Defending the Swedish Model : Social Democrats, Trade Unions, and Labor Migration Policy Reform 9780739138182, 9780739138168

Citation preview

Defending the Swedish Model

Defending the Swedish Model Social Democrats, Trade Unions, and Labor Migration Policy Reform Gregg Bucken-Knapp

LEXINGTON BOOKS A division of ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

LEXINGTON BOOKS A division of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200 Lanham, MD 20706 Estover Road Plymouth PL6 7PY United Kingdom Copyright © 2009 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Cataloging in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bucken-Knapp, Gregg. Defending the Swedish model : Social Democrats, trade unions, and labor migration policy reform / Gregg Bucken-Knapp. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7391-3816-8 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-7391-3818-2 (electronic) 1. Foreign workers—Sweden. 2. Foreign workers—Government policy— Sweden. 3. Sweden—Emigration and immigration—Government policy. 4. Landsorganisationen i Sverige. I. Title. HD8578.5.A2B84 2009 331.12'79485—dc22 2009022771 Printed in the United States of America

⬁ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

In memory of my father, John Michael Bucken

Contents

Acknowledgments

ix

Chapter One: Labor Migration and Migration Policy

1

Chapter Two: Labor Migration and the Preservation of the Swedish Model

29

Chapter Three: Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy: LO and the SAP in the 2002 Swedish Parliamentary Election Campaign

49

Chapter Four: The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

85

Chapter Five: Labor Migration and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union: Understanding the Divergent Preferences of the SAP and LO

117

Chapter Six: Labor Migration and the Swedish Model, At Home and Abroad

145

Bibliography

165

Index

177

vii

Acknowledgments

In the summer of 2002, I moved to Sweden to begin a position at the University of Gothenburg as a researcher in a project on Swedish industrial relations. Armed with a collection of admittedly vague ideas for my planned project, I spent the first month on the job reading, and in some instances re-reading, classic works on the evolution of the Swedish model. For all of the context that this literature provided, I had difficulty locating a puzzle that felt compelling enough to warrant a multi-year research project. To some extent, real world events helped provide the necessary focus. During the campaign leading up to the September 2002 Swedish parliamentary elections, it was difficult to avoid the debate over labor migration, which had emerged as a hot-button issue. Advocates of loosening restrictions cited the economic contribution that could be made by migrants to the Swedish economy, while skeptics underlined the need to fight existing levels of unemployment prior to admitting substantial numbers of foreign workers. I probably would not have given this debate much attention had it not been for the details of my own residence permit. As a researcher from outside the European Union, and present in Sweden on a fixed-term employment contract, I had been granted a one-year work permit, with the possibility of three one-year extensions. The permit was only valid for work as a researcher at the University of Gothenburg and did not constitute the basis for settlement. Perhaps unsurprisingly, I began to wonder why labor migrants were granted such limited access to the Swedish labor market. Against that backdrop, I immersed myself in the debate over Swedish labor migration policy reform, encouraged by the fact that a growing number of scholars were attempting to make sense of the increased salience ix

x

Acknowledgments

of labor migration across Europe and beyond. In analyzing this puzzle, I learned quickly that there are no heroes or villains, and it has not been my aim to cast proponents of one stance or another as occupying the high moral ground. Rather, my chief interest has been to better understand why the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions have been so skeptical toward calls from employers and bourgeois parties to open Sweden’s borders to workers from outside the European Union. As I show throughout the course of this book, such a stance can only make sense if the question of labor migration is considered in relation to the institutions and policies comprising the Swedish model. Defending the model is of paramount importance to these two actors, and labor migration reform has been a key setting in which the workings of the Swedish model can either be reinforced or challenged. At the University of Gothenburg, I am grateful to Bo Rothstein, who not only provided me with the opportunity to conduct research in Sweden, but has also encouraged me to follow my interests wherever they may lead. Jonas Hinnfors, Jon Pierre, Johan Karlsson, Isabell Schierenbeck, Staffan Kumlin, and Marcia Grimes are both good colleagues and even better friends, and I thank them for their considerable assistance in helping me overcome periodic bouts of culture shock. At University West in Trollhättan, the support of my colleague, Hanna Kjellgren, has been invaluable during the final redrafting of this manuscript. I also wish to thank the students of the International Program of Politics and Economics at University West, who have sat through countless lectures, seminars, and case-based learning exercises concerning labor migration. Their comments, questions, and feedback have been far more helpful than they know. I am also grateful to Carl Dahlström, Ann-Marie Ekengren, Gunnar Falkemark, Harvey Feigenbaum, Wuokko Knocke, Johannes Lindvall, Jessica Lindvert, Susan Marton, Michele Micheletti, Jeannette Money, Eric Shaw, Torsten Svensson, and Graham Timmins. The research for this project was funded by a grant from the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research (FAS). Betsy and Edward Knapp have mastered the skill of showing interest in my work without repeatedly asking when the manuscript will be completed. For that, and many other things, I am grateful. My wife, Lisa Broadwell, has served as a constant source of motivation, and an even more constant reminder that there is vastly more to life than scholarly pursuits. I dedicate this book to my father, John Michael Bucken. He is remembered, and missed, every day. Gregg Bucken-Knapp Haga, Gothenburg, Sweden

One Labor Migration and Migration Policy

Since the start of the new millennium, Sweden has experienced an intense debate over immigration. While there is still widespread public discussion regarding the economic and social integration of refugees and asylum-seekers that arrived in Sweden during the 1980s and 1990s, this new immigration debate is qualitatively different. As reports of the post–World War II generation’s coming exit from the workforce became increasingly prominent, and with many forecasts pointing to a general labor shortage in the near future, labor migration emerged as one of the most hotly contested issues on the Swedish political agenda. On the one hand, the Swedish Confederation of Enterprise (SN), Sweden’s four bourgeois political parties, and the Greens advocated a dramatic overhaul of Sweden’s sharply restrictive policies governing labor migration from non-EU countries. In December 2008, their nearly decade-long push for liberalization bore fruit. Since then, citizens from non-EU countries have faced substantially fewer obstacles when seeking access to the Swedish labor market. Gone is the requirement that local labor market boards must evaluate labor market conditions in conjunction with each individual work permit application. Swedish unions, who were once highly influential veto players in the granting of work permits, are now only consulted as to whether employment offers are consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreement. Unlike the policy of the past several decades, in which temporary work permits with strictly limited extensions were the norm, labor migrants arriving under this new policy find that continued employment for a period of four years can result in a permanent settlement visa. In short, when it comes to hiring, little 1

2

Chapter One

practical distinction remains between a Swedish workforce and those from beyond the European Union. Yet, throughout the reform process, the proposed liberal shift was met with fierce resistance from both the Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO). While these two allies repeatedly emphasized their belief that labor migration can serve as a valuable instrument for maintaining the health of the Swedish economy, they were far less enthusiastic about the specific proposals from both employers and bourgeois parties. Rather, they repeatedly voiced support for a labor migration policy that would have been significantly more cautious in granting third-country nationals access to the Swedish labor market. As such, the debate over labor migration reform in Sweden was not primarily a tale of whether or not foreign workers should be granted access to the Swedish labor market. On this issue there was broad agreement. Rather, the differences that did exist among key actors had to do with the policy design of proposed labor migration reform. Labor migration policy, whose primary objective is to regulate the entry of foreign nationals seeking to immigrate for purposes of employment, is not unlike any other instance of policymaking. The reform of labor migration policy involves hard choices regarding the scope of the policy’s goals, the specific means to be used for achieving those goals, and the designation of actors to carry out policy objectives.1 This book attempts to make sense of the labor migration policy preferences developed by the SAP and LO during the course of this debate. I argue that these two actors develop their labor migration policy preferences on the basis of whether varying reform alternatives are perceived to be consistent with, or have the potential to undermine, the Swedish model. While aware that increased labor migration can contribute to offsetting forecasted labor shortages, both the SAP and LO believe that a wide-scale resumption of labor migration has considerable implications for institutions, policies, and goals central to the Swedish model. In particular, I show that liberal labor migration has been perceived as threatening to the workings of two core features of the Swedish model: full employment policies and the universal welfare state. Thus, while generally positive to increased labor migration from non-EU countries, LO and the SAP only support specific policy reforms that they regard as consistent with the overall workings of the Swedish model. Labor migration policy reforms that the SAP and LO regard as incompatible with key features of the Swedish model are rejected out of hand. As such, the argument in this study stands in contrast to many classic and contemporary accounts of migration policy. First, Marxist-inspired accounts largely treat organized labor as an actor with preferences that are a simple function of the ongoing class struggle. Organized labor is

Labor Migration and Migration Policy

3

assumed to firmly oppose measures easing the access of foreign workers onto the domestic labor market. Its preferences are thought to stem from the cumulative historical experience of having witnessed employers use foreign workers to undercut wages and challenge union strength. Such arguments have limited utility when confronted with settings such as Sweden, where organized labor has played a historically important role in facilitating labor migration. Second, a number of recent studies have sought to demonstrate that increased internationalization is the driving force behind a liberal shift in the labor migration policy preferences of organized labor. In this literature, the decline in the capacity of states to maintain effective control over national borders, coupled with increased economic internationalization, is thought to force labor to reconsider the wisdom of opposing labor migration. However, these studies have largely ignored settings where organized labor and social democratic parties have been traditionally powerful. Moreover, this literature fails to specify how labor will choose among competing alternatives for easing restrictive labor migration policies. Finally, many scholars have emphasized the importance of domestic factors for analyzing migration policy preferences. In this broad cluster of scholarship, variables such as unemployment rates, electoral systems, and interest group systems emerge as being of significance. Yet, this literature often treats preferences as a given, instead emphasizing how domestic-level variables constrain the ability of key groups to act on their preferences. This study shares a great deal in common with those who would stress the importance of domestic institutions. Where this book differs is in demonstrating how key features of the Swedish model—full employment policies and the universal welfare state—matter because they are themselves core institutional expressions of the social democratic project that the SAP and LO prize greatly. The Swedish case of labor migration provides us with a telling instance where these “rules of the game” figure prominently as objects that specific actors consider highly worthy of defense. As the subsequent case study chapters will show, labor seeks to ensure that the choices made in terms of labor migration policy do not generate negative ripple effects for cherished institutions of the Swedish social democratic project. In short, the source of the labor migration policy preferences held by the SAP and LO is the desire to protect core elements of the Swedish model. As will be shown both later in this chapter and in the conclusion, this argument not only has significance for migration policy scholarship emphasizing the explanatory importance of institutions, but also for the broader comparative political economy scholarship. In particular, the case of Swedish labor migration policy reform has distinct implications for the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature. The VoC literature

4

Chapter One

has much to offer scholars interested in the politics of economic reform, focusing attention on the way in which dual convergence onto liberal and coordinated models of capitalism is thought to structure the reform process in advanced capitalist economies. However, the case of Swedish labor migration policy reform raises questions about the degree to which politics and ideology are omitted from the largely functional account of policymaking within the VoC literature, and also for the characterization of key actors as having reform preferences generally consistent with the design of the prevailing national model of capitalism. In developing my argument, it is also necessary to offer a detailed overview of the components comprising labor migration policy. Indeed, we cannot account for the sources of labor migration policy preferences without first identifying the specific choices that actors make when opting for one model of policy reform over another. Despite that, a frequent shortcoming of the migration policy literature is to define the content of labor migration policy in only the broadest of terms. Often, labor migration policy is operationalized as the choice between admitting a larger or smaller number of migrant workers. Such general depictions of labor migration policy overlook many key components upon which actors must develop their preferences. As the case study chapters will show, six components of labor migration have been especially salient in the Swedish debate: gatekeepers with decision-making power over the permit approval process must be assigned, criteria that need to be met in order for a work permit to be granted must be specified, decisions need to be made as to whether migrants can conduct job searches on-site or must do so from abroad, the initial degree of migrant labor market access must be determined, the potential for migrants to upgrade work permits (both in terms of renewals and expanded labor market access) must be established, and the degree to which migrant labor is immediately granted access to welfare state services must be decided upon. Each of these components has clear implications for the future prospects of the Swedish model. Restrictive choices, such as requiring a documented labor shortage prior to approving work permit applications, co-exist easily with active labor market policy measures intended to boost the workforce participation rate of domestic reserves. Alternately, more liberal choices, such as allowing for firms themselves to determine whether migrant labor is needed, can result in foreign workers gaining comparatively greater access to the national labor market without regard for labor market trends. Choices made in terms of these components can also have consequences for the degree to which corporatist practices guide the administration of the work permit system, or whether certain key actors, such as the state or specific labor market partners, will be excluded from the decision-making process. As one final example, the

Labor Migration and Migration Policy

5

degree to which migrant labor is immediately granted access to welfare state services can have implications for the principles of universalism associated with the Swedish model. In chapter 2, I discuss each of these six components in detail, and describe the key ways that each can vary. At this stage, however, it should be clear that the design of labor migration policy cannot be viewed in isolation from the broader institutional features of the economy or polity. For both LO and the SAP, constructing a coherent labor migration policy is not simply a question of satisfying the need of employers for a specific number of foreign workers. It also requires devising a policy that takes into account how the Swedish model will be affected by those conditions under which foreign workers are granted access to the labor market. Sweden is a particularly fruitful choice for the study of labor migration policymaking. Similar to other European settings, Sweden is a case where long-standing policies that have prohibited large-scale labor migration are now being challenged. Following two decades of labor migration in which, at its peak, roughly 45,000 foreigners migrated to Sweden annually for purposes of employment, labor migration was effectively brought to a standstill in 1972. Since then, as throughout Europe, asylum-based migration and family reunification have been the principal means by which individuals migrated to Sweden. Yet, despite a vibrant debate across Europe over the wisdom of less restrictive labor migration policies, recent literature has largely addressed policy shifts in liberal market economies. Moreover, the institutions and policies that comprise those political economies have not been emphasized as important explanatory factors for understanding the emergence of labor migration preferences.2 This study complements these earlier works by focusing on a case that is widely regarded as the archetype of the advanced welfare state. Thus, the analysis of the Swedish debate adds an important case to the cluster of national settings in which new migration policy dynamics are being explored. Second, my argument draws on a range of literature in which authors argue that a tension exists between migration and the welfare state. I contribute to this literature by providing an in-depth case study through which these claims can by systematically explored. Finally, the Swedish case of labor migration policy reform has much to offer those with an interest in the politics of economic reform more generally. As Sven Steinmo has observed, Sweden faces the dilemma common to all advanced democracies, one where “an increasing share of its workers will be recipients of social benefits instead of contributors.”3 Similarly, Paul Pierson has noted that one of the fundamental challenges facing welfare states is the issue of population aging and the related pressures that will be placed on healthcare services and publicly funded pension systems.4 According to Pierson, how policymakers respond to a range of domestic pressures, such as population .

6

Chapter One

aging, will have significant consequences for the continued fortunes of the welfare state. The case of Swedish labor migration reform thus constitutes one example of how policymakers are attempting to navigate this difficult challenge. It emphasizes the key considerations that underlie the hard political choices involved when actors must counteract the effects of an aging population, while at the same time ensuring that defining and desirable features of the political economy are left intact. The remainder of this chapter has three chief aims. First, I address the increasing importance that labor migration policy has assumed in the advanced industrial world, particularly in Europe. While few serious proponents argue that economic migration alone can be drawn upon in order to meet the challenges of a shrinking European workforce, there is general agreement that labor migration can serve as one element in the policy arsenal of states looking to ensure the continued supply of an appropriately sized and skilled workforce. Second, I present an overview of both classic and recent migration policy research of relevance to this study. The possible re-introduction of significant labor migration is challenging not only to the policymakers and populations of receiving countries, but also to scholars. Understandably, it is only in the past few years that political scientists have once again problematized the determinants of labor migration policy, as well as the preferences held by certain important societal actors. My assessment is that while much of this recent literature shares overlapping concerns with the puzzle being explored in this book, few of the studies have devoted sufficient attention to the link between labor migration policy and the broader institutional and policy features of the political economy. Moreover, almost none have the ability to be easily applied to the specific puzzle at hand: how actors who accept the need for increased labor migration choose among competing policy options for migration policy reform. Third, I turn my attention to the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) scholarship, particularly the emphasis within this literature on the close links between economic policymaking and the prevailing national model of capitalism. Indeed, the argument in this book, that both the SAP and LO choose labor migration reform alternatives on the basis of whether they display incentive compatibility with core features of the Swedish model, owes a certain intellectual debt to VoC scholarship. However, the functional nature of this literature, in which politics is essentially absent, does not allow for it to be grafted successfully onto the particulars of the Swedish case.

THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF LABOR MIGRATION In sketching out the challenges associated with Europe’s rapidly graying population, The Economist has noted with characteristic understatement

Labor Migration and Migration Policy

7

that governments “are in a bind.”5 The aging of the European workforce, coupled with a low fertility rate in many European states, has focused considerable attention on the shrinking available pool of labor throughout the EU. In 2008, the New York Times devoted a lengthy Sunday magazine article to detailing the challenges that are expected to result from a “childless Europe.”6 In a 2003 report, the European Commission presented data showing that the working-age population of twenty-five EU member states is expected to decrease sharply by 2030. From a then current figure of 303 million, the working-age population is expected to decline to 297 million in 2020 and then plummet to 280 million by 2030.7 As life expectancy increases, the elderly dependency ratio is forecast to skyrocket throughout the EU, more than doubling between 2000 and 2050. Across Europe’s welfare states, from those with the most generous range of benefits to those that are more restricted in scope, the question of how to address this demographic time bomb presents a significant policy challenge. The continued provision of generous social services, as well as the overall health of Europe’s economies, is frequently viewed as being heavily dependent on the extent to which policymakers are adept at dealing with shifts in Europe’s demographic make-up. While policymakers scramble to devise innovative solutions to this demographic challenge, one thing is clear. Concerns over the economic impact of a graying population, as well as shortages of an appropriately skilled labor force, have put labor migration squarely on the political agenda across Europe for the first time in over three decades. Throughout the late 1990s and first years of the twenty-first century, multiple European governments have proposed or implemented policies seeking to attract foreign workers to their shores. From 2002 through 2008, the United Kingdom’s Highly Skilled Migration Program (HSMP) provided skilled and educated economic migrants with the opportunity to enter the British labor market and to circumvent rules requiring that migrants have a job offer in hand before a work permit application is lodged. Under a 2006 revision to the program, migrants admitted under the HSMP were eligible for permanent residency after five years. While the HSMP is now closed to further applicants, labor migrants from non-EU countries are able to apply as highly skilled workers under a new broader points-based system governing admission to the UK. In 1999, the then governing German Social Democratic Party (SPD) implemented a five-year non-renewable Green Card program intended to attract skilled information technology specialists from abroad, primarily Asia. The program was expected to grant 10,000 work permits. However, the lack of a possibility to convert temporary permits into those that would result in permanent status led to only 7,000 migrants taking advantage of the scheme. In the subsequent Immigration Act of 2005, a ban on the recruitment of unskilled

8

Chapter One

and semi-skilled labor remained in effect; however, provisions were made to grant certain highly skilled workers immediate permanent residency upon arrival.8 Even at the sub-national level, economic migration has proved to be an attractive option for policymakers. In the mid-2000s, the then ruling Scottish Labor Party attempted to market Scotland to foreign workers under its “Fresh Talent” program, intended to recruit the “brightest and the best” of a global workforce to Scotland’s shores.9 A heightened interest from governments as to the potential of labor migration has also been matched with an awareness that migration alone cannot eradicate the full scope of policy problems posed by an aging population. An oft-cited report from the United Nations Population Division in 2001 pointed out that if retirement ages were left unchanged, “increasing the size of the working-age population” would be the only option in the medium to short term. However, the report authors stressed that it was impractical to tackle the challenge of a declining population entirely through increased migration, noting that an “extraordinarily large” number of economic migrants would be required to maintain current dependency ratio levels.10 The European Commission has expressed similar caution when touting the potential virtues of increased labor migration. In recent reports, the EC has underscored that “fully compensating” for the effects of an aging population via labor migration is “not a realistic option,” as the scope of immigrants required would not only be massive, but would also have to consider that immigrant populations themselves age, as well as the related integration challenges posed by new waves of economic migrants settling in Europe.11 Yet, while stating in a recent Green Paper that “immigration in itself is not a solution to demographic ageing,” debates over harmonizing certain aspects of members states’ labor migration policies within the next decade continue, under the realization that “sustained immigration flows could increasingly be required to meet the needs of the EU labour market and to ensure Europe’s prosperity.”12 Speaking before the European Parliament in 2004, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan emphasized that immigration “alone will not solve the problems (of a shrinking economy and stagnating societies), but it is an essential part of any solution.”13 Thus, while it appears widely understood by both the international and European community that a simple reliance on migration is unlikely to bring about a sustained increase in the size of the European workforce, this has by no means implied a wholesale rejection of the potential offered by labor migration for contributing to European economic and population growth. Rather, with the exception of far-right populist parties opposing increased migration on principle, the current debate over labor migration across future receiving countries has to do with what shape labor migration policies will take. Prior to addressing the specific

Labor Migration and Migration Policy

9

design of these policies, it is necessary to take stock of the available literature addressing migration within political science and cognate fields. When it comes to labor migration policy, how do scholars characterize the preferences of policymakers and other interested actors, and what are the sources of those preferences? Answering that question is the focus of the next section.

POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF LABOR MIGRATION POLICY PREFERENCES A rich literature has grown up over the past several decades addressing just how it is that migration policy outcomes emerge. In doing so, this literature has also grappled, to a greater or lesser extent, with the more narrow issue of preferences that are at the heart of this study. In this section, I draw the reader’s attention to certain key works in the study of migration policy. Some of these have focused on migration policy broadly, not making a formal distinction between labor migration, refugees, and asylum seekers, and those immigrating for purposes of family reunification. Others have been explicit in limiting their analysis to a more narrow interest in labor migration. My aim is to show how the question of migration policy preferences has (or has not) been problematized in this literature. In doing so, I stress both the advantages and the limitations of this literature for accounting for the puzzle at hand. While various aspects of these studies may appear to be applicable to the Swedish case, I demonstrate that none can be grafted neatly onto the Swedish reform process and provide a compelling explanation. The literature that I highlight portrays the emergence of preferences as stemming from one of three broad factors. First, there is the “conventional wisdom” account, in which the policy preferences of organized labor or business are shaped by their pre-ordained position in the ongoing class struggle. Second, shifts in migration policy preferences are sometimes explained as the result of increased internationalization. Inspired by the scholarly focus on globalization, these studies of migration policy preferences emphasize the way in which actors take into account the decreased capacity of states to effectively control national borders when choosing among reform alternatives. In these accounts, increased internationalization is either the primary driving force, or is filtered through varying domestic institutional configurations. Finally, a number of scholars have sought to emphasize that it is chiefly domestic factors that are of importance for explaining both preferences and outcomes. In some instances, national economic conditions and political institutions emerge as being of joint importance for understanding the emergence of preferences, while

10

Chapter One

other studies have primarily emphasized the key role played by political institutions. To the extent that the scholarship on migration policy has resulted in one largely enduring, broad brush-stroke assumption about the preferences that key actors hold in terms of an immigrant workforce, it is this: organized labor is generally thought to oppose measures that would result in eased access for foreign labor to the domestic labor market, while employers actively support and promote such efforts. Castles and Kosack sketch out the basic tenets of this class-based, Marxist-inspired conventional wisdom, observing that the “traditional hostility” of trade unions toward immigrant labor is the result of a “long and bitter experience” in which employers have attempted to use immigrant workers as a device to undercut wages and to prevent organized labor from gaining or consolidating power. Reducing the matter to a near axiomatic form, they state that it “is clear that the immigration of new workers is in the economic interests of the employers and against those of established labour.”14 Aristide Zolberg’s classic description of the “odd-couple” coalition that grows up around migration policy offers a similar logic. Arguing that migration constitutes a cross-cutting cleavage, he suggests that the “liberal” left will unite with business in favor of greater immigration, while organized labor will find an ally in social conservatives, and seek to limit the inflow of foreign labor. For business, the underlying factor shaping its preferences is the standard desire for a larger pool of potential labor, while unions are seen as opting for a closed-door stance in order to avoid competition over employment opportunities.15 This portrayal is also present in non-Marxist political economy approaches, such as the work of Gary P. Freeman, who notes that foreign workers have “diminished the power of organized labour by . . . easing the tight labour market conditions that would have enhanced labour strategic resources.”16 When faced with the prospect that unorganized workers will be released onto the labor market, the conventional wisdom suggests that labor movements have one pre-programmed response within their strategic arsenal. To the extent possible, it is expected that they will engage in the “device of the restriction of numbers.” Opting for this course of action implies a mere continuation of the underlying rationale behind the initial emergence of trade unions, in which labor sought “to defend a specific job territory, excluding outsiders from practising the trade. . . . If successful, this ensure(s) an artificial scarcity of their specific category of labour so that the ‘higgling of the market’ operate(s) in their favour.”17 Yet, while the conventional wisdom holds great appeal for the way in which it casts the preferences of business and labor in such sweeping terms, and also for how it appears to loosely mirror the broad contours of debates over the resumption of labor migration, it lacks the analytical

Labor Migration and Migration Policy

11

subtlety necessary to capture the dynamics at play in both historical and contemporary instances of labor migration policy. In terms of the former, an approach that emphasizes organized labor’s principled opposition to the admission of foreign labor is hard-pressed to account for the Swedish experience with labor migration during the 1950s and 1960s, the country’s first large-term experience with labor migration. During this period, the Swedish trade union movement played an active role in administering the work permit application process, approving applications from over 95 percent of those who applied. In terms of the latter, two key counterexamples emerge that run counter to the logic espoused in the conventional wisdom. First, while the Swedish trade union movement is generally portrayed as having a restrictive stance on third-country national labor migration, LO has repeatedly stated during the ongoing debate that labor migrants admitted to Sweden must be granted immediate permanent residency. Such a stance is difficult to explain if one is simply limited to overarching categorizations of actors’ preferences. If the conventional wisdom portrays unions as opposed to the use of immigrant labor, then wouldn’t one expect for LO to oppose permanent settlement visas for foreign workers? Second, the conventional wisdom offers little guidance for how to make sense of cases where organized labor has, at first glance, preferences that might appear contradictory. As chapters 3 and 4 will document, LO has remained a consistent skeptic of employer proposals for reforming third-country national labor migration policy. At the same time, as will be shown in chapter 5, LO broke ranks with the then ruling SAP and championed an open-door stance for workers coming from the ten states admitted to the European Union in May 2004. Clearly, the immigration of new workers does not always clash with organized labor’s preferences. As such, the objective is to better specify the factors that underpin the choices made by labor in distinct instances of labor migration policy reform. For that task, the conventional wisdom is pitched too broadly and is ultimately an unsatisfying tool. Challenges to the conventional wisdom regarding preferences have also emerged from within the migration policy literature itself. Several recent studies have explored how the effects of globalization may be causing both unions and employers to re-think the preferences assigned to them within the traditional Marxist-inspired accounts. Relying on case studies of union preferences toward immigration policy in France, Italy, and Spain, Julie Watts concludes broadly that “most (labor) leaders prefer policies that promote legal immigration.”18 Haus describes a comparable shift in the immigration policy preferences of U.S. and French unions. Her studies seek to provide an account for why French unions have opposed “restrictionist immigration policy measures considered or adopted by various French governments”19 and why the American labor movement

12

Chapter One

has “support(ed) open immigration legislation.”20 Informed by Sassen and other scholars of globalization, Haus stresses that trade unions now support increased immigration partly out of a realization that states wield considerably less sovereignty over borders than has previously been the case. Moreover, she maintains that the shift on the part of labor toward less restrictive policies has occurred as unions have realized the need to develop and implement more effective organization strategies, the need for which are “intensified in an era of economic internationalization.”21 To a great extent, Watts echoes the broad argument pursued by Haus, stressing that “many labor leaders see immigration as an inevitable consequence of globalization and believe restrictive immigration policies cannot stop the flow of immigrant workers.”22 Indeed, Watts turns the conventional wisdom on its head, arguing that labor leaders in both Western Europe and the United States have come to view restrictive policies as the source of a “precarious legal and economic position” for immigrants that is ultimately debilitating to the wage levels and conditions of the workforce as a whole. The advantage of this argument, when compared to the Marxist-inspired conventional wisdom, should be clear. Certainly, both Watts and Haus are to be credited for identifying a trend among trade unions in the advanced industrial countries. Yet, similar to the conventional wisdom, the globalization thesis advanced by both Haus and Watts is subject to certain criticisms. First, the claim that increasing economic internationalization has tipped organized labor away from a restrictive stance on labor migration offers little practical guidance for the analysis of a policy debate in which the central issue up for grabs is not whether to allow increased labor migration, but rather, how the policy should be structured. The domestic effects of globalization may very well suggest to labor that overly restrictive stances are futile, but in and of themselves, they say nothing about which less restrictive stance will be seen by labor as being the most advantageous route. Second, while it is important to acknowledge that Watts’s elaboration of the globalization thesis draws upon domestic level variables in order to better specify how the preferences of unions and employers will manifest themselves, the claim is made quite broadly, and no general account of the way in which domestic factors might lead either unions or employers toward some reform alternatives, and away from others, is provided. Watts suggests that “domestic politics, institutions, and economic conditions” filter the effects of globalization, allowing for national “distinctions in preference formations and policy outputs.”23 Labor’s preferences are shaped by “factors such as union organization, the institutionalization of private and governmental immigrant service networks, and the size of the underground economy,” and the ability of labor to realize its prefer-

Labor Migration and Migration Policy

13

ences is thought to be dependent on whether parties of the Right or Left occupy government. Employers, for their part, are argued to have their immigration policy preferences influenced by national labor regulations. No causal mechanism is offered to assist the reader in evaluating the proposed influence of these domestic factors on specific migration preferences or outcomes. Rather, elaboration of the argument occurs anecdotally, with domestic factors seen as significant for their broad ability to “shape” or “filter.” Third, this recent literature on trade unions and migration policy has focused exclusively on settings where both organized labor and the welfare state has been comparatively weak. As such, our current understanding of the proposed relationship between domestic factors and organized labor’s migration preferences contains a significant gap. Neither Haus nor Watts consider how the presence of a well-developed welfare state may have an impact on the labor migration policy preferences of trade unions or allied Left governments. Leah Haus does, however, stress that the generalizability of her argument could be substantially enhanced by exploring whether strong unions share the immigration policy preferences of their weak counterparts. She notes two possibilities that could contribute to lower levels of support from strong unions for less restrictive immigration policies. First, with higher density rates, stronger unions have substantially less interest in acquiring new members than do labor movements whose membership is low or is on the decline. Second, Haus maintains that strong unions may be more likely to back tighter immigration policies as their “voice will be heard and restrictionist measures will be imposed.”24 However, she is ultimately sceptical as to the explanatory weight of union strength, observing that not all cases with strong unions have seen similarly high levels of opposition to immigration.25 In short, there is uncertainty regarding how powerful trade unions will react to the prospect of increased labor migration, particularly in settings where the institutional structure of the political economy is broadly supportive of labor’s aims. Thus, a key contribution of this book is to complement Haus’s and Watts’s studies, in order to shed much-needed light on how one of the most influential labor movements in advanced industrial countries has developed its labor migration policy preferences. However, even if domestic factors are only broadly identified as having significance in the Watts study, this by no means implies that domestic variables do not constitute a potentially fruitful candidate in seeking to understand the emergence of labor migration policy preferences. Indeed, many studies have sought to highlight the differing ways in which domestic-level variables matter substantially for both migration policy preferences, as well as for outcomes. In some of these studies, political institutions share center stage with both local and national economic

14

Chapter One

conditions, while in others, they emerge on their own as being a key explanatory factor. Jeannette Money’s political geography account of migration policymaking offers a prime example of the way in which political institutions are thought to interact with national economic conditions in shaping the preferences of policymakers. In case studies focusing on the United Kingdom, France, and Australia, Money argues that immigration is rarely salient nationally. Rather, migration first rises high on the political agenda at the regional level, as “the geographic concentration of immigrants . . . tends to concentrate the costs of immigration and facilitate the organization of political opposition to immigration at particular junctures.”26 According to Money, economic recession within an electoral constituency with a high immigrant concentration will result in the “rise of political pressures against immigration.”27 The conveyor belt for making this antiimmigration political sentiment crucial to national politicians is whether or not the specific constituency has “the potential to swing the national election results between parties.” That is, if the number of constituencies combining recession and immigration is significant, and if the constituencies are deemed marginal, then national politicians will respond by adopting the immigration policy thought most attractive within these marginal districts.28 It should be noted that Money’s cases are exclusively those with single-member district electoral systems.29 The logic that immigration policy results from the regional salience of immigration, and is mediated through a first past the post electoral system (be it in one round, or as in French legislative elections, in two) may hold for states with this specific electoral system. However, it is uncertain that region-specific concerns of individual MPs are able to dictate the national policy agenda just as forcefully in a proportional representation system.30 Interestingly, Money herself notes the necessity of this distinction at the outset of her study, but does not explore how it challenges her analysis.31 Eytan Meyers’s recent attempt to put forth a comprehensive theory of migration policy provides an example of scholarship arguing that both national economic conditions and political institutions are crucial, the former for preferences and the latter for outcomes. In his study, rates of labor migration are “mainly determined by the state of the economy,” as measured by the annual unemployment rate.32 Both employers and organized labor take roughly similar cues regarding their labor migration policy preferences from unemployment statistics. To Meyers, “during recessions, workers will oppose immigration and employers will limit their investment in immigration advocacy.” Economic good times, at least as measured by a fall in the unemployment rate, are hypothesized to produce pro-labor migration stances: “employers will recruit foreign workers and invest resources in promoting liberal immigration policies,

Labor Migration and Migration Policy

15

while workers will limit their demands for restrictions on immigration.”33 However, it is important to stress that actors’ preferences appear to be determined from the outset: in Meyers’s hypothesis, labor will not be an active opponent of labor migration when unemployment figures are declining; nor, when unemployment is increasing, will employers wage a pro-immigration public relations campaign. A pluralist conception of policymaking guides Meyers’s account, with the state “responding to pressure from economic interest groups,”34 as it goes about administering labor migration policy. Meyers also argues that the state can “lose control” of labor migration policy, at which point it will be “de facto shaped by the employers.” Yet, it is never made clear how a passive state, implementing the joint preferences of labor and capital, can truly be regarded as “in control” of labor migration. One can give Meyers the benefit of the doubt and assume that responding to pressure group activity somehow includes a form of state autonomy to reject certain demands; however, this point is not addressed. In terms of the Swedish case, the key difficulty for Meyers’s hypothesis is that it provides little guidance for assessing how the detailed contents of labor migration reforms emerge, as the causal mechanism is only intended to capture shifts in preferences for the overall number of migrants, and not how the various components of entry, labor market access, and social and political rights are all pieced together to result in coherent policy proposals. Consistent with Meyers’s argument, one could assert that the genesis in the Swedish labor migration policy debate took place during a period in which the Swedish economy was expanding on the back of the IT boom. However, as subsequent chapters will show, the recognition that firms were facing significant recruitment difficulties did not result in a uniform rush by policymakers and social partners toward an open-door policy aimed at recruiting foreign labor. While both Money and Meyers emphasize the interaction between economic conditions and domestic institutional structures, other scholars have focused exclusively on the role of political institutions in the migration policymaking process. Jeffrey Togman’s study of migration policy in France and the United States emphasizes that the choice of immigration policies to be implemented by a state is partially a function of political institutions, conceived of as either an intervening variable or as a “filter.”35 In Togman’s account, institutions “translate causally relevant” factors “such as economic conditions and cultural traditions into immigration policy outcomes (and do so by) establishing the degree of influence any one set of actors has over the policy outcome.”36 Togman’s central claim is that the differences in French and American immigration policies can be accounted for by the pluralist and fragmented nature of the American state, versus the “statist-corporatist” institutions characterizing France.

16

Chapter One

Simon Green’s recent analysis of immigration policy in postwar Germany pursues a similar tack of argument. Challenging Rogers Brubaker’s claim that stability in postwar German immigration policy could be explained by elite consensus, Green put forward a compelling case for the pathdependent effect of German political institutions. Drawing upon Peter Katzenstein’s classic depiction of the German political structure as a “semisovereign model of governance,” Green demonstrates that the interaction between decentralized state interests and centralized societal interests in the “network nodes” of political parties, cooperative federalism and parapublic institutions resulted in “incremental outcomes” for German migration policy.37 Yet, although these studies deserve credit for carefully detailing the ways in which institutional structures can have an impact on migration policy outcomes, they do not problematize the question of preferences in general, nor do they explore the varying ways in which migration policy preferences might themselves be linked to a desire to maintain existing institutional structures. As such, the arguments put forward by these two authors appear to implicitly mirror rational choice institutionalism, in which “institutions decide the logic of the exchange between actors, but the institutions do not as such influence preferences.”38 Indeed, while there is little question that institutions structure the chances for actors to achieve their political goals, institutions also shape, as well as reflect, deeply rooted political preferences. Institutions, such as those associated with the Swedish social democratic welfare state, are the result of struggles for political power and are founded upon “material and ideological coalitions,” where specific actors continue to have vested interests (also material and ideological) in ensuring their preservation. Rothstein underscores the sanctity of the broad features of the universal welfare state for the ruling SAP when he emphasizes how unlikely it is that “any fundamental challenge to its principles will emerge from that quarter.”39 As will be argued later, the sanctity of certain institutional arrangements is an important determinant of the labor migration policy preferences held by the governing SAP and allied LO. Institutions not only lend structure to interaction among actors, making some strategies more viable than others, they also represent the concrete outcome of past political struggles. While the ultimate design of institutions does not always reflect intentional action, institutions can be the product of battles decisively lost and won, and symbolic of realized goals that are perceived as worthy of defense. Thus, while these studies draw our attention to the importance of institutions in structuring the opportunities for realizing a given migration policy preference, they do not sufficiently explore how institutions themselves may reflect the core values and political ideas held by certain actors, and how the desire to preserve these

Labor Migration and Migration Policy

17

institutions, as well as related policies, shapes the evaluation of migration policy reform proposals. David Bartram’s study of labor migration in Israel and Japan provides an interesting contrast to much of the above literature, in that he primarily places one domestic actor—the state—squarely in focus. Bartram’s core contention is that “labor migration flows reach significant dimensions when the receiving state does not have the ability to inhibit or constrain rent-seeking behavior on the part of private sector interests.” Bartram proposes that labor migration will be more likely to occur in “bourgeois clientilist” states, where the state “is a vehicle for rent-seeking, either on the part of government officials or (more typically) of employers, through the importation of foreign labor.”40 The opposite of the bourgeois clientilist state can be found in the developmental state. As definition is offered by way of contrast, one must assume that the developmental state does not have a weak bureaucracy, nor “elite groups as well as government officials (who) frequently use state power for their own self-aggrandizement.” Significant labor migration is unlikely to occur in these states, as they are capable of “blocking or constraining” private-sector interests seeking labor migration. At first glance, Bartram’s argument suggests substantial improvement over domestic politics accounts in which the state implicitly lacks autonomy. Here, the state is not a passive servant of societal interests. When endowed with the proper structural capacities, it has the ability to resist calls for the use of foreign workers. Therein lies the problem. Despite careful efforts not to portray states as being inherently predisposed against labor migration, the cumulative effect of Bartram’s argument is to convey that impression. In fact, Bartram states that he would be surprised if there were “government officials—at least those who are not already pawns of private interest groups who would embrace the idea of foreign labor because they believe it will benefit the entire society.”41 However, as the case study chapters show, that is precisely the stance embraced by the SAP, both in and out of power: depending upon its specific configuration, a less restrictive labor migration policy for non-EU citizens is thought to hold considerable promise for the Swedish political economy. Taken jointly, the literature encountered thus far has had much to offer for our understanding of both migration policy preferences and migration policy outcomes. While the Marxist-inspired conventional wisdom may be ill-suited for contemporary instances of labor migration reform, in which parties to the class struggle both find some merit in more liberal entry policies, it nonetheless has served as an effective shorthand for sketching the broad preferences that were once held by labor and business. Globalization-inspired accounts, either in their “pure” form or

18

Chapter One

when internationalization is mediated by domestic variables, also have much to offer in that they have proven to be an effective challenge to the once dominant conventional wisdom. By the same token, in their current iteration, they are unable to offer a compelling account for which reform alternative will be chosen by either business or organized labor. A similar point can be made with regards to the literature that has chiefly sought to stress the importance of domestic variables, be they political institutions on their own, or in conjunction with other factors, such as the economy. While some of these studies highlight how domestic factors are thought to shape preferences, their logic does not extend to the current reform process under way in Sweden. Moreover, much of this literature treats preferences as a given, choosing instead to place the focus on how a range of domestic factors constrain existing migration policy preferences. As such, while the overall literature reviewed in this section serves as a valuable resource, one must look further in order to locate an appropriate candidate for understanding the factors shaping the labor migration policy preferences of LO and the SAP.

LOOKING BEYOND MIGRATION POLICY: VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM AND THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM While the preceding review has focused on an assessment of migrationspecific literature for understanding the labor migration policy preferences of the SAP and LO, one could argue that a wider net could be cast. Indeed, as Gary Freeman has suggested, there is no reason to think that the politics of migration does not follow “well-established paths similar to those associated with the politics of trade, welfare . . . and all the other issues that political scientists study.”42 Given that, one strong candidate for use in the analysis of Swedish labor migration reform should be the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach, which is thought to open up “substantial new perspectives on both economic and social policymaking,”43 as part of an effort among some historical instititutionalist scholars to analyze supposed convergence among capitalist political economies onto a specific norm. As Hugo Radice has observed, such endeavors are far from new, with scholars throughout the social sciences having debated this question from the 1960s to the present.44 One of the more recent contributions to this debate emerged in the 1990s, when scholars sought an explanation for why varying “models of capitalism” appeared to provide different advantages for securing economic growth.45 While a number of influential monographs have sought to grapple with this question, one of the more prominent accounts is provided in Peter Hall and David Soskice’s edited volume Varieties of Capitalism.

Labor Migration and Migration Policy

19

The VoC approach has rapidly become central to the field of comparative political economy. Labeled “the state of the art in institutional analysis,”46 forecast to frame “more research projects than any other perspective”47 in the coming decade, and considered to be the “emblematic citation for all studies of diversity in capitalist economies,”48 the VoC literature advances an explanation for why, in the face of globalization and “neoliberal resurgence,” different capitalist political economies have not converged inevitably onto one institutional form. Hall and Soskice argue that this lack of institutional convergence toward liberal capitalism can be accounted for by examining the functional relationship among institutions of the national economy.49 In doing so, the authors adopt a firm-centered approach to political economy, and justify this choice on the basis of firms being the “key agents of adjustment in the face of technological change or international competition.” While the central agents, firms engage in relationships with other rational and strategic actors as a means of resolving coordination problems in five spheres of the political economy: industrial relations, vocational training and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations, and relations between employers and employees. Based on the institutions devised to solve these coordination problems among competing actors, national economies can be placed into one of two broad categories, either liberal market economies (LMEs) or coordinated market economies (CMEs). In LMEs, firms rely primarily on the use of the market as a means of organizing their relationship with other actors, while in CMEs, different means of non-market coordination take precedence. These distinct institutional clusters emerge owing to the presence of institutional complementarities across different spheres. According to Hall and Soskice, the resolution of a coordination problem in one sphere by either market or non-market means will increase the likelihood that a similar strategy will be adopted when facing coordination problems in other areas of the political economy.50 However, the VoC literature does not simply address the question of accounting for sustained institutional differences among capitalist economies. This approach is also intended to account for the dynamics associated with economic policy reform in advanced industrialized economies. In general, a functionalist perspective on public policymaking is dominant in the VoC volume, with policy measures portrayed as measures intended to maintain and support the continued workings of the broader institutional environment. Hall and Soskice specify that policies stand the greatest chance of achieving desired objectives when they are “incentive compatible”: successful public policies are those that act in complement to the prevailing institutional cluster in the national political economy, while unsuccessful policies are at friction with the logic of coordination predominantly operative in the five spheres.

20

Chapter One

The importance of compatibility between spheres of the political economy and policy reform is also thought to be significant for actors’ policy preferences, with Hall and Thelen noting that institutional complementarities across the political economy will exert a conditioning effect on preferences.51 As Hall and Gingerich observe, “the political response to contemporary economic challenges will vary across liberal and coordinated market economies,” with policymakers in LMEs opting for marketoriented strategies, and with CME policymakers avoiding “deregulatory initiatives that increase market competition.” In addressing the “mixed” French case, Hancké argues that the state now primarily offers “a social policy framework which furthers economic restructuring and competitiveness,” on the assumption that this strategy satisfies “corporate needs for flexibility and profitability.”52 Focusing specifically on employers, Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice have emphasized how the design of the political economy can shape social policy preferences, in that “rational employers who pursue distinctive product market strategies can benefit from welfare programs and policies that favor their product strategy.”53 Wood makes a similar point in his discussion of economic policy reform, asserting that employer preferences are “derived from the properties of CMEs and LMEs,” and further noting that, “employers will look to public policy to maintain and reinforce the variety of institutional competitive advantage upon which they rely.”54 As such, for many VoC scholars, preferences are at least partially (if not outright) a function of the institutional and policy environment of the political economy. Critics of the VoC approach have taken issue with this functionalist portrayal of institutional reform and policymaking, with Chris Howell suggesting that the VoC literature has allotted politics “an extremely thin” role at best.55 Elsewhere, Howell has argued that the VoC approach sees states acting “largely at the behest of employers,” with “employer preferences determine[ing] the content of policy.” He maintains that, in the VoC approach, states do not “appear to have interests distinguishable from those of employers, nor do they have the capacity to act independently, still less against, employer interests.”56 More recently, Walter Korpi has questioned whether the VoC approach has not mistaken consent on the part of employers for the implementation of generous welfare state programs in CMEs with an actual “first-order preference” to see such reforms enacted.57 Related to this is the charge that the VoC approach offers a richer explanation for continuity than it does for institutional and policy change. The emphasis in the core VoC literature on institutional complementarities and supporting public policies has led critics to observe that a blind eye has been turned to cases where the hallmark self-reinforcing equilibrium is lacking, and where there are signs of institutional and policy change

Labor Migration and Migration Policy

21

that could bring about shifts from one mode to another. Germany stands out as a prime example, where partial employer defection from institutions of the labor market leads Blyth to observe that a static portrayal of Germany as the “quintessential CME” may be misleading, as “Germany itself is no longer Germany.” Culpepper’s study of the ways in which European states induce firms to develop vocational training schemes provides an example of movement in the opposite direction, wherein institutions relying on non-market coordination can be fostered in political economies that are not necessarily CME in nature.58 What, though, does this generic discussion of the VoC literature contribute to a potential understanding of labor migration policy reform? The possible value of a VoC approach should be clear. In the migration literature, shifts in the degree of restrictiveness or openness of a state’s labor migration policy have often been cast as being reflexive responses to changes in the national unemployment rate, and the degree to which affected parties mobilize and engage in interest group politics. Institutions also figure prominently in the migration policy literature in terms of structuring the access that domestic groups have to migration policymakers and to relevant actors in legislatures, bureaucracies, and labor market institutions. However, little attention has been given to the question of whether and how functional complements among institutions may themselves contribute to the preferences of immigration policymakers. Thus, given the tight link between labor migration policy and many features of the national political economy, it appears plausible to assume that the logic of institutional and policy complementarities inherent in the VoC approach can make a significant contribution to the analysis of labor migration policy. Yet, as will be seen in the coming empirical chapters, there are certain difficulties associated with attempting to portray Swedish labor migration reform primarily through a VoC lens. Certainly, a strength of the VoC literature is to focus attention on the importance of incentive compatibility when considering the interrelationship among institutions and policies of the political economy. Indeed, this lesson is particularly important for the study of labor migration, where few recent studies have sought to examine how migration policy reform reflects the desire of policymakers and other interested actors to structure labor migration policy in a fashion consistent with the workings of broader economic and social policies. However, I maintain that the functionalist nature of the VoC approach is ill-suited for accurately describing the dynamics associated with the Swedish reform process in two ways. First, as developed more thoroughly in the following chapter, I show that functionalist imperatives per se are not at the heart of the SAP and LO’s labor migration policy preferences. Rather, the desire to maintain a labor migration policy

22

Chapter One

that these two actors regard as CME-consistent stems from political concerns over the implications that a shift toward a more LME-compatible labor migration policy would have for the Swedish model. Second, while employers have played a central role in the reform process, it would be difficult to characterize their role as calling for a labor migration policy consistent with workings of the Swedish CME. Rather, in seeking to overhaul Sweden’s restrictive labor migration policy toward third-country nationals, employers decisively threw their support behind a policy that emphasized the liberal market and not the Swedish model. This book takes seriously the claim by Geddes that “we need to analyze the form that immigration politics takes and the institutional venues where decisions are made.”59 To this, however, I would propose the following amendment. Analyzing the politics of migration reform requires that we consider the importance of institutional and policy venues across the political economy as a whole. Indeed, we should focus attention on the established venues in which the administration of migration policy has taken place. When proposals for migration reform suggest restructuring these venues so as to limit access for certain actors and to heighten the decision-making influence of others, we stand the potential to learn a great deal as to the material and ideological motives that underpin support for certain migration policy alternatives. However, as the preceding discussion has made clear, an analysis of key institutional venues should not solely be limited to those settings where migration policy is made, it should also extend to those institutional and policy settings where migration policy outcomes are thought likely to have a significant impact. While the institutions of government, as well as the systems of interest group representation, have a profound conditioning effect on migration policy outcomes, we should not lose sight of the way in which governments and their allies keep cherished institutions and policies in mind when developing or choosing among competing policy alternatives. As this book will show, migration policy is tightly interwoven with broader struggles over the design of the political economy and the politics of economic reform in advanced industrial countries.

