Decentralisation in Contemporary India: Status, Issues and the Way Forward 0367545950, 9780367545956

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Decentralisation in Contemporary India

This volume examines the process of decentralisation in India since the 1992 legislation which devolved powers to local government bodies to ensure greater participation in local governance and planning. It studies the functioning of Gram Sabhas, Panchayats, school development committees, water supply and sanitation committees, Residents Welfare Associations, and rural development schemes like the MGNREGS, analysing their effectiveness and tracing the political, administrative, and fiscal powers the local government wields. With case studies from different Indian states, the book examines the functioning of local governance mechanisms and institutions in relation to crucial issues such as citizen participation, the participation of women and disadvantaged groups, fiscal decentralisation, peace-building, economic development, and education, among others. Comprehensive and insightful, this book will be an essential read for scholars and researchers of development studies, political science, public policy, governance studies, regional development, political economy, political sociology, public administration, and South Asian studies, especially those focusing on India. D. Rajasekhar is HAG Professor in Economics at the Centre for Decentralisation and Development (CDD), Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC), Bengaluru. He was Visiting Scholar at the Universities of Oxford, Melbourne, Hitotsubashi, Sussex, and at the Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen. He has worked extensively on decentralisation, social protection, and microfinance, and served in policy bodies constituted by the government. His publications include Decentralised Governance, Development Programmes and Elite Capture (2018) and Cooperatives and Social Innovations: Experiences from the Asia Pacific Region (2020). R. Manjula holds a PhD in economics and works as Assistant Professor at the Centre for Decentralisation and Development at ISEC, Bengaluru. She was an Academic Visitor to the University of Oxford, UK, and a Visiting Scholar to the Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Japan. She has worked on research projects, covering themes of decentralisation, child

labour, social security, health insurance, public works programme, and public service delivery. M. Devendra Babu is an Honorary Professor at Karnataka State Rural Development and Panchayat Raj University, Gadag, Karnataka, and formerly Professor at the Centre for Decentralisation and Development, ISEC. His areas of interest are fiscal decentralisation, local planning, and public economics. He has published books (co-authored) as well as articles in national and international journals on different aspects of decentralisation. He was previously involved in ‘District Perspective Plans’ and ‘District Human Development Reports’.

Decentralisation in Contemporary India Status, Issues and the Way Forward

Edited by D. Rajasekhar, R. Manjula and M. Devendra Babu

First published 2022 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2022 selection and editorial matter, D Rajasekhar, R Manjula and M Devendra Babu; individual chapters, the contributors The right of D Rajasekhar, R Manjula and M Devendra Babu to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-0-367-54595-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-11363-0 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-09435-7 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003094357 Typeset in Sabon by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Contents

List of figures List of tables List of contributors Foreword Preface and Acknowledgements

vii viii xii xiv xviii

PART I

Introduction

1

1 Working of decentralised governance in contemporary India

3

D. RAJASEKHAR

PART II

Mechanisms to facilitate people’s participation and women empowerment

21

2 Are citizens participating in Grama Sabha to improve service delivery?: Evidence from Karnataka

23

D. RAJASEKHAR AND R. MANJULA

3 A quarter-century of the Women Component Plan at the rural grassroots level in Kerala: A case study of Mutholy Grama Panchayat

41

BLESSY SARAH MATHEW AND PUSHPA M. SAVADATTI

PART III

Fiscal decentralisation

67

4 Fiscal decentralisation at the sub-state level in India: A study of Karnataka State

69

K. BASAVARAJESHWARI

vi Contents 5 Issues in fiscal decentralisation in Chhattisgarh State: A study

88

M. GOPINATH REDDY AND BISHNU PRASAD MOHAPATRA

PART IV

Sectoral aspects of decentralisation

113

6 Peace-building and economic development through decentralisation: A case study of conflict-affected Jammu and Kashmir

115

SARDAR BABUR HUSSAIN

7 Landslides, decentralised government, and the MGNREGS: A study in Sikkim and Darjeeling

137

SHIKHA SUBBA

8 Decentralised delivery of school education: Evidence from Karnataka

156

D. RAJASEKHAR AND R. MANJULA

9 Is decentralised planning a success or failure?: Case of rural water supply in Kerala

176

K.R. NISHA

10 Functioning of Village Water and Sanitation Committees (VWSC) and sustainability of community-led water projects: An exploratory study of some tribal villages in Odisha State

200

PRAFULLA KUMAR NATH

PART V

Urban decentralisation

219

11 Urban decentralisation and local governance in the context of urban centralisation: Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh

221

ANIL KUMAR VADDIRAJU

12 Citizens’ participation in local governance: A study of Residents Welfare Associations in Delhi

240

NIVEDITA BOSE

Index

255

Figures

2.1 Satisfaction levels on streetlight services among the sample households 28 2.2 Satisfaction levels on mini water supply services among the sample household 30 2.3 Satisfaction levels on borewell with hand pump services among the sample households 32 2.4 Satisfaction levels on public stand post services among the sample households 33 2.5 Satisfaction levels on drainage service among the sample households 34 2.6 Satisfaction levels on road services among the sample households 36 4.1 Five-year average growth rate of Plan allocation to PRIs 76 4.2 Plan and Non-Plan outlays of PRIs as % of GSDP in Karnataka 78 7.1 Participation of SC/ST households in Sikkim and DGHC 146 7.2 Participation of women in the MGNREGS in Sikkim and DGHC 146 7.3 Average number of person-days of employment under the MGNREGS in Sikkim and DGHC 147 7.4 Proportion of households availing 100 days of employment under the MGNREGS in Sikkim and DGHC 147 7.5 Landslide risk reduction-related asset creation through the MGNREGS (2009–2016) 151 10.1 Details of water availability and pump operators in the selected villages 209 10.2 Conditions of water storage structures and distribution pipes in the selected villages 210 10.3 Status of contributions and the payment of electricity bills in the selected VWSCs 212



Tables

2.1 Distribution of Sample Households by Their Rating of the Services 26 2.2 Comparison of Ranks Between the Two Rounds of the Survey and the Participation of Households in Grama Sabha Meetings 29 2.3 Comparison of Ranks for Mini Water Supply Services and the Extent of the Participation in Grama Sabha Meetings 31 2.4 Comparison of Ranks for Borewell with Hand Pump Services and the Extent of the Participation in Grama Sabha Meetings 32 2.5 Comparison of Ranks for Public Stand Post Services and the Extent of the Participation in Grama Sabha Meetings 34 2.6 Comparison of Ranks for Drainage Services and the Extent of the Participation in Grama Sabha Meetings 35 2.7 Comparison of Ranks for Roads and the Extent of the Participation in Grama Sabha Meetings 36 2.8 Caste-Wise Variations in the Improvement of Ranks Assigned to Key Services Between the First and Second Rounds of the Survey 37 3.1 Socio-Political Features of the Mutholy GP 45 3.2 Details of Allocation and Utilisation of Funds in the Mutholy GP during the 12th Five-Year Plan Period 46 3.3 Total Fund Allocation and Utilisation in the Mutholy GP during the 12th Five-Year Plan Period 47 3.4 WCP Allocations in the Mutholy GP during 11th and 12th Five-Year Plan Periods 48 3.5 Extent of the Utilisation of the WCP Fund in the Mutholy GP during the 11th and the 12th Five-Year Plan Periods 49 3.6 Sector-Wise Shares in WCP Outlay in the Mutholy GP during the 12th Five-Year Plan Period 51

Tables  ix 3.7 Term and Sex-Wise Classification of GP Representatives in Mutholy 54 3.8 Knowledge of the WCP by the Mutholy GP Representatives (in %) 55 3.9 Involvement of Representatives of the Mutholy GP in the WCP Projects (in %) 57 3.10 Opinion of the Mutholy GP Representatives Regarding Finalisation of the WCP Project (in %) 58 3.11 Opinion of Representatives on the Conflict over WCP Projects and Participation of Female Representatives (in %) 60 3.A.1 Projects in the Production Sector in the WCP during 12th Plan Period 63 3.A.2 Projects in the Service Sector in the WCP during 12th Plan Period 64 3.A.3 Projects in the Infrastructure Sector in the WCP during 12th Plan Period 65 4.1 Preceding Enactments on Panchayats in Karnataka 71 4.2 Revenue and Expenditure of PRIs in Karnataka (Rs in Crore) 72 4.3 Ratio of Plan and Non-Plan Allocation to PRIs in Karnataka, 1998–1999 to 2016–2017 (Rs. in Crores) 74 4.4 Year-Wise Growth of Plan Grants of PRIs in Karnataka (Rs. in Crores) 75 4.5 Share of PRIs Plan Grants from the State’s Plan Grants (Rs in Crores) 77 4.6 Share of PRIs Allocation from the State as per the SFC Recommendations (Rs in Crores) 80 4.A.1 Allocation of Plan Grants to PRIs (Rs in Crore) 86 4.A.2 State Tax and Non-Tax Receipts of the State Government for the Period 1996–1997 to 2016–2017 (Rs in Crore) 87 5.1 GSDP of Chhattisgarh State (at Current and Constant Prices) (Rs. Crores) 93 5.2 Sectoral Composition of GSDP in Chhattisgarh State (at Current and Constant Prices) (in Per Cent) 94 5.3 Financial Position of Chhattisgarh State (Rs. Crore) 95 5.4 Broad Composition of Total Receipts of Chhattisgarh State (%) 96 5.5 Broad Composition of Revenue Receipts of Chhattisgarh State (%) 97 5.6 Composition of Own Revenue of Chhattisgarh State (Rs. Crores) 98 5.7 Own Revenue Sources Assigned to PRIs in Chhattisgarh State 100 5.8 Composition of Own Revenues of the GPs (in Rs.) 101

x Tables 5.9 Total Own Revenues of Janpad Panchayats 2011–2016 (Rs. Lakh) 102 5.10 Transfers from State to PRIs 104 5.11 Thirteenth Union Finance Commission Grants to the PRIs of Chhattisgarh State (Rs. In Crores) 105 5.12 Fourteenth Union Finance Commission Grants to the PRIs of Chhattisgarh State (Rs. in Crore) 106 5.13 Source-Wise Resource Availability to PRIs in Chhattisgarh State (Rs. in lakh) 107 6.1 Detailed Comparison Matrix 121 6.2 Panchayat Elections since 1996 124 6.3 Own Revenue of Panchayats (All Tiers, Total in Rs. Crore and Per Capita in Rs.) 127 6.4 Twelfth FC Grants to PRIs of J&K during 2005–2010 (as on 6 November 2009) 129 6.5 13th FC Grants to PRIs of J&K during 2010–2015 (in Rs. Crore as on 31 March 2015) 130 6.6 14th FC Grants Allocated to Rural Local Bodies of J&K State during 2015–2016 (Rs. Crore) 130 6.7 Rural Road Development Indicators as per Census 2011 131 6.8 Rural Households with Access to the Piped Water Supply as per Census 2011 131 6.9 Rural Households Having Toilet Facilities (as on 26 July 2018) 132 7.1 Proportion of Completed Flood Control Works to Total in Sikkim and the DGHC Region 148 7.2 Proportion of Water Conservation Works to Total in Sikkim and the DGHC Region 149 7.3 Proportion of Drought-Proofing Work to Total in Sikkim and the DGHC Region 150 7.4 Proportion of Completed Renovation Water Bodies Work to Total in Sikkim and the DGHC Region 150 7.5 Proportion of Completed Land Development Work to Total in Sikkim and the DGHC Region 151 8.1 Factors Contributing to Children Regularly Attending School in Kurubarahalli 166 8.2 Factors Contributing to Children Studying Well in Kurubarahalli 166 8.3 Factors Contributing to Children Regularly Attending School in Upparahalli 169 8.4 Factors Contributing to Children Studying Well in Upparahalli 170

Tables  xi 8.5 Factors Contributing to Poor Quality Education in Upparahalli 170 8.6 Factors Contributing to Children Regularly Attending School in Hathirahalli 172 8.7 Factors Contributing to Children Studying Well in Hathirahalli 173 9.1 Allocation of Development Funds for LGs as a Percentage of Plan Outlay (in Crore) 177 9.2 Sector-Wise Expenditure of the Local Government in Kerala in 2015–2016 and 2016–2017 (in Per Cent) 178 9.3 Description of Variables in the Effectiveness Index 184 9.4 Distribution (%) of Households by Effectiveness Index 184 9.5 Distribution of Households (%) by Water Scarcity across Different Regions and Schemes 185 9.6 Description of Independent Variables 186 9.7 Factors Affecting Effectiveness 187 9.8 Factors Affecting Effectiveness in Different Institutions 188 9.9 Description of Variables in the Sustainability Index 190 9.10 Distribution of Households (%) by Sustainability Index 191 9.11 Description of Independent Variables 191 9.12 Factors Affecting Sustainability 192 9.13 Factors Affecting Sustainability in Different Institutions 194 11.1 Sample Demographics of Urban System in Karnataka 234 11.2 Sample Demographics of Urban System in Andhra Pradesh 234

Contributors

Anil Kumar Vaddiraju teaches Political Science at the Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC), with research interests in urban and rural governance, social and political theory, and policy processes. Earlier, he worked on child labour and decentralisation policies in India. His current work is on urban governance in South India. Basavarajeshwari K. has completed a PhD at ISEC, Bangalore. Her areas of interest are fiscal decentralisation, own resource mobilisation, and budgeting of local governance. Her current research work focuses on the finances of rural local governments and Grama Panchayats in Karnataka Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra is an Assistant Professor at the Centre for Economic and Social Studies (CESS) in Hyderabad. His research interests include decentralisation, democracy, governance, local governments, policy studies, tribal governance and development. Dr Mohapatra is involved in research studies related to decentralised governance and has published in various journals. Blessy Sarah Mathew is Maulana Azad National Senior Research Fellow in Economics at the Department of Economic Studies and Planning, Central University of Karnataka, Kalaburagi. Her areas of interest include micro economics, gender economics and public finance. M. Gopinath Reddy is formerly a Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at CESS, Hyderabad. He obtained Ph.D. (Political Science), from Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC), Bangalore in 1990. His areas of interest are decentralised governance, forest governance, and livelihoods and natural resources. He has published papers on these areas in reputed journals. R. Manjula is an Assistant Professor at the Centre for Decentralisation and Development (CDD), ISEC, Bengaluru. Her areas of interest are decentralisation, service delivery, local governance, social security, health insurance, and child labour. Dr Manjula is involved in several collaborative studies with researchers from the UK, Japan, and Australia.

Contributors  xiii K.R. Nisha is an Assistant Professor at Government College, Tripunithura, Kochi, Kerala. Dr Nisha has vast teaching experience at graduate and postgraduate levels. Her areas of specialisation are institutional economics and econometrics. She is interested in carrying out research on institutional choices in rural water supply systems. Nivedita Bose is a PhD candidate at the Centre for the Study of Social Systems, Jawaharlal Nehru University, where she is currently writing a dissertation on the quotidian politics associated with participatory governance in Delhi. Her research interests include the identity and culture of the Indian middle class(es), development and planning in India, and the politics of urban space. Prafulla Kumar Nath is a Doctoral Fellow at the Institute of Rural Management, Anand. His research interests include Labour economics, public policy, collective action and cooperation. He specializes in econometric modelling and mixed method research. Pushpa M. Savadatti is a Professor and Head of the Department of Economics, Central University of Karnataka, Kalaburagi, Karnataka. Her areas of interest are applied econometrics and agriculture economics. She has guided a number of students for their PhD and MPhil degrees. She has visited the UK, USA, France, Netherlands, and Australia on academic assignments. Prof. Pushpa has presented research papers at various national and international conferences. D. Rajasekhar is a Professor and Head at CDD, ISEC, Bengaluru. His areas of expertise include decentralisation, social protection, microfinance, and public services. He has also worked on land transfers, household partitioning, rural credit delivery system, and poverty. He has been collaborating with the researchers from the UK, Japan, and Australia. Sardar Babur Hussain is a Doctoral Fellow in Development Studies at CDD, ISEC. His PhD project examines the political economy of the development of Jammu and Kashmir during the post-1947 period. His research interests include the political economy of development, agrarian transition and border industrialisation. He has presented his PhD work at Columbia University, Manchester University, De Montfort University, and European University Viadrina. Shikha Subba is a PhD scholar at CDD, ISEC, Bengaluru. She is currently working on ‘The role of local government in dealing with disasters in the Himalayan Region’ for her doctoral dissertation. Her areas of interest are disaster risk reduction, landslide hazards and vulnerability, decentralisation, common property resources.

Foreword

Ever since the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts were passed in India in the early 1990s and different state governments passing legislations complying with these legislations, local development is sought to be achieved through decentralised government in rural as well as urban areas. From the mid-1990s, the decentralised government has come to be firmly and formally established in all the Indian states with mandatory elections once in five years, reservation of seats and executive positions to women and those belonging to disadvantaged caste groups, provision for Grama Sabha to enable citizens, including those belonging to disadvantaged groups, to participate in local planning and implementation of development projects and transfer of functions relating to rural and urban development, and funds. The overall aim of decentralisation reforms is to achieve effective and equitable delivery of services and inclusive development. It is now more than 25 years since the decentralised governance came into existence in all the Indian states. Since then, several expectations were raised on the local government. In view of faster growth in GDP in the first decade of the new millennium not equally benefiting disadvantaged groups, such as Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, minorities, and women, the Indian government placed considerable emphasis on decentralised government to enable the participation of these groups in the decentralised governance and achieving inclusive development. International agreements on disaster management urge governments all over the world to assign functions and provide funds to the local government for the reduction and mitigation of disasters. The achievement of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 hinges upon the extent to which the goals are localised, and the local government is expected to undertake and fulfil functions relating to SDG goals. Against this background, this volume on Decentralisation in Contemporary India: Status, Issues and the Way Forward looks at the status of decentralisation by addressing the following questions. What is the current status of Grama Sabhas and fiscal decentralisation in India? What is the extent to which decentralised government has contributed to improved service delivery? What is the current status of urban decentralisation? The

Foreword  xv volume comes to the following conclusions and makes important policy suggestions. Grama Sabha is an important mechanism for the success of decentralised governance as it provides a space for citizens to present their needs and preferences, and contribute to their participation in the preparation of plans, their implementation, and monitoring. It is expected that the voices of citizens in Grama Sabha meetings will positively influence the GP to take measures to improve service delivery. It is found in this volume that the citizen participation in Grama Sabha meetings tends to be uneven between different Indian states, between men and women, and among different social groups. In view of this, efforts aimed at providing education and awareness on the importance of Grama Sabha among people, especially those belonging to disadvantaged groups, are therefore to be initiated to improve their participation in the meetings and deliberative democracy for effective and equitable service delivery. The evidence on the impact of the reservation of seats and executive positions for women is mixed. It is argued in this volume that although the representation of women in decentralised governance has improved, the awareness of women representatives on schemes benefiting women and their participation in the implementation of these projects is comparatively low. The volume argues that the projects that aim to promote the participation and empowerment of women are routine and not strategic in nature, and hence they fail to empower them. The design of gender-sensitive budgeting is therefore to be improved to meet the strategic needs rather than the practical needs of women. It is found in this volume that own revenue continues to form only a small proportion of total revenues at the local level and that the dependency of the local government on tied grants from higher levels of governments increased over time, thereby constraining the decentralised government to use its discretion in the use of tied grants for the need-based local development. The following are therefore suggested to improve the share of own revenue in the total expenditure. First, improving the administrative capacity of the staff of the local government in the imposition (identification of taxable units and periodic revision of tax rates) and collection of taxes assigned to the local government (improving the culture of tax payment and incentives to the staff and citizens). Second, the local government should promote non-tax revenue sources and collect revenue from these sources. Third, the policy of soft budget constraints should be replaced by hard budget constraints to provide strong incentives to the local government to depend on imposition and collection of tax and non-tax revenue. Decentralised government is expected to contribute to the improved delivery of services, such as education, agricultural development, drinking water, and so on, and thereby contribute to poverty reduction. In this volume, the contribution of decentralised governance on peacebuilding, disaster risk reduction, school education, and drinking water supply is examined,

xvi Foreword and the following policy suggestions are made. First, the decentralisation as a peacebuilding strategy, especially in the frontier and conflict-affected regions, will work when elections are held regularly, own resource mobilisation is high, and the devolution of fiscal resources is adequate. Second, the decentralised government contributes to landslide disaster management in those Panchayats where MGNREGS funds are effectively used in undertaking those activities (such as flood control, water conservation, droughtproofing, and renovation of traditional water bodies) for reducing the risk of landslide disasters. The capacity of Panchayats needs to be therefore strengthened in undertaking these activities. Third, peoples’ institutions created under the local government to promote the quality of education and thereby to achieve improved educational outputs (higher enrolment, retention, and completion rates) are likely to ensure improved educational outputs when the process of the formation of these institutions is free from political interference, and the capacity of members (especially those belonging to disadvantaged groups) of these institutions is constantly improved to enable them to participate effectively. Fourth, a comparative study on the performance of institutions (local government and community-based) in the provision of drinking water shows that different institutions have different ‘comparative advantages’, and hence collaboration between the local government and community-based organisations is required to achieve good development outcomes such as effectiveness and sustainability. There is a need to improve education and leadership skills among members of the community-based organisations (especially among Scheduled Castes and Tribes) for genuine empowerment. Urban decentralisation is a relatively under-researched area in the Indian context. In this volume, it is argued that the concentration of urban population in a large city leads to poor governance as there is an inverse relationship between governability of a city and the size of urban agglomeration. This leads to problems such as air pollution, housing problems, increased crime rate, and the failure of civic authorities and citizens to take action on any of these in an effective manner. The volume argues that spatial deconcentration of urban development as well as political decentralisation of urban governance is required. In addition, although the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act provides for Ward Sabhas in urban localities, they are not formed in all the urban localities. In those cases where they are formed, the Ward Sabhas seek to represent a very large number of citizens, thereby reducing their effectiveness. In view of this, the emergence of resident welfare associations as the ‘people’s voice’, albeit with their apparent middle-class nature, could be utilised as an important avenue for deepening participation and decision making at the local level. There is, however, a need to make these associations more inclusive and effective. The chapters in this volume thus cover important and neglected aspects in the discourse of decentralisation, such as peacebuilding through decentralised governance, disaster risk reduction, fiscal decentralisation, gender

Foreword  xvii budgeting, school education, and urban decentralisation. The chapters together provide an insightful and useful understanding of the working of decentralised governance and development efforts at the state level. The volume also presents cases from Jammu and Kashmir, Sikkim, Delhi, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha, the states from which not much literature on decentralisation is available. Prof. D Rajasekhar, Dr. R Manjula, and Prof. M Devendra Babu deserve appreciation for bringing out this publication. Professor Sukhadeo Thorat Chairman, ISEC Board of Governors

Preface and Acknowledgements

In 1992, historic legislation on decentralisation (the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts) was passed in India. Hailed as an important landmark for its radical approach towards decentralisation, this legislation devolved powers to sub-state level government and sought to ensure the participation of disadvantaged groups. The legislation sought to bring in a new political system at the grassroots level by giving priority to decentralised political institutions, and people’s participation in local governance and planning. In rural areas, a three-tier model with democratically elected governments at the village, block/taluk, and district levels was adapted, while urban local bodies were set up in towns and cities. The amendments provided for the Grama Sabha in rural areas and Ward Committees in urban areas (for promoting people’s participation in decision-making, planning, and development), reservation of seats and authority positions for women and those belonging to disadvantaged social groups, mandatory elections, the periodic constitution of state finance commission, and so on. Given that decentralisation reforms have been implemented in India for over a quarter-century now, the question of what is the current status of Panchayats in India becomes pertinent. In order to address this question, the Centre for Decentralisation and Development (CDD) at the Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC), Bengaluru, organised a seminar on ‘Twenty Five Years of Decentralised Governance in India: Status, Issues and the Way Forward’ during 28–30 August 2018 at the Institute. After the seminar, a few of the presented papers were selected for inclusion in the volume and these were revised in the light of comments from the discussants and participants in the seminar, editors of the volume, and peer reviewers at Routledge. In bringing out this volume for publication, we acknowledge the help and support received from several sources. A partial grant from Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi, was helpful to organise the seminar. Our heartfelt thanks go to Prof. Sukhadeo Thorat, Chairman, ISEC Board of Governors, for contributing the Foreword to the volume. A six-member screening committee was constituted for screening of the abstracts and providing comments on draft papers. Our sincere gratitude is

Preface and Acknowledgements  xix due to Professors N. Jayaram, M. V. Nadkarni and Abdul Aziz for being part of the screening committee for their support in the screening of abstracts as well as in the review of draft papers. The research assistance provided by Mr J. Murali is gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank the referee at Routledge for critical and encouraging comments on earlier versions of the chapters included in this volume. We also would like to thank the chapter contributors for revising their papers. Last but not the least, our heartfelt thanks go to Dr Shashank S. Sinha, the Publishing Director at Routledge, for his constant support and encouragement in bringing out this volume, and Ms Antara Ray Chaudhury, Development Editor at Routledge, for getting the entire process of refereeing completed in an efficient manner. D. Rajasekhar R. Manjula M. Devendra Babu

Part I

Introduction



1

Working of decentralised governance in contemporary India D. Rajasekhar

Decentralisation is defined as “the process of devolution of political, administrative, and fiscal powers from the centre to locally elected government, and the participation of people and the presence of their voices in improving service delivery and development through the local government” (Rajasekhar, 2022: 4). The content and pattern of the transfer may vary from one society to another and, depending on this, may take the forms of deconcentration, delegation, devolution, and privatisation (Rondinelli, John, and Shabbir, 1983). Of these forms, devolution is widely considered to be the strongest, while deconcentration is the weakest.1 In the literature, one will also find a reference to political decentralisation (devolution of political powers and functions), administrative decentralisation (devolution of powers on functionaries), and fiscal decentralisation (devolution of financial powers). Decentralised government is propagated all over the world because of its perceived advantages over centralised government. Being close to the people, the decentralised government is expected to have reliable and costeffective information on the needs and preferences of the citizens in its jurisdiction. With this information, decentralised government will be in a more advantageous position to enable the participation of citizens, especially those belonging to the categories of poor and disadvantaged, in the preparation of need-based and decentralised plans for the delivery of basic services, local development, and poverty alleviation. Elected leaders will have incentives to implement the plans in an effective manner as this is likely to help them to get re-elected. Regular elections will provide an opportunity to citizens to defeat non-responsive and non-performing leaders, and this will contribute to the downward accountability of the local government to its citizens (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Blair, 2000; Crook and Manor, 1998; Manor, 1999; Rondinelli, 1983; Rondinelli, McCullough and Johnson, 1989; Kulipossa, 2004; Oates, 1972; Smoke, 2015; Sharma, 2006).

Decentralisation in India These theoretical considerations have influenced governments worldwide, including India, to initiate decentralisation reforms. In India, DOI: 10.4324/9781003094357-1

4  D. Rajasekhar historic legislation on decentralisation (the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts) was passed in December 1992. These acts came into force as the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992, on 24 April 1993, and the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992, on 1 June 1993. Hailed as important landmarks for their radical approach towards decentralisation, this legislation devolved powers to sub-state level governments and sought to ensure the inclusion of disadvantaged groups in the decentralised governance at the local level. This legislation was intended to bring a new political system to the grassroots level by giving priority to decentralised political institutions and therefore encouraging people’s participation in local governance and planning. In rural areas, a three-tier model with democratically elected governments at the village, block/taluk, and district levels was adapted. In towns and cities, urban local bodies were set up. From 1993 onwards local government at the district, taluk, and village levels (called as Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs)) and in urban areas came into existence as soon as governments in the different states passed acts in compliance with the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts. It needs to be noted that local government existed in India even before 1992. However, a widespread feeling that existed during the period before the new legislation was that the local governments did not have the status and dignity of viable and responsive institutions. The main factors contributing to ineffective local governance, to name a few, were infrequent elections, prolonged supersession, insufficient representation of persons belonging to disadvantaged groups, inadequate devolution of powers, and lack of financial resources. The PRIs before 1992 did not have sufficient representation of persons belonging to the categories of Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), minorities, and women. The poor and wage labour dependent households were also not represented in Panchayats. This raised doubts on the ability of the local government to contribute to the democratisation of society and inclusive development. The new and historic legislation addressed the above by incorporating the following mandatory provisions in the decentralised governance. A provision for the Grama Sabha in rural areas and ward committee in urban areas was made for promoting people’s participation in the presentation of needs and preferences, facilitating decision making on priority needs, and enabling the people to plan, implement, and monitor development plans. Second, seats and executive positions were reserved for women and those belonging to disadvantaged social groups to pave the way for the inclusion of these disadvantaged groups for inclusive development at the local level. Third, elections for local bodies once in five years became mandatory to promote downward accountability as local politicians would have to ensure effective service delivery at the local level in order to get re-elected. Fourth, the State Finance Commission would be constituted once every five years to provide sufficient financial resources to the local elected government. The mandate

Decentralised governance in India  5 of the finance commissions is to assess the financial situation of local elected governments at all levels and recommend the devolution of finances if there is a shortfall between the needs of citizens and finance available with local government. Fifth, District Planning Committees (DPCs) would be constituted to facilitate decentralised planning. Thus, the provisions of these two legislations are expected to firmly place decentralised governance in both urban and rural areas. Another concern with local government before 1992 was the inadequate devolution of powers. The functions assigned to Panchayats did not include key components of rural development, such as land development, irrigation, agriculture, allied activities and rural industries, health, education, development of disadvantaged groups of women, and those belonging to lower caste groups. As a result, rural development was not perceived to be peoplecentric and inclusive. A rectification was sought for this with the decentralisation reforms of the 1990s, which stipulated that local government should prepare plans for economic development and social justice in respect of subjects as devolved by law, including 29 subjects in the Eleventh Schedule (Article 234G). It was expected that the decentralised government would result in democratisation, and people-centric and inclusive development.

Growing expectations on decentralised governance In the last decade or so, the expectations on decentralised governments to deliver inclusive and sustainable development are increasing. Many countries in the world, including India, have been giving considerable importance to inclusive growth and development. Growth rates have been impressive in India in the past couple of decades, and currently India is one of the fastestgrowing countries in the world. However, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the growth has not equally benefited disadvantaged groups, such as Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, minorities, and women. The main reason for this is the stratification of Indian society in terms of social, economic, and human capital endowments. The policymakers therefore aimed to empower decentralised government in rural and urban areas as important institutions for the delivery of the essential services that are critical to inclusive development (Government of India, 2006). A number of international agreements relating to sustainable development and disaster management goals have arrived at in the last decade or so, and these assigned roles to the local government in meeting these goals. As far as disaster management is concerned, the HYOGO framework for action (2005–2015) and SENDAI framework (2015–2030) are important international initiatives that aim to substantially promote disaster management at the local and higher levels. In response, the Indian government prepared the National Disaster Mitigation Plan, the Disaster Management Act 2005, and the National Policy on Disaster Management 2009. As per the Disaster Management Act 2005 of India, local governments, which

6  D. Rajasekhar include Panchayats, Urban Local Bodies (ULBs), Town Planning Authorities, Autonomous District councils, etc., would function as per the directions of the District Authority and would be responsible for carrying out the relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction activities in a post-disaster situation. Also, local authorities were empowered to ensure that all construction activities within or under its jurisdiction were in conformance with the mitigation guidelines laid down by National and State Disaster Management Authorities. In 2015, the United Nations formulated 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) after evaluating the success of the Millennium Development Goals. SDGs aim to achieve a combination of objectives relating to economic development, environmental sustainability, and social inclusion. These goals are: good health and wellbeing (Goal 3), quality education (Goal 4), gender equality (Goal 5), clean water and sanitation (Goal 6), and so on. Though these goals are formulated at the international level, they can only be achieved in a specific country when concerted action at the local level is planned, implemented, and monitored by an institution together with people. It is therefore expected that, at the micro-level, local government has a crucial role to play in achieving the SDGs by planning and implementing activities related to the 29 subjects enlisted in the Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution. For a long time there was criticism of the decentralisation in India that while the functions devolved to Panchayats are many, the funds provided were not in consonance with the assigned functions. In the last decade or so, two important policy decisions have improved the financial situation of Panchayats, especially Grama Panchayats (GPs). The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) provides considerable funds for undertaking rural development activities that provide wage employment to the poor and improve the community asset base in rural areas. More recently, the government has taken the initiative to strengthen Grama Panchayats financially. Based on the recommendation of the 14th Finance Commission, it was decided to provide grants to the tune of Rs. 200,292 crores to Grama Panchayats in India during the period 2015–2020. On average, each Grama Panchayat was expected to receive Rs. 17 lakhs in a year and Rs. 85 lakhs during the five year period, 2015–2020. Each Grama Panchayat was asked to spend this amount on sanitation, drinking water, maintenance of community assets, garbage management, drainage, roads, streetlights, and other basic services. Grama Panchayats through Grama Sabha are mandated to formulate planning for all development works, including basic infrastructure. Panchayats need to have localised planning to ensure that these amenities reach everyone, including those from the weaker sections. The trend of providing financial resources for local development continued: The 15th Finance Commission granted Rs. 436,361 crores from the central divisive tax pool to local governments, both rural and urban, for the period 2021–2026.

Decentralised governance in India  7

The volume The above suggests that there are several expectations on decentralised government in India. This leads to a question on whether the decentralised government is in a position to fulfil these expectations. An answer to this question depends not on powers devolved to the local government as per the constitution but on the current status of decentralisation, including the extent to which people are able to seize the decentralisation opportunity provided in the constitution. There is therefore a need to look at the status of decentralisation in contemporary India. The chapters in this volume look at decentralisation issues by raising the following questions. What is the current status of Grama Sabhas and fiscal decentralisation in India? What is the extent to which decentralised government has contributed to improved service delivery? What is the current status of urban decentralisation? The chapters in this volume, barring three, were presented in a seminar held at the Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bengaluru, during 28–30 August 2018. After the seminar, the chapters selected for inclusion in the volume were revised in the light of comments from the discussants and participants in the seminar, editors of the volume, and peer reviewers at Routledge. The chapters in this volume are unique in the sense that they seek to address certain key and neglected issues in the discourse of decentralisation, such as peacebuilding through decentralised governance, disaster risk reduction, fiscal decentralisation, gender budgeting, and urban decentralisation. The volume also presents cases from Jammu and Kashmir, Sikkim, Delhi, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha, the states from which not much literature on decentralisation is available.

Status and issues of decentralisation The chapters in the volume cover the following four major themes: Mechanisms facilitating people’s participation and women empowerment; fiscal decentralisation; impact of decentralisation on poverty reduction; urban local governments. In the ensuing paragraphs, key findings and conclusions of the chapters in this volume are presented by theme relating to status and issues concerning decentralisation in contemporary India. Mechanisms to facilitate people’s participation and women empowerment As noted earlier, decentralisation is a process that transfers powers to local government. However, the mere transfer of powers to the local government will not result in the good development outcomes of improved and efficient service delivery and poverty reduction at the local level. There is a need to empower the people at the local level for the process of deliberation under which a group of people can reach an agreement through discussion and

8  D. Rajasekhar debate (Heller and Rao, 2015, p. 1). Effective deliberation by local government can transform and empower the poor, enhance their capacity for collective action, and enable them to manage their own affairs. An important hallmark of decentralisation reforms in India is to provide institutional mechanisms of Grama Sabhas and Ward Committees in Grama Panchayats and ULBs, respectively, to facilitate deliberation at the grassroots level and to achieve people’s participation in local governance and planning. The Constitutional amendments have also provided a forum in the form of promoting people’s participation in planning and implementation. A Grama Sabha is a village assembly/council consisting of all the adult voters of the village. As Rajasekhar and Manjula write in their chapter in this volume, A Grama Sabha is an institutional space created within the local government for structured interactions between the public and the policymakers. Such an institution maximises opportunities for poor and socially marginalised groups and enables them to participate in the presentation of needs and preferences, prioritisation of the same, resource allocation, plan preparation, and implementation and monitoring. Rajasekhar and Manjula, after reviewing the literature, note that the studies exploring the association between Grama Sabha and service delivery are not many. Their chapter on ‘Are citizens participating in Grama Sabha to improve service delivery? Evidence from Karnataka’ therefore explores the association between participation in Grama Sabha meetings and improvement in the performance of GPs in the delivery of key services (streetlights, drinking water, sanitation, and village roads) with the help of data collected from a large number of sample households in nine districts at two points in time. The authors found an improvement in the performance of the local government in the delivery of key services during the period 2015 to 2017, and this improvement is attributed to citizen participation in Grama Sabha. An important empirical finding is that the participation of households in Grama Sabha meetings tends to be higher if they rate the delivery of a service as poor or average. They also show that there was no discrimination against the households belonging to Scheduled Castes and minority religions in so far as the improved delivery of key services is concerned. There was, however, discrimination against those belonging to Scheduled Tribes. The ability to improve the service delivery through participation in Grama Sabha was, however, not uniform across all public services, and the authors provide contributing factors to this. The authors thus argue that the participation of citizens in Grama Sabha meetings will positively influence the delivery of those services on which the GPs have control. Women empowerment The issue of the inclusion of women in decentralised governance and their empowerment is important given that there is a qualitative difference between women and men in the prioritisation of needs and preferences,

Decentralised governance in India  9 and allocation of resources. An affirmative policy is therefore followed in the local governance for inclusive development in India. As noted earlier, historic legislation provided for the reservation of one-third of the seats and executive positions to women in order to promote their participation in local governance. Subsequently, the proportion of seats reserved for women was increased to 50 per cent in several states. These policies have substantially increased the representation of women in Panchayats (local government) at the village, block, and district levels. It is hoped that the improved representation of women in local government will result in the participation of women representatives in local governance. It is also hoped that they will utilise the space provided for consultations with citizens, especially women, in the Grama Sabha and undertake those activities that are preferred by women, leading to the allocation of public goods in favour of women and thereby to inclusive development. Several studies have addressed the issue of the beneficial impact of reservations on women, although there is no agreement on the exact impact. Some studies found that reservations have had a positive impact. For instance, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) found that women leaders allocated more funds for those projects that are relevant for women. Rajasekhar and Manjula (2012) show that women-headed Grama Panchayats tended to be more efficient in the delivery of streetlight services. Deininger et al. (2015) found that gender quotas increase the level and quality of women’s political participation, their ability to hold leaders accountable, and their willingness to contribute to public goods. Ban and Rao (2008) arrived at the cautious conclusion that women leaders perform better than men in situations where they have more political experience, if they were living in villages less dominated by upper castes and in states where Panchayats are mature. Jayal (2006) notes that institutional design as well as of the design of social inequalities of gender and caste inhibit a fuller and more effective participation by women. The studies thus suggest that in a large and diverse country like India, there are bound to be differences across the states and that there is a need for more studies on this aspect. It is in this context that the participation of women representatives in gender budgeting is examined in the next chapter of this book in the specific context of Kerala. In this state, although human development is high, gender inequality exists in the socio-economic and political sphere. Women empowerment has therefore become an important concern of the decentralisation process in Kerala. As a response to this, 10 per cent of the total development expenditure of the Local Self Government Institutions is allocated to the Women Component Sub-Plan (WCP) for the upliftment of rural women. Blessy Sarah Mathew and Pushpa Savadatti in their chapter on ‘A quarter of a century of the women component plan at the rural grassroots level in Kerala: A case study of Mutholy Gram Panchayath’ examine the role of Grama Panchayat representatives, particularly women, in the effective execution of the WCP Sub-Plan at the level of GP. For this purpose,

10  D. Rajasekhar they collected primary data from a Grama Panchayat in Kerala for 25 years. By bringing out the nature of the projects implemented under the WCP and the amount that was allocated and utilised on WCP projects, the authors find that projects included under the WCP are repetitive and inadequate to empower rural women. After the enactment of the Kerala Panchayat (Amendment) Act 2009, the representation of women was more than that of men. But, the increased space did not translate into the equal involvement of women representatives in GP activities. Re-orientation of WCP projects is suggested to increase the participation of women representatives at GPs. Fiscal decentralisation Devolution of fiscal powers to the local government for the imposition of taxes and expenditure decisions is expected to result in good development outcomes. The power to impose taxes at the local level and a higher proportion of revenue through the local government’s own sources in the total expenditure is expected to contribute to improved accountability. Citizens will pay taxes when services delivered by the local government are needbased, appropriate, and effective. They refuse to pay taxes when the local government fails to provide effective services. A higher proportion of own revenue in the total expenditure is thus indicative of effective service delivery at the local level and accountability of the local government to citizens. A larger share of its own revenue also indicates that the local government has autonomy in the expenditure decisions and the provision of appropriate services to citizens. This is in contrast to a situation where a larger proportion of total expenditure incurred by the local government is through tied grants provided by the higher levels of the government. Against this background, the next two chapters examine the fiscal decentralisation in the two Indian states of Karnataka and Chattisgarh. The chapter by K. Basavarajeshwari on ‘Fiscal decentralisation at the sub-state level in India: A study of Karnataka State’ provides a long-term view on patterns in the finances of rural local bodies – own revenues, transfers, nature of grants, and the role of the State Finance Commission – with the help of secondary data collected over nearly two decades. The chapter shows that income from own revenue sources has been very nominal, and the dependency of the local government on grants has therefore increased in the last two decades. A detailed analysis of plan and non-plan allocation from the state and centre shows that plan outlay against gross state domestic product increased by just 1 per cent. On the other hand, non-plan outlays from the state witnessed a 3 per cent increase. Non-plan outlays are largely meant for the payment of wages and salaries. The author, thus, shows that the local government depended mostly on grants from the higher-level governments, which are largely conditional and matched in nature. The higherlevel governments also did not give discretionary authority to PRIs to spend grants on local priorities. This implies that the local government did not have

Decentralised governance in India  11 fiscal autonomy in the true sense and could not spend grants according to the needs and preferences of people at the grassroots level. Since Panchayats did not obtain untied grants, they could not prepare need-based plans for the benefit of the people. The author concludes that this goes against the theory and the very purpose of decentralisation. The next chapter by M. Gopinath Reddy and Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra looks at issues in fiscal decentralisation in Chhattisgarh, the state where we do not find much literature on decentralisation in general and fiscal decentralisation in particular. This chapter maps the fiscal decentralisation process in Chhattisgarh by analysing recommendations of State Finance Commissions (SFCs) and the Central Finance Commission, and offers policy recommendations to improve the financial situation of the PRIs. The chapter concludes that taxes and non-taxes are the main sources of own revenues of the PRIs, particularly in the case of GPs. However, the gap between demand and collection of taxes has increased, and this has disturbed the fiscal decentralisation agenda in the state. Policy suggestions emerging from the chapter are: (i) There is a need to reduce and rationalise the number of taxes by having a categorisation of taxes and non-taxes instead of obligatory and optional as mentioned in the State Panchayati Raj Act, and (ii) It is important to allocate at least 10 per cent of the state’s own tax revenue with Panchayats to effective delivery of services at the local level. Sectoral aspects of decentralisation Decentralised government is expected to contribute to poverty reduction in a number of ways. First, democratisation and empowerment of local elected bodies will lead to the participation of the people, especially the poor. Regular elections to decentralised government, introduction of transparency mechanisms, and devolution of political powers have the potential to empower the poor and enable their participation in local decision making, and hold the government officials accountable for their actions. Because of these, the local elected government is expected to improve the efficiency and responsiveness of public officials in the delivery of key services and thereby leading to inclusive development and poverty reduction. The experience of decentralised governments in the delivery of key services is discussed in this volume. Peacebuilding as an outcome of decentralisation is discussed by Sardar Babur Hussein in his chapter on ‘Peacebuilding and economic development through decentralisation: A case study of conflict-affected Jammu and Kashmir’. Another interesting aspect is that the chapter discusses the experience of decentralisation in the frontier and conflict-affected state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), which has not received much scholarly attention in spite of having the unique distinction of introducing the idea of decentralised governance much earlier. A central aim of this chapter is to provide a historical background of the decentralisation in the state of J&K and to

12  D. Rajasekhar assess the present work of decentralisation as a peacebuilding and development strategy. The chapter situates the work of decentralisation within the protracted conflict situation in the state and explores the outcomes related to local community participation and specifically the issues related to the devolution of funds and taxation powers. The chapter argues that Panchayats in J&K have failed to act as instruments of change and development. This is because the decentralisation strategy is driven largely by political motivations; important aspects such as credibility and the timely conduct of Panchayat elections, the state’s real commitment to devolution of powers including funds, and the taxation powers of PRIs have been sidelined and have been given secondary importance. Disaster risk reduction as an outcome of decentralised governance has been taken up for a discussion by Shikha Subba in her chapter on ‘Landslides, decentralised government and the MGNREGS: A study in Sikkim and Darjeeling’. Landslides are local disasters; the management of and reducing the risk of landslides, therefore, can best be dealt with locally and decentralised governance is best suited to this task. This chapter is a comparative study of the Sikkim and Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) region (consisting of Darjeeling and Kalimpong districts) in West Bengal, which frequently face landslide problems, but both are different in how local government deals with landslide disasters. In Sikkim, a decentralised government is entrusted with the function of dealing with landslide problems. In the GTA region, on the other hand, local administration functions are undertaken by the district government since there is no local government at the village level on account of the nonconduct of Panchayat elections. The key findings of the chapter are the following. First, the disaster risk reduction functions are mainly vested with the central and state authority and then to some extent to the district and a little to Zilla and Grama Panchayats. Though National Policy on Disaster Management 2009 emphasises the importance of local government in disaster risk reduction, it is mainly related to relief and rehabilitation. Second, Panchayats in Sikkim have played an important role in landslide disaster management, while there is no defined role for local government in the GTA region. Third, the analysis of secondary data on MGNREGS revealed that Sikkim is comparatively better in the implementation of the activities such as flood control, water conservation, and harvesting, and the land development and renovation of traditional water bodies, which have considerable potential to reduce the risk of landslides. Finally, human and material loss due to landslide disasters was much less in Sikkim. The chapter, thus, suggests that the performance of local governments in the implementation of disaster risk reduction activities under MGNREGS has had a positive impact on landslide risk reduction in Sikkim. The role of local government in the improvement of school education is taken up for discussion by D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula in their chapter on ‘Decentralised delivery of school education: Evidence from Karnataka’.

Decentralised governance in India  13 Governance and management related issues are one of the associated factors with poor educational outputs in terms of poor enrolment and retention. Decentralisation is often presented as a promising policy option to overcome these problems and thereby improve educational outputs. Decentralisation reforms have been therefore carried out for improving local governance for better educational outcomes. School Development and Management Committees (SDMCs) have been constituted to promote people’s participation in school development. The functioning of SDMCs in Karnataka is examined in this chapter with the help of primary data collected from SDMC member households and non-SDMC member households. The three SDMCs covered in the study are different in their functioning. While one functions well, another one does not function well. The third was completely defunct. The functioning SDMC had a good relationship with the Grama Panchayat, and hence outputs achieved were good in terms of resource mobilisation from the public and quick resolution of problems. The nonfunctioning SDMC witnessed political interference right at the time of its constitution; as a result, the composition of the SDMC was not accepted locally. This in turn resulted in an intense conflict between the SDMC and Grama Panchayat, and between the SDMC and teachers. The educational outcomes in the village with the non-functioning SDMC were poor in terms of reduced enrolment and poor retention rates. The decentralisation theory expects that the investment by the decentralised institutions is efficient; however, the investment in school building proved to be inefficient. The third SDMC became defunct because of internal contradictions and official interference. Here again, we did not find the cordial relationship between the Grama Panchayat and SDMC. The analysis thus shows that there is a need to have a harmonious relationship between the Grama Panchayat and SDMC for achieving good educational outcomes. The role of local government in the provision and sustenance of the supply of drinking water in Kerala is examined by K. R. Nisha in her chapter ‘Is decentralised planning a success or failure? Case of rural water supply in Kerala’. Nisha writes that Kerala state has implemented decentralised planning very successfully and effectively by transferring powers, functions, and funds to local governments over the last 25 years with appropriate institutional reforms and policy actions. Growing concern on the inadequate coverage of drinking water supply in rural Kerala influenced the state government to persuade the local government to take part in resolving drinking water problems. A number of institutional alternatives and arrangements were experimented within the state during the last three decades in this manner. As a part of decentralised governance, the state government transferred rural water supply schemes, which were originally managed by Kerala Water Authority (KWA), to Grama Panchayats and community-based water supply (CWS) organisations with associated powers. Grama Panchayats were entrusted with the responsibilities of monitoring and control, water quality testing, water resources management, technical assistance, conflict

14  D. Rajasekhar management, and so on. This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the performance of water supply schemes managed by different organisations – KWA, GPs, and CWS. For this purpose, primary data were collected from sample households benefiting from water supply schemes operated by each of these organisations in Kerala. The chapter reveals that the performance of GP schemes in terms of effectiveness was poor as compared to KWA, and community schemes. On the other hand, the GP and community managed schemes were more sustainable than the KWA water supply schemes. An important reason for this was the lack of technical efficiency. The chapter by Prafulla Kumar Nath on ‘Functioning of village water and sanitation committees (VWSC) and sustainability of community-led water projects: An exploratory study of some tribal villages in Odisha State’ examines the effectiveness of community-led projects in handling an extremely important public good like water in the rural context. The functioning of VWSC with regard to monitoring and maintaining the water supply projects, especially during the post-implementation period, to make the projects sustainable is examined. Since social capital (reciprocity, trust, and cooperation) is needed for the successful management of projects, the chapter examines how effectively the VWSCs have been able to build it up. The chapter also attempts to find out if the introduction of decentralisation has enhanced the capacity of the rural people to maintain water delivery systems, and looks at the sustainability of drinking water supply within the present frame of decentralised governance. The chapter tries to understand the panoptical (supervisory) role of the VWSC and how it has been able to bring about behavioural changes in the villagers. The chapter concludes that VWSCs are not functioning well in many villages not so much because of corruption or elite capture but because of lack of awareness on the need to involve decentralised government. It is suggested to make the VWSC self reliant in terms of raising the water issues in the Palli Sabha or Grama Sabha, collecting a monthly power bill and submitting it, maintaining meeting minutes and collection records, establishing a network with the officials of Grama Panchayat and higher-level Panchayats, and strict implementation of working rules (to check free-riding). The author concludes that decentralisation, in its current frame, fails to build social capital (trust, reciprocity, and cooperation), change in social attitude, and financial autonomy. There is, therefore, a need for real financial devolution to strengthen decentralisation as long-term financial dependency destroys the tendency of self reliance and participation among the people. Urban local governments The share of urban population in the total population of India has been increasing over the decades. The fast growth of the urban population (urbanisation) imposes a heavy burden on the urban local governments – in terms of decision making, resource mobilisation, efficient and normative level of

Decentralised governance in India  15 service provision, infrastructure development, and so on. For meeting the challenges and efficient functioning, decentralised urban governments need the proper assignment of administrative, functional and financial powers, and participation of citizens and non-governmental organisations. The next two chapters in this volume discuss these issues. Anil Kumar, in his chapter on ‘Urban decentralisation and local governance in the context of urban centralisation: Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh’, takes up the theme of urban primacy in the discourse of urban decentralisation. This article posits that studies dealing with contemporary urbanisation phenomenon in respect of the developing countries need to pay as much attention to ‘governance’ as to their ‘political economy’. The chapter contrasts the over-emphasis on the political economy of cities with a comparison of the urbanisation process and governance with respect to Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh as cases in point. The chapter finds that the two states continue to remain characterised by ‘urban primacy’ and an absence of a required focus on constitutional governance despite the presence of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act. Concentration of the urban population in a large city leads to poor governance as there is an inverse relationship between the governability of a city and the size of urban agglomeration. The chapter emphasises that there is a need for concerted efforts on the part of the state towards a genuine urban decentralisation in the context of a growing urban centralisation and ‘primacy’ in order to ensure that governance at the district- and taluk-level cities is not neglected completely. The last chapter in this volume is on ‘Citizens’ participation in local governance: A study of Residents Welfare Associations in Delhi’ by Nivedita Bose. As cities are increasingly seen as ‘engines of economic growth’, as well as an increasing strategic importance of them from a political and demographic perspective, various policies, and government interventions have been implemented to improve urban productivity and urban renewal, accompanied by ‘good governance’. This can be seen with the introduction of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act and Community Participation Law that both aim to bring in political decentralisation through citizens’ participation in local decision making. In the case of Delhi, to bring improvement in service delivery and decentralised urban governance through the participation of people in everyday decision making, the Delhi government has implemented the schemes of Bhagidari and Mohalla Sabha over the years. It is in this context, Nivedita examines the impact of neighbourhood-based activism on local governance by understanding the activities of resident welfare associations (RWAs), their interactions with the Bhagidari and Mohalla Sabha schemes, and how they have influenced decision making at the local and state level with the help of qualitative research. Using RWAs as a vantage point to understand citizen negotiations with the state, market, and civil society in the backdrop of newer cultural and political economies of liberalisation, this chapter investigates and recommends the ways in which

16  D. Rajasekhar RWAs can deepen the ideals of empowerment, democracy, participation, and inclusivity.

The way forward Grama Sabha is an important mechanism for the success of decentralised governance as it provides a space for citizens to present their needs and preferences, and contribute to their participation in the preparation of plans, their implementation, and monitoring. It is expected that the voices of citizens in Grama Sabha meetings will positively influence the GP to take measures to improve service delivery. It is found in this volume that the proportion of households attending Grama Sabha meetings tends to be high among those rating the delivery of a service as poor or average. The participation of households belonging to Scheduled Castes and minority religions was also comparatively high. Interestingly, the proportion of households stating that service delivery improved was also high among these two disadvantaged groups. This implies that citizens will present their grievances in Grama Sabha meetings if they find some deficiencies in the decentralised governance. However, it is shown in this volume that the participation of Scheduled Tribe households was relatively low in Grama Sabha meetings. The discrimination in the service delivery was also high in the case of households belonging to this category. The citizen participation in Grama Sabha meetings also tends to be uneven between different Indian states, between men and women, and among different social groups (Rajasekhar and Manjula, 2022). In view of this, efforts such as the provision of information on the importance of Grama Sabha are therefore to be initiated to improve the participation of citizens in the meetings and deliberative democracy for effective and equitable service delivery. The evidence on the impact of the reservation of seats and executive positions for women is mixed. It is argued in this volume that although the representation of women in decentralised governance has improved, the awareness of women representatives on schemes benefiting women and their participation in the implementation of these projects is comparatively low. This finding is related to gender-sensitive budgeting and genderresponsive budgeting, followed in several countries across the world. The volume argues that gender-sensitive budgeting improves projects that benefit women and contribute to some improvement in their economic position. However, the projects are routine and not strategic in nature, and hence they fail to empower women. The design of gender-sensitive budgeting projects is therefore to be improved to meet the strategic needs rather than the practical needs of women. It is found in this volume that own revenue continues to form only a small proportion of total revenues at the local level and that the dependency of the local government on tied grants increases over time, thereby constraining the decentralised government to use its discretion in the use of

Decentralised governance in India  17 tied grants to fulfil the needs and aspirations of the people. In this volume, the following are suggested as policy suggestions to improve the share of own revenue. First, improving the administrative capacity of the staff of the local government in the imposition (identification of taxable units and periodic revision of tax rates) and collection of taxes assigned to the local government (improving the culture of tax payment and incentives to the staff and citizens). Second, the local government should promote non-tax revenue sources and collect revenue from these sources. Third, the policy of soft budget constraints should be replaced by hard budget constraints to provide strong incentives to the local government to depend on imposition and collection tax and non-tax revenue. Fourth, there is a need to link taxes with benefits from the public services delivered by the local government. Decentralised government is expected to contribute to the improved delivery of services, such as education, agricultural development, drinking water, and so on, and thereby contribute to poverty reduction. In this volume, the contribution of decentralised governance on peacebuilding, disaster risk reduction, school education, and drinking water supply is examined, and the following policy suggestions are made. First, a study on the contribution of decentralised governance on peacebuilding, especially in the frontier and conflict-affected regions, shows that although there was high voter turnout in the Panchayat elections, indicating peoples’ faith in the decentralised governance, the inadequate devolution of powers and resources contributed to limited success in public service delivery. Decentralisation as a peacebuilding strategy will work in the conflict-ridden regions when own resource mobilisation is high, and the devolution of fiscal resources is adequate. Second, the decentralised government contributed to a reduction in landslide disasters in those Panchayats where the resources under MGNREGS were effectively used in undertaking those activities (such as flood control, water conservation, drought-proofing, and renovation of traditional water bodies) for reducing the risk of landslide disasters. This implies that MGNREGS has considerable potential to address the risks faced by citizens in areas where the landslide problem is acute. In view of this, the capacity of Panchayats needs to be strengthened in undertaking the mentioned activities for addressing the problem of disaster risk reduction. Third, peoples’ institutions created under the local government to promote the quality of education and thereby to achieve improved educational outputs (higher enrolment, retention, and completion rates) differed in their performance based on the relationship that these institutions had with the local government. The process of the formation of people’s institutions should be free from political interference, and the capacity of members of these institutions needs to be constantly improved to enable them to participate effectively. Fourth, a comparative study on the performance of institutions (local government and community-based) in the provision of drinking water shows that different institutions have different comparative advantages, and hence collaboration between the local

18  D. Rajasekhar government and community-based organisations is required to achieve good development outcomes such as effectiveness and sustainability. There is a need to improve education and leadership skills among members of the community-based organisations (especially among weaker sections) for genuine empowerment. Urban decentralisation is a relatively under-researched area in the Indian context. In this volume, it is argued that the concentration of urban population in a large city such as Bengaluru, Hyderabad, and so on leads to poor governance as there is an inverse relationship between governability of a city and the size of urban agglomeration. This leads to problems such as air pollution, housing problems, increased crime rate, and the failure of civic authorities and citizens to take action on any of these in an effective manner. It is concluded in the volume that spatial deconcentration of urban development as well as political decentralisation of urban governance are required. Second, although the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act provides for Ward Committees in urban localities, they are not formed. In those cases where they are formed, the Ward Committees seek to represent a very large number of citizens, thereby reducing their effectiveness. Against this background, the emergence of resident welfare associations as the ‘people’s voice’, albeit with their apparent middle-class nature, could be utilised as an important avenue for deepening participation and decision making at the local level. There is, however, a need to make these associations more inclusive and effective.

Note 1 There is, however, a view that these forms are complementary in nature, and that the introduction of a weak form leads to citizens demanding for the introduction of a more strong form of decentralisation (Falletti, 2005).

References Ban, Radu and Rao, Vijayendra (2008). ‘Tokenism or Agency? The Impact of Women Reservations on Village Democracies in south India’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 56(3), pp. 501–501. Blair, Harry (2000). ‘Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local Governance in Six Countries’, World Development, 28(1), pp. 21–39. Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra and Duflo, Esther (2004). ‘Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomised Policy Experiment in India’, Econometrica, 72(5), pp. 1409–1443. Crook, Richard C. and Manor, James (1998). Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Crook, Richard C. and Sverrisson, Alan Sturla (2001). ‘Decentralisation and Poverty Alleviation in Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis or, Is West Bengal Unique?’, IDS Working Paper 130. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

Decentralised governance in India  19 Deininger, Klaus, Jin, Songqing, Nagarajan, Hari K. and Xia, Fang (2015). ‘Does Female Reservation Affect Long-Term Political Outcomes? Evidence from Rural India’, The Journal of Development Studies, 51(1), pp. 32–49. Falletti, T. G. (2005). ‘A Sequential Theory of Decentralisation: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective’, American Political Science Review, 99(3), pp. 327–46. Government of India (2006). Towards Faster and More Inclusive Growth: An Approach to the 11th Five-Year Plan. New Delhi: Planning Commission, Yojana Bhawan. Heller, Patrick and Rao, Vijayendra (eds.) (2015). Deliberation and Development: Rethinking the Role of Voice and Collective Action in Unequal Societies. The World Bank: Washington. Jayal, Niraja Gopal (2006). ‘Engendering Local Democracy: The Impact of Quotas for Women in India’s Panchayats’, Democratization, 13(1), pp. 15–35. Kulipossa, F. P. (2004). ‘Decentralization and Democracy in Developing Countries: An Overview’, Development in Practice, 14(6), pp. 768–779. Manor, James (1999). The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralisation. Directions in Development Series. Washington, DC: World Bank. Oates, Wallace E. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Rajasekhar, D. (2022). ‘Decentralised Governance and Development in India: An Introduction’, in Rajasekhar, D. (ed.) Handbook of Decentralised Governance and Development in India. New York: Routledge (forthcoming). Rajasekhar, D. and Manjula, R. (2012). ‘Affordability of Streetlight Services by Gram Panchayats in Karnataka: Status, Determinants and Ways Forward’, Journal of Rural Development, 31(4), pp. 419–434. Rajasekhar, D. and Manjula, R. (2022). ‘Deliberative Democracy through Grama Sabhas: Progress and Issues’, in Rajasekhar, D. (ed.) Handbook of Decentralised Governance and Development in India. London: Routledge (forthcoming). Rondinelli, Dennis A. (1983). ‘Implementing Decentralisation Programmes in Asia: A Comparative Analysis’, Public Administration and Development, 3, pp. 181–207. Rondinelli, Dennis A., Nellis, John R. and Shabbir, Cheema G. (1983). ‘Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience’, World Bank Staff Working Papers No. 581 and Management and Development Series No. 8. Washington: The World Bank. Rondinelli, Dennis A., McCullough, J. S. and Johnson, R. W. (1989). ‘Analyzing Decentralization Policies in Developing Countries: A Political Economy Framework’, Development and Change, 20(1), pp. 57–87. Sharma, C. K. (2006). ‘Decentralization Dilemma: Measuring the Degree and Evaluating the Outcomes’, The Indian Journal of Political Science, 67(1), pp. 49–64. Smoke, Paul (2015). ‘Rethinking Decentralization: Assessing Challenges to a Popular Public Sector Reform’, Public Administration and Development, 35(2), pp. 98–112.

Part II

Mechanisms to facilitate people’s participation and women empowerment



2

Are citizens participating in Grama Sabha to improve service delivery? Evidence from Karnataka D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula

Introduction In decentralised governance, the participation of the people assumes considerable importance. Local government, being closer to the people, will have better information on the needs and preferences of the people under its governance so it can prioritise and formulate need-based plans for its population. In this scheme of things, a mechanism that facilitates participation is crucial to the success of decentralised governance. In the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, there is provision for Grama Sabha as a mechanism to promote people’s participation, improve responsiveness, and ensure accountability from the local government. Called as ‘invited space’ (Aiyer, 2010), Grama Sabha is the most visible mechanism providing an opportunity for people to participate in the local governance of India’s 250,000 Grama Panchayats (GPs). By providing legal backing to Grama Sabha, the government invites citizens to participate in deliberations at the local level, present needs and prioritise them, to assist in the implementation and administration of programmes, and monitor the implementation of plans and government programmes. Grama Sabhas have functioned in India now for over 25 years. Previous research has primarily focused on the conduct of Grama Sabha meetings, awareness of and participation in them, reasons why citizens attend and do not attend these meetings,1 the deliberations taking place, and the impact of these meetings.2 However, there are not many studies that look into the relationship between Grama Sabha and service delivery. In this chapter, we aim to fill this research gap. The chapter analyses the following key questions: How do people rate the key services provided by the GPs? Do they participate in Grama Sabha when they have problems with poor service delivery? Is participation in Grama Sabha meetings associated with the performance of the delivery of key services by the local government? The data used to address these questions was collected at two points in time from 2,231 randomly selected sample households from 154 villages located in the same number of GPs spread across nine districts of Karnataka. DOI: 10.4324/9781003094357-2

24  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula In this chapter, the focus is on key services, the provision of which is the key function of GPs. These are drinking water, streetlights, sanitation/drainage, and roads, which are essential services for citizens in the jurisdiction of GPs. The data on the functioning of these sources were collected from households directly depending on them at two points in time; in 2015 (the first survey) and in 2017 (the second survey). We asked the sample households to rate the performance of the drinking water supply on a five-point Likert scale of very poor, poor, average, good, and excellent. Likewise, questions were asked on the functioning of the streetlights close to their house, and drainage, and road located in front of their house. The descriptive analysis on the functioning of key services in this chapter, however, uses three scales, namely, poor, average and good, for the sake of simplicity in the analysis. We also asked the sample households whether they attended a GS meeting between 2015 and 2017. After this introduction, the legal provision for Grama Sabhas is discussed in the second section. In the third section, the performance of key services provided by GPs is provided. In the penultimate section, the association between Grama Sabha attendance and the performance of GPs in the delivery of five key services is discussed. The fourth section concludes the chapter.

