Cyprus: Reluctant republic 9783111529882, 9783111161778

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N E A R A N D M I D D L E EAST M O N O G R A P H S

Editore D. M. Dunlop Columbia University

T. Halasi-Kun Columbia University

Associate Editor P. Oberling Hunter College The City University of New York

XI

CYPRUS RELUCTANT REPUBLIC

by

STEPHEN G. XYDIS

1973

MOUTON THE HAGUE • PARIS

© Copyright 1973 in The Netherlands. Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, The Hague. No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 72-94514

Printed in The Netherlands by Zuid Nederlandsche Drukkerij N.V., 's-Hertogenbosch

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface Introduction. On State-Building in General and the Cyprus Case in Particular A. On the Proliferation of States B. Micropolitics in the Case of Cyprus State-Building . .

9 17 17 38

PART ONE

I.

As A. B. C.

1958 Opens Cyprus Deadlock Grivas in Cyprus Greek Government Memorandum to Rountree on Cyprus

63 63 74 78

II.

A New British Probe 84 A. Prelude to Selwyn Lloyd's Athens Visit 84 B. Lloyd's Athens Talks 87 C. Postlude to Lloyd's Athens Talks: An Imposed Solution? 105 D. The Greek Government Crisis—The Caretaker Government and the Cyprus Question 107 E. The Grivas-Foot Duel 114

III.

Towards a Venture in Partnership 119 A. The New Karamanlis Government and the Cyprus Question 119 B. The Turkish Cypriot Riots 125 C. The Macmillan Plan 130 D. The Greek and British Parliamentary Debates on the Macmillan Plan 143

6

CONTENTS

E. F.

Greek Diplomatic and Other Exchanges Grivas on the Cyprus Front

153 164

IV.

Suasion at the Summit 168 A. Prelude to Macmillan's Athens Visit 168 B. The Macmillan-Karamanlis Summit Conference . . 181 C. Summit Aftermath — Macmillan's Plan Revised . . . 213

V.

A New Idea 221 A. Greek, Cypriot, and Turkish Reactions to the Revised Macmillan Plan 221 B. "Isaakios"-Grivas Friction over Greek Policy . . . . 226 C. Makarios Proposes Independence for Cyprus . . . . 234

VI.

NATO and the Cyprus Tangle A. Spaak's Visit to Athens B. "Appointed Day" in Cyprus and "Black October" . . C. To Confer or not to Confer? D. The NATO Council Negotiations for a Conference and Their Breakdown

250 250 267 270

Back to the UN: "Rays of Hope" A. Prelude to the UN Debate of Item 68 on the Cyprus Question B. The UN Contestants' Approaches to the Cyprus Question C. Third-Party Views on the Cyprus Question D. Committee Resolution-Making E. A Symbolic Turkish Victory in the Committee. . . .

293

VII.

278

293 299 303 309 328

PART TWO

VIII. Greek-Turkish Conciliation A. Resolution 1287 (XIII), Symbol of a Greek-Turkish Rapprochement B. Greek-Turkish Talks Begin at the UN (December 6, 1958). The "Paris Sketch" Follows C. EOKA's Last Truce -

337 337 342 353

CONTENTS

7

IX.

Ultra-Quiet Diplomacy A. Greek-Turkish Negotiations: The First Round . . . B. New British Assurances and Makarios' Views . . . . C. The Second Round of Greek-Turkish Negotiations . D. Toward a Third Round of Greek-Turkish Negotiations

359 359 368 372 381

X.

Greek-Turkish Summit Agreement A. The Outlook from Grivas' Vantage Point B. Hesitant Agreement for a Summit Conference . . . . C. Informing Etnarch Makarios About the Greek-Turkish Negotiations D. The Greek-Turkish Summit Meeting at Zürich . . .

386 386 388

XI.

XII.

Concord in London A. Makarios' Views on the Zürich Agreements B. Grivas' Reaction to the News of Zürich C. The London Cyprus Conference — Its First Plenary Meeting D. Karamanlis-Makarios Confrontation in London . . . E. The Second Plenary Meeting of the London Cyprus Conference F. The Last Plenary Meeting of the London Cyprus Conference A New State Is Born A. Greek and Turkish Parliamentary Debates on the Zürich and London Agreements B. Grivas Reluctantly Approves the Cyprus Settlement. . C. The House of Commons Approves the Cyprus Agreements D. Implementing the Zürich and London Agreements. . . 1. The Work of the Joint Committee 2. The Work of the Transitional Committee 3. Drafting the Cyprus Constitution E. Cyprus Becomes a UN Member and Joins the Commonwealth

401 406 420 420 423 427 437 439 454 461 461 466 474 477 478 482 483 514

Appendix: Secret Treaty between Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece for the Application of the Treaty of Alliance of August 16,1960. . 521 Bibliography

537

Index

541

PREFACE

Cyprus: Reluctant Republic is a case study which may contribute to an understanding of the macropolitical process of proliferation of states which has been going on incessantly but unevenly during the last two hundred years of international politics. However, it is mainly a micropolitical study of state-building and constitution-making, of conflict and conciliation. If the term "conciliation" (perhaps it should have been placed within quotation marks for more reasons than one) was included in the title of the author's previous Cyprus book, 1 this was because the Greek government's five successive recourses to "parliamentary diplomacy" between 1954-1958 resulted in a minimum of conciliation— on paper. For the representatives of Greece, Britain, and Turkey, all primarily interested parties in the Cyprus question, saw fit to cast their afiirmative votes in favor of the one procedural and the two colorless resolutions the U N General Assembly adopted in 1954, 1957, and 1958, respectively, in its overtly collective efforts to deal with the Cyprus question. Indeed, the last of these resolutions was intimately linked to the extra-UN negotiations that began the very next day after its adoption and led to substantive as against paper or procedural conciliation — the main topic of this new political, not historical study based on the Cyprus question between 1958-1960. The new book begins with the events that followed the inconclusive debate and consideration of the Cyprus question by the twelfth General Assembly in December 1957. It describes at length the British probes and plans concerning the Cyprus question which occurred in 1958 and, to a 1

S. G. Xydis, Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1967) (cited hereafter as Conflict and Conciliation). According to one reviewer, this "stout tome" is "misleadingly titled" (W. H. McNeill, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 378 [July 1968], p. 162). O. Iatrides, in his review of this book, registers a similar complaint, Balkan Studies 9 ii (1968), p. 507.

10

PREFACE

lesser extent, the Committee debate and resolution-making at the Assembly's thirteenth session. It covers, too, NATO's interesting though abortive conciliatory efforts to prepare the ground for a new Cyprus conference. Furthermore, it deals in depth with those ultra-secret GreekTurkish negotiations that culminated in the Zürich agreements as well as with the Cyprus Conference of 1959 in London. Finally, Cyprus: Reluctant Republic goes beyond the date of the Zürich and London agreements, both of February 1959. For it recounts the international transactions that were conducted in order to implement these agreements and closes only with the establishment on August 16, 1960, of the new state of Cyprus and its subsequent admission into the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the Commonwealth. As is well known, conciliation and state-building were part of the same process. They were the outcome of a three-sided international conflict which included not merely "parliamentary" and conventional diplomacy and negotiation but also unconventional warfare between a small organized group of Greek Cypriots against the British colonial authorities who sought to suppress the freedom fighters. Also resorting to force, not, however, against the colonial power, but against the Greek Cypriots generally, was an organized group of Turkish Cypriots. Thus, in 1958, the year that ended with a beginning of conciliation, March witnessed renewed sabotage on the part of the Greek Cypriot EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) against British targets; June, attacks by Turkish Cypriots on Greek Cypriots and their lives and property, with Greek Cypriot retaliation soon following; and October a major campaign of force by EOKA, against the British authorities on the island. Constitution-making, on the other hand, was the outcome of conciliation and state-building. It aimed at establishing an elaborate political framework for ensuring harmonious cooperation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot elements or communities on the island in the sovereign state of Cyprus which the British, Greek, and Turkish governments, as well as representatives of the two Cypriot communities, had agreed to establish. Cyprus, as is well known, is still a sovereign state. Its Constitution, however, has broken down because of conflict mainly between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot elements on the island. Conflict in constitution-making foreshadowed this breakdown which, in turn, cannot be understood without reference to the island's pre-independence period, particularly during 1958, when the conflict between the two Cypriot elements escalated into violence, a phenomenon almost without precedent

PREFACE

11

during the entire period of British administration and colonial rule over the island since 1878, though latently the potentialities of such an extreme form of conflict had never been altogether absent. As in the case of the author's previous Cyprus book, because the study is based mostly on primary and hitherto unpublished documentation from the personal papers of Mr. Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, Foreign Minister of Greece almost uninterruptedly between 1956-1963, the picture of developments inevitably is seen mainly through the eyes of the "External Decision-Maker" of Greece, somewhat along lines of an F. Scott Fitzgerald novel — except that political actors may be conscious at some time or other that they might become subjects of a historical study. However, since the author's first Cyprus book was published, other Greek officials of primary importance graciously allowed the author to use some of their papers for his new book, and high officials of the government of Cyprus were kind enough to permit the author to consult documents concerning the implementation of the Zurich and London agreements between 1959-1960. Hence, at certain junctures, developments may be viewed from other viewpoints as well. These documents from Greek sources can be classified in the following three main categories: (1) Accounts by a Greek official (or by an assistant) of his oral exchanges in face-to-face meetings with officials of another government, such as an ambassador, a Foreign Minister, a Secretary-General of an international organization or a representative of another government at an international conference. Strictly speaking, only such documents can be regarded as revelatory of the perceptions of the Greek official involved. (2) Minutes of diplomatic exchanges between Foreign Ministers or Prime Ministers, which serve both parties as records of the exchange of views. Prepared by assistants attending these meetings, the documents sum up the verbal exchanges without noting the actors' psychological reactions and without comments on these exchanges. These minutes represent a summary of the respective viewpoints of the actors. (3) Among these sources, there were copies and at times even originals of notes and aides-mémoires of other governments to the Greek government. Hence, these involved perceptions or actions not of the Greek government but of other actors in the Cyprus drama. However, as long as no access is possible to equivalent British, Turkish, or American primary unpublished sources, any God-like, Tolstoyan approach to the Cyprus story is precluded. For the time being, then, the author had to be content with presenting the story as a limited number of

12

PREFACE

participants perceived and presented it. Since the Turkish government by 1958 started to play a dominant role in the Cyprus drama, the lack of access to Turkish archival materials is to be regretted to a greater extent than it was when treating the earlier phases of the Cyprus question, during which the Greek government played a protagonist's role, because it had been the first to raise the Cyprus question on the international level. As one of the reviewers, however, wrote about the author's previous Cyprus book, it is to be hoped that somewhat similar studies will eventually be published, presenting the Turkish and the British sides to the dispute, as well as the American views about it, 2 not to mention the Soviet views. From the synthesis of such accounts, a definitive narrative could then be constructed. In the preface to his earlier Cyprus book, the author explained that the remarks about the psychological reactions of some of the Greek Foreign Minister's conversation partners were no "romanticizations" invented by the author to make for lively reading, but where faithfully taken from the minutes the Foreign Minister himself kept of these conversations.3 This warning, it was thought, would also cover certain observations by other officials which are found in some of the other documents used in the preparation of that book, observations that could not have been made by the author since he was not present at these exchanges and took no part in them or in the Assembly sessions. But the author evidently was mistaken in his assumption. Certain reviews of the book have revealed that a communications failure occurred. One reviewer ascribed to the author sarcastic remarks about certain participants in the Cyprus imbroglio whereas certain participants in that imbroglio had recorded these remarks, and the author saw fit to reproduce them, since they were indicative of personal traits emerging from the "we-they" feelings of inter-group conflict.4 Another reviewer, though recognizing the author's objectivity, remarked that here and there his nationalist bias was showing. He imputed the author with an occasional lapse into a double standard, 5 whereas what the author intended was subtly to bring out the double standard in the behavior of some of the actors themselves in this intergroup conflict. 2

Review by J. Barros, The Middle East Journal 22 (1968), pp. 360-361. Conflict and Conciliation, p. IX. Review by Roderic H. Davison, American Historical Review 74 (December 1969), p. 667. 5 Review by Francis Deak, American Journal of International Law 63 (January 1969), p. 183.

3 4

PREFACE

13

Published official documents; proceedings of British, Greek and Turkish parliamentary debates; UN materials; non-official documentary collections; memoirs, monographs, articles and newspapers constituted the other primary, secondary or tertiary sources used in preparing this new study. With regard to UN materials, the author wishes again to warn scholars that to rely merely on official summary proceedings of committee debates may in certain cases deprive them of valuable insights to be gained by perusal of the unofficial but verbatim proceedings. In the case of the committee debates on the Cyprus item in the Political Committee during the thirteenth General Assembly, the précis writers, quite naturally from their viewpoint, left out entire passages of considerable importance for understanding the rapprochement between the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers which was occurring during that debate and led to a fruitful exchange of views between the two no sooner than this debate was over. With regard to books written by actors in the Cyprus story, the author again wishes to emphasize the importance of Grivas' own memoirs as against their edition by Charles Foley.6 The Greek-language edition helps to recreate Grivas' perceptions of developments in the Cyprus dispute, regardless of the accuracy of the news he received from the radio and the press as he conducted EOKA's struggle from his various underground hideouts. On the other hand, one cannot but note with regret that the book based on Sir Pierson Dixon's diaries and papers, which his son published in 1968,7 contains absolutely no reference to Cyprus at all. Sir Pierson, Permanent Representative of Great Britain to the UN, surely had intimate knowledge of Cyprus developments both inside and outside the United Nations, even though he was not Britain's spokesman during the Cyprus debates in the General Assembly. Through his classical education and his wife, Lady Ismene Dixon, he had sentimental ties to Greece, as references to that country in other parts of this book clearly show.8 6

G. Grivas-Dighenis, Memoirs of the EOKA Struggle 1955-1959 (in Greek) (Athens, 1961) (cited hereafter as Grivas Memoirs). The Memoirs of General Grivas, C. Foley ed. (New York: Praeger, 1965). 7 The period from 1945 to 1955 is covered by Harold Macmillan's, Tides of Fortune (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), i.e. not the period 1958-1960 covered in this study. 8 Piers Dixon, Double Diploma: The Life of Sir Pierson Dixon (London: Hutchinson, 1968). Incidentally, equally remarkable is the omission of any reference in this book to the background of the "Truman Doctrine" about which Sir Pierson surely must have had most illuminating things to say, working as he was at the time very closely with Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, whose actions precipitated the whole American program of aid to Greece and Turkey which inaugurated the "Doctrine".

14

PREFACE

Harold Macmillan's fourth volume of memoirs, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959, fortunately provides us with important insights into British perceptions, motivations, and policy with regard to Cyprus during those years. Prime Minister since January 1957, Macmillan took a lively personal interest in this problem. Hence his chapter entitled "Cyprus Tangle" is particularly valuable for understanding Britain's Cyprus policy during these critical years in the island's history. In this volume he clarifies the background of his tridominium plan of 1958 and provides important information about the Turkish position on this plan and about a "gentlemen's agreement" between himself and Premier Menderes concerning that plan's implementation, though he omits the precise details of that agreement. Equally important are Macmillan's elegant ellipses and shrewd silences. He makes, for instance, no mention at all of Makarios' proposal, published on September 22, 1958, for the establishment of an independent Cyprus. All in all, Macmillan's account of Cyprus developments and manipulations, which is interlarded with excerpts from his diaries, is a tantalizing hors d'oeuvre for a future student of the Cyprus question who will have access to the relevant archives of the Foreign and Colonial Offices. Although several of the documents used in the preparation of this study refer simply to Greeks and Turks of Cyprus, the author uses the terms "Greek Cypriots" and "Turkish Cypriots" throughout the text for reasons of uniformity and clarity, to distinguish them from the Greeks and Turks of Greece and Turkey, respectively. On the other hand, "Cypriot Greek" refers to a Greek citizen of Cypriot origin. Grivas, for example, was a Cypriot Greek; Makarios, a Greek Cypriot. In official British documents, incidentally, the terms "Greek Cypriot" and "Turkish Cypriot" appeared in the paper Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus of Lord Radcliffe, presented to Parliament on December 19, 1956,9 when the British government, for the first time, officially stated that the island's partition was one of the possible future solutions of the Cyprus question. The same terms, but hyphenated, appear during the London Conference on Cyprus (February 17-19, 1959). In pre-war British documents, on the other hand, the term "Greek Orthodox" was used instead.10 This was 9 Lord Radcliffe, Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus, Cmnd. 42 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1956). 10 Disturbances in Cyprus in October 1931, Cmd. 4045 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1932). By 1954, British officials called the Greek Cypriots "Greek-speaking Cypriots" and the Turkish Cypriots "Turkish-speaking Cypriots" (GAOR, Ninth Session 477th plenary meeting, September 24,1954, p. 53).

PREFACE

15

consistent with official efforts to discourage the idea that these inhabitants of Cyprus were ethnically Greek, as they maintained they were. Man's capacity for making errors is infinite. For all these errors the author is directly or indirectly responsible either at the typescript stage or at the stage of galley-proof or page-proof reading — that is, whenever the original typescript was provided to him for checking purposes. Before closing this preface, the author wishes to express his warm thanks and deep gratitude to Dr. Dana W. Atchley, Mr. George S. Coumantaros, and the Director of Columbia University's Institute for War and Peace Studies, Professor William T. R. Fox. Their friendship, generosity and assistance made possible the trips to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus which were indispensable for the gathering of all the materials that went into the making of this book. Likewise to be thanked are those Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot high officials who were of great help in presenting the various viewpoints of the parties concerned in the complex international question which since 1963 once again became a matter of concern to the United Nations; Hunter College of the City University of New York, which provided funds to help cover typing and other expenses, as well as Professor Tibor Halasi-Kun, of Columbia University, one of the members of the editorial board of the Near and Middle East Monographs, who carefully went through the manuscript before sending it to the printer and offered several helpful suggestions for its improvement. Stephen G. Xydis Hunter College, C.U.N.Y. Summer 1971

INTRODUCTION

ON STATE-BUILDING IN GENERAL AND THE CYPRUS CASE IN PARTICULAR

Cyprus became a sovereign state in 1960 and joined the United Nations that same year. Its population is about 630,000 according to the most recent estimates, with an annual growth rate of 1.7 per cent. Its capital is Nicosia, with a population of almost 110,000 inhabitants. Its other important urban centers, all situated on the coast, are Limassol (47,000), Famagusta (39,000), Larnaca (21,000), Paphos (10,000), and Kyrenia (4,000). About 78 per cent of the population of Cyprus consists of Greek Cypriots who belong to the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Cyprus and speak Greek; 18 per cent are Turkish Cypriots who are Muslim and speak Turkish and do not constitute a majority in any administrative district of the island; the remaining 4 per cent consists of Armenians, Maronites, and other minorities. The island itself is the third largest in the Mediterranean with an area of 3,572 square miles (about half the size of New Jersey). Britain maintains two bases under British sovereignty on this island which is strategically located in the Near and Middle East and lies 44 miles south of Turkey, 60 miles west of Syria, 240 miles north of the United Arab Republic, and 260 miles southeast of Rhodes (the nearest major island of Greece).

A. ON THE PROLIFERATION OF STATES

The study of the micropolitical process through which Cyprus emerged as an independent state in the two years between 1958-1960 contributes to a better understanding of the macropolitical process of proliferation of state actors in the multistate system. For it clearly shows that one of the main factors that account for this phenomenon in the last two centuries is the interaction of already existing state actors, or of the "state subsystems" of the global system, so that it would seem that the multistate system itself, on the level of the "state subsystems", spawns new states.

18

INTRODUCTION

At times the emergence of new polities in the system is the result of formally unresolved conflict between states, as witness the two Germanies, the two Koreas, the two Vietnams, the two Chinas. At other times, as the Cyprus case clearly reveals, the emergence of a new polity may be the result of quite deliberate efforts on the part of pre-existing states to achieve conflict resolution by setting up a new state. State-building may take place in the absence of any particular striving toward statehood on the part of a population segment of an existing state. Indeed it may even run counter to the desires of people or actors on the level of the substate systems. Thus, in the case of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots and their Ethnarchy wanted enosis, i.e. secession from the British system and integration into Greece,1 just as the people of Togoland or of the British Northern Cameroons wanted integration into Ghana and Nigeria, respectively, rather than separate statehood. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, likewise wanted no state of their own. For quite a while at least, they seemed to be perfectly content to go on living as subjects of the British Crown Colony.2 Only after the continuation of this status quo became unlikely did they aspire for enosis — integration — of the whole island, or part of it, with Turkey, under their "Cyprus is Turkish" organization. But new states may emerge not only against the wishes of actors on the level of "subnational systems", but also against the wishes of an overwhelming majority of the actors on the level of the "national subsystems". The case of Manchukuo illustrates this point, in the inter-war period; that of Rhodesia in our times. This underlines the essentially political function of recognition or nonrecognition of a new state at the level of the "national subsystems" as the minimal political interaction of states in the state-building process. World War II and Japan's defeat spelled the end of Manchukuo but no one can tell what would have happened to this "puppet" state if this defeat had not occurred. Manchukuo — mixed with Cyprus — might well be a model for building up Taiwan as a new state. This Japanese creation, at any rate, it will be recalled, served as the stimulus for the Stimson Doctrine which the League of Nations, too, adopted. The case of Manchukuo demonstrates that state-building may be connected with the state-builder's expansionist aims at the expense of another state in the multistate system. The interest organization which 1 G. Hill, A History of Cyprus 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), pp. 488-568. 2 Hill, A History of Cyprus, pp. 510, 518-519, 529, and 540-541.

INTRODUCTION

19

promoted the establishment of the new state, the North-East provinces of China, was not indigenous, home-grown Manchurian. It was a Japanese subnational system, the Kwantung Army, the presence of which in China's northeastern provinces was based on special treaty rights going back to the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905. Local autonomy of Manchuria became a Japanese political objective as centrifugal trends were evident in China of the warlord period, with Chang Cho-lin and then his son, Chiang Hsueh-lin, warlording over Manchuria. The north Chinese did not particularly like the predominently south Chinese republican government in Nanking. However, in 1928, Chiang Hsueh-lin declared his allegiance to Nanking and raised the national Chinese flag, despite Japanese warnings. He also refused to allow the Japanese to complete a strategic railroad from Tunhua to the Korean border. When Chang followed a policy of building railroad lines competitive with the South Manchurian railroad which was under Japanese control, the Kwantung Army decided to strike. On September 18, 1931, it staged the Mukden incident (a bomb explosion on the Manchurian railroad track), seized Mukden and, extending its military operations over all Manchuria, achieved control of the entire area by the beginning of 1932. On November 10, 1931, meanwhile, a Japanese-sponsored "Peace and Order Committee" set up in Liaoning Province became a provincial government and severed relations with the government of Chiang Hsuehlin. By January 1932, pro-Japanese regimes existed in all three northeastern provinces of China. Combining all the administrations into a new state was the next step. Strong Chinese localism and attachment to particular leaders aided the Japanese. However, the Japanese installed "advisers" in key positions to control the action and policy of the nominally Chinese superiors. The Kwantung Army Headquarters sponsored the organization of a "Self-Government Guidance Board", the main purpose of which was to foster an independence movement. A Chinese served as chief of this Board which, however, included many Japanese members. A conference held in Mukden, February 16-18, 1932, attended by two Mongol princes and the Japanese governors of the three north-eastern provinces of China, set up a North Eastern Supreme Administrative Council to prepare the basic structure of the new state. And on February 18, 1932, the conference issued a Declaration of Independence, which referred to the aspirations of thirty million Manchurians against "the autocratic rule of self-seeking militarists" and proclaimed the principle of racial self-determination.

20

INTRODUCTION

On February 29, 1932, an All-Manchurian Convention met likewise in Mukden; denounced the previous, Chinese regime; welcomed the creation of the new state; and named Henry Pu-yi, former emperor of China (of the Manchu dynasty), as provisional head of state. On March 9, organic laws were adopted. Three days later, the new regime informed the foreign powers of the creation of the new state. It also proclaimed Changchun as capital of the new state and adopted a five-colored flag. Once launched, the movement secured a certain amount of spontaneous support. On September 15, 1932, Manchukuo and Japan concluded an alliance and a secret military agreement. Under this treaty, Japan formally recognized the new state. On its side, the new state agreed to respect all Japanese interests and rights obtained under the previous Sino-Japanese treaties and recognized that the stationing of Japanese troops in Manchuria was necessary for maintaining Manchukuo's security. The Manchukuan government was essentially Japanese. Its Chinese facade did not conceal the state of affairs. Japanese propagandists, seeking to justify their state-building activities, invoked as a precedent the U.S. state-building activities that resulted in the establishment of Cuba as an independent state.3 Unlike Manchukuo but in certain respects like Cyprus, Panama and Albania are two cases of state-building by pre-existing states for the purpose of resolving or averting, or both, international conflict, without 3

F. C. Jones, Manchuria Since 1931 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949), pp. 3,12-18, 23, 28. After setting up the new state the Japanese tried to foster a sense of nationalism. They tried to recruit Manchus for the administration and to revive the Manchu spoken language and script (ibid., p. 59). The Japanese also built an important communications network (ibid., p. 12) and industrial potential (ibid., p. 164). For El Salvador's recognition, see China United Press, The Puppet State of "Manchukuo" (Shanghai, 1935), ed. T'an Leang-li, p. 110. Germany, Italy, and Hungary also recognized it. About centrifugal tendencies, see also J. C. Balet, Le drame de /'Extreme Orient. La Mandchourie historique, économique; son avenir (Paris: 1932), pp. 35-36. Balet mentions that after the establishment of the Chinese republic, a new provincial organization was introduced, with a civilian as well as a military governor for each province. The latter depended directly from the President of the Republic and the Minister of War in Peking. However, because of the rapid weakening of the central power, the military governor assumed powers of his own. The era of warlords thus began. In May 1922, Chang Cho-lin proclaimed Manchuria's independence and notified the diplomatic corps in Peking and the consular corps in Tientsin about this. The USSR recognized this independence and on October 8, 1924 concluded a treaty with Chang Cho-lin concerning the East China Railway. This treaty bore the seal of the Autonomous Government of the three eastern Provinces of the Republic of China. Balet speculates whether this was part of a plan to set up a Federal Republic of the United States of China.

INTRODUCTION

21

any major mobilization in favor of statehood on the part of the people who became the objects of state-building. In the case of Panama, the conflict was between the United States and Colombia over the building of the canal across the isthmus situated on Colombian territory. The interest of the United States in a trans-isthmian canal went as far back as 1823, during the times of the first republic of Colombia which comprised not only the present states of Colombia and Panama but also Venezuela and Ecuador. In 1846, by treaty, the United States actually obtained control over the Panama isthmus when New Granada, the successor of the first republic of Colombia, after Venezuela's and Ecuador's secession, guaranteed the right of transit across the isthmus. Between 1846-1903, the United States, invoking its rights of protection, had often deployed troops in the area. The Spanish-American war convinced Congress of the need for a shortened route between the Atlantic and the Pacific. In 1901, under the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, Britain recognized the right of the United States to control, manage, defend and fortify a canal between the two oceans which, however, was to be neutralized like the Suez Canal. It also should be noted, on the other hand, that unlike the Manchurians, the Panamanians had occasionally attempted to set up an independent state of their own, and that during the seventy-five years before 1903 they had enjoyed relative autonomy. When the Bogota Congress on August 12, 1903, rejected the HayHerran Treaty of January 22, 1903, under which, among other things, the United States would obtain "the use and control" of a zone of Colombian territory across the isthmus of Panama for a term of one hundred years renewable at the sole and absolute option of the United States, the conflict that arose was simply resolved by the establishment of a new state which, unlike Colombia, was willing to fulfill the requirements of the Hay-Herran Treaty, and even more. A small junta, originally consisting of Jose Agustin Arango, his three sons, his three sons-in-law, and Carlos Constantino Arosemena, which was interested in seeing to it that the interoceanic canal should be built through the isthmus of Panama rather than across Nicaragua, proclaimed rebellion against the Colombian government. The United States, by prohibiting, through armed forces of its own, Colombian troops from landing to suppress the insurgents' movement, assured the rebellion's success. Then it recognized the new government and established diplomatic relations with it. Shortly after, it guaranteed Panama's independence, in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, obtaining in exchange the rights to construct the Panama canal

22

INTRODUCTION

it had not been able to obtain from Colombia under the Hay-Herran Treaty. 4 Albania, unlike Panama or Manchukuo, is an example of a statebuilding a deux. It also brings to mind buffer states. Its creation constituted a method of conflict prevention rather than of conflict resolution. Unlike the Chinese in Manchuria, the Albanians, occasionally supported by the Ottoman government which wished to counteract Serbian and Greek claims to Albanian territory, had developed organized elites of their own for the purpose of changing Albania's political status within the empire, not, however, for attaining statehood. In the end, nonetheless, they got more than the autonomy they had originally wanted, because of actions by other states. As early as 1877, Austria-Hungary and Russia concluded a secret convention on the desirability of an independent Albania in case of territorial changes in the Ottoman Empire or of that empire's disintegration. For Austria-Hungary, Albania constituted a "bastion" against further Slavic expansion and influence in the Balkans. And, when Italy, from the 1880's on, started showing a lively interest in that part of the Ottoman Empire's European territories, Albania constituted for Austria-Hungary an area that should be preserved from any great power domination, because of its importance in the sphere of Austria-Hungary's Adriatic interests. Thus, through the Triple Alliance connection, Austria-Hungary agreed with Italy over the desirability of maintaining the status quo in the Albanian sector of the Ottoman Empire or, in case of any alteration of this status quo, over the need of setting up Albania as some sort of separate political entity, if not as an independent state. Finally, when the First Balkan War broke out in 1912, and it became clear that the status quo could not be maintained, Austro-Hungarian foreign policy makers decided that Albania's preservation from partition among the Balkan allies was in Austria-Hungary's vital interests and 4

D. C. Miner, The Fight for the Panama Route (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), pp. 335 ff.; 413-426 (Hay-Herran Treaty); 337 (Panamanian junta); 361-362 (U.S. interposition); the acting Secretary of the Navy sent instructions to the U.S. naval forces to prevent the landing of any armed forces with hostile intent, either government or insurgent, at Colon, Porto Bello, or any other point within fifty miles of Panama; 369 (Declaration of Independence); it was an American officer in uniform who, at the request of the revolutionary junta, raised the Panamanian flag; 370 (U.S. recognition); 377 ff. (Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty). For earlier period, S. B. Liss, The Canal: Aspects of U.S.-Panamanian Relations (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 16-17. The Japanese government, too, in 1925, used armed forces to interdict the entry of Chinese troops into Manchuria in an area within 20 li of the zone of the South Manchurian railway (China United Press, The Puppet State of Manchukuo, pp. 90-91).

INTRODUCTION

23

that any state should be prevented from setting foot on the eastern coast of the Adriatic. Vienna therefore proposed to Rome an exchange of views on the delimitation of the borders and the internal organization of Albania as an independent state.5 The establishment of another buffer state — of Banda Oriental as Uruguay — in 1828 was, unlike that of Albania, the result of conflictresolution rather than of conflict-prevention efforts. During the colonial period, Banda Oriental had been alternately in the hands of the Portuguese and Spaniards between 1680-1726. Thereafter it continued to be a bone of contention between the Spanish and Brazilian colonial authorities. When rebellion broke out in 1810 in Argentina against the Spanish authorities a group of rebels in Banda Oriental followed suit. Their leader aspired to federation with the Argentine provinces. Indeed, he managed to set up a short-lived federation. When Argentina achieved independence, however, Brazil incorporated Banda Oriental in 1821. Four years later, a revolutionary Assembly issued a declaration of independence and Argentina decided to support this independence movement. Brazil declared war on Argentina but was defeated. The belligerents accepted Britain's offer of mediation and the peace treaty concluded between Argentina and Brazil on August 27, 1828, provided for the establishment of a new state in Banda Oriental — Uruguay. 6 Unlike the case of Manchukuo, and more so than the cases of Cyprus or Albania, Uruguay's emergence as a sovereign state draws attention to "struggles from below" rather than to struggles between pre-existing states as factors in the emergence of new states in the world multistate system. Elites actors of "substate systems", whose goal is not union with another state or mere autonomy within an existing state, but sovereign statehood, lead these struggles. The parties to the conflict are, on the one side, these statehood-aspiring substate organizations, and, on the 5

S. G. Xydis, "Albania's Course toward Statehood", Balkan Studies 8 (1967), pp. 30-31, 35-36, 44 (review article of The Albanian National Awakening 1878-1912, by Stavro Skendi [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967]). The Albanian National Church, interestingly enough, was first set up in 1908 abroad, in Boston (ibid., p. 33). 6 Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus on the one part, and Greece, Britain, and Turkey on the other part, provides that "in the event of any breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey undertake to consult together, with a view to making representations, or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance of those provisions. Insofar as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty."

24

INTRODUCTION

other side, an already existing state, a "state subsystem". Again, the establishment of a new state may be the method for resolving the conflict. The result may be secession — a disintegrative process, with no pejorative meaning attached to the adjective "disintegrative" — and the addition of a new state to the existing state system, as the "substate system" becomes a "national subsystem". The case of Cuba as contrasted with Panama or Manchukuo serves to underline this importance of "substate systems" in the emergence of new states. Unlike Uruguay, however, Cuba did not become a sovereign state as a result of a treaty between two pre-existing states. The only outside state-building factor involved in the process was the United States. In this respect, it is difficult to reject the earlier-mentioned Japanese analogy between the setting up of Manchukuo and of Cuba as independent states, or of Panama, for that matter. For the Paris Peace Treaty with Spain, of December 10,1898, included no agreement for the setting up of the Pearl of the Antilles as an independent state. It merely provided for Spain's relinquishment of all claims of sovereignty over, and title to the island and for its occupation by the United States. So long as this occupation lasted, the latter would discharge the obligations under international law that resulted from its occupation, for the protection of life and property. The main difference between the genesis of Manchukuo and the genesis of Cuba resided, of course, in the presence of a significant statehoodaspiring elite in Cuba. Between 1868-1878, the Cubans had waged a struggle for independence against Spain. Then in their new insurrection of 1898 the Cuban insurgents, before, not after the U.S. occupation of Cuba, had proclaimed, not as creatures of the United States, the "Republic of Cuba". President McKinley found it inexpedient to recognize both this Cuban regime and its successor, the "Asemblea de Representantes del Ejercito Cubano", in contrast to the Japanese government which had created the government of Manchukuo. And the U.S. Congressional resolutions referring to Cuba recognized only the "people" of Cuba. The Teller Amendment, of April 1898, made it clear, however, that the United States, which in 1849-1851 had served as a base for Narciso Lopez' liberation expeditions to Cuba, did not intend to annex the island and that it was determined to leave the government and control of Cuba to its people when pacification was accomplished. Thenceforth, in contrast to American action in the Philippines, the process of statebuilding was one of U.S. contraction, of disengagement— of de-occupation

INTRODUCTION

25

— not dissimilar to that of decolonization, though at no point had the United States actually assumed sovereignty over the island, even as Spain, by a Protocol of August 12, 1898, had relinquished all claims to sovereignty over Cuba. Efforts to ensure that this new state would be bound to the United States "by ties of singular intimacy and strength", as McKinley said on December 5, 1899, in his annual message to Congress, accompanied this U.S. decision to see to it that an independent new state of Cuba should be created out of the former Spanish colonial possession. The results of these efforts were that the Cuban Constitutional Assembly after considerable hesitation adopted the famous Piatt Amendment without reservations or interpretation on June 12, 1901. By doing so, the Assembly agreed to include either in the Cuban Constitution or "in an ordinance appended thereto" a provision defining the future relations of the United States with Cuba. For the purposes of this Cyprus study, the most important points in the Piatt Amendment, which was embodied in a permanent treaty between Cuba and the United States, were that it limited the capacity of the new state to enter into relations with other states; established a right of U.S. intervention in Cuban affairs in certain cases; and made possible the establishment of U.S. coaling and naval bases on Cuban territory, though not under U.S. sovereignty, in order to enable the United States to maintain Cuba's independence and protect its people. In particular, the Cuban government undertook never to enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which would impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgement in or control over any portion of Cuba. Moreover, the Cuban government agreed that the United States might exercise the right to intervene for preserving Cuban independence, maintaining a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now assumed and undertaken by the Cuban government. By the Piatt Amendment, which is reminiscent of certain provisions of the Cyprus settlement of 1960, John Quincy Adams' belief that Cuba could "gravitate" only toward the North American Union became reality.7 7

R. H. Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), pp. 67-69, 78-79, and 270-271 (Treaty with Spain), 272-273 (Piatt Amendment).

26

INTRODUCTION

The decisions of the American, British, and Soviet governments to reestablish Austria and Albania as independent states after World War II likewise underline the importance of state actors in state-building — or state-restoring. Hitler, in 1938, had taken over Austria and incorporated it into the German Reich on March 13,1938; Mussolini had added Albania to the Italian impero in April 1939. The allied decision with regard to Austria had clearly a collective character. It was proclaimed during the Moscow Conference of the American, British, and Soviet Foreign Ministers in October 1943. However, it was implemented only in 1955. This Austrian State treaty, like the post-World War I settlement with regard to Germany and Austria, includes a prohibition against the Anschluss of Austria with Germany.8 In 1958-1959, the British, Greek, and Turkish governments had this provision in mind when making arrangements for settling the Cyprus question. They included in the Zurich Basic Structure of the new Cyprus Republic and in the Treaty of Guarantee a prohibition of enosis with Greece and, implicitly, of union with Turkey or any other state.9 8 With regard to Albania, which had not set up a government-in-exile, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, on December 11, 1942, stated that the United States had never recognized Albania's annexation by Italy and that the restoration of Albania's independence was a natural consequence of the Atlantic Charter. Then, on December 17, 1942, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, in the House of Commons, made a statement about the future independence of Albania, with the Soviet press publishing a similar statement next day; S. G. Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers 1944-1947: Prelude to the "Truman Doctrine" (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963), pp. 22-25; for Austria, The Austrian State Treaty, U.S. Treaties and Other International Acts, Series, 3298. Under Article 3 of this treaty "the Allied and Associated Powers will incorporate in the German Peace Treaty provisions for securing from Germany the recognition of Austria's sovereignty and independence, and the renunciation by Germany of all territorial and political claims in respect of Austria and Austrian territory". And under Article 4, "the Allied and Associated Powers declare that political or economic union between Austria and Germany is prohibited. Austria fully recognizes its responsibilities in this matter and shall not enter into political or economic union with Germany in any form whatsoever. In order to prevent such union, Austria shall not conclude any agreement with Germany, nor do any act, nor take any measures likely, directly or indirectly, to promote political or economic union with Germany, or to impair its territorial integrity or political and economic independence. Austria further undertakes to prevent within its territory any activity likely, directly or indirectly, to promote such union and shall prevent the existence, resurgence, and activities of any organization having as their aim political or economic union with Germany, and pan-German propaganda in favor of Union with Germany." On November 12, 1918, when the Austrian Republic was first set up, it demanded union with Germany (D. C. Watt, Frank Spencer, Neville Brown, A History of the World in the Twentieth Century [New York: W. Morrow, 1968], p. 309). 9 Under Article 1 of the treaty of Guarantee mentioned above in note 7, "the Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial

INTRODUCTION

27

In state-building, the number of participant actors on the level of the national subsystems may vary from case to case. In the genesis of Manchukuo, Panama, and Cuba as well as of many new post-World War II African or Asian states, there was only one such state actor; in the genesis of Albania and Uruguay there were two; in the genesis of Cyprus, three, just as in the case of the genesis of Greece in 1830, when Britain, France, and Russia were involved. In the genesis of Belgium in 1831, five states cooperated. In addition to Britain, France and Russia, there were also Austria and Prussia. These five states not only recognized Belgium as a new state but guaranteed its independence as well as its permanent neutrality. The participation of a large number of state actors on the level of the national subsystems of the global political system may acquire the character of state-building by international congress, international conference, or regional or universal international organizations of general competence. In the nineteenth century, the emergence of Romania and Bulgaria as sovereign states was facilitated by the European Concert through the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and the Berlin Congress of 1878, respectively, which provided for the autonomy of these two substate systems under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. This autonomy, in turn, allowed Romania and Bulgaria eventually to achieve full statehood without the prior consent of the European Concert. Bulgaria's emergence as an autonomous political unit without full sovereignty resulted from the decision of the Berlin Congress to scrap the statebuilding efforts of a single state, Russia. These had been formally embodied in the Russo-Turkish Treaty of San Stefano of 1878, which would have created a greater Bulgaria. The strivings, in other words, of a single state to build another state were, in the instance, frustrated by a collectivity of states — the Concert of Europe — at the Berlin Congress.10 In the twentieth century, state-building by the collectivity of states in certain parts of the world was institutionalized through the Mandate system of the League of Nations as part of the Versailles peace settlement. Under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League which established the

integrity, and security, as well as respect for its Constitution. It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever. With this intent, it prohibits all activity tending to promote directly or indirectly either union or partition of the island." 10 L. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1958), pp. 350-351,408, and 411.

28

INTRODUCTION

Mandate system, the victors of World War I agreed that certain communities formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire had reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations could be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they were able to stand alone. The principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory ought to be the wishes of these communities. On the basis of these provisions, Britain and France became engaged in somewhat reluctant state-building which resulted in the eventual emergence of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria as new states, at first through the conclusion of preferential alliances and treaties reminiscent of certain provisions of the Piatt amendment or the treaties of Alliance and of Guarantee which were part of the Cyprus settlement of 1960. The creation of Jordan was the consequence of British efforts to avert conflict with the Arabs and, indirectly, with the French, after the latter, in July 1920, had driven out of Damascus King Faysal, and his elder brother, Abdullah, had begun to organize in the south for military operations against the French in Syria. In March 1921, the British dissuaded Abdullah from carrying out his plan by offering him to make him amir of an area east of the Jordan River. When Abdullah accepted this offer, the British set up the Amirate of Transjordan which really had never been envisaged. The population of Transjordan itself, amounting at the time to about 300,000, of which more than half led a nomadic existence, had never given thought to getting a state of their own. In 1922, in order to carry out their promise to Abdullah, the British arranged for a revision of the draft of their Palestine Mandate. And in April 1923, Sir Herbert Samuel announced that, subject to the League's approval, the British government would recognize the existence of an independent government in Transjordan under the rule of Abdullah, provided this government were constitutional and placed the British government in a position to fulfill its international obligations in respect of the territory by an agreement to be concluded between the two governments. On May 25, 1923, Abdullah proclaimed the independence of Transjordan. The agreement between Britain and Transjordan, however, was signed only on February 20, 1928. Britain retained control in military, financial, and foreign affairs, while the Amir was allowed to rule as a semi-despot.11 After World War II, the collective state-building of the League of 11

M. Harari, Government and Politics of the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 151-152.

INTRODUCTION

29

Nations under the Mandate system was continued through the Trusteeship system of the United Nations, with greater institutionalization. The Trusteeship Council was the UN organ specifically entrusted with this task. The success of the UN Trusteeship system is too well-known to require any special or extensive comments here. Out of the eleven territories placed under this system in 1949, only two trust territories remained by 1970. The nine others had reached the Charter's goal of self-government or independence. Relevant to the Cyprus problem, during its earlier phase of 1950-1958, was the holding of plebiscites in British Togoland in 1956, French Togoland in 1958, the British Cameroons and Western Samoa, both in 1961. Not all these plebiscites resulted in the establishment of separate states. The people of British Togoland opted for enosis with Ghana. The people of the British Northern Cameroons opted for enosis with Nigeria, in contrast to the people of the British Southern Cameroons who opted for enosis with the Republic of Cameroon. 12 The UN Charter's various references to self-determination and the Declaration on Non-Self-Governing Territories, together with several resolutions of a general character concerning the right of self-determination, such as resolution 1514 (XV), provided another stimulus for statebuilding and hence for the proliferation of states in the global multistate system. Adopted in the same year that Cyprus became an independent state, resolution 1514 (XV) urged member states to take immediate steps, among other things, to transfer all power to peoples living in trust or non-self-governing territories and in all other territories which had not yet obtained independence, in order to enable them, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, to achieve complete independence and freedom. It is tempting but useless to speculate whether the fate of Cyprus would have been different, had the Greek government raised the issue before the United Nations in the sixties rather than in the fifties as it did. Concurrently with this great boom in collective state-building after World War II, the European colonial states themselves engaged in statebuilding activities of their own, setting up a considerable number of new states in their colonial territories. France, for instance, on the basis of the concept of the French community embodied in the Constitution of the Fifth Republic in 1958, set up, among others, the Central African Republic on the territory of Ubangi-Shari of the colony of French 12

373.

United Nations, Everyman's

United Nations (7th ed.; New Y o r k : 1964), pp. 370-

30

INTRODUCTION

Equatorial Africa, with an area somewhat larger than that of France but with a population of only 2,088,000 according to the 1966 census. On September 28, 1958, the French government approved the conduct of a plebiscite in this particular territory (an important source of French uranium) as well as in other French territories of French Equatorial Africa and French West Africa, except Guinea. The result was the emergence of the autonomous Central African Republic, among others. From autonomy to full independence it was but a step. On May 11,1960, the French National Assembly adopted an amendment to the Constitution of the Fifth Republic allowing former French colonies to remain within the French Community even after they had become independent. Less than a week later, the autonomous Central African Republic, together with the autonomous republics of Chad and the (French) Congo, decided to seek full independence, as a single unit, for they also set up a "Union of Central African Republics". In July 1960, however, the members of this "Union" decided to seek independence separately, having in mind, incidentally, that it would be politically advantageous to have one vote each in the United Nations instead of a single vote for all three together— evidence of the indirect effects of the United Nations on the process of the proliferation of states. Likewise in July 1960, the legislative Assembly of the autonomous Central African Republic ratified an independence agreement with France. And on August 14 of that same year (two days earlier than Cyprus), the Central African Republic officially became independent. So had Chad two days earlier, and the Republic of Congo a day later. Thus together with two other self-governing political units formerly part of French Equatorial Africa, a new state was added — painlessly — to the world multistate system. The Central African Republic became a UN member on September 20,1960. In November of that year, its legislature adopted a new Constitution based on a presidential system.13 The political objectives of the state-builders on the interstate level appear to fall into four main categories. The Cyprus case clearly reveals that one of the objectives is to remove a source of interstate tension and friction and to resolve a conflict among states themselves. In seeking to attain this objective, Greece and Turkey were primarily involved, with Britain taking appropriate measures to facilitate the state-building process that involved its Crown Colony. A similar political objective was served when Argentina and Brazil agreed to set up Uruguay as an independent state, or when Austria-Hungary and Italy agreed to do likewise with 13

Deadline Data.

INTRODUCTION

31

Albania. After World War I, the creators of the Versailles settlement set up the Free City of Danzig with similar objectives in mind. And the Big Four after World War II gave serious thought to a similar solution for the Italo-Yugoslav conflict over Trieste. Panama, too, emerged, as indicated, out of a specific conflict between the United States and Colombia, though not on the basis of an international agreement between the two states. But the Cyprus case, as well as that of the Central African Republic, also clearly reveals that another political objective of state-builders is to achieve the contraction of a state-builder's territorial sovereignty without allowing an adversary state to expand its own sovereignty or influence—to fill "a power vacuum". Britain, as well as Greece and Turkey, in setting up Cyprus, was anxious, as this study clearly reveals, to prevent the new state from coming under the political influence of the USSR and of the Soviet bloc. The state-building activities of Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands in the post-World War period with regard to their respective colonies provide numerous other examples of this sort of political objective. The UN's actions in the Congo must be largely viewed in this light. A third political objective of state-builders may be to weaken an adversary state. After World War I, the creators of the peace settlement promoted the building of Czechoslovakia, for example, or of Poland, or favored the establishment of an independent Armenia. And by setting up the Mandate system, they prepared the ground for state-building in territories taken from the defeated German and Ottoman empires, particularly in those territories which were placed in class of the Mandates system. The Trusteeship system of the United Nations completed the state-building arrangements for the mandates under category B and even for one of the mandates in category C: Western Samoa. The adroit insertion into the UN Charter of "the principle of equal rights and self-determination" by the USSR (Article 1, paragraph 2) served remarkably well the objective of the USSR to weaken its capitalist, "imperialist" adversaries. In its first four recourses to the United Nations on the Cyprus question, the Greek government invoked this principle against Britain with considerable zest, ignoring the provisions of Western provenance such as those contained in the Declaration on Non-SelfGoverning Territories. This Declaration constituted in essence a U.S.British compromise between American anti-colonialist inclinations parallel to those of the USSR, but based on different grounds, and Britain's objectives of dealing with people under its sovereignty so that self-

32

INTRODUCTION

government should not redound to the benefit of its major adversaries.14 Finally, a fourth political objective of state-builders may be to expand their influence and control over other people and territories, as revealed in the cases of Japan and Manchukuo and the United States and Cuba. The above-mentioned political objectives of state-builders may be mixed. Thus, the establishment of Manchukuo not only served Japan's expansionist aims but weakened an adversary state, China, control over which was the ultimate objective. It also served as a check to possible Soviet expansion there. This, on the other hand, was not the case of the United States and Cuba with regard to Spain. The Cyprus case, as suggested above, offers another example of mixed state-building political objectives. The same above-mentioned political objectives of state-building operations deliberately carried out by states also operate in favor of the maintenance of the multistate system, even in the absence of express agreements. Thus, Paraguay's existence as a sovereign state is based on the same political objectives that led Argentina and Brazil to set up Uruguay as a buffer state between themselves, though no formal treaty was ever concluded between them for achieving this goal. The same may be said about Afghanistan and the People's Republic of Mongolia, as compared with Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, or Romania. The situations that trigger state-building activities by existing states may be either interstate or intrastate conflicts, or both. Thus Manchukuo arose out of conflict between Japan and China; Panama out of conflict between the United States and Colombia; Albania out of potential conflict between Austria-Hungary and Italy, and actual war between the Balkan states, on the one side, and the Ottoman Empire, on the other. Danzig, the Arab states, various non-selfgoverning peoples who eventually acquired independent status through the Mandate system of the League of Nations and the UN Trusteeship system, or through the initiative of the colonial states, emerged out of conflict of World Wars I and II, or both. This does not mean that certain local conditions did not pre-exist that facilitated the task of the state-building states. Thus, intrastate conflict between the Albanians and the Ottoman authorities prior to 1912 meant that statehood was far from imposed upon the Albanians by Austria-Hungary and Italy. The same may be said about the Arabs as subjects of the Ottoman Empire. In Panama, as already mentioned, conflicts and tension between the 14

R. B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1958), pp. 75, 86, 88-89, 175, 337, 811, 815, and 817.

INTRODUCTION

33

Panamanians and the Colombian government antedated 1903. And even in Manchuria certain localist trends pre-existed which facilitated the state-building operations of the Kwantung Army. However, it was interstate not intrastate conflicts which catalyzed the state-building activities in these cases. In a great number of other cases, intrastate rather than interstate conflicts catalyzed state-building activities of existing states. To mention but a few examples, the United States, Cuba, Greece, Uruguay, Algeria, Israel, or Vietnam originated from conflict between local elites and the British, Spanish, Ottoman, French, or Brazilian governmental authorities. In Cyprus, it was originally not the strivings of the Greek government vis-à-vis the British government that created the issue, but the strivings of the Cyprus Ethnarchy vis-à-vis the British government and the tension and conflict which these strivings engendered within the British system. The Greek government entered into the picture later, in support of the cause of the Cyprus Ethnarchy so that the intrastate situation became an interstate dispute. Usually, the goal of these rebellious elites is the transfer of territorial sovereignty from the existing state to themselves with regard to part of the territory of the ruling state. Exceptionally, as in the case of the Cypriot Ethnarchy, or of the Germans in the Sudetenland or of the Austrians in 1918, the goal is the transfer of territorial sovereignty not to themselves but to another state. The attainment of sovereignty change is greatly facilitated if the intrastate conflict sets in motion state-building activities on the level of the state subsystem, i.e. on the part of other, pre-existing state actors, so that endogenous and exogenous activities converge toward the same goal. It may be argued, indeed, that without such state-building activities on the part of other states, the goal of the rebellious elite faces almost insuperable obstacles. Even Rhodesia's status of independence, unrecognized by other states in the world, could hardly continue if the Union of South Africa or Portugal tacitly did not recognize it as such. In the Cyprus case, the Greek Cypriots, through the strivings of the Ethnarchy and EOKA, paid a tribute in blood and treasure and therefore greatly contributed to the transfer of sovereignty from the British Crown to the Republic of Cyprus, though this was not exactly their goal. And the Albanians, too, in their struggle for greater autonomy with the Ottoman Empire, conducted quite a bloody struggle of their own against the Ottoman government, especially after the Young Turks took over. Yet, without the Greek-Turkish agreements of Zurich and the London

34

INTRODUCTION

agreements that followed, both in February 1959, it is hard to see how Britain's decision to relinquish its sovereignty over Cyprus could have been achieved merely through the exertions of the Ethnarch, Grivas and his EOKA men, just as it is difficult to imagine how Albania would have become a sovereign state without the state-building cooperation between Austria-Hungary and Italy, especially since statehood was not the original goal of either the Greek Cypriots or the Albanians. Although this was not exactly the case with the Uruguayans and the Cubans who, under their revolutionary leaders, struggled for "freedom" and "independence" against the Brazilian or Spanish governmental authorities, yet, without the treaty of 1828 between Argentina and Brazil, without the decision of the McKinley administration to refrain from annexing Cuba after Spain had reliquished its sovereignty over the island, all these strivings for statehood may well have come to nought. Banda Oriental might have been partitioned, or Cuba transformed into another state of the Union. In brief, in these cases too, the state-building policies of other states seem to have constituted a major factor in the outcome, regardless of the origin of the state-building strivings. In the case of certain other struggles for "independence" one might hesitate (perhaps for reasons of national pride) to reach a similar conclusion. Nonetheless no one can deny that the actions of pre-existing states in supporting these struggles often contributed greatly to the achievement of statehood. The genesis of Greece as an independent polity illustrates this point. In spring 1821, less than three weeks after a "Sacred Battalion" organized by a secret Greek society (the Filiki Etairia), composed of young Greek patriots of the upper and middle classes, moved from Russia into Ottoman territory which was later to become Romania, the Greek elite of the Peloponnese decided to rebel against the Ottoman government. A hard military struggle began. In January 1822, a National Assembly meeting in Epidaurus proclaimed the political existence and independence of the Greek nation and sought to get support from the European powers and even of the United States. But by 1827, because of the military aid provided to the Ottoman side by tributary Egypt, the Greek uprising appeared doomed. Three years later, nonetheless, Greece emerged as an independent state. Meanwhile the European Powers had decided to intervene. Emperor Alexander I of Russia, after denouncing at first the Greek insurrection, had sent an ultimatum to the Ottoman government in July 1821 with demands concerning mostly the protection of the Christian churches,

INTRODUCTION

35

freedom of Christian worship, and the pacification of the Danubian principalities. The Porte rejected this ultimatum. Although no war followed, the British government, on its side, fearing lest Russia undertake unilateral action against Turkey with beneficial results for itself, negotiated an agreement with Russia for both powers to mediate between the Greeks and the Ottoman government on the basis of complete autonomy for Greece under Turkish suzerainty (St. Petersburg Protocol of April 4, 1826). The Greeks formally applied for the mediation envisaged in the St. Petersburg Protocol. The Turks and Egyptians, on the other hand, did not. They were reluctant to stop their operations as victory seemed in sight. Under British initiative, Britain, France and Russia then agreed in the Treaty of London (July 6, 1827) again to offer their mediation, and if the Sultan rejected it, to "exert all means which circumstances may suggest" to impose the cessation of hostilities. Once again the Greeks accepted the mediation proposal. Once again the Sultan rejected it. To implement the London Treaty, British, French, and Russian warships sailed into Navarino Bay where a squadron of Turkish and Egyptian ships was anchored. No hostilities were intended unless the Turks should begin. A shot, however, catalyzed the naval battle of Navarino (October 20, 1827), which ended with the Turko-Egyptian fleet lying at the bottom of the bay. It is unnecessary to explain here the reasons for the Russo-Turkish war which ensued in April 1828. Suffice it to mention that at this time, Russia had concluded that the Ottoman Empire's partition between the European powers would not be to its interest, because Russia might then have to face in the Balkans not "the indifferent Turks" but dangerous enemies in southern Europe. Finally, in a new London Protocol (February 3, 1830), Britain, France and Russia declared Greece to be an independent state under the guarantee of the three powers.15 One of the provisions of the agreement was that no king of Greece should come from the royal families of the guarantor powers. For the Great Powers concerned, statehood for Greece was a self-denying method for averting a future conflict among themselves in that area, just as statehood for Cyprus was a method for resolving conflict between Greece and Britain and for averting conflict between Greece and Turkey. But the territorial extent of the new state in 1830 was kept quite limited so that the foreign policy of the new kingdom was virtually bound to be primarily irredentist in

15

Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, pp. 285-291.

36

INTRODUCTION

character, with Greece's Cyprus claims in the 1950's being a residue of this policy. The genesis of the United States itself as an independent polity likewise cannot be understood unless one takes into account the foreign policy of France toward Britain after the Seven Year's War. The Due de Choiseul, Foreign Minister of Louis XV, had made the secession of the American colonies from Britain a goal of French foreign policy well before the Declaration of Independence. His successor, the Comte de Vergennes, pursued this same objective. When the British Parliament, by adopting the so-called Coercive Acts in 1774, forced the Colonists to seek help from abroad, France was thus eager to help them. In 1774 France sent Beaumarchais on a secret mission to America to sound out the Colonists and tell them France favored their independence and would help them in achieving it. In May 1776, Louis XVI set aside one million livres (about $200,000) worth of munitions from the royal arsenals for American use. Spain contributed a like amount. Eventually ninety per cent of the gunpowder the Colonists used during the first two years of their war for independence came from European arsenals. By assuring France and other potential allies that the goal of the colonists was their separation from Britain, the Declaration of Independence prepared the ground for the eventual establishment of formal diplomatic relations between France and the U.S.-in-becoming and for the negotiation of treaties with France, the Netherlands, and other European states. The battle of Saratoga assured France that the colonists were capable of waging their war for independence successfully. It thus encouraged France to recognize the United States as a sovereign polity. Finally, by its two treaties of 1778 with the United States, France not only recognized this new polity but also guaranteed American independence and territory "forever" and renounced designs on any portion of the North American mainland held by Britain in 1673,16 just as the United States in 1903 guaranteed the independence of Panama; Japan, in 1932, the independence of now defunct Manchukuo; Britain, France and Russia, in 1830, the independence of Greece; Britain, Greece and Turkey, in 1960, the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. In sum, the proliferation of states in the global multistate system of anarchic polyarchy results from state-building activities of existing states and involves segments of population and territory within a third state. M

A. de Conde, A History of American Foreign Policy (New York: Scribner's, 1963), pp. 23-25, and 27-28.

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37

In a few cases, these population segments themselves are more or less passive objects of state-building, as in the case of Manchukuo, Jordan, Panama, Danzig, or the Central African Republic. In most cases, however, these population segments within a single state participate quite actively in the state-building process. Indeed, by their strivings they catalyze state-building activities by certain state actors and thus contribute to the outcome: the establishment of a new state. In the Cyprus case, the participation of representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots at the round table London Conference on Cyprus of 1959, side by side with representatives of Britain, Greece, and Turkey, symbolized the statebuilding role of these nonstate actors. In the cases of British Togoland or the Cameroons, the plebiscites held there granted an actor role to the populations of these Trusteeship territories. However, the role of state actors in the state-building process is always in evidence. This role may range from covert to overt support to rebellious actors within a state who are striving for a change of sovereignty, for "self-determination". This support may consist of military supplies, funds, moral support, political endorsement, recognition of insurgency and belligerency, alliances, guarantees, and round-table conferences for the achievement of various state objectives analyzed above. Recognition of the new state's existence as such constitutes the minimum of political action of other states vis-à-vis the new state. Acceptance of that state as a member of the United Nations, which is based on the principle of sovereign equality of states, is an additional political ritual through which the society of states recognizes the new state's birth. After a process of political fission, it constitutes to a certain extent a measure of integration in that society. If some new states appear to be more artificial than others, it is either because the people of the new state played a minimal role in initiating the state-building process, as for instance in the case of the Central African Republic or, because, as in the case of Cyprus, their active elites reluctantly gave up their original goal which involved a transfer of sovereignty but not statehood. A state, it has been said, is a work of art. But human building materials that do not easily lend themselves to state-building constitute a tremendous challenge to the state-builders. The result might be esthetically none too satisfactory. The participation of more than one state-builder in the creative process adds to the inherent difficulties of the task. To change the metaphor from architecture into the realm of culinary art, too many cooks spoil the broth, especially if they have altogether different tastes.

38

INTRODUCTION

After these observations about the macropolitical process of the proliferation of states which accelerated during the last two hundred years, here are some conclusions derived from the study in depth of the micropolitical process that culminated in the emergence of Cyprus as a sovereign state in 1960. These conclusions, together with their extensive notes, may serve also as an introduction to the main substance of the study.

B. MICROPOLITICS IN THE CASE OF CYPRUS STATE-BUILDING

The dynamics of negotiations, it has been said by a psychologist, vary according to whether the other party is perceived as a friend, a competitor, or a foe. A friend will be one whom one can trust and with whom one can have the open communication that facilitates the search for creative alternatives. A competitor, on the other hand, will use, or be expected to use the negotiations to strike the best bargain he can. A foe, finally, will use, or be expected to use negotiations for side effects to stall for time; to gather information about what he can expect or cannot expect to get away with; to deceive his opponent into believing that he is friendly; to create an effect on third parties or the world at large; or to intimidate his opponent.17 At a high level of abstraction, these are significant observations. However, in the world of real-life international negotiations there are various gradations between and within each of these typical perceptions of foe, competitor and friend. Then, it is possible that the parties to a dispute may have different perceptions of each other at a particular time. Third, as situations change, changes of perception may occur which complicate matters still further. Finally, it might be contended that the very basis of the whole approach is faulty; that what really matters in the dynamics of negotiations is the perception of a common interest, not the perception of whether one is dealing with a foe, a competitor or a friend; and that these distinctions are either irrelevant or merely a matter of choice of techniques or of style in conducting negotiations or of assuming attitudes in international political questions. In brief, for the true — or model — statesman, for homo politicus, there are — or should be — no friends, no competitors, no foes, but only national interests or goals which must be approached on the basis not of sentiments of friendship, competition 17

J. H. de Rivera, The Psychological Dimensions of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: C. E. Merrill, 1968), pp. 387-389.

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39

or hostility but of rational calculations about the possibility of achieving these goals in the face of political interests or goals of other political actors in the continuum of world politics, regardless of friendship, competition or hostility, and by the most appropriate means — the stick and the carrot included, and promises and threats thereof. But let us try, at any rate, to test these high-level abstractions against the facts of the Cyprus case between 1950-1960 18 which, formally, was an imperfect dispute, a conflict between allies, in which the initiating actor or protagonist, in striving to achieve his original goal, did not always behave according to the ideal model of homo politicus, not unlike many other actors in past, present and, it might be said, future politics, yet by his actions and through the reactions these actions aroused on the part of the antagonists and third parties (international organizations included), in half a decade brought about the genesis of a new state in the global system of anarchic polyarchy. First, Greek decision-makers, perceiving their British counterparts as good friends, but under continuous pressure from Greek Cypriot elites and certain segments of Greek public opinion often motivated by antiBritish, anti-NATO, anti-West counterelites, raised in the early 1950's the Cyprus question with British decision-makers through the diplomatic channel. 19 At the same time, in general terms, they started referring to

18

The remarks that follow are based mainly on the account by S. G. Xydis, "Toward 'Toil and Moil' in Cyprus", The Middle East Journal 20 (1966), pp. 1-19. In an interview with Cyrus Sulzberger published in the New York Times, July 28, 1948, King Paul I said that Greece desired and would continue to desire the union of Cyprus with the rest of Greece and that, should the island be ceded to Greece, this would in no way interfere with any military or other bases Britain had set up there. If it could be arranged under the United Nations, Greece would also be prepared to offer further bases to Britain and the United States in Crete and elsewhere. The British diplomatic representative in Athens delivered an aide-mémoire to the Greek government deploring any encouragement of enosis agitation as not being in the best interests of either Britain or Greece (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Cyprus: Background to Enosis, Chatham House Memoranda, February 1958, p. 8). The following year, on January 3, 1949, King Paul told Sulzberger that King George VI of England had berated him for wanting to take apart the British Empire (C. Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles [New York: Macmillan, 1969], pp. 429-430). On February 15, 1951, Premier Sophocles Venizelos in the Greek Parliament demanded enosis after a British statement in the House of Commons that no official demarche had been received from the Greek government on this demand. On March 20 of that same year, Greek Party leaders under the chairmanship of the Premier agreed that the Cyprus question should be promoted within the framework of Greek-British friendship. Shortly after, the Greek Ambassador in London carried out a relevant demarche with the British government (Xydis, "Toward 'Toil and Moil' in Cyprus", pp. 4-5). 19

40

INTRODUCTION

this question in the United Nations. 20 British decision-makers, however, perceived this action as unfriendly, as mischievous, as a nuisance. Pressed by Egypt, they were reluctantly getting out of that country and transferring the Middle East Command headquarters to Cyprus. Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the British government should have regarded the Greek request as an unfriendly act. Its leaders responded by curtly saying that no Cyprus problem existed. 21 More analytically, the British side refused to develop an understanding of the Greek position, to be open to communications from the Greek decisionmakers, and to recognize their commitments, perhaps fearing lest it get entangled in a situation in which the Greek side would try to secure some bargaining advantage. Understanding the Greek position, the British side probably felt, might eventually lead to loss of control over Cyprus. To admit that a Cyprus question did exist would have made it more difficult for the British side to refuse to discuss the question. To say, on the other hand, that no Cyprus question existed made it easier to turn down the Greek request for some sort of commitment on the Cyprus question. As a result of this rebuff, the Greek side no longer looked on the British side as a good friend. Its leaders acted accordingly in certain other areas

80

The first Greek reference of the Cyprus question in the United Nations was made in 1950 at the Assembly's fifth session (Conflict and Conciliation, p. 7). Other such references followed at the sixth, seventh, and eighth Assemblies, to climax in the Cyprus recourse to the ninth Assembly (1954). 21 In response to the Greek Ambassador's demarche mentioned in note 19 above, Acting Foreign Secretary H. S. Morrison was negative. This negative attitude of the Labour government was vividly expressed shortly after when at an official reception of the diplomatic corps in Buckingham Palace, King George VI stepped out of the line he normally followed in greeting the diplomatic corps and, walking up to the Greek Ambassador, told him he that Cyprus was a matter of imperial defense (Xydis, "Toward 'Toil and Moil' in Cyprus", p. 5). After the second Greek reference to Cyprus in the U N in 1951, Averofif-Tossizza and Eden met in Rome and the latter insisted there was no Cyprus question (ibid., pp. 6-7). Renewed Greek demarches in 1952 and 1953 climaxed in the clash of wills between Eden and Papagos of September 22, 1953. In response to one of the several demarches of the Greek Ambassador in London late in February and March 1954, Selwyn Lloyd predicted "toil and moil" in Cyprus if the Greek government persisted in this matter. On March 30, Eden expressed amazement to the Greek ambassador that the Greek government should place Cyprus in the forefront of its policy, when so many other things of importance for Greece should be done. Eden said that Greece, by emphasizing Cyprus, was endangering its prestige when it could expect absolutely nothing from this policy except the harm that would be inevitably created to the relations between the two countries and difficulties in the international field (ibid., pp. 9,10-11).

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o f G r e e k - B r i t i s h relations. 2 2 A n d t h e y redoubled their requests f o r d i p l o m a t i c negotiations w i t h the British side. W h e n t h e Under-Secretary o f State f o r t h e C o l o n i e s o n July 28, 1954 m a d e a public statement t o t h e effect that Cyprus, in contrast t o other British colonies, s h o u l d never e x p e c t t o achieve i n d e p e n d e n c e , 2 3 the G r e e k perception o f Britain a s a b a d friend w a s strengthened and Greek hostility against the British rose. A n o t h e r British public statement to t h e effect that Greece, as a friend, w a s unstable t h o u g h friendly did n o t i m p r o v e m a t t e r s . 2 4 H a v i n g failed in its efforts to negotiate w i t h the British side, and perceiving it as a bad friend, t h e Greek side decided in 1954 t o seek a debate o f the Cyprus question in the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . 2 5 A debate, it has b e e n said, a i m s at convincing third parties o f t h e correctness o f one's o w n p o s i t i o n a n d o f the " w r o n g n e s s " of the o p p o n e n t ' s position. After this n e w G r e e k m o v e , the perception by the British side o f t h e Greek side as an unreliable a n d unfriendly friend arose. T h e British side s o u g h t t o o p p o s e a U N consideration of a question that did n o t exist in its view.

22 For instance, Premier Papagos raised the question of expropriating the Britishowned company cultivating the reclaimed basin of Lake Copais in Boeotia, Conflict and Conciliation, p. 8. For the agreement of May 9,1953 on this matter, see, UN Treaty Series 398 (1961), pp. 179-182 (exchange of notes between the British and Greek governments). The Greek government also ended its ties with the British Naval Mission in Greece. The repeated diplomatic demarches over Cyprus were, in themselves, a form of harassment. 23 531 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), p. 504. 24 "I can imagine", said Lyttleton, "no more disastrous policy for Cyprus than to hand it over to an unstable though friendly power", ibid., p. 552. Next day, a Foreign Office official expressed regrets about this statement to the Greek Ambassador in London, Vassili Mostras (V. Mostras, "On the Cyprus Question" [mimeographed and privately and selectively circulated, Athens, 1960], p. 9). (Cited hereafter as "On the Cyprus Question".) 25 The efforts of the Greek diplomatic handlers of the Cyprus question to keep this issue as one between friends is clearly revealed in the last paragraph of a note the Greek Ambassador in London was instructed to hand to Eden after the latter, on March 30,1954, once again showed a firm unwillingness to discuss the Cyprus question with the Greek diplomat (see note 5 above). "I most deeply regret the continued lack of understanding resulting in statements such as that of March 15 [1954, by Eden in the House of Commons] which literally pour oil on the flames. Such inflexibility compels me to persist even more in the firm but conciliatory line of policy laid down which is based primarily upon the determination to do or omit [sic] nothing which could give it a character hostile to Great Britain. Should the British government persist in their inflexible policy, the only course left open to Greece would be to bring the matter before the General Assembly of the U.N. as the sole means of forestalling a still further intensification of anti-British feeling in Greece." The Foreign Secretary read this note, asked for certain clarifications and put it in a drawer of his desk. The Foreign Office made no further mention of this note to the Greek diplomat ("On the Cyprus Question", p. 66).

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INTRODUCTION

In the United Nations, while asserting there was nothing anti-Greek in this stand, 26 it invoked Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter to prevent the United Nations from considering the question. 27 It failed, however, to have the world organization accept the correctness of this view. The Assembly included the Cyprus question on its agenda. The question was discussed though not considered in December 1954. 28 But before this U N debate occurred, the British side suddenly started ultra-secret negotiations with Greece's Central Decision-Maker himself outside of official channels. Negotiating with somebody who is an enemy, it has been noted, may be used for side effects, stalling for time or creating an impression on third parties. Since by that time the Greek Central Decision-Maker's perception of British decision-makers was hardly that of a friend, he was likely to view with suspicion these negotiatory soundings. If those officials above whose heads these negotiations were being conducted learned about them, they were likely to fan such suspicions even more. Is it surprising then that these ultra-secret exchanges should have come to nought? 29 When Grivas started his EOKA operations in Cyprus on April 1,1955, the perceptions of each side could not but have become increasingly less friendly, if not hostile. 30 And when late in June of that same year, the British government invited Greece and Turkey to confer in London about security problems in the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, the Greek 26

Lloyd told both the General Committee and the General Assembly on September 23 and 24, 1954, respectively, that there was nothing anti-Greek in the British government's attitude in this matter. Britain loved and admired Greece, its history, its heritage, its people. It was acting, however, in the best interests of Cyprus, of Greece itself, of the countries of the Aegean, of the Middle East, and of the free world (GAOR, Ninth Session, General Committee, September 23, 1954, p. 9; 477th Plenary meeting, September 24, 1954, p. 53). On its side, the Greek government was trying to convince the British government that by its negative attitude in this matter, it was following an anti-British policy ("On the Cyprus Question", p. 46, note 2). 27 Presenting the British viewpoint, Lloyd referred to the Slav-speaking minority in northern Greece, suggesting in this retaliatory reference that this ethnic group might wish to achieve enosis with Yugoslavia or Bulgaria, thus arousing Greek official and public opinion perceptions of British unfriendliness (ibid., p. 9). 28 Lodge made this distinction during the debate. The word "consider" involved passing judgment, the word "discuss" did not, he explained, GAOR, Ninth Session, Political Committee, 749th meeting, December 14, 1954, pp. 544-545. 29 Xydis, "Toward 'Toil and Moil' in Cyprus", p. 16. Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 15-16. 80 The noted Hellenist, Lord Jowett, a Labour Party peer, speaking on April 8, 1955, in the House of Lords, suggested that Greece was ungrateful toward Britain when he referred to the anti-British broadcasts of Athens Radio which had elicited a demarche of Sir Charles Peake with the government in Athens ("On the Cyprus Question", p. 22).

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43

side found itself in a quandary. Was this the invitation of a friend or of a foe? Was it a bona fide effort to find a solution or a trap? One way to find out was by accepting the invitation. A t a minimum, attending the proposed conference would have the side effect that Cyprus was an international issue, despite the British position that n o Cyprus question existed. A t the tripartite London Conference of 1955, the Greek side learned that the British side wished by means of this conference mainly to demonstrate the intense interest of Turkish decision-makers in the Cyprus question — something the Greek side had refused to reckon with, acting somewhat as the British side had acted in response to the first Greek probes on the Cyprus question through the diplomatic channel. 3 1 A s a result, Turkey now became in Greek eyes a poor friend, if not a competitor and foe in the Cyprus question, especially when the anti31

The disregard shown by Greek decision-makers on the Cyprus question in 1954 toward the Turkish factor was not due to a lack of information about Turkey's attitude toward the Cyprus question but rather to an unwillingness to give due weight to this factor and to a tendency to approach the matter in legal terms because of Turkey's recognition of Britain's annexation of the island under Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne. This disregard could have strengthened Turkish resentment. In 1951 and 1952, Ankara's attitude in this matter, the Greek government was aware, was hardly encouraging. And on February 19, 1954 there had been a public Turkish statement to the effect that Turkey saw no need for a change in the regime of the island, hence no need either for talks with Greece over an island that belonged to Britain ("On the Cyprus Question", p. 3, note 2). Yet on April 15, 1954, when Premier Papagos, at a meeting with top advisers, decided to go ahead with the recourse to the United Nations, he expressed optimism on the matter of dealing with the Turkish government on the Cyprus issue. The Director-General of the Greek Foreign Ministry, A. A. Kyrou, likewise believed that no difficulties were to be expected on the part of the Turks, despite warnings of the Greek Ambassador in London since January 1954 about the important role Turkey was playing in allied plans for the defense of the Middle East and his forecasts that if Cyprus were ever to be discussed, Turkey was likely to be included in the talks {ibid., pp. 1-2). Generally, Kyrou believed that difficulties with Turkey could be easily ironed out; appeared to attach little importance to a conversation he had had about Cyprus a few days earlier with the Turkish Ambassador in Athens; and expected the Turkish attitude to become more conciliatory after the Turkish elections of May 2, 1954. Yet it seems that the Turkish ambassador had informed the Greek Foreign Ministry that his government wanted no change in the regime of Cyprus; that if talks were held on this matter they would have to be tripartite; and that debate of the issue in the UN would embitter Greek-Turkish relations. So at least Ambassador Mostras learned from British Ambassador Sir Charles Peake and then from the Foreign Office in London, duly reporting back these findings to Athens. Except for an abortive effort to raise the matter with Menderes on June 7, 1954, the Greek government does not seem either to have made any serious effort to probe the Turkish government's attitude on the matter. In August 1954, when the Greek Foreign Minister sought to raise the question of Cyprus with his Turkish colleague during a meeting of the Balkan Pact members at Bled in Yugoslavia, the Turkish Foreign Minister replied curtly: "There

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Greek riots broke out in Istanbul and Izmir the closing day of that conference.32 This quite brutally stimulated new perception of Turkey's interest apparently had an intimidating effect on both the Greek and Greek Cypriot sides. The latter now lowered the level of their demands on the British decision-makers by expressing willingness to discuss selfgovernment for Cyprus which they had hitherto rejected, if the British side were to give some sort of assurance about Cypriot self-determination in the future. One of its purposes was to exclude the Turkish decisionmakers from taking part in the negotiations. The result was that early in October 1955, Makarios and Harding began their negotiations, hardly as friends but as competitors if not as foes, while the Greek side acted closer to the friendship end of the spectrum in its relations with the British side.33 EOKA's continued activities together with Harding's introduction of extremely severe emergency measures in late November 1955 could not but have raised the reciprocal perceptions of the negotiators that they were foes. The outcome was no agreement and certain side effects — a propagandists effect on the world at large and the gathering of information about what each side could or could not get away with. When the British

is no Cyprus question" (ibid., p. 12). C. Christides, who served in the General Press Directorate in Athens from late 1952 to spring 1954 and specialized in Turkish affairs, maintained that reports about Turkish press items were not studied with due care and writes that in autumn of 1953 polemics began in the Turkish press with regard to the treatment of the Turkish minority in Thrace (C. Christides, The Cyprus Question and Greek-Turkish Matters 1953-1967 [Athens, 1967], [in Greek] p. 4). His memoranda of February 12, March 24, and March 29, 1954 about Greek-Turkish relations (ibid., pp. 7-17) reveal expectations that the Democrat Party in Turkey would be more friendly in the Cyprus question after the Turkish general elections of May 2, 1954. Indeed, their author recommended that the Greek government soft-pedal the issue before those elections so as to facilitate the victory of the Democrat Party at the polls (ibid., pp. 17-18). Interestingly enough, it was on May 3, 1954, namely the day after those elections, that Papagos for the first time announced publicly his government's decision to resort to the United Nations over the Cyprus question. Incidentally, this commentator on Cyprus affairs and Greek-Turkish relations, who deplores the lack of prior consultation between the Greek and the Turkish government on the Cyprus question, takes only the question of the Turkish minority on this island into account, not Turkey's strategic arguments. Moreover, in favoring the raising of the question, he assumed the existence of Anglo-American rivalry in the eastern Mediterranean whereas in reality the U.S. during this period tended to allow Britain to play the cards of the West in that part of the world in exchange for a free hand in the Far East. 32 Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 158-161. 33 Ibid.,pp. 114-118.

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side deported the leader of the Greek Cypriot side to the Seychelles in early March 1956, it is not surprising that the perceptions of both the Cypriot and the Greek side about British unfriendliness if not outright hostility were confirmed. 34 It is not necessary to continue this exercise of applying the earliermentioned highly abstract findings about the dynamics of negotiations in order to demonstrate their value for the analysis of specific cases. What has been said already demonstrates the importance of trust in negotiating as a preliminary for conflict resolution, in other words the necessity and the difficulties of building up friendly perceptions if efforts are to be made in earnest to resolve a conflict, especially if this is a conflict between friends. Between foes, trust is less important. A common interest is enough. The author's two books on the Cyprus question abundantly illustrate this problem. Since the end of 1956, the British side exerted many and varied efforts to alter the perception of the Greek side and the Ethnarchy that it was a foe or a perfidious friend. It came up with new proposals for selfgovernment in December 1956.35 In March 1957, it released Makarios from detention in the Seychelles, without, however, allowing him to return to Cyprus. In spring, it tried to get NATO into the picture through the good offices offer of Lord Ismay, NATO's Secretary-General.36 In August 1957 it made several efforts to get the Greek side to agree to a new tripartite conference. As an inducement it proposed the participation of NATO's Secretary-General and a U.S. representative as observers. However, the Greek side's experience with the London Tripartite Conference of 1955 turned out to be a major factor (or provided a credible justification) for the Greek side's distrust of these new efforts to initiate negotiations on the Cyprus question. 37 During NATO's vain efforts of late September-October 1958 to arrange another conference, this distrust on the Greek side was again much in evidence, with perceptions of hostility enhanced by the British side's efforts to implement the Macmillan plan, after Macmillan's visit to Athens. 38 During the negotiations with the Turkish side which led to the Zürich agreements of February 11, 1959, and almost to the very end, the Greek side's distrust of the British

34 35 38 37 88

Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 118, and 126-127. Ibid., p. 605. Ibid., pp. 72-74. Ibid., pp. 156-158,175, and 177. See below, Chapter VI, pp. 277-278.

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INTRODUCTION

side continued.39 Some of the Greek spokesmen played on this distrust in order to get the Greek Cypriot representatives to endorse the Cyprus agreements of London.40 During this last phase of the Cyprus question, Turkish distrust of the British side seems to have been far less intense than the distrust of the Greek side vis-à-vis Britain. However, at various other phases of the Cyprus question, Turkish distrust of the British seems to have been quite marked, for instance with regard to the Foot plan of early 1958.41 Some of the Greek participants in Cyprus developments that year felt that the Turkish side's decision toward that year's end to negotiate with Greece over the Cyprus question was, to a certain extent at least, motivated by Turkish distrust of Britain, whose representative had repeatedly stated in the UN General Assembly that partition of Cyprus was far from desirable as a solution to the problem.42 Turkish distrust of the Greeks was, of course, far greater throughout. And the Greek side encountered enormous difficulties in trying to allay this distrust and to demonstrate that it genuinely believed that independence was the most appropriate final solution of the Cyprus question, not just a step toward enosis.43 It would seem that as Turkey's distrust of Greek motivations waned and its distrust of Britain waxed, the moment was ripe for initiating negotiations with the Greek government. That the Greek decision-makers by late 1958 were no longer able to misperceive the position of the British Labour Party on the Cyprus question, when even the Left Wing Labour leaders in the House of Commons supported the Macmillan plan and then also came out in favor of Makarios' proposal for an independent Cyprus, dashed the expectations of the Greek side that cunctative tactics until a Labour government came to power in Britain might pay.44 38

See below, Chapters VIII, IX, and X, pp. 351, 368, and 400. See below, Chapter XI, p. 440. See below, Chapter I, p. 69. 42 See below, Chapter VIII, p. 300. 43 See below, Chapter XII, p. 470. 44 The Greek decision-makers responsible for raising the Cyprus question in the United Nations in 1954 not only tended to underestimate the Turkish factor but also disregarded warnings from the Greek Ambassador in London, early in 1954, that none of the Labour Party leaders he had gotten in touch with (Clement Attlee, Herbert Morrison, Hector McNeil, Hugh Gaitskell, F. Noel-Baker) showed any inclination to support the Greek views on British-Greek negotiations over Cyprus, although they recognized the existence of the problem and the sentiments of the Greek Cypriots. While regretting the inflamed public opinion in Greece, they concluded that beyond a constitution for self-government, agreed upon between the British authorities in 40

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47

Psychologists have demonstrated that the probability of cooperation is increased in a game if players share the common experience of being Cyprus and the Cypriots, no other solution was possible. And they considered that the moment for raising the problem was most inappropriate. In imperial defense matters, wrote the Ambassador, no fissure appeared to exist between the Conservative and the Labour parties ("On the Cyprus Question", p. 16). As long as the leadership of the latter was in the hands of Attlee and Morrison, the majority of the Labour Party, in times of crisis, Ambassador Mostras predicted, would be on the side of the Conservatives (ibid., p. 17). The extreme Left Wing of the Labour Party on the other hand, which he estimated at 96 members of Parliament at the time (ibid., p. 20, note 1), assumed a different attitude. In the Cyprus question, this became quite evident at the Party's annual conference in September 1954 at Scarborough. Perhaps interested (like the EDA party in Greece) in promoting Greek-Turkish conflict, these members, led by Aneurin Bevan, proposed a resolution expressing support of the Greek Cypriot struggle. The result was that Attlee himself was obliged in this intra-party conflict to concern himself with the drafting of this resolution which in its final form was of a rather vague and procedural character. In this resolution, the Party deplored the Conservative government's handling of the Cyprus question and urged the Labour M.P.'s to attack this policy on every occasion. In other words, for the Conference, the question was a stick with which to beat the "Tories". This resolution referred neither to enosis nor to self-determination. Moreover, as such, it had no binding character on the Labourites in Parliament. One of the "fellow-travellers" (T. Driberg) in the Labour Party hoped that in exchange for support of the Greek Cypriot cause, the Greek government might release a number of communists detained in prison or on islands of detention (ibid., pp. 16-18). The attitude of responsible Labour Party leaders in 1955 did not change, however. Thus McNeil, in a conversation with the Greek Ambassador to London, advised the Greek government against expecting anything more than selfgovernment for the Cypriots, not self-determination (ibid., p. 22). And Gaitskell refused a Greek government invitation to visit Greece (ibid., p. 23). To judge, however, from Premier Papagos' attitude, these reports did not reach him (ibid., p. 22) — unless he chose to ignore them, just as in 1954 he had disliked being reminded of the Turkish factor (ibid., p. 4). As de Rivera points out, the perception of a decision-maker depends on channels of communication consisting of chains of individuals and each individual is not a passive relay but has his own perceptions and each must decide what to report up the chain (De Rivera, The Psychological Dimensions of Foreign Policy, p. 49) — or a person's attentive process depends on his response to categories he has learned in the past and on his goals and beliefs, while his perceptual process depends on the nature of the stimulus he confronts and on his beliefs, with the alternative selected to be perceived being the alternative that requires the least reorganization of his beliefs (ibid., p. 45). As the case of certain Greek diplomatic officials in the Cyprus story reveals, sometimes individuals in a chain of communications of an organization are removed because of their perception of what they should report up the chain. But to continue on the subject of the Labour Party and Cyprus, Morrison, in May 1955, at a press conference merely referred to negotiations with the Cypriots for a constitution (self-government) not self-determination, and the Labour Party, in its election program, likewise of 1955, did not mention Cyprus at all but merely to the need of promoting self-government for all colonial peoples in terms that could be hardly distinguished from the relevant passage of the Conservative Party which proclaimed the intention of raising the living standards of the colonial peoples and of leading them toward self-government within the Commonwealth and the Empire. When Ambassador Mostras asked Driberg why Cyprus had not been mentioned, Driberg said this was due to lack of time ("On the Cyprus Question", p. 23). After the tripartite London conference of 1955, the

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INTRODUCTION

exposed to an obnoxious third party before the game begins.45 In seeing how the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers got together toward the end of the thirteenth UN General Assembly and how they began their negotiations which led to the Zürich summit conference, one wonders whether this third party was Britain. This, in turn, raises the question whether the British government quite deliberately tried to become obnoxious to the Greek and Turkish governments in order to get those

New Statesman and Nation, a Labour Party organ, praised as reasonable the first Macmillan plan (1955) with its concept of "triple condominium over Cyprus with common military bases" (ibid., p. 24). Of course, the Labour Party spokesmen did not fail to exploit to the utmost the British government's decision to deport Makarios to the Seychelles in March 1956, without, however, exposing themselves on the substance of a solution of the question along the lines desired by the Greek decision-makers {ibid., p. 25). At the 1956 Labour Party Conference, A. Robens spoke about a five-year period of self-government with defense and foreign affairs reserved for the Governor and about a second five-year period during which the date of self-determination would be decided through negotiations with the Cypriots. At the same time he expressed doubts whether the Cypriots would then opt for enosis. The relevant resolution, while inviting the Parliamentary Labour Party to insist on a solution of the Cyprus question based on the right of the Cypriots to self-determination, mainly condemned the policy of the British government and supported the demand of the Cypriot people for full syndical and democratic rights. And, outside the conference, Gaitskell, in October 1956, called for new negotiations with Makarios or NATO examination of the question, rejected the notion of a plebiscite, and suggested self-government with the discussion of self-determination at a later date. Bevan, too, by the end of December 1956, also spoke about sending the question to NATO and praised the Radcliffe plan for Cypriot selfgovernment, though rejecting partition, which Lennox-Boyd had presented as a possible future option on December 19,1956 (ibid., p. 27). The closest the Labour Party conference ever came to supporting the right of self-determination of the Cypriots was at its Brighton Conference in October 1957. The relevant resolution encouraged the Greek side (Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 248-249, 250-252, and 327). It proclaimed that the Cypriots should be given the right of self-determination and, after a certain period of time, the possibility of choosing union with Greece. The second paragraph of this resolution, however, which the Athens press did not publish, asserted that it was entirely possible that when the right of self-determination would be given to the Cypriots, they would decide in favor of remaining in the Commonwealth (i.e. opt against enosis). Athens, once again, chose to consider this resolution as binding on the Parliamentary Labour Party, whereas such resolutions, as mentioned earlier, are not. Indeed, after the Brighton conference, the Labour Party M.P., Desmond Donnelly, told the Cypriots over Cyprus Radio that a future Labour government could not be bound by this resolution since the course of international developments could not be foreseen. Then, on March 12, 1958, Bevan told foreign correspondents in London that even the mention of self-determination or enosis should be shelved for a number of years and that a new constitution providing for self-government was desirable (ibid., p. 32). Any lingering hopes of Greek politicians about the attitude of the Labour Party were dispelled during the Commons debates on the second Macmillan plan on June 26, 1958 (see below, Chapter m , pp. 149,150, and 151). 48 De Rivera, The Psychological Dimensions of Foreign Policy, p. 379.

INTRODUCTION

49

two governments to negotiate a solution of the Cyprus problem. After late February 1958, the British government decided to try to impose a Cyprus settlement. The Macmillan plan that was unveiled in June was the outcome of this decision. On October 1, 1958, efforts to implement it had begun. On the other hand, the Cyprus settlement of 1959 cannot be understood without taking into account the common distrust and fear which all three governments, with the United States in the background, shared vis-à-vis the USSR. This common distrust and fear was the thread of common interest among those states, those governments. This distrust toward the USSR was greater than the distrust they felt toward each other! Seen in this light, this settlement was a nondeliberate side effect of the Soviet government's new strivings late in November 1958 to bring about a change in the status of Berlin in its own favor. By provoking a new Berlin crisis, and thus heightening East-West tension, it was primarily the USSR, under Khrushchev, which played the role of the obnoxious third party in this dispute, and stimulated those Greek-Turkish negotiations that led to the Cyprus settlement of 1959. In a roundabout way, then, this crisis between East and West was an important factor in the birth of the new state. Conversely, Greek expectations that the USSR would become less obnoxious after Stalin's death in March 1953 constituted one of the factors underlying the Greek government's decision to go ahead and raise the Cyprus question the following year in the United Nations in the first place. For one of the keenest champions of such a move, the Cypriot Greek Director-General of the Greek Foreign Ministry, Alexis A. Kyrou, maintained that after Stalin's death a period of "cold peace" would succeed the Cold War. Whereas earlier, in 1945 and even in 1950, the year of the Cyprus plebiscite, he had expressed his opposition to raising the Cyprus question, by 1953 he felt that the moment had now arrived to do so with the British government and, if necessary, by resort to the United Nations. 46 The obnoxious Soviet third-party factor in its communist guise likewise contributed to government desires to reach a settlement of the Cyprus dispute, even before Khrushchev's quasi-ultimative note on Berlin in November 1958. This was particularly in evidence in the Greek political arena which, in the general elections of May 11,1958, witnessed a striking 48 Conflict and Conciliation, p. 7. S. G. Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers Prelude to the "Truman Doctrine", p. 582, note 80.

1944-1947:

50

INTRODUCTION

resurgence of the political influence and the Parliamentary strength of EDA, the communist-facade party which became active in Greek politics since 1951. The Greek Foreign Minister's letter to Grivas on the aftermath of these elections eloquently testifies the extent to which this domestic political development affected the views of the "External Decision-Maker" of Greece with regard to the Cyprus question. 47 The Cyprus story provides interesting instances of the resort to unacknowledged use of force in international politics which has been an important feature of the post-World War II era, when general and nuclear war has been avoided but resort to limited and localized use of force has brought about changes on the international stage. The antiBritish activities of EOKA, with its small group of determined men under an astonishingly resourceful and fanatical leader, are well documented. Originally, EOKA was not supported by the Greek government. It represented a private enterprise embarked upon by Grivas and Makarios, the former becoming the military arm of the latter. Very soon, however, the Greek government, being stymied in its efforts to achieve its goals by other political means, bipartite or parliamentary diplomacy, came around to supporting EOKA's efforts with arms and money so that this organization became an instrument of Greek statecraft 48 just as the guerrilla activities of Markos Yafiadis between 1946-1949 served as instruments of the Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian statecraft in the pursuit of their political aims. And just as the Greek government in December 1946 drew the attention of the UN Security Council to the support which Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were giving to these guerilla activities in northern Greece, so did the British government, in 1956, feel obliged to draw the attention of the UN General Assembly to EOKA's activities in Cyprus and to the Greek government's support of these activities.49 As the Cyprus story shows, it would seem that the Greek government progressively felt that these activities were becoming counterproductive and sought to restrain the operations of this covert military instrument of policy, in efforts to exercise civilian control over the military, while pursuing its goals through other political means. This, in turn, contributed to friction and tension in intragroup relations not dissimilar to those that developed between Truman and General MacArthur during the Korean War. But more about this later. 47

See below, Chapter III, p. 120. Xydis, "Toward 'Toil and Moil' in Cyprus", pp. 4-5, 14-15, and 17-18. ® UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 55, pp. 6-7.

48 4

INTRODUCTION

51

On the British side EOKA's activities elicited a response which involved relations of force and power; the appointment of a military man as the island's Governor and the introduction of emergency measures of great severity in November 1955. Gradually, the British government, just as the Greek government did in the case of its own covert instrument of agitational terrorism, came to realize that governmental terrorism was becoming counterproductive. Indicative of this change of mind was the appointment of a civilian official with Labour Party affiliation, to replace the military man as the island's governor — a change which may have created intragroup friction between the new governor and his human instruments of coercion. Because of lack of access to British and Turkish primary sources equivalent to those of the Greek side, less obvious were the British intragroup problems as well as the exact roles of the Turkish Cypriot organization Volkan,first,and then of TMT, which emerged in 1956 and served as military arm of the "Cyprus is Turkish" Association and thus were also instruments of Turkish statecraft on the island itself. The Turkish Cypriot attacks on the Greek Cypriots and Greek Cypriot property which were carried out in early June 1958 constituted an outstanding operation of these unacknowledged instruments of Turkish policy for the pursuit of Turkish goals in Cyprus, which originally envisaged not merely partition but the entire island's annexation to Turkey. In dealing with the Cyprus question, however, the Turkish government also resorted to covert and unacknowledged force against Greek targets outside the island as well. Foreshadowing the pattern of the Turkish Cypriot operation of June 1958 in Cyprus were the anti-Greek riots of September 1955 in Istanbul and Izmir. As the Yassiada trials of 1960-1961 revealed, there was considerable circumstantial evidence that Menderes and Zorlu planned a demonstration in Istanbul in order to press the Turkish cause on Cyprus. Evidence, too, was presented at these trials that the Turkish Foreign Minister had phoned from London during the tripartite conference there, urging that "a little activity would be useful" to his negotiating position, and that the police had received orders not to interfere with the demonstrators.50 Finally, backstage, the Turkish government resorted to techniques of power, namely to threats of resort to overt governmental force on several occasions during the pre-independence phase of the Cyprus dispute. 50 W. F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1963), p. 34.

52

INTRODUCTION

Occasionally officials of the American or British governments conveyed these threats to the Greek government. A few times, the Turkish government itself conveyed such threats to the Greek government through the diplomatic channel. 51 Moreover, in spring 1958, the Turkish government assumed a threatening attitude nonverbally, through the amassing (and reports thereof) of troops on the mainland of Anatolia opposite Cyprus. 52 As is well known, after Cyprus became a sovereign state, this technique assumed a far more menacing, explicit and overt form. In 1964 and again in 1967, the Turkish government engaged in impressive preparations for an armed invasion of the island, maintaining it had a right to resort to force under the Treaty of Guarantee, and the invasion was stopped short as it was about to be launched. In August 1964, in response to Greek Cypriot efforts to eliminate by force a Turkish Cypriot enclave near the Kokkina Bay, it resorted to displays of force and aerial bombing. The story reveals intragroup conflict on the Greek side and, to a lesser extent, on the Turkish and British sides. On the Turkish side, there seemed to have been differences of views between President CelSl Bayar and Zorlu, and, on the British side, between Colonial Secretary LennoxBoyd and Foreign Secretary Lloyd. The intra-Turkish conflicts were in evidence during the Greek-Turkish negotiations that led to the Zurich Conference. The intra-British conflicts between the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office can be guessed at other critical moments, during the NATO Council efforts to arrange for a round-table Cyprus conference and after the UN consideration of the Cyprus issue at the thirteenth General Assembly. On both occasions statements by Lennox-Boyd contributed to Greek distrust which hampered the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the opening of bona fide negotiations. Was the issue of partition the focus of this conflict? Researchers of the future might do well to check this hypothesis.53 Of course, the intragroup conflict occurring on the Greek side comes to the fore, because of the special intimacy of the sources used in this study. Conflicts occurred between the Greek Foreign Minister and Makarios, on the one hand, and Grivas on the other. But they occurred also between the Greek government and the Cyprus Ethnarch. These latter conflicts were of a different character than the former. They were 51

Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 79-81. See below, Chapter III, p. 122. 53 In the Colonial Office, E. Melville, Assistant Secretary at the Colonial Office, was thought by some to be a champion of partition. 62

INTRODUCTION

53

conflicts of a political character, conflicts not only among friends, mostly concerning methods for handling the Cyprus question and decisionmaking in general, but conflicts that shaded into competition for the office of central decision-making. Thus they inevitably involved Premier Karamanlis himself and the entire Greek government's position, with Makarios, on occasion, behaving almost as an "Aspiring DecisionMaker", in the arena of Greek politics.54 Typical of conflicts that often arise between civilian and military leadership were the intragroup conflicts between the Greek Foreign Minister and the Ethnarch, on the one side, and EOKA's leader, on the other. Averoff-Tossizza, for instance, viewed the Cyprus conflict as a competition with the British and Turkish governments, a struggle which had to be waged within the framework of the Atlantic alliance and of friendly relations among Greece, Britain and Turkey. This was mainly true of Makarios' attitude toward the question, especially with regard to the British. Hence both were out for a "political solution", a bargain, the best bargain they could achieve. Grivas, on the other hand, quite naturally as a military man, viewed the conflict mainly as a fight. Hence his tendency to be unreasonable, fanatical, heroic. Hence his constant advice to Averoff that Greece should kick aside its NATO allies. Hence his bitter feelings, when the Zürich and London agreements were reached, that the outcome had been capitulation. For if a conflict is viewed as a fight, the only outcomes of interaction that can be envisaged are domination or capitulation. In this intragroup conflict between the civilian and military leadership, the conflict between Grivas and "Isaakios" was waged within a mainly friendly framework. The conflict between Grivas and Makarios, on the other hand, had powerful overtones of competition. And the various actions of either cannot be understood unless viewed in such a context. Grivas, unlike the Ethnarch, during the 1954-1959 phase of the Cyprus 54

The day Makarios was released from his detention in the Seychelles Islands, namely around March 28, 1957, (when Lennox-Boyd announced this decision to the House of Commons) Sir Charles Peake, the British Ambassador in Athens, told Mostras, the Greek Ambassador to London (he was in Athens, having been recalled there after the Ethnarch had been deported to the Seychelles in early March 1956), that if Makarios came to Athens, he might eventually become Premier of Greece ("On the Cyprus Question", p. 28, note 1). This remark reveals a British perception of Makarios as a potential political leader in Greek not Cypriot politics, probably with the precedent of E. Venizelos and Crete in mind. To the Greek diplomat, it suggested that such a consideration might constitute one of the factors underlying the British decision to end the Ethnarch's detention in the Seychelles while continuing his exile from Cyprus.

54

INTRODUCTION

conflict does not seem to have entertained, as he did later for a while at least, any aspirations to become a "Central Decision-Maker" in Greece. In Cyprus itself it was a different matter. The break-off of direct contact with Makarios for several months in 1958 appears to be quite significant. So was his disgruntlement at the Ethnarch's lack of cooperation in passive resistance and especially in plans for setting up a political arm of EOKA. As his bitterness at not being invited to send representatives to the London Conference betrayed, Grivas resented being treated merely as the military arm of the Ethnarchy. Albeit reluctantly, on the other hand, he offered his various truces which "Isaakios" at various times suggested, thus loyally playing his role as an instrument of the Greek government's political struggle, which meant competing with, not fighting against the British and the Turks, in order to get the best bargain possible. The phases passed through until the Cyprus agreements of 1959 and 1960 were reached consisted first of a period of debate and then of a period of what has been called a "Rapoport debate", which really appears to be diplomacy conducted either publicly before third parties—"parliamentary diplomacy" strictu sensu — or quietly and privately backstage. Debate, as mentioned already, is designed to convince third parties of the correctness of one's own position. In it, each party states his own position, emphasizing its "correctness", and rebuts his opponent's position by pointing out things "wrong" with it.55 The opening statements of the Greek, British, and Turkish representatives in the Political Committee at the thirteenth General Assembly, together with the exchanges that followed these statements, clearly illustrate the main characteristics of debate. The Turkish Foreign Minister's more "reasonable" statement before the Political Committee on December 3, 1958, on the other hand, together with its noticeable change of tone toward the less acrimonious and passionate, illustrates this "Rapoport type" of debate which is really diplomatic soundings or even negotiation conducted publicly before a gathering of third parties. In this speech, Zorlu, as though playing the role not of a party to the dispute but of a Rapporteur, presented to the Committee an ostensibly unbiased analysis of the two conflicting views which had emerged from the Committee debate on the Cyprus question about what the United Nations should do in dealing 55

De Rivera, The Psychological Dimensions of Foreign Policy, pp. 280-281.

INTRODUCTION

55

with that question. In this type of debate, each party states or professes to state the other party's position until that other party agrees that his partner understands it. During the Cyprus item's consideration at the twelfth General Assembly in 1957 a move from debate to public diplomacy could be observed in the exchanges between the Turkish representative, Ambassador Selim Sarper, and the Greek Foreign Minister. On this occasion, the Turkish representative, after listening to the Greek Foreign Minister's exposition of the Turkish viewpoint and his proposals about how to meet this position, pointedly asked him "why he was negotiating with the Turkish government across the Committee table — sitting so far as he did? Better, much easier, more normal ways existed for negotiating than across a table in the presence of 82 delegations.56 In backstage diplomacy as contrasted to publicly conducted diplomacy, no better example of this type of interaction can be found in this Cyprus study than the exchanges that occurred between Macmillan and Karamanlis in their meetings of August 8-9, 1958, when indeed, the British Premier was explaining his partnership plan to the Greek Premier and exerted considerable efforts to state the Greek position until Karamanlis agreed that Macmillan had indeed understood it. Karamanlis, on his side, affirmed he was not bargaining in presenting the Greek objections to the Macmillan partnership plan. If he could not accept it, it was because he was convinced it would never work. Studies of the ways in which "conflicting worlds" interact have led certain students of conflict resolution to distinguish five basic outcomes of such interaction — domination, capitulation, compromise, encompassing responses, and agreement to disagree or second-level agreements.57 This author, in his previous Cyprus study, suggested that in addition to secondlevel agreement another type of outcome might be distinguished: agreement to try to agree.58 This sixth type of outcome, which is an indispensable precondition for at least three types of the above-mentioned basic outcomes if not for all five, is illustrated in Resolution 1287 (XIII) of the UN General Assembly which, as analyzed again in this new Cyprus study, symbolized an agreement between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers to exert efforts toward reaching an agreement. 6

® Conflict and Conciliation, p. 423. De Rivera, The Psychological Dimensions of Foreign Policy, pp. 279-280. 68 Conflict and Conciliation, p. 532. This type of outcome, the author noted, was a somewhat better outcome than a second-level agreement — an agreement to disagree. 67

56

INTRODUCTION

But in what category of basic outcomes of interacting conflicting worlds can the Zürich and London agreements of 1959 on Cyprus be placed? Evidently, despite the outcries of "Aspiring Decision-Makers" in both Greece and Turkey that these outcomes represented capitulations, the Zürich and London agreements were either a compromise or an encompassing response. In a compromise, the interacting parties leave their positions in favor of a third position, which often does not meet the values of either. In an encompassing response, on the other hand, the parties move to some new position that encompasses and integrates the values of all positions. Viewed as a whole, the Zürich and London Agreements represented a compromise. Britain abandoned its position that it should keep the whole of Cyprus as a base and agreed that bases in Cyprus were enough. Greece abandoned its claim for enosis and for self-determination. Turkey abandoned its claims for the island's annexation or for partition. Concurrently, all three parties adopted a third position, by favoring the establishment of a sovereign state of Cyprus. However, it would seem that an encompassing response, too, was involved within the ambit of this compromise, especially with regard to the Zürich Basic Structure and the Constitution which the Joint Constitutional Commission drafted within the framework of that structure. The Cyprus Constitution was the expression of this encompassing response. Though avoiding federation, which the Turkish side desired, it introduced important elements of functional partition. At the same time, to a certain extent again, it recognized the majority character of the Greek community as against the minority character of the Turkish community. This relationship was institutionalized in the offices of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic, in the 7-3 ratio of Greek Cypriot to Turkish Cypriot Ministers in the Council of Ministers, and in the other ratios between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the House of Representatives, the civil service and the police and armed forces. Compared with other cases of British dependencies gaining independence in the post-World War II era, Cyprus was unique for two reasons, it has been pointed out. 59 First, two other states formally contributed to this process and joined with Britain in military guarantees of the settlement; and, second, Cyprus did not become a member of the Commonwealth immediately on becoming independent but only nine months later and for a five-year trial period beginning from 1961. 59

J. D. B. Miller, The Commonwealth in the World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 227-228. The Commonwealth tie, in this author's view, was retained because of purely economic considerations.

INTRODUCTION

57

Whether this settlement was an unqualified success for the British government, because it was acceptable, is debatable. 60 In August 1957, the British government had informed the Greek government, first verbally, then in writing, that it desired a tripartite conference to assure Britain the following: 61 i. Essential military facilities in Cyprus under British sovereignty. ii. Protection of the island from communist infiltration. iii. Peace and tranquility on the whole island. Through the London agreements of 1959 and the establishment of Cyprus as an independent state, Britain achieved the first two goals. It attained, however, the third goal only for the period of three years at the most. It can thus be said that success in this last goal was very short-lived. As is well known, the island's tranquility was gravely jolted in 1963-1964 and again in 1967. These crises between Greek and Turkish Cypriots triggered grave Greek-Turkish crises. As British documents show, restoring the unity of NATO's south-eastern flank was another goal pursued by the British government since 1958 prior to the London agreements of 1959. Since 1964, UNFICYP's presence on the island (with British participation) to some extent has helped the British government in assuring its third goal of 1957. On the other hand, the strength of the communist-controlled AKEL party on the island has waxed. Thus, at some future time, the continued protection of Cyprus from communist infiltration — goal ii above — could be jeopardized. Thus, one can say that Cyprus was a British success only from the strategic viewpoint. The Greek government, incidentally, never disputed Britain's objective of maintaining a military base in Cyprus. The Turkish government, on the other hand, as revealed in this study, showed a lack of confidence in Britain's continued concern in maintaining such a base on the island. And it has been sceptical since about setting up a NATO base there, sharing in this respect the viewpoint of President Makarios. Observations have been made about the role of state actors in statebuilding as against the role of substate actors in the emergence of new states in the global multistate system. It was noted that if some new 00

N. Rosenbaum, "Success in Foreign Policy: the British in Cyprus 1878-1960", Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de Science politique 2 iv (December 1970), pp. 605-627. 61 Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 168, and 172.

58

INTRODUCTION

states appear to be more artificial than others, it was either because the people of the new state played a minimal role in initiating the statebuilding process or because their active elites reluctantly gave up their original goal which was something other than the attainment of statehood. Cyprus and, to a certain extent, Albania appeared to belong to this latter category. This Cyprus study also shows that pre-existing states, in their statebuilding activities, occasionally penetrate quite deeply into political matters usually considered as belonging to the sphere of "domestic" politics: constitution-making for the new state. Indeed, Cyprus provides a remarkably pure example of the predominant role pre-existing states may play in constitution-making as against the relatively minor role of the actors of the substate political level. For its Constitution was not the product of an elected national constituent assembly nor was it even ratified ex post facto by such an assembly or by a plebiscite, but was mainly the result of international negotiations. The Greek and Turkish governments first negotiated the constitutional skeleton of the Republic of Cyprus in a process that began at U N headquarters on December 6, 1958 and ended on February 11, 1959, in Zürich. This skeleton in turn was fleshed out by new international negotiations between Greece and Turkey which were now carried out, primarily though not exclusively, by a constitutional commission in which representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots also participated, having previously accepted in London, on February 19, 1959, the Zürich Basic Structure, among other agreements, as the constitutional foundation of their state. Finally, the British government accepted without change this Constitution which contained many features of the plan for an interim, seven-year period of selfgovernment for Cyprus — the Macmillan plan of June 1958 — and granted it to Cyprus through an Order-in-Council. An earlier example of the occasionally pre-eminent role of other states in constitution-making, not only in state-building, was the decision of the three guarantor powers in 1830 to set up Greece not only as an independent state but also as a monarchy, despite the fact that most constitutions the Greek national leaders themselves had adopted during the war of independence were republican in substance and all were constitutional in character. 62 Constitution-making, just like state-building, may be the result of a 62

For instance, the Constitutions of Epidaurus (1822), Astros (1823), or Troezene (1927). See N. Kaltchas, Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modem Greece (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940).

INTRODUCTION

59

convergence of factors emanating from the level of pre-existing states and their deliberate actions as well as from actors on the sub-state level. However, the deliberate impact of pre-existing states on constitutionmaking may be less overt than it was in the Cyprus case. For instance, the Greek Constitution of 1844 conformed to the type which the British Minister in Athens, on instructions received from London, outlined to Greek political personalities who were active in preparing that Constitution in the National Constitutional Assembly elected in 1843. And the particular provision concerning the religion of the Greek King's heir became an important and controversial issue between the protector powers of Greece and the King of Bavaria, the father of the King of Greece. When the Russian government supported the Greek draft of the relevant article, this was incorporated in the Constitution. 63 Indeed, only the study of diplomatic documents helps explain several hitherto inexplicable developments in the proceedings of the national Constitutional Assembly which drafted that Constitution. 64 At the other end of the spectrum, sub-state actors may play in constitution-making an altogether unique role, involving no deliberate actions on the part of actors on the state level. For the nascent United States the Articles of Confederation illustrates this point. Politically these were exclusively home-grown. Between this extreme of constitution-making and the other extreme illustrated by the Cyprus case — of overt and constitution-making almost exclusively by international negotiations — several intermediate types might be found. The impact of the collectivity of pre-existing states on constitutionmaking for a new state is particularly in evidence since the establishment of the United Nations, as the cases of Libya, Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi reveal. In the case of Libya, for instance, the United Nations, under a resolution of the General Assembly in 1950, appointed a commissioner assisted by a council of ten to assist the Libyan people in preparing a constitution and setting up an independent government. The Libyan National Assembly drafted and approved the Constitution on October 7,1951, which the King ofLibya promulgated that same day. 65 Another constitution drafted with UN assistance was that of Eritrea in 1952, as an autonomous unit of Ethiopia. 68

B. Jelavich, Russia and the Greek Revolution of1843 (Munich: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1966), pp. 38-39, and 41-44. 64 Conversation with the Greek historian, E. Prevelakis, Athens, 1968. • 5 For a detailed study, see A. Pelt, Libyan Independence and the United Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

60

INTRODUCTION

Although in the case of Cyprus, the United Nations played no role either in constitution-making or in the establishment of Cyprus as an independent state, first, among the drafters of the Constitution there was a neutral adviser and, second, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Rome Protocol were used in drafting the relevant chapter of the organic law of the Cyprus Republic. In other words, the quasi-legislative activities of a regional, European organization were invaluable in preparing these parts of the Constitution of Cyprus. But so was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Though not expressly referring to this Declaration, as certain other Constitutions did,66 the Constitution of Cyprus was inspired by it, as were the Constitutions of several other states.67

98

The Constitutions of Algeria (1963), Burundi (1962), Cameroon (1960), Chad (1960), Democratic Republic of Congo (1964), Republic of Congo (1963), Dahomey (1964), Gabon (1961), Guinea (1958), Ivory Coast (1960), Madagascar (1959), Mali (1960), Mauritania (1961), Niger (1960), Senegal (1963), Togo (1962), Upper Volta (1960), Somalia (1960), and Rwanda (1962). 67 The Constitutions of Afghanistan (1964), Central African Republic (1964), Dominican Republic (1963), Gambia (1965), Guatemala (1965), Haiti (1964), Honduras (1965), Jamaica (1962), Kenya (1964), Malawi (1964), Malta (1964), Morocco (1962), Nigeria (1960), Romania (1965), Sierra Leone (1964), Singapore (1965), Syria (provisional Constitution of 1964), Tanganyika (1962), Trinidad and Tobago (1962), Uganda (1962), UAR (1964), Yugoslavia (1963), and Zanzibar (1963).

PART ONE

I AS 1958 OPENS

A. CYPRUS DEADLOCK

The clash of wills that occurred on September 22, 1953 at the British Embassy in Athens, when Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden (soon to succeed Churchill as Premier) stiffly told Premier and Field Marshal Alexander Papagos that there was no Cyprus question, marked the critical moment when the leaders of Greece and Britain began tying up Cyprus into that tangled international knot which their successors, Constantine Karamanlis and Harold Macmillan, joined by Turkey's Adnan Menderes, were to have such enormous trouble in untying. This clash between British colonialism couchant and Greek irredentism on the wane set in motion an immensely complicated chain of events, of incidents and accidents which involved the United Nations and NATO. A Greek Cypriot and a Cypriot Greek, Archbishop and Ethnarch Makarios, and a retired Greek Army Colonel, George Grivas, were other major dramatis personae in this imbroglio. In their strivings for enosis, they planned those activities which erupted the night of March 31-April 1, 1955, when several explosions rocked Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Limassol, and "Dighenis" circulated his first proclamation as leader of EOKA—the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters.1 1

S. G. Xydis, "Toward 'Toil and Moil' in Cyprus", Middle East Journal 20 (1966), pp. 7-11. Also Conflict and Conciliation 1954-1958, pp. 9-10; 69-72 (biographical sketch of Grivas); and 133-134 (biographical sketch of Makarios). For enosis movement and the British and Turkish Cypriot attitudes toward enosis until 1950, see Sir George Hill, A History of Cyprus 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), pp. 488-568. Before Britain annexed Cyprus in 1914, the British government contended against partisans of enosis that under the Constantinople Convention of 1878, Britain had no sovereignty over Cyprus and that sovereignty was still vested in the Sultan. Hence, it could not dispose of the island, even if it so wished. This argument became untenable after 1914 when Britain annexed the island, and it became even more so after the British government in October 1915 offered Cyprus to Greece, if Greece entered World War I by fulfilling its treaty obligations to Serbia (ibid., pp. 522-523). The

64

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After vain efforts to negotiate with Britain through the diplomatic channel, the Greek government first raised the Cyprus issue in the United Nations in 1954. It had in mind the plebiscite conducted by the Ethnarchy in Cyprus in January 15, 1950, when 97 per cent of the Greek Cypriots voted for enosis: union with Greece of the British Crown Colony in the eastern Mediterranean. In U N terms, it formulated this goal as a request for the application of the principle of self-determination to the people of this Crown Colony. In 1954, however, the U N General Assembly, at its ninth session, merely debated the question. On December 17,1954, in Resolution 814(IX) it decided not to consider the item further, for the time being. 2 Then, at its tenth session, the Assembly decided on September 23, 1955 not even to include the Cyprus item in its agenda.3 The third time, at its eleventh session, it considered both the Greek request and a British item entitled "Support from Greece for Terrorism in Cyprus" as a single item. On February 26,1957, it adopted Resolution 1013(XI) which India's V. K. Krishna Menon had proposed. Under this Resolution the Assembly, believing that a solution of the question required an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression, expressed the "earnest desire" that a peaceful, democratic, and just solution could be found in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Turkish Cypriots on the other hand, in their opposition to enosis before 1914, expressed their contentment with the British administration. When in 1902 enosis became a particularly lively issue, the Turkish Cypriots even considered taking up arms, fearing the Greeks would take action (ibid., p. 510). During the Italo-Turkish War (1911-1912), Greek Cypriots of Limassol insulted Turks who retaliated. Five persons were killed and 135 wounded in the riots that ensued. By the end of 1912, the Turkish Cypriots hoped Cyprus might be ceded to Britain or annexed to Egypt (ibid., pp. 518-519). When Britain annexed Cyprus on November 5, 1914, the Greek leaders protested and urged enosis. They proposed that a convention guaranteed by Britain should be concluded, to ensure the Turkish minority. The Turkish Cypriots, on their side, favored permanent annexation of Cyprus to Britain. They were "deeply moved" when the British government in 1915, as mentioned, offered to cede Cyprus to Greece (ibid., pp. 521-522). In 1916, under the Sykes-Picot agreement with France, Britain undertooknot to negotiate with any third party for the purpose of ceding Cyprus without previous French consent (ibid., p. 524). In 1919, when the Greek Cypriot partisans of enosis became very active in pressing their claim at the time of the peace settlements, the Turkish Cypriots wanted to remain under British rule. A smaller party, however, advocated the island's cession to Turkey (ibid., p. 529). Turkish Cypriots welcomed the proclamation of Cyprus as a Crown Colony in 1925. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, solemnly protested (ibid., pp. 540-541). 2 Conflict mid Conciliation, pp. 9-14, and 17-22 (U.S. attitude especially). 3 Ibid., pp. 22-23.

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and the hope that negotiations would be resumed and continued to that end. 4 By the end of 1957, however, this Resolution remained unimplemented. Protagonists and antagonists were still deadlocked over the question. Indicative of this is that on December 14, because of the lack of a two-thirds majority, the twelfth General Assembly, after having once again considered the Cyprus issue quite thoroughly, did not adopt the draft resolution recommended by the Political Committee and favored by the Greek government but opposed by the British and Turkish governments because its operative clause referred to the right of self-determination of the people of Cyprus. As a result, Resolution 1013(XI) of the previous Assembly remained valid, with both the British and Greek representatives at the twelfth Assembly explicitly recognizing it as such.5 Since the adoption of Resolution 1013(XI), the Greek government had failed to get negotiations resumed between the British authorities in Cyprus and representatives of the people of Cyprus for setting up a "democratic" form of self-government at least for an interim period until the people, as a whole, not separately the Greeks and the Turks, would be allowed to exercise their right of self-determination. This procedure would prevent Turkey, the Greek government hoped, from playing any direct role in the question as a "party concerned", even though the Greek government recognized by now the need of safeguarding Turkey's interests in the Turkish Cypriot minority on the island and especially in its own security.6 Nor had Britain or any other state, for that matter, been willing to propose independence or dominion status for Cyprus for a certain number of years, pending the application of the right of selfdetermination to the people of Cyprus — a solution which both the Greek government and the Ethnarch of Cyprus had been willing to accept since August 1957, if another party were to propose it. 7 The British government, on the other hand, by early 1956 had officially ceased maintaining that the principle of self-determination did not apply to the Crown Colony's inhabitants. And, after the Suez debacle of that same year and Eden's replacement by Macmillan, it had decided that it no longer needed Cyprus as a base but only bases in Cyprus. 8 In August 4

Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 39-43, and 51-60. Ibid., pp. 492-494. 6 Ibid., p. 27. 7 Ibid., pp. 162-163,166, and 185. 8 In his fourth volume of memoirs, Harold Macmillan reveals that in spring 1957 he had asked a committee chaired by the Secretary to the Cabinet, Norman Brook 5

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1957, it had made this clear in writing to the Greek government in vain efforts to entice Greece into accepting the idea of a tripartite conference of Britain, Greece, and Turkey, possibly with NATO's Secretary-General, Paul-Henri Spaak, and the United States as observers, as an appropriate procedure for examining the entire range of possible solutions for settling the fate of the island, minus the bases Britain wished to keep on it. 9 The British government had also failed to persuade the Greek government to enter into bipartite negotiations with the Turkish government for dealing with the problem — a proposal made to the Greek Foreign Minister through the diplomatic channel late in October 1957.10 The U.S. government had urged the Greek government to accept either of these procedures.11 The Turkish government, finally, which, like Britain, originally had opposed any change in the status of the Crown Colony and in 1955 had maintained that Turkey should annex the island, if Britain were ever to withdraw from it, 12 was ceaselessly harping on the theme it had adopted since the end of 1956, that partition of the island between Turkey and Greece was the only solution to the problem. Accordingly, early in spring 1957, it had turned down the Radcliffe constitutional proposals put

(later Lord Normanbrook), to study the problem of a military base in Cyprus, in the event of the island's partition between Greece and Turkey or its becoming "truly independent" with Britain in effective control over the military area, for the Baghdad Pact and the general defense of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. In May, likewise, he began feeling that the island's partition might be the only solution to the problem, despite his dislike of it, because of the possibility of boundary troubles and the economic disadvantages of such a solution. At a Cyprus conference of July 7, 1957 in London, attended by R. A. Butler, Selwyn Lloyd, Lennox-Boyd, Duncan Sandys (Secretary of Defense), Sir John Harding, Sir William Dickson (Marshal of the R.A.F.), Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar (Foreign Office) and Norman Brook, partition was acknowledged to be a confession of failure. It would lead to civil war on the island, thence to a GreekTurkish war. H. Macmillan, Riding the Storm (London: Macmillan, 1971, pp. 659-660). 9 Ibid., p. 155. As Macmillan reveals, the British government intended to propose at this tripartite conference the establishment of a tridominium of Britain, Greece, and Turkey over the areas lying outside the British military bases on Cyprus, under a governor chosen by the three governments and, in the absence of their agreement, by the NATO Council. The Governor would be responsible for external affairs and certain reserved subjects. For internal affairs, the proposals of the Radcliffe Report, of December 1956, would be adapted to the concept of "triple sovereignty" (Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 660-662). 10 Ibid., pp. 258-259 (conversation between AverofT-Tossizza and Sir Roger Allen, October 25,1957). 11 Ibid., p. 251. 12 Ibid., p. 160.

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forward by the British government in December 1956.13 And in June of that same year, it had vehemently rejected any notion of a trip to Ankara by Spaak who, soon after becoming NATO's Secretary-General, had suggested that for a period of twenty years Cyprus should be set up as an independent state, with Dominion status, NATO membership and a British or NATO presence on the island, its final status to be decided by a conference after the passage of those twenty years, with Cypriot representatives participating in this conference and without any commitments with regard to the solution that would be accepted.14 The Turkish government likewise had failed to reply in writing to a letter of July 16, 1957 from Spaak who had then suggested to Premier Menderes pure and simple independence for Cyprus, with this independence limited by a statute to be guaranteed by a number of states, the United States included. Under such a treaty the parties concerned would pledge themselves never to claim sovereignty over the island and would also refuse it if it were ever offered to them. This treaty, too, would also take into account both the rights of minorities and the needs of NATO. 15 After the Turkish general elections of October 27, 1957, Premier Menderes, in presenting his government's program to the Grand National Assembly, categorically had stated that no further concessions beyond partition would be made. 16 After his return from NATO's Council summit meeting of December 12-19, 1957, he reiterated this point on December 24 and 26.17 The Turkish Foreign Minister, Fatin Riiçtii Zorlu, on January 6, 1958, told foreign journalists in Istanbul that Dr. Fazil Kiiçiik, President of the Association "Cyprus is Turkish", had informed him about latest developments on the island. How to secure the future of the Turkish community in Cyprus and to prevent it from being under a foreign flag was one of the issues. But an even more important one was related to the security and very existence of twenty million Turks in Turkey. 18 Concurrently, there were certain signs, too, that the Turkish government wished to come to an understanding with Greece on the Cyprus question. Menderes had said so clearly on December 24, 1957.19 And 13

Macmillan, Siding the Storm, p. 79. Ibid., pp. 136-137,242, and 252. 16 P.-H. Spaak, Combats inachevés 2 (Paris: Fayard, 1969), pp. 140-142. « Eleftheria, December 5,1957. 17 Oriente Moderno 38, p. 38. 18 Ibid., p. 42. On December 30,1957, the Turkish government had invited its Consul General in Nicosia as well as Kiiçiik to Ankara for consultations (ibid., p. 39). » Ibid., p. 42. Vima, December 25, 1958. "

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early in January 1958 the Greek Foreign Ministry learned that Zorlu had expressed regret that he had not had a meeting with his Greek colleague, Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, during the summit NATO Council meeting in December. He had said that he was prepared to meet him anywhere in order to exchange thoughts on the problems that affected the interests of Greece and Turkey because of the Cyprus question. At the same time, Turkey wished to make it quite clear that it was not disposed to accept any solution of the problem that did not satisfy its interests and touched its prestige. Even more significantly, the Greek government also received new information that the Turkish government might be somewhat softening its demand for partition and might be willing to limit itself to a demand for a Turkish military base on Cyprus. On his side, Ethnarch Makarios, after returning to Athens from New York, had stated he was willing to go to London for a high-level exchange of ideas with the British government without, however, any Turkish Cypriot participation in such exchanges. At the same time, however, he urged the Greek Cypriots to live in amity with the Turkish Cypriots. 20 During the first days of January 1958, the British government prepared a new move. The Cabinet adopted the recommendations which Sir Hugh Foot (later Lord Caradon) had presented to it as early as November 1957 when he was passing through London on his way to Cyprus to take over his new post. Sir Hugh had been sent to Cyprus late in 1957, to replace Field Marshal Sir John Harding, who had been appointed to that post in September 1955, for the specific purpose of suppressing the EOKA disturbances led by Grivas, who operated under the pseudonym of a legendary Byzantine hero, Dighenis. 21 The Foot plan provided for an interim period of five to seven years before any final decision was to be taken about the island's status. Meanwhile, the emergency measures would be ended and Ethnarch Makarios would be allowed to return to Cyprus. Negotiations then would begin on the island with the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities for setting up a system of self-government. After the end of the five- or seven-year period no final solution would be adopted that was not acceptable to the Greeks and the Turks alike. Sir Hugh, the British Cabinet further agreed, would go first to Ankara to discuss this plan with the Turkish government, then to Athens to explain it to the Greek government and to Makarios. On his return to Nicosia he would announce this plan and end the emergency.

20 21

Oriente Moderno 38, p. 39. Conflict and Conciliation, p. 114.

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He expected to make the relevant announcement on January 23, 1958. Alan Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, would precede him with a statement of his own on January 21 in the House of Commons. In brief, as Sir Hugh saw it, this plan offered immediate advantages to the Greeks and long-term assurances to the Turks. 22 The Turkish government, first to be consulted about the Foot plan, rejected it outright, however. It raised all sorts of objections to it. And, just as in June 1957 it had opposed Spaak's proposed visit to the Turkish capital, 23 so now it would not hear of any visit of the Cyprus Governor to Ankara, if he were also to visit Athens. 24 Even less would it hear of a visit to Ankara of Ethnarch Makarios who on January 13, 1958, had called on the Turkish Consulate in Athens and had asked for a visa to go to Turkey to discuss the Cyprus question with Turkish officials.25 Further British government efforts to move the Turks were in vain. The Turks would be satisfied by nothing less than partition. As a result, the Governor returned to Nicosia on January 21, with no plan and no explanation to offer. 26 Hence the vagueness of his radio statement on his return. Underlining the Turkish opposition to Governor Foot's plan, Turkish Cypriots, on January 21, demonstrated in Nicosia and Famagusta against his allegedly pro-Greek policy. However, no serious incidents occurred. 27 In London, Lennox-Boyd informed the House of Commons that same day and again on January 23 that he found himself unable to make any statement on Cyprus developments.28 Under the circumstances, the British government had not seen fit officially to inform the Greek government of the Foot plan, although an Agence France Presse dispatch published in an Athens newspaper on 22

H. Foot, A Start in Freedom (New York: Harper and Row 1964), pp. 159, and 163. Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 136, and 140. 24 Foot, A Start in Freedom, p. 164. The Turkish press reported on the other hand that on January 10 and 13, 1958, Foreign Minister Zorlu had conferred with the British Ambassador to Ankara, Sir James Bowker. After these meetings, he stated that the British government faithfully respected its assurances to take no decision on Cyprus before consulting Turkey, and that continuous contact was maintained between Turkey and Britain on this matter, Oriente Moderno 38, p. 43. 25 Oriente Moderno 38, p. 29. Vima (January 16, 1958) published a statement by Makarios to the effect that in accordance with his earlier expressed desire to Reuters for harmonious relations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, he had not hesitated to ask for a visa to visit Turkey. Both the Turkish government and the Turkish minority in Cyprus, he hoped, would duly appreciate this gesture. 28 Foot, A Start in Freedom, p. 164. 27 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1958), 16220 (cited hereafter as Keesing's). 28 580 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 150. 23

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January 9,1958 carried a relatively accurate account of its main points. 29 It was only after Ankara had rejected the Foot plan that Athens received its first substantive though outdated information about it, and this not directly from the Foreign Office. On January 18, Ambassador Yorgos Seferiadis (the later Nobel-prize-winning poet Seferis) reported that James Callaghan, the Shadow Cabinet Colonial Secretary of the Labour Party, had explained to him that this plan would provide first for selfgovernment and then for self-determination after a fixed period of time. When, however, the moment for self-determination came, if the Greek population of Cyprus asked for enosis with Greece, then the Turkish population, too, would have the right to ask for union with Turkey. At the same time, the British government was clearly to state that it condemned partition and would strive to avoid it. Sir Hugh Foot, Callaghan added, was categorically opposed to such a solution. If the Greek side were to cooperate in such a plan, the Governor would raise the emergency measures which Governor Harding had imposed on November 27, 1956. This, in turn, would make possible Makarios' return to the island. The Governor would then start negotiations with representatives of the Cypriot people in order to get their agreement on a Constitution which would be applied during the period of self-government. When the Greek Ambassador objected that, in the last analysis, this new plan provided for the island's eventual partition, Callaghan replied that neither the Labour Party nor Sir Hugh wanted partition and one should have confidence in the Governor. During the period of selfgovernment, the length of which had not been specified, it would be possible, Callaghan argued, for Greece to persuade Turkey to change its mind or at least to convert to the Greek side the majority of the Turks on the island. Taking into account the benefits of this new plan, the Greek government, he maintained, should make some concessions in order to get out of the dead-end which had been reached. The Greek diplomat observed that his government fully appreciated the integrity of Sir Hugh Foot. So many mistakes had been made in the past, however, that it was hard to believe that a whole people could immediately forget the bitter experiences they had gone through in order to place blind confidence in a person whom they had not even had the time to know better through his deeds. Lennox-Boyd's statement of December 19, 1956 about applying the principle of self-determination separately to the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, as one of the eventual 29

Vima, January 9,1958.

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options the British government would consider when the international strategic situation permitted and self-government had been working satisfactorily, 30 remained valid, Seferiadis added. A statement by the Governor, on the other hand, would be at a lower governmental level and by an official whom the British government could replace at any time. To these arguments the Labour politician replied that, if his own Party came to power, one could rest assured that the Governor would be kept in Cyprus and that, at any rate, so long as Sir Hugh remained Governor of Cyprus, he would have the Labour Party on his side and enjoy its full support. The leadership of the Labour Party, Callaghan emphasized, was in agreement with this. So was the Party's majority. With regard to the intention of Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd to inform the Turks of the above-mentioned solution during the upcoming session of the Foreign Ministers' Baghdad Pact Council in Ankara, the Greek Ambassador, in his report to the Greek Foreign Minister, expressed the view that the Turks were bargaining until the last moment. He also suggested that if the Greek government wished to get Washington to intercede at this point, it would be better to ask it to exert its influence with the Turks so that they should drop their claim for the island's partition. Athens evidently followed Seferiadis' suggestion. On January 22, the Greek Ambassador in Washington, George V. Melas, reported back to Athens on a démarche he had made to John Foster Dulles shortly before the Secretary of State left Washington to attend the above-mentioned session of the Baghdad Pact Council. After observing that during the U N debate of the Cyprus item at the twelfth General Assembly, no speaker had seriously put forward partition as a solution to the Cyprus problem, the Turks excepted — and they, not with any great vigor — Ambassador Melas told Dulles he was gravely concerned about reports that the British government, as a result of conferences with Sir Hugh Foot, favored now an interim period of self-government for the island, with the separate exercise of the right of self-determination on the part of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to follow. All such plans were totally unacceptable to the Cypriots, the Greek Ambassador said, even though London and Ankara seemed to be preparing them jointly, as the repeated visits of the British Ambassador in Ankara, Sir James Bowker, to Premier Menderes suggested. The United States, with its great moral prestige, the Greek envoy urged, should, in the most appropriate way, exert friendly but 8® 562 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 1272.

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steady pressure upon the British and the Turks so that once and for all they should understand that partition was chimerical and vain, because that solution would never be accepted and the Americans recommend that it be definitively dropped. Only if this became absolutely clear to the British and the Turks, the Greek diplomat argued, would probabilities gradually emerge for progress toward a solution of the "explosive Cyprus problem". If Turkey did not finally realize that partition would never be accepted, it would never agree to any other solution, since it saw that its "blackmail" was yielding results. Not only were Greek-Turkish relations in jeopardy, but also internal developments in Greece. The Greek diplomat concluded with a vibrant plea that Dulles intercede with London in order to prevent the issuance of the relevant British statement in the House of Commons which originally had been announced for January 21 and had then been put off for a few days, ostensibly in expectation of the results of the Ankara session of the Baghdad Pact Council. At this point, the Secretary of State, who had followed this plea with taut attention, asked Owen T. Jones, Director of the Office on Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs at the State Department, whether he had any knowledge of the plan mentioned by Melas. When Jones answered in the affirmative, Dulles told the Greek Ambassador: "I thank you very much for your communication. You did well to talk to me about this matter. I shall bear all this in mind. Of course", he added, "I cannot precisely define at exactly what point we should proceed, because in the present instance we are only volunteers". The Greek Ambassador replied that perhaps this was so in efforts aimed at finding a solution. However, the moral prestige of the United States and its political weight were so great that everybody listened to its words. American intervention and action, consequently, could bring about results. From this conversation, Ambassador Melas derived the clear impression that Dulles surely condemned partition as a solution to the Cyprus question, for the Secretary of State had registered a vigorously negative reaction to the Greek diplomat's mention of the quite stark views of Sir Harold Caccia, the British Ambassador in Washington, about the desirability of partition. Shortly after this conversation, a State Department official informed a member of the staff of the Greek Embassy in Washington (Phaidon Anninos-Kavalieratos) that Dulles would not discuss partition in Ankara. This was not inconsistent with the U.S. government's attitude toward the issue. Generally, the U.S. government, under the Eisenhower administration,

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with Dulles as Secretary of State, pursued a policy of neutrality in this dispute between three of its friends and allies. In essence, this, of course, meant that the Greek government alone had to face the British and Turkish governments with no allies from the West, except Iceland. Although not favoring Greek resort to the United Nations over the Cyprus question and attaching primary importance to allied unity and informing the Greek government that Turkey was a party concerned in this matter, the United States, on the other hand, out of principle and friendship for Greece, never formally opposed the inclusion of the Cyprus item in the Assembly's agenda, except in 1955, at the tenth Assembly. At the same time, not wishing to support — or oppose — any substantive resolution on Cyprus that might be tabled in the United Nations by the parties concerned, it tried to prevent the adoption of such resolutions. As a result, in the eyes of Greek officials, it really failed to maintain that neutrality to which it professedly adhered. In accordance with this policy, in the United Nations it supported only procedural or colorless third-party resolutions. In 1957, constantly reminded by the Greek government of its professions of neutrality and aware that an essentially Greek draft resolution would not be adopted by the required two-thirds vote in the General Assembly, the U.S. Delegation had abstained when that draft resolution of a substantive character was put to the vote. While trying to maintain this delicate, detached, uncommitted position on the Cyprus issue, the U.S. government at the same time was always eager to see a settlement of this dispute which involved its friends and allies and weakened NATO's strategic south-eastern flank—the area which had engendered the "Truman Doctrine". Thus, in the United Nations, it urged the parties to seek a settlement outside the United Nations, invoking Article 33 of the Charter which calls upon members to try first to settle peacefully their disputes by extra-United Nations methods, before resorting to the United Nations. Moreover, it declared its readiness to help the governments and peoples concerned to find a constructive solution of the dispute and, whenever the British government, through the diplomatic channel, proposed negotiations to the Greek government, it urged the latter to engage in such negotiations—in a form of procedural support to Britain, 31 which during this period seems to have been in 31

Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 18, 599, note 74 (Dulles to Papagos, November 16, 1954), 607 (Dulles to Averoff-Tossizza, February 13, 1957), 645-646 (Lodge statement on opposing inscription of Cyprus item on tenth Assembly's agenda), 192 (U.S. nonopposition to inscription of Cyprus item on agenda of Assembly's twelfth session), 353-355, 357-358, 379-380, 425-426, 444-445 (Greek efforts to ensure U.S. neutrality),

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charge of playing the allied cards in this East Mediterranean issue, as it had done during World War II.