PLAN OF THE BOOK Chapter 2 presents my main argument in greater detail. I begin with a focus on two defining aspects of the Swedish model—full employment policies and the universal welfare state. While increased labor migration is not, in and of itself, inconsistent with either full employment policies or a highly generous universal welfare state, I discuss how certain choices made within the construction of labor migration policy have the potential

Labor Migration and Migration Policy

23

to generate tension for key aspects of the Swedish model. As such, in seeking to defend the overall workings of the Swedish model, both the SAP and LO will be skeptical toward reform initiatives that are perceived as having the capacity to undermine core institutional features of the Swedish model. Following this, I provide detail on six components of labor migration policy that have been of particular salience in the Swedish case, detailing the possible choices that can be made for each policy component. The combined choices made for each of these six components constitute the dependent variable in this study. Finally, I conclude the chapter by briefly summarizing expectations as to the labor migration policy preferences of LO and the SAP. Chapter 3 begins the analysis of the recent Swedish debate over labor migration from non-EU countries by focusing chiefly on the events of the 2002 election to the Swedish parliament. I present an overview of the current framework governing non-EU labor migration to Sweden, stressing both its restrictive and coordinated nature. I then turn my attention to proposals from employers and bourgeois parties for the reform of Swedish labor migration policy, emphasizing how these proposals constitute a sharply liberal shift. Following this, I focus on the responses from the SAP and LO, as labor migration grew into one of the most hotly debated issues of the 2002 election campaign. These two actors took great pains to emphasize that they did not oppose the resumption of labor migration per se, but rejected the introduction of liberal labor migration. Key figures in LO and the SAP stressed that policy reform required careful attention to full employment goals, and guaranteeing continued influence for both trade unions and the Swedish National Labor Market Board (AMS) in the gatekeeping process. As such, this chapter provides considerable insight into why it is that both LO and the SAP diagnose a market-driven labor migration reform as inconsistent with the aims of the Swedish model. The focus of chapter 4 is on the events of early 2003 until spring 2008. At the start of that period, the bourgeois opposition and the Greens were able to force the establishment of a parliamentary committee charged with developing new rules to ease third-country national labor migration. With the then ruling SAP in the majority, the committee produced a proposal that sought to preserve an incentive compatible model for granting nonEU citizens to the Swedish labor market. Concurrent to the committee’s work, LO published several reports that offered increasingly detailed accounts of the trade union’s own preferences for an overhauled labor migration policy. Here too, the emphasis was on a highly regulated system, in which the documentation of labor shortages and a continued corporatist gatekeeping structure figured prominently as central components. Yet, for these two allies, the bourgeois victory in the 2006 parliamentary election

24

Chapter One

spelled defeat in the battle over labor migration reform. In the summer of 2007, the four-party bourgeois governing alliance proposed a policy in which employers would become the chief gatekeepers in almost all instances of third-country national labor migration. Despite efforts on the part of the SAP and LO to ensure the emergence of an incentive-compatible labor migration policy from the reform process, the decision of the bourgeois government to concentrate gatekeeping authority and decision making power in the hands of employers implied that the market would be the driving force behind Swedish labor migration policy, and not the priorities of the social democratic labor movement. In chapter 5, I take up an interesting challenge for my argument and focus on the debate over workers from the ten countries that joined the European Union on May 1, 2004. Unlike the case of non-EU labor migration in chapters 3 and 4, the SAP and LO had divergent preferences when it came to the question of whether or not to impose transitional rules on labor migrants from the new EU-members countries. The ruling SAP ultimately supported the implementation of restrictive entry policies that would have required work permits to be granted for the first two years that a national from a new EU member country was present on the Swedish labor market. LO, on the other hand, argued that no transitional rules should be implemented. How do we understand these divergent preferences? Moreover, what implications do they have for the general argument that defenders of the welfare state prefer labor migration policies that are consistent with the institutional and policy workings of the Swedish model? The SAP preference for transitional rules is unproblematic, and stems from concerns that extensive social services might result in a pull factor, attracting individuals seeking to capitalize on the high social wages. The opposition of LO to transitional rules can be understood by analyzing the specific proposals for curtailing the freedom of workers from the new EU member countries on the Swedish labor market. As we will see, these proposals only allowed for limitations to be placed on individuals who entered as employees, and placed no restriction on their ability to enter as independent contractors or through temporary agencies. Given this, LO felt that the implementation of transitional measures could still result in a worsening of conditions on the Swedish labor market and a weakening in labor’s overall position of strength. Thus, it sought instead to protect its priorities by lobbying both the Green Party and the Left Party for tighter labor market regulations. Chapter 6 concludes the book by assessing the implications of the Swedish case of labor migration reform. While the subsequent case study chapters will identify certain differences in the policy preferences of LO and the SAP, a common objective is shared: both actors seek to minimize any potential disruptive effects to the Swedish model when granting la-

Labor Migration and Migration Policy

25

bor market access to foreign nationals. I also call attention to the implications that employer support for a deregulated model of labor migration has for the VoC literature, as well as for scholarship addressing the current status of Swedish corporatism. Finally, I consider the significance of recent EU efforts for establishing a common migration policy, suggesting that debates in the national arena of policymaking will continue to remain relevant. In looking for evidence to assess my argument, I rely on a wide range of primary and secondary source material. These include parliamentary minutes, committee motions and reports, as well as proposals and reports issued by the government, state bureaucracy, political parties, and key interest groups. I have also drawn extensively upon Swedish media coverage of the labor migration policy reform debate, including editorials, commentaries, and statements made by key actors to print and broadcast sources. Interviews were conducted with a small number of key elites involved in the debate over labor migration reform in late 2003. These were of particular assistance as background for clarifying the stances of the SAP and the Confederation of Swedish Employers.

NOTES 1. Peter J. May, “Policy Design and Implementation,” in B. Guy Peters and Job Pierre (eds.), Handbook of Public Administration (London: Sage, 2005), 223. 2. Leah Haus, Unions, Immigration and Internationalization: New Challenges and Changing Coalitions in the United States and France (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 160. 3. Sven Steinmo, “Bucking the Trend? The Welfare State and the Global Economy: The Swedish Case Up Close,” New Political Economy 8, no. 1 (March 2003): 44. 4. Paul Pierson, “Irresistible Forces, Immovable Objects,” Journal of European Public Policy 5, no. 4 (1998): 550–551. 5. “Europe’s Population Implosion,” The Economist, July 17, 2003. 6. Russell Shorto, “No Babies? Declining Population in Europe,” New York Times Sunday Magazine, June 29, 2008. 7. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Immigration, Integration and Employment, COM (2003) 36 Final, 12. 8. German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Immigration Law and Policy, 2005, 31. 9. For a discussion of the debate over possible reform to European migration policies, see Jan Niessen and Yongmi Schiebel, “Promoting Debates on European Migration Policies,” European Journal of Migration and Law 4 (2003): 469–475. 10. United Nations, Population Division, Replacement Migration: Is It A Solution To Declining and Ageing Populations? 2001.

26

Chapter One

11. European Commission, COM (2003) 36 Final (2003): 16–17. 12. European Commission, Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration, COM (2004) 811 Final, 4. 13. Kofi Annan, “Why Europe needs an immigration strategy,” January 29, 2004. www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/sg-29jan2004.htm. 14. Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack. Immigrant Workers and Class Structures in Western Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 119. 15. Zolberg, as cited in Haus, Unions, Immigration and Internationalization. 16. Gary Freeman, “Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 485 (1986): 51–63. 17. Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism: Between Market, Class and Society (London: Sage Publications, 2001), 7. 18. Julie Watts, Immigration Policy and the Challenge of Globalization: Unions and Employers in Unlikely Alliance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), 2. 19. Leah Haus, “Labor Unions and Immigration Policy in France,” International Migration Review 33, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 685. 20. Leah Haus, “Openings in the Wall: Transnational Migrants, Labor Unions and U.S. Immigration Policy,” International Organization 49, no. 2 (1995): 293. 21. Haus, “Openings in the Wall,” 7. 22. Watts, Immigration Policy and the Challenge of Globalization, 2. 23. Watts, Immigration Policy and the Challenge of Globalization, 9. 24. Haus, Unions, Immigration and Internationalization, 159. 25. Haus, Unions, Immigration and Internationalization, 161. 26. Jeannette Money, Fences and Neighbors: The Political Geography of Immigration Control (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), 60. 27. Money, Fences and Neighbors, 9. 28. Money, Fences and Neighbors, 63. 29. Money, in fact, argues that even the French presidential election contests should be seen as a single-member district contest, given the district-level structure of campaigns. 30. Money, Fences and Neighbors, 20–21. 31. Money, Fences and Neighbors, 47. Moreover, Money holds that the logic developed in her book applies to any country whose wealth attracts immigrants, whose state capacity allows for the effective control of borders, and who possesses democratic political institutions that allow citizens to express their policy preferences. See p. 13. 32. Eytan Meyers, International Immigration Policy: A Political Economy Analysis (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 13–17. 33. Meyers, International Immigration Policy, 17. 34. Meyers, International Immigration Policy. 35. Jeffrey Togman, The Ramparts of Nations: Institutions and Immigration Policies in France and the United States (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2001), 4. 36. Togman, The Ramparts of Nations, 12. 37. See chapter 1 of Simon Green, The Politics of Exclusion: Institutions and Immigration Policy in Contemporary Germany (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2004).

Labor Migration and Migration Policy

27

38. Bo Rothstein and Sven Steinmo, “Restructuring Politics: Institutional Analysis and the Challenges of Modern Welfare States,” in Bo Rothstein and Sven Steinmo (eds.), Restructuring the Welfare State: Political Institutions and Policy Change (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 4. 39. Bo Rothstein, Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 22. 40. David Bartram, International Labor Migration: Foreign Workers and Public Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 17. 41. Bartram, International Labor Migration, 17–18. 42. Gary P. Freeman, “Political Science and Immigration: Policy Types and Modes of Politics,” paper presented at the R. F. Harvey Lecture Series, University of Toronto, March 21, 2003, 3–4. 43. Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001), 45. 44. Hugo Radice, “Globalization and National Capitalisms: Theorizing Convergence and Differentiation,” Review of International Political Economy 7, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 719. 45. See Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura (eds.), The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism: Germany and Japan in Comparison (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), chapter 1. 46. Chris Howell, “Varieties of Capitalism: And Then There Was One?” Comparative Politics 36, no. 1 (October 2003): 121. 47. Mark Blyth, “Same As It Never Was: Temporality and Typology in the Varieties of Capitalism,” Comparative European Politics 1, no. 2 (2003): 215. 48. Colin Crouch, “Models of Capitalism,” New Political Economy 10, no. 4 (December 2005), 442. 49. Hall and Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism. 50. See Vivien A. Schmidt, “French Capitalism Transformed, Yet Still a Third Variety of Capitalism,” Economics and Society 32, no. 4 (November 2003): 526–554 for an argument that the French political economy constitutes a distinct “stateenhanced” variety of capitalism. 51. Peter A. Hall and Kathleen Thelen, “Institutional Change in Varieties of Capitalism,” paper prepared for presentation to the Europeanists Conference, Chicago, March 2006. 52. Bob Hancké, “Revisiting the French Model: Coordination and Restructuring in French Industry,” in Peter Hall and David Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001), 334. 53. Margarita Estevez-Abe, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice, “Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State,” in Peter Hall and David Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001), 160. 54. Stuart Wood, “Business, Government and Patterns of Labor Market Policy in Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany,” in Peter Hall and David Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001), 249.

28

Chapter One

55. Chris Howell, Trade Unions and the State: The Construction of Industrial Relations Institutions in Britain, 1890–2000, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 28. 56. Howell, “Varieties of Capitalism,” 121. 57. Walter Korpi, “Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism: Protagonists, Consenters and Antagonists,” World Politics 58, no. 2 (2006): 167–206. 58. Pepper D. Culpepper, Creating Cooperation: How States Develop Human Capital in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002). 59. Andrew Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe (London: Sage, 2003), 22.

Two Labor Migration and the Preservation of the Swedish Model

The central argument of this book is that both the SAP and LO view labor migration policymaking as being closely intertwined with key institutions, policies, and principles of the Swedish model. In developing their policy preferences, these two actors consider the extent to which proposals for labor migration reform will be effective complementarities to institutional and policy features deemed central to the Swedish model. At times, such as the enlargement of the European Union on May 1, 2004, a key concern for the SAP has been the possible impact of unrestricted migration on Sweden’s generous provision of welfare state services. At other times, both the SAP and LO have evaluated proposals for labor migration reform against the backdrop of their likely impact on the organization of the Swedish labor market, as well as on the balance of power between employers and labor. Frequently, the question of continued trade union influence over the implementation of labor migration policy has been a central concern. Proposals perceived as having the potential to threaten the Swedish social democratic vision for the political economy have generally been opposed. In contrast, the SAP and LO are more favorably inclined toward proposals for labor migration reform that mesh with the existing design of policies and institutions central to the Swedish model. In this chapter, I develop the specifics of my argument in greater detail. Specifically, I demonstrate that labor migration policy, depending on its construction, can generate certain tensions for two key features of the Swedish model that are deeply cherished by both the SAP and LO: full employment policies and the universal welfare state. In the case of the former, labor migration generates a possible tension for the full employment policies of the Swedish model when, among others things, gatekeeping 29

30

Chapter Two

authority over work permit approvals is ceded entirely to employers who prioritize immediate access to foreign labor over continued reliance on active labor market policy measures that can keep domestic labor reserves at a minimum. In the case of the latter, labor migration results in a possible tension for the universal welfare state when actors fear that migrants are chiefly being drawn to the receiving country’s labor market by a highly generous set of welfare state rights that are available to all who can document a minimum level of employment. Taken jointly, these two tensions suggest that it is not labor migration per se that constitutes a threat to the workings of the Swedish model, but rather a specific configuration of the policy that grants foreign workers access to the Swedish labor market. I then discuss each of the six components of labor migration policy that have been salient in the Swedish case, describing the key ways that each can vary. The combined choices made for each of these six components constitute the dependent variable in this study. Prior to continuing, a brief definitional clarification is necessary regarding the Swedish model. As with many conceptual terms that are widely deployed within comparative politics, a commonly agreed upon definition of the Swedish model is lacking. In some instances, the model has referred to specific economic and social policy measures introduced by the SAP, while in other cases the model has also been characterized by a specific form of interest group representation, namely democratic corporatism. Despite the absence of a discrete definition, Rudolf Meidner’s attempt at capturing the essence of the broad model as “a description of the complex ends and means which together form Swedish postwar politics”1 appears to be the safest path when considering the possibility of omitting some crucial feature. Yet, such a depiction runs the risk of being too general, as considering the whole of the Swedish postwar polity to be the equivalent of the model prevents us from prioritizing the significance of some distinguishing features over that of others. Given that, the narrower version of the Swedish model to be explored in this study will chiefly be those two elements considered to be representative of the success of the model’s success during its postwar golden era: full employment and the institutions of the universal welfare state.2 By limiting our focus to the linkages between these two central features of the Swedish model and labor migration, the underlying logic driving the migration policy preferences of both the SAP and LO become increasingly clear.

THE LABOR MIGRATION–FULL EMPLOYMENT LINK Full employment is, of course, not a uniquely Swedish goal in the postwar era. Nonetheless, it has become a hallmark of what constitutes the Swed-

Labor Migration and the Preservation of the Swedish Model

31

ish model, when taken in conjunction with a number of other economic goals: low inflation, high economic growth, and wage equality.3 However, full employment and wage equality do not easily co-exist. Full employment objectives can be easily undermined by wage equality, as the latter is likely to create unemployment in inefficient economic sectors. Thus, to restore the possibility that full employment can be achieved simultaneous to reducing wage differentials, an active labor market policy emerged after World War II as one of the core instruments intended to facilitate full employment, serving as an “essential element of the Swedish welfare state” and “linchpin for continued cooperation” between the SAP and LO.4 It is worthwhile to pause and consider how, in general, an active labor market policy can be a critical tool for furthering the interests of the working class and its representatives. In a number of studies on Swedish active labor market policy, Bo Rothstein has stressed that labor market policy is central to the power struggle that occurs between classes in capitalist society. The very strength of trade unions is regarded by Rothstein as being “dependent on their ability to monopolize the supply of labour,” while employers who seek to tip the balance of power in their direction are portrayed as wishing “to recruit workers outside the control of unions.”5 The contemporary strategy of mass-membership trade unions seeking a monopoly over the labor supply has been to ensure that levels of unemployment remain as low as possible, thus minimizing the chances of competition among workers for scarce jobs, and preventing downward wage pressure.6 Since the 1950s, Swedish active labor market policy has not only been a powerful instrument acting in support of economic growth; it has also been utilized to attack the problem of unemployment, and thereby, to prevent the balance of power on the labor market from being tipped in the favor of employers. Originally proposed by two trade union economists, Gustav Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, active labor market policy was initially characterized by measures such as subsidizing removal expenses for relocating workers, vocational training, and the provision of employment information to job seekers.7 Tilton argues that the instruments of active labor market policy first had their “breakthrough” during the 1957–1958 recession.8 However, as the economy recovered and expanded, he also notes that the goals of active labor market policy moved beyond that of “alleviating unemployment” resulting from structural transformation to that of preventing unemployment and increasing workforce participation rates. As Swenson observes, active labor market policy had been a device to “allocate scarce labor across the Swedish economy,” whose primary target groups were blue-collar union members who could be channeled to industrial sectors and geographic locations where labor shortages existed. 9

32

Chapter Two

However, Christian Toft stresses that the target audience and content of Swedish labor market policy changed considerably during the 1960s and 1970s. According to Toft, the retraining of workers to meet new industrial needs became a mere “side issue” in the overall mix of active labor market policy. Rather, the bulk of the training was increasingly directed toward the provision of “basic competence-improving courses, ordinary education and training, and courses in Swedish language” to “groups with poor educational attainment and special needs.”10 A special focus on increasing the employment prospects for marginal groups remains a priority of AMS, with “youth, the work-handicapped, immigrants and those on long-term sick leave” identified as key groups upon whom labor market board officials must concentrate their efforts.11 Today, the goal of full employment and the related policy instrument of an active labor market policy remain central to both the labor movement and their governing social democratic allies. In support of full employment, AMS was budgeted approximately ten billion kronor per year for active labor market policy measures in 2006 and 2007. LO has described full employment as “decisive for taking care of welfare state financing” and senior LO economists have recently asserted that a welldefined active labor market policy can provide a strong incentive for the unemployed looking to re-enter the workforce.12 Full employment has been regularly characterized by former SAP cabinet ministers as crucial to the attainment of a society in which equality prevails, with active labor market policy receiving much of the credit for what has been achieved thus far.13 In 2004, then Minister of Working Life Hans Karlsson noted that Sweden’s success in meeting EU workforce participation targets well ahead of schedule could largely be put down to the workings of an active labor market policy: The truth is that a strong labor market policy is a guarantee for a continually ongoing and necessary structural transformation. A labor market policy that sees to it that people get protection when they are unemployed, that they aren’t arbitrarily dismissed, and that they are offered assistance in finding new work supports healthy industry and a developed working life.14

That full employment and an active labor market policy are important to LO and the SAP should be clear. How, though, does labor migration pose a challenge to those seeking to defend these institutions and policies central to the social democratic project? The answer should be equally obvious. It is not labor migration per se that threatens social democratic labor market policies and objectives, but rather how labor migration policy is structured. Proposals in which gatekeeping authority over migrant admissions, decisions over sectoral access for migrant labor, and permit extensions and upgrades are placed in the hands of employers are poor candidates for

Labor Migration and the Preservation of the Swedish Model

33

incentive compatibility with a model that is built on principles and practices of regulation, where the labor supply has been tightly managed and where organized labor has been granted an influential role to defend its interests. Liberal labor migration, in which the desire of firms for foreign labor is privileged, grants employers the freedom to pass over the existing pool of unemployed workers, as well as those registered in active labor market policy programs, and to recruit desired labor from anywhere and everywhere. In short, under this less regulated form of labor migration, a scenario could develop in which foreign labor emerges as a substitute to the domestic workforce. From the perspective of both the SAP and LO, liberal labor migration thus carries with it the possibility that full employment aims of an active labor market policy will be threatened, and that a tip in the balance of power away from organized labor may occur. Of equal significance, it strips Swedish organized labor of the gatekeeping function over the admission of foreign workers that it has held since 1949.15 However, labor migration policy preferences are not solely constructed on the basis of their perceived impact on full employment policies. Concerns about the relationship between migration and the universal welfare state are also of great significance. It is to that discussion that I now turn.

THE WELFARE STATE–MIGRATION LINKAGE A number of scholars have argued that our understanding of migration policy, both how it is made, and how societal actors develop their preferences, must take into account the tensions that exist between migration and welfare state structures. Writing in the 1980s, Gary Freeman stressed not only that welfare states may require restrictive policies in order to preserve their defining features, but also that welfare state services ultimately generate the conditions making migrant labor necessary. While the thesis that welfare states require restrictive migration policies is perhaps more common in both the academic literature and in the popular debate, I begin this discussion with Freeman’s second observation, one which has generated less attention: that welfare state services ultimately lay the groundwork for labor market conditions, increasing the demand for migrant workers. According to Freeman, a range of welfare state benefits, including unemployment compensation, housing allowances, and universal healthcare, have decommodified welfare state residents, allowing them to exercise substantially greater discretion in choosing employment opportunities than for individuals residing in less generous welfare states.16 This trend is particularly apparent in Sweden, where a recurrent theme in the public debate concerns the substantial portion of the working-age popu-

34

Chapter Two

lation that is not active on the labor market, but stands on the sidelines, such as students, early retirees, the unemployed, those in job training programs, and those on long-term disability leave. Given the exit option provided to domestic workers by generous welfare states, Freeman argues that employers will thus be forced to look abroad for the necessary labor supply. At first glance, this argument seems a bit crass: welfare states will treat foreign labor as a substitute for domestic workers who have opted to make use of healthcare, retirement, and education policies. Of course, it may not be possible to find policymakers or organized interests that frame the demand for foreign labor in such instrumental terms. Still, it is not inconceivable that relevant actors have become aware of how a sharp rise in the number of those exiting the labor market, particularly retirees who require increased access to costly social services, may necessitate labor migration. In this case, labor migration can become quite attractive to welfare-state defenders. First, labor migration can serve as one means for preventing an excessive rise in the old-age dependency ratio, which is vital to ensuring continued funding for social services. As the International Labor Organization has stressed, in order for Europe to maintain its current standard of living in the twenty-first century, a strategy that relies on both increased workforce participation for the domestic population and a substantial increase in the number of migrants will have to be enacted.17 Second, labor migration provides a pool of labor to staff the positions within welfare state services that are likely to face dramatic shortages in the coming decades. In February 2004, the chair of the Swedish Municipal Workers’ Union, Ylva Thörn, wrote an op-ed piece in Dagens Nyheter in which she pointed out that the combined effects of an aging population, and a decreasing interest among the young for careers in welfare state services, would result in substantial recruiting shortfalls. As one example, Thörn estimated that within eldercare, the recruiting needs would amount to roughly 35,000 to 42,000 new workers each year between 2004 and 2015, with secondary schools only producing 2,000 new graduates a year for this profession.18 Recruitment campaigns in Sweden, as well as in other European countries, such as the Netherlands, have been utilized successfully to attract foreign workers to healthcare sectors with serious staffing shortages.19 Thus, there is reason to believe that as the labor force needs grow within advanced welfare states, policymakers will look to the potential of foreign workers in meeting the challenge. Indeed, as the coming case study chapters will document, key figures in both the SAP and LO have emphasized that some form of labor migration from non-EU countries will eventually be necessary if Sweden is to maintain a generously financed bundle of welfare state services. Yet, while migration may be one tool for resolving the funding and labor force crisis confronting advanced welfare states, it also produces

Labor Migration and the Preservation of the Swedish Model

35

certain challenges. According to Freeman, national labor markets differ in terms of both their direct and indirect wages. Direct wages are the “direct money income and other fringe benefits paid by the employer,” while indirect wages, or the social wage, consists of state-provided benefits, protections, and rights. Freeman argues that foreign workers are not just drawn to job opportunities in receiving countries in a quest for high direct wages, but also for extensive indirect wages, which are thought to generate an “attractive pull on workers in less prosperous societies.”20 Suspicions as to the motives of migrants who seek to enter and establish residence in European welfare states may lead to specific policy preferences. Keith G. Banting has proposed the term “welfare chauvinism” as a way of capturing the restrictive preferences held by individuals that have traditionally supported welfare state services, yet who may be vulnerable to negative economic effects of migration.21 According to Banting, two varieties of welfare chauvinism exist. One alternative is the preference for a restrictive benefits policy, in which foreign residents are not provided with social services at a level equivalent to that of the citizen population. While arguing that such policies are most likely to find expression in liberal welfare states, scholars such as Geddes have pointed out that even social democratic welfare states, for example Denmark, are now witnessing the growth of restrictive policies intended to phase in access to welfare state services over a lengthy period.22 The second form of welfare chauvinism occurs in the form of a preference for restrictive entry policies, designed to “prevent foreigners from entering the country and gaining access to comprehensive social services.”23 According to Banting, it is this latter form of welfare chauvinism that has had the most impact in “expansive welfare states.” Indeed, he notes that while social democratic countries have been generally successful at incorporating those migrants who have been granted legal residence, the price has been the acceptance of restrictive immigration control policies.24 Thus, an assumption in this literature is that restrictive control policies serve a crucial function, preventing excessive demands from being placed on the ability of an advanced welfare state to provide services over the long haul. As the political theorist Joseph Carens puts it, “defenders of the welfare state” are suspicious that the final outcome of open migration policies would be a “return to a nineteenth-century laissez-faire social order.”25 Brochman strikes a similar tone, albeit less dramatic, when observing that states may choose to strictly control and limit entries “in order to maintain basic levels of social equality among the resident population.”26 Chapter 5 will provide a detailed analysis of a case in which the SAP sought, unsuccessfully, to limit labor migrant access from the ten countries that joined the European Union in 2004. While the SAP originally opposed transitional rules, both the media and a parliamentary commission

36

Chapter Two

of inquiry stressed the possibility that migrants from the new EU member states would arrive as Sweden as “social tourists,” primarily interested in gaining access to the benefits of the Swedish model. Citing concerns to protect both the welfare state and the system of labor market regulation, the ruling SAP eventually sought to push through rules requiring work permits during a two-year transitional period. Indeed, the financial pillars of the welfare state may be challenged when unrestricted entry policies are coupled with full access to social services. However, the question remains as to why restrictive benefits policies are not the policy instrument of choice in social democratic welfare states. I argue that proposals linking reformed entry policies to limited or graduated access to social services constitute an additional challenge to social democratic welfare states. In this case, it is not the financial capacity of the welfare state that is under assault, but rather what Esping-Andersen has referred to as the principles of universalism that are a defining feature of the Scandinavian welfare state. Characteristic of this cluster of welfare states are a set of “de-commodifying and universalistic programs” ensuring that manual workers come to enjoy rights identical to those of salaried whitecollared employees or civil servants; all strata are incorporated under one universal insurance system, yet benefits are graduated according to accustomed earnings. This model crowds out the market, and consequently constructs an essentially universal solidarity in favor of the welfare state. All benefit; all are dependent; and all will presumably feel obliged to pay.27

Rothstein’s description of the moral logic underpinning the universal welfare state provides an important glimpse into how specific migration policy reforms may challenge welfare state principles of universalism. Stressing that the fundamental feature of universal welfare state policy is the embracement of all citizens, he suggests that societies which have adopted this guiding value are effectively able to sidestep any discussion regarding where “boundary lines” ought to be drawn in terms of those who do and do not deserve state-funded provision of social services.28 Whereas welfare states that rely primarily on means-testing in order to allocate social services must delineate clear borders between those who are deemed to be deserving of state assistance and those who are not, the universal welfare state (in its ideal form) makes no such distinction. The discussion of whether boundary lines ought to exist, and where they ought to be drawn, is made all the more complex when taking into account that not all residents of the welfare state are citizens. Even if questions of whether to regard a documented need for social services as an appropriate criterion is resolved, there remains the issue of an individual’s status as either citizen or resident alien. As Kildal and Kuhnle have pointed out, universalism can be constructed in a restrictive fashion, with service provision

Labor Migration and the Preservation of the Swedish Model

37

only applying to citizens, or it can take on a more comprehensive design, extending to non-citizens with established residence.29 On balance, the Scandinavian welfare states have opted to define universalism in a comprehensive fashion, granting legal migrants generous access to a broad range of social services. Proposals for migration policy reform that contain explicit provisions limiting migrant access to social services, or phasing them in over time, are in sharp contrast to this established principle, and reintroduce the thorny issue of where appropriate welfare state boundary lines ought to be drawn. This does not imply that there will be no discussion or statements of concern on the part of social democratic governments and their allies as to the likely impact of migration on the demand for social services. Indeed, one of the central aims of chapter 5 is to trace the way in which concerns over “social tourism” became increasingly prevalent with the SAP, leading to the preference for restrictive transitional rules, but not for limited access to social services. Rather, as we will see in chapters 3 and 4, it is primarily employers and bourgeois parties who have broached the issue of a qualification period that must be successfully completed before full access to the goods of the Swedish welfare state can be had at levels identical to that of all other residents. Clearly, migration makes some hard choices necessary for defenders of the welfare state. Evidence and past practice suggest that an influx of foreign workers can have multiple benefits for welfare state institutions and programs. However, unrestricted migrant entry has the potential to overwhelm the service provision capacity of the welfare state, undermining the very system that migrant labor is intended to help shore up. For social democrats and allied trade unions, restrictive benefits policies will not generally be a viable policy alternative, as these violate principles of universalism considered fundamental to the Scandinavian welfare state. It now becomes necessary to shift our attention to the dependent variable in this study: labor migration policy preferences. While many studies have focused on actors and migration policy preferences in terms of the overall flow of migrants, I instead focus on the detailed components that are at the heart of the Swedish reform debate. It is these components that policymakers have sometimes disagreed vehemently over, and it is the configuration of these components that results in fears of the Swedish model being weakened by a resumption in labor migration.

IDENTIFYING THE PREFERENCES OF THE SAP AND LO: THE SIX COMPONENTS OF LABOR MIGRATION POLICY The argument of this book is that the SAP and LO examine various labor migration policy reform alternatives, opposing those they believe likely

38

Chapter Two

to have a damaging effect on the workings of the Swedish model, and supporting those thought likely to reinforce core features of the model. However, just what is it in terms of labor migration policy that these two allies are examining? There are of course, multiple ways to unpack the components of migration policy broadly, or labor migration policy more narrowly. Frequently, these efforts at operationalization involve specifying a liberal-restrictive continuum along which different immigration policies or policy components can vary. Givens and Luedtke follow the common practice developed by Tomas Hammar of distinguishing between immigration control policies and immigrant integration policies. To the former, they assign illegal immigration, asylum/refugees, family reunification, and legal labor migration, while to the latter they assign citizenship and anti-discrimination policies. Each of these six policies is thought to potentially vary between restrictiveness and expansiveness.30 Meyers operationalizes migration policy as taking place along three continua, all ranging from liberal to restrictive: the number to be accepted, the racial/ethnic and cultural composition of potential migrants, and the possibilities for permanent immigration.31 Boswell’s operationalization of migration policy is future-oriented, depicting three alternate scenarios. Yet, her categories also draw strongly on an effort to characterize migration policy as either more or less restrictive, with one possibility being that restrictiveness will continue, a second being that more liberal policies in one category of migration will extend more generally to additional categories, and a third, in which more liberal entry policies for one category of migrants will not necessarily extend to additional migrant groups.32 As such, a common practice in the analysis of migration policy of various stripes is to categorize policy or policy components on the basis of the varying degree to which they are restrictive. I also choose to make use of a liberal-restrictive continuum in detailing the content of labor migration policy. However, in order to understand the full range of possibilities in the Swedish case, and particularly for establishing subsequent linkages between policy preferences and concerns over the Swedish model, I maintain that it is necessary to disaggregate Swedish labor migration policy into six related components. These six components are derived from the specifics of the ongoing Swedish debate. I make no claim that all debates over labor migration policy reform in advanced industrialized countries will feature this same constellation of policy components. Yet, as the subsequent case study chapters show, there is a clear linkage between the possible choices on these six components, on the one hand, and the concerns held by LO and the SAP over the continued health of the Swedish model, on the other. The six components of labor migration policy in the Swedish case that I focus on are: the designation of gatekeepers, the criteria to be met in or-

Labor Migration and the Preservation of the Swedish Model

39

der for migrants to be granted work permits, the location of migrants’ job searches, the initial degree of migrant labor market access, the potential for migrants to upgrade work permits and to convert these into permanent resident status, and migrant access to welfare state services. Gatekeepers A gatekeeper is an actor that plays a formal part in the granting of work permits. Certainly, among gatekeepers, public actors figure prominently. The state migration board is perhaps the most common, and is generally responsible for receiving and processing applications, verifying the accuracy of certain information where necessary, notifying applicants and employers of eventual outcomes, and maintaining statistics over application trends. National and local labor market boards are also common public gatekeepers involved in the decision-making process. Oftentimes relied upon to make assessments of current and future labor-market needs (regionally, nationally, or within a given sector), their conclusions can be critical for the scope of migrant access. Private actors may also serve an important gatekeeping function. The most common of these is employers, who may initiate the formal application process by making a written offer of employment to the prospective migrant, and may even be required to submit the complete application on behalf of the migrant. Trade unions figure as the other key private actor with a potential gatekeeping role. Organized labor may be called upon for purely informational purposes, such as to verify that appropriate wages and employment conditions are being offered, or unions may be granted a significantly broader scope of influence, with their formal support necessary in order for either individual applications to be approved, or for specific sectors of the economy to be placed on occupational shortlists. As such, actors who are developing and evaluating proposals for labor migration reform must make decisions regarding who will control the foreign labor tap. This function can be broadly distributed, resulting in significant influence for a variety of public and private actors, or it can be constructed quite narrowly, limiting permit-granting authority to an individual actor or to a small cluster of actors. Criteria for Entry Once gatekeepers have been designated, the natural question to ask is what criteria should guide their admission decisions. While some criteria are seemingly a formality, gatekeepers must nonetheless check these items off in order to ensure that certain basic conditions are met. Key examples of these would be requirements that minimum or prevailing wages are

40

Chapter Two

met, that appropriate employment conditions are being offered, and that any information pertaining to a migrant’s possible criminal background is verified. Less of a formality, and vastly more contentious, is the question of whether a labor shortage exists, and what kind, which must be documented. One way to conceive of the possible choices in this instance is to utilize a continuum. Toward one end, we can find those measures that assess labor market conditions in one way or another before allowing employers to hire foreign labor. One highly restrictive variant of this is when labor shortages are assessed in conjunction with each individual application. In this case, prospective migrants are only granted admission if it can be verified that no appropriate candidate can first be located regionally, nationally, or as is the case in Europe, throughout the European Union. A less restrictive variant occurs when shortages need not be documented on a case-by-case basis, but rather by sector. Here, labor market authorities can assume a key role by providing expert information regarding those sectors that are currently facing substantial labor shortages, as well as those likely to witness similar shortages in the near future. Such sectors can then be placed on occupational shortlists, thus negating the need to conduct a test of labor market conditions for each individual applicant to jobs in those sectors. Toward the other end of the continuum, the employer’s perceived hiring needs take precedence. In this instance, consideration of migration’s potential impact on overall labor market trends are not necessarily paramount. Rather, employers conduct their own subjective assessment of firm needs and the degree to which those can be most effectively satisfied by either domestic or foreign workers. Under this highly liberal variant, employers have what amounts to the final say when making the judgment as to choosing foreign labor. Thus, what is up for grabs in determining the appropriate criteria for entry is the question of whether broader labor market trends should drive permit decisions, in which case the potential impact of foreign labor’s presence on the domestic workforce may be a factor, or whether foreign workers may be recruited solely on the basis of employer preferences. Location of Job Search It is commonly said that one of the most tried and true ways of finding employment is to “get out there and knock on some doors.” Yet, the design of labor migration policy does not always afford migrants this opportunity. On the one hand, the destination country can be ruled offlimits for potential migrants until an application for an initial work permit has been approved. That is, all contact between employers and potential migrants must occur outside the destination country through such devices as firm recruiting trips or job announcements placed in foreign

Labor Migration and the Preservation of the Swedish Model

41

media. This has the potential effect of making foreign recruitment a more costly prospect for employers, particularly when they must opt to travel abroad in hopes of locating appropriate candidates. In contrast, the other major option is to allow potential migrants to enter the destination country and to conduct their search for employment on-site. In this instance, migrants are granted a fixed period of time in which to carry out their job search. Should a job offer be received that is in accordance with relevant criteria as outlined above, an application could be submitted from within the country, thus contributing to an expedited process. A combination of these two approaches is possible, with foreign workers who possess desired skill sets being given access, while other categories of workers must rely on making contact with firms from abroad. Initial Migrant Labor Market Access and Duration of Employment Decisions also need to be made as to the degree of labor market access that will accompany the initial residency period, as well as the necessary duration of employment in order for a permit application to be approved. In terms of the former, it can again be useful to think of alternatives as ranging from restrictive to open. At the most restrictive end of the continuum, migrants who are newly admitted for purposes of employment are granted no freedom of movement on the broader labor market. Maintaining a valid permit status is contingent upon remaining employed in the position that served as the basis for the initial application. Should the migrant wish to switch employers, he or she would be required to submit a new permit application. Such a requirement can become a formidable obstacle, particularly when it occurs in conjunction with other components of migration policy that may require tests of labor market shortages for each individual application and where paperwork must be submitted from abroad. A less restrictive variant involves granting freedom of movement within a given occupational sector of the economy. In this instance, migrants are free to switch employers while present on their initial permit, but may do so only in the sector of the labor market to which they were initially admitted.33 At the opposite end of the spectrum, labor migrants face no restrictions on their labor market access at all, and are free to switch employers, and also to try their luck in any sector of the economy where job openings present themselves. In this instance, the initial work permit serves as an “all access” pass to the host country’s labor market, regardless of the nature of the original job offer. A related consideration is the duration of employment required in order for an initial work permit to be granted. In Sweden, two main possibilities exist. First, individuals may be hired on open-ended employment contracts. Such contracts generally provide the greatest degree of

42

Chapter Two

job security, as employees may only be dismissed for gross dereliction of duties, or when a documented lack of work exists. Alternately, an individual may be hired on a fixed-term basis. In this case, the termination date is clearly specified. Should employers choose to do so, possibilities for renewals exist. However, after a certain period of time, some temporary contracts must be converted into open-ended employment contracts. Taken jointly, actors are in essence deciding whether migrants should have labor market access equivalent to that of citizens and long-term residents, or whether they should be sequestered in specific jobs or professions. Moreover, they are deciding the extent to which migrants should be guaranteed long-term job security as a condition of entry, or whether short-term contracts suffice. Permit Upgrade Potential For migrants who are admitted, a key question is whether the possibility for a permit renewal exists, and whether renewals also result in increased labor market access. In terms of the former, the most restrictive variant occurs when no potential exists for a permit renewal, and when labor migrants are forced to exit the country upon expiration of the first (and only) permit. A slightly less restrictive variant exists when labor migrants are granted a finite number of permit renewal opportunities, each of fixed length. As a hypothetical example, a migrant admitted under an initial one-year work permit may have the opportunity for two additional permit renewals, each for a period of one year. Upon expiration of the third permit, no additional opportunities for renewal exist, and the migrant would then be required to exit the country. At the more liberal end of the spectrum, migrants may qualify for permanent residency (and ultimately citizenship) after a specified period of continued employment. Alternately, the question of permit renewals may be moot, as in instances where permanent residency is granted in conjunction with initial admission. In terms of the latter, the most restrictive variant, often in conjunction with either limited or no renewal possibilities, occurs when migrants remain tied to the employment opportunity that served as the basis for their initial admission. A somewhat less restrictive option involves the gradual increase of labor market access for the migrant in conjunction with permit renewals. As an example, migrants may start out with no labor market access beyond that of their current position, but then be granted sector-wide access in conjunction with their first renewal before being granted full labor market access upon attainment of permanent residency. For migrants who are admitted initially with permanent resident status, labor market access cannot be limited.

Labor Migration and the Preservation of the Swedish Model

43

Migrant Welfare State Rights The final component of labor migration policy crucial to this analysis is the degree to which migrants gain access to welfare state services provided to citizens and long-term residents of the destination country. One highly restrictive possibility is to grant migrants no access at all to publicly funded social services. In this instance, it is often a condition for admission that migrants can document either existing insurance coverage or that they are in possession of sufficient funds. A sharply less draconian measure, and one proposal common to many migration debates throughout Europe, involves phasing in welfare state rights over a period of time. Thus, while migrants may be granted little or no access to social services during their initial period of residency, the scope of services made available is expanded over time, until migrants attain welfare state rights identical to all other members of the polity. Finally, migrants may be immediately granted full access to welfare state services. At stake here is the path to social citizenship: whether one should exist, whether it should be conferred gradually, or whether it is a right bestowed in conjunction with entry.

Having explored the potential tension between labor migration and two core features of the Swedish model—the universal welfare state and active labor market policies—and having addressed the six components of labor migration policy upon which actors in the Swedish case must decide, one final question remains: what choices should we expect the SAP and LO to make as they navigate the labor migration policy reform process? For three of the components, the expected choices are relatively straightforward. When it comes to gatekeepers, we can expect that both LO and the SAP will regard continued reliance on a corporatist administrative practice as an effective means for maintaining the Swedish model, and will oppose efforts to reconcentrate decision-making power solely in the hands of employers. Similarly, we can expect that LO and the SAP will advocate the evaluation of labor market conditions (either for individual applicants or by sector) to determine the extent of shortages, as this allows for migrant labor to function as a complement to efforts at mobilizing domestic reserves. Preferences regarding migrant welfare state rights are equally unproblematic. Here, the principle of universalism will guide both the SAP and LO. As such, the two allies will support labor migrant access to welfare state services en par with that of citizens and long-term residents. Yet, for each of the three remaining labor migration policy components, there is more than one option for the SAP and LO as they seek to reform policy in a way that remains consistent with the Swedish model. First, when considering the location of the job search, one can easily rule out

44

Chapter Two

that the SAP or LO would support a carte blanche access to Sweden for foreign workers as they sought employment. On a practical level, this would be inconsistent with the demand that evaluations of labor market conditions should serve as the guide for work permit decisions. Potential migrants who traveled to Sweden and received an employment offer would still risk being forced to exit the country if the local labor market board concluded that no shortage existed. However, it is plausible that support for on-site job searches limited to a specific sector would not problematic. Having made the determination that a given sector was experiencing a chronic shortage, provisions could be made for a fixed number of job search visas allowing for potential migrants to enter Sweden and meet with prospective employers. As such, effective control could still be maintained. Finally, the most restrictive stance, in which potential migrants are forbidden from entering Sweden until after a work permit is granted, constitutes the most direct method for ensuring that employers can access the pool of foreign labor only with substantial effort, and only after a labor shortage has been documented. The remaining two components, migrant labor market access and duration of employment on the one hand, and permit upgrade potential on the other, are strongly interconnected. Here, it may be more appropriate to think in terms of a general logic, rather than a set of discrete preferences. We can begin by excluding the least restrictive stance from consideration. That is, we should not expect that LO or the SAP would support immediate permanent residency where admission is granted on the basis of a fixedterm contract. Granting permanent residency without simultaneously requiring an open-ended job contract could result in scenarios wherein migrants become unemployed in Sweden after only a short period, yet have full access to the goods of the welfare state, and with no requirement that they leave if new employment is not secured. Bearing in mind the earlier discussion of the function of restrictive entry policies, we are more likely to witness support for policies in which migrants with fixed-term employment contracts are initially granted temporary residence permits and limited labor market access. In this instance, periods of continued employment would constitute evidence that the migrant had desired skills and was less likely to face unemployment. After a certain period of continued employment, the temporary permit would be converted to permanent residency, thereby resulting in full labor market access. The SAP and LO will only potentially support immediate permanent residency both when a labor shortage has been documented and when an open-ended job contract is offered. In this instance, the risk of unemployment will be judged low, both on the basis of the comparatively stronger commitment made by the employer through use of the open-ended contract, and on the basis of the confirmation from the labor market board that the shortage is not merely

Labor Migration and the Preservation of the Swedish Model

45

short term. Of course, the most cautious strategy for ensuring that labor migration does not generate tension for the Swedish model would be to deny foreign workers who are present on temporary permits labor market access beyond that of their current employer, to strictly limit the number of permit renewals, and to grant permanent residency only in exceptional cases. Indeed, this has been the cornerstone of Swedish labor migration policy for more than thirty years. However, given that both the SAP and LO acknowledged the need to ease restrictions, we should not expect that they would merely advocate a direct continuation of the status quo. Readers who have a familiarity with scholarship in Swedish economic history will note that this discussion of migration policy components is influenced by the work of Christer Lundh, who has analyzed Swedish trade union stances toward migration during the period 1965–1975. According to Lundh, the labor movement gradually shifted toward support for a regulated migrant entry policy, opting for those features that were compatible with existing wage policy and Swedish corporatism.34 Yet, Lundh’s thorough treatment of organized labor and migration in the first decades of the postwar era, in which the labor market is the chief area of the Swedish model under examination, cannot be exported for analysis of the current debate with complete success. First, while concerns over the possible effects of labor migration on the workings of the Swedish labor market have been central to LO’s rhetoric, it has not always been the key element driving the policy preferences of the SAP, particularly in the case of transitional rules for citizens from new EU-member states. To make sense of this stance, it is necessary to broaden the focus beyond the sphere of the labor market and to include a discussion of welfare state rights. Moreover, while Lundh admirably captures the labor market dynamics associated with the stance of Swedish unions during the postwar era, his account is chiefly limited to gatekeepers, criteria for entry, and subsequent integration measures. These components in the design of labor migration policy accurately reflect the key features of labor’s emerging package of migration and integration policy in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet, as I have argued, a full understanding of the outlines of the current Swedish debate requires casting a wider net, exploring how labor market access, the location of job searches, and permit upgrade potential, are also evaluated by the SAP and LO for their likely impact on the workings of the Swedish model. That overall evaluation forms the basis of the following three case-study chapters.

NOTES 1. Rudolf Meidner, “The Swedish Model in an Era of Mass Unemployment,” Economic and Industrial Democracy 18 (1997): 88.

