Cultural Imperialism: Essays on the Political Economy of Cultural Domination 155111707X, 9781442602090

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Cultural Imperialism

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Cultural Imperialism Essays on the Political Economy of Cultural Domination Edited by

Bernd Hamm and Russell Smandych

broadview press

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©  Bernd Hamm and Russell Smandych All rights reserved. The use of any part of this publication reproduced, transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, or stored in a retrieval system, without prior written consent of the publisher—or in the case of photocopying, a licence from Access Copyright (Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency), One Yonge Street, Suite , Toronto, ON  —is an infringement of the copyright law. Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Cultural imperialism : essays on the political economy of cultural domination / edited by Bernd Hamm and Russell Smandych. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55111-707-X 1. Culture diffusion. 2. Globalization—Social aspects. 3. Imperialism. I. Hamm, Bernd II. Smandych, Russell Charles CB151.C853 2004

303.48'2

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Broadview Press Ltd. is an independent, international publishing house, incorporated in . Broadview believes in shared ownership, both with its employees and with the general public; since the year  Broadview shares have traded publicly on the Toronto Venture Exchange under the symbol . We welcome comments and suggestions regarding any aspect of our publications–please feel free to contact us at the addresses below or at [email protected] / www.broadviewpress.com North America PO Box , Peterborough, Ontario, Canada   Tel: () -; Fax: () - email: [email protected]  California Road, Orchard Park, ,   UK, Ireland, and continental Europe NBN Plymbridge Estover Road Plymouth   UK Tel:  ()    Fax:  ()    Fax Order Line:  ()    Customer Service: [email protected] Orders: [email protected] Australia and New Zealand UNIREPS, University of New South Wales Sydney, NSW,  Australia Tel:    ; Fax:     email: [email protected] Broadview Press Ltd. gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program for our publishing activities. Copy-edited by Betsy Struthers PRINTED IN CANADA

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Contents

Foreword  Preface  Acknowledgements  Notes on Contributors  PART 1: DEFINING CULTURAL IMPERIALISM Introduction  chapter 1 Cultural Imperialism and Its Critics: Rethinking Cultural Domination and Resistance Russell Smandych  chapter 2 Cultural Imperialism: The Political Economy of Cultural Domination Bernd Hamm  PART 2: CULTURAL IMPERIALISM: HISTORY AND FUTURE Introduction  chapter 3 Cultural Imperialism: A Short History, Future, and a Postscript from the Present Susantha Goonatilake  chapter 4 Imperialism as a Theory of the Future Ashis Nandy  chapter 5 Cynical Science: Science and Truth as Cultural Imperialism Bernd Hamm  PART 3: MEDIA IMPERIALISM AND CULTURAL POLITICS Introduction  chapter 6 Legitimating Domination: Notes on the Changing Faces of Cultural Imperialism Katharine Sarikakis  chapter 7 Content Industries and Cultural Diversity: The Case of Motion Pictures Christophe Germann 

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chapter 8

chapter 9

Cultural Imperialism, State’s Power, and Civic Activism In and Beyond Cyberspace: Asia’s Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) in Comparative Perspective On-Kwok Lai  Media Transmitted Values Transfer: The US at “War Against Terrorism” and Its Implications for the Information Society Elvira Classen 

PART 4: NEO-LIBERALISM, GLOBALIZATION, AND CULTURAL IMPERIALISM Introduction  chapter 10 Neo-Liberalism and the Attack on the Humanities: The New Social Science of Cultural Imperialism Herbert Schui  chapter 11 The Role of GATS in the Commodification of Education Christoph Scherrer  chapter 12 From White Man’s Burden to Good Governance: Economic Liberalization and the Commodification of Law and Ethics D. Parthasarathy  chapter 13 Deradicalization and the Defeat of the Feminist Movement: The Case of the Philippines Sheilfa B. Alojamiento  PART 5: LINGUISTIC AND ECOLOGICAL IMPERIALISM Introduction  chapter 14 Analyzing and Resisting Linguistic Imperialism Fritz Vilmar  chapter 15 Protection of the World’s Linguistic and Ecological Diversity: Two Sides of the Same Coin Hermann H. Dieter  chapter 16 Eco-Imperialism as an Aspect of Cultural Imperialism Gustav W. Sauer and Bernd Hamm  PART 6: POSTCOLONIALISM AND CULTURAL IMPERIALISM Introduction  chapter 17 The Cultural Imperialism of Law Russell Smandych  chapter 18 Enrique Dussel and Ali Shari’ati on Cultural Imperialism Abbas Manoochehri  chapter 19 Redefining Cultural Imperialism and the Dynamics of Culture Contacts Biyot K. Tripathy  Index

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Foreword

he ascendance of economic and political power in the modern age makes it possible to underestimate the importance of culture in understanding human societies. This text serves as a timely reminder that the assault on local culture serves “the powers that be” and that any effort to reclaim the local must include the preservation and restoration of the diversity of the cultures of place. For the majority of our sojourn here on this planet, we assembled ourselves in small human communities and anchored ourselves in diverse local cultures that were grounded in a special knowledge of our immediate surroundings. Over the past 10,000 years, centres of power have slowly emerged in some of these societies and have extended over the entire globe. This power first coalesced in state formations and then in market structures. Indeed, the assemblage of the axial institutions of our time in a political (state) economy (market), operating at the local, national, regional, and international levels, has come at the expense of culture which was the primary source of social cohesion in earlier times. Local culture has been thwarted, negated, eroded, forbidden, usurped, eclipsed, and undermined ever more completely by the political and economic apparatus of the most powerful political and economic interest groups as they sought to extend their control wherever possible in pursuit of their special interests. Through many forms— conquest, invasion, mercantilism, colonialism, imperialism, and empire— the centres of power assailed local cultures whenever they interfered with the growth of political or economic power. It may be helpful to remind ourselves of Marx’s classic formulation in The German Ideology: “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.” Indeed, the material forces of political economy are increasingly organized at the supranational level, but they continue to shape the content and distribution of ideas. It is this preponderant influence or ideological hegemony which is the central focus of this especially rich selection of material presented here. As the brokers of political and economic power pursue their agendas, there are consequences in the cultural domain. Some of these are incidental, many are

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viii ][ Cultural Imperialism unintended, and some are best understood as direct attempts at cultural imperialism. The cumulative effect of these cultural changes contributes to the undermining of local cultural diversity and difference and the imposition of a monocultural view that is capitalistic, materialistic, intolerant of difference and local autonomy, and a threat to the ecosphere. The authors of this text richly detail the myriad ways in which economic and political sources of power shape the concerns of science and the media and the template of what are considered acceptable forms of governance in the global array of nations; erode the integrity of national languages; seek to capture the educational domain of distinct cultures and convert them into a commodity for sale; and export their culture through the film industry, which they dominate globally (to mention only a few of those considered here). Clearly some of the key political and economic powers are situated in the US. But the material in this text comes from around the globe, and these local stories aptly demonstrate that it is the logic of capitalism, especially in its neo-liberal form, which is shaping market, state, and culture to support it. The chapters in this text repeatedly point out that the assault on non-capitalist cultures has been relentless, insidious, ingenious, and imperial. It is also shown to be extremely dangerous because it encourages a way of life that not only creates inequality, human suffering, and desperation but is also unsustainable. A recurring theme is that cultural imperialism must and is being resisted at the local level. This work provides each of us with an opportunity to reevaluate the emphasis that we place on the political, economic dimensions of human society and to reaffirm the central place of culture in our understanding of human affairs. It makes an excellent multidisciplinary contribution to the political economy literature. Rodney Kueneman Associate Professor of Sociology and Coordinator, Global Political Economy Program, University of Manitoba

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Preface

ritical thinking on cultural imperialism now cuts across many academic disciplines and subfields of interdisciplinary study. This is clearly reflected in the contents of the current book. This volume brings together a collection of 19 new chapters written by authors whose academic training spans a number of different social and physical science disciplines (including psychology, history, sociology, political science, law, economics, English literature, engineering, physics, and toxicology and biochemistry) as well as interdisciplinary subfields (including communication and media studies, and sociolegal studies). In addition the contributing authors’ biographies reflect the diverse multinational and global breadth of current research and writing on cultural imperialism, with contributing authors coming from nine different countries, known historically as either imperialist or colonial and now postcolonial, including Britain (Sarikakis), Canada (Smandych), Germany (Hamm, Classen, Schui, Scherrer, Vilmar, Dieter), India (Nandy, Parthasarathy, Tripathy), Iran (Manoochehri), the Philippines (Alojamiento), Japan (Lai), Sri Lanka (Goonatilake), and Switzerland (Germann). This diverse range of essays makes an important contribution to the state of current research, knowledge, and growing global political action and debate on cultural imperialism. First, collectively, the essays offer evidence of cultural imperialism as a rather holistic concept cutting through many disciplines including several where it has remained almost unexamined. Secondly, they highlight the continuing central relevance of the debate over cultural imperialism in Western academic and popular culture. Perhaps most importantly, they also provide compelling evidence of the close connection between cultural imperialism and the global power structure and the political and economic objectives behind current American attempts at global domination. However, as several of the chapter contributions contained in this book show, cultural imperialism is certainly, historically, not an American invention, and it will probably long outlive the current American Empire.

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Acknowledgements

he current book originated in a conference on Cultural Imperialism held at the University of Trier, Germany, in October 2002. Richard Huettel, art historian at the University of Trier, took the first initiative towards what later would become the Trier conference. Together with Herbert Hoffmann and Bernd Hamm he served on the preparatory committee. He took part in the conference and contributed a paper on “Disney Worldwide: Trivialization Under the Mouse,” but found no time and opportunity to get it translated. Herbert Hoffmann, then director of the Catholic Academy/Robert Schuman House, Trier, immediately recognized cultural imperialism as an important issue, accepted our proposal to house the conference, and gave it intellectual and financial support. He also organized and sponsored the cultural program framing the conference. Rita Koehl, secretary to Herbert Hoffmann, and the staff of the Catholic Academy/Robert Schuman House gave the conference all their support to make it a smooth and pleasant event. Johan Galtung made an important and stimulating presentation to the conference. Elsayed Elshahed, Hans Maier, and Piotr Mazurkiewicz, invited by Herbert Hoffmann to introduce religious perspectives on cultural imperialism, also presented papers to the conference. For different reasons, their contributions could not be included in this book. The Robert Schuman Foundation, Luxemburg; the Federal Agency for Political Education, Berlin; the Rhineland-Palation Agency for Political Education; the Friends of the Catholic Academy, Trier; Renovabis, the Solidarity Action of German Catholics with People in Central and Eastern Europe; the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation; and the Society for German Language—they all gave the conference financial support. Linda Ryan-Pohl was helpful with language polishing. We gratefully acknowledge all their contributions.

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Bernd Hamm, Trier Russell Smandych, Winnipeg

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Notes on Contributors

Sheilfa B. Alojamiento is head of Hags Incorporated, a feminist-oriented research group based in Davao City, Philippines. She has been doing studies on women, the Indigenous peoples, and the Moro tribes of Mindanao. She worked with the Moro People’s Resource Center from 1986 to 1990 and with the Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao from 1992 to 1995. Elvira Classen, a media scientist (diploma in social sciences) and freelance journalist, is writing her doctoral dissertation on “Crisis and War Communication in Information Society: Status and Intercultural Comparison of Strategies, Implications, and Intentions in the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany.” For five years, she worked as a researcher with the National Research Program “Esthetics, Pragmatics, and History of Screen Media” funded by the German Research Foundation (www.dfg.de/en/), and was an instructor both for media planning, development, and consulting at Siegen University and for journalism at Dortmund University. For ten years, she was chief editor of a journal in peace research. She collaborates with an interdisciplinary “Research Group on Information Society and Security Policy” (www.fogis.de) and is a member of the German Association for Peace and Conflict Research (www.bicc.de/coop/afk/englisch.htm). Hermann H.Dieter is a toxicologist and biochemist. During his college years in Tübingen, he specialized in languages, sciences, and classical music, followed by studies of biochemistry and toxicology at the universities of Tübingen, Marburg, Konstanz, and Düsseldorf, with research stays in the United States. He is currently head of the Department of Toxicology of Drinking and Swimming Pool Water with the German Federal Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt) in Berlin. He is also a member of the federal board of the “Association German Language/Citizens for Cultural Diversity” (www.vds-ev.de). Christophe Germann is an attorney who practices in Geneva and Zurich, Switzerland (www.germann-avocats.com). In March 2000 he established his own law firm after having worked as an associate of the international

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xii ][ Cultural Imperialism law firm of Baker and McKenzie (Geneva office) for four years. He also teaches courses on international intellectual property at the Institute for European and International Economic Public Law (IEW) of the University of Berne Law School and in the program Master in International Law and Economics (MILE) at the World Trade Institute (WTI) in Berne. He also worked as a freelance journalist for several daily newspapers and as a producer of narrative short films. Susantha Goonatilake was first trained in electrical engineering in Sri Lanka, Germany, and Britain and later in sociology in Sri Lanka and Britain. He is the author of numerous books, including: Foreign Funded NGOs in Sri Lanka and the Death of Civil Society (forthcoming); Anthropologizing Sri Lanka: A Civilizational Misadventure (2001); Toward a Global Science: Mining Civilizational Knowledge (1999); Merged Evolution: the Long Term Implications of Information Technology and Biotechnology (1999); and Crippled Minds: an Exploration into Colonial Culture (1982). He has taught and carried out research at a number of universities in Europe, Asia, and North America, and he has worked for the United Nations as a senior consultant for all the UN organs dealing with knowledge and science and technology issues (such as UNU, UNESCO, UNDP, ILO, FAO, ESCAP, APDA, etc.). Dr. Goonatilake is also a Fellow of the World Academy of Arts and Sciences and is the former General President of the Sri Lanka Association for the Advancement of Science. Bernd Hamm received his diploma degree in sociology and economics (1974) and his doctorate in sociology (1975) from the University of Berne, Switzerland. He used to work as a private consultant for Swiss local, cantonal, and federal agencies, but since 1977 has taught sociology, especially the sociology of human settlement, the environment, and planning, at the University of Trier. From 1984 to 1995 he served as chairman of the social science committee, German National Commission for UNESCO, where he concentrated on global problems and futures studies, including sustainable development. He has widely published in all these fields. Since 1981 he has done work in Eastern Europe, North America, Asia, and Australia, and was visiting professor to a number of European universities as well as in Canada. In 1995 he was awarded an honourary doctorate from the Economic University of Katowice, Poland. On-Kwok Lai is a professor at the School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan, and concurrently holds an honourary professorship in social policy and honourary research fellowship at the University of Hong Kong. He obtained his doctorate from the University of Bremen and has taught at universities in Hong Kong and New Zealand. His research interests include the comparative study of the socio-political aspects of public policies and societal change.

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Notes on Contributors ][ xiii

Abbas Manoochehri was born in 1956 in Isfahan, Iran. He obtained his PhD in Political Science from the University of Missouri in 1988, his MA in Political Science from the University of Toledo, Ohio, in 1980, and his BA in Management from Shiraz University (Iran) in 1978. Dr. Manoochehri is currently a professor in the Department of Political Science, Tarbiat Modarres University, Tehran, Iran, where he teaches courses on comparative political thought, the philosophy of social science, and the historical sociology of Iran. His publications include: Theories of Revolution (2000), Max Weber and the Question of Modernity (1998), Hermeneutics, Method and Liberation (2001), and translations of Max Weber’s Economy and Society (1995), and Martin Heidegger’s Poetry, Language and Thought (2003). Ashis Nandy is a political psychologist and sociologist of science who has worked on cultures of knowledge, visions, and genocides. He is a Fellow and former Director of the Center for the Study of Developing Societies and among his books are Creating a Nationality: The Ramjanmabhumi Movement and Fear of the Self (1995); The Savage Freud and Other Essays on Possible and Retrievable Selves (1995); An Ambiguous Journey to the City: The Village and Other Odd Ruins of the Self in the Indian Imagination (2001); The Tao of Cricket: On Games of Destiny and the Destiny of Games (1989); Time Warps: The Insistent Politics of Silent and Evasive Pasts (2002); and The Romance of the State and Fate of Dissent in the Tropics (2003). Nandy is also active in movements for peace, alternative sciences and technologies, and cultural survival and has coauthored a number of human rights reports. He has also been a Woodrow Wilson Fellow at the Wilson Center, Washington, DC; Fellow of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities, University of Edinburgh; and a Regents’ Fellow at the University of California, Los Angeles. He held the first UNESCO Chair at the Center for European Studies, University of Trier, in 1994. D. Parthasarathy is an Associate Professor in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, India. He received his PhD in sociology from the University of Hyderabad in 1995. His main areas of research and teaching include the sociology of agriculture, sustainable development, and ethnic conflicts. Katharine Sarikakis is the director of MA in Communications Studies at the Institute of Communications Studies, the University of Leeds, England. Her research interests are in the area of international communications and media policy, and she is currently working on a project that investigates the impact of communications policy on citizenship rights. She is the author of Powers in Media Policy (2004) and British Media in a Global Era (2004) and is the co-editor of Ideologies of the Internet (2004). She is also the managing editor of the International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics (Intellect).

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xiv ][ Cultural Imperialism Gustav W. Sauer, born in 1947 in Graz, Austria, received his diploma in technical physics from Graz Technical University in 1974 and a PhD in theoretical physics from Marburg University/Germany (1978). In 1982 he joined the Department of the Environment, City of Hamburg, and became in 1985 Head of the Section for Nuclear Energy Policy, Office of the Prime Minister of the State of Hesse. In the state government of Schleswig-Holstein he became Director-General of Nuclear Safety in 1988; in 1994 of Air Cleaning, Biotechnology/Genetic Engineering, Food Inspectorate, and Animal Protection; and in 2003 of Energy Policy and Economic Systems in different ministries, currently in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Employment, and Transport. Since 1997 he has also been a member of the German Major Hazard Commission under the federal Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety. Christoph Scherrer has an MA in economics and doctoral-level degrees in political science from Frankfurt University and the Free University Berlin. He is currently a professor for Globalization and Politics at the University of Kassel and has held the position of Kennedy-Memorial Fellow at Harvard University. His recent book publications include: GATS: Zu wessen Diensten? (GATS—In whose Service?), with T. Fritz (2002); Nach der New Economy: Perspektiven der deutschen Wirtschaft,(Beyond the New Economy: Perspectives for the German Economy), with S. Beck and G. Caglar (2002); GATS 2000. Arbeitnehmerinteressen und die Liberalisierung des Dienstleistungshandels (GATS 2000.Workers’Interests and the Liberalization of Trade in Services), with T. Fritz (2001); Global Rules for Trade: Codes of Conduct, Social Labeling, and Workers’ Rights Clauses, with T. Greven (1999); Globalisierung wider Willen? Die Durchsetzung liberaler Außenwirtschaftspolitik in den USA (Reluctant Globalization? The Assertion of Liberal Foreign Trade Policy in the USA) (1999); and Jobwunder USA—Modell für Deutschland? (Job Wonder USA—A Model for Germany?), edited together with S. Lang and M. Mayer (1999). Herbert Schui, born in 1940, studied economics at the Universities of Köln and Paris and obtained his PhD in 1972 at the University of Konstanz. From 1974 to 1980 he was Professor of Economics at the University of Bremen, and since 1980 he has been Professor of Economics at the Hamburg University for Economics and Political Science. He has also been a visiting professor at several universities, including Toulouse I, Wien WU, Orléans, and Havana. Russell Smandych is Professor of Sociology and Criminology at the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada. His current research interests intersect with three different areas of socio-historical and criminological research: comparative historical studies of legal ordering and social control, with a primary focus on the application of English colonial criminal law to Indigenous peoples; Aboriginal childhood and colonialism in Canadian history; and Canadian youth justice reform since the 1990s. He is the author

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Notes on Contributors ][ xv

of several edited books and numerous refereed journal articles and book chapters in the fields of criminology and legal history. Biyot K. Tripathy is a Professor of English and a prominent scholar and fiction writer. Educated at Ravenshaw College, the University of Calcutta, and the University of Wisconsin (Madison), Dr. Tripathy has taught, lectured, and researched at Himachal Pradesh University, Berhampur University, Utkal University, the State University of New York at Buffalo, and the University of Wisconsin at La Crosse. He has a large number of academic publications including books on D.H. Lawrence and American fiction. He also has two novels and one volume of short stories in Oriya and a novel in English. Dr. Tripathy is currently engaged in collecting and documenting tribal folktales in a project he calls “From the Margin to the Centre: Folklore and Mythology of the Tribal People of Orissa.” His collection, which has become the largest single collection of tribal folklore (214 tapes and 17,000 pages of transcripts), rests now with him and the Archives of Traditional Music and Folklore of the University of Indiana (Bloomington). He has recently completed a bilingual dictionary for Oxford University Press (released in November 2003) and is currently completing two more novels. Fritz Vilmar, born in 1929, is Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Free University Berlin, where he has taught since 1975. After finishing his studies in sociology, he went into continuing education in one of the big trade unions. He is one of the founders of Critical Peace Research to which he contributed a number of publications. In the 1970s, his major research interests shifted towards democratization and the development of more humane alternatives to existing economic and social structures. Among others, he published (all in German) Strategies of Democratization (2 volumes, 1973), Human Dignity in Private Enterprise (1973), Industrial Democracy in Western Europe (1975), Economic Democracy and the Humanization of Work (1978), The World of Work (1992), Ecological Socialism (1986), Self-help Handbook (1988), and The Rescuing Force of Utopia— German Jews Founding Kibbutz Hasorea (1990). He is co-founder of University Initiative Democratic Socialism, was a member of the Basic Values Commission of the Social Democratic Party, and was involved in initiatives for a Europe Free of Nuclear Weapons, among others. After 1991 he committed himself to a critical analysis of German unification and linguistic imperialism. After 50 years of active membership he left the Social Democratic Party in protest against its new political course in 2003.