B. GRIVAS IN CYPRUS

Although in autumn 1957, EOKA had directed attacks against certain Greek Cypriots it regarded as traitors, and, shortly before Sir Hugh Foot's arrival in Nicosia, serious communal riots had broken out in Nicosia in mid-December and demonstrations had been synchronized with the UN General Assembly's debate on Cyprus, 32 Grivas continued the truce he had observed since March 14, 1957.3 3 When Sir Hugh Foot arrived in Nicosia on December 3, EOKA's leader issued a leaflet offering the new Governor "a handshake" if Makarios was allowed to return to Cyprus and negotiations began between him and the Governor. At the same time, on December 12, he started preparations for a campaign of passive resistance. The more relaxed policy and pacification measures of the new Governor worried him. Sir Hugh, he believed, was trying to attract the Greek Cypriots to his side and estrange them from EOKA. On January 11, 1958, Grivas issued instructions to EOKA members for plans of action against both animate and inanimate targets, "Bizani" and "Korytsa" being the respective code names of these plans. 34 He also issued instructions on methods for dealing with Turkish Cypriot attacks and for maintaining the morale of EOKA cadres. On January 18, he noted in his diary that a policy of "fist" would be necessary, even a change in Greek foreign policy. On stage, he issued a leaflet welcoming the arrival in Cyprus of the Subcommission of the European Commission of Human Rights which was investigating charges the Greek government had raised with the Commission in 1956.35 To celebrate the eighth

496-497 (Greek evaluation of U.S. neutrality), 611 (J. J. Wadsworth's speech on Cyprus at the eleventh General Assembly), 371-372 (Lodge's speech on Cyprus at the twelfth General Assembly), and 417-418 (Averoff-Tossizza on Lodge's attitude). 32 Keesing's, 16219. 33 Conflict and Conciliation, p. (ft. 34 Grivas Memoirs, p. 223. Bizani was the name of a Turk-manned fortification of Janina which the Greek army captured in 1913 after a long siege during the Balkan Wars. Korytsa is the Greek name of Korce, the city in southern Albania or Northern Epirus, which the Greek army captured in 1940 during the Italo-Greek war launched by the Italians from Albania on October 28,1940. 35 For details, see, Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 144-147.

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anniversary of the Ethnarchy's plebiscite of 1950,36 he also issued a proclamation for January 15.37 When Governor Foot, after his London conversations and the Turkish rebuff of his Cyprus plan, returned to Nicosia on January 21, unable, as already mentioned, to make any positive announcement on developments, Grivas, in a long letter to Makarios, expressed his views on the situation and presented his plans for further action. As he saw it, between the Governor and the British government there was collusion designed to delude the Cypriot people by various gestures of pacification, for the purpose of bending Cypriot resistance in the hope that the liberation movement would wither away. Indeed, in his view, the Governor might even try to get the communists on his side, to organize them against EOKA. Finally, there was the Turkish factor, which was becoming more and more threatening because of the "incomprehensible" policy of the Greek government. The Greek government, he wrote, repeating earlier charges,38 was conducting a "policy of dollars" not a national policy that served the Cyprus question. Hence the pressures of the United States, the "embracing of Turkey, the obstinate rigidity of Britain and the arrogance of Turkey". The result was that he doubted whether at the next UN General Assembly Greece would manage to secure the same number of favorable votes it had gathered at the Assembly's previous session. He, at any rate, would go ahead with the struggle on all levels, both with arms and passive resistance, which he was preparing. Therefore, he needed more help. As for the Greek government, it should clearly make up its mind: was it really interested in the Cyprus question? If it was, it would have to adopt a new foreign policy. Or did it regard Cyprus merely as a political question which had to be settled within the framework of Greece's alliances? If the Greek government adopted the first policy, then surely the majority of the Greek political world and the Greek people would be at its side. Otherwise, in his view, the Greek 39

The Ethnarchy, under Makarios' predecessor, had organized this plebiscite. As Bishop of Kition, however, Makarios had played an important role in its organization; 95.7 per cent voted for union — enosis — with Greece. The results were communicated to the British and Greek governments as well as to the United Nations. In the plebiscite, all Greek Cypriots over eighteen of both sexes were allowed to vote by signing their names on sheets provided in the churches throughout the island. An Archiepiscopal encyclical of December 8, 1949 had urged voters to vote for enosis. Out of 224,747 Greek Cypriots eligible to take part in the plebiscite, 215,108 actually did so. Civil servants and other government employees did not take part, S. Mayes, Cyprus and Makarios (London: Putnam, 1960), p. 19. 37 Grivas Memoirs, pp. 223-224. 38 Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 180-181, and 264.

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government would not be representative of the majority of the people. Hence, there would have to be elections, because, as he saw it, between Greek government and Greek public opinion there existed a discord which only elections could resolve. For curbing Turkish arrogance, the Greek government should declare that if Turkey intervened in Cyprus or if the Turkish Cypriots committed any atrocities on the island, the Greek government would not remain indifferent but would take all appropriate measures. This was indispensable for putting an end to Anglo-Turkish collusion as well as for raising the morale of the Cypriot people. In conclusion, Grivas warned that there would be a parting of ways. He would undertake a campaign to enlighten the Greek people about the national dangers that threatened the nation. He would wait, however, until the end of February, he added, in order to see what policy the Greek government would pursue. After that he would act in accordance with his own conscience, assuming a responsibility of his own in this "pannational" issue and fulfilling his duty toward Cyprus. 39 This letter to Makarios, which Grivas wanted communicated also to the Greek Foreign Minister, elicited a reply from Averoff-Tossizza, signed with his usual pseudonym of "Isaakios". 40 The circumstances, he wrote, were such that it was not possible to change the foreign policy of Greece. A chain of mistakes on the part of all postwar Greek governments and the nonexploitation of opportunities presented in the past had led to the current disadvantageous position of Greece. Turkey, on the other hand, occupied an outstanding position in the Western world. The United States would never like to lose Greece, but Turkey even less. If it ever found itself in a position of having to choose between Greece and Turkey, it would prefer Turkey. From the present British government, he wrote further, no solution of the Cyprus question should be expected. Necessarily then, one had to keep open the issue until the Labour Party came to power. At any rate, EOKA's struggle would constitute invaluable capital for shaping future developments not only in Cyprus but abroad. In reply to these observations, Grivas once again reverted to his view that Greece should boldly turn "to the renascent Arab world and Africa". 41 During the Baghdad Pact Council of Foreign Ministers in Ankara 39

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 219-220. Ibid., p. 221. For a biographical sketch of Averoff-Tossizza, see, Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 45-49. 41 Grivas Memoirs, p. 220. 40

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(January 27-30, 1958), Foreign Secretary Lloyd, joined by Sir Hugh Foot, discussed Cyprus with Zorlu, his Turkish colleague, as well as with Premier Menderes. He found the Turks in general quite adamant and Zorlu in particular both rude and ruthless. 42 Underlining the Turkish position, the Turkish Cypriots staged, on January 27, in Nicosia, their first large-scale anti-British riots, calling for taksim ('partition'). Thousands of Turkish Cypriot youths hurled stones and bottles at British troops, overturned and set fire to military vehicles and police cars, and set up barricades in the Turkish quarter of the Cypriot capital. The demonstrators carried Turkish flags or placards with slogans such as "Out with Foot" and "Long Live Harding". In efforts to quell these riots, the British troops used batons and tear-gas shells; a curfew was imposed. Order was restored only by January 29. The human toll was four Turkish Cypriots killed in Nicosia and one in Famagusta, with about 120 people injured, 40 members of the British security forces included. 43 Osman Orek, a leading official of "Cyprus is Turkish", went to Ankara to report to Dr. KiiQtik, who was there at the time, as well as to the Turkish government. 44 Likewise on January 29, Zorlu declared that an implicit accord existed with the British government that Britain would not act to settle the Cyprus question without Turkish approval. It was Britain's policy, he added, to seek for the maximum cooperation between the Greek and Turkish governments, as well as with the two Cyprus communities. Britain could not abdicate from its responsibility of maintaining order on the island and of taking care of its political development.45 When Sir Hugh Foot returned to Nicosia from Ankara on January 30, he stated he fully appreciated the Turkish viewpoint and wished to reestablish the long and close friendship between the Cyprus government and the Turkish Cypriot community. He also thanked Premier Menderes for having recommended tranquility and peace to the Turkish Cypriots, and emphasized the importance of British-Turkish amity. 46 On his return to London, Foreign Secretary Lloyd acknowledged to the Commons that he had discussed Cyprus with the Turkish government, but stated in a written answer that he was in no position to make a statement on Cyprus. 47 On February 4 and 6, Colonial Secretary Lennox42 43 44

«

46 47

Foot, A Start in Freedom, p. 150. Keesing's, 16220. Oriente Moderno 38, p. 132. Ibid. Ibid. 581 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 137 (written answer).

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Boyd was equally reticent.48 He could not say either when a statement on Cyprus might be expected. Certain statements made at the Labour Party's Brighton Conference on October 1957,49 he said, had added to the tension. In Turkish minds, the attitude of a possible alternative government in Britain with regard to Cyprus, he added, was certainly a relevant consideration.50

C. G R E E K GOVERNMENT M E M O R A N D U M TO ROUNTREE ON CYPRUS

When William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, passed through Athens on February 1, 1958, after attending the Baghdad Pact Council in Ankara together with Secretary of State Dulles, he urged the convocation of a tripartite conference to deal with Cyprus, as his government had done in August 1957, when the British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Roger Allen, had probed the Greek government's views about such a conference.51 The Greek government, on its side, prepared for him a very long memorandum about the Greek position on the Cyprus question. This document reveals that by early 1958, as compared with 1954, the immediate goal of Greek political strivings in this question was primarily defensive: how to avert the island's partition as a solution to this dispute. In this memorandum, the Greek government noted, first, the existing deadlock in the Cyprus dispute and, second, the possibility that the issue was about to enter a dangerously critical phase. At the same time, it disclaimed responsibility for this situation. Britain, it observed, had not heeded the repeated Cypriot claims for freedom. Greece, on the other hand, had tried to restrain the Cypriots and at the same time to persuade Britain to give a just solution to the problem. Since 1954, when Greece, "unable forever to evade its moral duty" toward the Cypriots, had undertaken politically to support the Cypriots' claim, the Greek government had done everything to avoid a tense situation despite the "dreadful occurrences" in Istanbul in September 1955 and various other provocations. 52 Moreover, despite its internal difficulties, it had continued its 48

581 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 155 and 205 (written answers). Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 248-251. «» 581 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 501. 51 Conflict and Conciliation, p. 154. 52 On September 6, 1955, Turkish mobs sacked hundreds of Greek-owned shops and other premises and destroyed over twenty Greek Orthodox churches in Istanbul where

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moderate stand and had done its utmost to facilitate a relaxation of the situation. Thus, it had not adopted enosis as its slogan, but had upheld the view that the Cypriot people should be allowed to hold a plebiscite concerning their future after a reasonable period of time. It had furthermore declared that it would accept the plebiscite's outcome, no matter what that outcome might be. Thus, by its moderate though patriotic and firm stand, the Greek government had greatly contributed to greater tranquility in both Cyprus and Greece. Finally, for dealing with the question, it had put forward various suggestions which were designed to cover the objective needs of any third party. 53 Indeed, several personalities of international standing 54 regarded these suggestions as reasonable enough to be acceptable to any directly or indirectly concerned third party. Through this policy, however, this memorandum went on to say, the Greek government had reached the limits of "any politically or morally admissible concessions" beyond which neither the current nor any future government of Greece could go, regardless of consequences. Beyond that point, there were no other alternatives but partition or the Cypriots' abdication from their right to self-determination. Self-determination could eventually be postponed, the Greek government literally underlined in this memorandum, if a really democratic system of self-government was introduced in the interim. Under no circumstances, however, could the right of self-determination be dropped. Self-determination was the very essence of the whole issue. The Cypriots claimed this basic right. The Greek government could not, on the one hand, support this claim and, on the other, renounce its substance. Likewise, because the Greek government supported any solution that

there were about 80,000 Greek Orthodox Turkish nationals and 12,000 Greek nationals. At Izmir, headquarters of NATO's South-East European Command, mobs attacked Greek officers' houses and wrecked a Greek pavilion at a trade fair. In Ankara, several thousand demonstrators attempted a march on the Greek Embassy. A dynamite attack which, it was later discovered, a Turk had committed on the Turkish Consulate in Thessaloniki and the nearby house in which Kemal Ataturk had been bom, had sparked these "riots". On September 18, 1955, Secretary of State Dulles sent identical notes to the Premiers of Greece and Turkey expressing deep concern at these developments. He urged the two countries not to let these "unhappy events" destroy the partnership of Greece and Turkey in the Free World (Conflict and Conciliation, p. 620, note 30). 63 Ibid , pp. 314-315, 325-326, and 419-420 (from Averoff-Tossizza speeches at the twelfth General Assembly). 54 Ibid., pp. 420-421 (reference here perhaps to Secretary of State Dulles).

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was agreeable to the Cypriots, it could not accept partition of the island as a solution to the problem. No Greek Cypriot would accept partition. Indeed, perhaps most Turkish Cypriots, though not daring to admit it, regarded partition as contrary to their interests. Aside from the above consideration, there were several other very important reasons for the Greek government's objections to partition. First, partition might create a precedent for other minorities to request the United Nations to recommend "that part of the territory on which they were established, be conceded to them". Second, in those rare cases in which partition it had been applied — in Palestine, Korea, Germany, Ireland — it had created more serious problems than it had solved. Third, in the specific case of Cyprus, not the slightest part of the island was inhabited purely by the Turkish element. In no part of Cyprus did the percentage of Turks exceed twenty-five per cent. Thus, if partition were applied, an overwhelming majority would be placed under the administration of the minority. Fourth, in any part of Cyprus which Turkey planned to annex, there would be a continued reaction, if not uprisings, against the administration by the minority. Fifth, Cyprus would enter a period of ever more serious troubles and discord. Under such conditions, the relations between Greece and Turkey would greatly deteriorate. Partition, instead of promoting Greek-Turkish relations, would create a permanentsou rce of tension between Greece and Turkey. After thus emphasizing the drawbacks of partition as a solution to the Cyprus problem and asserting that actually it constituted no solution at all, the Greek government, in its memorandum to Rountree, turned its battery of arguments against those (unnamed) who, though disapproving of partition, regarded it as "the only solution", and especially against the Turkish government which insisted on this same point. First of all, Turkey, the Greek government maintained, had no right based on legal and historical grounds to be recognized as a "party directly concerned". 55 The only party directly concerned was the people of Cyprus. Thus, Turkey's claim to impose a solution or to veto any solution other than partition was unfounded and inadmissible. Officially and in most clear terms, the Ottoman Empire, one of the many conquerors and rulers of the island after the Arabs, the Crusaders, and the Venetians, had relinquished any right over Cyprus in 1878, when it "had ceded the island to Britain". 56 In 1923 (by the Treaty of Lausanne) Turkey had recognized 55

See above, note 6. Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey, signed at Constantinople on June 4, 1878 (British and Foreign State Papers, LXIX, 1877-1878), 56

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Britain's annexation of the island (in 1914). 57 The State Department's Legal Division, among others, had studied the matter and formed an opinion. Were one to maintain that legal rights could suppress the freedom of a people, then one would have to admit that only Britain had legal rights to Cyprus. Hence, Greece recognized the population of Cyprus and the British government as the parties exclusively concerned in the question. Nor could the existence of a minority in Cyprus establish Turkish rights, as some had maintained, this memorandum to Rountree continued. "It was immoral and impossible for eighty per cent of the population to be denied their freedom in the name of eighteen per cent." 58 Naturally, this minority should have the greatest possible independence. Greece had proposed that a neutral commission determine the privileges of this minority which would be placed under U N supervision. 59 With regard to the argument that Turkey's security might be endangered from Cyprus, Greece, likewise, had proposed that an international agency, selected by mutual agreement, should set up such a military status for the island that would not endanger Turkey's security,60 regardless of Cyprus' future regime.

p. 744. The relevant passage of this Convention provided that "if Batum, Ardahan, Qars or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of further territories [of Turkey] in Asia... England engages to join H.I.M. the Sultan in defending them by force of arms... and in order to enable England to make necessary provisions for executing her engagement, H.I.M. the Sultan... consents to assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England". Sovereignty over the island remained vested in the Ottoman Empire. The convention also provided that Britain should pay to the Porte the annual sum of £92,799, this being the calculated, average net revenue from Cyprus. Britain retained this annual sum to cover the defaulted Ottoman debt. From 1897 on, it provided a grant-in-aid to Cyprus which partly offset this "tribute money". In 1927 the grant-in-aid was fixed at £92,800, thus cancelling it right out. 57 Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923, League of Nations, Treaty Series 28 (1924). Under Article 20 of this treaty, Turkey recognized the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British government on November 5, 1914, after the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in World War I. By Letters Patent issued on May 1,1925, Cyprus was set up as a Crown Colony. 68 The estimated population of Cyprus at the end of 1958 was 549,000. Of these 78.8 per cent were Greek Cypriots and 17.5 per cent Turkish Cypriots. The remaining 3.7 per cent consisted of minorities belonging to the Armenian, Maronite, and Latin denominations. 69 Conflict and Conciliation, p. 48 (Averoff-Tossizza to John Foster Dulles, February 13, 1957). Ibid.

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Turkey, however, was not satisfied with Greece's absolute good will and readiness to safeguard any real and objective interest of any third party. The reason for this was, the Greek government asserted, that Turkey recently had launched an imperialist policy. In the framework of this imperialist policy, for which the Greek government could hardly be held responsible for reasons easy to understand, Turkey had put forward an entirely unfounded demand, supposedly in favor of a minority. At first it had claimed the whole of Cyprus for itself. 61 More recently, it claimed a large part of Cyprus on the basis of eighteen per cent of the island's population. 62 This was one of the worst forms of nineteenthcentury expansionist tactics. This policy also served to divert the attention of Turkish public opinion from the internal situation. The distortion of democratic institutions in Turkey had not been enough to stop criticism. Although the Greek government did not wish to comment in public on this unfortunate truth, it felt it necessary to discuss it with close friends who bore responsibilities worldwide in scope. But, continued the Greek government in its memorandum to Rountree, among those who conceded the soundness of the Greek position, some claimed that greater Greek concessions were necessary because of the danger lest the British get tired of the situation and leave Cyprus, in which case the Turks would immediately occupy a part of the island so that partition would become a fait accompli, with no one fighting to drive them out of the island. 63 The Greek government, however, believed that Britain, which had been responsible for the island for eighty years and had derived benefits from it (with Greek, not Turkish, Cypriots fighting on the British side in the two world wars), would never abandon Cyprus in a mood of "après moi, le déluge". Besides, even if Britain did so, Greece would immediately resort to all the appropriate international organizations in which it was sure of obtaining from the whole world manifestations of indignation and anger strong enough to halt any aggression aimed at occupying foreign territory. Under the moral pressure of public opinion, even those governments that were now unfavorable to the cause of the Cypriots would support the Greek position. Thus, it should not be assumed that such an eventuality would remain without a response. Moreover, if the appropriate international organizations were unable to redress the situation, Cyprus would be transformed into an 61

See above, p. 66. See above, p. 66-67. Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 78-79 (U.S. Ambassador George V. Allen to AveroffTossizza, April 12, 1957). 92 63

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exploding powder-keg. Some would suffer from the fire; others would seize the opportunity to spread it. Because of the tension prevailing in that part of the world, this contingency was so serious that it was preferable not to contemplate it any further. The Greek government, however, once again felt duty bound to give warning. All in all, because the true moral and political aspects of the Cyprus question had not been understood, despite all the Greek government's efforts; because, too, of attitudes that were either passive or pro-Turkish, Turkey had been encouraged to adopt a completely intransigent attitude and was blocking the solution of an extremely dangerous problem. In this memorandum's conclusion, the Greek government expressed regret that its allies had been of no assistance in this issue, despite Greek internal difficulties which "were derived solely from the Cyprus issue" and despite the achievement of sound economic conditions which safeguarded Greece's position within the framework of its alliances. On several occasions during the past years, for instance, during the recourses to the United Nations, these allies had assumed a clearly unfavorable stand on the ground that Greece was supposedly not proclaiming the truth when it was putting forward its views, but was merely formulating threats. The Greek government finally assured Rountree that it was anxious to see the Cyprus problem solved on the basis of political possibilities. Moreover, it categorically disclaimed any intention of influencing anyone either through premeditated incidents 64 or through threats and untrue allegations, as others had done.

64

Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 482-484 (explosions of December 13, 1957, in one of the barracks of the American airbase at Elliniko and at the USIA Library in Athens). A bomb explosion in Thessaloniki, engineered by a Turk, triggered, as mentioned earlier, the Istanbul anti-Greek riots of September 1955, see above, note 52.

II A NEW BRITISH PROBE

A. PRELUDE TO SELWYN LLOYD'S ATHENS VISIT

On February 3, 1958, Seferiadis informed the Greek Foreign Minister that the British government was extremely secretive about its Cyprus plans and its conversations with the Turks during the Ankara session of the Baghdad Pact Council. Had these plans been changed after the Ankara conversations, during which the Menderes government had considered it expedient to increase its pressure on the British and Americans by letting loose the rioting Turkish Cypriot mobs in Nicosia? He could not say for sure. Callaghan, over the phone, had told him he had no fresh information to impart to him. Under various pretexts, the Labour leader had avoided any new contacts with him. It was, at any rate, noteworthy that neither the former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, who was regarded in London as the father of the idea of partition, nor Sir John Harding, in the Sunday Times and the Sunday Express of February 2, had proposed partition as a solution to the Cyprus question. The former had suggested independence, with a guarantee against union similar to the provision contained in the Austrian State Treaty of 1955. The latter favored a compromise agreement between Greece and Turkey. Moreover, a Sunday Times editorial had proposed a regime that would lead Cyprus toward independence within the Commonwealth and the extension of Commonwealth ties to Greece and possibly Turkey. This showed, commented Seferiadis, that the British were far from sympathetic to partition and that they used it only as a Damoclean sword against enosis. At this point, he added, the resumption of dynamic action in Cyprus would be harmful, he felt. Shortly after, the British government decided to send Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Athens to talk over the Cyprus question with the Greek government. The Greek Government consented to this visit and on February 7 and 8 Seferiadis obtained a picture of its purpose. With Frederick Hoyer-

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Millar, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, the following dialogue took place on February 7 in response to the British official's question, at a Swiss Embassy dinner in his honor, as to whether the Greek envoy was optimistic about Lloyd's impending visit. "I would be in a better position to express my feelings if I knew more or less what Mr. Lloyd is going to do in Athens." "He will try to explain how the Turks understand the situation and ascertain the Greek views." "I thought he was to explain the British views." "We would be very happy if it were possible for you Greeks to agree with the Turks." "How is it possible for the Turks to agree with the Greeks when they are so greatly encouraged in their intransigence? What do the Turks really want?" "They want a 'foothold' on the island." "But how can they have such demands when nobody, absolutely nobody, in England, neither you yourself, nor even Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick or the Members of Parliament of the Suez group favor dismemberment?" "I believe that the Foreign Secretary will tell you more tomorrow. The matter is that the Turks and the Greeks shouldn't get at each other's throats." "The Greeks don't intend to act that way. It is the Turks who let loose such manifestations, without cause, in order to influence you. What, after all, were the reasons for the recent Turkish demonstrations in Nicosia? Had you refused them anything? And why did they create the miserable incidents of Istanbul in September 1955?" "If some one could persuade them that Greeks and Turks can live together in Cyprus." "Indeed they can live together. The British who have served in Cyprus, testify to this." "I know it. But the Turks, too, have their internal difficulties." "I would say they are looking for a way out of their internal difficulties." "Perhaps. But they have become terribly insistent. Zorlu, like a dictator, continually answered 'No' to the Foreign Secretary." "Then how is it possible to entertain any hopes of success?" At this point this brief exchange was interrupted. The Greek Ambassador's conversation with Foreign Secretary Lloyd next day lasted far longer — about an hour. From the outset, Lloyd expressed his anxiety about the Turks. They had become intransigent.

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They threatened war. For them, the protection of their minority on Cyprus had become a secondary matter. They wanted a physical presence on the island. " I don't understand", said the Greek Ambassador. "How is it possible for them to believe that an island with fully manned British bases on it can threaten them? I fear that, because they have formed the opinion that they have the power to get this 'physical presence', they put forward all these arguments in order to acquire a piece of the island." "Unfortunately, they no longer believe us when we say we shall stay on the island. They believe the time of our departure is near and they wish to secure themselves. Cyprus, for them, is an offshore island, and they want to exclude the eventuality of its falling into enemy hands. This I understand. If French émigrés had taken refuge on the Channel islands and sought to exercise the right of self-determination, I confess this would not please us at all." "First of all", replied the Greek diplomat, "other Greek islands in infinite number lie off Turkey's shores. Indeed, the whole of Greece lies offshore from Turkey. Are we soon to hear the Turks asking for a physical presence there, too? Second, at the time of Henry VIII, the British were at Boulogne. Would that be an argument for you to claim Boulogne? Thirdly, when the Turks feel that such unreasonable demands are taken into account simply because it is they who put them forward, they will certainly continue doing so. But in that case this is not a matter of a veto on the part of one of your allies. It is a matter of a Diktat. Under such conditions, I don't see how we can go ahead." "At any rate", said Lloyd, "we must have in mind five points. We seek bases and peace in the area. The Turks seek safeguards from the security viewpoint and for the safety of their minority. You seek self-determination within a fixed time limit. Until now we have dealt with matters in a theoretical way, I should say." Here, Lloyd referred to the Radcliffe Constitutional proposals as an example. "Now we must see to it that we deal with reality. When I left Ankara, the situation was better than it was when I arrived there. If it were possible for some improvement to occur on the Greek side when I leave Athens, then it is likely that we shall reach a conclusion for the general good." Ambassador Seferiadis replied that the Greek government, as the Foreign Minister had informed him, wished to make every effort to restore Greek-British relations to their old cordiality and that so long as an honorable solution was proposed, it would be ready to undertake the responsibilities of promoting it. He then asked Lloyd what his own

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method of facing "reality" would be. The Foreign Secretary evaded giving a clear answer. "My purpose", he said, "is to discuss matters with the Greek government and to see what it can do to allay Turkish anxieties. I would see afterwards what conclusions we could reach. At any rate", he added, "EOKA must not resume its action. If it kills two Turkish gendarmes you realize what the consequences would be." "We do not wish EOKA to start again", replied Seferiadis, "but we cannot influence it. You will agree, though, that flattering the Turkish demands is not the appropriate method for pacifying the island. If we, too, adopt the policy of suspiciousness the Turks cultivate, then why should we not suspect that their 'physical presence' on the island will constitute a permanent threat to half a million Greek Cypriots? You are aware of the traditional treatment the Turks have meted out to nonTurkish populations. For their minority in Greece, we would have no difficulty in accepting an international commission which would ascertain the conditions under which its members live." All in all, the Greek diplomat felt that a sense of heavy Turkish pressures and the fear lest EOKA resume its operations pervaded Lloyd's mood. The above two talks of the Greek Ambassador in London quite accurately foreshadowed the views expounded by Lloyd at greater length in his Athens conversations, which Sir Hugh Foot also attended.

B. LLOYD'S ATHENS TALKS

In his two conferences of February 11, 1958, with the Greek Foreign Minister and then his conference of February 12 with Premier Karamanlis, Lloyd denied he was moving between Ankara and Athens merely, as the press wrote, in order to appear as though he was doing all in his power about the Cyprus question. The truth was he was very much concerned about international developments particularly with regard to the Turkish factor. Because of the considerable Soviet activity in the region, the Turks felt very exposed. They had the Soviet danger at the north and perceived other dangers from other directions. Syria, they believed, had become a Soviet bridgehead and satellite.1 Cyprus was very close to 1

On October 15, 1957, Syria complained to the UN General Assembly that it was facing a military threat because of concentrations of Turkish troops near the Syrian-

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Turkey's shores. The Turks could not tolerate a Cyprus that would be independent or in foreign hands. In the past they had accepted British sovereignty over the island. They were convinced, however, that the British one day would leave both the island and their bases there. "The argument that we are NATO allies does not satisfy the Turks because NATO some day may be dissolved", Lloyd told Karamanlis during their meeting on February 12. If Cyprus became independent, it might accept economic aid and arms from the USSR, the Turks feared. And if Cyprus were united with Greece and if Greece, as during World War II, were to be occupied by a foreign power, Turkey would then be encircled. Turkey also faced the communist danger both from Greece and especially from Cyprus. A treaty with Greece would be no guarantee. If relations with Greece deteriorated, the treaty might be denounced and Turkey would be left only with "a piece of paper". The only security for Turkey was to have something "tangible" in Cyprus. In Turkey, Lloyd told the Greek Foreign Minister on February 11, he had encountered great fanaticism, great excitement. He was under the very clear impression that "we have come very close to war", though he could not foretell exactly how this would occur — by a declaration of war or by the dispatch of volunteers to Cyprus. Even the remote probability of war, he said in response to Averoff-Tossizza's somewhat less anxious attitude with regard to this matter, would be anathema. It would destroy the security "we are seeking to build up in the eastern Mediterranean". To the Greek Foreign Minister's response that this would be an aggressive war, Lloyd replied that the Turks might justify it as a defensive war for the purpose of supporting their rights in Cyprus, after the agreement of 1878 and the Treaty of Lausanne, both of which he invoked as giving certain rights to Turkey. At any rate, the characterization of the war as defensive or agressive did not matter. What mattered was its avoidance. Besides, if war began between the two countries, events would lead to partition. These conditions, Lloyd explained, affected in turn the Turkish Cypriots who were less disposed than before to cooperate with the British authorities on the island and were now strongly attached to the idea of partition. In Greece, there was a belief that time and a governmental change in

Turkish border, the violation of Syrian air space by foreign military planes, and armed raids from Turkey. Khrushchev, in a rocket-rattling threat published in the New York Times on October 10,1957, elicited U.S. State Department response to the effect that the United States would defend Turkey (Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 254-255, and 276-277).

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Britain worked in favor of Greece.2 But Lloyd believed time worked "against all of us". The situation had to be dealt with. Cyprus was no academic matter. The situation was worsening. He believed an opportunity existed now to do something. He called on the Governor of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot, to report about the situation in Cyprus itself. Sir Hugh Foot reported that since his arrival on the island in December 1957 the situation had worsened and was almost desperate. EOKA had ceased its activities but the change in the attitude of the Turkish element was new and impressive. Demonstrations had taken place. Turks had been killed. Temporarily the situation was kept in hand because of messages from Ankara to the effect that partition was now certain. No Turk in Cyprus had any doubt about that. The Turkish Cypriots did not regard partition as imminent but they were sure that it would finally be realized. "The riots that occurred during my stay in Ankara", Sir Hugh told Averoff-Tossizza on February 11, "ended in bloodshed which could end in civil war. The control of the situation is now difficult. If EOKA resumes its activities, it would then be fighting in favor of partition, not intentionally, of course, but by the results produced. The situation has never been more dangerous." As an example of the worsening situation, he mentioned the events in Famagusta, where Britishers had killed and wounded Turks, because the latter had insisted on entering the Greek quarter of the city — in which case there would have been bloodshed. If EOKA activities were to start again, Sir Hugh continued, it would be difficult to protect the population because in each city there were two camps and it was impossible to keep security forces in every city and village. Not all Turkish Cypriots knew, he added, how Ankara transmitted its instructions to the Turkish Cypriot leaders. These instructions seemed to be channeled through another level. They aimed at proving that Cyprus would not remain tranquil under current conditions. The Turks wished EOKA would resume its operations. After Lloyd intervened at this point to say that he believed that the Turkish government had cooperated well through the radio, for the purpose of pacifying tempers, Sir Hugh agreed that the Turkish leaders in Cyprus, on the Turkish government's instructions, sought now to pacify the Turkish Cypriot element. (In Nicosia, on February 2, Sir Hugh had broadcast an appeal to the Cypriots against any renewal of EOKA violence. Anyone who resorted to violence, he was convinced, would 2

This is evident from conversations of Averoff-Tossizza with the British and U.S. Ambassadors in Athens, in October 1957 (Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 248-249, and 250-252).

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destroy both himself and his cause. Never was there a time when it was more directly in the interest of everyone in the island to keep the peace and thus make the way open for progress by discussion and argument rather than by riot and terror.) 3 On the Greek side, Averoff-Tossizza said he believed that Lloyd's report on the situation did not fully correspond to reality, for it was onesided. However, before commenting further on the British Foreign Secretary's statement, he wanted to make certain matters clear. Some, he said, believed that Greece was tired of the Cyprus question. However, the contrary was the case. The entire Greek people and press supported the Greek position. Indeed, the Greek government had tried to calm down public opinion by raising hopes of a future settlement. The people understood the difficulties involved. The situation differed from that of two years earlier. Nonetheless, there were no signs of yielding with regard to the basic principles of the problem. Among the Greek leaders there were many, himself included, who desired to find a compromise solution, because they were aware of the dangers inhering in the situation. But the struggle the Greek government was waging was not merely due to popular pressure. It was due, too, and perhaps mainly, to faith in the cause. He would not go into the matter of whether the issue had been raised at the appropriate moment or whether adequate preparations had been made before raising it. At any rate, the Cyprus question now constituted a domestic political fact. No one in Greece ignored it or wished to ignore it. "I agree", Averoff-Tossizza continued, "that we are very close to war. We have information that the Turks have prepared an invasion of Cyprus. We know that they speak threateningly about Istanbul, the Patriarchate, the Aegean islands, and so forth. However, we have not provoked them. During the Istanbul riots of 1955,4 no Turk in Greece was harmed." The Greek government would continue this unprovocative attitude. No pretext would be given to the other side. "But", Averoff-Tossizza warned, "I wish to make it clear that we are ready to react immediately. Having repeatedly been threatened 5 we have been forced to examine this contingency. We shall respond, therefore, in a like way. And I can tell you the Turks will go through some quite unpleasant days. Any Turkish naval vessel that will take part in an attack will be sunk during the first twenty-four hours of the conflict." Of course, 3

Keesing's, 16220. For details, see, Conflict and Conciliation, p. 114, note 30 (p. 620). 5 For various Turkish threats of resort to force in 1956-1957, ibid., pp. 79-82, and 84-86.

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there would be many international repercussions. Some governments would seek to exploit the situation. "We shall also be obliged", he added, "fully to reappraise our alliances so long as one of our allies in a wider alliance attacks us." He hoped, however, the situation would not develop along these lines. T o sum up: first, the Greek government would never provoke war; second, its first reaction would be international denunciation; and, third, it would react militarily in a most lively fashion. Although rationally such a development should be excluded, both the personalities of Messrs. Menderes and Zorlu and the very special way in which democracy functioned in Turkey did not preclude irrational developments. In the unthinkable contingency of a war, which would occur, he stressed, only if Greece was attacked, Greece evidently would be waging a defensive war, while on the other side of the Aegean it would be a case of aggression, which would be contrary to the allied spirit. To Lloyd's argument that the Turks might regard their action as defensive because of certain treaty rights, the Greek Foreign Minister objected. Under the relevant articles of the Treaty of Lausanne the Turks had relinquished their rights over the island, he maintained. The opinion of the Legal Division of the State Department was in accord with this view. Averoff-Tossizza would like to know what the British reaction would be to such developments. For Britain, too, to a certain extent, would be responsible for the situation. The Turks, in his view, had been brought to the point where they were now, because they knew that their allies and the masters of the island would not displease them. They would not insist, if they knew that the United States and Britain would not yield to their demands. " A l l of us", the Greek Foreign Minister went on to say, "should be conciliatory. We started out with enosis. Then we asked for self-determination within a definite time limit. Now we seek something less, within a reasonable time." The Turks, on the other hand, had created a minority question and stuck to partition. "This is the only solution we cannot discuss, because it is unacceptable to Cyprus and encloses many other drawbacks." Incidentally, he was in a position to inform Lloyd that Syria and Egypt were now interested in partition, because they would ask for partition of the Hatay. The Cypriots also opposed a Turkish base on the island, because they believed that after a few years this would lead to partition, since the Turks would have very many opportunities to

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intervene even in private incidents.6 "The Turks", he reiterated, "seek partition and nothing else, whereas we say we are willing to discuss any solution which in some way would lead to self-determination, with partition excluded." In response to Lloyd's extensive exposition of the Turkish security arguments, Averoff-Tossizza expressed scepticism about the sincerity and seriousness of the Turks in this matter. He doubted that a question of Turkish security was really involved. Britain or some other powerful ally or NATO would have bases on Cyprus. And, as he had proposed, the rest of the island could be placed under a regime which Britain, Greece, Turkey and others would guarantee from the military viewpoint, so that the island would constitute no threat to Turkey. The participation of other states would be an adequate safeguard even for the most distrustful. Through such a solution one would have a more friendly population around the bases, whereas in the case of partition, the population would be hostile. As for the Turkish arguments about the danger of communism, Greece had had a bitter experience with communism, Averoff-Tossizza observed. It was the only European country that had fought communism with arms and many sacrifices. And it had defeated it. Greece would be the last country to succumb to communism — much later at any rate than Turkey. In Cyprus itself, the communists, he maintained, appeared to be more numerous than they really were, because they were concentrated in the cities. Many safeguards existed against communism in Cyprus, for instance, the great influence of the Church and the existence of the Right Wing liberation movement. The Communist Party had opposed the latter because of its Right Wing origin, and had lost its influence among youth. In his view, the very small percentage of communists in Cyprus would decrease rather than increase. With regard to Turkey's anxieties for the Turkish minority in Cyprus, 6

Seferiadis, in a conversation of November 12, 1957, with A.M.D. Ross, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, who had mentioned that the Turkish government might consider the establishment of a NATO base on Cyprus manned by British, Greek and Turkish contingents, had said that the Greek government had never requested the presence of Greek troops on the island. He thought that the introduction of Turkish troops would complicate matters. When Ross explained that the Turkish troops would also be concerned with the Turkish Cypriot minority, if the need arose, Seferiadis said this was likely to lead to a catastrophic confusion. If Turkey was really interested in the Turkish minority on the island, international guarantees and even some sort of court composed of international personalities of unassailable reputation could be set up (Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 267-268).

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the Greek Foreign Minister sarcastically observed he fully understood the fears of a country which had massacred the Armenians, liquidated the Kurds, and put the Greeks to the sword. Partition, however, was not the best way of protecting this minority. A better way to do so would be through a special regime prepared by neutrals and guaranteed by the United Nations, which might keep an observer on the spot. Under such a regime, the minority would enjoy privileges far more extensive than the usual ones. Besides many Turks in Cyprus had no desire for partition and had said so to the Greeks — among whom they lived peacefully. Concerning the situation in Cyprus, Averoff-Tossizza denied the Greek government had any control over E O K A . It had absolutely no relation with it. But even if it had allowed itself to have some sort of relation with it, again E O K A would not listen to it. The nature of the people who were waging this struggle precluded them from doing anything except what they regarded as right. A t any rate, the Greek government, as he had told the British Ambassador in Athens, was doing everything possible to pacify the island. The Greek consul in Nicosia was aware of the government's views about the disadvantages of a resumption of armed action. Besides, there was every reason for not wanting a resumption of these activities. Time worked in Greece's favor, because not only the Labour Party but the Conservative Party, too, was impatient to find a solution. "We know, however, that the Turks in Cyprus are well organized and that they will start action even if E O K A does not resume action. In all likelihood, they will use E O K A methods so that E O K A may be blamed. We have concrete evidence that such methods are under preparation. This action", he warned, "will provoke reprisals which may develop into a civil war, the suppression of which will be very hard." Such a development would be more dangerous than one could imagine. It would have a powerful impact on Greek-Turkish relations. He told Lloyd, in confidence, that the Greek government had already prepared a staff plan for protecting the Turks in Greece against reprisals. It feared that the Turks might overreach themselves and that the anger of the Greek people would be very great. Diplomatic relations would surely be severed. Nobody could foretell what would happen. Commenting on the points the Greek Foreign Minister had made, Lloyd said that all agreed that a compromise solution had to be reached. "All of us, then, must make sacrifices. We accept", he said, "that selfdetermination should be mentioned. Our difference is whether enosis should be one of the eventual solutions. We regard partition as a 'last resort'. We recognize its difficulties. Our present position is that we

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consider still valid our statement of December 19, 1956." "In order to avoid partition, we must find a solution among ourselves", said Lloyd. Averoff-Tossizza replied that partition could become acceptable if it were decided by a plebiscite of the entire population of Cyprus and by an absolute majority — but surely Mr. Lloyd did not mean it that way. Lloyd responded by presenting the British view. This, he said, was based on the following three points: First, mention of self-determination, with quite a clear promise about the time of the plebiscite; second peaceful conditions prevailing on Cyprus, with the minority secure; third, the security of Turkey with joint bases of the three countries on the island. On the two first points, he believed, it was possible to reach agreement, with the Turks dropping their demand for partition. Remained the question of Turkey's security. Averoff-Tossizza observed that mention of self-determination without an express revocation of Lennox-Boyd's statement of December 19, 1956 was worthless and would meet with universal disapproval both in Greece and Cyprus. With regard to Turkey's security, he did not think the Turks seriously believed that a threat against them could come from Cyprus. Their insistence was due, in his view, to reasons of domestic policy. The internal situation in Turkey was not good. Also Menderes and Zorlu were pursuing a sort of imperialist policy, to the novelty of which he wished to draw Lloyd's attention. Cyprus was but an objective in such a policy. He could not accept that the rulers of Turkey who were in a position to judge matters could regard Cyprus as a threat, as long as Britain or NATO maintained bases there or when there were all the other provisions on this matter which he had mentioned. Lloyd replied he personally did not regard as groundless Mr. AveroffTossizza's remarks about Turkey's domestic political situation. He disagreed, however, with his allegations of Turkish expansionism. A Soviet threat to Turkey existed in fact. The Turks were particularly sensitive to it. They also believed, he repeated, that the British forces would not stay in Cyprus for long and, in this case, the Turks regarded as inadequate the safeguarding of their security interest through NATO. Reverting to the purpose of his visit, the British Foreign Secretary stated that quite intentionally he had undertaken this trip with no concrete plan. One of his aims was to achieve political developments so that the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus might cooperate. "We recognize the principle of self-determination", he reiterated, "but we cannot withdraw our statement of December 19, 1956. A period of five to ten years might be set, on the other hand, with the creation of bases by the British and their

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allies and the raising of the emergency measures — the latter, of course, not before three months." The Turks, he added, wanted a "federal constitution" but he had told them he could not understand what they meant by this.7 He emphasized he was not bringing Turkish proposals but he believed that, if the strategic interests of Turkey were satisfied, progress could be achieved. Averoff-Tossizza, on his side, stated that, in addition to the solution the Greek government had proposed — interim period, plebiscite, guarantees — a good solution that would cover the needs of all would be to set up, after a short period of self-government, a new independent state, member of the Commonwealth. For an agreed upon period of time this state would be unable to change its status or raise the question of such a change. International guarantees would be granted to the minority as well as to Turkey, the security of which should be fully safeguarded even if NATO ceased to exist. After a period of time to be determined, no change in the status of Cyprus would be allowed without UN approval. "We believe this solution is constructive. The minority, in proportion to its numbers, would participate in the island's government. Turkish anxieties would be allayed as long as the new state remained within the Commonwealth." The creation of the new Commonwealth member could be achieved through an international convention, Averoff-Tossizza said, developing in broad outline this idea further. This convention would include provisions for the minority and the condition that this regime could not be changed. If the British told the Turks that this was a good solution, the Turks would realize that they could no longer insist on their views and finally would accept it. But as long as the British and many Americans told them they would not upset them, the Turks had no reason to change their views. With regard to the matter of bases, he wished to make it clear that "we accept the establishment of bases on Cyprus for Britain and its ' The Turkish Cypriot leaders had proposed a federal form of government for Cyprus to Lord Radcliffe who in 1956, at the request of the British government, had prepared a constitutional plan for the island's self-government. Lord Radcliffe, however, had rejected this proposal. No pattern of territorial separation existed, he observed, between the two communities. And he was baffled in the attempt to visualize how an effective executive government in Cyprus could emerge from a system in which political power was to remain permanently divided in equal shares between two opposed minorities. Either stagnation would occur in political life or some small minority group would acquire artificial weight by being able to hold the balance of power between the two main parties (Cmnd. 42, pp. 13-14).

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allies, Greece and Turkey excepted". If, nevertheless, the two latter countries were to participate in the manning of these bases, the strength of the contingents of the other allies should in no way be such that the position of the Turks became predominant. For meeting the security needs of Turkey "we would accept everything except partition and bases". Reverting to Lennox-Boyd's statement of December 19, 1956, to which Lloyd had referred, Averoff-Tossizza again noted that in essence it meant partition. This no Greek government could accept. If the British government was unable to revoke this statement and intended to repeat it, then it would be infinitely better to issue no statement at all and to reach an understanding with the Cypriots in order to grant them democratic self-government of a noncolonial character and let the matter of the island's future wait for a preliminary understanding later on. However, the Greek government itself could not propose such a solution, though it would accept it, if someone else proposed it. Finally, the Greek government would support any solution the Cypriots would accept after direct negotiations with the British. Lloyd explained with regard to the installation of bases in Cyprus, there were very many possibilities, i.e. only British bases; British bases with Turkish forces; British bases with NATO forces; British bases and separate Turkish bases; and, finally, separate British, Turkish, and Greek bases. The most important British conditions were, first, the maintenance of a British base on Cyprus and, second, the safeguarding of peace in the area together with Greek-Turkish relations. The Greek proposals satisfied the British interests concerning bases. He feared, however, they would not be acceptable to the Turks. "I believe", he continued, "that there is still an opportunity to negotiate with the Turks. You have never negotiated with them directly and I believe it would be useful for you to do so. Time, however, is short. I do not believe the Turks wish to jeopardize their relations with Britain. I think we have a little time left to avoid civil war on the island. I believe the Turks are seeking for something tangible", he reiterated. "They do not regard a treaty as such. I advise you to accept direct negotiations. The Turks really fear for their security. I wish to make it clear that this is not an indirect way toward partition. The Turks, I believe, would accept nothing less, and it seems they would not regard anything as tangible, unless they had forces on Cyprus. Nor would they be satisfied with NATO forces. And I doubt that it would be possible to persuade them without a commitment. In exchange for a base, you would have a united island. I do not think that the Greek proposal would be regarded as tangible."

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Lloyd appreciated the Greek proposal that Cyprus become a member of the Commonwealth, although he had observed that all members of the Commonwealth had the absolute freedom to break away from it. However, he did not think that Commonwealth status would be enough to satisfy the Turks. Eventually the Turks might change their mind about partition, he ventured, in exchange for something "tangible". Perhaps, there was still the opportunity for an understanding with the Turks, without conceding to them immediately what they wanted but with negotiations for the protection of the Turkish minority in Cyprus and the granting to them of "something tangible". But, he reiterated, he saw no other substitute for the present situation than the conclusion of a treaty through which "something tangible" should be conceded to the Turks. Such a treaty, Lloyd said, after listening to Averoff-Tossizza's views, would cover the following three points: First talks should start immediately between the Governor and the Cypriots for granting a Constitution. Second, at some fixed time, the Cypriots would be given the right to decide the island's future. The new regime would be placed under "international servitudes" of the form discussed and would also ensure the protection of the minority. Third, at some fixed time, something tangible on the island, he repeated, should be given to both Greece and Turkey. Before responding to Lloyd's suggestion for direct Greek-Turkish negotiations for achieving the above-mentioned objectives, AveroffTossizza explained precisely how the Greeks envisaged their relations with Turkey. Greece, he said, had always been under pressure from the north. Now this pressure was double, because both Slavism and communism exerted it. One could say that Greece had closed its door to the north in an unnatural way. Of course, it maintained the best of relations with Yugoslavia, but no one could foretell the future and, with the Yugoslav exception, a tremendous amount of pressure still was exerted in the direction of the Mediterranean. Perhaps this was the main reason why Greece had always remained on the side of the West and had maintained its alliance with the West. Too small to bear such pressures alone, it had therefore basic reasons for maintaining friendly relations with Turkey, which was suffering under the same pressure. But exactly for that reason, Turkey had an equal need for Greece's friendship. For imperative reasons, therefore, "we do not wish to oppose Turkey. On the contrary we wish to cooperate with it. The Cyprus issue, however, has divided us. Because of its nature, nevertheless, we cannot drop it." Coming now to Lloyd's suggestion of direct negotiations with Turkey,

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the Greek Foreign Minister adhered to the earlier Greek position on the matter. 8 He said he thought no Greek government or Cypriot delegation would ever propose such a thing. The Turks would have enough guarantees, if these were given by Britain and the Great Powers which did not consider treaties as mere "pieces of paper" as Turkey did. Besides, whenever he had discussed the Cyprus question with Turkish ambassadors or their superior, as he had done repeatedly, he was informed of the Turkish views. Any Greek negotiation with Turkey would be in vain, perhaps even dangerous. In his opinion, the best procedure would be for the United States and Britain gradually and moderately to indicate to the Turks that their demands were not achievable and that their security was adequately safeguarded. No Greek government, he thought, would ever negotiate the cession of bases to Turkey against nonpartition. After repeating that both partition and Turkish bases in Cyprus would meet with a strong negative reaction in Greece, Averoff-Tossizza wondered whether it might be possible to return to the point at which the HardingMakarios talks (October 4,1955 - March 3,1956) had been interrupted. 9 These talks, it will be recalled, aimed at self-government, with selfdetermination not excluded after a period of time. Lloyd countered this question by inquiring whether the Greek government's views about a tripartite conference remained unchanged. Averoff-Tossizza replied in the affirmative. The failure of such a conference was certain, he said, repeating an argument put forward in August 1957, when the British government had proposed a new tripartite conference on the Cyprus question.10 This would be extremely dangerous because the reactions of Turkey were not the same as those of Greece. In this connection, he referred to the anti-Greek events in Istanbul and izmir, of September 6, 1955. Rountree, he added, had already spoken to the Greek government about such a tripartite conference but he, AveroffTossizza, could see no practical purpose served by such a conference since, from the many opportunities of contact with the Turks, no common ground for an understanding appeared to exist. 8 Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 258-259 (conversation with Sir Roger Allen, October 25, 1957). The Greek Foreign Minister said then that he did not believe it was appropriate either for the Greek government to approach the Turkish government or even a third party, such as the British or U.S. government, to do so, if it were merely to state at the same time that the proposed solutions were to be to Turkey's liking. To say that solutions A or B were acceptable while at the same time saying that nothing would be done to displease the Turkish government was tantamount to allowing Turkey to have a veto right on any solution. 9 Ibid., pp. 114-127. 10 Ibid., pp. 177-178.

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When Averoff-Tossizza made another suggestion that perhaps it would be desirable to wait for better circumstances — Lloyd (supported by Sir Hugh Foot, who reemphasized the gravity of the situation in Cyprus where, he feared, the weapon of local disturbances would be used again) said that some political development should take place very soon because time was passing and in that case EOKA might resume its activities. Lloyd also affirmed that it was no longer possible to revert to negotiations between the British authorities in Cyprus and the Cypriots, in response to Averoff-Tossizza's statement that eventually the Cypriots might accept a regime of self-government under a really democratic Constitution, not, of course, of the type proposed by Lord Radcliffe11 which, in his view, hindered any further development. As Lloyd succinctly told Karamanlis on February 12, self-government would have been acceptable in the past but events had now "overtaken us". Summing up the British viewpoint about the whole Cyprus question for the benefit of the Greek Premier on February 12, (the meeting took place after Lloyd's two conversations with Averoff-Tossizza the day before) Lloyd mentioned four factors that had to be taken into account: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Greek-British friendship. British-Turkish friendship and the Baghdad Pact. Greek-Turkish friendship which must not be destroyed. Communism which "threatens us all".

The British government was seeking to ascertain what was the probability of dealing with the Cyprus question from a new angle. The Turks were concerned with three points: 1. The need for the solution of partition to remain open in case of selfdetermination. 2. Political development by a federal solution. 3. Security needs. He believed the third point was the most important one for the Turks. Events, he feared, were leading to partition. He considered that selfdetermination should apply also to the Turks in Cyprus. He did not conceal the view that partition enclosed great practical and political difficulties and undesirable consequences for Greek-Turkish relations. 11

Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 177-178.

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Hence, the British government was agonizingly seeking for a solution that would allow the maintenance of the unity of Cyprus. War between Greece and Turkey would lead to partition. He referred to the precedents of India and Ireland and wondered whether there might be a compromise solution. Lloyd then put forward certain "ideas" — not proposals — which, he said, had not been presented to the Turks. There were two points to study: 1. The question of bases and, more specifically: a. Securing British bases under British sovereignty. b. Ceding a military area to Turkey. c. A Greek military area, if Greece so desired. Of course, there were several details to decide. Would bases be set up during the interim period or after the Cypriot people had decided their own future? Fixing the time also was an essential matter. 2. Maintenance of Cyprus's unity with certain international "servitudes"— guarantees for the security of the Turks and of the minorities. However, he had to raise the question of a small military area for Turkey. And Turkey would give up partition. The task of getting Turkey to yield on this issue, he said, was very hard. There were also many related problems such as fixing the time, the size of the armed forces, the rules about the contacts of the military forces with the population. Perhaps the Greek government saw the Turkish base as allowing the sending of arms to the Turks on Cyprus. The rules of control ought therefore to be decided. Britain would like tripartite negotiations but Greece did not regard these as expedient. At any rate, the proposal still held good. Another possibility was a tripartite conference for a limited purpose, i.e. for security. The Turks would accept such a conference. At this conference, only security and strategic needs of the states concerned would be discussed. Inevitably, however, so would other related matters. Putting forward these ideas, he was in danger of provoking an immediate Turkish negative reaction. The Turks had to be persuaded about the dangers of the situation and the need to reestablish Greek-Turkish friendship. Also the danger of tension in British-Turkish relations should be invoked. An absolutely confidential exchange of views was required. There were, he acknowledged, very many practical problems that could not be explored at length that day. He wondered whether the next step on his return to London would not be to prepare a concrete plan that would then be discussed with each government. Premier Karamanlis, on his side, although expressing satisfaction for

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the British Foreign Secretary's visit to Athens, was not happy about what Averoff-Tossizza had told him about his two talks with the Foreign Secretary. It appeared, he said, that the British government was more concerned with pleasing Turkey than with achieving a reasonable and just solution of the Cyprus question. His own opinion was that quite the reverse position ought to be taken. When Lloyd referred to his proposal for another tripartite conference, Karamanlis, like Averoff-Tossizza the day before, reminded him of the unfortunate precedent of the tripartite London Conference on Cyprus of 1955. In view of Lloyd's remarks about the difficulties connected with partition, the Premier inquired what power would be able to enforce partition, if the occupying power were opposed to it. Dangerous situations ensued, when international relations were not based on rules of reason and morality. If Turkey behaved unreasonably, insisted on an unacceptable settlement, and sought to impose a solution despite the guarantees offered, it was up to Britain to restrain it. Cyprus was a simple and easy question as long as there was good faith, Karamanlis asserted. Greece belonged to the Western world and was a member of NATO. Hence, Cyprus, either as part of Greece or as an independent state, would belong to NATO. The question would be far more difficult, if Greece belonged to the enemy or neutralist camp. But matters being as they were, where was the problem? Clearly it lay in the prejudices and fanaticism created by the poor handling of the issue. Greece, at any rate, Karamanlis affirmed, would not negotiate under threats and blackmail. Until then, it had shown great moderation, in order to ease the situation. But if Turkey continued to threaten, he was prepared to react with all possible means. The Greek government, Karamanlis continued, always held that matters concerning Turkey were of special importance. But it could not allow Turkey to have a decisive say on the solution of the Cyprus question. It had always offered to satisfy Turkey in special matters. However, when it spoke of "parties concerned" it meant these parties in the following order of importance:

1. The sovereign people of Cyprus, which had the right to decide its own future. 2. Britain, as the occupying power. 3. Greece, which supported the majority of Cyprus' inhabitants. 4. Turkey, only for special reasons.

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Turkey, nevertheless, maintained it had more important interests. It threatened to provoke a rupture, if these interests were not satisfied. Greece, Karamanlis repeated, would not negotiate under threats both for reasons of national dignity and because decisions taken under such circumstances would lead to no good results. If Britain would accept a just solution, Karamanlis maintained, no one could frustrate it. Without believing that Lloyd's "ideas" were conducive to a solution, he would, nonetheless, like to get the necessary clarifications. Vagueness was no help in making progress. If he understood well, the question of security arose for Turkey in the event of enosis, since during the interim period Britain would maintain its sovereignty over the island. The main thing, he reiterated, was to find a reasonable and just solution. Greece desired a solution that would secure peace on the island and restore Greece's alliances. If, however, the settlement reached did not function, then the above objectives would not be achieved. The question was not who would yield, but which solution would be conducive to the attainment of the above purposes. The Turkish arguments about security, Karamanlis maintained, were groundless. Greece, he reiterated, belonged to the West. It had two alliances with Turkey. 12 It had neither enmity against Turkey nor the strength to threaten Turkey. Turkey's insistence was unfounded. In his view, only for internal reasons did the Turks reject enosis. The solution (outlined earlier by Averoff-Tossizza) of an independent Cyprus, member of the Commonwealth, of NATO, and the United Nations would cover the matter of Turkey's security. If Cyprus wished to alter its independent status, it would be obliged to go to the United Nations for this purpose and then Turkey would have again the opportunity of arguing its case against enosis. The Greek government's position was well known. The Greek government sought self-determination for the Cypriots. However, it would also sympathetically view a solution of independence such as the one he had outlined, if Britain took the initiative of proposing it. Other matters discussed during Lloyd's visit to Athens related to Makarios and to the final communiqué. The question of a meeting of Sir Hugh Foot with the Ethnarch revealed hesitation on the British side. Lloyd feared such a meeting might provoke a sharp Turkish reaction, since it would be difficult to keep secret. Sir Hugh, on the other hand, 12

Cmnd. 42. For Greek government rejection of the Radcliffe Constitutional proposals, see, Conflict and Conciliation, p. 605, note 13. For Turkey's final rejection, ibid., p. 57.

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though acknowledging the risks of such a meeting at that time, held that no progress was possible without Makarios, whom he regarded as a key figure in the whole Cyprus puzzle.13 Averoff-Tossizza, on his side, who had inquired about the possibilities of Makarios' return to Cyprus as a step that would greatly contribute to pacification, favored such a meeting. The outcome was that Sir Hugh, just before his departure for Nicosia, had with the Ethnarch a half-hour talk which, however, was not kept secret from the press, fortunately without immediate Turkish repercussions.14 During this conversation, Makarios asked for a lifting of the emergency measures in Cyprus, the disbandment of the auxiliary police which was recruited mainly among Turkish Cypriots, and the discouragement of the Turkish Cypriots.15 With regard to the drafting of the final communiqué on these conversations, the Greek Foreign Minister observed that its contents largely depended on the statement the British Foreign Secretary intended to make before the House of Commons on his return to London. Lloyd replied he would tell the Commons that his intention had been to complete in Athens the conversations he had held in Ankara, and to draw the attention of the parties concerned to the dangers that existed in the eastern Mediterranean because of the Cyprus question. He would add that he had sought to ascertain whether any ground for agreement existed and that the talks had ended in a clarification of the parties' views. When AveroifTossizza observed that reference to "dangers" could be interpreted as an attempt to frighten Greece, Lloyd agreed to alter his formulation and to stress that in both capitals he had emphasized the existence of dangers. He would add that he was continuing his exchanges with the two parties. Averoff-Tossizza remarked that the contination of these exchanges should be carried out in an appropriate way. Since Lloyd had mentioned tripartite talks, the best way would be for the British alone to propose a solution. And, in reply to a question by Lloyd, he said he had no objection if the Foreign Secretary were to state that he had proposed the calling of a conference. The critical point in the statement, he emphasized, would be the reference to bases. Lloyd said he would handle this matter in the sense that it was the object of Turkish prejudices, since the Turks regarded bases as "tangible guarantees". He would also mention that the Turks had asked for partition and that the Greeks were opposed to it. After 18 14 15

Foot, A Start in Freedom, p. 167. Ibid., p. 168. Grivas Memoirs, p. 230.

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observing that the Cypriots, too, opposed partition, Averoff-Tossizza inquired whether Lloyd would say that the Turks would drop partition if a base were ceded to them. No, said Lloyd. This was a remoter development. A premature announcement would only stir up reaction on both sides. And he would not mention either the Greek suggestion to set up Cyprus as a new Commonwealth member. However, he might mention a "federal Constitution", though he acknowledged the difficulties of implementing such a plan. But he would also say that he hoped the island would remain unitary, with guarantees to both communities and the safeguarding of Turkish strategic prejudices. He would speak, too, about the raising of the emergency measures. As for the possible return of Makarios to the island, he believed that this would meet with Turkish reaction at that stage. Hence, he would avoid stating anything on this matter. At any rate, he added, the content of his statement to the Commons would also depend on the consultations with his colleagues in the Cabinet. When Ambassador Seferiadis asked whether it was necessary to mention a "federal Constitution", Lloyd replied that this term was a misnomer. To many Britishers, however, the concept was attractive. Of course, because of the mixed population, there were difficulties in implementing federalism "but we can have a Constitution under the form of communal rights. Of course, a 'federal Constitution' presupposes a unitary island." Lloyd also agreed with Averoff-Tossizza's remark that the term "international guarantees" would be preferable to the term "international servitudes" he had used. All in all, he was loth to accept the view that there was a deadlock. The communiqué finally issued read as follows: On 11 and 12 February conversations took place between the British Foreign Secretary Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Averoff, on the Cyprus question. On February 12, Mr. Lloyd was received by Premier Karamanlis and conferred with him and Mr. Averoff. Mr. Lloyd had explained H. M. Government's viewpoint, stressed the risks inherent in the present situation in Cyprus, outlined various ways whereby he thought progress could be made, and emphasized the importance of restraint and moderation on all sides, in order that efforts to achieve a settlement should have a chance of success. The Greek Foreign Minister explained the principles upon which the Greek policy toward Cyprus is based and the reasons which made it necessary to take into account these principles in its solution. Although these views did not coincide on certain basic points, the Ministers agreed that the talks had been reciprocally useful and that they would study further the views on both sides. 16 16

Keesing's, 16222. In a fleeting reference to Lloyd's visit to Athens, Macmillan

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C. POSTLUDE TO LLOYD'S ATHENS TALKS: AN IMPOSED SOLUTION?

On February 17, the Greek Ambassador in London, duly instructed from Athens, spoke to A. D. M. Ross about the British Foreign Secretary's imminent statement about Cyprus in the House of Commons. The Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office told him that a Cabinet meeting next day would decide on the matter. The afternoon of that same day, Lloyd would make his statement. He wished to avoid the more acrimonious atmosphere of the foreign policy debate that would take place on Wednesday or Thursday. His statement would be brief and anodyne. It would parallel the Greek line. During this exchange of February 17 with the Greek Ambassador in London, Ross spoke favorably about the good atmosphere that prevailed during Lloyd's talks in Athens. The summary of the Greek views, he said, had created a very good impression upon Lloyd: self-determination with a fixed date, independence, willingness to study future British plans if they became more concrete. Seferiadis thought it advisable to sum up the Greek views on the basis of the instructions he had received from Premier Karamanlis: selfdetermination at a fixed date or with a mechanism that would determine its application; or, to facilitate the British and allay Turkish anxieties, acceptance, if the British government so proposed, of independence for Cyprus as a member of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations, with the obligation that no change could occur in this status without a UN decision. With regard to the "ideas" which Lloyd had put forward and which Karamanlis had agreed to study if they became more concrete, the Greek envoy stated that his government believed that these "ideas" could lead not to a happy solution but to dangerous complications. The only conciliatory way for solving the problem was through independence. Thus the agreement to study a plan based on these "ideas" did not necessarily mean its acceptance as a basis for discussions. At any rate, Seferiadis urged extreme secrecy lest the Turks provoke new incidents, if they learned that their demands were not heeded.

writes that the Foreign Secretary reported that the Greeks demanded that the principle of enosis be accepted as a final solution and that they might be prepared to accept the idea of a Turkish base on Cyprus if partition were permanently excluded (Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 666). The above account, based on official minutes, in no way confirms these points. The subsequent opposition of the Greek government to the establishment of a Turkish base on Cyprus would confirm the inaccuracy of Lloyd's alleged report.

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Ross agreed with these remarks about the Turks and promised extreme secrecy. Then, suddenly, he sprang upon the Greek Ambassador the following question: "How would an 'imposed' solution appear to you, in the sense of a solution Britain would impose without your agreement?" "Should you wish to impose a solution, of which we should not be cognizant before it was published, then you would bear the responsibility for the reaction I could not anticipate but which would be so grave as to set fire to the already so inflammable situation." A Times editorial of February 18 made the Greek Ambassador believe "that the British game of artfully leaking information had not been dropped". This editorial, too, suggested the need for an "imposed solution". So did, as a matter of fact, Lloyd, when he spoke next day to the House of Commons about his Cyprus talks in Ankara and Athens. On the one hand, he stated that the purpose of these talks had been to emphasize the dangers of the situation in Cyprus and to seek an area of common ground on which a settlement could be based, and that although he could not claim yet to have succeeded in this, he believed that the talks had resulted in the clarification of the position of the three governments, with the result that now he had certain ideas as to what might form the area of common ground and proposed to discuss these ideas with his Cabinet colleagues and follow them up with the Greek and Turkish governments in the most appropriate manner. On the other hand, in response to a question, Lloyd said that in case of diplomatic failure, the British government would go ahead and make its own policy on Cyprus and stand by it. 17 Neither Ambassador Seferiadis nor the Greek government was aware at the time that the need for an imposed solution had been the conclusion reached on February 15, when Premier Harold Macmillan, returning from a Commonwealth tour, met Sir Hugh Foot at Nicosia airport and exchanged views on the Cyprus question. In this exchange, the Cyprus Governor had recommended that the British government itself should work out a constitutional plan for Cyprus, since the Greek and Turkish governments refused to come to a tripartite conference and the negotiations could not be shifted back to Cyprus by ending the state of emergency there and bringing back Ethnarch Makarios to Nicosia, as Sir Hugh had proposed in his earlier plan. This time, the British government would not ask "everyone or anyone" to agree. It would go ahead with its plan 17

582, H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 1051 (reply to question by Desmond Donnelly).

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regardless of agreement. It would take and keep the initiative. Neither violence nor anything else would deflect it from its resolute course. Out of this conversation the Macmillan Plan was to emerge. It was ready by mid-April but announced only on June 19, 1958, first because of the Whitsun recess of Parliament, then at NATO's request.18 On February 21, Spaak, NATO's Secretary General, told the Greek representative to NATO, Ambassador Michel Melas, that Turkey's intransigence was the main cause for the deadlock. Without it, the British might be easier to persuade. However, they did not favor his own proposal for a solution. Sir Hugh Foot had told him that what was required was an interim solution. The British seemed still to be vacillating, perhaps for elections reasons, Spaak thought. They therefore hesitated to reduce their sovereign rights in the immediate future. In response to Melas' remark that the Turkish demands for partition were unacceptable to public opinion in both Cyprus and Greece, Spaak said the Turks might be insisting on partition in order to secure a military base on the island. If the Greeks were to agree to this, the basis for an understanding might exist. Asked whether he had any special reasons for believing this was the case, Spaak replied rather ambiguously that his was an "hypothèse fondée", a founded hypothesis. D. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT CRISIS — THE CARETAKER GOVERNMENT AND THE CYPRUS QUESTION

On February 27, 1958, a government crisis broke out in Greece. Two Ministers in the cabinet of Premier Karamanlis resigned on the ground of their disagreement with the Premier's decision (taken in consultation with George Papandreou, of the Opposition Center Union Party) to change the electoral system. Two days later, together with thirteen ERE (National Radical Union) members of Parliament, they declared that they were withdrawing their confidence from the government. As a result, the Parliamentary strength of Premier Karamanlis was reduced to 149 seats. His government, consequently, no longer enjoyed an absolute majority in Parliament. Three days later, on March 2, the Premier sent in his resignation to King Paul I. General elections were proclaimed for May 11. A caretaker government, with the President of the Red Cross, Constantine Georgakopoulos, as Premier, was set up to conduct the elections. 18

Foot, A Start in Freedom, pp. 156, and 168.

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One of the factors behind this crisis was the Cyprus question. Several leaders of the Opposition parties (except those of EDA, the United Democratic Left, the communist facade party) kept on assuring the allies that Greek national interest demanded a closing of the Cyprus question. 19 This, they maintained, could be achieved only through a coalition government which would undertake this responsibility. This view, according to Karamanlis, had been so diligently cultivated that the Americans and the British believed that if his government were overthrown, he would be obliged to cooperate with Papandreou and Sophocles Venizelos — in which case the Cyprus question would be dealt with in the above spirit. In this plan, the first signs of which appeared late in 1957, not only the owner of the influential Athens newspaper together with a member of the King's entourage had been the leading elements, but also the U. S. chargé d'affaires, James K. Penfield, who was thinking in terms of U. S. policy. As he was leaving the Foreign Ministry, Averoff-Tossizza, under his pseudonym "Isaakios", wrote to Grivas on March 4, acknowledging that certain disagreements had arisen between himself and Grivas recently, 20 and assuring him of his great esteem for his person and of his admiration for his "amazing struggle". Grivas, he wrote, would have agreed with him, were it possible to discuss the issue face to face rather than by letter. With Averoff-Tossizza no longer Foreign Minister and preoccupied with his electoral campaign, the caretaker government appears to have relied mainly on the Greek consulate in Nicosia for contacts with Grivas in Cyprus. Ethnarch Makarios, on the other hand, continued his correspondence with EOKA's leader, though, as will be seen, certain disagreements arose between the civilian leader and his military arm. Despite its character, the caretaker government in Athens, through its Foreign Minister, Michael Pesmazoglou, on March 6 assured the British Ambassador, Sir Roger Allen, that, because of the gravity of the Cyprus situation, it was disposed to examine the "ideas" Lloyd had put forward in Athens, if these took a concrete form, for the purpose of smoothing out the way for the successor political government that would emerge from the elections. Ambassador Seferiadis was instructed to make the same statement to the Foreign Office in London. The British government, however, did not follow up this suggestion. On April 1, Lloyd told 19 20

Conflict and Conciliation, p. 513. Ibid., p. 266.

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Seferiadis of his government's intention to keep the matter at a dead point for the time being, although he expressed anxieties about the situation similar to those he had voiced in Athens. Because of this inconsistency, the Greek government instructed Seferiadis on April 7 to inform the Foreign Secretary that the responsibilities for a turn to the worse in the situation would lie on that party which, though stressing the dangers involved, brought back the Cyprus question to a dead point. The Greek Foreign Minister gave the same warning to the British Ambassador in Athens. Nonetheless, Foreign Secretary Lloyd received Seferiadis only on April 21. He preferred, he said, to be blamed than to express new ideas during the pre-electoral campaign in Greece. In justifying its inactivity on the ground of the Greek elections, the British government recognized it also faced great difficulties on the Turkish side. It seemed clear that the "ideas" Lloyd had expressed in Athens were not acceptable to Ankara. For, on May 5, at the NATO Council meeting in Copenhagen, in response to the Greek Foreign Minister's question whether simply giving a base to Turkey might help in reaching a solution of the Cyprus question, the British Foreign Secretary replied that the Turkish demand for a base was tantamount to partition. Foreign Minister Zorlu, too, according to a Reuters dispatch of May 6, had said that a Turkish base in Cyprus would be a good thing but that it could not replace partition. 21 The Greek government viewed this statement in the light of reports from the Greek chargé d'affaires in Ankara to the effect that the Turkish government not only opposed a federal solution of the Cyprus question, because such a solution assumed the possibility of coexistence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but also regarded the presence of a Turkish garrison on Cyprus as a guarantee only during an interim period of self-government and that, at the same time, it also pursued partition as an immediate solution if possible. The Greek caretaker government, during this period, while remaining in the dark about British plans for an "imposed" solution, anxiously scanned the proceedings of the House of Commons, editorials and news items in the British press, as well as the situation in Cyprus itself, for signs of future developments. Although it had the impression that Foreign 21

Macmillan writes that Foreign Secretary Lloyd made a fruitless effort with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers during the NATO Council meeting in Copenhagen on May 6, 1958, and that he had instructed him to exert efforts to get the support of John Foster Dulles for the British tridominium plan for Cyprus (Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 666-667).

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Secretary Lloyd had taken over the Cyprus issue from Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd, the latter, nevertheless, in a statement to the House of Commons on March 12, had raised ripples of uneasiness in Greek government circles. In an oral reply to a question by Patrick Wall, a Conservative M.P., to what extent had the Colonial Secretary given consideration to a federation of British, Greek, and Turkish sectors under a federal insular government and without any change in sovereignty, Lennox-Boyd had said that no possible constitutional solution had been excluded in the discussions he had held and was holding. Lloyd, on the other hand, the Greek government noted, in his Athens conversations, had never mentioned such a solution. The Colonial Secretary, indeed, when asked by Callaghan, of the Labour Opposition, whether the British government had suspended any further initiative of exchanges with the Greek government, had evaded any reply by stating that any answer to this question would be of no benefit. 22 Developments in Cyprus itself suggested British policies aiming at partition, the Greek government suspected, by a deliberate strategy of fomenting hostility between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Consul-General in Nicosia, Angelos Vlachos, had drawn his government's attention to the fact that the police, during demonstrations of the Turkish Cypriots on March 10, had merely watched the demonstrators and had not intervened though, under the Emergency Act, demonstrations were illegal. This restraint, in contrast to the police intervention during the Turkish Cypriot demonstrations in Nicosia and Famagusta two months earlier (January 27, 1958), was liable to create the impression among the Turks that they enjoyed complete immunity from the law. Furthermore, the Consul-General observed, whereas the "natural" leader of the Greek Cypriots, Ethnarch Makarios, was still kept in exile, the "self-appointed" leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Dr. Kiisiik, President of the association "Cyprus is Turkish", freely travelled back and forth between Cyprus and Turkey, getting instructions from his superiors in Ankara. On his return, Kiisiik, on February 3, had placed himself at the head of provocative anti-Greek demonstrations. In these he had declared that enosis was buried once and for all and that taksim was 1,000 per cent certain. 23 Did not this constitute an intolerable provocation to the Greek Cypriots? To what extent was this unfair treatment on the part of the British deliberate? 22 28

584 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 1412. Keesing's, 16220.

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The Consul-General had also observed that, while the police had not interfered with the Turkish Cypriot demonstrations of March 10, it missed no chance of attacking, in order to scatter, Greek Cypriot demonstrators even at memorial services for EOKA fighters, wounding them, arresting them, and hauling them before the courts. Thus, the new Governor was continuing the discriminatory treatment of the Greek Cypriots, which had been a feature of Governor Harding's administration. This had not escaped the attention even of journalists. 24 Also, whereas the British forces continued their anti-EOKA operations and their efforts to discover the hideouts of EOKA members, they had not succeeded in seizing even a single member of TMT (Turkish Defense Organization), the Turkish Cypriot organizational equivalent of EOKA. Indeed, under various pretexts, officers of the Turkish Army reportedly had entered Cyprus undisturbed, and arms were being sent in from Turkey. Kiiçiik, evidently had such developments in mind when he had boasted to a Swiss journalist that the Turkish Cypriots already had on the island a base of their own which was strong enough to prevent Cyprus from coming under Greek administration. All the above strands of evidence, in the view of Greek officials reporting from Nicosia, suggested that after Ankara had torpedoed the Foot plan, Sir Hugh had lost his self-confidence and had fallen under the influence of colleagues who still favored resort to methods used by his predecessor, including the continued enrollment of Turkish Cypriots in the auxiliary police, beyond all proportion to the percentages of the population. Although Lloyd in Athens had assured the Greek government that partition was not the most desirable solution, what had he said about this to the Turkish government? Why did Zorlu in Ankara and Kiiçiik in Cyprus continue to assure their listeners, without any démenti being issued, that Cyprus would be partitioned? Why, too, had the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Harold Caccia, expressed himself so openly in favor of partition? From the outset, the British had considered that the best way for prolonging its occupation of the island would be to prove that their withdrawal would result in a clash between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.25 Several responsible British diplomats, Sir Francis Rundall, for instance, the British Ambassador to Israel, had asserted that Cyprus was on the verge of civil war. It was difficult to avoid the 24

A dispatch in the New York Herald Tribune, February 15, 1958, reported that the British authorities punished owners of houses on whose walls the words EOKA were inscribed but allowed Volkan slogans. 26 Conflict and Conciliation, p. 9.

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suspicion that clashes between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots could not but positively serve the British position. Were the British and Turkish governments acting in collusion at this point? This was another question that puzzled the Greek government. Suspicions that this was the case emanated from Nicosia. From Ankara, the answer, on the other hand, was a guarded No. The Turks, the Greek chargé d'affaires in the Turkish capital reported on April 12, had recently shown signs of distrust of British intentions. Whereas the British, he believed, favored a development toward self-government without, if possible, any further commitment, the basic aim of the Turks remained immediate partition without any interim period. Hence, limits, objectively, existed to any attempt at coordinated Turkish-British action. The best proof of this was the divergent views on the eventual setting up of a Turkish base on Cyprus. According to the Greek diplomat's information, the absolute accuracy of which he could not guarantee, when Lloyd, late in January 1958, had discussed this matter with Turkish officials during the Ankara meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council, he had stressed that his government was in no way influenced by prestige reasons and was willing to discuss a change in the colonial regime of Cyprus. However, in order to maintain NATO unity, it regarded it as its duty to see to it that its allies would approve any solution. Britain, therefore, would accept neither enosis which the Turks opposed, nor partition, which the Greeks opposed. When the Turks had observed that Lennox-Boyd's statement of December 19,1956 committed Britain to partition as a solution, Lloyd replied that the Colonial Secretary had mentioned partition only as one of the eventual options. Granting to both communities equal rights to self-determination could be achieved by other means as well. When the Turks countered this argument by demanding a positive guarantee in Cyprus for Turkey's security, it appeared that the British took this request for a base on Cyprus as an indication that the Turks were more interested in their security than in the fate of their countrymen on the island. They therefore regarded the idea of a Turkish base as a topic for discussion but hastened to add that it did not require immediate examination so long as at present there appeared no margin for an agreement between the parties concerned on the application of self-determination whereas, on the other hand, the settlement of the matter of self-government was urgent. When the Turks remarked that, even during the interim period, a guarantee for the stationing of a Turkish force on Cyprus was indispensable, Lloyd explained that such a claim would render problematic any Greek acceptance of self-government, even if provisions were made

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for a parallel stationing of a Greek force on the island. Viewed against this background, the chargé d'affaires speculated whether Lloyd's somewhat greater rigidity during his Athens conversations with regard to Lennox-Boyd's statement of December 19, 1956, together with his great emphasis on the strategic aspects of the Turkish demands for a base on Cyprus, could be construed as an effort to draw the Greek government into accepting self-government for Cyprus without any advance British commitment to the eventual application of self-determination — in which case the British would be able to tell the Turkish government that with Greek consent it would go ahead with setting up a system of self-government in Cyprus, while leaving the matter of a final settlement in suspense. But, regardless of British motivations and inner beliefs, it was evident, in the view of the Greek chargé d'affaires, that the Turkish demand for a base was due to the thought that a base would constitute the first step toward partition while, at the same time, the presence of troops on the spot would rid the Turks of diplomatic complications which an invasion would inevitably entail for them, if circumstances were ever to impose upon them such a step. Because of this information about Turkish intentions and of its perception of developments on Cyprus itself, the Greek caretaker government, on learning that Sir Hugh Foot had gone to London on May 5 (to be followed eight days later by the British Ambassador in Athens), instructed Seferiadis to warn the Foreign Office that any new proposals concerning Cyprus would be doomed to failure, if they included any provision for ceding a base to Turkey and that any unilateral attempt to impose such a solution would have catastrophic results. In response to this démarche, Ross reaffirmed the earlier-mentioned views Lloyd had expressed to the Greek Foreign Minister in Copenhagen. He also revealed that the "ideas" Lloyd had put forward in Athens had been shelved for the time being. From this conversation Seferiadis surmised that the new British plan would exclude both enosis and partition. In Cyprus, meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriots were going on with their plan of organizing separate municipalities and communities, though without the Governor's authorization. According to a dispatch by Colin Legum in the Observer of May 11, 1958, Turkish Cypriot leaders told that correspondent openly that they would not hesitate to use any method, including riots, to create chaos and bitterness on the island so that no solution other than partition would be possible. Another matter which preoccupied the caretaker government at the eve of the general elections was press allegations to the effect that it had

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been the Greek government which had first put forward the idea of partition as a solution to the Cyprus problem. On May 2, in reply to a question concerning a passage in an editorial of the London Times of May 1 which had alleged that this had been the case, Foreign Minister Michael Pesmazoglou stated that this allegation was wholly unfounded. He drew attention to the fact that Walter Elliot, a Conservative M.P., had put forward this idea in a letter to the Times published on July 17, 1956.26 Was the British government behind this Times editorial? If so, did this represent an effort to discredit Averoff-Tossizza's image among the Greek people during his campaign for re-election? Obviously, one can only speculate whether such a manipulative effort was involved. The timing of this editorial is suggestive. Whitehall did not care too much for Averoff-Tossizza's "undulating" handling of the Cyprus question. Nor did Ankara, as a matter of fact. 27 British efforts to undermine the position of another Greek spokesman in the Cyprus issue, Alexis A. Kyrou, Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1954, who had been largely responsible for raising the issue in the United Nations, suggest a precedent for such a maneuver. 28

E. THE GRIVAS-FOOT DUEL

Before the Greek government crisis of February 27, 1958, Grivas in his hole-in-the-ground, in a letter from the Greek Consul in Nicosia, Aristotle Frydas, had learned on February 19 that Lloyd had said in his Athens talks that the Turks might be satisfied with a base on the island instead of insisting on partition, but that the Greek government had categorically rejected such a measure. A letter from Makarios received two days later informed him that now the main problem was: how to satisfy the Turkish government. A critical moment had been reached. In a public statement, the prelate had said that further talks were purposeless so long as the British government made a solution of the Cyprus question dependent on Turkish acceptance. 29 From the above information, Grivas concluded that the British were trying to impose a solution, putting 28

Conflict and Conciliation, p. 617, note 42. Ibid., pp. 110-111. 28 Ibid., pp. 16 and 31. Foreign policy involves, among other things, efforts to influence who the leaders of other nations will be, J. H. De Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy, (Columbus, Ohio: C. E. Merrill), p. 362. 29 Grivas Memoirs, p. 231. 27

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forward the unacceptable Turkish demands. The Turks, on their side, were exerting pressure to force a solution before the Labour Party came to power in Britain. Greek diplomacy was to blame. 30 Under the circumstances, Grivas decided to go ahead with preparations for passive resistance which would include the boycott of British goods and nonparticipation in British football pools. 31 Armed action would be resorted to only if this would benefit the whole struggle. He also drafted self-defense plans against the Turkish Cypriots, if they moved again. A United Unshatterable National Front (EAEM) would be set up to raise morale and mobilize the people. On March 2, the day the Karamanlis government handed in its resignation, Grivas issued a leaflet to inform the Cypriots that the hour was approaching for waging "total War" against the British, against their economy and their administration. Passive resistance, he warned, would entail sacrifices not only in blood but also in money. The British, he charged, were trying to delude the Cypriots. By continually postponing a solution of the Cyprus problem, they hoped the Cypriots would get weary of their struggle for freedom. Each time they put forward different arguments. At first they had said that Cyprus was valuable as a strategic base; then, that the island was indispensable for the protection of Middle Eastern oil. 32 "Now they present us with a new argument: the Turkish factor. They tell us: be quiet so that we may find a solution that will be acceptable to all concerned." Then, on March 4, two days after the Greek government had resigned, Grivas issued orders for starting action against inanimate targets for the time being, to buttress passive resistance; show that EOKA's inactivity had been deliberate, not due to weakness; and raise the morale of EOKA members and of the people. Bombs exploded in the depot of the RAF airfield in Nicosia. 33 A campaign of sabotage of selected British targets thus began. Sir Hugh Foot, responding on March 9 to the threats of passive resistance and to the first acts of sabotage, attacked these developments in a radio speech. He gave an assurance that all necessary measures would be taken to protect the public against renewed EOKA violence.34 Grivas promptly countered with a leaflet entitled "The Tearworthy Speech of Foot". When the Governor, during a visit to the detention 30 31 32 33 34

Grivas Memoirs, p. 230. Reesing's, 16220. Eden had so stated in a speech at Norwich, of June 1,1956. Grivas Memoirs, pp. 223, 219-220, and 239; Appendix, p. 30. Keesing's, 16220. Keesing's, 16220.

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camp of Pyla, declared that releases of the detainees would be suspended if EOKA resumed its operations, Grivas responded with a leaflet entitled "Blackmail". Sir Hugh, he charged, was trying to use the detainees as hostages. If he dared to do so, Grivas threatened dire consequences. The Governor conferred with his political and military advisers on March 21. He was worried, Grivas concluded. 35 Sir Hugh, however, decided to relax the ban on parades and processions to enable the Greek Cypriots to celebrate Greek independence day, for the first time in three years. Some 400,000 Greek Cypriots throughout the island took part in the parades of March 25. Not a single incident occurred nor any communal disturbances. 36 April 1, on the other hand, the third anniversary of the outbreak of EOKA operations, was underlined by a general strike, demonstrations in the streets of Nicosia, acts of protest in the detention camps, and three bomb explosions. The day before, Grivas had allowed a greater latitude in the choice of inanimate targets. The Greek Consul in Nicosia was soon to criticize some of the acts of sabotage that followed — the destruction, for example, of tractors, bulldozers, and of an incubator — much to the scornful annoyance of Grivas who replied to this criticism by referring to the scorched earth tactics of General Kutuzov, during Napoleon's invasion of Russia. On April 3, Grivas issued a leaflet threatening attacks against British servicemen if the ill-treatment of arrested or detained Cypriots continued. On April 6, EOKA men attacked a police station at Koutroufa. April 14: William Dear, a member of the Special Branch, whom the Greek Foreign Minister during the UN debate on the Cyprus item in December 1957 had singled out as one of the most sadistic torturers of Cypriots, was shot by EOKA men. He died of the wounds a few days later. 37 On April 18, Grivas received a note of April 12 from the Governor himself, acting on his own, without any authorization from London. Sir Hugh appealed for an end to sabotage and violence and expressed willingness to meet the EOKA leader at any place of his own choice. 38 The deliverer of this note, Glafkos Clerides, in two notes of his own, made an interesting analysis of the Governor's views at the time. Sir Hugh, in his talk with Clerides, had emphasized (as he had done to the Greek officials in Athens) that if EOKA resumed full action, the results 35 38 37 38

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 239,237, and 235. Keesing's, 16220. Conflict and Conciliation, p. 650, note 62. Keesing's, 16221. Grivas Memoirs, pp. 243-248. Foot, A Start in Freedom, pp. 152-156.

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would be unfavorable for a solution of the Cyprus question and for Makarios' return to the island. And the reaction of Turkey as well as the position of the military in Cyprus, who disagreed with the Governor's views, would be strengthened. The truce therefore should continue for two or three months more. The Governor fully realized that the Cypriots were disgruntled at the delay in finding a solution of the Cyprus question, but for this delay, not he, but the Greek government was to blame, with its upcoming elections. Without the British government's approval, he had decided to confer with Grivas directly. Grivas not only rejected the Governor's offer of a meeting, considering it to be a trap, but avoided giving any direct reply to this note. He informed the note's bearer, however, that he had stopped and was waiting. If he realized that the British authorities were trying to trick him, then he would start action again at the soonest. Moreover, in a public response, he issued a proclamation calling for the speedy opening of negotiations for reaching a solution of the Cyprus question, before ordering an all-out drive. Sir Hugh, despite the failure of his unauthorized initiative, could note with satisfaction that the campaign of sabotage came to an end on April 20. However, since searches and governmental terrorism continued, Grivas felt that the Governor's military advisers had prevailed, so he issued a new proclamation on April 26 giving the Governor two days to end all repressive measures against the inmates of the detention camps — or else he would strike back at the British in reprisal. Concurrently he issued orders to EOKA sector leaders to be ready to strike against certain British "torturers". The British authorities, on their side, proclaimed the Greek Cypriot quarters of Nicosia, Famagusta and other cities out of bounds to servicemen. After the expiration of forty-eight hours, Grivas issued orders for organizing reserve groups for carrying out sabotage and executions. On May 4, in EOKA reprisals, two British servicemen, both of the Royal Military Police, were shot dead in the Varosha area of Famagusta. The Governor responded by reimposing the death penalty for bomb or firearm attacks on persons, or for carrying or possessing bombs or firearms with the intent of causing loss of life. 39 On learning that the Governor was getting ready to leave for London to confer with the Cabinet on the Cyprus question, Grivas issued a 39

Grivas Memoirs,

p. 249. Keesing's 16221.

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leaflet warning him against any effort to impose a solution on the Cypriots; against involving the Turkish factor in the Cyprus question; or against ceding bases on the island to Turkey. Otherwise, he threatened, November 1956, a particularly violent month in EOKA's activities, would pale before the new developments. On May 9, finally, two days before the Greek general elections, he ordered suspension of action, pending further instructions. At a time when important developments were expected also from London, he did not wish to give arguments to the foe. Since March 4 when he had ordered a campaign of selective sabotage against British targets, until May 13, EOKA had carried out or attempted fifty-seven acts of sabotage. 40 Meanwhile, the relations between Grivas and Makarios were somewhat discordant. Early in March and then during the third week in April the Cyprus Ethnarch wrote to Grivas that it would be a good idea to intimidate the Turkish Cypriots by scattering their gatherings with a few hand grenades, if they carried out unprovoked attacks. Grivas vigorously dissented with this suggestion.41 He also took violent exception with the Ethnarch's disapproval of the campaign of passive resistance which Grivas had begun simultaneously with his renewed sabotage operations. The Ethnarch, with the Greek Consul in Nicosia in agreement, believed that passive resistance ought to concentrate on the consumers, not the importers, of British goods. In a letter of April 25 to Grivas, he expressed fear lest boycotts have more harmful economic effects on a large segment of the Greek Cypriot population than on the British economy. He had ascertained that this measure had aroused considerable dissatisfaction. Replying on April 28, Grivas expressed amazement at the views of the Ethnarch, whose informants, he charged, were only a handful of disgruntled capitalists. In great detail he then went on to analyze the value of economic and other sanctions for EOKA's struggle. As a result of this controversy, direct contact with Makarios was broken for about two months, 42 it would seem.

40

«

42

Grivas Memoirs, Appendix, pp. 30-32. Ibid., pp. 258, and 273. Ibid., pp. 365-367.

in TOWARDS A VENTURE IN PARTNERSHIP

A. THE NEW KARAMANLIS GOVERNMENT AND THE CYPRUS QUESTION

In the Greek general elections of May 11, 1958, ERE, the National Radical Union led by Constantine Karamanlis, got 41.17 per cent of the popular vote and 171 seats in Parliament under the mixed majority and proportional representation electoral system applied to these elections. EDA, the Union of the Democratic Left, under John Passalidis, got 24.42 per cent of the popular vote and 79 seats in Parliament. The Liberal Party, under the joint leadership of George Papandreou and Sophocles Venizelos, came a poor third with 20.68 per cent of the popular vote and 36 seats in Parliament. Smaller parties garnered the remaining 14 seats in the 300-member legislature. The disgruntlement of many Greeks with the West's attitude in the Cyprus question partly accounted for this remarkable rise in popular support for EDA, the communist facade party set up in 1951, which thus became the principal Opposition Party in Parliament.1 In the new Cabinet, Averoff-Tossizza again took over the Ministry for Foreign Affairs despite the earlier-mentioned allegations, exploited in the Opposition press, with the voices of Menderes and Zorlu added after the elections,2 that he, not the Turks or the British, had been the 1

For election results figures, see T. A. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 231. Vima, May 12, 1958, commented that the increased strength of EDA was due in part to the British and Turkish attitudes on the Cyprus question. 2 An editorial in the extreme Right Wing Estia, May 15, 1958, quoted Zorlu as saying in Bonn that the Karamanlis government had first proposed partition as a solution to the Cyprus question and that the Radcliffe Constitution had taken over this Greek idea. Another editorial in the same Athens newspaper, of June 15,1958, reported that Zorlu had reverted to this charge, specifically mentioning Averoff-Tossizza as the author of this idea. Menderes, according to the same newspaper of July 1, 1958, had made a similar allegation. The Greek Foreign Minister repeated his categorical statement that neither the Greek government nor he personally had ever made such a proposal.

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father of the idea of partition as a solution to the Cyprus problem. His reaction to the remarkable resurgence of barely concealed communist political influence in Greek politics is clearly reflected in a letter he wrote to Grivas, shortly after the elections, under his pseudonym of "Isaakios". In this letter, not mentioned at all in Grivas' memoirs, "Isaakios" noted that on his return from his "trip to Europe" he had put order in his shop and his business had been strengthened. Therefore from that viewpoint he himself was well. However, the general state of affairs of the country worried him. On the one hand, the government had emerged strengthened from the elections because of its Parliamentary majority and because the people, frightened at the results, looked to Karamanlis and only Karamanlis in their great majority. On the other hand, however, the rise in the number of EDA votes disturbed him. Not all these votes were communist. But that was even worse. Thanks to the popular fronts of 1954 (municipal elections) and of 1956 (general elections),3 a segment of the Greek people had become accustomed to playing politics with the communists and no longer regarded them as pariahs in the life of the nation. Many discontented people cooperated with them. What would happen if these people were not satisfied? To what extent could these people be satisfied? During the previous two years there had been an unprecedented rise in prosperity. But the demands were greater than the capabilities. Daily a mass of young people reached adulthood. The population greatly increased. If other discontented people were added to the treasonable or stupid 25 per cent who had voted for EDA, where was the country going? The government, he hoped, would be able to deal with EDA and would exert every effort to satisfy the underprivileged. Because of these internal developments, continued "Isaakios", there were certain disadvantages for "our sacred cause". Besides, one did not know the nature of the new British proposals. Many people, "foreigners especially", believed it would be possible to discuss them. To judge from the Turkish reaction, perhaps something discussable would emerge. However, one could say nothing until "our people are fully and directly informed". Meanwhile, "Isaakios" suggested that, because of these difficulties and as long as a few hopes existed, one should wait for a few weeks. Should the Turkish Cypriots strike at the British, as certain 3

In the general elections of 1956, E R E had received 47.38 per cent of the total vote and the Center-Left Coalition 48.15 per cent of the total vote, with 165 and 132 seats, respectively. The coalition comprised the following parties: Liberal, Liberal Democratic Union, EPEK, Agrarian, Populist, Democratic, and EDA (Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences, pp. 230-231).

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trends suggested, "we should remain spectators and not provoke them". He also wrote that he often saw "Chares" (Makarios) and was on very friendly terms with him. "Chares'" shop, too, was not doing badly. In conclusion, "Isaakios", having heard that Grivas was not in too good health, urged him to take good care of himself. He was, he assured EOKA's leader, always at his disposal. On May 19, Lennox-Boyd told the House of Commons that after the Whitsun recess of Parliament the new British plan for Cyprus would be announced on June 17.4 On this occasion, Grivas circulated a leaflet warning that EOKA was prepared for either peace or war. 5 Makarios reiterated the need for self-determination as the indispensable basis for negotiations between the Cypriot people and the British government and said he would never accept a Turkish base on Cyprus.6 And AveroffTossizza, in response to the Zorlu statement made in Copenhagen early in May that Turkey would oppose any policy on Cyprus other than partition, stated that Greece was not demanding either the whole or part of the island but merely wanted the Cypriot people to have the right to determine their own future. The Greek government, he said, would accept no solution that was not based on the will of the Cypriot people.7 In a letter of June 6 to Grivas,8 the Greek Foreign Minister, under his pseudonym as usual, explained further several matters he had mentioned in his previous letter. After (pointedly?) informing EOKA's leader that the Greek government's cooperation with Ethnarch Makarios was very close, he reiterated that the rise in pro-EDA votes which the elections had revealed had become an obsession with the government which believed that this was its Number One problem. He expected that the proposals about Cyprus the British government was to disclose on June 17 would be communicated two or three days earlier to the Greek government and "probably other governments". From good sources, he had it that these proposals would constitute a program, of which only the details would be open for discussion, and that both Athens and Ankara would be displeased with it, though, according to his informants, matters would be 4

588 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 891. Grivas Memoirs, p. 251. Macmillan notes that the Commons accepted without protest Lennox-Boyd's explanation that the reason for the government's reticence over its new Cyprus proposals was that they were being discussed with the interested governments (Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 666). As far as the Greek government was concerned, this does not seem to have been the case. 5 Grivas Memoirs, pp. 251-252. 8 Leslie Finer dispatch in The Observer, May 25,1958. ' Grivas Memoirs, pp. 251-252. 8 Ibid., pp. 276-277. The text published contains many omissions.

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more pleasant for Athens than for Ankara. However, because of conflicting reports, many of which were journalistic, nothing could be foreseen about the substance of this program. The Greek government, "Isaakios" reminded Grivas, had rejected not only partition but also Turkish bases.9 Reports of disturbing troop concentrations on the Turkish shore opposite Cyprus were circulating, "Isaakios" wrote further. There had been also a Turkish statement that these were merely usual maneuvers, but there were denials, too. These troops, in the view of "Isaakios", however, would not invade the island, though he, personally, hoped the Turks would act. For he was sure that, through the United Nations, "we could provoke a storm against them and thus smash the Turkish factor".10 Turkish relations with Britain were strained. Britain was concerned with, and annoyed at Turkey's intransigence which had surpassed the limits of arrogance, "Isaakios" also wrote. As for the United States, it was anxious because of the results of the Greek elections. It showed sympathy for the Greek viewpoint but was unlikely to bring any effective pressure to bear on Turkey, to which it attached greater importance than ever, after events in Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan.11 He therefore supposed that the U.S. government would strongly back the new British plan. 9

See above, Chapter II, pp. 95-96. Kathimerini, June 8,1958, reported that the Greek Foreign Minister had been very reserved when asked about the reports of these Turkish troops concentrations and did not wish either to confirm or deny these reports. Makarios, in an Athens press interview of May 30, 1958, said that if the reports were true, the aim of these troop concentrations was to create psychological pressure to impose a solution conforming to Turkish demands. In conversation with the author, Karamanlis said that these troop concentrations had aroused considerable concern in top government circles and that Greek intelligence agents had confirmed them. 11 The union of Egypt with Syria as the UAR on February 1, 1958 had a profoundly destabilizing effect upon and in other Arab states — Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. On February 14,1958, the kings of Iraq and Jordan signed an Arab Federation agreement as a counterweight to the newly set up UAR. Lebanon, on the other hand, through a statement of its President on March 25, 1958, decided against joining either the UAR or the Arab Federation. However, the impact in that country was internal. Some of the Muslim Lebanese wanted to join the UAR, and on May 20,1958, an uprising occurred against the Lebanese government. In response to this situation, the Lebanese government resorted first to the Arab League, then to the UN. The latter responded by setting up UNOGIL. Then, on July 14,1958, military officers in a coup d'état overthrew the monarchy in Iraq and decided to dissolve the Arab Federation, with Jordan refusing to recognize this dissolution and fearing an Iraqi takeover. At the request of the President of Lebanon, the United States landed Marines in Lebanon on July 15. Two days later Britain sent troops to Jordan. Both these moves represented attempts to stabilize the situation vis-à-vis Nasser, the new Iraqi regime, and also the USSR (M. Harari, Government and Politics of the Middle East, pp. 97-100, and 117-118). 10

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What greatly disturbed him, "Isaakios" continued in this letter to Grivas, were the results of a possible resumption of EOKA's struggle. If it was true that the Turkish Cypriot minority in Cyprus was armed and organized and determined to carry out reprisals, inevitably there would be a conflict of successive reprisals by both sides, with killings, for instance, and arson. Should this occur, then in addition to sufferings in Cyprus, there would be, first, an abnormal development in Greek-Turkish relations, to a degree that could not be foreseen; second, trouble and massacres in Istanbul; third, effective exploitation of events by EDA; and, fourth, high probabilities of partition, because, though all governments had been persuaded that partition was bad and could not be implemented, it was likely that they would conclude that, for peace to be restored to the island, there was no other solution. For the above reasons "we who are here believe" that before any resumption of EOKA's struggle, there should be prior consultation with any supreme political authority, if any such authority had been recognized, and, if need be, with the Greek government, "if it finally deigned to get in touch with EOKA". This was the gravest of matters and "we must be very careful". Grivas knew that both materially and spiritually, he ("Isaakios") had supported his struggle, was unreservedly on his side as a warm admirer, and recognized that his struggle had yielded great results. "Today, however, I also see great dangers for many thousands of Greeks as well as for some basic interests of our nation." Should there be any need for a struggle, aside from a multiform political struggle, he saw no other form possible except sabotage, so that the killings of Turkish Cypriot auxiliary policemen and the triggering of reprisals should be avoided. Dated June 8 but evidently written before knowledge of the Turkish Cypriot anti-Greek Cypriot riots that broke out the night of June 7 in Nicosia, a letter addressed to Foreign Minister AverofF-Tossizza by the Greek Ambassador in Ankara, George Pesmazoglou, before his not yet cancelled departure for his post in Turkey, provides an insight into another source of important counsel that may have influenced the Foreign Minister's handling of the Cyprus question. In contrast to the advice that came from the Greek Ambassador in London and tended to favor procrastination, 12 this counsel was in the sense of a warning against further suspense of the Cyprus issue. Such suspense, in Pesmazoglou's view, enclosed both internal and external dangers, as he had orally explained to both the Foreign Minister and the Premier. So long as 12

Conflict and Conciliation, p. 158.

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Greece sought an understanding with Turkey, it was impossible, he wrote, to envisage a solution that would not safeguard the Turks against enosis, at least for a certain period of time. The Greeks could envisage enosis only if they ceased counting on Turkish cooperation or if the Greek-Turkish alliance really started bearing fruit. For that reason his opinion was that the government, after learning about the expected British proposals on Cyprus and weighing the national interests that were in balance, should reach the outer limit of concessions it believed possible and seek the mediatory intervention of the United States, so that the Turks might accept the reasonable compromise proposed. The United States, in his view, could impose itself upon the Turks. He was convinced that the Turks' intransigence since mid-September 1957 was due to their confidence that the United States continually yielded to their demands and threats. Were the Americans to refuse or not manage to help effectively, the Greek government should tell them clearly that in order to prevent the continued strengthening of the extreme Left revealed in the last elections, and the eventual collapse of the internal front in Greece, it was imperative to examine jointly with Greece's allies ways in which Greece might get rid of its allied and other commitments toward Turkey under NATO, until a settlement of the Cyprus issue became possible. If the Turks were convinced that Greece could acquire freedom of action toward them, he was of the opinion that they would finally accept reasonable Greek proposals, so as not to find themselves isolated among their neighbors. The situation in Iraq and Jordan undermined the very foundations of the Baghdad Pact. Turkey, hence, could not rely on that pact. And the chaotic situation in Lebanon together with the continuing strengthening of the United Arab Republic from all viewpoints did not allow Turkey to "breathe" except through the Greek seas. In November 1957, he had set down in writing his views about the outermost limits of concessions that might be made to Turkey in efforts to settle the Cyprus question. Now, because of the extraordinarily conciliatory attitude of Ethnarch Makarios, who represented the Greek population of Cyprus, there was a possibility of further retreat, as long as he agreed. At any rate, the Greek proposals to the Turks and the Allies should be categorically stated, the Greek Ambassador to Turkey believed, so that not the slightest doubt should exist that the present government could make any further concessions. He himself would contribute with all his strength to the success of any other solution which the government would regard as being more to its interest. Nonetheless, he had to observe that, if no further promotion of the issue for immediate liquidation was considered,

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he believed that the assumptions underlying his mission to Ankara would have ceased to exist13 — this, because it was likely that such a gesture of the Greek government would lose its value without any purpose, and thus the government would be deprived of the possibility of repeating such a gesture in the future, if this were again required.

B. THE TURKISH CYPRIOT RIOTS 14

The night of June 7-8, 1958, the "toil and moil" between Muslims and Greek Orthodox Christians, which Lloyd had predicted since early 1954, occurred in Cyprus. At 10:30 p.m. on June 7, somebody in a passing car (belonging to a Turkish Cypriot)15 hurled a small bomb at the Turkish Information Office (part of the Turkish Consulate) in Kyrenia Street of Nicosia. Immediately, large numbers of Turkish Cypriot youths armed with sticks, cudgels, iron bars, and other weapons poured out into the streets and attacked Greek premises in the Old City, setting fire to shops and a cigarette factory, and smashing windows. Crowds of Greek Cypriots soon came out into the streets, and a battle developed in which both sides indiscriminately used firearms, knives, and clubs. In the alleys around Famagusta Gate, a Turkish mob set a lumber yard ablaze and burned down a Greek sports club. Big fires broke out elsewhere in the city. The fire brigade tried to put them out, while the security forces tried to control the rioters. Only after the security forces had imposed a curfew and set up a barricade along the division between the Greek and Turkish quarters of Nicosia was order restored. In these riots, two Greek Cypriots were killed, many Greeks and Turks injured, and 80 persons arrested. Violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots also erupted in Larnaca after a crowd of Greeks armed with clubs gathered in one of the main squares of the city. Crowds of Turks invaded Varosha, the Greek quarter 13

In an effort to pave the way for improved relations with Turkey as well as for a settlement of the Cyprus question, Pesmazoglou, a non-career diplomat, had been appointed to Ankara at the end of June 1957, while on the Turkish side, Nureddin Vergin replaced Settar Iksel. Both Ambassadors played an important role in the diplomatic exchanges that led to the Zürich agreement of February 11,1959. Panayotis Pipinelis, in an article of June 20, 1957, in Kathimerini, had urged efforts to improve Greek-Turkish relations and to reestablish Greek-Turkish friendship. When Premier in 1963 for about three months, he followed this line. During the Cyprus crisis of late 1967, he became Foreign Minister and dealt with this crisis in the same spirit. 14 The facts are based mainly on Keesing's, 16221-16222. 16 The car was a Zephyr No. TL782 (Grivas Memoirs, Appendix, p. 46).

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of Famagusta, and wrecked a number of premises. Two Greek Cypriots were killed in these riots and order was restored only after a curfew was imposed. On June 8, the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement proclaiming that the only means of ensuring Turkey's own security was through partition of Cyprus. That same day, 200,000 people in Istanbul demonstrated in support of the Turkish Cypriots' demand for taksim. Ethnarch Makarios was burned in effigy, and speakers, among whom was Dr. Ku?iik, attacked both Britain and Greece. No possibility of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots living peacefully together existed, they declared. The question was no longer one for the Turkish Cypriots but for twentysix million Turks. Attempts were made to march on the British and Greek Consulates but the police intervened. On June 9, Foreign Secretary Lloyd summoned the Turkish Ambassador in London, Nuri Birgi, to the Foreign Office and apparently asked him to urge his government to exercise its influence on the Turkish Cypriot leaders to ensure calm and restraint. In Ankara, Sir James Bowker made similar representations to the Turkish government. Governor Foot had no doubt that Foreign Minister Zorlu had known of, and perhaps given the orders for the Turkish Cypriot riots and the attempt to burn Nicosia.16 In Athens, Makarios, likewise on June 9, said that the Nicosia and Larnaca riots suggested a premeditated Turkish plan on the pattern of the anti-Greek riots in Istanbul of September 1955. The Cyprus government, he charged, "once again had proved to be incapable of preventing or quelling disturbances in time". The Greek Cypriots, he said further, were forced to organize in self-defense against Turkish provocations or attacks in the future. Likewise in Athens, a Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman charged Turkey with working on a deliberate plan to exert pressure on Britain on the eve of the expected British policy announcement on Cyprus. The "vandalism" in Nicosia and Larnaca was part of that plan. Also announced in Athens on June 9 was that Greece had asked for an immediate meeting of the NATO Council because of the anti-Greek Cypriot riots in Cyprus and had made demarches in London, Washington, and the United Nations. The Greek Ambassador to Ankara was instructed not to return to his post until further orders. To deal with these events in Cyprus, Governor Sir Hugh Foot, on 18

Foot, A Start in Freedom, p. 150.

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June 8, had met with Turkish Cypriot leaders and urged them to do all in their power to prevent the situation from worsening further. As for the Mayor of Nicosia, Themistocles Dervis, he had phoned to the Governor earlier that day in protest against the alleged inert attitude and apathy of the security forces in the face of Turkish murder and arson. On June 9, the Governor imposed new and drastic measures. Further serious riots, however, occurred on June 10-12 in Nicosia and Famagusta again, as well as in Limassol and in the rural areas. In Nicosia, Turkish Cypriots set fire to the church of St. Luke.17 In these clashes four more Greeks were killed and a large number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots wounded. On June 12, Turkish Cypriots killed seven Greek Cypriots at the village of Geuneli, a few miles from Nicosia.18 In Ankara that same day, at Kemal Ataturk's Mausoleum, 100,000 demonstrators clamored for taksim. An Ankara dispatch of June 14 reported in an English newspaper that taksim for the Turkish man-in-the-street meant annexation, with official Turkish pronouncements and editorials full of elaborate proofs that Cyprus was Turkish, although four fifths of its population were Greeks. 19 Likewise on June 12, Averoff-Tossizza in Athens announced that he had protested to London at the "inadequacy" of the Cyprus administration in protecting the Greek Cypriots from Turkish Cypriot mob violence. He also disclosed that the Greek government had asked the UN SecretaryGeneral, Dag Hammerskjold, to intervene personally in view of the situation's gravity. If Turkish Cypriot violence continued, Greece would resort to the UN Security Council. Next day, the Greek government addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council and drew his attention to the whole situation. That same day, the Turkish government conveyed to the President its own version of the events, with both governments following up these notes with new ones on June 19 and 16, respectively.20 On June 14, the Greek government, in an aide-mémoire, drew the 17

Grivas Memoirs, Appendix, p. 33. See Foot, A Start in Freedom, pp. 172-174, for this event. Daily Telegraph, June IS, 1958. According to this dispatch, though "half the island" was the official Turkish theme on Cyprus, "the whole island" was often visibly the motive behind it. "Cyprus is Turkish" was a slogan as often to be seen in Ankara as "Partition or Death". 20 Fourteen Greeks were killed between June 7-19, 1958. Two churches, nine houses, and 18 cars were destroyed. The damage was estimated at about $1,700,000, M. N. Pissas, Constitutional Offers and Other Facts about Cyprus (Since 1878), (London: Ethnarchy of Cyprus publication, October 1958), p. 12. 18 19

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British government's attention to information from Cyprus that the Turkish Cypriots were expected to launch massive attacks on the Greek Cypriots on June 17 (the date of Macmillan's expected announcement of his new plan for Cyprus) and that Turkish "volunteers" in considerable numbers were to land in Cyprus. The British authorities should investigate this information and take all the necessary preventive measures. The Greek government reminded the British government that on various occasions it had conveyed to it all information a; its disposal concerning the premeditated attacks against the Greek Cypriots. It regretted that, despite these repeated warnings, the security forces in Cyprus had failed to protect the life and property of the Greek Cypriots. With great concern the Greek government noticed that the maintenance of order in Cyprus was still entrusted to Turkish auxiliary policemen. To believe that such tactics would deter Greece from further supporting the claims of the population of Cyprus to self-determination would be a mistake that could have far-reaching consequences, the Greek government further warned. Greece had a long experience of sacrifices which more often than not the attainment of freedom entailed. The orgy of violence launched by the Turks would strengthen, instead of curbing, the determination both in Cyprus and Greece to see the island achieve its freedom. Likewise on June 14, London announced that the 16th Parachute Brigade Corps (three battalions, each consisting of about 500 paratroopers) together with a battery of artillery and a squadron of engineers was flying to Cyprus. On June 15, the Greek government recalled its staff from the NATO Headquarters at Izmir. 21 During the meetings of the new Greek Parliament, the Cyprus events and Greek policy with regard to Cyprus were debated between June 10-13, 1958. Premier Karamanlis, in presenting his government's program, soberly declared that he would continue supporting the Cypriot struggle for freedom. For promoting the issue, he would choose the most effective means available, keeping in mind the basic interests of the Greek nation. The Turkish threats and Turkish Cypriot atrocities would "daunt neither us nor our Greek brothers. On the contrary, they would steel our will and determination in waging this struggle for justice and the protection of the lives and interests of our persecuted brothers." 22 EDA's leader, Passalidis, after denouncing Greek participation in NATO and urging 21

Grivas Memoirs; p. 260. Journal of the Debates in the Greek Parliament (in Greek), June 10, 1958, p. 10 (hereafter cited as GPD).

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ties of friendship with the Arab countries and all Balkan States, declared that Greece should wage its Cyprus struggle in close cooperation with the anticolonial countries. The Greek government should openly denounce the "Angloturks" and, instead of going to NATO, should resort to the UN Security Council and to the General Assembly, asking for selfdetermination from the latter. It should also withdraw from any joint military exercises in which Britain and Turkey participated and cooperate closely with the UAR. 23 In response to these observations, AveroffTossizza explained why Greece could not resort to the UN Security Council or, as Papandreou had proposed, get a UN peacekeeping force sent to the island. 24 He also referred to the various demarches the Greek government had made with other governments and the United Nations over the recent incidents in Cyprus. 25 Finally, he stated, the Greek government intended to resort to the UN General Assembly, if no solution occurred, and would not assume any commitment that would prevent it from resorting to the United Nations. 26 As for Grivas, he saw in the Cyprus riots a Turko-British drive not against EOKA but against all Greek Cypriots. The purpose of this drive was to prove that peaceful coexistence between the two ethnic elements was impossible; to justify the impossibility of meeting the Greek demands; to neutralize all Greek Cypriot resistance against the British plan that was soon to be announced; to estrange the population from EOKA, and to force EOKA to wage a two-front struggle against the Turkish Cypriots and the British, forcing it to reveal its strength. To deal with this situation, Grivas decided on various defense measures against the Turkish Cypriots, not against the British, because it was necessary to keep reserve EOKA forces intact to deal with the British later, should they launch extensive operations against the underground organization; also because it was important for the Greek government to appear as a plaintiff before the NATO Council. On stage, on June 13, Grivas issued a leaflet addressed to the Greek Cypriot people whose morale he sought to raise. 27 In this leaflet he pro23

GPD, June 11,1958, p. 17. Ibid., p. 24. 26 Ibid., pp. 24-28, and 50. Averoff-Tossizza pointed out first the difficulty of getting the Security Council to place the Cyprus crisis on its agenda, because of its composition. Then he mentioned that Britain had a veto. Third, he observed that the Council could refer the matter back to a regional organization, NATO, or propose arbitration or mediation. 26 Ibid., p. 25. 37 Grivas Memoirs, Appendix, p. 22.

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claimed that the "vandalisms and murders of Kiipiik's henchmen and Foot's collaborators would not daunt us". The Governor was grossly mistaken, if he believed he could "weaken us". On the contrary he had "strengthened us and fanaticized us". EOKA's forces were ready. Grivas went on to assure the Cypriots that he would return the blows of "the perfidious and bloody Foot" and of "the odious Kiigiik", if they continued "their orgy" of violence. On June 15, he gave orders for reprisals against the Turkish Cypriots, if they resumed their attacks. On June 20, in the municipal market of Limassol a Turkish Cypriot was shot. Ethnarch Makarios, incidentally, was angry that EOKA had not given a good lesson to the Turkish Cypriots. But Grivas wrote to him on June 26 that he refused to be carried away by events. He did not want to erode his forces with fruitless and exhibitionist actions merely to please certain individuals. He was a military man, not a demagogue. He was reorganizing his forces and did not want to engage his guerilla bands in action yet. On June 30, a Turkish Cypriot was shot and killed at Limassol. 28 However, although Turkish Cypriots went on with their violent activities against Greek Cypriots, Grivas continued his restraint until the second week of July.

C. THE MACMILLAN PLAN

Meanwhile, after June 10 the Cyprus question reached a crisis on the summit level, too. Macmillan, in separate letters to Karamanlis and Menderes as well as in a communication to the NATO Council, disclosed the outline of the new British plan for Cyprus which the British government had been preparing since Foreign Secretary Lloyd's return from Athens in mid-February. In his covering letter to the Greek Premier, 29 Macmillan explained that this was a seven-year plan, during which Britain would retain its sovereignty over Cyprus as well as the principal responsibility for its administration. However, during this seven-year period, 28

Grivas Memoirs, Appendix, p. 34. The Cyprus Question. Correspondence Exchanged Between Mr. Constemtine Karamanlis., Prime Minister of Greece, and the Right Honorable Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (June 10-August 19,1958) (Athens: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1958), pp. 5-7 (cited hereafter as Greek White Book I). Macmillan, in the second opening paragraph of this letter, referred to "the gravity of the present situation" and to "the dangers" which threatened NATO. These dangers, in his view, had increased "because of our unhappy divisions over Cyprus". The aim of bringing this dispute to an end had been dominant in his mind. 28

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the plan's keynote would be partnership, which would include not only the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot "communities" but also the Greek and Turkish governments. In this partnership, the two communities would enjoy full opportunities to regulate their own lives in matters that concerned them as communities, and to join together in matters that were of common interest. During this seven-year period, he hoped that the two communities would build up confidence and experience by working together for the island's peace and prosperity, and settle down side by side, and that a new spirit of cooperation for the good of Cyprus would grow. His government had faith in the ability of the "peoples" 30 of Cyprus to live in peace and unity in their island, if they were given the chance. The British government, Macmillan explained further to Karamanlis, was not asking the Greek government and the Greek Cypriote to renounce any of their ultimate aspirations. He proposed, however, to include in his relevant statement to the House of Commons an expression of hope that the whole partnership would "broaden out" into a final international status that would be consistent with the partnership plan. The whole plan, Macmillan maintained, offered a chance, perhaps a last chance, of ending the very dangerous situation of the island and outside it, and of bringing back the accord which ought to exist between the three allied countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. "We owe it not only to ourselves but to our allies." Therefore he asked for the help of both the Greek and Turkish governments through official representatives on the island who, under this plan, were to take part in the partnership system. The presence of Greek and Turkish representatives in Cyprus would be both a symbol of the new purpose "on which we are embarking", and a security for the two communities, which had such close cultural ties with Greece and Turkey, respectively. At the very least, he hoped the Greek government would study this policy and urge all concerned to refrain from any action which might prejudice the chances of its receiving a calm and balanced judgment. Should Karamanlis wish to send his own thoughts on any aspects of the new plan, Macmillan wrote further, he would be glad to study these thoughts with the closest attention. Indeed, he would be glad to have 30

The use of the word "people" in the plural indicated the British government's endorsement of the Turkish view that there were two peoples in Cyprus, not a single aggregate of the Cypriot people or Cypriot population, which was the Greek view. The Greek suspicions that the plan prepared the way for partition were thus strengthened by the British use of this plural.

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a personal exchange of views with the Greek Premier and would welcome meeting him to discuss the plan, perhaps in Rome or Geneva, perhaps with the Premier of Turkey also present. He was sending Menderes a message on similar lines. In the aide-mémoire enclosed in Macmillan's letter of June 10 to Karamanlis was the eight-point outline of the plan for partnership in Cyprus, which foreshadowed certain features of the 1960 Cyprus Constitution. The new Constitution was to provide for representative government and communal autonomy prepared in consultation (not in agreement) with the representatives of the two communities and the Greek and Turkish governments. From the first Macmillan Plan, of September 1955, the concept of British-Greek-Turkish cooperation was retained, with the following differences, however: The new plan provided for the presence in Cyprus of a Greek government representative and a Turkish government representative, to cooperate with the Governor. The earlier plan, on the other hand, envisaged the setting up of a British-GreekTurkish commission in London to put the plan into effect and to act as a center for discussing differences arising out of self-government which it was impossible to settle on the spot in Cyprus. 31 From Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals of December 19, 1956,32 the new British constitutional plan retained the concept of a special court to deal with problems of possible discrimination. However, whereas Lord Radcliffe's "Tribunal of Guarantees" was to have the authority to investigate complaints of discrimination or other violations of fundamental human rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the tribunal, under Macmillan's new plan, would consider any legislation which the representatives of the Greek and Turkish government believed was discriminatory. Another feature derived from earlier institutions of colonial selfgovernment was the provision for a Council of Ministers composed of four Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots drawn from the two Houses of Representatives, to exercise authority over internal affairs, other than communal affairs and internal security.33 Of course, since 31

Conflict and Conciliation, p. 160. Lord Radcliffe, Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus (London: H.M. Stationery Office, December 1956), Cmnd. 42, pp. 14, and 43-44. 33 From 1878 to 1882, the British High Commissioner of Cyprus administered Cyprus with an appointed five-person Council which included one Greek and one Turkish personality, whom the High Commissioner appointed directly. In 1882, a Constitution was granted based on the elective principle. An Executive Council was created for advising the High Commissioner. So was a Legislative Council. The latter consisted of six official members and twelve elected members, three of whom were elected by the

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Britain in Macmillan's seven-year plan retained sovereignty over the island, authority, under the constitution, for external affairs, defense, and internal security was reserved to the Governor, who would act, however, after consulting the Greek and Turkish Government representatives. Likewise reserved for the Governor was the authority to ensure the protection of community interests, again after consultation with the Greek and Turkish government representatives. All in all, Cyprus was to be associated not only with Britain and thus with the British Commonwealth, but also with Greece and Turkey. The Greek and Turkish Cypriots were to have Greek or Turkish nationality as well as their British nationality. The Greek and Turkish governments were to cooperate with the British government "in a joint effort to achieve the peace, progress, and prosperity of the island". Subject to the end of violence, the British authorities in Cyprus would take progressive steps to relax the emergency regulations and eventually to end the state of emergency. In this process, Cypriots at present excluded from the island would be able to return to Cyprus. Governor Sir Hugh Foot communicated this plan to Makarios in a letter of June 10, 1958. As Macmillan revealed {Riding the Storm, pp. 659-668) this tri-dominium plan had flowed from the British government's decision in spring 1957 to limit itself merely to military bases in Cyprus and to deal with the rest of the island's territory in cooperation with the Greek and Turkish governments. The plan had been elaborated in July 1957 and the Chiefs of Staff were satisfied with it from the purely military viewpoint. After Turkish inhabitants, and nine by the non-Turkish inhabitants. When Cyprus became a Crown Colony in 1925, the Legislative Council was enlarged by the addition of three officially nominated members and three elected members chosen by the non-Turkish voters. Thus the representation within the Council was 12 Greeks and 3 Turks, 9 officially appointed members. A Governor replaced the High Commissioner. He presided over the Council. In this total of 25, the Turkish members, together with the officially appointed members, outnumbered the Greek elected members very easily as the Governor was added to their strength. This Constitution lasted until October 1931, when the Greek members resigned en bloc and the Governor suspended the Council and deported 12 of the top Greek Cypriot leaders. From 1931 on, the Governor exercised the legislative function assisted by an Executive Council which consisted of four official British members, two Greek members, and one Turkish member, who were appointed by the Governor and replaced by him at his absolute discretion. The functions of the Executive Council were to advise the Governor on new legislation and on the exercise of the powers granted to the Governor in Council under existing laws. After World War II, British Constitutional proposals of January 28, 1948 provided for a Legislative Council consisting of four official members, 18 Greek members and 4 Turkish members, as well as for an Executive Council consisting of 4 official members, 3 Greeks and 1 Turk. These proposals remained open for discussion from August 12, 1948 until July 28, 1954, Pissas, Constitutional Offers and Other Facts about Cyprus, pp. 5-7.

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Lloyd's visit to Athens in February 1958, the British government had decided to go ahead with it as a provisional solution only, in order to meet the objections of the Greek and Turkish governments, which desired enosis and partition, respectively, as the ultimate solutions of the Cyprus problem. On May 11, 1958 (the day of the Greek general elections), the final plan was prepared at a conference held at Chequers, with Lloyd, Lennox-Boyd, Sir Hugh Foot, Norman Brook, and certain other officials (unnamed) in attendance. As Macmillan saw it, the plan was a synthesis of Foot's plan for self-government (January 1958) and the earlier (July 1957) tri-dominium plan for dealing with the problem's external aspects. On June 5, 1958, Macmillan sent instructions to the British ambassadors in Athens and Ankara to communicate the full text of these proposals to the Greek and Turkish governments. On July 12, the not unexpected U.S. government attitude of support for the Macmillan plan was disclosed to the Greek government. In a visit arranged at his own request, Ambassador James W. Riddleberger conveyed to the Greek Foreign Minister a message from Secretary of State Dulles who expressed "the earnest hope" that the Greek government would carefully study the British plan with the same seriousness the British government had devoted to the plan's preparation. The U.S. government recognized that the situation in Cyprus was "highly explosive". It was concerned about this situation's impact on NATO and its defense plans, and the Greek government, it believed, shared this view. For this reason, Dulles, though recognizing that the Greeks had shown "commendable restraint" and that such provocations naturally would place the Greek government in a difficult position, appealed to it, nonetheless, to exert every effort to prevent a worsening of the situation. Finally, Riddleberger informed AverofF-Tossizza that the U.S. Ambassador in Ankara had been instructed to draw the Turkish government's attention to the dangerous consequences of the situation created. After conveying Washington's communication to the Greek Foreign Minister, Ambassador Riddleberger began speaking in favor of the Macmillan plan. But Averoff-Tossizza immediately interrupted him. It was, he said, unnecessary for the Ambassador to exert himself, because even if the plan were admirable in all other respects—which, unfortunately was not the case—the mere fact that it recognized certain rights for Turkey that Turkey did not have, made the plan unacceptable without any discussion. "I regret", said the Foreign Minister, "that the U.S. government today again offers new evidence that, though it has always tried to seem neutral

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in the Cyprus question, it has in fact continually supported the Turks — unless the sending of an identical note to both malefactor and victim, as was the case in September 1955,34 could be regarded as evidence of neutrality". The Greeks, he added, never forgot what they owed to the Americans and had most friendly feelings toward them. "In the Cyprus issue, however, we have to admit that we have been ill-treated in a way that is politically unpleasant and morally unjustified." In Cyprus the British had hanged many Greeks simply for carrying weapons empty of bullets. 35 Had they hanged or flogged any Turkish Cypriot for having killed Greeks or destroyed Greek Cypriot property in Cyprus? Could one consider this impartiality? If American nationals had been treated in this way, would the proud United States have acquiesced in such treatment? These were questions which the Foreign Minister asked the U.S. Ambassador to convey to Dulles and Rountree in Washington. In the last analysis, Averoff-Tossizza went on to say in this exchange with Riddleberger, the nature of the whole Cyprus question was such as to arouse most extreme reactions among the Greeks who felt humiliated by the Allies. This was the feeling of the whole Parliament. "We are obliged not to conceal from the United States the gravity of the situation with regard both to internal Greek developments and to the future of our allied ties with Turkey in NATO. An avalanche of developments might occur. I hope that Dulles and Rountree, who know my frankness, will realize that I am not exaggerating. Dissatisfied Members of Parliament exist in each Party. If twenty of these were to abandon the government, because of the increasingly widespread dissatisfaction over the Cyprus question, what would happen then?" He himself experienced difficulty in restraining his personal feelings. He sympathized with the popular anger. King Paul I had been informed and was very worried: We are studying chaos. We are opposed to abnormal solutions but I fear that only a military dictatorship could extricate us from chaos. Such developments, however, are never good. Today, the Turks not only do not stop their acts of violence but have the impudence to publish a statement in which, on the acceptance of the British plan which favors them, they place conditions! Evidently, in order to render this plan more in accord with their own views, they request clarifications. This is the last straw! To be a barbarian and not to be descended from Plato is evidently a great disadvantage. An example of this: the financial aid the Turks receive in the guise of military orders from Germany, because they do not repay their debts. 34

See above, ChapterI,note51. The Greek Foreign Minister had the Pallikaridis case in mind, Conflict and Conciliation, p. 317. 35

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The best thing the British could do, the Greek Foreign Minister maintained, would be to scrap their plan. Since they, too, faced internal problems, they could explain that they were doing so because this plan provided for the cooperation of partners who refused to cooperate. The main concern now of the Greek government was the fate of the Greeks in Istanbul. "Should they suffer new woes, the reaction in Greece would be much sharper than toward events in Cyprus. Since the Greeks lived in Turkey, it would not be possible to blame the British for their illtreatment, as in the case of Cyprus." He therefore most earnestly urged the Allies to take all possible care for their protection. 36 The situation, he repeated, was extremely grave. "Indeed, you may not see me for long sitting here", he said, implying the possible fall of the Greek government: If until now our reactions have been moderate and our protests Platonic, this was because we hoped that the new British plan would be acceptable. As long as this is not the case, our reaction perforce will be quite unpleasant. Of course, certain limits exist beyond which the Greek government will not allow itself to go. However, if it is obliged to do so, the only way out would be withdrawal. Our feeling is that we have been abandoned. Mr. Dulles' message today is tantamount to a defense of the British viewpoint. At any rate, our feelings for the United States remain unchanged in all respects — except Cyprus.

Riddleberger listened carefully to Averoff-Tossizza's indignant words and took notes, frequently expressing his understanding of the Greek viewpoint. He promised to convey to his government what had transpired during this long talk of the Greek Foreign Minister. 37 On June 19, two days later than originally intended, because NATO's Secretary-General Spaak had so requested, 38 Macmillan, in the House of Commons, made public his seven-year Cyprus plan, somewhat more analytically than he had in the aide-mémoire he had sent to the Greek government ten days earlier. With regard to the future, after his interim seven-year plan had been applied, the British government, he stated, subject to the reservation to Britain of such bases and facilities which might be necessary for discharging its international obligations, would be prepared, at the appropriate time, to go further "to share the sovereignty of the island" with Greece and Turkey as its contribution to a lasting settlement. The purposes of the British policy in Cyprus were, he 36

For earlier examples of such requests, see, Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 81-82, 85, 95, and 292-293. 37 Riddleberger agreed with the remark of the Greek Foreign Ministry official who accompanied Averoff-Tossizza that it would be bad if the Greek government were obliged to resign over this issue. "We shall never find a better one in Greece", he said. 38 589 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 897-898.

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said: first, to serve the best interests of all the people of the island; second, to achieve a permanent settlement acceptable to the two communities in the island and to the Greek and Turkish governments; third, to safeguard the British bases and installations in Cyprus; and, fourth, to strengthen peace and security, and cooperation between Britain and its allies, in a vital area. 39 This plan, as a Times editorial, entitled "Tridominium", observed on June 20, involved a system of nonterritorial partition. And another British editorial remarked that "the Greeks would be wise to cease hoping — and the Turks fearing — that a change of government in England would mean immediate enosis for Cyprus", in view of the Labour Party's not unfavorable response to this plan. 4 0 The Turkish government's public verbal reaction to the Macmillan plan was disclosed the same day the British premier was unveiling it in the Commons. The reactions of Ethnarch Makarios and of the Greek government to the plan came a few days later. The Turkish government, Foreign Minister Zorlu declared on June 19, continued to be convinced that partition was the best solution for a final settlement of the Cyprus problem. Hence, it could accept no proposal that did not include this final solution, to which the Turkish Grand National Assembly had recently committed itself by adopting a relevant resolution. Besides, Foreign Secretary Lloyd had reaffirmed to the Turkish Ambassador in London that the British government had committed itself to "the application of self-determination, including partition, among the eventual options" under Lennox-Boyd's statement of December 19, 1956. To deal with the problem, a tripartite (British-Greek-Turkish)con ference was required at the soonest and at the highest level, as Macmillan had suggested. This tripartite conference should determine the final international status of Cyprus — not, in other words, merely the interim status cf the island as the Macmillan plan proposed to do. At this conference, the Macmillan plan should be taken not as a basic document but only as a conference paper together with any plan submitted by Turkey. In the Turkish government's view, a perfected plan for Cyprus could emerge by fusing together the principles of partition and of partnership. 41 30

589 H. C. Deb. (5th ser.), 1315-1318. An editorial in Kathimerini, June 21, 1958, termed the plan a prelude to partition. However, it called for talks between the British government and the leaders of the Greek Cypriots as well as of the Turkish Cypriots. 41 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 379-380. In this statement, Zorlu observed that the Turkish government had been aware of the plan since June 10,1958, and that it had had the opportunity of discussing it, as well as the Cyprus question, in 40

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In this statement of June 19, the Turkish Foreign Minister also expressed gratification that the British government was exerting every effort to solve the Cyprus question. He observed, however, that if these efforts had been made, as they had been made earlier, in consultation with the interested parties and particularly with Turkey, 42 more positive and constructive results would have been achieved. He also contended that the "regrettable incidents" on the island would not have occurred, had the British government taken the necessary measures, as it was doing now, at the time when the Turkish government had first drawn its attention to the need for such measures, or had the British authorities not relaxed such measures despite Turkey's warning. 43 For preparing the Greek Cypriot response to the Macmillan plan, the Cyprus Ethnarchy, the Ethnarchic Council, and the Greek mayors of the six main towns of Cyprus met in Athens between June 17-19 under the chairmanship of Makarios. This gathering unanimously turned down the British plan and, in a letter of June 20 to Governor Sir Hugh Foot, Makarios explained why the plan was unacceptable. It imposed, he observed, a "triple condominium" on Cyprus and therefore ran counter to the fundamental and inalienable right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination. The plan's main provisions also destroyed the unity of the Cypriot people by constitutionally sanctioning its division into two parts and unavoidably led to antagonism and strife, thereby creating a focus of unrest and a threat to peace in the whole area. In a counterproposal, Makarios wrote that he did not reject an interim stage of selfgovernment of a genuinely democratic character and would be ready to discuss such a matter with the British in bipartite talks. 44 Karamanlis, in a formal reply of June 21 to Macmillan's message of

the NATO Permanent Council, as well as to explain its attitude in the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Grand National Assembly and in a closed session of the Grand National Assembly on June 16, 1958. Macmillan, on the other hand, writes (without mentioning a particular date) that Menderes reacted first and wanted nothing short of partition. No plan, he argued, could be successfully implemented in Cyprus unless the island's final international status was determined. Partition itself was a great sacrifice for Turkey (Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 668). 42 According to the Times, in June 1956, the British government had prepared a new Cyprus plan but Turkey had rejected it before it had been presented to any other party (Pissas, Constitutional Offers and Other Facts about Cyprus, p. 9). 43 On his arrival in Cyprus in December 1957, Sir Hugh Foot made several gestures of good will toward the Greek Cypriots (Foot, A Start in Freedom, p. 161). 44 Pissas, Constitutional Offers and Other Facts about Cyprus, p. 15. Keesing's, 16451.

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June 10, explained the Greek government's viewpoint. 45 He was unable to agree with the British plan, he wrote, because he was convinced that it would only add new complications to those that already existed. The Greek government, on the other hand, while making efforts to contain Greek public opinion which had been justly aroused, was ready to discuss any solution of the problem that would give satisfaction to the just claim of the Cypriot people; safeguard the interests of Britain; and, through constitutional and international guarantees, would meet the legitimate interests of the Turkish minority in Cyprus and the strategic preoccupations of Turkey. The Macmillan plan, Karamanlis contended, would have been far more constructive, had it provided for an interim solution based on democratic self-government under British sovereignty, with the settlement of the main issue postponed until a more appropriate time. This solution would be a matter for the British government and the Cypriot people to decide. The Greek government, however, would be ready to help whenever it could usefully act in a mediatory way. If the British government was prepared to reconsider its plan and exert a new effort to find a solution which could be regarded as satisfactory, Karamanlis added, appeasement of the island would follow. Thus it would be possible to reach a final solution through various stages. Under the present circumstances the tripartite meeting Macmillan had suggested would not lead to any constructive results. On the other hand, a personal contact could be more useful than the exchange of messages, provided the ground was sufficiently cleared beforehand through the diplomatic channel. Since Cyprus, Karamanlis observed further in his letter to Macmillan, was a British Crown Colony, those principally entitled to determine the island's future were the people of Cyprus and Britain. For according to the Treaty of Lausanne "this right was reserved to the 'interested parties'". 4 6 Turkey, on the other hand, had relinquished all rights and titles to the island under that same treaty. As for Greece, though it supported the right of the Cypriots to self-determination, it had declared that it did not aim at annexing the island. Britain, now, by inviting Greece and Turkey to participate in the administration of Cyprus for a period of seven years and by thus creating a sort of de facto condominium over the island, was upsetting the prevailing legal status established by the 46

Greek White Book /, pp. 12-14. Under Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey recognized the annexation of Cyprus since Britain's proclamation of November 5,1914.