Legal provision for Ward and Grama Sabhas In this section, we will discuss the legal provision for Grama Sabha in the country as well as in Karnataka. Article 243 of the 73rd Constitution Amendment Act provides for the creation of Grama Sabhas, which consist of persons registered on the electoral roll of a village coming under the jurisdiction of the GP. In India, Grama Sabha, the meeting of which is held at the level of the GP, is a village assembly/council. Grama Sabha is an institutional space created within the local government for structured interactions between citizens and policymakers (elected leaders and officials). Article 243(A) mentions that a Grama Sabha may exercise such powers and perform such functions at the village level as the legislature of a state may, by law, provide. The Constitution has left it up to the states in the Indian union to specify the powers and functions of Grama Sabha. An institution like Grama Sabha at the grassroots level is intended to maximise opportunities for poor and socially marginalised groups and to exert influence over policy choice, resource allocation, and programme design (Robinson, 1998, p. 153). The Grama Sabha at the grassroots level facilitates participatory governance and planning since elected representatives, officials, and the citizens are expected to participate in it. This platform enables the GP to plan and implement the local development projects according to the needs and preferences of the people. Greater citizen participation in local budget decisions, spending choices, and development planning yield greater citizen satisfaction with basic services and more coverage for previously excluded groups – particularly the poor, minorities, and women – thus moving toward more inclusive governance (Babu, Rajasekhar, and

Does Grama Sabha improve service delivery?  25 Manjula, 2011, p. 214). Through Grama Sabha, the citizens exercise their voice and demand the accountability and transparency of local officials in their administration and development. Thus, in a nutshell, Grama Sabha paves the way for people-centred development. Besley, Pande, and Rao (2008, p. 253) mention the two ways in which Grama Sabha may improve the working of the local government. First, relative to elected representatives, these meetings may better reflect citizens’ preferences on issues such as how to target resources to the neediest groups. Second, by providing a forum for monitoring the actions of elected representatives, they may reduce agency problems in politics, and the extent of corruption. Complying with the mandatory Constitutional provision for Grama Sabha, the Karnataka government incorporated Grama Sabha in its new KPR Act, in 1993. As per this Act, all those persons above 18 years and whose names are registered on the village voters list are its members. Initially, Grama Sabhas were to be held in each of the revenue villages. Having village level Grama Sabhas and GP level Grama Sabhas used to create confusion among the people and resulted in underrepresentation of vulnerable groups in the final Grama Sabhas where the key decisions were arrived at. In order to strengthen the decentralisation process in Karnataka, the Government of Karnataka set up a working group on decentralisation in 2002. Accordingly, this Committee included Grama Sabhas as one of the thrust areas. With regard to Grama Sabhas, this Committee recommended the following changes in the KPR Act (GoK, 2002). ••

••

In order to clear the confusion about the Grama Sabha meetings specific to revenue villages and Grama Sabha meetings specific to the entire GP, the Committee proposed for the constitution of Ward (vasathi) Sabhas. The Ward Sabha meetings may be held by elected members of the Panchayat for the voters of each constituency. This forum would give an opportunity for more intense and meaningful participation of the people. With the introduction of the Ward Sabhas, the Committee recommended that Grama Sabha meetings relate to the Panchayat as a whole, rather than relating to any particular village. Thus, the Grama Sabha consists of all the voters in a GP.

To strengthen these institutions, the state government brought in certain amendments in the year 2004. As per this amendment, a minimum of two Ward Sabhas at the Ward (constituency) level and two Grama Sabhas at the Panchayat level are to be held in a year. Various functions, such as a review of Panchayat finances, development plans, audit reports, implementation and monitoring of programmes, identification of beneficiaries, etc., were entrusted

26  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula to the Ward and Grama Sabha. The main intention of such institutions is to involve local people in Panchayat activities, particularly in plan formulation, implementation, and monitoring (Rajasekhar, Babu, and Manjula, 2018a). Thus, Ward and Grama Sabhas play a key role in incorporating the governance principles in the implementation of development programmes. Both Ward Sabhas and Grama Sabhas should be held once in six months. The quorum of a Ward Sabha meeting should ‘not be less than one-tenth of the total number of members of the Ward Sabha or twenty members’, while the quorum of a Grama Sabha is ‘not less than one-tenth of the total number of members of the Grama Sabha or hundred members, whichever is less’ (Puliani, 2014, pp. 27–29).

Performance of Grama Panchayats in the delivery of key services Having provided the legal status of Ward and Grama Sabhas, let us now proceed to examine the ratings given by the sample households on the key services provided by the GP based on primary data collected through rounds of surveys. As stated earlier, the first survey was carried out in 2015 and the second survey in 2017. In both surveys, the households were asked to provide satisfaction levels for each of the services that they access on a five-point Likert scale. Subsequently, these are regrouped as ‘poor’, ‘average’, and ‘good’. Note, however, that responses of households that stated that a particular service was not provided are not included here. In other words, as we were focussing on the satisfaction levels of sample households of the services that were provided, a particular service that was not provided was dropped from the analysis. As can be seen in Table 2.1, citizens were highly dissatisfied with borewells with hand pumps. This was true for both the first round (75.2%) as

Table 2.1 Distribution of Sample Households by Their Rating of the Services Services

Streetlights Mini water supply Borewell with handpump Public stand post Drainage Roads

Poor

Average

Good

first round

second round

first round

second round

first round

second round

10.6 35.7

9.8 19.7

22.3 31.2

14.0 31.5

67.2 33.2

76.2 48.8

75.2

46.8

13.6

27.5

11.2

25.7

23.2

13.7

31.0

22.8

45.7

63.5

38.7 14.5

22.4 19.8

39.3 34.1

31.0 22.7

22.0 51.4

46.6 57.5

Source: For this and the following tables in the Chapter, the source is primary data.

Does Grama Sabha improve service delivery?  27 well as the second round (46.8%) of surveys. The least dissatisfaction was expressed for streetlights. Does this mean that the people were aware of their entitlement to access streetlight services? A study by Rajasekhar and Manjula (2012) analysed data on the installed and functioning streetlights in all the GPs in Karnataka and found that the norm fixed by the government was to install one streetlight for every 7–10 households. However, their study showed that only about 19 per cent of GPs had met this norm. This implies that citizens may not be aware of the norm, but they still express happiness with the streetlights close to their house. When we look at all the six services, there was an improvement in satisfaction levels between the first and second rounds for all services except village roads. As far as roads are concerned, although there was an increase in the proportion of households stating that the condition had improved between the two surveys, the proportion of households assigning a low satisfaction also increased. On the other hand, the proportion of sample households stating that the delivery of services of streetlights, drinking water supply sources, and drainage had become better went up during the period 2015 to 2017.

Association between participation in Grama Sabha and service delivery Now, the question is to what this improvement should be attributed to. In the case of services provided by the local government, especially the GP, the Grama Sabha plays an important role in the facilitation of people’s feedback on the quantum and quality of the services provided in the jurisdiction of the GP.3 Was there any participation by citizens in the Grama Sabha on services provided by the GP? If they did participate, what was discussed in these meetings? Of the 2,231 sample households, about 34 per cent stated that they had attended the Grama Sabha meeting during the period 2015 to 2017. One can find differences across the caste groups. The proportion of households participating in Grama Sabha meetings was the highest among minorities at 50 per cent followed by other ‘backward’ classes (35 per cent). The participation among SCs and STs was lower than the overall average. The lowest rate of participation was registered among households belonging to dominant castes. Those attending the meetings recalled that the main issues discussed were: (i) about basic services, (ii) MGNREGS, (iii) housing schemes, and (iv) the delivery of social security benefits. It is to be, however, noted that the discussion on the basic services of drinking water, streetlights, sanitation (especially toilet construction), and roads dominated the discussion. Over 71 per cent of those attending the Grama Sabha meetings stated that the above were the discussion points of the meetings. This shows that the participation in Grama Sabhas, though modest, mainly centred around the

28  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula discussion of the provision of core services by the GPs. If this was the case, what was the impact of this discussion on the performance of the delivery of these core services? We will take up this question for discussion in the ensuing sub-sections with reference to the four basic services. Streetlights Grama Panchayats are responsible for the provision of streetlight services to rural households. Figure 2.1 presents the satisfaction levels of streetlight services of the sample households. As can be seen, over two-thirds of the sample households stated that the streetlight services were good in 2015, and about one-third of them stated that they were poor or average. The qualitative information collected from the households revealed that reasons for providing a poor or average rating were the following. First, in some of the sample villages, the number of streetlights installed was lower than what was needed. In one of the sample villages, a streetlight was installed on every alternate electric pole; as a result, the light was insufficient. Second, the quality of light was poor either due to low voltage or inappropriate lights. Third, the number of hours of light provided was low because of power cuts in the night. Fourth, there was a considerable delay in the replacement of bulbs. Fifth, there was no centralised switching on and off of the streetlights. By 2017, there was considerable improvement in the performance of GPs in the delivery of streetlight services. Figure 2.1 shows a decline in the proportion of households stating that the streetlight service provision was poor or average. More importantly, the proportion of households stating that the

80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0

Poor

Average 1st round

Good 2nd round

Figure 2.1 Satisfaction levels on streetlight services among the sample households.

Does Grama Sabha improve service delivery?  29 streetlight services were good went up from 67.2 per cent to 76.2 per cent – an increase of nine percentage points. Such an improvement in the delivery of streetlight services can perhaps be attributed to citizens’ participation in Grama Sabha. Citizens who ranked streetlight services as poor or average attended Grama Sabha meetings to represent their problem. It was only to be expected that the citizens who were dissatisfied with the services provided by the Grama Panchayats would raise the problem in the institutional space provided to them. Of the 11 per cent of the sample households who stated that streetlight services were poor in 2015, as many as 43.8 per cent attended the Grama Sabha meetings during the period 2015 to 2017. Similarly, one-third of households who rated streetlight services as average attended the GS meetings. Interestingly, the participation of citizens who were already happy with the streetlight services was comparatively less. When people presented problems with regard to the delivery of streetlight services, the GPs seem to have taken this feedback into account and addressed the same. It is to be noted that the GPs could improve streetlight services because this was a ‘solvable problem’. It can be stated that a ‘solvable problem’ is one where one would evaluate a situation, come up with steps for addressing the same, and put together a plan for dealing with it. From this angle, the streetlight issue was a ‘solvable problem’ for GPs. For instance, it was not difficult for a GP to resolve complaints relating to increasing the number of streetlights, installation of high voltage bulbs, replacement of fused bulbs, and so on. Perhaps because the GP was in a position to solve problems associated with streetlight services, one can see a positive difference of 9 per cent improvement in the performance of streetlight services during the period 2015 and 2017. Drinking water supply services In Karnataka, the state-level Department of Rural Development and Panchayat Raj is responsible for coordinating and supplying water for domestic purposes in over 59,945 rural habitations. Rural households are provided with drinking water through three types of sources, namely, a mini Table 2.2 Comparison of Ranks Between the Two Rounds of the Survey and the Participation of Households in Grama Sabha Meetings Streetlights

HHs (%) ranking in first round

Of those ranking HHs (%) Difference in first round, HHs ranking in in the rank (%) attending second round Grama Sabha

Poor Average Good

10.6 22.3 67.2

43.8 34.1 31.3

9.8 14.0 76.2

–0.7 –8.3 9.0

30  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula water supply4 (MWS), borewells with hand pumps5 (BWH), and a piped water supply6 (PWS). By March 2016, the total number of schemes completed and commissioned in Karnataka was 36,634 in the case of PWS, 49,904 in the case of MWS, and 223,703 in the case of BWH. The total number of drinking water sources installed by March 2016 was thus 310,241 in 59,945 rural habitations in Karnataka. So, on an average, five water supply points were installed in each rural habitation. In Karnataka, it is the responsibility of GPs to operate and maintain water supply sources with three types of funds. The first source was an annual grant (received from the state government at the rate of Rs. 1,000 to each BWH, Rs. 5,000 to MWS and Rs. 10,000 to PWS). Second, a water cess collected from the households as part of the house tax was used towards the maintenance of public water supply sources. Third, water user charges were collected from households with private connections. In addition, households applying for a water tap in their houses had to pay for the installation. Fourth, with effect from 2015–2016, a portion of 25 per cent of Finance Commission grants were used by GPs for water supply services. In the ensuing paragraphs let us discuss the association between participation in GS meetings and the performance of these three types of water supply sources. Mini water supply The rating of sample households of the performance of the mini water supply, which is provided in Figure 2.2, shows that over 36 per cent of the sample households stated in 2015 that the performance of this water supply source was poor, while over 30 per cent of them ranked this source to be average. 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0

Poor

Average 1st round

Good 2nd round

Figure 2.2 Satisfaction levels on mini water supply services among the sample households.

Does Grama Sabha improve service delivery?  31 Table 2.3 Comparison of Ranks for Mini Water Supply Services and the Extent of the Participation in Grama Sabha Meetings Mini water HHs (%) Of those ranking in HHs (%) Difference supply ranking in first round, HHs (%) ranking in in the rank first round attending Grama Sabha second round Poor Average Good

35.7 31.2 33.2

36.5 29.9 29.1

19.7 31.5 48.8

–16.0 0.4 15.6

The reasons for such widespread disappointment with the mini water supply service in the first survey were the following. First, most of the cisterns were not regularly filled up due to failed borewells or a decline in the groundwater table. Second, the damaged cisterns were not repaired regularly. Third, water from cisterns was not potable due to pollutants (Rajasekhar, 2019). When we collected data on the status of mini water supply services from the sample villages in 2017, the situation had vastly improved. Figure 2.2 shows that the proportion of households ranking this water supply source as poor had declined, while that of households ranking the source as good increased by nearly 16 percentage points! What role did participation in the Grama Sabha play in this regard? This question is taken up for a discussion below. Table 2.3 shows that of those households that stated that MWS sources were poor in 2015, nearly 37 per cent attended the Grama Sabha meeting. These households may have presented problems associated with this water supply source in the Grama Sabha and thereby positively influenced the officials or elected representatives of the local government to take up corrective measures. As a result, there was a decline of 16 percentage points in the rating of MWS as poor during the period 2015 and 2017, and almost the same increase in the proportion of households ranking this source as good. Still the proportion of the sample households ranking this source as good was less than half in 2017. This is because, as mentioned earlier, several MWS sources depended on groundwater, the availability of which was problematic on account of failed borewells or a decline in the groundwater table. The recharging of failed borewells or improvement in the groundwater table are measures that require longterm planning and coordination between different government departments. As a result, the solution to the MWS problems was not completely in the hands of GPs, and hence the satisfaction level was somewhat low even in 2017. Borewells with hand pumps The rating of borewells with handpumps is provided in Figure 2.3, which shows that over 75 per cent of the sample households termed this water supply service as poor and another 14 per cent as average (Figure 2.3). Such a poor rating was mainly on account of failed or defunct borewells

32  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula 80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0

Poor

Average 1st round

Good

2nd round

Figure 2.3 Satisfaction levels on borewell with hand pump services among the sample households.

due to a decline in the groundwater table. Wherever a borewell was working, the water was not suitable for drinking due to a high fluoride content (Rajasekhar, 2019). Under these situations, the GPs found it difficult to improve the situation since they did not have full control of programmes that aimed to improve the groundwater table by rejuvenating water bodies and recharging the borewells. Let us look at the performance of GPs in improving the performance of BWH in the ensuing paragraphs. Only 32 per cent of the households rating BWH as poor attended the Grama Sabha meetings. What was impressive was that there had been a decline of 28.4 percentage points at the time of the second survey. This implies that GPs had indeed initiated measures to improve the performance of borewells with hand pumps. Despite an improvement in the performance of this water supply source by 2017, the proportion of households rating BWH as good tended to be low as compared to the same rating given to the other water supply services. Table 2.4 Comparison of Ranks for Borewell with Hand Pump Services and the Extent of the Participation in Grama Sabha Meetings Borewell with hand pump

HHs (%) ranking in first round

Of those ranking in first round, HHs (%) attending Grama Sabha

HHs (%) Difference ranking in in the rank second round

Poor Average Good

75.2 13.6 11.2

32.0 38.5 32.6

46.8 27.5 25.7

–28.4 13.9 14.5

Does Grama Sabha improve service delivery?  33 70.00 60.00 50.00 40.00 30.00 20.00 10.00 0.00

Poor

Average 1st round

Good

2nd round

Figure 2.4 Satisfaction levels on public stand post services among the sample households.

Public stand post Public stand post was the most preferred source of the households. However, it was not provided in all the localities of the village and also in all the villages. It may be noted that the provision of PSP in villages with undulating terrain is not easy. Among the three sources of water supply, the public stand post received the most positive rating: over 45 per cent of the sample households stated that the performance of the local government in the delivery of this water supply source was good. It needs to be, however, noted that about 23 per cent of the sample households rated PSP as poor in 2015 (Figure 2.4). The main reasons for giving such a rating were the following. First, an inadequate number of PSPs installed in a village in comparison to the requirement. Second, broken taps or pipes and/or poor maintenance of the existing sources. Third, the water was let out only for a short period either due to problems in the source or an erratic power supply (Rajasekhar, 2019). By 2017, there was considerable improvement in the situation (Figure 2.4). Nearly two-thirds of the sample households stated that the performance of the local government in the delivery of water sources through PSP was good. This means an improvement of 18 percentage points when compared to that given in 2015. Table 2.5 suggests that the participation in the Grama Sabha may have contributed to the improvement in the performance in the delivery of water supply services through PSP. A larger proportion of households stating that this source was poor attended the Grama Sabha meeting. More or less the same pattern emerges with regard to the households ranking the source as

34  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula Table 2.5 Comparison of Ranks for Public Stand Post Services and the Extent of the Participation in Grama Sabha Meetings Public stand post

HHs (%) ranking in first round

Of those ranking in first round, HHs (%) attending Grama Sabha

HHs (%) Difference ranking in in the rank second round

Poor Average Good

23.2 31.0 45.7

34.0 31.5 29.4

13.7 22.8 63.5

–9.5 –8.2 17.7

average. Perhaps, in response to the representation made by these households, the local government may have attended to the problems associated with the PSP. In any case, the problems identified by the households with PSP could be addressed by the powers and resources devolved to them. Drainage It was found in 2015 that drainage was provided in most of the streets in the sample villages, but that it was open drainage and therefore unhygienic. During the first survey, the majority of the sample households (78 per cent) rated the performance of the local government in the provision of drainage services as either poor or average (Figure 2.5). The main reasons for such a rating were the following. First, clogging of the drains due to silt or solid dry waste was a significant problem. Second, the local government did not frequently clean the clogged drains. Third, because of this, the water could

50.00 45.00 40.00 35.00 30.00 25.00 20.00 15.00 10.00 5.00 0.00

Poor

Average 1st round

Good

2nd round

Figure 2.5 Satisfaction levels on drainage service among the sample households.

Does Grama Sabha improve service delivery?  35 not freely flow and stagnated everywhere in the village. Fourth, stagnated water emanated a foul smell and became a breeding place for mosquitoes. Sixth, the villagers faced health problems on account of stagnant water in the drainage. The situation had, however, significantly improved when we revisited the sample villages in 2017. The percentage of households stating that the performance of the local government in the delivery of drainage services was good jumped to 46.6 per cent in 2017 from a mere 22 per cent in 2015. Correspondingly, the proportion of sample households terming the service as poor had declined from 38.7 to 22.4 per cent during this period. The improved situation could be attributed to the participation of citizens in the Grama Sabha meetings. About one-third of the households from all three categories attended Grama Sabha meetings. The lack of difference across the households expressing different levels of satisfaction with the drainage service could be attributed to the fact that even those ranking the drainage as good in 2015 may have something else to complain about with this source. Compared with the households rating the other four services as poor, the households who rated the drainage service as poor had less participation in the Grama Sabha. In other words, a comparatively smaller proportion of households who complained about dissatisfaction with drainage services attended the Grama Sabha meeting. This corroborates the findings of Manjula (2019), who notes that the households who rate drainage services as poor are less likely to represent the problem in the Grama Sabha meeting due to a lack of awareness of the health hazards of a bad drainage system. Roads Rural roads play an important role in rural development as roads are essential for undertaking income-generating activities and achieving better incomes through the marketing of produce. In 2015, over 51 per cent of the households rated road connectivity as good, while 15 per cent were unhappy with the road conditions (Figure 2.6). This had only marginally

Table 2.6 Comparison of Ranks for Drainage Services and the Extent of the Participation in Grama Sabha Meetings Drainage

HHs (%) ranking in first round

Of those ranking in HHs (%) Difference in the first round, HHs (%) ranking in rank attending Grama second round Sabha

Poor Average Good

38.7 39.3 22.0

31.7 30.5 34.5

22.4 31.0 46.6

–16.3 –8.3 24.7

36  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula 70.00 60.00 50.00 40.00 30.00 20.00 10.00 0.00

Poor

Average 1st round

Good

2nd round

Figure 2.6 Satisfaction levels on road services among the sample households. Table 2.7 Comparison of Ranks for Roads and the Extent of the Participation in Grama Sabha Meetings Roads

HHs (%) ranking in first round

Of those ranking in HHs (%) first round, HHs (%) ranking in attending Grama second round Sabha

Difference in the rank

Poor Average Good

14.5 34.1 51.4

36.9 31.6 33.1

5.3 –11.4 6.1

19.8 22.7 57.5

improved when we conducted the second survey. This means that only 6 per cent of the households had changed their opinion by moving from ‘poor’ to ‘good’. In fact, the proportion of sample households expressing unhappiness was 14.5 per cent in the first survey; however, this unhappiness increased to 19.8 per cent during the second survey (Table 2.7). As compared to the other four services, this was the only service where the proportion of households rating a service to be poor had increased between the two rounds of the survey. Only 37 per cent of sample households who were unhappy with the road services attended the Grama Sabha meeting. Interestingly, this was the only service after streetlights where relatively more households who were unhappy with this service had attended the Grama Sabha meeting. Despite the fact that a large proportion of the households stating the service to be poor attended the Grama Sabha, the situation did not improve significantly. This can be attributed to limited fiscal decentralisation. In other words, the funds

Does Grama Sabha improve service delivery?  37 Table 2.8 Caste-Wise Variations in the Improvement of Ranks Assigned to Key Services Between the First and Second Rounds of the Survey Caste groups

Change in the percentage of households assigning the rank of good to the delivery of Streetlights

Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Minorities Other Backward Castes Dominant castes Total

Mini water supply

Borewell with Public Handpump stand post

Drainage Rural roads

9.7

15.7

11.6

17.1

27.5

12.8

8.2

10.7

11.8

11.2

22.5

9.8

19.3 7.9

43.8 11.4

–8.1 16.9

34.6 16.1

27.5 24.9

9.6 –1.1

6.1

19.5

24.2

22.4

20.3

3

9

15.5

14.5

17.7

24.7

6.1

allocated to village roads were inadequate, and the GP could not use funds earmarked to other schemes due to the tied nature of the financial resources. Having argued that there is an association between participation in Grama Sabha meetings and performance by the local government in service delivery, it is important to look at the distributional aspect of service delivery. We therefore looked at the caste-wise variations in the improvement in the ranking provided of key services. Table 2.8 presents the change in the percentage of households assigning a ‘good’ rank to service delivery between the first and second rounds of the survey by caste groups. In the Indian context, the households belonging to SCs and STs are in general poor and disadvantaged, living in peripheral parts of a village. If the change in the proportion of households belonging to SCs and STs is higher than the proportion for all the sample households one can conclude that there is no discrimination. Otherwise, it can be concluded that improvement of the service delivery bypassed the traditionally disadvantaged groups. It can be seen from Table 2.8 that SC households did not face any discrimination in the delivery of streetlights, the mini water supply, drainage, and rural roads. The households belonging to STs did, however, face discrimination in the delivery of almost all the services except rural roads. Interestingly, the proportion of households stating that service delivery improved was higher than the state average in the case of minority religions (Muslims, Christians, and others) for the services of streetlights, the mini water supply, public stand post, drainage, and rural roads. The information thus shows that there was no marked discrimination against households

38  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula belonging to a lower caste and minority religions in so far as the improvement in service delivery was concerned.

Conclusions Grama Sabhas are an ‘invited space’ for people to participate in putting forth their needs and preferences, and to arrive at a decision on the preparation of plans, their implementation, and monitoring. This mechanism is crucial for the success of decentralised governance. It is expected that people will present their grievances regarding the poor quality of services in the Grama Sabhas, and influence the GP to take measures to improve the service delivery. It is in this context that the chapter analysed the question of whether citizens participate in the Grama Sabhas when they face problems with service delivery with the help of data collected at two points in time from over 2,200 households spread across 154 GPs in nine districts of Karnataka. The main findings of this chapter were that the proportion of sample households stating that service delivery was good increased during the period 2015 to 2017 in the case of all the key services (streetlights, drinking water, sanitation, and roads), the delivery of which is assigned to Grama Panchayats. Second, there was no discrimination against the households belonging to SCs and minority religions in the service delivery, while it could be seen in the case of those belonging to STs. We attributed this positive change to the participation of citizens in Grama Sabha, which was in general high among households belonging to minority religions and SCs. A remarkable finding was that the proportion of households attending Grama Sabha meetings tended to be high among those rating the delivery of a service as poor or average. Another important finding was that the improvement in service delivery tended to be better in the cases of those services which could be ‘solved’ by Grama Panchayats within the level of decentralisation that existed. Services such as borewells with hand pumps and the mini water supply could be improved only to some extent because their provision was dictated by the groundwater table, which was declining in most of the GPs. Depleting groundwater level was not a ‘solvable problem’ for GPs because they did not have full autonomy to solve this problem. Finally, people’s ranking was influenced by the extent of their awareness of deprivation. For example, the ranking given to streetlights was better even though the norm on the number of streetlights per 100 households was not strictly followed. So, Grama Sabha meetings need to educate people on what they are deprived of.

Notes 1 Studies note that while the main reason for attending Grama Sabha meetings was to obtain government benefits such as housing, the reasons for not attending these meetings are irregular conduct, preoccupation with livelihood concerns,

Does Grama Sabha improve service delivery?  39 lack of information on Grama Sabha meeting dates, conduct of meetings in faroff meetings, ‘Exit’ of the poor (Rajasekhar, Babu, and Manjula, 2018a, 2018b). 2 Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri (2007) found that Grama Sabhas in Kerala improved participation and fairer allocation of resources. Kadekodi, Kanbur, and Rao (2008) note that holding a grama sabha seems to have an egalitarian influence. Rao and Sanyal (2010) however note that while Grama Sabha enabled the citizens to access government schemes, it did not have much impact on enabling people to realise their rights and entitlements. 3 It needs to be noted that citizens can also provide feedback directly to the elected and non-elected officials of GP either at the office of GP or outside. However, these feedback mechanisms are not covered in this Chapter. 4 Water is pumped to a small tank (cistern) fitted with 3–4 taps, through which water can be collected by households. These are provided to habitations with populations in the range of 500 to 1,000 in plains (between 350 and 700 in the hills). 5 These are installed in the habitations with less than 500 population (in hilly areas less than 350 persons) by the Taluk Panchayat. 6 The district level local government installs these schemes in habitations with over 1,000 population (over 700 in the hilly areas). The GP distributes water through two types of pipes; public stand posts and private household connections (PHCs).

References Aiyer, Yamini (2010). ‘Invited Spaces, Invited Participation: Effects of Greater Participation on Accountability in Service Delivery’, India Review, 9(2), pp. 204–229. Babu, M. Devendra, Rajasekhar, D. and Manjula, R. (2011). ‘Role of Grama Sabha in the Implementation of MGNREGS: Field Insights from Karnataka’, The Grassroots Governance Journal, IX(2), pp. 210–232. Beseley, Timothy, Pande, Rohini and Rao, Vijayendra (2008). ‘The Political Economy of Gram Panchayats in South India’, in Kadekodi, Gopal K., Kanbur, Ravi and Rao, Vijayendra (eds.) Development in Karnataka: Challenges of Governance, Equity and Empowerment. New Delhi: Academic Foundation, pp. 243–264. GoK (2002). Report of the Working Group on Decentralisation. Bengaluru: Department of Rural Development and Panchayat Raj, Government of Karnataka. Heller, Patrick, Harilal, K. N. and Chaudhuri, Shubham (2007). ‘Building Local Democracy: Evaluating the Impact of Decentralization in Kerala’, World Development, 35(4), pp. 626–648. Kadekodi, Gopal K., Kanbur, Ravi and Rao, Vijayendra (eds.) (2008). Development in Karnataka: Challenges of Governance, Equity and Empowerment. New Delhi: Academic Foundation. Manjula, R. (2019). Citizens participation in Grama Sabha and Service Delivery. Paper presented an international seminar on ‘Assessing citizens participation and Voices in the Era of Democratic Decentralisation in Indian States’ held on 15 March 2019 at ISEC, Bengaluru. Puliani, Satpal (ed.) (2014). The Karnataka Panchayat Raj Manual. 6th Edition, Volumes 1 and 2. Bangalore: Karnataka Law Journal Publications. Rajasekhar, D. and Manjula, R. (2012). ‘Affordability of Streetlight Services by Grama Panchayats in Karnataka: Status, Determinants and Ways Forward’, Journal of Rural Development, 31(4, October–December), pp. 419–434.

40  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula Rajasekhar, D., Babu, M. Devendra and Manjula, R. (2018a). Decentralised Governance, Development Programmes and Elite Capture. Singapore: Springer. Rajasekhar, D., Babu, M. Devendra and Manjula, R. (2018b). ‘Quality of Governance in Grama Panchayats: Evidence from Karnataka’, Journal of Rural Development, 37(4), pp. 603–620. Rajasekhar, D. (2019). Decentralised Delivery of Drinking Water in Karnataka: Are Citizen Voices Heard? Paper presented an international seminar on ‘Assessing citizens participation and voices in the era of democratic decentralisation in Indian States’ held on 15 March 2019 at ISEC, Bengaluru. Rao, Vijayendra and Sanyal, Paromita (2010). ‘Dignity through Discourse: Poverty and the Culture of Deliberation in Indian Village Democracies’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 629, pp. 146–172. Robinson, Mark (1998). ‘Democracy, Participation, and Public Policy: The Politics of Institutional Design’, in Robinson, Mark and White, Gordon (eds.) The Democratic Developmental State: Political and Institutional Design. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 150–186.

3

A quarter-century of the Women Component Plan at the rural grassroots level in Kerala A case study of Mutholy Grama Panchayat Blessy Sarah Mathew and Pushpa M. Savadatti

Introduction Indian policymakers recognise the fact that without considering women, who constitute around half of the population, it is impossible to achieve inclusive growth. Rising gender inequality has been a critical developmental hindrance to the growth of the Indian economy. The recognition of this fact has contributed to the introduction of more gender-specific programmes and policies. One such policy was the introduction of the Women Component Plan (WCP) in Kerala in 1996 in the local bodies. Under the WCP, all Gram Panchayats (GPs) are mandated to allocate at least 10 per cent of their annual Plan Fund (also called development fund) towards projects that directly benefit women. The key objectives of WCP are to ensure that the basic needs of women are recognised, increase the activities that will enhance the income of women, and ensure improvement in women’s status. Kerala did not have any particular programme ‘addressing gender issues until the introduction of the WCP’ (Nair and Moolakkattu, 2014). Moving a step ahead to the 33 per cent reservation as per the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, Kerala has reserved 50 per cent of seats for women in their local self-government institutions (LSGIs) through the Kerala Panchayat (Amendment) Act 2009. The powerlessness of the women population and discrimination towards them are strongly associated with the social and cultural norms of society. The grassroots level government, therefore, has a significant role in uplifting and empowering women, as they are closer to them and can frame the schemes and projects for achieving inclusive development by taking the local environment into account. It has been two and a half decades since decentralised planning was introduced in India. Therefore, it is now reasonable to review the performance of the decentralised system during this period and look at future challenges. Though there are several studies related to the empowerment of women, the WCP at the GP in Kerala is an area of study that has been less explored, DOI: 10.4324/9781003094357-3

42  Blessy S. Mathew and Pushpa M. Savadatti particularly the role of GP representatives in its effective execution. This chapter, therefore, addresses the following questions: what is the nature of the projects implemented under the WCP? How much fund is allocated and spent on WCP projects? What is the extent of participation of the GP representatives, particularly female representatives, in the design and execution of WCP projects? The objectives of this chapter are to: i) identify the fund allocation and expenditure concerning WCP projects implemented in the GP; ii) study the understanding level of the WCP among the elected representatives in the GP; and iii) assess the rate of participation of elected representatives in the planning and framing of WCP projects. This chapter is based on primary as well as secondary data. The primary data was collected from representatives of the Mutholy GP in the Kottayam district, Kerala. This data was collected for five five-year terms, namely 1995–2000, 2000–2005, 2005–2010, 2010–2015, and 2015–2020. The secondary data was collected from the annual approved project expenditure report of sample GP for the period 2007–2017, the Kerala Economic Review, State Planning documents, books, and journals. Kerala is facing a paradoxical situation of high human development but with gender inequalities in all major walks of life. In Kerala, women achieved higher levels in education, health, and demographic indicators when compared to women from other states. Whereas women from Kerala are poorly represented not only in the state and central legislature but also in state and national level politics. Also, the female work participation rate is less than the national average, and wage rates are also unequal for men and women in agriculture, construction, and other unorganised sectors. Bradely and Pallikadavath (2013) identified that the connection between ‘dowry, harassment, and violence’ remains in Kerala society. Kottayam district, where the study area was situated, is a comparatively developed district. Kottayam is also known as the land of three ‘Ls’, namely, literacy, lake, and latex. In terms of literacy, Kottayam was in first position in 2011 and also had the highest female literacy (96.48 per cent) among the districts. However, in terms of sex ratio, the district ranks 11th with 1,039 females per 1,000 males, and the female work participation rate is only 20.4 per cent (Census, 2011). The Mutholy GP received the Swaraj trophy (state award) for its outstanding performance in administration, revenue collection, planning, implementation, and outcome of projects, male and female participation in Gram Sabha, and the initiative for socio-economic empowerment of women and marginalised sectors. Besides this, the Mutholy GP and GP president also received the Rashtriya Gaurav Gram Sabha Puraskar (national award) for ensuring direct participation in democracy and offering equal opportunities to all citizens, including women and the vulnerable to discuss, and critically evaluate, the various pressing issues affecting the socio-economic development of the GP. The criterion adopted in the study was to select the

The Women Component Plan in Kerala  43 GP with the most wins of the Swaraj trophy during the 12th five-year plan period. Hence, the Mutholy GP was selected for the present analysis, as it won first prize in 2013–2014 and 2015–2016 and second prize in 2014– 2015 in Kottayam. The study was limited to the allocation and utilisation of WCP funds over a period of time and the participation and involvement of GP representatives in the decision-making of WCP projects. The beneficiary analysis of WCP projects is not addressed in this present study.

Literature review The Women Component Plan falls into the broader literature on gender budgeting. Internationally, the first attempt to incorporate a ‘Gender Sensitive Budget (GSB)’ was made by Australia in 1984 (Sharp and Broomhill, 2002). Gender budgeting received further impetus when the specific reference was made in the Platform of Action of the Fourth UN Women Conference held in Beijing (Addabbo, Lanzi, and Picchio, 2010). The Canadian government made the Federal Plan for Gender Equality (1995–2000) in 1995 following its commitment to the Platform of Action movement. A GSB was introduced in countries such as South Africa, Fiji, St Kitts and Nevis, Barbados, and Sri Lanka with the support of the commonwealth in 1997. Before that, a GSB was initiated in South Africa with the equal support of parliamentarians and non-governmental organisations in 1995 (Budlender, 1996). The Indian Constitution agrees with the positive discrimination towards females for achieving inclusive development and social justice. According to Article 15(3) of the Indian Constitution, the state can make unique provisions for females with respect to educational prospects. Further, the Directive Principles of State Policy advise the state to guarantee equal pay for equal work for both women and men (Article 39(d)) and ensure maternity relief (Article 42). The reservation of one-third of seats to women in rural as well as urban local bodies was added to the Indian Constitution in the 73rd and 74th amendments, respectively, in 1992. The Economic Survey of 2017–2018 reported that India has improved on 14 out of 17 factors of women’s agency, attitudes, and outcomes over the past one and half decades (Government of India, 2018). Indian policymakers, recognising the fact that national budgets benefited women and men differentially, adopted Gender Responsive Budgeting (GRB) in 2005–2006. The annual budget allocations for women as a share of the total government budget, however, depict a mixed picture. Budget allocations for women rose from 3.3 per cent in 2007–2008 to 5.8 per cent in 2011–2012 and then declined to 4.5 per cent in 2017–2018 (Government of India, 2018). There has been an insufficient distribution of funds for the schemes targeting women despite many provisions. Kerala introduced the People’s Plan Campaign (PPC) during the ninth five-year plan period in an effort to ‘conceptualise, operationalise, and

44  Blessy S. Mathew and Pushpa M. Savadatti institutionalise a system of multilevel, people-centred planning process suitable to the regional specifications of Kerala’. In addition, PPC also focused on providing a better standard of living for women in the state. First, special directions were given to guarantee the higher participation of women in the Grama Sabha. Second, a gender impact statement was made mandatory in the cost–benefit assessment of the projects. Finally, local self-government was directed to allocate 10 per cent of Plan Funds under the Women Component Plan for projects directly helping women (Khan et al., 2004). As a part of gender budgeting, the GP has to mandatorily allocate at least 10 per cent of total Plan Funds for the projects exclusively meant for women, since the second year of the ninth five-year plan. The WCP helps to bring up a number of women as leaders at the grassroots level (Khan et al., 2001). The Kerala Development Report (Government of India, 2008) submitted to the National Planning Commission exposed that most of the women empowerment projects in Panchayats were carried out by self-help groups, and they were conventional in nature. Moreover, the report also stated that the tendency of including projects, which benefited both men and women under the WCP, to attain the 10 per cent allocation criteria in the annual Plan Fund of Panchayat was high. Many schemes formulated under the WCP were only distributing assets to women, but a gender perspective was hardly considered (Muraleedharan, 2007). The thought of female development in WCP projects mainly emerged from the requirement of meeting the practical needs of underprivileged women (Vijayan and Sandhya, 2004; Isaac and Franke, 2000). It was observed that most of the projects under the WCP were general in nature, and could be financed using general funds (Vijayan, 2007). There was a large gap between the allocation and utilisation of funds under WCP projects due to the low concern of female and male Panchayat representatives for WCP projects, and self-help groups were considered to be the rescuers of the WCP (Nair and John, 2014). The concept of ‘Panchayat feminism’ was introduced by Moolakkattu and Chathukulam (2007). According to them, it is a type of non-disputing feminism that is limited to the women reservation policy, WCP, self-help groups, and the Jagratha Samithis, and that it hardly has the capacity for mounting the political freedom of women. The Human Development Report of Ernakulam district (Government of Kerala, 2009) reported that WCP funds were utilised for satisfying the general needs of women and not for meeting the strategic requirements of women. As per the Human Development Report of Kerala (Government of Kerala, 2005), the local self-government was able to fulfil the criteria of the 10 per cent allocation of Plan Funds under the WCP, but this was achieved by shifting the expenditure on Anganwadi, toilets, drinking water, and roads from general to WCP expenditure, and therefore there was no real increase in the resources for women.

The Women Component Plan in Kerala  45 It can therefore be observed that although there are a few research studies on the WCP and the role of GP elected representatives in Kerala, studies on the 25 years of the WCP and the role of GP representatives in empowering women at the rural grassroots level in Kerala are rare in the literature.

The WCP in the Mutholy Grama Panchayat Profile of the Mutholy Grama Panchayat The Mutholy GP in the Lalam Block is agrarian in nature and benefits from the Meenachil River. The presence of the river facilitates cultivation. The GP is divided into 13 wards spread over an area of 18.12 square kilometres. The basic details of the GP are given in Table 3.1 Allocation and expenditure of funds under the WCP in Mutholy GP Outlay and utilisation of funds The financial sources of the GP are divided mainly into two major types, Plan Fund and Non-Plan Fund. The Plan Fund includes the general fund, Special Component Plan Fund for Dalits, Tribal Sub-Plan Fund, Central Finance Commission fund and World Bank fund, and the Special grant. The State government fund, Own fund, Block Panchayat fund, District Panchayat fund, and maintenance fund are part of the Non-Plan Fund. The details of allocation and expenditure of the Mutholy GP during the 12th five-year plan period are given in Tables 3.2 to 3.3. Of the total Plan Fund allocated during the 12th five-year plan period, the GP utilised, on average, 93.99 per cent (Table 3.2). The Non-Plan Fund (NPF) utilisation was 64.36 per cent. Moreover, the GP spent only 76.67 per cent of the total PF and NPF put together during the 12th five-year plan period (Table 3.3). The

Table 3.1 Socio-Political Features of the Mutholy GP District Taluk Block Villages Total Geographical Area (square kilometres) Total Population Male Female Sex ratio Literates (%) Male Literacy (%) Female Literacy (%) Source: Census data, 2011

Kottayam Meenachil Lalam Meenachil & Puliyannur 18.12 15,267 7,673 7,594 990 97.0 97.0 96.0

10,395,843 11,748,000 13,408,088 12,997,650

16,374,545

64,924,126

2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016

2016–2017

XII PLAN

61,019,762 (93.99)

13,709,247 (83.70)

10,395,346 (100.00) 11,748,000 (100.00) 12,501,088 (93.23) 12,666,081 (97.45)

TPF Utilised (in Rs) 13.43 10.31 12.81 8.59 (#11.27) 7.85 (#13.38) 10.36 91,357,030

17,097,343

17,395,524 20,136,874 17,953,329 18,773,960

% Share of TNPF WCP in TPF (in Rs)

Note: 1) TPF: Total Plan Fund, TNPF: Total Non-Plan Fund; 2) #: WCP PF % to Plan Fund (Excluding World Bank and Central Finance Commission) 3) Figures in parentheses are percentages.

Source: Annual Plan Reports Mutholy GP (2012–2017)

TPF Allocated (in Rs)

Year

58,796,168 (64.36)

10,675,042 (62.44)

11,645,943 (66.95) 14,732,590 (73.16) 10,239,821 (57.03) 11,502,772 (61.27)

TNPF Utilised (in Rs)

4.20

2.17

6.60 5.26 3.08 3.73

% Share of WCP in TNPF

Table 3.2 Details of Allocation and Utilisation of Funds in the Mutholy GP during the 12th Five-Year Plan Period

46  Blessy S. Mathew and Pushpa M. Savadatti

The Women Component Plan in Kerala  47 Table 3.3 Total Fund Allocation and Utilisation in the Mutholy GP during the 12th Five-Year Plan Period Year

TF (in Rs)

WCP Fund as % TF Utilisation TF Utilisation to Total Fund (in Rs) (in %)

2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 XII PLAN

27,791,367 31,884,874 31,361,417 31,771,610 33,471,888 156,281,156

9.16 7.12 7.24 5.72 4.95 6.76

22,041,289 26,480,590 22,740,909 24,168,853 24,384,289 119,815,930

79.31 83.05 72.51 76.07 72.85 76.67

Source: Annual Plan Reports Mutholy GP (2012–2017) Note: TF: Total Fund

decline in the devolution of funds from the state and the central government is one of the primary reasons for the fall in total Non-Plan outlay of the Mutholy GP (Annual Plan Report Mutholy GP 2012–2017). As per Government of Kerala order G.O. (M.S.) No. 225/12/, LSGD, Thiruvanathapuram, dated 18 August 2012, 10% of the Development/ Plan Fund must be allocated to the WCP (Government of Kerala, 2012). Through Government of Kerala order G.O.(M.S.) No. 4/2016/LSGD, Thiruvanathapuram, dated 11 January 2016, the LSGI limited the 10 per cent allocation from the Plan Fund (excluding World Bank fund, Central Finance Commission fund and Special grant) for the WCP (Government of Kerala, 2016). This decision by the local self-government reduced the volume of funds for the WCP. Table 3.4 shows year-wise details of the Plan Fund, Non-Plan Fund, and total fund envisaged under the WCP Sub-Plan in the Mutholy GP during the 11th and the 12th five-year plan periods. The percentage share of the Plan Fund in WCP outlay doubled from 30.1 per cent in the 11th plan period to 63.70 per cent in the 12th plan period (Table 3.4). The WCP Plan Fund outlay increased in absolute amount, whereas the WCP Non-Plan Fund and WCP outlay decreased in absolute terms during the 12th plan period compared to the 11th plan period. The data reveals that the Mutholy GP failed to translate its gender commitments regarding allocation to women-specific projects. Table 3.5 shows the expenditure under the WCP in the Mutholy GP during the 11th and the 12th five-year plan periods. The percentage utilisation of the Non-Plan Fund in the WCP and percentage utilisation in the total WCP fund improved by nearly 10 per cent. During the 12th five-year plan, around 5 per cent of the allocated Plan Fund to the WCP Sub-Plan was unutilised. The Government of Kerala order G.O. (M.S.) No. 225/12/ LSGD, Thiruvanathapuram, dated 18 August 2012, gave more autonomy to local

475,000 924,300 752,200 580,000 1,117,900 1,396,550 1,210,900 1,717,315 1,116,286 1,285,103 3,849,400 6,726,154

2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 XI Plan XII Plan

52.55 31.77 33.37 22.69 26.60 54.85 53.35 75.63 61.44 77.60 30.01 63.70

% Share Of PF in the total allocated for WCP (in %)

Note: PF: Plan Fund, NPF: Non-Plan Fund

Source: Annual Plan Reports Mutholy GP (2007–1017)

Allocation of PF for WCP (in Rs)

Year

428,942 1,984,767 1,501,660 1,976,627 3,085,100 1,149,550 1,058,900 553,450 700,537 370,915 8,977,096 3,833,352

NPF allocation for WCP (in Rs)

47.45 68.23 66.63 77.31 73.40 45.15 46.65 24.37 38.56 22.40 69.99 36.30

903,942 2,909,067 2,253,860 2,556,627 4,203,000 2,546,100 2,269,800 2,270,765 1,816,823 1,656,018 12,826,496 10,559,506

% Share of NPF in Total allocation for the total allocated for WCP (in Rs) WCP

Table 3.4 WCP Allocations in the Mutholy GP during 11th and 12th Five-Year Plan Periods

48  Blessy S. Mathew and Pushpa M. Savadatti

470,000 923,354 752,200 680,000 1,117,900 1,396,550 1,210,900 1,717,315 806,286 1,259,811 3,943,454 6,390,862

98.95 99.90 100.00 117.24# 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 72.23 98.03 102.44 95.01

Actual PF % of expenditure expenditure under against allocation WCP (in Rs) under WCP 344,942 1,984,767 361,633 1,372,211 2,255,000 719,522 1,051,111 343,450 658,069 259,412 6,318,553 3,031,564

80.42 100.00 24.08 69.42 73.09 62.59 99.26 62.06 93.94 69.94 70.39 79.08

814,942 2,908,121 1,113,833 2,052,211 3,372,900 2,116,072 2,262,011 2,060,765 1,464,355 1,519,223 10,262,007 9,422,426

90.15 99.97 49.42 80.27 80.25 83.11 99.66 90.75 80.60 91.74 80.01 89.23

Actual NPF % of expenditure Actual PF and NPF % of total expenditure under against allocation expenditure under expenditure against WCP (in Rs) under WCP WCP (in Rs) allocation under WCP

Notes: PF: Plan Fund, NPF: Non-Plan Fund, #spillover from NPF used for PF

Source: Annual Plan Reports of Mutholy GP (2007–2017)

2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 XI Plan XII Plan

Year

Table 3.5 Extent of the Utilisation of the WCP Fund in the Mutholy GP during the 11th and the 12th Five-Year Plan Periods

The Women Component Plan in Kerala  49

50  Blessy S. Mathew and Pushpa M. Savadatti self-government (LSG) bodies in the utilisation of funds, the GP can appropriate an amount of no more than 45% from the Plan Fund (excluding the Special Component Plan Fund for Dalits, Tribal Sub-Plan, aid from World Bank, and Special grants) to allocate it to the infrastructure sector. Table 3.6 demonstrates that there has been a tectonic shift in the focus of projects from the service and production sectors towards infrastructure projects. The infrastructure sector includes more construction, and it takes more resources than the service sector in absolute and relative terms. The share of funds allocated for infrastructure projects in the WCP Sub-Plan in the Mutholy GP increased during the 12th five-year plan period at the cost of service and production sector projects which directly benefit women. Guidelines for project preparation under the WCP Sub-Plan According to the Government of Kerala order G.O. (M.S.) No. 225/12/ LSGD, Thiruvanathapuram, dated 18 August 2012, the Local Self Government Department (LSGD) issued clear guidelines regarding the type of projects to be included under the WCP. All the local self-governing bodies were also directed to prepare the Women Component Plan to help women to enhance their economic and social status. The details of the WCP are to be included in a chapter comprising a project/plan outline in the Annual Gram Panchayat Development Plan. The WCP is expected to include programmes that enhance the job, income, and social status of women. Programmes that equally benefit male and female like the construction of houses and toilets will not be considered under WCP. However, the construction of houses and toilets and the setting up of drinking water facilities can be considered when the head of the household is a woman or in the absence of an adult male member in the household. The above guidelines were replaced by Government of Kerala order G.O.(M.S.) No. 4/2016/LSGD, Thiruvanathapuram, dated 11 January 2016. As per this order, 10 per cent of the total WCP fund must be allocated for widow welfare and development. While allocating individual benefits/ incentives, 3 per cent of the total fund must be allocated to those deserving applicants from the differently-abled category, if there are any. The following are the instructions to the GP concerning preparing WCP projects. 1. All LSGIs are directed to appropriate funds for the WCP that helps in improving the social and economic status of women. The WCP should consist of programmes that enhance the employment, income, and social status of women. 2. Toilets are to be constructed exclusively for women (as per their number, in a proportion of 40:1) in those schools which are handed over to the LSGD. Besides, toilets should be constructed and maintained with electricity and water facilities in the LSGD, in all institutions under

1,550,200 1,263,900 1,159,430 941,362 854,550 5,769,442

2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 XII Plan

60.88 55.68 51.06 51.81 51.60 54.64

Share of Production (in %) 743,000 936,930 749,561 441,468 2,870,959

Infrastructure (in Rs)

Source: Annual Plan Reports Mutholy GP (2012–2017)

Production (in Rs)

Year

Service (in Rs) 995,900 262,900 174,405 125,900 360,000 1,919,105

Share of Infrastructure (in %) 0.00 32.73 41.26 41.26 26.66 27.19

39.11 11.58 7.68 6.93 21.74 18.17

Share of Service (in %)

Table 3.6 Sector-Wise Shares in WCP Outlay in the Mutholy GP during the 12th Five-Year Plan Period

2,546,100 2,269,800 2,270,765 1,816,823 1,656,018 10,559,506

WCP

The Women Component Plan in Kerala  51

52  Blessy S. Mathew and Pushpa M. Savadatti the control of LSGIs, in hospitals, veterinary hospitals, markets, bus stands, and other public spaces where women arrive, engage with, and work. 3. There must be a labour bank and enterprises to market the products produced by self-help organisations that help with the enhancement of employment and income of women, even beyond the assistance from self-help entrepreneurship. 4. It is directed to establish comfort stations in public spaces (such as bus stands) and public institutions as well as feeding rooms for breastfeeding mothers. 5. Programmes that would equally benefit both males and females like the construction of houses and toilets are not considered under the WCP. 6. Girl students of secondary and higher secondary levels can be given training in physical education and in programmes of self-defence, such as karate etc., as according to the Nirbhaya programme of the Ministry/ Department of Social Justice, provided the trainer has recognition from the Sports Council. The Village and District Panchayats can undertake such a programme by allocating funds in a ratio of 50:50, but the implementation of the project is vested in the GP (Government of Kerala, 2016). Pattern of fund allocation and expenditure for different projects under WCP Production sector Most of the production sector projects incorporated into the WCP during the period 2012–2017 were associated with livestock development and agriculture (Annex 3.1), and these were considered to be non-sustainable in nature. Along with livestock schemes, skill development schemes should also be incorporated, which are sustainable. Without including programmes that enhance the skills of women, the main goal of the WCP will not be fruitful. During fieldwork, it was observed that women SHGs were actively running readymade garment and food processing units at the GP industrial centre constructed under the WCP. GP representatives reported that the GP provided all possible help for the successful running of these units. They also stated that animal husbandry schemes like goat rearing and cow rearing under WCP were also successful in the GP. Fodder subsidies to the women dairy farmers were also provided as extra aid for them. An examination of income-generating schemes under the production sector for women initiated in the Mutholy GP revealed that they were suited to the agrarian nature of the GP. It was quite true that a group of heterogeneous programmes was essential for the development of any particular community, especially women in the real sense of empowerment.

The Women Component Plan in Kerala  53 Service sector Housing, water, and toilets are essential requirements for people; therefore, construction of houses, drinking water sources, and toilets for femaleheaded households are also considered under service sector projects, which directly benefit women (Annex 3.2). The GP should include livelihood enhancement and entitlement generation programmes under the WCP SubPlan. In addition, the GP should also take the initiative to include direct income-generating projects for women. Projects such as Nirbhaya Kumari Security and Mediasree under the WCP in the Mutholy GP were introduced as per the instructions of the central and state government, respectively. The Nirbhaya Kumari Security programme provides martial arts training to secondary school girls in the Mutholy GP. The documentation of activities and the achievements of Kudumbasree (a female self-help group) units in the Mutholy GP were carried through the Mediasree project. GP representatives said that martial arts training under the Nirbhaya Kumari Security scheme improved the confidence level of teenage girls in the GP. Infrastructure sector The Mutholy GP has given special consideration to schemes that target the development of marketing and infrastructure facilities and the entrepreneurship programme for promoting women’s microenterprises under the WCP Sub-Plan (Annex 3.3). Interaction with GP representatives revealed that infrastructure created under the WCP Sub-Plan was facilitating the women empowerment initiatives of the GP. The employment training centres were used for conducting training and awareness programmes for women. Cultural centres provided a platform for women to perform by unleashing hidden talent. During the field visit, it was observed that industrial units constructed as part of the WCP were helping SHGs in their production activities. A cursory examination of WCP schemes/projects during the different years of the 12th five-year plan period clearly revealed that they were not heterogeneous in nature. The WCP projects should be intended to cater to the needs of women from different positions, such as income-generating schemes, schemes for house construction including the maintenance of houses and latrines, schemes for skill development, thrift and credit schemes, schemes for the development of infrastructure and marketing facilities and entrepreneurship programmes, schemes for studying the status of women, schemes for women’s security, shelter homes, etc. The GP should make all efforts within their capacity to cater to the needs of women from different walks of life. The major constraint to this is the lack of funds available to initiate a variety of projects. Therefore, it is advisable that the GP should plan for the projects from a long-term perspective rather than annually.

54  Blessy S. Mathew and Pushpa M. Savadatti Level of understanding about WCP among GP representatives in Mutholy GP Decentralisation empowers local bodies to utilise devolved resources for local planning and development. Local self-government and participatory planning are involved in targeting resources towards weaker sections of society (Besley, Pande, and Rao, 2005). There is a need to ensure that people, including disadvantaged groups, are part of local governments. The Kerala government initially reserved one-third of seats for women in all three tiers of local self-government institutions, and subsequently increased this to 50 per cent of the seats and leadership positions in 2009. Table 3.7 shows the term and sex-wise classification of GP representatives in the Mutholy GP during the five-year terms between 1995–2000 and 2015–2020. Among the 58 ward representatives, two male representatives passed away. Also, one male as well as one female ward representative got elected thrice, and two female ward representatives got elected twice. Therefore, the total sample is 50, among whom 20 were female and 30 were male. Table 3.8 presents information on the general understanding of the WCP by GP representatives in the Mutholy GP since 1995. It can be seen that general awareness of the WCP among GP representatives in the Mutholy GP was initially very low. However, the understanding of the WCP Sub-Plan among GP representatives increased over the 25 years of decentralised planning. However, the data depicts that the level of understanding of the WCP by female representatives was still low compared to their male counterparts. The understanding of women representatives differs from that of men concerning the WCP Sub-Plan. Although female and male representatives were aware that a certain proportion of the total GP fund was used separately for the betterment of women in the GP, only one-third of the present male representatives and one-sixth of the female representatives knew the mandatory share of the WCP Sub-Plan in the GP Plan Fund.

Table 3.7 Term and Sex-Wise Classification of GP Representatives in Mutholy Term of Office

Male

Female

Total

1995–2000 2000–2005 2005–2010 2010–2015 2015–2020 Total

6 6 8 8 6 34

3 4 4 6 7 24

9 10 12 14 13 58

Source: Official documents of Mutholy GP

– 16.67 33.33 – 50

– – – – 100

50

– – 50 – –

– 50 – 50 50

– 25 25 –

F

37.5

– 50 12.5 –

M

2005–2010

100 –

–

– 83.33 – 16.67

F

Note: F = Female; M = Male

Source: Primary Data

– 16.67 33.33 50 –

100 –

16.67

33.33 50 – –

M

2010–2015

Knowledge of Mandatory Percentage Set Apart for WCP Projects of Total GP Plan Fund (in %) 100 – – – – – – 5 – – – 25 – – – 10 – 66.67 – – – 16.67 – 15 – – 100 75 50 33.33 83.33 20 – 33.33 – – 50 50 16.67 Above 20

Knowledge about the Mandatory Provision of Total GP Plan Fund for WCP Sub-Plan – – – – 50 75 Yes 100 100 100 100 50 25 No

Special Component Plan for Women Women Empowerment Programme Poverty alleviation programme Income-generating programme for women Support system for socially and economically backward women

M

F

F

M

2000–2005

1995–2000

Awareness about WCP Sub-Plan Among Representatives

Term of office

Table 3.8 Knowledge of the WCP by the Mutholy GP Representatives (in %)

– 16.67 – 83.33 –

100 –

33.33

– 50 – 16.67

F

– 33.33 – 66.67 –

100 –

–

66.67 33.33 – –

M

2015–2020

The Women Component Plan in Kerala  55

56  Blessy S. Mathew and Pushpa M. Savadatti Involvement of representatives in the preparation of WCP projects GP representatives in Mutholy were using different methods for identifying the projects for inclusion under the WCP Sub-Plan (Table 3.9). Female representatives assigned priority to the preferences of the people in their wards. Unlike the earlier male representatives, who were concerned about the needs and demands of women in their respective wards, the present male representatives gave importance to previously successful projects. From a gender perspective, the most accessible level of government for women is local bodies. The male representatives were unsuccessful in reaching out to women to involve them in their plans for the WCP. Table 3.9 indicates that the male GP representatives are the decisionmakers in the planning and allocation of funds to the WCP Sub-Plan. It can be seen that the reservation of seats for women in the GP did not contribute to their active participation. However, the contribution of female representatives in the allocation and planning of WCP projects increased over the past two and a half decades, but it has not yet reached an appreciating level. The data reveals that patriarchal domination has continued in the financial matters of the GP over the past 25 years. Female and male GP representatives had a different opinion on who prepared the schemes under the WCP Sub-Plan. However, male GP representatives had a unanimous opinion regarding the final decision on the planning, framing, and allocation of WCP projects. The present female representatives, as well as previous female representatives in the Mutholy GP, were not wholly ignorant of who took the final decision on WCP projects compared to their predecessors (Table 3.9). The reservation for women at the GP gave opportunities to a few women to enter the GP as representatives. Nevertheless, the predominant social expectation of female subordination has constrained women from enjoying the benefits of reservation provided in the Indian Constitution except for in namesake. Though a few have occupied positions of power, they have not succeeded in addressing problems specific to gender issues. Functioning problems of WCP projects Productive discussions among GP representatives can be an excellent strategy for providing better solutions to the needs and concerns of women in their GP. Table 3.10 articulates that the WCP Sub-Plan was not discussed and debated in the GP committee. Women and their development concerns were not the major topics of discussion as compared to other development issues of the GP. Also, most projects, including the WCP Sub-Plan were repetitive in nature and functioning. The female and male representatives differed in their opinions about lastminute adjustments to meet Plan guidelines in the WCP Sub-Plan. A lesser degree of participation of female representatives from the Mutholy GP was found in the present study. Hence, it was better to rely on the opinions of

50 – 50 50

50

Stages of Involvement in WCP Projects Identifying the projects 100 Planning about the projects – Allocation of the projects – 100 – –

50

– – 50

25 25 50

–

50 – 50

100 – –

50

– 25 25

F

Note: F= Female; M= Male

Source: Primary Data

– – – 100 –

12.5 50 37.5

25

50 – 25

M

2005–2010

Final Decision-Makers on Planning, Framing and Allocation of WCP Projects Male Representatives 50 – – – – Female Representatives – 16.67 – – – GP President /Vice-President – – – 25 75 Panchayat Committee – 83.33 – 75 – Don’t Know 50 – 100 – 25

– – 50

M

F

F

M

2000–2005

1995–2000

– – 50

Successful Previous projects Projects implemented by other GP Identifying felt needs of the female in the ward Demand raised during Gram Sabha

Methods of Identifying WCP Projects

Term of Office

Table 3.9 Involvement of Representatives of the Mutholy GP in the WCP Projects (in %)

– – 66.67 33.33 –

50 50 –

33.33

16.67 33.33 16.67

F

– – – 100 –

16.33 33.33 50

33.33

66.66 – –

M

2010–2015

– – 66.67 33.33 –

66.67 16.67 16.66

50

16.67 16.67 16.67

F

16.66 33.33 50

25

75

– – – 100 –

–

–

M

2015–2020

The Women Component Plan in Kerala  57

– – 100 100

16.67 83.33 – 100 50 50 100

–

100 –

– 100

25 75

25 75

25 50 25 100

F

87.5 12.5

12.5 87.5 – 100

M

2005–2010

33.33 66.67

– 66.67 33.33 100

F

100 –

16.67 83.33 – 100

M

2010–2015

16.67 83.33

16.66 66.67 16.67 100

F

83.33 16.67

16.67 83.33 – 100

M

2015–2020

Note: F = Female; M = Male; #Wide discussions during the planning and framing different schemes and allocation of funds under WCP Sub-Plan.

Source: Primary Data

Last-Minute Adjustment to Meet Plan Guidelines in the WCP 50 50 25 Yes 50 50 75 No

Yes No Don’t know Total %

M

F

F

M

2000–2005

1995–2000

Discussions before the WCP Projects Are Finalised #

Term of Office

Table 3.10 Opinion of the Mutholy GP Representatives Regarding Finalisation of the WCP Project (in %)

58  Blessy S. Mathew and Pushpa M. Savadatti

The Women Component Plan in Kerala  59 the male rather than female representatives. The data sheds light on lastminute adjustments to meet plan guidelines in the WCP (Table 3.10). The autonomy of the GP is limited within the guidelines issued by the LSGD from time to time. The GP representatives pointed out that the sudden and immediate changes in guidelines with respect to the allocation of funds and projects implemented in the GP were major hindrances to the smooth working of the planning and allocation of projects and funds, respectively. This results in the dropping of projects and the addition of new projects without much discussion just to meet plan guidelines. Women representatives and WCP projects Creative conflict among female and male representatives regarding the allocation of funds towards women’s related projects was treated as positive (Moser, 1993). The higher level of gender consciousness among women resulted in creative conflict between female and male in such matters. In addition, Kabeer (1994) stated that females disagree with their male colleagues on planning priorities, but they will not get involved in conflict with men since the rules of games are against them, and the cost of the dispute is high. The unity and co-operation of GP representatives irrespective of their party, gender, and ward were the factors behind a healthy environment in the Mutholy GP. It also helped with the smooth functioning of day to day affairs of the Mutholy GP, and even reached the height of national recognition in 2016. The willingness of the GP to work shoulder to shoulder also requires significant applause. Either the lower level of gender consciousness of the female representatives in the Mutholy GP or the complete support from male representatives over WCP projects could be the reasons for the lack of conflict between female representatives with their male counterparts (Table 3.11). The Mutholy GP lacks the active participation of female representatives concerning the planning and framing of the projects required under the WCP Sub-Plan and putting WCP allocations in place (Table 3.11). One of the salient features of decentralised planning at the local level is its participation in nature. The active participation of females is significant for development efforts and particularly for women empowerment. According to Kabeer (1995), females should have a higher degree of involvement with their ability to participate. Otherwise, women will continue to be a residual class in development.

Conclusions Realising gender programmes and policy in practice is one of the major challenges for policymakers and planners (Moser, 1993). The present study found that there was a sharp decline in the percentage share of the WCP

60  Blessy S. Mathew and Pushpa M. Savadatti Table 3.11 Opinion of Representatives on the Conflict over WCP Projects and Participation of Female Representatives (in %) Term of office

1995–2000 2000–2005

2005–2010 2010–2015

2015–2020

F*

F

F

M

– 100

– 100

M**

F

M

M

F

M

Men and Women Representatives Conflict Over WCP Projects Yes No

– – 100 100

– – 100 100

– – 100 100

– – 100 100

Participation of Female Representatives Concerning Planning, Framing, and Allocation of the WCP Projects Active – – – – – – – – – – Moderate 100 100 50 75 100 87.5 100 66.67 100 50 Little 50 25 12.5 33.33 50 Source: Primary data Note: *F = Female; ** M = Male

Sub-Plan total budget share of the Mutholy GP, particularly during the 12th five-year plan period as compared to the 11th five-year plan period. It showed that there was a reduction in the size of funds for women-specific schemes, even though the government and policymakers were talking about their commitments towards women empowerment. Female GP representatives reported that due to the limited allocation of funds to the WCP, they failed to include skill generation schemes that require a lump sum amount. Skill generation programme provided training for women in income-generating activities that aimed to improve the overall position of women through economic independence. Besides, the share of service sector projects decreased both in absolute and relative terms. As infrastructure development was the primary focus in the 12th five-year plan period, there was an increased allocation to this sector. The share of the infrastructure sector in the WCP is more than 45 per cent, which is above the minimum limit as per the departmental guidelines. The Mutholy GP fully utilised the funds allocated for WCP projects, except in a few cases. This should be complemented, especially since most of the GPs in the state failed to spend the allocated money. Field observations and interaction with GP representatives revealed many positive impacts of the WCP projects on the women beneficiaries. The buildings created under WCP infrastructure projects were helping to achieve the goal of women empowerment. It provided space for women to come out of their house to work, to learn, and to showcase their talent. Small scale industries financed under WCP projects were working better in these industrial units than home-based units, and women were earning a reasonable income from the same, which in turn gave them economic mobility and independence. Stakeholders of animal husbandry schemes, such as cow and goat rearing,

The Women Component Plan in Kerala  61 were also earning income through selling milk, the by-products of milk, and cow dung, but their economic freedom and mobility were lesser than that of women who were engaged in employment activities outside their home. The transformation of stakeholders through these successful projects was visible through their increased attendance and involvement in Gram Sabha proceedings, and their increased willingness to seek legal support from Jagartha Samathi (the vigilance committee against violence to women at the GP) show their boldness to react to domestic violence rather than bearing it. Martial arts increased the self-esteem of the teenage girls who received training, and the girls became more confident when travelling alone, and they were also able to defend themselves against threats in their respective environments. Nevertheless, most of the schemes under the WCP were of a routine nature and mainly addressed housing, protein powder distribution, and livestock distribution. Along with such programmes, effective and efficient projects were required, taking women from welfare to development and development to empowerment. If the Government of Kerala exhibited the WCP Sub-Plan, incorporated at the GP level, as an instrument of achieving the welfare, development, and empowerment of the women community, then a reorientation of WCP programmes becomes necessary. An important question that arises here is about the capability of the GP to address such concerns. If there are any limits to the capacity of the GP to deal with such issues, the state government should renew the public policies connected to the devolution of the functions and funds of the GP. This chapter suggests immediate and strict guidelines to ensure that allocation under the WCP Sub-Plan meets strategic needs rather than the practical needs of women. Moreover, the WCP programmes should directly benefit women to scale the ladder of empowerment. The study proposes to conduct a survey among women to identify the real development hindrances faced by women in the GP. The study also recommends the incorporation of heterogeneous schemes under the WCP Sub-Plan to bring about the full potential of women in the GP. The positive outcome of decentralised planning is that it creates a space for women in Kerala in local bodies, which was hitherto occupied by men. The study also found that the involvement of female GP representatives in matters concerning the allocation and planning of WCP projects increased during the quarter-century of the Panchayat Raj in Kerala. However, the participation of women representatives has not yet reached an appreciating level. Besides, increased space and leadership positions for women through reservation in the GP failed to replace the patriarchy in the decision-making power of the GP committee. That is, even in the WCP and women related projects, the ultimate decision-making power was still vested in male GP representatives. The Government of Kerala ensured equal representation to females in the GP with the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Amendment) Act, 2009. At the same time, an increase in the participation of female representatives in

62  Blessy S. Mathew and Pushpa M. Savadatti GP activities is not as easy as increasing the number of females in the GP. Because the journey towards the equal involvement of men and women in GP functioning is slow since the involvement of women is correlated with the social and cultural norms of society. It is indispensable to accelerate the pace of participation of female GP representatives in the different stages of the planning process in the GP. What has already been achieved provides much scope for optimism and strength for facing future challenges in the path of politically and economically empowering women through rural grassroots level democratic institutions.

