Debating African Issues: Conversations Under the Palaver Tree 2022010382, 2022010383, 9780367201548, 9780367201494, 9780429259784

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Debating African Issues

This debate style textbook allows students to explore diverse, well-founded views on controversial African issues, pushing them to go beyond superficial interpretations and complicate and ground their understandings of the continent. From the positive images in the film Black Panther, to the derogatory remarks of former American President Donald Trump, the African continent often figures prominently in the collective, global imagination. This interdisciplinary collection covers 20 enduring and contemporary debates across a broad range of subjects affecting Africa, from development and health to agriculture, climate change, and urbanization. Each chapter has a pro and con view penned by a leading expert on the topic in an accessible and engaging style. These contrasting views on each issue are framed by an introduction that helps the student contextualize the debate and draw on further resources. Moreover, they enable readers to deepen their understanding of the topic, develop a more nuanced perspective, and foster classroom debates. This book is an excellent resource for Africa related courses across a range of disciplinary and interdisciplinary fields including African studies, anthropology, development studies, economics, environmental studies, geography, history, international studies, political science and public health. William G. Moseley is DeWitt Wallace Professor of Geography, and Director of the Food, Agriculture and Society Program, at Macalester College, USA, where he teaches courses on human geography, agriculture, environment, development and Africa. Kefa M. Otiso is Professor of Geography and Graduate Coordinator for the School of Earth, Environment and Society (SEES) at Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, USA. He’s also the founding president of the US-based Kenya Scholars and Studies Association (KESSA).

Debating African Issues Conversations Under the Palaver Tree

Edited by William G. Moseley and Kefa M. Otiso

Cover image: © Kefa M. Otiso First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 selection and editorial matter, William G. Moseley and Kefa M. Otiso; individual chapters, the contributors The right of William G. Moseley and Kefa M. Otiso to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Moseley, William G., editor. | Otiso, Kefa M., editor. Title: Debating African issues : conversations under the palaver tree / edited by William G. Moseley and Kefa M. Otiso. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, [2023] | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Identifiers: LCCN 2022010382 (print) | LCCN 2022010383 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367201548 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367201494 (paperback) | ISBN 9780429259784 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Africa--Civilization. | Africa--Economic conditions. | Africa--Social conditions. | Africa--Foreign relations. Classification: LCC DT31 .D29 2023 (print) | LCC DT31 (ebook) | DDC 960--dc23/eng/20220506 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022010382 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022010383 ISBN: 978-0-367-20154-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-20149-4 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-25978-4 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784 Typeset in Bembo by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.

Contents

List of figuresix List of tablex Acknowledgementsxi Editor biosxii List of contributorsxiv 1 Introduction to debating African issues: Conversations under the palaver tree

1

WILLIAM G. MOSELEY & KEFA M. OTISO

SECTION I

Historical and global context 2 Did European trade with Africans (including the slave trade) prior to 1700 damage or ruin economies on the continent?

9

11

YES: TOBY GREEN NO: JOHN THORNTON

3 Was Africa more peaceful and prosperous prior to European contact?

23

YES: MICKIE MWANZIA KOSTER NO: CHARLES OTOIGO CHOTI

4 Did colonialism distort African development?

38

YES: SEGBEGNON MATHIEU GNONHOSSOU NO: OGECHI E. ANYANWU

5 Is Africa’s border geography problematic? YES: SABELO J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI AND INNOCENT MOYO NO: MARINA OTTAWAY

53

vi  Contents SECTION II

Development issues65 6 Is Africa truly rising?67 YES: THOMAS JAYNE RICHARD MKANDAWIRE NO: FRANCIS OWUSU

7 Are foreign land acquisitions the latest form of neo-colonialism in Africa?80 YES: KERSTIN NOLTE NO: SAMUEL LEDERMANN

8 Is China better than other outside powers in fostering African economic transformation?96 YES: KWAME ADOVOR TSIKUDO NO: PÁDRAIG CARMODY

9 Are cities engines for economic development in Africa?109 YES: BENJAMIN OFORI-AMOAH NO: SARAH L. SMILEY

SECTION III

Agriculture, food and the environment

121

10 Are parks the best way to protect African wildlife?123 YES: MOSES MOSONSIEYIRI KANSANGA DANIEL KPIENBAAREH NO: RACHEL DEMOTTS

11 Are Africans adapting well to climate change?137 YES: MUTHONI MASINDE NO: JULIUS R. ATLHOPHENG

12 Is the New Green Revolution approach the best way to address hunger in Africa?151 YES: GLENN DENNING NO: HANSON NYANTAKYI-FRIMPONG

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13 Does scholarship on African food insecurity have a rural bias?164 YES: JANE BATTERSBY NO: EUNICE NJOGU

SECTION IV

Society, health and culture

177

14 Is modern African education counterproductive?179 YES: IDDAH OTIENO NO: APOLLOS O. NWAUWA

15 Is the focus on the development of the girl child counterproductive?196 YES: ROSE ADHIAMBO NYAONDO NO: WANDIA M. NJOYA

16 Are Africa’s health resources overly focused on HIV/AIDS?210 YES: JOSEPH OPPONG NO: KWADWO ADU BOAKYE

17 Is African religiosity a hindrance to development?222 YES: JOHN TADEN NO: SAMUEL ZALANGA

SECTION V

Politics, governance and security

235

18 Is multi-party democracy the best form of governance in African countries?237 YES: NIC CHEESEMAN NO: GEORGE AYITTEY

19 Is the growing foreign military presence in many African countries counter-productive?250 YES: BRENDON J. CANNON NO: ANDREWS ATTA-ASAMOAH

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20 Do more women in politics lead to better governance in African countries?261 YES: MARY NJERI KINYANJUI NO: PAMELA ABBOTT

21 Has the proliferation of cell phones strengthened social movements in Africa?273 YES: FRANKLINE MATANJI NO: TANJA BOSCH

Index

286

Figures

7.1 Land Investments in Africa90 8.1 China’s GDP Growth Per Capita 1960–202099 11.1 Number of people affected by climatic related disasters: 1900–2019140 11.2a Participation of Africans in research on climate change & IKS: Author regional affiliations142 11.2b Participation of Africans in research on climate change & IKS: Author country affiliations143 11.3 Benefits of nexus approach to climate change adaptation pathways (with excerpts from World Bank, 2019)148 12.1 The “GR4A Onion”160 13.1 Results of Scopus database search on African Food Security (Feb 2022)166 19.1 Foreign Military Bases in Africa253

Table

11.1 SDG13 on data tracker (20 March 2020)146

Acknowledgements

This edited collection has been a long time in coming and we are grateful to the many people who made it possible. First and foremost, we would like to thank the 43 contributors who wrote the essays that form the backbone of this project. Your thought-provoking work pushes us all to think more carefully. We also express our gratitude to Rosie Anderson, the exceptional editor at Routledge, who stuck with us through multiple COVID-19 related delays and worked tirelessly with us during the editing process. Bill wishes to thank his students who have debated many of these issues with him over the years and for their thoughtful responses to earlier versions of some of the essays in this collection. He also wishes to thank his many African collaborators (academics, development practitioners and community members) who have taught him to see the world more fully. Last but not least, Bill is especially grateful to his spouse, Julia Earl, who has traveled with him to many African communities and been a tireless supporter of his work. Thank you. Kefa wishes to thank his Geography of Africa students for the motivation to work on this volume that will enable future students to more easily appreciate that there are often legitimate contrasting views on many African issues. He is especially indebted to the contributors who, sometimes at the last minute, agreed to work on essays that were less than appetizing to them because they go against the popular intellectual grain. Thanks much Kemunto, Moraa, and Meroka for supporting my intellectual endeavors over the years.

Editor bios

William G. Moseley is DeWitt Wallace Professor of Geography, and Director of the Food, Agriculture and Society Program, at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN USA where he teaches courses on human geography, environment, development and Africa. His research interests include political ecology, tropical agriculture, environment and development policy and livelihood security. His research and work experiences have led to extended stays in Mali, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Botswana, Malawi, Niger and Lesotho. He is the author of over 100 peer-reviewed articles and book chapters. His books include: Africa’s Green Revolution: Critical Perspectives on New Agricultural Technologies and Systems (2016); Land Reform in South Africa: An Uneven Transformation (2015); Understanding World Regional Geography (2015, 2018); An Introduction to Human-Environment Geography: Local Dynamics and Global Processes (2013); four editions of Taking Sides: Clashing Views on African Issues (2004, 2006, 2008, 2011); Hanging by a Thread: Cotton, Globalization and Poverty in Africa (2008); The Introductory Reader in Human Geography: Contemporary Debates and Classic Writings (2007); and African Environment and Development: Rhetoric, Programs, Realities (2004). His fieldwork has been funded by the National Science Foundation and the Fulbright-Hays program. In 2011, he won the Educator of the Year award from students at Macalester College and in 2013 he was awarded the Media award from the American Association of Geographers for his work communicating geography to the general public via essays that have appeared in outlets such as the New York Times, Washington Post and Al jazeera English. Kefa M. Otiso is Professor of Geography, Professor of Service Excellence (2017–2020), Graduate Coordinator for the School of Earth, Environment and Society (SEES), and Director of the Global Village at Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403, USA. He’s also the founding president of the US-based Kenya Scholars and Studies Association (KESSA). He has a PhD in Urban and Economic Geography from the University of Minnesota - Twin Cities, USA, an MA from Ohio University, USA, and a B.Ed. from Kenyatta University, Kenya. His research interests are

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in urbanization, globalization, international migration, development, governance, and cultural change in the context of Africa and North America. Some of his research has been funded by the Rockefeller and MacArthur Foundations. He is co-author of Population Geography: Problems, Concepts, and Prospects, 10th Edition (Kendall Hunt Publishing, Dubuque, IA, 2013) and author of Culture and Customs of Tanzania (Greenwood Press, 2013), Culture and Customs of Uganda (Greenwood Press, 2006) and many refereed journal articles, book chapters, and editorials. He has presented papers in many national and international conferences and is a past editor of the African Geographical Review. He is a 2008 recipient of the Republic of Kenya’s Elder of the Order of the Burning Spear (EBS) award and is a frequent media commentator who has been featured on the BBC, Reuters, BG24 News TV, 13ABC News Toledo TV, KTN Kenya Diaspora Voice, various Internet Radio stations, Columbus Dispatch (USA), Daily Nation (Kenya), The Standard (Kenya), The Sunday Standard (Kenya), The Independent (Uganda), The Citizen (Tanzania), The Africa Report (France), Mshale (USA), Sentinel Tribune (USA) and the BGNews (USA).

Contributors

Pamela Abbott is Director of the Centre for Global Development at the University of Aberdeen, UK. She was born and raised in the UK. Her main research interests are in socioeconomic and political development and transformations, gender and quality of life. For the last 20 years, her research has focused on the countries of the former Soviet Union and Africa. She lived and worked in Rwanda from 2005–15. She is currently researching socio-economic and political transformations in North Africa, social practices in Rwanda, and good governance in the Horn of Africa. Ogechi E. Anyanwu teaches African history at Eastern Kentucky University. He received his PhD. in African History from Bowling Green State University, Ohio, USA, a Master’s degree in International Affairs and Diplomacy from Imo State University, Owerri, and a Bachelor of History degree from Abia State University, Uturu, both in Nigeria. His research interests and focus have been on Africa’s intellectual history and social policies. He situates his research within the context of the intersecting local and global forces shaping Africa’s colonial and post-colonial experience. Dr. Anyanwu has received multiple teaching and research awards. In addition, he has authored or co-edited ten books, and his articles have appeared in peer-reviewed national and international reputable books and journals. Julius R. Atlhopheng is a Biophysical Environmental Scientist and full Professor at the University of Botswana, Department of Environmental Sciences. His research interests include applied geomorphology, climate change, arid lands and sustainability science. As an expert negotiator for several multilateral environmental agreements (e.g., Rio+20, UNFCCC and UNCCD), he had active participation on sustainability approaches, as well as some participation in the IPCC. As a multi-disciplinary researcher, he has contributed in environmental sciences and management, including collaborative projects on desertification, climate change and tourism, and sustainable development goals, with community partnerships. The work has included components related to ISO on standards for land degradation and desertification. He has also worked with policy-makers in delivering the National Action Programme (NAP) for the Botswana UNCCD chapter.

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Andrews Atta-Asamoah is the Head of the Africa Peace and Security Governance Programme at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Prior to this role, he served on the United Nations Panel of Experts on South Sudan and was responsible for monitoring the conflict and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2206 in that country. He holds a PhD in Political Studies from the University of Cape Town in South Africa and a Master of Arts degree in International Affairs from the University of Ghana. His research interests cut across issues of Africa’s peace, security and governance issues broadly. George Ayittey is a native of Ghana. He is a retired Professor of Economics at American University and President of the Free Africa Foundation, both in Washington DC. He is also the author of several books on Africa including Indigenous African Institutions, Africa Unchained, and Africa in Chaos. Jane Battersby is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Environmental and Geographical Science at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. Her work has focused on urban food security, urban food systems and governance since 2007. Her work has both theoretical and applied components. To this end, she’s worked with a number of NGOs and civil society groups, served as a member of the Independent Expert Group of the Global Nutrition Report, done consultancy and advisory work with a number of UN Agencies and works closely with local and provincial governments on food policy issues. Kwadwo Adu Boakye is a Spatial Epidemiologist. He is a PhD student in epidemiology at the School of Biological and Population Health Sciences, College of Public Health and Human Sciences, Oregon State University, Oregon, USA. His research interests include the application of geospatial techniques to the understanding of how the built environment and environmental exposures are linked to risk of developing chronic diseases. Tanja Bosch is an Associate Professor of Media Studies and Production in the Centre for Film and Media Studies at the University of Cape Town. She teaches journalism and multimedia production, social media, radio studies and research methods at undergraduate and postgraduate level. Her first book, Broadcasting Democracy: Radio and Identity in South Africa, was published by the HSRC Press in 2017. Her second monograph, Social Media and Everyday Life in South Africa (Routledge, 2021) explores how South Africans use social media apps for personal and group identity formation. Brendon J. Cannon is Assistant Professor of International Security at the Institute of International & Civil Security (IICS), Khalifa University, Abu Dhabi, UAE. He earned a PhD. in Political Science with an emphasis on International Relations at the University of Utah, USA (2009). His research focuses on the nexus of security studies and international relations and the increasingly strategic interplay between Asia (West and East) with

xvi  Contributors

eastern Africa. He has published on topics related to regional security and geopolitics, the arms industry and military power in sub-Saharan Africa, power projection capabilities and the interests of external states vis-à-vis Africa, and the shifting distribution of power across the IndoPacific. He is the editor (with Ash Rossiter) of Conflict and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: New Geopolitical Realities (Routledge, 2020) and the author of multiple articles appearing in African Security, Terrorism and Political Violence, Defence Studies, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Third World Quarterly and African Security Review. Pádraig Carmody is a Professor of Geography at Trinity College Dublin. He previously taught at the University of Vermont, Dublin City University and St. Patrick’s College. His research centres on the political economy of globalization in Africa. He is Chair of the Masters in Development Practice. He has consulted for the Office of the President of South Africa, amongst others. He is a former editor of Irish Geography and sits on the boards of Political Geography, African Geographical Review, Politics and Development in Contemporary Africa (Zed Books) and is editor-in-chief of Geoforum. Nic Cheeseman is Professor of Democracy at the University of Birmingham. He mainly works on democracy, elections and development and has published research on Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Professor Cheeseman is the author or editor of more than ten books, including Democracy in Africa (2015), Institutions and Democracy in Africa (2017), How to Rig an Election (2018), Coalitional Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective (2018), Authoritarian Africa (2020) and most recently The Moral Economy of Elections in Africa (2020). Many of his newspaper columns and interviews, along with his latest research, can be found at: www.democracyinafrica.org. Charles Otoigo Choti is a Professor of History and Politics with a long teaching experience at universities in Kenya and USA. He is a former Fulbright Scholar with a PhD in Africana Women Studies from Clark Atlanta University, Georgia, USA, a MA in History from University of Nairobi, Kenya, and a BA degree from Egerton University, Kenya. His research interests include gender and politics, and international relations. He is the author of Gender and Electoral Politics in Kenya: The Case of Gusii Women, 1990–2002 (2013). Dr. Choti has presented papers in national and international conferences. He has interests in reading, politics, and community service. Rachel DeMotts directs and teaches in the Environmental Policy and Decision-Making Program at the University of Puget Sound in Tacoma, Washington. Her research engages with trans-frontier and communitybased conservation; gender and natural resource management; ecotourism; and human-wildlife conflict, primarily in Namibia and Botswana but

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also in South Africa and Mozambique. She often works in collaboration with local NGOs to conduct participatory research projects focused on grounded problem-solving through co-creation, data sharing, and accessible, applied materials. This approach is in service of the ongoing project of decolonizing Western scientific methods and re-centering Indigenous expertise in the research process. Glenn Denning is Professor of Practice at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), where he directs the MPA in Development Practice and teaches courses on Global Food Systems and Sustainable Development Policies and Practice. Prior to joining SIPA, Denning helped establish the MDG Centre of East and Southern Africa, and served as its founding director (2004–2009). He also served on the founding board of the Institute of African Leadership for Sustainable Development (UONGOZI Institute). Denning previously worked at the International Rice Research Institute (1980–1998) and the World Agroforestry Centre (1998–2004). He has advised governments and international organizations on agriculture and food policy in more than 50 countries. Segbegnon Mathieu Gnonhossou (PhD, University of Manchester) is an Assistant Professor of Theological Studies at Seattle Pacific University where he teaches at the intersection of theology and non-theological disciplines. With expertise in Public Theology, he previously taught African and African American Studies at Eastern Kentucky University and is an affiliate professor of Wesleyan Missiology and African Studies at Université Protestante de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (UPAO) in Porto-Novo, Bénin. He is the author of, among others, “Reading Scripture through the Agony of Postcolonialism” in Tapiwa N. Mucherera, Glimmers of Hope, (Wipf & stock, 2013) and “Conversation as an Act of Reclamation: John and Charles Wesley’s Relationship with two Enslaved Black Men,” Slavery and Christianity, in Wesleyan and Methodist Studies (forthcoming). Toby Green is Professor of Precolonial and Lusophone African History and Culture at King’s College, London. He has worked on collaborative projects with scholars in a number of African countries, including Angola, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and The Gambia. His books include The Rise of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade in Western Africa, 1300–1589 (2012), A Fistful of Shells: West Africa from the Rise of the Slave Trade to the Age of Revolution (2019) and The Covid Consensus: The New Politics of Global Inequality (2021). Thomas Jayne is University Foundation Professor of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics at Michigan State University. He is a Fellow of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association and a Distinguished Fellow of the African Association of Agricultural Economists. His works span numerous topics, including food marketing and price policies, changes in land use patterns, sustainable intensification, employment, and rural

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transformation. He has mentored dozens of young African professionals and played a major role in building Michigan State University’s partnerships with African agricultural policy research institutes. Moses Mosonsieyiri Kansanga is an Assistant Professor of Geography and International Affairs at the George Washington University. He is a critical geographer whose research focuses on questions at the intersection of sustainable food systems and natural resource management from a political ecology perspective. Moses has worked with smallholder farming communities in the Global South with concentration on sustainable agriculture and natural resource politics. Mary Njeri Kinyanjui is a Professor emeritus of development studies at the University of Nairobi, Kenya. She has 25 years of experience in research on development, gender, and informal economy. She is the author of five books and several journal articles. She also writes opinion pieces for the Daily Nation (a Kenyan newspaper) and the African executive online magazine. She is a development practitioner with a special focus on education, gender, and informal economy. She was recently recognized by the University of Nairobi as an up and becoming productive researcher. Mickie Mwanzia Koster is an Associate Professor of History in Africa and the African Diaspora at the University of Texas located in Tyler, Texas in the United States. She has a M.A. and PhD. in History from Rice University. She teaches a variety of undergraduate and graduate courses specializing in African American, and African histories and historiography. Her manuscript, The Power of the Oath: The Making of Mau Mau in Kenya, 1952–1960 examines nationalism, ethnicity, and gender by exploring radicalized ritual ceremonies used during the Mau Mau war. She is also the co-author of Hip Hop and Social Change in Africa: Ni Wakati. She co-edited the two volume book series entitled, Kenya at Fifty: Challenges and Prospects since Independence. Daniel Kpienbaareh is a Postdoctoral Associate at the Department of Global Development, Cornell University, USA. He has expertise in geospatial technologies – GIS, remote sensing, geo-visualization – and climate change science and policy, focusing on adaptation, mitigation, and energy policies. Daniel does interdisciplinary research with interests in the application of geospatial techniques for exploring locally relevant solutions to challenges facing socio-ecological systems. Specific research themes include natural resource management, sustainable agriculture, food security, land change analysis, and environmental health, in the Global South. His current research addresses how agroecology can be used to enhance ecosystem services, biodiversity and climate-resilient smallholder farming. Samuel Ledermann joined the Elliott School in Fall 2017 as an Assistant Professor in the International Development Studies program to work with the next leaders in development practice. He is an economic geographer

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with an extensive background in sustainable agricultural development in Africa, with a focus on sustainability, poverty and inequality. From 2012 to 2017, he worked for Biovision Foundation based in Switzerland, on sustainable development projects across Eastern and Southern Africa. His current research investigates the potential for private investments to create both social and environmental impacts, as well as the effects of COVID-19 on inequalities in agricultural development. Muthoni Masinde is a computer science researcher working as an Associate Professor at the Central University of Technology, Free State (South Africa). She is the Founder of ITIKI (Information Technology and Indigenous Knowledge with Intelligence). Masinde has developed a steady and successful research career that has seen her publish over 60 scientific publications and supervised several postgraduate studies. The applied nature of her research has also attracted social innovation funding and national and international recognition, such as being a recipient of USD 500,000 funding from USAID under the program: Securing Water for Food: A Grand Challenge for development. Frankline Matanji is a Ph.D. student in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Iowa. He holds a bachelor’s degree in Communication and Media from Kisii University, Kenya, and a master’s degree in Media and Communication from Bowling Green State University, USA. His work focuses on public opinion and political communication, Media and democracy, misinformation and news literacy, China-Africa international relations, and the empowering role of digital media and participatory communication for directed social change in the Global South. Richard Mkandawire is a Socio-economist and a Rural Development expert. He is currently the Africa Director of the Alliance for African Partnership (AAP) and Chairperson, Malawi Planning Commission. Before joining AAP, he worked as Vice President of the African Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partnership where he led a team of experts in driving innovative interventions for efficient and effective delivery of fertilizers among smallholder farmers in Africa. He has also served as Senior Advisor to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), where he was the principal architect in the design of NEPAD’s Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP). Prof Mkandawire’s academic career includes teaching and research with the University of Malawi at Bunda College of Agriculture. Innocent Moyo is a Senior Lecturer and Acting Deputy Dean of Research and Internationalisation, Faculty of Science and Agriculture, University of Zululand, South Africa. He researches borders, informal cross border trade, migration and development, migration politics and regional integration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

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Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni is Professor and Chair of Epistemologies of the Global South with Emphasis on Africa and member of Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence at the University of Bayreuth in Germany. He has published 21 books and over a hundred other peer-reviewed publications. The most recent major publications are the following books Epistemic Freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and Decolonization (Routledge, 2018); Decolonization, Development and Knowledge in Africa: Turning Over a New Leaf (Routledge, 2020) and Marxism and Decolonization in the 21st Century: Living Theories and True Ideas (Routledge, 2021) co-edited with Morgan Ndlovu. Eunice Njogu is Lecturer at Kenyatta University in the Department of Food, Nutrition and Dietetics in Kenya since 2009. She holds PhD and MSc Degrees in Food, Nutrition and Dietetics and a B.Ed degree in Home Economics from Kenyatta University, Kenya. She has successfully supervised dozens of postgraduate students on diverse research topics. She has also published a book chapter and several refereed journal papers. She has a wealth of experience in public engagement gained from African Population and Health Research Center (APHRC) Nairobi, during her sabbatical leave as a Visiting Scholar in 2018–2019. Wandia M. Njoya is a Senior Lecturer of Literature and French at Daystar University in Kenya. She graduated with a PhD in French from The Pennsylvania State University. She has since published in various academic journals and media outlets. Her articles cover culture, masculinity and women in literature from Francophone Africa, as well as genocide and political violence in Africa. Njoya also writes and speaks in online spaces, including on her award-winning blog. She has also been actively engaged in public discussions about education and Kenya’s schooling system. Kerstin Nolte is Assistant Professor of Empirical Economic Geography at the Institute of Economic and Cultural Geography at the Leibniz University in Hannover, Germany. She holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Göttingen. Her research focuses on rural transformation – triggered by global environmental change and economic globalization – and the resulting livelihood strategies. During her PhD, she focused on large-scale land acquisitions. Her research on the processes in which land acquisitions take place, and on the determinants and impacts, builds on field research in Mali, Zambia and Kenya. Her work has appeared in journals such as World Development, Land Use Policy, the Journal of Modern African Studies and the Journal of Economic Geography. Apollos O. Nwauwa, PhD., is Professor of History and Africana Studies at Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio. Educated both in Nigeria and Canada, Dr. Nwauwa earned his PhD in History from Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada. He has taught for over 20 years in various institutions in Nigeria and the US, including Bendel State University and

Contributors xxi

University of Calabar, both in Nigeria, and Rhode Island College, Brown University and now Bowling Green State University in the US. He served as the Director of the Africana Studies Program at Bowling Green State University. With his teaching and research focus on modern Africa and African diaspora, Dr. Nwauwa has published extensively including several monographs and over 30 scholarly works in many reputable international journals. Nwauwa is the editor of Ofo: Journal of Transatlantic Studies. Hanson Nyantakyi-Frimpong is an Assistant Professor of Geography at the University of Denver, Colorado, USA. His research focuses on the political ecology of rural development, the human dimensions of global environmental change, and sustainable agriculture and food systems. His work has been published in Global Environmental Change, Journal of Peasant Studies, Land Use Policy, Ecology & Society, Geoforum, The Professional Geographer, Applied Geography, and other interdisciplinary journals. Rose Adhiambo Nyaondo has a PhD in public policy from the McCormack School of Policy and Global Studies at the University of Massachusetts Boston and a Master of Arts Degree in International Relations from The United States International University, Nairobi, Kenya. Benjamin Ofori-Amoah is Professor of Geography and Chair of the Department of Geography, Environment, and Tourism at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo Michigan. His background is in economic and urban geography as well as urban and regional planning. His research interest is African development and small cities in the USA. His most recent book is Africa’s Geography: Dynamics of Place, Cultures, and Economies published by Wiley. Joseph Oppong is a Professor of Geography and Associate Dean of the Robert Toulouse Graduate School at the University of North Texas where he has been teaching since 1992. His research focuses on the geographic patterns of disease and health services and seeks to answer the question of who is getting what disease where and why? His previous research on spatial patterns of disease in Africa included HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, Buruli Ulcer, and COVID. A native of Ghana, Dr. Oppong has a bachelor’s degree from the University of Ghana and master’s and PhD degrees from the University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada. Dr. Oppong serves on the national council of the American Association of Geographers. Iddah Otieno was born and raised in the East African country of Kenya. She is a Professor of English and African Studies at Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, KY, USA, and the founding Director of the Kenya Exchange Program for the Kentucky Community and Technical College System (KCTCS). She is the author of Kenyan Public Universities in the Age of Internationalization, co-author of Voices of African Immigrants in Kentucky: Stories of Migration, Identity, and Transnationality, Reevaluating the

xxii  Contributors

Black Experience in Higher Education in Africa and the United States: Struggles, Survival, and Successes, and the editor of Anthology of Contemporary Short Stories and Poems from East Africa. Marina Ottaway is a Middle East Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, a Washington, DC Think Tank. She taught in a number of African and Middle Eastern universities and was a founder of the Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her research has alternated between the Africa and the Middle East, always focusing about the problems countries encounter trying to develop new political systems, be they the socialist systems embraced by many countries in the1960s and 1970s, or the more recent attempts at developing democratic systems. Francis Owusu holds a PhD in Geography from the University of Minnesota. He is currently a Professor and Chair of the Department of Community and Regional Planning at Iowa State University. He teaches courses on international development, world cities and globalization, economic and urban planning, and planning methods. Originally from Ghana, he has conducted research in many African countries and consulted for several international development agencies on topics such as globalization, development policy, public sector reforms, capacity building, and urban development and livelihood issues. Sarah L. Smiley is Professor of Geography at Kent State University-Salem. Her research interests include water access, water insecurity, flooding impacts, and the legacies of colonialism in Sub-Saharan African cities. She is a human geographer and has conducted fieldwork in Malawi, Senegal, and Tanzania. Her recent research was published in WIRES Water, Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space, and African Geographical Review. John Taden is an Assistant Professor of international studies at Pepperdine University. His research interests encompass natural resources, globalization, and religion. Professor Taden holds a PhD in Public Policy and Political Economy from the School of Economic, Political, and Policy Sciences at the University of Texas at Dallas. John Thornton is a Professor of history and African American Studies at Boston University. His research and teaching have focused on Africa and the Middle East. His books include: The Kingdom of Kongo: Civil War and Transition, 1641–1718 (University of Wisconsin Press, 1983); Africa and Africans in the Formation of the Atlantic World, 1400–1680 (Cambridge University Press, 1992, second expanded edition, 1998); and The Kongolese Saint Anthony. Dona Beatriz Kimpa Vita and the Antonian Movement, 1684– 1706 (Cambridge University Press, 1998). Kwame Adovor Tsikudo is a visiting assistant professor with the Department of Geography at Augustana College. He teaches classes on

Contributors xxiii

human-environment interactions, including natural resource management and digital Earth. The main strands of his research include international political economy, development studies, and China-Africa relations. Samuel Zalanga is a Professor Emeritus of Sociology at Bethel University in Saint Paul, MN USA. His broad area of specialization is development studies and social change. He completed his doctoral studies at the University of Minnesota’s Department of Sociology, with a dissertation entitled: “The Postcolonial State and the Development Agenda: A Comparative Study of the Role of Ruling Elites in Development Policy Formulation and Implementation in Malaysia and Nigeria.” Before moving to the United States in 1993 to pursue graduate studies, he lived and taught in Bauchi State, Northeastern Nigeria. He completed his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in Sociology, the first at Bayero University in Kano, and the second at the University of Jos, in Jos, Nigeria. Zalanga grew up in the northeastern region of Nigeria.

1

Introduction to debating African issues Conversations under the palaver tree William G. Moseley and Kefa M. Otiso

Introduction Many societies set aside certain spaces for discussion, debate and conversation. In the Global North, some may think of informal spaces like the British pub or the French café as places for friends to discuss the issues of the day or, in the public sphere, one may consider the British parliament, the American senate or the ancient Greek agora as sanctuaries for political debate. In a similar way, the living and dynamic traditions of discussion, deliberation and debate are alive and well on the African continent, be it with regards to contemporary issues or enduring questions. Some would even argue that, as compared to other regions of the world, this tradition is even more well developed in Africa given its strong oral traditions of storytelling (Vansina 1985). Examples of such spaces abound in the African context. In the cities, towns and villages of the West African Sahel, slowly drinking three cups of strong, sweet tea in the evening while talking and debating with friends is a common practice. From Kenya, to Côte d’Ivoire, to South Africa, men will gather with their friends in pubs, maquis and shebeens1 to catch up on and discuss the day’s news. Women across a broad range of African cities will come together in small groups to braid each other’s hair and discuss neighborhood dynamics. This practice of deliberation is not only limited to the private sphere, but also has a public dimension. In many rural areas of the continent, village councils of (typically male) elders will often adjudicate local disputes through a consensus process of discussion and debate as noted by the late George Ayittey in Chapter 18 of this volume. In fact, in Botswana, such a process of consensus decision-making has filtered up from the village council or kotla to the national parliament in Gaborone (Samatar 1999). Some ancient African universities, such as those in Timbuktu and Cairo, also encouraged debate as an approach to learning (Waghid 2016).2 To sum-up, in many areas of Africa, as in other parts of the world, debate and discussion, as opposed to rote learning and memorization, is an important way we learn about the world. The subtitle of this volume makes reference to the palaver tree. Palaver is defined, according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, as a long talk or parlay, “usually between persons of different cultures or levels of sophistication.” DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-1

2  William G. Moseley and Kefa M. Otiso

In many rural African communities this is a powerful concept and real physical space, usually under a large shady tree. It is a space for open discussion, debate, knowledge sharing and conflict resolution. It is a place where the community comes together to discuss issues of common interest in a peaceful, democratic, and constructive manner. “Roughly equivalent to a civic plaza, zocalo, or agora, the palaver is a place for comfortable community engagement” (Shanghai Academy of Fine Arts, ___: no pp). The rest of this short introductory chapter introduces you to the idea of learning from debate, provides some advice on how to weigh, compare and critically think about different types of arguments, and reviews some of the major themes covered in the book.

Learning from debate and developing a nuanced perspective Debate sharpens one’s understanding of a topic. In reading or hearing two or more views on the same issue, we come to understand the nuance involved, the different perspectives, as well as the local level and regional dynamics. This is in contrast to the many news reports, popular perceptions and conventional assumptions about African themes and topics, which are often simplistic, monolithic and totalizing, a problem that Nigerian author Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie discusses in her relatively well-known TedTalk lecture entitled “The Danger of a Single Story” (Adichie 2009). Think about the many different books, articles and essays that you have read. If you know a lot about the subject, or if you clearly disagree with the author’s perspective, then it may be easier to read the article from a critical perspective, noting questions and raising concerns as you read through a piece. This may be different for topics that you know less about or for which you may not have encountered a contrarian viewpoint. In such cases, it is not unusual to pick up an essay, read through the argument and think that it makes sense. It is only when we read a contrarian view by someone who also knows a lot about the same topic that we may realize that we may not have asked enough questions about the first essay. The upshot may be that we end up siding with one perspective versus another, or that we develop a more nuanced view on the topic, incorporating insights from both sides of a yes or no argument. In other cases, by reading different views and background notes, what we are developing is enough contextual information to understand that seemingly different perspectives may simultaneously be true or co-exist. For example, every time we watch the nightly news in the city where we live, the news anchors often lead with stories about crime. Absent any context, one might think that the city was a crime ridden cesspool and a terrible place to live. We however, understand that these crimes are exceptions and not the norm in the city. Furthermore, there is much that is good in the town. As such, we don’t deny that these crimes have happened, but we know enough to appropriately

Introduction to debating African issues 3

situate information and have a more nuanced view of the city. This vignette gets at a problem for a lot of African issues, that is, oftentimes people just don’t know enough to put the information they receive in context. They hear about violence in Africa, or corruption or environmental degradation, and then extrapolate this to the entire region. Yes, these problems exist, just as they do in many other parts of the world, but there are also many peaceful areas of the continent, not to mention effective conflict resolution strategies, traditions of good governance, as well as sustainable agriculture practices. Knowing enough to effectively take-in and analyze new information is key for developing a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of African issues.

Advice on how to critically think about different types of arguments When reading and assessing the different issues in this volume, there are a number of different aspects to keep in mind, namely: 1) where and when are they discussing the problem; 2) at what geographic scale are they discussing the issue and 3) what type of evidence are they using to support their argument. First, many arguments are often based on the study of particular place or country in Africa, or a particular time in African history. At the risk of stating the obvious, the situation in Kenya or South Africa, may be different from that in Mali or Senegal or the dynamics of the 19th century may be different from those of the 21st century. In other cases, authors are marshalling evidence from multiple locations or time periods in order to make their argument. As such, it is always good to be attentive to these details as they could explain at least part of the difference in conclusions. Second, authors will sometimes make arguments at different scales, and by scale in this case we mean the physical area over which a generalization applies, such as a homestead, village, district, country, region or continent. To wit, some authors may be discussing information and data at the continental scale whereas others are marshalling evidence from say, the East Africa Region or the country of Rwanda. Other than being attentive to the differences in place or country outlined previously, there are at least two issues regarding scale to which one should pay attention. The first is the ‘ecological fallacy,’ which is the caution that you cannot downscale the same information, or simply assume that broad scale generalizations apply more locally. For example, regional averages for West Africa cannot be applied to Ghana and by extension, an argument based on regional information is hard to compare to a more national level argument. Furthermore, as we change scales of analysis and levels of aggregation, this alone can alter our findings. Sometimes, referred to as the modifiable areal unit problem (Openshaw 1981), the boundaries and scale of a spatial unit really can influence one’s findings. For example, soil degradation in the former homelands of South Africa has sometimes been linked to higher

4  William G. Moseley and Kefa M. Otiso

population densities in these areas, but when one scales out temporally and spatially, they realize that the apartheid era policies of packing people into these areas from other zones has much to do with this relationship (and that we might miss if we only examined the dynamics at the more localized scale) (Bundy 1979). Third, a good critical reader always examines the quality of the argument being made. Is the argument logical? Is the author backing up their points with evidence? Does the author acknowledge the strong and weak components of their argument or aspects where there might be contradictory evidence? And does the author acknowledge other perspectives and respond to these points or critiques?

Debates covered in this volume and layout of the book This debate style volume covers 20 enduring or contemporary debates on key African issues, from the realms of health and development, to education and urbanization. Each issue has pro versus con views penned by leading experts on the topic in an accessible and engaging style. These contrasting views on each issue are framed by an introduction that helps the reader to contextualize the debate and draw on further resources if necessary. The main objectives of the volume are to: 1) expose readers to well founded, yet contrasting views on key African issues; 2) to deepen and nuance the reader’s understanding of key African issues via debate, careful reading and critical thinking and 3) to push readers to connect the theoretical perspectives (from class or other readings) to real world policy and decision making. While Africa has often been marginal in academic and geopolitical discussions, not to mention news coverage, the tide is shifting for a few reasons. First, due to changing global demographics, Africa will soon be the second most populous and youthful, global region, making it increasingly difficult to ignore (Kariba 2020). Second, several events in popular culture (good and bad) have led university students to become increasingly interested in Africa related courses, including: the box office blockbuster Black Panther with its successful, fictional African country, Wakanda, that was never colonized; and former US President Donald Trump’s 2018 derogatory comments about African ‘s***hole’ countries (Vitali et al, 2018: no pp). Third, ongoing historical and contemporary links between Africa and other world regions; including the historic slave trade and the resulting African diaspora across the Americas; contemporary migration flows to Europe and North America and trade, investment and resource flows between Africa and other world regions. The book is divided into five sections, with four issues or chapters each. The first section explores historical and global context questions, the second examines debates concerning development, the third is focused on agriculture, food and the environment, the fourth on society, health and culture, and the fifth on politics, governance and security.

Introduction to debating African issues 5

The first section examines Africa in its historical and global context. The first three issues in this section are more historical, while the fourth is more geographic or spatial. Chapter 2 examines the impact of European trade with Africa prior to 1700, a point after which there is broader agreement that the slave trade was detrimental to African economies. By focusing on this earlier time period, historians Toby Green and John Thornton wrestle with deep academic disagreements regarding European-African trade. In chapter 3, Koster and Choti debate how peaceful and prosperous the continent was prior to European contact. Chapter 4 takes us up to the period of formal European colonialism in Africa, which many see as beginning in the late 19th century. The impact of this period, about 80 years in many areas of the continent, is also a subject of debate. Chapter 5 in this section, looks at African borders, most of which date to the colonial period, and their influence on development. The second section explores development issues, tackling a number of simmering debates on the continent today. Chapter 6 examines the ‘Africa rising’ narrative, an idea that has gained some traction in popular news publications such as the Economist Magazine. Here Jayne and Mkandawire argue that this is a new and exciting phase of African development, whereas Owusu sees it as more of the same boom and bust growth based on extraction. In chapter 7, Nolte and Lederman take on the contentious issue of foreign land acquisitions, also known as ‘land grabs.’ Nolte suggests that this is basically neocolonialism, whereas Ledermann sees it as an opportunity for new investment and technology transfer. In chapter 8, our discussants – Tsikudo and Carmody - take on the role of China in African development. While long engaged on the continent in development work, China has become the largest investor on the continent over the past 10 years (surpassing the United States and France). While some see this as a new opportunity for SouthSouth development partnerships, others see this as just another neocolonial relationship. Lastly, in chapter 9 of this section, Ofori-Amoah and Smiley debate the role of cities in African development. Are these centers engines of development and innovation or are they parasitic growths that feed off the backs of rural producers? In section three, we dive into discussions concerning agriculture, food, and the environment. In chapter 10, we are introduced to debates about parks in the African context. Kansanga and Kpienbaareh basically argue that parks are needed, but that we need to slightly rethink the model. DeMotts is more overtly critical, suggesting that this model of conservation imported from the global North is deeply problematic. In chapter 11, Masinde and Atlhopheng debate the degree to which Africans are adapting well to climate change. Masinde highlights the way in which Africans have long dealt with high rainfall variation (making them experts in this domain). Atlhopheng is less sanguine, seeing climate change as the challenge of a lifetime that the international community and African governments are not meeting. The topic of the New Green Revolution for Africa is debated in chapter 12. This approach, involving the use of improved seeds, pesticides and fertilizers to produce

6  William G. Moseley and Kefa M. Otiso

more food is heralded by Denning, whereas Nyantakyi-Frimpong points out that it is not improving the food security and nutrition for the poorest of the poor. In the last issue, chapter 13, Jane Battersby of the University of Cape Town and Eunice Njogu of Kenyatta University debate whether scholarship on African food security has a rural bias. In the next section, several topics related to society, health, and culture are debated. In chapter 14, Professors Otieno and Nwauwa discuss whether modern African education is counter-productive. Clearly educational systems do not occur in a vacuum and are influenced by colonial histories and national politics. The question is whether this results in an approach that does more harm than good. Next, Nyaondo and Njoya debate whether the focus on the girl child in development programs and education is counter-productive in chapter 15. The underprivileged position of girls has been a concern of many donors, but the best way to address this problem is hotly contested. Another great challenge, that has shaped donor priorities in the health sector, is the scourge of HIV/AIDS. In chapter 16 Oppong and Boakye debate whether this problem has received so much attention that other health challenges have been overlooked. Lastly, in chapter 17, Taden versus Zalanga examine African spirituality in relation to development. As the authors point out, whether or not we believe African spirituality is a hindrance to development, our perception is influenced by the way we think about religion, whether it is an adopted set of exogenous beliefs that transforms a society, or a set of practices that is difficult to separate from the local culture. The final section of the book looks at politics, governance, and security. Here our authors tackle a number of hot button topics. In chapter 18, Cheeseman and Ayittey debate whether multi-party democracy is the best form of governance in African countries. Cheeseman suggests that there is little doubt that this is the best approach to governance for African countries, whether you care about human rights, political stability or development. Ayittey, in contrast, suggests that Western-style multi-party democracy is problematic in the African context for several reasons. The pros and cons of a foreign military presence in some African countries are discussed in chapter 19. Here Brendon Cannon suggests that this is a problem because the interests of outside militaries are often at odds with the interests of African hosts. Atta-Asamoah argues that many foreign militaries in Africa are filling critical security gaps by containing existing and emerging threats. In chapter 20, Kinyanjui and Abbott debate whether more women in African politics leads to better governance in Africa. Kinyanjui clearly argues yes, whereas Abbot focuses on how this has been operationalized in certain African countries, especially Rwanda which has one of the highest proportions of female parliamentarians on the continent and in the world. Here she focuses on the issue of quotas and how this can sometimes be problematic. The last chapter debate, for this section and the book, is between Matanji and Bosch on the role of cell phone technology in African social movements. Is this technology broadening participation or is it exacerbating existing power divides in terms of class, gender, and ethnicity?

Introduction to debating African issues 7

Notes 1. Maquis are small outdoor cafes or bars in francophone West Africa. Shebeens are small unlicensed bars in South Africa, traditionally located in Black townships. These date from the Apartheid era when Black Africans were barred from entering pubs. The term has Irish origins. 2. This tradition of learning through debate is much different than the rote learning (or memorization) approach that we see in some European and Koranic schools in Africa in the colonial and post-colonial periods.

References Adichie, Chimamanda Ngozi. 2009. “The Danger of a Single Story.” https://www.ted. com/talks/chimamanda_ngozi_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_story Bundy, C. 1979. The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kariba, F. 2020. “The Burgeoning Africa Youth Population: Potential or Challenge.” 30 July. Brussels: Cities Alliance. Available at: https://www.citiesalliance.org/newsroom/ news/cities-alliance-news/%C2%A0burgeoning-africa-youth-population-potentialor-challenge%C2%A0 Openshaw, S. 1981. “The modifiable areal unit problem.” Quantitative Geography: A British View. London: Routledge. Pp. 60–69. Samatar, A. 1999. An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership, and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. Shanghai Academy of Fine Arts (___). “Palaver Tree,” Shanghai Academy of Fine Arts, Shanghai University, https://www.instituteforpublicart.org/case-studies/palaver-tree/. Vansina, J. 1985. Oral Tradition as History. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Vitali, A., Hunt, K., and Thorp V, F. (2018). “Trump referred to Haiti and African nations as ‘shithole’ countries.” NBC News, Jan. 11, 2018 (Updated Jan. 12, 2018). https:// www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-referred-haiti-african-countriesshithole-nations-n836946. Waghid, Y. 2016. “African philosophy of education: A powerful arrow in Universities’ bow.” The Conversation. 29 July. https://theconversation.com/african-philosophy-ofeducation-a-powerful-arrow-in-universities-bow-62802.

Section I

Historical and global context

2

Did European trade with Africans (including the slave trade) prior to 1700 damage or ruin economies on the continent? YES: Toby Green

Department of History, King’s College London, England

NO: John Thornton

Department of History, Boston University, USA Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Toby Green, of the Department of History at King’s College in London, argues that prior to 1500, the polities of West and West-Central Africa such as Mali and Kongo were involved in nascent processes of globalization. Wealth was accumulating and there were manufacturing centers. However, he describes how by the 19th century these processes had been stopped and even reversed. The major economic transformation in this era was the Atlantic reorientation of African trade, moving away from transSaharan and Indian Ocean networks. He suggests that no other major factor has yet been proposed which can account for this reverse in fortune. With global history emphasizing the importance of local and global linkages, it is the Atlantic turn alone which can account for these changes. NO: John Thornton of the Department of History at Boston University in the USA suggests that Africa, like other areas in the world, had civilizations that were produced by political and economic elites. The surplus production that made those elites wealthy and allowed them to patronize the arts or architecture was bought at the expense of common people. The distortions brought about by the process of enslavement, were a part of that expense in Africa; the wastage of human life of slaves on plantations in Brazil and the Caribbean were the part paid for Europeans. Producing surplus, at least in the early modern world, often distorted the economy, but it would be an exaggeration to say that commerce with Europe, even the slave trade ruined African economies. The elites who made decisions concerning the slave trade surely took into consideration the social cost of their strategy, or more would, like the kings of Benin, simply have stopped participating. DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-3

12  Toby Green and John Thornton

In terms of context, a couple of different issues are important to keep in mind. First, there is much less of a debate about the negative impacts of trade on Africa in the 18th and 19th centuries. This is a time when the transatlantic slave trade intensified, and it is clearer that this was detrimental for African prosperity. Second, the degree to which slavery existed in Africa prior to the European controlled trade is sometimes evoked in certain aspects of this debate. And third, the question of African agency in the slave trade with Europeans is often considered a crucial point. Whether or not European trade with Africa, and especially the slave trade, underdeveloped Africa is a contested debate pre-1700. The evidence that this was detrimental is much clearer in the 18th and 19th centuries, the height of the triangular trade between Europe, Africa, and the Americas. In this period, Europeans exported cheap manufactured goods to Africa in exchange for human cargo. Slaves were sent to the Americas to work on plantations and in exchange, commodity crops (tobacco, sugar, and cotton) grown on these estates. These crops were then shipped to Europe and the cycle started all over. It is estimated that some 10–12 million Africans were exported to the Americas as slaves from the 16th to the 19th centuries. It is true that some forms of slavery existed in Africa prior to the European slave trade, but many would suggest that this form of slavery was quite different and does not excuse the European trade in African slaves. Waring groups in Africa did sometimes take captives and those captured were obligated to perform certain tasks for the victorious party. There are two important points to keep in mind related to these local forms of bondage. First, they were often organized in terms of the task system. If one completed the assigned task, then they were free to go about other tasks and keep the rewards from such efforts. The task system is different from the chattel or gang labor system, wherein the slave owner controlled all aspects of the slave’s life. Furthermore, slave captives taken were a by-product of warfare rather than the objective of warfare. This changed with European slavery when slave raids into the interior for the purpose of capturing slaves became more common. While this is rarely invoked in contemporary debates about slavery, in previous centuries, the fact that slavery existed in Africa prior to the European trade was a key aspect of the apologist argument for its continued existence. What this argument conveniently overlooked was how the European trade differed from previous forms. Last but not the least, is the complicated question of African agency in the slave trade with Europeans. Agency refers to one’s power in a situation. While John Thornton’s views are hotly contested, in this debate he does tap into a broader theme in post-structuralist literature on Africa: the notion that Africans were not helpless pawns in a world dominated by Europeans, but active and influential participants. Thornton essentially argues that African elites had a fair amount of agency and would not have traded captives unless it served their own purposes. Of course, the interests of African elites and everyday commoners were not the same, especially those of the enslaved who were shipped to the Americas and to the horrors of the plantation system.

European trade with Africa prior to 1700 13

YES: EUROPEAN TRADE WITH AFRICANS PRIOR TO 1700 SIGNIFICANTLY DAMAGED ECONOMIES ON THE CONTINENT In 1444, the year that Portuguese ships first arrived on the Senegal River, Western Africa was involved in a process of incipient globalization stretching towards North Africa, the Mediterranean and the Silk Roads leading to China that had been taking place for several centuries. Senegambia, Mali, Songhay and Borno had regular links and an expanding currency supply which boosted internal markets and a nascent cloth industry led by Fulani weavers found across the region. Further south, Kongo’s economy was connected through transcontinental routes to the Indian Ocean trading networks, which brought sugar plants and a shell economy long before the Portuguese. However, by 1700 this nascent globalization towards the North and East had been largely superseded by an Atlantic economy directed Westwards, whose demand was for captives and not the production of industry. The value of currencies used in Africa, and imported hand-over-fist by European traders during the preceding two centuries, had fallen and capital would become impossible to accumulate for internal industrial investment in the later 18th century. African markets were glutted by textiles and other manufactures, in a foreshadowing of the dumping of colonial and post-colonial eras. It’s my contention that these processes – first of reorientation of the economy coastward and second of African industrial and capital decline – are connected. But to understand how and why, first we need some understanding of the economic panorama of West and West-Central Africa before the arrival of Portuguese navigators in the mid-15th century. What was Western Africa like before 1500? One of the most famous figures in West African history is Mansa Musa. A study in Time magazine in 2016 estimated that, in comparative terms, this emperor of Mali was the richest person who has ever lived (Davidson 2015). During his hajj to Mecca in 1324–1325, as described by the later Timbuktubased historian Al-Sa’dī, he and his retinue of 60000 soldiers and 500 slaves brought so much gold through Cairo that they brought about massive inflation of the currency (Hunwick 1999: 9). This is not surprising, when sources tell us that each member of the party bore a wand made of pure gold weighing around two kilograms. The largest polity in West-Central Africa was the Kingdom of Kongo, on which historian John Thornton is one of the world’s leading experts (Thornton 1983; 1998; 2000; 2001). Sources on Kongo before the 15th century are somewhat more tenuous than those for Mali, but as I have written elsewhere many of these sources suggest that Kongo too was globally connected (Green 2019: 199–200: the presence of sugar cane and a shell currency prior to the Portuguese arrival suggest transcontinental connections through Central

14  Toby Green and John Thornton

and Eastern Africa to the Indian Ocean trading economies, and indeed later Portuguese sources produced both in Angola and Mozambique speak of such trading routes. Weaving was a key industry in Kongo, and remained one of its major products for the Atlantic market long into the 17th century. Just as Kongo’s ability to expand its power in the 14th and 15th centuries may have been assisted by its ability to control markets and trade through its nzimbu shell currency which it fished in Luanda, the empire of Mali’s wealth in this period drew on its participation in the routes of late medieval global trade linking West Africa to Asia. The cowries that were one of the major currencies in Mali came both by sea along Indian Ocean routes and along the Silk Road, while items of Chinese porcelain have been located in excavations at Essouk-Tadmekka, preceding the rise of Mali in dating to the 11th century CE (Nixon 2009: 241). The empire of Mali itself had diplomatic connections to the court of what became the Ottoman Empire, as did Borno further to the east. In sum, West and West-Central African economies prior to the 1450s were already in a process of semi-globalization; and some peoples were more integrated into this process than were others. Early globalization led to the growth of currency bases and the expansion of markets in both West and WestCentral Africa. The evidence of this is there especially in much of Sahelian West Africa, where such activity financed the building of famous monuments such as Djinguereber Mosque in Tombouctou. As markets grew, West African industries expanded, in particular weaving industries in which the Fulani craftsmen were well-known, whose techniques were copied originally by the Portuguese when they settled the Cape Verde islands in the 1460s. Yet history tells us that Mali’s wealth did not last. By 1591 its successor state Songhay had been defeated and the region had collapsed into a series of feuding mini-states; and today, the Republic of Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world. Meantime, Kongo’s power also did not last, being eroded by Portuguese slave-trading ventures from Luanda and rival rulers such as the Imbangala who participated in this trade. Like Songhay, it too would collapse into a fractured state riven by civil war, in the late 17th century. Causes of economic and political decline We can begin by looking at these case studies of Mali and Kongo, as they introduce the key themes that must be assessed. There were many factors in Mali’s decline, not least the overreaching of power by the Mansas and the power of Tuareg nomads to unsettle established power in the Sahel. But sources also do tell us that there were economic roots of this decline. On his hajj of 1324–1325 Mansa Musa dispensed gold so liberally that he became indebted and had to borrow money in Cairo to finance the return voyage across the Sahara; and the same thing happened to Askia Mohammad of Songhay in his hajj in the late 15th century. Indebted to the economies of outsiders, a pattern of economic inequalities began.

European trade with Africa prior to 1700 15

One of the sources of Mali’s decline was its inability to control the trade routes of the Western Sahara through Walata. As Portuguese navigators began to compete for access to West African markets from the 1430s onwards, Mali’s economic reach and access to local gold reserves here declined. And in fact, it is precisely in this period from the 1430s to the 1460s that Mali’s power was usurped by Songhay, located further to the east and less dependent on Atlantic markets. In Kongo, meanwhile, the process of political centralization was encouraged by further access to global markets offered this time through the Atlantic. Growing economic dependence on the Portuguese went with loss of internal economic and political control as slaves were sold from among the Kongolese aristocracy, the Mwissikongo. After a crisis in 1568, when rebels quite likely from within Kongo itself attempted to unseat the ruler or manikongo, dependence on the Portuguese grew. In 1575, Portugal occupied Luanda, essentially seizing what was effectively the Bank of Kongo from which the nzimbu shell currency was fished. Losing control over its currency supply, inflation followed and with it serious economic and political decline followed in the 17th century. The cases of Kongo and Mali illustrate broader patterns of Western African economies in the 16th and 17th centuries. Initially, in spite of subsequent rewritings of history by generations of colonial historians, this was not a “barter trade” of baubles for wealth, but rather an economic exchange of value. Europeans traded almost exclusively with objects already used as currency in West African economies: copper manillas, iron bars, cowries, and cloth. With access to markets from China and the Indian Ocean to Europe and the Americas, by accident or by design, they were able to flood African markets with these currencies when purchasing local captives and gold. The Portuguese, for instance, not only brought cowries as ballast from the Carreira da Índia shipping route to trade in Benin, but also brought nzimbu from Brazil to Kongo. At the same time, there was not a large trade in manufactured goods to go with this currency trade. Classic economic theory tells us that the import of large amounts of items used as currency without expanded increase of manufactured goods to purchase leads to inflation. Meanwhile, Western African exports were all high in capital value: gold, becoming the standard of global currency value, and captives whose labor produced surplus value in the plantations of the New World. As African currencies were flooded with surplus currencies their economies suffered from inflation (as sources on numerous regions tell us), and their value declined; meantime, their exports contributed to the development of surplus capital value outside the economy. And this was then followed by the middle of the 17th century with a rapid increase in the trading of cheaply produced cloths and hardware manufactured in Europe. Indeed, the historian Joseph Miller has shown how it was precisely the trade in these manufactured goods which produced the greatest profits for Atlantic traders (Miller 1984): essentially an early version of “dumping.”

16  Toby Green and John Thornton

Multiple processes therefore took place. On the one hand, the loss of capital value made it hard to accumulate the capital which later on, in the 18th century, would be required to invest in new modes of industrial production. At the same time, indigenous manufacture found it hard to compete with cheaply produced foreign goods being dumped in increasing quantities in African markets. Trade was certainly increasing all the time in coastal settlements in Africa, something which might lead some to argue that this trade had benefitted African economies and helped them to grow. However, I would argue that this trade was in what we might call – following Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz – an “empty shell” economy (Chabal; Daloz 1999): one which was in fact hollowing out the potential for growth and economic development which had been present prior to 1450 through the incipient globalizing economies of the region.

Conclusion By 1700, what was the economic panorama which was taking hold in Africa? Perhaps the most significant was one of reorientation. The economies of West and West-Central Africa now looked westwards, instead of northwards and eastwards. Ports, markets, and trade routes had changed their vectors of influence away from the interior (Kongo across Central Africa towards the Indian Ocean, Mali/Sahel across Sahara), which had provided markets and currency for a growing productive base. The growth that came was at the coast, where new merchant classes emerged, and port cities expanded. This is not in itself evidence of economic benefit to Africa as a whole, for this growth was in a context where the Atlantic markets demanded free labor of Africans in the Americas, and in return dumped cheaply manufactured produce that outcompeted African products. At the same time, can we say that these processes ruined African economies? There are many problems with a question such as this, not least the generalization as to “Africa,” where in fact there were many different experiences, which depended on many factors including (and perhaps especially) geographical location. In coastal areas, economic activity often expanded. New merchant and trading classes were formed. Thus, to talk of ruin unilaterally does not take account of the entrepreneurial skill which developed along with these processes. At the same time, it is clear that these processes of trade damaged the productive capacity and potential economic expansion of African producers. And moreover, it is evident that this early process had concomitant impacts on the accumulation of capital and the potential for investment come the 19th century, and indeed right up to the present day. In conclusion, I would like to ask a counterfactual question. Given that Mali was one of the world’s wealthiest states in the 14th century, what was the cause of this general economic decline in Western Africa, right down to the present day, if it was not the reorientation of African economies which

European trade with Africa prior to 1700 17

went with the rise of the Atlantic trade? Historians are increasingly pointing to the intersection of global and local frameworks as being key in understanding historical transformations. The major changing framework in this era was the Atlantic opening. And if this did not cause this economic transformation, some other even more significant framework needs to be mooted as a potential cause. Thus far none has ever been suggested. Short of one being produced, the evidence seems to me to be pretty conclusive.

References Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal. 1999. Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Oxford: James Currey. Davidson, Jacob. 2015. ‘The 10 Richest People of All Time,’ Time Magazine, July 30 2015. Green, Toby. 2019. A Fistful of Shells: West Africa from the Rise of the Slave Trade to the Age of Revolution. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Hunwick, John O. (ed.). 1999. Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire: Al-Sa’dī’s Ta’rīkh al-sūdān down to 1613, and Other Contemporary Documents. Leiden: Brill. Miller, Joseph C. 1984. ‘Capitalism and Slaving: The Financial and Commercial Organiza­ tion of the Angolan Slave Trade According to the Accounts of Antonio Coelho Guerreiro (1684–1692),’ International Journal of African Historical Studies, 17/1, 1–52. Nixon, Sam. 2009. ‘Excavating Essouk-Tadmakka (Mali): new archaeological investigations of early Islamic trans-Saharan trade,’ Azania: Archaeological Research in Africa, 44/2, 217–255. Thornton, John K. 2001. ‘The Origins and Early History of the Kingdom of Kongo, c. 1350–1550,’ International Journal of African Historical Studies, 34/1, 89–120. _____ 2000. ‘Mbanza Kongo/São Salvador: Kongo’s Holy City,’ in David M. Anderson and Richard Rathbone (eds.), Africa’s Urban Past (Oxford: James Currey), 67–84. _____ 1998. The Kongolese Saint Anthony: Dona Beatriz Kimpa Vita and the Antonian Movement, 1684–1706. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. _____ 1983. The Kingdom of Kongo: Civil War and Transition, 1641–1718. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

NO: EUROPEAN TRADE WITH AFRICANS PRIOR TO 1700 DID NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DAMAGE ECONOMIES ON THE CONTINENT Between 1440 and 1500, European sailors, primarily from Portugal, pioneered sailing routes between Western Europe and Atlantic Africa. Initially European sailors approached the African coast almost as pirates, raiding the coast, grabbing people and bringing them back to Europe. A post on the Saharan coast intercepted trading caravans heading north across the desert. But Africans soon responded, Portuguese ships were attacked, sometimes successfully and raiding quickly yielded to commerce. The pioneering diplomatic voyages of Diogo Gomes between 1456 and 1462 led to a transition from pillage to commerce. African embassies began to appear in Lisbon

18  Toby Green and John Thornton

in subsequent years, Senegal, Benin, and Kongo each sent embassies in the 1480s where they were shown noble hospitality. In the northern half of Atlantic Africa, Portuguese merchants simply sought to divert the well-established trade between the Western Sudan and North Africa that had almost a millennium of tradition. South of that, the commerce was newer, though even Benin and the Gold Coast (modern Ghana) had had indirect relationships with North Africa, mediated through the Western Sudan. South of the Equator, the Kingdom of Kongo was an entirely new region, there never having been even indirect relations between West Central Africa and North Africa or Europe. The impact of these new trading relationships, or at least new trading partners, has been controversial in history, primarily because one of the items being exchanged was slaves, and as the slave trade grew, its potential impact on demography and quality of life became greater. In the 1960s and early 1970s, Walter Rodney (1966) and John Fage (1969) had an in-print debate over the degree to which Western Africa was harmed by its new relationship with Europe, Fage maintained that it was not, and perhaps was enhanced, Rodney saw the relationship as harmful. Others have taken the debate up from time to time since then, but the question must be considered as an open one. From the start, however, one of the central problems of having the discussion is the relative lack of solid economic information on the African side of the equation. Most of the African societies were not literate and did not record population counts, track trading volume or prices or create documents that would record economic structure. Orally transmitted statistics, which probably did exist, were not transformed into lasting data that we can analyze today. Those societies that did record information in writing, in Islamic Africa (the Western Sudan) or Kongo, did not preserve it long enough to reach our time. Thus, to understand most economic activity on the African side of the equation we must proceed indirectly largely using sources written by the European partners in the trade. Because of this, we cannot be particularly sure about such basic information as population size. Estimates by Europeans have uncertain basis – how do they know what they say? Perhaps they tapped into oral sources, for example, tax collectors probably knew the number of people paying taxes even if they did not write it down and could be a source. At times we can guess, or assume they used local knowledge; other times perhaps they counted houses or other direct methods to produce estimates. But so much activity went on far beyond the reach of Europeans that we have no idea at all. Without population data it is very hard to estimate per-capita use of anything; but we also lack almost complete, quantitative data on actual production. At best, we can have indirect information, a short run of statistics, records of exported goods found in European fiscal sources, perhaps other indications. That is not to say that this sort of information is lacking at all, but that it is less certain, contains a wider margin of error, than what we have

European trade with Africa prior to 1700 19

for Europe or other regions where records keeping was available. Even here, though we are often forced to speculate or make assumptions from limited data and hope they apply more widely. Because even Europeans often did not keep records of mundane activities, or records of such activities were lost in time, we are in a sort of double blind, weak direct statistical information to compare with virtually absent written records. In such a situation, scholars are forced into speculation, typically drawn by theory rather than by the manipulation of data. One of the problems that emerge from this statistical imbalance is the overall assessment of economic strength brought about by a bias toward contemporary situations. Africa is today a poor region, possessing relatively little industry and falling far behind in what is usually called economic development; Western Europe is a verifiable powerhouse economically, with great industrial capacity and a healthy and generally wealthy population. This has meant that much of what is written about 16th and 17th century comparisons between Europe and Western Africa assumes too much development on the part of Europe, and too little on the part of Africa. In the absence of decisive statistics on both sides, the assumption is often written into the description of the relationship. In 1977, I published an article on the population of the Kingdom of Kongo, based on a rare set of data, baptismal statistics in the Christian country.1 Using indirect methods, I produced what I considered to be a valid approximation of the population structure of this African kingdom, which showed that in important ways, Africa (with Kongo as a proxy for the whole continent) had equivalent life expectancy and infant mortality rates to those of Western Europe at the same time. Thus, on this very basic measure of the potential for an economy to meet the needs of its people, there was no gap and no difference. A second revelation came when examining statistics of Portuguese imports into its colony of Angola of textiles produced in Kongo, Loango, and lands northeast of Kongo. The statistical summary, by a Portuguese customs official, indicated that on average, Angola imported some 100,000 meters of cloth each year from this region over a 10-year period of 1601–1611. This remarkable number was equal to that of large textile specialized regions in Europe, such as Southern Holland. While it is uncertain exactly how many people lived in the producing region in Africa, it is perfectly clear that this level of exports only represented a fraction of the total production of cloth in the area (Vansina 1962). While we can only speculate on that larger volume, it is also clear that by any measure this area of Africa was a major textile producing region, even when measured against similar regions in Europe or Asia. Likewise, in the early 1980s, Candice Goucher (1984) also published a study of African iron production in West Africa, proposing that African smiths were capable of producing substantial volumes of iron and steel, and this was seconded in the same period by archaeological work that tended to confirm the idea that African metal production was equal to that of other world regions, in quality though quantity still remained unmeasured.

20  Toby Green and John Thornton

This path breaking work in the 1970s and early 1980s has found additional support throughout the community of scholars working on these topics in Africa. It has forced us to rethink the initial bias and to recognize that the key watershed in economic history, that is the Industrial Revolution and allied transformations in the whole of the Western European economy radically diverted that region into a world powerhouse. Studies of 19th and 20th century African underdevelopment began to focus on what some economists have called the “reversal of fortune” hypothesis. Although prefigured by earlier work, the general idea was that modern Africa’s dilemma of trade and production, which tends to reinforce its existing underdevelopment, is a product not of long term disparities between Africa and Europe, but of the impact of a sudden and rapid transformation of Europe after about 1770, but particularly accelerating after 1850, and not a long term difference. If we take as a starting point the idea that in terms of productive capacity, Europe and Africa were more or less equal in 1500, there is no reason to believe that trading relationships would be anything more than complimentary exchanges, modified, in the case of commodities like textiles, by taste or fashion. But the central problem of economic harm rests on a different base, and that is, the slave trade. Trading in slaves, in human labor power, and usually the most productive labor power, cannot do anything but harm the society that trades in them. I see no reason to doubt this, and even a quick glance would tend to confirm it. Studies of the demographic impact of the slave trade typically focus on the 18th century rather than earlier periods, because, first we have more data for the 18th century, but also because the volume of the slave trade in the 18th century was much greater and so the prospect of harm is increased. My own demographic study of Angola, based on Portuguese censuses taken in the 1770s, would appear to show the impact of the slave trade on a larger region. The crucial variable is the remarkable sex-ratio of this population, especially among adults, where there were only 43 men to every 100 women (roughly 40–60), as the children had pretty much an even sex ratio. This meant that the labor performed by adult males would have to be greatly diminished, either that women would have to perform it, perhaps without the requisite skills, or it would have to be undone or even replaced by imports. Moreover, the dependency ratio, that is, the number of adults available to care for the children in this case, was also badly skewed. By anyone’s calculation this population was stressed, and its economy affected by its demography. It is fairly clear that the slave trade had something to do with this lopsided demography. We know that the trade favored adult males, and it is the missing adult males that are the cause of the imbalance found in other places. How did this come about? In Angola, where Portuguese led armies often led wars that resulted in enslavement, it would be easy to see it as a simple action of slave trading driven by the demands of Brazil. But elsewhere in the continent, where Europeans played no direct role in enslavement, was it the same?

European trade with Africa prior to 1700 21

By and large, the rulers of African states controlled the slave trade. European raiding at the very beginning ended quickly and after that Europeans purchased slaves from African sellers, sometimes through private lines, but usually either directly from the state or closely mediated by the African state at the point of sale. The slave trade was taxed and regulated by African officials, with the notable exception of Angola, where the Portuguese colonial state performed these functions, and wars conducted by the Portuguese with local troops acquired a large percentage of the slaves, at least before 1685. The capacity to export slaves was thus in the hands of the African political elite, and they acquired slaves through wars, or through judicial processes. At times, when a country was wracked by civil war, rival political regimes might enslave the followers of their opponents; in times of larger disorder, private agents might kidnap or violently seize otherwise free people. However, we should be cognizant that the African political elite were not enslaving people simply to sell them to Europeans. They had been enslaving people before the Europeans came and continued to enslave and hold people as slaves within Africa after the slave trade with Europe began. In part, this was because private citizens and the state both employed slaves as workers and producers for their work. These enslaved people might not be subject to a labor regime that was much different from free people’s labor regime; although there are instances of plantations producing crops that might involve more labor than free people would perform. In addition, especially in areas where there was low population density, people would be concentrated by the political elites to make their production more easily taxable. This can be seen particularly in Central Africa where populations were low compared to West Africa. In the Kingdom of Kongo, for example, the region around the capital held, according to estimates based on a baptismal count in 1624, about 100,000 people. The provinces, which covered about 130,000 square kilometers, had something like 700,000 people, with a population density around 5 or 8 per square kilometer, while the center had densities in excess of 50 per square kilometer. Nearly 20% of all the population in Kongo lived within about 10 kilometers of the capital. We know that wars often brought people to the capital, and the development of a population center of this size was not simply the result of voluntary immigration, but more likely the product of forced resettlement. The process of concentrating population probably started 100 years or more before the first Europeans arrived, and the sale of some of those people to Europeans represented an extension of the existing network of enslavement. It is entirely appropriate to describe the situation in which an unbalanced sex ratio and a concentrated population were the results of the Atlantic trade. It seems likely that more people were enslaved through existing mechanisms of enslavement and resettlement because of the Atlantic trade. From the point of view of the African commoner, living in an environment in which there was a slave trade made life harder and perhaps kept them poorer than it otherwise would have been. But this feature was a

22  Toby Green and John Thornton

product of Kongo’s internal development as much as its participation in the external trade. Africa, like other areas in the world, had civilizations that were produced by local political and economic elites. The surplus production that made those elites wealthy and allowed them to patronize the arts or architecture was bought at the expense of common people. The distortions brought about by the process of enslavement, were a part of that expense in Africa; the wastage of human life of slaves on plantations in Brazil and the Caribbean were the part paid for Europeans. Producing surplus, at least in the early modern world, often distorted the economy, but it would be an exaggeration to say that commerce with Europe, even the slave trade ruined African economies. The elites who made decisions concerning the slave trade surely took into consideration the social cost of their strategy, or more would, like the kings of Benin, simply have stopped participating.

Note

1. John Thornton, “Demography and History in the Kingdom of Kongo, 1550–1750,” Journal of African History (1977); the initial study, which relied on indirect means to calculate age structure was refined the next year in “African Historical Demography” which made use of a much more reliable source, a list by age of over 700 children under 7 from a small region in Kakongo (but from the Kingdom of Kongo)

References Fage, John. (1969). Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Context of West African History. The Journal of African History, 10(3), 393–404. Goucher, Candace L. (1984). The Iron Industry of Bassar, Togo: An Interdisciplinary Investigation of African Technological History (Metallurgy) (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles). Rodney, Walter (1966). “African Slavery and Other Forms of Social Oppression on the Upper Guinea Coast in the Context of the Atlantic Slave Trade.” Journal of African History. 7(3), 431–443. Thornton, John. (1977). “Demography and History in the Kingdom of Kongo, 1550–1750.” Journal of African History. 18(4), 507–530. Vansina, J. (1962). “Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa.” The Journal of African History, 3(3), 375–390.

3

Was Africa more peaceful and prosperous prior to European contact? YES: Mickie Mwanzia Koster

Department of Political Science and History, University of Texas at Tyler, USA

NO: Charles Otoigo Choti

Department of History, University of Embu, Kenya Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Mickie Mwanzia Koster of the Department of Political Science and History at the University of Texas in Tyler, USA, argues that Africa’s peace and freedom diminished in the 18th century as a result of socio-political and economic pressures exerted by Europeans that eroded local structures that were vital for Africans’ peaceful co-existence and identities. While Africans may have stood to benefit from trading with Europe in the beginning, and could have potentially learned new things from European explorers and missionaries, they were exploited and abused in ways that led to conflict on the continent. She concludes that Europeans ushered Africa into a new world order of conflicts and confrontations. NO: Charles Otoigo Choti of the Department of History at the University of Embu, Kenya, explores violence and warfare in pre-colonial Africa and argues that this is necessary to the understanding of the roots of modern warfare and conflict in Africa. He suggests that modern violence in Africa is historically rooted in the precolonial era, contrary to popular arguments that colonialism is the baseline for all the ills that have befallen the African continent. He also examines the way warfare shaped pre-colonial Africa in socio-economic, political, and cultural terms, and, specifically, the role warfare played in the emergence of a range of state and non-state systems and in the development of the continent’s military cultures. The African continent is sometimes associated with violence and war in the contemporary era because conflicts in some areas receive attention in the Western Press and an impression of violence is generalized to the entire continent. While violence in particular areas, such as rebel movements in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or Islamist attacks in the West African Sahel, are usually associated with more contemporary local dynamics and external factors, there is a debate about violence on the continent DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-4

24  Mickie M. Koster and Charles O. Choti

prior to European contact. Was the region more peaceful before Europeans arrived on the scene? Related to this debate is the idea that Europeans may have irreversibly changed conditions on the continent for the worse during the colonial period and continue to be a force that fosters violence in various regions of Africa today. African kingdoms rose and fell in the precolonial period, such as the Ghana, Mali and Songhay empires in West Africa, the Axum Empire in the Horn of Africa and the Karanga Empire in what is now Zimbabwe. These Kingdoms clearly had armies and used military force to maintain and expand their territories. Several of these kingdoms also amassed great wealth. For example, the King of the Mali Empire in the 14th century, Mansa Moussa, was arguably the wealthiest person to have ever lived. Mansa Moussa also used his wealth to found one of the oldest universities in the world in Timbuktu. The Axum Empire (200–700 CE) used its riches to construct the famous sunken Coptic churches that are found in Ethiopia today and the Karanga Empire built (1000–1700 CE) its stunning political capital, the Great Zimbabwe (namesake of the contemporary country Zimbabwe). Interestingly, the impressive ruins of the Great Zimbabwe used to confound racist Europeans who could not believe that Africans were capable of building such structures. As such, statecraft, empire building and organized militaries were not a novel innovation of Europeans. While they employed armies, clearly these empires were stable enough to allow for some level of wealth and prosperity. While the start of the formal period of European colonialism in Africa is usually associated with the Berlin Conference of 1884, a meeting in which no Africans were present and Europeans set the ground rules for dividing up the continent, Europeans made several forays into Africa South of the Sahara prior to this date. Excluding the Mediterranean basin, where exchanges date to well before the present era, Portuguese and then Dutch explorers and traders were active along African coastlines from the 15th century. This subsequently led to the establishment of several slave trading posts and the trans-Atlantic slave trade endured well into the 19th century. While the interior of the African continent was largely controlled by Africans up until the dawn of formal European colonialism on the continent, slave raids into the interior, encouraged by European slave trading outposts, fostered instability, depopulation and conflict. This instability created an opening for some 19th century jihadists, such as Samori Touré, who moved throughout what is now Mali, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea, terrorizing local populations and eventually clashing with the French colonial forces. In a similar time period, yet in Southern Africa, the Zulu kingdom battled several neighboring African peoples and was eventually subdued by British forces. In both cases, some local people preferred the peace ushered in by colonial rule to the threat of violence from neighboring African groups. As Professor Choti argues in his essay here, states and empires the world over have amassed wealth and used military force to maintain their regimes. The question is whether the European led trade in African slaves and

Peace and prosperity in Africa prior to European contact 25

subsequent colonial incursions (as Professor Koster argues), created a particular set of conditions that would foster a new level of instability and violence in Africa.

YES: AFRICA WAS MORE PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS PRIOR TO EUROPEAN CONTACT

Introduction From European contact, perceived conquest, and colonialism, Africa moved from a continent largely defined as a place of peace and prosperity to one challenged with violence and corruption. The interruption of Africa’s peace directly impacted Africa’s ability to prosper. This essay argues that European colonial contact with Africa disrupted the continent’s peace and prosperity by: creating foreign systems designed for economic exploitation, denying African histories and abandoning African traditions that were replaced with European and Christian narratives and concepts, as well as widespread disorder and unrest. This is not to suggest that wars and conflicts did not exist prior to the European colonial encounter. Pre-colonial Africa has narratives of struggles and conflict between and related to: ethnic and regional rivalries, migrations, religious movements, conflicting ideologies, labor needs, climate challenges and territorial adjustments. But this level of violence and hatred was low compared to the one that arose when Africa got entangled with European arrivals with their encroachment policies, and their guns and weapons. The conflicts between most African societies were known, manageable and understood; they rested on centuries of negotiations, strategy, physical strength in warfare and spiritual beliefs.

Historical Background Africa like other continents had its social, economic and political order which promoted its welfare and existence. Periods of peaceful co-existence as well as times of confrontations, wars, migrations and settlements were equal factors propelled by its environment as was in other continents. However, Africa’s existence by its habitual definition greatly changed from the period of European exploration, invasion and settlement, a process which changed the perspective of Africa and its practices, including tradition and interactions, through influences of external powers (Aremu, 2010). Conflict as a factor was an outstanding consequence of Africa’s interaction with Europe and the western world. By virtue of external political pressures, economic exploitation and disorientation and cultural derogation to diminish their identity, Africa fought among itself before realizing and uniting against the antagonist. Consequently, the continent was ravaged by wars that were consistent, systematically initiated and persistent. The widespread arrival of

26  Mickie M. Koster and Charles O. Choti

different Europeans during the 19th century came to Africa with disdain carrying notions of white superiority, black inferiority, arrogance, imperialism and weapons (Achankeng, 2013). Therefore, the shifts help outline an Africa with a changed environment and mood; one that learned and experienced European violence. It has led to new perceptions with enhanced levels of understanding of the scale and impact of violence in the African continent.

