Culture And Technology In Modern Japan 9780755619795, 9781860643255, 9780755632558

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Preface Ian Inkster

The intention of this volume of essays is to offer a variety of critical approaches to the analysis of the relations between 'culture' and 'technology' in the historical economic success of Japan. At a time when most commentators stress the shakiness of the East Asian economic miracle, when doubts are expressed as to the long-term viability of non-European institutions and practices in underpinning rampant capitalism, some exploration of Japanese history as exemplar could be of special interest. Did Japanese exploitation of Western technologies depend on specific institutions of government, and were such institutions forged from unique cultural materials? Does the present commercial malaise in the East represent some failure of such institutions, this in turn reflecting a new disintegration of traditional cultural mores and understandings? To what extent may the competitive private enterprise cultures of Japan be explained as direct outcomes of unique national characteristics, to what degree were they the natural products of very late development? Did the catching-up process lead inevitably to the loss of an earlier competitive edge based on not only low wages and aggressive industrial policies, but on behaviour patterns and institutions which were bound to be eroded by wealth, consumerism, tourism and global cultural intrusions? From differing disciplines and perspectives, the editors and essayists of the present collection find such questions very interesting indeed. Questioning the historical process in this way brings to light relations between the economic and the cultural. Again, the form taken by specific institutions which appear to have facilitated industrial modernisation, institutions such as the infamous Three Treasures (lifetime employment, enterprise

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN unions, and age seniority), might be examined in terms of endogenous cultural imperatives or through the pressures exerted by exogenous forces, from the Western technologies in Meiji industrialisation to the 'American' reforms of the allied Occupation of 1945-52. In using this range of questions to interrogate such historical episodes, the essays of the present volume approach issues which are at times highly problematic, diffuse and contentious. For instance, we might identify quite acutely the different technological and commercial features of Japanese and American industrial capitalism. We might as clearly show the saliency of such differences in explaining contrasting private enterprise activities between the two systems, as is done in the essays of Adams et al, Gill and Iinuma in the present book. For instance, a tactic of Gill's approach is to mark specific cultural differences between Japan and the West, and then to utilise these in a very complex series of cumulative claims in order to interpret differences in style of communication and thus in the modes of operating modern communication technologies and systems. But then the debate sets in. Is private company behaviour some direct outcome of company 'culture' or of company 'structure', and how do these two concepts, (which are rightly contained within scare quotation marks), relate to each other? Adams et al, Iinuma, and Inkster take up issues concerning the linkages between company behaviour and company culture, but this does not solve the emerging problematic of the character of the feasible causal relationship between company culture and Japanese 'national' culture. Does the one flow from the other osmotically. If not, then where are the sites and agencies that really matter? This directly raises the issue of the role and limits of the public sector, and the manner in which the activities of that sector have determined technological and industrial performance in the private sector. Again, we may certainly be brave or brash enough to compare the national cultures of, say, the USA (or, even more abstractly, the 'West') and Japan, and essays by Baba, Satofuka, Inkster, Gill and Kawada do so, but even to isolate such differences convincingly is not in itself sufficient to yield clear arguments about causation. National cultures differ, but do they determine different 'company cultures' across nations? If so, does this explain the observed variations in entrepreneurial and technological outcomes? Is it thus possible to answer the big question: Why has Japan succeeded? May the exploration of queries concerning the past have viii

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN much impact on problems of the present and future? The postmodernist collective wisdom is an answer in the negative. But there are always qualifications. Several writers in this volume raise the question of Japanese creativity If past industrialisation has ridden on the back of Western technique, how will Japan fare in the future, when the lag between its best core techniques and those of Europe and the USA has not only been reduced but, possibly, reversed? As we demonstrate here, on many measures Japan has already superseded other industrial nations, especially in such areas as electronics and communications, and including the generation of new core technologies. But we also stress, particularly in the essays by Inkster and Iinuma, that technological borrowing was never the passive option. Successful catching-up involves a myriad of creative processes, going beyond adjustment and incremental improvement to profound changes of cognition and the invention of entirely new institutions and agencies of change. Catching-up over quite a lengthy period has involved setbacks and learning processes, and these may well have induced a flexibility which will stand Japan in good stead. Several claims and issues of this type were voiced in the presentations and discussions at the session on 'Technology as Culture in Japan' at the conference of the Society for the Social Study of Science in Bielefeld in 1996. The editors would like to thank Wolfgang Krohn and other conference organisers in encouraging such investigations, as well as all participants at that session. Following the 4S meeting, Inkster and Satofuka considered that a published collection would be of use, and arranged for further contributors in order to focus more fully on the major themes. It is hoped that the eight essays of the present volume are of interest to a range of people concerned with the industrialisation process and its relationship to cultural attributes and institutional change.

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Notes on Contributors

Ian Inkster Is Research Professor of International History at the Nottingham Trent University, UK, and Visiting Professor of European History at Nanhua University, Taiwan, and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. Recent publications include Scientific Culture and Urbanisation in Industrialising Britain (1997); Technology and Industrialisation (1998); with Maureen Bryson Industrial Man: The Life and Works of Charles Sylvester (1999); Historical and Cultural Dynamics of Japanese Industrialisation (2000); and edited et al The Golden Age (2000). He is on the editorial boards of Social Studies of Science (UK), Prometheus (UK), History of Technology (UK), East Asia (USA), Science, Technology and Society (France and India), and is co-editor of Asian Journal of International Studies, (Taiwan and UK). Fumlhiko Satofuka Professor of Sociology of Technology, Faculty of Art and Design, Musashino Women's University, Japan and also Visiting Professor of Gothenburg University, Sweden since 1995 and Honorable Research Fellow, University of Wales and Open University, UK since 1998. Has undertaken interdiciplinary researches on technology and culture in Sweden, UK and Japan. He is a member of the Editorial Board of international journals such as AI and Society, ICON* and Science Studies and published many books on science, technology and society. Richard € Adams, Don E Kash and Robert W Ry croft Are all members of the Institute of Public Policy, George Mason University, USA, where Don Kash holds the Hazel Chair in Public Policy. Kash and Rycroft have collaborated for some time in a series of papers concerning complex technologies and technological innovation published in journals such as Research Policy, Science and Public Policy, and R&D Management. Masataka Baba Professor of History of Technology, Faculty of Commerce, Chuo University, Japan has carried out comparative studies through field work on traditional technology in Japan, Thailand and

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN elsewhere. He is a member of the Executive Board of the Japan Society for Science Policy and Research Management, and has published many books on technology and culture. Satinder P GUI Completed her doctoral thesis at the University of Cambridge in 1995 under the title Dialogue and Tacit knowledge for Knowledge Transfer. She is continuing her work on information transfer with frequent research trips in Japan and in recent collaboration with H. Nojima. Kazumasa Iinuma Independent journalist, member of Japan National Press Club, is the author of From Imitation to Creation in 1968 (Moho kara Sozo e) Japan's Tech - (Nihon Gijutsu, Sozo e no Sosiki o Motomete 1983) Creativity of Japanese Scientists in the Meiji Period (Nihon-jin no Sozosei), Can Japan's Science and Technology Attain to the Age of Creation in the 21st Century (Warera, Sozo no Seiki e 1994) and several other books. Junzo Kawada Professor of Cultural Anthropology, Faculty of International Studies, Hiroshima City University, PhD in ethnology at University of Paris 5 (Sorbonne), has carried out field researches on traditional technology in France, West Africa and Japan. He is a member of the Executive Board of Japan Society for International Development and was a chief editor of seven volumes of Development and Culture published by Iwanami-shoten, Tokyo, in 1997-8.

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Culture and Technology in Japan Ian Inkster

Japanese industrial modernisation seems to have been based on a workable mixture of flexibility, emulation, adaptation and control. The achievement is literally magnificent, beyond the pale of the West and forerunner of things yet to come in Asia and elsewhere. Japanese economic development has disturbed if not destroyed the predominant historical patterns as envisaged by the Western historians of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For twenty years the American students of Paul Samuelson's stupendously famous Economics textbook have been confronted with the fact that since 1880, and in contrast to all major nations, the growth trend of Japanese real per capita national product has been consistently upwards, warped by the exceptional downturns of war, but marked also by the clear accelerations of the 1960s and 1970s.1 By 1988 Japan's level of per capita income was above that of all major industrial nations and surpassed only by the income of the much smaller nations of Sweden and Switzerland.2 All historical commentators acknowledge the role played in Japan's success by foreign, advanced techniques, particularly in such important breakthrough periods of industrial growth as the Meiji era (1868-1912), the 1930s and the 1960s and 1970s. In such years, startlingly unusual growth performances worked against most expectations, and were closely associated with transfers-in of the ideas and artefacts of other nations. Such simple identities have given rise to the first sort of 'cultural' query: What were the special features of Japanese culture which either allowed or induced the successful transfer of advanced ideas, techniques and institutions into the nation? The 'education' of a relatively few outstanding individuals surely provides no real answer. This was, after all, a nation of over 30

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN million souls well prior to the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry's American fleet in July of 1853. But there is a second question. Japan has never been merely mimetic, the faultless copycat. Even prior to 1914, 'creative' discoveries and inventions originating in Japanese research and enquiry certainly included those of the bacteriologist Kitasato Shibasaburo (1853-1931) (the pure culture of tetanus bacillus) and the applied chemist Takamine Jokichi (1854-1922) (takadiastase and adrenaline), as well as the work of Nagai Nagayoshi (1885, ephedrine), Tagaki Teiji (1903, rational imaginary numbers), Tawara Ryojun (tetrodotoxin, 1909) and Noguchi Hideyo (1911, spirochete culture). If anything, from the First World War there was an acceleration in Japan's creative capabilities. If measured in specific achievements recognised elsewhere as influential intellectually or in the evolution of generic technologies, then these would have to include Honda Kotaro (1917, KS Steel), Torigata Uichi (1917, duplex telephony), Oguma Kan (1922, chromosomes), Okabe Kinjiro (1928, magnetron), Mishima Tokushichi (MK Steel), Yukawa Hideki (1935, meson theory, for which Yukawa (1907-81) was awarded the Nobel Prize in physics), Nozoe Tetsuo (1945, tropolone) and Watanabe Yasushii et al (1957, lazer technologies). Nevertheless, within Japan itself there remains a heavy weight of opinion which believes that emulation has been incompatible with 'real' creativity Such Japanese sceptics point to the fact that of some 450 Nobel Prizes awarded for natural sciences and medicine in this century, over 180 went to US citizens, only five to Japanese scientists. In this arena the two capitalist giants do not seem to compete on the same level playing field. The game of emulation does not fit Japan to compete in the game of paradigm shifting. The culture of transfer and adaptation has not been a culture of creativity. Nor has this theme been confined to intellectuals. Continued technology transfer has its high commercial and strategic costs. In that same year of 1988 when the nation's income level had surpassed that of most of its industrial competitors, Japan was yet paying out some US$ 2,263 million in payments to other nations for high technologies. In contrast, the USA was in pleasant receipt of over US$ 35,000 million in payment for its high technology exports and services and in licences, royalties and fees derived from nations such as Japan.3 A view influenced by such relationships might point to earlier Japanese creativity as something of an aberration, and emphasise the predominance of 'improvement' manufacturing tech-

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN nologies in Japan's truly unexpected economic achievements since circa 1970. So, in place of earlier creations we might list the Japanese improvement technologies of the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in such products as the electronic desk top calculator (1964) the quartz wrist watch (1969) the home VTR (1965), carbon filter products (1973), saticon (1973), the auto focusing camera (1977) NMR-CT (1982) and the recent liquid crystal displays. So, despite what appears as indisputable evidence of Japanese innovative capacity there still seems to be room for a second 'cultural' query: Does Japanese 'culture' somehow inhibit the growth of both scientific and technological creativity as defined in the 'West' and as associated with such Western institutions as free enterprise, the research laboratory and the competitive, academic intellectual endeavour of higher education, professional associations and research institutions? The wary reader will have noted the further utilisation of 'scare quotes' as either marked in the text so far or as implied. Whose definition of 'creativity'? Which facet of 'culture'? What measures of 'success'? The contributors to the present volume address aspects of both these 'cultural' questions and the feasible interplay between them. At what point and through which mechanisms is the nation's ^culture' distilled and institutionalised within a particular set of agencies eg., private enterprise? In the Japanese case, is the culture of enterprise equivalent to at least some representative portion of 'Japanese' culture? Or should all the queries above be rephrased to reflect the products of cultural manipulation or cultural engineering? That is, does the key to Japanese industrial modernisation, and, in particular, the ability of Japan supremely above all other nations to select, adapt and adopt and redefine the techniques of others, lie more in the power and agency of a relative few as against the culture of the many? Approaches to Culture There are historians and social scientists who would explain Japan's historical success in absorbing Western technologies in terms of markets, factor endowments and rates of investment. Yet market institutions are not the only institutions of economic development. Nor is the profit motive of the competitive individual the only spring of effective action.4 For such reasons, most economic historians do allow for and sometimes stress the unusual features of site and agency met with in any substantial

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN accounts of Japanese industrialisation.5 Other writers focus entirely on non-economic forces behind industrialisation, documenting the impacts of social disenchantment, alienation or loss of respect amongst key and powerful groups or classes.6 We may generalise by suggesting that most of the writers who stress the cultural aspects of Japanese industrialisation fall into one of two major schools of thought. The first of these evaluates Japan as a great exemplar of economic development and seeks to isolate specific traits which were and are functionally equivalent to cultural traits found in the West. Analyses in this globalist perspective seek to drive Japan away from China and towards Europe. Thus, for Jacobs or Braudel Japanese bureaucracy worked in contrast to that of the Chinese and served as a vehicle of transformation based on particular cultural traits.7 For others, social mobility and a spirit of individualism were ingrained within early modern Japan, whilst traits in Japanese neo-Confucianism may have acted on commercial behaviour in a way at least analogous to the 'Protestant Ethic' in the West.8 This approach to culture permits generalisations to be drawn from the Japanese case just as at the same time it shifts Japanese experience towards that of Europe. The second approach to Japanese culture stresses its uniqueness, the incommensurability of its traits or elements with those of the West. In this view there was little correspondence between Japanese culture and Western culture, Japan survived through protecting key cultural traits from Western influence, and Japanese industrial history cannot ever be a model for development elsewhere. To an extent embodying the formulae of the earlier Joi intellectuals, this approach is best epitomised today in the perspective of the Nihonjinron school. That such dualities still exert strong influence amongst modern Japanese intellectuals is well shown in the essay by Kawada, which concludes the present volume. A postulate of the approach in this volume is that we only arrive at either of these two extremes if the analysis focuses entirely upon culture as the sole and sufficient explicans of our explicandum of industrialisation. Once we allow for a plurality of explanations, a world of interacting explicantia, then it might be possible to generate some more useful, middle-range interpretations of Japanese industrial development. Causal Accounting: Culture, Society and Institutions. That great Meiji slogan wakon yosai, approximately meaning

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN 'Japanese spirit and Western means', conjures up a powerful combination and a neat explanation. But it might be remembered that such a slogan was a construction of the new industrialising elite, not an unproblematic portion of the fabric of Japanese society and industrialisation. As Ezra Vogel emphasised: The effort was to try to preserve the Japanese tradition even while bringing in Western means. The slogan developed from an effort to cope with the tremendous anxieties generated by the opening of Japan, the fear that the life people then knew, their work, their family, their community, their personal relations, much of what they most valued would be destroyed. The slogan was conservative in the sense that it aimed to preserve the essence of the tradition, even while it acknowledged the need for change.9 Similarly, another influential generalist, Peter Berger, has agreed with the convention that certain components of Western culture were 'necessary' for the emergence of industrial modernity in Europe, and that these have been fostered in 'specific elements of East Asian civilization'. This has handed that region a 'comparative advantage' in the recent playing of the modernisation game. Although the term 'fostered' leaves something to be surmised, these claims do yield a coherent causal accounting, and a form of argument which neatly aligns Japanese experience with that of the West. On the other hand, there are qualifications or embellishments. Thus Vogel is quick to admit a causal feedback system into history, seemingly dependent upon time, the global imperatives of advanced techniques, and the flexibility of Japanese cultural modes. Thus, as he continues in his placement of the wakon yosai slogan. In a certain sense the slogan, as appealing as it was, was doomed to failure for the new science and technology required a far more fundamental transformation of thought and in the patterns of organization than had originally been considered necessary. Even the most foresighted people had little idea of the precise nature of changes that would eventually be required. The general thesis here seems to be that, at times of crisis (and 5

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN in particular, during crises instigated by external events), the role of Japanese culture was to optimise the efficiency of elitest cultural engineering. In periods of slower, organic absorption of change, the role of culture was to adjust in order to allow the fuller intrusion or proper diffusion of modernising artefacts and agencies. Berger also embellishes his initial starkness.10 So, 'cultural' factors were necessary but not sufficient. For example, 'economic opportunities and policies, political structures, educational strategies have obviously played a decisive role as well', this introducing new terms and complications. Are all equally decisive, and are they unrelated? There is much here to do with the power and intentions of a few, rather than the culture of the many. Does causal accounting, from specific cultural attributes to successful industrialisation, always demand an argument about cultural engineering and the sources of social power of the elite agents of change? In the archetypal British case, Karl Polanyi has argued strongly enough that the prevailing ideas of individualism and liberalism, closely associated with original innovation and competitive commercial risk-taking activities, were in fact vital elements of a manufactured ideology, rather than an organic cultural cause or requisite of industrialisation. The British state and elite fabricated ideology in order to foster an English-style enterprise culture, identified in the features of individualism, the concentration on output and profit, the belief in the system logic (eg Adam Smiths 'invisible hand') of individual desires, actions and pursuits.11 For such an argument to hold, subsidiary arguments about motivation and power are once more required, and these have been attempted in the host of social histories of industrialising Britain which have been published since Polanyi's book of 1944. In the case of industrialising Japan, somewhat simpler approaches have been brought to bear on the problem of causal accounting. A dominant but often unrevealed perspective seems to have been inspired by John Calvin's warning that abundance might be a prickly thing. It is often suggested that Japan succeeded just because it had little in the way of natural resources, of land, minerals and botanical lushness, and that this in itself meant that Japan must maximise the potential of its resources of labour and skill. In turn the fulfilment of this latter requirement, necessitated a focus on cultural engineering, whilst a lack of other resources and a state of emergency legitimised the social power of the industrialising elites. However, with all of its

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN key functional terms in place, this sort of account does read as the historians wanting to keep their cake after eating it. Surely in most cases, abundance does breed abundance, poverty is insidious. It is quite feasible that the exigencies of resource scarcity and external threat combined to allow more latitude to the activities of the agents of industrial and technological change once they had established a cultural legitimacy in 1603, or 1868, or 1952. Without a coherent approach to the origins of such legitimacy and details of their subsequent manouvers it is perhaps improper to merely insinuate 'culture' as the necessary and sufficient ingredient which completed the recipe for success. The same is true for other approaches involving resources and the natural setting. Cultural geographers have focussed on the protected alluvial plains of Japan as rich settings for cultural cohesion, communication and nationalism. The well-populated alluvial plains encouraged cooperation, in contrast to the rivalry of the tribesmen on vast steppe areas: thus Britain and Japan on one hand, Russia and China on the other. The long-term response in the former cases is intensification of farming techniques and an increased efficiency in the exploitation of limited resources. Furthermore, and nicely completing the Japan model, 'there is a tendency toward strengthening dependence upon government authority and a quickening of national feeling.'12 A most interesting variant on this approach is to argue that it is possible to have too great an abundance of cultural resources. Thus in Oswald Spengler's theory of the 'moonlight civilization' China becomes a cultural solar centre, replete with generic mores and understandings which dominated a civilization far beyond its accepted borders, whilst Japan became the island variant, providing colour and a reworking of alien cultural infusions. Such a satellite nation is full of mutant 'ingenious devices' rather than a core creativity, receiving and manipulating cultural forms whilst eschewing their essence.13 The great load of original cultural achievements weighed on China. Peripheral status generated Japanese cultural flexibilities. This is a most attractive perspective, allowing the development of an argument which contains much history, avoids obvious cultural determinism, permits cultural relativism and learning processes, and combines with other perspectives on the cultural origins of Japanese success. Thus, in the perplexingly neglected comparative approach of I. Robert Sinai, Spengler's relationships sit nicely with the notions of cultural engineering, partial absorption, adaptation and response to resource limitations

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN which have been variously met with in the above account. So, in taking the story sweepingly back to the eighth century in the Christian calendar, Sinai generalises on how the vibrant T'ang culture generated Japanese response: Stirred by a spirit of enthusiasm and zeal, they were or so it seemed - as ready to adopt wholesale a whole foreign civilization as they were to submit themselves to all its intoxicating influences. Under the overwhelming impression of this brilliant model, the Japanese imported the Buddhist religion from China, its conceptions of empire and centralized administration, its writing system, literary forms, music, and dress, its arts and crafts, gardens and architecture. But what is peculiar and surprising about this whole amazing episode of cultural transplantation is that the Japanese handled Chinese forms and ideas, at this early stage, in the same way as they were to handle the influx of Western forms and ideas later on. Their apparently wholehearted adoption of Chinese civilization did not change their essential Japanese character... nor did their ready adaptation to Chinese ways in any sense destroy their own insular and complex personality... Japan never really soaked up the Chinese spirit but only put it on like a garment. It could exist within the Chinese pattern, develop much that looked Chinese, and yet remain inwardly untouched.14 Clearly, such a statement may be readily problematised, but the overall claim seems to throw light on many aspects of Japanese history. There is a difference between imitation and exploitation, the latter involving an astuteness of observation, outward expression, practicalities. Imitation and exploitation may be easily confused. As an example, the astonishing growth of the Japanese fishing industry from insignificance to first place in the world by 1937, was invariably explained as a result of simple Japanese imitation of Western, especially British, steam trawling technologies. In extreme contrast, the paintings and sculptor of Japan took Chinese and Korean forms, but by the turn of the eighth century the frescoes depicting the scenes from the life of Buddha in the Horyugi Temple at Nara, the vivid linear movements and the intricate patterning is wholly Japanese, even though formally modelled on the Chinese wall paintings of the T'ang period. Similarly, in the middle of the present century, a

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN most common view of Japan - including that of many Japanese themselves - was that of the Land of Contrasts: Western dress set against flowing robes, automobiles alongside rickshaws (themselves perhaps more Chinese than Japanese), concrete structures aside bamboo dwellings. Thus those Western observers of the nineteenth century who claimed that the Japanese were lacking in 'metaphysical, psychological and ethical controversy of all kinds', were 'inclined to be satisfied with a ready-made knowledge', but who acknowledged their place in the global scheme of things because 'their genius leads them in the direction of accurate, detailed investigation.'15 With its T'ang centralism, bureaucratic feudalism and absence of European-style 'enlightened despotism', the long Tokugawa shogunate may certainly be viewed in terms of cultural admixtures and disjunctions. The Tokugawa instruments of cultural suasion, such as sankin kotai, isolationism, revivals of Confucianism and so on, may be interpreted as part of the institutionalised response to the intrusions of the outside world. This was to be repeated in different form during the early Meiji industrial drive - the commutation of samurai stipends, the award of property rights in land, establishment of a people's army, compulsory primary education, all predicated on the Imperial proclamation of 1868 which demanded the discarding of 'absurd customs of former times', and associated with the experimental utilisation of French scepticism, German metaphysics and Russian nihilism. Cultural epiphenomenality is difficult to measure, but can be intuitively captured. Thus a composition of 1878, 'The Civilization Ball Song', invited Japanese children to recite the ten objects of Western culture while bouncing a ball to the emphatic beat of the repeated listings: gas lamps steam engines lightning conductors newspapers letter post

horse carriages cameras telegrams schools steam boats.16

Once more, the speedy introduction of exogenous artefacts required the invention of the past. Shintoism was revamped, the emperor system again installed, the Imperial Rescript of 1890 emphasised native customs, ancestor worship, filial piety, loyalty and duty, essential elements in what Sinai refers to as a 'deliberate resuscitation of various aspects of traditionalism, to protect the society from an indiscriminate xenophilia'.17

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN Whether we define the outcome of all this as imitative or more innovatively exploitative, at the back of such judgements stands the labelling of Japan as unique, as possessing mores and traits allowing for adaptive adoption, an absorption of the new without great stress or disorder or profound influence. In the Absence of Individuals: The Masuda Foundation Model The 'strong cultural argument' posits that the contrasts between Japan's culture and that of China determined the latter's failure and the former's success. It reflexively posits that the cultural contrast between Japan and Europe meant that Japan's pattern of industrialisation was markedly other than that of the West. There have been many approaches to Japan's cultural distinctiveness, but one of the most recent and important is that of the Masuda Foundation, which summarises a strong line of Japanese thinking in its principal claim that Japanese culture defines the individual entirely in terms of others. In Japan, human interactions 'are considered to have intrinsic value and are not maintained or abandoned according to an individual judgement as to whether they represent a functional plus or minus'.18 Furthermore, this seeming contrast arises because in Japan the basic unit of the social system is not the individual but the contextual or the relatum, a unit which lies at the nexus between what in Western terms might be thought of as the individual and her network relations. In the Masuda vocabulary: The contextual finds the basis of its own existence not within itself but in the relationship between ego and others. It is what may be called a social molecule, and interactions between ego and others are developed within the life space to which they both belong. In the case of the individual, interactions between ego and others take place outside the individual life spaces which they each possess, and the relationship itself is seen as goods or means to an end, which may be used for strategic maneuvering. Thus, major organisational features of Japanese private enterprise, such as quality control circles, kanban or the ringi system (see the next section), 'come from the circumstance that contextuals such as these support organizations.' So, in opposition to outsiders who view Japan's organizations as coercive, demanding sacrifices of the individual, in fact Japanesestyle 'corporativism' induces people who work together, 10

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN to go beyond their own duties and cooperate so as to secure appropriate benefits for themselves through the efficient achievement of the goals of the organization. Put another way, cooperation with other group members and spontaneous group participation are believed to be in people's own long-term interests through furthering the activities of the organization. It is because they put themselves first that they are so ready to cooperate with others... It is clear that the members of an organization in this case exist not as an individuum, ie. individuals, but as relatum ie. contextuals. The implications of this for any study of Japanese private enterprise and industrial organisation are obvious enough, and will be placed in context in the next section. Clearly, the approach aligns with other theories of groupism, even though it postulates its own specific and unique underlying origin. Thus the group-as-basic-unit is often called up to emphasise harmonious followership through the notion of atnae, where a person in a lower social position seeks emotional satisfaction by dependency on his/her social superior. In the work of Doi Takeo and others, the group once translated as a formal institution, is then characterised by marugakae (total embracement), this perhaps explaining the possibility that in Japan, more than in other places, leaders may change systems at will. Here we might ask how the Masuda model fits into the existing causal accounting which links culture to industrial success. Most importantly, the Masuda position does not privilege 'Culture' as an interpretive device, but seems to rest on an analogue with certain natural systems whose functionalstructural components are equivalents of those found in Japan. Indeed, at points the Masuda conception is strikingly close to that of Sinai and others. For instance, Japanese development may not be interpreted with reference to long periods of 'inconspicuous transitions'. Rather, 'Japanese society has responded to the international environment of the day, introducing what was needed as civilization, creating overlapping, multi-layered cultural and social structures in the same way that we put on layers of clothing according to the weather and our physical condition.' Indeed, Masuda emphasises response to outside threats or pressures and the cultural engineering activity of elite agency. 11

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN In such cases, 'invented tradition' is the device used to synchronize the 'endogenous evolution' of ordinary people and the 'exogenous revolution' carried out by key persons. The mechanism that operates here is one of selection - invention/rediscovery - integration. Tradition is not simply the repetition of ancestral patterns, but is created as necessary. Here attention is on 'the politics of interpretation' among the actor subjects involved. In this sense, invented tradition is 'negotiated tradition'. In general, invented tradition is a social device for the simultaneous accomplishment of the demands of maintaining consistency within the social system and adapting to the environment. It is the basic natural system of relatum/contexual which has forged the characteristic building blocks of Japanese culture, the household or le, village or mura, the party or to and the 'band in revolt' or ikki, organisations designated as 'network-type social systems' in the Masuda model. In turn these have spawned industry associations, prefectural organisations, private enterprise cultures and all those institutions which have 'individual contextuals as their constituent members.' Principal characteristics of such network systems are their high degree of 'respondency' or speed of change in response to changed external environs, combined with their relative stability - Japanese historians point to the long regimes of Kamakura (1185-1333), Muromachi (1392-1467) and Tokugawa,(l6031867), or to the political ease of system transformation eg., the relinquishing of effective power during the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the movement from defeat and depression at the beginning of the 1950s to renewed industrial progress, the present shift from cronyism and party dictate to cabinet-based ministerial responsibility in national politics.19 This useful developmental combination has, in the Masuda model, been secured at the expense of system accuracy - thus the departures from Korean or Chinese cultural forms. Enterprise Culture A principal intention of the Masuda model is to throw light on the nature of Japanese business enterprise. The argument proceeds by simple stages. In contrast to the West, to China and to East Asia generally, the Japanese enterprise is based on the contextualist group of employees mediated by shaen (societal ties), and this is 12

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN the focus of all subsequent networking. Within this nexus, kinship and class are of little importance compared to 'relations of najimf (familiarity) and a subsequently strong 'weconsciousness'. Japan is thus unique. Secondly, it is from this that there has emerged long-term stable employment or organization of jobs around the workplace group'. Around the former of these has developed such characteristic features as annual mass hiring, changing assignments, job rotation, age seniority. Thus the much vaunted 'three sacred treasures' of lifetime employment, seniority promotion and company unions, are not sufficient explanations of enterprise vitality, but only select fragments of a deeper group or social ties structuration. Finally, from this level has emerged managerial methods: quality control circles, on-the-job-training, training courses, post transfers, entertainment rewards etc. Given a commonality at the basic levels, these latter higher management practices vary widely across different industries and enterprise types, 'and they change rapidly as environmental changes call for new methods'. The Masuda model allows for many permutations amongst these elements and integrations between such social-ties organisations and traditional ties of kinship and locality: in the history of Japanese modernisation one finds devices by which the traditional communal group order based on kinship ties and community ties has been skillfully mobilized and rationally organized (a typical example is the ringi system, a process of gaining approval for a plan by circulating a draft proposal upward through an organization which is based on nemawashi or negotiations behind the scenes). From this form of analysis, combining the individual as contextual, with the dominance of social-ties in private enterprise, emerges the argument that Japanese business behaviour is systematically different from that of any other, and this to its own general advantage. If one's own perspective automatically embraces that of others, then business or legal communication 'does not necessarily require any clear verbal expression, and in many cases non-verbal forms of communication play a more important role.' Because of the ensuing significance of face-to-face communication, this has implications for information industries, several of which are explored by Satinder Gill in chapter 6 of the present volume. As 13

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN Masuda summarises, to 'digitalize information and convey it efficiently just as a mere message does not amount to communicating'. Similarly, within organizations, tacit understandings amount to information itself and represent a vital component of the well-being of the 'relatum as an actor subject': 'there is a meta-information which is mutually understood between people in silence, and frequently it is this metainformation that basically regulates peoples actual speech and conduct.' Thus the Masuda model seeks to explore both the origins of Japanese industrial success and the borders and barriers of understanding between Japanese people and others. But Masuda goes beyond this to approach the problem of Japan's limitations. Thus, tacit understandings lead to a homogeneity of 'culture' which 'has the demerits of not allowing people to engage in creative activity by themselves or not tolerating people who are outstandingly great', a field we entered at the outset of the present essay. The Masuda model delineates many of the features emphasised by modern writers on Japanese management culture and organization, particularly the very insightful recent work of Masahiko Aoki which stresses the structural logic of such practices as kanban20 and the functional rewards gained from ambiguity of job demarcations or reduction of unit-specific interests in business organisations.21 Such analysis has become of great concern to those diverse Western analysts who are prepared to explain Western (especially American) economic stagnation or slow-down in terms of institutions and the motivations of individual agents within particular institutional sites, especially as these determine technological flexibility, adaptation and creativity. In an influential volume, Paul Krugman, one of the most interesting and thoughtful of modern economist commentators, has found the sources of decreasing productivity in America at the conjuncture of those motivational, institutional and external environmental forces which together dictate the investment and technological behaviour of individual firms and industries.22 Peter Allen, in scorning earlier interpretations of economic dynamics which artificially separated the 'economic' from other 'factors', has recently argued that, in approaching the interpretation of evolving complex systems, the dynamics of technological change within such systems 'cannot be considered in terms of 'economics' alone'.23 The MIT team, including amongst its authors R.M. Solow, identified the US loss of productivity in failures of scientific and technological creativity 14