References Addabbo, Tindara, Lanzi, Diego and Picchio, Antonello (2010). ‘Gender Budgets: A Capability Approach’, Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 11(4), pp. 479–501. Besley, Tim, Pande, Rohini and Rao, Vijayendra. (2005). ‘Participatory Democracy in Action: Survey Evidence from South Indi’, Journal of European Economic Association, 3(2/3), pp. 648–657. Bradley, Tamsin and Pallikadavath, Saseendran (2013). ‘Dowry and Women’s Lives in Kerala: What Has Changed in a Decade?’, Contemporary South Asian Journal, 21(4), pp. 444–461. Budlender, Debbie (eds.) (1996). The Women’s Budget Cape Town. South Africa: Institute for Democracy in South Africa. Government of Kerala (2005). Human Development Report. Thiruvananthapuram: State Planning Board. Government of India (2008). Kerala Development Report. New Delhi: National Planning Commission & Academic Foundation. Government of India (2018). Economic Survey: Volume I. New Delhi: Ministry of Finance. Government of Kerala (2005). Human Development Report. Thiruvananthapuram: State Planning Board. Government of Kerala (2009). District Human Development Report. Thiruvananthapuram: State Planning Board. Government of Kerala (2012). G.O. (M.S) No. 225/12/LSGD. Thiruvananthapuram: Department of Local Self Government. Government of Kerala (2016). G.O. (M.S.) No. 4/2016/ LSGD. Thiruvananthapuram: Department of Local Self Government. Isaac, T. T. and Franke, R. (2000). Local Democracy and Development: People’s Campaign for Decentralised Planning in Kerala. New Delhi: Leftword. Kabeer, Naila (1994). Reversed Realities: Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought. London: Verso. Kabeer, Naila (1995). ‘Targeting Women or Transforming Institutions? Policy Lessons from NGO Anti-Poverty’, Development in Practice, 5(2), pp. 108–116. Khan, Pareethu Bava P. M., John, Ommen and Kumari, P. Leela (2001). Report of the Study of Women Component Plan in Kerala. Chennai: UNICEF. Moolakkattu, John S. and Chathukulam, Jos (2007). ‘Between Euphoria and Skepticism: Ten years of Panchayati Raj in Kerala’, in Oommen, M. A. (ed.) A

The Women Component Plan in Kerala  63 Decade of Decentralisation in Kerala: Experience and Lessons. New Delhi: Har Anand. Moser, C. O. N. (1993). Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice and Training. London: Routledge. Muraleedharan, Sarada (2007). ‘Negotiating Frameworks for Local Development: An Analysis of the Role of District Planning Committees’, in Oommen, M. A. (ed.) A Decade of Decentralisation in Kerala: Experience and Lessons. New Delhi: HarAnand. Nair, Nisha V. and Moolakkattu John, S. (2014). ‘Women Component Plan at the Village Panchayat Level in Kerala: Does it Live Up to its Promise?’, Indian Journal of Gender Studies, 21(2), pp. 247–276. Sharp, Rhonda and Broomhill, Ray (2002). ‘Budgeting for Equality: The Australian Experience’, Feminist Economics, 8(1), pp. 25–27. Vijayan, Aleyamma and Sandhya, J. (2004). Gender and Decentralised Planning in Kerala. Trivandrum: Caxton Press. Vijayan, Aleyamma (2007). ‘A Decade of Gender Mainstreaming in Local Governance in Kerala’, in Oommen, M. A. (ed.) A Decade of Decentralisation in Kerala: Experience and Lessons. New Delhi: HarAnand.

Appendix 3A Table 3.A.1 Projects in the Production Sector in the WCP during 12th Plan Period Projects

Allocation Expenditure Utilisation (in Rs) (in Rs) (in %)

Distribution of cows to women (2012–2013) Distribution of goats to SC women (2012–2013) Distribution of vegetable seeds for a vegetable garden at terrace and courtyard to women (2012–2013) Distribution of goats to women (2012–2013) Maintenance of women industrial unit (2012–2013) Financial assistance to the kudumasree readymade unit at Rajiv Gandhi women industrial unit (2013–2014) Distribution of rabbit to women(2013–2014) Financial assistance to the kudumasree readymade unit at SC women industrial centre for SC women (2013–2014) Fruit Samirthi (Sapling distribution to women) (2013–2014)

525,000

393,750

48,000

48,000

100

78,200

78,200

100

588,000

588,000

100

311,000

311,000

100

400,000

400,000

100

260,000

260,000

100

400,000

400,000

100

203,900

203,900

100

75.00

(Continued )

64  Blessy S. Mathew and Pushpa M. Savadatti Table 3.A.1 (Continued ) Projects

Allocation Expenditure Utilisation (in Rs) (in Rs) (in %)

Distribution of fruits, saplings and vegetable seeds for women (2014–2015) Distribution of rabbit for women (2014–1015) Distribution of hen for women (2014–2015) Distribution of goat for SC women (2014–2015) Financial assistance to the kudumasree unit at women industrial unit (2014–2015) Distribution of calf for women (2015–2016) Distribution of hen for women (2015–2016) Tissue culture banana sapling and biofertilisers distribution to women (2015–2016) Distribution of hen for women (2016–2017) Distribution of goat for women (2016–2017) Subsidies for women dairy farmers (2016–2017)

173,030

173,030

100

260,000

260,000

100

270,000 56,400

270,000 56,400

100 100

400,000

190,000

47.5

390,000 351,000

390,000 351,000

100 100

200,362

200,362

100

446,550 208,000

446,550 208,000

100 100.

200,000

200,000

100

Source: Annual Plan Reports Mutholy GP (2012–2017)

Table 3.A.2 Projects in the Service Sector in the WCP during 12th Plan Period Projects

Allocation Expenditure Utilisation (in Rs) (in Rs) in %

Honorarium to Anganwadi workers 45,900 (2012–2013) Protein powder distribution through 950,000 Anganwadi (2012–2013) Electric work at SC cultural centre 217,000 (2013–2014) Additional Honorarium to Anganwadi 45,900 workers (2013–2014) 45,900 Honorarium to Anganwadi workers (2014–2015) 50,000 Nirbhaya Kumari Security (2014–2015) 13,505 Financial assistance to Anganwadi workers for uniform (2014–2015) 65,000 Mediasree (2014–2015) 45,900 Honorarium to Anganwadi workers (2015–2016) 80,000 Nirbhaya Kumari Security (2015–2016) 360,000 Maintenance of house for women (2016–2017) Source: Annual Plan Reports Mutholy GP (2012–2017)

45,900

100

651,222

68.55

209,211

96.41

45,900

100

45,900

100

50,000 13,505

100 100

65,000 45,900

100 100

79,000 280,000

98.75 77.78

The Women Component Plan in Kerala  65 Table 3.A.3 Projects in the Infrastructure Sector in the WCP during 12th Plan Period Projects

Allocation Expenditure Utilisation (in Rs) (in Rs) (in %)

Increasing basic facilities of women employment training centre (2013–2014) Fund for the protection of the roof of Rajiv Gandhi cultural centre (2013–2014) Extension of women employment training centre (2013–2014) Furniture for Rajiv Gandhi Women cultural centre (2014–2015) Latrine for women at employment training centre Increasing facilities for Rajiv Gandhi women industrial centre Increasing basic facilities of women cultural centre Construction of generator cum go-down room at SC women industrial centre Renovation of women employment training centre (2014–2015) Increasing facilities at Rajiv Gandhi industrial unit (2015–2016) Plumbing work at the industrial centre Financial assistance to the cultural centre for women (2015–2016) Plumbing work at women industrial centre (2016–2017) Financial assistance to women cultural centre (2016–2017) Electric work at women cultural centre (2016–2017)

101,750

101,750

100

306,250

306,250

100

335,000

335,000

100

75,000

75,000

100

300,000

300,000

100

100,000

100,000

100

200,000

200,000

100

200,000

200,000

100

61,930

61,930

100

240,000

240,000

100

100,000 409,561

8,532 149,561

8.53 36.52

91,468

59,965

65.56

260,000

234,708

90.27

90,000

90,000

Source: Annual Plan Reports Mutholy GP (2012–2017)

100

Part III

Fiscal decentralisation



4

Fiscal decentralisation at the substate level in India A study of Karnataka State K. Basavarajeshwari

Introduction The introduction of the 73rd Amendment Act, in 1992, in Indian federal policy provided Constitutional status to Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs). Moreover, Article 243G of the Constitution states that the legislature of a state may endow Panchayats with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of local self-government (Government of India, n.d.). The institutional mechanism for effective government at district and sub-district levels has not only been formed but has also strengthened the devolution of finances to Panchayats through provisions made in Articles 243I and 280bb of the Constitution to enhance the fiscal arena of Panchayats. So, all such mandates and necessary legal entities have been bestowed upon the Panchayats through the Constitution and state legislations to empower Panchayats functionally and financially to enable them to fulfil the aspirations and needs of the local people. In order to meet local needs, Panchayats require adequate finances. They cannot become effective institutions of local self-governance unless they have a strong financial source and control. As per the provisions of the Constitution, the state legislature has been given the discretion to authorise Panchayats to levy taxes and assign taxes, etc., to enable them to mobilise their own resources for discharging assigned duties and functions. In the above context and in light of the experiences gained over two decades, it becomes important to study the financial domain of the Panchayats, evaluate the extent of fiscal outlays dispersed at their disposal at different levels of PRIs, and, finally, suggest suitable measures for improving the fiscal health of these institutions. So the main objective of the chapter is to study the status of the finances of Panchayats at different levels in the context of existing provisions. The analysis of the study pertains to the finances of PRIs in Karnataka. Based on secondary data, the study attempts to analyse the finances of rural local bodies – tax powers, transfers, nature of grants, and the role of the State Finance Commission. The study period is from 1990–1991 to 2016– 2017. The main data sources for the study were: State Finance Commission DOI: 10.4324/9781003094357-4

70  K. Basavarajeshwari reports, the Economic Survey of Karnataka State, and other documents. Simple statistical tools such as percentages and growth rates were used to analyse the data.

Federal governments: Theoretical framework The concept of a multi-level government system is basically derived from the theory of fiscal federalism (Government of Karnataka, 1996). A multilevel government would provide services optimally by meeting the different tastes and preferences of local people, rather than a centralised governing system; in the words of Oates, local governments would satisfy the divergent tastes and preferences of local people. If the provision of goods was centralised, it would be costly and would lead to the provision of public goods much different to the tastes and preferences of the citizens of a particular local jurisdiction (Oates, 1972; Tanzi, 1996). In other words, the national government would choose one uniform package, whereas local governments would choose according to their citizen’s preferences (Tiebout, 1956). Moreover, this multi-level government system would combine the advantages of decentralisation with the benefits of economies of scale (Government of Karnataka, 1996). So, functions that are local in nature should go to local governments and functions which involve economies of scale should go to the central government. Wherever there was no possibility for a proper demarcation, it would result in spatial spill-over of benefits and costs. So in such cases of imbalance, the higher-level government should try to balance them by providing assistance to local self-governments (Government of Karnataka, 1996).

Structure of PRIs In this section, we look at the status of the Panchayat Raj in Karnataka before the implementation of the 73rd Amendment Act. The 1983 Act transferred a large number of functions to Zilla Parishads and Mandal Panchayats (Rao et al., 2014). Table 4.1 provides information on the preceding enactments in the Karnataka state. The 1983 Act enacted and implemented by the Karnataka Government was considered to be a model of decentralisation and in a way replicated the important provisions of the 73rd Constitution Amendment Act (Babu, 2010b). Fiscal powers to Panchayats in the enactments preceding the 73rd Amendment On the financial side, during the early period, The Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Board Act, 1959, conferred Village Panchayats with some taxation powers, namely i) obligatory taxes/fees, ii) discretionary taxes/fees, and

Decentralisation at the sub-state level  71 Table 4.1 Preceding Enactments on Panchayats in Karnataka Year

Enactments

1862

Establishment of local fund

1902 1918 1959 1983

Principles

To carry out works (construction of roads and other works) in each of the districts Establishment of a three-tier Setting up of an institutional mechanism structure at district, taluk and village levels Local Board Enquiry Proposed three-tier structure of local Committee government Mysore Village Panchayats and Extended the role of Panchayats in Local Board Act development activities The Karnataka Zilla Parishads, Established a three-tier structure of Taluk Panchayat Samithis, decentralisation in 1987–1988 and Mandal Panchayats, and transferred a wide range of functions Nyaya Panchayat Act 1983 to Zilla Parishads and Mandal Panchayats

Source: Aziz, 1993; Rao et al, 2014

iii) a portion of land revenue. The taluk development boards were given 50 per cent of the land revenue collected within the taluk and 10 per cent of the land revenue of the state. With regard to the District Development Council, since it had no separate executive function, it was not entrusted with any sources of finance (Aziz, 1993). Later the 1983 Act provided finances to Zilla Parishads through transfers from the state consolidated fund, grants, contributions and loans from the government, rents from land and property, fees, penalties, interest, profits, and proceeds from the sale of land, and so on. The funds for Mandal Panchayats included grants and loans from the state government, revenue from property tax, entertainment tax, mineral rights, and from fees, and so on (Aziz, 1993). A study by Aziz (1993) states that all specified revenue sources were assigned to Zilla Parishads, but in reality the entrusted revenue sources were not tapped by the Zilla Parishads. PRIs structure in the post 73rd Amendment Act In order to give Constitutional status to Panchayats, the 73rd Amendment was passed in 1992. As per the 73rd Amendment, the financial provisions made for the Panchayats in the central legislation are as follows: the power to impose taxes, tolls, fees etc. by the Panchayats, and Constitution of the Finance Commission by the states to review the fiscal position of Panchayats (Government of India, n.d.). In conformity with the 73rd Constitutional Amendment, the Karnataka Government enacted the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act in 1993. Hence, the Karnataka Panchayat Raj (KPR) Act, as per the 11th Schedule, entrusted the expenditure and revenue assignments to rural local governments.

72  K. Basavarajeshwari The Grama Panchayats, Taluk Panchayats, and Zilla Panchayats perform the specified functions in Schedule I, II, and III, respectively. Provided that the state or central government provide funds for the delivery of functions specified under Schedule I, II, and III. Section 199 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act gives powers to Grama Panchayats to levy entrusted taxes and fees. Later the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act states that funds accrued from all property owned by or vested in the Taluk Panchayat shall be applied for the functions specified in Schedule II, and shall also be used for payment of salaries and so on. Furthermore, grants, contributions, and loans from the government, rents from land and property, fees, gifts, and proceeds from the sale of land shall also be used. The finances of the Zilla Panchayats consist of transfers from the state consolidated fund, grants, and contributions from the government, rents from land and property, fees, penalties, interest, profits, and proceeds from the sale of land and so on. PRIs are empowered to raise loans for developmental purposes (Government of Karnataka, 1993).

Revenue position of Panchayat Raj Institutions Information on the finances of the PRIs is presented in Table 4.2. As already noted, the Grama Panchayats are entrusted with some taxation powers, and they also receive grants from higher-level government. Data with regard to revenue and expenditure of the PRIs was collected for 11 years, from 2002–2003 to 2012–2013, for which information was available. Table 4.2 Table 4.2 Revenue and Expenditure of PRIs in Karnataka (Rs in Crore) Years

Own Revenue

Grants

Total Revenue

Total Expenditure

2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 Average of 11 years

123.6 (1.42) 205.3 (2.41) 132.3 (1.64) 192.2 (1.91) 233.7 (2.14) 277.1 (2.20) 285.6 (1.97) 266.8 (1.81) 269.9 (1.18) 303.9 (2.27) 247.9 (1.39) 230.7

8,559.3 (98.58) 8,323.6 (97.59) 7,917.0 (98.36) 9,872.0 (98.09) 10,702.2 (97.86) 12,299.6 (97.80) 14,212.0 (98.03) 14,451.3 (98.19) 22,672.8 (98.82) 13,085.9 (97.73) 17,550.5 (98.61) 12,695.1

8,682.9 (100) 8,528.9 (100) 8,049.2 (100) 10,064.2 (100) 10,935.9 (100) 12,576.7 (100) 14,497.6 (100) 14,718.0 (100) 22,942.7 (100) 13,389.8 (100) 17,798.4 (100) 12,925.8

– – – 10,043.7 (99.8) 10,144.0 (92.8) 81,68.9 (65.0) 14,242.7 (98.2) 14,701.7 (99.9) 18,002.1 (78.5) – – 13,958.0*

Source: Authors computation; Basic data: (1) GoI, (2010) Report of 13th Finance Commission from 2002–2003 to 2006–2007; (2) GoI, (n. d.)* from 2007–2008 to 2012–2013; (3) Government of Karnataka (4) RDPR (DAC) website for data on expenditure Note: * Average of six years; figures in parentheses are percentages.

Decentralisation at the sub-state level  73 reveals that the own revenue of PRIs increased from Rs. 123.6 crores in 2002–2003 to Rs. 247.9 crores in 2012–2013. It is also evident that taking an average of 11 years, the largest share of PRIs revenue originates from the grants, which accounts for Rs 12,695.1 crore. From the data presented in Table 4.2 it is observed that there is consistency in the share of grants, roughly about 98 per cent from 2002–2003 to 2012–2013. Though the share of own revenues did not rise consistently, it increased from 1.42 per cent in 2002–2003 to 2.41 per cent in 2003– 2004 then declined in subsequent years before increasing again in the year 2007–2008 by about 2.20 per cent. But in the later period, the share of own revenue of GPs declined to 1.18 per cent in 2010–2011, and then by an increment observed in 2011–2012 of about 2.27 per cent. This trend shows PRIs dependence on grants is increasing. Reasons for this despicable trend in mobilising own revenues by GPs is vote bank politics (Raphael, 2000), and the non-assignment of significant tax sources to them. Further, it is due to a lack of knowledge on the finances of Panchayats and less effort on the part of Panchayat functionaries in the collection of taxes. It is on this account that there is a provision under the legislation for PRIs to meet their growing responsibilities; there have been transfers from the state government for Plan and Non-Plan expenditure, and from the union government for executing centrally sponsored schemes.

Trends in PRIs Plan grants in Karnataka From the above discussion, it is clear that PRIs dependence on grants is very high. It is to be noted that in order to reduce the estimated gaps between the resources and expenditure of the Panchayats and to meet the current expenditure from the revenue sources, there is a legislative provision for PRIs to meet their growing responsibilities through transfers from the state government for Plan (a portion of this is conditional) and Non-Plan expenditure, and funds from the union government to carry out the centrally sponsored schemes, which are by and large conditional and matching. Keeping the present arrangements in view, the PRIs freedom to make decisions on local needs is limited. Panchayat Raj Institutions have no say in any of the rural development activities funded by the centre and even in the state Plan programmes that are implemented by the PRIs at the local level (Aziz, 1993). There were complaints about the extent and manner of fund allocations to decentralised governments prior to the 73rd Amendment Act. The complaints submitted to the State Finance Commission were regarding the quantum of financial assistance allocated from higher governments to carry out the entrusted responsibilities and to provide developmental activities, and also efforts to meet the local aspirations by the decentralised governments were meagre (Government of Karnataka, 1989). In essence, it would be appropriate to analyse the kind of financial allocations made from the centre and the state to PRIs after the 73rd Amendment Act.

74  K. Basavarajeshwari Table 4.3 Ratio of Plan and Non-Plan Allocation to PRIs in Karnataka, 1998–1999 to 2016–2017 (Rs. in Crores) Years

Plan State

732 (50.6) 1998–1999 792 (51.8) 1999–2000 962 (56.7) 2000–2001 2001–2002 1,083 (59.1) 617 (49.7) 2002–2003 688 (52.9) 2003–2004 2004–2005 1,013 (60.7) 2005–2006 1,992 (69.4) 2006–2007 2,176 (63.4) 2007–2008 2,241 (62.7) 2008–2009 2,632 (59.6) 2009–2010 2,880 (60.8) 2010–2011 3,010 (61.8) 2011–2012 3,726 (61.7) 2012–2013 4,055 (51.9) 2013–2014 4,841 (54.3) 2014–2015 9,676 (92.3) 2015–2016 10,776 (95.1) 2016–2017 11,945 (95.5)

Centre

Total Plan

Total Non-Plan

715 (49.4) 1,447 (38.0) 2,357 (62.0) 736 (48.2) 1,528 (36.1) 2,708 (63.9) 735 (43.3) 1,697 (37.0) 2,892 (63.0) 751 (40.9) 1,834 (38.0) 2,994 (62.0) 624 (50.3) 1,241 (27.4) 3,286 (72.6) 614 (47.1) 1,302 (27.5) 3,431 (72.5) 655 (39.3) 1,668 (32.5) 3,468 (67.5) 877 (30.6) 2,869 (42.0) 3,962 (58.0) 1,256 (36.6) 3,432 (42.8) 4,579 (57.2) 1,330 (37.3) 3,571 (37.1) 6,054 (62.9) 1,785 (40.4) 4,417 (38.2) 7,154 (61.8) 1,857 (39.2) 4,737 (38.3) 7,645 (61.7) 1,860 (38.2) 4,870 (22.2) 17,055 (77.8) 2,316 (38.3) 6,042 (39.1) 9,412 (60.9) 3,754 (48.1) 7,809 (39.9) 11,767 (60.1) 4,080 (45.7) 8,921 (81.8) 1,987 (18.2) 804 (7.7) 10,480 (39.8) 15,862 (60.2) 552 (4.9) 11,328 (42.6) 15,248 (57.4) 567 (4.5) 12,512 (42.3) 17,046 (57.7)

Total Plan and Non-Plan 3,804 (100) 4,236 (100) 4,589 (100) 4,828 (100) 4,528 (100) 4,734 (100) 5,136 (100) 6,832 (100) 8,011 (100) 9,625 (100) 11,571 (100) 12,382 (100) 21,925 (100) 15,454 (100) 19,576 (100) 10,908 (100) 26,342 (100) 26,576 (100) 29,558 (100)

Source: Authors computation; Basic data: (1) Government of Karnataka Various years (Budget Volumes); (2) Economic Survey of Karnataka 2016–2017 and 2013–2014; (3) Babu, 2010a; Government of Karnataka, 1998. Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages to the Total Plan for both the state and centre Plan grants

The budgetary document of the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, in the Government of Karnataka, 1998, provides a detailed list of the allocations obtained under several accounts. Table 4.3 presents the Plan and Non-Plan allocation to PRIs from 1998–1999 to 2016–2017 for the state as a whole. The Plan grant includes a) outlay from centrally sponsored and central sector schemes, and b) outlay from state Plan schemes. The Non-Plan grant includes state outlay to meet the entrusted responsibilities, mainly the salary component. It can be seen from Table 4.3 that the share of state Plan grants to PRIs in the Total Plan grant during 1998–1999 was about 50.6 per cent, and in the subsequent years this increased. During 2016–2017 it stands at 95.5 per cent. There was a decline in the share of central Plan grants to PRIs from about 49.4 per cent during 1998–1999 to 4.5 per cent in 2016–2017. Such decreases in the finances make it difficult for the PRIs to meet their growing needs, particularly when these PRIs are highly dependent on centre and state government grants. There are other studies that have also found similar results with a high volume of

Decentralisation at the sub-state level  75 state grants to PRIs (Raghunandan, 2014) and another study by Gayithri (2014) found that centre transfers to PRIs have declined from 1997–1998 to 2015–2016, while there was an increase in the case of state grants during the same period. The important observation from Table 4.3 is that the total share of state Plan grants to PRIs on average accounted for 72 per cent, while it is 28 per cent from central Plan grants. These Plan grants to PRIs are devolved with specified guidelines issued by the State Planning Department for the utilisation of grants by Panchayat Raj Institutions (Babu et al., 2018). Moreover, a Plan grant comes with stringent rules attached to it and does not give spending authority to PRIs based on local needs/priorities. Another aspect associated with Plan and Non-Plan allocation systems for PRIs is a lumpsum, which is a single payment of funds made to PRIs for formulating plans rather than a series of payments made over time (Aziz, 1993; Raphael, 2000). The year on year growth of Plan grant allocations to PRIs for 19 years from 1998–1999 to 2016–2017 reveal fluctuating trends (Table 4.4). The state and central government allocations, on the other hand, increased in one

Table 4.4 Year-Wise Growth of Plan Grants of PRIs in Karnataka (Rs. in Crores) Years

1998–1999 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017

Plan grants PRIs Share Growth PRIs Share from state rate from central Plan grants Plan grants

Growth PRIs Growth rate Total Plan rate grants

732 792 962 1,083 617 688 1,013 1,992 2,176 2,241 2,632 2,880 3,010 3,726 4,055 4,841 9,676 10,776 11,945

2.94 –0.19 2.25 –16.90 –1.66 6.74 33.90 43.13 5.93 34.15 4.06 0.15 24.53 62.09 8.69 –80.29 –31.33 2.70

8.20 21.51 12.56 –43.04 11.57 47.15 96.64 9.25 2.96 17.47 9.42 4.52 23.77 8.83 19.38 99.88 11.36 10.85

715 736 735 751 624 614 655 877 1,256 1,330 1,785 1,857 1,860 2,316 3,754 4,080 804 552 567

1,447 1,528 1,697 1,834 1,241 1,302 1,668 2,869 3,432 3,571 4,417 4,737 4,870 6,042 7,809 8,921 10,480 11,328 12,512

5.60 11.06 8.10 –32.34 4.92 28.10 72.00 19.61 4.05 23.68 7.25 2.81 24.06 29.24 14.24 17.47 8.09 10.45

Source: Authors computation; Basic data: (1) Government of Karnataka Various years (Budget Volumes); (2) Economic Survey of Karnataka; (3) Babu, 2010a.

76  K. Basavarajeshwari year and reduced the next year. However, plan allocations from the centre declined over this period of time. We see a notable increase in some of the years, particularly during 2005–2006 and 2014–2015 in the share of PRIs from the state Plan outlay. Having presented the revenues and trends of the Plan outlays of PRIs in the study, we may now review the finances of PRIs in light of pre- and post-fiscal decentralisation in Karnataka. Data with regard to this was collected from 1990–1991 to 2016–2017. Since the data availability on PRIs Plan outlays for both centre and the state is not available prior to 1990–1991, our analysis tries to reveal three years of the pre-AmendmentAct situation of which happened to be very short to reflect on pre-decentralisation reforms in Karnataka. From Figure 4.1, we see that the share of Plan allocation declined in 1995–1999 compared with the first five years (1990–1994) from both centre and state Plan allocation. However, it shows positive growth in Plan allocation from the state during 2005–2009 but, prior to this year (2000– 2004), it experienced dismal growth in Plan allocation from state Plan grants. Similarly, we see this trend in central Plan allocation to PRIs during the same period. However, during 2010–2014, Plan allocation from the centre to PRIs declined compared to previous years, while this increased in the case of state Plan allocations. One of the possible reasons for this was brought out by a Government of India (n.d.) study, where one of the major recommendations of the 14th Finance Commission is that from the total revenues of central government, 42 per cent of the share should be set aside

0.4 0.3

Percent

0.2 0.1 0 –0.1 –0.2 –0.3

1990-94

1995-99

2000-04

2005-09

State

0.16

0.06

0.01

0.1

0.34

Centre

0.15

0.11

-0.03

0.21

-0.19

Total

0.16

0.09

0

0.13

0.21

Figure 4.1 Five-year average growth rate of Plan allocation to PRIs. Source: Authors computation; Basic data: Economic Survey of Karnataka.

2010-14

Decentralisation at the sub-state level  77 for local governments (all states). This is a huge deviation from the 32 per cent recommended by the 13th Finance Commission, and restructuring of the centrally sponsored schemes by the current (Modi government) government were major reasons for the radical decline of the allocation of funds by the centre to the PRIs. The information with regard to Plan allocation is presented in Table 4.5. The Economic Survey of Karnataka State’s Planning, Programme Monitoring and Statistics Department (2014 and 2017) provides detailed information on the PRIs’ Plan outlays and the state’s Plan outlays (see Table 4.5). These have been presented in two categories: (i) the state’s Total Plan outlays, and (ii) the PRIs’ Plan grants from the state. The Plan grants are given to PRIs for developmental purposes. The Total Plan grants from the state and centre to PRIs was Rs. 1,447 crore during 1998–1999, and this increased to Rs. 12,520 crore in 2016–2017, it increased nearly 13 times over a period of 19 years. We see that the share of PRIs’ Plan outlay from the state’s total Plan outlay during 1998–1999 was about 22 per cent, and in the subsequent years it declined. From the analysis, it emerges that the share of PRIs’ Plan outlays to the state’s total Plan outlays has been declining in percentage terms over the years. During 2016–2017 the share of PRIs’ Plan outlay to the state’s total Plan outlay stood at 15 per cent. Table 4.5 Share of PRIs Plan Grants from the State’s Plan Grants (Rs in Crores) Year

State’s Total Plan grants

Grants to PRIs from out of state Plan grants

Share (%) of Plan grants to Total Plan grants to state

1998–1999 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017

6,513 7,087 8,506 9,605 9,522 10,670 13,311 14,609 17,806 20,532 28,199 32,431 33,764 40,872 42,972 55,693 62,987 71,892 86,230

1,447 1,528 1,697 1,834 1,241 1,302 1,668 2,869 3,432 3,571 4,417 4,737 4,870 6,042 7,809 8,921 10,480 11,328 12,512

22 22 20 19 13 12 13 20 19 17 16 15 14 15 18 16 17 16 15

Source: Economic Survey of Karnataka (Planning Programme Monitoring and Statistics Department, 2017; Planning Statistics and Science and Technology Department, 2014)

78  K. Basavarajeshwari Revenue availability Generally, the availability and growth of fund allocation are measured in relation to gross state domestic product (GSDP). An exercise in measuring PRI Plan and Non-Plan allocation with respect to this variable is done and presented in the following paragraphs. Figure 4.2 presents PRI Plan and Non-Plan outlay vis-à-vis GSDP over the years. It can be seen from Figure 4.2 that in 1998–1999 the share of the total Plan of PRIs to GSDP was 0.6 per cent. The share of total Plan outlay as against GSDP remained almost the same at around 1 per cent over the years. The share of PRIs Non-Plan outlay as against GSDP in 1998–1999 was 0.9 per cent. The highest share observed regarding Non-Plan grants during 2010–2011 was about 3.4 per cent. There is one concerning issue here in that the percentage share of PRI Plan outlay over the years as against GSDP is less than 2 per cent. Nature of grants available to PRIs We now see that the nature of the grants provided to PRIs from higher-level governments is generally categorised into tied and untied grants. The basic argument in fiscal decentralisation is whether the PRIs have the freedom to spend according to local priorities. In other words, can PRIs make decisions

4.0 3.5

3.4

% of GSDP

3.0 2.5 2.1

2.0 1.7

1.5

1.4

1.00.9

1.0

0.6

0.6

0.5

1.1 0.6

1.1

1.1

1.2

1.1

1.1 0.8

0.7 0.4

0.4

1.5

1.5

1.2 0.9

0.8

0.9

1.9

1.8

1.0

1.0

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.4

2.0 1.4

0.5 0.3

0.0

Total Plan

Total Non Plan

Figure 4.2 Plan and Non-Plan outlays of PRIs as % of GSDP in Karnataka. Source: Authors computation; Basic data: Government of Karnataka, Budget Allotment for Zilla Panchayat – Plan & Non-Plan from 1998–1999 to 2016–2017 (Link Documents).

Decentralisation at the sub-state level  79 according to the issues and priorities of the local populace? As per autonomy, PRIs should have more untied grants, but in reality they get more tied grants, which are largely tied to programmes/schemes (Aziz, 1993; Babu et al., 2018). So the question that arises here is how much do PRIs get as a percentage share in tied and untied grants. In this context, a study (Babu et al., 2018) of the share of untied grants in different Panchayat tiers (Zilla Panchayats, Taluk Panchayats, and Grama Panchayats) unveiled that the total Plan grants the share of untied grants to Zilla Panchayats for one year during 2013–2014 accounted for 1.7 per cent. During the same period, the share of untied grants to Taluk Panchayats constituted about 6.9 per cent, while it is about 23 per cent to Grama Panchayats. These estimates reveal that except for Grama Panchayats the other two tiers are mostly getting tied grants.

State Finance Commissions and recommendations Section 267 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993, provides for the setting up of a Finance Commission to review the financial position of the Zilla Panchayats, Taluk Panchayats, and Grama Panchayats, and to make recommendations with regard to the measures needed to improve the fiscal position of PRIs, the quantum and pattern of government assistance, and the principles governing grants-in-aid to them, and also to deal with any other matters referred to the Finance Commission by the government (Government of Karnataka, 1993). The terms of reference of the Finance Commission are to: a) make recommendations to the government regarding grant-in-aid to the PRIs from the consolidated fund of the state; and b) examine the extent and the manner in which the expenditures are incurring with the available resources by the decentralised bodies. The total grant allocations to PRIs from the state over the years are presented in Table 4.6. The total grants from the state to PRIs is Rs. 2,901 crore during 1996–1997, and this increased to Rs. 4,589 crore in 2000–2001; it increased roughly two times over a period of five years. We can see that the share of PRI Plan outlay from the state in 1996–1997 was about 30.15 per cent, and this increased to 34.57 per cent in 2000–2001. The total share of five years of the First State Finance Commission (SFC) shows 34.28 per cent, for which the Finance Commission indicated that these allocations should be implemented in percentage terms. Taking into account the Finance Commission recommendations, of the 36 per cent of non-loan gross revenue receipts of the statement 30.06 per cent is to be transferred to PRIs based on the following five criteria: a) proportion of the population in rural areas, b) proportion of area covered by PRIs, c) illiteracy rate, d) number of persons per bed in government hospitals, and (e) road length per sq. Km of area (Government of Karnataka, 1996). During the Second Finance Commission (from 2003–2004 to 2007–2008) period, there was a growth in the total allocations to PRIs for five years

80  K. Basavarajeshwari Table 4.6 Share of PRIs Allocation from the State as per the SFC Recommendations (Rs in Crores) Year

First SFC 1996–1997 1997–1998 1998–1999 1999–2000 2000–2001 Total of 5 years Second SFC 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 Total of 5 years 3rd SFC 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 Total of 5 years Total of 15 years

State own revenue receipts

Grants Share of allocated to Transfers to PRIs PRIs from the State own revenues

9,622 10,613 10,337 11,488 13,276 55,337

2,901 3,441 3,804 4,236 4,589 18,971

30.15 32.42 36.80 36.87 34.57 34.28

18,773 24,423 26,720 32,774 36,124 138,814

4,734 5,181 7,483 9,020 9,752 36,169

25.22 21.21 28.01 27.52 27.00 26.06

37,958 41,272 51,338 61,638 70,367 262,573 456,723

9,790 10,177 20,066 12,188 15,822 68,043 123,184

25.79 24.66 39.09 19.77 22.49 25.91 26.97

Source: Authors computation; Basic data: (1) Government of Karnataka, 1996, 2002, and 2008; (2) Government of Karnataka, Budget Allotment for Zilla Panchayat – Plan & Non-Plan from 1998–1999 to 2016–2017 (Link Documents) (Government of Karnataka, 1996, 2002, 2008)

which was about 26.06 per cent; however, this is less than the recommended share of Second SFC. Taking into account the Finance Commission recommendations that of the 40 per cent of non-loan gross own revenue receipts (NLGORRs) of the statement 32 per cent is to be transferred to PRIs based on the following five criteria: a) population, b) area, c) illiteracy rate, d) SC/ST population, and (e) population per bed (Government of Karnataka, 2002). The Second SFC made a change in the criteria by including SC/ST population instead of road length, as was used as one of the criteria in the First SFC. Likewise, during the Third Finance Commission period (from 2008–2009 to 2012–2013) the share of PRI allocation from the state own revenue receipts in 2008–2009 was about 25.79 per cent, but this declined to 22.49 per cent in 2012–2013. The total five years allocations in absolute figures show an increment from Rs. 9,790 crore in 2008–2009 to Rs. 15,822 crore in 2012– 2013. However, the Third Finance Commission recommended that of the

Decentralisation at the sub-state level  81 33 per cent of NLNORR (non-loan net own revenue receipts) the percentage share of PRIs allocation is 23 per cent (Government of Karnataka, 2008), and the criteria followed by the Third Finance Commission was similar to that of the previous finance commissions, but rather than five criteria it has included one more, i.e. density of population. It is clear that the available results indicate that state government implemented or in other words followed the recommendations given by the State Finance Commissions, specifically the share of funds from the state’s own revenue receipts to PRIs. To support this, a study (Babu et al., 2018) showed that the respective governments in the state accepted some of the important recommendations of the SFCs. Amongst the accepted recommendations was the percentage share of grants from the total revenues of the state with the PRIs. However, it noted that the criteria suggested for vertical and horizontal distribution of PRI grants within the tiers had not been accepted. This is a positive sign in the percentage share of fund allocation to PRIs from the state. The State Finance Commissions should also help the local governments to make plans for economic development by ensuring social justice and delivering public services to local people (Oommen, 2010). To sum up, above all, in the words of Aziz (2000), Panchayats have to be seen as governments rather than as the agents of state governments for implementing its development plans at the grassroots level.

Concluding remarks In 1983 Karnataka passed a legislative Act towards decentralisation. The success of the reforms for decentralisation after this prompted the 73rd Amendment to the Constitution. As a consequence, along with other states, Karnataka set up a three-tier government system; among the three tiers, only Grama Panchayats were entrusted with taxation powers. Also, Panchayats were empowered to collect non-taxes from their own assets and properties. Another source of income for the PRIs was grants from the state consolidated fund. The central government also devolved transfers for centrally sponsored schemes based on the recommendations of Union Finance Commissions (UFCs). So, in this chapter, we analysed the revenues from different sources, such as own revenues, grants from the state and from the central government, and grants from the UFCs. It is clear that revenues from own revenue sources are very nominal; hence, PRIs dependency on grants increased over the period of the study. Considering the importance of financial transfers to PRIs we also brought out a detailed analysis on Plan and Non-Plan allocation from the state and centre. Plan outlay against GSDP shows no more than 1 per cent increases while it is 3 per cent in the case of Non-Plan outlays from the state. These Non-Plan outlays are largely meant for wages and salaries. From the analysis, it is noted that PRIs largely depend upon grants from higher-level governments. The grants available to PRIs are largely conditional

82  K. Basavarajeshwari and matching in nature. However, it will be more beneficial to the PRIs if the higher-level governments give discretionary authority to PRIs to spend on local priorities. This would be fiscal autonomy in the true sense, and Panchayats could spend according to the needs at the grassroots level. More importantly, as per theory and as per practical purpose, they should get more untied grants so that PRIs can have some level of freedom to prepare a need-based budget/plan. It is also clear from the analysis that not all of the State Finance Commissions’ recommendations were accepted and implemented; however, one of the recommendations, specifically the share from state receipts to PRIs, has been accepted. So this is a positive sign and a welcome trend in fund allocation to PRIs from the state government. Even here, the Karnataka state has not been providing transfers equal to the SFCs recommended share. Keeping in view the above discussions, this chapter tries to answer two questions. First, is it possible to reverse the declining proportion of own revenue in Panchayat finances? How? Based on experience in India and Karnataka, in keeping Union Finance Commission and State Finance Commission grants and tax powers assigned to Panchayats, one can argue that Panchayats are to a large extent dependent on grants. Tax sources given to the Panchayats are all minor taxes except for the property tax. There are four issues identified in this chapter that help to increase own revenue mobilisation. This includes the administration capacity of Panchayat officials in assessing and collecting taxes, efforts in collecting non-tax revenues, the imposition of hard budget constraints for better fiscal management, and that revenue collection should be linked with the performance of GPs in their own revenue collection and fund allocation from higher governments. First, there is a need to improve the administration of the imposition and collection of existing taxes. Property tax is considered a significant tax source for GPs in Karnataka because in itself it is significant in terms of its potential to mobilise revenue. Evidence from our fieldwork1 shows that proper assessment of properties and the periodic revision of taxes by officials will result in an improvement in tax collection. However, if they consider all this while collecting tax then the quantum of their own revenue will improve. A study by Rao and Rao (2008) also points out that the actual revenue-raising depends on a variety of factors, which includes the visibility of benefits, rate of tax imposed, culture of tax payments, and administration capacity of Panchayats, and so on. Second, GPs can increase their revenue mobilisation by realising and making sincere efforts to collect revenues from their existing tax and nontax sources (Babu, 2004). There is evidence that shows that several GPs have also found different revenue generation methods, such as the construction of buildings and renting out of shops, godowns for storing agricultural produce, rejuvenation of natural resources for leasing out, etc. In this regard, a study by Aziz (1995) pointed out that Mandal Panchayats (MPs) mobilised a large share of income from non-tax revenues by raising nursery, forest, and fishery production. Another study by Nair (2004) on the mobilisation

Decentralisation at the sub-state level  83 of resources with respect to six selected Panchayats in Kerala, based on a primary survey, points out that revenue from non-tax revenue has increased over the years. Among the different components of non-tax revenue, the major share is from licence fees, gate fees, and ‘other miscellaneous sources’. Further, it is also highlighted that the single most important source of nontax revenue of these six selected GPs is other miscellaneous sources which mainly consisted of sale proceeds of trees, river sand, agricultural and industrial products, lease of lands, and fines and penalties imposed by GPs. Third, bring in hard budget constraints for fiscal balance. A study by Wetzel and Papp (2003) pointed out the importance of hard budget constraints. Importantly, intergovernmental transfers, and especially deficit grants, gives local governments very strong incentives to spend and very weak incentives to tax. Another study by Kornai (1980) also supports hard budget constraints for fiscal balance. Fourth, it is possible to ensure better revenue collection by linking taxes with benefits from public services at local levels (Rao and Rao, 2008; Wetzel and Papp, 2003). However, we see there is no association between taxations and the services provided, given the small amount of the own revenues of GPs. Most importantly, some studies show that there should be a link between the performance of GPs in revenue collection and the allocation of funds for better revenue collection. A study by Rajasekhar and Manjula (2012) also showed that the allocation of grants should be linked with the performance of GPs in revenue collection. Another question we tried to answer in this chapter is whether the grants received from higher-level government are adequate or not? A large number of schemes are entrusted to these Panchayats in India. Of course, the UFC has increased the grants to GPs significantly, up to 2 lakh crore rupees. Studies have also shown that the total Finance Commission grants to PRIs have increased substantially over a period of time. We saw that most of the Grama Panchayats were not able to mobilise revenue resources adequately to provide basic services; this in turn led to an unwillingness to pay taxes by rural local people. Further, the 14th FC recommended allocating substantial funds to Grama Panchayats to provide basic services and announced incentives for Grama Panchayats who maintain their accounts well and increase their own revenue collection. The 14th Finance Commission (award period 2015–2020) entrusted Rs. 200,292.20 crore to Grama Panchayats, and it was noted that the recommended share of the 14th FC was 3.18 times more than the 13th FC. However, 90 per cent of these grants were basic grants, and 10 per cent were performance grants. A study by Sinha (2017) makes observations on the 14th FC grants and their utilisation based on a visit to Assam. Further, the study also states that the financial position of Panchayats in Assam has improved significantly. Ever since the allocation of the 14th FC grants was made available to Panchayats in Assam, it has resulted in a better fiscal position in the majority of the GPs, i.e. out of 2,200 GPs in the state 1,455 have become eligible for receiving performance grants (Sinha, 2017).

84  K. Basavarajeshwari

Note 1 To analyse the finances of the Grama Panchayats we conducted field work in Karnataka as part of my thesis work. The title of my thesis is Local Government Finances: A Study of Selected Grama Panchayats in Karnataka. Further, Grama Panchayats were selected based on its distance to taluk headquarters i.e. two GPs which are closer to taluk headquarters and two GPs away from the taluk headquarters. Two taluks were selected based on their geographical locations and socio-economic conditions.

References Aziz, Abdul (1993). Decentralized Planning: The Karnataka Experiment. New Delhi: Sage. Aziz, Abdul (1995). Decentralisation: Mandal Panchayat System in Karnataka. Hyderabad: National Institute of Rural Development. Aziz, Abdul (2000). ‘Democratic Decentralisation: Experience of Karnataka’, Economic and Political Weekly, 35(39), pp. 3521–3526. Babu, M. Devendra (2004). ‘Finances of Panchayats in Karnataka: A Policy Paper’, Working Paper No. 143. Bengaluru: Institute for Social and Economic Change. Babu, M. Devendra (2010a). ‘Decentralised Planning in Karnataka: Realities and Prospects’, Social and Economic Change Monographs 19. Bengaluru: Institute for Social and Economic Change. Babu, M. Devendra (2010b). ‘Decentralised Planning: Status in Karnataka’, in Palanithurai, G. (ed.) Dynamics of New Panchayati Raj System in India: Financial Status of Panchayats (Vol VII). New Delhi: Concept, pp. 139–169. Babu, M. Devendra, Zahir, F., Khanna, R. and Philip, P. M. (2018). ‘Two Decades of Fiscal Decentralisation Reforms in Karnataka: Opportunities, Issues and Challenges’, Working Paper No. 416, Bengaluru: Institute for Social and Economic Change. Gayithri, K. (2014). Evaluation of State Finances of Karnataka. Study Report submitted to the Fourteenth Finance Commission, Government of India. Bengaluru: Institute for Social and Economic Change. Available at: https​:/​/fi​​ ncomi​​ndia.​​nic​.i​​n​/wri​​terea​​ddata​​%5Cht​​ml​_en​​_file​​s​%5Cf​​i ncom​​1​4​/ot​​hers/​​11​.pd​f (Accessed: 3 January 2019). Government of India (n.d.). The Constitution Seventy-Third Amendment Act Relating to Panchayats. Available at: http:​/​/ind​​iacod​​e​.nic​​.in​/c​​oiweb​​/amen​​d​/am​e​​ nd73.​​htm (Accessed: 25 February 2014). Government of Karnataka (1989). Report of the Finance Commission for Zilla Parishads and Mandal Panchayats. Bangalore. Government of Karnataka (1993). The Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993. Bangalore: Department of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of Karnataka. Government of Karnataka (1996). Report of the State Finance Commission. Bangalore. Available at: http:​/​/www​​.sfck​​arnat​​aka​.m​​rc​.go​​v​.in/​​sites​​/sfck​​arnat​​aka​ .m​​rc​.go​​v​.in/​​files​​​/1st%​​20sfc​​%201.​​pdf (Accessed: 16 July 2019). Government of Karnataka (1998). Budget Allotment for Zilla Panchayat – Plan and Non-Plan, Budget Volumes (Link Documents for Various Years as Presented to the Legislature). Bangalore.

Decentralisation at the sub-state level  85 Government of Karnataka (2002). Report of the Second State Finance Commission. Bangalore. Available at: http:​/​/www​​.sfck​​arnat​​aka​.m​​rc​.go​​v​.in/​​sites​​/sfck​​arnat​​aka​ .m​​rc​.go​​v​.in/​​fi​les​​/2st%​​20sfc​​.pdf (Accessed: 16 July 2019). Government of Karnataka (2008). Report of the Third State Finance Commission. Bangalore. Available at: http:​/​/www​​.sfck​​arnat​​aka​.m​​rc​.go​​v​.in/​​sites​​/sfck​​arnat​​aka​ .m​​rc​.go​​v​.in/​​files​​/3rd%​​20S​FC​​%20Ka​​rnata​​ka​.pd​f (Accessed: 16 July 2019). Kornai, J. (1980). ‘“Hard” and “Soft” Budget Constraint’, Acta Oeconomica, 25(3– 4), pp. 231–245. Nair, R. P. (2004). Mobilisation of Resources by Panchayats: Potential and Feasibilities (A Case Study of Six Selected Panchayats in Kerala) (No. Discussion Paper No. 70). Thiruvanthapuram, Kerala. Available at: http:​/​/www​​.cds.​​ac​.in​​/ krpc​​ds​/pu​​blica​​tion/​​downl​​o​ads/​​70​.pd​f (Accessed: 4 April 2018). Oates, W. E. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich. Oommen, M. A. (2010). ‘Have the State Finance Commissions Fulfilled their Constitutional Mandates?’, Economic and Political Weekly, XLV(30), pp. 39–44. Planning Programme Monitoring and Statistics Department (2014). Economic Survey of Karnataka 2013–14. Available at: https​:/​/pl​​annin​​g​.kar​​natak​​a​.gov​​.in​/ s​​torag​​e​/pdf​​-file​​s​/ESR​​%2020​​13​-​14​​%20En​​glish​​.pdf (Accessed: 12 January 2019). Planning Programme Monitoring and Statistics Department (2017). Economic Survey of Karnataka 2016–17. Bangalore. Available at: https​:/​/pl​​annin​​g​.kar​​ natak​​a​.gov​​.in​/s​​torag​​e​/pdf​​-file​​s​/ESR​​%2020​​16​-​17​​%20En​​glish​​.pdf (Accessed: 12 January 2019). Raghunandhan, R. T. (2014). A Contemporary Analysis of Fiscal Transfers to Rural Local Governments in India. PAISA 2013. Accountability Initiative. New Delhi. Available at: http:​/​/acc​​ounta​​bilit​​yindi​​a​.in/​​sites​​/defa​​ult​/f​​i les/​​artic​​le​_on​​_14th​​_fc​​_f​​ inal-​​1​-1​.p​​df (Accessed: 23 January 2019). Rajasekhar, D. and Manjula, R. (2012). ‘Affordability of Streetlight Services by Gram Panchayats in Karnataka Status, Determinants and Ways Forward’, Journal of Rural Development, 31(4), pp. 419–434. Rao, M. Govinda, Amar Nath, H. K., and Vani, B. P. (2014). Rural Fiscal Decentralization in Karnataka State. New Delhi. April 04, 2018 Available at: http:​/​/www​​.nipf​​p​.org​​.in​/m​​edia/​​media​​libra​​ry​/20​​14​/11​​/Rura​​l​_Fis​​cal​_D​​ecent​​ralis ​​ ation​​_in​​_K​​arnat​​aka​_S​​tate.​​pdf Rao, M. Govinda and Rao, U. A. Vasanth (2008). ‘Expanding the Resource Base of Panchayats: Augmenting Own Revenues’, Economic and Political Weekly, 43(4), pp. 54–61. Raphael, Jos C. (2000). Decentralised Planning in India. New Delhi: Anmol. Sinha, Rajesh Kumar (2017). ‘Utilization of Fourteenth Finance Commission Grant by Gram Panchayats: A Case Study from Assam’, Journal of Rural Development Review, III(3). Available at: http:​/​/cgs​​ird​.g​​ov​.in​​/jour​​nal​/i​​mages​​/pdf/​​Paper​​o​ctde​​c​ -2​.p​​df (Accessed: 20 November 2019). Tanzi, Vito (1996). ‘Fiscal Federalism and Decentralisation: A Review of Some Efficiency and Macroeconomic Aspects’, in Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995. Washington, DC: The World Bank, pp. 295–316. Available at: http:​/​/mef​​.gob.​​pe​/co​​nteni​​dos​/p​​ol​_ec​​on​/do​​cumen​​tos​/F​​iscal​​_Fede​​ralis​​ m​_Dec​​​entra​​lizat​​ion​.p​​df (Accessed: 16 March 2019). Tiebout, Charles. (1956). ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’, Journal of Political Economy, 64, pp. 416–424.

86  K. Basavarajeshwari Wetzel, D. and Papp, A. (2003). ‘Strengthening Hard Budget Constraints in Hungary’, in Rodden, Jonathan A., Eskeland, Gunnar S. and Litvack, Jennie (eds.) Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, USA: The MIT Press, pp. 393–427.

Appendix 4A Table 4.A.1 Allocation of Plan Grants to PRIs (Rs in Crore) Years

1990–1991 1991–1992 1992–1993 1993–1994 1994–1995 1995–1996 1996–1997 1997–1998 1998–1999 1999–2000 CAG 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009* 2009–2010* CAGR 2010–2011* 2011–2012* 2012–2013* 2013–2014* 2014–2015* 2015–2016* 2016–2017* CAGR

State Plan grants

Allocation of Plan grants to PRIs

State

Centre

Total

State

Centre

Total

1,145 1,558 3,025 3,383 3,758 4,360 4,545 5,353 5,888 7,274 19.82 8,588 8,611 9,780 12,323 13,555 16,166 17,783 25,953 29,500 31,000 17.30 38,070 39,764 48,450 65,600 61,844 71,054 85,375 14.65

221 379 596 792 890 951 1,090 1,160 1,199 1,232 18.41 1,017 911 890 988 1,054 1,640 2,749 2,246 2,931 2,764 16.58 2,802 3,208 7,243 1,476 1,143 838 855 –25.10

1,366 1,937 3,621 4,175 4,648 5,311 5,635 6,513 7,087 8,506 19.58 9,605 9,522 10,670 13,311 14,609 17,806 20,532 28,199 32,431 33,764 17.24 40,872 42,972 55,693 67,076 62,987 71,892 86,230 12.88

293 357 374 471 538 620 732 732 732 792 12.07 962 1,083 617 688 1,013 1,992 2,176 2,241 2,632 2,880 17.53 3,010 3,726 4,055 4,841 9,676 10,776 11,945 28.99

252 318 296 322 435 480 541 688 715 736 13.70 735 751 624 614 655 877 1,256 1,330 1,785 1,857 13.32 1860 2,316 3,754 4,080 804 552 567 –24.78

545 675 670 793 973 1,100 1,273 1,420 1,447 1,528 12.83 1,697 1,834 1,241 1,302 1,668 2,869 3,432 3,571 4,417 4,737 15.74 4,870 6,042 7,809 8,921 10,480 11,328 12,512 16.94

Source: Economic Survey of Karnataka (2016–2017 and 2013–2014) Note: * Includes Centre’s share of allocation under the Mahatma Gandhi NREGS, Swarna Jayanti Grama Swarozgar Yojana, District Rural Development Agency, Integrated Waste Land Development Programme, Drought Prone Area Programme and Desert Development Programme as per the budget link document.

Decentralisation at the sub-state level  87 Table 4.A.2 State Tax and Non-Tax Receipts of the State Government for the Period 1996–1997 to 2016–2017 (Rs in Crore) Year

State Own Tax revenue

Share in Central taxes

Total tax receipts

Non-Tax receipts

Total receipts

1996–1997 1997–1998 1998–1999 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 (RE)

5,768 6,412 6,943 7,744 9,043 9,853 10,440 12,570 16,072 18,632 23,301 25,987 27,646 30,579 38,473 46,476 53,754 62,604 70,180 75,566 82,211

1,730 2,176 1,924 2,133 2,574 2,623 27,826 3,245 3,878 4,213 5,374 6,779 7,154 7,360 9,506 11,075 12,647 13,808 14,654 23,967 28,760

7,498 8,588 8,867 9,877 11,617 12,477 38,266 15,815 19,951 22,845 28,675 32,766 34,799 37,939 47,979 57,551 66,401 76,412 84,834 99,534 110,971

2,125 2,025 1,470 1,611 1,660 1,094 1,278 2,958 4,472 3,875 4,098 3,358 3,159 3,334 3,358 4,087 3,966 4,032 4,688 5,355 7,099

9,622 10,613 10,337 11,488 13,276 13,570 39,544 18,773 24,423 26,720 32,774 36,124 37,958 41,272 51,338 61,638 70,367 80,444 89,523 104,889 118,070

Source: Economic Survey of Karnataka Note: (i) GSDP deflator has been used to convert the revenue receipts of the state government by taking the constant price of 2011–2012 base series; *AE-Advanced estimates are taken for GSDP (constant price); (ii) State’s own revenue till 2004–2005 represent gross and from 2005–2006 onwards net

5

Issues in fiscal decentralisation in Chhattisgarh State A study M. Gopinath Reddy and Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra

Introduction In recent times, there is an increasing realisation that genuine decentralisation leads to development. It is also felt that the decentralisation of power to local units of government and management is one of the best ways of empowering people, promoting public participation, and increasing efficiency (Reddy, 2003, p. 1284). Over the last two decades, many countries around the world have been embarking on the path of decentralisation. One of the principal motivations for decentralisation of political, administrative, and fiscal systems in developing countries is the belief that this will help to catalyse the process of harnessing the developmental potential and improve the living conditions of the people, particularly the disadvantaged sections (Rao and Raghunandan, 2011). It is argued that the decentralised institutions will be able to provide an accountable and transparent administration only when certain internal and external conditions are fulfilled. Conditions such as accountability, transparency, participation, and fiscal transfers are key to make these institutions effective and transparent (Mohapatra, 2013). Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) emerged as an instrument of decentralised governance in 1992 with the passage of the 73rd Constitution Amendment Act in India. This initiative provided a fresh impetus to PRIs by way of devolving necessary powers and responsibilities to function as institutions of self-government. The Act also has vested a wide range of powers to the PRIs to explore their own revenues in order to make them institutions of self-government. A significant component of this is vesting fiscal powers to the PRIs, which is mentioned under Article 243H of the Constitution. Further, Articles 243I and 243Y of the Constitution prescribe that the Governor of a state shall, as soon as may be within one year from the commencement of the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992, and thereafter at the expiration of every fifth year, constitute a Finance Commission to review the financial position of the PRIs to make recommendations to the Governor on these matters. Besides tax sharing, the State Finance Commission (SFC) is assigned the task of reviewing DOI: 10.4324/9781003094357-5

Fiscal decentralisation in Chhattisgarh   89 the financial position of rural and urban local bodies and making recommendations on the assignment of various taxes, duties, tolls, fees, and grants-in-aid to be given to these bodies from the consolidated fund of the state. The most critical function of the SFC is to determine the fiscal transfer from the state to the local bodies in the form of revenue sharing and grants-in-aid. In the case of Chhattisgarh, the PRIs have been functioning as institutions of self-government since the formation of the state in 2000. These institutions have taken many initiatives for providing basic services to the people in rural areas. However, in the present decentralisation regime, the PRIs have also faced challenges in discharging their duties. Further, the policies of devolution employed by state government have brought the issue of the devolution of powers to the forefront. The issue of the fiscal autonomy of these institutions seems to be writ large, notwithstanding the recommendations of the SFCs in this regard. It is in this context that there is a need to critically examine the issues associated with the process of fiscal decentralisation and position of the PRIs in Chhattisgarh. This chapter, which is a part of a study conducted for the Third State Finance Commission (TSFC) in 2017, analyses the funds, functions, and functionaries of the PRIs and the extent to which the devolution of powers, functions, functionaries, and funds have impacted the functioning of PRIs in the state. It also highlights the finances of the state with a focus on Own Sources of Revenue (OSR) and how this has influenced the finances of the PRIs in the state. The institutionalisation of the SFCs (First and Second SFCs) in the state and their key recommendations are also discussed, and how these recommendations have been taken up for implementation are highlighted. The chapter offers some suggestions, which are discussed in the last section of the chapter. The key objectives of the chapter are: (1) to map the fiscal decentralisation process in the state of Chhattisgarh through the working of various SFCs and Central Finance Commissions; (2) to analyse the finances of the state and status of the OSR of the state; (3) to analyse the status of the devolution of funds to the PRIs in the state; and (4) to offer a few policy recommendations to improve the financial position of the PRFs. The database for this chapter is the secondary information collected from various sources as part of working for the Third SFC of the state. The secondary information was collected based on a desk review of the available information such as reports of various SFCs, Action Taken Reports (ATRs) of the state government on SFC Reports, legal provisions (Acts, Rules, and Government Orders), study reports prepared by various Ministries and Government Departments, and various research publications. Interaction was also held with various categories of people like PRI Members, officials, and citizens to understand the implications of the fiscal decentralisation in the state.

90  M. Gopinath Reddy and Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra

Review of recent literature Understanding the finances of local governments has emerged as a key area of study for decentralised governance and devolution. The literature on ‘fiscal federalism’, which has evolved through different periods of time, has provided a wide array of theoretical underpinning and empirical evidence on issues pertaining to fiscal transfers to the local level of governments. The concept of ‘fiscal decentralisation’ has been extensively discussed in the literature (Oates, 1972; Marjit, 1999; Rao, 2000; Bardhan, 2003; Asfaw et al., 2004; Oommen, 2004, 2006; Boex, 2009) and has attained prominence because of a heightened focus given by different countries in the world while devolving fiscal powers and authority to local governing institutions (Mohapatra, 2013). It is argued that the essence of decentralised governance is based upon certain key factors, such as people’s participation, accountability, transparency, and fiscal transfers (Braun and Grote, 2002, p. 89; Tanzi, 2001, p. 13; Romeo, 1999, p. 137; Crook and Manor, 1998, p. 2; Litvack, Ahmed and Bird, 1998, p. 7). Fiscal decentralisation, according to Oommen (2008), is an integral subset of decentralisation and assumes significance because without its proper functioning decentralisation becomes inoperative and meaningless. Fiscal transfers have an important influence on the effective functioning of democratic decentralised institutions, as they provide impetus to these institutions to work as self-governments by vesting them with the autonomy to take prompt decisions regarding the finances of institutions. According to Boex (2009), sound fiscal decentralisation reforms require sound decentralised finances as well as sound decentralised governance and administration. Fiscal autonomy of democratic decentralised institutions has been argued on the ground that the guarantees for local autonomy lies in the way local governments have at their disposal financial resources which they can autonomously deploy to implement their local level development. Without financial resources any decentralised governance system is empty. Therefore financial resources must cement autonomy. (United Nations, n.d. p. 2) As decentralised governance needs the requisite powers for effective functioning and service delivery, so the transfer of powers can help to decide the allocation and distribution of public resources, the powers to implement policies and programmes, and the power to raise and spend public revenues for these as well as other purposes (Johnson, 2003). The fiscal portfolio of the local self-governing institutions is based upon the income from ‘own revenues’ and the ‘assigned and devolved revenues’ of the government and semi-government organisations (Sahasranaman, 2012). Banarjee (2013) mentions that in order to have more effective rural governments, it is important to have a clear and explicit assignment of the expenditure and

Fiscal decentralisation in Chhattisgarh   91 revenue functions. However, weak fiscal devolution can make the democratically decentralised institutions handy by creating a culture of ‘dependency syndrome’. In the case of India, the period after 73rd Amendment Act witnessed a number of studies carried out by various scholars to examine the overall issues of devolution and the finances of the PRIs in various states (Reddy, 2003; Reddy and Sreedevi, 2004; Jena and Gupta, 2008; Rajaraman, 2017; Reddy and Mohapatra, 2017). The evolution of decentralisation reforms and the emergence of decentralised governance as institutions of participatory decision-making and implementation of development programmes was part of the process of the democratic reforms in India. The post-1990s democratic reforms in the country emphasised much on the essence of the deepening of democracy and rejuvenation of the grassroots democratic institutions, which ultimately paved the way towards the institutionalisation of the PRIs in rural India. It was realised that human development issues such as health, education, sanitation, and drinking water, can be addressed effectively, through effective and financially sound PRIs. Rajaraman (2017) observed that Panchayats develop more local revenue resources, arguing that widespread local tax collection would strengthen local government in confrontation with local elites and make it less susceptible to elite capture. However, the financial status of these institutions remains elusive despite a number of studies on rural decentralisation in India since the enactment of the Act (Jha, 2002). In the case of Chhattisgarh and other Indian states, scholars (Oommen, 2004, 2006; Rajaraman, 2017) have tried to focus on the issues of fiscal decentralisation. It is observed by these scholars that a significant component of the 73rd Amendment is vesting fiscal powers to the PRIs. An important component of such a process is based on the collection of tax revenue from the local sources, as assigned by the states to these institutions. According to Oommen (2004), 28 types of taxes and rates have been assigned to the local governments since the enactment of the 73rd Amendment, which is eminently local in character. State-specific experiences of tax decentralisation, i.e. collection of own tax revenue, shows that the local governments’ own tax revenue has declined from 5.71% to 3.97% in 15 major states in India (Oommen, 2006). It is also argued that the PRIs should have the rights to collect taxes from private taxpayers (Marjeet, 1999), and this trend is not reflected in the tax decentralisation agenda of the various states, including Chhattisgarh. Further, the Assessment Report on Devolution to Panchayats in India (2012) shows that 32 types of tax sources were devolved to the threetier PRIs in different Indian states, including Chhattisgarh. In the case of Chhattisgarh, the PRIs have been enjoying the power of raising their own revenues from various sources. However, the fiscal autonomy of these institutions is still largely regulated and controlled by the state government. It is on this basis that this chapter has attempted to explore the status of finances

92  M. Gopinath Reddy and Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra of the PRIs in the state and challenges faced by these institutions by their methods of generating their own revenues. The status of SFCs and their major recommendations have also been highlighted to understand the overall issues.