European Encounters in Africa: Degradation and Death In pre-colonial Africa, Africans enjoyed centuries of peace, prosperity, tranquility and stability. They experienced comparably extended years of peace prior to the colonial exploration, conquest and settlement. Before the invasion and conquest, many African kingdoms were known for wealth, gold, technology, education, culture, music and art (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010). Their societies were anchored on rituals and prayers to address conflicts or threats. If there were issues of conflict, the African council (usually elders) was able to resolve the situation. The foundation of African society was built on a network of inclusion and age sets such that everyone understood their place and role in the society. African communities had elaborate, complex and intertwined political, economic, social and cultural systems, which fostered peace in societies. Their societies in most cases had effective policing organizations and ways for peacekeeping; peace meant prosperity as the society could stabilize and grow. Their models of crime control were anchored on traditional practices and rites that could uncover truth and see untruths. While some communities were not politically organized due to their smallscale nature, there were strong kinship ties and their homogeneous characteristics fostered on collective efforts that helped in maintaining peace (Herbst, 2014). This was also enforced and enhanced by structures of the family, village and the clan. Several families formed a village. Clans were made up of several villages while communities that had several clans were called kingdoms. The council of elders governed the clans. These elders enforced customary laws to ensure that people were protected and their properties were secured (Herbst, 2014). Their decisions were made through a consensus. However, regulating the relationships between members of different kingdoms or rival tribes was a major problem and was often exploited especially during the Atlantic Slave Trade. Equally, they took advantage of the African tribute system where slaves were given different kingdoms and states for wrongdoing. This developed to an unsustainable level of social imbalances, which caused detrimental effects on social relations and general peace across the continent. In essence, the European colonial powers effectively devised policies of division and competition which essentially disintegrated African unity, or gravitated rivalries to far reaching levels (Bozeman, 2015). This was to enhance the satisfaction of slave trade and in effect, weaken Africans for exploitation. Bozeman indicates that the divide and rule and colonial assimilation were by far the most effective policies used to degrade and promote colonial influence

Peace and prosperity in Africa prior to European contact 27

in the continent (2015). Africa as a society and state had routinely structured norms and traditions which in essence, promoted their coherence, notwithstanding the usual socio-political and economic interferences in the forms of conflicts, raids, wars and slave capture or even entire communal absorption by more dominant groups. It is however noted that with the European invasion of Africa, the state of affairs comparably worsened leading to steady rise in conflicts (Deng, 1996). For instance, in Zimbabwe, the Mutapa State experienced violent conflicts during the pre-colonial period soon after the Portuguese expressed their desire to take control of the country’s resources (Hove, 2019, pp. 147–163). Nevertheless, before colonization, confrontations entangled the Mutapa state and the Portuguese who attempted to conquer and dominate trade in gold and ivory on the Zimbabwean plateau. This gave rise to the proliferation of Nguni groups that attacked Rozvi State. The Ndebele raids were also conducted on Shona chiefdoms. Complex norms, institutions, as well as rules regulated African politics during the precolonial times. Such regulations included dispute resolution and war limitations. Most of the wars that were witnessed in Africa were based mostly on territorial aspects than ideological differences. According to Acharya and Johnston (2007), “the political balkanization of West Africa by European colonialism, and the failure of the colonial system to find a delicate equilibrium between the colonial state and the precolonial African societies, left a long-term heritage of domestic instability and external peace for postcolonial Africa.” This contributed to increased negative peace in the region that was further worsened by delimitation of boundaries during the scramble and partition of Africa. In essence, West Africa experienced conflicts that were easily resolved during the precolonial period but colonialism Balkanized the region creating animosity that continues to fuel wars. According to Falola (2009, p. 36), the Europeans solely ensured the instigation and the availability of millions of Africans that became victims of generations of servitude to white masters in the Americas. The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade is still a hallmark in the African history and is one of the darkest times in the continent. The number of Africans captured during the passage remains debatable. Scholars continue to debate just how many slaves were placed into this cruel system. While most claim around 10 million Africans were taken, some firmly hold that the numbers were as high as 50 million (Thornton, 1999). The rape, castration, maiming, whipping, hanging and murder of Africans during slavery and the 400 years after emancipation has had a long legacy in the United States and other places that share this history of African discrimination, hate and degradation. European colonial rule in Africa resulted in the dismantling and/or reconfiguring of African political, economic and social systems to structures for European rule and imposition. After the demand for slaves decreased following the abolition of slavery by Britain in 1807, there was an opportunity for Africa’s recovery and restoration. But this was short-lived. As a restoration of colonial dominance and with the Atlantic slave trade ending, Europe needed a new way to continue

28  Mickie M. Koster and Charles O. Choti

to build wealth. Europeans turned to the continent directly by considering direct occupation. The dividing of Africa took place in Berlin in 1885 without a single African leader at the table. Seeds of hatred were planted through the divide-and-rule strategy. As Mawere and Marongwe (2016) explain, “ethnic and ethnopolitical conflicts resulting from divide and rule have since caused many mistrusts and misunderstandings among societies that used to live together harmoniously before the coming of colonialists when conflicts were solved without causing much loss.” This became a sad period in the history of Africa due to numerous conflicts and inhumane atrocities whose effects exist up to date. At every turn, European contact with Africa was an affair that often-had deadly encounters.

Post-Colonial African Conflicts and Violence There are many types of conflicts that are responsible for the current instabilities in Africa. However, there are three types that particularly show roots and causes linked to the European presence in Africa: inter-ethnic conflicts, inter-state conflicts and liberation conflicts (Achankeng, 2013, pp. 11–13). Inter-ethnic conflicts The arbitrary borders Europe created in Africa during the 19th century disrupted ethnic communities by creating political units that divided ethnic groups in some cases and combined rival groups in others (Aremu, 2010, p. 551). These artificial constructions were designed at the Berlin conference in 1885 to prevent Europeans from going to war over the different African territories. The changed levels of interactions and contacts led to historical and new ethnic challenges as Europeans used ethnicity and ethnic beliefs or even stereotypes as a means for African control and exploitation. During colonialism, the divide-and-rule policy and the destruction of traditional peace education were largely responsible for inter-ethnic conflicts in Africa (Falola, 2009). In Nigeria, for example, “the colonialist while pretending to carry out a mission of uniting the warring ethnic groups, consciously and systematically separated the various Nigerian people thereby creating a suitable atmosphere for conflict.” (Osinubi and Osinubi, 2006, pp. 104–114). In Rwanda, the Belgian colonialists favored the Tutsi tribe more than the Hutus as a way of increasing their political power and opportunities in education (Isabirye and Mahmoudi, 2000). Due to these divisive policies, Tutsis also gained economic and political dominance in Burundi while the Hutus retained education dominance. Consequently, the Tutsis gained political domination in Rwanda that escalated the animosity with the Hutus. In the 1990s, the Rwandan Hutu elites who were in authority planned a genocide to counter the perceived threat from the Tutsis. The roots of this crisis lie in the European explorers and anthropologists who labelled some ethnic groups as

Peace and prosperity in Africa prior to European contact 29

loyal or rebel (rewarding some with protection and wealth). This brought about distinct identities among Africans that resulted in inter-ethnic clashes. In Kenya, “the colonialists spread such stereotypes like the Kikuyu were thieves and dishonest while the Luo and the Luhya were good servants.” (Ogot, 2005 pp. 169). In most of these cases, the new ethnic tensions resulted in violent situations, especially as Africans fought over now very limited resources such as land. Inter-state conflicts Before the arrival of European colonialists, African boundaries reflected the ethnic, traditional and historical boarders of indigenous people. Yet the states that were randomly made-up during Europe’s Scramble for Africa resulted in boundaries responsible for displacements and conflicts. The SomaliEthiopian war for instance, occurred between 1960 and 1967 as stated by Timothy (2018). The cause of the war was a disputed region called Ogaden that was largely inhabited by the Somali community. The Somali claimed this region because of the dominance of the Somali community who were separated from the larger community during the colonial delimitation of the boundaries. A similar situation led to war between Somalia and Kenya in 1977 that famously came to be known as the shifta war (Whittaker, 2008). The cause of the war was to consolidate the northern part of Kenya that is inhabited by the Somali community into the larger Somalia. In another example, in 1998 the ownership of Badme town brought about war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Abbink, 2003, 219–231). The dispute has never been fully settled even though a boundary commission that was formed to resolve the problem ruled that the area was part of Eritrea. In West Africa, for over 40 years Nigeria and Cameroon were at war over a colonial boundary in Bakasi peninsular. The International Court of Justice ruled that Cameroon was the rightful owner of the region in 2002 (Anyu, 2007). These instances depict at length the strife caused in Africa over the scramble and partition of the continent by Europe. Liberation conflicts Between 1950 and 1963, many African leaders challenged the colonial state through political parties and trade unions that helped pave the way for independence in Africa. While many countries in Africa were able to make relatively smooth transition to an independent Africa, settler colonies had it rough. The former Portuguese colonies, and South Africa, Algeria and Kenya are good examples of colonies that struggled. In Algeria, the Algerian War of Independence was fought between France and the Algerian National Liberation Front from 1954 to 1962 (Oni and Segun, 2014). This violent struggle was associated with guerrilla warfare, rural but armed resisters, and torture. An estimated 1.5 million Algerians were killed, hundreds of

30  Mickie M. Koster and Charles O. Choti

thousands detained, and the mass rape of women was witnessed. The same sort of African conviction to remove the Europeans occurred in Kenya as they fought the British to end colonial rule. In the case of the Mau Mau war in Kenya (1952–1960), thousands of Africans died and were hung for pledging to participate in the secret Mau Mau rebellion (Koster, 2016). This war was particularly engaging because participants turned to their old traditions to set curses and take oaths to fight the British and restore African land and freedom. The conflict was also known for high levels of torture in detention camps, raping of women and unjust hanging. It was a violent war in the forest and in print as the British used media to outline African savagery and violence while overlooking their dirty side of the war (Koster, 2016). Likewise, Zimbabwe’s war of independence (1965–1979) was a long and politically charged guerilla war (Hove, 2019). It was all-out war in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique, Angola, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau (1961–1974) and the South African colony of South-West Africa (Namibia). There was no military confrontation within South Africa around apartheid, but mass uprisings and sporadic guerrilla attacks spurred the fall of the apartheid regime in 1994 (Lodge, 2011). The people of South Africa took to the streets in mass civil unrest to overwhelm the resources of the apartheid regime. The African protesters suffered severe consequences, but ultimately their mass movement was too much for the white minority government. Among the many examples of mass protest in South Africa is the Soweto uprising of 1976, in which African students boycotted schools and took to the streets in protest, rather than have Afrikaans, the language of the oppressive white minority, elevated to a language of instruction in their schools (Lodge, 2011). These are some of the cases that defined African resistance and associated violence to European colonial rule in Africa. Collectively they show Africans who clearly wanted the Europeans out of their countries and who wanted their freedom restored. Based on the deaths associated with this conviction, they were willing to do whatever was necessary to fight the growing aggression of the European military which, in some cases, did not want colonial rule to end. Finally, there are the end of colonial rule wars and liberation efforts that have found ways to continue to linger in modern Africa. Upon gaining independence as stated by Gebremichael et al (2018), people living in the southern part of the then Sudan were marginalized. The marginalization began in 1899 when tribal chiefs were appointed under the British colonial rule. As a result, a separatist movement was created in the 1950s that escalated to a civil war in 1955. Another civil war broke out in 1983 and ended six years before South Sudan gained independence to become a sovereign state in 2011.

Conclusion From the very beginning of early contact with Africa, European interests, demands, occupation and rule brought mostly chaos, unrest, war and new levels of violence. The European thirst for African slaves and African resources

Peace and prosperity in Africa prior to European contact 31

broke the peace that was once prevalent across the continent. The level of peacefulness differed from one part of the African continent to another. This implies that the African continent before colonialism could not be classified uniformly to have been marred with violent conflicts as some people argue (Falola, 2000). We cannot ignore the conflicts that have arisen in Africa in the postcolonial period. Some scholars have argued that the root causes of these conflicts are more recent or contemporary (Wa Mui, 2010). This perspective is based on the thought that despite Africa being colonized, they have maintained several aspects of their socio-political existence. Still, the amount of influence that the colonial powers exert on the continent in the form of neo-colonialism is a huge source of conflicts. The divide and rule method employed by some of the colonial powers has heavily accentuated ethnic tensions in contemporary Africa. It is the same approach which has formed the conduit of exploitation of Africa by corrupt leaders who have continued to foster pre-existing ethnic divides in order to gain at the cost of their own people. Modern Africa is still trying to unthread itself from colonial legacies and chaos associated with European contact.

References Abbink, J. (2003). Badme and the Ethio-Eritrean border: The challenge of demarcation in the post-war period. Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell’Istituto italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, 58(2), 219–231. Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2010). Why is Africa poor? Economic history of developing regions, 25(1), 21–50. Achankeng, F. (2013). Conflict and conflict resolution in Africa: Engaging the colonial factor. African journal on conflict resolution, 13(2), 11–38. Acharya, A., & Johnston, A. I. (eds.). (2007).  Crafting cooperation: Regional international institutions in comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press. Ajayi, J. F. A., & Unesco. (2003). General history of Africa: VI. Glosderry [Cape Town: New Africa Education. Anyu, J. N. (2007). The International Court of Justice and Border-Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Bakassi Peninsula Conflict. Mediterranean Quarterly. 18(3): 39–55. Aremu, J. O. (2010). Conflicts in Africa: Meaning, causes, impact and solution. African research review, 4(4). Astor, M. (2018, March 5). 7 times in history when students turned to activism. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/us/student-protest-movements.html. Bates, R. H., & Bates, R. H. (2001). Prosperity and violence: the political economy of development (pp. 144). New York: Norton. Bozeman, A. B. (2015). Conflict in Africa. Princeton University Press. Brunschwig, H. (1973). Agbodeka (Francis): African Politics and British Policy in the Gold Coast, 1868–1900. A study in the forms and force of protest. Outre-Mers. Revue d’histoire, 60(221), 693–693. Caselli, F., & Coleman II, W. J. (2011). On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict. Unpublished typescript, London School of Economics.

32  Mickie M. Koster and Charles O. Choti Deng, F. M. (1996). Anatomy of conflicts in Africa. In Between development and destruction (pp. 219–236). Palgrave Macmillan, London. Falola, T. (Ed.). (2000). The end of colonial rule (Vol. 4). Carolina Academic Press. Falola, T. (2002). Africa; Colonial Africa, 1885–1939. Vol. 3. Falola, T. (2009). Colonialism and violence in Nigeria. Indiana University Press. Gebremichael, M., Kifle, A. A., & Kidane, A. (2018). South Sudan Conflict Insight. Gross, D. A. (2015). A Brutal Genocide in Colonial Africa Finally Gets Its Deserved Recognition. Smithsonian Magazine. Herbst, J. (2014). States and power in Africa. Princeton University Press. Hipfl, B., & Hug, T. (2006). Media communities. Waxmann Verlag. Hove, M. (2019). The Necessity of Peace Education in Zimbabwe. In Infrastructures for Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 147–163). Springer, Cham. Stephen B. Isabirye, S.B. & Mahmoudi, K.M. (2000). Rwanda, Burundi, and Their “Ethnic” Conflicts. Ethnic Studies Review. 23 (1): 62–80. Jonas, R. (2011). The Battle of Adwa. Harvard University Press. Kinni, F. K. Y. (2015). Pan-Africanism: Political Philosophy and Socio-Economic Anthropology for African Liberation and Governance: Caribbean and African American Contributions (Vol. 1). Langaa Rpcig. Kodila-Tedika, O., & Asongu, S. (2018). The Long-Term Effects of African Resistance to European Domination: Institutional Mechanism. Koster, M. M. (2016). The Power of the Oath: Mau Mau Nationalism in Kenya, 1952–1960 (Vol. 72). Boydell & Brewer. Koster, M. M., Kithinji, M. M., & Rotich, J. P. (Eds.). (2016). Kenya After 50: Reconfiguring Education, Gender, and Policy. Springer. Lindgren, K., Heldt, B., Nordquist, K. Å., & Wallensteen, P. (1991). Major armed conflicts in 1990. Lodge, T. (2011). Sharpeville: an apartheid massacre and its consequences. OUP Oxford. Maphosa, S. B., & Keasley, A. (eds.). (2019).  Peace education for violence prevention in fragile African societies: what’s going to make a difference? Africa Institute of South Africa. Mawere, M., & Marongwe, N. (2016). Violence, Politics and Conflict Management in Africa: Envisioning Transformation, Peace and Unity in the Twenty-First Century. Langaa RPCIG. Molemele, N. L. (2015). Factors Which Prolong Civil Conflict in Africa: The Case of Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Ogot, B. A. (2005). Britain’s Gulag histories of the hanged: Britain’s dirty war in Kenya and the end of empire. By David Anderson. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005, PP. viii+ 406 (ISBN 0-297-84719-8). Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya. By Caroline Elkins (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005). Pp. xiv+ 475. £20 (ISBN 0-224-07363-X). The Journal of African History, 46(3), 493–505. Oni, S., & Segun, J. (2014). Colonial Africa and its emerging cultures. Opolot, J. S. (2008). Police administration in Africa: toward theory and practice in the Englishspeaking countries. University Press of America. Osinubi, T. S., & Osinubi, O. S. (2006). Ethnic conflicts in contemporary Africa: The Nigerian experience. Journal of Social Sciences, 12(2), 101–114. Shepperson, G. (1985). The centennial of the West African conference of Berlin, 1884–1885. Phylon (1960-), 46(1), 37–48. Szayna, T. S., O’Mahony, A., Kavanagh, J., Watts, S., Frederick, B., Norlen, T. C., & Voorhies, P. (2017).  Conflict Trends and Conflict Drivers: An Empirical Assessment of Historical Conflict Patterns and Future Conflict Projections. RAND Corporation.

Peace and prosperity in Africa prior to European contact 33 Tilly, C. (1975). Reflections on the history of European state-making. The formation of national states in Western Europe, 38. Timothy, G. (2018, January 7). Inter-state conflicts in Africa. Medium. https://medium.com/ @gachanga/inter-state-conflicts-in-africa-2f378a03fa8. Thornton, J. K. (1999). Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500–1800. Routledge. Wa Muiu, M. (2010). Colonial and postcolonial state and development in Africa. Social research: An international quarterly, 77(4), 1311–1338. Whittaker, H. (2008). Pursuing Pastoralists: The stigma of shifta during the ‘Shifta War’in Kenya. Eras Edition, 10. https://www.monash.edu/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/ 1671045/whittaker-article.pdf

NO: AFRICA WAS NOT MORE PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS PRIOR TO EUROPEAN CONTACT

Introduction Africa is a vast continent of diverse ethnic communities, speaking many different languages as well as having multiple cultures and religions. The continent is also geographically diverse with highly differentiated economic activities. Clearly, these differences, coupled with other factors including human nature, constituted major sources of conflict and war in pre-colonial Africa. To be sure, in pre-colonial Africa, wars were waged for a range of reasons, including territorial expansion and control, self-preservation, defense and protection against external aggressors. Indeed, it can be argued that wars were profoundly important in shaping Africa’s past and in inspiring major political, social and economic changes. Moreover, even the mere struggle of trying to tame nature or to control resources such as water, arable land and pasture has long been a driver of conflict and warfare even in precolonial times (Reid, 2007). Pointedly, many societies or kingdoms in pre-colonial Africa rose to prominence and prosperity as a result of military conquest and acquisition of new territories. Let me be clear here: warfare or violence is not the preserve of African society only, rather, it is a universal human trait. As Uzoigwe suggests, “war or the use of naked force to achieve desired goals, has proved to be a permanent feature of human society. It is as old as the world and, therefore, older than history” (1987, pp. 22). Thus, like in most human civilizations, lifestyle in Africa has historically been characterized by some level of violence or warfare. Moreover, the precarious nature of life in pre-colonial Africa explains the inevitability of tensions, conflicts and warfare in and among its communities, albeit with less deadly weapons like spears and sling stones. Whereas Eurocentric scholars often undermine African military history prior to colonialism, dismissing African wars as tribal or ‘bush’ wars that need no explanation (Thornton, 1999, pp. 4), Afrocentric scholars’ romanticism that “Africa was more peaceful and prosperous prior to European

34  Mickie M. Koster and Charles O. Choti

contact” is equally misleading. In fact, pre-colonial Africa was far from being peaceful and prosperous. Despite the condescending attitude of some western scholars (Adas and Stearns, 2008, pp. 51), who view warring endeavors in pre-colonial Africa as senseless blood-letting orgies, lacking coordination and purpose, warfare had its place and purpose in precolonial state formation. Prior to European colonization in the late 19th century, Africa had a very long history of state building as well as a rich heritage of decentralized social and political formations (Zeleza, 1993).

The inevitability of violence in pre-colonial Africa As aforementioned, the precarious nature of life in pre-colonial Africa, the desire for territorial expansion as well as state preservation and self-defense, made war inevitable. In other words, violence or war provided the means through which African leaders consolidated their reign over large territories, asserted their power and influence as well as gained economic dominance over their neighbors. Wars were waged to ensure survival and to secure populations. To achieve this, there was need to not only mobilize both men and material resources but also to design strategies and produce weapons. This process led to the rise of the institution of the military, a tool of violence, in pre-colonial Africa. The military was integral to precolonial political structures. According to Uzoigwe, “In no state …is the military totally divorced from the political structure” (1987, pp. 23). Actually, the ideal African king or chief was a great warrior. This means that distinguished men with colorful military records stood good chance of becoming chiefs/kings in their communities. In many respects, militarism was especially celebrated in pre-colonial Africa and young men looked forward to joining the military more so after their manhood initiation ceremonies. The military was not only a source of personal pride and self-esteem, but also a socialization agency to honor, identity and fulfilment. It is instructive to note that the 5th Annual Social Science Conference of the University of East Africa held at the then University College, Nairobi, from the 8–12 December 1969, included a historical section on “War and Society in Africa” which examined violence and military traditions in pre-colonial Africa (Ogot, 1972). It found overwhelming evidence of war and conflict in the majority of pre-colonial societies; a reality that continued to characterize colonial and post-colonial African societies; with many modern civilian regimes in Africa continuing to rely on the military for their survival. In their text on the Yoruba warfare in the 19th century, Ajayi and Robert (1964), not only defined the art of war in Yoruba society but also demonstrated the intimate interaction of war and politics in pre-colonial Africa. Similarly, in his book, Technology, Tradition and the State in Africa (1971), Jack Goody discusses military technology and organization in pre-colonial Africa, especially, West Africa and argues that the nature of the then polity is related

Peace and prosperity in Africa prior to European contact 35

to the means of military destruction available in various political systems in West Africa. He thus concludes that for social organization, “the most significant aspect of distinction between acephalous societies, forest kingdoms and Savannah states lay in their military technologies rather than their productive techniques…it is because the crucial control of force was the first element of the systems to disappear under the colonial regime that this factor has so often been underplayed in retrospective analyses and post-colonial reconstructions” (pp. 34). In many respects, militarism was quite entrenched in pre-colonial African state structures. In his study on the military traditions of the Jo-Ugenya, a sub-ethnic community of the Luo of Kenya, Owino (20121993) observes that pre-colonial Africa was precarious and often characterized by lawlessness and widespread violence. He illustrates this with the wars that Jo-Ugenya fought with their neighboring communities including the Iteso, Buhkayo, Marachi, the Abakholo clans, the Marama, Wanga and their allies in south Ugenya. Subsequently, Jo-Ugenya fought with the Arab-Swahili traders and later, with the British colonial officers at Mumias. In the process of chronicling all of these wars, Owino identifies “the characteristics of the military tradition of the Ugenya and the historic circumstances within which they were molded and crystallized”; circumstances that clearly go back to the precolonial period. Reid (2007) examines the historical roots of African warfare by looking at the nature and objectives of 19th century violence in pre-colonial Eastern Africa, especially in highland Ethiopia and the Great Lakes region. He finds that very little is known about the history of violence and vulnerability in East Africa before 1800 despite its obvious importance to virtually any larger theme in the region’s history. He concludes that despite the fraught moral valences of violence and vulnerability – especially with respect to their importance in modern African history – historians must meet the challenge of studying the earlier histories of violence and vulnerability to get a fullfleshed sense of the African past. David Schoenbrun, on the other hand, focuses on violence and vulnerability in East Africa before 1800 and argues that the association of violence with Africa is a core part of the “Afro-pessimism” stereotype that Africa is doomed to economic underdevelopment, weak governance and endemic violence. The roots of this stereotype run through pre-colonial notions of burdens, barbarisms, apartheid and colonial practices of conquest and “pacification” and into a more distant past of enslavement and commerce. It is not hard to see in these compressed claims, the depth of the essentializing notions of Africa’s past as one soaked in blood and why it is difficult to set out the clear contours of a history of violence in Africa. He argues that to approach the study of violence in such a manner, perhaps, grants too much power to the binary that works in the shadows of these themes. We must not take for granted that we know how Africans thought about practiced and disciplined violence over long spans of time and historical contexts.

36  Mickie M. Koster and Charles O. Choti

In sum, war has been profoundly important in shaping Africa’s past; it has been both an outcome and driver of broader political, social and economic change. Throughout the continent’s recorded history, organized violence has been the product of the perennial struggle to maximize population growth – this is particularly critical in the context of Africa’s historical under population. As a relatively land-rich continent, African political and social development has been characterized by continual division and reformation, involving migratory movements and regional rivalries that have often been violent by their very nature. A common theme across much of the continent in the pre-colonial era is the constant creation and recreation of unifying, and often coercive, ideologies aimed at the maximization of productive and reproductive labor.

Conclusion It is paradoxical, if not hypocritical, for many African scholars to vehemently argue that violence in Africa was a colonial creation while also enthusiastically writing about great pre-colonial African military traditions and inventions. The fact that pre-colonial Africa had a sophisticated military civilization means that warfare and violence were part and parcel of Africa’s then history. Conversely, Eurocentric scholars tend to ignore significant developments in African military history prior to colonialism; with their narratives frequently shaped by normative European assumptions about the nature of warfare and its proper conduct and by their condescending attitudes towards “uncivilized people.” They, thus, tend to dismiss pre-colonial African wars as tribal or ‘bush’ wars that need no special explanation, or whose explanation defies the logic of the civilized wars that are the proper subject of military history. As a result, Africa is often left out or dealt with in a rather superficial manner in the literature on the comparative history of war.

References Adas, Michael; Peter N. Stearns (2008). Turbulent Passage – A Global History of the Twentieth Century (4th Ed.), Pearson Education Inc. Ajayi, J. F. A. and Smith, R. (1964). Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century. Ibadan Ibadan University Press 1964. Goody, Jack (1971). Technology, Tradition and the State in Africa, London: Oxford University Press 1971. Ogot, Bethwell A. (ed.) (1972). War and society in Africa; ten studies, conference proceedings of the 5th Universities of East Africa Social Science Conference, December 8–12, 1969, Nairobi, London, F. Cass 1972, 1972. Owino, Meshack (2012). A History of the Military Tradition of the Jo-Ugenya, C.1700– 1920, Master’s Thesis, Department of History, Archaeology and Political Studies, Kenyatta University, http://ir-library.ku.ac.ke/handle/123456789/4530. Reid, R. J. (2007). War in Pre-Colonial Eastern Africa: The Patterns and Meanings of StateLevel Conflict in the Nineteenth Century. Oxford: James Carrey.

Peace and prosperity in Africa prior to European contact 37 Schoenbrun, David Lee (1998). A Green Place, A Good Place: Agrarian Change, Gender, and Social Identity in the Great Lakes Region to the 15th Century. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. Thornton, John K., (1999). Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500–1800. London, UK: UCL Press. Uzoigwe, G.N. (1987). Partage européen et conquête de l’Afrique: aperçu general. In AduBoahen, A., Histoire générale de l’Afrique: VII L’Afrique sous domination coloniale, 1880–1935, eds. UNESCO, 39–66. Zeleza, Tiyambe (1993). A modern Economic History of Africa (Vol. I): The NineteenthCentury, Dakar, CODESRIA.

4

Did colonialism distort African development? YES: Segbegnon Mathieu Gnonhossou

School of Theology, Seattle Pacific University, USA

NO: Ogechi E. Anyanwu

Department of History, Eastern Kentucky University, USA Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Segbegnon M. Gnonhossou of the School of Theology at Seattle Pacific University, USA, argues that colonialism grossly distorted African development and that claims that this is not the case are nothing more than a recycling of the old and distasteful Eurocentric narratives that suggest that European colonialism of Africa, and even the Atlantic slave trade, were good for Africans and for the world economy. While colonialism may have come with some benefits like Africa’s economic and infrastructure development, these investments were meant to benefit the colonizers, not Africans. Moreover, according to Gnonhossou, a review of pre-colonial Africa shows that the continent was on an upward development trajectory that colonialism distorted by siphoning away wealth and labor for the benefit of Europe. NO: Ogechi E. Anyanwu of the Department of History and African Studies at Eastern Kentucky University argues that colonialism did not distort African development.1 Instead, colonial rule transformed Africa’s social, economic and political landscape for the better. In particular, the pluralistic modern African countries that colonial conquest forged, the enduring democratic institutions that colonial administrators engineered and the economic and educational changes that colonialism introduced to Africa planted the seeds of a potentially strong post-colonial African continent. Moreover, he argues that Africa’s current political and socio-economic challenges stem more from domestic factors and the inability of post-colonial African leaders to forge a better reality for their people than from the negative legacy of colonialism. The debate on whether European colonialism distorted Africa’s development has been raging for decades.2 The debate commenced with early colonial era accounts of Africa’s backwardness and the need for her to be civilized through the intervention of various European powers. As Africans got more exposed to the outside world through the acquisition of Western education, travel and even through their participation in World Wars I and II, DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-5

Colonialism’s distortion of African development 39

they started to question the purpose of the European colonial project in Africa. Some of this disillusionment also arose from the discrimination that Africans were forced to endure at the hands of European traders, educators and missionaries. Earlier on, Africans had endured the brutal Atlantic slave trade albeit with the collusion of some Africans. By the beginning of many African countries’ independence in the 1950s and 1960s, African scholars such as Senegal’s Cheikh Anta Diop were vigorously questioning the civilizing mission of European colonialism and the said superiority of the ‘white race’ over the ‘black race.’ In the process, Diop also dealt with the contributions of Africa to world history. This anti-colonial scholarship buoyed the African independence movement. In the early post-colonial period, scholarship on the damage done by the Atlantic slave trade and European colonialism in Africa grew substantially as did work on the grandeur of pre-colonial Africa which Louise Marie DiopMaes partly captured in her 1996 essay on The truth about what slavery did to Africa.3 Walter Rodney’s 1983 book on How Europe Underdeveloped Africa that discusses how Africa was deliberately exploited and underdeveloped by European colonial regimes gained significant notoriety in this era as African countries also found themselves caught in the middle of the ideologicaleconomic-military cold war between the US-led capitalist-democratic Western world and the former USSR-led communist alliance. But as the euphoria of African independence started to wane, starting with the economic problems of the 1970s, the debate on whether colonialism was good or bad for Africa rose to the forefront and is still going strong as evidenced in Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s informative 2021 essay on Moral evil, economic good: Whitewashing the sins of colonialism.4 Nevertheless, as Leander Heldring and James Robinson have aptly noted in their 2013 essay on Colonialism and development in Africa, the central question in this debate is: would Africa’s economic development have been different without colonialism? Would it have been richer today? YES: COLONIALISM DID DISTORT AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT A growing body of scholarship describes the supposed positive outcomes of European colonialism in Africa, and thereby creates the impression that European colonial involvement in Africa was commendable to some degree. As highlighted in the most recent research in this genre, this argument highlights the positive outcomes of colonialism in terms of the continent’s economic growth, infrastructure development and educational advancement (Dell & Olken, 2020). According to Acemoglou, Johnson and Robinson, (2002) previously poor African regions that received substantial European settlement got large infrastructural and other economic investments that transformed them for the better. According to some scholars, even current

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economic growth in Africa is one of the positive outcomes of colonialism (Feyrer and Sacerdote, 2009); an argument that ignores the reality that some of the poorly performing countries were wealthy in pre-colonial times but were impoverished by colonialism (Huillery, 2010). To make Africans regret their pre-colonial years is nothing but a ruse for continued neo-colonial European exploitation of Africa.

A resurgence of White superiority Focusing on French West Africa, a region commonly known to have endured a relatively more severe form of colonialism (Smith, 1978), Elise Huillery (2010) recently argued that, in fact, colonialism had a positive influence on the region’s good economic performance, including on its extractive colonies. She explains that those areas that received more European settlers, have performed better than those that received few or no settlers. Huillery does not deny the negative impacts of colonialism but insists that “the negative impact of settlers on institutions was locally overwhelmed by their positive impact on capital investment” (4–5). This line of thinking appears as a resurgence of propaganda dating back to the colonial period when agents of European imperialism, afraid of the European public’s increased dislike for colonial atrocities, attempted to sway public opinion with arguments emphasizing economic growth and other positive achievements in the colonies. Such was the case with Allan McPhee (1971) who tried to balance the positive image of the British Empire in West Africa with British brutalities in East Africa, especially during the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya in the 1952–1960 period. Robert M. Solow (1956) did likewise and paved the way for the forerunners of growth economists as intellectuals who promoted agents of imperialism, painting them as producers of economic growth. As several anti-colonial writers have noted (Beti, 2013; Achebe, 1994; Maddox, 1993; Derrick, 2008, 7–58, 122–140), such positive economic outcomes in the colonies, when true, do not preclude the traumatic suffering that Africans endured under European colonialism. Many Africans and Europeans forcefully opposed such suffering in writing and in action and ultimately ushered in the continent’s decolonization. Therefore, emphasizing the positive outcomes of colonialism such as economic growth, where applicable, minimizes the traumatic experiences inflicted on Africans by colonialism in the name of the said economic growth. Turning away from such sanctifications of cruelty requires a different interpretation of the economic growth observed in Africa.

Positive colonialism clarified Arguments on the positives of colonialism utilize two strategies. First, is the use of the misleading tactic of growth statistics (Solow, 1956). Morten Jerven (2013) calls these statistics Poor Numbers promoted by contemporary growth economists who are preoccupied with GDP growth and other questionable

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metrics that are problematic for historians (115–119). This is because, if economic growth was all that was needed to celebrate colonialism, then the entire project of Western imperialism going as far back as the Atlantic slave trade could also be deemed positive. In effect, economic growth did occur during the era African enslavement and was even the major reason why it lasted for centuries (Manning, 1982, 40–47; Boahen, 1987, 25–55) and was difficult to abolish. The use of growth statistics, therefore, is part of an intellectual gaze upon Africa that distorts its history and pre-colonial achievements and presents Western imperialistic presence as positive while downplaying its negative aspects. To this end, Manning rightly dismisses the necessity of inflicting human misery for the sake of growth (Manning, 1982, 49; See also Wesley, 1774, IV–6). Secondly, in addition to distorting Africa’s pre-colonial history, this pro-colonial argument also presents a corrupted version of colonial history. One example of this historical distortion is in the quantitative data presented in support of Huillery’s (2010) inaccurate historical argument which presents Cotonou as better developed that Porto-Novo because of successful colonialism: From before colonial rule, Porto-Novo was a very prosperous area: one of the most densely populated areas of West Africa. A powerful kingdom was controlling the southern part of current Benin (not a very expanded kingdom though). Because King Behanzin was particularly hostile towards French colonizers (even if his predecessor Glele was much more docile and had signed a friendship treaty), the French administration and private investors preferred to settle in the nearby district of Cotonou. Cotonou [therefore] grew rapidly and became the first economic place in Benin (33). This version of Benin’s history suggests that the current impoverished status of its capital city, Porto-Novo, is due to Porto-Novo’s resistance to colonial penetration under King Behanzin. Colonialists reportedly retreated from Porto-Novo to Cotonou and settled there quietly and that retreat, supposedly explains why Cotonou is wealthier than Porto-Novo today. By telling the story of a quiet retreat of the colonialists from Porto-Novo to Cotonou, Huillery ignores the long and successful history of French colonial military aggression against King Behanzin who fiercely resisted them with a wellorganized, gender-inclusive, anticolonial, resistance army (Katagir, 2012, 64–65). So fierce was this military conflict that Behanzin was finally defeated and exiled due to internal corruption and French infiltration of his army, thereby paving the way for the creation of an alien colonial state in Benin (Manning, 1982, 162–186). Huillery’s assessment ignores the subsequent colonial persecution of Porto-Novians who were imprisoned and, like King Behanzin, exiled to allow full French colonial rule of the area (Manning, 1982, 17–18, 263–275).

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Blaming Porto-Novo’s contemporary socio-economic status on Africans’ rejection of colonialism while claiming that Cotonou’s wealth is the result of its embrace of colonialism is a sad historical misconstruction, which Jerven Morten (2015), considering Africa as a whole, has rightly denounced as “compression of history” or as an ahistorical approach to African economics (45–73). A better assessment of the achievements of colonialism requires acknowledgement of its brutal nature, which is possible by affirming that “history matters” ( Jerven, 73–74). This reality is in keeping with the world system of capitalism and the sustained destruction it brought to pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Africa.

The need for a better narrative Africa’s colonization by Europeans was a new phase of imperialism that followed African enslavement. Contrary to what the European public was led to believe, colonialism was neither a civilizing mission nor an attempt to create legitimate commerce in place of slave trade. Moreover, colonization left many of the historical injustices that Europeans meted out of Africans unaddressed. These injustices were at the core of centuries of European enslavement of Africans: racism and capitalistic accumulation at the expense of African blood and labor. A better evaluation of colonialism would take into consideration the historically nefarious conditions that the colonizers created that eventually necessitated the urgent end of European slavery and colonialism. Additionally, the end of colonialism did not amount to the end of European powers’ exploitation of Africa. Rather, European politics, with their different styles, continue to impede African progress to this day through the neo-colonization of the continent (Kamalu, 2019).

The telos or inherent purpose and objective of colonialism The positive effects of colonialism on Africans were unintended and the nature of colonialism was such that those benefits would be reoriented toward European settlers while Africans bore its labor pains and losses (Tadei, 2020). The Western-controlled economic system set-up during the era of the Atlantic slave trade changed little with the abolition of the trade because it was replaced with another form of slavery: indentured servitude. This labor system had one foot in previous enslaving practices and another in the laborer’s own desire for economic gain (Northrup, 1995, 10). According to Northrup (1995), in the post-slave trade era, plantation economies remained virtually intact, with their owners shifting from free slave labor to the usage of equally profitable indentured laborers (104–106). The conditions of the indentured workers used to feed this capitalist system were very similar to those of previously enslaved people, if judged from the perspective of the laborers rather than from that of the plantation owners (109). While these exploitative conditions were widely

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shared by all indentured laborers; those pertaining to African laborers were the worst since their usage was based on a meticulous economic calculus of cost, productivity and profit with little to no interest in the humanity of the African laborers (113–120). Even with the end of indentured wage labor through the anti-colonial demands for better treatment of the so-called colored people, the quest for racist capitalist gain did not end (145). Forced to abandon indentured laborers, Eurocentric governments adopted racist immigration policies to the disadvantage of non-European laborers around the world (Northrup, 1995, 9, 145). These approaches of exploiting Africans and other non-European people show such a consistent commitment to preserving European profits from enslavement to such an extent that when forced to forsake its inhumane policies, European colonialism reinvented itself instead. Wearing new clothing while keeping its basic oppressive tenets from slavery, colonialism shifted to indentured labor and then to the equally exploitative post-indentured racist policies. Patrick Manning analyzes this phenomenon in modern Francophone African states in terms of the slave mode of production (Manning, 1990, 23–24, 104–105) that has positioned Africans to live in perpetual abject servitude in the world. For Manning (1988; 1982), in spite of their dominant numbers, these economic transformations were singularly meant to disadvantage Africans in the colonies and post-colonies. While many would suggest that European capitalism created a labor force in Africa to draw Africans into the money economy, or to teach Africans the value of work, these so-called colonial achievements conveniently overlook similar precolonial African successes.

Arguing with precolonial African potentialities Cheick Anta Diop (1987) aptly reveals that pre-colonial Africa had ample independent political systems (89–129) with a strong economic organization made up of monetary, tax, commercial components that even reached and rivaled Europe (130–149). The narrative of a backward Africa that needed Europeans to advance ignores this pre-colonial legacy of Africa that was farming to the level of other farming communities around the world (Manning, 1988, 39) and that used endogenous monetary systems long before Europeans took over their economies (Manning, 1982, 24).5 As Manning suggests, what Europeans sought in portraying Africans as needing European assistance was to discourage Africans from using their own money so they could “work for wages from European firms…and spend their money on imported European goods.” The goal of “teaching” Africans the value of work was actually to cause Africans to “place [a] greater value on working for a European employer at a low wage rather than on working their own land” (39). This objective well-suited the post-slavery world system of indentured labor that largely continues to this day. To achieve these imperialistic goals, Europeans used coercion, indoctrination and forced labor to construct highways, railroads and other public works

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using taxes that required local people to earn European cash (Manning, 1988, 40, 49). These infrastructures were part of the economic systems that colonialism set-up in Africa, not for the purpose of Africa’s growth for Africans sake, but rather for the purpose of extracting wealth from the continent in the post-slavery context using slave mode production strategies. Because Europeans were singularly determined to profit from Africa, when the world economy became favorable to Africans, e.g., in 1914 during World War I, the colonial governments increased taxes “so that what Africans gained through better [commodity] prices they tended to lose in higher taxes” (50). As result, Africans had to work longer hours to the benefit of the European capitalistic economy (50). Moreover, the colonial governments benefitted themselves even more by taking control of all vital economic sectors such as the “postal service, the ports, railroads, and the provision of water supplies and electric power in the main towns” (52). Besides the use of exploitative labor systems that subjected Africans to forced labor at low wages “and low wages at that” (54), urban Africans enjoyed the least and worst urban infrastructure and services during the colonial period because these cities were often racially segregated and serviced as such (Otiso, 2005; Smiley, 2009). Given such a profound negative transformation of pre-colonial African possibilities, it is important to make sense of the positive colonial achievements in Africa.

Understanding the positive achievements of European colonialism of Africa It is true that European colonialism caused some economic growth and development in Africa. Some scholars have used this reality as proof that colonialism enhanced African development (Austin, 2015). However, this growth did not increase the welfare of the African population because its European wage labor system, and the attendant changes in local social structures, came at the expense of work on the family plot (Manning, 1988, 55). This capitalist order debilitated pre-existing indigenous African entrepreneurship as Africans were forced to sell their labor cheaply, abandon their own economic systems and to consume “commodities produced by [European] capitalist industry” (55). In the end, European colonial capitalism did not usher in an “increase in wealth or an improvement in social welfare” (55) for Africans. Rather, colonialism led to the exploitation of Africans in their own land because it was based on a sustained ideology of inferiorizing and ‘othering’ Africans. European colonialism was essentially based on the “thing-nification” of Africa as a reservoir of untapped wealth that must be used for the benefit of European nations including the French, British, Italian and Portuguese. Overall, therefore, colonialism-led development of African economies and infrastructures was not a positive European achievement for the African continent. Rather, it was a means of appropriating and exploiting African

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wealth for the benefit of Europe. Simply, put the colonial development of Africa, though factual, produced and redirected African wealth from African soils into Europe while simultaneously impoverishing African masses and putting them on an existential mode of dependency vis-à-vis Europe. This unhealthy dependency continues to produce poor economic results for most of the African masses to this day.

Conclusion The colonial construction of Africa was successful. It was and continues to be enforced through a small group of Africans who were educated and acculturated enough to advance the European project in Africa. Called the évolués (the advanced elites) in Francophone Africa, these African bourgeois are the ones who now benefit from the continent’s economic growth and advanced infrastructures. They are endowed with various advantages such as dual (African and Western) citizenships and other political rights and privileges. They accept the logic of Eurocentric evolution and have adopted European religions, languages, cultures and economic systems (Manning 1988, 55) as ideals to the point of aiding continued European control of Africa (Manning, 1982, 19–205). However, those concerned with the overall welfare of all African people, as was the case in pre-colonial Africa, would stand by the assessment that European colonialism underdeveloped Africa (Rodney, 1983), that this colonialism was overwhelmingly negative (Heldring & Robinson, 2012), and that resistance to it and its eventual overthrow was and is the best course of action. It is not easy to see colonialism as a bearer of good news when seen against the background of pre-colonial Africa’s potential and the nature of colonialism as a rehashing of Western imperialism during and after the Atlantic slave trade.

References Acemoglu, Daron; Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James A. (2002). “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, (2002): 1231–1294. Achebe, Chinua. (1994). Things Fall Apart, Clayton: Penguin Books. Austin, Gareth. (2015). The Economics of Colonialism in Africa. In Célestin Monga and Justin Yifu Lin (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics: Volume 1: Context and Concepts. Great Clarendon: Oxford UP, 2015. Beti, Mongo. (2013). Cruel City (Global African Voices). Indiana: Indiana UP. Boahen, Adu. (1987). African Perspective on Colonialism, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. Dell, Melissa and Olken, Benjamin A. (2020). “The Development Effects of the Extrac­ tive Colonial Economy: The Dutch Cultivation System in Java.” The Review of Economic Studies, 87, 1 (2020): 164–203. Derrick Jonathan (2008). Africa’s ‘Agitators’: Militant Anti-Colonialism in Africa and the West 1918–1939, New York: Columbia UP, 7–58, 122–140.

46  Segbegnon M. Gnonhossou and Ogechi E. Anyanwu Diop, Cheick Anta. (1987). Precolonial Africa: A Comparative Study of the Political and Social Systems of Europe and Black Africa, from Antiquity to the Formation of Modern States, Westport: Lawrence Hill & Company. Feyrer, J. and B. Sacerdote. (2009). “Colonialism and Modern Income – Islands as Natural Experiments.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 91 (2): 245–62. Heldring, Leander and Robinson, James A. (2012). “Colonialism and Economic Development in Africa.” NBER Working Paper, 18566, JEL 37, 47, (November 2012): 1–40. Huillery, Elise. (2010). “The Impact of European Settlement within French West Africa. Did Precolonial Prosperous Areas Fall Behind?” Journal of African Economies, Oxford University Press (OUP), (2010): 1–49. Jerven, Morten. (2015). Africa: Why Economists Get it Wrong, London: Zed Books. Jerven, Morten. (2013). Poor Numbers: How We Are Misled by African Development Statistics and What to Do about It, Ithaca/London: Cornell UP. Kamalu, Ngozi Caleb. (2019). “British, French, Belgian and Portuguese Models of Colonial Rule and Economic Development in Africa.” Annals of Global History, 1, 1, (2019): 37–47. Katagir, Nori. (2012). “Drawing Strategic Lessons from Dahomey’s War.” ASPJ Africa & Francophonie – 3rd Quarter (2012): 59–78. Kodila-Tedika, Oasis and Asongu, Simplice A. (2018). “The Long-Term Effects of African Resistance to European Domination: Institutional Mechanism.” University of Kinshasa, Department of Economics, African Governance and Development Institute, MPRA Paper No. 85237, 17 Mar 2018. Maddox, Greggory (1993). Conquest and Resistance to Colonialism in Africa, Routledge. Manning, Patrick. (1982). Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth in Dahomey 1640–1960, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Manning, Patrick. (1990). Slavery and African Life: Occidental, Oriental and African Slave Trades, New York: Cambridge UP. Manning, Patrick. (1988). Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1880–1995, New York: Cambridge University Press. McPhee, Allan. (1971). The Economic Revolution in British West Africa, Oxon: Frank Cass and Company Limited. Northrup, David. (1995). Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism 1834–1922, Studies in Comparative World History New York: Cambridge University Press 1995. Otiso, Kefa M. (2005). Colonial Urbanization and Urban Management in Kenya. In Stevens Salm & Toyin Falola (Eds.), African urban spaces in historical perspective (pp. 73– 95). Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. Rodney, Walter (1983). How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications, London and Tanzanian Publishing House, Dar-Es-Salaam 1973, Transcript from 6th reprint. Solow, Robert M. (1956). “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 70, (1) (1956): 65–94. Smiley, Sarah L. (2009). “The City of Three Colors: Segregation in Colonial Dar es Salaam, 1891–1961.” Historical Geography, 37 (2009): 178–196. Smith, T. (1978). “A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 20, 1 (1978): 70–102. Tadei, Federico. (2020). “Measuring Extractive Institutions: Colonial Trade and Price Gaps in French Africa, Department of Economic History.” European Review of Economic History, 24, 1, (2020), 1–23. Wesley, John. (1774). Thoughts Upon Slavery, London: R Hawes.

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NO: COLONIALISM DID NOT DISTORT AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT Following the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, European powers such as Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Italy conquered Africa, bringing various territories under colonial rule. By 1914, all African societies, except Ethiopia and Liberia, had succumbed to colonialism. In the years following the First World War and up to the 1980s, European colonies in Africa gradually regained their independence. No one questions the brutalities that characterized European conquest and administration of Africa, but the impact of colonial rule on the continent has always attracted fierce scholarly debate. Afrocentric scholars have insisted that colonialism distorted African development. Walter Rodney underlined the Afrocentric position in his widely quoted statement: “Colonialism had only one hand—it was a one-armed bandit” (Rodney, 1983, p. 223). For the Afrocentric school of thought, colonialism arrested the development of Africa and led to the past and present developmental challenges facing the continent. This essay highlights the transformative impact that colonial rule had on African peoples and societies. It analyzes the previously ignored favorable economic, political, social and cultural impact of colonialism on Africa. Refuting the Afrocentric school of thought that dismisses colonial rule as an agent of African development, this essay contends that the beneficial influence of colonialism is, unfortunately, missing in the scholarship of modern Africa. As Peter Duignan and Lewis Gann noted, the “credit balance” of colonialism “by far outweighs its debit account” (Duignan and Gann, 1967, pp. 362). Colonialism bequeathed Africans a remarkably different continent from how it looked in the 1880s – one upon which post-colonial nationstates now rest. However, it is tempting to dismiss wholesale the positive contributions of European colonialism on African development, however unintended they might have been. Colonial rule transformed the economic landscape of Africa by (i) integrating the African economy into the global economic system, (ii) initiating efficient extraction of raw materials that fed European industries and generated export revenues for the colonial governments and subjects and (iii) creating previously non-existent infrastructural facilities (e.g., roads) that boosted the development of Africa’s economies. As Sir Henry Hamilton Johnston, a colonial administrator, correctly stated in 1890, colonialism aimed at developing the “undeveloped riches of these lands, so that we may discover and utilize the many oils, drugs, perfumes, foodstuffs, dyes, fibers, gums, woods, timbers, and other products of African vegetation” ( Johnston, 1890, p. 686). The enduring benefits of developing the riches of Africa and the subsequent exchanges between Africa and the Western world – however unequal and imperfect – were crucial in the emergence and sustenance of viable states in Africa. It also accelerated the production of cash crops that have continued to generate enormous revenue for Africa during and after colonial rule.

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The colonial integration of African economies with the global markets promoted economic vitality in the colonies. Although the Trans-Saharan trade flourished in pre-colonial Africa, it barely integrated African economies with the international market as much as the European colonial rule did. In the mining colonies, the introduction of more modern and efficient extractive technology by colonial governments boosted the mining of gold, diamond, copper and other minerals that were critical in generating export revenues, developing local economies, boosting earnings and the standard of living. Palm oil and palm kernel, sold on the international market, were massive revenue and wage income sources for producer colonies such as Nigeria. According to P. N. Okeke, then Minister for Agriculture in Eastern Nigeria, “The oil palm is the king of Eastern Nigerian agriculture. Each year, Nigeria exports about fifteen million pounds worth of palm oil and twenty-four pounds worth of palm kernels” (Eastern Nigeria, 1962, pp. 27). So important was the trade in palm oil that when prices fell during the early months of the Great Depression, the economically threatened women of Eastern Nigeria championed the first major anti-colonial rebellion in Nigeria. Increased demand for African products in the international market facilitated increased domestic production, aided by new technologies and methods. The initiation of modern job opportunities in Africa during the colonial era diversified the African economy and created new routes for social mobility. Increased revenue from the sale of cash crops and other minerals funded critical hitherto non-existent infrastructure such as roads and railways. African peoples have also continued to reap the benefits of mining technology and innovative farming techniques that first debuted in the colonial era. Even after independence, cash crops and minerals have remained a significant export earner for African economies. Roads and rails connected rural areas with the expanding urban centers, facilitating the movement of goods and services. The development of urban areas, a major feature of colonialism, has expanded in the post-independence era. These urban areas are now valuable centers of mass politics, government, global commerce, creativity and innovation. By establishing centralized political systems in Africa, some more democratic than others, colonialism left a legacy on the development of modern politics. Colonial rule brought new political institutions that made governance in multi-ethnic countries more organized and systematic. Although Afrocentric scholars may argue that European powers arbitrarily divided Africa and merged previously hostile ethnic groups into ethnically diverse countries, political centralization brought order and stability. It minimized inter-ethnic conflicts that characterized pre-colonial Africa significantly. Decreased warfare allowed for more productive economic, social and political activities. Before the colonial powers established colonies in Africa, most African societies lived in small, economically unviable decentralized states. The rise and fall of few centralized states, kingdoms and empires in pre-colonial Africa created political instability, typifying Europe before the

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signing of the Peace of Westphalia that ended the devastating 30 Years’ War (1618–1648) in the Holy Roman Empire. The colonies created by the various European colonial powers served as a vital vehicle for state formation in Africa, sparing the continent of the likely devastating wars historically common in state formation in Europe. By bringing diverse ethnic groups together under one central political system, colonialism created the foundation for the emergence of pluralistic, democratic modern nation-states in Africa. The diversity of the nation-states that colonial powers created is a strength that narrow-minded post-colonial leaders have hardly harnessed fully; instead, they exploited it to meet their selfish ends. Post-colonial leaders have often escaped accountability by “exploiting ethnic, religious, zonal, and geopolitical divisions. Divided, the people engage in an ineffective fight against the political elite. Divided, the people merely pose a disjointed, unsuccessful threat to the entrenched system of exploitation. Only when they set aside their differences can they recognize who their common enemy is and unite to wage a significant fight” (Anyanwu, 2021, pp. 196). The exclusion of the masses from political participation in colonial administration characterized early colonial policy in Africa. However, in the post-war years, colonial powers embarked on the systematic democratization of African political institutions leading to the election of nationalists into various local, regional and national legislatures. The colonial legacy of regular multi-party elections in multi-ethnic modern African nation-states remains popular despite intermittent military coups and totalitarian regimes, especially during the Cold War. Also, the colonial judicial system based on Western notions of justice and procedure created a modern criminal justice system that has superseded its pre-colonial counterpart, which was not as reliable, predictable or scalable to the national level. It is in the sociocultural sphere that the positive impact of colonial rule is primarily visible. Western education was the most significant aspect of the colonial enterprise, introduced by Christian missionaries and expanded by colonial officials. Western education supplanted the largely informal indigenous pre-colonial African educational systems and assumed great importance and popularity as an undisputed route to social mobility in colonial and post-colonial African societies. African people understood the importance of Western education from early on, and their thirst for it remains insatiable. As an African historian, Kenneth Dike, noted, “the whole region thirsts for knowledge. The wealthy and the poor, the aristocrats and the lowest peasants, Christians, Moslems, and the ‘pagans’ cry for it” (Dike, 1962, p. 233). Western education exposed Africans to new democratic norms and promoted economic growth and the rise of the middle class. The spread of Western education was a vital force in creating an educated class that championed decolonization and mass participation in post-colonial politics. That class played a significant role in the revival of African culture through literature, music and history, ushering the continent into the global intellectual

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community and bestowing Africans with the tools to compete and thrive worldwide. In addition, the widespread use of European languages as a medium of instruction in colonial and post-colonial schools helped forge continuing communication and connections across ethnicities and meaningful networks with the international community. Life expectancy received a significant boost during the colonial period due to the introduction of modern healthcare systems consisting of hospitals, dispensaries and new medical technologies and laboratories. These healthcare innovations also greatly, reduced mortality rates across Africa. Europeans’ need to survive diseases in Africa prompted technological breakthroughs in controlling hitherto uncontrollable diseases like malaria. The construction of boreholes improved access to clean water and sanitation and improved people’s health. The spread of Christianity and European cultures created new communities within existing ones, promoting social solidarity across ethnicities and clans. African societies became more progressive by using Christian and European values to scrutinize and discard many destructive cultural practices that did not serve them well, such as the Osu caste system and the killing of twins. Afrocentric scholars have rightly contended that the impact of colonialism on development in Africa should not be examined based on its outcomes during the colonial period. Instead, they contend that it must be approached by looking at the economic problems that plague post-colonial Africa, whose roots go back to the colonial period. They argue that to understand the impact of colonialism on development, one must also consider what transpired after colonialism. The position that colonialism explains the problem of development that African countries are currently experiencing is mistaken because the positive impact of colonial rule far outweighs its negative one. What the Afrocentric School ignores, however, is that the developmental challenges that African countries face do not only rest on the wrongs done to them by colonialism. Rather, these challenges stem from the inability or unwillingness of post-colonial African leaders to (a) wage a proactive fight against corruption, (b) fully harness the continent’s abundant human and material resources, (c) end massive capital flight and (d) resist the extensive intervention of external developmental financial institutions in the continent’s domestic policies. Corruption is one of the most decisive factors sabotaging development in Africa. Promoting development in post-colonial Africa requires the continent’s political elite to prioritize the fight against corruption in Africa. Postcolonial corruption in Africa, not colonialism, is the chief cause of distorted African development. According to Transparency International, for instance, Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of the Congo stole over $5 billion from his country, ranking him the third-most corrupt leader since 1984 and the most corrupt African leader during the same period (Denny, 2004). Less famous yet insidious cases of corruption are rife in Africa. For instance, a PBS NewsHour segment reported that former Nigerian Petroleum

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Minister, Diezani Alison-Madueke, diverted $6 billion (N1.2 trillion) from the Nigerian treasury to her pockets (Sobuto, 2015). The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission of Nigeria charged her with money laundering and the loss of $20 billion from the Petroleum agency. Although the former colonial powers brazenly provide a haven for the looted wealth of Africa, the ultimate responsibility for looting Africa lies with the looters. The weak political structures that mostly allow impunity to go unpunished are a problem for post-colonial Africa to address. The continent lost $1.4 trillion between 1980 and 2009 through corruption (African Development Bank Group, 2014). At the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry rightly stated that “Corruption is a radicalizer because it destroys faith in legitimate authority” (Morello 2016). Corruption has a corrosive effect on economic and political development. It contributes to poverty, political instability civil wars, and sabotages the future of the continent. Until African countries address the cancer of corruption, their full development will remain elusive. Solely blaming colonialism and other external factors for post-colonial Africa’s problems, while dismissing the extensive role of internal causative factors, severely weakens the position of Afrocentric scholars.

Notes 1. Anyanwu does not necessarily hold this view. This essay is necessitated by the debate-style nature of this volume. 2. Leander Heldring and James Robinson (2013). “Colonialism and development in Africa,” Vox EU, 10 January 2013, https://voxeu.org/article/colonialism-anddevelopment-africa. 3. Available from Le Monde Diplomatique, December 2007, https://mondediplo.com/ 2007/12/15slavery. 4. Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2021), “‘Moral evil, economic good’: Whitewashing the sins of colonialism,” Aljazeera, 26 Feb 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/ opinions/2021/2/26/colonialism-in-africa-empire-was-not-ethical. 5. Manning rightly suggests that ‘early growth’ during colonialism indicates that Dahomey (present day Republic of Benin) had a pre-colonial operative monetary system (24).

References Anyanwu, Ogechi E. (2021). The Making of Mbano: British Colonialism, Resistance, and Diplomatic Engagements in Southeastern Nigeria, 1906–1960. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books. African Development Bank Group. (2014). Tracking Africa’s Progress in Figures. Tunis: African Development Bank Group. Denny, Charlotte. (2004). “Suharto, Marcos and Mobutu head corruption table with $50bn scams.” The Guardian, March 26, 2004, accessed March 2, 2015, http://www. theguardian.com/world/2004/mar/26/indonesia.philippines. Dike, Kenneth O. (1962). “Development of Modern Education in Nigeria,” in The One and the Many: Individual in the Modern World, ed. J.N. Brookes. New York: Harper & Row.

52  Segbegnon M. Gnonhossou and Ogechi E. Anyanwu Duignan, Peter and Lewis Gann, (1967). Burden of Empire: An Appraisal of Western Colonialism in Africa, South of the Sahara. Stanford: Hoover. Eastern Nigeria. (1962). Community Development in Eastern Nigeria, Official Document No 20, 1962. Enugu: Government Printer. Johnston, H.H. (November 1890). “The Development of Tropical Africa under British Auspices, An Address Delivered to the Chamber of Commerce at Liverpool, Fortnightly Review 28, 287. 686. Morello, Carol. (2016). “Kerry: Corruption ‘destroys faith’ in authority, leads to extremism,” The Washington Post. January 22, accessed August 30, 2020, https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/kerry-corruption-destroys-faith-in-authority-leads-toextremism/2016/01/22/629495ca-bfca-11e5-98c8-7fab78677d51_story.html Rodney, Walter. (1983). How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. London: Bogle-O’Ouverture Publications. Sobuto, Jolo. (2015). “Ex-minister might have personally supervised stealing of $6bn,” 7 December, accessed August 29, 2020, https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/ diezani-ex-minister-might-have-personally-supervised-stealing-of-dollar6bn-video/ edxh0m1.

5

Is Africa’s border geography problematic? YES: Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni University of Bayreuth, Germany

Innocent Moyo

University of Zululand, South Africa

NO: Marina Ottaway

Woodrow Wilson International Center, Washington, DC, USA Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni of the University of Bayreuth (Germany) and Innocent Moyo of the University of Zululand (South Africa) argue that African borders are problematic at many levels. These borders are artificial and reflect the interests and desires of colonialists with imperial designs that never considered the views of African people. Borders do not work well in the African context for at least three reasons: plurality and fluidity of identities; mobility as a way of life and social integration of strangers into existing political formations. As such, the problems related to borders in Africa are complex, but can be linked to the colonial conquest of the continent and to the colonial ideas of whom should constitute nations and what African countries should look like. The epistemological approach to the study of borders in Africa is also problematic. Before borders emerged concretely on the ground, they have to exist in the minds of people epistemically. The focus on borders in Africa as innocent lines on the margins of nation-states occludes more than illuminates the ideology and injustices of the Berlin borders. NO: Marina Ottaway of the Woodrow Wilson International Center (USA) acknowledges that African borders were designed by colonial powers to suit their needs and their rivalries, and that independent African governments and local populations were never consulted. And yet, she suggests, the continuing weakness of most African states cannot be attributed to the artificiality of their borders and the fact that they were imposed by colonial powers. All countries have artificial borders, determined by military and political battles fought in the past. The problem for African countries is not the locations of their borders, but the weakness of the states within those borders as well as their failure to develop a sense of national belonging among their citizens. DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-6

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In order to better understand the debate between these authors, some historical and contextual information is useful. First, many authors writing about border issues in Africa will reference the Berlin conference of 1884. While Europeans had been active on the African periphery for centuries, it is only in the later half of the 19th century that they were able to explore sections of its interior. This coincided with a second phase of European colonialism globally (with the first phase largely playing out in Latin America and some parts of Asia) and tensions were beginning to flare up between different European powers as they jockeyed for control of different areas of the African continent. King Leopold of Belgium organized the Berlin conference, an event at which no Africans were present, to establish the ground rules for European powers claiming different parts of the African continent. As this framework would eventually influence the shape of a number of national borders on the continent, it is a key reference point for this debate. Second, the idea of ethnic territories influences certain aspects of this discussion. A common supposition is that national boundaries should respect the contours of ethnic territories and that colonial era borders did not do this. However, the challenge in much of Africa is that multiple groups often occupy the same space, making the idea of an ethnic territory somewhat of a fiction. A common constellation in some areas of the continent is farmers, herders and fisher folk of different ethnic backgrounds who all live in the same space, but occupy different livelihood niches. Even in cases where there is seeming ethnic homogeneity in a country, such as Botswana (meaning the country of the Swana in the Setswana language), there are concerns that minority ethnic groups were marginalized during the nation-building process. And, just for context, it is notable that the construction of many nation-states in Europe were also built on the suppression of linguistic and ethnic minorities, such as in the case of France. In sum, the idea that you theoretically could have minimized conflicts in Africa by drawing rational and workable borders around homogenous ethnic territories is based on flawed assumptions as exemplified in the decades-long civil war in Somalia despite the country’s ethnic and religious homogeneity. Lastly, the economic impacts of borders are often discussed in the development literature. A subfield of economics and geography known as economic geography often discusses at least two economic constraints related to borders. First is the challenge of being land locked as it often means that the cost of transport for getting goods in and out of a country is higher. This is particularly the case for heavier goods that require ocean transport (important for, say, copper from Zambia, but less critical for high value diamonds from Botswana which are flown out). This challenge exists for a number of land-locked African countries. The other problem is that most borders take time to traverse for trucks and trains as papers are checked and goods are inspected. As such, the more borders that one must traverse to get to a sea port, the higher the costs. As such, the crop of a cotton farmer in Mali must traverse a border, typically going via truck to a port in Côte d’Ivoire. Had

Africa’s border geography 55

Mali stayed in a union with Senegal (the case for the first year after independence), the same farmer would theoretically bear lower transit costs with no international border crossings. YES: AFRICA’S BORDER GEOGRAPHY IS PROBLEMATIC Three key issues defined Africa prior to colonization: plurality and fluidity of identities; mobility as a way of life; and social integration of strangers into existing political formations. As such, rigid borders cannot be called African. Any border geography which was and could be called African vanished when the colonizers partitioned and reordered Africa. In doing so, the colonizers contrived nation-states as containers of people, and confused the social and other patterns of life of local people as they tried to make nation and state coterminous. Post-colonial African leaders were eager to replace White colonialists and continue from where they left. Hence, they did not even make an effort to correct these colossal colonial mistakes. Being products of the Empire, which valorize and fetishize the paradigm of difference, post-colonial African leaders chose the path of emulation and enforcement of European institutions like the Berlin borders. As a result, the problem of borders in Africa is complex, but can be linked to the colonial conquest of the continent which led to the colonizer’s idea of whom should constitute nations and what African countries should look like. Continental and internal national borders of Africa are problematic. Besides being artificial, they reflect the interests and desires of colonialists. They are products of operations of global imperial designs which never took into account the views of the African people. Consequently, there is nothing called “Africa’s border geography” because the borders have less if not nothing to do with geography but more to do with what James Blaut termed the “colonizer’s model of the world” in general and the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 in particular (Blaut, 1993). At the center of the colonizer’s model of the world has been the idea of empty lands (terra nullius and tabula rasa) outside of Europe open for European activities including conquest and settlement. So what is problematic is not ‘geography,’ but global imperial designs in the form of the scramble and partition of Africa into its present continental and national architecture and design. By global imperial designs we mean the logics and technologies of imperialism, colonialism and capitalism that propelled Europe’s paradigm of ‘discovery’ which resulted in claiming, conquest, naming, and owning of Africa by Europeans. Of course, as noted by Mignolo (2000), global designs always confronted local histories, which the colonialists ignored or claimed never existed prior to their arrival. This had several effects, two of which are important for the present purposes. First, it led to the disruption of social patterns and geographical relationships, leading to a European understanding and physical bordering of

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Africa and its people (Bhambra, 2014). Second, but linked to the first, is that the imposition of the Westphalian nation-state system changed the nature and function of borders in terms of their being an instrument of colonial conquest, division, domination, power, and control (Okumu, 2014). This divisive impact of borders has stuck on Africa ever since. As a result of the Berlin borders, people who had always been one suddenly became foreigners and strangers to each other. As such, these borders have confused the lives of people through invented nation-states into which African people must belong, Procrustean style. Thus, instead of creating order, the Berlin borders created chaos and disorder and this is problematic. The divisive impact of the Berlin borders was amplified in the period immediately after the attainment of juridico-political independence in many African states and these divisions are still evident today. A case in point is that, attempts by the Pan-African Ghanaian President, Kwame Nkrumah, to create a United States of Africa led to dissension. The more radical and Pan-African 1961 meeting of Heads of African States in Casablanca led by Kwame Nkrumah provoked the formation of a rival group, the Brazzaville Group, which emerged between 1960 and 1961 and was mainly comprised of the former Francophone colonies (Söderbaum, 1996). The Brazzaville Group mutated into the Monrovia Group, which was generally opposed to the idea of a United States of Africa as championed by the Kwame Nkrumah and the Casablanca Group. Briefly, the former (nationalists) wanted the maintenance of the borders of the newly independent African nation-states while progressively moving towards economic integration. The latter (continentalists) wanted a more radical approach towards uniting Africa which entailed obliterating the Berlin borders. Although the two groups eventually formed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, it was a compromise solution which illustrated the triumph of the colonizer’s ‘design,’ if not drawing of Africa. The fact that some African leaders opted to respect the international law principle, uti possidetis juris, leading to the upholding of the status quo ante of the Berlin borders aptly demonstrates what Fanon (1963) calls paying tribute to and drawing inspiration from Europe. The victory of nationalists over the continentalists in 1963, shows the extent to which African countries embraced the violence of history which the Berlin borders embody and symbolize. Embracing such a violent history has necessarily meant sustaining it by using the same violence and this is the logic behind what Mbembe (2017) calls the detention, deportation, and in some cases, murder by African independent states of African people who cross borders from one country to the other. We see all this as problematic to the extent that, the Berlin borders have been a source of narrow nativism and xenophobia, which has materialized and dematerialized both at the margins and interior of African nation-states. This explains why many people from African countries who have migrated to South Africa, especially after the 1994 democratic dispensation have been attacked in a virulent xenophobic rage (Crush and Ramachandran 2014). Their only crime is that they were foreigners who had transgressed colonial borders

Africa’s border geography 57

and entered South Africa where they were not wanted. In extreme cases, xenophobic attacks involved the brazen murder of migrants, classic examples of which were the killing of a Mozambican migrant in South Africa in 2008 by setting him alight and the murder of another person in broad day light in 2015 (Moyo et al, 2017). In other parts of Africa, similar instances have been recorded, such as the expulsion of Ghanaians from Nigeria in the 1980s. More recently in August 2019, Nigeria also closed its borders, which resulted in retaliatory responses from countries like Ghana. In this sense, there is a colonial present in the way that borders in Africa have been managed. This effectively means that the division which was imposed in Berlin in 1884–1885 is sustained long after the colonizers have departed to their home countries. The technology of borders which was left behind by the colonizers continues to be effective and lethal even when it does not serve the interests of African countries and their citizens. In all this, what is striking is that many European citizens can travel to many African countries without visas, but African citizens cannot always do so in their own continent, let alone to Europe where they are constructed as the doppelgänger anti-citizens. In this logic, the Berlin borders have, in the words of Neocosmos (2006) constructed African people who are native to Africa to be foreigners and Europeans who are foreigners to be natives who can cross borders into any African country without many limits. Furthermore, the physical borders at the margins of nation states have also articulated themselves into the social, economic, and political process (symbolic borders) of nation-states with the result that borders are ubiquitous or everywhere (Balibar, 2002). A case in point is that after the partition of African countries, the European colonizers went further and also created social, cultural and other borders within African countries. Many examples abound, but that of the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda is perhaps the most documented. In this case, the Belgians constructed a social and political border between these two groups so as to divide and rule them. This planted the seeds for the 1994 genocide in the country. This genocide spilled over to neighboring countries such as Burundi, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and assumed a regional context. The simple reason behind the spread of the Rwandan conflict like a conflagration which engulfed and consumed the Great Lakes Region is the artificiality and porosity of the region’s national borders. For instance, there were Hutus and Tutsis in DRC and Burundi who had been separated from those in Rwanda by the Berlin borders and when the genocide started in Rwanda, these were drawn into it by sympathizing with their fellow Hutus or Tutsis in Rwanda or actively participating in the conflict by sheltering both the victims and perpetrators (Alusala, 2019). It is evident then that in Africa, we have problematic physical and socio-cultural borders which are a direct result of Europe’s global empirical deigns. Whereas, the internal borders have been a source of conflict within African countries, the artificiality of borders on the peripheries of the African nation states has also similarly provided a site for secessionist and irredentist wars and conflicts. In the former, groups of people have fought to break away from the

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so-called post-colonial state. A good example of this is that of the Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970 in which the predominantly Igbo provinces in South-Eastern Nigeria attempted to break away from Nigeria and form an independent republic called Biafra (Zeleza, 2008). The origins of this civil war can be traced to the colonial partition of Africa in which many nations such as the Yoruba in the West, Muslim Hausa in the North and Igbo in the East and several other smaller ones were suddenly manufactured as one nation state, Nigeria (Mazrui, 2008). In the latter, that is irredentist wars and conflicts, people fight to be part of or reunited with a country with which they can ethnically and/or historically identify. Examples of this include the Somalis in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya who desire unification with Somalia. In the irredentist wars, we again witness how the partition of Africa split nations into separate countries (Mazrui, 2008; Zeleza, 2008) and how this has become a good ingredient for cross border and internal instability in many parts of Africa. In all the examples provided in this essay, we see borders in Africa being a colonial enterprise and/or edifice with a border geography that is problematic on many levels. First, the border geography cannot be called African. Any border geography which was and could be called African vanished when the colonizers partitioned Africa. In doing so, they contrived nation-states, and disrupted the social and many other patterns of the lives of local people. Any attempts by African leaders to correct these colossal colonial mistakes have dismally failed because many of these leaders are products of the Empire who valorize and fetishize the West leading to the emulation, if nothing else, enforcement of European institutions like the Berlin borders. This is why the so-called post-colonial states burn, murder, deport, and punish fellow Africans when they ‘illegally’ cross their borders, which were created by Europeans. The same countries welcome Europeans with minimal visa requirements. The enforcement of Berlin borders fuels xenophobia, nativism, narrow nationalism, secessionism, irredentism, which further complicates borders in Africa. Differently stated, the problem of borders in Africa is complex, but can be linked to the colonial conquest of the continent which led to the colonizer’s idea of whom should constitute and what African countries should look like. What is also problematic is the epistemological approach to the study of borders in Africa. The narrow focus on the borders in Africa as innocent lines on the margins of nation-states occludes more than illuminates the ideology and injustices of the Berlin borders. This parochial study of borders in Africa has also failed to unravel the symbolic manifestation of borders in Africa at different scales and locales.

References Alusala, N. (2019). Border fragility and proximate causes of the DRC civil war. In: I. Moyo and C.C Nshimbi (Eds), African Borders, Conflict, Regional and Continental Integration, 89–114. London: Routledge. Balibar, E. (2002). Politics and the Other Scene. London: Verso

Africa’s border geography 59 Bhambra, G.K. (2014). Postcolonial and decolonial dialogues. Postcolonial Studies, 17 (2): 115–121. Blaut, J. M. (1993). The Colonizer’s Model of the World: Geographical and Eurocentric History. New York: The Guilford Press. Crush, J and Ramachandran, S. (2014). Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: Denialism, Minimalism and Realism. Migration Policies Series No 66. Southern Africa Migration Project and International Migration Research Centre: Cape Town and Canada. Fanon. F. (1963). The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Weidenfeld. Mazrui, A. A. (2008). Conflict in Africa: An overview. In A. Nhema and P. Zeleza (Eds) The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs, 36–50. Addis Ababa: OSSREA. Mbembe, A. (2017). Africa needs free movement. Mail and Guardian. https://mg.co.za/ article/2017-03-24-00-africa-needs-free-movement. (Accessed 10 April 2019). Mignolo, W. D. (2000). Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Know­ ledge, and Border Thinking. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Moyo I, Nshimbi C and Gumbo, T. (2017). Migration, logics of inclusion and exclusion, and xenophobia: The case of African migrants in post-apartheid South Africa. In: H.H Magidimisha, N.E. Khalema, T. Chirimabmowa, T. Chimedza (Eds), Crisis, Identity, and Migration in Postcolonial Southern Africa, 91–110. London: Springer. Neocosmos, M. (2006). From “Foreign Natives to Native Foreigners”, Explaining Xenophobia in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Citizenship and Nationalism, Identity and Politics. Dakar: CODESIRA. Okumu, W. (2014). The Purpose and Functions of International Boundaries: With Specific Reference to Africa. In; African Union Border Programme, Delimitation and Demarcation of Boundaries in Africa General Issues and Case Studies, 34–58. Addis Ababa: Commission of the African Union. Söderbaum, F. (1996). Handbook of Regional Organizations in Africa. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Zeleza, P. T. (2008). The causes and costs of war in Africa: From liberation struggles to the war on terror. In: In A. Nhema and P. Zeleza (Eds) The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs, 1–35. Addis Ababa: OSSREA.

NO: AFRICA’S BORDERS ARE NO MORE PROBLEMATIC THAN THOSE IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD The quick answer is no. The problems that afflict most African states do not stem from their borders, but from the weakness of the states’ encompassed by those borders. That does not mean that the problems often denounced about African borders are not true. Yes, African borders are artificial but so are almost all borders around the world. The concept of a natural border is a flimsy one: is a river a natural border, or are river valleys more likely to be the seat of a civilization straddling both shores, as was the case for Pharaonic Egypt or ancient Assyria? Are the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean the natural borders of the United States, or was “manifest destiny” a political rather than geographical proclamation? Yes, African borders were drawn by colonial

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powers with total disregard of the identities of the populations. Yes, they cut across ethnic and tribal groups. Yes, they are arbitrary and people involved were not consulted. But show me a border that is not arbitrary, that does not cut across population groups or that was designed in consultation with stakeholders. Most countries in the world that appear to have homogeneous populations now reached this point through a forced assimilation process imposed on the original population groups. Yes, Africa’s borders are artificial and problematic, but no more so than the borders of the rest of the world. Africa’s founding fathers recognized this in 1963 when they made respect for colonial borders a fundamental principle of the Organization of African Unity.1 They knew that the important task at the time was to build their states into viable entities, not to squabble endlessly over borders. The real problem in much of Africa is not where the borders are located, but that they were established before the states. Historically, all over the world borders have reflected power relations among states. Powerful states – or empires, or tribes – extended their borders, weak ones lost territory to others. The location of borders is for the most part the consequence of wars won and lost. This was certainly true in precolonial Africa. Shaka Zulu built an empire by defeating weaker clans and tribes, and the empire survived after his death until it ran into a better armed colonial army. Zulu soldiers fought bravely and defeated the British in a major battle at Isandlwana in 1879, but eventually they lost out and the Zulu empire disappeared in 1883.2 Ethiopia reached its present borders when Emperor Menelik embarked on a process of diplomatic maneuvering and conquest that greatly enlarged his territory – and to this day creates resentment among population groups that feel they were unjustly subjugated.3 Even today’s so-called nation-states, which claim to be the political expression of a pre-existing nation, that is peoples sharing a common identity, were originally built by conquest and the imposition of new identities on many of their citizens. Nations were made by states, not vice versa. But, as Benedict Anderson (1983) shows in his book “Imagined Communities,” many states, usually long after their formation, invented and propagated founding myths depicting their origin as an expression of the popular will. African borders do not reflect power relations among African states, most of which did not even exist when the borders were drawn. Rather, they reflected power relations among colonial powers. A few borders were drawn by conflict or at least threatened conflict, but it was conflict among colonial powers – the 1898 Fashoda incident that settled the Western border of the Sudan was a confrontation between France and Britain. Everywhere on the continent people resisted conquest, but this did not have an impact on borders. Eventually, the mounting resistance to colonization convinced colonial powers that it was time to give colonies their independence. A few countries, such as Algeria, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau had to fight for long years to achieve their goals and did forge an identity in the process. In many others

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independence was granted quickly to countries whose borders were hastily finalized late in the process. France’s sub-Saharan African possessions – French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa – underwent numerous administrative reorganizations before they were divided into the countries we know now, often not long before they became independent. In East Africa, Somalia was formed at the last moment by merging Italian Somalia and British Somaliland, and the border between the new Somalia and Kenya was also established on the eve of independence. Most of the new states as a result had weak identities and even weaker capacity to govern themselves. In 1993, Robert Jackson published a seminal book in which he argued African states were states de jure but not de facto – in his terminology, they were quasi-states. They were states de jure because they enjoyed international recognition, they were members of international organizations, and their borders were also accepted internationally as immutable. For example, when Biafra tried to secede from Nigeria in 1967, almost no country recognized it, although a few provided humanitarian aid to the starving population. De facto, however, most African states had weak capacity to govern themselves and to administer their territory, to deliver services to their population and to control their extremely porous borders. The new African states were acutely aware of their weakness, including the lack of trained cadres – most countries had a pitiable small number of university graduates and even fewer people with technical expertise at independence. And they also worried about their weak national identities. In fact, concern about the weakness of the nation initially prevailed over concern about the weakness of the state and many leaders tried to mobilize their population around the idea of the national unity and to create a national identity. Single-party systems, which quickly became ubiquitous in newly independent African states, were based not only on the desire of leaders to remain in power unchallenged, but also on a genuine fear that multi-party systems would encourage separate ethnic identities to crystallize around different political parties and divide the country – a fear that eventually proved well founded. In fact, the realization that African states had weak national identities and needed to do something about it led many Western scholars to defend single-party systems as the best solution for newly independent states – one of the best known was Immanuel Wallerstein (Africa: The Politics of Independence, Vintage Books 1961), who wrote passionately about the issue. Eventually, it became clear that single party systems were also becoming a tool for power abuse by leaders who had lost their idealism. Many regimes forced citizens to join the party, to participate in party-sponsored mobilization campaigns, purportedly to plant trees or clean up neighborhoods, but in reality to encourage a sense of identity and togetherness. Overtime, these efforts backfired and compulsion replaced mobilization. In the late 1970s, students at the University of Zambia (where I taught at

62  Sabelo J. N. Gatsheni, Innocent Moyo and Marina Ottaway

the time) were so reluctant to join the party as they were expected to do that the university started demanding that they show the party card in order to get meals in the cafeteria, a move that successfully increased party membership but contributed little to nation-building, stoking instead a lot of resentment. The building of the state, rather than that of the nation, did not elicit the same degree of concern on the part of African governments. Leaders were aware of their countries’ administrative and economic weaknesses, constantly denouncing the former colonial power for failing to prepare their colonies for independence. The state-building task was monumental, and the new countries were caught in a vicious circle because they did not have the people to carry it out. For example, they desperately needed more education at all levels, but so much of their population was not educated that they did not have people capable of devising comprehensive plans for educational reform or even enough teachers to staff the schools they were building. Foreign donors contributed to the problem: Tanzania, a darling of the international community in the 1970s, thanks to the reputation of President Julius Nyerere, was flooded at one point with foreign-built schools it could neither staff nor supply with books. Underlying any state-building effort is the development of the economy. A state needs resources to function and African countries were caught between the desire to become modern welfare states delivering services to their citizens and the realities of an underlying economy that could only support the slenderest of budgets. And economic development efforts were also caught in the vicious circle of lack of expertise. Almost all African countries announced five-year development plans. Unfortunately, most were purely aspirational, ambitious plans devoid of facts and figures and a solid analysis of where the resources and investments to carry out the plans were to come from. As a result, rates of development lagged badly in African countries, making the task of state-building even more daunting. In addition to the problems inherited from the colonial period, problems that were not of their own making, African countries soon faced a host of new obstacles their elites created through greed, corruption, incompetence, and the placing of personal interest ahead of the national interest. Independence was greeted with a lot of idealism and hope, but as nation- and state-building and economic development faltered – unsurprisingly because of the magnitude of the task – cynicism, personal ambition and corruption became prevalent. This was of course not a problem unique to Africa, but one widespread among developing countries, but this did not make the problem any less devastating. Some Africa states have started emerging from the problems that held back progress in early decades of independence and are experiencing solid rates of sustained growth as well as making some progress toward better governance. Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Ghana, Senegal for example were enjoying solid growth rates in the 2010s. All these countries still have considerable

Africa’s border geography 63

problems, but they are evolving. Many others, however, have not been able to exit the initial vicious circle and have joined the ranks of what international organization and NGOs and many scholars consider to be failed or fragile states, that is states that are not able to control their territories and provide even basic services to their populations. This brings us back to the issue of borders from which we moved away for a while. The phenomenon of the failed state is a recent phenomenon, related to the post-World War II idea that the world has been subdivided once and for all into sovereign states with immutable borders. It is not that states, kingdoms or empires did not fail in the past. But they did not continue a ghostly existence as internationally recognized empty shells. They were gobbled up by one or several more successful neighbors, or lost parts of their territories and shrunk to a rump entity the government could control. Failed states today are not allowed to fail completely and disappear, they are kept alive on life support by various forms of international aid that usually fail to relaunch a functioning state. There are many such states in Africa, not surprising because so many African states started their existence as empty shells inside borders designed by the colonial powers. African failed states did not get to that point because the geography of their borders was wrong. They failed because the borders came before the states, creating quasi states, few of which succeeded in becoming real states. Different border geography would not have changed the situation. There are to be sure some border problems in Africa resulting from particularly absurd borders or from competition for natural resources located near a border. But the real problem of borders is not their location but the fact that they were established and internationally recognized before the states were formed de facto, and that that process of state formation is far from being over.

