Us.). And often, his polemics were characterized by a loud laughter that jeers at so many empty ideals.¹² The same is true for Metrodorus, who burst into laughter at all the contemporary politicians who tried to imitate Lycurgus and Solon (ibid.  C = fr.  K.). In comparison with such passages, the tone of Diogenes of Oenoanda is undeniably milder. That is not to say, however, that polemical laughter is entirely absent from his inscription. In fr. , for example, he strongly emphasizes that his opponents’ theories about the origin of language are absolutely ridiculous (fr.  IV –: γελοῖον

¹² See on this Salem () –.





γάρ ἐστι, μᾶλλον δὲ παντὸς γελοίου γελοιότερον). But the general impression is that Diogenes’ polemics, albeit clear and straightforward, are still less harsh and more polite than those of Epicurus and his early followers. Twice, Diogenes says that he laughs at another’s arguments (fr. . on the topic of the number of worlds, and fr.  I – on death), but it is relevant that in both cases, the fragments are from his Letters. This may suggest a perspective of like-minded friends who share this laughter, and such a context is somewhat less provocative than a direct gibe at an audience that endorses the wrong convictions itself. In short, what we can read in the inscription is the message of a socially respected and distinguished citizen of Oenoanda. In the introduction to his Ethics, Diogenes makes it clear that he addresses persons who are στόμα κόσμιοι (fr.  I –). This is an ambivalent phrase (though the text is not entirely certain):¹³ Smith understands it as a reference to those people “who are civil-spoken”,¹⁴ which is sensible, but the phrase may likewise point to those people who are “moderate in their speaking”. Judging from his own approach in his inscription, Diogenes seems to attach a certain importance to such a decent behaviour. At the Esplanade of Oenoanda, well-cultivated citizens can converse with one another about the ideal way to reach happiness. They can even disagree with each other and engage in a debate, but they do not insult each other, or jeer at one another. If all this is true, it implies that Diogenes’ frankness (παρρησία) differs to a certain extent from that of Epicurus or Metrodorus. To be sure, Diogenes showed some παρρησία too, by frankly raising his voice through his inscription in the city centre,¹⁵ yet his first announcement to his readers, that the great majority of them is sick and that they need to be cured from their illness, is philosophically respectable – after all, the Stoics likewise proclaimed that we are all bad (omnes mali sumus) and live as bad among the bad (mali inter malos vivimus; Sen. Ir. III .) – and far less shocking than Metrodorus’ notorious statement that “we do not need to save the Greeks or to receive a crown from them for wisdom, but merely to eat and drink, and gratify the belly without harming it” (Plutarch, Non posse C–D and D; Adv. Col. D = fr.  K.). In this respect, Diogenes can be compared to the elegant Philodemus, who succeeded in making his Epicurean philosophy salonfähig in the villa of his rich patronus Piso. Diogenes’ παρρησία, like that of Philodemus, while being polemical, was generally refined and polite, and domesticated by the demands of social decorum.

¹³ Cf. Grilli () : “non capisco che cosa voglia dire in greco στόμα κόσμιοι, quindi non posso discuterne”. ¹⁴ Smith () . ¹⁵ Cf. Smith (b)  and Bendlin () .

’  



b) A second thing that we do not find in Diogenes’ inscription are long, drawnout arguments. Diogenes more than once gives the impression of being garrulous and he was definitely not niggardly with words, yet as a rule, he carefully controls his argument and does not indulge in excessively long elaborations. Usually, he focuses on the principal issues and introduces the views of his opponents briefly and right to the point. The most illustrative case is fragment , where we find a concise doxographic list of the different views that Diogenes’ philosophical predecessors held concerning the elements: Heraclitus of Ephesus identified fire as elemental, Thales of Miletus water, Diogenes of Apollonia and Anaximenes air, Empedocles of Acragas fire and air and water and earth, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae the homoeomeries of each thing, and the Stoics matter and God (fr.  I –II ). Such brief introductions are usually followed by a few polemical objections and opposed to the correct Epicurean perspective. This basic approach is mentioned by Diogenes himself in the same fragment , where he promises to explain what the elements are after first having demolished the theories of the others (fr.  I –). A typical example of this method can also be found in fr. , where Diogenes attacks Democritus’ view of the movement of atoms: If anyone adopts Democritus’ theory and asserts that because of their collisions with one another the atoms have no free movement, and that consequently it appears that all motions are determined by necessity, we shall say to him: “Do you [not] know, whoever you are, that there is actually a free movement in the atoms, which Democritus failed to discover, but Epicurus brought to light, – a swerving movement, as he proves from phenomena?” The most important consideration is this: if fate is believed in, all admonition and censure are nullified, etc. (fr.  II –III ). Again we come across the same pattern: Diogenes begins with a succinct introduction of Democritus’ position, confining himself to the core, without complicating details. This wrong view is then immediately confronted with the correct Epicurean alternative, that is likewise reduced to its essence. The reference to Epicurus functions as a kind of argumentum ex auctoritate, but Diogenes does not ask unreflective assent from his readers (cf. fr.  II –III ). He goes on adding that the existence of the swerve has been demonstrated on the basis of the phenomena. Further particulars, however, are omitted. Just before the fragment breaks off, Diogenes refers to one core argument (τὸ δὲ μέγιστον). We do not know whether or not this principal point was followed by a few others, but the general line of thought is clear, and Diogenes’





polemical method in this fragment is clearly characterised by an argumentative economy that is only focused on essentials. Basically the same pattern can be found in many other fragments as well,¹⁶ and this is very well in line with the dynamic combination of ἔλεγχος and νουθέτησις in Epicurean philosophy as mentioned above. Diogenes’ polemics clear the way for a correct view, removing obstacles and systematically replacing them with the sound, Epicurean conviction. All this is purifying polemics, or, to stick to Epicurean imagery, it is a φάρμακον. As such, Diogenes’ polemical method is thoroughly Epicurean. At the same time, however, it is also influenced by the medium of the inscription, which evidently implies some limitations. Lucretius can feel free to go on and on, piling one argument on another in order to prove the soul’s mortality (III –): if his papyrus scroll was full, he could just take another and continue. But a proliferation of Epicurean stoas in Oenoanda was probably unthinkable. Even in spite of the impressive dimensions of the wall, the available space was not infinite, and Diogenes had to make choices. His project required a discussion that is to-the-point, generally brief, and confined to one or a few well-considered and efficient arguments, and this is exactly what we get. .. Diogenes the Schoolmaster a) These constraints often entail a fairly schoolish approach. I confine myself to a few illustrative examples: Although Plato was right to acknowledge that the world had an origin, even if he was not right to introduce a divine craftsman of it, instead of employing nature as its craftsman, he was wrong to say that it is imperishable (NF .–). As for Democritus of Abdera, he did well to identify atoms as elemental, but since his conception of them was in some respects mistaken, he will be considered in the exposition of our theories (fr.  II –III ). In both cases, we find the same nuanced and clear-cut evaluation. The reader should read only one sentence in order to arrive at a correct judgement of the doctrines. The attack on Plato¹⁷ belongs to the Maxims, and shows that even in this section of the inscription, the Laconic presentation of the material need not completely rule out all nuance. Diogenes in fact points to a certain tension between right and

¹⁶ See, e.g., fr.  II –;  I –III ;  I –V ;  I –II ;  I –II ; NF  (in the hypothetical text reconstruction of Smith , ). See further Clay () – and () –. ¹⁷ See also the contributions of Erler and Verde – in this volume.

’  



wrong in Plato’s views: he was not completely mistaken after all. A similar nuanced evaluation can be found in the second example, which belongs to the Physics. There, Diogenes announces a more detailed discussion of Democritus’ view, but here already anticipates his differentiating assessment. What both passages have in common, is their straightforward presentation and evaluation of the views of philosophical predecessors. This is correct and this is wrong: one almost hears Diogenes speaking ex cathedra to an audience of students. A similar example can be found in fr. , which contains Diogenes’ polemical attacks against the Stoics and Democritus concerning the topic of dreams. The fragment ends with a summarising conclusion, which once again briefly identifies and evaluates both poles: So these theorists, the Stoics and Democritus, went astray in opposite directions: the Stoics deprive visions of a power which they do have, while Democritus endows them with a power which they do not have (fr.  V –). Passages like this one obviously recall a schoolish style. Some might consider them noteworthy examples of pedagogical clarity, others nothing more than dull pedantry. In any case, it contributes to the neat and systematic organisation of Diogenes’ polemics. Moreover, Diogenes here suggests that his own, Epicurean philosophy occupies the middle position between two erroneous extremes, and it is not unlikely that the Epicurean alternative also follows in the next sentence.¹⁸ If that is true, it would yield one further example of the typical combination of ἔλεγχος and νουθέτησις. Another telling example of Diogenes’ schoolish method can be found in fragment , where he points out, against his opponents,¹⁹ that not all causes precede their effects. He goes on to list, as a perfect schoolmaster indeed, three different kinds of causes, which are all briefly explained and illustrated by a few examples. Here, he appears as the authoritative teacher who knows his business. He is thoroughly familiar with such elementary distinctions and is perfectly able to teach them whenever necessary. He is also in a position to determine when philosophers are talking nonsense (fr. .– and  I ) and even knows them better than they know themselves. In fragment , for instance, he observes that Democritus goes wrong in a manner unworthy of himself ( II : ἀναξίως ἑαυτοῦ). This is no more than a passing remark, but it suggests a perfect mastery of Democritus’ philosophy and of the whole relevant domain. Diogenes can apparently decide, even better than

¹⁸ See Clay ()  (although his translation “Now the true nature of dreams” (my italics) is obviously biased, since the Greek has only ἡ δὲ φύσις τῶν ἐνυ[πνίων]). ¹⁹ Identified as either the Stoics or the Cyrenaics, cf. supra, note .





Democritus himself, on the course which the latter had to follow according to his own philosophical starting points. This recalls Plutarch’s argument in Adversus Colotem, where he similarly points out against Colotes what both Democritus and Epicurus should have said (A–D).²⁰ In such fragments, Diogenes thus appears as an erudite and distinguished Epicurean teacher who is thoroughly familiar with both the Epicurean tradition and the views of rival schools.²¹ This schoolish touch of Diogenes’ polemical argumentation is greatly enhanced by a persistent concern for systematization.²² One of the most striking characteristics of the inscription is indeed the repeated announcement of what will come next. Here are only a few examples out of many more:²³ Let us now discuss risings and settings and related matters after making this preliminary point, etc. (fr.  II –III ). I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now (fr.  I –). Let us now (sc. investigate) how life is to be made pleasant for us both in states and in actions. Let us first discuss states, keeping an eye on the point that … (fr.  VI –). Such announcements no doubt have their principal raison d’être in Diogenes’ concern for his readers:²⁴ they indeed facilitate the process of reading by providing the reader with secure beacons and guiding him accurately from argument to argument. At the same time, they create the impression of a careful, well-ordered line of reasoning. What Diogenes offers his readers is not a mess of carelessly collected ideas but one coherent argument, the parts of which are joined as smoothly with each other as the stones of the wall on which they are inscribed. b) Conciseness that is clear and to-the-point and a markedly systematic structure thus characterize Diogenes as a polemical pedagogue. Occasionally, however, this conciseness may also entail lack of clarity. His polemics against the Stoic view of

²⁰ Cf. Roskam () –. ²¹ See also NF  III –IV . The same picture can occasionally be found in Diogenes’ letters too; see Casanova ()  (arguing that Diogenes speaks “con un tono spazientito e professorale”). Contra Clay () , who characterizes Diogenes as an amateur philosopher. ²² Cf. Hammerstaedt (a) –. ²³ Other examples: fr.  I – and III –;  II – III + NF  I ; .– (although the text is entirely hypothetical);  I –; NF  II –. ²⁴ Cf. Roskam ().

’  



dreams are a case in point. He rejects their conviction that dreams are empty (κενά) and raises an objection that rests on the Epicurean understanding of the void as that which can neither act nor be acted upon (Epicur. Hdt. ), without, however, making this specific understanding explicit ( I –IV ).²⁵ Here, brevitas yields obscuritas as its fruit, and one can wonder indeed whether the interested layman whom Diogenes addressed, was able to follow this argument. Here, Diogenes de facto seems to presuppose at least some understanding of the Epicurean doctrine that could not be taken for granted in the case of ordinary people. And this reveals the difficulty of Diogenes’ project: how can he adequately refute so many rival doctrines if he has only a limited space at his disposal? Well-focused, clear and short attacks are a necessary condition under such circumstances, but passages such like fragment  show that even this does not solve all problems. Argumentative clarity requires at least some space to develop one’s point of view, and if too much remains unclarified or even unmentioned, the contact with the reader is lost. Another consequence of this conciseness is the omission of all nuances and qualifications.²⁶ That Diogenes therefore often fails to do justice to his opponents, is a point too obvious to be made. Often in fact, their position was much more subtle than Diogenes suggests, but this is a well-known refrain that sounds throughout the entire history of ancient polemics. Diogenes was no exception, even though his brevitas in this respect can at least partly be explained, as we have seen, by the constraints of his medium. Yet I doubt that this is the only reason. It is not unlikely indeed that Diogenes also realised very well that he derived interesting polemical advantages from neglecting the specificities of his opponents’ views. This also appears from the polemical distortions that can be found more than once in his fragments. In the same fragment  about dreams, Democritus’ view is presented as much more radical than it actually was.²⁷ In his discussion of Empedocles’ doctrine of metempsychosis (fr.  II –V ), Diogenes easily equates Empedocles’ δαίμων with the soul (ψυχή). In this, he probably echoes a long tradition, yet this equation entails a misrepresentation of what Empedocles himself precisely meant.²⁸ Aristotle and the Peripatetics are introduced as sceptics (fr.  I –III ), which may reflect Diogenes’ Epicurean point of view,²⁹ but is nonetheless

²⁵ Clay () –; see also Gourinat and Güremen in this volume. ²⁶ This is not necessarily true. In fact, Epicurus’ Κύριαι δόξαι often contain such brief qualifications and restrictions, in spite of their shortness (cf. Roskam a,  and passim; b, ). In Diogenes’ case, however, such nuances are usually absent. ²⁷ Clay () , who points to an interesting parallel in Plutarch’s Quaest. conv. AB. ²⁸ Thus Inwood (). ²⁹ Cf. Smith () –.





a serious distortion.³⁰ Diogenes’ attack against those philosophers who only accept antecedent causes (fr.  V = NF  II  – fr.  VI ) may also belong to this list.³¹ But the most extreme case is certainly the criticism of Protagoras, who is depicted as an atheist (fr.  II –III ). Diogenes refers to the sophist’s famous saying that he did not know whether gods exist, and goes on claiming that this amounts to saying that he knew that they do not exist. Smith no doubt has it right that Diogenes’ argument should be understood against an Epicurean background, which considers “the moral consequences of doubting the existence of the gods no less damaging than those of denying it”,³² but I am not sure whether this is enough to save Diogenes’ argument. However relevant Diogenes’ point may be from an Epicurean perspective, it still rests on gross oversimplification, and one may keep wondering whether this is anything more than very bad philosophy or the occasional slip of the erudite schoolmaster. Yet a note of caution is appropriate here: the end of the fragment is not well preserved ( III –), and it seems reasonable to suppose that Diogenes there explained in more detail what he wanted to say. His point may well have been less stupid than it now seems. However that may be, as far as we can still infer from the text we have today, this fragment seems to stem from the pen of a polemicist who pursued an easy success, rather than from that of a careful and erudite schoolmaster. .. The Rhetorical Diogenes a) Here we encounter another aspect of Diogenes’ authorial persona, that is, the rhetorical polemicist. Of course the whole tradition of ancient philosophical polemics had a strongly rhetorical character, and on this point as well, Diogenes was no exception. He likes using rhetorical questions in order to point out the obviousness of his convictions: no further argument is needed to see the truth of his position.³³ He also underlines that everybody agrees with his own view and that his philosophical opponents dismiss the unanimous conviction of both laymen and philosophers (fr.  II –: χαίρειν μὲν ὁμοῦ πᾶσιν λέγοντες ἰδιώταις τε καὶ φιλοσόφοις). This is a nice example of the traditional argument from consensus omnium,³⁴ that is used here in order to isolate the opponent. From a philosophical perspective, the value of

³⁰ Contra Sedley () : “But this is not a case of distortion or misrepresentation of an opponent’s view. Rather, it is a simple mistake: he has confused the Peripatetics with someone else”. See also Verde  with n.  and Tsouna  n.  in this volume. ³¹ If Diogenes here opposes the Stoics (but see supra, note ), his interpretation of their position, though problematic, is understandable from an Epicurean point of view; cf. Smith ()  and (a) , and Masi  and Gourinat  in this volume. ³² Smith () . ³³ See, e.g., fr.  II –;  I –II ;  I –II ;  I –. ³⁴ Cf. Obbink ().