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN and opportunism, slowness of innovation and diffusion, and they repeatedly and determinedly marked the contrast with Japanese organisations.24 While this 'turn to Japan' might be somewhat slowed with the current commercial crises in East Asia, the general focus on enterprise culture and the seeming Japanese advantage in that arena, is unlikely to fade. For twenty years the work of Michael Porter has been attacked and defended across a huge range of venues and audiences, but his close attention to the institutional origins of competitive advantage has not been convincingly dismissed. Porter's signal premise is that 'since firms play a central role in the process of creating competitive advantage, the behaviour of firms must become integral to a theory of national advantage'.25 Secondly, even within the same industry, successful firms inhabit particular sites, and something 'about these locations provides a fertile environment for firms in these particular industries', this pointing to the importance of the 'proximate environment' of the individual firm, rather than the market environs of the industry at large. Thirdly, success emerges from firms unencumbered by conventional wisdom, and these exhibit some weakening in the importance of hierarchy, formal knowledge, and close information linkages, but coexistent strengthening of diffused freedoms, intuitions, unusual network locations and weak but manifold linkages with others. This seems to represent the model of Japanese enterprise culture in the modern sector during the 1980s.26 The advantages of what we might term non-hierarchical strong culture enterprise are further spelled out by writers such as Michael Crozier, and (at least by implication), tend to downplay the short-term commercial problems of the Japanese economy. In this sort of approach, organization structure and the potential for its reform, depend on the character of the underlying 'human relations system', because significant alterations in ethos can not come about through 'direct shaping of the culture through motivational tools'. In a post-modern world of complexity and choice, success will arise from strong culture enterprises whose trajectory may shift 'from a technical and bureaucratic proficiency in mastering complexity to a capacity to create conditions for human groups to give the best of their resources to cooperate efficiently and to learn to innovate while taking upon themselves a greater share of the mastering of complexity.'27 From the perspective of a comparative analysis of groups and organizations, the sociologist Anthony Giddens has also 15

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN identified the attributes and advantages of Japanese enterprise culture.28 Drawing on the work of William Ouchi29 in particular, Giddens contrasts the Japanese business organization with the stylised model of Max Weber. Contra the latter, Japanese corporations are not pyramidical in authority and decision structure, involve far less employee specialisation, have the group rather than the individual as the basic node of organization, offer lifetime employment, forge very weak distinctions between the inside world of the corporation and the outside world. These are all features characterising the Masuda model as outlined above, although Giddens follows Ouchi directly in attributing such structures as outcomes of 'clan forms' of authority, which appear to lie somewhere between Masuda's social-tie groups (basic to the well-being of all relatums) and conventional or traditional clans.30 There seems to be some real basis for a causal accounting which can move from aspects of Japan's national culture at large, to features of the nation's industrial and technological performance in particular, although most such analyses appear weak on historical detail. In particular, the Masuda model represents the most uncompromising of causal accountings. Here the features of Japan as a natural system begin with the unit relatum, this determining both immediate and complex networks and institutional forms, this giving rise to particular behaviour patterns, this permitting the emergence of particular institutions conducive to industrial growth (eg the' three treasures'), these becoming the principal attributes causing Japan's industrial success. At the same time, the Masuda model would claim to answer those sceptical commentators who posit that the cultural models are either an attempt to obfiscate the inability of the Japanese to cope with industrial maturity and slow-down, or are well-intentioned but empirically infirm. For example, Kozo Yamamura's scepticism concerning the 'meatless sukiyaki' character of many cultural arguments, which seems strengthened by recent erosion of the 'three treasures' and increased closures, lay-offs and moves offshore, may be answered by the Masuda model's basic premise, that such features are readily alterable epiphenomena of the underlying cultural and societal systems.31 Questions of Resistance The analysis of resistance to modernising technologies is highly problematic for several reasons, some of which are addressed in the essays by Inkster and Iinuma. The evidence for the pre-1868 years, the long era of Pax Tokugawa (1603-1868), is slight, with 16

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN regional differences in technologies almost certainly some function of distance from centres of consumption and commercial activity, such as Osaka or Edo, or from ports and water routes. The crucial Meiji years of industrial transition are also difficult to evaluate. Many indigenous industries such as sake and soya processing or paper making were large employers, but not greatly affected by foreign technology or new forms of organisation. Where there is evidence of foreign technique in such industries, as in woodcutting and lumbering, there seems to have been no substantial impact on work and labour organisations. Most of the new industries using modern technique, such as beer making, railroad equipment manufacture, electrical appliances or motors, had no real entrenched work processes or culture of skill to contend with. The real centre of contention, therefore, was textiles, particularly cotton spinning, one of the great successes of Meiji industrialisation.32 But there is little evidence of the cotton industry providing any setting for luddite-style resistance to new techniques from the West. Indeed, during the 1880s, instances of depression in weaving districts, possibly caused by imported technique and products, tended to result in the formation of small producer associations aimed at, if anything, further diffusion of information and greater usage of foreign techniques, (eg. in dyestuffs).33 At the spinning end of the industry, the several (approximately 60 to 70) modestly-sized mills 'relied almost entirely on a labour force of women whose average (mean) entrant lived in a company dormitory and stayed no more than two years.'34 There was little basis here for proletarian revolt. Yet we would tend to agree with Japanese writers such as Masao Maruyama, that any historical analyst might well expect cultural and political resistance to technological change in Meiji Japan precisely because this is a good case of 'rapid and forced modernisation ... carried out almost exclusively through foreign' influence, wherein populist resistance might be predicted because 'social stagnation often stands side by side with technological innovations introduced from above.'35 But, as Maruyama clearly points out, Japan was not typical, does not fit a neat taxonomy, and his own passage relates to the possibly negative impacts of foreign investment, an element outlawed by the Japanese government during the years of Meiji industrial transition: The Western machina was to be introduced by government and by trade, not by the free-ranging Western capitalists themselves. 17

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN So, there might well have been something within the precise manner of Japanese industrialisation and its intersections with the West which tended to minimise either negative effects or the power of those who were so deleteriously effected to express themselves in cultural or political terms, as in the case of those thousands of young transient country girls isolated in the dormitory-mills of Osaka and Tokyo. Furthermore, the slightness of evidence makes it most difficult to distinguish resistance stemming from 'culture' - what a Schumpeterian might label as 'atavistic' responses - and resistance flowing from a rational perception of threat to either inherited or achieved assets. Elsewhere we have argued that the reactions to new technologies or to the modernising technological program of a regime, may arise from many quarters for several reasons, amongst these being a threatened or experienced erosion of skills, of land values and rents, of existing communication systems, policing systems and so on, reactions to any or all of which are surely 'rational' in even economistic terms.36 Any culture may exhibit reactions of this nature at almost any time, but especially in times of relatively rapid technological change, only exacerbated when the origin and physical style of the machinery, buildings, standards and assumptions are, essentially, culturally foreign. In short, even recognisable 'resistances to technology' may not be routinely assigned to culture, a point made in the essays by Inkster and Baba elsewhere in this volume. All that might be hazarded here is to indicate that such resistances are some evidence of the inability of any culture or cultural conditioning or cultural engineering to remove all pockets of technological resistance. How many of the rural riots of the Meiji years were evidence of culturally-based resistance to technological change as such, how many were evidence of the burden and incidence of the land tax, which caused many to lose their land and thereby 'sharply limited the peasants' power to purchase consumer goods, farm machinery and other products of Japan's new industries.'?37 In other words, both rice and urban riots may have been as much a result of a perceived 'exclusion from' the pale of technological modernisation as any expression of cultural 'resistance to' modernity, even when whipped up or politicised by ex-samurai or Tokyo-based Buddhist leaders. In the last years of the twentieth century there is, of course, great evidence of cultural resistance to the specific forms of Japan's industrial modernity. Generational and political elements confusedly intertwine in the move towards greater democracy 18

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN and plurality and honesty in national politics. But perhaps more indicative of a cultural change are the pervasive environmental, peace and women's movements as well as the more immediately focussed local government and residents' movements.38 Technological change has clearly been fundamental in setting the scene for the political and social tribulations of contemporary Japan. But so too, has the slow-down of growth and the change in expectations associated with the maturity of modern industrial technology worked in exactly the same direction. Without having a firm answer to the causal nexus, historians might still emphasise that cultural resistance to technological change has never before effectively threatened the overall Japanese trajectory. Conclusions As culture may be fairly defined as the values and norms of a social system, together with the material goods produced within that system, then the historical intrusion of foreign material goods and the means to fabricate them, are perforce periods of cultural crisis. By definition, culture becomes a limiting factor, in the same sense that the rate of physical investment may only be modelled as a determinant of the rate of growth of the ecomonic system if it is relatively scarce and in demand. If there is an overabundance of capital, its growth rate is unlikely to be a cause of the economic growth rate. Similarly, the 'cultural argument' requires that we move beyond a characterisation of the ideal and replete character of the stock of culture into analysis of cultural change or even cultural investment.39 A first conclusion is that all approaches intending a causal accounting do seem to also require some acknowledgement of cultural engineering at key stages of transition towards industrial success. Limiting ourselves to cases of known successful regime survival, in times of crises, culture does not act merely as a latent resource. In so far as this cultural engineering process is one of intent and requires the sustained operation of an industrialising elite, then the power base and status of that elite must be explained. No accounts presently seem to accomplish this explanation in entirely cultural terms. This means that we do not have an entirely 'cultural' mode of causal accounting. Second, the Masuda model, although at first appearing somewhat marginal or outlandish, in fact exhibits features which are in close accord with that of quite other commentators, both Japanese and Western. Although operating across the cultural 19

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN attributes of Japan, the Masuda approach does not yield a complete cultural mode of reasoning, because of the application of our first point above, and because the origins of the basic building blocks of analysis, the relatum/contextual, are not clearly cultural, although they are historical. Third, cultural arguments may address the theme of the character and role of Japanese private enterprise, in opposition to theories which explain the special organizational attributes of Japan in terms of market forces, government policies, the institutional innovations of the Occupation Forces (SCAP) in 1945-52, and so on. Explanations at this private enterprise level seem to complement several recent analyses of enterprise culture and its relationship to markets which have been generated by writers such as Porter or Crozier, whose prime focus or evidence has not necessarily been the Japanese or East Asian economies. This renders this type of analysis somewhat more attractive. Fourthly, there appear to be some analytical leads into distinguishing theJapanese case distinctly, not only from that of the West at large (not a matter of great moment), but from the cases of China and East Asia more generally, (a matter of significant analytical importance). In this regard, perhaps the approach of the Masuda Foundation represents the Strong Program. Finally, with more explicit reference to our original questions, we might sketch some boundaries. The cultural features which permitted Japan to absorb Western influence, and especially Western industrial technologies, are difficult to isolate, but probably relate to the very early history of cultural intrusions from outside, combined with some cultural feature which encouraged communal and social ties but dampened notions of the isolated self. Whether such a feature belonged to formal cultural systems such as Japanese neo-Confucianism, formal natural systems of the type suggested by the Masuda model, or something else, is not at all clear. It is probable that many cultural features often nominated as causal were in fact ancillary, reflective or at most co-requisites of change. Less equivocally, it is unlikely that analysis at this level will answer the question concerning successful absorption, for this did not depend, in times of crisis, on wholesale cultural change, but upon the power of leaders to effect cultural change. Contra this, cultural features may well throw a bright light on the ability of Japan to sustain growth and flexibility in long periods following such initial absorptions, during which continuing incremental changes from outside and accelerating internal institutional adjustments took 20

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN place. Over time, the accumulation of cultural features in these longer, organic periods may well serve to define the 'final' cultural systems of such periods. Perhaps by now the question of mimesis appears of minor importance! Rather than mimetic in the Toynbee sense, Japan was exploitative of the intellectual, ideological and physical artefacts of others over an immensely long period, this requiring enormously important institutional innovations. The question of the 'creativity' of the latter processes is surely of little importance. Of more relevance is the degree to which such institutional innovation may be interpreted in cultural terms. Here we do have some useful conceptual devices. There may be cultural interpretations of groupism, followership, altruism (in the Masuda model this becomes an artificial fabrication based on the concept of the individual as the basic unit, which disappears once the relatum is put in place) andflexibilty.It may then be possible to conclude that particular cultural features enabled Japan to effect creative institutional innovations at key moments of industrial modernization.

21

Chapter 2

Skill and Intuition - A new technology culture at the intersection of different cultures Masataka Baba

Introduction The primary concept of recent technological progress is the extent that computers have penetrated into almost all points of manufacturing, telecommunications and commodities where control is necessary. The diffusion of universal control technology can be seen for the first time. The fundamental elements of work are power and control. When people operate tools, they provide force by means of their muscles, and at the same time control the force applied. Man has developed power technology from ancient times to release himself from manual labor. He first used animal power, then water and wind power, and steam power after the industrial revolution. Steam power is widely still used, for example, in electricity-generating thermal plants, as well as in nuclear power plants. Power technology has been a driving force of technological progress throughout the history of man. Control of this power has been a different matter. In manual labor, man has his brain and nervous system to provide the necessary control of the brute force which is being wielded. For man's technological development, there was nothing which could replace the position the brain held in manual labor. Watt's governor in his steam engine was a first control technology but it was only a strictly mechanical device for the machines he developed. The computer's first appearance was as a calculator, and only much later became a new control technology. The computer is the first universal control device developed in the history of mankind. The influence of universal control technology is deep and wide as control is one of the fundamental elements of work; so we can characterize the penetration of the computer into 23

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN control functions as a technology revolution rather than innovation. This process is changing not only the features of technology but also the face of society and continues even now. Since the 1970's, Japanese companies have succeeded in utilizing the revolutionary capability of computer in the development of new products. There have been many arguments as to why Japan could realize such success. Japanese diligence, special skills, methodical nature, curiosity, talent for improvement, high level of education, and so forth have all been advanced as explanations. However, an important fact of Japanese culture has been largely ignored: Japan has a long history of isolation, and there has been a definite pattern in the manner in which she has absorbed influence from foreign civilizations. Without consideration of this factor in regard to the comparatively recent advance of Japanese technology, we will only gain a superficial understanding of the importance of the cultural inheritance of Japan. This cultural inheritance is expressed in the Japanese term tuaza or takutni meaning technique. I would like to approach the advancement of Japanese technology by focusing on this concept. Acceptance of Foreign Technology The history of Japan from a technological point of view can be divided into the following: 1. Before rice cultivation 0omon Age); 2. Introduction of rice cultivation (rice and bronze: Yayoi Age and Old Tomb Age), BC 5th century-AD 7th century. 3. From the introduction of the calendar, arts tools from China to Tenmon Age, 7th century-l6th century; 4. From Tenmon Age to Meiji Restoration, 16th century-1868; 5. After Meiji Restoration; 6. After the Second World War In the Jomon Age, Japan had a hunter-gatherer economy with some primitive cultivation (gourd, sesame, edible roots, millet). Jomon people had already developed earthenware and weaving technology. It is noticeable that there was earthenware before the development of large scale agriculture. 'Jomon' refers to the earthenware designs. In the Yayoi Age, rice cultivation and bronze technology were introduced from China (through the Korean peninsula), and Japan made the transformation from a hunting economy to a 24

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN production society. New advanced earthenware was manufactured. 'Yayoi' refers to it's designs. In the Japanese middle ages, new technologies came to Japan from China, along with political and economical systems. They included metallurgy, cast metal, architecture, civil engineering and a wide range of hand crafts. The fire lock gun came to Japan in 1543(Tenmon Age). After that, European arts and technologies were brought by the Portuguese and Dutch or through Chinese literatures.They included clocks, mining, civil engineering, metallurgy, medicine. After the Meiji Restoration, all kinds of modern sciences and mechanical engineering were introduced. A modern education system reaching from elementary school to university was established at the beginning of the Meiji Era. Many Europeans and American went to Japan to teach the new science and technologies, and many Japanese youth went abroad to learn them firsthand. After the Second World War, Japan introduced new technologies and engineering from the US. They are chemical engineering, electronics, telecommunication, atomic energy, computer science, aeronautical engineering, amongst others. On this analysis, Japan has introduced always new technology from foreign countries. First it was China; then Europe and the US. They were the countries that had developed the most progressive technologies of their time. New technologies developed in foreign countries were accepted and absorbed by Japanese culture and fused with traditional technology. This fusion is a specific feature of Japanese technology. As a result, with each foreign technological introduction, Japan had created a new fused technology culture. When a new technology was introduced, the Japanese people had the capability to accept it. When rice cultivation was introduced, it initially proved difficult as it meant changing from a natural gathering economy to a production economy, but it did succeed. We should consider that the Jomon people had already developed a high level of technology and mind set. Before the Meiji Restoration, there was almost no tradition of scientific thinking and mechanical technology. Instead, the Japanese developed a remarkably high level of hand craft. Japan successfully accepted western science and technology after the Meiji Restoration. It should be said that there was a mental preparedness for, and state of acceptance of, technology among the Japanese. 25

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN

Mental Attitude The mental attitude of Japan was best represented in the traditional arts and Budo or martial training. Taoism is the way to attain the summit and prepare the mind to waza. This mental attitude has its zenith in the concept of nothingness, an ideal of 'Zen1 Buddhism. Zen had great influence in many aspects of Japanese traditional culture. Man can transcend all being and value with the thought of nothingness. Therefore, he can accept all being and make it his own. This is the foundation for the acceptance of different cultures. This acceptance capacity is a specific character of Japanese culture. Budo has a dual structure of mental preparedness as yu-shin or practical awareness, and mu-shin or thought of nothingness. Waza cannot be realized without yu-shin. But it can not be accomplished with yu-shin. Waza can be completed first with mushin. Mu-shin is to abandon attachment. Practical awareness is expressed in a pattern, and this pattern can get true validity and ultimate beauty with mu-shin. This situation is expressed in crafts, too. For man to produce good work, he must stand in mushin and abandon his attachment. When he can attain mu-shin and realize the possibilities of waza, he will have the ability to produce masterpieces that will move the hearts of others. Man begins his personal training by learning the pattern given by his master. Then, he has to polish his skill and develop his own practical knowledge, and only then can he master waza and create his own technique of production. He can become an independent craftsman through these three steps. The absorption of foreign culture relies on the same process. The Japanese people learnt the European pattern of modern science and mechanical technology after the Meiji Restoration. They are now creating a new technological culture. These three steps are the same as the shu, ha, ri (conserving, breaking, separating) that is inherent thought in the tea ceremony. In the tea ceremony, man learns the master pattern in shuf polishes his waza in ha, and develops new awareness of himself in ri. Thus, the system of the acceptance of different cultures is inherent in Japanese culture. All Japanese cultures have a deep mental awareness as capable of reaching the highest evolution intertwined with the thought of nothingness. This thought is developed from Zen Buddhism. Takumi as the Combination of Skill and Practical Knowledge The theoretical, analytical, and linguistic knowledge has been 26

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN important in the tradition of European fields of thought since the Greek philosophers. It is needless to say that this knowledge bore the fruits of modern scientific knowledge. In Japan, this kind of knowledge was not developed, therefore intuitive, practical knowledge was important. Waza was important in arts and budo. Waza is the way to play dance, to operate sword in kendo or Japanese fencing, to play the tea ceremony, and so forth, and integrates skill and practical knowledge. This waza is common in craftwork, too. In the craft, it might be better to say takumi rather than waza. Logical concepts and scientific knowledge have linguistic and mathematical expression in the western countries. In comparison with this, practical knowledge grasped by intuition is expressed in the 'pattern'. The 'pattern' is universalized shape, a key concept in Japanese culture. It is said that the tea ceremony and traditional Japanese flower arrangement, for example, express the beauty of pattern. A Japanese sword has a special curvature, and it is said to be the reason for its excellent cutting quality and beauty. The special pattern of its curvature was selected from numberless shapes by not logical thinking but intuition, and this became the pattern of the Japanese sword. Truth and calmness of the cosmos is grasped by intuition and is expressed in the composition of the trees, stones, water and moss in Japanese gardens. Bonsai expresses harmony of nature in pattern. Thus, in Japan, knowledge is not theoretical and analytical but practical and presented not in language but in patterns. Michael Polanyi introduced the concept of 'tacit knowledge' for understanding. He pointed out the importance of nonanalytical, integrative knowledge in addition to theoretical knowledge and understanding. In Japan, intuitive knowledge was remarkably sharpened sophisticated because of the lack of theoretical knowledge, and it was presented in the pattern. There are three reasons why this practical awareness was well developed in Japan. First;historical conditions, second; natural environment, third; language. Takumi and Western Technology Japan had no tradition of developing machinery, while western countries had depended on it in their tradition of technology. As a result, Japanese developed manual skills instead of machinery. It is natural that this skill was combined with practical knowledge and created a high level of waza under the influence of Taoism. At the end of Edo period, western people who visited Japan 27

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN were surprised by the high quality handicrafts they found, handicrafts whose quality was a result of takumi. These handicrafts had precise finish, enough solidity for practical use, functional beauty and artistic beauty as well. The Japanese cutlery was used for manufacturing these handicrafts. This was made by laminating two kinds of iron; hard steel and soft iron. This laminated edge was made easily sharper by high level of sharpening technology. The excellent cutlery is a technological base for manufacture. Perry, who was given a lacquered pen box from Ero government, said that 'Japanese people showed high level of dexterity in the practical arts, and handicraft technology was complete. 'C. R Thunberg, a Swedish medical doctor, said 'Japanese are good at applications. They have no talent of invention. Iron and copper products are better than European. Swords, clocks, glass work are excellent, too. Lacquered vessels are of a unique quality not seen in foreign countries.' A. v. Siebold recognized that 'the Japanese have a specially strong desire of knowledge, love for things.' The Japanese tradition of takumi and western tradition of technology based on theoretical thinking and machinery shows a sharp contrast. It is possible to show this relation in the following co-ordinates. machinery oriented western technology ( the left brain technology)

science oriented

practical knowledge

y y y Japanese waza or takumi (the right brain technology) skill

Figure 1. Relation of Japanese takumi and Western technology 28

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN Takumi is almost the same as waza and can be expressed as right brain technology. On the other hand, Western technology could be expressed as left brain technology. N/C Equipment and Stepper Technology has the dual layer structure as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Dual layer structure of technology The total triangle shows the existent technology. The basic layer consists of traditional, inherent features of technology formed from historical, social and climatic conditions in a country. It plays part of the bass in a symphony. It is similar to the massive unconsciousness in psychoanalysis of the Jung school. The upper layer consists of features of technology added later. The existing technology has all this dual layer structure in itself. Therefore, the existing technology is individual, although science knowledge is universal. There is no exception even in case of high-technology. It is a useful trial of this structure see why Japan succeeded in the development of high-technology. Development of N/C equipment made the following possible; remarkable increase of machine tool production, increase of precision in machine work, and factory automation. These developed the high quality products and strong competitiveness in the world market for Japanese companies. The stepper is the most important piece of equipment in the process of manufacturing semi-conductors. When Japan obtained the largest share of the world semi-conductor production in the second half of the 1980s, it played an important role. N/C and stepper are the technology that supported Japanese success in the development of technology in 1970s-1980s. 29

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN N/C equipment was invented in the US at the end of the 1940s and was developed at MIT At first, the movement of the template by the machine was controlled by relay The relay was replaced by computers in the 1950s. In the US, an expensive type based on a closed-loop control was applied to the cutting of such large parts as the blade of helicopters or screw of a ship. This equipment was used by large airplane and military industries. This type of N/C equipment did not spread wide because it was so expensive and big and there was not good cooperation between electronic engineer and mechanical operator. In Japan, N/C equipment was developed by Fanuc. Fanuc pursued a simpler and cheaper version based on open-loop control using a new stepping motor. This small stepping motor used precise ball bearing technology which was supplied by the work of high-skilled craftsman of other bearing maker. As a result, even small companies with few workers could afford to buy this new development and it could be operated by non-skilled workers. It was very small as Fanuc used an Intel made custom chip, and, later micro computer. Therefore, N/C equipment made by Fanuc diffused rapidly after the 1970s. As a result, Fanuc became the principal supplier in the world. There was a big difference between the US and Japan in development of N/C equipment. In the US, closed-loop control was adapted, that was more complicated both in theory and mechanism. On the other hand, Fanuc stressed practical usefulness, even if it was more simple in theory Further, Fanuc promptly harnessed the greater capability of micro chip and could utilize the Japanese traditional craftsmanship. We can see here the practical feature of Japanese technology. In the process of manufacturing semi-conductors, the circuit pattern painted on the mask is copied on to a silicon wafer in the planer method. This is done with a photolithography aligner. Several types of photolithography have appeared since the 1960s when planer process was applied to manufacture integrated circuit. 1. 2. 3. 4.

contact aligner; proximity aligner; scanner aligner; stepper.

A photolithography aligner is used to position the mask relative to the wafer, to hold the two in place during exposure, and to expose the resist painted on wafer. 30

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN Stepper was developed by the US firm, GCA at the end of the 1970s. GCA was the principal supplier of stepper until the mid1980s, but when Nikon, a Japanese camera maker, began to ship new types of stepper, the market was gradually dominated by the Japanese maker. Nikon's stepper was technologically superior in through-put, resolution, and production yield. Despite the fact that Nikon's stepper had the same principle and almost the same mechanism, a large difference appeared in working precision and productivity. This difference was an integrated result of parts manufacturing and design work. Stepper requires extremely precise parts and is a typical complex technology of mechanics, electronics and optics. It is very important to make a completely flat surface of working bed and to make lens of the highest grade. Such things can be manufactured not with machinery but with handiwork of the high-skilled craftsman. There was great accumulation of skill to polish lens and to make precise metal parts in Nikon. The existence of skilled designers of optical systems contributed to producing the equipment of high quality. There was tight cooperation between mechanical, electronic and optical division in Nikon. The sum of these facts brought forth a big difference in the quality of the equipment. Nikon is still the principal supplier of stepper in the world. New Technology Culture The basic character of Japanese technology rests on the idea of 'fusion'. In Japan, a new culture has been created by the fusion of different cultures, just as a new technology has been created by the fusion of different technologies. This 'fusion' can be described as a basic facet of Japanese culture-creativity. Recent Japanese technology is based on the fusion of western industrial mechanical technology and Japanese craftsmanship combined with the fusion of scientific knowledge and practical knowledge as well. When this fusion creates a new technology or culture, the shuhari principle is adapted. The shu phase concerns an amount of straight imitation. The ha sees an introduction of creativity into the process. With the ri phase, a completely new and independent path is chosen. It could be said that Japan entered this ri phase during the 1970s. In 1969, Seiko developed the first quartz watch, the Astron. Up to this point, the clock and watch had been seen as the symbol of mechanical technology. With the replacement of the watch's complicated mechanism by 31

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN an electronic circuit and quartz, and a change in power source from a wound spring to a battery, the end of the strictly mechanical age was in sight - to be replaced by a new technology This high technology, with the computerization at its core, is changing society into 'post-industrial society', an age of information. During this time, Japanese companies rapidly developed such new products as: N/C equipment, audio-visual equipment, business machines, digital equipment such as new type of camera and watch, stepper, and so forth, Relevant aspects of Japanese traditional craftsmanship are; 1. high quality raw materials; 2. high quality tools (e.g. Japanese laminated cutlery and fine sharpening technology); 3. skill and practical knowledge; 4. perfect finishing technique and attention to detail; 5. durable products combining practicality and beauty Artisans can easily produce items of high quality by means of highly-developed skills, particularly if good materials and tools are available. The above mentioned aspects of craftsmanship also hold for the manufacturing of products. These requirements are the same whether you are producing goods by hand or through the process of modern industry. The gist of new technology is that this culture rests on industrial products produced by the fusion of modern science and industrial technology on the foundation of the traditional Japanese work ethic. New technology culture; the fusion of East and West, right and left.