Notes 1. The Charter of the Organization of African Unity was signed on 25 May 1963. Article III, paragraph 3 of the charter listed among the fundamental principles “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State,” which meant acceptance of colonial borders. 2. See, for example, https://www.britannica.com/place/Zululand. 3. See, for example, http://countrystudies.us/ethiopia/15.htm.

References Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso. Berendsen, Bernard, Ton Dietz, Henk Schulte Norholt and Roel Van Der Veen. 2013. Asian Tigers, African Lions: Comparing the Development Performnca of SouthEast Asia and Africa. Leiden: Brill. Elias, T. 1965. “The Charter of the Organization of African Unity,” American Journal of International Law. 59(2): 243–267.

64  Sabelo J. N. Gatsheni, Innocent Moyo and Marina Ottaway Jackson, Robert H. 1993. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Linz, Juan. 1990. “State-Building and Nation-Building.” European Review 1(4): 355–69. Pakenham, Thomas. 1991. The Scramble for Africa: White Man’s Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912. New York: Random House. Rotberg, Robert I. 2004. When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1961. Africa: The Politics of Independence New York, Vintage books.

Section II

Development issues

6

Is Africa truly rising? YES: Thomas Jayne

Department of Agricultural, Food and Resource Economics, Michigan State University, USA

Richard Mkandawire

Africa Director of the Alliance for African Partnership (AAP) and Chairperson, Malawi Planning Commission, Malawi

NO: Francis Owusu

Department of Community and Regional Planning, Iowa State University, USA Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Thomas Jayne of the Department of Agricultural, Food and Resource Economics at Michigan State University, USA, and Richard Mkandawire, Africa Director of the Alliance for African Partnership (AAP) and Chairperson of  Malawi Planning Commission, Malawi, argue that a middle class has started to emerge in Africa, propelled by agricultural growth, economic diversification, labor mobility and urbanization. They outline how Africa’s rise has much to do with broadly improving educations, greater access to information and opportunities, the spread of democracy and greater rule of law. They further suggest that virtuous cycles are being initiated: as the more educated and informed classes raise their voices in demanding clean and accountable governments, the quality of public services and infrastructure will continue to improve as it has over the past several decades, but at a faster pace. They acknowledge that while Africa’s positive trajectory is unmistakable, it will be at least several decades before most of its countries will be firmly middle class. However, compared to other regions of the world, they argue that this is a remarkably short period of time. NO: Francis Owusu, Department of Community and Regional Planning at Iowa State University, USA, discusses how the 1980s gloom and doom popular media accounts and academic writings on Africa have given way in more recent years to euphoric proclamations of “Africa Rising.” The proponents of “Africa Rising” see the continent as the next frontier in the global economy based on its enhanced geo-economic position and its attraction to many countries and investors worldwide, including China. However, this externally driven, resource-dependent economic growth view ignores the fact that Africa’s fundamental economic structures remain DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-8

68  Thomas Jayne, Richard Mkandawire and Francis Owusu

unchanged – driven by subsistence agriculture, resource extraction and the export of raw materials with little economic diversification. Real and sustainable development that benefits Africans themselves would require structural economic and social transformations, which are missing from the “Africa Rising” narratives. The title of this issue is borrowed from a line in some popular news magazines, such as the Economist, regarding more recent economic growth in Africa. These news outlets, as well as this issue’s yes authors, argue that Africa has turned the corner and is now developing at a remarkably rapid rate. Given that some African countries have experienced previous short-lived economic booms when relevant commodity prices were high (followed by busts), the question is whether this time is somehow different. Key to understanding this debate is comprehending the difference between economic growth on the one hand, and structural transformation on the other, as the latter is more commonly associated with longer lasting development. One potentially useful way to think about this is with regards to the composition of a national economy and its different types of economic activities. A common categorization breaks down an economy in terms of primary (agriculture, fishing, forestry and mining), secondary (manufacturing), tertiary (service sector), and quaternary (higher end financial, computing and design) activities. More developed economies are generally thought to have a healthy mix of all types of activities and especially those that involve a well-educated and better paid workforce. As such, a few years of high economic growth could simply be based on exporting a lot of timber, fish or cotton (all primary economic activities) that are minimally processed locally and therefore seldom beneficial to the welfare of most citizens. This would be different than an economy that has evolved to also include, for example, the manufacturing of textiles (secondary activity), an international tourism sector (tertiary economic activity) and/or the development of software for mobile banking (a quaternary activity). The yes authors in this issue clearly highlight economic growth statistics in their argument, but they also point to increased wages and education levels that could be indicative of structural transformation. The no author is less sanguine, suggesting that Africa’s growth is largely based on primary economic activities with little to no transformation or development occurring. One of the challenges for African countries is that it is actually quite difficult to diversify and develop new types of economic activities in a globally competitive world. An African country may want to develop a textile industry (and many did after independence) but this is hard to do if other countries are already producing clothing at a much cheaper price or of better quality. Of course, one could protect such a new industry with tariff barriers from the competition until they were established, but international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, have previously advised African governments not to do this. The argument here is that African governments

Is Africa truly rising? 69

ought to focus on primary economic activities (as this is where they are most competitive), but many would suggest that this is problematic, if not neocolonial, advice. YES: AFRICA IS TRULY RISING

Introduction Mounting evidence over the past several decades points to profound economic and social transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Living standards for most of the region’s population has clearly improved. While the number of people in SSA living in extreme poverty has increased from 376 to 413 million between 1999 and 2015, the region’s population increased over this same period from 652 million to 1.01 billion, resulting in a marked decline in the share of people in poverty, from 58% in 1999 to 41% in 2015 (World Bank, 2021). The region’s per capita GDP increased between 2000 and 2014 by almost 35% in real terms, doubling in some countries (Barrett et al., 2017). Africa’s increasingly educated labor force is diversifying away from subsistence farming and into off-farm employment that is providing much higher incomes (Diao, Harttgen & McMillan, 2017, McMillan, Rodrik & Verduzco, 2014). For those remaining in agriculture, returns to labor have also risen steadily since 2000 (Fuglie et al., 2020). Agricultural value added per worker in real 2010 USD rose from US$846 p.c. in 2000 to US$1563 p.c. in 2019 – a 3.2% annual rate of growth. SSA achieved the highest rate of growth in agricultural production value of any region in the world, expanding by 4.3% per year in inflation-adjusted USD between 2000 and 2018, roughly double that of the prior three decades. The world average over the same period was 2.7% (World Bank, 2021). Since 2000, SSA has been the world’s second-fastest growing regional economy, exceeded only by Asia (Badiane and Makombe, 2015). Girls have experienced significant improvements in primary and secondary education (McArthur & Rasmussen, 2018). Women have become considerably more active in labor markets (Diao, Harttgen & McMillan, 2017) and are gaining greater influence over household resources in many areas (Oduro and Doss, 2018). Financial inclusion is improving rapidly – for men especially, but also for women. The percentage of African women (men) with individual or shared accounts at a financial institution or mobile bank has swelled from 17.5 (22.8)% to 34.1 (47.0)% in the 6-year period between 2011–2017 (World Bank, 2021) Nutritional indicators also show gradual but clear improvement (Masters, Rosenblum & Alemu, 2018). Governance has improved, albeit unevenly across countries. The days of hyperinflation, black market exchange rates and macro-economic turmoil are largely over and the region has benefited from massive new local and foreign investment (African Center for Economic Transformation, 2017).

70  Thomas Jayne, Richard Mkandawire and Francis Owusu

To assert that Africa is rapidly developing is not to assert that life is rosy for everyone. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the poorest region of the world. But at least most key livelihood indicators have been moving in the right direction consistently for several decades now. So, as Africans mobilize to tackle the region’s many sobering challenges, it is not constructive to hold on to the “doom and gloom narrative” from the 1980s and 1990s, especially when Africans themselves have never been more optimistic about the future and vibrancy of the region (Mattes et al., 2016; African Youth Report, 2020). While these trends point to SSA’s remarkable development progress over the past several decades, one might question how sustainable they are. We believe that Africa’s long-term progress is irreversible for three interrelated reasons: an increasingly savvy and informed work force, driven by rising levels of education; the explosion of readily accessible information and, largely resulting from these two trends, improving governance and political accountability.

Increasingly savvy and informed electorate and work force Rising levels of educational attainment is the main reason that Africa’s rise will be sustained. Student enrolments across all levels grew from roughly 200,000 in the 1970s to an estimated 10 million in 2014 (Frisenhahn, 2014). The percentage of Africans over 25 years of age who completed lower secondary school has climbed from 23% in the 1980s to 43.7% in the 2015–2018 period, and is over 75% for both men and women in rapidly developing countries such as Ghana (World Bank, 2010). African countries’ average public expenditure per university student in 2006 was US$2,000 per year – more than twice as much as non-African developing countries invested in tertiary education. The pace of educational improvement in Africa is more rapid than any other region of the world has experienced. While, decades behind the rest of the world, Africa is starting to catch up. A more educated work force means decision making in the private sector, which includes millions of micro-entrepreneurs, is becoming more effective and competitive in the global work place. Rising education levels are also driving Africans’ demands for better governance. In the early 1980s, we were struck by how most Africans looked to governments for protection, for employment, for ensuring cheap food prices, etc. They viewed markets with suspicion. They bought the narrative that governments were looking out for their welfare after decades of foreign colonial rule. As Africans have become more educated, they have become more politically active and astute. Today, most young Africans demand greater accountability from their governments and view markets as their source of opportunity and livelihood. It is hard to fool and oppress educated people. A recent study from Kenya found that the richer and more educated people were, the more likely they were to support democracy and vote for the opposition (Cheeseman, 2015).

Is Africa truly rising? 71

African youth are transforming the continent, not because they are young but because they are more educated, more entrepreneurial, savvier and more able to utilize global information than any other generation of Africans before them.

Ever greater flow of valuable and publicly accessible information Especially when combined with a more educated work force and electorate, the rapid rise of publicly accessible ICT and phone-based information even in the most remote rural areas of Africa will almost certainly have profound pro-development impacts. A recent special section of the journal World Development (Kocec & Wantchekon, 2020) shows that information can indeed improve development outcomes when users perceive it as relevant, and when they have both the power and the incentives to act on that information. Rising educations will therefore contribute to more effective utilization of the rapidly expanding supply of information and its conversion into improved livelihoods. A special issue of Foreign Affairs (Annan, Conway & Dryden, 2016) documents the rapid growth in Africans’ use of mobile banking, and software-based provision of information and services. Former Netscape founder, Marc Andreessen, predicted recently that almost every African will own a smart phone by 2025; in anticipation, software providers are feverishly working to meet this growing market for digital services. In parallel to the transformational effect of digital technologies on business practices in developed countries, they will increasingly provide African farmers with access to information that improves their decision making and makes them more competitive. Digital technologies hold great potential to reduce if not overcome the historical link between remoteness and poverty, and even to redefine what remoteness means. Digital transformation has also enabled millions of Africans, especially the savvy urban youth, to connect with the global community in a manner that was not possible even two decades ago.

Governance improving Governance conditions are clearly improving for the region as a whole and over time. Of course, conditions for any given country may improve or decline in the short run, but this should not blind us to clear improvements in governance over the long-run. In the 1980s, most African governments were repressive. Coup d’etats were common. African big men ruled by iron fist and imposed horrible policies on their people. Free presses were rare. This situation describes only a few of SSA’s 45 countries today. Macro-economic management has improved dramatically in the post-structural adjustment period. Gone are the days of Idi Amin forcing finance ministers to print money; most Ministries of Finance are run by professionals who are committed to a

72  Thomas Jayne, Richard Mkandawire and Francis Owusu

market economy (Kapstein, 2009). There have been few cases since 2000 of African countries falling into massive debt, requiring bailouts from international financiers, experiencing hyperinflation or rapid currency depreciation. The majority of African countries have stabilized their macro-economies over the past 20 years, and this has attracted much greater foreign investment and improved economic performance in the region. Parliamentarians and government officials are mirrors of their society and constituents. And fortunately for Africa, as education levels continue to improve, the quality of governance will become more open, more egalitarian and more responsive to constituents. This doesn’t mean that there won’t be major hiccups along the way – one can point to setbacks and worrying developments in any country – but what matters is whether the cumulative impact of the positive developments outweighs the negative ones. On net, the governance trends in African are generally moving in the right direction, and this has been the case for at least three decades.

Conclusions Thirty years ago, Africa was synonymous with war, famine and poverty. That narrative is clearly outdated. A middle class has started to emerge in Africa, propelled by agricultural growth, economic diversification, labor mobility and urbanization. Africa’s rise has much to do with broadly improving educations, greater access to information and opportunities, the spread of democracy and greater rule of law. Virtuous cycles are being initiated: as the more educated and informed classes raise their voices in demanding clean and accountable governments, the quality of public services and infrastructure will continue to improve as it has over the past several decades, but at a faster pace. While Africa’s positive trajectory is unmistakable, its will be at least several decades before most of its countries will be firmly middle class. Compared to other regions of the world, that is a remarkably short period of time, even though millions of poor people will understandably regard it as painfully slow. Wayne Gretzky quipped that a good hockey player plays where the puck is, but a great hockey player plays where the puck is going to be. Africa’s future is best understood not by overly focusing on its difficulties – which are still many and can easily blight one’s vision – but to consider where the trajectory of its many long-term trends are pointing.

References African Center for Economic Transformation (2017). African Transformation Report 2017. Agriculture Powering Africa’s Economic Transformation. Accra, Ghana: African Center for Economic Transformation. African Youth Survey 2020 (2020). Africa Youth Survey 2020: The Rise of Afro-Optimism. A White Paper on the findings of the Ichikowitz Family Foundation – African Youth Survey 2020. The Ichikowitz Family Foundation. https://ichikowitzfoundation.com/ wp-content/uploads/2020/02/African-Youth-Survey-2020.pdf

Is Africa truly rising? 73 Annan, K., Conway, G, and Dryden, S. (eds.) (2016). African farmers in the digital age: How digital solutions can enable rural development. Foreign affairs, special issue, 2016. Badiane, O., & Makombe, T. (eds.). (2015). Beyond a Middle Income Africa: Transforming African Economies for Sustained Growth with Rising Employment and Incomes. ReSAKSS annual trends and outlook report 2014. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. Barrett, C.B., Christiaensen, L., Sheahan, M., & Shiferaw, B. (2017). On the Structural Transformation of Rural Africa. Journal of African Economies, 26, AERC Supplement 1, i11–i35. Cheeseman, N. (2015). No Bourgeoisie, No Democracy? The Political Attitudes of the Kenyan Middle Class. Journal of International Development, 27, 647–664. Diao, X., Harttgen, K., & McMillan, M. (2017). The Changing Structure of Africa’s Economies, The World Bank Economic Review, 31(2), 412–433. Friesenhahn, I. (2014). Making Higher Education work for Africa: Facts and figures. SciDevNet, article, 25 June 2014. Fuglie, K., Gautam, M., Goyal, A. & Maloney, W. (2020). Harvesting Prosperity: Technology and Productivity Growth in Africa. Washington, DC., World Bank Group. Kapstein, E. (2009). Africa’s capitalist revolution: Preserving growth in a time of crisis, Foreign Affairs, 88(4), 119–128. Kocec, K. & Wantchekon, L. (2020). Can information improve rural governance and service delivery? World Development, 125, in press. Masters, W., Rosenblum, N., & Alemu, R. (2018). Agricultural transformation, nutrition transition and food policy in Africa: Preston Curves reveal new stylized facts. Journal of Development Studies, 54(5), 788–802. Mattes, R., Dulani, B., & Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2016). Africa’s growth dividend? Lived poverty drops across much of the continent. Policy paper 29, Afrobarometer, http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r6_ policypaperno29_lived_poverty_declines_in_africa_eng.pdf McArthur, J., and Rasmussen, K. (2018). Change of pace: Accelerations and advances during the Millennium Development Goal era. World Development, 105 (May), 132–143. McMillan, M., Rodrik, D., & Verduzco, I. (2014). Globalization, structural change and productivity growth, with an update on Africa. World Development, 63, 11–32. Oduro, A. & Doss, C. (2018). Changing patterns of wealth distribution: evidence from Ghana. Journal of Development Studies, 54(5), 933–948. World Bank. (2010). Financing Higher Education in Africa. Washington, DC. World Bank. World Bank. (2021). World Development Indicators. https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/ last accessed 16 July 2021.

NO: AFRICA IS RISING ON A WEAK FOUNDATION

Introduction The discourse around Africa is now infused with optimism derived from the seeming economic and political changes in the region. Whereas stories of the “coming anarchy” or the “hopeless continent” abounded a little over a decade ago, talk of “African Rising” now pervades the discussion on the continent’s development prospects. From the mid-1990s, protagonists of “Africa Rising” began pointing to the region’s faster economic growth, higher incomes,

74  Thomas Jayne, Richard Mkandawire and Francis Owusu

declines in poverty, improvements in health and education, and other development gains to argue that Africa has indeed turned the corner. According to Radelet (2016), these changes in African countries’ economies are driven by four fundamental forces. First, there is a marked improvement in governance in many countries. Second, there are more skilled leaders and policymakers, including a new generation of managers, technicians, and entrepreneurs leading government agencies, civil society organizations, and private businesses. The third factor relates to improved economic and social policies. A more favorable world economic condition, including more effective foreign aid in the past two decades, is the fourth factor. For “African Rising” advocates, these factors have turned the continent into a rising economic power, a place for global resource extraction (including oil), a final global investment frontier, and an untapped global market for consumption. Such an “Afroeuphoric” prognosis based mostly on externally driven, resource-dependent economic growth potential raises important questions about whether Africa is indeed rising. It also becomes imperative to ask what the booming economic growth means for Africans and whether it can lead to inclusive, sustainable development? Thoughtful reflection of such questions may lead to an uncomfortable conclusion that while Africa may be emerging from years of economic decline, it has not yet risen. Real and sustainable “Africa Rising” would result in the structural economic and social transformation of African countries characterized by governance structures and macro-economic policies that benefit Africans rather than outsiders.

GDP growth is not enough The Africa Rising narrative is premised mainly on Africa’s apparent GDP growth. Indeed, the continent experienced average annual GDP growth of 4.6% between 2000 and 2016, making it the world’s second-fastest-growing region. Given the sluggish growth rates of many Western economies over this period, this growth rate looks impressive. However, we need to put this growth rate into its proper context. For one thing, the growth data used in these discussions often combines data for over 50 individual African countries into one statistic. Such an analysis obscures significant variations in economic performances among the nations (e.g., bifurcated growth paths between resource- and non-resource-intensive countries) and even between the different regions (e.g., East African grew at 5.3% in 2016 while West Africa grew at 0.4%). Besides, the GDP trend glosses over the sensitivity of Africa’s economic performance to global events. According to World Bank data, Africa’s GDP growth rate declined from 6.5% in 2007 to 1.1% in 2009 due to the US economic crisis and declined from 5% in 2013 to 1.3% in 2016 due to a decline in commodity prices (World Bank, 2010; 2017). Moreover, when you factor in population growth, Africa’s GDP growth almost disappears. According to UN estimates, Africa’s GDP per capita growth for the 2010s is unlikely to reach much above one percent in the near

Is Africa truly rising? 75

term, which is below the average growth of the previous decade and only marginally higher than average per capita growth in the 1980s and 1990s (United Nations, 2020). Besides, using GDP, which is a territory-based indicator to measure Africa’s growth, presents a distorted picture of African countries’ economic performance, given the importance of capital-intensive investment in resource sectors by foreign corporations in many African countries. Using Gross National Product (GNP), which refers to all goods and services produced by the residents of a given country, regardless of whether the income was generated within or outside its borders, to measure the performance of these same countries would paint a different growth picture (Taylor, 2016). One indicator of the economy often ignored in praising Africa’s economic growth is the increasing debt burden and the changing nature of African countries’ debts. As of 2017, 19 African countries have exceeded 60% debtto-GDP threshold, with as many as 24 countries surpassing 55% debt-toGDP ratio. Such debt levels make countries highly vulnerable to economic changes and reduce the government’s ability to support the economy in case of a recession. Besides, many African countries’ debts are shifting away from official multilateral creditors and towards the costlier non-concessional debt, especially commercial debt, which is also more vulnerable to changes in financing conditions. Furthermore, Africa’s private non-guaranteed debt has grown – for instance, between 2006 and 2017, private sector external loans tripled from $35 billion to $110 billion (Onyekwena & Ekeruche, 2019).

Growth but not structural transformation GDP growth alone is not enough to proclaim that the continent is rising if this is unaccompanied by long-term economic transformation. The “Africa Rising” narrative is based on superficial features of Africa’s economies such as GDP figures, prices, debt levels and exchange value rather than the less apparent but more profound structural features, for instance, changes in Africa’s place in the international division of labor (Taylor, 2016). Over two decades of GDP growth in Africa has not translated into structural transformation of African economies; instead, they remain integrated into a neo-colonial global economic and political system, characterized by external dominance and natural resource dependence. Most of the economies continue to depend on natural resources, the exportation of raw materials and the importation of finished goods. Rather than decreasing, Africa’s dependence on commodities has increased with the rising commodity prices, especially in the latter part of the 2000s, coinciding with the emergence of the “Africa Rising” narrative. For instance, the global market prices of the three product categories making up the bulk of exports – fossil fuels, minerals and agricultural products – have risen the past two decades. The region is also known for its stalled manufacturing growth and little added value in its products. Many African economies have experienced a steep decline in the manufacturing sector. The region’s share of global

76  Thomas Jayne, Richard Mkandawire and Francis Owusu

manufacturing has declined since the 1970s, and today manufacturing’s share of the region’s total economic output is lower than in other developing regions. The need to boost the manufacturing sector as part of the structural transformation of African economies cannot be underestimated, given the sector’s ability to support job creation to diversify economies. Manufacturing promotes development by generating value in the economy by further creating activity along value chains, from raw materials to finished products. Rather than rising, these dynamics have perpetuated Africa’s structurally unbalanced neo-colonial economic system characterized by a lack of economic diversification. Citing UNCTAD data, Taylor (2016) argued that SSA’s had become less diversified (the continent’s export concentration increased by 72% between 1995 and 2011), with commodities making up over 80% of its export revenues. Economic diversification, which helps to drive growth, build market resilience, withstand global economic shocks and promote sustained economic growth, is essential to structurally transform economies.

Externally driven growth is unsustainable A related aspect of Africa’s resource-dependent growth is the region’s dependence on external forces. Africa has deepened its engagement with the BRICS (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa) in trade, investment, development finance and diplomatic and cultural relations. Many have attributed Africa’s economic growth to its engagement with BRICS, especially China. However, since much of BRICS’ investment is directed to natural resources, only a few resource-rich African countries that have benefitted from such investments are growing. Africa’s externally driven growth is based on commodity price cycles, which make such growth unsustainable. African economics are vulnerable to changes in the performance of the international economy, for example economic performance in Europe, the US, China, etc. affect their trade with Africa, especially imports of commodities. For instance, after the commodity crash, annual FDI inflows to Africa slowed by 15% from 2008 to 2016 (Bond, 2017).

Lack of social transformation associated with Africa’s growth Africa’s GDP growth has also not been accompanied by significant social transformation. Although global poverty rates have declined, much of the decline was driven by Asia, especially China, with Africa experiencing only a modest decline. For instance, although global poverty rates fell from 42% in 1981 to 10% in 2015, the corresponding rates for Africa dropped 54.3 to 41.1%. The absolute number of the poor Africans has also been on the rise over the last three decades, with the number of Africans living on less than $1.90 a day (2011 Purchasing power parity or PPP) increasing from

Is Africa truly rising? 77

276 million in 1990 Africans to 398 million by 2015 (Frankema & van Waijenburg, 2018). The “African Rising” narrative is also premised on a questionable definition of the middle class. The African Development Bank’s Economist, Mthuli Ncube estimated in 2011 that one in three Africans could be classified as middle class. However, he defines the middle class as those who spend between $2 and $20 per day – a range that can be considered poverty level in most African cities (cited in Bond 2016). Moreover, access to basics services such as health care, education, water, sanitation, etc. remains highly unequal in many African countries; a situation recently brought to bear by the COVID-19 (Trenchard, 2020). As Bond (2016) argued, a more powerful display of the widespread discontent by Africans is the rising public protests across the continent. According to the African Development Bank data, major public demonstrations across the continent rose from an index level of 100 in 2000 to 550 in 2013. Although the index declined 2014 and 2015 at the end of the Arab Spring, it started to increase again in 2016, creating an increasing trend line for the period 2000–2016 (African Development Bank et al. 2017:131). These protests and demonstrations are mainly driven by many African – see as socio-economic injustices, including inadequate wages and working conditions, the low quality of public service delivery, social divides, state repression and lack of political reform. These uprisings, which happened when the international media and local enthusiasts were busy proclaiming that Africa is rising, often occurred in the vicinity of mines and mineral wealth (Bond, 2016).

Superficial/Paltry changes governance and modes of doing business Proponents of the “Africa Rising” narrative argue that many countries in the region have made significant progress in governance and that African governments are now heeding the call to create a more favorable environment for doing business. They point to recent leadership changes in many countries and the continent-wide push for greater accountability and democracy. However, it is questionable if democracy in Africa is indeed leading to improvement in governance. To illustrate, although the ruling governments in several African states have been defeated at the ballot box, many elections in Africa are marred by corruption and fraud. Moreover, other governance dimensions have also stalled or declined in recent years or have not reached all countries. Cheeseman and Smith (2019) draw on Freedom House data to argue that just 11% of the continent is politically ‘free,’ and that the average quality of political rights and civil liberties fell in each of the last 14 years. They also cite the Ibrahim Index of African Governance to show that democratic progress in Africa lags far behind citizens’ expectations. The perception of Africans regarding governance and the macro-economic environment

78  Thomas Jayne, Richard Mkandawire and Francis Owusu

seems different from those of African government officials, foreigners and the African rising proponents (Taylor, 2016).

Conclusion The Africa of today is undoubtedly different from the Africa that existed at the dawn of the century when doom and gloom dominated discussions of the future of the continent. The continent is now seen as a place of economic potential and opportunity for resource extraction, including oil, investment and market potential. These changes in the continent’s perception have enhanced its geo-economic position in the global economy and are attracting the attention of countries that traditionally had little economic engagement with the continent, including China. However, the fundamental structures of Africa economies remain unchanged – driven by subsistence agriculture, resource extraction and the export of raw materials with little evidence of economic diversification. Moreover, rather than helping to reduce poverty at a faster pace, Africa’s GDP growth has not benefitted the poor. As a result, poverty and unequal access to essential services persist and have stifled any significant social transformation that would justify the euphoria for the continent’s development and what that means for ordinary Africans. Besides, while most African countries have embraced the rituals of democracy, citizens have yet to enjoy its benefits, including good governance, as promised by advocates of western democracy. In sum, given the history of the continent’s dismal development record, its slow emergence as a place of potential opportunity for the global economy seemed enough for the “Africa Rising” advocates to conclude that the continent has turned a corner and is rising. In doing so, they have ignored the common question that many people in Africa are wrestling with: for whom is African rising?

References African Development Bank, OECD Development Centre, UN Development Programme and Economic Commission for Africa. (2017). African Economic Outlook. (Available at: https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/library/reports/african-economicoutlook-2017.html). Bond, Patrick (2016). “Africans Continue Uprising against ‘Africa Rising” in Gumede, V. (ed.) The Great Recession and Its Implications for Human Values: Lessons for Africa, Johannesburg: MISTRA. pp. 233–59. Bond, Patrick (2017). “Africa Rising” in Retreat: New Signs of Resistance” Monthly Review (available at: https://monthlyreview.org/2017/09/01/africa-rising-in-retreat/) Cheeseman, Nic and Jeffrey Smith (2019). “The Retreat of African Democracy: The Autocratic Threat Is Growing” Foreign Affairs, January 17, 2019 (available at: https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2019-01-17/retreat-african-democracy). Chukwuka Onyekwena and Mma Amara Ekeruche (2019). “Is a debt crisis looming in Africa? Brookings Institution, April 10, 2019 (available at: https://www.brookings. edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/04/10/is-a-debt-crisis-looming-in-africa/).

Is Africa truly rising? 79 Frankema, Ewout and Marlous van Waijenburg (2018). “Africa Rising? A historical perspective” October 2018, (available at: https://africasacountry.com/2018/10/africarising-a-historical-perspective). International Monetary Fund (2018). Regional Economic Outlook for Sub- Saharan Africa, Washington DC. International Monetary Fund, April 2018 (available at: https://www. imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/REO/AFR/2018/May/pdf/sreo0518.ashx). Radelet, Steven (2016). “Africa’s Rise – Interrupted?: The region’s future depends on much more than fluctuations in commodity prices” Finance and Development, June 2016, pp. 6–11. Taylor, Ian (2016). “Dependency Redux: Why Africa Is Not Rising,” Review of African Political Economy, March 2016, 43(147), pp. 8–25. Trenchard, Tommy (2020). “PHOTOS: Lockdown in The World’s Most Unequal Country” April 21, 2020 (available at https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/ 04/21/837437715/photos-lockdown-in-the-worlds-most-unequal-country). United Nations (2020). World Economic Situation Prospects 2020. New York: United Nations (Available at https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/world-economicsituation-and-prospects-2020/). World Bank (2010). Global Economic Prospects, January 2010: Crisis, Finance, and Growth. Washington, DC: World Bank. (Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/ handle/10986/2415) World Bank Group (2017). Global Economic Prospects, June 2017: A Fragile Recovery. Washington, DC: World Bank. (Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/ handle/10986/26800).

7

Are foreign land acquisitions the latest form of neo-colonialism in Africa? YES: Kerstin Nolte

Institute of Economic and Cultural Geography, Leibniz University Hannover, Germany

NO: Samuel Ledermann

International Development Studies Program, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Kerstin Nolte of the Institute of Economic and Cultural Geography at Leibniz University, Germany, explores whether land grabbing is a form of neo-colonialism in Africa. She examines the definition of land grabbing in the Tirana Declaration and then clarifies the terminology used to describe the phenomenon. She also looks at the empirical evidence on land acquisitions, a phenomenon in Africa that involves a distinct lack of transparency. Based on this evidence, she concludes that certain land acquisitions qualify as neo-colonial resource extraction or have at least neocolonial aspects. However, she notes that there are exceptions and that it is important to carefully examine each project. NO: Samuel Ledermann of the International Development Studies Program at George Washington University, USA, notes that there is increased scrutiny of private land investors in Africa. While marred by initial failures, he suggests that novel investment approaches and improved governance offer a viable pathway to achieve substantial social and environmental impacts. He acknowledges the global consensus calling for change, but outlines why land matters, how investments contribute to sustainable development and students’ potential role in the process. As the authors in this issue note, large scale foreign land acquisitions are difficult to label and define. While Africans have long produced crops for export, the difference with a land acquisition is that the foreign entity actually obtains the land (often through a 99-years lease) on which the crops are grown and overseas their production. The foreign investor arguably has a lot more control over crop production with a land acquisition as compared to simply buying crops from farmers. DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-9

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While some of these arrangements existed in Africa in the past, such as the Firestone rubber plantations in Liberia, there was an uptick in such deals after the 2007–2008 global food crisis, a time period when food prices rose about 50% on average and there was resulting social unrest in some countries. This period of high food prices spurred land investments in Africa for several reasons. First, after several decades of low food prices, many investors believed that we were entering a period of sustained higher food and biofuel prices and that it made sense to invest in crop production. Africa was seen as region with surplus land where such investments could be made. Second, the global food crisis scared some countries that import the majority of their food. As such, large scale land acquisitions were seen as a way to better control food production for your own people in another country. Third, the food crisis also breathed new life into the New Green Revolution for Africa (see chapter 12), an approach which encouraged private sector investment in African agriculture. As such, some large-scale land acquisitions were pitched as an agricultural development tool. As discussed in this chapter, Africa still has a large number of small hold farmers and in many cases their land rights are not very legible to outsiders, including their own governments. Traditional tenure, as opposed to private property and land titles, is still the dominant arrangement in many rural areas of the continent. With traditional tenure, a family often holds the use rights to the land, but it cannot be bought and sold like private property. This is a sound system because it ensures that land is passed down within families and not sold to outsiders. While these use rights are recognized within the community, the problem is that these rights are seldom recognized by national governments (although there have been efforts to record in some countries) and it is national governments that typically deal with outside investors. As such, in some instances, large scale land acquisitions displace local farmers. YES: MANY FOREIGN LAND ACQUISITIONS IN AFRICA REPRESENT A FORM OF NEO-COLONIALISM The term land grabbing is widely used in the media and most reports agree that this process is exploiting countries of the Global South, especially SubSaharan Africa. Furthermore, many people actually claim land grabbing is the latest form of neo-colonialism. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica (2016), neo-colonialism is “the control of less-developed countries through indirect means,” “is widely used to refer to a form of global power in which transnational corporations and global and multilateral institutions combine to perpetuate colonial forms of exploitation of developing countries,” and “retain them as sources of cheap raw materials and cheap labour.” Let us shed some light on the question of whether land grabbing is a form of neo-colonialism based on research insights and empirical evidence. Over

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the last decade, an increasing number of researchers have also explored the growing trend of large-scale land acquisitions – which is a more neutral term. According to the most comprehensive database on the topic, about 33 million hectares of land for 1,865 projects has been acquired in low- and middleincome countries since the year 2000 (Lay et al., 2021). This is almost the area of Germany. Large-scale land acquisitions take place all over the Global South and Eastern Europe. Sub-Saharan Africa is the continent most targeted with hotspots in Eastern and Western Africa. In particular, we see high concentrations of projects along important rivers, such as the Nile, the Niger and the Senegal rivers (Nolte et al., 2016). The key question in the whole debate on land acquisitions can be nicely summarized by one of the first policy reports on the topic: “land grab or development opportunity” (Cotula et al., 2009). This question is indeed not a simple one: while critics claim that power relations are unequal and land is being grabbed to the detriment of poor populations – confirming the image of neo-colonialism, others highlight the need for investments in agriculture and the opportunities coming along with such large-scale projects. In order to find an answer to this difficult question of neo-colonialism, I will first speak about terminology and then discuss the main research findings from the empirical literature. Based on this, we come to the following judgement: land grabbing as defined in the Tirana declaration clearly is a form of neo-colonialism. However, the empirical evidence on large-scale land acquisitions gives a more complex image that requires judging each project individually. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence reveals that many projects bear signs of neo-colonialism.

Terminology and definitions One of the hardest things in the whole debate is the question of terminology, or put differently, the question of defining the phenomenon. Why are there so many terms for the phenomenon, including land grabbing and large-scale land acquisitions? What are we speaking about, what do we include in our definition? Is it only acquisitions of land for agriculture, or also for industry projects or even areas reserved for national parks or environmental protection? Is there any size boundary: is a one-hectare acquisition of land included, or do we start at 20 hectares or at 200 hectares? Land grabbing obviously is a term that has a very negative connotation. Thus, researchers either decide to use a more neutral term, such as largescale land acquisitions. Or they decide to use the term land grabbing only for certain projects that qualify – according to a certain set of criteria – as land grabbing. These criteria are (for the first time) officially described in the “Tirana Declaration.” Accordingly, land grabbing are those cases of foreign and domestic investments in agricultural land that meet one of the following criteria: (i) violation of human rights; (ii) not based on free prior and informed consent of the affected land users; (iii) not based on a thorough

Foreign land acquisitions as neo-colonialism in Africa? 83

assessment of social, economic and environmental impacts; (iv) not based on transparent contracts, and (v) not based on effective democratic planning, independent oversight and meaningful participation (ILC, 2011). While it is nice to have a detailed definition of these “bad cases of land grabbing,” in practice it can be difficult to clearly judge whether an investment meets any of these criteria. One of the reasons is the persistent opaqueness of many of these projects. This could on the one hand indicate a tendency towards ‘land grabbing’: if a company has nothing to hide, why should contracts not be transparent? However, on the other hand, many investors claim that they do not want to disclose any information to competitors and therefore prefer not having any sensitive company information public. In addition, high pressure from media and civil society leads investors to rather be silent about any land-based projects in order to not be denounced as ‘land grabbers’ and face resistance, which would in turn harm their project. The Land Matrix Initiative1 operates the most comprehensive database on the topic, and therewith provides a data basis for many empirical studies. Their definition of large-scale land acquisitions thus plays a crucial role in the literature. In its global data base, the Land Matrix includes projects of (i) more than 200 hectares; (ii) initiated since the year 2000; (iii) entailing a transfer of rights to use, control or ownership of land through sale, lease or concession and (iv) implying the potential conversion of smallholder production, local community use or important ecosystem service provision to commercial use (Land Matrix, 2021). Many scholars and practitioners believe the size boundary of 200 hectares is very restrictive and should be lowered. Especially for projects from domestic investors, project sizes tend to be lower. Thus, Land Matrix data can be considered a rather conservative estimate of the true extent of the phenomenon. We will work with the more neutral and broader definition of large-scale land acquisitions – which may also include cases of ‘land grabbing.’ As we are particularly interested in neo-colonialism, we specifically look at larger transnational projects, but are aware that there are also domestic and smaller projects.

Empirical evidence Another challenge associated to the debate is the lack of transparency: in most countries, there is no official land registry and – as discussed earlier – many investors prefer not disclosing any information on their projects. Irrespective of the reasons for the secrecy surrounding many of the projects, it remains difficult to study large-scale land acquisitions: there is few data available and the data that we have is prone to biases. For instance, information on certain target regions or investors might be particular sketchy or information on certain aspects is entirely lacking. This is a major challenge to researchers and results in a rather fragmented body of research, with a multitude of detailed case studies – that typically cannot be generalized – and still few cross-country studies (Liao et al., 2016).

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Nonetheless, the growing body of research on large-scale land acquisitions reveals important insights that I will discuss in the following. First, let us look at the origin of investors. Investors come from all over the world, but the largest group of investors is from high-income European countries. North American investors also play an important role. More recently, investors from the Global South have gained in importance. These investors typically invest in their own region. However, it is important to mention that it can be difficult to clearly identify where an investor is from, with more and more investors registering in tax haven countries (Nolte et al., 2016). A sometimes-overlooked phenomenon is the importance of domestic investments: it is not only foreign-owned companies acquiring land, but also domestic investors. These are typically a bit smaller in size but the entity of domestic investments can be substantial (Nolte & Sipangule, 2017). Second, let us shed some light on the implementation of projects: There is quite a rich literature on the actual process of acquiring land that largely depends on the country’s land tenure system (German et al., 2013; Nolte, 2014). Most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa inherited a land tenure system with coexisting statutory and customary systems, which results in partly overlapping land rights and legal grey zones (Boone, 2014; Nolte & Väth, 2015). Especially in customary systems, documentation of land rights is sketchy. Local authorities administer land and if land is acquired, consultations often leave out the actual land users (Nolte & Voget-Kleschin, 2014; Vermeulen & Cotula, 2010). Another interesting aspect in the implementation of projects is the legal status of the land acquisitions: on the African continent, the great majority of land acquisitions are made in the form of leaseholds. These leaseholds may vary in terms of the lease duration – largely determined by the target countries’ legislation. The great majority of leases are long-term leases of up to 99 years (Nolte et al., 2016). Looking at the implementation of projects, we are also interested in the plans of investors to sell their produce. In particular, projects that grow agro-fuels typically target export markets (Cotula et al., 2011). Food crops may be sold on local markets, but especially high-value crops tend to be exported (Rulli & D’Odorico, 2014). Most authors suggest that the majority of agricultural products is targeted for export (Anseeuw et al., 2012; Davis et al., 2015). Finally, let us look at the evidence on the impacts of such land acquisitions. One of the aspects where information is still scarce is displacements. There is some evidence that displacements happen (Chu et al., 2015; Moreda & Spoor, 2015; Neef & Singer, 2015), and if they happen quite a number of people are displaced (Nolte et al., 2016). Even if households are not displaced, they may lose access to land and other resources (Oberlack et al., 2016). There is also a growing literature on potential socio-economic benefits of land acquisitions, looking at aspects such as infrastructure development, job creation, knowledge and technology spillovers (e.g. Ali, Deininger, &

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Harris, 2019; Baumgartner, von Braun, Abebaw, & Müller, 2015; Deininger & Xia, 2018; Oberlack et al., 2016). Findings of this literature are still ambiguous. However, a few general insights emerge: while for some projects positive aspects cannot be denied, benefits are not equally shared across communities. There are winners and losers of land acquisitions, often along wealth and gender lines (Behrman et al., 2012; Borras & Franco, 2013). This is particularly evident in employment creation. Most employment opportunities are low-skilled, short-term and mainly taken up by male workers (Nolte & Ostermeier, 2017) and may thereby exacerbate inequalities within communities. Impacts on the environment are generally perceived as negative, including the emission of toxic substances into the air, water and soil (Mujenja & Wonani, 2012; Zaehringer et al., 2018), overconsumption of surface and ground water ( Johansson et al., 2016) and carbon emissions (Liao et al., 2021).

So what? Is land grabbing neo-colonialism or not? Coming back to the key question: is land grabbing neo-colonialism or not, let us judge what we have discussed that far: First, if we adopt the definition of land grabbing emerging from the Tirana declaration, we can certainly speak about a new form of neo-colonialism. These projects that qualify as land grabbing are implemented without meaningful participation of those affected and disregarding the social, economic, and environmental impacts. Thus, these are examples of projects mostly interested in access to the resource land (and water) for economic profits – which conform to the notion of neo-colonialism. Second, looking at the empirical evidence from the literature on largescale land acquisitions, the judgement is a little harder. Not every single case is a case of neo-colonial land appropriation. It depends on how exactly the project is implemented. However, many of the projects we currently see being established certainly qualify as neo-colonial resource extraction or have at least neo-colonial aspects. These aspects include the fact that many land acquisition projects are top-down developments that do not consult with local land users and guarantee investors the long-term access to land. In many cases, benefits to local communities are limited to specific parts of the society. Often, even the produce is directly exported. Most investors come from rich European or North American countries, which confirm the image of neo-colonialism. In conclusion, if we use the term land grabbing with the Tirana declaration in mind, the answer is a clear ‘yes,’ land grabbing is neo-colonialism. If we look at the empirical evidence emerging from the literature on large-scale land acquisitions, many (if not most) projects can still be considered a new form of neo-colonialism. However, there are exceptions to this rule and it is important to first take a detailed look at each project before denouncing it as a new form of neo-colonialism.

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References Ali, D., Deininger, K., & Harris, A. (2019). Does Large Farm Establishment Create Benefits for Neighboring Smallholders? Evidence from Ethiopia. Land Economics, 95(1), 71–90. Anseeuw, W., Boche, M., Breu, T., Giger, M., Lay, J., Messerli, P., & Nolte, K. (2012). Transnational Land Deals for Agriculture in the Global South: Analytical Report Based on the Land Matrix Database. CDE/CIRAD/GIGA. Baumgartner, P., von Braun, J., Abebaw, D., & Müller, M. (2015). Impacts of Largescale Land Investments on Income, Prices, and Employment: Empirical Analyses in Ethiopia. World Development, 72, 175–190. Behrman, J., Meinzen-Dick, R., & Quisumbing, A. (2012). The Gender Implications of Large-Scale Land Deals. Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(1), 49–79. Boone, C. (2014). Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics. Cambridge University Press. Borras, S. M., & Franco, J. C. (2013). Global Land Grabbing and Political Reactions ‘From Below.’ Third World Quarterly, 34(9), 1723–1747. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597. 2013.843845 Chu, J., Young, K., & Phiri, D. (2015). Large-Scale Land Acquisitions, Displacement and Resettlement in Zambia. PLAAS Policy Brief, 41. Cotula, L., Finnegan, L., & Macqueen, D. (2011). Biomass Energy: Another Driver of Land Acquisitions? https://pubs.iied.org/17098IIED/ Cotula, L., Vermeulen, S., Leonard, R., & Keeley, J. (2009). Land Grab or Development Opportunity? Agricultural Investment and International Land Deals in Africa (IIED/FAO/ IFAD, ed.). Davis, K. F., Yu, K., D’Odorico, P., Rulli, M. C., & Pichdara, L. (2015). Accelerated Deforestation Driven by Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in Cambodia. Nature Geoscience, 8(10), 772–775. https://doi.org/10.1038/ngeo2540 Deininger, K., & Xia, F. (2018). Assessing the Long-Term Performance of Large-Scale Land Transfers: Challenges and Opportunities in Malawi’s Estate Sector. World Develop­ ment, 104, 281–296. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.11.025 Encyclopedia Britannica. (2016). Neocolonialism. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www. britannica.com/topic/neocolonialism German, L., Schoneveld, G., & Mwangi, E. (2013). Contemporary Processes of LargeScale Land Acquisition in Sub-Saharan Africa: Legal Deficiency or Elite Capture of the Rule of Law? World Development, 48, 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev. 2013.03.006 ILC. (2011). Tirana Declaration: “Securing Land Access for the Poor in Times of Intensified Natural Resources Competition.” http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/aom11/Tirana‗ Declaration‗ILC‗2011‗ENG.pdf Johansson, E. L. (1), Seaquist, J. W. (1), Fader, M. (2, 3), & Nicholas, K. A. (4). (2016). Green and Blue Water Demand from Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in Africa. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 113(41), 11471–11476. edselc https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1524741113 Land Matrix. (2021). Land Matrix. Global Observatory. https://landmatrix.org/global/ Lay, J., Anseeuw, W., Eckert, S., Flachsbarth, I., Kubitza, C., Nolte, K., & Giger, M. (2021). Taking Stock of the Global Land Rush: Impacts and Risks. Analytical Report III. Bern Open Publishing.

Foreign land acquisitions as neo-colonialism in Africa? 87 Liao, C., Jung, S., Brown, D. G., & Agrawal, A. (2016). Insufficient research on land grabbing. Science, 353(6295), 131–131. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf6565 Liao, C., Nolte, K., Sullivan, J. A., Brown, D. G., Lay, J., Althoff, C., & Agrawal, A. (2021). Carbon Emissions from the Global Land Rush and Potential Mitigation. Nature Food, 2(1), 15–18. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43016-020-00215-3 Moreda, T., & Spoor, M. (2015). The Politics of Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in Ethiopia: State and Corporate Elites and Subaltern Villagers. Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue Canadienne d’études Du Développement, 36(2), 224–240. https:// doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2015.1049133 Mujenja, F., & Wonani, C. (2012). Long-Term Outcomes of Agricultural Investments: Lessons from Zambia. IIED. Neef, A., & Singer, J. (2015). Development-Induced Displacement in Asia: Conflicts, Risks and Resilience. Development in Practice, 25(5), 601–611. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09614524.2015.1052374 Nolte, K. (2014). Large-Scale Agricultural Investments Under poor Land Governance in Zambia. Land Use Policy. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.01.014 Nolte, K., Chamberlain, W., & Giger, M. (2016). International Land Deals for Agriculture. Fresh insights from the Land Matrix: Analytical Report II. https://doi.org/10.7892/boris.85304 Nolte, K., & Ostermeier, M. (2017). Labour Market Effects of Large-Scale Agricultural Investment: Conceptual Considerations and Estimated Employment Effects. World Development, 98, 430–446. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.012 Nolte, K., & Sipangule, K. (2017). Land Use Competition in Sub-Saharan Africa’s Rural Areas. PEGNet Policy Brief, 10, 4. Nolte, K., & Väth, S. J. (2015). Interplay of Land Governance and Large-Scale Agricultural Investment: Evidence from Ghana and Kenya. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 53(01), 69–92. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X14000688 Nolte, K., & Voget-Kleschin, L. (2014). Consultation in Large-Scale Land Acquisitions: An Evaluation of Three Cases in Mali. World Development, 64, 654–668. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.06.028 Oberlack, C., Tejada, L., Messerli, P., Rist, S., & Giger, M. (2016). Sustainable Livelihoods in the Global Land Rush? Archetypes of Livelihood Vulnerability and Sustainabi­ lity Potentials. Global Environmental Change, 41, 153–171. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.gloenvcha.2016.10.001 Rulli, M. C., & D’Odorico, P. (2014). Food Appropriation through Large-Scale Land Acquisitions. Environmental Research Letters, 9(6), 064030. https://doi.org/10.1088/17489326/9/6/064030 Shete, M., Rutten, M., Schoneveld, G. C., & Zewude, E. (2016). Land-Use Changes by Large-Scale Plantations and Their Effects on Soil Organic Carbon, Micronutrients and Bulk Density: Empirical Evidence from Ethiopia. Agriculture and Human Values, 33(3), 689–704. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10460-015-9664-1 Vermeulen, S., & Cotula, L. (2010). Over the Heads of Local People: Consultation, Consent and Recompense in Large-Scale Land Deals for Biofuels Projects in Africa. Journal of Peasant Studies, 37(4), 899–916. Zaehringer, J. G., Wambugu, G., Kiteme, B., & Eckert, S. (2018). How do Large-Scale Agricultural Investments Affect Land Use and the Environment on the Western Slopes of Mount Kenya? Empirical Evidence Based on Small-Scale Farmers’ Perceptions and Remote Sensing. Journal of Environmental Management, 213, 79–89. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2018.02.019

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NO: FOREIGN LAND ACQUISITIONS ARE NOT NECESSARILY THE LATEST FORM OF NEO-COLONIALISM IN AFRICA

A change in business Land matters. It is one of the three key factors – the other two being capital and labor – that traditionally determine success in agricultural production. Agricultural development efforts often focus on addressing the key limiting factor in a given production system. Since the arrival of the Green Revolution more than 50 years ago, capital-intensive agriculture that is labor-saving (e.g., chemical pesticides reducing the need for manual weeding) or land-saving (e.g., high-yielding hybrid seeds that increase productivity) has become the global norm. As debated by others in this volume (Chapter 12), in SubSaharan Africa this intensification of production through capital has largely been missing. With the merits of this capital-intensive form of production being contested, the calls that the current system of production is no longer sustainable are echoing increasingly through the halls of key institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in the form of the slogan: “business as usual is no longer an option” (United Nations, 2017). Initially voiced by civil society actors, diverse stakeholders are now stressing the increasing environmental and social limits of an agricultural production system that maximizes short-term gains. This change is reflected in the holistic nature of the United Nations (UN) “Sustainable Development Goals” (SDGs) that aim to transform our world (United Nations, 2015). In order to achieve the aspirational SDGs’ 17 goals and 169 targets in developed and developing countries by 2030, investments in the range from four to seven trillion USD per year are needed, of which at least 1.4 trillion USD per year are expected from the private sector (Niculescu, 2017; UNPRI, 2017). The goal of ‘zero hunger’ (SDG 2) alone would need annual additional funding in the order of 11 billion USD per year (Laborde et al., 2016). It is within this context of limitations to capital-intensive production, calls for transforming our food system and noted public financing gaps for achieving sustainable development that (private) foreign investments in African lands have risen to prominence within the development sphere. This essay is outlined as follows: first, I present why land is more than dirt. Second, I move beyond the unhelpful terminology of ‘land grabbing’ to understand what investments in land can do and what to avoid. Third, by reviewing investment trends over the past 20 years, I showcase how new investors are emerging and why their ‘unusual’ investments are an option. Finally, I conclude with an outlook on foreign investments in land and students’ role in this development.

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More than dirt It might surprise you to know that we are only scratching the surface of the land we grow our crops on. Land is more than productive dirt: a key point recognized in 2020 when Rattan Lal, a pioneer in soil science, won the World Food Prize (Charles, 2020). His research on soils highlighted the importance for us to nurture and invest in them, as they play a crucial role for our own health (think micronutrient or pollution from soil dust), our ecosystems (think purification of water) and even for our planet’s future (think carbon sequestration to address climate change). These findings have also permeated into the public sphere and include calls for greater investments in soils such as the UN declaring 2015 the International Year of Soils (FAO, 2015). Even your own Netflix account streams documentaries such as ‘Kiss the Ground’, featuring celebrity activists, practitioners and scientists to showcase how “the earth’s soil may be the key to combatting climate change and preserving the planet” (Benenson Productions, 2020). As is often the case, these scientific findings are not surprising to farmers who have long noted that persistent use of synthetic fertilizer makes their ‘soils hungry’ (IFAD, 2015). Farmers across the world have consistently tried to make investments into their soils. Key to their investments are secure tenure rights: without ownership, farmers lack the incentives to improve their land in the long-term. A lack of land rights effects the soils in subsequent ways: farmers then lack the collateral needed to obtain credit and other agricultural services that allows them to make investments in the first place. Secure land rights for indigenous communities furthermore can support restoration of degraded land and reduce their vulnerability to and mitigation of climate change effects (McMonagle, 2021). In summary, what may appear as dirt to you is the foundation of livelihoods for millions of small-holder families across Africa.

Beyond grabbing The earlier mentioned gains in scientific knowledge and public awareness has significantly shifted private investments towards agricultural land, and not just in the Global South. The theory goes that large-scale land investments create an influx of new agricultural technologies and infrastructure that (in)directly benefit the surrounding population. Large farms are the logical entry point for leveraging such a change, as the top 1% of farmers occupy more than 70% of the world’s farmland (Lowder et al. 2019). In the United States, for example, large investment funds are acquiring US land, including for the purpose of converting land from conventional to organic agricultural production (e.g., Iroquois Valley, 2021). These investments are uncontroversial if not celebrated, as land rights are well established and the type of agriculture advanced is perceived as environmentally beneficial.

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Figure 7.1  Land Investments in Africa Source: Author’s Calculations

In Africa, we can map 617 land investments over the last two decades logged by an independent global land monitoring initiative – Land Matrix (2021) - against their potential to contribute to the agricultural sector by looking at the importance of agriculture to the larger economy (measured as percent value added from agriculture, fisheries and forestry to the country’s Gross Domestic Product). As shown in Figure 7.1 (Land Investments in Africa), land investments predominantly take place across Eastern and coastal West Africa. In stark contrast to Southern and Northern Africa, these are also the regions where agricultural production contributes up to 58% (in the case of Sierra Leone in West Africa where 22 deals were located) and 36% (in the case of Ethiopia in East Africa where 49 deals were located) to the GDP. Given the need for private investments to supplement declining public funding for agricultural development efforts, these deals have the potential to make a significant impact towards filling the financing gap to achieve the UN SDGs. African land rights however are not well formalized, with communal land rights in particular only reinforced through customary land tenure systems. Combined with low government accountability, large-scale investments historically have been controversial. Termed ‘land grabs,’ foreign investments that solely focus on maximizing production at a massive scale are untenable from an ethical, economic and environmental perspective (e.g., for Mozambique see

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Bourne, 2016). As opposed to the mono-cropped spaces of the US Midwest, African small-scale farms are omnipresent across diverse landscapes, with rushed investment deals leading to devastating displacements. Beyond displacements, marginalized groups include women (frequently invisible as farmers) that are lacking secure access to land and titles, pastoralists (whose land use is increasingly in conflict with small and large land owners) and landless farmers (who are often invisible to investors in the first place). Resettlement schemes, historically marred (e.g., in Ethiopia and Tanzania), are consistently flawed as they are offering short-term incentives (e.g., cash) on long-term marginal lands (e.g., poor soil fertility). Even if well intended, households rarely productively farm land farther from their homestead, resulting in additional barriers to sustainable production (Tittonell & Giller, 2013). The earlier mentioned concerns on land grabbing were accentuated by their predominant focus on export-oriented production of non-food crops. In the early 2000s, a hype emerged around the hardy nut ‘jatropha’ as an alternative source of biofuel (Charles, 2012). More than 15% of all foreign land investment deals registered in Africa aimed to grow that miracle bush; by now, the vast majority have been abandoned as their business plans have faltered. Since the global food crises in 2008–2009, a newer wave of investments focused on export production of food crops to strengthen food security in net food importers outside the African continent. While data is incomplete, the two largest export destinations are Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with the majority focusing on alfalfa and corn production in Sudan. While these contracts are reminiscent of neo-colonial tendencies, 11 out of the 17 (65%) have failed, with less than 10% of the land leased (15’359 ha out of 182’588 ha) actually under production (Author’s calculations based on Landmatrix). In summary, both trends emerging from the early 2000s have started to stall, and their long-term relevance was overblown. Emerging from these failures, however, were multi-stakeholder initiatives that aimed to guide a new set of investors to make foreign land investments a success.

Investments are an option It is in this context of initial controversies that a new path emerges for foreign investments: invest not only in large, but in middle-sized farms that can benefit neighboring farmers through outgrower or contract schemes. These arrangements allow smaller farmers to reliably source inputs, knowledge or machinery from the larger farm or supply their harvest to them in order to secure a stable market access and potentially higher prices. These models avoid displacement or resettlement of farmers, as they function without any change in land titles by smallholder farmers. Rather, farmers benefit by connecting to an integrated value chain that shifts power to the producers. The resultant production can be sustainable: as shown in the case of bioRe Tanzania, a pioneering organic cotton producer in Tanzania. For nearly two decades, smallholder farmers have benefited from higher prices due to certification of their cotton, as well as access to monthly agricultural extension services

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(Ledermann, 2012). Similar operations exist across the African continent with outgrower arrangements focusing on high-value crops for smallholder farmers who previously had no market access (Bourne, 2016). Key to the above success is that farmers hold secure land rights or tenure. Land inequality negatively impacts economic growth (Cipollina et al., 2018), and farmers who don’t own their land are unlikely to adopt sustainable agricultural practices (Ledermann 2012). As stated by Landesa, a Seattle-based nonprofit defending the land rights of smallholder farmers, “the key is leveraging that investment to yield benefits for all, ensuring secure land rights, thriving markets, and increased productivity on all farms, big and small,” a so-termed triple win (Bourne, 2016). This triple win forms the basis of financing provided by impact investors – the fastest raising investment category over the last years. Aiming to achieve not only a financial return, but also social and ‘environmental impact’ (so-called triple bottom-line), select investors are addressing financing bottlenecks to improve the long-term productivity and viability of farming without jeopardizing the environment. One pioneering African investor – Pearl Capital Partners based out of Uganda – receives and allocates funding from private banks (e.g., JP Morgan), philanthropists (e.g., Rockefeller Foundation) and bilateral and multilateral development agencies [e.g., USAID or International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)]. Operating since 2006, sample investments range from a small-scale organic Moringa oleifera farming operation (in Uganda) (Raintree Farms, 2021), a flower farm (in Central Kenya) (Wilmars Flower Ltd, 2021), to large scale mechanized production (in Northern Uganda) (Northern Uganda Agriculture Centre, 2021). Frequently including outgrower models, their aim is to transfer technologies and skills to farmers. That said, there are still novel challenges around lack of sustainability and increased dependencies. For example, where large farms are hiring nearby (landless) farmers as laborers, their food security overall might increase, but the benefits are too minimal for households to significantly invest into their own ventures (Fitawek & Hendriks, 2021). In summary, with the rise of new private capital to improve agricultural production, secure land titling will be key. Innovative approaches pioneered by the World Bank in collaboration with the Ethiopian government include avenues on how to reduce the gendered gap in access to land (Agada et al., 2021) With secure land titles, farmers have the incentives to keep investing in their land. Foreign investments in land that focus on a sole commodity or input might fail to bring about the transformation needed of the food system, but have the potential to introduce alternatives into an environment where access to resources are limited. I conclude by addressing these underlying issues and your role in them.

Students’ role in the process Thanks to the engagement of diverse stakeholders over the last decade, best practices on how foreign investments can contribute to development have emerged that will continue to increase the viability of foreign investments in

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African lands. Launched in 2006, the “Principles for Responsible Investments” (UN PRI, 2021) have now been signed by over 3000 investment managers, with a push to integrate social and environmental issues into their investment portfolios. Since 2012, the “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure” (VGGT) have been widely adopted to secure land rights for all (Munoz, 2017), with financing facilities piloted to support indigenous and community land rights (IISD, 2017). Most recently, global advocacy campaigns, such as the ‘Solid Ground’ launched in 2016 (Habitat for Humanity, 2020) and ‘Stand for Her Land’ launched in 2020 (Landesa, 2020), create multistakeholder coalitions to raise the awareness of and support implementation of women’s right to land in developing countries as a cornerstone for sustainable development, including food security and access to housing. Given the prominent placing of these initiatives within the UN Agenda 2030, I conclude by suggesting three avenues on what your (the students’) role and contribution can be to support the directionality and impact of foreign investments in African land. First, your own consumption matters. Private sector enterprises and their investors, respond to local and global market demands. If you make a conscious decision to eat and wear sustainably produced or sourced products, it will translate downstream towards the producers. Second, and related to the first, decide how you are saving or investing your own funds. With increased transparencies and options available to you as a client, scout banks that support local (rural) communities and investment funds that aim to not maximize your financial return, but offer a more balanced portfolio mix between financial, social and environmental impacts. And if this all sounds like it is light years ahead for you, then start small, volunteer your time, discuss with your loved ones, and know that your future financial decisions matter. Lastly, if you are looking forward to dedicate your time or possibly career to this issue, ensure that you are not prescribing solutions, but rather empowering others to make their own decisions. While we have all our own preferences (see prior point on consumption), what African smallholder farmers are lacking the most are options. Instead of imposing your own world view from the top down and position of privilege, ask how you can support their empowerment from the bottom-up. Frequently this will translate into you becoming a skilled listener and build on existing knowledge or capacities. So keep your ear on the ground, listen closely, as you will be the generation that hears the change growing underneath your feet.

Acknowledgments I thank P. Kollhoff for extensive comments.

Note

1. The Land Matrix Initiative is coordinated by five global and five regional partners. It operates the online data base Land Matrix https://landmatrix.org.

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References Agada, N., Grossman, L., & Williams, S. (2021, January 25). Owning Your Own Land Makes a Difference: The Role of Female Land Rights in Increasing Agricultural Production. IISD. http://sdg.iisd.org/commentary/generation-2030/owning-your-own-land-makesa-difference-the-role-of-female-land-rights-in-increasing-agricultural-production/ Benenson Productions. (2020). Kiss the Soil. Netflix. https://www.netflix.com/title/ 81321999 Bourne, J. K. (2016). Can Africa’s fertile farmland feed the world? National Geographic. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/foodfeatures/land-grab/ Charles, D. (2012, August 21). How A Biofuel Dream Called Jatropha Came Crashing Down. NPR. https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2012/08/22/159391553/how-a-biofueldream-called-jatropha-came-crashing-down Charles, D. (2020). A Prophet Of Soil Gets His Moment Of Fame. Npr.Org. https://www. npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/08/11/895765991/a-prophet-of-soil-gets-hismoment-of-fame Cipollina, M., Cuffaro, N., & D’Agostino, G. (2018). Land inequality and economic growth: A meta-analysis. Sustainability (Switzerland), 10(12). https://doi.org/10.3390/ su10124655 FAO. (2015). International Year of Soils. http://www.fao.org/soils-2015/en/ Fitawek, W., & Hendriks, S. L. (2021). Evaluating the impact of large-scale agricultural investments on household food security using an endogenous switching regression model. Land, 10(3). https://doi.org/10.3390/land10030323 Habitat for Humanity. (2020). Solid Ground. Habitat for Humanity. https://www. habitat.org/about/advocacy/international/solid-ground IFAD. (2015). Pablo Tittonnell: Dishing up Dirt. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=DCjzYJGUtB0 IISD. (2017, October 17). International Facility to Finance Community Land and Forest Tenure. SDG Knowledge Hub. https://sdg.iisd.org/news/international-facility-to-financecommunity-land-and-forest-tenure/ Iroquois Valley. (2021). Iroquois Valley Farmland Real Estate Investment Trust. https:// iroquoisvalley.com Laborde, D., Bizikova, L., Lallemant, T., & Smaller, C. (2016). Ending Hunger: What would it cost? (Issue October). http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/endinghunger-what-would-it-cost.pdf Land Matrix. (2021). The Land Matrix Initiative. https://landmatrix.org/about/the-landmatrix-initiative/ Landesa. (2020). Her rights. Her land. A better future for all. Stand For Her Land. https:// stand4herland.org Ledermann, S. T. (2012). Organic revolution: Cotton and its impact on poverty, inequality and sustainability. https://doi.org/doi:10.7282/T3736PXZ Lowder, S. K., Sánchez, M. V., & Bertini, R. (2019). Farms, family farms, farmland distribution and farm labour: What do we know today? FAO Development Economics Working Paper (No. 854-2020-093). McMonagle, R. (2021, June 29). Securing Land Rights For Indigenous Peoples & Rural Communities Can Activate Critical Change Agents In The Fight Against Climate Change. Skoll. https://skoll.org/2021/06/29/securing-land-rights-for-indigenous-peoples-ruralcommunities-can-activate-critical-allies-in-the-fight-against-climate-change/

Foreign land acquisitions as neo-colonialism in Africa? 95 Munoz, J. (2017, October 5). VGGT: The global guidelines to secure land rights for all. World Bank Blogs. https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/vggt-global-guidelines-ensure-secureland-rights-for-all Niculescu, M. (2017). Impact Investment to close the SDGs. Northern Uganda Agriculture Centre. (2021). About NUAC. https://www.nuac-ug.com Raintree Farms. (2021). Welcome to Raintree Farms. https://raintreefarms.com Tittonell, P., & Giller, K. E. (2013). When yield gaps are poverty traps: The paradigm of ecological intensification in African smallholder agriculture. Field Crops Research, 143, 76–90. UN PRI. (2021). What are the Principles for Responsible Investment? https://www.unpri.org/ pri/what-are-the-principles-for-responsible-investment United Nations. (2015). Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/ 1&Lang=E United Nations. (2017, February 22). Business-as-usual not an option with future global food security in jeopardy, cautions UN agency. UN News. UNPRI. (2017). Impact investing market map: White paper document for consultation. 1–52. https://www.unpri.org/about/pri-teams/investment-practices/impact-investingmarket-map Wilmars Flower Ltd. (2021). Hope Through Flowers. http://www.wilmar.co.ke

8

Is China better than other outside powers in fostering African Economic transformation? YES: Kwame Adovor Tsikudo

Department of Geography, Augustana College, Rock Island Illinois, USA

NO: Pádraig Carmody

Department of Geography, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Kwame Adovor Tsikudo of the Department of Geography at Augustana College, USA, is troubled by how China is often framed as a force for good or bad on the African continent. He sides with the optimistic advocates but goes a step further in proposing that African countries approach China with a strategy to take advantage of whatever opportunities China provides effectively. He proposes a more sophisticated analysis of China-Africa relations which transcends the binaries of good and evil and captures more nuanced processes and progress. NO: Pádraig Carmody of the Department of Geography at Trinity College Dublin, Ireland, argues that, on balance, China’s economic engagements in Africa are replicating previous patterns of dependence, founded and perpetuated by the Western powers. He acknowledges that China is different from other major powers in its engagements in Africa. However, the evidence seems to suggest that its increased presence on the continent, as well as that of Chinese firms, is not fostering economic transformation in Africa: at least to-date. Rather, China pursues its own interests on the continent foremost among which are resource and market access. While Chinese investment has been associated with some limited progress in industrialization in Ethiopia, the negative trade balance with that country and consequent debt accumulation is a problem. China has been active in Africa for much of the post-colonial period. Some context on how China’s engagement with Africa has changed over time is useful for understanding the current debate about China’s role on the continent. In the 1960s, China tended to support large, state-run agricultural projects in Africa. This approach reflected China’s own experience at home of promoting of large state-run, collective farms as well as its omnipresent concern about food security following China’s Great famine of 1958–1961. This was also a DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-10

China better in fostering African economic transformation? 97

form of diplomacy-based aid designed to counter foreign assistance provided by Taiwan to African countries. Both countries were seeking recognition by the United Nations and sought to cultivate the support of different African countries. China’s approach of supporting large state-run farms was quite different than Taiwan focus on small and medium sized rice and vegetable farmers. Over time, the Chinese grew to understand that there were difficulties maintaining large state-run farms. In 1971, the People’s Republic of China reclaimed China’s seat (from Taiwan) in the United Nations with support of many African countries to which China was giving support. As a result, Chinese took over many Taiwanese demonstration farms in Africa in the 1970s, as well as their extension efforts to smallhold farms in different African countries. This change in Africa mirrored changes occurring in China. China’s embrace of the Green Revolution at home (see Chapter 12) after US President Richard Nixon’s visit in 1972 began to be seen in its African aid approach. In the 1990s and early 2000s, China started to become concerned about the sustainability of its aid approach in Africa. Well before this became in vogue with Western donors, China started to experiment with public-private partnerships. Under this approach, many Chinese aid projects in Africa increasingly involved the participation of Chinese private firms. From the 2000s, China was growing rapidly and increasingly needed raw materials to supply its own factories at home. As such, a lot of Chinese aid that was focused on infrastructure development, including roads, bridges, railways and power generation, happened to occur in African countries and regions where China had an interest in accessing certain resources, such as copper in Zambia, tobacco in Zimbabwe or oil in Sudan. This is the time period when Chinese aid in Africa started to become controversial. Is China behaving in the same way that other colonial powers have that are interested in African resources? Or is the Chinese approach different and does this represent an opportunity for African governments and peoples? YES: CHINA IS ARGUABLY BETTER THAN OTHER OUTSIDE POWERS IN FOSTERING AFRICAN ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION After several centuries of inactivity, China re-emerged on the global scene in 1949 and swiftly formed strategic bonds with African countries. This relationship has endured periods of strains and Cold-War geopolitical uneasiness before taking form to crystallize in the 21st century. Studies show that China’s relationship with Africa is the most important with any developing region beyond Asia (Shinn & Eisemann, 2012). Yet, academic research on China-Africa relations relative to the other areas remains sparse. Even more interesting is that Western scholars and institutions account for most of the existing literature. Despite these deficiencies, there is a general recognition

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that, like other actors, China’s motive in Africa is interest-driven, centered primarily on the quest for raw materials, market expansion and new investment outlets (Carmody, Taylor, and Zajontz, 2021). Although this strategy is rarely covert, China’s emergence as a global economic and political actor is intertwined with the development studies literature (Bräutigam & Xiaoyang, 2012). As a result, China-Africa relations inevitably culminate in debate comparing the so-called “Washington Consensus” and “Beijing Consensus.” We can categorize the growing debate on China-Africa relations into two camps: critics and advocates. Primarily, critics of the relationship suggest that China’s involvement in Africa is a means to exploit Africa’s natural and mineral resources; obstruct the continent’s putative, optimistic strides towards good governance, as conceived in Western terms; and ultimately, emerge as an unstoppable imperial force in a morbid 21st-century replay of the colonial incursions into the continent five centuries earlier (Amoah, 2014). The critics also view China’s cooperation with African countries as a neo-colonial strategy designed to render the continent powerless amongst the comity of nations. In contrast to the foregoing, advocates consider China’s engagements with African countries as a boon and a new frontier of development possibilities. These perspectives highlight the pros and cons of this rapidly evolving engagement between China and African countries. However, critics oversimplify an invariably complex relationship. Undoubtedly, this simplified binary has courted critiques, including Ampiah and Naidu (2008), who concluded that such sentiments emanated from Manichean psychology1. Indeed, part of the complexity of China-Africa relations derives from a consciousness of South-South cooperation (SSC) – an approach to development based on the exchange of ideas, knowledge, technology and resources between so-called developing countries of the global South. It is instructive to note that the origins of SSC trace back to the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia, where China met and interacted with representatives from Asian and African countries. As China casts itself as the largest developing country, it also views Africa as the continent with the most developing countries. China adopts such a discursive posture to frame its shared characteristics with African countries. However, as the world’s leading economy behind the US, China can hardly be considered a developing country or an equal partner but a competitor with significant influence. These considerations foreground China-Africa cooperation as a remarkably complex relationship that requires careful unpacking for informed, strategic and effective policymaking. This part of the essay responds with a qualified yes to the prompt “Is China Better than Other Outside Powers in Fostering African Economic Transformation?” By explicating the advocates’ position that sees the Beijing Consensus as a better prospect for Africa’s progress compared to Washington Consensus. China is not doing anything markedly different from other actors on the continent. Still, there are reasons to be optimistic about China-Africa

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Figure 8.1  China’s GDP Growth Per Capita 1960–2020 Source: Constructed by author based on World Bank Data

engagement and the prospects for Africa’s development. Partly, this optimism hinges on China’s transformative experience over the past few decades. Since re-emerging in 1949, China had been nothing but a country with high poverty, unemployment and illiteracy levels. Mao Zedong’s aversion to change is encapsulated in the Cultural Revolution to preserve the country’s communist credentials. Things changed, however, as reform initiated under Deng Xiaoping begun bearing fruits in the 1990s. From 1993 onwards, China registered an impressive 10% economic growth per annum as it transitioned from a net exporter to an importer of resources (Corkin, 2011). Figure 8.1 illustrates this significant achievement. The unprecedented transformation was accompanied by further industrial growth and poverty reduction. It is estimated that China’s economic performance has made it possible to bring over 400 million people out of poverty over the past 30 years. The so-called “China Development Model” was achieved under the tutelage of an authoritarian regime amidst considerable global economic and political upheavals. China’s transformation exemplifies the state-led developmentalism that characterized the transformation of Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea in the 20th century ( Johnson, 1999). Japan is often touted to have had a catalytic impact on the resulting Asian Miracle, thus accentuating the transferability of the model. Indeed, China’s rise owes much to Japan’s influence and material support (Brautigam, 2009). African countries are inspired by China’s experience and feel attracted to the Asian superpower to learn to replicate the African version of the Chinese model. Replicating the developmental state and the Chinese model holds some truth, but this needs to be considered in

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the context of history, leadership, and national development aspirations to stand any realistic chance of being realized (Corkin, 2014). Another source of optimism that characterizes China-Africa relations stems from China’s support for African infrastructures. Development theorists categorize infrastructure into two groups: hard and soft (Mold, 2012). While hard infrastructures constitute tangible and physical undertakings such as roads, energy dams, and hospitals, soft infrastructures represent the intangible (often less material) elements that make the hard infrastructures functional, including human resource development initiatives and scholarships2. Over the years, infrastructural investments have constituted a bulk of external assistance to African countries (Wethal, 2019). However, shifting priorities and austerity wrought by neoliberalism and failed promises by Western donors and institutions have resulted in neglect and a huge financing gap for African countries. Currently, over 400 million Africans have no access to electricity (Sackeyfio, 2018). Similarly, road density has declined while schools and hospitals have crumbled over the past few decades (Lu, 2020; Adovor Tsikudo, 2021). With infrastructure financing averaging $30 billion per annum, China is helping the African continent overcome its deficit of $130–170 billion. These investments are in energy projects (solar and dams), transport (road and railways), and fibre optics – making China Africa’s principal source of infrastructure financing. Advocates also positively perceive China-Africa trade relations. China-Africa trade has grown exponentially over the past four decades. In the 1990s, for instance, trade between China and Africa was valued at less than $1 billion. By 2015, however, trade figures exceeded $200 billion, cementing China’s place as Africa’s primary trading partner – after achieving that feat in 2009. Bilateral trade exchanges between Africa and China comprise Chinese oil imports and household, electrical, and industrial good exports to Africa that were otherwise pricy and previously out of reach to most Africans. As the world’s most populous country, China serves as market for African produce which help generate revenue through sales of traditional and non-traditional export commodities. In Ghana, for instance, the export of 40,000 tons of cocoa beans to China as part of the payment of the Bui Hydro dam Project cut the country’s reliance on traditional European markets. Indeed, China’s emergence has provided African countries alternatives to the global commodity market, where they are essentially price takers instead of makers despite the being the majority of commodity producers. Advocates believe that these deepening exchanges between the two sides would eventually translate into less Chinese importance, as illustrated by Brautigam’s (2007) research in Mauritius and Nigeria using the ‘flying geese’ concept. Foreign aid comprising concessional loans, interest-free loans, and grants assistance constitutes another source of optimism by advocates of ChinaAfrica relations. While Western aid to African countries declines, that of China has been on the ascendancy. For instance, in 2003, China’s foreign aid totaled $631 million, increasing to $3 billion in 2013 and $3.1 billion in 2019. China’s aid is flexible and directed to small and medium-scale welfare

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programs, human resource development, material assistance and emergency humanitarian assistance. Chinese foreign aid has also supported several soft infrastructure projects in Africa, including training security, media and health personnel. As per the 2006 Africa policy document, China committed to establishing 30 malaria treatment centers, health worker training and scholarships for African students to build human resource capacity for the continent’s transformation. China continues to support African countries during the pandemic when Western partners took an inward-looking turn. Crucially, unlike Western aid, China’s development assistance3 (including loans, grants) carries little conditionalities (except adherence to the oneChina policy4 and in some cases, buying made-in-China goods). Additionally, foreign direct investments (FDI) in African manufacturing, pursued through the seven Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Nigeria, Zambia, Ethiopia, and Mauritius and other joint ventures, has sparked a positive feel for African transformation (Bräutigam & Tang, 2014). Like other continents, Africa struggles with unemployment, insufficient government revenue mobilization, technology and skills transfers. It is in this light that China’s SEZs have been described as potential antidotes. Critics of these arrangements worry about the inability of African countries to push Chinese investors into productive joint partnerships with African entrepreneurs to avoid creating Chinese enclaves and labor exploitation. African governments must consider these legitimate concerns to ensure they make the most of the engagement with China. Finally, advocates’ positive perception of China-Africa relation derives from the potential for self-determination. Unlike Western countries that see Africans as former subjects, China treats Africans differently (Maitseo 2018). This growing relationship has been forged on principles of mutual development, friendship, equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of each partner. These principles give credence to the idea of true independence instead of the flag independence that typifies the West’s engagement with Africa. Joshua Ramo (2004) articulates the notion of self-determination provided by China’s rise in other regions, including Africa as: To the degree China’s development is changing China, it is important, but what is far more important is that China’s new ideas are having a gigantic effect outside of China. China is marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not simply how to develop their countries but also how to fit into the international order in a way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a world with a single massively powerful center of gravity. Based on the preceding, I join other scholars (e.g. Amoah, 2014; Brautigam, 2009; Edoho, 2011) in proposing a more sophisticated analysis of ChinaAfrica relations which transcends the binaries of good and evil and captures more nuanced processes and progress.