48

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Treaty of Lausanne. In brief, Britain tended to disregard the principle of the sanctity of treaties.47 He, at least, believed it would be possible to find practical solutions that would also be consonant with justice and the existing international treaties. It was inconceivable, Karamanlis contended, to invoke Turkey's provocative attitude and intransigence as a decisive factor that would bar any fair and practical solution. Britain had the privilege of being a Great Power. For many years it had exercised sovereignty over Cyprus. It was Britain's responsibility to determine the island's future in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the provisions of other international agreements. He did not believe that Britain should evade this responsibility and divert the whole issue into the limited and artificial framework of a so-called Greek-Turkish dispute. Engaging himself now in a cursory critique of the Macmillan plan, the Greek Premier maintained that the whole system was based on an entirely ephemeral situation, i.e. the tension between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots who for centuries had lived in peace on a united and indivisible territory. In his view, this tension had been artificially created during the recent months. It could therefore be brought to an end. The plan, instead of contributing to appeasement would thus help maintain the current tension. The administrative machinery envisaged was not only unjustified but, because of its intricate nature and the friction it was bound to cause, would prove inoperable. The composition of the proposed Council, he observed further, disregarded the principle of true representation at the expense of the vast Greek majority. Thus, the only democratic institution provided for in the plan was "falsified". Karamanlis also noted incidentally that, because of its interim character, the Macmillan plan provided for no final solution through the application of the right of self-determination. 47

The invocation of the Lausanne Treaty somewhat surprised the British government. In its view, Greece by subscribing t o that treaty had recognized Britain's annexation of Cyprus, over which Turkey, in that same treaty, had surrendered all rights (Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 668). At the ninth General Assembly, Lloyd had invoked the principle of the sanctity of treaties in order to buttress his argument against the inclusion of the Cyprus question in the Assembly's agenda, GAOR, Ninth Session, General Committee, 93d meeting, September 23,1954, p. 8. The Greek government, at the time, countered this and other British arguments by invoking Article 16 of the Lausanne Treaty and by maintaining that the ulterior aim of this article was to provide for the application of the principle of self-determination both in the case of Cyprus and of the Dodecanese (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Question of Cyprus, Reply to the Arguments Advanced by the British Delegation during the Ninth Session of the Assembly of the United Nations. September 23-24,1954 [Athens, November 1954], p. 32).

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In the opening paragraphs of his letter, Karamanlis assured Macmillan he fully agreed with him about the gravity of the whole situation and the adverse consequences the Cyprus dispute had on allied ties. He himself was making every effort to restrain Greek public opinion which was justly aroused. On the Turkish side, however, he was met only with provocations. The publication of the British plan, "coming after the horrible acts of violence committed by the Turks in Cyprus, which the administration of the island ought to have prevented", rendered his efforts even more difficult. Through the British Ambassador in Athens, he had conveyed in time the Greek views about the British plan. These views, he had hoped, would have influenced the thoughts of the British government. However, Macmillan's statement before the House of Commons had widened the gap between the Greek position and the British plan. From his hideout in Cyprus, Grivas issued a leaflet in which he declared that the Greek Cypriot people were not asking for pseudo-constitutions but insisted on self-determination. Shortly after, in a proclamation, he threatened all-out action, if the British tried to impose the Macmillan Plan. "The gate of diplomacy will close; the gate of war will open, if our voice is not heeded." He also urged restraint with regard to Turkish Cypriot violence.48 In a letter of June 25 to Anthimos, the Bishop of Kition, the exiled Archbishop's locum tenens, he expressed his gratification at the Greek government's rejection of the Macmillan plan. No solution would be acceptable, he wrote, that did not provide for self-determination. If necessary, he was prepared to fight alone for this objective. Appropriate persons were required to carry out a program he had prepared for continuing the struggle. As for the self-defense organization, this was proceeding satisfactorily. His aim was to organize the masses in the cities and set them up in sections.49 As Grivas saw it, after the announcement of the Macmillan Plan, a new phase in the British-Turkish attack had begun, in the guise of reprisals for the nonacceptance of the plan and as pressure for imposing it. The first phase had consisted of preparations aimed at intimidating the Greek Cypriots into accepting the plan. Now, the ground was being prepared for partition. 50 On the basis of the Macmillan plan, Greeks living in villages with a Turkish minority were being driven away, while the Turks living south of the thirty-fifth parallel

48 49 50

Grivas Memoirs, p. 262. Ibid., p. 261. Ibid., Appendix, pp. 46-59.

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were moving to the part of the island that lay north of that parallel. And in the cities, dividing lines were being set up. 51 While the Ethnarch, the Greek Premier and EOKA's leader were unanimous in their opposition to the Macmillan plan, an Opposition newspaper in Athens charged Karamanlis with abandoning self-determination and urged him to resign, so that a coalition government with Ethnarch Makarios as Premier might be set up. 52 And backstage Grivas was at loggerheads with the Ethnarch over the latter's attitude toward EOKA's campaign of passive resistance. On June 26, Grivas received a letter from Makarios that infuriated him. Makarios once again observed that passive resistance had undesirable economic repercussions for the Greek Cypriots rather than for the British economy. He feared that Grivas' informants about the success of the campaign were not telling him the truth because they were reluctant to express opinions opposed to his own. EOKA, therefore, the Ethnarch suggested, without stating that it had made a mistake in this matter, should relax this campaign. Grivas responded to Makarios' suggestions in a very long and indignant letter of June 30, addressed not to the Ethnarch but to the Bishop of Kition. As he put it, he did not wish to get in touch with Makarios because he feared that his words and the tone of the letter were very sharp. In this letter, Grivas protested against the Ethnarch's remarks and attacked Mayor Dervis of Nicosia for apparently sharing the Ethnarch's views. After listing the successes of EOKA's economic boycott and stressing the sacrifices in blood and money of the poor Greek Cypriots, Grivas defiantly declared that his passive resistance campaign would go on to the end. The criterion was the interest not of a few selfish merchants but of the struggle itself. And he would strike hard at anybody who opposed this struggle. The Bishop of Kition, in reply, regretted that Grivas should ever have derived a mistaken impression from Makarios' letter. Not wishing to create an unbridgeable chasm between the two main factors in the struggle for self-determination, he had not seen fit to convey to the Ethnarch the contents of Grivas' reply. Makarios had expressed these views about passive resistance, the Bishop of Kition explained further, because he perceived that the struggle was entering a new protracted phase and it was necessary zealously to preserve the moral and material vitality and 51

Grivas Memoirs, p. 263. Ibid., p. 261. The exchange mentioned in note 37 above may be understood in this context. 52

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resources of the Greek Cypriots for waging this struggle. In conclusion, the Bishop appealed to Grivas not to regard this misunderstanding as a pretext for a development that could not but be catastrophic for "our liberation struggle". Grivas, however, was not persuaded, even though the Greek Consul in Nicosia, too, argued along the same lines: The divergence in views was basic, he felt. 53

D. THE GREEK AND BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON THE MACMILLAN PLAN

At a meeting of June 24, the Greek Parliament debated the Macmillan plan and the government's response to it. The "Aspiring DecisionMakers" took this opportunity to attack the entire Cyprus policy of the Greek government since Karamanlis became premier in October 1955 after Alexander Papagos' death. EDA, the principal Opposition Party, again harped on the theme that a change in Greek foreign policy was needed. Assuming an ultranationalist posture which resembled Grivas', its leader, Passalidis, called again for the alignment of Greece with the anti-colonialist states, and the Arab neutralist group in particular, along lines officially announced on April 5, 1956,54 at the expense of NATO and Turkey, with the latter regarded as the primary foe. As usual, he did not dare call upon Greece to join the Soviet bloc outright. However, he urged Greek acceptance of the Soviet-backed Romanian proposal of 1957 for a Balkan conference and generally pooh-poohed the fears of the Greeks about the intentions of their northern neighbors. The Greek government should threaten Britain with severance of diplomatic relations, if Turkish Cypriots killed one more Greek Cypriot. Together with the UAR, it should resort to the UN Security Council and charge that international peace and security were threatened in the Mediterranean. And it should propose and insist on the complete demilitarization of Cyprus, to deprive Turkey of its pretext that its security was endangered because of the island's proximity to Turkish shores. "Let's find a way to strengthen 68

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 367-369. In Grivas' book the letter is dated June 3,1958 but a typographical mistake is evident since Grivas says clearly that this letter was a reply to Makarios' letter which he had received on June 26, 1958. Correcting this error, the author had preferred the date of June 30 instead of the other possible date of July 3, 1958, on the ground that Grivas' response is likely to have been immediate. 54 Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences, pp. 105107.

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the anticolonial struggle of the Cypriot people, so that it might escape from the yoke of Britain and of Menderes", Passalidis urged. 55 The other opposition parties called upon the Greek government to resign. The Macmillan plan, they pointed out, was the worst of the three British plans put forward since the first Macmillan plan of September 1955. It was abundant proof of the ignominious failure of the government's entire Cyprus policy.56 The plan, George Papandreou observed (as had the Greek government), politically prepared the way for partition, because of the institution of the two communal Parliaments. Besides, it favored the Turkish Cypriots by giving them a greater number of members on the Council than they merited on the basis of their 1-5 ratio in the whole island's population. And ultimately it provided for a triple condominium. The Radcliffe Constitutional proposals had been therefore better—to which Premier Karamanlis responded by pointing out that these were tied up with the prospect of eventual double self-determination, under Lennox-Boyd's statement of December 19, 1956. Papandreou, however, pinned hopes on the attitude of the Labour Party in England which, at its Brighton conference in October 1957, had adopted a resolution referring to self-determination without partition as a desirable goal in Cyprus.57 In presenting the government's viewpoint, Averoff-Tossizza observed at the outset of the debate that the NATO discussions of the Cyprus question may have had something to do with the easing of the Turkish Cypriot attacks on the life and property of the Greek Cypriots, which the British authorities had not averted, either because of collusion, negligence, or inadequacy. As for the Macmillan plan, he attacked this as making little sense on the basis both of principle and practicality. The British government, he charged, had sprung this plan on the Greek government after carefully concealing its intentions and letting it appear, through official, semiofficial, and unofficial channels in various directions, that it had other intentions. Acknowledging the great difficulty of the current position, because of the Macmillan plan, he observed that earlier developments had been favorable for the Cyprus question, for instance the inability of Turkey to get the United Nations to recognize that it was 55

GPD, June 24,1958,184-186. S. Markezinis was especially sharp in his criticism (ibid., 201-208). He called upon the government to resign, as being responsible not only for the past handling of the Cyprus question but also supposedly incapable of conducting a policy either of struggle or of compromise. 57 Ibid., pp. 186-189. 56

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a "party concerned", or the adoption of Resolution 1013(XI) by the eleventh General Assembly,58 and the Political Committee's adoption of the essentially Greek draft resolution during the General Assembly's twelfth session.59 Another favorable sign had been the British Foreign Minister's request to visit Athens in February 1958. However, Turkey's intransigence and intense adverse reaction had become an increasingly dominant factor, which the Middle Eastern crisis had facilitated, because of Turkey's strong geographical location in the Middle East — a location the Powers actively involved had to take into account. The Macmillan plan, Averoff-Tossizza observed further, was opposed by the majority of Cypriots. It also ran counter to the norms of international life as well as to the rules of international law. For it altogether ignored and violated the Treaty of Lausanne, and article 27 of that treaty in particular, 59 despite all statements uttered about the need to respect international treaties as a basis for international symbiosis. Consequently the Greek government had rejected the British plan. It refused to cooperate in the violation of international treaties. It did not intend to abandon its support of the rights of the Cypriots. Nor was it disposed to accept that eighteen per cent of the Cypriot population, because of the massacres and crimes it perpetrated against eighty per cent of that population, could impose its will on that eighty per cent. "We shall do all we can with our limited power to oppose the butchery of Justice." Justice, of course, was on the Greek side. But the Greek government did not ignore the tremendous difficulties involved, because of the vast means the opponents had at their disposal. It had taken Crete forty-five years and seven revolts to achieve its freedom, 60 he reminded the Greek Parliament. The Cyprus problem, the Greek Foreign Minister expounded at length, could not be solved by Greece's withdrawal from NATO, as some people proposed. Such a move would render a settlement far more difficult. Besides, it would endanger Greek security. Four times in a generation 58

For the relevant Greek arguments, see, Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 43, and 53. Article 27 of the Treaty of Lausanne stipulates that "no power or jurisdiction in political, legislative or administrative matters shall be exercised outside Turkish territory by the Turkish government or authorities, for any reason whatsoever over the nationals of a territory placed under the sovereignty or protectorate of the other Powers signatory to the present Treaty, or over the nationals of a territory detached from Turkey". "It is understood that the spiritual attributions of the Moslem religious authorities are in no way infringed". (League of Nations, Treaty Series, XXVIII, 1924, p. 27.) 40 GPD, June 24,19S8,181. 59

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had Greece's northern frontiers been violated. The Greek officers had been withdrawn from NATO headquarters at Izmir, because their cooperation had become increasingly difficult and unproductive. The tension which had arisen between Greece and Turkey might necessitate, nevertheless, the reorganization of the Military Command on NATO's southeastern flank in the near future. The Greek government's position was, Averoff-Tossizza explained, to use all appropriate means for promoting the Cyprus question, taking into account the will of the Cypriots. While rejecting the Macmillan plan, the government was ready to accept the postponement of a final solution, if a really democratic constitution were granted to the Cypriots — a view the Cypriot leadership shared. If these proposals were accepted, the Greek government would enter into discussions with any one, in order to find a solution that would promote the question. If, on the other hand, no agreed solution were achieved, the Greek government, Averoff-Tossizza said, would again resort to the United Nations, where it would wage the struggle with great persistence and determination. Of course, he could not predict the outcome of the upcoming debates on the Macmillan plan in the House of Commons. After these debates were over, he would be in a better position to judge the extent to which the British government had been influenced by the Greek or Turkish government's views. Only then would one know whether any ground existed for an agreement with the Cypriots, as well as whether any prospects existed for renewing Greece's friendship with Britain. One would also know whether the Greek government and Greek people had been mistaken in pinning hopes on the clear statements on Cyprus which the Labour Party had adopted at its Brighton Conference. The Greek government, he assured Parliament, intended to deal with the Cyprus question in a spirit of realism and good will and in the framework of the ideas he had just outlined. However, it was not disposed to yield and accept solutions unacceptable to the Cypriots themselves. If the other side showed no understanding and asked the Greek government to make further concessions, the Greek government would continue its political struggle. He was well aware that this struggle was not likely to bear immediate fruit. Nonetheless, he was convinced that after passing through various difficult stages, it would end in full freedom for the Cypriots. 61 In the House of Commons, when Macmillan had announced his Cyprus 61

GPD, June 24, 1958, pp. 180-183.

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plan on June 19, Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the British "Aspiring DecisionMakers", had said that Macmillan's statement had been made at a very tense moment when there was danger of civil war in Cyprus, perhaps even of conflict between Greece and Turkey. Therefore the Labour Party would carefully consider the plan before expressing any opinions about it. 62 The Commons debate of June 26 gave Labour Party spokesmen the opportunity to air their views which Greek political leaders were awaiting with anxiety. For the government side, Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd started the ball rolling. Article 20 of the Lausanne Treaty, he noted, gave Britain the right among other things to decide what other countries it chose to consult about the island's future. Despite the anxiety of all to find a solution and reach an agreement in compliance with the Resolution 1013(XI) of the General Assembly, previous attempts at an international agreement on the Cyprus issue, he observed, had shown that Greece and Turkey were too far apart to make it possible to reach a settlement based on a detailed agenda. The British government therefore (in August 1957) had proposed a tripartite conference without any fixed agenda and with freedom to discuss without prejudice any suggestion previously put forward, for finding an acceptable solution to "an international problem". 63 Turkey had accepted the suggestion. Greece, however, though not rejecting the idea of a conference, had preferred that, before any conference met, the governments concerned should agree on the basic outlines of a solution. 64 When Sir Hugh Foot, in January 1958, had gone to London to report on the Cyprus situation, the British government still intended to try to reach an agreement with Greece and Turkey before issuing a new statement of policy. Accordingly, "following" the visits of Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Athens and Ankara, it had proceeded to several diplomatic exchanges. However, these exchanges had made it clear that no agreement could be reached on a course of action to be pursued in Cyprus. Meanwhile, Lennox-Boyd continued, the situation on the island had rapidly deteriorated, and it became urgently necessary to announce a policy and carry it through. 65 EOKA murders of Greek trade unionists 42

589 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 1319. Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 154 ff. Ibid., pp. 169,173, and 178-179. 66 590 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 614. Lennox-Boyd made no mention of the Foot plan which the Turks had rejected early in 1958, nor did he mention the period of the caretaker government in Athens during which no exchanges of any significance concerning the substance of the Cyprus question had taken place. 83 84

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began to reach their peak in May. And in the previous weeks there had been stirrings among the Turkish Cypriots following the deaths of Turks in January. And TMT began to get very active. At the beginning of May, violence had assumed an openly communal form. The people of Cyprus were given warning of the horrors of civil war; broadcasts from Athens and Ankara openly called for the storing of arms and ammunition and for blackguarding the members of the other race. In this dangerous situation, since there was no possibility of the Greek and Turkish governments agreeing on a solution by a conference or by diplomatic means, the only hope of avoiding disaster was for the British government to take a new initiative and adhere to it with resolution. When the Governor of Cyprus came again to London in early May, the government agreed with him on a new policy. Partnership and communal autonomy, Lennox-Boyd went on to say, were the cornerstones of the new plan. It had always been the British government's view that the interests of the people of Cyprus should come first in this new plan, and in this plan these interests did come first. The policy of communal autonomy was essentially one for an undivided Cyprus but it recognized the fact that two separate communities existed on the island. After recapitulating the details of the plan, Lennox-Boyd emphasized the British government's desire for the help and advice of the Greek and Turkish governments. "We want", he said, "to work out with them in detail a system of representative government and communal autonomy. Many important points remain to be settled, not only the Houses of Representatives and the definition of communal affairs, but the composition of the impartial tribunal to which legislation should be referred, and many other matters." The understanding Britain's NATO allies had shown, Lennox-Boyd noted in conclusion, had greatly encouraged the British government. Britain was ready to enter into constructive discussions with Greece and Turkey at any time; would continue to keep in touch with its other NATO allies; and would take full advantage of the opportunities for consultation offered by the NATO machinery. 66 Callaghan, "shadow" Colonial Secretary of the Labour Party, started out by noting the advantages of the Macmillan plan. It would permit, he said, the end of the emergency regulations, the return to Cyprus of its leaders, and the resumption of some form of government. The British «« 590 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 611-618.

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government, he added, should not pay so much attention to the rejection of its plan by all concerned as to the reasons given for its rejection. The original Foot plan, he observed, had never been published and had disappeared because of Turkish objections. In those circumstances, the government had gone to the very limits in the concessions it had made to the Turkish view. Indeed, in some ways it had gone beyond the limits he would have liked to see. While the Turkish government continued to insist on partition, Makarios and the Greek government had made many concessions in their responses to the plan. Therefore, any modification in working out the details of the plan should be "on the side of meeting those who had given up a great deal of the attitude they had adopted previously". The plan's major defect, Callaghan continued, was that it emphasized the division of the two communities in Cyprus rather than their unity. In this connection, he referred to the London Times editorial of June 20, which wrote that the plan involved what was virtually a system of nonterritorial partition. Yet, said Callaghan, all the island's inhabitants were Cypriots. The plan could be justified only if it were regarded as a temporary measure to bring the people together and not as a permanent feature designed to keep them separate. Permanent institutions, he maintained, should not be based on what might be a temporary and passing quarrel between the two communities. Under the new plan the only place where Greek and Turkish Cypriots met was in the Governor's Council. The Opposition would like to see the establishment of a Legislative Assembly for the people of the whole island,67 ideally to be based on a common electoral register. Initially, Callaghan acknowledged, the authority of such a body might be small. The Greek and Turkish Cypriots might have little to say to each other. But, as communal passions subsided, the two communities might be able to come together and recognize their common interests. The British government should propose setting up such an organ that "would of itself stop the Greeks from looking so much to Athens and stop the Turks from looking to Ankara". As self-government developed, this joint legislature "might be a receptacle into which the reserve powers of the Governor might be poured, so that it would become a democratic assembly in the fullest sense". 68 He could not 67 590 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 624-625. Such a unitary legislative body was provided for in the Zurich Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus. ,8 See note 67 above.

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believe that the government could go into private diplomatic discussions of the plan in the present circumstances without being prepared to make adjustments in order to concentrate on the essential unity of the island rather than to emphasize its separateness. Self-determination, in Callaghan's view, should come with the consent of the island's people and this included the consent of the minority. It could not be imposed by force. In the current atmosphere of civil war, it was impossible to apply this doctrine. British troops ought not to be asked to risk their lives in such an undertaking. The government had the right and the duty to tell the people of Cyprus: "We want you to proceed, like other territories in the Commonwealth, to determine your own future in due course. Our desire is to create unity, to create the instruments which will enable you to come together and live happily together." If the government made such an approach, then the future of the island might be happier than the past had been. After these remarks on self-determination which greatly disappointed the Greeks who regarded them as a retreat from the Labour Party position of October 1957, Callaghan appealed for even-handed justice to everyone in the island. Athens radio, he observed, was jammed but not the Turkish radio, so that it was only the Turkish incitements to violence which were now reaching the island. He also believed that the dangers of the minority had been overemphasized and artificially fomented. In conclusion, Callaghan underlined that the government had not consulted the Opposition about the drafting of the Macmillan plan. Therefore the Labour Party could not give the plan a blanket endorsement. However, he wished to make it clear that the situation in the island and in the Middle East was such that it would welcome any agreement the parties to the dispute could reach. It was, thus, the duty of all parties to go into negotiations to see to it whether the situation could not be ended. 69 During this long but rather restrained Cyprus debate in the Commons, especially if this is compared to the previous one, of July 15, 1957,70 members of government and opposition parties expressed various views and the latter addressed several pointed questions to the government about the plan. Francis Noel-Baker, a Labor M.P., for instance, noting that Zorlu quite publicly had stated that his policy was to achieve partition within a year, questioned the wisdom of the two communal 09 70

590 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 626. Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 148-152.

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chambers and of the double nationality provided for in the Macmillan plan. The latter he considered particularly dangerous. It would justify the intervention of the Greek and Turkish governments in order to protect their nationals. He also inquired whether there would be two municipalities in all towns and villages of Cyprus and noted that the Turkish Cypriots had already illegally started to set up their own separate municipalities. Communal affairs were very narrow and would be limited to education, religion, and special land arrangements for the Turkish community and possibly to some social services. Institutions should be set up for dealing with the really important questions — irrigation, communications, economic development, and day-to-day administration. Experiences with condominiums had not been very successful, except in the Sudan, because the Egyptians were sleeping partners. Noel-Baker also asked whether the plan was a "take-it-or-leave-it" proposal or a basis for discussions. If the Premier shut the door to modifications and changes and discussion and negotiation, then the plan was as good as dead. 71 Aneurin Bevan, leader of the Left Wing faction of the Labour Party, stressed that every dependency in the Commonwealth had "the right to look forward to full self-government, carrying with it the right to selfdetermination". Although the Opposition could not commend the Macmillan plan, it did not advise the Greeks and Turks to reject it out of hand. The plan itself, in his view, was not necessarily the basis for negotiation but "an opening phase of negotiation in the hope of a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem". 72 It should be modified to provide for an elected Chamber where the Greek and Turkish Cypriots could meet and discuss common aifairs. For, under this plan, the people were separated vertically from top to bottom, and a permanent dichotomy was introduced. And, as Callaghan had suggested, at a later stage some of the powers of government could be transferred to this body, so that the final stage would be reached where Cyprus had complete selfgovernment. Bevan, on the other hand, thought that the government had acted correctly in associating the Greek and Turkish governments with the new plan for Cyprus, but, he said, he would prefer that the representatives from Ankara and Athens should be regarded not as commissioners but as "midwives calling the baby nation into existence and after it had been 71

72

590 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 643-647. Ibid., 715,718.

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born, going away". It was also his view that the seven-year interim period contemplated in the Macmillan plan should be substantially shortened. Bevan, too, cautioned the government against surrendering to violence from one side when it was not prepared to surrender to violence from the other side. "In recent weeks", he said, "there had been a strong suspicion that the government has been influenced in formulating proposals by threats of increased violence from the Turks". If the Greeks were to believe this (as they did), then they would know what to do. He also warned the government against doing nothing, if violence died down. The Colonial Office, he charged, had sat back when violence had ceased. "If we have a period of peace now, I hope we shall take advantage of it and try to get a settlement." In conclusion, Bevan said he sincerely hoped that the government would go away from the debate feeling that the House of Commons was doing its best to try and provide a climate of opinion in which "we can make a fresh approach to the situation". 73 Macmillan, at the close of the debate, praised the restraint which all sides of the House had shown. As usual, he emphasized that Cyprus was not just a colonial problem. Behind the rival claims of the Greek and Turkish communities were the national interests of Greece and Turkey. One ought, at any rate, to concentrate on the future and one could not reach a settlement either on the basis of past history or on the basis of extreme present claims. One should try to find a solution that was both realistic and practical. It was with this object that the British government had put forward its policy. The Greek and Turkish governments had made clear the difficulties they saw in the British plan. Nevertheless, some elements of the reception of the plan gave grounds for some cautious optimism. Both Menderes and Karamanlis had responded in a friendly way to his proposal for a personal exchange of views, though each Premier had qualified his response in his own way. He himself remained ready and anxious to meet anyone and go anywhere if it could in any way help to bring these discussions to a satisfactory conclusion. Various questions had been asked in the House, and he hoped he would not be considered discourteous if he did not try to answer them. But, he affirmed, "we have not pride of authorship. Our purpose was to reach agreement and bring peace." The government would certainly be flexible but it would not be so pliant as to add to the rigidity of the other contending parties. A concession or an alteration should be judged not as to whether the British government was willing to make it. The test was to get the 73

590 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 717.

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Greeks and the Turks, both national and in the island, to agree. He noted the danger in putting so much weight on communal machinery rather than on the essential unity of the people but unity at the moment was represented in the single Council which would combine legislative and executive functions. What if the plan failed? He preferred to think in terms of success. But in case of failure, the government would be thrown back on other solutions and these, of course, would include, among others, that contained in Lennox-Boyd's statement of December 19, 1956, double self-determination, in other words. 74 Macmillan wrote (.Riding the Storm, p. 671) that he was very gratified with the attitude of the Labour Party spokesmen toward his tri-dominium plan, because it would have convinced the Greeks that they would not be nearer to enosis if Labour won the next general elections. And, although he was disappointed by the initial negative attitudes of the Greek and Turkish governments toward his plan, he was relieved that both governments had objected to it in the first instance. It would have been fatal, in his view, if one had accepted and the other had refused, he wrote to the Canadian Premier, John G. Diefenbaker, on July 1.

E. GREEK DIPLOMATIC A N D OTHER EXCHANGES

Responding to Karamanlis' letter of June 21, Macmillan on July 4 explained he had delayed his reply until after the Commons debate on the new Cyprus plan, so as to be able to assess the situation in the light of that debate and the immediate reactions to his plan. The debate, in his view, had been helpful; the generally favorable comments from many sources in Europe and America had been encouraging. To some extent, in his speech of June 29 to the Commons, he had given his considered reply to two points he felt the Greek Premier had wanted to impress upon him in his letter. Although he had said that in the immediate situation one had to build on the basis of currently existing facts, he had expressed the hope that Karamanlis was right in believing that the current divisions between the two communities were ephemeral. He had also emphasized that it was an essential part of the proposed new Constitution that it should contain within itself the possibility of development step by step to a larger unity. In conclusion, Macmillan expressed his gratification at Karamanlis' response to his suggestion for a personal meeting. He would 74

590 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 723-731.

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be very willing to meet the Greek Premier in Rome or Geneva, as he had originally suggested, or in Athens also, either before or after getting together with the Turkish Premier, to whom he had also suggested a personal meeting and with whom he would discuss Cyprus during the forthcoming Baghdad Pact Council meeting in London at the end of July. 75 On his side, Sir Hugh Foot, on July 5, replied to Makarios' letter of June 20 and wrote he could not accept the Ethnarch's contention that a plan based on partnership and cooperation would cause unrest. On the contrary, only by recognizing that there were two separate communities in Cyprus could a new basis be found for working together in good relations. Sir Hugh was sure that the only way for enabling the two communities to live and work in peace together was through acceptance of representative government and communal autonomy. If violence ceased, he reemphasized, progressive steps would be taken to end the emergency, and then Makarios and others excluded from the island could return to it. This would open the way for the Ethnarch to take part in discussions on the basis of the British plan. 76 Likewise on July 5, in Athens, U.S. Ambassador Riddleberger asked to see Averoff-Tossizza and arrived with a batch of cables, the substance of which he had summed up in a note he read to the Greek Foreign Minister. The State Department, the Ambassador said, regarded as very constructive and as capable of giving a great impetus to the Cyprus question certain ideas Averoff-Tossizza personally had proposed to both Sir Roger Allen, the British Ambassador, and Riddleberger himself a few days earlier. These ideas envisaged, among other things, an independent status for Cyprus for some time. 77 Now, continued Riddleberger, it was absolutely necessary for talks to begin between the parties concerned. Spaak had proposed official talks through the permanent NATO representatives of Britain, Greece, and Turkey. Under the circumstances, therefore, the United States would not intervene by offering its good offices. However, if other NATO members favored Spaak's intention of setting up in NATO an advisory committee on Cyprus, the United States would not object to participating in this committee. The powers of this 75

Greek White Book I, pp. 14-15. Keesing's, 16451. Since summer 1957, the Greek Foreign Minister, with Makarios in agreement, had several times proposed independence for Cyprus as an interim solution with selfdetermination always to be applied in the end (Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 162-163, and 218). 78

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body would be very broadly defined, and the Macmillan plan would be considered merely as a basis for putting forward constructive ideas. Accordingly, the ideas Averoff-Tossizza had personally put forward to Riddleberger a few days earlier could be presented to this NATO Committee with many probabilities of their bearing fruit, since the U.S. government had instructed its NATO representative to inform Spaak about them and about the relevant U.S. reaction to them. The State Department therefore hoped that the Greek Foreign Minister would meet with Spaak, to whom it would speak again. The Cyprus question, Riddleberger emphasized, had reached dead-end. It created many serious problems for NATO and it was indispensable to find an appropriate procedure to get out of this dead-end. Inevitably NATO some time again would have to deal with the question as long as the danger existed that Greece might withdraw from the alliance. At any rate, the Greek government, too, should suggest a procedure, through which its ideas might be implemented. The Greek Foreign Minister, with Riddleberger taking notes, replied that Greece's representative to NATO, Michel Melas, had been instructed to accept Spaak's invitation to dine with representatives of Turkey and Britain on the NATO Council, in the sense that the Greek government tolerated such a meeting. No instructions had been sent him as to what he should say during that dinner and he had been given no authority to assume any commitment during these talks which the Greek government regarded as altogether informal but which could be useful for ascertaining whether any points of contact existed. However, the talks were unacceptable if this meeting were to assume the character of a tripartite conference, albeit at the ambassadorial level. As far as the proposal for setting up an advisory committee in NATO was concerned, Spaak had not spoken to the Greek government about it, said AveroffTossizza. At first glance and without hesitation, the Foreign Minister regarded this proposal as dangerous. If this committee were to propose something the Greeks did not like, the Greek people would become very bitter toward NATO. Nor was he impressed by the argument that such a committee would have no arbitral powers. 78 Its prestige would be so great that even if its character were merely advisory, the recommendations it might make would, to a certain extent, be binding. The Greek govern78

The Greek government, having in mind that partition could be the outcome of arbitration, was averse to arbitration, which Lord Ismay had proposed in N A T O in 1947 (C.M. Melas, Reminiscences of an Ambassador [in Greek] [Athens, 1967], pp. 221-224).

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ment had never concealed the fact that in Greece great was the distrust toward NATO, which was regarded as a supporter of the colonial powers, if not as a colonial bloc. When Riddleberger remarked that the United States, though a NATO member, was no colonial power, Averoff-Tossizza agreed. However, in recent years, he observed, the United States, in many matters, for instance the Algerian and Cyprus questions, 79 had sided with the opponents of freedom for the colonies. The result was that Greek public opinion regarded Americans as supporters of the colonialists. This was a regrettable fact which he himself considered as unjustified in many respects, because he recognized that there was good faith and good will involved. At any rate, all classes of people in Greece would sharply react to the news that a NATO committee for Cyprus would be set up. The Opposition would exploit this reaction. The press would do so even more. The following results would ensue: First, as far as Greece was concerned, the committee would be a failure in advance. Second, for having accepted an unreasonable way out by entrusting the colonialists with a quasi-arbitration, the Greek government would be regarded as having been subjected to great pressure. And this pressure surely would be ascribed to the United States. The Greek government, on the other hand, though having a complaint against the United States, wished primarily to prevent the further growth of anti-NATO and especially anti-American feelings among the people. Third, the government might be unable to contain the pressure. If the entire Opposition were insistently to ask Parliament to meet because of a turn to the worse of the Cyprus question, the government would be unable forever to refuse to convene it. And, should a NATO committee on Cyprus be set up, Members of Parliament belonging to the government party would surely ask for a meeting of Parliament. But in Parliament there was no certainty that a government which had accepted the establishment of such a committee could maintain itself in power. Averoff-Tossizza then made the following clarifications: First, the ideas he had mentioned both to Riddleberger and Sir Roger Allen were purely personal. They committed him only if their governments accepted them. And between his own eventual commitment and the commitment of the government, the Party, and the Cypriots there was quite a distance. Second, he believed that for these ideas to bear fruit, they should never be presented as Greek views. Otherwise they were doomed to failure, because of Turkey's reaction. 79

Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 166, 296, also note 34 (p. 595).

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For presenting these ideas, Averoff-Tossizza went on to say, a simple and sure procedure existed. First, the Paris contacts in their altogether informal character would be useful, with the aid of Spaak, whom he praised, stressing he had complete confidence in him. However, if these contacts should not be enough, if they disclosed no points of contact, then these ideas could be urgently and actively explored through the diplomatic channel and should be systematically cultivated so that they bore fruit. When it was perceived that these ideas had become really acceptable, then the NATO Council could be convened on the Ministerial level, in order to take a decision on the basis of these ideas, defining the fundamental points of a solution and perhaps a framework of details that would be left for the permanent NATO Council to define. Thus, a success would be offered to NATO, whereas the outcome of any other approach would be failure. This, he was convinced, was the best if not the only procedure. However, he added, little time was left, for two reasons: First, he could not tell how long the state of peace would last in Cyprus. The Turks were resorting to murder and arson as a political weapon, and it was unknown whether EOKA could be restrained for long, unless it saw that a solution was around the corner. Second, although the Greek government was disposed to make every possible sincere effort to find a solution at the earliest, it would not forfeit its right to resort to the United Nations. Therefore, something should be accomplished soon. Otherwise, the procedure of a resort to the United Nations would begin. With regard to certain suggestions that the Cyprus question be placed, as it were, "in the freeze", Averoff-Tossizza said that this tactic would encounter obstacles neither from the Greek nor the Cypriot side, if this method merely postponed settlement of the matter through self-determination. However, he could not commend such a tactic because of what might happen in Cyprus in the meantime. The Greek view was that a democratic constitution providing full guarantees for the Turkish minority should be granted. Of course, negotiations could take place for settling whether the Constitution would or would not be complete from the outset. 80 In conclusion, the Greek Foreign Minister told Ambassador Riddleberger that he could not conceal from him his government's conviction that the U.S. government had treated Greece badly in the Cyprus question. 80 In his speech to the Commons on June 29, 1958, Macmillan had not altogether excluded exchanges with the Greek and Turkish Premiers over details of the British plan.

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When the Ambassador insisted this was not true and began the usual justification about the United States assuming a neutral stand in a dispute among friends, Averoff-Tossizza said he did not wish to revert to the past but, limiting himself to the present, could not but observe that the U.S. government had adopted the Turkish viewpoint. Riddleberger insisted this was not so. The Foreign Minister, however, contended that by backing the Macmillan plan, which represented to a major extent a British concession to the Turkish demands, the United States, too, was, in the last analysis, backing Turkey. The Foreign Minister also told Ambassador Riddleberger that throughout recent times, the United States had been completely indifferent to the internal difficulties the Greek government was experiencing not in form but in substance. It refused to cooperate in the Cyprus question. It continually referred the Greek government to NATO, though the Greek government explained the difficulties it encountered in this respect. The United States, he said, was applying to Greece a policy which many Western countries had applied in other countries with poor results — "a policy of leadership" relations not a "policy of peoples". Thus, in Egypt, the British had relied on the support of a few politicians and pashas, on King Fuad first, then on King Farouk. They had ignored the Egyptian people. The United States in China had ignored the Chinese people and had relied on Chiang Kai-shek and a few Chinese generals. In Iraq, reliance was placed on Nuri es-Said. Was the situation secure there? 81 "I fear", said Averoff-Tossizza, "that you are following the same policy in Greece. The King undoubtedly has his eyes turned toward the West. Regardless of the bitterness we feel, the same happens with all of us, with Karamanlis at our head. The same is the case of the leaders of the national-minded Opposition and of the leadership of the armed forces. But you are indifferent to what the people think and to trends. We are struggling to prevent Greece from finding itself with a pro-Western leadership and an anti-Western people. So long as you do not realize this struggle and continue the same tactics, which at present arouse a feeling of sorrow among the Greek people but may soon generate feelings of humiliation, I do not see how we shall be able to continue this struggle of ours which we regard as indispensable for the future of our nation." Ambassador Riddleberger said he agreed with many of these remarks and would convey them to Washington as he had done in the past. 81 On July 14,1958, the Iraqi monarchy and government were overthrown in Baghdad after which Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact.

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Before parting, the Foreign Minister said he would like to get a clear and concrete reply to his proposals. The matter had reached a critical point; unambiguous answers of substance were required. Five days later, July 10, while still with no response from Washington or London to the ideas he had formulated to Riddleberger and Sir Roger Allen for a new approach to the Cyprus question, Averoff-Tossizza received a dispatch from M. Melas, the Greek representative to NATO, who reported that, according to very reliable information, the Turkish government was blackmailing Britain over the matter of the Baghdad Pact. Certain Muslim states wanted either the United States to become a full member of it or Britain to withdraw from it so that the alliance should be transformed into a purely regional organization. Britain, of course, by all means was seeking to avoid the humiliation of an ouster, while Turkey was using the Cyprus question as one of its instruments of pressure. Hence the fact that Britain had not only disclosed its Cyprus plan to Turkey far earlier than it had to Greece, but had also agreed to change it according to Turkish suggestions. And now the following collusion was occurring: The Turks, for quite a while more, would protest against the Macmillan plan, saying that it sacrificed their interests, until international public opinion absorbed the idea that the plan was impartial since both Turks and Greeks rejected it. Then, step by step — the process had started already — the Turks would appear to retreat and the Greeks then would seem intransigent. The best response to this development, in Melas' view, would be for the Foreign Minister to mention the above maneuvers in his public interviews and to add that it was Greece, not Turkey, which was really conciliatory. To demonstrate this, he should go further and declare that Greece was ready to submit the whole Cyprus issue to arbitration by some international personality or group of personalities, which on the basis of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Atlantic Charter, and objective facts would propose a final and just solution.82 The extremely high tension between the British and Greek governments over the Cyprus issue during these weeks, which stemmed not only from the situation on the island itself but also from the British efforts to impose a partnership solution against Greek and Greek Cypriot opposition, was reflected in a meeting of July 12 between the Greek Foreign Minister and the British chargé d'affaires in Athens, A. E. Lambert. During this meeting which took place at the Foreign Minister's request, Averoff82

The Greek Ambassador to NATO reverted to a suggestion by Lord Ismay early in 1957 about resort to arbitration, see above, note 78.

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Tossizza handed Lambert a note and strongly protested against the toleration the British authorities in Cyprus had shown toward Turkish Cypriot acts of violence, and against the discriminatory treatment meted out to the Greek Cypriots. After listening to the Foreign Minister and reading the written protest, the British chargé d'affaires observed that the note contained unacceptable allegations. It would make a bad impression on the Foreign Office, he added. "The time is over for demarches of this nature", Lambert said. "The situation in Cyprus is so critical that we must dedicate all our efforts to redressing it. Otherwise we shall get closer to partition, which neither you nor we desire." He then inquired whether it was possible not to send this note to London. Averoff-Tossizza replied that the note depicted reality in very pale colors. Unfortunately, undesirable evidence existed to substantiate the truth of the charges. "I know", he said, "that my demarche will not be to the liking of the Foreign Office but I am obliged to insist that London be informed of it." Lambert then sought to ascertain whether the Greek government intended to reply to Macmillan's second message to Karamanlis. Averoff-Tossizza answered he had not yet had time to talk over the matter with the Premier before the latter's departure for abroad, but he intended to do so on his return. "I see", he countered, "that on your side there has been no follow-up of the ideas I had expressed to Sir Roger Allen before his departure for London. I have already informed the American Ambassador of these ideas and ascertained that the American side regarded them as constructive. These were bold ideas. I was justified in expecting an early reply to them on the part of the British government. The matter is urgent", Averoff-Tossizza continued, "first, because a time limit exists for our possible new recourse to the United Nations which we shall be unable to avoid, unless we have more concrete developments; and, second, because the worsening situation in Cyprus brooks no further delays." Lambert agreed it was expedient to speed up contacts and then inquired whether the Greek government was disposed to discuss the implementation of the Macmillan plan. Averoff-Tossizza expressed astonishment at this question. The Greek government, he reminded Lambert, had not accepted the British plan even as a basis for discussion. The British diplomat replied that if the Greek government maintained

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such an inflexible attitude, nothing good could be expected. "At any rate", he added, "if we were to discuss the plan's implementation, then, during the discussions, margins would be left for changing it." Averoff-Tossizza said that the Greek government, in the Premier's reply to Macmillan's letter, had set down the lines along which useful talks could proceed. He himself, furthermore, had formulated certain ideas about another approach to the Cyprus problem. In consequence, the Greek government was expecting certain replies from the British government, to find out whether any meeting between the two Premiers might be useful. No Greek government, however, he emphasized, could accept talks on the basis of the Macmillan plan. It was a pity that no progress could be perceived for only in that event would it be possible to assure a period of tranquility on the island. When Lambert remarked that protracted bloodshed would make matters more difficult and asked the Greek government to exert all its influence so that tranquility might prevail, Averoff-Tossizza replied he was doing all in his power for this purpose but considered he could exert no influence any longer. This was because, first, he could not assure all Cypriots capable of exerting any influence that any hopes existed for a political solution. If he were to do so, this would no longer correspond with reality. Second, Greeks were being killed in Cyprus, and the Greek government was unable to protect them, while the British forces there were not in a position to do so either. Under such circumstances no one could understand why EOKA, in spite of all contrary propaganda, was not acting. According to his information, the situation was explosive. The impression existed that the only way to salvation for the Greek Cypriots was to kill Turkish Cypriots in the multiple, so that the latter should realize that their crimes were getting too costly for them. Should this impression prevail, nothing would be able to stop massive retaliation. Two things were required: first, a change in Turkish tactics and more severe punishment of the Turkish Cypriots, and, second, the reaching of a settlement. Two days after this tense but fruitless exchange of views on July 12, with its veiled warnings and the handing of the Greek protest note, AveroffTossizza — "Isaakios" — wrote to Grivas summing up the situation to date in general terms and suggesting certain forms of positive action. 83 Whereas until February 1958 "our sacred cause" was going on quite well, after Lloyd's visit to Athens, the Turks had changed tactics. Greek 83

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 277-278 (far from full text).

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progress had frightened them and they had decided, first, to seriously prepare themselves for possible action through the United Nations. Accordingly, they had managed to obtain the replacement of several friendly delegates in the United Nations, 84 though fighting against various colonial items, such as the Algerian question. And they had also restored their relations with Albania. Second, they were conducting a policy of blackmail by all means — and they had such means, because of their geographical location and their very significant armed forces (underlined in text). Hence the aggressive Turkish policies in matters concerning the West, e.g. Lebanon, and, at the same time, their contacts with the Soviet Union and friction within the Baghdad Pact. Third, the Turks were inciting incidents in Cyprus, on the one hand, to frighten the allies by showing that they could stir up turmoil on the island and, on the other, to persuade everyone that the two "communities" were unable to live together and that partition, though bad, was the only possible solution. These Turkish policies, "Isaakios" continued, had been successful, the last one especially. For dealing with the other two, methods existed and they had been used. For instance, the withdrawal of Greek officers from Izmir had organically disturbed NATO and had led others to face the contingency of Greece's withdrawal from NATO. But against the third Turkish policy, it was extremely difficult if not impossible to react. Together with expert advisers, he had studied the matter of recourse to the UN Security Council but was convinced that nothing could be attained by such a move. Greece was seeking to exert as much pressure as possible and was disposed to exploit the present most grave events in Iraq. 85 But would all these moves lead to a satisfactory solution? Would they promote the issue from its present sorry state? And, most of all, would they halt Turkish violence in Cyprus? It was doubtful. The last was the most urgent and serious concern both "because our brothers are suffering and because Foreign Ministry reports reveal that more and more governments are inclined to favor partition as a solution". The moment had arrived, "Isaakios" wrote further, "for us to think alone or rather for you to think alone", thus implying that soon he might no longer hold the post of Foreign Minister, since he was under attack both from inside and outside Greece, the latter because he was held 84

After the twelfth General Assembly, the Iraqi government recalled its representative to the United Nations who had supported the Greek side during the Committee debate on the Cyprus issue (Conflict and Conciliation, p. 273). 85 Greece was the first Western state to recognize the new Iraqi regime of Brigadier General Abdul Karim Kassim after King Fayzal's overthrow.

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personally responsible for the withdrawal of the Greek NATO officers from Izmir. 86 He would confide in him a thought he had arrived at without absolutely any previous consultation. 87 Self-defense and reprisals, so long as they were carried out immediately, might somewhat stem the Turkish actions. He wondered, however, whether the following should not be done in order to bring British toleration to an end and for the British again to feel Grivas' presence: "You will issue a proclamation charging that the Turks and the British have loosened all reins of restraint; that the Turks want artificially to prove that coexistence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is impossible, whereas it has always been possible; that the British, regardless of reasons, do not punish the atrocities of the Turks; that the truces you offered have had no effect; therefore, you believe you should interrupt the truce for a few days, both to punish crimes and Anglo-Turkish collusion, and as a serious warning; finally, that after that, you would hold your action, if they became wiser. Two or three days of very hard blows at the British military installations should follow." He feared, "Isaakios" continued, lest the British and the Turks should believe that Grivas was weak or perhaps that he was in such desperate political straits that "we do not dare to react". If they so believed, they would feel their hands free. Conversely, if the blows were hard and dealt at widely dispersed points, and lasted for a short while, the following advantages would accrue: First, Grivas would have underlined both his strength and the seriousness of his threat. Second, he would have persuaded the British that if the Turks were dangerous, he was even more dangerous than they were. Third, despite its blindness, Ankara, too, would take his action into account. Fourth, by immediately resuming the truce, the Greek side would not be internationally charged with preventing the achievement of a settlement. Fifth, for all these reasons, there might be a pressuring reaction in Britain. And sixth, especially in view of developments in Iraq, there might be favorable reactions in the United States and more generally in the West. The above thoughts, "Isaakios" was careful to reemphasize, were purely personal (underlined in original text). They held good only if the Turks did not quiet down.

88

Grivas Memoirs, p. 277. "Isaakios" does not make clear whom he might have consulted: the Ethnarch? the Premier? any other member of the Greek Cabinet? 87

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F. GRIVAS ON THE CYPRUS FRONT

On July 9, Grivas who, as earlier mentioned, had been quite restrained in the face of the Turkish Cypriot acts of violence against the Greek Cypriots and their property, had issued orders for counterattacks against police stations, with Turkish Cypriot policemen as the main target. He had also lifted any limitations with regard to the "executions" of Turkish Cypriots. 88 In a letter of July 9, Ethnarch Makarios had written to him that a protracted struggle was expected and that in both Greece and Cyprus diffuse pessimism and anxiety about future developments prevailed. The foe was exerting psychological pressure and waging a war of nerves. "We shall not give in to pressure of any kind", the Ethnarch added. "We are not blind to the gravity of the situation. We shall face it, however, with courage on both the diplomatic and the other field."89 Next day, in an extremely long note to the Bishop of Kition, Grivas, under seven main headings, dealt with the matter of what should be done. 9 0 First, in the political sector, there should be no retreat from self-determination. Second, in the military sector, he would accept no further interference in purely military matters. He was sick and tired of the various recommendations for restraint. If he had complied with them all, EOKA would not have survived. He should be the absolute master of the military struggle in Cyprus. Political expediency should not be, as it had been until then, the main criterion for his military activities. Harmonization between the political and military leadership should be achieved by agreement. And he would accept no imposition by the political leadership concerning methods of military implementation. These were the exclusive task of the military leadership. Third, he urgently needed materiel for carrying out his struggle. For three and a half years he had never had more than 60 automatic weapons for fighting 36,000 British. His homemade explosives were not enough. Fourth, because new methods of warfare were necessary and these required far greater discipline than before, cadres of military officers were indispensable. He had repeatedly asked for such cadres, but in vain. Turkish officers, on the other hand, were training the Turkish Cypriots. Fifth, for dealing militarily with the latter, EOKA should be reorganized, to carry out reprisals. And for dealing politically with the Turkish Cypriots, his proposed Political 88 89 90

Grivas Memoirs, p. 268. Ibid., Appendix, p. 277. Ibid., Appendix, pp. 57-59.

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Committee should resort to a plan of action he had prepared. Sixth, the leader of AKEL (the Progressive Party of the Working People) should be told to put an end to various communist-created incidents that harmed EOKA's struggle. AKEL should be forced to place its own forces at EOKA's disposal. Above all, the Political Committee, which he had outlined in previous notes to the Bishop, should be set up, to cooperate closely with EOKA and undertake coordinated activities. This Political Committee, he had explained earlier, should study the contingency of the unilateral or coercive imposition of the Macmillan plan, and prepare a program of action for countering it. It should also plan and conduct passive resistance in both the economic and administrative sector. 91 On July 14, Sir Hugh Foot, together with the Mayor of Nicosia, Dervis, and Rauf Denkta§, Turkish Cypriot leader, appealed for an immediate cessation of violence. Next day, the Governor, on Cyprus Radio, warned there would be no hesitation in dealing with anyone who was mad enough to plunge Cyprus into civil war, and again appealed for an end to violence. 92 Grivas responded to the Governor's appeal with a defiant leaflet, saying that he would never cease his struggle unless self-determination was assured. 93 On July 15 (had he already received "Isaakios"' letter of July 14?) he issued orders for sabotage against British military installations, to be carried out sporadically and over a protracted period of time, in order to confuse and unnerve the British. His overall plan, as he explains in his memoirs, was to be implemented in phases. After containing the BritishTurkish attack, he would counterattack, but on a limited scale, the Turkish Cypriots, in order not to erode his own forces, while at the same time demoralizing the foe and raising the morale of his own men and of the Greek Cypriots. Then, at an appropriate moment, he would undertake an attack against the British, while at the same time keeping the Turkish Cypriots busy. Flexibility would be maintained in attacking the two foes. Against the British, mainly the men of the Special Branch, he would order reprisals, if Greek Cypriots were executed. If stronger anti-British reprisals were required, he would order ambushes against the foe's military forces. 91 92 93

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 56-59. Keesing's, 16482. Ibid., p. 269.

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On July 17, Sir Hugh Foot announced that Makarios, in response to a message from the Governor, had expressed his readiness to join in any efforts to end Greek-Turkish bloodshed, while alleging that the British authorities had failed to give adequate protection to the Greek Cypriots against Turkish Cypriot terrorism — a charge Sir Hugh called unacceptable. 94 On July 18, however, on the basis of his above mentioned plan, Grivas ordered a counterattack against the Turkish Cypriots. And toward the end of July, the implementation of his plan for anti-British action began. 95 Meanwhile, on July 20, the British authorities had imposed new and stringent security measures — the most far-reaching since the start of the emergency in November 1955. About 1,200 Greek Cypriots were arrested and about 59 Turkish Cypriots. Three days later, the British authorities finally banned TMT, the Turkish Defense Organization. 96 In a letter Grivas received on July 24, the Bishop of Kition informed him he had seen Averoff-Tossizza who had assured him that he was exhausting all available means, especially during the current Middle Eastern crisis, for exploiting to the best possible advantage the struggle being waged and the sacrifices being made in Cyprus. The Americans, the Bishop had learned, blamed Averoff-Tossizza exclusively for the withdrawal of the Greek officers from NATO headquarters at Izmir and for frustrating a proposed meeting of NATO leaders in Athens. They were therefore waging a personal war against him in order to remove him from his post as Foreign Minister. The Cyprus question, the Bishop of Kition informed Grivas further, would be placed on the provisional agenda of the U N General Assembly and the Greek government would use all available means to support its recourse. "For our position in the United Nations not to be weakened", the Bishop advised that "we should limit our attacks to the Turks only, inflicting upon them the severest blows possible. They should be pitilessly hit, because only in this way would it be possible

94

Keesing's, 16482. Grivas Memoirs, pp. 268-269. 98 Keesing's, 16481. The emergency measures included a night curfew in all towns from 7 p.m. to 4:30 a.m.; powers for district security committees to impose day curfews whenever necessary; a ban on all road traffic during the curfew period; a ban on movement outside village areas during curfew hours without special permission. A week earlier a doubling of the police forces in Cyprus had been announced and 300 police reinforcements were flown to the island from England. Grivas Memoirs, p. 271, gives a figure of 2,000 arrests. 85

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to terrorize them and deter them." The Ethnarch, he added, was in agreement with the above. 97 During July 1958,97 Greek and Turkish Cypriot civilians were killed — a record figure for any of the forty months of the Cyprus emergency. In addition, EOKA men killed two British soldiers of the Royal Horseguards on July 8, in retaliation for the killing of two Greek Cypriots three days earlier at the village of Avghorou (near Famagusta) where Greek Cypriot villagers attacked a small party of British troops, the leader of which had ordered the arrest of a youth who had refused to remove a large EOKA sign prominently displayed at the village coffee shop. 98

97 98

Grivas Memoirs, p. 276. Keesing's, 16481.

IV SUASION AT THE SUMMIT

A. PRELUDE TO MACMILLAN'S ATHENS VISIT

If in 1957 the proclamation of the "Eisenhower Doctrine"1 and then the Syrian "war scare"2 were outstanding Near- and Middle-East-centered events in world politics, 1958 witnessed, first, the union of Egypt with Syria3 and then a grave new Middle Eastern crisis. On July 14 of that year, a group of Iraqi army officers under Brigadier-General Abdul Karim Kassim overthrew the pro-Western monarchy of Iraq and set up a regime which shortly after withdrew from the Baghdad Pact. As a precautionary and stabilizing move, U.S. Marines, backed by the Sixth Fleet, landed in Lebanon on July 15, and British troops were flown to Jordan (with U.S. logistic support) at the request of the respective governments of those states. In these combined Anglo-American operations, the British government made facilities in Cyprus available to the United States and the British navy provided support. Both Lebanon and Jordan — the former on May 22, before the Iraqi revolution, the latter on July 17 — complained to the United Nations that 1

President Eisenhower had enunciated this "doctrine" on January 5,1957 in response to the collapse of British influence in the Middle East after the Suez affair of late autumn 1956. This move reflected the great concern of the U.S. government lest the USSR be tempted to fill the vacuum there by launching direct action. Although it included proposals for economic as well as military aid to states occupying this vital area in world politics, the "Doctrine", duly blessed by Congress, succinctly suggested that the United States was now deliberately extending its security commitments to the Near and Middle East and, if necessary, was ready to fight to keep that area from going Communist as a result of military aggression. This meant that more than ever before, the U.S. government was vitally interested in maintaining and strengthening the cohesion of NATO's southeastern flank, which the Cyprus dispute threatened to disrupt. For the text of "Eisenhower Doctrine", see, Documents on American Foreign Relations (New York: Harper and Bros., 1958) pp. 195 ff. 2 See above, Chapter II, note 1. 3 On February 1, 1958, Egypt joined Syria, to form the United Arab Republic. The union came to an end on October 5,1961.

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the newly established UAR was intervening in their internal affairs. In response to Lebanon's appeal, the UN Security Council decided on June 11 to send UNOGIL (United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon) to Beirut. Although it is not unreasonable to assume that this Near Eastern crisis of summer 1958 is likely to have intensified the Turkish government's desire for a speedy settlement of the Cyprus question, and though late in 1957 there had been the earlier noted reports that the Turkish Foreign Minister wanted to meet his Greek opposite number, 4 there were few such indications on July 21, 1958, when Zorlu received alone, contrary to his usual habit, the Greek Ambassador to Turkey, G. Pesmazoglou, who had just returned to his Ankara post. The revolution in Baghdad seemed, on the contrary, to have stiffened rather than softened the Turkish Foreign Minister's attitude on the Cyprus question. In contrast to earlier occasions, Zorlu appeared calm and controlled. He acknowledged that the Near Eastern crisis had disturbed his government but said he no longer saw any reason for anxiety after the landing of U.S. Marines in Lebanon and the U.S. assurances (unspecified) to the Turkish government. 5 He had not inquired about the possible return of the Greek officers to the NATO Command at Izmir. Nor had he expressed any inclination to proceed toward Cyprus talks with the Greek government. In fact, he had not touched on the Cyprus question at all until he had realized that the Greek ambassador did not intend to do so first. Nor had he spoken about the need for cooperation between Greece and Turkey during the current difficult situation in the Middle East, though he had referred to a long report on Athens conversations between Pesmazoglou and Vergin, the Turkish Ambassador to Athens, during which, as Pesmazoglou explained to Zorlu, both diplomats had expressed the belief that Middle Eastern developments no longer allowed Greece and Turkey to give the impression of being in sharp opposition to each other. And he had made no reference either to the Macmillan plan. Moreover, during his conversation of July 21 with the Greek Ambassador, Zorlu had not shared the views of both Pesmazoglou and 4

See above, Chapter I, p. 68. On July 28, 1958, Secretary of State Dulles, after attending the ministerial session of the Baghdad Pact Council in London, signed a declaration of collective security which committed the United States to cooperate with the member states of that regional security organization for their defense. He also promised increased military aid to Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan through bilateral agreements (A. De Conde, A History of American Foreign Policy [New York, Scribner's, 1963], p. 760). 5

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Vergin in their Athens talks that a third solution was required, since Turkey rejected self-determination for the Cypriots and Greece opposed the island's partition. On the contrary, the Turkish Foreign Minister argued that his government, in accepting partition as a solution to the Cyprus problem, had made a concession to the Greek government, which, through Averoff-Tossizza, he asserted, had first proposed partition. When the Greek Ambassador denied that his government had ever made such a proposal,6 Zorlu, though unconvinced by Pesmazoglou's arguments, retorted that, because of the mutual massacres occurring in Cyprus, no other solution but partition was possible. Zorlu had further complained that the Greek government supposedly maintained that Turkey had no interests in Cyprus.7 He had also expressed dissatisfaction about Greek moves designed to maintain good relations with the UAR and Yugoslavia, and suggested that Greece would do better to try to reach an understanding with Turkey.8 The Turkish Foreign Minister's whole attitude had been particularly unexpected, Pesmazoglou commented back to Athens after this meeting, because Sir James Bowker, the British Ambassador to Ankara, had told him that the British government was urging upon Turkey the need for a Greek-Turkish rapprochement, and the Italian Ambassador to Ankara 8 Zorlu maintained that the Greek Foreign Minister had made such a proposal to the Italian politician De Martino, to Spaak and two other (unnamed) personalities in the presence of witnesses, and that both the British and the Americans had been informed of this. However, this time, Zorlu did not invoke the testimony of Ambassador Iksel. Pesmazoglou reminded him that discussing the same matter with him in December 1957, Zorlu had based himself mainly on Iksel's testimony and had spoken only vaguely about other persons. He added that he was confident that when the Turkish government replied to the relevant inquiry of the Greek government, the error would be realized. On June 2, 1958, after Averoff-Tossizza had taken over the Foreign Ministry again, the Greek government officially asked the Turkish government to publish its evidence. Zorlu replied his government did not intend to reply to this inquiry in order not to put the Greek Foreign Minister in a difficult position. "It is regrettable", he added, "that Mr. Averoff has ceased supporting this solution". Pesmazoglou countered by saying he could not see how the Greek Foreign Minister could be put in a difficult position, since he himself had initiated the relevant inquiry with the Turkish government. Zorlu left this point unanswered. 7 Zorlu asserted in this connection that Ambassador M. Melas had made such an assertion in NATO. 8 In response to this complaint, Pesmazoglou remarked that Greece had accepted Tito's invitation to Brioni because Yugoslavia was an ally (through the Balkan Pact of 1953). As for Greece's good relations with Egypt, these were due to economic and other interests, especially the treatment of the Greek community there. Good relations with Yugoslavia and Egypt did not alter but, on the contrary, strengthened Greece's position in NATO, he observed. Premier Karamanlis had visited Yugoslavia on December 4-7,1956, and Egypt on August 17-21,1957.

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had informed him that the Turkish government was greatly interested in such a rapprochement. That Zorlu had felt it unnecessary to make even the slightest hint of a desire to reach an understanding with the Greek government over Cyprus led him to believe that the Foreign Minister wished to create the impression that Turkey looked toward future developments with equanimity, because it was convinced that its views would eventually prevail. It was natural for the Turks, in the Greek Ambassador's view, to exploit to the utmost the role they had the opportunity to play in the current Middle Eastern crisis. This Turkish behavior constituted a factor, the weight of which ought to be carefully reckoned with during the Greek government's next moves in the Cyprus question. On July 29, Macmillan, invoking sentiments of common humanity, proposed to Karamanlis that the Prime Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Britain should add their voices to those of leaders of the two communities in Cyprus and of the Governor, who had appealed for an end of bloodshed on the island, with Makarios endorsing this appeal. For, he observed, violence in Cyprus had sharply increased, and the Governor had been obliged to take drastic action to try and restore the peace necessary for peaceful and orderly progress. Macmillan added that he hoped to talk about Cyprus with Menderes, who was then in London for the meeting of the heads of government of the Baghdad Pact, and to have similar personal talks with Karamanlis as well.9 Assenting to Macmillan's proposal, Karamanlis issued a relevant appeal to the Cypriots on July 30. Macmillan and Menderes followed him on July 31 and August 1, respectively. In his appeal, the Greek Premier underlined he had not wished to leave the British request unheeded, though it was common knowledge that the Greek side had suspended its unilateral truce only when organized attacks had taken place against the life and property of the Greek Cypriots. In expressing the wish that peace and good will would be restored among the people of Cyprus "who had lived united for many centuries", he was voicing, Karamanlis said, the feelings of the Greek section of the population of Cyprus which during its long struggle for freedom had never attacked the island's minority. 10 On July 31, Makarios invited the Turkish Cypriots to end their attacks against the Greek Cypriots — in which case the latter would respond immediately in a similar way. 11 9 Greek White Book /, p. 17. "> Ibid., p. 18. 11 Grivas Memoirs, p. 271.

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Grivas, at first, did not heed the appeal of Karamanlis for pacification. In his view, the Premier should have asked the British government to hold the Turkish Cypriots in check. In response to Macmillan's appeal, he protested in a leaflet that the Greek Cypriots had not been the aggressors. He also warned that he would not halt his operations as long as British "intimidation and oppression" continued. Macmillan, he maintained, would have done better to order a cease-fire by the British soldiers and their "Turkish collaborators". Concurrently, he informed his men that the appeals of the Premiers of Greece and Britain in no way should affect their tactics against the "Angloturks". Thus, although the British authorities showered the island with half a million or more copies of Macmillan's appeal, 12 violence continued on the island for a few days— two British soldiers being killed on August 3. Then, on August 4, Grivas offered a new truce, the third of its kind since the beginning of EOKA's activities in April 1955.13 In the relevant leaflet, he warned that if further British and Turkish provocations went on in any way, he would feel free to resume his activities by August 10. Makarios called for acceptance of Grivas' offer and Athens regarded this new truce as meeting the problem of restoring peace not only between the two communities but also between EOKA and the British authorities. 14 An editorial of August 6 in the London Times, however, although welcoming these developments, urged the British authorities in Cyprus not to call off their current security drive against Grivas and EOKA. The gravity of the current situation, this editorial maintained, had been largely due to the relaxation on the part of the British authorities and particularly by Sir Hugh Foot, during the previous period of calm. This mistake should not be repeated. Likewise on August 6, TMT ordered the cessation of its operations. 15 Meanwhile, in a letter of July 31, 16 Karamanlis replied to Macmillan's letters of July 4 and 29. He would be able to meet the British Premier, he wrote, if certain views of the Greek government were to prevail in the Macmillan plan's final form. The involvement of the Greek and Turkish governments in the administration of Cyprus should be eliminated from 12

Grivas Memoirs, p. 272. Keesing's, 16482. Keesing's, 16482. The first truce had been offered on August 15, 1956; the second, on March 14, 1957, after the adoption of Resolution 1013(XI) by the UN General Assembly. 14 Grivas Memoirs, pp. 272-273. 15 Ibid., p. 273. Keesing's, 16482. 16 Greek White Book I, pp. 19-20. 13

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the plan, together with the idea of establishing in the future a triple condominium over the island. On the other hand (as Labour Party spokesmen had suggested), a single Parliament representing the whole of the Cypriot population should be provided for. Unless the British government accepted these views, Karamanlis explained, he would be unable to convince the Cypriots that the interim solution provided for in the Macmillan plan did not prejudge the final solution. By not accepting certain fundamental points of the plan, Karamanlis assured Macmillan in this letter of July 31, the Greek government was seeking not so much to secure a greater or lesser number of advantages for the Cypriots as to create the necessary conditions for the pacification and unity of the island and for the reestablishment of friendly relations among Greece, Britain, and Turkey. Because he wished the personal meeting between the two Premiers to be a success, he proposed that it be adequately prepared beforehand through the diplomatic channel. Accordingly, through Sir Roger Allen, he had conveyed to Macmillan certain views, to which the Greek government unfortunately had never received a reply. In conclusion, Karamanlis expressed his regret that the Greek government's conciliatory attitude which, he reaffirmed, aimed at bringing the current deadlock to an end and at contributing to the settlement of the Cyprus issue and to the improvement of relations between allies, had not been duly appreciated but had led to reactions which rendered a settlement of the Cyprus question more difficult and created dangers for the future. On August 4, the British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Roger Allen, met the Greek Foreign Minister at the latter's request. Averoff-Tossizza started out by referring to the British government's inflexibility in insisting on its new plan. The impression, he said, had been created in Athens that London had interpreted the hitherto prudent attitude of the Greek government as a sign of weakness. "I am not uttering threats", he said. "I simply don't wish that this misunderstanding which, to our opinion, has occurred, should continue." His government had been astonished that Macmillan should have somehow misinterpreted Karamanlis' appeal for a restoration of normalcy in Cyprus. This appeal had clearly stressed that the situation in Cyprus was the consequence of the attacks unleashed by the Turkish Cypriots. After Sir Roger, interrupting him, said that he did not remember the exact formulation of Macmillan's phrase but was under the impression

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that the British Premier had merely expressed a wish,17 Averoff-Tossizza told him that if the British government based its policy on the assumption that "we Greeks were ready to submit", and that "we would give in to anything the Turks were asking for", then it was seriously miscalculating, and events of incalculable consequences might ensue. "For sentimental reasons toward your country, but also for realistic reasons, we would not want this to happen. Unfortunately", he added, "you are driving us in that direction." He did not wish to indulge in idle boasting nor did he have any bad intentions. He merely desired the British government to be aware of the situation. When Sir Roger replied that in his reports to London he never failed to emphasize how strongly feelings were running in Athens over Cyprus, the Foreign Minister said that moments arrived when one was obliged to say that a dead end had been reached and to face the consequences, whatever these might be. As far as he was concerned, he believed that unfortunately "we were very close to such a situation". The British Ambassador replied that in his view this point had not yet been reached but that "we are approaching it". "I do not see what remains for us to do", he added. "You say that we always put forward the demands of the Turks. But, if we are already at a dead end, this is because of the actions of Greece in 1953-1954 when you resorted to the United Nations. 18 Now, at the dead end you created, you are asking us to sacrifice our friendship with the Turks." The Foreign Minister replied that at any rate Greece would have been unable for any length of time to withhold its support from the Cypriots after the developments which had taken place on the island. He himself, in 1951, as Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had asked Anthony Eden (then Foreign Secretary) for nothing more than a statement of policy on Cyprus that would clarify British intentions about the island's future. 19 "We did not ask you to sacrifice your friendship with Turkey.

17

In his appeal to the Cypriots on July 31, 1958, Macmillan had said: "Humanity demands that violence in Cyprus must stop. Killing, wounding, and damage to property can do nothing but harm to the interests of all the communities of the island. I am sure that the ordinary people of Cyprus desperately want peace and security. I therefore make this appeal to all concerned, within the island and outside it, to refrain from any action which would contribute to further violence. I am sure that this appeal will be fully supported by the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, as by men of good will everywhere." (Keesing's, 16482.) 18 Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 8-11. 19 Ibid., p. 7.

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We ourselves stated that sufficient guarantees of an international character should be given for the well-understood Turkish interests." The Turks did not regard these guarantees as adequate, Sir Roger answered. "If we wished to impose upon them the solutions you proposed, we would have a terrible quarrel with them and we want no such thing." This was tantamount to saying that nothing else was left but partition or a solution that led to partition, Averoff-Tossizza retorted. "This we could not accept." "Our plan", Sir Roger contended, "does not lead to partition." "The only way out, as I see it, is to postpone a solution." "I don't see the possibility of any such postponement, if the Turks accept the plan. How can we tell them that we are reversing our course?" "In that case there will be chaos, because the Greeks will not accept the implementation of the plan." "I know it", rejoined Sir Roger. "I myself wonder how the plan can be implemented. Probably before an empty chair" (meaning the chair of the Greek government's representative). "Before many empty chairs", retorted Averoff-Tossizza (meaning the chairs of Cypriots in the Greek House of Representatives and of the four Greek Cypriots on the proposed Council). "In this event, how will violence stop? How shall I be able to suggest its termination?" "If you don't persuade the British government that its plan leads to partition, it will not drop its plan. I don't see how you will be able to persuade it. Besides, why do you reject condominium? You say partition is unacceptable. But the condominium the British government proposes preserves the island's unity. Therefore, you don't oppose partition only but also the immixture of Turkey in the island's administration. I realize a change of mind is needed for you to accept something that is abhorrent to the Greeks. But is not condominium better than partition?" "With such reasoning, a condominium might well be asked for the islands of Imbros and Tenedos 20 and for Mytilene and Malta, too, because of the presence in the latter of Italian-speaking inhabitants. Such tactics could lead very far. Here is a colonial problem which must find its natural solution. Experiments such as a condominium could create great anomalies in other parts of the world. At any rate", AveroffTossizza concluded, "please advise your government about what I told 20

Although under Turkish sovereignty, these two islands southwest of the entrance to the Dardanelles had a predominantly Greek population. Mytilene, on the other hand, is under Greek sovereignty without any Turkish minority.

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you at the outset of our conversation so that no misunderstanding may exist about the Greek government's intentions." While the above tense exchange revealed the extent to which the Cyprus question was once again deadlocked, at least so far as the Greek and British governments were concerned, NATO's Secretary-General was drawing up for Cyprus a compromise constitutional plan, dated August 4. This was based on the Macmillan plan but eliminated from it certain features that were particularly abhorrent to the Greeks. Observing that the Cyprus problem had to be settled both for the good of the island's inhabitants and for the restoration of amicable relations among Britain, Greece, and Turkey, Spaak recognized in this conciliatory draft plan that, though it would be highly desirable to resolve the issue definitively, nonetheless this unfortunately appeared impossible, because of the passions stirred up by events and the political positions taken recently. It was, therefore, necessary to search for an interim solution. However, for that interim plan to be acceptable and worthwhile, Spaak maintained that it should in no way prejudge the final solution. The interim modalities for implementing the interim solution, therefore, should neither favor nor prevent, either directly or indirectly, any of the solutions which had been envisaged, and this without exception. An interim solution would have to mark an important progress toward self-government for the Cypriot community and include all the necessary guarantees for protecting the minority. It would also have to safeguard the bases and facilities necessary to allow Britain to fulfil its international obligations. In the seven principles on which the new institutions of Cyprus ought to rest, Spaak accepted the provisions of the Macmillan plan for Houses of Representatives for each of the two communities, with competence in all communal affairs (education, religion, justice, anything related to personal status); a Council, presided over by the Governor, a Britisher, with a Greek community majority, with the competence of regulating internal affairs; the reservation of foreign affairs, defense, and security to the Governor; and the seven-year duration of the interim regime. However, Spaak did away with the Macmillan plan's provisions for Greek and Turkish representatives to assist the Governor. He proposed instead that the Presidents of the two Houses of Representatives should assist the Governor in his executive functions. Furthermore, it would be up to the one or the other House of Representatives to submit to the impartial tribunal envisaged in the Macmillan plan any measure it believed was discriminatory or unfavorable to one or the other community. Finally, eliminating any reference to a possible future triple condominium for the

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island, Spaak proposed that only after the seven-year period of the interim regime was over would a final solution be sought for, and this final solution would have to be agreed upon by the three governments concerned. 21 At noon, August 6, Sir Roger Allen informed Averoff-Tossizza that Macmillan intended to arrive in Athens next day for a two-day conference. Averoff-Tossizza replied he would certainly confer with Premier Karamanlis about this, but could tell Sir Roger in advance that if Macmillan was coming in order to persuade the Greek government to accept his plan, his visit would be in vain. Sir Roger replied that "we were marching toward disaster. This was the last hope." In the afternoon, a message from Macmillan himself was received in Athens. He was arriving, Macmillan said, in a last effort to reach an understanding. Then he would go to Turkey to meet Menderes. Sir Hugh Foot was to join Macmillan in Athens. In a London airport statement before leaving for Athens next day, Macmillan recalled that the Greek and Turkish Premiers had sent affirmative replies to his suggestions for personal meetings with each. He expressed gladness at their quick response to his proposal for summit talks and at the appeals the Premiers had issued for a cessation of bloodshed in Cyprus. Although the first thing to do was to end the bloodshed and misery in the island and he did not know whether his talks in Greece and Turkey would lead to a final, detailed, comprehensive agreement on every point or to a final agreement on the future of Cyprus, he hoped, he said, for a broad understanding about the immediate future. The evening of August 7, Macmillan arrived in Athens, which he described as the most beautiful and famous city in the world. Karamanlis cordially greeted him at Elliniko airport where both political leaders, the Greek more laconically than the Britisher, expressed hope about Cyprus developments.22 The day before — August 6 — Ethnarch Makarios had conferred on the new developments with the Greek Foreign Minister, at the latter's invitation. 23 Averoff-Tossizza had stressed to him that the situation had 21

Since he succeeded Lord Ismay as Secretary-General of NATO in May 1957, Spaak had shown considerable interest in the Cyprus question (Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 107, 136-137, 140, 155, 163, 169, 175, 186-187, 242-246, 267-270, and 506). 22 Times, August 9, 1958. 23 Other officials present at this meeting were Ambassador George Christopoulos, Director of the First Political Directorate; D . Bitsios, Counsellor of Embassy, in charge of Cyprus affairs; and P. Molyviatis, attaché, who kept the minutes.

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reached an extremely critical point. He told Makarios that in his talk with the British Ambassador on August 4, he had explained, nonetheless, that though the Greek government was aware of the possible disasters and of the gravity of the situation in the Near East, it was firmly decided not to go beyond certain limits in concessions. Sir Roger's reply, he said, had been disheartening. The Turkish factor existed. It absolutely could not be ignored. The Macmillan plan aimed at overcoming the Turkish demand for partition, Sir Roger had said. Matters stood thus, when he — Averoff-Tossizza — learned of Grivas' new truce. Personally he rejoiced, because, whereas EOKA had made its presence felt by its action, the continuation of its action was likely to be harmful, because of very unfavorable effects on international public opinion. The Turks, of course, had committed even worse acts. Unfortunately, the press had written very little about these. After telling Makarios about how he had learned of Macmillan's impending arrival in Athens, Averoff-Tossizza explained that he had called him in order to express his own fears about the situation. "We are facing many dangers. The British Ambassador told me that if there is no agreement, we shall find ourselves either before partition or the implementation of the British plan without Greece." To this he had reacted violently by saying that the relations of Greece with Britain and Turkey would then reach a dead end. With regard to the U.S. attitude, Averoff-Tossizza said, it was something more than indifference toward Greece. The proof of this was that the Americans had let the opportunities slip by — the events in Baghdad and the loan to the Turks 24 — without trying to press the Turkish government. "We have been abandoned." He feared "we are proceeding toward extremely unpleasant situations". Perhaps Macmillan's visit gave a small hope. At any rate, he had to tell Makarios that the Greek government shared these fears. Concretely, he himself feared the possibility of an imposed partition or the implementation of the plan. What did the Ethnarch think about the situation? The Ethnarch countered by asking Averoff-Tossizza what he thought about the situation and an exchange of views followed, which was inter-

34

On August 3,1958, the Turkish government announced that Turkey would receive $359 million in economic assistance ($234 million from U.S foreign aid programs; $25 million from the International Monetary Fund; and $100 million from European members of the OEEO. In return Turkey promised financial reforms.

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spersed at certain points with questions and remarks by the two Greek diplomats who were present at this conference.25 In the course of this exchange of views, Averoff-Tossizza recounted that during his Paris visit, in connection with NATO's discussions of the Cyprus question, Spaak had been favorably disposed toward the Greeks and angry at the Turks. In the view of NATO's Secretary-General, if the proposals for representatives of Greece and Turkey and a condominium after the seven-year period were eliminated from the Macmillan plan, the Greeks should accept it, with a few changes. Spaak, on the other hand, warmly upheld that the Greeks should accept the two communal Houses of Representatives, but with a strict definition of their powers. He himself, AverofF-Tossizza explained, agreed that the Macmillan plan would be acceptable if the idea of partnership was dropped and a single House of Representatives was set up or at any rate two Houses with strictly defined powers. The problem was: what concessions could one make in order to halt the unpalatable developments without recognizing any rights of the Turkish government? Makarios, on his side, likewise rejected the idea of partnership. If the British dropped this idea, there would be a wide margin for discussion. What he would accept, he said, would be a regime of self-government. In the relevant talks with the British on this matter, he would raise no difficulties, even though the outcome might not really be a constitution of self-government. He thought the British would have no objections to such a proposal. He also said that if the British did not go ahead with their plan as it was, but offered to amend it, he could not accept the two Houses of Representatives. On the other hand, at a later point in this exchange, Makarios said that if the two Houses were accepted, as Spaak had urged, it would be necessary to define what community matters would be left out of the powers of the two Houses. On the condominium, he agreed that no concession should be made. Not rejecting but accepting the Macmillan plan as a basis for discussion and seeking improvements in it (a tactic that one of the Greek diplomats present had suggested as desirable) would depend on the extent of the improvements to the plan.

25

Christopoulos, for example, asked Makarios whether he did not fear a unilateral implementation of the Macmillan plan. Bitsios suggested that one might seek for a provisional arrangement that made no mention of the future. Thus the notion of a condominium would automatically be removed, together with the presence of the two government representatives.

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If, for instance, the amendments Bevan had proposed were accepted, then surely he would have no objections. 26 With regard to Averoff-Tossizza's fears of an imposed partition, Makarios said he shared these fears but not to the same extent as the Foreign Minister. The population movements in Cyprus did not disturb him very much. The Turkish Cypriots were moving mostly as a result of pressures and threats. Those who had moved found themselves in a very difficult position. They were hungry and unhappy, and they would soon return to their homes. He thought partition would be difficult to implement. Although it was not to be excluded, it was, in his view, not to Britain's interest. The Macmillan plan provided only for administrative (not territorial) partition. Moreover, if the British sought to implement their plan, they would be abandoning their concept of partnership, he said in response to a question whether he saw no danger of a unilateral implementation of the plan. While recognizing that the plan's implementation would "lead us to a very difficult situation", he absolutely did not share Averoff-Tossizza's fears lest the British find Greek Cypriots willing to cooperate with them in the plan's implementation. And, if the British did that, "we shall react with all means". But, what disturbed him, said Makarios, was passive resistance. On this "we have goofed". Because of it, economic hardship had occurred. This created discontent. Many came to him and complained. When he had sent a message to "Dighenis" telling him not to insist on passive resistance and suggesting that he was receiving inaccurate reports from his EOKA section leaders about the effectiveness of passive resistance, boycotts, etc., relations with Grivas had cooled. 27 Averoff-Tossizza, on the other hand, feared the results of continued bloodshed in Cyprus. He thought the Greek Cypriots would be unable to withstand such a situation for long. Active resistance, he believed, would have a worse effect than passive resistance, because if assassinations, arson, and looting continued daily, the morale of the Cypriots would bend. According to his information, persons would be found who would be willing to cooperate with the British for implementing their plan. Foreign Minister and Ethnarch also disagreed over the timeliness of Grivas' truce. Makarios had the impression that, though it had aided the meeting with Macmillan, it had been untimely. The Turkish Cypriots 29

See above, Chapter i n , p. 151. Bevan favored a provision for an elected Chamber where the Greek and Turkish Cypriots could meet and discuss common affairs. See above, Chapter i n , p. 142.

27

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should have been taught a few more lessons, so that it would not seem as though the truce had been declared from a position of weakness. Averoff-Tossizza, however, thought the truce had been proclaimed from a position of strength. With regard to Macmillan's imminent visit, the Foreign Minister had the impression that the British Premier was really trying to find a solution to the Cyprus question. However, he once again drew Makarios' attention to the fact that Turkey, at the moment, was the pivot of Western policy in the Near and Middle East and dominated British and American policy in the Near and Middle East. Makarios agreed that this was so with regard to British and American Near and Middle Eastern policies, and recognized that Turkey, because of its location, enjoyed certain advantages. However, he did not think Turkey was strong enough a factor in Cyprus "because we could destroy everything on the island". Averoff-Tossizza took strong exception to this remark of the Ethnarch. In his view, the Cyprus question was Britain's umpteenth care, and, he reiterated, he did not believe the islanders could stand the strain much longer. The essential thing, said the Greek Foreign Minister, was to escape from this difficult situation. He feared that one might even have to face revolution. His view was that one should make the maximum of concessions without, however, creating rights for Turkey. Greece, he observed, had become so isolated in the Cyprus question that friends, such as the Germans, had told him that the Greeks ought not to ignore the Turkish views. In conclusion, he repeated that the line that should be followed consisted in finding a way out of this difficult situation, retreating up to the point, but not beyond, where "we shall grant rights to the Turks". The Ethnarch registered no disagreement.

B. THE MACMILLAN-KARAMANLIS SUMMIT CONFERENCE

During the British-Greek summit conference of August 8-9, 1958 in Athens, three meetings took place. At the first, which lasted three and a half hours on August 8 (10:30 a.m.-2:00 p.m.) each "Central Decisionmaker" presented at some length his views on the Cyprus situation and the Macmillan plan. The British Premier, in his difficult multiple role as negotiator for Britain and mediator and conciliator between Greece and Turkey, if not as spokesman for the latter, started out. After the Greek Premier's exposition in general terms, he made a rejoinder. In conclusion he asked Karamanlis to present at their next meeting the concrete points

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which, in the Greek government's view, ran counter to the objectives on which both were in agreement. Karamanlis did so at the second, the afternoon meeting of August 8, which lasted four hours (4:00-8:00 p.m.). Shorter exchanges occurred toward the end of this meeting, with Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza and, on one occasion, even the interpreting Greek diplomat, 28 intervening. During the third meeting, of August 9, which lasted two hours (11:00 a.m.-l:00 p.m.), the Greek Premier reaffirmed, with the slightest of modifications, his stand on the Macmillan plan and the British Premier presented his reaction to the Greek objections, terming some more manageable than others, always referring to the matter of the Turkish government's attitude, known, hypothetical, or admittedly or allegedly unknown, and thanking Karamanlis for helping him better to understand the Greek viewpoint. The Greek government was not aware, nor was it made aware during this summit conference, that on July 29,1958, during the Baghdad Council meeting in London, Menderes and Zorlu had informed Macmillan in an ultrasecret meeting with him that his plan was statesmanlike, fair, honorable, and well balanced and that the Turkish government accepted it in full. The Greek government, therefore, should, in their view, be prevented from obtaining any amendments to it because the slightest change in the plan would upset its balance and mar its symmetry. If Britain proceeded to the plan's full implementation, Turkey would drop all its other claims, such as partition and military bases, and it would call off all violence. During the long and confused discussion that followed this astonishing Turkish volte-face, Macmillan had sought to retain the right to discuss and perhaps accept certain Greek amendments to his plan. Finally, a short note had been prepared, summarizing the discussion and constituting a sort of "gentlemen's agreement". Menderes and Zorlu, however, were not satisfied with it. Next day, ostensibly to bid goodbye to Macmillan, they came up with a far more binding paper in the form of a minute of the previous day's discussion prepared by the Turkish side. This paper introduced the concept of "no amendment" to the Macmillan plan. The Foreign Office found it unacceptable. Macmillan expressed amazement and some resentment at this new Turkish move. He refused to initial this paper. He finally made it clear to Menderes that if he had to ask the Turkish government to consider amendments to 28

Counsellor Bitsios. Others present at these meetings, on the Greek side, were Ambassador Seferiadis, G. Christopoulos; and, on the British side, Sir Roger Allen; Under-Secretary of State Ross; Governor Foot; E. Melville, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office; and F. A. Bishop, Secretary to Macmillan.

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his plan after meeting with Greek government leaders, he would not hold it to its acceptance of the British plan. The outcome was that the Turkish draft which attempted to put the "gentlemen's agreement" into legal form, was torn up. 29 1. First

Meeting

At the first of the Athens meetings, the British Premier, at the Greek Premier's invitation, presented his views, after listening to the welcoming words of Karamanlis, who said that Macmillan's affection and sympathy for Greece were known to the Greek people and expressed appreciation for his initiative in coming to Athens, even though the necessary diplomatic preparation had not taken place. For many reasons he was happy, Macmillan said, to make this trip. Without underestimating the art of diplomacy, he had come to Athens to talk frankly and discuss directly. The task he had undertaken was difficult. He hoped this would be understood. The situation was very tangled. In Ankara he would hear arguments opposed to those presented in Athens. One should ascertain whether it was possible even now to find a solution, perhaps an interim solution, that would be important for world peace — a duty he was aware of — and more particularly for "each of our countries". The best thing to do that morning, Macmillan proposed, was to conduct a general discussion to see whether means might be found for bringing together the views of both sides. Accordingly he would explain what he and his colleagues were thinking. After expressing his happiness in coming again to Greece; recalling the last time, in December 1944, he had been in Athens, with Churchill among cheering crowds; 30 and underlining the close ties of friendship between Britain and Greece, Macmillan expressed regret that the Cyprus problem should have arisen between both countries. No one, he said, would be happy until, at least an interim, if not a final solution was found. Unfortunately, despite hopes entertained toward the end of World War II, the world was split into the communist bloc and the West. Every problem had to be faced within the framework of this situation. The »

Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 672-674, and 679. This Athens visit of Churchill and Macmillan, then British Resident Minister in the Middle East, had taken place at Christmas 1944 in an effort to find a political solution to the civil strife which had broken out earlier that month when the communist-led guerrillas had tried to seize power in Athens. For this, see H. Macmillan, The Blast of War 1939-1945 (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 504-554.

80

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Greeks were suffering pressures on their frontiers and facing communism internally. The same happened with many other states of the West. Were he the Kremlin's leading mind, he would be delighted at disarray among the allies. Two or three more generations would have to face the problem of the current confrontation. His heart was shattered when he saw friends quarreling instead of being united. If he had come to Athens, it was to see whether the only matter that caused division could be settled. In the Cyprus question, Macmillan acknowledged, "all of us have made mistakes". Both the British and the Greeks had missed many opportunities for dealing with it before passions were inflamed. "If all of us had been more flexible or if we could have foreseen what was to follow", some of the proposals could have been accepted — the Radcliffe Constitution plan, 3 1 for instance. Pity the Greeks had not accepted it. But Britain, he added, had also made mistakes. But the situation had to be faced as it was today. His plan, Macmillan hoped, was a way for dealing with it. Its basic points, were, first, to ensure a period of tranquility on the island. To achieve this, the firm determination of all was required and a period of, say, seven years, which would be long enough to allow the island's population to play some role and short enough not to disappoint the hopes for the future. After that, a final settlement would have to be given. During the period of pacification, constructive work should be carried out and all extreme sol utions excluded "which would prejudge the final solution. At that period's end, moods might have changed and solutions found. Having been in politics for thirty-five years, he knew that men could not be asked to drop their goals and that human sentiments could not be ignored. In England, for example, the Labour Party had never dropped its goal of full nationalization, yet, when in power, it had done little to advance toward it. Britain, in the Cyprus question, was facing two goals: enosis, namely annexation, on the one hand, and the determination to prevent this even by force and to achieve partition by all means, on the other. It had tried all sorts of plans and at moments had hoped. It had discussed the possibility of a small Turkish base of a symbolic character, 32 but, frankly, 31

The main reason for the Greek government's rejection of these proposals was that Lennox-Boyd, in presenting them to the Commons on December 19, 1956, had stated that if in the future the Greek Cypriots wanted the application of self-determination with a view to achieving enosis, the Turkish Cypriots should be allowed to decide separately their own future. 32 See above, Chapter II, p. 96, about the Turkish views put forward by Lloyd during his Athens visit in February 1958.

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the Turks wanted a large, not merely a symbolic base. This would be a factor of war, because through this base Turkey could channel troops and arms to the island. With his colleagues, therefore, he had discussed a policy which would exclude partition, Macmillan went on to say. Partition would be fatal to Cyprus both because of the island's small size and its mixed population. Besides it, too, enclosed the germs of war and not the olive branch. On the other hand, because of the Turkish views toward enosis, to transfer the island's sovereignty from Britain to Greece was impossible. His desire to explain to the Greeks these ideas which were difficult to express in diplomatic documents motivated his visit to Athens. In addition to these two extremist positions, there was the British position. This was limited to military installations in Cyprus. How could one conciliate these three positions? Macmillan and his colleagues had thought that if the three governments could not fully satisfy their claims, they might, at least for the time being, cooperate so as to avoid armed rupture. Thus, they had conceived of partnership. And, knowing the Greek difficulties in accepting this concept, "we therefore proposed a period of seven years, with the rights of all reserved during this period". The British government had not hesitated to use the term "partnership" because in the great struggle that was being waged between the two blocs, events were leading toward partnership. Who, toward the end of World War II, would have imagined that Britain would be keeping 45,000 soldiers on German soil to protect Germany or that it would have accepted U.S. bombers on its territory? Was not NATO another example of partnership? Two hundred years after the Declaration of Independence, was not the U.S. President "concluding an agreement of interdependence with us"? 3 3 Summing up, Macmillan said that what was required was a seven-year period of tranquility, of armistice; the maintenance of an open future and the postponement of a final solution without any yielding of basic positions, and with both partition and enosis excluded during this interim period, but with British efforts to persuade the Turks to drop the idea of partition or of channeling Turkish troops to the island through a

33

In March 21-24,1957, Macmillan had met Eisenhower in Bermuda and had renewed the special U.S.-British relationship which had been jolted during the Suez affair of 1956. The two agreed on the deployment of a number of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in Britain. In his memoirs, Macmillan writes he referred to interdependence at the second Athens meeting (Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 676-677).

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military base on Cyprus; the application, finally, of a high degree of selfgovernment within the framework of partnership. The idea of a triple condominium after the seven-year period which he had mentioned in the House of Commons, Macmillan now explained, was not the solution the British government was pressing. It was merely the suggested British contribution to the final solution. He said this because he feared he had been misunderstood as presenting triple condominium as the sole solution. During the interim seven-year period of self-government, Macmillan continued, the two Houses of Representatives would be set up for dealing with community questions of a religious and educational character which both communities were already handling separately, and which constituted about 20-25 per cent of the total affairs of government. In the Governor's Council, which would consist of representatives chosen by the two Houses, the Greeks, because of their permanent majority of four Greeks to two Turks, would freely handle noncommunal questions. Since defense and external relations would be the Governor's competence, together with internal security, at least during the outset of self-government, the Greeks thus would have full control of other, general matters, whereas the Turks would control only their own community affairs, namely their religious, educational and, he added, social questions, without explaining the character of the latter, although at this point of the presentation, Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza, in one of his rare interventions in the summit conference, asked for a clarification of "social questions". 34 Macmillan (though told by the Turks that they liked his plan) said he doubted the Turks would accept the above arrangement, because, though they would have control only over their community affairs, they would constitute a permanent minority in the Council and would be asked to drop their claim for a base and for territorial partition. Therefore they should be granted certain guarantees. For this purpose two measures should be taken: First, because there would be a written Constitution, a Supreme Court would be set up. To this Court one would be able to resort if one believed oneself unfairly treated. 35 Such a measure favored both sides.36 Second, Greece and Turkey would have one representative

34

In reply to this question, Macmillan said this was a matter of detail to be settled later. 35 Macmillan asserted that this institution also existed in the United States, having in mind the U.S. Supreme Court. 36 The Radcliffe Constitutional proposals provided for a Tribunal of Guarantees.

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each on the Council who could watch over the interests of their respective governments. Macmillan then mentioned that the Greek Cypriots, finally, would be able, if they so wished, to acquire also Greek nationality. Of course, the same would apply to the Turks. The institution of double nationality, he maintained, was in harmony with contemporary developments in International Law. It favored, in this instance, the Greek Cypriots, because 60,000 of them resided in Britain. Those having double nationality would serve in the Army of one country only. 37 He and his colleagues, Macmillan assured Karamanlis, had discussed all other solutions. In the past, he reiterated, many opportunities had been missed. But reverting to the past was the task of historians, not of politicians. The situation had to be faced as it was now. "We must, despite difficulties, prevent it from developing into a catastrophe." He was grateful to Karamanlis for his appeal against the use of force. "We, the Free Peoples, have to fight communism, not each other." A fresh start, based on the principles of the plan he had outlined, should be made. He recognized the difficulties of implementing partnership, because he knew of the centuries-old struggle between Greeks and Turks. History could not be set aside. But if this was not done, he saw no future for Europe and the Free World. Postwar trends led to international cooperation. The conciliation of France and Germany was the greatest development. 38 If in Cyprus, beyond partnership there was nothing but partition, war, and bloodshed, the Greek government should carefully study the British proposal, Macmillan emphasized. 39 When visiting Ankara, Macmillan said he would tell the Turks that they could have neither partition nor a base in Cyprus nor any greater participation in the island's government beyond the British plan's provisions. In conclusion, Macmillan apologized for his long introduction but, 37

In this connection Macmillan mentioned that laws and rules on such matters easily changed in Britain. When he was young, he said, no one could join the British diplomatic service unless two previous generations of the candidate were British subjects. Thus, both Churchill and he himself had been excluded from the Foreign Office. This law, however, was no longer valid. The laws on nationality often changed. 38 Here Macmillan also referred to the cooperation between Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, and Alcide De Gas peri as inaugurating a new and hopeful era. He had followed its beginning in 1947 at Strasbourg, where there was no representative of Germany. Churchill, after a six-year war, had stated that Germany, too, ought to be represented. 39 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 676-677, asserts he made this and the previous point at the third meeting of the Athens summit conference. This perhaps is a case of historic licence or his assistant's sloppiness.

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he said, he wanted clearly to present his ideas and his feelings. He desired the restoration of Britain's old friendship with Greece and believed the Greek people wanted the same. In the previous years, many opportunities had been missed. Here now was another opportunity. He asked the Greek government to study the plan well, so that the opportunity should not be missed. The proposal was honorable. It shunted final ambitions into halflight. He believed that "our friends and allies in the Old and New World desire to see us leading the problem toward better, albeit provisional conditions. I would like you to appreciate the intentions that motivated us in formulating our plan." Incidentally, in this speech and in his subsequent statements, Macmillan altogether ignored Averoff-Tossizza's bold ideas for dealing with the Cyprus question by granting independence to the island for a number of years — ideas akin to those Karamanlis himself had imparted to Foreign Secretary Lloyd during their February meeting. 40 But neither did the Greek Premier refer to these ideas during this summit conference with his British opposite number. In his opening, general statement, Karamanlis responded to Macmillan's remarks about British-Greek relations by saying that the Greek government and the Greek people desired to strengthen the friendship and cooperation between Greece and Britain which existed in the past. Hence the Greek government wanted to find a way for settling the Cyprus question. Greece's attitude in the Cyprus question, he assured Macmillan, was inspired by no hostile feelings against the British people even after everything that had happened in Cyprus. The Greek people vividly remembered the past cooperation with Britain and well knew that this cooperation would be useful for themselves in the future, and that it was to Greek interest that a strong Britain should exist. Greece's position in the Cyprus question was dictated only by moral duty toward the Cypriots, not by feelings of hostility toward Britain. Karamanlis agreed with Macmillan's remarks about the international situation and the dangers of communism. Greece, because of its geographic location, felt this danger more intensely. For an effective confrontation of this danger, reciprocal respect in international relations was required, however. Without reference to the concrete case of Cyprus, he believed that the Free World was not sufficiently inspired by principles and this constituted its weakness. It did not realize that a new spirit pervaded the postwar world. 40

See above, Chapter II, p. 102.

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With regard to the Cyprus problem itself, Karamanlis denied he wished to refer to the past in order to prove that the Greek side had made fewer mistakes than the British side. He observed, nonetheless, that the Cypriots for several years had turned to Greek governments which had refused to espouse their cause because of a desire not to come to a rupture with Britain. 41 Because of this, Greece had been accused of neglecting a historic duty. But, he added, history, as Macmillan had said, was the work of historians. If he had invoked it, he had done so to prove Greek good faith in the past, the present, and the future, as well as to support his contention that Greece had no hostile intentions toward Britain. Karamanlis fully agreed with Macmillan that it was urgent to relieve the Cyprus question of its current inflamed state. Tension and fanaticism in Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey rendered difficult any solution. But, whereas in Greece fanaticism was spontaneous, in Turkey it was artificially stimulated. But the fact was that it existed. Also involved was the prestige of the three governments. This added to the complexity of a matter which, in his opinion, was quite simple, if it could be removed from its current tense climate. The matter was simple, because nobody, not even the British government, denied the right of a people to determine its own future. The question was one of right and justice, with certain political calculations and interests preventing a settlement. Even those who denied the right of self-determination did not do so because they did not believe in this right but because they invoked their interests. The problem, however, could easily be solved, if it were possible to satisfy this right, as well as the special rights. The Cyprus complications had occurred because of poor handling and misunderstandings. The question would have been difficult, had Greece belonged to another coalition. However, since it belonged to NATO and was linked to Turkey by an alliance, the matter was simple. A natural solution to the problem would be found, if, he repeated, the question was taken out of its climate of current tension and fanaticism. To help everyone to get out of this dead end, his government, by its policy of moderation, Karamanlis contended, had done all it could for three years. Though supporting a just cause, it had made sacrifices because it was aware of the question's difficulties. It had done likewise when the new British plan had been announced, by accepting the proposal of an interim solution, leaving the future open, even though a Greek

41

Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 6-9, and 133-134.

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Parliament resolution committed the government to insistence on the demand for self-determination within a specific time. The Greek government, however, disagreed with the nature of the interim regime outlined in the new British plan; it believed this plan would not lead to ends which both Greece and Britain desired: the creation, namely, of an interim regime that would not prejudge the future, would bring pacification, and restore the old British-Greek friendship. "Although you were utterly persuasive for anyone who does not know the question as well as we do, I am obliged to tell you that this plan not only does not lead to these objectives but renders impossible their fulfillment." The new plan, Karamanlis feared, complicated matters to such an extent as to create greater tension than before both in the island and in Greek-British relations. He was not discussing the question, he assured Macmillan, in order to gain more or less for his views but in order to draw his attention to the danger lest the question become still more tangled than before. As long as the final solution remained open, and the island's government and population knew this, it was natural that during the interim regime, antagonism would arise. That was why, he was sorry to say, he absolutely could not agree with Macmillan's view that his plan would achieve pacification and the improvement of Greek-British relations. The interim regime should therefore be simpler, Karamanlis went on to say. Elements that created a difficult psychological climate ought not be introduced into the plan, if preconditions for pacification were to be created. Without ignoring the difficulties, he wondered why would it not be possible for simple self-government, with the participation of the island's population, to function perfectly well under the British government's responsibility, without any interference by Greece and Turkey, so that the complications he feared might be avoided. Finally, in order to lead to pacification, the interim regime should include as many unifying elements as possible and eschew as many divisive elements as possible. This could be more easily achieved if the interim regime were simple and limited to the British government and the Cypriot people. The idea of cooperation among free peoples was indeed correct in dealing with communism, but in the concrete case of Cyprus, partnership, instead of being a solution, would complicate matters even more. For these reasons he had written to Macmillan (in his letters of June 21 and especially July 31) that efforts should be exerted to find means that would not complicate the situation. The British view, he believed, should

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be revised in the light of the dangers which certain points of the plan created for the present and the future. The Greek government always tried to help in finding a solution and consulted the British government. He urged Macmillan to consider his (Karamanlis') position. Certain provisions of the plan contained dangers and therefore he had to insist on their deletion. His view was not due to intransigence but to his conviction that the proposed procedure would not achieve the end he really desired to achieve. To prove the sincerity of his desire, Karamanlis invoked the fact that for three years he had handled the matter with moderation and courage against Greek public opinion. It would be to the interest of any politician to appear as a demagogue in a national question which excited everybody. Indeed, it was a great temptation to respond to the public opinion of one's own country. Everybody knew, however, that he had acted against popularity. He had done so because he appreciated the need of settling the question and realized the dangers of its remaining in suspense. In itself, Cyprus might be a small or a big question, depending on the viewpoint. Its repercussions, however, were disproportionately greater. It had already dealt a lethal blow to the Balkan Pact which was indispensable for the equilibrium in the Balkans. It had created discord in NATO and aroused an anti-Western spirit in Greece. The increased percentage of Left Wing votes in the last elections had been to a major extent due to the dissatisfaction created by the Cyprus question and to its exploitation. The psychological climate was shaping up to the USSR's advantage. There was danger in the future "lest the question escape our control". Aware of this danger, he had followed for three years a policy aimed at achieving an understanding. His position toward the British plan was taken with full awareness of the dangers and was based on a desire to prevent a worsening of the situation. Macmillan had spoken about the difficulties the British government faced on the Turkish side. Karamanlis did not wish to criticize the position taken by the Turkish government and its tactics. He wished, however, to stress that Britain bore the prime responsibility for Cyprus and, without ignoring the need to take into account the Turkish interests, he believed that the British government, because of this responsibility, should appreciate the value of these interests on the basis of reasonable and moral criteria. Karamanlis said he hoped Macmillan would consider his remarks with the same full spirit of understanding the Greek government and he himself had shown in studying the British views. He earnestly wanted to help in finding a way out of this dead end. Were he not utterly convinced that

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after a week the proposed Cyprus solution, if applied, would collapse, he would have no difficulty in accepting Macmillan's plan, in order to please him. If it were simply a matter of personal courage, he would do so. "We have the same desires and purposes but there is a different estimation of the course that should be followed in order to achieve and fulfill them. Therein lies our difference." He asked Macmillan, as the Premier of a great country, to understand the Greek difficulties and set aside its differences with the Greek government. In this particular case of Cyprus, Macmillan could do more than he — Karamanlis — could. Responding to Karamanlis' statement, Premier Macmillan thanked him for his presentation of the Greek viewpoint, for the spirit in which he had spoken and for the moderation he generally showed in public, not only in conference. He was well aware of the popular pressures to which a democratic government was subjected. After hearing this presentation, he considered that "we understand each other's views". Agreement existed, Macmillan observed, that, regardless of any final solution, there should be an interim regime, the character of which ought to be positive and constructive and not obstruct a future solution of one kind or another. This was important for both Greece and Turkey. And the British people would be satisfied in hoping that a solution to the Cyprus problem would be found. For Britain, Cyprus was not a mere colonial issue. If it were, it would have been solved ages ago. As the examples of India, Ghana, or Singapore showed, Britain always developed the right of people to settle their own future. If Cyprus were an island in the Pacific, no difficulty would exist. But one had to face reality. The problem was complex because of the island's location, the character of its people, and the long conflict between Greeks and Turks. He invoked the Greek Premier's sympathy for the difficult task he had to accomplish. Macmillan thought he could persuade the Turks to agree on an interim solution. For it would mean preserving the aims of both sides, namely the demands of the Greek Cypriots for enosis through a plebiscite, and the demand of the Turks for partition in this event. Turkey, he observed, had forcefully promoted the concept of partition which, no matter how bad it might be, had been de facto imposed in Korea, Kashmir, Palestine. Both the Greek government and he himself considered partition a measure of despair. He would have to persuade the Turks to drop it, though its application in other cases constituted an argument in its favor. With regard to the interim regime outlined in the British plan, Macmillan said that it was based on the thought that the Turkish presence on Cyprus was a fact. The Greek government maintained that this

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interim constitution should not prejudge any solution. But the Turkish government used the same argument. It held that the regime outlined prejudged the future, so long as it contained no features in favor of Turkey, whereas it provided for a unitary Council and was based on the concept of unity. The second point — the pacification of the island — could be solved only through the cooperation of all parties concerned. The Turks charged Britain with not protecting them. The Greeks made similar charges against Britain about the Greek Cypriots. But it was impossible to keep order and peace between two warring groups, even if 50,000 British soldiers were available in Cyprus. Britain had no effective means at its disposal. Only measures such as those the Russians had used in Poland and Hungary or the Nazis in occupied Europe during the war — or the communists in Greece 42 — might help in keeping order. "Let us not delude ourselves", said Macmillan, "that peace can be maintained if the three governments and the leaders of Cyprus do not agree on a plan which, though it may not be fully to their liking, they may at least tolerate". In conclusion, the British Premier proposed another meeting for the afternoon in which the Greek Premier might present the points which he believed ran counter to the British aims. Thus, it would be possible to discuss these points next day so that on leaving Athens, Macmillan would know that certain points had been isolated. Then Macmillan read the text of a release he would give to journalists for their unofficial guidance.43 2. Second

Meeting

Starting out the discussion at the summit conference's second meeting, the afternoon of August 8, Karamanlis said that the Cypriot people and the Greek government had been seeking a final solution in accordance with principles the British government had accepted earlier. However, because the question had become so tangled, he had agreed with the British view that an interim government should be achieved which "would

42

In this connection, Macmillan mentioned that when he had visited Athens in December 1944, he had seen 1,500 corpses of persons killed by the communists in mass executions. See also Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 532. 43 In this guidance, Macmillan made it known that the two Premiers had discussed fully the situation in Cyprus with regard to problems having special importance and that the discussions would continue at the next meeting.

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extricate us from this dead end". 44 This regime should not prejudge the future and should bring about pacification. In the Greek view, it was possible to set up an interim regime through talks between the British government and the Cypriots without the intervention of any other government. This would leave the future open. This procedure was in accordance with earlier and recent views of the British government.45 He could not understand why what was possible two or three years ago was now considered impossible. Of course, meantime the Turks had been putting forward their claims but did they thus obtain rights they did not have one or two years earlier? He did not overlook the need of covering the Turkish side nor did he ask the British government to take decisions unfair to Turkey. But he could not accept decisions unfair to Greece. Justice was the criterion the British government could and should apply. The British plan was, continued Karamanlis, the worst of all the plans proposed by Britain in the past. It complicated the Cyprus question even more; its implementation would surely lead to undesirable developments and new adventures. The provision for the cooperation of the three governments would not help a solution. On the contrary it enclosed new dangers for the future. It was neither necessary nor useful. "You maintained that the representatives of Greece and Turkey are indispensable as a guarantee for the Constitution's application. But the Constitution itself, the Supreme Court, the British government and you yourself guarantee the rights of each community... Allow me to insist that in the interim neither Athens nor Ankara must interfere." When the Constitution was prepared, the British government should have the responsibility of applying it. To lead to pacification, Karamanlis went on to say, the interim regime should have as few possible divisive elements and as many as possible unitary elements. The proposed two Houses psychologically fostered division. A single House, on the other hand, would cultivate a spirit of unity, add positive elements to the solution and become an important factor in the system. It should be set up, even if the provision of the two Houses was not dropped. 44

Averoff-Tossizza and Makarios, the day before, had agreed that this was the problem in a nutshell. The earlier views referred to were those of October 1955-March 1956, when Governor Harding and Makarios had conducted negotiations for self-government and selfdetermination. Originally, i.e. before 1955, the British government had maintained that the Cyprus question was purely a matter of domestic jurisdiction, affecting only itself and the Ethnarchy. 45

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With regard to the representation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the Council, Karamanlis observed that the percentage of participation should strictly correspond to the ratio between Greeks and Turks in the island's population. Otherwise one departed from the principle of democratic representation. The Greek Premier also thought that the provision for double nationality would constitute an additional divisive factor. Those Cypriots who would have an additional Greek or Turkish nationality would develop a different consciousness and a corresponding state of mind and behavior, so that they would continually provoke the intervention of their respective governments. Hence, this provision, too, would not be constructive but would lead to adventures and promote division. For all these reasons, the adoption of the above provisions, Karamanlis maintained, would lead to new complications instead of simplifying matters. In addition, it would lead to a regime that was not bereft of elements that prejudged the future. In the morning, the British Premier had spoken about the difficulties he met with in trying to persuade the Turks to give up their demands. "Allow me to repeat", said Karamanlis, "that anybody can formulate claims, but he who bears responsibility in the matter will have to judge these claims on the basis of certain principles." Concessions had already been made to Turkey. By the Greek position adopted, self-determination, which for years had been the aim of the Greek Cypriots, had been left open. This ought to satisfy the Turks who two years earlier had accepted solutions which were far more favorable to the Greeks than the Macmillan plan. 46 Consequently, Turkey should not appear intransigent today (for reasons he preferred not to mention) 47 and constitute a decisive factor in the Cyprus question. He saw no reason for contention with Turkey. The British government bore the responsibility in Cyprus and had the power to deal with Turkey. Reasonable solutions should not be shelved because of Turkey's intransigence. The Greek government, on the other hand, was assuming a responsible attitude and would like to find understanding on the British government's part. After thanking the Greek Premier for his presentation, Premier Macmillan replied he desired to recall certain cruel facts he had mentioned in the morning: a situation had been created which affected the NATO's stability and Greek-Turkish relations. This should be overcome. He fully 49

At first, the Turkish government did not reject the Radcliffe plan of December 1956. During the conversations with Lloyd in February 1958, the Greek officials had said that a combination of imperialism with domestic reasons motivated the Turkish government in its Cyprus policy. See above, Chapter n , p. 94.

47

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recognized the importance of the Greek government's view about the need for pacification and an interim solution. It was true that in the past there had been proposals which, if accepted, would have contributed to a solution. But, if another opportunity were missed, the results would be bad. The British government, Macmillan reiterated, had tried to find a plan that answered two needs: pacification and an interim regime. Both Greece and Turkey had reacted to this plan in a hostile way. He could not tell whether, during his visit to Ankara, hostile demonstrations would be repeated but he did not doubt the Turks would find certain bad points and certain good points in the plan. 48 What displeased the Greeks would please the Turks. Four factors had to be pleased: the governments of Greece and Turkey, and the Greek and Turkish leaders of Cyprus. That was the problem. The Greek Premier, he realized, was antipathetic to what the British government called partnership, because he believed that Greece would have obtained fewer advantages than Turkey at the next stage. But the opposite, too, could happen. No peace on the island and no cooperation "between our countries" could be achieved, unless a solution were found that was fair to all parties. After passions abated and cooperation was practiced, the final solution would become more attainable. He found nothing repugnant in the NATO view that a solution of this difficult problem should be found through the cooperation of the three states. He realized the Greek anxieties and agreed that the interim regime should include no elements that prejudged the future. Reverting to the problem of defending the new plan in Ankara, Macmillan said, he would have to use the opposite arguments there. The first point was to achieve peace. For this purpose the agreement of the four factors he had mentioned was necessary. The second point was to start the functioning of a governmental mechanism working on a temporary and empirical basis. Third, foreign policy, defense, and internal security (the latter for the time being) would have to be in the Governor's hands. Concurrently, the building of elements of self-government would have to start. Although the Radcliffe Constitution had been suitable and worthy, he did not think it was practically applicable now. When the Greek Premier interrupted at this point to say that the Radcliffe Plan had been linked to Lennox-Boyd's statement of December 19, 48

A meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council had taken place in July 1958, in London, so that Macmillan already must have had some idea of the Turkish attitude toward his plan, beyond the statement Zorlu had publicly made after the plan's official announcement.

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1956, about possible partition, 4 9 the British Premier replied that the Colonial Secretary's statement applied only in the case of a plebiscite on self-determination. After repeating his view about the inapplicability of the Radcliffe Constitution, he added somewhat cryptically he did not altogether exclude a development in that direction. Any Constitution, no matter how bad it was, could function if the right frame of mind existed. How could one give the Governor the first elements for building selfgovernment? "Let us take the two communities and let each of them elect their representatives." Macmillan recognized that this seemed like division. By limiting, however, the subjects under the jurisdiction of the two Houses of Representatives, although one was building on separate communities, the extent of the division was limited. For the two Houses would handle only matters related to their own communities — about twenty per cent of the affairs of the island. The proposed plan, therefore recognized the division but maintained it at a low level by limiting spheres of competence. At the next level, unity was restored by the setting up of a joint Council under the Governor, to handle 80 per cent of the island's affairs. The ideal, of course, would be to have a single House of Representatives but it was more practical to have two Houses through which, indirectly, the representatives of the population would be chosen for the single Council. It was true, Macmillan acknowledged, that in the Council the proportion should be four to one, to be representative of the population. But at any rate, the Greek Cypriots, through their four representatives against two of the Turkish Cypriots, would have a permanent majority in the Council. Ankara found this monstrous, because it demanded equal representation. Elements of development existed, he added, if the suitable atmosphere was created. Up to that point, then, he believed the plan could be implemented, because, though it divided at the base, it united at the top. And, he added, "we cannot oblige people to agree by force. We can only try to persuade them to cooperate." Coming now to the points to which the Greek Premier objected, Macmillan reiterated the arguments he had made in the morning in favor of double nationality. In case of enosis, he added, he would not like to see the thousands of Cypriots resident in Britain automatically deported 49

In this British commitment to eventual double-self-determination, Lennox-Boyd had said this would be one of the options that the British government would consider when the international strategic situation permitted and self-government had been working satisfactorily (562 H.C. Deb. [5th ser.], 1272).

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to Greece. And he believed, he said, the idea of double nationality should extend to the whole of Europe. Although he understood the Greek fears lest such an institution strengthen the Turkish demands, he doubted this would happen as long as nobody had much to gain or lose by it. His government sincerely believed the Greeks would welcome this idea. Concurrently, it thought it was a small guarantee for the Turks. At any rate, he took note of the Greek objections. Aside from the question of double nationality — perhaps it would also displease the Turks, he had no idea — the most difficult area of disagreement was limited to the two representatives of Greece and Turkey on the Council. This institution, Macmillan explained, was a generous British gesture to show that Britain did not intend to keep the island under a colonial regime, but sought the cooperation of Greece and Turkey, to a certain extent. It went back, he asserted, to the proxenoi — the consuls — which Sparta maintained in Athens and Athens maintained in various other Greek cities, as Thucydides mentioned, to look after their interests. In the Cyprus case, Britain was a third party, thousands of miles away. The representatives of Greece and Turkey on the Council would be present to oversee the Constitution's smooth functioning. The capitulations in Egypt were a somewhat analogous institution. But this institution was a compensation the British government granted to the Greek and Turkish governments for asking them to shelve for the time being enosis, on the one hand, and a military base, 50 on the other. Another thought that lay behind this proposal was that the Cypriots, although British subjects, felt like Greeks and Turks, and looked toward the governments of Greece and Turkey, respectively, for support. One should take into account, Macmillan added, that the two representatives would have no power. Their role would be limited to their being informed and consulted by the Governor. Their task would be to preserve the interests of each country in Cyprus. Their presence was not intended to prejudge the future. They would help the Governor in his work. Responding to the counter-remarks Macmillan made on the Greek objections to his plan, Karamanlis reiterated that "each of us is pursuing the same goals but in a different way". Matters one side regarded as constructive appeared obstructive to the other. The British government put forward double nationality and Greek and Turkish government so Usually, the contrast was made between enosis and partition, not between enosis and a military base. This would suggest either that the British Premier did not favor partition or that he saw in the notion of a military base a solution equivalent to partition that might be more palatable than partition to the Greek government.

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representation on the Council as generous offers. The Greek government believed these offers would lead to complications and rejected them. As long as the Greek government and eighty per cent of the Cypriots, who were essential factors, considered that these offers, instead of normalizing the situation, constituted obstacles, they rejected them. The interference of the Greek and Turkish governments, he repeated, would have undesirable results the Greek government wished to avoid. The greatest proof of the Greek government's good will and restraint in not seeking to obtain an advantageous position in the final round was that it had reached the point of putting enosis aside. If the Greek government rejected the earlier-mentioned points in the British plan, it was not in order to get a better position in the future but because it sincerely believed these points complicated the problem. It desired a solution that would end the present tangle. At this point, Karamanlis invoked the opinion of third parties which had no immediate interest in the Cyprus question. Spaak, he said, had informally taken the initiative of an exchange of views on the question and envisaged a solution simpler than the one provided for in the British plan. Karamanlis invoked this fact, not because it was of decisive importance, but because it proved that third parties, too, had similar reservations and fears about points in the plan the Greek government regarded as objectionable. In all these thoughts about an interim regime, Karamanlis noted further, the fact that the population of Cyprus was eighty per cent Greek was not sufficiently taken into account. Though concerning the interim regime, both sides held views that could be regarded as equally correct, it was natural that the views of the majority should be satisfied. If the British government did not intend to give satisfaction to the Turks, the problem would be far simpler. Of course, he did not claim that it should do injustice to the Turks and take no account of their rightful views. But the British desire to satisfy the Turks ought never to reach the point where an injustice would be committed on the Greek people who by their attitude showed a sincere desire to contribute to a settlement. By accepting in principle the British plan's basic point of seeking for an interim solution and of putting off a final solution for the future in order to contribute to pacification, the Greek government was serving this end. Macmillan then spoke. "We all agree", he said, "on the need to restore peace on the island. But this depends on agreement between the four factors I mentioned earlier." He did not know what the attitude of the Turks would be but thought that after their violent reactions, they might

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be inclined to cooperate. He believed they would ask not for partnership but at least for cooperation instead of partition. This demand should not be rejected. The Greek Premier had said that the two governments should not interfere in the interim regime and that the eighty per cent of the Cypriots should have a greater say in it. "Were Cyprus located west of Greece, we would have conceded it to you as we did with the Ionian islands. But we have to face reality. The existence of the interests of the two governments is a fact. I understand why you reject the idea of the two representatives. You believe that by accepting this point, you recognize the existence of the Turkish interest. But this interest of Turkey exists regardless of whether it is represented on the island. Cyprus lies close to Turkey. It has a strategic significance for Turkey and the Middle East." As for the Spaak exchanges, these were official, Macmillan said. He had read the relevant reports. Spaak had said that the Greek representative to NATO raised serious objections to the provision for two governmental representatives on the Council and that this was the only objection. However, Spaak had not termed this provision as bad. He had merely conveyed the objections of the Greek NATO representative to other representatives. Karamanlis replied he regretted that different views existed on basic matters and especially on the matter of the two representatives. Turkey, he said, needed no protection of its interests and security through a Turkish representative on the Council as long as Britain was responsible for this protection. Besides, Britain was an ally of both countries and would give all guarantees. The interference of the two governments in the interim regime, he asserted, was not only an obstructive but also a destructive feature. "We understand this basic point differently. You believe it will contribute to progress. We believe it will render a solution more difficult." Macmillan, in turn, was sorry Karamanlis insisted on this point and attached such importance to it. But he was gratified that this was the only point of disagreement. Karamanlis reponded by saying he maintained reservations on other points, too, but this was a basic point of disagreement. Macmillan then observed that, of course, no general elections would be conducted on the island. "If then we exclude double nationality and the two representatives, what do we offer to the Turks who seek partition and a base and are determined to fight for both?"

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"The shelving of self-determination is offered to them", answered Karamanlis. At this point, Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza intervened. What did Macmillan offer to the eighty per cent of the Cypriots and the Greek people, he asked. Macmillan replied he offered them full control over their own community affairs and a permanent majority on the Council which exercised authority over all matters, except internal security, defense, and foreign affairs. Averoff-Tossizza contended that, in the Council the majority was five to four, if the Governor and the Greek and Turkish representatives on the Council were included. "This, together with condominium after the sevenyear period, is what is offered to us in exchange for putting off enosis." "Whatever is conceded to you", retorded Macmillan, "seems to annoy you." "We are not struggling to gain more or less", Karamanlis intervened, "because then we would have insisted on self-determination. I am discussing the interim regime from the viewpoint of principle, namely is it so constituted as to lead to peace ? Otherwise it will lead to complications. Whatever you offer to Greece, you offer to Turkey. If we reject the offer, we do so to achieve a common goal." "I shall try to persuade you that you are wrong on two points", said Macmillan. "Spaak had said that these were our main difficulties. I perceive that you disagree about the two representatives because you believe they constitute a recognition of Turkey's rights." At this point, the interpreting diplomat observed he did not recall having ever interpreted anything to that effect to Macmillan. The Greek government's objectives, he clarified, were due to the conviction that the two representatives would complicate matters. Macmillan thanked the diplomat-interpreter for the correction. He was glad the Greek objections were not theoretical but practical. "The institution of the two representatives also prejudges the future", said Averoff-Tossizza. "What purpose would the interference of the two representatives serve if Britain maintains sovereignty over the island?" Karamanlis asked. "Our desire", said Macmillan, "is to show that the interim regime is a sincere and honorable experiment in partnership or at least cooperation. Despite Britain's continuing sovereignty over the island, the two representatives would help the Cypriots who would feel they had close to them, like a trustee, the country with which they had national bonds."

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"Why, if the Greeks of Cyprus don't feel such a need, should the Turks feel such a need?" asked Karamanlis. "Exactly because they are a minority", replied Macmillan. "The minority", said Karamanlis, "should trust the occupying power. The representatives will continually cultivate the present sort of climate. I therefore regard this institution as a most dangerous point." "I'm relieved to hear what you've said", said Macmillan. " I thought you objected to the representatives because you regarded them as symbols of the interest of the two countries, as elements which in some way prejudged the future. I see now that your objections are due to practical reasons, because you believe the representatives will foment antagonism." "Since each side reserves itself on the matter of the final solution, it is natural for the representatives to cultivate the present climate", said Karamanlis. "But a precedent is also created of a recognition to both governments, whereas none of them should have a mortgage, as it were, over the island's future." Averoff-Tossizza added it was not a matter of a symbol of interest but of principle. It was the beginning of a right that was coupled with the triple condominium. "If, indeed, we declare our cooperation for a triple condominium, we favor even greater division." "I believed", said Macmillan, "that yielding part of our sovereignty would help the situation. I would like carefully to examine your views. At any rate I'm happy to see that, except for the points of the two representatives and of the double nationality, on other matters we are close to each other. These points will be of vital importance in Ankara. Perhaps we might meet tomorrow", he added. "I am sure the world will not forgive us if an issue as narrow as this should be the only one that stands between peace and war. At any rate, I shall think until tomorrow." "I shall do the same", said Karamanlis. "I am fully aware of the criticality of our talks. Please understand that our views constitute full proof of our sincere desire to contribute to a solution. But beyond a certain point, concessions are likely to make a settlement impossible, whereas our desire is to find a workable solution." 3. Third Meeting The third meeting of the Anglo-Greek summit conference started out with Premier Karamanlis presenting his final position on the Macmillan plan. After noting that from the previous meetings it was clear that both

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sides sincerely desired to reach agreement, he said he would examine the extent to which the talks had contributed to this end. It had become clear, he said, that "we appreciate some of the same points differently". At any rate since the British Premier had taken the trouble to come to Athens, it was not desirable for the discussions to end in a way that would create misunderstandings. One should therefore speak with clarity. Unclarity and vagueness were conducive to misunderstanding and harm. Karamanlis then reemphasized that, in the Greek view, the institution of the two representatives of Greece and Turkey, respectively, on the Council was unacceptable and dangerous. He would not weary the British Premier by explaining again why this was so. Second, he continued to adhere to the view that setting up a joint House of Representatives "parallel to the other two Houses" would be a constructive and unifying element in the interim regime, even if provided for in the future, not immediately. Third, he still opposed the provision for double nationality. On the other hand, he did not refer to his earlier objection about the sort of Greek Cypriot majority that should, in the Greek view, exist in the Council. If agreement was to be reached on the above three points concerning the island's interim regime, the British premier should have in mind another point Karamanlis had made the previous day. Accordingly, it should be categorically stated that this interim regime in no way prejudged the future and that all relevant statements made in the past on the future of Cyprus were considered invalid. Furthermore, if it was possible for the views of each side to coincide on these basic points, an amnesty should be granted and Makarios be allowed to return to Cyprus, so that talks with the Governor might begin on the details of the new Constitution. After thus succinctly summing up the Greek position and terms of agreement, Karamanlis asked Macmillan to present his own views. The British Premier who now felt (Riding the Storm, p. 676) that the Greek position had hardened as compared with the previous day started out by expressing disappointment at the reception of his plan when he had presented it to the House of Commons in June, even though Spaak, in unofficial talks, and international public opinion had welcomed this plan as fair and constructive. 51 It was, nonetheless, true that for dealing with a problem, various ways often existed that led to the same goal. It also was true, however, that the Cyprus question could not be 61

One wonders whether by international "public opinion" Macmillan wanted to suggest that the United States favored his plan.

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solved now or in the future except through practical cooperation, though he regretted but understood the difficulties of the Greek government and Parliament in wholeheartedly accepting the concept of partnership, which he once again praised as corresponding with contemporary conditions and modern trends; "without wanting to be considered impertinent, those who reject the concept of partnership are not living up to the demands of the modern world". 52 He was happy, he said, that, though the British and Greek governments departed from various positions, agreement existed on two objectives: that bloodshed and disturbances should come to an end, and that efforts should be focused on achieving an interim settlement for seven years. The seven-year period would leave the political settlement of the Cyprus question "to our successors, and helps us to enter it in a spirit of cooperation". Macmillan then went on to comment on the Greek objections to the British plan, though not in the order Karamanlis had presented them that morning. 53 The British Premier singled out the question of the Greek and Turkish representatives on the proposed Council as the main obstacle to agreement. Reading Article III, also paragraphs b, c, and d of Article VII of the plan, 54 he acknowledged that these provisions granted important powers to these representatives and constituted substantial checks 52

Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 676, writes that he said he felt that the Greek government was not rising to the level of world events and even acting contrary to its real interests by rejecting his partnership plan. 53 For easier reading, the author preferred symmetry in presenting this part of the minutes. Macmillan, in fact, started out with references to Karamanlis' objections concerning previous British statements, for instance with regard to self-determination. Then, he considered as most important two points of the plan: the composition of the Executive Council and the absence of any provision for joint meetings of the two Parliaments. Then he went on with the double-nationality question and finally to the question of the two government representatives. 54 Article III reads: "The Greek and Turkish governments will each be invited to appoint a representative to cooperate with the Governor in carrying out this policy". Paragraph b, of Article VII reads: "Authority for internal administration, other than communal affairs and internal security will be undertaken by a Council presided over by the Governor and including the representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments and six elected Ministers drawn from the Houses of Representatives, four being Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots". Paragraph b of Article VII reads: "The Governor, acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments, will have reserve powers to ensure that the interests of both communities are protected". Paragraph c of Article VII reads: "External affairs, defense and internal security will be matters specifically reserved to the Governor acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments" (Greek White Book I, p. 10).

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on the Governor's powers. He was aware, he underlined, that the Greek government's objections to these provisions were due not so much to belief that these representatives were unnecessary but that they would complicate matters still further. However, he did not know the views of the Turkish government on this point. Therefore, before learning these views, he could not know the extent of the difficulties involved in this matter. Possibly, certain changes in the title of these representatives or in their powers, or other changes, could lead to common agreement. But he knew nothing yet. At any rate, he was leaving Athens with a full understanding of the Greek objections on this main point. With regard to the Greek objection contained in Karamanlis' second point, Macmillan said that to set up a unitary House of Representatives, because of the absence of any provision in the British plan for joint meetings of the two communal Houses of Representatives, was impossible at present. General elections would be required, and Sir Hugh Foot considered that at present they were out of the question. A measure of election, however, existed in the plan, Macmillan argued, because of the provision for the indirect election of representatives and their presence in the unitary Council. At any rate, he added, perhaps during the sevenyear period there might be possibilities of development toward a form of deliberation between the two Houses. And it was of primary importance that these two Houses should start functioning. The two Houses had a limited competence and the unitary Council, with representatives from the two Houses, had competence on general matters. If the proposed interim constitutional system began functioning and pacification, too, were achieved, "there would be possibilities of developing unifying elements which are now limited only to the Council". Double nationality (the Greek objection that came third in Karamanlis' morning summation) had no great importance, Macmillan stated. The Greek government, he asserted, already regarded the Greek Cypriots as Greek subjects. If the Turkish government, too, were to adopt the same attitude with regard to the Turkish Cypriots, there could be no objections. The British government had proposed double nationality as an element that would be acceptable to both sides. But this, unlike the institution of the governmental representatives on the Council, was not the heart of the matter. With regard to another Greek objection (Karamanlis' fourth point that morning), Macmillan maintained that previous British statements were valid and binding for the British government. They did not refer to the interim plan but to other matters, such as self-determination, which

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had no connection with the plan. "For the time being", he added, "we leave enosis, partition, etc., aside." In response to the Greek objection mentioned fifth in Karamanlis' morning speech, Macmillan declared that if pacification were achieved, the return of Ethnarch Makarios to Cyprus would be welcome, so that together with representatives of various segments of the population, the details of the constitutional plan might be discussed with the Governor. Coming to an objection Karamanlis had not mentioned that morning — the composition of the Council — Macmillan nonetheless thought fit to observe that the four-to-two majority provided for in the British plan for those matters in which the Governor requested the agreement of the Council, was an adequate majority for the Greek Cypriots. In his peroration, Macmillan stated he appreciated "the political difficulties all of us have to face. But I do not think that this point, no matter how important it may be, should doom our efforts and allow violence to be resumed." He was eager to confer with the Turks, he said, and would do all in his power to resolve the main point of disagreement— that of the Greek and Turkish representatives on the Council. "No matter how many difficulties we may have, if we settle this one, the progress achieved will be such that it will help put aside the other difficulties." Therefore, if he had judged the situation correctly, one should leave for later the details about the development of the two Houses of Representatives and the functioning of the Council. The Governor would easily resolve these problems in talks with the representatives of the two communities. "Although I do not know what other difficulties we shall have to face", the key for favorable developments, he reiterated, was the solution of the question of the two representatives. Karamanlis thanked Macmillan for his frankness and for the accuracy with which he had presented the Greek views. He regretted the Greek government's adverse reception of the British plan, but the Greek government's disappointment was even more profound because the new plan meant regression rather than progress. Without wishing to refer to earlier British plans for Cyprus and to the Greek attitude toward them, he could not but recall that in 1955 the British government had offered Cyprus self-government and had been willing to recognize the principle of self-determination with a reservation only on the time of its application. 55 A comparison of those proposals with the new plan could not 65

During the Harding-Makarios negotiations of October 1955-March 1956, the British government, in a double-negative wording, was prepared to recognize the

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but deepen the disappointment of both the Greek government and the Greek people. Nevertheless, the Greek government believed it should make even now an effort to find a basis for agreement. Karamanlis, thence, analyzing further the reasons for Greek disappointment with the Macmillan plan, compared the moderation and conciliatory spirit of the Greek government with "the unjustified and incomprehensible intransigence" of the Turkish government. He was unable to explain what had happened since then to account for the change in British policy. The day before he had told Macmillan he did not overlook the need to reckon with Turkish interests. But he did not believe it was right to let the Turks become the arbiters in the situation, because of their intransigence. Britain was the occupying power in Cyprus, Karamanlis continued. It was a great power. It could impose any plan it wished. "This, however, does not mean that we must cooperate in solutions that are not only unfair but humiliating for Greece." When the Greeks saw that efforts were made to satisfy the Turks because they clamored and misbehaved, the boundaries within which the Greek government could cooperate were greatly limited. If the impression was created that whenever the Greek government did not agree, the British government offered less,56 it was impossible to find a basis for agreement. "As a Greek", Karamanlis stated, "I fear you are showing an excessive weakness toward the Turks. The result is that you are unfair to Greece." His moderate policy, Karamanlis complained, had been misunderstood, instead of being appreciated as that of a man who honestly and sincerely wanted to help in finding a solution. It was perhaps easier to make concessions and sacrifices in matters of substance but "we shall never proceed toward a solution so long as the Turks provoke and threaten. For three years the Turks have been attacking us. They set fire to homes in Constantinople and Smyrna and issued inflammatory statements. 51 I avoided replies in the hope that a solution would be

principle of self-determination of the Cypriots by making an official statement that it was not the British government's position that "the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus" (Cyprus, Correspondence Exchanged between the Governor and Makarios [London: H.M. Stationery Office, March, 1956] Cmd. 9708, P. 3). 66 One method of bargaining in order to get a settlement consists of offering increasingly unfavorable terms. 57 For these anti-Greek acts, see above. Chapter I, note 52.

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found. I fear, however, that my prudence and moderation were misunderstood and stimulated the Turks to intransigence." To hold that a solution was necessary because the Turks were misbehaving was unacceptable to the Greek government. As matters were shaping up, Karamanlis explained, Cyprus, because of Turkish reactions, had become a question of national honor (filotimia) and prestige instead of an issue of practical policy. Quite frankly, Greece did not claim Cyprus. Cyprus was a matter of moral and historical duty, so that there was no reason to humiliate Greece as a nation. If he had spoken like this, Karamanlis explained, it had been not only because Macmillan had expressed his disappointment at the adverse Greek reception of his plan. He also wanted to explain to Macmillan the state of mind of the Greek government and people, because arguments of substance aside, his knowledge of this state of mind would help him in weighing the situation. Coming now to a substantive matter in support of some of his earlier points, Karamanlis remarked that Macmillan's unwillingness to decommit the British government from certain statements made in the past was in contradiction to the effort to set up merely an interim regime in Cyprus. He also wondered why certain other British statements made in the past, about self-determination, for example, 58 should not remain valid. How else could he persuade Macmillan that the British attitude toward Greece was discriminatory as compared to its attitude toward Turkey? Selfdetermination had been set aside for the Turks. They should regard this as a victory. Sir Roger Allen knew how costly that turn had been for Greece. "Possibly you do not care about what is happening in Greece. But I have to reckon with what internal developments will be if the Greek people are to be humiliated. All Greeks know that the matter has regressed. The British government, too, knows this. How much more can we retreat?" 59 Karamanlis then thanked Macmillan for saying that despite his dis-

68 See note 55, above. On July 12, 1956, Eden had again stated in the Commons that Britain recognized the principle of self-determination for Cyprus although because of the existing circumstances its application was not possible, as Makarios was to recall in an interview of August 28,1958 in Athens (Vima, August 29,1958). 59 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 677, gives a far more dramatic account of Karamanlis' statement. He writes that the Greek Premier became very emotional and said that the Greeks hated the Turks, that they had fought them for five centuries; that they would not be humiliated by them. A Turkish veto over Greek aspirations was humiliating.