46

Chapter Two

2. Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, “Internationalization and the Social Democratic Model,” Comparative Political Studies 31, no. 3 (June 1998): 354. 3. SOU 1990: 44, Maktutredningens slutrapport, Demokrati och makt i Sverige. 4. Heclo and Madsen, 49, and Ulf Olsson, “Planning in the Swedish Welfare State,” Wallace Clement and Rianne Mahon (eds.), Swedish Social Democracy: A Model in Transition (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc., 1994), 59. 5. Desmond King and Bo Rothstein, “Government Legitimacy and the Labour Market: A Comparative Analysis of Employment Exchanges,” Public Administration 72 (Summer 1994): 293. 6. Bo Rothstein, The Social Democratic State: The Swedish Model and the Bureaucratic Problem of Social Relations (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), 57. 7. Rothstein, The Social Democratic State, 59. 8. Tim Tilton, The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy: Through the Welfare State to Socialism (Oxford, England: Clarendon Paperbacks, 1991), 207–208. 9. Peter Swenson, Capitalists Against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2002), 280. 10. Christian Toft, “Evidence-based Social Science and the Rehnist Interpretation of the Development of Active Labor Market Policy in Sweden During the Golden Age: A Critical Examination” Politics and Society 31, no. 4 (December 2003): 591. 11. Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, Arbetsmarknadspolitiska programmen, årsrapport 2002, 10. 12. LO, Arbetsmarknadspolitiken vid ett vägskäl, and LO, Full sysselsättning—värd att slåss för, Kongressen kräver att regeringen tar krafttag. 13. On full employment see: Bosse Ringholm, “Trygghet, jobb och välfärd— förutsättningar för tillväxt,” Folkbladet, December 20, 2003; and Pär Nuder, “Jag tänker inte sopa problemen under mattan,” Dagens Nyheter, December 1, 2004. 14. Swedish Ministry of Industry, “Hans Karlsson: Regeringen har full sysselsättning i sikte,” May 19, 2004. 15. I discuss the events surrounding LO’s historical gatekeeping function over the entry of foreign workers at the outset of the following chapter. 16. Gary P. Freeman, “Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 485, no. 1 (1986): 51–63. 17. Michael Cichon, Florian Léger, and Rüdiger Knopp, “White or prosperous: How Much Migration Does the Ageing European Union Need to Maintain Its Standard of Living in Its Twenty-first Century? ILO, The International Financial and Actuarial Service, Geneva, March 2003, unpublished report, 9–10. 18. Ylva Thörn, “Gigantisk personalflykt hotar vården,” Dagens Nyheter, February 3, 2004. 19. “Tummen upp för utländska läkare,” Aftonbladet, August 8, 2003, and IOM, “Final Report to the Ministry of Health Care of the Netherlands: Monitoring of the Pilot project, ‘Polish nurses in the Netherlands,’” April 2005. 20. See Freeman, “Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare,” 51–63.

Labor Migration and the Preservation of the Swedish Model

47

21. Keith Banting, “Looking in Three Directions: Migration and the European Welfare State in Comparative Perspective.” In Michael Bommes and Andrew Geddes (eds.), Immigration and Welfare: Challenging the Borders of the Welfare State (London: Routledge, 2000), 13–33. 22. Andrew Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, 22. 23. Banting, “Looking in Three Directions,” 22–23. 24. Banting, “Looking in Three Directions,” 25. 25. Joseph Carens, “Membership and Morality: Admission to Citizenship in Liberal Democratic States,” in Rogers Brubaker (ed.), Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America (Lanham, Md.: The German Marshall Fund of the United States and University Press of America, 1989), 213. 26. Grete Brochman, “The Mechanisms of Control,” in Grete Brochman and Tomas Hammar (eds.), Mechanisms of Immigration Control: A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies (Oxford, England: Berg Publishers, 1999), 4. 27. Brochman, “The Mechanisms of Control,” 28. 28. Rothstein, Just Institutions Matter, 159. 29. Nanna Kilde and Stein Kuhnle, “The Principle of Universalism: Tracing a Key Concept in the Scandinavian Welfare Model,” paper presented at the First Conference of the European Social Policy Research Network, Social Values, Social Policies, Tilburg University, The Netherlands, August 29–31, 2002, 6. 30. Terry Givens and Adam Luedtke, “Comparing European Immigration Policies: Convergence, Salience and Political Partisanship,” paper presented at the 2004 Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 11–13, 2004, 5. 31. Meyers, International Immigration Policy, 11. 32. Christina Boswell, European Migration Policies in Flux: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion (Oxford, England: Blackwell, 2003), 5. 33. Labor market access may also be limited geographically, as is the case in Canada, where the Quebec government is able to exercise some control over which migrants are granted work permits to the province. 34. Christer Lundh, “Invandrarna i den svenska modellen—hot eller reserv? Fackligt program på 1960-talet,” Arbetarhistoria (1994), 23–36.

Three Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy: LO and the SAP in the 2002 Swedish Parliamentary Election Campaign This chapter is the first of two that focuses on the recent Swedish debate surrounding the reform of labor migration policy toward third-country nationals. Since the turn of the millennium, the restructuring of Sweden’s highly restrictive labor migration policy has been a hotly contested issue among political parties, labor market partners, and other interest groups. Throughout the 2002 parliamentary election campaign, both the main employers’ association, the Confederation of Swedish Employers (SN), and bourgeois parties argued that Sweden’s continued economic growth prospects required allowing in a substantially larger number of foreign workers. For their part, the then-ruling Social Democratic Party and LO expressed repeated scepticism toward the specifics of these proposals. While arguing that labor migration would likely be necessary in the long run, the two allies stressed that the immediate emphasis should be on reducing the unemployment rate, particularly among the existing immigrant population. In this chapter, I have four chief aims. I begin by presenting a short historical overview of Sweden’s first large-scale experience with labor migration, during the decades following World War II. This brief survey sets the stage for the contemporary debate over labor migration reform by highlighting those events that led both LO and the SAP to develop concerns over the potential impact of unregulated labor migration on the workings of the Swedish model. Second, I detail the rules governing labor migration to Sweden from non-EU countries that were in effect at the start of the debate, emphasizing the limited opportunities for entry that existed for third-country nationals seeking to take up employment in Sweden. Third, I focus attention on the proposals from both the main employers’ association and the Liberal Party for restructuring Sweden’s 49

50

Chapter Three

labor migration policy toward third-country nationals. In discussing these proposals, I show that they represented a sharp break with the principles of coordination that have guided contemporary Swedish labor migration policy. Above all else, proposals from SN and the Liberals during the election campaign sought to end tri-partite consultation over work permit approvals and relocate decision-making authority over the admission of third-country national workers solely in the hands of employers. Finally, I explore the initial response from the ruling SAP and allied LO to these proposals. While neither actor put forward a concrete proposal during the election campaign, two broad criticisms against liberal labor migration policies were articulated. First, both LO and the SAP emphasized that employer and bourgeois reform proposals would have a generally negative effect on efforts to combat unemployment, and would specifically result in worsened job prospects for immigrants residing in the suburbs of Sweden’s three major urban areas. Second, employer and bourgeois reform proposals were judged to have the potential to result in a guest worker system, placing migrant labor in a vulnerable economic position and resulting in a gradual erosion of the Swedish model. To the extent that the SAP and LO offered broad details as to their preferred design for an overhauled labor migration policy, the emphasis was on a continued need for coordination between labor market partners and the state. As such, an analysis of the labor migration policy reform debate during the 2002 election points to very real differences between labor market partners, as well as to differences between the SAP and their bourgeois opposition, over the economic policy objectives that were most significant when considering the reintroduction of labor migration. Of greater importance for the argument put forward in the preceding chapter, this analysis demostrates that concerns over an appropriate fit between labor migration and the workings of the Swedish model have guided LO and the SAP as they have evaluated competing proposals for the admission of third-country nationals onto the Swedish labor market.

SWEDISH LABOR MIGRATION POLICY: THE HISTORICAL LEGACY The wave of Swedish industrial expansion that followed the close of World War II triggered concerns that an insufficient supply of labor existed to keep pace with the growth that Sweden would likely be experiencing in the following years. A 1946 report from the Industrial Research Institute noted that, “During the following decade, when by all accounts we face a rapid expansion towards greater industrialization . . . (the immigration of 100,000 to 200,000 people) would be highly appropriate for

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

51

encouraging economic development.” Anticipating the scepticism that would likely greet calls for such a large-scale injection of foreign workers, the report’s author attempted to “prevent all misunderstandings” behind their motives and stressed that immigration was not intended as a device to prevent wage growth.1 The same year, a government appointed commission of inquiry, comprised of trade unions, employers’ associations, and representatives from the National Labor Market Commission (AK), was formed to consider the possibility of importing a foreign labor force. The chief domestic alternative to foreign labor consisted of mobilizing “women, the elderly and the partly disabled.” Trade unions expressed reservations toward a policy that would permit labor immigration, and along with women’s groups, voiced support for a strategy that would focus on the increased mobilization of domestic labor, particularly the large reserves of married women.2 The result of the commission’s work was a system of collective labor transfer that allowed for the importation of groups of foreign workers. Yet, it did so in a manner that provided labor with specific measures guaranteeing that immigration would not be used to undercut the trade union movement’s strength of position. Wages and working conditions were to be equivalent for both immigrants and Swedes. However, both organized labor and the Social Democrats insisted on certain points that curtailed the freedom of the individual foreign worker. First, while not firm-specific, work permits were only valid for a given industrial sector, and workers were not free to move between different occupational categories. Second, until 1965, foreign workers were denied the right of freedom of association afforded to Swedish workers: foreign workers were required to join labor unions and maintain a current membership throughout their entire stay.3 This system of collective transfer yielded relatively little in the way of an imported workforce, with only 3,129 Italians, Hungarians, and Germans being placed in Sweden under its auspices by late 1948.4 This highly restrictive approach to labor immigration was phased out in 1949 and replaced with a system that afforded organized labor even more direct control over the granting of work permits. In a circular from late that year, the labor market board laid out the following system: companies that claimed to be in need of a foreign workforce contacted AMS, who then consulted with the local labor market board and the relevant local trade unions prior to granting a permit. Such consultation with unions for first-time applications was deemed “obligatory,” while it was stated that consultations with employers over the fate of an application would only take place when conditions were thought to warrant it.5 Between 1950 and 1955, AMS granted roughly 12,500 permits under this arrangement, with

52

Chapter Three

the numbers dropping considerably to 1,500 for the second half of the decade.6 While organized labor gained much in the way of guarantees and concrete control over implementation in the 1949 system, Kuivanen points out the benefits of this arrangement for the state. He observes that the Swedish state had an imperative to involve unions in the administration of immigration policy, as it conferred a greater sense of overall legitimacy onto a highly contentious issue. By co-opting trade unions into the decision over work permits on a case-by-case basis, he argues that the state was effectively able to avoid the emergence of criticism from labor’s grass roots.7 In this portrayal, a tightly controlled and organized policy of labor immigration was symbiotic in nature. The trade union movement gained in influence and had guarantees against the realization of its fears, while the state seemingly had an effective device for legitimating its policies.8 Limiting the labor supply must be understood as a crucial component in the overall objectives of the Swedish trade union movement in the postwar era. The solidarity wage policy of 1951 “stressed the principle of equal pay for equal work across sectors.” As Blyth notes, a solidarity wage did intend to further “redistributive policy goals,” yet it was also designed to pressure inefficient firms to rationalize and increase productivity, or to go bankrupt.9 As stated in a key LO report from 1952, “Wage pressure on low-wage firms can therefore hasten the rationalization of existing business and the transferral of labor from less-effective to moreeffective firms.”10 The extent to which liberal immigration policies were viewed as a threat to this broad policy of structural transformation can be gleaned from comments made over a decade later by Hans Hagnell, a Metall union official and Social Democratic member of parliament. He observed that employers who didn’t want to modernize and pay proper wages “should not, with the help of the labor market board’s immigration policies, be provided with labor.” Even the redistributive aspect was clear in his remarks, where he pushed for increased efforts to counter “the employers’ interest in buying a cheap labor force from outside, thereby depressing wage development for certain groups.”11 The significance of labor’s involvement, and to a greater extent, its level of control over the admission of foreign workers, should not be underestimated. For when this control was seemingly threatened by events beyond the reach of LO, the trade union movement responded by advocating an ever more stringent clampdown on the admission of foreign labor. The immediate catalyst that emerged to disrupt LO’s uneasy acceptance of controlled immigration was the 1954 modification of the law that governed foreigners. Specifically, changes to the law did away with a requirement that foreigners should be in possession of a work permit prior

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

53

to entering Sweden. As such, this revision allowed for foreigners to enter as tourists, seek work, and then go through the process of applying for a work permit. Despite requirements that first-time applications be sent to AMS for determination of whether there was a specific need to employ non-Nordic labor, Lundh and Ohlsson note that from 1961 to 1965, less than 5 percent of the 90,000 first-time applications were rejected. The rejection rate for the 140,000 renewal applications during the same period was even lower, leading Lundh and Ohlsson to observe that in the mid1960s, receiving a Swedish work permit was a mere formality.12 While Knocke maintains that trade union opposition to the increasing stream of immigrant workers travelling to Sweden as tourists did not crystallize until the mid-1960s, there is evidence to the contrary.13 Rather, Kyle shows that in response to a 1961 official commission of inquiry, LO stressed that “full employment, regardless of one’s gender, age or region should be realized to the extent possible.” As Kyle notes, according to LO, the consequence of this stance for immigration policy was that the largely unregulated admission of foreign workers made possible in 1954 had to be stopped, and replaced by “a controlled (variant) such that domestic resources are better utilized.”14 In 1964, LO economist Per Holmberg dismissed as hypocrisy the claims of employers who desired immigration on the basis of “international mobility” or “greater solidarity with countries of high unemployment.” Rather, he declared that economic motives were at the core of liberal immigration policy and that “continued increases in immigration are not in the interest of wage-earners.”15 As the annual rates of immigration increased dramatically, more than doubling in 1964–1967 when compared with the start of the 1960s, an ever-growing number of new immigrants came from Southern Europe. According to Knocke, Greeks, Yugoslavs, and Turks, arriving unchecked and in large numbers, created a sense among trade unions that they were “losing control”16 over the inflow of foreigners. Unions also expressed concern that an unregulated flow of foreign workers was creating conditions ripe for ethnic slums. The trade union newspaper Fackföreningsrörelsen urged a limit to the use of non-Nordic immigration in order to “avoid the chaos of the type that the Yugoslavian invasion of southern Sweden is currently creating.”17 This concern led to a series of restrictive changes in the policies governing labor immigration. The first, resulting from negotiations between the Ministry of the Interior, LO, AMS, and the Swedish Employers’ Association (SAF, the precursor to SN), was designed to prevent the spontaneous immigration that had been common under tourist visas. Under the new 1966 rules, which SAF opposed, collective transfers of labor were reintroduced and made the responsibility of AMS. Foreign workers arriving under the AMS-guided system were required to have a work permit prior

54

Chapter Three

to entering Sweden. Yet exceptions to the rules, as well as inconsistencies in their application, meant that significant numbers of work-seeking immigrants continued to arrive as tourists.18 The second change came in 1967, when the rules were further tightened in an effort to halt residual tourist immigration, mandating that foreign workers should be in possession of an offer of employment, a work permit, and housing prior to entering Sweden. 19 With unregulated immigration effectively closed off, the collective transfer of labor thus became the only viable route of entry until the early 1970s, and ended not because of a shift in government policy, but when LO exercised its power to turn down all requests for work permits. LO issued a circular to all subsidiary unions encouraging them to pursue “a more restrictive policy with reference to the approval of work permits for a non-Nordic labor force.”20 The significance of this circular is noted by Hammar, who observed, “When thereafter the locals said no, the unions would say no and the AMS would say no: no more work permits were issued and practically all labour immigration came to an end.”21 In other words, LO exercised the power associated with its position of control, and stopped the flow of foreign workers into Sweden on its own. At first glance, the action would seem suspect: why would LO, which had tolerated controlled immigration in the past, now close the foreign labor tap entirely? Here it is plausible to point to LO’s continuous, yet increasingly adamant, preference for the mobilization of various domestic segments of the population as opposed to drawing upon foreign labor. Indeed, Knocke lends this claim some evidence. She observes that in terms of timing, LO did not close the tap until separate taxation for spouses was introduced, thereby providing an additional incentive for the reserve of married women to enter the workforce.22 From the outset of the postwar era, the Swedish trade union movement has expressed great suspicion regarding employer arguments of a domestic labor shortage, and has consistently pointed to a set of untapped domestic reserves in the form of women, the elderly, and the partially handicapped. Yet, with sufficient guarantees that foreign workers could not be utilized to threaten the position of labor, LO reluctantly accepted the controlled admission of labor immigrants. Once changes in immigration laws removed those guarantees, unregulated immigration loomed as a specter that LO could not tolerate. From the early 1960s onward, LO pushed for, and eventually received, substantially tighter immigration practices governing the admission of foreign workers. By 1972, with policies in place designed to encourage the mobilization of key reserves into the labor force, even managed immigration appeared to have posed a challenge. Thus, LO was able to use its privileged position in the administration of immigration policy, and effectively, to close the borders to foreign workers. As much of the analysis presented

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

55

in both this and the following chapter will demonstrate, the concerns that drove LO toward a restrictionist stance in the late 1960s and early 1970s have continued to hold sway, both for organized labor and the SAP, as the issue of labor migration rose to prominence again in the early 2000s.

LABOR MIGRATION POLICY TO SWEDEN FROM NON-EU COUNTRIES AT THE TIME OF THE 2002 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION For those individuals looking to migrate to advanced industrial countries in search of work and a better life, the first steps can frequently be taken on the Internet. In a number of states, the migration authorities use their web presence as a modern beacon, stressing that foreign workers are much sought after, and that the thresholds for entry are far from insurmountable. Potential migrants to Canada would discover on Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s website that “applying to come to Canada as a skilled worker is not difficult” and that “every year, Canada welcomes thousands of new residents.”23 Even sub-national regions, such as Scotland, have made active use of the Internet to attract economic migrants. At scotlandistheplace.com, visitors are met with a wealth of practical information explaining how job opportunities and work permits can be obtained. Moreover, they are also greeted with an earnest-sounding appeal from the Scottish Executive, stressing that the land of “five million friendly people” welcomes a new and talented workforce in order to secure Scotland’s place “as an essential part of the global economy.”24 However, for those whose web browsing took them to the homepage of the Swedish Migration Board in the early 2000s, the message would have to be regarded as less than encouraging. There, potential labor migrants were not met with points tests in which the likelihood of a work permit approval could be calculated, nor were they met with a battery of links to facilitate the immigration process. Rather, visitors were simply confronted with the straightforward declaration that “obtaining a Swedish work permit is no easy matter. Swedes, foreign citizens already living in Sweden, and EU/EEA citizens have preference over others in obtaining work here.” Moreover, for those non-EU foreign workers who did manage to meet the necessary requirements, the Swedish Migration Board stressed that non-EU workers must be “fully prepared to leave Sweden” when the term of employment is over.25 This grim portrayal of the chances for non-EU citizens to migrate to Sweden for purposes of employment reflects that fact that, since 1972, Sweden has largely been closed to labor migration other than for cases of

56

Chapter Three

filling short-term labor market gaps.26 Figures from the Swedish Migration Board show that between 2000 and 2004, an average of only 361 nonEU citizens per year have received permanent residency for labor market reasons. Underlying these low numbers was the stated principle that “labor migration should only occur in exceptional cases, and exceptions shall be granted primarily regarding key personnel in industry, commerce and the cultural sphere.”27 Rather, to the extent that labor migration was utilized by Swedish authorities at that time, the preference was to grant foreign labor only short-term access to the Swedish labor market, with an average of 7,380 non-EU workers being admitted per year on temporary permits between 2000 and 2004. As the former economic director of the Swedish National Labor Market Board, Sandro Scocco, remarked: “The view of the (social democratic) government is that the Swedish labor market is mainly for people living in Sweden.”28 If migration to Sweden for purposes of employment was “no easy matter,” what were the specific criteria that needed to be fulfilled in order for the Swedish Migration Board to approve a work permit application? Applications could be filed under one of four categories: permanent labor migrants, temporary labor migrants, “international exchange” migrants, and seasonal migrant workers. For each of these four categories, AMS specified that: • Non-EU workers were to be concentrated to sectors where recruitment difficulties were associated with wage levels, workplace environment or, local conditions; • Salaries, insurance, and other conditions of employment needed to correspond to the minimum conditions within the relevant collective bargaining agreement; • The period of employment while in Sweden needed to guarantee a sufficient standard of living; • The relevant union should have the opportunity to voice its opinion regarding the permit application; and • Housing needed to be arranged prior to arrival in Sweden and the application needed to be submitted from abroad either to the relevant Swedish consulate or via the Swedish Migration Board website. The following conditions were also relevant within each of the four categories: Permanent labor migration was limited to instances where the local labor market board determined that a given labor shortage was likely to be long term and where the shortage posed an obstacle for an employer’s expansion or for maintaining current levels of production or activity. Permanent work permits for third-country nationals were only to be issued

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

57

when no other candidates within the EU or EEA could be located within a reasonable period of time, or when job retraining could not be used in order to fill the position in the longer run. Open-ended employment contracts were generally a precondition in those instances. Temporary work permits for third-country nationals were also issued only when the local labor market board determined that an employer was facing difficulties in securing workers, but that the shortage would not have an impact on future prospects for expansion. Similar to cases of permanent labor migration, temporary permits were issued only when no other candidates within the EU or EEA could be located within a reasonable period of time, or when job retraining could not be used in order to fill the position in the long run. However, while this category was granted more frequently than permanent residency, the options for renewal and freedom of movement for the migrant on the Swedish labor market were substantially more limited. Migrants were limited to both a specific sector and employer for a combined maximum of eighteen months. In the event that the labor shortage was expected to be of a greater duration, the employer and the local labor market board were to reach agreement on how it would ultimately be alleviated. If employers, unions, and the labor market board were in agreement, temporary permits could be extended for a final six months. “International exchange” migration was exempt from tests of the local labor market conditions, as these positions were generally not thought to form part of the regular labor market. In general, this category was reserved for senior and specialist positions in international firms, athletes, researchers at universities, and those employed in the cultural sphere. Permits under this category were normally granted for a maximum of four years. While applicants were told that they must be prepared to leave Sweden at the conclusion of the exchange, “international exchange” migrants had a de facto possibility for permit conversion to permanent residency, particularly when the exchange had been extended beyond four years and when the employment contract had been made open ended. Finally, third-country national seasonal labor migrants were granted permission to work in the farming and forestry industries for a maximum of three months during the period 1 April to 1 November. Their employment was subject to the verification that other candidates could not be located in the EU/EEA. Permits were limited to specific sectors, but not to employers. Regional quotas were determined each year, and while the local labor market board chiefly determined whether applications for seasonal work permits were approved or rejected, some applications were reserved for the Swedish Migration Board, particularly those that involved planned stays of more than three months or when the applicant belonged to a nationality that was thought “to be at risk for staying in Sweden upon the

58

Chapter Three

expiration of the permit.” As of 2007, AMS forecasts showed that seasonal employment needs could be fulfilled from labor within the EU, and thirdcountry national seasonal permits ceased to be granted. In general, given the overwhelming reliance on temporary work permits when foreign labor was deemed necessary, it would not be inappropriate to characterize Sweden’s labor migration policies governing non-EU citizens at the time of the 2002 parliamentary elections as sharing some distinct similarities to a guest worker system, particularly in terms of time-limited permits that restricted the mobility of foreign workers on the Swedish labor market. To some extent, within the Swedish context, this is an unexpected claim. As we will see in this chapter, leading figures in the SAP and LO have repeatedly invoked the term guest worker system when characterizing proposals from both employers and the bourgeois parties to make Sweden’s labor migration policy less restrictive. The purpose in doing so has been to associate employer proposals for labor migration reform with the German Gästarbeiter system of the 1960s, which stands in sharp contrast to the substantially more generous Swedish practice during the same period of providing foreign workers permanent residency after two years in Sweden. In his classic study of Swedish social democratic ideology, Tim Tilton stressed that a defining feature of Swedish immigration policy is the conscious decision to treat foreign workers as immigrants and not as guest workers. According to Tilton, the cornerstone of this view is that “foreign workers are not expendable labour power to be sent home in periods of economic contraction. This inclusive, integrationist approach flows naturally from Social Democratic values.”29 As such, to describe Swedish policy toward third-country nationals at the time of the 2002 parliamentary election as conforming to the broad outlines of a guest worker system is controversial. However, there seems to be good reason for placing Swedish migration policy from this era under the heading of a guest worker system when one considers how the term is commonly defined in the research literature. The political theorist Michael Walzer characterizes the essence of a guest worker system as one where immigrants are “brought in for a fixed time period, on contract to a particular employer; if they lose their jobs, they have to leave; they have to leave in any case when their visas expire.”30 Joseph Carens sums up the experience of the postwar generation of guest workers as one where “they were admitted under conditions that explicitly specified that they could be sent back if they lost their jobs or drew too heavily on the welfare system, that they had no right to an automatic renewal of work and residency permits, and so on.”31 While temporary labor migrants to Sweden were not prevented from making use of the country’s generous social services net, there is little question that the practice of temporary

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

59

work permits for labor migrants in Sweden, expectations of departure upon completion or loss of job, and the lack of clear-cut possibilities for permit renewal or conversion to permanent status are fully consistent with the limited labor market and residency rights that constitute a guest worker system. The following section details the emergence of the debate over labor migration from non-EU countries at the start of the new millennium. Sweden’s hi-tech sector benefited greatly from the Internet and telecommunications boom of the late 1990s, and the growth of these sectors focused attention on difficulties that firms were facing in securing access to an appropriately skilled workforce. With a few exceptions, this initial phase of the debate was characterized by a skeptical stance from both key Social Democrats and figures in AMS toward the deregulation of non-EU labor migration. However, this debate was also initially marked by the lack of concrete policy proposals for the restructuring of non-EU labor migration policy. When the first of these proposals was published by the Swedish Confederation of Enterprise in late 2001, the SAP and LO hardened their stance against this call to deregulate the rules governing third-country national labor migration.

THE INCREASING SALIENCE OF LABOR MIGRATION IN SWEDISH POLITICS In the midst of the IT bubble at the start of the twenty-first century, the Swedish National Labor Market Board published data showing that Swedish schools were unlikely to be able to produce a sufficient number of graduates to meet the needs of Internet technology firms over the coming decade. At that point, the expectation was that the hi-tech sector would require an influx of roughly 100,000 new workers by 2010, yet the forecast was that many of the jobs would go unfilled, as only 60,000 newly qualified IT professionals would complete their studies during the same period. Forecasts of significant shortages were not limited to the IT sector. AMS maintained that an upcoming retirement wave was likely to pose a particular challenge for staffing levels in the healthcare sector through 2015. Moreover, AMS held that, even in the short term, difficulties in recruiting an appropriate workforce were also growing significantly in the education, information technology, and civil engineering sectors.32 However, while reports drew attention to the “demographic threat” of an aging Swedish population, unemployment levels among refugees and immigrants remained high. For “non-Nordic” citizens who had immigrated to Sweden, the unemployment rate stood at 21 percent in 1999, down sharply from 33

60

Chapter Three

percent in 1997. The level of unemployment was substantially lower for those immigrants who were naturalized Swedish citizens. This rate was 14 percent in 1999, unchanged from the 1997 levels.33 Both of these figures were approximately three to four times the size of the unemployment levels for the Swedish population as a whole, which hovered between 5 and 6 percent in 1999. Despite the gloomy recruiting prognosis, then AMS general director Anders Johansson placed little faith in the idea that labor migration could contribute to offsetting recruitment difficulties. Claiming that it would be “devastating” if Sweden were to pursue a strategy of labor migration, Johansson proposed that a more desirable solution could be found in ensuring that the Swedish educational system was properly tuned toward the needs of the IT sector.34 His lack of enthusiasm for the potential of labor migration was shared by then LO economist (and future economic director at AMS) Sandro Scocco. Framing the issue as one where it would be inappropriate for developed states to focus on their own short-term economic needs at the expense of the long-term interests of foreign jobseekers, Scocco argued that Sweden’s willingness to open its borders should instead be focused on refugees: We’re saying no to those that are starving in India and yes to those from India who, for the moment, we can make use of. In a humane perspective, that’s not right, to offer a person from another country the chance to work so long as we can use them. What happens when we don’t need them anymore? You can’t just treat people however you want. In a humane perspective, we should instead have a more open attitude towards refugees, who really need our help.35

In order to address the staffing shortages being faced by hi-tech firms, Scocco underscored that Sweden was already home to many individuals with a foreign background, toward whom employers had not displayed the greatest willingness to hire. As such, Scocco argued quite directly that, “There is still unemployment in this country today, and therefore we shouldn’t allow in more people.”36 LO’s stance that labor migration needed to take a backseat to the challenge of reducing unemployment and boosting the workforce participation rate was also evident in its comments on the Ministry of Finance’s 1999–2000 “long-term inquiry” that focused on the effects of aging populations throughout Europe. LO sided with the inquiry’s conclusion that labor migration should not be “placed under consideration” until domestic reserves were utilized to a greater extent. However, LO chose to stress that a pre-condition for a resumption of labor migration would be full employment, and that “labor migration must also be compatible with

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

61

international solidarity and not threaten development in those countries from which citizens choose to emigrate.”37 Not all key figures in the SAP, LO, or the state labor market bureaucracy were opposed to exploring the contribution that could be made by third-country national labor migration to the Swedish welfare state. Then foreign aid minister Maj-Inger Klingwall acknowledged in the pages of the LO weekly newspaper, LO Tidningen, that it is “sometimes alleged that immigration is a threat to our welfare.” However, she opted to portray labor migration as a force that could “strengthen the base of the welfare system, at the same time as it contributes to creating a dynamic society and economic growth that in turn generates more jobs.”38 In the subsequent issue of LO Tidningen, a rebuttal appeared which suggested that her optimistic assessment was not fully shared by all leading SAP politicians. Claiming that Klingwall’s depiction of the need for labor migration had been “a bit one-sided,” SAP chair of the parliamentary labor market committee Sven-Erik Österberg adopted a tone of reasoning similar to that of Sandro Scocco and chose to emphasize the domestic reserves that could instead be mobilized. While conceding that labor migration could be “good,” he stressed the importance of taking into account “an incredibly large potential labor force” within Sweden: This generally involves people who have been registered at the labor market exchanges as job-seekers for several years without having had regular work. It has to do with 100,000 people or more than two percent of the labor force. These groups are dominated by the older unemployed, people with disabilities, non-Nordic citizens with low levels of education and people with shorter periods of education.39

This strategy of dismissing calls for labor migration by way of reference to Sweden’s unemployed had been played out publicly before. In 1999, former SAP minister of finance Erik Åsbrink had proposed that labor migration could be used to alleviate the staffing strains that would increasingly be placed on the Swedish welfare state as the population aged.40 Yet, Marie Granlund, a social democratic MP in charge of the Ministry of Industry’s Diversity Project castigated Åsbrink for displaying a “great lack of knowledge” as well as “an incredibly naïve view” for ignoring the contribution that could be made by Sweden’s unemployed population. Suggesting that Sweden’s borders be opened to labor migration implied, according to Granlund, that Åsbrink “accepts that there should be longterm unemployment and that many immigrants should be left without work.”41 To a great extent, this initial public discussion at the start of the new millennium over the possible reintroduction of labor migration took place

62

Chapter Three

without a concrete proposal having emerged on which different parties, labor market partners, and relevant state agencies could take a stance. In late 2001, with less than a year until the September 2002 parliamentary elections, the terms of the debate changed when the Swedish Confederation of Enterprise (SN) published the report Globalisering och arbetsmarknad: Öppna den svenska arbetsmarknaden (Globalization and the Labor Market: Open the Swedish Labor Market). SN had been formed that year as the result of a merger between the Swedish Employers’ Confederation (SAF) and the Federation of Swedish Industries. According to Theodor Paues, the SN lobbyist behind the labor migration policy reform strategy, a central goal of the new employers’ organization was the identification of issues that would aid in establishing a profile for the merged association. Paues suggests that in the analysis of economic growth issues, the need for labor emerged as being increasingly important. Such “openness towards the surrounding world” was not only deemed necessary for domestic reasons. Paues maintains that “after September 11, 2001 and the rise of the far right in Denmark, it became all the more important to push the globalization line.”42 Authored by Bijan Fahimi, an SN board member and an up-and-coming politician in the Liberal Party, this report stressed three key points: First, an aging Swedish workforce, coupled with ongoing staffing shortages, made the resumption of labor migration critical; second, arguments against the resumption of labor migration were built on faulty assumptions; and third, a resumption of labor migration required the removal of state authorities from decisions over the appropriateness of a given applicant.43 Going beyond a narrow claim that recruitment difficulties in the IT sector necessitated industry-specific labor migration, Fahimi painted a picture of Sweden as coming face to face with a “demographic threat.” Drawing upon standard forecasts that Europe was on the verge of a sharp decline in the number of working-age adults, Fahimi argued that the challenge of the emerging demographic shift within Swedish society could be met through immigration from the developing world, where the youngest age cohorts were expected to increase substantially. As such, Fahimi argued that “everyone would benefit from a shift in the population, over the next twenty to thirty years, away from the third world and to Europe.”44 In diagnosing a demographic problem that identified labor migration as the necessary solution, Fahimi also took pains to address some of the most common criticisms against a resumption in labor migration. Pointing out that there will always be voices arguing that borders should be kept closed while there is unemployment, or that “we have to take care of the immigrants that we already have,” Fahimi maintained that these views rested on faulty logic. Noting that severe personnel shortages in a

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

63

given sector could not be offset simply on the basis of domestic reserves in general, Fahimi asserted that if firms assumed that “the competency they seek in other countries isn’t present among Swedes or immigrants in Sweden, then we have to respect their judgment.”45 Similarly, Fahimi rejected the claim that labor migration results in downward wage pressure, noting that even when individuals were recruited to Sweden from low-wage countries, their employment conditions are governed by Swedish collective bargaining agreements, thus rendering such downward shifts impossible. Yet, he also suggested that increasing migration could prevent the economy from overheating, thus minimizing the chances for inflation. Finally, he caustically dismissed claims that allowing migration of highly skilled individuals from the developing world resulted in a brain-drain effect. Stressing that individuals should have the right to live and work wherever they choose, Fahimi observed that: It isn’t leaders of LO or commentators from the left-wing in Sweden that can judge how an Iraqi doctor or an IT-expert from Bangladesh can best make a difference. A thought that frequently strikes me is why don’t these proponents of international solidarity emigrate themselves to impoverished lands in order to contribute to their development? Presumably it’s easier to display solidarity at someone else’s expense?46

However, the most notable feature of Fahimi’s report was that it constituted the initial seeds of an SN proposal that would emerge in the spring prior to the 2002 parliamentary election. Posing the rhetorical questions of who should be allowed to make work permit approval decisions, and when labor migration should be considered justified, Fahimi argued broadly for relaxed rules governing the admission of labor migrants. In making this initial case for policy reform, his strongest invective was reserved for the involvement of the state in the administration of work permits: When the sluggish decision-making process of state institutions is allowed to control what types of competence firms and society require, timing will inevitably be lacking. We should instead allow for firms to decide themselves regarding the competency they require. . . . Firms should be free to hire the type of competency that they desire, from locksmiths to researchers. . . . If a firm realizes that it’s necessary to recruit from other countries, then this should be proof in and of itself that it’s difficult to find the competency on the domestic (labor) market.47

Fahimi’s report was greeted sceptically in the pages of LO Tidningen. Adopting a dismissive tone, LO economist Dan Andersson quipped, “Where is the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise when we have hundreds of unemployed construction workers or when someone gets injured on the job? (Instead), we have lots of naïve liberals who dress themselves up in pretty

64

Chapter Three

messages.” LO chair Wanja Lundby-Wedin responded to the report by stressing that the question was not “whether we will increase labor migration, but how.” At the same time, the union newspaper underscored that it was LO’s position to “bet first on the immigrant labor that is already in the country and make sure that their competencies are properly evaluated.”48 Thus, to the extent that SN’s opening salvo in the coming battle over labor migration was commented upon, the response was skeptical. Reference was made to an assumed trade-off between unemployed workers already in Sweden and potential new waves of economic migrants. At the same time, Lundby-Wedin’s remarks indicated that the central disagreement would revolve around the design of a reformed labor migration policy. In June 2002, Lundby-Wedin and LO’s third vice chair, Leif Håkansson, emphasized that LO was not opposed to increased labor migration, but rather to “the type of completely free and unregulated migration that is being proposed, by among others, the Moderates, as well as from certain spokespeople for employers.” Pursuing a successful model for labor migration from non-EU countries was argued to require a close degree of cooperation between labor market partners: What characterized earlier Swedish labor migration, during the 1950s and 1960s, was that it was regulated and built upon labor market partners being in agreement. It’s against this background that LO has now taken the initiative for a discussion with the Swedish Confederation of Industries as to how we should deal with the labor shortage, a discussion that has to be both about the possibilities of labor migration and how we take care of the labor reserve that is already here.49

Yet, as we will see, when SN published their detailed proposal for reforming Swedish labor migration policy in the summer of 2002, the focus was not on continued coordination between unions and employers, either in terms of work permit approvals, or on the question of how migration should be balanced against domestic reserves. Rather, to a significant extent, the SN proposal suggested a restructuring of the work permit approval process that would grant employers a controlling interest, and which would make their perceived immediate need for labor the key criterion driving the admission of foreign workers. EMPLOYER AND BOURGEOIS PARTY PROPOSALS FOR LABOR MIGRATION REFORM IN THE 2002 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN When interviewed at a meeting of top EU, Latin American, and Caribbean leaders in Madrid in May 2002, then Prime Minister Göran Persson

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

65

was unequivocal that the Swedish Social Democrats were opposed to a resumption of labor migration in the foreseeable future. Referring to an opening of Sweden’s borders to large-scale labor migration as “the dumbest thing that we could do,” Persson stated that a precondition for the admission of foreign workers in any significant number was that, first, “unemployed immigrants who are already in Sweden (would) have to enter the labor market.”50 Persson’s comments were directed at a newly published SN report that included labor migration as one of a series of policy measures intended to ensure that Sweden would occupy fifth place in the international “welfare league” by 2010. Sandro Scocco, in the final months of his tenure as senior economist at the social democratic thinktank Tankesmedjan SAP, had also condemned this report in equally stark terms, declaring it to be “completely insane” and remarking that while labor migration may become necessary in 2007, Sweden could not resume labor migration “when so many immigrants are unemployed.”51 While the SAP was focused on portraying domestic unemployment rates as a practical barrier to opening Sweden’s labor market to non-EU citizens, LO’s comments hinted at a more pragmatic approach. Senior LO economist Dan Andersson made it clear that the trade union wasn’t “slamming the door shut,” but wanted to ensure that labor market partners would oversee the process to ensure that order would be kept on the labor market, that wage dumping did not occur, and that newly arrived migrants received both housing and education.52 Other leading figures within LO underscored the distinction between opposing labor migration on the one hand, and the specific policy design of the reform proposals on the other. Stressing the preference for a continued coordinated variant of labor migration, LO’s third vice chair, Leif Håkansson, rejected characterizations of the union as being opposed to immigration, stating that, “We are not at all opposed to labor migration, just so long as it is regulated.”53 A “regulated” model of labor migration was described by Håkansson as having similarities with the period of labor migration in the 1960s, in which labor market partners and the national labor market board were actively involved in the administration of work permit applications. According to Håkansson, such a design was preferable to that of “just opening the borders and allowing people to come here who might not stand a chance on the labor market.”54 Yet, the call from LO for labor migration to be treated within the framework of cooperation between labor market partners would go largely unheeded by the employers’ association. Since the mid-1980s, when the late Social Democratic prime minister Olof Palme first held a summer speech on the island of Visby at Almedal, political parties and interest groups have gathered each July on the island at what has come to be known as Almedal Week. Bearing a loose resemblance to a North American county fair, but lacking beauty pageants, amusement rides, and prize-winning

66

Chapter Three

livestock, Almedal Week is the focal point of the summer for those whose livelihood revolves around Swedish politics. Parties and interest groups use the opportunity of the slow summer news cycle to present reports intended to define the policy agenda for the coming year. Particularly in an election year, the week represents something of an informal kick-off for the September elections to the parliament. For SN, Almedal Week 2002 provided the backdrop for proposing a radical overhaul of Swedish labor migration policy toward third-country nationals. The report, Invandring för tillväxt och nya jobb (Immigration for growth and new jobs), was punctuated with repeated “causal stories,”55 each lamenting how talented foreign workers, with jobs and Swedish language skills, were being denied extensions of their works permits and were being threatened with deportation. The report coupled these cases with anecdotes detailing the substantial hurdles faced by Swedish industry in recruiting staff with the required skill sets. In an interview with report co-author Karen Ekenger, the strong sense of dissatisfaction felt by employers toward the restrictiveness of current Swedish labor migration policy was apparent. Ekenger noted that “We have a very selective system, that is so extreme, it has really been constructed just to ensure that people are kept outside of Sweden’s borders.”56 Yet, the proposed shift away from coordinated labor migration toward a largely liberal variant could be characterized as equally extreme: • Third-country nationals would be allowed to enter Sweden for a three-month period in order to conduct a job search; • Job seekers would not have access to work-based social insurance while searching for employment; however, full access to the Swedish social insurance system would coincide with commencement of employment; • Upon receipt of an employment contract or a binding offer, a thirdcountry national would be able to file a work permit application directly, and not be required to do so from her/his home country; • The determination of whether the applicant was appropriate for any given job opening would only be made by the employer; • Spouses of successful applicants would automatically be granted a work permit; • Work permits would be made available to foreign students during and after the completion of their studies in Sweden; • Work permits would not be limited to a specific occupation or employer; and • Third-country nationals who had worked in Sweden for a minimum of three years would have the possibility of a permanent residence permit.57

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

67

At its heart, this proposal called for the divorce of labor migration from the heavily regulated world of Swedish labor market policy, proposing its reconstitution as a private relationship between employer and employee. Of particular significance in SN’s proposed reform was that employers would have sole authority to determine whether a potential immigrant was appropriate for a given job opening. This change would effectively remove any actors other than employers from the decision-making process on work permits: trade unions would no longer be solicited for input, nor would the county labor market board be asked to provide information on local labor market conditions. Needs of the firm, and not a desire to treat migration within the context of reducing domestic unemployment, would steer Sweden’s labor migration policy. According to SN, the desire to abandon the coordinated system of work permit approvals reflected a simple logic of the job market, at least as seen from the perspective of employers: It is only the individual employer who will, and can, decide which competence is needed for the firm, and who can evaluate if an applicant meets the stated criteria. . . . The principle for labor migration should be the same as for all other recruiting, that is to say that companies that recruit shall get to decide what types of knowledge and competence they require. This should apply in all branches and sectors. To an ever-increasing extent, firms are looking for people with competence and experience that fit with just that company’s specific profile. It is therefore not possible to limit labor migration to specific occupations or educations.58

By not limiting permits to specific sectors or employers, the SN proposal opened up the possibility that economic migrants would be able to compete directly with domestic workers in sectors where no job shortages existed. As such, this constituted a second sharp break with the policy that was in effect at the time. Under those rules, only the few hundred third-country national labor migrants who received permanent residency each year were immediately granted unrestricted labor market access, and those were generally expected to have open-ended employment contracts. Instead, the vast majority of third-country national labor migrants were restricted to temporary permits linking their presence in Sweden to short-term employment with specific employers in sectors where significant staffing shortages had been firmly documented. Under the SN proposal, third-country nationals with a minimum of a one-year employment contract would be issued a five-year work permit that amounted to an all-access pass to the Swedish labor market. Taken jointly then, a result of implementing the employer proposal would be that control over the labor supply would shift markedly from county labor market boards and the relevant trade union to employers.

68

Chapter Three

Evidence does exist that the Swedish public was broadly sympathetic to the idea of a relaxed labor migration policy toward third-country nationals, if not necessarily toward the specifics of the SN proposal. In June 2002, the polling firm Temo surveyed 1000 Swedes regarding their attitudes toward labor migration. Sixty-seven percent of respondents favored a proposal that non-EU citizens with job offers in hand should be allowed to come and work in Sweden. As Table 3.1 shows, support for a less restrictive migration policy was high even among SAP voters (63 percent) and a majority of LO members (59 percent). However, key individuals in the state labor market bureaucracy doubted the veracity of these figures. According to Sandro Scocco, the survey, which has been ordered by SN, had been worded in such a way as to ensure that public opinion appeared to line up behind the employers’ association stance. Referring to the survey as “very unserious,” Scocco suggested that if one had “instead phrased the question as the law now says, ‘Should work in Sweden mainly be reserved for people living in Sweden?’” the response would have been 95 percent in favor.59 As is frequently argued in the analysis of survey data, it is possible that support for non-EU labor migration reflected the wording of the question. In data collected by the SOM Institute at the University of Gothenburg in 2001, there was considerably less support for the statement that “immigration to Sweden must increase Table 3.1. Support for labor migration to Sweden from non-EU countries in June 2002, by current party support and union membership, percent. There are proposals that a person who has been offered employment should get to come here and work even if he or she comes from a non-EU country. Do you think this is a good or bad proposal? Party

Good

Bad

Don’t Know/No Answer

Left Social Democrats Greens Center Christian Democrats Liberals Moderates

79 63 79 68 74 82 64

18 30 19 26 17 7 31

2 7 2 6 9 11 5

Union Membership LO TCO Other None

59 72 77 68

34 22 18 25

7 6 5 7

Source: Temo Survey, published June 27, 2002. Possible answers were “very good,” “somewhat good,” “somewhat bad,” “very bad,” and “don’t know.” In this table, “very good” and “somewhat good” are combined into “good,” while “somewhat bad” and “very bad” are combined into “bad.” In the case of the Left Party, the published figures only total to 99%.