’  



such an argument is not obvious: the Socrates of Plato’s Gorgias rejects it (e– a), as does Epictetus (II .). But in the context of Diogenes’ inscription, it does provide interesting opportunities. For Diogenes addresses the passers-by, the ordinary citizens from Oenoanda as well as the strangers who came there, in short, all the ἰδιῶται whom he mentions himself in this fragment, and for them, his argument probably had at least some persuasiveness. This is philosophical polemics for the man in the street, and in such a context, the appeal to consensus omnium may well have been one of the most powerful arguments. Moreover, Diogenes thus cleverly associates his own philosophical convictions with popular opinions, which may even further add to his success. Another means of convincing the reader is the functional use of repetition. Diogenes is fond of emphasizing his ideas by means of striking repetitions: It is not those, it is not those, Zeno and Cleanthes and you, Chrysippus, and all who follow the same path as you, it is not those pleasures of the masses that we advocate as being an end, but only these which we have just mentioned are an end (NF  III –: οὐκ ἐκείνας, οὐκ ἐκείνας, (…), οὐκ ἐκείνας κτλ.).³⁵ It is absurd, indeed more absurd than any absurdity (fr.  IV –: γελοῖον γάρ ἐστι, μᾶλλον δὲ παντὸς γελοίου γελοιότερον). In the first case, the remarkable anaphora insists in a particularly emphatic way on a point that is of crucial importance for Diogenes. This is the implicit refutation of the slanderous attack against the Epicureans that they were only interested in the base, vulgar pleasures pursued by the great crowd. Diogenes indignantly denies such calumny, and the repetition of οὐκ ἐκείνας definitely adds rhetorical power to his words. In the second fragment, Diogenes is deliberately placing a fermata on the ridiculous character of his opponents’ philosophical hypothesis, and thus evidently fixes all his readers’ attention on it. A somewhat different example can be found in fragment . There, Diogenes argues that the good man is conscious that his human corporeal nature exposes himself to many possible sufferings, and that it is impossible to avoid all of them. Instead of ‘many’, however, Diogenes says τόδε τι καὶ τόδε καὶ τόδε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά (fr. .–). By putting it this way, he makes his point less vague, emphasizing that he is thinking of concrete experiences. Moreover, the strategic repetition of τόδε underlines the idea that it is utterly impossible to avoid everything: there are simply

³⁵ Here as elsewhere in this contribution, I have adopted the translation of Smith, who assumes a triple anaphora in this fragment. Hammerstaedt, however, prefers to take the first οὐκ ἐκείνας with the previous sentence; see Hammerstaedt/Smith ()  (= , ).





too many instances of τόδε, even followed by a great many more (ἄλλα πολλά). While reading, the reader lingers for a while over this point, long enough to realise the full relevance of Diogenes’ point. Such repetitions, then, have nothing to do with Diogenes’ supposed garrulity, but with his powerful rhetoric that aims at maximum efficiency and persuasiveness.³⁶ b) Furthermore, Diogenes also uses his rhetoric in order to engage his readers. Often he directly addresses them³⁷ and thus involves them in the discussion. He asks them to observe the glaring implausibility of opposed philosophical views (fr.  IV –V : τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐξοφθά[λ]μως ἀπίθανον αὐτῶν ὁρᾶτε) and expresses his surprise about their ignorance (fr.  II –III ). The same conversational dynamics can also be found in the Maxims. In fr. , Diogenes observes that the sum of happiness consists in our disposition, of which we are master, whereas for military service and public speaking, we depend on others (.–). The implication of the argument is obvious, of course, but instead of a neutral or impersonal statement, Diogenes directly questions his readers’ conduct (.–): Why then do we pursue an occupation like this, which is under the control of others? Here, the stones contain a clear and direct appeal to the reader. Even more interesting is fragment . Although little of Diogenes’ argument has survived here and the reconstruction of Smith is largely hypothetical, it seems that Diogenes is here addressing himself (ὦ Διόγε[νες]). This gives the inscription a dialogical character, suggesting as it does a face-to-face conversation between author and reader. And this, we may recall, is what Diogenes himself also wished to do in ideal circumstances (fr.  III –IV ). All this shows that Diogenes as an author sought to establish a bond with his reader. The real Diogenes was living a sequestered life in his garden, but his authorial persona engages his reader through the medium of his inscription. This is not a detached, cold argument but a passionate plea that appeals to the reader. c) Another rhetorical strategy that can often be found in Greek philosophical polemics is the defamation and character assassination of the opponent. We have already seen that Diogenes as a rule avoids provocative and sharp insults and rather appears as a distinguished and polite citizen. Nonetheless, we do find a few subtle examples of this technique of defamation. ³⁶ See also Roskam (). ³⁷ See, e.g., fr.  I – (hypothetical text) and III ;  II ;  III –IV ;  III + NF  I –.

’  



A first example is fragment , where Diogenes, almost in passing, suggests that the Stoics want to say more singular things than others on the soul’s fate after death (III –IV ). Thus, they turn out to be led by a philosophically discreditable motivation. For firstly, philosophical innovativeness was not really appreciated in antiquity: in NF , Diogenes rather underlines that Epicurus did not contrive new arguments (IV –), and the Stoics themselves likewise claimed to recover primitive wisdom rather than breaking entirely new ground.³⁸ Secondly, the implication of Diogenes’ statement is that the Stoics are not so much concerned about the truth than about their own inventiveness. And such an attitude is obviously much more characteristic of sophists than of true philosophers.³⁹ In this light, we should have a new look at the complex fragment , where Diogenes refers to the self-love (φιλαυτία) of his opponents.⁴⁰ Smith, who identifies these opponents as the Stoics, interprets Diogenes’ mention of φιλαυτία as a reference to the Stoic doctrine of οἰκείωσις, more particularly to “the self-love, self-affinity, and self-preservation, which, according to the Stoics, motivate human beings as soon as they are born”.⁴¹ The concept of φιλαυτία thus receives a positive value, and although Smith cannot but recognize that he is unable to find convincing parallels for such use of the terms φιλαυτία and φίλαυτος in extant Stoic sources, he states that “there can be little doubt that Stoic writers did sometimes so use them”.⁴² Smith’s view was criticised by Sedley, who rightly underlines that the standard meaning of the term φιλαυτία is negative and who pertinently observes that the preposition μετά in fr.  V  clearly implies that the φίλαυτον πάθος should also be understood in a negative sense.⁴³ He proposes to connect φιλαυτία with the Cyrenaic doctrine.⁴⁴ In his view, the whole fragment is indeed directed against the Cyrenaics, and the reference to φιλαυτία is to be understood as an attack against the Cyrenaic doctrine of friendship, which does away with the concern for other people and thus reduces friendship to self-love.⁴⁵ The advantage of this view is that

³⁸ See Boys-Stones () –. ³⁹ A somewhat similar example can be found in fr. , where Diogenes supposes, for the sake of the argument, that the Stoics in fact agree with his own point of view, but hate the name of pleasure ( III –IV ). This would imply that they wrongly changed their philosophical convictions because they yielded to unjustified feelings. ⁴⁰ The phrase τοῦ φιλαύτου πάθους is not in the original edition of fragment  (in Smith , ) but only appeared after the discovery of NF  (in Smith , ). ⁴¹ Smith () . ⁴² Smith () . ⁴³ Sedley () . ⁴⁴ This question is discussed by Masi –, Tsouna , and Gourinat  in this volume. ⁴⁵ Sedley ()  and .





φιλαυτία indeed receives its usual, negative connotation. If Sedley is right, then, this is a theoretical criticism that has nothing to do with the rhetorical strategy of defamation. But there is an alternative: what if Smith is right and Diogenes attacks the Stoics rather than the Cyrenaics? Even then, the reference to φιλαυτία is meaningful, not as an allusion to the Stoic doctrine of οἰκείωσις but as an attempt at character assassination of the Stoics. I would be inclined to connect the reference to φιλαυτία in this fragment to the base motivations mentioned in fragment  discussed above. Diogenes’ opponents, whoever they may have been, are led by self-love rather than by a sincere concern for the truth, and this inevitably entails all kinds of erroneous ideas. Self-love in this context becomes evident in undue preoccupation with one’s own innovative ideas, as opposed to love of the truth which brackets the importance of the self. That this opposition can be traced back to an earlier philosophical tradition appears from an interesting parallel in Plutarch (viz. Quaest. Plat. A–C).⁴⁶ d) Diogenes’ strategy of ascribing dishonourable motivations to his opponents recalls a different one, that is, the attempt to impersonate the opponent in order to refute his doctrines from the inside. This, again, is a well-known polemical technique that frequently occurs in ancient philosophical debates. In Diogenes’ fragments, several traces of it can be found. In his attack against the Stoic view of dreams, for instance, Diogenes comes up with the following dilemma: either they call them empty because they have an exceedingly subtle corporeal nature, or because they have no corporeal nature at all. The former alternative is wrong, the latter altogether unthinkable (fr.  I –II ). In this case, then, Diogenes’ attack from the inside is combined with a reductio ad absurdum.⁴⁷ The technique is also used against Empedocles, though in a different way. Diogenes points out that, if we adopt Empedocles’ philosophical starting points, we would do better in making the souls independent and absolutely indestructible, rather than opting for transmigration (fr.  V –). Diogenes thus tells Empedocles what he should actually have said. The same strategy can often be found in Plutarch’s Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, where it is argued that an Epicurean philosopher who accepts pleasure as the final goal of life, should rather opt for the pleasures of the active and contemplative life and endorse the doctrines of the immortality of the soul and divine providence. Closely connected with such a polemical approach, finally, is the argument from inconsistency. It is quite remarkable that this argument is entirely absent from the

⁴⁶ Discussed by Opsomer () –. ⁴⁷ See also Leone  in this volume.

’  



extant remains of Diogenes’ inscription.⁴⁸ It is rather risky to speculate about the reason of this remarkable absence, even more so since we hardly have  of the original text. A possible explanation may be that the argument from inconsistency was not so easily reconciliable with Diogenes’ basic polemical approach discussed above, viz. the general pattern of short introduction of the opponent’s view, followed by a brief refutation and the presentation of the Epicurean alternative. The argument from inconsistency requires a somewhat different approach, and perhaps also more lengthy discussions, including verbatim quotations, as in Plutarch’s De Stoicorum repugnantiis (although the supposed inconsistency could, if necessary, be reduced to a dilemma of two alternatives through a careful argumentative economy: either you opt for x or for y, but not for both at the same time). Moreover, the argument from inconsistency results in the merely destructive point of internal contradiction, without any νουθέτησις. Diogenes may well have regarded this as contentiousness rather than as love of the truth (cf. fr.  III –), and he may have decided that such arguments had too little healing power to occupy the limited space on the wall and that his reading public would not be greatly interested in them. But, again, all this is quite speculative and may be confirmed or refuted by future discoveries of new fragments. .. The Sensible Diogenes a) What we do find in Diogenes, and quite often indeed, is the emphasis on real, concrete facts. This is a general characteristic of Epicurean philosophy, which often gave it a considerable advantage in polemical debates with other philosophical schools. The Stoics were much more vulnerable on this point, since their doctrines, most radically expressed in the paradoxes, were often at odds with common experience.⁴⁹ And thus, they could easily be charged to force the facts into agreement with their doctrines, rather than adjusting their doctrines to the facts (cf. Plut. Profect. in virt. F). The Platonists also had their unprotected flank, shrewdly exploited by Lucian, who made Plato living alone in his own imaginary state while the Epicureans were enjoying eternal blessedness in

⁴⁸ There may be a hint in fr.  IV – ([ἑαυτοῖς τε καὶ] ἀλλήλοις [ἐναντιολογοῦν]τες), but the text is far too hypothetical to rely upon. Cf. Sedley () : “the key verb ἐναντιολογο]ῦντες in line  being little more than guesswork”. ⁴⁹ Typically enough, Plutarch could write both on Stoic and on Epicurean inconsistencies (resp. De Stoic. rep. and the lost Περὶ τῶν Ἐπικουρείων ἐναντιωμάτων; Lamprias catalogue n. ), and he could argue that both the Stoics and the Epicureans talk more paradoxically than the poets (resp. Stoicos absurdiora poetis dicere and the lost Ὅτι παραδοξότερα οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι τῶν ποιητῶν λέγουσι; Lamprias catalogue ), but there is no Epicurean counterpart to his polemical dialogue De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos.





the afterlife (Ver. Hist. II –). The Epicureans, on the contrary, were usually sober-minded observers of real life, and they tried to take into account concrete reality as much as possible. That is not to say, of course, that their view was entirely neutral: they also approached life from their own philosophical point of view and presuppositions, but precisely this philosophical perspective both required and enabled them to analyse the facts carefully, without explaining away less welcome aspects.⁵⁰ The same sober-mindedness can be found in Diogenes. He is not impressed by oracular statements, since he knows how often things went wrong (fr. .– ; cf. also NF  I –II ). A similar down-to-earthness can be found in one of the last discovered fragments, where Diogenes points out that it is not possible to live twice, as it is not possible to die twice (NF  II –). Quite an undeniable observation indeed, and perfectly in line with the Epicurean doctrine. We may here also mention fragment , where the striking repetition of τόδε emphatically draws the reader’s attention to concrete reality. Several interesting examples can also be found in Diogenes’ treatise on Old age, as P.-M. Morel pointed out to me (see, e.g., fr.  II –III ;  I –II ;  I + NF  II –;  II –III ; NF .–). Another example is Diogenes’ evaluation of poverty and wealth. As a philosopher, he questions the importance of money and argues that common people who strive after great wealth and succeed in making big money, are frequently disappointed in their expectations (fr.  III –). Yet, he does not go so far as to say that, after all, there is no difference between wealth and poverty: But it is not possible to say this in the case of poverty and wealth; for we see many things which belong to wealth without belonging to poverty, and belong to poverty without belonging to wealth (fr.  I –II ). This once again reflects the same down-to-earthness of Diogenes’ Epicurean philosophy. It is not clear who are the opponents in this passage. Smith supposes that the argument is against the Stoics,⁵¹ and that is far from implausible indeed, in view of their doctrine of indifferents. But however that may be, no one could deny that the Epicurean view here rests on the firm foundation of real life. The same basic outlook also appears from fragment . In this fragment from the Letter to Dionysius, Diogenes deals with the issue of chance (τύχη). He begins by recognizing its relevance in a man’s life, and then comments:

⁵⁰ Cf. Roskam (a) –. ⁵¹ Smith () .

’  



So Epicurus, having regard to these matters, refused to remove chance from things entirely (for it would have been rash and incompatible with philosophical respectability to give a false account of a matter so clear and patently obvious to all), but not a few occurrences (sc. he called only) small (fr.  I –II ). This beautiful fragment is one of the most striking illustrations of the general Epicurean respect for the facts. From a philosophical point of view, it would be quite attractive to ignore the role of chance altogether, for then, the sage would be perfect master of his own happiness, without having to fear bad luck. Tellingly enough, Plutarch elaborates on this point in the first section of Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum. He mercilessly points out that the Epicureans can never be sure of their ‘stable condition of the flesh’, because the body can always fall prey to pains that reason is unable to avert (D–C). Epicurus was not blind for the relevance of this point, and Diogenes follows him in this. He tries to diminish the importance of chance (see esp. NF .–), but refuses to deny what is patently obvious to all (ἐν μέσῳ πᾶσιν προδήλου; fr.  I –). This, to my mind, is one of the most attractive aspects of Epicurean philosophy, and Diogenes himself likes to underline it in this fragment. Moreover, he connects it with the respectability (σεμνότης) of philosophy. This may well reflect his own point of view, for Epicurus seems to use the term especially for the gods (Epicur. Hdt.  and fr.  Arr.²), never for philosophy. In Diogenes’ days, however, philosophy had long become a great and precious possession (fr.  I –), and the title of philosophy was often used and abused for the sake of social self-promotion. Diogenes here suggests that his Epicurean philosophy perfectly respects and justifies the great esteem in which philosophy in general was held, through its careful concern for the facts. And this may well have been exactly the kind of thing which an ordinary layman was interested in. b) But that is not all. This down-to-earthness yields an additional advantage in polemical debates, in that one can appeal to common sense. This is a strategy that frequently occurs in Diogenes’ fragments, and this is not surprising. For not only is common sense generally a powerful weapon in discussions, but moreover, Diogenes addresses a broader reading public that is by definition open for such arguments. In fragment , for example, Diogenes argues that those philosophers who assert that things are inapprehensible (ἀκατάληπτα), deem φυσιολογία unnecessary: after all, who will choose to seek what he can never find? (I –). A common sense comment indeed. Again, concerning the origin of language, he points out that it cannot be a deliberate invention, since it is practically unthinkable that an individual can teach all the new words to everybody (fr.  IV –V ). And against Empedocles, Diogenes





wonders about the use of the soul’s transmigration (fr.  II –III  and III –), thus voicing the sober-minded reflex of the practical man who does not lose himself in other-worldly speculations. A particularly salient example can be found in fragment , where Diogenes even uses common sense in order to refute widespread common opinions. Most people suppose that the sun is as low as it appears to be, but Diogenes objects: if this were so, the earth and everything on it would necessarily be set ablaze (II – ). This is precisely the kind of argument that sets common people thinking. And Diogenes is kind enough to provide them immediately with the correct, Epicurean alternative: it is the sun’s image that we see low, not the sun itself (II – ).⁵² A final example is Diogenes’ criticism of Democritus’ atomistic doctrine, which would make it impossible for us even to live (fr.  II –). This is a well-known argument (cf. also fr. .–), that had been developed at length in the Epicurean school by Colotes, and that Plutarch gave an anti-Epicurean turn in his Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum. Diogenes here shows himself as an exponent of the previous Epicurean tradition, yet at the same time, he cleverly takes advantage of an argument that the man in the street, his reader, will probably appreciate. Epicurean down-to-earthness is a powerful ally in Diogenes’ general cure of the citizens and foreigners in Oenoanda. c) This intelligent use (and manipulation) of common sense beliefs culminates in a last strategy which I would call the ‘Colotes approach’ (although Colotes did not hold the monopoly on it). This strategy consists in presenting the implications of the opponents’ doctrines in a particularly concrete and ridiculous way, so that their absurd character no longer requires lengthy theoretical refutation. Colotes seems to have had a remarkable talent for this polemical technique. In his view, Parmenides abolishes cities in Europe and Asia (Plu., Adv. Col. B), Plato claims that it is idle to regard horses as being horses and men men (C–D), Socrates cannot explain why he puts food in his mouth and not in his ear (B; cf. F), and Arcesilaus should be puzzled why he does not walk to the wall instead of the door (E). All these examples illustrate a refined polemical humour that is much more efficient than long theoretical arguments. Moreover, this strategy is interesting in that it combines, in a masterly and well-balanced manner, several polemical strategies that have been discussed so far: the rhetorical approach, the attack from the inside, the emphasis on facts, and the appeal to common sense.

⁵² See Leone  in this volume.

’  



Examples of this ‘Colotes approach’ can be found in Diogenes too. His presentation of Democritus’ doctrine of dreams as visions that really chat to us (fr.  I –) resembles this technique, but a much better example is fragment  about the origin of language. There, Diogenes evokes with lively imagination how one individual in primitive times assembled a great multitude and then begins teaching them as a kind of schoolmaster, touching every individual object and giving it its appropriate name: let this be called ‘stone’, this ‘wood’, this ‘human being’, and so on ( V –). This concrete picture by itself suffices to show the absurdity of such an hypothesis. This is a virtuoso combination of powerful rhetoric and common sense: Epicurean polemics at its best.