32

Chapter 3

Towards Fusion: Technology and Tradition in Japan Fumihiko Satofuka

Introduction During the last decade there has been a debate on the nature of Japanese science and its potential. This chapter addresses itself to aspects of this discussion on Japanese tradition, locating it in a larger civilizational context and posing questions concerning the social conditions of Japanese tradition. My chapter covers the basic outline of this debate, the social nature of scientific tradition in Japan, and the larger social roots of cultural tradition. The Debate on Scientific Tradition in Japan. The concern for scientific tradition had been expressed at different levels of Japanese society. These discussions have highlighted certain areas where scientific tradition is considered to be lacking. These include the school system, the university structure as well as the laboratory world. For example, in an opinion survey technologists in the private sector of Japan were questioned about the comparative state of Japanese technology 20% thought it was the best in the world, 70% thought it was in the top class, whilst the remainder thought that it was lagging behind (Recruit 1985). The same sample when questioned about the originality of Japanese technology were firm on the lack of originality: 12% said there was an absolute lack of originality, whilst 50% saying there was a tendency towards a lack. Further, a report by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and by the Man-Power Needs Committee (MITI, quoted in Dore 1986) called for the need to redouble efforts in originality. This report recalled that past development was based on import of technology which path was also now being successfully followed by newly industrializing countries who were now posing a competition to Japan. Therefore the report suggests the 33

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN promotion of R & D and high levels of tradition and originality as an essential precondition (ibid). Similar views were echoed by writers and commentators of Japanese industry and scientific establishments. Thus Moritani, the author of Japanese Technology . Getting the Best for the Least reaffirms the need for technology development by Japanese themselves as does the Director of Research at the NEC Corporation when he states 'We can't wait for solutions to come from outside Japan. We have to create an adequate environment to promote scientific tradition by ourselves' (Bell et al. 1985). This view is once again reiterated by Kondo, the President of the Science Council of Japan in his call for scientific tradition (Kondo, U.S. National Science Foundation 1986). The Debate on Cultural Tradition in Japan Japan belongs to the category of continuous cultures: that is, where there is an unbroken continuity in the tradition and where, when westernization has been introduced, it was through individuals operating in the traditional culture. This is in contrast to colonial situations where westernization is grafted on to a traditional culture often as an alien product. In any cross-cultural organization analysis the question arises as to what type of organization is to be compared cross-culturally? To be comparable cross-culturally organizations must have some characteristics that do not vary cross-culturally thus allowing for a base of comparison. For instance, a caste-based cottage industry in India (like, say, metal working) may be considered to be an organization, so also may General Motors in Detroit and a Peoples' Commune in China. To make true comparisons it is evident that we will have to limit our comparisons to classes of organizations having common characteristics. The three organizations just mentioned also have common characteristics, for instance they are all production organizations, but for our analysis we will limit our attention to the class of large organizations associated with modern industrial productions of the factory type. This choice is deliberate as modern factory production, a cultural artifact that originated in the countries of the West, is now being universally introduced into almost all other cultures. It is in the organizations associated with these common industrial processes that we hope to see differences in the sub-culture of organizations and in the management system, as the imported industrial processes are acquired by different cultures. 34

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN Japan belongs to the exogenous category of industrialization in that, industrialization and the modern industrial process are foreign imports. We intend to show that the culture of Japan is continuous, meaning that there were no abrupt impositions or breaks in the continuity of its cultural history. Further, taking into account the role of elites, we hope to show that the industrialization process was a controlled one in that a comparatively small elite controlled this process often consciously selecting the elements it wanted absorbed into the cultural fabric from the West. This elite, it will be further shown, was interested primarily in results in that the efficacy of the cultural elements was always evaluated by certain criteria, one of which was organizational effectiveness, and cultural elements which were introduced and later were found to be wanting on the basis of these criteria were subsequently rejected. In our case the imported cultural elements we are most interested in are those relating to organizational control. In this chapter we will explore the effects of what is analogous to a cultural filter embodied in these elites on the organization sub-culture and the management system. We will also show that the filtered elements have resulted in an organization sub-culture that actively promotes the attainment of management objectives. Japanese society in the 1990's is different from the Japanese society in the 1870's, and so are the Japanese elites, the industrial processes and Western management technology have changed between these two dates. Thus we will be looking at a continuously changing internal (Japanese) situation as well as an external (largely Western) one. Yet it is our intention to show that during these changes and in the process of these changes, the Japanese ruling elite consciously selected only those elements of Western management which would magnify the appeals to cultural factors. They did not choose any elements that would negate these appeals. Proposals for Research As a result of my study, I have developed my own theory concerning the components and stages of development. Here I would like to put forward a specific proposal regarding the problems of technology and technology policy and the course of future study. What we desire is a dialogue with third-world intellectuals and practitioners now actively engaged with the problems of development and of technology in the context of development. This proposal could serve as a basis for further 35

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN dialogue towards a solution of these problems, exchanging actual experiences, specific examples, we participants in the dialogue can gain a clearer picture of development and its problems and identify common elements and possible solutions, and the proper priority or scale of the urgency of problems and how they might be addressed. Through such a dialogue, I will doubtlessly be compelled to revise my position on certain aspects and go back to the shop-floor to provide my colleagues with the information that may be needed to give them a fuller understanding of the Japanese experience, to help them solve or provide them a way for tackling their particular development problems. Specificity is desirable in the debates surrounding the problems of development and technology, especially reference in the debates to specific historical experiences. Without this specificity, there can be no approach to a solution. We cannot afford the privilege of leaving the solution of these problems to a third party. The problems require detailed inquiry. But detailed inquiry alone is not enough. Unless we converge specific cases to generalize, there can be no methodological basis for our dialogue. We cannot say, based on convergence from specific examples to theory, how far the dialogue we are urging will develop. We have, after all, only limited experience with such dialogues. Nevertheless, we must expect that our efforts will help to lift the discussion to a higher level for those who come later. Science and Culture in Japan in Comparison with the Tradition of Art and Technology Japanese scientific tradition has taken a multifaceted approach. It constitutes a carefully directed effort. The suggested changes include a move away from rote learning, the removal of the hierarchical order in school, changes in organizational structures of laboratories in favour of those promoting innovation, increases in funding, expanding links between industry and research and the careful cultivation of foreign scientists and foreign journals. A formidable attempt seems to be under way. The question we should pose is, will this succeed? One of the elements behind the lack of productivity and tradition of science in culturally dependent countries that has been identified is the incomplete and fragmentary nature of the mapping of 'international' science. It has been documented that most of the time the different disciplines and subdisciplines are incompletely mapped through teaching programs, journals, 36

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN reading material and laboratories in culturally dependent countries. In the case of Japan, however, this is not the case. The mapping is as complete as in any Western country and its science is fully integrated with that of the West. This source of the lack of productivity does not exist in the case of Japan. There is hardly any data on the functioning of the internal social system of Japanese laboratories in Japanese scientific centers comparable to the considerable material on similar sites in the Western world, accumulated especially over the last decade and a half. Further, there are no significant writings on whether Japanese scientists have used intellectual approaches drawn from their culture in the articulation of their work. I had earlier identified these two facets, namely the effective working at the small group level of Japanese science and the use of cultural inputs from Japan's indigenous store, as two vital approaches in reducing the cultural marginalisation of Japanese scientists and increasing their productivity. In the absence of direct data, I have to approach these two facets indirectly. Firstly, the social psychology dimension, by referring to the literature available on Japanese work organizations. This literature showed how the Japanese work situation has some flexible elements which could be favourable for Japanese culture, albeit in a form different from the Western variety. The Japanese work group, although it has stultifying aspects of conformity, also has the seeds of its opposite. The close discussions that the group indulges in, during the prolonged debates before decision-making, and the importance of inputs from several members of the group allows for free exchange of views and acceptance of ideas. Mechanisms such as those represented by the ringi system allow for the raising of new perspectives and their acceptance, albeit in a form different from the West. As for the acceptance of traditional elements from outside the immediate culture of the discipline, one has to again make an oblique approach by taking an example from a field of more detailed empirical material. For this, two somewhat related intellectual areas outside science will be examined. The two elements are (a) the arts and (b) technology Science, it should be noted, stands as an intellectual endeavour half-way between these two. Not-so-free in conceptualization and more bounded than the fine arts, whilst freer and with more speculative possibilities than the direct useoriented endeavours of technology. Are there examples of significant Japanese tradition in these two realms? 37

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN

Artificial Fusion Critics and commentators in the theater, dance and music fields have recently observed significant elements of traditions. In Japan today, a dominant position is held by Western music. This is not only so in the case of pop music but is perhaps more so in serious music. Serious, classical music in current Japan, it appears, is not the music of its tradition but Western music. (This, one should note in parentheses, is the opposite in India where its traditional classical music finds pride of place and a much wider audience than Western classical music.) The first landmark event in the history of contemporary music in Japan was in 1952 when Matsudaira Yoritsune won the first prize for a composition 'Theme and Variations for Piano and Orchestra'. This piece combined twelve tone techniques with a traditional genre of Japanese music, namely gagaku. In the late 1950s, many Japanese felt that they had 'caught up' with the standards of European music, as exemplified by Mayuzumi's Nirvana Symphony. This composition, it should be noted, employed Buddhist temple bells and Buddhist chanting. In the 1960s and 1970s traditional Japanese musicians began to perform Westernstyle compositions using traditional instruments. The use of Japanese tradition in Japanese Western music began to increase. By 1985 a student of the Japanese music scene was to say that 'the number of contemporary Japanese composers' works performed in Europe far outnumbered the works of modern European composers performed in Japan', signaling that Japanese music, revitalized by merging its culture with that of the West, had created something original and was exporting this. The post-Meiji new theater Shingeki was strongly influenced by the European theatrical tradition. Yet, from the 1960s onwards there were Japanese dramatists creating new material in theater, arising partly through a renewed interest in traditional Japanese theater. Although they were initially attacked for these (syogekijo undo) attempts, they had an enormous influence. These groups experimented with new concepts of space in the theater, blurring the separation of theatrical space from everyday living space, actor from audience, etc. Here, then, was an example of creativity. In fact, the creativity had arisen precisely because elements of tradition were spliced into the post-Meiji, Western-influenced new tradition. Any outsider to Japan would note the distinctive bodily movements in Kabuki and No as well as the distinctive rhythms of its popular dances in the many Japanese festivals. However, Western ballet, as well as the modern Western dance of 38

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN the Martha Graham variety, has pride of place in Japan. Yet, the imitative field of Japanese dance has recently shown remarkable creativity in one genre. The new dance genre 'Butoh' emerged in the 1960s. Hijikata, one of the leading exponents, holds a key position in its development. His inspiration for the new directions in dance was from the study of things Japanese. The Japanese body type, its size and shape, Hijikata has noted, was unsuitable for European classical ballet. He made new modern dance forms that were more suitable to the Japanese body type. Hijikata's work and approach was also related to the Japanese haiku, which makes 'unexpected' combinations of disparate images. Whereas in Western styles of dance the emphasis is on rhythm, balance and the rational flow of 'kinetic energy', Hijikata emphasized discontinuity and imbalance. The critical success and the influence of this innovation is another example of combining creatively cultural elements drawn from pre-Westernized culture and points to possibilities in other cultural fields, namely science. If there are examples from the arts of the fusion of the traditional and the Western, to give a creative mix, what examples of successes of cultural fusions exist in the sphere of technology, the other intellectual endeavor which, together with the arts, sandwiches science as a cultural phenomenon? Technological Fusion There have been several important examples of such fusions. They are in those Japanese technologies which are identified with Japanese innovation, namely, robotics, biotechnology and the new ceramics. This interdisciplinary technological strategy combines two existing areas of knowledge to give new products and new industries. The borders between such two disciplines are now blurred and many innovations may emerge by combining the two. Here no 'fundamental' creativity is required, but an imaginative application of existing knowledge at a higher level of integration. In this technological fusion, two basic technologies are combined into one to yield a new field of technology. The classic example is the Japanese experience in mechatronics - a field vital for robots - which combined mechanics and electronics. Mechatronics is a Japanese innovation where mechanical technology was fused with electronic technology. Examples of mechatronics are in Numerically Controlled (NC) machine tools and robots. This category also includes technologies where the mechanical 39

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN working part is either wholly or partly superseded by electronics. A mechatronized process it should be noted, was influenced by a MITI initiative resulting in a law in 1971 ('The Law on Temporary Measures for the Development of Specific Machinery and Electronic Industry') showing that direct legislation can have an influence on technological innovation. The innovation sequence in technological fusion occurs with an industry having an interest in product fields other than its principal product line. In mechatronics, technological fusion commenced after 1971 with a crossflow of ordinary machinery industry and the electrical machinery industry. Later, connections were created between precision instruments and communication and electronic equipment. With these four elements under fusion the new field was born. In biotechnology, compared to the four-fold connections made in the mechatronics industry, a three-fold connection between different fields was made. In 1971, a twoway connection between food and drugs and medicines resulted in the appearance of fermentation technology, one leg of biotechnology. When industrial chemicals joined this duo, biotechnology came into being as a high technology field. In the case of ceramics, the new ceramics emerged by initially fusing ceramics and ordinary machinery whence fine ceramics was born in 1980. In 1981, a connection was made between ceramics and industrial chemicals. By 1982, the three-fold connection between ceramics, ordinary machinery and industrial chemicals were made and the new ceramics were born. The developments resulting from technological fusion was the result, among others, of good company-to-company relations operating in the two respective fields and resulting in a fusion of the technological culture of mechanics with that of electronics. Better fusion results are obtained when one company partly merges with another through a process of cross-investment resulting in closer fusion of the two subcultures. This type of development could also occur within the organization. Clearly, what occurred was a merging and interpenetration of the knowledge cultures associated with the two fields giving rise to a synergistic result. It was the mechatronics revolution that spawned Japan's very successful innovations in robotics, making Japan the predominant power in this field. Other examples of successful technological fusion are biotechnology, and new ceramics. All three fields are front-line cutting edge technologies and the results of fusion show that cross-fertilization of disciplinary cultures can indeed be very 40

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN creative. We have seen examples from two different fields, technology and fine arts that are on two opposite sides of science in their intellectual characteristics. The arts, although bounded, allow for more play of the imagination then does science, which isfirmlyrooted to material reality. On the other hand, technology is much more grounded to reality and the everyday world than science is. In both these cases, we have seen that recent Japanese experiences show considerable tradition. This tradition is realized by essentially similar processes, by splicing-in elements drawn from Japan's past. In the case of technology, it was by merging two or more technological cultures. If tradition is possible in Japan in the two opposite parts of a three-fold intellectual spectrum, clearly it is possible for the one sandwiched in between, namely science. Scientific Fusion Whilst having noted the possibilities for tradition that have been described in the pages above, one should remember that cultural tradition, at least in science, had existed in Japan from the Meiji period onward. In spite of a perceived blanket of conformity, there have been several examples of Japanese tradition in science going back to the early period of its introduction, as outlined by Ian Inkster in Chapter 1. Thus, Kitasato Shibasaburo discovered natural immunity in medicine, although the 1901 Nobel Prize for this was given to Von Behring of Germany alone. Similarly, during World War I, Yamagiwa Katsusaburo of Tokyo University discovered a technique for inducing tumors into laboratory animals (although again the Nobel Prize went to the Dane Johannes Fibiger). It is true that some of this work was done abroad - Shibasaburo did his work in collaboration with Von Bering. Yet on the other hand, Shiga Kiyoshi discovered the dysentery bacillus on work done in Japan. Yamagiwa Katsusaburo demonstrated that he could produce tumors in laboratory animals and Nagaoka Hantaro proposed a model of the atomic nucleus. A more recent example of Japanese creativity would be Kimura's neutral theory of evolution which posits that evolution did not take place primarily through competition. Kimura has suggested that evolution proceeds not only by competition but also by adaptively neutral mutations. This is a major departure from the 'struggle for survival' model of evolution going back to Darwin. Yet as Darwin himself admitted, his ideas were influenced by Malthus' views on population and the struggle for resources, as well as other social ideas of competition prevalent 41

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN in the 19th century. Although research has to be done before any firm statement can be made, it is perhaps suggestive that Kimura mapped - consciously or unconsciously - some elements of Japanese-type group relations and wa in his model, as Darwin did the opposite in his model, illustrating the creative potential of cultural crossflows. Conclusion The Japanese attempts at creating a new scientific tradition take place within a particular national setting. This social structure had developed out of pre-Meiji origins under criteria, carefully laid down from to time, by members of the Japanese ruling elite. These efforts had given rise to a highly conformist, though very productive society. It had also attendant negative social facets. The Japanese attempts at technological tradition are within a particular national structure. This social structure had developed out of pre Meiji origins under criteria, carefully laid down from time to time, by members of the Japanese ruling elite. These efforts had given rise to a highly conformist, though very productive society. It had also attendant negative social facets like the delegation of women to a second-class status, and the spreading of a blanket of conformity. The present search for technological tradition with its slogans, and cries about 'crazy' ideas, as well as the urging of 'non-conformity' seems at first sight to be a challenge to this conservative society, it is very unlikely that exercises of 'craziness' would take hold in the Japanese society at large, so as to shake it from its larger conformist mould. The demands for scientific tradition come from the ruling elite itself who have seen limits to their markets in the existing products and now are searching for a new product array. It appears that 'craziness' is being introduced today under an updated Wakon Yosai ('Japanese Spirit, Western Civilization') which would very probably still allow the society to remain socially conformist and conservative. However, reforms in the educational system, if followed with zeal, and if they actually encourage a move away from cramming and drilling into sameness - might lead to a more democratic, pleasanter and less conformist society. Such effects however, will take place to a great extent, in the longer term. The present cry of technological tradition has being emphasized at the highest levels of the Japanese system. These levels which have close links with large scale production and other organizations, have themselves 42

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN contributed structurally to the perceived sterility of the Japanese mind. It is very unlikely therefore that these holders of power would allow the traditional slogan to go beyond defined bounds, so as to threaten the status quo.

43

Chapter 4

Cultural Resources, Social Control and Technology Transfer: Industrial Transition Prior to 1914 Ian Inkster

Introduction Japan is different. The hustle of Tokyo's Narita airport may present a super-modern, industrial culture which overwhelms the cheap Japanese trifles of tradition and the trinkets of tourism. Nevertheless, that complex place is embedded in a Japanese 'culture' which allows a tyro foreigner to abandon her expensive ^ggage in the middle of the huge passenger areas and go in search of coffee and not expect that luggage to be stolen. The speed and dissolution of city life do not prevent the Japanese taxi driver from searching out and locating the owner of a wallet, handbag or even cash who has left their belongings in his taxi. Much of this is now on the wane, but such aspects of Japanese life tempt observers, including historians, to project backwards, to assume that this 'difference' is a continuation of traditional Japanese cultural traits in the face of the homogeneities of industrial modernization. Japan escaped British Luddism or Russian revolution because the new technologies of the West and the speedy industrialisation of the nation were absorbed into an adaptable and flexible Japanese cultural frame. As with other contributions in this volume, the present chapter complicates such a simple perspective. But we should not ignore all cultural labels and must start somewhere if we wish to throw any light upon the remarkable record of Japan in the search to comprehend and assimilate the great array of industrial technique which flowed into the nation from Europe and North America from the 1860s. In a famous statement of position, Talcott Parsons claimed that any 'single factor theories belong to the kindergarten stage of social science's development' because, of course, all significant social 'factors' are interdependent with several others. Thus Parsons 45

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN appealed to a causal pluralism which allowed for hierarchical ordering of the relative importance of differing 'causal' factors or processes. Causal pluralism does not entail an abrogation of analytical responsibilities, but quite the reverse. In carrying out these responsibilities, Parsons arrived at culture: If he was to be labelled it was as a 'cultural determinist, rather than a social determinist'.1 Many approaches to Japan's industrial history are in this sense Parsonian, tending to give extra weight, if not privilege, to mental or ideational factors in lists of proffered explanations, and in some cases advancing a strong nihonjinron perspective wherein Japanese culture is both the essential multicause and unique.2 Japan seems to present an enigmatic culture and paradoxical tradition. Indeed, an essential role of Japanese 'culture' appears to have been to reconcile such apparently conflicting frames of mind as those represented by Confucianism, Buddhism, German idealism and indigenous Shinto. But this leads to two formal queries: When is a 'cultural trait' somehow really Japanese? (and not Asian). Within Japan itself, when can an event or process be said to be truly of the culture rather than an imperfect reflection of the cultural engineering activities of the ruling interests? Together these questions may identify the problems of any 'cultural' approach to Japan's industrial and technological success. Japan's long history is one of sporadic cultural transfers and accumulations. Early Buddhism in Japan was fundamentally a religion of refugees, immigrants, diplomats and commercial agents. It acted as a political tool of the ruling family, at least generally comparable to the role of Western liberal thought in the much later Meiji industrialization process. Again, Japanese Buddhism provides early examples of deliberate cultural manipulation, most commonly symbolized in the figure of Prince Shotoku Taishi (574-622), who, in the terms of Masahura Anesaki 'found in Buddhism a universal basis for the relationship of the ruler to the ruled. His inspiration helped in advancing national unity and in subduing the clannish spirit under it.'3 Considering the Meiji transition of the 19th century, it is as noteworthy that Shotoku was as prepared to utilize Confucianism to the same general social end and to popularise such notions through Chinese arts, from architecture to flower arrangement.4Japanese scholars have commonly emphasized worldly gains and a lack of 'real faith' in the early history of Japanese belief systems.5 Here I wish to qualify any stark distinctions between the 'economy' or material techniques on the one hand and Japanese 'culture' on 46

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN the other, by suggesting that at key points of transition (focusing in this essay on the years of Meiji industrialization circa 18681912) a series of institutional innovations in the socio-political system of Japan served to engineer a working relationship between existent cultural traits and intrusive Western technologies as a necessary condition of successful industrial modernization. Thus, much of Japan's industrial success may indeed be explored in terms of fundamental 'cultural traits' but only in the sense that culture was a resource drawn upon by key agents and sites of material change. A nation did not move into modernity as a unit on the march, mobilized by outside forces. Key groups of Japanese more or less influenced by the West (often in fear) utilized Japanese culture quite overtly. Conceivably, this set a scene for Japanese development which in the 20th century resulted in very complex relationships between the 'State' and the 'market'.6 In turn, this unusual relationship or juxtaposition became an important element in catch-up industrial progress from the 1950s and well beyond. The Smoothing of Japan Many very influential commentators have emphasized the relatively gentle character of the Japanese transition towards industrial modernity after the great Meiji Restoration of 1868. Perhaps the close diplomatic and political relations of Japan and Britain during the very early 20th century lent something to the notion that the industrialization of the island nation of Japan was at least similar to that of the hegemonic island empire of Great Britain.7 British Luddism and the Swing Riots of the early 19th century industrial revolution were disruptive and vital in the emergence of a highly specific class culture : But they were not revolution. If expensive policing and 'social control' was not in fact the source of Britain's industrial transition,8 then British culture' somehow produced accommodation and adjustment, a thriving and manipulative aristocratic class and a sense of overall equipoise after the mid-century celebration of British technological supremacy in the 1851 Great Exhibition.9 And it was just such exhibitions of industry alongside the great demonstrations of military strength in the Opium wars and the Crimea which so influenced the early Asian response to the technologies of the West.10 Whatever its historical origin, the idea that Japan's 'transition' was and is basically unproblematic, involving little in the way of 47

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN a great discontinuity or a clash between contending interests or classes, is a popular one in both Asia and the West. It is strengthened in the seemingly disinterested, a-political measurements of the expert economic historians. If measurable economic growth in Tokugawa Japan over a very long period (1603-1868) led almost inevitably to the industrial revolution of the Meiji years, then perhaps no significant socio-cultural or political discontinuity might be expected. Like its notional opposite, this perspective is, naturally, highly politicized. On one hand, such a view of Japan strengthens the policy hand of those who would wish to interpret modern Asian success as an outcome of concensus, with an underlying democracy arising from the potency of market forces.11 On the other hand, such a view strengthens the political hand of those many authorities who have an interest in today's underdeveloped nations, those who have seemingly missed the boat of Newly Industrialized Country development. Japanese history here shows that future modernity is inevitable, but slow, evolutionary and an outcome of organic processes involving little in the way of abrupt changes in direction or transformation of institutions. Of course, for more serious scholarly work, a specific agency or variety of agencies is yet required in order to establish theories of motivation, and such agency must be situated in specific geographical and social locations. An excellent example of this smoothing ofJapan may be found in a general work for historians by one of the world's leading Japanologists, the American, Edwin O Reichauer. Writing of the industrial transition from a view which stresses the significance of technology transfer into Japan from the West, Reichauer emphasizes the importance of Japanese assimilation of 'elements of Western civilization', and notes that the 'Japanese determined to learn from each Western county that in which it particularly excelled' for they saw 'at once that a technically competent populace was a prerequisite for a modern power.' And so emerged the dualistic formula in which 'Western science and cheap oriental labour made an excellent combination for low-priced production.'12 In an even more generalized framework, Kenwood and Lougheed claim that it was the readiness of the Japanese to 'adopt Western industrial techniques rapidly' which best explains the divergence in the subsequent paths followed by that country and China.13 In a onepage summary of the significance of Japanese history, Sumihito Hirai found room to affirm that the 'first step to economic development was to learn and imitate Western technology.'14 In 48

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN this class of interpretation, Japanese history is smoothed over, for here 'determination', presumably that of empowered leadership, is sufficient to power the transition of a whole system of 30 million people. Similarly, seeing 'at once' does at least imply a faultless cognition: The insightful leadership of a few could irreversibly mobilize the many. The well-known global approach of Everett Hagen, which is generally based on the idea of the destabilizing and energizing effects of status-withdrawal, provides a more precise story of agency and of social siting of key initial change. In accordance with more recent work on the industrial and commercial functions of the ex-samurai during the early years of the Meiji transition and on their even more complex social positions prior to that,15 Hagen argued that the motivations of the financially threatened samurai were crucial to any interpretation of transition, and revolved around the historical repercussions of the withdrawal of status respect for samurai groups during the preceding Tokugawa era. The commercial and social 'humiliation' of the samurai 'made it clear that technological progress was the only possible road to the restoration of national dignity,' at the same time as internal political changes 'made it clear that economic prowess offered the greatest opportunity for the subordinated groups'. Because the samurai possessed high honour 'the nation followed them' and with this agency 'Japan entered upon continuing technological progress'.16 Again, this is a clear enough story, but we do have a lot of inducement to 'clarity' and a 'nation' following the actions or exhortations of an 'honoured indigenous group' hitherto subordinated. There must be problems with this even beyond any contention concerning the history of the samurai as a very heterogeneous and complex social group: Indeed, the samurai encapsulated so diverse a variety of interests and incomes that they are better thought of as an array of groups.17 However, such writing conforms to common views held by the contemporary Japanese themselves. Thus A Samurai* writing in a newspaper in the mid-1880s. The Government, ever since the Restoration, vigorously set itself to many difficult works which involved the total change of the national foundation - a task which cannot be achieved by weak governments. The people, too, recognised the permanent influence of the Occidental civilisation and flung themselves headlong into the race 49

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN with other nations, in spite of the numerous sacrifices, expecting nothing but a fair treatment at their hands.18 The images here are very strong: efficient action, legitimized by the ready concurrence of the nation at large, urged on once more by the pressures from outside. With culture in place, the West energises an adaptive system towards modernized industry and trade. In all, these are stories of a very smooth transition to industrial modernity, accounts which in themselves do not consider the problems attached to terms such as 'culture' or 'recognised', and which neglect vital areas of empowerment and conflict. Sophistications A first sophistication of the simpler smoothing approaches is to postulate the accomodating role ofJapanese culture. Key features or traits may be identified and characterized in such a way as to establish them as either the motivational wellsprings of change or the central mechanisms which enabled a national accommodation to the West. Perhaps one of the most repeated of such claims was the contemporary one concerning the Japanese honour ethic of Bushido (bu-shi-do: military-knightly-ways), the sub-culture of the samurai.19 Thus Nitobe Inazo accounted for the various phases of industrial development as taking place against an enabling cultural background, predicting that 'we shall likely get richer, uglier and noisier for a long while to come.'20 The conditions of the Nitobe model were as follows: the Bushido ethos survived the Restoration conflicts (1867-68), as did many other traditional traits; prior to this the bushido idea had 'filtered through the social class for which and by which they were developed and leavened the whole nation' - so the popular saying that as 'amongst flowers the cherry', then so 'amongst men the samurai'; according with the Hagen model, the knightly class (not classes) were automatically 'followed' by the multitude of 'tradesmen and peasants'; honour as an ethic and honour as a practice were, in other's words, 'unsever'd friends', ultimately forging Japanese society as 'an encampment', highly prepared, easily mobilised, cemented in service; and, finally, Bushido provided both energy and agency, for during the industrial transition itself, the 'pecuniary or industrial considerations' were only subservient to an initial, motivating 'sense of honour which cannot bear being looked down upon.' This large claim is a compelling one particularly because it accorded so strongly with 50

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN the motivational statements of Meiji system builders. Thus Joyce Lebra's succinct account of the distinguished Meiji statesman Okuma Shigenobu (1838-1922) highlights Okuma's own estimate of the functional character of bushido in the transition to modernisation. So Okuma reminisced in 1895 : 'Bushido had the power to change feudalism into constitutionalism'.21 This is close to Nitobe's own claim, and as with the subsequent commentators sampled above, Okuma stresses leadership/followership and the natural power of culture, albeit a culture trait or complex originating in one stratum and somehow 'filtering down' into the populace prior to the transition of the 1860s. A more convincing cultural account might interpret this social filtration, identify the mechanisms whereby the trait was 'called up' as a dominant one when needed by the system. A near perfect account would contain a behavioural model or set of explicit and coherent assumptions which justified the notion that national systems 'need' anything and that teleology may be smuggled into historical interpretations without notice of intent. Nevertheless, the conception of Japan's flexibility and the relation between socio-cultural adaptation and technological adoption is surely an important one and may not be dismissed by substituting economistic accounts which rely on factor endowments, skills, industrial traditions or agricultural productivity to solve the problem of Japanese success.22 More developed versions of the 'traits' approach take up problems of Japanese distinctiveness - given that Chinese 'culture' did not lead to Chinese economic development prior to 1914, then how did Japanese and Chinese culture differ - and at the same time attempt to address the feasible relations between motivations, attitudes and actual behaviour, a generic problem for historians, who unlike social scientists can not send out questionnaires to their subject populations.23 One of the most interesting of such approaches is that of the most distinguished economist and econometrician, Michio Morishima, who has explicitly tackled the link between a 'Japanese ethos' and the Japanese ability to optimize the use of western technology.24 In crude brevity, the essence of Morishima's historical claim is that Japanese-style Confucianism was fundamentally different from that existing in China and elsewhere, and that this explains both the adaptability of the Japanese of the 19th century and their willingness to adopt industrialization upon a broadly Western model. Where anthropologists and sociologists have often overemphasised the dampening impacts of 'traditional 51

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN culture' on modernism - a popular theme of the 1960s especially - Morishima argues that an historical cultural trait may act as a fundamental machina of technological change in a hitherto isolated national system. That is, Morishima offers motive power as well as motivation, a method of transformation and a definite trajectory. In this he follows but greatly elaborates the earlier, perhaps more hesitant suggestions of Japanese writers such as Horie Yasuzo.25 In briefly considering the 'cultural influence' of Confucianism on Meiji entrepreneurship, Horie alludes to the 'common characteristic' of a Confucian education which differed in many respects from that of China. Following S. Azuma in his fundamental monograph of 1944,26 Horie emphasizes how Japanese Confucianism was accessible because of its simpler metaphysic, blended into Japanese Shintoism, with the latter's stress on loyalty and filial piety, and was influential upon Bushido's spread. With reference to our own emphasis on technology transfer, Horie judges that Confucianism's 'rationalism bred habits of mind that facilitated the introduction of Western technology. Intellectual discipline coupled with a flexible pragmatism made the Japanese quick to take up Western learning when its practical utility for national defence and other purposes became clear. Yet it also cultivated an instinctive nationalism, even in the process of adopting Western ways'.27 These are powerful images, and the analysis is strengthened with further claims as to the continuing centrality of the Confucian ethos in the lives of entrepreneurs even into the 20th century, the use of Confucian virtues in Meiji business practice and labour relations and the consequent development of a notion of 'enlightenment and civilization' which allowed an otherwise stark contradiction of traditionalism and modernity to co-exist over a considerable period.28 The distinctiveness of Japanese Confucianism from that of China, and its representativeness as an effective ethos of leadership and followership, is crucial to such cultural interpretations. Weber had earlier argued that traditional China was held back not by fundamental economic structures but by a patrimonial state and bureaucracy which failed to reduce risk (thus failed to induce any risk-taking habits), and that the behaviour of the literati followed from Confucian attitudes. Thus, in Weber, Confucianism could only be contrasted with Protestantism, with the one eschewing thriftiness and hard work for office-holding and self-perfection.29 Yet as with Weber, so with Morishima and others, it is perhaps 52

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN too tempting to emphasize certain social characteristics within a sect, value or belief system, often in the light of later presumptions concerning motivation and attitude. For instance, Morishima's great example, the second of the Twelve Articles in the Constitution of Shotoku (the Taika reform of AD 645-649), is the first instance of significant differentiation between Japanese and Chinese Confucianism.30 But here, Buddhism rather than Confucianism is advocated. Again, when the Confucian elements of the resulting constitution are surveyed, we discover highlighting of the 'Chinese' virtues of harmony, benevolence, sincerity and civil service, quite as much as the 'Japanese' virtue of loyalty. It is also well-known that other belief systems, such as Shintoism, performed an analogous function in the wider 'inculcation of loyalty', that there was never one representative mode of Japanese Confucianism, and that several Confucian schools were incorporated into Buddhism.31 More pragmatically, since the 1970s the economic rise of East Asia has been claimed as a reflection of certain aspects of Chinese Confucianism in both popular and convincing academic accounts.32 Recent studies of overseas Chinese business activity suggest great strength, adaptability and success, and yet such outcomes are not shot home to the prima-causa of Japanese style Confucianism.33 Perhaps more importantly still, even within Morishima's historical accounts there is evidence that socio-economic imperatives at times induce a usage (a 'calling up') of strategic cultural traits, amongst which were elements of the Confucian virtue system. In several cases, already empowered elites in Japan appear to have quite overtly fashioned and projected a style of Confucianism which best served their interests.34 Culture was not a dominant 'resource' to be lent on at will, but a problematic tool, adapted to the urges of already entrenched interests and sites of change. Culture becomes mediation, but a medium which in use is changed or reformulated (see below). Finally, as with most attempts at socio-cultural approaches (and we do not escape the problem in this essay by any means), it perhaps bears repetition that accounts such as these recognise no great distinctions, no tears in the fabric which weaves together motive, attitude and behaviour. Cultural Engineering for Technological Transfer Another sophistication of the basic cultural approach is to avoid the longer term argument altogether, and to point out that the fundamental distinction of Japan lay in its rapid establishment of 53

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN institutions which protected and diffused a value system of obedience, quietism and loyalty, concensus and reciprocity. Such institutional reformation, of course, drew upon a cultural base, but the distinctiveness of Japan lay not so much in the character of that base as in the astuteness of leadership and the consequent effectiveness of those institutions. Other systems 'failed' to transfer technique not because of their 'culture traits' as such, but because of the cultural confusion and disarray associated with social change under conditions of relative economic backwardness. Political revolution destroyed industrial revolution. This perspective, which we might label cultural-institutional, is seemingly immediate and apt, given a starting point which contains an already established, literate and purposeful controlling elite. Such an approach gives rise to the application to Japan of notions such as 'strategic elite', as in the work of Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Myers, who claim that during the transition, the authority 'of the emperor was maintained ... the traditional culture favoured the dynamic elite as the prime movers toward industrialisation, and this elite in turn preserved as much of that culture as possible.'35 This is a grand result which may be directly derived from the 'cultural engineering' argument. The early Tokugawa authorities institutionalized Confucianism itself as the dominant lay philosophy of the early seventeenth century, encapsulated in Ieyasu's support and employment of Shushiy the foundation of the official Tokugawa college (Shokeiko), the employment of Confucian advisors by individual daitnyo and the setting up of private academies in the major centres of Kyoto, Osaka and Edo.36 From that time other, political measures were added to cultural control, and this was a sufficient mix until the disruptive effect of the reform movements of the 1830s and 1840s.57 At this point, and faced with an increasingly 'displaced' samurai stratum (see Hagen above and the comments on this approach), the late-Tokugawa regime sponsored the new Confucianism, bushido and so on, as means of control and integration, this aiding the 'filtration' process whereby samurai values 'became' Japanese values. Thus, Harootunian writes that samurai values 'transmuted and creatively adapted, became the emblem of an entire society and in the process the class was robbed of whatever special identity it once possessed'.38 As the samurai groups became the backbone of the industrializing system after 1868, it followed that the articulation of their goals and policies was seen or felt as an expression of national values 54