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References Adovor Tsikudo, Kwame. 2021. “Soft Powering the China Water Machine : The Bui Dam and China – Ghana Relations.” Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines 00 (00): 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2021.1929360. Amoah, Lloyd Adu. 2014. “China, Architecture and Ghana’s Spaces: Concrete Signs of a Soft Chinese Imperium?” Journal of Asian and African Studies 51 (2): 238–55. https:// doi.org/10.1177/0021909614545854. Ampiah Kweku, Sanusha Naidu. 2008. Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Africa and China, Kwazulu-Natal: Kwazulu-Natal University Press. Brautignam, Deborah. 2007. ‘Flying Geese’ or ‘Hidden Dragon’? Chinese Business and African Industrial Development. In: D. Large, J.C. Alden and R.M.S. Soares de Oliveira (eds.) China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace, 51–68. London: Christopher. ———. 2009. The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Bräutigam, Deborah, and Xiaoyang Tang. 2014. “‘Going Global in Groups’: Structural Transformation and China’s Special Economic Zones Overseas.” World Development 63: 78–91. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.10.010. Bräutigam, Deborah, and Tang Xiaoyang. 2012. “Economic Statecraft in China’s New Overseas Special Economic Zones: Soft Power, Business or Resource Security?” International Affairs 88 (4): 799–816. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01102.x. Carmody, Pádraig, Ian Taylor, and Tim Zajontz. 2021. “China’s Spatial Fix in Africa: Constraining Belt or Road to Economic Transformation?” Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines 00 (00): 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 00083968.2020.1868014. Corkin, Lucy. 2011. “Uneasy Allies: China’s Evolving Relations with Angola.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29 (2): 169–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2011. 555192. Corkin, Lucy Jane. 2014. “China’s Rising Soft Power : The Role of Rhetoric in Constructing China-Africa Relations.” Revista Brazil Politics Nternaticional. 57: 49–72. Edoho, Felix. 2011. Globalization and Marginalization of Africa: Contextualization of China–Africa relations. Africa Today 58(1): 102–124. Johnson, Chalmers. 1999. “The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept.” In The Developmental State, edited by Woo-Cummings and Meredith, 32–60. Cornell: Cornell University Press. Lu, Saite. 2020. “China’s Infrastructure Investment in Africa.” In The Belt and Road Initiative: Opportunities and Challenges of a Chinese Ambition, edited by David De Cremer, Bruce McKern, and Jack McGuire, 137–56. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC: Sage Publications Ltd. Maitseo, Bolaand. 2018. “Chinese Soft Power and Botswana’s Higher Education: Confucius Institute and Chinese Studies Program, University of Botswana. p. 215–242” In Africa-China Partnerships and Relationships: African Perspectives, edited by K. Prah and V. Gumede. Trenton. London. Cape Town. New York: Africa World Press. Mold, Andrew. 2012. “Policy Arena Will it All End in Tears? Infrastructure Spending and African Development in History.” Journal of International Development 254: 237–54. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid. Ramo, Joshua Cooper. 2004. The Beijing Consensus. London: The Foreign Center.

China better in fostering African economic transformation? 103 Sackeyfio, Naaborle. 2018. Energy Politics & Rural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Ghana. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Shinn, D.H. and J. Eisenman. (2012). China and Africa: A century of engagement, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Wethal, Ulrikke. 2019. “Building Africa’s Infrastructure : Reinstating History in Infrastructure Debates.” Forum for Development Studies 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 08039410.2019.1616609.

NO: CHINA IS NOT BETTER THAN OTHER OUTSIDE POWERS IN FOSTERING AFRICAN ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION The rise of China in the international political economy is of epochal importance. It is now the world’s largest economy measured by what economists call “purchasing power parity” or what can be bought with Chinese money in China. It produces and consumes more than half of the world’s steel and more cement was poured in China from 2011–2013 than was used in the entire 20th Century in the United States (Swanson, 2015). This has created a strong imperative for the government and private Chinese companies to source supplies of strategic minerals and raw materials from elsewhere, often in Africa. Indeed, the Chinese economy is now heavily dependent on a variety of these resources including Angolan oil, South African platinum and many others, whereas most of the continent’s imports from that country are overwhelmingly manufactures. This has led some, such as the former SouthAfrican President’s brother and the former governor of Nigeria’s Central Bank of Nigeria to accuse China of neo-colonial practices (Carmody, 2016) because they are exchanging higher value-added manufactured goods for raw materials. What is the truth of this? Is China a neo-colonial or new imperial power following in the footsteps of Western countries and reinforcing primary commodity export dependence or are its engagements in Africa characterized by South-South cooperation and solidarity thereby promoting economic transformation? (Bello, 2019). China operates a different type of foreign economic policy than the Western powers, which insisted on, and continue to push for, a free market approach to development directly and through the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which they effectively control. Rather China maintains that it does not interfere in the internal affairs of partner states but lets them decide on what the most appropriate political structures and economic policies are for their own circumstances. However, this policy has come under strain in recent years as Chinese engagements on the continent have deepened and it has taken a greater interest in security. This growing interest in security may partly be to protect its own investments, as the Chinese Foreign Minister argued in 2016 (Hodzi, 2019). This so-called non-interference policy has been well received by African political elites who often resented Western

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conditionality but has also been conducive to Chinese policy objectives of investment, resource and market access. This represented a form of what Carmody & Taylor (2010) call flexible hegemony or Chinese ‘flexigemony;’ working with, rather than against the grain of existing state-society formations. There are limits to non-interference however, particularly that trade and investment partners must not recognize Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. The Ugandan government has also supported the government of China against protests in Hong Kong, arguing that they are “radical and violent” (Africa Times, 2019). Chinese economic engagement in Africa has been what some have called multi-vector, oftentimes linking trade, aid and investment (Kaplinksy, McCormick & Morris, 2007) and has often been led through central government or provincial state-owned corporations – so-called “dragon’s head” companies. In addition to foreign direct investment, another major modality of Chinese engagement on the continent has been “contracted overseas projects,” where in many cases China gives loans to African countries to have Chinese companies build infrastructure such as roads, railways, bridges and dams. Much of Ethiopia’s rapid economic growth in recent decades was by such infrastructural investment, but there are concerns about the debt sustainability of such deals. Furthermore, some of these loans to build infrastructure are being repaid in resources or primary products, such as copper, cocoa, or even fish, raising questions about economic and environmental sustainability. Further concerns have also sometimes been expressed about the closed nature of contracting processes and the valuation of raw materials, with some arguing that such deals are again reminiscent of colonial practice, when infrastructures on the continent were largely built to export raw materials to the metropolitan powers and enable imports of manufactured goods from them. Others argue that Chinese economic engagements are different in that they are often accompanied by debt relief and grants from funds such as the China Africa Development Fund, which is meant to spur industrialization on the continent. Furthermore, the Chinese government has a special economic zone programme for Africa, although these have often struggled or had limited success, with the partial exception of Ethiopia. However even in Ethiopia there have been questions about such zones’ impact on development (Giannecchini & Taylor, 2018), partly as result of the often low quality of work created. As labour costs have risen in China, some tout the industrializing potential of increased Chinese engagement on the continent (e.g., Sun, 2018). However, Africa is less industrialized now than in the 1970s. Value-added deriving from manufacturing in 2010 accounted for only 10% of gross domestic product (GDP) compared to almost 15% in 1975 (Rodrik, 2018)5 and manufacturing’s proportional share of total exports from the continent fell in the 2000s, even if they rose in absolute terms – reflecting the uneven and somewhat paradoxical nature of recent development trends. Whereas some have argued that the impact of China on Africa has been deindustrialization, others argue what is important is the way in which African governments engage with

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the “dragon economy”6 and their domestic policy choices. Still others retort that given the generally “neo-patrimonial” 7 nature of many African governments, a deindustrializing impact and impetus is visible across the continent. While Ethiopia is commonly held up as an exception in terms of the “impact” of China on its development, it still demonstrates substantial dependence, even if some of its economic interactions have been beneficial. Whereas Ethiopia imported more than US $2.5 billion from China in 2018, it exported only US $345 million to that country (CARI, 20198), meaning that China was extractive of value from the Ethiopian economy. Furthermore, the structure of trade is problematic. “Ethiopian exports to China are dominated by sesame seeds [which are popular as a snack food in China], which accounted for about 85 per cent of the total between 2006 and 2015” (Zwede, 2017 in ( Jenkins, 2019), 173). Furthermore “foreign currency earned through the sale is appropriated by Ethiopia’s state-owned Commercial Bank and used to fund Chinese projects in what effectively amounts to a revolving credit facility” (Ziso, 2018), 177), with the profits from these then flowing back to China. Such dynamics have led Ian Taylor (2014) to characterize the impact of China and other “emerging powers” as a diversification rather than transcendence of dependency. The picture is also not static however; particularly as a result of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) announced by China in 2013, which 40 African countries have now signed up to, and the associated Industrial Capacity Cooperation project which seeks to offshore less competitive industries from China. There are a variety of ways of conceptualizing the BRI, which is about constructing infrastructure around the world, some of which are inter-related. These include: •

• • •

• •

As a response to conjunctural or periodic over-investment brought about by economic stimulus to counter-act the global financial crisis in China. As China now produces too much cement and steel, for example, to consume domestically, it needs markets to absorb this excess capacity overseas. As a way to open up markets for Chinese goods through infrastructural improvements and the spreading of Chinese standards. As a way to integrate other territories into China-centered global production networks to take advantage of factor inputs or endowments, such as low cost labor or high quality raw materials. As a “spatial fix” to problems of over-accumulation in China, as low wages in that country mean profits can often not be profitably reinvested in production domestically, for lack of sufficient markets, so must seek new investment outlets overseas. As a geopolitical project to embed allies economically. As a type of “debt-trap diplomacy,” where loans can be securitized against existing assets such as ports and thereby allow China to exercise substantial/excessive influence over host governments. It is reported

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that if Kenya defaults on its debts for the recently opened and Chinese financed standard gauge railway (SGR) China will take ownership of the country’s biggest port, Mombasa. The BRI is still in its early stages, so it is too early to judge whether or not it will be economically transformative. The recently opened multi-billion dollar Chinese funded Ethiopia-Djibouti SGR is furthering the development of the latter country as a trade and logistics hub. However Djibouti increased its external public debt from 50% in 2015 to 91% in 2017 of gross domestic product (Maçães 2018 and Trading Economics 2019 cited in Taylor, 2019), with a reported 77% of this coming from Chinese sources (Dahir, 2019), raising fears about debt sustainability. The SGR is also further enabling Ethiopia to emerge as a manufacturing hub for Chinese firms by offsetting the impacts of “landlockedness”. Part of the attraction of Ethiopia for Chinese investment is that it was recently found to have the lowest wages in the world for textile and clothing workers. Average wages in Ethiopia are now approximately one eighth of what they are in China; a ratio similar to that when Japan began its catch-up phase with Britain (Frankema & van Waijenburg, 2018)8. Ethiopian garment workers have an average base wage of only US $26 a month – the lowest in the world, which are somewhat incredibly less than 8% of the average for equivalent workers in China; a country not noted for its high wages (Barrett & Baumann-Pauly, 2019). While new Chinese-funded infrastructural investment may drive growth, it often comes with associated debt obligations, which may depress future economic performance. While there are now an estimated 10,000 Chinese firms operative in Africa, many of these are trading companies, involved in the resource sector or are domestic market serving if they are manufacturers, which inherently limits their potential for growth. To-date there is little evidence to support Justin Yifu Lin’s (Lin and Yu, 2019) contention that rising wage costs in China will lead to structural transformation in Africa, as lower value industries are off-shored. This is particularly the case as such jobs are increasingly subject to automation (Baldwin, 2019) and consequently substantial re-shoring to rich countries in future. The rise of China and its increased engagement in Africa has been associated with faster economic growth on the continent; at least until the commodity price bust of 2014. However Chinese economic growth is now less energy and natural resource intensive, foreboding lower commodity prices for the foreseeable future. This is problematic for Africa as these constitute over 93% of Africa’s exports, according to some estimates (UNCTAD nd in Stein, 2014). China is different from other major powers in its engagements in Africa. However the evidence seems to suggest that its increased presence on the continent, and that of firms that originate there are not economically transformative: at least to-date. Rather China pursues its own interests on the continent foremost among which are resource and market access. While

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Chinese investment has been associated with some limited progress in industrialization in Ethiopia, the negative trade balance with that country and consequent debt accumulation is associated with, or a contributing factor towards, the current shift towards “neoliberal shock therapy” in that country (Molla, 2019). On balance then China’s economic engagements in Africa are replicating previous patterns of dependence, founded and perpetuated by the Western powers.

Notes 1. An idea that everything must be separated into good and bad. 2. China is currently the largest contributor to Africa human resource development and the second largest destination for African students behind France. 3. as aid is officially called in China. 4. A policy that all countries with diplomatic ties with China recognizes the People’s Republic of China (China) as the sole representative of Chinese people as opposed to supporting the Republic of China (Taiwan) as such. 5. Although some care should be taken with such statistics given their general unreliability ( Jerven, 2013) and also the fact that in recent decades manufacturing has undergone a process of “servitization,” where some service functions which were previously performed in-house have now been out-sourced. 6. Kragelund & Carmody (2016) argue that China is a dragon economy in the sense that it inhales air (natural resources) and breathes out fire (low priced manufactured goods that competitively displace African producers). 7. Neo-patrimonialism refers to the idea that certain states are not primarily organized along rational-bureaucratic lines but are rather characterized by a type of “who you know” or patronage politics. 8. For a more in-depth discussion of the reasons behind Ethiopia’s “industrialization” see Carmody (2017).

References Africa Times (2019) Hong Kong, Africa and the One China Policy. Retrieved from https:// africatimes.com/2019/10/06/hong-kong-protests-africa-and-the-one-china-policy/ Baldwin, R. E. (2019). The Globotics Upheaval: Globalization, Robotics and the Future of Work. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Barrett, P., & Baumann-Pauly, D. (2019). Made In Ethiopia: Challenges in the Garment Industry’s New Frontier. New York: NYU: Stern Centre for Business and Human Rights. Bello, W. F. (2019). China: An Imperial Power in the Image of the West? Retrieved from https://focusweb.org/publications/china-an-imperial-power-in-the-image-of-thewest/ Bangkok. CARI (2019). China-Africa Research Initiative Trade Data. Available at http://www. sais-cari.org/data-china-africa-trade Carmody, P. (2016). The New Scramble for Africa (Second Ed.). Cambridge: Polity. Carmody, P., & Taylor, I. (2010). Flexigemony and force in China’s resource diplomacy in Africa: Sudan and Zambia compared. Geopolitics, 15(3), 496–515. Dahir, A. L. (2019). A legal tussle over a strategic African port sets up a challenge for China’s Belt and Road plan. Quartz Africa, https://qz.com/africa/1560998/djibouti-dpworld-port-case-challenges-chinas-belt-and-road/.

108  Kwame A. Tsikudo and Pádraig Carmody Frankema, E., & van Waijenburg, M. (2018). Africa Rising? A historical perspective. African Affairs, 117(469), 543–568. Giannecchini, P., & Taylor, I. (2018). The eastern industrial zone in Ethiopia: Catalyst for development? Geoforum, 88, 28–35. Hodzi, O. (2019). The End of China’s Non-intervention Policy in Africa. Cham: Palgrave MacMillan. Jenkins, R. (2019). How China is Reshaping the Global Economy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Jerven, M. (2013). Poor Numbers: How we are Misled by African Development Statistics And What to do About it. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kaplinksy, R., McCormick, D., & Morris, M. (2007). The impact of China on Sub Saharan Africa. http://asiandrivers.open.ac.uk/documents/China%20and%20SSA,%20 DFID%20Agenda%20paper,v3%20Feb%2007.pdf Kragelund, P., & Carmody, P. (2016). BRICS’ impacts on local economic development in the Global South: the case of a tourism town and mining provinces in Zambia. Area Development and Policy, 1(2), 218–237. Lin, J. Y. and J. Yu (2019) ‘China’s light manufacturing and Africa’s industrialization in Oqubay, A., & Lin, J. Y. eds. (2019). China-Africa and an Economic Transformation. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Molla, T. (2019). Neoliberal shock therapy in Ethiopia. Review of African Political Economy blog, https://roape.net/2019/06/25/neoliberal-shock-therapy-in-ethiopia/. Rodrik, D. (2018). An African growth miracle? Journal of African Economies, 27(1), 10–27. Stein, H. (2014). The World Bank and neoliberalism: continuity and discontinuity in the making of an agenda. World Financial Review, http://www.worldfinancialreview. com/?p=2580. Sun, H. (2018). Foreign investment and economic development in China: 1979–1996. London: Routledge. Swanson, A. (2015). How did China use more cement between 2011 and 2013 than the US used in the entire 20th century? The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/ news/world/asia/how-did-china-use-more-cement-between-2011-and-2013-thanthe-us-used-in-the-entire-20th-century-10134079.html Taylor, I. (2014). Africa rising?: BRICS - Diversifying Dependency. Oxford: James Currey. Taylor, I. (2019) “Africa’s place in the belt and road initiative: A new route to dependency?” mimeo. Ziso, E. (2018). A Post State-Centric Analysis Of China-Africa Relations: Internationalisation of Chinese Capital and State-Society Relations in Ethiopia. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

9

Are cities engines for economic development in Africa? YES: Benjamin Ofori-Amoah

Department of Geography, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, USA

NO: Sarah L. Smiley

Department of Geography, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio, USA Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Benjamin Ofori-Amoah of Western Michigan University, USA, supports the view that African cities have historically been centers of economic development in Africa. This is because they serve as centers of innovation and employment because they have the requisite agglomeration economies for generating new ideas and businesses. Moreover, their innovativeness derives from their being gateways to the outside world. NO: Sarah L. Smiley of Kent State University, USA, disagrees with the view that cities are necessarily engines of economic development in Africa. Rather, they can only do so when the locational, functional, historical, political and resource conditions are right as well as when cities are inclusive. Moreover, there might be other better engines of economic development. Cities have historically served as centers of innovation, economic development, and poverty reduction. According to the Cities Alliance’ publication titled, ‘Cities as Engines of Growth: Unlocking Urban Productivity and Job Creation,’ urbanization is driven by agglomeration economies and the network effects of businesses and people working together near each other to create wealth and generate employment. These conditions create the urban productivity miracle more so in African cities that are (i) inclusive and have high levels of sharing, learning and innovation, (ii) effectively and efficiently governed and (iii) have affordable and reliable access to infrastructure and service, and housing. According to the Cities Alliance, many African urban areas are not engines of economic development because they are characterized by agglomeration diseconomies, constrained network effects and stunted inventiveness because they are overwhelmed by rapid population increases, slums, homelessness, infrastructure, service and housing deficits, unemployment, corrosive social tensions, unrest, and inequalities. As a result, these cities are not creating enough decent, productive and well-paid jobs more so for their youth. Many DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-11

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of their residents are thus trapped in low productivity, low return, low wage informal employment that is often characterized by unfulfilling, precarious and dangerous working conditions. Urgent action is therefore needed to transform African urban areas into drivers of economic growth. YES: CITIES ARE ENGINES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA Before arguing in favor of the notion that cities are engines of economic development in Africa, we need to provide a context within which to place the argument. We do this by defining the terms “cities,” “economic development,” and “engines of economic development.” Cities and economic development are two terms that defy commonly agreed definitions although we all seem to know what they mean when we use them. At the minimum, cities are defined by governments based on several criteria including population size, lifestyle, as well as political, economic and social functions (Mumford, 1937; Wirth, 1938; Clark, 1982). Cities in Africa tend to be the largest human settlements by size and area, as well as the political, social and economic hubs of their respective countries (Ofori-Amoah, 2020). If human settlements in a given country are arranged in hierarchical order of the criteria used to define them, cities sit at the top of the hierarchy. On its part, economic development implies improvement in living conditions and well-being of people that results from engagement in gainful employment (Seers, 1972), increased personal and national wealth, reduction in personal and national dependencies (Goulet, 1968), increased social and spatial integration and increased modernization of modes of production, consumption and living (Ofori-Amoah, 2020). The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “engine” as a machine for converting various forms of energy into mechanical motion. The expression “engines of economic development” implies machines or devices that produce economic development. Given these definitions, this essay will argues, that, yes, cities are indeed engines of economic development in Africa. Economic development takes place in the human settlement system, which is a network of settlements and associated activities interspersed by open land and other natural resources and connected by flows of people, commodities, and ideas. As noted by many regional economic development experts such as Perroux (1955), Hirschman (1958), and Friedmann (1978) however, economic development does not occur uniformly or simultaneously across geographic space and for that matter across the settlement system. Instead the impetus for development begins with certain members of the settlement system before spreading in some form of sequence throughout the entire system. By virtue of their position atop the settlement hierarchy, cities possess the economic, social, political, and technical resources to be starting points of the development process (Friedmann 1978). This general

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observation applies to cities throughout history everywhere and it is true today of African cities (Obeng-Odoom, 2015). A fundamental component of economic development is employment opportunities. To reduce personal and national dependencies, people should have a source of income through productive engagement in economic activities beyond agriculture, which is the default employment in many traditional or less developed economies in general and in Africa, in particular. The concentration of cheap and relatively skilled and unskilled labor, investment capital and land as well as other production inputs such as energy, transportation and communication networks and markets in African cities make them more efficient locations for economic production. As a result, African cities dominate non-farm employment and production. In this way also, they offer more opportunities for youth and migrants from the countryside, who are looking for work outside the farm (Rakodi 1997, Beavon 1997). Oftentimes, these new migrants to the city seldom find the jobs they are hoping for. However, they stay on in the city because they find alternatives that are not available to them in the countryside (Caldwell, 1969; Todaro, 1969; Jamal & Weeks, 1988). The employment opportunities offered by African cities extend to the countryside as well, because they serve as the main markets for products from the countryside including food and non-food products that are consumed by urban populations. Moreover, city factories consume most of the countryside’s agricultural and industrial raw materials. Economic development also rides on innovations in production, distribution and consumption of goods and services, as well as in general living conditions. It is a dynamic and learning process that involves adoption, adaptation or creation of new and better ways of doing things that feed into creation of new jobs, new sources of income and wealth creation and accumulation and improvements in general living conditions. Innovations come from environmental scanning which in turn comes from interactions with people and how they deal with everyday life problems and issues. Cities provide more opportunities for people to interact with each other in confronting problems and issues, which leads to cross-fertilization of ideas and the birthing of innovations (Davis, 1965; Friedmann, 1978). By their very nature, African cities are the most heterogeneous human settlements in their respective countries – microcosms of the ethnic, social, intellectual and technical makeup of their respective countries (Simone, 2005). For this reason, African cities serve as a huge laboratory for experimentation, development and marketing of new ideas from all the different geographic, ethnic and socio-economic spectrums of their respective countries. This is evident in the large concentrations of small-scale industries in African cities that range from one-person enterprises to larger clusters that produce and offer a wide range of consumer products. Examples of these clusters include Kampala’s Katwe (Uganda), Nairobi’s Jua Kali – hot sun – industries (Kenya) and Kumasi’s Suame Magazine (Ghana).

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In addition, African cities serve as gateways and linkages to the external world. In the current global environment, this historical role played by cities has become even more important than before. Thus, just as most internally generated new ideas get their debut and greatest exposure in the cities, all externally generated new ideas arrive in Africa through its cities. These functions place African cities at the crossroads of innovations from different parts of the continent as well as the external world. They facilitate the creation, adoption, adaptation or generation of new ideas, new lifestyles and new and oftentimes improvements in living conditions. While African cities do not have a monopoly as innovation generators, they often play a crucial role in the diffusion of innovations, depending on the types of innovation. Thus, city dwellers take the new lifestyles, ways of doing things, building and architectural styles to their respective hometowns thereby helping to spread what they have seen and learned from the cities. Economic development should also manifest itself in spatial and social integration. By spatial integration, we mean a conscious effort to develop an urban system that has an urban-rural continuum instead of a sharp break between them. By social integration we mean a reduction in the gap between minorities and newcomers, and the majority population in the country. Because of their positions at the top of national settlement systems, African cities are also nodes of socio-economic and spatial integration for their respective countries. Socially, African cities have linkages with the rest of their respective home countries through many daily, periodic and annual social movements that enrich the communities of both areas. Some of these social interactions run through the various hometowns of city dwellers. Many city dwellers use hometown associations to contribute to the socio-economic development of their hometowns through water, health and education provision projects. Economically, city dwellers also provide support to relatives in the countryside by way of remittances that supplement incomes in the countryside. Many city dwellers also build modern houses for parents and themselves in their rural areas of origin and also provide other forms of economic support for such areas through payment of school fees, hospital and other health care bills, and funeral costs. Collectively, these socio-economic linkages contribute to urban-rural spatial and social integration at various geographic scales. The high goals of economic development cannot be achieved without the accompanying or requisite political transformations – good politics and governance. At the end of the day, the substance of economic development policies, plans and their implementation are all political decisions that require appropriate political contexts to succeed. When and where the context is not appropriate, political transformation is needed. Like cities everywhere, African cities have been the origins of such political decisions and transformations. They played this role during the pre-colonial era of kingdoms and empires as well as in the colonial period. They continue to perform this function in the current post-colonial era as executive, legislative and judicial seats of government. The large ethnically, culturally and socio-economically

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diverse populations of African cities have made them instruments for measuring the national pulse of their respective countries because city dwellers hold sway in many national political decisions. While change may originate in small towns, it is not until it takes hold in the city that it gets traction. For example, although the Arab Spring began in the small Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid, it did not gain traction until it spread to Tunis and other major cities (Dabashi, 2012; McCaffrey, 2012). Finally, economic development results in the modernization and improvement in living conditions of people. African cities again are the prime source of this transformation. Elements of modernity in the built environment, streetscape, and architectural styles spread from African cities to the countryside through city dwellers who have strong affiliations to their hometowns. These occur in many different ways including remittances from city dwellers to support rural relatives and the building of modern houses for themselves as well as relatives. City dwellers also drive rural transformation through their hometown associations which have two main functions. The first is to serve as support groups for city dwellers who come from the same or nearby hometowns in the countryside. The second is to serve as agents of community economic development in their respective hometowns (Barkan, et al 1991; Woods, 1994). They tax themselves to raise funds to provide a wide range of basic services to their hometown communities including the provision of primary and secondary schools; construction of medical facilities including housing for medical personnel; construction of water supply systems and provision of electricity and roads and improvement of streets (Barkan, et al 1991). African cities are often criticized for being primate cities that siphon all the resources in their respective countries to themselves. However, this is a failure of urban development planning on the part of the respective governments, and not of the cities themselves (Yousry and Atta, 1997). African cities have potential to serve as real engines of economic development if deliberate efforts are made to project their energies and power throughout their national geographic spaces through thoughtful planning.

References Barkan, D., McNulty, M. L., and Ayeni, M. A. O. 1991 “Hometown’ Voluntary Associations, Local Development and the Emergence of Civil Society in Western Nigeria.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 29 (3): 457–480. Beavon, K. S. O 1997. “Johannesburg: A City and Metropolitan Area in Transformation.” In Rakodi, C. (Ed.) The Urban Challenge in Africa: Growth and Management of its Large Cities. Tokyo and New York: United Nations University Press, pp 150–191. Caldwell, J. C. 1969 African Rural-Urban Migration:The Movement to Ghana’s Towns. New York: Columbia University Press. Clark, D. 1982. Urban Geography. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Dabashi, H. 2012 The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism. London and New York: Zed Books

114  Benjamin Ofori-Amoah and Sarah L. Smiley Davis, K. 1965. “The Urbanization of Human Population” Scientific American 213 (3): 40–53. Friedmann, J. 1978. “The Role of Cities in National Development.” In Bourne, L. S. and Simmons, J. W (Eds.) Systems of Cities: Readings on Structure, Growth, and Policy. New York: Oxford University Press pp. 70–81. Goulet, D. A. 1968 “Development For What?” Comparative Political Studies 1: 295–311. Hirschman, A. O. 1958. The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven: Yale University Press Jamal, V., and Weeks, J. 1988. “The Vanishing Rural-Urban Gap in Sub-Saharan Africa” International Labor Review, 127 (3): 271–292. McCaffrey, P. 2012. “Why Tunisia?” In McCaffrey, P. (ed.) The Arab Spring. Ipswich, MA: H. W. Wilson pp. 41–43. Mumford, L. 1937 “What is a City?” Architectural Record LXXXII Obeng-Odoom, F. 2015. “Africa: On the Rise, but to Where?” Forum for Social Economics, 44:3, 234–250, Ofori-Amoah, B. 2020 Africa’s Geography: Dynamics of Place, Cultures, and Economies. Hoboken: Wiley Perroux, F. 1955. “La Notion de Pole de Croissance” Economic Apliquee. 1-2: 307–331. Seers, D. 1972. “What are We Trying to Measure?” The Journal of Development Studies. 8: 21–36. Simone, A. 2005 “Introduction: Urban Process and Change” In Simone, A. and Abouhani, A (Eds.) Urban Africa: Changing Contours of Survival in the City. Dakar: CODESRIA Books pp. 1–26. Rakodi, C. 1997. “Global Forces, Urban Change and Urban management in Africa.” In Rakodi, C. (Ed.) The Urban Challenge in Africa: Growth and Management of its Large Cities. Tokyo and New York: United Nations University Press, pp 17–73. Todaro, M. P. 1969. “A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Employment in Less Developed Countries.” The American Economic Review. 59 (1):138–148. Wirth, L. 1938. “Urbanism as a Way of Life” American Journal of Sociology 4: 1 Woods, D. 1994. “Elites, Ethnicity, and ‘Home Town’ Associations in the Côte d’Ivoire: An Historical Analysis of State. Society Links.” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 64 (4): 465–483 Yousry, M. and Atta, T. A. A. 1997. “The Challenge of Urban Growth in Cairo.” In Rakodi, C. (Ed.) The Urban Challenge in Africa: Growth and Management of its Large Cities. Tokyo and New York: United Nations University Press, pp 111–149.

NO: CITIES ARE NOT ENGINES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA In 2008, Giles Duranton wrote a working paper that asked whether cities were engines of growth and prosperity for developing countries. The paper used existing literature to answer two questions: (1) Do cities favor economic efficiency? and (2) Do cities bolster self-sustained growth? He was confident the literature showed that cities do foster efficiency but admitted that there was less conclusive evidence that they create growth, especially in countries with large primate cities. Still while he was confident about agglomeration

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effects overall, he did concede that most of the evidence focused on cities in the developed world and only on the formal sector. He also acknowledged that achieving economic efficiency would require solving some urban problems including those around squatter settlements and transportation infrastructure. Thus, from the outset, the literature calling cities engines of development included caveats and disclaimers. Collier, Jones, and Spijkerman (2018) revisited this idea and found that African cities are not experiencing the same levels of increased productivity, wages, and job creation as cities elsewhere in the developing world. Turok and McGranahan agree with this point in their examination of the relationship between urbanization and development in Asia and Africa and conclude that “it is not urbanization per se that stimulates and sustains growth, but rather the form that urbanization takes and whether it provides an efficient enabling environment” (2013: 466). Agglomeration alone does not cause development since its benefits can be offset by negative externalities such as overcrowding, inadequate infrastructure, unreliable services, excessive rural-urban migration (which can serve to urbanize rural poverty), and higher costs of living. Turok and McGranahan (2013) do acknowledge that studies have found that highly urbanized countries are wealthier but with two qualifications. First, these studies show variations in levels of development, which indicates that other factors influence this relationship. Second, they stress that correlation does not equate to causation; thus, urbanization could be either a consequence or a cause of economic development. This essay argues that cities may be engines of development in certain situations but that the existence alone of cities is not enough to generate development. It presents two explanations for why cities may not be engines of development in Africa: the importance of place and the need for inclusivity. It also offers alternative engines that have the ability to drive economic development on the continent.

Place matters for development A core issue with assuming that cities are engines of development is that it assumes that all cities look and function in the same way. Although Duranton (2008) outlines the benefits of agglomeration in driving economic development, Garretsen and Martin suggest that a central weakness of agglomeration theories is that they “embody crude conceptions of geography and history” (2010: 130). Consequently, Turok and McGranahan’s (2013) review of seven studies on the relationship between urbanization and development in Africa yielded mixed results: four found no such relationship while three found varying levels of connections. They point out that while evidence is stronger in the Global North, even some studies from there call this relationship into question. Thus, it seems that place matters.

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In Africa specifically, Cities Alliance (which is a global partnership of development agencies, governments and non-governmental organizations) highlights potential issues that may prevent cities from generating productive development. In particular, the Alliance identifies informality and employment as potential hurdles. Sub-Saharan Africa is rapidly urbanizing and experiencing faster urban growth than any other region. Yet this urbanization has not been accompanied by an increase in manufacturing jobs as observed in the West at similar stages of development. Thus, to an extent, the region is undergoing what the UN-Habitat terms the urbanization of rural poverty. Busani Bufana (2016), writing for the United Nations’ Africa Renewal magazine, acknowledges that this rapid urban growth brings challenges for economic growth including overcrowding and the distribution of people and resources. The horizontal growth that Bufana describes contributes to the growing number of people living in informal (or slum) settlements. According to Sustainable Development Goal tracking data, more than half of urban Africans live in slums. Although this percent has decreased over time, the total number of people living in them has actually increased owing to rapid urban growth. Because of overcrowding, lack of services and other factors, slums seldom foster socio-economic development. Informality is also a concern for employment since informal jobs dominate the continent. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO) (2018), 86% of all African employment was informal in 2016. Northern Africa relies less on informal work than Sub-Saharan Africa but still 67% of its employment is informal. These figures do vary across the continent, with Burkina Faso having the highest rate of informal employment at 95%. With most employment in Africa found in the informal sector, the issue is really about underemployment and a lack of wage employment rather than a true lack of jobs. Fox, Senbetb, and Simbanegavib (2016) suggest that in lowincome African countries, the unemployment rate is just 3%, which reflects the reality that few people can afford to not work. Yet they also note that unemployment rates are much higher for those youth with secondary school education, most likely because of the shortage of formal jobs. In its work on youth employment, the ILO (n.d.) finds that unemployment rates are higher in North Africa at 24% and have been steadily increasing.

Development must be inclusive A second problem with the assumption that cities are engines of development is the notion that economic development, broadly defined, is the desired end goal rather than development that benefits everyone. Even though African cities contain small percentages of the continent’s population, they make significant economic contributions. Bafana (20164) suggests that the continent’s largest cities contributed about $700 billion (or 31%) to its 2014 GDP of $2,239 billion (Statista 2019) and that figure will grow to $1.7 trillion (or 57%) by 2030 when Africa’s GDP is expected to be $3 trillion (Khumalo 2017).

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While the potential for GDP growth from cities is impressive, the concern is that this growth does not always lead to poverty reduction since it is not always inclusive either locally or nationally. Instead, local and global elites benefit most from these cities’ economic productivity. As McGranahan (2016) points out, rapid urban growth often leads to the exclusion of the ‘excess’ population, which impacts the well-being of disadvantaged groups. One way that people are excluded is through inequitable service provision. The UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) seek to reduce inequalities between and within countries and to eliminate them in certain areas including water and sanitation. Still, significant service disparities persist between the wealthiest 20% and the poorest 20% in Sub-Saharan African countries (WHO and UNICEF, 2017). Roche, Bain, and Cumming (2017) analyzed combined SDG coverage for water and sanitation and found that in Ethiopia, the combined coverage is 0 for the poorest 60% of the urban population. Thus, even though access to water and sanitation has improved in African countries, the benefits have not been felt equally by all people. In a survey of water access in Addis Ababa, Woldemariam and Narsiah (2014) found disparities between wealthy and poor households. Although all households used piped water, only the wealthier households had private household connections. The poor relied on public taps and vendors and consumed about half as much water as the wealthy but paid about 130% more each month thereby reducing their personal development or investible income. Rwanda offers interesting evidence for the need to consider the inclusivity of development programs. It has one of the continent’s fastest growing economies, and its GDP has tripled since 2006. The government is emphasizing modernization throughout the country, including in Kigali through the city’s master plan (Manirakiza, 2014). Although the plan advocates for sustainable and equitable development, it also allows for the demolition of informal settlements without providing suitable alternatives. The average cost of a middle-income family home is 16 times the yearly salary of a public sector employee. The construction of modern skyscrapers has not benefited much of the population nor led to its socioeconomic development.

Alternative development Engines Questioning the ability of African cities to be engines of economic development does not suggest that development is not possible; rather it should suggest that there may be better engines or even engines that might complement the role of cities. For instance, Ethiopia’s real GDP grew by over 10% in 2016/2017, up from 8% the previous year. This growth however is largely attributed to high levels of state spending, especially on some large rural infrastructure projects such as the Ethiopian National Railway Network and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Sennoga and Zerihun, 2018). This Ethiopian example shows that, in some circumstances, activities outside cities can drive development more than those within.

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Tourism offers another potential engine. Rwanda’s growth, despite concerns with inclusivity, has largely been spurred by the government’s emphasis on the development of the tourism sector. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development identified tourism as an “engine for inclusive growth and sustainable economic development” in Africa because of the potential for job creation (UNCTAD, 2017: 3). It highlights the growth in international tourist arrivals to Rwanda and the fact that tourism revenues tripled from 1985 to 2008. Yet while some of this tourism occurs in urban areas – such as conferences taking place at Kigali’s new Convention Center – the main attractions are in rural areas especially with gorilla tracking. Thus, while tourism can be an engine for growth by creating jobs for vulnerable populations, this sector is not necessarily helping cities drive economic development.

Conclusions In his 1999 book, “An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development,” Abdi Samatar describes how Botswana has bucked the all too common African resource curse to register rapid and impressive economic growth from diamond revenues. Although Botswana was 54% urban in in 1999, much of this economic growth came from mining and quarrying which are distinctly rural rather than urban activities (Ministry of Lands and Housing 2014). In this way, Samatar shows that for African cities to be engines of the continent’s economic development, their location and historical junctures also matter. In fact, Botswana succeeded because of its unique diamond resources and political strategy rather than because of its relatively high urbanization level. This does not mean that different miracles cannot occur, but rather that this exact miracle cannot be easily replicated. As Turok and McGranahan (2013) argue, there is no simple or linear relationship between urbanization and economic growth. Although cities have the potential to drive development, this outcome also depends on many other factors including a country’s unique history, population, resource base and political strategy. This is not to say that African cities may never be engines of development, but rather that neither urbanization nor the rise of cities automatically leads to development.

References Bafana, B. 2016. Africa’s Cities of the Future: Proper Planning Key to Sustainable Cities. Africa Renewal. April. Collier, P., Jones, P., and Spijkerman, D. 2018. Cities as Engines of Growth: Evidence from a New Global Sample of Cities. University of Oxford: Oxford. Duranton, G. 2008. Cities: Engines of Growth and Prosperity for Developing Countries? The World Bank: Washington, DC.

Cities and economic development in Africa 119 Fox, L., Senbet, L., and Simbanegavi, W. 2016. Youth Employment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges, Constraints and Opportunities. Journal of African Economies, 25: i3–i15. Garretsen, H. and Martin, R. 2010. Rethinking (New) Economic Geography Models: Taking Geography and History More Seriously. Spatial Economic Analysis 5(2): 127–160. International Labor Organization (ILO). 2018. Women and Men in the Informal Economy: A Statistical Picture. 3rd Ed. International Labor Office: Geneva. ILO. n.d. Youth Employment in Africa. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/africa/areasof-work/youth-employment/lang–en/index.htm. Khumalo, K. (2017). “Africa’s economy worth $3trln by 2030,” Business Report, 22 May 2017, https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/africas-economy-worth-3trln-by2030-9269951. Manirakiza, V. 2014. Promoting Inclusive Approaches to Address Urbanization Challenges in Kigali. African Review of Economics and Finance 6(1): 161–180. McGranahan, G. 2016. The Role of Cities and Urbanization in Achieving Development Goals. Institute of Development Studies: Brighton. Ministry of Lands and Housing. 2014. Botswana: Habitat III Report. Republic of Botswana: Gaborone. Roche, R., Bain, R., and Cumming, O. 2017. A long Way to Go: Estimates of Combined Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Coverage for 25 Sub-Saharan African countries. PLoS ONE 12(2): e0171783. Samatar, A. 1999. An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership, and Colonial Legacy in Botswana. Heinemann: Portsmouth. Sennoga, E. and Zerihun, A. 2018. Ethiopia: African Economic Outlook Country Note. African Development Bank: Abidjan. Statista (2019). “Africa: gross domestic product (GDP) from 1995 to 2016 (in billion U.S. dollars),” https://www.statista.com/statistics/240665/gdp-of-africa/. Turok, I. and McGranahan, G. 2013. Urbanization and Economic Growth: The Arguments and Evidence for Africa and Asia. Environment & Urbanization 25(2): 465–482. UNCTAD. 2017. Economic Development in Africa Report 2017: Tourism for Transformative and Inclusive Growth. UN: New York. Woldemariam, B. and Narsiah, S. 2014. The Poor and Differential Access to Water in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In: L. Asuelime et al. (eds.), Selected Themes in African Development Studies: Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development. Basel, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF). 2017. Progress on Drinking Water, Sanitation and Hygiene: 2017 Update and SDG Baselines. WHO: Geneva.

Section III

Agriculture, food and the environment

10 Are parks the best way to protect African wildlife? YES: Moses Mosonsieyiri Kansanga

Department of Geography, The George Washington University, Washington DC, USA

Daniel Kpienbaareh

Department of Global Development, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, NY 14853, USA

NO: Rachel DeMotts

Environmental Policy and Decision-Making Program, University of Puget Sound Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Moses Mosonsieyiri Kansanga of the Department of Geography at George Washington University, USA, and Daniel Kpienbaareh of the Department of Global Development at Cornell University, USA argue that wildlife conservation is more crucial than ever in Africa due to pressure from competing land uses and climate change. There is an ongoing debate as to the most appropriate conservation approach and they suggest that parks constitute the best model for wildlife protection. They do not agree that parks are an alien management technique, but are a way to align contemporary conservation needs with longstanding traditional resource management practices. They also highlight the successes of small-scale parks across the continent and contend that when created and managed at localized scales, parks provide an opportunity to align conservation goals with local livelihoods. NO: Rachel DeMotts of the Environmental Policy and Decision-Making Program at the University of Puget Sound, USA, acknowledges the association of African landscapes with charismatic megafauna, but suggests that no accounting of parks is complete without considering their complex histories and ongoing human impacts. She argues that parks are socially constructed, from their creation through forced displacement of Indigenous peoples, to ongoing violent conflicts between rangers and local communities. For her understanding, parks as pristine nature free of human interference not only neglects the myriad of impacts that they have on neighboring villages, but fails to do justice to Indigenous knowledge that is essential for conservation itself. She argues that continuing to separate people from nature through parks with enforced boundaries serves neither people nor wildlife. DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-13

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As this chapter’s contributors make clear, parks are a contested strategy for biodiversity conservation in Africa. Preservation, or the idea of setting aside land for the protection of flora and fauna, and to the exclusion of permanent human inhabitants, is often attributed to Western environmentalists such as John Muir. While the first officially designated national park was Yellowstone Park, established in the US in 1872, this idea has its antecedents in other parts of the world, such as the Bogd Kahn forest in Mongolia which has had protected status since at least the 18th century. In Africa, several hunting reserves and parks were established in the colonial era, such as Virunga National Park in the DRC, established in 1925 as Albert National Park by King Albert I of Belgium. In the post-colonial period, parks have been a focus of western environmentalists, with many new parks having been created in African countries since independence. It is the idea that parks ought to be spaces without permanent human residents that has been particularly problematic in Africa, not to mention other parts of the world. As Rachel Demotts discusses, parks have led to the displacement of local people and/or reduced their access to lands where they traditionally hunted, grazed animals or foraged for food. But if we let go of the Western idea of the park as a place without people, then – as Kansanga and Kpienbaareh suggest – then there are plenty of examples of indigenous African conservation strategies at more localized scales, often involving traditional rules about how much fishing, wood harvesting or hunting could happen in a particular area. This approach is more consistent with the way that natural resource managers define conservation (as opposed to preservation), which is resource use within biological limits. Given the growing recognition that the traditional park model is particularly problematic in Africa, there has been plenty of experimentation around developing alternatives, some of which are discussed by both of the authors in this issue. These alternatives to parks are often broadly described as community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) or integrated conservation and development. Here local communities, as opposed to central governments, play a much stronger role in managing resource use in certain areas. What is interesting is that while the authors for this debate start from very different positions, they both seem to land on the need for an alternative to park idea as defined by westerners. YES: PARKS ARE THE BEST WAY TO PROTECT AFRICAN WILDLIFE

Introduction Globally, an estimated one million plant and animal species are at risk of extinction within the next few decades (IPBES, 2019). This precipitous loss of wildlife is the result of interacting threats including habitat loss and alteration, climate change, emerging infectious diseases, invasive species,

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and pollution (Ntshanga et al., 2021). These threats are multidimensional in nature and act synergistically, thus making them complicated to address. The African continent has some of the world’s most unique, diverse and rare wildlife and supports 33% of all global biodiversity (African Wildlife Foundation [AWF], 2018). Habitat loss resulting from anthropogenic activities, particularly agriculture and mining, is considered the number one cause of the loss of wildlife in Africa (Curry et al., 2021; Martins-Oliveira et al., 2021; Ndegwa Mundia & Murayama, 2009). These land uses not only fragment the landscape, but also destroy sensitive habitats and inhibit the movements of animals (Ntshanga et al., 2021). While the need to protect wildlife is more obvious than ever before in the face of increasing climate change and pressure from competing land uses, there is an ongoing debate about the most appropriate wildlife protection approach for the African context. The debate is often pitted between proponents and opponents of parks. Proponents mostly argue that parks are alien to traditional resource management regimes of African societies and hence convey neoliberal ideals meant to keep people off the land. For instance, Lindsey et al. (2007) assert that in the Southern part of SouthEastern Africa, wildlife protection is driven by neoliberal approaches under the slogan ‘if it pays it stays,’ with profits accruing to the government and private companies at the expense of local livelihoods that are foreclosed. The foreclosing of local livelihoods tends to drive conflicts between communities and park guards as local people find ways to navigate the system to be able to extract game. In this paper, we seek to clarify that these concerns raised by opponents of parks are all directly linked to the way parks are managed and the scale at which they are deployed. Given the increasing extinction of wildlife and the obvious need for conservation, we seek to rescale this debate by arguing for a relatively localized park system grounded on integrated management. In this essay, we first engage with the theoretical argument that the park model is alien to traditional renouncement management in Africa. We argue that the concept of protected areas is not alien to traditional resource management practices in Africa. We refute this argument by drawing upon vignettes to demonstrate how parks align with longstanding local resources management practices in African societies. We also highlight how the park model provides an entry point for the consolidation and rejuvenation of these longstanding traditional conservation practices in the face of pressure from other competing land uses. Given the current rates of extinction of popular African wildlife species and pressure on land from competing uses, we also argue that the establishment of parks is the best way to organize contemporary human-environment interactions to co-deliver livelihood and conservation benefits. While recognizing the opportunities parks provide for sustainable consolidation of ‘people and nature,’ we highlight the need for parks to be localized in scope as opposed to largescale, operate within the confines of local resource management systems and be responsive to local needs.

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Are parks really an alien management technique? A longstanding argument against the establishment of parks in Africa has been that they are alien to local resource management systems. This framing is grounded in the understanding that African resource spaces are characterised by communal management strategies which give user rights to all community members to draw resources. In discussions about conservation, the communal resource governance system is often misinterpreted to mean open, unregulated and uncoordinated use of resources without norms and practices targeted at ensuring the sustainable use of these resources. While it is true that traditional resource governance systems across Africa tend to be communal, with all community members entitled to draw resources through livelihood activities such as hunting, these systems have clear longstanding conservation principles. One of these frequently overlooked conservation norms which bear a semblance to the park system of resource conservation is the establishment and maintenance of sacred groves – areas set aside by communities as sacrosanct spaces where human interference is prohibited (Decher, 1997; Lebbie & Freudenberger, 1996). Although these groves serve spiritual purposes including serving as dwelling places of deities and centres where occasional communication with the ancestors and gods is initiated through sacrifices, they are also intended to provide a safe habitat for endangered species and to regulate the rate of use of resources. Punishments of varying intensities, including banishment from the community and sacrificial animals like a cow or sheep, are some of the correctional routines implemented to ensure that those who violate these codes are held accountable. Chiefs and other traditional custodians implement such rules as part of their mandate as custodians of the land. While these traditional reserves and the local institutional systems that protected them have guided resource extraction in African communities for ages, empirical evidence suggests these systems have come under pressure and are crumbling due to pressure from competing land uses spurred by population growth, urbanization, intensive agriculture and globalization ( JuhéBeaulaton & Salpeteur, 2017; Kansanga et al., 2018; Lebbie & Freudenberger, 1996). The crumbling of these traditional resource conservation norms is also partly linked to their largely informal and unwritten nature which make enforcement by traditional leaders difficult amid pressure from competing land uses ( Juhé-Beaulaton & Salpeteur, 2017; Kansanga et al., 2018). Thus, given the longstanding commitment of African communities to creating safe habitats for biodiversity conservation, parks provide the opportunity to align contemporary conservation needs with pre-existing traditional resource management systems. Parks provide an opportunity for governments and development organizations to work with local communities to protect and expand these traditional resource spaces while providing the opportunity for communities to continue to govern and utilize them. A recent example is the Ankodida protected area initiative in Southern Madagascar where the

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World Wild Fund for Nature partnered with local communities to integrate sacred groves into the newly created protected area network (Ekblom et al., 2019). Thus, the fundamental argument that the parks system of conservation is alien to African societies is unfounded given their semblance to longstanding traditional resource management practices.

Scale reveals the feasibility of ‘parks’ as a conservation model in Africa The second argument against parks in the African context has been the tendency for their establishment to alienate local communities and put resource control in the hands of external players. Although it is true that largescale fortress-style parks foreclose local livelihood activities while permitting tourism whose revenue tend to be controlled by the government and private investors, there are many success stories of relatively smaller scale/localized community-led biodiversity conservation parks across the continent. These success stories we provide below clearly demonstrate how crucial it is to consider scale in the conversations surrounding the use of parks for wildlife protection. A successful example of the localized park model we argue is the Community Resources Management Area (CREMA) initiative in Ghana. To address concerns that local communities are often excluded in the management of largescale parks like the Mole Game Reserve which spans several communities – the government of Ghana implemented the CREMA model which currently devolves biodiversity management powers to groups of communities who unite around a common conservation goal. The CREMA model involves a group of communities agreeing to collectively manage a surrounding common area with a clear regulatory structure including an executive leadership structure, a constitution and relevant bylaws that regulate natural resource governance within the CREMA. These CREMAs are demarcated by communities with technical support from the Wildlife Division of the Forestry Commissions in a participatory manner. While serving as ecological corridors for endangered flora and fauna, these smallscale parks also ensure the regulated harvesting of fauna through CREMAspecific bylaws which are backed by the law. Another successful community-led wildlife management system in Africa that approached wildlife as a renewable resource through a regulated smallscale park model is the CAMPFIRE initiative in Zimbabwe. Like the CREMA system, the CAMPFIRE initiative sought to empower local communities living near community-owned wildlife conservation areas. The initiative requires hunters to pay a fee before being allowed to kill large game. The rationale of this community-led system is that funds generated from this form of regulated harvesting of game can be channeled into community development whiles creating the opportunity for local hunting livelihoods to proceed in tandem with the natural regeneration rates of flora and fauna. Given prevailing conflicts surrounding the state-led conservation parks in

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Africa, we argue that community-managed parks provide an entry point for both wildlife protection and the integration of local livelihoods like hunting in a regulated manner. This flexible park model also provides important insights for re-imagining the management of existing fortress-style parks on the African continent. From the foregoing discussion, it is thus clear that scale has been conflated and misrepresented in discussions on parks as tools for wildlife protection in ways that frame parks as largescale. The framing or operationalization of parks as largescale lands often spanning several 100s of hectares that forecloses local livelihood of multiple communities is often used as a footing by opponents to argue against parks. This argument is centered around the justification that it is impossible to set aside large tracts of land for biodiversity conservation in an era of competing land uses, especially given the land use challenges posed by existing large wildlife parks on the continent. While we agree with this point about competing land uses and needs, we argue that this conventional thinking about parks as large tracts of land conflates scale, and the opportunities relatively localized parks present in nature-wildlife interaction. We argue that parks can fit into the existing landscapes of local communities without the need to relocate local people or cut short their livelihoods if the scale is made consistent with ongoing land uses and needs. Thus, thinking about parks from such relatively localized perspective like the CREMAs and the CAMPFIRE models and their success so far in the African context defeats the conventional thinking that parks must always be extensive to be able to serve the purpose of biodiversity conservation.

Conclusions Current rates of global wildlife loss are being exacerbated by worsening climate variability and competing land uses, thus making conservation imperative. In this essay we argue that parks are the best approach to protecting threatened wildlife in Africa. Our argument clarifies a number of important points. First, parks do not constitute an entirely alien wildlife conservation approach in Africa as often framed in contemporary conservation discourse; African societies have for centuries, maintained protectionist resources conservation norms and practices albeit at a more localized scale. Thus, parks align with these longstanding communal management systems. Second, consideration of the scale at which parks are implemented is important in revealing their feasibility in the African context. Rather than taking the conventional largescale preservationist model that forecloses local livelihoods as common with most fortress-style parks on the African continent, we argue for relatively localized parks that integrate local livelihood activities as currently practiced under the CREMA and CAMPFIRE models in Ghana and Zimbabwe, respectively. The success of these localized conservation strategies offers insights for rethinking scale in conservation in Africa more broadly.

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References African Wildlife Foundation (2018). Land conservation. https://www.awf.org/sites/default/ f iles/public/media/Resources_0/Facts%2520%2526amp%253B%2520Brochures/ 2018_Factsheet_Land_Conservation_English.pdf. Accessed on September 7, 2021. Curry, C. J., Davis, B. W., Bertola, L. D., White, P. A., Murphy, W. J., & Derr, J. N. (2021). Spatiotemporal Genetic Diversity of Lions Reveals the Influence of Habitat Fragmentation across Africa. Molecular Biology and Evolution, 38(1), 48–57. Decher, J. (1997). Conservation, small mammals, and the future of sacred groves in West Africa. Biodiversity & Conservation, 6(7), 1007–1026. Ekblom, A., Shoemaker, A., Gillson, L., Lane, P., & Lindholm, K.-J. (2019). Conservation through biocultural heritage—examples from sub-Saharan Africa. Land, 8(1), 5. IPBES. (2019). 2019 Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. http:// sdg.iisd.org/news/ipbes-previews-2019-global-assessment-report-on-biodiversity/ Juhé-Beaulaton, D., & Salpeteur, M. (2017). Sacred groves in African contexts (Benin, Cameroon): Insights from history and anthropology. In A History of Groves (pp. 119–134). Routledge. Kansanga, M., Andersen, P., Atuoye, K., & Mason-Renton, S. (2018). Contested commons: Agricultural modernization, tenure ambiguities and intra-familial land grabbing in Ghana. Land Use Policy, 75, 215–224. Lebbie, A. R., & Freudenberger, M. S. (1996). Sacred groves in Africa: Forest patches in transition. Forest Patches in Tropical Landscapes, 300324. Lindsey, P. A., Roulet, P. A., & Romanach, S. S. (2007). Economic and conservation significance of the trophy hunting industry in sub-Saharan Africa. Biological Conservation, 134(4), 455–469. Martins-Oliveira, A. T., Zanin, M., Canale, G. R., da Costa, C. A., Eisenlohr, P. V, de Melo, F. C. S. A., & de Melo, F. R. (2021). A global review of the threats of mining on mid-sized and large mammals. Journal for Nature Conservation, 126025. Ndegwa Mundia, C., & Murayama, Y. (2009). Analysis of land use/cover changes and animal population dynamics in a wildlife sanctuary in East Africa. Remote Sensing, 1(4), 952–970. Ntshanga, N. K., Procheş, S., & Slingsby, J. A. (2021). Assessing the threat of landscape transformation and habitat fragmentation in a global biodiversity hotspot. Austral Ecology.

NO: PARKS ARE NOT THE BEST WAY TO PROTECT AFRICAN BIODIVERSITY

Introduction Images of an untamed African landscape teeming with wildlife dominate Western understandings of the continent as a whole. The construction of Africa in the imagination is so tied to an emblematic landscape that dozens of book covers feature sunsets and acacia trees, even when written about countries with few or no such trees. “In short,” as one observer put it, “the covers of most novels “about Africa” seem to have been designed by someone whose principal idea of the continent comes from The Lion King” (Ross, 2014). Yet those designers are not alone. This narrow view is an example of a persistent conceptualization of Africa as an enormous wildlife reserve, its

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residents (human included) the constituents of a zoo without fences. In the Western mind, Africa is often either a safari or a war zone, full of charismatic megafauna and one-dimensional humans, wild on several levels and in need of redirection by outside forces (Adams & McShane, 1997; Wainaina, 2006). Beginning with these flawed conceptions of what Africa might seem strange when considering strategies for biodiversity conservation, but any assessment of whether or not parks work must first consider whom they serve, and why. Parks in global context are often considered to be unproblematic goods, constituted simply of pristine wilderness that is best without people. But parks have deep social histories, and to ignore this is to mask their complex impacts and contested values. Parks are social constructions; to put it simply, “there is nothing natural about the concept of wilderness” (Cronon, 1996: 16). Focusing on parks as the best strategy for conservation perpetuates the idea that human beings are separate from nature and that nature is somewhere “out there” with a fence around it and rangers in olive drab to protect it. To address this often-hidden context, this essay will first briefly consider the history of parks in Africa. As a project embedded in empire, this legacy is crucial to unpacking the complex purposes of parks, which range far beyond biodiversity conservation. Second, it will offer some examples of more inclusive ways to think about biodiversity conservation in Africa, including the importance of traditional ecological knowledge, some of the pitfalls of isolating parks from the surrounding landscape, and community-based conservation. Finally, it will raise broader concerns about focusing on creating landscapes free of people, such as the current Half Earth movement, and problematize the ways in which this view separates people from nature. Meaningful biodiversity conservation must take place beyond parks and be embedded in broader resource management if it is to be successful.

Parks of empire It is impossible to understand the current impacts of national parks in Africa without situating them in historical context. Parks are a colonial project, created under European rule and informed by idealized notions of a landscape brimming with wildlife and devoid of people (Adams and McShane, 1997; Garland, 2008). Many parks were first established as game reserves for colonial hunting and functionally also became mechanisms of state control and surveillance, demonstrating that the state could arrange both people and the landscape as it saw fit (Mackenzie, 1988). This led to forced displacement (Brockington, 2002; Chatty and Colchester, 2002) and the rupture of local livelihoods including agriculture and hunting (Neumann, 2002; Garland, 2008). Embedded in the forced removal of villages from landscapes is not only exclusion, but also fuel for the argument that local residents, seen through paternalistic and racist lenses, are damaging the land upon which they live and must be stopped. Seeing local residents and agricultural practices as the driver of environmental degradation is reflected in colonial polices across

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the continent; in Guinea, for example, Fairhead and Leach (1996) traced a century of misguided Western ‘scientific’ assumptions about local forestry practices, resulting in restrictive policies that caused far more damage than locally embedded management. These legacies are not past – they are imprinted on the way that people living in and near parks continue to understand their position relative to these projects. During the process of creating the Great Limpopo Trans frontier Park in 2003, an effort to link existing parks in Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, residents of the game-reserve-turned-national-park in Mozambique understood this shift in land management to mean that their village areas were becoming part of South Africa (DeMotts, 2017a), even as plans were made to remove residents of the Limpopo National Park to outlying areas. Schmidt-Soltau (2009) documented the forced displacement of local residents from 12 different protected areas across Central Africa from 1996–2007. Such displacement disrupts not only access to land, social networks, and local authorities, but also the ability to use and allocate resources during and after resettlement (Milgroom & Ribot 2020). It can also negatively impact conservation outcomes through changing pressures on land use, generating conflict, enabling overuse of forest resources, and creating food insecurity (Cernea & Schmidt-Soltau, 2003; Milgroom & Spierenburg, 2008). Parks were, and often still are, sites of both structural and physical violence. As bounded spaces with rules promulgated by the state, parks make surveillance of rural landscapes more possible and enable the disruption not just of local economies but of cultural meaning-making (Neumann, 2002). The apartheid regime in South Africa used many of its protected areas located on international boundaries as sites for military encampments, and in some cases the South African Defense Force was involved in the ivory trade and parks in Angola, Namibia and Mozambique were heavily mined (Ellis 1994; Koch, 1998). Virunga National Park in the eastern Congo is often labeled as the “most dangerous” in Africa, a site of illegal resource extraction for militia groups, but also a battleground for park rangers who are expected to protect both, wildlife and tourists, 170 of whom have been killed in the last two decades. By some reports, unemployment around the park is 70% (Actman, 2018), leaving few job opportunities and creating even more pressure on the park to provide security and jobs – a purpose for which it was not designed. While the gorilla population has shown signs of recovery, it is difficult not to think that this level of securitization is unsustainable, or that it can address the underlying structural causes of poverty that force reliance on illegal resource extraction.

Surrounding parks? Considering connections to the broader landscapes within which parks are situated raises questions about what biodiversity conservation looks like when it is more holistic and includes a concern for local communities. Part of

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what is troubling about idealizing parks is that despite decades of ecological and social research, there is little systematic evidence that parks alone are the best way to conserve biodiversity (Brockington et al., 2008). In particular, the shift away from “fortress conservation” (Brockington, 2002) from the late 1980s sought to recognize, that the exclusion and marginalization of local residents from parks did not serve the ends of either conservation or poverty alleviation. For example, what of wildlife were not resident in parks? Human-wildlife conflict remains an enormous challenge in community areas in and around parks (DeMotts & Hoon, 2012). Even those parks with fences are porous, as elephants can range thousands of miles crossing multiple parks, agricultural lands and villages; lions can be lured to farms by cattle; and even smaller wildlife such as monkeys and birds can wreak havoc on crops. And residents in and near parks are often used to harvesting resources from them, from hunting for subsistence to gathering wild plants and firewood. Without consideration of these impacts, parks with surrounding communities will have difficulty achieving conservation goals. Beginning in the late 1980s with trusts in Botswana, conservancies in Namibia, and the CAMPFIRE program in Zimbabwe, community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) became a driving strategy for creating space for local participation in, and benefit from, conservation in Southern Africa in particular. These integrated conservation and development (ICDP) programs focused largely on trying to encourage local tolerance of wildlife through redirecting at least some economic benefits from conservation to local residents. Many also attempt to create knowledge partnerships with neighboring communities, acknowledging that community knowledge of the landscape could fill gaps in scientific knowledge. This approach recognizes that parks with hard boundaries reshape the ways in which traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) can be shared and enacted. For example, Western scientific strategies that focus in part on boundary drawing to exclude Maasai pastoralists from conservation areas miss Indigenous knowledge of wildlife that, in an inclusive view, could engender deeper ways of knowing the landscape (Goldman 2020). Admittedly, CBNRM has faced a wide range of challenges (Dressler et al., 2010), including struggles to create meaningful local participation, village elite co-optation (Hoon, 2014), a lack of community interest and inadequate local management capacity (Thakadu, 2005; Blaikie, 2006; Bixler et al., 2015), and different impacts for men and women (Khumalo & Freimund, 2014; Goldman and Little 2015; DeMotts, 2017b). Despite fits and starts, there have been successes when economic incentives are locally attuned (Suich, 2013), and such projects can help local communities to meet and mediate the growing pressures of a globalized tourist economy which can otherwise be difficult to access (Rodary, 2009). For example, community conservancies in Namibia are grounded in securing local rights to manage land, training residents to monitor wildlife and work in tourism, and benefit sharing at the community level. Roughly 20% of Namibians live in conservancies, which also provide

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employment, environmental education, and cover more land than national parks (Nuulimba and Taylor, 2015). This broader notion of inclusive management has enabled locally embedded environmental organizations to shift to meet emergent local needs, such as addressing HIV/AIDS and protecting women’s access to forest resources for craft making, which generates income that keeps young girls in school (DeMotts, 2008). Poverty alleviation in turn reduces reliance on natural resources, and higher educational attainment generally affords higher environmental values (Inglehart et al., 2014).

Returning to exclusion In recent years, as illegal wildlife trade has exploded in many parts of Africa, there has been a reification of early principles of conservation reliant on the exclusion of local communities under the guise of a crisis in poaching and the expansion of national parks into trans-frontier conservation areas (TFCAs). Parks such as the Kruger and Hluhluwe-Imfolozi in South Africa are experiencing an amplified presence of military and paramilitary forces, along with the use of drones and other technologies to surveil and enforce, resulting in what some scholars call “green militarization” (Lunstrum, 2014). Resurgent ‘wars’ for rhino horn and elephant ivory, along with increasing demand for pangolin scales and lion bones, have prompted government agencies and conservation groups to increase surveillance and policing of parks in an effort to curb this extraction (Büscher, 2018). Virunga, mentioned earlier, is clearly an example, but so is Botswana’s shoot to kill policy, only rescinded in mid-2019, and Kruger National Park’s resurgent conflict in which 9151 rhinos were killed between 2008 and 2018 (Save the Rhino, 2020). This says nothing of the loss of human life of both rangers and poachers; former Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano claims that 476 Mozambican poachers were killed by South African park rangers between 2010–2015 (O’Grady, 2020). Such aggressive policy also misses that it is crucial to address poaching at every step of the commodity chain – from the killing of the rhino, to the networks through which it horn arrives at a port, to a dealer in Ho Chi Minh City, where it satisfies the demand that drives it all. Such loss of life – both human and charismatic megafauna – makes it difficult to argue that militarization is working. Extensive research on local communities and poaching clearly demonstrates that while securitization may show short term gains in terms of protecting wildlife, it is detrimental in the longer term for its alienation of local communities and failure to address root causes of poverty (Duffy, 2016; Hubschle & Shearing, 2018). A wicked combination of increased policing of parks with efforts to scale them up into regional TFCAs like the Kavango-Zambezi Trans-frontier Conservation Area creates significant problems for local communities, ranging from park management that is more accountable to international donors than to local residents, to park rangers acting as de facto immigration agents in border areas (Ramutsindela, 2007; Büscher, 2013; DeMotts, 2017a). Further exacerbating

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this marginality are the resources pouring in to protected areas to save rhinos and elephants in an increasingly securitized manner that is ominous; “In the current environment, the perception that wild animals are valued more highly than black rural lives is hard to miss” (Hübschle, 2017: 3).

Conclusion A broader philosophical view of whether or not parks are the best way to protect biodiversity might be well served by a return to the fundamental question of how human beings understand themselves in relationship to the environment. The current ‘Half Earth’ (Wilson, 2016) movement, for example, argues that 50% of the planet should be ‘set aside’ for nature in order to save it – more than three times as much land as is currently protected. This view echoes old conservation narratives about landscapes best without people, and leaves little room for imagining new ways that human communities could instead rethink their patterns of consumption and environmental impact in much larger ways. Wilson’s plan is grand but vague, as he argues for a reduced human population concentrated into smaller areas and reliant on technological solutions to meet its needs that are likely to be compromised by a loss of agricultural land. Here, again, human communities are obstructions to be removed, with problems that must be solved by limiting access to land and resources. One response to Wilson argues that, “Addressing biodiversity loss and other environmental problems must proceed by confronting the world’s obscene inequality, not by blaming the poor and trusting the ‘free market’ to save them” (Büscher & Fletcher, 2016). The assumption that separation from nature is the answer is profoundly troubling. The present histories of parks are deeply embedded in social context, from the ideas of wilderness rooted in human imagination to the exclusionary practices upon which they were constructed. This is not to say that parks have no place in biodiversity conservation, but rather that their policies and processes must be understood as inseparable from the broader landscapes and human communities that relate to them.

References Actman, J. (2018) “Virunga National Park Sees its Worst Violence in a Decade, Director Says,” National Geographic [available at https://www.nationalgeographic.com/ news/2018/06/wildlife-watch-virunga-rangers-deaths-poaching-militia-gorillas/ last accessed 21 June 2020. Adams, J.S., & McShane, T.O. (1997) The Myth of Wild Africa: Conservation Without Illusion. University of California Press. Bixler, R.P., J. Dell’Angelo, O. Mfune and H. Roba. (2015) The political ecology of participatory conservation: institutions and discourse. Journal of Political Ecology, 22: 164–182. Blaikie, P.M. (2006) “Is small really beautiful? Community-based natural resource management in Malawi and Botswana,” World Development, 34(11): 1942–1957.

Parks and African wildlife 135 Brockington, D. (2002) Fortress Conservation: The Preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania. Oxford: James Currey. Brockington, D., Duffy, R., & Igoe, J. (2008) Nature Unbound: Conservation, Capitalism and the Future of Protected Areas. Earthscan. Büscher, B. (2013). Transforming the frontier: Peace Parks and the Politics of Neoliberal Conservation in Southern Africa. Duke University Press. ______ (2018) “From biopower to ontopower? Violent responses to wildlife crime and the new geographies of conservation,” Conservation and Society, 16(2): 157. Büscher, B. and Fletcher, R. (2016) “Why E.O. Wilson is wrong about how to save the earth,” Aeon 1 March. Available at: https://aeon.co/ideas/why-e-o-wilson-is-wrongabout-how-to-save-the-earth Last accessed 23 June 2020. Cernea, M., & Schmidt-Soltau, K. (2003). Biodiversity conservation versus population resettlement: risks to nature and risks to people. In International Conference on Rural Livelihoods, Forests and Biodiversity (pp. 19–23). Chatty, D., & Colchester, M. (Eds.). (2002). Conservation and mobile indigenous peoples: Displacement, forced settlement, and sustainable development (Vol. 10). New York: Berghahn Books. Cronon, W. (1996) “The trouble with wilderness, or getting back to the wrong nature,” Environmental History 1(1): 7–28. DeMotts, R. (2008). Mitigating an elephantine epidemic: gendered space for HIV/AIDS outreach through Namibian conservancies. Population and Environment, 29(3), 186–203. DeMotts, R. (2017a). The Challenges of Transfrontier Conservation in Southern Africa: The Park Came After Us. Lexington Books. ______ (2017b). Weaving a living: Gender, craft, and sustainable resource use in Botswana. Journal of Political Ecology, 24(1), 368–385. DeMotts, R., & Hoon, P. (2012). “Whose elephants? Conserving, compensating, and competing in Northern Botswana,” Society & Natural Resources, 25(9), 837–851. Dressler, W., Büscher, B., M. Schoon, D. Brockington, T. Hayes, C.A. Kull and K. Shrestha. 2010. “From hope to crisis and back again? A critical history of the global CBNRM narrative,” Environmental Conservation, 37(1): 5–15. Duffy, R. (2016). “War, by conservation,” Geoforum, 69, 238–248. Ellis, S. (1994) “Of elephants and men: Politics and nature conservation in South Africa,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 20(1): 53–69. Fairhead, J., & Leach, M. (1996). Misreading the African Landscape: Society and Ecology in a Forest-Savanna Mosaic. Cambridge University Press. Garland, E. (2008) “The elephant in the room: confronting the colonial character of wildlife conservation in Africa,” African Studies Review, 51–74. Goldman, M. (2020) Narrating Nature: Wildlife Conservation and Maasai Ways of Knowing. University of Arizona Press. Goldman, M.J. and J.S. Little. (2015) “Innovative grassroots NGOs and the complex processes of women’s empowerment: An empirical investigation from northern Tanzania,” World Development, 66: 762–777. Hoon, P. (2014). “Elephants are like our diamonds: recentralizing community based natural resource management in Botswana, 1996–2012,” African Studies Quarterly, 15(1), 55. Hübschle, A. (2017). “Fluid interfaces between flows of rhino horn,” Global Crime, 18(3), 198–217. Hübschle, A., & Shearing, C. (2018). Ending Wildlife Trafficking: Local Communities as Change Agents: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

136  Moses M. Kansanga, Daniel Kpienbaareh and Rachel DeMotts Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.) (2014) World Values Survey: All Rounds – Country-Pooled Datafile. Madrid: JD Systems Institute. Khumalo, K.E. & Freimund, W.A. (2014) “Expanding women’s choices through employment? Community-based natural resource management and women’s empowerment in Kwandu conservancy, Namibia,” Society and Natural Resources, 27(10): 1024–1039. Koch, E. (1998) “Nature has the Power to Heal Old Wounds: War, Peace, and Changing Patterns of Conservation in Southern Africa,” in D. Simon, (ed.), South Africa in Southern Africa: Reconfiguring the Region. Oxford: James Currey. Lunstrum, E. (2014) “Green Militarization: Anti-Poaching Efforts and the Spatial Contours of Kruger National Park,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 104:4, 816–832 MacKenzie, J.M. (1988) The Empire of Nature: Hunting, Conservation, and British Imperialism. Manchester, NY: Manchester University Press. Milgroom, J. and Ribot, J. (2020) “Children of another Land: Social Disarticulation, Access to Natural Resources and the Reconfiguration of Authority in Post Resettlement,” Society & Natural Resources, 33:2, 184–204. Milgroom, J. and Spierenburg, M. (2008) Induced Volition Neumann, R. (2002) Imposing Wilderness: Struggles over Livelihood and Nature Preservation in Africa. University of California Press. Nuulimba, K., & Taylor, J. J. (2015). “25 years of CBNRM in Namibia: A retrospective on accomplishments, contestation and contemporary challenges,” Journal of Namibian Studies: History Politics Culture, 18: 89–110. O’Grady, C. (2020) “The price of protecting rhinos,” The Atlantic, 13 January. Ramutsindela, M. (2007) Transfrontier Conservation in Africa: At the Confluence of Capital, Politics and Nature. Cabi. Rodary, E. (2009) “Mobilizing for nature in southern African community-based conservation policies, or the death of the local,” Biodiversity and Conservation, 18(10): 2585–2600. Ross, E. (2014) The Dangers of a Single Book Cover: The Acacia Tree Meme and “African Literature.” Africa is a Country [blog]; https://africasacountry.com/2014/05/ the-dangers-of-a-single-book-cover-the-acacia-tree-meme-and-african-literature/ Last accessed 12 June 2020. Save the Rhino (2020). Poaching Statistics. Available at: https://www.savetherhino.org/ rhino-info/poaching-stats/ Last accessed 22 June 2020. Schmidt-Soltau, K. (2009) Is the Displacement of People from Parks only ‘Purported’, or is it Real? Conservation and Society, 7: 46–55. Suich, H. (2013) “The effectiveness of economic incentives for sustaining community based natural resource management,” Land Use Policy, 31: 441–449. Thakadu, O.T. (2005) “Success factors in community based natural resources management in northern Botswana: lessons from practice,” Natural Resources Forum, 29(3): 199–212. Wainaina, B. (2006) “How to Write about Africa,” Granta, (4): 92–95. Wilson, E. O. (2016) Half-Earth: Our Planet’s Fight for Life. WW Norton & Company.

11 Are Africans adapting well to climate change? YES: Muthoni Masinde

Built Environment and Information Technology, Central University of Technology, Bloemfontein, South Africa

NO: Julius R. Atlhopheng

Department of Environmental Science, University of Botswana Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Muthoni Masinde of the Faculty of Engineering, Built Environment and Information Technology at the Central University of Technology in South Africa argues that Africans have long relied on indigenous knowledge to adapt to disasters triggered by climatic variations. She suggests that Western approaches are hardly utilized by the majority of Africans who live in remote villages where the adoption of modern technologies such as the internet is still low. As such, Africans have embraced indigenous knowledge to build resilience in the face of climate change. She ends by suggesting that the integration of indigenous knowledge with scientific approaches would further enhance Africans’ ability to adapt to climate change. NO: Julius R. Atlhopheng of the Department of Environmental Science of the University of Botswana discusses the current level of adaptation on the African continent. For him, adaptation is critical to overcoming climate change, with its extreme events and the worsening of existing vulnerabilities, which create scarcity and hardship. He believes that there is an adaptation gap which is related to market systems, funding, technology and the lack of a nexus approach. This is a significant problem because the continent depends on sectors, such as agriculture and forestry that are highly vulnerable to climate change. Despite global efforts to coordinate climate change adaptation, these remain insufficient. There is also paucity of data on several key issues that needs to be addressed to allow for better adaptation. While long known to be a problem, concern over climate change has been mounting in recent years. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 6th Assessment Report (2022) suggests that ongoing climate change will lead to more drought, sea level rise, flooding and hunger, which could be particularly problematic for poorer parts of the world, including much of Africa. The state of scientific knowledge on climate change is repeatedly assessed and reported on by the IPCC. Policymakers also meet periodically at United Nations’ climate change conferences to try to forge consensus around DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-14

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measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change. The most recent of these conferences was COP 26 in Glasgow, Scotland in November 2021. Several African government representatives attended this meeting, only to be left wishing that the wealthier nations responsible for the largest share of greenhouse emissions would do more to curb current emissions and help poorer countries adapt to the new conditions created by climate change. The authors in this issue discuss how well African countries are adapting to a changing climate. Some key terms to understand for this discussion include mitigation, adaptation, resilience and vulnerability. Mitigation refers to efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, or anthropogenic emissions that warm the earth’s atmosphere. The most significant of these gases are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Adaptation refers to a society’s ability to accommodate changing weather and climate conditions. This can involve changes in livelihood practices (such as growing more drought tolerant crops or fishing in different areas) or settlement patterns (such as moving inland or to less drought prone areas). It may also entail engineering accommodations such as building higher sea walls or switching from rainfed to irrigated agriculture. Resilience refers to a society, household or individual’s ability to bounce back after a climate related shock, such as a drought, flood or hurricane. Resilience is often shaped by a household’s assets (how much do they have to fall back on in a difficult period) and coping strategies, or the other things a household might do to make ends meet in a difficult period, such as migrating to find temporary employment. Lastly, vulnerability refers to how exposed a household is to a climatic shock. Vulnerability is typically considered to be composed of three components: (a) the probability of a shock, (b) the level of exposure to such a shock and (c) the degree to which a household can bounce back after a shock (or its resilience). YES: AFRICANS HAVE LED THE WAY ON ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE It is indisputable that climate change is real and the array of reasons for the perception that Africa is the most affected continent, include weak adaptive capacity, high dependence on ecosystem goods for livelihoods and less developed agricultural production systems (Ofoegbu and Chirwa, 2019). In advancing the argument that “Africans are adapting well to climate change,” the thesis of this essay is that Africans need to extend the African Union’s (AU) notion of “African solutions to Africa’s problems … by African people” to the climate change arena. To do so, they need to go back to their roots and rely on their tried and true African indigenous environmental knowledge (IEK). Since time immemorial, IEK has been at the heart of the coping mechanisms employed by Africans to adapt to climatic variabilities such as droughts and extreme rainfalls. Indigenous knowledge (IK), a superset of IEK, which is otherwise known as local or traditional or folk knowledge, is defined as the accumulation of knowledge passing from generation to

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generation which guides communities in almost every aspect of their interactions with the environment (Mafongoya and Ajayi, 2017). Most residents of rural Africa have limited access to local specific, reliable, timely scientific climate and weather information services that meet or addresses their needs in dealing with the effects of climate change, hence over 80% of them rely on IK (Ayal, 2017). With the significant gap found in climate science, IK plays and will continue to play a vital role. Evidence shows that these communities are more inclined towards indigenous coping mechanisms because they trust their built-up experiences gathered through the years (Kolawole et al., 2016).

The failures of “transferring of Northern designs to Southern realities” The scholarly literature is replete with scientific evidence that confirms that Africans have been aping Western civilizations blindly. The skewed publications and news coverage, most of which portray Africa in either negative terms or as donor-dependent (Schaeffer et al., 2015), do not help the situation. When it comes to climate change issues however, Africa has awaken and is not waiting for the bigger brothers (Europe, North America and Asia) to innovate and donate the solutions she needs. The position pursued here is that Africa does not have to follow this old trend that has mostly led to solutions that do not fit her realities as suggested by the phrase; transferring of Northern designs to Southern realities (Heeks, 2002). Conversely, Africa presents unique opportunities and challenges. Solutions for combating climate change must therefore incorporate some implicit elements of the continent’s status quo, cultural transfers and mutual learning. There is consensus that the war of combating climate change will only be won when the issues of vulnerability and adaptation are effectively and efficiently addressed by reconciling scientific findings about the extent and impacts, on the one hand, and the shifting politics of the international/national/regional/local regimes on the other. Contextualized solutions, built by, with and for the local people, have a higher chance of succeeding. IEK bridges this gap because it supports ways that are culturally appropriate and locally relevant.

Climate Change – Different realities in Africa The journey of combating climate change can only begin by appreciating the unique opportunities that Africa presents. These are described below. Insignificant role in climate change triggers and effects The main driver of climate change is the human expansion of the greenhouse effect (Mitchell, 1989). It is common knowledge that Africa has very little to do with the human activities responsible for this menace. Although Africa is (technically) not causing climate change, it is affected by climate change and Africans cannot purport to live in an island free of the effects thereof. On the other side

140  Muthoni Masinde and Julius R. Atlhopheng Number of People Affected by Continent Europe 0.61%

Oceania 0.40%

Africa 16.02%

Americas 4.14%

Asia 78.83%

Figure 11.1  Number of people affected by climatic related disasters: 1900–2019 Source: drawn by author based on data from https://public.emdat.be/data

of the spectrum, it does not make sense that Africans should depend on solutions developed by the very nations that top the list of greenhouse gases emitters who mostly operate extractive economic systems (Smith, 2012) with the sole purpose of profit-making at whatever cost. If they were honest, they would bring to life the various agreements within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, dealing with greenhouse-gas-emissions mitigation, adaptation and finance. Instead, many of these culprits continue to play politics and leave Mother Nature to suffer the consequences of unsustainable extraction of natural resources. Besides, if the number, frequency and magnitude of climatic-related disasters such as hurricanes and floods are anything to go by, Africa is not the most affected continent. Global climatic natural disasters reported over the years, exonerates Africa. See Figure 11.1. Africa’s rich indigenous knowledge for resilience and adaptation Sustainability refers to “capacity or ability to endure” while survivability is “the ability to remain alive or continue to exist.” The three pillars of sustainability are: (1) environmental, (2) social equity and (3) economic demand (Wilson et al., 2007). The sustainability cycle starts with the need to maintain economic growth that ensures continuous improvement of quality of life for the people involved. This slowly becomes a complex balancing act, then turns into a struggle for the fittest, leaving millions striving to survive and therefore replacing the word sustainability with survivability. In the face of climate change, this catastrophic trend can only be reversed through a shift in the prevailing philosophical mindset. In the case of Africa’s environmental sustainability, the thesis is that, this shift is to be found in integrating IEK with climate science.