.    The above survey may give us an idea of Diogenes’ rich polemical method. He had full mastery of the traditional strategies and arguments and knew how to use and adapt them for his own authorial purposes. As yet, however, one fragment has deliberately been left out of consideration, viz. the longest fragment we have, and which is inscribed on several successive stones (NF  + NF / + fr.  + NF  + … + fr. ). This lengthy sequence provides us with an interesting test case. For the picture obtained so far entirely rests on the analysis of isolated fragments, often little more than a few lines without context, and more than once containing a hypothetical text. This fragment, however, allows us to look at a more elaborate section that is, moreover, of a polemical character too. And thus, we can verify whether our general presentation of Diogenes’ polemical techniques corresponds to what we find in this fragment, or whether there are any significant differences between both and how these can be explained. I begin with a very brief summary of the great outlines of Diogenes’ argument. At the outset of the fragment, Diogenes attacks all those who regard the Epicurean view of the gods as harmful because it entails unjust behaviour (Theol. II –III  = NF  II –NF  III + NF  I ). Diogenes agrees that great criminals do not fear the gods, but argues that neither those who have correct insights nor the majority is influenced in their decisions by fear of the gods (Theol. III –VI  = NF  III + NF  I –NF  IV ). In none of the three cases, then, the Epicurean doctrine has any demonstrable negative effect. After a short conclusion (Theol. VI –VII  = NF  IV –V ) and a few uncertain lines (Theol. VII –VIII  = NF  V – NF  VI + NF  I ), we find ourselves in a polemic against the Stoic view of providence. Apparently, Diogenes has meanwhile finished his defence and taken the offensive. He demonstrates, against the Stoics, that god did neither create the world for his own sake (Theol. VIII –XIV  = NF  VI + NF  I  – fr.  III ),





nor for the sake of man (Theol. XIV –XVI  = fr.  III –NF  III , and after one missing block, fr.  II –IV ). In the middle of the latter argument, the text breaks off. a) To what extent, then, this lengthy fragment questions or confirms our provisional results? In an attempt to imitate Diogenes’ concern for a well-structured and systematic approach, I follow the structure of section  of this article, beginning with what we do not find. From this fragment, as from all the other ones, provocative and shocking language is absent. The notion of laughter is present in the characterisation of the Stoic doctrine as ridiculous (Theol. XII = fr.  I : γελοῖον), but for the rest, we find the usual well-balanced equilibrium of sharp polemic and refined, polite language. The decorum is never challenged. Particularly long arguments are absent as well. In the first part of the fragment, concerning Diogenes’ refutation of the anti-Epicurean slander, the arguments are quite short. Diogenes first develops a trichotomy between great criminals, people with correct insight, and the great majority of ordinary people, and very briefly comments on their respective situations. Then follows one further objection, which is undermined again by means of a few well-chosen observations (Theol. IV – VII  = NF  II –V ). This whole section gives the impression of a rigorous argumentative economy, which keeps to a few carefully selected arguments and avoids all digressions. That Diogenes also pays attention to the Epicurean alternative is evident in this case, as he is correcting anti-Epicurean slander. The first section thus shows a context-related application of the general polemical approach that can be found throughout the whole inscription. The second section, about the Stoic doctrine of providence, is more elaborate, although here as well, Diogenes does not indulge in extremely lengthy discussions, and the same basic focus on core arguments can still be found. Yet this part gives us a better idea of the composition of larger sections of Diogenes’ argument. We now see that his argumentative economy need not imply that different topics follow each other in rapid succession, as a mere concatenation of loosely connected μέγιστα. In this case, in fact, one and the same philosophical issue occupies many columns.⁵³ Diogenes thus takes the time he needs in order to expose his view, but does this straightforwardly and without asides. It may be noted that in this second part of the fragment, we also find a more circumstantial style (which need not be opposed to argumentative economy). This has to do with other aspects of Diogenes’ polemical technique, and I shall return to this in due course.

⁵³ A similar case may have been fragments  and : see Smith ()  (challenged, however, by Sedley ).

’  



b) We have seen that Diogenes often adopts a rather schoolish attitude, and this can be observed in this fragment too. The whole section shows a particularly systematic structure, in which every step in the argument is announced. A cross-reference (Theol. VII = NF  V –) helps the reader to recall previous steps, and a summarizing conclusion (Theol. VI –VII  = NF  IV –V ) shows him he has come to the end of a self-contained unit. The following scheme shows the framework of Diogenes’ argument: First section: Diogenes’ discussion of the anti-Epicurean slander – παραστήσω: I will present (Theol. II = NF  II ) – προαποσκευασάμενος πρῶτον τὴν ἐπιφερομένην διαβολὴν ἡμεῖν: initially disposing beforehand of the false accusation brought against us (Theol. II = NF  II – ) – τοῦτο γὰρ λοιπόν: for this is still left (Theol. VI = NF  IV ) – οὐκοῦν κτλ.: systematic conclusion (Theol. VI –VII  = NF  IV –V ) – ὥσπερ ἤδη προενπεφάνισται ταῦτα ὑμεῖν: cross-reference (Theol. VII = NF  V – ) Second section: Diogenes’ discussion of the Stoic theory of providence – πρῶτον οὖν ἐνταῦθ’ ἥκομεν: in the first place, we have arrived at this question (Theol. VIII = NF  VI + NF  I –) – θεασώμεθα: let us examine (Theol. IX = NF  II ) – First pole: the god created the world for himself – πρὸς τῷ: add to this (Theol. XII = fr.  I ) – ἔτι δὲ κἀκεῖνο: and there is this further point too (Theol. XII = fr.  I ) – Conclusion: εἰ μὲν οὖν ἑαυτῆς χάριν … ἄτοπα: if god made everything for himself, this is absurd (Theol. XIII –XIV  = fr.  II –III ) – Second pole: the god created the world for the sake of man – εἰ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἄλλα πάλιν ἀτοπώτερα (Theol. XIV = NF  III –) – Division: τέμωμεν εἰς δύο τὸν λόγον (Theol. XIV = fr.  III + NF  I –) – εἰς τὸν κόσμον (Theol. XIV = fr.  III + NF  I ) – (εἰς) τοὺς ἀνθρώπους αὐτούς (Theol. XIV = fr.  III + NF  I –) – First alternative: providence for sake of the world – καὶ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου πρῶτον εἴπωμεν (Theol. XIV = fr.  III + NF  I –) – Further subdivision: – First item: – Celestial phenomena: ῥηθήτω δὲ πρότερον τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις συνπτώματα (Theol. XIV –XV  = fr.  III + NF  I –II ) – Conclusion: τὰ μ[ὲν μετέωρα] τοιαῦτα (Theol. XVI = NF  III –)





– Second item: – Things on earth (?): τὰ [δ’ ἐπὶ γῆς] (Theol. XVI = NF  III ) – Conclusion of the first alternative: τὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ κόσμου τοιαῦτά ἐστιν (fr.  III –) – Second alternative: providence for sake of man themselves – τὰ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ αὐτῶν νῦν ἴδωμεν (fr.  III –) – ὧδε δ’ ἀρξώμεθα (fr.  III –) This schematic survey immediately shows that Diogenes’ argument forms one architectonic whole, in which every single step is clearly announced, with the rigid systematics of a schoolmaster. It is obvious that this strongly facilitates the process of reading, but this fragment also reveals a further, polemical function of this schoolish approach. In fact, this well-structured argumentation suggests that all the aspects of the opponent’s view are systematically and thoroughly refuted. There are no further loopholes available, for every single point seems to be examined and rejected. And at the same time, the truth of the Epicurean perspective is confirmed on all fronts. Of course, this suggestion is not without bias. Diogenes’ general focus on core doctrines and arguments sometimes entails polemical distortions. In this fragment, Diogenes never deals with the details of the Stoic doctrine, although his presentation of their view is generally fair. The clearest example of the influence of Diogenes’ own philosophical perspective appears in the much discussed reference to the Egyptians and the Jews as the most superstitious and vilest of all peoples (Theol. V –VI  = NF  III –IV ). This is not the place to deal at length with the background of this statement:⁵⁴ in the present context, it is merely interesting as one further example of the influence of Diogenes’ philosophical prejudices on his presentation of the views of others. c) This brings us to the importance of a rhetorical approach in Diogenes, and more specifically in this fragment. This once again becomes evident in a great number of rhetorical questions (Theol. VI = NF  IV –; Theol. IX = NF  II –; Theol. XI –XII  = NF  IV  – fr.  I ). Especially striking is the series of short rhetorical questions in Theol. XV –XVI  and – (= NF  II –III  and –), where we read no less than nine times the interrogative τί, followed by at least five times πόσα. This is an example of powerful and greatly effective rhetoric. Diogenes goes on and on, and every question hits his opponent as with a sledgehammer blow and further undermines his doctrine.

⁵⁴ See Smith () – and (c) –; van der Horst ().

’  



The strategy of defamation likewise occurs in this fragment. The Stoic doctrine is characterised as a myth, composed to gain the attention of an audience, not a natural philosopher’s argument searching for the truth and inferring from probabilities things not palpable to sense (Theol. X = NF  III –).⁵⁵ Again, Diogenes thus ascribes a dishonourable motivation to his philosophical opponent. The Stoics are not really interested in an in-depth philosophical search for the truth, but only aim at success with their audience. We here once more come across the same opposition between φιλαυτία and φιλαλήθεια. The passage thus provides interesting support for our interpretation of fragment  (see above, .c). And typically enough, even on this point, Diogenes takes care to add the correct Epicurean alternative. We have seen that Diogenes sometimes refutes his opponents from the inside, by endorsing (for the sake of the argument) their views and showing how they result in absurd conclusions. This strategy is also illustrated in the present fragment. Diogenes here starts from the hypothesis that god has indeed created the world, and he even accepts the un-Epicurean tenet that nothing is produced without a cause and that everything has been created by god (Theol. IX = NF  II –). Then follows a dilemma, in which both poles turn out to be extremely problematic. And within this general argumentative framework, Diogenes consistently keeps to the same strategy. If god created the world as a habitation and city for himself, so Diogenes argues, restating the Stoic view, the question arises as to where he was living before the world was created (Theol. XII = fr.  I –). Again, the Stoic view entails great difficulties, and Diogenes declares that he cannot find an answer, at any rate not one consistent with the Stoic doctrine, according to which this world is unique (Theol. XII –XIII  =  I –II ). The Epicurean alternative view could solve this difficulty, of course, for the Epicureans believed in an infinite number of worlds (Epicur. Hdt. ; Pyth. ; fr.  Us.; cf. also Diog. fr.  II –) and argued that the gods were living between them, in the μετακόσμια (Cic. ND I  and Div. II ). But that is not the point here. The correct, Epicurean view of the gods may have been mentioned shortly before this passage (Theol. XI = NF  IV –, although the text is not certain), but here, Diogenes for once confines himself to the negative conclusion.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ See Leone  with n.  and Morel  in this volume. ⁵⁶ That Diogenes’ polemical argument does not contribute much to our understanding of Epicurean theology is argued by Smith ()  (with reference to Lucr. V – and Cic. ND I  ff.).





d) Finally, Diogenes frequently takes into account concrete facts and experiences from everyday life, and often appeals to common sense. This is especially conspicuous in the second section of this lengthy fragment. A whole list of easily recognizable data is collected as one irrefutable argument against the Stoic doctrine of providence. Meteorological and celestial elements (such as thunder, lightning, hail, winds, etc.) and geographical observations (inhabitable places, the sea with its undrinkable water, the so-called Dead Sea)⁵⁷ all work towards the same conclusion that the Stoic belief is simply at odds with the undeniable facts. This careful concern for the information that can be derived from the facts is coupled with an appeal to common sense, as appears from Diogenes’ rhetorical question: what god, who has enjoyed his eternal blessings for thousands of years, would come to the idea that he needs a city and fellow citizens? (Theol. XI –XII  = NF  IV  – fr.  I ). The suggestion of this rhetorical question is obvious enough: everyone who is not completely deranged, immediately sees how absurd this is. And in this fragment too, the polemics culminate in the ‘Colotes approach’. Diogenes pictures the concrete implications of the Stoic doctrine and shows how absurd they really are, by evoking how the god like an unfortunate, destitute man, roams about at random, having no city or fellow citizens (Theol. XIII = fr.  II –). In other terms, the Stoic god hardly differs from a beggar seeking for a shelter – a counter-intuitive view of course, that is diametrically opposed to the current conception of the gods. And thus, our analysis of this lengthy fragment yields a picture of Diogenes’ polemical strategies that corresponds remarkably well with the results obtained in section three of this article. Nearly all the techniques that were discussed there, can also be found in this fragment. Here, however, they are combined in one coherent whole, and as such, we get a better idea of Diogenes as a polemical author.

.   We have seen how Diogenes uses many traditional strategies in order to refute his philosophical opponents and convince his readers of the truth of his own Epicurean beliefs. But at least one question still remains unanswered: what is the relevance of all this for the ordinary citizens of Oenoanda and for the foreigners who show up there? Why would they be interested in all this? Sometimes it seems as if Diogenes has forgotten that he is not writing a philosophical, technical polemic but an advertising text on a public building, addressed to the common man in the street. He may

⁵⁷ Usually understood as a reference to the Northern Ocean, on the basis of Plin. Nat. Hist. IV  (and a few other texts); see Kappeler (); an exception is Gordon () –.

’  



be systematic and concise in his polemical attacks, no doubt, but why should he involve his readers in such schoolish polemics, that sometimes even deal with rather technical issues? Why not focus more on the positive message of Epicurean salvation, while leaving school business to the school? A possible answer to this is that Diogenes wrote his Physics and Ethics first as separate texts, not designed for being carved on the wall. This, in other terms, would be recycled material. This is perhaps not impossible (though, perhaps, rather unlikely), but it surely is an unsatisfactory answer to our question. There are more than enough indications that show that Diogenes carefully reflected on his project. He knew very well what he wrote in his Physics and Ethics, and he deemed it important to have this inscribed on the wall. Moreover, as we have seen, the texts also contain many cross-references and even take into account the place where the different texts can be found on the wall. All this suggests that they were, in this version at least, directly written for the inscription.⁵⁸ And thus, the question remains: why trouble the passer-by with sharp polemics against Pythagoras or Empedocles, although these thinkers were dead for more than half a millenium?⁵⁹ An important key no doubt lies in the Epicurean tradition, which was from the very beginning characterised by a strongly polemical spirit.⁶⁰ Yet, in view of Diogenes’ unparalleled project, I wonder whether this is the only explanation. We should never forget the exceptional setting and social context of this text, nor

⁵⁸ Cf. Clay () . Smith (, – and b, ) leaves open the possibility that Diogenes published some of the writings in book form before or after the inscription was finished (for instance for the benefit of his friends in Rhodes). Again, this is not impossible, but if he did, that would have required some revision. On the wall, the different works belonged to one coherent project, as appears from the cross-references. If Diogenes published them as separate works, some of his arguments may have become unclear, and several references to the inscription itself (e.g. the introduction to the Physics, with its phrase τῇ στοᾷ ταύτῃ καταχρησάμενος in fr.  V –) would lose their relevance. A special case, of course, are the Fourteen-line-column Letters and the Ten-line-column Writings. The Maxims, too, were probably easier to publish separately (though cf. the verb ἐλιθοποιήσαμεν in fr. .–), but Hammerstaedt (a)  correctly observes that it was hardly a realistic option for Diogenes to do so. ⁵⁹ Grilli ()  quite strangely argues that fr.  should be directed against the Stoics on the ground that “nel II secolo d. C. i Cirenaici erano morti da secoli e non entravano in gioco altro che per il loro dossografico contrasto sulla preminenza del piacere fisico, punto di scontro basilare con l’edonismo epicureo: infatti su questo punto s’esprime anche Diogene in fr.  II. D’altra parte è chiaro che Diogene nel suo scritto non aveva alcun interesse ad attaccare dottrine scomparse, ma quelle d’avversari vivacissimi, come erano allora gli Stoici” (he may have been influenced by Sedley , ). But given the fact that Diogenes so often attacks Presocratics, this is obviously a bad argument. ⁶⁰ Cf. supra, n. .





the identity of Diogenes’ target readers. Even the Maxims, which were probably one of the most popular sections of the inscription, contain philosophical polemics, although this may not seem the most obvious place for such attacks. Again, why would even the casual reader, ὁ δεῖνα who walks in Oenoanda and spends just a few minutes of his precious time reading a couple of maxims, need this? Epicurus himself argued that all παιδεία was redundant, and he urged Pythocles on to hoist all sail and steer clear of all παιδεία (fr.  Us.). Is this advice no longer valid in Diogenes’ day? Simply pointing to the rich Epicurean polemical tradition will not do: Diogenes was an enthusiast follower of Epicurus, not an inconsiderate one. I can think of at least two alternatives (which, by the way, do not exclude one another). First, it was not strategically sound for Diogenes to ignore his philosophical opponents altogether. Even the ill-informed layman probably knew at least of the existence of different philosophical schools, and could thus suppose that Diogenes’ claims of the truth would not remain unchallenged. By keeping silent about these rival views, Diogenes would risk that such existing presuppositions would give rise to disbelief or scepticism in his reader: why, after all, would Diogenes’ Epicurean view be better than that of others? A way to avoid this is precisely to insert short, selective and informative attacks against some absurd doctrines of the other schools, omitting details and nuance, while always providing the sensible Epicurean alternative. Every refutation thus becomes at the same time a telling confirmation of the Epicurean truth. This decision at the same time enables Diogenes to invalidate the slander that is spread in some anti-Epicurean circles. It is probably no coincidence that Diogenes explicitly mentions and refutes this slander in his inscription (Theol. II = NF  II –). His emphatic rejection of vulgar pleasures (NF  III –) may also be understood in this light. This first explanation, then, shows that Diogenes’ philosophical polemics are important for his own credibility. There is, however, also a second possible explanation that shifts the attention from the author to the reader. Diogenes takes his reader seriously. He introduces him to a long intellectual tradition and dares to suppose that he will indeed be interested in this. In fragment , he acknowledges that the issue is difficult for ordinary people to conceive (III –: τὸ δυσεπιλόγιστον τοῦτο τοῖς πολλοῖς), but this remark does not close the discussion. In fact, these πολλοί could in all likelihood find a few arguments that clarify the question in what follows,⁶¹ and this shows that Diogenes found it worthwhile to explain the topic to them. A somewhat similar case can be found in fragment . Again, Diogenes points to the ignorance of most people, but here too, he briefly discusses the matter and then characterises his words as a digression (I –II ). Why then does he still deal with the question, in spite of the

⁶¹ Cf. Smith (a) .