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN and needs. So, Reinhard Bendix characterises the turmoil of 1868 as 'tailor made for men who suffered from the acute discrepancy between their high social rank and their lowly economic position,' and goes on to argue that the position of the Samurai vis-a-vis that of the Junker was a principal reason for the divergence in the pattern of industrialisation between Japan and Prussia.39 Thus a nation's transition becomes opportunistic. Through the creation of public institutions after 1868, key cultural traits could be enrolled into the purposes of industrialization. Thus Koschmann: The Meiji leaders laid the groundwork for soft rule by incorporating in their political creation an ethos of familistic national unity designed to ameliorate firm bureaucratic control. The emperor, newly reconfirmed as patriarch and ruler, provided credibility and legitimacy to the system as a whole... Success and high position were the rewards for faithful service... All in all, the ruling elite successfully dominated the public sphere throughout the Meiji and Taisho eras, encouraging and exploiting all political efforts to work within the system.40 Here the elite leans on features of the existent culture and provides the energy and has the power to thereby propel the 'adoption' of modern technologies. Culture is mobilized and formalized through institutions. In the case of Meiji Japan, the most obvious set of institutions to fit this view of the cultural argument was that of education, the subject of a great deal of scholarly output.41 If cognition, intention and the power of system builders is not to provide the sole argument for transition, then a functional approach to newly created educational institutions may provide some clue as to how an existing empowerment was translated into social system change. Education is a suitable case for treatment as it reformed relatively speedily (the confused period ending with the Education Ordnance of 1879 was followed by a systematizing of education at all levels under Arinori Mori from the mid-1880s), because it was always a battle ground of Confucian, nationalist and civil rights advocates, and because, unusually for a case of such relative economic backwardness, it developed from an earlier male basic literacy level of around 40% to 50%42 and a sophisticated, if at the same time somewhat piecemeal, array of 55

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN institutions which may have enrolled up to one million students at any one time during later Tokugawa.43 Although education takes us back to Reichauer's claim about Japan as a student of Western technology, a far greater amount was spent by the State on basic literacy and value - indoctrination than on the much-lauded modernizing of higher technical, scientific, commercial and legal education.44 The total cost to government of mass education during the Meiji era accumulated to around 1000 million yen, about one-third of all local government expenditure and equivalent to about 25 times the annual land tax revenue of the late 1870s.45 The modern Japanese estimate of the manner in which this Meiji system simultaneously increased cultural and commercial efficiency is best represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1972 summary that 'all people were first educated in 'becoming loyal subjects' at primary schools, followed by absorption into higher schools, depending on the degree of 'ability'. This made it possible to take into government service out of a vast pool of talent those people who were considered appropriate for the state and to bring the society classified into strata according to the degree of schooling closer to a society based upon ability.'46 Furukawa Tesshi has suggested that twin traits of the Japanese may be labelled 'spirit of the governed' and 'spirit of the taught' and that these derive largely (not entirely) from the character and authority of the 1890 Imperial Edict on National Education (Kyoiku Chokugo) for the moral training of the people, a law readily traceable to the Bushido textbooks of the early eighteenth century.47 Such formulations have been judged by later Western writers, such as Josiah Royce, as being the quintessential carriers of the most extreme of the loyalty doctrines.48 If not itself fundamental, then education became one vehicle of the transmission of the values of the elite to the populace at large, one which was invested in and institutionalized to an extent not witnessed elsewhere. Complications Several historical and analytical drawbacks are evident in any of the accounts of Japanese industrial and technological modernization which fix on either cultural continuities and resources (of the system) or cultural manipulations (by the elite in the system). Apart from not exploring adequately the continued power and cohesion of the elite during the transition period (say, the 1830s to the 1880s), they fail to sufficiently 56

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN acknowledge the great social and political conflicts which did occur in Japan prior to circa 1885. They tend to presume a 'Western technique' or form of industrialization which is homogeneous, i.e. the Western techniques of production and organization faced by the Japanese were on the whole those faced also by the Chinese, the Egyptians or the Russians. Such approaches do tend to rely upon a rather artificial and crude distinction between ideational/cultural forces of social change and structural (socio-economic) ones. Here, we may only very briefly suggest how such points complicate the cultural arguments. Despite the simpler arguments, Japanese culture was by no means sufficient to prohibit conflict between the industrializing elite, the ex-samurai and the larger population.49 This may be best illustrated for the years approximately 1875-1885, within which period the famous Satsuma Rebellion (1877) occurred. Although this civil war has often been discussed as a mere populist backlash, it was a major crisis, eventually met by enormous government expenditures and was seemingly associated with the more 'modern' ideologies entering Japan alongside the hard technologies of the West. Tokyo, Osaka, Nagasaki and other centres of technique import were also hosts to modernisttraditionalist debates in which Mill, Spencer, Darwin, Rousseau, Carlyle, Buckle and de Tocqueville were confusedly entwined.50 For a brief period there appears to have been a real causal association of new ideologies and physical force protests.51 Physical rebellion was by no means confined to the major sites of modernity in the large cities. Of over one thousand southern rebels who were sentenced by the Kyushu Special Court for May to December 1877, some 208 (18%) were from the Tokyo Fu, 151 (13%) from the Miyagi Ken, and 88 (7%) from Niigata, but the remaining 60% were divided fairly evenly amongst the 12 ken of Yamanashi, Gunma, Saitama, Tochigi, Chiba, Ibaragi, Ishikawa, Akita, Iwate, Yamagata, Tokushima and Aomori.52 Centres of unrest, such as Tosa, became centres of political ferment and locations for political meeting and debating, offered by the exsamurai (shizoku). Festering local dissatisfactions frequently became politicized. For instance, from around 1871 thousands of small farmers in the Nagasaki region (especially in Hiza province) threatened local authorities over rights to land, failing repeatedly in the local courts, but became politicized during 1881 as the result of the actions of outside political agents, mounting physical attacks on the local shoya (former village heads or chiefs) during the spring and early summer of that year.53 57

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN Furthermore, for the first time in Japan, unrest possessed a national voice through the fast expanding press and postal services. As early as 1878-79 some 56 million items were being sent through the internal system, a figure rising to over 83 million by 1880-81.54 The political public was large by most nineteenth century standards. The Osaka Nippo of 1882 estimated that Japan boasted some 50% of all the political journals published in Asia (some 400) and that they had an annual circulation of between 35 and 38 million.55 Fluctuations in the circulation of individual provincial newspapers was linked to political events. The increased official pressure brought to bear on the press during the Kumamoto outbreak of late 1876 did not prevent the wellplaced Kumamoto Shimbun from increasing its daily sales between 5000 and 6000.56 By the mid-1880s such political threat was, dramatically, over, a result of a mixture of severe repression, official rewards to selected agitators and political persuasions of an imminent democratic constitution.57 But it is clear that until then, opposition to industrial policy was strong. Culture was not sufficient to curtail conflict. Indeed, Buddhist priests and associations at times led the cry against all things Western or modern, making 'progress in proportion to the violence of their opinions.'58 We have also suggested that Japanese society did not face an especially disruptive form of Western technology transfer. Several Japanese and Western writers have stressed the buoyancy of the rural industrial sector throughout the transition, a sector which with apparent ease absorbed much in the way of Western technique, from improvements in button making and lacquer work to the utilization of small electrical motors.59 Although technology transfer in conditions of relative economic backwardness did very frequently centre on technique involving large scale production, application of machine skills and expert technological knowledge, this was less the case in Japan. In even the leading sector cotton industry of the 1880s there was surprisingly little new required in the way of either technological or management skills, and the use of large numbers of female labourers reduced the potential for any truly proletarian unrest.60 At the same time, early Meiji militarism and colonialism employed much of the heavy and skill-intensive techniques in arsenals, dockyards and other public sector enclaves, rather than in purely private establishments where the disarray between the new and the old would have been perhaps greater and less easily justifiable in traditionalist terms.61 58

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN Finally, it is surely clear enough that the distinction between 'culture' and 'structure' is too often implicit, overdone and is perhaps now outmoded. So, even in the example of the early modern changes supposedly causally associated with the later industrialization of Britain, most explanatory attempts may still be placed on a scale ranging from Marxian (base to structure to culture with some feedback), through the work of Lawrence Stone (structures to culture), to the novel work on individualism by the anthropologist and historian Alan Macfarlane (culture to structure and perhaps to base).62 In the case of a very late industralizer such as Meiji Japan, where almost all analysts agree to some form of impact coming from exogenous forces, we might well expect the resulting confusion and the speeding up of events to yield very different accounts of the work of culture, ones which were highly politicized at the time and have remained so ever since. How much damage has been done by the schematics of Chart X in terms of the various arguments above? Also, what would the evidence look like that measured the strength of this approach or, indeed, the validity of any single segment of the figure? It is difficult to estimate the damage done. We can get to the fundamental agency of transition (block D) without any reliance upon the manipulation of culture, but to get to a successful industrial transition (E) we must admit cultural engineering as well as continuing and accumulating technology transfers (ci), and also acknowledge that such strengthening flows further legitimized the policies of the industrializing elite (ei). By the late 1880s industrial success meant that the 'rejection' arguments of groups such as the Jot writers were becoming patently unrealistic - too much was already in place. It was at such a point that Fukuzawa Yukichi evolved a series of cultural and political propositions which fell between those who adopted everything Western and those who considered 'Westernism' still detachable from a broader cultural commitment.63 Other intellectual strategies were forged, such as these of Tokutomi Soho and his followers who began to reject fundamental Japanese cultural traits, arts and institutions, or the renewed search for a 'usable past' as formulated by the Seikyosha after 1888 (caught at flow (e) in the figure). Ultimately (block F), as Kenneth Pyle has summarized, the notion of sekai no bunmei (world civilization) obliged many of the intellectuals and bureaucrats 'to preserve and develop their distinctive talents and values in order to supplement the contribution of Western culture [to world civilization].'64 59

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN

Chart X Cultural Resources and Japanese Industrialisation

Exogenous (Western) Forces

energy c - direction and energy

a - direction

The Empowered Industrialising Elite

D technology transfer

legitimising processes

Meiji Industrialisation

E cultural I

I production

V The Twentieth Century

F

The manner of drawing up blocks A and B merely circumnavigates some of the basic problems faced by the text above. Assuming some liberalized and loosened version of a 60

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN structural-functional sociology, then we may slot in Hagen, McClelland and others by allowing flows (a) and (b), which in turn point to the vital agency of samurai groups and so on. The forced development typically associated with extreme relative backwardness more generally65 is explained away at block C and in flows (c) and (ci). In other nations situated similarly, failure arose either because the forces for change from the outside were simply not strong enough or because they directed the decisionmaking system into a trajectory which did not coincide with the demands being set by internal cultural and social forces. Finally, the figure implicitly argues that the existence of an empowered industrializing elite may not be sufficient to sustain an industrial drive under conditions of severe backwardness prior to 1914 in the absence of determined, probably expensive cultural engineering and institutional innovation (particularly education), the direction of which is possibly charted though the skill and control imperatives associated with further technology transfers (ci). This approach fails to do anything at all to explore the capacity of the Meiji system to select, absorb and accept foreign technologies (ie to be manipulative of flows c and ci and not merely terminals of them). Accepting the ambivalence of the precise functional relationships between blocks A and B, the stark distinctions between 'cultural' and 'structural' aspects begins to break down at the point where the individual analyst (Morishima or Inkster etc) claims that the character of the interpretative schema for any particular set of events or activities depends upon the point in the diagram upon which you happen to alight. Perhaps the best use of an authority figure such as this is to illustrate the enormous difficulties of any of the outstanding cultural approaches, as well as to point out the equal difficulty of readily distinguishing between and/or negotiating between socalled cultural and so-called structural interpretations of Japan's successful industrial transition. That is, it is all but impossible to imagine what the evidence would look like which would enable historians to, for instance, run exclusively down block B to flow (b) block D, without recourse to the other feasible elements. There seems to be no possibility of convincing quantification and no theoretical system which would yield unambiguous empirical operations for the relevant blocks and flows. In the end, this means that Parsons' move from a necessary multi-causality to a sufficiently 'cultural' determinism will not work for historians of Japanese industrialization. 61

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN

Exits : Japan as an Avoidance System? Although I am sceptical of any approaches that over-emphasise a distinction between the 'cultural' components of a social system and its 'structures', I also doubt models which place the cultural component as finally causal. I have suggested in this essay that some form of socio-culture argument is required in interpreting Japan's successful industrial transformation in the later nineteenth century However open and inconclusive such approaches may appear, the grey result may at times be superior to black and white results derived for simplistic economistic assumptions regarding the existence and operation of market institutions, rational behaviour and allocations and so on. But the stress here on the cultural empowerment of an industrializing elite and its consequent cultural, industrial and commercial activities gives a very incomplete result. In particular, we still require some explanation of the manner in which 'control' by the elite carried through the traumas of 'Westernism', new cultural and ideological challenges, and new technological potentials and requirements. As a last exit from culture we might suggest that the story of Meiji industrialization is essentially a story of avoidance. There is a very acute sense in which Japan never did confront the West, its ambitions, its traditions and its ideologies. Such a Toynbeean vision of wholesale cultural confrontation, reaction and response, mimesis and adaptation, might be wholly inapplicable to this case. Nor was Japanese 'culture' the stable medium through which Western ideas and artefacts were screened, selected and efficiently utilized. Rather, very specific, essentially artificial sites of endeavour were constructed in arsenals, armament factories, model factories, dormitory complexes, docks, stations and lighthouses, colleges and schools, and far more government finance was devoted to the avoidance of any direct, systematic cultural or social confrontation between Japan and the West than was ever spent on high technology, industrial projects as such. The resulting sites acted not so much as enclaves of development as harbours of conflict, change and development. At times, conflict and doubt moved out of such sites, was diffused and advertized more widely. More commonly it was contained nicely within them. Because they were not forged solely or mainly by private agency out of technological imperatives, such coastal and urban points were not distinct enclaves within and surrounded by 'foreign' territory. They were more like harbours, within which a specifically appointed and 62

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN negotiated 'foreigness' or 'otherness' was confined, studied and modified, where agents were only allowed to enter or exit on specific terms. Where laws and other institutional devices were constructed to ensure this as far as possible at reasonable cost, where the Japanese 'interior' was hallowed and protected deliberately, not wasted by the inevitability embedded forces of 'capitalist development', a common enough feature of underdevelopment in the twentieth century. This view entails another sort of history of Japan, one concentrated on the power of the elite and the precise interactions and mechanisms crafted by that elite which were fabricated to ensure continued interactions between the Japanese and Westerners, continued but controlled flows of foreign ideology and machinery, continued demonstrations of the possibilities inherent in Westernized industrialization. Territories in and around Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka and Nagasaki became the principal sites of transformation, not Japanese 'culture' or Japanese 'society'. Within such sites, the highest status of cultural agents, including the Emperor himself, his court and retinue, most government ministers, ex-princes of the Empire and ex-nobles at large, fashioned the transformation of a nation. In this process they drew upon cultural resources beyond the bounds of such sites in a manner suggested in the text above and as illustrated in the figure. In turn, the empowered utilized such cultural resources in the further, sustained spread of the 'spirit of industry' (a phrase used by the Emperor in public celebrations at such sites during the early 1880s). The commissioned and non-commissioned officers of change were exposed to industrial modernity through foreign trips and studies, but even more through the day to day interactions with Western agency in the ports and foreign settlement of the Meiji period. From a very early stage they represented themselves as, literally, students of change, and the words of a popular song amongst the Westernized student elite concluded, 'He's a student! He's a student - in disparagement they say; yet the present Privy Council, what but students all are they?'66 Defined so widely, Japanese students of change may well have drawn upon a great array of cultural resources in both internalizing and legitimizing their potentially disruptive activities. But, as I have urged above, this perfectly valid point does not in itself establish a satisfactory 'cultural' argument.

63

Chapter 5

From Imitation to Creativity Kazumasa Iinuma

The Enigma Surrounding Japan's Modernization It is widely recognised that one of the forces spurring the modernization, particularly the industrialization, of the advanced countries of the western world has been the spirit of individualism found in those countries.1 This view helps to explain the historical development of the West but it cannot be applied to Japan. So what has driven Japan's modernization and industrial development? This has come to be seen as something of an enigma. Japan has had remarkable success in modernizing and industrializing herself, though it is hard to claim that the process was bolstered by individualism. Japan's modernization began with the Meiji Restoration in 1868, and over the subsequent 130 years there is hardly a trace of evidence to suggest that individualism played an influential part in the modernization process. While it cannot be dismissed totally, it is difficult to identify the existence of a spirit of individualism strong enough to propel social development. Instead, there has been a deep belief within Japanese society that groups, or society as a whole, should be valued highly. It is a belief that does not regard the individual as a source of merit; it holds that there is more worth to be found in the 'whole', whether this is family, social grouping or society as a whole. As a result of this, the spirit of individualism has always been weak in Japan. As her modernization cannot be explained in terms of a view widely accepted in the West, Japan appears to resemble a car with no visible engine. How does this car manage to go as fast as cars with engines - in fact, even faster, in recent years?

65

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN

Social Institutions Reinforcing Deference to the 'Whole' In 1868 the feudalistic political administration of the Tokugawa shogunate collapsed2 in an upheaval that saw a revival of the status of the imperial house which for some centuries previously had not represented a significant political force. Taking the name of the new Emperor, this revival came to be known as the Meiji Restoration.3 The re-instated 'emperor system' was complemented by a parliament, and the aim of the newly-formed political administration was to turn Japan into a modern state with an industrialized society modelled on the advanced European states. They set about creating an institutional framework to achieve this, but that framework turned out to be an amalgam of institutions drawn from modernized western countries combined with a legacy of feudalistic Tokugawa social practices. I can summarize five of its major features as follows: i) The emperor system: The status of the Emperor was paramount in the hierarchy of political power. Ordinary people enjoyed no independent status as citizens, but were subjects required to be loyal to the Emperor. ii) Imperialistic military: Military administrators answered directly to the Emperor, and were not subject to civilian control through a parliamentary body or cabinet. iii) The family as the lowest legal entity: Society was seen to be made up of families rather than individuals, and the family unit was not based on a married couple but on the male line of grandfather, father, son and grandson. The family was enshrined in civil law as the basic unit of society. iv) The landowner/tenant system in rural society: Landowners holding vast acreages of agricultural land, including rice paddies and arable land, formed a controlling class in rural society. The majority of farmers were agricultural labourers who worked small patches of land rented from landowners and were known as 'tenant farmers'. v) Control of industry by the former zaibatsu families: Manufacturing, finance and commerce were controlled by a small number of enormous business enterprises, the zaibatsu.4 Few middle-sized business concerns had the power to compete with 66

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN them. The zaibatsu enterprises had grown by buying industrial concerns that the Government created and then ran during the first 40 years after the Meiji Restoration. They were thus closely linked to political power. Overall, industrial organization was highly monopolistic and thus uncompetitive. A belief in Japan that one should defer to the family, group or society as a whole worked for the benefit of these five institutions enabling them to maintain social control. The third and fourth, in particular, are clearly legacies of a feudal system that outlasted three centuries of Tokugawa rule.5 With this sort of amalgam of characteristics, Japan proceeded to modernize largely by importing social and cultural practices as well as science and technology from the advanced countries of the west. Development of a modernized society is largely represented by industrial development. In Japan's case, the powerful driving force behind her industrialization was the import of technology from the West. In other words, industrialization was an imitative activity: development did not come about through technology that was the product of the country's own creative resources. For 30 years after the Meiji Restoration, commodities from soap to steam engines were all imported, together with the factories to produce them. There were subsequent moves to make these products and manufacturing facilities within Japan, and once this became possible, the next stage was to import technology in the form of patents and know-how. In this way a domestic technology was fostered that was copied from imported technology.6 In the 70 years following the Meiji Restoration until the start of the Pacific War in 1941, industrialization in Japan was thus spurred by importing western technology. Expressed in the most simple terms, it was development based on imitation. The engine that hauled Japan's industrialization was in fact not Japanese, but western. More accurately, what pulled Japan along was less of an engine than a winch. However the winch arrangement that Japan put in place was extremely effective, as is widely acknowledged. The Outcome of Military Defeat Japan's defeat in the Pacific War in 1945 was a wretched and humiliating experience. The country was left with an urban fabric totally destroyed by bombing and fires; there were food shortages and mass unemployment. People died of starvation, and for several million Japanese repatriated from the former colonies there were no homes and no jobs. At that time Japan was 67

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN undoubtedly one of the poorest countries in the world. Average annual income per head was a mere $100, lower than that of Mexico ($121), while the equivalent figure for the USA was about $1,500. In the face of this scale of poverty, the Allied occupation under General Douglas MacArthur formulated a series of policies for Japan's recovery. Through these policies the five institutional features that had underpinned Japanese society since the Meiji Restoration were largely dismantled. The belief in valuing the 'whole' was also called into question, but it was not entirely discredited or eliminated. It was dressed up differently in what I see as a new set of clothes: the lifetime employment and seniority pay systems. The lifetime employment system was a further powerful force that helped Japan's postwar industrial recovery by pushing it from behind. Its greatest merit was that it brought stability. With large numbers of people unemployed, stable employment was the number one priority for the labour force, and the management side accepted it as a matter of course. It needs to be pointed out here that lifetime employment did not, in fact, guarantee a job until death. It was a system that guaranteed employment over a lengthy term of about 30 years starting from the age of 21 or 22. It is also worth noting that this custom was not something newly introduced into Japan's business and industrial circles after World War II. It had already been practised to some extent before that time.7 The bureaucracy in both central or local government administrations was one of the earliest sectors to enjoy lifetime employment, and it was the rule, too, in almost all the large enterprises in the zaibatsn. But in industrial society overall, there were many more enterprises that did not adopt lifetime employment, usually because they were not structured well enough to be able to offer lifetime employment contracts. Furthermore, there was no legal framework to protect the rights of labour. So for pre-war managers it was far easier both to take on and lay off workers, compared with their post-war counterparts, and lifetime employment was not so widely practised that it could be described as a characteristic feature of Japanese management at that time. After the war, however, labour unions were legalized and the organization of labour spread throughout the country. Lifetime employment became an established social practice that advanced workers' rights. This situation was virtually the same whether for manual workers in steel and shipbuilding or for white collar staff in trading companies or the retail sector. It applied to researchers 68

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN and technicians in universities and research institutes, to government officials, even to journalists in the mass media. Because employment in all sectors took on this same basic form, the way of thinking of working people came to have a great deal in common. And underlying their attitudes was the belief that the group, or the 'whole', should take precedence. It had managed to throw off something of its feudalistic colouring, but was nevertheless a way of thinking that people had from times past been familiar with. Working for 30 years or so in the same organization, people lived out their lives without any experience that gave affirmation of the independence of the individual. They were, however keenly aware of the advantages of belonging to a group and came to depend more on their group becoming more inclined by nature to extol its superior worth. THUS, the pre-war idea of putting the group first and belittling the individual persisted after the war within the lifetime employment system. It is perhaps more accurate to say that it had found new soil in which to survive. The Tractive Force for Japan's Post-war Industrial Development Two factors can be identified as having contributed significantly to Japan's recovery and development after the Second World War: lifetime employment and the import of technology. The lifetime employment system contributed greatly to stabilizing employment, and acted as a powerful force pushing Japan's industrial development, as it were, from behind. It was the import of technology that hauled from the front. It was not only during this period that technology imports played this role: this sort of activity had been continuing since the Meiji Restoration. Before World War II technology was drawn mainly from countries in western Europe such as Germany and Britain, whereas after the war the USA became the major source. After the defeat, imported technology became even more vital for Japanese industry. Japan's industrial infrastructure suffered almost total destruction in US air raids in the closing stages of the war. The quickest way to rebuild, literally from the ashes, was through the import of technology. Particularly in the first 15 years after the war (1945-60), Japanese industrialists and businessmen strove to bring in new technology from overseas, and their efforts covered the whole industrial spectrum, from iron and steel to electric power, electrical machinery, shipbuilding and chemicals. 69

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN There had usually been some resistance to the introduction of new technology to supplant older existing facilities, but in postwar Japan there was virtually no resistance or obstruction. With such an enormous gap in technology levels between Japan and the outside world, industrialists had no choice but to buy in proven technology from overseas. Even should there have been any new technology emerging as a result of creative activities in a particular industry or even in their own firms, it was still safer and more economical for business leaders to import from overseas. The bulk of Japanese industrial leadership chose to import technology during this 15-year period, based on decisions of what made the most economic sense. In other words, during this period Japan was again forced to resort to 'imitation' to kick-start recovery and development. If we look at the longer term, it has to be said that Japan's circumstances throughout the whole century after the Meiji Restoration obliged her to develop through reliance on 'imitation'. However, on reaching the mid-1960s we begin to see signs of a change in this state of affairs, though initially only the smallest hint. Signs of Change: the Mid-1960s For Japan, the mid-1960s represented a lapse of 20 years after the defeat of World War II, or going further back, 100 years after the Meiji Restoration. Post-war recovery had already been completed in 1953, the year in which consumption per head recovered to surpass pre-war levels. Volumes of agricultural produce, the basis of the food supply, had surpassed pre-war levels in 1952, while mining and industrial output had passed that landmark in 1951. In its Economic White Paper of 1956, the government declared that Japan was no longer in post-war economic recovery.8 The economy then entered a phase of high growth, and the distinctive feature of the six years starting in 1955 was the massive investment made in plant and equipment. Pre-war heavy industrial production facilities in steelmaking, shipbuilding and so on, were virtually all destroyed in the war. This eliminated the cost and effort required to dismantle outdated facilities in these sectors, and the most modern production plants could be built from scratch on cleared sites. The auto industry had hardly existed in pre-war Japan, but it began to gain prominence during this period, largely for the production of passenger vehicles. Electronics and petrochemicals represented new industrial endeavours throughout the post-war world, and again meant the construction of new production facilities. All through this period 70

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN Japan did its utmost to import the latest technology from the outside world.9 In 1964 the high speed 'bullet train', the world's fastest, went into service, and Tokyo proudly hosted the Olympic Games. However, in the mid-1960s two signs of change became apparent. One was an indication that a ceiling had been reached in terms of technology imports, matched with a corresponding 'boom' in the building of research facilities in Japan. The second was the first symptoms of a weakening of the lifetime employment system, which coincided with changes to the nation's population structure. The first of these changes I suspected, as early as 1968, indicated a transition 'from imitation to creativity'. It seemed that Japanese technology had reached a turning point and was moving towards creative activity for the first time since the Meiji Restoration. With regard to the second sign of change, I predicted that in the near future the lifetime employment system would face collapse. I also expressed the view that Japan's value concept of placing greater importance on the 'whole' would be forced to shift to one giving priority to the individual. All this I presented in the form of two hypotheses in a book published in 1968.10 Let us look next at these two changes in a little more detail. From Imitation to Creativity The surge of technology imports that lasted more than 15 years after the war gradually began to lose impetus in the mid-1960s. In 1966, referring to a survey into trends in technology imports, the Science and Technology Agency pointed out that new technology had accounted for more than 70 per cent of all technology imports in FY 1961, but by FY1965 this had fallen to 43 per cent, and more than half was for technology identical or very similar to something previously imported. The Agency added that this trend was particularly noticeable in machinery, chemicals and textiles, and for major large-scale installations, the proportion of new technology was even lower. This is what was called at that time 'reaching a ceiling' in imported technology. It was no longer possible to find attractive new technology, in either developed or undeveloped form, in countries overseas. Most of the technology with the greatest appeal had already been imported, and the economic advantages of this activity were steadily declining.11 There was instead heightened activity within Japan, and within individual enterprises, to nurture home-grown technology with future potential, and this led to the boom in 71

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN building research facilities. According to a Science and Technology Agency survey published in 1964, there were 12 research institutes set up by major corporations during the nine years from 1945 to 1954, or one every nine months on average. In the five years between 1955 and 1959, 17 more were established, or one every three to four months. But in just four years beginning I960, a further 32 facilities were opened, an average of eight a year. This 'research institute boom' is also demonstrated in the extremely high growth in investment in research facilities made by major corporate enterprises. In 1959 such investment grew by 39 per cent over the previous year, in I960 30 percent, in 1961 32 percent, and so on.12 Prior to this, with the exception of a very limited number of the largest corporations, Japanese private enterprises did not have any research facilities of their own. Industrialists had not felt the need to establish such facilities (though there were some plants with tiny 'test laboratories' tucked away in a corner). This underlines how much the 'research institute boom' represented entirely new circumstances for Japan's industrial leadership.13 Thus we can see that the two phenomena, the ceiling for technology imports and the research institute boom, were not independent of or unrelated to one another. Investment in home-grown technology continued to grow, and as it began to bear fruit, there was a further development: Japan began to export more and more of her own technology. Trends in technology exports suggest the extent to which Japan is dependent on her own creative research activity, while trends in technology imports indicate the extent of Japan's dependence on imitation. Fortunately, fairly well prepared statistical data on technology imports and exports is available. Both the Bank of Japan and the government's Statistics Bureau publish these statistics as part of their annual surveys. Figure 1 is based on this statistical data. It compares the value of imports (A) and exports (B) of technology and plots their relationship (B/A) as a 'technology trade balance' in percentage terms. As I have said, technology imports indicate the degree of dependence of Japanese technology on imitative activity, while technology exports indicate the degree of dependence on creative activity, and so B/A represents creativity/imitation, and we can take this as an index of Japan's self-reliance in technology. If B/A < 1.0, there is more imitative than creative activity, meaning that Japan remains in the imitative phase. If B/A = 1.0, then there is the 72

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN same degree of creative as imitative activity, and Japan has reached technological independence. If B/A > 1.0, then there is more creative than imitative activity, meaning that Japanese technology is in the creative phase. Figure 1 shows that before I960 the ratio B/A was close to zero, as Japan had no technology to export overseas during this period. But around 1965, the index reached 8.6 percent, from which we may assume that Japan had finally developed technology of her own that she could sell abroad. It then increased steadily until it reached 100 percent (or B/A = 1.0) around 1990. Let us look at two further figures. Figure 2 shows the Figure 1: Technology trade balance reaches equilibrium for the first time in 1989

98% 100%

Figure 2 \ Patents Filed in the US, by Nationality of Inventor W. Germany

k

UK

USA

1970

73.1

30

40

50" 60

70

80

90 100 (%)

O M US. Pmnt and Tfdamartt Otticm

proportion of patents filed with the US Patent & Trademark Office originating from each of five main countries, and the three 73

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN Figure 3 : Patent Citing Index by Country of Origin 2.00

1.50

1.34 1.06

1.00

094

0.80

0.79

0.50

Japan

USA

UK

France WGermany

Data National Science Foundation, NEW YORK TIMES. July 3,1988

Note: The NSF has surveyed the frequency of references on patent applications made to the US Patent Office between 1976-1983, then its frequency tranfered to an Index ("Patent Citing Index") and the NSF analyzed the top 10% of the most frequently cited patents by country of origin. 1.00 on the vertical axis is the average of the five nationalities.

bars, for 1970, 1980 and 1988, together indicate shifts over this period of time. In 1970, the other main countries were ranked after the USA in the order of West Germany, Britain, France and Japan. But by 1980 Japan followed the USA, with West Germany, France and Britain ranking lower. Figures 1 and 2 both refer to quantitative values, but Figure 3 gives an index based on the quality of patents. It is a comparison of the nationalities of origin of important patents quoted in the USA, determined from the frequency with which major patents are quoted in subsequent patent applications. The preceding patents that had been quoted in patent applications between 1976 and 1983 in the USA were retrieved, and the 10 per cent of these earlier patents that were cited most frequently were classified by nationality of origin. This information was published by the National Science Foundation. In my 1968 book From Imitation to Creativity I put forward the hypothesis that Japanese industrial development had reached a turning point. These data for the 30 years following 1968 serve to indicate that my speculations were no longer mere hypothesis, but had been borne out in reality.14 The Demise of Lifetime Employment? Also to appear in the mid-1960s were the first signs of the possible demise of the lifetime employment system. The expression 'lifetime employment', as it is used here, means not just that employees can hold their jobs for a period of 30 years or so; it is combined with a pay system based on seniority. In 74

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN comparison with usual US or European employment systems, the combination of lifetime employment and seniority pay form a system unique to Japan, according to James C. Abegglen, who first introduced this topic to the wider world.15 Under the seniority pay system wages and salaries, in general, rise in accordance with the number of years of employment. Rather than job content, the primary factor in determining pay is the employee's years of service, so the younger the employee, the fewer years of service accumulated, and the lower the pay. As the employee grows older, so the number of years of service, and therefore pay, increase. Under this sort of system, it works to the employee's advantage to remain as long as possible with the same firm or employer, and so people are keen to stay in one job for the whole of their working life. This is lifetime employment, and it goes hand in hand with seniority pay in Japan's most common system of employment. However, the effective working of this system of seniority pay requires the existence of a labour force in which the number of younger employees always exceeds that of their elders. In a labour market where young people become scarce, their levels of pay will inevitably rise, making it difficult to maintain not only the seniority pay system but also lifetime employment. Whether or not the number of young people in employment is greater than that of older people can be determined quite easily from the population structure, that is, the composition of population by age group. Figure 4 shows breakdowns of the Japanese population by gender and age-group. Back in 1965,1 thought that by examining such breakdowns it was possible to predict to some extent whether a seniority pay system could be maintained and lifetime employment supported. The three graphs in Figure 4 give population breakdowns by gender and age-group for the years 1935, 1960 and 1994. That of 1935 is a near-perfect pyramid in shape, but by I960 the shape had changed to resemble more a peaked dome. Noting this change, I predicted in 1965 that it would be difficult to maintain the lifetime employment system in the future.16 A shortage of young workers did, in fact, become evident in the mid-1960s. The numbers graduating from junior high schools were the lowest ever, and these new workers were known in those days as 'golden eggs'. Changes in the population structure that began in the 1960s were the result of a post-war policy to lower the birth rate. (This was in contrast to the period between the Meiji Restoration and the Second World War, when Japan's official policy on population could be summed up in the 75

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN

Figure 4: Population structure of Japan, by age group (1994)

, male 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8

8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8

8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8

Source: Census Reports, Statistics Bureau, Prime Minister's Office.