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PART 1

DEFINING CULTURAL IMPERIALISM

Introduction The two introductory chapters in Part 1 offer different ways of attempting to define and understand the meaning of cultural imperialism. In Chapter 1, Russell Smandych surveys recent literature in which the concept of cultural imperialism has been used and provides a view of how the work of contributing authors of the book fits within current debates surrounding the concept and theory of cultural imperialism. He does this, first, by briefly reviewing the development of cultural imperialism theory since the 1970s along with various attempts made by critics and apologists of cultural imperialism to debunk the original cultural imperialism thesis proposed by writers like Galtung (1971) and Schiller (1976). As part of this discussion, he points to the manner in which recent critics and apologists of “cultural imperialism” have begun to replace it with more innocuous terms like American “soft power” and “globalization.” He also shows how each chapter included in the book adds to the current debate over the meaning and utility of the concept. Smandych contends that each chapter shares the common theme of showing the importance of informational and cultural power for social control. He also notes that rather than necessarily drawing on a specific body of cultural imperialism theory, individual chapters are somewhat autobiographical in that each draws on the real-life experience—or individual narratives—of the contributing authors and their personal attempts to document and account for social institutions and processes linked to cultural imperialism as experienced in their own lives. In Chapter 2, Bernd Hamm offers both a personally and theoretically informed critique of cultural imperialism linked to a critical political economy perspective. Hamm reflects on his first-hand experience with American cultural imperialism as a youth in early postwar Germany and the historic events of the ensuing decades that caused him, along with many other individuals in both Europe and North America, to recognize the harmful tactics of deception perpetuated by succeeding American

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governments and the military-industrial complex that they supported and continue to support today. Hamm argues that in the current global context, it is the United States, above all other countries, which can be said to qualify as the ultimate “rogue state.” In addition to pointing to numerous examples of the manner in which citizens of both the US and most other countries of the world have been deceived with misinformation emanating from the American government-backed “consciousness industry,” Hamm raises several provocative questions, including: “How is it possible and how can it be explained that such a glaring contradiction survives and persists despite the fact that all necessary information is easily available? How can it be that even the media perpetuate more or less in unison this ideological image? Why do by far most governments rest subservient visà-vis the US, governments who have all the means of professional news scanning and intelligence? And this is one of the great mysteries of our time: Where are the social sciences to enlighten us on this important matter?” In raising these questions, Hamm sets the stage for both his own critical, political economy-based analysis of the causes and consequences of American cultural imperialism and for the wide-ranging types of analyses that follow in the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER 1

Cultural Imperialism and Its Critics: Rethinking Cultural Domination and Resistance Russell Smandych

lthough cultural imperialism as a concept and focus of research and debate has been in use since at least the 1970s (Galtung 1971; Schiller 1976; Hamm, Chapter 2 in this volume), it has garnered renewed and increased interest in recent years. There are undoubtedly numerous reasons for this renewed interest, many of which are explored in this book. These include, for example, the quickly increasing global reach and speed of the Internet and other forms of information and communication technology (ICT), the phenomenal growth and influence of American-exported cultural industries, and the shifting state of international relations and global politics in the aftermath of 9/11 and the American-led war against Iraq. The last decade has also witnessed a phenomenal outpouring of public concern and academic research on neo-liberalism and globalization, which, as some of the contributing authors of this book argue, have close ties to cultural imperialism. (For recent examples of literature on globalization, see: Arnowitz and Gautney 2003; Beneria and Bisnath 2004; Brawley 2003; Croucher 2004; Chossudovsky 2003; Eckes and Zeiler 2003; Eriksen 2003; Michie 2003; Peck and Yeung 2003; Perlas 2000; Urry 2003.) Cultural imperialism has been defined in a variety of ways in the past, and some of the contributing authors in this book also offer their own favoured definitions and conceptual refinements. In general, however, as a starting point for discussion, it can be noted that definitions of cultural imperialism appear to range along a continuum. On the one side, there are quite narrow and openly polemical definitions of cultural imperialism as “the domination of other cultures by products of the US culture industry” (American Popular Culture: Cultural Imperialism http://www.wsu.edu/ ~amerstu/pop/cultimp.html). On the other hand, there are more formal and abstract definitions like Schiller’s which states that cultural imperialism includes “the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes even bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of the dominating centre of the system” (Schiller 1976: 9). Also, not unproblematically, the concept of cultural imperialism has also been used interchangeably with

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concepts like electronic colonialism, media imperialism, ideological imperialism, and communication imperialism (White 2001). In a somewhat more cynical manner, in their provocative essay “On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason,” sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant (1999: 41) have argued that “Cultural imperialism rests on the power to universalize particularisms linked to a singular historical tradition by causing them to be misrecognized as such.” More specifically, Bourdieu and Wacquant contend that “today numerous topics directly issuing from the intellectual confrontations relating to the social particularity of American society and of its universities have been imposed, in apparently de-historicized form, upon the whole planet.” One such de-historicized topic, according to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999: 42), is “the strongly polysemic notion of ‘globalization,’” which, when used in academic and political discourse, “has the effect, if not the function, of submerging the effects of imperialism in cultural ecumenism or economic fatalism and of making transnational relationships of power appear as a neutral necessity.” Although a highly contested and arguably ambiguous concept, cultural imperialism, like the more recently faddish concept of globalization, is nonetheless an extremely popular concept in use in both academic circles and worldwide popular culture. As highlighted in the above noted definitions and interchangeably used terms, there is a continuing history of the use of the concept in the social sciences, especially in the fields of media and international communication studies, since the 1970s. More recently, the charge of cultural imperialism has been a constant feature of worldwide anti-globalization protest movements (cf. Natrajan 2003), alongside growing negative reactions to the expanding global dominance of American-based culture industries. It can also be seen in the recent worldwide protests, labelled “extremist terrorist campaigns,” of Muslim peoples against the economic, political, and cultural dominance of the West, particularly the US. The chapters written by contributing authors of this book also reflect different views on the meaning of cultural imperialism. This is reflected in part in the fact that they do not share a common definition of the concept. Rather, they describe what they, in their respective contexts, perceive as cultural imperialism. In the current chapter, I attempt to situate the work of these authors within current debates surrounding the concept and theory of cultural imperialism. I do so, first, by briefly reviewing the development of cultural imperialism theory since the 1970s along with various attempts made by critics and apologists of cultural imperialism to debunk the original cultural imperialism thesis proposed by writers such as Galtung (1971) and Schiller (1976). I then move on to show how the contribution offered by each of our contributing authors adds to the current debate over the meaning and utility of the concept. Further additional detail on the arguments advanced by each of the contributing authors is provided in the short introductions found at the beginning of each section of the book. Both the introductory chapters in Part 1 and the substantive chapters that follow work together to draw out a number of global developments and patterns of global change that are

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arguably linked to cultural imperialism. These include, most importantly, the rise of neo-liberal economic and political thought in the 1980s and the growth of American militarism (as discussed further by Hamm in Chapter 2), alongside the increasing use of so-called American “soft power” in the 1990s (Fraser 2003; as discussed in this chapter). Among other arguments, the work of the contributing authors shows that current worldwide concerns about globalization and its homogenizing or destructive effect on culture cannot be looked at in isolation from factors affecting global economics and politics. For example, a central theme that runs through many of these chapters is the effect that globalization— which arguably often takes the form of a subtle yet coercive imposition of neo-liberal political and economic strategies backed by Western governments and the private sector—has had in paving the way for accompanying developments in Third World countries, including the increasing influx of Western media; the adoption of Western conceptions of human rights and good governance; and the growing Western cultural dominance in the fields of language, science and education, religion, the arts, and systems of personal belief and self-interpretation. Of course, as Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999) among others have warned, we must also always be cautious of the way we use the term globalization, because, perhaps more often than not, it is a concept that is used arguably to depersonalize and anonymize the real power structure while in fact we know that the top of the global power hierarchy is formed by the Wall Street-Treasury Complex and its political puppets and economic allies in the US and other Western countries (Hamm, Chapter 2 in this volume). Yet, collectively, we also recognize that even under the most repressive regimes, resistance to attempts at political-economiccultural dominance is not necessarily impossible.

Cultural Imperialism Theory and Its Critics In a book published shortly before his death in January 2000, Herbert Schiller, the acclaimed media critic and pioneer in developing a political economy approach to the study of cultural imperialism (Webster 2000), reflected on his personal experience of having spent most of his life Living in the Number One Country ; that being, of course, the American Empire. In his chapter on “Corporatizing Communication and Culture,” Schiller notes that “the grand dilemma facing those who would challenge the many derelictions of the number one society” lies in the fact that any “serious effort to change the social order collides head-on with the fundamental interests of the corporate industrial system,” and that “system has at its disposal the informational apparatus and the cultural institutions that influence, if not determine, social thinking.” According to Schiller: “This explains why informational and cultural power have become key factors in governance” and why “How these are deployed is no less decisive for social control than are the army and the police” (Schiller 2000: 136–37). Recently, Matthew Fraser (2003) has followed up on the key theme raised

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in Schiller’s critical analysis of cultural institutions that influence social thinking by pointing out the role played by “soft power” in solidifying the power of the American Empire. In his provocatively titled book on Weapons of Mass Distraction: Soft Power and the American Empire, Fraser argues that “while US military and economic power is indispensable to America’s superpower status, soft power historically has been a key strategic resource in US foreign policy.” The importance of Fraser’s recent book lies in the manner in which it contributes in elevating cultural icons to important roles within global geopolitics. According to Fraser, America’s global domination has been achieved largely through non-military means—in short, through the extension, assertion, and influence of its soft power. If hard power, by definition, is based on facts, soft power is based on values. American hard power is necessary to maintain global stability. American soft power—movies, pop music, television, fast food, fashions, theme parks—spreads, validates, and reinforces common norms, values, beliefs, and lifestyles. Hard power threatens; soft power seduces. Hard power dissuades; soft power persuades. (Fraser 2003: 10)

It is significant to point out that Fraser (2003: 19) claims to disassociate his analysis of American soft power from the work of various critics of American cultural imperialism. He labels academic and political critics and protestors, who began raising concerns about American cultural imperialism in the 1970s, as anti-American polemicists and prophets of doom, who tended to oversimplify the causes and consequences of the global spread of American cultural institutions and icons, from McDonald’s and Coca-Cola to Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck, and Rambo. Fraser includes among these polemicists early media critics such as Schiller (1969), who contended that the American State Department had sponsored an “electronic invasion” of the world led by American media giants to promote the interests of American capitalism, and Paul Kennedy, the Yale professor who in 1988 predicted the inevitable decline of the American Empire because of “imperial overreach” or the problem of “an overextended strategic commitment to foreign domination” in the face of “diminishing economic means to maintain its global military presence” (Fraser 2003: 19–22). He also points to European (particularly French) intellectuals of the 1980s who railed against the US McDomination and the Coca-colonization of European languages and cultural industries. Fraser, like a chorus of other more open promoters of American culture and values abroad since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, contends that many leading critics of American cultural imperialism have overstated their case, while those who predicted the inevitable decline of the American Empire have been proven by more recent global geopolitical historical events to be simply wrong. While eschewing the use of the concept of cultural imperialism, Fraser is nonetheless forthright about his central argument. In the post-Cold War era the US has emerged “as an undisputed imperial power whose soft-

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power umbrella overarches the entire world.” At the same time, “American soft power is historically unprecedented due to the scope, velocity, and intensity of cultural globalization,” brought about at least in part by technology innovations in the use of the Internet and satellite communications. Consequently, Fraser concludes that while [t]he precise effects of American soft power, and reactions it provokes, can be debated … the reach of American soft power is indisputably global. Few corners of the world have not been touched by its influence … [and] the global ubiquity of American soft power has made it more difficult to resist [even] in regions where elites are hostile to liberal democracy and freemarket capitalism. (Fraser 2003: 32)

Fraser acknowledges that his recognition of the importance of American soft power is not an insight that he developed on his own. Rather, he admits that he copied the use of the term from Joseph S. Nye, the Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Bill Clinton, who championed the use of soft power, which he defined as “the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion.” According to Nye’s openly candid public position on American soft power, which he outlined in the New York Times in 2000 and elaborated upon subsequently in his book on The Paradox of American Power (Nye 2002), while US “hard power is needed as an implied threat, and should be used when necessary … American leadership in the world must depend on the assertion of soft power—namely, the global appeal of American lifestyles, culture, forms of distraction, norms and values. In short, American leadership is more effective when it is morally based” (Fraser 2003: 18). Nye’s assessment of the importance of American soft power is also not that much different from the one offered by another earlier leading American geopolitical strategist, Zbigniew Brzezinksi, in his book on The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (1997). In his historical comparison of the similarities and differences between modern American global power and the global power wielded both by earlier dominant European and Asian empires and by competitors of the US today, Brzezinksi notes that: America stands supreme in the four decisive domains of global power: militarily, it has unmatched global reach; economically, it remains the main locomotive of global growth …; technologically, it retains the overall lead in the cutting-edge areas of innovation; and culturally, despite some crassness, it enjoys an appeal that is unrivalled, especially among the world’s youth—all of which gives the United States a political clout that no other state comes close to matching. It is the combination of all four that makes America the only comprehensive global superpower. (Brzezinksi 1997: 24, emphasis in original)

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Curiously, while Brzezinksi, not unlike Schiller, is quite candid about how important it is for the US to enhance the appeal of American culture abroad, he, like other of its critics and apologists, refrains from using the term cultural imperialism, except perhaps to question its usefulness. At the same time, it is significant that there are also other even more open apologists of American cultural imperialism, who specifically use the term, basically arguing that the world is better with it than without it (cf. Rauth 1988; Rothkopf 1997). One widely cited example of this is David Rothkopf’s article “In Praise of Cultural Imperialism?” that appeared originally in Foreign Policy in 1997. Indicatively, Rothkopf, who served as a senior official in the American Department of Commerce during the first Clinton administration, wrote: Globalization has economic roots and political consequences, but it also has brought into force the power of culture in this global environment— the power to bind and to divide in a time when the tensions between integration and separation tug at every issue that is relevant to international relations … For the United States, a central objective of an Information Age foreign policy must be to win the battle of the world’s information flows, dominating the airwaves as Great Britain once ruled the seas. (1997: 39)

In addition, in the course of developing his argument in favour of “Exporting the American Model,” Rothkopf remarks: Many observers contend that it is distasteful to use the opportunities created by the global information revolution to promote American culture over others, but that kind of relativism is as dangerous as it is wrong … The United States should not hesitate to promote its values. In an effort to be polite or politic, Americans should not deny the fact that of all the nations in the history of the world, theirs is the most just, the most tolerant, the most willing to constantly assess and improve itself, and the best model for the future. (1997: 48–49)

Rothkopf does not refer directly to the sizable literature, some of which is cited in this book, that is relevant to making sense of the debate on the use of the concept of cultural imperialism, although it is clear from his article that he is both familiar with the debate and that he feels it is largely a luxury that is irrelevant to the economic and national security interests of the US. On the other hand, John Tomlinson, a leading British media specialist, has developed what has been viewed until recently as the most influential set of academic criticisms against the cultural imperialism thesis. Thompson (1991, 1997, 1999) argues against the utility of the concept of cultural imperialism in a globalizing world. In his now classic book on Cultural Imperialism (1991), he debunks the cultural imperialism thesis on two major grounds, the first being the charge of imperialism, and the second being the assumption of the consequent homogenization of cultures. In place of the concept of cultural imperialism, Tomlinson prefers to use the concept

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of “cultural loss,” which does not presuppose the existence or use of a coercive power relation, to describe the processes of cultural change that appear to occur with globalization. However, in his recent critical questioning of Tomlinson’s debunking thesis and in his own defence of the continuing relevance of the concept of cultural imperialism, Balmurli Natrajan (2003: 225) criticizes Tomlinson for adopting a concept of culture that operates to mask or veil the underlying actual meaning of current protests against globalization. According to Natrajan, Tomlinson’s arguments, which are widely used by many scholars and policy-makers, “rest on a peculiar understanding of the concept of culture,” which Tomlinson defined initially as “the context within which people give meanings to their actions and experiences, and make sense of their lives” (Tomlinson 1991: 7) and later refined to include all the “mundane practices that directly contribute to people’s ongoing ‘life-narratives,’ the stories by which we chronically interpret our existence in what Heidegger calls the ‘throwness of the human situation’” (Tomlinson 1999: 20; cited in Natrajan 2003: 225). In essence, Natrajan (2003: 226–27) argues that Tomlinson’s claim that current protests against globalization are ultimately caused by an individually and collectively experienced sense of cultural loss—or the supposed “existential loss of narratives for making sense” of one’s life—fails to capture the fact that the most compelling protests against globalization “can be argued to be about loss of entire contexts of politics, economics, and culture.” More specifically, arguing for the continued relevance of a political economy-based conception of cultural imperialism, Natrajan (2003: 227) remarks that “Tomlinson’s understanding of culture as ‘context for meaning production’ rather than ‘meaning production in context’ seems to fatally isolate narratives of meaning from their political economy, and enable a veiling of the coercion that is ever-present within globalization.” While Tomlinson’s critique of the cultural imperialism thesis may have served a useful purpose in prompting media and international communication specialists to think more critically about new patterns of cultural loss and cultural hybridization that occurred alongside the seemingly often “decentred” process of globalization (Mohammadi 1999: 168), Natrajan’s recent critique of Tomlinson’s debunking thesis shows that the debate over the utility of the concept of cultural imperialism is far from over. (For examples of other literature relevant to this debate, see, for example: Chadha and Kavoori 2000; Cole 2002; Cowen 2002; Crane et al. 2002; Croteau and Hoynes 2003; Dunch 2002; Ess 2000; Golding and Harris 1997; Griffin 2002; Jameson and Miyoshi 1998; Juluri 2003; Kang 1998; Kim 1998; Knight and Robertson 2003; Kuisel 2000, 2001; Main 2001; Morley 1996; Morley and Robins 1995; Nantambu 2002; Ouis 2001; Roach 1997; Robertson 1995; Sreberny-Mohammadi 1997; Strelitz 2001; White 2001.)

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Overview of the Book Perhaps because both of the editors of this book have completed the major part of their graduate training and academic life in sociology, in carrying out the research for this book we were struck with how frequently previous debates on culture imperialism have been taken up mainly in the field of media and communication studies, with what appears to be little input from researchers from other disciplines or other multidisciplinary fields of study. Consequently, one may argue that previous theoretical debates and research have been undertaken too often through single, isolated disciplinary lenses, rather than simultaneously from a number of different disciplinary, and even multidisciplinary, perspectives. For example, as illustrated earlier, in the past both critics and apologists have tended, perhaps mistakenly, to equate cultural imperialism with media imperialism. While the topic of media imperialism may arguably have been given too much prominence in the past, at the expense of a more nuanced analysis of the multitude of other ways in which cultural domination is attempted and sometimes achieved, we also recognize that it is still important to acknowledge the relevance of ongoing work and current issues in the field of media imperialism and cultural politics, as we do in Part 3 of this book. However, as other chapters clearly show, media imperialism, as a dimension of cultural imperialism, must also be looked at alongside many other dimensions of the manner in which the people of some cultures attempt to dominant others and of how others try to resist these efforts at cultural domination. The individual chapters contained here share the common theme of being concerned with documenting how informational and cultural power are as decisive for social control as are the army and the police (Schiller 2000). In addition, like Schiller’s account of Living in the Number One Country (2000), each of these chapters is somewhat autobiographical. While, of course, the country of one’s birth or residence may at times have nothing to do with how one perceives the world, as mentioned in the Preface, it is significant that the contributing authors come from nine different either historically known imperialist, and/or colonial and now postcolonial, countries, including the UK, Canada, Germany, India, Iran, the Philippines, Japan, Sri Lanka, and Switzerland. A notable and arguably significant omission from this lineup of contributing authors is the absence of authors from the US, although many of the chapters are in fact written by scholars who have either studied or spent time teaching in that country. This point is worthwhile mentioning, because, as we will see in the rest of this introductory chapter and in the substantive chapters that follow, it is quite often the case that the specific topical focus and lines of argument pursued by a particular author reveals something about the way in which he or she has personally experienced and attempted to cope with the presence and effects of imperialism, either or both as citizens of countries that have in the past been found guilty of committing acts of military, economic, and cultural imperialism, and as citizens of countries and members of cultural groups

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who have lived to personally experience the unmistakable and dominating presence, especially of the UK, and more recently the US, as global superpowers (Ferguson 2003; Blum 2000). As such, it is important to appreciate that this book does not draw nearly as much from any particular body of cultural imperialism theory, as it does from the real-life experience—or individual narratives—of the contributing authors and their personal attempts to document and account for social institutions and processes linked to cultural imperialism as witnessed in their own lives. Following the next introductory chapter by Bernd Hamm, the book is divided into five parts. Each part highlights the primary common theme addressed by the chapters contained therein. However, it is important to keep in mind that some of the chapters deal with themes that cut across a number of parts of the book. We have attempted to make note of this, where appropriate, in chapter cross-references and in the short introductions that have been included at the beginning of each part. Part 2 brings together three authors’ perspectives on the history and future of cultural imperialism. In Chapter 3, Susantha Goonatilake, a leading postcolonial critic and sociologist of science and technology from Sri Lanka, provides a critically informed analytical framework for understanding the historical development and trajectories of Western cultural imperialism since the fourteenth century. In his chapter on “Imperialism as a Theory of the Future,” Ashis Nandy, a prominent political psychologist and sociologist of science from India, also attempts to offer a prognosis of cultural imperialism’s future based on an analysis of the past, while in the next chapter on “Science and Truth as Cultural Imperialism,” Bernd Hamm offers an account of how Western concepts of science and truth have been used to legitimate Western political-economic interests aimed at the suppression and exploitation of nature and humans. The chapters included in Part 3 address key developments and issues in the field of media imperialism and cultural politics approached from a number of different disciplinary and worldwide national and regional vantage points. In Chapter 6, Katharine Sarikakis, a political scientist and specialist in international communications and media policy, explores the relevance of the concept of cultural imperialism within the context of current international affairs and the opening of new spaces of cultural domination. In particular, Sarikakis explores the case of the European Union (EU) in its complex intersections of internationalized governance regime and the assumed role of representational politics. In the following closely related chapter, Christophe Germann, a Swiss-based international intellectual property lawyer, freelance journalist, and short film producer, examines issues surrounding cultural diversity in the motion picture industry with a focus on the EU experience. On-Kwok Lai, a comparative social policy specialist from Japan, examines the implications of the growth of information and communication technology (ICT) networks in Asia’s new industrializing economies (NIEs) in Chapter 8. Lai, following the approach of Schiller (1999), uses the term “digital capitalism” to describe how ICT

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networks are now directly affecting social, cultural, and economic change as never before on a global scale. Finally, in Chapter 9, Elvira Classen undertakes an examination of media-transmitted values transfer in the post9/11 American-led “War Against Terrorism.” Writing from her vantage point as a media researcher and freelance journalist based in Germany, Classen traces the global struggle for the “Hearts and Minds” of citizens that prevailed in the media between September 11, 2001, and the capture of Saddam Hussein in Iraq late in 2003. Part 4 examines the confluence between neo-liberalism, globalization, and cultural imperialism. As in the case of other chapters of the book, they also highlight the critical knowledge that can be gained by exposing oneself to a wide number of different disciplinary and national and regional perspectives and arguments. In his chapter on “Neo-Liberalism and the Attack on Humanities,” Herbert Schui, a German professor of economics, illustrates that it is impossible to separate cultural imperialism from modern-day neo-liberalism. He does this, in part, by undertaking a critical reexamination of the ideas and influence of Friedrich Hayek, the father of neo-liberal economic theory. Schui argues that neo-liberalism is the first economic theory to claim that maximizing output or realizing the highest possible level of want satisfaction is not the purpose of a free market economy, and shows that, as a consequence, the theory has functioned to underpin Western cultural imperialism in several ways. The remaining chapters in Part 4 offer specific case studies that highlight the confluence between neo-liberalism, globalization, and cultural imperialism. In Chapter 11, Christoph Scherrer examines the role of GATS (the World Trade Organization framework of the General Agreement on Trade in Services) in the commodification of education in EU countries, arguing that “in line with the spread of neo-liberal constitutionalism, GATS provides a political and legal framework for deregulation and privatization of education.” In Chapter 12, D. Parthasarathy examines the effects stemming from the manner in which elements of neo-liberal theory are being applied in India in connection with economic liberalization and the commodification of law and ethics. In Chapter 13, Sheilfa B. Alojamiento examines the defeat of the feminist movement in the Philippines in the 1990s in a post-authoritarian and emerging liberal-democratic political climate characterized as consisting of “a cooptation with neo-liberalism.” The chapters included in Part 5 bring together the issues of linguistic and ecological imperialism as part of the broader problem of cultural imperialism. Although the worldwide dominance of the English language as part of cultural imperialism is a concern addressed in other chapters in the book, including in particular the chapters by Germann (Chapter 7) and Scherrer (Chapter 11), in Chapter 14, Fritz Vilmar, a German sociologist and member of the German Language Association/Citizens for Cultural Diversity, examines the debate over linguistic imperialism in Europe from an historical perspective. In the next chapter, Hermann Dieter, a Berlin-based toxicologist and biochemist, who is also a member of the German Language