Structure of own revenues of the state Chhattisgarh is one of the youngest states in India, with a geographical area of 135,192 square kilometres. Constituted on 1 November 2000, the state is located in the heart of India. The total population of the state as per the 2011 census is 2.55 crores, of which the total male population is 1.28 crores and the female population is 1.27 crores. The population density of the state is 189 per square kilometres as against the Indian average of 382 per square kilometres, and 44.21% of its land area is under forest, whereas the Indian average is 23.38%. The Chhattisgarh state government, like any other state government, has two sources of receipts – revenue and capital. Revenue receipts consist of own revenue (own tax revenue and non-tax revenue) and transfers from the Union Government (the state’s share of union taxes and duties and grantsin-aid). Capital receipts comprise non-debt (miscellaneous capital receipts such as proceeds from disinvestments, recoveries of loans and advances) and debt receipts (internal sources, market loans, borrowings from financial institutions/commercial banks, and loans and advances from GOI). The 14th Finance Commission recommended that the state government be excluded from the operations of the National Small Savings Fund (NSSF), with effect from 1 April 2015. During 2011–2012 to 2017–2018, the average growth rate of the Chhattisgarh state economy was 10.8 per cent at current prices and 6.3 per cent at constant prices (2011–2012) (Table 5.1). The growth of the economy of the state fluctuated at the aggregate level and also at the sectoral level due to various reasons. As far as the sectoral composition was concerned, Table 5.2 shows that the industrial sector constituted around 45 per cent at current prices and nearly 48 per cent at constant prices, followed by the service sector (around 35 per cent) and agriculture sector (less than 20 per cent). Status of state’s finances The total receipts of the state increased from Rs. 27,577.39 crore in 2011– 2012 to Rs. 44,571.54 crore in 2014–2015 (Table 5.3). It has further increased to Rs. 51,367.65 crore in 2015–2016 and estimated to increase further to Rs. 78,527.17 crore (2017–2018 RE) and Rs. 83,096.13 crore (2018–2019 BE). Of the total receipts, revenue receipts constituted 93 per cent in 2011– 2012, thereafter declining to less than 90 per cent in 2015–2016. In

Fiscal decentralisation in Chhattisgarh   93 Table 5.1 GSDP of Chhattisgarh State (at Current and Constant Prices) (Rs. Crores) Year

GSDP (at current prices)

2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 (P) 2016–2017(Q) 2017–2018 (A) Ave 2011–2018

158,073.82 177,511.32 206,833.19 221,142.37 234,212.37 262,263.36 291,680.72

Growth rate over previous year (%) 12.30 16.52 6.92 5.91 11.98 11.22 10.81

GSDP in 2011– 2012 (Constant) prices 158,073.82 165,977.40 182,579.45 185,882.21 197,068.84 213,648.98 227,866.31

Growth rate over previous year (%) 5.00 10.00 1.81 6.02 8.41 6.65 6.32

Source: Arthik Sarvekshan 2016–2017 and 2017–2018, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Chhattisgarh. Note: P= Provisional; Q= Quick estimate; A= Anticipated.

2016–2017, its share was 91 per cent. Again its share is estimated to decline to around 87 per cent in 2017–2018 (RE) and 2018–2019 (BE). The share of revenue receipts in the total receipts fluctuated between 85 per cent and 94 per cent during 2011–2019. The corresponding increase in capital receipts is due to the gradual decline/increase of Non-Debt Capital Receipts/Public Debt Receipts (Table 5.4). Revenue receipts Of the total revenue receipts, state own revenue is higher than the central transfers, the gap between the two showed a declining trend. The declining share of own revenue since 2015–2016 is mainly because of higher central tax transfers following the 14th Finance Commission award. The relative share of state own non-tax revenue showed a declining trend while own tax revenue showed an increasing trend from 2011–2012 to 2013–2014, and thereafter it is declining (Table 5.5). State’s own revenue Table 5.6 highlights the composition of own revenue during 2011–2012 to 2018–2019. The composition of states own revenue shows that nearly three-fourths of revenue was accounted for by own tax revenue and the remaining share by own non-tax revenue.

Review of the governance and devolution in PRIs Chhattisgarh is predominantly a rural state, with 76.76% of its population living in villages. The PRIs of the state have been providing basic services

2011–2012

2012–2013

19.32 45.90 34.78 17.81 47.56 34.63

16.97 49.08 33.95

2014–2015

18.42 47.42 34.16

2013–2014

16.93 48.26 34.81

20.14 43.39 36.47

2015–2016(P)

17.76 47.97 34.27

21.5 42.29 36.21

Note: P= Provisional; Q= Quick estimate; A= Anticipated.

17.15 47.65 35.20

22.16 41.01 36.83

2016–2017(Q) 2017–2018 (A)

Source: Arthik Sarvekshan 2016–2017 and 2017–2018, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Chhattisgarh.

GSDP (current prices) Agriculture 18.10 19.15 Industry 47.27 45.94 Services 34.63 34.91 GSDP (constant prices) Agriculture 18.10 18.32 Industry 47.27 47.09 Services 34.63 34.58

Sectors

Table 5.2 Sectoral Composition of GSDP in Chhattisgarh State (at Current and Constant Prices) (in Per Cent)

17.58 47.84 34.58

19.83 44.75 35.43

Avg. 2011–2012 – 2017–2018

94  M. Gopinath Reddy and Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra

1710.0 27577.4

11096.7 3605.2 33183.3

11927.9

17650.2

29578.1

2012–2013

5581.9 37632.2

12606.4

19443.9

32050.3

2013–2014

6638.7 44571.5

17350.8

20582.0

37932.8

2014–2015

5299.9 51367.7

23778.1

22289.7

46067.7

2015–2016

5140.1 58825.4

29070.8

24614.5

53685.3

2016–2017

9947.1 78527.2

36427.0

32153.0

68580.0

2017–2018 (RE)

10228.2 83096.1

38668.0

34200.0

72868.0

2018–2019 (BE)

Note: RE – Revised Estimate; BE – Budget Estimate.

Source: Various years of Budget At a Glance and Budget in Brief of Chhattisgarh, http:​/​/fin​​ance.​​cg​.go​​v​.in/​​budge​​t​_doc​​/main​​_b​udg​​et​.as​​p?) RBI, State Finances: A Study of Budgets (various years) and Arthik Sarvekshan 2016–2017, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Chhattisgarh.

II III

B

14770.7

25867.4

Total Revenue Receipts State’s Own Revenue Central Transfers Capital Receipts Total Receipts (I+II)

I

A

2011–2012

 

 

Table 5.3 Financial Position of Chhattisgarh State (Rs. Crore)

Fiscal decentralisation in Chhattisgarh   95

Total Revenue 93.80 State Own 53.56 Revenue Central Transfers 40.24 Capital Receipts 6.20 Non-Debt 4.67 Capital Receipts Public Debt 1.53 Receipts Total Receipts 100.00 (I+II) 100.00

6.20

35.95 10.86 4.66

89.14 53.19

100.00

10.45

33.50 14.83 4.38

85.17 51.67

100.00

14.45

38.93 14.89 0.45

85.11 46.18

100.00

9.73

46.29 10.32 0.58

89.68 43.39

100.00

8.44

49.42 8.74 0.30

91.26 41.84

100.00

12.28

46.39 12.67 0.39

87.33 40.95

100.00

11.93

46.53 12.31 0.38

87.69 41.16

2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 (RE) (BE)

Note: RE – Revised Estimate; BE – Budget Estimate.

Source: Various years of Budget At a Glance and Budget in Brief of Chhattisgarh, http:​/​/fin​​ance.​​cg​.go​​v​.in/​​budge​​t​_doc​​/main​​_b​udg​​et​.as​​p?) RBI, State Finances: A Study of Budgets (various years) and Arthik Sarvekshan 2016–2017, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Chhattisgarh.

III

2

2 II 1

I 1

Item

Table 5.4 Broad Composition of Total Receipts of Chhattisgarh State (%)

96  M. Gopinath Reddy and Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra

44.75 24.59 30.66 15.92 14.75 60.67 39.33

44.07

24.40

31.53

15.61

15.93

59.67

40.33

45.74

54.26

23.69

12.85

36.54

22.05

41.41

100.00 63.46

51.62

48.38

17.50

11.32

28.82

34.12

37.06

100.00 71.18

54.15

45.85

19.11

10.56

29.67

35.04

35.29

100.00 70.33

53.12

46.88

22.09

11.25

33.34

31.03

35.63

100.00 66.66

53.07

46.93

21.56

11.21

32.78

31.50

35.72

100.00 67.22

47.38

52.62

18.84

12.92

31.76

28.54

39.70

100.00 68.24

Note: RE – Revised Estimate; BE – Budget Estimate.

Source: Various years of Budget at a Glance and Budget in Brief of Chhattisgarh, RBI, State Finances: A Study of Budgets (various years) and Arthik Sarvekshan 2016–2017, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Chhattisgarh.

100.00 69.34

100.00 68.47

2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 Avg. (RE) (BE) 2011–2018

Total Revenue 100.00 1. Total Tax 65.85 Revenue A. State’s Own 41.41 Tax Revenue B. Share in 24.43 Central Taxes 2. Non-Tax 34.15 Revenue C. State’s Own 15.69 Non-Tax Revenue D. Grants from 18.46 the Centre State Own 57.10 Revenue (1a+2C) Central 42.90 Transfers (1B+2D)

Item

Table 5.5 Broad Composition of Revenue Receipts of Chhattisgarh State (%)

Fiscal decentralisation in Chhattisgarh   97

98  M. Gopinath Reddy and Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra Table 5.6 Composition of Own Revenue of Chhattisgarh State (Rs. Crores) Item

Total Own Revenue

Own Tax Revenue Own Non-Tax Revenue

2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 (BE) 2018–2019 (BE) 2011–2018 (Avg.)

14,141.32 17,521.15 21,372.30 24,110.87 28,748.84 29,384.25 31,124.84 34,200.00 25,075.45

9,830.45 (69.52) 12,175.59 (69.49) 15,300.30 (71.59) 17,926.25 (74.35) 20,085.85 (69.87) 21,964.10 (74.75) 23,420.64 (75.25) 26,030.00 (76.11) 18,341.65 (73.15)

4,310.87 (30.48) 5,345.66 (30.51) 6,072.00 (28.41) 6,184.62 (25.65) 8,662.99 (30.13) 7,420.15 (25.25) 7,704.20 (24.75) 8,170.00 (23.89) 6,733.81 (26.85)

Source: Budget at a Glance and Budget in Brief of Chhattisgarh, (various years) RBI, State Finances: A Study of Budgets (various years) and Arthik Sarvekshan 2016–2017. Note: Figures in brackets are percentages to the total.

to the people of the rural areas through various strategies. The state has 10,971 Gram Panchayats (GPs), 146 Janpad Panchayats (JPs), and 27 Zilla Panchayats (ZPs); 19 ZPs are part of the Scheduled Areas and of the implementation of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act. Of the total GPs in the state, 4,506 are located in the Scheduled Areas and are part of the implementation of the PESA Act. This Act also extends to 85 JPs out of a total of 146 in the state. It is estimated that 65 per cent of the total area of the state, i.e. 88,000 square kilometres comes under the implementation of the PESA Act. Further, the state has 19,679 villages. Legal provisions The state has adopted a three-tier Panchayati Raj system, like the ZPs at the district level, the JP at the intermediary level, and the GP at the village level. The legal provisions, institutional arrangements, and functioning of PRIs started with the formation of the state of Chhattisgarh. However, after its formation in 2000, the new state adopted the Panchayat Raj Act of 1993 and also the State Finance Commission Act of 1994 of Madhya Pradesh. The Panchayati Raj legislation applicable in Madhya Pradesh became applicable to the state of Chhattisgarh. However, in 2004, the state introduced the Chhattisgarh Panchayati Raj (Amended) Act (Adhiniyam) of 2004, which is now applicable to all the three tiers of the PRIs in the state. Functions of PRIs The Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Act identified functional areas for the PRIs in the state and made provisions for the transfer of these functions to them. These functions can be broadly divided into three categories, namely regulatory, maintenance, and development. Section 49, 50, and 52 of the Act

Fiscal decentralisation in Chhattisgarh   99 (Adhiniyam) enumerates the functions to be carried out by the PRIs (GPs, JPs, and ZPs) within the finances available at their disposal. The GPs, as per section 49 of the Act, have been entrusted with the maintenance of village-level infrastructure – school buildings, anganwadis, etc. The GPs also supervise the village-level implementation of various schemes, such as Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, mid-day meals, pensions for the elderly and the disabled, public distribution, and other social security schemes. The JPs under Section 50 of the Act have been entrusted with carrying out various activities related to agriculture, social forestry, animal husbandry, fisheries, public health, basic and adult education, communication, cottage industries, women and child development, social welfare, family welfare, and fairs and festivals. Under Section 52, the functions of the ZPs include consolidation of Panchayat plans and preparation of plans for economic development and social justice for the districts, coordination and monitoring the activities of the JPs and GPs, and implementing certain schemes of the central and the state government. The ZPs also have the power of supervision over the functions of various line departments located within their jurisdiction. Functionaries of PRIs The state government has also taken appropriate steps to transfer functionaries to the PRIs. The state government has transferred various developmental functions, including specific programmes and schemes of 15 departments, to the PRIs. These departments are related to (1) School Education, (2) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Development, (3) Women and Child Development, (4) Mineral Resource, (5) Village Industries, (6) Agriculture, (7) Animal Husbandry, (8) Fisheries, (9) Public Health Engineering, (10) Food and Civil Supply and Consumer Protection, (11) Sports and Youth Welfare, (12) Energy, (13) Water Resource, (14) Rural Road Development Agency (P&RD), and (15) Labour. The state government has also devolved powers to PRIs at the appropriate level to recruit teachers and medical/para-medical staff.

Finances of the PRIs in the state The revenue resources are statutorily assigned to the PRIs under the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (the Panchayat Act), assuring a certain amount of autonomous revenues to these institutions. Section 77 of the Panchayat Act empowers GPs and JPs to impose both tax and non-tax levies with a further division of obligatory and optional levies under each category. Table 5.7 presents the tax and non-tax sources assigned to PRIs as per the State PR Act. It is observed in the above table that the GPs have been vested with the power of levying various obligatory taxes, such as property tax, lighting

Tax

Tax

Non-tax

Optional Levies

Obligatory Levies Non-tax

Source: 2nd SFC, Government of Chhattisgarh

1. GPs (Section 77 and Property tax on land Market fees, fees on Tax on building not covered by the Fees for the use of sarais, dharmasalas, Schedules-I & II) buildings, Tax on Registration of property tax, Tax on Animals, rest houses, Slaughterhouses and Private Latrines, Street Cattle sold within Tax on non-motorised vehicles, camping grounds. Drainage fees light tax, Tax on the Panchayat Water Rate, Tax on persons where a system of drainage is persons exercising a area carrying on the profession of introduced by the Panchayats, fees on profession or carrying purchaser, agent, commission entry of vehicles into the Panchayat on any trade or calling agent, weigh man or a measure area, fees for bullock-cart and tonga in the Panchayat area Temporary stands, fees for a temporary structure tax for special works of public or any projection over public place utility, Tax for the construction or temporary occupation thereof, fees or maintenances of public for grazing cattle. Panchayat grazing latrines, General scavenging tax grounds. for removal and disposed of refuse 2. JPs (Section 77 and Tax on Theatres Nil Nil Fees for licences or permissions granted, Schedule-I) or theatrical fees for use occupation of lands performances or other properties vested in or and other public mentioned by the JP. entertainments, Development tax on agricultural land 3. Zila Panchayat Nil Nil Increase in the Cess on land from Nil (Section74 (2)) Rs.0.50 per rupee up to Rs.10

Level of Panchayat

Table 5.7 Own Revenue Sources Assigned to PRIs in Chhattisgarh State

100  M. Gopinath Reddy and Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra

Fiscal decentralisation in Chhattisgarh   101 tax, profession tax, and tax on local markets in the state. In the category of optional taxes, the major taxes are vehicle tax and water tax. In the obligatory non-tax components, the GPs have the power to levy and collect market fees and fees from the registration of cattle, and in the optional non-tax categories there are many fees which the GPs can levy and collect. Similarly, the Janpad Panchayats have the power of levying taxes such as entertainment tax and development tax on agricultural land. In the nontax revenues, the JPs have the power to levy fees for any licence for the use and occupation of land or other properties. They also have the power to auction/lease ferry services and impose fines on defaulters of payment tax. In the case of ZPs, it is observed that they have nominal powers with regard to levying and collecting taxes from various sources. They only have the power to increase the rate of cess on land revenue and can distribute the same among the JPs and GPs of their jurisdiction. With regard to nontax revenues of the ZPs, these bodies have vested power to raise revenue from water bodies (tanks), leasing out of fish ponds (tanks), and fees from property. Table 5.8 presents the status of the own revenues of the GPs in the state from 2014–2015 to 2016–2017. The composition of own revenues of the GPs at the aggregate level shows that obligatory tax revenue constitutes a major share (44.68%) followed by other fees (non-tax revenue) (36.15%) and optional taxes (19.17%). It is further observed that the three-year average of total own revenue for the period 2014–2017 per GP is about Rs. 52,572. The obligatory tax

Table 5.8 Composition of Own Revenues of the GPs (in Rs.) Year

Obligatory Tax

Optional Tax

Other Fees

Total

2014–2015

173,447,839 (44.21) 248,896,269 (41.73) 350,807,759 (47.31) 257,717,289 (44.68)

74,708,032 (19.04) 121,606,316 (20.39) 135,279,757 (18.24) 110,531,368 (19.17)

144,191,249 (36.75) 225,893,709 (37.88) 255,486,246 (34.45) 208,523,735 (36.15)

392,347,120 (100.00) 596,396,294 (100.00) 741,573,762 (100.00) 576,772,392 (100.00)

23,491

10,075

19,007

52,572

2015–2016 2016–2017 Average of Three Years Average Revenue per GP

Source: Director, Department of Panchayati Raj, Chhattisgarh. Note: Figures in brackets are percentage to row total.

102  M. Gopinath Reddy and Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra Table 5.9 Total Own Revenues of Janpad Panchayats 2011–2016 (Rs. Lakh) Year

Total own revenues (Tax and Non-Tax)

Revenue Average own revenue per JP collection as % of Demand Collection Balance demand Demand Collection Balance

2011–2012 30.43 2012–2013 37.58 2013–2014 42.62 2014–2015 115.97 2015–2016 52.36 Average 55.79 per year

17.07 19.28 25.29 95.85 35.31 38.56

13.36 18.30 17.33 20.12 17.05 17.23

56.10 51.30 59.34 82.65 67.44 69.11

0.21 0.26 0.29 0.79 0.36 0.38

0.12 0.13 0.17 0.66 0.24 0.26

0.09 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12

Source: Third SFC, Chhattisgarh State

revenue per GP is Rs. 2,349 followed by other fees (Rs. 19,007) and optional taxes (Rs. 10,075). With regard to the own revenues of the JPs, Table 5.9 shows the various aspects such as demand collection and the balance. The total own resources per JP ranged between Rs. 12,000 in 2011–2012 to Rs. 24,000 in 2015– 2016. The year 2014–2015 seems to be exceptional both in demand as well as in collection. The proportion of collection as a percentage of demand ranged between 51 per cent in 2012–2013 to 67 per cent in 2015–2016, barring 2014–2015. With regard to the own revenues of the Zilla Panchayats, it was observed that they were not empowered to levy any obligatory tax. However, they were empowered to levy optional tax and to increase the cess on land from Rs. 0.50 per rupee up to Rs. 10.

Assigned and transfer revenues of the PRIs Share of PRIs from state’s own tax revenue Besides own revenue, the sources of funds for PRIs also include a share in the state’s own tax revenue and grants from central and state governments. The scope of the revenue resources of local bodies expanded with recommendations by the Union Finance Commissions (UFCs), starting with the Tenth Union Finance Commission from the central government. The 73rd Amendment to the Constitution also broadened the power and functions of local governments (transfer of functions, functionaries, and finances from the state to local bodies) and also made provision for setting up a SFC to rationalise state–local fiscal relations. In the case of Chhattisgarh, the state taxes, which are assigned to PRIs (assigned revenue), are land revenue, royalty on minor minerals and additional stamp duty, and entertainment tax.

Fiscal decentralisation in Chhattisgarh   103 Transfer of resources to PRIs from state government The transfer of resources to the PRIs can be categorised into assigned taxes (through the state’s own tax revenue) and grants as recommended by the SFC, grants-in-aid as recommended by the Central Finance Commission and grants under central and state government schemes. Table 5.10 presents the nature of the transfers made to PRIs. Transfer of resources to PRIs from the central government The PRIs of the state have also receive grants from the central government for implementing various central sponsored schemes and programmes. Central government grants include those given by the Union Finance Commissions and for centrally sponsored schemes implemented by the Panchayats. Tables 5.11 and 5.12 show the extent of transfers made to the PRIs of Chhattisgarh under 13th and 14th UFCs, respectively. Table 5.13 shows the status of fund flow to PRIs through all revenue and receipts from the year 2014–2015 to 2017–2018 using available data from various sources.

State finance commissions of Chhattisgarh First State Finance Commission Since the state of Chhattisgarh was created in November 2000 as a reorganisation of Madhya Pradesh, its First SFC was constituted on 22 August 2003, and the Commission submitted its report in May 2007. In the meantime, the recommendations of the First and the Second SFC of Madhya Pradesh for the relevant years were applicable to the newly created state. However, the Second SFC of Madhya Pradesh was constituted, but it did not submit its report within the prescribed time. As a result of this, the newly created state of Chhattisgarh continued to provide financial assistance to the local bodies as per the recommendations of the First SFC of Madhya Pradesh. The principal task of the SFCs has been to get PRIs a share of the state revenues. Second State Finance Commission The Second State Finance Commission (SSFC) of Chhattisgarh was constituted on 23 July 2011 to make fiscal recommendations for the period of 2011–2016. The state government had extended the award period of the Commission for 2012 to 2017. The government also extended the award period of the First SFC to 2012–2013. The Second SFC submitted its report covering all aspects of its ToR during March 2012. The Commission had given 133 recommendations; of them,

Source: Second State Finance Commission, Government of Chhattisgarh, 2012

1. Manoranjan Kar Se Prapta Rashi se Panchayaton ko Anudan (Share from Entertainment Tax) 2. Mudrank Shulk (Registration fees) 3. Mukhyamantri Janpad Sashaktikaran Yojana (MJSY) 4. Janpad Panchayat Vikas Nidhi (JP Development Fund) 5. Vivekanand Yuva Protsahan Yojana 6. Janpad and Gram Panchayat Padadhikariyon Ka Mandeya Evam Suvidhayen (Honorarium for PRI Members) 7. Panchayati Raj Sansathao ka kshamta vikas (Improving Capacity of PRIs/Capacity Building Programme) 8. Mukhyamantri Panchayat Sashaktikaran (Strengthening of JPs)

Central, state, 1. Gram Panchayaton ko Mulbhut Karyon hetu and State Anudan (Grants For basic services) Finance 2. Pradhan Mantri Gramodyog Yojana Commission 3. Gaun Khanij Mad (Royalty from Minor Minergrants als) 4. Atal Samarasta Bhawan (Multi-Purpose GP Building) 5. Shradhanjali Yojana 6. Mukhyamantri Samagra Gramin Vikas Yojana 7. Gaon Ki Galiyon Ka Aantrik Vidyutikaran (Electrification of Rural Hamlets) 8. Rastriya Aajeevika Pariyojana (NRLP) 9. C.G. Rajya Kshetriya Gramin Vikas Pradhikaran (Area Development Authority) 10. Mini Stadium 11. Mukhyamantri Panchayat Sashaktikaran (Strengthening of GPs) 12. Sansad Aadarsh Gram Yojana 13. Vidhyak Aadarsh Gram Yojana 14. Panchayati Raj Sansathao ka kshamta vikas (Improving Capacity of PRIs/Capacity Building Programme) 15. Hamar Chhattisgarh Yojna (Our Chhattisgarh Programme)

JPs

additional Duty on Transfers of Property; Royalty on minor minerals; Entertainment Tax

GPs

Assigned taxes Net proceeds of land revenue. Cess on Land Revenue; Royalty on minor minerals

Transfers from state government

Table 5.10 Transfers from State to PRIs

1. Panchayat padadhikariyon ka Sammelan (PRIs Members Conference/ Conclave) 2. Zila Panchayat Vikas Nidhi (ZP Development Fund) 3. Zila Panchayat Samanya Prayojan (General Grants to ZPs) 4. Panchayat Padadhikariyon Ka Prashikshan (Capacity Building of Functionaries) 5. Sachiviya Vyavastha (Secretarial Provision) 6. Zila Panchayat Padadhikariyon Ka Mandeya (Honorarium/Allowance for the Functionaries) 7. Panchayat Sachivon Ka Vetan (Salary of Secretary) 8. Mukhyamantri Panchayat Sashaktikaran (Strengthening of PRIs/ZPs) 9. Panchayati Raj Sansathao ka kshamta vikas (Improving Capacity of PRIs/Capacity Building Programme ZPs)

ZPs

104  M. Gopinath Reddy and Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra

67.16 10.50

295.62

0

174.70

21.10

21.10

21.10

21.10

362.90 472.20

10.55

109.82 174.48

Source: Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Chhattisgarh, 2017.

274.50 415.50

0

56.53 151.8

21.10

21.10

21.10 574.00 511.80

52.48

244.89 190.30

21.10

73.80

583.78

105.50

73.05

494.12

105.50

393.20 1,869.93 1,779.53

10.02

82.87

21.10

279.29 1,106.85 1,106.85

0

21.10

255.53 279.29

21.10

221.50 255.53

21.10

196.86 221.50

196.86

153.67

2014–2015

General basic 153.67 grant 21.10 Special area basic grant 0 General area performance grant 0 Special area performance grant 174.77 Total

2013–2014

Total Total allocation release Allocation Release Allocation Release Allocation Release Allocation Release for five years

2012–2013

2011–2012

Component of 2010–2011 grant Allocation Release

Table 5.11 Thirteenth Union Finance Commission Grants to the PRIs of Chhattisgarh State (Rs. In Crores)

Fiscal decentralisation in Chhattisgarh   105

106  M. Gopinath Reddy and Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra Table 5.12 Fourteenth Union Finance Commission Grants to the PRIs of Chhattisgarh State (Rs. in Crore) Component 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 2019–2020 Total of Grant Basic grant 566.18 0.00 Performance grant Total 566.18

783.98 102.84

905.81 116.37

1,047.86 132.16

1,415.89 173.05

4,719.72 524.42

886.82

1,022.18

1,180.02

1,588.94

5,244.14

Source: Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Chhattisgarh, 2017.

62 were related to the PRIs and 65 to ULBs. The state government, through its Action Taken Report dated July 2013, accepted 54 recommendations, 12 recommendations were not accepted, and two recommendations (related to PRIs) were placed in the category of ‘to be considered’. With regard to functional devolution and Activity Mapping of the PRIs, it was recommended by the Commission that ‘A Committee under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary may be constituted to review the present state of devolution of functions by various departments and prepare a model of functional devolution’. The Commission also provided a few recommendations for improving the delivery of goods and services by the PRIs in the state. In this sense, it was recommended by the Commission that Government should identify the basic/core services which are required to be delivered by GPs for improving the overall quality of life of the people, i.e. drinking water, sanitation and drainage, lighting of public places, internal roads, and solid waste disposal etc. With regard to the functionaries of the PRIs, the Commission recommended that ‘the GPs urgently need the functionaries such as an Accountant-cumComputer operator, one assistant, and one technical person in bigger Panchayats to look after the maintenance of services’. The most important aspect of the Second SFC Report was ‘how to strengthen finances of the PRIs in the state’. On this issue, it was recommended by the Commission that ‘at least 8% of the own tax revenue (OTR) of the state should be transferred to the local bodies (PRIs & ULBs) for a period of five years (2017–2018 to 2021–2022)’. Of the 8% of the OTR, the Commission recommended 6.15% for the PRIs and 1.85% for the ULBs on the basis of the rural and urban population. For providing financial assistance to the PRIs In the PESA Area, the Commission recommended that ‘GPs in the PESA Area should get an additional Rs. 2 lakh each, out of total funds proposed to be transferred to PRIs’. Apart from the above issues, the Commission also recommended various other measures such as ‘strengthening audit and accounts of the PRIs,

79,800.00 (7.3) 25,700.00 (2.4) 1,089,676.03 (100.0)

5,963.96 (0.6) 38.56 (0.004) 890,602.00 (84.7)

5 7,415.74 (0.7) 38.56(0.003) 956878.00 (86.1)

2016–2017

6 8,157.31 (0.6) 38.56 (0.003) 1,159,398.00(89.2)

2017–2018

112,000.00 (10.7) 112,200.00 (10.1) 90,100.00 (6.9) 42,870.00 (4.1) 35,394.00 (3.2) 42,032.00 (3.2) 1,051,474.52 (100.0) 1,111,926.30 (100.0) 1,299,725.87 (100.0)

4

2015–2016

Source: Department of Panchayati Raj and Rural Development, Chhattisgarh, 2017.

4 5  

Own Revenue (GP) Own Revenue (JPs) Budget provision (Excluding SFC and assigned revenue but including 13th and 14th UFCs Grant) SFC grant Assigned Revenue Total

1 2 3

3,923.47 (0.4) 38.56 (0.004) 980,214.00(90.0)

3

2

1

2014–2015

Sources of Resources

Sl. No.

Table 5.13 Source-Wise Resource Availability to PRIs in Chhattisgarh State (Rs. in lakh)

Fiscal decentralisation in Chhattisgarh   107

108  M. Gopinath Reddy and Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra improving the capacity of the PRI Members and Functionaries and strengthening the functioning of the SFC in the state’. Third State Finance Commission The Third State Finance Commission was constituted in the state as per notification no. 02/L 8–9 (Part) /2016 /Fin./FCC, dated 20 January 2016. It was constituted as per Section 3 of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Vitta Ayog Adhiniyam, 1994 (No. 3 of 1994). The Third SFC of the state is yet to submit its report to the state government.

Emerging issues from the field survey Mismatch between devolution of funds and functions The crucial factor that has crippled the fiscal autonomy of the PRIs in the state is the incomplete process of devolution. The state government adopted the devolution policy that was introduced in the undivided MP. From 2006 to 2007, the state government took many policy measures and devolved many powers and functions to the PRIs in keeping with state-specific needs. As many as 27 functions relating to 29 subjects enumerated in the 11th Schedule of the Constitution were devolved to the PRIs in the state. However, it is observed that in some cases only functions have been devolved to the PRIs without functionaries and funds. For example, under the Subject of Animal Husbandry, Dairy and Poultry, the PRIs were not provided funds, but they had functionaries and functions. Similarly, under the subject of Social Forestry and Farm Forestry, the PRIs have functions, but they do not have funds and functionaries (The Forest Department Functionaries are not part of the PRIs). Further, two key functions, namely Minor Forest Produce and Technical Training and Vocational Education, have not been devolved to the PRIs in the state. Functional devolution for the PESA areas has not taken seriously It was observed through this study that the functional devolution process has not been done separately for the areas which are part of the implementation of the PESA Act. Under the PESA Act, many key functions have been assigned to the GPs and the Gram Sabhas of the PESA Area. However, the reality in the field is different. Under the Activity Mapping process, there is no mention of the PESA Areas. There is no special policy in place to devolve the functions to the PRIs as per the provision of the PESA Act, 1996. Further, the functioning of the PRIs in the PESA Area in many cases is being hampered by various parallel institutions. The institutions such as School Management Committees (SMCs) and Forest Management Committees (FMCs/VSSs) are nurtured, which have limited functional linkages with the PRIs (GPs) and the Gram Sabhas.

Fiscal decentralisation in Chhattisgarh   109 The slow process of Activity Mapping The state government has taken initiatives for undertaking a comprehensive Activity Mapping that aims at spelling out activities related to each function of the PRIs in a more clear-cut manner as compared to the 1998 order. Activity Mapping has been prepared for 27 of the 29 subjects of the PRIs as mentioned under the 11th Schedule of the Indian Constitution and the State Panchayat Raj Act, 1993. The process of Activity Mapping was completed in February 2006, and necessary Government Orders were issued to operationalise the Activity Mapping in the state. However, in spite of the preparation of the Activity Mapping framework and progress on 27 subjects, the necessary executive orders to operationalise the Activity Mapping have so far not been issued. Own revenue of the PRIs The status of the own revenue of the PRIs, particularly the GPs, show that they have collected more fees than obligatory and optional taxes during the last three years (Table 5.8). However, in many cases the gap between demand and collection has increased, which shows the failure of the PRIs with regard to tax collection. Further, the own revenue of PRIs located in the PESA Area is relatively low. Though in some GPs, the Self-Help Groups are involved in the process of collection of various taxes, but this practice is not pervasive in the state. With this connection, it is essential that the PRIs who have adequate avenues for tapping their own revenues such as fish ponds, market complexes, shops, weekly markets should be provided special assistance for maintaining these assets for a certain period. Further, those who do not have such assets or have few assets should be encouraged to create such assets through various schemes like MGNREGA and NRLM. Poor fiscal allocation The extent of fiscal devolution depends on the expenditure responsibilities and revenue assignments made to the lower tiers of government. However, in the case of Chhattisgarh, the GPs in the current period have been receiving funds from the central government as per the recommendations of the 14th Union Finance Commission. However, there is no funds provision made for the JPs and the ZPs under the 14th UFC, which has affected their functions in many ways. Further, under various central and state-sponsored schemes/programmes, the GPs received more funds than the JPs and the ZPs. This scenario to some extent has also hampered the development spirit of the institutions (JPs and ZPs) and affected their functions. However, it was observed that the PRIs, particularly GPs, have utilised the money for improving drinking water supply, sanitation facilities, road connectivity, and streetlights in various villages.

110  M. Gopinath Reddy and Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra State finance commissions and tax decentralisation The Second State Finance Commission suggested various ways for strengthening the PRIs. However, it was observed through this study that various key recommendations of the Second SFC have not been implemented. In some cases, the state has not fully implemented some key recommendations despite preparation and adoption of the Action Taken Report. Our interaction with various stakeholders revealed that in many cases they are not aware about the functioning of the SFCs and their recommendations and status of implementation. Fiscal dependency It is observed that the so-called financial decentralisation has given birth to fiscal dependency. This scenario has led to fiscal inefficiency and reduced the PRIs’ role to mere implementers of the government programmes. For the implementation of different development programmes, the PRIs are waiting for ‘sanction orders’ from higher-level government departments, which hinder the timely and effective implementation of the development programmes. Transfer of funds Transfer of funds to the local governments, either from state or the central government, is currently based on rigid procedures. The emergence of the Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSSs) in India has multiplied the workload of the PRIs in the state. However, the funds transfer process has further enhanced the burden. In this connection the Second SFC also observed that funds flow from the line departments to the PRIs have been delayed because of various reasons. In some cases like MGNREGA, a routine delay in paying wages to the workers was observed. A similar scenario was also observed in the case of the Swachha Bharat Mission (SBM). Lack of clear-cut guidelines and the existence of bureaucratic patterns of administration also in some cases created the scenario of delay.

Conclusion The findings of the study revealed that the PRIs in the state have become instrumental in fostering the process of development. However, it shows that the finances of these institutions remain in the nascent stage. Despite the enactment of the state legal provisions and institutionalisation of the SFC, poor finances have restricted the functioning of the PRIs. The own revenue generation of PRIs in many cases encountered various challenges. The gap between potential and actual collection of taxes has added to the precarious fiscal situation of the PRIs. This chapter therefore argues that proactive policy measures are needed to strengthen the fiscal decentralisation regime of the state. The state government should take the issue of the own revenues of the PRIs seriously and should amend the policies

Fiscal decentralisation in Chhattisgarh   111 accordingly. It is suggested that at least 10 per cent of the own tax revenue of the state should be devolved to PRIs to provide basic services at reasonable levels.

References Asfaw, Abay, Frohberg, Klaus, James, K. S. and Jutting, Johannes (2004). ‘Modeling the Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Health Outcomes: Empirical Evidence From India’, ZEF Discussion Paper on Development Policy No.87, Bonn: Center for Development Research (ZEF). Banarjee, R. (2013). ‘What Ails Panchayati Raj’, Economic and Political Weekly, XLVII(30, July), pp. 173–176. Bardhan, P. (2003). ‘Decentralization of Governance and Development’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(4), pp. 195–205. Boex, J. (2009). ‘Fiscal Decentralisation and Intergovernmental Finance Reforms as an International Development Strategy’, IDG Working Paper (2009–2006), Urban Institute Centre on International Development and Governance. Braun, F. V. and Grote, U. (2002). ‘Does Decentralisation Serve the Poor’, in Ahmad, E. and Tanzi, Vito (eds.) Managing Fiscal Decentralisation. London: Routledge, pp. 68–96. Crook, Richard C. and Manor, James (1998). Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and East Africa. London: Cambridge University Press Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Chhattisgarh (1993). Chhattisgarh Panchayati Raj Adhiniyam (C.G. Act No.1 of 1994), Government of Chhattisgarh. Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Chhattisgarh (1994). The Chhattisgarh Rajya Vitta Ayog Adhiniyam (The Chhattisgarh State Finance Commission Act, 1994), 1994 (C.G. Act No.3 of 1994) Government of Chhattisgarh. Gulati, C.J. (1996). ‘Panchayati Raj in India: Problems and Prospects’, IRIS-India working paper 31, Centre for Institutional Reform and Informal Sector (IRIS), University of Maryland, US. Jena, P. R. and Gupta, M. (2008). ‘Revenue Efforts of Panchayats: Evidence from Four States’, Economic and Political Weekly, 43(30), pp. 125–130. Jha, S. (2002). ‘Strengthening Local Governments: Rural Fiscal Decentralisation in India’, Economic and Political Weekly, 37(26), pp. 2611–2623. Johnson, C. (2003). Decentralisation in India: Poverty, Politics and Panchayati Raj. London: Overseas Development Institute. Litvack, Jennie, Ahmed, Junaid and Bird, Richard (1998). Rethinking Decentralisation in Developing Countries. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Marjit, S. (1999). ‘Decentralised Financing, Governance and Public-Private Cooperation’, Economic and Political Weekly, May, pp. 1197–1201. Mohapatra, B. P. (2013). ‘Decentralised Governance and Fiscal Devolution in India’, Review of Development and Change, XVIII(2), pp. 191–208. Oates, Wallace E. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Oommen, M. A. (1998). ‘Devolution of Resources to Rural Local Bodies: A Comparative Study of Select State Finance Commission Reports’, Institute of Social Sciences Occasional Paper Series 21, New Delhi: Institute of Social Sciences.

112  M. Gopinath Reddy and Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra Oommen, M. A. (2004). ‘Fiscal Decentralisation in Kerala’, in Sethi, Geeta (ed.) Fiscal Decentralisation to Rural Governments in India. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 107–162. Oommen, M. A. (2006). ‘Fiscal Decentralisation to the Sub-State Level Governments’, Economic and Political Weekly, 41(10, March), pp. 897–903. Oommen, M. A. (eds.) (2008). Fiscal Decentralisation to Local Governments in India. UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Rajaraman, Indira (2017). ‘Continuity and Change in Indian Fiscal Federalism’, India Review, 16(1), pp. 66–84. Rani, P. Geetha (1999). ‘State Finance Commissions and Rural Local Bodies: Devolution of Resources’, Economic and Political Weekly, 34(25, 19 June), pp. 1632–1639. Rao, M. G. (2000). Fiscal Decentralisation in Indian Federalism. Bengaluru: Institute for Social and Economic Change. Rao, M. Govinda and Raghunandan, T. R. (2011). ‘Panchayats and Economic Development’, Working Paper-86, New Delhi: National Institute of Public Finance and Policy. Reddy, M. Gopinath (2003). ‘Status of Decentralised Local Bodies: Post-73rd Amendment Scenario’, Economic and Political Weekly, 38(12/13), pp. 1284–1292. Reddy, M. Gopinanth and Mohapatra, Bishnu Prasad (2017) ‘Decentralised Governance and Devolution of Funds to the Panchayats in India: A Critical Analysis of Two States’, Studies in Indian Politics, 5(1), pp. 1–13. Reddy, M. Gopinath and Sreedevi, N. (2004). ‘Local Finances in Andhra Pradesh: A Situation Analysis’, Indian Journal of Public Administration, L(3, July– September), pp. 829–839. Romeo, Leonardo (1999). ‘Systems Experimentation in Support of Decentralization Reforms: Reflections on Local Development Funds’, Regional Development Dialogue, 20(2), pp. 134–157. Sahasranaman, A. (2012). ‘Panchayat Finances and the Need for Devolutions from the State Government’, Economic and Political Weekly, XLVII(4), pp. 73–80. Tanzi, V. (2001). ‘Pitfalls on the Roads to Fiscal Decentralisation’, Working Paper-No. 19, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. United Nations (n.d). Decentralised Governance for Democracy, Peace, Development and Effective Service Delivery, Division for Public Administration and Human Management, ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/88, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York.

Part IV

Sectoral aspects of decentralisation



6

Peace-building and economic development through decentralisation A case study of conflict-affected Jammu and Kashmir Sardar Babur Hussain

Introduction Arguments in favour of decentralisation claim that it can enable the efficient allocation of services, empower marginalised and weaker groups, and ensure higher economic growth. According to Rajasekhar (2022, p. 45): ‘Decentralisation is the devolution of political, administrative and fiscal powers from the centre to the locally elected government, and the participation of people and the presence of their voices in improving service delivery and development through the local government’. Economic advantages of decentralisation are seen in both the limited geographic extent of the benefits of public goods and the relatively high costs of decision-making if everything is centralised (Babu, 2009). India is known for introducing a decentralised system of reforms in 1993, and there is considerable literature on decentralisation in India that has investigated its impact on local development, reduction of poverty, and delivery of essential services, such as health and education (Johnson, 2003; Rajasekhar, Babu and Manjula, 2018 and references therein). Within India, the frontier and conflict-affected erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has not received much scholarly attention in spite of having the unique distinction of introducing the idea of decentralised development much prior to the conceptualisation of such reforms at the national level. Studies by Chowdhary (2001), Wani (2011), and Kumar (2014) argue that Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in J&K have failed to produce desired outcomes as the Panchayat elections are not conducted on time, and there are loopholes in the state’s reform legislation and Acts. However, there is a need to situate the working of PRIs within the political economy of the region so as to explain the extent to which decentralisation has been successful in peace-building and the successful provision of public goods and services. A central aim of this chapter is to provide a historical background of decentralisation in the erstwhile state of J&K and to assess its effectiveness and success as a peace-building and development strategy. The chapter is restricted to the period before the abrogation of Article 370 and does not take into account the recent substantive political DOI: 10.4324/9781003094357-6

116  Sardar Babur Hussain changes in August 2019, which led to the bifurcation of the state and its conversion into a Union Territory.1 Focusing on Panchayats, the chapter situates the working of decentralisation within the protracted conflict situation and explores the outcomes related to local community participation and specifically on the issues related to devolution of funds and taxation powers. The chapter argues that the decentralisation strategy in the erstwhile state is driven largely by political motivation, and the institution of Panchayats has failed to act as an instrument of change and development. Important aspects of the processes of decentralisation and local governance such as credibility and timely conduct of Panchayat elections, state’s commitment to devolution of powers consisting of fund transfers, taxation, and expenditure powers of PRIs have been side-lined and relegated to a position of secondary importance. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: the second section provides a background to the geographical and political context of the erstwhile state of J&K followed by the third section, wherein a detailed historical background of decentralisation in J&K is provided; the fourth section explains the working of the decentralisation strategy in recent decades followed by the final section that presents major conclusions emanating from the previous sections of the chapter.

Geographical and political context The erstwhile J&K is a mountainous border state – strategically located and conflict-ridden – situated in the extreme north of India. It consists of three regions: Jammu, Kashmir, and the sparsely populated Ladakh region. The erstwhile state consists of 22 districts – ten in Kashmir, ten in Jammu, and two in Ladakh. The overall population of 12.5 Million is split between Jammu (43 per cent) and Kashmir (55 per cent). Kashmir, having a Muslim majority of 97 per cent, is endowed with a good mineral base, significant hydropower potential, and is famous the world over for its handicrafts, handloom products, and horticulture production. J&K is primarily an agricultural economy with around 70 per cent of its population directly or indirectly depending on agriculture (Economic Survey of J&K, 2016). Both India and Pakistan claim this region, and this contestation between the two countries has been the reason for three short wars between India and Pakistan over the territory (1947, 1965, and 1999). The erstwhile state of J&K is unique from other states of India in many ways, not only because it is controversial and strategic, but also because it has the unique distinction of a separate Constitution and flag. The erstwhile state has a special relationship with the Indian Union as recognised by Article 370, which was supposed to protect the interests of the locals. The erstwhile state has the characteristics of a fragile state and has suffered from armed conflict, ethnic tensions, rigged elections, low economic development, unemployment, widespread corruption, and human rights violations (Government of India, 2003, 2006; Bose, 2003; UN Report on Kashmir, 2018). It is in this context

Peace-building and economic development  117 that a discussion on decentralisation is relevant to understand its role in building peace, ensuring people’s participation at the local level, and in service delivery.

Historical background of decentralisation in J&K Pre 1947 period The former state of J&K has its own unique history of decentralisation that dates back to 1935 when the first village Panchayat Regulation Act No. 1 was promulgated by the then Maharaja Hari Singh. The preamble of the Act states that ‘it is expedient to establish in J&K state the village Panchayats to assist in the administrative, civil and criminal justice and also to manage the sanitation and other common concerns of the village’.2 The main rationale behind the introduction of this Act was to pacify the grievances of the masses against the opposition to Maharaja rule. Agrarian discontent and paucity of employment opportunities were the motivating forces for the Muslim masses to protest against the despotic Dogra regime (Bamzai, 1994). As the Act of 1935 was limited in its scope, giving limited powers to Panchayats, it was amended in 1941, which devolved more powers to the Panchayats and included taxation as well as the construction and maintenance of public roads and bridges. According to Punjabi (1990), Panchayat institutions were manipulated by autocratic rulers and their collaborators for their own ends. He states that the Panchayats ‘comprised of the lower-level functionaries of the Maharaja, zaildars, numberdars, village heads, landlords and other influential people … The function of these was to settle petty disputes in the villages’ (1990, p. 37). During this period, the National Conference (NC) – which had the support and cooperation of the masses – was rallying against the oppression of a feudal and semifeudal class of landlords. In 1944, the NC, under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah, brought out a national economic and political plan – known as the New Kashmir Manifesto – which, apart from the restructuring of the political and economic structures, promised to empower political institutions at the grassroots level. The post-1947 scenario On 26 October 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh’s request for the accession of the J&K state to the dominion of India under ‘Special Circumstances’ subject to the condition of the plebiscite was accepted (Lamb, 1992; Bazaz, 1996). Sheikh Abdullah took over as the prime minister of the interim government on 17 March 1948. On 26 January 1950, the Constitution of India came into force with a unique provision – Article 370. Article 370 provided special status to the state of J&K, which includes autonomous rule in all matters except a few, such as defence, foreign affairs, communications, and foreign trade. The state had reserved the right to convene a separate

118  Sardar Babur Hussain Constituent Assembly in 1951 to frame a separate Constitution for itself. The subject of decentralisation was included in Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution of J&K (1956), which state that: ‘The state shall take steps to organise village Panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government’ (p. 6). After attaining statehood in the Indian Union, the first state government (1948) under Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah based its developmental strategy on the promises made in the New Kashmir Manifesto of 1944. In 1950, radical land reform legislation – the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act and the Distressed Debtors Relief Act – were passed. The former confiscated all parcels of cultivable land greater than 23 acres and either distributed them to landless peasantry or converted them into state property. The latter created a board that instituted policies for the relief of debt. All these measures created a conducive environment for reactivation of the Panchayati Raj system in reshaping the rural economy in the state (Aslam, 1977). Realising the need for introducing more congenial legislation, the government replaced the Panchayat Act of 1935 (as amended in 1941) with Act-V of Samvat 2008 (corresponding to the year 1951). The main features of this Act were: 1) Majority of the Panchayat members were to be elected on the basis of an adult franchise; 2) Panchayats were to perform administration, developmental, civic, and judicial functions; 3) Concept of the Halqa Panchayat compromising 5–7 villages; 4) a Panchayat board at each tehsil; and 5) Identification of sources of revenue for Panchayats. The state government then established Panchayats in the state. ‘By March 1951, 540 Panchayats had been established in the state. By March 1954, this figure had risen to 751, covering 4,774 villages’ (Sultan, 1995). During the 1950s, the state, as well as the rest of India, introduced community development programmes and the National Extension Services (NES), which required people’s active participation through the devolution of powers so as to achieve desired results. Accordingly, to facilitate these programmes based on the directional thrust of the Balwantrai Mehta Committee Report, the state government enacted the Jammu and Kashmir Panchayat Act in 1958 (repealing the earlier Acts). The new Act envisaged a two-tier Raj – Gram Panchayats at the village level and Block Panchayats Boards at the block level. The Act did not differ much from the 1951 Act so far as the major functions and sources of revenue of the Panchayats were concerned. The number of Gram Panchayats increased from 936 in 1962 to 1,483 in 1977–1978 (Government of J&K, 1998, p. 31). The Gajendragadkar Commission of Enquiry, appointed by the government in 1967 to look into regional disparities, observed that elections to local bodies were long overdue and that these bodies were no longer representative in character (Government of J&K, 1968). The report also mentions that by denying the public their fundamental right of a franchise, the government manages to have their own candidates elected in the Legislative

Peace-building and economic development  119 Council in the local bodies’ constituencies. According to Punjabi (1990, p. 41): The dismissal of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and his ministry and his subsequent arrest changed the whole scenario. The post-1953 era witnessed a continuous phase of undermining democracy and subverting of democratic institutions in the state. Under these circumstances, it was futile to expect democracy to function at the grassroots level, namely, the Panchayats. This had much to do with New Delhi’s policy of imposing governments as well as manipulations by the client governments.3 It was only in the year 1976 that the J&K state introduced landmark legislation known as ‘Single Line Administration’ in the field of decentralised planning. It has two basic objectives which continue to be relevant for the PRIs today, namely: 1) decentralisation of authority primarily to lend speed to development programmes, and 2) the involvement of the people with the process of development. In 1990, the average population per Gram Panchayat increased to 3,218 as compared to 2,386 at the All-India level. The number of villages per Gram Panchayat was 4.7 in 1990 compared to 2.8 at the All-India level (Government of J&K, 1998, p. 31). However, the story of Panchayats continued to remain the same in the 1970s and 1980s. Manipulation by various vested interests, absence of a mandatory provision for the regular elections, and the lack of financial autonomy were the major limitations to decentralisation (Chowdhary, 2001; GoI, 2003). The Jammu and Kashmir Panchayati Raj Act, 1989 To remove some of the difficulties of the previous Act, The Jammu & Kashmir Panchayat Raj Act, 1989 was introduced in the state Assembly in April 1988 and passed in March 1989. The preamble of the 1989 Act states: ‘Whereas it is expedient to promote and develop Panchayati Raj in the state as an instrument of vigorous local self-government to secure effective participation of the people in the decision-making process and for overseeing the implementation of development programmes’.4 Unlike the previous Act, which limited Panchayats to Village level only, the 1989 Act extended Panchayats to the village, block and district levels. The salient features of the Act are: 1) Reduction of voting age from 21 to 18 years; 2) Holding of elections within six months of supersession of a Panchayat; 3) Direct election of the Sarpanch (Chairperson); 4) Empowering Panchayats to prepare plans and implement schemes for poverty alleviation and employment generation, agriculture and allied activities, rural industrialisation, health, universalisation of elementary education, etc.; and 5) No bar on holding elections on party lines.

120  Sardar Babur Hussain Three-tier model The Act provides for a three-tier system consisting of the Halqa Panchayat, Block Development Council, and District Planning and Development Board.5 The Act provides for a Halqa Panchayat for every Halqa.6 The Halqa Panchayat shall comprise of such a number of Panchs not less than 7 and not more than 11, including the Sarpanch as the prescribed authority may fix from time to time. The Panchs shall be elected from the constituencies delimited by the prescribed authority. While the Naib-Sarpanch shall be elected by the Panches of the Halqa Panchayat from among themselves, the Sarpanch shall be elected directly by the electorate of the Halqa Panchayat. The Halqa Panchayat shall continue to function for a period of five years from the date of its Constitution. If it is dissolved for any reason before this period, elections will be held within six months. A Sarpanch or NaibSarpanch can be removed by a vote of no-confidence passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Panches of the Halqa Panchayats. The Act provides for the constitution of Block Development Councils consisting of a chairperson (elected by the electoral college comprising elected Panches and Sarpanches of Halqa Panchayats falling within the block); all Sarpanches of Halqa Panchayats falling within the block, and chairpersons of marketing societies within the jurisdiction of the block. Further, the Act provides for the constitution of a District Planning and Development Board (DPDB) comprising of chairpersons of the block councils of the district; Members of Parliament representing the area; members of the state legislature representing the area; chairperson of the town area committee in the district; and president of the municipal council (if any). The chairman of the DPDB shall be nominated by the government from amongst the members of the DPDB, and the vice-chairman shall be elected by the members of the DPDB from amongst themselves. The Act of 1989 also provides for the constitution of Panchayati Adalat (Panchayat Courts), compromising five members who shall be nominated by the prescribed authority out of the panel prepared and recommended by the Halqa Panchayat. The person so recommended for a term of five years shall be literate, shall have attained the age of 30 years, not be a Sarpanch or a Panch, and not be in the employment of the government or local body or corporation. Panchayati Adalats responsibilities consist of civil and criminal jurisdiction and imposition of penalties. At the national level, the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act was passed by the Parliament in April 1993, which provided a Constitutional status to the Panchayati Raj Institutions in India through the insertion of Article 243 to Part IX of the Indian Constitution. The Act was not directly applicable to the state of J&K as the state enjoyed autonomy under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Under Article 370, the central laws were not directly applicable to J&K, and the state had the option of enacting a parallel law if it so wished. The state decided to continue with the Jammu & Kashmir

Peace-building and economic development  121 Panchayat Raj Act, 1989, and amended it several times to incorporate some of the broader features of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act.7 Similarly, the state government introduced the Municipal Act 2000, which incorporated most of the features of the 74th Amendment of the Indian Constitution to empower the Municipal Bodies. The matrix as shown in Table 6.1 summarises the differences between the central and the state legislation (rural bodies). The aim of the matrix is to see whether differences such as low devolution of powers and funds, elections at Halqa level, the

Table 6.1 Detailed Comparison Matrix Entry

73rd Constitutional Amendment

Devolution of powers Three-tier System

Larger devolution of powers.

The J&K Panchayati Raj Act, 1989

Low devolution (lack of financial autonomy). Three-tier system at the village, Three-tier system at Halqa block and district levels. (village), block and district levels. PRIs Elections 1) Direct election at all levels 1) Direct elections to Halqa is not uniform across the Panchayats only. states. In some of the states, 2) Panch/Sarpanch eligibility: an indirect election is held 25 years. at the GP level. 3) No separate election 2) Panch/Sarpanch eligibility: Commission. 21 years. 3) Separate election commission. Panchayati Adalat No provision to constitute Provision to constitute Panchayati Adalat. Panchayati Adalat. Finance Provision to constitute State Provision to constitute State Commission Finance Commission. Finance Commission (since the 2011 amendment). Women 33 per cent 33 per cent nominations for Empowerment reservation(Subsequently inadequate representation. increased to 50 per cent in No reservation beyond several states). Panchs. Reservation extended to levels of Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat and chairman Block Development Council and Chairman of District Planning and Development Board. District Chairman: Elected by Panches, No election. Planning and Sarpanches of Gram Nominated by the Development Panchayat and chairman government from amongst Board of Block Development the members of the Board. Council.

122  Sardar Babur Hussain nomination of the Chairman of DPDB by the government, etc., have had an impact on the outcomes related to peace-building and local service delivery.

Peace-building and economic development through decentralisation (1996–2018) Decentralisation as a peace-building and state-building strategy has been used in a number of post-conflict states such as Colombia, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, etc. Donor agencies, especially the World Bank, have increasingly come to consider that decentralisation and democratic local governance should be priorities in peace-building processes. Potential advantages of decentralisation as a peace-building strategy are seen in both democratic and developmental terms, all of which mitigate the likelihood of conflict. These include greater political participation and improving democratic accountability; promoting social inclusion, which has been a major factor in the outbreak of the conflict; and efficient local service delivery (Nickson and Cutting, 2016). There is substantial literature on the impact of decentralisation in promoting peace in post-conflict as well as protracted conflict states, but there has been no clear cut answer to whether decentralisation helps build and promote peace. Some of these studies argue that decentralisation has had a significant, if varied, contribution to community cohesion, reconciliation and state legitimacy, while others conclude that it has created more conflict than before. Wall’s (2016) study on the immediate post-conflict period in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda found that decentralisation strategies have contributed to peace as these countries were able to introduce inclusive institutions and through greater equity in basic local service provision. Jackson (2016), in a comprehensive paper, focuses on a critical review of the literature on local government and decentralisation in postconflict contexts. This paper argues that the success of decentralisation is determined by the politics of local government and the political framework in which it operates, including the dynamics of the initial conflict itself. He also notes that local government is most successful when embedded in local contexts and the nature of the peace agreement itself. Several studies conclude that decentralisation can reignite conflict in fragile environments by different groups so as to gain control of public services, influence electoral results, and consolidate local territorial control (Sanchez and Chacon, 2005; Siegle and Mahoney, 2007). They stress the ways through which ineffective and corrupt partisan local political institutions cause frustration, resentment, and feelings of exclusion, and thus increase conflict risk. Nickson and Cutting (2016) critique the widely cited case of Sierra Leone as a positive example of the contribution that decentralisation can play in rebuilding the state. Using a political economy approach, their study highlights the fact that it was driven by powerful external actors in the international donor community, who were able to lock-in institutional reforms but because of the presence of powerful actors in the political economy of Sierra Leone

Peace-building and economic development  123 who are opposed to decentralisation, such as national political elites and senior central government civil servants, as well as the enduring patrimonial practices and networks of clientelism that they control, led to less impressive outcomes of decentralisation programmes. They mention two important reasons that have led to less impressive outcomes: low political autonomy of local bodies and highly centralised decision-making. Green (2008) in the case of Uganda argues that the decentralisation programme has helped to reduce national-level conflict but has replaced it with local-level conflict. This process has taken place in two ways. First, the concentration of local power at the district level has led to struggles over district leadership positions. Second, the huge expansion in the number of new districts has led to local-level conflict by altering relations between local ethnic groups. Similarly, Vidal, Atehortúa, and Salcedo (2013) and Voelkel (2013) in the case of Columbia have highlighted that the decisions over peace agreements are frequently centralised and exclude local government officials. Several studies have highlighted that decentralisation is complex, multifaceted, and faces many challenges, and has variable outcomes (as quoted in Crawford and Hartmann, 2008). Critics have favoured a more contextspecific approach that takes into consideration the social, anthropological, and political realities. Brancati (2009) argues that the ability of decentralisation to reduce intrastate conflict depends on the shape of the political party system, and the balance it strikes between state-wide and regional parties. Others like Treisman (2007) argues that decentralisation in and of itself cannot be seen as a necessary tool in conflict prevention and resolution. Indeed, the experience of decentralisation in post-conflict peace-building suggests that a more nuanced understanding is necessary to understand better how and when it may reduce or exacerbate conflict. Peace-building and electoral process The Jammu and Kashmir Panchayati Raj Act of 1989 could not be operationalised as armed conflict started in the region, and this led to a direct central rule in the erstwhile state for a period of six years. The armed insurgency has had a considerable negative impact on the economic development of J&K during the decade of 1990s. The state’s economy suffered owing to long spells of closure of industrial, commercial, and other business establishments. The laws, regulations, and rules that needed to be formulated to make the Act functional could not be drafted until 1997. In the year 1996, President’s Rule was lifted after six years of violent conflict and elections were held in the state. The National Conference, headed by Farooq Abdullah, won the state assembly elections in 1996 and formed government in the state. Chowdhary (2016, p. 130) states that since the mainstream politics was totally de-legitimised in Kashmir, it was not an easy task for the National Conference to capture the

124  Sardar Babur Hussain political space. The party also faced the issue of its own credibility. It was held responsible not merely for co-opting the centre in manipulating the local politics but also for compromising the dignity of Kashmir. Devolution of power to local governments and their involvement in decision-making has been an important part of the larger mainstream political debate in the erstwhile state of J&K since the late 1990s as the levels of armed conflict came down, and policies of peace-building and economic development were promoted in the region. Immediately after coming to power, the National Conference promised to conduct Panchayat elections, which were eventually conducted in a phased manner in 2001. Since 2000 only three rounds of elections were held in the erstwhile state, which covered only Halqa Panchayats and did not cover elections at block (Block Development Council) and district levels (District Planning and Development Board). In all three rounds of elections, local separatist leadership issued a call to the locals to boycott these elections as they believed that the state government uses the Panchayat elections to dilute the Kashmir issue. While the overall voting percentages of Panchayat elections has generally remained high (Table 6.2), it varied within different regions of the state. The voting percentages in the Kashmir region were low as compared to Jammu and Ladakh. For instance, during the recently concluded Panchayat election in J&K, the voting percentage of Kashmir valley, Jammu division, and Ladakh were 41.3 per cent, 83.5 per cent, and 67.8 per cent, respectively.8 Higher turnouts do not necessarily mean democratisation given questions have been raised against the credibility and timings of elections.9 Further, as argued by Rekha Chowdhary (2001, p. 1677), Almost all political processes and all political institutions in the valley suffer from a crisis of legitimacy. Panchayati institutions are perceived as a part of the existing structure of power that has no relation to the aspirations and choices of people. Such perceptions have led to an ineffective electoral exercise in Kashmir. It is also important to mention that before and after the elections, there have been a number of attacks on Sarpanches by militant groups, due to which a Table 6.2 Panchayat Elections since 1996 Panchayat Election

Voting Percentage

Term of Panchayats

2001 2011 2018

79 80 74

2001–2006 2011–2016 2018–2024

Source: Chief Electoral Officer, J&K

Peace-building and economic development  125 vast number of Sarpanches resigned. According to Mahapatra (2015), after the Panchayat elections of 2011, more than 900 Panchayat representatives resigned from several districts of Kashmir valley. This is mainly due to the fact that high voting percentages are used by the government to claim that normalcy has returned in the region, and Kashmir ceases to be a political problem. Peace-building at the local (Village) level is deeply influenced by the quality of efforts made at the sub-national and national levels. Since 2002 an important feature of the J&K state politics that has had a varied impact on decentralisation has been the fragile political situation, arising mostly due to two factors. First, the regional parties have not been able to form a government due to a lack of majority, which has led to unstable coalition alliances with the party in power in the centre. The Jammu and Kashmir People’s Democratic Party (PDP)–Indian National Congress (INC) coalition government (2002–2008) collapsed after PDP pulled out in 2008 over the allotment of land in Kashmir to Amarnath Shrine Board, leading to a collapse of the state government in July 2008. Governor’s rule was imposed for many months amidst a major agitation that took place against the transfer of government land to a religious trust leading to delayed legislative assembly elections. Following the previous assembly elections held in December 2014, after two months of intense negotiations, a coalition government was formed between the ideologically opposite PDP and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) based on a power-sharing pact. The government collapsed in June 2018, resulting in the imposition of Governor rule and the subsequent dissolution of the J&K Legislative Assembly in November 2018. The erstwhile state’s legislative assembly had been placed under suspension with Governor’s rule on 19 June 2018 and dissolved with the President’s rule in November 2019. New elections were expected within a period of six months but have subsequently been postponed. Thereafter, the state was under President’s rule until 31 October 2019, and it was extended to the Union Territory, which is still continuing. Second, since June 2008, the region has also witnessed a resurgence of massive public protests/agitations led by the separatists during the years of 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2016, triggering instability and adversely affecting governance. All these years, a discourse of normalcy was promoted in the region to create a façade of a stable political order.10 According to Farhad (2020), these protests were rooted in governance failures and indicate key turns in the conflict dynamics of the region. Because of the fragile political situation in the region, both the legislative assembly and Panchayat elections have been delayed. Panchayat elections which were due in 2006 could not be held until 2011. The tenure of Panchayats elected in 2011 expired in July 2016. For two years, the government couldn’t conduct elections due to political unrest. Finally, the same were held only in November–December 2018, five months after the fallout between the PDP and the BJP.