Figure 5: Population structures of advanced and developing countries, by age group

Source: UN Demographic Yearbook

Note: In general, as socio-economic development proceeds, the proportion of a country's population in the younger age groups falls, while that in the older age groups grows.

slogan 'More births! Greater numbers!' Increasing the population was thought to be necessary for the provision of plenty of tough fighting men. This policy was abandoned after the defeat in 1945, when measures to lower the birth rate were adopted).17 The effect of the new policy on holding down numbers began to appear during the 1960s. Let us turn to developments after 1965. The population structure further changed in shape to something more like a diamond, as shown in the 1994 graph in Figure 4. At the same time the Japanese system of lifetime employment was in retreat. I would like to refer to some very recent data from two sources that demonstrate this. One is a report published by the Ministry 76

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN of Labour in 1995, based on a questionnaire survey. Of the 500 enterprises surveyed, about 56 per cent responded that they planned to continue with the lifetime employment system in the future. Seven per cent responded that they no longer offer lifetime employment, while 36 per cent expected to modify the system in some way in the future. A committee of ten experts on employment issues analyzed the survey results, and in their summary they concluded that the lifetime employment system is likely to be continued for 'core' employees, though it is expected to be difficult to maintain lifetime employment and seniority pay in their present form due to changing social conditions. In the future, in place of seniority pay, merit pay is expected to become increasingly important, and more employees are likely to change jobs of their own volition.18 The second data source is a proposal published by the Japan Federation of Employers' Associations, also in 1995. It suggested that in the future, employment in Japan should be more diversified than the single lifetime employment system of the present. It envisaged three different styles of employment: the first is the existing lifetime employment system, or an updated version of it, linked to a monthly wage or salary; the second is a system based on an annually contracted salary, and is designed for those employed in research or other specialized jobs; the third is based on hourly wages, for auxiliary staff. The second and third systems are clearly unrelated to lifetime employment.19 These two sources appear to me to be restrained somewhat in their observations on the breakdown of lifetime employment. In reality I believe Japan has moved further towards abandoning the system, because the long recession at the start of the present decade has forced enterprises to clamp down on soaring personnel costs that derive from the system of seniority pay.20 To Sum Up with Illustrations In the two illustrations in Figure 6 I have attempted to depict the situation in Japan as I saw it in my two hypotheses. Figure 6a shows the pre-1970 situation and Figure 6b the post-1970 situation. In Figure 6a technology imports from advanced countries have strength enough to pull along Japan's development, and the lifetime employment system is powerful enough to push that development from behind. During this time, the role of the winch is very important, while the car representing Japan's development appears to have no engine. (Without an 77

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN

Figure 6 : How Japan's development came about Figure 6-A: Period up to about 1970

Japan's society technology imports from advanced countries

(QXQ)

Winch

(OXQ)

r

(QXQ)

lifetime employment

Engine ? T

(QXQ)

(pulled from the front by imitative activity)

(pushing from behind)

Figure 6-B: Period after about 1970

U S A a n d Europe

Japan's society lifetime employment

technology i r t f

(self-powered advance (pushingfrombehind) through creative activity)

engine, there was no need for gasoline, which here represents the spirit of individualism) However, around 1970, roughly 100 years after the Meiji Restoration, the role played by technology imported from advanced countries (the tractive force) began to lose significance. To replace it, an engine to drive further development was at last created within Japan (though even now, in 1998, it cannot be said to have reached full power). Furthermore, the system of lifetime employment, which was pushing development from behind, began a rapid decline from about the same period. At this time, more and more people were calling for greater importance to be placed on individuals over groups, and government policy on labour and on support for science and technology began to reflect a shift in this direction. Conclusion: Resolving the Enigma I would now like to return to the issue set out at the beginning of this paper: the enigma of Japan's modernization. How do we explain it? I would like to approach this issue using several simple 78

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN diagrams. Accepted thinking on the modernization of European countries can be represented by diagram (1) as follows: But if we bring in the historical development of Japan, we have Diagram (I) Modernization = Industrialization=the spirit of individualism

to adapt our diagram in the following way: We have to accept that the process of modernization and Diagram (II) ;=(a) Industrialization by means of creativity Modernization=lndustrialization =^v (b) Industrialization by means of imitation

industrialization is rather more complex than the simple one shown in diagram (I). This is because path (a) has only come about naturally in the case of the industrialization of a single or small group of the most advanced countries. In other, later developing countries,, (b) is the more natural path to follow. If the decision is based on economic principles, then inevitably path (b) will be selected, at least for some period of time. Furthermore, by comparison with the most advanced country or group of countries, there are naturally many more later developing countries. Thus diagram (1) has to be replaced by diagram (II). At the same time, the right hand part of diagram (1) has to be adapted as in diagram (III): Diagram (M)

(ii) A—(a) by means of creativity=spirit of individualism

Industrialization = ^ v=(b) by means of imitation= deference to the whole

Thus, in the case of path (a), in advanced countries, diagram (I) applies as it is, but in path (b), for later developing countries, it is a deference to the interests of the group or society as a whole, rather than individualism, that has greater social validity. In other words, the latter path provides a more effective means of 79

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN industrialization and modernization. However path (b) in diagram (III) cannot be followed indefinitely. In Japan, moves towards modernization began in 1868, some 50 to 80 years later than the advanced countries of western Europe. But by about 100 years after 1868 imitative activity had reached exhaustion. The economic rationality of imitative activity had declined, while that of creative activity had increased. This is shown in diagram (IV). Diagram (IV) x=(a) by means of creativity = spirit of individualism Industrialization/

/ = =(a')by

v = (b) by means of // ' imitation = ^ ^ = X XXXX

Here, a new path has appeared, from (b) to (a'). Without this change of path, further development on path (b) becomes increasingly difficult. I believe that Japan is undergoing this transition from (b) to (a') in the period from 1970 to 2000 or so. Thinking along these lines, it becomes clear that the idea underlying diagram (I) and accepted in western countries is no universal formula. If there is a universal formula, it is surely more likely to resemble diagram (IV). One of the possible paths shown in diagram (IV), path (a) is identical to diagram (I) and represents a specific formula that applies only to the most advanced countries in the world: a limited number of countries (or a single society) to which special circumstances apply. This does not mean to say, however, that I think we should make light of the value of individualism. But neither do I believe it should be more highly evaluated than the thinking that gives precedence to the 'whole' over individuals. For many later developing countries forced to adopt imitative activity to drive their development, as Japan was in earlier times, giving priority to larger interests is not necessarily a harmful attitude to take, at least for some period of time. Liberally-interpreted deference to the 'whole' is more useful than narrow-focused individualism. But development by means of imitation will sooner or later reach a ceiling, after which there is no choice but transition to development through creativity. It is surely at this stage that the spirit of individualism can really show its true worth. This is the conclusion I have reached. Acknowledgements: I am greatly indebted to Ms Sue Herbert for her assistance in translating and editing this paper. 80

Chapter 6

Culture and Design: Issues of Communication and Knowledge SatinderEGill

Introduction Discussions about technology have often been tied to philosophy, economics and management. With the information and multimedia society permeating everyday lives, and crossing cultural boundaries, the use of technology in communication is quickly becoming a central facet of understanding technology as a culture. Both culture and communication are highly complex domains. However, if I concentrate upon the nature of knowledge within communication, this will yield insights into the social/cultural and bodily dimension of knowledge in relation to common 'scientific' knowledge. This will enable an understanding of the symbiosis of culture and technology. The very design of multi-media communications technology needs to be seen as a cultural practice. Some issues which will arise are notions of individual interaction as embodied in the idea of human-computer interaction work, versus social interaction. For example, in discussions on knowledge and skill, the AngloSaxon cultures tend to focus on the individual, whereas in Japanese culture the focus is upon the community, or the group. The design of interfaces/communications systems is likewise oriented to meeting these needs. By comparing these design cultures, this chapter will indicate commonalities and differences in the way knowledge and technology is constructed in culture, and the possibilities for enabling knowledge transfer across cultural boundaries. Technology as Culture: Outline The increasing use of various kinds of computer-mediated communications technology is having an unquestionable impact upon the nature of society in the cultures that have access to it 81

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN and are developing it. It is noteable that its primary mode of communication, electronic mail, is a development of 'Western' culture. Electronic communication has facilitated the development of distributed organisations, the development of virtual cities, virtual art, virtual design (e.g. houses, landscapes), virtual education, virtual democracy, and so forth. In Western discourses it is perceived as a liberating force on the one hand, and as a move towards a fragmentation of society into distributed intelligent agents on the other. In the Japan case, it is still a relatively recent phenomenon. It is perceived largely as a liberating force, and any possibility or sign of fragmentation is noted and monitored. To isolate a few only, the discourses orient around promoting individual creativity, moral responsibility in communication, mediation of information, sustainability of social norms, sustainability of society. The goal of social (and thereby communicative) sustainability, for example, is achieved either by treating the electronic communication as unrelated to Japanese behaviour by assuming 'handle names' (Nojima, 1994) whose context is unrelated to reality, or by finding some mediating framework to regulate the communication and thereby sustain it.1 In contrast to the West, the use of explicit forms of communication is a problem for traditional Japanese cultural practices, where silence is heavily imbued with meaning. A culture which is analogous to a homogenous family is able to read the silence well. In fact, the point of reaching a consensus is understood instinctively. In Western culture, however, it is the written contract and the explicit statement that makes for clarity, or that is drawn upon in times of conflict. Consensus in Japan requires an agreement from all involved, whereas consensus in the West, is based upon the agreement of the majority. Within this rather simplistic picture lies a comparison between a predominantly 'individualist self' based culture and a 'social self' based culture, where the former is 'Western' and the latter is 'Japanese'. In studying the nature of self as a way of analysing the social/cultural and bodily dimension of knowledge, it is possible to make a cultural comparison of the way knowledge is imparted and acquired in communication within these cultures, and in particular within computer-mediated communications. It also makes it possible to hypothesise the potential difficulties or possibilities that arise in cross cultural communication, i.e. knowledge transfer across cultural boundaries. In this way, a picture can be proposed of how technology and culture are entwined. 82

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN TWo Perspectives Concerning Knowledge In this chapter, I shall develop the relation between self/culture, communication, knowledge and the design and use of technology. This is a preliminary discussion, given the expansive nature of the area to be covered and must not be taken as conclusive. The cultures that I compare here can be described as the individualist and collectivist cultures. I will take the broad categorisation of Western European and Anglo-American as individualist, in comparison with 'collectivist' Japan. The reason for this is that there is a similar shared idea of the 'individual' in the West derived from a historically shared religious and power background. This can be compared with the unique and virtually homogeneous Japanese society2 Two perspectives concerning knowledge will be discussed here in order to develop a discussion of the relationship between technology and culture. One, we shall call the 'scientific' form, and the other that which is situated in dialogue. In the former picture, significance is given to what can be made explicit, i.e. what can be abstracted. In the latter picture, significance is placed upon the social/cultural and bodily dimension of knowledge. In the domain of information systems technology, and discussions about electronically mediated communications technology in both the West and in Japan, emphasis is placed upon information access, acquisition, and transfer. In the West, there is a tendency to give significance to the former picture of knowledge described above, i.e. propositional knowledge. This is a-cultural and a-social and primarily functional. The model of communication becomes one of information/data transmission from point A to point B. However, with the increasing use of information and communication technologies (henceforth ICTs) in spheres of working life, education and leisure, it is gradually being realised in the West that this picture is problematic because communication is a rather more complex human activity and is the very cement of social co-existence. The issue of social cohesion (Gill, KS, 1997) in the European Community, sustaining local culture and systems of living and working, has been discussed in response to a growing concern about fragmentation enabled by ICTs. It is proposed that they can be harnessed for social cohesion. Western models of communication focus on the speaker and the listener, individual to individual. Human-computer interaction models predominantly focus on the relationship of 83

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN the individual to the computer, and it is suggested that this is a logical consequence of an individualist culture with a focus on individual 'minds'. Even within discussions of group working, the descriptions revolve around an individual's autonomy and the capability or process of accommodation in communication. It has been proposed that this predominant view of knowledge and individuals, deeply embedded in Western thinking, has evolved from a specific relationship of 'science' and mathematics to society, which is not the case in Japan. This relationship places emphasis on empirical validity and analytical thinking (Johannessen, 1988). In the West, mathematics became the model for language and for understanding the relationship of man to the world, and knowledge was 'universal'.3 The enlightenment of the eighteenth century with its 'dream of a mathematical language' (Leibnitz, 16664) and the rise of logical positivism in the early twentieth century (Carnap, 19565), with its emphasis on linguistic and empirical knowledge, are markers of this way of thinking about knowledge in what has been called 'scientific' terms (Winch, 1958; Rosenbrock, 1988; Collins, 1974, 1975). 'Science' was at one time a part of 'philosophy', i.e. of the study of the relationship between man and nature and God. With the development of modern science and analytical thinking, evident for instance in Darwinian theory and logical positivism, 'God' leaves the picture. However, in Japan, we do not find these linkages in society. The historical context is rather different, whether in religion, industrial development or scientific history.6 The result being that the emphasis is placed instead upon the ability to understand what is unsaid. It has been said that communicating in Japan is like communicating in a family - 'silence is meaningful. One knows another so well'.7 This could be traced to a Confucian (Jukyo) teaching of Koshi,8 'look at the complexion fkao iroj of a man' to understand what he wants to say even if he doesn't say it. (Smith, 1996). It would seem then that communicating across computer mediated space might be more problematic for the Japanese than for the Europeans, and this is proving to be the case. Where agreements are understood in their silent consensus, having to explicitly state one's position becomes highly problematic (Nojima, 1994). This is in contrast to a tradition of consensual understanding in the West based on 'rational' decision making, i.e. explicitly stated and reasoned. I shall argue that despite the historical and cultural differences, 84

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN if one takes the position that knowledge is socially and culturally embodied then it is possible to make a cultural comparative analysis of the development and use of technology within it's social/cultural setting. Central to this discussion on communication and knowledge will be the dimension of 'self'. In Japan, the emphasis on the relationship between the spoken and unspoken has resulted in the design of, what I shall describe as, a model of a mediating interface to facilitate communication across communications technology (Goto and Nojima,1995; Nojima,1994). It is suggested herein that it is not accidental that such a mediation model has arisen in Japan, as opposed to Europe or US. Such a mediation model can enable breakdown situations to be effectively managed, and its primary goal is to prevent breakdowns, by enabling communication to be socially sustained. Discussions of the kinds of difficulties faced when communicating across the net in the West conclude that face to face communication is vital to the success of the communication. In the event of breakdown, the only possible solution is to bring people face-to-face. Emphasis is therefore placed on video-conferencing (Tang & Isaacs, 1993), the term is itself a formal expression of rational dialogue, and on producing larger screens which give the impression of being in the same room as someone else. This is also being experimented with in Japan,9 and is seen as a useful tool for improving communications. However, no alternative models of communication are evolved in the Western research. The solution to reducing breakdowns has been primarily technical. Video (desktop) conferencing has 'apparently reduced e-mail usage and was perceived to reduce the number of shorter, two-person face-to-face meetings' (Tang and Isaacs, 1993). It is not possible to observe the effects of such a communication mode in Japan, as a great deal of emphasis is placed upon face-to-face meetings. Again, this indicates a difference as to how 'functionality' is practiced. In order to investigate the relationship of culture and technology within Japan, two cases of communicating and sharing knowledge in the context of communications technology will be discussed here. One is of the mediation model developed by Nojima (1990, 1994). The other is of the 100 Schools Project (MITI, Information Technology Promotion Agency, Japan) which has connected schools across Japan and Japanese schools and schools abroad. This project has recently entered its second phase of funding and activity, and has been generally evaluated as hugely successful. 85

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN

3. Knowledge and Communication Two different approaches to the discussion concerning knowledge shall be considered in order to reflect on the communication of knowledge in computer-mediated networks. The first is propositional knowledge which denotes explicit knowledge. The second being a human-centred approach which denotes knowledge that is situated and located in geographical and social spaces and in people. In the the former perspective, knowledge is acquired and transferred according to defined functions/rules and concepts. It consists in discrete entities and is transmitted from A to B. According to the latter picture, knowledge is situated in dialogue itself and cannot be abstracted out of its situation without loss of meaning, and a new meaning can be read into transferred knowledge as a new practice emerges, within which it gains further meaning. These contrasting pictures are seen as useful here as they provide us with two ways to think about knowledge, one being a-cultural (and a-social and so on) and the other is situated in cultural practices. The significance of the former for a cultural comparative analysis of communication across computer mediated networks within Western culture and Japan, is its influence in Western culture. In the case of electronic mail it is probably no coincidence that the communication can primarily be seen as functional and not in conflict with the social. Of course, there is a limit to how far this argument may be stretched as in the West there are clearly problems arising with the use of electronically mediated communication in the form of misunderstandings. There are also problems in reading and expressing ambiguity, or assuming it where there is none. This problem then is not solely one of concern to Japanese culture. However, in Japan, electronic mail is perceived to be in conflict with the social, due in large part, it will be argued, to the Japanese sense of self. There is a difference in the concept of functionality (situated in a view of knowledge) between these cultures. With relation to this we shall briefly discuss the Japanese practice of bonne and tatemae, that is, of informal and formal practices. The Traditional 'Scientific View' A traditional approach to knowledge discussed here is embodied in the idea of the computer-based information system, where it could be argued it reached its limit, particularly in the project of the 1980s to build the expert system'.10 In the cognitive revolution' of the 1960s this view of knowledge was prevalent in 86

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN the information transmission model of communication (Higgins, 1992). This focused on the transmission of information from a sender to a receiver, 'inspired by mathematical models of communication (e.g. Shannon and Weaver, 1949)' (Higgins, 1992). This approach to knowledge assumes that knowledge can be represented independently of the context within which it is situated and located. Therefore, only those aspects of what we say and do that can be expressed in formalisms/rules i.e. made explicit, is considered to be knowledge. This picture of knowledge could be said to be traced back through the history of ideas to the dream of the exact language of the seventeenth century in Europe. This 'dream' was an ambition to create a universal language which would allow one to express one's thoughts 'as definitely and exactly as arithmetic expresses numbers or geometrical analysis expresses lines'.11 This language would embody shared understanding. It would not allow for misunderstanding as 'it would embody and encode all valid modes of argument, so that different people reason together without fear of confusion or error'.12 This language would be an instrument of reason whereby knowledge is clear and unambiguous.13 The idea that knowledge must be well defined is central to traditional cognitive science, 14 where computer programming is regarded as scientifically useful for generating hypotheses about the mind. Underlying this idea of knowledge is the belief that the attempt to express vague concepts helps to clarify them15 (Gill, 1995 chapter 1). Sakaiya (1993) traces this idea of knowledge much further back than the seventeenth century, to the Roman empire where many different cultures and peoples intermingled, making written law a necessity. He describes this as being due to a lack of a common informational environment.16 It is proposed that this approach to knowledge is tied to the individual self7 where the person has to express what they need in order to be heard. This is in marked contrast to a culture of an interdependent self where one's needs are read and met by others without being expressed (enabled by a common informational environment). The concept of rule is linked to the concept of knowledge. Within the context of explicit ('scientific') knowledge, or more specifically what will be termed 'propositional' knowledge, a rule lays down the way in which the knowledge is to be interpreted or used. The concept of a rule in rule-based computer systems embodied the belief in a science of logical thinking which is historically tied to a scientific law for nature.18 87

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN The emphasis in computer-based information technology, and in the idea of information society and communications networks is upon 'information' which has a predominantly quantitative character. In the case of communication we can trace the quantitative idea of information back to Shannon's (1948) information theory, a mathematical theory, where information is a physical quantity, and flow of data is a physical concept. Alternative Human-Centred Perspective The alternative approach to this traditional perspective of knowledge is termed 'human centred'. This is a term adopted from the domain of technology (in particular, see Cooley; 1987, Gill, 1996) to provide a contrast to the 'traditional' view of knowledge presented above. Whereas the above perspective focuses 'on the individual as a universal entity independent of culture', the human-centred view is that 'one's personal knowledge is socially (and thereby culturally) situated'. This has been demonstrated in a study of knowledge as embodied in dialogue (Gill, 1995). In this human centred approach, self becomes part of knowledge, and self cannot be made propositional. Knowledge becomes context based and has a personal and social dimension. In this picture of knowledge, we shift from the idea of a rule (of the universal nature of knowledge) to the idea of rulefollowing (Wittgenstein, 1958),19 which shows that there is no one way in which to follow the rule - no particular way in which to enact a particular idea or word. Rule-following occurs in the practice of knowledge. Learning to master a language is a matter of mastering human reality in all its complexity. It is a matter of learning to adopt an attitude towards it in established ways, to reflect over it, investigate it, gain a foothold in it and become familiar with it 0ohannessen, 1992). Wittgenstein includes physical communication such as gestures in his extended concept of language. This is to show that we make use of a variety of means to make ourselves understood. Language and human action are intimately interwoven, and so thereby is the relationship between language and reality. Wittgenstein was interested in the application of the rule and the situation of the user. Rule following is a practice. If we do not know the closer details of the current use situation, we will not be able to make up our minds about what is actually said. Therefore, our mastery of a natural language must include a grasp, or practical understanding, of an enormously large repertoire of situations 88

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN involving the use of language. In order to understand and respond we must have situational understanding and judgmental power. This has implications for communications networks and the use of the internet, where we may not be familiar with the practices of the individuals we are communicating with. It finds expression in the need to come up with a variety of forms of visual depictions of feelings and thoughts which are being expressed in a message to ensure that the reader is able to accurately interpret what is being said.20 In a study of the relationship between tacit21 and formal aspects of knowledge in communication (Gill, 1995), a key finding was that the mediator is an important element in the resolution of breakdowns which occur in communication due to discrepancies in the participants' knowledge. Empathy and trust are required on the part of the mediator where people cannot make sense of one another's knowledge and perspectives. The mediator needs to be empathetic in his/her knowledge with that of the other people. In taking the perspective that there is an interdependent relationship between tacit and propositional knowledge, I studied the complexity of this relationship in communication and discovered that propositional knowledge is in itself a complex dimension of knowledge. This is contrary to the traditional view of knowledge, and indicates that empathy is an important aspect of sharing knowledge, and of the success or failure of communication. Discussions of practical knowledge or the tacit dimension (Polanyi, 1966) in the West have focused on 'know how' in relation to 'knowing that' drawing upon Ryle (1949) as a way of challenging a narrow conception of 'scientific knowledge as being detached, objective, as misleading because tacit thought forms an indispensable part of all knowledge'. (Gill, S.P.). In the case of Japan, there is an interdependence between what is formal and informal knowledge, bonne and tatemae, in cultural practices, which is conceptually distinct from the explicit/tacit demarcation in the Western discourse. 'Tatemae conceals honne even as it represents honne'. Honne has been described as being 'behind the scenes' (Uchiyama, 1996), 'the motives or opinions distinct from [tatemae] . . .[held] in its background' (Doi, 1986, p 37). Tatemae has been described as the surface reality' (Doi), as 'in front, which conceals honne even as it represents honne' (Uchiyama). The two often overlap. An organisational rule may be tatemae but it can be bent and 89

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN contradicted with a practical case (bonne), and provided all participants agree, the practical case is accepted. If anything, laws can be changed to fit in with a current. This means in Japan, contrary practices to a written contract can be followed with no conflict of interest. This is possible within an information environment which is commonly agreed upon. In this human-centred picture of knowledge, self is seen as being a significant dimension of knowledge acquisition and transfer.22 Empathy and trust are part of the attainment of shared knowledge. Self makes for empathy and for trust. As knowledge is embodied in dialogue, self is a key dimension of communication and its success or failure. This position will now be developed in the context of culture and knowledge. Knowledge and Culture: The Role of 'Self' We shall consider the question of 'knowledge' starting from the position of 'to know'/ to have knowledge'. In taking the case of the 'self' as a pivotal point for a study of the relationship between knowledge and culture, I seek to show that knowledge is in itself a culturally bound concept.23 It is proposed that the nature of self, whether individual or social, affects the nature of communication and the way in which one acquires knowledge and gives (assigns) meaning to certain kinds of knowledge. Studies in communication have already suggested that utterances which constitute the self have 'implications for the way people sample information that is self-relevant more frequently than information that is not self-relevant'24 (Triandis, 1989). 'In many Western cultures, there is a faith in the inherent separateness of distinct persons. . . . [where] the normative imperative is to become independent from others and discover and express one's unique attributes' (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Markus and Kitayama suggest that this view of self derives from 'a belief in the uniqueness and wholeness of each person's configuration of internal attributes'. (Johnson, 1985). The individual self strives for autonomy, and persons in Western cultures are more likely to hold this view than those in nonWestern cultures. Of course, this is a general distinction and there are variations of self within a culture, but the general distinction holds as the nature of that variation tend towards either individualism or a social self. It is no accident that in Britain, a former prime minister could have asserted that there is no such thing as society but only individuals. It is inconceivable that any Japanese prime minister could make such an assertion, let alone 90

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN for it to be embraced by the population as quite acceptable or even mundane. Cultural complexity has been given as a significant explanation for the rise of the individual self (Triandis, 1989) with the need to make the informational context of the communicative situation explicit.25 In being exposed to other cultures, the child becomes aware of different norms and has to choose his or her own standards of behaviour. The individual self is also described (according to the author's interpretation) as a predominant sampling of the 'private' self which refers to the person (Triandis), who, when considering the 'other', experiences a public self, a generalised others' view of the self - expressed in terms of how 'others in general' see 'me'. However, the social self or collective self, is situated in a group, for example how my family sees me, how my co-workers think of me, and is also likely to experience a 'public self, but unlikely to sample the private self. In each culture, people experience different degrees of these selves but in the West, the individual self is predominant whereas in Japan, it is the social self that is predominant. In line with the individual/social self distinction, studies have indicated, that when a teacher assesses a child's disruptive behaviour in a classroom in the West, the teacher is more likely to talk of the child's behaviour as being intrinsic to the nature of the child. The Japanese teacher, however, is more likely to refer to the child's lack of understanding and regular misbehaviour as stemming from the child's need for love and attention. (Rohlen, 1989 pp 22). The focus is on the social or collective nature of self. These are two markedly distinct ways of thinking about the person. The social self may be described as being 'interdependent' (Markus and Kitayama). In Japan, asserting one's individual self is viewed as being immature. Japanese refer to the term sunao to denote what makes for a good child, meaning a natural positiveness and acceptance of things, especially adult guidance. It is a term which 'assumes cooperation to be an act of affirmation of the self' (Kumagai, 1981). A sign of maturity is ittaikan, '2L feeling of merger or oneness with persons other than self (Weisz et al, 1984 pp 959, on Lebra, 1976). An appreciation and need for people will be more important for those with an interdependent self than for those with an independent self (Markus and Kitayama). Maintaining a connection to others means being aware of their needs, desires and goals. This involves the 91

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN willingness and ability to feel and think what others are feeling and thinking, to absorb this information without being told, and then to help others satisfy their wishes and realize their goals. In contrast, in the case of the independent self, it is the individual's responsibility to say what is on one's mind if one expects to be attended to (paraphrase pp 229). The formative stages of 'self are developed in child rearing, and it has been suggested that it is largely cultivated by the mother.26 It has been claimed that mothers in Japan teach their children to fear loneliness, whereas mothers in the West teach their children how to be alone (Lebra, 1976). In order to develop the individualist self, one needs to learn to stand out, whereas the collective or social self learns to stand in (Weisz et al., 1984). This has implications for what is meant by the group. In the West there has been a strong movement towards 'group working', and 'cooperative working' and an effort to design systems which fit this picture of group work and cooperation. The notion of group is markedly different in the West and in Japan. The Japanese practice emerges from the social self. They have a concept to describe 'teamwork', Wa, denoting harmony. The emphasis is on interdependence. The group practice is considered in terms of morals and emotions rather than role and function (Uchiyama, 1996). It has been described as being analogous to a marital relationship. In the West, the individual self requires a centre point which holds power to maintain the stability between individuals (evident in the classroom, court of law, and in the system of democracy). The Japanese centre is an empty or relatively open one (Rohlen, 1989). Hence in the West the interests of individuals which lie outside of a central interest are seen as peripheral and need to be harnessed. Whereas in Japan, the interests of individuals are all seen as part of the group interest, itself a relatively open idea, as all are interdependent. This system of power requires it's participants to give personal commitment/consensus. A revealing study of psychotherapy comparing Japan and the US by Weisz et al (1984) marks the difference in the self between the cultures of Japan and the West clearly. This provides us with examples of the repair of the self in these respective cultures. In Japan, two examples of psychotherapy, Morita and Naikan are discussed. The principal objective of Morita therapy is not to alter symptoms, but rather to alter the person's perspective of them. The person is encouraged to perceive their symptoms as a natural part of themselves, to accept the symptoms, and 'to work, 92

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN socialize, and behave normally in spite of them'. A 'patient' is considered cured when he has stopped groping for means to relieve his symptoms' (Reynolds, 1980 p 34). The main tenet of this approach is to accept things as they are, arugamama (Lebra, 1976, p.223). Lebra has described Naikan therapy as the method that 'best elucidates the core values of Japanese culture' (p.201). The person's sensei (guide) hears confessions and gives meditation instruction. Meditation topics involve a sequence of significant others in the patient's past. Focussing on each person, clients reflect on the kindnesses received from that person during specified periods of their lives - how little they have returned to that person, and how many troubles and worries they caused that person (Murase, 1974). A resultant sense of gratitude to them and a desire to repay those others are expected to generate 'joy, new purpose, and new meaning in life' (Reynolds, 1980). By contrast, in the West, the principal goal of psychotherapy is based on Freudian theory, which described psychoanalysis as a battle in which the person's symptoms have to be mastered and resolved. Analysis ends when the patient no longer suffers from his or her symptoms and has overcome their anxieties and inhibitions (Freud, 1916). Central importance is given to altering or modifying symptoms according to the individual's wishes, or the individual self. The prerequisite for harmony within both these systems of individual and social self is child-rearing, education, and socialisation.27 Later, herein, I shall address the possibilities of cross cultural communication between individual and social selves and the implications for knowledge transfer between Japan and Britain. Culture, Communication, and Technology Issues of cultural variations in the use of communications technology have been raised in studies undertaken in Japan (Nojima, 1994). Within the Japanese context there is a clear difference in the way in which people interact or behave within the network compared to their behaviour when face to face. He marks out three important differences. First with respect to emotionality, aggression is expressed where normally Japanese people avoid emotional confrontations. This sometimes leads to flaming wars' (Nojima p 7). Secondly, they are more likely to request off-line meetings as they get to know each other. Nojima found that groups in networks in Japan frequently request off93