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

69

in order for industry to get the labor force that it needs.” Presented with an eleven-point scale in which zero indicated being strongly opposed and where ten indicated strong support, only 19 percent of respondents who identified with the SAP rated their support at seven or higher. For LO members, the level of support was even less, with only 13.5 percent rating their support at seven or higher.60 Finally, it should be stressed that not all features of the SN proposal were identical to the earlier Fahimi report. In particular, the two reports differed in that Ekenger and Wallen did not mandate a restrictive benefits policy that would phase in access to social benefits over time. The only point at which economic migrants would be excluded from the Swedish safety net would be during their job search. Upon commencement of employment, migrants would receive access to social services at levels identical to all others working and residing in Sweden. However, the authors were cognizant that migrant access to generous social services was politically sensitive. In a section of the report focusing on the potential effects of increased labor migration on the Swedish welfare state, Ekenger and Wallén took exception to the claim that labor migration would increase the fiscal strain being placed upon the welfare state: the fact is the labor migration has positive effects for the welfare system. When more people work, earn money and pay taxes, there are increased possibilities for maintaining good levels within the safety system. Further, the construction of the social insurance system is also such that there is no risk for “over-exploitation.”61

However, if a restrictive benefits policy was absent from the SN call to overhaul labor migration policy, it did surface again in the Liberal Party’s call for a new integration policy that was presented in early August 2002. Claiming that “Sweden needs more immigrants, not fewer,” the Liberals sketched out a reform of third-country national labor migration policy that drew heavily on the substance of the SN proposal, albeit with notable differences.62 First, the Liberals proposed a five-year waiting period before the automatic granting of permanent residency, while remaining open to the possibility that applications for permanent status could be submitted after three years. Second, while the employers’ association had been silent on the issue of permit status for economic migrants who either lost or quit their jobs, the Liberals proposed that labor migrants would have three months after a job loss to secure new employment. If a new job was not found within that period, the temporary permit would be revoked, and the migrant would be required to leave the country. Third, the Liberals expressed support for phasing in social benefits. According to then Liberal Party leader Lars Leijonborg, labor migrants would be required to wait five years before gaining full access to what he termed

70

Chapter Three

“the Swedish social service apparatus.”63 In an interview with LO Tidningen shortly after the Liberal Party proposal was released, Leijonborg was asked why migrants would not receive immediate permanent residency. His response underscored the degree to which concerns over abuse of welfare state service shaped the Liberal stance: I think we need to have a qualification period. If everyone was allowed to stay permanently, then the pressure on the Swedish welfare system would be too great. Those that had a short-term job could be supported the remainder of the time with income support and other welfare contributions.64

Over the course of the spring and summer, the Moderates, the Christian Democrats, the Center Party, and the Greens all aligned themselves with the Liberals and announced their support for opening Sweden’s borders to labor migration.65 As one newspaper commentary pointed out, labor migration was shaping up to be an issue in the 2002 election campaign in which there was a genuine difference of opinion. In the following section, the extent of those divisions will become clear. For while employers, bourgeois parties, and the Greens lined up behind the idea of a radically less restrictive labor migration policy, the ruling SAP and allied LO remained highly sceptical. Their stance, as we will see, reflected what Daniel Tichenor has a labeled a “nationalist egalitarian” view of migration policy, as the opposition of the SAP and LO to calls for liberalization reflected a steadfast belief that “certain obligations to disadvantaged members of the national political community must be met before newcomers are granted admission.”66

THE SAP AND LO RESPONSE: DOMESTIC RESERVES AS AN OBSTACLE TO OPENING SWEDEN’S BORDERS Throughout the summer 2002 parliamentary election campaign, the response to employer and Liberal party calls for an overhauled labor migration policy from central figures within the then-governing SAP and the allied LO focused on three broadly related themes. First, these proposals were characterized as being incompatible with the drive to reduce unemployment rates, particularly with regard to the high levels of unemployment that Sweden’s immigrant population faced. Second, the reform proposals that had been put forward were portrayed as being akin to a guest worker system that would place new waves of labor migrants in a comparatively insecure position on the Swedish labor market. Finally, to a more limited extent, the proposal to deregulate Swedish labor migration

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

71

policy was portrayed as a Trojan horse, with an ultimate aim not of alleviating staffing shortages, but of dismantling the Swedish model. The initial response to the SN proposal came during “Almedal Week,” in which LO chair Wanja Lundby-Wedin conceded that 2007 would likely mark the point at which a resumption of labor migration would become necessary. Until then, she wondered rhetorically, “why don’t companies go out and recruit in (the heavily immigrant suburbs of) Tensta and Rinkeby?”67 The emphasis on cutting domestic unemployment levels prior to restructuring Sweden’s third-country national labor migration policy was a staple feature of LO comments throughout the summer election campaign. In an August 2002 debate, Liberal Party leader Lars Leijonborg challenged LO on the need to mobilize domestic reserves first, suggesting that a restrictive permit approval process was resulting in a loss of much needed skilled labor. As one example, he detailed the case of a Syrian surgeon employed in Sweden as a hospital ward assistant and wondered why the individual should not be granted permanent residency for labor market reasons. Lundby-Wedin’s reply skirted the issue of the immigrant’s medical qualifications, and stated simply that there was no current shortage of hospital ward assistants in Sweden. Refocusing the debate on the need to mobilize the unemployed, those involuntarily working part-time, and the long-term disabled, before moving ahead with plans to increase migration, Lundby-Wedin declared brusquely that, “We have enough labor in Sweden.”68 In a published version of the debate, Lundby-Wedin dismissed claims that LO failed to see the need for labor migration. Once again, she emphasized that the union accepted that “in the future, additional labor will presumably be needed in Sweden.” Yet, for the here and now, there was “still the many unemployed and those people on disability leave who want to and should get the chance to work. This is the primary consideration when future labor migration is to be discussed.”69 Other LO officials pursued a similar logic when arguing that a resumption in labor migration would have to wait. Writing in the pages of the syndicalist newspaper Arbetaren, the LO official responsible for integration, Thord Pettersson, described what economic conditions would look like when Sweden once again made broader use of labor migrations: Future labor migration is likely, and when that day comes, I will celebrate. Specifically, it will mean that Sweden has had a long period with high economic growth and has approached full employment. Labor migration can thus be a means for guaranteeing the continuation of the welfare state. . . . Everybody has the right to employment and to provide for themselves. Sweden must therefore make use of the work force that is already in the country. Labor migration cannot mean that the full employment goal becomes more distant.70

72

Chapter Three

For its part, the SAP response shared a similar focus on the presumably negative effects that increased economic migration would have on unemployment levels in general, and more specifically, on the employment prospects of first- and second-generation immigrants in Sweden’s three largest cities. Prime Minister Göran Persson led the assault on SN, making the issue a regular feature of stump speeches and interviews. In an annual August speech in Björkvik, Persson argued that labor migration could hinder efforts to reduce unemployment and increase integration of refugees: We have over 100,000 people that came to Sweden during the 1990s as refugees, who aren’t even in the unemployment statistics. But they are in our country. Often they are young, and not infrequently, well-educated. As a rule, they live in the suburbs of Stockholm, Göteborg or Malmö. We need them also. We have a huge chance to get them working in the coming years, if we manage to maintain current levels of economic activity. They would be able to get away from dependency on social services and could create their own freedom and their own lives. Until we have managed that task, and until we have managed to push back disability levels, we’re not interested in opening up for labor migration . . . we say no. If we were to, at this point in time, open up for a labor migration along the lines of what Lars Leijonborg described yesterday, that is, where people are tossed out of the country when the jobs disappear, then we know just one thing. Mass unemployment among people in the suburbs of the big cities would be made permanent (and) it would result in desperation and exclusion, social tensions and divisions in society.71

Persson was not the sole figure in the SAP stressing this presumed linkage. Other key members of the social democratic government and state bureaucracy portrayed the proposed reforms as counter-productive for efforts to reduce unemployment. In the final week before the election, then minister of agriculture Margareta Winberg denounced a Conservative Party campaign poster lamenting to voters that, “Your son can’t get a job.” Winberg mocked the Moderates’ sincerity on this issue by pointing to the party’s support for increased labor migration, asking, “Will it be any easier for ‘your son’ to find a job when crowds of new workers come to Sweden?”72 Jan O. Karlsson, then minister of migration, stressed that between 1990 and 1995, roughly 400,000 refugees were granted permanent residence permits and that for many of them, the difficulties of getting a foothold on the Swedish labor market were compounded by hard economic times. As such, Karlsson noted that while “the bourgeois parties are now competing to satisfy” the call from employers for liberal labor migration, the current need for labor in both industry and the public sector should instead be fulfilled by those “who currently stand outside

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

73

the labor market.”73 Even leading figures within the state bureaucracy suggested that other commitments precluded a strategy of labor migration. According to AMS general director Anders Johansson, a forecasted labor shortage of 300,000 by the year 2015 could be met through the activation of the “disabled, those who have opted for early retirement and those enrolled in labor market programs.”74 The statistics cited were often dramatic, as when Persson stressed in an interview on Swedish Radio that upward of 150,000 unemployed immigrants would have their “prospects demolished” if Sweden were to implement labor migration. On another occasion, Persson addressed a crowd in a southern Stockholm suburb, pointing out that unemployment levels of up to 60 percent for certain ethnic groups required saying no to labor migration.75 Following a speech in an immigrant-heavy neighborhood in the city of Uppsala, Persson expressed frustration that the debate over labor migration was becoming bogged down with questions regarding how unemployment levels were being calculated. According to the Swedish wire service, TT, Persson remarked: I’m relatively certain that there were a hundred people in the square here in (the neighborhood of) Gottsunda, who are unemployed (and) who aren’t even in our statistics because they are not looking for jobs. They’re left out. If we have a labor shortage, why don’t we begin there first? We’ll get a new Sweden if we can put these people to work. If we open up for labor migration, these groups will become permanently unemployed.76

One can wonder why it is that the SAP chose to highlight the necessity of reducing unemployment among the immigrant population prior to accepting a more generous labor migration policy for third-country nationals. Certainly, the strong emphasis on ensuring that labor migration should be limited until domestic reserves can be mobilized is consistent with the argument advanced in the previous chapters: in defending the workings of the Swedish model, the SAP and LO prefer a labor migration policy that does not prioritize the perceived need of individual firms over that of full employment goals. Yet, aside from the particular challenges associated with integrating non-economic migrants within Sweden into the workforce, why did Persson choose to hammer home the damaging effect that labor migration would have while significant immigrant unemployment still existed? Here, it would be reasonable to speculate that the rise of far-right populist parties across Europe was a contributing factor. A central feature defining far-right populist parties has been their support for sharply more restrictive entry policies for nearly all forms of migrants, and a related opposition to policies that promote multiculturalism. In recent years, these parties have grown substantially in electoral strength across Europe, particularly in France. Moreover, Scandinavia has not been

74

Chapter Three

immune to the success of the populist appeal. In the 2001 election to the Danish Folketing, Pia Kjærsgaard’s Danish People’s party increased its percentage of the vote by nearly 5 percent, from 7.4 percent to 12 percent and increased its number of parliamentary seats by nine, from thirteen to twenty-two. Perhaps more importantly, the party gained substantial influence over Denmark’s immigration and integration policies as a result of its close cooperation with the governing Danish Liberals, Venstre. To Sweden’s immediate west, the Norwegian Progress Party continued to hover at the approximate 15 percent range in the 2001 election to the Norwegian Storting, and managed to increase its number of parliamentary seats by one, to twenty-six. Yet, with one recent exception, Sweden has remained immune to a serious electoral challenge from populist political entrepreneurs. In 1991, New Democracy, whose platform included a call for increased restrictiveness in Sweden’s refugee policies, stormed into the Swedish Parliament, capturing just under 7 percent of the vote and twenty-six seats. However, three years later, the party imploded as a result of internal differences when it came to casting votes on the question of subsidies for the care of pre-school children. Despite their rapid exit from the political stage, the looming threat that the far right could make long-term gains in the Swedish political arena has haunted all Swedish parties, not least of all the SAP. As Schattschneider has observed, parties are less concerned with the ongoing challenge from traditional opponents confronting them within an existing cleavage structure than they are with the emergence of actors who can raise issues resulting in a realignment of voters under new cleavage structures.77 In the case of the SAP, this concern has manifested itself most clearly in the conscious effort to ensure that economic conditions cannot take root that may facilitate the establishment of a successful farright populist party. Thus, the SAP’s opposition to liberal labor migration, and its repeated emphasis on the need to mobilize the existing immigrant workforce, can also be understood within the context of a potentially disastrous chain of events: Through being able to bypass existing domestic reserves in favor of foreign workers, employers indirectly contribute to a worsening unemployment crisis for unemployed immigrants, which could then be exploited by populist political entrepreneurs. Indeed, if one looks at Göran Persson’s comments in the final few weeks of the parliamentary election campaign, it is possible to locate statements hinting at the concern that relaxed labor migration would constitute the first domino in a process resulting in an increased hostility toward immigrants and those with immigrant backgrounds. While in Göteborg, Persson “made reference to the risks that come along with unemployment in terms of xenophobia” and declared that, “We have to make sure that those who came here in the 1990s also get a job. That’s why

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

75

we can’t open the country up for labor migration now. This is a classic struggle for holding a country together.”78 The SAP concern that liberal labor migration could play into the hands of populist forces was made explicit in one of the final televised debates between party leaders before the September election. Addressing Liberal Party leader Lars Leijonborg, Persson suggested rhetorically that he should think some about why the far-right Danish People’s Party had congratulated the Swedish Liberals on their rapid rise in the public opinion polls throughout the summer campaign. According to Persson, the joint proposals of relaxed rules for labor migration and changes in Swedish labor law were likely to result in a rise of xenophobia.79 Perhaps most directly, Persson made the case for a link between relaxed labor migration rules and a potential rise in xenophobia after the 2002 election. Writing in the pages of the European social democratic magazine Progressive Politics in the summer of 2003, Persson argued: In many European countries, right-wing populists have gained political support on xenophobic messages built on prejudice and the scapegoat mentality. Unless we manage to persuade the voters that economic migration will be a prerequisite for welfare and wealth—that they will contribute, not be a burden—initiatives to promote this could become counter-productive. They would lead to larger support for populist parties and calls for restrictive policies to close borders.80

A repeated emphasis on unemployment rates as an obstacle blocking the immediate reform of labor migration policy for third country nationals was central to the rhetoric voiced by the SAP and LO during the 2002 election campaign and afterward. However, it was not the only counterargument raised. The second main element of the SAP and LO response was to stress that less restrictive labor migration would result in a guest worker system if implemented. In criticizing the proposed reforms, concerns were raised that a sharply deregulated model of labor migration would create a second-tier workforce of immigrants without access to the same wage levels or social rights guaranteed to other workers in Sweden. On several occasions throughout the campaign, the accusation was made that the adoption of liberal proposals would result in a guest worker system. When the Liberal Party proposed that unemployed labor migrants who could not find new work within three months during their first five years in Sweden would be stripped of their work permits and forced to depart Sweden, both the SAP and LO were quick to attack. Prime Minister Persson criticized the call for temporary work permits (granted without the involvement of the labor market board or unions), referring to the proposal as “unreasonable,” and asking, “Should we send

76

Chapter Three

people back after several years? They might have gotten married and had children. Should we then be sending back the whole family?”81 Yet, it was LO that offered the most comprehensive criticism of the impact that a five-year period with temporary work permits would have, not only on the rights of the individual migrant, but on the broader Swedish labor market. In her first comments responding to the August 2002 Liberal Party proposal, LO chair Lundby-Wedin remarked that: When the Liberal Party proposes that an immigrant workforce will lose its work permits if they lose their jobs, then we’re opening up for a Swedish guest worker system. I don’t think it’s right that people should be treated in this fashion. People should not be treated as if they are being used to regulate economic cycles; they have a right to build a life here.82

In a debate against Liberal Party leader Lars Leijonborg later that month, Lundby-Wedin posed the then rhetorical question, “What will happen to immigrants who, after four years, lose their jobs and only have three months to find work before they get thrown out of Sweden?”83 Lundby-Wedin eventually answered the question herself, outlining a dire transformation of working conditions in Sweden were the proposal to be adopted: This is a pure guest worker system. After three months (of being unemployed), the employee risks having to snatch up both family and children in order to leave the country. Given what is at stake for the individual, Leijonborg’s naïve phrases ring empty when he says that (migrants) won’t be forced to work for wages or conditions that are less than what is offered in collective bargaining agreements. Naturally it’s incredibly difficult for an individual to resist the suggestion of lower wages if the alternative is getting thrown out of the country. That such a system would provide the preconditions for building up low-wage sectors should be obvious to all. The Liberal Party proposal would also result in absurd effects. Would a person, who has been working for a year, and has been a member of the union and the unemployment insurance scheme, lose her rights if she was unemployed for more than three months?84

Yet, in evaluating Lundby-Wedin’s remarks, it is important to stress that both the employer and Liberal proposals are radically different from both a scholarly and popular understanding of a guest worker system in one key sense: neither actor proposed that a resumption of labor migration for third-country nationals should center on a principle of labor rotation in which economic migrants are precluded from the eventual acquisition of permanent residency in Sweden. Rather, status conversion from temporary to permanent residency was conditional upon demonstrating ongoing employment within a certain time frame. It should be

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

77

recalled that the then-existing Swedish labor migration policy covering third-country nationals explicitly imposed an upper-time limit on the length of stay (eighteen months in most cases), and required that foreign workers must exit the country upon completion of employment. Seen in that light, it was the existing policy for third-country labor migration that more closely approximated a guest worker system, and not the reforms being proposed by employers and the bourgeois parties. Lundby-Wedin’s comments demonstrate LO’s awareness of a possible interaction effect resulting from granting migrants full labor market access while at the same time making permanent residency conditional on remaining employed. Specifically, these comments demonstrate LO’s concern that the reform proposals would result in heightened competition for jobs and a substantial downward wage pressure, as migrants seeking to maintain their permit status would scramble to take the first possible employment opportunity that came along in order to remain legally resident in Sweden, and would be free to do so in any sector of the economy. While other key players in the debate did not raise the specter of a guest worker system, they did still allude to how proponents of labor migration had aims that went beyond securing needed labor. Immediately prior to being named director for AMS, Sandro Scocco wrote a report for the thinktank Tankesmedjan SAP focusing on the coming labor shortage. Scocco emphasized that while labor market policies within “the framework of the Nordic welfare model” could partially be utilized to meet the demographic challenge, increased labor migration would still be required at some point. Scocco’s embrace of labor migration’s potential was cautiously stated, and he warned that if labor migration became “a lever for pursuing broad political goals, such as tax cuts for the highest wage-earners, as certain interest groups and political parties have done to this point, the question will go down a blind alley. Without cause it will become associated with changes in the balance of power that are disadvantageous to regular wage-earners. That’s both unnecessary and dumb.”85 While Scocco speculated that labor migration could become a tool employed in the pursuit of other political ends, LO’s Thord Pettersson was unequivocal in painting the true intent behind calls for liberal labor migration as nothing more that the wholesale destruction of the Swedish model: There are two reasons why there are still proponents of free and unregulated migration. Some people simply don’t know any better. Others know better but are hiding it well. Given that the strong position of Swedish wageearners (achieved) through collective action has long been a thorn in the side of clueless and naïve liberals, they want to use immigration as a battering ram to tear down welfare-Sweden. The real motives are hidden behind humanitarian arguments.86

78

Chapter Three

Pettersson’s views were shared by the board of FAI, The Trade Union of Active Immigrants, which adopted the stance for the 2002 parliamentary election that “labor migration should be regulated, now and in the future.” Similar to the logic being put forward by LO, FAI chose to emphasize that liberal labor migration proposals from SN would “primarily benefit employers, who could choose and dispose of a labor force. There is also the clear risk that an unregulated labor migration would hollow out the rules and collective bargaining agreements having to do with wages, workplace environment, working times and so on, which currently prevail on the Swedish labor market.”87 When the votes in the parliamentary election were counted on September 15, the Liberals recorded a stunning increase of over 8 percent, capturing slightly more than 13 percent of the vote and increasing the number of seats held from seventeen to thirty-eight. Still, the outcome of the election was a continuation of SAP rule. As such, it would not have been unreasonable to assume that calls for the reform of labor migration policy would fade from the policy agenda, at least in the short run. Indeed, at the start of 2003, the leading conservative daily, Svenska Dagbladet, reflected, “When election year 2002 is laid to rest, when Christmas feasts are eaten and when snow has fallen in large parts of the country, it’s not labor migration that is highest up on the political agenda.”88 Such a prosaic assessment of the prospects for an overhaul of Swedish labor migration policy may have rung true at the start of the new year. Just two months later though, the scope of the conflict in favor of labor migration reform would be significantly widened. Calls for a less restrictive policy toward third-country nationals, quite simply, would not go away.

CONCLUSION The debate surrounding Sweden’s labor migration policy during the 2002 parliamentary election reveals sharp differences over the question of granting third-country nationals more liberal access to the Swedish labor market. For the chief employers’ association and the Liberal Party, labor migration reform represented an important tool in the effort to maintain and expand levels of economic growth, as well as for ensuring that the generous social services associated with the Swedish model are both funded and staffed as the post–World War II generation exits the workforce in ever greater numbers. In advancing an argument for a less restrictive labor migration policy, these two organizations have each stressed that the involvement of other actors in the work permit approval process (primarily the national labor market board and trade unions) has prevented employers from making what are regarded as internal hiring

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

79

decisions. To remedy this, their proposals sketched out a future in which Sweden’s borders would be open to a global workforce for a period of three months. Those who managed to secure employment would be allowed to stay, and could convert temporary residency to permanent status after a period of three to five years of employment. While on temporary work permits, third-country nationals could not have been unemployed for more than ninety consecutive days without risk of losing their permits. Moreover, the Liberals proposed a phased-in access to Swedish social services. This vision for reconstituting Sweden’s third-country national labor migration policy proved to be wholly unacceptable to the then-ruling SAP and LO. Rather than dissect the employer and Liberal Party proposals in detail, arguments against them were advanced at a more general level, wherein it was stressed that a shift away from a regulated framework would damage prospects for combating unemployment, particularly among immigrants and refugees in Sweden’s urban areas. Consistent with the argument advanced in the preceding chapter, LO and the SAP did not rule out a restructured policy that would grant a larger number of third-country nationals greater access to the Swedish labor market. However, the two actors were repeatedly explicit that this could only occur if such reform measures occurred inside a broader framework of policy measures intended to ensure that full employment was achieved. As such, this chapter has provided one important set of evidence, showing how the SAP and LO evaluate proposals for labor migration reform against the backdrop of their perceived effect on policies and institutions that are central instruments in the attainment of social democratic economic policy goals. Yet, there is an obvious limitation to the material presented in this chapter, in that it has only documented the broad logic underlying the opposition of the SAP and LO to calls for a more liberal labor migration policy. What, though, of the reform alternatives favored by these two actors? To what extent do they reflect a desire to ensure that labor migration acts in concert with the Swedish model? And if such is the case, to what extent is it visible in the choices that are made when assembling the six policy components of labor migration? I address these questions in the following chapter, detailing the development of reform process from early 2003 to the summer of 2008. Since early 2003, the Greens have become a key actor in support of labor migration reform, and joined the four bourgeois parties in pushing through a vote in the Parliament mandating that the then-SAP government appoint a parliamentary committee to propose less restrictive entry rules for thirdcountry nationals. The SAP-led committee responded by proposing slight modifications to Sweden’s labor migration policy that would have ultimately preserved much of the status quo. LO published several reports

80

Chapter Three

detailing its own support for a highly regulated system, in which the documentation of labor shortages and a continued corporatist gatekeeping structure would be essential features in any overhauled policy. Yet, the outcome of the 2006 parliamentary election resulted in a disastrous defeat for the SAP. Despite a clear desire on the part of the SAP and LO to reform labor migration such that policy components would reinforce objectives and institutions associated with the Swedish model, the social democratic loss of power implied that the era of a heavily regulated labor migration policy would be coming to a close. NOTES 1. Gösta Ahlberg and Ingvar Svennilson, Sveriges arbetskraft och den industriella utvecklingen (Stockholm, Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1946), 21. 2. Wuokko Knocke, “Sweden: Insiders Outside The Trade Union Mainstream,” in Rinus Penninx and Judith Roosblad, Trade Unions, Immigration and Immigrants in Europe 1960–1993 (London: Berghahn Books, 2000), 157. The notion that “the handicapped, married women, and the elderly” ought to be considered as a resource prior to the use of foreign workers re-emerged in the 1968 parliamentary guidelines for immigration policy. See Joachim Nelhans, Utlänningen på arbetsmarknaden (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1973), 72. 3. Knocke, “Sweden: Insiders Outside The Trade Union Mainstream,” 159. Nelhans attributes this move to an effort by government authorities to win support from the Swedish Metal Workers Union, Metall, which was, from the outset, an opponent to the use of foreign labor. See Nelhans, Utlänningen på arbetsmarknaden, 144. 4. Hannu Kuivanen, “Proletära byråkrater: en fällstudie av fackföreningsrörelsens inflytande vid kollektiv rekrytering av utlandsk arbetskraft 1946–1965,” (unpublished manuscript, 1992), 25. 5. Nelhans, Utlänningen på arbetsmarknaden, 186. 6. Christer Lundh and Rolf Ohlsson, Från arbetskraftsimport till flyktingsinvandring (Stockholm, Sweden: SNS Forlag, 1999), 59. 7. Kuivanen, Proletära byråkrater, 39. 8. This point is made more broadly regarding AMS and labor market policy in Bo Rothstein and Jonas Bergström, Korporatismens fall och den svenska modellens kris (Stockholm, Sweden: SNS Förlag, 1999), 15. 9. Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 121. 10. Fackföreningen och den fulla sysselsättningen, as cited in Berndt Öhman, “LO och arbetsmarknadspolitiken efter andra världskiriget,” in Tvärsnitt: sju forkningsrapporter utgivna till LO:s 75-årsjubileum 1973 (Stockholm, Sweden: Prisma, 1973), 101. Some critics argued that the rationalization of industry, implying the disappearance of low-wage jobs, yet with only the uncertainty that a higher-wage alternative would appear, was not necessarily an inviting prospect. See Svante

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

81

Nycander, Makten över arbetsmarknaden: Ett perspektiv på Sveriges 1900-tal (Stockholm, Sweden: SNS Förlag, 2002), 139. 11. Gunhild Kyle, Gästarbeterska i manssamhället (Stockholm, Sweden: LiberFörlag, 1979), 220. 12. Lundh and Ohlsson, Från arbetskraftsimport till flyktingsinvandring, 62–63. Three years earlier, the Swedish parliament had formally rejected calls from bourgeois parties for fully unregulated immigration. Parliamentary committees declared that such a policy would result in a stream of uneducated workers, particularly “foreigners with dubious morals” seeking to exploit the Swedish welfare system. Moreover, the committee noted that Swedish workers “only have understanding for foreigners when immigration occurs in conjunction with the union.” See Gunhild Kyle, Gästarbeterska i manssamhället, 217. 13. It is important to note that while spontaneous immigration made up an ever larger share of the foreign workers that came to Sweden, the AMS-designed scheme of 1949 did also continue, albeit to a much more limited extent, into the mid-1960s. See Kuinanen for a discussion. 14. Kyle, Gästarbeterska i manssamhället, 213. 15. Kyle, Gästarbeterska i manssamhället, 225. 16. Knocke, “Sweden: Insiders Outside The Trade Union Mainstream,” 163. 17. Lundh and Ohlsson, Från arbetskraftsimport till flyktingsinvandring, 67. See also Rolf Ohlsson, “Svensk invandrings—och flyktingspolitik efter 1945,” in Gunnar Jervas (ed.), Migrationsexplosionen (Stockholm: SNS Förlag, 1995), 88. 18. Knocke, “Sweden: Insiders Outside The Trade Union Mainstream,” 163, as well as Lundh and Ohlsson, Från arbetskraftsimport till flyktningsinvandring, 67. 19. Knocke, “Sweden: Insiders Outside the Trade Union Mainstream,” 163. 20. Lundh and Ohlsson, Från arbetskraftsimport till flyktningsinvandring, 70. 21. Tomas Hammar, “Mellan rasism och reglering: Invandringspolitikens ideologi och historia,” Arbetarhistoria 12, no. 46 (1988): 11–14. Translation as per Knocke, 165. 22. Knocke, “Sweden: Insiders Outside the Trade Union Mainstream,” 165. 23. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/ skilled/index.asp. 24. Scotland Is the Place, www.scotlandistheplace.com. 25. The Swedish Migration Board, www.migrationsverket.se/english.jsp. 26. Information regarding the policy that governed labor migration from nonEU countries during the reform debate can be found in Kommittén för arbetskraftsinvandring (KAKI), Arbetskraftsinvandring till Sverige—befolkningsutveckling, arbetsmarknad i förändring, internationell utblick, SOU 2005:50, Stockholm 2005, 201–216. 27. (KAKI), Arbetskraftsinvandring till Sverige, 201. 28. Author interview with Sandro Scocco, November 5, 2003. 29. Tilton, The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy, 279. 30. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983). 31. Carens, “Membership and Morality.” 32. Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, “Arbetskraftsinvandring och åtgärder för att möta framtida arbetskraftsbehov,” 27 April 2001, 4–5.

82

Chapter Three

33. Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, “Arbetsmarknaden för utomnordiska medborgare,” Ura 2000:5, 3. Non-Nordic resident immigrants comprise 4 percent of the overall population aged 16–64, while naturalized Swedes comprise 9 percent of the same group. 34. “Akut brist på IT-personal,” FinansTidningen, October 11, 2000. 35. “Arbetskraftsinvandring; Nej tack.” Computer Sweden, December 11, 2000. 36. “Arbetskraftsinvandring; Nej tack.” 37. Landsorganisationen, LOs yttrande över Långtidsutredningen 1999/2000— (SOU 2000:7), June 5, 2000. 38. Maj-Inger Klingwall, “Arbetskraftsinvandring kan förstärka välfärden,” LO Tidningen, March 9, 2001. 39. Sven-Erik Österberg, “Arbetskraften finns här!” LO Tidningen, March 23, 2001. 40. “Erik Åsbrink: Dags att tillåta arbetskraftsinvandring,” TT Nyhetsbanken, November 10, 1999. 41. “Ny attityd skapar jobb även för invandrare,” LO Tidningen, November 19, 1999. 42. “Theodor Paues är årets lobbyist,” Resumé, November 5, 2003. 43. Bijan Fahimi, Öppna den svenska arbetsmarknaden (Stockholm: Svenskt Näringsliv, 2001). 44. Fahimi, Öppna den svenska arbetsmarknaden, 12. 45. Fahimi, Öppna den svenska arbetsmarknaden, 13. 46. Fahimi, Öppna den svenska arbetsmarknaden, 14. 47. Fahimi, Öppna den svenska arbetsmarknaden, 16. A concrete feature of Fahimi’s report that did not appear in the subsequent policy proposal from SN was the suggestion that labor migrants to Sweden should have access to the Swedish welfare system “after a period of time . . . but not in the initial phase.” 48. “Han vill öppna gränserna för utländsk arbetskraft,” LO Tidningen, December 7, 2001. 49. Leif Håkansson and Wanja Lundby-Wedin, “Öppna för ny invandring och ta tillvara de arbetslösa,” LO Tidningen, June 14, 2002. 50. “Persson avvisar arbetskraftsinvandring,” TT Nyhetsbanken, May 17, 2002. 51. “LO avfärdar arbetskraftsinvandring,” Dagens Industri, May 18, 2002. 52. “LO avfärdar arbetskraftsinvandring.” 53. “Hård debatt om arbetskraftsinvandring,” LO Tidningen, June 7, 2002. 54. “Hård debatt om arbetskraftsinvandring.” 55. Deborah Stone, “Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas,” Political Science Quarterly 104, no. 2 (1989): 281–300. 56. Author interview with Karen Ekenger, November 4, 2003. 57. Karin Ekenger and Fabian Wallen, Invandring för tillväxt och nya jobb, Svenskt Näringsliv, July 2002. 4–5. Interestingly, a 2001 report from the Swedish government agency Invest in Sweden, on the need for attracting foreign skills, sidestepped any specific policy recommendations as to increasing the number of foreign workers in its conclusion. While alleging that the low to moderate number of skilled foreign workers in Sweden is partially attributable to the government’s immigration policies, the report merely suggested that “other countries can offer

Rejecting Calls for Deregulation of Labor Migration Policy

83

interesting insights” with regard to the eased granting of work permits. See ISA Council of Economic Advisors, Swedish Open, May 2001, 67. 58. Ekenger and Wallen, Invandring för tillväxt, 20. 59. Author interview with Sandro Scocco, November 5, 2003. 60. SOM Institute data, 2001. 61. Ekenger and Wallen, Invandring för tillväxt, 26. 62. Folkpartiet, En ny integrationspolitik, August 2002. 63. “Fp vill införa svenskatest för medborgarskap,” TT Nyhetsbanken, August 3, 2002. 64. “Utländsk arbetskraft sänker inte lönera,” LO Tidningen, August 16, 2002. 65. In some cases, this support arrived prior to the release of the actual reports. The Greens, for instance, issued a press release well ahead of the SN report urging that Swedes “listen to business” and realize that a “more open Sweden leads to a richer society.” See “Peter Eriksson om arbetskraftsinvandring: Lyssna på företagen!” May 17, 2002 press release from the Green Party. For the Moderate Party, the prominence of the issue revealed a rift over specifics within its parliamentary party group. Self-appointed Moderate spokesperson for integration policy, Göran Lindblad, suggested that Sweden would require approximately 133,000 immigrants a year for fifteen years. This shockingly high number was dismissed the very next day by the Moderates’ parliamentary group leader, Per Unckel, who pointed out that the party only supported labor market immigration for those individuals who had a job offer in hand. See “Moderaterna vill ha två miljoner invandrare på 15 år,” Svenska Dagbladet, August 9, 2002 and “Internt bråk hos m om invandring,” Svenska Dagbladet, August 10, 2002. 66. Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 37. 67. “Håll gränsen stängd,” Dagens Industri, July 11, 2002. 68. “Het debatt om invandring mellan LO och Fp,” TT Nyhetsbänkan, August 22, 2002. 69. “Pro/Kontra: Arbetskraftsinvandring,” Axess no. 5, 2002. 70. Thord Pettersson, “Fri invandring är inte humanism,” Arbetaren, March 8–14, 2002. 71. Speech by Göran Persson at Björkvik, August 5, 2002. 72. Swedish Ministry of Agriculture press release, September 9, 2002. 73. Jan O. Karlsson, “Mer än bara invandrare,” Svenska Dagbladet, August 27, 2002. 74. “Ams varnar för ekonomisk kris,” Dagens Nyheter, July 11, 2002. 75. “Persson: Ingen arbetskraftsinvandring de närmaste tio åren,” TT Nyhetsbanken, August 13, 2002 and “Persson varnar för borgerligt kaos,” TT Nyhetsbanken, August 20, 2002. 76. “Persson håller fast vid mål om minskad arbetslöshet,” TT Nyhetsbanken, August 28, 2002. 77. E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s Guide to Democracy in America (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1975). 78. “Persson citerade Palme and Erlander,” Aktuellt i Politiken, August 14, 2002.

84

Chapter Three

79. “Oststyrig och grälsjuk partiledardebatt,” TT Nyhetsbanken, September 10, 2002. Interestingly, Leijonborg seemed shocked by the accusation and replied, “You think our proposal is xenophobic? I think you should apologize for comparing our proposal with the Danish People’s Party. They want to get rid of immigrants, we want to accept more.” 80. Göran Persson, “Progress Europe: A Force for Good,” Progressive Politics, August 2003. 81. “Persson angriper folkpartiet,” Aktuellt i Politiken, August 5, 2002. 82. Landsorganisationen, “Wanja Lundby-Wedin, om Fps integrationsförslag— Folkpartiets integrationspolitik leder till ökad segregation,” August 8, 2002. 83. Landsorganisationen, “Folkpartiets politik skulle skapa en ny underclass,” www.lo.se/val2002/nyhet13.shtml. 84. “Pro/Kontra: Arbetskraftsinvandring,” Axess no. 5, 2002. 85. Sandro Scocco, Moder Sveas rynkor, Tankesmedjan SAP, May 29, 2002. 86. Pettersson, “Fri invandring är inte humanism.” 87. Nätverket fackligt aktiva invandrare (FAI), press release, May 24, 2002. 88. “Apropå: Arbetsmarknad—Arbetskraftsinvandring—frågan som försvann,” Svenska Dagbladet, January 2, 2003.

Four The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

The SAP victory in the 2002 parliamentary election appeared to imply that labor migration policy reform would fade from the policy agenda, and that active labor market policy measures would be relied upon for tackling labor shortages in the short term. Yet, as this chapter will show, the issue was far from dead. The reform drive gained a substantial boost in March 2003 when the Greens joined forces with Sweden’s four bourgeois parties, forcing the social democratic government to appoint a parliamentary committee to propose new rules for the admission of thirdcountry national foreign workers. Reflecting the SAP’s majority on the committee, the 2006 final report proposed some changes to facilitate the entry of third-country national labor migrants, but did so in conjunction with measures sharply similar to the existing policy: multiple gatekeepers, requiring tests of labor market conditions, and initial limitations to migrant labor market access. While the committee conducted its investigation, LO published two reports addressing the question of migration policy reforms. In these texts, the union reiterated its stance that employer and bourgeois proposals were inconsistent with the design of the Swedish model, and also put forward various elements of an incentive-compatible policy. With the social democratic loss in the 2006 parliamentary elections, an alliance of bourgeois parties took power and quickly stated that a proposal for labor migration based on employer needs would be forthcoming. Announced in the summer of 2007, the bourgeois government’s plan for an overhauled policy broke decisively with existing regulations on a number of fronts. Most dramatically, the bourgeois alliance proposed an end to the involvement of trade unions and labor market boards in 85

86

Chapter Four

verifying labor shortages. Both the SAP and LO greeted the governing alliance’s initiative with substantial criticism, accusing the government of taking further important steps away from the Swedish model by granting employers such broad influence over the admission of third-country nationals. Overall, this stage of the Swedish labor migration policy reform process will be shown to be consistent with the argument outlined in chapter 2. As the debate shifted from the campaign trail to parliamentary committee, the SAP and LO advocated the structured access of third-country nationals to the Swedish labor market. Both actors supported continued dispersal of gatekeeping authority over work permit applications among the state, trade unions, and employers; advocating limits on the rights of migrants to conduct job searches on site; and the imperative of using labor market boards to verify any shortages prior to admission. Both LO and the SAP supported granting third-country nationals welfare state rights identical to those of existing legal residents. Yet, the two allies did not make identical choices on all components of labor migration policy. LO mandated open-ended employment contracts as part of the initial employment offer, thus allowing for permanent residency and full labor market access. For the SAP, no such open-ended contract was required at the time of the initial hire, thus mandating a more cautious approach toward increased labor market access and the ability to achieve permanent residency. Underlying these two sets of policy components was the desire that the entry of third-country nationals onto the national labor market be structured so as to preserve incentive compatibility between labor migration and key pillars of the Swedish model. The reform of labor migration policy constituted a front line in the battle over the future trajectories of the Swedish coordinated market economy, with LO and the SAP well aware of the stakes.

AN ALLIANCE ACROSS POLITICAL BLOCS: THE GREENS JOIN THE CALL FOR LIBERAL LABOR MIGRATION Upon being named “2003 Lobbyist of The Year” in Sweden, Theodor Paues acknowledged that his work on behalf of SN to generate support for labor migration reform had benefited from the ability of the bourgeois parties to secure additional parliamentary support for their proposals. While the Left Party’s rhetoric strongly advocated an internationalist position, Paues clamed that they were unlikely partners for the emerging bourgeois alliance, as their rhetoric was regarded as “little more than words.” Nor was looking to the SAP government for support a feasible

The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

87

option. Indeed, in a parliamentary floor debate in December 2002, the Social Democratic MP and then vice-prime minister Margereta Winberg reiterated the difference in stances held by the Liberals and the SAP when it came to the admission of third-country nationals for purposes of employment. Winberg noted that Sweden’s then current acceptance rate for refugees and asylum-seekers had recently jumped by approximately 5 percent, placing it well over the EU average. However, the relative openness toward refugees did not translate into a general “open door” policy for non-citizens, with Winberg declaring that “we are not prepared to open our borders in the manner that, to example, was proposed by the Liberal Party.” Pointing to Sweden’s past experiences with large-scale labor migration, the vice-prime minister declared that she was not opposed to its resumption. However, Winberg emphasized the imperative for the SAP that labor migration would occur in an “organized” fashion, and that it would not result in “the politics of underbidding that we interpreted as part of many proposals that were circulating during the election campaign.”1 By process of elimination, this only left the Greens as a suitable candidate for cross-bloc cooperation, a party that Paues regarded as characterized by “international tendencies.” In February 2003, Paues scheduled a seminar on labor migration at the Swedish parliament, attended by roughly twenty MPs. Shortly thereafter, the Greens published the document Arbetskraftsinvandring med socialt ansvar—10 förslag (Labor Migration with Social Responsibility—10 Proposals), which Paues labeled as the “key” to the emergence of a blue-green coalition on third-country national labor migration.2 Basing their stance on the criticism that current “global development involves open borders for goods and capital, but closed borders for people,” the Green Party proposal stressed that despite a period of low economic growth and moderately increasing unemployment, recruiting difficulties were expected to become more severe for both public and private sector employers. Explicitly rejecting the SAP line that “those who live here first have to get jobs before we let others in,” the Greens also emphasized that labor migration did not need by default to result in a guest worker system, a claim that the Greens attributed to the SAP “propaganda of fear.” Stressing that it was also important to be critical toward those whose model of labor migration “is built exclusively on freedom for firms to exploit people on the Swedish labor market,” the Greens argued that labor migration reform could be structured so as to ensure that new migrants would have conditions equal to those of the domestic workforce. On balance, the Green proposal for labor migration differed very little from that which had been promoted by SN at Almedal Week the previous summer; the only noticeable difference was the proposal that

88

Chapter Four

third-country national labor migrants in Sweden would receive permanent residency after one year of employment. Similar to both the SN and Liberal party proposals, the Greens expected that third-country nationals would have the freedom to pick and choose among employers and sectors during their one year with a temporary work permit. No discussion was offered regarding a possible loss of permit status for those migrants who became unemployed during that one-year period.3 In terms of social citizenship, the report stressed that labor migrants were to receive the same “social insurance and other terms of employment” as provided for Swedish workers. Yet, what the Green proposal did not convey was how close the party had been to striking a deal with the Social Democrats over labor migration. According to the regional Swedish newspaper Sydsvenskan, the Greens had attempted to forge a deal on labor migration with SAP Minister of Working Life Hans Karlsson while discussing the government’s proposal for future labor market policy. Unable to come to terms, labor migration was fully absent from the document, and Karlsson’s plans instead centered on active labor market policy measures intended to create job coaches for unemployed migrants, to provide information to asylum seekers, to increase the subsidy provided to employers for job creation programs, and to establish re-training programs targeted at moving those already employed into sectors experiencing a labor shortage.4 The Liberal Party immediately welcomed the emergence of the Greens as an additional player supporting a deregulated variant of labor migration. While taking the opportunity yet again to emphasize how current rules resulted in situations where “doctors and others who are working in professions with labor shortages are getting thrown out of Sweden despite their contribution to Swedish welfare and growth,” Erik Ullenhag, then refugee policy spokesperson for the Liberals, hinted that a cross-bloc deal on the issue might be in the cards, noting that, “The preconditions for building a majority between the four bourgeois parties and the Greens are very good. It would be a real blessing if the Swedish parliament could pressure a government that sees immigration as a problem and not as a possibility for opening Sweden to the outside world.”5 In the following week, the Moderate Party also voiced its support for a parliamentary investigation into a reformed policy. Then leader of the Moderates, Bo Lundgren, expressed support for a core principle of liberal labor migration, stating that, “Those who are offered work in Sweden should get to come here.”6 Such a viewpoint was still generally in keeping with the attitudes held by the Swedish public, even if support had declined substantially among certain political party supporters. In a survey commissioned by SN and published in May 2003, 68 percent of all respondents supported proposals to allow entry for third-country nationals who had arranged employment

The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

89

Table 4.1. Support for labor migration to Sweden from non-EU countries in May 2003, by current party support and union membership, percent. Survey answers from 2002 in parentheses. There are proposals that a person who has been offered employment should get to come here and work even if he or she comes from a non-EU country. Do you think this is a good or bad proposal? Party

Good

Bad

Don’t Know/No Answer

Left Social Democrats Greens Center Christian Democrats Liberals Moderates

66 64 90 56 60 71 75

(79) (63) (79) (68) (74) (82) (64)

32 (18) 31 (30) 9 (19) 39 (26) 34 (17) 26 (7) 21 (31)

2 5 1 4 6 3 3

(2) (7) (2) (6) (9) (11) (5)

Union Membership LO TCO Other None

63 70 74 66

(59) (72) (77) (68)

31 25 22 30

6 5 4 3

(7) (6) (5) (7)

(34) (22) (18) (25)

Source: Temo Survey, published May 8, 2003. Possible answers were “very good,” “somewhat good,” “somewhat bad,” “very bad” and “don’t know.” In this table, “very good” and “somewhat good” are combined into “good,” while “somewhat bad” and “very bad” are combined into “bad.” In the case of the Center Party, the Moderate Party and no union membership, the published figures only total 99 percent.

in Sweden. As Table 4.1 shows, support from respondents who identified with the Social Democrats continued to hover at just under two-thirds. While there was a notable decline in support for the proposal among the supporters of several of Sweden’s parliamentary parties, no pattern emerged in terms of ideological blocs. Support fell in excess of 10 percent among respondents who identified themselves as supporters of the Left Party, the Center Party, the Christian Democrats, and the Liberal Party. Only respondents who identified themselves as Green or Moderate Party supporters showed increased support for the proposal. Perhaps most surprisingly, support from LO members had increased, jumping four points to 63 percent.7 By late March, the five parties were in agreement that the Swedish labor market should be more accessible to third-country nationals, and had submitted a joint reservation to the parliamentary social insurance committee calling on the government to appoint a committee that would explore how increased labor migration could be implemented.8 While the five parties constituted a parliamentary majority, they were in the minority within the committee. The SAP and the Left Party, who together held a majority of committee seats, expressed support for a more limited commission of inquiry, which would “first analyze the need for

90

Chapter Four

labor migration from countries outside the EU and the consequences for, among other things, the labor market.9 Indeed, the day after the Social Democratic and Left Party MPs in the social insurance committee opposed the joint reservation, Hans Karlsson pinpointed labor migration as a potential threat to the long-term stability of the Swedish welfare state. In rejecting the idea that the government ought to approve applications from counties and municipalities that had proposed themselves as pilot areas for increased labor migration, Karlsson stated: For me, as a social democrat, it is a matter of exceptional concern that increased labor migration is not used as a neo-liberal wedge to break up the model that has developed on the Swedish labor market. It is a model that is built upon . . . strong trade unions, collective agreements that are broadly encompassing, and labor law that strengthens the individual’s position. The fear that comprehensive labor migration could lead to wage-dumping as well as increased divisions in society, and thereby threaten welfare and security, must be taken seriously.10

Other leading Social Democrats pointed out that calls for a deregulated labor migration policy was not the only reform measure being pursued by the Liberals and Moderates. In an op-ed piece published in the business daily Dagens Industri, Anders Karlsson and Tomas Eneroth asserted that it was “hardly a coincidence” that the two bourgeois parties were so actively campaigning for increased labor migration, as they had also proposed a review of Swedish labor law. For the SAP, it appeared to be simply a matter of linking these two puzzle pieces together. In challenging the Liberals and Moderates to detail which features of Swedish labor law they hoped to revise, Karlsson and Eneroth stressed the interrelationship between the two policy initiatives, concluding that, “Consequently, the demand for unregulated labor migration is being used as a back door for driving wedges into, and breaking up, the Swedish model of strong trade unions, collective bargaining agreements and wage-earner protection.”11 In the run-up to the scheduled April 10 debate on the floor of the Swedish parliament, LO renewed its assault on deregulated labor migration, when the trade union’s Alla published an interview with senior LO analysts under the headline, “Do we need to import labor?” Defending the virtues of the current labor migration policy for both the economy and Swedish wage-earners, LO analyst Jan Edling emphasized how a restrictive policy toward non-EU citizens was supportive of key labor market policy goals and how liberalization would likely undermine continued attainment of those same goals: The rules (governing labor migration) that exist today prevent there from being a surplus of labor. This means that there is no risk of wage-dumping.