’  



fact that the available space on the wall is limited? Probably because he nevertheless deemed it important to introduce even the ordinary layman to the rich possibilities of Epicurean φυσιολογία. Furthermore, we saw that Diogenes often confines himself to the core arguments and presents these in a clear and concise way, yet this does not imply that he lowers his readers to the position of mere idiots. In fragment , he even explicitly invites them to adopt a critical attitude: nobody has to accept unquestioningly whatever he reads on the wall. The only thing Diogenes requires here is to read his message carefully (fr.  II –III ). This fragment also indicates how seriously Diogenes takes his readers. In that sense, his project has something radically emancipatory.

. :    It may be useful to return, at the very end of this article, to its beginning, in order to place our results in their broader perspective. Just like Epicurus, Diogenes wished to cure the widespread disease of all kinds of erroneous opinions which he saw all around him. He therefore turned to the therapy with which he was so familiar and which had proved its trustworthiness and value in his own person (fr.  VI – ). For unlike Euripides’ doctor (TrGF ., fr. ), Diogenes did not heal others while being full of sores himself. His therapy not only consisted of positive advice but also required swallowing a great dose of polemics (against both philosophical and popular convictions). In these polemics, he followed traditional paths. None of the techniques we discussed in this article is greatly innovative. Diogenes used them, however, within his own project and carefully took into account this particular context. This entailed a more systematic approach and a well-considered focus on essentials, but not a different cure or different medicines. One may rather say that Diogenes turned with his Epicurean stoa Epicurus’ τετραφάρμακος⁶² into a generic medicine available for everyone. At the low cost of some time and reading effort, everybody could have a medicine at his disposal with the same healing power as the traditional ones that could be bought in the book shop. In the (perhaps unlikely) case that our contemporary pharmaceutical industry would some day feel the need of a patron for the scientific research on generic medicines, Diogenes would, I believe, qualify as an excellent candidate.

⁶² On the τετραφάρμακος and the question of whether it can be traced back to Epicurus’ himself, see Angeli () –.

         Fr. = Fragment(s) of Diogenes’ inscription, unless otherwise indicated. The numbering is that of Smith ( and ). NF = New Fragments of Diogenes’ inscription. NF – were first published by Smith between  and  and were re-edited in Smith () and, with drawings and photographs, in Smith (). NF  was first published in Smith (). NF – were first published in Smith () and republished, with revisions, in Smith (a). NF  was first published in Smith (), and NF – by Smith and Hammerstaedt in a series of articles from  to . In addition, NF  was first published in Hammerstaedt/Smith (). NF –  are collected in Hammerstaedt/Smith () –, preceded by a list of pages where new readings in previously published fragments can be found (see Hammerstaedt/Smith , , and ibid. n. ). Theol. (Théol. in the French contributions) indicates the “Theological PhysicsSequence”. It is the longest continuous passage of the inscription yet known. Only one of its five blocks (fr. ) was already known before Smith’s editions of  and . Theol. contains sixteen columns of text, with only few parts missing. The continous text has been combined from the most recent partial editions in Hammerstaedt/Smith () – and is followed by an English translation (ibid. –). YF = Yazı Felsefi (Philosophical Inscription). The YF numbers are the inventory numbers of all pieces of the Diogenes inscription which have been found or relocated since . HK = Fragments in the edition of Heberdey/Kalinka (). The numbering is still in use for those stones which have not reappeared and are missing since the Austrian and/or French investigations of the  century. (Numbers given by HK to missing pieces which had last been seen by the French investigators are put in round brackets.) YÇ = Yazı Çeşitli (Various Inscriptions). The YÇ numbers are the inventory numbers of Oinoanda inscriptions that are not part of Diogenes’ work.

 Acosta Mendez / Angeli () = E. Acosta Méndez / A. Angeli, Filodemo. Testimonianze su Socrate = La scuola di Epicuro  (Napoli ) Alberti () = A. Alberti, “The Epicurean theory of law and justice”, in: A. Laks / M. Schofield (ed.), Justice and Generosity. Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum (Cambridge ) – Algra () = K. Algra, “The Treatise of Cleomedes and its Critique of Epicurean Cosmology”, in: M. Erler (ed.), Epikureismus in der späten Republik und der Kaiserzeit (Stuttgart ) – Amato/Kulien () = E. Amato (ed.) / Y. Kulien (tr.), Favorinos d’Arles, Œuvres. Tome I. Introduction générale. Témoignages. Discours aux Corinthiens. Sur la fortune (Paris ) Anderson/Parsons/Nisbet () = R.D. Anderson / P.J. Parsons / R.G.M. Nisbet, “Elegiacs by Gallus from Qasr Ibrim”, in: The Journal of Roman Studies  () – Angeli () = A. Angeli, Filodemo. Agli amici di scuola (PHerc. ). Edizione, traduzione e commento = La Scuola di Epicuro  (Napoli ) Annas () = J. Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford ) Arrighetti () = G. Arrighetti, “Sull’Epistola di Epicuro a Pitocle”, in: Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di lettere e filosofia  () – Arrighetti () = G. Arrighetti, Epicuro. Opere (Torino ²) Arrighetti () = G. Arrighetti, Poesia, poetiche e storia nella riflessione dei Greci (Pisa ) Asmis () = E. Asmis, Epicurus’ Scientific Method (Ithaca / London ) Auvray-Assayas / Delattre () = C. Auvray-Assayas / D. Delattre (ed.), Cicéron et Philodème. La polémique en philosophie (Paris ) Bachmann () = M. Bachmann, “Oinoanda Arazi Çalışmaları . Fieldwork at Oinoanda in ”, in: Anmed  () – Bachmann () = M. Bachmann, “Oinoanda Arazi Çalışmaları . Fieldwork at Oinoanda in ”, in: Anmed  () – Bachmann () = M. Bachmann, “Oinoanda Arazi Çalışmaları . Report on Campaign at Oinoanda in ”, in: Anmed  () – Bachmann (a) = M. Bachmann, “Oinoanda Araştırmaları . Report on Campaign at Oinoanda in ”, in: Anmed  () – Bachmann (b) = M. Bachmann, “Neue Forschungen in Oinoanda”, in: Martin Seyer (ed.),  Jahre Grabung Limyra = Forschungen in Limyra  (Wien ) –





Bachmann () = M. Bachmann, “Oinoanda . Report on the  Campaign at Oinoanda”, in: Anmed /, – Bakker () = F.A. Bakker, Three Studies in Epicurean Cosmology (Utrecht ) Bakker () = F.A. Bakker, Epicurean Meteorology. Sources, Method, Scope and Organization (Leiden/Boston ) Baltes () = M. Baltes, Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten, Teil I (Leiden ) Baltussen () = H. Baltussen, “Early Reactions to Plato’s Timaeus: Polemic and Exegesis in Theophrastus and Epicurus”, in: R.W. Sharples / A. Sheppard (ed.), Ancient Approaches to Plato’s Timaeus (London ) – Barney () = R. Barney, “Appearances and Impressions”, in Phronesis  () – Bastianini/Long () = G. Bastianini / A. Long, “Hierocles, Elementa Moralia”, in: Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini. I. Vol. ** (Firenze ) – Bénatouïl () = T. Bénatouïl, “La méthode épicurienne des explications multiples”, in: T. Bénatouïl / V. Laurand / A. Macé (ed.), L’épicurisme antique = Les Cahiers Philosophiques de Strasbourg  () – Bendlin () = A. Bendlin, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of Divination. Oracles and their Literary Representations in the Time of the Second Sophistic”, in: J.A. North / S.R.F. Price (ed.), The Religious History of the Roman Empire. Pagans, Jews, and Christians (Oxford ) – Bergjan () = S.-P. Bergjan, Der fürsorgende Gott. Der Begriff der ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑ Gottes in der apologetischen Literatur der Alten Kirche (Berlin ) Berti () = E. Berti, La filosofia del ‘primo’ Aristotele (Padova  [Milano ²]) Besnier () = B. Besnier, “Justice et utilité de la politique dans l’épicurisme. Réponse à Elizabeth Asmis”, in: Auvray-Assayas / Delattre () – Bett () = R. Bett, Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy (Oxford ) Bett () = R. Bett, Sextus Empiricus. Against the Logicians (Cambridge ) Bignone () = E. Bignone, Epicuro. Opere, frammenti, testimonianze sulla sua vita (Bari  [= Roma ]). Bignone () = E. Bignone, L’Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro ( [=]) Bloch () = O. Bloch, “Le contre-platonisme d’Épicure”, in: M. Dixsaut (ed.), Contre Platon. Tome I. Le platonisme dévoilé (Paris ) – Bollack/Laks () = J. Bollack / A. Laks (ed.), Études sur l’Épicurisme antique = Cahiers de Philologie  (Lille ) Bonazzi (a) = M. Bonazzi, “Antiochus and Platonism”, in: D. Sedley (ed.), The Philosophy of Antiochus (Cambridge ) – Bonazzi (b) = M. Bonazzi, “Plutarch on the Difference between Academics and Pyrrhonists”, in: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy  () –

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Bonazzi () = M. Bonazzi, “Parmenide e Platone (e Aristotele) nel Contro Colote di Plutarco”, in: Aitia  () = http://aitia.revues.org/ Boyancé () = P. Boyancé, Lucrèce et l’épicurisme (Paris ) = Lucrezio e l’epicureismo. Ed. it. a c. di A. Grilli (Brescia ) Boys-Stones () = G.R. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy. A Study of its Development from the Stoics to Origen (Oxford ) Brancacci () = A. Brancacci, “La ‘dottrina riservata’ di Protagora (Plat. Theaet. c –e )”, in: Méthexis  () – Brandt/Kolb () = H. Brandt / F. Kolb, Lycia et Pamphylia. Eine römische Provinz im Südwesten Kleinasiens (Mainz ) Broadie () = S. Broadie, Nature and Divinity in Plato’s Timaeus (Cambridge ) Brown () = E. Brown, “Politics and Society”, in: Warren () – Brunschwig () = J. Brunschwig, “The cradle argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism”, in: M. Schofield / G. Striker (ed.), The Norms of Nature. Studies in Hellenistic ethics (Cambridge ) – Burris/Fish/Obbink () = S. Burris / J. Fish / D. Obbink, “New Fragments of Book  of Sappho”, in: Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik  () – Cambiano () = G. Cambiano, I filosofi in Grecia e a Roma. Quando pensare era un modo di vivere (Bologna ) Campbell () = G. Cambell, Lucretius on Creation and Evolution. A Commentary on De Rerum Natura, Book Five, Lines – (Oxford ) Capasso () = M. Capasso, Il ritorno di Cornelio Gallo. Il papiro di Qasr Ibrîm ˙ venticinque anni dopo (Napoli ) Capone Braga () = G. Capone Braga, “Aristotele, Epicuro e Diogene di Enoanda”, in: Atene e Roma  () – Capone Braga () = G. Capone Braga, Studi su Epicuro (Milano ) Cardullo () = L. Cardullo, Aristotele. Metafisica, Libri Α , α (Roma ) Casanova () = A. Casanova, I frammenti di Diogene d’Enoanda (Firenze ) Casanova () = A. Casanova, “Il canone etico in una lettera di Diogene di Enoanda”, in: Giannantoni/Gigante () II – Chiaradonna () = R. Chiaradonna, “Plotinus’ Account of Demiurgic Causation and Its Philosophical Background”, in: A. Marmodoro / B.D. Prince (ed.), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity (Cambridge ) – Chilton () = C.W. Chilton, Diogenes Oenoandensis. Fragmenta (Lipsiae ) Chilton () = C.W. Chilton, Diogenes of Oenoanda. The Fragments (London ) Clay () = D. Clay, “An Epicurean Interpretation of Dreams”, in: American Journal of Philology  () – Clay () = D. Clay, Lucretius and Epicurus (Ithaca/London )

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Clay () = D. Clay, “A Lost Epicurean Community”, in: Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies  () – Clay () = D. Clay, “The Philosophical Inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda. New Discoveries –”, in: ANRW II . () – and –  Clay () = D. Clay, “Diogenes and his Gods”, in: M. Erler (ed.), Epikureismus in der späten Republik und der Kaiserzeit (Stuttgart ) – Clay () = D. Clay, “The Trial of Socrates in Herculaneum”, in: Cronache Ercolanesi  () – Concolino Mancini () = A. Concolino Mancini, “Sulle opere polemiche di Colote”, in: Cronache Ercolanesi  () – Cornford () = F.M. Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology. The Timaeus of Plato (London ) Corradi () = M. Corradi, “Πιθανολογεῖν fra Platone, Aristotele ed Epicuro. Un dialogo metodologico a distanza”, in: M. Tulli (ed.), Testo e forme del testo. Ricerche di filologia filosofica = Ricerche di Filologia Classica VII (Pisa ) – Corti () = A, Corti, “È realmente esistita una polemica tra Arcesilao e la scuola epicurea?”, in: Aitia  () = http://aitia.revues.org/ Corti () = A. Corti, L’Adversus Colotem di Plutarco. Storia di una polemica filosofica, (Leuven ) Coulton () = J. Coulton, “The buildings of Oinoanda”, in: Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society  () – Coulton () = J. Coulton, The Balboura survey and settlement in Highland Southwest Anatolia. . Balboura and the history of highland settlement = British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara Monograph  (Ankara ) Coulton/Stenton () = J. Coulton / E. Stenton, “Oinoanda. The Water Supply and Aquaeduct”, in: Anatolian Studies  () – Cousin () = G. Cousin, “Inscriptions d’Oenoanda”, in: Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique  () – Crönert () = Crönert W., Kolotes und Menedemos (Leipzig  [= Amsterdam ]) Decleva Caizzi () = F. Decleva Caizzi, “La ‘materia scorrevole’. Sulle tracce di un dibattito perduto”, in: J. Barnes / M. Mignucci (ed.), Matter and Metaphysics. Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum (Napoli ) – De Lacy () = P.H. De Lacy, “Lucretius and Plato”, in: ΣΥΖΗΤΗΣΙΣ. Studi sull’epicureismo greco e romano offerti a Marcello Gigante vol. I () – De Lacy/De Lacy () = P.H. De Lacy / E.A. De Lacy, Philodemus. On Methods of Inference = La Scuola di Epicuro  (Napoli ) Delattre/Morel () =D. Delattre / P.M. Morel, “Une lecture nouvelle du fr. B 

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D.-K. de Démocrite”, in: Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik  () – Delattre/Pigeaud () = D. Delattre / J. Pigeaud (ed.), Les Épicuriens (Paris ) De Sanctis () = D. De Sanctis, “Utile al singolo, utile a molti. Il proemio dell’Epistola a Pitocle”, in: Cronache Ercolanesi  () – De Sanctis / Spinelli / Tulli / Verde () = D. De Sanctis / E. Spinelli / M. Tulli / F. Verde (ed.), Questioni epicuree (Sankt Augustin ) Dillon () = J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists. B.C. to A.D. (London ) Dillon () = J. Dillon, The Heirs of Plato. A Study of the Old Academy (–BC) (New York ) Dorandi () = T. Dorandi, “Filodemo. Gli Stoici (PHerc.  e )”, in: Cronache Ercolanesi  () – Dorandi () = T. Dorandi, Ricerche sulla cronologia dei filosofi ellenistici (Stuttgart ) Dorandi () = T. Dorandi, “Chronology”, in: K. Algra / J. Barnes / J. Mansfeld / M. Schofield (ed.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge ) Dorandi () = T. Dorandi, Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Cambridge ) Dorandi () = T. Dorandi, “Review of Montarese ()”, in: Klio  () – Dyck () = A.R. Dyck, Cicero. De Natura Deorum. Liber I (Cambridge ) Einarson / de Lacy () = B. Einarson / Ph. de Lacy, Plutarch’s Moralia Vol. XIV (Cambridge Mass. / London ) Erler () = M. Erler, “Praesens divinum. Mythische und historische Zeit in der griechischen Literatur”, in: M. Janka / C. Schäfer (ed.), Platon als Mythologe. Neue Interpretationen zu den Mythen in Platons Dialogen (Darmstadt ) – Erler () = M. Erler, “Platon”, in: H. Flashar (ed.), Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie = Die Philosophie der Antike Bd. / (Basel ) Erler () = M. Erler, “‘Naturae extrema vestigia’ (ciu. ,). Sophistisches und Epikureisches in Augustinus’ ‘terrena civitas’”, in: C. Mayer (ed.), Augustinus – Ethik und Politik (Würzburg ) – Erler () = M. Erler, “Furcht und Pflicht. Aischylos’ Eumeniden und die Einbürgerung des ‘wilden Schreckens’ in der Gesellschaft”, in: J. Robert / F.F. Günther (ed.), Poetik des Wilden. Festschrift für Wolfgang Riedel (Würzburg ) – Erler / Rother () = M. Erler / W. Rother (ed.), Philosophie der Lust = Schwabe Epicurea  (Basel ) Ernout/Robin () = A. Ernout / L. Robin, Lucrèce, De rerum natura. Commentaire exégétique et critique précédé d’une introduction sur l’art de Lucrèce et d’une traduction des lettres et pensées d’Épicure. Tome premier, Livres I et II (Paris )

