Desire: The Concept and Its Practical Context 2015047587, 9781412863131

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THE LEARNED SOCIETY OF PRAXIOLOGY

PRAXIOLOGY: The International Annual of Practical Philosophy and Methodology Vol. 24

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Wojciech W. Gasparski Kozminski University 57–59, Jagiellonska St., 03–301 Warsaw, Poland [email protected]

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD: Timo Airaksinen, Finland Victor Alexandre, France Josiah Lee Auspitz, USA Mario Bunge, Canada

Friedrich Rapp, Germany Leo V. Ryan, USA Ladislav Tondl, Czech Republic

First published 2016 by Transaction Publishers Published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 2016 by Taylor & Francis.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Catalog Number: 2015047587 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Airaksinen, Timo, 1947- editor. Title: Desire : the concept and its practical context / editors Timo Airaksinen, Wojciech W. Gasparski. Description: New Brunswick : Transaction Publishers, 2016. | Series: Praxiology; Volume 24 | Includes bibliographical references. ,GHQWL¿HUV/&&1SULQW _/&&1HERRN _,6%1  KDUGFRYHU _,6%1 6XEMHFWV/&6+'HVLUH3KLORVRSK\ &ODVVL¿FDWLRQ /&& %' '  SULQW  _ /&& %'  HERRN _''&GF LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015047587 ISBN 13: 978-1-4128-6313-1 (hbk)

Contents Editorial, Wojciech W. Gasparski

vii

Introduction, Timo Airaksinen

xiii

Part One: Desire and Practice Narratives of Desire, Timo Airaksinen

3

Reasons for Being Flexible: Desires, Intentions, and Plans, Piotr Makowski

59

Desires of Others, Heta Aleksandra Gylling

79

([FXVHGE\&XOWXUH"6H['HVLUHDQG&RQÀLFWVLQWKH&RXUWURRPV Annamari Vitikainen 97 Part Two: Desire and Moral Life Absolute and Final Desire: Plato or Buddha, David Berman

117

'HVLUHLQ%XGGKLVP³&KLOG3HRSOH´DQG³7UXH$GXOWV´ Margarita Kozhevnikova

135

Freud on Desire and Debt, Jason M. Peck

155

Structures of Desire in The Trial and Moby-Dick, J.D. Mininger

169

:KDW5ROH'R(PRWLRQV3OD\LQ0RUDO'LVDJUHHPHQWV" Margit Sutrop

183

Part Three: Business Ethics and Other Contexts The Unappreciated Virtue of Frugality, $QQD/HZLFND6WU]DáHFND

203

The Desire to Take the Right Management Decisions: Can We Rely on Intuition? Experimental Praxiology Approach, Piotr Lukasz Jurkiewicz

215

The Need for a Design Education Strategy, Thorbjoern Mann

229

Notes about the Authors and Editors

241

Editorial Wojciech W. Gasparski Editor-in-chief Why one acts? What motivates one to be active? What is the reason of/for an action? These and many similar questions are formulated since action theorists came to the fore studying deeds, that is, practical human behavior. Pierre Bourdieu, the author of Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique  ZULWHVWKDWFRJQLWLRQGHSHQGVQRWRQO\²DVHOHPHQWDU\UHODWLYLVP WHDFKHVXV²RQDSDUWLFXODUSRLQWRIYLHZREVHUYHUV³ZKRDUHSUHVHQWLQ a given place and time” employ toward a subject of observation, but also on the very fact that the observer accepting the point of view toward an action and eliminating himself from that action to be able to observe it, to look for it from the above and from the distance, makes practical activity WKHVXEMHFWRIREVHUYDWLRQDQGDQDO\VLV%RXUGLHX +RZWKHQ do different action theorists observe an action from its beginning, let us call it initium, from the distance and from the above? The majority of action theorists study human action only, although they accept some animals’ actions too1; this is characteristic for those related WRSUD[LRORJ\.RWDUELĔVNL0LVHV 6RPHDFWLRQWKHRULVWVDOVR include other beings as active creatures; they even suggest biopraxiology .DXIPDQQ $IHZRIWKHDFWLRQWKHRULVWVFRQVLGHUDJHQWVLQJHQHUDODVVXEMHFWRIDFWLRQ%XQJH %HVLGHVDFWLRQWKHRULVWVH[SODLQ action reason not only from its starting point but from the state a subject RIDFWLRQZDQWVWRDFKLHYH²DQHQGDJRDORUDSXUSRVH²WKDWLVWKURXJK the so-called teleological explanation1RZDN /HWXVUHYLVLWVRPH different ways of the issue of action initialization and motivation. $3ROLVKSKLORVRSKHU7DGHXV].RWDUELĔVNLZKRFRQVLGHUHGDFWLRQDV an event, that is, a change of states, wrote: “The agent of an event is he ZKRVHIUHHLPSXOVHLVDFDXVHRIWKDWHYHQW´ +HJDYHVRPH vii