The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

91

But, SN, the Moderate Party and the Liberal Party want deregulation . . . they want to create a surplus of labor that already exists in sufficient amounts and, as a result, bring about increased wage competition on the entire labor market.12

Thord Pettersson underscored the linkage between migration and labor market policy in the same article. Noting that if “firms in Sweden have difficulty with recruitment, then they should be a little self-critical,” Pettersson suggested that employers’ recruitment problems could be solved in two related ways. First, employers needed to tap the existing pool of unemployed immigrants already present in Sweden. Second, recruitment difficulties could be eliminated if employers were to make better use of the instruments of Swedish active labor market policy. Pettersson lamented that, “Employers don’t participate in labor market policy. If employers told county labor market boards what types of labor were required, then everything would work much better.”13 In late spring 2003, Pettersson authored an op-ed piece in Alla, in which he scathingly portrayed proposals for liberal labor migration as an instrumental component in a broader assault on much of the Swedish model itself: The Liberal Party and SN like market solutions. That’s why they want market-based, migration (where people are exposed to) competition. Everyone is welcome to try, but only the cheapest immigrants get to stay, underbidding is welcome—three months is all the time one has to find a job—then one has to leave. . . . For the bourgeois parties, labor migration is just a part of a larger project, the reform of the labor market and labor market policy. The bourgeois parties want to shut down AMS, county labor market exchanges and union control over unemployment insurance.14

When the parliamentary debate took place, it proved largely to be a restatement of the positions previously articulated by the two sides. Indeed, as the debate dragged on into the afternoon, Social Democratic MP Göte Wahlström attempted to sum up what was, to him, the obvious areas of agreement, when he noted that, “Let’s just say that we’re in agreement about the need to have a discussion about labor migration . . . but we have to look at it on the condition that we are not going to tear up labor law and worsen conditions for those people who are in the workforce today.”15 That summer, Göran Persson would put forward a more eloquent version of Wahlström’s succinct comments, stressing that Europe as whole would inevitably require an injection of labor from outside of the EU, even after “unemployment has come down, the refugees that are not currently included in the employment statistics have found jobs, and early retirement and sick leave has decreased.” However, while acknowledging that “inspiration and knowledge” could come from other countries whose

92

Chapter Four

economic growth owes much to large-scale waves of migration, such as the United States and Canada, Persson stated that the policies adopted in these countries might not be compatible with European political economies. Persson argued that Europe must “find its own model, one that permits a growth in the number of economic migrants it attracts without weakening the labor laws and protection of the employed, and one that does not create a new under class of guest workers.”16 Lacking a parliamentary majority however, the SAP and the Left Party were unable to limit the commission of inquiry’s mandate to that of simply determining whether a need existed for labor from non-EU countries. The Swedish government was now charged with appointing an official commission of inquiry that would also propose a new policy for third-country labor migration. Eventually issued in February 2004, the directive from the Ministry of Industry placed Lena Hjelm-Wallén in charge of the Committee on Labor Immigration’s (KAKI) work. The choice of Hjelm-Wallén to take on this role hinted at the extent to which the SAP saw the issue of labor migration as a crucial one, given that she had previously held several key posts with the social democratic government during the 1990s, including foreign minister and vice prime minister. As is the norm with Swedish parliamentary committees, provisions were made for the inclusion of viewpoints beyond that of parliamentary politicians, with a reference group consisting of labor market partners established and affiliated with the committee. Moreover, the committee was expected to consult with relevant government agencies in the course of its work, notably AMS, the Swedish Migration Board, and others. The committee was charged with the following specific tasks as part of their policy review: • Propose rules that would allow both for the scope and type of labor migration to be more quickly matched with labor market needs; and to simplify the administrative process for authorities and firms, as well as individuals, in the evaluation of work permit applications; • Consider the advantages and disadvantages of coupling the validity of temporary work permits to employment in a specific position or with a specific employer; • Focus attention on the relationship between permanent residency for labor market reasons and temporary work permits; consider whether multiple paths for labor migration should be instituted, and whether “international exchange” permits should be handled separately; • Consider the possibility of allowing foreign exchange students to remain in Sweden after the completion of their studies; • Consider whether employers who hire third-country nationals should be required “to support” the integration of their new employees;

The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

93

• Propose rules that would be sustainable in the long term and not dependent upon shorter-term economic cycles.17 As such, many of the key policy specifics to be examined by the parliamentary committee hinted at the areas in which the five-party coalition disagreed vehemently with the SAP and the Left Party. The question of simplifying the administrative rules in the evaluation of work permit applications provided an arena for the discussion of both the actors that would be involved in the work permit approval process, as well as what would be the guiding criteria for an approval. The matter of the relative advantages associated with limiting the labor market access of thirdcountry nationals in possession of temporary work permits spoke to the fundamental disagreement that had been central to the debate over labor migration during the 2002 election campaign: proponents of a deregulated labor migration policy viewed liberal labor market access for temporary permit holders as a cornerstone of their proposal, granting migrants the same job-seeking opportunities as any Swedish resident. For proponents of the prevailing model, labor market restrictions for temporary permits had been central to decades of Swedish labor migration policy, and unrestricted access for temporary permit holders was perceived as an attempt to lower wages, weaken the power of collective bargaining agreements, and damage the position of trade unions. Finally, the question of the degree to which employers would be responsible for the integration of third-country national employees represented broader disagreement over whether the hiring of foreign workers represented merely a staffing solution, as preferred by proponents of deregulated labor migration, or whether it needed to be considered within the broader context of an impact on the Swedish polity as a whole, as was the stance of those who advocated more limited reforms. While the content of the establishing directive says a great deal about the ways in which the various components of a revised labor migration policy could have an impact on the Swedish model, the absence of certain features was equally telling. According to the regional newspaper Göteborgs-Posten, the SAP had been unable to convince the Greens to support a more narrowly defined mandate for the committee’s work, one which would have involved investigating the appropriateness of the work permit system that Germany had implemented in the late 1990s to attract highly skilled Asian IT professionals.18 Permits granted in the German scheme were popularly dubbed green cards, calling to mind the American quota-based immigration system of the same name. However, the label green card was very clearly a misnomer in the German case. While U.S. green cards allow for the successful recipient to be granted a permanent work and residence permit, the German variant set a maximum

94

Chapter Four

five-year period for the permit’s validity, leaving the recipient with no avenue for acquiring permanent residency.19 The lack of an opportunity to migrate permanently was widely thought to be one of the reasons for the low interest in the program among foreign IT specialists. At the end of the program’s first year, approximately 8,500 foreign IT workers had taken up employment in Germany, 1,500 less than the target number at which the government would then evaluate a need for making further green cards available.20 While no actors involved in the Swedish debate addressed the point that the German experiment with temporary work permits had essentially failed, the decision by the Greens to ally with the bourgeois parties meant that the point was essentially moot, at least for the time being. In June 2005, KAKI issued its interim report, which primarily served as a review of information framing the committee’s deliberations, including an overview of Swedish and European demographic trends, the status of migration policy in Sweden and other industrialized countries, and an overview of current labor market trends.21 While legislative proposals were not the subject of the interim work, hints as to the final proposal could be teased out of both the initial report, as well as comments made by key figures prior to its publication. In terms of the former, the report noted that foreign exchange students and researchers were of particular interest. Declaring these students and researchers as a resource that could “contribute positively to the development of Sweden,” the report stated that the final reform proposal would include features to ease a framework that was seen as “far too restrictive” for the possibility of these groups to take up long-term residency in Sweden.22 On the question of attracting skilled foreign labor for highly specialized research positions, the SAP, too, had shifted toward a stance of greater openness. In 2004, the SAP board proposed to the party congress that foreign students who completed their doctoral education in Sweden should be granted work permits upon successful defense of the dissertation.23 In terms of the latter, one month before the report’s release, KAKI chair Lena Hjelm-Wallén told Swedish Radio that foreign students were a group that could be particularly beneficial for Swedish society, if allowed to stay. Yet, she also took the opportunity to make the case for why long-term job contracts more generally would be a necessary feature of a revised policy. According to Hjelm-Wallén, such a criterion for entry would result in maintaining order on the Swedish labor market, as immigrants would have the security of knowing that they could settle within Sweden and eventually acquire citizenship. As such, her comments echoed earlier statements from LO as to the negative effects that could result from insecure employment contracts for migrants, indicating that the linkage between this aspect of labor

The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

95

migration policy and the balance of power on the Swedish labor market was an important feature in the overall bundle of SAP preferences.24 Yet, the key feature of the KAKI report came in the form of a series of questions that committee members hoped would “stimulate debate” among the general public as deliberations progressed.25 Grouped into several themes, the questions were intended to shed light on broad areas, including: • the positive and negative effects for Sweden of a resumption in labor migration; • the designation of actors to be involved in the permit approval process; • the relative attractiveness of Sweden as a destination for labor migrants; and • the relationship between labor migration, asylum seekers, and integration. The questions of labor migration’s effects, as well as the determination of actors with control over work permit applications, suggested that many of the same issues contested during the 2002 election campaign remained salient. In terms of this latter issue, the report noted the involvement of labor market authorities, the Swedish Migration Board, as well as labor market partners, and asked for opinions as to which actors should have decision-making authority under the revised set policy. In noting the potential effects of migration on Swedish society, the report was careful to emphasize the arguments that had been advanced both for and against a resumption of labor migration. The report invited comments regarding how increased labor migration could contribute positively to development in Sweden, framing instances where foreign labor served as a complement to domestic shortages, and how the influx of “competencies and experience on a more general level” as appropriate examples. The potential of labor migration was also framed in a significantly less positive fashion, with the observation made that: Labor migration can also influence conditions at workplaces and on the labor market in a negative fashion. One effect is that the ambition could decrease to accommodate workplaces to those who are already in the country, but who are unemployed. Another problem could be the attempt to bypass the right for migrants to receive salary and employment conditions at the same level as those wage-earners who are already in the country.26

In conjunction with this, the public was invited to comment on how the risk that labor migration might “push aside” domestic labor could be

96

Chapter Four

avoided, and how to counteract the risk that labor migrants would be exploited in terms of salary and employment conditions. The stance of labor market partners toward labor migration reform was also highlighted in the interim report, with this serving as one of the few occasions when labor market partners other than LO and SN saw their positions receiving publicity. In particular, it is worth pointing out that the two other major unions representing Swedish employees declared their preferences as being largely synonymous with that of LO. While the white-collar Swedish Confederation for Professional Employees (TCO) and the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO) argued that the international movement of labor was essentially positive, both organizations supported a continued reliance on labor market policy measures that would mobilize domestic reserves in order to counteract shortages. The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SKL), representing municipal and regional public sector employers, focused solely on what it saw as the “most powerful measure” for increasing the labor supply, namely efforts centering on increasing the workforce participation rate of the domestic population. At the same time, SKL emphasized that it saw no contradiction between increased labor migration and efforts at boosting the participation rate. In sum, the cross-bloc alliance to force the appointment of KAKI, as well as the publication of its interim report, both provide clear instances of the suspicions held by the SAP and LO toward the potential effects of a more liberal labor migration policy for the Swedish political economy. Faced with the prospect of a blue-green alliance on the issue, the SAP and LO redoubled their efforts at portraying these proposals as having dire consequences for the effectiveness of Swedish labor market policy, as well as for the broad balance of power between labor market partners in the sphere of industrial relations, particularly in terms of salaries and working conditions. Far from suggesting that a decision had been reached on a major policy overhaul, the tone of the interim report was that many core issues were not yet resolved. Quite simply, the question of gatekeepers, criteria, labor market access, permit renewal, and conversion possibilities all appeared to remain up for grabs. Parallel to KAKI’s establishment and first year of deliberation, LO now spoke out to an ever greater extent on labor migration reform. As had been the case prior to the establishment of the parliamentary committee, the trade union continued to emphasize its lack of support for employer and bourgeois-Green proposals. Yet, with policy reform clearly going forward in one form or another, LO’s tone shifted to an elaboration of the broad features that it hoped to see as central components in a revised labor migration policy. As will be shown, LO would not only rigidly defend

The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

97

the model of labor migration that had served its interests so well over the decades. By extension, it would also seek to defend the workings of the Swedish model.

LO AND THE EMERGENCE OF A COORDINATED LABOR MIGRATION POLICY ALTERNATIVE In 2003, LO published the report Flytt, pendling, arbetskraftsinvandring och europeisk integration (“Movement, commuting, labor migration and European integration”), which drew attention to the increasing challenge that Sweden was likely to face as the population aged. Soberly assessing the need as one where the number of working hours would need to increase greatly, LO economists Dan Andersson and Thord Pettersson wrote that the situation demanded more people at work, a reduction in the number of early retirements, efforts to get more people to work past the age of 65, stimulated economic growth and childbirth rates, and increased effectiveness in the education system to reduce the amount of time spent in school. Yet, according to Andersson and Pettersson, even with those measures in place, Sweden could still expect to require additional labor in the form of foreign workers.27 Thus, one major aim of the report was the presentation of initial proposals sketching out how labor migration from non-EU countries could be structured. Seeking to deflect claims that the trade union’s stance was protectionist, Andersson and Pettersson underscored that “LO has never advocated closed borders toward other labor markets. But we have always preferred regulation. Shielding the labor market against an influx (of foreign workers) has never been LO’s strategy.”28 Developing this line of reasoning further, the report authors offered an explanation for why deregulated labor migration did not advance the causes central to the social democratic project: LO has never been opposed to labor migration. It is not the task of the union to shut anyone out from the labor market. The task of the union is to strengthen the position of wage-earners, protect wage-earner conditions and increase the status of being an employee. Since labor migration can be compatible with this effort, union organizations do not need to oppose labor migration. Proposals for “free” migration that have been put forward by, among others, the Liberal Party and the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise are a long way away from the “new way of thinking” that they are marketed as. By “free” immigration it’s meant that labor from outside the EU, that is the rest of the world, can travel here freely to look for work in Sweden. Those who succeed get to stay as long as they have a job.29

98

Chapter Four

According to the report, the key evidence that deregulated labor migration would not work was the fact that Sweden had previously experienced a similar lack of controls in the late 1960s. This phase of Sweden’s postwar migration history, in which foreign workers could enter Sweden on tourist visas and seek employment, was now being drawn upon by LO as a symbol for what could be expected if employers and the bourgeoisGreen migration alliance were able to drive through their preferred policy alternative. Stressing that the tourist labor migration of the 1960s resulted in numerous problems for the Swedish economy, the report authors rattled off an exhaustive laundry list of how tourist migration had served the Swedish economy poorly in the past: a disproportionate number of foreign workers had been engaged in low-skilled manual labor; unemployment rates for foreign workers ran at a rate three times as high as Swedish citizens; the presence of foreign workers in certain industrial sectors prevented much-needed structural transformation; the demand for labor did not take into account the ability to provide sufficient social services; labor migration had a negative impact on the economies of sending countries; and, “increased competition over wages and social differences had threatened to create ethnic divisions at workplaces and in society.”30 Implicit in this condemnation of tourist migration in the late 1960s was a degree of guilt by association: the implementation of deregulated labor migration in the 2000s would give rise to the same problems that had been experienced in the 1960s. As the report stressed, “Sweden has tried free immigration before . . . and in 1968, a majority in the Parliament found it to be so bad that they decided to scrap it.”31 Against this backdrop, LO declared that its support for a resumption in labor migration should be built on the following elements: • Mandating that labor migration be regulated and involve cooperation between unions and employers; • Assigning AMS a “special mission” in supporting labor migration through the establishment of labor market exchange offices or “other planned efforts” to be located in non-EU countries; • Reducing individual insecurity associated with an evaluation of the “economic consequences of moving”; • Requiring that migrants would be offered open-ended job contracts, housing, and Swedish language training “on the spot,” with some role in this process being given to AMS; • Ensuring that migrants who become unemployed would not have their permits revoked and be required to exit Sweden; and • Increasing efforts to prevent illegal labor migration, with additional resources being channeled to the police, workplace oversight bod-

The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

99

ies and the tax authorities in order to maintain order on the labor market. Two comments on the specific content of the LO proposal are in order. First, taking steps to reduce the “individual insecurity” associated with a foreign worker’s decision to relocate to Sweden can only be made more concrete by considering an earlier passage in the report, wherein the authors argued that the migration decision cannot be based on information channels resulting from transnational migrant networks: An advantage with labor migration is that it is based on economic cycles. But, in order for it to work, it requires that the foreign job-seeker has current and accurate information about labor market conditions within Sweden. . . . Hearsay and postcards from fellow countrymen who already find themselves in Sweden are not enough. On the contrary, they can provide a distorted view of the prospects for employment. The best alternative for a direct match between supply and demand is to link a work permit to a test of labor market conditions. This assumes that the foreign employee applies for work and a permit before entering Sweden and is granted a work permit on the basis of a job offer from an employer in Sweden.32

Here, LO conveyed the clear message that the freedom of entry afforded under employer and bourgeois-Green proposals, in which migrants have the possibility to act upon news of job prospects from earlier waves of migrants (regardless of their accuracy), prevented an optimal matching between the number of workers and available jobs. In the eyes of LO, attaining the desired degree of control over the labor supply required the implementation of measures to keep foreign workers outside of Sweden’s national borders until it could be determined that labor market conditions existed to merit their entry. Indeed, in a parliamentary hearing on labor migration held in May 2003, Pettersson stated that LO supported a measure that would require each individual application to be approved by a county labor market board or a similar authority.33 Second, LO’s emphasis on ensuring that migrants who become unemployed would not be deported needs to be understood in the context of the objective that labor migration is incentive compatible with the design of the Swedish model. Of course, this aspect of the proposal can be regarded as an effective means for guaranteeing that out-of-work migrants do not find themselves required to accept employment at increasingly lower wages in order to avoid deportation. Yet, the promise not to deport unemployed migrants may also have the unintended consequence of

100

Chapter Four

increasing the financial strain placed upon welfare state services, particularly if employers are free to hire migrants on employment contracts of varying lengths and without taking broader labor market trends into account. Indeed, that is potentially the case under a policy in which migrants may only be hired on short-term contracts, easily dismissed, and are then able to make use of generous welfare state services. Recalling the discussion from chapter 2, it is possible to decrease the likelihood of this fiscal pressure emerging by phasing in access to social citizenship rights. However, it should be clear that proponents of the universal welfare state are unlikely to find this strategy ideologically palatable. Rather, the preferred route for minimizing this risk is to exercise control over entry. Guaranteeing continued residency for unemployed migrants becomes significantly less risky when other measures are in place to ensure that only those migrants who stand a low likelihood of becoming unemployed are admitted in the first place. Indeed, these other features were part and parcel of the LO proposal. AMS involvement in determining the existence of sectoral or profession-based shortages ensures that labor market conditions are screened to determine staffing needs, while the requirement that migrants are offered open-ended contracts, making dismissal comparatively more difficult than for temporary workers, increases the likelihood that migrants will have a lengthy period of tenure with their first Swedish employer. The likelihood of dismissal is also reduced through LO’s proposal that employers ensure the provision of mentors and Swedishlanguage training for migrants.34 In this case, firms would be less likely to incur costs associated with migrant integration if the intent was simply to regard foreign workers as a solution to short-term staffing needs. Viewed jointly, these measures stand out as ways to decrease the prospect that foreign workers who enter Sweden will become unemployed. As such, minimizing the risk of migrant pressure on welfare state services is exercised on the front end of the migration process, in conjunction with a more restrictive entry policy, rather than after the fact, with unemployed migrants being denied access to benefits. Overall, LO’s proposed alternative for a new third-country national labor migration policy was, in many ways, nearly identical with the policy in effect at the time: tri-partite involvement of the state, unions, and employers was envisioned at different points in the policy process, favorable decisions on admission would be conditional upon verification that a labor shortage existed, and non-EU job seekers would be required to complete their hunt for employment without setting foot in Sweden. On the face of it, it is difficult to imagine a proposal that was more antithetical to the deregulated labor migration but forward by the blue-green migration alliance. Indeed, a follow-up report by SN lobbyist Theodor Paues in 2003 underscored the general opposition of the employers’ association

The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

101

to “centralized and collective labor migration” policies in which every “application must pass through the local country’s labor market board, where representatives of the labor market partners evaluate whether the position can be filled by someone already in Sweden.” Paues reiterated that the essence of the SN reform proposal was that it represented a “decentralized and individual” model of labor migration, granting no role for AMS or any other government agency and in which there was “no need for a centralized test of shortages or coordination of recruitment from other countries. Rather, every company could locally evaluate their recruiting needs, and if necessary, could search for co-workers in other countries.”35 While one aspect of the first union report was the attempt to refute assertions that LO was anti-immigration, the subsequent Mer än bara öppna gränser (More than just open borders) sought to discredit claims that labor migration would primarily result in increased job competition and lower wages. In addressing three “myths” about immigration and the labor market, the report seemed sharply at odds with earlier LO logic. Whereas statements from LO during the 2002 election campaign advocated the mobilization of domestic reserves prior to allowing for new waves of labor migration, the new report declared that, “No, immigrants don’t take jobs (away from others) or increase unemployment. This view builds on a misunderstanding that there is only a certain amount of job opportunities to divide up and that the demand for labor is limited.”36 Acknowledging that LO wished to see powerful measures taken to help those on the sidelines of the job market secure employment, the report stressed that these measures did not preclude labor migration, declaring that, “An increased supply of labor does not create unemployment. If that were the case, we would need to limit child birth in order to avoid unemployment in the future!”37 An assurance that migration did not spell problems for the Swedish job market was also matched by an emphasis on how foreign workers would not necessarily result in depressed wages. According to the report, the assumption that immigration results in lower salaries for workers who are exposed to competition was dependent on an “unregulated labor market without trade unions.” Taken jointly, LO made a careful argument in favor of the potential that migration could hold for Swedish society, albeit one that clearly built on the continued presence of certain defining features of Swedish industrial relations practice. In challenging these myths, LO was discrediting arguments in favor of restrictive stances toward migration that are common to far-right populist parties, as well as to those who subscribe to economic nationalism. Yet, the report contended that there was an additional myth regarding migration that required examination. While the first two myths had equated migration with an economic threat, LO also explored the flip

102

Chapter Four

side of the coin and sought to challenge those who portrayed migration in overwhelmingly positive terms. Specifically, LO expressed doubt that migration was the sole answer to Sweden’s coming demographic crisis. The authors painted a detailed picture of the enormous scope of migration that would be necessary if Sweden were to rely strictly on a strategy of admitting foreign workers for combating the effects of an aging population: A number of researchers maintain that increased immigration is not a longterm solution to the demographic problems of the western world. The reason is simple. Even those who migrate to a country will get old and need healthcare, elder-care and a pension. In order to have an impact on the dependency ratio, an extremely high level of immigration is necessary. If the dependency ratio remains unchanged, immigration would have to increase from today’s 15,000-20,000 per year to 400,000 per year by 2050. All together, Sweden would require immigration of roughly ten million people by 2050, which is not a realistic population development for Sweden. It won’t work to import the solution to the dependency ratio problem in the long run.38

Having challenged the claim that foreign workers were the sole answer to the difficulties posed by Sweden’s graying population, the report reiterated the need to focus on achieving a workforce participation rate of 80 percent for all between the ages of 20–64, while simultaneously casting labor migration as one component that could be effective within a broader arsenal of measures. But the report authors took pains to emphasize that “the contribution made by labor migration to growth and welfare depends on how it is organized and regulated.” While much of the detail as to the form of regulation mirrored the concerns expressed in the earlier 2003 report, as well as LO’s rhetoric during the 2002 election campaign, the authors stressed the importance for the issue to be dealt with at the level of “international society.” In the short term, according to LO, bilateral agreements would be required to regulate the movement of workers between states.39 It should be stressed that organized labor’s concern over the effects of migrant labor was not just limited to the question of foreign workers seeking legal access to Sweden. LO has also been clear that it regards the presence of illegal migrant labor as a significant problem. Yet, while trade unions in many advanced industrialized countries have lobbied for a regularization of status for illegal workers, including the United States, Canada, France, and Spain, LO announced a hard-line position in 2005 against any measures that might result in an amnesty for illegal migrants, stressing that it would simply send the wrong signal.40 Suggesting that upward of 50,000 illegal workers were active on the Swedish labor market, chief LO negotiator Erland Olausson and Leif Håkansson made it

The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

103

clear that the union regarded the presence of illegal foreign workers as a natural component in the “hunt for cheaper labor that has always been a means (for attaining) higher profits.” Equating the employment of illegal workers with the crime of human trafficking, the two officials declared that the issue was one of solidarity, and that LO’s proposed changes in the relevant laws were meant to assist illegal migrants who had been exposed to exploitative conditions on the Swedish labor market. Specifically, Olausson and Håkansson argued for an increase in the financial penalty to be levied against employers who were discovered with illegal foreign workers on the payroll. Fines were to consist of the difference between the migrant’s illegal wage and the prevailing normal wage within the sector, as well as personal damages, and would be paid directly to the migrant. However, one key feature of the proposal revealed that notions of solidarity did not extend to allowing exploited foreign workers to remain in Sweden. Specifically, LO’s proposal did not call for an end to the legal provision mandating the deportation of illegal migrants. If anything, LO envisioned that the Swedish equivalent of sans papiers would play a willing part in their own expulsion from Sweden: Naturally, if our proposal is implemented, those who are working illegally in Sweden would still risk deportation upon discovery, but hefty financial damages would provide the possibility of a fresh start back home. The tide would be turned and wage-earners would dare to come forward and tell about mistreatment.41

However, the point of detailing LO’s stance when it comes to undocumented workers is not to argue that it can be regarded as particularly harsh, or that it is out of step with the strategies chosen by organized labor in several European countries and in North America. Rather, it is to underscore that LO’s willingness to grant migrants (illegal or otherwise) access to the Swedish labor market is predicated on the conditions associated with their entry. As we saw in chapter 3, LO suspected that employer and Liberal Party proposals would result in downward wage pressure as out-of-work migrants would consider lower salaries an acceptable tradeoff to avoid deportation. Instead, LO supports a highly regulated system of entry for foreign workers, one in which each individual component of labor migration policy combines to minimize the chance that migrant labor can result in an unchecked supply of surplus labor on the Swedish job market. Amnesties can be challenging to the efficiency of highly regulated labor markets as they rely on humanitarian considerations for granting a regularization of status, and not an evaluation of current labor market needs. Moreover, a possible byproduct of amnesties is the generation of a pull factor that results in additional undocumented workers gambling on the prospect that a subsequent amnesty will be announced.

104

Chapter Four

Indeed, undocumented workers may be ripe targets for exploitation by unscrupulous employers, but they have the additional potential to generate substantial disequilibrium on national labor markets where the tap of foreign labor is tightly regulated by the state and labor market partners. As with the evidence presented in the previous chapter, it should be clear that LO’s chief conern at this stage primarily was minimizing the potential negative effects of labor migration for the Swedish model. In sketching out its vision for an overhauled labor migration policy, the trade union emphasized the desirability of continued coordination—both in terms of the inclusion of multiple actors in the gatekeeping process, as well as guaranteeing that labor migration did not threaten social democratic policies intended to mobilize domestic reserves or allow for employers to undermine conditions associated with collective bargaining agreements.

AN ALLIANCE ACROSS POLITICAL BLOCS, REDUX? LIBERAL UNCERTAINTY OVER GATEKEEPERS As Peter Gourevitch observed at the start of his classic Politics in Hard Times, “Policy requires politics.” Certainly, the story of Swedish labor migration reform cannot be told without repeated reference to the importance of coalitions between political parties and interest groups, who have sought to ensure that any new policy governing the entry of third-country nationals reflects certain core beliefs as to where priorities ought to lie in economic policymaking. Nor can the story be told without reference to the importance of realignments across political blocs, in which bourgeois parties and the Greens found common cause and forced the ruling SAP to convene a parliamentary committee to propose a less restrictive labor migration policy for non-EU citizens. Yet, a realignment among actors has not only figured prominently as a strategy for those who seek to provide workers of the world easier access to the Swedish labor market. In the summer of 2006, with a new parliamentary election campaign getting under way and just months before KAKI would issue its proposal for a revised labor migration policy, reports surfaced that the Liberal Party had defected from the bourgeois Green coalition on labor migration and had joined forces with the SAP and the Left Party. As such, it briefly appeared likely that the final report would emphasize a variant of labor migration fully compatible with the design of the Swedish model, emphasizing substantial regulation across nearly all components of the policy design. Speaking to Swedish Radio in June 2006, KAKI chair Lena HjelmWallén offered a selective account of the committee’s mandate, stating that third-country labor migration was only to be the case when shortages

The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

105

of labor could not be resolved through either domestic or EU reserves. It is hardly surprising that the former social democratic vice-prime minister would choose to frame the committee’s work in terms that were consistent with the party’s espoused vision for labor migration. Rather, the real news in Swedish Radio’s report was that the broad outlines had begun to emerge of the forthcoming proposal. Central to the leaked policy design was the continued reliance on tri-partite coordination between the state and labor market partners as gatekeepers. Swedish Radio speculated that tests of labor market conditions for each individual applicant would be scrapped, to be replaced with negotiations between AMS, employers, and unions as to which sectors experienced severe labor shortages. These sectors would then be opened up to third-country nationals, who would have the right to enter Sweden on a new job-seeking visa category for up to three months, on the condition that the individual could show sufficient funds to cover maintenance during that period. As such, while the key criterion for entry was thought to be shifting from an individual test of labor market conditions to the sectoral level, the requirement that the labor market board and trade unions also be consulted in the process would ensure continued regulation and coordination over entry. No mention was made of labor market access rights, though the emphasis on establishing a list in which occupational shortages existed suggested that full labor market access would not be granted to third-country nationals. Renewal and conversion possibilities for permit holders were thought likely to consist of limiting the migrant to temporary residency under her or his first four years in Sweden. However, if at the end of four years the sectoral shortage still existed, permanent residency would then be granted. As such, the possibilities for conversion also underscored the key priority of ensuring that migrant labor did not result in competition with a domestic workforce: not only would third-country nationals be limited to specific sectors, but their long-term fate in Sweden would be dependent on an assessment of labor market trends unknown at the time of their arrival.42 While the news report emphasized that the forthcoming proposal had been hammered out in a deal between the SAP, the Left Party, and the Liberal Party, the three remaining bourgeois parties and the Greens were portrayed as being critical to continued state involvement in determining the need for labor. Indeed, in a press release posted the same day on the SN website, senior analyst Karin Ekenger expressed disappointment with the proposal likely to emerge in the final KAKI report, noting that it would be “very unfortunate” if AMS were to define recruitment needs on the Swedish labor market. According to Ekenger, overseas recruitment was rarely the first choice for firms, as it involves greater risks than hiring domestic applicants, who have more familiar educational qualifications

106

Chapter Four

and whose references can be more easily checked. As such, she argued that, “Companies, who, despite this, choose to hire an employee from a non-EU country should not be obstructed by an agency that will first conduct an evaluation of whether there is a sectoral shortage.”43 Certainly, the opposition of Sweden’s main employer’s association came as no surprise. It was less clear, however, as to whether the Liberal Party had, in fact, switched sides and joined the SAP and the Left Party in developing a labor migration policy that was incentive compatible with the workings of the Swedish model. While the Liberal Party issued no specific statement on the Swedish Radio report, the party’s webpage revealed that a substantial re-think had taken place on the question of third-country labor migration. As late as March 2006, the Liberal Party’s homepage featured a statement on labor migration that, “Everyone who can get a job in Sweden should get to move here.”44 Yet, in the fall of 2006, this clear support for a liberal labor migration policy was temporarily toned down. In its place stood the following statement: We don’t believe that a regulated labor migration is at odds with an increased workforce participation rate. On the contrary, firms also have to recruit key personnel from abroad. We believe that Sweden needs to open up for labor migration from outside the EU for sectors with labor shortages. A person who migrates for the purposes of employment should have the right to temporary residency, which after a few years, can be converted to permanent residency if the person is still employed.45

While the differences with the party’s previous stance may appear subtle, especially given the continued broad support for “opening Sweden up to labor migration from non-EU countries,” they are quite a significant departure in one arena. In terms of criteria for entry, the Liberals no longer espoused letting the need of the individual firm serve as the key determinant and now supported making the determination of shortages at the sectoral level. As such, this implied that the preferred gatekeeper could no longer be an individual employer, but rather should be multiple employers, who must either coordinate their own assessment of shortages, or do so in conjunction with state agencies. As such, this reversal of course placed the Liberal Party on a sharply different path regarding labor migration from the three other bourgeois parties and the Greens. This is perhaps most notable given the fact that since summer 2005, the four bourgeois parties cultivated the image of being an “Alliance for Sweden,” jointly ready to take power away from the long-ruling SAP at the 2006 parliamentary election. A cornerstone of alliance efforts had been to carefully convey the image that the four different parties had resolved differences on many of the key issues that divided them in the past, such as nuclear energy and social insurance provision

The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

107

rates. Yet, on labor migration, there appeared to be little consensus prevailing between the Liberal Party and the other members of the bourgeois alliance. Such discord would become open in conjunction with the publication of the KAKI report. When the committee released its final report in October 2006, just one month after the voters rejected the SAP in favor of a four-party bourgeois coalition, it was clear that the aim for the SAP had been the preservation of much of the coordinated model of labor migration. Writing the majority report together with the Left Party, the SAP proposed leaving untouched the requirement that third-country nationals only be granted access to employment sectors in which AMS had determined there to be a shortage that could not be filled domestically or within the EU. As part of the evaluation of labor market conditions within a given sector, it was expected that AMS would solicit statements from relevant unions and employers. Permits would be granted for an initial two-year period, during which time third-country nationals would be limited to both a specific sector and employer. In order for a permit to be granted, documentation was required that wages and working conditions were comparable to conditions for those already employed within the sector. While it was still expected that the general practice would be to seek employment from abroad, the SAP supported the introduction of a job-seeking visa that would allow citizens of countries requiring entry visas to look for employment in specific sectors from within Sweden. If at the end of two years, the migrant was still employed in the same position, she or he could be granted a two-year extension, and would be granted a sector-wide work permit. However, if the migrant had become unemployed during that period, she or he could only remain in Sweden if new employment was located in a sector with a documented shortage. After four years, the temporary work permit would be converted to permanent residency. Lena Hjelm-Wallén, the committee chair, stressed the continuity between the overall proposal and current policy, underscoring how Swedish and EU workers would still take precedence over third-country nationals, and that evaluations of labor market needs could best be judged by AMS and trade unions, not by individual employers.46 Two separate reservations were appended, underscoring both the lack of unity among bourgeois parties on the question of labor migration, and indirectly raising questions as to what the content would be of an eventual proposal from the new bourgeois governing alliance. The Moderates, Center Party, and Christian Democrats, joined forces with the Greens to author one reservation, in which it was argued that tests of labor shortages should not involve either AMS or unions, but rather should be the sole purview of employers. To a great extent, the reservation mirrored the proposals that had been put forward by SN and the Liberal Party in 2002,

108

Chapter Four

stipulating that immediate full labor market access should be granted and that renewal would simply be contingent on continued employment. The only area of overlap between these four parties and the majority proposal was on the issue of job-search visas for citizens whose entry to Sweden was conditional upon possessing a valid visa.47 The second reservation was issued by Liberal MP Mauricio Rojas, who supported limited labor market access during the initial permit period. More surprisingly, Rojas abandoned core features of the 2002 Liberal Party proposal and advocated the continued use of multiple gatekeepers and the verification of labor shortages prior to granting work permits to third-country nationals seeking employment in sectors that were not on occupational shortlists.48 This seemingly open division in the bourgeois-Green alliance over the direction of Swedish labor migration policy would be short-lived, as the comparatively more restrictive stance advocated by Rojas would fall by the wayside in conjunction with his departure from the position of Liberal Party spokesperson on integration issues in October 2006.49

FROM THE KAKI PROPOSAL TO THE ALLIANCE POLICY LO’s response to the KAKI proposal was not uncritical. Writing in the regional Göteborgs-Posten, Lundby-Wedin stressed LO’s belief that on-site job searches would increase the potential for migrants to be exploited on the labor market. Moreover, she argued that similar risks could only be avoided if migrants were provided with “long-term permits and not permits coupled to a specific employer.”50 With the new bourgeois government in place, leading SAP figures directed their comments not at their own committee report, but at the prospect that Moderate Party Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt would push ahead with labor migration reform. In December 2006, Sven-Erik Österberg, SAP vice-chair of the parliamentary labor market committee, lamented that the new bourgeois alliance intended to make use of migration to counteract growing labor shortages. In language notably similar to that of the 2002 parliamentary campaign, in which Göran Persson had repeatedly argued that unemployment levels needed to be reduced prior to allowing increased labor migration, Österberg stated, “I fear the government will solve (recruiting difficulties) through labor migration instead of through betting on job retraining for those who are already unemployed.”51 Österberg’s fears that the government would bet, at least partially, on the virtues of labor migration were quite justified. In the summer of 2007, Minister of Migration Tobias Billström released a government proposal to alter radically the shape of Swedish labor migration policy toward third-

The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

109

country nationals. The core of the proposal detailed a system in which employers across the Swedish labor market would be free to recruit labor from abroad after having listed the opening with both Swedish and EU job exchanges for a short period of time. For those migrants who wished to conduct job searches in Sweden and who required a visa for entry, a system of job-search visas based on sectoral shortages would be implemented, as per the KAKI report. Prospects for renewal would solely be dependent on documenting continued employment with requisite wages and benefits. In addressing gatekeeping responsibility, the government proposal issued what could only be considered a sharp slap in the face to both the SAP and LO, both of which had persistently maintained that a natural role existed for the state and labor market partners in the work permit approval process: It’s natural that the state has responsibility for controlling that wages, insurance and other employment conditions correspond to what prevails for wage earners who already reside in the country. The same applies for (ensuring that) the condition of EU-priority for job applications exists. However, when it comes to the question of whether a labor shortage exists, the role of the state isn’t equally obvious. It should be assumed that individual employers have the best knowledge and insight into the competence that needs to be recruited to the workplace. Therefore, when recruiting from third-countries, the judgment of the employer should therefore be decisive when it comes to the labor needs of the firm. . . . This means that it is the individual employers, and not the National Labor Market Board, that will, in the future, decide whether there is a need to recruit from third-countries.52

Yet, it was not only the AMS that was to be excluded from its traditional gatekeeping function in the work permit approval process. The role of organized labor was also to be very sharply circumscribed. Acknowledging that the problem of unscrupulous employers was a legitimate one, the government stated that organized labor would continue to play an important part in ensuring that “wages, insurance and other employment conditions” were in line with what prevails on the Swedish labor market. Under the new policy, if the Swedish Migration Board deemed it necessary to confer with the relevant trade union as to employment conditions, it could do so.53 However, it would no longer be required that unions be given the opportunity to state whether they supported or opposed individual work permit requests. For decades, this key feature of Swedish labor migration policy, in which unions had been able to act as a powerful veto player, with the ability to influence the access of foreign labor to the Swedish labor market, was to be thrown on the scrap heap.

110

Chapter Four

The reconfiguration of both gatekeeping authority and the criteria for entry were undoubtedly the most significant areas of reform when comparing the government’s proposal to that of KAKI, and comments from key Swedish political elites reflected the significance of the new direction. At the press conference in conjunction with the release of the proposal, Billström attempted to portray the introduction of the job-search visa as the key element in the new plan. However, he was also candid that a new era was emerging in Swedish labor migration policy, noting that organized labor “will not be playing the role that it has previously. If there’s a position that needs to be filled, organized labor shall not get to exercise a veto right.”54 Dan Andersson, chief economist at LO, portrayed the shift as both epic and dramatic, stating that, “This involves an additional step away from the Swedish model, which builds on equal partners on the labor market. There is no other country where it is only the market that steers over which labor is brought in from other countries.”55 SAP member of parliament Göte Wahlström, who served on the KAKI committee, responded by noting that it was the position of the party that trade unions should get to exercise influence over labor migration policy, adding that, “Organized labor has had (that influence) out of tradition. The risk is, that when coupled to other measures, that the union will decline in strength.”56 The final government proposition, that was presented in late April 2008 and became law on December 15, 2008, preserved the essence of what the bourgeois-Green alliance had been proposing, albeit with one interesting modification. Among the key provisions of the final legislative proposal were the following: • Employers would be free to recruit non-EU labor, provided the position had been advertised first within both Sweden and the EU; • Tests of local labor market conditions would cease; • Wages and other working conditions would need to be consistent with the prevailing norms in the relevant sector; • Temporary work permits of no greater than two years would be issued initially. Renewals of temporary permits would be possible for a total of four years; • Labor migrants who, during a period of five years, had been employed for at least four of those years, would be eligible for permanent residency; • No option for permanent residency would be available in conjunction with the initial permit application; • During the first two years of a temporary permit, labor migrants would have their labor market access limited to both the specific em-

The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

111

ployer and sector; and, following this two-year period, sector-wide access would be granted.57 Of specific interest is the final provision detailed here. At first glance, it appeared that the bourgeois-Green alliance had ultimately chosen to adopt a restrictive stance on labor market access. Indeed, while the bulk of the earlier proposals from employers, bourgeois parties, and the Greens had largely called for full labor market access to be granted in conjunction with the granting of the initial work permit, this final proposal appeared to prevent foreign labor from competing on the broader labor market. Such language seemed consistent with the KAKI proposal from nearly two years earlier. Yet, a closer reading of the proposed legislation suggests potential migrants would find little in the way of restrictions to prevent them from seeking employment on the labor market as a whole. Noting the need to ensure that labor migrants would not be dependent on their current employers in order to remain in Sweden during their temporary work permit period, the proposal specified that labor migrants should be allowed to switch employers, or even job sectors: should they become unemployed, should the employer go out of business, or should “cooperation” between the employer and employee not work out. Labor migrants would then have a three-month period during which their temporary permit would still be valid. Assuming a new employment offer was received, and was in keeping with the conditions of the initial permit, no new application would be necessary. In other cases, such as the employee choosing to switch sectors, a new application could be filed from within Sweden.58 As such, despite the claim that labor migrants will find their temporary permits tied to specific employers and sectors, nothing prevents them from moving throughout the Swedish labor market, as long as their skill set is in demand by some employer. To the social democratic opposition and their trade union allies, the presentation of the bourgeois government’s final proposal for labor migration reform meant that the writing was on the wall. A labor migration policy in which domestic reserves took precedence, and in which measures existed to guarantee union influence, was being rapidly ushered out. In the arena of labor migration, the Swedish model was indeed under siege.

CONCLUSION This chapter has traced the events surrounding the work of the KAKI committee to reform Sweden’s restrictive labor migration policy toward

112

Chapter Four

third-country nationals, as well as the proposals put forward by LO and the recently elected bourgeois government. In doing so, the chief aim has been to demonstrate how both the SAP and LO develop labor migration reform proposals primarily on the basis of their expected degree of fit with certain key features of the Swedish model. The chief aspect of the model that has been relevant in the case of third-country national labor migration has been the aim of full employment, with a related emphasis on active labor market policies and the preservation of trade union strength. LO and the SAP have not made identical choices on the six components of labor migration policy. Indeed, differences do exist between the two allies over certain key details, including the location of job searches, the initial duration of employment, and the conditions surrounding the granting of permanent residency. Yet, as will be discussed in the concluding chapter, these differences primarily represent alternative paths in pursuit of a common aim. Specifically, the SAP and LO seek to ensure that the entry of foreign labor onto the Swedish labor market occurs in a regulated manner that does not result in undue labor market disturbances and that does not pose a challenge to the general strength of organized labor. Prior to that concluding analysis, the following chapter switches the focus to a separate instance of labor migration reform by considering the case of the 2004 EU enlargement. As will be shown, the SAP and LO pursued sharply divergent strategies when confronted with the prospect of eastward expansion. Responding to concerns over “benefits tourism,” the governing SAP backed the implementation of transitional arrangements that would have required citizens from the ten new EU member states to apply for a one-year work permit prior to their entry into Sweden. As such, the behavior of the ruling social democratic government in this instance of policy reform provides an ideal example of how concerns over the impact of migration on welfare state services can have an impact on policymakers. For LO, transitional arrangements would ultimately be dismissed as an ineffective temporary measure, as they did not apply to independent contractors and workers outsourced to Sweden. While acknowledging that concerns over the abuse of welfare state services was a realistic possibility, the trade union would place greater emphasis on the potential disturbances that could result for the Swedish labor market upon the date of accession. Given that, LO chose to respond to the prospect of increased labor migration from the new EU member states by calling for an increased regulation of the Swedish labor market as a whole, to ensure that independent contractors and outsourced workers were also subject to oversight measures. Whereas the SAP would seek to defend the welfare state by restricting the entry of new EU citizens into Sweden temporarily, LO would seek to defend the Swedish labor market through a substantial enhancement of regulatory measures. In both instances, the

The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

113

link between the possible effects of migration and cherished features of the Swedish model were a guiding consideration. NOTES 1. Riksdagen, Snabbprotokol 2002/03:35, December 12, 2002, Anf. 127. 2. “Theodor Paues är årets lobbyist,” Resumé, November 5, 2003. In November 2002, during an exchange on the floor of the Swedish Riksdag between the Liberal Party MP Nyamko Sabuni and the Green Party MP Gustav Fridolin, the Greens stressed their support for labor migration, with Fridolin professing opposition to “the form of labor migration in which those who come here and look for work get fewer rights and worse possibilities. We do want labor migration, and not, for example, the deportation of those who have a job in Sweden. That is for certain.” See Riksdagen, Snabbprotokoll 2002/03:14, November 8, 2002, Anf. 138. A month later, an exchange between the Liberal MP Erik Ullenhag and the Green MP Mona Jönsson read as if the two were hashing out the first steps of a possible alliance on the issue of labor migration, with Ullenhag stressing the possibilities for policy reform if the Greens were willing to join the bourgeois parties in the quest for a solution. See Riksdagen, Snabbprotokoll 2002/03:33, December 10, 2002, Anf. 12–15. 3. Miljöpartiet de Gröna, Arbetskraftsinvandring med socialt ansvar—10 förslag, March 4, 2003. 4. “Förslag om arbetskraftsinvandring togs bort,” Sydsvenskan, March 8, 2003. 5. Folkpartiet, Ullenhag: Arbetskraftsinvandring kan bli verklighet, March 4, 2003. 6. “Moderata positiva till arbetskraftsinvandring,” TT Nyhetsbanken, March 10, 2003. In a report issued by the Moderate Party on the same day, the SAP claim of a trade-off between efforts at combating Swedish unemployment and the admission of new migrants was dismissed out of hand, and labor migration was cast as “a natural in a globalized world, and a positive contribution to a dynamic market economy.” See Moderaterna, Invandring och integration—moderata utgångspunkter, March 10, 2003. 7. Temo survey, arbetskraftsinvandring och integration, May 8, 2003. 8. See reservation 11 in Riksdagen, Socialförsäkringsutskottets betänkande 2002/03:SfU8 Migration och asylpolitik. 9. Riksdagen, “Fem partier will öppna för större arbetskraftsinvandring,” March 25, 2003. 10. Riksdagen, Svar på fråga 2002/03:696 om kommuners och läns behov av arbetskraft från tredjeland, March 26, 2003. 11. Anders Karlsson and Tomas Eneroth, “Vilka motiv har m och fp för fri invandring?” Dagens Industri, April 25, 2003. Later that spring, the Liberal Party responded, also in the op-ed pages of Dagens Industri. Acknowledging that it was true that the Liberals were in favor of a “more flexible labor law,” Liberal MPs Erik Ullenhag and Mauricio Rojas stressed that the purposes were consistent with protecting the rights of labor migrants. As one example of this, they stressed that

114

Chapter Four

an area of labor law that should be changed was the “limitation of possibilities to circumvent labor law by using foreign employers for people working in Sweden.” See Erik Ullenhag and Mauricio Rojas, “Ökad invandring inget vapen mot arbetsrätten,” Dagens Industri, May 6, 2003. 12. “Behöver vi importera arbetskraft?” Alla, March 31, 2003. 13. “Behöver vi importera arbetskraft?” 14. Thord Pettersson, “Oansvarigt, Svenskt Närningsliv!” Alla, May 28, 2003. 15. Riksdagen, Snabbprotokoll 2002/03:88, April 10, 2003, Anf. 72. 16. Göran Persson, Progressive Politics. 17. Swedish Ministry of Industry, Kommittédirektiv: Översyn av regelverket för arbetskraftsinvandring, Dir. 2004: 21. It should also be stressed that the timing of the directive from the Ministry of Industry was strongly criticized by the Liberal Party. Throughout 2003, the Liberals repeatedly posed questions to SAP ministers, asking when the forthcoming directive could, in fact, be expected. The Liberal impatience culminated in two fashions. First, in parliamentary floor debate in November 2003, Liberal MP Erik Ullenhag and SAP Minister Hans Karlsson squared off on why the directive had become so delayed. Documenting how Karlsson had repeatedly indicated that the directive would be shortly forthcoming, only for it never to appear, Ullenhag pushed Karlsson for a specific date. Karlsson ultimately replied by stressing that while the directive was under preparation by the government, if “Ullenhag is thinking of suspecting the government of not playing fair, then I am going to become violently irritated.” See Riksdagen, Snabbprotokoll 2003/04: 38, November 28, 2003, Anf. 22–28. When no directive had yet been released at the end of January 2004, Ullenhag reported Karlsson to the constitutional committee of the Riksdag, requesting an investigation of why a full nine months had passed with no action from the government. See letter from Erik Ullenhag to Konstitutionsutskottet, January 28, 2004. 18. “Gränserna öppnas för ny arbetskraft,” Göteborgs-Posten, February 20, 2004. 19. Dieter Dettke, Germany’s New Immigration Policy, Testimony prepared for the Hearing on Germany of the U.S. Congressional Human Right Caucus, October 11, 2001, 4. 20. Goethe-Institut Inter Nationes, “Germany’s ‘Green Card’—Reasons—Analyses—Prospects,” Info no. 26 (2001). 21. Just weeks before the report’s release, key figures in the SAP began to sing the virtues of labor migration, such as finance minister Pär Nuder, who declared on the floor of the Riksdag that “if labor migration can lead to increased integration, then I’m positively prepared to try such proposals.” See “Nuder öppnar för arbetskraftsinvandring,” Dagens Industri, May 18, 2005. 22. Kommitté för arbetskraftsinvandring (KAKI), op. cit., 218. 23. Socialdemokraterna, Förslag till politiska riktlinjer till mellankongressen 16–18 April 2004 (Stockholm, Sweden: 2004), 28. 24. Interview with KAKI chair Lena Hjelm-Wallén, Sveriges Radio Ekot, 9 May 2005. 25. (KAKI), Arbetskraftsinvandring till Sverige, 218. 26. (KAKI), Arbetskraftsinvandring till Sverige, 218. 27. Dan Andersson and Thord Pettersson, Flytt, pendling arbetskraftsinvandring och europeisk integration (Stockholm, Sweden: LO, 2003), 33. Elsewhere, LO would

The Battle to Preserve an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy

115

argue that it was not solely the coming demographic challenge that had resulted in the visibility of labor migration on the policy agenda: “Above all else, the driving force behind labor migration is the dependency ratio burden that will occur from here on in as the result of an aging population. Beyond that, there are other driving forces and actors, for example the bourgeois parties and industry associations.” See Landsorganistionen, Långt borta och nära, 20 omvärldstrender till 2010 (April 5, 2004): 14. 28. Andersson and Pettersson, Flytt, pendling arbetskraftsinvandring och europeisk integration, 28. 29. Andersson and Pettersson, Flytt, pendling arbetskraftsinvandring och europeisk integration, 31. 30. Andersson and Pettersson, Flytt, pendling arbetskraftsinvandring och europeisk integration, 33. 31. Andersson and Pettersson, Flytt, pendling arbetskraftsinvandring och europeisk integration, 31. It should also be stressed that the report did make mention of the prospect of migration from the ten new member countries that joined the European Union on May 1, 2004, albeit fleetingly. In noting that the combined population of these ten countries was more than 200 million, the authors also drew attention to the fact that over 15 million of these people were unemployed, and that “far more are underemployed.” Yet, the clear impression in the report is that the specter of labor from the new-EU member countries was far from the most significant issue, as the report expected there to be only “moderate” increases in labor mobility after May 1, 2004. 32. Andersson and Pettersson, Flytt, pendling arbetskraftsinvandring och europeisk integration, 38. 33. “Öppenhet för invandrad arbetskraft,” TT Nyhetsbanken, May 8, 2003. 34. “Öppenhet för invandrad arbetskraft.” 35. Theodor Paues, Arbetskraftsinvandring—ett år senare (Stockholm: Svenskt Näringsliv, 2003). 36. Landsorganistionen, Mer än bara öppna gränser: Landsorganisationen och migrationen (2004): 11. 37. Landsorganistionen, Mer än bara öppna gränser, 10. 38. Landsorganistionen, Mer än bara öppna gränser, 11. 39. Landsorganistionen, Mer än bara öppna gränser, 35. 40. “De som lockas jobba illegalt bör få rätt till skadestånd,” Dagens Nyheter, July 20, 2005. 41. “De som lockas jobba illegalt bör få rätt till skadestånd.” It should be noted that the author co-wrote an editorial column encouraging LO to support amnesty for illegal workers along the lines of that done by the AFL-CIO in the United States. See Gregg Bucken-Knapp and Johan Karlsson, “Amerikansk solidaritet starkare än LO:s,” Expressen, April 12, 2005. 42. Sveriges Radio, June 2, 2006. 43. Svenskt Näringsliv, Företagen—inte AMS—avgör bäst behovet av nyanställningar, June 2, 2006. 44. As the original web page has now been replaced with text reflecting the significantly less liberal stance, it is only possible to access using Google’s cache service: http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:IjdmG_oAvtIJ:www.folkpartiet

116

Chapter Four

.se/templates/ListPage____1195.aspx+folkpartiet+arbetskraftsinvandring+site: folkpartiet.se&hl=sv&gl=se&ct=clnk&cd=3. Accessed August 8, 2006. 45. www.folkpartiet.se/FPTemplates/ListPage____1195.aspx. Accessed August 8, 2006. 46. See Kommittén för arbetskraftsinvandring (KAKI), Arbetskraftsinvandring till Sverige—förslag och konsekvenser; SOU 2006:87, “Oenighet om regler för jobbinvandring,” Dagens Nyheter, October 19, 2006; and “Utredning föreslår friare arbetskraftsinvandring,” TT Nyhetsbanken, October 18, 2006. 47. (KAKI), Arbetskraftsinvandring till Sverige—förslag och konsekvenser, 281–282. 48. (KAKI), Arbetskraftsinvandring till Sverige—förslag och konsekvenser, 283–286. 49. “Mauricio Rojas lämnar integrationsfrågorna,” Dagens Nyheter, October 4, 2006. 50. Wanja Lundby-Wedin, “Jämnlika villkor krävs för arbetskraftsinvandring,” Göteborgs-Posten, October 20, 2006. In the concluding chapter, I return to the issue of how this divergent stance between allies on two labor migration policy components ultimately reflected similar objectives. 51. “Het arbetsmarknad ställer ökade krav på arbetslösa,” TT Nyhetsbanken, December 5, 2006. 52. Swedish Ministry of Justice, Ett effektiv och flexibelt system för arbetskraftsinvandring, Ds 2007:27, July 17, 2007, 20. 53. Swedish Ministry of Justice, Ett effektiv och flexibelt system, 22–23. 54. See Sveriges Radio, “Regeringen öppnar för arbetskraftsinvandring,” http://sr.se/ekot/artikel.asp?artikel=1485607, July 17, 2007 and “Lättare att arbetskraftsinvandra,” Dagens Nyheter, July 18, 2007. 55. “Lättare att invandra för jobb,” Svenska Dagbladet, July 18, 2007. 56. “Kritik från oppositionen,” Dagens Nyheter, July 18, 2007. 57. Regeringens proposition 2007/08:147, Nya regler för arbetskraftsinvandring, April 29, 2008, 26–37. 58. Regeringens proposition 2007/08:147, 30–33.