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One may ask, does IK really work? First, the accumulated knowledge has always worked for locals; the debate here can only be on the level of success. One reason for this is that it addresses their local contexts and realities. Furthermore, IK automatically gains acceptability and a sense of ownership among the people and the fact that such systems are built on what is known to have worked locally, makes them resilient. Some of this knowledge is so intertwined with the communities’ cultural and religious beliefs that it has resulted in ‘good myths’ such as prohibiting cutting down of some specific trees for fear of the spirits (Manganyi and Buitendag, 2013). African IK has been weakened by the continent’s Westernization, urbanization, modernization, population growth, and by the passing away of the elders (who are the custodians of the IK) and, not surprisingly, climate change. This therefore calls for a ‘marriage’ between IK and scientific solutions to climate change. This marriage can take three forms: (1) using IK to downscale climate science; (2) using computer science approaches to scale-up IK and (3) an integration between IK and climate science. Integrating between IK and climate science into user applications A marriage between indigenous and climate science is definitely a rocky one and there are a number of hurdles on the way. First, the conceptual underpinnings on which these two systems are hinged are worlds apart. Besides, climate scientists find it difficult to describe the relationships between IK and climate systems that affect the daily weather and this may have led to the current status where IK is viewed as inferior to climate science. This is further complicated by the fact that in IK systems, the relationships between the inputs and the outputs may not be represented in formal structures and often contain incomplete and uncertain knowledge (and this has been compared to fuzzy logic). In order to achieve the integration of the two, the path of building bridges from indigenous across to scientific knowledge must be pursued. To allow for insights into the dilemmas and trade-offs involved in building such bridges, participatory approaches must be applied as I have shown elsewhere (Masinde, 2015, 2020; Masinde, Mwagha & Tadesse, 2018). I am a computer scientist who was born and bred in a typical rural village in Kenya. Here, IK is the only information I experienced and which I witnessed my small-scale farming mother (plus her neighbours) apply. Applying my computer science knowledge, I embarked on reclaiming, re-telling and re-writing Africa’s climate change story, the African way. Using the analogy of an ‘indigenous bridge’ (called itiki in my local language), I conceptualized the integration of an IK-based drought forecasting system with the seasonal climate forecasts. Until late 1990s, itiki used to be constructed by local ‘experts’ who possessed IK on the rivers’ terrain as well as on the strength of the various trees’ ability to sustain the weight that itiki would eventually withstand. Such was the accuracy of itiki that during the 1992 floods that

142  Muthoni Masinde and Julius R. Atlhopheng

were experienced in that part of Kenya, a newly constructed modern bridge was swept away while itiki nearby was left standing (as witnessed by author).

Are African Researchers addressing the context? The direction proposed above can only be sustainable if backed by scientific research and innovation. In this section, analysis of research related to climate change and indigenous knowledge system is presented. This was achieved by using data from publications in the Web of Science (WoS) database. The Advanced Search feature in WoS was run based on the following search strings: •

ALL = (Climate change AND (Indigenous Environmental Knowledge OR Indigenous Knowledge OR Traditional Indigenous knowledge OR Traditional Knowledge OR Local Knowledge) AND Africa)

Based on the “full record and cited references” on WoS, the search string above returned a total of 815 publications. Using VOSview software (van Eck & Waltman, 2017), bibliometric analysis (Adisa, Masinde & Botai, 2020; Yang & Zhang, 2020; Botai et al., 2021) of the 815 publications was carried out. In doing so, the parameter “total link strength” was used to establish the connectedness of the climate change and indigenous knowledge research. Further, in order to determine the level of participation of Africans in these publications, the authorship and country-network shown in Figures 11.2a and 11.2b respectively were generated using the parameter “total link strength” of the co-authors’ affiliations.

Conclusion ITIKI (Information Technology and Indigenous Knowledge with Intelligence) is a framework for building an integrated Drought Early Warning System Oceania 4%

Americas 16%

Africa 35%

Asia 4%

Europe 41%

Figure 11.2a  Participation of Africans in research on climate change & IKS: Author regional affiliations

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Figure 11.2b  Participation of Africans in research on climate change & IKS: Author country affiliations

(DEWS) that integrates indigenous and scientific drought forecasting approaches using three ICTs: (1) mobile phones; (2) Wireless sensor networks and (3) Artificial Intelligence (agents, fuzzy logic and artificial neural networks). Itiki (pronounced e-ti-ki and spelled as ïtiki) is the name given to an indigenous bridge used for crossing rivers among the Mbeere people in the Eastern part of Kenya. As described in Masinde (2015), ITIKI is a highly accurate (70–98%) early drought warning service that helps small scale farmers make better and informed decisions, e.g., on when, what, how and where to plant. Similarly, ITIKI can be adopted for the integration of IEK with climate science. Despite being branded as the continent not ready for climate change, the presentations in this paper prove otherwise. Africans are awake to the tragedies of copying-andpasting Western solutions on one hand and the potential of their indigenous knowledge on the other hand. Entrenching IK within the climate sciences is alive in Africa and African researchers are on the steering wheel of this train. It is safe to conclude that, when it comes to the war on combating climate change, Africans’ victory is coming tomorrow!

References Adisa, O. M., Masinde, M. and Botai, J. O. (2020) ‘Bibliometric Analysis of Methods and Tools for Drought Monitoring and Prediction in Africa’, Sustainability, 12(16), p. 6516. Ayal, D. Y. (2017) ‘Revisiting Indigenous Biotic and Abiotic Weather Forecasting for Possible Integration with Scientific Weather Prediction: A Case from the Borana People of South Ethiopia’, in Purushothaman Venkatesan (ed.) Indigenous People. Rijeka, Croatia: InTech, 135–158. Botai, J. O. et al., (2021) ‘A Review of the Water – Energy – Food Nexus Research in Africa’, Sustainability, 13, p. 1762.

144  Muthoni Masinde and Julius R. Atlhopheng van Eck, N. J. and Waltman, L. (2017) ‘Citation-based clustering of publications using CitNetExplorer and VOSviewer’, Scientometrics. Springer Netherlands, 111(2), pp. 1053–1070. doi: 10.1007/s11192-017-2300-7. Heeks, R. (2002) ‘I-development not e-development: Special issue on ICTs and development,’ Journal of International Development. doi: 10.1002/jid.861. Kolawole, O., Motsholapheko, M., Ngwenya, B., Thakadu, O. T., Mmopelwa, G., Kgathi, D. (2016) ‘Climate variability and rural livelihoods: How farming households perceive and adapt to climatic shocks in the Okavango Delta, Botswana’, Weather, Climate, and Society, 8 (2), pp. 131–145. https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-15-0019.1. Mafongoya, P. L. and Ajayi, O. C. (2017) Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Climate Change Management in Africa. Wageningen: CTA, https://hdl.handle.net/10568/91189. Manganyi, J. S. and Buitendag, J. (2013) ‘A critical analysis on African Traditional Religion and the Trinity’, HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies, 69(1), pp. 1–13. doi: 10.4102/hts.v69i1.1934. Masinde, M. (2015) ‘An innovative drought early warning system for sub-saharan Africa: Integrating modern and indigenous approaches’, African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development, 7(1). doi: 10.1080/20421338.2014.971558. Masinde, M. (2020) ‘ITIKI Success Story: Classic Application of Design Thinking’, in Cunningham, M. C. and P. (ed.) IST-Africa 2020 Conference Proceedings. Kampala, Uganda: IEEE, pp. 1–9. Masinde, M., Mwagha, M. and Tadesse, T. (2018) ‘Downscaling Africa’s drought forecasts through integration of indigenous and scientific drought forecasts using fuzzy cognitive maps,’ Geosciences (Switzerland), 8(4). doi: 10.3390/geosciences8040135. Mitchell, J. F. B. (1989) ‘The “Greenhouse” effect and climate change’, Reviews of Geophysics. doi: 10.1029/RG027i001p00115. Ofoegbu, C. and Chirwa, P. W. (2019) ‘Analysis of rural people’s attitude towards the management of tribal forests in South Africa’, Journal of Sustainable Forestry. Taylor & Francis, 38(4), pp. 396–411. doi: 10.1080/10549811.2018.1554495. Schaeffer, M. et al. (2015) ‘Africa’s Adaptation Gap 2’, pp. 1–67. Smith, R. (2012) ‘Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty’, RUSI Journal. doi: 10.1080/03071847.2012.733122. Wilson, K. A. et al. (2007) ‘Conserving biodiversity efficiently: What to do, where and when’, PLoS Biology. doi: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0050223. Yang, W. and Zhang, J. (2020) ‘The Prediction of Infectious Diseases : A Bibliometric Analysis’, Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 17(17), p. 6218.

NO: AFRICANS ARE NOT ADAPTING WELL TO CLIMATE CHANGE

Introduction General climate change – Why it is an issue and why the world should be concerned Climate change often forces people to migrate, putting more pressure on cities, due to the extreme weather events it generates and other related impacts (WMO, 10 March 2020). In addition, climate change has led to

Are Africans adapting well to climate change? 145

environmental refugees, who migrate to other countries in search of secure livelihood options. Climate change threatens intergenerational equity, with many in Africa being born into poverty, thus inheriting poverty. Thus, climate change is building societies which are being left behind, due to emissions that continue un-abated; and the lack of capacity to adapt, typical of developing African countries (Atlhopheng et al., 2019). The intergenerational poverty due to climate change will likely escalate due to the increasing global temperatures which threaten the attainment of the Paris Agreement. The 1.5°C targets as well as those for 2°C continue to remain elusive and current efforts are not enough to meet them (World Bank, 2019). The necessary investments in renewable energy, sustainable financing mechanisms, climate smart/resilient health, agriculture etc. continue to remain out of reach, especially with increased extreme events which include epidemiology (World Bank, 2019). Climate change adaptation requires tracking the successes made, including efforts to build resilience. The continent of Africa depends on economic sectors that are more vulnerable to the rigors of climate change. Thus, the continent suffers due to the disposition of higher vulnerability. Adaptation measures now would reduce the impacts going into the future. To build better resilience and enhance ease of adaptation, the continent needs to shift to sectors that are more climate-smart, and have better economic complexity indices. This shift would cushion it from current and future climate impacts. There is thus need for a guidance framework on implementing adaption (World Bank, 2019), e.g., investment portfolios to guide businesses on the nature and attributes of climate resilient investments, green bonds; resilience metrics (standards) and criteria for climate resilient projects (risks, adaptive capacity, national resilience building) where behavioral, policy and infrastructural options are included. Global efforts in coordinating adaptation – UN, continental blocks, agencies, NGOs, national, regional and community level. The climate change challenge has seen the formation of several entities, nationally, regionally, and internationally, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) complement national governments initiatives, on climate change; as well as institutional initiatives. The UNFCCC seeks to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at acceptable levels which would avoid untenable anthropogenic interference to the climate system. This means taking action within a safe time frame which would enable ecosystems and humanity to naturally adapt to ensure sustainability continues. This also means protecting the planet for present and future generations; to help developing parties to bear and adjust to climate change impacts as they develop their economies and the common but differentiated responsibilities to climate change, i.e., taking into account different contexts e.g. socio-economic, technical, capacity and environmental considerations. This will ensure that risks and impacts of climate change, through adaptation plans, lead to the building of resilience.

146  Muthoni Masinde and Julius R. Atlhopheng

The IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) provides data on climate change, assesses the science related to climate change, and the implications of such data on socio-economic and other systems/processes. These may include future climate change risks – and the possible/sustainable options that are amenable to application. For instance, the 2018 IPCC report, on 1.5°C warming, points to a ‘not safe’ level for natural and human systems. This means, compared to the current 1°C warming, the new scenario leads to insecurity of most nations, communities, ecosystems, and sectors – and this is at a high confidence level. The science is pointing to a worsening global trajectory. SDG13 – data on actions based on targets/indicators (are we winning or losing?) The UN’s SDG131 on climate seeks urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts. Like other SDGs, the success of SDG13 can be assessed using the 5Ps, that is, ensure that no person suffers from poverty or hunger, that the planet is protected, that “peaceful, just and inclusive societies” are created to ensure prosperity, and that the partnerships needed to achieve the UN’s SDGs exist (see The 5Ps of the Sustainable Development Goals).2 Efforts to achieve the SDGs are consistent with combating climate change (high confidence by IPCC 2018 report on 1.5°C warming). Secondly, there is high agreement that “adaptation strategies can result in trade-offs with and among the SDGs” and that “pursuing place-specific adaptation pathways towards a 1.5°C warmer world has the potential for significant positive outcomes for well-being in countries at all levels of development.” Thus, it has been established that climate change adaptation options have some co-benefits with sustainable development initiatives. To monitor SDGs, there is a tracker – and for goal 13, there are 5 Targets and 8 Indicators (see Table 11.1). Table 11.1  SDG13 on data tracker (20 March 2020) SDG13 Target

Evidence/data for action

13.1: Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related disasters

a) Mixed signal of success & failure on deaths, injuries from disasters and environmental refugees. b) No data on disaster risk management for many countries. Same for local disaster risk management. a) Most INDCs submitted, but no data on implementation of adaptation actions. a)  Education on climate change – no data. b) Capacity-building for climate change – no data a)  GCF pledges per capita, ongoing.

13.2: Integrate climate change measures into policy and planning 13.3: Build knowledge and capacity to meet climate change 13.A: Implement then UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 13.B: Promote mechanisms to raise capacity for planning and management

a)  No data for LDCs.

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Climate change – Its nature and context in the African continent National development and climate change: Climate change has “the largest risk multipliers for the people, environment and stability of the continent”(UNDP 2018:4). Thus, climate change challenges development endeavors, and even threatens to reverse the gains made earlier. Climate change is also associated with extreme events e.g. droughts, floods and diseases. This is in addition to existing development needs, hence an extra burden for fragile economies. Knowledge-based economy and climate change impacts: Households and traditional knowledge systems are susceptible to climate change as the new conditions contrast with past patterns upon which the traditional knowledge was founded. Modern scientific knowledge approaches rely on western know-how which requires funding to access. Since many stakeholders are compromised financially, adaptation on the basis of knowledge may lead to mal-adaptation. There is also limited information and capacity on climate change – e.g. adaptation options and climate change coordination. Policies and climate change: Even though Africa has made strides in developing policies and applying them (policy implementation), the impact is variable. Since most of its policies are not climate change compliant, its development initiatives also have no in-built climate change adaptation leave alone the inclusion of stakeholders to reduce inequalities in risks, decision making, disaster vulnerability, health, wealth/finance, food & nutrition security, services, and assets. Mainstreaming climate change into development, as per Paris agreement, has been done through Global Environment Facility (GEF), albeit with limited success. Many sectors therefore have room for improvement. Technologies and innovations for climate change: These are key to adapting and ensuring sustainable benefits from targeted interventions, yet continental progress on this measure is wanting partly because Africa’s technological and innovation indices are amongst the lowest in the world. The UNFCCC’s bilateralism and Annexure 1 commitments on technology transfers to mitigate the continent’s climate change impacts do not make adaptation to rise to measurable, reportable, and verifiable levels. Thus, transformative and low carbon development in Africa is low. Market systems to curtail climate change and enhance adaptation: Market tools such as tax incentives, insurance schemes, and investments for climate change remain poorly developed to ensure a climate secure Africa that is well adapted to impending climate change impacts. Funding for climate change: Since most African economies are weak, they struggle to finance their climate change and development priorities.

148  Muthoni Masinde and Julius R. Atlhopheng

Consequently, there is insufficient availability of predictable and sustainable funding to carry out adaptation projects and initiatives to the desired level of impact. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) has not demonstrated impact to build resilience across the continent, and it has not led to sustainable funding or empowered many countries to scale up best adaptation practices. Co-funding with the private sector, which is either under-developed in the continent or dominated by multinational companies, has not led to the significant innovate benefits. Therefore, the continent’s climate change adaptation burden is on under-resourced individuals and governments. Climate change also creates serious equity concerns. For example, while the world’s industrialized countries often create enormous economic value by emitting copious amounts of greenhouse gases; developing countries contribute to this prosperity by paying for adaptation. The nexus approach to climate change: The nexus approach is critical to climate change resilience building because the approach is more holistic and impactful (Figure 11.3). Moreover, this cross-sectoral approach promotes collaborative partnerships that more effectively engage stakeholders and deliver climate change solutions. Yet, most climate change agencies do not follow the nexus approach due to their unfamiliarity with it as well as the tendency to follow the familiar established procedures of sectoral processes (World Bank, 2019). It is noted that, the benefits of nexus thinking have not been adequately researched, neither are their economic benefits and their ability to break silos. Thus, there is need to adopt this transformative disposition.

Figure 11.3  Benefits of nexus approach to climate change adaptation pathways (with excerpts from World Bank, 2019).

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Climate change adaptation in Africa – conclusions Successful adaptation to climate change is about avoiding or reducing harm and harnessing the benefits that arise due to the change (Moseley, 2016; Filho et al., 2018; Atlhopheng et al., 2019). Thus, adaptation is the ability to cope with climate change exposures and risks so as to maintain resilience. Unfortunately, sustainable adaptation funding provisions are limited, despite the GCF and others. Climate change adaptation may lead to new, innovative, and beneficial ventures, business opportunities, technologies, and processes. For instance, climate change adaptation may address the accumulation and protection of assets, risks, and the ability to adapt at the ecosystem and the landscape management levels in diverse sectors such as agroforestry, climate smart agriculture, water conservations, and renewable energy. The UNFCCC’s first, second and third communications, as well as the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs), outline some of these adaptations. Nevertheless, the mainstreaming of climate change into urban, regional, and national socioeconomic development policies and plans, and the integration of gender responsive considerations in National [Climate] Adaptation Plan (NAP) processes (Dazé & Dekens, 2017), points to limited success in building resilience i.e., no effective adaptation has been demonstrated; including inadequate nexus/synergy approaches. The adaptation pathways, and their measure of effectiveness, are tools that need to be developed so as to apply comparisons at scale, including globally.

Notes

1. SDG13 refers to the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal 13 on Climate Change (https://sdgs.un.org/goals). 2. The 5Ps of the Sustainable Development Goals https://www.unescwa.org/sites/ default/files/inline-files/the_5ps_of_the_sustainable_development_goals.pdf

References Action Plan on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience: Managing risks for a more resilient future. World Bank (2019). The World Bank Group Action Plan on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience. Washington, DC: World Bank. Atlhopheng J.R., M.G. Moshoeshoe, G. Phunyuka and W. Mokgopa (2019). Biodiversity and climate change perceptions in arid lands-implications for sustainable development in Botswana. Botswana Journal of Agriculture and Applied Sciences, 13(2), 24–31. https://doi.org/10.37106/bojaas.2019.47. Chersich, M.F. and Wright, C.Y. Climate change adaptation in South Africa: a case study on the role of the health sector (2019). Global Health 15, 22 (2019). https://doi. org/10.1186/s12992-019-0466-x Dazé, A. & Dekens, J. (2017) ‘Gender in National Adaptation Plan (NAP) Processes: A pilot review of climate change adaptation planning documents from 15 countries’, NAP Global Network, May 27, 2017, International Institute for Sustainable Development – IISD,

150  Muthoni Masinde and Julius R. Atlhopheng https://napglobalnetwork.org/2017/05/gender-national-adaptation-plan-nap-processespilot-review-climate-change-adaptation-planning-documents-15-countries/, accessed March 26, 2020. Filho, W. L.; Balogun, A-L; Ayal, D. Y.; Bethurem, E. M.; Murambadoro, M.; Mambo, J.; Taddese, H.; Tefera, G. W.; Nagy, G. J.; Fudjumdjum, H.; Mugabe, P. (2018) Strengthening climate change adaptation capacity in Africa-case studies from six major African cities and policy implications. Environmental Science & Policy, Volume 86, August 2018, Pages 29–37. IPCC Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5°C (2018). https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ Moseley, W. (2016). Agriculture on the Brink: Climate Change, Labor and Smallholder Farming in Botswana. Land. 5. 21. 10.3390/land5030021. Published. Rissik, D. and Reis, N. (2013) City of Melbourne Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan. The National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility. https://www.nccarf.edu.au/localgov/case-study/city-melbourne-climate-changeadaptation-strategy-and-action-plan. SDG Tracker – Goal 13. https://sdg-tracker.org/climate-change#targets (accessed 20 March 2020) The Commonwealth and Climate Change (2018) at COP24. https://thecommonwealth. org/sites/default/files/inline/EYSSD_COP24_Booklet.pdf. UNDP 2018: Climate Change Adaptation in Africa - UNDP Synthesis of Experiences and Recommendations. https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/publications/CCAAfrica-Final.pdf. UNFCCC: https://unfccc.int/. World Bank (2019) The World Bank Group Action Plan on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience, Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/519821547481031999/The-World-Bank-Groups-Action-Plan-on-Climate-ChangeAdaptation-and-Resilience-Managing-Risks-for-a-More-Resilient-Future.pdf. World Meteorological Organization – 10 March 2020. Multi-agency report highlights increasing signs and impacts of climate change in atmosphere, land and oceans. https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/multi-agency-report-highlightsincreasing-signs-and-impacts-of-climate-change.

12 Is the New Green Revolution Approach the best way to Address Hunger in Africa? YES: Glenn Denning

School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, USA

NO: Hanson Nyantakyi-Frimpong

Department of Geography, University of Denver, USA Issue Summary and Introduction Glenn Denning of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, USA, discusses how several countries responded to the launching of the African Green Revolution in 2004 with policies and programs to boost agricultural productivity. This includes Malawi where farm input subsidies have almost doubled maize production. Across sub-Saharan Africa, cereal production has increased by 77% since 2004, through a 37% increase in crop area and 29% higher yields. Africa’s recent production gains compare favorably with those of Asia (1966–1981), yet scope for productivity improvement remains. Denning argues that, to end hunger in Africa, the Green Revolution approach must be adapted to include investments in market infrastructure, improved postharvest stewardship, healthy and sustainable diets, and access to safety nets for the most vulnerable. Hanson Nyantakyi-Frimpong of the Department of Geography and Environment at the University of Denver, USA, discusses the recent efforts of the New Green Revolution to promote the heavy use of fertilizer, hybrid seeds, pesticides, and related inputs to increase food production in Africa. The underlying goals of this approach are to transform traditional African agriculture, eliminate poverty and prevent hunger. He argues that due to its many limitations, the new Green Revolution is not the best approach to address hunger in Africa. Some of these limitations include an excessive focus on food availability versus access and quality, threats to Indigenous farming knowledge, environmental concerns and likelihood that high-cost inputs will lead to growing inequalities in Africa. The authors in this issue are debating the best way to address malnutrition and food insecurity in Africa. In particular, they are focusing on the pros and cons of a donor supported initiative launched in 2004 known as the New Green Revolution for Africa. As Denning and Nyantakyi-Frimpong DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-15

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discuss, the main idea has been to encourage increased use of improved seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides and to better integrate African farmers into more commercial networks. While boosting food production may seem like the most obvious way to address food insecurity, the scholarship on this topic suggests that it is a more complicated problem. Food security is defined by the United Nations as “a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”.1 Furthermore, the studies suggest that there are six dimensions of food security that need to be considered when addressing malnutrition. We briefly present these dimensions here so the reader may keep them in mind when assessing both sides of this debate. These are: availability, access, stability, utilization, sustainability, and agency. Availability refers to how much food is available to a household, either through its own production or on the market. Available food in a country is often a combination of local production and net food imports (or imports minus exports). Access is a household’s ability to acquire food. While there may be plenty of food on the market, one needs adequate financial resources to purchase the food. This means that poor households often have more limited access to food. Sadly, there are historical examples of famines happening at the same time there is plenty of food on the market. Stability has become increasingly important in a global trading system where some food markets experience considerable price volatility, making it more difficult for poorer households to access food. Utilization refers to having proper access to the sanitation and cooking facilities needed to properly prepare food. For example, if the price of cooking gas goes up, it may be more difficult for some households to properly prepare nutritious food. The last two dimensions of food security, and the newest to be recognized by the scholarly community, are sustainability and agency. Sustainability refers to the durability of food production practices, or the ability to produce food without undermining the natural resource base. Agency refers to the control a community or individual has over how they produce food and over the type of food they consume. For example, structural factors, like supermarketization in Southern Africa, may constrain people’s agency in making healthy food choices, resulting in the consumption of more processed and less nutritious foods. This background information should help you better digest these readings. We hope you will enjoy this engaging and dynamic debate. YES: THE NEW GREEN REVOLUTION APPROACH IS THE BEST WAY TO ADDRESS HUNGER IN AFRICA? Ethiopia experienced extraordinary famine conditions between 1983 and 1985. After three years of weather-related crop failures, exacerbated by civil conflict, an estimated one million people perished, and millions more were

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displaced or impoverished by the crisis that extended to the Greater Horn of Africa and beyond (Keller, 1992). Television reporting by the BBC’s Michael Buerk and Mohamed Amin brought unprecedented global awareness of hunger on the African continent (Franks, 2014). The BBC footage was transmitted by 425 television stations worldwide (Franks, 2014) and a globally broadcasted concert, Live Aid, reached almost two billion people in 150 countries ( Jones, 2005). Hunger in Africa had become a global issue.

Bringing the Green Revolution to Africa: Ryoichi Sasakawa and Norman Borlaug Ryoichi Sasakawa (1899–1995), founder and former Chairman of the Japan Shipbuilding Industry Foundation, was deeply moved by the Ethiopian tragedy (Sasakawa, 2015). He believed that food aid was not a lasting solution and was aware that high-yielding rice and wheat varieties had helped avert famine in India and Pakistan in the 1960s. The rapid spread of these technologies – known as the Green Revolution – required strong public policies and investments in research and development, irrigation and rural roads, credit for farmers, input supply systems, and price stabilization mechanisms (Hazell, 2009). The Green Revolution approach had spectacular impacts on food security, poverty reduction, and economic growth in Asia (Pinstrup-Andersen & Hazell, 1985). Sasakawa was convinced that a Green Revolution approach could work in Africa. He enlisted Norman Borlaug (1914–2009), who won the 1970 Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions to world food security. Borlaug was aware of promising research for maize and sorghum, two key African food staples (Sasakawa, 2015). He believed that the key to success would be strong agricultural extension campaigns that had worked in India and Pakistan. Former US President Jimmy Carter offered support in mobilizing political leadership in Africa, and in 1986, Sasakawa Global 2000 and the Sasakawa Africa Association (in this paper, collectively referred to as Sasakawa) were formed to bring Asia’s Green Revolution to Africa. Between 1986 and 2003, Sasakawa established millions of field demonstrations across Africa to promote new crop varieties, increased fertilizer use, nitrogen-fixing cover crops, and better crop management methods (Sasakawa, 2015). Farmers’ yields doubled or tripled, but often resulted in localized supply gluts, postharvest losses, and depressed prices. This experience generated concerns that a narrow, production-focus was not suited to African conditions where markets were poorly developed. Despite some localized successes of Sasakawa and others, agricultural productivity in Africa remained stagnant as we entered the 21st century. Cereal yields were just over 1 metric ton (t)/hectare (ha) (FAO). The 2002 World Food Prize laureate, Pedro Sanchez, identified soil fertility depletion as the major biophysical cause of low per-capita food production in Africa (Sanchez, 2002). However, replenishment of soil fertility was constrained by the risky nature of rainfed agriculture, poorly adapted crop varieties, costly fertilizer due to high

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transport costs and the absence of policy incentives and strong institutions to promote technology adoption. These constraints had been overcome in much of Asia, but not in Africa, where a different approach would be needed.

Launching a uniquely African Green Revolution: Kofi Annan On July 5, 2004, one day before an African Union (AU) summit, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan (1938–2018) addressed an audience of several heads of state, senior government officials, and assorted development experts and diplomats at the UN Conference Centre in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He made an impassioned call to action launching a new effort to end hunger in Africa (Annan, 2004): Let us generate a uniquely African green revolution – a revolution that is long overdue, a revolution that will help the continent in its quest for dignity and peace. A year earlier, African Heads of State and Government signed the Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security. As a result, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) was established to increase public investment in agriculture to 10% of national budgets, and to raise agricultural growth to at least 6% annually. Building on the momentum created by the Maputo Declaration and CAADP, Annan’s speech in Addis Ababa acknowledged that Africa was the only continent where food availability and child malnutrition were worsening. While agricultural productivity had advanced in Asia, there had been no Green Revolution in Africa. African farmers on average applied about eight kilograms of fertilizer per hectare, less than a tenth of that applied by Asian farmers (Morris et al., 2007). Agriculture in Africa depended almost entirely on rainfall and was vulnerable to climate shocks. Structural adjustment and the dismantling of government support to agriculture had also slowed progress in African agriculture. Prior to the Addis Ababa conference, the UN Millennium Project Hunger Task Force (HTF) developed a practical framework for action on hunger (Sanchez & Swaminathan, 2005). The HTF recommended that Africa’s small-holders gain better access to agriculture inputs – in essence, a Green Revolution approach within an integrated rural development strategy. In his Addis Ababa speech, Annan endorsed the HTF recommendations, and called for practical interventions appropriate to Africa, including: soil health improvements; water and irrigation investments; improved seeds; better roads; access to credit; rural electrification; more extension workers; communitybased health workers and effective anti-malarial control. Annan recognized the importance of African women in agriculture and called for increasing their access to land, credit, technology, training and extension services.

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Following Annan’s call for a uniquely African Green Revolution, several countries responded with policies and programs to boost agricultural productivity. Few attracted as much attention as Malawi, where the government embarked on one of the most ambitious assaults on hunger in the history of the African continent (Denning et al., 2009).

“Enough is enough”: Malawi’s Green Revolution A dry spell, during Malawi’s 2004–2005 growing season, reduced the national maize yield to just 0.8 t/ha, a third lower than the long-term average; it was the country’s worst harvest in a decade (FAO). By late 2005, five million Malawians – 38% of the population – were at risk of acute hunger. President Bingu wa Mutharika (1934–2012) decided he would no longer rely on food aid for national food security. Instead, the Government of Malawi implemented a nationwide program to subsidize fertilizer and provide improved maize seed to millions of farmers. The controversial strategy worked: from a 43% national food deficit in 2005, Malawi achieved a 53% surplus in 2007 (Denning et al., 2009). Reflecting on Malawi’s experience in June 2008 meeting of the World Economic Forum in Cape Town, Mutharika declared: “Enough is enough. I am not going on my knees to beg for food. Let us grow the food ourselves.” (Mutharika, 2008) The Malawi government has continued to subsidize farm inputs since 2005, amid criticisms of high cost, inefficient implementation, corruption, and perverse political motivations. The program resulted in a quantum leap in maize production: over 14 years following the 2005 drought, annual national production has averaged 3.20 million t with an average yield of 1.96 t/ha; in the 14 years prior to 2005, the corresponding figures are 1.70 million t and 1.24 t/ha (FAO). The Green Revolution approach has enabled Malawi to avoid the famine conditions that struck Ethiopia in the mid-1980s. Malawi was spared the destructive riots that accompanied the worldwide food price spikes in 2007–2008 and in 2010–2011. However, since 2005, the country’s population has risen from 13 million to almost 19 million in 2020; as a result, national food supply has again dropped below national requirements. Malawi’s Green Revolution was necessary, but not sufficient to end hunger in Malawi. The counterfactual case of a Malawi without farm input subsidies can only be imagined: catastrophic hunger, political instability and conflict, mass migration, and continuing dependence on food aid. Even with the high cost of imported fertilizer and the inherent riskiness of rainfed farming, experience from the Millennium Villages Project found that local production was much cheaper than food aid delivered from the United States, estimated at $806/t in 2008 (Sanchez, Denning, & Nziguheba, 2009). Even the most ardent supporters of Malawi’s input subsidy program recognize the need to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. However, the less intangible benefits of national food security – including “dignity and peace”

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mentioned by Annan in his Addis Ababa speech – demand further reflection by those donor agencies and academics who have consistently dismissed Malawi’s efforts as a policy failure.

Progress and prospects The uniquely African Green Revolution, launched by Kofi Annan in 2004, and implemented by Malawi and several other countries, is beginning to demonstrate a tangible impact on a continental scale. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation established the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) in 2006; AGRA has since supported governments, businesses, and NGOs to improve the livelihoods of more than 10 million smallholder farmers in 11 focus countries (AGRA, 2021). In 2014, the AU’s Malabo Declaration on Agricultural Growth and Transformation committed to end hunger by 2025 through doubling agricultural productivity (AU Commission & NEPAD, 2016). In his retrospective of the Green Revolution, Prabhu Pingali noted that, while Africa had lagged behind Asia in productivity growth, there was a growing demand for yield-enhancing technologies, as population pressures mounted and the arable land frontier was closing. Pingali noted then that productivity gains from research investments focused on Africa were already beginning to emerge (Pingali, 2012). In terms of percentage cereal production increases, sub-Saharan Africa (2004–2019) has outperformed Asia (1966–1981) over the initial 15 years of implementation. Since 2004, cereal production across sub-Saharan Africa has increased by 77%, because of an increase of 37% in crop area harvested and a yield increase of 29% (FAO, comparing averages for 2002–2004 and 2017–2019). Taking 1966 as the starting point for the Asian Green Revolution, the comparable cereal production increase over the first 15 years was 62%, with a yield increase of 50% and an 8% increase in crop area harvested (FAO, comparing averages for 1964–1966 and 1979–1981). While Asia’s Green Revolution came almost entirely from yield increases, Africa’s Green Revolution required significant contributions from both land area expansion and yield per hectare. There remains considerable potential for further productivity improvements in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially through soil fertility improvement ( Jayne & Sanchez, 2021). Images of the Ethiopian famine in October 1984 were a wakeup call to the world. But through its increased investment in research and extension, Ethiopia has enjoyed the highest agricultural growth rate of any country in sub-Saharan Africa since 2000 ( Jayne & Sanchez, 2021). Despite reliance on rainfed farming systems, recurrent droughts, poor infrastructure and underfunded public institutions and services, Africa has responded to Kofi Annan’s 2004 call for a uniquely African Green Revolution. Malawi, Ethiopia and Ghana, among others, have shown the way. Key success factors have included: • •

Strong and committed national leadership Applied research to develop and adapt improved technologies

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• • • • •

Improved infrastructure to connect farmers to input and output markets Promotion of technologies through modern extension approaches Financing to ensure technologies are widely adopted by farmers Market support and price stability to encourage investment An enabling environment for the private sector

The uniquely African Green Revolution is underway (Sanchez, 2015; Jayne & Sanchez, 2021). But Africa continues to have the highest prevalence of hunger of any region: almost 20% of the population is undernourished (FAO et al., 2019), and the population is rising at 2.6% per annum (UN, 2019). Hunger has been on the rise in most African regions since 2015 (FAO et al., 2019). Drought, conflict, and the COVID-19 pandemic are key contributing factors and cannot be addressed by production alone. A successfully executed Green Revolution approach must be just one part of a comprehensive and context-specific food security strategy that includes public and private investment in market infrastructure, improved postharvest stewardship, healthy and sustainable diets and access to safety nets for the most vulnerable. No doubt, Kofi Annan would urge us all to act with even greater purpose and urgency in the quest to end hunger and malnutrition in Africa. It matters little whether the effort is branded as a “Green Revolution,” but “green” and “revolutionary”, it must be.

References African Union Commission and NEPAD (2016). Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods. https://www. nepad.org/caadp/publication/malabo-declaration-accelerated-agricultural-growth (accessed August 29, 2021) AGRA (Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa) (2021). Nurturing Change Across African Agriculture. Annual Report 2020. https://agra.org/annual-report-2020/wp-content/ uploads/AGRA-Annual-Report-2021-15-07-2021-02.pdf (accessed August 29, 2021) Annan, Kofi (2004). Secretary-General Calls for ‘Uniquely African Green Revolution’in 21st Century, to End Continent’s Plague of Hunger, in Addis Ababa Remarks. SG/ SM/9405-AFR/988. 6 July 2004. https://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sgsm9405.doc. htm (accessed August 29, 2021) Denning, G., Kabambe, P., Sanchez, P., Malik, A., Flor, R., Harawa, R., Nkhoma, P., Zamba, C., Banda, C.Magombo, C., Keating, M., Wangila, J. & Sachs, J. (2009). Input subsidies to improve smallholder maize productivity in Malawi: Toward an African Green Revolution. PLoS Biol 7(1): e1000023. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1000023 FAO (n.d.). FAOSTAT database. http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QCL (accessed August 29, 2021) FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO (2019). The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2019. Safeguarding against economic slowdowns and downturns. Rome, FAO. http://www.fao.org/3/ca5162en/ca5162en.pdf (accessed August 29, 2021) Franks, Suzanne (2014) Ethiopian famine: how landmark BBC report influenced modern coverage. The Guardian Poverty Matters Blog: https://www.theguardian.com/ global-development/poverty-matters/2014/oct/22/ethiopian-famine-report-influencemodern-coverage (accessed August 29, 2021)

158  Glenn Denning and Hanson Nyantakyi-Frimpong Hazell, P. B. R. (2009). The Asian Green Revolution. IFPRI Discussion Paper. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute. https://www.ifpri.org/publication/ asian-green-revolution (accessed August 29, 2021) Jayne, T.S. & Sanchez, P.A. (2021) Agricultural productivity must improve in subSaharan Africa. Science, 372 (6546), 1045–1047. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abf5413 Jones, Graham (2005). Live Aid 1985: A day of magic. CNN.com: http://edition.cnn. com/2005/SHOWBIZ/Music/07/01/liveaid.memories/index.html (accessed August 29, 2021) Keller, E. (1992). Drought, war, and the politics of famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 30(4), 609–624. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00011071 Morris, M., Kelly, V. A., Kopicki, R. J., & Byerlee, D. (2007). Fertilizer use in African agriculture: Lessons learned and good practice guidelines. The World Bank. https:// doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-6880-0 Mutharika, Bingu Wa (2008). World Economic Forum on Africa: Capitalizing on Opportunity 17. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rmUjw1J35V4 See President Mutharika’s intervention from 32 min. (accessed August 29, 2021) Pingali, P. L. (2012). Green revolution: impacts, limits, and the path ahead. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(31), 12302–12308. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas. 0912953109 Pinstrup-Andersen, P. & Hazell, P.B.R. (1985). The impact of the green revolution and prospects for the future, Food Reviews International, 1:1, 1–25, https://doi.org/ 10.1080/87559128509540765 Sasakawa Africa Association (2015). Take it to the farmer: the Sasakawa experience in Africa. Sasakawa Africa Association. https://www.saa-safe.org/elfiles/d3gqNeG9/saa30year_ history.pdf (accessed August 29, 2021) Sanchez, P. A. (2002). Soil fertility and Hunger in Africa. Science 295 (5562), 2019–2020. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1065256. Sanchez, P. A. (2015). En route to plentiful food production in Africa. Nature Plants, 1(1), 14014. https://doi.org/10.1038/nplants.2014.14 Sanchez, P. A., & Swaminathan, M. S. (2005). Cutting world hunger in half. Science 307(5708), 357–359. http://doi.org/10.1126/science.1109057. Sanchez, P. A., Denning, G. L., & Nziguheba, G. (2009). The African Green Revolution moves forward. Food Security 1, 37–44. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-009-0011-5 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). World Population Prospects 2019, Volume I: Comprehensive Tables (ST/ESA/ SER.A/426). https://population.un.org/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2019_Volume-I_ Comprehensive-Tables.pdf (accessed August 29, 2021)

NO: THE NEW GREEN REVOLUTION APPROACH IS NOT THE BEST WAY TO ADDRESS HUNGER IN AFRICA While this effort may raise agricultural production, the focus on exogenous technologies and market integration excludes the poorest of the poor and thereby fails to address hunger. Moseley, 2017, p. 178

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Introduction Over the last few years, world hunger rates have increased steadily. The Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) latest report shows that an average of 768 million people were facing hunger in 2020, which represents 118 million more hungry people in 2020 than in 2019 (FAO et al, 2021). The report further shows enduring and troubling regional inequalities in the rate of hunger. Of the 768 million undernourished people in 2020, more than one-third (282 million) were living in Africa (FAO et al., 2021). For children who are underweight, a measure that captures acute malnutrition, the absolute number for Africa has risen over the past two decades and is expected to remain unchanged until 2030 (FAO et al., 2021; Global Nutrition Report, 2020). These statistics raise concerns about Africa’s ability to achieve the Zero Hunger target in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The question of how best to reduce hunger and under-nutrition in Africa has been a subject of heated and polarized debate. On one hand, some have called for the use of agro-ecological practices rooted in indigenous knowledge and that enhance biodiversity, ecological resilience, and social justice (Bezner Kerr, 2012; Snapp et al., 2010). On the opposite hand, others have called for a New Green Revolution for Africa (hereafter GR4A), mimicking earlier efforts to improve agriculture in Asia ( Juma, 2015; Toenniessen et al., 2008). Spearheaded by philanthropic foundations and a coalition of African and donor governments, the GR4A seeks to promote a high-external-input, market-based model for agricultural development. The basic assumption is that African subsistence-oriented small-holder agriculture is a problem. By relying on indigenous agricultural practices, African farmers are perceived as inefficient, backward, and underproductive (Collier and Dercon, 2014). Advocates of GR4A therefore argue that to boost crop production, farmers need to focus on a few targeted crops (e.g., corn and rice), planted in monoculture and with genetically modified seeds, as well as the heavy application of pesticides and synthetic fertilizers ( Juma, 2015). In this essay, I argue strongly against the GR4A. I contend that this approach is ill-suited to addressing hunger in Africa. As I show below, the GR4A reproduces the same problems that have historically stalled agricultural development in Africa, including resource depletion, intensifying class and gender inequalities, and the lack of respect for indigenous knowledge. I have organized my arguments around the onion metaphor, a framework employed to show the hidden, scalar, and multilayered problems inherent in the GR4A. The onion is an illuminating bulb, but only by peeling its many hidden layers can one reveal whether there is a sweet or a rotten core. I pose and examine one fundamental question: when examined critically, does the “GR4A Onion” have a sweet or a rotten core? The following section answers this question, drawing upon my own research and other pertinent case studies and literature on African agriculture.

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Peeling off the hidden layers of the “GR4A onion” Peeling away the layers of the “GR4A Onion” reveals a host of problems and contradictions. Starting from the outer layer (Figure 12.1), the first problem is the narrow focus on productivity. The GR4A prioritizes the maximization of agricultural yields over other socio-economic, environmental, and bio-cultural objectives. It assumes that simply boosting agricultural production would reduce hunger in all households. However, as many empirical case studies have shown, Africa’s hunger crisis is hardly a food supply and availability problem (Bezner Kerr, 2012; Moseley, 2017). By simply equating food availability with food access, the GR4A ignores lessons from decades of research on entitlements, capabilities, and rights to resources (Bassett and Winter-Nelson, 2010). A productivity-focused approach also does not address the underlying causes of “hidden hunger,” which is the lack of essential micronutrients like zinc and iron in diets (FAO et al., 2021). Given the GR4A’s emphasis on a few targeted crops, there is little promise of enhancing dietary quality or alleviating micronutrient malnutrition in Africa. In peeling off the second layer of the “GR4A Onion,” issues of cost and income inequality become apparent. Given the nature of the technologies associated with the GR4A (e.g., the use of genetically modified seeds), new seeds must be purchased annually, making this a recurring expenditure (Schnurr, 2019). Yet, most poor African farmers do not have funds for such recurring expenses (Bezner Kerr, 2012; Snapp et al., 2010). They are also not seen as credit-worthy enough to receive agricultural loans. Thus, the GR4A has a class-based problem, which is a fundamental food and social justice issue. It is highly inaccessible to the poorest of the poor for whom food insecurity remains pervasive. If increasingly pushed onto farmers, the GR4A can also lead to financial indebtedness and sharply rising poverty, as has been experienced in Asia (Bezner Kerr, 2012). Similarly, the higher costs farmers pay for externally produced inputs may reduce household incomes. Evidence

Figure 12.1  The “GR4A Onion” Source: Hanson Nyantakyi-Frimpong

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from the nutritional sciences shows that reduced incomes frequently lead to poorer nutrition (FAO et al., 2021), exactly the opposite of what GR4A proponents promise. Given these concerns, there is a profound incongruity between the optimistic rhetoric that accompanies the GR4A and the realities of farmers who are its intended beneficiaries. As the third layer of the “GR4A onion” is peeled away, one comes across a problem related to the colonial perpetuity of disregard for African indigenous knowledge. The GR4A is predicated upon the ideological principles of modernization theory (Bezner Kerr, 2012). This theory suggests that poorer regions need to make the transition from backward, traditional societies, to modern, advanced societies through technological change. In a post-colonial era, this approach to agricultural development is deeply problematic and raises a host of moral and ethical concerns of which two are noteworthy. First, because of its overreliance on external technologies, the GR4A might erode Africa’s ageold and intergenerationally transmitted indigenous farming knowledge. This includes indigenous seed saving practices, soil and water conservation measures, and other agronomic practices (Richard, 1985). Typical examples of this problem have been found in many African countries, concluding in Ghana, Gambia, Malawi, South Africa, and Uganda (Bezner Kerr, 2012; Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner Kerr, 2015; Schnurr, 2019). Secondly, it is rather derogatory to classify a region’s indigenous farming practices as primitive, backward, and in need of technological advancement. As many ecologists and social scientists have shown, African peasant farmers know more about what is needed to improve agricultural productivity than agronomists versed in modern science (Richards, 1985). More crucially, African farming systems are calibrated in response to local socio-environmental conditions, including seasonal labor availability, the timing of rains, soil characteristics, and other biophysical characteristics (Gengenbach et al., 2018; Richards, 1985; Schnurr, 2019). It is therefore unwise to compel farmers to change their time-tested indigenous agricultural practices over the course of millennia and replace them with GR4A. In examining the fourth layer of the “GR4A onion”, one is further confronted with problems linked to environmental sustainability. Since monoculture or single-crop farming is easier to mechanize and irrigate, it is heavily promoted in most GR4A initiatives. For the most part, farms under GR4A initiatives have plants that are of the same species or even genetic identity (Schnurr, 2019). Due to their lack of biological and genetic diversity, as well as overreliance on farm mechanization, monocultures do not support environmental sustainability (Snapp et al., 2010). They lead to groundwater pollution, widespread soil degradation, and worsening pest problems (Weis, 2010). Additionally, farms planted under monoculture do not always promise the best harvests (Snapp et al., 2010). Finally, the innermost layer of the “GR4A Onion” reveals problems linked to gendered property rights, division of labor, and resource access and control. Several case studies have shown how the GR4A and similar initiatives have been politicized even at the household level. These case studies show how GR4A initiatives have led to disputes over women’s traditional land rights,

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intensification of their labor, and worsening nutritional quality (e.g., Bezner Kerr, 2012; Carney, 2004; Gengenbach et al., 2018; Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner Kerr, 2015). For example, ethnographic work in Ghana has shown that women are required to work harder in order to meet weeding and fertilizer application schedules associated with hybrid seeds (NyantakyiFrimpong and Bezner Kerr, 2015). Similarly, in a rice intensification project in Gambia, women’s labor was increased and extended throughout the year rather than seasonally (Carney, 2004).

Conclusion From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that advocates for a GR4A do not fully appreciate the social and structural underpinnings of Africa’s hunger crisis. This has led to (a) externally-designed, top-down, and short-term “solutions” to the crisis; (b) solutions that recycle the problem as the solution; and (c) solutions that also hide the “GR4A Onion’s” hidden layers and rotten core that strengthen the very structures that perpetually reproduce hunger in Africa. In contrast to the GR4A, there are other more viable, sustainable, systemic, historically grounded, and just approaches to addressing hunger in Africa. These include agroecology and food sovereignty approaches that not only hold greater promise in this regard (Snapp et al., 2010) but are already yielding positive results in all parts of Africa (Bezner Kerr, 2012; Moseley, 2017; Snapp et al., 2010). Moreover, these alternative approaches seek to promote, rather than supplant, the rich traditional agricultural knowledge of local African farmers. These approaches are also participatory and integrative and have African farmer-led initiatives at the center of the transformation of the continent’s food systems. To cut down the number of hungry people from two billion to zero, as envisioned in the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) number 2 (Zero Hunger),2 there is need to urgently deal with, and think through, the sting from peeling the “New Green Revolution for Africa (GR4A) Onion”.

Notes

1. HLPE. 2020. “Food Security and Nutrition: Building A Global Narrative Towards 2030”. Report #15. High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE), UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS). June. http://www.fao.org/3/ca9731en/ca9731en.pdf 2. United Nations (___) “The 17 Goals’, https://sdgs.un.org/goals.

References Bassett, T.J. and Winter-Nelson, A. (2010). The atlas of world hunger. University of Chicago Press. Bezner Kerr, R. (2012). Lessons from the old Green Revolution for the new: Social, environmental and nutritional issues for agricultural change in Africa. Progress in Development Studies, 12(2–3), 213–229.

Is New Green Revolution Approach the best way to Address Hunger? 163 Carney, J. (2004). Converting the wetlands, engendering the environment: The intersection of gender with agrarian change in the Gambia. In Peet, R. and Watts, M. Liberation Ecologies. Collier, P. & Dercon, S. (2014). African agriculture in 50 years: Smallholders in a rapidly changing world? World Development, 63, 92–101. FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO (2021). The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2021. Transforming food systems for food security, improved nutrition and affordable healthy diets for all. Rome, FAO. Gengenbach, H., Schurman, R.A., Bassett, T.J., Munro, W.A. & Moseley, W.G. (2018). Limits of the New Green Revolution for Africa: Reconceptualising gendered agricultural value chains. The Geographical Journal, 184(2), 208–214. Global Nutrition Report (2020). Action on Equity to End Malnutrition. Development Initiatives, Bristol, UK. Juma, C. 2015. The New Harvest: Agricultural Innovation in Africa. New York: Oxford University Press. McMichael, P. & Schneider, M. (2011). Food security politics and the Millennium Development Goals. Third World Quarterly, 32(1), 119–139. Moseley, W. G. (2017). The New Green Revolution for Africa: A political ecology critique. Brown Journal of World Affairs, XXIII(II), 177–190. Nyantakyi-Frimpong, H. & Bezner Kerr, R. (2015). A political ecology of high-input agriculture in northern Ghana. African Geographical Review, 34(1), 13–35. Richards, P. (1985). Indigenous Agricultural Revolution: Ecology and food production in West Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Schnurr, M.A. (2019). Africa’s Gene Revolution: Genetically Modified Crops and the Future of African Agriculture. McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP. Snapp, S.S., Blackie, M.J., Gilbert, R.A., Bezner-Kerr, R. & Kanyama-Phiri, G.Y. (2010). Biodiversity can support a greener revolution in Africa. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(48), 20840–20845. Toenniessen, G., Adesina, A. & DeVries, J. (2008). Building an Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1136(1), 233–242. Weis, T. (2010). The accelerating biophysical contradictions of industrial capitalist agriculture. Journal of Agrarian Change, 10(3), 315–341.

13 Does scholarship on African food insecurity have a rural bias? YES: Jane Battersby

Department of Environmental and Geographical Sciences, University of Cape Town, South Africa

NO: Eunice Njogu

Department of Food, Nutrition and Dietetics, Kenyatta University, Kenya Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Jane Battersby of the Department of Environmental and Geographical Sciences at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, argues that African food insecurity scholarship has a rural bias. She demonstrates the relative absence of scholarship on this problem as compared to data on the extent of African urban food insecurity. This persistent rural bias is argued to be the result of an urban agenda that fails to focus on food, a rural development agenda informed by historic urban bias theory, and the power of the development agenda to shape research funding priorities. She calls for an urban food research agenda that views food insecurity in African cities not simply as a phenomenon that exists within these spaces, but one that is shaped by the nature of the urban condition. NO: Eunice Njogu of the Department of Food, Nutrition and Dietetics at Kenyatta University, Kenya argues that scholarship on African food insecurity does not have a rural bias. It is noteworthy that more than half of the world’s population lives in urban areas leading to increased poverty and food insecurity. However, the global sustainable development goals (SDGs) focus on both rural and urban areas. She argues that studies done by individuals and organizations have focused a lot on the urban areas. She recommends that programs and policies be tailored specifically to tackle the emerging food insecurity in urban areas, but that we not forget about rural areas. The focus of this debate is on food insecurity and whether scholars studying this problem in the African context have been overly focused on rural areas. Food security, or access to enough and timely food for a healthy and active live, has received considerable attention in Africa historically. Even today, trying to better understand African food insecurity and hunger dynamics continues to be a topic of scholarly interest because Africa has the highest prevalence of hunger in the world (although the largest number of hungry people are found in South Asia). DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-16

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The question is whether African food security scholars are keeping up with the times and properly accounting for the fact that more and more poor and hungry people now live in African cities. Jane Battersby thinks that they are not, whereas Eunice Njogu believes they are. Battersby makes her point by doing an analysis of scholarly journal publications (finding a relative paucity of publications on urban food insecurity) and then providing an explanation for why this might be. Njogu looks more at development initiatives, suggesting that the problem is adequately recognized. Some background on a few concepts may help us better understand this debate, namely urban bias, urban agriculture, and famine early warning. Jane Battersby discusses urban bias in her essay. This is the idea that many policies in the 1960s and 1970s in Africa favored urban populations. This included, for example, price controls on certain staple foods, overvalued currencies that supported cheaper imports and greater investment in urban infrastructure. Many of these policies were overturned during neoliberal economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, leading to increases in urban poverty. While urban agriculture is a current new trend in some North American and European cities, it has long existed in some African cities, particularly those with less density and more space for such activities. A key point to keep in mind is that there is a lot of variation on the African continent, with urban agriculture or gardening being wide spread in some cities like Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, or Bamako, Mali, and harder to come by in the townships of Cape Town, South Africa or Gaborone, Botswana. A lot of urban gardening in African cities is market oriented, but there are also those who have smaller plots for home consumption. While agriculture and animal husbandry are sometimes considered non-urban or rural activities, this distinction between urban and rural economic activities is often blurrier in many African contexts. Lastly, famine early warning systems were put in place across Africa in the 1980s in the aftermath of some major droughts and famines that caught the international community off guard. These were put in place to carefully monitor several factors related to food insecurity, such as food prices, crop production, rainfall, and livestock prices. These systems have often been more rurally focused as acute hunger was historically a bigger problem in rural areas. A much different approach may be needed to monitor hunger in African cities as the food systems are quite different. We hope you enjoy this debate! YES: SCHOLARSHIP ON AFRICAN FOOD INSECURITY HAS A RURAL BIAS?

Introduction Food security research and policy in Africa has not traditionally focused on urban areas. The attention has instead been on rural household food insecurity or mechanisms to improve national food security through production.

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Figure 13.1  Results of Scopus database search on African Food Security (Feb 2022)

As early as the mid-1990s researchers were highlighting the neglect of urban food insecurity (Lourenco-Lindell, 1995; Maxwell, 1999) and yet this neglect persists. A search on the Scopus database in February 2022 using the search terms ‘Africa’ and “Food Security” found 5063 publications between 1980–2021, just 528 of these mentioned the term ‘Urban.’ As Figure 13.1 illustrates, there has been an increase in the number of publications that explicit reference ‘urban,’ but they are very much the minority. While there has been relatively little research on urban food insecurity in the African context, the significant presence of food insecurity in African cities has been repeatedly flagged. In 2007, IFPRI’s report on The World’s Most Deprived found that 12 out of 18 sampled low-income developing countries (including 5 out of 9 sampled African countries) had incidences of urban food insecurity that were the same or higher than those of rural areas, despite the higher incomes of urban households (Ahmed et al., 2007, 37). More recently, the FAO’s (Food and Agricultural Organization) Food Insecurity Experience Scale survey of 146 countries in 2014–2015 found that 50% of urban populations in least developed countries were food insecure, compared with 43% in rural areas. The proportion of households experiencing food insecurity reached 70–95% of the population in urban informal settlements around the world (Tefft et al., 2017, 36). Given the evidence of high levels of food insecurity in African cities, why has it historically received so limited research focus? Is there evidence of a rural bias? This essay argues that the relative absence of urban food security research in the African context can be attributable to four key issues: (a) the urban agenda in African research and policy, (b) poor data disaggregation and proxies, (c) historical urban bias in agricultural policy, (d) developmental

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agendas and (e) research funding. The essay concludes by asserting why a specifically urban lens is essential (nutrition and urban drivers of food insecurity)

Why a rural bias exists and persists African urban agenda While food security is a mainstay of the rural development agenda and of African rural scholarship, food has been largely absent from African urban research and policy. David Maxwell (1999) argued this to be because on the basis of limited budget and capacity, local governments focus on “more urgently visible problems,” such as housing and sanitation. Furthermore, he argued, food insecurity in urban areas is often less visible than in rural areas, manifesting at the household scale due to access failures, which households mitigate by a series of coping strategies that render the food insecurity less visible. Finally, he argued that the long-established perceptions of food security and poverty being rural problems make policymakers less likely to see urban food insecurity. This has been reinforced by the “urban consensus” that emerged from Habitat II in 1996, which framed the primary urban challenge as one of slum eradication (Pieterse et al., 2018). While housing and urban shelter are of critical importance, this urban consensus masks adequate focus on other, equally important, urban challenges, such as food security and urban food systems. Agricultural Policy and urban bias The second reason for the neglect of urban food security is the residual effect of urban bias theory (Lipton, 1977), in which it was argued that cities were parasitic on rural areas (Baker & Pedersen, 1992). Under this framing, it was argued that urban consumers and industry were able to exert political pressure on government to ensure cheap food supply to the cities, at the expense of decent prices for rural farmers. Agricultural terms of trade were, according to this argument, tipped to favor urban areas over rural (Bates, 1981). This is what Lipton termed price twists (Lipton, 1977). A rural development agenda arose in the wake of this urban bias and was supported by the architecture of the UN, specifically through IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development) and the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS) of the 1980s and 1990s included a number of measures to address the rural-urban imbalance, including: the privatization of parastatals and other nationalized industries; the introduction of competition within the economy; trade liberalization; the abolition of centrally-fixed currency exchange rates; the deregulation of currency markets; active encouragement for the private sector, including both domestic and foreign capital and a reduction in the size of the public sector workforce, including retrenchment packages for public sector workers (Briggs & Yeboah, 2001, p. 20).

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The elimination of food subsidies and the new export orientation of the agricultural sector increased food prices in urban areas (Riddell, 1997). At the same time urban wages fell in real terms, state services were rolled back and there were large-scale urban retrenchments, all of which increased urban food insecurity. After the initial shock of the SAPs, food prices stabilized, and trade liberalization addressed urban food supply problems. However, this trade liberalization has served to accelerate the nutrition transition and bring about the challenge of obesity-associated food insecurity (Hawkes et al., 2009), which manifested first in urban areas. As a result of the urban bias framing, poverty and therefore food insecurity are persistently imagined to be primarily located in rural areas, and yet poverty is increasingly an urban phenomenon (Crush et al., 2012). Sub-Saharan Africa is the fastest urbanizing region in the world. The 2014 State of African Cities report notes that a quarter of the 100 fastest-growing cities in the world are in Africa, and that the share of Africa’s population living in urban areas will increase from 40% in 2010 to 50% by 2035 and just under 58% by 2050 (UN Habitat, 2014, 25). The same State of African Cities report further notes that, urban poverty will become more widespread as urbanization increases, particularly given “continuing and significant shortfalls in urban institutional capacities” (UN Habitat, 2014, 7). Specifically, urban governance responses are required and there needs to be a focus on increasing urban food governance capacity. Development agenda and research funding While there is increasing evidence of food insecurity in African cities, and calls made for specifically urban policy and programmatic responses that are informed by the urban drivers of food insecurity (Ruel & Garret, 1999, 1972; Ruel et al., 2017), the development consensus persists in its framing of food insecurity as rural. While the FAO increasingly acknowledges the presence of urban food insecurity (FAO et al., 2019), the organization’s strategic objectives maintain a focus on eradicating rural poverty specifically (FAO, 2019). This replicates the framing with the SDGs in which SDG 2 (End Hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition) does not mention the urban and SDG11 (Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable) does not mention food (Battersby, 2017b). This framing has significant knowledge and governance effects (Battersby, 2017b). The ways in which the food security issue has been framed has shaped what data are gathered and how these are disaggregated and interpreted (knowledge effect). The data, in turn, reinforce the policy and programmatic focus of the state (governance effect). The mutually reinforcing nature of the knowledge and governance effects of the development framing at the global level has a profound effect on shaping food security research. Not only does it shape the research imaginary, but it also fundamentally shapes the research funding landscape,

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and funding drives research agendas. As a researcher working on urban food security and food systems, I have consistently found that food security or food system research funding programs center on issues of sustainable production or rural food security. This serves to reinforce the rural research bias.

Why urban-specific work is necessary It is now clear that urban food insecurity is increasingly prevalent in urban Africa, not simply because of the migration of poor people to cities, but because of the nature of the urban condition (Battersby and Haysom 2019). This urbanization is precipitating changes in the food system and in the nature of rural-urban linkages. Food insecurity in urban areas is also manifesting differently to the kinds of food insecurity historically found in rural areas. Hunger-based malnutrition co-exists with increasing rates of obesity and diet-related diseases that are linked to the overconsumption of processed foods (Doak et al., 2005). There is a pressing need to develop new ways to address the food and nutrition security challenges facing African cities. Ruel and Garrett warned as far back as 1999 that policy makers and program administrators should not just transfer existing food security programs from rural to urban areas. Rather, in light of the new urban focus, novel responses to urban food insecurity informed by the current urban condition are required. And yet, Satterthwaite argues that policy responses and researchers remain ideologically driven and oblivious of urban lived realities: Why do almost all discussions of food and nutrition in urban areas in Africa and Asia: forget to mention that it is individuals’ and households’ inadequate or irregular incomes that are the main reason for hunger?; forget to ask urban dwellers who suffer hunger what their priorities are?; stress only urban or peri-urban agriculture as the solution when in every successful city, the possibilities of low-income groups getting access to agricultural land and water is very limited? (Satterthwaite, 2011) The City Region Food Systems Approach has been promoted by the FAO since 2015 and is beginning to place urban food on the political agenda in Africa. The language of this approach is evident in the New Urban Agenda (NUA), which is the first global urban document to acknowledge food as a basic urban service. Paragraph 95 of the NUA commits to “the implementation of integrated, polycentric and balanced territorial development policies and plans, encouraging cooperation and mutual support among different scales of cities and human settlements” (UN-Habitat, 2016). While the presence of food within the New Urban Agenda is a cause for some celebration for urban food researchers, there are concerns about how the call for food system planning at the territorial scale may provide a rationale for local

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government to neglect food system planning within municipal boundaries. Further, the approach is argued also to be “largely apolitical and ignores the power of multiple stakeholders, including large-scale private-sector actors, donor agencies, global trade agreements and other actors in shaping food system conditions” (Battersby & Watson 2019, 4). A rural bias persists in scholarship and policy work on food security in the African context which manifests not only in the location of food security studies, but also in the framing of the studies. There is a need for more research which seeks to understand food insecurity in African cities not simply as a phenomenon that exists within the cities but is also shaped by the nature of the urban condition. What is therefore required is not simply a change in the spatial location of research, but also new measurements and metrics designed for urban contexts (Haysom & Tawodzera 2018), new scales of analysis and intervention (Battersby & Haysom 2019), and new objects of research (Battersby 2017a).

References Ahmed, A.U., Hill, R.V., Smith, L.C, Wiesmann, D.M. & Frankenberger, T. (2007) The World’s Most Deprived: Characteristics and Causes of Extreme Poverty and Hunger. A 2020 Discussion Paper 43, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, October https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/events-presentations/ 257.pdf Baker, J. & Pedersen, P. O. (1992) The rural-urban interface in Africa. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala. Bates, R. (1981) Markets and states in tropical Africa. University of California Press, Berkely, CA. Battersby, J. (2017a) Food systems transformation in the absence of food system planning: The case of supermarket and shopping mall expansion in Cape Town, South Africa, Built Environment 43 (3) 417–430. Battersby, J. (2017b) MDGs to SDGs – New goals, same gaps: The continued absence of urban food security in the post-2015 global development agenda, African Geographical Review 36 (1) 115–129 Battersby, J. & Haysom, G. (2019) Linking urban food security, urban food systems, poverty and urbanization, in Battersby, J. & Watson, V. (Eds.) Urban Food Systems Governance and Poverty in Africa, Routledge Battersby, J. & Watson, V. (2019) Introduction, in Battersby, J. & Watson, V. (Eds.) Urban Food Systems Governance and Poverty in Africa, Routledge. Briggs, J. & Yeboah, I. A. E. (2001) Structural adjustment and the contemporary sub- Saharan African city. Area, 33(1), 18–26. Crush, J., Frayne, B. and Pendleton, W. (2012) “The crisis of food insecurity in African cities,” Journal of Hunger & Environmental Nutrition 7(2–3): 271–292. Doak, C.M., Adair, L.S., Bentley, M., Monteiro, C. and Popkin, B.M. (2005) “The dual burden household and the nutrition transition paradox,” International Journal of Obesity 29(1): 129–136. FAO (2019) Mid-term review synthesis report 2018, http://www.fao.org/3/my779en/ my779en.pdf FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO. (2019) The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2019. Safeguarding against economic slowdowns and downturns. Rome, FAO.

Scholarship on African food insecurity  171 Hawkes, C., Chopra, M. & Friel, S. (2009) Globalization, trade, and the nutrition transition. In R. Labonté, T. Schrecker, C. Packer, & V. Runnels (Eds). Globalization and health: Pathways, evidence and policy. Routledge, New York, pp. 235–262. Haysom, G. & Tawodzera, G. (2018) “Measurement drives diagnosis and response”: Gaps in transferring food security assessment to the urban scale. Food Policy, 74, pp. 117–125. Lipton, M. (1977) Why poor people stay poor. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Lourenço-Lindell, I. (1995) The informal food economy in a peripheral urban district: the case of Bandim District, Bissau. Habitat International, 19(2), pp. 195–208. Maxwell, D. (1999) The political economy of urban food security in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Development 27(11): 1939–1953. Pieterse, E., Parnell, S. & Haysom, G. (2018) African dreams: locating urban infrastructure in the 2030 sustainable developmental agenda. Area Development and Policy, 3(2), pp. 149–169. Riddell, B. (1997) Structural adjustment programmes and the city in Tropical Africa. Urban Studies, 34(8), 1297–1307. Ruel, M. & Garrett, J. (1999). Overview of special Issue: Urban challenges to food and nutrition security. World Development, 27, pp. 1885–1889. Ruel, M., Garrett, J. & Yosef, S. (2017) Food security and nutrition: Growing cities, new challenges, in International Food Policy Research Institute (ed.) 2017 Global Food Policy Report. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, pp. 24-33 Satterthwaite, D. (2011) Why are the main means by which urban dwellers avoid hunger ignored? International Institute for Environment and Development. Available at: http:// www.iied.org/why-are-main-means-which-urban-dwellers-avoid-hunger-ignored Tefft, J. et al. (2017) Food Systems for an Urbanizing World, World Bank Group and Food and Agricultural Organization. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 454961511210702794/pdf/Food-Systems-for-an-Urbanizing-World.pdf UN Habitat (2014) State of African Cities, UN Habitat, Nairobi. Available at: mirror. unhabitat.org/pmss/getElectronicVersion.aspx?nr=3528&alt=1 UN Habitat (2016) New Urban Agenda http://habitat3.org/wp-content/uploads/NewUrban-Agenda-GA-Adopted-68th-Plenary-N1646655-E.pdf

NO: SCHOLARSHIP ON AFRICAN FOOD INSECURITY DOES NOT HAVE A RURAL BIAS First things first, what is food security? This is a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (World Food Summit, 1996). In contrast, food insecurity is the state of being without reliable access to enough affordable and nutritious food. Let me take you through solid reasons as to why scholarship on African food insecurity does not have a rural bias.

Demographic and social economic situation With the understanding of what food insecurity is, we need a quick snapshot of the trends of demographic and social economic factors in urban areas. Today, about 55% of the world’s population lives in urban areas, a

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proportion that is expected to increase to 68% by 2050 – especially in Africa and Southeast Asia, where hunger and poverty are currently mostly concentrated. This is according to United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2018).  There have been declining incomes, growing poverty and increased informalization of urban economies in Africa, which in turn has resulted in increased urban food insecurity (Smit, 2016). As a result, the urban poor are sleeping hungry because they can’t afford food. Note also that about 80% of all food produced is consumed in urban areas. This stirs up a lot of interest in urban food insecurity, but not rural food insecurity. What does this mean in terms of research? I argue that there are countless numbers of studies focusing on food insecurity in the urban areas in an attempt to try and come up with solutions. Allow us to consider the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) because they form the basis of most of studies.

Sustainable development goals The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were set as the 2030 agenda for sustainable development (UNDP, 2015). Do these goals have a rural bias? The answer is NO! The SDGs are plans of action for all people both in rural and urban areas. This has given scholars a platform or basis for research on food insecurity which does not necessarily focus on the rural areas. In this case, let us consider two specific goals: Goal numbers 2 and 11. The aim of goal 2 is to end hunger, achieve food security and improve nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture. The question is, where? Rural? The answer is a big NO. The focus is both rural and urban areas. What about goal number 11? This goal aims at promoting sustainable cities and communities. Does it mention rural? The answer is NO. If we look specifically at target 11(a) on the same goal 11, the target is to support positive economic, social, and environmental links between urban, peri-urban, and rural areas by strengthening national and regional development planning. The truth is that there is no rural bias here. What we see are urban, peri-urban, and rural areas. Now, let us focus specifically on the African context where there is overwhelming evidence of rapid urbanization and the growing likelihood of an urban future for most Africans. As mentioned earlier, there is evidence that shows that there is growth in urban poverty and food insecurity and malnutrition, hence increased researcher concentration on these issues in urban rather than in rural areas. Therefore, I question the claim of there being a rural bias in food insecurity and malnutrition research. Researchers focusing on African urban food insecurity range from those from international organizations, consortiums of organizations, intergovernmental agencies, local research institutions, local municipal authorities, and individual researchers from all over the globe. If we look at each of these groups of researchers one by one, you will see that the claim that scholarship on food insecurity has a rural bias does not hold up.

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Studies by international organizations International organizations such as Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations have a lot of focus on urban food insecurity through the greener cities initiative and many others that we may not cover exhaustively here. The promise of greener cities is to focus on urban development that alleviates food insecurity, provides decent work, increases incomes, and avails a clean environment and good governance for all citizens in urban rather than rural areas.

Consortiums of organizations Consortiums of organizations have also come together to mitigate increasing urban food insecurity. A good example is the Urban Early Warning Early Action (UEWEA) Project in Kenya composed of four non-governmental organizations – Kenya Red Cross, Concern Worldwide, Oxfam in Kenya and World Vision Kenya. The project is aimed at developing early warning systems and early action responses to crises that affect poor people in urban slums. Through this project, the partners aim to have response mechanisms in place to avert food insecurity and health related crises in the urban slum areas of Nairobi (OXFAM, 2017).

Intergovernmental agencies While there are many intergovernmental agencies in Africa, my focus here is on the African Union (AU) and East African Community (EAC). The African Union (AU), in its 2063 agenda, has targets that include having healthy and well-nourished citizens, addressing poverty, reducing inequality and hunger, and increasing modern agricultural productivity and production. Note that the focus of this effort is not indicated as being on rural areas. Similarly, the East African Community (EAC), which includes the seven partner states of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Congo DRC, and Uganda, has as one of its targets, improvements in the community’s agricultural productivity and value addition. The EAC also gives research awards to scholars from member states who are engaged in a wide array of research without a bias towards rural food insecurity.

Local research institutions Local research institutions such as Kenya’s Mazingira Institute, Tanzania’s SAFE Gardens, and Uganda’s Camp Green promote urban agriculture. The Mazingira Institute, which is based in Nairobi, Kenya, has an Urban Food and Nutrition Security and Urban Agriculture Project that provides training courses in urban agriculture, food security, nutrition, and food systems. As a result of this effort, urban agriculture has gradually gained acceptance in

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Nairobi city even though it was once illegal. The institute has trained over 3,000 urban farmers of all ages and has established a farmer-to-farmer education network to continue spreading knowledge on how to alleviate urban food insecurity. In Arusha, Tanzania, SAFE Gardens is a multifunctional garden which provides women with a participative urban agriculture experience. The project promotes urban agriculture practices that can reduce malnutrition and food insecurity in the urban community. In Kampala, Uganda, Harriet Nakabaale, one of the Uganda’s most successful urban farmers, runs Camp Green, a space where young people can learn the fundamentals of urban agriculture and how to develop their own urban farms even in limited spaces. Since Camp Green started in 2012, it has taught over 10,000 city residents how to compost their food waste, grow produce, raise chicken and eat nutritiously. New Vision, Uganda’s government-owned daily newspaper recognized Nakabaale as the woman achiever of the year in 2012, citing her outstanding dedication to ensuring urban food security. All these are urban rather rural food initiatives. What about municipal authorities, what are they doing about urban food insecurity? Let us deal with this question in the next section.

Local municipal authorities and urban food insecurity In many cases local authorities have pledged to undertake various programs to promote urban agriculture. For example, food insecurity is a significant problem in Nairobi city, Kenya. According to a report by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and the University of Nairobi’s African Women’s Studies Centre, 14.5% of Nairobians suffer from low food security, and 11.7% are chronically food insecure. Furthermore, a study from the African Population Health Research Center shows that in Nairobi’s poorest neighborhoods, only one in five households is food secure (Faye, et al., 2011). Therefore, urban agriculture has the potential to help provide healthy food for the city’s most vulnerable communities. The Government of Kenya is also committed to supporting initiatives geared towards alleviating urban food insecurity by collecting and maintaining data on urban agriculture activities and programs. Moreover, the government is developing urban farming projects in all seventeen of Nairobi’s sub-counties (Food Policy Snapshot 2018).

Funding for individual researchers Funding institutions have also supported  African researchers to carry out studies in the urban areas focusing on urban food insecurity and other urban problems. Examples are research through the AGROPOLIS program which was launched by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in 1998, to encourage young scholars to undertake research on urban agriculture (UA). These research projects were done in Ghana, Senegal, Malawi,

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Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These scholarly works were on urban food systems, urban planning, the use of participatory methodologies, and wastewater use (Redwood 2009). Rather than having a rural bias, the AGROPOLIS program was geared towards urban agriculture thereby undermining the rural bias thesis. There is also the African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN) which was founded in 2008 to address the crisis of food insecurity in Africa’s rapidly growing towns and cities. AFSUN was established as a vehicle for universities, NGOs, and municipal governments to collaboratively identify and solve the pressing issues of urban food insecurity in Southern African cities. AFSUN also conducts graduate and in-service training programs designed to build the capacity of African governments and NGOs to respond to the challenge of rapid urbanization and feeding Africa’s hungry cities. This shows non bias to rural food insecurity. Warren Smit (2016) states that urban food systems have increasingly been recognized as a topic that needs to be better understood, in order to address issues of urban food security and urban poverty. This is particularly so in Africa, which has high rates of urban population growth and high levels of urban food insecurity. This therefore confirms that African scholarship is not rural biased.

Conclusion This essay has provided evidence of scholarly works on food insecurity in urban areas with a view of showing that scholarship on African food insecurity does not have a rural bias. In closing, the words of Jonathan Crush and Bruce Frayne (2010) come to mind: Rural and urban areas cannot function separately and must develop exchanges for mutual benefits. Better access to markets can increase farming incomes and encourage shifts to higher-value crops or livestock. Strengthening agricultural production in rural areas especially that of smallholder farmers, would certainly enhance food availability and support food and nutrition security in urban areas. Exchange of innovative value addition skills among the rural and urban farmers would go a long way in strengthening the agricultural value chain both in the rural and urban areas. Therefore we must carry out scholarly works that are applicable in both rural and urban contexts.

References AFSUN. No date. “African Food Security Urban Network” https://www.afsun.org/ about-us/ AU 2019. “African Union Agenda 2063.” https://au.int/agenda2063/sdgs FAO 2010. “Green Cities.” http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/greenercities/pdf/GGC-en.pdf

176  Jane Battersby and Eunice Njogu Faye, O., Baschieri, A., Falkingham, J.  et al.,  (2011). Hunger and Food Insecurity in Nairobi’s Slums: An Assessment Using IRT Models.  J Urban Health 88,  235–255 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11524-010-9521-x Food Policy Snapshot. 2018. “Nairobi Establishes a Framework from Which Urban Agriculture Can Flourish.” January 2. https://www.nycfoodpolicy.org/15213-2/. Crush, Jonathan & Bruce Frayne (2010). The Invisible Crisis: Urban Food Security in Southern Africa. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 265069074_The_Invisible_Crisis_Urban_Food_ Security_in_ Southern_ Africa [accessed Sep 30 2020]. OXFAM. 2017. https://kenya.oxfam.org/latest/policy-paper/urban-early-warningearly-action Redwood, Mark. 2009. Agriculture in urban planning: generating livelihoods and food security. https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/handle/10625/36354 UNDP. 2015. SDGs Booklet. https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/ corporate/brochure/SDGs_Booklet_Web_En.pdf United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2018). The World’s Cities in 2018—Data Booklet (ST/ESA/SER.A/417). https://www. un.org/en/events/citiesday/assets/pdf/the_worlds_cities_in_2018_data_booklet.pdf Smit, Warren. (2016) Urban governance and urban food systems in Africa: Examining the linkages https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2016.05.001 World Food Summit (1996) ‘Report of the World Food Summit, 13-17 November 1996, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 1996, https:// www.fao.org/3/w3548e/w3548e00.htm.

Section IV

Society, health and culture

14 Is modern African education counterproductive? YES: Iddah Otieno

African & African American Studies, Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, USA

NO: Apollos O. Nwauwa

Department of History, Bowling Green University, USA Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Dr. Iddah Otieno of the African and African American Studies program at Eastern Kentucky University, KY, USA, argues that despite the remarkable growth in Africa’s education system and some Africanization of its curriculum since independence, the system is largely counterproductive. This is, for instance, easily demonstrated by the continent’s massive graduate unemployment and/or brain drain problem. NO: Apollos O. Nwauwa of the History Department and Africana Studies Program at Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, USA, argues that modern African education, which has its roots in the colonial era, is contentious. While its detractors argue that the system has displaced indigenous education, indoctrinated Africans with Western values, concepts and paradigms resulting in cultural alienation, its proponents argue that despite its limitations, modern African education has produced modern literary traditions, political cultures, economic structures, technology and socio-cultural values that are not only beneficial to Africa but have also integrated Africa into the global village.  The debate in this chapter is closely related to the one in Chapter 4 on whether colonialism distorted African development. One of the most obvious imprints of colonialism on Africa is in the education sector where much of the instruction, especially at the secondary and higher education level, is conducted in the colonial languages of English, French, Spanish and Portuguese. In North Africa, an argument can be made that even Arabic is a colonial language. Since language transmits culture, it is not difficult to see that the colonial language dominance of the post-colonial African education system and other socioeconomic spheres means that Europe, and the broader Western world including the USA and Canada, still holds considerable sway over the continent. Except for Swahili/Kiswahili, which is widespread in Eastern Africa, few indigenous African languages can currently challenge this European DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-18

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language and cultural dominance in any meaningful way. It will, therefore, take a while for Africa to de-colonialize and indigenize its education even though the contours of the latter endeavor are far from straight forward.1 An objective assessment of Africa’s neocolonial education system thus unearths many pros and cons. As Professor Nwauwa argues, albeit as a devil’s advocate given the slant of his previous scholarship, Africa’s colonial and neo-colonial education system has many undeniable advantages e.g., its association with modern healthcare systems that have saved the lives of many Africans. But as Professor Otieno notes, the system can also be faulted for aliening Africans and producing many unemployed and underemployed Africans. As you read the pieces in this debate, reflect on how the best aspects of Africa’s modern education system can be preserved while also making it more responsive to the needs of the continent’s indigenous population. As you do so, bear in mind that Africa is a huge continent that is nearly four times larger than the United States and has immense cultural diversity. As a result, Africa’s education system is equally diverse and attempts to reform and indigenize it must be equally diverse. Questions of what to keep or discard are thus pertinent. YES: MODERN AFRICAN EDUCATION IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

Introduction The continent of Africa has a long history with education that dates to precolonial times. Contrary to the colonial assumption that education did not exist in the continent prior to the arrival of missionaries and subsequent colonial occupation in the second half of the 19th century, a rich educational tradition existed in Africa with the main aim of preparing individuals to be active participants in the world around them. This type of education was accessible, relevant and responsive to societal needs. It came in different forms and transmission modes that were adaptable to individual aptitude and innate levels of ability. Valuable cultural beliefs and traditions were passed from one generation to the next through language, music, dance, oral traditions (proverbs, myths, and stories), religion and other cultural practices. The overarching goal of education was to produce individuals who were ready and capable of being responsible members of their societies (Omolewa, 2007). Africa’s educational landscape has changed significantly since then, more so in the post-colonial era, leading many to question the value and relevance of modern African education to African societies. This chapter explores, in very broad strokes, the genesis of some of the emergent challenges with modern education in Africa, arguing that even though major strides have been made, including increased access to institutions of higher education and some Africanization of the curriculum, tales from these institutions and the masses they serve suggest that there are unintended consequences that have rendered modern day African education

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counterproductive. Some of these challenges include the introduction of colonial modes of schooling, alienation of the African child, quality assurance, privatization in the academic marketplace, growing graduate unemployment and brain drain in the age of internationalization. Contrary to the belief that the modern African educational enterprise would usher in a new age of opportunities and socioeconomic prosperity, the modern African educational experiment calls into question its relevance in meeting the needs of fast changing African societies.