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN line meetings.28 'It is often the case when several people get to know each other via email, BBS29 or mailing-lists, they like to have an off-line meeting. For example, within a year of establishing a mailing group called 'UK-stayers' (consisting mostly of the Japanese community staying in the UK), more than six off-line meetings were held around London. Thirdly, a curious phenomena is the use of anonymity by communicating using assumed 'handle-names'. This has the character such that if one reveals one's anonymity by referring to one's actual context, it is almost offensive to the others on the network. One of the most problematic issues is that of 'ambiguity'. This is discussed in the case study below. Nojima points out that there is little research being undertaken on the cultural differences in using electronic communication media. In the West, it can broadly be said that computer mediated communication has been an area of great interest. Since the 1980s the research focus has been upon group working and the idea of collaborative working environments, within the domain of CSCW It is notable that with the increase in the use of communications networks, the research field of CSCWhas grown in importance, reflecting a need for sustaining social communication. This is primarily30 concerned with providing supportive technology for collaborative group working. Such systems are expected to provide support to: a) allow each individual to access shared functions and information in their own preferred fashion; b) facilitate the exchange of information and ways of working between individuals; c) allow evolutionary development and dissemination of working practices and support mechanisms (Brooke, 1993). The first two criteria are of particular interest here with respect to the noted emphasis on the individual. However, other discussions emphasise that methods of working collaboratively emerge through tacit agreement and mutual accommodation, although still between individuals. The interpretation of information is a difficult issue (Dourish et al., 1993) as there is a need to consider what contextual cues should be provided in order to assist users in interpreting the information correctly, and how to develop appropriate sets of interpretative practices and to guide this process. Dourish et al. also suggest that more investigation is needed to reveal the intricate relationships between information which these systems carry and the context in which it is embedded. Some key phrases in current use are: 'awareness', 'affordance', 'computer-mediated co-presence', 'co-ordination of activity'. Some new phenomena 94

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN of behaviour have been noted by Heath and Luff (1992) on the use of video-mediated communication as being advantageous for collaborative working. 'It allows the individual to distance himself from the moment by moment demands of his colleagues whilst preserving mutual availability, allowing users to witness and coordinate tasks and activities whilst remaining relatively insensitive to the potential demands and interruptions of a shared physical environment'. We have here an emphasis on the maintenance of the individual self. Other approaches which are concerned with teleworking and other hi-tech networks try to develop frameworks within which we can describe the changes taking place in the societies concerned. Hi-tech networks include telework (elusive offices), distance training (network colleges and virtual classrooms), computer conferencing systems (network meetings), soft cities, intelligent buildings and electronic libraries. They are organisational or social networks in which people do not interact or work together physically in an office, building or classroom. Yet they are part of a common organisation communicating via computers and telecommunications. Simultaneously with their rise a new paradigm of social theory is being developed called organisational communication theory, where social and organisational systems are conceptualised as socalled 'self-referential' systems - self-producing and self-reflective systems. Sometimes organisations are called autopoetical systems using a term borrowed from biology (Maturana and Varela, 1980). Qvortrup (1992b) thinks that the idea of self-referentiality is useful for understanding hi-tech network organisations. A network organisation is a diffused organisation which is not just less hierarchical but is based on ad-hocracy. As new networks are continuously being built such organisations depend on dispersed information and they survive as such because of communication. In network organisations each node may belong to a number of organisations. Such organisations need flexible workforces with people with a high standard of qualifications going in and out. Morgan (1986) stated that it is possible to see organisations becoming synonymous with their information systems. Qvortrup (1992b) has produced a theoretical model based on a biological model for representing the processes of knowledge in distributed networks. He proposes a model of selfreferentiality which asserts that to reproduce a set of shared meanings is to refer to a set of values that has been produced within a mutual process. His discussion focuses on the concept 95

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN of organisation. He argues that a focus on groups and organisations in the West has evolved a way of thinking about knowledge processes which requires knowledge to be bargained about, agreed upon, to be accountable, i.e. contractual or consensual (by this is meant a formal/explicit kind of consensus, based on majority rule). With the advent of communications technology these processes might be hindered or altered in a detrimental manner for social systems if individuals become selfcentred (Good, 1996), emphasising their needs and rights as consumers of knowledge, rather than considering their duties, and effects they have, as producers of 'knowledge'. This problem is more easily imaginable in a culture of the individual self. Curiously, the Japanese cases do not concern themselves with 'organisation*, or 'synchronised communication', but upon mediating31 information. Mediating information, here, is taken to mean the transfer of information in a manner which enables others to relate themselves to it, and in relationship to each other. The latter part signifies the social or collective self. In Japan, the internet is a fairly new phenomena of the past seven years or so. In this sense, making a direct mapped comparison of the stages that the countries are in, in their development and usage of communications technology, is not completely possible. However, there is sufficient experience of usage to provide us with indicators of how the cultural practices might differ or be similar. It is proposed that the difference will be largely due to the nature of self and communicative practices, and the idea of what it is to have knowledge. In recent years in the West, the concept of 'affordance' (Gibson, 1986) is increasingly being employed in thinking about the information environment and people's actions within it: 'Affordance designates the instantaneous recognition of something that may satisfy an individual's needs' (Mantovanni, 1996 p 9). It emphasises the individual. However, the concept has been described as being insufficient to think about 'the presence of interpretation in the relation between actors and situations' Mantovanni stresses the importance of seeing action as situational, as actors both model and are modelled by their environment. He describes how an actor's individual goals are intrinsically unstable as people relate to the same situation differently in different moments, and this in turn, changes the structure of the situation and the shape of actor-situation interaction. This individualist conception of interaction is depicted as a-cultural. It is one of actions, artifacts and actors. 96

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN This is a very different conception of human relations to the one held by the Japanese, where the emphasis is not on satisfying one's own needs but on being in tune with other's needs. In Japan, discussions about technology seek to sustain this concept of social and collective self This is marked in the developments in telematics in the last few years, compared with the picture of Western development, and it becomes evident in the studies cited below. It is interesting to find that in Japan, there is a central agency which handles the progress of teleworking in Japanese organisations. The Satellite Office Association of Japan (SOAJ)32 was established in 1991 as a voluntary organisation and became a non-profit organisation endorsed by four ministries in 1993. It consists of 130 groups, including the main Japanese companies, organisations and local governments. Its central tenet is a discourse of empowerment: it will seek out new workstyles which empower the individual as well as endeavour to raise corporate efficiency by supporting administrative policy initiatives. We will pursue programs designed to improve social awareness and acceptance of decentralised offices such as the satellite office, thereby contributing to the sustainable development of a balanced Japanese society.33 The emphasis is placed on employees being able to 'make good use of their free time to realise their self interests and also have spiritual comfort. Companies can urge their workers to show their abilities and to improve intellectual productivity by concentrating on their tasks', (op. cit.) In practice, employees can work from home or from a satellite office for anything from a day or more, but they still have a base and work from the head office. This is in contrast to developments in the UK where companies can reduce a substantial proportion of their offices by making their workers home-workers. Such workers have no central base from within which they can physically work. The arguments from the macro-level also differ. The Japanese argument is that 'distributed offices' are an 'attractive measure against disasters such as earthquakes in major cities' and are viewed as a way to 'meet a social demand for correcting over concentration of population and political, economic and financial functions in Tokyo', in addition to which they offer 97

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN sustainability of family life and local communities. The well-being of the worker is linked to the well-being of the family and local community. This is linked to creativity. Hence, although on one level, the Japanese idea of the individual could be perceived as being the same notion of individual as in the West, a closer look presents us with a picture of the social self of the person (individual). The collective self is seen in relation to the individual self. Given this, it follows that in general, Japanese companies are unwilling to adopt teleworking.34 The Case of Japan Two case studies will now be examined to show how the above discussion of knowledge, culture, communication, self etc. bears upon this relationship between culture and technology and is linked to the differences in technology. These will be case studies on the development of computer-mediated communications networks. The first example will focus on email and the second upon multi-modal (e.g. video conferencing, home pages) and single modal in a project which is connecting a large number of schools across Japan. Language and Knowledge: Ambiguity Versus Certainty In cultures where the social self is dominant, as in the case of Japan, there is less likelihood of expressing negative emotion, and more expression of 'other focussed emotions'. This means that disagreement is more likely to be couched in terms which facilitate the maintenance of social harmony. In Japan one expresses disagreement indirectly through the use of ambiguity in expressions. Disagreement is never expressed directly as this is offensive behaviour. This, it is suggested, is due to the need to consider other selves and be interdependent. It becomes possible to avoid situations of direct disagreement as the behaviour is oriented towards finding agreement. With the advent of the electronic medium of communication (email and bulletin boards - private and public) there is a problem of direct expression and difficulty to express and read ambiguity. It is often observed that a reader of a message feels offended by a sentence in it, which itself is not offensive, at least from the other's view point. It is because Japanese do not offend other people in such apparent fashion (e.g. using harsh words), but criticism is woven into the ambiguous words. So, a reader has to read criticism from 98

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN ambiguous sentences, if it ever exists and which often leads to misjudgements. (Nojima, 1994 p 9) In this case study a problem arose: The problem was one of using explicit language to express disagreement, and the use of explicit records of the email messages as evidence for argument, ...it is often observed that when there is a disagreement between people involved in the discussion on the network, they tend to quote the opponent's argument and rebut it almost word for word' (Nojima, 1994 p 9). In the case of one group of Japanese, this resulted in a breakdown and the group boycotted the use of electronic communication. An alternative system was developed which involved mediation. Goto and Nojima (1995) describe the nature of, what I shall call, this mediation structure as a gatekeeper model. Their model itself is universally applicable, but my interest here lies in the fact that they came up with it at all and that the people involved in the network developed a mediating structure to handle their difficulty I propose that it is no accident but a cultural consequence of the social and collective self which brings about a different concept of a mediating interface. This is a dialogical model which seeks to try and prevent breakdowns occurring, in line with the social self and the maintenance of the 'information environment'. In the event of misunderstanding in the computer mediated network, there is a need for creating shared understandings. This is a social not a technical approach to the problem of breakdown. In the network, individuals are isolated. They need to establish a community where they can have shared knowledge to facilitate agreement. In the example of the Gatekeeper model, the group who faced a breakdown situation produced a three layer structure (Goto and Nojima): brains, end users and gatekeepers. Brains are the most technically expert, in charge of maintaining the network, adopting new technological innovations; the end-users use the computer network as a tool for their job and have no interest in the network itself. Gate-keepers take care of the end users, and relay between them and the brains, and inform end-users on how to behave with recent developments in the environment. Gatekeepers distribute shared knowledge. This is situated in group practices in Japanese culture. If any member of the group has a problem; they do not need to state it, they have an expectation or rather, a trust, that someone else in 99

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN the group will become aware of their problem and help them with it. Likewise, they are expected to be aware of others' needs in the group and to attend to them where they have the expertise (brain), or to find someone who has the expertise (gatekeeper). Any individual is not expected to hold all the expertise (as in a Western model of 'expert' imposed upon by information technology), instead the 'unit of knowledge' lies in the group.35 This is seen as an effective way of working. Goto and Nojima (1995) base the development of the mediation model on 'the structure of information distribution in human society'. They cite Imai's (1984) claim 'that it is important to consider the way of information delivery by human beings before some electronic network is installed'. The project cited above is one of many 'reported to have failed because electronic technology is not adapted to human society'. Multi-modal Interfaces In 1994, MITI set up a project for one hundred schools across Japan to be linked-up via the internet. The project itself has been managed by the Information-Technology Promotion Agency and Centre for Educational Computing. The schools are elementary, junior high, and senior high schools covering an age range of 618 years.36 One of the goals of the network is to 'help students to foster their creativity, express their own ideas effectively and think freely through improved access to domestic and international communication and information sources' (cf. IPA and CEC, 1985).37 The internet allows for 'new possibilities in learning methods'. The focus is not on the technology itself but on the possibilities for education and the acquisition of new skills. The idea is to give children the skills needed to compete in a changing information world. An emphasis is also placed upon Japanese children communicating with other cultures where the medium is often English. Multi-modal interfaces are developed and used, taking the form of home pages, both interactive and noninteractive, and video conferencing (use of cu-see me), to learn presentation and communication skills. There is little preconception as to how the skills will develop and much has been learnt or emerged from the experiment. The project has been regarded as a great success by teachers, and by the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Trade and Industry, such that the project is entering its next stage and further funding has just been provided to open the project up to a large number of other schools. 100

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN The schools carried out surveys, conducted network conferences, and encouraged pupils to express opinions and to reason and learn about application software. A common theme expressed by teachers is the need to motivate children to learn. They see the technology as a motivating force. Through the creative use of network facilities, the normal pupil-teacher relationship undergoes a fundamental shift. The pupils gain power and are proactive. Teachers noted that children engaged with each other far more in this activity than in the traditional school curriculum. It was emphasised that this medium of communication forced children to present themselves, which Japanese children do not normally do. With regard to cross cultural communication, apart from the development of written and oral skills in the English language, this enabled children to reflect on their assumptions about other cultures, such as Korea, Nepal, Malaysia and America including Hawaii. It also caused them to rethink what it means to be Japanese, as they saw how others perceived them. What is striking about this approach to cultural communication, is that the teachers are keen for children to see themselves in relationship to others. The excitement around the project is such that it has been decided to leave the definition of it's goals open-ended. The aim is to discover the possibilities. Consider the following 'Mission Statement' in the Introduction to the home page of one school by its Principal: We'd like to teach and encourage students: 1) to have a thoughtful mind and a kind heart; 2) to have good motivation to learn diligently and pursue their studies; 3) to cooperate together and exercise discipline at school; 4) to work willfully and realise responsibility for their school; 5) to come in contact with humans and natural surroundings in a respectful manner. This emphasis is in line with the development and maintenance of a social self, and can be traced, in part, to Confucian values,38 Ethics, respect for others, respect for family, respect for nature and one's environment, self-reflection - to be aware of how others see you - are a part of Confucian values and can be seen in the project. 101

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN Ethics of communication in the network is a prominent concern of the teachers. This was one the tenets cited in the Mission Statement of one school. In a collaborative effort by members from some of the schools, they translated into Japanese a book of etiquette by an American author for the internet.39 One school set up courses which provided instructions on using the internet which included morals.40 Throughout the reviews, self-reflection on one's own understanding of one's environment, culture, and daily living is seen to be of educational value in the development of the person of the student. Presenting information is important because the student receives a response which make her or him aware of what and how they are presenting themself: 'consciousness about expression is achieved by receiving impressions and encouragement from many people through the network'.41 In developing lessons around the use of the internet, common themes are the local town or city, the region, the planets, weather forecasting, festivals, wildlife. In one example of weather forecasting, the teachers asked students to 'write cards, telling [them] that asking and gathering the information from others and their opinions are a 'useful way to summarise their way of thinking, to return them to the originators of the information'. The teachers expected the students to gain conciousness about observing nature 'through relationships among friends and people who provided the information'.42 They were quite surprised at the interest that the students took in searching for information and in presenting it. It is the responses which motivate them to want to provide further information. The internet is also seen as a vehicle for promoting individual creativity, motivation and self-expression. This is in marked contrast to the social self, but is considered in balance with a maintenance of the social self. In order to create environments allowing for individualism or independence, schools emphasise that students must 'feel free' in their use of the internet. One school describes the students as feeling as free in handling it as if they are indexing the information at a library or handling stationaries'.43 Another school states that the internet 'must be handy for students anytime, anywhere' and has 'established an environment called Internet Wherever'.44 The teachers noted the students' excitement as they were able to easily 'gather' and 'transmit information'. The teachers see the internet as providing them with 'an environment' for improving 102

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN and developing their communication skills, which they refer to as communication abilities'. The role of communicating with other cultures has already been mentioned. The value of this is tied to the belief in selfreflection and social consiousness about one's relation to others and to nature. The students are also more motivated to learn other languages shown by the marked increase in their desire to learn English. Cu-see me and other kinds of video conferencing accelerates the learning process and excitement as students interact live with other students from other countries. Multimodal communication allows children to communicate even when they do not share a common oral language, by using colours and shapes: 'students feel that a dream has come true that, although they cannot speak Russian, they can design handkerchiefs under the theme of Russian and Japanese natural grass using color images, overcoming the language barrier'. One school describes the teacher's role as supporting 'students who want to study with intelligent curiosity',45 and another tries to promote self study.46 This need to develop creativity in Japanese schools is a national concern particularly motivated by a concern with a world, which is rapidly changing with the advancement of globalization and information technology. 'For the past 50 years, Japanese companies did not look at workers' individual talents, favouring people who could steadily complete given assignments', said Kazuhide Ito, manager of the Human Resources Development Group at Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren). 'But companies are beginning to seek creativity and unique individual ability. The Japanese education system must change to nurture such people'. The Japan Times Given the emphasis on developing a social self, it is not surprising that in a sub-committee progress report on the use of the internet in elementary and junior high schools, a junior high school teacher notes that one of the changes taking place in the students: 'Since students can act as they want, selfish children, heavily involved in their own world, are increasing.' This seems to indicate that electronic communication may lead to the emergence of an individual self in the young Japanese. It is more likely that such a change would emerge in a younger 103

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN age group, as the Japanese traditional process of enculturalisation, through regulated order at school, into becoming a member of society is a gradualist one. It has an inevitability about it (Rohlen, 1989). If this becomes broken, then normal enculturalisation will not reach its eventual maturity. It is then even more interesting that the teachers emphasise social manners and respect as part of the behaviours across the net. One junior high school 'wishfes] to instruct students that they are conscious that even a junior high school student is respected as a person on the network, as well as moral education in the use of the network using the moral lessons and other activities'. The development of self-control behaviours must also be nurtured by promoting self-consciousness as a junior high school student. The potential of developing a system of behaviour which can maintain the stability of Japanese culture, then becomes a possibility given the awareness of the Japanese for the effect it has on their children. The dilemma is two fold, however, for not only must sustainability be achieved within the Japanese cultural practices, but also when communicating with other cultures, and in particular, individualist cultures. The Communication of 'Self': Knowledge Transfer In the studies above the development of individualism is seen as being an aspect of communications technology. From the case of education, individualism is seen to be an increasing virtue for developing an internationally competitive society. It is equated with creativity, and the fulfillment of potentials of children. Many of the issues raised by the studies, including the need to maintain the stability of cultural norms/practices is reflected in the discussions and developments within teleworking in Japan. In the case of teleworking, individual creativity is a motivating force of its promotion. In the case of the 100 schools project, the emphasis placed upon individual creativity is seen, rather, to be an outcome of the use of electronic mail, emerging out of the experiment. The primary emphasis has been, and is, the 'advanced use of information by schools through the network'. Underlying this seems to be the idea that the interface of the communications network has a mediating role in imparting contextual information, and for empathetically connecting to others. In one of the examples cited above where school children from a Japanese and a Russian school did not share a common oral language, they were able to communicate using colours and shapes. All the schools consider the development of self104

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN reflection, based on the students' expression and response to their expressions, as part of learning. They talk of relating to friends, or brothers and sisters, and of communicating with respect. There is a belief in building up relationships across the network: 'Interchange with the internet, however, can be realised only when communicating people exist. To find a good partner and establish a reliable international relations cannot be done by 1 or 2 years.' It is not simply to see the communications technology as providing for efficient means of communicating across space and time, but it is also about building relationships. Information is valued according to how it enables the student to become socially aware of the effects of their actions, by reflecting upon the responses they receive from the way they present themselves. In searching for information, not only must they inquire for it, but they must then present their understanding of the information to the 'originator' of it. Although the practices of using the internet vary between the schools, there is a general ethos which is rooted in a Japanese way of being. Signs of the private or individual self emerging (noted by one of the schools) is not unexpected, given the effect that this technology has had upon Western practices. In addition, the interaction between Japanese and other cultures across the net means that the Japanese person begins to see other possible worlds which contrast with their own. Triandis' (1989) argument that cultural complexity gives rise to the individual self seems to make sense here, along with Sakaiya's discussion of the need to make the informational context of the communicative situation explicit (1993) in order to create a common informational environment (Uchiyama, 1996). However, the teachers desire to develop the individual, the student, in the context of the Japanese way of being. In a similar way to the satellite offices, what appears to be an emphasis on the individual is not the same as in the West. The individual here has responsibility for his or her actions. In using the network, 'students began to discuss what is lacking to each student and how they should be in the future'. This parallels the traditional method of education where teachers do not interfere in student's assessment of each other but encourage them to learn from their own conflicts, and other kinds of interaction. It is part of the learning process to become self-aware of each other's behaviour in relationship to each other. Rohlen (1989) refers to this process as 'social configuration'. For example, 'the consequences of improper behaviour must be allowed to appear and then the children must be given the time 105

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN and delegated the authority to discuss and figure out how to correct the situation' (Rohlen p 24). It is too early to gauge how this activity may change in relation to traditional teaching methods with the use of the internet. In summary, the schools project provides us with some hints as to how the Japanese sense of self may be influenced by a technology which is fragmentary in its nature as it is promoting communication across spaces. It is necessary to undertake a study of the communication and to track its progress in order to get a real picture of the effects of technology. The development of the 'gatekeeper' model (Nojima, 1994) provides a way of thinking about information, which situates it in people, and not in technology. 'It is in a social context that we learn to use networks' (Nojima. p 16). He says that a voluntarily created structure that helps each other may be helpful in creating socially shared knowledge (Nojima, 1992). The gatekeeper is there to maintain and sustain the communication between user and designer, and to act as mediator in the event of misunderstanding, and guide upon behaviour on the network. The idea is also to maintain a social system of an interdependent self, whereby a unit of knowledge exists in the overall group, and not in the individual. Etiquette on the internet is a concern of the schools project, that children should learn about how to behave on the network. However, they are adopting etiquette texts written in the American cultural context and what impact this may have is not yet known, but it will be interesting to see. The issues that Nojima raises with regard to a need to establish a network community which can establish a shared knowledge base is critical in the Japanese context. It has recently also been raised in a European research programme called i3 which proposes the creation of shared information environments. What is being proposed in this chapter is that largely due to the Japanese social self, technology has, from the beginning, been considered in terms of its appropriateness and compatibility with the communicative practices. It has in turn been implemented to fit in accordance with these practices. There is a huge momentum to encourage the ability to become information literate, to become skilled in knowing how to access it and become competitive in dealing with the international world. Japan is now opening its doors and is being forced into being competitive in a way it has not had to before. The world of information in the communications networks needs to be harnessed so that society 106

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN itself does not become unable to sustain its own social base. The schools project, for example, is a highly reflective project and involves the ministry of education, ministry of trade and industry, the Japan technology promotion agency, and the teachers in schools who have been the driving force of the project. There are no central determinants as to how the project should develop or what it should limit itself to. The point of this essay was to identify the way in which knowledge and technology is shaped in different cultures, and the possibilities for enabling knowledge transfer across cultural boundaries. The communications technology and the idea of information expressed in Western discourse has itself arisen within an individualist cultural base. Yet in its transfer to Japan, it has acquired a new meaning. It is a driving force for promoting the development of certain behavioural and individualistic creative characteristics. The concept of an individual is situated in an idea of social self, not of private self. Certain features of the technology are having a similar effect as in the Western culture, namely that of increasing a sampling of the private self, leading to certain 'selfish' traits. What is interesting here is to see how cultures gain a handle upon the technology and evolve it and evolve with it in order to sustain a cultural identity and thereby achieve social sustainability. The picture presented here of the relationship between culture, self and technology is one that provides a possible way of thinking about the long-term cultural issues of the effect of communications technology

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Hisao Nojima for many discussions, and for reading this chapter and making valuable suggestions in working it through. I also warmly thank Masahito Kawamori for his meticulous reading.

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Chapter 7

National Culture, Policy and Competitiveness: Export Performance of U.S. and Japanese Industries Richard C Adams, Don E. Kash and Robert W Rycroft Introduction Americans have traditionally assumed that all peoples and cultures are at their core the same.1 That is, faced with the same external environment people from whatever culture will, given knowledge and time, respond in similar ways. Thus, given the increasing globalization of economic affairs, manifested by the dominance of multinational corporations, the ever more common demands for innovating technology, and the growth of international markets, the dominant view in the USA is that all national economies will eventually look much like that of the USA.2 This view of economic behavior is reflective of the universalist postulates integral to the Enlightenment philosophy that is threaded through US culture. What James Fallows has labelled the Anglo-American economic model assumes that all peoples will react to their external environment in rational ways that maximize their self-interest.3 Thus, people regardless of their culture, want to and will ultimately behave in economically selfmaximizing ways because such behavior delivers the maximum benefits (defined as maximum consumption) for everyone. The ultimate convergence of national economies is taken as a given. The Anglo-American view of appropriate economic behavior in an international market is nicely summarized by Paul Krugman who sees a world in which the behavioral norms of the USA are universal and in which national differences in economic behavior should cease to exist: Students should learn that high productivity is beneficial, not because it helps a country compete with other 109

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN countries, but because it lets a country produce more and therefore consume more... One of the most popular, enduring misconceptions of practical men is that countries are in competition with each other in the same way that companies in the same business are in competition... An introductory economics course should drive home to students the point that international trade is not about competition, it is about mutually beneficial exchange.4 The view of economic behavior derived from the AngloAmerican economic model was seldom challenged during the 1950s and 1960s when US firms dominated the world economy. That changed rapidly, however, with the arrival of the Asian miracle'. Triggered by explosive economic growth in a number of Asian countries a very different economic model began to be the focus of scholars and the reference system for policy makers. The alternative economic model posits that economic success in the international market results from a different mix of factors, including an orientation on production rather than consumption, an emphasis on exports, and support for an active government role in developing the technologies of the future. The initial attractiveness of the alternative model came with the recognition that Japan had achieved its striking economic gains while 'violating' several norms of the Anglo-American model. Japanese society, for example, expects to subsidize foreign trade even though this is not in the short-term self-interest of the Japanese consumer. Similarly, Japanese firms focus more on gaining market share than profits - a pattern that is not in the short-term interest of Japanese stockholders. Peter Drucker sees the pattern that developed as follows: The emergence of new non-Western countries foremost, Japan - creates what I would call adversarial trade... Competitive trade aims at creating a customer. Adversarial trade aims at dominating an industry... Adversarial trade, however, is unlikely to be beneficial to both sides.... The aim of adversarial trade is ... to drive the competitor out of the market altogether rather than let the competitor survive.5 One explanation for the evolution of the Japanese model is based on the idea of 'comparative capitalism'. Any number of

no

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN authors have advanced this notion, which asserts the existence of different national approaches to the generation of wealth, based on different economic, social, and political objectives and divergent patterns of behavioral norms. 6 The comparative capitalism thesis is that the Japanese have not been beating the USA at its own game. Rather, the Japanese are playing the game by a different set of rules. As Fallows sees it: The real drama of this American form of Capitalism lies in the struggle to perfect the rules. According to its deepest assumptions, governments can never outguess the market about where the money should go. All that government can - and should - do is make sure that the crucial signals flow. Signals come in the form of prices... If the American approach boiled down to 'getting the prices right,' the Japanese approach boiled down to something different. Its essence was 'getting enough money' - not worrying about theoretical efficiency, not being concerned about the best rules for competition, but focusing only on getting the nation's money into the hands of the nation's big manufacturing firms. If companies could get more money to work with than their competitors, then in the long run they would prevail.7 From the vantage point of the latter half of the 1990s a convergence of capitalist economic systems appears unlikely. That is because successful societies can and probably must operate with different norms than those used in the USA. Those

differing norms reflect the fact that economic behavior is interrelated with and inseparable from national culture. National culture as an influential factor has attracted increasing attention as traditional conceptualizations of national competitive advantage have become less effective in providing understanding or guiding policy. National industries producing commercial technologies increasingly have access to essentially the same markets, capital, and product technology, and they are generally able to develop and access similar scientific and technological expertise. National industries, however, continue to perform differently. It is increasingly difficult to explain the variations in the success and failure of national industries without including culture. Francis Fukuyama's argument seems compelling: ill

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN The long-standing debates between free market economists [e.g., Krugman] and neomercantilists [e.g., Fallows] over whether and how the government ought to intervene in the economy sidestep an important issue. Certainly macroeconomic policy is important, but it must be applied within a particular political, historical, and cultural context. Policy prescriptions arising from either perspective may not be generalizable... The important variable is not industrial policy per se but culture.8 But if various forms of capitalism, levels and types of national economic performance and behavior, including competitiveness, are influenced by cultural factors, how are these patterns manifested, and how can they be measured? We focus on US and Japanese trade in process and product technologies, and we do so for three fundamental reasons. First, technology is the engine of economic growth in modern societies. Second, all developed countries seek to gain economic benefits from generally the same advanced technological sectors, most of which are global in scope and feature extensive and growing trade competition. And third, performance in international trade is a key benchmark by which nations can gauge the development of their industries and on which they base many of their public policies.9 Japanese and US Trade Patterns National economies have historically and continue to exhibit very different sectoral patterns of success in the international market. In a study published in 1995 Joseph Gagnon and Andrew Rose found persistently different patterns of sector competitiveness over the last thirty years in the USA, Japan, Korea, United Kingdom, Brazil, and Turkey10 When one looks at the recent technology trade performance of the USA versus Japan a very distinct difference is evident. Both the USA and Japan have run trade surpluses in the arena of complex process/simple product technologies, but the US position has eroded in a major way in the arena of complex process/complex product technologies (Table I)11 For the complex product technologies produced with complex processes in the thirty most valuable goods exported internationally the trade balances for Japan and the USA were going in opposite directions between 1980 and 1993. Measured in 1993 dollars, the US trade balance declined from a $22 billion 112

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN surplus in 1980 to a $28 billion deficit, while Japan's surplus increased from $70 billion to $153 billion. This success is associated with a distinctive ability on the part of Japanese technology producers to cany out incremental innovations of existing technologies and to produce new technologies through a process of 'fusing' existing technologies (e.g., combining electronic and mechanical systems to produce mechatronic systems).12 It appears likely that the group focus of Japanese culture is a major contributor to the capacity to carry out innovation through fusion. TABLE ^INTERNATIONAL TRADE BALANCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: TOP 30 TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS (In 1993 $ Billions) Simple Process/Simple Product Japan U.S. 1980 ($11.6) $18.0 ($43.0) 1993 $8.9

Simple Process/Complex Product Japan U.S. 1980 1993

Complex Process/Simple Product U.S. Japan 1980 $14.7 $96 $16.0 $8.3 1993

Complex Process/Complex Product U.S. Japan 1980 $21.7 $70.3 $153.5 ($28.5) 1993

Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, Vol. II: Trade by Commodity: Commodity Matrix Tables, (New York: United Nations), 1975, pp. 17-19; United Nations, International Trade Statistics Yearbook, Vol II: Trade by Commodity: Commodity Matrix Tables, (New York: United Nations), 1995, pp. 3-329.