viii

Desire

examples of the impulse such as shifting a lever, pushing a button, or striking a piano key. He prefers the term “impulse” to “pressure” “since it better covers those simple act in which the behavior of the agent, in some respect that is important to the given case, does not principally consist LQ DQ\ PXVFXODU H[HUWLRQ´.RWDUELĔVNL    +RZHYHU HYHQ ³LQ all cases when we do not visibly act by a pressure on something in our environment, still a free pressure occurs, being as it were concealed in WKHLQWHUQDOSURFHVVHVRIRXUV\VWHP´.RWDUELĔVNL :KDWKHPHDQV E\IUHHGRPLVWKHIROORZLQJ³E\IUHHGRP,PHDQDSURSHUW\²NQRZQWR WKHUHDGHUIURPKLVRZQH[SHULHQFH²RIGHOLEHUDWHEHKDYLRUDQGQRWDQ\ indeterministic freedom of action in the sense of its being not dependent of FDXVHV´.RWDUELĔVNL ,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRDGGZURWHWKHSKLORVRSKHU that “we are always agents not only of what we intended, but, in so many LQVWDQFHVRISUHFLVHO\ZKDWZHGRQRWLQWHQG´.RWDUELĔVNL IRU H[DPSOHZKHQDSHUVRQRSHQVWKHGRRUV¿HUFHO\LJQRULQJWKHSRVVLELOLW\ that somebody else might walk along the outside corridor close to the doors at the same time, and the doors hit that passing person. In general, one is the agent of any such event as a result of a given free impulse; consequently, each such event is our work and is characterized by the fact that the said free impulse was its cause, even if the event was caused neither deliberately nor consciously, and even should we be wrongly convinced, at the moment of the free impulse, that QRVXFKHYHQWZRXOGRFFXURUHYHQWKDWLWZDVQRWSRVVLEOH.RWDUELĔVNL

According to another praxiologist Ludwig von Mises, an Austrian scholar ZKRFRQVLGHUHGSUD[LRORJ\VSHOOHGDVSUD[HRORJ\ DVDIRXQGDWLRQRI economics: “Action is will put into operation and transformed into an agency, is aiming at ends and goals, is the ego’s meaningful response to stimuli and to the conditions of its environment, is a person’s conscious DGMXVWPHQWWRWKHVWDWHRIWKHXQLYHUVHWKDWGHWHUPLQHVKLVOLIH´0LVHV  +HDGGHGWKDW³WKH¿HOGRIRXUVFLHQFHLVKXPDQDFWLRQQRW the psychological events that result in an action. It is precisely this which distinguishes the general theory of human action, praxeology, from psychology. The theme of psychology is the internal events that result RUFDQUHVXOWLQDGH¿QLWHDFWLRQ7KHWKHPHRISUD[HRORJ\LVDFWLRQDV VXFK´0LVHV± $OWKRXJKKHFODLPHGWKDWWKHUHZDVDUHODWLRQ between action theory and psychological analysis, he concluded that “We may say that action is the manifestation of a man’s will. But this would not add anything to our knowledge. For the term will mean nothing else that man’s faculty to choose between different states of affaires, to prefer one, to set aside the other, and to behave according to the decision2 made LQDLPLQJDWWKHFKRVHQVWDWHDQGIRUVDNLQJWKHRWKHU´0LVHV 