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Essler () = H. Essler, “Cicero’s Use and Abuse of Epicurean Theology”, in: J. Fish / K.R. Sanders (ed.), Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition (Cambridge ) – Etienne/O’Meara () = A. Etienne / D. O’Meara, La philosophie épicurienne sur pierre. Les fragments de Diogène d’Œnoanda (Paris/Fribourg, CH ) Évrard () = É. Évrard, “Diogène d’Œnoanda et Lucrèce”, in: R. Poignault (ed.), Présence de Lucrèce (Tours ) – Fortenbaugh () = W.W. Fortenbaugh, “Biography and the Aristotelian Peripatos”, in: M. Erler / S. Schorn (ed.), Die griechische Biographie in hellenistischer Zeit (Berlin ) – Fowler () = D. Fowler, “Lucretius and politics”, in: M. Griffin / J. Barnes (ed.), Philosophia togata. Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society (Oxford ) – Frischer () = B.D. Frischer, The Sculpted Word. Epicureanism and Philosophical Recruitment in Ancient Greece (Berkeley / Los Angeles ) Gagliarde () = G. Gagliarde, “L’Epicuro breve”, in: Appunti Romani di Filologia  () – Gay/Corsten () = K. Gay / Th. Corsten, “Lycian tombs in the Kibyratis and the Extent of Lycian Culture”, in: Anatolian Studies  () – Gercke () = A. Gercke, “Chrysippea”, in: Jahrbücher für classische Philologie. Supplement-Bd.  (Leipzig ) – Giannantoni/Gigante () = G. Giannantoni / M. Gigante (ed.), Epicureismo greco e romano. Atti del congresso internazionale, Napoli, – maggio  (Napoli ) Gifford () = E.H. Gifford, Eusebii Pamphili Evangelicae Praeparationis Libri XV (Oxford ) Gigandet () = A. Gigandet, “Physique du hasard, éthique du désir: les épicuriens et la vérité des rêves”, in: J. Pollock (ed.), Pratiques du hasard. Pour un matérialisme de la rencontre (Perpignan ) – Gigante ( [= ]) = M. Gigante, Diogene Laerzio, Vite dei filosofi (Bari  [= Roma/Bari ⁸]). Gigante () = M. Gigante, Scetticismo e epicureismo. Per l’avviamento di un discorso storiografico (Napoli ) Gigante () = M. Gigante, Cinismo e Epicureismo (Napoli ) Gigante () = M. Gigante, Kepos e Peripatos. Contributo alla storia dell’aristotelismo antico (Napoli ) Görgemanns () = H. Görgemanns, “Oikeiosis in Arius Didymus”, in: W. Fortenbaugh (ed.), On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics (New Brunswick / London ) – Goldschmidt () = V. Goldschmidt, La Doctrine d’Épicure et le droit (Paris )

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Gordon () = P. Gordon, Epicurus in Lycia. The Second-Century World of Diogenes of Oenoanda (Ann Arbor ) Gourinat () = J.-B. Gourinat, “The Stoics on Matter and Prime Matter: ‘Corporealism’ and the Imprint of Plato’s Timaeus”, in: R. Salles (ed.), God and Cosmos in Stoicism (Oxford ) – Gourinat () = J.-B. Gourinat, “Aëtius et Arius Didyme sources de Stobée”, in: G. Reydams-Schils (ed.), Thinking through Excerpts. Studies on Stobaeus (Turnhout ) – Gourinat () = J.-B. Gourinat, “Was Marcus Aurelius a philosopher?”, in: van Ackeren / Opsomer () – Grilli () = A. Grilli, “I frammenti dell’epicureo Diogene da Enoanda”, in: V.E. Alfieri / M. Untersteiner (ed.), Studi di filosofia greca (Bari ) – Grilli () = A. Grilli, Diogenis Oenoandensis fragmenta (Milano/Varese ) Grilli () = A. Grilli, “Il nuovo Diogene di Enoanda”, in: La Parola del Passato  () – Grilli () = A. Grilli, “Postilla minima su Diogene di Enoanda”, in: La Parola del Passato  ()  Grilli () = A. Grilli, “Sul nuovo Diogene di Enoanda”, in: Cronache Ercolanesi  () – Hadot () = P. Hadot, La citadelle intérieure. Introduction aux Pensées de MarcAurèle (Paris ) Hall () = A. Hall, “The Oenoanda Survey –”, in: Anatolian Studies  () – Hall () = A.S. Hall, “The Klarian oracle at Oinoanda”, in: Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik  () – Hall/Milner () = A. Hall / N. Milner, “Education and Athletics, Documents illustrating the Festivals of Oenoanda”, in: D. French (ed.), Studies in the history and topography of Lycia and Pisidia in memoriam Alan S. Hall = BIAA Monograph  () – Hall/Coulton/Milner () = A. Hall / J. Coulton / N. Milner, “The Mausoleum of Licinnia Flavilla and Flavianus Diogenes of Oinoanda. Epigraphy and Architecture”, in: Anatolian Studies  () – Hammerstaedt () = J. Hammerstaedt, Die Orakelkritik des Kynikers Oenomaus = Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie  (Frankfurt am Main ) Hammerstaedt () = J. Hammerstaedt, “Das Kriterium der Prolepsis beim Epikureer Diogenian”, in: Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum  () – Hammerstaedt () = J. Hammerstaedt, “Zum Text der epikureischen Inschrift des Diogenes von Oinoanda”, in: Epigraphica Anatolica  () – (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , –) Hammerstaedt () = J. Hammerstaedt, “Philosophie auf Stein”, in: G. Blamberger

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/ D. Boschung (ed.), Morphomata. Kulturelle Figurationen – Genese, Dynamik und Medialität (München ) – Hammerstaedt (a) = J. Hammerstaedt, “Die Zweite Sophistik als geistiger Hintergrund von Marc Aurels Selbstbetrachtungen”, in: van Ackeren / Opsomer () – Hammerstaedt (b) = J. Hammerstaedt, “Leib, Seele und Umwelt. Überlegungen zum Hedonismus des Diogenes von Oinoanda”, in: Erler/Rother () –  Hammerstaedt (a) = J. Hammerstaedt, “Strategien der philosophischen Darstellung für ein Laienpublikum in der Inschrift des Diogenes von Oinoanda”, in: I. Männlein-Robert / S. Schorn / Chr. Tornau (ed.), Philosophus Orator. Rhetorische Strategien und Strukturen in Philosophischer Literatur = Schwabe interdisziplinär  (Basel ) – Hammerstaedt (b) = “Considerazioni epicuree sul tema della vecchiaia”, in De Sanctis / Spinelli / Tulli / Verde () – Hammerstaedt / Hinzer-AlHasan () = J. Hammerstaedt / B. Hinzer-AlHasan, “First investigations of the three-dimensional scans of the Epicurean inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda”, in: Epigraphica Anatolica  () – Hammerstaedt/Smith () = J. Hammerstaedt / M.F. Smith, “Diogenes of Oinoanda: The Discoveries of  (NF –)”, in: Epigraphica Anatolica  () – (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , –) Hammerstaedt/Smith () = J. Hammerstaedt / M.F. Smith, “Diogenes of Oinoanda. The Discoveries of  (NF –)”, in: Epigraphica Anatolica  () – (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , –) Hammerstaedt/Smith () = J. Hammerstaedt / M.F. Smith, “Diogenes of Oinoanda. The Discoveries of  (NF –)”, in: Epigraphica Anatolica  () – (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , –) Hammerstaedt/Smith () = J. Hammerstaedt / M.F. Smith, “Diogenes of Oinoanda. The Discoveries of  (NF –, and Additions to NF  and )”, in: Epigraphica Anatolica  () – (= Hammerstaedt/Smith , –) Hammerstaedt/Smith () = J. Hammerstaedt / M.F. Smith, “Diogenes of Oinoanda. New discoveries of  (NF –) and new light on ‘old’ fragments”, in: Epigraphica Anatolica  () – = (= Hammerstaedt-Smith , – ) Hammerstaedt/Smith () = J. Hammerstaedt / M.F. Smith, The Epicurean Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda. Ten Years of New Discoveries and Research (Bonn ) Hammerstaedt/Smith () = J. Hammerstaedt / M.F. Smith, “New Research at Oinoanda and a New Fragment of the Epicurean Diogenes (NF )”, in: Epigraphica Anatolica  () –

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Heberdey/Kalinka () = R. Heberdey / E. Kalinka, “Die philosophische Inschrift von Oinoanda”, in: Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique  () – Hershbell () = J.P. Hershbell, “Plutarch and Epicureanism”, in Aufstieg and Niedergang der römischen Welt . () – Hicks () = R.D. Hicks, Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Vol. II (Cambridge Mass. / London ) Hirzel () = R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften. I. De natura deorum (Leipzig ) Hoffman () = N. Hoffman, Diogenes of Oenoanda. A Commentary. Vol. I (Diss. Univ. of Minnesota ) Indelli () = G. Indelli, Polistrato. Sul disprezzo irrazionale delle opinioni popolari = La Scuola di Epicuro  (Napoli ) Indelli/Tsouna-McKirahan () = G. Indelli / V. Tsouna-McKirahan, Philodemus On Choices and Avoidances = La Scuola di Epicuro  (Napoli ) Inwood () = B. Inwood, “Empedocles and metempsychôsis. The Critique of Diogenes of Oenoanda”, in: D. Frede / B. Reis (ed.), Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy (Berlin / New York ) – Ioppolo () = A.M. Ioppolo, “The Academic Position of Favorinus of Arelate”, in: Phronesis  () – (= Ioppolo , –) Ioppolo () = A.M. Ioppolo, Dibattiti filosofici ellenistici. Dibattiti filosofici ellenistici. Dottrina delle cause, Stoicismo, Accademia scettica (Sankt Augustin ) Irwin () = T. Irwin, “Aristippus against happiness”, in: Monist  () – Isnardi Parente () = M. Isnardi Parente, “Il Parmenide di Plutarco”, in: La Parola del Passato  () – Isnardi Parente (a) = M. Isnardi Parente, “Diogeniano, gli epicurei e la τύχη”, in: Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II . (Berlin ) –  Isnardi Parente (b) = M. Isnardi Parente, “ΥΛΗ ΡΕΥΣΤΗ”, in: La Parola del Passato  () – Ju () = A.E. Ju, “Posidonius as Historian of Philosophy. An Interpretation of Plutarch, De Animae Procreatione in Timaeo , b–c”, in: M. Schofield (ed.), Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century B.C. New Directions for Philosophy, Cambridge () – Kany-Turpin () = J. Kany-Turpin, Lucrèce. De la nature / De rerum natura (Paris ) Kappeler () = T. Kappeler, “Das “Tote Meer” bei Diogenes von Oinoanda (NF )”, EA , –. Karamanolis () = G. Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford )

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Kechagia () = E. Kechagia, Plutarch Against Colotes. A Lesson in History of Philosophy (Oxford ) Kleve () = K. Kleve, “The Philosophical Polemics in Lucretius. A Study in the History of Epicurean Criticism”, in O. Gigon (ed.), Lucrèce (Geneva ) –  Kleve () = K. Kleve, “Scurra Atticus. The Epicurean View of Socrates”, in: ΣΥΖΗΤΗΣΙΣ. Studi sull’epicureismo greco e romano offerti a Marcello Gigante vol. I (Napoli ) – Körte () = A. Körte, “T. Lucretius Carus bei Diogenes von Oinoanda?”, in: Rheinisches Museum  () – Konstan () = D. Konstan, “Περίληψις in Epicurean Epistemology”, in: Ancient Philosophy  () – Kovacic () = F. Kovacic, Der Begriff der Physis bei Galen vor dem Hintergrund seiner Vorgänger (Stuttgart ) Krämer () = H.J. Krämer, Platonismus und hellenistische Philosophie (Berlin / New York ) Kullmann () = W. Kullmann, Aristoteles. Über die Teile der Lebewesen (Berlin ) Lakmann () = M.-L. Lakmann, Der Platoniker Tauros in der Darstellung des Aulus Gellius (Leiden ) Lapidge () = M. Lapidge, “ἀρχαί and στοιχεῖα. A Problem in Stoic Cosmology”, in: Phronesis  () – Laplanche/Pontalis () = J. Laplanche / J.-B. Pontalis, Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse (Paris ) Laursen () = S. Laursen, “The early parts of Epicurus, On nature, th book”, in: Cronache Ercolanesi  () – Lee () = M. Lee, “Antecedents in Early Greek Philosophy”, in: R. Bett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism (Cambridge ) – Leith () = D. Leith, “Pores and Void in Asclepiades’ Physical Theory”, in: Phronesis  () – Leone () = G. Leone, “Epicuro, Della natura, libro XIV”, in: Cronache Ercolanesi  () – Leone () = G. Leone, “Epicuro fondatore del Giardino e l’opera sua conservata nei papiri”, in: Cronache Ercolanesi  () – Leone () = G. Leone, Epicuro, Sulla natura, libro II = La Scuola di Epicuro  (Napoli ) Leone () = “Eidola e nuvole. Su alcune metafore e similitudini in Epicuro”, in: Cronache Ercolanesi  () – Leone () = G. Leone, “Epicuro e la forza dei venti”, in: De Sanctis / Spinelli / Tulli / Verde () –

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Lévy () = C. Lévy, “Les petits Académiciens. Lacyde, Charmadas, Métrodore de Stratonice”, in: M. Bonazzi / V. Celluprica (ed.), L’eredità platonica. Studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo (Napoli ) – Lévy () = C. Lévy, “Plutarque juge et partie. À propos des débats entre l’Académie, le Jardin et le Portique”, in: Aitia  () = http://aitia.revues.org/ Long () = A.A. Long, “Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy”, in: Classical Quarterly  () – Long ([=] ) = A.A. Long, “Pleasure and Social Utility. The Virtues of Being Epicurean”, in: Aspects de la Philosophie Hellénistique = Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique  (Vandœuvres/Genève ) –, quoted as reprint in: Id., From Epicurus to Epictetus. Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (Oxford ) – Long () = A.A. Long, “Aristotle and the History of Greek Scepticism”, in Id., From Epicurus to Epictetus. Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (Oxford ) – Long/Sedley () = A.A. Long / D. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. . Translations of the Principal Sources with a Philosophical Commentary. Vol. . Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography (Cambridge ) Longo () = A. Longo, “La maschera di Epicuro sul volto dell’avversario in tema di provvidenza e piacere nello scritto di Plotino, Contro gli Gnostici. Alcuni paralleli con Celso, Attico, Alessandro di Afrodisia e ‘Ippolito di Roma’”, in H. Seng / L.G. Soares Santoprete / Ch.O. Tommasi (ed.), Formen und Nebenformen des Platonismus in der Spätantike (Heidelberg ) Mansfeld () = J. Mansfeld, “Doxography and Dialectic. The Sitz im Leben of the Placita”, in: Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt . () –  Mansfeld () = J. Mansfeld, “Sources”, in: K. Algra / J. Barnes / J. Mansfeld / M. Schofield (ed.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge ) – Masi () = F.G. Masi, Epicuro e la filosofia della mente. Il XXV libro dell’opera Sulla natura (Sankt Augustin ) Masi () = F.G. Masi, “The method of multiple explanations: Epicurus and the notion of causal possibility”, in: C. Natali / C. Viano (ed.), Aitia II. Avec ou sans Aristote. Le débat sur les causes à l’âge hellénistique et impérial (Louvain-la-Neuve ) – Maso () = S. Maso, Cicerone. Il fato (Roma ) Mayor () = J.B. Mayor, M. Tullii Ciceronis de natura deorum libri tres. Vol. I (Cambridge ) Merkelbach/Stauber, SGO = R. Merkelbach / J. Stauber, Steinepigramme aus dem griechischen Osten – (Leipzig etc. –)

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Miloš () = A.G. Miloš, “Epicurean Perceptual Content”, in: Prolegomena  () – Mitsis () = P. Mitsis, Epicurus’ Ethical Theory, The Pleasures of Invulnerability (Ithaca ) [New edition: P. Mitsis, L’Éthique d’Épicure. Les plaisirs de l’invulnérabilité, French tr. by A. Gigandet (Paris )] Montague () = M. Montague, “The Content of Perceptual Experience”, in: B. McLaughlin / A. Beckermann / S. Walter (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (Oxford ) – Montarese () = F. Montarese, Lucretius and his Sources. A Study of Lucretius, De rerum natura I – (Berlin/Boston ) Morel () = P.-M. Morel, Démocrite et la recherche des causes (Paris ) Morel () = P.-M. Morel, “Épicure, l’histoire et le droit”, in: Revue des Études Anciennes  () – Morel () = P.-M. Morel, “Les communautés humaines”, in: A. Gigandet / P.M. Morel (ed.), Lire Épicure et les épicuriens (Paris ) – Morel () = P.-M. Morel, Épicure. La nature et la raison (Paris ). Morel () = P.-M. Morel, “Diogène d’Œnoanda. Inscription murale épicurienne” (tr. franç., notice et notes), in Delattre/Pigeaud (), – Morel () = P.-M. Morel, Épicure, Lettres, maximes et autres textes (Intr., tr., dossier et notes) (Paris ) Morel () = P.-M. Morel, “Alle origini del contrattualismo. La concezione epicurea del giusto tra natura e convenzione”, in: Iride  () – Morel (a) = P.-M. Morel, “Cicero and Epicurean virtues (De finibus –)”, in: J. Annas / G. Betegh (ed.), Cicero’s De Finibus. Philosophical Approaches (Cambridge ) – Morel (b) = P.-M. Morel, “Épicure et les biens matériels, ou la pauvreté bien tempérée”, in: É. Helmer (ed.), Richesse et pauvreté chez les philosophes de l’Antiquité (Paris ) – Morel/Verde () = P.-M. Morel / F. Verde, “Le Contre Colotès de Plutarque et son prologue”, in: Aitia  () = http://aitia.revues.org/ Müller () = R. Müller, Die epikureische Gesellschaftstheorie (Berlin ) Obbink ()= D. Obbink, “‘What all Men Believe – Must be True’: Common Conceptions and Consensio Omnium in Aristotle and Hellenistic Philosophy”, in: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy  () – Obbink () = D. Obbink, Philodemus. On Piety, Part I (Oxford ) Obbink () = D. Obbink, “‘All Gods are True’ in Epicurus”, in: D. Frede / A. Laks (ed.), Traditions of Theology. Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (Leiden ) – Obbink () = D. Obbink, “Two New Poems by Sappho”, in: Zeitschrift für Papyrologie ind Epigraphik  () –