The making of modern African education Modern African education has a colonial genesis in which Western education models were transplanted into non-Western African contexts with total disregard for local interests and needs. Colonial models of schooling were implemented with the assumption that indigenous African societies did not have legitimate forms of educating the masses. From the curriculum, staff, funding and everyday operations of African educational institutions, the colonial administration’s DNA was firmly imprinted in the modern African educational enterprise. According to former Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, this type of education “was motivated by the desire to inculcate [the] values of the colonial (neocolonial) society [on the African] and to train individuals for the service of the colonial state” (Nyerere, 1968, p. 51). Consequently, modern African education, particularly the modern university idea is a recent development whose debut brought great expectations for a continent rising from the ashes of colonial suppression and subjugation. A tight coupling existed between these universities and the national governments they served. As Eric Ashby aptly observed in his widely read book, African Universities and Western Traditions, “… under the patronage of modern governments, they are cultivated as intensive crops, heavily manured and expected to give to a high yield to the nourishment of the state” (Ashby, 1964, p. 7).

Alienation of the African Child Modern education in Africa has alienated the African child. When outside influences make their way into a culture, they can disrupt it and cause many discontinuities including the use of the language of the colonizer as the official language of instruction. Depending on the part of the country that a child is from, fluency in the colonial language of instruction can be difficult with those who fail to do so being severely sanctioned or punished by teachers and parents. In my educational journey, for example, I was introduced to two new languages in my third grade. Kiswahili, which is Kenya’s national language, was easier to learn since we were already exposed to it in one form or the other at home. On the other hand, English was a big challenge for me and my classmates. The desire to learn English became intense as we watched upper classmen graduate and advance to prestigious boarding high schools far away from

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home. We admired our older siblings who spoke English effortlessly whenever they returned home during school holidays. English became a ticket to “a better life” away from the “village.” It was a badge of honor flaunted around by those who possessed it. Parents considered their English-speaking kids to be “educated” because they spoke the language like Wazungu (white people). As we acquired English for survival in the school system, we began to look at our mother tongue with contempt and shame. Kenya’s Ngugi Wa Thiong’o (1986) captured the process of using language as a tool for cultural domination thus: … the children of the colonized are punished and ridiculed whenever they are caught speaking their mother’s language, and rewarded when they speak the language of the master… this had one aim: to make a child despise his language, hence the values carried by that language, and by implication despise himself and the people who spoke a language which was now the cause of his daily humiliation and corporal punishment (p. 94). To this day, modern African educational systems produce graduates who are barely literate in their native languages and cultures. The new graduates are a blend of cultural misfits and drive through tourists who can barely converse with their rural grandparents in their native languages. Apart from alienating the African child, African schools, modeled along strict English traditions, have also reproduced the cultural capital of the educated elite by “allowing elite groups to maintain power by only recognizing as ‘intelligent’ their cultural capital, that is their tastes, for certain cultural products (music, literature, film, music), their manner of deportment, speech, style of dress, consumptions patterns and the like” (Bradley & Holland, 1996, p. 6). Modern African education also gives conflicting messages to its clients in what Bradley and Holland call the “twin identities of the modern state citizen: national and individual.” While the state would have us believe that we all are “members of one entity,” it has segmented communities as it “individualizes” or separates people in very specific ways (p. 16).

Africanization efforts post-independence With the attainment of political independence, the push to Africanize the curriculum became a top priority. This became more evident in African universities whose creation captured the hopes of the newly independent nations of Africa. Speaking on this effort in the East African country of Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere praised the newly introduced curriculum as becoming “much more Tanzanian in content… our national songs and dances are once again being learned by our children; our national language [has] been given the importance in our curriculum which it needs and deserves” (Nyerere, 1968, p. 52). His neighbors in Kenya celebrated the same milestone when the University of Nairobi was delinked from the University

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of London, ushering in the introduction of African languages, literatures, religion, philosophy and history in its curriculum. Its teaching and administrative staff was locally sourced, with the hope of creating culturally relevant modules in the curriculum. This new dawn reverberated across the continent as universities mushroomed to accommodate growing demand. However, a look at the modern day African educational sector clearly shows that it has not quite managed to balance the continent’s local and global needs. Most of its universities have been forced to offer foreign driven market courses, some of which are offered by foreign universities that have found their way into the former colonial universities. This situation is made worse when African researchers are forced to decide between local needs or outside research agendas in order to get published. As one researcher at the University of Nairobi once observed, “You find that for you to be published in a peer reviewed international journal, there are some areas of research that are considered key or top notch. If you are not researching in that area, your paper will not be accepted in those journals. Yet the research you are carrying out locally could be of importance and serving a noble purpose” (Otieno, 2018, p. 94). In cases where African researchers have collaborated with others outside the continent, reports of intellectual property violations have emerged where indigenous knowledge provided by local researchers has ended up in the hands of “an awkward intellectual conman” (p. 95).

Quality assurance and massification The growing demand for higher education in Africa has led to the creation of numerous institutions at both tertiary and university levels. Some of these institutions have reported shortages of teaching staff, classrooms and accommodation for admitted students leading to poor teaching, learning and living conditions. The quality of instruction has suffered as students graduate with less than adequate skills for the job market (Wanzala, 2017; Ouma, 2008; West, 2000). African universities have also faced financial constraints that have compromised institutional level standards in testing services, course preparation and delivery methods. Grading standards have been lowered, while gross cheating in exams, sex for grades have become the order of the day at some of the oldest and most prestigious African universities (Kokutse, 2020). In addition, the political and economic difficulties faced by African countries have directly impacted institutional level operations as government assistance has become scarce. In response to these external pressures, institutions have been forced to look for alternative sources of funding. Ajayi, Goma, and Johnson (1996) in the African Experience with Higher Education, captured the challenges facing the modern African universities: “In the 1990s and beyond, institutions of higher education in Africa, especially the universities, must contend with several interrelated problems, whose combined effect threatens to strangulate them … African countries and societies are going through a period of economic uncertainty, political and social upheavals, plus other contortions,

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and higher education has become a victim of the prevailing state of affairs. The situation is likely to remain so, well into the twenty first century” even as these universities churn out graduates annually (p. 146; Chege, 2015).

Privatization and market-driven models The 1990s witnessed a steady increase in new forms of international engagement in the African higher educational landscape. For instance, the growth of privately funded institutions of higher education opened a new era of access to higher educational opportunities for African students in their home countries. Most of these privately funded institutions are within walking distance from major African universities – making them accessible to both students and teaching staff who are attracted to the market-driven courses that have now become a distinguishing feature of both public and private universities. For example, degrees in accounting, Business Administration, Computer Science and Electrical Engineering are considered the most marketable compared to the Arts and Humanities. This business approach to modern African education has dealt a severe blow to the public education sector which has hitherto not been as market driven. Non-lucrative academic majors have now been abandoned entirely as students pick and choose their degree courses in a highly competitive academic marketplace. Those who have the means to fund their educational appetite can enroll in multiple institutions while the financially disadvantaged are left to fend for themselves in Africa’s grossly underfunded public universities (Bok, 2009). University professors have also learned to supplement their meager income by taking additional teaching responsibilities at private institutions which offer better and often timely remuneration. The unintended consequence of these privatization practices is that modern African educational institutions now have to walk the fine line between global pressures and local needs.

Brain drain in the age of internationalization The modern African educational sector is under constant pressure from a fast changing higher educational landscape brought forth by fast changing economic, technological, political, cultural, and scientific trends. While proponents of internationalization efforts at institutions of higher education in Africa stress their benefits, including economic gains, cultural diversity, homeland security, educational and research opportunities and an increased knowledge base; critics, on the other hand, see them as another tool of domination and control of developing countries by the developed world (Carnoy, 1974; Samoff & Carrol, 2004). In particular, internationalization has been blamed for increased brain drain from Africa because of declining working conditions and remuneration practices at these universities. According to a faculty member at the University of Nairobi, budding and seasoned scholars are permanently migrating from

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African universities at alarming rates: “We are training for the North … somebody graduates and looks at home, he doesn’t see any work. He goes to the US for a conference and gives a very good paper. He leaves his number and address and so on … next time you see him, he is resigning” (Otieno, 2018, p. 92). Many African universities now have a critical shortage of qualified professors to train the next generation of scholars. As a result, these universities are forced to rely on lecturers with limited academic preparation and commitment to one university, with immense negative consequences for their development. While this brain drain is not peculiar to Kenyan universities, it is undeniable that it has stagnated development in most African countries by robbing them of critical skilled labor and manpower. According to the African Capacity Building Foundation, African countries lose approximately 20,000 homegrown experts annually – a rate that is unsustainable from an economic standpoint. While it is true that there exists socio-economic and political factors that may force individuals to leave their countries for greener pastures, the impact brain drain on Africa’s development is monumental. The African Center for Economic Transformation (2016) reported that almost half of the 10 million graduates churned out of the over 668 universities in Africa yearly do not get jobs. It is no wonder that university graduates are leaving their countries of origin for employment opportunities outside the continent of Africa. While some of these overseas jobseekers return home at some point in their careers, majority make the host countries their permanent homes of residence.

The future Modern African education is still under construction. Even though notable gains have been realized in the years following the attainment of political independence by most African countries, many contextual challenges are yet to be overcome in reevaluating the role of education in the modern nations of Africa. The continent’s educational enterprise is uniquely positioned to contribute to the production of global knowledge while also responding to the local needs of African societies. Developing this niche amidst heavy reliance on foreign educational practices and models is their greatest challenge.

References African Center for Economic Transformation (2016). ‘Unemployment in Africa: no jobs for 50% of graduates’, April 1, 2016, https://acetforafrica.org/highlights/ unemployment-in-africa-no-jobs-for-50-of-graduates/. Ashby, E. (1964). African Universities and Western Tradition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ajayi, J.F., Goma, L.K & Johnson, J. A. (1996), The African Experience with Education. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. Bok, D. (2009). Universities in the Marketplace: Commercialization of Higher Education. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

186  Iddah Otieno and Apollos O. Nwauwa Bradley, A.L. & Holland, D.C. (1996). The cultural production of the educated person: An introduction. In Bradley, A.L., Foley, D.E., & Holland, D.C. (Eds.). The Cultural Production of the Educated Person: Critical Ethnographies of Schooling and Local Practice. New York: State University of New York: 1–54. Chege, M. (2015). Re-inventing Kenya’s universities: From a “graduate-mill” to a development oriented paradigm. International Journal of Educational Development, 44, 21–27. Carnoy, M. (1974). Education as Cultural Imperialism. New York: David McKay Company. Kokutse, F. (2020). University suspends ‘sex-for-grades’ Staff for 4, 6 months. University World News, February 18. Nyerere, J.K. (1968). Education for self-reliance. In I. N. Resnick (Ed.) Tanzania: Revolution by Education. Arusha: Longman of Tanzania. Omolewa, M. (2007). Traditional African modes of education: their relevance in the modern world. International Review of Education, 53(5/6), 593–612. Otieno, I (2018). African Universities in the Age of Internationalization: Challenges and Prospects. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books. Ouma, G.W. (2008). Higher education marketization and its discontents: The case of quality in Kenya. Higher Education, 56 (4), 457–471. Samoff, J & Carrol, B. (2004). The promise of partnership and continuities of dependence: External support to higher education in Africa. African Studies Review, 47 (1): 67–199. Thiong’o, N. W. (1983). Education for a national culture.” Barrel of a Pen: Resistance to Repression in Neo-Colonial Kenya. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press. Thiong’o, N. W. (1986). Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature. London: James Currey. Wanzala, O. (2017). Varsities and employers team to resolve skills mismatch. Daily Nation, April 2017. West, J. (2000). Higher education and employment opportunities and limitations in the formation of skills in a mass higher education system. Journal of Vocational Education and Training, 52(4), 573–588.

NO: MODERN AFRICAN EDUCATION IS NOT COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

Introduction Much of my earlier research and writings on this topic argue that modern African education is counterproductive (see Nwauwa, 1993; 1995; 1996; 1999; 2002; 2020). However, for the purposes of this chapter, I would like to consider the other side of the discourse to see if there are ways in which modern education has been otherwise. First, what is modern African education? Essentially, in the African context, modern education is the system of education that Africans inherited from their former European colonizers. Sometimes, it is referred to as Western education. Modern (Western) education in Africa was first introduced by European missionaries in the 15th century, and then perfected in the 19th and 20th centuries by European colonial rulers (Nwauwa, 2020, pp. 1–26). Before the advent of Europeans, indigenous education systems existed as “ways of teaching and learning … which [were]

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based on indigenous knowledge accumulated by Africans over centuries in response to their different physical, agricultural, ecological, political and socio-cultural challenges” (Njoki, et al., 2015, p. 135). Quite holistic in principle and practice, indigenous education provided individuals with the knowledge, skills, and aptitudes necessary for a successful life in society. Yet, the European colonial blitzkrieg predicated on flawed notions of the “Whiteman’s burden” of “civilizing natives,” and social (racial) Darwinism (with blacks at the bottom of the human evolutionary scale), transformed all aspects of traditional African life. Indigenous education became a target as European sought to superimpose their culture and values on all facets of African life through Western education. Our effort here is to assess whether modern (Western) education has ultimately become counterproductive for Africans. My answer is NO because modern African education has been an unsung blessing.

Benefits and contradictions of modern (Western) education In another study, I have described Western education “as a double-edged sword” (Nwauwa, 2020, p. 20). When it was first introduced, modern education was intended to serve the proselytizing interest of European missionaries and much more. The decisive role of education in dominating Africa was not lost to missionaries in view of their maxim that he/she “Who owns the schools will own Africa” (Saayman, 1991, pp. 29–44). Later, however, European colonial rulers adapted and promoted Western education as a veritable tool for effective colonization of Africa. In other words, while missionaries used education as an instrument for effective conversion of Africans to Christianity, colonial governments saw education as a way of socially and politically controlling the subjects. Conversely, modern education was also subsequently used by Africans as a means of liberation from colonialism and as a tool for postcolonial development in Africa. Undeniably, modern education produced some obvious contradictions and negative consequences including the displacement of Africa’s indigenous education system, cultural bastardization and/or alienation, uncritical adoption of Western concepts and paradigms, and mental confusion (Rodney, 1972, p.  264; Wa Thiong’o, 1981).2 Yet, despite its shortcomings, modern African education has not been entirely counterproductive. While it is a truism that colonialism was ferocious in its attack on the indigenous cultures, traditions, and values of colonized societies; African indigenous education was itself replete with serious limitations that could have hardly withstood the economic and technological assault of modern (Western) education. These limitations were also structural, transcriptional, and standardizational. Furthermore, before European colonization, African was a continent in self-isolation. Despite all the negative attributes of European intrusion, their modern education helped to integrate Africa and Africans into the global ferment of knowledge production and utilization. Although

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African indigenous education was involved in knowledge production prior to the arrival of Europeans, Dama Mosweunyane has argued that it “lacked [a] theoretical base” (Mosweunyane, 2013, p. 51). Moreover, indigenous knowledge was locally consumed with little effort toward creating the conditions necessary for broader economic, political, and scientific expansion beyond the continent’s local communities. In a sense, Africa’s indigenous education was territorial, delimiting and dated. With between 1,000 to 2,000 linguistic dialects and cultural groups, educational standardization in Africa through a common language was a major challenge. Thus, when Europeans arrived and imposed their languages (e.g., English, French, German, Italian) over large areas of the continent, they were able to impose uniform systems of education in their colonies undergirded by their respective colonial languages. Modern education has also not been counterproductive because it has tremendously enhanced the living standards of Africans since its introduction in Africa, its expansion in the 1920s, and widespread adoption in postcolonial Africa. As much as we frown upon some of the vices that accompanied the introduction of modern (Western) education into Africa, there is no question that its benefits or advantages far outweigh the supposed negative outcomes. It is often assumed that precolonial Africans lived totally productive and fulfilled lives prior to the advent of the Europeans. In other words, Africans were content with their lives and their indigenous education systems were adequate and efficient for their societies. However, the problem with this line of reasoning is that the supposed outcomes of such social systems were measured in local contexts rather than in relative terms with the larger world. Besides, as in many other parts of the globe, Africans were at the time faced with many challenges such as wars and diseases, which complicated everyday life. Prior to the 15th century, Africans had only marginal contacts with the rest of the world, and even then, these early contacts were ineffectual in creating substantial cross-cultural exchanges. Therefore, there was no attempt at comparative education through cross-cultural comparison of the structure, objectives, methods and achievements of various African and nonAfrican educational systems. At a time when Western education was helping Europeans and Arabs to invent navigational devices such as the compass and astrolabe, and ocean-going ships to explore and conquer the world, African indigenous education was only capable of training Africans for life within their immediate locality. It may be argued that while modern education was innovative, probing and pushing the frontiers of knowledge beyond the immediate surrounding, African indigenous education systems were localized, insular, confined and reticent.

Scientific, technological and industrial transformation Modern education also brought the benefits of modern science, technology, and industrialization to Africa. Although precolonial Africa was not devoid of innovation in science, technology, arts, craft, and literary and artistic

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tradition, these were quite rudimentary, localized and mundane. Similarly, while it is undoubtable that the slave trade and European colonialism stunted Africa’s technological and industrial take-off, especially between 1500 and 1900, the introduction and adoption of modern education in Africa has been a blessing since the pre-1500 largely non-literate African cultures were not at par with their literate European, Asian and Arab counterparts.3 Modern (Western) education came with dominant European languages, literacy, modern science, technology and artistic expression. From learning the basics of reading, writing and arithmetic, Africans began to crave for more modern education. Those who could not obtain higher education in Africa, were sent overseas to specialize in various fields. Soon, Africans began to be trained in the hard sciences such as chemistry, biology, physics, mathematics, algebra, calculus, and other related subjects. Many of the recipients of this training proceeded for advanced education in various professions including medicine, engineering, pharmacy, etc. Western educated lawyers, doctors, engineers, teachers, scientists and other professionals returned home and began to apply their newly acquired knowledge towards the improvement of the lives of peoples beyond their local communities.

Modern medicine and healthcare delivery system Western education introduced modern healthcare systems in Africa which have played a significant role in curing, controlling, and even eradicating many life-threatening diseases in Africa. Undoubtedly, pre-colonial Africa had its own homemade system of healthcare and healing processes. However, African indigenous doctors were “medicine men” who were variously known as “witch-doctors” or “priest-doctors” and who were knowledgeable about the healing potency of African herbs and roots, and who healed various diseases with herbs mixed with occultism. Their routine involved a combination of divination, herbal administration, and mystical healing. One of the shortcomings of African indigenous education was its inability to stimulate more advances in the indigenous medical vocation and delivery system. African medicine men could not produce their drugs in large, marketable qualities; they did not develop precise doses or measurements that could be administered in regular and predictable ways. Training of others in the profession was through apprenticeships that made no meaningful innovation or advancement in the production and dispensation of medicine. Moreover, traditional African healthcare’s attribution of many causes of disease to preternatural or spiritual forces rather than to germs or chemical imbalances in the human body limited its ability to respond to large scale outbreaks of disease (Osemwenkha, 2000, pp. 583–590). Furthermore, traditional African healthcare’s diagnostic procedures took the form of opaque divinations and pronouncements by priest-doctors that could not be made available to others in distant areas in standardized formats. With the advent of modern education, however, modern healthcare in Africa became possible.

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This was a milestone that transformed and integrated Africa into modern medical traditions and global standard practices. Today, far more Africans are patrons of modern medicine, hospitals and doctors than of the so-called indigenous healers and witchdoctors. Thus, modern education has not proved to be counterproductive in the medical field.

Political re-orientation In the realm of politics, modern education introduced advanced participatory democracy in Africa. The use of the term “advanced” here is relative to elements of indigenous democratic tradition that pre-dated the coming of Europeans to Africa. Aspects of participatory government, with ideas of separation of powers and checks and balances existed among many African societies such as the Igbo of Southeastern Nigeria, the Kikuyu of Kenya, and the Oyo Empire (Nwauwa, 2005, pp. 1–24; Khapoya, 2013). Yet, when observed more closely, the Igbo political system exhibited rudiments of dictatorship by unelected elders in the form of a gerontocracy. Similarly, in the Oyo Empire, despite the powers of the Oyomesi to check the excesses of the Alafin (king), it did not evolve into a full-fledged legislature just as the Ogboni Cult could not develop into an independent judiciary. A more advanced concept of a parliamentary democracy with a representative government was not practiced in a strict sense in Africa until Western education made that possible. European rule may have truncated the existing African indigenous political systems and replaced them with the dictatorship of unelected colonial governors, but it was modern education that advanced Western-type democracies in Africa with elected presidents and representatives, especially during the post-colonial era (Nwauwa, 2005). It is often argued that modern, Westerntype democracy and party politics have promoted repulsive corruption and leadership deficits in Africa, yet the problem may reside with its African practitioners and not necessarily with the system. Moreover, African indigenous traditions have not offered a better alternative to representative democracy.

Economic change Modern education significantly transformed African economies. Although some African scholars argue that “there is no direct and positive correlation between the expansion of education and economic progress” (Mugaju, 1991, pp. 110–124), there is no question that as more Africans became educated during the colonial era, they began to be engaged in import and export business, land acquired greater commercial value, cash-crop agriculture was introduced resulting in higher living standards and in the rise of a new elite. The introduction of money economies, including banking systems, changed the traditional standards of wealth and status while creating new wage earners and salaried persons. These developments helped to integrate Africa’s economies into the global economy in general (Boahen, 1987, pp. 100–102). With modern

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knowledge of export-oriented agriculture, Europeans encouraged and in some cases, introduced large-scale production of cash crops for export. Although initially, the new colonial economy was quite exploitative in the sense that Europeans determined and fixed the prices that they were willing to pay for the new cash crops, later, Africans accepted and used the new economic tools to transform and to boost their economies in the post-colonial period. West Africa witnessed large-scale production of palm oil, ground nuts and cocoa for the international markets while East Africa began to export coffee and tea overseas. Mining was another area where modern education was impactful although, to date, foreign firms continue to dominate oil, diamond, copper and uranium mining in Africa. Africans have been able to learn the techniques of drilling through the instrumentalities of Western education, but funding and administration remain two major impediments for complete control of the mining sector by Africans. Furthermore, because of the very expensive nature of mining, African leaders prefer to hire or lease out their mining sector to foreign companies and expatriates, with Africans working as associates. Nevertheless, without modern education, it is unlikely that major advancements would have occurred in the economy would have occurred when they did; even the ideological constructs of socialism and capitalism are all intertwined with modern education and Westernization. Against this backdrop, it is difficult to argue that modern education has been counterproductive to African economies. While it may be argued that during the colonial period, modern education helped to enhance European exploitation of African resources, there is also no doubt that post-colonial Africa inherited and advanced the economic processes of the colonial European regimes.

Transformation in law and jurisprudence In the sphere of law and jurisprudence, modern education has been quite beneficial to Africa. African legal systems are now more aligned with what obtains globally as exemplified in African representation at the International Court of Justice at the Hague, Netherlands. Undeniably, pre-colonial Africa was not devoid of laws and justice systems for dealing with crime and punishment, but there were several limitations. Those familiar with the novel, Things Fall Apart, by Chinua Achebe would appreciate the role of African gods and earth goddesses, priests and priestesses in the dispensation of justice. The gods/goddesses made pronouncements through their priests/priestesses, which could not be adjudicated by any other higher authorities. In some instances, the village elders took decisions in consultation with the gods, and there was really no appeal of last resort. Although the systems of justice served traditional African societies somewhat well in their immediate environment, they had glaring drawbacks in comparison to modern jurisprudence. They were unorthodox, localized and amorphous. The dispensation of justice was mostly left to the whims of invisible deities and spiritual forces with priest-doctors, masquerades and,

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sometimes, village elders as lawyers, judges and juries. Indigenous education could not uplift the justice systems beyond their rudimentary stages until modern education introduced new judicial systems that were analogous to European jurisprudence, which operated in conjunction with African customary laws. Evidently, the modern world demanded more standardized and scalable legal codes with lawyers, judges and juries to dispense justice more quickly and fairly. Modern education made it possible for the training of lawyers and judges to handle Africa’s new judicial systems that are aligned to standard global practices despite their admitted insensitivity to certain African legal conditions.

Sociocultural change Modern education also reformed many socio-cultural conditions and practices in Africa. Education, as William Saayman affirmed, “can never be isolated from culture” (Saayman, 1991, p. 30). One of the obvious complaints against modern education by scholars of modern African studies is the fact that it altered and alienated Africans from their culture by imposing European cultural ways on them. This mainly occurred because modern education, unlike its traditional African counterpart, made little effort to incorporate indigenous cultures and values in the training of Africans to be successful in their respective societies. Conversely, through conquest and persuasion, and guided by a self-acclaimed superiority complex, Europeans superimposed their traditions and cultural values on the preexisting cultural practices of Africa. Modern education highlighted the cultures and social mores of the Europeans and ignoring, if not supplanting, those of the Africans. This was unavoidable since no one would expect Europeans to glorify the African cultures and traditions that they sought to dominate through their new imperialism anchored on the Darwinian notion of “survival of the fittest” (Darwin, 1859).4 Doing otherwise would have amounted to cultural suicide on their part as well as being a direct antithesis to the motives of European imperialism. Overtime, however, it became fashionable for educated Africans to imbibe and mimic European ways as it increasingly became impossible for them not to adopt the culture and practices of those who trained them. Behaving like Europeans, hook, line and sinker became a benchmark for proper training in the modern education tradition. Unavoidably, European cultures and values almost completely replaced those of Africans as modern education became widespread throughout Africa during the colonial and post-colonial eras. For instance, European suits and tuxedos were adopted as formal dress by Africans even under the scorching African heat. The attainment of higher educational training began to be measured in proportion to the extent to which recipients adopted Western values and ways of life. To date, African lawyers in the former British colonies of Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and others continue to wear white wigs in courts as their hallmark of proper in training in modern law and practice.

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Similarly, other insignias of Western culture such as church weddings with white wedding dresses became preferred outfits by African couples in tying their nuptial knots. It is easy to see that without the introduction of modern education and Western values; these cultural transformations would not have taken place in a sweeping fashion. African indigenous education and traditional values could not compete with Western education and its imperial paraphernalia. Apparently, the attires of traditional African priest-doctors, the costumes of masquerades and customary garbs for traditional weddings could not contend with the more modern, convenient and trendy styles that modern education highlighted. Although Africans have been free to manage their own affairs since independence mostly in the 1950s and 1960s, including changing undesirable Western traditions and value systems, they mostly continue to retain and glamorize them instead. As Africans continue to celebrate Western culture and values, it will be out of place to view modern education in Africa as counterproductive unless viable traditional alternatives are offered. Paradoxically, educated Africans continue to be the most fervent defenders of Western education, tradition and values. Early efforts by African nationalists to insist on Africanization and adaptation of education to African conditions and environments were regarded with suspicion by elite Africans. Chukwuemeka Ike noted how students at Nigeria’s premier University College at Ibadan proudly referred to the institution as “the University of London situated at Ibadan for purposes of convenience” (Ike, 1976, p.  1). Although during the period in question, the University College was still under the “special relationship arrangement” with the University of London, one would have expected that Nigerian educated elites would have supported Africanization of the education system. Even in the 1920s when European colonizers suggested that “education should be adapted to the mentality, aptitudes, occupation and traditions” of local peoples (CO 987/13, 1920), many Africans became suspicious that “a second-rate curriculum was being foisted upon them” (Nwauwa, 1996, p. 213). It was not until the eve of independence, with its attendant euphoria, that educated Africans began to allow limited adaptation that still retained the pillars of Western educational standards. Since they have proved that they are intellectually equal to Europeans, after distinguishing themselves in various academic and professional fields in European, American and African universities, African elites no longer view adaption as an effort to foist inferior standards on them. Yet, post-colonial African institutions retain much of their colonial curriculums as well as the academic robes of European and American universities and their intellectual traditions. Whatever one may say about modern education, it has produced numerous world-class African intellectuals such as Wole Soyinka of Nigeria, a Nobel Prize Laureate in Literature, Wangari Maathai of Kenya, the first African woman to win the Nobel Prize and a host of other luminaries in various academic and socioeconomic fields. Thus, modern African education is not counterproductive.

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Conclusion In sum, modern (Western) education has become somewhat “indigenized” in Africa since independence. It has become the new normal and there is no discernible competitor except for Islamic education in some Muslim countries (although it is arguable that Islamic education has also lost substantial ground to its Western counterpart). Modern education has produced in Africa permanent and beneficial contemporary literary traditions, political cultures, economic structures, technology and socio-cultural values. In today’s world where globalization is the order of the day –with its interconnected economic, technological and cultural structures – isolationism is neither a good nor viable option for Africa. Instead of being counterproductive, modern education has played a key role in preparing Africans for success in today’s global village. Africa’s ‘good old’ precolonial days are probably gone forever. Restoring them in the new world order seems farfetched.

Notes 1. Dennis Ocholla (2020). “Decolonizing higher education in Africa,” International Insights, Vol 81, Issue 6 (2020), https://crln.acrl.org/index.php/crlnews/article/ view/24481. 2. For Rodney, colonial [modern] education in Africa “was education for subordination, exploitation, the creation of mental confusion and the development of underdevelopment.” (p. 264). 3. This argument does not preclude the smattering literacy in Arabic in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa as well as the pictoral rock paintings that pre-existed European presence. 4. Charles Darwin’s hypothesis as espoused in The Origins of Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859) was crudely misappropriated and given racial connotations by Europeans in their quest for new colonies in Africa and Asia.

References Boahen, A. Adu. (1987) African Perspectives on Colonialism ( John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore), 100–102. Colonial Office Documents, London (CO 987/13 (1920) Education Policy in British Tropical Africa: Memorandum by the British Advisory Committee on Native Education. Ike, Chukwuemeka. (1976) University Development in Africa: The Nigerian Example (Oxford University Press: Ibadan), p. 1. Khapoya, Vincent B. (2013) The African Experience: An Introduction, 4th Edition (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey) Mosweunyane, Dama. (2013) “The African Educational Evolution: From Traditional Training to Formal Education, Higher Education Studies, Vol. 3, (Issue 4), p. 51. Mugaju, Justus B. (1991) The Burden of Education on Economic Development in Africa: An Assessment,” Transafrican Journal of History, (Vol. 20), pp. 110–124. Njoki, Mugo Agnes, et al., (2015) “The Practice of African Indigenous Education and Its Relevance To Theory And Practice Of Modern Education In Africa,” International Journal of Innovative Research and Studies, Vol 4, (Issue 12), p. 135.

Modern African education 195 Nwauwa, Apollos O. (1993) “The British Establishment of Universities in Tropical Africa, 1920–1948: A Reaction Against the Spread of American ‘Radical’ Influence,” Cahiérs D’Études Africaines, Vol. 130, (Issue XXXIII-2), 247–274. _______ (1995) “University Education for Africans, 1900–1935: An ‘Anathema’ to British Administrative Policy,” Asian and African Studies, Vol. 27. (Issue 3), pp. 263–292. _______ (1996) Imperialism, Academe and Nationalism: Britain and University Education for Africans, 1860–1960, (Frank Cass: London) _______ (1999) “Far Ahead of His Time: James Africanus Horton’s Initiatives for a West African University and His Frustrations, 1862–1871,” Cahiérs D’Études Africaines, Vol. 153, (Issue XXXIXIX-1), pp. 107–121. _______ (2002) “Educational Policies and Reforms,” in Toyin Falola (ed.) Africa, Volume 4: The End of Colonial Rule, (Carolina Academic Press, Durham), pp. 167–183. _______ (2005) “Concepts of Democracy and Democratization in Africa Revisited,” in Charles Nieman (ed.) Democracy and Globalization (Kent State University Press, Kent: Ohio), 1–24. _______ (2020) “Western Education and the Rise of a New African Elite in West Africa,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia, Africa History, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press), 1–26 Osemwenkha, Sylvia (2000) “Disease Aetiology in Traditional African Society,” Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell’Istituto italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, Anno 55, (Issue 4), pp. 583–590. Rodney, Walter. (1972) How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London: Bogle-L’Ouverture) 264. Saayman, Willem (1991) “Who Owns the Schools Will Own Africa’ Christian Mission, Education and Culture in Africa,” Journal for the Study of Religion, Vol. 4, (Issue 2), pp. 29–44. Wa Thiong’o, Ngugi. (1981) Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in Africa Literature (Portsmith, NH: Heinemann).

15 Is the focus on the development of the girl child counterproductive? YES: Rose Adhiambo Nyaondo

Independent Scholar & Ph.D. in Public Policy, McCormack School of Policy and Global Studies at the University of Massachusetts Boston, USA

NO: Wandia M. Njoya

Department of Language & Performing Arts, Daystar University, Kenya Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Rose Adhiambo Nyaondo, an independent scholar with a PhD. in public policy from the University of Massachusetts Boston, argues that the girlchild development agenda in Kenya and other African countries has become counterproductive, not because of its aims but rather because of its approach. As a result, many of the programs geared towards the empowerment of girls have tended to produce many unintended and counter-productive outcomes. Aside from their poor documentation, the programs often expose their beneficiaries to additional negative pressure from their communities and families. Moreover, she argues that in focusing on the girl-child alone, such programs harm the girl-child in the long-term because they often end up being married to boys who have been left behind socioeconomically. She thus calls for the creation of girl-child empowerment programs that use the intersectional approach because they tend to be more holistic, effective and capable of accommodating their beneficiaries’ diverse cultural backgrounds, identities and histories. NO: Wandia M. Njoya, a Senior Lecturer of Literature and French at Daystar University, Nairobi, Kenya, argues that focus on the development of the Kenyan girl child is not counterproductive because, in comparison to boys, girls in Africa still face bigger social obstacles in their quest for opportunities such as school education. Therefore, they deserve more investments even though attempts to highlight the challenges that girls face have resulted in a counter-narrative that girls are benefitting from attention “at the expense of boys.” Using the example of how this counter-narrative emerged in Kenya, she argues that the criticism of activism for girls’ education is, in reality, an expression of the angst of male African elites who are losing national control of their states to the globalizing neo-liberal international order. DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-19

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The two pieces in this chapter do not quite have opposing views on the issue at hand. Both are supportive of efforts designed to develop the girl child. Nevertheless, some context is necessary to facilitate understanding of their take on the debate. To begin with, both pieces in this debate, draw heavily on Kenya’s experience thereby somewhat limiting the applicability of their claims to the broader and incredibly diverse African continent. Nevertheless, the core of this debate is the ongoing women’s struggle for gender equality in many African societies which have historically been patriarchal as exemplified by Kenya. As a result, women and girls tend to be disadvantaged in their access to socio-economic resources. For example, while most farmers in Africa are women, very few of them control the land they farm because in many African societies, land is inherited along the male line with women and girls accessing land through their male relatives – fathers, husbands and brothers. Even in countries like Kenya that has a constitutional bill of rights that bars, among other things, discrimination on the basis of sex, that is, “women and men have the right to equal treatment, including the right to equal opportunities in political, economic, cultural and social spheres,” women and girls continue to struggle to own land.1 Therefore, the education of girls has been long seen as a critical way of empowering women and girls to succeed in these patriarchal societies. Guided by the adage that “if you educate a man you educate an individual, but if you educate a woman you educate a family (nation),” governments and other development agencies have since independence made concerted investments in women’s and girls’ education. These agencies belief that while education is beneficial to both sexes, it is especially beneficial for society to invest in girls’ education because girls magnify the value of their education by taking better care of themselves and their families. Thus in many African countries, the education of girls has been hailed as the silver bullet that can improve a nation’s quality of life by improving the quality of its workforce, leading to healthier families by reducing child malnutrition and increasing the utilization of medical services, reducing early-life pregnancies and lowering the wage gap between the sexes. In recent decades, the wisdom of investing more on the education of girls than boys has come under scrutiny for “disempowering women by viewing them as developmental instruments and reinforcing patriarchal stereotypes.” 2 Moreover, the maxim – if you educate a man you educate an individual, but if you educate a woman you educate a family (nation) – has been criticized for presenting “women as development agents not to be wasted …. It also bears the assumption that women must assume their household roles as mothers and wives so that their education would lead to development in the wider context” (ibid. 61). Additionally, educating girls, while commendable, can be counterproductive if “the strategic gender needs necessary for sustainable improvements in women’s lives” (ibid. 71) are left unaddressed. Nyaondo’s argument not only critiques the effectiveness of many current girl empowerment programs, it also questions their cultural appropriateness and sustainability.

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Thus, empowering girls alone can be counterproductive if it leads to reverse injustice against boys. Moreover, these empowered girls must work and live in a society with disempowered boys with disastrous consequences for both sexes. How then do we address historical injustices involving girls’ disadvantaged access to socio-economic resources without creating new injustices? How, for instance, can the issue of educational inequality be tackled in a manner that transcends these challenges? If Africa’s resource (e.g., educational) inequality is tackled in a manner that is seen to disadvantage boys, it can lead to backlash, as it seems to be doing in Kenya, even if, as Njoya argues, the cause of male discomfort in the country is the current global neo-liberal international order which has led to gross economic inequality, high unemployment levels and many other challenges that have cost many men their traditional socio-economic power. Simultaneously, in places like central Kenya where women have high levels of education and employment, even as the boy child appears to have stagnated, it is increasingly hard to silence claims that the focus on the girl child has left boys behind. 3 YES: THE GIRL CHILD DEVELOPMENT AGENDA IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IN KENYA It goes without saying that the single best indicator of whether a nation will succeed is how it treats its women and girls. Investment in girls has historically been credited with better health outcomes, economic gains and improvement in the overall quality of life. During the Obama administration, the US government created a White House Council on Women and Girls designed to focus on the issues affecting women’s and girl’s development (White House, 2009). In Africa, the number of programs and financial investments geared towards improving the status of girls by increasing their access to education, healthcare, life skills and even public leadership opportunities though these differ by country and region. Laws and policies have been implemented to support girls’ access to spaces that they could not otherwise access decades ago. However, we need not be carried away by their increased numbers of school enrolment or by the budgetary allocation and expenditures on programs geared towards the development of girls. In this essay, I want to draw attention to two key questions: First, what is the meaning of girl-child development? How is this development evaluated and by whom? What markers indicate its’ achievement or lack of thereof? Defining what development is and for whom we seek it determines our central focus. In this case, the weight of the challenges facing girls sits on the girls’ shoulders rather than on the system that produces them. Second, are girl-child development programs actually solving the problem of the subjugation of girls and women, or does the problem simply mutate with each new wave of development initiatives?

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The question of defining development especially in the social sciences is a particularly difficult one because it is highly subjective and relative to circumstances. It can be said that women and girls have made significant socioeconomic gains in Kenya over the last five decades (USAID & Meassick, 2020). World Bank Data confirms their progress on many indicators including literacy levels, access to basic needs and better health outcomes etc. Many more girls have increased access to education hence their higher school enrolment, better healthcare and declining maternal mortality rates and better physical security and lower reported cases of violence against women. But do the live experiences of women and girls show that their lives have improved? Moreover, when talking about girls’ development, what are the social costs paid by the girls who benefit from these programs and how do the communities they come from view these costs? I argue that the programs geared for girls’ empowerment are counterproductive. They not only produce vast unintended outcomes that often go undocumented, but they also subject the beneficiaries to additional pressure from their communities and families. Take the education sector for instance, which is believed to be the engine of socio-economic empowerment. In Kenya, the late president Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi, left a strong legacy of support for the education of girls as exemplified, for instance, in the long trail of Moi Girls’ Primary and Secondary schools in Kenya today. However, due to many socio-cultural beliefs and other reasons, many girls did not have access to education under Moi. Then President Mwai Kibaki’s administration compounded this problem by implementing a gender-blind Free Primary Education for All policy (Bulemi, 2019) as if changing policy alone is enough to keep girls in school (Akala, 2019). While available data suggests shows that a near equal proportion of boys (51%) and girls (49%) are now enrolled in Kenyan primary schools, and that there are slightly more girls (50.2%) than boys (49.8%) in its secondary schools (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2021: 265, 273), more boys than girls are dropping out because of many factors including broken families, household poverty, poor parental supervision, low parental education, loss of one or both parents to death and low household value for education (Owuor, 2012). Moreover, in some parts of Kenya, many older boys are lured out of school by the mining, ranching and motorcycle transport (boda boda) industries (Oduor, 2014; Oduor et al., 2014). Campaigns focused on girl child education have also resulted in minimal or no attention being paid to boys (Oduor, 2014). At the higher education level, more Kenyan women than men are enrolled in the country’s Master’s and PhD programs (Kajilwa, 2016), yet far more men than women hold Kenya’s positions of power (Ndanu, 2020). “Things have certainly improved for women [in Kenya and in many other countries around the globe], but at the top of both industry and government the faces remain stubbornly male” (van der Gaag, 2014, no pp). Thus, change is not happening as quickly as it could perhaps because of other underlying factors. In essence, therefore, development for girls has become this ever-elusive goal that keeps changing positions with time.

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At the grassroots level, many valuable co-curriculum programs, including Girls in STEM, Girls Code and Arise Girls, are trying to give girls a leg up and to boost their self-esteem. In a local primary school, in a small village in Koru, a few miles from Kisumu, Kenya, a select number of girls are in mentorship programs like DREAM and Girls Club. Other programs focus on provision of free sanitary towels for girls, and provision of school uniforms and shoes and mentors (Mire, 2020). When the girls are gathered for such programs, boys are usually playing soccer or involved in other games. While parents are typically happy to let girls participate in various extracurricular activities, this does not usually exempt them from their domestic and/or other responsibilities and expectations around family and the home. They are not removed from the daily realities that produce a double consciousness in them – they are constantly juggling two worlds. Which leads one to wonder whether such girls adjust their sense of self with the new empowerment information, they receive even when their environment largely remains the same. How do their peers see them when they do/do not change? In Kakamega County, Kenya, nearly all women Members of the County Assembly (MCAs) are involved in some sort of girl empowerment program including provision of free shoes, sanitary towels and motivational talks to young girls. This is an easy way for MCAs to earn political capital. While clearly the girls are better off with the donations than without, these can come at a great cost to the girls and their communities if the conditions that make girls vulnerable are left unchanged. The implementers of girls’ development programs, out of the need to showcase their compassion and accomplishments, often use the media to highlight their work. For instance, when political leaders invest in girl-child development projects, they use the media to gain political mileage from such investments. While this is good, the negative effect of such publicity stunts is that they give a misleading impression that a lot more investment is being made on the girl-child than is the case. Besides, the differential benefits of such programs are seldom accounted for. Not all girls benefit from such programs and even among those who benefit, there are differences. The constant publicity around girl-child development creates a façade that enough is being done when in fact this is not the case (Mire, 2020). If this reality was well-captured, below are some of the counter-productive outcomes one would find: 1 In some cases, these programs subject their beneficiaries to danger: Based on the publicity and attention the girls receive, those lacking that attention are further aggravated sometimes to the point of violence. Those who believe such attention takes power from them push back to regain their assumed lost power. This is not unique to Kenya or Africa. Take the example of Malala Yousafzai of Pakistan, had she not captured global attention, would she have survived her October 2012 attack? Unlike Malala, many young female victims of violence do not attract global media attention, but they nonetheless suffer unimaginable violence and many of them do

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not seek personal development opportunities for fear of such backlash. Indeed, in Malala’s words, “I tell my story not because it is unique, but because it is the story of many girls” in the world (Malala Fund, 2022). 2 Misplaced priorities in the girl-child advancement agenda: The heightened publicity around girl-child empowerment from grassroots and national NGOs leads to the impression that girl-child problems have been solved and that there is no need for additional resources. Therefore, a lot more needs to be done to combat the pushback that girls face because of their elevated status. Moreover, the girls who benefit from such girl-child empowerment programs need additional support with respect to their roles within their domestic environments which often hinder them from taking full advantage of the empowerment programs offered to them. 3 The programs do not address the issue of disempowerment of girls in the long term: While in the short-term, girls gain from empowerment programs, they often lose out in the long-term by remaining in their disempowering social environments which do not change in the short term. Without long-term investment and change in the socio-cultural environment, girls eventually become disempowered despite going through empowerment programs. For instance, girls often end up being married to male counterparts who did not benefit from such programs thereby undermining their achievements. Alternatively, society often devalues girls’ achievements thereby hindering their subsequent accomplishments. Part of the reason why programs geared towards the advancement of girls are generating counter-productive outcomes is because many of them are not intersectional in their approach. Instead, they have a linear approach to providing solutions to the challenges of girls and women. These liberal feminist programs focus on changing laws and providing temporary relieves and services that do not create the systemic changes required to alter the belief systems that generate the disempowerment of girls in the first place. Intersectional approaches to program formulation and implementation produce more holistic and effective girl empowerment programs that account for girls’ diverse cultural backgrounds, identities, and histories. Nevertheless, intersectional approaches can be costly and complex. The second reason why this problem arises is because programs and solutions for improving the status of girls come from outside the target communities rather that within. Social science researchers have come up with community participatory research models that involve the target communities in problem framing and solution identification. These begin with the envisioning and description of the word development. What development means to a New York policy activist is different from an activist in Cape Town, South Africa, or in a little village in Kiambu, Kenya. When girls and their families are involved in identifying the problem, multi-layered causalities are often established based on the respective communities and their

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needs. Perhaps, different ideas are generated, and robust and long-term solutions are also likely to arise from such environments. The other reason this problem arises is when girl empowerment programs ignore men as allies. Many communities remain patriarchal in nature and their worldview right from the individual to the family. Empowered girls and women exist within these structures which introduce very confusing realities for young girls particularly when the causes of their disempowerment are directly related to patriarchy and the power systems that support it. To resolve this issue, programs geared towards developing the girl-child should remain conscious of the environment that the girl child needs to thrive as opposed to focusing on the girl child alone. This calls for an intersectional feminist approach. The two ways of doing this in the existing communities without uprooting the girls from their homes are: a Involve fathers, uncles and brothers in programs aimed at benefiting girls: Across the globe, efforts to improve maternal health have shown that involving fathers in such initiatives leads to shared decision making within the household. Similarly, when fathers, brothers and uncles who traditionally have a major say in the lives of girls and women become allies, girls and women are likely to face less opposition when they begin to shine. In short, “Men and boys are unavoidably involved in gender issues. There are pragmatic reasons for this. Any reform agenda requires resources. The existing pattern of gender inequality – men’s predominant control of economic assets, political power, cultural authority, and armed force – means that men (often, specific groups of men) control most of the resources required to implement women’s claims for justice” (Connell, 2003: 3). b Community acceptance of girl’s development projects: Community involvement in girl child development projects is a great way to buy their acceptance and community ownership of the same and hence less backlash on the girls.

References Akala, Beatrice (2019). “Fixing policy isn’t enough to keep girls in school in Kenya and South Africa,” Quartz Africa, November 7, 2019, https://qz.com/africa/1742853/ girls-still-face-education-barriers-in-kenya-and-south-africa/. Bulemi, William (2019). “Free Primary Education: A noble idea poorly executed,” The Standard, November 21, 2019, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/commentary/ article/2001350224/did-kibaki-use-fpe-just-to-win-power. Connell, R. W. (2003). “The Role of Men and Boys in Achieving Gender Equality,” United Nations Expert Group Meeting on “The role of men and boys in achieving gender equality” 21 to 24 October 2003, Brasilia, Brazil. https://www.un.org/ womenwatch/daw/egm/men-boys2003/Connell-bp.pdf. Kajilwa, Graham (2016). ‘More women than men taking Masters and PhDs, Kenya’s ministry of education reveals’, The Standard, Aug 25th 2016, https://www.standardmedia. co.ke/mobile/article/2000213378/more-women-than-men-taking-masters-andphds-kenya-s-ministry-of-education-reveals.

Development of the girl child 203 Keino, Kipkoech J. (2020). “Influence of motorcycle (bodaboda) business on pupils’ dropout in public primary schools in Rangwe Sub-county, Homabay County, Kenya.” MEd. Thesis, Department of Educational Foundations, University of Nairobi, Kenya. http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/152930. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2021). Economic Survey 2021. Nairobi: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. Malala Fund (2022). “Malala’s Story.” https://malala.org/malalas-story. Manning, Patrick. (1988). Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1880–1995, New York: Cambridge University Press. Manning, Patrick. (1990). Slavery and African Life: Occidental, Oriental and African Slave Trades, New York: Cambridge UP. McPhee, Allan. (1971). The Economic Revolution in British West Africa, Oxon: Frank Cass and Company Limited. Mire, Abdullahi (2020). “‘I wish I was a boy’: The Kenyan girls fighting period poverty,” Aljazeera, 24 February, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/2/24/ i-wish-i-was-a-boy-the-kenyan-girls-fighting-period-poverty. Ndanu, Grace (2020). “Kenyan Parliament in crisis after failure to attain the twothird gender rule,” UAB Institute for Human Rights Blog, November 2, 2020, https://sites.uab.edu/humanrights/2020/11/02/kenyan-parliament-in-crisis-afterfailure-to-attain-the-two-third-gender-rule/. Northrup, David. (1995). Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism 1834–1922, Studies in Comparative World History New York: Cambridge University Press 1995. Oduor, Augustine (2014). “Study: More boys dropping out of school than girls,” The Standard, May 29, 2014. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/education/article/2000122797/ study-more-boys-dropping-out-of-school-than-girls. Oduor, Stephen; Openda, Joseph; Koech, Flora; Ondieki, Geoffrey; Matara, Eric; Njuguna, Steve; Maina, Waikwa; Njoroge, John; Sayagie, George; Ojina, Elizabeth; Byron, Ian; Amadala, Benson; and Luvega, Derick (2021), ‘Kenya: More Boys Than Girls Missing From Schools’, Daily Nation, 19 January 2021, https://nation. afr ica/kenya/news/education/more-boys-than-g irls-m issing-from-schools3261322. Otiso, Kefa M. (2005). Colonial Urbanization and Urban Management in Kenya. In Stevens Salm & Toyin Falola (Eds.), African Urban Spaces in Historical Perspective (pp. 73–95). Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. Owuor, Ruth (2012). Factors Influencing Dropout Among Boys in Public Primary Schools in Dagoretti Division, Nairobi County. MA Thesis, Department of Educational Adminis­ tration and Planning, University of Nairobi. Smiley, Sarah L. (2009). “The City of Three Colors: Segregation in Colonial Dar es Salaam, 1891-1961.” Historical Geography, 37 (2009): 178–196. Smith, T. (1978). “A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 20, 1 (1978): 70–102. Solow, Robert M. (1956). “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 70, 1 (1956): 65–94. Tadei, Federico. (2020). “Measuring Extractive Institutions: Colonial Trade and Price Gaps in French Africa, Department of Economic History.” European Review of Economic History, 24, 1, (2020), 1–23. USAID Kenya and Mark Meassick (2020). ‘My Voice, Our Equal Future’ Needs to Include Kenyan Girls, USAID, Sunday, October 11, 2020. https://www.usaid.gov/ kenya/news/my-voice-our-equal-future-needs-include-kenyan-girls.

204  Rose A. Nyaondo and Wandia M. Njoya van der Gaag, Nikki (2014). “Women are better off today, but still far from being equal with men,” The Guardian, Monday, 29 September 2014, https://www.theguardian. com/global-development/2014/sep/29/women-better-off-far-from-equal-men. Walter Rodney (1983). How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications, London and Tanzanian Publishing House, Dar-Es-Salaam 1973, Transcript from 6th reprint. Wesley, John. (1774). Thoughts Upon Slavery, London: R Hawes. White House (2009, March 11). “The White House Council on Women and Girls.” https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/cwg.

NO: THE FOCUS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE KENYAN GIRL CHILD IS NOT COUNTERPRODUCTIVE The proposition implied in this question, that activism to support girls is harmful to society, is now popular in Kenyan public discourse. The girl child conversation drew public attention following continental campaigns aimed at tackling the cultural challenges which girls face in obtaining education, such as female genital mutilation (FGM) and childhood marriages – which Kenya does not have the courage to call pedophilia. In Kenya, however, the argument implicit in the proposition has degenerated into a disingenuous lament about the plight of boys who have been sacrificed in the promotion of girls’ education. Meanwhile, the quite serious topics that brought up the issue of the “girl child” have now dropped out of public discourse. Yet, as of 2020, 21% of women in Kenya have undergone FGM even though 90% of Kenyans think that the practice should end. According to the Government of Kenya and UNESCO, about 20% of the total number of girls between got pregnant between 2016 and 2017, and almost 8% of those who got pregnant were aged between 10 and 14. By 2014, 13000 girls in Kenya were reported to be dropping out of school annually (Muturi, 2020). The data on discrimination against women in the Kenyan economy indicates that we need to pay attention to the plight of girls so as to guarantee a better future for them and to society as a whole. The current gender inequality is in plain sight. In 2016, only 12% of board directors of companies listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange were women (Kariuki, 2016). Kenyan women comprise 80% of the workforce in agriculture, but hold only 1% of title deeds to land, and 5–6% of joint title deeds (Kenya Land Alliance, n.d.). In terms of political representation, Kenya lags the region with 23.5% of representatives being women (Kachambwa, 2018). As of 2017, women earned 68 Kenya shillings for every 100 shillings earned by men (Otieno, 2018). The backlash against the public awareness about this inequality has come in the form of a narrative that the public should take care of the boys who are suffering because of focus on girls. This reply may be more instinctive to Kenyans than to Africans in the rest of the continent, to the extent that it was part of the popular reaction in 2019 to the public hacking to death in broad

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daylight of Ivy Wangechi, a young female university student by a young man who was said to be her boyfriend, but the claim was disputed (Koskei, 2019). In response to the public horror, some Kenyans wondered why the crime against her received more attention than the neglect of the boy child exemplified by her killer. One disturbing tweet said: “My heart bleeds for the boy child. Nobody wants to see how depressed and desperate [he] was.” The callousness that inspires this pity for killers, rather than for their victims can be read against the backlash following the entry of more African women into the cut-throat economy introduced by colonialism in many African countries (Pike, 2020). The uniqueness of Kenya’s expression of this backlash lies in the ethnic politics which are rooted in the racial politics of Kenya’s history as a settler colony. When Kenyans complain about the “focus” on girls at “the expense” neglect of boys, they are, in reality, struggling with the decay of the familiar, albeit oppressive, colonial, ethnic and patriarchal African state and its replacement with the current global, neo-liberal order and its focus on confusing identity politics. Within this larger environment, it is inevitable that facts and logic challenging claims about the advantages enjoyed by girls will not really matter. By the same token, neither will gender of the Kenyan adherents to the boy child narrative, as Pike (2020) has shown, because the issue here is more a global interpretation of society and less the place of different social groups in it. These discursive dynamics, in turn, affect the possibility of debate. Debate requires that one side makes a proposition, to which the other side is willing to listen before offering a contrary opinion in response. However, no such courtesy exists on the question of the girl child, because the Kenyan public has been rendered hostile to discussions about gender. How did this happen? The answer lies in understanding the meaning of the key words in this debate: focus, development and counterproductive.

Whose focus are we talking about? The Kenyan public is unaware that the boy child narrative is rooted in elitist and specifically in the ethnic politics dominated by the Kikuyu. Male elites, who are predominantly Kikuyu, control power and wealth in Kenya, and are obsessed with masculinity which they express through the “politics of the foreskin” (Lamont, 2018) to taunt leaders of other ethnic groups. In addition, the dis-proportionate wealth and the higher population of educated women in predominantly Kikuyu areas have implications for the birth rate, which worries Kikuyu politicians who justify their national dominance on the basis of their ethnic group being the largest in Kenya. More fascinating is that despite the widespread resentment of Kikuyu elitism across Kenya, popularly referred to as “uthamakism” (The Elephant, 2017), this narrative of masculinity has s successfully camouflaged its overt ethnic dimensions. I will demonstrate this paradox through a discussion of an early landmark in the emergence of the “boy-child” narrative, which was the

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dramatic saga involving Bishop Margaret Wanjiru, a boisterous and wealthy pastor with political ambitions, and James Kamangu, a cobbler. In 2007, Kamangu sought the help of the court in stopping Wanjiru’s impending marriage to a South African pastor, claiming to be Wanjiru’s husband by customary law and to be the father of her three children. Wanjiru hit back, publicly referring to Kamangu as “this jigger-infested man” and saying to the media that he should “hang on a tree and we will have a funeral” (Kavulla, 2008, p. 258). The image of a rich, abrasive woman humiliating a poor humble man, initially shocked the public. The event also catapulted to national limelight Nderitu Njoka, who accompanied Kamangu to court and who, under the auspices of his briefcase organization “Maendeleo ya Wanaume,” (Progress of Men) became “the face and spokesperson of Kenya’s battered men, especially from a ‘certain community and region’ [i.e., the Kikuyu]” (Ng’enoh, 2014). Nderitu gave voice to the public suspicion that women unfairly gain wealth and power at the expense of men, and that this imbalance is reinforced by resources at the disposal of NGOs engaged in activism for the girl child (Gachango, 2014). At the heart of this bitterness with activism for girls is foreign donor funding, which is associated with access of local, often female NGO activists to foreign currency that exchanges well against the Kenya shilling, and is accompanied by perks such as travelling abroad. The respectability offered by the media to Njoka and the resentment which he promoted was replicated in academia. Naturally, most of the research and dissertations on the boy child were in the field of education, since education remains a major route to material wealth and power in Kenya. Academics explicitly mentioned the material and institutional resources behind activism for girls’ education. One dissertation, for example, singled out the Forum for African Women Educationists, a continent-wide body, for promoting girls’ education with the backing of powerful ministerial voices at the continental level, and lamented the lack of a “counterpart organization or clear effort towards boys’ education” (Kamanja, 2012). Other academic publications reveal the nonchalance with which scholars make claims about girls trumping boys in school. Hardly any publications provide a theoretical justification for focus on the boy child other than the narrative of favoritism. They use raw numbers of girls and boys in school, without factoring in performance or completion rates. They do not account for why few Kenyans (3.5% in 2019), mostly men (about 60%), attend university in the country (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2019). Furthermore, they fail to mention the intersection of class and gender, for example, in the reality that teenage pregnancies, which lead to school dropout, are higher among girls from lower income households (Muturi, 2020), or the likelihood that the rise in completion rates for girls is commensurate with policies such as free pre-tertiary education and the increase in parents, especially among the educated, who value girls’ education. An example that illustrates this phenomenon is an academic journal article which claims that “the girl-child has been fore grounded at the expense of

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boy-child,” and that this phenomenon has reversed the gains Kenya had made in achieving “social equality and non–discrimination” (Chang’ach, 2012, p. 184). The article provides no data to back up the claims about Kenya’s social equality and that educating girls is a threat to social equality. Eventually, the narrative of discrimination would be picked up by Kikuyu politicians. In 2015, for example, the Nyandarua Country deputy governor Waithaka Mwangi attributed rampant alcohol abuse in the community to neglect of boys due to too much focus on girls (Ngetich, 2015). The elite mimicry of the activism for girls reached an absurd point when the wife of the Nyandarua County Governor visited a school to donate oversized underwear to boys, presumably as the equivalent of programs which provide sanitary towels to girls. The media report was accompanied by a photograph of the governor’s wife standing with the hapless boys holding the colorful underwear over their heads (Munyeki, 2018). This absurdity emerges from the academic mediocrity and general anti-intellectualism of the Kenyan media, academia and the state, all which have legitimized the spurious boy child narrative for public consumption. The public, in turn, evokes the boy child to minimize the death of women at the hands of abusive men. However, this conversation about the boy child is curiously absent when boys are victims of violence at the hands of institutions such as the schools and the state. For instance, activists struggle to evoke public empathy for victims of police killings, majority of whom are young men from low income areas. When cases of injuries inflicted on boys in school become public, Kenyans say that the bullying is part of becoming a man. The voting choices of Kenyans also demonstrate lack of sympathy for men. A few months after her public humiliation of Kamangu, Bishop Wanjiru was elected as a Member of Parliament in the 2007 general elections. Less than a year later, Kamangu died in hospital. Despite its claim to care for men, the Kenyan public rewards cruelty against men if it is perpetrated by elites associated with state power, regardless of the gender of the elites. The proposition of this debate is therefore ambiguous. It does not name whose focus is of interest here, for whom the “focus” on girls is counterproductive, or what development means. However, the brief historical overview provided here demonstrates that the complaint about favoritism of girls is really a backlash against the well-connected women advocates for girls’ education by their male elite counterparts. Violence against the ordinary Kenyans, especially women and the poor, is simply collateral damage of this backlash against the entry of women into the elite. Likewise, the plea for boys is simply an alibi to protect the macho, ethnocentric colonial state and the advantages it accords to mostly male elites in the media, academia and politics. Ultimately, the proposition against girl-child activism reflects the angst of African elites about the precarity of their colonial patriarchal privilege instigated by the neoliberal, global economy that is promoting women’s inclusion in the ethnocentric, macho African state. The complaint about the boy child is not really about boys.

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Notes 1. Constitution of Kenya, Chapter Four - The Bill of Rights, Part 2. Rights and fundamental freedoms, (3), https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-ofkenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms/ 193-27-equality-and-freedom-from-discrimination. 2. Serena Suen (2013). “The education of women as a tool in development: challenging the African maxim,” Hydra, 1(2): 60–76. http://journals.ed.ac.uk/hydra/issue/ view/61. 3. Isabel Pike (2021). “A Discursive Spectrum: The Narrative of Kenya’s ‘Neglected’ Boy Child,” Gend Soc. 2020 Apr; 34(2): 284–306. Published online 2019 Jul 27. doi: 10.1177/0891243219863029.

References Chang’ach, John K. (2012). An unfinished agenda: Why is the boy child endangered? International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 2(4), 181–188. Gachango, Rayhab. (2014, November 11). Profile on Nderitu Njoka – Maendeleo ya wanaume. Potentash.com. Retrieved from https://www.potentash.com/2014/11/11/ profile-nderitu-njoka-maendeleo-ya-wanaume/ Kachambwa, Memory. (2018, February 28). Political participation for Kenya’s women still a far cry from its constitutional provision. Retrieved from Women Deliver: https://womendeliver. org/2018/political-participation-kenyas-women-still-far-cry-constitutional-provision/ Kamanja, Peter. W. (2012). Factors influencing the boy-child secondary education in the rice growing region of Kirinyaga South District, Kirinyaga County, Kenya. Nairobi: Kenyatta University. Kariuki, James. (2016, March 3). Stop paying lip service and put women in boardrooms, NSE firms told. Daily Nation. Retrieved from https://www.nation.co.ke/kenya/business/ stop-paying-lip-service-and-put-women-in-boardrooms-nse-firms-told-1176002 Kavulla, Travis. R. (2008). “Our enemies are God’s enemies”: The Religion and politics of Bishop Margaret Wanjiru, MP. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2(2), 254–263. doi:10.1080/17531050802058369 Kenya Land Alliance, n.d. (n.d.). Women, land and property rights and the land reforms in Kenya. Nairobi: Kenya Land Alliance. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2019). 2019 Kenya Population and Housing Census: Volume IV - Distribution of Population by Socio-Economic Characteristics. Nairobi: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. Koskei, Silah. (2019, April 9). Medical student killed outside Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital, Eldoret. East African Standard. Retrieved from https://www.standardmedia. co.ke/article/2001320249/medical-student-hacked-to-death-outside-mtrh-eldoret Lamont, Mark. (2018). Forced male circumcision and the politics of the foreskin in Kenya. African Studies, 77(2), pp. 293–311. doi:10.1080/00020184.2018.1452850 Munyeki, J. (2018, July 18). Protests as county first lady donates oversized underpants to school boys. East African Standard. Retrieved from https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ article/2001288546/protests-as-county-donates-oversized-underpants-to-school-boys Muturi, Glory N. (2020, March 6). Teenage pregnancy: Doom and gloom in education, health. Retrieved from https://ncpd.go.ke/teenage-pregnancy-in-kenya/ Ng’enoh, P. (2014, January 24). How Nderitu has tamed women. East African Standard. Retrieved from https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000103094/how-nderituhas-tamed-women

Development of the girl child 209 Ngetich, Daisy. (2015, June 25). Boy child neglect to blame for rampant alcoholism, say leaders. Citizen Digital. Retrieved from https://citizentv.co.ke/news/boy-childneglect-to-blame-for-rampant-alcoholism-say-leaders-90169/ Otieno, Dorothy. (2018, March 7). Why the fight for women’s rights is necessary … over 100 years later. Daily Nation. Retrieved from https://www.nation.co.ke/newsplex/ Women-s-day/2718262-4332242-3uo6rd/index.html Pike, Isabel. (2020). A discursive spectrum: The Narrative of Kenya’s “neglected” boy child. Gender and Society, 34(2), 284–306. doi:10.1177%2F0891243219863029 The Elephant. (2017, August 7). The Ideology of Uthamaki: A conversation with Edwin Mutemi wa Kiama. The Elephant. Retrieved from https://www.theelephant.info/ radio/2017/08/07/the-ideology-of-uthamaki/

16 Are Africa’s health resources overly focused on HIV/AIDS? YES: Joseph Oppong

Department of Geography, University of North Texas, USA

NO: Kwadwo Adu Boakye

School of Biological and Population Health Sciences, College of Public Health and Human Sciences, Oregon State University, Oregon, USA Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Joseph Oppong of the Department of Geography and the Robert Toulouse Graduate School at the University of North Texas argues that despite a rapid rise in non-communicable diseases in Africa, in line with its epidemiologic transition, health system financing across the continent is focused on HIV-AIDS programs to the detriment of overall health system improvements. Since most of the continent’s HIV-AIDS programs are donorfunded, this focus on HIV/AIDS has a bandwagon effect that attracts even more funding to HIV-AIDS from new donors. This situation fuels the mismanagement of health funds and distorts national health priorities. Oppong calls on African countries to focus on improving their overall health systems including paying attention to their rapidly growing non-communicable disease burden. He also argues that donor resources must support, not displace, African health priorities. NO: Kwadwo Adu Boakye of the School of Biological and Population Health Sciences at Oregon State University, Oregon, USA, argues that HIV/ AIDS continues to be one of the major disease burdens in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, the high amount of resources spent on controlling HIV/AIDS in Africa is justified. Moreover, because of resource sharing in the health sector, this high HIV-AIDS spending builds up the capacity of the continent’s overall health system. In any case, the continent’s success in eliminating some communicable diseases in the last decade suggests that the continent is not overly focusing its health resources on dealing with HIV/AIDS. Africa is faced a double burden of infectious (e.g., the common cold and HIV/AIDS) and chronic diseases e.g., diabetes and cancer. “While infectious diseases still account for at least 69% of deaths on the continent, age specific mortality rates from chronic diseases [are] actually higher in sub Saharan Africa than in virtually all other regions of the world, in both men and women.”1 As a result, the continent is expected to have the “largest increase DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-20

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in death rates from cardiovascular disease, cancer, respiratory disease and diabetes” (ibid) in the foreseeable future as it undergoes a rapid epidemiologic transition in which the “pattern of mortality and disease in a population is transformed from one of high mortality among infants and children and episodic famine and epidemics affecting all age groups to one of degenerative and human-made diseases (such as those attributed to smoking) affecting principally the elderly.”2 Africa’s double burden of infectious and chronic disease is at the center of this debate on whether Africa is overspending health resources on HIV/AIDS. Should it continue to spend high amounts of money on HIV/AIDS or should it also begin to pay attention to chronic diseases? For starters, according to the World Health Organization, Africa has the highest incidence of HIV in the world, with 25.7 million people living with the virus in 2018. The continent also accounts for 66% of the world’s new HIV infections. Therefore, without continued vigilance, HIV/AIDS would still be a big killer in Africa as it was in the 1990s and 2000s before the intervention of programs like PEPFAR. Because of the continent’s double burden of infectious and chronic diseases, it is likely that it will continue to spend significant amounts of resources on controlling HIV/AIDS even as it begins to pay attention to diseases like diabetes and cancer. YES: AFRICA’S HEALTH RESOURCES ARE OVERLY FOCUSED ON HIV/AIDS

Introduction Although Africa has the world’s highest prevalence and death rate for HIV/ AIDS, for many African countries, HIV is not the most important cause of sickness and death. Yet, the continent devotes an inordinate amount of health resources to fighting HIV, leaving very little money for other more pressing health challenges. In many African countries, health resources are overly focused on HIV/AIDS because external funding agencies see it as a humanitarian disaster. In fact, in some countries, external funding for HIV/ AIDS dwarfs the national health budget. However, Africa is going through an epidemiological transition, where the leading causes of sickness and death are changing from communicable to non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Thus, the current overemphasis on HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases leaves Africa grossly unprepared to face the future pandemics of NCDs such as diabetes, hypertension and stroke.

HIV/AIDS and Africa In 2019, an estimated 38 million people across the world were living with HIV/AIDS. Out of this number, 20.7 million people (54%) lived in Eastern and Southern Africa and Western and Central Africa contributed another

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4.9 million (13%). Of the 690,000 global AIDS related deaths, 300,000 occurred in Eastern and Southern Africa while Western and Central Africa accounted for 140,000. Thus, Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 67% of global HIV cases and about 64% of total deaths. Moreover, the countries with the highest HIV rates worldwide are all in Sub-Saharan Africa and include Eswatini, formerly known as Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana. South Africa has the highest number of people living with HIV in the world (7.5 million), while Eswatini has the highest prevalence rate in the world (27%). Nevertheless, not every country is severely affected, and HIV prevalence rates are very low in Senegal, Ghana and many other countries. Due to the excessively high prevalence of HIV in African countries, the global effort to control HIV/AIDS has prioritized Sub-Saharan Africa. This is especially important because whereas other countries have routine access to antiretroviral treatment for people living with HIV, due to cost, such access is extremely limited in African countries. Thus, seeing the devastation of HIV, especially from vertical transmission – from mothers to their children and the challenge of AIDS orphans – funding agencies pump tons of money into HIV prevention, treatment, and control programs. Such external prioritization of HIV compels national governments to follow suit, not necessarily because HIV is their top priority, but because of the financial controls exerted on them by these benefactors. Consequently, HIV/AIDS receives the most attention of all the diseases across the continent.

Bandwagon effect The current global prioritization of HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention is diverting donor and national human resources toward HIV/AIDS and away from other important health issues. When donors provide extensive funding for one disease, it receives priority attention from the limited health workforce that is attracted to the gleaming buildings and better working environments and higher emoluments and benefits. This happens at the expense, and to the neglect, of other health problems. Moreover, when influential donors prioritize a particular disease, others follow, leading to the neglect of other diseases. For example, when the US government increased funding for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, commitments from the European Union and G8 countries increased as well. This has been called the bandwagon effect (Périn & Attaran, 2003). Consequently, by diverting donor and national human resources toward HIV/AIDS, and away from other important health issues, the global HIV/AIDS agenda may be having negative overall health impacts. Instead of investing in general health systems, donors prefer vertical programs – specific diseases or programs – because they ensure service specialization, better accountability and rapid results even when the health systems are weak. For example, the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which was launched in 2003 by President George W. Bush,

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targets funding to HIV/AIDS to save the lives of those suffering from the disease. Since its inception, PEPFAR has provided more than $80 billion in cumulative funding for HIV/AIDS treatment, prevention and research, making it the largest global health program focused on a single disease in history. PEPFAR is widely credited with saving millions of lives, primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa, by expanding access to HIV prevention, treatment and care interventions. This has led to large increases in the number of people receiving antiretroviral therapy and reductions in mortality. However, PEPFAR’s narrow focus on HIV, to the exclusion of – and possibly to the detriment of – other basic priorities such as strengthening of health systems or primary care, is problematic. Huge donor funding for HIV/ AIDS sometimes crowds out other health needs, distorts health priorities and exerts undue pressure on the limited number of health workers in Africa. In Uganda, for example, next to a US government funded state-of-the-art HIV clinic, diabetics at a nearby government treatment facility in Mbarara to the Southwest of Kampala, sleep on the floor (Smith, 2009). Dr. Medaro, the resident physician, lamented the dearth of resources and visible inequities there: “My patients sleep on the floor, or outside … One woman told me she would like to have HIV, because at least those drugs are free, whereas she has to pay for her insulin” (Smith, 2009: no pp). This suggests that donor prioritization of HIV/AIDS may be reducing the attention paid to other health issues.

Distorted funding priorities In several African countries with low to moderate HIV prevalence levels, donor funding for HIV/AIDS frequently exceeds the entire national health budget (Bernstein and Sessions, 2007). In Ethiopia, with an HIV prevalence rate of 1.4%, donors committed US$130 million for HIV/AIDS in 2005, compared with a 2003 national health budget of US$113 million. In Uganda, with a 6.7% adult HIV rate, the HIV allocation from external funds was $167 million compared to a national health budget of only $112 million. Even where HIV/AIDS funding does not exceed the national budget per se, gross distortions of priorities are obvious. In Rwanda, with a 3% infection rate, only $18 million was earmarked for malaria (the biggest cause of mortality and morbidity in the country), and $1 million for the integrated management of childhood illnesses, compared to $47 million for HIV/AIDS (Shiffman, 2008). An additional problem is that frequently, the health aid directed towards HIV is inversely proportional to the burden of HIV disease. For example, about 80% of US support to Nigeria, Ethiopia and Uganda was committed to PEPFAR (Lyman and Wittels, 2010) while HIV/AIDS accounts for a small fraction of these countries’ disease burden. Also, the global response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic has been “overmedicalized.” Most programs deliver medications that prolong the lives of adults and infants, while reducing vertical transmission – from mother to child. The narrow focus on survival – reducing the death count – as the

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measure of program success, translates into severe underfunding of services for survivors such as AIDS orphans. Yet, education and support for these AIDS survivors is vital. In addition to medication, people living with HIV/ AIDS have many other needs including food, housing, education and jobs.

HIV/AIDS support breeds corruption The flood of donations to battle HIV/AIDS has also created conditions for widespread misuse of the funds. In some African countries, the establishment of HIV/AIDS-focused non-government organizations is now an industry. Mismanagement of AIDS funds is widespread. Examples include Zimbabwe where the Global Fund requested pay back of $7.2  m in ‘misused’ funds; Zambia, where European donors recently froze HIV/AIDS funding; and Uganda, where three former ministers of health faced trial for corruption.

Strengthening health systems – a neglected priority Finally, countries, with the most severe HIV/AIDS devastation, also face extremely difficult problems including poor health care infrastructure and inadequate numbers of health workers. Without major improvements in the health systems, eradicating these diseases is impossible. Thus, health systems strengthening efforts must be a higher priority. In fact, the proportion of funding for HIV in SSA is higher than the burden of disease attributable to HIV in 2008 (Amico, Aran & Avilla, 2010). Overall, African governments do not spend enough on healthcare. While governments pledged in 2001 through the Abuja Declaration to commit 15% of their annual budgets to public health spending, only a few countries have actually achieved the target.

Epidemiologic transition Africa is going through an epidemiologic transition and the disease burden on the African continent is shifting from infectious diseases, such as HIV and tuberculosis, to non-communicable diseases, such as cancer, diabetes and cardiovascular disease. Due to income and health disparities between rural and urban areas, many countries are experiencing a dual burden of disease – NCDs dominate the urban areas while communicable diseases dominate in rural areas. Overall, NCDs are set to overtake the combined burden of communicable, maternal, neonatal and nutritional (CMNN) diseases as the leading cause of mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2030. In 2017, the leading causes of the NCD burden were cardiovascular diseases, cancers, mental disorders and diabetes. In some African countries, such as Mauritius, Namibia and Seychelles, NCDs cause over 50% of all reported adult deaths. This implies that NCDs will soon be a leading cause of ill health, disability and premature death in the Region, and will have an adverse impact on socioeconomic development. In many cases, the shift of mortality from communicable to noncommunicable diseases is a consequence of success in addressing HIV/AIDS.

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Furthermore, people living with HIV/AIDS are also at increased risk of cardiovascular disease, cancers, and other non-communicable diseases resulting from both HIV infection and its treatment. Long-term treatment with antiretroviral produces complications such as hypertension and diabetes (Siddharthan, et al., 2015). Yet, the continent has a severe shortage of specialized physicians and medical equipment to treat NCDs, hence the difficulties it faces in addressing these and other challenges. In fact, the severe lack of NCD health workers means that patients are often misdiagnosed or diagnosed late, which increases their mortality and the cost and intensity of their treatment. Thus, for example, doctors on the continent are more likely to see late-stage cases of cancer than early treatable ones. In addition, patients must often travel long distances to seek treatment. In Kenya, for example, the nation’s few oncologists are in the capital city of Nairobi where they are inaccessible to many cancer patients in the country. But while Africa’s NCD disease burden continues to grow, funding for these types of diseases is far from adequate.

Does targeting HIV/AIDS improve funding for other diseases? Some have argued that donor prioritization of HIV/AIDS control improves attention and funding levels for the overall health sector. However, Shiffman, Berlan and Hafner (2009) did not find any evidence to support this assertion. Rather, HIV/AIDS may have helped to increase funding for the control of other infectious diseases and nothing else. In fact, between 1987 and 2007, as funding for HIV/AIDS control rose from just 5.5% to nearly half of all health aid, funding for health systems strengthening declined from 62.3% to 23.9%. For population and reproductive health, funding declined from 26.4% to 12.3% (Shiffman, Berlan and Hafner, 2009). Also, even as total aid for health tripled during this decade, aid for health systems strengthening largely stagnated. Overall, there is little support for the contention that donor funding for HIV/AIDS benefits all other diseases or the overall health sector. Additionally, medical needs are changing across the continent. Although much of the current focus of healthcare in Africa is on communicable diseases such as HIV and malaria, lifestyle changes and a growing middle class are making NCDs including cardiovascular disease, cancer and diabetes more pressing issues in many African countries. Rapid urbanization and increased Westernization of lifestyles among the middle classes is causing an increase in the risk factors that cause non-communicable diseases such as smoking, physical inactivity, harmful use of alcohol and unhealthy diets. Sadly, those surviving HIV/AIDS are now faced with NCDs which are low priority diseases.

Conclusion Driven by the HIV epidemic, health system financing across Africa is focused on HIV-specific programs at the expense of overall health system

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improvement. These health systems are ill equipped to manage the epidemiologic transition to non-communicable diseases. Although NCDs are the future, most African countries are not ready for them. Overemphasis on curative medicine rather than preventive medicine means that essentials such as exercise, healthy eating/living and other programs designed to reduce obesity and ensure healthy living are not a priority in many African countries.