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Association/Citizens for Cultural Diversity, develops an argument in favour of the equal importance of the protection of linguistic/cultural and ecological diversity. Specifically, Dieter argues that it is imperative that we work “to safeguard the world’s thousands of genocultural codes against the linguistic pressure of a worldwide monolingualism. This is not only a human rights issue, but also an essential precondition for perceiving and hence saving the genetic and phenomenologic diversity of nature. Destroying a language is the same as destroying a specific way to perceive (certain aspects of) nature or human environments, respectively.” In Chapter 16, Bernd Hamm and Gustav Sauer, a German nuclear physicist and member of the German Major Hazard Commission under the federal Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, carry the ecological side of Dieter’s argument a step further, pointing to the disastrous ecological consequences of global neo-liberal economic policy. Although Sauer and Hamm argue that neo-liberal ideology may not necessarily be the cause of the current global problématique (as the Club of Rome called the syndrome of combined ecological, economic, and social global crises), they claim that it is currently indeed its major and most powerful engine. Part 6 deals with connections linking postcolonialism and cultural imperialism. Over the past two decades developments in the field of postcolonial theory and postcolonial studies have had a transformative effect on most, if not all, humanities and social science disciplines. Although the development of the field can be traced to earlier works, including Frantz Fanon’s key early study of The Wretched of the Earth (1963), since the 1970s the postcolonial studies movement has perhaps been inspired most importantly by the critical writing of Edward Said (cf. 1978, 1993, 2000, 2001). Ironically, even though one of Said’s most important later works was titled Culture and Imperialism (1993), and even though it is evident in other recent work (such as the chapters by Goonatilake and Nandy in this volume) that postcolonial theory and postcolonial studies have potentially a great deal to offer to the study of cultural imperialism, to date few authors have explicitly explored the utility of postcolonial theory as a heuristic theoretical framework for approaching the examination of different dimensions and agencies of cultural imperialism. The chapters included in Part 6 contribute to a more explicit study of cultural imperialism informed by postcolonialism by exploring specific ways in which the values of colonialism seep into general local or Indigenous cultures, and, in turn, how colonized peoples can respond to, accommodate, and/or resist specific agencies of cultural imperialism (Smith 1999; Young 2001). In Chapter 17, Russell Smandych, a Canadian historical-sociologist and criminologist, examines the value of postcolonial theory in developing a theoretical framework for the study of law as an agent of cultural imperialism. In Chapter 18, Abbas Manoochehri, a leading Iranian professor of politics and Western political thought, examines the theoretical insights on cultural imperialism offered in the works of two postcolonial thinkers inspired by early work of Frantz Fanon (1963): Enrique Dussel

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and Ali Shari’ati. In the final chapter, Biyot K. Tripathy, a professor of English and a prominent scholar and fiction writer from India, describes the research he has carried out in collecting and documenting folktales of the tribal people of Orissa. In the process of doing this, he seeks to separate the dynamics of culture contacts from those of political relationships driven by power and domination. Tripathy draws critically on recent postcolonial literature to argue provocatively that, rather than colonialization representing a one-way, top-down imposition of the culture-forming institutions of the more powerful colonizers on the less powerful colonized, “even when a nation is colonizing another, the colonized may carnivalize the colonizer’s culture products and drive them out of use or create new products of its own.” Tripathy’s main point, as he says, is that “the political colonizer cannot colonize a culture.” Although Tripathy’s argument is open to challenge, and no doubt would be disputed by many, including a number of the contributing authors of this book, in my opinion, this represents a healthy and constructive theoretical development. Indeed, it is my hope that, collectively, the chapters of this book will serve the purpose of provoking students, scholars, and political activists (and also hopefully, but not very likely, political apologists) to rethink their own views on the dynamics of cultural domination and resistance. In this respect, Tripathy’s provocative chapter provides a good end point for this book as well as a good starting point for future work in the field of cultural imperialism studies.

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Cultural Imperialism and Its Critics ][ C H A P T E R 1 ][ 15 Chossudovsky, Michel. 2003. The Globalization of Poverty and the New World Order. 2nd ed. Shanty Bay, ON: Global Outlook. Cole, C.L. 2002. “The Place of Golf in U.S. Imperialism.” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 26: 333–36. Cowen, Tyler. 2002. Creative Destruction: How Globalization is Changing the World’s Culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Crane, Diana, Nobuko Kawashima, and Ken’ichi Kawasaki (Eds.). 2002. Global Culture: Media Arts, Policy, and Globalization. New York: Routledge. Croteau, David, and William Hoyes. 2003. Media Society: Industries, Images, and Audiences. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press. Croucher, Sheila. 2004. Globalization and Belonging: The Politics of Identity in a Changing World. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Dunch, Ryan. 2002. “Beyond Cultural Imperialism: Cultural Theory, Christian Missions, and Global Modernity.” History and Theory 41: 301–25. Eckes, Alfred, and Thomas Zeiler. 2003. Globalization and the American Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eriksen, Thomas (Ed.). 2003. Globalization: Studies in Anthropology. London: Pluto Press. Ess, Charles. 2000. “Cultural Collusions in the Electronic Global Village: From McWorld and Jihad to Inter-cultural Cosmopolitanism.” Philosophy and Social Action 26: 33–46. Fanon, Frantz. 1963. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press. Ferguson, Niall. 2003. Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power. New York: Basic Books. Fraser, Matthew. 2003. Weapons of Mass Distraction: Soft Power and American Empire. Toronto: Key Porter Books. Galtung, Johan. 1971. “A Structural Theory of Imperialism.” Journal of Peace Research 8(2); Repr. J. Galtung. 1980. Peace and World Structure: Essays in Peace Research, Vol. 4. Copenhagen: Ejlers. 437–381. Golding, Peter, and Phil Harris (Eds.). 1997. Beyond Cultural Imperialism: Globalization, Communication and the New International Order. London: Sage. Griffin, Michael. 2002. “From Cultural Imperialism to Transnational Commercialization: Shifting Paradigms in International Media Studies.” Global Media Journal 1(1). Available at . Jameson, Fredric, and Masao Miyoshi (Eds.). 1998. The Cultures of Globalization. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Juluri, Vamsee. 2003. Becoming a Global Audience: Longing and Belonging in Indian Music Television. New York: Peter Lang. Kang, Myung Koo. 1998. “A Reconsideration of Cultural Imperialism Theories: Globalization and Nationalism.” Paper presented to “Problematising Asia,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Conference, National Tsing-Hua University, Taiwan. July 12–17. Available at . Kim, Seongcheol. 1998. “Cultural Imperialism on the Internet.” The Edge: The E-Journal of Intercultural Relations 1(4). Available at: . Knight, Alan, and Philip Robertson. 2003. “Empires of Information.” Global Media Journal 2. Available at . Kuisel, Richard. 2000. “Learning to Love McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, and Disneyland Paris.” La Revue Tocqueville/The Tocqueville Review 21: 129–49. Kuisel, Richard. 2001. “The Gallic Rooster Crows Again: The Paradox of French AntiAmericanism.” French Politics, Culture and Society 19: 1–16. Main, Linda. 2001. “The Global Information Infrastructure: Empowerment or Imperialism?” Third World Quarterly 22: 83–97. Michie, Jonathan (Ed.). The Handbook of Globalization. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Morley, David. 1996. “EurAm, Modernity, Reason and Alterity or, Postmodernism, the Highest Stage of Cultural Imperialism?” In Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, ed. David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen. London: Routledge. 326–60. Morley, David, and Kevin Robins. 1995. Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries. London: Routledge. Nantambu, Kwame. 2002. “Decoding Euro-Cultural Imperialism.” Trini Center: News and Views. Available at . Natrajan, Balmurli. 2003. “Masking and Veiling Protests: Culture and Ideology in Representing Globalization.” Cultural Dynamics 15: 213–35. Nye, Joseph S. 2000. “The Power We Must Not Surrender.” New York Times, 3 January. Nye, Joseph S. 2002. The Paradox of American Power. New York: Oxford University Press. Ouis, Soumaya Pernilla. 2001. “McDonald’s or Mecca? An Existential Choice of Qibla for Muslims in a Globalized World?” Encounters 7: 161–88. Peck, Jamie, and Henry Wai-chung Yeung (Eds.). 2003. Remaking the Global Economy: Economic-Geographical Perspectives. London: Sage. Perlas, Nicanor. 2000. Shaping Globalization: Civil Society, Cultural Power and Threefolding. Quezon City, Philippines: Centre for Alternative Development Initiatives and Global Network for Social Threefolding. Rauth, Robert K. Jr. 1988. “The Myth of Cultural Imperialism.” The Freeman 38 (11). Available at . Roach, C. 1997. “Cultural Imperialism and Resistance in Media Theory and Literary Theory.” Media, Culture and Society 19: 47–66. Robertson, Roland. 1995. “Glocalization: Time-Space and HomogeneityHeterogeneity.” In Global Modernities, ed. M. Featherstone, S. Lash, and R. Robertson. London: Sage. 25–44. Rothkopf, David. 1997. “In Praise of Cultural Imperialism?” Foreign Policy 107: 38–53. Said, Edward. 1978. Orientalism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Said, Edward. 1993. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage Books.

Cultural Imperialism and Its Critics ][ C H A P T E R 1 ][ 17 Said, Edward. 2000. Reflections on Exile and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Said, Edward. 2001. Power, Politics, and Culture: Interviews with Edward W. Said. New York: Pantheon Books. Schiller, Dan. 1999. Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Schiller, Herbert. 1969. Mass Communications and American Empire. New York: A. Kelley. Schiller, Herbert. 1976. Communication and Cultural Domination. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Schiller, Herbert. 2000. Living in the Number One Country: Reflections from a Critic of American Empire. New York: Seven Stories Press. Smith, Linda Tuhiwai. 1999. Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples. London: Zed Books. Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle. 1997. “The Many Cultural Faces of Imperialism.” In Golding and Harris 1997: 49–68. Strelitz, Larry. 2001. “Where the Global Meets the Local: Media Studies and the Myth of Cultural Homogenization.” TBS Archives 6 (Spring/Summer). Available at . Tomlinson, John. 1991. Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Tomlinson, John. 1997. “Cultural Globalization and Cultural Imperialism.” In International Communication and Globalization: A Critical Introduction, ed. A. Mohammadi. London: Sage. 170–90. Tomlinson, John. 1999. Globalization and Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Urry, John. 2003. Global Complexity. Malden, MA: Polity Press. Webster, Frank. 2000. “Herbert Schiller: Intellectual Scourge of Media Manipulation and Sceptic of the Information Revolution.” The Guardian, February 18. White, Livingston A. 2001. “Reconsidering Cultural Imperialism Theory.” TBS Archives 6 (Spring/Summer). Available at . Young, Robert. 2001. Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell.

CHAPTER 2

Cultural Imperialism: The Political Economy of Cultural Domination Bernd Hamm

Personal Departure ultural imperialism has been with me since my earliest childhood right after World War II. As children of four or five, we stood on the sidewalks to watch American tanks roaring by from which chewing gum and candies were thrown. Later, at regular adventure tours in our local forests, we found wooden boxes of American military food supplies buried in the ground, almost undistinguishable from those containing chains of machine gun ammunition. We loved both, eating the food and lighting fires in a lost stone-pit in which the ammunition exploded—only one of us lost the top of his thumb. Blue jeans and parkas became the compulsory fashion standard, authentic only if they were purchased illegally in an American military PX store. Our favourite readings were books by first John Steinbeck and Jack Kerouac and later on Henry Miller and William Boroughs—the best of us read them in English. When I came home from work (as a typesetter apprentice), I spent a good deal of my nightlife in a jazz club, fascinated by and imitating John Coltrane’s and Miles Davis’s music. Among the luckiest moments were those when we attended the annual blues festivals and jazz concerts—even today I remember seeing and hearing Count Basie and Ella Fitzgerald. This was well before McDonald’s took over. At university, American sociology textbooks and journals were top reading. We challenged our professors for not being upto-date with the latest developments in the field of sociology. Those who had been to the US appreciated a special bonus; having taught at an American university was the undisputed proof of academic quality. The state of the art always was an American state of the art against which all others counted little. Until today, some 30 years later, German sociologists tend to see the highest possible academic blessing in the acceptance of an article by the American Journal of Sociology or in an invitation to teach at one of the Ivy League departments or at one of the Institutes for Advanced Study. Most of my generation grew up totally infiltrated by a positive image of the US; we were Americanized and would have been proud of that characterization. “Americanization” was considered to be

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something positive, something to strive after, something to show off. No doubt, this generational experience had two sources. One (push) was the rejection of our Nazi parent generation. Nationalism of any sort and feelings of superiority, intolerance, racism, and militarism were definitely out. The second source (pull) was the attraction of a society that we believed had not only liberated us from the Nazis and brought us the Marshall Plan, but with it the ideals of democracy, freedom, justice, the rule of law, solidarity and cooperation, self-determination, open minds, respect for others, and responsibility. Propaganda also told us that “communism,”—i.e., the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe, China, and some other countries—was the exact antithesis of the image we had of the US. Our ethical standards were to a large extent transmitted to us from that country. Into this positive affiliation exploded the Vietnam War. Napalm, Agent Orange, My Lai were first added to, and then changed, our vocabulary associated with the US. The deception was immense. At first reaction we distrusted sparsely found information, but our skepticism grew and spread. Senator Fulbright’s The Arrogance of Power (1966) was an eye-opener. We started investigating the history of this war and beyond and found ourselves increasingly sucked into a long series of stories about open or covert actions against many countries; William Blum (2000) lists almost 100, with some 12 million people killed. Many of those who continued to excuse the American government by pointing to our liberation from the Nazis and the Marshall Plan and who rejected the hypothesis of the American government exerting a ruthless, selfish, violent, immoral power, became convinced by the coup in Chile and the assassination of Salvador Allende in 1973. Many other events contributed to the terrifying impression of unbelievable hypocrisy. And plenty more such opportunities followed. In those days, communism served as a welcome excuse for American imperialism. But even after the communists and other enemies of capitalism disappeared from the earth’s surface and Francis Fukuyama declared the End of History (1992), the chain of American violence against others did not stop. Anyone who has ever seriously studied the history of the Gulf War of 1990–91 has discovered the tricks to drag Saddam Hussein into Kuwait and the decoy to get Saudi permission for the deployment of troops, the public relations strategy to achieve the consent of the American people, and the ways by which the 28-nation alliance was brought together, bypassing Congress. Shamefully, there are still people calling themselves political scientists who continue to tell the story that Saddam was the same as Hitler and that he invaded Kuwait for pure evilness. Even physically, American dominance is with the region where I live: F16 fighter planes roaring above our heads disturb our seminars and the sleep of our children. It happened that one crashed only a few months ago less than a mile away from my home. German authorities let us know it had only training ammunition on board— lucky us (if the information was correct). Americans kept silent. Our German government felt no reasons not to subjugate themselves to American authority. They obeyed American political directives and re-

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armed, introduced emergency legislation, and integrated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). We learned to understand that the American economy, the strongest in the world, would bring us American corporations to dominate ours. We learned to eat hamburgers and drink Coke, we accepted Hollywood and pop music as extensions of our cultural horizon. We had little doubt that we were all threatened by the communists and paid little attention to the wars Americans fought and the dictators Americans sustained. They liberated us from the Nazis and they brought us the Marshall Plan, so whatever they would do must be okay, and beyond that it was not our right to criticize them or even to ask questions. Germany became an American colony not only in the hard facts of politics and economics, but also in our minds. The US invaded our brains and our bodies, our language and our perceptions of others and the world, the way we dressed and the way we acted. We have all gone through a thorough brainwashing. The dialectic is amazing. It was American values that made me a wholehearted anti-American, together with so many all around the world, including some Americans themselves. The US, this Janus-faced society, taught me to become opposed to American political and economic leadership. Some 80 per cent of Americans are more or less unaware of the Machiavellian machinations of this small group of power cadres. If they did know, they would also know how to defend themselves.

Describing Cultural Imperialism This book’s starting point is a contradiction, a strange phenomenon, difficult to understand and more difficult to accept. The US has successfully managed to implant into the brains of perhaps a majority of human beings a self-portrait of a brave hero fighting fiercely for freedom, democracy, social justice and the rule of law wherever there is need to fight. Reality, however, cannot be further away from that. In fact, and certainly after the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it has been the most ruthless, most egomaniac, most brutal actor, the real Rogue State (Blum 2000, 2005; Hamm 2005a). How is it possible and how can it be explained that such a glaring contradiction survives and persists despite the fact that all necessary information is easily available? How can it be that even the media perpetuate more or less in unison this ideological image? Why do by far most governments rest subservient vis-à-vis the US, governments who have all the means of professional news scanning and intelligence? And this is one of the great mysteries of our time: Where are the social sciences to enlighten us on this important matter? If I call this phenomenon cultural imperialism, is there such a thing at all, and who exerts it? Is the force we feel behind cultural imperialism the American power cadres, or is it anonymous globalization? Is it the insatiable hunger of capitalism, or is it the historically specific state in the development of forces of production? Or are these all different analytical

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approaches to try to understand the same empirical phenomenon? Some of these questions will be addressed in the following chapters, from different disciplinary and cultural backgrounds and, of course, the reactions will be more differentiated than the observations with which I started. The actual world situation dominated in 2004 by the American government’s wars on Afghanistan and Iraq is a perfect example of the tenuous basis of cultural imperialism. Despite all the public accusations made by the American government against Iraq—which have been clearly refuted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors as well as by American and British intelligence organizations—the war is not about weapons of mass destruction nor about Iraq’s involvement of any sort in alleged Al Qaeda activities. The strategic interest is certainly oil, not only in Iraq but in the entire region. However, there is more to it, as revealed by a document released in September 2000 of which I shall cite only the first and the last sentence: “This report proceeds from the belief that America should seek to preserve and extend its position of global leadership by maintaining the preeminence of US military forces.... Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor” (Project for a New American Century 2000). Then came the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, of September 11, 2001 (known as 9/11)—a “catastrophic and catalyzing event” indeed. This is not the place to analyze in any depth what happened then nor to discuss the different interpretations about it. I renounce the temptation to offer my current version (see the summary of the critical arguments in Davis 2005). But we must not ignore the effects spreading from there because they are at the centre of our interest here. The important point in the present context is, of course, that the American government not only sets itself above national (Parker and Fellner 2005) and international law, it also is totally disrespectful not only of other countries’ rights to self-determination but to other cultures. “Who is not with us, is against us,” as President George W. Bush defined the lines of conflict in his “war on terror.” “With us” are those conducive to American interests and ideals, the “coalition of the willing” who helped invade Iraq. The “interests” are, first of all, easy access to raw materials like oil; the “ideals,” first of all, are totally liberalized world markets and American-type democracies. And the “American” has little to do with the American people, but much to do with the small group of economic, military, and political leaders in the US. Other ways to organize society are not accepted, and reservations against the imposition of American standards are suspected to be, or at least to support, terrorism. One could put aside the document mentioned above as some sort of more or less private meanderings of a group of right-wing extremists. However, it was not only produced right before the 2000 presidential election after which George W. Bush was lifted into office, but, since then, all its proponents have acquired government office, and it has become the

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blueprint of the National Security Strategy. Thus, American global preeminence must be pursued primarily with military means in order to secure a world conducive to American interests and ideals. The American government reserves the right to define who complies with its expectations and who does not; it even reserves, and has exercised, the “right” to torture and assassinate people in other countries whom it suspects to be terrorists. Special forces of all its intelligence services are, once again, involved in covert actions all over the world. Within days after the “catastrophic and catalyzing event,” George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair decided to wage war on Iraq. It looks very much as if 9/11 was not the cause of the war but rather a welcome pretext for it. American Secretary of State Colin Powell was shameless enough to present alleged evidence against Iraq to the United Nations Security Council, evidence which, in fact, was to a large extent copied from a student’s paper of the early 1990s and made available by the public relations department of the British Prime Minister’s Office (and German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was shameless enough to call this alleged evidence “convincing”). The first major effect of 9/11 was that an American president of doubtful legitimacy rallied around himself the vast majority of a frightened population. Hysterical propaganda serves to keep people in paranoid fear by announcing new terrorist attacks almost every week, which then do not happen—but the announcements at least suggest that they could. Thus, it was easy to introduce oppressive legislation and surveillance, needed not so much for protection against terrorist attacks but rather to control a population experiencing increasing social inequality and tension. Reports are abundant of normal people, students, artists, poets, immigrants, and tourists who have found themselves annoyed by the police and agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). All Western countries have followed this example, although not with the same rigidity. Security arguments are being used to tighten the surveillance of dissident groups and to cut back democratic rights. Even before 9/11, governments were cracking down on dissent. In Genova in July 2001, for example, peaceful mass demonstrations against the G8 globalization strategy were infiltrated by Italian police agents provocateurs who initiated violence, maltreated innocent people, and shot one demonstrator dead. In the US after 9/11, massive hate propaganda was levelled at governments and people of countries (for example, France and Germany) who disagreed with the US invasion of Iraq. The second major effect of 9/11 was the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq. Although there was, and still is, no convincing evidence that either Osama bin Laden, or Al Qaeda, or the Taliban, or the government of Iraq was behind the attacks (Davis 2005), George W. Bush and his government endlessly continue to maintain that this was the case, and used this pretext to kill some 6,000 innocent people in that poor and miserable country of Afghanistan, and to cover Iraq with a carpet of bombs with tens of thousands of victims. The third major effect, which is of most interest here, is the amount of propaganda aimed against, first, so-called “Islamic fundamentalists,” and,

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second, at Islam in general. This propaganda drive was well-prepared by the Olin Foundation’s Samuel Huntington who expected a Clash of Civilizations (1993). “They” hate us because “we” live in a free and affluent society; thus, we see the growing popularity of leaders like George W. Bush. This pattern prevented all questions as to why, and how, and by whom the 9/11 attacks were in fact committed. Official inquiry began with the alleged fact that “Islamic fundamentalists” were behind the attacks and asked only whether or not better intelligence would have been able to prevent them (Davis 2005 has put together most of the information doubtful of this official version). The anti-Islamic rhetoric was echoed in most Western media, and the exceptions (like Le Monde Diplomatique) were few. The media headlined cases of people arrested as suspected Al Qaeda collaborators; little noise was made when they were released because of proven innocence. The only one actually convicted and sentenced to 15 years in jail for collaborating with the terrorists, Mounir el Motassadeq, had to be released in April 2004 for lack of convincing evidence and until today the American government is either unwilling or unable to provide sufficient evidence. The West—that is, the US and its “colonies” in Europe, Japan, and Australia— versus the rest of the world— follows the understanding of international relations in Huntington’s book as well as of the current Bush government, as revealed in the National Security Strategy. Underlying this is the view that the West must become stronger than all others to fend them off. In the meanwhile, the American government has been extremely successful in creating the enemy it pretends to fight. Cultural imperialism has developed into the most comprehensive, most sophisticated, and most actual form of “consciousness industry” (Bewusstseinsindustrie, Enzensberger 1962). In an Orwellian manner, human consciousness has become subject to large-scale planned production processes. For example, Operation Mockingbird (a simple Google search will give you sufficient information) was invented by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under Allen Dulles in the 1940s to infiltrate the media and make sure that their position was severely anti-socialist and procapitalist. However, cultural imperialism in its true sense is much more comprehensive and touches on almost all aspects of life. Among the basic motivations for such far-reaching and costly efforts, profit is only a welcome side-effect. More important is to win peoples’ hearts and minds for the imperialists’ interests and purposes. This is exactly what Zbigniew Brzezinski refers to in The Grand Chessboard: American Primary and its Geostrategic Imperatives (1997: 46). The strategy is effective. Doubts have, however, arisen. Of the G8 governments, Canada, France, Germany, and Russia have declared they will not follow the US into war. On 15 February 2003, 6 million people worldwide demonstrated against the American war policy. Opinion polls everywhere in the West show harsh criticism. One hundred and twenty-five American cities have deposited protests in the White House. While supporting the American option, the governments

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of the United Kingdom (UK), Spain, Italy, and Poland clearly occupy minority positions in their countries; in March 2004, the pro-war government in Spain was defeated by an opposition that withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq. Even in the US opposition is on the rise. And the European Union (EU) has intensified its cultural exchange with Muslim countries.