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appointment with the adverse Greek reception of his plan, 60 he felt the need to study most carefully the points to which he had drawn his attention. He appealed to him to do so with greater determination and assured him that in this way not only the purpose pursued but also justice would be served. Seeking to impress on the British Premier that the Greek counterproposals to the British plan were the Greek government's last line of retreat, Karamanlis further assured Macmillan that if he had expressed his objections and reservations on the plan, this was because he could do nothing beyond what he had mentioned. For him it was not a matter of inclination or policy. Really he could offer nothing else, he emphasized. If it was a matter of giving Macmillan personal satisfaction, he would, as he had told him, consent to the British plan. But he knew in advance that the plan could not work. He adjured Macmillan, the Premier of a great and friendly country, against asking him for something he could not do. If for the Turks Cyprus was a matter of obstinacy, for the Greeks it was a matter of justice and of repercussions on internal affairs. Finally he appealed to him to weigh most carefully all these matters and, with his great experience and high sense of responsibility, to do everything necessary for a solution to be reached. Macmillan responded by thanking Karamanlis for having helped him to understand the situation better. He had been impressed. If he had been disappointed over his plan's reception, this had been because his impression was that it would resolve the issue. The Scriptures said that peacemakers were blessed. Unfortunately this saying did not work out like that. Yet he was greatly encouraged. There was agreement on the need for peace and a seven-year interim regime. If he had correctly understood, the two representatives on the Council was the only great difference. 60

Macmillan himself summed up the criticism of his plan as follows: First, the Greek government objected to the ratio of four Greek Cypriots to two Turkish Cypriots in the Governor's Council as unfair. The population ratio would call for four Greek Cypriots to one Turkish Cypriot on the Council. Second, the plan contained no provision for a joint Assembly. Third, the Greek government was opposed to dual nationality for the Cypriots. Fourth, it hated the provision for governmental representatives of Greece and Turkey on the Governor's Council. With regard to the latter objection, it was not clear in his mind, he wrote, whether the Greeks objected to the presence of these representatives on the island in any capacity. He noted that he had not pressed for a clarification of this matter. Though they seemed to attach equal importance to all these points, what the Greeks resented most was that particular provision which the Turks so greatly valued that they were willing to drop their demand for a military base on Cyprus or partition, if that provision was implemented. Ibid., pp. 676, and 678.

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The other differences could be managed. He would, he promised, give careful thought as to how to handle the matter. Perhaps it would be easy; perhaps it would be difficult. At any rate, Macmillan continued, "if we are able to start implementing the plan, we shall find ourselves on the way toward better times. Both of us desire the same thing: peace and the start toward self-government", he reiterated. "We also desire the return of the Archbishop, to start talks and cooperation with the Governor, together with representatives of the Turkish community in Cyprus." Though it sounded very ambitious on his part, because he was aware of five hundred years of history (in GreekTurkish relations), he would try to achieve a solution, recognizing the moderation and efforts of Premier Karamanlis. In concluding, Macmillan said he considered it his duty to bring about pacification in Cyprus and to carry out the seven-year interim plan. He would check what obstacles existed on the Turkish side so that the situation might be fully clarified in his mind. This would enable him to realize what could be done. If the matter of the representatives was settled — and he promised to do all he could in this matter, though acknowledging the difficulties involved — "we shall find ourselves on the way toward implementation of the seven-year plan". Perhaps this would be a matter of days, perhaps of weeks. At any rate there would be progress. The achievement of peace, he reemphasized, was the most important matter. To achieve this, he reiterated, the agreement of the four factors he had mentioned — the Greek and Turkish governments and the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots — was indispensable. The Anglo-Greek summit conference of August 8-9, 1958 ended after Karamanlis thanked Macmillan for his having taken the initiative and trouble to come to Athens to discuss with him in person the Cyprus question. He would like the British Premier to appreciate the efforts he had made and was making for achieving a solution of the problem, just as he appreciated the British Premier's efforts in that same direction. In the words of the cryptically brief communiqué issued at the end of this summit meeting, the two Premiers agreed that their talks had been very useful, though it could not be said that their views had coincided. 61 The tone of all three meetings corroborates Sir Hugh Foot's words that, while the British could agree with the Turkish leaders but found their methods unbearable, the courtesy of the Greek leaders even when there el Averoff-Tossizza said a useful exchange had taken place but no progress had been achieved. He was, however, optimistic (Grivas Memoirs, p. 278).

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was blanket disagreement made disputes with them seem like quarrels between friends. 62 Macmillan left Athens with the impression that the Greek government was frightened of Makarios, of Parliament, and of the rise of the communist vote in the elections of May 11, 1958 and therefore could not accept the British plan for Cyprus. Whether it could acquiesce in this plan, was, he thought, less clear. Makarios, unless attracted by the prospect of going back to Cyprus, would persist in opposing it. Of course, the matter of the government representatives on the Governor's Council was the big stumbling-block. However, wrote Macmillan in his memoirs, the Turks would not drop this provision which for them was of cardinal importance. 63 During this last summit meeting, the Soviet Ambassador in Athens, Mikhail Sergeev, delivered to the Greek Cabinet a message from Khrushchev, outlining the Soviet views on the Near East crisis and urging the Greek government to demand the withdrawal of British and American troops from Lebanon and Jordan. Asserting that these troops were preparing further armed intervention in other Arab countries, Khrushchev maintained this was a campaign directed against the peoples of the Near East and of Cyprus seeking for self-determination.64 A few words on the Soviet attitude toward Greece in the Cyprus question are in order here. Though the Soviet government after Stalin's death in March 1953 had normalized diplomatic relations with Greece by sending in mid-September of that year an ambassador to Athens, it had vainly tried to prevent the conclusion of the U.S.-Greek agreement of October 12, 1953 permitting the establishment of American bases in Greece, and viewed with interest the growing dispute over Cyprus between Greece, on the one side, and Britain and Turkey, on the other. Together with Czechoslovakia, it had supported in the General Committee the inscription of the Cyprus item on the UN agenda, when the Greek government first brought that question to the United Nations in 1954 — in contrast to the United States which had merely abstained. Generally, the Soviet government sought to exploit the anti-Western climate of opinion that was developing in Greece because of the Cyprus question, so that the years 1955-1956 revealed a growing Soviet-Greek friendship—a trend facilitated by the then prevailing • a Foot, A Start in Freedom, p. 151. 83 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 678. Macmillan, referring to this conference, writes that "he liked both Karamanlis and Averoff, especially the former, who was a true and sincere man". He found both charming and friendly. (Macmillan, ibid., p. 677.) 64 Times, August 11,1958.

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"Geneva Spirit". In August 1955, a Soviet-Greek trade agreement had been signed, to be followed by agreements on cultural cooperation. When the conflict over Cyprus sharpened in September 1955 after the breakdown of the tripartite London Conference and the anti-Greek riots in Turkey, the atmosphere became propitious for setting up in Athens a Greek-Soviet Society and for concluding an agreement between "Intourist" and a Greek tourist agency. 65 When the British authorities in Cyprus in March 1956 deported Ethnarch Makarios to the Seychelles, an even more favorable climate had developed for the USSR in Greece. The climax of Soviet efforts at a rapprochement with Greece occurred at the end of June 1956, when Foreign Minister Dimitri T. Shepilov arrived in Athens on an unofficial visit. He offered full Soviet support on the Cyprus question, a "peace pact" with Greece, guaranteeing Greek territorial integrity, and Soviet economic aid as well as attractive trade arrangements.66 However, as even the Soviet press had to acknowledge, Shepilov's mission failed as a whole. Events in Hungary in October 1956 tarnished the image the Soviet government was trying to create.57 From that point on, the Soviet government seems to have devoted more attention to the so-called "democratic forces" in Greece than to the Greek government. When Greece accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine, the USSR started a new campaign against the Greek government. This campaign may account 65 N. Alexandrov and V. Kondratyev, "The New Tendencies in Greece", Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizri 5 (1956), pp. 88-91. 66 Pravda, July 1 and 2,1956. 67 "Prospects for Improvement of Greek-Soviet relations", Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' 8 (1956), pp. 124-125. An Athens story in the Christian Science Monitor, November 22, 1958, by John N . Rigos, under a headline reading "Moscow Steps Up Greek Pressure", reported on the great growth of Soviet efforts to subvert the Greeks, and cited the great number of Soviet bloc and especially Soviet Union officials attached to the diplomatic missions in Athens, and the almost unrestricted travels of Ambassador M. Sergeev and his staff throughout Greece, despite existing agreements between the two countries. During the electoral campaign period of 1958, this Soviet touring of the country reached its peak. The amount of Soviet bloc propaganda material circulating in Greece had also risen considerably as had the broadcasts of the clandestine radio station, "Voice of Truth", the organ of the outlawed Communist Party of Greece, which originated either from Prague or Budapest, although pretending to emanate from inside Greece. As a result of these developments, the Greek government, in September 1958, issued an order prohibiting the further distribution of foreign propaganda in Greece. The USIA complied with this order; but the Soviet Embassy did not. On the contrary, Sergeev delivered a note which in effect denied the Greek government any jurisdiction in its own country over the publication and distribution of subversive Soviet propaganda. A chilly atmosphere had prevailed when the Soviet Ambassador, before leaving for a vacation in the USSR, called upon the Greek Foreign Minister to say goodbye.

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to a certain extent for the success of EDA, the communist-facade party in Greece, at the Greek general elections of May 11, 1958.

C. SUMMIT AFTERMATH — MACMILLAN'S PLAN REVISED

The importance the British government attached to pacification in Cyprus is revealed by the fact that, when Sir Hugh Foot, during his stay in Athens, met Makarios twice, he tried to persuade the Ethnarch that violence led to no solution but only to a catastrophe. For finding a solution therefore, peace and order had to be first restored. He asked Makarios to exert his influence for the termination of violence.68 The Ethnarch replied that the restoration of peace could not be discussed as an issue that was unrelated to the settlement of the Cyprus question. For peace to be achieved, an appeal to EOKA was not enough. It had to be accompanied by the announcement of an agreement which had been either reached or at least provided well-grounded hopes of a settlement. The British, he observed, had never contributed to the restoration of peace. The various truces of EOKA had been one-sided. The Macmillan plan, furthermore, he said, was unacceptable and should be dropped. Sir Hugh's response to these observations had been noncommittal. Nonetheless, Makarios derived the impression that the British might drop the concept of partnership in order to begin talks on a Constitution, after his return to Cyprus had been allowed. At one point, the Governor asked the Ethnarch whether Grivas might be persuaded to leave the island. Makarios replied Grivas was not disposed to leave before an agreement had been reached on the Cyprus question. 69 In a letter of August 13, 1958, the Greek Foreign Minister alias "Isaakios", summed up for Grivas' benefit the main points of the AngloGreek summit conference, providing also certain sidelights on exchanges which evidently took place outside the conference itself. The Greek government, he wrote, had stressed the rights of the Cypriots and the moral duty of Greece to support them. It had also acknowledged the dangers that flowed from the dispute's nonresolution and therefore favored a final settlement to make possible the revival of sincere alliances 88 The same British preoccupation was evident in 1956 during the Harding-Makarios negotiations and then early in 1957 in connection with the release of the Ethnarch from his detention in the Seychelles (Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 123-124, and 73-74). 69 Grivas Memoirs, p. 279. The British government had offered Grivas a safe-conduct out of the island in March 1957 (Conflict and Conciliation, p. 75).

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and friendships. However, if a final solution were not possible, it had said it was prepared to accept an interim solution, the preconditions of which "Isaakios" most accurately summed up. But "Isaakios" also reported that Macmillan had said he had often spoken to Sir Hugh Foot about the situation and Sir Hugh had told him that, if the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus wanted to exterminate each other, he had no adequate forces to stop them from doing so, and that the British would not tolerate much longer the killing of British youth attempting to protect third parties from mutual extermination. If the situation continued, he would have to recommend Britain's withdrawal from Cyprus. The British were not interested in Cyprus as a base but only in bases on the island. Averoff-Tossizza, wrote "Isaakios" about himself, had responded by saying that peace was easy to attain if a political solution were found. The withdrawal of the British, he argued, would mean complete Greek victory, because he could manage to get a UN interposition. If, on the other hand, the United Nations did not intervene, "then, inevitably, we would be marching toward a Greek-Turkish war. But then, what would be the position of the British bases?" 70 He had also insisted that no measures should be taken against the Greek Cypriots and EOKA, because he would be unable to maintain the truce, which was "a divine gift". To what did the Governor attribute the "Dighenis" truce, he had asked him. After a brief hesitation: "To political judgment", the Governor had replied. From various details, Averoff-Tossizza concluded that Sir Hugh believed EOKA was in close touch with Makarios and the Greek government. The present crisis, "Isaakios" wrote further to Grivas, was one of the most tragic if not the most tragic of all. "Our natural allies, on whom our security from Slavo-Communism depends, are our opponents in the Cyprus question. On the other hand, the natural foes of the nation, who, were they to prevail, would drain our blood for geopolitical reasons, are our allies in Cyprus. In our sacred cause, friends have become foes and foes friends." This deeply influenced political positions at home. It was incredible how many Greeks had forgotten the occupation and the guerilla war. The masses did not think. They merely reacted. To a great extent they were grateful to the USSR because of its support in the Cyprus question and especially vis-à-vis Turkey. EDA exploited this situation magnificently. It acted demagogically on all occasions but without resorting to the ancient extremes (bloody incidents, etc.). The 70

Grivas Memoirs, p. 280.

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Soviet Embassy helped very cleverly. As a result, he saw a rise in the number of fellow-travellers, a trend toward social intercourse between the nation-minded elements and the Leftists. The axiom that Leftism = Trojan Horse = treason = communism had been forgotten. The government, disturbed, was acting in this sector. It organized propaganda, took preventive measures, proceeded to the arrest of dynamic cadres. Some of the sympathizers seemed to have lost courage. However, a new bad turn of the Cyprus question would bring far greater gains to the Left Wingers than these small setbacks. Grivas, as usual, vigorously dissented with the Greek government's policies. In response to "Isaakios'" above letter as well as to other letters from Athens informants he expressed his conviction that mere tittletattle among London-Athens-Ankara would not lead to a settlement. As long as the Greek government insisted on solving the Cyprus question within the framework of its alliance with the West, no favorable solution could ever be achieved. But each should weigh his responsibilities toward History. "We shall do our duty, determined to fall to the last man. We only regret that when the day of Freedom dawns thanks to our struggle, there will be no life on our island to embrace it." Nevertheless, in order to neutralize any argument that the negotiations made no progress because of the resumption of EOKA activities, Grivas decided to extend the duration of the truce beyond August 10, though the security forces continued their searches and arrests and the Turks their acts of arson against Greek Cypriot property. 71 Meanwhile Macmillan and Foot had flown from Athens to Ankara for their summit conference with Menderes and Zorlu. On August 9,1958, Macmillan explained to them that the Greek government had accepted the two main principles of no more terrorism and a seven-year provisional settlement and that it had objected to certain points in the British plan. The Turkish leaders appeared surprised that after the secret London talks of July 29-30, amendments to the British plan should have been discussed in Athens. They were inflexible. They reemphasized how well designed, how well conceived, how perfectly balanced that plan was. When Macmillan inquired why then had the Turkish government stimulated such massive "spontaneous" riots and demonstrations against the plan throughout Turkey, a long wrangle followed about what had been said in London on July 29-30. Macmillan reminded the Turks that he had refused to initial a record of the London meeting prepared by their own 71

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 279-281.

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officials, because he did not intend his Cyprus plan to be absolutely impervious to any amendment. Since the Turkish leaders refused even to consider amendments, no progress was achieved at the next meeting either, of August 10. At noon that day, Macmillan suggested adjournment of the meeting. After a lunch redolent of Russia (vodka and caviar), Macmillan informed the Turkish leaders at their afternoon meeting that the British government intended at any rate to implement its plan for Cyprus. He hoped this would be in a form that would allow the Turkish government to cooperate in its implementation. The Turkish side agreed to end the discussion of the Cyprus issue and the conferees turned their attention to the Middle East and other matters. 72 It was evidently at one of these meetings that Macmillan, infuriated by Zorlu's "intolerably insulting behavior", got up and left the conference room, followed by officials begging him to return. 73 According to the communiqué issued on August 10 after this BritishTurkish summit conference, a frank and friendly exchange of views had taken place. Macmillan had explained the nature and purposes of the new British plan and Menderes had set out the viewpoint of his government. On August 11, Zorlu emphasized the gravity of the Cyprus situation and said that if the island's political status was not settled as soon as possible, any initiative was doomed to failure and renewed conflict would flare up. His government, he said, was convinced that only partition could restore peace to the island. Partition, he asserted, was not incompatible with the principle of partnership of the Macmillan plan. 74 Macmillan did not pass through Athens on his way back to London. He flew to Cyprus instead. There he visited the headquarters of the Middle East land and air forces, saw the British service chiefs, and observed troops taking part in anti-EOKA operations. In separate meetings he conferred with leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities; the former included Nicosia's Mayor Dervis, the latter Dr. Kiiçùk. 75 The Greek Cypriot leaders stressed that no solution was possible without the Ethnarch and denounced the "partial" attitude of the British authorities, the inflammatory statements of the Turks, and the stand of the security forces. 76 72 73 74 75 76

Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 679-680. Foot, A Start in Freedom, p. 150. Times, August 8,1958. Keesing's, 16452-16453. Grivas Memoirs, p. 278.

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After his Athens and Ankara conferences, Macmillan decided to revise somewhat his plan, with some amendments to please the Greek government, and one amendment to please the Turkish government. While in Nicosia he drafted his relevant statement and the texts of the telegrams he would send to Ankara and Athens. On August 12, back in London, at a meeting of members of the Cabinet, he reported on his visits to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus and proposed to go ahead with his Cyprus plan, undeterred. The other Cabinet members agreed, even though a renewal of violence was expected.77 In a letter to Gaitskell, Macmillan explained that during his Athens and Ankara talks he had aimed neither at a tripartite agreement nor at a treaty. He hoped, however, for acquiescence in his plan, and for some support in practice. Some of the revisions he was introducing to his plan, he underlined, such as the possibility in the future of a joint elected assembly, had been drawn from points made by the Opposition during the Commons debate on his plan. Macmillan also informed Spaak of his revised plan, while Selwyn Lloyd, then in Washington, explained it to John Foster Dulles.78 In his letter of August 14, addressed to Karamanlis, the British Premier enclosed the text of a statement he would issue next day. Together with the covering letter, this statement revealed that the principal point of disagreement between the Greek and British Premiers — the provision for a Greek and a Turkish representative to sit on the proposed Governor's Council — had not been resolved by its deletion, as the Greek government desired. In other words, if Macmillan had tried to persuade Menderes of the need of dropping provision, he had failed. In this institution, Macmillan introduced only a very minor modification. The representatives of Greece and Turkey would not actually sit on the Council, he explained, though their functions as he had set them out on June 19 would remain unchanged. In a status he believed more consonant with their character as representatives of sovereign states, they would not be under the Governor's chairmanship but would work, as it were, side by side with him. They would be regarded as specially appointed representatives of their countries with direct access to the Governor and with such other facilities as they needed to carry out their functions. Nor was any provision or any firm commitment included in Mac77

Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 683-684. In five years, he observes, the British forces in Cyprus suffered 90 fatal casualties, " a sad but not shattering result of... a military campaign". 78 Ibid., p. 684.

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millan's new statement for setting up a joint House of Representatives parallel to the two communal Houses, as the Greek government had proposed. Macmillan merely observed that the system of communal assemblies with their specific functions and of the Governor's Council with its more general duties did not exclude, and should, with general good will, facilitate "the development of some form of representative institution serving the interest of the island as a whole". Only the proposal for dual nationality was deferred, pending the consideration of the complex legal and other aspects involved, which further inquiries had revealed. Both draft statement and covering letter to Karamanlis also made it clear that the British government had decided to go ahead with implementing its plan. Macmillan revealed that an Order-in-Council had already been approved. It authorized the preparation of electoral registers in the island. This was expected to take two to three months. When these registers were complete, it would be possible to hold elections for the two Houses of Representatives. The preparations for the elections would involve consultations between the Governor and leaders of the two communities. If, as the British government hoped, violence ceased, those presently excluded from the island (e.g. Makarios) would be allowed to return to Cyprus to play their part in these electoral processes and in consultations on the details of the system of representative government and communal autonomy set out in Macmillan's statement of Cyprus policy of June 19. Then, as soon as the two Houses of Representatives had been elected, they would be asked to elect their representatives to the Governor's Council which would then become the authoritative body to deal with all matters not specifically devolved upon the Houses of Representatives or reserved to the Governor at his discretion. Meanwhile — and this was a new point and a sign of a Turkish success at the Ankara summit conference — concurrently with the preparation of the electoral registers, "in accordance with the spirit of the decision to encourage the communities to regulate their own affairs", the Governor would authorize the setting up of separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot municipal councils where local circumstances made this desirable. Until then the separate Turkish Cypriot municipal councils had been unauthorized. Finally, the British government invited the Greek and Turkish governments to appoint their representatives to the Governor's Council "with effect from October 1" — the appointed day, as it became known later —, for the official inauguration of the Macmillan plan.

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In presenting this only slightly modified plan and announcing the imminent beginning of its implementation, Macmillan observed that after his personal exchanges with the Greek and Turkish Premiers and his study of Spaak's informal memorandum (of August 4),7 9 he and his colleagues were in the possession of all the elements on which to take the necessary decisions. In other words, the British government appeared to exclude any further consultations with Greece, Turkey or NATO on the matter. Fully conscious of the heavy responsibility that lay upon him as Premier, he was satisfied, he wrote to Karamanlis, that the policy he had announced on June 19 was the most likely to restore confidence in Cyprus and lead to the strengthening of friendships in a vital part of the world. In conclusion, Macmillan appealed for support from all concerned for the two major concepts which underlay that policy: first, for a period of calm and the cessation of violence; and, second, for deferring for a seven-year period any final solution without prejudice to the future or the views and aspirations of any parties concerned. 80 The Governor of Cyprus likewise communicated to the Ethnarch the revised Macmillan plan in advance, urging him to support it as perhaps the last opportunity for making a fresh start to bring peace and progress to Cyprus, though he realized from the talks he had had with him that there were aspects of the new policy with which the Ethnarch disagreed. If this opportunity was not seized, he could foresee nothing but continuing misery for the island. If, on the other hand, all decided to sink past differences and work together in mutual understanding and confidence, he felt sure that a period of good order and good sense could be achieved and the island saved from further conflict. In due course, the foundations for a final and just settlement could be laid. "A great responsibility rests on us all to put first the interests of the people of the island, and to that overriding purpose I am pledged", wrote Sir Hugh. 81 Dated August 15, the letter of Ambassador Christian X. Palamas, Greek representative to the UN, to the Secretary-General, requesting the inscription of the Cyprus question on the agenda of the thirteenth General Assembly,82 was not a Greek response to Macmillan's new move. Press dispatches with an August 11 dateline had already reported 78

See above, p. 176. Greek White Book I, pp. 21-24. 8 » Keesing's, 16453-16454. 82 UNGAOR, Thirteenth Session, Agenda Item 68, Annexes, p. 1 (cited hereafter as Agenda Item 68). 80

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that the Greek government had decided to lodge an appeal on Cyprus with the United Nations in the next two or three days — August 16 being the last day for the addition of items to the supplementary agenda of the General Assembly. During the summit conference, the Greek government, it was believed, having gone to the limit of concession while the risk of partition still existed, was concentrating all its efforts on the elimination of anything likely to make partition a permanent solution for Cyprus. 83 Hence this recourse to the United Nations.

83

Times, August 12,1958.

V A NEW IDEA

A. GREEK, CYPRIOT, AND TURKISH REACTIONS TO THE REVISED MACMILLAN PLAN

The announcement of the British decision to go ahead with the revised Macmillan plan created in Greek government circles a grave new crisis. Karamanlis cut short his holiday in Rhodes to fly back to Athens and confer with his Ministers amid reports that Greece might sever diplomatic relations with Britain and Turkey. Backstage, the British decision engendered considerable friction between Grivas and "Isaakios" and between Makarios and Karamanlis over methods for dealing with the crisis. On August 15, 1958, the Greek Ambassador to the United States, G. V. Melas, resigned from his post, reportedly because he considered his mission to Washington to have failed. He was the second Greek envoy to the United States to do so for reasons connected with the Cyprus problem. 1 Athens sources close to the Greek government asserted six days later that his resignation was intended to be a protest against the lack of American sympathy for the problems of Greece. He was reported to have told the State Department that Washington had treated Greece unfairly both in the matters of Cyprus and of U.S. aid, while Turkey had become the most favored country in American policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. 2 1

In December 1954, Thanassis ,G. Politis, Greek Ambassador in Washington, refused to accept his appointment to New Delhi which he had been offered, and resigned for reasons connected with the U.S. attitude on the Cyprus question. Then, in April 1957, Vassili Mostras, Greek Ambassador in London, resigned, also in connection with the Cyprus question (Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 77-78). Alexis A. Kyrou, Director-General of the Foreign Minister, a Cypriot Greek and a most active element in raising the Cyprus question in the United Nations in 1954, likewise found himself in a position of having to place himself at the disposal of the Foreign Ministry early in 1955, after the first Greek recourse to the United Nations in 1954 (ibid., p. 31). 2 Times, August 21, 1958. Reasons of health were given as the main reason for this resignation. The Ambassador had sent in his resignation by August 15, 1958, Vima,

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Amid indignation in Athens,3 an outraged Ethnarch4 rejected the modified Macmillan plan, with Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza reportedly in agreement.5 In a letter of August 16 to Sir Hugh Foot who, as mentioned, had informed him about the revised plan in advance, Makarios foretold that efforts to implement it would involve grave consequences, the responsibility for which would lie with the British government. The people of Cyprus, he declared, would accept no arbitrary and unilateral decision; more than ever before, they were intent on asserting their right to self-determination and to achieve freedom. Makarios expressed painful astonishment at the British intention to implement a plan that was unacceptable to the large majority of the Cypriot people. Yet he had made it abundantly clear that the Greeks of Cyprus would never accept a plan that ignored their basic democratic rights and denied them both freedom and peace. By imposing outside governments on them, the plan frustrated their freedom. By its constitutional provisions, it broke up their unity and prejudged their future. The proposed regime set the stage not for peace, unity and cooperation, but for intensified antagonism and strife, with wider repercussions, he predicted. A wide gap existed between the positive nature of the Governor's plea for sinking differences and for mutual understanding and the negative aims of the divisive Constitution, which was based on mistrust and separation.6

August 22, 1958. According to this report, Melas had favored the introduction of a draft resolution calling for an independent Cyprus at the twelfth session of the General Assembly in 1957. For his attitude on that occasion, see, Conflict and Conciliation, p. 289. 3 Michael Manning, Sunday Times, August 17, 1958. Makarios had expressed painful astonishment. The resumption of EOKA violence was expected. 4 Leslie Finer, The Observer, August 17, 1958, wrote that rarely had he seen "this usually suave and controlled man so outraged". The swift and unexpected manner of the British announcement as much as its contents had added anger and irritation to the existing objective disagreements with the plan's terms. Makarios, Finer continued, felt that Britain had deliberately maneuvered Greece into a false position. The Greeks felt that Britain, after having led them part of the way toward agreement and implying that further efforts would be made to make the agreement complete, had sprung the doors of a trap. It looked as if the animal was not going to accept captivity without a struggle, he added. "Both the plan as it stands and the methods used by Britain in the attempt to enforce it are thoroughly dishonest", Finer reported that Makarios had told him. None of the Greek objections left unanswered when Macmillan left Athens for Ankara had been met, the Ethnarch observed. 5 Times, August 16, 1958. • Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 685, notes that this rather ambiguous phrase could refer either to independence or to enosis — the latter, in his view, being the equivalent of self-determination.

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With equal firmness though in a less defiant tone, Premier Karamanlis, 7 in a long letter of August 19 to Macmillan,8 likewise rejected the revised Macmillan plan. He also decommitted himself from an interim solution. With regret, he wrote, the Greek government was unable to cooperate in the plan's implementation. Accordingly, it did not intend to appoint, as Macmillan had requested, a representative to cooperate with the Governor of Cyprus on his Council. The Greek government had never asked to participate in the exercise of sovereignty over the island. As he himself had pointed out to Macmillan, this plan would serve no purpose. Since the agreement for an interim solution had been frustrated, Greece would continue its efforts to promote the freedom of the people of Cyprus with all legitimate means. His government was fully aware of the ordeals it eventually would have to face. But as in other, similar circumstances, the Greek nation was prepared to bear these eventual ordeals, for it had full confidence in justice. In this letter to Macmillan, Karamanlis expressed the Greek government's disappointment at the contents of the British Premier's letter. Because his government claimed the right of self-determination for the Cypriots, it had appealed to the United Nations and was convinced that this right would not be refused to a European people still living under full colonial status. He also reminded Macmillan of the various objections he had formulated on the subject of the British plan during their summit conference.9 Not only had these objections not been met in the revised plan but a new element had been introduced: the provision for setting up separate municipal councils. In this connection, he could not see why the system of single municipal councils should be dropped. It had been in force "for many centuries" in Cyprus. The dangerous complications of setting up separate municipal councils were clear to everybody; he was unable to understand how such an unprecedented institution had been conceived. All in all, Karamanlis wrote, the whole plan retained traces of the unfortunate solutions (i.e. partition) which had created such tragic complications throughout the world at the expense of the Free World's prestige. If the other side had made moves as conciliatory as those made by the Greek government in order to achieve pacification, the current crisis surely would have been overcome by now. The people of Cyprus, 7

Keesing's, 16454. The Observer, August 17, 1958. From Rhodes, Karamanlis had flown to Athens, then to Corfu to see King Paul I and discuss the new Cyprus development. » Greek White Book I, pp. 25-27. 8

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he underlined, had seconded the Greek government not only through the recent proposals of their representative, but also through three truces which the organization of Cypriot fighters had offered and had kept, although constantly provoked to discontinue them. On August 21, the British Ambassador in Athens phoned the Greek Foreign Minister and asked him to convey to the Greek Premier a message from Macmillan, in acknowledgment of Karamanlis' letter of August 19. Thanking the Greek Premier for his moderate tone, Macmillan appreciated the Greek approach to the matter of the resumption of violence and informed him that if violence was not resumed, then, he thought, a way would be found for the situation to develop on its own, so "that we get out of this dead end". Macmillan also thanked Karamanlis for his courteous reception in Athens. Averoff-Tossizza replied he did not quite understand what was meant by "moderation". It was natural for the tone of Karamanlis' letter to be courteous, not insulting. "We do not recognize better manners in others. Besides we had in mind that Macmillan's Philhellenic past and our past sentiments probably were only temporarily in lethargy." As for the letter's content, it was the same as that of other documents which were regarded as intransigent. Some British newspapers, he added, so clearly made this distinction with regard to Makarios' reply to Sir Hugh Foot 1 0 that he believed they aimed at creating a split in the Greek-Cypriot front. This was not fair and in no way corresponded to fact. The British Ambassador appeared astonished and fully agreed with Averoff-Tossizza.11 About the resumption of violence in Cyprus, the Greek Foreign Minister stressed that a real revolution was under way on the island. "We do not control it or influence it. We desire peace and say so, but this can have an effect only so long as we are assured that we have some hope for a political solution. To say this now is impossible because we look only toward the United Nations and this for the next three or four months. Consequently we may have peace but also we may not." 12 In response to the British Ambassador's strictly personal inquiry 10

See above, p. 222. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 686, writes that on August 19, 1958, Ambassador Seferiadis in London called on him but had little to say. He gave Macmillan the impression that the Greek government was behaving weakly and foolishly and said that Makarios' return to Cyprus might be the only way out and that his presence in Athens made the government's position impossible. 12 Times editorial, August 20, 1958.

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whether the Foreign Minister thought it might be helpful if the Governor proclaimed that, should tranquility be restored, the emergency measures would be raised from date X and those outside Cyprus, i.e. Makarios, would be allowed to return, Averoff-Tossizza replied that such a proclamation might be of help if date X was not too remote. Sir Roger Allen, as Macmillan noted on August 23, 1958, kept informing London about the great difficulties the Greek government was facing at this point. It would threaten, he predicted, and perhaps be compelled, to leave NATO — something which Macmillan doubted. 13 As Macmillan had predicted since August 16, the Turkish government, in contrast to the Greek government and the Ethnarch, notified Sir James Bowker, the British Ambassador in Ankara, of its acceptance of the revised Macmillan plan, on August 25. That same day, in a press statement, Foreign Minister Zorlu said that Turkey had not dropped its demand for the island's partition but regarded the revised British plan as "reconcilable with our thesis". Later, in a statement before the Grand National Assembly, he said that his government had decided to support this plan, to prove Turkey's good will in the face of positive efforts made by Britain. 14 On August 28, on the other hand, Makarios reiterated at a press conference held in Athens that he would oppose by all available means the British plan's implementation. He also appealed for effective UN intervention for restoring peace in Cyprus and putting an end to the Cyprus drama. The United Nations, he said, should take a clear stand on applying self-determination to Cyprus.15 Incidentally, by this time, the Turkish Foreign Minister, as Ambassador G. Pesmazoglou reported from Ankara on August 19, had ceased invoking the testimony of Settar iksel, the former Turkish Ambassador in Athens, as the main Turkish source of the allegation that AveroffTossizza had been the first to propose partition as a solution of the Cyprus question. When the Greek Ambassador asked Zorlu to reply to the Greek government's inquiry on this matter, the Turkish Foreign Minister answered that he did not wish to place the Greek Foreign Minister in a difficult position. And, when the Greek envoy countered by observing he did not see exactly how Averoff-Tossizza could be embarrassed since the inquiry with the Turkish government had been 18 14 15

Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 687. Keesing's, 16453. Kathimerini, August 29, 1958.

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made on his own initiative, Zorlu chose to remain silent and then switched the conversation to another matter. Commented Pesmazoglou in his report to Athens: as long as the Turkish government did not reply to the Greek government's inquiry and wished only by indirection to justify its contention, and as long as Zorlu remained silent after his own challenging remark, he believed the matter was now closed "in our favor". One could hardly expect the Turkish officials to admit the inaccuracy of their contention about the paternity of the idea of partition.

B. "ISAAKIOS"-GRIVAS FRICTION OVER GREEK POLICY

Very shortly after the revised Macmillan plan was announced, Grivas, in a note to Averoff-Tossizza for which he provides no date but which cannot be earlier than August 18,16 asserted that the Cyprus problem would never be solved as long as attention was not clearly focused on the role each state would play in a future conflict. At tragic moments for the nation, he unfortunately was, he wrote, the only one who saw matters differently from the rest, completely disagreeing as he did with the politicomilitary leadership in Greece. "At great moments, great decisions are required, and only revolutionary ideas, beliefs, and methods can save the situation." Although he acknowledged he neither had the power to impose his views on anyone nor could he claim to do so, he vehemently urged the Greek government to show at least national dignity and pride and not refrain from striking counterblows at "impotent" Turkey. Had not Greece refused to yield to two all-powerful empires, Germany and Italy? But, regardless of what the Greek government would do, he, at any rate, in Cyprus would accept no compromise in order to win freedom. Rather than depend on the toleration of others for survival, he preferred to die in battle.17 On August 21, he circulated a leaflet declaring that "we shall not surrender to the Anglo-Turkish conspiracy of partnership . . . We seek self-determination. The 450,000 Greeks are determined to react by all means... The British plan will be shattered by the will of the Cypriot people." He called on the Greek Cypriots to get ready for the great battle and to obey the orders of the struggle's leadership. In another 16 This was a reply to Averoff-Tossizza's letter of August 13, which, Grivas writes, he received on August 18,1958, i.e. five days later. 17 Grivas Memoirs, p. 280.

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leaflet he called on the Governor of Cyprus to bury the British plan, because only over the bodies of 450,000 Greek Cypriots would he be able to impose it. Concurrently, he directed his attention to the concrete problems of slowing down the preparation of the electoral registers and of getting the cooperation of the Greek Cypriot civil servants in preventing the implementation of the revised Macmillan plan.18 Revealing, on the other hand, the Hamletian quandary in which the Greek government found itself at this critical juncture is a letter of August 20, 1958, from the Greek Foreign Minister, under his "Isaakios" pseudonym, to Grivas, suggesting that EOKA, for the time being, should wait before resuming action. In this letter, after referring with pride to the Greek government's rejection of the revised Macmillan plan, "Isaakios" wrote that he himself could not see what would emerge. Had matters reached a dead end? Was a protraction of the struggle to be expected, with the contingency of faits accomplis occurring meantime? Was he himself prepared for the protraction of the struggle? Though the government perceived serious ordeals ahead and did not wish to withdraw from its alliances (because of the dangers to Greek security and because through such an act the Cyprus situation might worsen), it was determined to continue a lively struggle and to maintain an independent attitude vis-à-vis the allies. It would never accept an interim solution, except if this interim solution was one that it could accept. But, first, was this really so? Second, what perspective did it have by following such tactics? Third, what concrete means were available for applying these tactics? Were these tactics effective? Before researching this matter further, he would like to have Grivas' views on these matters. This was urgent, not only because research on this matter was urgent but because he himself would soon be away from Athens (at the United Nations). In the meantime, "Isaakios" acknowledged, he did not know what Grivas would do. It was difficult for himself to give an opinion on this matter, because he should have all the data necessary for taking a decision, and he had only very few, and these were not absolutely reliable. Nonetheless, "Isaakios" conveyed to Grivas the following thoughts: Although at first glance, the lack of any perspective and of sufficient understanding weighed in favor of resuming the intense political struggle of "the political organization which you have at your disposal", the resumption of this 18

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 283-284. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 687, noted on August 23, 1958, that EOKA had issued "a rather strange threat" in ordering a political boycott of the British plan, not a resumption of terrorism.

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struggle would immediately provoke armed action on the part of the British and the Turks, the latter aided by the former. The ordeals that would ensue from this clash did not frighten him. What frightened him, however, were the possible political consequences of such action, and mainly the occurrence of faits accomplis. Also he was in no position to weigh well the consequences of the resort to the United Nations in such an eventuality. For these reasons, he believed that, at least for a certain span of time, "until we study the situation and, so long as the Turks are not inflicting blows in Cyprus and the British are restrained, we should wait". 19 In response to Grivas' earlier-mentioned letter as well as to other letters which Grivas had written to the Bishop of Kyrenia for instance, sharply criticizing Greek policy in the Cyprus question, "Isaakios", in a letter of August 23, analyzed at some length this policy, focusing on Turkey's position. And, as he had done in his letter of August 20, once again he advised restraint, at least for the time being. The Greek government's policy, wrote "Isaakios", was not due to lack of dynamism or courage. It was based on convictions about the interests of the whole Greek nation. Turkey's originally "nonexistent or minimal" interest in Cyprus had been artificially cultivated and was now real. Its rulers now were prisoners of their intransigence both because of their repeated statements and their incredibly obstinate character — Zorlu's in particular. As a result, the last relics of Byzantium—the Hellenism of Constantinople and the Patriarchate—were in danger. Besides, the West, rightly or wrongly, regarded Turkey as a decisive factor in the Near and Middle East, because of Suez and that region's oil resources. "Isaakios" thence summed up the methods to which the Greek government had resorted in order to counter Turkey's strong position. First, by strong arguments, the government sought to persuade Western leaders to change their mind about the correctness of their policy. A few results (unspecified) had been achieved by this method. Second, it conducted a strong pro-Arab policy, so as to serve Greece's more general interests and so that Greece might exert a radiating influence in the Near East, in contrast to Turkey. This method had led to clear results and successes. Third, the government sought to provide evidence that Greece, because of the Cyprus question, might abandon the West, thus severing Turkey from the West. In this third method, however, the Greek government had met with 16

Grivas Memoirs, p. 284.

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complete failure. During the Lebanon landings in mid-July this had become quite clear. Until then, NATO had been annoyed and disturbed but its response to the Greek threats had been to say that at the most it would merely have to change its plans. During the Lebanon landings, however, which were quite an important military operation and were carried out with preparations even for an eventual big clash, the allies had asked the Greek government for the use of many Greek airfields and other facilities. Despite other possible repercussions, the Greek government had not deferred to these requests on the correctly formal ground that the Lebanon landings were not a NATO operation, though major European powers had taken quite a different position. As a result of this refusal, the allied operations were carried out through Libya and Malta. 20 This involved greater financial costs but, after demarches and complaints for a few hours, the operations went on, and the Greek factor was ignored. The conclusion, therefore, was that modern military means rendered Greece seriously annoying only if it became actively hostile to the West and to Turkey. But this was something no national-minded Greek would do. A merely neutral Greece could annoy, "Isaakios" reemphasized, but not seriously enough for it to be able to get important concessions in exchange for its returning to the allied fold. In the Cyprus question, continued "Isaakios", Greece would also have to face the categorical opposition of all allies who were exerting efforts to solve the problem by stages and in a favorable way outside of the United Nations, where undesirable intra-allied verbal clashes occurred in the presence of Soviet bloc states. Besides, within the framework of the alliance, a pressure beneficial to the Greek cause was exerted on the "Anglo-Turks". This, indeed, was one of the reasons that the Turks were trying to force an immediate solution. Another reason was that they feared the Labour Party might come to power in Britain. This might not solve the question but could lead to developments more favorable for Greece. If Greece withdrew from NATO, not only would the Cyprus question deteriorate, "Isaakios" argued. So would the position of Greece — not only because of economic problems. To a certain extent the latter could be met thanks to the great eagerness of the USSR further to develop the already important Soviet-Greek economic relations. However, many other problems, of a fundamental character, were also involved. Third 20

In 1971 the author was informed by a reliable source that the Greek military actually did permit the use of Greek airfields on this occasion.

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parties outside of NATO (i.e. Yugoslavia) wanted Greece in NATO. Because of Greece's NATO membership they behaved toward Greece with respect and strengthened it. Otherwise, because of its geographical location and strength, Greece would become a mere Balkan appendage without any other power on which to rely. Besides, Soviet tactics always included infiltration and local wars. With regard to infiltration matters were not going too well. And in the event of a local war, a neutral Greece would be a great temptation for Bulgaria which wanted an outlet to the Aegean. Bulgaria was militarily far stronger than Greece. The USSR had armed it to the teeth. If Bulgaria carried out a fait accompli by occupying Thrace, what state would move in favor of Greece, to kick the Bulgars out of that mere ribbon of land? NATO, on the other hand, was not so much interested in that strip of Thrace as in Greece as a whole, for if Greece fell into enemy hands, this would be a grave setback.21 Moreover, about 90 per cent of Greek exports went to the West. "Isaakios" thus concluded that the struggle for Cyprus could be waged only within the framework of the alliance with the West. The current moment, he acknowledged, was the most difficult of all. Turkey, after the previous UN General Assembly, wanted to get something definitive. If it did not succeed through blackmail, it would try bloodshed in Cyprus. Britain, fearing the erosion of its worldwide prestige, did not want bloodshed, which also created serious internal political difficulties. Important Tories and, unfortunately, important Labourites, too, believed that if grave turmoil occurred again in Cyprus, the British government should declare that it would keep only bases on the island and, giving up its sovereignty over the island, should invite Turkey to seize the northern part of Cyprus and Greece the southern part. Apparently the Turks favored a clash in Cyprus on the basis of the same calculation. "Isaakios" went on to recommend what should be done under the circumstances. The Macmillan plan should be frustrated. It was full of dangers for the present and the future. In the view of many allies, if tranquility in Cyprus prevailed and it were demonstrated within two or three months that the plan could not be applied, Britain would be forced into something tolerable, albeit still provisional. Accordingly, "Isaakios" prescribed that clashes with the British or the Turks in Cyprus should be avoided because otherwise an avalanche of developments might occur that could create difficulties or frustrate backstage activities of the allies. 21

In his book, Grivas omits "Isaakios' " reference to the possibility of a war with Bulgaria.

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In the United Nations, a new course would be pursued, he added, without elaborating further. In conclusion, "Isaakios" insisted he had not the slightest doubt that at this moment (emphasis in text) at any rate, "our revolution would not be beneficial and could even do much harm". On August 24, responding to "Isaakios'" anxious letter of August 20, received on August 23, Grivas, expressed his views about the situation in terms of grand strategy without providing any data about his own concrete EOKA situation in Cyprus. 22 As usual, he attacked the Greek government's Cyprus policy and blamed it for the dead end which had been reached. Instead of conducting a ruthless and all-out policy, such as the one he had advocated from the very beginning, and instead of playing the Greek trumps with determination and steadfastness, in which case he was confident that a 100 per cent success would have been achieved, all postwar Greek governments had chosen to play the game within the framework of Greece's alliances. The result was that instead of Greece exerting pressure on Britain, Britain now was exerting pressure on Greece. For it knew "we would not break away from our alliances and therefore whatever we did or said was bluff". Under the circumstances, the armed struggle in Cyprus, the original purpose of which had been to support diplomacy, was without an objective and likewise at a dead end. It was not Turkey's location, Grivas maintained (this location argument for him was poppycock, he wrote), but Turkey's determination and steadfastness in pursuing a single goal — partition — and of threatening withdrawal from NATO if it did not get half of Cyprus, that made the Anglo-Americans dance to the Turkish tune. In reality, Turkey was like a rock which, at the first blow, would sink into the ocean depths. For it was isolated, surrounded by foes, with only Iran and Pakistan as dubious allies. Far preferable to the alliance with Turkey would be a BelgradeAthens-Cairo coalition, as he had argued earlier, too. 23 This would provide not only greater maneuverability but also security for the whole of Africa and of the Balkan area — something Turkey could not assure. But the Greek government's Cyprus policies, which were based on sentiment not on self-interest, were also to blame for the rise of communist influence in Greece. Instead of raising a barrier to communist infiltration, of checking communism, these policies strengthened it. For among the Greek people they engendered feelings of anger against the West and of sympathy for the East, which supported the Cyprus cause. If this policy M 23

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 285-286. Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 266-267.

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continued, he feared the communist party would emerge all-powerful from new elections. The Greek people had a great vice: they took revenge, regardless of consequences. If a plebiscite were to be conducted at this time, the Karamanlis government and the Anglo-Americans would receive not even a single vote. Accordingly, Grivas' prescription for dealing with the situation was: kick aside both the East and the West. The Greek government should pursue an independent policy. This was the only way toward salvation. The entire nation would follow. If necessary, the Opposition parties ought to be invited to take part in a coalition government to deal with the crisis. This would not lower the government's prestige in the eyes of the people. On the contrary, it would raise it, by showing that the government at great historical moments was not pursuing party interests but the union of the entire nation in order to defend the right of half a million Greeks as well as Greek dignity against the wicked and unfair treatment of the Allies. If this were not done he saw no satisfactory solution to the Cyprus question. He was aware, of course, of the arguments about Greece's economic dependence on the West, but he was prepared to refute these, too. There was no point in answering Averoff-Tossizza's concrete question about EOKA's situation and needs, after the above analysis, Grivas maintained. The answer resided not in technical means but in discovering the causes of the dead end reached. As far as he was concerned, at any rate, one could depend on him to wage the armed struggle until the last bullet. As long as he lived, he would never give in. Nobody should ever dare ask him to abandon Cyprus and his struggle for the purpose of imposing the monstrous British plan. He did not intend to dishonor himself and Cyprus. Even if Greece should be unable diplomatically to exploit his struggle, his own personal obligation was never to come to terms, but to die, in order to cleanse away the shame of others. Replying to this letter of Grivas, "Isaakios" reiterated at even greater length the points he had made in his letter of August 23, including in it verbatim a great number of the letter's paragraphs with minor additions and expressing his consternation at Grivas' views. In spite of press reports, no disagreement, "Isaakios" stressed, existed within the Greek Cabinet, though as in any collegiate body it was natural for differences to arise over matters of detail. The Greek government, he emphasized, had shown many examples of independent action, in the cases, for instance, of the Suez crisis of 1956, the Syrian-Turkish crisis of 1957, the recall of the Greek NATO officers from Izmir, the recognition of the new Iraqi

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government, the latter two in 1958. Once again he hinted that in the United Nations the Greek government was preparing to spring on the adversaries a surprise that might produce results. And the threat of the revolt rather than the revolt itself, he wrote, benefited the Cyprus cause more. However, he expressed the fear lest, even if Grivas wanted peace, peace might not be kept, because the Turks had an interest against it — in which case Grivas inevitably would react. 24 In response to "Isaakios'" letter of August 23, Grivas, on September 1, wrote that he had not intended to criticize the Greek Foreign Minister but wanted merely to inform him of his own views. Perhaps his frankness had shocked "Isaakios". However, he was not used to concealing his feelings. He could not conceal the fact that Karamanlis enjoyed no esteem among the Cypriots who saw with dismay the humiliations suffered by the Greeks. To drive this point home, he quoted from a report he had recently received from an EOKA sector leader. 25 Grivas, it seems, did not again hear from the Greek Foreign Minister before the second half of October. 26 On September 9, he denounced his truce of August 4 but at first limited himself to reprisals.27 Two days earlier, Karamanlis publicly warned that Greece would use all political and diplomatic means to prevent the implementation of the Macmillan plan. Efforts unilaterally to implement this plan, he predicted, would contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus and possibly to dangerous developments which would not be to the interests of the Free World. The plan was unjust because it disregarded the will of the great majority of the Cypriots. It was also a flagrant violation of the Lausanne Treaty. The British government would exclusively bear the responsibility for the consequences of its insistence on imposing the Macmillan plan and of its disregard of the Greek government's reasonable and moderate proposals. And King Paul, from Switzerland, declared that the Cypriots wanted to become free, had a right to become free, and would become free. 28

24

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 286-288. Ibid., p.m. a ® Ibid., p. 288. 27 The first EOKA ambush was carried out on September 13, 1958 when a British soldier was killed and another one wounded. British soldiers carried out reprisals in the villages of Kathika, Yolu, and Theletra, ibid., p. 312. 28 Ibid., p. 303 (full text of Karamanlis statement). 25

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On September 5, 1958, under the chairmanship of Premier Karamanlis, top Greek government officials discussed the handling of the Cyprus question in the upcoming UN General Assembly,29 adopting the new strategy which "Isaakios" hoped would, as he had written to Grivas, take the opponents by surprise. Seven days later, the Greek Mission to the United Nations sent in to the Secretary-General the relevant explanatory memorandum. 30 Although in its recourse of August 15, it had not used its customary formula "of self-determination under the auspices of the United Nations", but had merely asked for the inclusion of the "Cyprus Question" in the Assembly's agenda, in its explanatory memorandum of September 15, it emphasized the issue as one of freedom and selfdetermination (note the order of the words), which the British government continued to deny to the Cypriots. Despite Resolution 1013(XI), the Greek government observed in this memorandum, the British government had avoided entering into direct negotiations with the Cypriots. Nor had it taken into account that the Political Committee at the Assembly's twelfth session in 1957 had adopted a resolution calling for the application of the right of self-determination for the Cypriot people, with the Assembly likewise favoring it by a simple majority. Summarizing developments since then, the Greek government recounted that the British government sought for an interim solution. The Greek government, with Makarios in agreement, had said that the only acceptable interim solution was the setting up of a genuine and democratic selfgovernment. The Macmillan plan, however, was undemocratic on two counts. It totally ignored the right and the will of the 80 per cent of the population and it called on foreign governments to share in the continued alien domination over a non-self-governing territory and its people. 31 Thus the plan was contrary to the UN Charter. Besides, by preparing for the island's partition, it also prejudged the future. Referring to the Turkish attacks of June 1958 against the Greek population, the Greek government charged that the purpose of these attacks was to demonstrate 29

Vima, September 6, 1958. Averoff-Tossizza left for New York to handle the question at the UN on September 6, 1958, while C. Tsatsos took over as Acting Foreign Minister in Athens. 30 GAOR, Thirteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 68, pp. 1-3 (hereafter cited as Agenda Item 68). 31 In the past, the Greek government, in its recourses to the United Nations, had not invoked the Declaration on Non-Self-Governing Territories of the Charter but only the principle of self-determination of Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Charter.

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the need of partition as a final solution. The Turkish government, moreover, was threatening direct intervention. A chaotic situation prevailed on the island. Thousands of Greeks were held in concentration camps. The situation had entered a critical phase. The British attempts to impose a solution could endanger the peace and security of the whole area. The Assembly, the Greek government hoped, would take appropriate action to alleviate the plight of the Cypriots, to remove all foreign threats of interference, and to help the Cypriots realize their legitimate claims in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter. In a long dispatch of September 13,32 a well-informed Greek journalist at the UN headquarters reported that certain diplomatic observers had noted that the Greek government's explanatory memorandum on the Cyprus question left the door open for any solution proposed by the United Nations that would be in accordance with the UN Charter. One such solution would be the establishment of an independent Cyprus. In the past, the Greek government and Makarios had rejected such a proposal. 33 But now, a call for independence would extricate the Greek government from the dead end in which it found itself. Independence would be a counterweight to the Macmillan plan. In the United Nations, a draft resolution calling for Cypriot independence, not self-determination (which people like Krishna Menon considered as a cover for enosis) would facilitate the position of Greece's friends and render more difficult that of its foes. The question was: how would Ethnarch Makarios react to such a proposal? At the time it was not public knowledge that already, on September 7, 1958, Makarios had told the Greek government privately that he was now ready to accept independence for Cyprus under UN auspices after a period of self-government.34 On September 13, Makarios appealed to the ambassadors of Britain and the United States in Athens asking them to prevent the arrival in Cyprus of the representative of the Turkish government provided for in the Macmillan plan. And Averoff-Tossizza, in New York, publicly reiterated that the plan was an unnatural solution and that the Cyprus 311

Vima, September 14, 1958. Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 53-54, and 380-381. 34 R. Stephens, Cyprus, A Place of Arms (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 155, writes that on September 7, 1958, Makarios told the Greek government privately that he was now ready to accept independence for Cyprus under U N auspices after a period of self-government. This was two days after the Greek government discussed the handling of the recourse to the United Nations. To judge from the pattern of cooperation between the Greek government and Makarios, it is likely that the Greek government idea was communicated to Makarios who then gave his assent.

33

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question would dangerously complicate the situation in the Near and Middle East. Greece, he added, would continue to struggle for the liberation of Cyprus from colonial domination. 35 On September 17, in the United Nations the General Committee decided to recommend the inclusion of the Cyprus question in the Assembly's agenda; on September 22, the Assembly adopted this recommendation. 3 6 Immediately after the Assembly's decision, the Greek Foreign Minister asked to meet and met his British colleague at the latter's apartment in New York, with other officials present on both sides. AveroffTossizza proposed that the implementation of the Macmillan plan which was to start on October 1, 1958 be suspended and that the whole Cyprus question be put "in the freeze" for at least three years, with EOKA completely ceasing its operations. In exchange, he was prepared to recommend to Athens the withdrawal of the Cyprus item from the Assembly's agenda. Selwyn Lloyd, however, was obdurate. His government was officially committed to the Macmillan plan. If it dropped this commitment, perhaps EOKA would end its operations, but a Turkish EOKA would start similar activities. Since Cyprus was so close to Turkey, reinforcing the Turkish EOKA would be very easy. Until now we have been unable to persuade you. Today I am convinced we cannot persuade Turkey. As a result, in one case our alliance with Greece is endangered, and the bloodshed is the fault of the Greeks; in the other case, we have the same results for our alliance with Turkey, the bloodshed being the fault of the Turks. Since you did not listen to us and were in a hurry, 37 since you chose to ignore the Turks altogether, since we put forward many solutions and now have exposed and committed ourselves to the Macmillan plan, we have no other choice but to apply it. Do you wish to accept it? We shall be happy. If you do not, we shall implement it with the Turks as best we can. Sooner or later a part of the population will help us. In one way or another we must close this problem. Withdrawal of your recourse to the United Nations would have some importance. Acrimonious debates would be avoided. However, the recourse does not bother us too much. You will accuse us. Others, by whom we have stood, will praise us. And you will get no resolution. I would prefer your avoiding the recourse so that your relations with Turkey do not become cooler than they are now. Otherwise, the recourse has no great significance. Withdrawing it cannot constitute for us the basis of a

35

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 303-304. GAOR, Thirteenth Session, General Committee, p. 4; 752d plenary meeting, September 22, 1958, p. 51. 37 Lloyd had predicted "toil and moil" in Cyprus if Greece insisted on raising the problem, as early as 1954, Conflict and Conciliation, p. 9. 38

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bargain in which we, in exchange, would revise the policy to which we are committed.38 In Athens meanwhile, on September 19, Karamanlis and Makarios conferred at length on the Cyprus situation. Constantine Tsatsos, Acting Foreign Minister in the absence of Averoff-Tossizza, and three officials of the Greek Foreign Ministry were present. 39 The Premier started out by bringing the Ethnarch up to date on the Greek government's efforts to frustrate the implementation of the Macmillan plan. First there was the communication of September 19 to NATO's Secretary-General and NATO members in which Karamanlis had drawn attention to the fact that the plan's implementation would endanger peace in the eastern Mediterranean and the cohesion of the alliance. Second, on September 9, he had asked Spaak to call a meeting of the NATO Council to discuss the Greek appeal on the limited question of frustrating the implementation of this plan. Third, the Greek government, on September 18, through letters handed by C. Tsatsos to the ambassadors in Athens of state signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne (France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Japan), had drawn attention to the intended violation of that treaty on the part of Britain and Turkey (because of the partnership feature of the plan) and had requested their intercession.40 Coming then to the question of Cyprus in the United Nations, it was expedient, Karamanlis said, to examine whether from now on one should accept any of the solutions to the Cyprus problem which UN members also might accept, for instance independence or a UN trusteeship, for the purpose of immediately undertaking a campaign to enlighten foreign governments and render them sympathetic to such a solution. Makarios replied that, in his opinion, there was no chance that year for the Assembly to adopt a resolution calling for self-determination for the people of Cyprus. He therefore concurred that the Greek government should put 38

The Last Battle (in Greek) (Athens, 1961), pp. 15-16. This book is evidently based on sources provided by Averoff-Tossizza himself, if it was not written by him, for his 1961 election campaign. 38 The officials were Pericles Skeferis, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Ministry; Paul Gouras-Economou, acting Director of the Second Political Directorate; and D. Bitsios. 40 In its identic notes to the Ambassadors in Athens of France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Japan (all parties to the Lausanne Treaty), the Greek government invoked Article 27 of that Treaty which stipulated that Turkey would exercise no political, legislative or administrative authority or jurisdiction outside of the territory of Turkey on subjects of territories under the sovereignty or the protectorate of the other power signatories of the Lausanne Treaty or on subjects of a territory detached from Turkey.

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forward independence as a solution to the Cyprus question, but without any conditions or limitations. Such a proposal, in his view, would evoke a more favorable response than one calling for Cypriot self-determination. After a brief discussion, it was agreed that the solution of unconditional independence should be put forward, it being left to the Assembly to propose any limitations it believed appropriate. Mention was also made that Makarios had referred to the solution of independence in his talks with Barbara Castle, M. P. for Blackburn and Vice-Chairman of the Labour Party, who had passed through Athens on her way to Cyprus for an on-the-spot study of the situation on the island.41 Karamanlis, then, observing that the Greek recourse to the United Nations would not be debated before December, stressed that to frustrate or achieve the suspension of the Macmillan plan's implementation was a far more urgent matter. What were Makarios' views on this, he asked. "I cannot conceal from you my impression that the government's reaction to the British plan has not been vigorous enough and effective", replied the Ethnarch. "I believe NATO should have been warned that Greece would examine its position in it, if the plan is implemented." "I am astonished", retorted the Premier, "because this is the first time I hear complaints of this sort. All our moves against the Macmillan plan were carried out in agreement. During our meetings a week ago you formulated no observations, no complaints. At any rate, I wish to inform you that the government, without raising a clamor, because this is often not desirable, had made repeated and vigorous demarches for the purpose of frustrating the British plan. To the moves I have already mentioned to you, I should add that the King sent a personal message to Eisenhower42 and that I myself handed a personal note to the U.S. Ambassador on the matter. All these demarches contain a warning that the implementation of the British plan in Cyprus will render problematic the position of Greece in NATO." "I did not know this. We must, however", continued Makarios, "examine why the actions until now taken by the government have been unsuccessful. In my opinion, this is due to the way in which the de41

The Memoirs of General Grivas, ed. Charles Foley (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 162. According to this version of Grivas' memoirs, Barbara Castle, visiting Cyprus, brought word from Athens that Makarios did not exclude independence, after a period of self-government, as a solution. After touring Cyprus, she saw Makarios again in Athens. He authorized her then to give this news to the world's press. This information is not found in the Greek-language Grivas Memoirs. 42 Apparently, President Eisenhower replied to this note without touching the substance of the question.

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marches were made. Perhaps the other governments were not allowed to understand that they cannot ignore the views of Greece with impunity. As an example, I mention the statement of Averoff-Tossizza, when he was going to Brioni, that Greece will not abandon its alliances." "If in the past statements were made about our steadfast adherence to our alliances", Karamanlis explained, "this was imperative at the time either because we had to react to the efforts of the Left Wing to draw Greece away from its alliances or because it was necessary to neutralize the propaganda of our opponents that Greece was an unreliable and faithless ally — which, in a certain way, also harmed our struggle in the Cyprus question. I have mentioned to you", Karamanlis added, "all those actions we resorted to and the spirit in which they were carried out. In my view, beyond these actions only the actual withdrawal of Greece from NATO remains. On this occasion, I would like to know whether you espouse this view which, especially in recent times, certain circles put forward, among them Cypriot circles, too." 4 3 "In principle I would use in a skilful way the threat of withdrawal from NATO and would never state that I would remain in the alliance", replied Makarios. "And if this brought no results? If, namely, you declared that you would withdraw from NATO, what would you do, if your demands were not satisfied? In my opinion, you would have to withdraw. Otherwise you would become an international laughing stock." "If need be, we should temporarily withdraw from NATO." "If these are your views, then, indeed, there is a disagreement between us", said Karamanlis, "because the government, defending the more general interests of the nation, is not disposed to follow a policy of withdrawal from NATO. You must keep in mind the geographic position of Greece, which is under the pressure of the Slav and communist mass. You must keep in mind the permanent threat of the Slavs for the creation of a Macedonia of the Aegean in order to realize the dangers Greece would be running if it broke away from the West. Suffice it for me to tell you that even Yugoslavia offers its friendship to us as long as we maintain the Balkan Pact and remain in NATO. It would therefore be unforgivable to endanger the security of free Greece in order to speed up the solution of the Cyprus question. Cyprus, no matter what the British do, will finally be freed, and its inhabitants will get justice. Were Greece, however, 48

Grivas, it will be recalled, continually urged Greece's withdrawal from NATO and the setting up of a Belgrade-Athens-Cairo Axis.

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to withdraw from its alliances, it would run the danger of ceasing to exist as a free country. Without a free Greece, there can be no thought of a free Cyprus." "In my opinion", rejoined Makarios, "these dangers would not exist. In the end the Americans will not let Greece withdraw from NATO or, if it has withdrawn, they will later welcome it back again into the alliance." "I do not believe it is possible, without danger, to lead the country into such an adventure", replied Karamanlis. "However, the implementation of the British plan and the arrival of the Turkish representative in Cyprus will create an explosive situation and will be considered as a failure of the government's policy." 44 "For the first time I ascertain a disagreement. You are trying to separate your responsibilities from my government's. This, however, is not brave. The policy followed for years was a joint policy. Until now I know of no disagreement having occurred between ourselves in handling the Cyprus question, except for today's disagreement which has to do with our position in NATO. If you had complaints or disagreements, why did you not mention them to me until now?" "I confess that until the new British plan was formulated, no disagreement had ever arisen between me and the government about the handling of the Cyprus question. However, after the plan was formulated, I think the government's actions have not been successful, because they were not taken in a satisfactory way." "You are not right. Even after the British plan was formulated, ours was a joint policy. Both of us rejected the plan and we jointly decided upon the improvements we requested. Had we accepted the plan and had you not accepted it or vice versa, there would have been disagreement. However, since there was no such disagreement, I am astonished to hear now and for the first time such complaints." 44

On September 22, 1958, Grivas received a letter from Makarios who wrote that the appointment of a Turkish representative to Cyprus would affect also the political situation in Greece. Grivas replied that politics in Greece interested him only insofar as they served the struggle in Cyprus. He was not interested in personalities or parties and would applaud any political group of national-minded parties which would regard the Cyprus question as a really national question and would try to solve it by pursuing a purely national policy instead of being dictated by sentimental alliances or economic benefits. He himself was not indulging in politics when he maintained that the Greek government had not correctly conceived the politico-military policy of Greece. If those who handled Greek affairs well understood the value of Greece in a future clash and exploited it, "surely we would today be victors in the Cyprus question" (Grivas Memoirs, p. 303).

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"Mr. President, there are no complaints. But in recent times a difference exists in the estimate of the limits of our actions which, in my opinion, have not been exhausted." "It is the government which determines these limits. It is better informed and has wider responsibilities. Let me tell you that our actions are already approaching the peril point, for I consider our withdrawal from NATO as a national peril." "I repeat", said Makarios, "that if the British plan is implemented and the Turkish representative goes to Cyprus and the question is raised whether the Greek government has done all in its power in this matter, I shall be unable to reply in the affirmative." "Then, from now on we shall disagree since for the first time there is disagreement about NATO", retorted Karamanlis. "For three years we have been cooperating and I am not aware that you ever had any disagreement. In quite a few cases, we accepted your views exactly in order to avoid a split in the struggle.45 But, I ask you: why did you not, even in our most recent meetings, express your complaints? It is unseemly to express disagreement today, on the ground that the Cyprus question is entering an extremely disagreeable phase because of the imminent implementation of the British plan, and to try to lay the responsibility on one partner when it follows from today's discussion that no difference exists in the responsibilities of both partners. In my opinion", continued the Premier, "we should, instead, keep our sang froid and our cohesion with the conviction that the British plan will fail and that international developments will favor us in the future. Cyprus, as all international problems, is a matter of time. That is why patience and persistence above all are required." "There is no disagreement on the general line", replied Makarios. "But I have some reservations about details. From what you tell me today, I see there are no omissions. I maintain, however, the impression that the demarches made were not sufficiently vigorous. If I made this remark, it was because you asked me for my view. If I were to express it publicly, I would inform you in advance. My intentions are absolutely sincere." At this point, Karamanlis and Makarios decided to hold a further 45

During the twelfth General Assembly, for example, because of Makarios' rejection of Krishna Menon's proposal for the tabling of a draft resolution calling for independence, the Greek Delegation, despite its own inclination to accept the proposal, rejected it and went ahead with its draft resolution calling for self-determination, Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 380-381.

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meeting after the return of Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza from abroad. Three days after this rather tense exchange, as NATO SecretaryGeneral Spaak was about to arrive in Athens in connection with the Cyprus question, the world learned of a dramatic new development in the Ethnarch's position on it. In an interview of September 22, 1958, with Barbara Castle, who had conferred with him in Athens, where she had briefly stopped on her way back to London after her Cyprus trip, Makarios proposed that the right way for taking both the Greek and Turkish governments out of the Cyprus dispute was for Cyprus, after a fixed period of self-government, to become an independent state that would be linked neither to Turkey nor to Greece. This independent status would not be changed either by enosis or partition, unless the United Nations were to approve of such a change. The United Nations thus would guarantee the new state's independence. Full safeguards for the Turkish community of Cyprus would be negotiated. And Commonwealth membership of the new state would not be incompatible with this status of UN-guaranteed independence. The first step in implementing this proposal would be for the British government to work out with representatives of the Cypriot people a Constitution for self-government. An independent Cyprus, he was convinced, would make a better contribution to the defence of freedom than a Cyprus torn by colonial or civil war. Once the problem was no longer complicated by the introduction of third parties into the dispute, confidence and harmony could be restored among the Cypriot people. On September 27 these proposals were formally conveyed to Premier Macmillan through the British Embassy in Athens. 46 The idea of setting up an independent Cyprus as a solution to the dispute, it should be noted, was not new. What was new was that the Ethnarch himself for the first time had committed himself publicly to such a solution, without any reference to self-determination. Ever since the Indian Defense Minister, Krishna Menon, at the ninth General Assembly in 1954, during the first Greek recourse to the United Nations, had maintained that Cyprus really was a question of the freedom and independence of the Cypriot people,47 this state-building concept had germinated and had started to grow both inside and outside the United 46

Keesing's, 16454. Full text of Makarios' interview, Times, September 23, 1958. For text of Makarios' message to Macmillan, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 387-388. 47 GAOR, Ninth Session, 477th plenary meeting, September 24, 1954, p. 59.

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Nations. In 1955, during the tenth General Assembly's debate over the inclusion of the Cyprus item in the agenda, Krishna Menon had reemphasized this idea. 48 He had done so again during the eleventh and twelfth General Assemblies.49 Indeed, late in 1956, at the eleventh Assembly, backstage, he had even proposed to the Greek Delegation the tabling of a draft resolution that would call for the independence of the Cypriot people. 50 Though the Greek government, with Makarios then in exile in the Seychelles Islands, had rejected this proposal, it had now taken up this concept as a device to show up its conciliatory spirit and the possibly expansionist aspirations of the Turkish government. 51 In its view however, independence would be followed eventually by the exercise of the right of self-determination.52 Spaak, NATO's SecretaryGeneral, had meanwhile adopted a similar view.53 So had Makarios in July 1957 after his return from the Seychelles. Like the Greek government, however, he regarded such a solution acceptable only if another state, not Greece, proposed it. The British and American governments had been informed about this. 54 At the twelfth General Assembly, however, when the Indian Defense Minister in December 1957 reverted backstage to a proposal similar to the one he had made to the Greek Delegation at the Assembly's previous session, the Cypriot Ethnarch had rejected this approach, preferring to insist on the demand for self-determination, even though the Greek Foreign Minister, by that time, was inclined to endorse the Indian proposal. 55 Then, in February 1958, as mentioned earlier, both the Greek Foreign Minister and the Greek Premier had told Lloyd that 48

GOAR, Tenth Session, 521st plenary meeting, September 23, 1955, p. 62. GAOR, Eleventh Session, First Committee, 856th meeting, February 22, 1957, Verbatim Record, pp. 54-56. Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 469-470, and 472. 60 Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 380-381. 51 Thus, in his set statement at the 847th meeting of the Political Committee, on February 18, 1957, during the eleventh General Assembly, Averoff-Tossizza stated that Greece, through its representatives, had repeatedly declared that it was not asking for the union of Cyprus with Greece but for the freedom of the Cypriots. It demanded the application of the right of self-determination. Greece would respect the result, whatever it might be, of a plebiscite, even if, for example, the Cypriot people should decide to continue as a British colony or to form a totally independent state. And at the Committee's 855th meeting, he challenged the Turkish Delegation to reply to his question whether Turkey would be ready to sign an agreement on a solution which would rule out annexation. He had received no reply, he added, Verbatim Record, pp. 21-22. For repercussions of this statement, see, Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 110, 112, and 344. 82 Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 162-163. 58 Ibid., p. 137. 54 Ibid., pp. 162-163, and 185 (Karamanlis statement of September 5, 1957). 56 Ibid., pp. 380-381. 49

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independence and commonwealth participation for Cyprus, at least for a fixed period of years, would be acceptable again so long as Britain or the United States were to propose such a solution. During the crisis over the Macmillan plan in its original formulation in mid-June 1958, AveroffTossizza had approached the British and American ambassadors in Athens with a similar proposal. 56 In a letter to Grivas, 57 Makarios explained that his proposal to Barbara Castle, though appearing to be a concession, constituted a tactic which the situation imposed and any cool confrontation with reality demanded. The recent news he had received about the situation had been most disheartening. Britain was firmly resolved to impose its plan on Cyprus. British public opinion had turned "against us". Even the Labour Party press organs, whenever they did not attack "us", avoided publishing any news that would harm the prestige of the British armed forces in Cyprus, and kept silent about their barbarities. They merely stressed the gravity of the situation and the need to safeguard Turkish interests in Cyprus. As for U.S. policy, this was fully aligned with British policy. The probabilities of any success in the United Nations were very limited. A demand for self-determination would have few chances of a success similar to the one achieved at the previous General Assembly. Barbara Castle and the Labourites had said they were unable to react against the British plan, unless he offered something new that would have a favorable impact in Britain. With a new proposal, on the other hand, their Conference would be willing to make a demarche with the British government. Though he could not foretell the consequences of his new move, they could not be bad. Besides, in the United Nations, only on the basis of independence would it be possible to have some hopes. The position of Greece in the Western bloc was such that any determined action for substantial and positive support of the Cyprus cause was incredibly difficult. Only withdrawal from the Western bloc could create a new situation. But such a move was absolutely unacceptable to the Greek side. Under the circumstances, it was necessary to arrive at the proposal for independence. And it was indispensable to make such a proposal before developments led to faits accomplis in Cyprus, because the imposition of the British plan would inevitably lead to partition or at least would automatically create situations and would assure rights for the Turks which it would be impossible to erase later, even if international conditions were to change. 68 67

See above, Chapter IV, p. 154. Grivas Memoirs, pp. 304-305. Grivas received this letter on September 28, 1958.

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In London, according to press reports, Makarios' proposal of September 22, 1958 for a UN-guaranteed independent Cyprus was received with barely disguised suspicion. Such a scheme, it was believed, would be unacceptable to Turkey. An independent Cyprus, ruled by a government loyal to Athens, would be little more than a satellite of Greece. There was no such thing as a Cypriot nation. It was difficult to visualize that such an unviable community could maintain its independence. Makarios' initiative was but an effort to block Turkey from playing an active role in the island's administration as proposed in the Macmillan plan. On the other hand, it was acknowledged that the idea of an independent Cyprus would probably appeal to many UN members. 58 The Turkish reaction to Makarios' proposal was, again, according to British press reports, sceptical and completely negative. In the view of a Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman, this proposal was a Greek attempt to achieve enosis by indirect means. Turkish opinion, according to this Ankara dispatch, had never accepted the idea of an independent Cyprus on the ground that independence would mean a Greek majority administration and consequently oppression of the Turkish minority. The Turkish Cypriots had refused to agree they were a minority in the normal, democratic sense of the word. They insisted they were a separate community. This was the basis of their demand for partition. 59 In Cyprus itself, the Greek mayors endorsed Makarios' proposal, but the Bishop of Kyrenia, in exile like the Ethnarch, vehemently protested against the abandonment of enosis which this proposal entailed. 60 Dr. Ku?uk, on the other hand, rejected the proposal on the ground that it would inevitably lead to enosis. Turkish leaders reportedly were prepared to accept Makarios' renunciation of enosis only if it were expressed in contractual form, perhaps in a treaty. As for the island's Governor, he chose to make no reference to the new proposal in the broadcast of September 23 he addressed to the British forces. On the contrary, he had nothing but praise for the Macmillan plan, though he acknowledged there were serious dangers in going ahead with it. The new policy, he maintained, was right, and the dangers of wavering or going back were greater. Welcoming the Turkish 58 Times, September 23, 1958. 5» Ibid., September 24, 1958. 80 Vima, September 24, 1958. (full text of the protest of the Bishop of Kyrenia). Only fighting could thwart the implementation of the Macmillan plan, the Bishop maintained. Makarios responded merely by stating that the Bishop was free to have his own opinions on the matter of dealing with the Cyprus question.

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community's cooperation, he said the door was left open to the Greeks. He trusted they would realize the tragic blunder of throwing away the opportunities the new policy offered. "For our part", he said, "we are convinced of the justice of our policy. We believe the policy is the best for the people of Cyprus. We are convinced that it offers the only escape from the deadlock of the past and the only hope for practical progress." 61 Far less convinced of the lightness of this policy, on the other hand, was the Labour Party, the Vice-Chairman of which had promised that she would suggest the adoption of the independence plan as the Party's official policy. Its National Executive Committee, in a statement of September 26, called upon the government to suspend the implementation of the Macmillan plan by postponing the arrival of the Turkish representative in the island. Makarios' proposals, according to this statement, held out new hope for a settlement by agreement. Accordingly, negotiations should be reopened with representatives of the Cypriot people, without whose consent no lasting settlement was possible. The overwhelming majority of the island's inhabitants had already rejected the Macmillan plan, and any attempt to impose it would be unwise and dangerous and would put the British forces in an intolerable position. For negotiations to succeed, Greek fear of partition and Turkish fear lest the Turkish minority be ruled from Athens would have to be removed. If this were done, progress could be made for self-government with full protection of minority rights. The Labour Party's Executive Committee also appealed anew to all concerned to refrain from violent acts. 62 Gaitskell, the Labour Party's leader, termed Makarios' proposal as one of great importance. Bevan too, came out in support of it. 63 An editorial of September 28, 1958 in a British newspaper that reflected the above views was likewise hopeful about Makarios' proposal. It urged clarification of this proposal and an attempt to see how far it could be reconciled with the British plan and Turkey's views. In the context of an independent Cyprus, the communal autonomy envisaged in the Macmillan plan might appear less repugnant to the Greeks. Similarly, safeguards embodied both in the Constitution of an independent Cyprus and perhaps in an international instrument, a Greek-Turkish treaty, for instance, for making sure that enosis would not occur and for protecting the Turkish

81 62 65

Times, September 24, 1958. Keeslng's, 16454. Grivas Memoirs, p. 307.

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minority, might weaken Turkish opposition to the setting up of an independent Cyprus. 64 On the Greek government side, shortly after the Makarios-Castle interview was published, Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza stated he was in full agreement with Makarios on the future of Cyprus. 65 Incidentally, both Karamanlis and Averoff-Tossizza, together with their diplomatic aides in handling the Cyprus question, had been quite upset by the timing of the interview-statement of Makarios, who, before allowing Barbara Castle to disclose his proposal for UN-guaranteed independence for Cyprus, had not consulted the Greek government. They had been keeping this proposal in reserve, with the intention of springing it upon the General Assembly at an appropriate moment. 66 Meanwhile, as Averoff-Tossizza's earlier-mentioned demarche of September 22 with Lloyd reveals, they were trying to get the British to suspend the implementation of the Macmillan plan by other means which included strenuous efforts to use NATO for this purpose. On his return to Athens from New York, Averoff-Tossizza conferred with Makarios on September 27 and posted him about the latest developments in the Cyprus question and the relevant demarches he had made in New York, Paris, and Rome. When the Ethnarch's interview with Barbara Castle was mentioned, Makarios suggested that Ambassador Palamas, acting head of the Greek Delegation to the General Assembly, should without fail express himself in favor of the solution of independence during the general debate in the Assembly. On his side, Averoff-Tossizza agreed to send the appropriate instructions to Palamas 67 but reminded Makarios that from the outset Premier

84

The Observer, September 28, 1958. Royal Institute for International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1958, p. 27. 88 GPD, December 13, 1958, p. 335. (Statement by Karamanlis that, though the government agreed with the solution of independence, the proposal had been untimely and not presented in the most appropriate way.) 87 GAOR, Thirteenth session, 769th plenary meeting, October 3, 1958, p. 314. The proposals made by Makarios for the independence of Cyprus under the guarantee of the United Nations after a period of self-government, the Greek Ambassador said in the general debate, offered a fair, constructive and conciliatory way for solving the problem in accordance with the Charter's relevant provisions. These proposals would enable the people of Cyprus — both Greeks and Turks — to work together as Cypriots for the progress and welfare of their island. Independence of Cyprus was a UN solution consistent with the spirit of our times. It surely ought to be acceptable to the British nation. That it had been rejected revealed a regrettable and unjustifiable intransigence by the British government. One wondered whether the British government was actually 65

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Karamanlis had been prepared to espouse the solution of independence by means of a public statement, by agreement with him, however. Makarios acknowledged this was true but now the moment had come for the government to express itself on this matter in order to place the British government in a difficult position, particularly after he had received certain messages from friends of his in England. Mention being made of the long and tense Karamanlis-Makarios exchange of views of September 19, Averoff-Tossizza stressed the need of maintaining at all costs the existing concord between the Greek government and the Ethnarch. Discord would deal a mortal blow to the Cyprus struggle. It was, he had added, a delusion to imagine that anything else than the withdrawal of the Parliament's confidence in the government could overthrow it. 68 Even if one supposed that the government were to lose its large Parliamentary majority, again the way out would be through general elections. Consequently, the government was not worried about its position. On the contrary, if the Ethnarchy of Cyprus were to repeat its views about the need for Greece to withdraw from NATO, not only the press but also influential government officials would negatively react against the Cypriot leaders in quite a lively way. The Foreign Minister then explained the practical reasons why the withdrawal of Greece from NATO was undesirable. First of all, the Cyprus question would be harmed. He mentioned concrete points which proved that the position of Greece as a neutralist state would be untenable. Averoff-Tossizza finally referred to the Bishop of Kyrenia's disagreement with Makarios' new line 69 and severely condemned it. The Ethnarch, on his side, in this meeting of September 27 with the Greek Foreign Minister, reiterated the views he had expressed during his conference with the Premier. He emphasized in particular certain acts of commission or omission of the Greek government which could be construed as evidence that it was not supporting with all due determination the Cyprus cause and suggested that it had failed to impress the opponents about the grave consequences that would ensue from British

interested in reaching a negotiated settlement or whether it preferred to resort to force in order to impose a plan contrary to the will of the overwhelming majority of the people of Cyprus. • 8 As mentioned earlier, in a letter which Grivas received on September 22, 1958, the Ethnarch had written that the arrival of the Turkish representative in Cyprus would have political repercussions in Greece. 69 See above, note 60.

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efforts to implement the Macmillan plan. He did not ignore, he said, the reasons which in many cases imposed on the government certain statements or measures, for instance the statement of Averoff-Tossizza at Brioni or the systematic ban on demonstrations. 70 As the Bishop of Kition wrote to Grivas at this time, Averoff-Tossizza had told him, too, that he was annoyed because the two Cypriot prelates supposedly were thinking of denouncing the Greek government to the Greek people for its "lukewarm" policy in the Cyprus question. He had also tried to persuade him that both the Greek people and, quite concretely, the Army would react against the withdrawal of Greece from NATO which the Cypriot leaders (and Grivas, too), were urging upon the Greek government. 71 Karamanlis, who had first heard of Makarios' interview from Barbara Castle, issued on September 29 a formal public statement endorsing Makarios' independence proposal. 72 Macmillan, however, responding by letter next day to this statement, merely asserted that the Ethnarch's proposal for Cypriot independence fell outside the scope of the immediate problem of setting up interim arrangements for restoring order and developing representative institutions in Cyprus, though it could, of course, remain open for consideration along with any other proposal for a final settlement of the Cyprus question. 73

70

Times, October 3, 1958. Athens student organizations had called for a mass protest on October 4, 1958. According to the Times, October 4,1958, there was tension in Athens when strong police forces broke up small groups of students shouting antiBritish slogans who tried to defy the police ban. The police reportedly had information that communist elements were preparing to take advantage of the demonstrations in order to stage anti-government riots. Troop detachments were sent to guard the Turkish and British embassies. 71 Grivas Memoirs, p. 306. Oddly enough, Macmillan does not mention Makarios' proposal for independence. He refers only to the Ethnarch's letter of August 16, 1958 to Governor Foot, with its ambiguous reference to either independence or selfdetermination. See above, note 60. ,a Keesing's, 16454. The Premier's statement reads: "The government has always proclaimed it does not claim Cyprus but is struggling for the freedom of the Cypriots." "In this spirit it put forward internationally the demand of the Cypriots for selfdetermination." "In view of the immediate danger lest the situation in Cyprus deteriorate and the relations of Greece with its allies be irremediably shattered, the Greek government, in full agreement with Archbishop Makarios, will support the solution of independence." 78 Times, October 1, 1958.

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A. SPAAK'S VISIT TO ATHENS

The Greek demarches Karamanlis had mentioned to Makarios during their tense meeting of September 19, 19581 aimed at frustrating the implementation of the revised Macmillan plan which was to begin on October 1. They led to quite lively efforts within NATO to contribute to the resolution of the Cyprus conflict, with NATO's Secretary-General trying to play a conciliatory role. Already since August 14, when told by Macmillan of his revised Cyprus plan, Spaak informed the British government that he regarded the decision to go ahead with it on October 1 as too hasty. Before doing so it was indispensable, in his view, to resolve some of the juridical problems involved. Then after a Greek government memorandum of September 8 and especially after Karamanlis' brief and ominous note of September 19, he felt that as NATO Secretary-General he could not ignore the implied threat contained in that note and decided to exert conciliatory efforts. Accordingly, he called together the NATO representatives of the states not directly concerned in the Cyprus question and asked them to convince their governments to ask the British to postpone the implementation of the revised Macmillan plan. Not having, however, obtained unanimous agreement on this, he decided to go to Athens himself.2 On September 22, the same day the Makarios interview with Barbara Castle was published, the Ethnarch of Cyprus was informed by Dimitri Bitsios, Embassy Counsellor in charge of the Cyprus desk at the Greek Foreign Ministry, that NATO's Secretary-General was arriving in Athens next day in response to Karamanlis' brief but urgent message of September 19 to him, in which the Premier had stressed that Britain's 1 2

See above, Chapter IV, p. 237. Spaak, Combats inachevés, II, pp. 145-147.

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insistence on unilaterally applying the Macmillan plan was inadmissible and would shock public sentiment in Greece to such an extent as to render problematic Greece's position in NATO. 3 The Premier, Bitsios told Makarios, intended to ask NATO to limit its action to requesting the British government to put off the plan's implementation and especially the appointment of a Turkish government representative to the island's Governor. However, since it was very likely that Spaak would argue that NATO could not make such a demarche without at the same time proposing to the British government another plan to replace Macmillan's, the Premier wished to know whether Makarios agreed that Spaak should be asked to present to NATO's Council the plan he had formulated on August 4, 1958,4 but which he had not followed through because of Macmillan's visits to Athens and Ankara (August 9-11, 1958) and the publication of the revised Macmillan plan on August 15. Spaak's plan, Bitsios reminded Makarios, contained no provision for Greek and Turkish representatives to the Cyprus Governor, and Karamanlis intended to ask Spaak to include it in a provision for setting up a unitary House of Representatives. Makarios replied that after his interview with Barbara Castle, the Greek government might tell Spaak that NATO should ask the British government to negotiate directly with the Cypriots over the matter of an interim regime which should not prejudge the island's future. This, the Greek diplomat replied, would be done. But what if the British government stated that for the time being it did not wish to discuss a final solution? Would it not be expedient then, in order to frustrate the implementation of the British plan, to accept Spaak's and thus avoid accomplished facts? Makarios agreed that if his first proposal were to fail, the Greek government should encourage Spaak to put forward his own plan, which should not only include a provision for a unitary House of Representatives but also mention that the interim regime should lead to the independence of Cyprus. Spaak arrived in Athens on September 23 shortly before noon. Publicly he said he had no concrete plan for settling the Cyprus question but only personal views on the matter, as he had been following the latest develop8

The Cyprus Question. Discussion at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September-October, 1958 (Athens: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1958), p. 7 (cited hereafter as Greek White Book II). The note is dated not September 19, but September 20, 1958. * See above, Chapter IV, pp. 176-177.

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ments and the worsening of the situation on the island. Without losing time he started his talks with the Greek Premier at lunch. 5 The official talks took place in the evening.6 Karamanlis, after thanking NATO's Secretary-General for having understood the gravity of the situation, for having decided to come to Athens and for having always shown sympathy toward Greece, refrained from explaining to him the story of the Cyprus question, the Greek position with regard to it, and the behavior of the Allies toward Greece which placed his government before a tragic dilemma. He had dealt with these points at great length during their lunch. What was noteworthy, he went on to say, was that almost everybody recognized that the Greek government was supporting a just cause. However, because of the question's complexity and the desire not to become unpleasant to Greece's opponents, nobody was able to help. Nonetheless, his government believed that with good will the problem could easily be solved. Therefore, to facilitate a solution, it had recently made several concessions which, however, remained without any response from the Turkish and British sides. At the moment, the main Greek demand was that the implementation of the British plan be suspended. If that plan were implemented, grave consequences would ensue. Karamanlis then invited Spaak to present his views on the issue. Spaak, on his side, thanked Karamanlis for his welcoming words which proved that he understood the spirit which had moved him to come to Athens though at first glance his arrival there appeared strange. The Greek Premier's wire of the previous Friday (September 19) and the repeated warnings of the Greek representative to NATO, M. Melas, about the gravity of the situation which had reached the point of rendering problematic Greece's position in NATO, had imposed upon him the duty to come to Athens. The date of October 1, he feared, could become fatal, with untoward consequences both in Greece and Cyprus. Only a few days remained. The time for decision had come. As viewed in Athens (in London and Ankara it was, of course, viewed otherwise) the arrival of the Turkish representative on the island would have cata5

Daily Telegraph, September 23, 1958. After his meeting with Karamanlis, Spaak was reported as saying that the application of the Macmillan plan was one of the elements which rendered the situation on the island difficult. The Makarios plan for independence was an important declaration, he added, though refusing to elaborate. 8 This meeting was attended by the Acting Greek Foreign Minister, C. Tsatsos, the Department Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, P. Skeferis; the Greek Representative to NATO, M. Melas; Ambassador Verykios and Counsellor Bitsios. Spaak was seconded by his Italian deputy, Aubrey Casardi; his legal adviser, the international jurist Jules Basdevant; and his chef de cabinet, André Saint-Mleux.

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strophic results. Only two possibilities existed for dealing with the situation: the first was an immediate suspensory action; the second, a positive settlement of the question. From the Greek government's various memoranda, the argument about the Treaty of Lausanne had specially impressed him, said Spaak, although he had not had time to get the opinion of his legal advisers on the matter nor even to read the relevant proceedings and had limited himself merely to a simple reading of the relevant articles of that treaty. However, particularly from Article 27 of that treaty,7 it followed that at first glance the Greek position was strong and could be juridically exploited. He wondered, therefore, why the Greek government had not attached greater importance to this argumentation and had not resorted to the International Court of Justice in this matter. If Greece decided on such a resort, it would be difficult for the British government not to accept it and not to suspend the implementation of its plan. Certain preliminary probes at any rate should be undertaken. A resort to the International Court would be to the advantage of the Greek government. If the Court accepted the Greek viewpoint, the British government would no longer be able to go ahead with its plan. If, on the other hand, the Court did not accept the Greek viewpoint, the Greek government would in no way be bound by such a decision. So much as far as suspensory action was concerned. Resort to the Court, without constituting an extraordinary solution, would allow an escape from the dead-end. Later during this conversation, in response to Karamanlis' question about the extent to which the British government's consent would be necessary for a resort to the Court, Spaak said it was impossible for Britain to oppose such a recourse, especially since it had signed the optional clause of the Court's Statute.8 When Karamanlis inquired further whether Spaak himself might ask the British government to suspend the application of the plan if Greece accepted the recourse to the Court, NATO's

'

For Article 27 of the Lausanne Treaty, see above, Chapter V, p. 234, note 40. Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that "the states parties to the present statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a. The interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international law; c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d. the nature and extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation". Paragraph 3 of the same Article provides that "the declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time". 8

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Secretary-General replied that, though he had not discussed the matter with the British, he had, nonetheless, well founded hopes about this, inasmuch as most NATO members would pressure Britain in that direction. And in reply to Melas' question whether Spaak himself would agree to present the proposal for a recourse to the Court, he said he would do so, as long as he knew the Greek government would back his proposal. About the second matter — the positive and final settlement of the Cyprus question— Spaak observed that without any diplomaticconference among the parties concerned the question could never be solved. Reverting to earlier ideas of his, of autumn 1957, he thought that in such a conference representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus should also take part. 9 He noted further that usually the following two contentions were raised against Greece: first, that Greece did not adhere to the appropriate lines in the Cyprus question; and, second, that the Greek government did not recognize Turkey's interest in Cyprus and its right to intervene in the whole affair. He himself did not accept the second contention. He believed Greece denied not the Turkish interest but merely the right of Turkey to return to the island. Between the two there was a vast difference. If the Greek government were to take the initiative in calling together a conference, this would resoundingly silence both contentions that were directed against Greece. At the same time, Spaak recognized that it would be necessary to define beforehand the basic guidelines of such a conference. Especially after his talks with the ambassadors to NATO of Greece, Turkey, and Britain, these guidelines, he now believed, could be determined. He was making this proposal with some anxiety because he recognized that the consequences of the situation would be terrible. "The hour has come for all of us to act boldly and assume responsibilities." That was the only way to keep control over events, "for us not to become rearguards of events but, on the contrary, to forestall them". NATO's Secretary-General, after Karamanlis spoke about certain points Spaak had made, explained that in the past he had exerted various efforts within NATO's framework in order to achieve the suspension of the Macmillan plan's implementation. Thus, he had convoked the NATO Council and had submitted to it the draft of a letter which was to be 9 Conflict and Conciliation, p. 243. While not excluding Cypriot participation in a conference, British experts had remarked in October 1957 that it was not easy from a legal standpoint to find a formula that would permit British representatives, Cypriot leaders, and foreign envoys to sit together at a joint international diplomatic conference, ibid., p. 246.

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addressed to Macmillan. But the reply to this move was still awaited. And the course of events had outstripped this demarche. On the one hand, probably not all NATO members would approve of this draft letter. On the other, even if Macmillan were to receive this letter, he could reply that it had come too late for fresh discussion. Spaak realized that the Greek government was not opposed in principle to a conference of the three governments and the two communities, provided certain guidelines were predefined. Hence the need of defining these general guidelines. However, he wished to ascertain the extent to which Premier Karamanlis was opposed to an interim settlement of the problem — the only possible solution for the time being, because of the current grave difficulties. Indeed, for a final solution to be accepted, Turkey publicly would have to repudiate partition, Greece to forego enosis, and Britain to alter its course by ninety degrees. An interim settlement, on the other hand, should in no way prejudge the future. His own plan was one such solution. But he would like another clarification, too, with regard to the concept of self-government: did the Greek government mean full self-government covering all stages? If so, full democratic selfgovernment would not constitute simply an interim solution but would be very close to a final settlement of the Cyprus question. His own plan, 10 Spaak explained further, was imbued by two principles. On the one hand, the Cypriot people should be allowed to arrive at democratic self-government and, on the other, the minorities should be safeguarded. He himself was no champion of the principle of the two representatives-assistants of the Governor because he believed they would be useful in no way. He also realized that the Greek government's objections to this provision of the Macmillan plan were fully justified because placing a Turkish representative on the island would constitute the beginning of the return of Turkish sovereignty over the island. He believed, however, that no harm would be done if the presidents of the two communal Houses of Representatives were to undertake the duties of the two government representatives, for this would be in accordance with the principle of the Cypriots taking over power for themselves. Spaak also acknowledged that this plan did not provide for a joint House of Representatives, but only for the two Houses representing the two communities of the island which would have authority over community affairs (matters of personal law, etc.). For the remaining domestic affairs,

10

See above, Chapter IV, pp. 176-177.

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the Council would have authority of a mixed executive and legislative character. In this body the Greeks would have a majority. In the matter of defining the island's future after the seven-year period mentioned in the Macmillan plan (another point Karamanlis had touched upon), Spaak believed that any prognosis would be unclear and uncertain. Hence, during the course of the conference that he proposed, the extent to which his plan could serve as a basis for discussion and the extent to which the Greek government objected to his plan should be determined. Although he could promise nothing, he believed, nonetheless, that if the Greek government proposed a conference and a resort to the International Court of Justice, the British government would be unable to respond with an insistent refusal. All NATO members not concerned in the Cyprus question were likely to approve of such an approach. On the other hand, the British government would certainly reject any proposal for the mere suspension of the Macmillan plan's implementation. Would the Greek government let him know whether it wished him to present the ideas of a conference and of a resort to the International Court of Justice as his own and would it support him in this move? And would it want other states or persons to participate in the conference he proposed? To this latter question, Acting Foreign Minister C. Tsatsos replied that the Greek government would like Spaak to take part in the conference. And Spaak went on to say that after settling the matter of who should take part in the conference it was necessary to define the basis of discussions there. Responding first to Spaak's reference to the criticism leveled at Greece for its Cyprus policy, the Greek Premier asserted that this criticism was unfair. After seeking for four years to persuade the British to settle the Cyprus question in a friendly way with the Cypriots and having met with the insistent British refusal to do so, Greece had offered its support to the Cypriots by resorting to the United Nations, thus fulfilling a historic and moral duty. 11 It had no other way to defend the Cypriots' right to self-determination, which the UN Charter and any free man recognized. Until the announcement of the Macmillan plan, which was combined with the well-known tension in the island, it had adhered to this position. Then, in order to prevent the further worsening of the situation, the Greek government as well as Makarios had made important concessions. They had accepted that the final settlement of the question 11

Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 4-5, for Greek government rationale for raising the Cyprus question in the first place.

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be left open, with a reasonable constitution being granted to the Cypriots as an interim regime. More recently, in a desire to facilitate escape from the dead-end reached, Makarios had accepted guaranteed independence as a final solution. Hence, charges that Greece had not assumed a constructive attitude in order to find a solution of the Cyprus question were unfounded. In response to the Turkish demands, Karamanlis observed further, Greece was prepared to offer the Turkish Cypriot minority a special regime which would be guaranteed both constitutionally and internationally. It was also ready to concede to Turkey a customs union and free ports in Cyprus, in order to cover Turkish economic interests in the island, though the Greek government believed such interests were nonexistent. Finally, Greece believed that the existing two alliances — NATO and the Balkan Pact — provided sufficient safeguards to Turkey to cover its claims for security. Consequently, the argument that Greece ignored Turkey in its Cyprus policy likewise was incorrect.12 Summing up the current Greek government position, Karamanlis said that Britain should provide the Cypriots with democratic self-government for a specifically defined period of time. By democratic self-government he meant a Parliament which would be elected by the people, and a democratic government which would have authority over all matters except a few such things as foreign policy and defense. Sovereignty would remain with Britain. After such a provisional solution was found, it would be possible to restore friendships and alliances and find a final solution. At the end of the interim period of democratic self-government, the Cypriots should be able to achieve independence. The Macmillan plan, on the other hand, provided for no such developments. It created an interim regime which would contribute to the worsening of the relations between the Greek and Turkish governments and between the two communities which were struggling from the outset to impose a final solution favorable to themselves. These were the reasons why the Greek government had not accepted the Macmillan plan, the implementation of which, if the British insisted on it, would provoke not merely unpalatable but dangerous consequences. The Greek government, Karamanlis also told Spaak, had no objection to discussing the Cyprus question anywhere and at any time, provided 18

Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 314-315, 325, and 419-420 (passages in statements of Averoff-Tossizza during the First Committee's meetings, at the twelfth session of the UN General Assembly).

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certain basic and general principles were defined in advance. Spaak, the Greek government realized, believed the Macmillan plan would lead to no desirable results. Accordingly, he had outlined a new plan. The Greek view was that the points in the Macmillan plan which brought about division rather than unity should be deleted. In his plan, Spaak proposed that the Greek and Turkish representatives provided for in the Macmillan plan should be dropped, and that these two government representatives be replaced by representatives of the two Cyprus communities. This, of course, was a step in the right direction. However, missing from Spaak's plan was the institution of a unitary House of Representatives. And another shortcoming of this plan was its last paragraph to the effect that the final settlement could not be reached except through common agreement of the three governments concerned. This rendered well nigh impossible a final solution. Consequently, Spaak's plan, though softening the shortcomings of the Macmillan plan, did not constitute the ideal solution that would restore peace to the island. At a later point during this exchange of views and after a few minutes' adjournment, Karamanlis reaffirmed that for Spaak's plan to be acceptable despite the serious reactions it would meet with, as the basis of discussions for the definition of the island's interim regime, it should provide for the setting up, parallelly to the two communal Houses of Representatives, of a unitary House of Representatives which would represent all the island's inhabitants. Macmillan, during his Athens visit, he observed, had recognized the need for such a unitary House, though he had stated that it might be set up in the future only, because of current technical difficulties.13 Moreover, Spaak's plan should either leave completely open the matter of the final settlement by deletion of that plan's last paragraph, or should include a statement to the effect that after the period of the interim regime, full independence of the island would be provided. These changes, Karamanlis argued, did not greatly differ from the Macmillan plan. It, too, provided for the institution of a unitary House and left the future open and undetermined. All the proposed procedures, Karamanlis added, should take place before the UN debate of the Cyprus question. But, there would be no reason for these discussions to take place, if the implementation of the Macmillan plan was not suspended. Prior to any action he would also have to consult Cypriot opinion, too. He would therefore get in touch with Makarios that same evening, and, so long as Spaak agreed, he would send him a 13

See above, Chapter IV, p. 205.

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relevant telegram about the Ethnarch's attitude. Should the Cypriote disagree, Spaak might still exert a supreme effort to achieve the suspension of the Macmillan plan's implementation. In response to Spaak's remarks about the Treaty of Lausanne, Karamanlis said his government believed that the Macmillan plan ran counter to explicit provisions of that treaty and was examining the contingency of resorting to the International Court of Justice on this matter. However, this aspect of the question was juridical, whereas the Greek government believed the matter was primarily political. Only a firm effort on the part of Spaak would help bring about a solution. As Spaak himself recognized, the first thing was to have the implementation of the Macmillan plan suspended so that discussions might be resumed on the previously mentioned bases. The dangers that would ensue from the British plan's implementation, Karamanlis repeatedly emphasized, were not imaginary. They were real and imminent. Aside from the political reasons which everybody could realize, national honor was involved. This factor should not be ignored. When not the slightest spirit of understanding was shown for Greece's really major concessions, the moment was being reached when Greece would be fighting not for the question itself but for its national honor. If the allies insisted on implementing the Macmillan plan, the Greek government might be unable to remain in control of the situation and would face the contingency of revising its foreign policy. Regardless of what public opinion was, he himself had the feeling of an ally who, after making a series of concessions, had been met with obdurate bad will. Consequently, the Greek government, both for reasons of substance and national honor, had to react. His government followed a policy which in many respects was unpopular — a policy that differed greatly from British wiliness and Turkish rabble-rousing. The allies should appreciate this policy accordingly. Besides, there was always the danger lest the matter escape his government's control. Other countries outside the allied family, the Arab states, for example, might show interest in the matter. Supported by other states, they might create a situation that would be beyond his own government's control. At the outset of this exchange of views, NATO's Secretary-General had suggested, albeit somewhat vaguely, that the conference among Greece, Turkey, Britain, and representatives of the two communities in Cyprus which he urged upon the Greek Premier should itself discuss the extent to which his draft plan of August 4, 1958 might serve as a basis for discussions, together with the Greek government's objections

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to it. Now, however, having listened to the Greek Premier's explanation of the Greek position, Spaak went further. He proposed that his own plan should also embody the Greek proposals. With a suitable introduction, it should serve as a basis for discussions at the Cyprus conference which he favored. In this revised version of his original plan, the formulation should be borrowed, as much as this was feasible, from the Macmillan plan and should not encounter any Turkish objections. This would strengthen his position in presenting his plan. Was the formulation about a unitary House of Representatives contained in the Macmillan plan sufficient and satisfactory to the Greek government, he asked. No, the Greek side retorted. In the Macmillan plan there was the mere expression of hope that such an institution might be set up in the future. The provision for such an institution should be absolutely clear so as to exclude any possibility of misinterpretation. Since Karamanlis also objected to the second paragraph of the seventh principle of the Spaak plan which provided that the consent of the three governments concerned would be required for changing the island's regime, Spaak agreed that this second paragraph could be deleted from his plan. On the other hand, in reply to Karamanlis' question of why did Spaak exclude the idea of guaranteed independence as a final solution of the Cyprus question, NATO's Secretary-General said that the mention of guaranteed independence might endanger his whole plan. Summing up, Spaak said that the basic idea of his revised plan remained an interim settlement of the Cyprus question which would in no way prejudge the island's future. Accordingly, he would delete the second paragraph of the seventh principle of his original plan so that the future of the island would be left entirely open after the seven-year period of the interim regime. Then, he would add to his original plan a paragraph that would provide for a unitary representative institution competent for internal matters. The institution of a unitary House of Representatives could be formulated as an "organe représentatif, chargé des intérêts de l'île dans son ensemble" — with C. Tsatsos suggesting here that the adjective "législatif" and "commun" be added to this formula, and with Karamanlis reiterating that the relevant provision should be couched in absolutely clear terms so that when used as a basis for discussion, it might provide well-founded hopes for success and avoid the danger of any misunderstandings. In the introduction to his plan, said Spaak, he would mention the Greek contention that the Macmillan plan involved a violation of the Lausanne Treaty and suggest that the Greek and British

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governments resort to the International Court of Justice over this matter. This plan, modified in the above manner, Spaak reaffirmed, should constitute the basis for discussion at the conference of the three governments concerned and of the representatives of the two communities which he had proposed. The main thing now was to convoke the conference. He would therefore go ahead and after receiving an affirmative wire from Karamanlis about the Cypriot assent to this move propose it to NATO next day. So that the NATO Council should not think his plan was a covert Greek proposal, the Greek representative on the Council should say he had to study the plan and ask for instructions from his government before taking any position on this plan. Spaak also understood that the Greek government would ask the United Nations to discuss the Cyprus item last but would be unwilling to discuss his revised plan if the British government did not suspend the implementation of the Macmillan plan. Makarios was informed of the Spaak plan by Premier Karamanlis the same evening (September 23). He said that the procedure Spaak had proposed was agreeable to him but he would prefer that during the conference the subject of a final solution should not be raised. The Premier agreed and observed that only because of developments was it likely that calling for independence would be regarded as the expedient position. Makarios agreed that Spaak should be informed to go ahead on the basis of what had been agreed in Athens. On September 24, in the morning, after his return to Paris, NATO's Secretary-General convoked the Council and called for a Cyprus conference to meet within the shortest possible time, with the participation of the British, Greek, and Turkish governments and of representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to discuss his plan, the general points of which he had outlined to the Greek Premier in Athens. 14 The only point omitted from the revised plan's text was the reference to the need of resorting to the International Court of Justice on the matter of a possible British violation of the Lausanne Treaty by the Macmillan plan. Most representatives on the Council favorably received the Spaak plan which indubitably took the representatives of Britain and Turkey by surprise. Both had the feeling that it posed new problems. They promised to transmit Spaak's proposals to their respective govern14

Greek White Book II, pp. 8-9. Also Discussion on Cyprus in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September-October, 1958 (H.M. Stationery Office, 1958), Cmnd. 566, pp. 4-5 (hereafter cited as British White Paper).

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ments but doubted they would be accepted. After a brief discussion, they proposed that a new meeting take place next day. At this next NATO Council meeting, which took place toward the end of the afternoon of September 25, the British representative stated he lacked instructions and would be unable to get any for several days, because his government had to study Spaak's plan very carefully in order to weigh its possible implications and Lloyd was at the United Nations in New York. The Turkish representative, on the other hand, who had gotten in contact with Foreign Minister Zorlu who happened to be in Paris at the time, attacked the plan as well as Spaak himself with extraordinary violence. He accused him of acting beyond his rights as Secretary-General, of being partial to Greece, of making proposals that were unacceptable to Turkey. Terming the entire plan as a "knife in Turkey's back", he rejected it and ended with the categorical statement that his government adhered strictly to the Macmillan plan and to its implementation. There would be no other conference on the Cyprus question, he said. Spaak, he added, no longer enjoyed the Turkish government's confidence. The Greek representative, on his side, without any show of enthusiasm, accepted Spaak's plan on behalf of the Greek government. Spaak himself rebutted the Turkish charges by showing how fair and impartial his plan was. He emphasized the success he had achieved in getting the Greek government to accept discussion of the Cyprus question with Turkey—something the Greek government had refused to do until then. He observed that it was not likely that this Greek approval had been given without previous consultation with Makarios and this, to him, was of primary importance. Likewise important was Makarios' new position on the Cyprus question. Spaak also drew attention to the Turkish government's responsibility for an explosion in Cyprus if it were to reject the proposed conference. The permanent representatives of the governments not directly concerned approved of Spaak's bold initiative and expressed their gratitude for the stand he had taken. Finally, the Turkish representative declared that his government's final decision would be taken when the British views became known. The Council adjourned the meeting until the British government should be in a position to present its views. Spaak then left for the United States.15 On September 27, in Boston, NATO's Secretary-General met Secretary 15

Spaak, Combats inachevés, II, pp. 148-151.

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of State Dulles. With him he not only examined General de Gaulle's famous memorandum of September 17, 1958, proposing the establishment of a three-power directorate in NATO to deal with global affairs, but also the Cyprus situation.16 Spaak told him about his Athens visit, stressing the gravity of the whole situation. The Secretary of State had nothing to say against this. He agreed with Spaak's prediction that the British reply to his plan would be neither Yes nor No and that probably one would be faced with British counterproposals. Dulles advised Spaak to return to Paris to chair the next NATO Council meeting which was to take place on September 29, and Spaak followed this advice which he found wise. During the NATO Council meeting of Monday, September 29, the British representative stated that, after due consideration, the British government was unable to give up the implementation of the Macmillan plan in Cyprus. His main argument was that such a move would threaten to create an extremely confused and dangerous situation and that, though the Greek Cypriots might not oppose it, it might dangerously irritate the Turkish Cypriots, and this would place the Governor of the island in a critical position.17 The British representative, nonetheless, added that his government was prepared to take part in a conference for the purpose of discussing the Cyprus question on the basis and within the framework of the Macmillan plan. The Turkish representative, much more moderate than at the meeting of September 25, stated that his government had decided to appoint the Turkish Consul General in Nicosia to fulfill the duties of the Turkish representative provided for in the Macmillan plan. The debate that followed at this NATO Council meeting of September 29, Spaak wrote to Karamanlis on October 1, 1958, focused mainly on the following two points: First, what precise interpretation should be given to the role the British government intended to give to the representative the Turkish government had appointed and to the representative the Greek government might eventually appoint. And, second, on what basis would it be possible to convoke the conference Spaak had proposed and what would be its framework. In the lengthy debate that ensued, most NATO representatives of the parties not directly concerned in the Cyprus question intervened in both a conciliatory and positive 16

Spaak, Combats inachevés, p. 183. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 687, wrote on October 4, 1958, that if the plan had been postponed "we should have lost the Turks for good, and civil war would have^begun". 17

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spirit. The debate brought out a certain number of new elements which, to Spaak, appeared very significant, especially with regard to the position of the representatives of the Turkish and Greek governments in Cyprus and to the role that would be assigned to them. The formula Macmillan had used in his Commons speech of June 19, 1958 was compared with the formula he had used in his subsequent statement of August 15. After careful and repeated reading of the two texts, it was ascertained that there was both a considerable development and considerable unclarity. Asked by Ambassador M. Melas to give as clear an explanation of these texts as possible, the British Ambassador to NATO considered it possible to give a definition that could be called negative. He said that the text of the British government's statement of August 15 meant that the representatives mentioned in the Macmillan plan would exercise no part of sovereign power nor even part of administrative power. He was unable to go beyond that. To Spaak, however, this statement appeared very important and probably was sufficient from the Greek viewpoint. If Spaak well understood the Greek viewpoint, opposition to this substantive point of the Macmillan plan resided in the Greek government's refusal to agree to any concession of any part of sovereignty or even of part of administrative power to the Turkish government. Consequently there seemed to him to be no basic opposition between the Greek and British governments. It seemed rather that a misunderstanding continued which was derived from the fact that the British statement was very general in character. But it also seemed that this misunderstanding could be resolved. He believed that it would not be wise of the Greek government to assume any definitive position without having fully clarified this point. After the NATO Council had discussed this particular problem, it had been possible to determine successfully the basis upon which, and the limits within which it would be possible for the Cyprus conference to take place, Spaak believed. Indubitably, it would be impossible for the British government to drop its plan altogether. However, this plan now constituted only one of the elements of the discussion. Spaak's plan, too, could constitute part of the discussion on an equal basis with the British plan itself. In his letter of October 1, to Karamanlis, Spaak also observed that the debate would be completely free and that any proposal and any amendment on which the parties concerned were to agree during the course of the conference would have to be accepted. Of course, he well realized that from the Greek side, the situation remained replete with

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difficulties. But he was convinced that progress of great importance had been achieved. More than ever before, he was persuaded that if a conference took place under the conditions he had proposed, a favorable solution might ensue for the people of Cyprus which also would be desirable for the Atlantic Alliance. For all these reasons, he hoped that it would be possible for the Greek government to give its consent to the calling of a conference. He believed that the Greek government, without laying itself open to charges that it had completely yielded in its position on a grave matter of substance, could accept the explanations given about the Turkish representative's role if after the conference the provision for such government representatives was maintained. Indeed, he believed that the government representative ought to be regarded as a sort of diplomatic representative of the Turkish government accredited to the authorities of the island. This, to him, did not seem opposed either to the Treaty of Lausanne or to the Greek position. During the afternoon meeting of the NATO Council of Tuesday, September 30, Spaak added, a procès verbal of the meetings had been drawn up and it had been decided that each representative would convey this document to his government for approval. If all governments were to accept it, the result would be that the proposed conference would take place very soon. The Greek government, he hoped, would be able to agree with it. 18 The eleven-paragraph procès verbal drawn up after the NATO Council had examined this particular phase of the Cyprus question contained at least six paragraphs of a quasi-preambular nature. The remaining five were of a somewhat operative character. 19 It recorded the Council's anxiety over the inter-allied disagreement in the Cyprus question. It noted that the Greek government was vigorously opposed to the matter of a Turkish representative on the island and that this objection was due to its opposition to the exercise of any part of the sovereignty or administrative power in Cyprus by the Turkish government. It observed that there was no question of the arrival in Cyprus, on October 1, of a senior Turkish official charged to fulfill the function of permanent representative of Turkey on the island under the Macmillan plan, though the Turkish government had designated its Consul General in Nicosia to fulfill these functions. It underlined the relevant paragraph of the British statement of August 15, 1958 on the revised Macmillan plan concerning 18

«

Spaak, Combats inachevés, pp. 151-154. Greek White Book II, pp. 11-12.

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the functions of the government representatives under this plan. It acknowledged that, because the functions of these government representatives had been defined only in general terms, a certain misunderstanding had occurred. Accordingly, it concluded that the appointment of the Turkish government representative should not be considered as fundamentally opposing the Greek government's position or as prejudging a final decision. But this NATO Council procès verbal of September 30,1958 also noted that the British representative had been authorized to accept a conference on the basis of, and within the framework of the Macmillan plan, though his government could not postpone that plan's implementation, which, however, would be spread out over a certain period of time. For these reasons, the Council considered that there was room for constructive discussion among the parties concerned and that there was no obstacle to the convoking of a conference which it esteemed indispensable and which it believed could be crowned with success. The three governments concerned would take part in this conference together with the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus. This conference would take into consideration the elements of the British proposals as well as the modifications the Secretary-General of NATO had suggested. It would be understood that all modifications or all amendments on which the conference would agree could be incorporated in the measures to be applied (under the Macmillan plan). On these terms, the Council expressed its lively hope that the parties concerned would meet as soon as possible to hold this conference. As indicated by the minutes of a conversation of September 30 between Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza and U.S. Ambassador Riddleberger, the initial Greek attitude toward this new plan was negative. That the Turkish representative with the Governor of Cyprus would be Turkey's Consul General in Nicosia and not a special official from Turkey did not remove the basis of Greek objections to the relevant provision of the Macmillan plan. In this exchange, which was very tense, Averoff-Tossizza asserted that the State Department had deceived the Greek government, since all NATO countries except the United States had favored Spaak's plan and Dulles evidently had exerted pressure on Spaak during his stay in the United States, in order to make him change his views.

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B. "APPOINTED DAY" IN CYPRUS AND "BLACK OCTOBER"

On October 1,1958—the' 'appointed day" — the Turkish Consul-General in Nicosia, Burhan l§in, officially assumed the duties of Turkey's representative with the Governor in Cyprus. In that capacity he called on Sir Hugh Foot. The Turkish Cypriots proclaimed "appointed day" a holiday. The Greek Cypriots staged a general strike throughout the island, and a number of demonstrations occurred which led to clashes with the security forces at Larnaca and Varosha. 20 Since September 25, as the "appointed day" was approaching, Grivas had issued two orders: one was addressed to his guerilla bands, telling their leaders to be ready to act, should the Turkish representative arrive on the island; the other was directed to EOKA sector leaders and defined that the targets should be both inanimate and animate, should that event occur. The night of September 30-0ctober 1, action began, according to plan. At first, operations were limited to the cities but on October 7 Grivas ordered the guerrilla bands to start striking in the countryside. During that month which became known to the British as "Black October" EOKA men carried out a total of 45 ambushes. 21 On October 3, the Ethnarch of Cyprus, in an impassioned message to the Cypriots over Athens Radio (no longer jammed since August 11, 1958)22 urged them vigorously to react against the efforts to implement the Macmillan plan — the outcome of Anglo-Turkish collusion as he termed it. Unfortunately, the British government had not responded positively to his independence proposal and was going ahead with the unilateral implementation of its partnership plan, thus leading the island to perdition. At a moment when not only the historic unity "of our country", not only "our security and peace", but also the very survival "of our race" in Cyprus was threatened, he called for unity as one man, regardless of ideological or social affiliations. The supreme struggle was on, he proclaimed. "Armed with the invincible panoply of right, we shall fight force and tyranny, certain of final victory." In the end, justice would 20

Keesing's, 16454. Grivas Memoirs, p. 311. Grivas Memoirs, p. 313, and Appendix, pp. 41-43. Keesing's, 16483, reports that during October, 44 people were killed and about 370 injured. Of those injured, 90 were British nationals — nearly all members of the security forces — and about 280 Greek Cypriots, of whom some 250 were injured by the British forces in the Famagusta events that followed Mrs. Cutliffe's murder. For those killed, see p. 270. 22 Grivas Memoirs, Appendix p. 63 (full text). Keesing's, 16482.

21

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prevail. Light would dispel darkness; freedom vanquish slavery. That same day, Grivas received a letter from the Bishop of Kition who favored greatly intensified EOKA activities against the British. 23 Likewise on October 3, the 42-year old wife of a British soldier, Catherine Cutliffe, mother of five children, was shopping in Famagusta with a friend, Mrs. Elfrieda Robinson, when two Greek Cypriot youths shot both women in the back and fled. Mrs. Cutliffe was killed on the spot. Mrs. Robinson was seriously wounded and taken to a hospital. As Sir Hugh Foot and Major-General Sir Douglas Kendrew immediately flew to Famagusta on learning this news, the town was placed under virtual military occupation. A stringent curfew was imposed, as Famagusta became the scene of the biggest round up the Cyprus emergency had known. British soldiers rounded up for questioning every Greek Cypriot male between the ages of fifteen and twenty. On October 5, the Cyprus government announced that an official inquiry was proceeding on certain incidents which occurred during this round up. Out of the 650 persons arrested, it was officially stated, 250 had received injuries in the round up; 17 were in a hospital, seven with serious injuries; two Greek Cypriots had died; and a 12-year old Greek Cypriot girl had also died of heart failure. The Nicosia correspondents of both the Times and the Daily Telegraph reported that Mrs. Cutliffe's murder "had inflamed passions and turned the island almost into a cauldron of hatred" and that for an hour or so after the murder "the conduct of a number of troops was unsatisfactory". 24 EOKA responded by distributing leaflets castigating the conduct of the British security forces but making no direct reference to the murder of Mrs. Cutliffe apart from insinuating it was not EOKA's work. 25 The Mayor of Nicosia offered a reward of £5,000 for information that would lead to the gunmen's arrest. In Athens, Makarios condemned both the murder and the "blood orgy against Famagusta's Greek population on the part of the security forces". And a Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman said that attacks on women were "not in the tradition of Greek fighters". The Cyprus government, on the other hand, stated that there was "not 33

Grivas Memoirs, p. 306. Keesing's, 16484. 25 Grivas Memoirs is reticent on this matter. The English version (Foley ed.), p. 169, on the other hand, asserts that there was no evidence whatever that EOKA was involved, though "nobody could rule out the possibility of some misunderstanding or of some hot-headed Greek seeking to revenge the frequent attacks on women of the Greek community by the army".

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one iota of evidence" that the murder "was carried out by anyone other than EOKA terrorists". Athens Radio began a new anti-British campaign in which Sir Hugh Foot was called, among other things, a "Gauleiter" and the British troops "filthy cannibals". On October 6, the Cyprus authorities resumed their jamming of Athens Radio. 26 Backstage, Grivas was astonished to read a statement by the Greek Foreign Minister deploring the murder of Mrs. Cutliffe and not mentioning "the barbaric acts of the British troops and their murder of women". 27 Averoff-Tossizza, on the other hand, in a long letter of October 14 to Grivas, 28 in which he dealt mainly with NATO developments of the Cyprus problem, observed that the attitude of Labourites in England had taken a bad turn. For some time, their attitude had been lukewarm as compared with what it had been in 1957. But now, after the murder of Mrs. Cutliffe and the campaign launched by the British press on this matter, the Labourites, too, were joining the bandwagon. Even the most zealous supporters of the Greek Cypriot cause, and the Left Wingers among them, blamed Makarios, whose radio appeal of October 3 they considered to have triggered this murder. The inflammatory tone of that appeal had made matters very difficult at the very moment they themselves and NATO were seeking for a political solution. If he was well informed, the Labourites had appealed to Makarios, through the Ethnarchic representative in London, Spyros Kyprianou (later Foreign Minister of Cyprus), to disavow this murder and to issue a conciliatory statement. Otherwise they would have difficulty in supporting him. The Greek Delegation to the United Nations, too, was confronted with similar charges. Some people had reached the point of saying that the conduct of the British troops had been but the natural reaction of outraged soldiery. Replying to this letter, Grivas, among many other things, referred to EOKA's relevant leaflet and deplored the complete absence of any systematic Greek government propaganda that would carry out a counterattack against the British and point out that they had killed in cold blood ten or so Greek Cypriot women and children. He himself had recently published the names of such Greek Cypriot victims. As for Makarios' appeal of October 3, this was most appropriate, he maintained. It had

28

Keesing's, 16484. The broadcast appears to have been based on an editorial of Estia, October 4, 1958. 27 Grivas Memoirs, p. 307. M Ibid., p. 289.

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served to buttress morale and to steel the faith of the Cypriots in their struggle. 29 "Black October" 1958, according to British sources, ended with a total of 44 people killed and about 370 injured. Six among those killed were British civilians (Mrs. Cutliffe included); ten were British soldiers, killed by ambushes or electrically-detonated mines laid on roads used by military vehicles; 11 were EOKA men killed by the British forces; and 17 were Greek Cypriots killed by EOKA. The British authorities, nonetheless, continued their efforts to go ahead with the Macmillan plan. In midOctober a three-man commission arrived in Cyprus to examine the question of separate municipalities provided for in the revised British plan. 30 To deal with EOKA's greatly intensified activities, on the other hand, the British authorities imposed new and drastic regulations on October 16, and reintroduced certain emergency measures which had been revoked a year earlier (in August 1957).31 And the British forces, under Major General Kenneth Darling, Kendrew's successor, carried out extensive anti-EOKA operations killing several EOKA men, among them Kyriakos Matsis, Grivas' second in command in the whole Kyrenia region. In November and December 1958, EOKA agents killed several more British civilians and soldiers as well as several Greek Cypriots.32

C. T O CONFER OR N O T TO CONFER?

Meanwhile, between October 2-4, 1958, Karamanlis, at his home, met with the Cyprus Ethnarch three days in succession in order to decide what to do next about Spaak's letter of October 1 and the new NATO recommendations contained in the NATO document of September 30. Also present were Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza; C. Tsatsos, Minister of Presidency; M. Melas, Greek Ambassador to NATO; and Counsellor Bitsios. The proposals emanating from NATO placed the Greeks in a quandary for Karamanlis had made it clear to Spaak, and Spaak had understood well this point (though appearing to ignore it now), that the Greek government would go ahead with the conference Spaak recommended on the basis of the revised Spaak plan, only if the 26

Grivas Memoirs, p. 291. Keesing's, 16454. »i Ibid., 16484. 32 Grivas Memoirs, pp. 325-327. A statue of Matsis has been set up in a square of Nicosia. 30

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British government suspended the Macmillan plan's implementation. Would the Greek government, now, despite the British government's categorical refusal to do so, decide, nonetheless, to accept the idea of a conference in which not only the Macmillan plan but also the (Greek) modifications of it proposed by Spaak would serve as a basis for discussions? At the first of these three meetings, on October 2, Makarios favored acceptance of the conference idea without any insistence on clarifications in advance. At the conference itself, if the opponents were to accept the determination from now of a regime of independence for Cyprus, "we shall be most flexible on the details of the interim regime". If, on the other hand, the opponents were to insist that only the interim regime should be settled at this conference, then the Greek and Greek Cypriot sides should insist that this interim regime should contain no elements that prejudged the future and final regime. Summing up his view, "we must accept", he said, "the conference. It is not possible to put conditions from the outset." Karamanlis, on his side, speaking after the Cypriot Ethnarch, emphasized that the most important thing of all was to get out of this dead-end, because as soon as the fanaticism of both sides had subsided, the rights of the Cypriots could not but prevail. It depended "on us" to reject, during the conference itself, any pressures for further concessions that might harm the prestige of Makarios and endanger Greece's internal stability, he maintained, in response to certain cautioning remarks by Bitsios. Makarios voiced agreement. If (as Makarios held) it were believed that one should put forward no conditions for attending the proposed conference, then, in replying to Spaak, he — Karamanlis—would say that the Greek government considered it expedient that France and Italy should take part in that conference and that the negotiations should be based on both the Macmillan plan and the Spaak plan outlined in Athens. At the second of these meetings, on the other hand, the Greek Premier, speaking before Makarios, proposed that in his reply to Spaak's letter of October 1, he should ask that the matters of the unitary House of Representatives and of the "discoloring" of the role of the two governmental representatives of Greece and Turkey in Cyprus should be accepted in advance "so that we should have our minimum claims assured". At a later point (in response to a remark by Ambassador M. Melas that one could not reject the proposed conference without withdrawing from NATO), after stating that Greece's withdrawal from NATO was not only contrary to his government's policy but also could

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not be implemented for reasons which, he hoped, all understood, Karamanlis stressed that the main question was: "What shall we do if we reject a conference?" Developments in the Cyprus question had repercussions within Greece. If bloodshed continued, the country might be gravely shaken. "Consequently, we cannot say that if we reject the conference, we shall pursue a policy of waiting. In the Cyprus question, it is we who are in a hurry and it is to our interest that the Cyprus question should be discussed anywhere and at any time." Perhaps because Karamanlis suggested that he make the above proposal to Spaak, Makarios now changed his mind about attending the proposed conference unconditionally as he had originally suggested. He asserted that the above two proposals were not sufficient preconditions for accepting this conference. In his reply to Spaak, the Premier should also ask that his own proposal for independence be discussed at the proposed conference, in addition to the Macmillan and Spaak plans. By this he meant not that his proposal for an independent Cyprus should be accepted in advance of the conference but that it be included in the conference's agenda, together with the Macmillan and Spaak plans. During the conference itself, Makarios explained further, the Greek and Greek Cypriot sides should insist exclusively on the solution of independence as the final regime of Cyprus, because if enosis and partition were excluded, there were other solutions possible, too, for instance federation. Without the matter of the final solution of the Cyprus question being placed on the conference's agenda, he maintained, "we cannot be satisfied with the acceptance of the other two points", namely the unitary House of Representatives and the "discoloring" of the two governmental representatives. "We shall throw all our weight behind our demand for a final solution. If this is accepted, then for the seven-year period we shall accept even the Macmillan plan. Otherwise, we shall accept the discussion of only the Spaak plan." Summing up his position on that day, he said that if the matter of the final solution of the Cyprus question was accepted for inclusion in the conference's agenda, "we should go to the conference". If, on the other hand, it became necessary to disagree at the conference itself, "we shall do so on the matter of the final solution and we shall emphasize this as the cause of the conference's breakdown". If the opponents were to oppose the settlement of the matter of a final solution but were to accept a unitary House of Representatives and the abolition of the two governmental representatives, he reserved the right to discuss this contingency when and if it arose. Premier Karamanlis, in response to Makarios' summation of his views,

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observed that the opponents, though opposing the settlement of the island's final regime, might accept the setting up of a unitary House of Representatives and the abolition of the institution of the two governmental representatives after two or three years. In such an event, the Greek side should not provoke the conference's breakdown because, as he had always stressed, the main thing was to create conditions of pacification and soften the current fanaticism, especially of the Turks — in which case the Cyprus question would get its natural solution. When he reiterated the above views, Makarios who, as mentioned at first, had said that one should decide on such an eventuality when it came up, replied that he agreed. Adhering to the main point he had made at the second meeting, Makarios, at the third of these meetings, on October 4, said that one should go to the proposed conference if the matter of a final solution of the Cyprus question was included in the conference's agenda. It was not possible to discuss the Macmillan and the Spaak plans, he reasserted, except in correlation with the final solution. If during the conference discussion the opponents maintained that the time was not appropriate for deciding on a final solution, then the Greek government and Greek Cypriot representatives should reject the two plans in order not to commit themselves for a full seven-year period. The thought of Karamanlis that one should ask for a limitation of the term of the governmental representatives on Cyprus, should be examined on the spot. 33 During these three meetings, Foreign Minister AverofF-Tossizza was rather noncommittal and came up with no recommendation of his own. As an observer rather than as an adviser, he was pessimistic about the outcome of any conference. At the meeting of October 2, he posited the problem by saying that after the receipt of Spaak's letter of October 1 and 33

In a letter of October 6, received by Grivas on October 21, 1958, Makarios wrote he had opposed the Spaak-proposed conference to discuss the Macmillan and Spaak plans unless his own proposal for independence were also to be discussed at the conference (Grivas Memoirs, p. 309). Because of newspaper reports that Makarios had favored unconditional acceptance of a conference (as he had indeed on the first day of these meetings with Premier Karamanlis), Makarios had told journalists about his conditional acceptance of such a conference, thus creating the impression that he was firmer than the government was in dealing with this issue. Tension naturally resulted between the Ethnarch and the government, especially since the Greek Foreign Minister, as the above account reveals, was hardly in favor of going to the conference at all. Press reports to the effect that the Ethnarch was unhappy with the handling of the issue in the N A T O Council were an additional source of friction. Makarios was asked to consult fully with the government before taking any moves. His failure to do so before giving his "independence" interview with Barbara Castle was on the government's mind.

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the new plan, two courses lay open: either to reject the new proposal or to accept the conference proposed. In the second case, he believed it would be incorrect to demand that the Greek claims be accepted beforehand, because it was impossible for these claims to be accepted and it would be consequently thought that the Greek side was rejecting the idea of a conference by putting forward conditions for its convocation. The fact remained, he also noted, that the basic British text of June 18, 1958 concerning the institution of the Greek and Turkish representatives on Cyprus had not been voided, though in this matter the British government had retreated inch by inch. In the original Macmillan plan, these representatives were to sit on the Governor's Council. Then this privilege had been withdrawn in the revised Macmillan plan of August 15. Then it had been decided not to send a special representative from Turkey to the island but to entrust the Turkish Consul General in Nicosia with his functions. Finally, the British Ambassador to NATO had said that the Turkish representative would have nothing to do with the island's administration and would exercise no sovereign rights. During the second of these meetings, Averoff-Tossizza, at a certain point, said everyone knew he was a politician who favored a vigorous reaction even up to the point of withdrawal from NATO. Such a policy, however, presupposed a monolithic front in Greece. Since his return from abroad, he was worried. Greece had no means at its disposal to strike direct blows against the British and Turks and could not expect any general uprising in Cyprus either which would have decisive results. The grave danger therefore existed lest "tomorrow we regret having lost an opportunity, as had occurred in the past, whenever we let opportunities slip by". The dangers from developments in Cyprus were great. After Karamanlis expressed full agreement with these remarks and Makarios asked him what he recommended in conclusion, the Foreign Minister said that he reserved the right to think about what should be done further. At the third of these meetings, however, he came up with no proposal of his own but said he was convinced that the conference would fail. He was, he wrote to Grivas, quite opposed to the idea of a conference, because he considered it impossible to reach a satisfactory solution at such a conference. As long as the opponents controlled the world press to the extent they did, the result would also be that Greece would appear to be intransigent and the opponents conciliatory. 34 34

Grivas Memoirs, p. 289. (Letter of October 14, 1958 from "Isaakios" to Grivas). In this letter, Averoff-Tossizza informed Grivas that the British (during Macmillan's

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Somewhat more active than the Foreign Minister at these three meetings was Minister C. Tsatsos. At the second meeting he raised the question of whether it was preferable to disagree now rather than later, during the proposed conference. In which case would the harm be less? If one now expected the conference's failure, he observed at the third meeting, then the idea of attending it should be dropped. In his view, the two conditions the Greek government should put forward for agreeing to take part in the proposed conference were the inclusion of the question of a final settlement of the Cyprus question and safeguards with regard to the interim settlement, namely a unitary House of Representatives and the withdrawal of the Turkish representative after a certain period of time, unless another way was found to "discolor" him. At the last of these three meetings, it was decided that if the matter of the final settlement of the Cyprus question was not included in the proposed conference's agenda, the Greek government and the Cyprus

visit to Athens) had been disposed to make many satisfactory concessions but that the Turkish reaction had been extremely sharp. Then the Greek side had become inflexible and many, except the Turks, believed Greece would withdraw from NATO. Hence Spaak's hurried trip to Athens. Because Spaak was backing the Greek viewpoint, the British and the Turks had charged him with scandalous partiality. During the NATO Council meetings all, except the British and Turkish representatives, had maintained a favorable attitude toward the Greek viewpoint. Their support, however, had cooled because of the sharp reaction of the British and the Turks. The Greek side insisted on abolition of the government representatives, a single House of Representatives, etc., or independence after the seven-year period of interim government. Only under these conditions would it discuss the British plan. After Spaak's visit to Athens, the question of accepting some sort of conference had been discussed, with AverofT-Tossizza opposing such a step. He added that the Americans were interested in a conference, and Turkey's intransigence had displeased them. In his reply to this letter, Grivas informed "Isaakios", among other things, that the communist-controlled AKEL party of Cyprus had decided to ask Makarios to expose the Greek government by public charges that it was betraying the struggle of the Cypriot people. If the prelate refused to do so, AKEL would be obliged to make proposals of its own to the British about a solution of the Cyprus question. In his view the British and Turks, with the tacit support of the United States, wanted a prolongation of the existing situation in order to bend Cypriot resistance, promote the application of the Macmillan plan, and arouse Cypriot public opinion against the Karamanlis government and probably against the Ethnarch, too. In Greece this plot aimed at increased tension and new concessions of the Greek government for closing the question because of the danger of its downfall and the strengthening of communism. His prescription was that ties with NATO should be severed. National independence and dignity should be placed above any consideration of economic advantages. A ray of hope appeared in the West, where de Gaulle's star was rising. He seemed to be a leader with liberal principles, a wholly independent national policy, and he was not willing to go along with the AngloAmericans. Audacity, again audacity, and more audacity was necessary (echoes of Danton).

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Ethnarch would reject the conference proposal. Makarios concluded by noting that "above all we are interested in preventing the application of partition". He would not have the other two plans (Macmillan's and Spaak's) discussed separately from his own. As long as the symbol of Turkish sovereignty existed in these plans "we shall ask for guarantees for the future". Then the draft reply of Karamanlis to Spaak's letter of October 1, 1958, which had been prepared the day before, was read. Its final text was settled, and Karamanlis gave instructions that it be adapted to what had been finally decided. In this letter of October 4, 1958 to NATO's Secretary-General, 35 Karamanlis wrote that his government could accept the NATO procès verbal of September 30 on two conditions only: first, that at the proposed conference, in addition to the Macmillan plan and the NATO draft, both of which dealt with the interim period, the foundations should be laid for a final solution of the Cyprus question; and, second, that in the proposed conference, representatives of three other NATO members with Mediterranean interests, namely the United States, France, and Italy, should also take part as impartial participants exercising a conciliatory influence, in addition to the representatives of Britain, Greece, Turkey and of the Greek majority and Turkish minority of Cyprus. Karamanlis underlined that this offer constituted another compromise at Greek expense. He stressed, too, the "immensity" of the concession made by Makarios and adopted by the Greek government (released from its Parliamentary commitment to self-determination) in proposing guaranteed independence for Cyprus, to the exclusion of enosis and partition, together with wide scale guarantees for the rights of the Turkish minority on the island. Karamanlis also suggested that it would be preferable, for reasons which he thought Spaak would appreciate, that the conference be held at the level of heads of government. (At the KaramanlisMakarios meeting of October 2, M. Melas had made such a suggestion, pointing out that in this way Foreign Secretary Zorlu would be avoided as a spokesman of the Turkish views.) The date of the conference should be set as early as possible, for the Greek government was willing to put off the debate on its Cyprus recourse to the United Nations to the end of the Assembly's session. However, it could not altogether withdraw its recourse, as long as a solution of the Cyprus question outside the United Nations was not in sight. As for the venue of the conference, a

86

Greek White Book II, pp. 12-13.

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town on the French or Italian Riviera or on the Italian lakes might be suitable. In this letter of October 4 to Spaak, Karamanlis also wrote that the U.S. government, though unsolicited by the Greek government, had informed Athens that it would be happy to take part in the proposed conference. Indeed, Under-Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, in a message to Karamanlis, had advised acceptance of a conference, in which the United States, too, would be willing to participate. He added that Greece could seek to achieve within the framework of the Macmillan plan an interim regime that would not prejudice the future. The Greek government had thanked the U.S. government for the proposed assistance, but had requested that the proposed conference should decide that after the Macmillan plan's seven-year interim period, a plebiscite for independence be held. On October 6, the Greek Ambassador to NATO made a statement to the NATO Council in accordance with the spirit of the Greek Premier's letter to Spaak. 36 In this statement, M. Melas indirectly criticized the British government for having first published the Macmillan plan and for having proposed afterward the plan's discussion to the Greek and Turkish governments instead of negotiating in private with those two governments before publishing the plan. Nobody in Greece, he also said, had understood the point of Macmillan's trip to Athens in August which had interrupted Spaak's attempts at conciliation at a moment when these attempts were giving rise to a certain amount of optimism. Furthermore, while saying he was unable to see what advantage Britain could hope to gain from discord between the Greeks and the Turks, Melas observed that intentionally or unintentionally recent British actions had aggravated the tension between Greece and Turkey. Therefore, there was reason for fearing that if an interim solution was applied in Cyprus without any indication of what would happen after that interim period, the deliberate or involuntary actions of the British authorities would continue to maintain and aggravate misunderstandings between Greeks and Turks both in Cyprus and outside the island. But even were this danger eliminated, a seven-year interim period would give at the most only two or three years of respite. After that one would have to face again the same tragic situation, because inevitably all interested parties would start maneuvering for what they believed to be the most favorable position for themselves at the moment the final solution came up for "

Greek White Book, pp. 14-17.