Editorial

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Referring to Locke3 and Leibnitz,4 Mises states the following: “The incentive that impels a man to act is always some uneasiness. A man perfectly content with the state of his affairs would have no incentive to change things. He would have neither wishes nor desires; he would be perfectly happy. He would not act; he would simply live free from care” 0LVHV±  /HWXVFRPPHQWRQWKDW,IRQHGRHVQRWFDUHRIWKHVWDWHWKHSUDFWLFDO VLWXDWLRQ VKHLVFRQWHQWRIVKHPD\ORVHLWVRRQHURUODWHUEHFDXVHRIQDWural external processes or actions of other humans. Let me recall a passage from one of my earlier contributions to praxiological design methodology: “A practical situation is the set of facts recognized by the subject of the situation as satisfactory or unsatisfactory because of the values of the VXEMHFW´*DVSDUVNL ³7KHDLPRIWKHFKDQJHLVDQDLPRIWKH VXEMHFWRIDFRUHSUDFWLFDOVLWXDWLRQZKR²ZKHQWKHH[LVWLQJVLWXDWLRQ GRHVQRWVDWLVI\KLPKHU²WHQGVWRchangeWKHVLWXDWLRQRU²ZKHQVKH FRQVLGHUVWKHVLWXDWLRQVDWLVIDFWRU\²WHQGVWRSUHVHUYHLWWKURXJKchanging practical situation complementary to the given core situation, or through PRGLI\LQJERWKVLWXDWLRQV´*DVSDUVNL  Mario Bunge of McGill University notices differences in studying DFWLRQEHWZHHQVFLHQWLVWVDQGSKLORVRSKHUV 6FLHQWLVWVDUHPDLQO\ interested in collective actions and social forces not really caring to “eluFLGDWHWKHNH\FRQFHSWVWKH\HPSOR\LQGHVFULELQJDFWLRQ´%XQJH  3KLORVRSKHUVDFFRUGLQJWRKLPIRFXVRQLQGLYLGXDODFWLRQDQGDUH interested in intentions, decisions, and proper terminology.5 The quoted philosopher claims, however, there need not be contrast between scientists’ and philosophers’ approach to studying action. “Moral philosophers and psychologists are interested in uncovering the possible sources of motivation of human action. It turns out that whereas some of them are positive or constructive, others are negative or destructive. Basic needs, legitimate interests, love, the sense of duty, and curiosity are among the former; and fear, shame, greed, and hatred among the latter. In a good society the positive motivations would be rewarded and the negative ones discouraged, so that on the whole the former would prevail over the latter. A society that strives on fear or shame and promotes greed or hatred is HYLO´%XQJH  This volume is just the case of what was referred after Bunge, for it is composed mainly by moral philosophers, some of them with psychological interest, who were encouraged by Professor Timo Airaksinen, an eminent scholar of the University of Helsinki, to analyze the concept of desire and its different practical contexts. Desire is a rich term meaning wish and want, willingness and relish, appetite and lust. All the various understandings