The Political Economy of Cultural Imperialism How does cultural imperialism work in practice? We must find out more about the mechanisms of its working and the intentions behind it. Studies of cultural imperialism began with the work of Frantz Fanon (1963) from the perspective of colonized peoples; however, fewer such studies are being written or published today. Cultural imperialism is a by-product—sometimes intended, sometimes unintended, but always inevitable—of political and economic imperialism. Although they often go together, these two are quite different. Political imperialism is exerted through coercion, control over scarce natural resources, and propaganda; economic imperialism comes through control of money, at least in all societies where money counts. How do the politics and the economy of the colonizer intertwine to shape the institutions, the ideologies, and the social consciousness of colonized people? And what are the expected and the unintended consequences of such domination? The most overt case might be the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its structural adjustment policy (SAP), which is more or less uniformly imposed on indebted countries. While it is based on the “Washington Consensus”—i.e., the usual catalogue of measures included in SAP was worked out by, and serves the interests of, the Wall Street-Treasury Complex—it was backed by the complicit G7 governments which hold the majority of votes in the IMF’s governing bodies. The common recipe— devaluation of currency, strong public austerity, cash crop production for export, capital liberalization, freezing of salaries together with liberalization of prices, the end of all restrictions against foreign investment, etc.— does in fact decapitate a country’s self-determination not only in its economic but in its entire political decision-making and delivers it to the capitalist rule. SAP delivers not only the income out of exports, but also the natural and social assets of a country to international financiers and transnational corporations, thus forcefully integrating it into the capitalist world economy. Some 90 countries are now under IMF tutelage, and often have been so for decades. In the case of Argentina, for example, indebtedness began when a military junta in the 1970s plundered the assets of the country and, with the aid of Western banks, took out loans which they immediately transferred to their private accounts in these same banks. The population suffers the results of inflation and deficit even today. The rule of the IMF never ends because of such revolving debts. SAP usually means widespread unemployment and poverty, sharp reduction of public services like health and education (while the military is usually

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exempted), the end of redistribution in favour of the poor, the breakdown of social security systems, deregulation in favour of foreign companies, and privatization of formerly public infrastructure. The banking, communication, and media sectors are especially attractive to foreign companies. There remains no choice in the system of regulation, nor in the patterns of consumption propagated, nor in the supply of energy and water monopolized by transnational corporations. This is cultural imperialism in its most rabid, most direct form. There are, of course, more subversive and more subtle forms of cultural imperialism, some of which are exposed in this book; “good governance,” the “free flow of information,” popular culture, advertising, and other formulae which sound so undoubtedly positive all carry the message that there is no alternative to the American capitalist mode of social organization. If we define cultural imperialism in the words of Susantha Goonatilake (see Chapter 3 in this volume; there is broad consensus on this definition) as “an imposition of a cultural package against the informed will of the recipients,” then capitalism is the most aggressive of cultural imperialists. Its major instrument—the rise of neo-liberalism as the dominant economic ideology—has been gradually developed over decades. “How did neo-liberalism ever emerge from its ultra-minoritarian ghetto to become the dominant doctrine in the world today? Why can the IMF and the [World] Bank intervene at will and force countries to participate in the world economy on basically unfavorable terms? Why is the Welfare State under threat in all the countries where it was established? Why is the environment on the edge of collapse and why are there so many poor people in both the rich and the poor countries at a time when there has never existed such great wealth?” asks Susan George (1997). Its success can be explained by the combination of four factors: 1.

With rapidly raising unemployment in the countries of the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) after 1974, social democratic and Keynesian economic policies were quickly discredited as being the major reason for the economic crisis. The combined influence of right-wing foundations with literally unlimited funds together with massive media propaganda helped to bring in new conservative governments first in the UK and then in the US, and Germany. 2. Partly by unemployment, partly by conservative strategies, partly by inner corruption, the trade unions experienced a dramatic loss of power. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was especially successful in destroying the public sector in the UK and laying off 2 million employees, mostly unionized. In Germany, corruption within the unions’ cooperative sector played a particular role. 3. In this situation, neo-liberal economists offered an ideology according to which state regulation was responsible for the economic crisis while “the market” was considered best suited to regulate all spheres of society. This “theory” was widely propagated by right-wing foundations and

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their paid accomplices who even succeeded in influencing the Nobel Prize for Economics (such as Assar Lindbeck, the long-time president of the search committee) which, in reality, is the Prize of the Bank of Sweden in Memory of Alfred Nobel. 4. It became much easier to sell market fundamentalism after the collapse of the socialist regimes in 1989–90, a collapse which many economists attributed to the principal failure of state regulation and planning and the epistemological cleansing following it (for a more extended interpretation, see Hamm 2005b). What was propagated was in fact not a scientific economic theory (its empirical bases being all too shaky) but rather an image of American society as the proposed blueprint for all others. The idea of a common good and of the state’s task to tame individual egoism and the exertion of power at costs to others, part of the European legacy and enshrined in European constitutions, has been gradually dismissed and replaced by the ideology that only the individual is responsible for his or her fortune, that inequality and insecurity are productive because they stimulate competition, and that the “invisible hand” will automatically take care that the sum of individual egoisms will result in the maximum common welfare (“market fundamentalism”). The principle of social solidarity has been dismantled—definitely an aspect of cultural imperialism. Contrary to European tradition, this “theory” is vulgar Social Darwinism: the strong will and should win all, the weak may starve, but this is how the world ought to be organized (see Schui, Chapter 10 in this volume). Pierre Bourdieu has seen “symbolic violence” behind this attempt to destroy European culture (Eine Gefahr für die Grundlagen unserer Kultur, 4 December 1999). There were also earlier warnings: “To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment ... would result in the demolition of society” (Polanyi 1957: 73). Neo-liberal political and economic strategies pave the way for, and are accompanied by, the influx of Western media, of monopolistic Western conceptions of human rights and good governance, of Western popular culture and tourism—in fact, of cultural imperialism in language, science and education, religion and the arts, and in systems of belief, cosmology, and self-interpretation. The mass media, almost totally monopolized by Western corporations, tend to have global reach; they are organized as capitalist enterprises; they depend on advertising; and they are produced by Western middle-class people. Therefore, the image they disseminate through the world across all genres of news, films, and popular entertainment is one of the thoughtlessly consuming Western middle class as the generalized norm to which normal life should conform. Junk food or pop music, fashion clothing or soap-operas, Hollywood movies or stock exchange news—they all carry that message. To all those who do not fit into that pattern, this image says: Life is easy, why do you stick to your old traditions? Why don’t you accept the promises of capitalism? Why do you

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stay with your folks in that garbage village? Why don’t you get ready for competition? Do you want to be a life-long loser? The real world is the world where everything can be achieved with money, money is the only thing that really counts, “greed is good.” Once caught by the media, this image won’t let you go. It shapes your outlook, your understanding of your society and the world, your understanding of yourself and your people, your perceptions and your moral standards, and all through foreign eyes. This is real-life brainwashing. Whatever you grew up with, whatever your culture might have been, it will count less and less and eventually disappear completely. One day it might come back, in the form of a totally commercialized, totally Westernized folklore caricature of your own memories, and you will have to pay for it. This is what cultural imperialism means and what it does to you. Often the argument has been made against cultural imperialism that cultures cannot be protected and preserved; they must be strong enough to defend themselves in the global confrontation of different cultures, and if they are not, they may disappear. In this logic, culture is a process of continuous amalgamation in which elements are permanently sorted out and eliminated while others are included and assimilated. This is the basic way of cultural evolution and has been with humankind since it became conscious of itself. Social Darwinism in this argument is obvious. While it has some merits in directing our views to the productivity of intercultural contact and learning, it also has severe limits. Capitalism is aggressively and unscrupulously expanding its rule. Through the brains and hands of its political and economic decision-making elite, capitalism tends to subdue all other forms of social regulation. But in human society, it is not simply a question of natural law who prevails. Instead, we have an option to decide what we want to preserve. May sympathy, respect, and wisdom guide us in this decision (see Dieter’s contribution to this volume, Chapter 15). Modernization theory is all too blind in its assumption that the course of social change in all societies will eventually converge to a Western capitalist pattern; it simply ignores that this best of all possible worlds is also the most destructive in terms of ecological damage and human suffering. The opposing view maintains that cultures are part of human ingenuity to adapt to very different environments. They cannot be judged according to strength or weakness but rather are all of the same value and need all to be respected in equal ways. We are damaging the common wealth of humanity if, for example, we allow languages to disappear in much the same way as biological species become extinct (Dieter, Chapter 15 in this volume). The colonial experience usually debated from the perspective of those on the third-world periphery exists even within the capitalist centre (see, for example, Kroes 1999). It cascades all the way down the global power hierarchy and its different subsets. The best way to understand this process rests on the fundament of Galtung’s “Structural Theory of Imperialism” (1971). The people on the receiving end are not passive buckets into which new contents are being thrown to replace existing ones. Rather, they are actively

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interpreting and appropriating such new content; they can develop more or less resistance; and they can also be encouraged, intimidated, or threatened by reference groups (Tripathy, Chapter 19 in this volume). This helps to explain what may be called selective diffusion, an argument often raised against the idea of cultural imperialism. National economic and political elites will often be the first to be confronted with other cultures, including the imperialist, and the more ties they have with the respective other society through education, flattering, or corruption, the more they might be willing to adopt these new cultural elements. Second will be the urban intellectual middle class. It may take a long time before people in remote villages are reached. So cultural intrusion seems to work along the hierarchy of power structures. Selective diffusion modifies the general thesis without rendering it superfluous. It is also a matter of quantity. If you have no other choice than to receive American popular music on your radio, or if a specific news agency has a monopoly in delivering news, then you have only one choice: either you expose yourself, or you switch off. If you choose the first option, you will gradually learn to perceive your own culture and society through foreign eyes. This may alienate you from your traditions and mores, change your criteria for esthetical and moral judgments, and expose you to subversive models which you cannot submit to scrutiny. Cultural diffusion rests on physical infrastructures. The development and implementation of physical-technical infrastructure, however, follows other rules than the development of cultural content. Because it needs technological knowledge and skills, investment expecting profit, and permissions by public authorities, it is open to control and censorship, as the end-user has to pay for its use and therefore needs money. Roughly, technical infrastructures will be developed to the extent to which they promise to generate profit. In other words, cultural imperialism is only possible and will only proceed if it is embedded in a process of thorough commercialization and monetarization of the society, and it is modified by the effectiveness and efficiency of control and censorship mechanisms exerted on it. This is where the economic and political mechanisms are connected with and reinforce cultural imperialism. Is resistance possible?

This Book More than 30 years ago, cultural imperialism was located in a broader framework called the “Structural Theory of Imperialism” (Galtung 1971). After that, as it became theorized by others such as Edward Said (1978, 1993), Susantha Goonatilake (1982), and Ashis Nandy (1983), it developed into something like the heart of postcolonial theory (see, as an overview, Gandhi 1998). Our approach in this book does not come from theory but rather from real life experience where we found it a concept of major importance. However, it is not “cultures” which act, it is humans in social contexts who act and who impose, and it is human beings in other social contexts

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on whom something is imposed. Culture is communication, although asymmetric in this case. Therefore, the concept of cultural imperialism necessarily implies that we are precise and concrete in pointing out who the imperialist is, who the victim is, and in which structures they operate (this point is also made by Smandych in Chapter 1 of this volume). The American attempt to streamline public opinion and allied governments to support its “war on terrorism” shaped the climate which led us to organize the conference that brought together the authors of this book. This propaganda campaign was in full swing when the authors met at a conference on “Cultural Imperialism” held in Trier, Germany, in October 2002. The conference organizers shared the feeling that cultural imperialism is allencompassing and therefore should not be limited to the present US role in global politics, nor to the role of the media, nor to present times alone. We wanted to bring together as many facets of the phenomenon as possible, given the two-day limit of the conference, and find out what they have in common. The conference brought together some 120 people from 16 different countries, among them political scientists and philosophers, nuclear physicists and sociologists, psychologists and toxicologists, lawyers and historians of art, activists involved in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and anthropologists, economists, engineers, and theologists. In preparing this volume, it was not our intention to iron out the rich multidisciplinary texture, nor to streamline all contributions along the lines of one theoretical frame of reference. Much more fascinating was how the diversity of disciplinary, epistemological, and cultural backgrounds unfolded. After the conference, participants were asked to revise their contributions and submit them to a second review process conducted independently by the two editors. This is how the present volume came into being.

References Blum, William. 2000. Rogue State. Monroe, ME: Common Courage. Blum, William. 2005. “A Concise History of US Global Interventions, 1945 to the Present.” In Hamm 2005. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1999. Eine Gefahr für die Grundlagen unserer Kultur, 4 December. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1997. The Grand Chessboard: American Primary and its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Basic Books. Davis, Walter E. 2005. “September 11 and the Bush Administration.” In Hamm 2005. Enzensberger, Hans Magnus. 1962. Bewusstseinsindustrie. In Einzelheiten, ed. H.M. Enzensberger. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Fanon, Frantz. 1963. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History. New York: Free Press. Fulbright, William. 1966. The Arrogance of Power. New York: Random House. Galtung, Johan. 1971. “A Structural Theory of Imperialism.” Journal of Peace Research 8,2. Repr. Galtung, Johan. 1980. Peace and World Structure: Essays in Peace Research. Vol. 4. Copenhagen: Ejlers.

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Gandhi, Leela. 1998. Postcolonial Theory. New York: Columbia University Press. George, Susan, 1997: “How to Win the War of Ideas: Lessons from the Gramscian Right.” Dissent 44 (Summer): 47–53. Goonatilake, Susantha. 1982. Crippled Minds: An Exploration into Colonial Culture. New Delhi: Vikas. Hamm, Bernd (Ed.). 2005a. Devastating Society: The Neo-conservative Assault on Democracy and Justice. London: Pluto. Hamm, Bernd. 2005b. “Introduction.” Hamm 2005. Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations.” Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer): 22–49. Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Touchstone Books. Kroes, Rob. 1999. “American Empire and Cultural Imperialism: A View from the Receiving End.” Paper presented to a conference on The American Impact on Western Europe. Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, March 25–27. Nandy, Ashis. 1983. The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism. Delhi: Oxford. Parker, Alison, and Jamie Fellner. 2005. “Above the Law: Executive Power After September 11.” In Hamm 2005. Polanyi, Karl. 1957. The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press. Project for a New American Century. 2000. Rebuilding America’s Defenses. Available on-line at . Said, Edward. 1978. Orientalism. New York: Pantheon. Said, Edward. 1993. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage Books.

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PART 2

CULTURAL IMPERIALISM: HISTORY AND FUTURE

Introduction Susantha Goonatilake, a leading postcolonial critic and sociologist of science and technology from Sri Lanka, provides a critically informed analytical framework for understanding the historical development and trajectories of Western cultural imperialism since the fourteenth century. According to Goonatilake, cultural imperialism on a global scale is characterized by an imposition of a cultural package against the informed will of the recipients. Historically, this has been done by the force of arms and, additionally or alternatively, through less obvious, subtler means. The classic case of the former was during the Iberian conquest of Latin America and parts of Asia which started in the 1400s, and the cultural package imposed through force of arms was Catholicism. However, Goonatilake notes that as the world’s geopolitical and other relationships changed, cultural imperialism also changed its character. For example, he argues that while the period of early European imperial expansion prior to the nineteenth century is easily identified with the unilateral imposition of the certitudes of the Catholic Church or later of the Enlightenment on non-Western cultures, the present era of globalization is characterized by greater fluidity and multidirectional and even reverse cultural flows. Thus, just as today’s global economy is not unidirectional, neither is the world of cultural imperialism. Amidst the collapse of civilizational certainty in the West, one can see the emergence in the West of non-Western cultural strands such as the increasing recognition of the parallels between South Asian Buddhist thought and that of Western philosophers and the important influence of different aspects of Buddhist and Hindu philosophy and practice—for instance, the practice of yoga— on the daily lives of millions of people living in Western countries. Despite these reverse cultural flows, however, Goonatilake argues that a more unidirectional type of cultural imperialism is still being experienced in nonWestern countries, as attested to by the continuing “cultural rape” being committed by fundamentalist Christian missionary movements, along with the ongoing “cultural colonization” being done by foreign funded nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), who benefit from the practice of preying “on new Third World souls.”

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Ashis Nandy, a prominent political psychologist and sociologist of science from India, also offers a prognosis of cultural imperialism’s future based on an analysis of the past. In line with Goonatalike, Nandy argues that “contemporary incarnations of cultural imperialism derive their strength from the nineteenth-century colonial and social-evolutionist conventions of defining cultures as mature and immature, rational and irrational, and historical and ahistorical.” According to Nandy, these religious-based (Christian) and secular “visions of the ideal society of the future” developed as an inherent component of, and justification for, modern European colonialism and imperialism, which marked the first serious systematic effort at globalizing the world. Nandy examines the more recent legacy of nineteenth-century European imperialism, noting that although “the project of imperialism gradually dissolved after World War II, it was never quite fully dismantled.” As a result, “the culture of imperialism did not face a direct global challenge and the postimperial world never really jettisoned some of the key tenets of the worldview of imperialism,” which continued to include such components as the “belief in a hierarchy of culture, the emancipatory role of Western powers as carriers of the Enlightenment vision,” and “theories of progress and stages of history that defined Asian and African cultures as a throw-back to Europe’s past.” Indeed, Nandy argues that many current concepts and concerns tied to global governance, such as economic aid and development, human rights, democracy, progress, statecraft, governance and diplomacy, and “even our idea of fighting imperialism” are “all tinged by the worldview of imperialism.” He believes that it is not impossible for non-Western societies to “break out of the straightjacket of imperial categories and build on the ground-level resistance of the ordinary citizens living their everyday lives.” However, he points out that, to date, this type of ground-level resistance to Western cultural imperialism has not slowed the majority of today’s non-Western cultures from “tamely and obediently moving towards a uniform future that is nothing other than a slightly modified version of the contemporary Western world.” Bernd Hamm, a German sociologist and specialist in global problems and futures studies, offers an account of how Western concepts of science and truth have been used to legitimate Western political-economic interests aimed at the suppression and exploitation of nature and humans. In doing this, according to Hamm, “science and truth” have become ideologies that tend to benefit the “power elites” (cf. C.W. Mills 1965) of society and the scientific community at the cost of the population at large. In his chapter, Hamm supports this thesis, first by interrogating the Western definition of science and truth as objective and value free. He then moves on to offer observations that do not comply with this self-image such as the relation between science, money, and power; the rise of neo-liberalism; the Americanization of science; and recent university reforms undertaken in Germany that are heavily influenced by the American model of postsecondary education. These contrasting critical observations lead Hamm in turn to offer a cynical diagnosis of the current state and future of social science disciplines in Europe and other Western countries.

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CHAPTER 3

Cultural Imperialism: A Short History, Future, and a Postscript from the Present Susantha Goonatilake ultural imperialism on a global scale is characterized by an imposition of a cultural package against the informed will of the recipients. This has been done by the force of arms and through less obvious, subtler means. The classic case of the former was during the Iberian conquest of Latin America and parts of Asia, the cultural package imposed through force of arms being Catholicism. As the period of Iberian plunder changed into the period of British domination in the nineteenth century to American hegemony in the latter half of the twentieth century to the emerging period under current forces of globalization, so did the nature of cultural imperialism also change. The period of direct hegemony is easily identified with unilateral imposition whereby certitudes of the Church or later of the Enlightenment and mixtures thereof prevailed. The present globalization however is characterized by greater fluidity. Just as the global economy is not unidirectional—there being, for example, cross-marriages between leading transnational corporations spread across several continents—so is the world of cultural imperialism. Today’s dominant social science paradigm of postmodernism illustrates the lack of a central cultural package in the West; other symptoms of this loss of certainty include the collapse of belief in Christianity in Europe. Amidst this collapse there has been the emergence in the West of non-Western cultural strands. For example, many key writers of fiction in English are of Asian background. As the world changes rapidly in the coming decades under the forces of globalization— which is not just a crude imposition of the West—with a shift to Asia in many fields and with major changes in technology, the world of culture and of cultural imperialism also changes. This chapter sketches these complex changes and identifies the areas of intervention possible for forces arraigned against cultural imposition.