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Ogle () = W. Ogle, Aristotle. On the Parts of Animals (London ) O’Keefe () = T. O’Keefe, “The Cyrenaics on Pleasure, Happiness, and FutureConcern”, in: Phronesis  () – Opsomer () = J. Opsomer, In Search of the Truth. Academic Tendencies in Middle Platonism, (Brussel ) Pace () = N. Pace, “Religione ed etica nel NF  Smith di Diogene di Enoanda”, in: Cronache Ercolanesi  () – Pautrat () = B. Pautrat, Lucrèce. De la nature des choses (Paris ) Pease () = A.S. Pease, M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum. libri III (Cambridge, Mass. ) Pendrick () = G.J. Pendrick, Antiphon the Sophist, The Fragments, ed. with intr. tr. and comm. (Cambridge ) Pérez-Jean () = B. Pérez-Jean, Dogmatisme et scepticisme. L’héraclitisme d’Énésidème (Villeneuve d’Ascq ) Petzl () = G. Petzl, “Furchterregende Götter? Eine Notiz zu Diogenes von Oinoanda NF ”, in: Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik  () – Philippson () = R. Philippson, “Die Rechtsphilosophie der Epikureer”, in: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie  () – and – Philippson () = R. Philippson, “Diogenes von Oinoanda”, in: RE Supplementband  () – Philippson () = R. Philippson, “Diogene di Enoanda e Aristotele”, in: Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica  () – Piazzi () = L. Piazzi, Lucrezio e i Presocratici: Un commento a De rerum natura , – (Pisa ) Pisano () = G. Pisano, “Colote, Epicuro e Diogene di Enoanda”, in: Atene e Roma  () – Polito () = R. Polito, The Sceptical Road. Aenesidemus’ Appropriation of Heraclitus (Leiden/Boston ) Polito () = R. Polito, Aenesidemus of Cnossus. Testimonia (Cambridge ) Powers () = N. Powers, “Plato’s Demiurge as Precursor to the Stoic Providential God”, in: The Classical Quarterly  () – Price () = H.H. Price, Perception (London ) Radt (a) = S. Radt, Noch einmal zu … Kleine Schriften von Stefan Radt zu seinem . Geburtstag (Leiden/Boston ) Radt (b) = S. Radt, “Οἱ περί τινα bei Strabon”, in: Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik  ()  Ranocchia () = G. Ranocchia, “Il ritratto di Socrate nel De superbia di Filodemo (PHerc. , coll. –)”, in: L. Rossetti / A. Stavru (ed.), Socratica . Studies in Ancient Socratic Literature (Bari ) –



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Reinhardt () = T. Reinhardt, “To see and To Be Seen. On Vision and Perception in Lucretius and Cicero”, in: G.D. Williams / K. Volk (ed.), Roman Reflections. Studies in Latin Philosophy () – Riley () = M.T. Riley, “The Epicurean Criticism of Socrates”, in: Phoenix  () – Romeo () = C. Romeo, “Demetrio Lacone sulla grandezza del sole (PHerc. )”, in: Cronache Ercolanesi  () – Roskam (a) = G. Roskam, ‘Live unnoticed’ (Λάθε βιώσας). On the Vicissitudes of an Epicurean Doctrine (Leiden/Boston ) Roskam (b) = G. Roskam, A Commentary on Plutarch’s De latenter vivendo (Leuven ) Roskam () = G. Roskam, “Arguments as Boxing Gloves. Ethics of Philosophical Polemics in Middle Platonism”, in: Les Études Classiques  () – Roskam () = G. Roskam, “Will the Epicurean Sage Break the Law if He is Perfectly Sure that He Will Escape Detection? A Difficult Problem Revisited”, in: Trancations of the American Philological Association  () –. Roskam () = G. Roskam, “Plutarch’s polemic against Colotes’ view on legislation and politics. A reading of Adversus Colotem – (D–E)”, in: Aitia  () = http:// aitia.revues.org/ Roskam () = G. Roskam, “Epicurean Philosophy in Open Access. The Intended Reader and the Authorial Approach of Diogenes of Oenoanda”, in: Epigraphica Anatolica  () – Rousset () = D. Rousset, De Lycie en Cabalide. La convention entre les Lyciens et Termessos près d’Oinoanda = Fouilles de Xanthos  (Genève ) Russo () = A. Russo, Scettici antichi (Torino ) Salem () = J. Salem, Tel un dieu parmi les hommes. L’éthique d’Épicure (Paris ) Schmidt () = J. Schmidt, Lukrez, der Kepos und die Stoiker. Untersuchungen zur Schule Epikurs und zu den Quellen von ‘De rerum natura’ (Frankfurt am Main ) Schoemann/Stickney () = G.F. Schoemann / A. Stickney, M. Tullii Ciceronis De natura deorum libri tres (Boston ) Schofield () = M. Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City (Chicago ) Schrijvers () = P. Schrijvers, “Die Traumtheorie (DRN IV, –)”, in: Id., Lucrèce & les sciences de la vie (Leiden ) – Sedley (a) = D. Sedley, “Epicurus and the Mathematicians of Cyzicus”, in: Cronache Ercolanesi  () – Sedley (b) = D. Sedley, “Review of Smith ()”, in: Classical Review N.S. () –

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Sedley (c) = D. Sedley, “Epicurus and His Professional Rivals”, in: Bollack/Laks () – Sedley () = D. Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom (Cambridge ) Sedley () = D. Sedley, “Diogenes of Oenoanda on Cyrenaic Hedonism”, in: Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society  () – Sedley () = D. Sedley, Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity (Berkeley / Los Angeles / London ) Sedley () = D. Sedley, “Antiochus as Historian of Philosophy”, in Id. (ed.), The Philosophy of Antiochus (Cambridge ) – Sedley () = D. Sedley, “Epicurean versus Cyrenaic Happiness”, in: R. Seaford / J. Wilkins / M. Wright (ed.), Selfhood and the Soul. Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill (Oxford, forthcoming ) – Seel () = G. Seel, “Farà il saggio qualcosa che le leggi vietano sapendo che non sarà scoperto?”, in: Giannantoni/Gigante () – Sharples / van der Eijk () = R.W. Sharples / Ph. van der Eijk, Nemesius. On the Nature of Man (Liverpool ) Shorey () = P. Shorey, “Plato, Lucretius, and Epicurus”, in: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology  () – Sigismund () = M. Sigismund, Über das Alter. Eine historisch-kritische Analyse der Schriften Über das Alter / περὶ γήρως von Musonius, Favorinus und Iuncus (Frankfurt am Main ) Smith () = M.F. Smith, “New Fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda,” in: American Journal of Archaeology  () – Smith () = M.F. Smith, Thirteen New Fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda = Tituli Asiae Minoris Ergänzungsband  (Wien ) Smith () = M.F. Smith, “More New Fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda”, in: Bollack/Laks () – Smith () = M.F. Smith, “Fifty-five New Fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda”, in: Anatolian Studies  () – Smith () = M.F. Smith, Diogenes of Oinoanda. The Epicurean Inscription = La Scuola di Epicuro. Supplemento  (Napoli ) Smith () = M.F. Smith, “New Readings in the Demostheneia Inscription from Oinoanda”, in: Anatolian Studies  () – Smith (a) = M.F. Smith, The Philosophical Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda = Tituli Asiae Minoris Ergänzungsband  (Wien ) Smith (b) = M.F. Smith, “A ‘Herculaneum’ in the Mountains of Turkey. Oinoanda as a Source of Epicurean Texts”, in: Giannantoni/Gigante () II –. Smith () = M.F. Smith, “Excavations at Oinoanda . The New Epicurean Texts”, in: Anatolian Studies  () –

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Smith (a) = M.F. Smith, “Elementary, My Dear Lycians. A Pronouncement on Physics from Diogenes of Oinoanda”, in: Anatolian Studies  () – Smith (b) = M.F. Smith, “The Introduction to Diogenes of Oinoanda’s Physics”, in: Classical Quarterly  () – Smith (c) = M.F. Smith, “Digging up Diogenes. New Epicurean Texts from Oinoanda in Lycia”, in: M. Erler (ed.), Epikureismus in der späten Republik und der Kaiserzeit (Stuttgart ) – Smith () = M.F. Smith, Lucretius. On the Nature of Things (Indianapolis/Cambridge ) Smith (a) = M.F. Smith, Supplement to Diogenes of Oinoanda, The Epicurean Inscription = La Scuola di Epicuro. Supplemento  (Napoli ) Smith (b) = M.F. Smith, “Herculaneum and Oinoanda, Philodemus and Diogenes. Comparison of Two Epicurean Discoveries and Two Epicurean Teachers”, in: Cronache Ercolanesi  () – Smith () = M.F. Smith, “In Praise of the Simple Life: A New Fragment of Diogenes of Oinoanda”, in Anatolian Studies  () – Smith () = M.F. Smith, “Diogenes of Oinoanda. News and Notes ()”, in: Cronache Ercolanesi  () – Smith () = M.F. Smith, “Diogenes of Oinoanda. News and Notes IV ()”, in Cronache Ercolanesi  () – Smith () = M.F. Smith, “Diogenes of Oinoanda. News and Notes VI ()”, in: Cronache Ercolanesi  () – Spinelli () = E. Spinelli, “Sextus Empiricus, the Neighbouring Philosophies and the Sceptical Tradition (again on Pyr. I –)”, in: J. Sihvola (ed.), Ancient Scepticism and the Sceptical Tradition = Acta Philosophica Fennica  (Helsinki ) – Spinelli () = E. Spinelli, “Presocratici scettici? Assunti genealogici nel Varro di Cicerone”, in: S. Giombini / F. Marcacci (ed.), Il quinto secolo. Studi di filosofia antica in onore di Livio Rossetti (Passignano sul Trasimeno ) – Spratt/Forbes () = Th. Spratt / E. Forbes, Travels in Lycia, Milyas, and the Cybiratis, in Company with the late Rev. E.T. Daniell (London ) Staab () = G. Staab, “Epigramm auf eine Nemesisweihung und Sonnenuhr aus Oinoanda”, in: Epigraphica Anatolica  () – Sudhaus () = S. Sudhaus, “Zu Diogenes von Oinoanda”, in: Rheinisches Museum  () – Summers () = K. Summers, “The Books of Phaedrus Requested by Cicero (Att. .)”, in: The Classical Quarterly  () – Taub () = L. Taub, Ancient Meteorology (London ) Taub () = L. Taub, “Cosmology and Meteorology”, in: Warren (), – 

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Tepedino Guerra () = A. Tepedino Guerra, “L’opera filodemea su Epicuro (PHerc. ,  β)”, in: Cronache Ercolanesi  () – Theiler () = W. Theiler, “Philo von Alexandria und der hellenisierte Timaeus”, in: R.B. Palmer / R. Hamerton-Kelly (ed.), Philomathes. Studies and Essays in the Humanities in Memory of Philip Merlan (The Hague ) – Tsouna () = V. Tsouna, The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School (Cambridge ) Tsouna () = V. Tsouna, The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School (Cambridge ) Tsouna () = V. Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus (Oxford ) Tsouna (), V. Tsouna, “Cyrenaics and Epicureans on Pleasure andthe Good Life. The Original Debate and its Later Revivals”, in: S. Weisser / N. Thaler (ed.), Strategies of Polemics in Greek and Roman Philosophy (Leiden ) – Tsouna-McKirahan () = V. Tsouna-McKirahan, “The Socratic Origins of the Cynics and the Cyrenaics”, in: P. Vander Waerdt (ed.), The Socratic Movement (Ithaca NY ) – Tsouna-McKirahan () = V. Tsouna-McKirahan, “Is there an exception to Greek eudaemonism?”, in: M. Canto / P. Pellegrin (ed.), Le style de la pensée. Mélanges Jacques Brunschwig (Paris ) Tutrone () = F. Tutrone, “Lucrezio e la biologia di Aristotele”, in: Bollettino della Fondazione Nazionale Vito Fazio Allmayer  () – Tutrone () = F. Tutrone, Filosofi e animali in Roma. Modelli di animalità e umanità in Lucrezio e Seneca (Pisa ) Usener () = H. Usener, Epicurea (Lipsiae  [= Stuttgart ]). Usener () = H. Usener, “Epikureische Schriften auf Stein”, in: Rheinisches Museum  () – Vallance () = J.T. Vallance, The Lost Theory of Asclepiades of Bithynia (Oxford ) van Ackeren / Opsomer () = M. van Ackeren / J. Opsomer (ed.), Selbstbetrachtungen und Selbstdarstellungen. Der Philosoph und Kaiser Marc Aurel im interdisziplinären Licht (Wiesbaden ) van der Horst () = P.W. van der Horst, “‘The Most Superstitious and Disgusting of All Nations’. Diogenes of Oenoanda on the Jews”, in A.P.M.H. Lardinois / M.G.M. Van der Poel / V.J.C. Hunink (ed.), Land of Dreams. Greek and Latin Studies in Honour of A.H.M. Kessels (Leiden/Boston ) – Vander Waerdt () = P. Vander Waerdt, “The Justice of the Epicurean wise Man”, in: Classical Quarterly  () – Vander Waerdt () = P.A. Vander Waerdt, “Colotes and the Epicurean Refutation of Skepticism”, in: Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies  () – Vassallo () = C. Vassallo, “Testimonianze su Anassagora e altri Presocratici nel





libro IV della Retorica di Filodemo: Praesocratica Herculanensia V”, in: Lexicon Philosophicum  () = http://lexicon.cnr.it/index.php/LP/article/view// Verde (a) = F. Verde, Epicuro. Epistola a Erodoto (Roma ) Verde (b) = F. Verde, “Ancora Su Timasagora Epicureo”, in: Elenchos  () – Verde (a) = F. Verde, “Cause epicuree”, in: Antiquorum Philosophia  () – Verde (b) = F. Verde, Epicuro (Roma ) Verde (c) = F. Verde, Elachista: La dottrina dei minimi nell’Epicureismo (Leuven ) Verde (a) = F. Verde, “Aristotle and the Garden”, in: A. Falcon (ed.), Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity (Leiden ) – Verde (b) = F. Verde, “Timasagoras de Rhodes,” in: Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques (DPhA) VI () – Vogt () = K.M. Vogt, “All Sense-Perceptions are True. Epicurean Responses to Skepticism and Relativism”, in: J. Lezra / L. Blake (ed.), Lucretius and Modernity. Epicurean Encounters Across Time and Disciplines () – Warren () = J. Warren, “Diogenes Epikourios. Keep Taking the Tablets”, in: JHS  () – Warren () = J. Warren (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism (Cambridge ) Warren () = J. Warren, “Epicureans and Cyrenaics on Pleasure as a Pathos”, in: S. Marchand / F. Verde (ed.), Épicurisme et Scepticisme (Roma ) – Weisser/Thaler () = Sh. Weisser / N. Thaler (ed.), Strategies of Polemics in Greek and Roman Philosophy = Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture (Leiden ) West () = D. West, “Virgilian Multiple-Correspondence Similes and their Antecedents”, in: Philologus  () – Westman () = R. Westman, Plutarch gegen Kolotes. Seine Schrift ‘Adversus Colotem’ als philosophiegeschichtliche Quelle (Helsinki ) Wigodsky () = M. Wigodsky, “Homoiotetes, Stoicheia and Homoiomereiai in Epicurus”, in: The Classical Quarterly  () – William () = J. William, Diogenis Oenoandensis fragmenta (Lipsiae ) Wörrle () = M. Wörrle, Stadt und Fest im kaiserzeitlichen Kleinasien. Studien zu einer agonistischen Stiftung aus Oinoanda = Vestigia  (München ) Zilioli () = U. Zilioli, The Cyrenaics (Durham )

   Martin Bachmann was Architect and Deputy Director of the Istanbul Department of the German Archaeological Institute. From  to  he was the director of the field work in Oinoanda. Among his interests were research on civil engineering in Anatolia from the Early Neolithic to the  Century, the restoration of archaeological monuments and the Late Ottoman wooden houses in Istanbul. Michael Erler is Professor of Classical Philology at the University of Würzburg. He is the author of several books and articles on Plato (Der Sinn der Aporien in Platons Dialogen (), Platon (Munich ), Platon (Überweg, Basel )), Platonism, Epicurus and the Epicurean tradition (Epikur. Die Schule Epikurs-Lukrez, Überweg, Basel ) and other classical authors. He is interested in the relation between literature and philosophy and has published numerous articles on ancient literature and philosophy. Alain Gigandet is honorary Assistant Professor of History of Ancient Philosophy (University Paris Est Créteil). He has published several books and articles on Lucretius, on Ancient Epicureanism in general, and on modern and contemporary interpretations of Epicureanism. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat is Senior Researcher (Directeur de recherche) at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and director of the Centre Léon Robin (Research Center on Ancient Thought) at the University Paris-Sorbonne and the Ecole Normale Supérieure. His main research interests are the history of ancient Stoicism and ancient logic and dialectic. Refik Güremen is Junior Lecturer at Mimar Sinan University (MSGSÜ), Istanbul. He obtained his PhD from the University Paris  – Panthéon-Sorbonne with a dissertation on the human being as a political animal in Aristotle. He is the co-editor (with Annick Jaulin) of Aristote. Animal politique (PUPS, ). Jürgen Hammerstaedt is Professor of Classics and Papyrology at the University of Cologne where he directs the Research Centre for Papyrology, Epigraphy and Numismatics. Among his interests are the papyrus texts of the Epicurean library of Herculaneum. He also published the Diogenes fragments found in the recent Oinoanda survey together with Martin Ferguson Smith. Giuliana Leone is Associate Professor of Papyrology at the University of Naples Federico II and a member of the Centro Internazionale per lo Studio dei Papiri



  

Ercolanesi ‘Marcello Gigante’. She has focused her interests on the Herculaneum papyrus texts and has published critical editions of Epicurus’ On Nature Books XIV (), XXXIV () and II (). She has also published several works on aspects of Epicurus’ doctrine and on the history of the studies of Herculaneum Papyrology. Francesca Masi is Tenure-Track Researcher in History of Ancient Philosophy at the University Ca’ Foscari of Venice. Her research is dedicated to ontology, physics, psychology and ethics in ancient thought. She has published several articles on Epicurus and Aristotle, and two books: Epicuro e la filosofia della mente () and Qualsiasi cosa capiti. Natura e causa dell’ente accidentale. Aristotele, Metafisica Epsilon – (). She has also coedited, with Stefano Maso, Eidola in Epicurus’ Peri Physeos Book II (). Pierre-Marie Morel is Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the University Paris  – Panthéon-Sorbonne and honorary Member of the Institut Universitaire de France. He is the author of several books and articles on Aristotle, Democritus, and the Epicurean tradition. He has translated into French Epicurus’ Letters and Maxims and, in , the fragments of Diogenes of Oinoanda. Geert Roskam is Associate Professor at the KU Leuven. He is especially interested in Hellenistic and ‘Middle’ Platonic philosophy, and has published monographs on Epicureanism (), Stoic and Middle-Platonic philosophy () and on Plutarch ( and ). Martin Ferguson Smith is Professor Emeritus of Classics at Durham University. He has been involved in the discovery and editing of the inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda since . He has also translated and edited Lucretius. Voula Tsouna is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Her publications include Philodemus. On Choices and Avoidances (Naples ), which received the Theodor Mommsen Award, The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School (Cambridge ), The Ethics of Philodemus (Oxford ), and a volume of collected essays on the Socratics and the Hellenistic philosophers in modern Greek translation (Athens ). Additionally, she has published articles on Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic and Roman philosophers in English, French, Italian, and Modern Greek. Francesco Verde received his PhD degree in Philosophy from La Sapienza University of Rome in ; he is currently Adjunct Professor in History of Ancient Philosophy at La Sapienza; he has been awarded (in ) a Humboldt Research Fellowship

  



for Experienced Researchers (University of Würzburg). His interests are ancient atomism, ancient physics, Hellenistic philosophy, and Herculaneum Papyrology. He has published books and articles on Epicureanism.