Economic Activity and Culture How is it possible to understand these differing patterns of national economic success? Neoclassical economics suggests the patterns will not persist in an environment where key inputs to production flow relatively easily across national boundaries. Yet the patterns described in the table have persisted over decades in one case and 13 years in another. Recall in the case of the USJapanese technology trade comparison that the dollar strengthened significantly during the 1980-1993 period. It is our belief that some societies (cultures) may be better positioned than others at a given time to create and take advantage of the most economically beneficial combination of organizations and technologies. 113

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN Recognition of the link between economic activity and culture is certainly not new. Many have examined this relationship.13 This study shares particularly the following perspective of Thomas Haskell and Richard Teichgraeber: The relation between culture and economic activity is, we assume, one not of mutual exclusiveness but, rather, of reciprocal influence and interpretation, sometimes harmonious, sometimes conflictual. Economic practices are imbedded in aspects of culture.14 Viewed broadly, economic behavior reflects the intertwining of four powerful forces: (1) culture; (2) organizations; (3) technologies; and (4) markets (Figure 1). This combination of forces can lead to either the convergence or divergence of national economies. As Figure 1 shows, national culture is usually a major force behind divergence, while markets (increasingly international in character) tend to drive convergence. However, these are only general trends. A closer look at each of the forces reveals how complex the patterns of their interactions have become. Markets drive divergence

National cultures drive divergence

National cultures

Figure 1. The coevolution of organisations and technology is influenced by both markets and national culture 114

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN

National Culture Culture, as used here, is defined as 'meanings which people create, and which create people, as members of societies.'15 Culture determines, in many respects, how we find meaning in life. Culture defines who we are as people and how we conduct our lives. Culture influences how we view cause and effect relationships: this is critical in determining our conceptualization of the world and how we seek answers to questions.16 Thus, an especially important aspect of culture is its influence on how we learn. Thomas Rohlen notes: Learning, however, is not simply a matter of human psychology or of universal economic laws. Rather, the cultural and social environment shapes what learning means and defines its character and dynamic.17 Another important aspect of culture is its embeddedness in economic activity due, in part, to its ability to empower and constrain social relationships and guide how trust is formed in a society. American culture, for example, tends to generate trust in markets and competition while Japanese culture tends to generate trust in organizations, institutions and community. Stewart Clegg and Gordon Redding argue that in both cases it is culture which informs the formation of networks of social relationships which play a central role in producing trust. In their words: The mechanisms may be diverse; for instance they may exist in the charismatic capitalist's commitment to a moral economy in which they trust... [O]ther mechanisms are manifest in the contrasting content but functionally similar role that is provided by comparing economic embeddedness in 'communitarian' Japan, [and] 'patrimonial' South Korea...18 Differences in the tendency to trust have major consequences for the ways organizations, technologies, and markets interact in the US and Japanese national cultures. So the three other major differences in basic 'cultural tenets' outlined in Table 2 do also.

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CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN TABLE 2. BASIC TENETS OF U.S. AND JAPANESE NATIONAL CULTURES

View of Universe Learning Knowledge Tendency to Trust

USA

Japan

Mechanistic Reductionism Conceptual Individual/ Competition

Organic Synthesis Tacit Institution/ Community

American culture generally views the universe and its operation in mechanistic terms.19 Based on Newtonian physics, the universe is seen as a machine that can be understood using causility mechanisms. There are basic laws which guide the universe and we only need uncover them to understand how things operate. Americans tend to believe that reason and analysis are the best ways to learn. We learn by understanding cause and effect and by breaking complex phenomena into pieces which can be more easily understood (reductionism). The whole is understood by comprehending the individual parts, thus the whole is viewed as being the sum of the individual parts. Americans tend to have a hierarchical view of nature. According to this view, nature is something to be controlled or revered. One implication of this view is that Americans generally believe conceptual learning is the highest form of learning. That is, according to American culture, the most significant learning is largely independent of practical experience. This American view of nature is generally consistent with what Philip Selznick refers to as 'basic' naturalism. Nature and experience are to be studied by the scientific method and explained. Thus, in this view of nature, all knowledge gained is essentially cognitive and based on a neutral, detached, and nonspiritual view of nature. Selznick writes: Basic naturalism requires no special conception of nature. Whatever regularities we discover in the course of experimental inquiry — • which includes practical experience - count as nature. This understood, naturalism speaks to limits as well as to opportunities; is neither pessimistic nor optimistic; is as open to a spirit of resignation as to a more abundant faith in what can be gained from cooperative study and collective action.20 116

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN American culture is highly individualistic.21 Americans generally put their trust in individuals and assume that the greatest social good will come from competition among individuals and groups. The US norm is to separate social and economic goals and to pit government, industry, and labor against each other. Yet, at the same time, Americans have demonstrated an ability to 'come together' into effective groups or associations when faced with adversity. Many observers have noted the tendency of Americans to form voluntary associations to address social needs.22 There is, in fact, considerable conflict between the myth of extreme American individualism and the reality of community in American history. Fukuyama observes: Americans see themselves as individualistic Lone Rangers, defying authority and unable to merge themselves together effectively in the group. But American social history tells us exactly the opposite: We have been an extremely cohesive society, raising barns for the neighbors, establishing hospitals, organizing community soccer or baseball matches or setting up globe-spanning companies. Americans, in fact, have a very dense and strong layer of intermediate organization. Indeed, the chief characteristic noted by Alexis de Tocqueville was America's 'art of association.'23 Japanese culture is largely a product of Confucian philosophy and Zen Buddhism which generally posits that the world in its operation and function is highly organic.24 The universe is seen as a growing and evolving organism which can only be understood as a whole. As a result, Japanese are suspicious of sole reliance on rational and logical methods as sources of learning. Confucian and Zen Buddhist doctrine focuses attention on intuition and synthesis as sources of knowledge. According to Shuji Hayashi: The dominant perception in Japan is that 'the whole is more than the sum of the parts'. We are taught this from childhood; it is constantly reinforced in the family, at school, and at work, and it permeates the fabric of our culture... Western science and philosophy teach that to understand the truth of a thing, the totality must be broken down into its parts... The Japanese outlook may be common to all Orientals, and perhaps explains why Western-style science did not develop in Asia. Japanese 117

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN believe that the essence of a thing is not found in the details but in the whole; we are relatively unconcerned about the elements. We prefer direct sudden insight. Zen Buddhism relies on disciplined intuitive breakthroughs.25 In Confucian and Zen doctrine, people and nature are viewed as being in harmony26 The highest forms of learning are often viewed as being dependent on practical experience in nature.27 The importance of tacit knowledge in the technology innovation process is generally more recognized by Japanese than Americans.28 At the heart of Confucian thought is the 'way of the jen'./en, which loosely translated means compassion, signifies the importance of filial piety. Thus, the parent-child relationship is the model for all relationships and family harmony (wa) is the greatest social goal. In other words: 'The most important requirement for social order and harmony is for each and every individual to be continuously aware of his or her position in society and to act in strict accordance with what society demands of the incumbent.'29 Thus, Japanese tend to put their trust in institutions and believe that collaboration among individuals and groups (community) offers the greatest social benefit. Markets Economic success often depends on a firm's ability to rapidly learn and adapt to market changes. Especially as markets become more international, it would appear likely that national industries and firms will increasingly manifest converging organizational norms based on common market experiences. Certainly the dominant American economic worldview asserts the inevitability of market-led convergence. Yet it is also the case that Asian countries in general, and Japan in particular have a fundamental mistrust of the marketplace. From their perspective, the unpredictability of markets means they should not be trusted to make big decisions (e.g., how a society should be run, what direction an economy should take). In Japan, for instance, it is quite common for company representatives as well as government officials to speak negatively of 'excessive competition' or 'confusion in the market' and to advocate the reshaping of markets in the national interest. The market-defining policies carried out by the Japanese government have included everything from restrictions on foreign investment and foreign exchange to weak enforcement of antitrust 118

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN regulation and supporting the organization of industry cartels during hard economic times. And these overt market-shaping actions pale in comparison to the more subtle managing of market dynamics by organizational arrangements like the 'societies of business', or kieretsu, which often have used mutual shareholding, interlocking directorates,and close buyer-supplier relationships to engage in exclusionary behavior.30 On the other hand, it is precisely intrinsic market uncertainty that is the key to economic life in the USA. Of course, both public and private organizations also mould markets in the USA, but this is generally excused as a response to 'market failure,' or camouflaged as defense-related activity. The idea that organizations should systematically seek to shape markets is entirely foreign to the discussion of American economic growth or of debates about public policy. Technologies The notion that technology and markets can determine cultural attitudes and values has a long history. Karl Marx praised technology as the embodiment of scientific rationality and as breaking down the barriers of primitive and magical thought.31 Despite Max Weber's idea of economics as a cultural science he argued that cross-cultural 'rational action' would transform modern capitalism to a uniformity in which cultural value was absent.32 More recently, critical theorists have asserted that technology rationalizes culture. Jurgen Habermas defines technology as 'scientifically rationalized control of objectified processes' and notes that '[t]o the extent that technology and science permeate social institutions and thus transform them, old legitimations are destroyed'.33 Thus, numerous scholars have argued that technology will transform social institutions by exposing and invalidating the basic tenets which guide individual behavior and organizational norms. In this way culturally determined views of the world are replaced by self-reification based largely on assumptions of rational choice behavior. If truths were objectively determined then these arguments would be more salient. However, subjectivity remains a powerful force in determining perceptions of the world. Jeffery Alexander puts it nicely when he says: It is impossible for a society to be dominated by technical rationality because the mental structures of humankind cannot be radically historicized; in crucial respects, they 119

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN are unchanging. Human beings continue to experience the need to invest the world with metaphysical meaning and to experience solidarity with objects outside the self.... Individuals can exercise scientifically rational orientations in certain situations, but even in these instances their actions are not scientifically rational as such. Objectivity is a cultural norm, a system of social sanctions and rewards, a motivational impulse of the personality. It remains nested, however, within deeply irrational systems of psychological defense and cultural systems of an enduring primordial kind.34 As a result, powerful culturally-based endogenous forces continue to operate within industries and firms making some types of learning and adaptation easier than others. These forces tend to sustain or enhance divergent organizational norms among industries and firms. Moreover, complex technology largely evolves along trajectories which reflect the search routines, core competencies (or past learning) of an industry or firm.35 Although technology is responsive to the market, it is increasingly recognized that technology evolves in a way that is consistent with endogenous forces operating within an industry or firm. As technology becomes increasingly complex, there are numerous ways to innovate a technology with needed performance characteristics as defined by the market. Thus, even if all firms in an industry had the same technological goal, endogenous forces operating within firms encourage the use of differing paths to achieve that goal. Richard Nelson observes: Thus diversity of firms is just what one would expect under evolutionary theory. It is virtually inevitable that firms will choose somewhat different strategies. These, in turn, will lead to firms having different structures and different core capabilities, including their R&D capabilities. Inevitably firms will pursue somewhat different paths.36 Contrasting strategies among firms result in differing pathways among firms. Again quoting Dosi: [TJhere is growing evidence that specific 'innovation avenues' are a widespread feature of the observed patterns of technological change.... Indeed, the evidence 120

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN surveyed suggests that one still observes 'explorations' limited to some, much smaller, subsets of notional characteristics space. It is precisely the paradigmatic cumulative nature of technological knowledge that accounts for the relatively ordered nature of the observed patterns of technological change.37 Thus, it appears that technology evolves within a paradigm which Dosi defines as, both an exemplar - an artifact that is to be developed and improved (such as a car, an integrated circuit, a lathe, each with its particular technoeconomic characteristics) and a set of heuristics (e.g., Where do we go from here? Where should we search? What sort of knowledge should we draw on?).38 The technology trajectory within the paradigm is influenced by how an organization learns, which is a product of organizational search routines. Changes in a technology paradigm producing a new technology trajectory will likely be linked to changes in organizational search routines. As technology becomes more complex, its innovation is increasingly a product of experiential learning which produces tacit knowledge.39As a result, the capacity to pursue innovation is to an increasing extent industry and firm specific.40 The result is that search routines related to the innovation of complex technologies become increasingly industry and firm specific. It appears evident that the search routines that guide the learning associated with the coevolution of organizations and technology are a product of culture and past learning. Given that the learning critical to the evolution of organizations and complex technology is to a large extent experiential, search routines will tend to be industry and firm specific. Thus, although markets foster convergence in organizational norms and technology trajectories, powerful endogenous forces are derived from national culture embedded in the search routines that are intertwined with organizational norms and technology trajectories. One then would expect variations among national industries and firms. Organizations Organizations extend individual limits for handling information 121

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN and decision making.41 They do this by creating organizational and behavioral norms, including norms for social relationships, which are based on selected conceptual views of the environment. These norms are formed partially by experience with what works and partially on what is empowered and discouraged within the broader culture within which the organization operates.42 Of this Selznick says: The self is ineluctably social, but people responding to specific situations are not mere puppets or replicas of each other; they are not prisoners of abstract values or roles; they act in light of unique needs, wants, opportunities, and constraints. Individual action is situational; operational roles are emergent and not ordained by culture; collective action is best understood as a product of negotiation and mutual adjustment.43 And Hayek has noted: As Alfred Whitehead has said in another connection, 'It is a profoundly erroneous truism ... that we should cultivate the habit of thinking what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them.' This is of profound significance... We have developed these practices and institutions by building upon habits and institutions which have proven successful in their own sphere and which in turn become the foundation of civilization we have built up.44 Complex Technology, Organizations, and Culture Masahiko Aoki argues that history and culture help to explain the tendency of USfirmsto adopt an 'H-mode' of organization and of Japanese firms to adopt a 'J-mode'.45 The H-mode involves hierarchical separation of planning and implementation based on contractual agreements and emphasizes specialization. The J-mode has horizontal coordination among operating units and emphasizes the sharing of experiential learning. Aoki writes, Despite the increasing globalization of markets, the fact that we have been observing a relatively similar coordination mode within each economy, but relatively 122

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN dissimilar patterns in the West and Japan, may have to do with historical, cultural, and regulation factors... [T]he maintenance of organizational integrity in the context of individualistic values in the West (particularly in North America) may have necessitated contractual agreement on the more hierarchical structuring of internal coordination. On the other hand, in Japan, respect for differentiated status by attributes (sex, age, seniority, family background, etc.) and level of training has been a dominant traditional social value... [WJithin a small group, horizontal coordination rather than clear job demarcation tends to emerge spontaneously in Japan, possibly because of the collective memory of the traditional agrarian customs and values.45 Japanese culture fosters viewing technology in organic or evolutionary terms.46 Japanese tend to see technology evolving in response to the needs of the environment (e.g., user needs). Ikujiro Nonaka describes a process used at Honda to develop a new automobile: Project team leader Hiroo Watanabe coined another slogan to express his sense of the team's ambitious challenge: Theory of Automobile Evolution. The phrase described an ideal. In effect, it posed the question: If the automobile were an organism, how should it evolve?47 Japanese organizations view themselves and technology as being embedded within a context of physical reality which moves the technology in certain directions. A successful technology evolves, in a way that creates and is created by harmony, within a context. Americans tend to see technology in revolutionary rather than evolutionary terms. An American view of successful technology innovation would identify events such as putting a man on the moon or curing cancer. In sum, American culture emphasizes risk taking and leaps forward unlike Japanese culture which emphasizes the gradual and mundane. Hayashi writes: The adventuresome, revolutionary mind-set of Westerners, especially of Americans, always seeks new worlds to conquer. Risk-taking and discovery are supreme values... The Japanese way of thinking favors the gradual, mundane, and peaceful. Rooted in human activities, this 123

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN approach inspires no brilliant breakthroughs or heroic sagas... Although Japanese companies are less zealous in coming up with original technology and developing new fields, they constantly improve existing products and make them available to tens of millions of people.48 In previous work two of the authors have argued that the concurrent growth of the Japanese economy and the increasing complexity of commercial technology are related.49 They suggest that this link is due, in part, to Japanese culture. That is, by encouraging a J-mode of organization and an evolutionary view of technology, Japanese culture fosters organizational norms and search routines which emphasize synthetic and experiential learning which are critical in innovating complex technology. Alternately, by encouraging an H-mode of organization and a revolutionary view of technology, American culture fosters organizational norms and search routines which emphasize reductionist and cognitive learning which are critical in innovating simple technology. A fundamental shift has occurred in the nature of technology innovation processes. Successful complex technology products today seldom result from technological breakthroughs. Rather they are overwhelmingly the result of the technology fusion and incremental innovation processes referred to earlier.50 Thus, it appears that the competitive benefits of synthetic learning (usually critical to technology fusion and incremental innovation) are increasing dramatically.51 This learning which is inseparable from the innovation of complex technologies is in turn dependent on group processes that integrate diverse sources of knowledge and especially tacit knowledge gained from trial and error learning.52 Thus, Japanese culture provides a fertile context for innovating complex technology. First, it fosters synthetic learning while American culture fosters more reductionist learning. Second, Japanese culture is likely more supportive of group-oriented innovation processes than American culture with its celebration of the individual. Third, the emphasis in Japanese culture on harmony with nature is likely more supportive of trial and error learning and the resulting accumulation of tacit knowledge than American culture which tends to focus on accumulating conceptual knowledge.

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Case Study Findings As part of a broader study of organizational processes associated with the innovation of simple and complex technologies the authors investigated seven successful technologies, one simple and six complex. The simple technology was Dow Chemical's Insite Technology Process for producing thermoplastics. The complex technologies were: General Electric's blades for high pressure turbines on jet engines, Hewlett Packard's cardioimaging technology, Intel's microprocessor, Varian's linear accelerator for cancer treatment, Sony's compact disc, and Sony's 3-5' micro-floppy disk.53 One purpose of the case studies was to compare the innovation processes associated with the various technologies with the search routine patterns that would be expected from American and Japanese cultures.54 The first and clearest finding is that the search routines utilized in the innovation of the simple technology conformed to the norms of American culture. They were mechanistic, reductionist, conceptual, and success was clearly associated with identifiable individuals. The search routines evident in the six complex technology cases varied among the technologies and over time. For example, in the two oldest of the technologies, the turbine blade and the linear accelerator for cancer treatment, the search routines evident from their initial innovations into the 1980s were roughly consistent with the norms of American culture and the patterns evident in the simple technology case. Beginning in the late 1980s the search routines used to innovate the turbine blade and the linear accelerator moved rapidly in the direction of those used in the innovation of the other four complex technologies. That is, they took on characteristics similar to those that would be expected in the Japanese cultural context. They were organic, utilized synthesis, recognized and emphasized tacit knowledge, and emphasized the group or community as the source of innovation. The clearest factors associated with the movement over time toward Japanese search routines was the increasing complexity of the technologies and the increasing pressure to deliver incremental innovations rapidly. The most striking difference between the four US-based complex technologies and the two Japanese ones was the role of management. One of the authors characterized the US cases as involving the need for management to make their organizations cultural islands' if they were to be successful in the incremental 125

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN innovation of their technologies. In the most distinctive case Intel follows a conscious and continuous strategy of creating a company culture that conforms to the Japanese search routine norms. Intel's management continuously emphasizes the importance of Japanese-like norms and rewards individuals for behaving according to the norms. In the same vein Intel devotes major training efforts to teaching its people how to interact in ways that support and reinforce the Japanese cultural norms. In all of the US cases there was some evidence of dissonance on the part of people within these cultural islands because the patterns needed for company success do not conform to the norms of American culture. Alternatively, the case studies identified no similar dissonance in the two Sony cases. There was no evidence, for example, of formal rules of behavior for meetings as was evident in some of the US cases. In sum, the search routines that appear to be essential to the successful innovation of complex technologies fit comfortably at Sony. The case studies support the hypothesis that Japanese culture fits well with the needs of complex technological innovation. It seems plausible that Japan's cultural norms are and will continue to be a major asset in the economic competition of the 21st century. Alternatively, to utilize the same search routines in the USA will require major efforts by management and perhaps by government.

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CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN APPENDIX A Table A: Top 25 (3-Digit) World Exports, 1993 (Billion $)

srrc

Industrial Sector

(Rev 2)

Category Code

World

United States

Japan

781

Passenger Motor Vehicles

C/C

185.6

14.8

47.1

776

Transistors/Valves

C/C

92.7

20.1

22.0

784

Motor Vehicle Parts, Ace. NES

C/C

89.8

19.7

15.3

752

ADP Equipment

C/C

86.1

18.0

16.9

764

Telecom Equip, Parts, Ace NES

C/C

77.2

12.3

17.8

792

Aircraft

C/C

69.3

31.9

.6

759

Office/ADP Parts, Ace.

C/C

58.2

12.4

12.4

541

Medicinal/Pharm. Products

s/c

51.5

5.8

1.5

778

Electrical Machinery NES

C/C

50.0

7.3

10.2

583

Polymerization Products

6.1

3.3

Paper and Paper Board

s/c s/c

48.4

641

47.8

4.7

1.3

772

Switchgear Etc., Parts NES

C/C

42.0

5.9

8.0

749

NonElec. Mach. Parts, Ace. NES

s/c

40.7

4.3

6.9

728

Other Mach. Spec. Industries

C/C

40.3

5.7

6.7

713

Internal Comb. Piston Engine

C/C

40.1

7.4

9.6

874

Meas ./Control Instruments

C/C

40.1

11.0

5.0

782

Special Motor Vehicle NES

C/C

37.5

4.0

9.7

674

Iron/Steel Plate, Sheet

36.7

1.1

7.1

843

Women's Outerwear not Knit

893

Articles of Plastic

821

Furniture

894

Toys/Sport Goods

s/c s/c s/c s/s s/s

793

Ships & Boats

C/C

845

Outerwear Knit Nonelastic

s/s

35.0

.8

.1

34.4

4.2

1.3

33.5

3.3

.6

30.3

3.3

1.9

30.1

1.0

10.2

29.0

.7

.1

Source: United Nations, 1993 International Trade Statistics Yearbook. Volume II: Trade bv Commodity. Category Code: C/C = Complex Product/Complex Process Technology S/C = Simple Product/Complex Process Technology S/S = Simple Product/Simple Process Technology

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Chapter 8

Technology and Its Value Orientation Junzo Kawada

-1 This paper aims to analyze some aspects of technology in modern Japan, using three models of 'technological culture'. By the concept of 'technological culture', I mean a complex of certain technological principles, in connection with a set of value orientations, such as world view, attitudes towards living things, productivity and labour. Up to now, technology has been mostly treated separately from world view or value orientations. In reality, I think these two aspects of a culture are closely interrelated, the technological aspect of a culture being the embodiment of the world view of its culture, realized through value orientations on the material world, living things and labour, as well as through social relations. I have tried to elaborate three models of the thus defined 'technological culture', on the basis of ethnographical data of three cultures, namely Japanese culture, French culture and the culture of the ancient Mossi kingdom (Burkina Faso) of West Africa. These three cultures, Asiatic, European and African cultures, which I have had a chance to study intensively, are radically different from each other, with no direct contact until the second half of the nineteenth century. By taking three cultures as points of reference, we can expect to relativize and objectify more efficiently one of the three points, including the observer's culture. Besides, the comparison of quite different cultures has an obvious heuristic effect. By this type of comparative method, which I call the 'triangulation of cultures', I have studied several aspects of culture, such as the techniques of the body, the iconographic-linguistic study and 'sound culture' (note 1). In this paper I would like to apply this method to 129

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN analyse the characteristics of technological culture in modern Japan. Because of the limit of space, I cannot take Mossi culture fully into account, being obliged to focus on the comparison of the technological cultures of Japan and France, which has direct bearing on the present subject. But even to study the problems of modern Japan, in connection with the Western world, an African case as a point of reference is helpful to make some points clear in the anthropological comparative perspective. The comparison is done by means of operational models, which are elaborated from the data taken mainly before the mid-nineteenth century when Japan re-established direct and overall relations with many Western countries, including France, and began its socalled modernization. -2-

The operational model of technological culture based on French culture (model A), which has many traits in common with West European culture in general, is characterized first by its doubly human independent orientation, in contrast with the doubly human dependent orientation found in model B, derived from Japanese culture. The doubly human independent orientation of model A consists of: First, the effort to devise instruments in order to enable to get a constantly good result, independent from the human personal skill; and second, the idea to utilize to the maximum non-human energy, thus sparing human pains, but at the same time to get a result on a larger scale. On the contrary, the doubly human dependent orientation of model B is characterized by: First, the use of simple and non specialized tools to get an effective result, by means of highly trained human skill; and second, the unsparing use of human energy to attain a good result. The orientation found in model A, derived from the ancient West Asiatic agro-pastoral culture, is based on the maximal use of domestic animals, not only for milk, meat, leather or wool, but also for their energy. In its origin, it is ideologically supported by 'Genesis', according to which the Creator made human beings in his image, and other animals for the use of human beings. Thus, humans are designated to be the master of other living things. This anthropocentric conviction, together with the technological ideas mentioned above, has been corroborated by scientific research as the effort to decipher nature, this great book given by 130

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN the Creator to humans. Thus, this model A has supplied, on the ideological level, the basis for the philosophy of modern humanism with the idea of human rights, as the leading principle for the modern world, including non Western societies. The use of non-human energy has shifted from animal power or water and wind energy to fossil fuel and nuclear fuel energy By using non-human energy, the system of its transmission has been highly developed, with multiple use of the rotative principle by means of wheels, gears, belts or connecting rods, which were absent in the technological cultures of model B - except for wheels in a very limited use - and model C (the Mossi culture), where instruments have remained as an extension of the human body. In the case of model C, which had no tools with the principle of lever either, we can speak of instrumentalization of the human body, as it is seen in the hoe with a short handle. In model A, human labour and skill consequently have come to be used mainly to control the transmission of non-human energy, as is clearly seen in driving a car, but that was already the case in the use of domestic animal power, such as in conducting a plough or a cart by using animal traction. Sparing painful human energy by such devises is in complete accordance with the attitude toward labour in model A, where labour is considered as a necessary evil, as it is symbolically expressed by the French word 'travail' which is derived from 'tripalium', a set of three poles used for torturing in ancient Rome. In the modern capitalist economy too, labour is considered as a factor to be minimized from both the managerial side and the workers' side. As for the attitude of humans toward non human living things, the Japanese have the custom of keeping some kinds of insects such as the cricket family Gryllidae (for instance, suzumushi,

Homoeogryllus japonicus

and matsumushi,

Xenogryllus

marmoratus) in a fine bamboo cage to listen to their 'songs', and in ancient times our ancestors organized competitive 'concerts' between such insects. They have the analogous custom for wild birds of beautiful voice, like the Japanese bush warbler uguisu

(Cettia diphone) or the skylark hibari (Alauda arvensis = A. japonica), and they train the young birds to sing better by putting the cage alongside that of a 'master singer' bird. Among the domesticated animals and plants artificially bred by the Japanese, we find totenko (a variety of Gallus gallus var. domesticus of south-east Asiatic origin, the cock of which sings marvelously), onagadori (another variety of G. g. d. with extremely long and beautiful tail feathers), chabo (another 131

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN dwarfish and tiny variety of G. g. d., which reminds us of bonasbi, the miniaturized trees), fine varieties of goldfish (of the genus Crassius), as well as of the chrysanthemum (Chrysanthemum morifolium) and of the morning glory (Ipomoea nil). All of these were improved by breeding through an aesthetic interest, not for practical use. This may be partly due to the fact that the Japanese consumed a lot of fishing products and to a smaller extent hunting products, but practically no meat or milk of domestic animals, except for small quantities of chicken and eggs. At the same time, it is timely to be reminded that in model B, the human being is not considered as the master of other living things, but it constitutes with the latter a humble part of nature. With nature, humans had relations of an emotive rather than intellectual character, as it is clearly seen in Japanese literature and fine arts. As a consequence, in model B sciences did not developed to analyse nature in order to make use of it more efficiently. -3In what condition then, could the doubly human dependent orientation develop in model B? The rice cultivation with an irrigation system, which was the most important susbsistence activity in Japan, might be a major factor. Rice is a rare domesticated plant which, by irrigation, can be cultivated continuously without limit in the same field. In Japan, where non arable mountainous woodlands occupy about three quarters of the total area, its inhabitants were obliged to till limited land for a highly concentrated population. Once the irrigation system is constructed, it must be maintained and managed collectively by a certain number of farmers concerned, and thus, they were inevitably bound to the land generation after generation. Thus, they had no other choice but to make their living by investing unsparingly their labour, in order to get a better harvest from the small paddy; in other words, to increase the land productivity, without taking any formal account of labour productivity. This situation was aggravated during the two and a half centuries (from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century) of the feudal system under the Tokugawa Shogun government, with its policy to extend enormously the rice cultivation, while at the same time to make more severe the levy of land tax by rice; as an unique institution 132

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN in the world, in Japan under the feudal system, and even before, the salaries of all offficials were paid in rice. It must be noted that in the paddies of small scale, the use of animal power was very limited, and the delicate important work of planting rice, as well as repeated weeding in the paddy under the burning sun of summer were done only by manual labour; they were mechanized only recently after the new technological renovation of the 1960's. This situation of the Japanese farmers can be understood clearly, when it is compared with the traditional French farming of the three-field system. For the cultivation of wheat, to plough before seeding is of capital importance, and this work is appropriately done by mighty, sometimes wheeled plough pulled by two or more horses or oxen. For the cultivation of spring wheat in the South European type of rainy-winter climate, in contast to the rice cultivation in the rainy-summer climate in East and South-East Asia, the weeding is not necessary, except for occasional removal of thistle in late spring. We can understand, as compared with Japanese paddy farming, how the animal husbandry occupies an important place in the three-field rotation system, as it is seen from the fact that most of the summer crops, as well as the pasture during its fallow period, that is to say, about two thirds of the total land use, are destined to feed domestic animals. In model C, where slash-and-burn shifting cultivation of millet and sorghum is practised, without the association of animal husbandry, in the rainy-summer type of climate, farmers are less bound to the land, and as in other tropical areas, a low land productivity contrasts with relatively high labour productivity Besides, the overwhelming climatic factors play a fatal role for the crop and nourish a value orientation to count on luck rather than on effort. In these conditions, we can understand that farmers' view of the nature and the labour of model C are radically different from those found in model B. But this first aspect of the doubly human dependent and independent orientations - unsparing use of human energy and the maximum use of non-human energy - found respectively in model B and model A, might have also another socio-cultural basis. In Japanese, in contrast with the French concept found in 'travail' or 'travailler', the corresponding words "hatarakV or 'hataraku' meant originally to act devotedly without due recompense. This view of human labour derives much from the weakness or even the absence of the idea of contract among the 133

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN Japanese; in other words, non-economic compulsions prevailed in the pre-modern Japanese society. This situation may derive mostly from the traditional human relationship defined always by unequal dichotomous terms, like superior vs. inferior, master vs. subordinate or favour vs. obligation. Besides these social factors, a core concept of Japanese value orientations, which is expressed by an adjective 'mottainai\ extremely difficult to translate into European languages, determines the Japanese attitude towards labour. Its original meaning might be put in English words as something like inappropriate to the esssentials of the universe'. It is used to blame someone who does not properly pay respect to a person, or who wastes, or who does not work as one ought to do, in any case when someone does not obey ethical principles of the universe, although they have not a clear idea of the universe and its principles. The Japanese do not believe in God, but in their animistic world view, they are in awe of the essentials of the nature or of the universe, which are often conceived in the form of gods or genii. Verbal expressions to praise or to respect another person's labour are rich in Japanese and frequently used in everyday life, which are totally absent in French or in English. It is also absent in Arabic, and I think in the monotheistic belief, represented in model A, these expressions like 'gokurousama', *otsukaresama\ or 'goseiga demasune' in Japanese can be replaced by the wish of God's grace or recompense to the addressee. At the same time, this has some bearing on the precise concept of contract in model A, where the Testament itself is a primary contract of humans with God. When I lived in Paris, I felt uneasy in saying nothing to a joiner who came to my apartment to repair something, in order to praise his labour as in Japan I customarily did. I asked my French friends what should I say in French in such circumstance, and the reply was: 'Nothing. It is not necessary, because he is paid for his labour.' -4-

As for the second aspect of the human dependent orientation in model B, to use to the maximum human personal skill in order to diversify the functions of a simple instrument and to use it efficiently, the prevalence of manual skill in Japanese everyday life was an important factor in developing this orientation. For example, everyday use of chopsticks and writing brushes from early infancy in pre-modern Japan, as well as the wide-spread 134