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Cultural Imperialism’s First Phase: Primitive Onslaught Portugal and Spain in the southeast corner of Europe once subject to strong cultural influences of Islam were the first carriers of cultural colonialism

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on a global scale. They, for their part, had earlier learnt much from Asia through connections across the Mediterranean and through Arabic contacts. They were also at the time of their voyages across the world, strongholds of the Inquisition. In 1492, the Pope through the Treaty of Tordesillas divided the world in two between Spain and Portugal, largely for religious purposes. This in effect became a license for plunder, rape, and mass genocide primarily in the Americas and Africa and to a much lesser extent in Asia. This civilizational thrust of the Church mission killed millions and dispossessed whole nations of their history and the will to survive. The prime targets in Asia were Sri Lanka and the Philippines. The remains of the precultural conquest Philippines indicate that they were at the time of the Iberian incursion beginning to emerge from the tribal phase and were establishing elements of a higher culture and civilization, namely, of building cities and establishing formal written cultures. Thus, remains of South Asian influences (in the form of Hindu and Buddhist statues, an Indic script, and elements of the Sanskrit classic Ramayana) as well as of Chinese influences (in the form of coin and pottery remains) and of later Islamic influences are found before the arrival of the Spanish. Because of the massive Iberian onslaught on the Philippines there are no large-scale cultural remains today of this civilizational kind. Being on the margins of international cultural exchanges, the Philippines is not therefore a particularly good example for seeing the dynamics of international civilizational cultural dialogue under terms of strong imposition. Sri Lanka, on the other hand, has been on the crossroads of East-West dialogue for well over 2,300 years and, as the cultural onslaught by the Iberians was also strong upon it, provides a better case study. As an example of both cultural onslaught and resistance, its experience is instructive. I will take this example. Let me begin with the first phase of cultural imperialism, namely, that of the Voyages of Discovery and thereafter.

God’s Global Lucre In this first phase the cultural package exported was overlaid with the ideology of the European Dark Ages, which lasted from the fourth century to the fourteenth century. This was the period when Europe rejected the Greek and Roman classical heritage and adopted Christianity. The first phase was also one of Europe finding itself again and returning to the aims of its classical tradition. In this effort Europe was also fed by non-European elements, such as from Asia brought by the way of the Arabs and partly through the Iberian Peninsula itself. The major cultural package imposed in this first phase was Catholicism. The techniques used for conversion were taken directly from the Inquisition. These techniques had been mastered by the Church in the preceding centuries through its barbarity on its own people in its home continent. In Lisbon there is today an Inquisition Museum which displays

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how the Church went about this holy but grisly work. The most telling exhibit shows a priest gleefully watching a hapless victim whose leg had been cut off as part of the essential ingredient in applying the will of the Church. These techniques sanctified the widespread use of violence as holy duty, especially in the Americas.

Catholic Action: Inquisition Approach in Sri Lanka If one were to summarize in a few sentences the effect of Catholic piety in Sri Lanka, one would begin by noting that today there are no temples over 150 years old in areas once held by the Portuguese; the rest of the country has temples with a continuous history of over 2,000 years. The Portuguese burnt all the Buddhist temples as well as the few Hindu ones. They carted off the loot in the form of gold statues and jewel-encased ornaments to Lisbon. The building materials that remained after the temples were burnt were used to build churches and forts. The Portuguese threatened those who would not convert; as special inducements they spiked children in front of their recalcitrant parents. Hundreds were beheaded as examples. There are many examples of the temples that were destroyed. Just on the outskirts of Colombo was the famous Temple of Kelaniya built in the third century BC. This temple complex was completely burnt and destroyed. In the eastern and southern coasts of the country were two “thousand pillar” temples, which were temples so large that in the public imagination they were perceived to have 1,000 pillars. These were destroyed. Some of the other complexes destroyed were university-style centres of learning. Those who could not escape after the looting were killed. Outsiders to South Asian history may consider that this was not much of a loss in the cultural sense as Sri Lanka was a small entity in a faraway land. However, this view is completely inaccurate. Existing at the crossroads of civilizations and on the East-West trade routes from at least the seventh century BC (according to modern archeological excavations), the country developed a sophisticated architectural, literary, and cultural tradition. The Roman historian Pliny the Elder, in the first century AD, recorded the visit of four ambassadors from Sri Lanka whose leader’s father had also been to China (Guruge 1993). As both Sinhalese and Chinese records reveal, there was also travel in the opposite direction towards China as well as, of course, in the immediate South Asian region. The classical European author Cosmas Indicopleustes, writing in the sixth century, called Sri Lanka “mediatrix”: midway on the trade routes between East and West (Guruge 1993: 13). The Chinese author Li Chao observed that “ships from Simhala-Sri Lanka [were the] largest in Chinese ports” (Weerasinghe 1995: 35). Paralleling this trade position was Sri Lanka’s intellectual position as one of the world’s major repositories and centres of philosophical and religious thought. This began from around the third century BC through the large-scale introduction of Buddhism. The extensive literature of Buddhism was originally translated into Sinhalese, but was later retranslated, together

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with extensive commentaries written in Sri Lanka, to the lingua franca of Theravada Buddhism, namely, Pali, which was the equivalent of Latin to Catholicism. Sri Lanka soon became a major centre of Buddhist thought. It developed extensive cultural contacts with most of Asia. Many records exist of such cultural travel; a notable one was in AD 429 when Sinhala nuns travelled to China to establish a Buddhist nuns’ order there. This was the longest women’s travel recorded anywhere until then. Sri Lanka produced a vast literature that covers areas from ontology, to epistemology, to psychology, to creative literature, to architecture and medicine. It was this tradition that the Pope’s minions destroyed. It was in many ways a partial equivalent to the destruction of the library of Alexandria together with all the practitioners of the knowledge that the library held. One can summarize briefly the knowledge institutions and creators that the Church through the Portuguese destroyed in Sri Lanka. By the early centuries of the first millennium, Sri Lanka had three large university-type monasteries, each hosting a couple of thousand monks. They interacted with fellow scholars in Asia as not only local records, but South Asian and Chinese records, show. It was the heirs to these monastic universities that the Portuguese destroyed. Although in the sixteenth century the number of monks in each such monastery university had dwindled to the hundreds, they were yet the same major centres of learning. Students in these monasteries were expected to know six languages. They had access to a large literature both high and popular. Unlike in the European Middle Ages, literacy was high, and some of the literature was composed by all social strata including women. In the nineteenth century several museums in the Western world collected Sri Lankan manuscripts, and these collections now hold tens of thousands of manuscripts. Some in the British Museum are, for example, autobiographical writings of women pilgrims (dated circa fifteenth century), as they went from site to site, indicative of both the freedom of women as well as their ability to write good poetry. Heinz Bechert, the German Indologist, has calculated that in nineteenth-century Sri Lanka, before the introduction of Western-type reforms, the country had a higher rate of literacy than that of nineteenth-century Britain (Bechert, cited in Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1988: 207). This, it should be noted, was after the decline of Buddhist institutions due to colonial incursions. Poems scribbled by visitors from the sixth to the ninth century on the walls to the abandoned rock fortress of Sigiriya show a high literacy rate among a broad spectrum of society (Ariyapala 1956). There is also some data indicating that life expectancy in Sri Lanka at the time was higher than in contemporary Europe. Whatever the “actual” life expectancy differences, there was of course a marked difference in the mythical life expectancies of the two cultural areas. Europe had its biblical maximum life expectancy of fourscore and ten, while for Sri Lanka it was the Buddhist life expectancy of 120 years. These life expectancies must also be considered cultural products reflecting partly the maximum life expectancy in the regions in which they arose. The biblical lands were dry,

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desert, or near-desert lands dependent heavily on animal food with its artery clogging and cancer-causing tendencies. Sri Lanka was, on the other hand, heavily dependent on plant food and therefore tended to have a higher maximum life span. The literature written at the time of the Portuguese incursion—in fact, some written a few centuries earlier—describe an extensive geographical knowledge partly arising from the trade and cultural traffic. Thus, nearly 50 countries are mentioned (Weerasinghe 1995: 9–12). Sri Lanka during the period immediately before the coming of the Portuguese also maintained its tradition of strong cultural traffic. This included contacts primarily with Southeast Asia, which was influenced heavily from the ninth to the fifteenth century by Sinhalese culture (de Silva 1981). There are also many indications of the cultural richness of local knowledge before the European incursion. For example, Greek and Roman arithmetic could count up to only 10,000, the Myriad. Buddhist sources to which Sri Lanka was heir to, mention figures of up to 1053 (Singh 1988). Buddhist theory also had a view of the world in which both matter and time were considered atomistic (Karunadasa 1967; Karunadasa 1983). All living matter was considered interrelated, a view with strong implications for the environment (Padamasiri de Silva 1998). Human will was considered central, and there was a well-developed psychology to explain in a naturalistic manner everyday human phenomena, especially those dealing with perception and cognition (Sarathchandra 1958; Goleman 1981; Goleman 1988). Although there were mythological elements in popular astrology, the country was also heir to the broad heliocentric astronomy of South Asia. European natural history at the time was based on Aristotle. This was later changed by the writings of the Portuguese Garcia D’Orta working in Goa (Patterson 1987). His writings, based on local information, part of which he obtained from Sri Lanka, later revolutionized European thinking and led to modern botany. Garcia D’Orta’s work also covered South Asian medicine, which in common with those of Sri Lanka was at the time considered more efficacious than that of Europe (Gaitonde 1983). The formal grammar used in Sri Lanka was based on classical South Asian ones going back to the pre-Christian era, which, until the advent of William Jones in the eighteenth century and his invention of modern philology, based on South Asian models, was the best grammar around. The belief system was based on Buddhism, which denounced forms of superstition like astrology as uncouth and “forbidden” arts, although there was also at times practice of exorcism. Yet the general attitude towards these was instrumental, almost as some sort of non-naturalistic vending machines. Robert Knox, an English prisoner of the Sinhalese king in the seventeenth century, had this to say of the irreverence with which the population used these practices. “The Sinhalese would ... laugh at the superstitions of their own Devotion ... I have often heard them say, ... what a God is He? .. Shit in his Mouth ... Give him no Sacrifice ... so slight estimation have they of their Idol-Gods” (Knox 1681: 83). After the Portuguese

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imposition of Christianity in the coastal areas, this instrumental disbelief was replaced by the blind faith of the Church.

Onward Christian Soldiers: From Iberian to Western European Protestant Dutch and British in Sri Lanka With the end of the mercantile era associated with the plunder capitalism of Portugal and Spain the centre of gravity of global European power shifted to Holland and Britain. This also coincided with the shift of the capitalist mode from mercantilism to industrial capitalism. Now, new economic relationships of a more subtle kind operated. An emerging global economy tied to industrial production in Europe, and to raw materials and markets in the rest of the world, required low-level skills in the colonized countries, thus leading to the emergence of Western-style school systems and partial colonization through the school syllabus. Direct religious oppression and the imposition of Catholicism of the Portuguese era now changed to the less brutal conversion systems of the Protestants and to a belief in the “White Man’s Burden.” The Protestant-Catholic clash in Europe was also replicated in Sri Lanka. It is important to observe how these changes played themselves out. At the time, Sri Lanka was subject not only to the turmoil created by colonial incursions but also to infighting among local royal factions. As part of these factional fights, the local rulers attempted to entice the Dutch, who were now sniffing around the coast of the country, to get a foothold in the country against the Portuguese. This resulted in the Dutch replacing the Portuguese by foul means, amply expressed by the Sinhalese saying “Giving up ginger [meaning the Portuguese] and getting chilies [meaning the Dutch] in return.” The Dutch occupied the coastal region of the country and quickly began to persecute the Catholics, who were forbidden to practice their religion. Catholic priests fled to the area under the control of the Buddhist king who allowed them to be smuggled back at night to their flocks in the Dutch areas to practice their religion. When Catholicism had come with the Portuguese, the Muslims in turn had been persecuted, and the Sinhalese king had resettled them elsewhere, deep in his kingdom, so that they could practice their religion freely. The British gradually replaced the Dutch and in 1815 displaced the last Sinhalese ruler and became complete overlord of the country. The treaty with the Sinhalese that consummated this legally not only allowed the practice of Buddhism but also, in keeping with earlier royal traditions, promised to safeguard it. As a partial consequence, the coastal areas which had been hitherto under the Portuguese and the Dutch in turn (and now the British) saw an upsurge in Buddhist activities, including building and repairing of temples and their attendant human institutions. Alarmed, the British introduced new restrictions and also introduced new attempts to convert the Sinhalese to Christianity.

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Civilizing the Brown Sahib However, there was now a qualitative change in the colonizing cultural package. To the earlier religious package was added a new civilizational urge, the White Man’s Burden. This is amply described by the notorious comments of the British reformer, Thomas Babington Macaulay, in 1835, who said: “A single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia.” He went on to describe his recipe for remaking the South Asian, stating that: We [the colonizers] must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions who we govern, a class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population. (McCauley 1835; cited in Edwards 1967: 125)

This was the general thrust of colonial cultural policy in South Asia. Its outcome in Sri Lanka is seen in this comment in 1843 by a Briton, who stated: The Sinhalese are partial to Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield and Birmingham manufacturers ... the higher ranks indulge in the best wines, particularly Madeira and champagne which are liberally dispensed at their parties to European guests; and no people in the world set a higher value upon British medicines, stationary and perfumery; or relish with a keener zest, English hams, cheese butter, porter ale, cider, sherry, herrings, salmon, anchovies, pickles and confectionary. (Bennet 1843: 48)

Reverse Cultural Flows What Bennet meant by “the Sinhalese” was not the whole country but only its ruling classes. Also inaccurate was his characterization of culture influences and changes flowing in one direction from England to Ceylon. As in the Portuguese era—for example, the work of D’Orta—there was also a reverse flow of culture from the East to the West. One of the most telling cases of this is the British imperialism’s major poet, Rudyard Kipling, and his most famous poem “If.” Many key statements of his poem could have come from the classic summary of Buddhist thought, namely the Dhammapada (sixth century BC). Perhaps unconsciously, but I believe more consciously, the essence of “If” has been directly lifted from the Dhammapada, including virtually all the key passages. The point is that the region, and Sri Lanka, was not an isolated entity. Sri Lanka had always been interacting with its regional environment, especially

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South Asia and Southeast Asia. Under European siege in its coastal regions, Sri Lankans had been trying to revive their culture. In the mid-eighteenth century, a remarkable monk and a remarkable king brought about a revival of the country’s religion and culture (Bond 1992; Malalgoda 1976). Ancient institutions and temples, some dating back 2,000 years, were restituted and repaired. Classical learning, especially in Pali and Sinhalese, which had declined over the previous 150 years, was revived, partly by introducing texts from Siam, the Theravada country to which the Sinhalese had earlier transferred their classical learning. This return to the classical civilization was continued in the nineteenth century throughout the British period when links between Asian and Western centres of debate were established whose reverberations we still feel today. A key element in this formal reverse transfer was the establishment by William Jones of the Royal Asiatic Society in Calcutta, modelled after the Royal Society of Britain. Branches of the Royal Asiatic Society were formed elsewhere in South Asia including in Colombo. This provided a venue for the Britons at the time, as well as Westernized locals, to learn about the past culture and civilizations of South Asia. Significant outcomes of the Society were important research on language, history, and culture. William Jones, especially, made a seminal contribution in his comparison of the languages of South Asia and those of Europe, thus virtually inventing modern philology. The nineteenth century also saw translations of major Sanskrit and Pali works, respectively the two classical languages of South Asia. For the first time the West discovered Buddhism and Hinduism relatively unadulterated by prejudice. Consequently, major South Asian thought was being translated into the West and studied in a relatively objective manner. The nearest parallel up to that time of such large-scale translation was the first millennium project of translating Buddhist texts into Chinese. It should be noted here that the thesis of Edward Said (1978) that there was deliberate distortion of Asia in “Orientalist” European writing did not apply to the scholars who studied South Asia. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century European studies of South Asia were generally sympathetic to the subject matter. An important cultural project in Sri Lanka that had global ramifications was the repercussions of the continuation of Buddhist resurgence in the nineteenth century. After the formal British takeover of the country with a treaty allowing the continuation of Buddhist practices as under the kings, some leeway was allowed the local culture. Temples began to be rebuilt again along the coastal areas. An important event was the founding in 1853 of Parama Dhammacetiya, a key temple, in the outskirts of Colombo; it became a centre for cultural discussion. The Buddhist resistance fed also by renewed links with Burma and Thailand soon resulted in a series of challenges to the Christians—this time to the English church which was attempting conversion. A series of debates between Christians and Buddhists resulted in the Christians getting trounced. The Buddhist monks who appeared in these debates were also well read in Western literature.

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Englishman John Capper who reported on these debates noted “Some of the Buddhist priests were thoroughly versed in the works of modern scientists” (Capper, 1873; cited in Abhayasundara 1990: 155 ). When reported abroad, these debates attracted attention. One group that was so attracted was the Theosophists in New York. This group’s leaders, Madame Blavatsky and Colonel Olcott, started a correspondence with the monks who were involved in the debates. The Theosophists, mystical in nature and hardly scientific, had a major influence on subsequent cultural events in the West. Madame Blavatsky has been hailed recently as the “grandmother of the New Age.” She incorporated as one of her “Masters” a Sri Lankan monk (as well as Indian equivalents as other “Masters”) in her influential book The Secret Doctrine (Blavatsky 1888; Johnson 1994). The Theosophist connection with South Asia, of Westerners trying to learn from Asia, had an important impact on both the self-esteem of South Asians and on the independence movements. Gandhi was to say that “Top Congressmen were Theosophists” (cited in Cranston 1993: 194). The nature of the relationship between the Theosophists and Sri Lankan monks is also seen in the following quote from Olcott, writing in 1879 to a Sinhalese monk. I pass among ignorant Western people as a thoroughly well informed man but in comparison with the learning possessed by my Brothers in the oriental priesthoods, I am as ignorant as the last of their neophytes ... To you and as you must we turn, and say: Fathers, brothers, the Western world is dying ... come and help, rescue it. Come as missionaries, as teachers, as disputants, preachers ... Persuade a good, pure, learned, eloquent Buddhist to come here and preach, you will sweep the country before you.... (Cited in Guruge 1984: 338–39)

Eventually Olcott and Blavatsky came to Sri Lanka and formally became Buddhists, interacting with locals and helping the Buddhist resurgence. However, the locals incorporated the Theosophists only insofar as the Theosophists agreed to Buddhist thought. But this was always not to be. When Theosophists brought in heavy overlays of the mystical and the supernatural, as they were wont to do, they were rejected and at one stage were nearly thrown out of the Buddhist groups until a formal apology was made by Olcott. The so-called Buddhist Theosophical Society that they formed in Colombo was never a Theosophical society but remained above all a Buddhist society. It was not only the Theosophists that were interacting with the local monks. By the late nineteenth century, around 40 Sinhalese scholar monks had emerged with high learning, knowledge of foreign languages, and extensive contacts around the world (Guruge 1984: lvii). These monks had links to the West (US, UK, Germany, France, Denmark, Russia, Austria, etc.) as well as Asia (Burma, Cambodia, China, Japan, India, Thailand). Several

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became actively involved in the transfer of key Pali texts, as well as some Sanskrit ones, to the West. The list of Western scholars that corresponded with these monks or were guided by them, reads like a Who’s Who of Western scholars of Asia. The relationships of these Western scholars to the local monks is best summarized in the words of a prominent Danish Pali scholar, Viggo Fausboell: “We, Europeans, must, of course, stand in need of such help [from these scholar monks] as we are so far from the living fountains of Buddhism and so scantily furnished with materials” (cited in Guruge 1984: xv). Under such tutelage, it was unlikely that the orientalism of the Edward Said kind could emerge in the case of Buddhist studies or, for that matter, South Asian studies in general. The European and American scholars who corresponded or worked with these Buddhist monks included Childers, author of a Pali dictionary; Rhys Davids, founder of the Pali Text Society in London, which published the major Pali texts; Hermann Oldenberg, author of the first authoritative German text on Buddhism; Max Muller, the leading German Sanskrit and Pali scholar and author of the Sacred Books of the East series; Wilhelm Geiger, a leading German Pali scholar; Sir Edwin Arnold, author of Light of Asia; Paul Carus, editor of The Open Court and The Monist; and several others, such as Rost, Minayeff, Hardy, Warren, Lanman, and Fausboell. Some of the correspondence of the scholars with the Sri Lankan monks has been published and amounts to nearly 1,000 letters (Guruge 1984). One of the most seminal figures to emerge from the Buddhist Renaissance was Anagarika Dharmpala, the founder of the international Buddhist movement. With the emergence over the last two decades of a neocolonial antinational backlash in Sri Lanka, Anagarika has been deliberately attacked and denigrated. Initially a protégé of Olcott, he moved against the latter when he tried to bring the supernatural aspects of Theosophy into Buddhism. Anagarika’s address to the World Congress of Religions held in 1893 in Chicago had a strong impact. This Congress, held as a culmination of Western dominance in the nineteenth-century, was turned by Anagarika’s speech to its opposite. His address helped launch the international Buddhist movement as the address of Vivekananda of India launched the International Hindu movement (Guruge 1965). Anagarika eventually established a global Buddhist network stretching from Japan to the US. His contacts came partially from the earlier correspondence engaged in across the globe by the scholar monks. One of his key achievements was the reclamation once again of Indian Buddhist sites as objects of pilgrimage and sanctity. The mid twentieth-century resurgence of Buddhism in India owes partly to his pioneering efforts. Anagarika was a polymath well read in both Western and Asian literature, both secular and religious. In his speeches and letters spread over the decades, now partially published, one sees him discussing knowingly a large gamut of Asian and Western scholars. In the latter category, he spoke on Antiochus, Antiogonas, Aristotle, Democritus, Diogenes, Plato, Ptolemy, Pythogoras, Socrates, Galileo, Einstein, Darwin, Huxley, Machiavelli,

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Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, William James, Herbert Spencer, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, and Mill (Guruge 1965). It should be noted that many South Asian responses in the nineteenth century to Western inroads differed from those of East Asia in that the South Asians tended also to mimic the Western refrain that “the East is East and the West is West” to emphasize that, unlike the West, the East was more “spiritual.” Indian Hindu figures as varied as Vivekananda, Gandhi, and the first Nobel Prize winner from Asia, Tagore, also stressed this assumed spiritual superiority of the East. The different Asian responses were illustrated by Tagore’s visit to East Asia after winning the Nobel Prize. He spoke to large audiences in Shanghai and Yokohama, only to see his audiences turned off by his presumption of the spirituality of Asia. In fact, he was hailed as an emissary of a failed civilization (Hay 1970). Anagarika on the other hand was—to use a Western term—a Renaissance man, attempting to build a new world on the basis of his culture’s past as well as the contemporary experience of other countries. Instead of rejecting modern science and technology, he welcomed it. He visited industrial schools in the West and in Japan and established similar ones in Sri Lanka (Guruge 1965). His views on the backward-looking Gandhi and his type of thinking were telling. Anagarika said “the universal use of the spinning wheel ... is not sufficient to make a people progressive,” and he bemoaned the ignorance of India’s villagers whose “lives are regulated by the calculations of astrology and their religions are based on fatalistic superstitions which are founded on ghosts, gods and creators.” He added “the antiquated bullock cart would not do today, for we have to compete with people who have the motor lorry and the auto car” (Guruge 1965: 715).