   (‘ ’ = metaphorical places) Academy (Athens) ; see also Platonists Ankara – Antalya  Athens , , – Ceramicus  Balbura  Bergama (Pergamon) Bubon 



Chalcis (Euboea)  Cyprus  Cibyra  Claros (oracle)  Egypt

XIV

Fethiye (Telmessos)  Foula ,  Herculaneum

XXIV, , , , ,

XIV, XVI

Incealiler XXIV Istanbul XVII, XIX, XXIV, XXV,  ‘Kallipolis’ , ,  Kınık ,  Lampsacus  Lycia (Province)

Oinoanda XI, XIV, XVI–XX, XXIV, –, , , –, , –, – , , –, , , ,  Agora (Roman) –, ,  Aqueduct ,  Bathhouses –, –,  Byzantine Citadel  Churches , ,  ‘Demostheneia’–Festival  Esplanade XVI, –, , , , – , , ,  Great Wall –, , ,  Hellenistic Wall , – Heroon  Inscriptions –, , –, , –, ,  Kemerarası , , – ‘Martin’s Hill’ XVI–XVII, , – ,  Mausoleum , ,  Stoai  North Stoa –,  South Stoa , , – ‘Diogenes Stoa’ XV, XX, , , , , –, –, , – , , , –, , , , – Storehouse XX, –,  Theatre – Olympia 

, , 

‘Magnesia’ ,  Muğla XIX, XXIV Mytilene (Lesbos) 

Paris XXIV–XXV Patara (Delikkemer) Rhodes

–, 





       

Seki (river and plain) Syracuse 

, , , 

Vienna

, 

Xanthos (river)



Thebes  Tusculum 

        Apollo



Centaurs  Cerberus  Furies Hades

Nemesis



‘Pronoia’



Scylla



Venus



, , – ,  Zeus Hypsistos

Kronos





   ,     (‘ ’ = literary persons) Aelius Aristides  Aenesidemus ,  Alciphron  Alexander of Aphrodisias ,  Alexander the Great – Anaxagoras XI, , , , , , –,  Anaximenes XI, , , –,  Anniceris/Annicerians , , , , ,  Antiochus of Ascalon  Antiphon XI, – Antoninus Pius  Apollodorus  Arcesilaus –, , , , ,  Aristippus XI, XXII, , –, –, , ,  Aristippus the Younger  Aristocles  Aristophanes  Aristotle XI, XXI, –, –, – , , , , , , , , , –, –, , –,  Aristotelians XXI; see also Peripatetics Arius Didymus , ,  Asclepiades of Bithynia –,  Atticus (Cicero’s friend)  Atticus (Platonist) –, –, , ,  Balbus (Quintus Lucilius)  Barbarians (non Greeks) ,  Basilius of Caesarea 

Calvenus Taurus  Carneades  Chrysippus XI, , , , –, –, –, , –, – , , ,  Cicero , , –, , –, , , –, , , , , ,  Cleanthes XI, –, , –, –, ,  Cleomedes  Colotes XIX, XXI, –, –, – , , , , , , –,  Cornelius Gallus XV Crantor  Cratylus – Cynics , , , ,  Cynicism  Cyrenaics XXII, , , , – , –, , –, , , –, –, –, –, –, –, , –, – , , , –,  Demetrius Laco , –,  Democritus XI–XII, XXIII, , , , , , , , , –, –, , –, –, –, , –, , , , , – , –, – Demosthenes (C. Julius) , , – Diagoras XI, ,  Dicaearchus – Diodorus 



   ,    

Diogenes of Apollonia XI, , , –,  Diogenes Laertius , , , – Diogenes of Sinope  Diogenianus (Epicurean)  Dionysius of Cyrene  Domitianus 

Galenus , , – Gellius  ‘Glaucon’ – Greeks ,  ‘Gyges’ –

Favorinus of Arelate – Flavianus Diogenes , –

Marcus Aurelius , ,  Metrodorus –

Hedonism XXII, , –, , , , –, , , –, ,  Egyptians ,  Empedocles XI, , , , , , , Hegesias , –,  , , –, , , , , Heraclides – Heraclitus XII, , , –, –,  , , –, ,  Epaminondas  Hermarchus , –, –, ‘Ephectic’ philosophers –,  –,  Epicharmus  Hesiodus  Epictetus  Hierocles  Epicureans XII, XIX, XXI–XXII, , Homer  , , –, –, ––, , –, , –, , –, , , Horace XIV –, –, –, , , Iuncus  , , , –, –, , –, –, –, , – Jews ,  , –, , , , –, , –, –, , , ‘Karos’ – – Epicurus XI, XIII–XIV, XIX, XXI, XXIII, , –, –, –, , , Lacydes XII, –, , , ,  , , , , , , , , , – Lais , ,  , –, –, , , – Licinnia Flavilla , – , , , , , , , – Lucretius XI, XIII, XIX, XXIII, , , , , –, –, , , –, , , , , –, , –, , –, , – –, , , , , , , , –, –, , –, –, –, , , , –, , , , –  Epicurus’ mother  Lucullus  Eudoros  Lycurgus  Eusebius , 

   ,    

Mettios Phanias  Mettius (PIR M )  Mettius (grandson of PIR M ) Musonius  Nemesius





Oenomaus of Gadara  ‘Orestes’ , , – Panaetius  Parmenides , –, ,  Peripatetics –, –, , , , , – Phaedrus (Epicurean)  Philo of Alexandria ,  Philodemus XI, XIII–XIV, XIX, – , , –, , , , , , , , ,  Piso  Plato XII, XX–XXI, ––, –, –, , –, , –, , , , , , –, , , , –, , –, –, , ,  Platonists XIX, –, , , , ,  Old Academy ,  Middle Academy , ; see also Sceptics New Academy , ; see also Sceptics Middle Platonists XXI, , , –  Neoplatonism  Plutarch XIX, XXI, , –, , –, –, –, –, , –, –, , , ,  Polemon 



Polystratus – Posidonius , , –, ,  Presocratics XIX, , , ,  Protagoras XII, , ,  Ptolemy I  Ptolemy II(?)  Pyrrho/Pyrrhonists –, , , ; see also Sceptics Pythagoras XII, , , , ,  Pythagoreans  Pythocles  Sappho XV Sceptics/Scepticism XXI, XXIII, –, –, , , , , , – ‘Second Sophistic’  Seneca ,  Sextus Empiricus , , , – Socrates XII, XXI, , , –, , , –, , , , , , , ,  Socratics , , , , , ,  Solon  Speusippus  Stobaeus  Stoics/Stoicism XII, XIX–XXIII, , , –, –, , , , , , –, , –, –, , –, –, –, – , –, , , –, , , , , , , , , , –, –, –  Strabo  Strato of Lampsacus –,  Thales XII, , , –,  Theodorus of Cyrene , –, –, –, , –, 



   ,    

Theophrastus –, , ,  Timagoras –,  Titus  Torquatus , ,  Trebonius (PIR M ) see Mettius Velleius XXI, – Vespasianus , , 

Xenocrates , –,  Xenophanes  Zeno of Citium XII, , –, – , –, –, –,  Zeno of Sidon , , 

      Amato, E.  Angeli, A.  Annas, J. , , , ,  Arnim, H. von  Arrighetti, G. , , ,  Asmis, E. – Atçi, S. XXIV Aygün, Ö. XXIV Bachmann, M. XVI–XVII, XX, XXV,  Bakker, F.A. , ,  Bailey, C.  Baltes, M. – Baltussen, H.  Barnes, J.  Barney, R.  Bastianini, G.  Beaujean, D. XXV Bénatouïl, T.  Bendlin, A. –,  Berner, K. –, , –, ,  Berti, E.  Besnier, B.  Bett, R. ,  Bignone, E. , , ,  Bloch, O.  Bonazzi, M.  Boyancé, P.  Boys–Stones, G.R.  Brancacci, A.  Broadie, S.  Brown, E.  Brunschwig, J.  Busch, A. XXV Cacciabaudo, F. XXV Cambiano, G. 

Campbell, G.  Canfora, L.  Capone Braga, G.  Cardullo, L.  Casanova, A. ,  Chiaradonna, R. ,  Chilton, C.W. ,  Clay, D. –, , , –,  Corradi, M.  Corti, A. , ,  Coulton, J.J. ,  Cousin, G.  Crönert, W.  Daniel, R.W. XXV,  De Lacy, P.H.  Decleva Caizzi, F. – Delattre, D. ,  Dillon, J.  Dorandi, T. , ,  Dyck, A.R. – Erler, M. –,  Ernout, A.  Essler, H.  Étienne, A.  Évrard, É.  Fischer, K.  Fortenbaugh, W.W.  Fowler, D. , – Fraser, J. ,  Freud, Sigmund  Gagliarde, G.  Gigandet, A. ,  Gigante, M. , , – Görgemanns, H. 



     

Goldschmidt, V.  Gomperz, Th.  Gordon, P. –, , –,  Gourinat, J.–B. , , –, , , –, , – Grilli, A. , , , , , , ,  Güremen, R. XXV, , , , , ,  Güveloğlu, N.  Hadot, P.  Hall, A.  Hammerstaedt, J. XVI, XXV, , , , , , –, , , , , – , , , , , –, – , –, , , –, – , –, , , , , , , , –, , , ,  Heberdey, R. ,  Hershbell, J.P.  Hirzel, R.  Hinzer, B. – Hoffman, G.N. – Holleaux, M.  Hoskyn, R.  Hume, David ,  Indelli, G. ,  Inwood, B.  Irwin, T.  Işık, F. XXIV Isnardi Parente, M. – Jaffro, L. XXIV Ju, A.E.  Kalinka, E. ,  Kappeler, T.  Karamanolis, G. 

Kechagia, E. , ,  Kleve, K. ,  Koch, N. – Konstan, D.  Körte, A.  Kranck, G.  Kullmann, W.  Laursen, S. ,  Lee, J.Y. ,  Leith, D. , – Leone, G. , , , ,  Leopardi, Giacomo – Lévy, C. ,  Long, A.A. , , , ,  Longo, A.  Macaulay, Rose XV Mansfeld, J.  Masi, F. , , , –, , , ,  Maso, S.  Mayor, J.B. – McKirahan see Tsouna Milner, N. , ,  Miloš, A.G.  Mitsis, Ph. , , ,  Montague, M.  Montarese, F. , ,  Morel, P.–M. , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , –, ,  O’Keefe, T.  O’Meara, D.  Obbink, D. ,  Opsomer, J.  Pace, N. ,  Paris, P. 

     



Paul, J.–J. XXIV Paulsen, Th.  Pease, A.S. –,  Pendrick, G.J.  Petzl, G.  Philippson, R. – Pisano, G. ,  Polito, R.  Powers, N.  Price, H.H. 

–, , , –, –  Spengel, L.  Spinelli, E. , ,  Spratt, T. , ,  Staab, G. , , ,  Stickney, A.  Sudhaus, S. ,  Süel, E. XXIV Summers, K. 

Radt, S.  Reinhardt, T.  Riley, M.T.  Robin, L.  Roche–Grandpierre, É.  Roskam, G. , , , , , , –, –, , , –, ,  Ross, W.D. 

Taub, L.  Tegethoff, R. XXV Tepedino Guerra, A.  Theiler, W.  Tsouna, V. , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Tutrone, F.  Usener, H.

Salem, J. ,  Schmidt, J.  Schoemann, G.F.  Schofield, M.  Schrijvers, P.  Sedley, D. XXII, , , –, , , , , , , –, , –, , , –, , , –, , , –, , , , – , ,  Seel, G.  Shorey, P.  Smith, M.F. XXI–XXII, XXV, –, , , , –, , , –, , , –, –, –, , –, –, –, –, –, , , –, –, – , , –, , , , , –, , –, , – , –, –, , , , –, , , –,

, , 

Vallance, J.T.  Van der Horst, P.W.  Vander Waerdt, P. ,  Vassallo, Ch.  Verde, F. , , , –, , –, , , , ,  Vogt, K.M.  Walzer, R.  Warren, J. , , , ,  West, D.  Westman, R.  Wigodsky, M.  William, J. ,  Wörrle, M.  Woodward, Christopher XIV Zeitler, A. – Zilioli, U. 

    Aetius IV .– (SVF II )  IV . (SVF II )  V . (DK  A )  Alcinous, Didascalicus  (.–)  Alciphron II   Alexander of Aphrodisias De Anima libri mantissa . (SVF III )  . (SVF III )  De Mixtione .–  Alexis Fr.  K.–A.



Apollodorus FGrHist.  F



Aristophanes Clouds  Aristoteles De ideis Fr.  Ross  De anima  De caelo ,  I .bff.  I .aff.  I .aff.  De generatione animalium I .a  III .a 

De incessu animalium .a  De insomniis e  De partibus animalium I .a  Ethica Nicomachea II .a–  Metaphysica I .b–  I .a–  II .a  III .bff.  VI .b–  Meteorologica mete. b–a  Physica I  Arius Didymus Fr.  (DG –)  Fr.  (DG )  Fr. .– (DG ) –,  Fr.  (DG )  Fr.  (DG –)  Athenaeus VIII  B  XII  A–B ,  XII  E  XII  A (Epicur.  Us.) Ps.(?) Basilius Caesarensis Comm. in Is.   Cicero Academica I  



   

I –  I  – I – (SVF I )  II   II   II   II   ad Atticum XIII   XIII   Cato Maior de senectute  De divinatione I  (DK  A )  II   II  (DK  A )  De fato   –  De finibus I  I –  I   I  ,  I  ,  I   I  – II  (SVF I ) ,  III   III   V   V   De legibus I  (SVF III )  De natura deorum XXI, , –,  I –,  I ff.  I –  I –  I – , 



I  ,  I   I   I – ,  I   I  ,  I  – I   II   II  – II  ,  De officiis III   Tusculanae disputationes III –  III  (Epicur.  Us.)  Clemens Alexandrinus Stromata II  – Cleomedes I . Todd (SVF II ) II .– 



Colotes

Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι κατὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων δόγματα οὐδὲ ζῆν ἐστίν ,  Demetrius Laco On the size of the sun (PHerc. )  Col. XX –  Col. XX –  Democritus (DK ) A   A   A  



   

A   A   B   B  (Sext. Emp. Math. IX ) ,  B   B   Diodorus Siculus I .  Diogenes of Oinoanda¹ NF –  NF –  Physics XII, XXIII, , , –, –, , , –, , ,  Fr. –  Fr.   Fr. – ,  Fr.  XXII,  Fr.  I –II   Fr.  II –III   Fr.  II –  Fr.  III –  Fr.  III –  Fr.  XXII, , ,  Fr.  I –  Fr.  I –  Fr.  I – – Fr.  I  ,  Fr.  I – 

Fr.  II –VI   Fr.  III   Fr.  III –IV  –,  Fr.  III   Fr.  IV  Fr.  IV –  Fr.  V – Fr.  V –  Fr.  V –  Fr.  V   Fr.  V –  Fr.  V –VI  XIV,  Fr.  VI –  Fr.  XXII, –, –, – , , – Fr.  I  Fr.  I   Fr.  I   Fr.  II  Fr.  II – , ,  Fr.  II –  Fr.  XXI, –, –, , , , , , , ,  Fr.  I –III  ,  Fr.  I –II   Fr.  I – ,  Fr.  I –  Fr.  I –III  , ,  Fr.  I –II   Fr.  III – ,  Fr.  III   Fr. – 

¹ The Theol. sequence precedes fr. . Allocation of New Fragments (NF) to Diogenes writings –: (Phys.) Theol.; –: Ethics; –: Maxims; –, : Old Age; : Ethics; : Old Age; –: Physics; –: Ethics; NF –: Maxims; –: TLC; –: Old Age; : (Phys.) Theol.; : Ethics; –: Maxims; : TLC; –: Old Age; : (Phys.) Theol.; –: Maxims; –: TLC; : Old Age; –: Ethics; : Maxim; –: Old Age; NF  Physics(?); : Ethics; : ‘New’ Letter; –: Old Age; : Maxim.