126  Sardar Babur Hussain Decentralisation of power and service delivery Devolution of powers and funds are important aspects of effective decentralisation as without the same these institutions are bound to fail and prove to be inefficient instruments of development and change (Manor, 2002). As Panchayat elections in the erstwhile state have been limited to Halqa Panchayats and no serious efforts have been made to elect Block Development Councils and District Planning and Development Boards, the Ministers and MLAs continued to exercise powers at those levels. The J&K Panchayat Raj Act, 1989, neglected the higher tiers of Panchayat Samities and Zilla Parishads in terms of giving them higher powers. The Ministers and MLAs blocked reforms aimed at the decentralisation of power. According to Rekha Chowdhary, as quoted in DownToEarth (2012): ‘Their presence cannot allow the district-level Panchayat to be a democratic body, independent of governmental control and influence’. Similarly, the Report of the Group of Interlocutors for J&K (2013, pp. 18–19) states that: The state government apparently does not intend to bring legislation giving Panchayats the same substance as the 73rd and 74th amendments of the Constitution of India, or more, because the Members of the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (MLAs) are opposed to any dilution of their own powers. The politicians in power have ignored the devolution of powers to the Panchayats. Even the allocations were not guided by equity considerations as it is not guided by allocation formulae. As stated by a former member of State Finance Commission (2007–2010): ‘Unfortunately the SFC [State Finance Commission] report was tabled in the Legislature but not put to debate nor the allocation formulae have been used while District Development Boards approve the district plan’ (Nisar Ali, 2013). We tried to collect secondary data on the internal resource mobilisation as well as the actual devolution out of the net tax proceeds on Halqa Panchayats, but unfortunately in the case of J&K it is difficult to find out due to lack of data. The State Finance Commission Report (2010, p. 530) states that: ‘Since the Commission does not have the district level consolidated information, in spite of the repeated requests, therefore, the Commission is unable to provide actual devolution out of net tax proceeds on Halqa Panchayats’. Therefore, we have relied on available information to provide some insights regarding the devolution of power to these institutions. Taxation powers and own resource mobilisation Section 15 of the Panchayat Raj Act of 1989 vests the Halqa Panchayats to levy taxes and fees. The Gram Panchayats in J&K have powers to levy 17 different types of taxes/fees/cess. Surprisingly, among the taxes which

Peace-building and economic development  127 Table 6.3 Own Revenue of Panchayats (All Tiers, Total in Rs. Crore and Per Capita in Rs.) State

2005–2006 Total

Himachal Pradesh J&K Manipur Uttrakhand All India

Per Capita

2006–2007

2007–2008

Total

Total

Per Capita

Per Capita

5.9

10.2

6.1

10.5

6.3

10.8

0.2 0.3 9.5 2430.7

0.3 1.9 14.2 31.0

0.2 0.3 10.9 2,664.6

0.3 1.9 16.0 33.5

1.8 0.3 0.3 2,736.4

2.2 2.0 0.4 34.1

Source: Alok (2012)

a Halqa Panchayat can levy, building tax, water tax, conservancy tax, or street lighting tax do not figure (Government of J&K, 1998). The actual amount of taxes/fees/cess that is collected at the local level is very negligible and low in comparison to the hill states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand (Table 6.3). Commenting on the own resource mobilisation of the Panchayats, the first Panchayat Budget of J&K, 2018, states that Panchayats have also generated their own resources to the tune of Rs. 20 crores in the past few years. This seems to be very low in comparison to other states of India. Devolutions from State Finance Commission The State Finance Commission plays an important role to improve the financial position of the Panchayats through fiscal devolution. The official discourse on Panchayats in the region completely ignores this important aspect of decentralisation. Wani (2011, p. 290) rightly points out: The J&K law neither fixes a minimum amount of grant-in-aid by the state to the Panchayats, nor does it provide autonomous machinery for the objective allocation of funds. It has not assured the Panchayats regarding a source of income either. The law, therefore, does not ensure financial viability and autonomy of the Panchayats and leaves enough financial power in the hands of the state government, which it could use it to arbitrarily influence the working of the Panchayats. The state government has not evolved an appropriate framework/mechanism for sharing of central transfers as well as the state government revenues with the PRIs. While the J&K Panchayati Raj Act, 1989, does not have any provision for the State Finance Commission to review the financial position of the Panchayats and Municipalities, the state government

128  Sardar Babur Hussain has enacted, consistent with the recommendations of the 13th Central Finance Commission, the State Finance Commission for Panchayats and Municipalities Act, 2011.11 Chapter II of the Act states that: The Government shall, as soon as may be from the commencement of the Act, and thereafter at the expiration of every fifth year, constitute a ‘State Finance Commission for Panchayats and Municipalities’ to review the financial position of Panchayats and Municipalities and to exercise the powers conferred upon and to perform the functions assigned to it, under the Act. The mandate of the Commission for recommending devolution of funds to PRIs includes inter-alia: 1) The distribution between the state and the Panchayats of the net proceeds of the taxes, duties, tolls, and fees leviable by the state, which may be divided between them and the allocation between the Panchayats at all levels of their respective shares of such proceeds; 2) The determination of the taxes, duties, tolls, and fees which may be assigned to or appropriated by the Panchayats; 3) The grants-in-aid to the Panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of the state; 4) The measures needed to improve the financial position the financial position of the Panchayats. However, to date, no State Finance Commission for Panchayats and Municipalities has been constituted, and as a result funds flow from central as well as state governments for PRIs lack any devolutionary design or principles.12 The misleading of people by claiming that the state government is devolving funds to Panchayats seems to be never-ending. For instance, on 11 January 2018, the PDP–BJP-led government had made a provision in the state Budget to spend Rs 1,000 crore on Panchayats during the year 2018–2019.13 However, there existed no Panchayat bodies in the state as the term of previous local rural bodies had been completed in July 2016, and as new elections were delayed, the funds remained unspent. Devolutions from the central Finance Commission The central FC provides grants-in-aid to duly constituted Panchayats and Municipalities to support and strengthen the delivery of basic civic services, including water supply, sanitation, and maintenance of community assets. The erstwhile state of J&K has lost the bulk of Finance Commission allocations for not having elected Panchayats. Under the 12th Central Finance Commission (CFC) award, an amount of Rs. 281 crore was earmarked for the PRIs of J&K. As per the guidelines of CFC for the release of grants, the disbursal of funds cannot be recommended for states that have not duly elected Panchayats and Municipalities. Due to non-fulfilment of prescribed conditions, the state government could not secure the release of more than 80 per cent of funds during the period of 2005–2006 to 2009–2010 (Table 6.4) and 36.27 per cent funds during the period of 2010–2015 (Table 6.5).

17.6

35.24

Source: 13th Finance Commission Report

281

Lapse

Lapse

Lapse

52.86

228.14 81.18

Total 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 Total Funds % of funds allocation Release Lapsed lapsed

Amount Released (Rs. in Crores)

Table 6.4 Twelfth FC Grants to PRIs of J&K during 2005–2010 (as on 6 November 2009)

Peace-building and economic development  129

130  Sardar Babur Hussain Table 6.5 13th FC Grants to PRIs of J&K during 2010–2015 (in Rs. Crore as on 31 March 2015)

Allocation Release % of funds lapsed

General Basic General Grant Performance Grant

Total

608.51 524.03 13.88

929.45 592.26 36.27

320.94 68.23 78.74

Source: Website of Ministry of Panchayat Raj, Government of India.

Table 6.6 14th FC Grants Allocated to Rural Local Bodies of J&K State during 2015–2016 (Rs. Crore) Year

2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 2019–2020 Total

General Basic General Performance Total Amount Grant Grant Allocation Released (A)

(B)

A+B

373.96 517.81 598.29 692.11 935.19 3,117.36

– 67.92 76.86 87.29 114.3 346.3

373.96 585.73 675.15 779.40 1,049.49 3,463.73

367.72 Lapsed (66.79⁕) Lapsed Lapsed –

Source: Website of Ministry of Panchayat Raj, Government of India. ⁕ → Performance grant on account of last year’s activities.

Similarly, as the term of the previous local elected body had completed in 2016 and fresh elections were only held in November–December 2018, the state has faced financial loss (funds lapsed) both in the form of basic grant and performance grant for three consecutive financial years – 2016–2017, 2017–2018, and 2018–2019 (Table 6.6). As stated by the Report of the Group of Interlocutors for J&K (2012, p. 68): The Finance Commission awards for strengthening and promoting local governance (Panchayats) have not been fully utilised due largely to inordinate delay in holding Panchayat elections and making them functional. Eventually, the state is a loser due to the state’s lack of responsiveness to community need. The lapses are in a way expected because of the non-existence of local bodies the Gram Panchayat Development Plans (GPDP), which is a requirement for the release of Finance Commission funds, could not be prepared.

Peace-building and economic development  131 Impact on local service delivery The lapsing of the central funds, limited devolutions from the state finances, and low own revenue has a negative impact on local governance as Gram Panchayats are not able to support and strengthen the delivery of basic civic services, including water supply, sanitation, and maintenance of community assets, maintenance of roads and other services. There is hardly any evidence to claim that service delivery and socio-economic indicators in the erstwhile state of J&K have improved as a result of decentralised governance. We are considering rural development indicators such as roads, access to piped water supply, and toilet facilities as they are implemented by Gram Panchayats. Tables 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9 provide figures for rural development indicators – roads, water supply, and toilets – for J&K and several other mountain states of India. It is clear from the tables that states such as Himachal Pradesh (HP), Arunachal Pradesh, and Uttarakhand are far ahead of the erstwhile state of J&K, and this has something to do with better decentralisation strategies adopted in these states as compared to J&K. According to Kumar (2014) the Panchayats in J&K during their first term from 2001 to 2006, and even after 2011, were neither funded by the state Table 6.7 Rural Road Development Indicators as per Census 2011 States

Rural Road Density (km/100 sq km)

Surfaced Rural Road Density (km/100 sq km)

Rural Road availability (km/lakh population)

Surfaced Rural Road availability (km/lakh population)

Arunachal Pradesh Himachal Pradesh Jammu & Kashmir Uttarakhand

NA

NA

1052

594

30

22

268

195

6

4

144

88

17

12

129

87

Source: Medhi (2015)

Table 6.8 Rural Households with Access to the Piped Water Supply as per Census 2011 States

Rural households

Coverage with tap water

Arunachal Pradesh Himachal Pradesh Jammu & Kashmir Uttarakhand All India

195,723 1,310,538 1,497,920 1,404,845 167,826,730

59.30 88.70 55.70 63.90 30.81

Source: Census of India, 2011

132  Sardar Babur Hussain Table 6.9 Rural Households Having Toilet Facilities (as on 26 July 2018) States

No. of rural households having toilet facilities

% of rural households having toilet facilities

Arunachal Pradesh Himachal Pradesh Jammu & Kashmir Uttarakhand All India

183,400 1,433,766 1,354,919 1,514,563 142,406,829

100.00 100.00 92.67 100.00 88.51

Source: Ministry of Drinking Water & Sanitation (data​.gov​​.in).

nor were allowed to raise their own resources, and remained visible in relation to few centrally sponsored schemes. The rest of the centrally sponsored schemes, as stated by Chakravarty (2018), are mainly controlled by middlemen and funds for Panchayats are mainly utilised by the local legislator. In addition to the problem of lapses of central funds, there is the problem of low utilisation of central funds due to extreme winter and agitations (curfews and hartals) during the summer season. Substantial amounts of funds also remain unutilised due to delays in the formulation of Gram Panchayat Development Plans. For instance, in 2016, there were reports that funds from the central government remained unutilised (Daily Excelsior, 2016).

Conclusion A central aim of this chapter was to understand the role played by decentralisation in peace-building and service delivery in the erstwhile state of J&K. A political economy approach used in this chapter provides a nuanced understanding of the experience of decentralisation in the region. There have been few positives coming out from the case of J&K, such as high voter turnouts in decentralised elections, which shows that people are keen on change and in favour of better local governance to address their day to day problems. However, reforms aiming at decentralisation have had limited success overall in the erstwhile state and specifically in Kashmir valley in terms of peace-building and service delivery. The chapter argues that the decentralisation strategy in the region is driven largely by political motivation, and the institution of Panchayats has failed to act as instruments of change and development. It is the contention of this chapter that one of the main problems of decentralisation and local governance in J&K has to do with the fact that the important aspects of these processes such as credibility and timely conduct of Panchayat elections, state’s commitment to devolution of powers consisting of fund transfers, taxation and expenditure powers of PRIs have been side-lined and relegated to a position of secondary importance.

Peace-building and economic development  133 The Panchayati Raj Institutions lost their credibility as real devolution failed to materialise and as it was not able to produce desirable outcomes. Though these institutions have triggered considerable debate during the last two decades in terms of signifying political participation in electoral processes in the region, there has been little debate on the role that limited devolution of funds, taxation powers, etc., play in undermining and weakening the strength and effectiveness of these institutions. At present, the PRIs in the region sustain and reinforce the structures of centralisation as limited powers and funds have been distributed down the ladder of the power hierarchy. The legal framework for establishing viable and self-sustaining rural local self-government institutions leaves a great deal to be desired.

Notes 1 On 5 August 2019, Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which guaranteed special rights to the Muslim-majority state and excluded it from the application of various constitutional provisions, was abrogated, while Article 35A, which limited certain residency rights to the local population and granted them certain protections, was scrapped. The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act was passed by the Indian Parliament on 6 August 2019. The Act reorganises the former state of J&K into two union territories – Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh – w.e.f on 31 October, 2019. 2 As quoted in Panchayat Budget Speech of 2018 (p. 1). Accessed at: http:​/​/jak​​ finan​​ce​.ni​​c​.in/​​Budge​​t18​/P​​ancha​​yatBu​​dge​ts​​peech​​2018(English).pdf (Accessed: 15 March 2019) 3 See Wani (2019) for a rich account of governance in Kashmir during 1948–1990. 4 Available at: http:​/​/ceo​​jammu​​kashm​​ir​.ni​​c​.in/​​pdf​/P​​ancha​​yati-​​Raj​-A​​​ct​-19​​89​.pd​f (Accessed: 20 February 2019) 5 Unlike the other states, J&K has halqa Panchayats in place of Panchayat Samities and District Development Board in place of Zilla Parishads. 6 According to J&K Panchayati Raj Act of 1989 a ‘Halqa’ means the area comprising a village or such contiguous number of villages as may be determined by the government from time to time. 7 Since 1989 the J&K Act for rural local bodies has been amended four times. The latest Jammu and Kashmir Panchayati Raj (Fourth Amendment) Act, 2018 is available at: http://jklaw​.nic​.in​/pdf​/Raj​.pdf (Accessed: 25 March 2019) 8 In the panchayat elections of 2001 and 2011 the voting percentage was low in Kashmir as compared to Jammu and Ladakh. Although the region-wise figures are not available for these two elections studies by Chowdhary (2001), Wani (2011), and Kumar (2014) confirm that voting percentages were less in Kashmir. 9 See Telegraph, 2018 (Kashmir’s high voter turnout is no indicator that democracy is healthy there). Available at: https​:/​/ww​​w​.tel​​egrap​​hindi​​a​.com​​/opin​​ion​/h​​ igh​-v​​oter-​​turno​​ut​-in​​-kash​​mir​-p​​ancha​​yat​-e​​lecti​​ons​-d​​oes​-n​​ot​-in​​dicat​​e​-nor​​malcy​​ -or​​-h​​ealth​​y​-dem​​ocrac​​y​/cid​​/1675​​971 (Accessed: 10 March 2019). See also: Scroll (2018): J&K panchayat elections saw 74 per cent voter turnout – but that figure hides the full story. Accessed at: https​:/​/sc​​roll.​​in​/ar​​ticle​​/9053​​64​/a-​​close​​r​-loo​​ k​-vot​​er​-tu​​rnout​​-numb​​ers​-d​​o​-not​​-tell​​-the-​​whole​​-stor​​y​-of-​​kash​m​​irs​-p​​ancha​​yat​-e​​ lecti​​ons (Accessed: 10 March 2019) 10 See Staniland (2013) for a full discussion of promotion of discourse of normalcy in the region.

134  Sardar Babur Hussain 11 Available at: http:​/​/www​​.jkla​​w​.nic​​.in​/p​​df​/St​​ate​%2​​0Fina​​nce​%2​​0Comm​​issio​​ n ​ % 20f​​ o r ​ % 20​​ P anch​​ a yats​​ % 20an​​ d ​ % 20M​​ u nici​​​ p alit​​ i es ​ % E​​ 2 ​ % 80%​​ A 6 ​ . pd ​ f (Accessed: 10 February 2019) 12 The J&K Budget of 2018 and 2019 promised the constitution of the State Finance Commission. 13 Available at: http:​/​/jak​​finan​​ce​.ni​​c​.in/​​Budge​​t​/Bud​​get18​​/Panc​​hayat​​Budge​​​tspee​​ ch201​8(English).pdf (Accessed: 25 March 2019)

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136  Sardar Babur Hussain Sanchez, F., and Chacon, M. (2005). ‘Conflict, State and Decentralization: From Social Progress to an Armed Dispute for Local Control, 1974–2002’, Working Paper No. 70, London: Crisis States Programme. Siegle, J., and P. O’Mahoney (2007). Assessing the Merits of Decentralization as a Conflict Mitigation Strategy. Report to USAID, Development Alternatives, U.S. Staniland, Paul (2013). ‘Kashmir since 2003: Counterinsurgency and the Paradox of Normalcy’, Asian Survey, 53(5), pp. 931–957. Sultan, M. (1995). Jammu & Kashmir, Status of Panchayati Raj in the States of India-1994. New Delhi: ISS and Concept Publishing House. Treisman, Daniel (2007). The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. UN (2018). Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Kashmir: Developments in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir from June 2016 to April 2018, and General Human Rights Concerns in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan. Available at: https​:/​/ww​​w​.ohc​​hr​.or​​g​/Doc​​ument​​s​/Cou​​ntrie​​s​/IN/​​Devel​​ opmen​​tsInK​​ashmi​​rJune​​20​16T​​oApri​​l2018​​.pdf (Accessed: 20 February 2019). Vidal, R., Atehortúa, C. and Salcedo, J. (2013). Local Government Responses to Internal Displacement in Urban Areas: A Study of Bogotá and Cali, Colombia. Brookings-LSE. Available at: www​.b​​rooki​​ngs​.e​​du​/re​​searc​​h​/rep​​orts/​​2011/​​10​/ho​​st​ -co​​mmuni​​ties-​​colom​​bia​-i​​dp (Accessed: 7 January 2021). Voelkel, C. (2013). Local Governments after the Conflict: The Potential Pitfalls of a Centralised Peace Process. Available at: http:​/​/www​​.cris​​isgro​​upblo​​gs​.or​​g​/ cri​​meand​​polit​​ics​/2​​013​/0​​2​/07/​​local​​gover​​nment​​s​-aft​​er​-th​​e​-con​​flict​​-the-​​poten​​tial-​​ pitfa​​lls​-o​​f​​-a​-c​​entra​​lised​​-peac​​e​-pro​​cess/​ (Accessed: 12 January 2021). Wani, A. (2011). ‘2011 Panchayat Elections in Kashmir: A case of Democratic De-Centralisation’, South Asian Survey, 18(2), pp. 279–292. Wani, Aijaz (2019). What Happened to Governance in Kashmir? New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Wall, Gareth (2016). ‘Decentralisation as a Post-Conflict State-Building Strategy in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone and Rwanda’, Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 1(6), pp. 898–920. Available at: 10.1080/23802014.2016.1369859 (Accessed: 10 March 2020).

7

Landslides, decentralised government, and the MGNREGS A study in Sikkim and Darjeeling Shikha Subba

Introduction It is estimated that 30 per cent of the world’s landslides occur in the Himalayan region, including parts of five nations – India, Nepal, China, Bhutan, and Pakistan. Nearly 15 per cent of the land in India is prone to landslide problems of varying degrees. The most sensitive area in the country is the Himalayan region, the Nilgiris, the Western and Eastern Ghats. Himalayan landslides kill one person per 100 square kilometres per year. It is estimated that average losses due to Himalayan landslides cost more than Rs. 550 crores per year and causes more than 200 deaths (NDMP, 2016). The Darjeeling and Sikkim Himalayan Region1 frequently experience landslides. A study on the effectiveness of local government in this region is interesting because a local decentralised government is present in Sikkim, while a decentralised government has ceased to function in the Darjeeling region for the last one and a half decades. This therefore provides a good methodological setting for the study of the effectiveness of local decentralised government in addressing landslide related disasters. Local government is best suited to deal with landslides as these are local disasters. Messer (2003) argued that disaster is mostly a local phenomenon, and rarely hits the entire country. Since these are local disasters, the use of local information, knowledge, and resources is critical for effective disaster management, including risk prevention measures. Even if the central government is uninterested in disaster risk prevention and preparedness, local politicians, who are accountable to their voters, can draw the attention of the central government and also raise funds locally and allocate more resources for disaster preparedness. The role of local government in the three phases of disasters is as follows. The prevention measures in the pre-emergency phase typically include risk mapping, application of building codes, land zoning, construction of dams, embankments, etc. Local governments can undertake functions relating to these activities. The emergency phase requires an immediate and quick response. Decentralised government, located close to disasteraffected citizens, can mobilise resources very quickly using local knowledge DOI: 10.4324/9781003094357-7

138  Shikha Subba and expertise. Local politicians who want to accumulate political capital will have strong incentives to participate in relief and rescue efforts. Rehabilitation and reconstruction in the post-emergency phase can also be effectively implemented and coordinated by the local government with appropriate assessment of the damage and proper targeting. In short, greater availability of information and the presence of accountability mechanisms, targeting efficiency, and cost-effectiveness may lead to efficient disaster risk management by a decentralised government. Against this background, this chapter attempts to comprehend the role of local government in landslide risk reduction. In the next section, an attempt is made to delineate the functions assigned to local government in disaster risk reduction with the help of a review of official documents and interviews with officials. The discussion in the second section shows that formal functions assigned to the local government in Sikkim and West Bengal are related to disaster management; however, they are more related to relief and rehabilitation and not so significant in the case of disaster risk reduction. Even so, as the discussion in this chapter shows, the local government in Sikkim has been playing an important role in landslide disaster management as compared to the Darjeeling region. The discussions with the officials revealed that funds earmarked for the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Scheme (MGNREGS) had been used to undertake measures aimed at landslide disaster risk reduction. Under this scheme, livelihood security is provided as a legal right. The Gram Panchayats are the key local organisations for planning and implementation of the MGNREGS. The activities undertaken under the MGNREGS are related to greater environmental services such as groundwater recharge, flood control (risk reduction), providing irrigation and improving soil quality, soil moisture, and retention (erosion control) etc. (Rajasekhar, Berg, and Manjula, 2012). Several of these activities have the potential to reduce the risk of landslide disasters. According to a study undertaken by the Institute for Rural Management Anand (IRMA) in Sikkim, the MGNREGA has provided a platform to undertake pertinent community activities. Land development activities such as flood control, soil erosion, and those enhancing land stability, etc., in the state enhanced the level of community participation in the MGNREGS. The case studies in the IRMA (2010) study bring out that the MGNREGS activities have contributed to the reduction of the landslide risk. This implies that the MGNREGS may have significantly contributed to landslide disaster risk reduction. However, the effectiveness of the MGNREGS in the landslide disaster risk reduction may be less in the Darjeeling region due to the absence of a local decentralised government. The administration in the Darjeeling region has been entrusted with the responsibility of mobilising people to present their needs and preferences for the activities under the scheme, decentralised planning to identify the shelf of projects, and implementation of the MGNREGS works. The effectiveness is likely to be better in

Landslides and the MGNREGS  139 Sikkim because of a well-functioning decentralised government. In order to test this hypothesis, we collected secondary data from the official website of the MGNREGS and analysed the same to examine whether the local government in Sikkim is more successful in the implementation of the MGNREGS. In order to understand the role assigned to the local government in the Constitution and by the higher levels of government, interviews were held with the officials from both Sikkim and West Bengal. In Sikkim, personal interviews were held with the Secretary of Panchayats at Gangtok, the District Disaster Management Officer (DDMO), and elected representatives of the Zilla Panchayat in the South Sikkim district, and elected GP leaders. The interviews, conducted with the help of an open-ended questionnaire, focused on the functions assigned to the local government with regard to landslide risk disaster management, staff provided to undertake these functions, and funds allocated. As far as the Darjeeling region is concerned, a discussion was held with the Principal Secretary of Panchayat, West Bengal, in Kolkata. In the year 2017, the Darjeeling region was bifurcated into two districts: Darjeeling and Kalimpong. The newly created Kalimpong district, which has a relatively larger area exposed to landslide disasters, and borders with the Sikkim state, is appropriate for the study. Hence, interviews were conducted with the DDMO located at the headquarters in Kalimpong. Since a Zilla Panchayat does not exist in the district, no discussion with elected representatives at the district level could be held. After the discussion with the DDMO, it was learnt that at the village level a nominated executive assistant is asked to deal with landslide disasters. We therefore talked to this official from the District Administration. The information collected with the help of a checklist included the institutions that are assigned to deal with landslide disasters in the Darjeeling region governed by the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA), funds allocated, and so on.

Landslides in Sikkim and Darjeeling Landslides are widespread phenomena, and these are major hydro-geological and anthropogenic hazards that not only affect the hilly region but also the mining areas, plateau river terrains, coastal, and offshore area (Nad, 2015). Darjeeling district in West Bengal and the Sikkim state (hereafter the Darjeeling–Sikkim region) are highly prone to landslides. The highly vulnerable areas of landslides are those which are subject to seismic shaking, mountainous land with a high relative relief, and places where mining or land use is unscientific. The moderately vulnerable areas are those that suffer from land degradation, areas covered with thick sheets of losses, and also the areas with a high intensity of rainfall and poor drainage system. The rising trend of Himalayan young fold mountains is also one of the basic reasons for frequent landslides in these regions. Barring the All India

140  Shikha Subba Soil and Land-Use Survey in some areas of Darjeeling district was carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, there is no systematic soil mapping in this region. Therefore, there is no database on how much of soil cover has been actually destroyed (Nad, 2015). In the Darjeeling–Sikkim region, many deaths on account of landslides are reported. Landslides primarily are the result of two causes: physical and human-induced factors. In the context of the Sikkim–Darjeeling region, the physical factors for landslides include: (i) shocks and vibrations occurring from the earth’s seismic activity; (ii) high rate of soil erosion and heavy precipitation, especially during the time of monsoon rainfall; (iii) an increase in the slope angle if stream erodes the bottom slope; and (iv) an increase of pore water pressure in the slope materials, exceeding the water holding capacity of the soil and surface runoff. The human-induced factors include local shocks and vibration occurring from the operation of heavy construction machinery; steepening of the slope due to building works, when there are additional weights placed on the slope by the dumping of waste or by building construction, deforestation, the unscientific methods of mining and quarrying that reduce the basal support of the slope, and heavy vehicular movements causing local shocks and vibration; heavy land degradation by human activity, roadways construction, population pressure, use of non-degradable materials like plastics, etc. (Nad, 2015). The discussions with key stakeholders (state-level officials and others) from Sikkim during the visit showed that most of the landslides in the region occurred because of excess human intervention (such as construction activities) on the topography.

Administrative arrangement in Sikkim and Darjeeling Sikkim became one of the Indian states in 1975. Owing to the historical antecedent, Sikkim did not witness the community development phase of early 1950. Under the Indo-Sikkim Treaty, 1950, it was agreed to have a progressive association of people for the governance of the state in this matter for the formation of Village Panchayats on an elective basis. The local area Panchayats were established in 1951, but the then government of Sikkim did not show any interest in the proper functioning of these bodies. These institutions became defunct as soon as they were established (Dhamala, 1994). The Sikkim Panchayat Act, 1965, was an attempt to establish Panchayat Raj Institutions in Sikkim. The Act stipulated a non-hierarchical Panchayat at the village level. The block Panchayat constituted under this Act continued until 1981. During this period, four elections were held in 1966, 1969, 1972, and 1976. Block Panchayats were given a wide range of functions, which may be grouped under three headings, a) development, b) welfare, and c) agency. Popular participation is the cornerstone of the Panchayat Raj system. This was evidently lacking in the Panchayati system established under the Sikkim

Landslides and the MGNREGS  141 Panchayat Act, 1965, though much lip service was given to this objective before 1975. Real participation was sought to be ensured with the enactment of the Panchayat Act, 1982. In keeping with the recommendations of the Ashok Mehta committee, a two-tier system was introduced. The 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act also stipulated a two-tier Panchayat system to the state because it had less than 20 lakh population (Dhamala, 1994). The state’s two-tier system of local governance in rural areas consisted of the Gram Panchayat at the lowest level and Zilla Panchayat2 at the district level. In order to fit with the various developmental profiles of the villages, which have different needs and aspirations, remote locations, etc., decentralised governance had to focus on needs-based development. To achieve these needs, block administrative centres were established to provide administrative, accounting, and technical support to a cluster of Gram Panchayats. These centres functioned as support offices for clusters of agriculture and education sectors to support the cluster of Gram Panchayats. Institutions that facilitate decentralisation, i.e. the District Planning Committee, the State Election Commission, and the State Finance Commission, were made fully functional. In addition, decentralised planning was formalised with the Village Development Action Plan (VDAP) exercise, in which multi-sectoral plans were under preparation at the Gram Panchayat level (Tambe, Arrawatia, and Ganeriwala, 2012). The focus on empowering the Panchayats was initiated in 2002–2003 with the devolution of specific functions, transfers of more grants, and posting suitable personnel to the Panchayats through the ideal design of the three Fs – ‘Functions – Funds – Functionaries’ (Dafflon, 2011). According to the Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India, in 2010–2011, Sikkim was ranked third in the country and ranked first among the smaller states in performance and accountability. The overall development through the decentralisation process gained marked achievements. The state of Sikkim has been progressing remarkably well in terms of rural development. The decentralised governance helped to rebuild the development in many aspects, and rural poverty declined from 30.9 per cent in 2005 to 13.1 per cent in 2010 (much less as compared to the country’s average of 33.8 per cent). The total forest cover area accounts for 47.59 per cent, which is double of country’s average of 23.81 per cent. Through local representation, the needy households are identified for a housing programme; as a result, Sikkim was declared a katcha free house state by 2013, and it is the first state to achieve 100 per cent sanitation. The rural road connectivity increased; the protected area coverage is 33 per cent, far above the national average of 5 per cent. These are very pertinent outcomes for decentralisation, which are important for disaster risk management. Darjeeling: Gorkhaland Territorial Administration The Gorkhaland Territorial Administration comprises the Darjeeling district and the recently bifurcated district of Kalimpong. Until the year of 2012, the

142  Shikha Subba administration was under the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC), and from 2012 the region was administered under the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration. The administrative system in Darjeeling is different. Since the year 2000, under the then Hill Council of Darjeeling Gorkha Parishad, Panchayat elections were not held for 18 years (Chhetri, 2016). There was discussion about conducting a three-tier Panchayat election which, however, did not happen, as it could only be done after making a few amendments in the laws pertaining to conducting such elections. A proposal for a three-tier Panchayat election was forwarded by the state to the central government, and both ruling and opposition parties in the hills had also given their consent. However, there was no further development on this. We hypothesise that the lack of Panchayats may have affected many areas, especially rural areas where development benefits through the Panchayat system may not have reached the needy households. The Gorkhaland Territorial Administration was constituted in 2011 after the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration Act of 2011 was passed. All the administrative/executive/financial powers were vested with the Territorial Authority. The disaster management activities were listed under Section 26 (XXXV) of the GTA Act of 2011. In a notification issued by the Disaster Management Department, it was noted that the two programmes administered by the department were: i) Distribution of House Building Grants for people who are affected by natural calamities like fire, flood, cyclone, earthquake, landslide, tsunami, avalanche, landslide, and cloudburst; and ii) Distribution of Economic Rehabilitation Grant among persons belonging to BPL category against fixed quota. In the notification, the procedure for the sanction of these grants was revised and specified as follows. A four-member Joint Inspection Team for Rural Areas consisting of a Block Development Officer (BDO), concerned Member of GTA for the area, a Pardhan (his or her authorised representative), and leader of the opposition in Gram Panchayat would be constituted for select beneficiaries. In the absence of the opposition leader, there would be no fourth member. The BDO would prepare and approve the priority list of beneficiaries in consultation with the members of GTA, after finalisation of the claims and objectives, and send the proposal for the sanctioning of the grant to the Principal Secretary of the GTA. As far as grants for economic rehabilitation are concerned, the members of the GTA would be consulted by the BDO before finalising the list of beneficiaries, and the list would be sent to the Principal Secretary of the GTA. This implies that there was no role for the people’s representatives in the selection of beneficiaries and distribution of grants to disaster victims in the area governed by the GTA.

Landslides and the MGNREGS  143

Local government in the landslide disaster risk management in Sikkim and Darjeeling In Sikkim, a two-tier decentralised government exists. According to the notification issued by the Rural Management and Development Department, Government of Sikkim (dated 29 April 2008), the state of Sikkim has transferred all 29 subjects to Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) as specified in Article 243G of the Indian Constitution. In so far as disaster management is concerned, the Zilla Panchayat is vested with the functions of i) investment in preventive measures and also preparedness; ii) minor repairs and maintenance of activities (with a budget ranging between 10 to 20 lakhs); iii) assisting in the assessment of damages during natural calamities; and iv) providing training for relief and rescue work, coordinating with district relief committee and village relief committee. The functions assigned to the Gram Panchayat are i) temporary restoration of the village road, water supply, schools, and health centre; ii) mobilisation of the community for relief and rescue; iii) identification of victims and providing relief; and iv) organising rescue and relief through the Zilla Panchayat and Gram Panchayat Committee. There are no elected bodies in the Darjeeling region. As a result, all the functions relating to disaster management are assigned to the Disaster Management Department and BDO office at the block level. How are these functions performed at the local level? Interviews were conducted with key stakeholders at the state and district levels to find out the answer to this question. In Sikkim, the Secretary of the Panchayat Raj Department in Gangtok is of the opinion that Panchayats play a major role in disaster management. According to the official, the State Institute of Rural Development conducted several rounds of capacity building programmes for Panchayat functionaries, and these were termed to be helpful for disaster prevention. The official from this department maintained that since landslides in Sikkim are mainly area-specific and mostly due to human intervention (road construction, etc.), the response should also be locally specific. The Disaster Management Department at the district level notes that the functions relating to disaster risk reduction and providing relief during and after landslide disasters are undertaken by the Zilla Panchayat and Grama Panchayat. According to them, Disaster Management Committees have been set up in all Grama Panchayats. For the Darjeeling region, the Secretary of the Panchayat, West Bengal, did not provide any information on the role of the Panchayat or local government in disaster management or landslide mitigation. When it was asked whether the absence of Panchayats have any implication in so far as landslide disaster risk reduction is concerned, she was non-committal. She also

144  Shikha Subba mentioned that she is not convinced that the local government would make any difference in landslide disaster mitigation. According to the officer from the District Disaster Management Department in Kalimpong, Panchayats only have minimal functions for landslide mitigation. It was also clarified that only a very minimal set of activities relating to prevention and mitigation are undertaken at the grassroots level; otherwise, most of the activities are undertaken only during the post-disaster phase. Since there are no elected bodies at the village level, some people directly approach the Gram Panchayat executive office or block office, whichever is convenient owing to distance if they face issues relating to landslides. Due to the lack of Panchayat Raj bodies in Darjeeling, funds for disaster management are not properly generated and used. The district office does not have any funds earmarked separately for pre and post-disaster activities. The funds go directly to the GTA. In practice, according to the district level official, funds earmarked for landslide management are spent only for post-disaster activities. This is because funds are released only after the submission of a monsoon report on calamities and damages that occurred in the previous year. This is usually done in the initial month (February) of the following year. Thus, the funds are not usually spent for landslide disaster risk reduction. For landslide risk reduction the only activity that the district office is undertaking is to conduct landslide awareness generation programmes for locals and school students. There are differences in the administrative functioning of the local selfgovernment in the GTA and Sikkim state. In the case of the GTA under the state of West Bengal, the Panchayats do not seem to be active in landslide mitigation and prevention. The major challenges for landslide mitigation, according to officials, are mainly policy-related issues, where rules are there, but people are not following them; they are constructing houses in fragile zones. The other problems are natural challenges, deforestation, fund crunch, financial vulnerability, physical vulnerability, etc. According to the Executive Assistant of the Sangsay Gram Panchayat DGHC region, the Gram Panchayat is very vulnerable to landslides. In this Gram Panchayat, vulnerable areas and sinking zones have been identified and reported to the block level office. For the prevention of landslides, they have planted 5,000 Vertebra grass plants in the sinking zone of the Upper Mansaydhura ward, which comes under their Gram Panchayat. In the case of disaster relief, shelter points are being made in schools and community halls. School teachers, the Gram Panchayat Relief Committee, and NGOs volunteer during emergencies. Regarding the funds, he added that until now there is no separate fund for landslide mitigation or disaster management. The last meeting with locals for landslide mitigation and management was held way back in 2013. There are development meetings with block level officials where issues pertaining to landslides, earthquakes, etc., are discussed.

Landslides and the MGNREGS  145 According to the information provided by the executive assistant, some people come to complain about the landslide problem after a disaster. He added that public awareness is much less in the case of the mitigation and prevention of landslides. Due to the absence of a village representative or elected representative, it is very difficult for an executive assistant to handle different issues as he needs to cover a large area.

The MGNREGS and disaster risk management The above discussion shows that decentralised government is actively functioning in Sikkim and is undertaking the functions relating to disaster management. On the other hand, there are no Panchayats in the Darjeeling region. Did this make a difference in the implementation of development programmes that promote disaster risk reduction at the local level? We take the case of the MGNREGS to address this question. As mentioned earlier, this programme is selected because several of the MGNREGS works are related to land and water conservation, and they can potentially be used for disaster risk reduction. In the field, the stakeholders at the district and local levels noted that flood control works under the MGNREGS were utilised for reducing the risk of landslide occurrence. For exploring the link between the MGNREGS and landslide disaster risk reduction in this section, the secondary data provided by the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, is used. The data pertaining to Sikkim and the DGHC, an autonomous body comprising two districts – Darjeeling and the newly formed Kalimpong district – is analysed. Although we collected the secondary data for the period 2006 to 2016, only the data from 2009 to 2016 is used in this chapter as figures were only available for both Sikkim and DGHC region for this period. This data is analysed to look at the participation of different social groups, employment provided, and performance of the MGNREGS in Sikkim and Darjeeling. As far as the performance is concerned, the works relating to landslide disaster risk reduction are identified. Subsequently, the proportion of completed works to total landslide disaster-related works is worked out to find out whether the performance varied across the two regions. Figure 7.1 provides the percentages of SC/ST participation in the MGNREGS in Sikkim and the DGHC. It can be seen that SC/ST participation was comparatively less in the DGHC during the period 2009 to 2016. According to the census of 2011 the proportion of the ST population was 33.8 per cent, and SC was 4.63 per cent in Sikkim, in the DGHC the percentages of ST and SC were 21 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively. In the case of SC/ST participation in Sikkim, the state was doing better than the DGHC. The participation of SC/ST households was less in the DGHC region at 34.6 per cent in 2009–2010 and 37.9 per cent in 2010– 2011, while in Sikkim it was 52.19 per cent and 51.93 per cent, respectively.

146  Shikha Subba

Person-days of employment (%) provided to SC/ST

60 50 40 30 20 10

SIKKIM DGHC

0 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 Years

Figure 7.1 Participation of SC/ST households in Sikkim and DGHC.

Person-days of employment (%) provided to women

60 50 40 30 20 10 0

SIKKIM DGHC 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 Years

Figure 7.2 Participation of women in the MGNREGS in Sikkim and DGHC.

In Figure 7.2, the percentage of person-days of employment provided to women compared to the total person-days has been provided for Sikkim and the DGHC. In 2010–2011, the participation of women in Sikkim was higher as compared to the DGHC. But, in subsequent years, their participation in Sikkim declined. Figure 7.3 provides the average number of person-days of employment provided to each household. It can be seen that Sikkim state had done remarkably well in this. In the years 2009–2010 and 2010–2011, the average person-days of employment was in the range of 80 to 90%. Although

Landslides and the MGNREGS  147

Person-days of employment (%) provided to households

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20

SIKKIM

10

DGHC

0

2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 Years

Figure 7.3 Average number of person-days of employment under the MGNREGS in Sikkim and DGHC.

the average number started to decline from 2011–2012, the figures remained substantially above those in the DGHC during the period 2011–2012 to 2014–2015. This can perhaps be attributed to the well-functioning of Gram Panchayats in the state, which provided information on landslides, mobilised the people in the planning and implementation of works, and in monitoring. On the other hand, in the case of the DGHC region, the number of person-days of employment went down to 45.95 in 2014–2015. In Figure 7.4, we provide the percentage of households with 100 days of employment under the scheme in the Sikkim and the DGHC region. It may

Households (%) availing 100 days of employment

50.00 45.00

SIKKIM

40.00

DGHC

35.00 30.00 25.00 20.00 15.00 10.00 5.00 0.00

2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16

Years

Figure 7.4 Proportion of households availing 100 days of employment under the MGNREGS in Sikkim and DGHC.

148  Shikha Subba be noted that this variable is important to gauge the success of the scheme in the provision of employment and for providing needs-based activities for the region. It may also be noted that several observers on the performance of the MGNREGS in India have noted that the scheme has not been successful because hardly 10 per cent of the households obtained 100 days of employment under the scheme. In the DGHC region, the proportion of households obtaining 100 days of employment was by and large less than 10 per cent during this period. Sikkim performed quite differently in this respect. As can be seen from Figure 7.4, the proportion of households obtaining 100 days of employment touched a high of 45 per cent in 2011–2012, and remained higher than 15% for a couple of years. Although the figure fluctuated, the performance of Sikkim was much better than that of the DGHC.

Did the MGNREGS works contribute to landslide risk reduction? Several MGNREGS works relate to land and water conservation, and can potentially be utilised for landslide risk reduction. We have identified works relating to flood control, land and water conservation, renovation of traditional water bodies, and drought-proofing as important for the achievement of the objective of landslide risk reduction through the MGNREGS. In the ensuing paragraphs, we will analyse performance by looking at the rate of completion of these works to the total taken up in each year. In Tables 7.1 to 7.5, we provide the percentages of completed projects under different activities that are directly or indirectly related to landslide risk reduction activities. Table 7.1 Proportion of Completed Flood Control Works to Total in Sikkim and the DGHC Region Sikkim

DGHC

Years

Projects Projects Taken up Completed

%

Projects Taken up

Projects Completed

%

2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 Total Average per village

215 273 390 475 512 373 286 2524 5.49

43.26 66.30 15.38 15.58 7.03 20.64 20.28 22.94

164 196 362 962 659 1034 1941 5318 7.48

99 86 84 61 128 31 93 582 0.82

60.37 43.88 23.20 6.34 19.42 3.00 4.79 10.94

93 181 60 74 36 77 58 579 1.26

Source: http://nrega​.nic​.in​/netnrega​/home​.aspx

Landslides and the MGNREGS  149 Table 7.1 shows the performance of flood control works in the two regions. The discussions with officials and elected representatives revealed that most of the activities pertaining to landslide risk reduction, such as land terracing, jhora training work, plantation etc., are done under flood control measures. In this regard, the completed work proportion in the DGHC was far less than the national average in the respective years. In the year 2014–2015, the proportion of completed works in the DGHC has come down to 3 per cent against the national average of 9 per cent. However, in the same year, Sikkim had a comparatively larger proportion of completed flood control works with 20.64%. On the whole, the proportion of completed works to total works was 22.94% in Sikkim, while it was 10.94% in the DGHC during this period. Table 7.2 shows the proportion of completed water conservation-related works. Water conservation work is done on arable and non-arable land, and by constructing check dams, stop dams, talabs, and village ponds. The proportion of completed works was 31.12% in Sikkim, and it was only 12.77% in the DGHC region, thus suggesting that the performance of water conservation works in Sikkim was relatively better. Table 7.3 provides the proportion of completed drought-proofing works. Drought-proofing work includes afforestation consisting of covering up degraded forest and barren land, eco-restoration of forests, block plantation, and silvopasture. These activities have the potential to contribute to landslide risk mitigation by maintaining soil quality and provide flood resistance. The figures for the completion of drought-proofing work fluctuate. On the whole, however, the proportion of completed works was much higher in Sikkim as compared to the DGHC region during the period 2009–2010 to 2015–2016. Table 7.2 Proportion of Water Conservation Works to Total in Sikkim and the DGHC Region Sikkim

DGHC

Years

Projects taken up

Projects completed

%

Projects taken up

Projects completed

%

2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 Total Average per village

258 431 186 325 386 409 495 2490 5.41

197 360 10 42 87 48 31 775 1.68

76.36 83.53 5.38 12.92 22.54 11.74 6.26 31.12

5 6 84 235 94 81 662 1167 1.64

2 4 20 55 50 2 16 149 0.21

40.00 66.67 23.81 23.40 53.19 2.47 2.42 12.77

Source: http://nrega​.nic​.in​/netnrega​/home​.aspx

150  Shikha Subba Table 7.3 Proportion of Drought-Proofing Work to Total in Sikkim and the DGHC Region Sikkim

DGHC

Years

Projects taken up

Projects completed

%

Projects taken up

Projects completed

%

2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 Total Average per village

880 578 772 476 414 633 829 4,582 9.96

780 415 320 205 32 18 109 1,879 4.08

88.63 71.79 41.45 43.06 7.72 2.84 13.14 41.01

20 209 251 324 152 23 257 1,236 1.74

12 11 101 2 109 11 0 246 0.36

60.00 53.58 40.23 8.02 71.71 47.82 0 19.90

Source: http://nrega​.nic​.in​/netnrega​/home​.aspx

Table 7.4 provides the proportion of completed works relating to the renovation of traditional water bodies. Renovation of water bodies includes some of the landslide mitigation measures such as check dams, maintenance of existing irrigation tanks, ponds, talabs, weir structures, etc. In this case, the average proportion of completed works in Sikkim was 30.25%, while it was only 6.98% in the DGHC region during this period. Table 7.5 provides the proportion of completed land development works. Land development work includes landslide prevention measures such as the levelling of common land for the production and development of common Table 7.4 Proportion of Completed Renovation Water Bodies Work to Total in Sikkim and the DGHC Region Sikkim

DGHC

Years

Projects taken up

Projects completed

%

Projects taken up

Projects completed

%

2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 Total Average per village

29 26 21 23 13 5 2 119 0.26

5 17 3 7 0 2 2 36 0.08

17.24 65.38 14.29 30.43 0.00 40.00 100.00 30.25

1 10 11 29 13 42 209 315 0.44

1 6 2 10 2 0 1 22 0.03

100.00 60.00 18.18 34.48 15.38 0.00 0.48 6.98

Source: http://nrega​.nic​.in​/netnrega​/home​.aspx

Landslides and the MGNREGS  151 Table 7.5 Proportion of Completed Land Development Work to Total in Sikkim and the DGHC Region Sikkim

DGHC

Years

Projects taken up

Projects completed

%

Projects taken up

Projects completed

%

2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 Total Average per village

258 305 2,196 2,034 1,672 938 708 8,111 17.63

119 199 311 445 414 197 113 1,798 3.91

46.12 65.25 14.16 21.88 24.76 21.00 15.96 22.17

35 133 476 1182 1116 808 815 4,565 6.42

20 69 140 200 601 3 27 1,060 1.49

57.14 51.88 29.41 16.92 53.85 0.37 3.31 23.22

Source: http://nrega​.nic​.in​/netnrega​/home​.aspx

wasteland. The figures fluctuate in both regions. On the whole, the performance was roughly the same in both the regions. Figure 7.5, which pools the evidence on the performance (in terms of completed to total works initiated) across the two regions, shows that the performance in Sikkim was comparatively better in the case of flood control

45.00 40.00

SIKKIM DGHC

35.00 30.00 25.00 20.00 15.00 10.00 5.00 0.00 Flood Control and Protection

Water Conservation

Drought Proofing

Renovation of Traditional Water Bodies

Land Development

Figure 7.5 Landslide risk reduction-related asset creation through the MGNREGS (2009–2016).

152  Shikha Subba and protection, water conservation, drought-proofing, and renovation of traditional water bodies. What factors contributed to the better performance in Sikkim? The discussions with officials and elected representatives suggested that the decentralised government in Sikkim was far more active in utilising the MGNREGS funds for landslide risk reduction. In the case of the South Sikkim district, it was revealed by the DDMO that the department is collectively working with the Zilla Panchayat and Gram Panchayat for disaster management. Bamboo trenching, plantation of Vertebra species are some of the risk reduction strategies adopted in the district. Until 2010, there was a top-down approach to disaster management, but from 2011 the emphasis was given to discussion at the grassroots level and to bottom-up approaches. In Sikkim, the MGNREGA officer concerned said that landslide prevention was mostly done under flood control activity, which includes the maintenance of jhoras (local name for drainage channels for waste and rainwater), proper drainage systems, land terracing, plantation of Vetiver grass, and bamboo plantation (which is considered to be good for both livelihood security and landslide prevention). According to the elected member of the Zilla Panchayat, the Disaster Management Committee was formed at the Gram Panchayat level. The region was having severe landslide problems, and the Zilla Panchayat had a major role in all phases of landslide management. He further added that the Zilla Panchayat is effective in landslide risk reduction. For prevention, they carried out activities such as land terracing, the formation of protective walls, plantation, jhora training work, catch water drains, retaining walls, and breast walls. As far as relief and rehabilitation is concerned, landslide damaged houses are also retained through the CMRHM Chief Minister Rural Housing Mission. Meetings are held with representatives of the Zilla and Gram Panchayats for discussing the pertinent issues of landslides. The Zilla Panchayat is active in providing landslide awareness programmes and guiding Gram Panchayats during landslide emergencies. During landslides emergencies, the Zilla Panchayat comes in contact with the Gram Panchayat, District office, and office block. The Gram Panchayat member of the Turung Mamring Gram Panchayat under the Namthang block, South Sikkim District, said that the area had a big problem with landslides. For prevention activities, they carried out activities such as plantation (of Vertebra grass) and building protection walls. Every Grama Panchayat has a trained Disaster Management Committee and active volunteers from all villages. In 2015, the Grama Panchayat planted 1,500 saplings provided by the forest department in the major landslide regions. The project officer from Darjeeling mentioned that the MGNREGA scheme comes under the GTA. As far as landslide risk reduction is concerned,

Landslides and the MGNREGS  153 flood control activities such as building and maintaining a protection wall and plantation of Vertebra grass are undertaken. MGNREGA work comes under the GTA and District Collector. MGNREGA works are not implemented effectively. The officer stated that without local rural bodies only 50% of the MGNREGA works are effective. Conversion of MGNREGA works for landslide reduction is not successful in the case of the GTA.

Conclusion The Himalayan region is prone to the problem of landslides. The problem of landslides is usually confined to one region or locality. As a result, these disasters have hardly been an issue of national importance or attention. Landslide disaster risk reduction is a long term process, and a top-down approach in the localities vulnerable to landslide disaster may not work very well, and lead to high risk to life and property. Disaster risk reduction functions are vested with the central and state authority and then to some extent to the district and a little to the Zilla and Gram Panchayats. Although the National Disaster Act, 2005, and National Policy on Disaster Management, 2009, highlight the importance of the local level government in disaster risk reduction, functions and roles assigned to local government are mainly related to relief and rehabilitation. The assigned role in disaster risk reduction seems to be somewhat insignificant. Discussions with officials, including those from the Disaster Management Department, revealed that the Panchayats in Sikkim were playing an important role in disaster management. On the other hand, there was no defined role for local government in the case of the DGHC region, presently known as the GTA region for landslide risk management. The absence of local representatives in the GTA region also marks the absence of an arrangement to represent local problems, and this affects the risk reduction strategies. Secondary data on different dimensions of the MGNREGS in Sikkim and Darjeeling are analysed in this chapter to find out whether the decentralised government used the funds under this scheme to reduce landslide risk. Key findings from the analysis are the following: a) The total number of households obtaining wage employment under the scheme has declined in India during the period 2009 to 2016, while it increased in the Sikkim and Darjeeling region; b) The participation of people belonging to the SC/ST community was high in Sikkim as compared to the Darjeeling region; c) The participation of women in the programme increased in all three regions; d) The average person-days of employment provided to households was substantially higher in Sikkim as compared to the Darjeeling region; e) The proportion of households obtaining 100 days of employment was also higher in Sikkim. The works relating to flood control, planting of trees and grass, and land and water conservation are related to landslide risk reduction. The

154  Shikha Subba percentage of completed landslide reduction-related works was taken as a variable to measure the performance of the MGNREGS in reducing the risk of landslide disasters in the Sikkim and Darjeeling regions. One can see fluctuations in the trend presented in the charts in this chapter. If one takes up the figures for the entire period, it is clear that the performance in Sikkim tended to be better. This can be attributed to the decentralised government facilitating people’s participation in the planning and implementation of MGNREGS works. The case studies presented in IRMA (2010) reveal that: ‘Tree plantation with broadleaf species like Uttis, Aukharetc has also been carried out on village land primarily to prevent landslides’ (p. 56). In another village, the women participating in the focus group discussion stated that catch drain works were quite effective in arresting erosion of a large area of arable land (which runs into acres) as it channelled the gushing water into irrigation channels. They stated that ‘this makes water available for our land, and also prevents landslides and thereby huge personal losses as well’ (p. 76). Did the better performance of the local government in the implementation of the MGNREGS in Sikkim have a positive impact on landslide risk reduction? We do not have direct evidence to answer this question. However, the human and material loss on account of landslide disasters was much less in Sikkim as compared to the Darjeeling region. The data provided by the Geological Survey of India shows that, during the period 2009 to 2016, landslide disasters occurred in both the states more or less on identical dates (GSI, 2018). The total number of landslide related deaths in the Darjeeling region was 54 during this period, while it was only six in Sikkim. In addition, according to Geological Survey of India reports, the number of injuries and damages to houses and other properties on account of landslide disasters was also high in Darjeeling. In 2009 a total of 550 houses were reported to be damaged due to landslides in Darjeeling. It may not be completely correct to relate the lower incidence of landslides in Sikkim in the recent past to the better performance of the state in the implementation of the MGNREGS. We need to have more data and undertake an in-depth analysis with primary data to shed more light on this.

Notes 1 Darjeeling is a district in the Indian State of West Bengal located in East India, while Sikkim is a North-Eastern state. The two regions are more prone to landslides, the details of which are provided in the subsequent section of this chapter. 2 However in North Sikkim the traditional village administrative system known as Dzumsa, can be found in two villages – Lachen and Lachung. It was first established in the 19th century. The Dzumsa is directed by a group of people, elected or designated by villagers depending on the period, to represent them and manage village affairs. This system exists in Lacehn and Lachung, and was officially recognised in 1985 and still continues to function. The Dzumsa are vested with administrative functions such as economic mobilisation, decision making in common affairs, employment etc. However they also play an important role in

Landslides and the MGNREGS  155 times of emergencies, natural calamities and deaths by asking every villagers for some amount of contributions (Sabatier and Denjongpa, 2004).

References Chhetri, V. (2016). ‘Morcha Ready to Take Part in Two-tier Panchayat Polls’, Hill Party Mellows, The Telegraph, West Bengal, 28 December. Dafflon, B. (2011). The Political Economy of Decentralisation in Sikkim: Strengthening Gram Panchayat Planning and Budgeting. New Delhi: ISMS, SDC. Dhamala, R. Ranju (1994). ‘Panchayati Raj Institution in Sikkim: Participation and Development’, in Lama, Mahendra P. (ed.) Sikkim: Society, Polity, Economy, Environment. New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company. GSI (Geological Survey of India) (2018). Landslide Recent Incidences. Ministry of Mines, Government of India. IRMA (2010). An Impact Assessment Study Usefulness and Sustainability of the Assets Created Under MGNREGA in Sikkim. Report submitted to Secretary, Rural Management and Development Department, Sikkim. Gujarat: Institute of Rural Management Anand (IRMA). Available at: https​:/​/nr​​ega​.n​​ic​.in​​/netn​​rega/​​ succe​​ss​%20​​stori​​es​/IR​​MA​_St​​udy​_​S​​ikkim​​_2010​​.pdf (Accessed: 18 March 2021). Messer, N. (2003). The Role of Local Institutions and their Interaction in Disaster Risk Mitigation. FAO. Available at: http://www​.fao​.org​/3​/a​-ad710e​.pdf (Accessed: 18 March 2021) Nad, C. (2015). ‘Landslide Hazard Management of Darjeeling Hill: A Critical Need for Inhabited’, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention, 4(3), pp. 48–52. NDMP (2016). ‘National Disaster Management Plan’, National Disaster Management Authority. Government of India. Rajasekhar, D., Berg, Erlend and Manjula, R. (2012). NREGS, Grama Panchayats and Inclusive Climate Smart Agriculture: Evidence from South India, paper presented in CAPRi/CCAFS Workshop on ‘Institutions for Inclusive ClimateSmart Agriculture’ at Nairobi, Kenya during September 10–13. Sabatier, B. and Denjongpa, B. (2004). ‘The Dzumsa of Lachen: An example of a Sikkimese Political Institution,’ Bulletin of Tibetology. Available at: https​:/​/ww​​w​ .rep​​osito​​ry​.ca​​m​.ac.​​uk​/bi​​tstre​​am​/id​​/6379​​79​/bo​​t​​_200​​4​_01_​​04​.pd​​f/ (Accessed: 18 March 2021). Tambe, Sandeep, Arrawatia, M. L., Ganeriwala, Anil K. (2012). ‘Managing Rural Development in the Mountain State of Sikkim, India’, Mountain Research and Development, 32(2), PP. 242–252.

8

Decentralised delivery of school education Evidence from Karnataka D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula

Introduction Considerable efforts were made by the Indian government after Independence to promote school education; yet not all children of school-going age are in school. Although considerable progress has been made in achieving the target of universal primary education, high dropout rates remain a big challenge, and two out of every ten children entering primary school in India are likely to drop out. Another problem is the poor quality of the education imparted, which gets reflected in almost half of the children in Class 5 not being able to read the text at a Class 2 level (Rajasekhar et al., 2007; Pratham, 2014). This means that the ability of these children to cope up with curricula in the higher classes will be low, leading to the problem of dropouts and eventual illiteracy. In addition, lack (and/or inadequate supply) of basic school equipment, poor infrastructure, and the quality and availability of teachers at schools are important concerns. All these are disturbing considering the importance of education for human, social, and economic development. Governance and management related issues are usually associated with poor educational outputs. Governance factors such as differential access to schooling facilities among social and economic groups, lack of accountability to the public at large, poor efficiency in the delivery of educational services, and inequity in the delivery of educational services adversely affect the quantity and quality of education. Decentralisation is often presented as a promising policy option to overcome these problems and thereby improve educational outputs. Fiske (1996, p. 24), after examining the question of why decentralisation was initiated to provide educational services in a number of countries, concludes that decentralisation ‘will improve the quality of teaching and learning by locating decisions closer to the point at which they must be carried out and by energising teachers and administrators to do a better job’. Decentralisation allows quicker identification of problems relating to the provision of educational services and offers more appropriate solutions to them (Machado, 2013). DOI: 10.4324/9781003094357-8

Decentralised delivery of school education  157 The reasons why governments decide to initiate a decentralisation process around education are that they are seeking improvements in efficiency, improvements in financing and redistribute power to decision-making bodies with better knowledge of educational needs. The efficiency goal is argued on the basis that a centralised system is often characterised by having a high bureaucratic burden, thus incurring losses of resources and time. By decentralising decisions, they are accelerated, and at the same time, better information is available to run. The efficient allocation of resources by sub-national governments allows … (for better) allocations in education as opposed to large national budgets that are not always allocated efficiently. On the other hand, the redistribution of decision-making is seen as a way to include the less weighted groups giving better facilities in attending to their needs. (Serrano and Llop, 2012, p. 5) A number of empirical studies on decentralisation and education (Faguet and Sanchez, 2009; Mahal, Srivastava, and Sanan, 2000; Yoem, Acedo, and Utomo, 2002; Yolcu, 2011; Machado, 2013; Brosio, 2014; Shen, Zhao, and Zou, 2014) discuss and analyse the experiences of countries with educational decentralisation either individually or in comparison to other countries. A review of these studies suggests that outcomes of educational decentralisation are mixed (Upadhyay and Rajasekhar, 2020). Against this background, the decentralised delivery of educational services is examined in this chapter in the specific context of Karnataka. For improving school education, the 11th Schedule assigns the responsibility of education, including primary and secondary schools, to PRIs. School Development and Monitoring Committees (SDMCs) have been constituted to promote people’s participation in school development. It is, however, argued that these have not really succeeded in promoting people’s participation. Further, there are not many studies, especially qualitative and in-depth studies, that look at the linkage between SDMCs and PRIs. The factors that influence the functioning of SDMCs are also not explored adequately in the literature. This chapter seeks to fill in these research gaps. In this chapter, the functioning of SDMCs located in three Grama Panchayats in Karnataka is examined. The main objectives are to: i) Look into the composition of SDMCs; ii) Analyse the role played by Grama Panchayats and SDMCs in decentralised delivery of educational services; and iii) Assess educational outputs achieved and factors that influenced the performance of the SDMCs. In order to address the study objectives, the primary data was collected from a few villages in Harapanahalli taluk in Davanagere district in Karnataka. From this taluk, three villages were selected on the basis of adult illiteracy and distance to the town. While Hathirahalli1 was close to

158  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula the taluk headquarters, Upparahalli was distantly located. The functioning of SDMCs among these three villages was uneven, with SDMC defunct in Hathirahalli. Primary data was collected from the sample households representing two categories. The first category consisted of SDMC member households. With the help of the SDMC member list in the study villages, all the households with membership to the SDMCs were interviewed. The second category was non-member households. Based on the list of all the households in the village, which was obtained from the GP, Non-SDMC member households were selected using a systematic random sampling method. Subsequently, a screening question was asked to ensure that at least one child from the sample households was studying in the government school of the village and that they did not have SDMC membership. Interviews were conducted with 33 SDMC members and 43 non-members in the SDMC. The data were collected in early 2016. After this introductory section, the issues relating to school education are discussed. In the third section, the functioning of school development and monitoring committees in the sample villages and the perception of the people on their functioning are discussed. A summary and conclusion are provided in the last section.