Reverse Cultural Flows in the Age of Globalization In the pages above, I have described some key reactions of Sri Lanka to the Western onslaught in the nineteenth century. Sri Lanka, and Asia in general, also attempted to respond in a global manner. At the eve of the twentieth century, the reverse flow from East to West was being increasingly recognized. In some technical literature the impacts were significant. Although Western philosophy had been the only recognized one in the West previously, it was now acknowledged that philosophical issues of a most significant kind had been addressed in Asia as well. Thus commentators were writing on parallels between South Asian thought and those of Western philosophers, for example, between Buddhism and Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche (Hoffman 1978). Parallels and similarities with Buddhism were noticed in Husserl, Heidegger, and Ernst Mach. South Asia had now begun to have some influence on Western philosophy (Inada and Jacobson 1984). American philosophers known to have been influenced by South Asian thought included William James, Charles A. Moore, Santayana, Emerson, Irving Babbitt, Charles Pierce, John Dewey, William James, Alfred North Whitehead, and Charles

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Hartshorne (Riepe 1967). And journals such as The Open Court and The Monist, both edited by Paul Carus, provided an open platform for EastWest dialogues (Jackson 1968), which may have had surprising impacts on the new physics of the twentieth century. Theories of relativity and quantum physics resulting from non-commonsensical observations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries required a radical reorientation to the process of observation. The key theorists in the two realms, Einstein and Schrödinger, were both deeply influenced by philosophy. There is some evidence that both had either Asian influences or resonances with Asian thought. Schrödinger directly admitted to this as emphasized by his recent biographer Walter Moore (1994), whilst the influence on Einstein is presumed to be indirectly through Ernst Mach, who was both a major philosophical influence on Einstein as well as a friend of Paul Carus and contributor to The Open Court and The Monist (Goonatilake 2000). At a less tangential level, Buddhist influences have been noted in such areas of American culture as poetry (Tonkinson 1995). The reform and protest movements associated with the 1960s counterculture had several threads that traced back to Buddhism and Hinduism. Aspects of Buddhist and Hindu philosophy and practice have also found homes in aspects of Western life (Fields 1992), such as the popular practice of yoga. Hundreds of studies have been done on the theory and practice of meditation and have been published in the most respectable of scientific journals. These studies indicate the efficacies of meditation in several physical and mental spheres. Meditation—the highest form of Buddhist and Hindu practice— is today observed by millions of Westerners in both its traditional as well as in a changed form, prescribed as therapy by the Western medical system. Western medicine also uses South Asian techniques in such areas as stress treatment, anxiety, panic, and phobias. (For a detailed treatment on the inflow of such South Asian cultural materials into twentieth-century science see Goonatilake 1998.) If the above describes some aspects of the changing global cultural system, how shall we describe the characteristics of the cultural state of the globe today? How have the key cultural factors that have been dominant in the past changed? The West today is not the hegemonic cultural whole that it was earlier. In fact some of the most creative work in some cultural areas of the West is being done by non-Westerners. Some of the best writers of fiction in English are South Asians, while some sections of fashion are dominated by East Asians. Key science and technology innovators in the US are increasingly of non-European origin. A significant proportion of graduate students who constitute the future research and development potential of the US are Asian. In Silicon Valley start-ups, the incubator of cutting-edge technology, Asians have a significant share as both technology innovators as well as entrepreneurs. As for Christianity, whose brutal assault through the Iberians on the rest

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of the world marked the primitive stage of cultural colonialism, there have been qualitative changes. Western Europe is in many ways a post-Christian society. The churches are largely empty, and those who formally believe are few except in Eastern and Southern Europe, both relatively cultural and scientific backwaters compared to Western Europe. Both regions had been subject to ideological jackboots: in Eastern Europe that of Stalinism and in some cases Catholicism; in the case of Southern Europe of Catholicism alone. One sees also in the US some loss of belief in Christian dogma among educated Americans. As for a major ideological compass of a nonreligious nature, such as that derived from social science, there seems to be none. The current dominant social science paradigm of postmodernism is the very opposite of a science, in that its practice is nihilistically to question and reject every position. To me this appears not so much a theory as a symptom of the collective loss of a rudder in Western society for the first time since the Enlightenment. Postmodernism, therefore, is more a symptom of the West’s decay and loss of certainty than a theory.

The Shift to Asia If the above is a partial snapshot of the current cultural situation in the West, what are the emerging economic and geopolitical trends in the world that would underwrite a future cultural situation? The dominant global trend is a shift towards Asia. Within the next 30 years, the economic axis of the world will return to Asia. In the next few decades, South, South-East, and East Asia will have as much economic impact as Europe and the US. Still, although average incomes, especially in South Asia, will be lower than in the West, the potential clout of these large population and civilizational masses will be high. This has major implications for civilizational shifts. Given massive intercommunication possibilities, the world could now open up. For the first time in 300 years, there is the possibility of transactional relations among civilizations. But first one must do an exercise in foresight. The utopia is not yet in sight—there are two colonizers lurking again in missionary clothes. They are our old enemy the Church and a new hidden one, foreign funded NGOs.

The Church and Cultural Rape To begin with the churches. In Europe the churches may be empty, yet they collect enormous sums of money. In countries such as Germany there is a formal collection in the form of a church tax. On American TV, pop star status is given to evangelical figures who raise large sums of money. Since the Christian empire has no where to expand in Europe and the US, it now searches for new markets in the poor Third World. The hunter for souls, no different from his sixteenth- and seventeenth-century counterparts, is now armed not with guns but with money. Like in previous centuries, the

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motivation for all this is for the benefit of its victims, whose souls Christianity will save. Sometimes, especially in some European Christian religions, the act of giving is separated from the message of faith in God, Christ, and other superstitions. That is true charity, respecting the recipient’s beliefs, and is to be commended. But unfortunately these good Samaritans’ works are marred by a mass cultural rape being undertaken by Christian churches. Consequently, there is much disquiet especially in South, South-East, and sections of East Asia. In many countries conversions are made in the form of direct or indirect bribes. People are paid to become Christians or, in another ruse practiced by new Korean Christian converts and American fundamentalists, they are taught English through the Bible with special cash incentives given to attend this novel form of learning. It is not only the usual suspects such as Christian fundamentalists from the American Bible Belt that are at fault. When he was in India, the Pope himself, undeterred by his sheep running away from his church in Europe, made an offensive public call for the Christianization of Asia. This was a highly offensive statement by one who was received as a state guest. The detailed plans and targets of the Christianization process are easy to find on the Internet. These are similar to military plans with details of demographics of the target population down to district and town level, giving weaknesses and strength of the local population and the means of bringing them into Christianity. These are plans with the stamp of the most crass mass merchandising on them. In Sri Lanka cultural rape by the churches, the old and new, is continuing. There is a widespread feeling that the techniques which American fundamentalists brought to Korea after the Korean War and which led to widespread Christianization is now occurring in Sri Lanka. Such an apparatus for unethical conversions has resulted in over 1,000 evangelical organizations operating in the country. Many have been registered as tax-free foreign investments with the permission to import vehicles and equipment at cost. A prime target for conversion have been Tamil Hindus, who in the civil war were caught between the government and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The biggest supporters of the LTTE have also been the Christian clergy both of the new and old church. Hindu priests are conspicuous by their absence in LTTE propaganda. Some recent debates in Sri Lanka in which the Catholic Church has been involved appear innocent but on hindsight are something different. A few years ago, there was a Church-led opposition to upgrading the Voice of America relay station, which had been operating in Sri Lanka since the 1950s. But this opposition coincided with the expansion of radio facilities by the Church’s own broadcasting station Radio Veritas, operating from the Philippines. Both these radio stations are in fact two multinational colonizers battling over the radio waves for Asian minds. Radio Veritas, however, is a remnant of the European Dark Ages while the Voice of America, although also in effect a cultural colonizer, is at least modern in the sense that it eschews superstitions. It is said that today McDonald’s is

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better known across the world than the Cross. I am not a believer in McDonald’s; to me, it provides an artery clogging and cancer-causing pseudo-food. But to me and my concern for Sri Lanka as a civilizational target of the Church for five centuries, it appears that clogging up the arteries is better than clogging up the mind with superstitious mish-mash.

The World Opens Up In Peculiar NGO Ways If a newly rearmed Church is to be a major intrusive player in the cultural colonization sphere, another hidden intruder is the foreign funded NGO. For those unfamiliar with the working of NGOs in the Third World a few words are necessary. By foreign funded NGOs, I mean those non-state organizations that have exploded over the last decade or so in the Third World and that get their funding primarily from Western donors. This is the result of deliberate Western decisions whereby foreign aid is less and less channelled to Third World states. This is overt because Third World states cannot be trusted to be transparent, fair, and not corrupt in the delivery process (Hulme and Edwards 1997). Foreign funded NGOs in the Third World that have emerged as a response to this are not to be mistaken for real civil societies. They are often as undemocratic and corrupt as Third World governments. Some NGOs in fact do perform good functions in the Third World, for example, in such fields as health, education, family planning, etc. But often they do not have democratic structures. Formed usually by a few middle-class individuals, they constitute a new private sector in the Third World, albeit sometimes performing useful functions like private companies. The old profit-making private sector, it should be noted, was at least arguably accountable to the market system. It succeeded or failed depending on relatively impersonal criteria of profit and loss. The new private sector, the NGOs, are accountable only to themselves and to their donors. Foreign funded NGOs with their access to the resources and local and foreign media publicity that money can bring often marginalize real local initiatives. This has resulted in a new NGO colonialism and the creation of a new dependent class. Especially in the cultural, ideological, and political sphere they become an insidious force, virtually a fifth column for Western interests, albeit sometimes from the Western left. This prevents real alternatives appearing either from the right or from the left, because to be funded requires acceptance into the desired ideological frame of the funders. A few facts about how the foreign funded NGOs sector is distorting Sri Lankan cultural reality, and, I dare say, many Third World academic and cultural scenes, are pertinent here. Quite often these NGO mercenaries are far less qualified or experienced than university academics or other local cultural producers. Yet equally often, they are paid more than local cultural producers. They also travel more and so create false linkages between the West and the non-West. The NGO’s preemptive access to the West and vice versa distorts the relationship between a globally dominant West and the local cultural scene. The growth of real organic civil society having a voice

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in the country is thus preempted. By dealing with local politics and attendant foreign relations, the NGOs are, it has been noted, privatizing foreign policy, leading to the formation of a new form of imperialism (Duffield 1997: 98). Even in relatively innocuous areas without many political implications, they have distorted the local structure. A good example of this is the Sri Lankan NGO Sarvodaya. The Sri Lankan Sarvodaya is not to be mistaken with the Gandhian organization in India with the same name. At one stage it was a recipient of a large amount of foreign aid; in fact, every year foreign countries hold a special aid consortium to fund it. Once it marketed itself as the largest Sri Lankan NGO and claimed to reach virtually every village in the country. Its funding by foreign donors began in the 1970s, coincident with the tail end of the counterculture in the West and its appreciation of things non-Western. At that stage Sarvodaya marketed itself as a Buddhist organization. Later it changed its messages to the Western donor market as the latter changed its requirements. Subsequently, a judicial commission of inquiry by the state, under the chairmanship of a well-respected Supreme Court judge, has documented massive frauds conducted by this NGO and benefitting its founder and his family. If this type of fraud was carried out by a poor clerk in a government office, I believe the clerk would have been immediately arrested and successfully prosecuted and sent to jail. It is important to emphasize here that the primary colonizers through NGOs are not necessarily the Western funders but the skewed social conditions and relations that they create by distorting the local scene away from real local responses. Indeed, among Western funders there are groups, for example in Germany, that emphasize local culture and local knowledge as central to their funding. An example is the Heinrich Boell Foundation with ties to the German Greens. The question then, is: should the West and international organizations like the UN stop funding NGOs entirely? The answer is clearly no. There is room for aid for real voluntary recipients. The funding should come to real civil society as opposed to artificially created aid traps created for and by a few individuals. Generally funding should be only for democratically elected bodies. There are hundreds of trade, professional, and other organizations that constitute real civil society in Sri Lanka and elsewhere. They deserve to be funded first, although occasionally a few cases outside these organizations could also be donor fed as seed experiments.

Conclusion The world of cultural imperialism has changed from the crudity of the Iberian onslaught and perfidy of the Church through the divisions brought in the era of industrialism to the present globalizing world with its parallel process of a shift to Asia. The present is not a hegemonic blanket. The globalizing process is not, unlike crude simplistic formulations, always

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unipolar. There are also new players in cultural imperialism like aspects of the NGO phenomenon and a reformed Christian strategy as it preys on Third World souls. In the present and increasingly in the future there are emerging points of resistance to the hegemony and growth points of new culture outside the Eurocentric realm. As the shift to Asia intensifies and Asia becomes increasingly confident, these points of new cultural growth will increase in number. Possibly within the next generation or two, cultural imperialism could be dead, replaced by multiple centres of cultural growth and dissemination.

References Abhayasundara, Pranith (Ed.). 1990. Controversy at Panadura or Panadura Vadaya. Colombo: The State Printing Corporation. Ariyapala, M.B. 1956. Society in Medieval Ceylon. Colombo and Kandy: K.V.G. de Silva. Blavatsky, Helena Petrovna. 1888 [1978]. The Secret Doctrine. Adyar: Theosophical Publishing House. Bennet, J.W. 1843. Ceylon and its Capabilities. London: W.H. Allen and Co. Bond, George D. 1992. The Buddhist Revival in Sri Lanka. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Ltd. Capper, John. 1873. A Full Account of the Buddhist Controversy held at Pantura, in August 1873 between a Buddhist Priest, Gun_nanda Mohattivatte, and two Ministers of the Protestant religion, the Rev. D. de Silva and the Rev. F. S. Sirimanne. Colombo: Times of Ceylon. Cranston, Sylvia. 1993. H.P.B.: The Extraordinary Life and Influence of Helena Blavatsky, Founder of the Modern Theosophical Movement. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons. De Silva, K.M. 1981. A History of Sri Lanka. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. De Silva, Padmasiri. 1998. Environmental Philosophy and Ethics in Buddhism. New York: Palgrave. Duffield, M. 1997. “Evaluating Conflict Resolution.” In NGOs in Conflict—An Evaluation of International Alert, ed. G. Serbe, J. Macrae, and L. Wohlgemuth. Fantoft-Bergen, Norway: Christian Michelsen Institute. Edwards, Michael. 1967. British India 1772–1947. London: Sidgwick and Jackson. Fields, Rick. 1992. How the Swans Came to the Lake: A Narrative History of Buddhism in America. Boston and London: Shambhala. Gaitonde, P.D. 1983. Portuguese Pioneers in India Spotlight on Medicine. Bombay: Popular Prakashan Private Ltd. Goleman, Daniel. 1981. “Buddhist and Western Psychology: Some Commonalities and Differences.” Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 13: 125–36. Goleman, Daniel. 1988. The Meditative Mind. New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons. Gombrich, Richard, and Gananath Obeyesekere. 1988. Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change in Sri Lanka. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Goonatilake, Susantha. 1998. Toward Global Science: Mining Civilizational Knowledge. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Goonatilake, Susantha. 2000. “Modern Physics Bears the Imprint of Western and Asian Philosophies.” Nature 25 (May): 399. Guruge, Ananda W.P. (Ed.). 1965. Return to Righteousness: A Collection of Speeches, Essays and Letters of the Anagarika Dharmapala. Colombo: The Government Press. Guruge, Ananda W.P. (Ed.). 1984. From the Living Fountains of Buddhism: Sri Lankan Support to Pioneering Western Orientalists. Colombo: Ministry of Cultural Affairs. Guruge, Ananda W.P. 1993. “From Tamraparni to Taprobane and from Ceylon to Sri Lanka.” In The Cultural Triangle of Sri Lanka. Paris: UNESCO. Hay, Stephen. 1970. Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and his Critics in Japan, China, and India. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hoffman, Yoel. 1978. “The Possibility of Knowledge: Kant and Nagarjuna.” In Philosophy East/Philosophy West: A Critical Comparison of Indian, Chinese, Islamic and European Philosophy, ed. B. Scharfstein, I. Alon, S. Biderman, D. Daor, and Y. Hoffman. New York: Oxford University Press. 269–90. Hulme, David, and Michael Edwards (Eds.). 1997. NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort? New York: Macmillan Press Ltd in association with Save the Children. Inada, Kenneth, and Nolan Jacobson (Eds.). 1984. Buddhism and American Thinkers. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Jackson, Carl. 1968. “The Meeting of East and West: The Case of Paul Carus.” Journal of the History of Ideas 29: 74–75. Johnson, Paul. 1994. The Masters Revealed: Madame Blavatsky and the Myth of the Great White Lodge. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Karunadasa, Y. 1967. Buddhist Analysis of Matter. Colombo: Department of Cultural Affairs. Karunadasa, Y. 1983. “Vibhajyavada versus Saravastivada: Buddhist Controversy on Time.” Kalyani 2 (October): 1–28. Knox, Robert. 1983 [1681]. An Historical Relation of the Island of Ceylon in the East Indies. New Delhi: Navrang Publishers and Booksellers. First Facsimile Reprint. Malalgoda, Kitsiri. 1976. Buddhism in Sinhalese Society 1750–1900: A Study of Religious Revival and Change. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Moore, Walter. 1994. A Life of Erwin Schrödinger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Patterson, T.J.S. 1987. “The Relationship of Indian and European Practitioners of Medicine from the Sixteenth Century.” In Studies on Indian Medical History, ed. G. Meulenbeld and D. Wujastyk. Groningen: Egbert Forsten. 119–29 Riepe, Dale. 1967. “The Indian Influence in American Philosophy: Emerson to Moore.” Philosophy East and West 27: 124–37. Said, Edward B. 1978. Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books. Sarathchandra, E.R. 1958. Buddhist Psychology of Perception. Colombo: Ceylon University Press.

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CHAPTER 4

Imperialism as a Theory of the Future Ashis Nandy

odern colonialism was the first serious, systematic effort at globalizing the world. The two world wars, which marked the end of modern colonialism, indicated by their very nature and names that they were the last scenes in a particular phase of globalization. (For the moment, I am bypassing Charles Long’s argument that the Atlantic slave trade was the first serious effort to globalize the world, because the trade represented the first attempt to fully commodify human beings themselves. It is possible that the colonial theories of civilizational mission and social evolutionary hierarchy of cultures had much to do with the discovery of the New World and the large-scale, international trade in humans that took a toll of roughly 3 million African lives.) The earlier efforts at globalization—of the kind represented by many forms of conquest, discovery, and evangelism—never seriously sought to bring the whole world under its scope, certainly not to make the world more transparent and predictable in the way present-day globalization is seeking to do or as colonialism in the second half of the nineteenth century did. Alexander the Great lamented that he had no more worlds to conquer, but the world he had conquered was certainly not the globe, and he knew that. Christian evangelism, too, sought to convert the world and to remake it according to its God’s dictates. Yet, it could never truly give up the ideas of redeemable and irredeemable souls, true Christians and rice Christians who, at the drop of a hat, would revert back to hedonism if the incentives for them to remain Christians were not quite right. Persistent paganism introduced an element of permanent uncertainty in the evangelical worldview. Colonialism was the first serious effort to rework the world according to a new, man-made image. In that image the Christian God, despite protestations to the contrary, had a subsidiary place. Secular gods like Galileo, Descartes, and Francis Bacon were the ones who shaped that world image. Colonialism, despite its Christian links, was driven by the visions of a future and of an ideal society that were almost entirely an ad nihilo product of human ingenuity. There are some clear components of these visions of an ideal society of the future that deserve elaboration, for almost all subsequent efforts to generate humane theories of progress or stages of history have—in order to protect and ensure the centrality of European civilization—drawn

M

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upon these visions willy-nilly. However, before I venture such an elaboration, two caveats are in order. First, I do not believe that dissent is ever entirely free of what it dissents from; indeed, it is often predominantly shaped by what it is dissenting from. Even organized protests and counter-movements often end up incorporating elements from the dominant culture they seek to dismantle. For example, the trade union movement, as we know it, was a protest against nineteenth-century industrial capitalism. Once capitalism itself began to metamorphose radically towards the end of the twentieth century, trade union movements, too, began to falter or weaken. Today trade unionism is in tatters in many societies. The new form of global finance capitalism and its various constituent institutions have begun to encourage the growth of a different set of organizations, which to some extent are performing a role roughly akin to the one trade unions used to perform during the interwar years and in the immediate postwar period. For instance, various nongovernmental organizations and movements working in areas such as the environment, human rights, women’s issues, and peace could be called “homeomorphic” equivalents—Raimundo Panikkar’s term used in an altogether different context—of nineteenth-century and early twentiethcentury trade unions (Panikkar 1995). Their internal dynamics, goals, and social roles may be different and their structures and working cultures are certainly more diverse when compared to those of trade unions. But if the central function of trade unions in their days of glory could be defined retrospectively as counterplayers of the dominant structure of industrial capitalism, the most important function of the voluntary sector at its best today can be said to be roughly similar. Whether the voluntary sector as a whole is performing that role well or not is a different issue. Second, though the project of imperialism gradually dissolved after World War II, it was never quite fully dismantled. Imperialism did not suffer any decisive, global defeat. The imperial powers emerged weakened but victorious in the 1940s. The way they loosened their grips on their former colonies also gave the impression that such loosening was a triumph of conscience over self-interest, rather than of self-interest over the romance of imperial glory. Indeed, thanks to the authoritarian regimes that they fought in World War II, after the war the colonial powers emerged as self-proclaimed defenders of democracy and humane society. The global situation and experiences with the Axis powers pushed many others to accept that claim. As a result, the culture of imperialism did not face a direct global challenge and the post-imperial world never really jettisoned some of the key tenets in the worldview of imperialism. Indeed, these tenets—especially belief in a hierarchy of culture and the emancipatory role of Western powers as carriers of the Enlightenment vision, both theories of progress and stages of history that defined Asian and African cultures as a throw-back to Europe’s past— became an inseparable part of the postwar culture of global politics, the network of international institutions set up after the war, and postwar concepts of economic aid and development. Indeed, our ideas of human

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rights, equality, justice, democracy, progress, and even of fighting imperialism, whether surviving in the guise of old-style colonialism or as neocolonialism, are all tinged by the worldview of imperialism. So are our concepts of statecraft, governance, and diplomacy. The entire twentieth century can be read as a clash among various nineteenth-century theories of social engineering, some of them directly colonial, the others anticolonial but deeply influenced by colonialism itself. Reading the resilience of anti-colonial struggles as a by-product of the resilience of colonialism does not deny the creative potentialities of such struggles, but tells us something about the culture within which the struggles flourished and about the culture that they carried within themselves as an imprint of their times.