Five Labor Migration and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union: Understanding the Divergent Preferences of the SAP and LO On May 1, 2004, the European Union expanded from fifteen to twentyfive states. With the entry of the former communist countries of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, along with Cyprus and Malta, the population of the EU grew by approximately 70 million people to a total of over 450 million. Yet, for many of those 70 million new citizens of Europe, the eastward enlargement of the EU on the international day of workers’ solidarity must have been seen to contain a rather cruel irony. For while Karl Marx had once noted that Europe was haunted by the specter of communism, the tone of the public debate leading up to the formal accession date suggested that a very different specter faced policymakers and citizens of the EU15: the unrestricted right of workers from new member states to seek employment anywhere in the EU. Throughout the European media, fears were voiced regarding how the presence of workers from the new EU member countries would drive down wages, increase unemployment for the domestic workforce, and act as a drain on social services. Indeed, twelve of the states that made up the EU15 opted to make use of transitional arrangements that had been adopted by the European Council in June 2001. That allowed for member states to limit the access of workers from the new EU member countries to their national labor markets for a period of two to seven years.1 Only Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom chose to grant full labor market access rights to citizens of the new EU member states from the very first day of membership. The broad focus of this chapter is the Swedish debate over whether or not transitional arrangements should have been applied in conjunction with eastward enlargement of the EU. Similar to the issue of a labor 117

118

Chapter Five

migration policy toward third-country nationals, the question of labor market access for citizens from the new EU member states was an extremely contentious issue for policymakers, pundits, and interest groups within Swedish society. Yet, a key difference in the debate over EU labor migration was the divergent stances taken by the SAP and LO toward transitional arrangements. Based on the previous two chapters, one might expect that the ruling Social Democratic Party and their trade union allies would have been unified in support of implementing transitional arrangements as a means of defending core features of the Swedish model. A historically strong organizational bond exists between the two actors, which has its most direct expression in the chair of LO being granted one of seven seats on the executive committee of the SAP. However, a shared vision of the need to restrict labor market access was not the case. The two actors were on opposing sides of the debate over the wisdom of adopting transitional arrangements: the governing SAP responded by supporting restricted access for labor migrants from the new EU member states, while LO opposed any such measures. What explains this divergence in policy preferences? As this chapter will show, the SAP viewed transitional arrangements as a way to prevent excessive demands from being placed on the services of the Swedish welfare state by non-citizens who were suspected of being attracted to high social wages. Both the key government report investigating the expected consequences of eastward EU expansion and subsequent media coverage emphasized a nightmare scenario in which EU labor migrants would be able to qualify for generous Swedish social services with only minimal effort. By requiring labor migrants from the new EU member states to have work permits during the first year of their stay, the SAP hoped to minimize the likelihood that “social tourism” on the part of migrant labor would occur. Such a stance is broadly in keeping with the argument outlined in chapter 2, wherein defenders of the welfare state primarily opt for restrictive entry policies. However, the SAP also expressed some interest in pursuing a restrictive benefits policy, wherein EU citizens would only be able to access certain Swedish social services after a certain period of time. The logic underlying the opposition of LO to implementing transitional arrangements is less intuitive, particularly when taking into account the concerted efforts on the part of the trade union to ensure the regulated entry of labor from non-EU countries. Why would LO demand such restrictive policies for one category of foreign workers, while actively opposing any measures to limit the entry of a different category of foreign workers? I argue that the key to understanding this puzzle can be found in the specific measures for restricting the free movement of labor from the new EU member states that were possible under transitional

Labor Migration and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union

119

arrangements. Specifically, LO chose to oppose the implementation of transitional arrangements, as the Accession Treaty only allowed for restrictions targeting individuals from the new EU member states who arrived with a status of employee. No provisions existed allowing the EU15 to control the entry of individuals who arrived under the guise of being self-employed or as workers posted from firms abroad. As such, individuals working in the construction, plumbing, and electrical professions, among others, could easily circumvent any restrictions that would have been enacted by transitional arrangements. Given this, LO viewed transitional arrangements as a flawed policy option, one that would not allow for a regulated entry of broad categories of foreign workers onto the Swedish labor market. Instead, LO chose to focus its efforts on securing a more general strengthening of labor market regulations as a whole, in order to minimize the prospect that the presence of workers from the new EU member states would have a negative impact on Swedish wages and labor market conditions.

TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF LABOR IN THE ACCESSION TREATY In order to minimize fears within the EU15 member states that the eastward enlargement of the EU would result in an uncontrolled flooding of foreign workers onto the labor markets of Western Europe, the European Commission proposed a set of transitional arrangements in April 2001 “to phase in full rights to free movement of workers for new member states.”2 Applying to all candidate countries except Malta and Cyprus, the transitional arrangements allowed for “old” member states to restrict the entry of migrant workers for a five-year period via the continued application of national policies regulating entry. Prior to the expiration of the first two years following accession, the Council would conduct a first review. Old member states would be required to notify the Commission of whether they intended to lift transitional arrangements and begin the application of Community law, or whether they intended to leave transitional arrangements in place for an additional three years. Member states choosing to lift restrictions at this point would have the option of reintroducing them “should they undergo or foresee disturbances on their labour markets.”3 New member states would have the possibility of requesting one further review, and it was expected that old member states would fully apply Community law no later than five years following accession. Yet, in the instance that “serious disturbances (or threat thereof)” existed for any national labor markets, member states would have the option of a final two-year extension of transitional arrangements upon notification to the Commission.4

120

Chapter Five

However, while the treaty was explicit in allowing for temporary limits to be placed on the free movement of labor, it is important to stress that the Commission limited restriction over entry to “migrant workers, and not to any other category of EU citizens.”5 As Willem Maas has noted, the implications of this policy was that only workers who sought employment with firms in an existing member state would be affected. Workers posted abroad by their current employer to an old member state, as well as independent contractors relocating to an old member state, were exempt from any provisions restricting their labor market access.6 The exclusion of these categories of workers from transitional arrangements was consistent with Article 43 of the EC Treaty, in which the Right of Establishment ensured that EU citizens have the freedom to “take up and pursue activities as self-employed person” in any member state and that restrictions against the “setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State” would be prohibited.7 As will be seen in this chapter, a central concern for both the leadership of LO and several of its member unions was that the Right of Establishment would allow workers from the new EU member states to circumvent restrictions on labor market access for employees, thereby placing them outside of the scope of collective bargaining agreements.

THE SAP AND TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS From Open Borders to Benefits Tourism Sweden held the rotating presidency of the EU in the first half of 2001, during which time the Commission proposal for transitional arrangements was developed. Yet, while Sweden played a key role in fostering support for the rules that would allow for temporary restrictions to be placed on the free movement of labor within the EU, the ruling SAP was initially adamant that Sweden would not make use of transitional arrangements. Rather, the SAP insisted that workers from the ten new EU member states would be granted full access to the Swedish labor market from the first day of accession. In January 2002, the government established a committee charged with investigating the consequences of the movement of labor in conjunction with EU expansion, noting several reasons as to why it did not view restrictions on the entry of workers from new EU member states as being necessary. Without exception, the arguments put forward at this time gave the impression that the SAP did not believe that any significant waves of migration would result from EU expansion. The directive noted that the low degree of flexibility in terms of wage-setting on the Swedish labor market, as well as “skill demands,

Labor Migration and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union

121

language and the declining significance of traditional industrial job opportunities” would all combine to limit the inward flow of migrants following EU enlargement.8 In an interview shortly before the 2002 election to the Swedish parliament, Göran Persson expressed a similar degree of skepticism toward the prospect that large numbers of workers would arrive on Sweden’s shores in May 2004. Asked whether it was consistent to oppose labor migration from non-EU countries while simultaneously rejecting transitional arrangements blocking the entry of workers from the new EU member states, Persson declared that the two policy stances “fit together beautifully,” as experiences from previous waves of EU expansion had shown that “when a country joins the EU, it results in a boost, a mood in the country wherein (the people in those new member states) want to stay at home.”9 Yet, when the committee published its report in January 2003, it was clear that the special investigator in charge, former Swedish Migration Board director Berit Rollén, was decidedly less sanguine about whether Sweden had little to offer in terms of pull factors that would attract labor migrants from the new EU member states. Of particular concern was the question of how different economic standards between Sweden and candidate countries could lead to a situation wherein generous Swedish social wages would be abused. Rollén drew attention to the fact that EU nationals employed in another EU country were generally entitled to similar treatment as that country’s own citizens when it came to social services. Thus, a key question was the criteria that needed to be fulfilled for an individual to be considered an employee. Rollén noted that under EU law, an individual was classified as an employee providing she or he: held a job for a minimum of ten hours a week, was under the direction of another individual, and received some compensation for services rendered. Rollén then raised a warning flag about the potential that the so-called ten-hour rule held for the Swedish welfare state: My judgment is that the legal rules of the EU, in combination with Swedish laws on social benefits, can invite abuse of the Swedish welfare system in different ways. As a parallel to how we have seen organized crime sell “asylum packages” over the past year, one can imagine that it could be a business idea to sell employment offers that would result in work permits and access to the entire Swedish welfare state. The employment offers could be fictitious, of limited extent, and/or poorly paid. There are many feasible ways in which calculating people could, in exchange for pay, lure people here that are in need of financial support of healthcare. After a short period of time, they would become the responsibility of Swedish society. There is also the possibility that individuals—without the involvement of criminals—would take the chance of supporting themselves and their families via poorly paid work of limited extent.10

122

Chapter Five

With these concerns as a backdrop, Rollén presented a series of financial calculations intended to demonstrate the resulting worst-case consequences for the Swedish welfare state were labor migrants granted employee status on the basis of only ten hours of work per week. Working from a hypothetical case in which a migrant had annual gross wages of 45,000 kronor (approximately $6,425, and based on only ten hours of employment per week), Rollén concluded that the migrant’s annual contribution to the public sector would be 37,600 kronor ($5,370).11 When juxtaposed with the transfer payments that could be made to the migrant, the resulting numbers portrayed an outcome in which the ten-hour rule would result in a clear financial loss for the welfare state: were the migrant in a family with two adults and two children, the family would receive 120,400 kronor ($17,200) in social assistance funds and housing allowances. Were the couple childless yet chose to relocate both sets of parents to Sweden, the resulting benefits would be 200,000 kronor ($28,571). A final scenario in which a couple had both two dependent children and two sets of dependent parents, would result, after taxes, in the family receiving 282,000 kronor ($40,285) per year.12 Asserting that it would not take many cases of migrants receiving this level of benefits for anti-immigrant opinion to benefit, Rollén maintained that Sweden would best be served by making use of the provisions possible under transitional arrangements, and thereby “gradually checking” to see whether the potential financial risks of her worst-case scenario were indeed going to materialize. To that end, the report proposed that labor migrants from the new EU member states would be required to apply for work permits once a job offer had received, and that permits would only be valid for one year at a time. While acknowledging that the decision to opt for one-year permits might be seen as “excessively cautious,” Rollén stressed that the potential risks for “crime and abuse” justified departing from the standard practice of granting five-year permits to EU citizens. In order to counteract the potential risks associated with the “ten hour rule,” the proposal also mandated that full-time employment with “regular Swedish wages” would also be required in order for a permit to be issued. Unlike the permit approval process for third-country nationals, applicants would be allowed to submit paperwork from within Sweden, no assessment would be made of labor market conditions, the application would not be passed on to social partners for their opinion, nor would the permit be employer-specific. Information regarding permits would be public in the event that trade unions wished to “follow up” any cases.13 In responding to the committee report, the SAP sidestepped the specifics of Rollén’s proposals for limiting access to the Swedish labor market during the transitional period. Rather, Göran Persson noted that if abuse of social services did occur, measures would be taken to stop those.

Labor Migration and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union

123

However, he stressed that the fundamental message of the report was that Sweden would not be witnessing a “violent onrush” upon accession of the new EU member states.14 Making use of transitional arrangements would simply not be necessary. Indeed, this remained the stance of the ruling SAP throughout much of 2003. In mid-November, Persson reiterated his opposition to calls for limiting access to Sweden’s labor market, noting how accession would increase the level of optimism among the newest EU citizens. Persson argued again that the mindset would be one where individuals would prefer to remain at home, as they would be likely to think, “When I am convinced that my children will be better off in this country than I have been, then I’ll choose to stay here and be a part of things and create a better future for my children in my own country.”15 Yet, in a national radio interview just two days later, Persson indicated that the government was increasingly concerned about the possible negative consequences of EU expansion for the Swedish welfare state, stating that it was important not to be naïve with regard to the risks of “benefits tourism.”16 While still formally maintaining opposition to restrictive measures allowed for under transitional arrangements, Persson hinted that the government was considering adoption of Rollén’s proposal of one-year work permits as a requirement for citizens from the new EU member states, or the possibility that the granting of a work permit would be conditional upon a full time job.17 These comments came on the heels of an episode of the documentary program Uppdrag granskning (Assignment Investigation) on Swedish state television, focusing on the possible consequences of EU expansion for the Swedish welfare state. Central to the program was the worst-case scenario sketched out in Rollén’s report, with a particular emphasis on how the “ten hour rule” could be exploited by eastern Europeans who had secured part-time employment in Sweden. As a hypothetical example, the program detailed the case of a married couple in Poland with three children, in which the husband was a construction worker. Assuming that he commuted to Sweden and was employed for ten hours a week, Uppdrag granskning emphasized that the family would be eligible for 9,000 kronor ($1,285) monthly in benefits from the Swedish welfare state for use in Poland, including housing and child allowances, as well as parental-leave benefits. The episode concluded with the host asking the viewing audience, “The question now is how generous we have the ability, or desire, to be?”18 According to Henrik Brors, the senior political correspondent at the liberal daily Dagens Nyheter, this episode of Uppdrag granskning played a significant part in forcing the SAP to re-evaluate its support of open borders for workers from the new EU member states. Brors notes that following the broadcast of the episode, Göran Persson demanded to know why he had not been

124

Chapter Five

informed of the implications of the “ten hour rule” for Swedish social services.19 However, the evidence is far from conclusive on this point.20 As the subsequent section will show, the SAP ultimately sought to justify its policy reversal on the basis of the growing number of member states that intended to restrict access for workers from the new EU member states. For the SAP, this situation implied that Sweden would be one of the few destinations to which new EU citizens would have unhindered access on May 1, 2004. When coupled with the generous social wages of the Swedish model, the SAP would judge the risks to be too great. The SAP Proposal for Transitional Arrangements Throughout late 2003 and early 2004, tactical maneuvering over the question of transitional arrangements intensified. While the SAP was increasingly open that it would propose restricted access to the Swedish labor market, the four bourgeois parties sought to achieve consensus on how to reform the social services system as a whole to minimize the chance that any abuse could occur, regardless of whether it occurred at the hands of a Swede or a migrant.21 The Left Party preferred a general strengthening of Swedish labor law, warning that the focus on benefits tourism would only serve to stir up anti-immigrant sentiment,22 while the Greens had earlier joined the bourgeois opposition in a statement to the parliamentary social insurance committee opposing transitional arrangements.23 In March 2004, the SAP government released its proposal for limiting the access of citizens from the new EU member states during a transitional period. Pointing out that a majority of existing EU/EEA member states, including Sweden’s neighbors, had now either opted to make use of transitional arrangements or were intending to do so, the government argued that it had little choice but to follow suit, noting that Swedish welfare state services were likely to be a significant pull factor: If Sweden were, despite the change in conditions, not to implement special rules under a transitional period, then significantly more people are likely to come here from the new member states than would have been the case if only a few of the current member states had implemented transitional arrangements. [T]here still exists great economic differences between the new member states and the current member states. Among other things, the consequence of this is that there are significant differences between the compensation levels of the Swedish social system and those of the new EU member states. These circumstances can be exploited by unscrupulous employers looking to recruit a labor force from new member states and to offer terms of employment that significantly undercut conditions generally prevalent on the Swedish labor market.24

Labor Migration and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union

125

In keeping with the Rollén report, the government proposed that an initial one-year work permit would be required for all citizens of the new EU member states (notwithstanding Malta and Cyprus) who sought employment in Sweden. During the initial year of residence, migrants would not normally be allowed to switch employers. Similarly, an offer of either fulltime employment or one with wages that guaranteed an appropriate level of subsistence was required. Following twelve months of continuous employment, labor migrants would be subject to the same regulations governing citizens of the “old” EU member states, and would automatically be issued a five-year work permit. Yet in contrast to the Rollén report, the government proposal specified that migrants from the new EU member states would be required to file applications for a work permit from outside of Sweden, and that while not a formal condition for approval, it was expected that housing would be arranged prior to entry. According to the government, the submission of permit applications from abroad ensured that a situation could be avoided wherein migrants entered Sweden and took up employment with “worse conditions in hopes of staying, or that they would be forced to apply for social services in order to support themselves.”25 Underscoring the linkage between the proposed restrictions on labor market access and the Swedish welfare state, Minister of Migration Barbro Holmberg and Minister of Working Life Hans Karlsson stressed that average wage levels in some of the new EU member countries were lower than child allowance payments for three children in Sweden.26 A similar point was made by SAP Minister of Coordination Pär Nuder in a parliamentary debate, who stressed that transitional arrangements were necessary to ensure that “rich employers in the West (cannot) purchase cheap labor and offer access to the social safety system as some kind of bonus.”27 Nuder’s assessment that the threat to the Swedish model came primarily from employers and not from Eastern European migrants was echoed by Holmberg, who noted, “It’s not about cheating on an individual level. It’s not as if people in these countries are sitting there and thinking about Swedish child allowances, absolutely not.”28 Regardless of the source of the threat, however, it was clear that the ruling SAP had opted for a model of transitional arrangements that was seen as likely to minimize the chance that any actor could take advantage of the generous safety net, and as such, would be clearly “compatible with the Swedish social welfare system.”29 The SAP proposal also emphasized the necessity of additional measures to guarantee effective regulation of the labor market. Some of these focused on assigning responsibility for administrative tasks, such as ensuring the ability of the Swedish Migration Board to verify proof of employment, and that an ongoing overview of labor market trends in the wake of EU expansion be conducted by AMS. Other measures were

126

Chapter Five

proposed more generally at this stage, particularly those highlighting the uncertainties posed by the ability of EU citizens to enter Sweden as selfemployed individuals or as workers posted to Sweden from firms abroad. In these instances, the report stressed the need to catalog and address any problems that may result as a consequence.30 Finally, the report called for measures to ensure that provisions associated with collective bargaining agreements were being observed on the labor market.31 Polling data showed that there was substantial support for limiting the Swedish labor market access of citizens from the new EU member states. In a survey conducted for Svenska Dagbladet, respondents were asked whether they thought it was a good or bad idea that Sweden should limit labor migration from the new EU member states. While a bare majority of 54 percent overall backed limiting labor migration in conjunction with EU enlargement, support for transitional arrangements was significantly more popular among Social Democratic voters and LO members. For these categories, support for restrictive entry policies rose to 62 percent and 66 percent respectively.32 The SAP decision to make use of transitional arrangements is in keeping with the argument in chapter 2 regarding a preference on the part of universal welfare state defenders for restrictive entry policies over that of restrictive benefits policies. Yet, as migration scholars such as Geddes have noted, even traditionally social democratic states are now home to calls for restrictive benefits policies when confronted with concerns over the impact of migration on welfare state services. Indeed, the question of restricted access to benefits did also figure into the Swedish debate over transitional arrangements, with the SAP proposing an overview of the social services law in order to determine whether benefits for newly arrived EU citizens could be phased in over time.33 It should be stressed here, however, that the resulting report proposed merely that Sweden’s legislation be made uniform with the 2004 EU directive on the rights of free movement for EU citizens, which grants that member states “shall not be obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the first three months of residence.”34 Thus, for the SAP, restricted entry remained the key policy objective in conjunction with EU enlargement. The Failed Effort to Adopt Transitional Arrangements While the Center Party and the Christian Democrats remained steadfastly opposed to any restrictions on the entry of workers from the new EU member states, both the Liberal Party and the Moderate Party emerged with separate counter-proposals for transitional arrangements. Liberal Party leader Lars Leijonborg announced that the party’s response to the government proposal was a firm “no”; however, a deeply divided

Labor Migration and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union

127

parliamentary party adopted an alternate plan for minimizing the chances that EU enlargement would result in any abuse of the Swedish welfare state. Under the Liberal Party proposal, citizens from the new EU member states would be required to provide documentation once in Sweden that they were in possession of sufficient funds, such that it would not be necessary to resort to social assistance, with verification being handled by the Swedish Migration Board.35 The documentation requirement would take effect on May 1, 2004 and would cease at the end of the year, during which time Leijonborg hoped that such a provision would be made mandatory for any citizen of the Union relocating to another EU country.36 Writing in Svenska Dagbladet, senior Moderate Party politicians attacked the ruling SAP’s call for transitional arrangements, noting that while previously “a wall kept people trapped in Eastern Europe, the Social Democrats want to erect a wall around Sweden that will shut them out.”37 As an alternative, the Moderate Party proposed a four-point initiative: • Permits would be granted to migrants from the new EU member states who could produce both valid identification and a concrete employment offer; • Citizens of any EU member states would not be eligible for social service benefits while conducting their employment search in Sweden; • The government should explore the possibility of limiting housing allowances to EU citizens who are official residents of Sweden; and • The possibility of phasing-in of social service benefits should be explored.38 While similarities existed between the Liberal and Moderate Party alternatives, there was little overlap with the initial proposal put forward by the SAP, thus minimizing the prospects that the three parties could find common ground. Indeed, Liberal Party leader Leijonborg issued an ultimatum, stating that the only possibility for the SAP to achieve any restrictions on the entry of workers from the new EU member states would be if the party supported the Liberal proposal. This threat was quickly dismissed by Tomas Eneroth, Social Democratic chair of the parliamentary social insurance committee. The proposal from the Moderate Party was subject to a particularly sharp attack from the SAP, with Barbro Holmberg and Hans Karlsson accusing its bourgeois rivals of wanting to use EU enlargement as an opportunity to introduce a guest worker system to Sweden. Writing in the regional paper Östgöta Correspondenten, the two ministers condemned the Moderate Party proposal for seeking to limit access for non-Swedish citizens to welfare state services and stressed that the SAP proposal for transitional arrangements reflected a more general desire shared by the governments of all existing EU member states to

128

Chapter Five

protect “individual wage earners, welfare systems and to maintain order on labor markets.”39 When the government proposal was set to go to a vote in both the parliamentary social insurance committee and then the floor of the Swedish Parliament, it was clear that the SAP lacked the necessary votes to win. However, the government attempted to salvage victory by proposing a compromise with the Liberals. In a last-ditch effort prior to the parliamentary social insurance committee vote, the SAP offered to withdraw its call for transitional arrangements. Yet, the Social Democrats were only willing to do so if the Liberals supported the right of the government to require work permits at a later date during the transitional period, should they be deemed necessary. A heavily divided Liberal Party parliamentary group rejected the offer, leading Göran Persson to speculate that Liberal MPs would think, after the fact ,that “we’re the ones who wrote in our own parliamentary motion that there’s a risk for abuse, and now we’ve actively voted against it.”40 With these entrenched positions as a backdrop, there was little surprise when the government proposal to require work permits failed to secure support from any of the other parliamentary parties in either committee or on the floor of the Parliament. In committee, the Moderate Party and the Liberal Party voted for their respective proposals to require proof of sufficient funds, while the remaining parties simply opposed the SAP plan. When the government proposal reached the floor of the Swedish parliament barely a week later, it was ultimately defeated by a vote of 182–137. As a contrast, motions from the Left Party and the Greens to ensure that the entry of independent contractors and workers posted to Sweden by foreign firms did not result in disturbances on the labor market met with success.41 The inability of the SAP to push through transitional arrangements was a bitter loss for Persson and other senior Social Democratic figures. Minister of Migration Barbro Holmberg described the loss as an “absurd situation,” noting that the government would continue to monitor how enlargement had an impact on both the labor market and the welfare system, and would propose additional measures to the Swedish parliament if necessary.42 Prime minister Göran Persson learned of the outcome while meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush at the White House, characterizing the decision as “extraordinarily irresponsible” and lamenting that Swedish policymakers had failed to see that transitional arrangements were necessary to ensure that, “we don’t experience abuse or exploitation of a workforce.”43 For the SAP, the battle over transitional arrangements represented a clear loss in terms of being able to implement the policy measures seen as necessary to minimize disturbances to the Swedish model. Yet, as the subsequent section will show, the Swedish debate over transitional arrangements resulted in a sharply different outcome for LO,

Labor Migration and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union

129

as the trade union saw the bulk of its proposal for strengthening oversight and regulation of the Swedish labor market adopted. LO AND TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS Internal Differences Between LO Leadership and Member Unions While LO played a central role in attempting to block the efforts of both the main employers’ association and the Green-bourgeois alliance to liberalize third-country national labor migration policy, the trade union generally opposed measures restricting the entry of workers from the new EU member states. In the earliest period of the debate, the union’s lack of support for transitional arrangements reflected a general faith in the strength of Swedish labor market institutions. Speaking at a November 2002 social dialogue summit in Brussels, LO chair Wanja Lundby-Wedin was openly critical of those who argued that transitional arrangements were necessary to counteract wage dumping. As Lundby-Wedin noted, any EU citizen who arrived to take up employment in Sweden would be covered by both Swedish collective bargaining agreements and Swedish labor law. Given this, she argued, “wage dumping won’t be possible.”44 Upon release of the Rollén report in January 2003, LO acknowledged the possibility that EU enlargement could result in some abuse of Swedish social services, but the trade union sought to portray the chances of this as minimal, with Lundby-Wedin commenting that, “Admittedly, there’s a theoretical risk of increased costs for Swedish welfare and health care services, but not to the extent that can justify the special investigator’s proposal of restrictions.” Rather, the union’s initial statement on the Rollén report sought to emphasize both that the free movement of labor within the EU would benefit the Swedish economy and that strong collective bargaining agreements would guarantee the protection of all workers.45 However, LO did see expansion as presenting certain challenges, with the union focusing on the varied ways in which labor migrants from the new EU member states could enter Sweden: as either employees, self-employed independent contractors, or as workers posted to Sweden by firms abroad. Speaking at a May Day 2003 rally in Vargön, LO’s third vice-chair Leif Håkansson noted that transitional rules would only apply in the instance of employees, thus necessitating other regulatory strategies to ensure that EU enlargement did not result in a worsening of conditions on the Swedish labor market: More resources are . . . needed to ensure an orderly labor market. Everyone shall participate with the same conditions and prevailing rules and agreements shall be followed. Already today, great problems exist in terms of

130

Chapter Five

order (on the labor market), above all else in the construction, transport and service sectors. There exists an imminent risk that these problems could get worse. But, this isn’t chiefly because of the free movement of labor, but is rather a consequence of free movement of services and the right of companies to establishment. These problems can’t be prevented with some sort of transitional arrangements, as these rights already exist. That’s why special transitional arrangements won’t amount to anything in the long run. . . . Laws, agreements and rules shall apply to everyone working in Sweden. It’s that kind of order we must have. An order that is maintained by labor market partners and that must be guaranteed through Sweden’s own policies.46

However, as senior union figures convened in order to draft the official response to the Rollén report, it became clear that there existed a significant rift between top LO leadership and six of the fifteen member unions. In contrast to LO’s call for open borders in conjunction with EU expansion, leaders of the Union of Services and Communication Employees (Seko), the Swedish Building Workers Union (Byggnads), the Swedish Building Maintenance Workers Union (Fastighets), the Swedish Painters Union (Målarna), the Swedish Transport Workers Union (Transport), and the Swedish Electricians Union (Elektrikerna) indicated that they would be filing a separate response to the Rollén report, calling for some form of transitional arrangements to be adopted. Otherwise, as Seko chair Jan Ruden noted, unions would find themselves constantly having to pursue legal action in the courts.47 Characterizing calls to oppose transitional arrangements as “naïve and wide-eyed,” Byggnads chair Hans Tilly speculated that LO would be better served if it were to opt to limit labor market access for a full seven years, “otherwise the compass needle of unscrupulous employers will be pointed towards the Nordic (states).”48 In general, opposition on the part of these six unions to the LO stance reflected concerns that unrestricted labor market access would make it difficult to guarantee that collective bargaining agreements were being followed. Yet, fears also existed that EU enlargement could lead to benefits tourism. Jan Lindkvist, the editor of Transport’s monthly publication Transportarbetaren, cited the now familiar example of the Polish family relocating to Sweden with the ability to use social services, observing how the Swedish Association of Social Insurance had concluded that the “eventual abuse of social services could lead to a negative attitude towards migrants from other EU member states.”49 Ultimately, the six unions were not able to paper over their differences with LO’s leadership: the trade union opted to submit a general response to the Rollén report, reflecting the stance of the organization as a whole, as well as a reservation, detailing the stance of the six dissenting unions. The response from LO as a whole dismissed claims that EU expansion would result in any undue risks or abuse of the Swedish welfare system,

Labor Migration and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union

131

with Lundby-Wedin pointedly stating that, “We believe that Rollén’s argument, that people will come here and be some kind of welfare cheat, is highly exaggerated.”50 However, the trade union did acknowledge that certain problems for the labor market would arise in conjunction with enlargement. LO’s specific concern centered on the effects that both the right of free movement of services and the right of establishment would have on the Swedish labor market. As such, the union called for several measures to be adopted that would strengthen oversight and regulation of the domestic labor market, and established a working group to ensure their adoption by policymakers: • Requiring entrepreneurs be made legally responsible for ensuring that taxes and fees on all subcontractors would be paid; • “Cleaning up” the staffing firms sector through establishing a board to oversee registration and to ensure that minimum economic and employment conditions would be met; • Demanding more stringent background checks in conjunction with the granting of F-tax cards (that allow firms and self-employed individuals to conduct business); • Strengthening the union’s right to oversee working conditions and requiring employers to provide documents such that unions could verify that employers followed prevailing collective bargaining agreements; • Requiring Sweden to ratify ILO 94, governing labor conditions in public construction projects; and • Adopting transitional arrangements “against social dumping,” wherein the transportation sector would be shielded by exemptions from the general free movement of labor under a fixed period.51 While the call for increased regulations for “an orderly labor market” was often motivated by an explicit desire to ensure that EU enlargement did not exacerbate existing problems on the Swedish labor market, LO also stressed that further regulation would have positive economic growth effects in two separate ways. First, LO suggested that where an illegal workforce was employed, it became more cost efficient for firms to rely on these individuals than to opt for solutions involving greater technological efficiency. Such a situation was thought by the union to result in lower productivity rates. Second, LO argued that Sweden was likely to face a labor shortage in the near future. Without an orderly labor market, it was argued that it “would be difficult to accept an increase in labor migration.”52 Unions skeptical to the free movement of labor in conjunction with enlargement spoke out in favor of several of the measures being proposed by LO. Transport head Per Winberg welcomed the final measure,

132

Chapter Five

that sought to limit the ability of transport drivers to work in Sweden without having obtained a Swedish driver’s license. At the same time, Winberg threatened that if the Swedish parliament voted it down, LO might be required to re-evaluate its stance on transitional arrangements.53 The call for stricter measures to be adopted in conjunction with issuing F-tax cards was intended to address concerns that it had become too easy for “non-serious” firms and individuals to conduct business in Sweden. Introduced in the early 1990s, the F-tax card allowed for businesses and self-employed individuals to document responsibility for payment of taxes to the state. Yet, a number of LO member unions feared that Eastern European workers were being encouraged to acquire an F-tax card and declare themselves as independent contractors, thus placing them beyond the reach of collective bargaining agreements that only applied to employees. A press release from Byggnads Council, the senior decisionmaking body in the construction union between congresses, made clear the frustration felt by the union on this point, noting that, “Labor, primarily from the Baltic states and other countries in the east, works for wages under the prevailing Swedish collective bargaining agreements and with a bad working environment. The union isn’t even allowed to talk to those construction workers who are quickly provided with tax documents verifying self-employed status and are exploited under the cover of being ‘self-employed.’”54 Yet, while union leaders such as Hans Tilly and Per Winberg welcomed the working group initiative as a means for tighter labor market regulation, it did little to change the belief that transitional arrangements were necessary. In a reservation to the LO response, the six dissenting unions noted the difficulties that were expected to arise in conjunction with enlargement, and were adamant that the only way to respond was through the restrictions as proposed in the Rollén report. Labeling the assessment that the Swedish labor market would only witness minor disturbances in conjunction with EU enlargement as a “middle class perspective,” the six unions stressed the concern that a “threat to the members’ employment conditions, collective bargaining agreements and, in the long run, the Nordic model of labor law” would result if temporary restrictions were not placed on workers from the new EU member states.55 Specifically, the reservation identified six potential problems that would likely be exacerbated if transitional arrangements were not adopted, including: firms choosing not to sign collective bargaining agreements when not specifically requested to do so by employees; the lack of a legal right for unions to ensure that contracts were being honored at firms where employees were not union members; the lack of regulations concerning employment conditions at staffing firms; the possibility that union density rates would decline in specific sectors, thus making it diffi-

Labor Migration and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union

133

culty to uphold the principle that union wage agreements ought to apply to nonunion employees; an increase in the number of individuals opting for self-employed status whom organized labor regarded as employees; and, that foreign firms would be able to exploit sharp differences in social insurance fees between Sweden and the new EU member states. Compounding these problems was the fact that, by this time, both Germany and Austria had chosen to adopt transitional arrangements. As such, the six unions expressed a concern that Sweden would grow in attractiveness as a destination for migrants whose access to other labor markets was being closed off for the short term. Transitional arrangements were ultimately viewed by these unions as a device for buying time, to ensure that the Swedish state would put measures into place to allow for “better surveillance and control of how labor markets work in an expanded Europe.”56 The Dual Strategy: Threats and Unlikely Alliances As has been shown thus far, the position of the LO leadership on transitional arrangements differed considerably from that of the ruling SAP, as well as from that of several member unions comprising LO. Whereas both the SAP and dissenting member unions emphasized temporary restrictions on labor market access as the primarily policy instrument to be deployed in the face of EU enlargement, LO as a whole sought chiefly to pursue a strategy of increased regulation and oversight of the Swedish labor market. Indeed, LO’s own statement of position on labor migration, both from within and without the EU, was that it had never sought to shield the Swedish labor market from an influx of foreign labor. However, in late 2003 and early 2004, LO hinted that its commitment to the free movement of labor was not an absolute, and remained conditional upon the successful realization of the goals being pursued in the organization’s working group for an orderly labor market. While continuing to advocate its support for the free movement of labor, the trade union also stated that such a position could be reconsidered if demands for labor market reform were not met. As noted in chapter 4, the LO report Flytt, pendling, arbetskraftsinvandring och europeisk integration (“Movement, commuting, labor migration and European integration”) put forward initial proposals for managing the reintroduction of increased labor migration from non-EU countries. Yet, the report also made reference to the impact that EU enlargement was expected to have on the Swedish labor market. Stressing that expansion carried with it “obvious risks” that EU citizens would be exploited by unscrupulous Swedish employers, the report drew attention to how the free movement of labor within the EU had led to instances of fatal

134

Chapter Five

accidents on the job and foreign workers living in barracks-like conditions. Noting that such instances led many member unions to be “highly doubtful” toward labor migration, the report emphasized the call from LO leadership for resources to guarantee regulation of the Swedish labor market, yet also issued a clear warning: If the desired labor market reforms were not adopted, then “LO’s board can re-evaluate the stance that general transitional arrangements are not necessary.”57 In January 2004, Dan Andersson and LO analyst Kristina Mårtensson wrote an op-ed piece in Dagens Nyheter in which the trade union issued a starkly negative assessment of the efforts made thus far by the Swedish state to implement LO’s desired regulation of the labor market. Stressing the difference in stances between LO and the SAP, the authors acknowledged that the trade union “saw the risks of benefit tourism,” but devoted substantially greater attention to detailing the “completely unacceptable lack of order in how authorities are controlling the consequences of immigration.”58 Interestingly, while LO touched upon many of the points developed in its response to the Rollén report, it appeared to do so in conjunction with third-country labor migration. Andersson and Mårtensson noted the apparent ease with which “any hot dog stand owner” in Sweden could hire foreign labor, as authorities failed to verify whether the business was genuine, and stressed the need for AMS to ensure that labor migration was conducted in such a way as to ensure a high workforce participation rate. However, the warning from LO was unequivocal and was clearly directed toward the coming expansion of the EU, with the authors stating that, “As long as no joint policies exist to meet (the challenge of) the increased mobility of labor, then the demands from union organizations for transitional arrangements will remain, that is, barriers against mobility during a transitional period.”59 As such, one component in LO’s lobbying strategy to attain a more comprehensive regulation of the Swedish labor market was to imply that a lack of action from policymakers was fanning the flames of support for transitional rules on the part of certain LO member unions. Explicit warnings as to the implications of policymaker inaction were, however, far from the main tool deployed by the union to see its reform objectives realized. A significantly more important feature of the trade union campaign to achieve labor market reform was the attempt to persuade policymakers that adopting the reform package preferred by LO was a necessity for maintaining a regulated labor market. In late November 2003, LO analyst Ingemar Göransson criticized Persson for suddenly emphasizing the need for transitional arrangements as a means for combating benefits tourism. According to Göransson, the greater danger was “dumping tourism”; namely, the threat that wage dumping and disorder on the labor market would result from enlargement if LO’s

Labor Migration and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union

135

demands were not translated into policy.60 While Göransson charged the government with refusing thus far to realize the seriousness of the risks at hand, Leif Håkansson indicated that discussions over the LO reform package were already under way between the union and the Ministry of Industry.61 However, discussion with relevant government ministries to ensure support from the SAP could, on their own, not guarantee the necessary parliamentary votes to ensure the adoption of LO’s desired labor market reforms. Support from the Left Party was already ensured, as the parliamentary party had previously introduced a motion to the Swedish parliament rejecting transitional arrangements as discriminatory and likely to result in a division of the EU workforce into “A- and B-level teams.” Rather than place limits on the free movement of labor throughout the expanded EU, the Left Party emphasized areas requiring greater regulation that were roughly identical to those raised in the LO response to the Rollén report, including concerns over tax documents, staffing firms, and subcontractors.62 Indeed, in late February 2004, the Left Party Congress officially rejected transitional arrangements, while offering formal support for the LO policy reform package.63 Additional parliamentary party support would be necessary if LO were to be successful in seeing its campaign for tougher regulation of the Swedish labor market adopted. Cooperation with any of the four bourgeois parties in opposition was beyond the realm of possibility. Thus, the sole remaining alternative was the Green Party. An alliance between the Greens and LO over a policy reform so intimately linked with migration may have seemed highly improbable. Not only were the Greens adamantly opposed to transitional arrangements, the decision to strike a deal with the four bourgeois parties on labor migration policy for third-country nationals was clearly at odds with the more restrictive stance advocated by LO. Deeper reasons existed, however, for animosity between the two organizations. In 1999, the Greens came out in support of legislation allowing small businesses to exempt any two employees of their choosing from a “last in, first out” procedure in the event that dismissals became necessary. This stance earned the party particularly sharp invective from Hans Karlsson, then senior contracts negotiator for LO, who threatened to “make the Greens suffer” for attacking the legal security of LO members.64 To say that the two organizations shared a checkered past in terms of Swedish labor market reforms would clearly be an understatement. Thus, it came as somewhat of a surprise when it was announced in January 2004 that the Greens and LO had agreed to establish a joint working group to explore specific labor market reforms that would make the Swedish adoption of transitional arrangements unnecessary. Thord Pettersson characterized the working group as an effort to “strengthen

136

Chapter Five

the position of all wage earners on the Swedish labor market, Swedish as well as foreign.”65 According to Green Party spokesperson Peter Eriksson, the fact that LO now dared to cooperate with the Greens was a sign of fresh thinking from the trade union.66 Green spokesperson Maria Wetterstrand acknowledged the significance of the decision by the two actors to establish a working group, stating that LO occupies “a key position as the representative for many employees and is traditionally the social democratic government’s cooperation partner. If the two of us can reach an agreement, then it will be difficult for the government to continue to push the question of transitional arrangements.”67 Several weeks after the establishment of the joint working group, there was little sign that cooperation between the two unlikely bedfellows was weakening, with Eriksson noting that while “it isn’t obvious that we’ll agree on all points,” discussions were nonetheless proceeding in a positive spirit.68 To the extent that disagreement within the working group between LO and the Greens existed, it appeared to center on two issues. First, the party was unwilling to support the implementation of tougher regulations in conjunction with the granting of F-tax cards. According to Ulf Holm, Green Party MP and representative to the working group, the party considered the current level of bureaucracy associated with the necessary paperwork to be a stumbling block for new entrepreneurs. Moreover, the Greens were skeptical of calls to provide unions with an increased ability to monitor working conditions, with Holm claiming that this would represent “too great of an interference in personal integrity.”69 From LO’s side, not all senior figures were equally willing to acknowledge the formal efforts being conducted within the working group. Erland Olausson, then LO Secretary of Bargaining Agreements, maintained that no “organized cooperation” existed with the Greens, rather only with the SAP. Still, he conceded that the trade union was discussing the reform package with the Greens, albeit “we’re doing that with other parties as well,” and that any Green Party motion would not result from having reached a joint agreement.70 In the midst of discussions between LO and the Greens, the government began drafting its response to the Rollén report, in which it called for the adoption of transitional arrangements. As noted in the previous section, the most detailed portion of the SAP plan to implement transitional arrangements centered on restricting access for nationals from the new EU member states for a one-year period. Additionally, the government proposal also called for measures to guarantee the effective regulation of the Swedish labor market. Both the Left Party and the Greens, who were sympathetic to the LO reform package, came out immediately in opposition to the SAP proposal. Left Party MP, and member of the parliamentary labor market committee, Camilla Sköld Jansson argued that transitional rules

Labor Migration and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union

137

would only hasten wage dumping on the Swedish labor market, asking why the government hadn’t yet attempted to implement the demands that the party shared with LO.71 The Green Party was equally critical of the government proposal, with party spokesperson Peter Eriksson characterizing it as a “historic deceit that can cost Sweden dearly in the long run.” Maria Wetterstrand emphasized the ongoing cooperation between the Greens and LO in favor of labor market reform, challenging the government to withdraw its proposal and support the joint working group’s efforts at achieving an orderly labor market wherein unscrupulous employers could not engage in exploitation.72 In contrast to the Greens and the Left Party, LO did not voice any detailed criticism of the government proposal. Rather, LO issued a press release in February 2004, in which Wanja Lundby-Wedin maintained that the trade union had to “respect that the government is discussing the consequences of enlargement from a different perspective than we are doing, and therefore can arrive at different conclusions than us regarding the necessity of transitional arrangements.”73 To the extent that there was criticism from LO, it focused on the seemingly unintentional consequences of requiring work permits for the long-term security of migrants. In conjunction with the decision of the SAP parliamentary party to back the government proposal, LO third vice-chair Leif Håkansson expressed concern over the implications that an initial one-year work permit would have for citizens from the new EU member states, pointing out that migrants would be dependent on maintaining their initial employment status for twelve months, otherwise they would be required to exit the country.74

LABOR MARKET REFORM INSTEAD OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: LO TRIUMPHS Whereas LO had expressed reservations regarding the SAP decision to stress work permits as a device for counteracting benefits tourism, the parliamentary motion put forward by the Greens in late March 2004 represented a significant victory for the trade union’s lobbying efforts. In the final days prior to the release of the Green Party proposal, Erland Olausson acknowledged the strategic importance of discussions between the two organizations, noting that the minority SAP government “rests on the support of the Green Party, and has for a very long time.”75 Upon release, the thirteen-page motion reiterated the party’s opposition to the government’s call for transitional arrangements, maintaining that adoption of the SAP proposal would result in a “deep divide” throughout the EU and would prevent Sweden from meeting the long-term economic challenges associated with continuing to fund welfare state services.