Decentralisation of education in India The decentralisation of education in India took formal shape in the form of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments in 1992. This provided for the setting up of local bodies (Panchayats), uniformly throughout the country, at village, block, and district levels (village being the most basic unit), and also in urban areas through the democratic process of elections and for the delineation of their functions and responsibilities. Regarding education, Panchayati Raj Institutions were assigned the responsibility of primary and secondary education, technical training and vocational education, adult and non-formal education.2 A division of responsibilities regarding education among local bodies at different levels is also recommended in various sections of the Panchayati Raj Act as follows: ••

•• ••

Grama Panchayats are given the responsibility of providing education through primary and middle schools, of creating awareness among the people, and ensuring enrolment of all the children in primary school, and of construction and maintenance of hostels. Panchayats at the block level are supposed to promote primary and secondary education, construct and maintain school buildings, and provide for education for working children. Panchayats at the district level have the role of constructing roads connecting all the schools and colleges in the district, constructing and maintaining primary and secondary schools and hostels, constructing

Decentralised delivery of school education  159 and maintaining schools and hostels for Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes, and other backward class students, and the provision of scholarship, free textbooks, teaching, and learning materials for such groups. The core of educational decentralisation consists of planning, management, control, evaluation, and adequate autonomy on revenue and expenditure decisions. It is to be noted, however, that the different states in India, in pursuance of the Act, have adopted different approaches regarding the management and governance of education. For example, in Bihar, the responsibilities of the Panchayats regarding education are limited to the construction and management of the schools. In Uttar Pradesh, the roles and responsibilities of local bodies are clearly defined, but their implementation status is questionable; Kerala has devolved important functions like the supervision of routine school functions, including the performance of teaching and nonteaching staff, offering assistance regarding disciplinary action against such staff if needed, and monitoring the existence of adequate staff at the beginning of the academic year. The state has also devolved 40 per cent of its budget to Panchayats for developmental plans, including education, which is not the case with many other states. Karnataka has devolved teacher recruitment to the block level, and several other such variations can be seen across the states (Govinda and Bandopadhyay, 2010). People’s participation in school management Community involvement and participation has been a professed goal of educational decentralisation in India since the beginning. Following the National Education Policy, 1986, there was a significant move to involve the community in the provision of education services. Almost all the states, through government orders, established a Village Education Committee (VEC) that included parents, community members, and teachers. In some states like Karnataka, the SDMC was established as a powerful decision-making institution at the school level with outreach to the parents through the parents’ council (Govinda and Bandopadhyay, 2010). Further, the Central Advisory Board of Education, 1993, also recommended setting up VECs at the village level and Education Committees at the block level as part of the Panchayat system itself (Mukhopadhyay, Ramkumar, and Vasavi, 2009). It is notable that in some states VECs are also responsible for mobilisation and utilisation of funds available from the government and other sources. Under the Education for All Movement, VECs are credited with the responsibilities of deciding, in consultation with school authorities, how the funds will be used for the development of the school, with instances of their involvement in monitoring the attendance of teachers and students, volunteer teaching, and teaching–learning materials preparation (Ramachandran, 2001 as quoted in Govinda and Bandopadhyay, 2010). Similarly, SDMCs are supposed to be engaged in the management of the school, ensuring enrolment of children,

160  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula supervising student and teachers’ attendance, community mobilisation, and help in ensuring the quality of education. Community participation after the transfer of political power to people’s representatives has had a significant positive impact on primary schools in a district in Karnataka. Here, the community provided not only physical and human facilities, but also exerted pressure on the teachers to achieve a higher quality of education. The community participated in a number of ways – educated youths worked as teachers on a voluntary basis, necessary infrastructure was provided to the school, non-monetary contributions – meetings, school day celebrations, financial support, the community saw to it that there was no discrimination in the schooling with respect to caste and gender, and that there was very good leadership by landlords in promoting schooling. The community exerted pressure on teachers to maintain timings, monitored happenings at school, teacher transfer was denied by the community until there was a substitute, and so on. Social capital for achieving a higher quality education was not just seeking explanation in terms of network, cooperation, and trust, but also in terms of ability or the capacity of the community to define what it wanted from education and why (Mythili, 2002). However, other studies argue that these constitutional, structural, and legal arrangements have not led to active participation, increased accountability, or improved learning outcomes in most of the cases. The involvement of Panchayats has been minimal, with their engagement confined mainly to the construction and maintenance of school buildings. The lowest tier of the Panchayats had a negligible say in educational matters of local schools. Lack of clarity and information-awareness about their roles and responsibilities, financial dependence in the absence of adequate revenue-generating powers, periodic alterations and functional instability, and political co-option and elite capture have been among the major reasons for the low involvement of Panchayats in educational governance (Fiske, 1996; Govinda and Bandopadhyay, 2010; Mukhopadhyay, Ramkumar, and Vasavi, 2009). As far as the participation of the community is concerned, this has also been low and has often been limited to contributions in cash or kind (Govinda and Bandopadhyay, 2010). Even in states like Kerala, VECs and other institutional structures for community participation have not taken root and are characterised by a lack of acceptance among stakeholders (Mukundan and Bray, 2004). The study of Ramachandran and Saihjee (2002), as quoted by Govinda and Bandopadhyay (2010), suggests ‘the VECs either do not function or seem to function with mechanical intensity rather than a genuine sense of participation and commitment’. As in the case of Brazil and Turkey, factors like poverty, inequality, and illiteracy have been identified as impediments to the participation of the marginalised (Mukhopadhyay, Ramkumar, and Vasavi, 2009; Govinda and Bandopadhyay, 2010). In this regard, Mukhopadhyay, Ramkumar and Vasavi (2009, p. 26) emphasise that:

Decentralised delivery of school education  161 Although cases of positive contribution and engagement exist even among the most disenfranchised communities, the ability of many marginalised and non-literate communities to be able to contest forms of education exclusion, dysfunctional schools and errant teachers remains limited. Cultural barriers, such as the inability to engage with upper caste and traditional elite, the culture of political and social subordination etc limit the capacity of these processes and structures. The need to enable women, members of minority and disadvantaged groups to access these structures and become active participants in the process still remains a challenge. In Bihar, it was found that teachers did not get to school on time, and used their union strength to get themselves bailed out. Due to the weak capacity of poor people to challenge power structures, there was bribery in the appointment of teachers, teachers themselves paid bribes to the district superintendent of education so that they could be posted elsewhere and out of the purview of the VEC (Priyam, 2015, pp. 36–41). Lower participation causes lower accountability of teachers and thereby low results as far as learning outcomes are concerned. Pandey, Goyal, and Sundararaman (2008), in their study of the three states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Karnataka, found that teachers may not be accountable because the community does not have the capacity to hold them accountable as parent members of the VEC are not participating in their oversight capacity. The learning outcomes, which were found to be low in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh and higher in Karnataka, also mirrored the lower participation and lower accountability of teachers. The Karnataka data shows that the members of SDMCs received training on their roles and responsibilities and were aware of this as compared to their counterparts in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. Similarly, the proportion of teachers present in the schools and engaged in teaching was higher in Karnataka. Though other factors such as a child’s socio-economic background may influence their learning, teachers’ engagement in teaching and teachers’ attendance in Karnataka was found to be significantly and consistently associated with higher scores. The example of Himachal Pradesh also indicated that with the active involvement of Mother Teacher Associations, the attendance and performance of children improved. Further, this helps in increasing the participation and enrolment of girls and making the school environment more gender-friendly (Govinda and Bandopadhyay, 2010). SDMCs in Karnataka In order to improve school education, the 11th Schedule assigned the responsibility of education, including primary and secondary schools, to PRIs. The Activity Mapping in Karnataka specified roles to all three levels. The functions assigned to Grama Panchayats are: i) ensuing full enrolment

162  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula of school-age children; ii) maintenance of school buildings and playgrounds; iii) exercising vigilance on regular attendance of teachers and students, and report to the concerned; and, iv) assist the Taluk Panchayat in the distribution of study material to target group children. VECs were formed to assist Grama Panchayats in undertaking the above functions. Studies reveal that although the primary responsibility of VECs was supervision of primary education in villages this was not done. Meetings were irregular because timings were inconvenient to a large number of members, who were busy with their livelihood concerns. It was found that more than 67 per cent of VECs flouted the norm of one-third reservation to women, including in the Dakshina Kannada and Shimoga districts where female literacy was the highest, probably because of an inability to take punitive action due to the lack of legal backup. Women could not attend meetings due to multiple responsibilities and also due to a lack of support and encouragement from male relatives (Devi, 2002, pp. 6–11). Members of school committees were not aware of their powers. They compared themselves with Grama Panchayat members and felt that they were only ornamental structures. Resolutions passed have given more responsibility to the VECs, but they have not been able to strengthen their lateral linkage with grassroots political institutions or educational bureaucracy for the effective integration of school management. The highest dropouts were from VEC families; non-enrolled children present in VEC families reflected the negative attitude of VEC members (Devi, 2002, pp. 12–17). Lack of statutory powers is one reason for the lackadaisical role of VEC members. The implication is that VEC training should first help to develop a positive image of oneself. They should be empowered with appropriate strategies. Capacity-building should generate positive attitudes, individual capabilities, and skills for managing self and school. The lack of linkage between VECs and Grama Panchayats should be corrected (Devi, 2002, pp. 20–21). VECs were replaced by SDMCs on the recommendation of the Education Task Force constituted by the Government of Karnataka to make recommendations to improve the status of primary education. SDMCs were conceptualised as school-level committees consisting of nine elected representatives of parents of school-going children, the headteacher, a health worker, an Anganwadi worker, representatives from community-based organisations and Non-Governmental Organisation, elected representatives from the Grama Panchayat, the Taluk Panchayat, and the Zilla Panchayat, the donors who contributed in cash or kind for the development of the school, and two children representatives from Class 7 or 10. SDMCs, as per 2014 guidelines, consists of: 1. Parental Representatives: 18 members who are elected from the parents’ council and one among them elected as the Chairman of SDMC. 2. Ex-officio members: Headmaster of the concerned school, Anganawadi worker, and health worker are the ex-officio members of the committee.

Decentralised delivery of school education  163 3. Nominated members: One elected representative of the local body, one teacher representative, and one student of the school. In total, there are 23 members of the committee, out of which 12 members are women. The Mission of the SDMCs is to involve the local community in general and the parents of the school-going children in particular in the process of schooling to ensure their active participation in order to deliver a quality education to all children (NLSIU, 2006). Though formed in 2001, Karnataka Grama Panchayat’s Model Bylaws of June 2006 provided them with a legal and democratic institutional status. The power and functions of an SDMC are the following: i) school management which includes addressing grievances from students, parents, teachers, implementation of midday meal scheme, keeping records of meetings of parents council, and supervising teachers and students attendance; ii) ensure enrolment of all the children (including physically challenged) in the village so that educational opportunities are provided equally to everyone, monitoring of dropout rate, ensure attendance and retention; iii) mobilising the community with the help of periodic meetings such as parents’ day, etc.; iv) ensure a good quality of education through regular visits, addressing staff issues, and enhance the teaching–learning environment; v) ensure proper utilisation of funds and oversee financial matters; vi) undertake civil works such as protect school premises, maintenance of the school, improve infrastructure facilities such as the playgrounds, classrooms, toilets, etc. The following strong linkages between SDMCs and Grama Panchayats are visualised. 1. In each Grama Panchayat, there will be three Standing Committees to undertake development works, they are: a. Production Committee b. Social Justice Committee c. Civic Amenities Committee (CAC) 2. The Civic Amenities Committee is responsible for undertaking development activities in the area of education, health, public works, etc., in the jurisdiction of the Grama Panchayat. 3. The President of the Grama Panchayat is the member and speaker of the CAC. The CAC comprises three to five Grama Panchayat members. 4. The CAC shall transfer all funds received by it for education and infrastructure of schools to the account of the school within a week of receipt of the funds. 5. The CAC may transfer additional funds to the accounts of the schools within the Panchayat area, depending upon their needs. 6. Periodically review the implementation of the annual works plans of schools within the Panchayat area and, wherever possible, provide necessary assistance for its implementation.

164  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula 7. Convenes a joint meeting of office-bearers of SDMCs of all schools within the Panchayat area at least once every three months in the academic year for the purpose of exchange of information and coordination. Studies conducted on the functioning of SDMCs in Karnataka revealed a lack of linkage between Panchayats and SDMCs and a lack of support from teachers. The functioning of SDMCs was found to be top-down, and sufficient orientation to SDMCs was not provided. It was also found that the headmaster often exercised complete control of the SDMC and got in the way of the independent functioning of SDMC. The participation of parents was found to be poor. Teachers usually made up records to show that meetings were conducted. SDMCs often did not monitor the flow of funds. Studies found that the SDMC Chairperson was signing cheques without knowing the purpose, transactions were being confined to the headteacher and the SDMC president, and transparency and accountability were absent in funds and activities. As far as the implementation of activities was concerned, one or two members were found to be taking an interest. Wider participation of members was not ensured. Parent council meetings were not regularly held to monitor the functioning of SDMCs and review their performance (NLSIU, 2006).

Functioning status of the selected SDMCs As mentioned earlier, we studied three SDMCs in three villages. The three SDMCs varied in their functioning. The SDMC in Kurubarahalli was functioning well, while that in Upparahalli was not functioning well. The SDMC in Hathirahalli was defunct. Let us discuss the functioning status of each one of these SDMCs in some detail. Functioning SDMC In Kurubarahalli, the SDMC can be seen as functioning because of the following reasons. First, the SDMC was constituted two times in the last six years. Second, when we approached the school for SDMC records, they were readily made available. Third, there is a willingness among the teachers as well SDMC members to discuss the affairs of SDMC. Kurubarahalli is a homogenous village predominantly inhabited by Kurubas. This is a shepherd caste known for its educational backwardness. In this village, there was an upper primary school located right in the centre of the village. The school building had three rooms. As far as the composition of SDMC members was concerned, 88 per cent belonged to the Kuruba caste; 38 per cent of the total members were women. With regard to educational background, 25 per cent of members

Decentralised delivery of school education  165 were illiterate, while 50 per cent had completed primary education. Wage labourers constituted 50 per cent of the total SDMC members. We made an attempt to ascertain whether the members of this SDMC were aware of their functions. This is because having knowledge of their functions helps them to perform their roles and responsibilities effectively. Though there was some difference among the members in so far as precise knowledge on functions of the SDMC was concerned, it was heartening to note that most of the members had a fair knowledge of their roles and responsibilities in the SDMC. Relationship between SDMC and GP We had discussions with elected office-bearers of the GP and SDMC members on the role of the Grama Panchayat and the functioning of the SDMC. According to a member, who served as president of the GP until 2015, the relationship between the GP and SDMC should be like mother and child. According to him, the GP should take ownership of the SDMCs in its jurisdiction and provide all the support and encouragement in the way a mother provides to her child. This perception was also shared by other members, who recounted that some GP members spent personal funds on the welfare of the school. It was also stated that GP members pooled together money and donated plates and glasses for better functioning of the midday meal programme in the school. GP members also recalled an incident that highlighted the close relationship between the GP and the SDMC. In September 2013, a reporter from Vijayavani (Kannada newspaper) visited the village as there were complaints about hygiene around the school. The reporter highlighted the story with photographs that the road in front of the school was in a poor condition, causing stagnation of rain and dirty water. The children were walking in this dirty water to reach the school. This news caught the attention of other newspapers as well as the officials concerned. The Block Education Officer and Executive Officer, Taluk Panchayat, Harapanahalli, called the then GP President to look into the matter. According to GP members, Rs. 4 lakhs were spent by the GP for the construction of a cement road and clearing of water stagnation. Another member stated that ‘the problem was solved in one week’. Educational outcomes Did this close relationship result in better educational outcomes? An attempt was made to ascertain this from non-SDMC member households in this village. Information was collected on two outcomes: regular attendance at the school and the quality of education. With regard to the question of whether children regularly attend the school located in the village, 96 per cent of the parents provided an affirmative answer. The contributing factors for such a

166  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula Table 8.1 Factors Contributing to Children Attending School in Kurubarahalli

Regularly

Factors

% of responses by parents

Good teachers Good quality of teaching Midday meal Good facilities Child has an interest in studies Children aspiration Others Total

29.58 23.94 14.08 5.63 16.90 7.04 2.82 100.00

Source: Primary data is the source for this table as well as for the remaining tables.

high level of attendance in the school are provided in Table 8.1. A striking feature of Table 8.1 is that about 73 per cent of the responses by the parents were related to factors that indicated the good functioning of school in the village. About 54 per cent of the responses were on good teachers and a good quality of teaching. About 14 per cent of the responses indicated that the midday meal accounted for the good functioning of the school. Nearly 6 per cent of the responses suggested that good facilities contributed to the children regularly attending the school. It can be argued that all these factors have become possible because of the better functioning of the SDMC. Factors such as ‘child has an interest in their studies’ and ‘children aspiration’ do not have much to do with the good functioning of the SDMC. But these two factors only accounted for 24 per cent of the total responses. Another outcome related question that was asked to non-SDMC member households was whether their children study well or not. It was heartening to note that 80 per cent perceived that their child was studying well (Table 8.2). Again the factors ‘good teacher’, ‘good quality of teaching’, and ‘child has an interest in their studies’ accounted for nearly 90 per cent of the responses. The above data on schooling outcomes corroborates the widely held belief among members of the Grama Panchayat and the SDMC that the Table 8.2 Factors Contributing to Children Studying Well in Kurubarahalli Factors

% responses

Good teacher Good quality of teaching Child has an interest in studies Good facilities Others Total

31.03 32.76 25.86 6.90 3.45 100.00

Decentralised delivery of school education  167 functioning of the school was good. It can be argued that this is mainly because of the close and working relationship between the GP and the SDMC in Kurubarahalli. Non-performing SDMC The SDMC in Upparahalli can be called ‘non-performing’ because of the following reasons. In 2011, the SDMC was constituted as per the rules. However, the same members were found to be continuing when data was collected in 2016. The headmaster when asked for the records was reluctant to show them and often provided vague answers to our questions. Upparahalli is a heterogeneous village with several caste groups present. However, the Uppara caste is significant. The profile of SDMC members is the following. Thirty per cent of SDMC members belonged to the SC/ST, 10 per cent to minorities, 40 per cent to backward castes, and 20 per cent to the dominant caste; 40 per cent of the members were women. The educational background of the members showed that 10 per cent were illiterate, 40 per cent had completed primary education, and 50 per cent had completed upper primary education. About 60 per cent of the members were wage labour households. Several problems were encountered in the constitution of the SDMC, with the MLA suggesting his nominees be included. The MLA promised funds for the construction of school rooms and repair of the school building in return for his nominees being included. Thus, the SDMC consisted of politically dominant persons with close links with the MLA. Relationship between SDMC and GP The constitution of the SDMC with MLA nominees vitiated the relationship between the GP and the SDMC right from the beginning. As promised, the MLA succeeded in sanctioning funds for the construction of four classrooms. SDMC members with allegiance to the MLA obtained the contract. This infuriated the other SDMC members and GP members, who constantly posed difficulties and obstructed the implementation. Allegations and counter-allegations became the order of the day. This had an adverse impact on the school infrastructure development and functioning of the school. The investment in educational infrastructure was considered to be inefficient. It was reported that the quality of the construction was bad with leakage problems whenever it rained happened within one year of construction. We also noticed the problem of leakage in the classrooms. Because of the construction of several classrooms, one room was rented out to a bank as its office. It was alleged that an SDMC member and current GP member collected rent for four years and used the same for his personal expenses. The justification provided for this was that he spent money from his pocket for getting the room ready for renting it out. After a prolonged

168  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula struggle, only recently did the school start to collect the rent from the bank. According to the headmaster, the rent that was collected from the bank was used for installing an iron gate in the school compound. More evidence of inefficient infrastructure investment was the complete disuse of the old school building. The school conducted classes in the building before four newly constructed classrooms became available. Although the old school building was repaired with funds received by the SDMC, it was never used because of the existence of more classrooms than needed for the children enrolled. As a result, the old school building again became unusable. With the funds received by the SDMC, a toilet for girls was constructed; however, the quality of the construction was perceived to be bad, and the toilet was not in usable condition. This also shows that the investment in school facilities was inefficient. According to one SDMC member, the relationship between SDMC members and teachers is not good. These two actors do not function in a coordinated and collaborative manner leading to declining standards in the school. SDMC members are divided according to political party (Congress and BJP) lines and resort to politics ridden with hatred and jealousy. What one group proposes is rejected by another and often go on quarrelling among themselves. Members want monetary benefit from the SDMC. The quarrels between the GP and the SDMC, and teachers and SDMC members resulted in a poor quality of teaching and declining enrolment in the government school. The children who were studying in the school moved to a private school located in Harapanahalli town. Due to the poor quality of teaching, poor facilities, and frequent fights, the parents either sent their children to the school in town or withdrew them completely. One SDMC member noted that the number of enrolled students had declined dramatically in recent years. According to him, his daughter is in Class 4; however, there were only three girls in the class. Whenever the other two girls did not come to school, his daughter was reluctant to attend the classes, and she came back home. Because of declining strength and frequent squabbles, he sent his younger daughter and son to a private school in the town. The adverse impact on enrolment of the non-availability of toilets for girls was also reported. According to one woman SDMC member, the toilet for girls does not have water. Despite her feedback to the headmaster on this, the problem was not solved. She attributed the falling enrolment to the non-availability of toilets. The study team noticed a school bus from the nearby town transporting a large number of students from the village. Educational outcomes To the question of whether children attend school regularly or not, 90 per cent of non-SDMC members stated yes. The main contributing factors

Decentralised delivery of school education  169 Table 8.3 Factors Contributing to Children Attending School in Upparahalli

Regularly

Factors

% of responses by parents

Good teachers Good quality of teaching Midday meal Good facilities Child has an interest in studies Children aspiration Others Total

0.00 6.90 20.69 0.00 51.72 13.79 6.90 100.00

were: ‘child has an interest in their studies’ and ‘children aspiration’, which account for nearly 65 per cent of the total responses (Table 8.3). The factors associated with the good functioning of the SDMC, such as good teachers, good quality of teaching, and good facilities account for less than 7 per cent of the total responses. The qualitative information collected from non-SDMC member households threw further light on the poor quality of teaching. According to one respondent, the quality of teachers was good in the past, and there was an alarming deterioration in the quality of teaching in the recent past: ‘teachers do not teach well and always allow children to play’. Another respondent, a working wage labourer in agriculture, responded that ‘teachers do not come to the school regularly. If our children have to study well, good teachers are very much needed. Otherwise, our children will end up like me as an agricultural labourer’. Some respondents stated that although they complained to the headmaster of the school and SDMC members, the problem was not resolved. Because of the irregular attendance of teachers and the poor quality of teaching, many children were taken out of the school and were sent to private schools located in taluk headquarters, which was 20 km away from the village. Although 21 per cent of the respondents stated that the midday meal scheme was the reason contributing to the regular attendance, this did not mean that the scheme was managed well by the SDMC. In fact, several respondents expressed anguish at the way the midday meal scheme was organised in the village. One respondent complained that the ‘food-grains meant for the midday meal scheme are stolen by the cooks and that milk for the children made out of milk powder is diluted by adding too much water’. We were told that children from poorer households were motivated to attend school regularly just to get a free meal. The poor performance of the SDMC in this village resulted in several problems for these households. A statement was therefore made to the Grama Panchayat to reconstitute the SDMC with new members. When it comes to the quality of education, only 32 per cent of parents in Upparahalli, as compared to 80 per cent in Kurubarahalli, stated that their

170  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula Table 8.4 Factors Contributing to Children Studying Well in Upparahalli Factors

% responses

Good teacher Good quality of teaching Child has an interest in studies Good facilities Others Total

0.00 9.09 54.55 9.09 27.27 100.00

child was studying well. A child’s interest in their studies was the main contributing factor (Table 8.4). It is to be noted that 68 per cent of the parents stated that their child either just passes examinations or often fails. The main contributing factors to this are: absence of teachers (52 per cent) and a poor quality of teaching (40 per cent). Even SDMC members also acknowledge that the quality of teaching in their school is poor and deteriorating. A woman SDMC member belonging to the Uppara caste noted that there was a need to change the current teachers. According to her, the teachers did not come to the school regularly. They also did not take proper care of the children. She asked us (the study team) to transfer the teachers and bring good teachers to the school. She was not aware that it was her responsibility to undertake regular supervision of the school and ensure that the teachers came on time. When asked about the role of the SDMC, she mainly articulated her role in terms of the construction of school buildings, supervision of construction, and so on. She also noted that her husband mainly undertook this function. Another woman SDMC member belonging to the Uppara caste stated that she was selected because her children were studying. According to her, the previous teachers were good; however, the current teachers sit in a group

Table 8.5 Factors Contributing to Poor Quality Education in Upparahalli Factors

% responses

Absence of teachers Poor quality of teaching Corporal punishment Why study; the child has to work Why study; child has to get married Others

52.00 40.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.00

Decentralised delivery of school education  171 and only talk among themselves. They let the children play most of the time. She was not even aware that she was an SDMC member. The qualitative evidence collected from parents provides insight into why SDMCs are not functioning. A parent belonging to the Lingayat caste noted that the SDMC was not successful and that it was non-functional. When asked for the reasons, he stated that the rice and rations that children receive are stolen by those cooking food. They add lots of water to the milk powder and serve it to the children. Barring one teacher, others do not teach well and are absent now and then. He also noted that SDMC members are partisan, and do not bother to take the views and opinions of others into consideration. He complained that although there were several educated persons in the village, less educated ones were chosen for the SDMC. A male construction worker belonging to the SC community complained that many children from this village are joining private schools as teachers do not come to the school regularly. SDMC members only attend the functions organised at the school but do not bother to visit the school to monitor teachers’ attendance, teaching, or midday-meal. One Uppara caste woman, whose livelihood was grazing cattle, noted that her son did not study well and spent more time watching TV than studying. School teachers did not teach but played cricket with the school children. She was not aware of the SDMC, its members, and its functions. Hence, she did not complain about this. A woman agricultural labourer belonging to the Lingayat caste noted that ‘Teachers do not come to the school regularly, and there is no one to ask them. There is a need to have good teachers in the school for our children to study. Otherwise, they will become agricultural labourers like us’. Defunct SDMC The SDMC in Hathirahalli was constituted in 2011. This was a heterogeneous village, with the Lingayat caste being dominant. The profile of SDMC members show that 29 per cent of SDMC members belonged to the SC/ST, 13 per cent to minorities, and 29 per cent each to backward castes and the dominant caste; 43 per cent of the total members were women. As far as educational background was concerned, 43 per cent were illiterate, while 29 per cent had completed primary and upper primary education. About 60 per cent were from wage labour households. At the time of the constitution of the SDMC, members belonging to different political groups were included. This resulted in sharp political

172  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula divisions. It so happens that a senior official from the education department hailed from this village. This official took a keen interest in the functioning of the school. The SDMC became defunct within one year after its constitution because of a quarrel relating to the use of vessels belonging to the school for the village function by one of the SDMC members. This resulted in the prolonged non-functioning of the SDMC, and thereby school development was adversely affected. The official from the education department intervened and saw to it that the SDMC was defunct so that funds could be directly transferred to the headmaster. Relationship between SDMC and GP The Grama Panchayat has not been playing any role in the functioning of the school because the SDMC is defunct, and a senior official from the education department, who hailed from the village, took a keen interest in the functioning of the school. Educational outcomes The information collected from non-SDMC member households showed that 94 per cent said that their children regularly attend the school. It needs to be noted that the good functioning of the school contributed to the regular attendance of children in the school. It needs to also be, however, noted that 31 per cent of the responses were related to factors such as ‘child has an interest in their studies’ and ‘children aspiration’, which were only weakly connected to the functioning of the school (Table 8.6). Sixty-eight per cent of the parents stated that their children study well largely on account of a good teacher, good quality of teaching, and good facilities (Table 8.7). This showed that although the SDMC had been defunct in this village, the school outcomes were reasonably good because of the involvement of senior officials from the educational department and centralised management of the school.

Table 8.6 Factors Contributing to Children Attending School in Hathirahalli

Regularly

Factors

% of responses by parents

Good teacher Good quality of teaching Midday meal Good facilities Child has an interest in studies Children aspiration Others Total

22.98 21.74 13.66 6.83 25.47 5.59 3.73 100.00

Decentralised delivery of school education  173 Table 8.7 Factors Contributing to Children Studying Well in Hathirahalli Factors

% responses

Good teachers 28.00 Good quality of teaching 28.00 Child has an interest in studies 26.40 Good facilities 10.40 Others 7.20 Total 100.00

Conclusions and ways forward In this chapter, the functioning of three SDMCs located in three different Grama Panchayats in Karnataka was discussed. This discussion covered; i) the composition of SDMCs; ii) the role played by Grama Panchayats and SDMCs in the decentralised delivery of educational services; iii) analysis of educational outputs achieved and factors that influenced the performance of the SDMCs. The three SDMCs covered in the study were different in their functioning. While one was functioning well, another one was characterised by poor functioning. The third was completely defunct. The functioning SDMC had a good relationship with the Grama Panchayat, and hence the outputs achieved were good. In this village, the SDMC ensured that there was a mobilisation of resources from the public. When newspapers reported that children faced problems reaching school, the problem was promptly resolved. This is what one would expect from the local government; however, it needs to be noted that the villagers themselves did not raise this issue. It was a news reporter who raised this issue, which resulted in a quick resolution of the problem. The non-functioning SDMC witnessed political interference right at the time of its constitution; as a result, the composition of the SDMC was skewed in favour of supporters of the MLA, and this was not accepted locally. This in turn resulted in an intense conflict between the SDMC and Grama Panchayat and between the SDMC and teachers. The educational outcomes in the village with a non-functioning SDMC were poor. The theory relating to decentralisation expects that investment by decentralised institutions tends to be efficient, but, in this village, the investment in the school building was inefficient. There was a leakage problem in the classrooms. The decision to incur investment on the renovation of the old school building was taken without first ascertaining whether this was needed or not. In view of low enrolment, the renovated old building was not used, and this soon fell into disuse. The third SDMC became defunct because of internal contradictions and official interference. Here again, we did not find the cordial relationship

174  D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula between the Grama Panchayat and the SDMC. The analysis thus showed that there was a need to have a harmonious relationship between the Grama Panchayat and the SDMC for achieving good educational outcomes. The analysis also revealed that the SDMC, which had a good relationship with the Grama Panchayat resulted in good development outcomes in Kurubarahalli. On the other hand, the non-functioning SDMC in Upparahalli did not result in good development outcomes. The composition of the SDMC, together with democratic functioning led to an active parent–teacher interaction. The chapter also suggested that both top-down and bottom-up approaches work. Factors such as the interest of SDMC members in the school development activities, parents demanding accountability from SDMC members, and active cooperation with teachers resulted in the regular attendance of teachers, an improved teaching quality, and better educational outcomes. On the other hand, factors such as poverty, illiteracy among the parents, and political interference in the functioning of SDMCs and lack of monitoring of teachers attendance resulted in poor educational outcomes. As against the theory of decentralisation, the local government did not succeed in the mobilisation of local resources, efficient investment, and good educational outcomes in the village where SDMCs functioned independently of the Grama Panchayat. Thus, decentralised government works better provided that there is good cooperation and collaboration between local government and the institutions that seek to promote people’s participation in the implementation.

Notes 1 Names of the sample villages have been changed to protect their identity. 2 The Eleventh Schedule of Constitution enumerates 29 functions to be taken up by the Panchayats, which also includes above-mentioned functions regarding education. However the devolution of these functions is left to the states and there is variation across the states with respect to devolution of these functions.

References Brosio G. (2014). ‘Improving Service Delivery Through Decentralization: A Challenge for Asia’, ADB Economics Working Paper Series, No. 389. Devi, M. D. Usha (2002). ‘Participatory Institutional Structures in Decentralized Management of Elementary Education in Karnataka’, Working Paper 105, Bangalore: ISEC. Faguet J.P. and Sanchez, F. (2009). ‘Decentralization and Access to Social Services in Colombia’, CAF Working Paper No. 2009/01. Fiske, E.B. (1996). Decentralization of Education Politics and Consensus. Washington, D.C: World Bank. Govinda, R. and Bandopadhyay, M. (2010). Changing Framework for Local Governance and Community Participation in Elementary Education in India. Create Research Monograph No. 35.

Decentralised delivery of school education  175 Machado, F.V.P. (2013). ‘Decentralization and Accountability: The Curse of Local Underdevelopment’, IDB Working Paper Series, No. IDB-WP-397. Mahal, Ajay, Srivastava, Vivek and Sanan, Deepak (2000). ‘Decentralization and Public Sector Delivery of Health and Education Services: The Indian Experience’, ZEF Discussion Papers on Development Policy, No. 20. Mukhopadhyay R., Ramkumar, N. and Vasavi, A.R. (2009). Management of Elementary Education Structures and Strategies. New Delhi: National University of Educational Planning and Administration. Mukundan M. V. and Bray, M. (2004). ‘The Decentralisation of Education in Kerala state, India: Rhetoric and reality’, International Review of Education, 50, pp. 223–243. Mythili, N. (2002). ‘Community Pressure for Higher Quality of Education: Rural Primary Schools in Karnataka’, Economic and Political Weekly, 37(24), pp. 2349–2355. NLSIU (2006). A Study of the Role of SDMCs in the School Management and Supervision in Karnataka in the context of SSA. Bangalore: NLSIU. Pandey, Priyanka, Goyal, Sangeeta and Sundararaman, Venkatesh (2008). ‘Public Participation, Teacher Accountability and School Outcomes’, World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 4777. Pratham (2014). ASER 2013-Rural: Annual Status of Education Report (Rural). New Delhi: ASER Centre. Priyam, M. (2015). Contested Politics of Educational Reform In India. New Delhi: Oxford. Rajasekhar, D., Manjula, R, Suchitra, J.Y. and Kumar, Sanjiv (2007). Child Labour in Bidar and Chamarajanagar Districts: Status Report and Ways Forward. New Delhi: ILO. Ramachandran, V. (2001). Reaching the Hardest to Reach - Reflections on DPEP. In: European Commission (2001) Reflections on Equity, Quality and Local Planning in the District Primary Education Programme. Occasional Papers, New Delhi: European Commission. Ramachandran, V. and Saihjee, A. (2002). ‘The New Segregation: Reflections on Gender and Equity in Primary Education’, Economic and Political Weekly, April 27-May 03, 37(17), pp. 1600–1613. Serrano, Luis Diaz and Llop, Enric Meix (2012). ‘Do Fiscal and Political Decentralization Raise Student’s Performance? A Cross Country Analysis’, IZA Discussion Paper No. 6722. Shen, Chunli, Zhao, Xiaojun and Zou, Heng-fu (2014). ‘Fiscal Decentralization and Public Service Provision in China’, Annals of Economics and Finance, 15(1), pp. 135–160. Upadhyay, M. and Rajasekhar, D. (2020). Decentralization and People’s Participation in Educational Governance: A Review of International Experiences. ISEC Working Paper 480. Yoem, M., Acedo, C. and Utomo, E. (2002). ‘The Reform of Secondary Education in Indonesia During the 1990s: Basic Education Expansion and Quality Improvement Through Curriculum Decentralization’, Asia Public Education Review, 3(1), pp. 56–68. Yolcu H. (2011). ‘Decentralization of Education and Strengthening the Participation of Parents in School Administration in Turkey: What has Changed?’, Educational Sciences: Theory and Practice, 11(3), pp. 1243–1251.

9

Is decentralised planning a success or failure? Case of rural water supply in Kerala K.R. Nisha

Introduction The decentralisation of powers to local self-governments (LSGs) in India provided ample opportunities to the citizens of the country to participate in the development process of their locality. The state government implemented decentralisation at different levels, including the delivery of essential services with the support of proper institutional reforms, innovative policies, and actions by the end of the 1990s. The decentralisation process of the Government of Kerala was acclaimed as a successful initiative across the world. Management of the drinking water supply in Kerala is crucial at the policy level, mainly due to the paradoxical situation of water scarcity despite heavy annual rainfall and numerous rivers and ponds. Three different institutional arrangements experimented with in the state are the government (through Kerala Water Authority (KWA)), Grama Panchayat (GP), and community (through community-based water supply (CWS) schemes). The questions to be addressed in the context of the delivery of essential services are: how much are the decentralised experiments effective in fulfilling local needs? What is the extent of people’s participation in the management of rural water supply schemes at a decentralised level? What are the thrust areas of intervention for the LSGs in resource management? Against this backdrop, this study tries to analyse the performance of the decentralised experiments in Kerala with special reference to the rural drinking water supply in terms of sustainability and effectiveness.

Background of decentralisation – Experience from Kerala One of the most remarkable paradigm shifts witnessed in the state of Kerala over the last two decades is the implementation of decentralised planning by the local self-government. The Government of Kerala initiated decentralised planning, popularly known as the ‘people’s plan’, in 1995 following the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Indian Constitution. The state adopted a separate budget document exclusively for local self-governments in February 1996 and introduced a formula for the allocation of Plan funds DOI: 10.4324/9781003094357-9

Decentralisation: success or failure?  177 (grants-in-aid) to the LSGs. The government completed the transfer of power, functions, institutions, staff, and funds to local governments by the end of 2000. The proportion of funds (grant-in-aid) devolved to all local governments (including Panchayats, municipalities, and corporations) is nearly 25 per cent of the Plan outlay of the state. The award of the Development Fund to LGs (2012–2017) is given in Table 9.1. The expenditure of local governments (as a percentage of Plan outlay) was increased from 75 per cent in the ninth and tenth plans to 87 per cent in the 12th Plan. Local self-governments spend their funds mainly in three places – the production sector, service sector, and infrastructure sector. The production sector includes agriculture, irrigation, animal husbandry, and dairy development, with a major share for agriculture. Infrastructure includes transport, public building, and electrification, with an emphasis on transport. The sector-wise expenditure of local governments for 2015–2016 and 2016–2017 is given in Table 9.2. The actual expenditure of GPs in the service sector was around 60 per cent over the past five years. The service sector includes all essential services like health, education, housing, drinking water, sanitation, etc. The total expenditure for service sector activities by all the local governments comes to 2,455.24 crore (63.94 per cent) in 2016–2017, which was higher than the previous year. Of this, drinking water, sanitation, and waste processing activities account for nearly 20 per cent (487.61 crore) of service sector expenditure (GOK, 2017).

Rural water supply in Kerala The drinking water system in Kerala can be broadly classified into three categories: i) River-based urban and rural water supply schemes, ii) Groundwater-based rural water supply schemes, and iii) Family managed drinking water supplies. The first two systems are owned and operated by Table 9.1 Allocation of Development Funds for LGs as a Percentage of Plan Outlay (in Crore) Year

State Plan Outlay Development Fund to LSGs

Development Fund to LSGs (%) to State Plan Outlay

2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 Total

14,010.00 17,000.00 20,000.00 20,000.00 24,000.00 95,010.00

23.04 23.52 23.50 24.00 20.83 22.90

3,228.00 4,000.00 4,700.00 4,800.00 5,000.00 21,728.00

Source: Economic Review of 2017 (GOK)

Total

7.92 6.93 5.27 4.30 7.68

Block Panchayats District Panchayats Municipalities Corporations Total

59.43 60.43 51.37 48.59 54.47

53.21

Source: Economic Review of Kerala, 2017

8.81 32.65 32.64 43.35 47.1 37.85

37.98 100 100 100 100 100

100 14.84 14.73 7.25 3.14 11.31

12.22

Productive

Infrastructure

Productive

Service

2016–2017

2015–2016

Grama Panchayats

Type of LGs  

62.27 67.71 61.94 65.55 63.94

63.73

Service

22.89 17.55 30.81 31.31 24.75

24.05

Infrastructure

Table 9.2 Sector-Wise Expenditure of the Local Government in Kerala in 2015–2016 and 2016–2017 (in Per Cent)

100 100 100 100 100

100

Total

178  K.R. Nisha

Decentralisation: success or failure?  179 the government through the KWA and the state water department. The third involves individual families creating their own drinking water sources by constructing wells in their house compounds and managing them by themselves (SEUF, 2000). Until 1998, the KWA was the nodal agency for the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of water supply and sewerage schemes in the whole state. The KWA has been implementing piped water supply schemes based on surface and groundwater sources. It also executes multilateral and bilateral funded projects and accelerated rural water supply schemes on behalf of the Government of India. Of the 1,916 schemes in operation in 2003, 58 were urban, and 1,858 were rural water supply schemes (GOK, 2003). Among the rural water supply schemes, 607 are multi-Panchayat, and 1,093 are single Panchayat schemes. About 224 urban and rural water supply schemes are under different stages of implementation; of these, 182 are rural, and 42 are urban water supply schemes (GOK, 2002). The state-led water supply schemes were mainly concentrated in the urban areas and not able to meet the entire water demand of the state. Relative high implementation costs in rural areas made the scheme town centred. As the GOK (2002) pointed out, one of the major deficiencies of the piped water supply systems in Kerala is its inability to meet the full water requirement and total non-availability of water in the elevated areas. Along with diminishing water availability, poor financial performance with high revenue loss played an important role in the emergence of an alternative institutional setup of the drinking water supply system in Kerala. A new approach was needed to address the inadequacies of state-led water supply programmes in the context of decentralised planning, which experimented with community involvement in the provision of drinking water supply in different parts of the state. Role of PRIs After the initiation of the people’s plan campaign, the rural water supply was placed substantially under the PRIs, with the Kerala Water Authority concentrating on larger schemes. According to the Panchayati Raj Act, a request for a new scheme is put forward in a Grama Sabha. The Grama Panchayat considers this request and puts forward a proposal to the KWA. The KWA prepares the technical detailed project report with financial components for implementing the scheme and passes this information to the Grama Panchayat. It is the responsibility of the Grama Panchayat to mobilise the funds for the scheme. Once the resources are pooled, the Panchayat deposits the money with the KWA. The KWA completes the scheme and hands it over to the Beneficiary Group. The Grama Panchayat also deploys an engineer (or overseers) from the Local Self-Government Department (LSGD) to supervise and check the work in progress to ensure the quality of construction (IRC, 2015).

180  K.R. Nisha Institutional alternatives Since drinking water is a basic need, the government provided water supply services are always under-priced, requiring subsidies (partially or fully) from the government towards operation and maintenance. There is, therefore, a difference between expenditure and revenue, leading to a financial burden on the government. The absence of financial discipline has a negative impact on the incentive and accountability of public authorities to provide highquality services. Ultimately, this leads to a vicious circle of unreliable services, low willingness to pay, and a further decline in the capacity to provide services (Serageldin, 1995). The problem of financing water services may be one of the contributing factors to institutional change. In this context, privatisation or a marketbased profit dominated approach to the water supply service has emerged as a policy suggestion to tackle the problem. However, the privatisation of such an essential service is not politically or socially viable. Further, marker strategies and privatisation tend to raise inequalities. Another approach, aiming at both economic and environmental sustainability, includes decentralised development with the cooperation of NGOs and local communities. The community management of drinking water has recently emerged as an alternative to the prevailing institutional setup. The current literature on water supply systems shows that a proper institutional framework and collective action improve efficiency (Narayan, 1995). The new democratic initiatives in the ‘people’s plan campaign’ provided a firm footing for the decentralised planning process in the state. The state government devolved powers to local governments to initiate new water supply schemes. Following the structural adjustment programme in the national economy and implementation of neoliberal policies, public investment in necessary services declined. The new policy approach comprised decentralised administration and collaboration between state, NGOs, and civil society movements and had far-reaching consequences in state-regulated or market-based economic approaches. As part of these initiatives, Kerala Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency, NGOs, community organisations, etc., subsequently entered into the water and sanitation sector.

Conceptual framework Performance of local organisations is assessed in different ways. Economic gains, social benefits, equity, effectiveness, and sustainability are usually considered as the indicators to evaluate the performance of local organisations (Esman and Uphoff, 1984; Narayan, 1993; Rajasekhar and Veerashekharappa, 2003; Katz and Sara, 2005). However, because of the natural and social variability in rural areas, the outcome varies with the local conditions. In other words, the environment – such as physical features (topography), economic resource availability (income level), social relations (heterogeneity), societal norms, and bureaucratic capacity (Esman

Decentralisation: success or failure?  181 and Uphoff, 1984) – of the local organisations facilitate or constrain their performance. In the case of water supply, outcomes are mainly assessed in terms of the quantity of water distributed across different households, time spent and distance travelled to fetch water, and costs incurred for getting piped water. Even though the promotion of equal opportunities and benefits is considered as one of the most important objectives of local organisations, various studies conducted in the context of water supply found that serious inequality persists in people’s access to water. It was pointed out that socially and economically weaker sections of the society bear more burden of inefficient water supply services (Serageldin, 1995; Roth, 1987; Rajasekhar and Veerashekharappa, 2003). In the specific context of Kerala, socio-economic variability among the beneficiaries was less pronounced due to higher educational attainment and state intervention. The cost of the water supply service was also shared equally among the beneficiaries as it was either fixed by the government in the case of state-owned/operated schemes or by the beneficiaries in the case of community-managed water supply schemes. Hence, the present study emphasised the effectiveness and sustainability of water supply schemes rather than equity. Nevertheless, this study considered equity (quantity of water available – measured as litre per capita per day) as an independent variable that influenced the effectiveness and sustainability. Effectiveness Two terms, namely efficiency and effectiveness, are often used to assess the overall performance of service delivery by an organisation. Efficiency describes how well an organisation uses resources to produce services, whereas effectiveness is the extent to which a system achieves its programme and policy objective (Dollery and Wallis, 2001). Effectiveness encompasses a number of different desired aspects of the service linked to programme outcome objectives. These are: i) appropriateness – matching the service to clients’ needs; ii) accessibility – aspects like affordability, representation amongst priority groups, and physical accessibility; and iii) quality – the process of meeting the required standards or incidence of service failures (Dollery and Wallis, 2001). In the case of water supply, efficient allocation means efficiency in both production and distribution. Efficiency in production is satisfied if all inputs are optimally utilised, while distribution efficiency is the minimisation of losses during the transmission of treated water to the final consumers (Pushpangadan and Murugan, 1995). The effectiveness of water supply delivery is also equally important. Narayan (1993) considered effectiveness as the optimal, hygienic, and consistent use of water supply facilities to maximise benefits and minimise the negative consequences over a period of time. The present study concentrated on the effectiveness of the water supply system as an indicator of performance

182  K.R. Nisha Sustainability In community-based service delivery systems, sustainability is defined as the capacity of the project to continue to deliver its intended benefits over a long time (Bamberger and Cheema, 1990, cited in Katz and Sara, 2005). Katz and Sara (2005) defined sustainability as ‘the maintenance of an acceptable level of services throughout the design life of the water supply system’. A sustainable water supply system means that it is sustainable, technically and institutionally, and most importantly that eventual replacement or expansion of the system can be delivered within the existing framework. Also, that the resource is sustainable; that is, the system does not fail at any time due to failure of the resource – e.g. due to drought, excessive water table draw-down, streams drying up, etc.1 (International Centre for Water and Sanitation). Sustainability in water supply involves ensuring the continuous availability of sufficient quantity and quality of water within adequate institutional frameworks, applying sound management practices, appropriate technologies, and full-cost accounting, and effectively maintaining facilities and equipment (World Health Organisation). The entire sustainability of the water supply system consists of three aspects, i.e. institutional sustainability, financial sustainability, and resource sustainability. The present study concentrates on the institutional and financial sustainability of the water supply system and defines sustainability as: ‘the ability of the system to provide water supply benefits to the beneficiaries without interruption’. Narayan (1993) identified different indicators for sustainability in the context of water supply and sanitation programmes. These are reliability of the system, human capacity building, local institutional capacity, costsharing, and collaboration among organisations. Katz and Sara (2005) prepared an index for sustainability using 50 variables. These variables indicate the physical condition of the system, consumer satisfaction, Operations and Management (O&M) practices, financial management, and willingness to sustain the system.

Sampling and collection of data Data for the chapter was collected from a field survey conducted in Malappuram district, which was ranked first by the Government of Kerala for the necessary interventions in the water supply and sanitation sector. The number of Panchayats involved in the implementation of communitybased water supply schemes was also high in Malappuram as compared to other districts. The sample for the survey was selected from five Grama Panchayats – one from coastal, three from midland, and one from highland regions – using a multi-stage random sampling technique. The sample included 310 households – 200 from among the beneficiaries of community water supply schemes, 60 from KWA schemes, and 50 from GP schemes. Data was collected at the household level with the help of a structured interview schedule. Additional information regarding the characteristics of the

Decentralisation: success or failure?  183 locality was collected through informal discussions with senior citizens in each locality.

Effectiveness of water supply systems The effectiveness of the water supply systems is captured with the help of an index. For the purpose of constructing an effectiveness index, five different variables were considered: frequency of breakdowns in the system, time taken to repair the breakdown, seasonal variation in water supply, users’ satisfaction with water pressure, and user’s perception of quality of water supplied. Among these, the frequency of breakdown indirectly indicated a technical problem with the construction and the quality of materials used, whereas variables indicating water pressure showed problems with engineering. Time taken for repairing the damage represented the efficiency of maintaining the system. These five variables were combined into three for the construction of an index. The frequency of breakdown and time taken to repair variables were combined into one variable and ranked according to the superiority of the situation. Similarly, seasonal variation in water supply and satisfaction with water pressure were combined into one variable and ranked. Perception of the quality of water also ranked according to the order of preference. Rank values assigned to all the three variables ranged from 0 to 4. Weighted summation of these three ranked variables were taken as an effectiveness index (weight2 and rank are given in Table 9.3). The resultant index ranged from 0 to 100, with 0 representing less effectiveness and 100 representing better situations. The distribution of households by effectiveness across different institutional setups (Table 9.4) show that CWS schemes were more effective as compared to KWA and GP schemes. In GP schemes, the effectiveness index varied in the range of 1–75, whereas in the KWA schemes, the index varied mainly in the range of 25–75. Performance of an institution varied with the physical characteristics of the area and the social and economic condition of the beneficiaries. Hence, variation in effectiveness with the physical characteristics, socio-economic conditions of the households, and the different institutional settings were analysed with the help of a linear regression model. The regression model was estimated with an effectiveness index as the dependent variable and geographical area, with institutional dummies, group characteristics, and household characteristics as independent variables. Geographical location of the region was the main locality characteristic taken into consideration. As an ideal situation, it was assumed that all the schemes were equally effective in all geographical regions. The evolution of community-managed water supply schemes are supposed to reduce to a certain extent the difficulties in providing water to interior and elevated rural areas, which were considered as the major constraints

184  K.R. Nisha Table 9.3 Description of Variables in the Effectiveness Index Variable Description

Score Weight

Breakdown and No breakdown in last one year Occasional breakdown and took 3 days to repair for repair Very frequent breakdown and took 3 days to repair Seasonal No seasonal variation and very much satisfied variation with the pressure Seasonal variation exists but very much satisfied in water with the pressure supply and No seasonal variation and moderately satisfied satisfaction with the pressure with pressure Seasonal variation exists and moderately satisfied with the pressure Not at all satisfied with the pressure Perception on Very good Fairly good quality of Satisfactory water Poor Bad

4 3 2 1

.611

0 4

.278

3 2 1 0 4 3 2 1 0

.111

Table 9.4 Distribution (%) of Households by Effectiveness Index Index

0 < 25 25–50 50–75 > 75 Total

Institution CWS

GP

KWA

0.0 8.5 14.5 37.0 40.0 100.0 (200)

0.0 36.0 36.0 26.0 2.0 100.0 (50)

1.7 13.3 38.3 38.3 8.3 100.0 (60)

Note: Figures in the parenthesis are actual numbers.

of government-managed water supply systems. The new initiative of community water supply schemes was perceived to be more effective as it was demand-driven and considered the water needs of the households. The present study, hence, assumed that community schemes worked more effectively as compared to government schemes. Group size and leadership are the two group related variables considered in the model.3 A larger group size makes management of the schemes difficult in terms of maintaining and providing a satisfactory service. So, group size was expected to influence effectiveness negatively. However,

Decentralisation: success or failure?  185 earlier studies on natural resource management found that problems arising from large groups can be solved to a large extent with active leadership. The quantity of water available to households is another factor that was expected to improve the effectiveness of the system. Availability of sufficient quantities of water to households leads to the perception among the beneficiaries that the water supply system is effective. The association between collective action and outcomes was captured by the inclusion of the participation index4 in the model. Existing studies on community water supply schemes have pointed out that participation of the beneficiaries in the water supply schemes improves project outcomes, including effectiveness and sustainability (Narayan, 1995; Isham and Kähkönen, 1999, 2002; Katz and Sara, 2005). It is argued that high community participation reduces the time taken to repair damage to the systems (Imboden, 1977 cited in Prokopy, 2005). The social and economic characteristics of the households are supposed to improve the effectiveness of water supply systems. Household characteristics that were expected to influence effectiveness in the present study are scarcity of water, educational level, and participation in other local organisations. Water scarcity faced by households makes it necessary to have a timely repair and maintenance system for the water supply system. Distribution of households by water scarcity in the different geographical regions is given in Table 9.5. Similarly, social capital, captured by educational level and the participation of households in other local organisations, was identified as a significant determinant of project effectiveness in community water supply schemes Table 9.5 Distribution of Households (%) by Water Scarcity across Different Regions and Schemes Scheme

CWS

KWA

GP

Area

Costal Midland Highland Total Costal Midland Highland Total Costal Midland Highland Total

The extent of water scarcity of the households Total Perennial scarcity

Seasonal scarcity

Bad quality

No problem

33.8 39.0 60.0 40.5 (81) 35.0 30.0 40.0 35.0 (21) 60.0 50.0 70.0 56.0 (28)

6.2 47.6 26.7 31.0 (62) 10.0 55.0 45.0 36.7 (22) 0.0 33.3 10.0 22.0 (11)

56.9 1.0 6.7 20.0 (40) 35.0 0 0 11.7 (7) 20.0 3.3 0.0 6.0 (3)

3.1 12.4 6.7 8.5 (17) 20.0 15.0 15.0 16.7 (10) 20.0 13.3 20.0 16.0 (8)

Note: Figures in the parenthesis are actual numbers

100 100 100 100 (200) 100 100 100 100 (60) 100 100 100 100 (50)

186  K.R. Nisha Table 9.6 Description of Independent Variables Variable

Description

Area

Geographical Area

1= Coastal Or Highland

GP CWS Group size Leadership

Institution dummy Institution dummy Size of the group Any active leadership

1= GP 1= CWS

LPCD Summer PINDEX Drinking water Water scarcity Education Local participation

Expected sign

+ + – 1= Presence of Active + Leadership Quantity of water available in summer + Participation index + Use water for drinking 1= Water used for + drinking Scarcity of water 1= Having perennial + scarcity of water Percentage of family members with education + greater than 10 Percentage of family members participating in a + local organisation

(Isham and Kähkönen, 2002). The description of independent variables and their expected results are given in Table 9.6. Factors affecting effectiveness were analysed with the help of a linear regression model. Results of the regression model are given in Table 9.7. Estimated equation effectiveness = a0 + a1area + a 2 gp + a 3cws

+ a 4lpcdsummer + a 5leasdership + a6 pindex + a7 drinking water + a8water scarcity + a 9 education



+ a10local particiaption + a11 pci + ui Results of the regression analysis revealed that institutional variables, quantity of water available, and household characteristics related to water availability, significantly influenced by the effectiveness of the water supply. There was no difference in the effectiveness of water supply systems in different geographical regions. However, GP schemes were less effective, and the community-managed schemes were more effective as compared to KWA schemes. Effectiveness index in the study mainly captured the effective working of the system in terms of timely repair and sufficient water availability. Nearly 67 per cent of KWA users reported that it took two to five days to repair any damage. In some instances, the time taken for repair

Decentralisation: success or failure?  187 Table 9.7 Factors Affecting Effectiveness Dependent Variable: Effectiveness Index Variable

Coefficient

C 52.87* Area –0.06 GP –7.20*** CWS 12.42* LPCD Summer 0.09* (0.08) Leadership –1.39 PINDEX 0.06 (0.02) Drinking water 10.64* Water scarcity –11.74* Education –0.06 (–0.06) Local Participation –0.09 (–0.09) PCI –0.00004 (–.009) R-squared 0.30 Adjusted R-squared 0.27 Number of observations: 310

Std. Error*

t-Statistic

5.07 2.77 4.23 3.91 0.03 2.70 0.05 3.08 3.80 0.07 0.10 0.00 F-statistic Log likelihood D-W statistic

10.44 –0.02 –1.70 3.18 2.75 –0.52 1.21 3.46 –3.09 –0.81 –0.90 –0.30 11.54* –1372.33 0.94

Notes: *White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance. *, **, *** Significant at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, 10 per cent level, respectively. Figures in the parenthesis are elasticity.

was as much as one month. The reluctance of government employees, who are responsible for the O & M of the schemes was the cause for this delay. In the case of GP schemes, the frequent breakdowns and seasonal scarcity made water supply schemes less effective. Nearly 60 per cent of the sample respondents using GP schemes reported that breakdown to the water supply system was very frequent. Poor quality of construction as well as the lack of proper maintenance contributed to this problem. Most of the small water supply schemes undertaken by the GP under decentralised planning were implemented with the help of private contractors. Out of the five GP schemes considered in the study, three were constructed by private parties during the last five years. This implies a lack of technical capacity for the GPs to carry out water supply projects, which ultimately results in poor effectiveness. Per capita water availability to the households was the other factor that positively influenced effectiveness. As per the estimated elasticity, change in water availability improved the effectiveness by nearly 8 per cent. Higher needs for water to drink increased the effectiveness of the schemes, whereas effectiveness was less where households faced perennial water scarcity. Opposing the recent discussion on the positive relationship between participation and project effectiveness, the present study found that both participation and social capital were not related to the effectiveness of rural water supply systems. This deviation might be because of the difference in the indicators used to capture social capital and effectiveness. Isham and

188  K.R. Nisha Kähkönen (1999, 2002) took the existence of civic associations, the pattern of interactions, trust, and reciprocity among the households as the indicators of social capital. However, the present study took educational level and participation in other local organisations as indicators. The insignificance of these variables implies that awareness of group activities among the households was not enough to improve the effectiveness of water supply systems. There was no association between the per capita income of the households and the effectiveness of the system. Alternatively, the effectiveness of the water supply system did not vary with the income of the household Disaggregate analysis of the factors affecting effectiveness in three separate institutions is shown in Table 9.8. It was found that only per capita water availability to the households and water scarcity related variables significantly influenced effectiveness in community schemes. Group size had a positive and significant influence on effectiveness in community and KWA schemes. The change in effectiveness for an increase in group size was higher in the case of the KWA. Again, it implies that large schemes of the KWA became more effective probably because of scale economies. The influence of the geographical features of the locality on the effectiveness of KWA and GP schemes was positive. The schemes operated by the GP and KWA were less effective in coastal and highland regions as compared to the midland region. In the case of CWS schemes, the variable leadership did not significantly influence effectiveness,5 and this implies that active leaders could not effectively solve problems of damage to the water supply system,

Table 9.8 Factors Affecting Effectiveness in Different Institutions Variable

Coefficient CWS (N=200)

C Area LPCD Summer Group size Leadership PINDEX Drinking water Water scarcity Education Local Participation PCI R-squared Adjusted R-square F-statistic

KWA (N=60)

GP (N=50)

74.95 214.07 77.36* ** 2.71 –123.17 –41.44* –0.06 –0.02** 0.42* ** *** 0.09 (0.075) 0.10 (7.85) –1.01*** (0.370) –1.41 – – 0.05 (0.022) –0.89 (–0.23) 0.08 9.35** –0.45 2.33 –19.13* –8.47 –0.98 0.01 –0.15 –0.18 –0.09 –0.17 –0.04 –0.0001 (–.020) 0.0001 (0.039) 0.0004 (0.103) 0.17 0.36 0.45 0.12 0.24 0.32 3.78* 3.10* 3.64* *

**

Notes: *, **, *** Significant at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, 10 per cent level respectively. Figures in the parenthesis are elasticity.

Decentralisation: success or failure?  189 problems of water quality, etc. None of the water scarcity related variables were associated with the effectiveness of both KWA and GP schemes, maybe because of seasonal variation in water availability in these schemes. Nearly 40 per cent of the households belonging to GP and KWA schemes reported that there was some seasonal variation in water availability. This implies that these schemes could not always cater for the water needs of households, especially in the summer season. To sum up, the community schemes were more effective than the government-managed water supply systems. There was no variation in the effectiveness of community-managed water supply schemes across different geographical localities. In the case of the KWA, the schemes located in highland and coastal areas worked less effectively. Among household characteristics, water scarcity related variables were important in influencing the effectiveness of the system. There was no association between community participation and the effectiveness of the water supply schemes. Educational level and participation in other organisations also did not influence the effectiveness of the water supply.

Sustainability of water supply systems As in the case of effectiveness we constructed an index to capture sustainability. The method adopted to prepare the index was as follows. We considered the following variables relating to the functioning of rural water supply systems: (i) coverage of operation and maintenance cost of the system, payment of tariff, punishment for the tariff defaulters, (ii) community capacity to repair the system, (iii) time taken to repair the damages, and (iv) effect of conflict on water supply delivery and overall satisfaction of the scheme. Of these variables, those relating to tariff and punishment indicated whether the water supply system was able to cover O & M expenses or not, and whether any institutional arrangement was made to punish tariff defaulters. These two variables were combined into one variable (Table 9.8). The rank values that were assigned to this variable ranged from 0 to 5. The ranks obtained indicate the extent to which the water supply institutions were financially sustainable. The variables on the community’s capacity to repair the system and the time taken for repairs were included to indicate the capacity of the users to maintain the system. The third variable included in the sustainability index combined three variables, namely the existence of conflict, the impact of conflict on water supply provisioning, and satisfaction of the users. This combined variable indicated the resilience capacity of the water supply systems to resolve the conflicts and minimise the adverse impact of the conflict. These three variables were ranked on a six-point scale with rank values ranging from 0 to 5. The weighted average6 of these variables was calculated to arrive at a sustainability index. The description of different variables included in the sustainability index is given in Table 9.9.

190  K.R. Nisha Table 9.9 Description of Variables in the Sustainability Index Variable Description

Score

Weight

O & M coverage O & M cost is covered and tariff paid and payment O & M cost is covered, tariff not paid and punished of tariff O & M is not covered and tariff paid O & M cost is covered, tariff not paid and not punished O & M is not covered, tariff not paid and punished O & M is not covered, tariff not paid and not punished Community The community has the capacity to repair capacity to the system, and the breakdown was repair the repaired within 1 day The community do not have the system capacity to repair the system, but the breakdown is repaired within 1 day The community has the capacity to repair the system, and the breakdown is repaired within 2 to 5 days The community do not have the capacity to repair the system, but the breakdown is repaired within 2 to 5 days The community has the capacity to repair the system but still took >6 days to repair the breakdown The community do not have the capacity to repair the system and took >6 days to repair the breakdown Effect of No conflict in the group and very much conflict on satisfied with the service water supply Conflict existed; did not affect water supply and satisfied with service and overall Conflict existed; affected water supply satisfaction and satisfied with service No conflict, not satisfied with service Conflict existed; not affected water supply but not satisfied with service Conflict existed; affected water supply and not satisfied with service

5 4

0.611

3 2 1 0 5

0.278

4 3 2

1 0 5

0.111

4 3 2 1 0

The index of sustainability varies from 0 to 100, with 0 representing low sustainability and 100 representing a higher sustainability potential. Distribution of households by sustainability index shows that the community schemes were more sustainable than GP and KWA schemes (Table 9.10).

Decentralisation: success or failure?  191 Table 9.10 Distribution of Households (%) by Sustainability Index Index

CWS

GP

KWA

0 < 25 25–50 50–75 > 75 Total

1.5 10.5 21.0 12.5 54.5 100.0 (200)

0.0 26.0 42.0 4.0 28.0 100.0 (50)

0.0 31.7 30.0 36.7 1.7 100.0 (60)

Note: Figures in the parenthesis are actual numbers.

The relative importance of the factors affecting sustainability was analysed using a linear regression model with locality, group, and household characteristics as the factors affecting sustainability. Table 9.11 provides the expected relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables relating to locality, group, and household characteristics. These variables, barring the one on effectiveness, were used in the model to explain the factors influencing effectiveness. The logic behind the expected relationship was the same as explained in the case of the model on effectiveness. As far as the new variable effectiveness is concerned, we expected to obtain a positive relationship, since effective delivery of services improved

Table 9.11 Description of Independent Variables Variable

Description

Area

Geographical area

GP CWS LPCD Summer Effectiveness Group size Leadership PINDEX Drinking water Water scarcity Education Local participation

1= Coastal Or highland Institution dummy 1=GP Institution dummy 1=CWS Quantity of water available in summer Effectiveness index Size of the group Any effective leadership 1= Effective Leadership Participation index Use water for drinking 1= water used for drinking Scarcity of water 1= Having perennial scarcity of water Percentage of family members with education greater than 10 Percentage of family members participating in the local organisation

Expected Sign

+ + + + – + + + + + +

192  K.R. Nisha the collective action among the users. This ultimately contributed to the sustainability of the system. Estimated equation sustainability = a0 + a1area + a 2 gp + a 3cws

+ a 4lpcdsummer + a 5effectiveness + a6 leadership + a7 pindex + a8drinking water + a 9 water scarcity



+ a10 education + a11local particiaption + a12 pci + ui Regression results show that the geographical area, institutional variables, quantity of water available, effectiveness, and leadership significantly influenced sustainability (Table 9.12). Barring the variable on the geographical character of the locality, all others were found to have a positive relationship to sustainability. Sustainability of water supply schemes was low in coastal and highland regions as compared to the midland region. As households located in coastal and highland areas were facing acute water scarcity problems it was possible that water supply schemes might not be catering to the entire water needs of households in these regions. This provided less

Table 9.12 Factors Affecting Sustainability Dependent Variable: Sustainability Index Variable

Coefficient

29.51* –18.02* 8.48*** 10.48** 0.07** (0.060) 0.36* (0.348) 6.68*** 0.07 (0.024) 0.86 1.62 0.05 (–0.012) –0.04 (0.008) –0.00001 (–0.002) 0.35 R-squared 0.32 Adjusted R-squared Number of observations: 310 C Area GP CWS LPCD Summer Effectiveness Leadership PINDEX Drinking Water Water Scarcity Education Local participation PCI

Std. Error*

t-Statistic

7.59 3.04 4.63 4.63 0.03 0.06 3.48 0.06 3.15 4.76 0.09 0.09 0.00 F-statistic Log likelihood Durbin-Watson stat

3.89 –5.92 1.83 2.26 2.40 5.78 1.92 1.23 0.27 0.34 0.53 –0.39 –0.06 13.21* –1419.0 0.87

Notes: *White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance. *, **, *** Significant at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, 10 per cent level, respectively. Figures in parenthesis are elasticity.

Decentralisation: success or failure?  193 incentive for the users to remit the water tariff, and ultimately the schemes became financially unsustainable. Among the sample households, nearly 35 per cent from the coastal regions and 18 per cent from the highland regions reported that O & M was not covered, tariffs were not paid, and they were not punished for tariff defaulting. The GP and community-managed schemes were more sustainable than the KWA water supply schemes. The main factors contributing to the poor sustainability of the KWA system were the inability of the community to repair the damages and the poor financial status of the KWA. The tariff collected from the consumers was not sufficient to meet the O & M cost in KWA schemes. The same was found in sample localities as well. It was found that equitable and effective service delivery contributed to the sustainability of the system. However, there was no association between community participation and sustainability of the water supply systems. This might be because of the influence of active leadership in the group. The sustainability of groups with active leadership was high as compared to those without active leadership. The presence of active leaders to solve the conflicts, system damages, as well as problems arising out of delayed tariff repayment might reduce the participation of others. Results show that none of the household characteristics had a significant influence on the sustainability of the water supply systems. A separate analysis was carried out to identify the factors affecting sustainability in different institutional setups. Disaggregate analysis of the factors affecting sustainability in different institutional setups shows that CWS and GP schemes were less sustainable in coastal and highland regions. Geographical location was not a factor determining sustainability in the case of KWA schemes (Table 9.13). In KWA schemes, an increase in the quantity of water available improved the sustainability of the schemes. However, in community-managed schemes, it was the effectiveness that made the systems more sustainable. As in the case of effectiveness, the necessity of water for drinking purposes improved the sustainability of the community schemes. In this case, an increase in the number of beneficiaries reduced the sustainability of water supply systems. An insignificant relationship of leadership with sustainability implied that the problems on account of largesized groups could not be solved by the active leadership in the communitymanaged water supply schemes. One of the surprising relationships obtained in the analysis was the negative relationship of the participation index in the case of KWA schemes. In KWA schemes, participation of beneficiaries was almost absent, except the attendance of a few beneficiaries in Grama Sabha meetings. Decisions in the KWA were taken mainly by the government. The incidence of perennial water scarcity did not affect the sustainability of the water supply system in any of the three institutional setups. Similarly, the social capital of the beneficiary households was also not found to be associated with the sustainability of rural water supply systems.