Bequests of the Culture of Colonialism It is a part of the cultural inheritance of colonialism to look at the developing countries as somewhat dumb, apprentice nation-states that are, to use the clichéd expression of Cecil Rhodes, half-savage and half-child. The hegemonic presence of ideas such as development and modernization have made these nations increasingly look like expectant, destitute mothers delivering their babies on a busy street corner. No vestige of dignity is left to them. Everybody crowds around them to witness the great event and give them sage advice, some alms, and expert consultation. It is a basic presumption in the global structure of commonsense that, for a developing society, any distinctive vision of a desirable society is a contradiction in terms, an oxymoron. For developing societies as developing societies are not supposed to have a vision of the future. They are forbidden to have one. They have only their objective, immutable, inevitable past, present, and future. Their past and present are of course fused; their “natural” ahistoricity ensures that their present is no different from the past of the developed countries. The future of developing societies, of course, is as they presently are. Some nasty souls might suspect this to be a way of hijacking the visions of the future of all humankind. They may or may not be right, but it is obvious that you do not have to mobilize someone from a developing society to hear his or her version of the story, unless that version has an esoteric, ethnic touch. The story is known; it is being repeated everyday over the global media. Only the specifics occasionally change, and then only in minor details. Many human rights activists are concerned with the fate of Tibet, particularly the erosion of its distinctive religious and cultural traditions. I am pretty sure that if Tibet becomes an independent nation-state tomorrow, many in the same crowd will borrow Henry Kissinger’s expression to describe it as a developing society fit to be classified, along with Bangladesh, as a “basket case.” Others will be eager to find out whether Tibet, like any other “normal society,” would join the World Trade Organization and allow the world’s highest McDonald’s to be built somewhere near Lhasa.

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Economic history tells us—defying the economic historians, I guess— that almost all the major developed countries developed before the concept of development itself developed after the end of World War II; that is, before the development experts, development economics, and theories of development came into being. Arguably, among the major developed societies, only postwar Japan developed after the idea of development had become trendy in the world of knowledge and in economic practice. One is sometimes tempted to guess that Japan’s problems of development performance and economic management began when it started to take seriously the theories of Japanese-style management and development strategies floating around the world and sought to institutionalize them within Japan itself in the 1980s. Tacit theories of social and political changes are often more efficient than explicit ones. At least such tacit theories do not promote the growth of a professional class that develops a vested interest in these theories and helps freeze them in time. Not merely the political economy but the psychological history of development, too, is flattening identities and rendering them one-dimensional. China, we used to once think, was China and India was India. We have learnt that now, even for many Chinese and Indians, they are first of all developing countries, faithfully following trajectories specified in textbooks of development. Their obedience to the social evolutionary demands of developmentalism and modernization has ensured that the self-definitions of these societies are now shaped primarily by their GDP (gross domestic product), per capita income, credit ratings, export potentials, bank rates, and defence capabilities. As societies, cultures, and lifestyles, they have been declared obsolete except for tourists and academic area specialists. Indeed, these societies themselves seem prepared, indeed eager, to jettison crucial sections of their selfhood to avoid being declared redundant in the global order. Even that often does not work. As a modern nation-state and economic super power, Japan has not merely shed many aspects of its culture and lifestyle; it has continuously sought to be redefined as an efficient, modern man-machine system and political economy. Its distinctive idea of plural faiths (for instance, it is one of the few countries where the percentages of different religions add up to more than 100 per cent because a majority of the Japanese have more than one faith), its attempts to ensure the survival of communities in a highly industrialized society, even its “impossible” 8 million Shinto gods and goddesses and its “irrational” attachment to Japanese rice and rice farmers, have apparently nothing to say to the global mass culture.

The Flattening of Identities Many of the movements and strands of consciousness that seek to resist such flattening of identities and, at the same time, humanize the process of social change have failed to withstand the pressures to conform. The

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struggle for an alternative future itself has sometimes been a technology of integrating the peripheries into the imperium as second-class citizens. For instance, in many parts of the world, human rights activists have to operate with spirited sermons ringing in their ears about the correct way to fight for human rights, by exclusively building upon the European Enlightenment’s vision of human and individual rights. Thus, there is a touch of colonial strategy even in the global struggle for human rights. All dissent is monitored; some are declared sane, constructive, and “normal,” while others are rejected as pathological, unrealistic, or irresponsible. The result has been a certain distance between human rights activism and its targeted beneficiaries. The idea of a humane society associated with such activism has often failed to enthuse large sections of Afro-Asian societies that might have gained the most from it. There is limited awareness that societies that dominate the human rights discourse have a record of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and despotism in the Southern world over the last 500 years (cf. Bourgeault et al. 1992: Churchill 1992). To much of the South, these societies and their elites suddenly seem to have become fiercely conscious of the need for civil rights, human brotherhood, and racial, religious, and ethnic amity. Many in the South suspect that behind this fierce new commitment is the fact that, by the middle of the twentieth century, the violence that was being exported from Europe to the Southern world has begun to come home to roost. The technology of genocide, so efficiently applied in Europe on European Jews in the 1940s, was honed in Africa and South America; the concept of the concentration camp was invented by the British in South Africa during the Boer War (Ferguson 2003). The theory of area bombing, as opposed to strategic bombing, though tried out by the Nazis in Guernica and Imperial Japan in Nanking, was developed into a proper theory and deployed on a wide scale by Sir Arthur Harris and that battleaxe of democracy, Sir Winston Churchill. Many Asians have bitter memories of Japan’s actions in World War II, but they have also not forgotten that the deliberate fire-bombing of Tokyo killed in one day roughly the same number of people as the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima did—140,000 persons, a huge majority of them noncombatants. The history of the battle for democracy and human rights has had many twists, and, for the so-called developing countries, these twists have been both educational and edifying. For more than four decades, independent India’s political elite, for instance, grew up listening to sermons on how India should emulate the Shah of Iran, Syngman Rhee, Chiang Kai-shek, Ferdinand Marcos, and the more flamboyant leaders of the Latin American military juntas, for they represented democracy and free enterprise. Even the Indian left, official dissenters in India, thought of India as at an earlier stage of the Soviet Union and, later, the People’s Republic of China—two other “paragons” of human rights. The end of the Cold War may have ended that debate, but, for the apprentice societies of the world, the pedagogues have designed other, new academic courses. These backward societies are now invited to choose between Asian values and human rights. The global

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media has turned Mahathir Mohammed, Prime Minister of Malaysia, and Lee Kuan Yew, the Political Leader of Singapore, into symbols of Asian values and the famed Taliban in Afghanistan, originally set up under American auspices, into an exemplar of Islamic vice. The Dalai Lama when he talks of a compassionate polity or Aung Sang Suu Kyi when she fights for an open society in Burma do not, of course, represent Asian values; they are portrayed as representing only universal values as enshrined in the European Enlightenment.

Development Without Development If societies can develop without the benefit of a concept of development, I suspect that people can also fight for their basic rights without the benefit of a standardized concept of human rights. In any case, Mahathir Mohammed and Lee Kuan Yew are self-appointed guardians of the values of a few Asians who probably constitute a minority in their own countries. The politics in Malaysia has already supplied enough clues to that, and politics in Singapore should do so in the future. Ordinary Asians still determine what Asian values are. And they still have the tendency to presume that the Dalai Lama represents Asian values more than any despotic regime can, exactly as they have the right to presume that human rights activists Asma Jahangir and Chandra Muzaffar represent Islamic values more than did the Taliban clique in Afghanistan. By giving monopolistic rights to petty despots to talk on behalf of some of the oldest civilizations of the world, the dominant culture of a global politics has humiliated these civilizations and sought to legitimize despotic regimes in country after country. Many environmental, peace, and democratic movements in the South, as a result, have to fight not merely local autocrats but also the ideas of statecraft and public life that have been legitimized during the last 200 years as sane, rational, mature, and realistic. At least some of these movements are now trying to fight their battles in their own language, so that they can reach and be audible to their nextdoor neighbours. The key concepts in the vocabulary of these movements, under the new regime of globalization, are survival, community rights, and cultural resistance. The rumour is still spreading that the Enlightenment in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries gave complete answers to all basic human questions; all that the rest of the world can now do is to faithfully replicate the slogans currently fashionable in the global culture dominated by the West. Yet, in the last century, at least 200 million killed in organized violence have paid the price for the absence, among the great Enlightenment figures, of a single thinker who thought of non-violence as a core value of human life. Indeed, the major bloodbaths in this century, even when in Asia, have justified themselves not in terms of Asian values but that of the Enlightenment. In Germany it was eugenics and nineteenth-century biology; in the Soviet Union, China, and Cambodia it was the ineluctable forces

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of history and an evolutionary theory of political economy. In South Asia modern nation-state and European-style nationalism have displaced, within three decades of independence, the anti-imperialist territoriality that propelled the freedom movements. Many forms of Satanism in the public sphere in the Southern world today are by-products of modern state-building and nation-formation. The Asian elite has learnt from the Imperial West because that was the only West they knew first-hand during the colonial period. The struggles for a humane society in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are in continuity with the ones that were often waged in colonial times. Human rights and environmental activists and the anti-nuclear and democratic movements in the South have to fight not merely local despots but also the categories, concepts, and ideas of statecraft that have been legitimized during the last 200 years as essential to civilized life. In this struggle, it is not impossible to break out of the straightjacket of imperial categories and build on the ground-level resistance of ordinary citizens living their everyday lives. Let me end with an example. According to opinion polls reported by the major TV channels, mainly NDTV and Star News, more than 90 per cent of Indians supported the country’s nuclearization in the autumn of 1998 in the first flush of enthusiasm. Within a few weeks the figure was down to 60 per cent. Six months later, a major national newspaper, The Hindu, sponsored a survey, which revealed that only about 44 per cent approved the previous year’s nuclear tests by India, a large proportion of them urban, Western-educated, and modern. Perhaps in an old, tired, cynical civilization, public enthusiasm for such modern technology (with its possible consequences) does not last very long. But it is still not easy to dismiss the grounds on which 56 per cent of Indians refused to applaud the bomb. Hope seems to lie with these humble, ill-educated, unexposed Indians and the ability of the movements opposed to nuclearization to deploy them. These people may not be the ones favoured by the global “commonsense” that has been manufactured through the global media machine, but they remain as possible links in an alternative language of communication among the diverse cultures that have still survived the age of globalizing and the thrust of nineteenth-century colonialism.

Conclusion In a world where dominance is exercised mainly through a set of imperial categories, the contemporary incarnations of cultural imperialism derive their strength from the nineteenth-century colonial and social-evolutionist conventions of defining cultures as mature and immature, rational and irrational, historical and ahistorical. This set of categories reduces a culture to a two-dimensional entity, the fate of which is decided only by its level of—and success in—development and modernization. As a result of such evolutionism, visions of the future and the scope for envisioning diverse ideals of a desirable society have been abridged. A majority of cultures

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have already been redefined as various exotic editions of pre-modern Europe and North America, tamely and obediently moving towards a uniform future that is nothing other than a slightly modified version of the contemporary Western world.

References Bourgeault, Ron, Dave Broad, Lorne Brown, and Lori Foster (Eds.). 1992. 1492–1992: Five Centuries of Imperialism and Resistance. Halifax, NS: Fernwood. Churchhill, Ward (Ed.). 1992. Struggle for the Land: Indigenous Resistance to Genocide, Ecocide and Expropriation in Contemporary North America. Toronto: Between the Lines. Ferguson, Niall. 2003. Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power. New York: Basic Books. Panikkar, Raimundo. 1995. Invisible Harmony: Essays on Contemplation and Responsibility. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press.

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CHAPTER 5

Cynical Science: Science and Truth as Cultural Imperialism Bernd Hamm

his chapter argues that our Western concepts of science and truth are used to legitimate interests aimed at the suppression and exploitation of nature and humans. They are used to mask the destructive character of Western political-economic interests. In doing this, science and truth have become ideologies. As such, they tend to benefit the “Power Elites” (C.W. Mills 1956)1 of society and, of course, the scientific community, at the cost of the population at large. The forced global imposition of this understanding of science and truth is part of cultural imperialism. This thesis is formulated in negative terms. It criticizes Western science but will not propose alternatives. Theodor W. Adorno, one of the leading figures of the Frankfurt School of sociology, has coined the term “negative dialectics” and argued that a critical analysis of existing reality implicitly contains its antithesis. This is not the place to go deeper into the issue of other knowledge systems (for a discussion of this see, e.g., Goonatilake 1998). My intention is not to follow up on Johan Galtung’s (1971) understanding of scientific imperialism (as a subtype of cultural imperialism), which still holds the assumption that science is a serious attempt to find out “the truth” (the imperialism in it being, rather, that valid objective science exists but is misused in the interest of power), but rather to challenge this assumption. Science has become in the course of history, or always was, so closely associated with, and subservient to the interests of, the power cadres that the idealistic idea of science appears as a major instrument to safeguard access to and influence on these cadres; in other words, it is a professional ideology. The chapter will explore this thesis, first, by recapitulating the Western definition of science and truth as objective and value-free. It then moves on to some observations which do not comply with this self-image: the relation between science, money, and power; science and the problem of sustainable development; the Americanization of science; and university reform as experienced in Germany as part of the Bologna Process. These

T

1 As “elite” carries with it a connotation of moral superiority, I prefer the less common term of “cadres” for the powerful groups in society.

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observations contrasted with the ideology will lead to a diagnosis of cynical science. Finally, the globalization of such cynicism will be discussed.

The Ideology of Science and Truth “Knowledge” may be defined as the way in which humans categorize, encode, process, and impute meaning to their experiences. This is as true of scientific as of non-scientific forms of knowledge (Studley 1998: 1). There are many different ways to acquire knowledge: through logical reasoning; sensual perception; intuition; authority and conformism; or devotion and love. An experience made according to certain rules commonly accepted in the community of scientists is called “scientific.” Irrelevant as this code might be for the majority of ordinary people, it has still succeeded in gaining strategic influence among cadres. Knowledge is acquired and processed in the context of world views, of systems of knowledge, and of cultures which people share and regularly confirm to each other. It is built into existing frames of reference, evaluated, and selected; meaning is attached to it and tied into the historical experience of a given society. It is neither autonomous nor objective but rather bound into those social conditions under which people live and is influenced by the social position of an individual in his or her society and the respective material living conditions. The sociology of knowledge (beginning with Karl Mannheim, 1893–1947) has provided ample evidence for this (see, however, the critical review of Mannheim’s approach by Adorno 1955), and many empirical studies have explored the images of society held by different social strata and professional groups. Such paradigms, which are relatively resistant to change, also exist in science, as Thomas Kuhn (1962) has argued. In everyday life, we accept a statement as “true” if it is confirmed by the rules of everyday experience, if it seems reasonable, if it is held true by people we love and respect, or if it is confirmed by secondary information. A statement is taken to be “scientifically true” if it has been published in a highly reputable volume and is taken for granted by respected scientists, or if it has been tested according to the rules of scientific methodology. Karl Popper’s insistence that the truth of a statement can never be objectively confirmed in scientific rigour and that the scientific method demands that well-established hypotheses be falsified, thus gradually narrowing the field of potential truth, is of only theoretical value (Popper 1960). It does not count very much in real practical research because new hypotheses are being continuously generated and tested in the hope of verification, while sets of well-established hypotheses being falsified is the exception. In extra-scientific everyday life, sensual experience, the opinion of a reference group, but mostly the mass media are relevant proofs of truth. In most of the sciences the empirical proof of truth is made by statistical tests based on probability theory, while quoting from the Bible or from a classical author has lost its persuasiveness. Mathematics is seen as an

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objective basis for rational argument. Empirical phenomena are supposed to be translated into the language of numbers to become scientifically accessible by mathematical transformation. Truth can be calculated, according to common belief in the scientific community. The methods of scientific discovery are conventional; they rest on culturally specific consensus. However, we also have to assume that there are different ways towards achieving knowledge, which might well lead to different results. Scientific education and training transfer such conventions. Therefore, it is important to understand who is entitled to determine the existence of such conventions, and on which criteria. Despite the obvious need for such careful reflection, the current common practice is that European (and other) social scientists tend to accept those statistical and methodological procedures which are the fashion of the day in the US as the standard for the relevance of our own work. The way into “refereed journals” seems to be more often paved with sophisticated statistics than with theoretically relevant arguments. How often do we find heavy statistical artillery used to shoot at theoretical mice! According to its self-image, science has to be independent and valuefree, leaving the scientist devoid of all external restrictions. There is only one goal, i.e., pure, purposeless knowledge. No political, economic, or other non-scientific interest should intrude into and divert the scientific process. Only then is it guaranteed that science will come continuously closer to the truth. Curiosity is not only part of the inner nature of humans but also serves the benefit of humankind at large. The scientist has one and only one task: to engage in pure research and make his or her knowledge available to others. He or she bears no responsibility beyond this. This is why the nationstate maintains universities and guarantees the freedom of research and teaching (sometimes, like in Germany, even in the constitution). National governments are well advised to invest in science because, at least in the long run, science will lead to wisdom and betterment, but also to competitive advantages, and thus to innovation, growth, employment, and income. Globalization increases the validity and the relevance of this argument. It is true, there are problems. Education, science, innovation, and growth are believed to be the means to solve them. According to this logic, many problems have their cause in the fact that people are not scientifically educated, that they act in their traditional, “irrational” ways. Scientific progress is seen as the solution for all our problems: diseases will be eradicated or healed, environmental damages prevented or repaired, poverty and hunger overcome, non-renewable resources substituted, crime and drug abuse prevented, life-time extended and eternal youth achieved, development enforced and material welfare secured for all. Scientific progress is the panacea for all deficits. The idea of a reality that opens itself to scientifically objective insight— that problems are the simple consequence of insufficient knowledge—is very tempting. First, it provides a welcome excuse because nobody is responsible for the deficits in scientific knowledge. Secondly, it allows us

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to delegate the solution of our problems to others. The competence to establish the objective truth has been attributed to science. The reputation of science depends largely on its ability to render this service to society. Of course, this image of science has always been put to doubt. There have always been, in all disciplines, individual voices calling for an ethical foundation for science. Often these ethical scientists have been criticized by the mainstream, who argue that they oppose intellectual freedom and the freedom of research and, hence, that they are against democratic thinking and might even advocate state-directed science. This would, of course, ultimately serve the interests of the ruling class—ironically making scientists with a strong ethical foundation alleged proponents of political totalitarianism. To avoid overgeneralization, it needs to be noted that “Western” or “modern” science is by no means a homogeneous body. There are “intellectual styles” (Galtung 1988: 27) in different societies, and there have always been dissenting voices among the disciplinary mainstreams, marginal epistemological positions with greater or smaller numbers of proponents. The characteristics described above refer to the mainstream. Value freedom, purposelessness, and non-responsibility are seen as primary virtues in those very institutions that serve the self-administration of science and receive gigantic sums of money for research funding. They still provide the yardsticks for academic education and are being used to justify the privileges which scientists enjoy in our societies, especially in the rank of professors. In an article on “Western Domination in Knowledge,”1 the Sri Lankan writer Nalin de Silva (2002) addressed this problem very directly, arguing that: “Western science is supposed to be making attempts to understand the objective reality, and the truths or whatever that is taught by the westerners is said to be objectively valid. The entire European modernism that began in the fifteenth century with Renaissance, is based on objectivity, reality, and absolute truth.” Science, then, is the process of the gradual and methodologically standardized approximation of objective reality. However, to be in a position to assess the degree of approximation, we should already know the objective truth. This is, in other words, a classical circular argument. Even if we assume, continues de Silva, that there is an objective reality that we can apprehend and can appropriate (“know”), even then the process of appropriation is subjective, or relative. There is no way to appropriate an objective reality objectively, i.e., equally valid for all at the same time. Even the concept of objective reality is formulated subjectively (a very similar argument has been advanced by Feyerabend 1979).

Observations The following observations provide some accidental empirical information, although not systematical research, on the ideology of science 1 Made available to me by Sheldon Gunaratne.

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described above. They are used here as arguments to put the validity of the assumptions presented into question and thus open the door to better insights into the real, i.e., supposedly cynical, nature of science.

Science, Money, and Power Those who are interested in science as a social institution use a line of arguments different from the above, and they arrive at very different conclusions. First of all, they stress that science is a way to secure one’s living. Scientists need money not only for their research but for their and their families’ physical survival and comfort. Thus, scientists will be inclined to conduct the research for which they are paid; who pays might be of secondary interest. Those concerned with science as an institution will perceive a complicated network of universities, institutes, and research departments in government and private corporations, and cannot ignore the permanent struggle for competitive advantages, reputation, money, power, and influence among them. While the allotment of such privileges in industry depends on the scientist’s ability to deliver marketable results, the system is more complicated in universities. Academic criteria of quality are generally based on disciplinary achievements like the number, volume, and place of professional publications, fund-raising, conferences organized, and quality of teaching, but not necessarily on the capability of the scientific effort to contribute to practical problem-solving. In sociology, for example, it is possible to have tenured professors teaching the sociology of work and industry who have never seen an industrial workplace up close; teaching political science does not presuppose that the professor ever attended a legislative meeting on whatever level or seen a department of public administration from inside. In the academic sphere, careers can be made by writing books on issues deduced from books written by people who know reality from books. Career promotion and popularity are primary goals for scientists at least until they are granted tenure. How does one attract the attention of others in a scientific community? Who is in control of the resources one needs to secure the relatively comfortable and privileged lifestyle of an academic? To what extent does this depend on the intellectual quality and originality of one’s work? For one thing it is important to be active in professional organizations and their research committees. This binds the scientist firmly into disciplinary ties. For young academics, this is the prime job market. Secondly, it is very important to invent or discover something new, give it an easily memorable title, and call it “paradigm change.” In light of the many paradigm changes I have seen declared in my own narrow field of specialization Thomas Kuhn would have serious doubts that his Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) has really been read and understood. The overwhelming proportion of scientific work is, however, done in applied research. Scientists and their work are expensive investments that only very few can afford. One of those is private business expecting a high

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yield of monetary return; the other is the state spending tax money mostly for armament research which, again, is highly profitable with little risk. By far the overwhelming role of science is to yield profit—in terms of money or in terms of votes. Responsibility for one world, intercultural understanding, priorities common to all humanity—these are almost non-existent on the agenda of scientific endeavour. “Technology ... has cannibalized science” (Nandy 1987: 45). Science is dominated by the perceptions, interests, and worldviews of those who can afford to pay for it. Of course, this insight is far from being new; however, it does deserve to be brought up because it strongly relates to our interest in cultural imperialism. Scientists have been more successful than others in asserting their selfimage almost undisputedly on the public. The media support this image by interviewing scientists for every minor issue, for them to declare the truth. Courts of law and public administration need armies of scientists as experts; and in the political arena scientists play their role as consultants, in expert committees, and on fact-finding commissions. Throughout, the nimbus of independence, objectivity, and incorruptibility is carefully maintained. It is only in the back room that cynical attitudes may be expressed: you can buy any desired expertise if you only select the suitable expert and pay him or her accordingly. But it is also in the interest of the people in those back rooms to openly declare their deep belief in the objectivity of the scientific endeavour. It is this coincidence of interests that binds the two spheres—the power cadres and the scientists—so intrinsically together. Ninety-five per cent of all global funds invested in research (which is almost exclusively dominated by the West) goes into applied research. Of this, some 65 per cent is tax money used by governments for armament research (Nandy 1993: 383). Space research, astronomy, nuclear fusion, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, or microbiology and genetic engineering are of no recognizable value for normal people in our societies, who would certainly have serious doubts against investing much money in these areas. But they are connected with new business fields and gigantic profit expectations, and sometimes with presidential elections. Huge sums are being invested in such areas, while—according to official documents signed by heads of state (e.g., at world conferences over the last decade)—other areas of research affecting the real needs and misery of millions of human beings are severely lacking. There is neither value-free, purposeless science nor scientists dedicated exclusively to “the truth” or the “common good.” The self-image of science serves as an ideology to camouflage the real use of science in our societies. I make this argument not on the individual level, but on the structural level where those conditions are formed and maintained that channel science and scientists in the direction of becoming the servants of economic and political power cadres.