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN games for children which consist of the competition in the manual skill of the players, like kendama (a sort of French 'bilboquet', but far more complicated) for boys and otedama ('jonglage' with two or three small beanbags) for girls. The use of chopsticks is a good example of this orientation. A pair of sticks are extremely simple as instruments, but by means of human skill, they can be used in several different functions either to eat meals or to cook, such as to pick up, to cut, to scoop up or to push food into the mouth. This orientation is made clear when it is compared with the triple set of a knife, fork and spoon, used by the French common people since the seventeenth century, far more complicated and specified in each function, but it does not need a high skill to use them as in the case of chopsticks. If we take as an example from another point of reference model C, the use of the right hand to eat, a common custom in Africa and many other areas in the world, and which also requires a certain skill, it may be characterized by the technological orientation of 'instrumentalization of the human body', as opposed to that found in model B, which may be labelled as 'humanization of instruments'. In such a way, model A can be described as 'dishumanization of instruments'. This characterization is valid also for the first aspect of the human dependent and the human independent orientation, as we saw it earlier. Let us exmine this characterization by other examples. To see the relations between the human body and instruments - in a larger sense to designate all materials for human use -, especially in the comparison of model A and model B, I take as examples, scissors, carrying pole, footwear and clothing. The scissors used in model A have two or three rings in which to put the fingers of the user. These rings are conceived to make the functioning of the instrument the most efficient, but those of model B, a shears type without a pivot, have no such devices, the position of the fingers on the instrument being left to the user's choice. Consequently, the users of scissors of model B can put their fingers as they want, changing their positions according to the purpose. In the case of the scissors for needlework, to do some very fine work, as to unfasten seams by cutting the thread with the points of scissors, the users put their thumb and forefinger near the points, but for a long and rough cut of a piece of cloth, fingers are preferably put rather low on the scissors. The efficient use of this type of scissors requires a certain skill, but in the case of the scissors of model A, by the differentiation in types, a more easy and efficient use is possible. 135

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN The carrying shoulder pole, widely used in Japan, was a simple wooden pole, relatively long for the human body and rather flexible, being made of the wood of the Japanese cypress (hinoki), it is light but resistant because of its strong longitudinal veins. It is placed over one of the porter's shoulders in the sagittal sense, and the loads are hung from the two ends of the pole by a relatively long rope. This causes the loads to swing to the rhythm of the porter's stride, and the spring-like motion of the ends of the pole partly absorbs the weight felt on the shoulder. This nececessitates a rhythmic swaying of the hips, which requires a certain skill acquired through practice, especially to keep water from spilling out of the pails. The posture adopted for this type of portage can be described as: the torso is inclined slightly forward, and the knees are bent to maintain balance while the hips sway. These characteristics are clearly recognizable when compared to those of the carrying loads in model A, by means of the shoulder yoke which is short, wide and stiff, carved with a groove so that it can be placed sideways over both shoulders in a stable way. In France, this mode of transport is usually used to carry two pails of water, which are often secured on each side by means of a ring to avoid splashing. We can see that these two methods of portage found in model A and model B respectively, have inverted orientations, though each of them aims to faciliate carrying pails of water. The French posture used for this type of portage is also very different from that of the Japanese. The trunk is held upright so that the shoulders bear the weight vertically. In some cases, the hands are also used to stabilize or even to carry the buckets. Consequently, it is through the strength of the shoulders and arms that the load is supported and stabilized. If we compare the flexible shoulder pole used by the Japanese, very simple in form and precariouly positioned over the shoulder, with the French shoulder yoke, an elaborate tool solidly attached to the human body, the fundamental traits of the two different orientations with regard to technology, can be discerned. The Japanese favour the use of simple tools that do not have specialized functions and that require human skill for proper use. Consequently, the relations between the tool and the human body are, for the Japanese, more supple and less predetermined. These traits can be found also in other domains of material culture, footwear and clothing. The Japanese footwear, like geta (wooden clogs) and zori (straw sandals), as well as the Japanese 136

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN clothing, kimono, have only three sizes: those for men, for women and for children. In the case of niwa-geta (literally, clogs for the garden) for the common use by family members, even this distinction in size does not exist. For the footwear, there is no distinction between the pieces for the right and left foot. The way to wear kimono, by each person of a different size of body, is left to the taste and elegance of each wearer. For children, according to the growth of body size, the length of the sleeves and body height is adjusted to by taking a tuck. As for the footwear and clothing of model A, the size is adjusted to each wearer, although in the case of sabot, or wooden shoes, the wearer could manage the fitness by stuffing them with straw. But generally speaking, we can see there that the relation between the human body and material device is less supple and more predetermined than that of model B, as it was also in the case of the scissors and carrying pole. -5I take another example in order to see in a time perspective the difference of technological culture between model A and model B in their fundamental orientations: the techniques of navigation of river vessels. In Japan, the most frequently used techniques for fluvial navigation were the pole (sao), the Asiatic stern oar (ro) and occasionally, the sail. The stern oar might have been invented in East or South-East Asia, and introduced to Japan during the first century B.C. Light and manipulatable, it was fitted for a small boat and for a short distance. But for a long distance move of a vessel of a larger size, the pole was the most frequently used. The stern oar requires certain skill, but to manipulate the pole, long term training is necessary. A Japanese dictum says: 'Three months for the stern oar, three years for the pole'. I myself understood it by interviewing several experienced Japanese boatmen. In manipulating a long and heavy pole made of the wood of the Japanese cypress (hinoki), what is the most delicate is to know exactly the moment and the appropriate angle at which to put the point on the riverbed. First, the boatman stands at the bow. After having placed the upper end of the pole at his breast, the boatman chooses the most appropriate angle to thrust the pole into the water and push it until the lower end of it touches the riverbed. Then, at the best moment, the boatman begins to push the upper end of the pole by his breast, and pushing with all his strength, he walks 137

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN along the edge of the boat towards the stern, thus moving forward the vessel. If he thrusts the pole too fast in an angle too steep, the heavy pole stands in a vertical position, and it is impossible to advance the boat. On the contrary, if he does it too slowly at a flat angle, the boatman risks falling forward with the pole at his breast. But once he has mastered the skill after a long training, the appropriate movements come in sequence almost reflexively, and the boatman advances the vessel all day long without any conscious effort, humming songs. With a simple instrument, but by using it with a high skill, the user 'humanizes' the instrument to make it as an extension of his body. In France, since the fifteenth century, they have used the technique of 'navigation par eeluses', or navigation by means of sluices. It is a method to advance a vessel by regulating artificially the water level of different continuous sluices. We see there a characteristic of the technological orientation of model A to use efficiently non-human energy. But at the same time, they used animals - horses, donkeys, and once in a while oxen - for towage, especially in the case of navigation by canals, from 'le chemin de halage', or the tracking road. At the end of the eighteenth century, the paddle-wheel steamer appeared, but before this innovation of energy, horse power had been used to work the same system: on the deck six horses turned horizontally a wheel, the movement of which was transmitted by gears to the paddle-wheels set at both sides of the hull. Soon after, the steam engine was invented in England. In the second half of the nineteenth century, by the invention of the screw, screw steamers came into use, and at the beginning of the twentieth century, the screw ships with an internalcombustion engine became common. Meanwhile, in certain places the towage by locomotives - at first steam locomotives, then electric ones - from the canal side, where the rail was set on the former horse road, was in practice, and in some parts of large rivers, in France, especially between Paris and the lower reaches of the Seine, the kedging system was used, with a tugboat. Until quite recent times, in parallel with these various methods, the towage of vessels from river- or canal-side by horses was widely practiced in France, about which I could learn by interviewing old 'mariniers', or boatmen on fluvial vessels, at Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, a big old river port of the Seine near Paris, and an old guardman of a canal gate at Montargis on the Briare canal, the oldest in France, built in the first half of the 138

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN seventeenth century. On the other side, if the sail was formerly used in fluvial navigation in France, the stern oar was completely absent, and the pole - a very short one -, if used, was just to arrange the position of the vessel, by putting the other end on the riverside and not on the riverbed. In Japan, too, the old navigation technique by pole was largely practiced until the 1960's, the big turning age of technology not only in Japan, but also in France. By examining the fluvial navigation technology of the two models, we are surprised by the contrasting traits in time perspective: in model B, an immobilism of the techniques for centuries, in opposition to those of model A, where successive technical changes have occurred since the end of the eighteenth century. I think that the technical development took place in model A, because of its fundamental characteristics of doubly human independent orientation and successive changes in replacing non-human energy, without relying on human personal skill. In model B, the technological immobilism has derived mainly from its doubly human dependent orientation; by humanizing simple instruments, and by using unsparingly the human energy, there was no place for the innovation of material devices, but only the refinement of the human skill. In place of material development, they elaborated ethics and esthetics of human labour: for a skillful Japanese boatman it should be a delight to advance a large vessel on the river by his own, well trained power. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the sudden introduction of the techniques of model A into Japan occurred. But alongside the many screw ships with internal-combustion engines, constructed at first by imitating those of model A and used largely in Japan, the old system survived until recently. -6When we think of the so-called modernization of Japan, we must first take into account that the reform of Meiji was, from the point of view of value orientations, the renewal and the re-forging of the old ethics around the re-sacralized Tenno, going back to the period prior to the twelfth century when the Tenno was the real head of the nation; since that time, during more than six centuries until Meiji, it was always the samurai-shogun who governed the nation. From this fact, a strange amalgamation of modern English royal customs and the pre-twelfth century Tenno customs found in the modern Tenno system can be understood: 139

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN the official costume of the Tenno is English, even when he goes to worship at Ise shrine, the shrine where his ancesters are deified, and his wife, Kdgd, in 'robe montante'. But at some ceremonial occasions like marriage or enthronement which take place in the palace, he wears the sokutai, the formal court costume, institutionalized since the Heian period (from the end of the ninth century to the end of the twelfth century) when the Tenno was a real ruler. Taking an example, in the Japanese imperial navy, constructed in the Meiji period on the model of the English navy, imitating every Western modern technique, the official ceremonial song, the famous (Umiyukaba\ was composed in 1880, at the beginning of Meiji, by an imperial court musician, using the verse of an eighth century court officer and poet expressing the deathdefying devotion in military service for the Tenno. This song was frequently and solemnly performed in Japan until the end of the Pacific War, where the military technology originated from model A played a crucial role, on the Japanese side, too. Of course, Japan entered into the international society of midnineteenth century Occidental countries, as a new nation-state of constitutional monarchy on Occidental criteria, but it was not based on a history of the long bloody struggle between the people's representatives and the monarch, as in England. Far from that, the Japanese political leaders who realized the Meiji reform, reorganized the traditional syncretic Shinto-Buddhistic beliefs to an artificially purified Tenno-centred Shintoism as the new State religion. In the international situation of the midnineteenth century, when the Occidental powers colonized most of the Asian countries, the choice of the new Japan was summarized in three slogans: 'Datsu a nyu d' (Leave Asia and enter the Occident), Tukoku kyohei' (Make the country rich, build a strong military) and 'Wakon ydsai' 0apanese spirit with Occidental technology). Around the eighth century, Japan was strongly influenced by China, and on the basis of the culture of Chinese origin, the Japanese imperial court, as well as the administrative institutions were formed. By using the characters introduced from China, the Japanese wrote in the eighth century, the first book on their history. The above mentioned verse used in the ceremonial song of the modern Japanese navy was also written in that century. But since that era and later, among the Japanese intellectuals, there was always the influencial idea of Wakon kansai' 0apanese spirit and Chinese technology). 140

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN Though the cultural impact of the Occident on Meiji Japan was immense, it was not for the first time that Japan had such a strong influence from outside, and as this slogan shows, the reaction from the Japanese was similar. The Japanese thus wished to resist an overwhelming foreign cultural flood, by separating the spirit, or the value orientation in our words, from the technology, in order to maintain their cultural identity. But in my opinion, these two aspects of culture are closely related, not only at its formative state, but also in its practice. I have not enough space to discuss this position in detail, but as I briefly showed above, the technological culture of pre-modern Japan had almost the opposite orientations to that of the Occident, represented by model A, and even in the modern period after Meiji, what the Japanese realized and practiced is different from the technological culture of model A. I would like to point out the association of the fundamental traits of these two models in modern Japan. Because they were based on opposing but complementary value orientations doubly human dependent vs. independent orientations, the Japanese could develop a new type of technological culture, having strong competitive power in international industries. Because, to use the material devices produced by the doubly human independent orientation of model A, with the highly trained human skill and unsparing human labour of model B could bring an excellent result. But after the period of the 1960's, in the so-called affluent society and by the fundamental change in everyday life style through the globalized information revolution, the value orientations of the Japanese of younger generations are and will not be the same as those of yesterday. In particular it may be true for the communal spirit and the concept of labour, because the socio-cultural and economic bases which might have contributed to form these values do not exist now. -7It is obvious that the modern world is largely influenced by the technological culture of model A. Because, it has, by its nature, successfully raised productivity and efficiency, and at the same time it has economized human labour and increased comfort; it has increased also agro-pastoral and industrial products. I think the human's fairly common triple desires might be summarized as: 'Get more, more rapidly, with less pain', and the 141

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN technological culture of model A is well appropriated to realize it. Its anthropocentric ideology expressed in 'Genesis', as I mentioned above, gave the basis for modern humanism accompanied by the augmentation of material comfort and medical services. But today, by the excessive development led by a few powerful nations and international industries, the destruction of the natural environment is in a critical phase. The Creator's words to the first humans: 'Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it' cannot be followed indefinitely because of the approaching crisis of population explosion. In this situation, a new technological culture for a better human future should be found. Before the total disappearance of the characteristics of the different technological cultures under globalizing impacts, we must find out positive traits, not only in the three models cited in this paper, but also in numerous other feasible models. In this perspective, the Japanese technological culture with its value orientations and with the lessons of their transformation in the modern period, may be worth being studied in connection with the traits of other technological cultures. The awe of nature, together with the non-anthropocentric world view, might be one of the positive traits found in not only the Japanese technological culture, but also in those of other Asiatic or African peoples. The conviction that humans constitute but a small part of nature is becoming more clear with the advance of natural sciences, especially in the field of human biology and human paleontology. This conviction does not contradict the revaluation of the sense of respect for nature, which is still living in animistic folk beliefs. It will lay the real basis for the protection of nature. The denial of the devaluation of labour as a simple economic act, and the restoration of the ethical value of human labour have a long ideological history with John Ruskin, Mohandas K. Gandhi and Ernest F. Schumacher. The idea is also found in the Japanese technological culture, as it was pointed out above. Nonanthropocentrism does not thus necessarily result in the denial of human value; on the contrary, it can stand alongside an orientation which focesses on respect for an essential humanity.

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Notes/Bibliography to all Chapters Chapter 1 - Introduction: Culture and Technology in Japan 1. Samuelson, Paul, A, Economics, (New York, 11th edition, 1980). 2. Bank of Japan, Comparative International Statistics, Economic Planning Agency, (Tokyo, Japan, 1989) 3. Keizai Koho Centre, Japan 1991, An International Comparison, (Tokyo, 1991), p.26 table 3-10. The Japan figure for 1975 was much lower at US$592 million. Of course, although this may spur the views of various interested parties, the net financial result is positive ie transfers - inprovide massive exports of goods from Japan through the production process. 4. Sowell, T, Knowledge and Decisions, (New York, 1979); Street, James H., 'The Institutionalist Theory of Economic Development', Journal of Economic Issues, 21 ( 1987), pp 1861-87; Inkster, Ian, 'The Institutionalist Theory of Economic Development, Technological Progress and Social Change: A Comment on James Street', Journal of Economic Issues, 23 (1989), pp 1243-47 5. As a major early exemplar see key passages of Ohkawa, K. and Rosovsky, H., Japanese Economic Growth, (London, 1964), especially pp 218-9 6. The most famous of such approaches include Hagen,E.E. 'How Economic Growth Begins: A General Theory Applied to Japan', Public Opinion Quarterly, 22 (1958), and McClelland, D.C., The Achieving Society, (New York, 1961) 7. Jacobs, Norman, The Origins of Modern Capitalism in Eastern Asia, (Hong Kong, 1958); Braudel, Fernand, The Wheels of Commerce, (London, 1985) 8. See discussion in Inkster chapter 4 below, and Morishima, Michio, Why Has Japan Succeeded? (Cambridge, 1982) 9. E.F. Vogel, Western Spirit and Eastern Means (yookon wasai), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Tokyo, 1979), p 3 10. Peter Berger, The Capitalist Revolution. Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equality, and Liberty, (Aldershot, 1987), quotes pp 166-7 11. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, (New York, 1944) 12. R.H. Whitbeck and O.J. Thomas, The Geographic Factor. Its Role in Life and Civilization, ( New York, 1932 and 1970), quote page 277 13. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, (London, 1932). 14. I.Robert Sinai, In Search of the Modern World, ( New York, 1967), quote pages 43-4 15. J.A. Bather, 'Natural Science in Japan', Natural Science, 4, January-June 1894 16. G.B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan, (New York, 1962) 17. Sinai op.cit., quote page 92 18. Research Project Team for Japanese Systems, Japanese Systems. An Alternative Civilization?, Sekotac Ltd., Yokohama, 1992, quote page 12. Published in Japanese and English, this book is the first major publication 143

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN of the Masuda Foundation for International Communication and Education, a private foundation established in Yokohama in 1988 and named after its President Seiji Masuda. Unless otherwise indicated, this section is based on this publication and on E. Hamaguchi, 'A Contextual Model of the Japanese: Towards a Methodological Innovation in Japan Studies', Journal ofJapanese Studies, 11, no.2, 1985. 19. This latter is of some significance to the arguments of this text, as ministers would have full responsibility for policies publicly announced and implemented, this strongly discounting nemawashi and other concensus-building, pre-emptive bids from interested parties of, indeed, 'social-tie groups' of the Masuda model type. 20. Kanban is the note of instruction, advice or information which is created by small units as they interact in the shop floor work process, epitomising the opposition between hierarchical Western andflatJapanese business authority and decision structures, and initiated at Toyota. Interestingly, given the Masuda distinction between networks based on social-ties and on those based on traditional relations, the term is derived from the system which originated in Tokugawa local administration, whereby a noticeboard (kanban) was utilised by leaders of household groups (gonin-gumi) to circulate information and instructions to householders as passed down from above. In terms of cultural assets, such a system presumed hierarchy, obedience, goal recognition, coherence and literacy. 21. See in particular Aoki, M. 'Horizontal vs. Vertical Structures of the Firm', American Economic Review, December 1987, and A New Paradigm of Work Organization: The Japanese Experience, WIDER Working Papers, WP36, February 1988, United Nations University, Helsinki, 1987 22. Krugman, Paul, The Age of Diminished Expectations, (Cambridge Mass., 1990). 23. Allen, P.M., 'Evolution, innovation and economies', in G.Dosi et.al., (eds), Technical Change and Economic Theory, (London, 1988), pp 95-119 24. Dertouzos, MX. et.al., (eds), Made in America: Regaining the Productive Edge, (Cambridge Mass., 1989). See also Inkster, Ian, "Made in America but Lost to Japan: Science, Technology and Economic Performance in the Two Capitalist Superpowers', Social Studies of Science, 21 (1991), pp 157-78; idem., Japan: taking over and staying ahead*, Futures, JanuaryFebruary 1992, 311-3; idem., 'Promethean Futures: the biotechnological challenge and the Japanese model', Asian Studies Review, ii (1991), ppl29-34 25. Porter, M.E., The Competitive Advantage of Nations, (New York, 1990), quote page 21 26. Our reservations here being twofold: that much of Japanese industry is organised in sub-contracting, medium and smallfirms,and selfemployment, which does not exhibit such characteristics, and, that the weakening of some of these stylised features is observable in the Japanese modern sector from the late 1980s to the present time. On the second point, we might bear in mind the Masuda model, which allows for frequent changes in surface organization whilst identifying continuity in underlying structure, particularly that which is close to the individuum/relatum distinction. 144

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN 27. Crozier, Michael, 'Will a New Logic of Management Emerge?' in Crozier et.al., (eds), Societal Change Between Market and Organization, (Aldershot, 1993), quotations page 22 28. Giddens, Anthony, Sociology, (Cambridge, 1989), espeially pp 282-86 29. Ouchi, William, Theory Z (Reading Mass., 1981) 30. Giddens page 286. See above text and footnote 21. 31. Yamamura's remark was made in a review of Michio Morishima in Journal of Japanese Studies, 9 no.l, Winter 1983, pp.215-7. 32. Abegglen, James C , The Japanese Factory, (Glencoe, 1958); Taira, Koji, Economic Development and the Labour Market in Japan, (New York, 1970). 33. Morris-Suzuki, Tessa, The Technological Transformation of Japan, (Cambridge, 1994), pp 94-5 34. Saxonhouse, G., 'Country Girls and Communication among Competitors in the Japanese Cotton-Spinning Industry* in Patrick, H. (ed) Japanese Industrialization and its Social Consequences, (Berkeley, 1976), pp 97-126, quote p 98 35. Maruyama, Masao, 'Patterns of Individualism and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Schema', in Jansen, M.B., (ed), Changing Japanese Attitudes towards Modernisation, (Princeton, 1967), pp 489-531, quote p 502 36. Inkster, Ian, Into the Twentieth Century Patterns in the Relations between Science, Technology and the State during the Early Industrialisation Process', in Barrere, Mertine (ed), Sciences et Devetoppement, (Paris, 1996), pp 67-96 37. Roth, Andrew, Dilemma in Japan, (London, 1946), quote p 57 38. Irokawa, Daikichi, 'Popular Movements in Modern Japanese History', in McCormack, G. and Sugimoto, Y., (eds) The Japanese Trajectory Modernisation and Beyond, (Cambridge, 1988), pp 69-86 39. Inkster, Ian, 'Capitale umano e trasferimenti tecnologica in Giappone dai tempi dell 'industrializzazione Meijf (Human Capital Formation and the Institutions of Technology. Lessons from Japanese Development), forthcoming in Annali di Storia d'impresa, 10 (1998) Chapter 2 - Skill and Intuition 1) Suzuki, Daisetsu, Zen to nihonbunka (Zen and Japanese Culture), Tokyo, 1940 2) Suzuki, Shunryu, Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind, New York, 1970 3) Saegusa, Hiroto, Saegusa Hiroto Chosaku-shu, Dai 10-kan, Gijutsu no Rekishi, 1973 4) Saegusa. Hiroto, Saegusa Hiroto Chosaku-shu, Dai 11-kan, Gijutsu no Rekishi, 1973 5) Tamura, Eitaro, Nihon Shokunin Gijutsu Bunkashi, Tokyo, 1984 6) Endo, Motowo, Nihon Shokunin-shi Josetsu, Tokyo, 1985 7) Minamoto, Ryoen, Kata to Nihonbunka, Tokyo, 1992 8) Minamoto, Ryoen, Kata, Tokyo, 1989 9) Kage, Seiichi, Chi no Bunka to Kata no Bunka, Tokyo, 1991 10) Izuka, Masayoshi, Gijutsu Bunmei Siron, Kyoto, 1972 11) Kazumi, Akira, Waza to Nihonjin, Tokyo, 1995 12) Nikkei Sangyo Shinbun, Nihin no Seizou-gijutsu, Tsuyosa no Himitsu, Tokyo, 1992 145

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN 13) Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, London 1966 14) Watsuji, Tetsuro, Fudo, Tokyo, 1935 15) Kodama, Fumio, Haiteku Gijutsu no Paradaimu, Tokyo, 1991 Chapter 3 - Towards Fusion: Technology and Tradition in Japan Robert J. (1965) 'The Dynamics of the Nation State—Japan's Industrial Society', in The Changing Patterns of Industrial Relations, Japan - Institute of Labour, Tokyo, 1961 Dore, Ronald P., Education in Tokugawa Japan, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1965 Yoshino, M.Y. (1968), Japan's Managerial System, Trachtom and Innovation, MIT, 1968 Ballon, Robert, J. (1969) "The Japanese dimensions of industrial enterprise', in The Japanese Employee, Ballon (ed.), Tokyo, 1969 Nakane, Chie (1970), Japanese Society, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1970 Takamiya, Susumu (1970) 'Background, Characteristics and Recent Trends in Japanese Management', in Modern Japanese Management, BIM, London, 1970 Mansfield, Edwin 'Technology and Productivity in the United States', in M. Feldstein (ed.), The American Economy in Transition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980 Boardman, Terry (1981) 'Can the Japanese Really Innovate?', New Scientist, 29 October, 1981 Glazer, Herbert (1979) 'The Japanese Executives', in The Japanese Employee, Robert J. Ballon, ed., Tokyo, 1969 Sasaki, Junnosuke (1981) 'Endogenous Technology and Society in Japan', Working paper, United Nations University, Japan. Shishido, Toshio 'Japanese Industrial Development and Policies for Science - and Technology', Science, 219 (1983) no.21, 261 Shishido, Toshio 'Japanese Technological Development', in Shishido and R. Sato (eds.), The Economic Policy and New Development Perspectives, Auburn House, London, 1985 Bell, John et al. (1985) 'The New Face of Japanese Science', New Scientist, 21 March, 1985 Kondo, Jiro (1986), 'A Visit with Dr. Jiro Kondo President of the Science Council of Japan', Report Memorandum 95, The Tokyo Office of the U.S. National Science Foundation, 1986 Marchall, Eliot (1986) 'School Reformers Aim at Creativity', Science, Vol.233, July, 1986 Nagai, Michio (1986), Japanese Discovery of Europe Gijutsu-sha no koyo to manejimento ni kansuru chosa, (A Survey on the Recruitment and Management of Technologies)', Recruit 1985b, Rikuruto Joho Shuppan Institute of Investment Economics, Development Bank of Japan, Henbo suru kenkyuu kaihatsu toushi to setsubi toushi, (Chenging Pattern of R & D and Investment), Vol.51, July 1984 Economic Planning Agency, Current Economy of Japan, EPA, Tokyo, 1985, pp. 125-134 Moritani, Masanori (1982) 'Japanese Technology, Getting the best for the Least', Simal Press INC, 1982 146

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN Dore, Ron (1986) 'Where will the Japanese Nobel Prizes come from?'. Science and Public Policy, December, 1986 Morris-Suzuki Tessa 'The Technological Transformation of Japan: From Seventeenth to the Twenty - first Century', Cambridge University Press, 1994 Nakayama, Shigeru 'Science, Technology and Society in Post-War Japan', Kegan Paul International, 1991 Hayashi, Takeshi 'The Japanese Experience in Technology - from Transfer to Self-Reliance', United Nations University Press, 1990 Kiyokawa, Yiikihiko 'Nihon no Keizai Hatten to Gijutsu Fukyu (Economic Development and Technological Diffusion in Japan)', Toyokeizaihinposha, 1995 Sugihara, Kaoru 'Ajia kan Boeki no Keisei to Kozo (Formation and Structure of Asian Trades)', Mineruva-shobo, 1996 Uenami, Wataru (1985), The Characteristics of Japanese Post War Music, The Japan Foundation, Tokyo. Senda, Akihiko (1986), Metamorphoses in Contemporary Japanese Theatre: - Life-size and More-than-life-size, The Japan Foundation, Tokyo. Kuniyoshi, Kazuko (1985), An Overview of the Contemporary Japanese Dance Scene, The Japan Foundation, Tokyo. Kodama, Fumio (1990), 'Japanese Innovation in Mechatronics Technology', - in Sigurdson (ed.) 1990. Stankiewiez, Rikard, 'Basic Technologies and the Innovation Process', in Sigurdson (ed.) 1990. Kimura, M. (1979), 'The Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution', ScientificAmerican, 241(5): 98-126. Kimura, M. (1985), 'The Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution', New Scientist, 11 July 1985. Chapter 4 - Cultural Resources, Social Control and Technology Transfer: Industrial Transition Prior to 1914 1. Parsons, Talcott, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966) quotes p. 113 2. For which see Sugimoto, Yoshio and Mouer, Ross (eds), Nihonjinron ni Kansaru 12-sho (Twelve Chapters on the Stereotypical Theories of the Japanese), (Tokyo, 1983). 3. Anesaki, Masaharu, Prince Shotoku, the Sage-Statesman and His Mahasattva Ideal (Tokyo, 1948) quote p. 17. 4. Samsom, George, A History of Japan to 1334 (Stanford, 1958). 5. Miyamoto, Shoson 'The Relation of Philosophical Theory to Practical Affairs in Japan', in Moore, Charles, A.(ed) The Japanese Mind. Essentials of Japanese Philosophy and Culture (Tokyo, 1967), pp.4-23. 6. Johnson, Chalmers, MI77 and the Japanese Miracle : The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford, 1982). 7. For the contrasts see Ian Inkster. 'Culture, action and institutions : on exploring the historical economic success of England and Japan' in Gouk, Penelope (ed) Wellsprings of Achievement. Cultural and Economic Dynamics in Early Modern England and Japan (London, 1995) pp. 239-266. 8. Thompson, F.M.L. 'Social Control in Victorian Britain', Economic History Review 34 (1981) pp. 189-208. 147

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN 9. Burn, WL. The Age of Equipoise. A Study of the Mid-Victorian Generation (London, 1964). 10. Kajima, Marinosuke, A Brief Diplomatic History of Modern Japan, (Tokyo, 1965); Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia (New York, 1992); Paske Smith, M. Western Barbarians in Japan and Formosa in Tokugawa Days (Kobe, 1930); Beasley, WO. Great Britain and the Opening of Japan 1834-1858 (London, 1951). 11. Clive, William R., 'Can The East Asian Model of Development be Generalised?' World Development 10/2 (1982), pp 150-164; Ranis, Gustav, 'A Comment', World Development 13/4 (1985) pp. 211-217; Park, Yung Chul, 'The Little Dragons and Structural Change in Pacific Asia', The World Economy 12/2 (1989), pp. 125-161. 12. Reichauer, Edwin O., Japan, Past and Present (London, 1964), pp. 132,123. 13. Kenwood, A.G. and Loughheed, A.L, The Growth of the International Economy 1820-1960 (London, 1971), p.243 14. Hirai, Sumihito, 'Lessons from Japan's Economic Development'. Focus Japan, 18 October 1978, p. 16. 15. Hagen, E.E., On The Theory of Social Change. How Economic Growth Begins. (London, 1964), p; Totman, Conrad, Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu 1600-1843 (Camb. Mass., 1967); Moore, R.A., 'Adoption and Samurai Mobility in Tokugawa Japan', Journal of Asian Studies 29/3 (1970), pp. 617-632; Yamamura, Kozo, A Study of Samurai Income and Entrepreneurship (Camb. Mass, 1974). 16. Hagen, E. E, 'How Economic Growth Begins: A General Theory Applied to Japan, Public Opinion Quarterly, 22 (1958) pp. 369-389 quote pp. 383, 389. 17. For a good summary, Lehmann, Jean-Pierre, The Roots of Modern Japan (London, 1982), pp. 79-89, 109-129. 18. 'A Samurai'Japan Weekly Mail, letters 26 July 1884, signed Yokohama 18 July 1884, published also in Japanese language press. 19. See Inkster in Wellsprings pp 256-265; Nakamura, Hajime, The Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples (Tokyo, I960). 20. Nitobe, Inazo, Bushido. The Soul of Japan (New York, 1907); Nitobe, Lectures on Japan (London, 1936), all quotes from this edition, chapter VIII 'Japanese Code of Honor1, pp. 124-141. 21. Lebra, J.C., Okutna Shigenobu, Statesman of Meiji Japan, (Canberra, 1973) quote p. 44-5. 22. See the varied authorative accounts by economic historians brought together in Macpherson, W J., (ed) The Industrialisation of Japan (Oxford, 1994) where a host of economistic approaches touch upon socio-cultural factors en passant but frequently quite crucially in terms of completeness of argumentation. 23. Ian Inkster, 'Motivation and Achievement: Technological Change and Creative Response in Comparative Industrial History', Journal of European Economic History, forthcoming 26 (1997). 24. Morishima, Michio, Why Has Japan Succeeded? (Cambridge, 1982). 25. Horie, Yasuzo, 'Modern Entrepreneurship in Meiji Japan' in Lockwood, William (ed) The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan (Princeton, 1965), pp.183-208. 148

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN 26. Azuma, S., Kinsei Nihon Keizai rinri shiso shi (A History of Economic Ethical Thought in the Tokugawa Period), (Tokyo, 1944). 27. Horie in Lockwood, p. 196. 28. Ranis, G, 'The Community Centred Entrepreneur in Japanese Development', Explorations in Entrepreneurial History 8/2 (1955), pp 8098; Hirschmeier, Johannes, 'Shibusawa Eiiichi: Industrial Pioneer', in Lockwood ibid., pp. 209-247 and Morishima/#p