194  K.R. Nisha Table 9.13 Factors Affecting Sustainability in Different Institutions Variable

Coefficient CWS (N = 200)

71.86* C –24.46* Area 0.0007 (0.001) LPCD Summer 0.40* Effectiveness –0.37** (–0.298) Group size 4.50 Leadership 0.07 (0.029) PINDEX 9.92** Drinking Water –5.94 Water Scarcity –0.18 Education –0.07 Local participation –0.0001(–0.019) PCI 0.43 R-squared 0.40 Adjusted R-square F-statistic 12.90*

KWA (N = 60)

GP (N = 50)

–63.01 96.10 0.12**(0.138) 0.16 0.01(1.195) – –1.52** (–0.046) –2.30 –4.78 0.06 –0.21

76.74* –53.08* 0.30 (0.66) 0.16 –0.98 (0.416) – 0.28 (0.027) –2.80 6.82 0.18 0.20

0.00005 (0.023) 0.43 0.31 3.66*

–0.001(0.008) 0.52 0.40 6.44*

Notes: *, **, *** Significant at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, 10 per cent level, respectively. Figures in the parenthesis are elasticity.

In short, the sustainability of rural water supply schemes was more if it was managed by the community or local government with the participation of beneficiaries. Both community and government-managed water supply schemes would not be sustained in coastal and highland regions even though water scarcity was higher in those regions. There was no association between beneficiary participation and the sustainability of water supply schemes. Among different sets of factors, physical characteristics of the locality were found to be more influential in explaining the variation in sustainability. The group size influenced sustainability in the case of community-managed and GP schemes. An important finding was that participants did not explain the variations in the effectiveness and sustainability of water supply systems. This can be attributed to the following. ••

Participation in the CWS schemes depended, to a significant extent, on whether the people using the water supplied by these schemes for drinking and cooking purposes or not. As explained above, participation as well as outcome variables were associated with whether water was used for drinking. In the field, it was observed that a majority of the households did not use the water supplied by CWS schemes for drinking or cooking as ‘this water was chlorinated’. This implies less than optimal

Decentralisation: success or failure?  195

••

••

••

importance attached to the water supplied by CWS schemes or institutions managing the water supply. People did not show much interest in the participation (in both meetings and decision making) when water supplied was adequate. It was learnt that the people participated in the CWS schemes in the initial stages as they needed a water supply source that supplemented their open wells. Once this was fulfilled, they assigned lesser importance to CWS schemes. In some of the groups, outcomes achieved were good, although participation was not widespread. For instance, the water supply source managed by the ‘Rahmath’ group in the Peruvalloor Grama Panchayat was working very effectively. The value of the sustainability index was also high. The reason behind this was that the group was managed well by the secretary of the BG. As a result, the other members did not think their participation in the meetings and decision making was of great necessity. In a few cases, the people realised that their participation would be of great use in improving effectiveness. In the case of a water supply source managed by a ‘Palaparambu’ group in the Cheekode Panchayat located in the highland region, an overhead tank was leaking due to defects in construction. Households were unhappy with the situation and were not willing to participate in the meetings or give financial contributions to solve the problem. The efforts made by the leaders to convince the beneficiaries to get involved in the collective action were in vain.

Summary and conclusions The performance of different institutions for providing drinking water supply was assessed by taking development outcomes such as effectiveness and sustainability of water supply schemes into consideration. The locality, group, and household characteristics were considered as factors influencing outcomes. Effectiveness of the water supply system was captured by an index, which showed that GP managed water supply systems were less effective as compared to KWA schemes, whereas CWS schemes were more effective. Effectiveness of the systems did not vary with geographical location. All the other variables influencing effectiveness were related to water availability to the household. One important finding was that in those cases where the quantum of water available was more and households were using the water supplied for drinking, the effectiveness of the water supply system was found to be better. Sustainability of the water supply system was captured by an index. Both community and GP schemes were found to be more sustainable than KWA schemes. It was found that water supply schemes were less sustainable in coastal and highland regions. Equity and effectiveness of the system

196  K.R. Nisha contributed positively to sustainability. Effective leadership in the group also contributed positively to the sustainability of water supply systems. None of the household characteristics like household water needs, education level, and participation of households in other local organisations was found to be associated with sustainability. Considering the performance of different water supply institutions, it was observed that community-based schemes performed better in terms of effectiveness and sustainability. Among the factors affecting effectiveness, it was observed that only water availability related variables influenced the effectiveness of water supply systems. However, the sustainability of the systems was influenced by group characteristics. Household characteristics did not have any influence on the sustainability of different schemes. The sustainability of most of the CWS schemes could be attributed to active leadership. This leads to a question of whether such an arrangement is actually sustainable or not? Besides, under the community water supply systems, once the supporting organisations withdraw from the locality, the users may not have the technical capability to tackle the problems like source failure or damage to the physical structure of the water supply system. Under these circumstances, NGOs, Panchayats, or the government might not turn up to share the responsibility along with the community. If that happens, the cost incurred to set up the new institutional arrangement may be wasted. The participation of beneficiaries also did not have any significant influence on the effectiveness and sustainability of the water supply systems.7 In most of the community water supply schemes, it was observed that participation was higher in the initial stages of implementation. However, once the schemes started, participation gradually declined. The present study found that the extent to which water was used for drinking and cooking purposes improved the participation and effectiveness of the water supply systems. This implies that the participation of the households in CWS schemes depended upon the value that people assigned to the water supplied through these schemes. Because of the cultural habit of people in Kerala, they perceived that only water obtained from open wells was suitable for drinking and cooking purposes. The taste of chlorine, used for treating water, made people reluctant to use it for drinking purposes. Hence, households used the water supplied through community/government schemes mainly for other domestic needs. Alternatively, we can argue that the capability of collective action to influence sustainability or effectiveness seems to be dependent on the availability of supplementary resources. The results might have been better if the interventions were in the form of mechanisms to recharge groundwater or management of existing resources. We found8 that the communities entrusted with the responsibility of water supply paid less attention to the issue of groundwater recharge. The World Bank guidelines made it mandatory for the community to spend a certain percentage of the total investment in water supply projects on groundwater recharge. There were scanty attempts in this direction. But none of the

Decentralisation: success or failure?  197 sample beneficiary groups successfully implemented methods for recharging the groundwater. This has further implications for the sustainability of the schemes in terms of resource availability. As there is no evidence to argue that collective action improves effectiveness and sustainability, community-based water supply systems need not be taken as a better alternative to government and Panchayat schemes. However, since GP schemes were less effective and most of the communitybased organisations did not have the technical capacity to manage the systems, state, local government, and community synergy were considered as better alternatives. Besides, since the long-term sustainability of communitymanaged schemes cannot be predicted due to plausible technical, institutional, and resource failure, the government can shoulder the responsibility of managing water supply systems along with the community.

Notes 1 www2​.irc​.nl​/manage​/whatisit​/sus​tain, Accessed on 6-2-2004. 2 Weights were assigned using the DEFINITE package by giving first preference to the variable representing breakdown and repair, second to satisfaction and pressure, and third to perception on quality. First preference was given to the repair variable because, as per the definition of effectiveness, appropriateness of the service was an important factor in improving effectiveness. Besides, satisfaction, pressure and quality were perception variables which might change according to the water using practice of the households. 3 Group size could not be included in the combined model as there was a multicollinearity problem. 4 The participation index considered in the model was a combined index of participation index for attendance and decision-making. Combined index was constructed by assigning weights obtained from the DEFINITE package to different participation variables. For obtaining weights, variables, namely, attendance in the group meeting, making suggestions in the meeting, influence in the location of water supply and influence in deciding monthly tariff were ranked in the ascending order. 5 In GP and KWA cases leadership was not included as an independent variable because in the latter case active leadership did not exist in any of the schemes, and in the former it existed only in one scheme. 6 Weights were assigned using the DEFINITE package by giving first preference ranking to the coverage of operation and maintenance cost by tariff as it represented the financial sustainability of the group. Power charges constituted a major share of operation and maintenance cost of water supply systems and defaults in the payment of power charges constrained the water supply delivery. Hence, financial sustainability was very important in delivering intended benefits to users especially in water supply context. 7 Existing studies on the factors affecting development outcome of the community water supply and sanitation, it was found that collective action improves the efficiency and sustainability of water supply systems (Narayan, 1993; Rajasekhar and Veerashekharappa, 2003; Katz and Sara, 2005). 8 Narain (2004) has argued that even though water supply systems managed by beneficiaries were termed as community systems, the arrangement in Kerala is quite privatised. She has pointed out that community wells for water supply in densely populated Kerala are a potential source of conflict. Conflicts arise by the

198  K.R. Nisha over-extraction of water from these wells and for this reason other well-owners in adjoining lands become worried about water level decline. Hence, if not adequately recharged, the source can dry up, and the entire system can become a wasted asset.

References Bamberger, M. and Cheema, S. (1990). Case Studies of Project Sustainability: Implications for Policy and Operations from Asian Experience. Economic Development Institute (EDI) seminar series. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Dollery, E Brian and Wallis, Joe (2001). Political Economy of Local Government: Studies in Fiscal Federalism and State-Local Finance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Esman, Milton. J. and Uphoff, Norman T. (1984). Local Organization: Intermediaries in Rural Development. London: Cornell University Press. GOK (2017). Economic Review. Thiruvananthapuram: State Planning Board. GOK (Government of Kerala) (2002). Report on Kerala Water Authority. Thiruvananthapuram: State Planning Board. GOK (Government of Kerala) (2003). Economic Review. Thiruvananthapuram: State Planning Board. Imboden, N. (1977). Planning and Design of Rural Drinking Water Projects: A Research Framework to Analyse Experiences with Rural Drinking Water Schemes. Experiences in Rural Development Occasional Paper No. 2 OECD Development Centre, 77(22). IRC (2015). International Resource Centre for Water and Sanitation. Available at: https​:/​/ww​​w​.irc​​wash.​​org​/s​​ites/​​defau​​lt​/fi​​les​/1​​3​_ker​​ala​_k​​odur_​​​asci_​​cw​:2016​.pdf (Accessed: 25 July 2018). Isham, Jonathan and Kahkonen, Satu (1999). ‘What Determines the Community Based Water Projects: Evidence from Central Java, Indonesia, on Demand Responsiveness, Service Rules and Social Capital’, Social Capital Initiative Working Paper, No.4. Washington D C: The World Bank. Isham, Jonathan and Kahkonen, Satu (2002). ‘Institutional Determinants of the Impacts of Community – Based Water Services: Evidence from Sri Lanka and India’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 50(3), pp. 667–691. Katz, Travis and Sara, Jennifer J. (2005). Making Rural Water Supply Sustainable: Report on the Impact of Project Rules. Water and Sanitation Program. Washington, DC: World Bank. Narain, Sunitha (2004). ‘Water Riddles’, Editor’s Page, Down to Earth, 13(4), p. 4. Narayan, Deepa (1993). ‘Participatory Evaluation, Tools for Managing Change in Water and Sanitation’, World Bank Technical Paper No. 207, Washington D. C: The World Bank. Narayan, Deepa (1995). ‘The Contribution of People’s Participation: Evidences from 121 Rural Water Supply Projects’, Environmentally Sustainable Development Occasional Paper Series No. 1. Washington D. C: The World Bank. Prokopy, Linda Stalker (2005). ‘The Relationship Between Participation and Project Outcomes: Evidence from Rural Water Supply Project in India’, World Development, 33(11), pp. 1801–1819. Pushpangadan, K. and Murugan, G. (1995). ‘Cost Efficiency in Water Supply System in Kerala’, Productivity, 36(2), pp. 228–235.

Decentralisation: success or failure?  199 Rajasekhar, D. and Veerashekharappa, C. (2003). Role of Local Organization in Water Supply and Sanitation Sector: A Study in Karnataka and Uttaranchal States, India. World Bank Project on Roles of Rural Local Organization. Bangalore: ISEC. Roth, Gabriel (1987). The Private Provision of Public Services in Developing Countries. Washington D.C: The World Bank. Serageldin, Ismail (1995). Toward Sustainable Management of Water Resources. Washington D C: The World Bank. SEUF (Socio Economic Unit Foundation) (2000). Annual Report. Thiruvananthapuram: Socio Economic Unit Foundation.

10 Functioning of Village Water and Sanitation Committees (VWSC) and sustainability of community-led water projects An exploratory study of some tribal villages in Odisha State Prafulla Kumar Nath Introduction This chapter attempts to understand how well-rooted the process of decentralisation has become in the tribal villages of Odisha state since its inception way back in 1992. The process started with the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act with the purpose of accelerating development by incorporating people in decision-making at the grassroots level. Availability of safe and adequate drinking water to every household can be a good indicator of both development and democracy. Ensuring water in tribal hamlets nestling among the hills is, however, challenging. In Odisha, this has been made possible with the effort of the community, which was further improved under the decentralised frame of governance. The water supply has become more regular, the quality of water has increased, and the distance between the user and the source of water constantly declined. For the successful management of community-led water projects, there is a strong need for the participation of local people, and this has been possible through the institutional mechanisms of Grama Sabha or Palli Sabha meetings and the functioning of Village Water and Sanitation Committees (VWSCs). Moreover, this chapter looks into the post-implementation challenges of drinking water supply projects. It was a mere coincidence that decentralisation and the Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking Water Mission began in the early 1990s. But later, governments at the centre and state levels used the decentralised frame of governance to ensure drinking water to the rural populace. The real effort was made towards this end under the National Rural Drinking Water Programme (NRWDP) initiated in 2009, with an objective of safe drinking water for all throughout the year in rural areas. Odisha does not have a bright record of providing a drinking water supply in rural areas, and when we talk of piped water supply systems it looks even bleaker. And if we take into account DOI: 10.4324/9781003094357-10

The VWSC and community-led water projects  201 the widely stretched tribal belt, the picture looks much bleaker still. The present study covers a wide area in the district of Gajapati (south Odisha), close to Andhra Pradesh. The region is endowed with lush green vegetation and tall mountains (Mahendragiri), but finding water at an altitude close to 5,000 feet is a Herculean task, especially in the dry months. The tribal hamlets settled at different altitudes have extreme difficulties finding water for drinking and other domestic purposes. Though decentralisation began in 1992, and with it came the responsibility of supplying drinking water to the local administration, in reality there was no mechanism to make the locally elected government (Panchayat) responsible for water problems. At those points in time, several community-led piped water supply systems were initiated in different hamlets. Of course, behind such activities there were also the efforts of several NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations). The roles and functions of the Grama Panchayat and other institutions (VWSC, Grama Sabha) within it are critical for providing services like drinking water. The NRWDP can bring new dimensions to the delivery of drinking water in rural areas. The programme was embedded in the existing PRIs, and in this regard the roles and functions of the Panchayat were categorically mentioned in the Panchayati Raj Act of 1964 of Odisha state. These include: (1) providing safe drinking water; (2) facilitating sanitation provision; and (3) helping to manage Common Property Resources (CPR). Responsibility has been fixed as starting from Sarpanch to VWSC to Grama Sabha. All aspects of drinking water, including construction, distribution, maintenance, and supervision of water supply, fall into the hands of local people. Over the years, the character of community-led piped water supply systems in tribal areas have metamorphosed themselves within the present frame of decentralisation.

Institution under study The main point of study in this chapter is the VWSC, which is an important institution entrusted with the function of providing safe and adequate water at the village level. It has the potential to bring tremendous change in the attitude of the local people. It can be very instrumental in building social capital in the village. As an institution it accommodates the representation of different classes in society. Its role in managing and delivering a public good like water is crucial. The abilities of the members of the committee have a bearing on the smooth functioning of the community-led water systems and their future sustainability. Effective management of the drinking water supply by the VWSC can be seen as an indicator of good local governance of our present form of decentralisation. For this, meaningful linkage between the VWSC and Grama Panchayat is crucial in setting up piped drinking water supply systems and managing them in the tribal belt of Odisha. The VWSC is operational in those villages where a community-led drinking water supply system exists. The Grama Sabha, the village assembly

202  Prafulla Kumar Nath as an integral part of the Grama Panchayat, forms the VWSC from the village community. The VWSC makes a plan by taking advice from experts (generally NGOs), makes an expenditure estimation, and presents the same before the Grama Sabha. Once it is passed in the Grama Sabha, the entire plan is presented before the Sarpanch (head of the GP). When the proposal gets the approval of the Sarpanch, it was placed before the JE (junior engineer), who sits at the block headquarters. The needs and aspirations of the local community are voiced through the Grama Sabha, which is metamorphosed into an actionable project by the VWSC in collaboration with the head of the Grama Panchayat (Sarpanch). In the entire process, the Palli Sabha/Grama Sabha occupies a central position to address the local issues in a village or hamlet. The Panchayati Raj Act of Odisha (1964) provides that in February every year the Palli Sabha will meet (they may meet at other points of time if required). All the legitimate voters of the village are members of the Palli Sabha, and one of them will be selected to preside over the meeting. It is the participatory forum for the local people where the proposals for setting up of community piped drinking water supply are placed and, if agreed upon, forwarded to the next Grama Panchayat meeting. Now the question that arises is: from where would the funds come for such projects (piped drinking water)? The newly created Panchayati Raj and Drinking Water Department (earlier called the Panchayati Raj Department) in 2017 provided funds to every Grama Panchayat, especially for drinking water. The route for funding support is the following: pass the proposal at the village meeting (Palli Sabha), place it in the meeting of the Grama Panchayat and then move it to the block level through the Sarpanch for releasing the funds. The older projects operating in the area were funded by people and NGOs. But now, the plans are placed before the junior engineer (in the block) through the Grama Panchayat, and projects become operational with the joint effort of the government, people, and NGOs. In the later phase, when the projects face a crisis (damage of the water pump or tank), people get help from the government. But they have to follow the same process, i.e. passing the proposal at the Palli Sabha and through the Grama Panchayat before going to a higher level. Against this background, two research questions can be raised. How effective is the role and functioning of the VWSC in providing a public good like water in a decentralised administrative frame? What challenges will be faced by the VWSC while managing community-led water supply projects? These questions are analysed in this chapter with the help of the following objectives and methodology.

Objectives and methodology The objective of this chapter is three-fold. First, the chapter attempts to look at, within the present frame of decentralisation, if the delivery of water supply (of community-led water projects) has improved. Second, the chapter

The VWSC and community-led water projects  203 aims to find if the decentralised governance over the last two decades has enhanced the participation (especially in minority sections like women) in decision-making and been able to build social capital (reciprocity, trust, and cooperation), which is essential to run community-led projects. Third, an attempt is made to understand whether village level institutions, including the VWSC, have the strength to make piped drinking water supply systems sustainable or not. This study, based on the author’s own fieldwork, highlights problems and challenges in the functioning of the VWSC to manage community-led drinking water supply systems, and explores the possibility of improvement of such projects and their long term sustainability. It will help policy formulators and end-users to get a fair idea about the reality on the ground. The study will also help the VWSC and other local governance under PRIs to improve their performance both at the planning and implementation level. The approach adopted in this study is exploratory in nature. The main focus of the study is to gather insights so that further investigation can be carried out into the issue. It helps to understand the finer aspects of the issue of piped water supplies within the framework of decentralisation. Exploratory study here becomes extremely important as the entire issue of piped drinking water supply systems in rural settings on difficult terrain has scores of stumbling blocks. It is even more important as it deals with several stakeholders and tries to accommodate everyone’s interests. To run such a community-led water system, the prime requirement is to understand economic aspects (monthly contribution, conflict of interest, location), social aspects (gender, caste, religion), and political aspects (ideological difference, local politics). Since the study deals with the VWSC, an institution that works at the lowest ladder of decentralisation as an agent of change, the exploratory study of the present issue is highly appropriate. Both qualitative and quantitative data were used in this study. Before the actual study, the author travelled extensively to understand the process of the construction of such community-led water projects. He lived among the villagers, observed how mobilisation was done and noted a consensus over several rounds of talks with the people of a particular hamlet undertaking a project. He observed the process adopted in placing the entire proposal before an open Palli Sabha meeting, estimation of total project cost, fixing of individual household contributions, the assigning of responsibilities, and ensuring community participation in every sphere, starting from planning to execution to monitoring. In the entire district of Gajapati, more than 300 community-led piped water supply projects were under operation. Therefore, a sample of 30 villages (10%) was used for the study. One thing that must be mentioned here is that all the villages under study were not revenue villages; sometimes they were, but in several cases these villages are tribal hamlets. To make the sample truly representative, a stratified sampling technique was adopted. The entire district was divided into five clusters on the basis of geographic

204  Prafulla Kumar Nath features. From each cluster, a proportional number of villages was used randomly for the study. Each selected village was visited for personal observation of the piped water supply system. In this process, aspects like the source of water, system of conveyance (pipe), storage condition, and distribution process were minutely observed. In addition, the flow, wastage, and quality of water were checked. These aspects of the water supply system are important for they ensure not only water quality but also the sustainability of the entire system. Personal observation has also shown functional bumps that the villagers and VWSC frequently face in running such community-led water supply systems. It also highlighted the capability of the VWSCs and local people in maintaining and managing the supply systems. To understand the piped drinking water supply system, a checklist was developed incorporating aspects like water (quality, quantity, and availability hours), maintenance (running pump, overseeing, record), and finance (collection of monthly charges or contribution, energy bill). The checklist also included aspects of social capital like cooperation, trust, and reciprocity. It also tried to capture the social norms and attitudes towards aspects of water and sanitation. In order to fill up the checklist, each VWSC was contacted. After a discussion with the members, the details were put in place. Sometimes to cross-check the information, help from the local people was taken. Another mode of data collection was a formal discussion with female members of the VWSC. Informal discussions with the women of different hamlets were also held; the discussions highlighted facts such as occasional exclusion, the role of religion in moulding attitude, and old practices that helped with understanding the social dynamics of a village. At times it also highlighted the collective attitude of an entire village towards getting funds through the Grama Panchayat. Other tools used for the study include focus group discussions (FGDs), interviews, and case studies. Women are at the highest risk when the water and sanitation system breaks down. Therefore the author conducted several FGDs with the women in some of the villages. Interviews were held with some Sarpanches, ward members, and project coordinators of the NGOs. Four case studies on particular villages were prepared.

Engagement with the literature Over the last three decades, decentralisation has been at the centre stage of policy formulation and implementation in all developing countries, including in Latin America and Asia (Bardhan, 2002). To make the process fast and legitimate, a landmark Constitutional Amendment (73rd) was introduced and passed in 1992. It was widely believed that decentralisation would bring a large number of benefits to the people and make the government more responsive and efficient (Bardhan, 2002). The governments of different developing countries are trying hard to bring their people to

The VWSC and community-led water projects  205 the centre of the development process by making them actors of change. Participation in decision-making at the grassroots level through decentralisation not only brings power to the people but also enhances transparency, accountability, and effectiveness in the process of development (Bryld, 2001). The new philosophy of development is to induce people to take part in the governance and make them the actor of their own development. Decentralisation needs to be seen as a distribution of political, social, and economic power. Therefore, one thing that must be noted here is that decentralisation is never apolitical. Merely focusing on the technical and administrative aspects of decentralisation will lead us to the wrong destination (Bryld, 2001). Conyers (1990) moved one step further by saying that decentralisation of responsibility, planning, and implementation will initiate a balance of power. An individual or a group of individuals will see what benefit is going to be achieved from a particular decision, and they will closely observe whether the way things are planned are implemented or not. By design, decentralisation is seen as a powerful instrument to ensure the participation of local people in planning, implementing, and monitoring so that the benefits reach the target people at minimum cost (Nagarajan, Binswanger-Mkhize, and Meenakshisundaram, 2014, p. 1) Very often, decentralisation is seen as a means, not an end in itself. In a developing country like India, decentralisation is looked at as an instrument of economic development without its social and political context. The most crucial aspect of decentralised development is the understanding of how resources are used and distributed, and the way inevitable disputes among different groups (lose or win) are handled (Leftwich, 1994). This chapter handles the central issue of the participatory community-led distribution of water resources. But there is no such solution that will be universal in nature. We have to ensure that every actor in a community or village is capable and knowledgeable and they have a space for activity. The actor will be able to participate through this space of activity (Bryld, 2001). Social theories provide the concept of structural determinism. According to this concept, structures (a framework) influence the behaviour of the different actors tied within it. Any change in a structure is manifested through (everyday activity) the actors (individual) or group of actors and finally leads to a new consequence (Arce, Villarreal, and Vries, 1994). In a time of difference, conflict, and frequent sectarian movements, decentralisation in general is regarded as a means to diffuse both the social and political tensions, and at the same time ensure cultural and political autonomy (Bardhan, 2002). It is a well-known fact that the tribal districts of Odisha are inhabited mainly by tribal Hindus and Christians. And conflict between the two is not new. But in several instances, it has been found that the community-led water supply system has kept them united. They share their resources, labour, and difficulties. Decentralisation means different things to different people. In this specific case of the management of community-led water supply systems, we discuss a particular type of

206  Prafulla Kumar Nath decentralisation where decision-making power is passed to smaller local entities. It is neither simple administrative decentralisation nor financial decentralisation. Decentralisation in India now stands at a critical point. Some see it as an opportunity to clip the wings of the government, and some others see it as a remedy for market failure. There are some groups that are supporters of the philosophy of the anti-market and anti-centralised state. Bardhan (2002) describes this as ‘anarcho-communitarian’, and believes in the control of the local (self-governing) community. There is no doubt that decentralisation has several merits and strengths, but there is a fear that, like a market failure or government failure, there can be community failure (Bardhan, 2002). In fact, during the study it was found that some of the community-led water supply systems failed miserably. One of the merits of decentralisation is accountability (Ribot, 2004). If local elected representatives fail the test of accountability then the probability of their re-election is greatly reduced. But we have to remember that election is a blunt instrument of accountability (Bardhan, 2002). Therefore for increasing accountability other institutional devices like community organisations may be deployed within the framework of decentralisation to strengthen accountability. The piped water supply systems in the tribal district of Gajapati are operating with the help of community organisations in close association with the Grama Panchayat. The link between PRIs and community organisations is direct as all the proposals for the construction of piped water supply systems start with the consent of local people, and then plans and proposals are placed before the Palli Sabha. The voice of minority sections, especially women, is heard, and the distributive aspect of water addressed so that all the sections of the population of a village get water. Decentralisation addresses the principal–agent problem (Tommasi and Weinschelbaum, 1999). Under decentralisation, especially under PRIs, the number of agents is much less in comparison to any centralised administration or system. If the principal (citizenry) is large, the problem of coordination becomes acute. In community-led water projects sometimes a principal also becomes an agent (a member of the VWSC or ward member), and they work in cooperation with the community. However, in big villages (more households), the problem of free-riding has been noticed. In the case of community-based projects, especially when it deals with public goods like water, few people enjoy benefits without involvement (Olson, 1965, pp. 53–56). In this case, group size also matters; the larger the size of the group, the larger is the chance of free-riding. A community-managed water supply system within the framework of the PRI has improved the water delivery process. The effectiveness of such systems largely depends upon six sets of factors, such as adequate incentives, sufficient skill and resources, the right process of operation and maintenance, interior organisational relationships, technology, and an effective system of

The VWSC and community-led water projects  207 monitoring (Rondineli, 1991). No doubt, the community-led water supply systems in the tribal villages of Odisha have enhanced the accessibility of potable water. To collect water from traditional sources, people spent much time and energy; now, they are getting easier access to it (Tavangar, 1989). Decentralisation and women empowerment It is a fact that the responsibility of drawing water mainly falls on the womenfolk of the household. Even adolescent girls do not get respite from it. When water accessibility improves, women find more time for other economic activities. The piped drinking water now becomes available inside the house (every household has a two-tap provision). Earlier women used to spend hours fetching water, but now with the turn of the tap they get water instantly. Now they find more time for bagad (working in the forest), the collection of saal or tendu leaves, or fuel for cooking. Each respective household will now find an opportunity to redistribute time (saved due to the piped water) to maximise its welfare. It not only helps women to get economic benefits but also it enhances the welfare of the entire family. The adolescent girls can now attend school. When safe drinking water becomes available near the house, it ensures the health and wealth of the household. Many societies have the under-representation of women in decisionmaking bodies even at the local level, such as the Grama Panchayat, Grama Sabha, or VWSC (Dahlerup, 2006). Women in the tribal villages can get entry into decision-making bodies by becoming members of the VWSC or by participating in the Palli Sabha. In such societies, in addition to cultural and social constraints, women also find time constraints. They may find time to participate in the Palli Sabha if water is available near their house. Increasing the participation of women may reduce corruption at the local level. Studies link a higher participation of women in the decision-making bodies with a lower corruption rate (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti, 2001).

Sustainability of community-led water supply system To facilitate the operation of a community-led piped water supply system, the community places the proposal in the Palli Sabha. They use the common land (a common resource) for the construction of water collection chambers and water tanks. Individual households make monetary as well as in-kind (labour) contributions, and the piped water project is built with the help of an NGO (having both resources and expertise). Initiating and installing such a drinking water supply system is difficult since people have to work collectively within the framework of the PRIs. But it has been more difficult to manage such water projects after their installation. Once the piped water is supplied, people obtain immediate and multiple benefits such as reduced travel distance, potable water, and the provision of water to livestock. The long term benefits such as reduced incidence of water-borne diseases and

208  Prafulla Kumar Nath more time to undertake income-generating activities can only be availed when the project is in operation for a long time. It has been found in the district that many piped water supply projects have become defunct due to many different reasons. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, community failure may happen, as in the cases of market or government failure. The future of such projects depends upon effective management and the real involvement of the community. This chapter tries to find a theoretical explanation for the ineffective management of community-led drinking water supply projects. At the same time, the field survey provides ample evidence for the existence of potential issues, which, if not addressed in time, will cause such projects irrecoverable damage. Community-led water supply provision suffers from motivational problems like any other common pool resource or good public management. In such cases, there is an incentive for free-riding. To handle such problems, there must be some rules or institutions within the core structure of the governance. If such rules are absent or not enforceable, the situation will get out of control (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 50–51). The existence of the free-rider problem is so subtle that it cannot often be detected by the other members of the community. Such elements may exist at three different levels of the system: constitutional, operational, and choice (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 51–55). In many cases, it has been found that the operational and constitutional rules (for drinking water supply projects) are not working, and people therefore find opportunities to free ride. For example, the cleaning of the water tank is supposed to be carried out every month (the rule is there but not in practice). Whenever cleaning is to be done (once in a blue moon), some people find a pretext to avoid it. This fact emerged from the narration of many members of the VWSC. However, there are some villages where regular cleaning of water tanks is done. In this regard, the literature suggests that differences in institutions (different water supply systems) may lead to a difference in results or outcomes (Ostrom, 2007; Saleth and Dinar, 2004). In this regard, the role of local government becomes important. The local governance structure and public policy providing institutional arrangements assume importance for the effective management of such community-led water supply systems. Under the present decentralised governance, if a major problem appears (replacing a supply pipe, renovation of a water tank, replacing water pump), the VWSC will take the initiative to raise the issue at the Palli Sabha and consult the Sarpanch of the Grama Panchayat; estimation of the expenditure is decided at the junior engineer office at the block level. For any mishap and damage either in the water tank or delivery pipe it takes considerable time to repair. In many villages, enough corpus (from the monthly contributions) has been built up to make the community self-sufficient financially; it could use part of this fund to maintain the water delivery system (repair tanks, extend pipes, replace pumps). But, in many villages, people have a strong preference to use government funds for maintenance rather than using their own corpus,

The VWSC and community-led water projects  209 and wilfully leave the water supply system to remain defunct (once it goes out of order). Getting government funds to renovate a water supply system always takes time, and once the water supply system is not used for some time it not only causes trouble to the people but also results in permanent damage. However, there are some villages where people have managed government funds to renovate water supply systems. The effect of leadership and networking plays a positive role in the effective management of such community-led water projects (Madrigal, Alpízar, and Schlüter, 2011). The effectiveness of the community-led water supply system also depends upon the gender composition of the VWSC and the inclusion of experts within it (Vedeld, 2000).

Key findings and analysis This study has two core areas of investigation – the quality of drinking water supply service (present status and future prospects) and the effect of decentralised governance on participation in local decision-making and the capability building of minority sections. The quality of the water supply basically depends on users’ satisfaction, quality of infrastructure, mode of technology, and financial strength. The effect of decentralised governance can be captured by looking at the participation of people in local decisionmaking (attendance at the Palli Sabha), the composition of the VWSC, and female representation in local bodies. The survey found that 16 per cent of water supply systems were defunct, and about 75 per cent of them were giving low yield during the summer months (Figure 10.1). Why have so many projects stopped working? It was found that once a project started to decline in water sources the villagers never revived it. In some places, water tanks were damaged, and in other places the water pumps were damaged. Further, the condition of reservoirs

Figure 10.1 Details of water availability and pump operators in the selected villages. Source: Field survey.

210  Prafulla Kumar Nath

Figure 10.2 Conditions of water storage structures and distribution pipes in the selected villages. Source: Field survey.

was by and large good. However, when it came to water pipes, about 56 per cent were either damaged or leaking (Figure 10.2). We also found villages where energy bills were not paid for years, and hence the electricity department cut off the power supply. When water supply systems remain unused for years, they fall apart. In all these cases, villagers and especially the VWSC were found to be inactive. To revive those water supply systems, they could raise the issue at the Palli Sabha and Grama Sabha level. Now, the Panchayati Raj and Drinking Water Department, Government of Odisha have made fund provision for every Grama Panchayat. But people have not been able to derive benefit out of it as they were not proactive. Of course, it is an admissible fact that government officials at the lower levels have efficiency problems. The quality of the water supply service (quality and quantity of water) also depends upon the choice of technology. But the choice of technology very often does not only depend upon the decision of the VWSC or the people of that village. It depends upon the geographic features of the area and cost-effectiveness. There are two modes of drawing water that are operative in the region – gravity flow and water pumps. In the area, 69 per cent of water supply projects use a gravity flow mode, and the rest are dependent on water pumps. A gravity flow mode of water supply is preferred by the local people for it does not require power and consequently there is no need to pay electricity bills. But it has its own demerit. During the dry months, the flow of water from the nearby mountains (Eastern Ghats) becomes less, and at times it becomes so low that fulfilling the bare minimum requirement of water becomes difficult. This is the toughest time for the tribal people living in the higher mountain terrains. On such occasions, the VWSC plays a positive role by rationing water. People get a one-time water supply once

The VWSC and community-led water projects  211 a day, and even that is only for a few hours. Water supply in these tribal hamlets thus should not be seen in isolation; it is related to the functioning of the VWSC, governance under the Panchayati Raj Institutions, and the local environmental condition. Water supply systems working with electric pumps also have some disadvantages. Leaving aside the monthly energy bills, the power supply in that difficult terrain is not very regular. In the summer months, the dug wells for this purpose also yield less water, and the pumps have to work longer hours. Therefore the pump sets get damaged often, which gives unspeakable trouble for the entire village. Another aspect of the power supply is that it is too sensitive to storms and wind, which frequently occur in the region. If an electric wire or pole gets damaged, it poses another set of troubles. In many cases, the role of the VWSC is very limited in dealing with this type of problem. The survey found that 15 per cent of reservoirs were not in a good condition and the condition of conveyance pipes was not good in 9 per cent of cases. Leakage of water pipes was found to be a problem in 47 per cent of the cases. The VWSCs exist in an informal manner in as many as 25 per cent of cases. In many villages, VWSCs were formed by following the government guidelines. The composition of VWSCs (as human capital) is very important. In many VWSCs, women are adequately represented, and local representatives (like the Sarpanch, ward members), members of SHGs, ASHA and Anganwadi workers, and school teachers in the locality also find a place in them. But the survey found that such committees were ineffective. Many VWSC members are barely literate, and many women members could not articulate the challenges properly. A few of them did not know the name of the local Sarpanch. There is no intention to underestimate these innocent people, but the point is that how could such VWSC members handle the problems of the water supply system. To address drinking water issues, one must have networking ability and the skills to convince the junior engineer at the block level to handle any crisis related to the water. During visits to far-flung hamlets, it was found that VWSCs (in many cases) did not hold regular meetings, no record of meeting minutes was found, and many members did not turn up at the meetings when anything urgent needed to be discussed. In the Gajapati district, only 25 per cent of projects were run by power, but payment of the energy bill was highly irregular. Half of the power-run projects were on the verge of closing down as the electricity bill was either not paid or disputed (Figure 10.3). The inability of VWSCs became more obvious in such villages where monthly energy bills remained unpaid. Some people were unable to make a contribution, and some others did not want to. This leads to the accumulation of the bill and finally to power disconnection (Figure 10.3). Even where there was no need for an energy bill, people had to contribute Rs. 20 or 30 (monthly) towards the maintenance of the water supply system. Many households across the villages in the entire belt

212  Prafulla Kumar Nath

Figure 10.3 Status of contributions and the payment of electricity bills in the selected VWSCs. Source: Field Survey.

did not pay. Of course, we found some villages where VWSCs had done tremendous work. All those high performing communities had a distinct set of governing rules to take care of water quality, corrective and preventive maintenance of water infrastructure, and financial process. Without any such rules, the performance issues of the water supply system could not be resolved (Madrigal, Alpízar, and Schlüter, 2011). A new approach to address the issues of accountability of VWSCs, freeriding, and motivation could be adopted and based on the concept of the panopticon, a metaphor developed by J. Bentham and further popularised by Michel Foucault (Eckersley, Ferry, and Zakaria, 2014). A panopticon is a disciplinary system in which one can observe or watch others without the knowledge of the persons who are being observed. The argument behind this idea is that if people know that they are under surveillance, they will adhere to discipline and work according to the social norm and behaviour, even if they are not really watched (Foucault, 1977, pp. 122–124). In some villages, there is provision for surveillance and those who break the rules are heavily fined. But in many communities, such a panopticon is not in place, and if it is there, it functions loosely.

Case analysis and inferences To substantiate the arguments made throughout this chapter, a few caselets are now presented. In some cases, decentralisation under the Panchayati Raj system has brought some change. Not only have they made the drinking water supply sustainable, but they have also brought changes in the field of health, education, and income. At the same time, we found villages that had never moved an inch after several years of effort; the condition of their water system was dilapidating, health and hygienic conditions were visibly poor, and the cleanliness of the village streets were beyond the point of

The VWSC and community-led water projects  213 acceptability. The following cases will show if decentralisation has brought any noticeable change in the attitudes towards common resources and the ability to handle public affairs. They will also provide an idea on whether decentralisation promotes gender equality and creates an opportunity for women to raise a voice in the Palli or Grama Sabha meetings. Effectiveness of decentralisation must be judged in light of the real participation of the community in decision-making and their ability to address their own problem. Case study 1: Tumba Tumba is an interesting village. Development is seen everywhere – in education, cleanliness, livelihood, and the maintenance of community-led water projects. It is a big tribal hamlet consisting of 75 households situated in the Koinpur Grama Panchayat in the Rayagada block. A community-led water project was initiated here in 1992. During the initial years, the system was not functioning under the frame of the present decentralisation, but later it was incorporated within the decentralised frame of the PRI. The VWSC was managing the water supply system amazingly. The ex-Sarpanch of Koinpur, Mr Sanyasi Karzee, who led the project in the village at the beginning, claimed that the necessity of water bound them together. The leadership of Sanyasi Karzee was crucial for installing a community-led water supply system and instilling social practice in the village to manage it. Everyone in Tumba had a house with a concrete roof. Almost all the households had fruit orchards which generated a handsome income. The common fruits grown there included pineapple, mango, lemon, mosambi, and kaju. The initiation of social forestry by various NGOs planted the seed of economic wellbeing. This economic wellbeing then promoted education, which in turn brought a change in attitude towards health and sanitation. The success of a community-led water supply system thus depends upon local leadership, education, and the economic wellbeing of the local people. Tumba has been successful for several reasons, such as initial conditioning of the villagers by the early leadership and regular participation of people to handle the issues of the water project and regular monthly contribution (due to economic wellbeing). Case study 2: Belpadar Belapadar village, which is by the side of the main road, is in the Koinpur Grama Panchayat in the Rayagada block of the Gajapati district. It has around 50 households surrounded by forest and hills. The notoriety of Belapadar for its uncleanliness was known to all in the area. The main road of the village was full of cow dung, and the roadside had turned to a strange puddle of water, mud, and bovine waste. The village courtyards looked damp as water was oozing out of them. They looked very unhealthy and unhygienic. The village sanitation and water supply system was on the verge

214  Prafulla Kumar Nath of breakdown. The economic conditions of the people in the village were not looking promising at all. So too was the condition of education and health. Children were defecating in the village courtyards just in front of the houses, and hens were feasting on it. Several leakages were visible in the conveyance pipe. There was no community effort to maintain the system. People were not contributing anything to maintenance and not holding any meetings to give the issue collective thought. People were addicted to country alcohol, and the VWSC did not dare to raise a voice on who was cooking the alcohol by using community water. The toilets and bathrooms of several households were in a dilapidated condition, some of them had lost doors, and some others were not used for months. People also had several issues with the water conveyance pipe and the water supply being reduced in summer. Belapadar is thus a case of collective failure. Case study 3: Padampur Padmapur, a medium-size village, falls under the Gosani block of the Gajapati district of Odisha. It has 50 households comprising about half of the Telugu speaking population. This is one of the oldest communityled water supply systems. This village was included wilfully in the study to understand the effect of age on the efficacy and existence of a drinking water supply system. The condition of the water tank was pitiable. It was in a dilapidated state and broken in places. The tank house was occupied by someone, the conveyance pipes were damaged, and more importantly its custodian the VWSC had disbanded. The village had more than Rs. 60,000 in their corpus fund. They could do anything they wished to collectively rejuvenate the water system. Two important things, which were missing in the village, must be mentioned here – leadership and cooperation among the people. The head of the old VWSC, an octogenarian, lamented over the dilapidated condition of the project. However, from his words it becomes evident that the village was expecting some outside intervention. The project initiated, people harvested its benefits for over a decade, but when the question of its sustainability came, nothing concrete was done. No sense of ownership was found among the villagers. Padmapur defeated the very purpose of the community-led water project. Case study 4: Sailada Sailada is a different village in many respects. It is the largest village in the entire region, with 156 households in the village and another 50 migrating to cities like Hyderabad and Chennai. Most of the people are Telugu speaking. The community-led water supply system was commissioned in 2003. The old water tank stands tall by the roadside, and the water conveyance system now runs under (DRDA) Biju Kandhmala Gajpati Yojana. Mr Sudhakar Rao (looks after the water supply management) gave detailed information about the running of the project in broken English. He operated the pump

The VWSC and community-led water projects  215 and oversaw the conveyance of water. The yield of water was very good, the conveyance pipe seemed new, but the condition of the water reservoir was bad and dilapidated. The economic condition of the people was good as there lay vast stretches of arable land around the village, and many of the villagers owned the arable land. Sudhakar himself boastfully claimed that he was the owner of 8 acres of arable land. The VWSC claimed to hold Rs. 3.5 lakh. But the attitude of the people had not changed. The committee had not paid its electricity bill since 2013. And they did this intentionally with the impression that if the bill remained unpaid the government would bail them out. Still, people are managing this community-led water system. But the question is: is this the best way of managing community-led water projects?

Conclusions and the way forward In this chapter, an attempt was made to explore if the people of tribal Odisha have been able to resolve the water problem through communityled water supply systems, and if the VWSCs have perfectly performed their assigned roles. It was found that two crucial mechanisms (working rules and accountability) were seriously missing in many villages. This did not mean that these two mechanisms were totally absent, but they were not applied properly in practice. Some may argue that problems in the community-led water supply system arise either due to corruption or due to disproportionate elite capture of the local resources (Ribot, 2002). However, scholars like Pranab Bardhan (2002) disagree on such elite capture. In this study, only one case of corruption (misuse of the collective fund) was reported in the management of the community-led piped water supply system. But no case of elite capture was seen. Tribal societies are very egalitarian in nature, and there prevails a spirit of cooperation among the villagers. The decentralised frame of local governance in rural India over the last two and half decades has never been able to groom the minority sections of society, such as women, the SCs, and STs. Institutions like VWSC were not functioning well in many villages. The most important thing that needs immediate attention is making the VWSC self-reliant in terms of raising the water issues in the Palli Sabha or Grama Sabha, collecting monthly power bills and submitting them, maintaining meeting minutes and collection records, establishing a network with the Sarpanch and block-level officials (JE), and strict implementation of working rules (to check free-riding). It was also found that the present frame of decentralisation fails to build social capital (trust, reciprocity, cooperation) and changes in social attitudes. It was also found that people of every village were looking for outside funds (either from the government or from NGOs). Therefore there was a need for real financial devolution to strengthen decentralisation. Long term financial dependency destroys the tendency of self-reliance and participation among the people.

216  Prafulla Kumar Nath The way forward The 73rd Amendment introduced a framework of decentralisation. Through reservation, it ensured that a few representatives from minority sections (SCs, STs and women) can now take part in local administration. But they are unable to do so due to a lack of education, articulation, information, and experience. The female members lack the basic ability to work within the decentralisation framework (Bryld, 2001). The ability of tribal women, who are comparably less educated, cannot effectively participate in local governance and raise water issues at the block level. For genuine empowerment, the education and leadership skills of minority sections need to be improved. In the present frame of decentralisation in India, space for financial decentralisation is very limited. In developing countries like India, decentralisation is primarily about pushing collected revenue from the higher level to the lower level of administration. The main focus is how to spend public money (Bardhan, 2002; Gulati, 1994). To see changes in rural India, decentralisation must go hand in hand with financial devolution. We all know that an election is not a good instrument for testing political accountability, but people have no other option. And the politicians at the upper level manipulate funds towards their respective vote banks. Bringing about a change in social attitudes towards the community needs serious attention. The community must work on social capital (reciprocity, trust, and cooperation) to bring sustainability to the service of any public good. Sustainability of the village water supply system is a serious challenge under community-led projects due to a lack of social capital. To bring development via decentralisation social capital must be built up.

References Arce, Alberto, Villarreal, Magdalena and Vries, Pieter De (1994). ‘The Social Construction of Rural Development: Discourses, Practices and Power’ in Booth, David (ed.) Rethinking Social Development: Theory: Research and Practice. Harlow: Longman. Bardhan, Pranab (2002). ‘Decentralization of Governance and Development’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(4), pp. 185–205. Bryld, Erik (2001). ‘Increasing Participation in Democratic Institutions Through Decentralization: Empowering Women and Scheduled Castes and Tribes Through Panchayat Raj in Rural India’, Democratization, 8(3), pp. 149–172. Conyers, Diana (1990). ‘Centralization and Development Planning: A Comparative Perspective’, Decentralizing for Participatory Planning, pp. 15–34. Dahlerup, Drude (2006). ‘The Story of the Theory of Critical Mass’, Politics & Gender, 2(4), pp. 511–522. Dollar, David, Fisman, Raymond and Gatti, Roberta (2001). ‘Are Women Really the “Fairer” Sex? Corruption and Women in Government’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 46(4), pp. 423–429.

The VWSC and community-led water projects  217 Eckersley, Peter, Ferry, Laurence and Zakaria, Zamzulaila (2014). ‘A Panoptical or Synoptical Approach to Monitoring Performance? Local Public Services in England and the Widening Accountability Gap’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 25(6), pp. 529–538. Foucault, Michel (1977). Discipline and Punish (A. Sheridan, Trans.). New York: Pantheon. Gulati, I. S. (1994). ‘Financial Devolution to Local Bodies: Role of State Finance Commissions’, Economic and Political Weekly, pp. 2622–2624. Leftwich, Adrian (1994). ‘Governance, The State and the Politics of Development’, Development and Change, 25(2), pp. 363–386. Madrigal, Róger, Alpízar, Francisco and Schlüter, Achim (2011). ‘Determinants of Performance of Community-Based Drinking Water Organizations’, World Development, 39(9), pp. 1663–1675. Nagarajan, Hari K., Binswanger-Mkhize, Hans P. and Meenakshisundaram, S. S. (2014). Decentralization and Empowerment for Rural Development. Cambridge University Press. Olson, Mancur (1965). Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies. v. 124). Harvard University Press. Ostrom, Elinor (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. Ostrom, Elinor (2007). ‘A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(39), pp. 15181–15187. Ribot, Jesse (2002). Democratic Decentralization of Natural Resources: Institutionalizing Popular Participation. Washington DC: World Resources Institute. Ribot, Jesse (2004). Waiting for Democracy: The Politics of Choice in Natural Resource Management. Washington DC: WRI Report, World Resource Institute. Rondinelli, Dennis A. (1991). ‘Decentralizing Water Supply Services in Developing Countries: Factors Affecting the Success of Community Management’, Public Administration and Development, 11(5), pp. 415–430. Saleth, R. Maria, and Dinar, Ariel (2004). The Institutional Economics of Water: A Cross-Country Analysis of Institutions and Performance. Washington DC: The World Bank. Tavangar, Jahangir (1989). Rural Water Supply, Sanitation and Developmental Issues in Asia and Near East. Report prepared for USAID, Washington, DC: Water and Sanitation for Health Project. Tommasi, Mariano, and Weinschelbaum, Federico (1999). A Principal-Agent Building Block for the Study of Decentralization and Integration. Universidad de San Andrés. Vedeld, Trond (2000). ‘Village Politics: Heterogeneity, Leadership and Collective Action’, The Journal of Development Studies, 36(5), pp. 105–134.

Part V

Urban decentralisation



11 Urban decentralisation and local governance in the context of urban centralisation Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh Anil Kumar Vaddiraju Introduction This chapter argues that while studying the urbanisation process in contemporary developing countries as much attention should be devoted to governance as to the political economy. Second, taking the example of two south Indian states, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh,1 this chapter argues that both states are characterised by ‘urban primacy’, i.e. the size of the first cities (Bangalore and Hyderabad) is many times larger than the second cities (district-level cities). This connotes what Kundu (2014) earlier called ‘top-heavy’ urbanisation in these two states. The chapter further argues that this ‘top-heavy’ urbanisation process has deleterious effects on participatory local governance of both district-level cities and the ‘primate cities’ themselves. In this pattern of development, while the district-level cities suffer owing to lack of sufficient attention on their governance, primate cities’ governance too suffers owing to their ungovernability stemming from the scale of the local politics. Urban citizen participation and local self-governance thus becomes only nominal in both the metropolitan and district-level cities. This chapter further argues that urban primacy also means political centralisation in terms of primate city development running counter to the logic of decentralisation, local self-governance, and the subsidiarity principle. Urban primacy, as mentioned above, runs squarely counter to participatory democracy and decentralisation drives, reforms, and laws. Both intra-city and inter-city decision-making powers get concentrated in the hands of top political elite groups owing to the fact that these mega urban agglomerations also serve as political capitals. This pattern of centralised urban development is the very antithesis of the decentralisation process. The repercussions of participatory, decentralised local governance are all too severe to be overlooked in this pattern of urban development, which is essentially a centralised development process. What we are trying to explain in this chapter is that the pattern of development in these states is largely urban-centric and metropolitan-centric. There is a tension between this pattern of the development process, on the one hand, and decentralisation, even urban decentralisation drives, reforms, and laws, on the other. No DOI: 10.4324/9781003094357-11

222  Anil Kumar Vaddiraju wonder, in the contexts of such urban centralisation or urban primacy, the implementation of laws such as the 74th Constitutional Amendment (CAA) is defeated often in spirit and letter. The keywords for this pattern of development are urban centralisation, primacy, metropolitanisation, top-heavy development, rather than decentralised development, local self-governance, participatory governance, local democracy and development. This pattern of development fails the spirit of local self-governance in general and urban local self-governance in particular. This chapter attempts to elaborate on these themes. While the above themes are the focus of this chapter, the chapter is structured in the following way: the first section deals with the approach of the chapter and makes clear as to why a re-orientation of focus is needed in urbanisation studies from political economy to governance. The second section deals with a comparison of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh; the third section focuses on the nature of urban primacy and its effects on governance; and the fourth section draws all the strands together and forms the conclusion.

Governance or political economy? From a perspective of urbanisation, it is often viewed that while the cities of the Western world form the core of urban governance, those of the developing countries continue to grapple mainly with the issues of political economy or are characterised, as they have been, by informal economies and other political economy issues, such as the tertiary sector. Another strand of argument is that since cities of the developing countries evolved from the erstwhile Western colonialism (and hence as the outposts of the Western world2), they constitute ‘peripheral’ cities not only in the context of global political economy, but also as far as the subject of urban governance is concerned (Flanagan, 1993). This point of view is presented by Flanagan in his Contemporary Urban Sociology (pp. 130–131). However, this point of view needs to be corrected in that not only the developing country cities have no longer remained on the global periphery (as clearly mentioned in the South Asia Human Development Report of 2014 by MHDC cited below). However important the political economy may be, these cities have also acquired new features and new problems related to urban governance. The point to be noted is that the ‘governance dimension’ of these cities is critically important3 for the overall wellbeing of the inhabitants of the cities. In contrast to Flanagan’s viewpoint, urbanisation in the context of developing countries has received increased positive attention in the texts of urban politics (Davies and Imbroscio, 2009) in that there is a greater appreciation observed of the developing country urbanisation pattern in respect of urban politics and urban governance vis-a-vis Flanagan’s views. In fact the political economy approach followed by Flanagan largely describes

Local governance and urban centralisation  223 the developing country urbanisation pattern in negative terms, while Stern (2009), for example, after reviewing the state-of-the-art in developing country urban studies, observes: As the growing importance (socially and economically) of cities is recognised, urban political studies will undoubtedly gain more traction in the comparative field. Just as political studies have followed urbanisation patterns in the United States and Western Europe, the force of practical issues – such as dealing with poverty, disease, inequity, social diversity and infrastructural scarcity – will demand imaginative ideas that can help us to understand the complex politics of urban development of 80 per cent of the world’s population. For the future of urban political studies in developing countries, there is nowhere to go but up. The above observations made by Stern (2009, pp. 164–165) are indicative of a very positive attitude shown by urban politics texts towards developing country urban politics and governance issues. The reasons for Flanagan taking a negative view and later urban politics texts taking a more positive approach are both ideological and temporal in nature. First, Flanagan takes an explicitly Marxian approach rooted in the third world studies of the 1980s and 1990s. Second, ever since Flanagan wrote his text in 1993, urbanisation as a process has picked up momentum in the developing world in general and South Asia in particular. With an increasing momentum of urbanisation taking place in this part of the world, which remains largely unplanned, ad hoc, and haphazard, a plethora of urban politics and governance issues have come to the fore. Therefore while we do not dismiss the ideological approach followed by Flanagan, the issues that have emerged today in the context of the developing world and South Asian urban areas in particular have more to do with urban governance, politics, and planning. In fact there is now a reconsideration of the entire approach of viewing the world in three parts, first, second, and the third, besides many ramifications that the temporal and spatial changes have brought in to bear upon such a point of view. Another important point is that not all cities in developing countries have had an equal degree of colonial past, and second those which were noncolonial cities, mostly parts of the local princely states, have had their own significant share of ethnic diversities and issues. A singular political economy approach may possibly gloss over these dimensions of reality while sidestepping the most crucial issues pertaining to the politics and governance of these cities; while on the other side, politics of class, as political economy so significantly focuses upon, forms only a marginal dimension of the politics and governance of these cities. The dichotomising of governance and political economy may appear less than correct, as some would argue that both dimensions are important. The central focus on governance in this chapter is on the ground

224  Anil Kumar Vaddiraju that so far there has been an overemphasis on urban political economy rather than urban governance and politics. This exclusive focus on political economy most often overlooks the complex and relevant aspects of politics and governance. Second, most political economy studies concentrate on metropolitan urban agglomerations, ignoring the district-level cities. This holds true in spite of the studies, as exceptions, that deal with the issue of urban governance with respect to the cities of developing countries. Flanagan’s study, mentioned above, falls under the group of political economy studies. Flanagan discounts all other approaches to studying the developing world’s urban reality, other than a political economy/world system approach. This is true of both the developing world and South Asian region, with the latter being considered historically as the least urbanised part of the developing world. It is indeed in keeping with the momentum of the South Asian urbanisation process that the Human Development Report of South Asia made urbanisation its major theme in 2014 (MHDC, 2014). This fact indicates that there has been definite change as far as urbanisation in the context of developing countries is considered, between 1993 and 2014. The South Asia Human Development Report of 2014 (MHDC, 2014, pp. 4–5), for example, observes as follows: The challenges posed by urbanisation in South Asia are complex and multi-faceted, especially when that urbanisation has been rapid, mostly unplanned and disorganised. When these are compounded by pollution, congestion and inadequate basic services, including water, power and transport, urbanisation can become a nightmare for all, including policy makers … On the contrary, urbanisation also provides opportunities. Urbanisation can be a major force of wealth creation and freedom from deprivation. It is the driving force for modernisation, economic growth and human development. The above observation amply brings to the fore the dilemmas posed by the kind of urbanisation process taking place in the developing countries in general and South Asia in particular. Especially the keywords used in explaining the urbanisation process in South Asia today, i.e. ‘rapid, mostly unplanned and disorganised’, point to the adverse impact on governance in terms of providing the basic facilities to the city dwellers and even overshadowing the other advantages associated with the urbanisation. One of the major findings of the South Asia Human Development Report 2014 (MHDC, 2014, pp. 2–3) is: Urbanisation in South Asia has been rapid, unplanned and uneven, with a large share of the population concentrated in few large cities. The share of the small and medium cities in the total urban population has

Local governance and urban centralisation  225 been declining over time, putting strains on existing resources in the megacities. In this context, this study focuses on urban governance in district-level cities in India. In fact, we look at both urban governance and local democracy. The concept of governance From the foregoing discussion, it shows that the governance of cities is just as important as their political economy. The word governance has multiple connotations. The term has come to be used essentially as neoliberal governance wherein the state retreats and is no more a regulator or provider but a facilitator. Following this definition, the state essentially has to facilitate markets and market-led development. The state of this type is envisaged as consisting of a thin bureaucracy, with the majority of its functions being outsourced to either private market players or civil society. This definition of the state builds on the failure of the commandist state in delivering high rates of economic growth. This is essentially an economic definition of the state in terms of its ability to promote markets and market associated development. The definition of a facilitator state came into prominence, essentially in the 1990s. Mark Bevir (2011) defines governance essentially as a ‘pattern of rule’ in which the state is characterised by a certain hybridness. That is, the state combines its functions, in its pursuit of retreat, the outsourcing of its major functions to markets and civil society actors. Another definition of governance is provided by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), according to which the state has to function in partnership with the market and civil society in a tri-sector (state, market, and civil society) model. However, these definitions discussed above connote roles for markets and civil society actors in varying degrees. Another dimension of governance concerns the relationship between governance and social capital. According to this definition, governance becomes effective, efficient, and economical only if there is social capital in its surrounding society. That is, the more civil society organisations pressurise the state to work, the better the functioning of the state will be. To put it differently, it is the density of civil society organisations, and their willingness and attempts to engage the state, according to this point of view, that matters. Also, following this viewpoint, the state–civil society relationship is crucial: whether the nature of the relationship is synergistic or contestatory. In this chapter, by governance we mean Constitutional governance. That is, governance as laid out by the Indian Constitution, particularly the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA) concerning urban governance. Accordingly, this chapter examines whether the governance in district-level cities conforms to this mandatory stipulation or not.

226  Anil Kumar Vaddiraju The urban decentralisation law being implemented in district-level cities in India is the 74th CAA, the main features of which include: The macro national policy The macro-policy for urban governance at the district level is provided by the 74th CAA. The main features of this are: conducting regular periodic elections with affirmative action of reserving seats and authority positions for Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (SCs/STs), other backward classes (which is optional), and one-third for women; planning for town/ city through District Planning Committees, planning for metropolitan cities through Metropolitan Planning Committees; and constituting ward committees for citizen participation in governance. As regards planning, the Constitution, as per Article 243ZD (Jha and Mathur, 1999), has the following to say: 1. There shall be constituted in every state at the district level a district planning committee to consolidate the plans provided by the Panchayats and the municipalities in the district and to prepare a draft development plan for the district as a whole. 2. The legislature of a state may, by law, may make provisions with respect to a) The composition of the District Planning Committees b) The manner in which the seats in such committees shall be filled. Provided that not less than four-fifths of the total number of members of such committee shall be elected by, and from amongst, the elected members of panchayat at the district level and of the municipalities in the district in proportion to the ratio between the population of the rural areas and of the urban areas in the district; c) The functions relating to district planning which may be assigned to such committees; d) The manner in which the chairperson of such committees shall be chosen According to the 12th Schedule of the Constitution, i.e. Article 243W, 18 aspects4 of governance are to be devolved to urban local bodies (Jha and Mathur, 1999). Therefore, the macro-policy towards district urban planning and governance is clear. The CAA is also clear on the devolution of powers and functions to be devolved to the local bodies. However, while the Constitutional authority is promulgated by the central government and legislature, powers and functions to the local bodies are to be devolved by state governments in India. The interesting point is that the Indian state and its bureaucracy have to adapt to both the facilitator paradigm of governance and the Constitutional decentralisation process. The Indian state’s response to adapting to both

Local governance and urban centralisation  227 is imperfect, leaving much to be desired. Das (2013) notes the same point regarding bureaucracy. And it comes out in this study that this is the crucial dilemma that the district-level governance surrounds. This dilemma defines the very essence of the functioning or otherwise of local democracy, defined by the Constitution as local self-government. Besides bureaucracy many other structures of the state also tend to resist local self-governments, particularly in urban areas at all levels. The Indian bureaucracy, in particular, appears markedly reluctant to adapt to both the concepts of state-as-facilitator and urban local self-government. This aspect is noted by Das (2013) as well. Das, for example, observes: As regards the facilitator’s role, there have been significant problems. For example, the provisions of the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution provide for passing on power to the elected members of the local bodies. These amendments have brought about a local governance system in which participate, regulate and monitor how agreedupon things are done […] Unfortunately, most civil servants working at the field level are yet to come to terms with their diminished role. (Das, 2013, pp. 56–57) In the context of the above discussion the chapter below examines how urban local governance suffers in the context of increasing urban centralisation and urban primacy. We take the states of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh to demonstrate this.

Comparison between Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh The methodological approach adopted in the chapter relates to a comparison of Karnataka with Andhra Pradesh. Why these states? Because, at the outset, we have to note that the economic reforms initiated since 1991 have led to tremendous regional disparities in the country. Not all the states of the country have been growing evenly. The southern states, along with the western states such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Punjab, have been growing at a faster rate than the eastern and northern states. The growth of southern states has been rapid, with Karnataka and erstwhile Andhra Pradesh being part of this process. Indeed, these two states adopted economic and governance reforms early on, and, as a consequence, investments have been flowing to these states significantly in sectors such as Information Technology (IT) and Information Technology Enabled Services (ITES), Biotechnology and the service sector.5 Today Karnataka, more specifically Bangalore, which has come to be known as the ‘silicon valley of India’, alone accounts for 38 per cent of the software exports from the country, followed by Andhra Pradesh (read Hyderabad), accounting for 14 per cent of the software exports (Das and Sagara, 2017). The then two chief ministers of these states, S. M. Krishna in Karnataka and N. Chandrababu Naidu in

228  Anil Kumar Vaddiraju Andhra Pradesh have been more than enthusiastic about the economic and governance reforms. In fact, the latter was called, at that time, the ‘poster boy’ of economic and governance reforms, as he was able to attract substantial investments into the state. These reforms initiated by these two chief ministers in the early 1990s have been continuing irrespective of the change of parties in government, change of chief ministers, and even bifurcation of the state of Andhra Pradesh. In fact, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh have been competing with one another for attracting investments. The politics underlying these reforms have been well noted (Mooij, 2005; Assadi, 2017; Srinivasulu, 2017). In the scholarly literature, one finds three explicit comparisons carried out with respect to these two states (Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka): one by Balasubrmanyam and Balasubramanyam (2012) and the other by Manor (2006). The first one, while comparing the political economy of these two states, holds that these are ‘disparate twins’, and the second paper by Manor (2006) compares the ‘successful governance reforms’ of these two states. Balasubramanyam and Balasubramanyam (2012) argue that the Karnataka model of development, led by software technology and the tertiary sector, has not succeeded in reducing rural poverty and that a substantial rural–urban inequality has led to Karnataka’s ‘elitist’ growth. The study in fact terms it as the ‘Karnataka’s Elitist Growth Model’; on the other hand the study claims that that the AP model of development has been able to reduce rural poverty to a fair extent, thanks to what the study calls a ‘Populist Model of Development?’ (the study observes this with a question mark). Following the study, the success of the AP model in substantially reducing both rural poverty and urban poverty could be attributed to the populist policies introduced by successive governments (Balasubramanyam and Balasubramanyam, 2012, pp. 50–51). These authors observe that: Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, though geographically contiguous, exhibit distinctly different growth and development trajectories. AP’s record on reduction of poverty and fertility is commendable though it ranks lower than most other states, including Karnataka on other development indicators, such as literacy rates and absolute levels of mortality. Growth in Karnataka is driven mostly by the tertiary sector and skill intensive manufactures. The sort of growth experienced by Karnataka has provided jobs for the skilled and earned it kudos for its contribution to the production and export of software from the country. But its record on poverty reduction and creation of employment is relatively poor. The growth and development experience of the two states illustrates the influence of history and institutions in shaping policies for development and implementing them.