References Amico P, Aran C, Avila C (2010) HIV spending as a share of total health expenditure: An analysis of regional variation in a multi-country study. PLOS ONE 5(9): e12997. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0012997. Amugsi DA, Dimbuene ZT, Mberu B, et al. (2017). Prevalence and time trends in overweight and obesity among urban women: an analysis of demographic and health surveys data from 24 African countries, 1991–2014. BMJ Open 2017;7:e017344. doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2017-017344. Bendavid E. (2016). Past and future performance: PEPFAR in the landscape of foreign aid for health. Current HIV/AIDS reports, 13(5), 256–262. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11904-016-0326-8. Bernstein, M. & Sessions, M. A. (2007). ‘Trickle or a flood: commitments and disbursement for HIV/AIDS from the Global Fund, PEPFAR, and the World Bank’s MultiCountry AIDS Program (MAP).’ Washington (DC): Center for Global Development, March 5, 2007. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/trickle-or-flood-commitmentsand-disbursement-hivaids-global-fund-pepfar-and-world-banks. Bongaarts, J., & Over, M. (2010). Public health. Global HIV/AIDS policy in transition. Science (New York, N.Y.), 328(5984), 1359–1360. https://doi.org/10.1126/science. 1191804. Lyman P, Wittels S. (2010). No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: The Unintended Consequences of Washington’s HIV/AIDS Programs. Foreign Affairs. 2010 Jul–Aug. Ooms, G., Van Damme, W., Baker, B. K., Zeitz, P., & Schrecker, T. (2008). The ‘diagonal’ approach to Global Fund financing: A cure for the broader malaise of health systems?. Globalization and Health, 4, 6. https://doi.org/10.1186/1744-8603-4-6. Périn, I. & Attaran, A. (2003). Trading Ideology for Dialogue: An Opportunity to Fix International Aid for Health? The Lancet, 361 (9364), 1216–1219, April 5, 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1576815. Shiffman, J. (2008). Has donor prioritization of HIV/AIDS displaced aid for other health issues? Health Policy Plan, Mar 2008, 23(2):95–100. doi: 10.1093/heapol/czm045. Epub 2007 Dec 21. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/18156161/. Shiffman, J., Berlan, D., & Hafner, T. (2009). Has aid for AIDS raised all health funding boats? Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes (1999), 52 Suppl 1, S45–S48. https://doi.org/10.1097/QAI.0b013e3181bbcb45. Siddharthan, T., Ramaiya, K., Yonga, G. et al., (2015). Non-communicable diseases in East Africa: Assessing the gaps in care and identifying opportunities for improvement. Health Affairs 34:9, 1506–1513. Smith, A. D. (2009). Experts want African aid funds channelled away from HIV. The Guardian, Saturday, 24 October, 2009. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2009/oct/25/aids-hiv-africa-aid-scientists.

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NO: AFRICA’S HEALTH RESOURCES ARE NOT OVERLY FOCUSED ON HIV/AIDS Africa has made tremendous progress towards reducing HIV/AIDS in the past few decades. Reasons for this great achievement include improved HIV/AIDS prevention efforts, surveillance, treatment and care for HIV/AIDS patients by governments. In addition, international donor agencies have played a major a role in this effort by funding these governments’ battle against HIV/AIDS in Africa (Duarte & Hancock, 2017). Despite these efforts, Africa remains the continent with the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence. One possible reason for this could be that the resources invested in HIV/AIDS are probably inadequate. In other words, we need more resources. HIV/AIDS is not the only disease on the African continent that has benefited from the astronomical funding it has received over the past decade. Simultaneously, other communicable and non-communicable (NCD) diseases have either benefited from the HIV/AIDS funds or seen an increase in their funding because of an increase in HIV/AIDS funds. One may argue that the percentage of the health budget that is allocated to HIV/AIDS is high compared to the other combined health sectors of many African countries. This has resulted in decades of limited investment that have hindered the upgrade and improvement of dilapidated health systems in many African countries. One major reason for this assertion could possibly be due to the role of international funding donor agencies in battling HIV/ AIDS. Since the funding is coming from foreign donor agencies, they dictate where and what the money should be used for. This sometimes interferes with African governments’ decision processes when making policies that affect the overall healthcare system. Also, HIV/AIDS donor funding makes it difficult for some governments to complement foreign funding with domestic funding to ensure that other health sectors receive a fair amount of attention. The large-scale funding for HIV/AIDS seen on the African continent does not necessarily lead to the diversion of funds from other health programs. But rather, the huge amount of health funding spent on HIV/AIDS, in the long run, plays a major role in strengthening the continent’s overall health systems and infrastructure. There are scenarios where foreign donor agencies make policies that support parallel logistics and delivery systems for other health sectors as part their HIV/AIDS funding. This reduces inequalities in health resource distribution. Many African countries have seen noticeable upgrades and increases in health resources through HIV/AIDS programs initiated by foreign donor agencies. For example, infrastructure and laboratories have been strengthened, as well as improvements in primary healthcare services. Similarly, one of the goals of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a major initiative by the United States government to combat HIV/AIDS globally, is to maximize and synchronize its HIV/AIDS programs to have a positive impact on overall health systems (Gray, 2017). Also, because of funding from programs

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like PEPFAR, some domestic money is freed up for investment in other health programs including improved working conditions for health workers. The money could also help increase physicians’ and other health workers’ salaries thereby helping to motivate them to deliver their services more efficiently and diligently. When this happens, the overall healthcare system benefits. Because of external funding by foreign donor agencies, Africa has seen increased government attention to public health through bilateral and multilateral government and public-private partnerships which contribute to the success of the continent’s overall healthcare system. For example, scaled up HIV/AIDS programs in Africa have contributed to an overall improvement in the quality of local laboratory systems and modern treatment centers that benefit all patients including those with HIV/AIDS and other communicable and NCD diseases (El-Sadr et al., 2012). Communicable diseases have been a major public health burden in Africa for a very long time and HIV/AIDS is just one more communicable disease that the continent is currently battling even though it is not one of the top 10 diseases in many African countries. Thus, the question of whether Africa’s health resources are overly focused on HIV/AIDS does not arise or preclude attention to other communicable and non-communicable diseases. HIV/ AIDS is simply one more communicable disease just like Ebola, cholera, and malaria. Because the continent’s attention is mainly focused on communicable diseases, its current attention and spending on HIV/AIDS is not misplaced. In any case, putting a big chunk of health resources on HIV/AIDS does not necessarily amount to the diversion of funds away from other health programs. Rather, the programs, facilities and interventions used to combat HIV/AIDS go a long way in strengthening the continent’s entire healthcare system. Tackling the challenge of non-communicable diseases in Africa is gradually improving. This can partly be attributed to the investments and scaling-up of health programs, facilities and interventions used to battle HIV/AIDS. By leveraging lessons from fighting HIV/AIDS, authorities can better deal with the rising burden of non-communicable diseases in Africa. For example, the recent outbreak of EBOLA in the Democratic Republic of the Congo did not last long and had few casualties because of the country’s swift response to the disease outbreak thanks to the emergency protocols and infrastructure put in place in the earlier HIV/AIDS era. Also, because Africa had already been battling communicable diseases for a long time, it already had the infrastructure, surveillance systems and contact tracing protocols that made its response to the Ebola outbreak more effective. A similar scenario can be seen in the response of African governments to the ongoing novel COVID-19 crisis. Some of the health resources and infrastructures being used to respond to the COVID-19 outbreak were pre-existing, having been used in the war against HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases. This could be a possible reason for the low number of COVID-19 cases and fatalities in Africa (Oppong et al., 2021) -- a clear indication that Africa’s health resources are not overly focused on HIV/AIDS. Coinfection with HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases such as malaria is associated with an increased risk of maternal mortality (Lathrop

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et al., 2014). The correlation between HIV/AIDS and increased maternal mortality in Africa has over the years led to calls for improved intervention measures to reduce HIV/AIDS-related maternal mortality on the continent. This is one example of the positive impact of HIV/AIDS control efforts on overall health improvements in Africa. Public health programs used to tackle HIV/AIDS have been replicated as well as being instrumental in reducing maternal and child mortality in Africa. Similarly, the continent’s HIV/AIDS control programs have contributed to its progress in achieving the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goal 3: good health and well-being (United Nation, n.d.). For example, the care and support provided to pregnant HIVpositive women has had a significant impact on the reduction of maternal and child mortality on the continent by preventing mother-to-child HIV transmission. In other words, the prevention of mother-to-child HIV transmission in Africa has not only been able to reduce HIV/AIDS but also its maternal and child mortality rate. Elimination and eradication of other diseases as well as the establishment of world-class health facilities have been witnessed on the African continent over the past few decades. These are examples and evidence of overall improvement in all health sectors and not just those touching on HIV/AIDS. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2020 announced that wild polio has been officially eradicated from the African continent after decades of funding and attention (World Health Organization, 2020). This great feat was achieved through the effective allocation of health resources more so by ensuring that every newborn received a polio vaccine. That Africa’s health resources are not overly focused on HIV/AIDS is also evident in WHO’s 2016 announcement that the African continent had made considerable success in controlling river blindness. A tremendous effort to end Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs) is also underway on the continent. For example, in 2017 the WHO named Togo as the first African country to eliminate lymphatic filariasis. Similarly, in 2018, the WHO named Ghana as the first African country to eliminate trachoma (World Health Organization, 2019). Other diseases such as Leprosy and Human African Trypanosomiasis are gradually being eliminated from the African continent. These great achievements in other health sectors are clear evidence of an overall health improvement on the African continent, not just on the HIV/AIDS front. Although focusing health resources on combating HIV/AIDS is still being criticized by some sections of the public as being unfair to other health systems, there are a lot of positives that cannot be overlooked. For instance, emergency response systems used to battle HIV/AIDS in Africa have been expanded to create emergency response systems to combat other diseases. Africa has made great strides in establishing emergency response and control centers to provide an effective and rapid response to disease outbreaks. The establishment of the African Centers for Disease Control (ACDC) demonstrates that the continent has a vision to strengthen its health capacity to respond to other communicable and NCD disease threats and outbreaks.

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These emergency response centers have the capacity to perform surveillance and diagnostic testing that enables health providers to rapidly detect communicable diseases such as malaria as well as prescribe life-saving treatment. In addition to the African CDC which is the main body that oversees outbreaks on the whole continent, several individual countries have also set up their own CDCs that respond to communicable disease outbreaks in their territories. The scaling up of HIV/AIDS programs and policies has thus provided the framework for establishing CDCs in various African countries. The introduction and advancement of new technologies to help reduce disparities in access to healthcare is another piece of evidence that shows that the continent does not overly focus its health resources on HIV/AIDS. The technological advancements that are gradually gaining momentum and attention on the continent range from telemedicine to drones and apps (Mars, 2013; McCall, 2019). For instance, drones are now used in the transport of blood, delivery of organs and in emergency rescue missions in remote rural areas. The use of drones in the delivery of blood is gaining momentum in countries such as Ghana, Rwanda, Cameroon and South Africa because they can help tackle high maternal mortality (e.g., during childbirth) across the continent. Ghana, in an effort to improve its healthcare, has expanded its medical drone network into the largest vaccine delivery network on the African continent. The introduction of telemedicine or telehealth care on the continent has also seen a lot of gains. Through telemedicine, the expertise of doctors in cities or urban areas can be used to improve rural healthcare (Mars, 2013). For example, Kenya’s national telemedicine initiative aims to tackle both communicable and NCD diseases as well as improving access to healthcare in rural areas. With the expansion of internet services, rural healthcare workers are able to use video conferencing to interact with experts in the major cities. In summary, HIV/AIDS continues to be a major public health burden on the African continent which remains the world’s epicenter of HIV/AIDS despite enormous amounts of health resources invested to reduce this prevalence. Critics may argue about a disparity between HIV health spending and overall health spending. Nevertheless, the scaling up HIV/AIDS response programs has produced improvements to the overall health system. Foreign donor agencies should therefore continue to invest in HIV/AIDS control programs in Africa because such programs have contributed to the continent’s great overall healthcare achievements in the last decade.

Notes

1. Ama de-Graft Aikins et al (2010). “Africa’s chronic disease burden: local and global perspectives,” Globalization and Health, 2010 6:8, https://www.biomedcentral.com/ collections/africas-global-chronic-disease-burden. 2. The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica (2021). “Epidemiologic Transition,” Encyclopedia Britannica, Dec 22, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/topic/epidemiologictransition.

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References Duarte, A. A., & Hancock, J. W. (2017). An exploration on HIV/AIDS funding in South Africa. SAGE Open, 7(3), 2158244017718235. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 2158244017718235 El-Sadr, W. M., Holmes, C. B., Mugyenyi, P., Thirumurthy, H., Ellerbrock, T., Ferris, R., Sanne, I., Asiimwe, A., Hirnschall, G., Nkambule, R. N., Stabinski, L., Affrunti, M., Teasdale, C., Zulu, I., & Whiteside, A. (2012). Scale-up of HIV treatment through PEPFAR: A historic public health achievement. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes (1999), 60(Suppl 3), S96–104. https://doi.org/10.1097/QAI.0b013e31825eb27b Gray, L. (2017). The United States president’s emergency plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR): A comparative analysis of USA presidents’ policy towards Africa. African Renaissance, 14(1/2), 17–37. https://doi.org/10.31920/2516-5305/2017/v14n1_2a2 Lathrop, E., Jamieson, D. J., & Danel, I. (2014). HIV and maternal mortality. International Journal of Gynaecology and Obstetrics: The Official Organ of the International Federation of Gynaecology and Obstetrics, 127(2), 213–215. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijgo.2014.05.024 Mars, M. (2013). Telemedicine and advances in urban and rural healthcare delivery in Africa. Progress in Cardiovascular Diseases, 56(3), 326–335. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pcad. 2013.10.006 McCall, B. (2019). Sub-Saharan Africa leads the way in medical drones. The Lancet, 393(10166), 17–18. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(18)33253-7 Oppong, J. R., Dadson, Y. A., & Ansah, H. (2021). Africa’s innovation and creative response to COVID-19. African Geographical Review, 0(0), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 19376812.2021.1897635 United Nations (_n.d.__). The 17 Goals. https://sdgs.un.org/goals World Health Organization. (2019). Ghana eliminates trachoma, freeing millions from suffering and blindness. https://www.who.int/news-room/photo-story/photo-story-detail/ ghana-eliminates-trachoma-freeing-millions-from-suffering-and-blindness World Health Organization. (2020). Polio. WHO Regional Office for Africa. https:// www.afro.who.int/health-topics/polio

17 Is African religiosity a hindrance to development? YES: John Taden

Department of International Studies, Pepperdine University, USA

NO: Samuel Zalanga

Department of Sociology, Bethel University, USA Issue Summary and Introduction YES: John Taden of the department of international studies at Pepperdine University, USA, analyzes the role of religious leaders who enjoy elite level interaction with the state, religious networks which provide alternative political and economic vision and religious texts which inspire new perceptions among citizens. He finds some adverse outcomes, including an unfortunate relationship between religion and: the slow pace of democratization, a sluggishness of economic development and a lack of peace and security in many African countries. He concludes that a reawakening of religious leadership, a reassessment of the role of religious networks, and a facilitation of inter-religious dialogue would be crucial to the stemming of these unfortunate trends. NO: Samuel Zalanga of the Department of Sociology at Bethel University, USA, argues that African spirituality is not a hindrance to development on the continent. He starts by noting that it is the process of development that shapes the nature, substance, and process that spirituality takes. More specifically, it is the complex process of human and societal development that leads to the emergence of different kinds of spirituality as coping mechanisms. Spirituality cannot therefore be understood in a social, historical, and/or cultural vacuum because its emergence, persistence, and utility can only be appreciated and understood if one understands the context whose evolution and development shape the substance of spirituality. As such, he concludes that spirituality is not an exogenous factor that shapes development. While by no means unique to Africa, there is growing concern that certain African religious communities and practices may be having an adverse impact on the continent’s development prospects. Spiritual practices in Africa are often grouped in terms of three categories: indigenous, Christian and Muslim (with much smaller Jewish communities in a few areas). Indigenous spiritual practices vary widely across the continent and predate Christianity and Islam. The first Christian communities were established in North Africa and the Horn of Africa during the 1st and 2nd Centuries (before those in Europe), with a second wave in the colonial period. Islam was introduced to DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-21

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North Africa and East Africa along trade routes in the 7th and 8th centuries, gradually spreading south in subsequent periods. Just as has been the case with Christianity and Islam in other parts of the world, these traditions have often been inflected with indigenous spiritual practices in many African contexts. Two major concerns have emerged in terms of discussions about religion, politics, and development. The first issue, as discussed by Taden, is that some religious groups have become deeply politicized and militant. If these groups go on to interfere with politics, or resort to violence, then this could have consequences for development. The other concern is that some religious groups may perpetuate beliefs, such as about the role of women in society that many would consider to be problematic for development. In terms of a counter argument, Zalanga raises several interesting points about the way we think about religion. It is not, as he suggests, some exogenous force, but rather a set of beliefs and practices that are reflective of the broader society. We cannot separate one from the other. Ultimately, there may be social challenges, but we cannot blame these on religion. However, a complicating factor that he does not address, is the role of external or imported radicalized religious fighters (e.g., Islamist jihadists) and zealots (e.g., some American evangelicals) in negatively influencing the national social and political landscape of many African countries. We hope you enjoy the debate! YES: AFRICAN RELIGIOSITY IS A HINDRANCE TO DEVELOPMENT

Introduction Indeed, all life in Africa is religiously tainted as it is impossible to distinguish between religious and non-religious areas of life. As John Mbiti famously observed in African religions and philosophy: “The African is notoriously religious” (Mbiti 1969: 1). Thus, the politics, economics and philosophy of the African cannot be discussed outside of religion. Depending upon which survey one views, the share of the population of the continent that considers religion very important in their daily lives is at least 89% (Pew Research Center, 2018). Comparatively, only about 20%–23% of Europeans consider themselves religious. In between these two extremes are other regions such as North America, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia. The ubiquity of religion only, however, makes it difficult to explain the state of morality on the continent. Contextually, religion is viewed as the frame of reference for a society’s value system. Values such as respect, integrity, honesty and openness are sacredly guarded by all the major religions of the world. It is thus justifiable to ask: why, in spite of the prevalence of religious thought in the African public space, are moral shortcomings such as corruption and violence so widely persistent?

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In this essay, the earlier question will be examined. However, it is essential to acknowledge that historically, religion in Africa has never simply been a network of individuals connected by a common spiritual authority, but rather, a transcendence of ideas, institutions and societies. This phenomenon complicates the distillation of religious causes and effects regarding socio-economic development on the continent. For example, is the state of religiousness on the continent itself an outcome of poverty or does it help explain why poverty lingers? That is, does religious observance lead to poverty, or do people turn to religion to escape economic despair?1 Nevertheless, while these questions remain, we cannot brush aside the fact that in other parts of the world, such as in Europe, which started off just as religious as Africa is today, aggregate religious observances have declined as economic freedoms rose. Thus, in the proceeding section, compelling associations between religiousness and certain political-economic developments on the continent will be presented under three broad topics: political development, economic development and peace and security.

Religion and Africa’s political development Religious leaders enjoy strong political significance in Africa, often enjoying elite level interaction with political rulers and serving as voices for millions of adherents. However, while their impact on the politics and governance of countries is historical and ubiquitous, it also largely defies easy characterization as there have been both positive and not-so-positive outcomes. The exodus of colonialism and the advent of democratization created power vacuums that did not only attract power struggles between political hopefuls but, also, religious movements as they sought to regain their position and influence social policy within the state. Religious leaders (both Christian and Muslim) led many of the agitations that led to transitions to democracy, especially in the early 1980s and 1990s in countries such as Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)), Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Togo, Niger and Mali. Most of these agitations were, however, short-lived as both the Church and state found they had more in common and could benefit from each other. In the interest of both the religious and political leaders, there was a crucial need for social and political stability, even if it took totalitarianism to attain it. Thus, on its part, the state offered recognition and privileged access to religious leaders who, in turn, offered unconditional support for the state. It was not often difficult for religious leaders to justify their new support for the status quo to their congregations, either. While several examples abound throughout the continent, commonly cited examples concern some of the well-known dictators such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Jeff Haynes Professor (2004) talks about the 1965 archbishop of Kinshasha, Joseph Malula, who, while personally addressing then dictator, Sese Seko, assured him that the Church recognized his authority because it came from God. The Archbishop also promised to loyally apply any laws the

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dictator-president established to restore peace. Agbiji and Swart (2015) also discuss an example in Harare, Zimbabwe, involving President Mugabe at a February 2002 pre-election prayer day event. At the event, the leader of the African Apostolic Faith, Madzibaba Nzira, while claiming he had received a prophecy from God, declared that God had appointed Mugabe Zimbabwe’s King, and no one should dare contest him. These attempts by these religious leaders to turn a blind eye to the political injustices of the state while dissuading public contestation of the state has religious textural underpinnings. Religions across the world have a tendency to preserve the status quo as all authority is viewed as ordained by God and, thus, must not be contested. The severity of religious adherence on the continent only implies a higher observance of these beliefs. In the 2013–2015 round-6 Afrobarometer surveys, one-third of Africans expressed the belief that citizens should never criticize government (Afrobarometer Data, 2015). Also, more than half of Africans agreed that it is better to have a government that gets things done without citizens’ contribution than a government that is accountable to its citizens even if it means a slow-down in decision making. Religious people were more likely to be satisfied with the state of democracy than non-religious people on the continent. This low preference for accountable governance among citizens, enabled by religious text, has consequences on the state of democratization on the continent and can certainly not be dissociated from the level of corruption among public officeholders. While this point will be echoed in detail in the next section, it is important to remember that politicians typically have no incentive to provide strong, accountable institutions. This is because weak institutions allow them to get away with diverting national resources into personal gains without real consequences. Thus, without strong demand in the form of public pressure and criticism from citizens, weak and complacent institutional environments sprawl, leading to a cycle of corruption, slow growth and lack of rule of law.

Religion and Africa’s economic development There is always a more cognitive dimension to the relationship between religion and economics than can be measured. Religious organizations provide an enormous amount of social services on the continent, including secured employment opportunities for an untraceable number of people, even as African unemployment rates remain globally high. The cognitive linkage between spirituality and economic development, however, cannot be ignored in analyzing Africa’s economic development. Fundamentally, all major religions persuade against materialism or wealth accumulation as it can often be the root of evil. Religious living favors elegant simplicity and contentment. As such, research shows that often, religious people are less likely to desire higher material living standards as they are more likely to express a higher subjective wellbeing. As I have written elsewhere, I have demonstrated that

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given the same environment as non-religious people, religious people are more likely to be satisfied with the state of their economy. Additionally, religious texts are associated with system justifying tendencies where the universe is characterized as a just world in which everyone gets what they deserve and deserve what they get. For instance, the Hindu teachings of karma admonish worshippers to accept their status in society as deserving, such that, if you are a beggar, you were born to be one; and that obedience to religious teachings, however, will reward in the afterlife. The Western religions in Africa also lend strong spiritual legitimacy to certain system-justifying ideologies. Judeo-Christian teachings, for instance, relate suffering to sin and doing harm to others. One’s fate on earth is attributable to virtue and grace. Palliative stories such as that of Job in the Bible are used to assure worshippers about how long-suffering and grief eventually conjure insurmountable riches on earth. People are therefore resigned to assign personal and national economic failures to divine causes, to which more prayer and fasting rather than individual entrepreneurism is needed. A variant of system justifying worldviews known as the prosperity Gospel is taking hold among African Christians, especially young Africans. In a 2010 Pew Center survey, 56% of African Christians stated that they believed in the prosperity Gospel; that God will reward wealth and good health to those who have enough faith. In Ghana (77%) and Nigeria (77%), the proportion of prosperity-Gospel believers are significantly higher. From this perspective, it is not surprising than in African countries such as Ghana and Chad, young adults are significantly more religious than older adults, according to the survey. The effect of religion on Africa’s development also has an economic and institutional dimension. Take the fiscal capacity of a state as an example. A country’s fiscal capacity is a dynamic product of an endless bargain between citizens and the state. Citizens agree to pay taxes in exchange for public services and representation. The state, on the other hand, can gain more tax revenue by increasing its public service provision and being accountable. Through this continuous exchange, the state’s fiscal capacity grows as citizens enjoy more public services and accountability, leading to a self-sufficient state that relies solely upon its citizens to fund its expenditure. The onset of a third-party service provider in this exchange, however, disrupts the relationship significantly. Take foreign aid donors or mineral wealth as an example. If citizens can have public services through foreign aid without paying taxes, their demand on the government for those services, for representation and for accountability is likely to be lower. On the other hand, if a state receives significant foreign aid, it does not have to go to its citizens to demand taxes and thus, becomes complacent about internal revenue mobilization. Both of these lead to weak fiscal capacity and a continuous, unhealthy dependence on aid. This same dynamic applies when religious organizations become a thirdparty significant service provider. According to Madeleine Bunting (2005), religious organizations are said to provide about 50% of all education and health services on the continent. The state is essentially substituted for the

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organizations as people look to religious networks for alternative economic and political provisions. Subsequently, citizens are more willing to pay tithes than taxes, allowing the state to further fail. It is no coincidence that African countries rank poorly on fiscal capacity.

Religion and peace and security development in Africa For decades, religious organizations and leaders across the continent have actively led conflict prevention programs and served at the forefront of peace and reconciliation movements. For example, in post-genocide Rwanda, religious networks, in personifying the government’s message of forgiveness, have provided a spiritual context to the reconciliation process, providing worship spaces for victims and their attackers to meet and heal. Outside of Rwanda, the works of prominent leaders such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu in post-apartheid South Africa, who led the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission to help mend racial wounds and place a new nation on the path to development, cannot be ignored. In discussing the state of peace and security in Africa, however, it is difficult to ignore the complicated and protracted conflicts between Christians and Muslims in the DRC, Nigeria and the Sudans. It is impractical to disregard the palpable tensions and fragile relationships between Islamist groups and the governments of Egypt, Algeria and Ethiopia. It is particularly painful and heartbreaking, just thinking about the millions of permanently disrupted lives of the citizens of Somalia and Kenya by Al Shabab; the Central African Republic, the DRC and South Sudan by the Lord’s Resistance Army; Nigeria, Cameroun, Chad and Niger by Boko Haram; and Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Tunisia by Al Qaeda, the Islamic State (ISIS) and Ansaru. While these terrorist organizations undoubtedly represent a tiny proportion of their religions, they often seek nothing other than to spread a radical version of their religious ideologies. And it would be disingenuous to absolve the religious bodies themselves of blame and responsibility. According to a Pew Center (2010) study, about 19% of Christians and 29% of Muslims in Africa believe that violence against civilians in defense of one’s religion is sometimes or often justified. Further, more than 40% of Christians believe Islam is a violent religion, even as only about 20% of Muslims think the same about Christians. These beliefs and their associated physical manifestations, even as they have justifiable roots in the teachings of their religions, are also byproducts of several factors including religious competition for power, lack of inter-religious dialogue and genuine beliefs that the other people are infidels or representatives of Satan on earth. While these issues persist, their known economic and political effects are inescapable. The thwarted abilities of political leaders to focus on productive economic planning for the future, to attract long-term savings and investment and to motivate patriotic citizenship is glaring.

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Conclusion This essay only provokes a rethinking of the impact of religion on Africa’s development. And there has never been a more opportune moment to do so. Younger Africans are turning to faith in numbers not seen before. It is projected that by 2050, Sub-Saharan Africa alone will be home to four out of every 10 Christians in the world. Thus, harnessing and repurposing religious ideology for the good of the continent is now more crucial than ever. Religious leaders, networks and citizens must rethink the role of religion in a manner that revolutionizes everyone’s role from what it is currently.

References Afrobarometer Data. Round 6, 2013–2015, available at http://www.afrobarometer.org. Agbiji, O. M & Swart, I. (2015). Religion and social transformation in Africa: A critical and appreciative perspective. Scriptura vol. 114 Stellenbosch Bunting, M. (2005, March 27). Where faith is a healer. The Guardian, available at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/mar/28/religion.hearafrica05 Professor, J. H. (2004) Religion and democratization in Africa, Democratization, 11:4, 66–89, DOI: 10.1080/1351034042000234530 Mbiti, J. S. (1969). African religions and philosophy. London: Heinemann. Pew Research Center. (2010, April 15). Tolerance and tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa. Available at https://www.pewforum.org/2010/04/15/executivesummary-islam-and-christianity-in-sub-saharan-africa/ Pew Research Center. (2018, June 7). The age gap in religion around the world. https:// www.pewforum.org/2018/06/13/the-age-gap-in-religion-around-the-world/pf-0613-18_religiouscommitment-00-01/ Pew Research Center. (2018, June 13). How religious commitment varies by country among people of all ages. https://www.pewforum.org/2018/06/13/how-religiouscommitment-varies-by-country-among-people-of-all-ages/ Taden, J. (n.d) Religiosity and the demand for government accountability: how religion impacts protests and democracy in Africa. Manuscript.

NO: AFRICAN SPIRITUALITY IS NOT A HINDRANCE TO DEVELOPMENT?

Introduction What is development and what is African spirituality? It is pertinent to begin the response to this question by briefly providing the reader with an overview of what development is on the one hand, and what African spirituality is on the other, so as to provide a context for the position I am taking which is: No, African spirituality is not a hindrance to development on the continent. For a long time, in the social sciences, the development level of a society was measured using the growth or level of its gross national income and/or its income per capita. Presumptuously, the higher these figures

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are, the higher the given society’s level of development because it is automatically assumed that when economic and income growth takes place, everyone benefits from it and becomes prosperous because the benefits of growth trickle down to the least advantaged members of society. For many developing countries such as those in Africa, economic growth was heavily promoted during the first United Nations’ Development Decade in the 1960s. Unfortunately, by the end of the 1960s, empirical evidence confirmed that many countries that experienced impressive economic growth in the developing world and recorded high per capita income growth also experienced poverty rate increases. Their impressive economic growth did not have a decisive impact on eradicating or drastically reducing poverty (Adelman and Morris 1975). Consequently, in the 1970s, which was the United Nations’ second national development decade, the emphasis in development shifted from economic growth alone to economic growth with equity or economic growth with redistribution. Deliberate steps were taken to ensure that the type and manner of economic growth was such that it would reduce poverty and elevate the levels of living of the least advantaged people in society. Indeed, as Professor Dudley Seers (1969, p. 3) then asserted, the appropriate development questions to ask are: “What is happening to poverty? What is happening to inequality? What is happening to unemployment?” If any one of these human development indicators is increasing, then the country cannot be considered as developing even if the economy is growing impressively. For Denis Goulet (1985), development is a multidimensional and multifaceted experience. It includes the progressive transformation of social structures and popular attitudes so that they can support the creation of more inclusive, just, and fair national public policies and institutions that can drastically reduce the degree of poverty and inequality in society. Amartya Sen (2001) later extended Goulet’s argument by saying that what development means is freedom and increasing people’s capability to function effectively in their society. It includes broadening the options and choices of members of society. Overall, development means promoting people’s capacity for self-sustenance, increasing people’s self-esteem as human beings, and freeing humans from all sorts of servitude such as slavery to other human beings, to nature, or to certain traditions and beliefs (Todaro and Smith 2020). With regard to African spirituality, it is important to note that this is a very broad concept with no single definition in the literature. Furthermore, there is no one spirituality that applies to all African people and any kind of spirituality that is characterized as African can just as easily be found on other continents in one form or another. In this respect, Kasambala (2005), building on Kalilombe’s (1994) understanding and analysis, asserted that “an African spirituality could be described as consisting of African people’s attitudes, beliefs and practices as they strive to reach out toward the supersensible realities: God, the spirits, and the invisible forces in the universe.” Along the same line, Emmanuel Lartey (1997) argues that spirituality is “a human capacity for relationship with self, others, world, God, and that which

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transcends sensory experience, which is often expressed in the particularities of given historical, spatial and social contexts, and which often leads to specific forms of action in the world.” The preceding definition underscores the fact that African spirituality is in its inner core very relational. For his part, Pargament (1999) maintains that spirituality is part of religion, which he considers to be broader than spirituality (Reich 2000). Nevertheless Reich et al., (1999) developed a more concise conceptualization of spirituality by asserting that while there is overlap, there is a distinction among the following: “religion, religious-spirituality, and natural spirituality.” One major implication of Reich et al’s., (1999) analysis is that an atheist can still have spirituality given that spirituality does not necessarily need to be religious. Finally, to illustrate the complex nature of African spirituality, Emmanuel Lartey (1997) argued that African spirituality is distinct because, at its core, it is relational in five different dimensions. These dimensions include: a relationship with transcendence, an intra-personal relationship with oneself, interpersonal relationships with other people, corporate relationships within a group of people, and finally, spatial relationships between people and their environment, place, and things. At the core of this essay’s position is the fact that the process of development as we know it shapes if not determines the nature, substance, and process that spirituality takes. Indeed, it is the challenge and complex process of human and societal development that leads to the emergence of different kinds of spirituality as coping mechanisms. Spirituality cannot therefore be understood in a social, historical and cultural vacuum, because its emergence, persistence, and utility can only be appreciated and understood if one understands the social, historical, and cultural context whose evolution and development shape, if not determine, the nature and substance of spirituality.

Spirituality is a symbolic appearance of an underlying reality in a society The attempt by some scholars to treat African spirituality as an obstacle or hindrance to development in the continent is well-taken but when critically examined, such a way of thinking treats spirituality in general, and African spirituality in particular, as either being independent of society or existing in a socio-cultural and historical vacuum. While recognizing the relative role of spirituality in human society, there are several solid arguments that can be put forward to counter such simplistic reasoning. The first counter argument comes from Karl Marx’s observation in his 1859 book titled “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy” that “it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, [it is] their social being that determines their consciousness.” Marx’s argument here is that people first have to exist, and for this reason, their material and social existence comes first and foremost. It is in the process of

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trying to exist by creating the necessary social and material conditions that spirituality becomes an important tool that enables any group of people to effectively cope, thrive, and flourish. What this means is that as human communities evolve and go through different levels of material and social development, their spiritual needs and demands will also change to fit the level of development in their society. Therefore, whether spirituality plays a positive or negative role in the life of a person or in the development of a society is not a spiritual issue. Rather, it is a question of how humans, in their attempt to cope with the material and social challenges of their existence, decide to instrumentally use, construct, and shape their spirituality. A second strand of argument that can be made against the idea that spirituality in and of itself is an obstacle or hindrance to development in Africa can be deduced from Karl Mannheim et al.’s (1955) sociology of knowledge. On this basis, one can argue that human spirituality in Africa, as a body of knowledge and ways of acting and relating, always functions and operates in a manner that is rooted in a particular tradition/perspective. This is because ideas and human consciousness, including spirituality, are always to varying degrees tied to a particular social location 2 in the social structure3 of a society and its social-historical context. Lewis Coser articulated Mannheim’s position on this issue in the following quote: All knowledge and all ideas are ‘bound to a location,’ though to different degrees, within the social structure and the historical process. At times a particular group can have fuller access to the understanding of a social phenomenon than other groups, but no group can have total access to it. Ideas are rooted in the differential location in historical time and social structure of their proponents so that thought is inevitably perspectivistic. (Coser 1977). In one way, it has to be acknowledged that the nature of social inequality in a society, the way and manner power and privilege is unequally distributed, can have serious consequences on how people see the world (i.e., their worldview) or the social reality that they are living in with great variation across social groups even within the same society. Once this is understood, we can conclude without hesitation that what is known as African spirituality in a continent characterized by structured inequality is also mediated by such inequality. Furthermore, how African spirituality is used by the adherents of such spirituality is not a matter of the spirituality per se, but rather of how that spirituality is itself conditioned by the structure of inequality that it exists in, which is in turn shaped by the process of evolution and development in that society. It is not surprising then that dominant classes use religion as an ideological instrument of social control and stability often amidst injustice. Third, building on the preceding argument that is deduced from Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, it can be asserted that how the adherents of any kind of spirituality in Africa engage, experience, and process the

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knowledge of the spiritual tradition, emotions and practices of their spirituality is decisively shaped by existential factors. Without understanding the existential conditions of Africa, we cannot understand the spirituality of Africa, let alone how it is used instrumentally. Here, Mannheim is making an argument that can, by implication, be said to reach far deeper into the inner-sanctum of the evolution and practice of any kind of spirituality in the sense that existential factors and conditions shape and distort the evolution, practice, and development of all forms of spirituality. He is of the view that existential factors and conditions: Are relevant not only to the genesis of ideas, but that they penetrate into the forms and content and that they decisively determine the scope and the intensity of our experience and observation, i.e., the ‘perspective of the subject.’ (Coser 1977) In this respect, we can infer that even the passion and commitment that adherents of a particular spiritual tradition in Africa manifest in their lives is infused, conditioned, and shaped by existential factors and conditions that underlie the life history of such adherents. Given the foregoing, it is not surprising then that there is not one but many types of spirituality in Africa. These different types of spiritual traditions are used differently at different times because of variations in the existential conditions of various African societies and social groups which, in turn, have diverse levels of evolution and socioeconomic development. In short, spirituality never stands on its own or alone. Fourth, the psychological literature documents the fact that spirituality exists, and is institutionalized, because of the human propensity to renew their hope and cultivate meaning in life. People, however, do not develop their spirituality in isolation but through collective sources, which means that wherever spirituality exists, it is conditioned by a particular cultural and social context (Kwilecki 1999). Thus, people become spiritual through the process of social learning and numerous factors and processes affect the content and use of social learning. The culture of a society provides the broad parameters for spiritual choices and the options that any one individual can choose from. Similarly, people appropriate different elements in their spiritual tradition depending on the sources that are available to them and the extent to which the different elements of their spirituality agree or are in tune with their unique personal needs and sensibilities, whatever such sensibilities are e.g., pessimism, optimism, aggressiveness, conscientiousness, introversion, extroversion, anxiety, and intrinsic or extrinsic motivation. These sensibilities in turn shape how people perceive, interpret, and behave with respect to the situations, key elements, and practices of their spiritual tradition(s). Thus, African spirituality reflects the underlying realities and contradictions in the evolution and development of Africa.

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Fifth, psychological research studies have also established that humans are vulnerable to situations that cause them extreme pain, frustration, and depression. As a result, when people find themselves in unresolved crisis situations that can or do incapacitate them, they turn to spirituality (Kwilecki 1999). In effect, personal distress, which is often rooted in the structures and processes of society, causes people to pursue spirituality. Spirituality is thus a reflection of the inner workings of society since it guides the individual search for hope, meaning, and identity. However, if, when, and the extent to which people engage with any spiritual tradition depends on the degree to which the elements of that tradition are congruent with their subjective individual and group self-awareness and identity. Since human beings have perceptual habits, they tend to be predisposed to aspects or elements of a spiritual tradition that either affirm or transcend them and their identity.

Conclusion To conclude, the greatest hindrance to Africa’s development is not African spirituality. Rather, it is the existential conditions, situations, and factors that are integral to the evolution and development of Africa. It is these existential conditions, situations, and factors which lead to the emergence of particular kinds of African spirituality at different times and places. Therefore, more development friendly forms of African spirituality require a change in these existential conditions, situations, and factors

Notes 1. Editors’ note: Religion has a spiritual and psychological nonmaterial dimension that attracts even economically well-off people across the globe. 2. “An individual’s social location is … the [individually unique] combination of factors including gender, race, social class, age, ability, religion, sexual orientation, and geographic location” (National Council on Family Relations, April 4, 2019 / Spring 2019 NCFR Report, https://www.ncfr.org/ncfr-report/spring-2019/ inclusion-and-diversity-social-location). 3. Social structure refers to the distinctive, stable arrangement of institutions whereby human beings in a society interact and live together (https://www.britannica.com/ topic/social-structure).

References Adelman, I., & Morris, C. T. 1975. Economic growth and social equity in developing countries. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Coser, Lewis A. 1977. Masters of sociological thought: Ideas in historical and social context. 2nd ed. Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press, p. 431. Goulet, D. 1985. The cruel choice: A new concept in the theory of development. Lanham: Univ. Press of America. Kasambala, A. E. 2005. The Impact of an African Spirituality and Cosmology on GodImages in Africa: A Challenge to Practical Theology and Pastoral Ministry. International Journal of Practical Theology, 9(2).

234  John Taden and Samuel Zalanga Kalilombe, P. 1994. Spirituality in the African Perspective. In R. Gibellini, Paths of African theology. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, p. 116. Kwilecki, S. 1999. Becoming religious: Understanding devotion to the unseen. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press. Lartey, E. Y. 1997. In living colour: An intercultural approach to pastoral care and counselling. London: Cassell. Lartey, E. Y. 1997. In living colour: An intercultural approach to pastoral care and counselling. London: Cassell. Mannheim, K., Wirth, L., & Shils, E. 1955. Ideology and utopia: An introduction to the sociology of knowledge. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. Pargament, K. I. (1999). The psychology of religion and spirituality? Yes and no. International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 9(1), 3–16. https://doi.org/10.1207/ s15327582ijpr0901_2 Reich, K. H. 2000. What Characterizes Spirituality? A Comment on Pargament, Emmons and Crumpler, and Stifoss-Hansen. International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 10(2), 125-128. doi:10.1207/s15327582ijpr1002_05 Reich, K. H. R., Oser, F. K., & Scarlett, W. G. S. 1999. Spiritual and religious development: Transcendence and transformations of the self. In K. H. Reich (Author), Being Human: The Case of Religion (Vol. 2, pp. 7–24). Lengerich (etc.): Pabst Science Publ. Seers, Dudley. 1969. “The meaning of development,” paper presented at the Eleventh World Conference of the Society for International Development, New Delhi (1969), p. 3. Sen, A. K. 2001. Development as freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Todaro, M. P., & Smith, S. C. 2020. Economic development. Harlow, United Kingdom: Pearson Education Limited.

Section V

Politics, governance and security

18 Is multi-party democracy the best form of governance in African countries? YES: Nic Cheeseman

International Development Department, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK

NO: George Ayittey

Late Emeritus Professor of Economics, American University, and President of the Free Africa Foundation, both in Washington DC, USA1 Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Nic Cheeseman, of the University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK, argues that democracies tend to perform better not only in terms of human rights and political stability but also when it comes to the economy. Moreover, because democracy is also favored by most African peoples, it is clearly the best form of governance for African countries. NO: George Ayittey, of the Free Africa Foundation in Washington DC, USA, posits, conversely, that Western-style multi-party democracy is not well-suited for African countries although it is transparent, fast, and efficient, it is not suitable for African countries because it ignores minority positions, and leads to “tyranny of the majority,” and one man/party dictatorships. Moreover, in multi-ethnic countries, such as those that are prevalent in Africa, it can promote tribal parties and politics that can dismember countries and lead to civil wars. Consequently, Africa should return to or revive its precolonial consensus-based traditional democratic systems which are better suited to its conditions of local inclusivity, accountability and local freedom of expression. Unlike many other issues in this volume, these two contributions broadly agree that democracy is the best governance option for Africa. As a result, their essays are not focused on whether democracy is or is not the best form of governance in Africa. Rather, the essays are focused on the form of democracy that is best for Africa: western liberal democracy or homegrown African democracy? Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, the fortunes of democracy in Africa grew significantly as the “third wave” of democratization took hold on the continent. Indeed, according to an article by DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-23

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John Campbell and Nolan Quinn (May 26, 2021), titled “What’s Happening to Democracy in Africa?” in the Council of Foreign Relations,2 whereas two-thirds of African states were “not free,” in 1989, by 2009, two-thirds of them were considered “free” or “partly free.” Since then democracy has lost ground such that by 2021, only eight countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were deemed to be “free” or fully democratic. These included Cape Verde, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Ghana and South Africa. Thw majority of the remaining ones (22) were considered “partially free” and were living under populist authoritarian governments that sought to maintain power by “suppressing opposition groups, postponing elections, eliminating term limits and abusing human rights” (ibid.: no pp). There are many reasons for Africa’s troubled democratic history including weak foundations for liberal democracy, the ongoing power of religious and ethnic rivalries and the negative influence of many African countries’ colonially rooted armed forces that often favor the political dominance of a few self-serving elites at the expense of the majority. Consequently, Campbell and Quinn note that even though the state of democracy in Africa is multifaceted, there are four dominant trends: (a) gradual albeit temporary gains for authoritarians, (b) geographic or regional clustering of countries’ democratic situations (neighborhood effects), (c) the increasing role of the internet and social media in politically empowering Africa’s youthful population and (d) the emergence of COVID-19 pandemic politics that have given some African governments the perfect opportunity to deploy “heavy-handed security responses and emergency measures to crush dissent, criminalize basic freedoms, silence independent reporting, and curtail the activities of nongovernmental organizations” (ibid.: no pp). While pandemic politics might recede as the COVID-19 pandemic is brought under control, it is unlikely that the enduring structural impediments to the growth of liberal democracy in Africa will go away soon. This is, perhaps, why George Ayittey is right in arguing that African countries should probably look inward for homegrown democratic models that are, perhaps, more responsive to their complex socio-economic reality. YES: MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY IS THE BEST FORM OF GOVERNANCE IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Introduction There can be no doubt that multi-party democracy is the best form of government for African countries. Whether you care about human rights, political stability, or development, multiparty democracy is superior to any of the alternatives. This argument might surprise some readers. On the one hand, those less familiar with the region may vaguely remember seeing media headlines about election related violence in a country like Kenya or Zimbabwe, and think that

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multi-party competition always leads to conflict. On the other hand, those familiar with the continent may know the development success of Rwanda, one of the most repressive states in Africa, and think that African countries require a “Strong Man” to reduce corruption and improve public services. Although both these narratives are commonplace, they are misleading. Rwanda is a rare example of an authoritarian regime that performs well: on average, democracies perform better. Similarly, the extent of election violence is often exaggerated because negative stories tend to capture the headlines. As a result, the improvements that democracies have realized in terms of respect for political rights and civil liberties tend to be underestimated. A balanced assessment, therefore, demonstrates that multiparty democracy is the best form of governance for African states. Perhaps more importantly, multiparty democracy is also the kind of political system that most people in Africa want to live under. Given this, we have no reason to think that democracy is “unAfrican’, or that of authoritarian systems such as one-party states and military rule would somehow perform better on the continent.

Why democracy is better for human rights and political stability Almost all African states now hold multiparty elections of some form, although Eritrea and eSwatini remain important exceptions. In many cases, though, these elections are not free and fair because they are manipulated by the government (Adejumobi 2000). In countries such as Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan and Zimbabwe, opposition leaders may be arrested and even assassinated. Opposition supporters may be too scared to even cast their votes because they are intimidated and harassed, while the media is censored. As if this was not enough, the ruling party typically spends vast sums of money in an attempt to buy citizens’ votes, while the electoral commission makes sure that the government never loses (Makinda 1996). These governments often like to call themselves democracies in order to mask their failings. In reality they are nothing of the kind and should be thought of as ‘counterfeit democracies’ in which governments retain power through force and repression as much as through the ballot box (Cheeseman and Klaas, 2018). It is sometimes argued that this kind of “strong man” regime is required to maintain law and order. But this argument doesn’t make sense when you actually look at what has happened to the countries in this category. Very few of these governments have actually managed to eradicate crime and instability. Instead, abusive and violent governments in countries like Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic and Sudan have failed to protect their own citizens and instead have committed widespread humanrights abuses. Partly as a result, these fake democracies have often faced armed rebellions and, in several cases, civil war.

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In other words, it is simply not true that authoritarian governments are needed to maintain political stability, or that benign dictators can be relied upon to keep their own people safe. For this, you need a democracy. Today, Africa features a small number of high-quality democracies and what is striking about them is that they have managed to maintain high levels of political stability as well as respect for human rights. Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Namibia, Mauritius, Senegal and South Africa all have a track record of more open and competitive politics. A common feature of these political systems is that in addition to respecting the political rights of their citizens they also respect their civil liberties, and examples of state repression are extremely rare. Despite allowing for extremely competitive politics, which has led to transfers of power in Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mauritius and Senegal, multiparty democracy has not undermined political stability in any of these countries. Indeed, one of the most striking things about them is that, despite a history of military rule (Benin, Ghana) and divisive apartheid governments (Namibia, South Africa), they are some of the most politically stable countries on the continent. None of these states has witnessed civil conflict, the collapse of the government or sustained ethnic violence since the early 1990s (Ndulo and Gazibo 2016). We therefore have no reason to think that there is anything inherently unstable about multiparty democracy in Africa. In fact, the continent’s most democratic countries are also its most peaceful and stable states. The final issue that we need to consider when it comes to human rights is the kind of political system that people actually want to live under. It is not always expressed in these terms, but the ability to live under the kind of government that you want to can also be a kind of human right. Authoritarian leaders are fond of telling the world that their people do not want to live under democracy – that they prefer other political systems that are more compatible with “African” values (Cheeseman and Fisher 2019). But this is not true. Although there is a lot of variation in public opinion both within and between countries, one thing is clear: Africans want to live in democracies (Bratton et al 2005). Nationally representative surveys carried out by the Afrobarometer group between 2016 and 2018 in 35 countries found that strong majorities preferred democracy3 to any other form of government in every major state surveyed (Cheeseman and Sishuwa 2021).4 There is also strong support for specific components of multiparty democracy, with three-quarters of those surveyed agreeing that “We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections”. Checks and balances on presidential power, such as enforcing term-limits so that no leader can rule for too long, are also extremely popular (Dulani 2015). Moreover, while many respondents wish to see democracy perform better in their countries, there is very little support for any authoritarian alternative. Multiparty democracy is thus the best form of governance if we care about human rights, political stability and respecting the wishes of African citizens themselves.

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Why democracy is better for development Multi-party democracy is also better for development – however we define it. Economists tend to track development by measuring a country’s gross domestic product and how it increases over time. The impressive performance of two authoritarian states – Ethiopia and Rwanda – in terms of this measure in the 2010s misled many people into thinking that “strong men” were needed to make tough decisions and get Africa’s economies to work (Matfess 2015). Again, this was a mistake: these countries were not representative of the broader set of authoritarian states that performed very badly. Instead, they are better thought of as the exceptions that prove the rule: on average, democracies grow faster. Not enough research has been conducted into exactly why this is the case (Ake 1996), but it seems fairly clear that it is related to the fact democracies tend to be less corrupt and to feature a higher quality of economic governance. As a result, they are less wasteful and tend to make better decisions about how to allocate state resources, leading to higher economic growth than in authoritarian regimes. These effects are apparent in countries that have only been democracies for a short period, but they become stronger over time as norms of accountability and productive economic investments accumulate and reinforce one another (Masaki and van de Walle 2014). The same pattern holds up if we look at other measures. Development practitioners and ordinary citizens tend to pay less attention to economic growth and instead look more at the provision of public services and the quality of life of individuals (see, for example, UNDP 2020). After all, what good is a larger economy if it doesn’t enable the government to better meet the needs of its people? Considering this, it is particularly significant that multiparty systems also perform better on this measure of development. For example, the reintroduction of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa drove an expansion of expenditure on education. This occurred because politicians understood that reducing the cost of education was a policy that appealed to a broad cross-section of voters. While voters are swayed by a number of considerations, including the ethnicity and gender of the candidate, they also care about the delivery of key services. This means that politicians can increase their support by delivering on high profile issues such as roads and hospitals (Harding and Stasavage 2014). In the case of education, canny leaders promised to introduce free primary education if elected, which helps to explain why free primary school attendance is higher in multiparty democracies. These patterns are not just true for contemporary Africa, but also held in the first four decades after independence. Most African states were governed by either one-party states, personal dictatorships or military rule between 1970 and 1990. Very few of these regimes managed to deliver high levels of economic development. Instead, the only two real economic success stories during this period were Botswana and Mauritius, which achieved low levels of corruption and high levels of economic growth (Hwedi 2001). There

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were also two of the only countries on the continent to maintain multiparty democracy the whole time. The idea that authoritarian systems have an advantage when it comes to economic growth is therefore not only wrong for our own time – it ignores the lessons of history. Since independence, democracies have performed better on development.

Reading the debate Given that multiparty democracies perform better than authoritarian regimes, it is important to ask why there is not a stronger consensus in favor of these kinds of political systems. Despite the data, many social media commentators and political leaders continue to question the value of democracy. The idea that Africans don’t want democracy – that poor people prioritize food and security – and would be happy to accept authoritarian rule to achieve a higher standard of living is also surprisingly persistent. One reason for this is that not everyone pays attention to the evidence. Another more sinister explanation is that authoritarian leaders have an incentive to promote the idea that democracy doesn’t work (Fisher 2015). Spreading this message enables would-be dictators to create a domestic and international environment that is more tolerant of repression. Rwandan President Paul Kagame, for example, has often argued that Western style democracy would not work in his country and so he should be allowed to pursue a more “African” alternative (see, for example, Financial Times 2017). Other authoritarian regimes pay for people to go on social media to make their governments appear to be more popular than they really are. They also spend vast sums on Western lobbyists and public relations companies to “clean” the image of their leaders and to push their case in foreign capitals such as London and Washington (Resistance Bureau 2021). So if you find yourself reading that multiparty democracy is bad for Africa, first ask yourself who is making such a statement, and then ask why.

References Adejumobi, Said. “Elections in Africa: A fading shadow of democracy?” International Political Science Review 21, no. 1 (2000): 59–73. Ake, Claude. Democracy and development in Africa. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 1996. Bratton, Michael, Robert Mattes, and Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi. Public opinion, democracy, and market reform in Africa. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005. Cheeseman, Nic. Democracy in Africa: Successes, failures, and the struggle for political reform. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015. Cheeseman, Nic, and Jonathan Fisher. Authoritarian Africa: Repression, resistance, and the power of ideas. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019. Cheeseman, Nicholas, and Brian Paul Klaas. How to rig an election. Yale University Press, New Haven, 2018.

Multi-party democracy and governance  243 Cheeseman, Nic, and Sishuwa Sishuwa. “African Studies Keyword: Democracy.” African Studies Review (2021): 1–29. doi:10.1017/asr.2021.43 Dulani, Boniface. “African publics strongly support term limits, resist leaders’ efforts to extend their tenure.” Afrobarometer Dispatch 30, no. 25 (2015): 1–12. Financial Times, “Transcript: Rwanda President Paul Kagame,” 27 August 2017, https:// www.ft.com/content/0ec9dc4e-8976-11e7-8bb1-5ba57d47eff 7. Fisher, Jonathan. “‘Image management’ in east Africa: Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya and their donors.” In Julia Gallagher (ed.) Images of Africa: Creation, negotiation and subversion. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2015. Harding, Robin, and David Stasavage. “What democracy does (and doesn’t do) for basic services: School fees, school inputs, and African elections.” The Journal of Politics 76, no. 1 (2014): 229–245. Hwedi, Osei. “The state and development in Southern Africa: A comparative analysis of Botswana and Mauritius with Angola, Malawi and Zambia.” African Studies Quarterly 5, no. 1 (2001): 19–31. Masaki, Takaaki, and Nicolas Van de Walle. The impact of democracy on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa, 1982–2012. No. 2014/057. WIDER Working Paper, 2014. Makinda, Samuel M. “Democracy and multi-party politics in Africa.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 34, no. 4 (1996): 555–573. Matfess, Hilary. “Rwanda and Ethiopia: Developmental authoritarianism and the new politics of African strong men.” African Studies Review 58, no. 2 (2015): 181–204. Ndulo, Muna, and Mamoudou Gazibo, eds. Growing democracy in Africa: Elections, accountable governance, and political economy. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016. Resistance Bureau, “Resisting the Whitewash: The Role of PR and Lobby Firms in Laundering Authoritarianism,” Public Webinar, 2 June 2021, https://www.theresistancebureau.com/episodes/r74igzlt44nt5gn8hwxnywj9k9wjhe. UNDP, “Human Development Index Report 2020,” 2020, http://hdr.undp.org/en/ 2020-report.

NO: WESTERN-STYLE MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY IS NOT THE BEST FORM OF GOVERNANCE FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Introduction Democracy was one of the demands of the liberation struggle against colonial rule in Africa in the 1950s. At the Pan-African Congress in Mwanza, Tanzania, in 1958, the delegates raucously railed over the fact that: “The democratic nature of the indigenous institutions of the peoples of West Africa has been crushed by obnoxious and oppressive laws and regulations, and replaced by autocratic systems of colonial government which are inimical to the wishes of the people of West Africa” (Blake, 2010, pg. 85). They demanded that: “The principle of the Four Freedoms (Freedom of speech, press, association and assembly) and the Atlantic Charter be put into practice at once…Democracy must prevail throughout Africa from Senegal to Zanzibar and from Cape to Cairo” (Langley, 1979, pg. 741; also quoted in Ayittey, 2005, pg. 95–96)

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Treacherously, after gaining independence, the nationalist leaders never established these freedoms in post-colonial Africa. In fact, true freedom never came to much of Africa. At independence in the 1960s, one set of masters (white colonialists) was traded for another set of masters (black neo-colonialists) and the oppression and exploitation of the African people continued unabated. In 1990, only four African countries were democratic – Botswana, The Gambia, Mauritius and Senegal. Today (2020), only 17 out of 54 are democratic. At this rate, it will take Africa as long as 85 years to become fully democratic (Abidde 2020). Some 60 years after independence, tyranny remains the order of the day. To illustrate, in March 2017, Emmanuel Elibariki, a hip-hop artist, released a song in which he asked, “is there still freedom of expression in Tanzania?” He was promptly arrested, and his song banned from the airwaves (The Economist, Oct 19, 2017; p. 43). This contumacious betrayal occurred right after independence when African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana rejected democracy as “an imperialist dogma” being foisted on Africa. Others such as Daniel arap Moi of Kenya insisted that democracy was a luxury Africa could not afford. In its place, they copied the Soviet style one-party socialist state system to impose upon their people for nearly three decades. In 1989, the former Soviet Union collapsed and African emperors found that they no longer had any clothes. The source of their ideology had disintegrated. Angry Africans – including women with babies strapped on their backs – took to the streets to demand democratic change. The street protests morphed into winds of change and swept across Africa, toppling long-standing autocrats in Benin, Cape Verde and other African countries. Though the push for reform came from within Africa, Western donors lent a hand. For example, in 1991, the World Bank and Western donors suspended aid to Malawi and Kenya until they established multiparty democracy. That quickly became the new political conditionality for Western aid to Africa. To receive or have Western aid restored, many African leaders hastily adopted the Western form of multiparty democracy without a firm understanding of its suitability for Africa. In earlier decades, they had similarly adopted the Soviet one-party state system with disastrous consequences to many African countries. Two caveats must be noted about democracy. For one thing, democratic decisions can be taken in two ways – by majority vote (the Western form). It has the advantage of being transparent, fast and efficient. But the downside is that it ignores minority positions. The second form of democracy is to take decisions by consensus. This has the advantage of taking all minority positions into account. However, its demerit is that it can take an awfully long time to reach a consensus when a large number of people is involved. Nevertheless, the Nobel Peace Committee and the World Trade Organization (WTO) all take decisions by consensus. For another, elections alone do not make a country democratic. In addition to periodic elections, an independent and free media, an independent judiciary, an independent central bank, and neutral and professional security forces are also needed.

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Nevertheless, while Western-style multi-party democracy is possible in Africa, it comes with additional problems. First, it is not suitable for multiethnic African countries. It can easily degenerate into “tribal politics,” where parties are formed along tribal lines. Ethiopia is grappling with ethnic violence which left more than 250 people dead in April 2020. Its constitution permits “ethnic federalism” and even secession. Eritrea broke away, becoming independent in 1993. With more than 82 ethnic groups in Ethiopia, ethnic federalism and secession could dismember the country. An ongoing Civil War in the Northern Tigray region of the country has thrown it into turmoil and could lead to the breakaway of Tigray (BBC 2021). Second, decision-making by majority vote can ignore the minority or even lead to the “tyranny of the majority.” The minority may even be persecuted as was the Tutsi minority in the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Ignoring the minority in Africa is not only ethically wrong but can also be a very dangerous prospect. It often takes a small band of determined malcontents to wreak mayhem and destruction to an African country. For example, in 1985, Yoweri Museveni set out with only 27 men, overthrew the Ugandan government, and seized power. In 1990, Charles Taylor started out with 100 men and plunged Liberia into a 5-year civil war. In 1990, Mohammed Farah Aided set out with 200 men. Somalia has never recovered from the ensuing civil war and mayhem. Third, the Western democratic model coupled with the unitary state system produced a lethal and heinous instrument of governance in post-colonial Africa. The unitary state system centralized power and decision-making in the capital city. Majority vote allowed the winner of the vote to ignore the minority. This combo became a dictator-producing model. An elected leader could use the power concentrated in his hands to control the state machinery and key state institutions to perpetuate himself in office and ignore everybody else. Once they win an election, it is lights out. For many African countries, one man one vote came happened only once followed by long periods of “democratic” one party one man rule, often with regular “free and fair democratic elections”. Fourth, dictators also used that awesome power to advance their economic interests as well as those of their cronies and ethnic groups to the exclusion of all others. Illustrations of this include but are not limited to Kenyatta of Kenya and the Gikuyu, Moi of Kenya and the Kalenjin, Biya of Cameroon and the Beti and Eyadema of Togo and the Kabye. The richest persons in Africa are heads of state and ministers. Quite often, the chief bandit is the head of state himself. When in September 2017, Pres. Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola stepped down after 38 years in office, he had amassed a personal fortune of $20 billion (Anonymous, June 26, 2020). His daughter, Isabel, became the richest woman in Africa with a net worth of $3.5 billion (Dolan, 2021). Yet in 2017 – after 42 years of independence – more than 60% of Angolans lived in abject poverty, unrelenting squalor and social destitution; earning less than $2 a day – the definition of extreme poverty.

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Lack of appropriate democracy has exacted a toll on African development. More than 40 civil wars have been waged in post-colonial Africa since 1960. These wars have destroyed infrastructure, uprooted people and sent refugees – mostly women and children – scampering across borders. Agricultural economies have been decimated since over 70% of Africa’s peasant farmers are women who cannot produce food when they are sheltering in refugee camps. Because of this and other reasons, Africa can no longer feed itself and must spend $35 billion a year to import food whereas it used to feed itself in the 1950s. Most of Africa’s civil wars have been started by politically excluded groups. Many countries such as Congo DRC, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Uganda could have been spared of such violence, mayhem, and destruction had they been democratic in a manner that is appropriate for local conditions.

So, what kind of democracy would be suitable for Africa? One enduring colonial myth is the notion that Africa had neither history, nor viable institutions before contact with Europeans. Its people labored under horrible despotic chiefs. So, colonialism was good for Africans because it liberated them from their terrible chiefs. Of course, most of these claims were just that – myths. In traditional Africa, decision-making was/is by consensus and chiefs were/are held accountable. Governance in Africa’s traditional villages is a simple affair. For instance, a chief is chosen by the Queen Mother of a royal family, which is the clan that founded the village. His appointment is then ratified by a Council of Elders, which consists of heads of extended families in the village. While governing, the chief must consult with the Council and reach unanimity on all important matters. Without this council, the chief is powerless. If the chief and the Council are deadlocked on an important issue, he must convene a village meeting. There, the issue is put before the people and debated until they reach a consensus. Once reached, everybody in the village, including the chief, must abide by it. Village assemblies are commonplace among African ethnic groups. They are called asetena kese among the Ashanti of Ghana, ama-ala among the Igbo of Nigeria, guurti among the Somali, kogtla among the Tswana of Botswana, dare among the Shona of Zimbabwe, pitso among the Xhosa and ndaba among the Zulu of South Africa. These meetings are usually held under the shade of a big Baobab or palaver tree which serves as a “natural gathering spot for community discussions, storytelling, problem solving, and festivals. Roughly equivalent to a civic plaza, zocalo, or agora, the palaver is a place for comfortable community engagement” (Shanghai Academy of Fine Arts, _n.d.__: no pp). Routine matters are resolved by acclamation. Freedom of speech is respected. No one is arrested for expressing an opinion the chief does not like. Though appointed for life a ‘bad’ chief can be removed from office at

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any time by the Queen Mother, by Kingmakers, Council of Elders or abandoned by the people. Here are some chiefs who were removed from office in modern times: •

•

•

The Chief of Akyem Osorase near Oda in the Eastern Region (of Ghana), Barima Adu-Baah Kyere and his supporters including the Gyaasehene have allegedly fled the village to an unknown destination following assassination attempts on them. A pick-up vehicle being used by the chief was said to have been burnt to ashes by the irate mob which besieged the palace. A police source said there was a dispute between Barima AduBaah and section of the people of Osorase over accountability on the village’s revenue (Ayittey, 2006 p. 165). Nana Sobin Kan II, the Chief of Asansi Dompuase traditional area in the Ashanti region of Ghana was dethroned for failing to disclose to his kingmakers the huge sums of money that he allegedly received as compensation on behalf of his area from the AngloGold Ashanti mining corporation (Ayittey, 2017 p. 104). The traditional ruler and the paramount ruler of Mahin kingdom, in Ilaje Local government Area of Ondo State in Nigeria, Oba Lawrence Omowole, was removed from office for “ceding Aboto community which is an important part of Mahin kingdom to another person either in the garb of a king or otherwise.” He denied the allegation (Gbadamosi, 2017).

There is nothing physically wrong with this traditional system. The articles of governance – democracy, freedom of expression, accountability, etc. – are all there. African leaders could have built upon this system after independence, instead of blindly copying the Soviet system. This effort was made by pro-democracy forces in the in the 1990s. They revived and modernized Africa’s village assemblies into “sovereign national conferences” (SNC) to chart a new political future in Benin, Cape Verde, Congo DRC, Malawi, Mali, South Africa and Zambia. Each identifiable group – economic, political, religious, ethnic – chose its own leader or delegate to send to a national conference (village assembly) to deliberate on national issues. Benin’s 9-day “national conference” began on February 19, 1990, with 488 delegates, representing various political, religious, trade union and other groups encompassing the broad spectrum of Beninois society. The conference, whose chairman was Father Isidore de Souza, held “sovereign power” and its decisions were binding on all, including the government. It stripped President Matthieu Kerekou of power and scheduled multiparty elections that ended 17 years of autocratic Marxist rule. The Republic of Congo’s national conference had more delegates (1,500) and lasted a long three months and was over in June 1991 (Noble, 1991). South Africa’s was called the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). It began deliberations in July 1991, with 228 delegates drawn

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from about 25 political parties and various anti-apartheid groups (South African History Online -SAHO, _n.d.__). This model could have been used as a basis for a modern democratic African government. The delegates could form a National Assembly, taking its decisions by consensus, with the president of the country chosen from among the delegates or the governors of the regions either by rotation, acclamation or by vote. Thus, the country would save the resources wasted on multi-party elections and universal suffrage. This type of democracy is in consonance with Africa’s own heritage. It is simple, inexpensive, and desperately needed.

Notes

1. Sadly, Prof. George Ayittey (1945 – 2022) died in January 2022 in Alexandria, Virginia, USA, aged 77, a few months after contributing this essay. He will be missed. 2. https://www.cfr.org/article/whats-happening-democracy-africa 3. Those who are critical of democracy sometimes suggest that surveys like this are misleading because people do not really know what democracy means and simply give this response because they think it is the “right” answer. This is both patronizing and untrue. When asked to define democracy, most people referred to elections or a form of representative government, with other common responses including liberal values such as freedom of expression. 4. The one exception was the small monarchy of eSwatini.

References Abidde, Sabella Ogbobode (2020). African Scholars and Intellectuals in North American Academies: Reflections on Exile and Migration. London and New York: Routledge. Anonymous, (2020). “José Eduardo dos Santos is still the richest man in Angola,” Plataformamedia, June 26 2020. Ayittey, George B.N. (2005). Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa’s Future. New York: Palgrave. Ayittey, George B.N. (2006). Indigenous African Institutions. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers Ayittey, George B.N. (2017). “The non-sustainability of Rwanda’s economic miracle,” Journal of Management and Sustainability, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2017: 88–104. doi:10.5539/jms. v7n2p88. BBC ( June 29, 2021). “Ethiopia’s Tigray war: The short, medium and long story.” Available online: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378, Accessed July 28, 2021. Blake, Cecil (2010). The African Origins of Rhetoric. New York and London: Routledge. Dolan, Kerry A. (2021). “How Isabel Dos Santos, Once Africa’s Richest Woman, Went Broke,” Forbes, January 22, 2021. Economist, (2017). “John Magufuli is bulldozing the opposition and wrecking the economy,” The Economist, Oct 19, 2017. Gbadamosi, Hakeem (2017). “I Remain Traditional Ruler Of Mahin Kingdom – Deposed Traditional Ruler,” Nigerian Tribune, February 18, 2017, https://tribuneonlineng.com/ i-remain-traditional-ruler-mahin-kingdom-deposed-traditional-ruler/.

Multi-party democracy and governance  249 Langley, J. Ayo, ed. (1979). Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa, 1856–1970. London: Rex Collins. Noble, Kenneth B. (1991). “Congo Political Conference Gives Africa a Democratic Model,” The New York Times, June 25, 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/25/ world/congo-political-conference-gives-africa-a-democratic-model.html. Shanghai Academy of Fine Arts (no date). “Palaver Tree,” Shanghai Academy of Fine Arts, Shanghai University, https://www.instituteforpublicart.org/case-studies/palaver-tree/. South African History Online -SAHO (no date). “Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA),” https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-southafrica-codesa.

19 Is the growing foreign military presence in many African countries counter-productive? YES: Brendon J. Cannon

Institute of International and Civil Security (IICS), Khalifa University of Science & Technology, Abu Dhabi, UAE

NO: Andrews Atta-Asamoah

Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Brendon J. Cannon, of Khalifa University of Science & Technology, Abu Dhabi, UAE, argues that the growing foreign military presence in many African countries is counter-productive because the interests of these militaries are often at odds with those of their African hosts. Moreover, these militaries are there to counter their own perceived security interests, not those of Africa, which provide the pretexts for establishing and growing these bases. These bases are counterproductive because they have directly or indirectly contributed to the wanton proliferation illegal arms trafficking and increases in inter- and intra-state conflicts. They have also undermined the African state by promoting the presence of shadowy foreign mercenaries, besides increasing the intensity and geographic scope of conflicts on the continent. NO: Andrews Atta-Asamoah, of the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, argues that the growing foreign military presence in many African countries is not necessarily counter-productive. Besides offering Africa many benefits, many foreign militaries in Africa are filling critical security gaps, containing existing and emerging threats at source, degrading overbearing threats and building state capacity to address insecurity. Powerful countries and empires have throughout history maintained varying levels of military presence in conquered regions and countries or those in their sphere of influence. Concerted foreign military presence in Africa begun in the late 19th century after the 1884 Berlin conference that created European colonial spheres in Africa. The European militaries of the United Kingdom, France, Portugal, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Spain played a decisive role in conquering, colonizing, pacifying and maintaining Europe’s colonies in Africa. At independence, mostly in the 1950s and 1960s, many European countries, with the notable exception of France, reduced or downgraded their military presence in Africa. France still maintains over ten bases mostly in its former colonies in West Africa. DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-24

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In the postwar period, during the Cold War (1946–1991) between the United States (US) and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union, now Russia), both powers sought world dominance through ideological conflicts between capitalism (US) versus communism (USSR) and democracy (US) versus authoritarianism (USSR), many proxy wars and an aggressive and costly arms race. Africa was one of the major sites of these powers’ ideological, military and arms conflicts; with some African countries like the Kenya being allied to the US while Ethiopia and others were allied with the former USSR. Although some of Africa’s wars were financed by these powers for ideological reasons, many others were also fermented by these powers to advance their goal of controlling and exploiting Africa’s immense natural resources. Such conflicts have also long created lucrative markets for weapons producers in these countries. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Africa has continued to be a site of superpower contests that feature an increasing number of foreign powers including the United States, Russia, China, France and Russia. Currently, as Padraig Carmody and Francis Owusu, argue in their 2007 journal article titled “Competing hegemons? Chinese versus American geo-economic strategies in Africa,” the main competing powers in Africa now are the US and China, with the US, by far, having the most military bases in Africa (about 16) compared to China’s one in Djibouti. Nevertheless, China now enjoys considerable economic influence in Africa. On January 1, 2020, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) came into force. The AfCFTA is a major step in the continent’s quest for an economically integrated Africa that might also be peaceful and powerful enough to resist foreign economic and military domination. But in the meantime, the 47 foreign military bases, presences and outposts in Africa have many positive and negative consequences for their African hosts. YES: THE GROWING FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE IN MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE At least 13 African states host foreign military bases. While the nature of the bases or facilities may differ, the fact remains that Africans are rapidly finding themselves sharing land and resources with soldiers and contractors connected to foreign militaries who often have interests antithetical to those of Africans and their states. I argue, therefore, that these foreign ‘lily pads’ are counter-productive to the interests of African states and have already produced unwanted results. In principle, a military base is a form of military installation – usually with some degree of permanency. Foreign military ‘bases’ are most commonly thought of as part of a state’s infrastructure for war-making; that is, a critical means through which states project military power abroad. Legacy bases

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dating from the Cold War have largely made way for smaller locations – often designated as “installations,” “facilities,” “forward operating sites” or “cooperative security locations” (rather than bases) – from which, and in which, various security-related tasks are performed. These can range from kinetic counter-terrorism operations to the delivery of security training assistance. On the African continent, a host of states and international actors have established a military presence, either in the name of security assistance or to partner with local allies against terrorism in the region (Rossiter & Cannon, 2019, p. 168). As such, foreign military installations in Africa necessarily vary significantly in size and scope. Some amount to nothing more than a few small buildings used for storage; others consist of large barracks for hundreds of troops, sizeable naval stations or even full-scale aerodromes. Rather than differentiating between various types of military installations, for the purposes of this exercise, I will focus only on identifying the presence of foreign military facilities, how that presence has grown, and how and why they is counter-productive for African states, their sovereignty and development. France and the United States (US) possess the majority of foreign military bases in Africa. France’s presence geographically aligns with its former colonial possessions, which bequeathed France with a network of bases from Dakar to Djibouti. It has a military presence in at least ten African countries and currently has over 4,500 troops spread across five countries in Africa – Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad (the so-called G5-Sahel) – as part of Operation Barkhane.1 In addition, France’s Mission Corymbe, ongoing since the 1990s and originally aimed at preserving French oil exploitation and economic interests in the Gulf of Guinea, has shifted its focus to battling maritime insecurity, piracy and illicit trafficking. The US maintains 29 military installations across 15 African countries. These comprise 13 “enduring” bases and 16 “non-enduring” outposts. US bases in Africa are largely a legacy of the 9/11 attacks and the resulting War on Terror. Camp Lemmonier in Djibouti, for example, was leased in 2001 to assist US military operations in Eastern Africa as well as South Asia. Other bases soon sprouted, from Manda Bay, Kenya to Agadez, Niger. While some installations have reportedly been shuttered, others are reportedly in the works (Turse, 2020). The military installations of other states are relatively few when compared to those of the US and France. Between the United Kingdom (UK), Israel,2 Germany, Italy, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia,3 Russia, Belgium, India, China, Japan and Spain, a handful of bases dot the continent, the majority centered on three states: Djibouti, Mali and Niger (Atta-Asamoah, 2019). With the exception of the UK’s long-standing training base at Nanyuki, Kenya, other installations are only ten years old, at most. Nonetheless, at least 15 states now have some sort of military presence in Africa (See Figure 19.1). Why? Foreign states’ militaries maintain a presence in Africa for primarily political, economic and/or security reasons. Security interests account for the lion’s share of growth in military missions and bases. Countering terrorism

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Figure 19.1  Foreign Military Bases in Africa

and piracy in the Horn of Africa or migration and terrorism in West Africa provide the very real, but also highly convenient pretexts needed for states to establish, grow and keep their African bases. In fact, while fighting piracy accounted for the base building spree in Djibouti – China, Italy and Japan all reportedly built their bases to combat piracy – there is little doubt that “mission creep” has occurred. That is to say, as the piracy threat has reduced, the rationale for foreign bases has correspondingly dwindled. Yet, not only do they remain, but they are growing in size (Turse, 2020). Economic interests, particularly the maintenance of privileged economic positions, are also important. States such as France, Italy or China have major interests in protecting maritime trade, particularly the flow of hydrocarbons from the Gulf of Guinea and the Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb Strait to fuel their own economies. Many of these states also compete for African resources, be they cobalt, uranium, oil or coal. Many installations have a political rationale: keeping an eye on strategic competitors. This represents perhaps the driving force in keeping bases open and operational even after initial security threats such as piracy have receded. In addition, having overseas military bases is often conflated with a state’s influence, prestige and power.4 The US, Japan, and India, for example, all have strategic interests in maintaining military bases in Africa in order to keep an eye on China (Khurana, 2008; Cannon, 2018; AFRICOM, 2019). Regional rivalries amongst Middle East states, on the other hand, seem to be driving the base race in the Horn of Africa. The UAE, for instance, was attempting to build

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bases to “fill space, before others do,” such as regional rivals Turkey and Iran (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 5). Turkey’s military facility in Mogadishu means “Ankara wants to strengthen its geostrategic position in the world by politically, financially and militarily engaging with the Horn of Africa” (Cengiz, 2017). This viper’s nest of competing geopolitical and ideological aims, particularly as they are acted upon from foreign military bases in Africa, means bases have much to do with extra-regional states’ power and interests and very little to do with the interests of Africans. “Apart from turning Africa into a proxy turf for extra-regional competition, the risks of such tensions escalating [between China and the US, for example] are high. In such situations the host member states and Africa, in general, are set to house the showdown and will be on the receiving end of the ensuing destruction” (Atta-Asamoah, 2019). The African Union (AU) has been vocal critic of these bases, counseling member states in 2016 to be “circumspect whenever they enter into agreements that would lead to the establishment of foreign military bases in their countries” (African Union, 2016, 2). Three years later, the AU condemned all external interference into Africa’s peace and security affairs, pointedly noting that “the defence and security of one country in Africa is directly linked to that of others as provided for in the Common African Defence and Security Policy and also in the AU Non-Aggression Pact” (African Union, 2019, pg. 1). While it remains to be seen how much influence over politics Turkey or the UAE will derive from their enhanced security roles and presence on the continent,5 it is certainly well-known that unequal security relationships involving a foreign military presence can lead to the domestic authority structures of the host state being compromised. This would gravely damage what is already a tenuous sovereignty in some African states.6 There is an added danger that African leaders may misread the level of commitment from external states housing troops in their respective countries. They may come to believe that foreign troops on their soil can play a protective role, perhaps offering even military commitment to the African state or its leader(s). This is dangerous and could lead to military adventurism on the part of certain states interested in settling regional scores or quelling domestic opposition (Rossiter & Cannon, 2019, pp. 177–181). In certain Sahel states or Somalia, training activities held at foreign bases have led to a congested security landscape (Reno, 2018). The G5 Sahel or the Somali security forces trained by multiple foreign states are but two examples. Competing security structures and differing levels of training by outsiders may also exacerbate existing clan or tribe fault lines, with one group being trained and equipped and the other excluded. This produces power asymmetries thereby engendering conflict. The possibility of foreign-trained forces being used for criminal or political schemes by their local commanders is also a possibility (Barkawi, 2011). Bases also often house large amounts of weaponry leading, at times, to yet more arms flooding the illegal market.7 The base race in Africa has also contributed to an uptick in foreign mercenary groups’ operations in locations like the Central Africa Republic

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(CAR), Mozambique and Libya. Mercenary groups have a long history of operating in Africa, particularly during the Cold War. The reported actions of the Russian Wagner Group private military company or that of Eric J. Prince’s Frontier Services Group (FSG), however, and the roles they may play in lengthening a conflict or deciding their outcomes almost certainly run contrary to the peace and stability of the African states in question. In conclusion, foreign military bases undermine the sovereignty of African states. They engender and encourage conflict, reify the economic advantages and interests of foreign states, further weaponize the continent and may lead to lengthier conflicts through the introduction of proxy forces. In short, the rapid increase of foreign military bases in Africa has not led to a corresponding decrease in threats or conflict rather they have increased in intensity and expanded geographically.