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discussion. Hence, after Makarios' proposal for an independent Cyprus as a final solution of the question and the Greek government's espousal of this offer, an opportunity had arisen for making further progress toward setting the Cyprus question. All should seize this opportunity, because a final solution would be in the interest of all. Arguing in this way in favor of the Greek point that the proposed conference should also include in its agenda the matter of a final settlement of the question, Melas also warned that the Greek Cypriots' renunciation of enosis would not be indefinitely valid. Because of world developments favoring full recognition of the right of people to selfdetermination, it was likely that in seven years' time the leaders responsible would be far less conciliatory than the current leaders and would be able to count on greater support on the part of world opinion. In seven years' time it might, moreover, be difficult for the British government to discuss its military bases in Cyprus within the same limited Atlantic family circle and in the same comfort as it currently was discussing them, because Arab states, for instance, might wish to have a say in this matter.

D. THE NATO COUNCIL NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONFERENCE A N D THEIR BREAKDOWN

It is hard to piece together from materials available a clear picture of what exactly happened in the NATO Council from October 6 until October 29, 1958, when the Greek Ambassador to NATO formally declared that his government was renouncing "under the present circumstances, the pursuit of the attempt" to convene a Cyprus conference. The British and the Greek government, at any rate, sought to blame each other for the breakdown of these mediatory efforts to get a conference going to deal with the Cyprus problem, and published certain NATO documents in order to support their contentions. Nonetheless, from the available materials, press reports included, the following points emerge, suggesting the extent to which Cyprus developments outside of NATO contributed to this breakdown. After Ambassador Melas' above-mentioned statement of October 6 in which he conveyed to the NATO Council the Greek government's conditional acceptance of the conference proposed in the NATO Council proces verbal of September 30 and urged upon Karamanlis by Spaak on October 1, the British and Turkish representatives on the Council said they would have to refer these Greek counterproposals back to their

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respective governments for instructions. And the British representative on this occasion assured the Council that absolutely no provisions of the Macmillan plan prejudged the island's future and final regime. The next Council meeting took place on October 8, when, reportedly after U.S. mediation, Greece supposedly had tabled a compromise proposal for a nine-party conference, with Germany to be asked to participate, too. 37 Meanwhile, the Greek government learned that Britain was strenuously opposed to the broadening of the conference by the participation of France and Italy in it, as the Greek government had requested on October 6. Indeed, the British government had asked the Italian government to reject any invitation to attend such a conference, so that it would not be thought that it was Britain that was rejecting the Greek proposal. Then, on October 9, Foreign Minister Zorlu reportedly rejected independence as a final solution of the Cyprus problem. 38 A few days later the Turkish government appointed a new Consul General in Nicosia, thus enabling the previous one to concentrate exclusively on the fulfilment of his duties as "High Commissioner" of Turkey in Cyprus, under the Macmillan plan. Likewise on October 9, Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd, in a speech at the Conservative Party Conference at Blackpool, reaffirmed the government's intention not to be diverted from implementing the Macmillan plan in Cyprus by trying to get a long term solution when it knew that one was not possible. He also emphasized Turkey's vital strategic interest in its "offshore island", as he termed Cyprus. Turkey, he added, could get help through its southern ports only so long as Cyprus remained "in friendly and strong hands". 39 Athens reportedly took these remarks to mean that no binding agreement on a final solution of the Cyprus problem could be achieved at the moment and that the possibility that Cyprus might eventually become Turkish was not excluded. 40 Accordingly, Averoff-Tossizza, commenting on Lennox-Boyd's statement, said that if it was true, he feared that any further talks between Britain and Greece were useless.41 To this, a Foreign Office spokesman responded by saying that there was nothing incompatible between Lennox-Boyd's remarks and the British government position that it was ready to discuss any modifications 87 88 39 40 41

Grivas Memoirs, p. 309. Vi'ma, October 10, 1958 (S. Zotos dispatch from New York). Greek White Book II, p. 22. Times, October 11, 1958. New York Herald Tribune, October 11, 1958.

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of the Macmillan plan that would be agreed upon among the three governments concerned. And Macmillan himself, before leaving for a visit to Bonn, stated that nothing was ruled out as to the final solution, whether this was Makarios' plan for independence or any other.42 In Athens on October 13, in separate press conferences for visiting foreign journalists, both Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza and Cyprus Ethnarch Makarios in Athens expressed pessimism about the possibility of achieving any solution through NATO.43 The former said Greece insisted on acceptance of its preconditions for attending a Cyprus conference. The latter referred to the statements of Lennox-Boyd and Macmillan to justify his pessimism. The Macmillan plan, he emphasized, prejudged the future of Cyprus and led to the island's partition. On the other hand, Makarios was more optimistic about the recourse to the United Nations. He believed that in that international forum his proposal for an independent Cyprus would be more favorably received than in NATO. Both he and the Foreign Minister emphasized that Greece and Cyprus had gone to the utmost limit of concession by proposing the establishment of an independent Cyprus, with Makarios making it clear that he would accept the seven-year period for an interim settlement regime of self-government of Cyprus, as the Macmillan plan provided for. 44 According to a British press report, Averoff-Tossizza said in this connection that a settlement of the Cyprus question was possible only on two alternatives: either through setting up Cyprus as an independent state; or through leaving the door open after a period of self-government which, however, should not prejudge the future. On this occasion, he also listed three guarantees which he proposed should be given to Turkey to dispel its fear on strategic security, the safety of the Turkish minority in Cyprus and the economic ties between Turkey and Cyprus.45 Relations with Turkey could hardly be worse, he stated, however. Incidentally, he disclosed that whereas Turkey had rejected out of hand Spaak's proposal 42

Times, October 11, 1958. Kathimerini, October 14, 1958. 44 Until then, Makarios had not made it clear that he accepted the seven-year interim period. 45 Times, October 14, 1958. The three guarantees Greece offered, said AveroffTossizza, were, first, that an international body should establish the military status of Cyprus in such a way that it would never be a threat to Turkey. British bases could remain there and only one division would be allowed to be stationed on the island. Missiles and air bases would be banned; second, a commission of neutrals should fix the status and rights of the Turkish minority, with the observance of this status to be ensured by the United Nations; and, third, Greece agreed to study free port status for Cyprus as well as a Greece-Turkey-Cyprus customs union.

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that the two government representatives provided for in the Macmillan plan should be replaced by representatives of the two communities in Cyprus, the British government had intimated that this proposal might become a bargaining point at a Cyprus conference. As he wrote to Grivas next day, he personally feared a conference, even though the Americans were interested in one and had tried to bring pressure to bear on Ankara because of Turkey's intransigence. But regardless of the amount of pressure a conference would exert, in the last analysis it would not displease the Turks. Consequently Turkey would not commit herself to Cypriot independence and would not fully abolish the Turkish representative on the island. 46 Likewise on October 13 in Athens, it was officially announced that Premier Karamanlis had instructed Ambassador M. Melas in Paris to tell the NATO Council that Greece was not prepared to tolerate further protraction of the Cyprus discussions in NATO. If the Council's mediatory efforts did not bear fruit at its meeting of October 13, the Greek government believed it preferable that it should not prolong these efforts. 47 On October 13, NATO's Secretary-General submitted to the NATO Council a new procès verbal48 which summarized the position of the parties concerned to date and indicated that while the Greek government had obtained acceptance of its request that the question of a final solution to the Cyprus problem be included in the agenda of the proposed conference, the matter of the conference's composition had not been settled according to its desires. The Council, according to this document's quasipreambular paragraphs, noted that all three governments concerned had accepted the idea of calling a conference at an early date, in which representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus would be present. The Council also noted that the three governments agreed that apart from the discussion for an interim solution of the Cyprus problem, the discussion of a final solution should also appear on the conference's agenda. With regard to discussion of an interim solution, the British government wanted the Macmillan plan to be examined but agreed it could be defined or modified on points over which agreement was to be reached at the conference. The Greek government, for its part, desired that the "suggestions" Spaak had put forward on September 24, 46 47 48

Grivas Memoirs, p. 289. Times, October 14, 1958. Kathimerini, October 14, 1958. Greek White Book II, p. 18.

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1958 should be discussed. The Turkish government, finally, asked that the British plan (not the Spaak "suggestions") should be taken into consideration but agreed that any amendment could be put forward at the conference and that it intended itself to present such amendments. After noting further that these statements of positions presented special points of view but were neither contradictory nor irreconcilable, the Council, in the operative paragraphs of this document, recommended that the British government take the initiative in calling a conference on the conditions indicated. It further suggested that the conference be held on the territory of another friendly (and allied) country which would give its assistance to the good functioning of the conference (and with the participation of a NATO observer), and that the conference be presided over by a personality who would not be a national of Britain, Greece or Turkey and who would be chosen by common agreement of the governments of those three countries. The bracketed words indicated points in which no agreement had yet been reached, but one can surmise that Turkey was opposed to the participation of a NATO observer at the conference, since it was annoyed with Spaak's role in this affair, in contrast to the Greek government which, as mentioned earlier, favored Spaak's participation. On October 14, the NATO Council adjourned its meeting, reportedly because the Greek Ambassador to NATO had not yet received any instructions from Athens evidently with regard to the new NATO Council procès verbal of October 13.49 Next day, after all NATO Council representatives charged Greece with torpedoing the conference, he wired the Greek Foreign Minister transmitting an appeal by Spaak to Premier Karamanlis and Makarios that they accept the convening of a conference, as long as its composition was broadened. Spaak, apparently very angry, particularly drew attention to the fact that, since all parties agreed that the conference would acquiesce in any changes of the interim regime and that the question of the final regime would be included in the conference's agenda, the Greek government's efforts in the United Nations would be doomed to failure because the Turks and the British would contend there that they had shown a considerable spirit of accommodation. Melas added that NATO's Secretary-General had told the Council that in order to cover NATO's responsibilities in this matter, it would be necessary to issue a communiqué placing responsibilities where they lay, in which case the Greek government might be denounced as responsible for the break49

Grivas Memoirs, p. 309.

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down of NATO's mediatory efforts. Melas suggested that if the government had any reasons to want to frustrate agreement, it was greatly preferable that this should occur during the course of the conference on the occasion of any mistake whatever of Turkey, rather than now when Greece's twelve allies in NATO were witnesses that Turkey was willing to accept the discussion of the Greek condition about including the question of the final regime of Cyprus in the conference's agenda together with all the other demands put forward by the Greek government in Karamanlis' letter to Spaak of October 4. To deal with this crisis, Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza flew to Paris next day, October 16. He publicly stated on his arrival that he was determined to achieve results. 50 He managed to dissuade Spaak from issuing a communiqué in which Greece would have been blamed for the failure of NATO's mediatory efforts. On October 17, after a new meeting of the Council, Spaak drafted another procès verbal about the situation, forwarding it to member states in a covering letter. 51 Repeating verbatim the quasi-preambular clauses of the previous procès verbal, of October 13, and also the quasi-operative clause which recommended that the British government take the initiative in calling a Cyprus conference, this document's operative part also suggested this time that NATO's SecretaryGeneral and a representative of the U.S. government "should attend the conference in order to help the participants by lending their good offices". Thus, the conference's composition was somewhat broadened, though not to the extent originally requested by the Greek government in Karamanlis' letter of October 4 to Spaak. On the other hand, omitted from this document was the suggestion that the conference be held on the territory of a friendly [and allied] country. Likewise omitted was the suggestion that it be presided over by a personality who would not be a national of the countries directly concerned and who would be chosen by common agreement of the governments of these three countries — perhaps at the request of the Greek government which was suspicious of any procedure that smacked of arbitration. 52 To the above document, the Turkish representative had proposed two amendments. The first of these aimed at ensuring that the discussion of a final solution of the Cyprus question should not constitute a prior condition for the discussion of the interim solution. The second amendment, on the other

60 61 52

Grivas Memoirs, p. 309. Greek White Book II, p. 21. See above, Chapter m , p. 155, note 78.

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hand, aimed at making clear that the Turkish as well as the Greek government would accept the discussion of the interim solution only on condition that this solution would not prejudge the final one. On October 19, a meeting took place between the representatives of Britain, Greece, and Turkey and NATO's Secretary-General. The Turkish representative strongly opposed any suggestion that the conference should be further broadened to include other parties in addition to the Secretary-General and a representative of the U.S. government. Spaak then proposed that a Norwegian representative be invited to participate in the capacity of assistant to the Secretary-General. This proposal was phoned to Athens which rejected it as insufficient. However, the Greek government said it was ready to accept that, instead of three additional Powers participating besides Britain, Greece and Turkey, there should be only two, on condition that first, the representatives of these two Powers should not participate in the conference merely as observers or in order to offer their good offices, and second, that the two Turkish amendments to the proces verbal of October 17 be rejected. However, "this fresh and ultimate Greek concession" met with no response and on October 23, Averoff-Tossizza flew back to Athens to consult his government.53 For the moment, no more Council meetings were reportedly foreseen.54 On October 24, in Ankara, the Turkish Foreign Ministry authorized the Anatolian News Agency to deny as malicious and inaccurate a report by Cyrus Sulzberger published in the New York Times of October 22 to the effect that during NATO Council discussions Turkey had given up its claim for the partition of Cyprus.55 That same day, in Athens, Makarios called on AverofF-Tossizza to confer with him about the situation. After bringing Makarios up to date about the NATO negotiations, the Foreign Minister explained the British and Turkish concessions and mentioned the procedural matters over which disagreement now still remained. He then expressed the view that it would be in "our interest" not to refuse to take part in the proposed conference, since disagreement was now limited to the issue of the participation of one more state in the conference. If Greece refused to attend "

Greek White Book II, p. 5. Times, October 24, 1958. According to this dispatch, the British view was that, if a conference were to have any real chances of success, there should be some assurance that the Greek government would not ask for more and more concessions in the name of Greek public opinion. 55 Greek White Book II, p. 23. 54

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this conference, then it surely would be charged with intransigence, and in the United Nations it would find itself in a difficult position, because all NATO members would corroborate such a charge on the part of the British and the Turks. He therefore now thought it preferable to attend the proposed conference and from a position of strength disagree there, if necessary. Nobody then would be able to accuse Greece of intransigence, if it disagreed on matters of substance, on which its views were known to all. Makarios replied that the disagreement was not limited merely to the matter of the conference's broadening. Although he acknowledged that Greece had received satisfaction in its request for including in the conference's agenda the issue of a final solution of the Cyprus problem, the British and the Turks had managed to alter the desired form of the conference by putting forward a series of demands with regard to the second Greek condition. He also believed that it would be extremely difficult to unhook oneself from the conference because then the danger of being termed intransigent would be much greater. He therefore believed that it would be preferable "to limit ourselves to our recourse in the United Nations". On that occasion EOKA should proclaim a truce in Cyprus so that the struggle might enter into a calmer phase, while one waited for a change in international conditions. 56 Averoff-Tossizza, however, insisted that the Greek handling of the UN recourse would be rendered extremely difficult as long as NATO countries were to proclaim that Greece had been responsible for the nonconvocation of the conference, especially since Resolution 1013 (XI) recommended negotiations for resolving the Cyprus question. He reminded Makarios that when the British and the Turks had first rejected the Spaak plan, it would have been possible to request NATO to end its mediatory effort, without any harm done. He himself, at that point, had opposed participation in the proposed conference. The Ethnarch, on the other hand, had favored the view of not rejecting Spaak's second approach after the British and Turks had rejected the Secretary-General's first demarche. Indeed, initially, he had been ready to accept the convoca66

Times, October 27, 1958. According to this dispatch, Makarios' attitude had to be viewed against the background of local politics. The previous week, the Greek Opposition (G. Papandreou) parties for the first time had challenged his right to renounce enosis through his independence offer. These reactions, as well as the earlier reaction of the Bishop of Kyrenia, had compelled the Ethnarch to retract and to explain that his proposal, while depriving Greece of any territorial claim on the island — which officially Greece had never formulated — left the future of an independent Cyprus the exclusive concern of the Cypriot people.

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tion of a conference without even requesting any prior clarifications. To these remarks, Makarios replied that at the decision-making stage many things had been said but finally the two Greek preconditions for a conference had been formulated. During the lengthy discussion of this point, mention was made of certain ethnarchic statements to the press and of the relevant Greek government replies.57 Averoff-Tossizza then told Makarios that the only way to extricate oneself from this impasse was to declare that the Greek government was willing to overlook the still existing procedural obstacles and to take part in the proposed conference but that the conference could not take place, because the Cypriot elements would take no part in it. In this way it might be possible to lessen the danger lest "we be denounced in the United Nations by all NATO members without exception for having rejected negotiations without any significant justification". Makarios saw no objection to such a procedure, if it was believed that the matter would thus be facilitated. To judge from a letter of the Bishop of Kition to Grivas, he feared that the British and Turks were indulging in dilatory tactics to avoid the UN debate of the Cyprus question and to be able to continue the implementation of their "satanic" (Macmillan) plan. 58 After Makarios reportedly conferred with Premier Karamanlis on this matter, the Greek Ambassador to NATO was instructed to inform the Council on October 25 that Greece would take no further steps toward a conference.59 According to his instructions, he was to tell the Council that his government, after painstaking negotiations during which it had made various concessions, still maintained certain reservations of a procedural character which, nevertheless, would not have prevented it from taking part in the proposed Cyprus conference. Accordingly, it had been discussing the remaining basic points of disagreement concerning the substantial broadening of the conference which it regarded as indispensable because of the nature of the problem and the tension it provoked. However, during the previous weeks, the continuous and intense opposition of the British and Turkish sides not only on procedural matters but also on matters of substance had convinced the Greek govern17 Earlier in October, Makarios had made certain statements to Vima which caused friction with the Greek government, because they rendered more difficult the negotiations going on in NATO. 68 Grivas Memoirs, p. 310. 59 Kathimerini, October 30, 1958.

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ment that the proposed conference was doomed to failure. While the Council had been discussing the matter of including the question of a final solution on the proposed conference's agenda, responsible British officials had made statements that Cyprus ought to be regarded as an offshore island of Turkey. And the Turkish side had repeated with provocative insistence that partition was the only acceptablefinalsolution. With regard to the interim solution, the Turkish government had appointed a Turkish representative to Cyprus with special authority. The Greek government's conviction that the proposed conference was foredoomed was strengthened even more when the representatives of eighty per cent of the inhabitants of Cyprus stated they neither regarded the preconditions for the conference as satisfactory nor could they hope for the conference's success. The failure of a conference that would meet under NATO's aegis, in the Greek government's view, especially at a moment when spirits were greatly inflamed and the situation in Cyprus was so tragic, could harm both the alliance and the relations among Britain, Turkey and Greece and lead to even greater tension between the two sectors of the island's population. On the other hand, thanks to the interest expressed by many NATO members in favor of an equitable solution of the colonial question of Cyprus, the atmosphere of dissatisfaction with NATO which existed in Greece had been changed. The Greek government would not wish to endanger this improvement. In particular it would not wish the whole alliance to be held responsible in a matter in which only two of its members were gravely responsible. This could occur if the conference were to fail — which seemed more than likely because of the above-mentioned reasons. Accordingly, the Greek government believed that the proposed conference, under the current circumstances, should not be convoked. In conclusion, the Greek government expressed its thanks to NATO's Council which had exerted many efforts for convoking the conference. It was especially grateful to NATO's Secretary-General who not only had worked in order to find an equitable solution but, by his actions, had contributed to the strengthening of Greece's confidence in NATO. Four days later, on October 29, the Greek Ambassador to NATO reaffirmed his government's decision in a long speech before the NATO Council. It was only then that it was revealed that the Secretary-General's proposal for the participation of a Norwegian representative in the conference would be acceptable to the British and Turkish governments,

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as the fourth and last NATO Council procès verbal, dated October 29, 1958, shows. 60 In his speech of October 29, 1958 before the NATO Council, 61 the Greek Ambassador amplified the main points of the instructions he had conveyed to the Council four days earlier. Reemphasizing the Greek charge that the spirit of conciliation necessary for the conference's success was lacking, he underlined that Lennox-Boyd's Blackpool statement of October 9 had been a turning point. Several British newspapers, he observed, in big headlines, had said that the Colonial Secretary, by his statement, had torpedoed the Cyprus conference. But the Turkish government, too, had left no illusions about the possible success of negotiations at the conference. During the Council discussions, the Turkish Ambassador to NATO had made clear that his government intended to ask that, on the Governor's Council provided for in the Macmillan plan, the Turkish minority — eighteen per cent of the island's inhabitants — should have equal representation with the Greek majority, which consisted of eighty per cent of the island's inhabitants. Under such conditions, to hope for agreement even on the matter of the interim regime seemed already more than problematic. Moreover, despite the importance the Greek government attached to reaching, during the conference, a final solution of the Cyprus problem, not only had the Turkish Foreign Minister again declared that his government would accept no solution other than partition, but all British and Turkish public men, whose views had come to the Greek government's attention, had stated that, to their mind, there was no hope that the conference would adopt a final solution. After declaiming against enosis for years, Britain and Turkey attached no importance at all to Greece's decision to sacrifice enosis. This revealed their lack of any true conciliatory intentions. The Greek government, thus, had found itself facing a dilemma: either to interrupt the preliminary talks for convening a conference and thus risk losing the even slight chance a conference always offers of reaching an agreement even in the most unfavorable of circumstances; or to yield on the question of broadening the conference and to attend it with its opponents plainly determined to show themselves uncompromising. After a thorough study of this question, the Greek government chose the first alternative, namely that of interrupting the preliminary talks. It concluded that the chances of success at a conference were too small to make it worthwhile to run the grave risk of failure. 60 61

Greek White Book II, pp. 5-6, and 27-28. Also British White Paper, pp. 5-6. Greek White Book II, pp. 24-26.

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The British Ambassador to NATO's Council reportedly stated in response to his Greek colleague's statement of October 29 that his government left the door open for a conference. His Turkish colleague expressed regret at the Greek government's decision.62 The fourth, last NATO procès verbal with the Secretary-General's covering letter, at this stage of the Cyprus problem repeated verbatim the quasi-preambular clauses of the previous such documents of October 17, 1958, though it incorporated in its text the two Turkish amendments which had been listed separately in the earlier procès verbal. Replacing, however, one of the earlier document's operative clauses, it provided two alternative paragraphs. Under the first of these, the Council suggested that the conference should be held in Paris and that NATO's SecretaryGeneral, representing the organization, should extend his good offices to the parties concerned. Under the second of the alternative paragraphs, the Council suggested that NATO's Secretary-General, assisted by one of the permanent representatives on the NATO Council and a representative of the United States, should attend the conference, in order to help the participants by extending their good offices.63 In Athens, likewise on October 29, Premier Karamanlis issued a statement and his government published a communiqué both of which were designed to justify the Greek move. 64 Karamanlis blamed the British and Turkish governments for the failure of NATO's mediatory effort and emphasized Greece's conciliatory and moderate stand. Neither he nor his government's communiqué blamed the Cyprus Ethnarch for this failure. The communiqué laid emphasis on Spaak's original proposal of September 23, 1958, and underlined that neither Britain nor Turkey had agreed to consider the Spaak plan as an obligatory basis for the proposed conference's discussions, in contrast to Greece. It also observed that both governments had rejected the Greek condition for a broadening of the conference's composition by the inclusion of representatives of other governments with rights equal to those of the other participants or at least as impartial third parties, for the purpose of reaching a constructive solution. As the Greek Ambassador to NATO had done, it referred, but without details, to public British and Turkish statements made outside the NATO forum which had suggested that the conference was doomed to failure — at least from the Greek viewpoint. In conclusion, 42 83 64

Grivas Memoirs, p. 310. Greek White Book II, pp. 27-28. British White Book, pp. 5-6. Kathimerini, October 30, 1958.

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the communiqué stated that the Greek government would now direct all its efforts to support the just demands of the Cypriots in the United Nations. Responding to these Greek public statements, Macmillan on October 30, in the House of Commons, said his government was prepared to take up the idea of a conference at any time and preferred to regard this round of discussions as adjourned rather than concluded. He also recounted the concessions made by Britain during the NATO Council discussions and mediatory efforts. 65 Recapitulating more or less Macmillan's statement of October 29, the British government issued next day, October 31, a White Paper66 publishing the text of Spaak's plan of September 24, 1958, and the fourth procès verbal together with Spaak's covering letter, both of October 29, 1958, omitting, however, the date of these two latter documents. In a brief introduction, this White Paper emphasized that the NATO Council had been in substantial agreement over these documents and that the British government had accepted either of the alternative paragraphs 8 of the procès verbal of October 29. Underlining again the British concessions made during the NATO Council discussions, the White Paper also stressed, as Macmillan had done in the Commons, that the British government would not object if Makarios were to represent the Greek Cypriots at the proposed conference. Finally, without comment, it noted the Greek government's decision of October 29 to drop any further attempts to convene a conference. This White Paper, which was also a response to British Labour Party charges of British Government responsibility for the breakdown of the NATO negotiations, was transmitted by the Permanent British Representative to the United Nations, Sir Pierson Dixon, to the UN Secretary-General on November 3, in connection with the Cyprus item on the General Assembly's agenda. 67 At this point, too, the Times' diplomatic correspondent, writing about the Cyprus affair, observed that Makarios' proposal for the setting up of an independent Cyprus as a final solution of the problem did not altogether exclude the possibility of enosis, if the United Nations were to guarantee this status and would also be allowed to change it. Only the unanimous approval of the North Atlantic Council instead of a UN General Assembly resolution (presumably to be adopted by a two-thirds vote, if the

85 88 87

594, H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 37-48. Cmnd. 566. GAOR, Thirteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda item 68, 3-5.

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change of status issue were to be regarded as an important matter) would ensure Turkey against enosis.ea The Greek response to Macmillan's statement in the Commons and to the British White Paper was to release to the press on November 1 parts of the text of Spaak's letter of October 1, 1958 to Premier Karamanlis as well as Ambassador Melas' address to the NATO Council on October 6, 1958.69 Finally, for use in the United Nations, the Greek government issued a White Book, publishing several other NATO documents. 70 Added to other published or unpublished papers and press reports these documents provided, as already mentioned, the bases for the story presented here about NATO's mediatory efforts of September 23-October 29,1958, with regard to the Cyprus imbroglio. An appendix to this Greek White Book included excerpts from Labour Party member statements in the House of Commons which supported the Greek contention about where the responsibility lay not only for the breakdown of NATO's conciliatory efforts but also for the violence occurring in Cyprus since the "appointed day" of October 1,1958. 71 In Gaitskell's view of October 28, 1958, if the British government had taken up Makarios' offer to renounce enosis, further violence might have been avoided in Cyprus. 72 NATO's Secretary-General had been greatly disheartened by the failure of his conciliatory effort. A letter of November 6 from the U.S. Secretary of State somewhat cheered him. Dulles, in this letter, expressed his appreciation and admiration for Spaak's efforts to achieve a compromise between the parties to the Cyprus dispute. He was encouraged, he wrote, by the indisputable progress achieved during five weeks of NATO discussion of the Cyprus question. These discussions had not only considerably reduced the divergencies of views about a conference but had exerted a salutary effect on the Greek attitude toward NATO. As a result of Spaak's efforts, the Greek government had set aside its suspicions about NATO as far as the Cyprus question was concerned. This improvement in the Greek attitude would facilitate further discussions within the alliance. Dulles hoped that after the UN debate on the Cyprus question, the NATO Council would be able to resume the

98 88 70 71 72

Times, October 29, 1958. Kathimerinl, November 2, 1958. See above, note 3. Greek White Book II, pp. 29-35. 594 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 18.

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discussion on that issue. The U.S. government was prepared to help Spaak in his extremely difficult but vital task. 7 3

73

Spaak, Combats inachevés, II, pp. 161-163. After the London agreement on Cyprus was reached on February 19, 1959, Spaak received thanks for his conciliatory efforts from Christian Herter, Dulles' successor as Secretary of State, as well as from Premier Karamanlis and Foreign Secretary Lloyd but none from any Turkish official of an equivalent rank.

VII BACK TO THE UN: "RAYS OF HOPE"

A. PRELUDE TO THE UN DEBATE OF ITEM 68 ON THE CYPRUS QUESTION

Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza and Ethnarch Makarios left Athens for New York on November 15, 1958, to wage the fifth UN debate on the Cyprus question which the breakdown of NATO's conciliatory efforts had made inevitable. Before their departure, a group of some hundred students outside the Athens airport lounge shouted slogans of "EOKA, EOKA" or "Enosis, Enosis". The Foreign Minister said, among other things, that the United Nations now would have to take a clear stand on the proposal that Cyprus should become an independent state. Reportedly, the Greek government had already decided that unless Britain and Turkey accepted in advance the principle of an independent Cyprus, it would accept no UN recommendation for NATO talks to be resumed. The UN guarantee was considered sufficient to exclude the possibility of enosis for an independent Cyprus.1 Two objectives had to be achieved immediately: first, preventing partition and, second, getting the British to suspend the Macmillan plan's continued implementation.2 In anticipation of the imminent debate over the Cyprus question in the UN Political Committee, the Greek side exerted efforts in two directions: toward convincing third-party member states to support the Greek viewpoint which focused on the theme of independence, and toward achieving a less tense atmosphere for the debate, by securing some relaxation of EOKA's "Black October" activities which had continued well into November 1958. With regard to the latter aim, Makarios, it will be recalled, when asking Averoff-Tossizza on October 24 to desist from further efforts 1 2

Times, November 16, 1958. The Last Battle, p. 18.

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that might lead to a Cyprus conference under NATO auspices, had simultaneously favored, in view of the Greek recourse to the United Nations, a new EOKA truce.3 Accordingly, before leaving for New York, he had written to Grivas on November 9 indirectly suggesting such a step. An unnamed British resident of Cyprus, Makarios wrote, had visited him and informed him on behalf of the Governor that if EOKA were to proclaim a truce, the British side would respond accordingly. The Britisher had said that Sir Hugh Foot was a man of good intentions and sincerely wanted a fair solution of the Cyprus problem. Expressing the same opinion about Macmillan, he had added that the British government did not desire partition but for the time being did not regard it expedient clearly to say so. And it was carefully studying the independence proposal, despite reservations that this proposal was not sincere but a mere maneuver. During this exchange, Makarios had denied that a truce depended on himself and had blamed British policies for having forced the Cypriots to resort to arms in order to get their freedom. He had also asked the Britisher why was the British government going ahead with administrative partition, if it was seriously studying his proposal for independence? The Britisher had replied that the British government intended to implement the Macmillan plan up to the point where the rights of the Turkish community would be fully safeguarded. Then it would tell the Turks they could no longer have any further claims. From this conversation, Makarios concluded that the British side would make concessions so that an agreement might be achieved, after all British efforts to obtain acceptance of the partnership plan had failed.4 At this juncture, the Greek Consul in Nicosia, in a note of November 17 to Grivas, likewise proposed a relaxation of EOKA's activities. Such a move, he argued, would create a favorable impression and deprive the antagonists of their arguments about Greek fanaticism and the consequent impossibility of reaching any political solution under conditions of "terrorism". "Isaakios" himself, in a letter received by Grivas on Novem3

See above, Chapter VI, p. 285. Grivas Memoirs, p. 330. The English version of Grivas' memoirs, pp. 179-180, reveals that this unnamed British resident of Cyprus was Kenneth Mackenzie, editor of the English-language newspaper Cyprus Mail and correspondent for the London Times. His brother was a spokesman for the Foreign Office. According to this account, when Makarios inquired how the British forces would respond to a new EOKA cease-fire, Mackenzie said that a British cease-fire could not be offered without precipitating a Tory backbench revolt in Parliament and infuriating Turkey. Avoiding any overt move, Governor Foot would try to get the British forces to exert restraint in their operations. 4

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ber 19, expressed the view that the UN battle would be greatly facilitated, if Grivas halted his activities for a while, ten days, for instance. He might issue a proclamation to the effect that so long as the United Nations was debating "our fate", EOKA had confidence in its liberal principles and suspended its activities. "If our freedom was granted, we would stop our actions, because our aim is to live in freedom and tranquility, etc.", he might also say in this proclamation.5 Grivas' response to these suggestions was primarily but not exclusively negative. In his answer to Makarios' letter of November 9, he opposed the idea of a truce. The opponent, he argued, wanted only a unilateral truce and EOKA might appear ridiculous by making once again such an offer. In his last leaflet, he added, he had formulated the conditions even for an armistice. These conditions were: acceptance of the just Greek claims and cessation of violence on the part of the opponent. Otherwise one would have to go on to the bitter end. He agreed, however, slightly to de-escalate his activities, by limiting them to blows against targets of opportunity instead of seeking out targets at all costs. And, in a further de-escalation on November 22, he issued a leaflet proclaiming that EOKA would limit its activities merely to neutralizing actions and reprisals, while calmly waiting for the UN verdict. At the same time, he warned that if no solution were found, he would continue his struggle with greater intensity than ever.6 In the sphere of international activities connected with the imminent UN debate on Cyprus, the Greek government had instructed its embassies abroad, special envoys, important Greek personalities outside Greece, honorary consuls, and friends of Greece to carry out various appropriate demarches and actions in support of the Greek viewpoint on the Cyprus question. However, reports coming back to Athens or New York gave no ground for optimism. The British government, too, was engaged in similar activities, to get support for its own viewpoint. In demarches with governments which had voted for the essentially Greek draft resolution at the previous Assembly, it had not only complained but had suggested 5

Grivas Memoirs, p. 330. ' Ibid., pp. 330-331. Factors behind Grivas' initially negative attitude were, among others, also the death of his top aide, Kyriakos Matsis, the same day he received the notes of the Greek Consul and of "Isaakios". Some days earlier, he had also rejected an appeal of Zorlu for a cease-fire. After conferring with his military advisers, the Governor cancelled a curfew of youth in Larnaca. However, the operations of the security forces continued, with the Governor stating, in response to Grivas' proclamation, that he would continue these operations as long as they were necessary for suppressing violence.

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the possible cooling of political and economic relations, if support of Greece were to continue. Even some of the former colonies and newly independent states said that their interests demanded support of the British viewpoint.7 And, as "Isaakios" wrote to Grivas, the Soviet Union, too, was showing signs of reluctance. It favored self-determination (not independence), in order to render a solution more difficult and give Left Wingers the opportunity to demonstrate that they demanded more rather than less for Cyprus than did the Greek government.8 After the experience of the previous Assembly, the Turkish government had conducted quite a campaign for winning friends and influencing people in support of its viewpoint on the Cyprus question. Within three months it had set up eight new embassies in countries where it had none previously. It had also sent special missions to several countries in efforts to obtain their governments' backing. To get support among the Arab countries it stressed the common Muslim heritage, while in NATO Council discussions the Turkish representative had, on occasion, accused the other members of ganging up together as Christians against the Muslim Turks. 9 This time, too, in the UN debate, Foreign Minister Zorlu himself, assisted by a specially large mission totaling twenty-one officials as compared with fifteen the previous year, represented Turkey. And the Turkish Delegation, which on previous occasions had refrained from supporting the cause of the Algerians, now cosponsored with the Arab states a resolution on the Algerian question. 10 On November 20, taking the Greeks by surprise, the British delegation made public its draft resolution on the Cyprus item, thus obtaining a procedural advantage. 11 In this draft resolution it sought in effect to get the General Assembly to endorse the efforts to implement the Macmillan plan in Cyprus. In its operative paragraphs, the British Delegation proposed that the Assembly invite the British government to continue its efforts to arrive at "a peaceful, democratic, and just solution" of the 7

The Last Battle, pp. 18-19. Grivas Memoirs, p. 330. Melas, Reminiscences of an Ambassador, p. 226. He points out that Spaak was not Christian. 10 The Last Battle, p. 19. 11 Times, November 21, 1958. Karamanlis summoned the American and French Ambassadors to his office and reportedly asked them to convey to their governments the Greek attitude on this draft resolution. The Greek government was known to believe that any British or Turkish draft resolution on Cyprus would be defeated with the help of the Afro-Asian and Soviet blocs but was aware of the procedural advantage of this early introduction of the British draft resolution. 8

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Cyprus problem (the ambiguous formula of Resolution 1013 [XI]), and call upon the other parties to cooperate to that end. It also asked the Assembly to call upon "all concerned to put an end to terrorism and violence in Cyprus". 12 Certain statements Makarios made on November 20 to the New York Times13 did not ease the Greek Delegation's task. Makarios, in this interview, presented his proposal for an independent Cyprus as a concession but also made it plain that enosis remained the end goal, though without the approval of the United Nations this goal could not be achieved. And, although he said that in the government of an independent Cyprus the Turks would be represented according to their ratio in the island's population, he was unwilling to offer assurances that an independent Cyprus would allow Britain to maintain military bases on the island. On this matter, he said, he did not want to say anything, because both the Arabs and the USSR opposed the maintenance of British bases in Cyprus, and the help of those countries was needed in the forthcoming UN debate. In this interview, he also said that "American circles" had encouraged him to make his independence proposal. This statement elicited a prompt denial from a State Department spokesman who reaffirmed that the United States had taken no position as to a specific solution of the Cyprus question.14 Makarios' remark about enosis as the ultimate Greek Cypriot goal angered Greek officials handling the Cyprus recourse, undermining as it did the Greek Foreign Minister's efforts to persuade other delegates of the sincerity of this proposal. Krishna Menon, too, the earliest advocate of Cypriot independence, reportedly was annoyed by this remark, and Turkish and British representatives as well as their supporters exploited it, to buttress their contention that the proposal for setting up an independent Cyprus was but a maneuver designed eventually to lead to the union of Cyprus with Greece.15 Since November 21, 1958, the Political Committee had decided to take up the last three items on its agenda in the following order: the questions of Cyprus, of atomic radiation's effects, and of Algeria. All three contestants had agreed that Cyprus should be discussed first.16 Item 68 12

Agenda Item 68, pp. 15-16. The New York Times, November 21, 1958. Times, November 22 and 24, 1958. 15 Vima, November 22, 1958 (S. Zotos dispatch). 18 On November 18, 1958, the Political Committee proposed that Item 68 (Cyprus) be debated after the Committee had considered the question of the peaceful uses of outer space (GAOR, Thirteenth Session, Political Committee, 898th meeting, November

13 14

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thus came up for general debate and resolution-making after the Political Committee had considered the question of the peaceful uses of outer space. As matters turned out, this Cyprus debate, after a somewhat slow beginning, was to be the longest and most complex of the five successive battles in "parliamentary diplomacy" over Cyprus which Greece had inaugurated with its recourse to the ninth Assembly in 1954. This engagement lasted fifteen meetings of the Political Committee between November 25 and December 4,1958; witnessed sharp exchanges between the main contestants with their respective supporters occasionally taking part in the fray; spawned four third-party draft resolutions, by member states seeking to play the role of conflict moderators; and ended in a noticeably conciliatory atmosphere due mainly to a marked change in the tone of the Turkish Foreign Minister's statement. Was the grave new Berlin crisis Khrushchev had triggered with his quasi-ultimative letter of November 27, 1958, coming as it did after the jolting series of Middle Eastern crises since the Suez affair of 1956, and the sputnik shock of October 4, 1957, a decisive factor in this change of tone which led to the Turkish-Greek rapprochement and, shortly after, to a solution of the Cyprus question, at least for the time being? It is difficult to say for sure. It is, however, a fact that this new Berlin crisis was at the time on every statesman's mind both in the United Nations and outside and had aroused fear of a possible worldwide conflict. It is a fact, too, that Zorlu's conciliatory attitude, which strongly implied abandonment (at least for the time being) of the basic feature of the immediate Turkish political goal in Cyprus since 1956 — partition — became quite strikingly evident in his speech of December 3 on the Cyprus question in the Committee, namely less than a week after Khrushchev had delivered his quasi-ultimatum on Berlin. The British representative's reiteration that his government, while wishing to leave all options open for a final solution, did not favor partition, may have constituted an additional factor for this change of attitude.

18, 1958, 221). Then on November 21, 1958, the representative of Iran, noting that all parties concerned agreed that Cyprus should be discussed first, proposed that the Committee should take up the last three items on its agenda in the following order: Cyprus, effects of atomic radiation, and Algeria. The Chairman put the proposal to the vote, and the Committee adopted it by 60 votes to none, with two abstentions. He noted hereafter that the countries most directly concerned seemed ready to take up the question of Cyprus {ibid., 993rd meeting, November 21, 1958, 233).

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B. THE UN CONTESTANTS' APPROACHES TO THE CYPRUS QUESTION1'

In its draft resolution, tabled on November 25, the Greek Delegation, instead of urging the Assembly to call for the application of the principle or right of self-determination to the population of Cyprus, as it had done at previous Assembly sessions since 1954, wanted the Assembly to approve in principle the setting up of an independent Cyprus. In this draft resolution's operative paragraphs, it accordingly proposed that the Assembly invite the British government to help the Cypriots toward instituting, after a period of "genuine democratic self-government", the "status of independence" in which adequate guarantees would be provided not only for the protection of the Turkish minority but also for its participation in the island's administration. For implementing the above points, the Greek Delegation proposed that a five-state good offices committee be set up which would report back to the Assembly.18 The Turkish Delegation, on the other hand, in its draft resolution, tabled likewise on November 25, called in effect for self-determination but for the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus separately, in a way that could lead to the island's partition. This draft resolution's operative paragraphs proposed that the "three governments directly concerned" (a phrase anathema to the Greeks) should resume and continue their efforts in a spirit of cooperation in order to reach a friendly solution "in application of the principle of equal rights and self-determination" (of Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Charter) in accordance with "the particular circumstances of Cyprus and its peoples", in conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. It also proposed that the Assembly should call upon all concerned to refrain from supporting or encouraging 17

In citing from the debate in the Political Committee at the thirteenth General Assembly, the author uses the verbatim but unofficial proceedings of the Committee, as he had done when dealing with the Cyprus debate at the twelfth General Assembly, because of reasons mentioned in the preface. However, since this new study is not primarily one of "parliamentary diplomacy", a greater degree of selectivity is applied, footnotes have been kept to a minimum, and the focus is on the resolutionary process proper rather than on the substantive debate of the issue. Moreover as the subchapters reveal, the author has separated the debate among the three main contestants from the statements of third-party speakers on the Cyprus item. For AveroffTossizza's set statement, see UNGA, A/C.1/PV.996 First Committee, Verbatim Record of the 996th meeting, November 25, 1958, pp. 4-(53-55). These verbatim records will be hereafter cited as Verbatim Record, with the number and date of the Committee meeting. 18 For text of the Greek draft resolution, see, Agenda Item 68, p. 16.

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violence in Cyprus and from resorting to radio broadcasts and other mass media in a way that harmed relations between the two peoples of the island. 19 At the Political Committee's 1003rd meeting, the afternoon of December 1, the text of a nine-state draft was circulated. Prepared by Krishna Menon, in close cooperation with the Greek Delegation, this draft resolution was less extreme than the Greek draft resolution but was favorable to the Greek viewpoint, because it was definitely "anti-partition" in character. And the Greek Delegation had grounds to believe that, unlike its own, it would gather eight to ten more votes than the two thirds required for Assembly adoption. 20 Under the operative paragraphs of this document's once revised form, the Assembly would urge "all concerned, particularly the government and people of Cyprus", to endeavor to establish conditions for the cessation of violence in Cyprus helpful to peaceful negotiations. It would also request "all concerned", particularly the British government, to continue negotiations with a view to promoting self-government in Cyprus, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and "the preservation of its integrity". The Assembly would also state that for a peaceful, equitable and stable settlement, effective provisions for the protection of all legitimate minority interests were essential. Finally, it would call upon all member states to cooperate to this end, "undertaking to respect the integrity of Cyprus", as well as its self-government, when the latter was "fully" attained. 21 Two of this draft resolution's preambular clauses contained references to British or Greek government statements on the Cyprus question made in the Committee. Thus, the sixth and seventh such clauses welcomed, respectively, statements Commander Allan H. P. Noble made in his opening set speech22 that his government sought to help preserve the united personality of Cyprus and did not favor partition or consider it to be a solution of the problem. And the eighth preambular clause welcomed the Greek government's statements that Greece had no territorial claims or expansionist desires with regard to Cyprus. If this nine-state draft resolution made no reference to full independence for Cyprus as one might have expected from its principal author, this was partly due to the fact that Makarios' reference to enosis in his New 19

Agenda Item 68, p. 16. The Last Battle, pp. 61-62. 21 Agenda Item 68, p. 15. 22 Verbatim Record, 1003rd meeting, December 1, pp. (93-95>96. For N o b l e ' s set statement, see, Verbatim Record, 996th meeting, November 25, 1958, pp. 56-82. 20

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York Times interview had rendered Krishna Menon reluctant to put forward such a proposal, unless the Greek Delegation agreed to including in this draft resolution some statement to the effect that Greece would forego enosis forever. This, the Greek Foreign Minister, despite his initial inclination, was unwilling to accept, cautioned by one of his aides against doing so and having in mind Makarios' stipulation that the status of Cyprus' independence might be changed by a U N resolution. On December 1, as the 1003rd meeting of the Committee was about to adjourn, Noble read out a written statement 23 and dealt this draft resolution a lethal blow, even before the representative of Ceylon had formally introduced it. He reminded the Committee that in his opening statement he had explained that though his government did not favor partition and was trying to preserve the island's integrity by its partnership plan, it also believed the Assembly should do nothing at the moment to point the way for a final settlement. For the Committee to refer to the island's future integrity in any resolution, as the nine-state draft resolution did, and not to permit for the time being all final solutions of the Cyprus problem to remain, at least theoretically, possible, would be to prejudge the island's future. In the delicate state of intercommunal feeling prevailing in Cyprus it would be equally dangerous to ask the Turkish community to drop its hopes for partition as it would to require the Greek Cypriots to drop their hopes of preserving the island's integrity. Those who agreed with his delegation that the island's integrity was desirable should therefore weigh the danger lest insistence on it now might provoke its opponents "into civil war or an even wider conflict". After asserting that the seventh preambular clause of the nine-state draft resolution "somewhat misquoted" his original statement, he reiterated in conclusion that he had never said that his government did not consider partition to be a solution of the problem. He had only said that it did not favor it. The fact was that one of the governments and one of the communities concerned desired partition as a solution of the problem, because of the fear and the lack of confidence which EOKA's "terrorist" tactics had evoked. The present aim should be to remove that fear. If, however, the Assembly adopted the nine-state resolution, in the situation as it was, that fear would only grow sharper. The debate, he asserted, so far had revealed general agreement on the need for an interim settlement and on the desirability of negotiations between the parties concerned.

23

The Last Battle, pp. 62-64.

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His government remained willing to resume negotiations and to do everything possible to ensure their real success. This British move, which in the Greek Delegation's opinion had been prompted by the Turkish Foreign Minister, astonished all representatives, angered many, and generally aroused fear lest the nine-state resolution, if adopted, lead to civil strife in Cyprus if not to war. 24 A brief exchange followed among the representative of Iceland, the Turkish Foreign Minister, and the Committee Chairman about whether Noble had acted irregularly in discussing a draft resolution before it had been formally submitted and fully explained to the Committee members. When the Committee adjourned, the members of the Greek Delegation scattered in all directions, calling on members of other delegations to ascertain their reactions. Toward midnight they gathered together again and reported on their findings. All agreed that most delegations now feared to vote for a draft resolution which might lead to bloodshed, even to war. Indeed, some of the draft resolution's cosponsors wondered whether they should not withdraw this draft resolution. However, Krishna Menon, though disturbed and angered, maintained that one should not retreat. 25 And next day the draft acquired a tenth sponsor: Ethiopia. At the Committee's next meeting, its 1004th, the morning of December 2, Krishna Menon briefly commented on whether Noble's intervention the day before had been proper. Then the Greek Foreign Minister dramatically counterattacked the substance of Noble's statement on the now ten-state draft resolution. He observed that the day before, nineteen representatives had spoken and most of them agreed that partition should be avoided and condemned. The ten-state resolution reflected this trend of opinion. The British representative, however, in order to maintain for the sake of another state the solution of partition which the ten-state draft resolution excluded, had dared threaten the Committee and the partisans of the island's integrity with civil war, even general war, if they took decisions in accordance with their free judgment. This British threat of war in order to prevent the adoption of a UN resolution was unique in the annals of the United Nations. It constituted an indirect incitement to violence. For by his statement, the British representative was implicitly inciting the Turkish Cypriots to massacre their Greek compatriots, and Turkey to declare war on Greece, if the United Nations were to defend the 24 25

The Last Battle, p. 64. Ibid., p. 64.

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island's integrity. This statement not only had torn up the Charter and trampled on its principles. It seriously endangered NATO. It constituted a real insult to the representatives on the Committee, whose high mission was above any intimidatory maneuver. It was a provocation, a casus belli. To this implied threat, Greece replied: "We have proved we were never afraid, even of the greatest of attacks. We ourselves shall never be aggressors. We face with sang froid the aggression with which we were threatened yesterday, because the maintenance of international peace lies with the United Nations." 2 6 What had happened the day before, Averoff-Tossizza continued, had at least demonstrated publicly the sort of conference to which Greece had been invited to attend (by NATO). The representative of Iran, too, had been warned about the sort of conference to which he was inviting Greece with his draft resolution. A blow had been dealt to the prestige and the freedom of judgment of the United Nations. As soon as Averoff-Tossizza had finished his speech the entire British team on the Committee, with the exception of a young secretary, walked out of the conference hall, with an air of deep concern on their faces. Shortly after, so did the head of the delegations of NATO members together with the heads of certain other delegations, especially of those which were close to Britain. Though the Greek side had exploited what many delegations believed to have been a serious British tactical blunder, that blunder had severely damaged the chances of the nine-state draft resolution. This was the feeling that prevailed by the time the Committee ended its morning meeting of December 2. 27

C. THIRD-PARTY VIEWS ON THE CYPRUS QUESTION

While protagonist and antagonists in their set speeches and exchanges sought in such and other ways to influence the views and voting attitudes of the other U N members, representatives of thirty-seven third-party states presented their views on the issue, either taking sides or trying to play a conciliatory role among them, or urging the United Nations to do nothing about the substance of the dispute. ae

Averoff-Tossizza and Karamanlis, in backstage diplomatic responses to threats of Turkish resort to acts of violence or war, had stated that Greece in that case would resort to the United Nations and ask for help from anywhere (Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 79-80, and 85). Before the United Nations now, Averoff-Tossizza publicly reiterated the Greek government's commitment to such action. 27 The Last Battle, p. 67.

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Among the latter, the United States was predominant. On November 28, in the morning, at the Committee's 1000th meeting, the U.S. representative had spoken up, essentially in opposition to the view that the Assembly should make any recommendation of substance on the Cyprus question. 28 In a brief speech, Ambassador James W. Barco once again expressed his government's regret that the Assembly had been obliged to take up the complex and difficult problem of Cyprus. In the U.S. view, the United Nations was not the place to arrive at a solution of the Cyprus problem. The U.S. government was convinced that the parties to the Cyprus dispute should work out a solution themselves. The only thing the Assembly could do was to try to see to it that the deliberation facilitated further efforts of those directly concerned with this problem to find a mutually acceptable settlement. The United States, he continued, had taken no position in favor of any particular formula among those which had been suggested as a final solution, because so far no formula had appeared to be generally acceptable to all concerned. This was essential if any formula was to succeed. This did not mean that the United States was indifferent to the crucial necessity of reaching a settlement. On the contrary, it urgently sought for an early, equitable solution and was prepared to help in every way it appropriately could. The violence in Cyprus and particularly the ugly elements of intercommunal strife underscored the need of finding an early solution. Despite the violence, the United States had noted some encouraging developments since the Assembly last considered the Cyprus question. As envisaged in Article 33 of the Charter, 29 discussions had taken place with a view to arranging a conference among all concerned, including representatives of the two Cypriot communities. The U.S. government supported the very real efforts which had taken place under the aegis of NATO to arrange a conference where quiet diplomacy could have an opportunity to permit all concerned to come to an agreement. It had been disappointed when these efforts collapsed since it was convinced that they offered real promise of substantial progress. That all three governments directly concerned with the Cyprus problem, as their remarks had demonstrated, recognized that a solution could be found only through negotiation and conciliation 28

See above, Chapter I, p. 73, for background of this attitude. Article 33, paragraph 1, of the U N Charter provides that "the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice".

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heartened the United States. The United Nations, the United States believed, could take action which would lead to a resumption of efforts in a manner consistent with Article 33 of the Charter. This would be the greatest contribution it could make toward bringing about an agreement among those concerned. As in the past, the United States would determine its attitude toward the various draft resolutions tabled in the light of its judgment as to whether their adoption would in fact enhance or impair the chances of fruitful negotiations. The representative of the other superpower, on the other hand, favored application of the self-determination provisions of the UN Charter to Cyprus. Speaking at the 1001st meeting of the Committee on November 28, in the afternoon, Arkady Sobolev emphasized the view that the people of Cyprus were fighting for freedom from colonial domination. He urged that they be given the opportunity, in accordance with the UN Charter, to exercise their legitimate and inalienable right to self-determination and gain their freedom. Britain stubbornly refused to recognize this right, because it was using the island to support its collapsing colonial positions in the Near and Middle East. It had not complied with Resolution 1013 (XI), and the British authorities of the island had persevered in a policy of terrorism and violence in Cyprus. The Macmillan plan totally ignored the right of the Cypriots to self-determination. By creating two communities, this plan would place Britain in the role of an arbiter between the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus, by enhancing their antagonism. It was based on the old imperialist rule of divide and conquer. Its purpose was to have the question of the island's future dropped from public discussion for seven years. The project, however, Sobolev predicted, was doomed to failure. It ran against the will of the people who were struggling for independence against colonial domination. But the Macmillan plan, the Soviet representative also observed, emphasized as a primary task the need to keep British military bases on Cyprus for an indeterminate period of time. Strategic, not economic interests were the reason for Britain's stubbornness. Cyprus was to serve as a marshaling base for attacks on other countries, for implementing farreaching aggressive plans hatched by NATO, for serving the interests of oil monopolies, and for suppressing the national liberation movement in the Near and Middle East. It had been used for Anglo-American military intervention in Jordan and Lebanon, the actual object of this intervention being Iraq, also as a base for Anglo-French aggression against Egypt in 1956. As an atomic base, Cyprus constituted a danger for the Cypriot people themselves. Greece's NATO allies had tried to make

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Greece agree to take part in a conference which would give its blessing to the implementation of the Macmillan plan. Accordingly, the U.S. government had sent Robert D. Murphy and Douglas Dillon to Athens to exert pressure in that direction on the Greek government. Dillon, according to a Greek newspaper report, had recommended concessions on the Cyprus question. In exchange, the United States would grant additional military aid to Greece. The NATO efforts to deal with the Cyprus question had once again revealed "the true visage of that aggressive organization as the strangler of freedom and of the independence of peoples". The Soviet Delegation, said Sobolev in conclusion, would support those proposals that would meet the just demands of the Cypriots. At the same meeting of the Committee, the representative of Hungary spoke in a similar vein, emphasizing that the opinion of the Cypriots themselves about their fate had never been ascertained. At the Committee's previous meeting, its 1000th, and at a subsequent meeting, its 1003rd, the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Romania, respectively, supported the Soviet viewpoint, with the former fleetingly referring to independence as a solution of the Cyprus problem. In favor of the establishment of an independent Cyprus were Yugoslavia, the Ukrainian S.S.R., Sudan, Ceylon, Iceland, and, of course, India. Even New Zealand, which at the outset of the UN's Cyprus debates in 1954, had acted as a proxy for Britain, 30 acknowledged that as an ultimate solution independence had much to commend it. And, together with Britain and Australia, it did not look on partition as a good solution. Representatives of sixteen third-party states who spoke on the substance of the Cyprus question during various Committee meetings expressed direct or indirect opposition to the island's partition. China's representative spoke in favor of the cohabitation of the two ethnic groups; the representative of the Dominican Republic refuted the Turkish Foreign Minister's reference to the case of Hispaniola as an analogy for partition; the representatives of six states (Ceylon, Peru, Ireland, Spain, Iceland, and Venezuela), three of them insular, stressed the island's unity, "insular cohesion", or integrity; and the representatives of the UAR, Liberia, and Romania expressly argued against partition. Indeed, four representatives, those of Peru, Liberia, Spain, and Romania, cited relevant passages from Noble's opening statement which showed that Britain, too, did not favor such a solution to the Cyprus problem. As for the representative of Ireland, he noted that Zorlu had avoided the word "parti30

Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 13, and 22.

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tion" in putting forward the Turkish viewpoint. Only the representative of Pakistan spoke in favor of the island's partition. Thus, from the Turkish viewpoint, the attitude of third parties was none too favorable. The representatives of Malaya, of Iran, and of Australia spoke in favor of the British or Turkish viewpoints or both. The theme of a possible federal solution of the Cyprus question reverberated unpleasantly to Greek ears in the Malayan representative's speech. 31 The Iranian, among other things, expressed scepticism about the idea of independence, by referring to Makarios' New York Times interview. Less inclined toward the British or Turkish viewpoint or both was the representative of Colombia, who also tabled a draft resolution which the Greek Delegation viewed with mixed feelings. Under this draft resolution's operative clause, the Assembly was called upon to set up an observation group to assist "all the parties concerned" in resuming and continuing their negotiations for the purpose of finding a peaceful, just and democratic solution of the Cyprus problem. At the request of the parties concerned, this observation group could assume the functions of a good-offices committee. 32 Out of the third-party representatives who spoke about the Cyprus question at various meetings of the Committee, six — those of Iran, Belgium, Costa Rica, the Netherlands, Afghanistan, and Portugal 33 — were, like the U.S. representative, noncommittal about any substantive solution of the Cyprus problem, and dwelt on procedural methods for dealing with the dispute. Moreover, the representatives of Iran and of Belgium tabled draft resolutions of their own, while the representative of Costa Rica voiced support for the Colombian draft resolution. Iran presented a revised version of its resolution at the 1005th meeting of the Committee on December 2. This new version, as compared with the previous one, contained certain changes which were welcomed by, but did not satisfy the Greek Delegation. 34 In this new draft, the Iranian Delegation tried to avoid taking up any question or using any expression that might prejudge the island's future status. The new version, which, the Iranian representative was convinced, went further than Resolution 31

The Last Battle, p. 52. Agenda Item 68, p. 16. 38 For the Iranian statement, see. Verbatim Record, 1000th meeting, November 28, 1958, pp. 11-21. Belgian statement, ibid., 1005th meeting, December 2, 1958, p. 6. Costa Rican statement, ibid., 1003rd meeting, December 1, 1958, pp. 37-(38-40). Netherlands statement, same meeting, pp. 51-(53-55). Afghan statement, same meeting, pp. (78-80)-82. Portuguese statement, same meeting, pp. 82-86. 84 The Last Battle, p. 67. 82

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1013 (XI) and in many respects was more complete and specific, recommended that the three governments concerned and representatives of the Cypriots should hold a conference. Like the Colombian draft resolution, it also envisaged assistance by governments and personalities acceptable to the governments directly concerned. It tried, too, to define the nature and scope of the conference by stating that there would be discussion, not only of the interim arrangements for the administration of Cyprus, but also of a final solution of the problem. In other words, though the Iranian Delegate did not say so, this conference in effect would be similar to the one recommended by NATO. The conference, under this Iranian draft resolution, should also take into consideration both the principles of the Charter and the legitimate aspirations of the inhabitants of Cyprus.35 The Belgian representative presented his draft resolution likewise at the 1005th meeting of the Committee on December 2. Under this formal proposal, the Assembly would call upon "all concerned" to use every possible means for putting an end to terrorism and recommend that they resume and continue their efforts in a spirit of cooperation with a view to reaching a friendly solution in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. As in the past, his government, the Belgian representative explained, did not believe that the Cyprus question could be solved in the United Nations.36 Particularly interesting with regard to the process of state-building were not only Krishna Menon's views but also certain somewhat discontinuous remarks by the representative of Peru, a former President of the UN General Assembly, the elderly statesman Victor Andrés Belaunde. In his view, the development of the personality of Cyprus required peace, harmony and the solution of the problem, but in this hierarchy of values, he placed the personality of Cyprus first. This required unity, the consciousness of unity, and the will to unity. One had to create a spiritual unity for the integration of Cyprus. The duty of Britain, Greece, and Turkey, and of the United Nations was to contribute to the creation of an atmosphere conducive to integration. On the moral plane, there had to exist a sort of intermingling of the elements involved in the geographical factors. There had to exist a spiritual plane, and this could be produced not only by culture but by the modern system of economy which could result in the nuclear age. All in all, the Committee debate on Item 68, as the Rapporteur of that 35

Agenda Item 68, p. 14. Ibid., p. 17.

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Committee noted in his report to the Assembly, showed the complex nature of the Cyprus problem. On the one hand, the different aspirations of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were involved; on the other, there were geographic and strategic factors. Many representatives had expressed concern that since the Assembly had adopted Resolution 1013 (XI) on February 26, 1957, no solution had been reached. Though all representatives who had taken part in the debate agreed that future negotiations between the parties concerned were desirable, in order to find a solution in accordance with the principles of the Charter, two different positions had emerged as to the contents of a resolution. A large number of representatives had expressed the view that a resolution should contain fundamental elements as directives for future negotiations. Other representatives, however, had urged the Assembly not to point, at the present time, the way to any particular final settlement, so as not to prejudge the future. 37 The latter view was to prevail.

D. COMMITTEE RESOLUTION-MAKING

At the end of the Committee's 1006th meeting, of December 3, when no other representatives wished to speak, the Chairman closed the general debate on Cyprus. "We will now concentrate on the discussion on the draft resolutions before us", he said, listing the seven draft resolutions which had been tabled. As the new, penultimate phase of the UN resolutionary process was about to open, the Mexican representative, Rafael de la Colina, observed that the Assembly should avoid taking a decision which one or more of the three parties directly concerned might reject and therefore subsequently disregard. The revised Iranian draft resolution seemed to him as the most viable among those tabled, though he acknowledged that the Colombian as well as the ten-state draft resolution contained many invaluable elements. On the other hand, because the draft resolutions tabled by Britain, Greece, and Turkey intensely reflected the respective peculiarities of their sponsors' position on the question, it would be rather difficult to combine them with the other draft resolutions and to produce a single draft resolution. Accordingly, de la Colina proposed that a working group, consisting of the sponsors of the three third-party resolutions of "rapprochement", be set up to prepare, in consultation with the British, 37

GAOR, Thirteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, December 5, 1965, 457-458.

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Greek and Turkish representatives, a compromise resolution out of these three third-party proposals. When the Greek Foreign Minister expressed the opinion that it would be premature to set up the proposed working group before Committee members had expressed their views on the various draft resolutions, de la Colina concurred. Accordingly, the Chairman suggested postponement of the consideration of the Mexican suggestion until the end of the afternoon meeting of the Committee after the speakers on the draft resolutions had been heard. Between December 3-4, 1958, the Committee, at its 1007th, 1008th, 1009th, and 1010th meetings transformed itself from a forum for debate into a bazaar for selling and buying draft resolutions and considered the various formal proposals put forward for dealing with Item 68 of the thirteenth Assembly's agenda. The representative of Colombia inaugurated this seventh phase of General Assembly resolution-making by praising his own draft resolution as a proposal that pointed out that the solution of the Cyprus question should be peaceful and in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter. It was against all violence and pressure, whether exercised on the negotiators or on the island's inhabitants. It should be adopted by common agreement. Precisely because of the failure of the NATO negotiations, he contended, it was appropriate for the United Nations to do something in this matter. It would be a serious blow to the UN's prestige to say, after the Assembly had examined the question at three successive sessions, that this question was not within the organization's competence or could not be appropriately discussed by it. The Greek Foreign Minister spoke next. Having already criticized directly or indirectly the British and Turkish draft resolutions during the general debate in the Committee, and also having explained the Greek draft resolution, he limited himself to discussing the four third-party draft resolutions submitted by Iran, Colombia, Belgium, and the ten states. Starting out with the Iranian draft resolution, his delegation, AveroffTossizza said, was categorically opposed to it in both its original and revised version. The representative of Iran had made a speech which "endorsed the Turkish thesis on Cyprus all along the line". His draft resolution "was merely a new version of the Turkish draft resolution". The revised Iranian draft, despite its semblance of impartiality, likewise served the cause of partition. If the Turkish draft resolution tried to get the United Nations to introduce partition through a wide open door, the

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Iranian document would let partition in more modestly through the service entrance. The Iranian draft resolution also referred to "the three governments concerned", which meant the Greek, Turkish, and British governments rather than the people of Cyprus, who would be merely allowed to await the verdict of the three governments, namely, of "their present masters and of their masters to come". But this draft also referred to a solution which would meet the "legitimate aspirations of the inhabitants of Cyprus". This vague and anodyne formula would immediately be construed as reserving for the Turkish minority the right of partition. The word "legitimate" had different meanings in the United Nations, London, Ankara, Athens. Ambiguous formulas could be interpreted by everyone in his own way. In case of doubt, one would resort to the resolution's source, i.e. to the Iranian representative's statement, and the partition thesis would suddenly appear on the conference table. Those who said this was a procedural draft resolution should become fully aware that it would commit its supporters much more than procedure would allow them to commit themselves. But a paramount reason which militated against the Iranian draft resolution, the Greek Foreign Minister went on to say, was that it would serve no useful purpose. For neither Cypriots nor Greeks would go to a conference if the partition interpretation were on the conference table. "We shall no longer go to conferences where we shall be alone to confront the Diktat of those who during this debate... have dared to suggest... that civil war or war in general might well supervene if a solution other than the one proposed by a certain power were to be adopted." Such a conference would be bound to fail and Greece would never acquiesce in it. To any understanding, to any conference, partition was the great hurdle. The people of Greece and of Cyprus had accepted great sacrifices in order to preserve the island's integrity which most representatives on the Committee had recognized as necessary. They would not go to a conference "contrived in such a manner as to jeopardize that integrity". For these reasons he urged the Committee to vote instead for the tenstate draft resolution. Addressing himself then to the Colombian draft resolution, AveroffTossizza regarded it as a constructive contribution but was unable to endorse it, because it sidestepped the guiding principles which should govern the negotiations contemplated. It was true that the proposed observation group would ask the Assembly to give instructions at its next session. But was it wise to waste a whole year when blood was being shed in Cyprus and the situation called for an urgent solution to the

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problem? Besides, the text recommended the resumption of negotiations as soon as possible. But Britain had made no serious effort to negotiate with the people of Cyprus, the principal party concerned. Instead it had simply published a plan and insisted on implementing it against the will of eighty per cent of the population of Cyprus. Peru's Belaunde, who spoke next, carefully analyzed the various draft resolutions before the Committee. In commenting on the draft submitted by the ten states, he repeated his view of Cyprus as a territorial unity having a common destiny in which the Turkish community should have something more than the status of a minority, and noted that the Greek representative had conceded this. In conclusion, he outlined a compromise draft resolution of his own, without formally tabling it. Krishna Menon then took up the defense of the ten-state resolution. His delegation, he explained, did not wish to impose any particular solution. It simply wanted to set forth the kind of method which could be used in attempts to provide a solution to the problem. He agreed with the Peruvian representative that if a resolution carried with it the Assembly's moral authority, it would make a great contribution to the cessation of violence in Cyprus by convincing the Cypriots that self-government was the aim which had been set for their country and that it would be gradually attained. Violence, as he knew from his own country's experience, hindered progress toward freedom. For agreement's sake, he added, his delegation was willing to accept the deletion of paragraphs containing references to statements made by governments. Indeed, it was ready to accept any amendment which did not change the fundamental purpose of the draft resolution, which was to seek a peaceful, democratic and just solution. Because the situation in Cyprus did not make it possible for the territory to attain independence in one stage, Krishna Menon continued, the word "independence" did not feature in the draft resolution. On the other hand, it was natural to wish to promote self-government, in accordance with the UN Charter's provisions. And to avoid partition, it was essential to adopt effective provisions for the protection of minority interests. His delegation did not feel that the unity and integrity of Cyprus made a unitary form of government imperative. All solutions were possible as long as the interests of the island's communities were properly protected. Nor did he rule out the possibility of seeking a solution in cooperation with the Greek and Turkish governments. He felt, however, that those governments were not entitled to share sovereignty over the island. The provision of the draft resolution calling upon all member states to respect

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the self-government and integrity of Cyprus was aimed at anyone who had annexationist views with regard to Cyprus. If this draft resolution was adopted, any violation of it would be tantamount to the violation of an international treaty, he averred. After referring to the Potomac Declaration of June 29, 1954, in which Eisenhower and Churchill had undertaken to defend the principle of the right of non-self-governing territories to govern themselves and to promote the unification of divided people; 38 after citing, too, a statement of July 20, 1954 by the Colonial Secretary, Sir Oliver Lyttelton (later Lord Chandos), 39 Krishna Menon quoted passages from the speech of New Zealand's representative at the 1000th meeting of the Committee, which suggested that he shared the basic opinions of the Indian Delegation about self-government for Cyprus. He hoped the Committee would do the same and adopt the ten-state draft resolution unanimously. A statement by the representative of Cambodia followed. The speaker said he would abstain from voting unless the sponsors of the draft resolutions agreed upon a text acceptable to the three parties concerned. Then the Belgian representative spoke. He stated that he would take no part in the working group proposed by de la Colina, and that his own draft resolution would be useful not if it were merged with other drafts, but only if the Committee failed to adopt the other drafts. The afternoon meeting of December 3, 1958 ended after a brief discussion of the Mexican suggestion for a working group to hammer out a compromise draft resolution. Noble, agreeing with Averoff-Tossizza's earlier expressed view on this matter, felt there was no need to alter the Committee procedure in view of various discussions going on at the time. Starting out the morning, 1008th meeting of December 4, the Turkish Foreign Minister observed that the differences between the Turkish and the British drafts were mostly of a procedural nature whereas the Greek draft and the Turkish draft were diametrically opposed. His delegation's draft resolution aimed at reconciling the various viewpoints and was based on the purposes and principles of the United Nations as well as on the letter and spirit of the Charter. The adoption of this draft 88

"Joint Statement Issued by the President of the U.S. and the Prime Minister of the U.K., Washington, June 28 and 29, 1954", Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954 (New York: Harper and Bros., 1955), p. 62. 38 In reply to a question, Oliver Lyttleton had stated that clause 3 of the Potomac Declaration reflected what had been for many years the policy of the British governments of all parties in regard to the political advance of all colonial territories including Cyprus (530 H.C. Deb. [5th ser.], 110).

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resolution would enable the three countries concerned to reach an agreement and emerge as friends, while meticulously safeguarding the paramount interests of the island's inhabitants. The draft's first objective was to establish conditions in which the problem could be peacefully settled in accordance with Resolution 1013 (XI). The first condition for such a peaceful settlement was the end of terrorism and violence and of incitement and provocation by the Greek government radio and the Greek press. Greece should desist from extending moral and material aid to the terrorists in Cyprus. The draft resolution's first operative paragraph provided for that condition. Second, the Turkish draft resolution invited the three governments concerned to resume and continue their efforts in a spirit of cooperation with a view to reaching a friendly solution of the matter. This again was in perfect harmony with the Charter's provisions. There was no doubt that the continuation of the Cyprus question impaired the normal friendly relations among the nations concerned, caused unnecessary tensions in the area, and did not serve the interests of the inhabitants of the island, which were paramount. It was therefore essential that the solution to be found should be in harmony with these paramount interests and true wishes of the peoples of Cyprus and should take into account the particular circumstances of this NonSelf-Governing Territory as the Charter prescribed. Zorlu then turned to a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of his Delegation's draft resolution, incidentally reaffirming that he did not agree with this Greek colleague's statement that the Cyprus question had brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war. 40 After this detailed analysis, he expressed the hope that the Assembly, by adopting the Turkish draft resolution, would pave the way for the peaceful and friendly solution of the Cyprus problem, for the improvement of the plight of the peoples of Cyprus, and for the restoration of normal friendly relations among the countries concerned. His delegation was inspired exclusively by the desire for a solution which would not infringe on the rights of anyone concerned in this problem which involved three countries and two communities attached to two of them. After very briefly praising the British resolution not as an effort to get the Assembly to endorse the Macmillan plan, as the Greek Foreign Minister had charged, but as an attempt to achieve success in the British 40

In a press interview of October 12,1958, Averoff-Tossizza had stated that Greece's relations with Turkey, because of the Cyprus dispute, could hardly be worse — barring war (Times, October 12, 1958).

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and NATO efforts to bring together a conference among Britain, Greece, and Turkey, Zorlu critically examined the Greek draft resolution. This draft resolution, he observed, in contrast to the Turkish and British drafts, represented an attempt to pre-impose a solution by previously obtaining a resolution from the Assembly. It gave the impression that all would be well if the island's inhabitants were left alone to deal with Britain and if independence was given to Cyprus. This view ignored the fact that the communities on the island were in conflict and that the Turkish community did not wish to be placed under the Greek community's rule. This fact, in turn, had its repercussions on the nations to which the communities belonged, and gave rise to the dispute. What was the core of the problem? It was that a Greek-Turkish conflict had found a manifestation on the island of Cyprus as well. It was impossible to solve the problem by shutting one's eyes to that fact. If the British government was hampered on the island, it was because it had been faced for years with the opposing national aspirations of the two communities. It was because of the incompatibility between these two communities that Greece and Turkey faced each other in a dispute under the pressure of their respective public opinions. Briefly repeating the reasons for Turkey's close concern in the island and for Britain's obligation to cooperate with Turkey because of this concern, Zorlu then urged the Committee to dwell very carefully on the warning the British representative had voiced about the dangerous emotional reactions which could be provoked in the island, especially on the part of the Turkish community, were the Assembly to adopt a resolution which would "superimpose itself on the will of the inhabitants". Viewed in the light of the Greek Foreign Minister's statements, this draft resolution aimed at placing the Turkish elements on the island as a minority under the domination of the Greek community. It was as clear as daylight, Zorlu declared, that the Turkish community would never resign itself to such a plight. This being the case, he would leave it to the Committee to decide whether the Greek draft resolution served to resolve the existing conflict or to aggravate it. The solution of the problem which had created tension between three governments and especially between Greece and Turkey lay not in seeking to discard the parties but in bringing the parties together with a view to reaching agreement. The Greek Foreign Minister, his Turkish colleague continued, had complained that Turkey did not take note of his statement to the effect that the Greek government did not demand the annexation of Cyprus from the United Nations. He had to assure him that "we do take note

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of the statement and we do not question it as far as it goes. However, we are compelled to state that it does not go far enough." Makarios, who had announced the new formula of "so-called independence" in agreement with the Greek government, had openly stated that he considered it as a stepping stone for enosis. It was presumed that once an independent Cyprus was set up with the Greek majority in a central Parliament, a declaration of the island's union with Greece would follow. It was also presumed that the Turkish Cypriots, having become a minority in a Greekdominated state, would also have to be annexed, and that all the legal procedures having thus been met through these tactics, the United Nations would only have to stamp the document of union to Greece with its approval. In these assumptions, however, one thing was forgotten: the vital interests of nations and the rights of human beings. The Greek draft resolution could thus have no other meaning but to advocate independence for the purpose of preparing procedural formalities for the island's annexation. The Assembly should be extremely careful not to allow any abuse of the lofty word "independence" to cover other ambitions which were contrary to the principles of justice and international law. If, he added, the Greek government were interested only in obtaining freedom, liberty and democratic progress for the Greek community in Cyprus, "there would have been no difference of opinion between us". The Cyprus question would not have caused the bitterness and the strained relations it caused today. But all the Greek government's proposals until now sought one end: to place the Turkish community of Cyprus under Greek domination against that community's will. Concluding his criticism of the Greek draft resolution, Zorlu reiterated that Cyprus was not an ordinary question, because it had too many aspects that were special to the issue and these realities could not be obliterated. Any practicable statesmanlike solution should take into account all these aspects and realities. He believed, however, that such an approach was possible, and that the rights and aspirations of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots were not irreconcilable. If each community were directed to seek its own welfare and improve its own status without infringing on the rights of the other community, such a peaceful, just and happy solution could be reached in the best interests of all concerned. 41 41

Again the summary but official record hardly conveys the conciliatory content of this particular part of Zorlu's speech. It merely reads: "It was essentially due to the incompatibility between the Turkish and the Greek communities that Greece and Turkey were engaged in a dispute. The solution of the problem lay, not in attempting

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Turning now to the ten-state draft resolution, Zorlu criticized it at great length and said that his delegation was unable to accept it either in whole or in part, despite certain changes made in its text. Summing up his delegation's objections to it, he said that this draft resolution denied the legitimate rights of Turkey and the Turkish community on Cyprus, by refusing even to recognize Turkey's right to take part in negotiations; by emphasizing the vague, novel and dangerous concept of the "united personality" of geographic entities, instead of the fundamental conceptions of the Charter which were based on peoples, nations and states; and by attempting to impose a preconceived status on the peoples of the island. It also aimed at prejudging the future of the island and the status of its peoples in contravention of international practice and the right of selfdetermination. There was no difference between it and the Greek draft resolution. The Colombian draft resolution, on the other hand, Zorlu declared, was a sincere effort to solve the dispute. His delegation, however, believed that it would be more fruitful at the present stage to bring the parties together and leave them alone, or to prepare the ground for negotiations by them with other participants of their own choosing. As for the Iranian draft resolution, this had the virtue of offering the greatest possibility for holding a conference among the parties concerned, and likewise represented an effort to achieve a compromise. But by attempting to define the scope of the negotiations, it went to the extreme limit of what was feasible and thus carried within itself the danger of failure, because any deviation from its defined scope might defeat its own purpose and might put the participants in the peculiar position of having to accept the conclusion to be reached through negotiations even before the negotiations were begun. Zorlu also welcomed the Belgian draft resolution, believing it was constructive because its purpose, too, was to bring about negotiations between the parties. In a quite lengthy peroration (altogether ignored in the summary record) the Turkish Foreign Minister assured the Committee that Turkey's earnest objective was to prepare the ground for "the speedy" solution of the dispute which unfortunately existed among three allied governments and to act in the interest of the peoples of Cyprus. Turkey believed, he said, that this question could be solved only at a conference among the parties. Such a conference, he added significantly, should be held to ignore one of the parties, but in bringing them together". (GAOR, Thirteenth Session. First Committee, 1008th meeting, December 4, 1958, 305).

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with the purpose not of imposing anybody's desires one hundred per cent and thus attaining success, but of seeking a solution which would offend no one, leave no traces of bitterness between neighboring and allied countries by infringing on the rights of others, and would not be a success for anybody but a success for all. The representatives of Ireland, Guatemala, and Austria followed Zorlu's statement with their own. The first two favored the Greek draft resolution. The former, however, as a cosponsor of the ten-state draft resolution, observed he would not discuss the Greek draft because for the time being its sponsor had yielded priority to the ten-state draft. As for the Austrian representative, he hoped a compromise draft resolution acceptable to all parties concerned might still be worked out. The Iranian draft resolution, but also the ten-state draft resolution could be amended so as to become acceptable to all. In a statement that was strongly suggestive of the new turn in the Cyprus question that was to follow the thirteenth Assembly's debate on Cyprus, the Greek Foreign Minister spoke next, carefully emphasizing he did so without a prepared text and in this way probably indicating he was speaking without the advance approval of the Greek Prime Minister and Cabinet. He wanted, he said, to make a confession. The atmosphere of the United Nations was most comforting and stimulating. He represented a peace-loving and conciliatory government. He himself was a peace-loving and conciliatory man. And he had noted that this atmossphere was stimulating and salutary equally for his Turkish colleague, whose statements of the last few days had been of a different character than earlier. "Today his statement was constructive and conciliatory, and we can only congratulate ourselves, both as the United Nations and as individuals." In Zorlu's speech he saw a ray of hope, perhaps the only one in the whole debate. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Averoff-Tossizza observed, had said his country had noted with satisfaction — if he had understood him correctly—"our declaration on the solution of guaranteed independence, but [had said] that he believed we had not gone far enough". This real ray of hope indicated that from now on, it was a matter of confidence, of the discussion of details, and of being able perhaps to arrive at some solution. This, he could assure the Committee, was the Greek government's great hope. 42 43

The summary but official record utterly fails to convey the subtle offers at a rapprochement which the verbatim but unofficial text reveals, with its expressions of "rays of hope" of being able to arrive at some solution (Verbatim Record, 1008th meeting, December 4,19S8, p. 36).

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III this connection, Averoff-Tossizza continued, he wanted to tell the representative of Turkey that he had no reason to maintain that the Greek draft resolution, which the Greek Delegation had not withdrawn, tended to place under Greek domination the Turkish minority on Cyprus. On the contrary, it was careful to provide that adequate guarantees should be given not only for the Turkish minority's protection but also for its participation in the island's administration. He wished to explain to the representative of Turkey and to the Committee, AverofF-Tossizza went on to say (reiterating the theme Premier Karamanlis had presented in exchanges with both Foreign Secretary Lloyd and Premier Macmillan) — and he attached particular importance to what he was going to say—that if his government wished to exclude a priori the island's partition, it was not for any polemic reasons or because of any fanaticism, but for fundamental reasons he would explain and complete. Accordingly, he would present some new arguments and he hoped the Committee would understand that they were perhaps decisive. The first argument, as he himself summed it up, was that if partition were one of the solutions, the interim period of self-government would, of necessity, be one of non-cooperation for it was only natural that the Turkish minority, in order to bring about partition, would not wish to cooperate. The second argument, which had become apparent to him "through certain telegrams" he had received, unhappily for himself (obviously intimating communications to him from Makarios as representative of the eighty per cent of the population of Cyprus), was that, if partition were not excluded, the other extreme solution—enosis—could be revived and could not be excluded either. For the Greek Cypriots, after many years of dreaming of enosis, had arrived at the idea of guaranteed independence after mature consideration and much dissatisfaction, but they had reached it. And if it were insisted that partition should continue as one of the solutions, he was very much afraid — and there were indications in this respect — that the eighty per cent would go back to the idea of enosis. In this connection, he was careful to observe that it was not in the Greek government's power to exclude such a development, because it was acting only as a spokesman for this eighty per cent of the population of Cyprus, and "if they say No, we must say No". If this were to occur "we shall find ourselves in the midst of new complications". That was why, without trying to be polemical or fanatical, his delegation had presented to the Committee, through its words and draft resolution, guarantees for the treatment of the Turkish minority and for its adequate

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participation in the new autonomous entity, by excluding this extreme solution of partition as it had equally excluded the extreme solution of enosis. Averoff-Tossizza then turned to the Iranian and Colombian draft resolutions. To the former, he expressed continued opposition, arguing that if Noble had charged that India, which supported the ten-state draft resolution, was partisan, he could say the same about the sponsor of the Iranian draft, who was allied to Britain through the Baghdad Pact, in contrast to Greece which had no ties of alliance with India. After reiterating that he could not accept the thesis that the Cyprus question should be settled exclusively by the British, Greek, and Turkish governments, he denied the Turkish representative's assertion that Greece had given material aid to the Cypriot rebels, and repeated his proposal that a neutral committee be set up to examine this charge. If his Turkish colleague wished to know how these reports had circulated, he would tell him some rather strange stories about the British Intelligence Service and the Greek Intelligence Service and about how false information had been disseminated.43 Violence, he agreed, should cease, but on both sides. And, above all, the cause of the violence had to be eliminated. In conclusion, Averoff-Tossizza reiterated his feeling that a "glimmer of hope" could be found in his Turkish colleague's statement. He would like to assure him that his own government envisaged a solution to the Cyprus problem in "the spirit of conciliation which the other day, after virulent attacks, led the representative of Turkey to call me 'dear friend', a title which I return to him with great satisfaction". Introducing a second revision of his draft resolution, the representative of Iran spoke next. This new version, he said, represented a further effort to bring about a rapprochement between divergent positions and was offered with the same spirit of compromise as the earlier Iranian proposals. In assuring the Greek Foreign Minister of his sincerity in seeking a compromise, the Iranian said he had used his full powers of persuasion to induce Britain and Turkey to make concessions which would narrow the area of disagreement with Greece. He also denied Averoff-Tossizza's charge that Iran was supporting partition. He had said nothing to support this thesis. He had merely said that if the Greek and Turkish communities learned to live together in harmony, the concept of an 43

Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 77-78, deals with this British wiretapping incident and its exploitation by the Greek government. Even in New York, the Greek Delegation was suspicious about possible surveillance devices and often met at a shipowner's Fifth Avenue apartment in order to plan its Cyprus strategy.

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independent Cyprus might genuinely evolve. The insertion in the revised Iranian draft resolution of a preambular paragraph referring to selfgovernment and free institutions should dispel any doubt AveroffTossizza might still have regarding Iran's sincerity. Iran, he added, had never harbored extremist feelings or advocated extremist solutions. In view of the conciliatory tone of the debate in the past few days and that day especially, he hoped the Greek representative would make a new effort to understand the Iranian position and the nature and scope of this newly revised draft resolution which, he acknowledged, was more than merely procedural. Averoff-Tossizza, speaking on a point of order, said he would give further study to the newly revised Iranian draft resolution but on first view it did not have the constructive elements he considered essential. Zorlu followed him, to state that his Greek colleague was right in seeing certain "glimmers of hope" in the Turkish position. From the very outset of the debate, he asserted, Turkey, even while standing for its principles and its rights, had always shown a great deal of understanding and a sincere and heartfelt desire to find a solution to the Cyprus dispute. Both in his draft resolution and in his statement, Zorlu asserted, he had never said that Turkey wanted to go to a conference with the absolute determination of imposing its point of view and of seeing the triumph of what it preferred. In going to a conference, all parties should arrive without prejudice, with the lofty aim of reaching an understanding and harmonizing their various views. That was his government's attitude, Zorlu asserted, and that was why the Greek Foreign Minister was right in seeing some glimmers of hope in his statement and in his attitude, as voiced that day. Speaking next, the British representative once again underlined the fundamental principles on which not only the British draft resolution but also the Macmillan plan was based. And once again, with regard to the latter, he sought to assure the Greek Foreign Minister that the plan involved no abdication of British sovereignty during the seven-year interim period by its provision that the Governor should consult representatives of Turkey and Greece in the exercise of its reserved powers — foreign affairs, defense, and internal security. If Averoff-Tossizza feared that the plan would work to the disadvantage of Greece and the Greek community, it would be illogical not to appoint a representative who could reassure him on that score. Turning then to the ten-state draft resolution, Noble reemphasized the dangers which, in his government's view, would ensue, were the Assembly to adopt it. Because this draft

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resolution prejudged the future by calling for the maintenance of the island's integrity, it could arouse violent reaction among the Turkish elements of the island who favored the island's partition. Reiterating the point that his government did not favor partition but also saying that the views of those favoring partition should be taken into account, he maintained that if one attempted now formally to steer the island away from partition, the danger existed lest "we shall in fact achieve the exact opposite of our aim", because of the great intercommunal tension prevailing on the island. In contrast to the British draft resolution, the tenstate draft represented exactly what the Assembly should not do in dealing with the Cyprus question. Between these two draft resolutions, Noble went on to say, was the Iranian draft resolution which, though not meeting all the requirements embodied in the British draft resolution, did at least safeguard the essential minimum of British requirements, and, above all, did in no way prejudge the future. Beyond that, it called for negotiations between the parties concerned along the lines of the conference which had very nearly been agreed upon recently (in NATO). Reiterating the British position with regard to the NATO conciliation efforts but without mentioning that international security organization by name, he concluded by stating that his delegation was ready to accept the revised Iranian draft resolution. This draft resolution, he said, seemed to provide a genuine compromise and under those circumstances it would be in accordance with the wishes of the Committee and with the spirit of the debate if the three draft resolutions of the protagonists were withdrawn. The British Delegation therefore would be willing to withdraw its own draft resolution, if the Greek and Turkish Delegations were willing to do likewise. Averoff-Tossizza, responding to the British statement, maintained, despite Noble's assertion to the contrary, that the Governor's legal obligation (in contrast to his right) under the Macmillan plan, to consult the government representatives of Greece and Turkey in foreign affairs, defense, and internal security, meant a de facto participation of Greece and Turkey in sovereignty over Cyprus. And once again he derided the Macmillan plan which in the British view was to be the basis of the proposed conference called for, and reiterated his delegation's view that the interim regime provided for in the Macmillan plan prejudged the future in favor of partition. He stuck, he said, to the thesis that since one side had made a substantial concession and had clearly shelved an extremist position, surely the other party should do the same in an effort to reach agreement.

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After the Iranian representative expressed regret that the Greek Foreign Minister had rejected the second revised version of Iran's draft resolution, and expressed hope that this was not a final decision, the Turkish Foreign Minister, aligning himself with the British position on the three contestants' draft resolutions, declared at the end of the Committee's 1008th meeting that he would not press for a vote on the Turkish draft resolution and would vote for the new Iranian draft. The Committee's afternoon, 1009th, meeting, of December 4, 1958 began in an atmosphere that was unfavorable from the Greek viewpoint. If the revised Iranian draft resolution appeared attractive to a great number of delegations, it was the reverse with the ten-state draft resolution, which, even some of the sponsoring delegations were now reluctant to support.44 Speaking in succession, the representatives of Cuba and Canada stated they would vote in favor of the revised Iranian text. The former expressed hope that the three delegations directly concerned might be able to reach agreement before the vote. The latter voiced regret that the Greek Delegation might not support this draft resolution. Then the Colombian representative spoke, underlining that his draft resolution was not incompatible with any of the other draft resolutions and noting that its distinguishing feature was that it expressed no judgment on the substance of the question. Belaunde, the Peruvian, followed him, expressing both gratification about the change in tone of the entire debate, and hope that the supporters of the Colombian, Iranian, and ten-state draft resolutions would achieve a further rapprochement, to allow the Committee unanimously to adopt a single text. The representative of Pakistan, on the other hand, felt that the Iranian draft resolution best met the needs of the situation. He also said that he would vote against both the Greek and the ten-state draft resolution, and that the Colombian draft could prove useful, but only at a later stage. At this point, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge announced that the United States intended to vote for the Iranian draft resolution as revised. His delegation believed this draft was essentially procedural and would help to encourage the negotiations which, all agreed, were required to bring about a solution of the complicated Cyprus problem. He could not follow the reasoning which was advanced that, because this draft resolution did not specifically contain provisions which members might desire, 44

The Last Battle, p. 97.

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it was, for that reason, against their interests. His delegation did not favor resolutions which had the effect of passing judgment on specific solutions — as the U.S. representative had made clear in his previous statement. He wanted only to say that the U.S. position remained as stated at that time. Silence greeted this announcement which publicly revealed that the United States was throwing its tremendous weight behind the Iranian draft resolution which both the British and Turkish representatives were now supporting; that it sought to avoid the protraction of the debate; and that, in essence, it publicly invited its friends to vote in favor of that draft resolution.45 "Do I take it from the silence of the Committee and from the fact that no one has asked to speak, that we are ready to vote on the draft resolutions?" asked the Committee Chairman. Thereupon, de la Colina responded by proposing a forty-five minute recess. He had heard, he said, of new and diligent efforts being made to try to find some solution. Just as the Committee Chairman proposed under rule 117 of the rules of procedure to put the Mexican motion to the vote, Noble, speaking on a point of order, said he wanted to know a little more about what was going to happen in that forty-five minute recess. The recess would be of great value, if it were successful. The Mexican representative, he continued, had spoken about "new and diligent efforts". Perhaps he could tell a little more about these efforts, because it seemed to him (Noble) that there was great and growing support for the Iranian draft resolution, as revised, which seemed to him the most admirable compromise. De la Colina, with the Chairman's assent, replied that, though he 46

The Last Battle, p. 103. The Athens press reacted vociferously to this statement of the U.S. position (Times, December 6,1958). Kathimerini wrote that the Greek people would not forget this decision of the United States to side with the Iranian proposal which was in favor of the British-Turkish view; Ethnos published a violently anti-American editorial pointing out that but for U.S. support, the Iranian draft resolution would not have been adopted. Greek officials reportedly conceded that this resolution approval constituted a moral victory for Turkey (Times, December 6, 1958). The Turks, on the other hand, were reported to be very pleased about the UN resolution, with Ankara newspaper headlines containing such phrases as "a Greek defeat" (ibid., December 8, 1958). Reports from Athens suggested that the United States would receive most of the blame for the Greek diplomatic defeat and that it might be all the harder to persuade the Greeks to attend a conference under NATO auspices (Sunday Times, December 7, 1958). From Nicosia it was reported that the catch phrase on every Greek Cypriot's lips was: "The Greeks would have won if the Americans had not backed the British" (Times, December 8,1958).

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could not guarantee nor verify what he was going to say, he had heard that the delegations of Iran, on the one hand, and of the cosponsors of the ten-state draft resolution, on the other, were still carrying out or trying to carry out one final effort to reach an agreement between them. The Chairman then put the Mexican motion for a forty-five minute recess to the vote, and the Committee adopted the motion by 52 votes to none, with 24 abstentions. Among the latter was the United States.46 During the recess, in quite a charged atmosphere, the members of the Greek Delegation took part in various exchanges with other representatives, and urgently drafted amendments to the Iranian draft resolution, over which the Greek Delegation was to wage a last rearguard action.47 When the Committee resumed its deliberations, the Chairman announced that some delegations wanted to propose certain amendments, and the Greek representative spoke. To his great regret, Averoff-Tossizza said, the U.S. Delegation, just as everything seemed to point to a compromise resolution, had "managed to dam up the stream of this conciliatory effort". If he had any doubts about the effects of this anticonciliatory statement, the British representative had removed them by immediately opposing the recess of the meeting. And the United States had aligned itself against this recess which had been requested for achieving a compromise resolution. He had great admiration for the United States, he added, and was grateful to it. This par excellence democratic country had broadened the meaning of democracy by giving aid to many countries, and to Greece, in particular, which had been saved through this aid. But this could never prevent him from calling a spade a spade. The U.S. Delegation, the Greek Foreign Minister continued, had always said it would remain neutral in this dispute among three of its friends. Greece had opposed the Iranian draft resolution; the United States had supported it. Was this neutrality? The day before, he had said that the Greek Delegation in some circumstances would have preferred that the Committee should adopt no resolution at all. Did not neutrality call for weighing this point also, instead of passing on immediately to the vote? The United States had always told the Greek government it favored conciliation among its friends. Why was it that, when the great majority was in favor of a conciliatory resolution, the U.S. Delegation worked against it and at the last moment expressed itself in this way 46 47

This is inferred from Averoff-Tossizza's statement after the recess, see below, p. 326. The Last Battle, pp. 104-105.

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and, in addition, when the vote was taken on recessing the meeting, had abstained. Could not this attitude be interpreted as being against the conciliation effort desired by fifty-two members and supported by eminent representatives of great countries? Why this attitude? He did not wish to answer his own question. His gratitude and feelings precluded him from highlighting certain shortcomings of this stand concerning a colony of the British Crown which wanted to become independent. It was true, Averoff-Tossizza conceded, that the second revised Iranian draft resolution had assumed another meaning and (as Lodge had said) was purely procedural. In order, however, to avoid any confusion, he felt entitled to ask two questions, especially concerning the U.S. Delegation's vote: First. Did the U.S. Delegation favor total independence for Cyprus as the final goal? Second. Was the U.S. Delegation opposed to the island's partition? Turning then to the Committee Chairman, he announced he was tabling a number of draft amendments to the Iranian draft resolution which, he said, were of a purely procedural nature. Another dead silence occurred after Averoff-Tossizza's statement. Lodge hastily consulted his advisers.48 The Turkish Foreign Minister, however, came to the rescue. His Greek colleague, by raising these two questions, he argued, had touched on the substance of the question instead of discussing a question of procedure. This would serve no useful purpose. In Zorlu's view, the U.S. representative had merely said that for the parties to be able to go to a conference, they should have their hands absolutely free. Accordingly, the Committee should take no decision on a matter of substance. The Iranian draft resolution, unlike the ten-state draft resolution, left the door open for all possibilities. Zorlu did not think it was quite fair of "his colleague and friend", the Greek Foreign Minister, to take advantage of the opinion expressed by a representative to seek a declaration of principle, particularly as all representatives who had spoken in the debate had already made such declarations. For his part, Zorlu concluded, he would like to appeal to the Greek representative's spirit of conciliation not to prolong the discussion at this level and let the Committee freely decide for itself. When the Chairman proposed the meeting's adjournment to permit study of the Greek draft amendments to the Iranian draft resolution, the representative of the Dominican Republic wondered whether the 48

The Last Battle, p. 106.

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Chairman might inform the Committee members of the contents of these amendments, so that they might study them before their distribution. As a result, at the Chairman's invitation, the Greek Foreign Minister spelled out to the Committee his proposed amendments, repeating them at Noble's request. The first of these draft amendments called for the deletion of the entire third preambular clause of the Iranian draft resolution, in order to eliminate any shadow of a suggestion that Greece was to blame for the breakdown of NATO's efforts toward a Cyprus conference. The second of these draft amendments, while reintroducing the NATO conference formula without in any way identifying it as such, eliminated from the Iranian draft's fourth preambular clause the detested words "directly concerned" from the reference to governments which would take part in a conference dealing with the Cyprus question. The third of these draft amendments, finally, called for the deletion from the Iranian draft's fifth preambular clause of the words "to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Cypriots" to which, it will be recalled, Averoff-Tossizza had taken strong exception when criticizing the Iranian draft resolution. 49 After a new recess moved by the Iranian representative to permit an exchange of views on the Greek draft amendments and adopted by the Committee by 63 votes to none, with three abstentions, the Iranian representative asked for a change in wording of the French text of his own draft resolution on the ground that it did not adhere to Charter wording.5 0 But this slip meanwhile had been taken up by the Greek Delegation in drafting one of its amendments to the Iranian text and led to a debate that spilled over in the next meeting of the Committee. More importantly, the Turkish Foreign Minister presented three subamendments to the Greek amendments. One of these reintroduced the words "directly concerned" in reference to "governments" which the second Greek draft amendment proposed to delete from the Iranian draft resolution's fourth preambular clause. The second Turkish subamendment to the third Greek draft amendment concerning the Iranian draft resolu49

See above, p. 311. The Iranian representative had used the word "autonomie" (autonomy) for selfgovernment, which is the English word used in Article 73, paragraph 1(b) of the U N Charter, whereas the French translation of that word in that article refers not to "autonomie" but to "la capacité de s'administrer elles-mêmes" (self-administration). Self-administration, of course, is something less than self-government and, as mentioned elsewhere, according to the American drafters of the Charter as against the English drafters (it would seem the French who translated the text followed the latter) "self-government" includes independence. 50

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tion's fifth preambular clause, aimed at replacing the words "self-government of Cyprus should be established" by the words "self-government by the Cypriots should be developed". And the third subamendment proposed, likewise with regard to the third Greek draft amendment, that the words "in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" be replaced by the words "in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations". To enable delegations to consider the proposed amendments and subamendments to the Iranian draft resolution, the Committee adjourned its meeting. It met again that evening at 8:30 p.m.

E. A SYMBOLIC TURKISH VICTORY IN THE COMMITTEE

The evening, 1010th meeting of December 4, 1958, witnessed a volley of exchanges between antagonist and protagonist mainly on the subject of the Turkish subamendments of the Greek amendments to the Iranian draft resolution. It ended with roll-call votes being taken on the three out of the seven draft resolutions which survived the verbal fray. After certain remarks of a purely technical nature by the Committee Chairman, the Turkish Foreign Minister started explaining his delegation's subamendments to the Greek Delegation's amendments. He found it difficult, he said, to understand why the Greek Foreign Minister had deleted the phrase "three governments concerned and representatives of the Cypriots" from the text of the Iranian draft resolution. If he was given an explanation, he added, he would not hesitate to withdraw the Turkish subamendments. It seemed to him, however, that when the Committee insisted that the parties concerned should go to a conference, it should be made perfectly clear who was involved and what was involved. Then he observed that for reasons he could not fathom, the Greek amendment (based on the incorrect French text of the Iranian draft resolution) used terminology that differed from the Charter's wording. Hence the second Turkish subamendment. As for the third Turkish subamendment, Zorlu said he was prepared to withdraw it. The Turkish Delegation, he concluded, was eager to go into a conference with Greece, Britain, and representatives of the Cypriots in order to arrive at a peaceful, just and equitable solution capable of restoring friendship and brotherhood and of cementing relations among the three countries. That was why it was prepared to accept the Greek amendments with the modifications he had offered. This was another token of Turkey's spirit of understanding

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and friendship, "a spirit we want to maintain and develop in respect to a Greece which will show us a like spirit of understanding and amity". In trying to respond to his Turkish colleague's statement on the Turkish subamendments, the Greek Foreign Minister found himself in a hardly tenable position. For if it was hard to reason against the Turkish argument in favor of reintroducing into the Iranian draft resolution's text the reference to "the three governments concerned and representatives of the Cypriots", it was even harder to oppose the second Turkish subamendment to the Greek amendment, the phraseology of which was based not on Charter wording, but on this wording's incorrect rendition in the French version of the Iranian draft resolution — a slip which, as mentioned already, that draft resolution's Iranian sponsor had formally acknowledged and corrected. Nonetheless, Averoff-Tossizza, in a desperate effort to extract some phrase from any improvised replies his Turkish and British antagonists might give, so as to be able, without fear and perhaps to Greek advantage, to accept the Iranian draft resolution, embarked on a deliberately rambling speech.51 The result was a verbal exchange which surely must have challenged the ingenuity of UN précis writers seeking to make sense out of its vagaries when preparing the meeting's summary but official record. Suffice it to note here first, that Averoff-Tossizza, while urging the omission of the phrase "the three governments concerned and representatives of the Cypriots" in connection with the first Turkish subamendment, had to concede that it was clear who the parties to the proposed conference were to be; second, that the Iranian representative, in the discussion over the second Turkish subamendment, did state that it had never been the sense of his draft resolution that the Cypriots should forever remain under the domination of a foreign power; and third, that Zorlu himself, although stressing that the Iranian draft resolution itself, despite its reference to self-government, was purely procedural and did not deal with the substance of a solution to the Cyprus problem, could not but concede that Chapter XI of the Charter never intended non-self-governing territories to be condemned to permanent colonial status. The Greek Foreign Minister, however, was not satisfied with Noble's statement, at another point in these exchanges, that self-government was self-government not autonomy or anything else, nor even with his verbatim reiteration of a passage in his opening statement of November 25, that there was "no need to expect that 81

"Je vais bafouiller", he told a member of the Greek delegation (The Last Battle, p. 109).

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Britain would make the retention of its present sovereignty in Cyprus an obstacle to an eventual settlement". Therefore, Averoff-Tossizza continued to oppose the two Turkish subamendments, though he eventually yielded on the second one concerning the replacement of the word "autonomy". Finally, after the Turkish representative formally withdrew his third subamendment to the Greek amendment as he had proposed to do earlier, the Chairman suggested that the Committee should vote on the various draft resolutions. In accordance with rule 132 of the rules of procedure, he proposed a vote on the British draft resolution first, since it had been submitted first. Zorlu, at this point, said he would not press his draft resolution to the vote if the Iranian draft resolution obtained a majority. Noble followed him, reiterating he was prepared to withdraw the British draft resolution, if the Turkish and Greek representatives withdrew theirs. As for AverolfTossizza, he said he would not object if priority in voting were given to other draft resolutions, but wished to be able to revive the Greek draft resolution if other proposals were withdrawn or did not obtain a sufficient majority. Then at the request of the Iranian representative the Colombian waived his right to voting priority of his draft resolution. After the Venezuelan representative asked for a separate vote on each Turkish subamendment to the Greek amendments to the Iranian text, and Zorlu reminded the Committee he had withdrawn his third subamendment, the Chairman put to the vote the two Turkish subamendments. The Committee adopted both, by 34-19, with 25 abstentions, and with 26-22, with 31 abstentions, respectively. Averoff-Tossizza thereupon declared he would vote against his own amendments in view of the adoption of the Turkish subamendments to them. He also declared he would vote against the Iranian draft resolution as a whole. The Chairman then called for a vote on the Greek amendments to the Iranian draft resolution. The Committee adopted the first (by 45-0, with 31 abstentions), and the second (by 27-15, with 33 abstentions). However, it rejected the third amendment (by 22-21, with 34 abstentions). This, it will be recalled, aimed at deleting the words "to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Cypriots", to which the Greek Delegation objected, for reasons mentioned earlier. The Chairman then put the draft resolution as amended to the vote, with Averoff-Tossizza calling for a roll-call vote. The Committee adopted

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this basically Iranian draft resolution, as amended, by 31-22, with 28 abstentions. 52 After this, Averoff-Tossizza announced he would not press the Greek draft resolution to a vote. So did Noble and Zorlu with regard to their own draft resolutions. The Chairman then called for a vote on the Colombian draft resolution, and Averoff-Tossizza declared he would accept it. The Chairman then ruled out of order a question by the Argentine representative whether the British and Turkish representatives also supported the Colombian draft resolution. And the Committee voted on this resolution by a roll-call vote requested by the Mexican representative. The Colombian draft resolution was not adopted because of a tie vote — 17 in favor, 17 against, with 47 abstentions. Asked by the Chairman whether the sponsors of the ten-state draft resolution wanted their draft to be put to the vote, the representative of Iceland, on their behalf, stated they would not do so. Its sponsors, he said, would use the time until the matter came up before the General Assembly to work for a text acceptable to all concerned. Neither they, nor the Greek Delegation (with regard to its own draft resolution as well) wished the General Assembly to record that proposals for the island's integrity and independence had been rejected by the United Nations. 53 On the ground that the Iranian draft resolution had not obtained the required two-thirds majority for Assembly adoption, the Belgian representative asked that his draft resolution be put to the vote and requested a roll-call vote. The Committee rejected the Belgian draft resolution by 22-11, with 48 abstentions. Certain explanations of vote followed — by the Union of South Africa, Turkey and Peru. Zorlu explained that his delegation had been sympathetic toward both the Colombian and Belgian draft resolutions but had voted 52

The precise results of the voting were as follows: In favor: Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, France, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, U.S.A. Against: Albania, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Nepal, Panama, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian S.S.R., USSR, UAR, Yemen, Yugoslavia. Abstaining: Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Tunisia, South Africa, Uruguay, Venezuela. 53 The Last Battle, p. 116.

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against them, because the Committee had already adopted the Iranian draft resolution. The votes clearly showed, commented de la Colina, the need for further negotiations in order to achieve a single draft resolution. He appealed to the parties concerned to make another effort to reach agreement before the Assembly's plenary meeting. The Spanish representative made a similar appeal. Under this essentially Iranian draft resolution to which, as recounted, certain Greek amendments subamended by Turkey had been added (italicized in text below), the General Assembly, having considered the question of Cyprus; recalling Resolution 1013 (XT) of February 26, 1957; believing that a conference among the three governments directly concerned and representatives of the Cypriots at which there would be discussion not only of the interim arrangements for the administration of Cyprus but also of a final solution, with the assistance if desired of governments and personalities acceptable to the interested parties, offered the best hope of peaceful progress toward an agreed solution of the Cyprus problem; considering that self-government and free institutions should be developed in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Cypriots; urged that such a conference should be convened, and that all concerned should cooperate to ensure a successful outcome in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 54 The Committee's recommendation to the Assembly under the above draft resolution in essence, then, gave its blessing to the NATO-engendered proposals for convening a Cyprus conference — proposals which the Greek government had rejected on October 25,1958, partly in the hope of getting the Assembly to endorse the proposal for an independent Cyprus to which Makarios had committed himself since September 22 of that year. In other words, by this resolution, the Assembly would thereby send back to NATO, a "regional" organization for collective self-defense, the matter of a settlement of the Cyprus situation or dispute — more or less as the United States had willed. However, the Assembly would have explicitly urged that such a settlement should be in accordance with the UN Charter — a provision not mentioned in the NATO proposals for a conference. But this essentially Iranian draft resolution, as the resolution-struggle over the Greek amendments and Turkish subamendments to it revealed, 54

Agenda Item 68, pp. 18-19.

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symbolized, on the one hand, a Greek defeat, because the Committee had rejected the third Greek draft amendment calling for deletion of any reference to the "legitimate demands" of the Cypriots, and, on the other hand, a Turkish victory over Greece, because the text included (through the Committee's adoption of the second Turkish subamendment) a reference to "the three governments directly concerned", a phrase which the Greek Delegation both at the eleventh and twelfth General Assembly had managed to avert. 55 Finally, the reference to "Cypriots" not to "Cyprus" could likewise be construed as favoring the Turkish thesis that the interests of the people themselves were involved, not the island as a territorial entity — a concept which Krishna Menon firmly espoused. This symbolic Turkish victory was a sort of revanche for the symbolic victory Greece had won in the amendment-subamendment contest which had occurred when the previous General Assembly had debated the Cyprus question. 56 Out of this symbolic defeat, however, the Greek Delegation was to snatch some sort of verbal satisfaction, thanks to a conciliatory Turkish gesture, because the Assembly finally adopted a resolution which merely mentioned "the parties". Then the Greek government managed to attain the originally Indian and quite substantive goal of independence for the island, though not exactly on its own terms.

55 56

Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 40, 43,428, and 465-466. Ibid., pp. 475-476.

PART TWO

VIII GREEK-TURKISH CONCILIATION

A. RESOLUTION 1287 p a n ) , SYMBOL OF A GREEK-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT

The evening of December 4, 1958, just after the Political Committee of the General Assembly had adopted the Iranian draft resolution, Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza, somewhat dejected and quite exhausted by the whole debate, was talking to Greek reporters at the entrance of the Committee hall, when Foreign Minister Zorlu came up to him. "Congratulations for the fine fight you put up", he said. "Thanks for your condescending words. They aren't hard to utter since you are leaving with the spoils of battle", replied the Greek rather bitterly. Zorlu, though taken aback, insisted in a slightly cooler tone. "I haven't come either to provoke you — or to be provoked by you", he retorted. "I came because I was really astonished by the battle you waged up to the very last moment. Though I think we won, I believe you were the victor. Your interventions were always outstanding." The atmosphere became less tense. "Thanks, I must own that you fought very well", said Averoff-Tossizza, returning the compliment. "But", he added, "regardless of who of us was better in the debate, the fact is that we are wasting our talents on a petite politique not a grande politique." (They were conversing in French.) "What do you mean?" "To cross swords internationally over the Cyprus question, without resolving it, while fearsome and common dangers threaten both of us, is a petite politique. To sit down together and resolve it is a grande politique, and this we aren't doing." Zorlu agreed. "I, too", he said, "fear a great deal the common dangers and tremendously regret that the Cyprus question had played such a disproportionate role in our foreign policy. Unfortunately your insistence

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that Cyprus is inhabited by a people which includes a small minority and that the island plays no role in our security doesn't allow us even to start a discussion." "We proposed demilitarization", rejoined the Greek Foreign Minister. "We therefore recognize to a certain extent your security problem." "Demilitarization", interrupted the Turkish Foreign Minister, "means that, when the British leave this island, for they will leave it some day, Cyprus will be an easy prey for any foe." "At any rate", Averoff-Tossizza insisted, "we take into account those anxieties of yours which are well founded. As for the minority, I cannot recognize it as a 'people'. However, if it helps, I can recognize it as a 'community' that is close to another, much larger community. So long as your don't recognize that the twenty per cent of the island's inhabitants cannot be considered equal to the eighty per cent, any discussion is impossible." "If the subjects of security and of the existence of the Turkish community were accepted, we may have disagreements", replied Zorlu, "but at least we may be able to talk over the issue together and seek for a solution. Should we meet?" The Greek Foreign Minister replied in the affirmative. He added, however, that he was none too optimistic and, at any rate, one should first wait to see what would happen in the Assembly next day, with regard to the Iranian draft resolution the Committee had just adopted. 1 Whether the Assembly would have adopted the Iranian draft resolution by the required two-thirds vote of members present and voting, is a moot point. Sir Pierson Dixon, of the British Delegation, reportedly was confident that, because of the pledges given by numerous delegations, such a majority would be forthcoming. 2 A leading diplomatic official on the Greek Delegation feared this confidence was not unfounded. He felt that the British could, as it were, "buy" the needed four or so more affirmative votes or four more abstentions (at the expense of the resolution's opponents) — for achieving a two-thirds majority in favor of the Committee's recommendation. On the other hand, the conciliatory efforts of de la Colina, which had been evident in the last phase of the Cyprus debate, had to be reckoned with. It is not known whether he was acting on his own initiative or on behalf of other delegations, but both that night of December 4 and early next day, the Mexican representative saw the leaders of the delegations of the United States, Britain, Turkey, 1 2

The Last Battle, pp. 126-127. Times, December 6, 1958. Foot, A Start in Freedom, p. 176.

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and Iran, and told them that many of those who had voted in favor of the Iranian draft resolution in the Committee were none too happy about it. Although all agreed that Greece was wrong in opposing the inclusion in that draft resolution of any reference to "the three governments directly concerned" (under the first Turkish sub-amendment) they felt that the Greeks were right on the entire substance of the matter by opposing partition which one of the governments desired. Thus, the Mexican implied that some, at least, of those who had voted for the draft resolution might not do so again in the Assembly, since they were reluctant to inflict a defeat upon Greece. Other delegations, too, it seems, made similar demarches. Their aim was to find a resolution acceptable to all.3 Ambassador Lodge, by his attitude, contributed significantly to a conciliatory atmosphere. Between the afternoon and evening meeting of the Committee, the Greek Foreign Minister had conferred with him and had pleaded for full U.S. neutrality in the Assembly. Lodge, on his side, had urged conciliation and the avoidance of any acrimony. 4 He confided to Averoff-Tossizza that together with certain other U.S. officials, he had often registered strong disagreement with the State Department about the handling of the Cyprus question but had been unable to convince the persons responsible (Dulles?) of that policy's wrongness. Later, Lodge urged conciliation and avoidance of acrimony also upon the British and the Turks. 5 But Sir Pierson Dixon, too, after the Committee had adopted the Iranian draft resolution, was pursuing success, not victory.6 Members of the Greek Delegation indeed believed that their British counterparts had been embarrassed because of the Turkish victory in the Committee — thus arousing Turkish suspicions. Finally, the dominant actor at this juncture, Foreign Minister Zorlu himself, strongly urged by Ambassador Selim Sarper, Turkey's Ambassador to NATO, and also keeping in mind the above-mentioned talk with his Greek colleague, had become quite receptive to the idea of a compromise resolution that would be acceptable to the Greek Delegation. A Turkish victory in the Assembly, too, he estimated, was not likely to facilitate further contacts and talks with the Greeks, who, in his view, had taken their symbolic defeat as a Greek tragedy. The members of the Greek Delegation, meanwhile, were engaged in 8

The Last Battle, p. 119. Ibid., pp. 116-117. » Ibid., p. 118. « Foot, A Start in Freedom, p. 176.

4

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various demarches with several delegations in order to ensure continued support from those which had voted against the Iranian draft resolution or to get abstainers to do likewise in the Assembly. Thus, they were not aware at the time of all the backstage conciliatory activities mentioned above.7 In general, they saw no reason to discourage these activities. First they felt that, because of the means of pressure available to the antagonists, even if the required two-thirds vote should not be finally forthcoming, an increase in the number of votes in favor of the Iranian resolution was likely to occur in the Assembly. Besides, the Greek Delegation thought it undesirable to displease friends belonging to the Latin American group which, as a whole, represented a force of twenty votes.8 The outcome of all these activities was that early in the morning of December 5, 1958, the U.S. Delegation urgently sought to get in touch with the Greek Foreign Minister, who was difficult to find because the Queen of Greece had arrived that day in New York, and at 10:30 a.m., at the UN building, in a conference room close to the hall where the Political Committee met, the delegation heads of Britain, Greece, Iran, Mexico, Turkey, and the United States gathered. Lodge proposed that the Iranian draft resolution be dropped. Another resolution should be adopted, he thought, which would be acceptable to all, in other words to the Greek Delegation, too. Agreement on a new draft resolution was not easy to reach. The discussion was protracted. The British and Turkish Delegates yielded inch by inch, as the Greek Foreign Minister put forward his proposals. At one point, AverofT-Tossizza felt that no progress was being made and proposed adjournment of the talks. Unless he obtained satisfaction, he preferred, he said, to be defeated in a matter over which he was fighting than to settle for something he did not like. Finally, the conferees reached agreement on the text of a new draft resolution.9 As a result of these backstage developments, when the Assembly met to deal with agenda item 68, in the afternoon of December 5, the Iranian draft resolution adopted by the Political Committee was never put to the vote. After the Austrian rapporteur of the Committee, Ambassador Franz Matsch, submitted his report on the Cyprus item, de la Colina 7

The Last Battle, p. 117. Averoff-Tossizza in the Greek Parliament, GPD, December 11, 1958, pp. 258-259. The Last Battle, pp. 119-121. Foot, A Start in Freedom, pp. 176-177, emphasizes the role of Sir Pierson Dixon in the whole affair and makes no mention of Cabot Lodge's activities, in contrast to the author of The Last Battle. However, as AveroffTossizza wrote to the author, Sir Hugh Foot was not at the United Nations but in Cyprus at the time. 8

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recommended to the Assembly the text of another draft resolution negotiated with all the "parties directly concerned" and expressed the hope that the Assembly would adopt it unanimously and that there would be no need for any further debate or explanations of vote. He asked the Assembly's President to take up this draft resolution first. The President, after inquiring whether there were any objections to the Mexican proposal and ascertaining there were none, asked the Assembly to vote on this new draft resolution. The Assembly adopted it without objection, namely without even the procedure of a formal vote. Only the Soviet representative made a statement in connection with the vote which had been taken. He directed his criticism mainly against the now defunct Iranian draft resolution, saying that it did not mention the principle of self-determination (a remark that applied likewise to the Mexican resolution) and that the tripartite conference it recommended was but a cover for referring the Cyprus question back to NATO. With regard to the new resolution, he expressed regret it represented a return to Resolution 1013 (XI), instead of taking a step forward and ensuring a settlement in accordance with the interests of the people of the island and with their aspirations toward free and independent development. The outcome, he maintained, was "a direct consequence of the antipopular attitude of the principal colonial powers", including Britain and the United States, which gave no thought to the national interests of peoples but were concerned only with their own military-strategic goals.10 In this outwardly innocuous and colorless document— Resolution 1287 (XIII) — the Assembly, having considered the question of Cyprus and recalling Resolution 1013 (XI), "expressed its confidence" that continued efforts would be made "by the parties" to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution in accordance with the UN Charter.11 Since the text of this resolution, in the last analysis, had really been the outcome of an agreement reached primarily between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, for both outranked the other participants of the morning conference of December 5, the words "expressed confidence" were something more than the words "expressed the earnest desire" of Resolution 1013 (XI) and indicated an implicit personal commitment of the two Foreign Ministers to start talks, if not negotiations, in order to solve the Cyprus problem. Thus, Resolution 1287 (XIII) not only closed a phase in 10

GAOR, Thirteenth Session, 782d plenary meeting, December 5, 1958, 458-459. Agenda Item 68, p. 19. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 668, claims this resolution was a British success and incorrectly adds to it the word "concerned" after "parties".

11

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the Cyprus question which began in 1954 when the Greek government first raised the issue before the United Nations, but also inaugurated a new phase in the whole question. It was the first step toward those conciliatory Greek-Turkish diplomatic efforts that led to the summit meeting of Premiers Karamanlis and Menderes in Zürich, February 5-11, 1959, and to their agreement to set up Cyprus as an independent state. This sort of bipartite procedure for dealing with the Cyprus question had been urged on the Greek government by the U.S. government at least as early as November 15, 1956, when Robert D. Murphy, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, at a conference between top Greek and American officials which took place at the State Department, told Premier Karamanlis that the U.S. government believed that an effort to reach an understanding with Turkey would have good results. Then, a year later, after the British Ambassador in Athens told Foreign Minister AveroffTossizza that his government would examine very sympathetically the application of any of the solutions for the Cyprus question the Greek government considered acceptable, so long as Turkey, too, agreed to this solution, Secretary of State Dulles, in a conversation of October 26, 1957 with the Greek Ambassador in Washington, insisted on the need for a direct agreement between the Greek and Turkish governments over Cyprus. 12 The Turkish government, too, preferred this bipartite procedure and had often asked the U.S. government not to involve itself in the substance of the question on the ground that no settlement would be reached without an agreement between Turkey and Greece. If for so long it had made no overtures of its own to the Greek government, it was because it studiously avoided doing so, as long as the Greek government was not willing to accept negotiation on the basis of the principle ot partition.

B. GREEK-TURKISH TALKS BEGIN AT THE U N THE "PARIS SKETCH" FOLLOWS

The first meeting between the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, for the purpose of discussing a Cyprus settlement, took place in the Delegates' Lounge of the UN building on December 6, 1958, namely the day after the Assembly adopted Resolution 1287 (XIII). In their twohour long exchange of views, they prepared, for reference to their 12

Conflict and Conciliation, pp/257-258.

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respective governments (and, in the case of the Greek Foreign Minister, to Makarios, too), the ground for further negotiations on the Cyprus question. It was during this exchange of views that the germs of the Zurich agreements were sown. Zorlu explained that by partition he did not in principle mean territorial partition, and repeated that Turkey feared that the Greek majority in Cyprus would ill-treat the Turkish minority, and therefore wanted tangible safeguards for its protection. 13 The Turkish government, he said further, would accept the establishment in Cyprus of a federal system of government, with recognition of the equality of the two communities at least in certain sectors. And very persistently he proposed the setting up on the island of two Turkish and two Greek military bases, under the full sovereignty of Greece and Turkey, respectively. Averoff-Tossizza, however, categorically rejected the Turkish claims. Nonetheless, certain ideas did remain, such as recognition that full independence for the island was desirable (with Zorlu proposing a federation to be called a Greek-Turkish Republic); that a President of the Republic with augmented powers should be elected from among the Greeks; and that in certain sectors at least, the Greek community should have majority rights. 14 These ideas were to be developed further, in great secrecy, eventually to be transformed into the basis of a settlement. On his return to Athens, Averoff-Tossizza, in his extremely lengthy report of December 11 to the Greek Parliament on Cyprus developments since June 20,1958, disclosed nothing about the contents of this important conversation with his Turkish colleague at UN headquarters, five days earlier. However, in this different forum, he did not hesitate to underline the noticeable relaxation in the tone of the Turkish speeches which had occurred during the debate in the Political Committee and said he was unable to tell whether this was a result of the debate itself or of the influence of other factors or whether this denoted the intention of a further relaxation. His talks with the Turkish Foreign Minister had not allowed him to reach any conclusions on this matter. But, he added, all could remain sure that, if this relaxation went deeper and was genuine, then the Greek government would respond accordingly for the very simple reason that this had always been its policy toward all. It had conducted such a policy of relaxation even toward the Eastern bloc, having reestablished relations with almost all that bloc's states. Why 18

Grivas Memoirs, p. 353. Makarios letter to Grivas, received by the latter on February 3, 1959. The Last Battle, p. 129.

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should not Greece adopt a similar policy toward Turkey? Doing so would mean following the course taken by Eleftherios Venizelos and Kemal Atatiirk. Thence, Averoff-Tossizza, in almost literal translation, reiterated several points he had made during the debate in the Political Committee in his efforts to convince the Turkish Delegation that in sincerely endorsing guaranteed independence as a solution to the Cyprus question, his government in no way wished to place the Turks of Cyprus under Greek Cypriot yoke. Imbued with this spirit, continued Averoff-Tossizza, the Greek government believed that independence should be pursued as a final solution, after the shortest possible interim period. For it believed that only through agreement on a final solution would the sufferings of the population of Cyprus and the undesirable political repercussions outside the island come to an end. If, on the other hand, despite these hopes, insuperable political obstacles were to prevent an early final solution, then, if one had to confront an interim solution, it would be indispensable that this solution should be really democratic and just and in no way prejudge the future. Otherwise, antagonism and troubles in and over Cyprus would inevitably continue. If, therefore, one desired to avoid such consequences, the Greek government, he reiterated, believed that guaranteed independence as a final settlement should be pursued. It was, on the other hand, self-evident that in case an interim solution were preferred, then he was obliged clearly to state that unfettered selfdetermination would not be excluded as a final solution, if the interim settlement really were not to prejudge the final settlement of the question. On this occasion, Averoff-Tossizza also replied to a Cyprus statement made to the Commons the day before by Macmillan who reiterated the British government's readiness to take part in a Cyprus conference along NATO-proposed lines with the British plan as a basis for discussions.15 The Greek government, Averoff-Tossizza reaffirmed, believed that any conference would be useless, unless a certain framework for solutions had been determined beforehand. However, it was willing to go to any sort of a conference, if this condition had been fulfilled, but he considered that the Macmillan plan was stillborn and could not serve as a basis for discussions. Only Spaak's plan could serve as such. In conclusion, he 15

597 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 343-347. In this statement, Macmillan drew the attention of the House of Commons to the upcoming Ministerial meeting of the NATO Council and said that no doubt advantage would be taken of this occasion for confidential discussions between those who were principally concerned in the Cyprus question. He felt sure, he said, that this approach would be most likely to be fruitful.

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reemphasized the moderation, realism, and good will of his government's Cyprus policy. His government did not aim at prolonging the Cyprus question. It desired a realistic and practical solution, which would be in accord with the principles upon which modern international society rested. If this attitude was not reciprocated, the struggle would, however, be continued. It would also be protracted, because Greece would never betray the cause of freedom of "our Cypriot brothers". 16 The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey continued their Cyprus exchanges in Paris when the NATO Council met on the ministerial level from December 16 to 18,1958. Macmillan revealed in his memoirs17 that Averoff-Tossizza and Zorlu jointly called on Selwyn Lloyd and asked him whether the British government agreed that they should continue their private talks on the Cyprus question and whether it saw any advantage in their reaching an agreement on the matter, under which Cyprus would become an independent state, with the Greek and Turkish Cypriots enjoying a measure of communal autonomy in it, and Britain retaining military bases on the island, in full sovereignty. Their general plan was first to discuss between themselves the internal aspects of a Cyprus settlement and then to consider the results of these discussions as well as external questions such as guarantees and treaties in a round of tripartite talks. The atmosphere of Greek-Turkish conciliation that prevailed at this time is suggested by the fact that the two Foreign Ministers jointly asked Selwyn Lloyd, after one of the NATO Council meetings, to order the stay of execution of two Greek Cypriot youths who were to be hanged next day for a political murder. If the sentences were carried out, both Foreign Ministers said, hopes for a peaceful settlement might be destroyed. Governor Foot, accordingly, was urgently sent the necessary instructions and granted the two youths a last-minute reprieve.18 It was in Paris that Averoff-Tossizza and Zorlu sketched the outline of what was eventually to become the basic structure of the new independent state of Cyprus, again for reference to their respective governments. The sixteen-point "Paris sketch" reveals that the two Foreign Ministers were in agreement for setting up Cyprus as an independent state (as Makarios had proposed in his interview with Barbara Castle, published on September 22,1958), indeed as the Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, it indicated 18 17 18

GPD, pp. 259-261. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 689. Foot, A Start in Freedom, p. 179. Keesing's, 16833.

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their acceptance of certain features of the Macmillan plan which favored the Turkish viewpoint, such as that plan's provision for two separate Houses of Representatives for the Greek and Turkish communities on the island—Communal Chambers, as they are called in the relevant French notes of this sketch for a final Cyprus settlement. But this sketch also embodied certain institutions which the British Labour Party, the Greek government and Spaak had desired to see added to the Macmillan plan. For it provided for the setting up of a unitary legislative body which the Macmillan plan referred to merely as an institution that might eventually be created in the indeterminate future. This "Paris sketch" also briefly mentioned the need of concluding a treaty of alliance between the proposed Republic of Cyprus and Greece and Turkey — a feature which Krishna Menon's remarks during the U N debates on the Cyprus question may have suggested, with Averoff-Tossizza concurring. 19 Finally, instead of the U N guarantee of the proposed new state's independence which Makarios and the Greek government had proposed since the end of September 1958, this sketch revealed that the two Foreign Ministers contemplated the conclusion of a treaty among Greece, Turkey, and Britain for guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and fundamental articles of the new state's constitution, probably on the model of the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 — a suggestion publicly made by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick in a Sunday Times article of February 2, 1958. 20 Implicit in this state-building sketch was the maintenance of British military bases on the island — a condition which the British government had made clear to the Greek government in August 1957 for dealing with the island's non-base territory after Britain recognized it no longer needed Cyprus as a base but only bases in Cyprus. 21 This sketch parenthetically noted that it was understood that the British bases would remain outside the scope of the proposed treaty of alliance among Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. However, in this "Paris sketch" no reference at all was made to the establishment of Turkish and Greek military bases on the island — a point on which Zorlu had insisted when talking over Cyprus with Averoff-Tossizza during their meeting of December 6, 1958, at the UN headquarters in New York. The agreement on the need of setting up the Republic of Cyprus led, of course, to several provisions of a novel character. Implicitly, the 19 20 21

Verbatim Record, 1006th meeting, December 3, 1958, p. 62. See above, Chapter II, p. 84. Conflict and Conciliation, p. 154.

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republican form of regime which the two Foreign Ministers endorsed in their Paris talks excluded the possibility of any personal union of Cyprus with Greece through the Greek Royal family, on the Cretan analogy. Cyprus, according to this Paris sketch, was to have "a presidential" regime. And — echoes here of Lebanon's Constitution — the President would be Greek, the Vice-President Turkish, and both would be elected separately by the Greek and Turkish communities, respectively, by universal suffrage. Both President and Vice-President would have the right of absolute veto, separately or jointly, in matters of foreign policy and defense (the Cyprus Governor's reserved powers under the Macmillan and Radcliffe plans), possibly, too, in matters of internal security and even of agrarian policy (in a'l likelihood, at Zorlu's request). The President and Vice-President would also have suspensory veto powers for "all laws and decisions" which would then be sent back to the unitary legislative Chamber for a second examination, though no provision was made about the sort of majority that would be required for overriding a Presidential or Vice-Presidential suspensory veto. The government or Council would be under the Presidency and the Vice-Presidency of the President and Vice-President of the Republic, according to this "Paris sketch", and would be composed of six Greeks and three Turks, chosen, respectively, by the President and Vice-President. Zorlu wanted two votes for each of the Turkish members of this body but AverofT-Tossizza wanted one vote for each. No agreement was reached on this point. It would appear that the Council would have the right of an absolute and a suspensory veto under the same conditions enumerated for the laws and decisions of the legislature. Each community, as already mentioned, would have its own Chamber (composed of a number of representatives that would be fixed by each community) in order to direct communal affairs and issue laws on religious questions; questions of education, culture, and teaching; questions of personal status; questions involving institutions which were specifically communal, such as banks, foundations, various welfare or social institutions as well as the municipalities. In this connection, it was understood, however, that this provision could not be interpreted in such a way as to prevent the creation of mixed and common institutions, should the inhabitants so desire. At the suggestion of Ambassador Sarper, the communal Chambers would have the right to collect from members of their community taxes and levies in order to meet their needs as well as the needs of the welfare organizations and institutions, for the administration of which they were responsible.

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The legislative power would be ensured by a single House composed of representatives of the people elected by universal suffrage separately by each community. The number of representatives was not fixed, but it was agreed that seventy per cent of this Chamber would consist of Greeks and thirty per cent of Turks. Laws which the President or Vice-President regarded as discriminatory with regard to one of the two communities would be sent to an arbitral court (a provision of the Macmillan plan and of the Radcliffe Constitutional proposals), composed of three members, a Greek, a Turk, and a neutral personality of foreign nationality, chosen by common accord, in advance, by the President and VicePresident. This court would have the right to void, "ratify", or return such a law to the Legislative body for new examination, in whole or in part. In any case, this law would not be enforceable until the court — or the Chamber, in case of return — had pronounced itself on this law. In all public administration or persons of public law of a mixed character, seventy per cent of the employees would be Greek and thirty per cent Turkish. This would not be interpreted as preventing the utilization of a higher percentage of Turks. It was well understood that this quantitative repartition would be applied to the extent that would be practicable in all grades of the hierarchy. In local, municipal, or other locality administrations in which there was a close-to-one-hundred per cent majority of one of the communities, the administration would include elements of only that group. In localities which had a mixed population, the administration would have to be composed, to the extent this was possible, of officials in the same proportion as that of the two groups in that locality. In the five largest cities of Cyprus, the question would be examined for setting up separate municipalities, not obligatorily, but possibly. The President and Vice-President, respectively, would be considered as commander-chief and deputy-commander-in-chief of the armed and security forces. The commander and deputy-commander of the armed forces, the police, and the gendarmerie would be nominated by common accord by the President and Vice-President. One of these commanders would be Turkish. The deputy-commander would always be from the other community. For any amendment of the Republic's Constitution outside the sphere of the fundamental principles relating to the establishment and the composition of the State, a majority of eighty per cent would be required in the unitary Legislature. It was understood that the President and VicePresident would preserve their right to use the veto under the afore-

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mentioned provisions, even in cases of amendments to the Constitution adopted by an eighty per cent majority of the Legislature.22 The two ForeignM inisters also agreed in this "Paris sketch" that the ambassadors of Greece and Turkey in Cyprus would enjoy precedence over other ambassadors and that Greek and Turkish would be the new republic's official languages. They agreed, too, that in its international relations, the Republic of Cyprus would grant the most-favored-nation clause to Britain, Greece, and Turkey in all accords, regardless of their nature. This, however, would not be construed in a way that would prevent the conclusion of an economic and mutual aid accord between the state of Cyprus and Greece, Turkey, or Britain, separately or jointly. And it was well understood that the conclusion of such accords would be accomplished after a positive opinion on the part of the above-mentioned states. The most-favored-nation clause in such accords would not extend to third parties. The two Foreign Ministers, on the other hand, could not agree about the exact nature of the state that was to be set up. Zorlu still wanted the Republic of Cyprus to be a Greek-Turkish federative union. AveroffTossizza, however, wanted to regard it as a state set up by the will of the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus. There was disagreement, too, on the question of an appropriate flag. Zorlu wanted the flags of Greece and Turkey to be flown together. His Greek colleague favored a new flag, with the two communities allowed to raise also the Greek and Turkish flags on holidays but next to the flag of Cyprus. He also thought that the national Greek and Turkish holidays should be celebrated as national holidays in Cyprus. Nonetheless, the "Paris sketch", providing as it did for the creation of a Republic of Cyprus, became the basis for further exchanges and negotiations between Averoff-Tossizza and Zorlu through five meetings of the Greek Ambassador in Ankara with the Turkish Foreign Minister and another meeting between the two Foreign Ministers in Paris, on January 18, 1959.

Macmillan and Selwyn Lloyd, meanwhile, who faced the dilemma about what to do with regard to implementing the British tridominium plan in Cyprus, decided after much Cabinet deliberation to let the Greek and Turkish governments continue their negotiations without further interference. According to the memoirs of Macmillan 23 they felt that 28 23

As is well known, the U.S. President has no veto right over amendments. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 689-690.