x

Desire

DUHDQDO\]HGLQWKH¿UVWDQGVHFRQGSDUWVRIWKHERRNLQZKLFKPRWLYDWLRQ of the agent of an action is studied and explanations are offered. “We may call such explanations rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes WKHDFWLRQ´'DYLGVRQ &RQWHPSRUDU\H[SHULPHQWDOSKLORVRSK\ RIIHUVDGGLWLRQDOH[SODQDWLRQDQDO\]LQJFDVHVUHODWHGWRGHVLUH/XHWJH 5XVFKDQG8KO0DFKHU\DQG2¶1HLOO± 6RDVRQH may expect, it would encourage praxiologists to examine a possibility to introduce the approach to human action theory as experimental praxiology like it was done in a study presented in the third part of this book. The situation is different when one’s desire is considered as a force to be accelerated for encouraging people to act in the particular way one wanted them to behave. It calls for ethical analysis. It is “because applied research involves doing, it gives rise to moral problem regarding the legitimacy of this same doing, that is, regarding the means enacted WRDFKLHYHWKHSURSRVHGLQWHQGHGJRDOV´$JD]]L 6XFKDVLWuation is characteristic for business in general and comers in particular. Consumers are objects of marketing technology which is used to trigger consumers’ desires for products offered. In relation to that, one should ask WKHTXHVWLRQWRZKDWDQH[WHQWQHHGLW³RXJKWWREHGRQH"´$JD]]L ± 7RDQVZHUWKHTXHVWLRQLVDGXW\RIEXVLQHVVHWKLFVDQGVRPH attempts to do that are presented in the third part of the book devoted to other contexts of desire. They are frugality, manger’s decision-making, and design education. Desire, and its contexts, is the issue relevant for practical activity in general and work in particular, the areas situated in the crossroad of SUD[LRORJ\HWKLFVSV\FKRORJ\DQGHFRQRPLFV7KLVLVZK\WKHYROXPH² following the tradition6²LVGHGLFDWHGWRWKH6L[WK:RUOG&RQJUHVVRIWKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO6RFLHW\RI%XVLQHVV(FRQRPLFVDQG(WKLFV,6%(( RUJDnized in 2016 in Shanghai, China. As the theme of this Business Ethics Olympics is “Ethics, Innovation, and Well-Being in Business and the Economy” it is worthy to desire the wise outcome of the congress debate RQD[LRORJLFDOFRQWH[WRIEXVLQHVVEHKDYLRU*DVSDUVNL  * * * It is with great sorrow that we let you know that Professor Ladislav Tondl, Dr.Sc., died on August 7, 2015, at the age of 91. He was a prominent Czech scientist, member of the International Advisory Board of Praxiology: The International Annual of Practical Philosophy and Methodology, honorary member of the Learned Society of Praxiology, and acclaimed in the world

Editorial

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RISKLORVRSK\IRUKLVFRQWULEXWLRQLQWKH¿HOGVRIORJLFVHPDQWLFVWKHRU\ of action, and science and technology studies. He was a professor at the Philosophical Faculty, Charles University, in Prague and served as director of the Institute for Theory and Methodology of Science at the CzechoVORYDN$FDGHP\RI6FLHQFHV)RUSROLWLFDOUHDVRQVFRPPXQLVWUHJLPH DQG6RYLHWLQYDVLRQ KHZDVGLVPLVVHGIURPKLVSRVLWLRQVDQGZRUNHGLQ the sphere of CAD in a design organization. After his full rehabilitation in 1989, he was head of the Center for Science, Technology and Society Studies, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. Professor Tondl is the author of ten monographs, three of which were published in English DQG*HUPDQ6FLHQWL¿F3URFHGXUHV, Problems of Semantics, Technisches Denken und Schlussfolgern  KDV FRDXWKRUHG VHYHQ ERRNV DQG KDV written over two hundred articles published both in Czech and in other ODQJXDJHV+HZDVWKH¿UVWFKDLUSHUVRQRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPLWWHH for the UNESCO Science Policy and a member of the editorial boards of journals and book series, including Erkenntnis, Theory and Decision Library, and Praxiology: The International Annual of Practical Philosophy and Methodology. He was also a member of the Association for the Philosophy of Science, and the International Council for Science Policy Studies. The Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic awarded him in 1999 the František Palacký medal, and in 2004 he was honored by Czech President for his contributions to science and philosophy. Scholars and readers, praxiologists in particular, appreciate his contribution to the development of the discipline and keep in grateful memory this extraordinary personality and friendship. Notes  7DGHXV] .RWDUELĔVNL D IRXQGHU IDWKHU RI 3ROLVK VFKRRO RI SUD[LRORJ\ ZURWH LQ his treatise the following: “As regards the agent, the question may be posed as to ZKHWKHURQO\DKXPDQEHLQJFDQEHDQDJHQW,QP\RSLQLRQ²QR,DPFRQYLQFHG that the chimpanzee which wields a stick to get a banana, the dog which takes a stranger’s coat in its teeth, the bird which puts the food into the open beaks of its OLWWOHRQHV²DOORIWKHVHSHUIRUPFHUWDLQVLPSOHDFWVDQGLQJHQHUDODQLPDOVGRDFW