138

Chapter Five

Leveling a particularly sharp attack against Göran Persson, the Green MPs disputed whether any facts existed to support claims that Sweden’s generous welfare state benefits would serve as a pull factor in conjunction with EU enlargement, and concluded that the government proposal was “based more on fear than on the relevant facts.”76 While acknowledging that Swedish unemployment rates were still significant, the Greens stressed that combining full labor market access for citizens from the new EU member states together with an active labor market policy constituted a viable recipe for economic success. Against this backdrop, the party rejected claims from those who held that employment opportunities had to be guaranteed for the domestic labor force prior to an opening of borders. Stressing that the party had come to a shared understanding with LO as to the need for labor market reform, the Green proposal included the following measures: • Supporting discussions as to the implementation of regulations requiring entrepreneurs to be responsible for all fees and taxes to be paid in conjunction with subcontractors; • Requiring the registration of staffing firms and the establishment of a special body to oversee this process; • Requiring a more systematic set of follow-up procedures to be implemented in conjunction with the granting of F-tax cards, including providing authorities with the ability to check whether foreign applicants have any unpaid taxes or registered economic crimes abroad; allowing individuals or unions the right to demand investigations into whether specific firms/individuals no longer meet the conditions to hold an F-tax card; allowing the tax authorities to conduct an unannounced audit of firms/individuals with F-tax cards; and increased penalties for the employment of illegal labor; • Supporting an investigation into whether employers ought to be required to provide information allowing trade unions to monitor whether collective bargaining agreements were being followed; and • Requiring the ratification of ILO convention 94.77 LO responded to the Green Party’s parliamentary motion the very same day, noting that the proposal met those demands put forward by LO for preventing wage-dumping on the Swedish labor market. Yet while Erland Olausson pointed out that the motion by the Greens ensured there was a parliamentary majority to “make the necessary decisions,” he shied away from encouraging the Swedish parliament to reject the government’s call for transitional arrangements. Rather, observing that the SAP and its two parliamentary allies had now agreed on the specifics needed

Labor Migration and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union

139

for long-term reforms, Olausson expressed hope that similar agreement could also be reached on measures necessary for the short run.78 Yet, as noted previously, when the government proposal reached the floor of the Swedish parliament just three days before the enlargement took place, the SAP was unable to secure the necessary votes to allow for the implementation of transitional rules. The response from leaders of several of the six dissenting unions within LO varied from bitter disappointment to calls for immediate government action. Transport chair Per Winberg acknowledged that the outcome wasn’t unexpected, yet was still disappointing, saying that the lack of transitional arrangements would function as “a turn signal directed towards Sweden, which stands alone without any buffer.”79 Byggnads chose to focus on the way forward, with union chair Hans Tilly stressing that the it was “unbelievably important” for the government to return to parliament with legislation that would ensure that collective bargaining agreements were being followed at workplaces with non-union members.80 In December 2004, LO was able to look back on the battle over transitional arrangements and document that significant progress had been made on many of the demands in its initial reform package. Legislation had been proposed to require that entrepreneurs be responsible for the taxes and fees associated with subcontractors, twenty million kronor had been budgeted to allow for increased control over the granting of F-tax cards, and an investigative committee was exploring how to implement increased union oversight into collective bargaining agreement compliance. Indeed, the only area in which LO could not point to a victory was in its call for the adoption of transitional arrangements in the transport and maritime sectors. There, however, LO sought to portray the outcome in the best possible light, stating that government agencies had been charged with monitoring developments on the labor market, and that proposals to implement transitional arrangements could be forthcoming if necessary.81 For LO, transitional arrangements had ultimately proved to be unnecessary. Defending the Swedish model did not require tighter control measures over who crossed national borders, but within the institutions and policies governing the Swedish labor market.

CONCLUSION This chapter has focused on the divergent preferences of LO and the ruling SAP toward the question of transitional arrangement for citizens from the ten states that joined the European Union on May 1, 2004. The differing stances held by the two organizations should be of interest for two

140

Chapter Five

reasons. First, in terms of the close alliance between the then-governing SAP and its organizational backbone over a restrictive labor migration policy toward third-country nationals, one should expect that a similar shared perspective would apply in the case of EU enlargement. Second, it should be recalled that the central argument of this book is that actors with a primary interest in defending the Swedish model will develop and propose labor migration policy reform alternatives that are least likely to undermine the workings of the model. In that case, the ruling SAP has acted in accordance with expectations, as the party’s concern over the possible emergence of “benefits tourism” in conjunction with EU enlargement led the party to propose a series of restrictive entry measures for citizens from the new EU member states. Yet, LO has seemingly deviated from the argument advanced in chapter 2 by not only refusing to back calls for transitional arrangements, but also by openly contesting the wisdom of the government’s proposal requiring temporary work permits. However, this chapter has shown that defense of the Swedish model does not always equate with opting for the most restrictive policy alternative available. Rather, in the case of LO and transitional arrangements, it was immediately apparent to the union that the options for limiting entry under the Accession Treaty only applied to individuals who entered the Swedish labor market as employees. Even if Sweden had opted to implement a restrictive labor market access for this category of EU citizens, it would have been impossible to regulate the entry of those foreign EU nationals that acquired paperwork documenting their status as independent contractors, or who had been relocated to Sweden by a firm abroad. Given this, transitional arrangements must have appeared to LO as the modern labor market equivalent of the famed Maginot Line: intended to inspire great confidence in those seeking the ultimate protection from outsiders, but ultimately flawed given the ease with which its barriers could be circumvented. Aware of the weakness inherent in the limited protection offered by transitional arrangements, the leadership of LO instead campaigned for a general strengthening of Swedish labor market regulations, thus minimizing the chances that EU enlargement could depress wages or alter the balance of power on the Swedish labor market. More generally, the behavior of LO underscores that while the design of migration policies is important, they are not ends in and of themselves. Rather, the significance attached to the design of labor migration policies lies in the expected impact that the policies will have on the workings of the political economy. In instances where the desired outcome cannot be achieved by reforming labor migration policies, then actors seeking to preserve a given set of institutions must look elsewhere, and identify those related policies whose reform can minimize the potential risk associated with labor migration.

Labor Migration and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union

141

NOTES 1. Transitional rules only applied to workers from the former communist countries and not to citizens of Malta or Cyprus. 2. Commission of the European Communities, Enlargement: Commission Proposes Flexible Transitional Arrangements for the Free Movement of Workers, IP/01/561, April 11, 2001. 3. Commission of the European Communities, Communication From The Commission to The Council, The European Parliament, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of The Regions, COM (2006), 4. 4. Commission of the European Communities, COM (2006), 4. 5. Commission of the European Communities, COM (2006), 4. 6. Willem Maas, “Citizenship, Free Movement and EU Enlargement,” Jean Monnet Chair Lecture, University of Miami, October 2005, 4. 7. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Title III. 8. Swedish Foreign Ministry, Kommittédirektiv: EU:s utvidgning och arbetskraftens rörlighet, Dir. 2002:1. 9. “Persson beredd bromsa EU-invandring från öst,” Svenska Dagbladet, September 1, 2002. 10. EU:s utvidgning och arbetskraftens rörlighet (SOU:2002:116): 153. 11. This figure includes direct payroll taxes, social insurance fees, and indirect taxes. 12. EU:s utvidgning och arbetskraftens rörlighet, 155 13. EU:s utvidgning och arbetskraftens rörlighet, 162. 14. “Utredare vill ha hinder för arbetskraft från nye EU-länder,” TT Nyhetsbanken, January 15, 2003. 15. “Persson slår ifrån sig LO-krav om övergångsregler,” TT Nyhetsbanken, November 19, 2003. 16. “Göran Persson orolig för ‘social turism,’” Aftonbladet, November 21, 2003. 17. “Persson kräver tydliga regler,” Dagens Nyheter, November 22, 2003. 18. While the episode is no longer online at the Sveriges Television website, a detailed description of its contents is available at http://svt.se/svt/jsp/Crosslink .jsp?d=6437&a=137638. 19. “Tv-inslag fick Persson att byta fot,” Dagens Nyheter, April 5, 2004. 20. Persson once responded to the charge that the episode of Uppdrag granskning was the source of his policy reversal by noting that, “I never watch TV.” See “Persson har trappat ner på entusiasmen,” Göteborgs-Posten, May 6, 2004. 21. “Borgerlig front mot övergångsregler,” Dagens Nyheter, February 24, 2004. 22. “Regeringen kritiserades för tal om ‘social turism’ i debatt,” TT Nyhetsbanken, February 11, 2004. 23. “Majoritet i riksdagen är för fri arbetskraftsinvandring,” Göteborgs-Posten, November 26, 2003. 24. Regeringens skrivelse, Särskilda regler under en övergångsperiod för arbetstagare från nya medlemsstater enligt anslutningsfördraget, Skr. 2003/04:119. 24 25. Regeringens skrivelse, Särskilda regler under en övergångsperiod, 24–27.

142

Chapter Five

26. Barbro Holmberg and Hans Karlsson, “Särregler gagnar alla,” Svenska Dagbladet, March 12, 2004. 27. Stadsrådet Pär Nuder, Riksdagen, Snabbprotokoll, 2003/04:88, March 25, 2004, Anf. 52. 28. “Det handlar ju bara om en övergångstid,” Göteborgs-Posten, February 6, 2004. 29. Skr. 2003/04:119, 24. 30. The question of increased labor market regulation to address the arrival of workers posted to Sweden by firms abroad as well as independent contractors is dealt with in the portion of this chapter focusing on LO and EU enlargement. 31. Skr. 2003/04:119, 30–31. 32. “En majoritet svenskar vill ha övergångsreglar,” Svenska Dagbladet, April 10, 2004. 33. “En majoritet svenskar vill ha övergångsreglar,” 32. 34. European Parliament, Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council April 29, 2004, Official Journal of the European Union, L 158/112. 35. See Folkpartiet, “Fp vill bara ha en övergångsregel: Jobbet ska räcka till egna försörjningen,” March 16, 2004 and “Folkpartiet går med på övergångsregel för nya EU,” Dagens Nyheter, March 16, 2004. 36. “Arbetsintyg fp-krav för alla inom EU,” Svenska Dagbladet, March 17, 2004. 37. Fredrik Reinfeldt, Gunilla Carlsson, and Per Westerberg, “Ingen mur runt Sverige!” Svenska Dagbladet, March 18, 2004. 38. Ibid. In terms of phasing-in access to social services, it should be noted that the Moderate Party made reference to the cases of Ireland and the United Kingdom, in which a qualification period up to several years had been discussed. 39. Swedish Foreign Ministry, Debattartikel av Barbro Holmberg och Hans Karlsson om övergångsregler—Östgöta Correspondenten, April 23, 2004. 40. See “Fp spräckte övergångsregler,” Dagens Nyheter, March 22, 2004 and Sveriges Television, “S-bud om övergångsregler avvisades,” http://svt.se/svt/ Crosslink.jsp?d=1804&a=202589. 41. As will be seen in the subsequent section, these measures represented the core of LO’s policy objectives in conjunction with EU enlargement. 42. “Nej till övergångsregler bakslag för regeringen,” Dagens Industri, April 29, 2004. 43. “Persson till hard attack mot nejröstare,” Dagens Nyheter, April 29, 2004. 44. Landsorganisationen, “LO:s ordförande Wanja-Lundby Wedin vid Sociala dialogens toppmöte: Kräv inga särskilda övergångsregler för EU:s kandidatländer,” November 28, 2002. Lundby-Wedin makes a similar argument in the LO press release, Landsorganisationen, “LO:s ordförande Wanja Lundby-Wedin om EU:s utvidgning—Ett viktigt steg för fred och ökad stabilitet i Europa,” December 13, 2002. 45. Landsorganisationen, “Överdrivna farhågor om arbetskraftsinvandringen,” January 15, 2003. 46. Leif Håkansson, May Day speech at Vargön, May 1, 2003. 47. “Sex LO-förbund will inte ha fri rörlighet,” LO Tidningen, April 11, 2003. 48. “LO-fack vill inte öppna gränserna,” Dagens Nyheter, April 3, 2003.

Labor Migration and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union

143

49. Jan Lindkvist, “Risk för lönedumpning utan övergångsregler,” Transportarbetaren 6 (June 2003). 50. “LO: Arbetsrätten ska hindra lönedumpning vid EU-utvidgning,” TT Nyhetsbanken, June 2, 2003. 51. See LO’s response to SOU 2002:116, EU:s utvidgning och arbetskraftens rörlighet (Dnr UD2003/147/MAP, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and the LO press release, Landsorganisationen, “Beslut i LO-styrelsen om arbetskraftens fria rörlighet: Aktionsgrupp bildas för ordning och reda på arbetsmarknaden,” June 2, 2003. 52. Landsorganisationen, Stärk myndigheterna för mer ordning och reda på arbetsmarknaden, April 15, 2004. 53. “Specialregler för chaufförer från öst LO-krav,” Dagens Nyheter, June 3, 2003. 54. Swedish Construction Workers Union, Uttalande från Byggnads förbundsfullmäktige 17–18 juni 2003. 55. Union of Services and Communication Employees, The Swedish Building Workers Union, The Swedish Building Maintenance Workers Union, The Swedish Painters Union, The Swedish Transport Workers Union, and the Swedish Electricians Union, Underremiss avseende utredningen EU:s utvidgning och arbetskraftens rörlighet, SOU 2002:116. 56. Underremiss avseende utredningen EU:s utvidgning och arbetskraftens rörlighet, SOU 2002:116. 57. Andersson and Pettersson, Flytt, pendling, arbetskraftsinvandring, 40. 58. Dan Andersson and Kristina Mårtensson, “LO varnar för arbetskraftsinvandring,” Dagens Nyheter, January 13, 2004. 59. Andersson and Mårtensson, “LO varnar för arbetskraftsinvandring.” 60. Ingemar Göransson, “Noterat: Dumpingsturism,” LO Tidningen, November 28, 2003. 61. “Facken skeptiska till Perssons utspel,” TT Nyhetsbanken, November 22, 2003. 62. Vänsterpartiet, Motion till riksdagen 2003/04 v.772 av Camilla Sköld Jansson angående trygghet för internationell arbetskraft, October 3, 2003. 63. “Irland på tur för övergångsregler. LO-mp i samspel inför östutvidgning,” Dagens Nyheter, February 25, 2004. 64. In Swedish, “Det ska svida i Miljöpartiet att ge sig på LO-medlemmarnas rättstrygghet.” Cited in Riksdagen, Snabbprotokoll, Protokoll 2000/01:9, Anf. 87, Patrik Norinder, October 11, 2000. 65. “LO ska bredda majoritet åt s,” TT Nyhetsbanken, January 22, 2004. 66. Unlike other political parties in Sweden, the Greens do not have a party chair, and instead make use of two party spokespeople. 67. Miljöpartiet de Gröna, “Mp och LO tillsätter gemensam arbetsgrupp,” January 22, 2004. 68. “LO hoppas att samtal ska leda till stöd från miljöpartiet,” LO Tidningen, February 13, 2004. 69. “Pengar till Skatteverket kan stoppa övergångsregler,” TT Nyhetsbanken, March 2, 2004. 70. “Mp tanker inte kompromissa om nya regler,” Dagens Nyheter, March 26, 2004.

144

Chapter Five

71. Vänsterpartiet, “Camilla Sköld Jansson (v): Regeringen öppnar för gästarbetarsystem!” March 12, 2004. 72. Miljöpartiet de Gröna, “Maria Wetterstrand och Peter Eriksson om övergångsregler: Ett historiskt svek,” March 12, 2004. 73. Landsorganisationen, “De är inte lösningen på arbetsmarknadens problem,” February 9, 2004. See also the appendix to the press release, “LOs krav för Ordning och reda på arbetsmarknaden,” for a restatement of LO’s desired labor market reforms in conjunction with EU enlargement. 74. “Regeringen vill ha övergångsregler från 1 maj,” TT Nyhetsbanken, March 9, 2004. 75. “S-nederlag en fullträff för LO,” Dagens Nyheter, April 21, 2004. 76. Miljöpartiet de Gröna, Motion till riksdagen av maria Wetterstrand m.fl. (mp) med anledning av skr. 2003/04:119, Särskilda regler under en övergångsperiod för arbetstagare från nya medlemsstater enligt anslutningsfördraget, 4. 77. Miljöpartiet de Gröna, Motion till riksdagen av maria Wetterstrand m.fl, 6–10. 78. Landsorganisationen, “Miljöpartiet vill medverka till att förhindra lönedumpning på svensk arbetsmarknad,” March 26, 2004. Three days later, the Left Party issued a separate parliamentary motion opposing transitional arrangements, which also called for implementation of LO’s desired labor market reform package. See Vänsterpartiet, Motion till riksdagen 2003/04:v014 av Lars Ohly mfl (v) med anledning av skr. 2003/04:119, Särskilda regler under en övergångsperiod för arbetstagare från nya medlemsstater enligt anslutningsfördraget, March 29, 2004. 79. “Kritiska fack kräver nya lagar,” Dagens Nyheter, April 29, 2004. 80. Swedish Construction Workers Union, “Byggnads om beslutet om övergångsregler: Nu måste regeringen agera snabbt!” April 28, 2004. 81. Landsorganisationen, “Ordning och reda på arbetsmarknaden—LO och förbunden ställer krav på förändringar av arbetsmarknadsreglerna,” December 2004. To aid the union in its efforts at ensuring that the labor market regulations were followed, LO also produced a handbook for union activists that focused on access to the Swedish labor market, relevant laws and agreements, the distinction between employees and self-employed independent contractors, staffing firms, and different courses of action allowed to union in labor conflicts. See Landsorganisationen, Handbok för ordning och reda på arbetsmarknaden, November 2004.

Six Labor Migration and the Swedish Model, At Home and Abroad

Six years after the issue of labor migration reform dominated the 2002 parliamentary election campaign, Sweden adopted policies granting third-country nationals very liberal access to its labor market. Such an outcome is noteworthy in and of itself. While other European states, such as Denmark and Norway, have recently modified their labor migration policies to grant specialists and highly skilled workers eased entry, few other countries have proposed putting employers so decisively in the driver’s seat across all sectors of the economy, allowing them to determine whether third-country nationals should be allowed to migrate for purposes of employment. The evolution in Swedish labor migration policy from restrictive to market-oriented undoubtedly represents a fascinating shift. While readers will have different objectives for familiarizing themselves with the particulars of the Swedish case, my aspiration with this book has not simply been, as it were, to tell a good story. Rather, the chief objective of this book has been to highlight how the SAP and LO develop and evaluate proposals for labor migration reform on the basis of their likely impact on the workings of the Swedish model. Actors must be assigned authority over the permit-granting process, criteria need to be developed for the evaluation of applications, rules clarifying how migrants may conduct their job search must be put into place, the scope of migrant labor market access and employment duration must be clearly delineated, questions regarding whether migrants will be able to reside in the host country either temporarily or permanently must be answered, and the pace at which social services are made available to migrants must be considered. By addressing each of these issues, policymakers and reform advocates are able 145

146

Chapter Six

to assemble key components underpinning labor migration policy. Yet, as the preceding chapters have shown, the design of labor migration policy clearly does not take place in either an institutional or political void. Certainly, the broad aim of labor migration policy represents a response to a central coordination problem faced by firms: the challenge of securing an appropriately skilled workforce.1 However, in structuring how employers will be allowed to gain access to a pool of foreign labor, the design of labor migration policy reflects a great deal more than the “amelioration of some problem.”2 Choices regarding policy design are made against the backdrop of expectations, educated guesses, hopes and fears about the likely impact of labor migration on the broader workings of the economy and polity. The possible questions to be considered are many, but some of the key considerations include: To what extent will new rules for labor migration upset the balance of power, if at all, on the labor market? To what extent will labor migration foster economic growth and generate needed tax revenue, and to what extent will it result in a labor surplus and a downward wage spiral? To what extent will labor migration result in a drain on social services? To what extent will labor migration serve to attain or undermine other labor market policy objectives? While both the SAP and LO share the broad assessment among mainstream political parties and interest groups throughout Sweden that an increase in third-country labor migration will be important for continued economic prosperity, chapter 3 documented the criticisms of the two allies toward proposals from employers and bourgeois parties. In repeatedly rejecting these proposals throughout the 2002 election campaign to the Swedish parliament, both LO and the SAP emphasized the fundamental incompatibility of these proposals with full employment aims and the workings of an active labor market policy. LO also voiced substantial concern that the proposals, with an emphasis on temporary work permits during initial residency, would result in a guest worker system, wherein migrants who found themselves unemployed would be forced to scramble for jobs with poor wages and working conditions in order to maintain a legal permit status. In chapter 4, my focus was on the development of alternative reform measures by both the SAP and LO as the bourgeois-Green effort to overhaul labor migration policy moved forward, along with the response of labor to the new bourgeois government’s reform proposals. Differences did exist between the two allies over certain components of labor migration policy, and these are addressed in the following section. Despite these differences, both LO and the SAP announced policy reform measures that were described as being consistent with the social democratic labor market policy goals. Migrant laborers would be carefully granted entry and access to the Swedish labor market on the basis of documented

Labor Migration and the Swedish Model, At Home and Abroad

147

labor shortages, thus ensuring that foreign labor could not constitute a substitute workforce to existing domestic reserves. Lacking the ability to block the plans of the new bourgeois government to implement proposals for liberalization, the SAP and LO could only call attention to the multiple ways in which an employer-centered policy would result in critical steps away from the Swedish model. Finally, chapter 5 explored a separate debate over labor migration reform in Sweden, that of the 2004 European Union enlargement. A clear divergence existed between LO and the SAP in terms of the possible negative effects that eastward expansion of the EU held for the Swedish model. The SAP was chiefly concerned that differences in benefits levels between Sweden and many of the ten new member states could result in migrants establishing minimum or spurious footholds on the Swedish labor market, thus allowing for family members abroad to receive generous benefits. Fears of benefits tourism led to calls for a restrictive entry policy and a lack of free movement on the Swedish labor market during the first year of residency. In contrast, LO assessed transitional arrangements to be of little strategic value, as only certain categories of migrant labor could have their access to the Swedish labor market regulated. Rather than limit entry of workers from the new EU member states, LO sought to build the necessary parliamentary majority to achieve increased regulation and oversight of the Swedish labor market as a whole, thus ensuring that any potentially negative effects of enlargement could be neutralized. In the remainder of this concluding chapter, I have three objectives. First, I revisit the six components of labor migration policy developed in chapter 2, detailing overall stances held by LO and the SAP. Despite differing choices on several policy components, these alternatives both share a key objective of minimizing disruption to the Swedish industrial relations system when considering the opening of borders to third-country nationals. Second, I call attention to the implications of the Swedish case for both the VoC literature and the continued focus within comparative political economy on the status of Swedish corporatism. Finally, I cast a tentative gaze forward, focusing on recent efforts by the European Union to establish a common migration policy. While political parties and interest groups within Sweden have devoted considerable effort to debating and developing proposals for a national migration policy, the relevant future arena is likely to be Brussels for many instances of migration reform. What does this imply for all of the hard work that has been done to reform Swedish labor migration policy? Has this been a case of much ado about nothing, or will decisions taken today at the national level still matter for future policy initiatives as Brussels assumes greater responsibility over the inward flow of third-country nationals?

148

Chapter Six

DEFENDING THE SWEDISH MODEL AT HOME Different Strategies for a Common Aim In analyzing the Swedish case, I have proposed that we can understand the labor migration policy preferences of the SAP and LO by chiefly focusing on the perceived link between six key policy components and the workings of the Swedish model. While policymakers involved in the reform process, as well as those actors seeking to influence outcomes, may not always identify specific policy features in terms of gatekeepers, criteria for entry, location of job search, migrant labor market access and employment duration, permit upgrade potential, and migrant welfare state rights, much of the analysis in the preceding case study chapters shows that these six items emerge repeatedly as being of central concern. Table 6.1 details the preferences held by the SAP and LO for these six components in both instances of labor migration reform examined in this book. Of interest here is not the stance of these two actors on each individual component of labor migration policy, but rather how choices combined to create a coherent response to the need for increased migrant labor force, while also remaining incentive compatible to key elements of the Swedish model. As the logic associated with the divergent stances of the SAP and LO in the case of transitional arrangements has been discussed in chapter 4, the focus here is on third-country national labor migration reform. What should stand out, above all else, are the different regulatory paths chosen by LO and the SAP. Both actors have expressed a clear preference that the designation of gatekeepers should remain essentially unchanged and support a system in which AMS, unions, and employers’ associations all have different degrees of influence in the granting of work permits. Both AMS and trade unions would serve as the more influential gatekeepers, as their assessment of whether or not a labor shortage exists is thought to be decisive for the prospects of a permit being granted. Employers are cast in a supporting role, as their influence is limited to starting the process by making initial offers of employment. While both the SAP and LO agree on the need for the involvement of the state and social partners in conjunction with work permit applications, the two allies currently part company when it comes to four of the five remaining components associated with third-country national labor migration policy. In general, LO’s stance combines an approach to entry that is sharply restrictive with measures granting substantial rights and freedom on the Swedish labor market to those migrants who are admitted. At the “front end” of the migration process, the union’s insistence that third-country nationals conduct their job search from abroad, coupled with a requirement that a genuine labor shortage must be docu-

SAP and LO: Social Partners and Labor Market Board

SAP: Sectoral shortage, supply/demand test, no open-ended contract required LO: Supply/demand test, open-ended job contract

SAP: Searches abroad to be “general practice” plus introduction of three-month job-search visa LO: Job search must be conducted from outside Sweden

SAP: Tied to employer/sector in first 24 months LO: Full labor market access

SAP: Clear path to permanent residency LO: Immediate permanent residency

SAP and LO: Rights identical to existing Swedish residents

Gatekeepers

Criteria for Entry and Duration of Employment

Location of Job Search

Migrant Labor Market Access

Permit Upgrade Potential

Migrant Welfare State Rights

SAP: Called for investigation into some limits LO: None

SAP: Five-year EU permit after first year LO: None

SAP: Tied to employer/sector first year LO: None

SAP: Job search must be conducted from outside Sweden LO: None

LO: None

SAP: Full-time employment offer

SAP: Swedish Migration Board LO: None

EU Enlargement, 2004

For the SAP, information regarding preferences comes chiefly from the 2006 KAKI report. LO information regarding preferences comes from both official reports and comments made by senior LO figures in the Swedish media.

1

Third-Country National Reforms1

The Six Components of Labor Migration Policy: SAP and LO Preferences

Component

Table 6.1.

150

Chapter Six

mented, renders it effectively impossible for a significant number of migrants (or any) to search for work in Sweden independently. The access of third-country nationals to the Swedish labor market would be limited to those instances where employers could make contact with migrants outside of Sweden, where labor market board and union officials were in agreement as to the existence of labor shortages, and where legally binding open-ended employment contracts were present. Yet, for those who managed to make it through these formidable hoops, LO proposed generous conditions on the “back end” of the migration process: work permits either of a long duration or immediately permanent, and with no restrictions on labor market access, plus welfare state rights identical to existing Swedish residents. On the other hand, the SAP has proposed an approach to “front end” features of labor migration policy that are less restrictive, advocating the use of occupational shortage lists, and three-month on-site job search visas. However, the relatively more liberal access that would be granted to labor migrants is coupled with “back end” measures that only gradually confer freedom of movement throughout the labor market to the migrant: sector-wide after two years, and then labor market–wide after an additional two years, at which point one would be eligible for permanent residency. No restrictions in welfare state rights are proposed. Despite differences in their configuration of policy components, it appears that both alternatives represent plausible attempts to negotiate successfully the troubling balancing act of ensuring that a properly sized and skilled labor force can be had by Swedish employers, yet doing so in a way that is compatible with full employment goals and active labor market policy instruments central to the social democratic model.3 In different ways, both sets of preferences chiefly cast foreign labor as a complement to the domestic work force, assigning it a supporting role to be activated only when the domestic supply is shown to be insufficient. For the SAP, the use of occupational shortlists and a slowly expanding freedom of movement throughout the labor market allows for authorities to exercise a careful control over the flow and effects of migrant labor, both in terms of how many third-country nationals are granted access, but also in terms of how many are allowed to establish a permanent foothold on the Swedish labor market. Initial entry constitutes no guarantee for an individual labor migrant that she or he would be allowed to settle in Sweden. Rather, such an outcome would be dependent on either continued employment with the same firm upon expiration of the first twenty-fourmonth permit, or the ability to locate work in another shortlisted sector shortly thereafter. The effect of these policy components would likely be to minimize both any prospect that first-time arrivals could compete for jobs in sectors with deep labor reserves, and to reduce prospects that un-

Labor Migration and the Swedish Model, At Home and Abroad

151

employed migrant labor present in Sweden on temporary permits would be able to remain and swell the ranks of the domestic reserves. For LO, the multiple barriers erected in conjunction with entry serve a similar function. First, as migrants would lack the ability to conduct their job search on-site, a situation would not emerge wherein migrants would be tempted to accept wages and working conditions below industry standards if their job-search visas neared expiration and no employment offers had been received. Second, preventing the entry of migrants until an employment contract is received and a permit is granted satisfies a second concern that LO has: that third-country national labor migrants with no employment contract in hand would overstay their job-search visa and join the underground economy rather than leave Sweden. Indeed, a central feature of LO’s criticism against the relatively unregulated tourist migration of the 1960s, in which foreign workers arrived in Sweden on tourist visas to conduct their job search, is that it generated a poor matching of labor supply and demand, resulting in significant numbers of unemployed, homeless migrants living in camp-like conditions. LO understood then that the solution was to advocate “a more regulated migration” when confronted with the negative effects of tourist migration, and the union is convinced that a comparable system of labor migration would introduce a disruptive force onto the Swedish labor market again.4 Third, requiring that third-country nationals be supplied with openended employment contracts immediately increases job security and imposes higher costs on employers seeking to dismiss foreign workers than in situations where temporary contracts are used. Finally, maintaining the privileged position of unions in the gatekeeping process serves as a near iron-clad guarantee that no admission of foreign workers will take place counter to the desires of LO. Undoubtedly, there is less of a risk involved in granting labor migrants permanent residency and full labor market access when measures have been put into place at every step of the front end of the migration process to ensure that migrants are unlikely to have a negative impact on existing domestic labor reserves. Robert Goodin has observed that coordinated market economies are “hard to build but easy to demolish.”5 When considering the case of labor migration reform and the continued viability of the Swedish model, the analysis presented in this book points to a need for distinguishing between scholarly assessments of the continued health or existence of the Swedish model, on the one hand, and the degree to which its defense is invoked by actors engaged in the policy reform process. Undoubtedly, a vast amount of political economy scholarship focusing on Sweden over the past two decades has grappled with the question, “Whither go the Swedish model?” In doing so, an equally broad number of assessments have been offered, some of which steadfastly declare its death, others its

152

Chapter Six

resurrection, and those with a more ambivalent perspective.6 It remains to be seen whether the liberal shift in Swedish labor migration policy will result in a further weakening of the model. Yet, the detailed case study offered in this book suggests that the image of the Swedish model remains a potent force shaping the economic reform strategies of the social democratic labor movement as it confronts the challenges of a declining workforce. The SAP and LO do not prize an incentive compatible labor migration policy for functionalist reasons, but rather because it is best thought to preserve those policies that have guaranteed working-class strength within a capitalist economy. In that sense, the battle over Swedish labor migration reform has very much been a political battle highlighting the defense of interests. The Significance of Employer Defection from an Incentive-Compatible Labor Migration Policy The central aim of this book has been to offer a plausible motive for the labor migration policy preferences of both the SAP and LO. However, brief comments are in order regarding the implications of employer preferences for both the VoC literature, as well as for the continued debate over the future of corporatism. As noted in chapter 1, a common criticism of the varieties of capitalism approach is that it primarily offers a functionalist account, both in terms of the relationship between policy reforms and the broader political economy, as well as for the underlying preferences held by key actors in the polity. In terms of the latter, the prevailing model of capitalism is thought to exert a strong conditioning effect on the preferences of employers, wherein market-conforming reform measures are assumed to reflect and further employer interests. As one example, Hall and Soskice note that in CMEs, employers within the coordinated model are less likely to support calls for deregulation, “because many firms draw competitive advantages from systems of relational contracting that depend on the presence of supportive regulatory regimes.”7 The claim that CME-based employers will not consider deregulation of the economy as a tool for furthering their interests is also pursued by other authors contributing to the VoC volume. In her chapter, Kathleen Thelen addresses the defection of Swedish employers in metalworking from peak-level bargaining in the 1980s. While this could be seen as empirical evidence that employers do not necessarily find the coordinated design of the industrial relations sphere to be compatible with their interests, Thelen notes that by the mid-1990s, both employers and unions reached agreement on new means of coordination in the wage formation process. As such, she concludes that, “Swedish employers do not think they can get what they want through deregulation.”8

Labor Migration and the Swedish Model, At Home and Abroad

153

However, the evidence presented in the preceding chapters clearly suggests that Thelen’s depiction of Swedish employers as actors who fail to see deregulation as serving their interests is overstated. Indeed, the clear stance taken by Swedish employers toward labor migration reform has been a radical rejection of the prevailing policy. Restrictive and coordinated policies making access to foreign labor conditional on documentation of labor shortages and union approval are seen by Swedish employers as constraining the ability of firms to maintain growth and competitiveness in a global market. More broadly, the preference of Swedish employers for a deregulation of the country’s labor migration policies implies that general claims of employer support for marketconforming policies and practices need to be tempered until further evidence is assembled from additional critical cases of economic reform in both coordinated and liberal market economies. The concerted effort by Swedish employers to break with an incentivecompatible labor migration policy and to replace it with a sharply deregulated variant may seem counterintuitive to those familiar with a set of scholarship cognate to the VoC approach, one which addresses the role of employers in constructing the institutions and policies of the welfare state. Peter Swenson’s focus on the eagerness of Swedish employers to support the development of active labor market policies in the first decades of the postwar era stands out in this regard. He argues that not only did Swedish employers play an enthusiastic part in the construction of institutions central to the workings of the Swedish model, but that they opposed efforts by political allies to dismantle them. As Swenson notes, SAF (the organizational precursor to SN) rejected bourgeois party efforts to derail active labor market policy, as it would “militate totally against” employer interests.9 Two plausible explanations exist for the differences that exist between Swenson’s portrayal of employer preferences with those documented in this book. First, it is possible that one cannot equate the interests of SAF, who merged with Sveriges Industriförbund in 2001, with that of the resulting new employers’ association, SN. In fact, there is some evidence to support this claim. During the 2002 parliamentary election campaign, a surprising addition to the chorus of criticism against employer and bourgeois proposals for a deregulated labor migration policy came from Hans-Göran Myrdal, the former chair of SAF. Adopting rhetoric that was nearly identical to that of LO, Myrdal wondered what would happen when immigrants found themselves out of work after a year in Sweden “and are not attractive to other employers?” To Myrdal, the likely costs would accrue to the state, as he expected that AMS and Swedish social services would “be compelled” to take over. Myrdal’s critique of the proposals for a deregulated labor migration policy painted a grim scenario, suggesting that the end result of open borders would be an

154

Chapter Six

increasing number of unemployed foreign citizens who refused to leave: “And what will happen if a lot of people come here on their own initiative and after three months fail to find work but don’t go home and instead get in line for asylum or join the ranks of the illegal immigrants?”10 Indeed, a central message in Myrdal’s column was to emphasize that SAF, under his leadership, had been opposed to a labor migration policy with few restrictions on entry and labor market access. A second strategy for making sense of the differences between the stances of employers in the golden years of the Swedish model and their contemporary policy preferences is to place the case of labor migration reform alongside recent scholarship addressing the status of corporatism. While corporatism has not always figured into definitions of the Swedish model emphasizing the aims of full employment and welfare state policies, others have viewed the participation of social partners in the “formulation and implementation of policies that go beyond their specific sectoral interests”11 as a central element in the model.12 Perhaps more important than whether corporatism is a defining feature of the Swedish model is the degree to which it has benefited the efforts of the Swedish social democratic labor movement to further its interests. Rothstein stresses its importance for the historical development of the balance of power on the Swedish labor market, noting that while it may be excessive to maintain that corporatism can account for “the entire social democratic dominance and the union movement’s unusual strength in Swedish politics, we still wish to maintain that it has contributed powerfully to increase and reproduce their strength.”13 In the face of recent conflicts between labor market partners over wagebargaining institutions and administrative corporatism, it is perhaps unsurprising that a substantial degree of literature has been produced addressing the extent to which it is still accurate to describe the Swedish polity as being characterized by corporatist relations. Much of this research concludes that, for varying reasons, employers no longer identify their interests as being best served by corporatist institutions and have opted to defect. Bergström and Rothstein detail how SAF withdrew its representatives from over 10,000 seats on the boards of Swedish public agencies in the early 1990s, not for ideological reasons, but owing to a lack of influence.14 Lindvall and Sebring argue that the Swedish Confederation of Employers has effectively “left corporatism behind” with little common ground remaining between employers, the state, and unions on the perceived value of active labor market policy.15 Jessica Lindvert’s recent account of Swedish labor market policy reform argues that the opposition of SN to corporatism results from both pragmatic and ideological reasons.16 Whether the combined findings of these scholars add up to suggest that the overall era of Swedish corporatism is now consigned to

Labor Migration and the Swedish Model, At Home and Abroad

155

the history books is well beyond the scope of this book. Yet, one conclusion seems inescapable when it comes to labor migration policy: whereas defense of the broad Swedish model has been central to the rhetoric of the SAP and LO, a similar claim cannot be made regarding employer support for administrative corporatism. The employer campaign to strip unions and labor market boards of their influence in the gatekeeping process, as well as the decision by the bourgeois government to assign employers a decisive role over the entry of foreign workers, means that an important shift has occurred in this critical area of policymaking. Within Swedish labor migration policy, corporatism is on the verge of dying and employers have enthusiastically sought its demise. Corporatism, Concentrated Costs, and the Study of Migration Policy Reform While this study has relevance for our ongoing assessment of the degree to which corporatism is still a useful term for describing the interaction between social partners and the state in Sweden, it also has clear relevance for the more general study of migration policy reform. Indeed, an initial objection to this study could be formulated by asking why one would even expect trade unions and their social democratic political allies to engage in such a sustained campaign against calls to deregulate labor migration policy. Such a question might seem, at first glance, quite odd. Yet, it is important to recall that in Gary P. Freeman’s classic modes of immigration politics, mobilization is chiefly thought to occur on the part of employers, who favor policies providing them with greater access to a foreign workforce. Freeman’s argument is based on James Q. Wilson’s typology of politics, in which the costs and benefits of policies, in general, can be characterized as either concentrated or diffuse. Concentrated costs associated with policies are borne by specific groups or narrow segments of society, while diffuse costs are shouldered more broadly and spread throughout the polity. Similarly, concentrated benefits are thought to result when a policy only results in improvements for specific groups, while diffuse benefits are more generally enjoyed. Freeman asserted that “the typical mode of immigration politics in the liberal democracies is client politics in which policymakers interact intensively and typically out of public view with groups having direct interests in immigration.”17 Of central importance is Freeman’s initial assertion that the benefits of migration were concentrated, while the costs diffuse, thus giving “those who expect to gain from migration stronger incentives to organize than those who anticipate bearing its costs.”18 Freeman has since acknowledged that there is substantial empirical evidence that could be used to mount a challenge to this claim, most notably, Europe’s experience with

156

Chapter Six

far-right populist parties over the past two decades. Yet, as this book has shown, it is not only parties and actors on the far right who have engaged in substantial mobilization efforts to prevent the adoption of liberal labor migration policies. Indeed, the case study chapters have documented the intense efforts by both LO and the SAP to ensure that a reformed labor migration policy remains consistent with the workings of the Swedish CME. How can we understand this? One way, of course, is to revisit the central argument of this book; namely, that both LO and the SAP opt for labor migration policy reforms that are perceived to be most consistent with the overall design of the Swedish model, and actively oppose any reform alternatives that are considered a threat to central features of the model. Still, one might pose the question differently and ask what the implications of this book are for Freeman’s claims regarding group mobilization in the face of migration policy reform. On the one hand, one can differ with Freeman when it comes to the question of whether or not the benefits of migration are strictly concentrated. Certainly, it is the case that employers benefit immediately from a relaxation in strict labor migration policies, as they instantly enjoy a less hindered access to a pool of labor that has otherwise been off-limits to them. By the same token, both the general international discourse on the coming retirement wave, as well as the more narrow Swedish discussion on the implications of a shrinking workforce for the continued provision of welfare state services, point strongly to the fact that labor migration has distinct benefits that diffuse broadly throughout society, both in the form of tax revenue and service provision. Perhaps more important is the question of costs, which Freeman assumes to be spread diffusely throughout the receiving country. Indeed, the concerns over the potential abuse of Sweden’s generous universal welfare state fall under this heading, as the costs for hypothetical migrant exploitation of these services would be shouldered by the Swedish population as a whole. Yet, as Karen M. Anderson’s work on Swedish pension reform has shown, the logic of diffuse costs might be more appropriate to national settings where pluralism is the prevailing mode of interest group representation than to societies where corporatism is the norm for state-interest group relations.19 Specifically, she shows that when faced with the reform of unemployment insurance, unions were willing to accept some features of retrenchment (a reduction in the reserve wage), but actively opposed challenges to one of its top priorities: the continued administrative role for organized labor over unemployment insurance schemes.20 The potential loss of this administrative role constituted a specific concentrated cost to organized labor, a potential threat that struck at the very heart of trade union power. Such reasoning is easily extended to the debate over labor migration reform, as a central

Labor Migration and the Swedish Model, At Home and Abroad

157

component in the labor migration policy preferences of unions was to ensure a continued gatekeeping role in the work permit approval process. Defense of this administrative role does not represent a desire to maintain power for its own sake. Rather, as has been argued throughout this book, decisive union influence over the work permit approval process provides organized labor with the assurance that the tap of foreign labor can be controlled, and not result in a threat to labor’s core interests. As such, the Swedish case appears to provide us with a very clear instance in which mobilization occurs at least partially on the basis of concentrated costs, and where labor campaigns actively to prevent the implementation of policies deemed harmful to its interests.