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new and more hopeful prospects would appear if the two governments were able to work out an agreed basis for a Cyprus settlement. The result was that the British government, in a note of December 23, 1958 which the British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Roger Allen, handed next day to the Greek Foreign Minister, defined in writing its position toward these Greek-Turkish negotiations which aimed at a final and not an interim settlement of the Cyprus question. According to this note which was also conveyed to the Turkish government, Lloyd, on returning to London, had informed his Cabinet colleagues of the Cyprus talks in Paris and they were glad to hear of the new developments and that the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers were attempting to solve the problem in the context of renewed Greek-Turkish friendship. This, they believed, represented a basic change in the situation and they wished to give all possible help in these efforts to make progress. The British government, according to this note, was deeply conscious of its responsibility to all Cypriots for their progress and well-being. In addition it was of primary importance that it should secure bases in Cyprus under British sovereignty. This was necessary not only for national reasons but also to enable Britain to discharge its international responsibilities. The Paris talks had made it very clear to Lloyd that both Averoff-Tossizza and Zorlu well understood this and also were prepared to see to it that facilities and communications in the rest of the island necessary for operating the bases would be fully safeguarded. That being so, the British government would welcome a scheme for the future of Cyprus based on cooperation between the two communities in the island and among the Greek, Turkish, and British governments. For its part, therefore, the British government was very willing that Averoff-Tossizza and Zorlu should continue their discussions on cooperation between the two communities in Cyprus with a view to drawing up an outline of institutional arrangements to protect and preserve the interests of the two Cypriot communities in a new form of government. When the Greek government considered that sufficient progress had been made on these international aspects of the question, which were of great importance, the British government was agreeable that further discussions should take place between the three governments in order, first, to consider the arrangements proposed for cooperation between the two Cypriot communities in a new form of government; and, second, to discuss and draw up a plan for settling the international aspects. Such a plan would have to cover the defense and foreign policy aspects, including the necessary treaties and the necessary safeguards for British rights in respect of the

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sovereign British bases in Cyprus and the provision of the necessary facilities for their operation. In conclusion, the British government, in this note, reaffirmed its wish to give all possible help to this new and hopeful approach to the problem. Although it could not bind itself to any precise formula or course of action with regard to the sovereignty of Cyprus before agreement had been reached on all relevant matters, nevertheless it believed that an approach in the context of the restoration of the former friendship and alliance between Greece and Turkey formed a sound basis for the hope of success. After reading this note, the Greek Foreign Minister told the British Ambassador that he had told other things to Lloyd in Paris and Lloyd seemed to be replying to other things in this note. Lloyd continually spoke about "a new form of government", about "cooperation of the two communities and the three governments", whereas he — Averoff-Tossizza — had made it clear that full independence was required in order to make other concessions. He observed further that this note's reference to the importance the British government attached to securing British bases in Cyprus under British sovereignty only negatively implied the raising of British sovereignty over the rest of the island, when it had been agreed that this was not enough, especially when the entire text straightforwardly and repeatedly mentioned other matters. Averoff-Tossizza asked Sir Roger to convey these views of his to London and to inform his government that he would be unable to continue his talks with Zorlu unless he had in hand a clear statement about Britain's agreement concerning the setting up of an independent Cyprus so long as British interests on the island were met. Sir Roger observed it was not easy for his government to bind itself to any precise formula or course of action with regard to sovereignty over Cyprus before agreement had been reached on relevant matters. With regard to the substance of the matter, he affirmed, the views of the two governments were not distant. Before Sir Roger left, U.S. Ambassador Riddleberger arrived. Since the British Ambassador had asked Averoff-Tossizza not to tell the American about the British government's note, the Greek Foreign Minister spoke to the U.S. envoy about Cyprus developments only in general terms and said that the British government had not yet responded, but was asking for clarifications. The British silence, he added, was suspect. Nonetheless, this was "our last hope". Riddleberger said that his government should exert pressure and promised to cable to Washington accordingly. In the afternoon of December 24, the Greek Foreign Minister called

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on Ambassador Vergin and, as he had done with Riddleberger, spoke only in general terms about Cyprus developments. Nor did he give the Turkish Ambassador any details about his Paris conversations with Zorlu, not knowing whether Vergin had been informed about them. He, himself, had not confided even in his closest Foreign Ministry collaborators about his negotiations. However, he did tell Vergin about Lloyd's message, which, as Sir Roger had told him, would also be delivered to the Turkish Foreign Minister. And he asked Vergin to convey to Zorlu his views about this message. Premier Karamanlis, he also told the Turkish Ambassador, continued in principle to favor new Greek-Turkish exchanges and negotiations and would soon convey to Ankara his most recent views on the issue. After Lloyd's message, however, the Greek side was hesitant. It would probably go on with the talks but not with the freedom it would have otherwise enjoyed. He ventured the opinion that perhaps the British "wished now to divide us". On December 26, the Turkish Ambassador in Athens read to the Greek Foreign Minister a wire from Zorlu who was replying to AveroffTossizza's own message to him, of December 24, through Vergin. The Turkish Foreign Minister affirmed that the identic British note of December 23 faithfully rendered the Paris conversations, could not be regarded as negative, and gave no ground for suspicions. In his view, it was not possible at this point clearly to state that independence for Cyprus was an acceptable solution. He had an additional reason for saying so: the Turkish opponents of such a solution. Already he found himself in a somewhat difficult position. Because of leaks which had occurred, a reaction had started in Turkey. The worst was that on January 5, the Grand National Assembly was to meet, and he had learned that he would be attacked with charges of having given up partition as a solution to the Cyprus problem. Then, on January 7, the Committee on Foreign Affairs was to start its debate on the Foreign Ministry's budget. Certain concrete questions would be raised, to which it would be hard to reply. More than ever before, however, Zorlu urged his Greek colleague, one should hasten to achieve a solution. Time was working against both Greece and Turkey. In this connection, he expressed disappointment that Averoff-Tossizza had gone to Paris without full powers to negotiate. Progress, however, had to be achieved and could be achieved before January 1, 1959 by meeting again abroad, as he had told both AveroffTossizza and Lloyd. Zorlu believed, according to this message, that if the Greek and Turkish governments wanted to settle the Cyprus problem and rid Greek-Turkish relations of the heavy mortgage of that question,

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agreement should be reached and jointly presented. He feared, however, that public opinion in both countries would endanger the agreement. On the other hand, he did not fear the British, because they would be unable to reject a solution on which both Greece and Turkey were agreed. In response to this message from Zorlu, Averoff-Tossizza insisted with Vergin that the British note did not faithfully render the Paris conversations. He had told Lloyd repeatedly that full independence for Cyprus would constitute an exchange for concessions made by both sides, whereas the British note presented this only in an indirect and confused way. Perhaps, he acknowledged, he was oversuspicious vis-à-vis the British. Yet he feared that, though they might not say "No" to a Greek-Turkish agreement on Cyprus, they might say "Yes, of course, but...". He agreed, however, that it was necessary to hasten to reach an agreement, though the British note had chilled him somewhat to this idea. At any rate, the Greek government had brought over from Ankara its ambassador, G. Pesmazoglou, to inform him of the Greek Premier's views and to convey these views back to Ankara, so that one might speedily go ahead. Because of doubts about the British attitude, this would be done with a certain hesitation. The Turkish Ambassador informed the Greek Foreign Minister that he had received that morning the British Ambassador, who had learned from London that Vergin had called on Averoff-Tossizza on December 24. Sir Roger had told him that the Greek Foreign Minister's fears were unjustified. How could London disagree with a solution which both Ankara and Athens had accepted? From Zorlu's wire, the Greek Foreign Minister derived the impression that the Turkish envoy was not fully informed about the details of the Paris talks. For Vergin had spoken about "a sort of federation" and about "a sort of equality of status" for the two communities in Cyprus. Zorlu had his own difficulties to cope with, he concluded.

C. EOKA'S LAST TRUCE

Equally unaware of the new ultra-secret Greek-Turkish exchanges which began in the United Nations with the backstage talks between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers on December 6, 1958, was EOKA's leader in Cyprus, who, it will be recalled, had shown little enthusiasm for Makarios' proposal for setting up Cyprus as an independent state

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and was a fervent champion of enosis through self-determination. 24 In Grivas' eyes, the U N resolution could not but appear as another U N effort to get rid of the Cyprus question until the Assembly's next regular session. 25 Only a ruthless and hard struggle would be capable of bending British diplomacy and strengthening Greek diplomacy, he believed. Accordingly, after the Assembly had adopted Resolution 1287 (XIII), he issued orders to his sector leaders in which he stressed, among other things, that liberation struggles could be won only with the spirit of the people and that only he who suifered but never yielded became the final victor. 26 Yet even before the end of the U N debates on Cyprus, Grivas had received on December 3 a letter from Makarios urging him to continue the relaxation in EOKA operations which EOKA's leader had applied since mid-November. In this letter, the Cyprus Ethnarch affirmed that efforts would be exerted for the release of those detained and generally for the lifting of the emergency measures and for the cessation of antiEOKA operations, with the terms of the truce to be conveyed to the Governor of the island. All sides, Makarios reported in this letter, were cultivating an atmosphere of détente. The British, perhaps because they would conduct elections shortly; the Turks, because they had internal and external problems and realized that time did not work in their favor; the Greeks, because they desired to normalize their relations with Turkey. From the purely Cypriot side, therefore, efforts had to be made for the existing détente to be most advantageous. It was desirable, in view of the probable British elections, to continue this situation in the hope that the Labour Party would come to power. Although one had to be very reserved with regard to the attitude of the Labourites once in power, it would be easier to reach an understanding with them, because they had assumed no commitments toward the Turks. Of course, if the British government did not show understanding and continued implementing the Macmillan plan, then it would bear the full responsibility for the consequences because it would thus force EOKA to resume its operations. 27 Learning of Macmillan's earlier-mentioned statement to the Commons on December 10, Grivas concluded that the UN resolution had brought no change in British policy toward Cyprus. 28 Press reports to the effect 24 85 28 37

Grivas Memoirs, p. 335. See above, Chapter V, p. 244. Grivas Memoirs, p. 335. Ibid., p. 339. Ibid., p. 336.

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that Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd, at a private meeting with Conservative backbenchers, had mentioned the existence of a British partition plan aroused new dark suspicions in his mind as well as in the mind of Greek Cypriots and Greeks that their allegations about an "Anglo-Turkish plot" were well founded.29 Noble's explanation in the Commons, on December 15, that LennoxBoyd had merely said that in May 1957 preliminary research had been carried out on the questions of whether partition constituted a practical possibility and of the implications of such a solution to the problem, did not dispel these suspicions. The same may be said of Macmillan's statement of December 18, likewise in the Commons, that partition was the worst solution to the Cyprus question, though he could not exclude it if other attempts to settle the issue were to fail. 30 Moreover, in Cyprus the British military authorities were continuing their anti-EOKA operations, with the result that Grivas was obliged to issue an order for organizing women and children for self-defense, if British troops took hostages or ill-treated the villagers. And he also gave orders for a resumption of limited action, should EOKA members condemned to death be executed.31 It is in the light of this latter order that the aforementioned joint demarche of the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers with Foreign Secretary Lloyd in Paris can be fully appreciated. Finally, on December 19, the very day two British airmen were killed in an ambush near Galinoporni of Karpasia, and a third was seriously injured (as matters turned out, they were the last British victims of EOKA operations),32 Grivas received notes from the Greek Consul in Nicosia and "Isaakios" recommending the maintenance of quiet. Public opinion, Frydas wrote, had difficulty in justifying the detonation of land mines in recent days — which were acts of EOKA reprisals. The atmosphere created by political contacts, he cryptically added, was such that the matter of 89

Times, December 15, 1958. Wrote the Times' Nicosia correspondent: the effect of the Minister's statements — whatever the exact words he used — was all the more tragic in that it came at a time when a slight détente was perceptible. 30 597 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 743, 1307-1309. Macmillan said that the study LennoxBoyd had referred to had been mentioned as early as May 31, 1957 and showed that partition was technically possible but would bring intolerable hardship. 31 Grivas Memoirs, pp. 339-340. 32 Keesing's, 16833. In the English-language edition of Grivas' memoirs, p. 183, Grivas says that even if he had wished to conform to the requests of Averoff-Tossizza and Frydas to end EOKA reprisals and operations in general, he would have been unable to prevent the attack because it took place 100 miles away and no messenger could have got there in time to cancel the plan.

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continued operations had become of secondary importance. It is not surprising that these remarks enraged Grivas, who responded by reaffirming that he would accept no unilateral truce, and in a further letter to the Consul maintained that it was inconceivable for the opponent to strike blows without EOKA returning them, for the sake of mere policy. In conclusion, he noted a certain lack of eagerness in sending him support. He declared, however, that he would never yield and never lay down his arms before final victory had been achieved. For the Cyprus cause, he would fight, if need be, even outside the island. For the sake of political expediency or alliances, he would never accept any hermaphroditic compromise. 33 Nonetheless, despite these brave words, Grivas, on December 24, 1958, issued a proclamation of what turned out to be his fourth and last unilateral truce. 34 The text of this document was prepared in close cooperation with the Greek Consul in Nicosia. According to this proclamation, the UN resolution had constituted a clear condemnation of the abortive Macmillan plan, which the "Tory government" had concocted in order to continue its enslavement of the Cypriot people, by applying the principle of "divide and rule". In order to produce a peaceful atmosphere, EOKA had relaxed its action even before the United Nations had started its debate on Cyprus. Nonetheless, the Tories had maintained an intransigent attitude and had continued oppressing the Cypriot people with searches, curfews, ill-treatment of civilians, the destruction of property, etc. UN members should appreciate this Tory attitude. EOKA, however, would, as in the past, respect the UN resolution. Accordingly, it would halt the activities imposed on it, so long as the other side were to do the same, and it would wait to see how the British government intended to implement the UN resolution. EOKA was prepared for either course: for a protracted armed struggle, if British intransigence continued; and for the cessation of the struggle, if a just solution that would satisfy the demands of the Cypriot people were given. In conclusion, EOKA's leader expressed the hope that the British government would not regard this gesture as a sign of weakness, as it had done in the past, because it would wake up from this illusion with a shock. Three days after issuing this Christmas eve truce proclamation, Grivas received from "Isaakios" a letter containing not only comments about the Cyprus struggle at the Assembly's thirteenth session but also cautiously 33 34

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 339-340. Ibid., p. 341.

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referring to Greek moves toward reaching an understanding with Turkey on the basis of guaranteed independence for the island. If a solution were to include not full equality of Greeks and Turks in Cyprus but the granting of minority privileges to the Turkish Cypriots, their participation in government and all possible safeguards that they would be able to live on equal terms with the majority, then this solution would merit consideration and would be both fair and politically expedient. Of course, such a solution would require concessions by both sides. Would the Turks made concessions acceptable to the Greek government? It was doubtful. On the other hand, "Isaakios" had positive indications that the British were greatly disturbed at the Greek-Turkish rapprochement. Of course, should a Greek-Turkish agreement be reached, they would find themselves in a difficult position if they wanted to reject such an agreement. Under these circumstances, he did not dare to be optimistic. The Greek-Turkish contacts were a ray of light but he could not say whether this ray would be transformed into the full light of liberty. At any rate, for the time being, one had to wait to see whether this ray might not become stronger. 35 Macmillan took his truce as a sign of EOKA weakness. He was against accepting it. In consultation with Lennox-Boyd, he instructed Sir Hugh Foot not to relax the pressure on EOKA or start any talks or negotiations with it. Even if the Greek-Turkish negotiations led to a solution, Macmillan believed that EOKA, like the I.R.A. in Ireland, would continue its activities. Staying executions were another matter. 36 In seeming response to Grivas' Christmas eve truce proclamation, Sir Hugh Foot, on December 30, 1958, announced the commutation of four more death sentences. On January 1, 1959, he visited Makarios' locum tenens in Cyprus, the Bishop of Kition, and asked him to exert his influence for a continuation of the truce. On the other hand, as Secretary of Defense Christopher Soames arrived in Nicosia, the British forces in Cyprus, assisted by helicopters and light planes, started on January 6, 35

Grivas Memoirs, p. 337. "Isaakios", in this letter, started out by observing that during the U N debate of the Cyprus question almost all delegations had been persuaded to oppose partition as a solution of the Cyprus question. This became plain from many speeches. However, regardless of what representatives said in their speeches, their voting was based exclusively on government interests, and the bargaining power of the Anglo-Turks was greater than that of Greece. He feared that it was difficult to expect any solution from the United Nations. Since one could expect nothing from the United Nations nor from elsewhere (the United States, etc.) it was necessary to try to reach an understanding with the Turks. 38 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 691 (December 31, 1958).

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1959 a new round of anti-EOKA operations, blockading first a wide area in the Kambou-Kykkou region, and then extending these operations to the Makhaira-Marathassa-Solea region and beyond. According to London reports, one of the objectives of these operations was to discover Grivas in his hideout. These operations ended on January 19 without results, so that Grivas felt no need to take any special measures to counteract them. On January 20, on the other hand, Lennox-Boyd categorically rejected a proposal by the Labourites that the anti-EOKA operations be suspended, and on January 29 operations were announced in the region of Karpasia, with the Colonial Secretary, however, terming these merely a military exercise and the Cyprus government later defining them as a combination of training exercises with extensive patrol action.37

37

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 344-345.

IX ULTRA-QUIET DIPLOMACY

A. GREEK-TURKISH NEGOTIATIONS: THE FIRST ROUND.

Since December 26, 1958, when Ambassador Vergin had informed the Greek Foreign Minister of the Turkish Foreign Minister's opinion about the identic British note of December 23 to the Greek and Turkish governments, the Greek-Turkish negotiations had gone on. Bearing instructions drafted on the basis of the comments Premier Karamanlis himself had made on the "Paris sketch", Ambassador George Pesmazoglou returned to his post in Ankara on December 28. That same evening, at about 7:00 p.m. Foreign Minister Zorlu received him at the Foreign Ministry. Opening the conversation, Zorlu observed that, as the Greeks had seen, though he had won a victory at the United Nations, he had refrained from speaking triumphantly. On the contrary, he had come up to Averoff-Tossizza and had said he was prepared to accept a compromise amendment to the Iranian draft resolution — which he did not achieve, because of the Greek refusal. He also reminded Ambassador Pesmazoglou that after the Assembly had adopted the Mexican resolution, he had proposed to Averoff-Tossizza the establishment of a unitary Chamber as well as a Turkish Co-President or Vice-President for Cyprus. More generally, Zorlu emphasized the spirit of compromise which he had shown, and his conviction that "we must not only revive the friendship founded by Atatiirk but must develop it even more". The Greek Ambassador replied that the spirit of compromise was reciprocal. Premier Karamanlis shared in this spirit. With interest and satisfaction he had listened to what his Foreign Minister had told him about his Paris conversations with the Turkish Foreign Minister. He sincerely desired an accord which would render Cyprus happy and GreekTurkish cooperation close and fruitful. Evidence for this Greek spirit of compromise was to be seen in what was happening in Athens and Cyprus. For instance, the Greek government had taken a categorical stand vis-i-

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vis the Bishop of Kyrenia (the prelate had denounced, it will be recalled, Makarios' independence proposal)1. Archbishop Makarios had issued a statement expressing his desire that Greek-Turkish cooperation be restored. 2 The Bishop of Kition, speaking from the ambo, had expressed regret at the killing of Britishers. All these developments, continued Pesmazoglou, had probably obliged "Dighenis" for the first time to speak out (in his proclamation of December 24) about the cessation of violence, if he met a response, instead of offering a mere truce. The Greek government, Pesmazoglou added, had decided to proceed toward a compromise solution of the Cyprus problem, at the sacrifice of its popularity. At this point, Foreign Minister Zorlu, interrupting, repeated what he had said about his good intentions and observed that Cyprus, instead of dividing "our countries" should become the starting point for a more general Greek-Turkish federation. For this reason, he added, in addition to the British bases on the island, it would be good for both countries to acquire strong military bases and set up a strong combined GreekTurkish military headquarters on Cyprus. Ambassador Pesmazoglou was somewhat disturbed by these last words of Zorlu about Turkish and Greek bases and a combined Greek-Turkish military headquarters on Cyprus, because the "Paris sketch" in no way referred to them. Accordingly, he replied that he, too, hoped Cyprus would become a means of union "of our two countries" but regarded it preferable not to discuss topics not included in the Paris preliminary draft agreement, and, instead, to seek by joint efforts to overcome certain differences of view which still existed in the preliminary draft. Zorlu responded by saying that President Celal Bayar was raising strenuous objections and that Premier Menderes had undertaken to sway him. The existing differences of views, he maintained, could be smoothed out at a new meeting of the two Foreign Ministers, provided with full powers. The Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey might also meet, retorted Pesmazoglou, but prior to any such meeting, some points, to which the 1

Vima, December 25, 1958, published the Greek Foreign Minister's relevant statement. Averoff-Tossizza stressed that the Bishop's view ran counter to those of the great majority of Cypriots and of Makarios as well as those of the Greek government. 2 Ibid. In this statement Makarios also said that a rapprochement of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots was desirable. If understanding were shown by all sides, he added, a fair and reasonable solution would ensue.

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Turkish Foreign Minister objected, as well as the observations of the Greek Premier, should be clarified. In continuation, he told Zorlu that before going ahead to a more detailed exposition of Karamanlis' observations on the "Paris sketch", he wished to assure him that the Greek government desired that most powerful safeguards be granted to the Turks of Cyprus, to secure them from their fear that they would be under the discretionary authority of the Greeks. It desired, too, that Cyprus should not be transformed into a satellite of Greece — even if there was a trend toward this. On the contrary, the Cypriot state would have to follow a policy of equal friendship toward both "our countries", while at the same time ensuring that Turkey's security would never be endangered from Cyprus. For realizing these objectives, he added, the Turkish Foreign Minister should understand that the government of his country, in which the popular feeling, until that moment, demanded either union or unconditional self-determination as solutions of the Cyprus problem, would first have to persuade its public opinion to accept the creation of an independent state with the above commitments. Zorlu countered by remarking that the Greek government, too, on its side, should understand that it would be a tour de force for any Turkish government to retreat beyond the last concession of partition and to accept the establishment of a federal state in Cyprus. And he allowed Pesmazoglou to understand that his government was not only meeting with objections on the part of the Opposition but that it also had to face very serious difficulties within the Democrat Party itself. But, he added, clearly and without a shadow of doubt, Turkey, as he had told Averoff-Tossizza, was unable to accept any other form of state. The Greek envoy, in reply, contended that the Turkish government would have the opportunity to offer to its public opinion many achievements because of the Paris draft plan. Noteworthy gains for the Turkish effort were the provision for the participation of the Turkish Cypriots in the government of the new state in a proportion that was higher than their ratio in the island's population; the provision of means (the veto of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President) which would allow them to prevent the exercise of authority in accordance with the majority's desires; and the provision for the independent administration of unmixed Turkish Cypriot affairs by the Turkish Cypriots themselves. Although the Greek Ambassador was prepared to enter into other relevant arguments, Zorlu preferred to enter into the substance of the Greek Premier's remarks on the Paris draft plan. Accordingly, Pesmazoglou referred first to the matter of the characterization of the new

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state's form and to the question of its flag. The Greek Premier, he told Zorlu, shared Averoff-Tossizza's views on these matters, namely that Cyprus should not be termed a federal state but a state set up by the will of the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus, and that it should have its own distinct flag. Zorlu was unyielding in his insistence that Cyprus should be termed a federation. At great length he developed the arguments in favor of this thesis. Concerning the flag question, on the other hand, he accepted the proposal for a new flag, so long as the authorities, on holidays or at state ceremonies, also raised the two other flags. Pesmazoglou replied that his government could not yield in the matter of the federal form of government for Cyprus even by giving the impression of a federation. Finally, after quite a lively discussion, Zorlu asked him to try to combine the two versions, with federation somehow to be mentioned at any rate. For a moment, this gave Pesmazoglou the impression that perhaps a concession might be made if not in substance at least in the matter of formulation, but this impression was soon dispelled by what followed. The Greek Ambassador then developed to Zorlu the Greek Premier's remarks on the veto provisions of the Paris draft plan. This right of VicePresidential veto, the Greek Premier had pointed out, could lead the regime to immobility. The interests of the Turks in Cyprus could be safeguarded by sending contentious issues to the arbitral court which had the right to judge the matters and invalidate laws and decisions. Moreover, Karamanlis wanted this right of veto to apply to matters of foreign policy and defense only, not of internal security. For the latter there was the safeguard of the presence of the Commander or Deputy-Commander who would be a Turkish Cypriot. Zorlu, however, was adamant in insisting that questions of internal security should also be subject to the veto. However, he accepted that on other matters, the Vice-President's veto could be limited to the right of sending back the relevant bills and decisions either to the Chamber or to the arbitral court. The two then turned to the composition of the arbitral court. In the Greek Premier's view, this court, for reasons of appearance and respect for the mass of Greeks in Cyprus, ought to include two Greeks, one Turk, and one neutral judge — the latter with a winning vote in case of a tie. Over this point, too, however, Zorlu accepted no change from the "Paris sketch" provision, despite Pesmazoglou's arguments that this proposed new composition of the court did not alter the majority but merely sought to give the impression of a more reasonable composition. The Turkish

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Foreign Minister maintained that the basis of this argument was faulty, because in the case of an arbitral court, the arithmetical ratio of the population was irrelevant. A tough discussion then followed on Premier Karamanlis' proposals concerning the ratios of Ministers and civil servants in the Cyprus government. With regard to the former, Karamanlis proposed that instead of the 6-3 ratio between Greek and Turkish Ministers mentioned in the "Paris sketch", a ratio of 5-2 would be preferable. With the President and the Vice-President, this ratio would become 6-3 — which was still extremely favorable for the Turks. For a small state seven Ministers in all would be enough. With regard to the 70-30 ratio between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot civil servants mentioned in the "Paris sketch", the Greek government had no particular objections. However, if efforts were made to implement this ratio at all levels of the administrative hierarchy, poor administration might result, because of the small number of Turkish Cypriots available. Karamanlis therefore proposed that the Cyprus Constitution should provide that the number of Turkish Cypriot civil servants could never fall below twenty per cent. Zorlu's reaction to the first proposal — concerning the Ministers — was to say that he might, if need be, accept it. However, he would accept no retreat in the matter of the 70-30 ratio between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot civil servants in the administration. Zorlu was equally unyielding with regard to Karamanlis' proposal that the elections of the President, Vice-President, and members of the unitary legislative House of Representatives be carried out by all inhabitants of Cyprus voting as a unitary body, instead of by separate electoral bodies as suggested in the "Paris sketch". He gave numerous reasons for insisting on the two electoral bodies for the election of these government officials, and for rejecting the proposal of the Greek Premier who wanted a more powerful regime, based not on separation but on cooperation, together with a system that would ensure that the Turkish Cypriots elected by the unitary electoral body would be no mere instruments of the Greek majority. Said Zorlu about this proposal: "This would infringe upon the idea of a federation, from which, as I explained to Mr. Averoff, it is impossible for me to part". 3 At this point the exchange ended. It was 9:30 p.m. Zorlu was exhausted. The two agreed to meet again next day, at 10:00 a.m. 3

"Ceci enfreindrait l'idée de la fédération qui [sic], comme j'ai expliqué à Mr. Averoff, il m'est impossible d'en départir", said Zorlu.

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At 10:00 a.m. on December 29, Ambassador Pesmazoglou again met the Turkish Foreign Minister, as agreed. From the general conversation that took place before the two examined particular topics, he realized that Zorlu, after their conversation the evening before, had met separately President Bayar and Premier Menderes as well as leaders of the Turkish Cypriots. His impression was that the Turkish position on the matter of a federal form of government for Cyprus had now stiffened and that Menderes was putting forward new terms beyond those which Zorlu had presented to Averoff-Tossizza during their Paris meeting. Proceeding to the examination of the Greek Premier's observations on the two proposed Communal Chambers, Pesmazoglou said that Karamanlis believed that this matter had to be discussed further, because confusion was likely to arise about the functioning of these two Chambers. How, for instance, would banks come under these Chambers if there was to be a single legislation for banks, among which Turkish banks were likely to be included? Also the competence of these Communal Chambers would have to be carefully defined. And under what bodies would be placed the communities of mixed Greek-Turkish villages? The Greek Premier proposed that the competence of these Communal Chambers should cover all religious questions, the administration of the property of both religious organizations, all educational questions (without excluding the possibility of setting up mixed schools), all athletic and sports organizations (without again excluding mixed clubs). The above would not be taken to mean that if some Turkish Cypriot foundations, e.g. hospitals, were set up, these would be prohibited from being unmixed. It would only mean that these foundations, like the Greek foundations, would be regulated by a unitary legislation (control, grants from the State budget, etc.). Foreign Minister Zorlu at first wanted to hear of no change from the proposals contained in the "Paris sketch" with regard to the Communal Chambers' competence in the case of banks and economic development. When Pesmazoglou argued that, regardless of whether Cyprus had a federal or unitary form of government, banking legislation could not but be unitary, he finally accepted that the banks should function under such unitary legislation. He insisted, however, that they should depend on the Communal Chambers at least as regarded supervision and review. When Pesmazoglou insisted that this, too, was practically inapplicable, Zorlu was very upset and said the matter could be discussed later. With regard to other observations of the Greek Premier concerning the Communal Chambers, Zorlu appeared to agree, but insisted that the

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control of the communities should lie with the Communal Chambers. In order to clarify his thought, he added that the Communal Chambers would have the right to impose taxes and subsidies — which would never be considered as an attack on the right of the State of Cyprus to legislate in order to impose taxes and levies for its own finances.4 The Greek ambassador replied that this clarification had confused his own thought, with the result that Zorlu proposed that this matter, too, which essentially involved the Cyprus government's right of concurrent taxation, could be discussed later. Zorlu, on the other hand, saw no difficulties in reaching agreement over another proposal of Premier Karamanlis which Pesmazoglou, according to his instructions, explained to the Turkish Foreign Minister. Karamanlis proposed that with regard to the most-favored-nation clause mentioned in the "Paris sketch", it would have to be agreed that this clause would be granted to the other two states, if one of the three happened to be granted a favor. However he did not believe that if the Cyprus Republic wished to conclude a beneficial agreement with another state, Germany, for instance, all three would benefit from the favor it would get, because of special exchanges which one of the three might be unable to offer. He had no fear that a favor would be given in the other direction (e.g. the Soviet Union). Besides the veto on matters of foreign policy constituted an additional safeguard. The Greek Premier's observations about the armed forces of the Cyprus Republic were then discussed. Under his instructions, Pesmazoglou proposed that, instead of separate bodies for the armed forces, the gendarmerie, and the police, a single body be set up with a Greek Cypriot commander and a Turkish Cypriot deputy-commander. Being a small state, Cyprus, in Karamanlis' view, would require a tidy administration. On this matter, Zorlu not only insisted on three separate bodies for the armed forces, the police, and the gendarmerie, but also told Pesmazoglou that Premier Menderes insisted that the total number of men in these three bodies should not exceed 3,000 in all, and that the ratio of Greeks to Turks in them be 50-50. The Greek envoy expressed astonishment at this demand and Zorlu retorted that, unfortunately, the Turkish Cypriots could accept no diminution in the ratio which currently existed between Greek and 4

The French here reads: "Les chambres communales auraient le droit de percevoir des taxes et des subsides, ce qui ne serait jamais consideré comme une atteinte au droit de l'état de Chypre de légiférer en consequence pour percevoir des impôts et taxes pour ses propres finances".

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Turkish Cypriote in the police and gendarmerie.5 Pesmazoglou countered that this constituted no argument, because currently the British were free to choose their own security instruments. With regard to the question raised by Karamanlis on the relevant point in the "Paris sketch" as to whether it was desirable that British approval be required for the conclusion of economic and mutual aid accords between Cyprus and Greece, Turkey or other states, Zorlu expressed the opinion that it would be better not to discuss this matter at this point. On the other hand, the Turkish Foreign Minister had no objection to it being mentioned that the 70-30 ratio of Greek to Turkish Cypriote in the government, in the House of Representatives and possibly in the administration did not reflect the ratio of Greek to Turkish Cypriote in the island's population, but had been agreed upon in a spirit of fruitful cooperation and was judged desirable in order to give satisfaction to the Turkish Cypriot element. Finally, Foreign Minister Zorlu stated he wished to present two new observations Premier Menderes wanted to make about the "Paris sketch": First, Menderes desired the deletion from the "Paris sketch" of the provision that in the localities with a mixed population, the administration should be composed, to the extent this was feasible, of ofiBcials in the same proportion as that of the two ethnic groups in that locality.6 Second, Menderes insisted that two separate military bases be set up in Cyprus for Turkish and Greek armed forces or for mixed Greek-Turkish armed forces, and, in any case, on a combined Greek-Turkish headquarters. When the Greek Ambassador reacted with great sharpness to this second proposal, Zorlu commented that such reactions were unavoidable whenever officials without full powers were discussing matters in efforts to reach agreement. Subjects of this sort could not be discussed otherwise, and for that reason it had been impossible to discuss them in Paris. Generally, formulating such matters through correspondence could cause misunderstandings and give an opportunity to the British to torpedo these Greek-Turkish efforts by spreading various rumors among public opinion organs. All this would be avoided if plenary powers were given to both 5

On May 14, 1957, Lennox-Boyd, in the House of Commons, had stated that the strength of the auxiliary police was 1,399. Of these, 46 were Greek Cypriots and 1,335 Turkish Cypriots, 570 H.C. Deb. (5th series), 14. 6 The French text reads: "Dans les localités à population mixte les administrations précitées devront avoir une composition se rapprochant autant que possible à la composition de la population".

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Foreign Ministers or if the two Foreign Ministers followed their Premiers at a personal meeting. Pesmazoglou observed that, as far as he was concerned, a meeting of the two Premiers would be useful. He had been the first to advocate the idea of such a summit meeting. But he perceived the difficulties of such a meeting, regardless of the matters which had been discussed, so long as no agreement existed as to whether one should proceed from the idea of an independent Cyprus or from the idea of a federation. Zorlu agreed that this difficulty did indeed exist. He was convinced, however, that in spite of it, agreement could be reached if the two Premiers met. Pesmazoglou replied that, despite the favorable disposition of both the Greek Premier and his Foreign Minister, it seemed to him difficult to reach agreement on this point and asked Zorlu whether, such being the case, he perceived any other solution. If the two Premiers entered into discussion, Zorlu replied, any solution could be discussed. Nonetheless, he himself was sure that federalism was the more correct solution. For that reason, with the assistance of his legal colleagues, he had drawn up article by article a plan for the entire Constitution of Cyprus. He added that he believed that, if agreement were reached on the Cyprus question as he himself imagined it, then very soon a very close cooperation would develop between Greece and Turkey. This would be accompanied by considerable concessions for the people of the two countries, and would soon end in a more general federation of the two countries. Pesmazoglou was ready to leave, when Zorlu stopped him to add that, since he—the Greek Ambassador—was convinced of the need for sincere cooperation between Greece and Turkey, he should not report this conversation in writing but develop it verbally to the Premier and help achieve a meeting of the two Premiers, either secretly or publicly, as the Greek government would prefer. Pesmazoglou replied he had no objection to returning to Athens immediately. However, in his opinion, the summit meeting Zorlu proposed would not be fruitful, unless agreement was reached on the main subject. When Zorlu offered to place at his disposal a special military plane to fly him back to Athens, the Greek envoy said he preferred to take the regular air line for this purpose so as to avoid any special publicity. Thus, his second conversation with Zorlu came to an end, as he reserved himself verbally to report to the Greek Foreign Minister on this first round of negotiations based on the "Paris sketch".

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On December 30 or 31, 1958, the British Ambassador in Athens, at his own request, called on the Greek Foreign Minister at the latter's Kifissia home and said he had been instructed to convey to him certain observations in reply to certain remarks Averoff-Tossizza had made during their meeting of December 24. It had become clear in Paris, Sir Roger Allen told him, that the bipartite Greek-Turkish conversations should continue. If they ended in agreement, tripartite talks would follow. These developments would have come to nought, he said, if Foreign Secretary Lloyd, after informing his colleagues about the Paris talks, had announced that the Cabinet was not in agreement. The British government, he said, felt that this "new approach" was very encouraging and approved this procedure. Accordingly, the Ambassador was authorized to say that, provided the topics touched on in the Paris conversations to which the British note of December 23, 1958 had referred were covered, the British government "do not exclude" the "transfer" of its sovereignty over that part of "the island outside the British bases". Averoff-Tossizza's verbal reaction to this oral communication was more or less similar to his previous reaction when Sir Roger had communicated to him the British note of December 23. Though he acknowledged that this verbal message was somewhat more positive than the earlier note, he observed that it was still hedged with reservations, and this did not encourage him. At any rate the Greek government, he told Sir Roger, was continuing its efforts with the Turks, because of the gravity of the matter, and it would see in the end what these talks would yield, if they were successful. Sir Roger affirmed with insistence that his government was sincere and that it wished to help in finding a solution. It was evident that even if it wished to frustrate a solution on which Greece and Turkey had reached agreement, it would be unable to do so. Evidently aware of what AveroffTossizza had told Vergin on December 26, he remarked further that Britain would never say "No", but would say "Yes, but..." and that it trembled over the "but" because the agreement with the Turks would not satisfy anyone 100 per cent. Averoff-Tossizza replied that he had no illusions about this but his government was doing its best, being ready for reasonable concessions but also for chaos if this were again to emerge. Sir Roger, however, insisted on his view, saying that it would be enough for the Greeks and Turks to agree for a settlement of the Cyprus question to be achieved.

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The views of the Cyprus Ethnarch, then still in New York, on the setting up of an independent Cyprus are revealed at this point in a note of January 1,1959, from the head of the Permanent Greek Mission to the United Nations, who, acting on Athens instructions, had had an extremely long conversation with Makarios on certain fundamental points concerning the practical possibilities of implementing the guaranteed independence of Cyprus the Ethnarch had proposed. 7 Summing up the Ethnarch's views on these matters as faithfully as he could interpret them, the diplomat wrote that Makarios believed that a precondition for any possible exchange of ideas with the British and the Turks on the content of the "independence plan" was the acceptance of this plan, at least as a basis for discussion. The meaning of such an acceptance would be that the British-Turkish side had dropped partition as a solution. In other words, dropping of partition was to be a precondition for any exchange of thoughts on the Cyprus problem. After that it would be possible to discuss the opponents' proposals, making reasonable concessions. In this connection, Makarios said that he himself had not studied in detail the political and administrative content of the proposed "regime of independence of Cyprus" because he regarded this as premature, so long as the acceptance of the idea of independence had not yet ripened on the other side. At any rate, for some time he had carefully studied certain basic points of the plan. On these, his thoughts had crystallized approximately as followed: With regard to safeguards for ensuring the independence of the new state, Makarios himself was aware that the UN guarantee he had proposed — with no change in this regime possible without the UN General Assembly's approval — would not be sufficient for the opponents. Therefore, because the proposal for Cypriot independence was sincere and aimed at ensuring under the current difficult circumstances a regime of free life for the Cypriot people, Makarios would consent to further safeguards, to the extent, of course, that Turkish or British insistence rendered such additional safeguards necessary. Accordingly, he would agree that on the international level, the independence of the island should be recognized and safeguarded by an international treaty. The application of such a treaty might be placed under UN supervision for further security. But on the internal level, too, he would consent to safeguards being built ' Three originals were made of the relevant documents, one for the Greek Foreign Ministry; the second delivered to Makarios; the third was kept at the Greek UN Mission. Makarios refused to affix his signature to the relevant documents.

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into the Cyprus Constitution, so that the change of certain fundamental provisions of the Constitution (independence, form of regime, etc.) should be impossible without the explicit consent of both the Greek and the Turkish population of Cyprus. As for the internal structure of the Cypriot state, it would be, in Makarios' view, composite, namely, unitary in whatever concerned general affairs, and communally autonomous in whatever concerned religious, educational, cultural, etc. life and activities of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. From the outset, the Cyprus Ethnarch had accepted the above administrative autonomy expressed in the Communal Chambers, for which the Macmillan plan also provided. The Constitution would also define and safeguard the Turkish minority's participation in the exercise of political and administrative powers. So long as the theory of the two communities which the Turks put forward as against the majorityminority theory of the Greeks, which they opposed and feared, had already been accepted on the level of community life, it could also be accepted on the level of the island's political and administrative organization, if the real fact that the Greek community was larger than the Turkish community was not done away with. For even with the best of wills, there could be no equality of representation and participation. Such equality would in fact constitute an intolerable inequity. However, it would be possible to define through the Constitution a ratio satisfactory to the Turkish Cypriots, of up to thirty per cent, for their permanent participation in the island's government and the administration. Many other special problems could be solved in the same spirit. Thus, if as was reasonable, the President of Cyprus was to be a Greek, it was possible to set down that the Vice-President would always be a Turk. And, for instance, the composition of some sort of auxiliary police force for security which the Cypriot state should have at its disposal, would, perforce, be Greek-Turkish. But here, too, the ratio of participation would be set down at a reasonable level by common agreement. On the other hand, Makarios did not believe the establishment of a federal state was either easy or desirable. It presupposed a geographical division of the population which, as matters stood, was unachievable without the imposition of further suffering on the Cypriot population. Moreover, it would cause administrative anomaly and confusion. All in all, the Ethnarch aimed at securing the sincere cooperation of the Turkish Cypriots with their Greek compatriots. Beyond the above concessions on the level of organizing a free Cypriot state, he desired to restore full confidence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. He viewed

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with optimism the fact that the aforementioned politico-administrative structures, which a realistic confrontation of the present international situation imposed, did not basically change reality in Cyprus. This island remained Greek and would be kept Greek as a natural reserve in the indivisible course of history toward the future. In response to Averoff-Tossizza's request for the Cyprus Ethnarch's opinion on certain points the Turks had made, Makarios categorically rejected, as the Greek government had done, any cession of even a small enclave of Cyprus to Turkey. The Ethnarch also believed that mention of a federal Greek-Turkish composition of the state in Article 1 of the Constitution should be avoided, though he did not exclude the basis of the two communities and thought the matter should be studied and negotiated. The Turkish proposal for military and internal security forces of not more than 3,000 men with a 50-50 Greek-Turkish composition of these forces was subject to further negotiations to ensure a better proposal. With regard to the internal security forces, however, the 50-50 ratio was unacceptable. Matters likewise requiring further negotiation were the proposed ratio of 70-30 between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the unitary House of Representatives and the election of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot representatives by the two communities acting as separate electoral bodies. Without breaking up the fundamental unity of the Cypriot electoral body, a way, he thought, should be found to cover the fears of the Turkish Cypriots lest the Greek Cypriots, finally, elect the Turkish Cypriots they wanted. The principle of unanimity of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Ministers and of the Greek Cypriot President and Turkish Cypriot VicePresident in foreign policy and security decision-making was acceptable to the Ethnarch only in matters of national defense and matters of foreign policy related to national defense. He did not, on the other hand, believe that the veto was justified in matters of secondary importance in foreign policy. With regard to the proposal that possible disagreements on other matters be resolved by an arbitral court composed of one Greek, one Turk, and one Swiss, as President, Makarios' view was that the acceptance of this proposal depended on the court's composition and powers. He did not view sympathetically the idea of a foreign arbitrator and would prefer an exclusively Greek-Turkish court. This matter was one for further negotiation. On the other hand, the Cyprus Ethnarch agreed that the President of Cyprus should be a Greek Cypriot and the Vice-President a Turkish Cypriot; that the numbers of Ministers in the Council should be either

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six or five Greek Cypriots and three or two Turkish Cypriots, though he also thought that a ratio of seven Greek Cypriots to three Turkish Cypriots should be sought. He also accepted the Turkish proposal that the two Communal Chambers, in addition to their more general powers over their respective communities, should have the right to tax their own members for community expenditures.

C. THE SECOND ROUND OF GREEK-TURKISH NEGOTIATIONS

In preparation of a second round of negotiations with the Turkish government, Ambassador Pesmazoglou, on January 1, 1959, was given new instructions. The Greek government, according to these instructions, quite frankly was unable to discuss the question of Greek and Turkish bases in Cyprus, a matter Zorlu had raised for the first time in his exchanges with Pesmazoglou on December 28 and 29, 1958. If the setting up of such bases was a condition for an agreement, it would be preferable urgently to search how, by means of an interim solution, it might be possible to preserve the improved relations between Greece and Turkey. At any rate, Athens fully realized the need for cooperation between Greece and Turkey. Hence it had made many concessions for fully safeguarding the rights of the Turks of Cyprus and for allaying Turkey's anxiety for its security. These concessions, however, should not exceed certain limits because the result might be a useless solution, if the Greek Cypriots did not accept it, and the creation of a tragicomical and most complicated regime which would be unable to function. The Greek views aimed at covering these matters and at the same time at meeting the just demands of the Turkish Cypriots and of Turkey. In the Greek view, according to these new instructions, it was preferable to discuss the substance of the main points touched upon. If agreement were reached on these points, it would be possible to find a compromise formulation on Article 1 of the Constitution of Cyprus. The term "Federation", however, created great problems. What really was important, nonetheless, was the substance, and in this the Greek government offered such guarantees that if agreement were reached, it would not be difficult to find a name for the regime. The Greek government accepted the Turkish views about a meeting of the Greek and Turkish Premiers. It believed that such a summit conference would be fruitful and that the Premiers would not take long

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in reaching an agreement, if certain basic points which were still unclear had been clarified beforehand. It then went on to present its views on the points on which differences of views had arisen during the conversations of the two Foreign Ministers in Paris and the two meetings of the Turkish Foreign Minister and Ambassador Pesmazoglou on December 28 and 29, in Ankara, and explained that the remaining points on which there had been a coincidence of views held good as they were. With regard to the Turkish view that the Communal Chambers should have the authority to impose taxes and levies, the Greek government, desiring to accomodate the Turkish government, accepted this proposal, in spite of its belief that such a provision would create complex problems of multiple fiscal services. And it made the clarification that the proceeds of these taxes and levies on the purely Greek and Turkish natural and juridical persons would be used for servicing the needs of the unmixed institutions of each community of a religious, social, sports, and municipal administrative character. Moreover, the Greek government expressed its willingness that the veto right should apply also in matters of internal security but only during the first triennial of the proposed republic's independent life. Then, it was also willing to drop its proposal that the arbitral court should be composed of two Greeks, one Turk, and one neutral judge, and to accept the Turkish proposal for a court composed of one Greek, one Turkish, and one neutral judge. Furthermore, in spite of its conviction that a ratio of 70-30 between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the civil service would create problems and harm the administration, if this ratio were maintained in all services, the Greek government, again in order to accomodate the Turkish government, would accept this ratio and hoped to be able to impose it. On the other hand, though the Greek government agreed with the Turkish view that the armed forces of all kinds should not be large, it believed that the limitation of the number of these forces to 3,000 men, as the Turkish government proposed, was excessive. The Greek view was that 5,000-10,000 men was the number desirable for the armed forces, the police and the gendarmerie. Moreover, it considered altogether unacceptable the Turkish proposal for a ratio of 50-50 between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in these forces. In the army itself it was inevitable that the ratio (of 80-20) between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the population should prevail. In the police and gendarmerie, a ratio of 70-30 might be accepted, with great difficulty, formally. To ease the current real situation and enable the new Cyprus regime to start out without dismissals of salary-earners, it would be possible to agree that,

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if the number of permanent Turkish Cypriot policemen and gendarmes who were currently serving was above the ratio of thirty per cent of the total of those who would be used, they should be kept until their natural retirement from the service. The Greek government also desired agreement that during the proposed Greek-Turkish summit meeting no new basic questions should be raised. And since a Constitution included very many details on which endless discussions were likely, it considered it indispensable that it should be agreed from now on that, after the two Premiers had established and approved the basic structure of the new state, they should choose a neutral specialist of great prestige who would be entrusted with the task of drafting the Constitution with the aid of one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot, and with the basic structure agreed upon serving as "terms of reference". Such a procedure would be practical, unimpugnable and impartial. Should agreement finally be reached, it would also be understood that both governments would support it with the British government. For reasons of order and for the purpose of avoiding the contingency of having to face the British government's disagreement and exposing oneself before public opinion, the agreement reached should be communicated to the British government before its release to the press. With the above instructions, Ambassador Pesmazoglou was back in Ankara on January 3, 1959, at about 10:30 a.m., bearing also a personal message from Premier Karamanlis to Premier Menderes. In this message, the Greek Premier expressed his desire that one should reach an immediate result through these negotiations and for that reason accepted Foreign Minister's Zorlu's suggestion for a meeting with the Turkish Premier. He believed, however, that certain differences of view which had arisen during Zorlu's talks with Averoff-Tossizza first had to be clarified. After hastily translating his instructions into French, the Greek envoy met Zorlu at the Foreign Ministry at about noon. He started out by telling the Turkish Foreign Minister about his government's willingness for a summit conference. This news visibly pleased Zorlu. On the other hand, the Turkish Foreign Minister reacted unfavorably when he learned that the Greek government refused to discuss the establishment of Turkish and Greek military bases on Cyprus. Over this point, the discussion became quite lively. Nevertheless, Pesmazoglou once again realized that the Turks were in a hurry to reach agreement. With regard to the matters of bases and of a combined Greek-Turkish headquarters in Cyprus, the Turkish Foreign Minister once again developed the familiar Turkish arguments in their favor. The Greek envoy,

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on his side, explained "how difficult and groundless it was to seek the creation of bases and of a combined command at a moment when, until even yesterday, we found ourselves in full opposition". And he stressed how psychologically dangerous and undesirable such a measure would be for both parties. Zorlu then invoked the fear of communism as a ground for setting up bases in Cyprus. Pesmazoglou said such a contingency was excluded. If Leftism, which was incorrectly confused with Communism, existed in Greece, this was because of the justified dissatisfaction of the Greek people over many matters. And in Cyprus, it was a consequence of the revolutionary bitterness which the Cypriots felt, because they were the only European people who were still under a colonial regime. Zorlu replied that, in spite of all that, one should not exclude any contingency, and he produced a telegram of March 1935 which bore Pesmazoglou's own signature. In this telegram the Greek government requested Turkish aid in planes in order to suppress the revolutionary coup of that year. 8 The Greek envoy responded by saying that so long as Greece and Turkey were allies, both would do the same and, at any rate, the matter was unrelated to the question of bases in Cyprus. Zorlu then invoked the argument that the United States, too, maintained bases in other allied countries, indeed in Britain and Turkey itself. Pesmazoglou, however, reiterated that the Turkish request for a base was psychologically undesirable from the viewpoint of either Greek or Turkish public opinion. The conversation then turned to the question of the characterization of the regime. In this matter, too, the Turkish Foreign Minister appeared to be equally inflexible. His government, he said, could not agree that the concept of federation should be omitted from the proposed Constitution of Cyprus. His government had to face terrible internal difficulties. The Greek Ambassador countered by reminding Zorlu of a statement made two days earlier by the Secretary-General of the Republican People's Party, Kasim Gulek, who had said that if the regime of Cyprus were to change and no partition was carried out, it was not necessary for the plan under study to include the term "Federation", if the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey's security were safeguarded under that plan. But Zorlu also objected to the Greek proposal for entrusting to a foreign constitutional expert the drafting of the detailed constitution. 8 In early March 1935, Eleftherios Venizelos attempted a coup d'etat against the government of Panayotis Tsaldaris. Several Greek naval vessels supported this coup as well as certain Army units in northern Greece. The coup failed. Venizelos first escaped to the Dodecanese, which was at the time under Italian sovereignty, then went to Paris where he died the following year.

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"We ourselves", he said, "can work this out." Pesmazoglou observed that the procedure proposed did not prevent the Greek and Turkish governments from making as many plans as they wished. The two Premiers would settle the Constitution's general outlines while the foreign constitutional expert, assisted by the two Cypriots, would contribute toward rendering the Constitution beyond reproach and unchallengeable by public opinion in both Greece and Turkey as well as among the Cypriot people. At this point, Zorlu confided to the Greek envoy that he did not desire the immediate participation of the Cypriots in drafting their Constitution on the ground that "they could render difficult our work because of their intransigence". Pesmazoglou countered by saying that in essence the Turkish government could appoint any Turkish Cypriot it wished as an assistant and channel its wishes to him through an appropriate person. On this occasion, he once again made clear to Zorlu the Greek position about the characterization of the regime of Cyprus—a position from which his government could not retreat. He added that in accordance with the Greek proposal a foreign constitutional expert would be required, if for no other reason, in order to provide the appropriate characterization of the Cyprus regime in a way that could not be challenged. The discussion of the constitutional plan for Cyprus ended here. Zorlu, who had been taking copious notes of the instructions Pesmazoglou was conveying to him, said he could give no reply until he conferred with Premier Menderes. He also asked Pesmazoglou not to write anything to Athens in the meantime, and told him he would immediately go to Istanbul to meet the Premier and inform him in person that the Greek envoy was bringing him a message from Karamanlis. He promised to keep Pesmazoglou posted and, if necessary, he would place at his disposal a military aircraft, to take him to Istanbul for a meeting with Menderes. Later that afternoon, the Greek envoy received a phone call from the Director of Zorlu's special office who informed him that a military plane would be at his disposal at 8:00 a.m. next day to fly him to Istanbul for this meeting. At this meeting of January 4, 1959 with Premier Menderes, Ambassador Pesmazoglou verbally conveyed Premier Karamanlis' message concerning the proposed summit conference, and very friendly courtesies were exchanged. Menderes declared that the immediate purpose of this summit conference should not be the Cyprus question but, more generally, the whole question of Greek-Turkish relations, on the tightening of which the future of Greece and Turkey to a great extent depended.

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Great progress had taken place in the notion of cooperation since their last meeting, he maintained, and the distrust which had recently existed had lessened. Thus, the two Premiers would be able to confer in a constructive way on the matter of future Greek-Turkish relations—the main subject of interest for Turkey and Greece. Within that framework the solution of the Cyprus question should be sought. For this reason he considered that the two Premiers should include the solution of the Cyprus question in the general examination of questions outstanding between Greece and Turkey, without commitments. Accordingly, the Turkish Premier did not see of what use it would be to define in advance the terms of the conversations between the two Premiers. These, rather, should be left altogether free. Matters such as the military bases, for instance, did not constitute part of the agreement on Cyprus, but a form of cooperation between the two countries. Ambassador Pesmazoglou replied with the known arguments about the need to clear the ground before the two Premiers met. He added that, so that no time should be lost in further trips and exchanges of views, he preferred to enumerate and explain one by one the Greek Premier's views on the results of meetings of Zorlu and Averoff-Tossizza in Paris and of Zorlu and himself in Ankara. From this account, he said, Menderes would realize that except for the issue of bases, no insuperable obstacles separated the Greek from the Turkish views. When the Turkish Premier, at this point, remarked that a difference of views still existed over the ratio of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the armed forces, Pesmazoglou replied that since agreement in principle existed that the number of men in the armed forces, gendarmerie, and police of Cyprus should be quite limited, the difference of views about the ratio of Greeks and Turks in the army was essentially inconsequential. And when Menderes also observed that a difference of views also existed about the extent of the veto right of President and Vice-President and that in this question the Turkish government did not wish that the veto in matters of internal security be limited only to the first triennial of the Republic's life, and the Greek envoy countered by arguing that nothing prevented the Turkish Premier from asking at the summit conference for an extension of this period to three and a half or even four years, and that consequently this matter did not essentially prevent a free discussion, Zorlu intervened. The Turkish government, he said, wanted the veto power in matters of internal security to be maintained in perpetuity. Retorted Pesmazoglou: then, it would no longer be a case

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for free discussion at the summit conference but of a unilateral imposition of Turkish views. The issue of characterizing the exact nature of the Cyprus regime was then the subject of a long contentious discussion. During this exchange, Pesmazoglou defended the solution his government proposed, namely that the foreign constitutional expert to be selected by the two Premiers should be entrusted with finding the appropriate characterization of the island's regime. Finally, it seemed to him that no Turkish objections remained on this issue. Thus, the divergence of Greek and Turkish views was limited to the issue of military bases. The discussion on this matter was laborious and long. Menderes told the Greek envoy that when he spoke of bases, he did not mean bases similar to those set up by Britain or the United States. It would be possible, he believed, to devise a new method for setting up these bases, in a way that would "facilitate us" (the Greek government? the Greek and Turkish governments?) when the question of British bases on the island came up for discussion. Although Pesmazoglou for a moment gave thought to exploring the content of this unclear formulation, he refrained from doing so, on the one hand, in order not to give the impression that the Greek side was inclined in any way to yield on this point, and, on the other hand, because he feared lest he get involved in a discussion of the question of British bases in Cyprus. Believing, nonetheless, that Menderes wished to yield on this point, he proposed that the Turkish government's reply be formulated as follows: "The Turkish government could not yield on the question of bases, but Mr. Menderes, desirous of facilitating the meeting of the two Prime Ministers, would accept setting aside this issue for the time being." Foreign Minister Zorlu, however, at this point again intervened. He declared that such a formula was impossible. Originally, the bases, he said, were an idea of Menderes, which he could not drop. Because, during the course of the discussion, Pesmazoglou realized that the reaction about the bases came from Zorlu rather than from Menderes, he observed that, though he did not have a long experience of diplomatic negotiations, he believed that both his and Zorlu's role were to facilitate, not to render more difficult the discussion, the more so since the Greek opposition to this proposal was derived from a condition Premier Menderes had put forward ex post facto, namely after the two Foreign Ministers had prepared their "Paris sketch" of an agreement. The Turkish Foreign Minister smilingly remarked that he was only

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interpreting the Premier's thoughts, and Menderes, likewise smiling, approved of Zorlu's words. With the discussion thus ended on individual points, Menderes suggested that Pesmazoglou should immediately report to Averoff-Tossizza orally. The Greek Ambassador replied he had no difficulty in doing so. He feared, however, that since he had not been sufficiently persuasive, he would be obliged to bring back a new reply from Athens, eliciting perhaps a counterreply. At any rate he assured the Premier he did not intend to report by wire what had transpired during this second round of exchanges. He would report to the Greek Foreign Minister by means of a personal letter. So that no misunderstanding should occur, he asked the Turkish Premier what exactly did he wish him to convey to Athens. Premier Menderes asked Pesmazoglou to convey to Athens his desire to meet Premier Karamanlis as soon as possible. He envisaged this meeting as taking place in a tranquil place, where the two Premiers could live together for two or three days at the same hotel in order to discuss and solve all problems that were in suspense between their two countries, continuing and completing the work which Venizelos and Atatiirk had begun. He failed to understand why the Greek side was setting terms for this meeting when the Turkish government set no preconditions for its realization. But this would not prevent the two governments from adhering to their views, so long as one side would be unable to persuade the other. Pesmazoglou felt it necessary to observe in this connection that he had been the first to propose a meeting of the two Premiers, in August of the previous year, and that Menderes then had shown no eagerness to receive him and had frustrated any further exploration of the matter. Since then, new events had occurred, such as the unilateral implementation of the Macmillan plan and the NATO and UN discussions. All these rendered a meeting more difficult, if certain matters, on which views diverged, were not cleared up. In conclusion, many compliments were exchanged on both sides. Then Premier Menderes dictated to Ambassador Pesmazoglou his message to Premier Karamanlis, with the request that Foreign Minister AveroffTossizza should kindly convey it to him. In this message, after the opening courtesies, Menderes invited Karamanlis to meet with him as soon as possible. Through a direct contact the two would be able to resolve the questions contained in the remarks of the Greek Premier. The significance they reciprocally attached to a Greek-Turkish rapprochement and

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fraternization was of such a nature as to facilitate the task and allow an agreement. 9 After thanking Menderes for the above message, the Greek Ambassador, nevertheless, expressed doubt, despite the message's content, that the Greek Premier would be so easily persuaded to agree to a meeting. For that reason he would not proceed to setting down any details for the conference. Indeed, he wondered, since matters were so, whether it might not be wiser to seek for an interim solution that would be acceptable to both governments. Zorlu replied that the Macmillan plan constituted such an interim solution and was already being implemented. Pesmazoglou retorted that this plan was no solution at all because, whether the British wished so or not, neither Greece nor the Greeks in Cyprus would cooperate in it, and the unilateral participation of the Turks in it did not constitute implementation. Zorlu replied with generalities to the effect that it would be better to leave aside any discussion of this matter. He saw no possibility or usefulness of an interim solution of the Cyprus problem. In conclusion, the Greek Ambassador expressed regret that Foreign Minister Zorlu would be unable to report anything positive on the Cyprus question when he appeared next day before the Grand National Assembly which would discuss his ministry's budget. Zorlu responded by saying he had taken appropriate measures in time and had managed to postpone the debate on his Ministry's budget until after the debate of the budgets of the Ministries of the Interior and of Defense. Thus the second round of Greek-Turkish discussions came to an end. Commenting on this round, Pesmazoglou informed Averoff-Tossizza that his impression was that the inflexibility of the Turkish stand was due less to Premier Menderes than to Foreign Secretary Zorlu. Despite all that had been said about the paternity of the idea of bases, he wondered whether this idea had not originated in the mind, not of Menderes, but of Zorlu. He recalled, in this connection, that when Ambassador Vergin, some time ago, had first spoken to him about bases, he had told him that this was an idea of the Foreign Minister. Pesmazoglou also noted that the Turks had given no concrete answer to the specific remarks of Premier Karamanlis. However, he felt that no insuperable obstacles 9

The French text reads: "II invite Mr. Karamanlis de se rencontrer avec lui le plus vite possible et c'est par un contact direct qu'ils peuvent résoudre les questions comprises dans les remarques du Premier Ministre grec. L'importance qu'ils attachent réciproquement au rapprochement et à la fraternization gréco-turque est de nature à faciliter la tâche et permettre un accord."

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would be met in the matters to which these remarks referred. Furthermore, he thought domestic reasons might largely account for the Turks' insistence on certain outwardly impressive demands in the Cyprus question. Finally, the Turkish shift of emphasis to the entire question of GreekTurkish relations, he suggested, could be interpreted merely as an effort to persuade the Greek government that the Greek concessions in the Cyprus question were of minor importance, if an all-embracing cooperation between Greece and Turkey were to be secured. On the other hand, this new emphasis could be genuine, not motivated by bargaining purposes. Together with the haste the Turkish officials were showing in wanting a summit conference and an agreement, this emphasis on the importance of Greek-Turkish relations could be dictated by Turkey's entire position in the Near and Middle East.

D. TOWARD A THIRD ROUND OF GREEK-TURKISH NEGOTIATIONS

Responding on January 7, 1959 to Pesmazoglou's report on the second round of Greek-Turkish negotiations, Averoff-Tossizza sent him new instructions for the further handling of these exchanges. In these instructions, he asked the Greek envoy to inform Zorlu, always in the spirit of a desire for reaching an accord, that he had conveyed to Premier Karamanlis the content of Pesmazoglou's recent talks with Zorlu and Menderes. The Greek Premier, thanking the Turkish Premier for his message, assured him that the warm expressions he had used about Greek-Turkish brotherhood and cooperation deeply gratified him because they precisely rendered his own feelings and beliefs on the matter. Premier Karamanlis continued to be of the opinion that meeting a statesman such as Menderes could be useful. This meeting, however, especially after the hopes the new atmosphere had engendered, should lead absolutely to full agreement. On the other hand, a meeting of the two Premiers without the removal of areas of disagreement was likely to be dangerous. The spectacular shattering of hopes almost always caused a great exacerbation of the situation. Placing the Cyprus problem in the broader framework of Greek-Turkish relations, as Menderes indicated, was, Karamanlis believed, absolutely reasonable and based on a sweeping political conception of the situation. So long as the two countries had common basic interests and thorny problems did not separate them, the establishment of close Greek-Turkish relations met with no difficulties. Conversely, the

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suspense of the Cyprus problem rendered such a development more difficult if it did not indeed lead to the opposite result. If, then, Cyprus was placed in the broader framework of most important Greek-Turkish interests, then it was practically the only question which had to be settled. However, after the recent talks of the Greek Ambassador in Ankara and Istanbul, a rapprochement of views on topics regarded as basic did not seem to have occurred, particularly in matters to which a meeting of the Premiers could give no compromise solution. For example, the ex post facto terms about Greek and Turkish bases or a Greek-Turkish headquarters in Cyprus were, unfortunately, not of a nature to be reasonably resolved by compromise. The Greek Premier, according to these new instructions to Pesmazoglou, attached a many-sided importance to the Cyprus question and was dealing with it in a spirit of absolute good will. With the sole aim of meeting all basic Turkish views, he had made many important concessions. His proposal that a neutral jurist of great international prestige should draft the Constitution of Cyprus in a framework to be agreed upon, aimed at the use, on the one hand, of the only practical modus operandi and, on the other hand, of the only method which public opinion in both countries would be unable to challenge. The impression, thus, was created in Athens that despite many and substantial concessions made to Ankara, the Turkish government, taking into account internal reactions in Turkey, did not take into account that certain limits existed beyond which the Greek government could not go, because negative reactions in Greece and even more negative reactions in Cyprus would occur. The statements of Premier Menderes and Foreign Minister Zorlu to the effect that, should disagreement occur on the solution now under discussion, no other interim solution would be possible, except the Macmillan plan, strengthened further this impression. The Turkish government, however, was aware that the Macmillan plan was not only unacceptable to the Greek side but would lead directly to a serious aggravation of the state of affairs in Cyprus. As a result, the favorable atmosphere created between the two countries would be dissipated. Under these circumstances, the Greek Foreign Minister at least, who was aware of his responsibility and was deeply convinced of the necessity for Greek-Turkish friendship, as his deeds had demonstrated for many years, would regret to have to choose between a final solution of the Cyprus problem which, in his opinion would be bad, and an interim solution which would be based on the Macmillan plan. He believed it

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was his duty to inform the Turkish Foreign Minister that, in that case, the advice he would have to give would be negative to both alternatives. With the same frankness, however, the Greek Foreign Minister wanted to assure his Turkish colleague that he would do all in his power so that this critical point should not be reached. Besides, his impression was that the differences of views had been reduced to a few points only, though these were important points. He hoped, on the other hand, that the Turkish Foreign Minister already was convinced that the Greek proposals were not of a nature to be of advantage to Greece but aimed solely at arriving at a practical, viable solution. Followed the text of a message from Premier Karamanlis which Pesmazoglou was to convey to Premier Menderes. In this message, Karamanlis wrote that the contacts between the two governments had been useful and had created conditions which allowed hope that a definitive result would be possible. Nonetheless, since some time he had the impression of a certain stagnation, not to say of a step backwards. In all sincerity, he assured Menderes that he ardently desired that an understanding should be reached so that a period of constructive cooperation "between our two countries" might be inaugurated. For a personal meeting to contribute to this end, however, he believed that certain points, "on which our opinions differ", should be clarified. Once these divergencies were eliminated, he would be very happy to meet the Turkish Premier as soon as possible so that the foundations of a new era in Greek-Turkish friendship and cooperation might be laid. In a covering letter, likewise of January 7, Averoff-Tossizza congratulated Pesmazoglou for his handling of the negotiations. He noted, however, that the insistence of Menderes and Zorlu over the issue of bases did not help matters. But on this issue not the slightest retreat was conceivable. He could not know whether the Turks were putting forward these demands with such insistence and ex post facto for internal reasons or tactical purposes, as the Turkish side elsewhere had allowed him to understand. He personally suspected they were doing so at the suggestion of the British, for whom this matter was of interest, in order to cover their fears about a possible future hostile development of the Cypriot state. But, regardless of the causes for this Turkish stand, one could not yield. Therefore the decision had been taken to give a reply which revealed a desire for reaching agreement, but also inflexibility over the few substantive points on which no agreement had been reached. Thus, while indicating the true Greek intentions, one would see whether or not the Turks were willing to yield. Pesmazoglou would find that Zorlu was

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prepared for the Greek intentions, because Averoff-Tossizza had spoken to Ambassador Vergin, at a reception, about the Greek government's lively desire to reach an understanding but also about its discouragement because of Turkish insistence on certain essential subjects. Expressing, then, confidence that Pesmazoglou would handle matters in the most appropriate way, always with the objective of achieving a satisfactory result, Averoff-Tossizza then went on to give him certain additional thoughts about handling the negotiations. So that the Turks should not get the impression that the Greek side demanded them to yield, Pesmazoglou, as though expressing a personal opinion, should insist on the particular point of his instructions in which the Greek government said that it had made many concessions. To support this argument he should present various examples of such concessions — the form of the regime in which the existence of the two communities was recognized, and the main lines proposed under the "Paris sketch". He should also emphasize, as a concession of great interest that offered many favorable possibilities to the Turkish side, the proposal to have a neutral constitutional expert draft the Constitution of Cyprus. With regard to the issue of the military bases, Pesmazoglou should not only repeat the familiar arguments that such bases would lead to a monstrous territorial fragmentation of the island and complicate matters from the point of view of administration, but also point out that the existence of Greek and Turkish enclaves in Cyprus as well as the presence there of Greek and Turkish troops would provoke the most fanatical elements on the island either to insist on their older conceptions or to provoke incidents with a resultant disturbance of the cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots — a cooperation which would be all the more necessary at the outset when relations between the two ethnic groups were still tense. Averoff-Tossizza also asked Pesmazoglou to exploit particularly the point in his instructions that emphasized that Greece did not ask anything for its own advantage and that its proposals aimed merely at creating a practical and viable regime and at facilitating the acceptance of a solution of the Cyprus problem. In this connection, the Ambassador could invoke the very many points on which agreement had been reached, in order to demonstrate that Greece and the Greeks of Cyprus were getting nothing, while Turkey, on the contrary, was getting a great deal, both from the viewpoint of security and of privileged treatment of the Turkish Cypriots. These facts eloquently spoke of themselves. On the

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other hand, he should stress that there were certain questions which, the Greeks believed, would either inflict daily wounds on the new regime of Cyprus or prevent the very birth of the new state. For those reasons, the Greek government was unable to yield on these matters. Averoff-Tossizza wrote that he really believed that the Greek government had yielded only where it had to yield objectively. However, since Pesmazoglou's Turkish conferees were somewhat "egopathic" characters, it was desirable for the Greek side to stress that it had yielded plenty, while they had not. Of course, he added, the Turks' attitude was not determined only by "egopathy" but, he believed, almost exclusively by the need of facing internal difficulties. However, the Greek government, on its side, could not satisfy them on the familiar basic points of disagreement because of these internal Turkish difficulties. Besides, the Turks should also take into account difficulties of theirs of a different, external kind. The situation in the Near and Middle East and especially close to Turkey was not at all good. Some maintained that a revolution might soon occur in Iran. Afghanistan was increasingly infiltrated and, not to mention the situation in Iraq, the Kurds were a source of anxiety. He was aware, of course, of the strong support Turkey would get at any rate and that Turkish leaders did not feel that their country was on the verge of collapsing. However, it was impossible for them to have no anxieties at all. All these were factors that would press them toward of a rapprochement. Generally, Averoff-Tossizza advised Pesmazoglou, his manner should be sincere, persuasive, warm but inflexible. He should create the impression, without saying so clearly, that the Greek government faced the possibility of breaking off the negotiations. For this reason, if the Turkish side did not immediately invite Pesmazoglou next day to present his reply, he should not bother them. He, personally, believed that the Turks would not break off the talks and that some conclusion would be reached. Averoff-Tossizza, finally, asked Pesmazoglou to do his best so that his meetings with the Turkish officials should not become public knowledge. Otherwise, reporters would immediately raise pressing questions, with optimism perhaps, or, in the case of silence, pessimism aroused. Pesmazoglou should urge this point also upon Zorlu and ask for secrecy.

X GREEK-TURKISH SUMMIT AGREEMENT

A. THE OUTLOOK FROM GRIVAS' VANTAGE POINT

While the ultra-secret top-level Greek-Turkish negotiations were going on with even the top Cyprus experts of the Greek Foreign Ministry kept in the dark about these developments, at least until mid-January 1959, Grivas in Cyprus, though not altogether unaware that certain GreekTurkish exchanges were occurring, was directing his attention toward organizing the Greek Cypriots for a protracted conflict. He sought to promote the establishment of an information and propaganda bureau; to activate the work of the Political Committee which was to handle passive resistance; and to create an overt and legal political organization, which, eventually transforming itself into a political party, might deal with Cypriot problems after peace had been reestablished on the island, represent the Greek Cypriots in case of negotiations, and prevent chaos which the communists might exploit. However, for these plans he found scant encouragement on the part of Consul Frydas and the Cyprus Ethnarch, with "Isaakios", informing him that these were matters for the Ethnarch to decide. As a result, he sensed that something was "cooking". 1 A letter of January 11 from "Isaakios" who gave him new information about the course of Greek-Turkish talks over the Cyprus question confirmed his suspicions. These talks, "Isaakios" wrote, were progressing more than it appeared on the surface. A certain coincidence of views was occurring, with independence as a basis for a solution; with a special status and privileges accorded to the Turkish Cypriots, to allow them to participate in the government; and with equal friendship toward Greece and Turkey, but with a rather predominant position for the Greek Cypriots. The British would keep military bases on the island under full sovereignty. Nonetheless, quite a few differences of views remained. The 1

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 345-348.

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British seemed worried at the signs of a sincere and full Greek-Turkish rapprochement. He could not foresee the outcome. At any rate, he believed that if Greece and Turkey were to reach an agreement and support it, Britain would be unable to oppose it. Both the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, he added, had agreed to keep absolute secrecy on the progress of their talks until an agreement in principle was reached.2 Under these circumstances, Grivas' main sources of information on Cyprus developments at this point were the mass media. From these media he learned that Makarios, on his return to Athens from New York on January 15, had once again stated that the Macmillan plan should be dropped, even though the British government insisted on its implementation; 3 that on January 18, Averoff-Tossizza and Zorlu had met in Paris "in an atmosphere of optimism"; that Zorlu has stated that it was premature to talk about the probable achievement of an accord and that Averoff-Tossizza had said he was less optimistic than Zorlu on this matter, though both stated that their talks had been useful. 4 From the mass media too, Grivas learned that the Greek Foreign Minister, on his return to Athens, had said that there was a fifty-fifty chance of success and that the exchanges would continue through the diplomatic channel; that, on January 27, Makarios told a BBC correspondent he was rather optimistic about the possibility of a solution for the Cyprus question.5 On the other hand, from the same public sources, Grivas learned on January 29 that a Foreign Office spokesman had said that Britain would continue the implementation of the Macmillan plan and that the Bishop of Kition, on his return to Cyprus, had asserted that the British were trying to torpedo any efforts aiming at a Greek-Turkish rapprochement. 6 It is thus not surprising that Grivas should have been disturbed at being kept more or less in the dark. In a letter of January 19 to the Bishop of Kition, he bitterly complained about the lack of coordination between the political and military leaders. "It is not possible", he wrote, "for

2

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 351-352. Ibid., p. 352. Vima, January 16, 1959. 4 Ibid., January 24, 1959. (Grivas Memoirs, p. 352.) 5 Grivas Memoirs, p. 352. In an interview of January 31, 1959 with the Cyprus newspaper Eleftheria, Makarios reiterated his opposition to the Macmillan plan and his desire for an independent Cyprus. He also said that the Turkish government had realized that partition could not be achieved. A condominium or bases in Cyprus for Turkey were nondiscussable matters. If Turkey did not show greater understanding, he saw no reason for a resumption of the Greek-Turkish talks. Vima, February 1, 1959. • Grivas Memoirs, p. 352. *

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the military leadership to be ignorant of where diplomacy is leading us." On the British side he sensed an effort to end the struggle, without any guarantees. He also realized that Athens, too, wanted the struggle to cease. Most categorically he declared, however, that he would never cease this struggle, unless a final decision were taken that would satisfy Greek aspirations, be acceptable to the Cypriots, and also provide for a general amnesty and safeguards against ill-treatment of EOKA fighters. Although "Isaakios" and company were, in his view, not playing it straight with him in the matter of sending him material, he was in a position to continue his struggle for a very long period of time, as long as he was strengthened with adequate cadres. "If Athens is weary of discussing the Cyprus question, we are not weary of fighting with our weapons and soul." 7 Shortly after Grivas had to move from one hideout to another — a rather complicated operation. Then, once settled down in his new underground quarters, he learned from Cyprus Radio that Premiers Karamanlis and Menderes were meeting in ZUrich; that on February 11, 1959 they had reached agreement to set up Cyprus as an independent state; and that both were returning to their respective capitals while their Foreign Ministers were flying to London to confer with their British colleague over the Cyprus question.8 What had happened meanwhile? How had this come about? What was the content of this agreement?

B. HESITANT AGREEMENT FOR A SUMMIT CONFERENCE

In a letter of January 9, 1959, Ambassador Pesmazoglou, acknowledging receipt of the Greek Foreign Minister's letter and new instructions of January 7, informed him that from friendly contacts with certain Turkish Opposition circles, he had learned that the Opposition intended most vehemently to oppose any agreement of the Menderes government on Cyprus, regardless of how satisfactory that agreement might be for Turkey, because it wanted to smash the dictatorship Menderes was seeking to impose, and it regarded the solution of the Cyprus problem without the Opposition's participation as a dictatorial attempt. The Opposition's inflexibility, Pesmazoglou had been told, was due to the intention to 7 8

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 348-349. Ibid., pp. 356-357, and 374.

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force the government to reach an advance understanding with Ismet tnonu, leader of the Republican People's Party, on the matter. In the belief that one should avoid as much as possible the Opposition's reaction, especially since the Menderes government's position was become daily more insecure, Pesmazoglou wondered whether it might be useful to inform the U.S. Ambassador in Ankara, Fletcher Warren, of this attitude of the Opposition, letting him understand that it might not be inexpedient for him to proceed on his own initiative and advise Menderes of this attitude, so that the latter might be facilitated in his negotiations with the Greek government. Unless he received contrary instructions by the next diplomatic pouch from Athens, he would do so. On the other hand, Pesmazoglou also intended to meet Inonu, not before the lapse of a week, however, during which time new developments might have occurred. Finally, Pesmazoglou informed Averoff-Tossizza that the editor of the Turkish newspaper Vatan was to arrive in Athens on January 15 and had asked him to arrange meetings with the Greek Foreign Minister and the Premier. 9 In this letter of January 9, Pesmazoglou also reported that he had called on British Ambassador Sir Ronald Burrows 10 who bad just returned from a long conference with Foreign Minister Zorlu. The Greek government was making every effort to come to an understanding with Turkey, Pesmazoglou told Sir Ronald, without, however, mentioning on what basis. The British Ambassador inquired whether the exchanges would continue through the diplomatic channel or whether he thought it preferable for them to take place through a conference of the two Premiers. The Greek Ambassador replied that in his estimation, the summit conference would really be useful if certain differences of views were clarified, so as to ensure, to the degree this was humanly possible, that such a conference would not result in disagreement. Under the current circumstances, such an outcome would be extremely dangerous. Then, on January 10, Ambassador Pesmazoglou had a long talk with Foreign Minister Zorlu. At first, Zorlu seemed wholly to reject the position Pesmazoglou had taken on the basis of his instructions, namely that substantial agreement on points of difference should precede a 8 The editor of Vatan, Ahmet Emin Yalman, after his stay in Athens, sent to Greek journalists an appeal, saying that Greece and Turkey, because of geopolitical factors and historic developments, had a common destiny either to cooperate as good neighbors, close friends, faithful allies or to commit joint suicide. Vima, January 18, 1959. 10 Sir Ronald Burrows had replaced Sir James Bowker in Ankara in summer 1958.

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conference of the two Premiers. However, after a long discussion, he agreed to convey the Greek views to Premier Menderes and give a reply. Toward this meeting's end, a spirit of cooperation was created between the two in order to bring about the proposed summit conference. Zorlu said that probably Pesmazoglou would have to meet President Bayar, whose intransigence created difficulties. This meeting, in Pesmazoglou's view, would be decisive. Should a breakdown of the negotiations seem imminent, he outlined to Averoff-Tossizza in his report on this talk, the text of the statement he might have to make in order to avert such a breakdown. At this important meeting of January 10, Pesmazoglou, before reading to the Turkish Foreign Minister his instructions, thought it would be useful to tell him that from his repeated personal contacts in Athens he had formed the impression that his government was very deeply disappointed because, despite its repeated concessions, the Turkish government seemed to take into account only its own difficulties and not at all those the Greek government would have to face. In spite of its disappointment, his government, he said further, had accepted all the more general views of Premier Menderes and shared them. However, he explained the reasons why it could accept no meeting before prior agreement. When Zorlu reacted in a most lively manner to the text of the Greek instructions read to him, Pesmazoglou enumerated the Greek concessions, stressing that the Turkish side had made none. And when Zorlu contradicted him on this latter point and said that the Turkish side had accepted the institution of a unitary House of Representatives and the idea itself of independence for Cyprus, which, in his view, would create many difficulties, the Greek envoy stressed that the idea of independence constituted a Greek rather than a Turkish concession. Indeed, he argued, if the Cyprus question were to remain in suspense, he had no doubt at all that one day the island would become Greek. Undoubtedly, however, the price of this development would be heavy for the relations between Greece and Turkey. For that reason the Greek government had retreated, accepting independence as a solution of the Cyprus problem. At any rate, he added, the important point now was how to persuade the two Premiers to meet under conditions which would be of benefit for further understanding. On his side, Zorlu again put forward the question of bases which, he stressed to Pesmazoglou, Premier Menderes had raised. Why was the Greek government not disposed even to discuss this matter? Pesmazoglou, avoiding any answer to this question, explained that it

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was natural that, after the London Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus (August 29-September 6, 1955),11 his government feared the consequences of a conference's failure. He stressed, too, that since he was accredited to his — Zorlu's — country, he tried as much as possible to interpret and speak in favor of the Turkish views to his own government and hoped that Zorlu, too, would exert a similar effort in order to interpret the Greek views to his own government. Zorlu then confided to Pesmazoglou that he himself had suffered much in the Grand National Assembly's secret session, during which Cyprus had been debated. He also had to face the intransigence of President Bayar, who a few days earlier, after Zorlu's most recent statement on Cyprus, had remonstrated with Premier Menderes about this statement's conciliatory tone. Reverting to the main point, the Greek envoy told the Turkish Foreign Minister that greater efforts should be exerted and therefore the Turkish government should accept that "the questions which separate us are grave and that before their clarification the meeting of the Premiers is not expedient". Finally, after an hour-long discussion, Zorlu agreed to make another effort, though without much hope, to persuade Premier Menderes. President Bayar, too, would have to be persuaded, for a phobia of losing his popularity had seized him. As soon as he had a reply from his Premier, he added, he would meet the Greek envoy again. The evening of that same day, at about 10:00 p.m., Foreign Minister Zorlu phoned to inquire whether the Greek Ambassador could meet him immediately. Pesmazoglou, however, having received no instructions from Athens, excused himself by saying he was already in bed and indisposed. The two met again on January 11, at 9:00 a.m. During this meeting of January 11, Zorlu started out by enumerating the tremendous, as he said, difficulties he faced in the effort he was making. Nonetheless, his Premier continued to believe that if he met with Premier Karamanlis, a solution could be found to all matters that remained in suspense between the two governments. Sensing Zorlu's yielding mood, Pesmazoglou replied that he regarded it his duty to warn him that his government's decision had already been taken and it would serve no purpose to repeat to him what he had already said on the matter under consideration. Zorlu then told him that, if finally the Greek Premier did not wish to change his mind, a meeting between himself and Averoff-Tossizza in u

Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 158-161.

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Paris, on the occasion of the session there of OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation), would easily smooth out the way for a summit conference. He then read to the Greek Ambassador the text of a message Premier Menderes was sending to Premier Karamanlis. In this message to the Greek Premier, Menderes wrote that he had carefully studied Karamanlis' message which Pesmazoglou had conveyed to him. And he was happy to see that the climate necessary for a settlement of the Cyprus problem seemed about to be realized. In particular he wished to emphasize two ideas contained in the Greek Premier's message which were of capital importance for the final success "of our efforts". The first of these ideas mentioned the need to profit without loss of time of the currently favorable atmosphere in "our respective positions", and the second was related to the utility of placing the solution of the Cyprus problem in the framework of a general amelioration of the relations between "our two countries". In his estimation, there was no doubt that the talks which had recently taken place between the two Foreign Ministers had been of an incontestable usefulness for the success of the efforts made for settling the Cyprus problem. Indeed, with pleasure he noted that the views of the two parties on numerous aspects of the problem had become much closer. That was why he believed that it would be possible to reach a settlement of the Cyprus problem by mutually giving proof of courage and good faith. The best way to act, it seemed to him, was to have contacts on a very high level. Despite the qualities of their respective ambassadors, it was evident that the contacts taking place through them could not offer the same degree of efficacity as those which took place between responsible political personalities. Thus he had no doubt that one of the main reasons for the progress which had occurred after the recent Paris talks was that these contacts had taken place directly between the Foreign Ministers and not on the ambassadorial level. Because he was sure that Premier Karamanlis attributed to Greek-Turkish relations and to the settlement of the Cyprus problem the same importance the Turkish government did, it seemed to him necessary for a direct contact to take place between the two Premiers on this matter. He believed that the Greek Premier would agree with him that this problem would have the greatest chances of settlement by a direct intervention of both. Besides, he was sure that the Greek Premier, like himself, considered it a duty toward his people to find a solution to the problem and to organize, to this end, a meeting which, he hoped, would lead to the desired result and, in the contrary case, could be surrounded by all necessary precautions in order to eliminate any adverse effects. What, indeed, was more natural than a

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meeting of the two chiefs of government who wished to find a solution to a problem which divided their peoples? If, nonetheless, the Greek Premier had any hesitations over this matter, he would like then to suggest that the two Foreign Ministers meet as soon as possible, for example, that same week in Paris, for the purpose of preparing the ground "for our own reunion". In conclusion, Menderes asked Karamanlis for his views on this suggestion as soon as possible. After handing this message to Pesmazoglou, Foreign Minister Zorlu repeated that if he were to meet his Greek colleague, he would manage to persuade him that the two Premiers should meet without any further loss of time. The Greek envoy appeared reserved. During the last days, he said, he had studied anew the points his government wished to clarify before the proposed conference of the two Premiers and wondered whether the Turkish government realized the consequences of the new concessions it was seeking from the Greek government. Aside from the unacceptable question of bases, the Turkish government's demand, for example, for a 50-50 ratio of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the security forces could not even be discussed, because it would not result in the granting of further safeguards in favor of the Turkish minority but would place a very great majority of the island's inhabitants under the power of a small minority. Even if one took into account not the 3,000 men the Turkish side proposed for these forces but the lowest figure of 5,000 the Greek side counterproposed, the gendarmerie and police would include at least 2,500 men — which meant one policeman or one gendarme per 200 inhabitants. As a result, most regions of the island inhabited by a large majority would be placed under an unmixed Turkish security force. Did he s;ncerely believe it was possible to discuss such an eventuality? The Turkish Foreign Minister countered with generalities, mentioning the need for mutual confidence and cooperation. Finally he said it was possible for his government to accept an increase in the number of security forces, whereupon Pesmazoglou replied that, whereas it has been the Turkish side which had asked for a limitation in the number of the armed forces, it was now obliged to ask for an increase in size, because the iron logic of numbers had overturned its other arguments. Pesmazoglou added that by mentioning the above example, he wanted to demonstrate how right the Greek government was in insisting that the differences of views be liquidated first, before any meeting of the two Premiers took place. For the Turkish government itself had not fully estimated the consequences of the demands it was putting forward.

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This meeting between Foreign Minister Zorlu and Ambassador Pesmazoglou ended at this point. In the latter's opinion, a predisoposition toward some retreat existed and most probably would become manifest at the proposed meeting of the two Foreign Ministers. In Athens, on January 13, Premier Karamanlis, who had received Menderes' message also through Ambassador Vergin the day before, thanked the Turkish Premier for his message and said that in general he regarded it useful to meet with him. The relaxation in tension and the good climate which had been created had indeed aroused expectations that a solution was round the corner, Karamanlis told Vergin. A summit meeting would intensify these expectations. However, were no settlement achieved, confusion would ensure in Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, and the situation might get out of hand and become very dangerous. So long as certain points then still existed upon which there had been no rapprochement, it was very likely that the conference would cause harm. The present relaxation was, hence preferable, and all preparations should be made so that the conference would end in success. Accordingly, the Greek Premier, too, thought that a meeting of the two Foreign Ministers would be useful in order to clarify the possibilities of a Premiers' meeting. In this meeting with Ambassador Vergin, Premier Karamanlis very aptly stressed that nothing else than his decision to go ahead, but without creating harm, dictated his attitude. When he made observations on the substance of the issue, he was neither bargaining nor trying to obtain certain benefits. He was merely seeking for an agreement which the Cypriots, too, would be able to accept and which would set up a "workable" regime. If the settlement did not fulfill these two objectives, it would be practically useless. If he was seeking for an agreement, it was exactly because he believed that tranquility and prosperity should be assured for the Cypriots, so that Greece and Turkey might proceed with undivided attention toward a sincere, broader cooperation. With regard to this latter objective, Karamanlis pointed out that, for example, the Common Market posed serious problems for both Greece and Turkey but that if both countries acted in common and in a broad spirit of cooperation, they could achieve a great deal. Ambassador Vergin, who appeared to share fully these views, insisted that the conference of the two Premiers would be fruitful, but seemed satisfied to learn that Premier Karamanlis had agreed that the two Foreign Ministers ought to meet again. A discussion followed about the place and date for the meeting of the two Foreign Ministers. AveroffTossizza, who was present at this meeting between Karamanlis and the

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Turkish Ambassador in Athens, said he would leave it to Zorlu to set the place and date of their meeting, since the OEEC session had been postponed. The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey met in Paris on January 18, 1959. Their relevant public statements after that meeting have been briefly mentioned. Direct documentary evidence about what exactly transpired at this meeting was not available to the author but there were press reports from Athens to the effect that the thorniest problem of all was how to provide Turkey with guarantees against eventual enosis of the island with Greece. Though Ankara reportedly might not insist on getting a Turkish base on the island, it desired recognition in some way of its right to intervene in Cyprus, should it believe that the island's political or juridical status was threatened. 12 Some of the additional difficulties the two negotiating Foreign Ministers encountered during this second Paris meeting of theirs can be adduced, however, from what followed. Premier Karamanlis, as Pesmazoglou informed Zorlu when the latter, on his way back to Ankara, stopped at Elliniko airport outside Athens on January 22, was none too happy about this meeting's outcome. His impression remained that since the first Paris talks, a regression had occurred. More and more there appeared to be basic differences of views about the regime Greece and Turkey were trying to set up in Cyprus. The Greek side was pursuing the setting up of an independent Cyprus that would not become a satellite of Greece. It wanted for Cyprus a regime which would fully safeguard the maintenance of the island's independence; Turkey's security from that direction; and a fair, even privileged position of the Turkish Cypriots in this regime. The Greek side, too, had accepted almost all points which Turkey wanted, though many of these points were unpleasant to the Greek government or evidently would obstruct the functioning of the Cyprus regime. If it assumed this attitude, this was because it eagerly desired the revival of Greek-Turkish cooperation, under the presupposition that a really independent Cypriot state would be created. However, aside from Turkey's 12

Le Monde, January 27, 1959. On January 20, 1959, Averoff-Tossizza had told Cyrus L. Sulzberger that a Cyprus solution was in the offing, and emphasized the tight secrecy of the negotiations. Only four people in the world, he told the journalist, knew about their contents (Menderes, Zorlu, Karamanlis, and himself). He was now apprehensive about whether Grivas would agree to this solution and suggested that Sulzberger secretly get in touch with EOKA's leader in order to explain to him the situation. C. L. Sulzberger, The Last of Giants (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 523-524.

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continued insistence on some of the most difficult points, the Turkish side was raising new questions which gave the impression that it was seeking to create a semi-independent state based on a mechanism which partitioned the population in all sectors. The Turkish side, moreover, now wanted to preclude Cypriot membership in the United Nations. And it opposed the establishment of a NATO base on the island, though it would be to the interest of Cyprus to become a member of NATO and have a NATO base on its territory. But the Turkish side also had proposed that for the Cypriot government to be able to do A or B which it might regard as being to its interest, it should get the approval of three or at least two other governments and this despite the various constitutional safeguards against any discriminatory governmental acts by means of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential vetoes in matters of foreign policy and defense, the arbitral court, etc. It had also raised the question of setting up a Turkish and a Greek military base on the island or a combined military headquarters with the presence of Greek-Turkish forces in quite significant numbers. For setting up various institutions, the Turkish side, too, had sought to consecrate an altogether unprecedented separation of the two communities, though all the indispensable separate institutions had been recognized for the Turkish community. For instance, while the Greek side accepted as reasonable the need for a neutral supreme court, the Turkish government demanded separate courts for each community. This was surprising, the more so because the right of appeal to higher courts was provided for, and the High Court would set up and control the lower courts. The Turkish demand that the budget be valid only so long as one half of the Turkish deputies in the unitary House of Representatives voted in its favor was another example of Turkey's attitude. Both the Greek Foreign Minister and the Premier agreed that a certainty should exist that budgetary expenditures should be allocated fairly, but under the method the Turkish side proposed it would be possible for one half of the Turkish deputies in the House of Representatives — a few people, namely—to frustrate the adoption of the budget and eventually impose paradoxical views. Premier Karamanlis, Zorlu was told by Pesmazoglou, most sincerely desired a Greek-Turkish agreement over Cyprus. For that reason he had accepted certain points which satisfied the Turkish government although they could create difficulties for the Greek government. As a result such a considerable rapprochement of views had been achieved that one would have thought that the two governments were close to complete agreement. However, he reiterated, he could not accept certain points, of which the Turkish

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government was well aware. Accordingly, he hesitated to agree on a meeting with the Turkish Premier because he feared continued disagreement on these points, and a summit meeting which had failed would dissipate the useful current atmosphere and would not exclude undesirable developments of a more general nature in the future. Nonetheless, if Premier Menderes believed such a conference would be useful, Karamanlis was at his disposal. While the Greek Premier thus left the door open for the proposed summit conference despite continued differences of views on the abovementioned matters, Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza was seeking clarifications of detail about points over which agreement in principle seemed to have been reached. On January 23, he instructed Pesmazoglou not only to tell Zorlu that his government could make no other concessions and that he should take this warning very seriously, but also to mention to him certain other matters which in his view required further clarification. For, during the last Paris talks, while Averoff-Tossizza had used manuscript notes, Zorlu had used a typewritten text and the latter was longer and did not altogether agree, in Averoff-Tossizza's view, with what had been previously discussed. This impression was confirmed when Zorlu, at the Greek Foreign Minister's request, sent him a copy of this typewritten text which he was thus able to compare with his own manuscript notes. Thus, while the Greek side had proposed that a neutral international jurist "prepare" the Constitution of Cyprus on the basis of the "terms of reference" agreed upon, with the assistance of Greek and Turkish Cypriots and after examining the situation on the spot, Zorlu's text said that the Greek government had proposed that a neutral international jurist "examine" the terms of reference relating to the drafting of the Constitution. For many reasons, Averoff-Tossizza continued to insist that the Greek proposal constituted the only practical procedure for dealing with this matter. Then, Zorlu's text failed to mention the Greek proposal that in flag-raising, the population would be allowed to use the Greek and Turkish flags alongside the Cypriot flag. Whether the authorities would be obliged to do so had not been clarified but remained open for discussion. Averoff-Tossizza also pointed out with regard to the Turkish text, that in no way had it been agreed that economic development would be among the powers of the Communal Chambers. On the contrary, he had stressed that this would be a task for the central and unitary authority. And he had also maintained that banks and organs of local government should be fully subordinated to the central administration, though he had finally accepted that only certain unmixed banks

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and unmixed local communities could be placed under the communal chambers. He had also made it clear that, though the most-favored-nation clause would apply to conventions and treaties concluded with either Britain, Greece, or Turkey, it would not be obligatory for all three with regard to agreements made with third countries, West Germany, for example, in order to secure greater economic benefits. Since the Cypriots would act on the basis of their well-understood interests and many other different safeguards existed, Zorlu would have no reason to fear that Cyprus would ever conclude any "dangerous" conventions. With regard to the 70-30 ratio of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the administration, Averoff-Tossizza thought that it had been agreed not to say that nothing prevented the use of a greater percentage of Turkish Cypriots. And Zorlu's text did not mention that Averoff-Tossizza had insisted that the proposed percentages could not apply to all levels of the administrative hierarchy, because possibly there would not be enough Turkish Cypriots for all grades. With regard to separate municipalities in the five major towns of Cyprus, Zorlu insisted that this system was already being implemented, that it was a matter of capital importance for him and that after two years the community authorities should examine the possibility of its abolition. Then, in connection with the Greek compromise proposal for retaining in the police and gendarmerie a number of Turkish Cypriots above the percentage proposed until their retirement age but not replacing them thereafter, Averoff-Tossizza wanted to make clear that this would not apply in the case of the auxiliary Cypriot police. This auxiliary body, it will be recalled, consisted primarily of Turkish Cypriots, and the British authorities in Cyprus had set it up in order to deal with EOKA's activities during the period of the emergency. In asking Pesmazoglou to draw Zorlu's attention to these discrepancies, Averoff-Tossizza observed that in the main (underlined in text) these observations did not concern capital matters over which no rapprochement of views at all had been achieved. To these latter capital matters, he wanted Pesmazoglou once again to draw Zorlu's attention, because, he reiterated, he sincerely believed that, on the one hand, no concessions were possible on the Greek side, and, on the other hand, because concessions would serve no essential Turkish interests since they would not contribute to a practical implementation of a Cyprus settlement. At this juncture, a measure the British authorities in Cyprus said they would take, appeared to endanger the course of the Greek-Turkish negotiations about the island's future regime, yet may well have speeded up the process of deciding to hold a Greek-Turkish summit conference.

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On January 28, Sir Roger Allen, the British Ambassador in Athens, informed the Greek Foreign Minister that his government intended to publish next day the law about the preparation of the electoral rolls in Cyprus which would be another step in the implementation of the Macmillan plan for an interim seven-year regime in Cyprus. 13 The British government, which originally intended to publish the electoral law on January 15, 1959, had postponed its publication because it had learned of the impending second meeting between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers in Paris on January 18 and wished to create the most favorable atmosphere possible for these talks. Now it was becoming impatient. If the Greek-Turkish talks came to nought, Macmillan wrote to Dulles, he had to live up to his commitment to the Turks to hold communal elections in Cyprus that year. 14 Likewise on January 28 in Athens, Ambassador Vergin asked to meet Averoff-Tossizza to convey to him Zorlu's reply to the latest Greek observations concerning the substance of the proposed final settlement for Cyprus. To deal with both matters, the Greek Foreign Minister asked Embassy Counsellor Phaidon Anninos-Kavalieratos to meet the Turkish Ambassador and talk over the situation with him. At the meeting between the two diplomats which took place that same day, January 28, Vergin informed Anninos-Kavalieratos that he had received from Zorlu, then attending a CENTO Council meeting in Karachi, a reply to the Greek Foreign Minister's communication to him through Pesmazoglou, the evening of January 22, when the Turkish Foreign Minister passed through Athens airport. The Turkish leaders, according to Zorlu's reply, insisted that the two Premiers should meet either alone or accompanied by their Foreign Ministers and were willing to accept one more meeting between the two Foreign Ministers to prepare the ground for the summit conference. Commenting on this reply, Vergin stressed that it had been given with full awareness that Pesmazoglou's communication of January 22 represented the Greek government's last line of retreat and that the Greek government had made clear that if this line was not accepted, any further effort and further meetings would be in vain. Hence, said Vergin, the Turkish leaders' insistence on a summit conference meant much. "I cannot say more. You understand what I mean", he added. 13

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 350-351; according to information Grivas had received, on January 28 instructions had been given to the Cyprus government printing office to publish the relevant act next day. 14 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 690. The letter to Dulles bears no date.

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When Anninos-Kavalieratos mentioned his government's doubts after the receipt of the British government's communication, Vergin termed this British demarche a "trip-up" effort aimed exactly at frustrating a Greek-Turkish understanding over Cyprus. "Time is working in our favor", he stressed, "and you have every interest to speed up the agreement. We, at any rate, are making haste. Do not let this opportunity slip by. We ardently desire an understanding and, I believe, so do you. We desire an understanding not because of those things which are said, namely our economic situation, the situation in Iraq, etc. We desire it because it is to our interest and because of insistent suggestions made to us by a great ally, which, I am sure, had made similar suggestions to you, too." After this hint of earnest U.S. interest in a Greek-Turkish agreement on Cyprus, 15 Vergin recounted that a few days earlier, in a conversation with Sir Roger Allen, he had told him that the British-Turkish front had been unable to bend Greece, and that he doubted whether a GreekBritish front would be able to bend Turkey. But could the British resist a Greek-Turkish front, he had asked. Sir Roger, said Vergin, had answered: "I believe not." "As you know", Vergin continued, addressing himself to the Greek diplomat, "we dropped partition. Hence there is no serious obstacle to our reaching agreement." The Greek diplomat asked Vergin whether it was true, as Sir Roger had maintained, that the electoral law was to be published because of the Turkish Cypriots' insistence. The Turkish diplomat, in his answer, implied that the Turkish Cypriots were not acting on their own initiative and that certainly the Turkish government, insisting as it was on the continuation of the Greek-Turkish talks, would not be the one to raise such matters at an untimely moment. At this point, Vergin, somewhat conceitedly, asked himself whether his own optimistic statement to the British Ambassador a few days earlier about the course of the GreekTurkish negotiations had not caused the British move. The Greek diplomat, commenting on this meeting, reported that Vergin clearly had exerted all efforts to appear most sincere and to express the absolute sincerity of the Turkish leaders.

15

The New York correspondent of Vima, Stephen Zotos, had reported on December 23, 1958 that the Greek-Turkish rapprochement had been the result of an insistent recommendation on the part of the U.S. government (Vima, December 24, 1958). See also Times dispatch, December 15, 1958, reporting that the United States was eagerly promoting this rapprochement, because the strained relations between Greece and Turkey made increasingly difficult its military aid program to these two countries.

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C. INFORMING ETHNARCH MAKARIOS ABOUT THE GREEK-TURKISH NEGOTIATIONS

Cyprus Ethnarch Makarios, as already mentioned, had been consulted from the very first round of the Greek-Turkish negotiations for a Cyprus settlement when he was still in New York. After he had arrived in Athens on January 15, 1959, he was now kept directly posted about further developments in these negotiations and, in view of the possibility of an imminent breakthrough in these negotiations, had canceled a proposed trip to Japan and the Far East. 16 On January 29, the day after the Greek government had learned that the Turkish government insisted on a summit conference, while being fully aware that the Greek government intended to make no further concessions, Premier Karamanlis conferred with him, in the presence of Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza, the Bishop of Kition, and Angelos Vlachos, a Director in the Greek Foreign Ministry who had served for several years as Consul-General in Nicosia. The Greek Premier started out by explaining to the two Greek Cypriot leaders that during a recent meeting of the Greek Foreign Minister with the Turkish Foreign Minister there had been repeated talks about the possibility of a solution of the Cyprus question on the basis of independence for Cyprus. However, the Turkish side had vigorously put forward the proposal for setting up of a Turkish military base on the island. The Greek Premier categorically had rejected this demand. Through the Foreign Minister, he had communicated to the Turkish leaders that their insistence on this point would mean the breaking off of the talks which had begun, and that in no case would he accept a solution which would include the establishment of a Turkish base on Cyprus. Karamanlis went on to say that, though the Turkish position on this point had shown no signs of change, Foreign Minister Zorlu had come forward with the idea that with the conclusion of a treaty of alliance among Turkey, Greece, and independent Cyprus, a combined Greek-Turkish headquarters should be set up on the island. The Greek reaction to this proposal, Karamanlis added, was reserved, but he thought such a suggestion might be examined. The Cyprus Ethnarch registered no objection on this matter. Then, when Premier Karamanlis observed that it was possible for Cyprus to 19

Vima, January 16, 1959. Le Monde, January 24, 1959. Vima mentioned that Makarios would visit that day at noon the Greek Foreign Minister. Le Monde reported that important exchanges had taken place between the two in Athens.

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become a member of NATO, in which case it would make no difference what troops would man the bases of the alliance, Makarios commented that it was to the absolute interest of the Cypriots for independent Cyprus to take part in the defensive alliance that was NATO. Karamanlis then mentioned that the relevant exchanges between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers had focused on the form of the regime which an independent Cyprus would eventually have. He added, though, that he had taken the opportunity of the Turkish Foreign Minister's passage through Elliniko airport to send him a message through Pesmazoglou who was in Athens for official purposes, to the effect that the Turkish government's insistence on a base in Cyprus would mean a definitive wrecking of the efforts to achieve a rapprochement of divergent Greek-Turkish views. "It is noteworthy", Karamanlis added, "that despite this double affirmation, the Turkish Foreign Minister has already requested a new meeting with his Greek colleague to take place in Switzerland". As to the form of the regime of an independent Cyprus, there was a coincidence of views that this would be a Presidential Republic in accordance with the U.S. model, with a Greek President and a Turkish Vice-President, who would be elected directly by the people, with the Greeks of Cyprus electing the President; and the Turks of Cyprus, the Vice-President. A coincidence of views had also occurred on the following points: a unitary House of Representatives for the general problems of the island, 70 per cent of which would consist of Greek Cypriots, and 30 per cent of Turkish Cypriots; and two Communal Chambers, one Greek and one Turkish, with authority in matters of education, personal status, and religion, and with powers to impose contributions on their respective communities for supporting the foundations which were subject to their authority. On the Turkish side there were also demands that, on the one hand, the Turkish Communal Chamber should control the unmixed Turkish Cypriot organizations which, otherwise, would function under the laws of the new State; and, on the other hand, that the Communal Chambers should deal with matters of the economic development of their respective communities. On these latter demands, which were, at any rate, vaguely formulated, the Greek government had expressed lively reservations. Continuing his account of the proposed institutions for an independent Cyprus, Karamanlis told the two Greek Cypriot leaders that agreement existed that if the unitary House of Representatives or another authority were to adopt a law or decree or decision which the Turkish Cypriot

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community considered discriminatory, that community would have the right to send this law or act or decision to an Arbitral Court composed of one Greek Cypriot, one Turkish Cypriot, and one neutral judge, who would also preside over this judicial body. The Premier then mentioned that during the exchange of views between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, the latter had expressed the view that the Turkish VicePresident should have the right of veto on matters of foreign policy and defense. The Greek side had registered no basic objection to this view. The Turkish side had also propounded the view that three security bodies — police, gendarmerie, and a small army — should be established. Two of these bodies would be under Greek Cypriot command, and one under Turkish Cypriot command. The deputy commanders, conversely, would be two Turkish and one Greek Cypriot. The ratio, however, of Greek to Turkish Cypriots in these bodies would be 50-50. The Greek side had categorically rejected this latter proposal, and had counterproposed a ratio of 70-30. With regard to the Judiciary, the Turkish side was interested in the secure composition of the High Court (not to be confused with the earlier-mentioned arbitral court), and proposed that its President, too, be neutral. Premier Karamanlis also explained that the Turkish side had requested that the Vice-President should also have the right to return legislative acts or decrees to the authority which had issued them, for a second vote. Moreover, it had asked that the ratio of Greek to Turkish Cypriots in the civil service amount to 70-30 and that in the higher ranks of the civil service hierarchy this ratio should be maintained so long as qualified Turkish Cypriots were available. The Turkish side, he added, had agreed that any jurisdiction not expressly defined as lying within the competence of the Communal Chambers should automatically fall under the authority of the unitary House of Representatives. At this point, Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza intervened, to mention another Turkish request: that separate municipalities be set up. These had already started to function in some cities. He added that he had persistently rejected this proposal on the ground that the creation of such separate municipalities would, in some measure, constitute, even though in a special way, a divisive element in the Cypriot administration. The two prelates counter-remarked that particular institutions which formerly could have a divisive character no longer had that character. If previously they had vigorously opposed them, they had done so because the entire effort being made was in the direction of partition. So long as the objective was not partition, but, on the contrary, the establish-

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ment of a unitary state, particular matters had to be judged only from the viewpoint of their practical application and of the interest of the Greek Cypriots. Although the Foreign Minister repeated his own view on the matter, the Cyprus Ethnarch and the Bishop of Kition replied that because Turkish Cypriot quarters in the cities were miserable and had many problems, it would be necessary to spend a great deal of money on them, and this would have to come from the Greek Cypriot taxpayers' pockets. Besides, no matter how much money was spent on the Turkish Cypriots, they would never be satisfied. This would create continuous friction which would harm ad infinitum peaceful cohabitation. If, on the other hand, separate municipalities existed, the Turkish Cypriots would have only themselves to blame for their bad functioning. The two prelates added that this issue was not of capital importance and that the Greek side, at any rate, could not get involved in such responsibilities since it always acted as a mandator for the Greek Cypriots. Intervening at this point, Premier Karamanlis affirmed that the Greek government was indeed acting as a mandator of the Greek Cypriots and that their views would be taken into account during the final negotiation of the municipalities question. Makarios, then, in a categorical statement, declared that a Turkish military base on Cyprus was unacceptable and that the Greek government had been right in rejecting this proposal. He then inquired about the meaning of the combined Greek-Turkish headquarters. When the Foreign Minister clarified the matter, the Ethnarch formulated no objection and said that, since a Greek force would participate in it, the installation of the proposed military headquarters would present no major difficulties. Makarios also expressed his agreement on the form of the proposed regime and, together with the Bishop of Kition, stressed that the start of a free political life in Cyprus would have tremendous significance, especially since the Greek Cypriot position would be dominant, and this was certain, regardless of whether privileges would be granted to the Turkish Cypriots in order to fully safeguard them. Without granting them these privileges it was impossible to start a free political life in Cyprus. To the powers of the two Communal Chambers, the Cyprus Ethnarch observed he had no objection with regard either to the subjects under their jurisdiction or the imposition of taxes so long as these taxes were to be borne by the respective communities. As for the other powers of the Communal Chambers, he held that these should be specific. In this connection, he said that, for instance, control of the Turkish Cypriot

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banks by the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber would not bother him. The Greek Foreign Minister then asked the Ethnarch whether he had any reservations, for reasons of prestige, to the proposal for a neutral President for both the Arbitral Court and the High Court of Justice. He, personally, he said, regarded such an institution as most useful, given the composition of the island's population. Makarios hastened to reply that he would not like foreigners in the governmental system if the organs in which they participated appeared as a sort of para-government. This, of course, was not the case with the two courts. On the veto question, Makarios accepted this right for the VicePresident in matters of foreign policy and defense. However, he expressed the view that care should be taken to define other matters in which the Vice-President would have no right of veto. For the judicial branch of government, he also accepted the proposed composition of the High Court as well as the unitary composition of lower courts in the case of correligionary disputants and the mixed composition of these courts in cases among disputants of different religion. The Bishop of Kition noted, indeed, that such an arrangement was desirable. When the Foreign Minister remarked that efforts should be exerted to establish a unitary judicial branch and that the High Court, functioning as a judicial Council, should set up particular courts, the two prelates agreed this would be useful. On the composition of the security bodies and the army, Makarios said that the Greek government had done well in rejecting the Turkish demand for a 50-50 ratio of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in those bodies. When the Foreign Minister observed that a concession could be made by proposing that the already appointed Turkish Cypriots in the police and the gendarmerie, beyond the 70-30 ratio should not be dismissed, the two prelates agreed. They excluded, however, any such proposal with regard to the auxiliary police. They also agreed about the proposed command of the security bodies and army. All in all, during this conference, Makarios' attitude on what Premier Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza had explained to him concerning the Greek-Turkish negotiations for setting up an independent Cyprus had been positive and encouraging for the continuation of further Greek contacts with the Turkish government in order to explore in the best possible way its intentions to reach an eventual agreement. The two prelates expressed fear lest the British seek to prevent an accord between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus. Karamanlis, in this connection, said that according to his information, in the British government there

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were two groups. One of them desired an agreement between Greece and Turkey; the other was trying to torpedo such a Greek-Turkish rapprochement. He added that the British Ambassador in Athens had told him that the implementation of the Macmillan plan could not be put off ad infinitum and that the British authorities in Cyprus would shortly publish the Turkish electoral rolls. The Greek Foreign Minister's lively reaction to this information had been to say that he would denounce the British as seeking to sabotage the Greek-Turkish rapprochement. The British government then had given the assurance that these electoral rolls would not yet be published, though it was impossible to postpone their publication for ever. In conclusion, Premier Karamanlis, developing once again the broad outline of the eventual Cyprus settlement that was taking shape, emphasized that in an independent Cyprus both the numerical and qualitative superiority of the Greek element on the island would assure its full control over the life and activity of that great island which now would be free. All participants concurred. During this conference, incidentally, it was repeatedly mentioned that the British military bases would be left under British sovereignty, and no objection was raised. On the other hand, the press-reported Turkish claim for a right to intervene in Cyprus, if Ankara believed that the island's political or juridical status quo was threatened, was not discussed.

D. THE GREEK-TURKISH SUMMIT MEETING AT ZURICH

Menderes and Zorlu returned from Karachi and Tehran the night of January 29-30, 1959, and the latter invited Pesmazoglou to meet him next day, January 31. As the Greek diplomat reported after this onehour conversation, Zorlu started out by saying that from the communication he had received from the Greek Foreign Minister, when passing through Athens on January 22, and from a note Pesmazoglou had sent him which had been forwarded to him in Karachi, he had ascertained that unfortunately it would be difficult to reach an understanding, because the views of the parties were diverging more and more. Matters, however, had changed since then and, whereas he had proposed a new meeting between the two Foreign Ministers to prepare, if possible, the ground for the summit conference, agreement had now been reached for the summit meeting to take place immediately, with the two Foreign Ministers also attending. This conference, set for February 4, would take

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place at the Hotel Dolder, in Zurich. Commented the Greek Ambassador in his report to Athens: surely Britain's decision to go ahead with the Macmillan plan's implementation had contributed to this decision. In the course of their conversation, Zorlu and Pesmazoglou reexamined the points over which disagreement still existed. Starting out with the definition of the new regime of Cyprus, Zorlu observed that Turkey wanted federation; Greece, independence. Turkey had already accepted the compromise solution of independence federative. The matter had to be overcome, rejoined Pesmazoglou, since the Greek proposal had been accepted that an international personality should define the character of the new regime in accordance with whatever had been agreed upon between Greece and Turkey. To this Zorlu countered by saying that the Turks wished to avoid what the Greek side wanted, namely that a foreign international expert should go to Cyprus and, after an on-the-spot investigation, go ahead with drafting the Cyprus Constitution assisted by Greek and Turkish Cypriots. "We are capable of drafting the Constitution ourselves", he maintained. Pesmazoglou, nonetheless, insisted that only a neutral expert in international affairs could make the definition of the regime. His ruling would be unchallengeable and thus more easily acceptable to the island's population and to public opinion of both Greece and Turkey. Zorlu then said he thought there would be no serious difficulties for Turkey's compromise solution of independence federative to become acceptable to the Cypriots if he had in his hands a letter from Nicosia's Mayor Dervis accepting this principle. Then the two again discussed the bases and a combined Greek-Turkish headquarters in Cyprus, with Pesmazoglou for the nth time observing that this proposal was totally unacceptable to his government. He added that, in his strictly personal view, it would perhaps be possible to find a solution if a NATO base were proposed for Cyprus. Zorlu, however, replied that it would be preferable to have no foreigners mixed up in this matter. His reaction, however, was less sharp than it had been on previous occasions. He added that, since Premier Karamanlis, as Averoff-Tossizza had told him, had accepted a headquarters manned by fifty Turks and fifty Greeks and there were British bases on the island, a more practical solution might consist of placing the combined headquarters under British command or within the Commonwealth defense system. Pesmazoglou replied it was altogether unlikely that his government would accept this proposal, since, as far as he knew, the Greek Premier had never said he would agree to the setting up of such a combined GreekTurkish headquarters.

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At any rate, Zorlu concluded by saying that in other matters it was easy to find a basis for agreement and asked Pesmazoglou to contribute to this with all his power during the summit conference. The Greek envoy replied that it was the first time that he had heard about the decision to hold immediately the summit conference and that he had received no instructions to go to Zürich. Zorlu retorted that this was evidently due to the fact that it had been agreed to keep the conference secret until the two Premiers left for Switzerland. The summit conference of Zürich between the Greek and Turkish Premiers together with their respective Foreign Ministers took place between February 5 and 11,1959. At its conclusion on February 11, Premiers Karamanlis and Menderes signed a Protocol in which they declared that they had read, approved, and initialed four documents (written in French) which, with the exception of one of them, a "Gentlemen's Agreement", they undertook to bring to the attention of their respective Parliaments within the shortest possible time. These documents, except for the aforementioned "Gentlemen's Agreement", were published after the London Conference of February 17-19, 1959.17 First there was the agreement titled "Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus", which in twentyseven points and one Annex set out the basic constitutional framework of the proposed new State. Second, there was the four-article Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus, on the one part, and Greece, Britain, and Turkey, on the other. And, third, came the six-article Treaty of Alliance among the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. The "Paris Sketch" of December 18, 1958 and the subsequent Greek-Turkish negotiations which culminated in the Zürich agreements had provided for all these instruments. However, at least within the sphere of GreekTurkish negotiations, most of the preparatory work through the two Foreign Ministers mainly seems to have focused on the basic constitutional structure of the proposed new state. The precise details of how exactly these agreements were reached during the six-day Zürich summit conference are not clear. Neither side kept official minutes of this conference and on the Greek side no post-conference report was ever prepared for the Foreign Ministry, as Premier Karamanlis had requested. The information that follows is derived mainly but not exclusively from interviews with participants on the Greek side, the two main Turkish participants being dead. 17

Conference on Cyprus. Documents Signed and Initialed at Lancaster House, Cmnd. 679 (Miscellaneous No. 4), (London, H.M. Stationary Office), 1959. (cited hereafter as Cyprus Conference).

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The main burden of the negotiations fell upon the shoulders of Foreign Ministers Averoff-Tossizza and Zorlu meeting en tête-à-tête in the morning and the afternoon. Ambassador Palamas, not Ambassador G. Pesmazoglou, and Melih Esenbel, Director-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, were their principal assistants, occasionally attending the talks between the two Foreign Ministers. Bitsios and Zeki Küneralp, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, were entrusted with the job of preparing the final drafts of the texts, on the basis of the scribbled notes their superiors handed them. As for Premiers Karamanlis and Menderes, they met on occasion, privately, in order to resolve the knottiest of problems which the Foreign Ministers felt should be decided only at the summit level. The Greek Delegation to this conference was much smaller in size than the Turkish Delegation, because it had been understood that the maximum of secrecy ought to be maintained. The Turkish Delegation, on the other hand, included Vergin, the Ambassador in Athens; Nuri Birgi, Ambassador in London; also two sons of Menderes. Several Turkish journalists were also present. The presence of the latter suggested to the Greeks the firm Turkish decision to reach an agreement at this conference. To judge from the course of the already recounted three rounds of Greek-Turkish negotiations since December 6, 1958, the treaties of guarantee and of alliance were the principal new items of discussion. And it was the Turkish side which presented the first drafts of these two instruments. Since the Treaty of Guarantee also involved a nonparticipant, the British government, it is likely that its text, which was loosely drafted, had been outlined prior to the Zürich Conference by means of TurkishBritish negotiations conducted through the diplomatic channel. The purpose of the Treaty of Guarantee was to ensure the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the Republic of Cyprus by preventing direct or indirect enosis or partition or annexation by any of the three guarantor states. In that treaty, Article 3 (later Article IV in the text agreed upon in London) was the subject of protracted and fierce discussions which foreshadowed the ferocious debate on this article's meaning since the Cyprus crisis of 1963 and on its compatibility with peremptory rules of international law (jus cogens) as well as with the provisions of the UN Charter against resort to force in international relations, except under certain conditions. 18 As is well known, this article, reminiscent of the Piatt amendment 18

Jus cogens, a peremptory norm of international law, cannot be set aside by a

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to the first Cuban Constitution, 19 provides that in case of any breach of this treaty, Greece, Britain and Turkey undertake to consult together "with a view to making representations, or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance of those provisions". Should "common or concerted action... prove impossible", each of the three guarantor powers "reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty". It seems that the original draft of this article contained no provision for prior consultation between the guarantor powers, before resort to unilateral action. And, at a certain point of the negotiations, the Turkish side wanted specific reference to the right of resort to "military" action for the purpose of restoring the state of affairs established by the treaty. The Greek side, however, contended that resort to military action was prohibited by the UN Charter and was permissible only under a decision of the Security Council, if at all. Finally, the text was drawn up in its present form, with the Turks always having possible resort to the ultima ratio in mind, in contrast to the Greeks who did not. A not unrelated issue which was the subject of lively debate and considerable bargaining, was finally resolved by agreement over Articles 3-6 of that other Zurich instrument, the Treaty of Alliance among Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Under these four articles, it was provided that in order to ensure the new state's defense against "any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, directed against the independence and territorial integrity" of Cyprus, a tripartite Cypriot-Greek-Turkish Headquarters would be set up on the island. To this Headquarters, Greece and Turkey would contribute, respectively, 950 and 650 officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. The command of this Headquarters would be assumed in rotation and for a period of one year each by a Greek, Turkish and Cypriot General Officer, to be appointed by the Greek and Turkish governments and by the President and Vice-President of Cyprus, who, acting in agreement, would also have the right to ask the Greek and

treaty provision, and since the UN Charter prohibits threats and the use of force, treaty provisions such as Article IV of the British-Greek-Turkish-Cypriot Treaty of Guarantee cannot be interpreted as meaning that one or more of the parties may resort to force or threats thereof in taking action under this treaty. The counterargument is that the use of force is permissible for the purpose only of restoring the status quo. For relevant discussion, see UN Security Council, Official Records, 1098th Meeting, February 27, 1964, pp. 16-19. 18 See above, Introduction, p. 28.

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Turkish governments to increase or reduce the number of Greek and Turkish contingents contributed to this Headquarters. Reaching agreement on the above articles was an extremely arduous task. At first, the Turkish side continued to insist on getting a military base on Cyprus. It was willing even to drop several of its other demands, if this one were conceded by the Greek side. The Greek side, however, remained adamant on this matter which, as already indicated, it had regarded as nondiscussable from the very outset of the Greek-Turkish negotiations. Then, the alternative to a Turkish military base — a Turkish military presence on Cyprus through the establishment of a combined headquarters on the island — was discussed and when the Greek side put forward the compromise idea of honorary Turkish and Greek military detachments on the island, the debate revolved around the size of such contingents or detachments. The Turks started out by asking for a total contingent of perhaps 10,000-6,000 men. The Greeks, on the other hand, put forward the already alluded to proposal for an honorary detachment of fifty officers and men from each country. The Turks then lowered their demand to 3,500 and 1,500 officers and men. Zorlu insisted that the presence of substantial numbers of Turkish troops in the island was indispensable. The military, he said, would kill him, if Turkey did not get satisfaction in this security matter. The Greeks then upped their proposal from 50 to 150 officers and men. They argued that larger military contingents of Greece and Turkey forces were unnecessary. If Turkey ever wished militarily to intervene in Cyprus, its proximity to the island would enable it to do so without difficulty. Menderes considered this figure outrageously small. It would be unacceptable in Turkey. He issued instructions which suggested the imminent departure of the Turkish Delegation from Zürich. This would mean either the break-off or the breakdown of the negotiations. Finally, the two Premiers reached agreement on the above-mentioned figures of 950 and 650 Greek and Turkish officers and men as token forces at the tripartite Headquarters to be set up in Cyprus under the Treaty of Alliance. The Greek side managed, at any rate, to ensure that these token forces of the Tripartite Headquarters would be used only for the purposes envisaged by the Treaty of Alliance. In other words, these forces could not be used for purposes of unilateral action envisaged under that other Zürich instrument, the Treaty of Guarantee. Accordingly, Article 3 of the Treaty of Alliance starts out (emphasis added), as follows: "In the spirit of this alliance and to fulfill the above purpose a tripartite Headquarters shall be established...".

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Though with regard to the "Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus" matters mainly of drafting, clarifying and filling in with more details were involved, rather than of basic new proposals, negotiations, and bargaining, nonetheless it seems that several points of this document as well were subject to considerable debate at the Ziirich Conference. The Turkish side insisted that decisions of the House of Representatives on budgetary matters and tax laws should be taken by a separate majority vote of the Greek and Turkish Representatives, on the ground that, despite all guarantees, it would be possible to destroy the Turkish community by tax measures. Very reluctantly, the Greek side yielded on this matter which was to constitute one of the provisions which led to the breakdown of the Cyprus Constitution. The Greek side also was unable to get the Turkish side to accept the proposal Karamanlis had made during the first round of Greek-Turkish negotiations through the diplomatic channel, for the President, VicePresident, and members of the House of Representatives to be elected by the people of Cyprus voting not separately, by community, but as a unitary electoral body. Likewise, Greek efforts to get a definition of cases in which the Turkish Vice-President would be unable to use his veto were unsuccessful. The Turkish desire for the establishment of separate municipalities in the five largest towns of Cyprus was another source of difficulties. The Greek side not only regarded this measure as impractical but also viewed it with foreboding as a possible step toward some sort of partition. Had not Makarios prior to the conference assented to this proposal, Karamanlis would have regarded the Turkish demand as unacceptable even as a basic issue which could lead to a breakdown of the conference. Finally, it was agreed that in the five largest towns of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots would establish their own municipalities, provided, too, here a Greek modification, a coordinating body were set up in each of these towns to supervise the work which would have to be carried out jointly and would deal with matters which required a degree of cooperation. It was agreed, too, that within four years, the President and the Vice-President of Cyprus would examine whether or not this separation of municipalities in the five largest towns of the island should continue. On the other hand, a comparison of the final text of the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus with the background of negotiations which preceded the Zürich Conference reveals that the Greek side managed to prevent the adoption of any definition of the regime of the new state as having some sort of federal character, as the Turkish side wanted. Point 1

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of this document merely mentioned that "the State of Cyprus shall be a Republic with a presidential regime". Moreover, the number of men in the army and the security forces was raised to 4,000 men, as against the original Turkish proposal of only 3,000 men, and, more importantly, the Turkish side yielded in its demand for a 50-50 ratio of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the army and agreed to a 60-40 ratio. In the case of the police and the gendarmerie, this ratio was raised to 70 percent of Greek Cypriots as against 30 percent of Turkish Cypriots. Incidentally, the "Basic Structure" might have been longer, had not Averoff-Tossizza, in what turned out to be his last bargaining confrontation with Zorlu over this document, rejected point blank some of the proposals his opposite number was reading out of a voluminous dossier. Abruptly closing this dossier, the Turkish Foreign Minister signified the end of bargaining and a desire for prompt agreement. A bad cold of Karamanlis, which kept him in his room toward the end of the summit conference, may also have speeded up Turkish agreement on certain points, because the Turks apparently took it to be a case of diplomatic sickness. Of basic importance, of course, was the fact that Greece and Turkey, through this summit conference, formally decided that a new independent state of Cyprus should be set up. They agreed that this new state should come into being as soon as possible with the signing of the treaties of alliance and guarantee and within a period of not more than three months from their signing. They likewise agreed, in point 22 of the new state's Basic Structure, that "it shall be recognized that the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other state, or a separatist independence for Cyprus (i.e. the partition of Cyprus into two independent states) shall be excluded", and that the treaties of alliance and guarantee should have constitutional force. Premiers Karamanlis and Menderes, in the never published "Gentlemen's Agreement", also agreed that Greece and Turkey would support NATO membership for the new state of Cyprus, and that the installation of a NATO base on the island as well as its composition would depend on the accord of the Greek and Turkish governments. They would intervene, too, with the President and Vice-President of Cyprus, respectively, so that the communist party and its activities be prohibited in the island. As for the first commander of the tripartite General Headquarters to be set up under Article 3 of the Treaty of Alliance, he would be chosen by lot. And, under this "Gentlemen's Agreement", all emergency measures in Cyprus would have to be lifted and a general amnesty granted, after the treaties had been signed.

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Under these Greek-Turkish agreements, Turkey, though giving up the idea of annexing or partitioning Cyprus, was given safeguards for its own strategic and security needs and for the protection of the Turkish Cypriot element—the Turkish "community" — on the island. With regard to its strategic and security needs, though it failed to get one or more military bases in Cyprus under Turkish sovereignty, which would be a form of partition, it did achieve a military presence there. It also acquired a right of intervention — means not specified — in the island's affairs, in case the status quo was, in its view, threatened directly or indirectly, externally or internally. Moreover, it received assurances against the island's annexation by, or union (enosis) with Greece, on the part of the latter, and, eventually, on the part of Cyprus, too. For the Turkish Cypriot element it secured not merely minority rights such as those, for instance, enjoyed by the Turkish element in Greek Thrace under the Treaty of Lausanne, but also a position of considerable importance in the island's government. This position would allow the Turkish Cypriots not only to administer their own community affairs but also to hamstring, if they wished, the island's government, as the analysis of the island's basic constitutional structure abundantly reveals. Under the constitutional framework negotiated between the Greek and Turkish governments after consultation of the former with Ethnarch Makarios and presumably with the consent of the leaders of the Turkish Cypriots, as far as the Turkish side was concerned, Cyprus would be a Republic with a presidential regime, in which, however, the VicePresident would be no "superfluous Excellency" as in the American system, and the executive would be plural in character. Both President and Vice-President, moreover, would be elected directly by universal suffrage by the Greek and Turkish communities respectively, voting separately. Thus, the quasi-constitutional custom consecrated since the Osmanli Turks conquered the island in 1571, under which the Archbishop of the autocephalous Church of Cyprus served as head of the Greek Orthodox millet of the island, was not institutionalized. This opened the possibility of a secular President of the Republic of Cyprus. Under the Zurich Basic Structure, the Republic would have two official languages — Greek and Turkish — but its own single flag. However, authorities and communities would have the right to fly the Greek and Turkish flags on holidays, together with the flag of Cyprus. And both communities would have the right to celebrate the Greek and Turkish national holidays which, incidentally, commemorate auspicious events

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in the story of Greek-Turkish conflict — victories for one side, defeats for the other. The President and Vice-President's terms of office would be five years. In case of absence, disability, or death these officials would be replaced by the President and Vice-President of the House of Representatives, respectively. In case of a vacancy in either post, the elections of new incumbents would have to take place within a period of not more than forty-five days. Executive power would be vested ("sera assuré", according to the official French text) in the President and Vice-President. For this purpose they would have a Council of Ministers consisting of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers appointed respectively by the President and the Vice-President in an instrument signed by both. 20 Ministers could be drawn from outside the House of Representatives. And one of the following Ministries — of Foreign Affairs, Defense, or Finance — would be entrusted to a Turk, though if the President and Vice-President agreed, they could apply a system of rotation. The Council of Ministers would take decisions by an absolute majority, but the President and VicePresident would have the right of a final veto and the right to return the Council's decisions under the same terms as those laid down for laws and decisions of the House of Representatives. The legislative power would be vested in a House of Representatives elected for a term of five years by universal suffrage of each community voting separately. Seventy per cent of the House would consist of Greek community representatives and thirty per cent of Turkish community representatives, this being fixed independently of statistical data. The House would exercise authority in all matters other than those expressly reserved to the two Communal Chambers. In case of aconflict of authority between the House and the Communal Chambers, the Supreme Constitutional Court, composed of one Greek, one Turk, and one neutral, appointed jointly by the President and Vice-President, would decide. The House would adopt laws and decisions by a simple majority of members present and, unless the President or Vice-President returned them to the House for reconsideration, they would be promulgated within fifteen days. For the adoption of any law relating to duties and taxes, to municipalities or to a modification of the electoral law, the House would vote by a simple majority of the Greek and Turkish members voting separately. 20

For discussion of this provision in the Joint Constitutional Commission, see below, Chapter XII, pp. 495-505.

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The checks of the executive power on the legislative power were to be very considerable. Thus, the President and Vice-President, if, in their judgment, any question of discrimination arose, would have the right to return to the House the budget it had adopted. Should the House maintain its decision, the President and Vice-President would then have the right to appeal to the Supreme Constitutional Court. But the President and Vice-President, separately and conjointly, would also have the right of a final veto with regard to laws and decisions of the House concerning defense, security, and foreign affairs, except the participation of Cyprus in international organizations and pacts of alliance in which both Greece and Turkey participated. In the case of all laws and decisions, furthermore, the two top executive officials would have, too, the right of a suspensory veto, being obliged to promulgate the law or decision, if the House maintained it. The Zürich constitutional framework also provided for the establishment of a Communal Chamber for each of the island's two communities. The Communal Chambers would be composed of a number of representatives to be determined by each community, and would have the right to impose taxes and levies on community members to provide for their needs and for the needs of bodies and institutions under their supervision. They would exercise authority in all religious, educational, cultural and teaching questions and questions of personal status, and generally in matters where the interests and institutions were of a purely communal nature. This provision, it was added, could in no way be interpreted in such a way as to prevent the creation of mixed and communal institutions where the inhabitants desired them. Producers' and consumers' cooperatives, though administered under the laws of the Republic, would be subject to supervision by the Communal Chambers. So would matters initiated by municipalities composed of one community only. The municipalities, to which the laws of the Republic would apply, would be supervised in their functions likewise by the Communal Chambers. The Zürich Basic Structure also provided that seventy per cent of the Civil Service should consist of Greeks and thirty per cent of Turks. It was understood that this quantitative division would be applied as far as possible in all Civil Service grades. In regions or localities, however, where one of the two communities was in close to 100 per cent majority, the organs of the local administration responsible to the central administration would be composed solely of officials belonging to that community. The deputies of the Attorney-General, the Inspector-General, the

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Treasurer, and the Governor of the Issuing Bank — all to be appointed by the President and Vice-President acting in agreement — should not belong to the same community as their principals. The same would apply to the heads and deputy heads of the armed forces, the gendarmerie, and the police. Compulsory military service could be introduced only with the agreement of the President and the Vice-President of Cyprus. The army would consist of 2,000 men, of whom sixty per cent would be Greek and forty per cent Turkish. The security forces (gendarmerie and police) would consist likewise of 2,000 men and could be reduced or increased by agreement of both the President and the Vice-President. Seventy per cent of these forces would consist of Greeks, thirty per cent of Turks. However, for an initial period, the percentage could be raised to a maximum of forty per cent of Turks, with a consequent reduction of the percentage of Greeks, in order not to discharge those Turks who were currently serving in the police, apart from the auxiliary police. It was also provided that forces stationed in parts of the territory of Cyprus inhabited in a proportion of close to one hundred per cent by members of a single community should belong to that community. The highest organ of the judicial branch would be a High Court of Justice consisting of two Greeks, one Turk, and one neutral, appointed jointly by the President and Vice-President of the Republic. The neutral judge would serve as President of the Court and would have two votes. Civil disputes where the plaintiff and the defendant belonged to the same community would be tried by a court composed of judges belonging to that community. If, however, plaintiff and defendant belonged to different communities, then the court's composition would be mixed and would be determined by the High Court of Justice. Civil disputes relating to questions of personal status and religious matters would be dealt with by the courts composed solely of judges belonging to the community concerned, since such matters were reserved to the competence of the Communal Chambers, which would draw up relevant legislation for the composition and status of such courts, and the law to be applied. In criminal cases, the court would consist of judges belonging to the same community as the accused. If the injured party belonged to another community, the court's composition would be mixed and determined by the High Court of Justice. The President and Vice-President would each have the right to exercise the prerogative of mercy to persons from their respective communities who were sentenced to death. Where the plaintiffs and the convicted persons were members of different com-

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munities, the prerogative of mercy would be exercised by agreement between the President and Vice-President. In case of disagreement, the vote for clemency would prevail. When mercy was granted, the death penalty would be commuted to life imprisonment. With regard to the contingency of agrarian reform, the Zürich Basic Structure provided that lands would be redistributed only to persons who were members of the same community as the expropriated owners. Expropriations by the State or by municipalities would be carried out only on payment of a just and equitable indemnity, fixed, in disputed cases, by the courts. An appeal to the courts would have the effect of suspending action. Expropriated property would be used only for the purpose for which the expropriation was made. Otherwise the property would be restored to the owner. The provisions of the Zürich Structure of Cyprus for the creation of separate municipalities in the five largest towns of Cyprus have already been mentioned. So has the provision that the two treaties — of alliance and guarantee — should have constitutional force. For amending the Cyprus Constitution it was agreed at Zürich that a decision of the House of Representatives taken by two thirds of the Greek members and two thirds of the Turkish members voting separately would be required. However, this amending procedure would not apply at all to the Constitution's basic articles. And all the points contained in the Basic Structure should be regarded as basic articles of the Constitution. In its international relations, it was provided in the Basic Structure that the Republic of Cyprus would grant the most-favored-nation treatment to Britain, Greece, and Turkey for all agreements regardless of their nature. However, this would not apply to treaties between Cyprus and Britain concerning the bases and military facilities accorded to Britain. The Greek and Turkish governments would have the right to subsidize institutions for education, culture, athletics and charity belonging to the respective communities and could provide schoolmasters, professors or priests for the working of institutions if either community did not have the necessary number of such people. The aforementioned "Gentlemen's Agreement" between Premiers Karamanlis and Menderes provided that the Constitution of Cyprus would be drafted as soon as possible by a commission composed of one representative of the Greek community of Cyprus, one representative of the Turkish community of Cyprus, and two representatives who would be appointed respectively by the Greek and Turkish governments. An expert jurist, acting as an advisor, to be chosen by the Ministers of

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Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey, would assist this mixed committee in its task. This commission, in preparing the Constitution of Cyprus, would have to take into account and punctiliously respect the points established in the documents of the Zürich Conference and accomplish its task in conformity with the principles thus posed. In the joint official communiqué on the Zürich summit conference issued on February 11, the Premiers of Greece and Turkey stated that in an atmosphere of sincere cordiality they had examined Greek-Turkish relations and had decided to place their two countries on the course of the close cooperation and constructive friendship which the great statesmen Kemal Atatürk and Eleftherios Venizelos had established. Having reached a crucial moment in this course, the two Premiers expressed their conviction that this happy development would immediately become manifest in all important sectors of Greek-Turkish relations. Cyprus had been discussed at length, they said. In a spirit of reciprocal understanding, a compromise solution had been finally achieved despite the great difficulties this problem presented. The cause of freedom, cooperation and prosperity in Cyprus had emerged victorious from the trial. The moment had now arrived to inform the British government of the results of the Greek-Turkish negotiations which had been inaugurated during the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers in Paris in December 1958, the two Premiers stated further in their joint communiqué. Greece and Turkey, friendly and allied countries of Britain, did not hesitate to believe that an agreement among the three states concerned would lead to a final solution of the Cyprus question. Considering that the progress achieved during the Zürich Conference adequately opened the way for such a solution, the Greek and Turkish governments intended to confer with the British government in order to continue the negotiations on a tripartite level so as to reach a happy conclusion. For this purpose, the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers were leaving that day for London in order to inform their British colleague of the results of the conversations which had now come to an end. 21

21

New York Times, February 12, 1959 (full text).