Local governance and urban centralisation  229 In the second instance of comparison, Manor (2006) discusses some prominent governance reforms being successfully implemented in both the states, such as the Bhoomi project, the Bangalore Action Task Force (BATF) in Karnataka, the women’s self-help group programme, Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA), and the Hyderabad metro water reforms, etc. In this regard, he highlights the political leadership in steering these reforms successfully. He also compares the political developments of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. Thus, these two adjacent states, which also share strong linguistic and cultural similarities, have been compared earlier in the literature. And what we are attempting in this chapter is in the same vein. The two states have been growing at a rapid pace besides being ahead in carrying out economic and governance reforms. The point, however, is the growth in these two states, thanks to the early adoption of economic and governance reforms, has been taking place in and around the capital cities. In Karnataka, the growth has been in and around Bangalore, while in erstwhile Andhra Pradesh, in and around Hyderabad. Thus the growth, a fall out of economic reforms, has also resulted in an uneven, metropolitan urban growth. This uneven metropolitan urban growth has all the characteristics of the top-heavy urban growth that Kundu has mentioned. Moreover, this urban growth is happening when the surrounding agricultural regions of the two states remain relatively neglected. Thus, the growth story presents itself as a regionally uneven and basically urban phenomenon. In fact one study terms the Chandrababu Naidu initiated growth path as ‘Hyderabad-centric’ (Srinivasulu, 2017) and the same holds true in the case of Bangalore. It is also true that the agricultural sector in these states has been in dire straits. Farmers’ suicides have been taking place in both states. Scholarly reports with precise reasons and the extent of farmers’ suicides remain few and far between. However, the media has more often than not put the number of suicides into the thousands in both the states. Thus, the alarm bells are ringing clearly as far as the agricultural sector is concerned. Thus, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and now Telangana are comparable in view of a similar pattern of development. It is precisely that growth is taking place in urban areas and is largely urban-centric. Therefore, it is important to examine the nature of urbanisation in these two states. That is what this chapter intends to undertake. In the context of the above-said pattern of development, what has been happening to the governance of district-tier cities in these states? That is what we attempt to explore comparatively. Urban primacy and urban centralisation6 Kundu (2009) has earlier characterised the Asian and Indian urban development pattern as ‘exclusionary urban development’. While this is true, what

230  Anil Kumar Vaddiraju is taking place is not only exclusionary for social groups, but also spatially very unequal and uneven. The pattern of urbanisation in the three south Indian states under consideration is so characterised by ‘urban primacy’ and spatial inequality7 that it is similar to what was earlier evidenced in respect of the Latin American continent. Here only one city in each state dominates urban development while the rest of the cities are either comparatively small or their development and governance have got stunted. The qualitative and quantitative nature of development is that of ‘primate cities’; the cities surrounding them are different in terms of demography, political economy, civic amenities and governance. We discuss the same below:

‘Urban primacy’ in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh Urban primacy and centralisation is a significant factor in the urban development in these two states. The concept of urban primacy was originally introduced by geographer Mark Jefferson (Jefferson, 1939). As Jordanian scholar Servet Mutlu (Mutlu, 1989, pp. 611–612) puts it: ‘Primacy, in the original Jeffersonian sense of the term, means that the size of the first city in a country is disproportionately large in relation to the size of the second city’. The literature on urban primacy informs that this is a feature that usually takes place in the development pattern of today’s developing countries. Particularly, this phenomenon is pronounced in the context of Latin America (Browning, 1989). Browning, for example, says: The urban system of most Latin American countries is dominated by a primate city which overwhelms the cultural, economic, political and social life of the nation.’ And Browning goes on to say, ‘Latin America, among the world’s regions, is most characterised by high primacy. Most Latin American countries not only have a primate city, they exhibit strong or prominent primacy. A disturbing recent trend is the growth of many of the primate cities into giant cities with populations exceeding six million. (Browning, 1989, pp. 71–72) The urban development process in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh exhibits a very high level of spatial concentration; there is no spatial de-concentration or decentralisation of urban development. Therefore, much of the attention is directed towards the development of Bangalore and Hyderabad cities in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, respectively. The impact of this urban primacy is increasingly being reflected in the neglect of district-tier cities with respect to development, governance and democracy. The literature on urban primacy informs that such a phenomenon is associated

Local governance and urban centralisation  231 with inequality among cities within the urban system, intra-city inequality among social groups and that this pattern of development is highly eliteoriented. The figures given below attest to the phenomenon of primate city development: Karnataka •• ••

According to the 2011 census, Bangalore, with an 8.426 million population, is 9.49 times bigger than Mysore, the latter with a population of 887,446. According to the 2011 census, Bangalore, with a population of 8.426 million, is 8.9 times bigger than the second biggest city of Karnataka Hubballi, Dharwad, with a population of 943,857.

Andhra Pradesh ••

••

According to the 2011 census, Hyderabad, with a population of 6.81 million, is bigger than the next biggest city in Andhra Pradesh, Warangal, by 8.3 times. Warangal has a population of 811,844 (close to the Mysore population). According to the 2011 census, Hyderabad, with a population of 6.81 million, is bigger than the next biggest city in Andhra Pradesh, Guntur, by 9.15 times. Guntur’s population is 743,654.

Earlier, we cited Kundu’s contention that the Indian urbanisation process is ‘top-heavy’ (Kundu, 2014). We need to examine this concept in some detail. First, this ‘top-heavy’ urbanisation process is partly a historical hangover of colonial development, and second the rapidly increasing primate city development has its roots in the economic reforms introduced since 1991. In fact, it is the competitive interest shown by state governments in attracting industries such as IT and ITES, biotechnology industry and all other forms of industry and investments to the capital cities that have resulted in this ‘top-heavy’ urbanisation or primate city development. For example, Shaw (1999, pp. 976–977) says the following regarding Hyderabad in her article calling the latter, ‘The Rising Star: Hyderabad’: No other city has been hailed as much by the media as Hyderabad, symbolising an information-based economy exporting to global markets and drawing on high-quality professionals and technology as Hyderabad. And no other state has received as much media attention in this context as Andhra Pradesh. Though Bangalore is still ahead in terms of its software output, Hyderabad is predicted to overtake it in the 21st century. The thrust towards software and information systems of Andhra Pradesh and Hyderabad received a

232  Anil Kumar Vaddiraju big boost in the mid-nineties with Chandrababu Naidu coming to power in the state. As for Karnataka, the official document ‘Urban Development Policy for Karnataka’ (GOK, 2009, pp. 7–8) states thus: As in the case of economic and human development, there are serious regional imbalances in urban development in Karnataka... Much of the imbalance is caused by the huge gap between the size and economic role of Bangalore and the next largest cities in the state or what may be called the ‘Bangalore-centric’ development. Some of the additional implications of this process are presented here. Urban primacy means the spatial concentration of the urban population; in fact, one big city develops, overtaking others in terms of population growth: thus acquires the position of a mega urban agglomeration with the service sector, industry and informal economies all being concentrated in such mega urban agglomerations. In terms of census classification, these become metropolises. What appears disturbing is that this pattern of urban growth is highly and fallaciously recommended by economists because the process is said to carry with it economies of scale and positive externalities. However, this pattern of urban growth has serious negative implications for politics and local governance. Some of these we discuss as below: Urban primacy means political concentration in that political power flows from cities. What takes place is a spatial concentration of political and bureaucratic power with the offices of government, bureaucracy, justice, and law and order, getting concentrated in the mega urban agglomerations. This in turn leads to the spatial concentration of the decision-making power with respect to all the matters that concern the citizens of the entire geographical region. Urban primacy also means the domination of a single city over others. The mega urban agglomerations that flourish in the processes described above tend to dominate economically, politically, and culturally all the other cities and other surrounding rural areas of the region. These mega urban agglomerations become centres of economic, political and cultural elites who spin around themselves entire paraphernalia of media, technocracy and political middlemen. The culture industries of a particular language or ethnic groups too become concentrated in these mega urban agglomerations, thus making them invincible to other cities in terms of hegemony and also their economies wield enormous power and dominance. And the last, but not least, the financial services of an entire economy too get concentrated in these cities. Cities of this type (described as mega urban agglomerations) become hubs and headquarters of finance capital from where financial services branch out to other places in the region.

Local governance and urban centralisation  233

Urban primacy, centralisation, and local self-governance Urban primacy also means political centralisation in terms of primate city development running counter to the logic of decentralisation, local self-governance, and subsidiarity principle. Urban primacy, as mentioned above, runs squarely counter to the decentralisation drives, reforms, and laws. Both intra-city and inter-city decision-making powers get concentrated in the hands of top political elite groups considering that these mega urban agglomerations also serve as political capitals. This pattern of urban development is the very antithesis of the decentralisation process. Urban development of this kind leads to the concentration of all health and educational services in one city. Often, mega urban agglomerations also happen to be centres of education and health – both public and private. All university and higher education centres, and all hospitals and the healthcare industry in general, get concentrated in mega urban agglomerations, thus causing enormous difficulties in the process for the citizens in other places in the region in terms of accessing them when in need. Gradually, these education and health industries develop their own elite groups that are more interested in protecting their vested interests in these mega urban agglomerations. Thus a primate city becomes the only repository of these high-quality services such as super-speciality hospitals and higher education in elite institutions of technology and management, besides hosting a multitude of elite ‘think tanks’ of policy thinking and making. Browning (1989), while discussing the consequences of urban primacy, notes that the following are telling consequences: Growth of the larger primate cities has worsened already severe urban problems: traffic, pollution (air and water), the provision of water and waste disposal, and increase in land prices and crime levels. Politicians and political parties are often particularly sensitive to the needs of primate city, traditionally a symbol of national pride and achievement. The political authorities also view these giant cities as potential tinder boxes of discontent. Thus there is a tendency to favour the primate city at the expense of the smaller towns and rural areas who are left to muddle through because they pose less of a threat to political stability. Tables 11.1 and 11.2 clearly point to a population concentration in two major capitals. Following the 2011 census, this data taken at one point clearly alerts us to the process and nature of urban development. This spatial concentration of urban development wherein a single city dominates over all other district cities is called the development of ‘urban primacy’. The nature of this development as we have argued earlier tells us about

234  Anil Kumar Vaddiraju Table 11.1 Sample Demographics of Urban System in Karnataka City

Level of the City

Population (2011)

Bangalore Hubballi-Dharwad (H-D) Navalgund Kalghatgi Kundagol Udupi Karkala Kundapur Udupi

State Capital District Capital Taluka of Dharwad District Taluka of Dharwad District Taluka of Dharwad District District Capital Taluka of Udupi District Taluka of Udupi District Taluka of Udupi District

8,426,000 943,857 24,613 14,676 16,837 165,401 25,824 160,000

Source: GOI: Census of India, 2011.

Table 11.2 Sample Demographics of Urban System in Andhra Pradesh City

Level of the City

Population (2011)

Hyderabad Mahabubnagar Mahabubnagar Badepally Narayanpet Kurnool Nandyal Adoni Yemmiganur Dhone

State Capital District Capital Mandal of Mahabubnagar District Mandal of Mahabubnagar District Mandal of Mahabubnagar District District Capital Mandal of Kurnool District Mandal of Kurnool District Mandal of Kurnool District Mandal of Kurnool District

6,810,000 217,942 32,598 41,752 424,920 211,000 166,344 95,149 59,272

Source: GOI: Census of India, 2011.

the ‘metropolisation’ of urban development in these two states. By ‘urban primacy’ we do not mean that the urban sector is the primary sector. The phrase ‘urban primacy’ connotes a specific meaning of the metropolisation of urban development and urban concentration of the population according to what Amitabh Kundu has earlier called a ‘top-heavy’ urban development process with serious implications for all the other sectors and also other cities of the region. The main consequence of the above-described pattern of urban development is that district and taluk-tier cities get completely neglected in respect of urban development and governance policy. Within these, the condition of the district-tier cities – which serve as district capitals – is somewhat better, as they can easily draw the immediate attention of bureaucrats who stay and work there. When compared even to the district-tier cities, the taluk-tier cities – which are home to Taluk Panchayats – suffer most. Their development and governance are nobody’s concern, and usually they fall outside

Local governance and urban centralisation  235 the attention purview of politicians, bureaucrats, and planners; nor do they have anyone to champion their cause. They are struggling through various stages of decay, and their woes regarding basic services as sanitation, drinking water, and solid waste disposal remain unaddressed. The citizens of these cities become second rate or third rate citizens in the urban hierarchy, as per the urbanity norms. They are neither rural nor urban. Neither do they have Grama Sabhas to vent their grievances nor is there a vocal media to speak on behalf of them. Thus, the condition of cities that serve as taluk headquarters is that of a limbo between the rural and urban; further, these cities are neglected by authorities who care for rural areas and those who care for urban areas. Often they lack in the industry and manufacturing sector or service sector. These taluk headquarters, as a consequence, become massive sources of out-migration to primate cities. However, urban decentralisation following the 74th Amendment to the Constitution happens to be a state subject. However, most state governments appear reluctant to implement this law in letter and spirit. The Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh governments are no different in this respect. As far as laws per se are concerned, in Karnataka the previous laws such as the Karnataka Municipalities Act of 1964, and the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act of 1976, are still prevalent and operative. According to the Constitution, the earlier laws have to be abolished, and the 74th Amendment to the Constitution should be fully followed in the governance of cities. This, however, has not happened. The situation is similar in Andhra Pradesh state. Thus, city-level governance still privileges the laws prior to the 74th Amendment Law. In addition to this, our studies show that district-level governance is run primarily by bureaucracy in both states. While it is the Deputy Commissioner’s office that takes all the important decisions regarding district-level urban governance in Karnataka, it is the Municipal Commissioner’s office that takes all the decisions regarding the same in Andhra Pradesh. With regard to the District Planning Committees (DPCs), these institutions are formed in Karnataka and are essentially planning for rural areas, where they work – but in a substantial number of districts in Karnataka they are not in a working condition, and in Andhra Pradesh they are not even formed. Thus the role of DPCs as institutions is solely limited to rural planning if at all they are conducting district planning. District-level urban planning is next to absent, and while there is some growth of district-level cities this takes place in an ‘unplanned, ad hoc, and haphazard’ manner. Thus this author contests the claim that there is sufficient urban governance and planning at the district level.

Conclusions As already stated in the introduction to this chapter, developing country cities can be approached either from the point of view of political economy

236  Anil Kumar Vaddiraju or governance. We have preferred to follow the latter approach. We have argued that although we do not dismiss the approaches of political economy focusing on informal and tertiary sectors of cities, what we have tried to highlight is that the developing country cities also have come to be confronted with remarkable governance problems of late, particularly against the backdrop of a rapidly growing urbanisation process and urban centralisation. Therefore focusing on the governance of cities is important. Second and more importantly we have argued that the states of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh are characterised by the development of primate cities of Bangalore and Hyderabad. We have also discussed the consequences of primate city development for the rest of the cities in both states. We held that the major consequence of the development of the primate cities is that the district-tier cities get neglected in governance and provision of basic minimum needs and urban planning. Shaw’s observation8 in this regard is true. Finally, does urban concentration mean poor governance? Both at the level of district-tier cities and taluk level and at the level of primate cities themselves? The answer to this question is an unequivocal ‘yes’. As we argued earlier, primate city development runs counter to the spirit of Constitutional local self-governance. First, the primate cities themselves become too large for the purpose of local self-governance. In the process of urban concentration, the spirit of decentralisation is lost. Second, even for those who govern these cities in the current fashion, the cities are simply too large in size to be manageable. All the problems that Browning has mentioned above in the context of Latin America are also true of the Indian primate city development. That is to say, clearly there is an inverse relationship between the governability of the city and the size of the urban agglomeration. The current problems that the megacities in India are affected with are a clear indication of these: traffic congestion; air pollution; housing problems; increasing crime rate; and the failure of civic authorities and citizens to take action on any of these in an effective manner. This is besides the problems of dominance and hegemony of the primate cities over the lower-tier cities that we have mentioned earlier. At the level of the district-level cities – at any rate in the current dispensation – we have argued that the 74th Amendment to the Constitution is observed only cursorily, certainly not beyond the conduct of periodic elections. The actual practice of urban governance firstly takes place in terms of the laws prior to that of the Amendment, and the district urban governance is run by the Deputy Commissioner as in the case of Karnataka, or the same is run by the district Municipal Commissioner in the case of Andhra Pradesh. We have also mentioned that the DPCs are instituted in Karnataka but do not function effectively vis-a-vis urban governance, and the same are not even in place in Andhra Pradesh. Considering this fact the district-level urban governance and planning certainly are far from what they are envisaged to take place in terms of local self-governance by the

Local governance and urban centralisation  237 Indian Constitution. The policy implication that flows from this discussion is, therefore, that there should be both spatial de-concentration of urban development and political decentralisation of urban governance.

Notes 1 Throughout this chapter the name Andhra Pradesh is used to connote both Telangana and Andhra Pradesh as the state was divided only recently and division of the state does not have much bearing on the central arguments of the chapter. The development of Hyderabad as an Information Technology (IT) centre has happened much before the division of the state. And is since only, if anything, augmented further after the division of the state into Telangana and new Andhra Pradesh. 2 Contrary to the opinion that colonial legacy is the reason why we neglected large cities, this author thinks that, in the first place, colonial legacy is why we have the current large cities. Colonial rule depended primarily on creating three presidency areas of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras and these three primate cities, later along with Delhi and some others have developed in a neo-colonial and neo-liberal model of development. 3 This chapter does not deal with the political economy issues of the cities. For example we do not devote much space to deal with issues such as unemployment, inequality and poverty because these are not the focus around which the chapter is written. 4 The ‘Twelfth Schedule’ of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act consists of 18 items on which powers have to be devolved for urban local self-governing institutions (Jha and Mathur, 1999, pp. 304–305). 5 On the reforms carried out to encourage IT and ITES in India and the extent of development of IT sector in various states including Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, see a recent paper by, Keshab Das and Hastimal Sagara (Das and Sagara, 2017). 6 Written five years after the initiation of the liberalisation process Annapurna Shaw’s article sounds almost prophetic. Most of her predictions on the future of urbanisation under a liberalised economy have come true regarding Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. For instance Shaw observes thus: ‘With the industrial /business class on the ascendency, greater attention will be focused on the urban – the headquarter location of major industry and business and the place of residency of this class. State governments will compete with one another to provide the best urban facilities in order to attract new industries and business, particularly, those involving foreign equity. This will necessitate major investments in urban infrastructure and the largest metro cities with their already developed markets and basic infrastructure would receive the greatest attention’ – Shaw (1996, pp. 227–228). 7 I thank Professor Kala Seetharam Sridhar, who at first brought this phenomenon to my notice regarding Bangalore and Karnataka (personal communication). 8 ‘However, there exists considerable tension between the state and urban local bodies with the former unwilling to relinquish its control over the urban. It is seen, for instance, in the slow compliance of most states to the 74th (Constitution Amendment) Act, 1992. This will affect the speed with which urban areas are able to become vibrant, democratic units of self-governance, accountable to the local population. Until this transition is made from the state to the local level, policy making will remain mostly rhetorical with little impact on the day-to-day living conditions in our cities’ (Shaw, 1996, pp. 227–228).

238  Anil Kumar Vaddiraju

References Assadi, Muzaffar (2017). ‘State, Society and Identity Politics in Karnataka: Shifting Paradigms’ in Roy, Himanshu, Singh, M. P. and Chouhan, A. P. S. (eds.) State Politics in India. New Delhi: Primus, pp. 387–408. Balsubramanyam, V. N. and Balsubramanyam, A. (2012). ‘Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh: The Disparate Twins’ in K. Pushpangadan and V. N. Balasubramanyam (eds.) Growth, Development and Diversity: India’s Record Since Liberalisation. New Delhi: OUP, pp. 23–54. Bevir, Mark (eds.) (2011). The SAGE Handbook of Governance. London: SAGE. Browning, Clyde. E. (1989). Year Book (Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers), 15, pp. 71–78 (accessed from JSTOR). Davies, Jonathan S. and Imbroscio, David L. (eds.) (2009). Theories of Urban Politics. Los Angeles: Sage. Das, Keshab and Sagara, Hastimal (2017). ‘State and IT Industry in India: An Overview’, Economic and Political Weekly, LII(41), pp. 56–64. Das S. K. (2013). The Civil Services in India, New Delhi: OUP. Flanagan, William G. (1993). Contemporary Urban Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Government of India (2011). Census of India. https://censusindia​.gov​.in (Accessed on 17th February, 2018). Government of Karnataka (2009). Urban Development Policy for Karnataka − 2009. Bangalore: Government of Karnataka. Jefferson, Mark (1939). ‘The Law of the Primate City’, Geographical Review, 29, pp. 226–232. Jha, S. N. and Mathur, P. C. (1999). Decentralization and Local Politics. New Delhi: Sage. Kundu, Amitabh (2009). ‘Exclusionary Urbanization in Asia: A Macro Overview’, Economic and Political Weekly, XLIV(48), pp. 48–58, 28 November. Kundu, Amitabh (2014). ‘India’s Sluggish Urbanisation and its Exclusionary Development’ in Mc Granahan, G and Martine, George (eds.) Urban Growth in Emerging Economies: Lessons from the BRICS. London and New York: Earthscan and Routledge, pp. 191–233. MHDC (2014). Human Development in South Asia 2014: Urbanization: Challenges and Opportunities. Lahore: Mahabub ul Haq Human Development Centre (MHDC). Manor, James (2006). ‘Successful Governance Reforms in Two States: Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh’, IDS, Sussex Working Paper, Brighton, Sussex: Institute of Development Studies. Manor, James (2004). ‘Explaining Political Trajectories in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka’ in Jenkins, Rob (ed.) Regional Reflections: Comparing Politics across Indian States. New Delhi: OUP. Mooij, Jos (eds.) (2005). The Politics of Economic Reforms in India. New Delhi: Sage. Mutlu, Servet (1989). ‘Urban Concentration and Primacy Revisited: An Analysis and Some Policy Conclusions’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 37(3), pp. 611–639. Paul, Samuel, Sridhar, Kala Seetharam and Reddy, A.Venugopala (2012). State of Our Cities: Evidence from Karnataka. New Delhi: OUP.

Local governance and urban centralisation  239 Shaw, Annapurna (1996). ‘Urban Policy in Post-Independent India’, Economic and Political Weekly, 27 January. Srinivasulu, K. (2017). ‘Region, Caste and Politics in Andhra Pradesh: Mapping the Paradigm Shift in the State Politics’ in Roy, Himanshu, Singh, M. P. and Chouhan, A. P. S. (eds.) State Politics in India. Delhi: Primus, pp. 1–34. Stern, Richard (2009). ‘Globalisation and Urban Issues in the Non-Western World’, in Davies, Jonathan S. and Imbroscio, David L. (eds.) Theories of Urban Politics. Los Angeles: Sage.

12 Citizens’ participation in local governance A study of Residents Welfare Associations in Delhi Nivedita Bose In a public speech during the Delhi assembly election campaign, vying to become the next Chief Minister of Delhi, Arvind Kejriwal proclaimed, ‘janta ka nirnay hona chahiye ki unhe pyaas lagi hai ya bhook lagi hai’ (translated to contextualise, ‘people should decide if they want the government to act on food security or to provide water services’). He critiqued the heavily centralised process of planning in the country, which, he said, didn’t reflect the needs of the people. To solve this, an innovative scheme was launched after the Aam Aadmi Party came to power called the Mohalla Sabha (henceforth referred to as MS). It was stated that the MS would make decision-making more participatory, reflecting the aspirations and demands of the people involved. Some might argue that this wasn’t the first such experiment in the capital since the previous Congress-led government had also instituted the Bhagidari scheme, which involved Residents Welfare Associations and government officials, among other actors involved, in grievance redressal.1 In fact, these participatory schemes could be seen as manifestations of an increasing concern with improving urban infrastructure, services and on the upkeep of ‘good governance’, which are now considered vital by policymakers for achieving economic growth and on a larger scale realising India’s ambition of becoming a global superpower. After independence, although efforts were made to invoke people’s participation and create institutions in the country to realise these ideals, they were focused primarily on rural areas. For instance, Article 40 of the Directive Principles of State Policy mentioned the formation of Panchayats in rural areas; however, there was no mention of a corresponding body in urban areas. Municipal laws in cities remained archaic and belonged to the British era and, therefore, remained inadequate to tackle issues of burgeoning city life. Generally, from the 1990s, there has been a global trend in the promotion of decentralisation policies as part of the reform triptych ‘decentralization–privatization–participation’ (Tawa Lama-Rewal and Zérah, 2011). These reforms have been crucial in promoting the position of cities as ‘engines of economic growth’, which has manifested itself into policies and government interventions focused on increasing urban DOI: 10.4324/9781003094357-12

Citizens’ participation in local governance  241 productivity and urban renewal. This was made apparent in the landmark 74th Constitutional Amendment Act on decentralisation and local selfgovernance. The Amendment giving more powers to previously debilitated urban local bodies and the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission engraving the Community Participation Law are two critical events that support the stand that political decentralisation should also be accompanied by citizens’ participation in local decision-making. Multilateral bodies have also emphasised this aspect. A World Bank paper on ‘Governance and Development’ (1992) highlighted aspects such as transparency and accountability in defining the features of a ‘good government’, wherein political decentralisation and citizen participation are seen as a means of achieving both empowerment and development. It is in this context that there has been an increasing visibility of neighbourhood-based civic activism across major Indian cities, especially in the form of Residents Welfare Associations (henceforth referred to as RWAs). RWAs are essentially groupings of private property owners organised at the neighbourhood level. In Delhi, these are voluntary bodies registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1860. Each RWA has its own Memorandum of Association and a charter of rules and regulations pertaining to its membership, elections, and office positions. As neighbourhood civic associations require residents to pay regular (mostly monthly) subscription charges, they are engaged in everyday problem solving and grievance redressal related to the maintenance of common resources, infrastructure, and service delivery, such as those related to sanitation, security, and roads; celebration of cultural festivals; and increasingly with larger issues of governance and quality of life. Although the role of RWAs hasn’t been formally recognised in the decentralisation of governance, especially at the municipal level, the ethnographic fieldwork reveals that RWA office-bearers have become important informal conduits between urban residents and the state, who rely on their social capital to approach and negotiate with officials at various government and utility agencies. Moreover, participatory schemes by the Delhi government, especially Bhagidari became noteworthy in this context as they institutionalised citizen participation at the level of the neighbourhood through RWAs without changing any formal political structures; they signalled a change in the relationship between RWAs and government agencies by bringing them to a common platform, along with traders’ associations and politicians, for collective problem solving within the ambit of a governance programme. Neighbourhood associations benefit from disproportionate visibility due to the interest shown by the television and print media in recording their statements and initiatives, thereby magnifying the discourse of the RWAs (Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2007, p. 60). As platforms where urban residents can mobilise and voice their demands, they constitute an important aspect of a thriving associational life within urban civil society. This has provoked increasing academic inquiry about whether they constitute the new face of urban civil society in India and what

242  Nivedita Bose are the consequences of such a phenomenon. Some scholars have argued that large cities in India are currently witnessing a rise in neighbourhood associations as an outcome of the rapid growth generated after economic reforms in the early 1990s (Chatterjee, 2004; Fernandes, 2007). Studies of neighbourhood associations in India, including RWAs and their role (Harriss, 2005; Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2007; Zérah, 2007; Fernandes, 2007) draw attention to the class character of such associations and the dominant presence of middle-class associations in such exercises. Drawing implicitly on Partha Chatterjee’s (2001) distinction between ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’, such dominance, they point out, tends to exclude the voices of the poorer sections, i.e. members of the political society. In an urban context increasingly structured by the axis of class, John Harriss formulates that middle-class associations maintain a distance from the sphere of local politics. As in, ‘civil society is the arena for middle-class activism and assertion, while the poor engage in politics’ (2005, p. 32). These middleclass collective actors have been increasingly located within the realm of ‘new politics’, an emerging project of partnership between the reforming state, private capital and sections of civil society, aimed at reclaiming urban governance from what they perceive as messy and dirty dealings of electoral democracy (Harriss, 2007). First, rather than being located within the infrastructure of parties and electoral democracy, new politics is organised in small-scale voluntary associations. Second, they employ ‘civilised modes of engagement such as memos, media coverage, and courts rather than mass campaigns, rallies, or demonstrations’ (Coelho and Venkat, 2009, p. 359) and are rooted in residential and recreational domains. In this chapter, I enquire about the transformation in the nature and activities undertaken by RWAs due to the emergence of RWA umbrella bodies called federations in the city. The above mentioned scholarly literature on RWAs focus on their neighbourhood-based mobilisation. However, these federations have changed the ambit of influence of RWAs, which was previously restricted to the boundaries of their colony but has now spread to the city at large. This is also manifested in the increasing political activity undertaken by RWAs, which field and support candidates in local elections. I also try to understand whether various state-sponsored schemes, such as Bhagidari and MS, implemented by the government over the years to decentralise urban governance, have successfully (or not successfully) institutionalised the ideal of citizen participation in everyday decision-making and improved service delivery in the city. How have they organised citizen participation? Have they really empowered citizens by increasing the scope of their decision-making? Have they changed the face of local governance? To investigate these questions, qualitative research has been conducted in select neighbourhoods of Delhi, which are representative of the city’s different types of settlements: elite neighbourhoods of plotted lands, Delhi Development Authority (DDA) flats, urban villages, and slum settlements. To understand the modalities of neighbourhood-based civic activism as well

Citizens’ participation in local governance  243 as the Delhi government schemes for promoting civic participation in local governance, such as Bhagidari and MS, semi-structured interviews were conducted with residents, office-bearers, and members of Resident Welfare Associations, umbrella RWA organisations, party workers, and journalists. Ethnographic material was collected by observing RWA meetings and elections, public meetings conducted by political representatives before elections, and MS meetings. Information received was also supplemented with newspaper articles, various government reports, Public Interest Litigations (PILs) filed, and photos and videos available to the public on the organisation’s website and social networking websites. Based on the fieldwork conducted, I also suggest some ways in which these schemes can be improved further by identifying lacunae and problem areas in the everyday functioning of the associated organisations. In Delhi, neighbourhood associations such as RWAs are primarily middle class in nature, prevalent in both planned neighbourhoods and regularised colonies, although now there are increasing numbers of RWAs also being formed in slums and urban villages led by pradhans (traditional community leaders). Even though it is difficult to draw any generalisation about the trajectory of growth of RWAs, their emergence could be attributed to the growth of public housing by the Delhi Development Authority in the 1980s and a mandatory provision in the DDA Act for the creation of management committees in group housing localities. The general perception about RWAs during this period is that they mostly existed only on paper. However, as Poulomi Chakrabarti (2007) points out, in colonies located at the outskirts of the city during the 1980s, where infrastructure facilities like water supply, bus services, and internal roads had not been completely developed, neighbourhood associations worked extensively to lobby with political representatives and government officials for these services. Some have also argued about how RWAs were also formed following the bloody riots after the assassination of Indira Gandhi as concerns of security increased in both Sikh and non-Sikh neighbourhoods. RWAs primarily organised and supervised security during this period (Rashmi, 2016). Following the enactment of the 74th Constitution Amendment Act, 1992, which envisaged the formation of Ward Committees (henceforth referred to as WC), the smallest electoral constituency in the Indian urban political architecture. WCs would provide a forum for local problems to be discussed between the councillor, members of the municipal administration, and representatives of civil society. However, these WCs failed to become effective participatory institutions at the scale in which they were constituted. In Delhi, there were WCs that were formed for a population as high as ten lakh people per committee, which could not ensure proximity and accountability between the people and their elected representatives (Zérah, 2007, pp. 59–60). Also, due to the unique arrangement of political institutions in Delhi, wherein the centre has exclusive power over land, law, and order;2 WCs weren’t conducive to decentralisation. This vacuum left

244  Nivedita Bose by ineffective WCs was filled by RWAs because as neighbourhood bodies they were considered to be more representative of the needs of the people. However, the MS scheme introduced later on continued to conceive WCs as an important tier in decentralised governance, albeit a little ambiguously. Here, members of the MS would vote for two representatives to be included in the next formation, i.e. of WCs, which would coordinate at the ward level to deliberate on funds and resources for the delivery of projects decided at the level of the Mohalla. In fact, the Delhi Nagar Swaraj Bill, 2014, envisaged making both MS and WCs stronger and more powerful in combating corruption at the local level. Community participation has become somewhat of a buzzword in development discourse, with virtually every development agency advocating its importance. Closely knitted with the ideas of community deliberation, activity, and action in the scheme of governance is the importance of civil society organisations. However, in Delhi, instead of being an organic process, through the Bhagidari programme and MS, it is the state which has tried to engineer this process of community participation. These schemes of participatory governance that are entrenched in the discourse of empowerment seek to achieve this through the development of local organisational capacity through inclusion and participation, which could bear ‘the potential of greatly improving the accountability of both government and market’ (Harriss, 2007, p. 2717). The Bhagidari scheme was awarded the UN Public Service Award in the year 2005. Its main goals were to provide improved service delivery; to create a clean, green, and ‘hassle-free Delhi’; and to make Delhi a world-class city; based on the notion of a ‘caring state’ which actively links its citizens, who occupy ‘legally designated neighbourhoods’, to various government agencies. Within the Bhagidari, workshops were designed to bring together the representatives of all stakeholders: citizen groups (namely Market Traders Associations (MTAs) and Resident Welfare Associations), NGOs, government elected representatives, and parastatal agencies (such as the Delhi Development Authority, Delhi Vidyut Board, Delhi Jal Board, and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi). It is worth noting that it was only in the Bhagidari programme that RWAs got formally included in a government scheme introduced for participatory governance in the city as the voice of the residents. However, it has also been noted that this programme was simply a means for the government to disown its responsibilities and to blunt RWAs by keeping them from criticising the government (Hull, 2011, p. 789). One of the unintended consequences of Bhagidari was the formation of RWA federations. Because Bhagidari workshops and Utsavs (festivals) brought RWAs from all over the city onto a common platform, it led to the emergence of horizontal networks among them, leading to the formation of federations for collective bargaining with the government, claiming to represent the interests of the city as a whole. The sphere of influence of RWAs until a few years back was restricted to the boundaries of their

Citizens’ participation in local governance  245 neighbourhoods. The formation of federations resulted in the extension of the influence of RWAs from just their neighbourhoods to encompass the realm of the city at large. RWAs from all over Delhi came together and became one of the principal ‘voices’ of the citizens in the media and public policy discourse. The Delhi Residents Welfare Association Joint Front was formed in 2003 in response to changes in government regulation relating to cable television technology in the city (Chakrabarti, 2007). The public discontentment against this issue was high, and this matter was discussed in a Bhagidari meeting held then. This led to some RWAs of South Delhi coming together to form a coalition of sorts since they considered that it would be easier to bargain with government agencies as one group rather than as disjointed voices. Today it is one of the major RWA umbrella organisations in the city, along with United RWAs Joint Action (URJA). Tawa Lama-Rewal identifies them as ‘visible spokespersons and efficient lobbyists’. One of the reasons why they have been effective in influencing public policy outcomes is due to the extensive use of media to articulate their demands, which creates awareness among the larger public and generates pressure on the government. During the initial years of formation, these federations were involved in organising protests against the increase in charges by private power distribution companies and against the privatisation of water distribution in Delhi (The Hindu, 6 October 2005), which the government had to ultimately roll back on. Recently these federations have also been involved in getting member RWAs tickets to contest in municipal elections. An RWA federation member stated in an interview that RWAs in the city were encouraging their members to contest in elections, especially in the 2017 MCD elections, because they were fed up with vote bank politics that was meant to appease the urban poor while marginalising the voice of the middle class. He stated the reason for middle-class associations entering politics is the desire to ‘clean up the system’ and change ‘dirty politics’. In the 2017 Delhi municipal elections, quite a few RWA members got tickets to contest in the election, even from national political parties like the Bharatiya Janata Party and Congress.3 Mr Navjyot,4 President of the C-1 Block RWA in Vasant Kunj, contested in the municipal poll as an independent after being associated with the RWA for the past ten years. According to him, during his time being the RWA President getting approvals for the smallest of jobs like the pruning of trees and repairing roads was difficult because of the inefficient councillor. He further added that when the councillors/MLAs finally allocated money for projects these were chosen ‘jaha unka sabse zyada fayeda hota hai’ (in areas that represent their vested interests) in the nearby slums and urban villages. He said that poor people easily get impressed by even the smallest of projects undertaken in their colony like the cleaning of drains, but it is only the ‘educated class’ who know about the legalities involved in contracts, proper execution, etc., and can check if the work is done properly or not. He remarked that unlike candidates from established political parties who

246  Nivedita Bose are seen only at the time of elections, independent candidates like him from RWAs won’t be able to get away easily if they don’t perform since they have to interact with their vote base every day as they are his neighbours. Echoing this sentiment was Ms Riya,5 who has long been a part of Hills View RWA and associated with URJA, who contested as a candidate from the Swaraj Party. She also remarked that she was a better candidate since she has indepth knowledge of the everyday problems of the neighbourhood and its residents due to the experience she had gained from being with the RWA for so long and has already proven her leadership skills and acceptability within the community. Proximity to the ‘local’ is an aspect that the state government too has sought to capitalise on by utilising RWAs as conduits and participants in various projects. For instance, the cabinet of the Delhi government cleared a proposal that identified working with civic associations such as RWAs to take up greening works in parks and gardens and maintain them (Hindustan Times, 19 September 2018) under the ‘Citizen Charter for Work Plan Financial Assistance to RWAs’ by the Delhi Parks and Gardens Society (DPGS) under the Government of NCT of Delhi. In a meeting of the Chief Minister with 200 RWAs in the city, it was announced that the financial assistance given to RWAs registered with the DPGS for the maintenance of parks would be doubled to Rs. 2 lakhs per acre. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is to be signed between the RWA, MLA, and DPGS for obtaining financial assistance for maintenance of parks and gardens; RWAs are expected to submit applications after receiving concurrence from land managing agencies (Delhi Development Authority, New Delhi Municipal Corporation, or the trifecta of Municipal Corporations of Delhi, as is applicable). Funds are released in three instalments after submission of a utilisation certificate, CA audited expenditure statement, and a satisfactory report by field supervisors. The DPGS states that on work being carried out satisfactorily in the first year, the scheme can be extended for a further period of one–two years. In 2018, 261 RWAs received financial assistance of approximately Rs. 1.63 crore for maintaining 1,164 parks covering 370 acres (The Times of India, 23 July 2018). Additionally, the South Delhi Municipal Corporation6 also roped in RWAs as stakeholders in the maintenance of colony parks under its private–public partnership (PPP) scheme (The Times of India, 28 November 2018). However, these arrangements are rather ad hoc and temporary, as it also depends on the funds at the disposal of the Municipal Corporation itself. This issue was brought to the fore with the growing financial crisis of the East Delhi Municipal Corporation, which severely impacted civic services carried out within its jurisdiction. As a member of the IP Extension RWA complained, residents now have to privately look after parks by hiring gardeners and machinery as the East Delhi Municipal Corporation’s PPP scheme for maintenance of parks is no longer operational because of a fund crunch. On the other hand, the state government also signed MoUs with RWA federations such as URJA for

Citizens’ participation in local governance  247 the government’s anti-dengue campaign. This was to ensure the participation of RWAs and reach out to the masses in a ‘big way’, making it a mass campaign. Participating RWAs, in turn, were allotted tasks previously carried out by the government agencies themselves (particularly the Delhi Jal Board and Municipal Corporation of Delhi), such as conducting inspections in houses for stagnant water, maintaining a dengue-free atmosphere, and providing residents with information materials like pamphlets and stickers on combating dengue. As discussed above, the recent trend of an increasing ‘city-wide character’ and ‘political turn’ of RWAs might lead one to ask regarding the impact of neighbourhood associations on the kind of city it promotes; does it lead to a more egalitarian arrangement, or does it exclude and marginalise others; does it deepen democracy at the local level? On the one hand, RWAs do promote the participation of people in the management of local affairs. However, political participation provided by neighbourhood activism is overwhelmingly informed by class. The essentially ‘middle-class’ nature of some neighbourhood associations gives them access to resources like money and contacts, making them unrepresentative and elite. RWA office-bearers, especially from upper-middle-class colonies, are usually retired public servants; because of their pre-existing contacts, they often are seen favouring interactions with high-level government officials and judges rather than elected political representatives like councillors, which could undermine the legitimacy of elected representatives at the local level. Second, RWAs are increasingly being criticised for their parochial and restrictive outlook. A number of respondents who were rentiers complained that RWAs of their co-operative housing societies would use informal means of coercion and harassment, especially against migrant, unmarried, working women regarding their ‘unpredictable behaviour’ of long and variable working hours, and an increased surveillance with male guests, citing security reasons. RWAs have, in these instances, increasingly cited compliance with their bye-laws in maintaining ‘society standards’. Furthermore, the engagement of neighbourhood associations in local elections shows that RWAs aspire to a position that gives them the means to act beyond their neighbourhood. However, candidates fielded by RWAs didn’t fare well in elections and didn’t get enough votes, which perhaps highlights the inherent contradiction in terms of the parochial nature of RWAs’ concerns of representing the interest of only their colony and their endeavour to play a role beyond the neighbourhood they belong to. The engagement of neighbourhood associations in local elections might also have some positive ramifications. RWAs during elections were involved in encouraging people in their neighbourhood, even the largely ‘apathetic’ middle classes to vote. RWA based candidate’s demands for more transparency, accountability, and participation could help improve the functioning of representative democracy. However, the activities of these associations promoting the political participation of the ‘upper-middle classes’ also might end up empowering

248  Nivedita Bose the already powerful, thereby increasing inequality in the city. It has also been noted that the activities of RWAs might be detrimental to the position of the urban poor in the city. In my own interviews with members of RWAs they often equated slum settlements within and around their neighbourhood to criminals because they occupied land illegally and stated that removal of ‘encroachments’ was one of the objectives of the association. When talking to residents of Vasant Vihar, an elite neighbourhood in South Delhi, they told me how the slum cluster near their house was a health hazard to them. They complained of open sewage near the slum and equated the slum cluster to an open dumping ground because of the garbage piling up and the open defecation by the slum dwellers, which they said made it unbearable for the residents to venture out because of the smell. The RWA President even stated that even though the residents of the neighbourhood had to pay one of the highest property taxes in Delhi, they were made to live next to ‘antisocial elements’. They complained that although arrangements had been made to build a wall separating themselves from the nearby slum, it was of no avail since the slum dwellers had broken the barrier wall in a matter of a few days. They further went onto explain that they were planning to make a separate entrance for the slum dwellers, as their thoroughfare was causing inconvenience to the residents. The Nagara Raj Bill under the flagship programme of the Jawaharlal Lal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission in 2006 and the coming of the Aam Aadmi Party-led government in Delhi (in 2013 and later in 2015) attempted to change the perceived elitist hegemony and the pro-middleclass dimension of RWAs by the introducing the participatory governance scheme of MS7 in the city. Claimed to be a neo-Gandhian project, it seeks to improve upon the Bhagidari scheme and the format of RWAs by including a wider base for participation. Since the former included only those who were homeowners and not tenants, it seeks to include all eligible electoral voters located in the Mohalla. The concept of MS can also be seen as the urban counterpart of Gram Sabha (the primary body of the Panchayati Raj system). The guidelines state that a municipal ward would be divided into ten parts, each part called a ‘Mohalla’;8 every registered voter of a Mohalla would become a member of the MS. The government states that these MSs would increase accountability and transparency in decision-making by keeping the politicians constantly on their toes as the MS offers a platform where politicians can be publicly questioned. Furthermore, the funds allocated for the infrastructure project can be withheld from the contractor if the work done is considered sub-par by members of the Sabha. Atishi Marlena who was spearheading the MS initiative earlier stated that they want to promote the concept of Swaraj (self-rule) through participatory governance. RWAs, however, see this governance scheme as detrimental to their position and have been quite vocal in their opposition and criticism of it. A former member of the federation of URJA questioned the need to have the MS when according to him, RWAs are already the pre-designated units of citizens to

Citizens’ participation in local governance  249 represent them. However, in some cases, I saw RWA members being very vocal and actively participating in Sabhas, suggesting that there is scope for cooperation rather than confrontation between the two. This aspect was seen in a MS meeting organised in Tilak Nagar to discuss the presence of a liquor shop in a residential neighbourhood with the residents, RWA office-bearers, government officials, and political representatives, and the owners of the ‘wine and beer shop’ were present at the meeting. The RWA of the neighbourhood on many occasions complained to the MLA of the area about the ‘nuisance’ created by the shop. Many women narrated incidents of how their safety and mobility was compromised due to the presence of inebriated men near their house who would frequently make lewd comments and harass them. Both the Chief Minister as well as the Deputy Chief Minister were present at the Sabha, lauding this as a unique instance of decision-making whereby those directly affected were participating in the decision-making process by voting on the issue. The Deputy Chief Minister to this effect said, ‘purey desh ke janta ko aapse seekhne ko milega ki jantantra kaisi chalti hai’ (people in this country will get to learn from all of you present as to how democracy should actually work). He further added that the decision reached by the residents, which was to remove the shop, would be binding on the government officials. This was a step, according to him, leading to greater transparency and accountability in the everyday working of the government since the decision didn’t happen ‘band kamro mein’ (behind closed doors). Over the last two decades there have been several initiatives taken to decentralise governance and empower them in urban areas. In Delhi, the emergence of RWAs as the ‘people’s voice’, albeit with their apparent middle-class nature, could be utilised as an important avenue for deepening participation and decision-making at the local level. However, to do so, there also needs to be urgent changes brought about to make it more inclusive and effective. In my interviews RWAs often complained that they usually faced a shortage of funds to carry out their responsibilities, which perhaps shows that decentralisation has taken place with some devolution of functions without the required devolution of funds. In more modest colonies (like slums and smaller urban villages) which don’t have access to membership fee from residents, it affects the development projects that they can undertake. Affluent colonies, on the other hand, are able to conduct some amount of development work based on the subscription and membership charges they collect, bypassing the councillor when required. Although the 74th CAA brought in reservations for politically marginalised communities, this hasn’t been realised in RWAs as most of them are still male-dominated, especially as office-bearers in larger RWA federations. In RWAs, women often play a minor role; however, there is an increased participation of women in the RWA managing committee, though not as office-bearers, who have more power and responsibilities. Also, since RWAs are voluntary associations governed by the Societies Registration Act of 1860, they

250  Nivedita Bose are responsible for drawing up their own guidelines for elections, meetings, and membership requirements. However, there could be some standard guidelines given for the manner in which elections are to be conducted, tenure of office-bearer positions, expenditure accounts to be maintained, and meetings to be conducted on a regular basis for increasing accountability. This is important because in some RWAs elections were conducted on an ad hoc basis, with the person running for the position of president unopposed, which also resulted in them retaining the position of president for many years at a stretch. A few RWAs also didn’t conduct meetings on a regular basis which affects the deliberation process undertaken by them. And when such meetings were conducted, they happened to take place at the residence of office-bearers, thus restricting participation in the decisions being made. To rectify some of these worrying trends, the welfare section of the Department of Personnel and Training (Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances, and Pensions, GOI, 2018) even brought out a circular to modify and standardise the rules and regulations of RWAs of central government employee neighbourhoods. However, this pertained to only a few RWAs, and requires a more concrete and concerted effort in this direction. The recent scheme of MS could perhaps be an important corrective to the deficiencies displayed by neighbourhood associations in terms of its coverage and inclusivity. However, in a RTI filed by a neighbourhood magazine enquiring into the number of Sabhas conducted, it was revealed that in the year 2016–2017 no Sabhas were conducted in the North and South-East districts of Delhi (Newsbytes, 29 March 2017). While the state government had allocated Rs. 350 crores for various development projects undertaken under the scheme, in 2016 no funds could be spent as it failed to receive the assent of the Lt. Governor (Hindustan Times, 9 August 2017). In areas where MSs were conducted, work has lagged behind. For instance, in the MS conducted in Kirari in 2015, 15 projects were identified by the residents to be undertaken in the area. Since the neighbourhood is located in the periphery of the city, this area often lacks even access to basic infrastructure. In the months following the monsoon season, parts of the locality can be seen turning into swamps with water stagnating with plastic bags and garbage piling up on it, leading to the breeding of mosquitoes. A resident complained how his entire family fell prey to dengue and chikungunya (both mosquito-borne diseases) and how many people in his colony died because of it. Residents were angry that no action had been taken on cleaning stagnant water, a project selected in the Sabha meeting. They further alleged that no money had been spent from the funds allocated on other projects as well, which included: the covering of drains, installation of CCTV cameras and streetlights, installation of iron gates at entry and exit points, removing malba (garbage), and turning designated open spaces into parks. An RWA member claimed that even after two years ‘abhi das rupaiya ka kaam bhi nahi hua hoga’ (work amounting to ten rupees hasn’t even been undertaken) although money was allocated for all the projects. However, most residents

Citizens’ participation in local governance  251 and RWA members agreed that the concept of MS had a lot of potential for improving service delivery; however, both politicians and government officials kept passing the buck without getting work done. The ideal of citizen participation has been increasingly advocated by both international development agencies and planners based on the assumption that the inclusion of a plurality of actors would increase engagement with issues of governance, representation, transparency, and accountability. Also, it has been generally recognised that state responsiveness is increased in participatory democracy framework, thus, formulating better policies. This provides a framework for voters who get to contribute towards government decision-making beyond just casting their votes during elections. Further, it is also envisaged as providing an opportunity for those who are otherwise politically marginalised to have a voice in formulating policies. Participatory schemes introduced by the government, in this sense, could be seen as manifestations of an increasing concern with improving urban infrastructure, services, and on the upkeep of ‘good governance’, which are now considered vital by policymakers for achieving economic growth. Metropolitan cities across India are currently witnessing a proliferation in neighbourhood associations such as the Porto Alegre inspired experiment called Janagraha in Bangalore, the Advanced Locality Management programme in Mumbai, and Residents Welfare Associations in Chennai and Delhi. From the above discussion it can be seen that although these neighbourhood associations have had some positive ramifications for increasing citizen participation in decision-making at the grassroots level, these associations can also exacerbate inequality in the city. As RWAs aspire for a position that gives them the means to act beyond their neighbourhood as can be seen from formations of RWA federations and their increasingly political character, some reforms need to be urgently undertaken. Otherwise, neighbourhood-based associations might become a parochial project which ultimately makes cities for some and not cities for all.

Notes 1 There was also another rather short lived participatory governance experiment introduced by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) in 2011 called the Residents Ward Committee (RWC). Meant to initiate a dialogue between residents and councillors, it failed to take-off after the trifurcation of the municipal corporation. 2 Delhi by virtue of being the capital of the country has a unique institutional framework granting it the status of ‘Limited Statehood’. This is because even though the 69th CAA gave Delhi special status by constituting a Legislative Assembly, its powers were severely limited as matters relating to police, public order and land weren’t under its purview. The Union Home Ministry manages all matters relating to Delhi police, whereas the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) is accountable to the Union Ministry of Urban Development leaving the Delhi Jal Board (DJB) and DISCOMs (electricity distribution companies) to be managed by the Delhi government. Hence, the role of ULBs in the management of local affairs is restricted

252  Nivedita Bose by the intervention of either the central or state governments and their parastatal agencies. In this context of institutional fragmentation, the role of municipal corporations is largely reduced to the maintenance of civic infrastructures. 3 In the present context this could be partly attributed to the delimitation exercise that had been carried out which changed the electoral pattern in a number of wards, and the emergence of new political parties contesting in the elections like the Aam Aadmi Party and Swaraj Party. 4 Name changed 5 Name changed 6 The Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 2011 trifurcated the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) into three corporations. Thus, creating three new Corporations, namely: North Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC), South Delhi Municipal Corporation (SDMC) and East Delhi Municipal Corporation (EDMC). However, the term MCD still lingers on in the everyday lexicon of the inhabitants of the city when referring to the municipal corporation. 7 As translated, mohalla is the Hindi/Urdu word for an urban neighbourhood, and sabha is the Hindi word for a public meeting or assembly. 8 Roughly there are 40,000 voters in a ward. So, there would be about 4,000 voters in every mohalla. The principle governing the MS meeting is: citizens will decide what they want and their representatives (i.e. the councillor and MLA) will merely carry out the will of the people within the limits of jurisdiction, law, and availability of funds.

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Citizens’ participation in local governance  253 in Society and History, 53(4), pp. 757–790, October. Available at: 10.1017/ S0010417511000405 (Accessed: 4 November 2019). Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances, and Pensions, Government of India (2018). Review of Model Constitution and Rule and Regulations for the Residents Welfare Associations Recognised by the Government of India, Department of Personnel and Training, 4 June. Available at: http:​/​/doc​​ument​​s​.dop​​tcirc​​ulars​​.nic.​​ in​/D2​​/D02a​​dm​/a​w​​ozFad​​O​.PDF​ (Accessed: 5 November 2019) Newsbytes (2017). ‘Newsbytes RTI: Did AAP Conduct Mohalla Sabhas in Delhi?’, New Delhi, 29 March. Available at: https​:/​/ww​​w​.new​​sbyte​​sapp.​​com​/t​​imeli​​ ne​/Po​​litic​​s​/575​​8​/351​​94​/mo​​halla​​-sabh​​as​-ye​​t​-ano​​ther-​​p​romi​​se​-aa​​p​-did​​n​-t​-k​​eep (Accessed: 20 October 2018). Rashmi, Richa (2016). Role of RWA in Residential Neighbourhood Management (A Case Study Of Delhi). MPL thesis. New Delhi: School of Planning and Architecture. Available at: https​:/​/do​​cplay​​er​.ne​​t​/102​​04651​​4​-Sch​​ool​-o​​f​-pla​​nning​​ -and-​​archi​​tectu​​re​-ne​​w​-del​​hi​-th​​esis-​​dept-​​of​-ho​​using​​-role​​-of​-r​​wa​-in​​-resi​​denti​​al​ -ne​​ighbo​​urhoo​​d​-ma​n​​ageme​​nt​-a-​​case-​​study​​-of​-d​​elhi.​​html (Accessed: 14 October 2018). The Times of India (2018). ‘Govt Aid to RWAs for Upkeep of Parks Doubled to Rs 2 lakh/acre’, New Delhi, 23 July. The Times of India (2018). ‘RWAs to Get Rs 5,500 More per Acre to Manage Corporation Parks’, New Delhi, 28  November. The Hindu (2005). ‘RWAs to Wage Battle on Water Front’, New Delhi, 6 October. Tawa Lama-Rewal, Stéphanie (2007). ‘Neighbourhood Associations and Local Democracy: Delhi Municipal Elections’, Economic and Political Weekly, 42(7), pp. 51–60. Tawa Lama-Rewal, Stéphanie and Zérah, Marie-Hélène (2011). ‘Introduction in Urban Democracy: A South Asian Perspective’, South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 30 December. Available at: https​:/​/jo​​urnal​​s​.ope​​nedit​​ion​.o​​rg​ /sa​​​maj​/3​​188 (Accessed: 8 July 2018) World Bank (1992). Governance and Development. Washington DC: World Bank. Zérah, Marie-Hélène (2007). ‘Middle Class Neighbourhood Associations as Political Players in Mumbai’, Economic and Political Weekly, 42(7), pp. 61–68.

Index

A accessibility, 181, 207 accountability, 25, 89, 165, 205–06, 241, 243–44, 247–48, 251 downward, 3, 4 from SDMC members, 176 from the local government, 23 mechanisms, 138 of public authorities, 180 of VWSCs, 212 Action Taken Reports, 89 Activity Mapping, 106, 108–09, 161 administrative decentralisation, 3, 206 affirmative action, 226 Andhra Pradesh, 15, 201, 221–22, 227–31, 234, 236–37 Arunachal Pradesh, 131–32 Assam, 84 B Bangalore, 221, 227, 229, 230–32, 234, 237 Bihar, 159, 161 Block Development Council, 120–21, 125, 127 bottom-up approaches, 152, 176 C Capital receipts, 92–3 Central Finance Commission, 11, 45–7, 103, 129 centrally sponsored schemes, 74, 78, 103, 132 Chattisgarh, 10 Chennai, 214, 251 Citizen Charter, 246 civil society, 15, 180, 225, 241–44 consolidated fund, 71, 80, 82, 89 Constituent Assembly, 118

Constitutional Amendment Act 73rd, 23, 41, 120–21, 141, 200 74th, 15, 18, 225, 238, 241 cost-effectiveness, 138, 210 curricula, 156 D Dakshina Kannada, 162 Darjeeling, 12, 137–45, 152–54 decentralised governance, 3–5, 7–8, 12–14, 16–17, 23, 38, 90–1, 141, 203, 209, 244 decentralised institutions, 13, 89–1, 175 decentralised planning, 5, 13, 41, 54, 59, 61, 119, 138, 141, 178–80, 187 decision making, 4, 11, 14–15, 18, 154, 195 deconcentration, 3, 18 deforestation, 140, 144 delegation, 3 Delhi, 7, 15, 119, 241–49, 251 dependency syndrome, 91 deprivation, 38, 224 devolution, 3, 89, 93, 127, 133, 141 financial, 14, 215, 216 fiscal, 91, 109, 128 functional, 106, 108 of finances, 5, 69 of functions, 249 of funds, 47, 129 of funds and functions, 61, 108 of funds and taxation powers, 12, 116 of powers, 4–5, 11, 17, 115, 118, 127, 132 of powers and functions, 226 of powers and funds, 121 Direct election, 119, 121

256 Index Disaster Management, 5–6, 12, 138–39, 142–45, 152–53 discrimination, 8, 16, 37–8, 41, 43, 160 District Planning Committee, 5, 141, 226, 236 E educational outcomes, 13, 167, 175–76 effectiveness, 14, 18, 115, 133, 137–38, 178, 180–81, 185, 187–89, 205–06, 209 index, 183 of water supply, 181, 183, 185, 194–95 efficiency, 11, 14, 138, 156–57, 180–81, 210 egalitarian, 39, 215, 247 elected representatives, 24–25, 31, 42, 45, 139, 149, 152, 162, 206, 243–44, 247 Eleventh Schedule, 5–6, 176 empowerment, 7–9, 11, 16, 18, 21, 41–2, 44, 52–3, 59, 60–1, 207, 241 F feudal, 117 fiscal decentralisation, 3, 7, 10, 11, 36, 77, 79, 89–1 flood control, 12, 17, 138, 145, 148–49, 151–53 functionaries, 74, 89, 102, 106, 108, 117, 143 G gender inequality, 9, 41 Gram Panchayat Development Plan, 50, 130, 132 Grama Sabha, 8–9, 14, 16, 23–6, 38, 44, 179, 200–02, 210, 215 grants-in-aid, 80, 89, 103, 129, 177 gross state domestic product, 79 groundwater, 31–2, 38, 138, 179, 196–97 Gujarat, 227 Guntur, 231 H Halqa Panchayat, 118, 120, 128 Himachal Pradesh, 128, 131–32, 161 Himalayan region, 137, 153 Hubballi-Dharwad, 234 Hyderabad, 18, 214, 221, 227, 229, 230–31, 234, 237

I inclusive governance, 24 inclusive growth, 5, 41 India, 3–7, 23, 41, 69, 110, 115–17, 156, 158, 178, 205–06 Indian federal policy, 69 institutional fragmentation, 252 institutions, 109, 127, 139, 228, 241 democratic, 62, 119 elite, 233 financial, 92 for the delivery of the essential services, 5 grama & ward sabha, 25–6 inclusive, 123 of participatory decision-making, 91 of self-government, 89–90 parallel, 108 participatory, 243 peoples’, 17 political, 4, 125, 162 public, 52 responsive, 4 village level, 203 water supply, 195–96, 208 intergovernmental transfers, 84 J Jammu & Kashmir Panchayat Raj Act, 119 Jammu and Kashmir, 7, 11, 115, 118–19, 124, 126–27, 133 Janpad Panchayats, 98, 101–02 K Karnataka, 10, 12–13, 15, 23–4, 30, 38, 69, 70–1, 73–8, 82–3, 85, 87–8, 156–57, 159, 160–61, 164–65, 174, 221–22, 227–32, 234, 236–37 Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 71, 73, 80 Kerala, 9–10, 13–14, 41–5, 53–4, 61, 84, 159–60, 177–81 Kottayam, 42–3, 45 Kudumbasree, 53 Kurnool, 234 L Ladakh, 116, 125, 133 landlords, 117, 160 Landslides, 12, 137, 139–40, 143–45, 147, 152–54

Index  257 leadership, 18, 54, 61, 117, 124–25, 160, 184, 186, 188, 196, 213–14, 216, 229, 246 legitimacy, 123, 125, 247 livelihood, 38, 53, 138, 152, 162, 173, 213 Local Self Government, 9, 41, 44, 47, 50, 54, 69, 119, 133, 178, 227 M Madhya Pradesh, 98, 103, 161 Mahabubnagar, 234 Maharashtra, 227 Malappuram, 182 Mandal Panchayats, 70–1, 83 marginalised, 8, 24, 42, 115, 160, 249, 251 Metropolitan, 221, 224, 226, 229, 251 MGNREGS, 6, 12, 27, 137–38, 145, 148, 153–54 and landslide, 145 community participation, 138 disaster risk management, 145 funds for landslide risk reduction, 152 performance of, 148 resources under, 17 middle class, 243, 245, 247 Millennium Development Goals, 6 mini water supply, 30–1, 37, 38 Mohalla Sabha, 15, 241 Multilateral bodies, 241 municipal council, 120 Mysore, 70–1, 231 N Neighbourhood associations, 241–43, 247, 250–51 Non-Governmental Organisation, 162 Non-Plan Fund, 45–9 O obligatory taxes, 70, 99 Odisha, 7, 14, 200–01, 205, 207, 214–15 optional taxes, 101–02, 109 own revenue, 10, 16–17, 74, 81–4, 88, 92–3, 101–02, 109–10, 131 Own Sources of Revenue, 89 P Pakistan, 116, 137 Palli Sabha, 14, 200, 202–03, 206–10, 215

Panchayat feminism, 44 Panchayati Adalats, 120 Panchayati Raj Act of Odisha, 202 Panchayati Raj Institutions, 4, 69, 73–4, 76, 89, 115, 120, 133, 140, 143, 158, 211 Parastatal agencies, 244, 252 participation, 195, 209, 247 citizens, 3, 15, 29, 221, 241–42, 251 civic, 243 community, 12, 15, 116, 138, 160, 189, 203, 241, 244 in grama sabha, 8, 23, 27, 29, 30–1, 33, 35 in local governance, 9 in plans preparation, 16 in school management, 159 index, 185, 193 of beneficiaries, 196 of elected represenatives, 42 of households, 196 of parents, 165 of people, 3, 11, 14, 23, 25, 118, 205, 213, 247 of SDMC members, 165 of women, 44, 146, 207, 249 of women representatives, 9–10, 56, 59, 61 political, 9, 123, 133 popular, 140 public, 89 SC/ST, 145, 153 peace-building, 115, 123–25, 132 people’s participation, 4, 7–8, 23, 90, 117, 154, 157, 178, 241 People’s Plan Campaign, 43 PESA Act, 98, 108 plurality of actors, 251 policymakers, 5, 24, 41, 43, 59–60, 251 political autonomy, 124, 205 political decentralisation, 3, 15, 18, 238, 241 political economy, 15, 115, 123, 132, 221–25, 228, 230, 236–38 poverty alleviation, 3, 119 primate cities, 221, 230, 233, 236–37 principal–agent problem, 206 private–public partnership, 246 privatisation, 3, 180, 245 property tax, 71, 83, 99–100 Public Interest Litigations, 243 Punjab, 227

258 Index R rehabilitation, 6, 12, 138, 142, 153 Residents Ward Committee, 251 Residents Welfare Associations, 15, 241, 251 responsiveness, 11, 251 S Sarpanch, 119–21, 201–02, 208, 211, 213, 215 Scheduled Areas, 98 School Development and Monitoring Committees, 13, 157–59, 161–62, 164–65, 167, 173–76 Second Finance Commission, 80 self-governments, 70, 90, 178, 177, 227 Self-Help Groups, 109 Shimoga, 162 Sikkim, 7, 12, 137–41, 143–54 skill development, 52–3 social capital, 185, 187, 193, 201, 225, 241 for achieving a higher quality education, 160 trust, reciprocity, and cooperation, 14, 188, 203–04, 215–16 spatial spill-over, 70 Special Component Plan, 45, 50, 55 Stakeholders, 60 State Finance Commission, 4, 69, 74, 80, 83, 89, 98, 103, 108, 110, 127–29, 134, 141 state legislature, 69, 120 subsidiarity principle, 233 sustainability, 18, 178, 180, 182, 185, 189, 191, 193, 200, 203, 216 environmental, 6, 180 index, 182, 190, 195 of community-led water projects, 14 of water supply, 181, 193–96 Sustainable Development Goals, 6

T Taluk Panchayats, 73, 80, 235 Telangana, 229 terms of reference, 80 Third Finance Commission, 81–2 Thiruvanathapuram, 47, 50 Town Planning Authorities, 6 transparency, 25, 89, 90, 165, 241, 247–48, 251 Tribal Sub-Plan, 45, 50 Twelfth Schedule, 238 U Udupi, 234 urban agglomeration, 15, 18, 221, 224, 232–33, 237 Urban Local Bodies, 4, 6, 43, 89, 226, 238, 241 urban planning, 236–37 urban primacy, 15, 221–22, 227, 230, 233–34 urbanisation, 15, 221–24, 230–31, 237–38 Uttar Pradesh, 159, 161 Uttarakhand, 128, 131–32 V Village Education Committee, 159–60, 162 Vocational Education, 108, 158 W Warangal, 231 Ward Sabhas, 18, 25, 26 West Bengal, 12, 138–39, 143–44, 154 Women Component Plan, 41, 43–4, 50, 53 work participation rate, 42 World Bank, 45–7, 50, 123, 196, 241 Z Zilla Panchayats, 73, 80, 98, 102 Zilla Parishads, 70–1, 127, 133