DEFENDING THE SWEDISH MODEL ABROAD The preceding analysis has presented one case of Swedish labor migration reform that has been shaped to a great extent by international factors and one instance of reform that has chiefly reflected domestic political considerations. In terms of the former, it would be difficult to understand the 2004 debate over the implementation of transitional arrangements without making significant reference to the international dimension. For the then-ruling SAP, the decision to opt for work permits reflected concerns that different benefits levels between old and new member states would pave the way for possible exploitation, and the preponderance of existing member states that adopted transitional arrangements generated fears that an increasing number of workers from the new EU member states would target Sweden as their destination. For LO, the decision to reject transitional arrangements stemmed from an awareness that the Accession Treaty placed constraints on which categories of EU citizens could be subject to restricted entry. The case of third-country national labor migration reform presents a clear contrast. Here, the need for a policy overhaul stemmed from forecasted shortages in the domestic workforce. Political parties and interest groups have each advanced proposals for how domestic institutions and policies can best be reconfigured to ensure that an optimal labor supply can be had, and the debate took place against the backdrop of the future of the Swedish model. Indeed, no actors seemed to question seriously whether the state had the capacity to control the access of foreign nationals to the Swedish labor market. While links between Swedish labor migration reform and the international community did emerge from time to time, they often appeared drowned out in a debate that repeatedly centered on the motives of various domestic actors, as well as whether liberal reform would undermine distinguishing features of the Swedish

158

Chapter Six

political economy. When international issues associated with thirdcountry national labor migration briefly took center stage, they often involved the extent to which brain-drain would result in the developing world if Sweden opted for a more generous entry policy, and whether bilateral agreements between sending and receiving states constituted a viable model for labor migration reform. Yet, while the current debate over labor migration has largely drawn to a close in Sweden now that the new reform has been implemented, other debates over how best to regulate the access of foreign labor continue. This time, however, the focus is not national policy, as determined in Stockholm, but rather European Union plans for the establishment of a common policy for both economic migrants and asylum-seekers. While the venue may shift from the national to the supranational arena, the preliminary evidence suggests that the debate will bear a strong resemblance to recent Swedish experience, with concerns over gatekeepers, conditions of entry, initial/subsequent labor market access, permit upgrades, and welfare state rights receiving substantial attention. EU Plans for a Common Migration and Asylum Policy The first steps toward a common policy were taken at a meeting of the European Council in Tampere, Finland in October 1999, wherein EU leaders called for the establishment of a “comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit,” that would emphasize “more efficient management of migration flows at all their stages” and “information campaigns on the actual possibilities for legal immigration.”21 In July 2001, the European Commission put forward a proposal that would harmonize the entry policies of member states toward third-country migrant labor. Several central features of this early attempt at creating a common policy stood out in terms of replicating the issues that were core to the Swedish debate. Perhaps chief among these was the desire to construct a policy based on “respect for the domestic labour market situation,” in which employers would be required to have all job openings posted on the European Employment Services Network (EURES) prior to being able to offer the position to a third-country national. As part of this economic means test, EU citizens and other categories of resident third-country nationals would have priority over those whose residence was outside the Union. Exceptions to this test would be possible in situations wherein wages exceeded a certain threshold and where employers were willing to pay a certain fee to the “competent authorities” to be used for either integration measures or vocational training. According to the logic of the commission, the willingness of employers to pay a charge could be con-

Labor Migration and the Swedish Model, At Home and Abroad

159

strued as evidence that a labor shortage existed and that employers were in genuine need of foreign labor. Moreover, the Commission stressed that tests to determine labor shortages would be undermined if third-country nationals who were granted access to EU labor markets then opted to pursue employment opportunities in other professions during their initial period of residency. As such, the proposal called for limiting labor market access to the admitted sector for a three-year period, after which, unrestricted labor market access would be granted. However, this first effort at developing the outlines of a common policy may have gone too far, too fast, and did not survive past a first reading of the text in the Council. When the Commission raised the issue four years later, it opted not to do so as a formal proposal, but under the guise of a green paper, the aim of which was to “launch a process of in-depth discussion, involving the EU institutions, Member States and the civil society, on the most appropriate form of Community rules for admitting economic migrants and on the added value of adopting such a common framework.”22 As such, the chief emphasis of the green paper was largely to pose a broad set of questions addressing the complexities of developing a policy governing the admission of economic migrants to the EU. Issues raised included initial and subsequent labor market access, the nature of tests for determining labor shortages, options for admissions with self-employed status, applications procedures, and rights to be enjoyed during the period of residency. Yet, while both the Commission’s first proposal and the subsequent (and more tentative) green paper honed in on many of the components of labor migration reform that have been contested in Sweden, one notable omission existed in that gatekeeping responsibility was not addressed. Indeed, in the response from the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) to the green paper, criticism was expressed on this precise point: There is no reference to the important role that Social Partners and social dialogue can play at all relevant levels in assessing labour market needs, promoting sustainable policies for economic migration, addressing and preventing exploitative working conditions of migrant workers, and promoting their integration and non-discrimination in the labour market and the workplace.23

By 2005, a shift had occurred, with new emphasis being placed on policies targeting specific categories of migrants: highly skilled workers, seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees, and remunerated trainees.24 Moreover, member states are guaranteed ultimate control over the flow of third-country nationals who initially arrive within their borders, as the “decisions on admissions numbers for economic migrants entering the EU in order to seek work are the responsibility of the Member States.”25

160

Chapter Six

Such an emphasis makes it clear that attempts to construct an EU-wide labor market will run up against the hard boundaries of member states and their desire to protect the domestic work force. As the commission noted, while ambitious proposals exist, such measures would take a backseat to provisions guaranteeing that the workings of “national labour markets are fully respected.”26 One example of these ambitious efforts is the EU Blue Card, a program intended to “provide Member States and EU companies with additional ‘tools’ to recruit, retain and better allocate (and reallocate) the workers they need.”27 Exclusively targeted at highly skilled workers, the Blue Card program will create a single application procedure allowing for thirdcountry nationals who possess both a recognized diploma and a minimum of five years professional experience in the relevant sector to apply for work in the EU. An employment contract guaranteeing an annual income at least 1.7 times that of the average gross salary in the host country, and wages not lower than that of comparable workers in the host country, will also be required. Permits will initially be valid only in the host country for a period of three years. If the migrant is still employed following that period, a renewal permit that carries with it EU-wide labor market rights would then be issued for an additional two years.28 The EU Blue Card program rests firmly on the principle of community preference; that is, member states will have final say over the number of migrants to be admitted each year.29 While the European Parliament approved the proposal in late November 2008, formal adoption is not expected until 2009. However, what role does Sweden play in the European Union efforts to achieve increased coordination over migration policy? One can argue that the debate over the future of an EU common migration policy is likely to feature many of the leading players from the Swedish debate as it continues. As one example, LO chair Wanja Lundby-Wedin was named president of the ETUC in 2007, heading its governing bodies. While Lundby-Wedin has yet to comment publicly on the proposed features of a common migration policy, she has addressed an intimately related component: the question of how best to deal with the large number of illegal migrants working within Europe’s borders. Here, there has been an interesting partial shift away from LO’s call in 2005 for illegal migrants to turn themselves in and receive financial damages prior to facing deportation. According to Lundby-Wedin, the ETUC will not be pushing for closed borders, but rather will be considering how to “support these people and possibly organize them.”30 Indeed, in September 2008, LO entered into a joint initiative with several other unions, establishing an office in Stockholm to provide undocumented workers with information about their labor market rights.31 As a second example, in July 2009, Sweden will be assuming the EU presidency once again, albeit this time

Labor Migration and the Swedish Model, At Home and Abroad

161

under the leadership of a bourgeois government. Minister of Migration Tobias Billström has already indicated that the issue of migration will be a priority for Sweden during its turn at the helm of the EU. In addition to continued work on the development of common asylum and visa policies, the Swedish government appears likely to highlight its 2008 overhaul of labor migration policy, noting in a recent document that “Sweden works for a general and flexible system (of labor migration) based on the needs of the labor market. The positive aspects of migration will be emphasized (during the EU Presidency), for receiving as well as the host countries.”32 To further promote the potential of labor migration, the bourgeois government has planned a conference on labor migration to be held in Malmö in the autumn of 2009. Thus, while the outcome of precise policies may not yet be fully known, it is clear that key Swedish elites will attempt to play a central role in shaping the overall common EU migration policy. Sheri Berman has argued that the study of specific policy positions has “little relevance for larger and more substantial inquiries.”33 However, the case of Swedish labor migration policy suggests that such claims might need to be tempered. As Hall and Gingerich observe, reform proposals in one economic sphere can have substantial side effects under conditions where institutional complementarities are pervasive.34 On the face of it, the question of whether or not to reform Swedish labor migration policy is about who gets in, what skills or traits will secure one the best chance of admission, and what increased bundle of rights may be granted over time. Considered in that fashion, many of the finer points of this policy debate might appear to be of interest only to a narrow sub-group of scholars. Yet, as this book has demonstrated, labor migration policy is distinctly embedded in a broader set of economic policies and institutional arrangements. Reformed slightly one way or the other, the implications of a new labor migration policy can alter the workings of labor markets, the long-term balance of power between social partners, and the composition of the national political community. For those reasons, it is hard to imagine a more substantial inquiry. NOTES 1. Hall and Soskice, op. cit., 7. 2. John S. Dryzek, “Don’t Toss Coins in Garbage Cans: A Prologue to Policy Design,” Journal of Public Policy 3, no. 4 (1983): 346. 3. Torbjörn Lundqvist suggests that LO faces a particular balancing act when confronting the prospect of labor migration. In addition to having the potential positive effects of benefiting the national economy, labor migration can also boost union density rates. This must be balanced against fears that migration will increase risks of member unemployment in periods of economic downturns, the

162

Chapter Six

possibility that workers from a different political culture would not feel the natural affinity to join a trade union. See Torbjörn Lundqvist, “Arbetskraftsinvandringen och facket: Debatt och historia i framtidsperspektiv,” in Bo Malmberg and Lena Sommestad (eds.), Befolkning och välfärd: Perspektiv på framtidens välfärdspolitik (Stockholm, Sweden: LO & Institutet för framtidsstudier, 2002), 120. 4. Andersson and Pettersson, Flytt, pendling, arbetskraftsinvandring, 32. 5. Robert Goodin, “Choose Your Capitalism?” Comparative European Politics 1, no. 2 (2003): 207. 6. For examples of literature addressing the demise of the Swedish model, see Jonas Pontusson, “Between Neo-Liberalism and The German Model: Swedish Capitalism in Transition,” in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), The Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997); Victor Pestoff, “The Disappearance of Social Partnership in Sweden During the 1990s and Its Sudden Reappearance in Late 1998,” paper presented at the 1999 ECPR Joint Sessions in Mannheim, Germany, March 29–31, 1999; and Jonas Pontusson and Peter Swenson, “Labor Markets, Production Strategies, and Wage Bargaining Institutions: The Swedish Employer Offensive in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 2 (1996): 223–250. 7. Hall and Soskice (eds). Varieties of Capitalism, 58. 8. Kathleen Thelen, “Varieties of Labor Politics in the Developed Democracies,” in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001), 88. 9. See Peter A. Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 281. For additional examples of this literature see Duane Swank and Cathie Jo Martin, “Employers and the Welfare State: The Political Economic Organization of Firms and Social Policy in Contemporary Capitalist Democracies,” Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 8 (October 2001): 889–923. 10. Hans-Göran Myrdal, “Europas fattiga kommer,” Svenska Dagbladet, August 17, 2002. 11. Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), 92. 12. As examples, see Olof Petersson, “Democracy and Power In Sweden,” Scandinavian Political Studies 14 (1991): 173–191 and Lars Magnusson, Håller den svenska modellen? Arbete och välfärd i en global värld (Stockholm, Sweden: Norstedts akademiska förlag, 2006). 13. Bo Rothstein, Den korporativa staten: Intresseorganisationer och statsförvaltning i svensk politik (Stockholm, Sweden: Norstedts Juridik, 1992): 328. 14. Bo Rothstein and Jonas Bergström, Korporatismens fall och den svenska modellens kris (Stockholm, Sweden: SNS Förlag, 1999). 15. Johannes Lindvall and Joakim Sebring, “Policy Reform and the Decline of Corporatism in Sweden,” West European Politics 28, no. 5 (November 2005): 1060–1064. 16. Jessica Lindvert, Ihålig arbetsmarknadspolitik: organisering och legitimitet igår och idag (Umeå: Boréa, 2006). 17. Gary P. Freeman, “Political Science and Comparative Immigration Politics,” unpublished manuscript, 3.

Labor Migration and the Swedish Model, At Home and Abroad

163

18. Freeman, “Political Science and Comparative Immigration Politics,” 3–4. 19. Karen M. Anderson, “The Politics of Retrenchment in a Social Democratic Welfare State: Reform of Swedish Pensions and Unemployment Insurance,” Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 9 (2001): 1070. 20. Anderson, “The Politics of Retrenchment,” 1075. 21. European Parliament, Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, October 15 and 16, 1999. 22. European Commission, COM (2004) 811 final, 3. 23. European Trade Union Confederation, Towards a Pro-active EU Policy on Migration and Integration: ETUC Response to the Commission’s Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration, Resolution adopted by the ETUC Executive Committee in their meeting held in Brussels on March 15–16, 2005. 24. European Commission, Communication from the Commission: Policy Plan on Legal Migration SEC(2005)1680. 25. European Commission, SEC(2005)1680, 4. 26. European Commission, SEC(2005)1680, 7. 27. European Commission, “Attractive Conditions for the Admission and Residence of Highly Qualified Immigrants,” European Commission Memo/07/423, October 23, 2007. 28. The United Kingdom and Ireland have chosen not to opt in to the Blue Card program. 29. European Parliament Press Release, “A European “Blue Card” for Highly Skilled Immigrants,” November 05, 2008. 30. “I täten för 60 miljoner européer,” Göteborgs-Posten, May 21, 2007. 31. Landsorganisationen, “Fackligt center för papperslösa öppnat,” September 03, 2008. 32. Swedish Ministry of Justice, Ett tryggare och öppnare Europa—Justiedepartementets prioriterade frågor under ordförandeskapet, April 14, 2009. 33. Sheri Berman, The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 21. 34. Peter A. Hall and Daniel W. Gingerich, “Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Macroeconomy: An Empirical Analysis,” paper prepared for presentation to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, August 30, 2001, 32.

Bibliography

Ahlberg, Gösta, and Ingvar Svennilson. Sveriges arbetskraft och den industriella utvecklingen. Stockholm, Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1946. “Akut brist på IT-personal.” FinansTidningen, October 11, 2000. “Ams varnar för ekonomisk kris.” Dagens Nyheter, July 11, 2002. Anderson, Karen M. “The Politics of Retrenchment in a Social Democratic Welfare State: Reform of Swedish Pensions and Unemployment Insurance.” Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 9 (2001): 1063–1091. Andersson, Dan, and Kristina Mårtensson. “LO varnar för arbetskraftsinvandring.” Dagens Nyheter, January 13, 2004. Andersson, Dan, and Thord Pettersson. “Flytt, pendling arbetskraftsinvandring och europeisk integration.” Stockholm, Sweden: Landsorganisationen, 2003. Annan, Kofi. “Why Europe Needs an Immigration Strategy.” January 29, 2004. www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/sg-29jan2004.htm. “Apropå: Arbetsmarknad—Arbetskraftsinvandring—frågan som försvann.” Svenska Dagbladet, January 2, 2003. “Arbetsintyg fp-krav för alla inom EU.” Svenska Dagbladet, March 17, 2004. “Arbetskraftsinvandring; Nej tack.” Computer Sweden, December 11, 2000. Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen. “Arbetskraftsinvandring och åtgärder för att möta framtida arbetskraftsbehov.” April 27, 2001. Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen. Arbetsmarknadspolitiska programmen, årsrapport, 2002. Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen. “Arbetsmarknaden för utomnordiska medborgare,” Ura 2000:5. Banting, Keith. “Looking in Three Directions: Migration and the European Welfare State in Comparative Perspective.” In Immigration and Welfare: Challenging the Borders of the Welfare State, edited by Michael Bommes and Andrew Geddes. London: Routledge, 2000. Bartram, David. International Labor Migration: Foreign Workers and Public Policy. New York: Palgrave, 2005. 165

166

Bibliography

“Behöver vi importera arbetskraft?” Alla, March 31, 2003. Berman, Sheri. The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 199. Blyth, Mark. Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2002. ———. “Same As It Never Was: Temporality and Typology in the Varieties of Capitalism.” Comparative European Politics 1, no. 2 (2003), 215–225. “Borgerlig front mot övergångsregler.” Dagens Nyheter, February 24, 2004. Boswell, Christina. European Migration Policies in Flux: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion. Oxford, England: Blackwell, 2003. Brochman, Grete. “The Mechanisms of Control.” In Mechanisms of Immigration Control: A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies, edited by Grete Brochman and Tomas Hammar. Oxford, England: Berg Publishers, 1999, 1–27. Bucken-Knapp, Gregg, and Johan Karlsson. “Amerikansk solidaritet starkare än LO:s.” Expressen, April 12, 2005. Carens, Joseph. “Membership and Morality: Admission to Citizenship in Liberal Democratic States.” In Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America, edited by Rogers Brubaker. Lanham, Md.: The German Marshall Fund of the United States and University Press of America, 1989, 31–49. Castles, Stephen, and Godula Kosack. Immigrant Workers and Class Structures in Western Europe. London: Oxford University Press, 1973. Cichon, Michael, Florian Léger, and Rüdiger Knopp. White or Prosperous: How Much Migration Does the Ageing European Union Need to Maintain Its Standard of Living in Its Twenty-first Century? Geneva: ILO, The International Financial and Actuarial Service, March 2003. Unpublished report. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, www.cic.gc.c/english/immigrate/skilled/ index.asp. Commission of the European Communities. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2006). Commission of the European Communities. Enlargement: Commission Proposes Flexible Transitional Arrangements for the Free Movement of Workers, IP/01/561, April 11, 2001. Crouch, Colin. “Models of Capitalism.” New Political Economy 10, no. 4 (2005): 439–456. Culpepper, Pepper D. Creating Cooperation: How States Develop Human Capital in Europe. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002. “Det handlar ju bara om en övergångstid.” Göteborgs-Posten, February 6, 2004. Dettke, Dieter. Germany’s New Immigration Policy. Testimony prepared for the Hearing on Germany of the U.S. Congressional Human Right Caucus, October 11, 2001. Dryzek, John S. “Don’t Toss Coins in Garbage Cans: A Prologue to Policy Design.” Journal of Public Policy 3, no. 4 (1983): 345–368. Ekenger, Karin, and Fabian Wallen. Invandring för tillväxt och nya job. Svenskt Näringsliv, July 2002. “En majoritet svenskar vill ha övergångsreglar.” Svenska Dagbladet, April 10, 2004.

Bibliography

167

“Erik Åsbrink: Dags att tillåta arbetskraftsinvandring.” TT Nyhetsbanken, November 10, 1999. Estevez-Abe, Margarita, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. “Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State.” In Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, edited by Peter Hall and David Soskice. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001, 145–184. European Commission. “Attractive Conditions for the Admission and Residence of Highly Qualified Immigrants.” European Commission Memo/07/423, 23 October 2007. ———. Communication from the Commission: Policy Plan on Legal Migration. SEC (2005): 1680. ———. Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Immigration, Integration and Employment. COM (2003) 36 Final. ———. Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration. COM (2004) 811 Final. European Parliament. Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council April 29, 2004, Official Journal of the European Union, L 158/112. ———. “A European “Blue Card” for Highly Skilled Immigrants,” November 05, 2008. ———. Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, October 15 and 16, 1999. European Trade Union Confederation. Towards a Pro-active EU Policy on Migration and Integration: ETUC Response to the Commission’s Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration. Resolution adopted by the ETUC Executive Committee in their meeting held in Brussels on March 15–16, 2005. “Europe’s Population Implosion.” The Economist, July 17, 2003. EU:s utvidgning och arbetskraftens rörlighet. SOU:2002:116. “Facken skeptiska till Perssons utspel.” TT Nyhetsbanken, November 22, 2003. Fahimi, Bijan. Öppna den svenska arbetsmarknaden. Stockholm, Sweden: Svenskt Näringsliv, 2001. Folkpartiet. En ny integrationspolitik, August 2002. ———. “Fp vill bara ha en övergångsregel: Jobbet ska räcka till egna försörjningen,” March 16, 2004. ———. Ullenhag: Arbetskraftsinvandring kan bli verklighet, March 4, 2003. “Folkpartiet går med på övergångsregel för nya EU.” Dagens Nyheter, March 16, 2004. “Förslag om arbetskraftsinvandring togs bort,” Sydsvenskan, March 8, 2003. “Fp spräckte övergångsregler.” Dagens Nyheter, March 22, 2004. “Fp vill införa svenskatest för medborgarskap.” TT Nyhetsbanken, August 3, 2002. Freeman, Gary P. “Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 485 (1986): 51–63. ———. “Political Science and Comparative Immigration Politics.” Unpublished manuscript.

168

Bibliography

———. “Political Science and Immigration: Policy Types and Modes of Politics.” Paper presented at the R.F. Harvey lecture Series, University of Toronto, March 21, 2003. Geddes, Andrew. The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. London: Sage, 2003. German Federal Ministry of the Interior. Immigration Law and Policy, 2005. Givens, Terry, and Adam Luedtke. “Comparing European Immigration Policies: Convergence, Salience and Political Partisanship.” Paper presented at the 2004 Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, Illinois, March 11–13, 2004. Goethe-Institut Inter Nationes. “Germany’s ‘Green Card’—Reasons—Analyses— Prospects.” Info 26 (2001). Goodin, Robert. “Choose Your Capitalism?” Comparative European Politics 1, no. 2 (2003): 203–213. “Göran Persson orolig för ‘social turism.’” Aftonbladet, November 21, 2003. Göransson, Ingemar. “Noterat: Dumpingsturism.” LO Tidningen, November 28, 2003. “Gränserna öppnas för ny arbetskraft.” Göteborgs-Posten, February 20, 2004. Green, Simon. The Politics of Exclusion: Institutions and Immigration Policy in Contemporary Germany. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004. Håkansson, Leif, and Wanja Lundby-Wedin. “Öppna för ny invandring och ta tillvara de arbetslösa.” LO Tidningen, June 14, 2002. “Håll gränsen stängd.” Dagens Industri, July 11, 2002. Hall, Peter A., and Daniel W. Gingerich. “Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Macroeconomy: An Empirical Analysis.” Paper prepared for presentation to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, August 30, 2001. Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice, eds. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001. Hall, Peter A., and Kathleen Thelen. “Institutional Change in Varieties of Capitalism.” Paper prepared for presentation to the Europeanists Conference, Chicago, March 2006. Hammar, Tomas. “Mellan rasism och reglering: Invandringspolitikens ideology och historia.” Arbetarhistoria 12, no. 46 (1988): 11–14. “Han vill öppna gränserna för utländsk arbetskraft.” LO Tidningen, December 7, 2001. Hancké, Bob. “Revisiting the French Model: Coordination and Restructuring in French Industry.” In Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, edited by Peter Hall and David Soskice. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001, 307–335. “Hård debatt om arbetskraftsinvandring.” LO Tidningen, June 7, 2002. Haus, Leah. “Labor Unions and Immigration Policy in France.” International Migration Review 3, no. 3 (1999): 683–716. ———. “Openings in the Wall: Transnational Migrants, Labor Unions and U.S. Immigration Policy.” International Organization 49, no. 2 (1995): 285–313. ———. Unions, Immigration and Internationalization: New Challenges and Changing Coalitions in the United States and France. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

Bibliography

169

“Het arbetsmarknad ställer ökade krav på arbetslösa.” TT Nyhetsbanken, December 5, 2006. “Het debatt om invandring mellan LO och Fp.” TT Nyhetsbänkan, August 22, 2002. Holmberg, Barbro, and Hans Karlsson. “Särregler gagnar alla.” Svenska Dagbladet, March 12, 2004. Howell, Chris. Trade Unions and the State: The Construction of Industrial Relations Institutions in Britain, 1890–2000. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. ———. “Varieties of Capitalism: And Then There Was One?” Comparative Politics 36, no. 1 (2003): 103–124. Huber, Evelyne, and John D. Stephens. “Internationalization and the Social Democratic Model.” Comparative Political Studies 31, no. 3 (1998): 353–397. Hyman, Richard. Understanding European Trade Unionism: Between Market, Class and Society. London: Sage Publications, 2001. “Internt bråk hos m om invandring.” Svenska Dagbladet, August 10, 2002. IOM. “Final Report to the Ministry of Health Care of the Netherlands: Monitoring of the Pilot Project, ‘Polish nurses in the Netherlands.’” April 2005. “Irland på tur för övergångsregler. LO-mp i samspel inför östutvidgning.” Dagens Nyheter, February 25, 2004. ISA Council of Economic Advisors. Swedish Open. May 2001. “I täten för 60 miljoner européer.” Göteborgs-Posten, May 21, 2007. Karlsson, Anders, and Tomas Eneroth. “Vilka motiv har m och fp för fri invandring?” Dagens Industri, April 25, 2003. Karlsson, Jan O. “Mer än bara invandrare.” Svenska Dagbladet, August 27, 2002. Katzenstein, Peter. Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985. Kilde, Nanna, and Stein Kuhnle. “The Principle of Universalism: Tracing a Key Concept in the Scandinavian Welfare Model.” Paper presented at the First Conference of the European Social Policy Research Network, Social Values, Social Policies, Tilburg University, The Netherlands, August 29–31, 2002. King, Desmond, and Bo Rothstein. “Government Legitimacy and the Labour Market: A Comparative Analysis of Employment Exchanges.” Public Administration 72 (1994): 291–308. Klingwall, Maj-Inger. “Arbetskraftsinvandring kan förstärka välfärden.” LO Tidningen, March 9, 2001. Knocke, Wuokko. “Sweden: Insiders Outside the Trade Union Mainstream.” In Trade Unions, Immigration and Immigrants in Europe 1960–1993, edited by Rinus Penninx and Judith Roosblad. London: Berghahn Books, 2000, 157–182. Kommittén för arbetskraftsinvandring (KAKI), Arbetskraftsinvandring till Sverige—befolkningsutveckling, arbetsmarknad i förändring, internationell utblick. SOU 2005:50, Stockholm, Sweden, 2005. ———. Arbetskraftsinvandring till Sverige förslag och konsekvenser. SOU 2006:87, Stockholm, Sweden, 2006. Korpi, Walter. “Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism: Protagonists, Consenters and Antagonists.” World Politics 58, no. 2 (2006): 167–206. “Kritik från oppositionen.” Dagens Nyheter, July 18, 2007.

170

Bibliography

“Kritiska fack kräver nya lagar.” Dagens Nyheter, April 29, 2004. Kuivanen, Hannu. “Proletära byråkrater: en fällstudie av fackföreningsrörelsens inflytande vid kollektiv rekrytering av utlandsk arbetskraft 1946–1965.” Unpublished manuscript, 1992. Kyle, Gunhild. Gästarbeterska i manssamhället. Stockholm, Sweden: LiberFörlag, 1979. Landsorganisationen. Arbetsmarknadspolitiken vid ett vägskäl. ———. “Beslut i LO-styrelsen om arbetskraftens fria rörlighet: Aktionsgrupp bildas för ordning och reda på arbetsmarknaden,” June 2, 2003. ———. “De är inte lösningen på arbetsmarknadens problem,” February 9, 2004. ———. “Fackligt center för papperslösa öppnat,” September 3, 2008. ———. “Folkpartiets politik skulle skapa en ny underclass,” www.lo.se/val2002/ nyhet13.shtml. ———. Full sysselsättning värd att slåss för, Kongressen kräver att regeringen tar krafttag. ———. Handbok för ordning och reda på arbetsmarknaden, November 2004. ———. Långt borta och nära, 20 omvärldstrender till 2010, April 5, 2004. ———. “LO:s ordförande Wanja Lundby-Wedin om EU:s utvidgning Ett viktigt steg för fred och ökad stabilitet i Europa,” December 13, 2002. ———. “LO:s ordförande Wanja-Lundby Wedin vid Sociala dialogens toppmöte: Kräv inga särskilda övergångsregler för EU:s kandidatländer,” November 28, 2002. ———. LOs yttrande över Långtidsutredningen 1999/2000. SOU 2000:7, June 5, 2000. ———. Mer än bara öppna gränser: Landsorganisationen och migrationen, 2004. ———. “Miljöpartiet vill medverka till att förhindra lönedumpning på svensk arbetsmarknad,” March 26, 2004. ———. “Ordning och reda på arbetsmarknaden LO och förbunden ställer krav på förändringar av arbetsmarknadsreglerna,” December 2004. ———. “Överdrivna farhågor om arbetskraftsinvandringen,” January 15, 2003. ———. Response to SOU 2002:116 EU:s utvidgning och arbetskraftens rörlighet. Dnr UD2003/147/MAP, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ———. Stärk myndigheterna för mer ordning och reda på arbetsmarknaden, April 15, 2004. ———. “Wanja Lundby-Wedin, om Fps integrationsförslag:—Folkpartiets integrationspolitik leder till ökad segregation,” August 8, 2002. “Lättare att arbetskraftsinvandra,” Dagens Nyheter, July 18, 2007. “Lättare att invandra för jobb,” Svenska Dagbladet, July 18, 2007. Lindkvist, Jan. “Risk för lönedumpning utan övergångsregler,” Transportarbetaren 6 (June 2003). Lindvall, Johannes, and Joakim Sebring. “Policy Reform and the Decline of Corporatism in Sweden.” West European Politics 28, no. 5 (2005): 1057–1074. Lindvert, Jessica. Ihålig arbetsmarknadspolitik: organisering och legitimitet igår och idag. Umeå: Boréa, 2006. “LO: Arbetsrätten ska hindra lönedumpning vid EU-utvidgning,” TT Nyhetsbanken, June 2, 2003. “LO avfärdar arbetskraftsinvandring,” Dagens Industri, May 18, 2002. “LO-fack vill inte öppna gränserna,” Dagens Nyheter, April 3, 2003.

Bibliography

171

“LO hoppas att samtal ska leda till stöd från miljöpartiet,” LO Tidningen, February 13, 2004. “LO ska bredda majoritet åt s,” TT Nyhetsbanken, January 22, 2004. Lundby-Wedin, Wanja. “Jämnlika villkor krävs för arbetskraftsinvandring.” Göteborgs-Posten, October 20, 2006. Lundh, Christer. “Invandrarna i den svenska modellen—hot eller reserv? Fackligt program på 1960-talet.” Arbetarhistoria 70 (1994): 23–36. Lundh, Christer, and Rolf Ohlsson. Från arbetskraftsimport till flyktingsinvandring. Stockholm, Sweden: SNS Forlag, 1999. Lundqvist, Torbjörn. “Arbetskraftsinvandringen och facket: Debatt och historia i framtidsperspektiv.” In Befolkning och välfärd: Perspektiv på framtidens välfärdspolitik, edited by Bo Malmberg and Lena Sommestad. Stockholm, Sweden: LO & Institutet för framtidsstudier, 2002. Maas, Willem. “Citizenship, Free Movement and EU Enlargement,” Jean Monnet Chair Lecture, University of Miami, October 2005. Magnusson, Lars. Håller den svenska modellen? Arbete och välfärd i en global värld. Stockholm, Sweden: Norstedts akademiska förlag, 2006. “Majoritet i riksdagen är för fri arbetskraftsinvandring.” Göteborgs-Posten, November 26, 2003. Maktutredningens slutrapport. Demokrati och makt i Sverige, SOU 1990: 44. “Mauricio Rojas lämnar integrationsfrågorna,” Dagens Nyheter, October 4, 2006. May, Peter J. “Policy Design and Implementation.” In Handbook of Public Administration, edited by B. Guy Peters and Job Pierre. London, Sage: 2005, 3–23. Meidner, Rudolf. “The Swedish Model in an Era of Mass Unemployment.” Economic and Industrial Democracy 18 (1997): 87–97. Meyers, Eytan. International Immigration Policy: A Political Economy Analysis. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004. Miljöpartiet de Gröna. Arbetskraftsinvandring med socialt ansvar—10 förslag, March 4, 2003. ———. “Maria Wetterstrand och Peter Eriksson om övergångsregler: Ett historiskt svek,” March 12, 2004. ———. Motion till riksdagen av maria Wetterstrand m.fl. (mp) med anledning av skr. 2003/04:119, Särskilda regler under en övergångsperiod för arbetstagare från nya medlemsstater enligt anslutningsfördraget. ———. “Mp och LO tillsätter gemensam arbetsgrupp,” January 22, 2004. ———. “Peter Eriksson om arbetskraftsinvandring: Lyssna på företagen!” May 17, 2002. “Moderata positiva till arbetskraftsinvandring.” TT Nyhetsbanken, March 10, 2003. Moderaterna. Invandring och integration—moderata utgångspunkter, March 10, 2003. “Moderaterna vill ha två miljoner invandrare på 15 år.” Svenska Dagbladet, August 9, 2002. Money, Jeannette. Fences and Neighbors: The Political Geography of Immigration Control. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999. “Mp tanker inte kompromissa om nya regler,” Dagens Nyheter, March 26, 2004.

172

Bibliography

Myrdal, Hans-Göran. “Europas fattiga kommer,” Svenska Dagbladet, August 17, 2002. Nätverket fackligt aktiva invandrare (FAI). Press release, May 24, 2002. “Nej till övergångsregler bakslag för regeringen.” Dagens Industri, April 29, 2004. Nelhans, Joachim. Utlänningen på arbetsmarknaden. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1973. Niessen, Jan, and Yongmi Schiebel. “Promoting Debates on European Migration Policies.” European Journal of Migration and Law 4 (2003): 469–475. “Nuder öppnar för arbetskraftsinvandring.” Dagens Industri, May 18, 2005. Nuder, Pär. “Jag tänker inte sopa problemen under mattan.” Dagens Nyheter, December 1, 2004. “Ny attityd skapar jobb även för invandrare.” LO Tidningen, November 19, 1999. Nycander, Svante. Makten över arbetsmarknaden: Ett perspektiv på Sveriges 1900-tal. Stockholm, Sweden: SNS Förlag, 2002. “Oenighet om regler för jobbinvandring.” Dagens Nyheter, October 19, 2006. Ohlsson, Rolf. “Svensk invandrings—och flyktingspolitik efter 1945.” In Migrationsexplosionen, edited by Gunnar Jervas. Stockholm, Sweden: SNS Förlag, 1995, 83–97. Öhman, Berndt. “LO och arbetsmarknadspolitiken efter andra världskiriget.” In Tvärsnitt: sju forkningsrapporter utgivna till LO:s 75-årsjubileum 1973. Stockholm, Sweden: Prisma, 1973. Olauson, Erland, and Leif Håkansson. “De som lockas jobba illegalt bör få rätt till skadestånd.” Dagens Nyheter, July 20, 2005. Olauson, Erland, Anders Karlson, and Ulf Holm. “Diskussion om övergångsregler i samband med EUs utvidgning,” October 30, 2004. Olsson, Ulf. “Planning in the Swedish Welfare State.” In Swedish Social Democracy: A Model in Transition, edited by Wallace Clement and Rianne Mahon. Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc., 1994, 45–64. “Öppenhet för invandrad arbetskraft.” TT Nyhetsbanken, May 8, 2003. Österberg, Sven-Erik. “Arbetskraften finns här!” LO Tidningen, March 23, 2001. “Oststyrig och grälsjuk partiledardebatt.” TT Nyhetsbanken, September 10, 2002. “Övergångsregler ska gälla första året.” LO Tidningen, March 12, 2004. Paues, Theodor. Arbetskraftsinvandring ett år senare. Stockholm, Sweden: Svenskt Näringsliv, 2003. “Pengar till Skatteverket kan stoppa övergångsregler.” TT Nyhetsbanken, March 2, 2004. “Persson angriper folkpartiet.” Aktuellt i Politiken, August 5, 2002. “Persson avvisar arbetskraftsinvandring.” TT Nyhetsbanken, May 17, 2002. “Persson beredd bromsa EU-invandring från öst.” Svenska Dagbladet, September 1, 2002. “Persson citerade Palme & Erlander.” Aktuellt i Politiken, August 14, 2002. Persson, Göran. “Progress Europe: A Force for Good.” Progressive Politics, August 2003. “Persson håller fast vid mål om minskad arbetslöshet.” TT Nyhetsbanken, August 28, 2002. “Persson har trappat ner på entusiasmen.” Göteborgs-Posten, May 6, 2004. “Persson: Ingen arbetskraftsinvandring de närmaste tio åren.” TT Nyhetsbanken, August 13, 2002.

Bibliography

173

“Persson kräver tydliga regler.” Dagens Nyheter, November 22, 2003. “Persson slår ifrån sig LO-krav om övergångsregler.” TT Nyhetsbanken, November 19, 2003. “Persson till hard attack mot nejröstare.” Dagens Nyheter, April 29, 2004. “Persson varnar för borgerligt kaos.” TT Nyhetsbanken, August 20, 2002. Pestoff, Victor. “The Disappearance of Social Partnership in Sweden during the 1990s and Its Sudden Reappearance in Late 1998.” Paper presented at the 1999 ECPR Joint Sessions in Mannheim, Germany, March 29–31, 1999. Petersson, Olof. “Democracy and Power in Sweden.” Scandinavian Political Studies 14 (1991): 173–191. Pettersson, Thord. “Fri invandring är inte humanism.” Arbetaren, March 8–14, 2002. ———. “Oansvarigt, Svenskt Närningsliv!” Alla, May 28, 2003. Pierson, Paul. “Irresistible Forces, Immovable Objects.” Journal of European Public Policy 5, no. 4 (1998): 539–560. Pontusson, Jonas. “Between Neo-Liberalism and the German Model: Swedish Capitalism in Transition.” In The Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, edited by Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck. London: Sage, 1997. Pontusson, Jonas, and Peter Swenson. “Labor Markets, Production Strategies, and Wage Bargaining Institutions: The Swedish Employer Offensive in Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Political Studies 29 (1996): 223–250. “Pro/Kontra: Arbetskraftsinvandring.” Axess no. 5, 2002. Radice, Hugo. “Globalization and National Capitalisms: Theorizing Convergence and Differentiation.” Review of International Political Economy 7, no. 4 (2000): 719–742. “Regeringen kritiserades för tal om ‘social turism’ i debatt.” TT Nyhetsbanken, February 11, 2004. “Regeringen vill ha övergångsregler från 1 maj.” TT Nyhetsbanken, March 9, 2004. Regeringens proposition 2007/08:147. Nya regler för arbetskraftsinvandring, April 29, 2008. Regeringens skrivelse. Särskilda regler under en övergångsperiod för arbetstagare från nya medlemsstater enligt anslutningsfördraget, Skr. 2003/04:119. Reinfeldt, Fredrik, Gunilla Carlsson, and Per Westerberg. “Ingen mur runt Sverige!” Svenska Dagbladet, March 18, 2004. Riksdagen. “Fem partier will öppna för större arbetskraftsinvandring.” March 25, 2003. ———. Snabbprotokoll 2000/01:9. Anf. 87, Patrik Norinder, October 11, 2000. ———. Snabbprotokoll 2002/03:14. November 8, 2002, Anf. 138. ———. Snabbprotokoll 2002/03:33. December 10, 2002, Anf. 12–15. ———. Snabbprotokol 2002/03:35. December 12, 2002, Anf. 127. ———. Snabbprotokoll 2002/03:88. April 10, 2003, Anf. 72. ———. Snabbprotokoll 2003/04: 38. November 28, 2003, Anf. 22–28. ———. Snabbprotokoll 2003/04:88. March 25, 2004, Anf. 52. ———. Socialförsäkringsutskottets betänkande 2002/03:SfU8 Migration och asylpolitik. ———. Svar på fråga 2002/03:696 om kommuners och läns behov av arbetskraft från tredjeland. March 26, 2003.

174

Bibliography

Ringholm, Bosse. “Trygghet, jobb och välfärd—förutsättningar för tillväxt.” Folkbladet, December 20, 2003. Rothstein, Bo. Den korporativa staten: Intresseorganisationer och statsförvaltning isvensk politik. Stockholm, Sweden: Norstedts Juridik, 1992. ———. Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998. ———. The Social Democratic State: The Swedish Model and the Bureaucratic Problem of Social Relations. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996. Rothstein, Bo, and Jonas Bergström. Korporatismens fall och den svenska modellens kris. Stockholm, Sweden: SNS Förlag, 1999. Rothstein, Bo, and Sven Steinmo. “Restructuring Politics: Institutional Analysis and the Challenges of Modern Welfare States.” In Restructuring the Welfare State: Political Institutions and Policy Change, edited by Bo Rothstein and Sven Steinmo. New York: Palgrave, 2002, 1–32. “S-nederlag en fullträff för LO.” Dagens Nyheter, April 21, 2004. Sabuni, Nyamko, et al. “Osaklig och osmaklig s/LO-kampanj.” GT, September 1, 2002. Schattschneider, E. E. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s Guide to Democracy in America. Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1975. Schmidt, Vivien A. “French Capitalism Transformed, Yet Still a Third Variety of Capitalism.” Economics and Society 32, no. 4 (2003): 526–554. Scocco, Sandro. Moder Sveas rynkor. Tankesmedjan SAP, May 29, 2002. Scotland Is the Place, www.scotlandistheplace.com. “Sex LO-förbund will inte ha fri rörlighet,” LO Tidningen, April 11, 2003. Shorto, Russell. “No Babies? Declining Population in Europe.” The New York Times Sunday Magazine, June 29, 2008. Socialdemokraterna. Förslag till politiska riktlinjer till mellankongressen 16–18 April 2004. Stockholm, Sweden: 2004. “Specialregler för chaufförer från öst LO-krav.” Dagens Nyheter, June 3, 2003. Steinmo, Sven. “Bucking the Trend? The Welfare State and the Global Economy: The Swedish Case Up Close.” New Political Economy 8, no. 1 (2003): 31–48. Stone, Deborah. “Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas.” Political Science Quarterly 104, no. 2 (1989): 281–300. Streeck, Wolfgang, and Kozo Yamamura, eds. The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism: Germany and Japan in Comparison. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001. Svenskt Näringsliv. Företagen—inte AMS—avgör bäst behovet av nyanställningar, June 2, 2006. Sveriges Radio. “Regeringen öppnar för arbetskraftsinvandring,” http://sr.se/ ekot/artikel.asp?artikel=1485607, July 17, 2007. Sveriges Television. “S-bud om övergångsregler avvisades,” http://svt.se/svt/ Crosslink.jsp?d=1804&a=202589. Swank, Duane, and Cathie Jo Martin. “Employers and the Welfare State: The Political Economic Organization of Firms and Social Policy in Contemporary Capitalist Democracies.” Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 8 (2001): 889–923. Swedish Construction Workers Union. “Byggnads om beslutet om övergångsregler: Nu måste regeringen agera snabbt!” April 28, 2004. ———. Uttalande från Byggnads förbundsfullmäktige 17–18 juni 2003.

Bibliography

175

Swedish Foreign Ministry. Debattartikel av Barbro Holmberg och Hans Karlsson om övergångsregler—Östgöta Correspondenten, April 23, 2004. Swedish Migration Board. www.migrationsverket.se/english.jsp. Swedish Ministry of Agriculture. Press release, September 9, 2002. Swedish Ministry of Industry. “Hans Karlsson: Regeringen har full sysselsättning i sikte,” May 19, 2004. ———. Kommittédirektiv: Översyn av regelverket för arbetskraftsinvandring. Dir. 2004: 21. Swedish Ministry of Justice. Ett effektiv och flexibelt system för arbetskraftsinvandring. Ds 2007:27, July 17, 2007. ———. Ett tryggare och öppnare Europa Justiedepartementets prioriterade frågor under ordförandeskapet, April 14, 2009. Swenson, Peter. Capitalists Against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2002. Thelen, Kathleen. “Varieties of Labor Politics in the Developed Democracies.” In Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, edited by Peter A. Hall and David Soskice. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001, 71–104. “Theodor Paues är årets lobbyist.” Resumé, November 5, 2003. Thörn, Ylva. “Gigantisk personalflykt hotar vården.” Dagens Nyheter, February 3, 2004. Tichenor, Daniel J. Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Tilton, Tim. The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy: Through the Welfare State to Socialism. Oxford, England: Clarendon Paperbacks, 1991. Toft, Christian. “Evidence-based Social Science and the Rehnist Interpretation of the Development of Active Labor Market Policy in Sweden during the Golden Age: A Critical Examination.” Politics and Society 31, no. 4 (2003): 567–608. Togman, Jeffrey. The Ramparts of Nations: Institutions and Immigration Policies in France and the United States. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2001. “Tummen upp för utländska läkare.” Aftonbladet, August 8, 2003. “Tv-inslag fick Persson att byta fot.” Dagens Nyheter, April 5, 2004. Ullenhag, Erik. Letter to Konstitutionsutskottet, January 28, 2004. Ullenhag, Erik, and Mauricio Rojas. “Ökad invandring inget vapen mot arbetsrätten.” Dagens Industri, May 6, 2003. Union of Services and Communication Employees, the Swedish Building Workers Union, the Swedish Building Maintenance Workers Union, the Swedish Painters Union, the Swedish Transport Workers Union, and the Swedish Electricians Union. Underremiss avseende utredningen EU:s utvidgning och arbetskraftens rörlighet. SOU 2002:116. United Nations, Population Division. Replacement Migration: Is It A Solution To Declining and Ageing Populations? 2001. “Utländsk arbetskraft sänker inte lönera.” LO Tidningen, August 16, 2002. “Utredare vill ha hinder för arbetskraft från nye EU-länder.” TT Nyhetsbanken, January 15, 2003.

176

Bibliography

“Utredning föreslår friare arbetskraftsinvandring.” TT Nyhetsbanken, October 18, 2006. Vänsterpartiet. “Camilla Sköld Jansson (v): Regeringen öppnar för gästarbetarsystem!” March 12, 2004. ———. Motion till riksdagen 2003/04:v014 av Lars Ohly mfl (v) med anledning av skr. 2003/04:119, Särskilda regler under en övergångsperiod för arbetstagare från nya medlemsstater enligt anslutningsfördraget, March 29, 2004. ———. Motion till riksdagen 2003/04 v772 av Camilla Sköld Jansson angående trygghet för internationell arbetskraft, October 3, 2003. Watts, Julie. Immigration Policy and the Challenge of Globalization: Unions and Employers in Unlikely Alliance. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002. Wood, Stuart. “Business, Government and Patterns of Labor Market Policy in Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany.” In Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, edited by Peter Hall and David Soskice. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001, 247–275.

Index

active labor market policies, 31–33, 88, 91, 112, 138, 146, 160, 163–64 Almedal Week 2002, 65–66, 71, 87 AMS. See Swedish National Labor Market Board Andersson, Dan, 63, 97, 110, 134 Åsbrink, Erik, 61 Banting, Keith G., 35 Bartram, David, 17 benefits tourism, 37, 118, 121–25 Berman, Sheri, 161 Billström, Tobias, 108, 110, 161 Blyth, Mark, 21, 52 Brochman, Grete, 35 Brors, Henrik, 123 Brubaker, Rogers, 16 Canada, 55, 92, 102 Carens, Joseph, 35, 58 Center Party, 70, 89, 107, 126 Christian Democratic Party, 89, 107, 126 Committee on Labor Immigration (KAKI): establishment and interim report, 92–97; final report, 104–108; responses to final report, 108–111 corporatism, 152–55

Eneroth, Tomas, 90, 127 Ekenger, Karen, 66, 69, 105 Eriksson, Peter, 136–37 Esping-Andersen, Gösta, 36 ETUC. See European Trade Union Council European Trade Union Council, 159–60 European Union: Accession Treaty (2004 enlargement), 119–20; common migration and asylum policy, 157–61; European Commission, 7–8, 158. See also Green Party and Swedish Social Democratic Party Fahimi, Bijan, 62–63, 69 France, 11, 13–14 Freeman, Gary P., 10, 18, 33–35, 155–56 F-tax cards, 131–32, 136, 138–39 full employment, 30–33, 53, 60, 71, 79, 112, 146, 150, 154 Geddes, Andrew, 22, 35, 126 Germany, 21, 93–94, 133 Goodin, Robert, 151 Göransson, Ingemar, 134–35 Gourevitch, Peter, 104 177

178

Index

Green Party, 70, 93–94, 96, 124, 128–29, 146; alliance with bourgeois parties, 86–88; cooperation with LO, 135– 38; KAKI final report and bourgeois alliance, 105–11 Green, Simon, 16 guest worker system, 50, 58–59, 70, 76–77, 92, 127 Håkansson, Leif, 64–65, 102–103, 129, 135, 137 Hagnell, Hans, 52 Hall, Peter, 18–20, 161 Hancké, Bob, 20 Haus, Leah, 11–13 Holm, Ulf, 136 Holmberg, Barbro, 125, 128 Holmberg, Per, 53 Howell, Chris, 20

Lundby-Wedin, Wanja, 64, 71, 76–77, 108, 129, 131, 137, 160 Lundh, Christer, 45, 53 Mårtensson, Kristina, 134 Meidner, Rudolf, 30–31 Meyers, Eytan, 14–15, 38 migration policy, 2–6; components of, 37–45; corporatism, 155–57; Marxist-inspired approaches, 10–11; globalization-inspired approaches, 11–13; domestic variables, 13–18; full employment, 30–33. welfare state services, 33–37; See also Swedish labor migration policy Moderate Party, 64, 88, 90–91, 107–108; EU enlargement, 126–28 Money, Jeannette, 14–15 Myrdal, Hans Göran, 153–54

International Labor Organization, 131, 138 Italy, 11

Nuder, Pär, 125

Johansson, Anders L., 60, 73

Paues, Theodor, 62, 86–87, 100–101 Persson, Göran, 64–65, 91–92, 118; 2002 parliamentary election, 72–75; EU enlargement, 121–23, 128, 134, 138 Pettersson, Thord, 71, 77–78, 91, 97, 99, 135

KAKI. See Committee on Labor Immigration Karlsson, Anders, 90 Karlsson, Hans, 32, 88, 90, 125, 127, 135 Karlsson, Jan O., 72 Katzenstein, Peter, 16 Klingwall, Maj-Inger, 61 Knocke, Wuokko, 53–55 Kuivanen, Hannu, 52 Left Party, 24, 86, 92–93, 104–7; EU enlargement, 124, 128, 135–37 Leijonborg, Lars, 69–72, 75–76, 126–27 Liberal Party, 62–63, 69–71, 75–78, 87–91, 97, 103; possible defection from bourgeois-green alliance, 104– 108; EU enlargement, 126–28 Lindkvist, Jan, 130 LO. See Swedish Trade Union Confederation

Olausson, Erland, 102–103, 136–39

Rehn, Gustav, 31 Rojas, Mauricio, 108 Rollén, Bertil, 121–23, 125, 129–36 Rothstein, Bo, 16, 31, 36, 154 SAP. See Swedish Social Democratic Party Schattschneider, E. E., 74 Scocco, Sandro, 56, 60–61, 65, 68, 77 Scotland, 8, 55 Sköld Jansson, Camilla, 136 SN. See Swedish Confederation of Employers social tourism, 37, 118, 121–25 Soskice, David, 19–20, 152

Index Spain, 11 Swedish Building Maintenance Workers Union (Fastighets), 130 Swedish Building Workers Union (Byggnads), 130 Swedish Confederation of Employers (SN), 39–40, 78, 86–87, 91, 100–101, 105, 108, 153–54; Bijan Fahimi report, 62–64; 2002 proposal, 66–72 Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO), 96 Swedish Confederation for Professional Employees (TCO), 96 Swedish Electricians Union (Elektrikerna), 130 Swedish Migration Board, 55–57, 92, 95, 125, 127 Swedish labor migration policy: bourgeois alliance policy, 108–11; historical legacy, 50–54; KAKI reports, 92–97, 104–08; LO and EU enlargement, 129–39; LO proposals, 97–104; Policy prior to reform, 55–58; SAP and EU enlargement, 120, 122–29; SN 2002 proposal, 66–72 Swedish model: defined, 30; full employment, 30–33; welfare state services, 33–37 Swedish National Labor Market Board (AMS), 32, 51, 53–54, 58–60, 73, 77, 92, 98–101, 105–7, 125, 134, 148, 153 Swedish National Labor Market Commission, 51 Swedish Painters Union (Målarna), 130 Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP), 2–6, 61, 118; debate surrounding establishment of KAKI, 89–93; EU enlargement, 120, 122–29; full employment, 30–33; migration policy preferences, 43–45, 148–52; response to 2002 SN report, 72–75; welfare state services, 35–36; response to governing bourgeois alliance proposal, 108, 110 Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), 2–6, 11, 18, 21, 90–91;

179

development of labor migration proposals, 97–104; EU enlargement, 129–39; full employment, 31–33; guest worker system, 75–77; migration policy preferences, 43–45, 148–51; previous labor migration, 52–55; response to new calls for labor migration, 60–64; response to 2002 SN report, 70–71; response to KAKI final report, 108 Swedish Transport Workers Union (Transport), 130 Swedish Union of Services and Communication Employees (Seko), 96 Swenson, Peter, 31, 153 Thelen, Kathleen, 20, 152–53 Thörn, Ylva, 34 Tilly, Hans, 130, 132, 139 Tilton, Tim, 31, 58 Toft, Christian, 32 Togman, Jeffrey, 15 Ullenhag, Erik, 88 United Kingdom, 7, 117 United Nations, 8 United States, 12, 15, 92, 102 VoC. See Varieties of Capitalism Varieties of Capitalism (VoC), 3–6, 18–21, 152–53 Wahlström, Göte, 91, 110 Wallén, Fabian, 69 Wallén, Lena-Hjelm, 92–94, 104, 107 Watts, Julie, 11–13 welfare state services, 5–6, 16, 20, 29–30, 33–37, 43, 69–70, 77, 100, 121–31, 148–150, 56, 158 Wetterstrand, Maria, 136, 137 Wilson, James Q,. 155 Winberg, Margareta, 72, 87 Winberg, Per, 131–32, 139 Zolberg, Aristide, 10