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A. MAKARIOS' VIEWS ON THE ZÜRICH AGREEMENT

On returning to Athens from Zürich on February 11, 1959, Premier Karamanlis said it was one of the happiest days of his life and that the foundations had been laid for a solution "of one of the most difficult international problems". That same evening, he got in touch with Ethnarch Makarios and told him about the Zürich agreements. The Greek Cypriot leader, gratified about the news, congratulated the Premier on the results achieved, issuing a relevant statement hailing the rapprochement of the Greek and Turkish governments over the Cyprus question as a step toward a new period of freedom and welfare for both Greeks and Turks of Cyprus.1 Next day, February 12, Karamanlis invited Makarios to his home at 6:00 p.m., informed him in all detail about the results of the GreekTurkish summit conference, and handed him the Zürich texts in Greek translation. Makarios read them and expressed his absolute agreement with them. The Premier then told him that Averoff-Tossizza had phoned him from London saying that Lloyd had informed him that the British government was considering the possibility of calling a five-party round-table conference composed of representatives of Greece, Britain, and Turkey as well as of representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The British government, however, wished to be certain that the representatives of the Cypriot people approved the agreements reached at Zürich and that the texts of these agreements, which Makarios had just read, would not come up again for discussion at the proposed conference. The Ethnarch of Cyprus replied he was in absolute accord with the texts and that he would bring up no point at all of the Zürich agreements 1

Keesing's, 16645. Vima, February 12, 1959.

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for discussion. He added, however, that for reasons of order, the impression should not be created that the Cypriot representatives were being invited to the conference merely to be notified of what already had been agreed upon. And he would like to have the opportunity to raise with the Turkish Cypriot leaders certain points which might be amended by common agreement. Karamanlis replied that it could not be maintained that the Zürich agreements had been reached in absentia of the Cypriots since they strictly adhered to lines on which Makarios had agreed beforehand. Indeed, at Zürich, the Greek government had achieved improvements on many points. Besides, the invitation to the proposed conference would be of a general character so that the Ethnarch should not fear that the impression he had mentioned would be created. He added that the Ethnarch would be free to discuss matters backstage, not during the conference, with Turkish Cypriot leaders. If his backstage consultations brought no results, however, the relevant issues would not be officially raised at the conference. Karamanlis emphasized he had to assure the British government that during the proposed five-party conference the Cypriot representatives would not again discuss the Zürich agreements. He wanted, therefore, a clear reply on this matter so as to be able to convey through Averoff-Tossizza this assurance to the British government. The Cyprus Ethnarch once again assured the Premier that no such thing would occur. He reiterated, however, his desire for an opportunity to confer privately with the Turkish Cypriot leaders. At any rate he was determined to accept integrally all provisions contained in the texts he had read, he added. Then he mentioned that, if the proposed conference were to take place, he intended to invite the mayors of the five main cities of Cyprus as well as the acting Ethnarch, the Bishop of Kition, to join him in London. After asking for the clarification of certain points in the Zürich agreements, which the Premier explained to him, he thanked Karamanlis and departed. It was agreed that he would be kept informed about further developments so that, if the conference were convoked, he should have time to issue invitations to the five mayors and the Bishop of Kition. The afternoon of next day—February 13—Premier Karamanlis learned through Vlachos that Makarios, after a second reading of the Zürich agreements, had been seized by doubts and hesitated to sign them if invited to do so at the proposed London conference. He therefore instructed Vlachos and Bitsios to call on the Ethnarch to clarify the situation. The two Foreign Ministry officials called that day on the Ethnarch and,

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after analyzing the Zürich agreements article by article, asked him on behalf of the Premier whether he adhered to the assurances he had given to Karamanlis the day before. Ethnarch Makarios then began to express various reservations of a secondary character on the agreements and said he had difficulty in deciding to sign these agreements without prior consultation with representatives of the Cypriot people. From a purely legal viewpoint, Bitsios replied, the Ethnarch could rightfully contract with the other parties in the name of the Cypriot people, since no duly constituted Cypriot polity was yet in existence. And from a political viewpoint, if he were to consult broader Cypriot circles, he would be conceding this legal right to third parties. Consequently, he would then be prevented from taking decisions on matters which he, himself, had already studied and approved. He also warned the Ethnarch that the Premier was determined to publish the contents of the Zürich agreements and to declare that the Greek government's role in the Cyprus question had come to an end with these agreements, inasmuch as the Greek government had exhausted all means for further help to the Cypriot people. Consequently the moment was critical for the Cyprus Ethnarch. The consequences of a failure of the London Conference would be incalculable. No other course would be open for the Cypriots except the implementation of the Macmillan plan. The Bishop of Kition and the Abbot of Kykko, Chrysostomos, who were present, absolutely agreed with what Bitsios and Vlachos had said. They appealed to Makarios to go ahead with the agreements that would bring independence to Cyprus. They stressed that the Cypriot people, who had suffered so greatly during the recent years, would enthusiastically welcome the solution given. Later that day, the Greek Premier himself spoke to the Cyprus Ethnarch and asked him to explain the doubts he had already voiced during his earlier meeting with the two Foreign Ministry officials. Makarios, after reiterating his desire to consult various Greek Cypriot elements before taking any decision, located this time his doubts on Article 3 of the Treaty of Guarantee which, as already mentioned, gave the guarantor states the right to intervene in Cyprus in case the independence and territorial integrity of the new state were threatened, and for the sole purpose of reestablishing the state of affairs set up by the treaty. Makarios' view was that, because of that clause, it would not be expedient for representatives of the Greek Cypriot people to subscribe to the Treaty of Guarantee.

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Premier Karamanlis gave the appropriate explanations and indicated that only through a fault of the Ethnarch himself could a situation arise in Cyprus that would allow the intervention of the guarantor states. He also reiterated he wanted a clear answer from the Ethnarch as to whether he had decided, on going to London, to accept and sign the texts of Zürich, upon which he had expressed agreement in detail. The Premier denied he wished to exert psychological pressure upon Makarios and the Cypriots but stated that he was obliged to leave no doubt at all in their minds about his decision to consider the Greek government's policy and mission in the Cyprus question as coming to an end through the agreements he had signed with the Turkish government. The Ethnarch promised to give a final reply to the Premier next day. Accordingly, on February 14, he sent, through Bitsios, a message to Karamanlis saying that he had decided to go to London; that he would merely consult the Cypriot mayors and other elements that would accompany him; and that he had decided to insist upon the acceptance of the Zürich agreements. He asked, however, the Greek government to publish nothing on the matter of British bases in Cyprus because he wanted this question to be left open so that the representatives of the Greek Cypriot people might be able to negotiate the question in its details. Likewise on February 14, Makarios invited twenty-three Greek Cypriot leaders to join him in London. With this matter apparently settled, the British government call for the five-party conference to meet on February 17, 1959 at Lancaster House, in London.

B. GRIVAS' REACTION TO THE NEWS OF ZÜRICH

In Cyprus, the Greek and Turkish communities were reported to have reacted cautiously to the news of the Zürich agreements. Their leaders adopted an attitude of reserve. In general terms, however, they publicly expressed their approval of the agreements. However, neither EOKA nor Grivas himself issued any statement on this important news.2 For the Greek government as well as for Makarios, informing EOKA's leader about the Zürich agreements and getting his approval of them was, for obvious reasons, a matter of concern. They were aware of his strongly held views on Greek Cypriot goals and aspirations. In his new hideout, he 2

Keeping's, 16645.

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received on February 12 two notes: one from the Bishop of Kition, the other from Consul-General Frydas. 3 The Bishop wrote that AveroffTossizza had informed him by phone that the Greek government considered the agreements an important success for the Greek side and that the maximum possible had been achieved. The Ethnarch, who had been kept posted about the contents of the agreements, confirmed the above point. Certain possible difficulties, however, remained to be ironed out with the British side. To deal with these difficulties, the Bishop reported the Greek view was that the Cypriot people should express their absolute support of the Ethnarch who had accepted the agreements. Certain divisive moves of the communists would thus be forestalled. About the substance of the agreements, no relevant statement would yet be issued. However, press reports about certain features of these agreements were accurate, although the news that Turkey or NATO supposedly would be granted a base on the island was without any foundation whatsoever. The far briefer note of the Consul-General advised Grivas to consider the Bishop's letter as coming personally from the Greek Foreign Minister. EOKA and the people, at this point, should, in the Consul's personal opinion, declare their full support of Makarios. Grave dangers still lay ahead because of British intrigues through the political opposition in Greece and possible actions of the Bishop of Kyrenia's supporters and of the communists. Such dangers would be averted if Grivas reissued his earlier statement that the people of Cyprus should abide by the decisions of their Ethnarch. In an extremely urgent reply of February 134 to these two notes, Grivas wrote to the Bishop of Kition that as a matter of tactics, EOKA should issue no statement at all on the Zurich agreements. The people, too, should proceed to no expressions of approval because the British government might misinterpret such manifestations and ask for a few more concessions. The Greek government could exploit for its own purposes EOKA's attitude of silent expectation. With regard to the agreements, on the other hand, he felt unable to take a position on them, because he did not know their contents. He, too, had certain responsibilities and could not shift them onto the shoulders of others. At any rate, the report about the stationing of Turkish troops on the island had painfully impressed him. If this was true, in all probability he would be obliged to reappraise his responsibilities. In conclusion, however, Grivas assured 3

*

Grivas Memoirs, p. 375. Ibid., p. 376.

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the Bishop in this letter, a copy of which he sent to the Consul-General, that in no way did he intend to bring about a split in the unity of the Cypriot people. That same day — February 13 — Grivas also received a letter from the Ethnarch himself (signed with the usual pseudonym of "Chares") who termed the results of Zürich as rather satisfactory.5 Under the prevailing circumstances, Makarios wrote, it was not possible to achieve any better solution. The final goal of the struggle had been, of course, enosis, but in his view, it would be completely unrealistic to believe that the political line of "enosis and only enosis" would surely lead to that ultimate goal. The Turkish factor, which British diplomacy had meanwhile created, would never cease existing, except, of course, in the event of an international upheaval. And this factor would constitute an insuperable obstacle even if the Labour Party came to power in England. He sincerely believed, he added, that "we have exploited to the maximum by means of the Zürich agreements" the struggles and sacrifices of the Cypriot people. The agreements laid the foundations of an independent and sovereign Cypriot state, thus terminating a centuries-long slavery of the Cypriot people. After dwelling on the agreements' terms and saying that they did not significantly differ from those reported in the press, he observed that the only point over which one might have reservations was the provision for a combined Cypriot-Greek-Turkish Headquarters on the island. If Cyprus were to become a member of NATO, this Headquarters, however, would be automatically abolished, being replaced by a NATO contingent. It was not yet known, he added, whether the British government would consent to the Zürich agreements. If it did so, it was likely that a conference would follow in which the Cypriots would take part. At this conference some of the terms of these agreements might be improved. The Archbishop, Makarios wrote further in the third person form used in this secret correspondence with Grivas, was rather pleased. He thought it desirable, unless Grivas believed otherwise, for EOKA to issue a proclamation to the effect that it would agree with any settlement that would be acceptable to the political leadership.6 Grivas, however, refrained from issuing the suggested proclamation. Instead, he merely sent instructions to his cadres asking them to maintain cohesion and discipline. He would let them know of his further decisions when he was fully informed about certain points of the Greek-Turkish 6

Grivas Memoirs, p. 377. « Ibid., p. 376.

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agreements. He would never betray either the struggle or the sacrifices of the struggling Cypriot people. All should be certain about this. He obeyed only the voice of Cyprus.7 Makarios was having difficulties, too, with the mayors of the five main cities of Cyprus. They believed the Ethnarch should have consulted them before accepting the agreements as he had done when the Macmillan plan had been announced, and they refused to send telegrams of congratulations to him and the Greek government for the conclusion of the Zürich agreements, though the Bishop of Kition and the Greek ConsulGeneral in Nicosia had asked them to do so. As a result, the Bishop flew to Athens to inform the Ethnarch and the Greek government about this situation and the icy reception by the Greek Cypriots of the news about the Zürich agreements.8 When Grivas learned from the radio on February 14 that the Ethnarch had invited twenty-three Greek Cypriot personalities to join him in London to serve as an advisory body and that these were to leave the next day, he was very painfully astonished. The Bishop of Kition had ignored assurances he had given to EOKA's leader that in any future negotiations the struggling people of Cyprus — EOKA, in other words — would be duly represented. Both the Ethnarch and the Greek government, he suspected, wanted to avoid having him appoint EOKA representatives to attend the London conference, lest these reject the Zürich agreements.9 The day before Ethnarch Makarios and the Bishop of Kition flew to London, the latter acknowledged receipt of Grivas' letter of February 13 and fully concurred with its contents. Demonstrations in favor of the agreements would be desirable as soon as agreement was reached in London. The presence of a small Turkish military contingent on Cyprus was, unfortunately, linked to the proposed treaty of alliance which included Turkey. On the basis, however, of existing international practice, he perceived a possibility for Cyprus as an independent state to denounce at an appropriate moment this treaty as well as other points of the agreement. 10

7

Grivas Memoirs, p. 377. Vima, May 20, 1959 (on Dervis articles in Ethnos of Nicosia). 8 Grivas Memoirs, pp. 377-378. Various figures are given about the representatives invited. The original figure seems to have been 25-27. Stephens, Cyprus: A Place of Arms, p. 164, mentions 38. 9 Grivas Memoirs, pp. 378-379. 10 Ibid., p. 379.

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C. THE LONDON CYPRUS CONFERENCE — ITS FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Meanwhile, the discussions among the Greek, Turkish and British Foreign Ministers, which had begun in London the evening of February 11, had gone on, making good progress. On February 12 in the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Lloyd welcomed the Greek-Turkish agreements of Zürich, expressing pleasure that the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey had come to London to acquaint the British government with the agreements' provisions. He declared that his government had always maintained that the only hope for a final solution of the Cyprus problem lay in agreement between the Greek and Turkish governments and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Speaking on this occasion for the Opposition, Bevan likewise expressed pleasure at the extent of the agreement reached so far. 11 Next day, as the Foreign Ministers announced that Makarios and Kü$ük had been invited to London to take part in discussions on the Cyprus question, Sir Hugh Foot arrived from Nicosia and in an airport statement paid warm tribute to the spirit the Premiers and Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey had displayed. The Cyprus situation, he said, had been transformed by "something very much like a miracle". 12 On February 16, however, the day after Makarios arrived in London, 13 and on the eve of the London Conference on Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot representatives conferred with Makarios as chairman. After the Ethnarch explained to them the Zürich agreements, he invited them to present their own views. Twenty-five out of the twenty-seven Greek Cypriots present there voted against accepting the agreements. This may have pleased the Ethnarch because it provided him with ammunition to reject at the last moment certain provisions of these agreements. At the end of the meeting, however, he made it clear that the views of the Greek Cypriot representatives were but of a consultative character and that he, as representative of the Cypriot people, would be free to decide.14 The Ethnarch informed the Greek Foreign Minister of these developments and said he would be unable to sign the agreements. Averoif11 599 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 1356-1357. 12 Keesing's, 16645. « Ibid. 14 Dervis interview, in Ethnos (Nicosia), May 20, 1959. Of the remaining two Greek Cypriot representatives, one said he would do what the Ethnarch wished, the other made an ambiguous statement. Grivas Memoirs, p. 381. Vima, May 20,1959.

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Tossizza promptly phoned the news to Premier Karamanlis in Athens. Together with his aides, he launched a vigorous backstage campaign to bring about a change of mind among the Greek Cypriot representatives. Foreign Minister Zorlu likewise phoned the news to Ankara, to Premier Menderes. Thus, on February 17 the fate of the entire conference appeared to be in the balance. Nonetheless, the first plenary session of the Cyprus Conference of 1959 opened on Tuesday, February 17, at 11:30 a.m. with Ethnarch Makarios present. Its chairman, Foreign Secretary Lloyd, started out with a statement on his government's position on the Zürich agreements. He welcomed the fact that the conference was taking place. Some of the participants had worked for it for a long time, and both Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd and he, himself, were attending it on behalf of their government in seeking a just solution of the Cyprus question, which, as all knew, had been fraught with many difficulties and had caused much bitterness in Cyprus and outside Cyprus. With this conference a moment of destiny had been reached for Cyprus and for the countries associated with Cyprus. The conference had become possible, Lloyd went on to say, because of the agreements the Greek and Turkish governments had reached at Zürich. Those present were familiar with the story of these negotiations which had begun toward the end of the previous year and had culminated in the Zürich agreements. The British government knew about these negotiations and fully supported them, because it believed that they were a good way to see whether the two governments could reach agreement, having in mind the basic requirements of any plan for a solution of the Cyprus problem. The basic requirements of such a plan in the British view, were: first, that the strategic needs of the British government should be met in a manner that was impossible to challenge and was absolutely clear for all to see; second, that reconciliation should take place between the two main communities in Cyprus; third, that Greek-Turkish friendship, which was so important for security and stability in the eastern Mediterranean, should be re-created; and, finally, that the Cypriots themselves be given the opportunity to develop their institutions. At the outset of the Greek-Turkish negotiations, Lloyd continued, his government had made it clear to the Greek and Turkish governments that so long as British military requirements were met by the retention of bases on Cyprus under British sovereignty, together with the provision of such facilities as would be necessary, the British government would

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approve the transfer of sovereignty to a new State of Cyprus, which would be created on the basis of friendship and of agreement between Greece and Turkey and between the communities of the island. The background requirements and position of the British government which had been made clear at the beginning had not changed since then. After summarizing the main points of the three Zürich agreements, Lloyd observed that the two Foreign Ministers, who had arrived in London the previous week, had explained these documents to him. His government, he declared, welcomed these agreements and understood that the Greek and Turkish governments were acting with the knowledge and approval of the acknowledged leaders of the two Cypriot communities in drawing up these agreements. Then, Lloyd formally presented his government's position in what became a conference document which was later published.15 In this document, the British government, having examined the Zürich agreements and having taken into account the consultations in London, from February 11 to 16, 1959, among the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Britain, declared that it accepted the Zürich agreements as the foundation for the final settlement of the Cyprus problem, if Britain's requirements for two military bases on Cyprus under full British sovereignty were accepted and provision were made by agreement for the protection of the fundamental human rights of the various communities in Cyprus, and of the interests of the members of the public services in Cyprus; if, too, the nationality of the persons affected by the settlement was determined, and the Republic of Cyprus assumed the appropriate obligations of the current Cyprus government, including the settlement of claims. Under this declaration, the British government also welcomed the draft Treaty of Alliance among Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey and affirmed that it would cooperate with the parties to that treaty in the common defense of Cyprus. Lloyd then noted that there was one obvious omission from this declaration: the timetable of events leading to the transfer of sovereignty. This matter would have to be dealt with in the course of further discussions. Another point he then made was that in the Treaty of Guarantee, the British government wished to have inserted an article under which Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus would undertake to respect the integrity of the British bases and to guarantee the use and enjoyment by Britain of the rights to be secured to Britain by Cyprus in accordance with the British 15

Cyprus Conference, pp. 11-13.

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declaration. And there was also an annex setting out the various facilities required for the operation of the bases — a document that would be duly circulated which he did not think worthwhile reading before the conference.16 In addition to the British declaration on the Zurich agreements and the article inserted in the Treaty of Guarantee in order to maintain the position set out in the declaration, there were also numerous financial matters to deal with, Lloyd continued. At the moment the British Exchequer was subsidizing the Cyprus government to a considerable extent. There were, too, the problems of setting up the Army and security forces, and of protecting the interests of the smaller communities (the Armenians, Maronites, and British residents). And there was a mass of administrative problems of great complexity. He wanted to be frank. Having made this declaration, having taken the decision to transfer sovereignty upon the terms he had set out, his government believed that the quicker it was done, the better. No unnecessary delays were desirable. The planning and the administrative work required should be pushed on just as fast as possible. The question of nationality both of Cypriots in the new Republic of Cyprus and of Cypriots living abroad was one among the many complicated problems which had to be settled. But because that morning he had warned about some of the difficulties, one should not think for that reason the British government was going to attempt unnecessary delays in the process. Having made the decision, it would, if its declaration were accepted, push on in good faith and with the utmost good will and carry into effect as speedily as possible the birth of this new state, with which, it hoped, Britain would have many ties and common interests still and a feeling of the utmost friendship. Therefore, with due solemnity, because this was a very important decision, a very important departure of policy, he made this declaration on behalf of Her Majesty's government. The Greek Foreign Minister, speaking next, thanked Lloyd both for the invitation the British government had extended to his government immediately after being informed of the Zurich agreements, and for the declaration Lloyd had just made. Greece, as was well known, had fought for four orfiveyears for the claim of the Greek Cypriots, without animosity but in a spirit of good feeling and as a moral and historic duty. He thought that all sides had made many mistakes. Naturally his government believed it had done its best 13

Cyprus Conference, p. 13.

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but the other governments, too, also believed they had done their best, and Greece respected this view. During the political struggle over Cyprus, many difficulties, including psychological and emotional difficulties in many countries and many people had been revealed. These objective, internal political, and psychological difficulties had shown that it was necessary to reach a compromise. Bismarck had said that politics was "the art of the possible". Poincaré had said it was "the art of finding practical solutions". He, himself, firmly believed that politics was not the art of the possible but the art of finding what one desired and what was not impracticable. Accordingly, after five years of hardships for the people of Cyprus, the Greek government, having studied the reactions of the world to this very dangerous matter, had decided to search and see if a compromise solution could be found. He had engaged in long talks with his friend, Foreign Minister Zorlu, in a spirit of sincerity, of justice, in a spirit of "neither Greece nor Turkey nor the Greek Cypriots nor the Turkish Cypriots", so that no one would be the winner and no one the loser, but everyone should be relatively satisfied. It was obvious that no one would get one hundred per cent of what he wanted, but clearly he should have his fundamental interests secured in the best way possible. He thought that in this task of finding a solution, the interests of every party had been relatively covered. And success had been achieved. After long talks, long negotiations, which often were hard because of the problems' complexity, a solution had been reached in an agreement which upheld the principles of democracy and of modern humanity. In this solution the people of Cyprus would be free and independent to decide about their life and well-being. All matters that ought to be separated because they were of a completely different nature, religious affairs, for example, had been separated. And the majority, which was overwhelming, had been respected and would have a larger share of the administration. But the minority also had been given not only rights but a fair share in the administration. And the system of administration was such that the Turks of Cyprus would not feel they were at the mercy of the majority, if that majority wanted to be unfair. Provisions, too, had been made for the security of Turkey and of Britain. The latter's security needs had been so well covered that they had not even been discussed because it was impossible that they would not be covered as the British government wanted. Having reached agreement on these lines, Averoff-Tossizza continued, the final meetings had taken place in Zurich with the two Premiers

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present. After five days of new discussions an agreement had been signed. This had been done because it was in the common interests of both Greece and Turkey in the middle of a world that was full of dangers that could not be ignored. These agreements had been signed because it was felt that they covered both relatively and absolutely the interests of the people of Cyprus as a whole. His government had signed these agreements also because "the respected man who is at the head of the Greek community in Cyprus", who had been considered in all the Greek government's deliberations as representing the will of the Greeks of Cyprus, had informed the Greek government that he was in accord with these agreements. But, Averoff-Tossizza added, he did not think his government had signed these agreements only because it had the Ethnarch's agreement. It had signed them because it was convinced that the relatively best possible solution had been reached. If at the same time the Greek government took into consideration the Ethnarch's opinion, it was for the fundamental reason that it had declared during its discussions that it would not impose these decisions by force or by other means on the Greek Cypriots. In this connection, he noted that in his talks with Zorlu, the question of whether the Republic of Cyprus would remain in the British Commonwealth or not had not been discussed. This was consistent with his government's principle of not wishing to impose anything upon the Cypriots. On this question, his government would take no position. It would be up to the Cypriots to decide whether they would remain in the British Commonwealth or not. His government's intention not to impose on the people of Cyprus whatever had been decided, continued Averoff-Tossizza, did not mean that his government would not stick to the Zurich agreements. The Greek government had always honored its decisions. It would honor its decision in this case, too. It would stand behind this agreement the Greek Premier had signed. The agreement's contents constituted now the foreign policy of Greece on the Cyprus question. But his government would also tell "our brothers in Cyprus" that to the best of its knowledge, it believed that the Zurich agreements were the best possible settlement that could be reached under the actual circumstances. It was in this spirit that, having read the British government's declaration, he wanted to declare in the name of the Greek government that he accepted the declaration together with the documents approved by the heads of the Greek and Turkish governments as providing the agreed foundation for a final settlement. He would, however, make only one

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remark. He fully agreed with Lloyd's words about the timing of the transfer of sovereignty under the conditions the British Foreign Secretary had mentioned. For the Greek government, too, the time should be short. It was, therefore, important, since this was a compromise agreement, to fix a date that could not be very remote. He had studied the question not only with Foreign Minister Zorlu but also with the people of Cyprus, and the Greek government firmly believed that the proper agreement should be concluded before the end of 1959. If in some branches certain difficulties arose, they could be left out of this date. This was his government's position. Adressing himself now to the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Foreign Minister said that it was his government's deep belief that it had done work that was useful for them also because as a result of his negotiations with the Turkish Foreign Minister they were getting what they needed. They were also given the possibility, in a spirit of cooperation with the Greeks who for centuries had lived with them in peace, to live in an independent island governed by all of its people for the well-being of all of its people. The moment then had come for an agreement, after which all the people of Cyprus should immediately start to work for the drafting of a new Constitution within the framework of the fundamental articles of the Zürich agreements. The moment had come to work for the transfer of authority in Cyprus, to organize the new state, and to reorganize the island for the well-being of all its people. The Greek government very eagerly wished that the Cypriots — all the Cypriots — would agree to this and that this constructive and peaceful work would begin. It was convinced that by agreeing the Cypriots were not only doing the only thing that could be done, but were also helping the two countries which the island loved more than any other countiies. In his peroration, the Greek Foreign Minister observed that a great weight, extending from Moscow to the Balkan mountains, was pressing down upon Greece. Both Greece and Turkey, because of this common danger, could not afford the animosity the Cyprus question had aroused between them. Necessity obliged them to get together. Only in this way could they hope to be able to survive. Consequently, the Greek government would do its best to maintain this policy of cooperation and to solve the Cyprus problem along the lines laid down at Zürich, in order to create peaceful and constructive cooperation on the island. The Turkish Foreign Minister then spoke. He thanked the British government both for having called the conference to discuss the Zürich

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agreements, and for deciding to accept these agreements. The Turkish government was in full agreement with the declaration Foreign Secretary Lloyd had made on behalf of his government. And he wanted to thank his friend, the Greek Foreign Minister, for the kind words and the full explanation he had given on the Zürich agreements. These agreements had been the result of very tough discussions and very long disputes which unfortunately had cast more than a shadow over the good relations between Turkey and Greece as well as over the relations of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. The governments of Turkey and Greece, inspired by the spirit of leaders like Atatürk and Venizelos, had done their utmost to reach agreement. The two Foreign Ministers had a very hard time. Averoff-Tossizza was a very tough negotiator, too. This was not a complaint, but showed how difficult the task was of reaching agreement. He wanted to pay the Greek Foreign Minister a compliment because he was defending not only Greek Cypriot but also Turkish Cypriot interests. Zorlu then went on to say a few words about the Zürich agreements. First, he stressed that these agreements represented a binding and final solution which required only the British government's acquiescence in order to be put into effect. With the spirit and friendship and mutual understanding which had inspired the talks taking place in London during the last days, this acquiescence had already been achieved so that now one could look at the work of Zürich as representing a strong and immutable foundation of the policy of the three governments. And he could accept the point Averoff-Tossizza had made that no one wanted to impose this solution on the two communities, and he thought the opportunity existed to have contact with them during the negotiations. This would be the best solution if one really wanted to settle the dispute and establish cooperation and collaboration without going to extreme solutions with the two communities in Cyprus. The second point Zorlu wanted to emphasize was that the Zürich agreements represented the outcome of long and complicated discussions. These had led to a compromise solution which constituted a whole. From this whole it was not possible to remove one single part without endangering the entire solution. If he was saying this, it was not because he feared that something like that would happen. He only wanted to remind the conference of the importance of keeping this point in mind. Finally, a third point on which Zorlu wanted to dwell was that there was no doubt that the Zürich agreements represented the termination of a long and thorny way in the relations between the different parties and

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especially between Greece and Turkey. Zürich was the starting point of the return to the spirit of sincere friendship and cooperation. This, he thought, was the most striking feature of the Zürich conference and gave the greatest hope for the future that the existence and welfare of Cyprus would be preserved. In conclusion, the Turkish Foreign Minister expressed his happiness at the presence of representatives of the two Cypriot communities at the conference and hoped that they would find between themselves the same spirit of cooperation that existed between Averoff-Tossizza and himself and between the Turkish and Greek Premiers. Chairman Lloyd at this point, after observing that it was now for the Cypriot representatives to speak, suggested that they might prefer to reserve their remarks, at all events their main comments, until the next day. His two colleagues and he, himself, had made important declarations, and he offered this merely as a suggestion, not for the purpose of stopping anything, but purely for the convenience of those representatives. "When would the British declaration be submitted?" inquired AveroffTossizza. "In the course of the day", replied Lloyd. The Cyprus Ethnarch then made his statement. First of all, he expressed deep appreciation for all the work which had been done and the spirit of cooperation which had prevailed at Zürich between the Greek and Turkish governments, and the great response on the part of the British government, for which all were grateful. It had been done in a positive spirit of sincere and mutual trust so that the Greek and Turkish people of Cyprus could go forward together, cooperating as one united people in their common benefit for the welfare and progress of their island. The Zürich agreements and the expressed intention of the British government to transfer sovereignty were a good basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem. However, he had some reservations on certain points of the agreements which did not seem workable. But he was fully convinced that the representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities, through close cooperation in a spirit of good will, would satisfactorily prepare a detailed Constitution. He also wished to raise several points concerning the proposed treaties of alliance and guarantee, Makarios added. Finally, in this brief statement, he expressed the hope that this conference would put an end to the unpleasant situation in Cyprus which had grieved all. Speaking on behalf of Dr. Kü?ük, as representative of the Turkish Cypriots, Rauf Denkta? thanked the Conference chairman for the in-

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vitation to the conference. He had, he said, taken full account of what all the representatives of the three interested governments had said in the matter and had carefully listened to the words of the representative of the Greek community in Cyprus. He wished to assure all concerned that the Turkish community's position was, as always, one of cooperation and coexistence in Cyprus in peace, and he felt that the Zürich agreements had provided for this. He could not but agree with the Turkish Foreign Minister's statement that this was the time to accept the agreements and endorse them, and to go ahead with them. After having studied the documents to be circulated he hoped to make a further statement next day. After the preliminary statements of the two Cypriot representatives, Lloyd asked whether the conference should adjourn until next day. The Foreign Ministers, he observed, still had some points to clear up among themselves. Perhaps the next plenary meeting of the conference could take place in the morning, next day — February 18. As for the three Foreign Ministers, they might meet at 3:00 p.m. that same afternoon. Averoff-Tossiz2a remarked that Premiers Karamanlis and Menderes were arriving in London that afternoon but one could send messages to them. He then went on to praise the spirit of understanding that prevailed at the conference table. When Lloyd repeated his question about holding a meeting next morning, Makarios said Yes. Whereupon Lloyd asked whether he might be permitted to communicate the exact time for the next plenary meeting later, because he did not know whether the Premiers would be attending and, if they were to attend, what time would suit them. A brief exchange followed over the press release to be issued on the Conference's first plenary meeting. The three Foreign Ministers agreed that this release should mention that the Greek and Turkish governments had reaffirmed the Zürich agreements and that the British government had accepted them, with the Greek and Turkish governments on their side accepting the British declaration. When Lloyd asked whether the release should mention that the representatives of the Cypriots had made preliminary remarks or preliminary observations, Ethnarch Makarios said he wanted to have a meeting with the Turkish Cypriot representative, who welcomed this proposal. Finally it was agreed also to include in the press release reference to the afternoon meetings of both the three Foreign Ministers and of the leaders of the two Cypriot communities.

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D. KARAMANLIS-MAKARIOS CONFRONTATION IN LONDON

When this first plenary meeting of the Conference was over, Sir Hugh Foot sought out the members of the Greek Cypriot delegation. Makarios had appointed the Mayor of Nicosia, Themistocles Dervis, as their spokesman. During this late afternoon meeting, sharp exchanges occurred. Sir Hugh adjured the Greek Cypriot representatives to accept the agreements. Otherwise, he said, the opportunity would never arise again. The word "never", replied Dervis, reminded him of Hopkinson's famous "never", which had brought about misfortunes to the British Empire. That moment, he got a message to hurry to the Greek Embassy, at the request of Karamanlis.17 As soon as Premier Karamanlis learned on February 16 about Makarios' refusal to subscribe to the Zürich agreements, he called a Cabinet meeting and told his colleagues about his intention to fly to London immediately, to defend the interests of Cyprus and the honor of Greece. The Cabinet fully approved of the Premier's decision, and on February 17, accompanied by his physician (for he was running a high temperature), he left for London. From the plane, he radioed to the Greek Embassy there to arrange immediately on his arrival a meeting with AveroffTossizza, Makarios and leading members of the Greek Cypriot delegation. On arriving in London, Karamanlis heard that Premier Menderes, who had suggested that the two Premiers take the same plane to the British capital, had been rushed to the hospital because of injuries suffered when the plane carrying the Turkish official and several aides crashed as it was about to land at Gatwick airport.18 Instead of going to his hotel, Karamanlis went straight to the Greek Embassy. Waiting for him there were Averoff-Tossizza, Ambassadors Seferiadis and Palamas, Makarios with the Bishop of Kition, Mayor Dervis, Zenon Rossides, and another leading Cypriot, George Chrysafinis. It was about 6:30 p.m. "What's happening?" Karamanlis asked Averoff-Tossizza. "Mr. President, Archbishop Makarios refuses to endorse the agreements." "Why has Your Beatitude's position changed? You had agreed to the accords without reservations. Only after that did I accept, as you know, the British government's idea for a conference. Have you forgotten our 17 18

Dervis interview, in Ethnos (Nicosia), May 20, 1959. Keesing's, 16645.

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discussions in Athens and our agreement on the entire line? Do not the Cypriots realize the historic opportunity that is presented to them by accepting the independence they are offered?" Karamanlis then went on to explain the advantages of the agreements which had been achieved after hard struggles and extremely tough negotiations. The Cypriots were now offered for the first time in their two millenia of history the opportunity to get their independence. The obligations to be undertaken by the Republic of Cyprus constituted the minimum guarantees which Turkey and Britain demanded in order to accept the Greek position of independence for Cyprus. The agreements achieved exhausted all possibilities of further negotiations, constituted an indivisible whole, could be accepted only as a whole, and henceforth constituted the Greek government's policy on the Cyprus question. Although Greece would not impose upon the Cypriots any particular solution, the Cypriots should be aware that they would bear the responsibility for any consequences that might occur if they rejected the Ziirich agreements. The Greek government could not diverge one iota from the terms of the agreements because, on the one hand, it had exhausted all means for a further effective struggle, and, on the other, dangers threatened the more general interests of Greece and Greece's position had reached a critical point. Regardless, however, of the worth of the solution offered, Karamanlis expressed astonishment over the Ethnarch's last-minute retreat. From the very outset and uninterruptedly, he had kept him informed about developments of the negotiations at every stage, and these had been continued with his full consent. In particular, Karamanlis mentioned the conference he had held with him, in the presence also of the Bishop of Kition, three days before his departure for Ziirich, when Makarios again had expressed agreement.19 At this point, the Bishop of Kition intervened, to confirm the Premier's words. And Makarios himself, imperturbable, acknowledged their accuracy. Karamanlis then reminded Makarios that immediately after initialing the Ziirich agreements, he himself had conveyed to him their complete texts and the Ethnarch had agreed on them. It was only after Makarios had expressed agreement with these documents that the Greek government had gone ahead and accepted the calling of thefive-partyconference. The Cyprus Ethnarch, in reply, said that the Greek government was 19

See above, Chapter X, pp. 401^t06.

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absolutely in order, and that he had indeed given his consent to the Zürich agreements. However, after he had received information from Cyprus, he was obliged to declare that he would be able to accept the basic constitutional structure of the Cyprus Republic, reserving his right to bring about certain changes to it, in agreement with the Turkish Cypriots. He would be unable to accept, on the other hand, the Treaty of Alliance as well as certain provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee. When other Cypriots present said that under the circumstances mentioned by the Premier, the Ethnarch's attitude was incomprehensible, Makarios exclaimed: "Gentlemen, you may be right. But I abdicate from the leadership of the Cypriot struggle, which one of you may take over." The Premier, after again chiding Makarios for having retreated from his original position, declared that the international status and honor of Greece did not allow the Greek government to indulge in such retreats. Greece had not come to London to become a laughing stock. It was too small a country to dishonor its word. Consequently, it would adhere to the agreements. "I draw your attention to the consequences of your attitude and must declare the following: I neither desire nor am able to press you to take part in the conference and sign the agreements. I inform you, however, that I shall protect the honor of Greece, which accepted the invitation to the conference after your assent, and I shall go to the conference. I also declare that by signing these agreements, my government ends its Cypriot policy. You are free, if you wish, to continue the struggle alone." The discussion ended after this statement of Karamanlis. Shortly before leaving, however, Makarios said he would agree to sign the Treaty of Alliance, if its duration were to be limited to ten years. Thus after this dramatic exchange, the fate of the Conference still remained in the balance. E. THE SECOND PLENARY MEETING O F T H E LONDON CYPRUS CONFERENCE

The second plenary meeting of the Cyprus Conference at Lancaster House started next day not in the morning of February 18, butat7:00p.m. According to some press reports, Menderes' plane crash mishap had something to do with this delay.20 However, the main reason for it was 20

Downing Street had announced that no conference meeting would be held on February 18, 1959, because of the plane accident, Keesing's, 16646.

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Makarios' continued reluctance to give his blessing to the Zürich agreements as they stood. Averoff-Tossizza himself, at the Greek Embassy, the morning of February 18, exerted strenuous efforts toward getting the various Greek Cypriot representatives to change their minds over the agreements they had almost unanimously rejected at their meeting of February 16. He pointed out that the Cyprus Ethnarch had originally accepted the agreements and argued that if he now rejected them, the Greek government would be exposed and, in turn, would be obliged to expose Makarios in the eyes of the Greek people. 21 "Further catastrophes and sacrifices will be on your head", he is said to have told them. Sir Hugh Foot and Kü$ük reportedly visited the Ethnarch to persuade him to endorse the Zürich agreements. 22 A new meeting of the Cyprus representatives took place at noon on February 18. After conferring for two hours, twentytwo out of twenty-five Greek Cypriot leaders now voted in favor of giving the Ethnarch carte blanche in dealing with the issue, including the authority to sign the Zürich agreements. They had been swayed, it seems, by information to the effect that nothing would please the British more than the breakdown of the conference. According to the press again, at 5:00 p.m. the three Foreign Ministers decided to call the second plenary meeting of the Cyprus Conference at evening. 23 Chairman Lloyd started out by expressing the deep sympathy of all participants for their Turkish colleague and their sorrow at the loss of life in the plane crash of the day before. Turning then to business, Lloyd announced that the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers had reaffirmed their acceptance of the British Declaration circulated the day before. The representatives of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities would now be heard, he added, calling upon the Cyprus Ethnarch to speak. The Ethnarch, after opening remarks of sympathy for the victims of the air crash, once again expressed in a most emphatic way his gratitude for the great work the Greek and Turkish governments had accomplished at Zürich. In the relations between Greece and Turkey a totally new and 21 22

Grivas Memoirs, p. 381. Vima, May 20, 1959.

Keesing's, 16646. 23 Dervis interview in Ethnos (Nicosia), May 20, 1959. Dervis explained the representatives were motivated by fear not of partition but of the withdrawal of the British to their bases, so that the rest of the island would be left at the mercy of the Turkish auxiliary policemen and the Turkish Cypriots who were better armed. Only EOKA could help. And Turkish guerrillas were ready to land on Cyprus. He also asserts that in the rural areas, British soldiers had engaged in acts of vandalism.

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happy atmosphere had been created. At the same time friendly relations between the Greek and Turkish people in Cyprus had been reestablished. The British government's prompt response to the Zürich agreements and its readiness to transfer sovereignty over Cyprus had been most constructive. Therefore, on behalf of the people of Cyprus, he expressed his deepest appreciation and thankfulness. In his brief address of the day before, Makarios went on to say, he had mentioned that he had certain reservations on certain points of the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus which did not seem workable. He also had reserved his attitude with regard to the proposed two treaties. He now intended to refer to these reservations as quickly as possible. With regard to the basic constitutional structure, he had the following observations to make: First, in Point 7, the provision that the levy of taxes or fees would require a separate majority of the Greek and Turkish members present in the House of Representatives in order to become valid was likely to make for some difficulties in the normal functioning of the government machinery. Second, clarification was required on Point 8 about the extent of the President's or Vice-President's right of veto of any law or decision in foreign affairs. Was this intended to include ordinary administrative decisions on foreign affairs? And, third, he believed that the ratio of thirty per cent of Turkish Cypriots in the civil service was not justifiable. With regard to the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee, he had the following reservations: He did not object to the Treaty of Alliance in itself, but wanted it concluded as a treaty on terms and not as a basic article of the Cyprus Constitution with all the implications such an article involved. His reservation on the Treaty of Guarantee regarded the provisions of Article 3 of that treaty which made it possible for any one of the guarantor states to take separate action in intervening in the internal affairs of Cyprus. In conclusion, Makarios requested the three governments to give serious consideration to his remarks on the Zürich agreements. Reiterating his gratefulness for the efforts of the governments in reaching agreement, he nonetheless thought that the Conference could not be placed "in the position to take it or leave ii". He accepted the agreements as a good basis toward the final solution of the Cyprus problem. Dr. Kü?ük followed with his statement. The Cyprus question, in his view, no doubt had started as a dispute between two sides, the Greeks of Cyprus wanting one hundred per cent union of the island with Greece, and the Turks declaring that Cyprus was Turkish for a variety of reasons.

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It was, however, not necessary to recapitulate the misery and bloodshed which had ensued during the last four years. The Cyprus dispute had embittered Greek-Turkish relations on the mainland but the Turkish case throughout had been, despite Turkish public opinion, one of a reasonable approach to a difficult task. Whenever a chance of finding an end to this strife appeared, the Turks had shown willingness to accept it. Each time the chance had been missed because the Greek side wanted one hundred per cent of all it had set out to get. Names changed but the plan was exactly the same. As days went by, exasperation grew. So did the rift between the two communities. Tragedy of an unprecedented degree loomed ahead. Two communities strong enough to rout each other had either to clash in a final and bloody conflict, or to find a compromise. Greece and Turkey, alive to the situation and fully realizing the consequences of such a clash, had produced a compromise at last. They had done so, fully aware that for the Turks of Cyprus, whatever Turkey said or dished out as right and just would be acceptable, and that the Greeks of Cyprus would not reject whatever Greece offered. The Zürich agreements had been the result of this understanding and he was grateful to the countries which had produced them and to the country which had endorsed and blessed them. The day before, continued Küpük, he had said that the Turkish Cypriots would fully cooperate in this new spirit of Greek-Turkish friendship and do their utmost to make this plan work. They were ready and willing to discuss the details and working arrangements of this plan. They were under the impression that the Greek side would accept the situation in the same spirit and would treat the Zürich agreements as the beginning of a new life, not as a basis for new negotiations. Because the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots could not themselves produce a compromise, Turkey and Greece had worked out an acceptable and reasonable compromise for both. The Cyprus dispute had to stop somewhere before it turned into calamity not only for Cyprus but also for its neighbors. The Zürich agreements were the result of a realistic approach to this complex problem. In this spirit of understanding and good will, Kü?ük observed, he had met Makarios the previous afternoon to discuss the difficulties in the working arrangements of the Cyprus Constitution, as he had put it, and the points or reservations which he had now made before the Conference. The Turkish Cypriots felt that these points concerned fundamental provisions of the Zürich agreements and they had taken due note of them and studied them later that day. It was, however, impossible to

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agree to open negotiations on the Zürich agreements which the Turkish Cypriots had taken to be the final framework within which one would be working. To start altering the framework would be to start pulling down the whole structure. He had informed Makarios of these views that morning. The Zürich agreements were calculated to bring about "a Republic of the peoples of Cyprus". The agreements recognized the rights of the two peoples and compromised on points where these rights clashed. In time, under this arrangement, the notion of Cypriot nationality might be bom, but before that notion was born, each side would have to make certain sacrifices and show understanding. The Turkish Cypriots were prepared to do so. If, however, they accepted Makarios' observations as a ground for opening negotiations on the Zürich agreements, then they did not know where they would be ending. As for Point 7 of the Basic Structure and Makarios' observation on it, this was a recognition of the existence of two communities in Cyprus and gave them the right to prevent obnoxious taxation of the peoples of Cyprus. There was no doubt that if taxation was for the good of the country as a whole, the majority of the Greek representatives voting in the House of Representatives would vote for it. So would the majority of the Turkish representatives. As for Makarios' objection to the right of veto of the President and Vice-President on foreign affairs and the need for its clarification, Küsük felt it was unneccessary because, as far as he knew, the Greek and Turkish governments had defined what these foreign affairs were,24 and this was was known to Makarios as it was known to himself. The third objection — to the ratio of Turkish Cypriots in the civil service — indicated, in Kügük's view, that the Turkish Cypriots were still to be treated in the eyes of the Greek side as a mere minority, not as a community. This was not a justifiable approach to a compromise. One was asked to compromise on a compromise. "Our case was that Cyprus was Turkish and we are entitled to all that Cyprus gave". The thirty per cent ratio of Turkish Cypriots in the civil service had been given as a compromise and had been accepted, although it did not meet with all the Turkish Cypriot requests. As for the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee, these were matters among the three nations most concerned with the future of Cyprus. They provided guarantees to the Turkish Cypriots who would 24

See below, "Gentlemen's Agreement" between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, pp. 458-459.

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hesitate before requesting anyone to change or reformulate these guarantees. The Turkish Cypriots therefore accepted them in full and called on Makarios and on the Greek side to approach this final and last compromise in a good spirit and with readiness, and to share its benefits. Thirty per cent of Turkish Cypriots in the administration might seem too much in numbers but giving this thirty per cent a chance in the administration would gain Turkish Cypriot cooperation to the full. This was a case of compromise, Kügük concluded. The Turkish Cypriots accepted it. They accepted, too, the declaration the three governments had made the day before, and were prepared in a good spirit of friendliness and cooperation to endorse them to the full. Speaking next, the Greek Foreign Minister declared it was his duty to his country's good name, since this had been challenged, to reaffirm his government's willingness to adhere to the policy laid down in the Zürich agreements and the agreements with Britain. But it was his duty not only toward the good name of Greece but also toward the people of Cyprus to say that his government felt that the arrangements made had created the conditions for a happy island. Both he himself and many other persons respected Ethnarch Makarios. And he understood very well his reservations. Nor did he wish to challenge his right to change his views, because human beings changed views. For Makarios had changed his views since the time he, the Foreign Minister, had informed the British Foreign Secretary that, having seen the Zürich documents, the Ethnarch was in agreement with them. However, he wanted to assure the Ethnarch as well as the people of Cyprus that these reservations, as well as other reservations he himself had or could formulate, would not impede the agreement, the functioning of the new state, and the happiness of its people, if collaboration on the island could occur, as he was convinced it could occur. But he would prefer not to enter into details concerning these and other reservations. He would like only to note that the thirty per cent ratio of Turkish Cypriots in the civil service did not correspond to the ratio of the ethnic groups in the population of Cyprus, as was well known from the island's statistics. His government, however, as well as many Greek Cypriots, felt that as their Turkish brothers on the island constituted only eighteen per cent of the population, it was only fair to give them a bigger part in the administration so that they might feel greater confidence for their future collaboration with the community with which they had lived on peaceful terms for so many centuries. "We felt this was a very small

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thing that we could give, sacrificing some of our own interests so as to create again conditions of collaboration." In general, Averoff-Tossizza went on to observe, if no spirit of collaboration existed between Greece and Turkey and between Greeks and Turks of Cyprus, the entire agreements, not only those parts of the agreements upon which reservations existed, would impede the Constitution's workability. If, however, this spirit of collaboration existed—and he wanted categorically to declare that the governments would adhere to this spirit — then not a single reservation could exist, because no veto would ever be raised without reason and nothing would impede the workability of the system which had been created. Because, however, he was deeply convinced that the people of Greece and Turkey and their governments were determined to work hand in hand in a world in which mounting threats endangered the two countries, and because the Greeks and the Turks of Cyprus had lived for so many centuries in a spirit of brotherhood, he believed that the system established by the Zurich agreements would be welcome. Even matters that could and perhaps should arouse suspicions now, would have no effect. With his friend Zorlu, he had discussed the question of the guarantee. The Turkish Foreign Minister had told him: "Do you think we want to stir up trouble over very small matters? But don't you think that in view of the atmosphere of suspicion which had prevailed we must not have the right to intervene if a coup de main is made?" Knowing the leaders of Turkey, Averoff-Tossizza was confident that they would not try to cause trouble and prevent agreement over small questions — what someone might think about enosis, for instance, or partition. But Averoff-Tossizza wanted to assure the Greek Cypriots that his government had taken care of their pride and had done nothing that could diminish this pride. Greece was a proud country. It had done very well during its 130 years of free life. It was respected in the international family of the world. Yet, at the time of its birth, Greece had been the object of several guarantees and had accorded similar rights to the three protector powers of those times.25 This had not prevented the Greeks from working well or from having a proud life in the world. He was convinced that with Ethnarch Makarios' high spirit of morality which he himself had often witnessed, and with the good nature of his 26

Under the treaties of London of May 7, 1832, of November 14, 1863, and, as regards the Ionian islands, of March 29,1864, Britain, France, and Russia had certain rights of supervision and control over Greece.

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brothers in Cyprus and of the Turks of Cyprus, too, all these matters would not impede agreement or prevent the overcoming of current suspicions. Foreign Minister Zorlu followed with a similar appeal for cooperation and acceptance of the Zürich agreements. He had, he said, very few things to add after the declaration of his friend, Averoff-Tossizza. With deep attention he had heard the statements of Ethnarch Makarios and Dr. Kü?ük. He emphasized that both in Zürich and in several meetings with the Greek Foreign Minister before Zürich, efforts had been exerted to create an atmosphere of friendship, co-operation and collaboration between Greece and Turkey and between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots on the island. Implementing all these agreements was a matter of spirit, of feeling. If the Cyprus communities as well as Greece and Turkey were really willing to cooperate for the welfare of the people of Cyprus and of their Republic, they could without any doubt make these agreements workable. These agreements, the result of a compromise, were, as Averoff-Tossizza had said, directed, on the one hand, toward creating an atmosphere of confidence for the Turkish community, which could feel itself in a minority in face of the Greek community, and, on the other hand, presupposed that the two communities would have to work together if they did not want to be separated but united. Many articles in these agreements, Zorlu went on to say, needed very close cooperation and understanding between the two leaders of Cyprus, the President of the Republic and the Vice-President. If it was not possible to ensure this cooperation, this friendship, this brotherhood, no agreement was workable, because the basis of any agreement was a matter of feeling, of sentiment, of good will. "If both of you are looking upon each other not as brothers but as people trying to have the others under the domination of yourselves, you can never find yourselves in agreement. But if you look upon each other as brothers, as people who ought to come to an understanding and collaboration, who prefer to use the bases already laid, then the foundation of a settlement is already there." This foundation had been worked out with great care and he did not think it was possible to find anything other than these agreements. These agreements represented the foundation of the island's future. Zorlu then appealed to Makarios carefully to ponder both his words and the words of the Greek Foreign Minister. This was not a case of postponing or delaying or altering these agreements. If the atmosphere were to change, perhaps one would not be in a position to build up again. This consideration prompted him to appeal to Makarios to take into

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consideration the interests of all the peoples of Cyprus. Cooperation between the Turks and Greeks of Cyprus had been lacking for many years, but now was very near to being reached. He asked the Ethnarch to consider again his position. Interrupting the opening words of a statement Foreign Secretary Lloyd had begun to make, Zorlu added that he fully endorsed Averoff-Tossizza's words about the right of intervention included in the Treaty of Guarantee. Turkey was not ready to create any trouble by using the "art of intervention" for small things. What he thought he had told his friend, the Greek Foreign Minister, was this: it was up the Cypriots, to Makarios and Kiifiik, perhaps, to take care of these matters by the laws they would promulgate in the island. If they wanted to create unity in Cyprus and a feeling of Cypriot nationality, they would have to take care not to allow anyone in Cyprus to create trouble by advocating a course of action that would run counter to what had been agreed upon, and to make it clear that their policy was one of cooperation and unity in Cyprus. The Greeks of Cyprus should not try to get enosis, just as the Turks of Cyprus should not try to get partition. The Greeks and Turks of Cyprus should put out of mind such activities. Desiring to explain the Greek position on the intervention provision of the Treaty of Guarantee, Averoff-Tossizza then spoke. He pointed out, at the suggestion of one of his aides, that because Greece would have more soldiers on the island than the Turks under the Treaty of Alliance, and because Greek Cypriot participation in the Cypriot Army would be greater than Turkish Cypriot participation, it could be thought that the Greek side might disarm the Turks of both the Cypriot army and the Turks of the alliance, and "create the right of intervention". Therefore, he wanted to declare that his government regarded intervention as a right that would be used only in case of a Turkish attempt at partition, or of a Turkish attempt to overthrow the government. Greece would never intervene by means of its own armed forces on the island, or by other means, if, for instance, Turkish schoolboys were to shout in favor of partition or if a newspaper were to publish an article on the subject. In such a case, the Greek Ambassador in Cyprus would make a demarche to the Cyprus government and ask it, just as the Turkish Ambassador to Athens and the Greek Ambassador in Ankara did, why had the newspaper written such things. This was how his government envisaged the right of intervention. Proceeding now to his interrupted statement, Foreign Secretary Lloyd, carefully observing he was speaking as Chairman of the meeting, re-

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minded the participants that when the conference had opened, he had emphasized the extreme importance of the occasion. Everyone around the table was aware that, as he had put it on the first day, this was a moment of destiny for the people of Cyprus and, indeed, for the countries that were so closely connected with the future of Cyprus. He had heard with great interest what had been said. He had been profoundly moved to hear Averoff-Tossizza speaking, as a Greek, of the Turkish brothers of the Greek Cypriots, and of Zorlu's endorsement of that theme. The collaboration between the Greek and Turkish governments which had been evinced really was the essential basis for a happy future for the people of Cyprus. The statements made that day were really of great value to those who were seeking a genuine settlement of the Cyprus problem. The conference, Lloyd continued, had been called because his government had been assured that among the five parties, namely the three governments and the representatives present of the two Cypriot communities, there was agreement as to the foundation of the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus. In the light, however, of what had been said that night, he, as Chairman, had to consider whether any useful purpose would be served by calling a further meeting of the Conference. For occasionally, a Chairman had to take a certain responsibility upon himself. His feeling was that the interests of all would best be served if he exercised his prerogative as Chairman and broke off the meeting now and declared it closed. This was the right thing to do, he thought, and that was what he proposed to do. Makarios: "May I say a few words, if you please? Would you please permit me to speak in Greek and Mr. Rossides will translate?" A misunderstanding here had occurred, Makarios believed, continuing in Greek. He was represented as rejecting the Zurich agreements. He believed he had been called to a conference. The conference meant that he had been able to express his views on the agreements reached, not that he should be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it situation. In the first place, his remarks regarded certain points in the basic constitutional structure which rendered the functioning of the government machinery difficult. Could one not, he asked, discuss the points of the Zurich agreements which he believed rendered difficult the functioning of the Constitution? Should everything the three governments had prepared be accepted word for word, without any discussion or any amendment which he considered necessary? Only God-inspired matters were final. Man-made things should be open to discussion. The day before, he had discussed with Denktaj and Ku?uk the first

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of the points he had mentioned. They themselves realized that certain difficulties existed. One point he had mentioned to them as an example of such difficulties was that of the coordinating committees for the separate municipalities in the five main towns of Cyprus. And what if disagreement should arise on the appointment or election of the President? In the Basic Structure of Zürich no provision existed for dealing with this eventuality. And the procedure for adopting a tax bill created great difficulties. A small number — smaller than the number of Turks — could take advantage of this provision. The machinery of government could be stopped. This was an important matter. The Turkish representatives themselves had acknowledged that certain difficulties existed and had said that these should be discussed. With regard to the treaty of alliance, he had said that creating the impression that Cyprus would not be an independent country but a country under occupation should be avoided. He had said that he did not object to the alliance but that this alliance should not create the impression that Cyprus was under the supervision of troops from outside which were stationed on the island. From his point of view, this was the more important point. And he wanted in some way to see that a proper solution would be found. At this juncture, speaking on a point of order, Foreign Minister Zorlu intervened. He thought that the Chairman's statement had been correct. The participants in the conference had convened, having in mind that they were in agreement on the foundation of the Ziirich agreements. His friend, the Greek Foreign Minister had said so, for he had stated just now that all parties were in agreement on these fundamental articles of the Constitution of Cyprus as well as on the treaties. And now Makarios was criticizing one by one the articles and the whole Constitution by saying that these were minor matters. That was not the Turkish government's position. He really thought it would be better if all found themselves in agreement. As the Chairman had suggested: "We find ourselves in a false position and it is not necessary to continue further discussions, because we see that what we have said we want and have agreed on is stated by Mgr. Makarios to be a beginning, from which he thinks he can go on with negotiations." He, himself, had come to the conference, said Zorlu, with the clearest conception that the leader of the Greek community in Cyprus and the leader of the Turkish community on the island had accepted what the governments of Turkey and Greece had accepted at Zürich. After Zorlu had spoken on this point of order, Chairman Lloyd said

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he thought that the Ethnarch had very nearly finished his statement. Of course, he added, a change of position had occurred. As he, too, understood it, the conference had been called on a basis of agreement between the representatives of the two communities present at the conference and three governments. And now Makarios was reopening matters dealt with in these agreements. If he had allowed him to speak, it had been because he thought Makarios was simply developing again the points he had made in his first speech. But he had to say quite frankly, Lloyd added, that Makarios' statement had changed the basis of the situation, because everybody thought that the conference was meeting on a basis of agreement. Makarios: "Not on the basis, Mr. Chairman. His Excellency has told me that I am challenging the whole thing again, but this is not the case." Chairman: "Archbishop, may I ask you this very direct question? Do you accept the documents which have been tabled before this meeting, and the declaration which we have heard, as the foundation of the final settlement? If you accept that...". Makarios: "What do you mean, the foundation? No. I accept it...". Chairman: "May I explain to you, Archbishop, what we mean by a foundation? A foundation is something upon which you can build, but if you take away something from it, the whole structure falls down. That is what I mean by foundation." Averoff-Tossizza intervened. From the discussion, he said, he saw some clarifications were needed. For instance, the example Makarios had given of the coordinating bodies for the separate municipalities was obviously a matter which needed something added. Provision had been made for the President and Vice-President of Cyprus to appoint the President of the Coordination Committee. If they did not agree, an agreement could be made that would indicate how this official would be chosen — perhaps by lot. Obviously, such matters would have to be added. Therefore, the Greek and Turkish governments had agreed that a Committee of Turks and Greeks in Cyprus should work together to draw up the Constitution. 26 Many things had to be done. But it should be clear that as far as the fundamental lines of the Zürich agreements were concerned, there could be no change in them, unless all were convinced that some of these provisions should be changed. Consequently, if there was agreement on this notion, he thought everyone would agree that a full 26

See above, Chapter X, p. 418, "Gentlemen's Agreement" between Premiers Karamanlis and Menderes.

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Constitution had not been drawn up in the Greek-Turkish negotiations. Some provisions would have to be added. Chairman: "But the point which I want to have clear, because I have to decide whether any useful purpose will be served by reconvening this meeting, is this: I do ask to know whether Archbishop Makarios is prepared to answer my question in the light of the explanation I have made — that a foundation is something on which you build, and if you take something away from it, then the building falls down. What I want to know, if I may ask the Archbishop this question, is whether you do accept the documents which you have seen and the declaration which has been made as the foundation for the final settlement?" Makarios: "I am not sure whether the people of Cyprus will accept all these documents just like that, without any change of a single word, and that is why I cannot accept them as they are — without changing a single word." Chairman: "Archbishop Makarios, this I think is valuable. We are not asking you to accept this agreement without the change of a single word. There may be matters of detail to be discussed, to be worked out; there may have to be additions to the structure. But what we want to know — before I make the decision whether any further meeting is possible — is whether you accept this in essence as the foundation of the final settlement — in essence." Makarios: "At this stage? I cannot accept at this stage. I will ask my advisers." An exchange occurred here between Makarios and Averoff-Tossizza. Chairman: "As Chairman, I must ask your indulgence, because a certain amount of discussion is going on which I do not fully understand. Where exactly are we? Archbishop, I think I have asked you, I think, a very plain question, and I would hope that you would be able to give an answer." Makarios: "May I give an answer tomorrow?" Chairman: "You see, time is going on, as you know, and I would have thought, with respect, that this is no new question. This is something which must have been present in your mind...". Makarios: "No." Chairman: "Unless we had known, as we thought, beforehand your answer to this question, I would never have called this conference, I would never have asked you to come. But I understood that this was a matter on which you had seen the documents and you were agreed with the Greek government as to your attitude. Therefore we took the risk

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because great issues are at stake for the people of Cyprus and for the rest of us, and the governments concerned. We took the great risk of assembling this conference to decide on this matter, and we did it in the belief that you had already agreed to these proposals as the foundation of the final settlement. Now I really cannot see, if I may say so with respect, why you cannot give us a plain answer to that question." Makarios: "At this stage?" Averoff-Tossizza: "Mr. Chairman, may I ask for a recess for a quarter of an hour?" Zorlu: "Yes, but I think one thing is really important. The essence of our compromise, of our agreement, is that, as you said, this is the foundation, and nothing can be taken out of this foundation. On this basis something can be built, but this is the foundation and nothing can be taken from it. And I think Archbishop Makarios, in giving his answer, has to take this into consideration. For, as Mr. Averoff-Tossizza had said, we have been told that you once accepted it as the foundation, and now what we have to do is to complete the Constitution. But in completing the Constitution, what is set up already will stay there, and this will be so for articles on which we give the guarantee, as well as for the treaties and other things. They are different parts of the whole compromise and of the equilibrium. Knowing this, it is up to you to give your answer, because — I think I can give you the reason — this is something on which you have to work if you are to stimulate the spirit of cooperation with your Turkish Cypriot brothers. If you cannot, it is not possible, not workable. For instance...". Makarios: "If you want me to give the answer now, I say No." Zorlu: "I am not asking for the answer just now, but I am asking you the answer by taking into consideration all these things." Makarios: "I know what to take into consideration." For instance, the Turkish Foreign Minister continued, Makarios had spoken of the matter of the chief of the coordinating committee for the municipalities to be chosen by himself and the Vice-President. This was something that was evident in every State. In every State, there was a Head of State and a Prime Minister, and sometimes there was a VicePresident and a President, and for the appointment of someone it was necessary for the Minister to propose and the other to accept. Then, there was a basis of cooperation, a spirit of cooperation. This is what he had to say now. Chairman: "I think what I would like to know is whether you think

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there would be any useful purpose in our having a recess of fifteen minutes. I think it was you, Mr. Averoff, who suggested it." Makarios:' 'I would suggest we adjourn and call a meeting for tomorrow. Otherwise I would say No." Chairman: "I will at any rate declare a recess for fifteen minutes." Accordingly, the meeting was adjourned. When the meeting resumed, Chairman Lloyd stated the position as he saw it after the short adjournment. Makarios, he said, had told him he was unable to answer his question that night. Lloyd had accepted that. The Ethnarch had been good enough to say that he would inform him by 9:45 next morning whether his answer to his very plain question was Yes or No. Since the question he had asked was known to those present, he would not read it out again. If Makarios' answer was affirmative to the question of whether he accepted the documents and declarations as the foundation of the final settlement of the Cyprus question, then the conference would reconvene next morning. If his answer, on the other hand, was No, Lloyd had told the Ethnarch that he saw no useful purpose in reconvening the conference. Makarios confirmed that Lloyd had accurately stated the position between them. Foreign Minister Zorlu agreed that one should give more time to the Ethnarch of Cyprus. He took this opportunity to assure him that he could rely on the Turkish government's good will, because he believed that this new State of Cyprus, under the leadership of Makarios and of the representative of the Turkish community, could go ahead very well to establish the welfare of the people of Cyprus. He was sure that Makarios would do his utmost, and had every confidence that he would establish a good spirit of cooperation and collaboration between all the people of Cyprus. Makarios had no need to show any suspicion of Turkey. Turkey was full of good will and had faith in the island's future if this spirit of cooperation and collaboration was established. For this reason, he wanted again to make an appeal to him to enable the conference to go ahead next day. Echoing these sentiments, the Greek Foreign Minister said he would not like to leave to his Turkish colleague alone the privilege of having paid this homage to the leader of the Greek Cypriots. He himself wanted to assure the Turkish community of Cyprus, and especially Mssrs. Kiigiik, Denkta?, and Orek, that his government looked upon them with full confidence for the leadership of their community. His government knew about their character and was sure that they would collaborate in

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the best way expected. He wanted to assure them that the feelings and position of the Greek government were such that they should look upon it without any suspicion. The Greek government had made it clear that this was Greek policy and that this policy would be followed with full confidence on the part not only of the Greek side in Cyprus but also, it was sure, of the Turkish side. The Chairman, after thanking the participants for their statements, declared the meeting closed and asked the participants to exercise great discretion with the press and not to reveal what had occurred at what he believed had been "an intimate and useful meeting". The press would be informed that discussions were still going on. When informed about Makarios' reservations, Macmillan was very glad that these focused on the Zürich agreements not on the matter of military bases on the island in full British sovereignty.27

F. THE LAST PLENARY MEETING OF THE LONDON CYPRUS CONFERENCE

After the end of the second plenary meeting of the Cyprus Conference, on February 18, Greek government officials in London continued their efforts to get the Greek Cypriot representatives gathered there to support the acceptance of the Zürich and consequent agreements. Queen Frederika herself, it is said, phoned from Athens to Makarios that evening, urging him to accept the agreements. The morning of February 19, with the Ethnarch not present, the thirty-five Greek Cypriots now assembled in order to vote without debate either Yes or No on these agreements. By twenty-seven votes to eight, they voted Yes. Among the Noes were the votes of the five communist representatives and of a member of PEKA (Political Committee of Cypriot Fighters), the political arm of EOKA, who, however, did not represent Grivas' organization in any capacity.28 The last plenary meeting of the Cyprus Conference opened at Lancaster House at 3:45 p.m. on February 19. The British and Greek Premiers were present. Macmillan, acting as Chairman, in a brief opening address expressed regret that for reasons all knew well, Premier Menderes was unable to attend. He then asked Foreign Secretary Lloyd to report on the position which had now been reached. 27

Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 695. Grivas Memoirs, p. 381. Estia, May 12, 1959. Stephens, Cyprus: A Place of Arms, pp. 165-166 (Makarios* later account).

28

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After briefly recapitulating the conference events since its first plenary meeting on February 17, Lloyd reported he had received at about 9:30 that morning a message from Ethnarch Makarios saying Yes in answer to the question whether, having examined the documents concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, drawn up and approved by the heads of the Greek and Turkish governments in Zurich on February 11, 1959, and the declarations made by the British government and the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers on February 17,1959, he accepted these documents and declarations as the agreed foundation of the final settlement of the Cyprus problem. Therefore, he had invited the participants of the Conference to meet that afternoon. After Lloyd's report, the participants, on Chairman Macmillan's proposal, either initialed or signed in full the three Zurich agreements as one document and seven Lancaster House documents.29 The participants then made their final statements at this closing plenary meeting of the Cyprus Conference.30 All expressed various degrees of gratification—with Macmillan rejoicing, Karamanlis sharing Macmillan's sentiments, and Zorlu more cautious—that a settlement had been reached, and congratulated each other about it. This settlement, the government representatives emphasized, was particularly welcome because of the common dangers which Britain, Greece, Turkey, and the Free World, generally, had to face. Cordial relations among Britain, Greece, and Turkey were now restored in a most vital part of the world: the Eastern Mediterranean. It would now be possible, said Karamanlis and Zorlu, to build on the foundations of Greek-Turkish friendship and cooperation which Kemal Atatiirk and Eleftherios Venizelos had laid. Much, of course, remained to be done. And the same spirit of friendship and cooperation should continue. It was now up to the Cypriots themselves, through the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, to lead Cyprus toward happiness, prosperity, and exemplary unity. The representatives of the two communities in Cyprus, on their side, welcomed the occasion as a great and happy day and expressed their conviction that with cooperation and good will their island would prosper. Before the meeting adjourned and the Conference closed, the participants, with Macmillan proposing, agreed on arrangements for meeting with Menderes in the hospital, where the three Premiers would sign a 29

Cyprus Conference, pp. 5-15. Conference on Cyprus. Final Statements at the Closing Plenary Session at Lancaster House on February 19, 1959, Cmnd. 680, Miscellaneous No. 5 (H.M. Stationery Office, 1959).

30

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Memorandum Setting out the Agreed Foundation for the Final Settlement of the Problem of Cyprus. They also agreed on the text of the statement to be issued to the press and on the publication date and time (5:00 p.m. Greenwich time, Monday, February 23, 1959) of all the relevant documents. In the statement he would make to the House of Commons before leaving with Lloyd for Moscow on February 21, Macmillan said he would give only a broad picture of the agreement and avoid details or figures.31 Later that same afternoon, the members of the Greek Cypriot delegation, led by their Ethnarch, called on Premier Karamanlis and thanked him for his efforts on behalf of their cause and for the conclusion of the agreements. At one point, when Karamanlis was alone with AverofFTossizza, Makarios approached them and said: "Did you really believe, Mr. President, that I would not sign the agreements?" "Why then all the turmoil you caused for two days with your lastminute refusal?" "I had my reasons", replied Makarios cryptically. Three months later, in a statement published in the Nicosia newspaper, Ethnos, on May 21, 1959, and in response to an interview given to that same paper by Mayor Dervis concerning the backstage events of the London Conference, the Ethnarch explained that he had signed the London agreement on Cyprus fully aware that the refusal to do so would have had catastrophic consequences for the island's future. Before signing, he had told the Greek Cypriot representatives in London that he did not wish them to share the responsibility of signing the agreement but undertook alone the full responsibility of doing so, with the Cypriot people remaining free to accept or reject the agreement signed. On this occasion, too, he categorically rejected the charge that he had signed the agreement because of strong pressure exerted on the part of the Greek government. No power in the world could have forced him to sign if he believed that this would be against the interests of the Cypriot people. The Greek government, he sincerely believed, had exerted all in its power in this matter and had achieved whatever was achievable under the then prevailing conditions. That the Greek Premier and the Foreign Minister had drawn his attention to the consequences of a refusal to sign the agreement was not pressure on their part but their duty.

31

600 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 618-622.

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The documents initialed or signed at the London Conference on Cyprus and published on February 23, 1959 were the following: First, there was the aforementioned memorandum in which the British, Greek and Turkish Premiers took note of the declarations of the two Cypriot leaders that they accepted the annexed documents as the agreed foundation for the settlement, and adopted the documents on behalf of their respective governments "as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus". Second came the three Zürich agreements of February 11, 1959, in English translation. These were the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance. Third, there was the Declaration of the British government presented to the London Conference on February 17, 1959. Fourth, there was the earlier-mentioned additional article to be inserted in the Treaty of Guarantee with regard to the British bases in Cyprus. Fifth, there was the declaration of February 17, 1959 of the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers in which they accepted the British Declaration — the third document mentioned above — as well as the Zürich document of February 11,1959, as the agreed foundation for the Cyprus settlement. Sixth and seventh were the declarations made by the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on February 19, 1959, in which each declared "that he accepts the documents and declarations as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus". Finally, there was a document on agreed measures to prepare for the new arrangements in Cyprus. 32 In addition to the eight fully signed or initialed documents of the London Conference on Cyprus of 1959, which were published on Monday, February 23, 1959, there were two other, non-published documents both of February 19, 1959: Agreed Minutes of the Foreign Ministers of Britain, Greece, and Turkey, and a "Gentlemen's Agreement" between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers. The Agreed British-Greek-Turkish minutes provided that the permanent representatives of the three governments on the NATO Council would submit a joint report to the Council on the work of the London Conference on Cyprus. It was premature, the three Foreign Ministers agreed, to discuss the possible entry of the Republic of Cyprus as a member of NATO. Such a step, it will be recalled, had been envisaged by Karaman32

Cyprus Conference, pp. 14-15. For details, see below, Chapter XII, p. 477.

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lis and Menderes in their "Gentlemen's Agreement" of Zürich. Under these agreed minutes, it was noted that the British government had stressed that among the obligations which the Republic of Cyprus should undertake for the British government was the safeguarding of the enjoyment by the U.S. government of certain facilities and installations in Cyprus. It was also agreed that the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey would consult and cooperate with Britain with regard to the joint defense of Cyprus. And, any needs or questions that might arise out of the implementation and functioning of the military needs of Britain would normally constitute the object of discussion and settlement between the British military authorities in Cyprus, on the one side, and the tripartite Military Headquarters of Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish forces, on the other. In these British-Greek-Turkish minutes, the three governments also agreed that it was of fundamental importance to maintain the continuity of the civil service in Cyprus. For this purpose, all encouragement would be given to the current members of the civil service to remain in the service of the new Republic of Cyprus. To all members who desired or who were asked to cease occupying themselves, a pension would be assured to which they themselves or their dependents were entitled by law, and a plan for compensation, on the basis of guide lines adopted in other territories where similar constitutional changes had occurred, would be introduced without delay after discussion with the civil service organizations concerned. The granting of compensation and pensions to the current or former civil servants would be one of the obligations the Republic of Cyprus would assume. Finally, it was agreed in these minutes that Article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee would not prevent the Republic of Cyprus from remaining in the Commonwealth or the sterling area, and that Point 23 of the Basic Structure of Cyprus would not prevent the Republic from continuing to apply the system of Commonwealth preference.33 In their "Gentlemen's Agreement", Averoff-Tossizza and Zorlu clarified Point 8 of the Zürich Basic Structure by enumerating the questions that should be regarded as foreign policy matters subject to the final veto of 33

Article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee provides that the Cyprus Republic undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. Point 23 of the Zürich Basic Agreement provides that the Republic shall accord most-favored-nation treatment to Great Britain, Greece and Turkey for all agreements whatever their nature, and that this provision would not apply to treaties between Cyprus and Britain concerning the bases and military facilities accorded to Britain. Cyprus Conference, pp. 10 and 9.

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the President and the Vice-President. These clarifications were to become clauses (i)-(vi) of sub-paragraph (a) of Article 50 of the Constitution of Cyprus. These foreign policy questions were: the recognition of states and the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations with other states as well as the severance of such relations; the granting of recognition to diplomatic representatives and of exequaturs of consular representatives; the appointment of diplomatic and consular representatives as well as of plenipotentiaries; the conclusion of treaties, conventions, and agreements of an international nature; the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace; the protection of Cypriot nationals and of their interests abroad; the establishment, the status, and the interests of aliens in Cyprus; and the acquisition of foreign nationality by nationals of the Republic of Cyprus as well as acceptance of their employment and their entry into the service of foreign governments. With reference to Article 3 of the Treaty of Guarantee, the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers agreed it was self-evident that with regard to all events that might not be regarded as capable of touching by a governmental action or by a real fact the order of affairs consecrated by virtue of this treaty, the Greek and Turkish governments would exhaust all measures available to them by the normal diplomatic channel before resorting to the procedure provided for in the above article. As all realized, a lot of hard work — of further consultations, negotiations, and bargaining—remained to be done to build the new state of Cyprus on the foundations which Britain, Greece, Turkey and the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots had laid at the London Conference on Cyprus of 1959. The U.S. government wholeheartedly welcomed the conclusion of the London agreements on the substance of the final settlement of the Cyprus problem. By throwing its weight behind the Iranian draft resolution during the Cyprus debate at the thirteenth General Assembly, it had indirectly contributed to this result which, according to its wishes, had been achieved outside the United Nations. President Eisenhower, then on a state visit to Mexico, sent from Acapulco on February 19, 1959, personal cables to the Premiers of Greece, Turkey, and Britain congratulating them in various laudatory terms — for this "victory of common sense"; this "imaginative and courageous act of statsmanship" which could not "fail to strengthen and encourage the whole NATO alliance"; for this "splendid achievement".34 34

Department of State Bulletin, 40 (March 16,1959), pp. 367-368.

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According to a Greek Cypriot source, the U.S. State Department in December 1958 had invited separately the Greek and Turkish Ambassadors in Washington and had impressed upon them the necessity of a settlement. It recognized that Greece, after dropping its claim for enosis, could make no further concessions and asked the Greek Ambassador to get his government to convince the Greek Cypriots of the necessity of further concessions. From the Turkish government, on the other hand, the State Department had supposedly requested that it drop its claim for partition and come down to earth and not be "charmed by the sirens of British diplomacy". The Turks, according to this same source, were threatened that if they did not conform, they would not be granted the 150 million marks from West Germany which the United States had arranged for Turkey. As for the Greek-Turkish negotiations that led to the Zurich agreements, these had been invisibly directed by the U.S. Embassy in Rome.35

36

Statement of the Mayor of Nicosia, Themistocles Dervis, to Ethnos, of Nicosia, May 21, 1959.

XII A NEW STATE IS BORN

A. GREEK AND TURKISH PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON THE ZURICH AND LONDON AGREEMENTS

The legislative bodies of Greece, Turkey, and Britain, on February 28, March 4, and March 19, 1959, respectively, approved the London agreements. In the Greek Parliament, the debate (February 23-28) was stormy, as the government sought to get a vote of confidence on the agreements and the Opposition parties tabled two motions of non-confidence.1 The Greek Parliamentary critics of the Zurich and London agreements once again attacked the whole handling of the Cyprus question by the government since Karamanlis became Premier in October 1955, without, however, any constructive proposals of their own. The spokesmen for EDA, the communist facade party, went further by attacking the whole proWestern, pro-NATO policy of the government.2 All maintained that under this Cyprus settlement the new state of Cyprus would be neither independent nor free. Most of the critics termed the island's proposed new status a condominium, a triple condominium. A few called it a protectorate. 3 And some maintained that Cyprus was being placed under a triple occupation.4 The new state, they observed, would be based on alliances concluded even before that state had been born. These alliances deprived the Cypriots of any possibility to exercise their right

1

GPD, February 23, 1959, p. 289 (the two motions of nonconfidence). Ibid., February 25, p. 309 (E. Iliou); February 28, p. 454 (A. Brfflakis). 3 Ibid., February 25, p. 293 (S. Venizelos); p. 319 (S. Stefanopoulos); February 26, p. 334 (S. Markezinis); p. 346 (S. Allamanis); p. 361 (S. Houtas); February 27, p. 367 (G. Papandreou); p. 395 (K. Mitsotakis); February 28, p. 429 (K. Pyromaglou); p. 449 (Brillakis). 4 Ibid., February 28, p. 410 (N. Zorbas); p. 429 (Pyromaglou). Both had played a role in the resistance movement during the Axis occupation of Greece. 2

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of self-determination and to conduct an independent foreign policy.5 They imposed upon Cyprus commitments or servitudes — for instance, through the presence of foreign troops on the island's territory under the Treaty of Alliance, or through the right of intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee. And they would be susceptible to no revision, since they were to be considered as fundamental and nonamendable articles of the Constitution. The critics argued further that the government of the new state would not be democratic either. The Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus placed a minority — the Turkish Cypriot community — in a privileged position in both government and administration. Because of his veto powers, the Turkish Vice-President was really just another President or a co-President. The Council of Ministers would be responsible not to the House of Representatives (as under a Parliamentary system) but to the two Presidents. The system of separate voting by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representatives in the House when dealing with tax bills, changes in the electoral law, or amendments to the non-fundamental articles of the Constitution was likewise undemocratic. Indeed, this system, together with the two Communal Chambers, resulted in four legislative bodies, not three. Likewise undemocratic were the ratios of 70-30 and 60-40 for Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the administration the security forces and the Army, respectively, as compared with the 81-17 ratio of Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots in the island's population. 6 One critic maintained that the real bearer of sovereignty in the Cyprus government would be the neutral judge of the Supreme Court. 7 At any rate, democratic or not, the regime, because of its complexity, would be unworkable.8 It was a monstrosity. 9 An Opposition member from Crete compared the Cyprus agreements with developments toward self-government which after the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) ended in the union of the island with Greece under the peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire. The small Greece of the late nineteenth century, he observed, had not acquiesced in an accord which would prohibit in perpetuity the island's union with Greece. In 1899, when 5

GPD, February 25, p. 303 (Hiou); p. 310, and 312 (E. Tsirimokos); p. 317 (Stefanopoulos); February 26, p. 346 (Allamanis). « Ibid., February 25, pp. 301, and 303 (Iliou); p. 317 (Tsirimokos); February 27, p. 367 (Papandreou); p. 395 (Mitsotakis). 7 Ibid., February 25, p. 303 (Iliou). 8 Ibid., February 25, p. 350 (A. Baltadjis); February 27, p. 395 (Mitsotakis). 8 Ibid., February 25, 310 (Tsirimokos); 360 (Houtas).

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Crete had become fully autonomous after a decision of the four European Great Powers, elections under the new Constitution were carried out by the Cretans as a unitary electoral body, in a system that ensured the representation of the minority. No ratios of Christians and Muslims had been established in the gendarmerie, the army, or the civil service. The government was appointed by the Prince of Crete and enjoyed the confidence of the Assembly. No vetoes existed. No distinctions were made in the Ministries. No separate municipalities had been set up, even though in the island's three largest cities the inhabitants were preponderantly Muslim. 10 All in all, in the critics' views, the Zurich and London agreements were an ignominious, a shattering defeat for Greek foreign policy. Thanks to these agreements, Turkey was now returning to the island, despite the Treaty of Lausanne. 11 Why such haste to reach agreement, asked one of these critics.12 The government, many charged, had exerted pressure on Makarios to subscribe to these agreements.13 Besides, no improvement in Greek-Turkish relations would flow from these agreements.14 No solution had really been found. Cyprus had been transformed into a powder-keg, into an advanced zone for permanent Greek-Turkish war. Greece had built on sand. 15 The proposed new state was not even based on a particular nation. It was therefore an artificial statelet.16 On the government side, Premier Karamanlis, on February 23, when announcing with deep satisfaction the proposed final settlement, emphasized the historical significance of the decision to set up Cyprus as an independent state and the spirit of understanding and cooperation shown by the Turkish and British Premiers and the leaders of the two Cypriot communities. After summing up the contents of the agreements, he underlined that this settlement of guaranteed independence for the island had been achieved within the period of barely six months after Makarios had proposed such a regime for the island and the British and Turkish governments had rejected this proposal. The regime outlined in the agreements, he acknowledge, was no ideal, Platonic polity. However, the 10 GPD, February 27, pp. 395-396 (Mitsotakis). 11 Ibid., February 25, p. 302 (Iliou); February 26, p. 315 (Stefanopoulos); p. 346 (Allamanis); EDA spokesmen assumed a virulent anti-Turkish attitude. 12 Ibid., February 26, pp. 330-331 (Markezinis). 13 Ibid., February 25, p. 293 (Venizelos); pp. 307-308 (Iliou); pp. 312-313 (Tsirimokos); February 26, pp. 347-348 (Allamanis); February 28, pp. 350-451 (Brillakis). 14 Ibid., February 25, pp. 316-317 (Stefanopoulos). 15 Ibid., February 25, p. 307 (Iliou); p. 312 (Tsirimokos); February 25, p. 309 (Hiou). " Ibid., February 25, p. 310 (Tsirimokos).

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Cypriots were getting their freedom and it was now up to them to make the best of it for their own good. He was convinced, he said, that a spirit of cooperation would prevail between the island's two communities, so that the constitutional regime outlined in these agreements would function normally. In conclusion, he emphasized the great importance for Greece of the restoration of the spirit of Greek-Turkish cooperation and of friendly relations with Britain.17 Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza followed on February 25 with a more detailed report of the Zurich and London agreements and led the government's counterattack against the Opposition's attack which had begun when Sophocles Venizelos, after pointedly reminding Parliament that Makarios' original goal was enosis, deplored that the government had not accepted the earlier British proposals for Cyprus— of Governor Harding (October 1955-March 1956), of Lord Radcliffe (December 1956)18 and even the Macmillan Plan. The agreements, Averoff-Tossizza maintained, took into account a real situation. The regime they proposed for Cyprus could function without difficulty, if an elementary spirit of cooperation existed between the two communities. Because the majority enjoyed a dominant position in the government and the administration and took decisions in cooperation with the smaller community, the regime proposed was democratic. Of course, no regime at all would be able to function, if no spirit of cooperation were to prevail. Cyprus would be a focus of serious disturbances and hardships for its inhabitants under any regime, enosis and partition included. Fortunately, a spirit of cooperation between Greece and Turkey existed and this could not but ensure a harmonious cooperation between the island's two communities. After emphasizing, as Karamanlis had done, the importance of the fact that the Cypriots for the first time in their history were now acquiring their freedom, he reminded Parliament that Greece, too, on achieving independence, had been subject to certain commitments on the part of the three protector and guarantor powers, yet this had not prevented Greece from prospering. The victory thus belonged to the Cypriots themselves, not to Greece or Turkey. 19 During the debate, incidentally, Premier Karamanlis denied that the U.S. government had exerted any pressure on the Greek government for the purpose of achieving a compromise agreement. During the 17 18 18

GPD, February 23, pp. 286-289. Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 114-127, and 605. GPD, February 25, pp. 296-300.

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previous six months, he said, between the Greek and U.S. governments no talks on Cyprus had taken place. 20 And Averoff-Tossizza, in response to a question, affirmed that Britain's nonparticipation in the Treaty of Alliance aimed at averting any possible entanglement of Cyprus or Greece in British and Turkish Middle Eastern commitments under the Baghdad Pact. 2 1 Another pro-government spokesman who dealt with Greece's entire Cyprus policy since 1948 as a series of lost opportunities disclosed that Krishna Menon, at the eleventh General Assembly (1956-1957), had proposed to the Greek Delegation backstage the tabling of a draft resolution calling for the establishment of an independent Cyprus, and that the Greek government, despite the then prevailing highly charged anticolonial atmosphere that followed in the wake of the Suez fiasco of 1956, had not heeded this proposal. 22 Finally, on February 28, the two motions of non-confidence were rejected by 170 to 118 votes. The Greek Parliament thus approved the Ziirich and London agreements by a majority based exclusively on the ERE ruling party. All Opposition members stood up and shouted "Long live enosis", when Sophocles Venizelos gave the example by doing so. 23 As Zorlu had mentioned in one of his speeches during the U N debate on the Cyprus question, it had been Venizelos who had raised the question of Cyprus in the Greek Parliament eight years earlier. Nonetheless, backstage in spring 1957, he had told the U.S. Ambassador in Athens, George V. Allen, that a solution of the Cyprus question should be sought in the creation of an independent state, with, if necessary, appropriate international guarantees given to Turkey that the island would never be united to Greece. 24 The Greek NATO contingent returned to ízmir in two groups, on February 25 and 28. It had been withdrawn in June 1958, as will be recalled. The Turkish Grand National Assembly approved the Ziirich and London agreements on March 4, 1959, by 347 votes to 138. ínónü, the Opposition leader, was dissatisfied with the guarantees which the government had secured for the Turkish minority on Cyprus and regarded them as insufficient. Unless additional guarantees could be obtained from Britain for immediate military cooperation with Turkey to block any 80 GPD, February 25, p. 313. Ibid., February 27, p. 388. 22 Ibid., February 27, pp. 386-387 (G. Kassimatis). 23 Ibid., February 28, p. 462. 24 Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 6-7, and 83. 21

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move toward enosis, the Opposition would vote against the agreements. Foreign Minister Zorlu, on the other hand, maintained that the agreements provided adequate safeguards both for the security of Turkey and for the Turkish Cypriots. The British bases would constitute an additional guarantee of permanent peace in the island. He also stressed that the Turkish Cypriot community would enjoy full equality with the Greek Cypriots and would be completely free to develop its religious, educational, social, and economic institutions.25

B. GRIVAS RELUCTANTLY APPROVES THE CYPRUS SETTLEMENT

Getting Grivas to endorse the Zürich and London agreements on Cyprus was another problem that not only the Greek government but also Ethnarch Makarios had to solve. Indeed, if the Ethnarch had shown such recalcitrance in acquiescing in the London agreements, this might have been partly due to the already-mentioned considerable reluctance of EOKA's leader to proclaim his support of the Zürich agreements. On February 16, namely the day before the first plenary meeting of the London Conference on Cyprus convened, Grivas had received from Consul-General Frydas two notes. Continued silence on EOKA's part, the Consul observed in the first of these notes, might allow the British to contend that the forthcoming agreement with the Ethnarch of Cyprus would not be respected by the whole Cypriot people, if its armed elements did not disclose their thoughts on the Zürich agreements. Thus the Ethnarch's negotiating position might be weakened. In the second of these notes, Frydas conveyed to Grivas the response of Averoff-Tossizza to the objections registered by Grivas with regard to the Turkish military presence on Cyprus which the Treaty of Alliance envisaged. In the proposed Tripartite Headquarters, the Foreign Minister emphasized, the Greek forces, together with those of Cyprus, would enjoy a generous margin of preponderance. Besides, this Tripartite Headquarters would be under a single command, and would be based on the model of NATO headquarters in Naples or Izmir, for instance. The troops would be very small in number and in no way could they be regarded as a threat against the island. Hence, this instrument of the alliance could in no way limit the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. And possible eventual NATO 25

Keesing's, 17069.

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membership for Cyprus would call for new arrangements, with Greece itself having a veto right in relevant matters. 26 A note of February 17 from the Greek Consul-General in Nicosia drew Grivas' attention to Moscow's stand with regard to the Zürich agreements. If EOKA were to proclaim its support of the Cyprus Ethnarch, Moscow, which wished to keep the Cyprus question eternally open as a trouble spot, would think twice before exposing its henchmen in Cyprus to any opposition on the part of the great majority of the Cypriot people. If the agreements fell through, on the other hand, the Cyprus question would be completely isolated. Even if Greece were able to continue supporting the Cypriot people, the spirit which would internationally prevail, under the pressure of various international problems (Berlin, Near and Middle East, for example), would be anything but favorable for the Greek Cypriot viewpoint. This was the conclusion derived from the course of the Cyprus problem before the United Nations. To reach, therefore, an agreement whereby British sovereignty over the island would be removed was a realistic policy. Even if one were not fully satisfied with certain points in the agreements, it were desirable to appear as accepting the agreements with all sincerity and as determined to implement them. 27 Together with this letter was a note from another Greek diplomat conveying to Grivas the views of Premier Karamanlis himself, who, at this critical moment, felt it his duty to communicate directly with Grivas to inform him about the latest developments. Karamanlis wanted Grivas to know that he had reached the Zürich settlement with the full conviction that under the current circumstances this was not merely the only historically possible solution but also one which essentially fulfilled the goal of freedom for which EOKA had been fighting. Because for the first time in its history, Cyprus was now proclaimed an independent state with a predominantly Greek character. If, in order to achieve this great goal, certain concessions of internal law were made to the Turkish community, this is no way reduced the value of this achievement. Good faith required recognition of the defensive needs of the Turkish community. As for the Tripartite Headquarters, this was an expression of the threestate alliance and a safeguard for internal and external security. With regard to the British bases, no Greek government had ever envisaged

26

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 383-384. Emphasis was also laid on the fact that Cyprus would become a member of the United Nations and of other international organizations. " Ibid., p. 384.

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Britain yielding its sovereignty over the island without the recognition of the British right to bases on Cyprus. 28 Grivas, however, would not be moved. Acknowledging on February 19 receipt of these various notes, he wrote to Frydas that so long as he remained ignorant of the full text of the agreements, he was unable to take any position on them. 29 Two days after the London agreements were signed on February 19, Grivas received letters from the Bishop of Kition and Archbishop Makarios himself. The Bishop hoped Grivas would no longer be reluctant to issue a leaflet, in which, as leader of the fighting segment of the Cypriot people, he would greet the agreements reached. Only the communist members of the Greek Cypriot delegation in London, the prelate added, had vigorously opposed the signing of the agreement, because of the provision for British bases on the island. Their stand, according to firm information, had been due to directives from Moscow, which did not want to see a settlement reached in this dispute between members of the Western alliance. The extent of the British bases, however, would remain as it currently was. And no sovereign rights were conceded to the British over the communications arteries between the two bases. As for the presence of the Turkish troops on the island, this would not infringe on the sovereign rights of the independent state. Nor did the Bishop think that Grivas would object to the separate Turkish municipalities, for these would be supported by taxes imposed on the Turkish Cypriots only. Finally, the agreements provided for the dismissal of the Turkish Cypriot members of the auxiliary police, and Greek policemen would join the security forces in accordance with the ratio which had been agreed. The Bishop, in conclusion, conveyed his warmest congratulations to Grivas for the superb struggle he had waged amid incredible difficulties and hardships. Grivas' name was inscribed with letters of gold on the first pages of Cypriot history. His heroic figure would remain forever in the minds of future generations as the champion of Cypriot freedom and as the unexcelled fighter of the nation. 30 Makarios, in his letter to Grivas, observed that he had waged a protracted and hard struggle in the diplomatic arena in order to achieve certain improvements in certain points of the agreements. Estimating, however, the sad results which the frustration of the accords would have 28

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 384-385. Ibid., p. 385. He also stated that he thoroughly disagreed with the arguments concerning the stationing of Turkish troops in Cyprus. Ibid., pp. 385-386.

29

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had for the Cypriot people and for Greece, he had felt it his duty to sign the agreements, under which British sovereignty over Cyprus came to an end and a little Greece was created in this part of the eastern Mediterranean. After emphasizing in familiar terms the advantages of these agreements and belittling their shortcomings, for instance the presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus, the Cyprus Ethnarch in conclusion expressed the view that the appropriate moment had now arrived for EOKA to take a clear position on the agreements, in order to demonstrate the unshatterable unity of the national front. 3 1 On February 20, Makarios, in a proclamation to the Cypriot people, welcomed the agreements as laying the foundations of freedom and independence for Cyprus. 32 But Grivas still remained silent. A very long letter from the Greek Foreign Minister, no longer signed under the pseudonym of "Isaakios" but under his real name, was likewise of no use. In this letter, 33 Averoff-Tossizza wrote that protracted political and diplomatic struggles, waged with fiery faith and all means available, had persuaded him that the Cyprus question had reached a dramatic deadend. There were serious and concrete reasons to fear that this dead-end would result in the worst of solutions. The non-recognition of accomplished facts and the continuation of fruitless political struggles provided no way out of this dead-end. Facts would remain accomplished and one would be left only with the consolation of struggling. Grivas' astonishing struggle had projected the issue, if it had not indeed given birth to it, and had nourished it. But no matter how great the heroism exerted, it would not suffice for imposing a permanent political solution. On the contrary, because the Turks were able to transform a rebellion against the occupying Power into a bloody intercommunal struggle, resort to arms could lead to imposed partition, the worst solution of all. Thus, he had derived 31

Grivas Memoirs, pp. 386-387. Ibid., p. 387. In this proclamation, Makarios sent special greetings to the "heroic leader of the freedom movement of Cyprus, General George Grivas" and all the members of EOKA. Thanks to their struggle and sacrifices, he said, it was now possible to taste the fruits of freedom. The agreements constituted the exploitation of their struggle, their sacrifices and their patriotic actions. In the history of Cyprus they would remain the unsurpassed fighters and heroes of freedom. In conclusion, the Ethnarch also sent heartfelt greetings to the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus and welcomed the agreements which had been reached. He was confident that a new period of progress and prosperity was beginning. 33 Ibid., pp. 388-390. Averoff-Tossizza, of course, emphasized that Cyprus became really independent, with all the features of independence under international law (member of the UN, sovereignty, its own coinage, etc.). H e also stressed that the 70 per cent majority assured decision-making for the Greeks. 32

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the impression that only one hope remained: agreement with the Turks on a compromise solution. But this effort, too, had encountered several basic difficulties. The first and greatest of these difficulties was the distrust of the Turks. This was justified. Regardless of any agreement, the Turks feared that a coup d'état would be carried out sooner or later in order to proclaim erwsis. Meanwhile, an independent Cyprus would be transformed into a self-governing Greek province. But the Turks also feared the growth of communism in Cyprus, the influence of the USSR, the possible threat to Turkey's security from the direction of Cyprus. To allay these fears, they sought either partition or, in the case of an independent Cyprus, the establishment of a powerful Turkish base on the island and an equal share in government authority. Thus agreement appeared impossible. Because this distrust was great and real, a great deal of hard work had been required. However, he would not go into this phase of the struggle. He would only add, not in order to place responsibilities upon others, that during this phase he had kept Makarios posted throughout — indirectly when the Ethnarch was in New York, directly after he had returned to Athens. Thus, at each step, he was informed about the Ethnarch's last line of retreat. Later the Bishop of Kition, too, had been informed. Finally, after Zurich, the Ethnarch had been shown the texts of the agreements themselves. Only after he had approved them had the government pressed ahead toward the five-party London conference. Thus the views of the Greek Cypriot leadership had in no way been ignored. The Greek Foreign Minister then went on to analyze, in this letter to Grivas, the main points of the Zurich agreements, mentioning also the points on which the Turks had given in, and dwelling in particular on controversial provisions of the agreements such as the voting procedure in the House of Representatives in certain specific matters, the creation of separate municipalities, and especially the right of intervention and the presence of Turkish troops on Cypriot soil under the treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance, respectively. These and other "points of resistance" were matters of which he was fully aware. 34 Nonetheless his satisfaction with the agreements remained. The solution, though a compromise, averted dangerous

34

For example, the characterization of Cyprus as a federal state, new flag, bases. The controversial provisions were: the separate voting in the House of Representatives in budgetary and tax matters; the creation of separate municipalities in the five main cities of Cyprus; the right of intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee; the CypriotGreek-Turkish Headquarters in Cyprus.

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and perhaps unpredictable developments which Greece had no means to combat. British sovereignty (except for the bases) was removed from the island and independence gained. Hellenism as a whole emerged the gainer. Better days would dawn for the Greeks in Constantinople. GreekTurkish relations were restored. Premier Karamanlis, he added, shared fully these views. In conclusion, Averoff-Tossizza assured Grivas that it had been agreed with the Turks at Zürich jointly to support the granting of a general amnesty for EOKA as soon as the agreements were signed. 35 Certain legal obstacles had arisen with the British but these had been overcome. Naturally, with them he had raised the case of Grivas as a personal matter. In conclusion, Averoff-Tossizza expressed particular interest in getting Grivas' views on the situation. In this letter, the Greek Foreign Minister did not tell Grivas that when discussing his case with the British after signing the London agreements on Cyprus, he had been told that the British authorities in Cyprus had cornered Grivas and could capture him; that he had argued that if they tried to do so, they would only get his dead body; and that he had threatened to tear up the agreements if they did. He had proposed instead that the British should honor EOKA's leader and let him leave Cyprus with a British guard of honor attending his departure. Macmillan seemed to like this idea as a gesture of British sportmanship. He thought it would contribute tremendously toward restoring Anglo-Greek friendship. Foot, too, shared Macmillan's view but said he was afraid lest some Britisher take this opportunity to shoot Grivas. So the idea was dropped. On February 22, Grivas replied to Averoff-Tossizza in a very brief note, that, though he still had no full texts of the agreements, on the basis of the above letter he had certain grave objections to their terms and serious hesitations about the applicability of the complex system of government envisaged in the agreements. 36 Finally Grivas on February 23 received the texts of the three Zürich documents but not the London Declaration of the British government or its annex concerning the British bases on the island. The Greek Consul-General, in forwarding these texts to him, alluded to Grivas' continued silence on the agreements and also asked for his views on the amnesty to be granted to EOKA and its supporters. Grivas, however, replying that same day, informed the Consul he wouldiss ue no procas

Under the Zürich "Gentlemen's Agreement", see above, Chapter X, p. 413. 3« Grivas, Memoirs, p. 390.

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lamation so long as the terms of the amnesty were not known to him. 37 The day before, the British authorities in Cyprus had released all political detainees, — about 1,000 in all3 8 — and the Governor had announced that the state of emergency would be ended at the earliest possible moment. Both issues — of the bases and of the amnesty— thus became now the main hurdles to Grivas' endorsement of the Zürich and London agreements and it was Makarios' turn to experience difficulties of recalcitrance on the part of this important actor on the Greek Cypriot front. On February 25, when Grivas learned from a public interview of Sir Hugh Foot that Britain wanted additional localities in Cyprus included in the two bases of Dekeleia and Episcopi, he was very upset. In a letter to the Consul he complained that the Greek side had not consulted military experts before dealing with this matter. Reverting to the same matter on February 28, he observed that even small British forces could assume control over the whole island by seizing a few strategic communication points in Cyprus. 39 When the Governor of Cyprus, on February 27, published the terms of the amnesty, 40 Grivas considered them unacceptable. He felt responsible for his EOKA men and wanted to safeguard them from any illtreatment. All in all, at this crucial point, he was still seriously pondering the possibility of continuing EOKA's struggle despite the Zürich and London agreements and their endorsement not only by the Greek government but also by the Ethnarch of Cyprus. As a result, when Ethnarch and Archbishop Makarios, after an exile of almost exactly three years, arrived in Nicosia on March 1, 1959, Grivas in no way participated in his triumphal reception, and sent no EOKA representative to greet him on his return to the island. He wished to settle the question of the amnesty directly with him. 41 On March 3, Grivas received a note from Makarios who asked to meet him in Nicosia. Grivas sent him a representative who returned with the Ethnarch's version of the way in which the Zürich and London agreements had been reached. 42 The amnesty problem, however, remained 37

Grivas Memoirs, p. 398. Keesing's, 16833. Lennox-Boyd in the House of Commons, 602 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), March 19, 1959, 642. 89 Grivas Memoirs, pp. 398-399. 40 Keesing's, 16833. 41 Grivas Memoirs, pp. 400-401. 42 Ibid., p. 401. Makarios acknowledged that before Karamanlis left for Ziirich, agreement existed about the framework of the settlement. When, however, he was 38

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confused. It was settled according to Grivas' wishes, when the Cyprus Governor, on March 8, published the final terms of the amnesty.43 By now, Grivas had decided to accept the Zürich and London agreements as a fait accompli. And on March 9, he issued his last proclamation under the title "Cease Fire". In this proclamation, he observed that following the Zürich accords between the Greek and Turkish governments and their ratification by Makarios in London, he was obliged to order the cessation of the struggle. Recognizing that its continuation would divide the Cypriot people and possibly the entire (Greek) nation, he called on all Cypriots to rally around Makarios and appealed for concord, unity, and love for the task of building the new edifice of the Republic of Cyprus.44 From the original draft of this proclamation, he deleted certain passages in response to the suggestions of Makarios. The deleted passages termed the settlement a compromise which did not satisfy the aspirations of the Greek Cypriots and laid the blame for this result on the political leadership. As the news of Grivas' proclamation spread, Greek Cypriots broke out into spontaneous celebration. Eight days later, the leader of EOKA, in a Dakota of the Royal Greek Air Force, returned to Athens which he had left more than four years earlier. "Isaakios" — Foreign Minister Averoff-Tossizza — together with the Archbishop Theoklitos of Athens greeted him at the airport in a state reception during which vast crowds welcomed him back as a national hero. The day after his arrival in Athens, the Greek Parliament unanimously proclaimed Grivas "Worthy of the Nation" and promoted him to the rank of lieutenant-general on the retired list. On March 19, King Paul I bestowed upon him the highest Greek military decoration, the Order of Valor, as well as the Grand Cross of the Order of George I.

informed of the final text, then he realized that Karamanlis had exceeded the limits of the agreed upon framework, though the Premier did not think so. In London, pressure had been exerted on him to accept the terms. 43 602 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), March 19, 1959, 642-643, and 647. In the amnesty measures there were two categories of prisoners. By March 8, 1959, 244 releases had been made. And in the second category 72 were left. The Governor decided that 49 of these should be released in Cyprus. The remaining 23, of whom 14 were in British prisons, were released on condition that they went to Greece. By March 9, 9 prisoners had been sent to Greece; by March 13, 3 were sent to Cyprus. On the same day, the amnesty for Grivas was announced and arrangements were made for his safe-conduct out of Cyprus. 44 Grivas Memoirs, p. 403.

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A few days later, the Mayor of Athens conferred on him the freedom of the city.45 Grivas-Dighenis, who had refused the Greek government's offer to recall him to active army service, soon was to get involved in a controversy with Makarios, publicly reiterating the backstage strictures and complaints he had registered with regard to the Zurich and London agreements when still in his hideout on the island. At one point in this controversy he went so far as to charge that the Zurich and London agreements contained certain verbal commitments of which he had been unaware at the time and that these included far-reaching concessions to the British and the Turkish viewpoints. Both Makarios and the Greek government (through Premier Karamanlis and Foreign Minister AveroffTossizza) denied these charges on July 30, without, however, managing to silence the General. Finally, Makarios and Grivas, after meeting in Rhodes (October 6-19, 1959), issued a joint statement to the effect that they had achieved a full identity of views over the future of Cyprus. Thus the political and the military leaders of the Cyprus struggle were reconciled46 — for the time being.

C. THE HOUSE OF COMMONS APPROVES THE CYPRUS AGREEMENTS

After the Greek and Turkish Parliaments had approved the Zurich and London agreements and Grivas had arrived in Athens, the House of Commons, on March 19,1959, adopted by 299 to 246 votes a government sponsored resolution welcoming the Cyprus agreements.47 In the debate that took place on this occasion (the first major Cyprus debate in the Commons since June 1958) members of the Opposition, while upholding the agreements as a whole, maintained that a major factor in preventing an earlier settlement had been the policies of the government since 1954. The sentence in Hopkinson's speech of July 28, 1954, that there would be no question of any change of sovereignty in Cyprus, had done more harm and had lost more lives than probably any sentence ever uttered, charged Aneurin Bevan. Governor Harding had sought not for a political but for a soldier's solution. And the government had erred in refusing to 48 46 47

Keesing's, 16834-16835. Ibid., 17067-17068. 602 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 539.

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accept immediately Makarios' independence proposal in September 1958. The Paris and Zurich Greek-Turkish exchanges, he added sarcastically, had been conducted under the enormous advantage of the absence of both Lennox-Boyd and Lloyd. At any rate, he hoped the constitution would work though it was festooned with all sort of obstacles.48 Callaghan, the Colonial Secretary of the Labour shadow government, said that many people held the view that the troubles really started when Sir Anthony Eden met Papagos in Greece and told him there was no Cyprus question. A long sequence of similar statements had followed. All in all, the government had misjudged the Cyprus situation and the temper of the people of Cyprus. When Makarios had become Ethnarch, changes had taken place. But, while tension mounted, the government went on repeating the same phrases. It had misjudged EOKA, its strength and its truces. For years it had told the people that EOKA was about to be crushed. Then, at one moment it negotiated with Makarios, and the next, deported him. Policy had vacillated between strength and compromise. 49 Unhappy with the agreements were certain Conservative Party members. Viscount Lambton criticized the government for having allowed Turkish and Greek representatives to meet at Zurich and discuss the future of the Crown Colony without any British participation. Britain should have stayed on at least for three to five years more, to prevent vendettas and blood feuds among the Cypriots. 50 And another such spokesman, R. T. Paget, asserted that the enclaves Britain would keep on Cyprus were not really bases at all and were virtually worthless. The sovereignty over them was futile. 51 Lennox-Boyd, on the other hand, the principal spokesman for the government, because of the absence of Macmillan and Lloyd in the United States after their visit to Moscow, maintained that this settlement ful48

602 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 650-651 (Bevan). Ibid., 739-748. In a sort of balance sheet, said Callaghan: "We have said we would not discuss Cyprus with anybody; we have done it. We have said they must remain in the Commonwealth; they are now free to leave. We said that public security, defense and foreign affairs must be handled by Britain. They will be handled by the Republic of Cyprus. We refused to deal with Makarios; we have now feted him in the Dorchester Hotel; ... We have surrendered sovereignty over the island, shall withdraw from its administration; ... closed the concentration camps ... allowed Makarios to return to the island ...; declared an amnesty ...; facilitated Grivas' departure. We are asked to applaud the government action. We cannot do it. We uphold the agreement". Ibid., 747-748. 60 Ibid., 682-683. « Ibid., 723.

48

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filled the aims of the policy proclaimed on June 19, 1958, when the Macmillan plan had been presented to the Commons. It served the best interests of all the people of the island. It was a permanent settlement acceptable to the two communities and the Greek and Turkish governments. It safeguarded British bases, to enable Britain to carry out its international obligations. And it strengthened peace, security and cooperation between Britain and its allies in a vital area of the world. The Opposition's desire not to make a settlement more difficult had also been helpful, he had to acknowledge. The miraculous change which had occurred since June 1958 had been brought about, said Lennox-Boyd, first, by the courage, patience, and discipline of the security forces and the civil administration, both of which shared the view that a political solution was essential. Second, this change had taken place because of the growing realization that the Macmillan plan would be implemented in the absence of agreement among the Greek and Turkish governments and the two communities of Cyprus. Later, during the debate, he asserted that had partition not been brought into the picture through the Macmillan plan, the settlement would never have been reached. Macmillan's appeal of July 31, 1958, for the end of violence, the similar appeals of the Turkish and Greek Premiers that followed, together with Macmillan's visits to Athens and Ankara in August had greatly contributed to the final result, Lennox-Boyd asserted. Under these agreements both enosis and partition were excluded, he emphasized. Either of these solutions would have led to civil war on a scale transcending the clashes between Turkish and Greek Cypriots of the previous year. Lennox-Boyd also quoted verbatim a passage from Zorlu's speech of March 4,1959 before the Grand National Assembly in which the Turkish Foreign Minister had expressed his appreciation of Britain's encouragement during the initial stages of the Greek-Turkish negotiations that led to the Zurich conference. The Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, Lennox-Boyd underlined, had never questioned the British requirement for sovereign bases. Much of course, remained to be done, and it should be done fast. As one of the conferees had said, this was "a souflte which must be eaten before it subsides".52 R. A. Butler, speaking for Lloyd at the end of the debate, after stating in response to Opposition charges that it was rather valueless wasting time over post-mortems, likewise declared that one had to look at the future. Yet in efforts to impress the Commons with the firmness of the 52 602 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 639-649.

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government's policies against charges of vacillation, he summed up Cyprus developments since the London Tripartite conference of 1955: in 1956, the Radcliffe Constitutional proposals; in 1957, UN Resolution 1013 (XI); Grivas' truce of offer of March 14; then, the good offices proposal of Lord Ismay, NATO's Secretary-General; the series of informal exchanges in summer with the Greek and Turkish governments to bring about a conference; in 1958, Lloyd's trips to Ankara and Athens; then, in June, the Macmillan plan, and later the NATO conference efforts, and the thirteenth UN General Assembly. Before Christmas, the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers explained to Lloyd in Paris the lines of a settlement and, as soon as the Foreign Ministers had agreed in Zurich, the London Conference had been called. Enosis, he also reminded the Commons, was no new phenomenon. When Churchill arrived in Cyprus in 1906, shouts of enosis had greeted him. 53

D. IMPLEMENTING THE ZÜRICH AND LONDON AGREEMENTS

The first steps toward the return to normal conditions in Cyprus were the amnesty, the revocation of the deportation orders of 1956 against Makarios, the Bishop of Kyrenia, and two other priests, and the ending of the emergency measures which the British authorities of Cyprus had introduced in November 1955.54 Implementing the Zürich and London agreements came next. For this purpose it had been agreed in London immediately to set up the three following bodies: 1. A Joint Committee in London, entrusted with the task of preparing the final treaties giving effect to the conclusions of the London Conference on Cyprus. 2. A Transitional Committee, in Cyprus, to draw up plans for adapting and reorganizing the government machinery in Cyprus. 3. A Joint Constitutional Commission, likewise in Cyprus, to complete a draft Constitution incorporating the provisions of the Zürich Basic Structure of the Cyprus Republic. 55 63

602 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 749-757. Cyprus (British Information Services, July 1960), p. 8 (cited hereafter as Cyprus BIS). 66 Keesing's, 16835. The principal delegates were: from Britain, John Profumo, Minister of State, Foreign Office; for Greece, Seferiadis, Ambassador in London; for Turkey, Birgi, Ambassador in London; for the Greek Cypriot community, Rossides; 64

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In other words, the Joint Committee in London was to deal mainly with three components of the projected new state: its territorial extent, its specific settled population, and its capacity to enter into relations with other states. The Transitional Committee and the Joint Constitutional Committee, on the other hand, both in Nicosia, were to deal with the projected new state's fourth component: the structure of government during the interim period prior to independence and then during full statehood. At this new stage of the state-building operation, the five parties concerned were assigned various roles. Only the Joint Committee included them all. The Transitional Committee was composed only of representatives of Britain, as the Colonial power, and of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. The Joint Constitutional Commission, on the other hand, was composed not only of representatives of the two Cypriot communities but also of representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments, but excluded Britain. Each party tried to improve the terms of the final settlement in implementing the Zürich and London Agreements. Usually, the Greek Cypriots and the Greek government representatives cooperated in dealing with the Turkish Cypriots and Turkish government representatives. Occasionally, however, as will be seen in the Joint Constitutional Commission's work, the Greek Cypriots did not see eye to eye with the Greek government representatives. In the London Joint Committee, the Turkish government representatives showed little interest in matters connected with the bases Britain was to retain on the island. And the Turkish Cypriots occasionally played the role of mediators between the Greek Cypriots and the British representatives whose views were diametrically opposed in the question of the precise territorial extent of these bases. As for the Greek-Turkish cooperation which had made possible the Zürich and London agreements, this did not blossom into that overall relationship of special amity which the Greek and Turkish leaders so sanguinely predicted. On the contrary, as time passed, it tended to fade away. And the Turkish military coup d'état of May 27, 1960 removed from office the Turkish architects of these agreements. 1. The Work of the Joint

Committee

The Joint Committee charged with drafting the treaties giving effect for the Turkish Cypriot community, Osman Orek. A second tier of delegates consisted of deputies of the above, for Britain, Sir Alexander Knox-Helm; for Greece, Bitsios; for Turkey, Halflk Bayulken.

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to the London and Zurich agreements held its first meeting in London on March 23, 1959. Consisting of one representative each of the British, Greek, and Turkish governments, and one representative each of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, this committee was entrusted with the task not only of preparing the draft treaties concerning matters arising out of the retention of British bases in Cyprus and of settling the question of Cypriot nationality, but also of dealing with the question of the liabilities of the Crown Colony, as well as with financial and economic problems arising out of the building of the new state.56 Though first to start its work, this joint body was the last to end it. It set up a Committee of Deputies which met continually throughout 1959. However, it became necessary to convene a new round-table Conference on Cyprus in London (January 16-18,1960) during which the Foreign Ministers of Britain, Greece, and Turkey, as well as Makarios, Kiïçiïk, Sir Hugh Foot and Julian Amery, Colonial Office Under-Secretary of State, reviewed the work of the Joint Committee for the purpose of reaching final decisions on outstanding questions in time for the transfer of sovereignty by the planned date of February 19,1960. The communiqué issued at the end of this conference disclosed that it had not been possible to complete consideration of all the outstanding matters. Accordingly, at the request of the Cypriot leaders, the date for the declaration of Cypriot independence was postponed to March 19,1960. Working groups were to continue the Joint Committee's work with all possible speed, and the question of reconvening the conference was left for a later decision.57 Subsequently, the London joint committee suspended its work. Further negotiations were conducted in Nicosia among Amery, Sir Hugh Foot, and the leaders of the two Cypriot communities. Mainly responsible for the delay in reaching agreement were difficulties in determining the precise area of the two bases Britain was to retain on the island. Before going to London, Ethnarch Makarios, it will be recalled, had asked Karamanlis that at least in the question of bases he should be allowed

56 Cyprus BIS, pp. 10-11. Keesing's, 17727. The principal issue was the size of the two British bases that would be left under British sovereignty. In the House of Commons, on February 1, 1960, Lloyd explained that originally the government had thought it would be necessary to retain areas in which about 16,000 Cypriots lived. This had been reduced to an area between 150 and 170 square miles with some 4,500 Cypriots. In a further reduction to 120 square miles, the number of Cypriots would be under 1,000. There would be no question of a separate little "colony", Lloyd said (616 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 637). 57 Cyprus BIS, p. 12.

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to handle the problem himself and this he did in the Joint Committee either indirectly through Zenon Rossides, the Greek Cypriot representative on that Committee, or by himself personally in Nicosia later on, with Grivas prodding him to achieve the most advantageous arrangement for Cyprus by his earlier-mentioned attacks on the Zürich and London agreements. A communiqué issued in Nicosia on April 21, 1960 disclosed that differences about the extent of the base areas had been sufficiently narrowed to justify detailed discussion in relation to the relevant section of the Treaty and to the maps. However, after a meeting on May 6, seven weeks elapsed before further formal meetings were held. Meanwhile, contacts were maintained among the British, Greek, and Turkish governments, and from time to time direct and indirect contacts took place among the various delegations in Cyprus. 58 The main issues still to be settled were, first, the future of the sovereign base areas if Britain ever decided to relinquish them; second, the arrangements for administering the base areas; third, the exact delimitation of these areas; and, fourth, the amount of financial aid to be given to the Republic of Cyprus. 59 After formal meetings were resumed in Nicosia on June 23, 1960, it was announced on June 26 that agreement had been reached on the civil administration of the British bases. Three days later, a broad measure of agreement had been reached on all the major issues which had been under discussion the last five days. The exact figure of British financial aid to Cyprus remained to be decided. Finally, on July 1,1960, a joint communiqué disclosed that agreement had been reached among the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders and the British Delegation on all outstanding questions. The Greek and Turkish governments had been kept informed and the relevant documents were being drawn up in agreement with them. On July 6, 1960, the Treaty documents were initialed. 60 The negotiations had been long and arduous but finally it had been possible to reach an accommodation between the essential requirements of Britain and the requests put forward by the Cypriot leaders and to achieve a settlement in full accord with the Zürich and London agreements. The British bases, under the agreement, would comprise two separate 58 58 80

Cyprus BIS, p. 11. Keesing's, 17727-17728. Cyprus BIS, p. 11. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

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areas totaling some 99 square miles. This represented a compromise between the base area the British government had originally proposed and the base area proposed by the Greek Cypriots during the Joint Committee's London meetings in 1959. The British government at first wanted an area of 170 square miles for its two bases on Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, had counterproposed an area of 36 square miles which was three times the area of the actual British bases on the island. The British proposal, they observed, included a number of localities not mentioned in the London Agreement of February 19, 1959. It therefore ran counter to the express provisions of that agreement. Moreover, a civil administration with civil courts and land registry offices would be required because of the inclusion of quite a number of villages in the base areas under the enlarged British plan. These bases, the Greek Cypriots contended, would thus become a British colony on the island, in violation of the express provisions against partition in the Zurich Basic Structure (Point 22) and in the Treaty of Guarantee (Article 2). Political problems of irredentism would arise. Besides, the British proposal would create a number of important economic problems. 61 Under the agreement of July 6, 1960, the British government in an exchange of letters, acknowledged that should it in future decide, in view of changes in its military requirements, to relinquish its sovereignty over those bases, the territory involved would be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus. All in all, for the new state, this agreement meant, first, a territorial extent larger than the one the British government originally wished to concede to the new Republic and, second, the exclusion of any legal possibility for Britain to cede either to Turkey or Greece, or to any third state for that matter, the territorial area it retained in Cyprus, if it ever decided to give up its bases on the island and withdraw from it. Ethnarch Makarios and Rossides, his representative on the Joint Committee, were primarily responsible for this outcome with no support on the part of the Turkish Cypriot representatives and with the Greek and Turkish 81 In a statement of June 8, 1959, the Greek Cypriot representative on the Joint Committee had emphasized questions of underground water supply. Of the three main sources of such water supply in Cyprus, only one would remain under the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus if the British proposals were accepted. Then, the Republic would be deprived of important cultivated and agricultural lands, which would involve deprivation of half of the island's whole sultana production; about one third of its potato production; one fourth of its grape production; and one third of its cotton production. Thorny fiscal problems would also arise, particularly of customs revenue, as well as many administrative difficulties.

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representatives leaving the matter to be settled by the two Cypriot communities, on the one side, and the British government, on the other. On July 7, 1960, the Colonial, Foreign, and Defense Secretaries of Britain presented to the House of Commons a bill to grant independence to the Crown Colony of Cyprus, together with an explanatory White Paper containing the treaties and other documents formally approved in Nicosia. 62 2. The Work of the Transitional

Committee

The Transitional Committee envisaged in the London agreements to draw up plans for adapting and reorganizing the government machinery of the Crown Colony was set up on April 5, 1959, after discussions between Makarios and Kii?uk, their agreement on the allocations of ministerial portfolios, and Sir Hugh Foot's approval of this ministerial list. Essentially this body served as the first provisional government of Cyprus. To share the responsibilities of administration as far as possible with this provisional government, the Governor inaugurated, on April 7, regular meetings attended by members of the Governor's executive council and of this provisional government, sitting together as a joint council. On April 21, the Governor invited the members of the provisional government to assume special responsibilities for particular departments and functions of government, under the terms of the London agreement. 63 On November 9,1959, after consultation with the Joint Constitutional Commission and agreement with the joint council, Governor Sir Hugh Foot promulgated the Registration of Electors Law, which dealt with the matters of the requirements and qualifications of persons eligible for registration in the Greek or Turkish register according to his (or her) community. These matters were the subject of considerable debate in the Joint Constitutional Commission which finally agreed that members »2 Cyprus (London: H.M. Stationery Office, July I960), Cmnd. 1093. (Cited hereafter as Cmnd. 1093.) 63 Cyprus BIS, pp. 8-9. Keesing's, 16835. Makarios and Ku?uk respectively made the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ministerial appointments. Greek Cypriots held the Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Finance, Communications, Commerce and Industry, Labor and Social Services. Turkish Cypriots held the Ministries of Defense, Agriculture, and Health. And there was a Greek Cypriot Deputy Minister of Agriculture and a Turkish Cypriot Deputy Minister of Finance. None of the Greek Cypriot Ministers was over 40, and two were in their twenties. They included two former EOKA leaders both of whom had prices of £ 5,000 on their heads during the emergency. Makarios himself took over provisionally the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All Greek Cypriot Ministers were of Right Wing tendencies.

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of the Armenian, Maronite or Latin churches who were qualified persons and fulfilled the age and residential requirements should be registered on the Greek register. Persons belonging neither to this category nor to the Greek or Turkish communities could apply for registration on a Greek or Turkish register, if otherwise qualified, by making a written declaration of their preference to the Governor before November 23, 1959.64 On December 13, 1959, a step toward something more than a provisional government for Cyprus was taken. Presidential elections were held. Archbishop and Ethnarch Makarios was elected (with women voting for the first time) first President of the Cyprus Republic, though its Constitution had not yet come into being. Ten days earlier, on nomination day, Dr. KüQük had been officially declared elected as Vice-President of the Cyprus Republic, when he was returned unopposed. 65 It was, however, only on April 6, 1960, that the draft constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was initialed in Nicosia by leading members of the Joint Constitutional Commission which had been set up under the London agreement of February 19, 1959, on the basis, in turn, of the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of February 11, 1959, between the Greek and Turkish Premiers. The protracted international and intercommunal negotiations that led to this accomplishment are recounted below. 3. Drafting the Cyprus

Constitution

By the London agreements of February 19, 1959, Britain refrained from playing any direct role in constitution-making for Cyprus just as it had refrained from playing any direct role in the Greek-Turkish negotiations which had led to the Zürich Agreement on the basic constitutional structure of the new republic. As a result, constitution-making for Cyprus was again the handiwork mainly of the Greek and Turkish governments. This time, however, representatives of the two Cypriot 44

Cyprus BIS, p. 9. See below for consultation of the Governor with the Joint Constitutional Commission on this issue. 85 Keesing's, 17147. Makarios received 144,501 votes against 71,753 votes for John Clerides, leader of the Cyprus Democratic Union. The electorate included 238,000 Greek Cypriots. The Ethnarch received overwhelming support in the villages. Clerides polled strongly in the cities, because of Left Wing support. On December 11, 1959, Grivas issued a statement denying reports he was supporting Makarios and repeating he did not wish to take part in Cyprus politics in any way. On December 14, Makarios called for unity and cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Kü9ük welcomed the result of the election and expressed confidence in future cooperation between Makarios and himself.

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communities, as well as a neutral legal adviser, participated in the negotiations. The Joint Constitutional Commission, which first met on April 13, 1959 in Nicosia, consisted of one representative each of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities; one each appointed by the Greek and Turkish governments; and of a legal adviser appointed by the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers under the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of Zürich. Professor Marcel Bridel, one-time Rector of the University of Lausanne, was selected for this post. The Commission's task was to prepare the Constitution of the new Republic of Cyprus along the lines laid down by the Zürich agreement on the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus. During the London Conference on Cyprus of 1959, Makarios, it will be recalled, had expressed reservations on certain points in this document and had called for clarifications of it both in backstage talks with the leaders of the Turkish Cypriots and at the conference in its second plenary meeting. Moreover, after the London Conference, the Greek government felt obliged to seek for certain improvements in the Zürich Basic Structure. Accordingjy, Premier Karamanlis gave instructions on March 5, 1959 that such efforts should be exerted to achieve the deletion of the provision under which the separate majority of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives was required for adopting tax bills. In case of discriminatory tax measures, the Turkish community would always be able to resort to the Supreme Constitutional Court to avert the adoption of such measures. He also favored the addition of a provision under which the President and Vice-President of Cyprus, by joint decision, would be able to increase or decrease the size of the military force of 2,000 men envisaged in the Zürich agreement. And he would like to see the veto rights of the President and Vice-President in the matter of appointments and promotions in the armed forces limited to the top echelons only. At any rate, the promotion in the lower echelons would be made on the basis of general criteria provided for in the organic laws, over which both President and Vice-President enjoyed the veto right. Finally, agreement ought to be reached with the Turkish government to ensure the reasonable use of the Zürich agreement's provision under which the Greek and Turkish government were permitted to subsidize public works of the respective communities in Cyprus. Foreign Minister Zorlu, however, reacted negatively to these proposals when Premier Karamanlis raised them during his visit to Ankara May 7-10, 1959.

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Toward the end of March the issue (never resolved to this day) of setting up separate municipalities in the five major towns of Cyprus (Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Paphos and Larnaca) gave rise to a dispute over both the means of implementing this provision of Zurich and the respective competence of the Constitutional Commission and of the Transitional Committee to deal with this matter. The Turkish Cypriot side favored territorial separation of the municipalities. The Greek side opposed this view. It feared the creation not of "municipalities within municipalities" but "of states within the state". The Turkish Cypriot demand, it believed, was not well-founded. It ran counter to the unifying spirit which had prevailed among Greeks and Turks at the Zurich and London conferences. It ran counter, too, to the letter of Point 20 in the Zurich agreement which stipulated that the separate municipalities would be set up in the five largest cities of Cyprus by the Turkish inhabitants of those cities — which meant that these separate municipalities would consist of individuals without any territorial jurisdiction in the cities, which would preserve their geographical and legal unity (emphasis added). Besides, it was not even in the interest of the Turkish Cypriots to set up territorially separate municipalities in those cities, since statistics revealed that they contributed far less than did the Greek Cypriots to the upkeep of these cities. But, in addition to certain economic, legal and technical drawbacks to the establishment of separate municipalities with territorial jurisdiction, political considerations had to be reckoned with. For it was almost mathematically certain that public opinion both in Cyprus and Greece would experience bitter disappointment, if such a right were conceded to the Cypriot Turks. Extremely undesirable repercussions could follow. 66 When the Transitional Committee, on March 26, 1959, appointed a legislative committee to report on draft legislation prepared by the Governor concerning the establishment of separate municipalities in the five major towns of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot legal counsellor on this committee, Criton Tornaritis, Q.C., stated on March 30 that, in his 86 Economic problems would arise because many and flourishing Greek Cypriot enterprises would be included in the Turkish sectors and might be subject to unfavorable treatment on the part of the Turkish Cypriot authorities, especially if similar Turkish Cypriot enterprises existed. Territorial separation, moreover, would be unachievable because of the intermixture and cohabitation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots for a long time. Efforts to achieve such separation would have harmful results for both, at the expense of general tranquility and mutual trust. Smaller technical difficulties would arise, for instance, in questions connected with the reparation of sewage systems passing through both municipalities.

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opinion, this was a matter not for the Transitional Committee but for the Joint Constitutional Commission to decide since a point of the Zurich Basic Structure was involved and it was the task of the Constitutional Commission, not of the Transitional Committee, to draft the Cyprus Constitution, incorporating into it the Zurich Basic Structure. The Turkish Cypriot legal counsellor, N.N. Miinir, Q.C., took the opposite view. He contended that until the independent republic came into being and the British government transferred its sovereignty to the new republic, the Governor of Cyprus still exercised legislative power though he had seen fit to obtain the views of the members of the Transitional Committee (not of the Constitutional Commission) about the draft legislation on separate municipalities before publishing it and enacting it. Miinir argued, too, that only the relevant article of the Zurich Basic Structure on setting up separate municipalities had to be included in the draft Constitution, not the provisions of the draft bill, on which the committee had been asked to report, or provisions similar to it. As a result of this disagreement only the Turkish Cypriot representatives on this legislative committee sent in a report to the Transitional Committee, the Governor, Makarios and Kiisiik. 67 To deal with this deadlock, the Governor proposed that the bill on the separation of municipalities be sent to the Joint Constitutional Commission to allow it to check whether it contravened the provisions of the Zurich Basic Structure and even to amend it if the Commission and the Transitional Committee believed this was necessary before it became law. On April 12, at a meeting with Sir Hugh Foot, in the presence of the Greek and Turkish Consuls in Nicosia, the heads of the Greek and Turkish Delegations to the Constitutional Commission, Professors Themistocles 67

Commenting on a memorandum on the municipalities question which Makarios had presented, the Turkish Cypriot members observed that the matter of whether the separate municipalities would be temporary or not should be decided when that matter of the already established municipalities was reviewed at the end of four years as stipulated in Point 20(b) of the Zurich Basic Structure. That the President and Vice-President had been vested with an inherent power to review the position after four years did not make the separation of the municipalities temporary or tentative, they wrote, agreeing with the Turkish view. If at some future date, the President and Vice-President agreed to reunite the municipalities, the legal provisions giving effect to the separation would have to be repealed whether or not these were embodied in an ad hoc law or in a separate part of the main law. The Turkish Cypriots also maintained that there was no prohibition against separate municipalities in other areas and therefore the Governor of Cyprus was empowered to create new municipalities, the boundaries of which might embrace part of a town or part of a village, or areas comprising parts of both.

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Tsatsos and Nihat Erim, respectively, with members of their delegations also present, developed their views on this issue, handing to the Governor their relevant memoranda. Tsatsos presented the two principles which in his government's view should be accepted with regard to the creation of separate municipalities.68 Erim unequivocally accepted the first principle but reserved his right to discuss the second principle again after further study. In inspiring terms he declared that Zürich and London had inaugurated an altogether new and different era and that the successful organization of the administrative structure of the new Republic of Cyprus would constitute the touchstone of the close future friendship between Greece and Turkey, which eventually would reach federal unification because of geopolitical and other reasons. As for the Governor, he declared that the matter was extremely urgent. He feared lest delay in solving this matter might jeopardize the whole agreements of Zürich and London. Kü?ük and Denkta?, he said, had been very patient until then. However they would not want to wait any longer for a solution of this matter. He proposed, therefore, that the two government delegations confer and then meet again with him later. Meanwhile he would ask the Attorney-General to draft a bill and the Mayors to begin talks with the local leaders of the communities and report back to him, so that he might consult the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Delegations and keep them posted about developments. Both Tsatsos and Erim, however, again in virtual unison, asked the Governor to entrust this task not to the Attorney-General but to a collective organ on which the two Cypriot communities would be represented. Nevertheless, the Governor insisted. A Committee, he contended, would be unable to draft a bill, because of the divergent views of the two communities. The bill prepared by the Attorney-General, he counterproposed, should afterward be placed before representatives of the two communities, so that their views might be heard. On their side, 88 The first of these principles was that only inhabitants with an approximate ratio of 100 per cent of a certain nationality would be included in the boundaries of a municipality. Wherever this was not possible, the ratio of Greek Cypriot inhabitants of a part of a Turkish Cypriot municipality would be proportionate to the ratio of the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of a Greek Cypriot municipality. The second of these principles would be that the Greek Cypriots to be included in a Turkish Cypriot municipality and the Turkish Cypriots to be included in a Greek Cypriot municipality would pay municipal taxes and levies to the municipality of their nationality which would provide them with the services for which the relevant taxes had been imposed. The coordinating organs provided for under Point 20 of the Zürich Basic Structure would settle matters of the proportional allocation of the obligations of providing services and other details.

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Tsatsos and Erim stressed that a bill, so prepared, would arouse suspicion of the communities and was undesirable for psychological reasons. Disagreement also arose between the Governor, on the one side, and the heads of the two government delegations, on the other, about the communiqué he proposed to publish after this meeting. Sir Hugh seemed to be in a hurry to inform the public that the question had not bogged down and that progress was being accomplished.69 Subsequently, Erim proposed that the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members of the Constitutional Commission should carry out among themselves private talks on this difficult matter in order to find a solution to it. The Greek Cypriot Delegation agreed to such a procedure. When the Joint Constitutional Commission held its first plenary meeting on April 13, 1959, other issues connected with the drafting of the Cyprus Constitution temporarily displaced the municipalities problem as a focus of friction and a source of disputes. It was agreed to prepare the Constitution on the basis of draft constitutions the Greek and Turkish Delegations would present to the Commission. The Greek and Turkish draft constitutions were not tabled on April 20, as originally intended, but on May 6, at the Commission's fourth plenary meeting. The Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots accepted these drafts as bases for discussion, not as binding documents. Bridel, the Swiss legal adviser, had prepared a 12-page draft constitution of his own based on the Zürich Basic Structure. After the tabling of the Greek and Turkish drafts he refrained, however, from submitting it. Supposedly, a faulty typewriter was to blame for this contretemps. He reserved, however, his right to make comments on the two drafts. And Erim proposed that Bridel's draft be circulated to the delegations. The Turkish draft constitution, Erim observed, represented an effort to systematize and to comply with the teachings of constitutional law, but, of course, within the framework of the Zürich Basic Structure. He supposed that the Greek draft Constitution had been prepared within 69 In its memorandum to the Governor concerning the draft legislation on separate municipalities, the Greek Delegation drew the Governor's attention, among other things, to the fact that the decisions of the Transitional Committee, by their very nature, were of a provisional character and valid only during the transitional period. However, any decision unanimously taken by the Transitional Committee and without the reservation of temporariness would have to be respected also by the Republic of Cyprus when it had been set up. The Delegation also approved the Governor's stated intention to refer the bill to the Joint Constitutional Commission so as to allow that organ to ascertain whether this bill was in accord with the provisions of the Zürich Basic Structure.