   

Fr.  , , –,  Fr.  I   Fr.  I –  Fr.  I – , ,  Fr.  I –II   Fr.  I   Fr.  II –  Fr.  II –  Fr.  II – XII, ,  Fr.  II –III  ,  Fr.  II – XII Fr.  II –  Fr.  II   Fr.  III – XII Fr.  III – ,  Fr.  III –  Fr.  III – ,  Fr.  ,  Fr.  II –III  XII Fr.  II –  Fr.  II –  Fr.  II   Fr.  II –  Fr.  II –  Fr. – XII,  Fr.  XXIII, , , –, , , , – Fr.  I –  Fr.  II –IV  – Fr.  IV–V  Fr.  IV –V   Fr.  VI  Fr.  VI – XII Fr.  VI –  Fr.  VI  ,  Fr.  VI –  Fr.  , , , , , , , , ,  Fr.  I –IV  XII Fr.  I–II  



Fr.  I –V   Fr.  I –IV  ,  Fr.  I –  Fr.  I – – Fr.  I –  Fr.  I   Fr.  I –  Fr.  I –II  –,  Fr.  I –  Fr.  II –  Fr.  II –  Fr.  II –  Fr.  II   Fr.  II   Fr.  III–IV ,  Fr.  III –IV   Fr.  III –IV   Fr.  IV – – Fr.  IV –V  XII Fr.  IV –V  ,  Fr.  V – –, ,  Fr.  V –  Fr.  V – ,  Fr.  V –  Fr.  , , ,  Fr.  I –  Fr.  III –IV   Fr.  IV – –,  Fr.  IV –V   Fr.  V –  Fr. – ,  Fr.  , ,  Fr.  I –  Fr.  I –II   Fr.  I –II   Fr.  II –  Fr.  II –  Fr.  II –  Fr.  II –  Fr.  II – 



   

Fr.  II –III   Fr.  III   Fr.  III –  Fr.  III –  Fr.  III   Fr.  III –  Fr.  III –  Fr.  III –  Fr.  III –  Fr.  III –  Fr.  IV –  Fr.  (NF ) ,  Fr. .–  Fr. .–  Fr. .–  Fr. .–  Fr. .–  Fr. .  Fr.  II –III  ,  Fr.  II   Fr.  III –  Fr.  I –II   Fr.  II –  Fr.  II   (Phys.) Theol. + fr.  ,  (Phys.) Theol. XXIV, , , , , –, , , , –, ,  Col. I–III (NF ) , ,  Col. II–VII XXI Col. II –III   Col. II –  Col. II   Col. II –  Col. II –  Col. II   Col. II –  Col. II –III   Col. III–XI (NF /) , , 

Col. III–VIII (NF )  Col. III–IV  Col. III  Col. III –VI   Col. III –  Col. III –  Col. III –IV  – Col. III –  Col. III –  Col. III –IV   Col. III –  Col. IV –VII   Col. V  Col. V   Col. V –  Col. V –VI   Col. VI  Col. VI –  Col. VI –  Col. VI – ,  Col. VI   Col. VI –  Col. VI –VII   Col. VI –VII   Col. VI –VII   Col. VII  Col. VII –  Col. VII –VIII   Col. VII –VIII   Col. VIII–XI (NF ) –, ,  Col. VIII ,  Col. VIII –  Col. VIII –XVI  XII,  Col. VIII –XIII   Col. VIII – – Col. VIII –  Col. VIII –XIV   Col. VIII –  Col. VIII  

   

Col. IX–X  Col. IX ,  Col. IX –  Col. IX –  Col. IX –X   Col. IX   Col. IX   Col. X  Col. X –  Col. X –  Col. X –  Col. X   Col. X – , ,  Col. XI –  Col. XI –XII   Col. XI –  Col. XI –XII   Col. XII–XIV (= Fr. ) , ,  Col. XII (= Fr.  I)  Col. XII   Col. XII –  Col. XII  ,  Col. XII –  Col. XII   Col. XII   Col. XII –XIII   Col. XIII (= Fr.  II)  Col. XIII –  Col. XIII –XIV   Col. XIII   Col. XIV–XVI (NF ) ,  Col. XIV –XVI   Col. XIV –  Col. XIV –  Col. XIV   Col. XIV   Col. XIV –  Col. XIV – 



Col. XIV –XV  ,  Col. XV–XVI (NF ) , , , , , – Col. XV   Col. XV –XVI   Col. XV –  Col. XV –  Col. XVI –  Col. XVI   Col. XVI –  Col. XVI   Col. XVI   Col. XVI –  Fr. – XII Fr.  , ,  Fr.  II –IV   Fr.  III –  Fr.  III –  Fr.  III –  Fr.  III –IV   Fr.  IV –  Fr.  IV –  Fr.  V  Fr.  , , ,  Fr.   Fr. .–  Fr.  , , –,  Fr.  I –  Fr.  I –  NF –  NF  ,  NF .–  NF .–  NF   NF  I –II   Title in Physics Course NF   Ethics XII, XXII, , –, – , , 



   

Maxims below Ethics –, , , –; see also fr. , , , , and Epicur. Sent. , ,  Fr. –  Fr.  (+NF ) XXII, , – Fr.  (+NF ) I –III  – ,  Fr.  I –  Fr.  II – III+NF  I   Fr.  III + NF  I  Fr.  III + NF  I – , ,  Fr.  III + NF  I   Fr.  III + NF  I –  NF +Fr.   Fr.  XXIII, , , ; see also Maxims below Ethics Fr.  I –II   Fr.  I –  Fr.  I –II  ,  Fr.  II –III   Fr.  II –III   Fr.  III – XIV Fr. .–  Fr. –  Fr. – , –, , , –, ,  Fr.  XII, XXII, –, – , , , –, , , ,  Fr.  I –  Fr.  I –  Fr.  I –III  –,  Fr.  I  ,  Fr.  I –  Fr.  I   Fr.  II –  Fr.  III  

Fr.  III –IV  –,  Fr.  IV –VII   Fr.  VI  Fr.  VI –  Fr. +NF  , , –, ,  Fr.  (see also NF ) XII, XXII, –, –, , –, , –, , , , , , , ,  Fr.  I–V  Fr.  I–V   Fr.  I –II  , ,  Fr.  I –  Fr.  I –II   Fr.  I – ,  Fr.  I   Fr.  I –II   Fr.  I –  Fr.  I   Fr.  II –III   Fr.  II   Fr.  II –III  –,  Fr.  II –  Fr.  II   Fr.  III –  Fr.  III –VI   Fr.  III –V  –,  Fr.  III –  Fr.  III –V   Fr.  III –  Fr.  III   Fr.  IV ,  Fr.  IV  ,  Fr.  IV = NF  I –  Fr.  IV = NF  I –  Fr.  IV = NF  I –  Fr.  V (+NF  II) –VIII  , , 

   

Fr.  V (+NF  II) –VIII   Fr.  V (+NF  II) –VI  –, , –,  Fr.  V (+NF  II) –  Fr.  V (+NF  II) –  Fr.  V   Fr.  V (+ NF  II)   Fr.  V   Fr.  V (+NF  II) –VI   Fr.  VI –VIII  –,  Fr.  VI –  Fr.  VI –VII   Fr.  VIII – ,  Fr.  XXII, – Fr.  II –  Fr.  II –  Fr.  III –  Fr.  III –  Fr.  III –  Fr.  III   Fr.  III   Fr.  III –IV   Fr.  V –  Fr.  VI –  Fr.  VI –  Fr.   Fr. – ,  Fr. .– XII Fr. .–  Fr. .–  Fr. .  Fr. .  Fr.  III –  Fr.  III –V  XII,  Fr.  III –IV   Fr.  IV –  Fr.  IV –V  

Fr.  V –  Fr.  V –  Fr.  V   Fr. .  Fr. .–  Fr. .  Fr.  I–II  Fr.  II –V  ,  Fr.  II –III   Fr.  III –  Fr.  V –  Fr.  XII, , , , , , ,  Fr.  I –II   Fr.  I – XII,  Fr.  I   Fr.  I – – Fr.  I   Fr.  I –II  XII Fr.  I –II  ,  Fr.  II  Fr.  II –  Fr.  , –, –,  Fr.  III –  Fr.  ,  Fr.  I–II (YF )  Fr.  III–IV (YF )  Fr.  (YF )  Fr.  XXII, , , –, , – Fr.  I –  Fr.  II  Fr.  II –  Fr.  II   Fr.  III ff.  Fr.  ,  Fr.  ,  Fr.  I –II   Fr.  I –II  





   

Fr.  II –III  XII,  Fr.  II –III  ,  Fr.  II –III   Fr.  III  XI Fr.  XXIII, , , –,  Fr.  I  Fr.  I – XIII Fr.  II   NF  XII, , –, , , ; see also fr.  IV–V NF  , , ; see also NF  NF   NF   NF –  NF  XXII, , ; see also NF  NF  I –II   NF  IV +  I –  NF   NF –  NF  see Fr.  NF  XII, XXII, –, , , –, , , , , – NF  III –IV  ,  NF  III – ,  NF  III –  NF  III –  NF  III –IV   NF  III –IV   NF  IV –  NF  , –; see also fr.  NF  I – see Fr.  III + NF  I – F(ourteen)L(ine)C(olumn)–Letters –, –,  Fr. – 

Letter to Antipater  Fr. –  Fr. –  Fr.  II – ,  Fr.  III–IV (YF )  Fr.  IV   Fr.  IV  XI Fr.  V  XI Fr. .  Fr.   Fr.  I  ,  Fr.  I –  Fr.  I   Fr.  II –  Fr.  II   Fr.  II   Fr.  I –II   Letter to Dionysius –,  Fr.   Fr.  II –  Fr.  , – Fr.  I –II   Fr.  I  XI Fr.  I –  Fr.  II  XI Fr.  ,  Fr.  III  XI Fr.   Fr.  I –  Fr.  ,  Fr. .– – Small–Letter Fragments of Uncertain Position Fr.  (Physics? FLC?)  Fr.  (Ethics?)  NF  (Physics?)  NF  (Ethics? FLC?)  NF  (Physics? FLC?)  ‘New’ Letter belonging either to Ethics- or to Maxims’ course 

   

NF  II –  NF  II –  Maxims of Diogenes XXI, , , , , –, , , –  Fr. –  Fr.  (NF ) ,  Fr. .  Fr.  (NF ) – Fr. .  Fr. .–  Fr. .  Fr. .–  Fr. .  Fr.  XII, XXI, –, , , ,  Fr. .  Fr. .–  Fr.   Fr.   Fr.   Fr.   Fr.  , –,  Fr.   Fr.   Fr. .– XIV,  NF –  NF  ,  NF –  NF  XXI, , , –, , , –, –, , , ,  NF .  NF  XXII, , –,  NF .–  NF –  NF –  NF  XXII, , –,  NF .–  NF  



NF  –, , ,  Directions to Family and Friends Fr. – – TLC–Writings of Diogenes  Fr. –  Fr.  III –  Fr. –  Fr.  , , , ,  Fr.  II –  Fr.   Fr.  I –  Fr. +NF  , ,  Fr. –  Fr.   Fr.  ,  Fr.  I –II   Fr.   NF –  NF  see fr.  NF –  NF   NF  I  XI Old Age –, –, ,  A/B/C–Course blocks  Fr. –  Fr. .–  Fr. .–  Fr.  II –III   Fr. +NF   Fr.  I –  Fr.  I –II   Fr.  + NF  + NF  ,  Fr.  I + NF  II –  Fr.  II –III   Fr.  see NF  Fr.   Fr.  III –  Fr.   Fr.   Fr.  I – 



   

Fr.  I  XI Fr.  II –  NF –  NF  see fr.  NF  see fr.  NF   NF   NF –  NF –  NF  see fr.  NF   NF –  NF –  NF  + fr.   NF .–  Unplaced Diogenes Fragment Fr. .–  Eliminated Diogenes Fragment Fr.  XVII Diogenes Laertius I   I   I   II –  II  ,  II   II  ,  II  ,  II  ,  IV   IV   VI  ,  VI   VII – (SVF II –)  VII  (SVF II ) ,  VII   VII – (SVF III ) , , – VII  (SVF III ) , 

VII  ,  VII   VII   VII  (SVF II ) , –, – VII  (SVF II )  VII   VII   IX  (DK  A )  IX   IX –  X   X   X  (Epicur.  Us.)  X   X  (Epicur.  Us.)  X b (Epicur.  Us.)  X  ,  X   Epictetus I .  II .  III .  Epicurus On Nature , –, ,  II , ,  Col. . Leone  Col. . Leone  Col. .– Leone  Col. . Leone  XI–XIII ,  XI , , ,  [.]  Arr.²  [.]  Arr.²  [] . Arr.²  [] .– Arr.²  XIV , , ,  Col. XXIV Leone 

   

Col. XXX – Leone  Col. XXXV – Leone  Col. XXXVIII – Leone  XV  XXV ed. Laursen (/) ,  Laursen ()  ([.] Arr.²) –,  Laursen ()  ([.] Arr.²)  Laursen () – ([.] Arr.²)  XXIX .– Arr.²  Letter to Herodotus , , –, , –,   ,  –      – ,  –   , ,     (Epicur.  Us.)   ,     –    ,  –  – ,   –, , –     Letter to Menoeceus ,  –  –    –  – 



–   ,      Letter to Pythocles , , –, , –, , –,   , ,  –  –  –   , ,   ,      –         ,    –      –    –   , ,    –          Principal Doctrines (Sent.) , , , , , ,   ; see also Diog. fr.  and Maxims below Ethics  , ; see also Diog. fr.  and Maxims below Ethics  



   

 ,  –          –  –     , , –; see also Diog. fr. ,  and Maxims below Ethics   –    –    Vatican Sayings ,   ,        Fragments  Arrighetti²   Us(ener)  – Us.   Us.   Us.   Us.   Us.   Us. =  Arr.²   Us.   Us.   Us.   Us.   Us.   Us.   Us.   Us.   Us. 

Euripides F  (TrGF)



Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica III . (SVF II )  IV   VI   XI .  XI .–  XIV .–  XV .  XV .  XV .  XV .  XV .  XV .  XV .  XV .– –,  XVI .–  Galenus De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis V . (SVF III a)  V .  V .  De Elementis ex Hippocrate .  De usu partium XI   Gellius IX .  XI   Hermarchus Fr.  L(ongo) ,  Fr. .– L.  Fr. .. L. , ,  Fr. . L.  Fr. ..– L. 

   

Hierocles, Elements of Ethics Col. VII   Col. VII   Horace, Carmina III . XIV Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies I .  Leucippus (DK ) A   Lucianus Symposium   Verae Historiae II – – Vitarum Auctio   Lucretius De rerum natura ,  I  ,  I – – II –  II –  II –  II   II   III –  III –  III  XI III –  IV –  IV –  IV –  IV –  IV –  IV – 

IV –  IV   IV –  IV –  IV –  IV –  IV –  IV –  IV –  IV – – IV –  IV –  IV –  IV – ,  IV – ,  IV –  IV –  IV –  IV –  IV –  IV –  IV –  IV –  IV –  IV – – IV –  IV ff.  IV –  V – ,  V –  V –  V   V –  V –  V –  V –  V –  VI –  VI – 





   

Marcus Aurelius I .  II   IV .  IV   VI   VI   VIII   IX .–  IX   X   X .  XI   XII   Metrodorus Fr.  K(örte)  Fr.  K.  Nemesius De natura hominis  (Matthaei)  Oenomaus of Gadara fr.  Hammerstaedt

On Death ,  XII –XIV  H(enry)  XVII –XVIII  H.  On Economy ,  XXIII – J(ensen)  XXIII – J.  XXIII – J.  XXIII – J.  On Epicurus I col. XVII Tepedino  On Music IV CL – Delattre  On Phenomena and Inferences (De Signis) –,  IX –XI  De Lacy  XXXIII – De Lacy  On Piety  – Obbink  On Rhetoric Book IV (II  Sudh.)  On the Stoics XIII  Dorandi  On Vices and Virtues Book IX 



Philo of Alexandria De opificio mundi   De somniis I .  Philodemus of Gadara Academicorum Index XXVII – D(orandi)  XXI – D.  On Choices and Avoidances II – Tsouna/Indelli ,  II – Ts./I. ,  XXII –XXIII  Ts./I. 

Philoponus In Aristotelis Categorias prooemium II  Busse  Plato Apologia Socratis c  Cratylus a–c  Gorgias e–a ,  Leges IV c–b  X b  X d , 

   

Phaedo c  a–d ,  Phaedrus e  Politicus e  Republic , ,  I b–d  II e–c  II  c  II c ff.  V  c–d  VIII   VIII a  IX d–b  X b  Theaetetus d  e–  Timaeus XX–XXI, –, , – , , ,  a  b  c  d  a  a  Pliny the Elder, Naturalis Historia IV   Plutarchus Adversus Colotem  B  C  D  E–F  A–D 

–, , ,



A (Epicur.  Us.)  B  C – F–A  A , ,  B–C  C–D  F  C  E  B–B (Epicur.  Us.) – D–E  D–E  D ,  D  C   A–B (Epicur.  Us.)  C  D  An seni res publica gerenda sit  De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos  De Epicureorum Repugnantiis (lost)  De profectibus in virtute F ,  De Stoicorum Repugnantiis  .D–E  De virtute morali . C–D (SVF III )  Epicureos absurdiora poetis dicere (lost)  Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum , – D–C  C–D  D  Quaestiones Convivales V .A–B 



   

V ..F–A  VIII ..F  VIII ..A–B (DK  A ; Epicur.  Us.) , , ,  Quaestiones Platonicae  A–C  Stoicos absurdiora poetis dicere  [Plutarchus] De Fato E  Placita Philosophorum – I .C  I .C–D  IV .F  IV .D–F  IV .E  Polystratus, Against those who irrationally despise popular beliefs Col. XIV –XVI  Indelli  Porphyrius De Abstinentia I – (Hermarch fr.  Longo)  I –  I   I .  I   I . , ,  I   I .–  Posidonius T  Edelstein/Kidd F  E./K. 



Proclus In Platonis Rempublicam commentarii II p..ff. Kroll  In Platonis Timaeum commentarii III p. .ff. Diehl  III p. .ff. Diehl  Seneca De ira III .  Epistulae morales ad Lucilium .  .  .–  .  Sextus Empiricus Contra Mathematicos VII –  VII   VII   VII  (SVF II )  VIII   VIII   VIII   VIII  (Epicur.  Us.)  VIII ff.  IX  (DK  B ) ,  IX  ,  XI   XI   Pyrrhoneion Hypotyposeon I  ,  I   I –  I – 

   

Speusippus F  Isnardi Parente (F b Tarán)  Stobaeus I   II   III . (DK  B )



III  – III a  III   III   Strabo XVII . (C)





S(toicorum) V(eterum) F(ragmenta) I   I   I   II  ,  II   II –  II   II  , – II   II   II   II   II   II   II   II   II   III  ,  III   III  

Suda ε   λ   Theophrastus Historia Plantarum IV .  Reply to Natural Philosophers (lost)  Xenocrates F  Isnardi Parente²

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Other Inscriptions found at Oinoanda ‘Demostheneia’–Inscr. , – YÇ  (CIG  n²)  YÇ   YÇ   YÇ  ,  YÇ   YÇ  a/b 