References African Union. (2016, May 30). Peace and Security Council 601st Meeting Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 30 May 2016 [Press release]. https://archives.au.int/handle/123456789/6460 African Union. (2019, November 15). Communique of the 868th meeting of the PSC on the state of foreign military presence in Africa, held on 14 August 2019 [Press release]. https:// www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-868th-meeting-of-the-psc-onthe-on-state-of-foreign-military-presence-in-africa-held-on-14-august-2019. AFRICOM. (2019, February 7). 2019 Posture Statement to Congress [Press Release]. https://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/2019-posture-statement-to-congress Atta-Asamoah, A. (2019, August 27). Proceed with caution: Africa’s growing foreign military presence. Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa). https://issafrica.org/iss-today/ proceed-with-caution-africas-growing-foreign-military-presence Barkawi, T. (2011). Defence diplomacy” in North-South relations. International Journal, 66(3), 597–612. Cannon, B. J. (2018). Grand strategies in contested Zones: Japan’s Indo-Pacific, China’s BRI and Eastern Africa. Rising Powers Quarterly, 3(2), 195–221. Cannon, B. J., & Donelli, F. (2020). Asymmetric alliances and high polarity: evaluating regional security complexes in the Middle East and Horn of Africa. Third World Quarterly, 41(3), 505–524. Cengiz, S. (2017, October 21). What is at stake for Turkey in Somalia?. Arab News. http:// www.arabnews.com/node/1180881/columns International Crisis Group. (2018). The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa. Crisis Group Middle East Briefing 65, 1–12. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-eastnorth-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/united-arab-emirates/b65-united-arabemirates-horn-africa. Khurana, G. S. (2008). China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications. Strategic Analysis, 32(1), 1–39. Lefebvre, J. A. (2012). Iran in the Horn of Africa: Outflanking US allies. Middle East Policy, 19(2), 117–133. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00539.x Reno, W. (2018). The politics of security assistance in the Horn of Africa. Defence Studies, 18(4), 498–513. DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2018.1463819

256  Brendon J. Cannon and Andrews Atta-Asamoah Rossiter, A., & Cannon, B. J. (2019). Re-examining the “Base”: The political and security dimensions of Turkey’s military presence in Somalia. Insight Turkey, 21(1), 167–188. DOI: 10.25253/99.2019211.09 Sheikh, A. & Omar, F. (2018, August 25). Exclusive: Weapons stolen from UAE training facility in Somalia, sold on open market. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-somalia-arms/weapons-stolen-from-uae-training-facility-in-somalia-sold-onopen-market-idUSKBN1HW26I Turse, N. (2020, February 20). Pentagon’s Own Map of U.S. Bases in Africa Contradicts Its Claim of “Light” Footprint. The Intercept. https://theintercept.com/2020/02/27/ africa-us-military-bases-africom/

NO: THE GROWING FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFRICA IS NOT NECESSARILY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE The African continent is currently hosting about thirteen known foreign military presences (FMPs) dotted across its various regions (Atta-Asamoah, 2019). From a policy standpoint, the US and France have the most significant and growing military footprints on the continent. France has an estimated 4,000 troops across French-speaking West Africa, while the US has widespread presence through its estimated 29 bases in 15 African countries (Turse, 2020). The presence of the Chinese military is, however, principally in Djibouti but is projected to increase across the continent in the coming years, due to China’s rising influence in many African countries (Bearak, 2019). Even though the reality of the situation has gained policy attention on several fronts, there are still considerable unknowns about it not least because such arrangements and their associated operations are based on secret bilateral arrangements between African host countries and the deploying foreign states. Generally, host countries welcome foreign military installations through careful consideration of their sovereignty, security, economic and foreign policy realities. Despite perceptions of tilted power relations in such arrangements, the certainty that African countries proceed based on self-interest should not be trivialized. Djibouti, for example, leverages its use as a base by major powers in the Horn of Africa for economic gain to the tune of more than US$300 million annually (Atta-Asamoah, 2019). While I am aware of the real and potential negative impacts of such presence in Africa, my purpose in this paper is to highlight gains that accrue to the continent from FMPs. This article argues that FMPs offer Africa four important benefits. Considered in the context of those benefits, therefore, the presence of foreign militaries on African soil is not entirely counter-productive as argued by many.

Yawning African capacity gaps Though many African countries have made considerable progress in governance, peace and security since the end of the Cold War, the security situation in many has deteriorated over the last decade. The number of active

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violent extremist groups on the continent has increased about five-fold. From about five active groups in 2010, Africa now has about 25 active militant groups operating across the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and, in recent times, Mozambique. Apart from being responsible for more than 10,460 fatalities in 2019, African Centre for Strategic Studies (2019). for instance, their activities continue to rise and spread towards the coastal states of sub-Saharan Africa. Between 2009 and 2019, reported cases of violence associated with their operations increased more than 1,105% to about 3,471 events according to the African Centre for Strategic Studies (2019). This reality in Africa is symptomatic of underlying governance challenges and a stark indication of the existence of key drivers which continuously spawn insecurity in Africa’s many weak states. Growing foreign military presence in response to such trends particularly in the Sahel is thus, both indicative of an existing and growing domestic capacity gap in dealing with such security realities. Foreign militaries deployed in such situations directly address these capacity gaps in host states. FMPs also help host governments to project and maintain some semblance of authority in their territories in the face of new and/or advancing threats. Without the support of “Operation Serval” by the French military in 2013, for example, the Malian military would not have rebuffed the advance of armed jihadist groups from the north towards the capital, Bamako. The ability of the French military to confront this group was therefore instrumental in preserving the territorial integrity of the Malian state. Even though the operation did not address the underlying drivers of insecurity in Northern Mali, it helped to keep the Malian state together, prepare the ground for a UN multilateral force and, ultimately, to contain the spread of the crisis to Bamako. Without the intervention of the French military, Bamako would have fallen to armed jihadist forces and made it harder to restore the Malian state. FMPs that are deployed to address capacity gaps have the added advantage of being more specialized, better trained and equipped and, therefore, more agile in the face of threats than their local counterparts. Even in countries with significant military capacity, foreign military deployments beef up the capacity of national forces in specific specialized areas, particularly intelligence gathering, thereby improving the outcome of African-led operations. The importance of such support is further evidenced in the fight against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, jihadists in the Sahel and Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa.

Containing threats at source Arguments against FMPs are often based on the notion of “African solutions to African problems,” the idea that Africans should take the lead in solving African problems. Though Pan-African in motivation, however, such arguments do not take into adequate consideration the ease with which local or national threats to peace and security can quickly become bigger regional or international problems. Due to improved media coverage, extensive social media penetration, direct targeting of foreign citizens and the enabling

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influence of the forces of globalization, it is increasingly difficult for any security threat to be contained in any one given country or region. Thus, domestic threats can quickly internationalize and become a challenge to international peace and security. There is, thus, no clear distinction between what is local and what is global: What is local is effectively global. This “glocalization” of threats to peace and security, has blurred the lines in the ownership of threats, impacted the notion of territorial fixity and created more demands on regional member states and beyond. It has made it easier for adherents of the notion of responsibility to protect to find justifiable grounds for a responsibility to contain, as well. The deployment of foreign militaries to help address local threats, even in situations where such deployments have struggled to address the said threats, is worthwhile because they, at least, serve the secondary purpose of slowing the evolution and advance of such threats into forms that might otherwise engulf entire countries, regions, and continents. The “glocal” nature of threats also means that a threat anywhere is a threat everywhere. Therefore, the idea of not involving capable states in addressing emerging threats in any given region can be self-defeating. In this context, the success or failure of FMPs should not be measured only in terms of benefits to the host country, but also in terms of their contribution to the broader maintenance of international peace and security. Hence, the deployment of FMPs to address threats associated with ungoverned spaces and to contain specific threats from spilling over should be considered successes in their own right. By taking the fight to Al Shabaab in Somalia through its drone and covert commando operations, the US has been able to contribute greatly to the containment of this threat from spreading to other parts of Africa and beyond. While this has not solved the entire Somali problem, it has provided a valuable window of time that can be used to resolve the underlying drivers of insecurity in the country.

Degrading overbearing threats Related to the above is the extent to which FMPs have contributed to degrading threats in many countries. For example, US drone operations and covert commando raids in the Horn of Africa have contributed significantly to the degradation of the disruptive capacity of Al Shabaab and other related groups. Without such support, the weak Somali government would have struggled to collect and to effectively use military intelligence on Al Shabaab. US action against the group has significantly degraded the leadership cadre of the group thereby reducing its relative capacity to oppose or destabilize the Somali state and her neighbors including Kenya.

Building local capacity In addition to direct operations, most FMPs have bilateral arrangements to build the capacity of local forces in weapon handling, tactical training, and intelligence sharing. In many countries, these have helped to beef up the

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capacity of governments to address emerging and existing threats. In Somalia, for instance, the creation of the Danab Brigade, a highly trained Somali army commando unit, has hugely impacted local responses to insecurity threats. Similar training schemes exist across the Sahel and are major contributors to Africa’s capacity to defend its peace and security. These four major issues indicate that despite the failures of FMPs in some countries, the conversation on their relevance ought to be contextualized in the broader framework of building partnerships for achieving a secure and more prosperous Africa. Clearly, FMPs are not the solution to Africa’s many security challenges. But their role should not be dismissed either. As much as FMPs serve certain foreign nations’ interests, it is imperative for their African hosts to also use them to achieve their goals, rather than leaving them to only serve foreign purposes at the expense of Africa’s.

Notes 1. Operation Barkhane is an ongoing anti-insurgent operation in Africa’s Sahel region. Headquartered in N’Djamena, the operation commenced in August 2014 and gets its name from a crescent-shaped dune in the Sahara Desert. 2. Reports of an Israeli base, as well as an Iranian base, in Eritrea surfaced nearly a decade ago. These remain disputed, denied by the Eritrea government and unsubstantiated (Lefebvre, 2012, pp. 126–130). 3. Saudi Arabia has reportedly been building a military base in Djibouti since 2016. It has yet to become operational. 4. There has been a great deal of ink spilled and hyperbole about overseas bases in Africa, particularly those of China and Japan, and what they say about “great power” status or a state’s power projection. What is important to note is that neither Beijing nor Tokyo are interested in abandoning their bases anytime soon. The bases arguably give them hitherto unavailable political and military leverage over the host state and, potentially, in the host state’s near abroad. 5. For more on Middle East states and their security interactions, particularly in the Horn of Africa, see (Cannon & Donelli, 2020). 6. The AU, for example, expressed its concern that “foreign military presence and military bases are contributing to the risk of rivalry and competition among foreign powers within Africa and undermining national sovereignty and peace efforts” (African Union, 2019; 2). 7. For example, after a diplomatic spat resulting in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis, at least 600 weapons were stolen from a former UAE-run military training center in Mogadishu. The training facility and arsenal were looted and the weapons were reportedly sold throughout the city. (Sheikh and Omar, 2018).

References Atta-Asamoah, A. (2019, August 27). Proceed with caution: Africa’s growing foreign military presence. ISS Today. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.org/ iss-today/proceed-with-caution-africas-growing-foreign-military-presence. Turse, N. (2020, February 20). Pentagon’s Own Map of US Bases in Africa Contradicts its Claim of ‘Light’ Footprint. The Intercept. https://theintercept.com/2020/02/27/ africa-us-military-bases-africom/

260  Brendon J. Cannon and Andrews Atta-Asamoah Bearak, M. (2019, December 30). In strategic Djibouti, a microcosm of China’s growing foothold in Africa. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ africa/in-strategic-djibouti-a-microcosm-of-chinas-growing-foothold-in-africa/ 2019/12/29/a6e664ea-beab-11e9-a8b0-7ed8a0d5dc5d_story.html Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2019, July 9). Frontlines in Flux in Battle against African Militant Islamist Groups. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/fronts-fluctuate-in-battleagainst-african-militant-islamist-groups/

20 Do more women in politics lead to better governance in African countries? YES: Mary Njeri Kinyanjui

Department of Development Studies, University of Nairobi, Kenya

NO: Pamela Abbott

Center for Global Development University of Aberdeen, Scotland Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Mary Njeri Kinyanjui, professor emeritus of the Department of Development Studies at the University of Nairobi, Kenya, argues that more women participating in politics would enhance governance in Africa. She supports this with evidence of notable women’s socio-political activities and achievements in the past, women’s grassroots movements, and female leadership in corporate and international organizations. She concludes by asserting that women have the power to transform governance in Africa. Activating that power involves recognizing what African women have already done. NO: Pamela Abbott of Center for Global Development at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, argues that an increasing number of women members of parliament has not changed politics in Africa because most women MPs are elected through quotas and voting patterns suggest that voters still think that men make better politicians than men. The increase has not resulted in better governance or in greater space being given to issues that are of concern to women. It has also not resulted in greater gender equality or in the empowerment of women. She concludes that patriarchal attitudes continue to dominate African parliaments and political spaces, not to mention African societies more generally. While gender is a social construction, it does have real world impacts. As in other parts of the world, socially constructed gender roles in different African cultural contexts shape women’s and men’s roles and responsibilities. This in turn may have an impact on how men and women approach politics and the issues of concern that they bring to the table. Would greater involvement of women in African politics lead to better governance? In this debate, Mary Njeri Kinyanjui essentially argues that we have often obscured or occluded a history of African women’s involvement in politics and social struggles. This has been disempowering for many contemporary African women. She suggests DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-25

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that African women have been a powerful socio-political force and we need to recognize this. Pamela Abbott focuses, in particular, on the case of parliamentary quotas for women in countries like Rwanda where, she suggests, there has been limited real change as women have been co-opted by party politics. As Abbott writes, African parliaments have some of the highest numbers of female MPs in the world, yet this average masks a considerable amount of variation, from over 60% in Rwanda to almost none in some African countries. Kinyanjui also outlines how there have been several African female presidents, including Sirleaf Johnson of Liberia (2006–2014); Sahie-Work Zwede of Ethiopia (2018– present); Joyce Hilda Banda of Malawi (2012–2014); Ameenah Gurib Fakim of Mauritius (2015–2018); and Samia Suluhu Hassan of Tanzania (2021 – present). Because of their socially constructed gender roles, do African women have a fundamentally different approach to governance? Are they more likely to emphasize stronger education and health care programming, pay more attention to women’s issues, approach conflicts differently, or push for less graft in government? Of course, we must be careful about essentializing, or simplifying, people along one dimension such as gender, age, ethnicity, occupation, or political affiliation. A more nuanced way of looking at the situation might be in terms of intersectionality, or the idea that people have multiple identities and that they strike a balance between these on a daily basis. Perhaps one’s life experience as a woman in a particular social context matters, but this is nuanced by other identities. In Rwanda, for example, your life as a wealthy, urban Tutsi woman closely affiliated with the ruling party may be quite different from that of a relatively poor, rural Hutu woman. We hope you learn from this issue. Enjoy the debate! YES: MORE WOMEN IN POLITICS LEADS TO BETTER GOVERNANCE IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES Most analysts view African governance as dysfunctional and characterized by leadership that is undemocratic, autocratic, and predatory. African leaders are often accused of amassing wealth for themselves instead of championing the development of their countries in health, education, manufacturing, agriculture, and services that would benefit the general populace. The political leadership in Africa is largely male. To date, the continent has only had five women heads of state: Sirleaf Johnson of Liberia (2006–2014); Sahie-Work Zwede of Ethiopia (2018 – present); Joyce Hilda Banda of Malawi (2012–2014); Ameenah Gurib Fakim of Mauritius (2015–2018); and Samia Suluhu Hassan of Tanzania (2021 – present). Five women have also been presidents in acting capacity: Cathrine Samba of Central Africa Republic (2014–2016); Agnes-Monique Ohasan Bellepeau of Mauritius (2012–2015); Rose Francine Rogombe of Gabon (2009); and Ivy Matsepe-Cassabari of South Africa (2005).

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This essay argues that higher women’s political participation would enhance governance in Africa. Evidence for this is provided by the activities of women in the past, women’s grassroots movements, and women’s leadership roles in corporations and international organizations.

Past women’s leadership and socio-political activities and achievements In terms of parliamentary representation, African women account for 23% of the global average of women parliamentarians (Kara 2019). Women’s political activism and the imposition of gender quotas in various countries has contributed to the increased number of women in parliament. In Kenya, for example, all the country’s 47 counties elect a women’s representative to parliament. Although the country’s constitution states that “not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender,”1 it has been difficult to achieve this. Rwanda leads other African countries in terms of women representation in political positions. According to Kara (2019), Rwanda has 11 female cabinet ministers out of 20. Other countries with a high representation of women include Ethiopia, South Africa, and Zambia. African judiciaries are also attempting to improve women representation. In Kenya, the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice are female. The country has several women judges and magistrates. Women also hold senior positions in the courts of Ghana, Nigeria, Benin, Niger, and Rwanda (Kara 2019). There are several reasons why increased women’s political representation would lead to improved governance in Africa. Women leaders of African institutions have generally performed very well. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia and Prof. Wangari Maathai of Kenya were awarded Nobel Peace Prizes for their work. Other distinguished women whose works and activities have positively affected Africa in general and women in particular, include Dr. Anna Tibaijuka of Tanzania, Graca Machel of Mozambique and South Africa, Dr. Dambisa Moyo of Zambia, Prof. Micere Mugo of Kenya, Chimamanda Adichie of Nigeria, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala of Nigeria, Miriam Makeba of South Africa, and Prof Miriam Were of Kenya. These women have not only championed the cause of women in Africa, but have also addressed the continent’s social, political, economic, and environmental issues. In the words of the former Secretary General to the United Nations, Kofi Annan, women like Dr. Ann Tibaijuka are “…a sign of hope for the many women, particularly in Africa, that are still refused professional opportunity” (Kihangah 2010). Further back in history, there are also plenty of examples of women who have played important political roles. Such women include Queen Nzinga of Angola and Mekatilili wa Menza from the Giriama community of Kenya. They played important roles in resisting colonial occupation of their communities in the early 17th, 18th, and 19th Centuries. Queen Nzinga lived

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between 1583 and 1663 (Wikipedia 2022a). She was the leader of the Ndongo and Matamba kingdoms. She is known for her military, diplomatic, and political prowess in the management of her kingdoms and for her fight against the Portuguese. Mekatilili wa Menza lived between 1860 and 1924 (Wikipedia 2022b). Using the local kifundu dance, she mobilized the Giriama community to resist British colonial rule. She was exiled to Kisii in Kenya’s then Nyanza Province but later returned to her community and continued with the resistance. Mekatilili and Nzinga demonstrate the important role women played in Africa’s resistance to colonial occupation. They were not just spectators. Many more women participated in the freedom struggle though their stories remain untold. Thus, “in the six decades since many African countries attained political independence, the stories of women in the liberation struggle is yet to be told and celebrated unlike their male counterparts who wasted no time in having universities, airports and major highways named for them and affixing their faces on national currencies” (Asiedu, 2019: no pp). Elsewhere, in March 1896, traditional warriors, farmers, and pastoralists as well as women defeated a well-armed Italian army in the northern town of Adwa in Ethiopia. This battle’s outcome became a symbol of freedom for black people globally and ensured Ethiopia’s independence, making it and Liberia, the only two African countries never to be colonized (Woldeyes 2020). Women have also actively participated in fanning the liberation struggle. In Kenya, Njeri wa Ndugo from Gatundu in Kiambu County played a significant role in the liberation struggle (Kinyanjui, 2019) and girl-child education. She was one of the founders of the Independent School movement and she spearheaded the construction of a girls’ hostel at Githunguri Teachers College. Not only did she participate in Kenya’s Mau Mau liberation struggle, but she also sought to empower women economically by mobilizing them to raise funds to buy land from departing white settlers. In South Africa, Winnie Mandela played a big role in the struggle against apartheid. In Kenya, achievements of women in the past are silenced or distorted by the masculine frames of analysis or by current feminist tropes which claim that women leadership began with the multiparty democracy movement of the 1980s and 1990s (Tripp, 2017; Nzomo 1993). The silencing of Kenyan women’s leadership abilities by masculine frames is traceable to the colonial times where men gained early access to Western education and therefore had a head-start in managing and leading the affairs of the post-colonial state. Thus, when Jomo Kenyatta became Kenya’s first post-colonial leader, he sidelined women like Njeri wa Ndugo and Wambui Otieno who had worked with him in the liberation struggle instead of giving them significant state responsibilities. Eventually, many of the women who were in the liberation struggle became part of the Nyakinyua Traditional Dancers troupe who regularly entertained Kenyatta. After Kenyatta’s death on August 22, 1978, many of these dancers faded into obscurity and poverty (K24 TV, 2013). Other women, like Jael Mbogo and Muthoni Likimani, who tried to vie for political positions in the first decade of the post-colonial state were silenced.

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Jael Mbogo was the first African female shorthand typist employed by the City Council of Nairobi who later obtained a degree in Economics from the United States. She contested for the Bahati parliamentary seat against Mwai Kibaki in 1969 but was defeated as a result of widespread rigging of the election (Wikipedia 2022c). She then invested her energy in transforming the Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organization. As a result of her political activism, she became a founding member of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy political party in the late 1980s. Muthoni Likimani (2005) in her autobiography, Fighting Without Ceasing outlines how her political participation was affected by an overnight rumor on the eve of election that she had quit the election in favor of a male candidate. Muthoni did not give up. She went out to build a career in broadcasting and became a business magnate. In an attempt to draw attention and funding to women issues, many writers often employ feminist tropes that inadvertently silence the history of women in leadership (Tripp, 2017; Nzomo, 1992, 1993, 1997; Kinyanjui, 2019). Without sufficient historical background, such writers often portray women as missing in political leadership from time immemorial. By doing this, they deny current and aspiring women leaders the benefit of historical lessons from past women leaders like Queen Nzinga, Mekatilili, Njeri wa Ndugo, and Jael Mbogo. In the absence of such lessons, the current crop of women leaders is left with no option but to learn from patriarchal frames of leadership. If more historical examples of women’s leadership are highlighted, there will be a large canvas from which contemporary women can draw specific leadership lessons.

Women’s grassroots resistance Women’s grassroots resistance is also evidence that increased women participation can lead to improved governance in Africa. There is limited effort in documenting women’s grassroots political resistance. Tanzania’s Marjorie Mbilinyi has attempted to document the activities of unsung heroines in Tanzania and the role they have played at the household and community levels. In Kenya, the Release Political Prisoners struggle led by mothers of sons who had been detained for agitating for multi-party democracy was a strong women’s statement of commitment to liberation. Yet the story of the second liberation struggle in Kenya is always told from the perspective of male liberators who tend to downplay the role of grassroots women who put their lives on the frontline to liberate their sons and support the liberation struggle (Kinyanjui, 2018). For example, Monica Wangu Wamwere, whose three sons were accused of raiding Bahati Police station in Nakuru, mobilized the mothers of the 52 Kenyan political prisoners to demand for their release. They had been detained for allegedly clamoring for multi-party democracy in Kenya. This was branded ‘anti-government’ by the then Moi regime (Kenya Film

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Commission 2012). The women’s bid, on February 2, 1992, to have Amos Wako, the then Attorney General, to produce the accused in court and deliberate on their case was aborted. The women staged a hunger strike at Uhuru Park’s Freedom Corner to press for the release of their sons. On the third day of their activism, they were ambushed by police, beaten, and tear gassed. In response, three women stripped naked crying out: “what government beats women? If you want, kill us!” In many traditional Kenyan communities, women use stripping as a last resort to curse their oppressors. The women thus cursed the police who employed excessive force against them as well as the government that sent them. Singing the song: “We are fighting for our children. We will continue fighting even if you kill us,” they sought refuge in the basement of the All the Saints Cathedral in Nairobi where, multiparty crusaders such as Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Masinde Muliro, and Wangari Maathai, encouraged them to soldier on and to align their freedom struggle for their sons and their motherhood rights with the broader multiparty movement. Wangu, a proponent of non-violent struggle, held that ucamba ti kuoya mucinga (power does not rest in the gun only), articulating that what one wants is also a tool of fighting. Her husband, Wamwere, died when she was in the middle of hunger strike but amid government pressure, she refused to bury him arguing that according to Gikuyu tradition, sons must bury their fathers. He was buried after her sons were released. The funeral became a big platform for multiparty crusaders like Paul Muite and Raila Odinga. The women remained at the All the Saints Cathedral until March 1993 when the last prisoner was released. Undoubtedly, the mother’s strike gave impetus to Kenya’s movement for democracy. Thus, women have the power to change the way governments are run in Africa. Activating that power entails recognizing what African women have already done.

References Asiedu, K. G. (2019). “Africa has forgotten the women leaders of its independence struggle.” Quartz Africa, March 16, 2019, https://qz.com/africa/1574284/africas-women-havebeen-forgotten-from-its-independence-history/ Kara, E. (2019). “Gender Equality Policies and African Women: A Comparative Critique.” In The Palgrave Handbook of African Women Studies. Eds. Olajumoke, YacobHaliso and Toyin Falola. Palgrave Macmillan Kenya Film Commission. (2012). “The Unbroken Spirit.” Film. https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=lAiMIXckFBY Kihangah, N. (2010). “Dr. Anna Tibaijuka calls it a day.” East African. 6th September. Kinyanjui M. N. (2019). The Sweet Sobs of Women in Response to Anthropain. New Castle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press. Kinyanjui, M. N. (2019). “A Lone Ranger: My Journey Towards Becoming A Feminist Geographer in Nairobi, Kenya.” Gender Place and Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geographers. Published online 5/15/2019.

Women and governance in African countries  267 Kinyanjui, M. N. (2018). “Feminine Utu: Rethinking Women Movements in Africa with a Special Focus on the Agikuyu of Kenya.” In Kabira Wanjiku Mukabi, KamiriMbote, Patricia, Kabira Nkatha and Meroka Agnes. Eds Changing the Mainstream: Celebrating Women’s Resilience. Nairobi: African Women Studies Centre. K24 TV (2013, Dec 15). “Kenya at 50: Nyakinyua Dancers.” YouTube, https://youtu. be/bqVxPpHSXns. Likimani, M. (2005). Fighting Without Ceasing. Nairobi: Noni Publicity. Mbilinyi, M., and Kalindile, R. (1991). “Grassroot Struggles for Women Advancement: The Story of Rebeka Kalindile.” In The Unsung Heroines. Dar es Salaam: WRDP Publications. Nzomo, M. (1997a). The Gender Dimension of Electoral Politics in Kenya: Capacity Building of Women Candidates for 1997 and Beyond. Nairobi: NCSW and Type Design Ltd. Nzomo, M. (1997b). Women Candidates in Kenyan Electoral Politics. Nairobi: NCSW and Type Design Ltd. Nzomo, M. (1997c). Women in Top Management in Kenya. Nairobi. AAPAM. Nzomo, M. (1993). Empowering Kenya Women. School of Journalism, University of Nairobi. Unpublished report. Nzomo, M. (1992). Women in Politics and Public Decision-Making. Nairobi: AAWORD. Tripp, M. A. (2017). “Women’s Movement in Africa.” In Women’s Movements in the Global Era: The Power of Local Feminisms, 37–64. Boulder: Westview Press. Wikipedia. (2022a). “Nzinga of Ndongo and Matamba.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Nzinga_of_Ndongo_and_Matamba Wikipedia. (2022b). “Mekatilili Wa Menza.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mekatilili_ Wa_Menza. Wikipedia, (2022c). “Jeal Mbogo.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jael_Mbogo Woldeyes, Y.G. (2020). “124 years ago, Ethiopian men and women defeated the Italian army in the Battle of Adwa.” Quartz Africa. March 2. https://qz.com/africa/1811232/ how-ethiopians-defeated-the-italian-army-in-the-battle-of-.adwa/

NO: MORE WOMEN IN POLITICS DOES NOT LEAD TO BETTER GOVERNANCE IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Introduction African legislatures now boost some of the highest levels of women’s representation in the world, however, in this article I argue that there is little evidence to support the position that more women in politics has led to better governance in African Countries. Between 1995 and 2019 the average proportion of parliamentary seats (single/lower house) held by women increased from 8% to 23% (World Bank, 2021). However, this masks considerable differences between countries ranging from an increase of 56 percentage points in Rwanda to no change in Benin. Rwanda is the only country to have achieved the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 50% target for women MPs with 61% of MPs being women. Apart from Rwanda only 12 African countries out of 55 have the 30% or more female MPs generally considered to be the critical number necessary to bring about change in governance. Furthermore, the

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increase in seats is mainly due to reserved seats, legislative political party quotas or voluntary quotas that political parties have observed. Women’s representation rarely exceeds the quota and there has been little increase in women’s representation in countries without quotas suggesting that there has been little change in voters’ perception that men make better politicians than women. African governments have shown a commitment to achieving gender equality and the empowerment of women. All African countries with the notable exception of Sudan have acceded to/ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, albeit some have entered reservations to certain clauses, most notably Muslim majority countries to clauses that conflict with Shari’a Family Law which makes women second class citizens (Teti et al., 2020). They have also signed up to the Millennium Development Goals and the 2030 targets. However, women across Africa continue to face structural, institutional and cultural barriers to enjoying full citizenship rights with social practices and lived experience generally being in conflict with more progressive laws and policies where they have been introduced. Patriarchy continues to dominate women’s lives in the private and public spheres with little sign of a transformation in gender relations (Abbott and Malunda, 2016). Only one country, Namibia has achieved the targets for SDG 5 with 3 others, Lesotho, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, looking as if they could be on track to achieve them (United Nations Development Programme, 2020).

Women and Governance Women’s underrepresentation in politics has become a global issue in the 21st Century. Women’s claim to equal citizenship was recognised in international law with the passing by the United Nations (UN) in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, yet women remain underrepresented in government. Gender justice requires that women are recognized as full citizens, that there is a change in cultural values so that women are fully accepted as equal citizens and that their concerns and interests are taken into consideration alongside those of men (Fraser, 2007). Good governance is not just about democratically elected governments that are answerable to the electorate, that fight corruption, that respect civil and political rights and the rule of law and ensure the welfare of citizens. It is also about gender justice and the transformation of gender relations ensuring not just that there is a legal and policy framework for gender equality and the empowerment of women, but that women are able to claim and exercise these rights. However, too often the increase in descriptive representation does not result in substantive representation – the presence of more women MPs does not lead to a change in the agenda nor to better governance (Dimitrova‑Grajzl and Obasanjo, 2019). Women’s descriptive representation has increased mainly due to quotas but there is little evidence that it has had a positive impact on better governance or substantive representation

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(Edgell, 2018; Okedele, 2020; Ramtohul, 2019). The proportion of women elected rarely exceeds the quota threshold, quotas in effect set a glass ceiling (Abdelgawad and Hassan, 2019; Edgell, 2018; Fracolli, 2020) and women elected to reserved seats have a second class status (Dimitrova‑Grajzl and Obasanjo, 2019). Furthermore, an increase in women’s entry into politics does not necessarily mean women can challenge patriarchal ideology or that they become empowered in their personal lives (Uvuza, 2014).

Impact of increased numbers of women in parliament on governance in Africa Africa suffers from bad governance, corruption, and gender imbalances in decision making and the reason for increased representation of women is almost exclusively due to quotas and not related to an increase in democracy, socio-economic development or a reduction in patriarchal attitudes. Authoritarian rulers gain legitimacy by introducing parliamentary quotas and gender equality laws from development partners and the international community more generally. Despite virtually all African countries having seen an increase in the proportion of women MPs between 1996 and 2019, 46 countries (85%) remained either hybrid (20) or authoritarian (26) in 2019 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020). Eight of the authoritarian regimes had 30% or more female members of parliament than three of the hybrid ones (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2020). Furthermore, the two countries that were democracies in 2019 (Mauritius and Cape Verde) already had good governance in 1996 as did three of the flawed democracies, Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa (Karatnycky, 1998). Tunisia’s democratisation is an outcome of the Arab Uprisings and governance indicators in Lesotho and Sao Tome and Principe, two other flawed democracies, deteriorated between 1996 and 2019 although there had been an increase in the proportion of women MPs in both countries.

Women’s parliamentary representation and empowerment for women It has been argued that having an increased representation of women in politics will change the culture and priorities of parliaments so that women’s interests come onto the political agenda however, increased representation does not mean that this is inevitable (Dodson, 1997). A key barrier to the feminization of politics is the dominance of patriarchal ideology which not only results in resistance to reforms to advance women’s issues but structures the way that parliaments operate (Galligan, 2007; Lovenduski, 2005). In Africa where women’s political representation has mainly been increased by gender quotas, women have struggled to change the political agenda with parliaments remaining aggressively masculine and providing little political space for women (Wangnerud, 2009).

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In most African countries the vast majority of legislation originates in the executive branch drafted by technocrats working in the ministries or international consultants (Burnet, 2019). Women MPs continue to encounter exclusionary masculinized environments (Wylie and Kristin, 2020), are expected to behave like men (Uvuza, 2014), lack confidence and social capital, and face institutional barriers. Women MPs are also subject to sexual harassment and gender stereotyping. African countries generally score low on gender equality measures, and while some gains have been made in education, and there is high participation of women in the labor force, women have made few gains in getting decent employment, ownership and control of land or in voice (Ruiz, 2020). Furthermore, there is a growing gap between urban elite women and the rest. Even in democratic countries women can struggle to make a difference (Devlin and Elgie, 2008). While in South Africa women have had an influence on legislation and the parliamentary calendar in Namibia, they have not managed to make parliament more women friendly and have had difficulty implementing reforms. In more authoritarian regimes like Mozambique, Uganda, and Rwanda there is little evidence of women MPs having had any impact. Rwanda has been portrayed as a success story, but its large proportion of women MPs comes from a combination of 30% reserved seats and a 30% quota on party lists. Many of the most significant gains for women came before the adoption of gender quotas in 2003 (Burnet, 2019). Having more women in parliament has not noticeably increased the influence of women in policy making, has not resulted in changes in private patriarchy or improved the lives of most Rwandan women (Abbott and Malunda, 2016; Uvuza, 2014). The law may give women equal ownership of land, but both men and women think that husbands are the ‘real’ owners and men have benefitted far more than women from the increase in non-farm employment. As the numbers of women in parliament increased, the country became more authoritarian and the space for women’s advocacy both in and outside parliament became more restricted. Women parliamentarians have supported the ruling party and helped it build nationwide dominance (Burnet, 2019). The Rwandan parliament, with a majority of women MPs, voted to reduce paid maternity leave in the 2009 Labour Law and increased the working week from 40 to 45 hours (Burnet, 2019). Women’s organizations did quietly lobby after the law came into force for the restoration of maternity benefits, but it was the President they lobbied not the women in parliament.

Conclusions An increase in the number of women MPs does not inevitably lead to better governance or legislative changes that improve the lives of women generally. Women elected to reserved seats are often seen as being second class MPs. In authoritarian and hybrid regimes little power lies with parliament, with most of the political power and control lying with the executive branch of government. Even when progressive laws and policies are passed,

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implementation remains a challenge and patriarchal ideology continues to dominate in both the public and private sphere. Governments are more concerned with meeting gender equality targets than transformative change in gender elations.

Note

1. Kenya Constitution 2010, Article 27(8)

References Abbott P and Malunda D (2016) The Promise and the Reality: Women’s Rights in Rwanda. The African Journal of International and Comparative Law 24(4): 561–581. Available at: https://euppublishing.com/doi/pdfplus/10.3366/ajicl.2016.0173. Abdelgawad H and Hassan M (2019) Women in the Egyptian Parliament: A Different Agenda? Review of Economics and Political Science On line Oc. Available at: https://www. emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-06-2019-0076/full/pdf ?title= women-in-the-egyptian-parliament-a-different-agenda. Burnet JE (2019) Rwanda: Women’s Political Representation and Its Consequences. In: The Palgrave Handbook of Women’s Political Rights, Gender and Politics. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Devlin C and Elgie R (2008) The Effect of Increased Women’s Representation in Parliament: The case of Rwanda. Parliamentary Affairs 61(2): 237–254. Dimitrova‑Grajzl V and Obasanjo I (2019) Do Parliamentary Gender Quotas Decrease Gender Inequality? The case of African Countries. Constitutional Political Economy 30: 149–176. Available at: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10602-01809272-0.pdf. Dodson DL (1997) Change and Continuity in the Relationship Between Private Responsibilities and Public Office holding: The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same. Policy Studies Journal 25(4): 569–584. Available at: https://onlinelibrary. wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1997.tb00042.x. Edgell AB (2018) Vying for a Man Seat: Gender Quotas and Sustainable Representation in Africa. African Studies Review 61(1): 185–214. Available at: https://www.cambridge. org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/vying-for-a-man-seat-gender-quotasand-sustainable-representation-in-africa/5852043E8CC09952DB5475592E23918E. Fracolli E (2020) Women and Quotas in Egypt’s Parliament. Available at: https://timep. org/commentary/analysis/women-and-quotas-in-egypts-parliament/ (accessed 25 April 2020). Fraser N (2007) Feminist Politics in the Age of Recognition: A Two-Dimensional Approach to Gender Justice. Studies in Social Justice 1(1): 23–35. Galligan Y (2007) Gender and Political Representation: Current Empirical Perspectives. International Political Science Review 28(5): 557–570. Available at: https://journals. sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0192512107082100. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2020) Gender Quota Data Base. Available at: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas (accessed 24 April 2020). Karatnycky A (1998) Freedom in the World 1996-7. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction Publishers. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/202002/Freedom_in_the_World_1996-1997_complete_book.pdf.

272  Mary N. Kinyanjui and Pamela Abbott Lovenduski J (2005) Feminizing Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. Available at: https://www. amazon.com/Feminizing-Politics-Joni-Lovenduski/dp/0745624626. Okedele A (2020) Women, Quotas, and Affirmative action Policies in Africa. In: YacobHaliso O and Falola T (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of African Women’s Studies. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Ramtohul R (2019) Mauritius: Still a Long Journey Ahead. In: The Palgrave Handbook of Women’s Political Rights, Gender and Politics. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Ruiz MJ (2020) Facts, Narrative and Action on Gender Equality in Modern Africa: A Sociological Approach to Priorities and Omissions. In: Konte M and Tirivayi N (eds) Women and Sustainable Human Development. Empowering Women in Africa. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030149345. Teti A, Abbott P, Talbot V, et al. (2020) Democratisation Against Democracy: How EU Foreign Policy Fails the Middle East. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2020) Democracy Index 2019. London: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. Available at: http://www.eiu.com/public/thankyou_ download.aspx?activity=download&campaignid=democracyindex2019. United Nations Development Programme (2020) Sustainable Development Goals 2020 Report. New York: United Nations. Uvuza J (2014) Hidden Inequalities: Rwandan Female Politicians’ Experiences of Balancing Family and Political Responsibilities. University of Newcastle Upon Tyne. Available at: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.635012. Wangnerud L (2009) Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation. Annual Review of Political Science 12: 51–69. Available at: https://www.annualreviews. org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053106.123839. World Bank (2021) World Development Indicators. Washington DC: World Bank. Available at: https://tinyurl.com/y28dlzng (accessed 3 February 2020). Wylie M and Kristin A (2020) Transnational Organizing, the Boosting Effect, and Women’s Legislative Caucuses in Africa. Politics, Groups, and Identities 8(3): 615–626. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21565503.2020.1752441.

21 Has the proliferation of cell phones strengthened social movements in Africa? YES: Frankline Matanji

School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, USA

NO: Tanja Bosch

Centre for Film and Media Studies, University of Cape Town, South Africa Issue Summary and Introduction YES: Franklin Matanji, of the University of Iowa, USA, argues that cellphones have strengthened social movements in Africa by empowering and giving voice to marginalized social groups like women and youth. Cellphones empower and give voice to social movements in Africa by facilitating fundraising, communication and mobilizing people for mass action. Moreover, cellphones are helping Africans confront negative coverage of their movements and Africa in Western media outlets. NO: Tanja Bosch, of the University of Cape Town, South Africa, contends that the proliferation of cell phones in Africa has not necessarily resulted in the strengthening of social movements. Despite the crucial role of cellphones in facilitating democratic activism and social protest in Africa in recent decades. The limited influence of cellphones in Africa’s social movement space is due to many factors including the existence of a substantial digital divide on the continent and the fact that cellphones are not neutral digital technologies. Rather, they can engender and exacerbate offline inequalities. Scholars have intensely examined the potential and actual role of information and communication technology (ICT) in Africa since the early 2000s. For example, in their 2009 African Geographical Review article titled, “Examining Claims for Information and Communication Technology-Led Development in Africa,” Kefa M. Otiso and William G. Moseley argued that whereas ICTs are making a positive contribution to Africa’s socio-economic development, the technology is not a panacea to the region’s development challenges because it is embedded in existing relations of social support, resource extraction and conflict. Moreover, they argued that the use of ICTs like cellphones in Africa is faced with many obstacles including inadequate power supplies, gross gender and social inequalities in access to the technology, and lack of significant African DOI: 10.4324/9780429259784-26

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language content on most ICTs. Consequently, the impact of ICTs in Africa is often contradictory; it can thus simultaneously facilitate change and reinforce existing inequalities in society. For this reason, the potential and actual impact of ICTs like cellphones in Africa should not be overrated. According to “The Mobile Economy Sub-Saharan Africa 2020” report from the Global System for Mobile Communications1, smartphones accounted for 50% of connections in 2020 mostly due to increasing availability of cheaper devices. By the end of 2025, the “number of smartphone connections in Sub-Saharan Africa will almost double to reach 678 million … an adoption rate of 65%.” As impressive as this penetration rate is, 35% of Africans (about 365 million people) will still be without smartphones in 2025. The impact of cellphones on Africa’s social movements must thus be understood in this context of unequal access to smartphones (and all cellphones for that matter) in Africa. This reality means that, on one hand, cellphones can both support African social movements by enhancing communication through mobile messaging (e.g., on WhatsApp) and fundraising through mobile money services (e.g., Kenya’s Mpesa). But on the other, cellphones can hinder Africa’s social movements by being inaccessible to many users, especially those that are poor, generally illiterate and most in need of the social benefits that can be gained through social movements. As a result, many of the urgent policies that can encourage investment in much-needed mobile phone infrastructure and improve access digital services in Africa will also enable cellphones to more positively contribute to not just Africa’s socio-economic growth but also to the strengthening of its social movements.

YES: THE PROLIFERATION OF CELL PHONES HAS STRENGTHENED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA

Introduction Digital media, such as cell phones, internet and social media, have transformed how social movements are organized and executed for mass action in Africa. Christiansen (2009, p. 2) defines social movements as “organized yet informal social entities that are engaged in extra-institutional conflict that is oriented towards a goal.” Cell phones are now playing a vital role in the construction of collective identities, mobilization, organization and sustainability of social movements (Breuer, Landman, & Farquhar, 2015). This essay is grounded in social movement theory which argues that the success of social movements mainly depends on the availability of resources and the ability to efficiently use them (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Saunders, & Roth, 2019). This theory stipulates that the success of a social movement is dependent on factors such as availability of material resources such as money, venue and physical supplies and social-organizational resources used for building social networks that are useful for connecting with the movement’s participants among other factors.

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In this essay, I first discuss ways in which cellphones in Africa have augmented how marginalized communities, such as youth and women, fight for their empowerment. Social movements make use of the ease of communication afforded by digital media to challenge repressive patriarchal societies and regimes. I also look at how social movements use services such as mobile money, texting services and chat and image capturing and sharing to mobilize material resources for their operations. Lastly, I look at how cell phones are playing a vital role in changing the image of the African continent against stereotypical Western media representation where narratives such as “a hopeless dark continent,” “a dangerous continent,” and “a poverty-stricken continent” are used to describe the entire African continent; a generalization that does not depict the truth on the ground.

Social movements for youth and women empowerment To begin with, I look at the role that cell phones and social movements are playing towards youth empowerment in Africa. In most societies, youth and women have been denied opportunities to play a vital role in the development of their nations. When Nelson Mandela came up with this popular phrase, “The youth of today are the leaders tomorrow,” he was hoping to encourage leaders to believe in youth. However, there are instances where African leaders have overlooked youth and appointed veteran politicians to positions meant to benefit youth. For instance, in 2018, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta sparked massive online protests when he appointed the then 91-year-old former vice president Moody Awori as a member of the country’s Sports, Art and Social Development Board. In response, the President argued that the appointment was justified “due to a dwindling trust in youth whom the president linked to rampant corruption in different sectors of Kenya’s economy” (Obura, 2018, para. 2) Similar events have been observed in other African countries. Researchers have looked at how South Africa’s large and persistent socio-economic disparities have led to several social protests (Alexander, 2013; Bosch & Mutsvairo, 2017; Al Jazeera, 2021). Protests such as Fees Must Fall led by students from the University of Cape Town that started in October 2015 and widely spread on Twitter, later grew into social movements for the abolition of institutional racism and the culture of racial exclusion on campus, decolonization of the country’s university curriculum and the transformation of the university faculty to ensure diversity and inclusivity. Most of these online movements are carried out on cellphone social media and texting apps. Other campaigns such as the Age Reduction Bill popularly symbolized by the hashtag #NotTooYoungToRun that began in May 2016, led by young Nigerians, and sponsored by Tony Nwulu in the House of Representatives and Abdul Aziz Nyako in the Senate in Nigeria, have been prefigured for bringing change in political representation in Nigeria. This movement was popular on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. With the mobility and

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convenience provided by access of these platforms on cellphones, Nigerian youth were able to eventually force a change of the repressive law that denied them a chance to run for political office. Social movements have been heralded for giving a voice to marginalized women in communities too. For centuries, patriarchal societies have marginalized women and denied them equal socio-economic rights and opportunities to engage in personal development endeavors such as access to education and equal employment. Women empowerment movements have become a global topic of discussion that has stood up against some of these patriarchal roadblocks. With the trigger being lack of equal rights amongst all genders, cell phones and social media are playing an important role in developing meaningful social movements that have forced regimes to reform and give women a voice. For instance, Khoja-Moolji (2015) looked at the emergence of publics on the African continent that engage in liberal feminism that uses salvation narratives characterized by hash tagging aimed at women emancipation from repressive cultures. Movements like #BringBackOurGirls forced the Nigerian government to act to recover girls who had been abducted by the Boko Haram terrorist group in 2014. When Dr. Stella Nyanzi, a renowned Ugandan feminist was arrested for publishing a poem that described the country’s president, Yoweri Museveni, as “a pair of buttocks,” she was charged by the government for cyber harassment and offensive communication which is a violation of the country’s Computers Misuse Act. While in jail, she managed to publish 45 poems on unemployment, bad governance, corruption and oppression. A hashtag #PushForNyanzi was created by Ugandan women feminists and magnified by social media to challenge the unjust social and legal systems in Uganda. These three hashtags – #NotTooYoungToRun, #BringBackOurGirls and #PushForNyanzi – are good examples of how social media are being used in Africa and beyond as a tool to fight against oppression and to promote the sustainable social economic empowerment of the underprivileged groups in society.

Cell phones and resource mobilization Cell phones are playing a huge role in material resource mobilization and dissemination as well as acting as a social networking tool that connects activists, non-profit organizations and social movement participants. Sharing of information and financial resources are among the utilities that cell phones provide that are being exploited because of their ability to easily reach out to the masses and pass messages across with minimal effort using platforms such as text messages, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp and mobile money services. Critics of digital activists have argued that it is characterized by the “feel-good back patting” where participants simply sit back and watch, like or comment on the issue at hand without any tangible action such as protests, rallies and boycotts (Knibbs, 2013). However, Glenn (2015) argues that digital activism is a force for social change, as demonstrated by events such as the Arab Spring

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that took place in Tunisia, Egypt and Sudan, spearheaded by citizens in despair and aided greatly by social media that ultimately led to regime change. Besides enabling communication and organizing via social media and chat apps, cell phones play a pivotal role as a means of disseminating financial resources to organizers. Mobile money services such as M-pesa (M stands for mobile and pesa means money in Swahili) in Kenya which operate on phones are the easiest way of making logistical payments and financial contributions towards most successful social movements. Non-governmental and community financial contributions using mobile money play an immense role in making resources available to fund the operations of many social movements (Matanji, 2019; Mbiti & Weil, 2015; Mutsune, 2014; Wolf, 2017). Another example of how cellphones are contributing to the success of social movements is illustrated by Chiumbu (2012) who argues that South Africans use cell phones functionally as tools for building collective identities and social capital. She looks at the case of the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign where South Africans in Cape Town used free open software called FrontlineSMS to disseminate and collect information via text messages (SMS). The campaign, which emerged in 2001, sought to demonstrate against lack of or poor service delivery, especially housing in urban Western Cape. According to Chiumbu, this amplification of social movements by cell phones has strengthened traditional ways of mass mobilization and given new meaning to the use of cell phones. Another way that cell phones have aided social movements in Africa is by recruiting members to such movements. This is often done through participants taking pictures and videos and posting them online to encourage other participants to join their cause. In addition to cellphones acting as tools for storing image records of events, sharing these materials on social media is an effective way of popularizing social movements and encouraging people to participate in them. Tifentale (2015) calls cellphones networked cameras, in her journal article titled the “Art of the Masses: From Kodak Brownie to Instagram,” because cell phones that are equipped with cameras have given rise to a culture of picture-taking and online-sharing and viewing that has led to the “de-professionalization of photojournalism” (Alper, 2014). As a result, pretty much anyone in Africa can engage in visionary information sharing and entice people to take part in their social movements.

Digital media as tools to fight Africa’s negative collective representation Social media and chat apps provide a platform for users to tell their stories without the worry of it being filtered by media gatekeepers. This social media affordance has led to accusations of its contributions to the proliferation of virtual and real-world hate speech, fake news, propaganda (Pate & Ibrahim, 2020) and trolling. Still, we cannot rule out the fact that cellphones have also enhanced the sharing of factual and benevolent information.

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One way that social media has enhanced social movements is through the use of playful engagements and sarcastic tweets aimed at correcting stereotypes. To express their displeasure with poor foreign media coverage of Africa by Western media houses or to correct the same or show their Pan Africanism, Africans throughout the continent (e.g., Kenyans on Twitter, #KOT) have proven effective at responding to such coverage through humorous tweets united by hashtags like #SomeoneTellCNN. Platforms like Twitter and Facebook have afforded them this kind of powerful online engagement. They have been adopted by journalists, politicians, human rights activists, celebrities, and the public as microblogging services to connect, inform, persuade, and entertain others. Moreover, Twitter and Facebook are used in Africa to address social, cultural, and political issues as well as everyday life occurrences that shape the wellbeing of people on the continent. Playful hashtags such as #SomeoneTellCNN, #TheAfricatheMediaNeverShowsyou and #IfAfricaWasABar are examples of hashtags that employed sarcasm to disseminate their intended messages. The hashtag #SomeoneTellCNN was first used by Kenyans to express their displeasure at the way CNN covered news of Al Shabaab’s – a Somalia based terrorist group –grenade attack in Nairobi in 2012 where CNN reportage created the impression that the violence was all over Kenya. The hashtag reemerged again in 2013 during Kenya’s presidential election when CNN aired false reports of militias preparing for violence in the Rift Valley region (Tully & Ekdale, 2014; Dewey, 2013). The climax of the hashtag was two days before the arrival of former US President Barack Obama to Kenya in 2015 when CNN wrote a story headlined: “Security Fears as Obama Heads to Terror Hotbed.” To challenge this negative portrayal of their country, Kenyans on Twitter mounted revenge “attacks” (twars) on CNN (Nothias & Cheruiyot, 2019) with tweets like these: #SomeoneTellCNN that the last time a Kenyan made a bed hot in Hawaii, it produced a @POTUS ~ @kenyaenews @JulieGichuru (Stephen Yiembe @Stephen_yiembe Jul 23, 2015) Dear @CNN if u cannot make proper research on African countries; please spare us ur ignorance #SomeoneTellCNN @camanpour @BeckyCNN @ErrolCNN (Lizz Ntonjira-Mutuma @lizzientonjira Jul 23, 2015) This online campaign forced the journalist who filed the story and the CNN to apologize for misrepresenting the country. CNN management reinforced this message by sending representatives to Kenya to mend fences with the country. #IfAfricaWasABar is another online movement that utilized the affordability of Twitter hashtags and playful engagement as a gatekeeping tool. This hashtag highlighted most of the stereotypes that have been propagated by Western media in mis-portraying Africa only as a continent of poverty, ethnic wars, and disease. In contrast to Western media portrayals, most of the tweets considered

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here focused on the following four statements: “Africa is not a country; Africa is a continent made up of 56 countries. Africans do not all look alike. Africa is not defined by poverty. I don’t speak “African” because African is not a language” (Ekpe, 2017). A few of the tweets utilized by the #IfAfricaWasABar hashtag (Cheruiyot & Uppal, 2019) included: #IfAfricaWasABar it would have 54 branches, but Westerners (esp Americans) would think there was ONE bar Africa. (M.Mubarak @somalianalyst·Jul 27, 2015) #IfAfricaWasABar a European would wander in one day then say he owns the bar because he ‘discovered’ it. (Africa Ukoh @Pensage·Jul 27, 2015) In conclusion, cell phones have strengthened social movements as both online and offline movements that are serving as the African voice. In this epoch where both digital natives and digital immigrants are making use of cellphones to promote youth and women’s empowerment and liberation by using hashtags such as #NotTooYoungToRun, #BringBackOurGirls and #PushForNyanzi. By giving youth and women a greater voice in society, there is hope that these digital media promoted social movements could help to emancipate Africa’s underprivileged communities. Cell phones are also playing vital roles in mobilizing resource for Africa’s social movements. Services such as Mpesa (mobile money), which is widely used in many East African countries, are vital in many social movements’ financial mobilization even though internet censorship has become a worrisome issue in Africa (Bosch & Mutsvairo, 2017). However, free cross-platform messaging apps such as WhatsApp and mass texting have been used by social movements in repressive countries to navigate various internet restrictions. These platforms have enabled social movement participants to mobilize and communicate even when mainstream media have been captured by the state. Wasserman and Madrid-Morales (2019) posited that Africans are known for communicating using satire, parody, and jokes to provide political criticism. This can be observed on social media too when conveying their criticism of Western media’s representation of the African continent. With the affordability provided by cell phones and social media, they form an online movement that has been active in championing for fair representation of the continent.

References Al Jazeera. (2021, July 13). Violent protests deal body blow to South Africa’s economy. Retrieved on July 29, 2021 from: Violent protests deal body blow to South Africa’s economy | Business and Economy News | Al Jazeera Alexander, P. (2013). Marikana, turning point in South African history. Review of African Political Economy, 40(138), 605–619.

280  Frankline Matanji and Tanja Bosch Alper, M. (2014). War on Instagram: Framing conflict photojournalism with mobile photography apps. New Media & Society, 16(8), 1233–1248. Bosch, T., & Mutsvairo, B. (2017). Pictures, protests and politics: Mapping Twitter images during South Africa’s fees must fall campaign. African Journalism Studies, 38(2), 71–89. Breuer, A., Landman, T., & Farquhar, D. (2015). Social media and protest mobilization: Evidence from the tunisian revolution. Democratization, 22(4), 764–792. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13510347.2014.885505 Cheruiyot, D., & Uppal, C. (2019). Pan-Africanism as a laughing matter: (Funny) expressions of African identity on Twitter. Journal of African Media Studies, 11(2), 257–274. Chiumbu, S. (2012). Exploring mobile phone practices in social movements in South Africa: The Western Cape anti-eviction campaign. African Identities, 10(2), 193–206. doi:10.1080/14725843.2012.657863 Christiansen, J. (2009). Four stages of social movements. EBSCO Research Starters, 1248. Dahir, A. L. (2017, December 15). Ethiopia has blocked social media sites as new Oromo protests hit the country. Retrieved on April 13, 2020 from: https://qz.com/ africa/1157890/oromo-protests-ethiopia-has-blocked-social-media-sites-facebooktwitter-and-youtube/ Dewey, C. (2013). Kenyans mock foreign media coverage on twitter (posted 2013-03-04 18:37:11). The Washington Post Ekpe, B. N. (2017). Social Media: Towards the Realization of A Global Stance for the African Voice. Journal of Pan African Studies, 10(10), 109–121. Glenn, C. L. (2015). Activism or “Slacktivism?”: Digital media and organizing for social change. Communication Teacher, 29(2), 81–85. Khoja-Moolji, S. (2015). Becoming an “intimate publics”: Exploring the affective intensities of hashtag feminism. Feminist media studies, 15(2), 347–350. Knibbs, K. (2013, May 15). Slactivists, unite! Social media campaigns aren’t just feel-good back patting. Retrieved from https://www.digitaltrends.com/web/ slacktivists-unite-social-media-campaigns-arent-just-feel-good-back-patting/ Matanji, F. (2019). WhatsApp and mobile money: Ameliorating crowdfunding for social change in Kenya. Asia Pacific Media Educator, 29(2), 237–248. doi:10.1177/ 1326365X19894780 Mbiti, I., & Weil, D. N. (2015). Mobile banking: The impact of M-Pesa in Kenya. In African Successes, Volume III: Modernization and Development (pp. 247–293). University of Chicago Press. McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. American journal of sociology, 82(6), 1212–1241. Morozov, E. (2009). The brave new world of slacktivism. Foreign policy, 19(05). Mutsune, T. (2014, January). No Kenyan left behind: The case of financial inclusion through mobile banking. In Global Conference on Business & Finance Proceedings (Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 472). Institute for Business & Finance Research. Nothias, T., & Cheruiyot, D. (2019). A “hotbed” of digital empowerment? Media criticism in Kenya between playful engagement and co-option. International Journal of Communication, 13, 24. Obura, F. (2018, December 6th). Uhuru explains appointment of ex-VP Moody Awori to sports board. Retrieved in April 2020 from: https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/ 2001305284/uhuru-explains-appointment-of-ex-vp-moody-awori-to-sports-board Pate, U. A., & Ibrahim, A. M. (2020). Fake News, Hate Speech and Nigeria’s Struggle for Democratic Consolidation: A Conceptual Review. In Handbook of research on politics in the computer age (pp. 89–112). IGI Global.

Cell phones and social movements  281 Saunders, C., & Roth, S. (2019). NGOs and social movement theory. Routledge Handbook of NGOs and International Relations. Abingdon: Routledge. Wolf, C. (2017). From Harambee to modern crowdfunding: The opportunities and challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa. Developing Africa’s financial services. Bingley: Emerald Publishing, 263–77. The Economist. (2016, December 10). Mobile phones are transforming Africa. Retrieved from: https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2016/12/10/ mobile-phones-are-transforming-africa Tifentale, A. (2015). Art of the masses: from Kodak Brownie to Instagram. Networking Knowledge: Journal of the MeCCSA Postgraduate Network, 8(6). Tully, M., & Ekdale, B. (2014). Sites of playful engagement: Twitter hashtags as spaces of leisure and development in Kenya. Information Technologies & International Development, 10(3), 67. Wasserman, H., & Madrid-Morales, D. (2019). An Exploratory Study of “Fake News” and Media Trust in Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. African Journalism Studies, 40(1), 107–123.

NO: THE PROLIFERATION OF CELL PHONES HAS NOT STRENGTHENED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA

Introduction The rise of cell phones in Africa has mitigated the limitations of fixed line telephony and increased access to the mobile internet, giving rise to a wealth of academic research and literature which foregrounds the positive role of new media technologies for democracy. But, it is problematic to argue that the proliferation of cell phones has strengthened social movements in Africa. The essay provides a response to claims that widespread access to cell phones has resulted in increased engagement in social activism and a strengthening of social movements on the continent. Instead, it makes the case that the proliferation of cell phones has in fact not strengthened social movements in Africa, and that the focus on digital technologies is simply a distraction in line with the old modernization paradigm, which focused on technological development as a means to social progress. Much of the literature on the significance of cell phones in Africa has been embedded within the modernization and leapfrogging paradigm “that equates use of technology with economic growth and development” (Chiumbu, 2012, 193). This modernization perspective holds the view that the widespread penetration of cell phones in Africa has contributed to the deepening of democracy, by expanding possibilities for participation in the public sphere. It is certainly true that in some African contexts, cell phones have been used, albeit in limited ways, for democratic activism. However, in settings characterized by conflict and inequality, as is often the case on the continent, cell phones do not necessarily play a key role in activism or strengthening social movements. The hash tagged activism of campaigns

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such as #RhodesMustFall or #FeesMustFall in South Africa, for example, were driven by a digital elite, who had access to smartphones and data. As I have argued previously, social media, Twitter in particular, was used by students to coordinate and drive offline activism, as well as to draw attention to the movement, particularly by the mainstream media, as discussed flater (Bosch, 2017). The rise of global social movements in the 1990s, to protest neo-liberalism, have used the internet and cell phones to share information and coordinate offline action, but the extent of this has been limited in the African context. Moreover, we should also keep in mind that mobile phones “are not socially neutral tools, but rather can entrench or exacerbate unequal gendered or classed power relations” (Wasserman, 2011, 149). Offline inequalities are easily exacerbated in online contexts; and sometimes hierarchical leadership structures in social movements can be replicated in online spaces. In other words, the presence of cell phones does not necessarily lead to a strengthening of these or any other social movements. Moreover, there is a tendency “for women, rural dwellers, and poor people to use cell phones at lower rates than men, urbanites and those who, relatively speaking, are economically wealthy” (Bratton, 2013, 310). Social mobilization and strengthening of social movements is often dependent on factors other than technology, though the latter could be a useful tool. Social movements with poor organization or diffused leadership, will not benefit from technologies such as cell phones; the primary factors impacting the success of social movements is tied to harnessing collaborative approaches to change, articulating clear values and building networks of ideological continuity. While digital media are increasingly becoming vehicles for social mobilization, protest and “sites of resistance” around the world, this chapter argues that the proliferation of cell phones has not strengthened social movements in Africa. The main challenges to considering cell phones as a key catalyst in the growth and development of social movements, is the fact that while cell phone penetration has increased dramatically in Africa in recent years, the majority of mobile users do not have smart phones; and for those who do, the costs of mobile data is often prohibitively expensive. It is primarily smart phones and their access to the internet and social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter which have been raised as key in the success of social protest and campaigns. In addition, while there does tend to be “a consistent affinity between the spread of cell phone technology and growth in important dimensions of civic activism,” research has shown that the primary use of cell phones in Africa is for voice-calling, followed by text-messaging (Bratton, 2013, 313). Use of cell phones is often passive with people sending “please call me” text messages when they have run out of airtime; and users often having limited access to these devices because they are shared within communities. In addition, even in countries like South Africa, which has one of the highest penetration rates of cell phones on the continent, call and data costs

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remain prohibitively high, handsets often remain too expensive and people often share devices (Wasserman, 2011). “High penetration of mobile phones into the market should not automatically be taken as an indication of high usage of phones or as having an unqualified positive effect on the social lives of Africans” (Wasserman, 2011, 149). Some research has shown that people spend disproportionate amounts of money on cell phone data compared to essentials such as food, with women and children most affected by this trend, and as Wasserman (2011) further argues, “These findings mitigate the euphoric notions of mobility, independence, and individuality often characterizing discourses around mobile phones in Africa” (149). The recent Fees Must Fall student protests in South Africa highlighted the role of mobile technologies, the internet and mobile phones for social activism. However, as I have previously argued (Bosch, 2017), the use of mobiles to access Twitter was primarily to organize offline political action; and as I have later shown (Bosch, 2020), social media formed part of a broader media ecology, with much of the internal communication within the movement using other more mainstream technologies, and social media apps like Twitter mostly seen to play the role of broadcasting the news of activist events, rather than to facilitate discussion or debate. Without cell phones the student protests would still have taken place, albeit in a different perhaps less mediated format. Moreover, long before the scholarship on the Arab Spring highlighted the role of so-called Facebook revolutions and Twitter uprisings, there had been social protest across Africa for over a decade, and these movements and protest coalitions build on “earlier waves of political agitation” (Aidi, 2018). Cell phones in Africa have also had unintended consequences, most notably during the post-election crisis in Kenya in 2007–2008. As Goldstein and Rotich (2008) have shown, the Kenyan case “illustrates how digitally networked technologies, specifically mobile phones and the Internet, were a catalyst to both predatory behaviour such as ethnic-based mob violence and to civic behavior such as citizen journalism…” (2). SMS campaigns were used to promote violence, with cell phones making it easy and cheap to transmit messages urging people to attack other ethnic groups; and similarly in Uganda in 2007, violent acts were also organized via SMS (Goldstein and Rotich, 2008). As Pierskalla and Hollenbach (2013) have further argued, the availability of cell phones in Africa “has increased organised and violent forms of collective action” (207). Similarly, as Bratton (2013) has shown, in Nigeria, groups of youth were incited by the electronic dissemination of inflammatory statements by election losers, leading to violence. While cell phones and related apps and technologies can potentially play a positive role in civic activism, these examples show that cell phones can sometimes potentially also play a far more negative role, one that inhibits democratic citizenship and the strengthening of social movements. As Christensen & Garfias (2018) argue, there is no empirical evidence to support the claim that cell phones enable protests, and some studies show that these technologies

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could even reduce collective action, even though they reduce coordination costs for demonstrators. It is certainly true that to some extent mobile phones have introduced new communicative and cultural practices in Africa, which have been used by social justice movements to coordinate actions, mobilize and create networks (Chiumbu, 2012). Chiumbu (2012) has explored how in the South African context, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction campaign has used mobiles to amplify traditional ways of mobilization; but as argued earlier, it would be too far reaching a claim to say that cell phones have strengthened social movements, given the limitations outlined thus far. Cell phones have certainly provided social movements with an additional tool for internal and external communication, but alone they have not strengthened social movements. One might go so far as to argue that even if there was not widespread penetration and access to cell phones, social movements would use traditional mobilization methods to strengthen their networks and activities. As has been previously argued (see Bosch, et al 2018), the role of nanomedia in social media activism in Africa, remains a key strategy, alongside cell phones and new media. The term nanomedia refers to a wide range of symbolic resources such as protest songs, dances, the use of printed slogans on T-shirts etc., which the authors argue played a key role in the South African context. In South Africa, Bosch et al (2018) argue, social movements and low resourced community based organizations rely primarily on traditional offline, face-to-face mobilization and communicative methods. “Community-based groups, however, tend to have poor Internet access and limited resources, so word of mouth, going door-to-door, and walking among houses with a loud-hailer to call people to meetings is much more common” (Bosch, et al 2018, 2157). While the growth of the mobile internet and the widespread proliferation of cell phones across the continent is a defining feature of the contemporary African media landscape; this chapter has argued that due to a number of challenges and potential unintended consequences, increased cell phone penetration has not been the primary factor in strengthening social movements in Africa. Protests in Africa are ongoing, and a strong culture of social movement activism drives these protests, whether they be for constitutional reform, political or economic grievances. New media technologies and cell phones are useful tools in these campaigns, but the growth and strength of this activism and social movement networking across the continent, cannot be attributed primarily to these devices. The structural conditions in most African countries, as elsewhere in the world, necessitates the formation and growth of social movements, with or without cell phones.

Note 1. https://www.gsma.com/mobileeconomy/sub-saharan-africa/

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References Aidi, H. (2018). Africa’s new social movements: A continental approach. Policy Centre for the New South, Policy Brief. Available at https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/ africa%E2%80%99s-new-social-movements-continental-approach. Accesed 4 July 2020. Bosch, T. (2017). Twitter activism and youth in South Africa: The case of #RhodesMustFall. Information, Communication & Society, 20(2), 221–232. Bosch, T. (2020). Social media and everyday life in South Africa. Routledge. Bosch, T., Wasserman, H., & Chuma, W. (2018). South African activists’ use of nanomedia and digital media in democratization conflicts. International Journal of Communication, 12, 2153–2170. Bratton, M. (2013). Briefing: Citizens and cell phones in Africa. African Affairs, 112(447), 304–319. Chiumbu, S. (2012). Exploring mobile phone practices in social movements in South Africa – the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign. African Identities, 10(2), 193–206. Christensen, D. & Garfias, F. (2018). Can you hear me now? How communication technology affects protest and repression. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 31(1): 89–117. Goldstein, J., & Rotich, J. (2008). Digitally networked technology in Kenya’s 2007–2008 post-election crisis. Berkman Center Research Publication, 9, 1–10. Pierskalla, J. H., & Hollenbach, F. M. (2013). Technology and collective action: The effect of cell phone coverage on political violence in Africa. American Political Science Review, 107(2), 207–224. Wasserman, H. (2011). Mobile phones and everyday African democracy: Transmissions and transgressions. Popular Communication, 9(2): 146–158.

Index

abolition of slavery, 27 Addis Ababa, 117 Adichie, Chimanda Ngozi, 2 African agency, 12 African bourgeois, 45 African culture, 49 African Development Bank, 77 African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN), 175 African state, 21, 60 African Union (AU), 254 African universities, 183 Africa Rising, 67–79 AFRICOM, 253 Afrikaans, 30 Afrobarometer, 225 Afrocentric scholars, 47, 48 Afro-pessimism, 35 agglomeration diseconomies, 109 agglomeration economies, 109, 115 aggregation, 3 agriculture, 81, 88, 90 agro-fuels, 84 alfalfa, 91 Algeria, 29, 60 Algerian National Liberation Front, 29 Al Queda, 227 Al Shabab, 227, 257 Americas, The, 12 Angola, 14, 18, 20, 21, 30, 60, 103, 131, 239, 245 Annan, Kofi, 154 Apartheid, 4 Arab Spring, 113 archeology, 19 Arusha, 174 Ashanti, 246 Asian Miracle, 99 assimilation, 60

Atlantic economy, 13 Atlantic markets, 16 Atlantic slave trade, 26, 27, 39, 41 Atlantic trade, 17 Axum Empire, 24 Bamako, 165, 257 Banda, Joyce, 262 Bandung Conference, 98 Beijing Consensus, 98 Belgian, 57 Belgian colonialists, 28 Belgium, 47, 250 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 105 Benin, 11, 18, 41, 240 Berlin Conference, 24, 28, 47, 54 Berlin Wall, 237 Biafra, 58, 61 biodiversity conservation, 123–136 biofuel, 91 Blaut, James, 54 Boko Haram, 227, 257 borders, 5, 53–64 boreholes, 50 Borlaug, Norman, 153 Borno, 13 Botswana, 1, 54, 132, 212, 240 boy child, 196–209 Brazil, 22 Brazzaville Group, 56 BRICS, 76 Britain, 47 British, 44 British forces, 24 Burundi, 28, 57, 173 Cairo, 1, 13, 14 CAMPFIRE program, 127, 132 Cameroon, 29, 220, 239, 245

Index 287 Cape Town, 155, 165 Cape Verde, 14, 30, 238, 240 Capitalismo, 42 Caribbean, 22 Casablanca, 56 Cash crops, 47, 48 cell phones, 6, 273–286 Central Africa, 21, 131 Central African Republic, 239, 262 Chad, 226 charismatic megafauna, 123 China, 5, 67, 76, 78, 96–108, 253–254 China-Africa relations, 96–108 China Development Model, 99 China’s Great Famine, 96 Chinese porcelain, 14 Christianity, 50, 187, 226 Christian missionaries, 49 cities, 109–119, 166–167 Cities Alliance, 116 civil society, 83, 88 civil society organization, 74 clean water, 50 climate change, 5, 89, 123, 137–150 climate change adaptation, 137–150 cocoa, 104 Cold War, 251 colonialism, 23, 25, 27, 38–52, 187 commodity, 75–76 community-based natural resources management (CBNRM), 124 Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), 154 conflict, 23–37 conflict resolution, 2 Congo-Brazzaville, 224 consensus, 26 conservation, 123–136 copper, 48, 54, 97, 104 corruption, 50, 62, 214 Côte d’Ivoire, 54, 62 Cotonou, 41 COVID-19, 2018, 238 council of elders, 26 currency, 13 Dar es Salaam, 165 debt, 75 debt burden, 75 democracy, 70, 78 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 50, 57, 131, 173, 224

Deng, Xiaoping, 99 Dependence, 107 depopulation, 24 desert, 17 development, 47, 222–234 developmental state, 99 development plans, 62 diamonds, 48, 54 diaspora, 4 diffusion of innovation, 112 digital technology, 71 Diop, Cheikh Anta, 39, 43 Diop-Maes, Louise Marie, 39 Disease, 210–221 displacement, 123 divide-and-rule policy, 28 Dos Santos, Jose Eduardo, 245 Djibouti, 58, 106, 252 Dutch, 24 East Africa, 35, 82 ecological fallacy, 3 economic activity (primary, secondary, tertiary, quaternary), 68 economic decline, 16 economic development, 19, 109–117 economic diversification, 68, 76 economic exploitation, 25 economic geography, 54 economic growth, 40, 41, 49, 68, 74 economic transformation, 17, 43, 69, 74, 96–108 education, 6, 69, 70, 77, 179–195 electricity, 100 English language, 181 elites, 11, 21 employment, 111 energy, 100 enslavement, 11–22, 41 entrepreneurship, 16 epidemiologic transition, 214 eSwatini/Swaziland, 212, 239 Ethiopia, 29, 35, 47, 58, 60, 62, 90–91, 96, 101, 104–106, 117, 153, 213, 241, 246 Ethiopian famine, 156 ethnic territories, 54 Eritrea, 29, 239 Europe, 76 European languages, 50 European sailors, 17 Euopean settlers, 42

288  Index Fage, John, 18 failed states, 63 Fakim, Ameenah Gurib, 262 farmers, 71, 93 farming techniques, 48 female/girls empowerment, 196–209 female parliamentarians, 6 fertilizer, 89 fish, 104 fishing and fisheries, 90 flexible hegemony, 104 food crops, 84 food insecurity, 151–163, 164–176 food security, 6, 92, 151–163, 164–176 food system, 88 forced labor, 43 foreign assistance, 97 foreign investment, 69, 72, 88, 104 foreign land acquisition, 80–95 foreign military presence, 6, 250–260 forestry, 90, 127 France, 5, 29, 47, 250, 253 French, 44 French colonial forces, 24 French colonial rule, 41 French West Africa, 40, 61, 256 Gabon, 224 Gaborone, 1, 165 gang labor system of slavery, 12 garment workers, 106 gateway cities, 112 genetically modified seeds, 159 generalization, 3 genocide, 57 geographic scale, 3 geography, 54 Germany, 47, 250 Ghana, 57, 62, 100, 127, 128, 162, 212, 220, 226, 238, 240 Ghana Empire, 24 girl child, 6, 196–209 global economic system, 47 global food crisis, 91 globalization, 13 gold, 15, 27, 48 Gold Coast, 18 gorillas, 118 governance, 6, 69–71, 74, 77, 237–249, 261–272 Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, 117 Great Lakes region, 35 Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, 131

Green Revolution, 88, 97, 151–163 ground water, 85 Guinea, 131 Guinea Bissau, 30, 60 habitat loss, 124 Hassan, Samia Suluhu, 262 Hausa, 58 health, 74, 89 healthcare, 50, 77, 189, 210–221 HIV/AIDS, 6, 133, 210–221 Horn of Africa, 257 hospitals, 50 humanitarian aid, 61 hunger, 151–163, 164–176 Hutu, 28, 57 hyperinflation, 69 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 77 Igbo, 58 indigenous knowledge, 123, 138, 141–144 immigration policies, 43 imperialism, 42, 45 indentured workers, 42 India, 253 Indian Ocean, 13, 14, industrialization, 104, 107 Industrial Revolution, 20 industry, 13 inflation, 15 informality, 116 infrastructure, 44, 84, 104, 106, 109 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 137 inter-ethnic conflicts, 48 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 92 International Labor Organization (ILO), 116 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 103 internet communication technology (ICT), 71 invasive species, 124 Isandlwana, 60 Islam, 227 Islamic State (ISIS), 227 Italian, 44 Italy, 47, 250, 253 iron, 19 Islamic Africa, 18 ivory, 27 Japan, 253

Index 289 Kagame, Paul, 242 Kampala, 111 Karanga Empire, 24 Kenya, 29, 30, 58, 61, 70, 92, 173, 182, 196–209, 214, 238, 244, 252, 262–267, 275, 283 Kerry, John, 51 Kigali, 117 King Leopold of Belgium, 54 Kikuyu, 29, 205 Kongo, Kingdom of, 11, 13–15, 18–19, 21 Kumasi, 111 labor markets, 69 Lal, Rattan, 89 Landesa, 92 land grab, 80–95 land locked, 54 Land Matrix Initiative, 83, 90, 93 Land rights, 90, 92 land titles, 81, 92 law, 191 leaseholds, 84 Lesotho, 212 Liberia, 47, 246 life expectancy, 50 Lion King, 129 livelihood mobility, 55 Lisbon, 17 Loanga, 19 local knowledge, 18 Lord’s Resistance Army, 227 Luanda, 14, 15, Luhya, 29 Luo, 29 Madagascar, 126 maize (corn), 91 malaria, 50, 101 Malawi, 151, 155–157, 244, 262 Mali, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 54, 224, 252 Mali Empire, 14, 24 Manning, Patrick, 43 Mansa Musa, 13, 14 Manufacturing, 75–76, 104, 116 Mao, Zedong, 99 maquis, 7 Mauritius, 100, 238, 240, 262 medicine, 189 metal production, 19 middle class, 49, 72, 77 migrants, 111 militarism, 35

military, 34 mineral resources, 98 Mohammed, Askia, 14 Moi, Daniel Arap, 199, 244 monocropping, 91 monoculture, 159 mortality rates, 50 Mozambique, 14, 30, 60, 90, 131, 133 Mpesa, 275 Mugabe, Robert, 224 multi-party democracy, 6, 237–249 multi-party elections, 49 Museveni, Yoweri, 245 nationalism, 58 nation-building, 62 natural resources, 75, 98 nature, 123–136 Namibia, 131, 240 Nairobi, 111 Ncube, Mthuli, 77 network effects, 109 New Green Revolution for Africa, 5, 81, 151–163 New Urban Agenda, 169 neocolonialism, 5, 80–95 Nigeria, 28, 29, 48, 57–58, 61, 100–101, 213, 226, 247, 275 Nigerian civil war, 58 Niger, 224, 252 Niger River, 82 Nile River, 82 Nkrumah, Kwame, 56, 244 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 145 North Africa, 90 Nyererre, Julius, 62, 181–182 oil, 74, 78, 97, 103 oral sources, 18 organic agriculture, 89 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 56, 60, 63 Ottoman Empire, 14 palaver tree, 1 palm oil, 48 parks, 5, 123–136 park guards, 125 peace, 23–37 PEPFAR, 213 pirates, 17 plantation, 12

290  Index plantation owners, 42 platinum, 103 political accountability, 70 political participation, 49 political institutions and structures, 48, 51 population, 18, 21 population density, 21 population growth, 36, 74 Porto-Novo, 41 Portugal, 15, 17, 47, 250 Portuguese, 13–15, 19–20, 24, 27, 44 Portuguese merchants, 18 poverty, 69, 74, 76, 78, 133 preservation, 123–136 primate cities, 113 Principles for Responsible Investment, 93 private property, 81 quantitative data, 41 racism, 42 railroads, 43 religiosity, 222–234 remittances, 113 resource extraction, 68, 78, 80 reversal of fortune, 20 #RhodesMustFall, 282 roads, 48 Rockefeller Foundation, 92 Rodney, Walter, 18, 39, 47 rural bias, 164–176 rural-urban migration, 115 Rwanda, 28, 57, 118, 173, 220, 239, 241–242, 267–272 Sahara, 14 sanitation, 50, 77, 117 Sao Tome and Principe, 238 Sasakawa Global 2000, 153 Sasakawa, Ryoichi, 153 Saudi Arabia, 91 schools, 62 Scramble for Africa, 29 secessionism, 58 Seko, Mobuto Sese, 50, 224 Senegal, 18, 54, 62, 212, 240 Senegal River, 13, 82 Senegambia, 13 sesame seeds, 105 settlement system, 110 Seychelles, 238 sex ratio, 21 shebeens, 7

shell currency, 13, 15 Sierra Leone, 90, 246 Silk Road, 14 Sirlief Johnson, Ellen, 262 slums, 109 social media, 273–285 social movements, 273–285 Somalia, 29, 54, 58, 61, 246, 254 Somali-Ethiopian war, 29 Somaliland, 61 Songhay, 13, 14 Songhay Empire, 24 slave trade, 3, 5, 11–22, 38 slavery, 11–22 slums, 116 social movements, 6 soil, 85, 89 South Africa, 29, 56–57, 103, 131, 133, 212, 220, 238, 240, 277, 284 Southern Africa, 90 South-South development partnerships, 5 South Sudan, 30, 173 Soviet Union, 244 Soweto uprising, 30 Spain, 47, 250 spirituality, 6, 222–234 squatter settlements, 115 statistics, 19 storytelling, 1 structural adjustment programs (SAPs), 167–168 structural transformation, 75 subsistence agriculture, 68, 78 Sudan, 30, 91, 97, 239 sugar cane, 13 surplus value, 15 sustainability, 140 sustainable development, 68 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 88, 90, 116–117, 146, 159, 162, 172 Swahili/Kiswahili, 179, 181 Taiwan, 97, 104 Tanzania, 62, 91, 173, 182, 262 tariff barriers, 68 task system of slavery, 12 taxes, 44, 113 technology spillover, 84 tenure rights, 89 terrorism, 250–260 textiles, 19 tobacco, 97 tourism, 118

Index 291 Tigray, 245 Timbuktu, 1, 14 Tirana Declaration, 80, 82, 85 Togo, 224, 245 Touré, Samori, 24 Toxic substances, 85 trading relationships, 18 trading volume, 18 traditional practices, 26 traditional tenure, 81 transparency, 80 Trans-Saharan trade, 48 Tuareg, 14 Tunis, 113 Tunisia, 113 Tutsi, 28, 57 Uganda, 57, 92, 104, 173, 213, 239, 246 underdevelopment, 20 unemployment, 109 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 91 Unitd Kingdom, 250 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 118 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 159, 167 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 140, 145 United States (US), 5, 76, 252, 254 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 92 University of Cape Town, 275 University of Nairobi, 183 University of Zambia, 61 urban areas, 48, 109–119 urban bias, 165 urban farming, 174 urban food security, 166 urban infrastructure, 44

value chain, 91 village council, 1 violence, 23, 26, 33 Virunga National Park, 131 Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure (VGGT), 93 vulnerability, 89 Wallerstein, Immanuel, 61 warfare, 23, 33, 48 Washington Consensus, 98 Water, 117 wealth, 44 weaving, 14 West Africa, 41, 81 Westphalian nation-state system, 56 Western education, 49 wildlife, 123–136 women in politics, 6, 261–272 World Bank, 68, 92, 103, 244 World War I, 38 World War II, 38 World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 127 World Trade Organization (WTO), 244 Xenophobia, 58 Yellowstone Park, 124 Yoruba, 34, 58 youth, 71 Zambia, 54, 101 Zimbabwe, 27, 30, 97, 127–128, 131–132, 238–239 Zulu Kingdom, 24, 60 Zulu, Shaka, 60 Zwede, Sahie-Work, 262