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the same framework. Tsatsos, in his presentation, affirmed that this was so. His delegation regarded the Zurich Basic Structure as a binding document. This structure had in no way been modified or amended in the Greek draft constitution. It had only been reordered and supplemented. Tsatsos also made it clear that the Greek draft was neither binding on his delegation nor definitive and that he would study with care all possible improvements to its text. In his speech, Erim referred to the current world situation in which Greece and Turkey were united in order to defend themselves against common dangers. The Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots would constitute a further factor in their unity. By May 13, at the Commission's fifth plenary meeting, the four delegations had at their disposal the two draft constitutions duly translated into Greek and Turkish, the two official languages of the Commission. It was agreed to provide Bridel with a translation of these texts. After considerable debate about procedures for dealing further with these two documents, the Commission decided to set up a preparatory subcommittee to compare them and report back to it on identical articles in both as well as on articles that were in conformity with the Zurich Basic Structure. The subcommittee would consist of one member each from each delegation, aided, if necessary, by another member, who, however, would be prohibited from participating in the debate. The Subcommittee carried out the task entrusted to it on May 14. And next day, the Commission decided to entrust it also with the drafting of the section of the Constitution dealing with Human Rights. Not only the two constitutional drafts but also the Rome Accord on Human Rights should be taken into account in carrying out this task. This meeting of May 15 opened with an acrimonious exchange between Denktaj, of the Turkish Cypriot Delegation, and Tsatsos, because of a Times of Cyprus story to the effect that the latter had supposedly told a Journal de Geneve correspondent that difficulties arising in the Commission's work were due to Turkish Cypriot fears of the qualitative and quantitative superiority of the Greeks. That same meeting witnessed the beginning of a protracted and fierce dispute about criteria for including Cypriots in either the Greek or Turkish community. This dispute was triggered by Governor Foot's request, of May 14, to the Constitutional Commission for guidance in matters affecting the elections for President, Vice-President, House of Representatives and Communal Chambers, and especially the system of elections, the qualifications of voters, and the definition of the constituencies. Linked to this issue was the question of the representation of the

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A NEW STATE IS BORN

Armenians, Maronites and other groups or communities in the Greek or the Turkish community for electoral purposes. 70 At its seventh plenary meeting, of May 20, the Commission agreed that the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots should submit their views about who should be considered a Greek and who a Turk. Tsatsos and Erim would submit their recommendations with regard to the question of defining the various communities. At the Commission's next meeting, of May 22, the matter of replying to the Governor's letter of May 14 was to be discussed. Meanwhile, in three meetings between May 16 and May 19, the Subcommittee had compared the corresponding provisions of the two draft constitutions and had started work on the section of the Constitution on Human Rights, with Bridel invited to take part in their reformulation. On May 21, it resumed its discussion on Human Rights. At its eighth plenary meeting of May 22, the Constitutional Commission continued its discussion of the issues raised by the Governor in his efforts to push on toward elections in Cyprus. The same topic preoccupied the Commission at its ninth plenary meeting, of May 26, with the Subcommittee going ahead with its discussion of Human Rights, and then resuming the study of the relevant provisions of the Greek and Turkish draft constitutions. The definition of members of the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus, which a reply to Governor Foot's letter of May 14 required to enable him to prepare the Registration of Electors law, was again discussed with extraordinary intensity at the tenth plenary meeting of the Constitutional Commission on June 1. Finally, it was decided to cut short the debate and to continue it at the next meeting of the Commission. This meeting, the Commission's eleventh, took place in June. It resulted in agreement not to discuss the two communities problem and not to reply to the Governor's letter of May 14 until the entire question had been settled. It is hard to fathom the political motivations for the intensity of this debate about the criteria for belonging to the Greek or Turkish community. For the Turkish side, mainly language ought to be the criterion for belonging to one or the other community, with those whose mother tongue was neither Turkish nor Greek being allowed freely to choose 70

In a memorandum to Makarios of April 1, 1958, the Maronite community had asked for safeguards in view of the forthcoming independence of Cyprus. It desired, among other things, the right to elect a Maronite representative to the House of Representatives.

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which community they wished to join for voting purposes. The Zurich Basic Structure, the Turkish spokesmen argued, had recognized only two communities on the island and if, for instance, the Armenians or Maronites were forced to join any particular community, they would be deprived of their individual rights which had to be assured for them under the London Declaration of the British government, to which the other parties had subscribed.11 For the Greek side, on the other hand, religion was the most important criterion for belonging to the Greek or Turkish community. Accordingly, Armenians, Maronites or British residents as Christians should be included in the Greek community. This had been the approach of the 1907 Cypriot Constitution under which municipal elections were conducted on the basis of the distinction between Christians and Muslims. Or these non-Greek and non-Turkish communities should be allowed to make their choice as communities, as entities, through their representatives, not on an individual basis. This, the Greek side contended, was the meaning of the provision of the London Declaration for it called for the safeguarding of the human rights of the other Cypriot communities. At one point, the debate became so heated that, when Bridel, on a matter of procedure, gave his support to the Turkish procedural position, 72 Tsatsos observed that procedural questions often had a substantive aspect and threatened to walk out of the meeting if Bridel did not withdraw his proposal. At another point in the debate, Denkta?, goaded by his Greek Cypriot opposite number, Glafkos Clerides, had to acknowledge that the President and Vice-President under the Zurich agreements could be elected only by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot citizens, to the exclusion of non-Greek and non-Turkish Cypriots. But he countered by asking Clerides whether, if non-Greek or non-Turkish Cypriots were included in the electoral body with a corresponding right of eligibility, the possibility might not arise of having a Maronite or an Armenian President or Vice-President.73 Was the Turkish side, by its approach to the problem, anxious to prevent any other minority in Cyprus from acquiring the status similar to that of the Turkish community, 71 In Annex III, subsection 5, paragraph b(2) (i) (Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom) of the London Agreements of February 19, 1959, it was stipulated that provisions shall be made by agreement for the protection of the fundamental human rights of the various communities in Cyprus, Cmnd. 679, p. 12. 72 At the May 26, 1959 plenary meeting of the Commission, Bridel had proposed a majority vote on his proposal, which the Turkish side endorsed, that the qualifications of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities should be decided first. 78 At the June 1,1959 plenary meeting of the Commision.

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with all its political implications? Did the Greek side fear that the Turkish attitude tended to strengthen the federal approach to Cyprus' political arrangements? This writer frankly fails to find any satisfactory answer to these questions. In the end, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots got together and reached agreement on February 5,1960. Both viewpoints were included in Article 2 of the Cyprus Constitution, with the term "community" reserved only for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and the other entities referred to merely as "religious groups" 74 — a concession to the Turkish viewpoint, at the expense perhaps of the federal principles which they otherwise tried to promote. At this meeting of June 8, 1959, at any rate, the Constitutional Commission decided not to discuss this matter at the next plenary meeting, because of Tsatsos' expected absence, and instructed the subcommittee to discuss the legislative power on the basis of the Greek and Turkish constitutional drafts. Four days earlier the Subcommittee had completed its observations on Human Rights, and Bridel had provided it with a list of rights included neither in the Greek nor the Turkish draft nor in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms nor in the Protocol. After having discussed this list, it had recommended the adoption of some of these rights, for instance freedom of emigration out of the Republic and free and compulsory primary education, also the right to social security. At two other meetings, the question of the protection of foreign capital was debated, Tsatsos having prepared a relevant draft on this subject. And it recommended for adoption Bridel's proposals about freedom of commerce, industry and work. After discussion on provisions of a state of emergency was put off for a later stage, the debate on Human Rights was completed and Bridel was asked to prepare the complete draft of the chapter on Human Rights. 75 Then, at two meetings, the Subcommittee, as instructed by the Commission, began discussing the legislative power. It agreed that this power should be exercised by the House of Representatives in all matters except those expressly reserved to the Communal Chambers under the Constitution. The Greek side, however, reserved the right to argue that the President and Vice-President also exercised legislative power. The Turkish side, on the other hand, cautioned against limiting the power 74

Cmnd. 1093, pp. 91-92. Ibid., pp. 94-105, for fundamental rights and liberties in the Cyprus Constitution (Articles 6-35). 75

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of the House of Representatives to the legislative function only, since the House had other competences, too, as foreshadowed by the Zurich Basic Structure. Agreement, however, was reached on the procedure for fixing the number of representatives in the House and on matters relevant to their election.76 After a Greek-Turkish disagreement over the voting procedure to be adopted, should the House wish to dissolve itself,77 the Turkish representative, Bilge, asked for postponement of further plenary meetings of the Commission as well as of the Subcommittee until June 17. For Erim, his chief, was now absent. The Joint Constitutional Commission's eleventh plenary meeting, of June 8, 1959, turned out to be its last one. From then on, the work of preparing the Cyprus Constitution was taken up mainly by the Subcommittee. And it was speeded up by negotiations between the leaders of the Delegations of Greece and Turkey, Professors Tsatsos and Erim, in Geneva, without the participation of representatives of either the Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot Delegations. Greek-Turkish exchanges through the diplomatic channel contributed further to this faint repetition of the process which had begun in December 1958, when the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers had started their talks over the setting up of the new state of Cyprus. Meeting in Geneva the second week of June 1959, Tsatsos and Erim compared their respective constitutional drafts and reached agreement on a number of issues, in some cases after reference to their respective governments, in others with the reservation of their governments' approval. These agreements were formalized in two protocols. The first of these protocols, dated June 18, 1959, dealt with the Turkish Draft Constitution article by article. The second protocol, bearing no date, dealt in a similar way with the Greek draft Constitution. Of major importance for later legal arguments concerning the status of Cyprus as a new state and the authority to bring about amendments to the Constitution even counter to provisions of the Constitution's funda76

The two communities would agree about the number of representatives in the House of Representatives and this number would be mentioned in the Constitution, and be subject to the amendment procedure of non-fundamental provisions of the organic law (ibid., Article 62, pp. 117-118). 77 In the Greek view, a simple majority of the total number of Representatives would be appropriate; in the Turkish view, this matter should be decided by a simple majority vote of the representatives separately by community. Article 67 of the Constitution provides that the House of Representatives may dissolve itself only by its own decision carried by an absolute majority including at least one third of the Representatives elected by the Turkish community (ibid., p. 119).

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mental and non-amendable articles, was the Turkish acceptance at Geneva of Article 1 of the Greek draft Constitution which provided that the state of Cyprus would not be merely a Republic with a presidential regime but also sovereign — a point which neither the Zürich Basic Structure nor the Turkish draft Constitution mentioned, though both documents did say that the new state would be independent. 78 No agreement, on the other hand, could be reached on paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Greek draft which provided that all powers derived from the Cypriot people and were to be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. Erim, here, wanted the world "people" in the plural, but Tsatsos categorically rejected this proposal. Another formulation, it was agreed, should be sought. Otherwise that paragraph should be deleted — as it was indeed in the end so that Article 1 of the Cyprus Constitution reads as follows: The State of Cyprus is an independent and sovereign Republic with a presidential regime, the President Greek and the Vice-President being Turk elected by the Greek and the Turkish Communities of Cyprus respectively as hereinafter in this Constitution provided.

Both these protocols brought out into high relief the problem of the Executive Power which was to remain a major stumbling block in drafting the Cyprus Constitution until the second week of November 1959. Indeed, this issue led to friction between the Greek government and the Greek Cypriot Delegations to the Commission, with the latter also resenting the lack of consultation on the part of the former in dealing with the problems of constitution-drafting with the Turkish government Delegation exclusively during the Geneva talks between Tsatsos and Erim. During the July meetings of the Constitutional Commission's Subcommittee, when the legislative power was the main topic of discussion, several disagreements arose between the Greek and Turkish sides. Thus the Turkish side wanted the system of separate majority voting in the House of Representatives to be applied for the adoption of organic laws, 78

Th. Tsatsos, Observations on the Cypriot Constitution (in Greek) (Athens: A. N. Sakkoulas, 1965), pp. 11-12, emphasizes the importance of the introduction of the term "sovereign" in Article 1 of the Cyprus Constitution; underlines that the admission of Cyprus in the United Nations internationally buttresses the sovereign character of Cyprus because Article 2 of the Charter proclaims that the U N is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its members; and goes on to argue that the prohibition against amending the Constitution as well as the right of intervention are invalid. The sovereignty of a state is tantamount to the power of the people to establish the State. In his view, this is a typical case of an unconstitutional constitutional provision.

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or at least the application of some system of qualified majority. The Greek Cypriot Delegation, on the other hand, was not prepared to accept this proposed extension of the principle of a separate majority vote or of a qualified majority to such matters. The Zürich Basic Structure, they argued, made no such provision and was restrictive in defining the instances of a separate majority vote in the House. The Greek Delegation, too, could not agree to the inclusion in the Cyprus Constitution of additional instances of a separate majority vote. 79 Then, whereas the Greek side proposed that the House should consist of fifty members, the Turkish side wanted eighty. It also wanted the extension of the 7-3 ratio to the composition of the committees of the House of Representatives, whereas the Greek side opposed this view, invoking restrictively the Zürich Basic Structure and favoring a committee composition that would reflect the strength of political parties in the House. 80 But, as already mentioned, drafting the constitutional provisions on the executive power was the major issue. Point 5 of the Zürich Basic Structure, it will be recalled, provided that the executive power would be "ensured" (sera assuré) to the President and the Vice-President. For this purpose they would have a Council of Ministers composed of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers to be designated respectively by the President and the Vice-President who would appoint them by an instrument signed by them both. Article 5 of the Turkish draft Constitution, with regard to the first sentence of the above Zürich point, provided that the executive power belonged to the President of the Republic and to his Aide (the VicePresident) and was exercised by them jointly (emphasis added). Article 8 of the Greek draft Constitution provided that the executive power belonged to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic within the framework of the Constitution and the laws. Elsewhere in this draft Constitution, the Greeks had exerted efforts to emphasize in various ways the nonequal status of President and Vice-President in the exercise of the executive power. The Greek Cypriots wished to strengthen the role of the President, a Greek Cypriot, in the Cyprus Constitution, as against the role of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President. Accordingly, within the limits of the Zürich Basic Structure's provisions, they wanted him to be regarded as the organ of executive power, except in the concrete cases in which he 78 80

July 1, 1959 meeting. July 7, 1959 meeting.

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had to act jointly with the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President under the Zürich Basic Structure. In a Presidential system, the elected President, they reasoned, was the leader of the government and of the executive power. As for the Ministers, they were merely "secretaries" assisting the President in the exercise of the executive power and were responsible to him, not to the House of Representatives, as in a Parliamentary system.81 During the Tsatsos-Erim meetings in Geneva, the Greek representative objected to the above-mentioned article 5 of the Turkish draft Constitution. For, as soon as the Turkish draft Constitution had been tabled in May, Athens had considered the addition of the word "jointly" to the first sentence of this article as unacceptable and had instructed Tsatsos to achieve the deletion of this word and generally to exert efforts to raise the Presidential office above that of the Vice-President. When the Turkish side expressed reservations on this matter, Tsatsos drew the attention of the Greek Foreign Ministry to the need of achieving through the diplomatic channel either the withdrawal of the Turkish reservations or the clarification of the provisions that regulated the relations of the President with the Vice-President in a way that would lay to rest any interpretational doubt. The Tsatsos-Erim Protocol of June 18, 1959 reported that agreement on Article 5 of the Turkish draft Constitution had not been possible and that the negotiators would refer this matter back to their governments. By invoking the Zürich text itself, the deletion of the word "jointly" was, however, finally achieved and incidentally the faithful adherence of Greece to the Zürich Basic Structure was thus expressed. During the Geneva talks of Tsatsos and Erim, on the other hand, in the relevant provisions of the Greek draft Constitution, the words "and the Vice-President" had been added to the word "the President", and certain other provisions had been either deleted or amended. For instance, Article 36 (paragraph a) of the Greek draft Constitution had been dropped. It provided that the President of the Republic was Head of State and represented the Republic in all official manifestations. The result was that, in the Greek Cypriot view, President and Vice-President had been placed on the same level. On July 29, when the issue came up before the Subcommittee of the Constitutional Commission in Nicosia, the Greek and Turkish Delegations presented the following agreed text: The Executive Power shall be ensured ("sera assuré") by the President and the Vice President within the framework of the Constitution. 81

Tornaritis memorandum to Makarios, July 8, 1959.

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Despite, however, this agreement on phraseology, the Greek and Turkish Delegations differed about the text's meaning. The Turkish Delegation, with the Turkish Cypriot Delegation in agreement, regarded the words "by the President and the Vice-President" as meaning that the executive power would be ensured by the two officials equally. The Greek Delegation, on the other hand, maintained that the above words were merely descriptive, namely that they indicated that both President and VicePresident participated in the executive power in different degrees. As for the Greek Cypriot Delegation, it would not even accept the above proposed text, for the earlier-mentioned reasons. It contended that since this proposed text gave rise to conflicting interpretations, this point should be resolved, not shelved. At Erim's suggestion, Tsatsos undertook to propose a text that would formulate the principle as he understood it from the first sentence of Point 5 in the Zürich Basic Structure. At the subcommittee's next meeting, however, on July 31, the Greek Delegation announced it had not formulated the text as suggested. The Greek Cypriot Delegation, instructed by Makarios, continued to object to the verbatim repetition of point 5 of the Zürich Basic Structure in the draft Constitution of Cyprus. And the Subcommittee decided to defer consideration of the matter for the time being. During conversations between Bitsios and Küneralp in Ankara (July 27August 6, 1959), the latter had conceded that the executive power belonged to the President, with the Vice-President acting with him only in the instances provided for in the Zürich Basic Structure. Two days later, however, the Turkish government declared that the views Küneralp had expressed to Bitsios were unofficial and in no way binding upon the Turkish government. Erim, therefore, adhered to the position his delegation had assumed at the beginning of the debate on this matter. Indeed, he visited Ankara for instructions, and apparently talked over this matter with Foreign Minister Zorlu in the presence of Bitsios. During these talks, Zorlu upheld the doctrine of the equality between President and Vice-President, and asserted that the Greek and Turkish governments had agreed on this matter at Zürich. When, on August 7, the Subcommittee again debated the issue the Greek Delegation proposed that whenever it was not possible to find an agreed interpretation, the relevant text of the Zürich Basic Structure should in the last resort be transcribed into the Cyprus Constitution word by word. This, however, would be understood subject to the self-evident condition that every side should withdraw any interpretation put forward and

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agree on the transcription of the provisions of the Zürich Agreement, relying on Constitutional practice and the findings of the Constitutional Court for their interpretation. 82 Erim subsequently supported this view. The Greek Cypriot Delegation, however, once again rejected this proposal. Agreement, it insisted, should be reached on this matter and on the precise meaning of the article proposed. To resolve this issue, Erim went to Ankara to consult his government on the formula the Greek Cypriot Delegation had drafted at Makarios' request. Under this formula, the President of the Republic would exercise the executive power, with the Vice-President acting jointly with him only in those instances that were specifically provided for in the Zürich Basic Structure. However, the Turkish government felt unable to accept this formula, and Erim, on his return to Nicosia, met Makarios together with Tsatsos and was willing to accept merely that, because the President had seven Greek Cypriots in the Council of Ministers, as compared with the three Turkish Cypriot Ministers, the President and Vice-President did not share equally in the executive functions. Acceptance, however, of the Greek Cypriot formula, he said, would create public opinion difficulties in Turkey. As the Greek Cypriots understood the Turkish position to be at this juncture, all executive power was vested in the President and the VicePresident, though as far as that part of the executive power the President and Vice-President exercised through the Council of Ministers, the President was in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the Vice-President. The Vice-President, finally, jointly with the President, or separately, exercised that part of the excutive power for which express provisions to that effect existed in the Zürich Basic Structure. To endorse the Turkish position, the Greek Cypriots, however, believed, would be dangerous. It would mean acceptance of the condominium of the President and Vice-President in the exercise of the executive power. Moreover, since it was impossible to enumerate exhaustively all instances of executive power, 83 the Vice-President, in all executive functions, would share, in addition to the powers expressly given to the President, VicePresident and the Council of Ministers, in the residue of the executive power. In the Greek Cypriot view, this residual executive power should belong to the President. If the Turkish Delegation, because of Turkish 82

Greek Delegation statement at the meeting of the subcommittee on August 7,1959. Reference was made here to H. S. G. Halsbury's Statutes of England, 2nd ed. (London: Butterworth, 1948), vol. 6, p. 385, in a Greek Cypriot memorandum to Makarios of August 31, 1959.

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public opinion, found it difficult to accept the Greek Cypriot formula, the maximum that could be done was to agree exhaustively to enumerate the instances in which the Vice-President exercised executive functions either separately or jointly with the President; to illustrate merely the instances in which the President exercised executive functions, without at the same time enumerating exhaustively these functions; to provide that all residual executive power was vested in the President; and to define the competence of the Council of Ministers with regard to its executive functions. At this juncture, the Greek Cypriot representatives had been informed that during the Zürich Conference, the Greek government had committed itself to the view that the executive power was vested in both the President and the Vice-President. However, in order to minimize the dangers that might arise from the principle of condominium, it had proposed the second part of point 5 of the Zürich Basic Structure, i.e. the phrase "for this purpose they have a Council of Ministers". This phrase the Turkish side had accepted. As the Greek Cypriots saw it, the Greek government position was as follows: The executive power was vested in the President and the VicePresident in all instances specifically enumerated in the Constitution; the residue of all executive power, however, was vested in the Council of Ministers; for the purpose of public prestige, the President should be given certain functions over and above those of the Vice-President but these functions would be of a formal character; also the President should be regarded a Head of State — a function the Greek government did not consider executive. If the Greek Cypriots were to endorse this view, efforts would have to be exerted to get the Turkish side to agree to a specific enumeration of the executive functions of President and Vice-President, and to include in the Constitution an express provision giving competence to the Council of Ministers in all matters other than those which were specifically reserved for the President and the Vice-President. However, this Greek government approach, like the Turkish approach, was not desirable in the view of the Greek Cypriot Delegation. It was, it believed, tactically wrong to negotiate with the Turkish side along the lines the Greek Government favored, since the Zürich Basic Structure envisaged a Presidential republic and this, the Turks could argue, precluded the Council of Ministers from having a greater sphere of competence than the President and Vice-President or both. The Greek government approach also begged the whole vital question of whether the executive

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power was vested in the President, subject to certain specific exemptions in favor of the Vice-President as a safeguard for the interests of the Turkish Cypriot minority; or whether the republic was a state in which there was a condominium of executive power in the President and the Vice-President, with that power exercised through the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers, the Greek Cypriots observed, was not a homogeneous body and, though unquestionably it would have to consider certain matters, delays, complications and strains were bound to arise in the decision-making of this collective bicommunal body. The Turkish Cypriot community would be thus able to delay or frustrate the administration of power in all matters, not only in those which normally should be the subjects of decision on the part of the Council of Ministers. In cases of disagreement, the Turkish Ministers would be able either to resign or walk out of meetings and thereby cause serious crises and intercommunal tension. And, since the Vice-President had the right to return any decision of the Council of Ministers back to that body, he would have this right with regard to all matters that involved the exercise of the powers of the Council. Finally, this solution would destroy the notion of a Presidential regime and would create a regime of executive rule by a ten-member Council. This would be contrary to point 1 of the Zürich Basic Structure, which proclaimed that the state of Cyprus would be a republic with a presidential regime. By the end of August 1959, as Grivas publicly charged that the Greek Delegation on the Constitutional Commission was neglecting Greek Cypriot interests, and the Greek Cypriot Delegation was not happy about the Greek Delegation's position on this issue, the issue was up to the Cyprus Ethnarch. After a meeting of both Tsatsos and Erim with Makarios on August 31, the head of the Greek Delegation addressed to the Ethnarch a letter emphasizing his success in getting the Turkish side to delete the word "jointly" from their Constitutional article on the executive power. Of course, he acknowledged, in the mind of some people, this deletion was unimportant since Article 5 of the Turkish draft Constitution even without that word meant that the President and Vice-President shared in common the executive power. Others, however, having in mind that this deletion had been achieved, accepted that a substantive argument had been gained for the Greek view that this was not the meaning of Article 5. And he appealed to the Ethnarch to accept as a last resort the use of the relevant text of the Zürich Basic Structure, since earlier, in London, he had shown such courage in assuming the responsibility of subscribing to the Zürich and London agreements.

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Tsatsos emphasized further with regard to the substance that, with the exception of the cases of the final veto of the Vice-President and the separate majority voting in the House of Representatives in specific instances, the Greek Cypriots ruled the island in all other matters. Assuming that the strengthening of the power of the President of the Republic and not of the Council of Ministers, or the other way round, were solutions of equal strength from all other viewpoints, it was, in his view, indifferent for the Greek side if the President of the Republic or the Council of Ministers were to be strengthened, because the President was a Greek Cypriot and the majority of the Council of Ministers was likewise Greek Cypriot. However, from the viewpoint of political expediency, it was preferable to strengthen the power of the Council of Ministers, not of the President of the Republic. In case of doubt, the presumption of executive competence therefore should be in favor not of the President but of the Council of Ministers. To back this view, Tsatsos reasoned that this solution was more in harmony with the text of the Zürich Basic Structure {pour ce faire ils auront un conseil de ministres...); that the exercise of supreme executive power by a collective organ was more democratic, because it averted the possible arbitrariness of a single person; that it would give prestige to the Council and permit more expert persons responsibly to exercise their duties; that it would allow knowledge of Turkish Cypriot views in advance; and that it would avert frequent political crises since decisions would be taken by the Council of Ministers, not by the President with whom the Ministers might be in disagreement. After trying to refute various counterarguments, Tsatsos observed that Erim, the day before, had accepted the possibility of the delegation of powers to the President by the Council of Ministers. This flexibility in the regime would constitute a real advantage. If an imposing Presidential personality existed, it was natural for the Council to decide to delegate powers to him. In the absence of such a personality, on the other hand, it was correct that the Council of Ministers should decide. Thus, the question of the superiority of the President over the Vice-President was completely shelved and the presumption of executive competence was placed in favor of the Council of Ministers. This would constitute a safeguard against the concentration of power in a person who might be unsuitable, "when Cyprus would no longer have the good fortune to benefit from the profound judgment and the serene and dauntless diligence" of the Ethnarch. So much with regard to substance. From the viewpoint of appearance and prestige, all were agreed that the clear distinction between the

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President and the Vice-President should be the objective of the negotiations. The President should be the Head of State; the Vice-President only the Vice-Head of State. In conclusion, Tsatsos regarded that the creation of a crisis over the question of the relations between President and Vice-President was not "in our interest" and was indeed dangerous. As the Turkish position had been shaping up, it was unlikely that any further insistence on the Greek side that the presumption of executive competence should lie with the President rather than with the Council of Ministers would be internationally regarded as in conformity with the Zurich Basic Structure's provisions on the executive power, the text of which aroused doubts, in this disputed matter, even in the ranks of the Greek Cypriot Delegation. Agreement, however, on the question of the executive power was not reached until November 10, 1959. Meanwhile, on the one hand, friction arose between the Greek and Greek Cypriot delegations on the matter of the Communal Chambers, and on the other, between the Greek and Turkish sides over several other matters. Friction of the first sort (leading to quite bitter backstage exchanges) arose when the Greek Delegation, without any prior consultation with the Greek Cypriot Delegation, raised in the Subcommittee on August 31 the question of whether the representatives of the Communal Chambers should be appointed, not elected by the respective communities. The purpose of this move was to minimize the importance of the Communal Chambers. The Greek Cypriot Delegation, though fully favoring this objective, believed that what was important for the purpose of averting the impression that these Chambers constituted a government within a government and that the Constitutional regime of Cyprus was federal, was not the mode of election to the Communal Chambers but the degree of control the central government would exercise over them. With regard to the substance of the Greek Delegation's proposal, it believed it would not be democratic to have the members of the Communal Chambers appointed rather than elected, since the Chambers would have the power to legislate on communal affairs and to control, among other things, education. Indeed, in its view, it was impossible to interpret Point 10 of the Zurich Basic Structure as consistent with the view that these representatives were to be appointed not elected. Besides, efforts to evade commitments already undertaken would only serve as an example of bad faith on the Greek side and the Turkish side would not fail to exploit them. 84 84 The Greek Cypriot Delegation also pointed out that the Greek draft constitution for Cyprus contained express provisions about the election of the representatives

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Indicative of the tension which had developed between the Greek and Turkish sides in the Subcommittee negotiations was the fact that from September 12 on, two separate reports were issued on the Subcommittee's proceedings. Then, between October 20 and November 2, the Subcommittee suspended its work when the Greek Cypriot Delegation declared it could not take part in the Subcommittee's work because of the incident caused by the Turkish caique "Deniz" which its three-man crew (all Turkish nationals) had scuttled within Cyprus waters in efforts to conceal from the British minesweeper H.M.S. Burmaston, which had intercepted it, the fact that its cargo consisted of several cases of ammunition probably destined for Turkish Cypriots. 85 Nonetheless, the Subcommittee did discuss and agree on various matters, the Communal Chambers, for example. And on October 13, it agreed at last on the text of a reply to the earlier mentioned letter of May 14 from Governor Sir Hugh Foot who had asked the Constitutional Commission for guidance in electoral matters. Moreover, on November 3, the Constitutional Commission sent to Sir Hugh the Subcommittee's comments on the draft bill of the Registration of Electors law, which included the suggestions that the expression "Greek" and "Turkish" should replace the terms "Greek Cypriot" and "Turkish Cypriot" wherever these appeared in the draft bill in reference to the two communities, and that the members of the Armenian, Maronite and Latin Churches in Cyprus should be included in the Greek electoral register. 86 On November 10, 1959, Ethnarch Makarios and Dr. Kiigiik signed their agreement on the executive power which the Governor, in his monthly statement for November, described as the most important single achievement since the London agreements, adding that it had cleared the way for the presidential elections which took place in December. Under this agreement, the Presidential system of Cyprus acquired certain features of cabinet government, since the Council of Ministers was recognized as a bearer of executive power, subject to limitations from above — the specific cases of the exercise of executive power reserved for the President

to the Communal Chambers; that Tsatsos at Geneva had agreed with Erim to accept the relevant article 47 of the Turkish draft Constitution which provided for such a procedure; and that the Greek Delegation, at a Subcommittee meeting of July 14, 1959, had agreed on the election qualifications of candidates to the Communal Chambers. 85 Keesing's, 17069. 88 See also above, p. 491.

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and Vice-President — and limitations from below — the executive functions delegated to the two Communal Chambers. Moreover, under this agreement of November 10, the Greek Cypriot President, as far as status was concerned, would be the Head of State and take precedence over all persons in the Republic and represent the Republic at all official functions and sign and receive credentials. The Vice-President would be Vice-Head of State and would be entitled to be present at all functions. 87 In other words, despite the Geneva talks between Tsatsos and Erim, despite the strenuous objections of Zorlu, who wanted credentials to be addressed not to the President but to the Republic, the Greek viewpoint had prevailed in this matter. As in the Zürich formula, the executive power was ensured by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. To ensure this power, the President and Vice-President would have a Council of Ministers designated respectively by the President and Vice-President. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers would exercise executive power in all matters other than those those expressly reserved for the President and VicePresident. 88 This indicated that the Greek Cypriots had been won over to the Greek government view that efforts should be exerted toward strengthening the executive position not of the President but of the Council of Ministers, and toward creating a presumption of executive competence in favor of the Council of Ministers, not of the President. The Council's powers were enhanced vis-à-vis both President and VicePresident — a gain for the Greek side since the seven Greek Cypriot Ministers would constitute a majority over the three Turkish Cypriot Ministers in the Council of Ministers. Among the powers of the Ministers would be general direction and control of the government, direction and general policy of foreign affairs, defense and security, and coordination and supervision of public services other than those within the competence of the Communal Chambers. The Council of Ministers would take decisions by an absolute majority, and the President and Vice-President would have to promulgate these 87

Keesing's, 17148. For final text, see Articles 36-38 of the Constitution (Cmnd. 1093, pp. 105-106). 88 Article 46 of the Cyprus Constitution reads in part as follows: "The Executive power is ensured by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic in order to ensure the executive power shall have a Council of Ministers composed of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers. The Ministers shall be designated respectively by the President and Vice-President of the Republic who shall appoint them by an instrument signed by them both." {Ibid., p. 110.)

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decisions, though having the power to return them to the Council of Ministers for reconsideration as well as a final veto on decisions on foreign affairs, defense and security.89 This agreement on the executive power, incidentally, did not end all debate on the issue in the Subcommittee. On November 28, the Turkish Cypriot Delegation proposed a change in wording to it, in connection with the executive power of the President exercised conjointly with the Vice-President. The Greek Delegation, however, considered the initialed text as final from every point of view and objected to any change in it, even in the wording. 90 The Subcommittee of the Constitutional Commission ended its meetings in Nicosia on January 11, 1960, to resume them in Lausanne on January 18, after the earlier-mentioned London round-table conference on Cyprus of January 16-18, 1960. A major but unresolved issue was that of the separate municipalities in the five largest cities of Cyprus which the Subcommittee discussed on December 12, 16, 21 and 29, 1959. On the first of these dates, the Turkish Cypriot Delegation produced a statement expressing, among other things, its opposition to the Greek Delegation's view that the existence and functioning of the separate Turkish municipalities was subject to, or conditional on the creation and existence of the coordinating bodies provided for under Point 20 (a) of the Zurich Basic Structure. At any rate as a result of its meetings in Lausanne, the Subcommittee, on February 10, 1960, had a text of the Constitution ready for initialing and terminated its work, though certain issues still remained in suspense. In their closing statements, all delegations started out by thanking the legal adviser, Bridel; his assistant, Louis Bagi; and the secretariat. Bridel thanked all for having come to him for assistance and for having thus dissipated the painful impression that he was being kept away from the work of the delegations. He acknowledged that such considerable progress had been achieved that he could have no illusions about his possibilities of influencing the work done. He had limited himself to making only a few suggestions and generally had never insisted on them if they met with little response, reserving, of course, his right to have his regrets recorded in the minutes of the meetings. There was one question, 88

Article 54 of the Cyprus Constitution, ibid., p. 115. The Turkish and Turkish Cypriot representatives maintained that the initialed text did not bind the Commission in the matter of proper drafting. Their purpose was to make it clear that the President could not by himself exercise powers he could exercise conjointly with the Vice-President. 90

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however, on which he wished to insist: on the right of free marriage between members of the two communities without which the Bill of Rights of the Cyprus Constitution would, in his view, be incomplete. The Constitution of Cyprus, he continued, would certainly have been far different both in form and substance had he alone drafted it. But any of the participants in the work done would be able to say the same. A work of compromise, founded on a compromise, the Constitution could not satisfy each in all its parts. It was a hybrid, but one should console oneself by noting that mongrels were the most resistant and vigorous of all dogs. In this spirit he had tried to direct the meetings, attaching less importance to improving a text on which everybody had greatly worked than to trying to conciliate the last remaining differences. He thought a great step forward had been made, though he regretted to see that the list of matters in suspense was still quite long, though longer in appearance than in reality. He hoped it would be possible quickly to resolve these last remaining issues. Mutual concessions would be required. But these concessions would be generously rewarded if the Constitution could soon be adopted in its final form. It is not necessary to deal here with all the questions that remained in suspense, to be settled later. Suffice it to mention one of these. During the Subcommittee's meetings in Lausanne it had been agreed on January 28 that in Article 1 of the Cyprus Constitution the new Republic should be described not only as independent and sovereign but also as a democratic state. However, on February 9, the Turkish Cypriot representative asked that the word "democratic" be deleted from this article. The Greek representative, on the other hand, declared that without a grave reason the Subcommittee could not reverse a decision it had unanimously taken at Bridel's suggestion. Bridel, however, reminded the delegations that "democratic" meant majority rule. If this term were kept in the Constitution, a counterweight would have to be included — a reference to the setup of the Cypriot state on the basis of two communities. The Greek representative then proposed that this issue should be debated in Nicosia. The term "democratic", in his view, did not necessarily mean majority rule and its use was not incompatible with the rights recognized to the Turkish Cypriot minority. When the final text of Article 1 of the Cyprus Constitution was adopted, the word "democratic" was omitted. Incidentally, during the Subcommittee's deliberations in Lausanne, Erim, on February 1, 1960, emphasized that only the Zürich Basic Structure's text could be invoked for interpreting the Constitution, because no procès verbal of the Zürich summit conference had been kept.

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And on January 29, when the Subcommittee dealt with the relevant articles of the Constitution's final provisions giving constitutional form to the Treaty of Alliance, the conferees inconclusively discussed the interesting legal question of when and how would the Constitution come into force. Would a referendum be held on this Constitution's adoption or would the House of Representatives have to vote on it? In both cases there was the danger lest it be rejected. Besides, as Bridel pointed out, in the House of Representatives, the Constitution, normally, would have to be discussed. The Turkish Cypriot representative suggested that since the people of Cyprus had already conducted presidential elections, a referendum had in effect already taken place. Tsatsos opined that the acceptance of the Constitution as well as of the treaties would occur the moment the members of the House of Representatives gave their affirmation of fidelity to the Constitution. Erim, on the other hand, underlined the specifically international character of the Constitution which had been born from the Zürich summit conference. It was a sui generis case which would require an exceptional solution with regard to its adoption. None of these arguments convinced Bridel. However, when the Turkish Cypriot representative proposed that the Constitution would come into force by an act of the British Parliament, Bridel concurred, pointing out that until then sovereignty would be vested in Britain. The draft Constitution of Cyprus, adopted and signed by the Joint Constitutional Commission in Nicosia on April 6, 1960, consisted of 198 articles and about 40,000 words with five pages of annexes and two index pages. 91 To achieve this result, the Commission had held eleven plenary meetings and its Subcommittee 99 meetings in Cyprus and 24 meetings in Lausanne. A second subcommittee, for purely drafting purposes, met eight times. Tsatsos, in his speech, observed that if the crisis over the executive power had not occurred, the Commission's task would have ended much earlier. The Constitution, however, had to be the result of agreement among the Greek Cypriot community, the Turkish Cypriot community, and Greece and Turkey, and to move within the rigid framework of the Zürich agreements. The length of the text was greater than customary to such a document because of the absence of a local constitutional tradition and certain special constitutional institutions. And the Constitution had to deal with new problems arising out of the coexistence of a Turkish and a Greek community. He expressed the hope that the young 81

The final text had 169 Articles, Cmnd. 1093.

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Cypriot state would soon grow into maturity and take at once its proper place in world society. The Greek government promised always to defend the island's progress and security. Speaking for the Turkish government, Bilge hailed the completion of the task assigned to the Commission under the relevant London Declaration of February 19, 1959. The Constitution included all the provisions of the Zürich agreements with all possible clarity. The text was the outcome of compromises reached as a result of great understanding and close cooperation on the part of all the delegations to the Commission. He hoped the Constitution would be auspicious for the Cypriots. Clerides, the Greek Cypriot Delegate, observed that after many difficulties, good will and the spirit of understanding on the part of all delegations had triumphed. The same qualities were required for facing the future with confidence. Perfection was humanly unachievable but the Constitution which had been drafted would greatly contribute to the consolidation of the Cyprus Republic on healthy foundations if applied in a spirit of sincere and honest cooperation. The Turkish Cypriot Delegate, Denktaj, expressed pride that the Turkish Cypriots, whose rights and interests had been set down as a separate community under the Zürich agreements, had done their job in preparing the Constitution which was true to the letter and spirit of the Zürich and London agreements. Between the completion of the Constitution and the birth of the Republic much remained to be done. He regretted that no agreement had yet been reached on the question of implementing the 70-30 ratio between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the civil service. During the transitional period agreement had to be reached on this important point. Otherwise one would face the danger of postponing the date fixed for the parliamentary elections and the proclamation of the Republic. As for Bridel, once again he expressed regret that his proposal about free marriage between members of the two communities had not been accepted because the Turkish Cypriots had rejected it, despite the fact that the other three delegations had agreed to include this principle in the Constitution. On a higher international level than that of the Joint Constitutional Commission several constitutional matters had been settled earlier. Thus after a conversation of January 27, 1960, between Foreign Secretary Lloyd and Amery, on the one side, and President Makarios, on the other, the latter agreed that provisions should be made in the Constitution for the representation of the minor religious groups of Cyprus in the

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Greek Communal Chamber. Kii?uk and Denktas, who had been consulted earlier that same day by Lloyd and Amery, had expressed no objection to such an arrangement. Agreement on certain constitutional issues was also reached on the level of the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey. AverofF-Tossizza and Zorlu agreed, for instance, that it would not be necessary for the Constitution to include a preamble about the historical background of the establishment of the new state, as the Turkish draft Constitution provided for and the Turkish Delegation to the Subcommittee of the Constitutional Commission had proposed on July 24, 1959. They agreed, too, that the provision of the initialed text of the Constitution under which the VicePresident would not have the right to replace the President should be maintained, but that provision should be included to the effect that, should the President or Vice-President of the House of Representatives be unable to replace the President or Vice-President of the Republic, the Greek members of the House would recommend a temporary replacement for the President, and the Turkish members of the House would do the same for the temporary replacement of the Vice-President.92 The two Foreign Ministers also agreed that no separate vote by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representatives would be required when the House was deciding the imposition of martial law, because this matter was subject to the final veto of President and Vice-President, or both. The Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers could not avoid dealing with the thorny problem of the separate municipalities in the five largest towns of Cyprus. They agreed, of course, that the Constitution should include Point 20 of the Zurich Basic Structure, but also that the Greek Cypriot electors of each city would elect the Council of the Greek Cypriot municipality and that the Turkish Cypriot electors of each city would do likewise for electing the Council of the Turkish Cypriot municipality.93 In other words, in this respect the city would be ethnically not territorially divided. Accordingly, the municipal taxes and levies of each municipality would be imposed only on the persons of the municipality of the same ethnic origin. Moreover, the levies imposed for services rendered would be paid to the municipality that rendered the particular service. In fulfilling the provisions of Point 20 of the Zurich Basic Structure, the 82

Article 36, paragraph 2 together with Article 72, paragraph 3, of the Cyprus Constitution deals with this problem, Cmnd. 1093, pp. 106, and 120. 93 Article 173, paragraph 2, ibid., p. 159.

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President and Vice-President would conclude an agreement for fixing the respective limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the five Greek Cypriot and five Turkish Cypriot municipalities.94 In the Greek Foreign Minister's view, the Constitution could not be put into application before this agreement had been concluded. In the Turkish Foreign Minister's view, this agreement would have to be concluded before the work on the Constitution had been ended. With regard to the text of the Zürich Basic Structure, the two Foreign Ministers decided it should be incorporated in the Cyprus Constitution. However, the Constitution would be the applicable law. And the Zürich Basic Structure would be taken into account (by the Supreme Constitutional Court) only in case of doubt about the meaning of a constitutional provision. 95 At the same time, at the head of the relevant annex, it would be stated that Cyprus had been founded on this basic structure which the signatories engaged themselves to respect. The text of the Constitution, initialed on April 6, 1960, was conveyed to the British government, which, though still sovereign in Cyprus, had not been represented on the Joint Constitutional Commission. The British government had no comments to make on the draft Constitution. 96 On July 4, President-Elect Makarios and Vice-President-Elect Kü?ük settled the last remaining obstacle to the proclamation of Cyprus' independence. They agreed that the 70-30 ratio of Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots in the Civil Service would be implemented within five months after the establishment of the Republic. Until then, Kügük had insisted that this provision should be implemented before independence and had stated he would not sign the Cyprus treaties until this matter had been satisfactorily settled. 97 On July 6, 1960, a schedule of amendments to the Constitution was initialed in Nicosia. Next day, as already mentioned, the text of the bill to grant independence to Cyprus was laid before the House of Commons together with the White Paper containing the Constitution, the treaties and other documents formally agreed upon in Nicosia. In the debate that took place on July 14 in the House of Commons in connection with the second reading of the Cyprus bill, Callaghan, speaking for the Labour Party Opposition, taunted the government by underlining that six years after it had declared (through Henry Hop94 95 86 97

Article 174, Cmnd. 1093, pp. 159-160. Articles 179 and 180, ibid., p. 161. Ibid., p. 3. Keesing's, 17728.

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kinson, then Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies) that Britain's sovereignty over Cyprus would be maintained for an indefinite period and after about 600 lives had been lost 98 and millions of pounds spent, it was now giving up sovereignty over the island. The agreement, Callaghan asserted, could have been reached four years earlier. He also cited passages from Eden's memoirs as evidence that the British government had fomented trouble between Greece and Turkey, especially by calling the Tripartite London Conference of 1955 on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus," and had conducted a policy of "divide and rule". The whole handling of the question, he felt, represented "a shabby and discreditable period of history in the record of the Conservative government". 1 0 0 Another member of the Labour Party, Francis Noel-Baker, repeating some of the above charges and also criticizing several provisions of the Cyprus settlement, 101 asserted that the government had been morally responsible for the extraordinary success of EOKA, because it had been British officials who believed and said that Cypriot nationalism was a myth invented by Makarios, supported by a few agitators who could easily be crushed by force. 102 The Greek-Turkish Zurich agreements had not been a result of British policy. They had been reached because the Iraqi revolution of July 1958 and the collapse of the Baghdad Pact which ensued had brought the Menderes government in Turkey to its senses. 103 For the government, on the other hand, Ian Macleod, Lennox-Boyd's successor at the Colonial Office, praised the settlement.104' And Lloyd, in response to the Opposition's contention that the settlement could have been reached much earlier, maintained Zurich could not possibly have taken place before the Greek government had clearly understood that it could get no support "for its enosis solution" from the United Nations. 105 Other government spokesmen also pointed out, as usual, 98

626 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 31-32 (oral answer). A. Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 447. Eden acknowledged he deliberately wanted to underline thereby the potential Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus in an effort to counteract the thesis that the Cyprus troubles were caused by old-fashioned British colonialism. 100 626 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 1633-1636. 99

101 102 103 1M 105

Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,

1659. 1654. 1656. 1613-1621. 1634.

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that when the Labour Party had been in power, it too had rejected the idea of any change in the status of the island. 106 One of these spokesmen indeed blamed the Labour Opposition for the delay in reaching a Cyprus agreement. For time and again, by statements on the Cyprus question, it had made the Greeks and Greek Cypriots more intransigent and had made it therefore more difficult to reach agreement. 107 Toward the end of the debate, Amery underlined that the settlement reached met Britain's primary concern which was a defense interest. 108 After paying tribute to Makarios for the achievement of the settlement, he emphasized that Kiiijuk had been tireless in his efforts to reconcile differences that arose at various times between the British Delegation and the Greek Cypriot Delegation during the negotiations in the Joint Committee (over the base areas). Without Kiigiik, he thought, the agreements would not have been reached. 109 The British Parliament enacted the Cyprus Bill on July 29, 1960, thus empowering the Queen of England to transform by Order in Council the Crown Colony of Cyprus into the sovereign independent Republic of Cyprus on an appointed day. Much of the Bill dealt with the complex question of nationality, which the London Joint Committee, not the Joint Constitutional Commission, had handled. The Act provided that the Queen would exercise sovereignty or jurisdiction only over the British sovereign base areas. During the Bill's second reading in the Commons, the nine-month limit during which Cyprus would be treated as if it were "with but not of" the Commonwealth, unless the Cyprus House of Representatives took a decision to the contrary, was deleted by a government amendment on the ground that it might be misconstrued as putting pressure on Cyprus. The Commonwealth governments would have to approve the decision of the Cyprus House of Representatives to join the Commonwealth. 110 Because of the protracted negotiations in the Joint Constitutional Commission and other problems, the elections for the House of Representatives had not taken place, as originally planned, on February 7,1960. They were now conducted on July 31, 1960, under the electoral law the 106

Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 51, note 11, and 249, note 4. 626 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 1639. For instances of such conduct see, Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 249-250. 108 626 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.), 1730. 109 Ibid., 1738. 110 Keesing's, 17730. In an unopposed second reading in the House of Lords, FieldMarshal Lord Harding, the penultimate Governor of Cyprus, declared that the settlement was one worth working for and worth waiting for. 107

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Cyprus government had approved on December 31, 1959 on the recommendation of the Joint Constitutional Commission. The first House of Representatives of Cyprus, according to a dispatch from the Nicosia correspondent of the Times, was devoid of any pro-Grivas, anti-Zurich elements. The elections of the two Communal Chambers took place on August 7. The Greek Communal Chamber included one representative each for the three minor religious groups, the Armenians, Maronites, and Roman Catholics. 111 Four days earlier, on August 3, 1960, Queen Elizabeth II issued an Order in Council which provided that the transfer of sovereignty from the Crown to the new republic would take place on August 16, 1960. It was on that date that the Governor of Cyprus, on behalf of the British government; the representatives of Greece and Turkey; President Makarios, on behalf of the Greek Cypriot community; and Vice-President Kiisiik, on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community, signed the Constitution's text in the House of Representatives' building in Nicosia. This text, as recounted, had been the work of the Joint Constitutional Commission, with diplomatic negotiations occasionally being conducted between the Greek and Turkish governments in the background. By the earlier-mentioned Order-in-Council made under the Cyprus Act the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus came into force that same day. Likewise on August 16, 1960, the same parties signed the Treaty of Establishment Between Britain, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus; the Treaty of Guarantee; and, minus Britain, the Treaty of Alliance together with the Agreement (initialed on October 27, 1959 in Athens) 112 for the Application of the Treaty of Alliance, as contemplated by paragraph III of its Additional Protocol No. 1. This agreement's purpose was to define the sites of the cantonment for the Greek and Turkish contingents participating in the Tripartite Headquarters, their juridical status, facilities and exemptions in respect of customs and taxes as well as other immunities and privileges and other military and technical questions concerning the organization and operation of the Headquarters. (See Appendix.) That same day, as the British flag was taken down and the flag of the new republic was raised in its stead, these four treaties as well as the Constitution of Cyprus came into force. 111

Keesing's, 17730-17731. In the elections for the House of Representatives, only 64 per cent of the Greek Cypriot electorate went to the polls whereas 74 per cent of the Turkish Cypriot electorate voted.

112

Ibid., 17148.

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Incidentally, because of the firm opposition of Rossides, the Greek Cypriot representative on the London Joint Committee, the Treaty of Guarantee included no stipulation to the effect that the treaties were in conformity with the UN Charter, as the Turkish representative had proposed, getting the support of the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, of Britain, and even of Greece. As a result, the Cyprus government could not be estopped from claiming, as it did later on, that Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee concerning the right of intervention of the guarantor powers contravened Article 103 of the UN Charter and violated the prohibition of the threat or use of force contained in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter. Through these international instruments and the internationally negotiated Constitution, Cyprus, a British Crown Colony since 1925, became a new state in the multi-state world society through an international political process that began when the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey met on December 6, 1958, at the headquarters of the United Nations in an effort to seek a final, not an interim solution of the Cyprus problem which the Greek government, acting for the Greek Cypriots represented by Ethnarch Makarios, had first raised at the General Assembly's ninth session in 1954 with not exactly a state-building goal in mind. In a congratulatory, Independence-Day message addressed to Makarios on August 16, 1960, President Eisenhower accorded recognition to the new state. The State Department announced that same day that the U.S. Consulate-General in Nicosia was being raised to Embassy status. 113 Other states followed suit.

E. CYPRUS BECOMES A UN MEMBER AND JOINS THE COMMONWEALTH

On taking office as President of Cyprus on August 16, 1960, Makarios declared that the Republic desired friendly relations with all nations, would 113

W. V. O'Brien and U. H. Goebel, "U.S. Recognition Policy Toward the New Nations", in W. V. O'Brien, ed., The New Nations in International Law and Diplomacy, The Yearbook of World Polity, vol. II, New York: Praeger, 1965, pp. 122-123. In this message the U.S. President welcomed the independent and democratic Republic of Cyprus to the family of nations and looked forward to maintaining close and cordial relations with the Government and people of Cyprus. In view of Turkish sensitivities, the word "democratic" was unfortunate. It was not included in the Cyprus Constitution on Turkish insistence, as already noted.

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seek particularly close ties with neighboring countries, and would adhere to the principles of the UN Charter. As a personal opinion, he also said, Cyprus should remain in the Commonwealth. 114 Very shortly after being created, this new polity applied for membership in the United Nations. Britain and Ceylon (the latter symbolizing the Commonwealth) sponsored the relevant resolution. On August 24, 1960 the UN Security Council met to examine this membership application and on this occasion the representatives of Greece and Turkey were invited to attend. During the discussion on this application, all speakers emphasized the long, rich, and varied cultural heritage of the people of the island, where, as Cabot Lodge observed, Aphrodite had been born. The British Delegate underlined the remarkable economic and social changes which had occurred on the island during the eighty-two years of British rule. This had made it easy for Cypriot officials to take over the administration from British hands. The Zurich agreements — a notable act of statesmanship — and the London settlement that followed had justified the confidence which the General Assembly (in Resolution 1287) had expressed that continued efforts would be made to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution. 115 The Greek representative, Ambassador Paul EconomouGouras, was convinced that the Republic of Cyprus, to the extent of its possibilities, would be a factor that would contribute to the political stability and progress in the eastern Mediterranean. 116 As for the Turkish Delegate, Seyfullah Esin, he said he was particularly happy to support the request of Cyprus for UN membership because his government was justifiably proud of the successful efforts it had exerted for the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus based on an agreement that was in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. 117 The U.S. Delegate, Cabot Lodge, in supporting this UN membership application, observed that the primary challenge for Cyprus was not underdevelopment but the creation of a national identity out of diverse elements. It was a matter of history that independence was not the first choice of many and perhaps even the majority of the Cypriots. He felt, however, sure that the people of Cyprus would come to value their independence no less than the United States valued its own. The United States felt 114

Keesing's, 17730. Application of Cyprus for UN membership, S/4467, August 24, 1960. For British statement, see, SCOR, 892d meeting, pp. 1-6. 118 SCOR, ibid., pp. 6-7. «» Ibid., pp. 7-8. 115

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confident that in the future the inhabitants of Cyprus would take justifiable pride that they were first and foremost Cypriots. 118 In his speech, the Soviet representative, Platon Morozov, emphasized that independence had been the result of the gallant struggle of the Cypriots for freedom and independence. The formation of the Republic of Cyprus was for the Cypriots an important stage in the struggle for independence. The USSR had always sided with the people of Cyprus in their fight against colonial domination and had systematically defended in the United Nations the right of the Cypriots to self-determination. Voting, however, for the admission of Cyprus to the United Nations should in no sense be construed as any recognition by the Soviet government of the provisions concerning the maintenance of foreign military bases on the island. These bases had nothing in common with the purposes of ensuring the security of Cyprus which was obviously not threatened by anyone from any quarter. 119 The representatives of lesser third parties who spoke on this occasion echoed various themes which the spokesmen of the superpowers and the parties primarily concerned had presented. Thus the representative of «»sponsoring Ceylon emphasized that the United Nations had acted realistically in expressing its confidence that a peaceful, democratic and just solution would be reached. This solution was a heart-warming example of international cooperative action, and Britain, Greece, and Turkey deserved congratulations for having achieved it. 120 The Polish representative, though speaking before his Soviet colleague, emphasized his government's support of Cypriot self-determination and its objections to the continued presence of British military bases on the island. 121 And the Tunisian representative warned that the essential precondition for harmonious development in Cyprus was that all its citizens should consider themselves first and foremost as Cypriot citizens, having no citizenship ties with any other country. 122 The representative of Italy likewise welcomed the solution reached, as did the representative of 118

SCOR, pp. 9-10. The clandestine radio "Voice of Truth", organ of the outlawed Communist Party of Greece, broadcasting from behind the "Iron Curtain", attacked, in a broadcast of September 2, 1960, Lodge's reference to the need of developing a national Cypriot consciousness. It asserted that the national consciousness the U.S. government desired was one of submission to the Pentagon and NATO in which national origin would be forgotten together with the demand for enosis. 119 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 120 Ibid., p. 13. 121 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 122 Ibid., pp. 14-15.

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France who said that Greece and Turkey deserved the thanks of the international community for reaching the Zürich agreements.123 According to the representative of Argentina, the entry of Cyprus into the community of independent nations was a triumph of the spirit of tolerance and coexistence over inflexibility and fanaticism. After animated debate in several sessions of the General Assembly, quite suddenly and unexpectedly, wisdom had won out. The Zürich agreements represented a triumph of intelligence over passion. 124 For the representative of Ecuador the emergence of a new independent state as a member of the international community constituted a reason for joy and jubilation among those who believed in the principle of self-determination as the key expression of true justice on which an international world based on law and order should be built. 125 After the General Assembly adopted the Security Council's recommendation for the admission of Cyprus in the United Nations, as required under the UN Charter, Zenon Rossides, the former ethnarchic counsellor and now Ambassador, made his acceptance speech on September 21. 126 For five years running, he said, the name of Cyprus had resounded in the hall of the General Assembly and in the committee chambers where the problems of its people, their rights and aspirations had been discussed in animated debate. Now, as an independent country and a member of the United Nations, Cyprus entered upon its new duties of active participation in the world community. In full awareness of its responsibilities as a member of the United Nations, it meant to fulfil them with objectivity and detachment as befitted a spiritually free people. Since Cyprus had just emerged from colonial status, its sympathies would naturally be with all peoples in the world who were striving to attain under the Charter the dignity of national independence. However, its representatives would come with an open mind and an open heart. Cyprus, as one of the smallest units of the United Nations, commanded no material power or influence. Its strength would wholly depend on the moral content of its stand. After noting that Cyprus had been the birthplace of the Stoic philosopher, Zeno of Kition, who aimed at a world state in which national antagonisms would be merged into the common brotherhood of man, he suggested that Cyprus, placed as it was geographically "at the 12!

> SCOR, pp. 10-12. Ibid., pp. 8-9. la ® Ibid., pp. 13-14. 128 Cyprus in the United Nations, Statements by Ambassador Zenon G. Rossides (New York, 1961), pp. 7-9.

124

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crossroads between three continents", might have a particular role to play in the United Nations. In the past it had often been a meeting-place for wars and conquests by nations from east and west. Now it might become a bridge of unity, understanding and cooperation in the Mediterranean and the world beyond. His country would consistently abide by the principles of the United Nations and uphold its purposes. In his statement of October 17, in the general debate, the Cyprus Delegate made clear that Cyprus would join no power blocs or camps but would follow an unaligned policy. As might be expected, in this same speech, as well as in his speeches on the Algerian question (December 15), and on colonialism (December 13), Rossides upheld the right of all peoples to self-determination.127At the same time, in this latter speech, he underlined the importance of the particular operative paragraph of the relevant draft resolution which proclaimed that any attempt to undermine the national unity and territorial integrity of a country was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. 128 And in his remarks of October 25 on the South Tyrol question, he was careful to stress that this was not a matter of self-determination but of implementing an international agreement between Italy and Austria. In dealing with this matter, he said, the paramount interest of the Italian state in its unity and security should in no way be overlooked. No nation could be expected to favor the concept of a state within a state. Although the legitimate human rights of distinct ethnic groups should in all cases be granted, it should not be forgotten, as the Indian representative had said, that majorities, too, had rights. Emphasis should be laid on what united rather than on what separated and divided 129 — echos of Greek Cypriot and Greek criticism of the defunct Macmillan plan. But both in his admission speech and in his speech on disarmament on November 8 before the First Committee, Rossides expressed hope that an effective military force under UN command would be set up as a guarantee of peace and freedom in the world. In this connection, incidentally, he noted the concern President Makarios had voiced about the storing of nuclear weapons on Cyprus and supported the notion of denuclearized zones in which Cyprus, too, would be included. 130 All in all, the statements were tinged with Greek Cypriot awareness of the problems the new state of Cyprus had to face in maintaining its 127 128 129 130

Statements by Rossides, pp. 9-15, 37-43, and 29-37. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid., pp. 16-21. Ibid., pp. 21-26.

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territorial integrity and ensuring its security against attack. These were problems the United Nations would be called upon to deal with less than four years later. The decision on whether Cyprus should become a member of the Commonwealth was taken by the House of Representatives on February 16,1961, in a resolution favoring membership for a preliminary period of five years, after which the House would decide whether or not to continue the Commonwealth association. The tenth conference of Commonwealth Premiers, meeting in London March 8-17,1961, decided on March 14 to admit the new state in the Commonwealth. President Makarios was invited to attend the conference. Arriving that same day at London airport, he expressed his gratification at this decision, and declared that despite differences and bitterness of the past, the relations of Cyprus with Britain were very good. All efforts would be exerted to strengthen these relations. The past was forgotten. 131 On May 24, 1961, Cyprus also became the sixteenth member of the Council of Europe in a document of accession signed at the Maison de VEurope in Strasbourg. Accordingly, it acquired the right to send three representatives to the Consultative Assembly. 132 Even during its preindependence period, one of the Council of Europe's organs, the Commission on Human Rights, had concerned itself in Cyprus matters, and the Cyprus question occasionally had been aired in the forum of the Consultative Assembly. 133 Cyprus, however, having decided to take the position of an unaligned state in world politics, never joined any European security organization, even though, before becoming independent, it had been the object of quite considerable NATO attention. The Zurich provision for Cyprus membership in NATO, under the Karamanlis-Menderes "Gentlemen's Agreement" of February 11,1959, remained a dead letter, with important consequences in the later unfolding of the Cyprus story. On the other hand, far more substantively than during the period of its status as a British Crown Colony in the post-World War II period, Cyprus, as an independent state, was to become again an important focus of U N action, of Security Council action this time, from late 1963 on. After the setting up of the rather reluctant republic, the Cyprus question entered a new phase. Old vinegar, it seemed, had been poured into a new bottle. 131 132

183

Keesing's, 16987.

Ibid. Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 144-147.

APPENDIX

AGREEMENT between the Republic of Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus and the Kingdom of Greece for the application of the Treaty of Alliance signed at Nicosia on August 16th, 1690.

The Republic of Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus and the Kingdom of Greece, Being parties to the Treaty of Alliance signed at Nicosia on the 16th day of August, 1960, Have agreed as follows: — ARTICLE I DEFINITIONS

In this Agreement and its Annexes: (a) "Treaty of Alliance" means the Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey signed at Nicosia on August 16th, 1960. (b) "Additional Protocol No. I" and "Additional Protocol No. II" refer to the Additional Protocols Nos. I and II to the Treaty of Alliance. (c) "Committee of Ministers" means the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs mentioned in Additional Protocol No. II. (id) "Tripartite Headquarters" means the Tripartite Headquarters provided in Articles HI and IV of the Treaty of Alliance, as a whole. However, the term "Tripartite Headquarters" for technical reasons is also used in certain cases in this Agreement and its Annexes to denote the Commander and the Staff. (e) "Operational Command" means the authority granted to a Commander, under the provisions of this Agreement, to assign missions or tasks to subordinate Commanders, to deploy units and to assign or reassign forces as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include administrative command or logistical responsibility, but does include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned.

522

APPENDIX

( / ) "Cypriot" means a citizen of the Republic of Cyprus. (g) "Appropriate Authorities of the Republic of Cyprus" means such authority of the Republic of Cyprus, which is competent under the Constitution to deal with relevant matters. (/») "Greek and/or Turkish Contingents" means the Greek and/or Turkish Contingents provided by Article I of Additional Protocol No. I of the Treaty of Alliance. (0 "Greek and/or Turkish Forces" means formations or part of the said Contingents. The term "Forces" has a special meaning for the purposes of Annex "C" (Status of Forces) of this Agreement.

ARTICLE II COMMON DEFENCE

1. For the purpose of implementation of Article I of the Treaty of Alliance the Committee of Ministers shall assign to the Tripartite Headquarters the preparation of plans for the common defence of Cyprus. The Committee of Ministers shall lay down the general directives and strategic concepts for the preparation of these plans, taking into account the overall defence structure and requirements of the three countries concerned. 2. The Committee of Ministers shall control and ratify the plans prepared by the Tripartite Headquarters in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article and shall outline the conditions of their implementation. 3. With the exception of the provisions of Article V, paragraph 1, of this Agreement, all Forces located in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus for the implementation of the plans referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall come under the Operational Command of the Tripartite Headquarters which shall be responsible for the implementation of the plans concerning the Republic of Cyprus.

ATTACK AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS ARTICLE III

For the implementation of Article II of the Treaty of Alliance: 1. "Attack" means any attack by land, sea or air. 2. "Direct or indirect attack" means not only an attack conducted by

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an external enemy, but also the internal subversive activities directed against the independence and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

ARTICLE IV

1. Plans for the facing of a direct or indirect attack, directed against the independence and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, shall be prepared by the Tripartite Headquarters on the basis of: (a) General directives issued by the Committee of Ministers on its own initiative or upon a request of the Tripartite Headquarters. These directives shall define the general framework and the specific aims as well as any limitations thereto. (b) The Forces stationed in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus (Army of the Republic of Cyprus, Greek and Turkish Contingents provided in paragraph I of the Additional Protocol No. I). 2. In these plans, provisions shall be made for the case in which additional Hellenic and Turkish Forces will be sent to Cyprus, as referred to in Article XIV of this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

1. The Authorities of the Republic of Cyprus shall be primarily responsible for dealing with the subversive activities mentioned in Article III, paragraph 2, of this Agreement. For this purpose they shall use by preference their Security Forces and only in case of emergency the Army of the Republic of Cyprus, without the intervention of the Tripartite Headquarters. In this case the Army shall no longer come under the Operational Command of the Tripartite Headquarters. 2. Intervention, in the above case, of the Tripartite Headquarters with its Hellenic and Turkish Forces, stationed in Cyprus, shall take place only upon decision of the Committee of Ministers, which may set forth, in its decision, any limitations as to their use. 3. In case of such an intervention by the Tripartite Headquarters, mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Article, the Army of the Republic of Cyprus shall be put under the Operational Command of this Headquarters. 4. In case of a threat of an attack by an enemy acting from without, the

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Tripartite Headquarters shall be responsible for dealing with it acting on the instructions of the Committee of Ministers. Nevetheless, in the event of a surprise attack by an enemy acting from without, the Tripartite Headquarters shall proceed automatically with the implementation of the plans for repelling it. At the same time it shall report without delay to the Committee of Ministers for further instructions. 5. In all the cases of its intervention the Tripartite Headquarters shall have consultations with the Appropriate Authorities of the Republic of Cyprus, in order to determine the necessary co-operation of the Security Forces of the Republic of Cyprus and the conditions for the implementation of this co-operation, or, in exceptional cases, to put these Forces entirely or in part under the Operational Command of the Tripartite Headquarters. 6. The Republic of Cyprus shall assume the obligation, in accordance with its Constitution, of putting at the disposal of the Tripartite Headquarters, upon request, any additional means necessary such as safe use of civilian communications, transportation, etc., for the successful implementation of the plans mentioned in this Agreement. 7. Whenever the successful implementation of the plans mentioned in this Agreement requires the proclamation of Martial Law, in whole or in part, a request to that effect shall be made to the Appropriate Authorities of the Republic of Cyprus, by the Tripartite Headquarters upon approval by the Committee of Ministers.

ARTICLE VI THE TRIPARTITE HEADQUARTERS

1. The Tripartite Headquarters provided by Articles HI and IV of the Treaty of Alliance shall consist of: (a) the Commander and the Staff of the Tripartite Headquarters, and (b) the Units and Services of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus to be assigned by it, and all the Hellenic and Turkish Forces stationed in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. 2.—(a) Nicosia shall be the seat of the Commander and Staff of the Tripartite Headquarters. (ib) The seat of the Units and Services of the Hellenic and Turkish Forces shall be within Nicosia town area. (c) The seat of the Units and Services of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus shall be determined by the Republic of Cyprus, in accordance

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with the relevant provisions of its Constitution, following an advisory proposal of the Tripartite Headquarters. (id) In any event of a direct or indirect attack which, under the provisions of this Agreement, necessitates the intervention of the Tripartite Headquarters, it may redeploy units and services under its Operational Command.

ARTICLE VII

1. Commander of the Tripartite Headquarters. (a) The General Officer who shall assume the command of the Tripartite Headquarters, in accordance with Article V of the Treaty of Alliance, shall have the rank of Brigadier or Major General and shall be other than the Commanders of the national Forces, subject to the exception provided in paragraph 4 of this Article. (b) The term of duty of the Commanders of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be of one year on a rotation basis among Cypriots, Greeks and Turks. The nationality of the first Commander as well as the subsequent order of rotation shall be determined by lot. (c) The term of command of the first Commander of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be effective as from the arrival in the Republic of Cyprus of the Greek and Turkish Contingents mentioned in paragraph I of the Additional Protocol No. I. (,d) If the Republic of Cyprus believes that a Cypriot Commander of the Tripartite Headquarters is not sufficiently experienced, the Commanders of the Hellenic and Turkish national Forces shall be required to act as his advisers for as long as is deemed necessary. The above special duties of these Commanders shall be distinct from their normal duties as members of the Advisory Committee mentioned in Article IX, paragraph 2, of this Agreement. 2. Deputy Commander of the Tripartite Headquarters. (a) There shall be a Deputy Commander of the Tripartite Headquarters with the rank of Colonel or Brigadier General. Whenever practicable, he should be senior to the Commanders of the Hellenic and Turkish Forces. (b) The provisions of paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (6), of this Article shall apply for the Deputy Commander who shall not, however, be of the same nationality or ethnic origin as the Commander. (c) In the event of absence or impediment of the Commander of the Tri-

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partite Headquarters or vacancy of his post, the Deputy Commander shall assume his command and have the same authority as the Commander for a period not exceeding thirty days. Beyond this period, and until the end of the term of duty of the formal Commander, a new Commander of the same nationality shall be appointed. The Committee of Ministers shall be informed of any such event. (d) With the exception of the situation referred to in sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph, the Deputy Commander shall act as assistant to the Commander of the Tripartite Headquarers, in accordance with the latter's instructions. 3. Chief of Staff of the Tripartite Headquarters.

(a) There shall be a Chief of Staff of the Tripartite Headquarters with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel. (b) The Chief of Staff shall not be of the same nationality as the Commander or the Deputy Commander. 4. The Cypriot nominees to the posts of Commander, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be the Commander, the Deputy Commander and the Chief of Staff of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus, respectively. The Cypriot nominees to the posts of Commander, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Tripartite Headquarters shall also retain their respective posts in the Army of the Republic of Cyprus, as its Commander, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff.

ARTICLE Vffl TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE TRIPARTITE HEADQUARTERS

1.—(a) The Tripartite Headquarters establishes the plans according to Articles II and IV of this Agreement, and implements them in accordance with their provisions. (b) It exercises operational command of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus (within the limitations of Article V, paragraph 1 and Article VI, paragraph 1(6), of this Agreement), of the Greek and Turkish Contingents referred to in paragraph I of the Additional Protocol No. I, and of those Forces referred to in Article XIV of this Agreement. (c) It makes recommendations concerning the construction of military installations and fortifications required for the implementation of the plans referred to in this Agreement. These recommendations shall be subject to the approval of the Committee of Ministers, and the final

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decision will rest with the Republic of Cyprus which will bear the cost of the construction. Such installations and fortifications shall be controlled by the Tripartite Headquarters. (d) It is kept informed about the major war materiel available to the Army of the Republic of Cyprus and to the Greek and Turkish Contingents. This information shall include particulars of the storing, the movement and the allocation of this materiel in order that the Tripartite Headquarters may intervene whenever it deems it necessary, for the purpose of ensuring the better implementation of the plans referred to in this Agreement. (e) It is responsible for the training of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus. The responsibility of the Tripartite Headquarters on basic training shall be delegated after three years to the chain of Command of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus. ( J ) It sets up a programme of joint general exercises, in which the Army of the Republic of Cyprus and the Hellenic and Turkish Forces stationed in the Republic of Cyprus participate. These exercises shall be conducted under the direction, and according to the directives of the Tripartite Headquarters. One of the aims of these exercises will be to check the operational readiness of these Forces. (g) It submits advice to the Committee of Ministers and to the Appropriate Authorities of the Republic of Cyprus on all matters provided for in this Agreement, as well as on any other matter within its competence about which such advice may be requested. (h) In accordance with Article IV of the Additional Protocol No. II, it submits to the Committee of Ministers its annual report which shall refer, inter alia, to the present state of the Forces under its Operational Command (e.g. units, their stationing, their strength, materiel, training status, operational readiness). 2. The Appropriate Authorities of the Republic of Cyprus shall be responsible for the maintenance of internal order and the application of Martial Law. Nevertheless, in matters concerning the security of the Forces under the Operational Command of the Tripartite Headquarters as well as the conduct of operations, the Appropriate Authorities of the Republic of Cyprus may delegate some responsibilities to the Tripartite Headquarters upon the latter's recommendation approved and conveyed by the Committee of Ministers.

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RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMANDER OF THE TRIPARTITE HEADQUARTERS

1. The Commander of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be entitled, after consultation on important matters with his Advisory Committee as defined below, to make decisions, to issue orders and to submit recommendations to the Committee of Ministers on matters within the competence of the Tripartite Headquarters. 2. The Advisory Committee mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article shall consist of the Commanders of the other two national Forces. The Commander of the Tripartite Headquarters may request his Deputy and Chief of Staff to attend the meetings of this Committee. 3. Any member of the Advisory Committee may request it to consider any matter within the competence of the Tripartite Headquarters and to submit its recommendations to the Commander thereof. The Committee shall satisfy such a request. 4. Without prejudice to the cases in which the Committee of Ministers has exclusive authority, the provisions of this Article shall not be construed as preventing the Commander of the Tripartite Headquarters from making a decision, issuing an order or taking action in cases of urgency, within the competence of the Tripartite Headquarters. In such an event consultation with the Advisory Committee shall take place without any undue delay. 5. On any question or difficulties of a technical and current nature, which may arise concerning the application and operation of the military requirements of the United Kingdom in Cyprus, under the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on this day's date, the Tripartite Headquarters, after consultation with the United Kingdom Military Authorities in Cyprus, shall advise directly or upon request the Appropriate Authorities of the Republic of Cyprus on the steps to be taken by the Republic of Cyprus.

ARTICLE X

1. The flag of the Republic of Cyprus, with the flags of Greece and Turkey on either side, shall be hoisted over the building of the Tripartite Headquarters. The Greek or Turkish national flag together with the flag of the Republic of Cyprus shall be hoisted only at the Headquarters of the Hellenic and Turkish Forces, respectively, as well as over the premises where these Forces shall be garrisoned.

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2. The Hellenic and Turkish Forces may celebrate their national holidays only within the precincts of their garrison area and/or within their official buildings, and may stage parades and march past only within the precincts of their garrison area. They may, however, participate in the public parades and march past on the Independence Day of the Republic of Cyprus or on any other occasion upon the request of the Appropriate Authorities of the Republic of Cyprus. 3. The official languages used by the Tripartite Headquarters shall be both Greek and Turkish. All the documents shall be prepared and issued in both languages. Documents addressed to the Tripartite Headquarters shall be made available by it in both official languages without delay. ARTICLE XI

1. All the expenses for the functioning of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be equally allocated between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. 2. For this purpose the Commander of Tripartite Headquarters shall prepare an annual budget and submit it for approval to the Committee of Ministers. 3. During the first year of operation of the Tripartite Headquarters no budget shall be prepared. Instead, the expenses shall be approved from time to time, according to the same procedure. 4. The Republic of Cyprus shall provide the necessary public building or buildings for the installation of the Tripartite Headquarters, free of cost. The cost of maintenance of these buildings shall be included in the budget drawn up as above. ARTICLE XH

1.—(a) The Table of Organization and Major Equipment of the Tripartite Headquarters is set out in Annex "A" to this Agreement. (b) The personnel allocated to the Tripartite Headquarters shall come under the allowed personnel ceiling for each national Contingent. 2. In the event that the plans mentioned in this Agreement should have to be implemented, the Staff establishment of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be supplemented according to Part II of Annex "A" to this Agreement. The provisions of paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), of this Article shall be applicable in this case.

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3. The civilian personnel required for the operation of the Tripartite Headquarters shall consist of Cypriots. Their total number, which temporarily is included in Annex "A" to this Agreement, shall be determined at the time of the approval of the budget (or the expenses) of the Tripartite Headquarters according to Article XI of this Agreement. 4. In the event that additional Hellenic and Turkish Forces should have to be sent to the Republic of Cyprus, as provided for in this Agreement, the necessary completion of the Tripartite Headquarters shall take place accordingly. For this purpose the Tripartite Headquarters shall prepare supplementary Tables of Organization and Major Equipment, in accordance with appropriate plans, to be approved by the Committee of Ministers. ARTICLE x m GREEK AND TURKISH CONTINGENTS

1.—(a) The Tables of Organization and Major Equipment of the Greek and Turkish Contingents provided in paragraph I of the Additional Protocol No. I are set out in Annex "B" to this Agreement. (b) In the event of an increase or reduction of these Contingents in accordance with paragraph II of the Additional Protocol No. I, a new Table of Organization and Major Equipment shall be prepared subject to the approval of the Committee of Ministers. 2.—(a) The ceiling of the Greek and Turkish Contingents, set out in paragraph I of the Additional Protocol No. I, shall be deemed to include all Greek and Turkish military personnel on duty within the territory of the Republic of Cyprus as well as those who belong to these Contingents and are temporarily abroad for service, on furlough, medical treatment, etc. In excess of the above mentioned ceiling, Greek or Turkish military missions or personnel may be sent on temporary duty to the Republic of Cyprus with the approval of the Appropriate Authorities of the Republic of Cyprus and the Committee of Ministers. (b) In the event of replacements, the ceiling set out for the Greek and Turkish Contingents in paragraph I of the Additional Protocol No. I, as well as their agreed major equipment, may be exceeded in proportion to the replacing personnel and equipment. This exception may not last for more than two weeks. The number of replacements shall be fixed by the Tripartite Headquarters in accordance with the existing policies for replacements in the respective countries. (c) Whenever the Greek and Turkish Contingents exceed their ceiling

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as above, the Commander of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be informed thereof in due course and he, in turn, shall inform the Committee of Ministers and the Appropriate Authorities of the Republic of Cyprus. 3. The Commanders of the Hellenic and Turkish Forces shall have full authority over all Greek and Turkish military personnel, respectively, normally stationed in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and not senior to them. They shall be responsible for the discipline of all their respective national military personnel not senior to them. 4. Wherever personnel coming from different national Forces are working together, the chain of command shall be applied according to rank. In the case of equality of rank, seniority in acquiring that rank shall be taken into consideration. The Tripartite Headquarters shall keep an up to date roster of the officers and NCOs of the three Forces and shall furnish to the Appropriate Authorities of the Republic of Cyprus an information copy including dependents, enlisted men and employees. 5. The civilian personnel required for the Hellenic and Turkish Forces shall consist of Cypriots.

ARTICLE XIV ADDITIONAL HELLENIC AND TURKISH FORCES

1. With reference to Articles II and III of this Agreement, the following procedure shall govern any increase in the Greek and Turkish Contingents stationed in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with paragraph I of the Additional Protocol No. I: (а) The President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus acting in agreement may request the Governments of Greece and Turkey to increase the strength of the above mentioned Contingents. The matter shall be referred to the Committee of Ministers which shall request the Tripartite Headquarters to submit its views as to the strength, organization and major equipment of the eventual additional Forces. The final decisions of the Greek and Turkish Governments shall be communicated in due course to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus. It is understood that the additional Forces may be land, naval or air Forces. (б) If an increase in the strength of the Greek and Turkish Contingents mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article is deemed necessary by the Committee of Ministers, or is requested by the Tripartite Headquarters and approved by this Committee, the latter shall communi-

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cate a request to that effect, together with recommendations by the Tripartite Headquarters as to the strength, organization and major equipment of the eventual additional forces, to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus who shall decide, acting in agreement, whether this request shall be referred to the Governments of Greece and Turkey for a final decision on the matter. (c) The proportion between the Greek and Turkish Contingents established in paragraph I of the Additional Protocol No. I, concerning personnel, as well as the proportion established in Annex "B" to this Agreement concerning major equipment, shall also be observed with regard to the additional Forces. (d) Upon their arrival in the Republic of Cyprus, the additional Forces with their equipment shall be placed under the Operational Command of the Tripartite Headquarters, on the conditions effective for the Greek and Turkish Contingents provided for in paragraph I of the Additional Protocol No. I. 2. The procedure and rules set forth in paragraph 1 of this Article shall apply to any importation into the Republic of Cyprus for the use of the Greek and Turkish Contingents, of war materiel in excess of that provided for in Annex "B" to this Agreement or in paragraph 1 of this Article.

ARTICLE XV

1. The legal status of the Hellenic and Turkish armed Forces is set out in Annex "C" to this Agreement. 2.—(a) All the expenses of the Hellenic and Turkish armed Forces, stationed in the Republic of Cyprus, shall be borne by their respective Government. (b) The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to provide for the use, as required by the Hellenic and Turkish Forces, of public utilities (water, telegraph, electric power, etc.) upon payment. (c) Accommodation and training areas for the Hellenic and Turkish Forces shall be provided by the Republic of Cyprus which shall make every effort to secure them free of cost. Their cost of maintenance shall be borne by the Forces using them. In the event of common use by the above mentioned Forces the cost shall be borne proportionately. 3. The Republic of Cyprus shall provide for the free use of roads and ports in its territory by the Hellenic and Turkish Forces under the same conditions as will be the case with the Army of the Republic of Cyprus.

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4. The Republic of Cyprus shall ensure the use of airfields in its territory by the civilian and military aircraft of Greece and Turkey to serve the military transportation needs of the Hellenic and Turkish Forces, stationed in Cyprus, from these countries to the Republic of Cyprus and vice versa, under the international regulations of air transportation. 5. The Hellenic and Turkish Forces shall be garrisoned in the same area as near each other as possible and within a radius of five miles and they shall share the same recreational and other facilities. The Republic of Cyprus shall do its utmost in this direction. 6. The total pay (including basic monthly payment and all overseas allowances) shall be the same within each rank for all personnel of the Hellenic and Turkish Forces normally stationed in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and shall be agreed upon by the two Governments concerned.

ARTICLE XVI TRAINING OF THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

1. The training of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus is set out in Annex " D " to this Agreement ("Training of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus"). 2. The training of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus shall be carried out by Greek and Turkish military personnel in accordance with Article IV of the Treaty of Alliance. It shall cover all phases of training (basic, advance and unit training) for Officers, NCOs and Enlisted men. 3. The Appropriate Authorities of the Republic of Cyprus, in consultation with the Tripartite Headquarters, shall determine the general aims of the training of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus within the framework of the provisions of this Agreement. 4.—(a) All training of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus (Officers, NCOs and ORs) shall be undertaken by the Greek and Turkish military personnel. This personnel shall come under the ceiling of the Contingents as provided for in paragraph I of Additional Protocol No. I. (b) The general proportion between Greek and Turkish training personnel shall be the same as that applied to the ethnic composition of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus according to the latter's Constitution. The same proportion shall apply, as far as practicable, to all ranks of the training personnel. 5.—(a) The Tripartite Headquarters shall decide with the concurrent

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opinion of the Commanders of the Hellenic and Turkish Forces the number of personnel of each rank to be assigned by the Greek and Turkish Contingents, respectively, for the training of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus. (b) The actual nomination of this personnel shall be made by the Commanders of the Hellenic and Turkish Forces, respectively. 6.—(a) The Greek and Turkish training personnel shall form a group under a single command. The Chief of this Training Group shall be responsible to the Commander of the Tripartite Headquarters with regard to the training of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus. (b) The Chief of the Training Group shall be a Greek and a Turk by yearly rotation. The Deputy Chief of the Training Group shall not be of the same nationality as the Chief. For the first year the Chief shall be designated by lot, but he shall not be of the same nationality as the Commander of the Tripartite Headquarters. 7. The Greek and Turkish training personnel shall exercise no command authority within the Army of the Republic of Cyprus. 8. The principle of mixed organizational structure of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus shall be adhered to also in training. FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE x v n

1. The Committee of Ministers shall have competence for the authoritative interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement including the Annexes thereto. 2. The Committee of Ministers shall be empowered to make amendments and additions to this Agreement and the Annexes thereto, provided that such amendments and additions do not affect the Treaty of Alliance.

ARTICLE XVm

1. The Annexes to this Agreement shall come into force and effect as an integral part of it. 2. This Agreement, including Annexes "A", "B", "C" and " D " thereto, shall come into force on the same date as the Treaty of Alliance. In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed the present Agreement.

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Done at Nicosia, this 16th day of August, 1960, in three copies in the English language, of which one shall be deposited with each of the High Contracting Parties.

For the Republic of Turkey:

For the Republic of Cyprus:

For the Kingdom of Greece:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTATION Personal Files of Mr. E. Averoff-Tossizza, Athens. Personal Files of Mr. C. Karamanlis, Paris. V. Mostras, "On the Cyprus Question" (mimeographed), Athens, 1960. Certain files of the Cyprus House of Representatives and of the Cyprus Presidency, Nicosia. Personal papers of certain other Greek and Greek Cypriot officials.

OFFICAL PUBLISHED DOCUMENTATION Great Britain British and Foreign State Papers 69 (1877-1878). Conference on Cyprus. Documents Signed and Initialled at Lancaster House, Cmnd. 679 (= Miscellaneous No. 4), H.M. Stationery Office, 1959. Conference on Cyprus. Final Statements at the Closing Plenary Session at Lancaster House on February 19,1959, Cmnd. 680 ( = Miscellaneous No. 5) (H.M. Stationery Office, 1959). Cyprus 1956 (H.M. Stationery Office, 1957 [Colonial OfficeD. Cyprus, Cmnd. 1093 (H.M. Stationery Office, July, 1960). Cyprus. Correspondence Exchanged Between the Governor and Makarios, Cmd. 9708 (H.M. Stationery Office, March, 1956). Cyprus. Statement of Policy, Cmnd. 455 (H.M. Stationery Office, June, 1958). Cyprus (British Information Services. July, 1960). Discussion on Cyprus in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September-October, 1958, Cmnd. 566 ( = Miscellaneous No. 14) (1958). Disturbances in Cyprus in October 1931, Cmd. 4045 (H.M. Stationery Office, 1932). House of Commons Debates, 5th series, 1958-1960. Radcliffe, Lord. Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus, Cmnd. 42 (H.M. Stationery Office, December, 1956). The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, Cmd. 9594 (H.M. Stationery Office, October, 1955).

538

BIBLIOGRAPHY Greece

The Cyprus Question. Correspondence Exchanged between Mr. Constantine Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece, and the Sight Honorable Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (June 10, 1958-August 19, 1958) (Athens, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1959). The Cyprus Question. Discussion at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, SeptemberOctober, 1958 (Athens, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1958). The Cyprus Question. Negotiations, October 4, 1955 to March 5, 1956 (Athens, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1956). Journal of the Debates of the Parliament, 1958-1959 (in Greek). The Question of Cyprus, Reply to the Arguments Advanced by the British Delegation during the Ninth Session of the Assembly of the United Nations (September 23-24, 1954) (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, November, 1954). United

States

State Department Bulletin, 1958-1959. United

Nations

General Assembly, Official Records, Thirteenth Session (debates on the Cyprus question). Treaty Series, vol. 382 (1960), and vol. 397.

UNOFFICIAL PUBLISHED DOCUMENTATION Council on Foreign Relations, Documents of American Foreign Relations, 1958 (New York: Harper and Bros). Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs 1958, 1959, 1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962, 1963, 1964).

BOOKS Anonymous, The Last Battle (Athens, 1961). Barros, J., The Aland Islands Question (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). Christides, Ch., The Cyprus Question and Greek-Turkish Matters (in Greek) (Athens, 1967). Couloumbis, T. A., The Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). De Conde, A., A History of American Foreign Policy (New York: Scribner's, 1962). De Rivera, J. H., The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1968). Dischler, L., Die Zypernfrage (Frankfurt-am-Main, Berlin: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1960). Dzelepy, E. N., Le complot de Chypre (Bruxelles: Les Editions politiques, 1965). Eden, A., Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960). Foley, C. (ed.), Grivas Memoirs (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1964).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

539

Foley, C., Island in Revolt (London: Longmans, 1962). Foot, H., A Start in Freedom (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). Grivas-Dighenis, G., Memoirs of the EOKA Struggle 1955-1959 (in Greek) (Athens, 1961). Hill, G., A History of Cyprus, IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952). Jelavich, B., Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1843 (Munich: R. Oldenburg, 1966). Kyriakides, S., Cyprus. Constitutionalism and Crisis Government (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968). Jones, F. C., Manchuria Since 1931 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949). Macmillan, Harold, The Blast of War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper and Row, 1968). Tides of Fortune, 1945-1955 (New York: Harper and Row, 1969). Riding the Storm (London: Macmillan, 1971). Marinos, C. D., La tragedie chypriote (Athens, 1964). Mayes, S., Cyprus ami Makarios (London: Putman, 1960). Melas, M. C., Reminiscences of an Ambassador (in Greek) (Athens, 1967). Miller, J. D. E., The Commonwealth in the World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965). O'Brien, W. V., and Goebel, U. H.; "U.S. Recognition Polity Toward the New Nations", in W. V. O'Brien, ed., The New Nations in International Law and Diplomacy, The Yearbook of World Polity II (New York: Praeger, 1965). Pissas, M. N., Constitutional Offers and Other Facts about Cyprus (since 1878) (London: Ethnarchy of Cyprus Publication, 1958). Russell, R. B., A History of the United Nations Charter (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1958). Spaak, P.-H., Combats inachevés II (Paris: Fayard, 1969). Stephens, R., Cyprus: A Place of Arms (New York: Praeger, 1966). Sulzberger, C. L., The Last of the Giants (New York: Macmillan, 1970). Tsatsos, Th., Observations on the Cypriot Constitution (in Greek) (Athens: A. N. Sakkoulas, 1965). Xydis, S. G., Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation 1954-1958 (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1967). Greece and the Great Powers 1944-1947 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963). Weiker, W. F., The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1963).

ARTICLES Alexandrov, N., and V. Kondratyev, "The New Tendencies in Greece", Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' 5 (July 1 and 2, 1956) and 8 (1956). Rosenbaum, N., "Success in Foreign Policy: The British in Cyprus, 1878-1960", Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de Science politique 2:iv (December, 1970), pp. 605-627. Xydis, S. G „ "Toward 'Toil and Moil' in Cyprus", Middle East Journal 20 (1966), pp. 1-19. "The U N General Assembly as an Instrument of Greek Policy: Cyprus, 19541958", The Journal of Conflict Resolution 12 (1968), pp. 141-158.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

REFERENCE PERIODICALS Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1958-1960). Oriente Moderno (1958-1960).

NEWSPAPERS Daily Telegraph (London). Eleftheria (Athens). Estia (Athens). Ethnos (Nicosia). Kathimerini (Athens). Le Monde (Paris). New York Herald Tribune. New York Times Sunday Times (London). The Observer (London). Times, The (London). Vima, To (Athens).

INDEX

Abdullah, 28 Acapulco, 459 Adams, John Quincy, 25 Adenauer, Konrad, 187 n. Adriatic, 22-23 Aegean Sea, 91, 230 islands, 90 Macedonia, 239 Afghanistan, 32, 60 n„ 307, 385 Africa, 76,231 African states, 27 Agence France Presse, 69 AKEL, 57, 165, 275 n. Albania, 20, 22-23, 26-27, 32, 34, 50, 58, 162 Albanians, 22, 34 Alexander I of Russia, 34 Algeria, 33, 60 n., 297 Algerian Question, 156, 162, 296 Allamanis, S„ 461 n., 462 n., 463 n. Allen, George V., 82 n., 465 Allen, Sir Roger, 66 n., 78, 98 n., 108, 154, 159-160, 173, 177-178, 182 n., 208, 224-225, 350-353, 368, 399-400, 406 America, 153 Amery, Julian, 479, 508-509, 512 Anatolia, 52 Anatolian News Agency, 284 Anglo-American rivalry, 44 n. "Angloturks", 129, 172 Ankara, 43 n„ 70, 76, 86, 89, 103, 106, 111-112, 114, 124-125, 149, 151, 183, 187,194,196-197,202,217,252,281, 284, 311, 353, 377, 382, 395, 406, 428, 476 Anninos-Kavalieratos, Phaidon, 72, 399400 Anschluss, 26 Anthimos, Bishop of Kition, 141-142,

164, 166, 249, 268, 286, 357, 360, 387, 401, 404, 422, 424, 426, 437438, 468, 470 Arab countries, 129, 296 Arab states, 32, 76, 259, 278, 296 Arabs, 80, 297 Arango, Jose Agustin, 21 Ardahan, 81 n. Argentina, 23, 30, 32, 34, 517 Armenian Church, 483, 503 Armenians, 17, 81 n., 93, 430, 490-491, 513 Arosemena, Carlos Constantino, 21 Asian states, 27 Ataturk, Kemal, 127, 344, 379, 434, 449, 455 Athens, 43 n., 86,106,121,134,149,151, 173, 183, 194, 198, 217, 226, 236, 311, 372, 376, 388, 395, 428, 476 British Embassy in, 63, 242 Mayor of, 474 Soviet Embassy in, 215 Turkish Consulate in, 69 U.S.I.A. Library in, 83 n. Athens Radio, 42 n., 150, 267, 269 Atlantic Alliance, 53,263; see also NATO Attlee, Clement, 46-47 n. Australia, 306-307 Austria, 26-27, 33, 318, 518 Austrian State Treaty, 26, 84, 346 Austria-Hungary, 22, 30, 32, 34 Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos, 11, 40 n., 53, 66 n„ 68, 73 n„ 108, 114, 127, 129, 166, 177, 182, 186, 188, 222, 226,237,242,270 ,273-274, 279-280, 283, 301, 313, 315, 321, 327-328, 331, 339, 342, 355, 359, 361, 363, 371, 374, 379-380,388-390, 394,399, 401, 406-407, 409, 413, 419-421, 424, 427-429, 434, 436-437, 440,

542

INDEX

447-449, 452,456, 466, 473-474, 484, 509 and Grivas, 469-471 ; see also "Isaakios" and Parliament, 144-146, 343-345, 464-465 at Lancaster House, 430-433, 444-447, 450-454 exchanges with: Sir Roger Allen, 173-176, 224-225, 350-351, 368, 399 A. E. Lambert, 159-161 Selwyn Lloyd, 88, 90-99, 103-104, 236 H. Macmillan, 201-202 Makarios, 177-181, 247-248, 284286, 403-405 J. W. Riddleberger, 134-136, 154159, 266, 351 N. Vergin, 351-353 F. R. Zorlu, 337-338, 343, 347-349, 357-359, 395, 509 Avghorou, 167 Baghdad, 178 Baghdad Pact, 124, 159, 162, 168, 171, 320, 465, 511 Council, 71-72,76,78, 84,112,154,182 Bagi, Louis, 505 Balkan Conference (Romanian proposal for), 143 Balkan Pact, 191, 239, 257 Balkan states, 129 Balkan wars, 22, 462 Balkans, 22, 231 Baltadjis, A., 462 n. Banda Oriental, 23, 34 Barco, James W., 304 Basdevant, Jules, 252 n. Batum, 81 n. Bavaria, King of, 59 Bayar, Celâl, 52, 360, 364, 390-391 Bayiilken, Halûk, 478 n. Beaumarchais, Pierre Augustin Caron de, 36 Belaunde, Victor Andrés, 308, 312, 323 Belgium, 27, 31, 307-308, 313, 331 Belgrade-Athens-Cairo coalition, 23 Berlin Crisis (1958), 49, 298, 467 Berlin Congress (1878), 27 Bevan, Aneurin, 47-48 n„ 151-152, 180, 246, 427, 474 Big Four, 31 Bilge, S., 508

Birgi, Nuri, 126, 408, 477 n. Bishop, F. A., 182 n. Bismarck, Otto von, 431 Bitsios, Dimitri, 177 n., 179 n., 182 n., 237 n„ 250-251, 270, 409, 421-423, 478 n„ 497 "Bizani", 74 "Black October", 267, 270, 293 Blackburn, 238 Blackpool, 279 Bled, 43 n. Boeotia, 41 n. Bogota Congress, 21 Bolivia, 331 n. Bonn, 280 Boston, 262 Boulogne, 86 Bowker, Sir James, 69 n„ 71, 126, 170, 225 Brazil, 23, 30, 32, 34 Brazilian authorities, 34 Bridel, Marcel, 484, 488-492, 505-508 Brillakis, A., 461 n. Brioni, 239, 249 Britain, 9, 23, 27-28, 31, 36, 39 n., 41, 46, 56, 63, 66, 73, 77, 88-89, 91-92, 98, 102,122, 129-130,133,136,139-140, 154, 159, 163, 171, 176, 178, 181, 184, 188-190, 192-193, 198, 200-201, 211, 214, 221, 231, 237, 243-244, 250, 253-254, 257,259, 261, 276-277, 279, 282, 284, 287-289, 293, 297, 308-309, 315, 320, 328, 349-350, 378, 398,410,418-419,431-432,438, 444445, 458-461,475-476,478, 480-481, 507, 511-512, 514-516, 519 Government, 10, 14, 26, 40, 49, 51-52, 57, 65-66, 73, 76, 81, 84, 100-101, 106, 108, 110, 112, 121, 128, 131, 134, 138-139, 147-148, 160, 168, 175-176, 185, 189, 191, 193-196, 198, 204-205, 207-208, 213, 216, 219, 233-234, 248, 250-251, 253, 256, 260-261, 263-264, 267, 270, 274, 278-279, 281-282, 289-291, 295-296, 299-300, 311, 315, 320, 345-346, 350, 368, 374, 387, 399, 405, 420-421, 425, 427-428, 434, 436, 463, 479-482, 486, 491, 513 Cabinet, 119, 217, 349 Colonial Office, 52, 152 Exchequer, 430 Foreign Office, 52,182, 287

INDEX

Parliament, 512 House of Commons, 69, 72, 77, 103, 106, 109-110, 121, 141, 146, 152-153, 203, 290-291, 344, 355, 456 Parties, Conservative, 93, 279 Labour, 46, 47 n„ 70, 93, 115, 137, 146-147, 150, 153, 184, 229, 238, 244, 246, 269, 291, 324, 425, 511 Brighton Conference, 48 n., 78, 144 Scarborough Conference, 47 n. British Delegation to UNGA, 296, 303, 338 British Intelligence Service, 320 British-Greek relations, 41, 188, 190 British-Turkish relations, 100 Brook, Norman, 65 n., 134 Buckingham Palace, 40 n. Budapest, 212 n. Bulgaria, 27, 32, 50, 230 Burma, 331 n. Burmaston, H.M.S., 503 Burrows, Sir Ronald, 389 Burundi, 59, 60 n. Butler, R. A., 66 n., 476 Byelorussian S.S.R., 331 n, Byzantium, 228 Caccia, Sir Harold, 72, 111 Callaghan, James, 70-71, 110, 148, 475, 510-511 Cambodia, 313 Cameroon, 37, 60 n. Northern, 18, 29 Southern, 29 Republic of, 29 Cameroon, British, 29 Canada, 323 Castle, Barbara, 238, 242, 244, 247, 249251, 345 Center Union Party (Greece), 107 CENTO, 399 Central African Republic, 29-31,37,60 n. Central Powers, 81 n. Ceylon, 301, 306, 515-516 Chad, 30, 60 n. Chang Cho-lin, 19, 20 n. Changchun, 20 Channel Islands, 86 "Chares", 121, 425; see also Makarios

543

Chiang Hsueh-lin, 19 Chiang Kai-shek, 158 Chile, 331 n. China, 18-19, 32, 158, 306 Republic of, 20 n. Choiseul, Due de, 36 Christians, 296, 463, 491 Christides, C., 44 n. Christopoulos, George, 177 n., 179 n., 182 n. Chrysafmis, George, 437 Chrysostomos, Abbot of Kykko, 422 Churchill, Winston S., 63, 183, 313 Clerides, Glafkos (John), 116, 491, 508 Coercive Acts, 36 Cold War, 49 Colina, Rafael de la, 309-310, 313, 324, 331-332, 338, 340 Colombia, 21, 31-32, 307, 310, 323, 330331 Colon, 22 n. Common Market, 394 Commonwealth, 10, 56, 84, 95, 432, 515, 519 Congo (Kinshasa), 31, 60 n. Congo, Republic of, 30, 60 n. Constantinople, 207, 228, 471; see also Istanbul Convention (1878), 80 n., 88 Copáis Lake, 41 n. Copenhagen, 109 Costa Rica, 307 Council of Europe, 10, 519 Commission of Human Rights, 519 Crusaders, 80 Crete, 39 n., 145, 347, 462-463 Cuba, 24-25, 27, 32-34, 323, 410 "Asemblea de Representantes del Ejercito Cubano", 24 Constitutional Assembly, 25 "Republic of", 24 Cubans, 34 Cutliffe, Catherine, 268-270 Cypriots, 71, 78-80, 82, 91, 96-97, 99, 115, 139, 146, 156, 161, 174, 180, 194, 199-201, 235, 271, 306, 311-312, 328-329, 333, 350, 388, 394, 421, 428, 430, 447, 464, 473, 475, 508, 515-516 Cyprus, 9-535 (except 19, 22, 24, 27, and 32) Annexation by Turkey, 66 British authorities in, 172, 212, 270,

544

INDEX

277, 355, 360, 398, 406, 471-472, 477 Bases in, British, 17, 57, 65, 67, 86, 95-96, 100, 115, 137, 214, 297, 305, 345-346, 351, 360, 368, 386, 406-407, 423, 428-429, 454, 467-468, 471-472, 475-476, 479481, 512, 516 Greek, 100, 343, 346, 360, 372, 374375, 382, 396 NATO, 57, 67, 396, 402, 407, 413, 424 Turkish, 68, 91, 96, 98, 100, 104, 107, 109, 112-114, 121, 184187, 198, 343, 346, 360, 371372, 374-375, 377-378, 380, 382384, 395-396, 401-402, 407, 411, 414, 424, 470 Church, 17, 92 Commonwealth members, 95, 97, 102, 104, 294, 407, 432, 458 Communities, 77, 370 Constitution, 56, 60, 104, 132, 203, 367, 370, 372, 374-376, 382, 384, 407, 419, 433, 441-442, 449-450, 462, 483-484, 486, 488, 493-495, 497, 506-510, 513-514 Crown Colony, 18, 64-65, 139, 475, 479, 482, 512, 514 Elections, 483, 512-513 enosis, 18, 26, 46, 56, 64, 70, 79, 84, 91, 93, 102, 112, 124, 137, 185, 192, 197-199, 206, 242, 245, 272, 278, 288, 290-291, 293, 297, 300301, 316, 319, 354, 395, 409, 414, 425, 441, 447, 460, 464-466, 470, 476-477, 511 Ethnarchy, 18, 33, 45, 64, 75, 138, 248 "federation", 353, 360-362, 364, 370, 372, 375, 407, 502 Greek-Turkish Military Headquarters, 360, 366, 382, 396, 404, 407 House of Representatives, 519 Independence for, 67, 84,102,104-105, 188, 235, 237-238, 242-247, 249, 257, 272, 278, 280-281, 293, 296, 299, 306, 312, 344-345, 353, 369, 388, 390, 395, 401-402, 406-407, 425-426, 438, 463, 466-467, 469, 475, 482 Joint Committee, 477-479, 481, 512, 514

Joint Constitutional Commission, 477478, 482, 484, 486, 488-490, 492, 508, 510, 512-513 London agreements on, 11, 33, 53, 56, 461-466, 468, 472-473, 477-479, 481-483, 500, 508 Conference (1959) on, 14, 420, 422423, 427-428, 439, 448, 454, 456-457, 466, 470, 477, 484 Conference "Gentlemen's Agreement", 457-459 Conference (1960) on, 479, 505 Tripartite Conference (1955), 42-43, 45, 101,212, 391,477, 511 NATO membership, 401, 413, 425, 457, 466-467, 519 "Paris sketch", 345, 349, 359-361, 363, 366, 378 Partition of, 56, 66-67, 69-72, 80, 84, 88-89, 93-94, 99-100, 104, 107, 109, 111-114, 119 n., 120-121, 137, 180, 185-187, 192, 197, 206, 220, 234-235, 246, 272, 306-307, 310-311, 319, 326, 343, 355, 369, 409, 447, 464, 476 Republic of, 33, 346, 349, 365, 377, 409, 430, 432, 438-439, 443, 455, 457-458, 473, 477, 480-481, 483484, 492, 494, 506, 508, 512-516 self-determination for, 56, 64, 70, 79, 91, 94, 99,102,105,113,121, 128, 139, 150, 189-190, 197, 206, 208, 222-223, 234-235, 237-238, 242243, 296, 305, 354, 462, 516 self-government for, 68, 70-71, 79, 96, 109, 112-113, 186, 206, 234-235, 242, 246, 280, 299, 312-313, 328 settlement, 25, 28, 49, 350, 392, 398, 455 Transitional Committee, 477-478, 482, 485-486 Treaty of Alliance, 346, 408-411, 413, 426, 429, 439, 441, 443, 447, 449, 462, 465-466, 470, 507, 513 Treaty of Establishment, 513 Treaty of Guarantee, 369, 408-411, 422, 429-430, 439, 441, 443, 445, 447, 462, 470, 481, 513-514 Tridominium, 14, 133, 138, 186, 349, 461 Tripartite Military Headquarters, 410411, 425, 466-467, 513 Turkish Cypriot community in, 131,

INDEX

152, 210, 216, 242, 254, 261, 266, 281, 294, 301, 312, 315, 317, 338, 346, 423, 436, 446, 455, 462, 466, 478-479, 507, 513-514; see also Turkish Cypriots Turkish minority in, 92, 97, 123, 139, 465, 506 UN membership of, 396, 515, 517 "Cyprus is Turkish", 18, 67, 77, 110, 441 Czechoslovakia, 31, 211, 306 Dahomey, 60 n. Daily Telegraph, 268 Dakota, 473 Danubian principalities, 35 Danzig, Free City of, 31-32, 37 Dardanelles, 175 n. Darling, Kenneth, 270 Dear, William, 116 Dekeleia, 472 "Deniz", 503 Denkta$, Rauf, 165, 435-436, 448, 453, 487, 491, 508-509 Dervis, Themistocles, 127, 142, 165, 216, 268, 407, 437, 456 Diefenbaker, John G„ 153 "Dighenis", 360; see also Grivas Dickson, Sir William, 66 n. Dillon, Douglas, 306 Dixon, Lady Ismene, 13 Dixon, Sir Pierson, 13, 290, 338-339 Dolder Hotel (Ziirich), 407 Dominican Republic, 306, 326 Donnelly, Desmond, 48 n. Driberg, Tom, 47 n. Dulles, John Foster, 71-73, 78, 109 n., 134-136, 169 n., 217, 263, 266, 291, 339, 342, 399 EAEM, 115 East China Railway, 20 n. Eastern bloc, 343 Economou-Gouras, Paul, 237 n., 515 Ecuador, 21, 517 EDA, 47 n., 50, 108, 119-121, 123, 128, 143, 214 Eden, Anthony, 26 n., 41 n., 63,65,115 n., 174, 208 n„ 475, 511 Egypt, 34, 40, 91, 158, 168, 198, 305 Egyptians, 35,151 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 72,238,313,459, 514 "Eisenhower Doctrine", 168, 212

545

El Salvador, 20 n. Elliot, Walter, 114 Elizabeth II, Queen of England, 512-513 Elliniko airport, 177, 395, 402 U.S. airbase at, 83 n. Enosis; see Cyprus, enosis EOKA, 10, 33-34, 50-51, 54, 63, 74-76, 87, 89, 93, 111, 115-118, 121, 123, 129, 142, 147, 161, 165, 167, 172, 178, 180, 213-215, 227, 231-232, 236, 267-270, 285, 293, 295, 301, 353, 355-358, 388, 423-426, 454, 466-468, 472-473, 475, 511 Epidaurus, National Assembly of, 34 Episcopi, 472 ERE (National Radical Union), 107,119, 465 Erim, Nihat, 487-488, 493-494, 496-498, 500, 506-507 Eritrea, 59 Esenbel, Melih, 409 Esin, Seyfullah, 515 Estia, 119 n. Ethiopia, 59 Ethnos (Cyprus), 153, 456 Europe, 198 European Concert, 27 European Commission of Human Rights, 74 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 60 Rome Protocol, 60 Famagusta, 17, 63, 69, 77, 89, 110, 127, 268, 485 Far East, 44 n. Farouk, King, 158 Faysal, King, 28 Filiki Etairia, 34 Foley, Charles, 13 Foot, Sir Hugh (Lord Caradon), 68-71, 74-75, 77, 87, 89, 102-103, 106, 113, 115-116, 126, 130, 133-134,138, 147, 154, 165-166, 177, 205, 210,213-215, 219, 224, 245, 267-269, 294, 357, 437, 440, 471, 473, 479, 482, 486, 490, 503 Foot Plan, 46, 68-69, 87, 111, 149 France, 27-31, 35-36, 64 n., 187, 237, 271, 276, 279 Fifth Republic, 29-30 National Assembly, 30

546

INDEX

Frederika, Queen, 340, 454 Free World, 187-188, 223, 233, 455 French Community, 29-30 French Equatorial Africa, 29-30 French West Africa, 30 Frydas, Aristotle, 114, 355-356, 386, 424, 466-468, 471 Fuad, King, 158 Gabon, 60 n. Gaitskell, Hugh, 46-47 n„ 147, 217, 246, 291 Galinoporni, 355 Gambia, 60 n. Gasperi, Alcide de, 187 n. Gatwick airport, 437 Gaulle, Charles de, 263 Geneva, 132, 154, 493-494 "Geneva Spirit", 212 Georgakopoulos, Constantine, 107 George VI, King of England, 39 n„ 40 n. German Empire, 31 Germany, 18, 26, 80, 185, 187, 226, 365, 398, 460 Geuneli, 127 Ghana, 18, 29, 192 Great Powers, 35, 463 Greece, 9,26,42, 63, 66,79, 81-83,88-90, 93, 100-102, 107, 124, 129, 131, 133, 136, 139, 143, 145-146,148,154-156, 158-159, 162,164, 169,174, 176-178, 181, 186, 188, 190, 192, 194, 196, 198, 207-208, 211-213, 219, 229-233, 236, 238-240, 248, 251-256, 259, 271-272, 274, 276-277, 279-280, 283287, 289, 295-296, 298-303, 306, 308-309, 314-315, 320-322, 325, 327-329, 333, 339, 342, 344-346, 349, 351-353, 361, 366, 368, 372, 376-377, 380-382, 384, 386-387, 394395, 398, 400-401, 405-407, 410, 418-419, 431-435, 437-439, 440-442, 444-446, 455, 458-462, 464-465, 471, 481, 487, 489, 496, 507, 511, 514, 516-517 Government, 10-11, 26, 46-47, 49-50, 52, 58, 64-65, 73, 75, 77-78, 83-84, 90-91, 93, 96, 98, 106, 109-110, 112-114, 127, 129, 134, 137, 139, 144, 146, 148-149, 151-152, 155157, 160-161, 169-170, 172-173, 176, 178, 182-183, 188-193, 195, 199, 204-213, 215, 217-218, 220-

224, 226, 228-229, 231-235, 237, 241, 248-250, 253, 255-265, 270271, 275, 277-279, 281-284, 287288, 290-291, 293, 295-296, 311, 315-316, 318, 320, 325, 333, 342, 344, 346, 349-350, 352, 357, 359, 361, 368, 371, 373, 381-382, 384385, 389-390, 393, 395, 397, 399, 401, 413, 421-424, 427-429, 432433, 435, 439-440, 450, 454, 456, 464, 466, 473-474, 476, 478-480, 483-484, 497, 499, 508, 511, 514 Cabinet, 211, 218 Greek Delegation to UNGA, 247, 269, 297, 299-300, 307, 319, 322, 325, 331, 338-339, 465 Greek Mission to UN, 234 Parliament, 143, 211, 343, 461, 464465, 473 Greek-Turkish friendship, 100, 350, 382383, 428, 455 Greek-Turkish relations, 72, 80, 93, 97, 99, 123, 195, 210, 353, 376-377, 381, 392, 419, 442 Greek Constitution (1844), 59 Greek Cypriots, 10, 14, 17-18, 33, 51, 74, 87, 94, 110-111, 125, 127, 128131, 141-143, 149, 160-161, 163-167, 171-172,180,187, 195,197,202, 206, 214, 222, 226-227, 263, 267-269, 278, 301, 309, 345, 355, 357, 362, 370, 372-373, 380, 384, 386, 393, 397, 402-405, 407, 420, 426, 430-431, 442, 446-448, 453-454, 460, 462, 466,473, 481,484-485,488-490,492, 512, 514 Greek Cypriot Community, 131, 152, 216, 254, 261, 266, 281, 315, 321, 346, 423, 427, 434, 436, 446, 455, 478-479, 491, 504, 507, 513 Greek Intelligence Service, 320 Greek Orthodox, 14, 414 Greek-Soviet Society, 212 Greeks, 35 Grivas, George, 13-14, 34, 42, 50, 52-53, 63, 68, 75-76, 108, 114, 117-118, 120-121, 129, 141, 163-164, 166, 172, 178, 180, 213, 215, 221, 226228, 231-234, 240 n., 244, 248 n., 249, 267-270, 274, 281, 286, 294295, 353-358, 386-388, 423-426, 466468, 471-474, 477, 480, 500; see also "Dighenis"

INDEX

547

Guatemala, 60 n., 318 Guinea, 30, 60 n. Gülek, Kasim, 375

Ivory Coast, 60 n. Izmir, 44, 51, 79 n., 146, 162-163, 232, 465-466

Haiti, 60 n. Hammarskjöld, Dag, 127, 290 Harding, Field Marshal Sir John, 66 n., 68,70,84,111,194n., 464,474,512n. Harding-Makarios talks, 44, 98, 206 n. Hatay, 91 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, 21, 22 n. Hay-Herran Treaty, 21-22 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 21 Hellenism, 228, 471 Henry VIII, 86 Herter, Christian A., 277, 292 n. Hispaniola, 306 Hitler, Adolf, 26 Honduras, 60 n. Hopkinson, Henry (Lord Colyton), 474, 510-511 Houtas, S., 461 n„ 462 n. Hoyer-Millar, Sir Frederick, 66 n., 84-85 Hull, Cordell, 26 n. Hungary, 193, 212, 306

Jamaica, 60 n. Japan, 18, 20, 32, 36, 237 Jones, Owen T., 72 Jordan, 28, 37, 122, 124, 168, 211, 305 Journal de Genève, 489 Jowett, Lord, 42 n. Jus cogens, 409

Iceland, 73, 302, 306 Iksel, Settar, 125 n., 170 n. Iliou, E., 461 n., 462 n., 463 n. Imbros (Imroz), 175 India, 100, 192, 306, 320 inönü, Ismet, 389, 465 International Court of Justice, 253, 256, 259, 261 Ionian islands, 200 IRA, 357 Iran, 231, 303, 307, 320, 323, 325, 330, 340, 385 Iraq, 28, 122, 124, 158, 163, 168, 232, 305, 385, 400 Ireland, 80, 100, 306, 318, 357 "Isaakios", 53-54, 76, 120, 122, 161, 163, 165, 213-215, 221, 227-234, 274 n., 294, 296, 355-357, 386, 388, 469, 473; see also Averoff-Tossizza Ijin, Burhan, 267 Ismay, Lord, 45, 477 Israel, 33 Istanbul, 44, 51,78, 85,123,125, 136,376 Patriarchate, 90 Italian impero, 26 Italo-Turkish war, 64 n. Italy, 22, 30, 32, 34, 226, 237, 271, 276, 279, 516, 518

Kambou-Kykkou region, 358 Karachi, 399, 406 Karamanlis, Constantine, 53, 55, 63, 87, 99-100, 104-105, 107-108, 115, 120, 128, 130-131, 138, 142-144, 152-153, 158, 160, 170 n., 171-172, 177, 181, 183, 188-195, 198-204, 206-210, 217, 221, 223-224, 232-234, 237-242, 247-250, 252-253, 256261, 263, 270-278, 281-282, 286, 289, 291, 292 n., 296 n., 303 n„ 319, 342, 352, 359, 361, 363-366, 374, 376, 379-381, 383, 388, 392-398, 401-403, 405-409, 412-413, 418-423, 428, 436-439, 454-456, 461, 463-464, 467, 471, 474, 479, 483-484, 519 meetings with: Selwyn Lloyd, 99-102 Macmillan, 181-196, 198-203 Makarios, 237-242, 270-276, 420421, 437-439, 446 Menderes, 40 R . D . Murphy, 342 Spaak, 252-261 Vergin, 394-395 Karpasia, 355, 358 Kashmir, 192 Kassimatis, G., 465 n. Kemal Ataturk, see Ataturk, Kemal Kendrew, Douglas, 268, 270 Kenya, 60 n. Khrushchev, Nikita S., 49, 211, 298 Kifissia, 368 Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone, 84-85, 346 Knox-Helm, Sir Alexander, 478 n. Kokkina Bay, 52 Korea, 18-19, 80, 192 Korean War, 50 Korytsa (Korcè), 74 Kremlin, 184 Krishna Menon, V. K „ 64, 235, 241 n.

548

INDEX

242-243, 297, 300-302, 308, 312-313, 333, 346, 465 Kiitfik, Fazil, 67, 110-111, 126, 130, 216, 245, 427, 435, 440-443, 446, 448, 453, 463, 479, 482-483, 486-487, 503, 509-510, 512-513 Kiineralp, Zeki, 409, 497 Kurds, 93, 385 Kutuzov, General, 116 Kwantung Army, 19, 33 Kyprianos, Bishop of Kyrenia, 245, 248, 285 n„ 360, 424, 477 Kyprianou, Spyros, 269 Kyrenia, 17, 270 Kyrou, Alexis A., 43 n„ 49, 114, 221 n. Lambert, A. E„ 159 Lambton, Viscount, 475 Lancaster House, 439, 454 Lannaca, 17, 63, 125, 267, 295 n., 485 Latin American group, 340 Latin Church (Cyprus), 483, 503 Lausanne, 505-506, 512 Treaty of, 43 n„ 80, 81 n., 88, 91, 139, 145, 147, 159, 233, 237, 253, 259-261, 414, 463 League of Nations, 18, 28-29 Mandate system, 27-28, 31 Covenant of, 27 Lebanon, 28,122,124, 162, 168-169, 211, 229, 305, 347 Legum, Colin, 113 Lennox-Boyd, Alan, 48 n., 52, 53 n., 66 n., 69-70, 77-78,96,110,112,121, 134, 137, 144, 147, 153, 196, 279280, 288, 355, 357-358, 428, 475476, 511 Liaoning, 19 Liberia, 306 Libya, 229 Constitution of, 59 King of, 59 National Assembly, 59 Limassol, 17, 63, 64 n., 127, 130, 485 Lloyd, Selwyn, 40 n., 42 n., 52,66 n., 71, 77, 84-87, 89-94, 96-97, 99, 102-103, 105-106, 108-111, 113, 125-126, 130, 134,137,147,161,188,217,236,243, 247, 262, 292 n., 319, 345, 349-352, 355, 368,420,427-430, 433-436, 440, 447-449, 453-456, 475, 477, 508-509, 511 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 42 n., 73-74 n.,

323, 326, 339-340, 388, 515 London, 126, 173, 252, 311, 426 Protocol of 1830, 35 Treaty of 1827, 35 Treaty of 1832, 455 n. Treaty of 1863, 455 n. Treaty of 1864, 455 n. Swiss Embassy in, 85 Lopez, Narciso, 24 Louis XV, 36 Louis XVI, 36 Lyttelton, Sir Oliver (Lord Chandos), 41 n„ 313 MacArthur, Douglas, 50 Macedonia, 239 Mackenzie, Kenneth, 294 n. Macmillan, Harold, 14, 45, 55, 63, 65, 104 n., 106, 109 n„ 121 n., 128, 130, 136-138, 141, 152-153, 171-172, 177178, 181, 183-188, 192-193, 195-206, 209-210, 214-218, 223-225, 242, 249, 251,255,264,280,290,319, 344-345, 349, 354, 357,399,454-456,463,471, 475-476 Macmillan plan I (1955), 47 n., 132 Macmillan plan II (1958), 46, 48 n., 49, 58, 107, 132, 137-138, 140-141, 143, 146, 151, 158, 165, 169, 172, 176, 178-180, 207, 213, 221-223, 227, 230, 233-238, 246-247, 249-250, 254-260, 262, 264-265, 267, 270-274, 277, 279-281, 286, 288, 293-294, 305, 314, 321-322, 344, 346-348, 356, 379380, 387, 406-407, 464, 476-477, 518 Madagascar, 60 n. Maison de l'Europe, 519 Makhaira, 358 Makarios III, Archbishop and Ethnarch, 14, 45-46, 48 n„ 50, 52-54, 57, 63, 68-69, 74-76, 102-103, 106, 108, 114, 117-118, 122 n„ 124, 126, 137-138, 142, 149, 154, 164-165, 171, 177, 179, 181, 194 n„ 212-214, 218, 221222, 234-235, 244-248, 250-251, 257258, 261-262, 267, 269-276, 278, 280, 284-286, 290-291, 293-295, 297, 300, 307, 316, 319, 332, 343, 345-346, 353-354, 360, 369-372, 387,401,403405, 412, 414, 419-423, 427, 435446, 448-456, 463-464, 466-470, 472475,477,479,481-484,486,498,500, 503, 508, 510-514, 518-519

INDEX

Mali, 60 n. Malawi, 60 n. Malaya, 307 Malta, 60 n„ 175 Manchu dynasty, 20 Manchukuo, 18, 20, 22-24, 27, 32, 36-37 All-Manchurian Convention, 20 Declaration of Independence, 19 Northeastern Supreme Administrative Council, 19 "Peace and Order Committee", 19 "Self-Government Guidance Board", 19 Manchuria, 19-20, 22 Marathassa, 358 Markezinis, S., 144 n., 461 n., 463 n. Maronite Church, 503 Maronites, 17, 81 n„ 430, 483, 490-491, 513 Matsch, Franz, 340 Matsis, Kyriakos, 270, 295 n. Mauritania, 60 n. McKinley, William, 25, 34 McLeod, Ian, 511 McNeil, Hector, 46-47 n. Mediterranean, 17, 97, 143, 276 Eastern, 44 n., 64, 74, 103, 131, 221, 428, 455, 469, 515 Melas, George V., 71-72, 221 Melas, Michel C., 107, 155, 159, 170 n., 252 n„ 254, 264, 270-271, 276-278, 283, 287-288, 291 Melville, E., 182 n. Menderes, Adnan, 14, 51, 63, 67, 71, 77, 84, 91, 119, 130, 138 n„ 144, 152, 171, 177, 182, 215-217, 364, 366, 374, 376-381, 385, 388, 390-393, 397, 406,408-409, 413, 418-419, 428, 436, 439, 455, 463, 483, 519 Mexico, 309, 313, 340, 459 Middle East, 66 n„ 145, 150, 168, 200, 216, 228, 298, 305, 385, 467 Command, 40 Oil, 115 Mitsotakis, K., 461 n., 462 n. Molyviatis, P., 177 n. Mongol Princes, 19 Mongolia, People Republic of, 32 Morocco, 60 n. Morozov, Platon, 516 Morrison, Herbert S., 40 n., 46-47 n. Moscow, 433, 467-468, 475 Moscow Conference, 26

549

Mostras, Vassili, 41 n., 43 n., 47 n., 53 n., 221 n. Mukden, 19 Münir, N. N., 486 Murphy, Robert D „ 306, 342 Muslims, 296, 463, 491 Mussolini, Benito, 26 Mytilene, 175 Nanking, 19 Naples, 466 Napoleon, 116 NATO, 10, 45, 48 n., 53, 57, 63, 73, 88, 92, 94, 96, 101, 107, 109, 112, 124, 128-129, 135, 143-144, 146, 148, 154, 156, 158, 162, 166, 179, 189, 191, 195-196, 200, 219, 229-231, 238-241, 247-250, 253, 257, 269-271, 280, 285, 287-289, 293, 303-305, 308, 310, 322, 327, 332, 344, 379, 396, 402, 407, 413, 424-425, 459, 461, 465, 466, 519 Council, 66, 68, 129, 155, 157, 237, 261-266, 278-279, 281-282, 286290, 296, 345, 457, 477 South-East European Command, 77, 128, 169 Navarino, 35 Nazis, 193 Nepal, 331 n. Netherlands, 31, 36, 307 New Granada, 21 New Jersey, 17 New Statesman and Nation, 47 n. New York, 247 New York Times, 284, 297, 300, 307 New Zealand, 306 Nicaragua, 21 Nicosia, 17, 63, 69, 74, 77, 85, 89, 106, 110, 112, 117, 125, 127, 217, 472, 479-480, 484-485, 498, 506-507, 510 Greek Consul in, 93, 108, 116, 118, 143, 294, 426 RAF airfield in, 115 St. Luke's Church in, 127 Turkish Consul-General in, 263, 265266, 274 Turkish Information Office in, 125 U.S. Consulate-General in, 514 U.S. Embassy in, 514 Niger, 60 n. Nigeria, 18, 29, 60 n. Noble, Allan H. P., 300-302, 306, 313, 320-322, 324, 327, 329, 355

550

INDEX

Noel-Baker, Francis, 46 n., 150, 511 Nuri es-Said, 158 Observer, 113 OEEC, 392, 395 örek, Osman, 77, 453, 478 n. Osmanli Turks, 414 Ottoman Empire, 22,27-28,31-33,80,462 Ottoman government, 34-35 Pacific Ocean, 21, 192 Paget, R. T„ 475 Pakistan, 231, 307, 323 Palamas, Christian X., 219, 247, 369, 437 Palestine, 80, 192 Pallikaridis, Evagoras, 135 n. Panama, 20-22, 24, 27, 31, 36-37 Papagos, Alexander, 40 n., 41 n., 43 n., 44 n., 47 n., 63, 73 n., 143,475 Papandreou, George, 107-108, 119, 129, 144, 285 n„ 461 n., 462 n. Paphos, 17, 485 Paraguay, 32 Paris, 247 Treaty of 1856, 27 Treaty of 1898, 24-25 Passalidis, John, 119, 128, 143 Paul I, King, 39 n„ 107, 135, 158, 233, 238, 473 Peake, Sir Charles, 42 n., 43 n., 53 n. PEKA, 454 Peking, 20 n. Peloponnese, 34 Persian Gulf, 66 n. Peru, 306, 308, 331 Pesmazoglou, George, 123, 125 n., 169170, 225-226, 353, 359-367, 372-385, 388-395, 397-399, 402, 406-407 Pesmazoglou, Michael, 108, 114 Philippines, 24 Pipinelis, Panayotis, 125 n. Plato, 135 Piatt Amendment, 25, 28, 409 Poincaré, Raymond, 431 Poland, 31, 193, 516 Politis, Thanassis G., 221 n. Porto Bello, 22 n. Portsmouth, Treaty of, 19 Portugal, 33, 307 Potomac Declaration (1954), 313 Prevelakis, E., 59 n. "Principle of equal rights and selfdetermination", 31

Profumo, John, 477 n. Prussia, 27 Pu-yi, Henry, 20 Pyla, 116 Pyromaglou, K., 461 n. Radcliffe, Lord, 14, 95 n., 464 Constitutional proposals, 48 n., 66, 86, 99, 132, 144, 186 n„ 195 n., 196197, 347-348, 477 "Rapoport Debate", 54 Reich, 26 "Republic of Cuba", 24 Rhodes, 17, 221, 474 Riddleberger, James W., 134-136, 157158, 266, 351-352 "Riding the Storm", 133, 153, 203 Robens, A., 48 n. Robinson, Elfrieda, 268 Romania, 27, 32, 34, 60 n„ 237, 306 Rome, 23, 132, 154, 247 U.S. Embassy in, 460 Ross, A. D. M., 92 n., 105, 113, 182 n. Rossides, Zenon, 437, 448, 477 n„ 480481, 514, 517-518 Rountree, William M., 78, 80, 98, 135 Royal Horseguards, 167 Rundall, Sir Francis, 111 Russia, 22, 27, 34-36 Russians, 193 Russo-Turkish War (1828), 35 Rwanda, 59, 60 n. "Sacred Battalion", 34 Saint-Mleux, André, 252 Samuel, Sir Herbert, 28 Sandys, Duncan, 66 n. San Stefano, Treaty of, 27 Saratoga, battle of, 36 Sarper, Selim, 55, 339, 347 Schumann, Robert, 187 n. Seferiadis, Yorgos, 70-71, 85-86,105-106, 108-109, 113, 182 n. Senegal, 60 n. Serbia, 22, 63 Sergeev, Mikhail, 211, 212 n. Seven Years' War, 36 Seychelles, 45, 48 n., 53 n„ 212, 243 Shepilov, Dimitri T., 212 Sierra Leone, 60 n. Singapore, 60 n., 192 Sino-Japanese treaties, 20 Sixth Fleet, 168

INDEX Skeferis, Pericles, 237 n., 252 n. Slavic expansion, 22 "Slavocommunism", 214 Slavs, 239 Smyrna, 207; see also Izmir Soames, Christopher, 357 Sobolev, Arkady, 305 Solea, 358 Somalia, 59, 60 n. South Africa, Union of, 33, 331 South Manchurian Railroad, 19, 22 n. South Tyrol, question of, 518 Soviet bloc, 31, 143, 229, 296 n. Soviet-Greek trade agreement, 212 Spaak, Paul-Henri, 66-67, 69, 107, 136, 154-155, 157, 170 n., 176, 179, 199201, 203, 217, 219, 237, 242-243, 250-256, 258-265, 270-274, 277, 281283, 285, 289, 291-292, 344 Spain, 24-25, 32, 36, 306 Spaniards, 23 Spanish authorities, 34 Spanish-American war, 21 Sparta, 198 St. Petersburg Protocol (1826), 35 Stalin, Josef V., 49, 211 Stefanopoulos, S., 461 n., 462 n., 463 n. Stimson Doctrine, 18 Strasbourg, 187 n. Sudan, 151, 306 Sudetenland, Germans in, 33 Suez, 21, 65, 228, 232, 298 Sulzberger, Cyrus L., 284 Sunday Express, 84 Sunday Times, 84, 346 Switzerland, 233, 402, 408 Sykes-Picot agreement, 64 n. Syria, 17, 28, 60 n., 87, 91, 168 Syrian-Turkish crisis (1957), 168, 232 Taiwan, 18 Taksim, 77,110,126-127; see also Cyprus, partition Tanganyika, 60 n. Tehran, 406 Teller Amendment, 24 Tenedos (Boczaada), 175 Theoklitos, Archbishop of Athens, 473 Thrace, 230 Turkish minority in, 44 n., 87, 93, 414 Thucydides, 198 Tientsin, 20 n. Times (London), 106, 114, 137, 149, 172,

551

268, 290, 346 Times of Cyprus, 489 Tito, Josip Broz, 170 n. T M T , 51, 111, 148, 166, 172 Togo, 60 n. Togoland, 18 British, 29, 37 French, 29 Tornaritis, Criton, 485 Transjordan, Amirate of, 28 Trieste, 31 Trinidad and Tobago, 60 n. Triple Alliance, 22 Trojan Horse, 215 Truman, Harry S., 50 "Truman Doctrine", 73 Tsatsos, Constantine, 234 n., 237, 252 n., 256, 260, 270, 275, 500 Tsatsos, Themistocles, 486-489, 492-494, 496-498, 500-502, 507 Tsirimokos, E., 462 n., 463 n. Tunisia, 516 Tunhua, 19 Turkey, 10, 18, 26, 42, 44, 66, 73, 76, 82, 88,92,94,98,100-102,107,124,126, 129, 131, 133, 136, 138-140, 143148, 154, 159, 169-171, 174, 176-178, 181-182, 186, 189-190, 192, 195-196, 198,200,208,211,214,219,221,225226, 228, 230-231, 236-237, 245-246, 255, 257, 259, 261-262, 276-277, 279-284, 287-289, 293, 302, 308-309, 314-315, 320-322, 328, 331-332, 342, 344, 346, 349, 351-353, 357, 361, 366, 368, 372, 376-377, 381, 384388, 394-395, 398, 400-401, 405-407, 410,418-419, 431-435,438, 440, 442, 445-446, 453, 455, 458-461, 464-466, 481, 487, 489, 507, 511, 513, 516-517 Government, 12, 26, 48, 51-52, 55, 58, 65-66, 77, 89, 106, 109, 112, 114, 127, 131, 134, 137-138, 148-149, 151-152, 169, 171-172, 178, 182, 199, 205, 207, 210, 215-218, 225226, 235, 251, 257, 261-265, 277, 279, 282, 284, 287, 289, 296, 311, 320, 342, 349, 350, 352, 359, 361, 373, 377-379, 382, 390, 393, 396, 401, 413, 421, 427-429, 435, 440, 443, 450, 463, 473, 476, 478-480, 483-484, 479, 508 Grand National Assembly, 67, 137, 225, 352, 391, 465, 476

552

INDEX

Republican People's Party, 389 Turkish Delegation to UNGA, 296, 299, 322, 338-339, 344, 427 Turkish Cypriots, 10, 14, 17, 51, 76-77, 80,85, 89,94,103,110-111,113,115, 120, 123, 125-130, 140, 143, 149, 151, 160-161, 163-167, 171-173, 180, 195, 197, 205, 245, 263, 267, 302, 309, 316, 345, 357, 361-366, 370, 372-373, 384, 386, 393, 397-398, 402-405, 407, 414, 420, 431, 433, 442-444, 446-447, 462, 466, 484-485, 488-490, 492, 503; see also Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot community and Turkish minority in Ubangi-Shari, 29 Uganda, 60 n. Ukrainian S.S.R., 306 UNFICYP, 57 "Union of Central African Republics", 30 United Arab Republic, 17, 60 n., 124, 129, 143, 169-170, 306 United Nations, 10, 17, 30, 37, 39 n., 40, 42, 59-60, 63-64, 73, 122, 126, 146, 162, 168, 174, 211, 214, 223225, 227-231, 233, 235, 242, 256, 258, 276, 280, 282, 285-286, 294, 297, 313, 315, 328, 353, 359, 379, 396, 511, 514, 516-517, 519 Charter, 29, 73, 140, 234-235, 299, 304-305, 312, 327, 341, 409, 514, 518 Declaration on Non-Self-Governing Territories, 29, 31, 234 n General Assembly, 9, 13, 46, 48, 50, 74-75, 129, 166, 219, 230, 234, 236-237, 244, 290, 315, 332-333, 369, 459, 465, 477, 514 General Committee, 236 Political Committee, 65, 145, 234, 293, 297-323, 333, 337 Resolution 814 (IX), 64 Resolution 1013 (XI), 64-65, 145, 147, 234, 285, 297, 305, 307309, 314, 332, 341, 477 Resolution 1287 (XIII), 55, 341-342, 354, 515 Resolution 1514 (XV), 29 Security Council, 50, 127, 129, 143, 162, 519 Trusteeship Council, 29

Trusteeship system, 29, 31, 237 UNOGIL, 169 United States, 21,24-25, 31-34, 36, 39 n„ 66, 71, 73, 76, 91, 98, 122, 124, 135, 156, 163, 168, 211, 221, 244, 275 n., 277, 289, 297, 304, 325, 332, 359, 378, 459, 515 Congress, 21, 24 Declaration of Independence, 36, 185 Government, 52, 134, 243, 277, 283284, 292, 342, 464-465 Department of State, 81, 91, 221, 266, 297, 339, 342, 460 USIA, 212 n. U.S.-Greek Agreement of October 12, 1953, 211 U.S. Marines, 168-169 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 60 Uruguay, 23-24, 27, 30, 33 Uruguayans, 34 USSR (Soviet Union), 20 n., 31, 49, 88, 162, 191, 212, 214, 229, 296-297, 341, 365, 470, 516 Upper Volta, 60 n. Vafiadis, Markos, 50 Varosha, 117, 267 Vatan, 389 Venetians, 80 Venezuela, 21, 306, 330 Venizelos, Eleftherios, 53 n., 344, 379, 419, 434, 455 Venizelos, Sophocles, 39 n., 108, 119, 461 n., 463 n„ 464-465 Vergennes, Comte de, 36 Vergin, Nureddin, 125 n., 169-170, 352353, 359, 368, 380, 394, 399-400 Versailles, Treaty of, 27, 31 Vienna, 23 Vietnam, 18, 33 Vlachos, Angelos, 110, 401, 421-422 "Voice of Truth", 212 n., 516 n. Volkan, 51, 111 n. Wadsworth, James J., 75 n. Wall, Patrick, 110 Warren, Fletcher, 389 Washington, 71, 126 West, 230, 232, 239 Western bloc (world), 101, 244, 468 Western Samoa, 29, 31 White Book (Greek), 291

INDEX Whitehall, 114 White Paper (British), 290-291 World War I, 28, 31-32 World War II, 18, 29, 31-32, 74, 88, 183, 185, 519 Yalman, Ahmet Emin, 389 n. Yassiada trials, 51 Young Turks, 33 Yugoslavia, 43 n„ 50, 60 n„ 97, 170,230, 237, 239, 306 Zanzibar, 60 n. Zeno of Kition, 517 Zorbas, N., 461 n. Zorlu, Fatin Rü$tü, 51-52, 54, 67-68, 77, 91, 109, 111, 119, 121, 126, 137, 150, 169-171, 182, 215-216, 225-226, 262, 276, 279, 288, 296, 298, 302, 306, 313-318, 321, 326-331, 337-339, 342-

553

343, 345-347, 349-350, 352-353, 355, 359-368, 372, 374-376, 380-384, 387391, 395, 397-398, 406-409,413, 419, 427-429, 431-433, 445-449, 452-453, 455, 458-459, 476, 484, 497, 504, 509 Zürich, 407 Agreements, 11, 33, 45, 53, 56, 408, 420-423, 425-430, 432-435, 437, 441-444, 448-449, 455, 457, 460461, 464-467, 470, 472-474, 477, 479-500, 508, 511, 517 Basic Structure, 26, 56, 58, 408, 412418, 441, 448-449, 458, 462, 477, 481, 484, 486, 488-489, 491, 493498, 500-506, 509-510 Conference, 10, 48, 52, 342, 388, 407409, 412, 419-420, 475-479, 499, 507 "Gentlemen's Agreement", 408, 413, 418, 519