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The Science of Sustainable Development We can identify two groups of cynics who consider the concept of sustainable development: on the one side, those who understand the problem and pretend more research is needed before steps can be taken to solve it and, on the other, those who deny the existence of environmental problems and therefore claim that environmental protection is unnecessary and economically harmful. Structurally, scientists must be interested in leaving problems unsolved, or in inventing or appropriating new ones, because this guarantees their further funding. Sustainable development is a perfect example. Consider the sums of money that are being invested in researching the conditions in favour of sustainable development. Most of this research is in vain because those conditions can easily be enumerated and are already well-known: the simple baseline being that rich countries have to cut their consumption of natural resources by something like 90 per cent to become globally sustainable. But no action is taken because of the opposition of powerful adverse interests. In this case, research is used as a pretext not to act. The important point here is that while few scientists point to the threats of biological survival on Planet Earth, many scientists do not care at all for practical solutions of the problem but rather are interested in exploiting it for money, reputation, and public attention. It is not only their egoistic self-interest they serve in doing so but also the egoistic interests of the power cadres who clearly perceive the challenge formulated by sustainable development as a systemic, antagonistic conflict. It is a good recipe for prominence in the sciences to contest an established paradigm, and if the paradigm goes against the interests of the powerful, contesting bears all chances of a high yield in terms of money and publicity. This is what Greenwash strives for. Bjorn Lomborg, professor of statistics at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, became the most prominent recent example of this breed in the ecological field. His basic recipe is simple: challenge all evidence on the global environmental catastrophe, set against it an idea of environmental improvements, and underlie all this with an impressive number of statistics. You do not need to understand even a small part of the complexities in ecology to do this. What you need is a prominent publisher (Lomborg 2001). In 2002, Lomborg was convicted by the Danish Council of Scientific Dishonesty for having fabricated and selectively used statistical data, misused statistical methods, distorted interpretations and conclusions, and consciously misinterpreted research done by others. Nonetheless the right-wing Danish government appointed him to the post of director of the new Institute of Environmental Examination, and he serves among President George W. Bush’s principal environmental advisors.

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The Americanization of Science In Western science, the peak of the pyramid is usually assumed to be science in the US. Western scientists are supposed to follow rather closely what happens in their field in the US, have close connections with their American colleagues, and derive many of their hypotheses from the American literature (which would give them at least a tiny chance to get their own writings published in the US). An American scientist, at least in the social sciences, may publish relatively trivial things which are far from being new to Europeans with average education; yet he or she can still be sure to attract a lot of attention and citations in other parts of the West. Those who do not follow the American literature closely enough are seen as parochial. The reverse way of thinking does not exist. Just as the American mass media seldom follow non-American news, so also the American scientific community seldom pays attention to developments in other parts of the world. Non-American social scientists are supposed to publish in English and see their papers refused for inadequately mastering the English language. On the other hand, it is much harder to find American social scientists who have gained their academic reputations because of their familiarity with Chinese (the world language!), Arabic, French, Spanish, or German developments in their respective disciplines. What is pushed to prominence in American social science is defining the mainstream. As in all other spheres, the ability to delineate mainstream and margin is an expression of a power structure where few rule and many obey.

University Reform Traditionally, the German system of higher education was exclusively statefunded, non-competitive, and non-hierarchical, and combined teaching and research. For students tuition was free. Under the German federal system, universities were part of the second tier, the Land (provincial) administration; the federal government had very little authority to framework legislation and fund infrastructure. Although there was a certain differentiation in status and income, professors were tenured civil servants from the beginning. They enjoyed a high degree of autonomy secured by the constitutional principle of freedom of research and teaching (art. 5.3 of the Constitution). There was no evaluation of academic performance, neither by students nor by peers, heads of department, deans, or rectors/presidents. It was not until 1990 that the first university ranking was published (Der Spiegel 1990). It was very much debated and mostly denied. Statistically, Germany produced fewer university graduates per age cohort than other countries, and it took them longer to graduate. Of course, to be of any validity such information should reflect the quality of education. Besides this, Land governments were heavily indebted and looked for ways to cut university budgets. Both elements pressed for university reform. The governments switched to block grant funding using as pretext the alleged

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increase in university autonomy. First, elements of evaluation were introduced, and rankings became more common. In May 1998, ministers responsible for education in some of the larger European countries met in Paris to adopt a declaration demanding a common European system of education. Only one year later the Bologna Declaration was signed by 29 European governments; it aimed for a unified European system of higher education to be implemented by 2010. Bachelor and Masters programs would replace the traditional methods of graduation; transferable credit points, accreditation of programs, and quality control were introduced. This is seen as a step towards worldwide standardization. We should not forget at this point that the EU, negotiating for its member states, committed itself to liberalize education in the context of the General Agreement on Trade in Services of the World Trade Organization (WTOGATS) as early as 1994. Lobbying for a multilateral services agreement began in the US in the early 1980s when the companies who had joined forces in the Coalition of Service Industries were able to put the subject on the agenda of the Uruguay Round. This might help to explain the widely executive character of the standardization process (Scherrer, in this volume). It is easy to imagine how tempting a standardized European Learning Space must be for the predominantly American-based education service industries, from all forms of eLearning via direct university subsidiaries to accreditation, evaluation, and testing services. The new system is a more or less exact copy of the American university system without any serious research on which system is more productive, more creative, and more in favour of autonomous critical thinking. In fact, although the traditional German system must appear somewhat chaotic to an outsider, its productivity was relatively high and German students going to, for example, American universities found themselves often among the best in their classes. The new system will mostly benefit industry; corporations want low-brow graduates, obedient and easy to train on the job. Industrialists will directly influence university decisions in the new boards of governors. As most students are supposed to be confined to bachelor degrees, these programs will mostly consist of lecture courses, the content of which is to be obediently reproduced in exams. More autonomous forms of self-directed learning, like seminars and projects, will almost disappear. More students, more lectures, more assignments, more grading mean the dissolution of the nexus between teaching and research. As universities are seen to be similar to corporations, the dependence on fund-raising together with ranking and evaluation will enforce a hierarchical system of university management. The new system is being politically imposed from top to bottom. With the forced opening of universities for private enterprise as foreseen in WTO-GATS, the commodification of education will prevail over the principle of public responsibility. Private corporations will tend to subdue any idea of critical intellectual autonomy and replace it by fully commodified education in the interest of pure market demands. Ironically, it was reserved to a federal minister for education and science

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from the Social Democratic Party to announce, in early 2004, the government’s plan to select, in a competitive process, five to six “elite universities.” These shall then receive additional funding from the federal budget of some 300 million Euros. It is not difficult to foresee the consequences. Public and even more private funding will go to the inner circle of “elite” schools while the rest will not only lose resources but also intellectual standing and attraction. The non-elite university will be transformed into a professional college. Education statistics will reveal higher proportions of university graduates, but they will not show the lowering of intellectual standards.

Diagnosis: Cynical Science What comes out of this diagnosis? The criticism of Western science can be summarized in six arguments: 1. Science has become more or less identical with technology; there is little Orientierungswissen (knowledge for orientation) but overwhelmingly Verwertungswissen (knowledge for profit making). All scientific endeavour has its beginning and its end in society. Every theme considered worthy of scientific reflection becomes such only in a process of social perception and negotiation. Every problem must go through social definition before it becomes accessible to science. Science, therefore, must not be allowed to ignore its social responsibility. Society needs science, though not any science serving whatever particular interest but rather one accepting responsibility for the whole of society which, to be sure, is the global society. Science must not be allowed to ignore responsibility for the common good. The claim of many mainstream scientists to separate logic from morals is ideological. Ethics and science ought not to go apart. 2. Most technology is in the long run destructive and blind to risks. It begins with the heavy weight, and gigantic “success,” of armament research: every human being on Planet Earth carries tons of virtual TNT-equivalent over his or her head, all from Western arsenals. At the same time, the basic reason for the global ecological crisis is the increasing natural resource throughput of material and energy in the Western countries induced by science and technology since the industrial revolution (Fischer-Kowalski et al. 1997). Nuclear power does not only lay uncalculable risks on the shoulders of hundreds of future generations, it is the most expensive and most inefficient way of transforming primary energies into electricity. There is no serious risk assessment of genetically manipulated organisms on the side of the big corporations nor on the side of the state; the few who engage in this research are being hindered and discriminated against. The plundering of raw materials, the risks and wastes, signify that we are about to purchase short-term use for present generations for long-term destruction for all future

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generations (which is the exact opposite of sustainable development). Pharmaceutical industries invest huge sums in the invention of new “diseases,” the cure for which they make us believe lies in their drugs. The biochemical analysis of love is being put forward in order to develop and sell new pharmaceuticals—“the tablet at the right moment” will destroy the essence of what we find so wonderful and so essentially human about falling in love. 3. Science produces knowledge only for those in power. At least with industrialization, the essential purpose of science has become the mastery of nature by means of technology. There is no a priori decision on what from the wide range of scientific research will finally result in technology, but this decision is made according to the profit interests of those who have technologies developed and used for their own purposes. Research is passed through a series of filters that select what is profitable and sort out what is not. Science and technology are, both at the same time, instruments for mastering nature and instruments for mastering humans. They transform humans, but their character as instruments of power is veiled by the impression that technology determines objectively the conditions of social organization in a way that the personal power behind it is no longer detectable. Scientists are eager to provide the necessary ideology by maintaining that the evolution of all natural systems must be governed by competition and the survival of the fittest. This is not so much an insight gained by rigorous research, but rather a guiding principle, a preformulated frame of reference imposed on empirical findings while ignoring opposing interpretations. Why not reinterpret evolution in terms of solidarity and cooperation? It also sweeps aside the basic essence of what is human. Humans have knowingly and willingly escaped from the chains of natural determination and substituted for them civilization and culture. 4. Science does not empower but deprives humans of the possibility to decide on their own future. Increasingly, science drives society and deprives it of democracy and human rights. There is, for example, no democratic dialogue on how much genetic research we want for our society, if at all. Decades ago there was a slight possibility of such a dialogue, as can be demonstrated by, for instance, the (negative) public vote on nuclear energy in Austria. A public vote on genetically manipulated organisms (GMOs) would immediately be suppressed today by pointing to global competition in research to which Europe has to keep up. Globalization is blamed for making it more and more difficult to organize democratic protests. Proponents of GMOs primarily make the points that more and better food could be produced and diseases healed. However, the Director General of the World Health Organization, Gro Harlem Brundtland (2001), cannot see anything useful in GMOs. If, as can easily be

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demonstrated, hunger on earth is a problem of distribution instead of production, then the problem will not be solved by higher yield crops. 5. Science often veils more of reality than it elucidates. In the social sciences, and especially in their positivist mainstream, science tends to veil more of reality than it elucidates. This is relatively easy to demonstrate in neo-liberal economic theory. However, this did not prevent the political enforcement of this approach against all alternatives and the enormous damage that has resulted for humans and for nature. It might be not equally easy to make this point with respect to the empirical social sciences. A few randomly chosen examples may suffice as illustration. • A key variable for the understanding of every society, crucial for informed democratic participation, is the distribution of power. Although we do not lack definitions or methods to measure power and power differences, the issue is close to non-existent in research. • An important variable for understanding social inequality is income distribution. Although we live in statistically overdeveloped and overbureaucratized societies, income statistics are insufficient, even false. In international comparisons of income distribution, the tables published, for example by the World Bank in its annual World Development Report, are little more than tea-leaf reading. Monetary and real income are two totally different things and have totally different weight in different societies. Nonetheless, those numbers are used for research and enjoy the authority of the World Bank. • Representative surveys are a prominent instrument of social research. For reasons of cost efficiency they are mostly conducted in standardized form. The respondent can answer a question by ticking a box the scientist has provided. He or she must adapt to the categories the scientist considers relevant—a scientist who very often has not the slightest idea of the real life situation of the people in his or her sample. This becomes adventurous in the case of international surveys. • From the 1960s on, the broad field of the social sciences has undergone a quantitative revolution. Statistical analyses have increasingly replaced substantial arguments. Much less attention is given to data quality than to the sophistication of statistical algorithms. A typical example: in a very popular series of German social indicators (Statistisches Bundesamt, WZB, ZUMA) unemployment statistics are being reported which are generated by the Federal Agency for Work. Although it has often been criticized that these numbers underestimate real unemployment by something like 50 per cent, they are published without comment (like figures in the Statistical Yearbook) and are taken as valid descriptions of reality by many researchers. • But there is another problem with quantification. If we describe social reality in statistical numbers, we only retain those parts of information

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that lend themselves to easy quantification—whether or not they are thoughtless, and to what degree, the relevant part of the information may be lost because it is not, or not as easily, quantifiable. Think of mathematical simulation models. It is not only close to impossible to solve the problem of complexity, it may well be that exactly the very information that is crucial for the understanding of the phenomenon to be explained cannot be included because it is not easily quantifiable. If science tends to degenerate into a procedure to veil reality, it may be because the last proof of truth is seen in mathematics or statistical tests. Everything must be formulated in a way that is easily digestible by mathematical transformation. “I am speaking of the operationalism which reduces reality to the reality accessible to the methods of science, and then reconstructs the ‘whole’ reality—of nature, persons, or cultures—by extrapolating from that operational reality” (Nandy 1987: 116). An intelligence quotient is no longer seen as an insufficient approximation to a phenomenon; rather, intelligence becomes what is measured by an IQ. 6. The manipulation of our brains. To a large extent science is used to manipulate our brains. This is not only the case in advertising but increasingly in the manipulation of public opinion, or “strategic communication” as it is euphemistically called, as well as in “crimini di pace” (crimes of pacification) where dissenting individuals are forced into conformism (Basaglia et al. 1980). Of course, science maintains and increases its own influence. Desires are artificially created, behaviour designed, loyalty produced, or diseases invented. The consent of the American population to the Gulf War of 1990–91 was deliberately produced by scientific methods (Carlisle 1993).

The Globalization of Cynicism The aggressive culture of the West has deep historical roots. The separation of humans from nature, of soul from body, and the struggle for survival in a hostile environment, the forceful subjugation of nature, are prominent themes in the Old Testament (Nandy 1987: 25, Galtung 1988: 15). Nature is principally hostile, and Adam is forced to kill animals and plants for his own survival. “Chaotic” nature became gradually exterminated and replaced by orderly cultivated fields and gardens. Within only a few centuries Europeans (and after their arrival in the New World, white Americans) managed to eradicate and transform everything that would not obey their Christian desire for control. Until today the fiction of an endless nature with its usable resources belongs to the dominant myth of Western societies—despite better knowledge. “A similarly hostile attitude was mandated against other gods and the sacred notions of other cultures; they were to be seen as adversaries to the true god, and destroyed” (Sardar et al. 1993: 26).

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The idea of other humans and societies being inferior to one’s own dates back to Greek antiquity: who could not speak Greek was Barbarian. “To say that some people could not speak Greek was to imply that they had no faculty of reason and could not act according to logic; that their intellect was poorly developed and unable to control their passions; and that while they could apprehend reason they could not have possession of true reason” (Sardar et al. 1993: 26). This attitude was later drastically expressed by attributing all sorts of monstrosities to the Other, the unknown, the “Indian” (a term used for all unknowns), especially cannibalism. Thus, an image emerged over the centuries to separate the civilized self from the wild, barbarian, and incalculable Other. This image extends throughout Christianity well into the European Middle Ages. “It is hard not to see this potent image of the naked, hairy, club-wielding brute as a projection of all that European civility tried to distance from itself” ( Sardar et al. 1993: 35). Even to this day, this inferior Other is proclaimed, for example, when wartime propaganda portrays the enemy in such terms as “gooks” (the American expression for Vietnamese in the Vietnam War; gooks are something easier to kill than humans). Both nature and other cultures appeared to Europeans as hostile and inferior at the same time. The stereotype takes two forms: the first is of the wild, untamable cannibal (today’s Islamophobic propaganda); the second is of the naive child in need of guidance and education (much of today’s development aid). The basic pattern of reaction is the same in both cases: the inferior is either brought to servility, or exterminated. “The wild man had therefore to be either civilized or sacrificed to civilization” (Sardar et al. 1993: 35). In citing Ali Shari’ati, Abbas Manoochehri (in this volume) argues that Western colonizers not necessarily negated the culture and the history of the colonized but rather tried to convince the colonized that they were negative, inferior, unable to think. At the same time, by divide et impera, the comprador bourgeoisie was transformed into a mere caricature of the Western elite and cut off its own cultural roots. But science is also directly used for the domination and control of developing countries, as Johan Galtung has shown in his analysis of Project Camelot (1967) and his generalizing conclusions (1970–71). This biggest social science project ever funded was supposed to investigate how Americanfriendly governments in Latin America could be supported against insurgency (the funding institution was the Pentagon). Social scientists of highest reputation were involved in the project. It was discontinued in 1965 only after it became public and raised opposition and after Latin American social scientists refused to cooperate. The aggressive character of Western knowledge systems is revealed by the evidence that there are other knowledge systems often called local, traditional, indigenous (Galtung, for example, compares Christian and Buddhist epistemologies, 1988: 15; see also the contributions to International Social Science Journal 173, 2003). Everywhere on earth people have accumulated knowledge suitable for their ecological habitat and

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historical experience. Usually such knowledge is tied to a certain place, or culture, or society; it is dynamic and changes; it belongs to social groups living in close contact with nature; and it is different from “modern,” “Western,” or “scientific” knowledge. “It might include spiritual relations, relations with nature, the use of natural resources, relations between humans and is reflected in language, social organization, value systems, institutions and in law. It might comprise sacred texts, is often only orally transmitted and lives in legends and stories. Therefore it is difficult to access for an outsider, and vulnerable” (Studley 1998: 5). While it is not neutral, or value-free, Western science and technology succeeds in making most people believe in its objectivity. This does not only endanger other knowledge systems but also excludes any alternative within Western thinking itself. Scientifically understood and mastered nature re-emerges again in the apparatus of technical production and destruction which affects individual life and, at the same time, subjects it to the masters of the apparatus. Thus, rational and social hierarchies are in conflict. If this is so, a change in the direction of progress able to dissolve this fatal bond must impact on the very structure of science. Without losing its rational character, its hypotheses would develop in an essentially different context of experience (one of a pacified world); science would arrive at a very different conception of nature and would arrive at essentially different facts (Marcuse 1964: 181). Within the large and comprehensive context of cultural imperialism we can find a number of mechanisms aimed at the global imposition of Western conceptions of science and truth and at generalizing its harmful effects. From the “green revolution” to Monsanto’s “terminator technology,” scientific progress has always been used to destroy local subsistence economies and to force people under the dictate of the global economy, commercialization, monetarization, and market rule. Structural adjustment with its rabid demand for opening up national markets appears as one of the major instruments of this strategy, putting national economies under tutelage. Both have led to the cleavage between the small number of rich (who, in their attitudes and lifestyles follow the Western model and who deposit their money in Western banks) and the overwhelming majority of poor people in the second and third worlds. Here is a fatal paradox: exactly those who are supposed to demand and consume the overproduction of Western automatized factories are being deprived of the means to do so, while the tiny caste of oligarchs does not invest its richesse (except to secure their own influence in the media, commodities, or corruption), but engages in speculation. When you can make money with money, human beings become superfluous even as consumers. The global imposition of Western concepts of science and truth is only one little stone in the big mosaic of cultural imperialism. Control of the news market is as important as the new role of public relations; popular music is as relevant as comics and junk food; films and soap operas belong as well as global-style architecture, structural adjustment policies, the “war

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on terror,” science and technology, englishification of language, and the americanization of universities. Taken all together, we are on the way to generalize our model of social organization forcefully throughout the globe. One might argue that it is neither science nor truth which are so destructive per se, but rather their misuse by the polity and the economy. I doubt it; the story goes much deeper historically, and it has, indeed, inflicted our very understanding of science in the long process. Opponents are rare, and reversal seems unlikely. There is a correlation between the progress in science on the one hand, the aggravation of the Global Problématique on the other. To be sure, correlation does not necessarily mean causality, but it makes one think. There is only one small detail those propagandists of science have forgotten: that in this best of all possible worlds, Western capitalism with its insatiable hunger for consumption and growth, is well on the road to destroying the biological life support system of all human beings on Planet Earth.

References Adorno, Theodor W. 1955. Prismen. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Alvarez, Claude. 1992. “Science.” In The Development Dictionary, ed. W. Sachs. London: Zed Books. Basaglia, Franco, Franca Basaglia-Ongaro, Michel Foucault, et al. 1980. Crimini di pace. Torino: Giulio Einaudi. Brundtland, Gro Harlem. 2001. “Food Safety: A World-wide Challenge.” Speech delivered to the “Food Chain 2001: Safe, Sustainable, Ethical” Conference. Uppsala, Sweden. 14 March. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1997. The Grand Chessboard. New York: Basic Books. Carlisle, Johan. 1993. “Public Relationships: Hill & Knowlton, Robert Gray, and the CIA.” Covert Action 44: 19–25. Chossudovsky, Michel. 1997. The Globalization of Poverty. Penang: Third World Forum. Chossudovsky, Michel. 2004. “Global Poverty in the Late Twentieth Century.” In Devastating Society: The Neo-liberal Assault on Democracy and Social Justice, ed. B. Hamm. London: Pluto. Der Spiegel. 1990. Welche Uni ist die beste? Hamburg (Spiegel-Spezial 1/1990). de Silva, Nalin. 2002. “Western Domination in Knowledge.” The Island (Sri Lanka), June 18. Festinger, Leon. 1957. The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson. Feyerabend, Paul. 1979. Erkenntnis für freie Menschen. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Fischer-Kowalski, Marina, et al. 1997. Gesellschaftlicher Stoffwechsel und Kolonisierung von Natur. Amsterdam: OPA. Galtung, Johan. 1967. “After Camelot.” In The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, ed. I.L. Horowith. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Repr. Galtung, Johan. 1979. Papers on Methodology: Theory and Methods of Social Research. Vol. 3. Copenhagen: Ejlers, 161–179.

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Galtung, Johan. 1970–71. “Science Assistance and Neo-Colonialism: Some Ethical Problems.” PRIO publication M–13. Repr. Johan Galtung. 1980. Peace and World Structure: Essays in Peace Research. Vol. 4. Copenhagen: Ejlers. 180–93. Galtung, Johan. 1971. “A Structural Theory of Imperialism.” Journal of Peace Research 8,2. Repr. Johan Galtung. 1980. Peace and World Structure: Essays in Peace Research. Vol. 4. Copenhagen: Ejlers. 437–81. Galtung, Johan. 1988. Methodology and Development. Essays in Methodology. Vol. 3. Copenhagen: Ejlers. George, Susan. 1997. “How to Win the War of Ideas?” Dissent 44: 47–53. Goonatilake, Susantha. 1998. Toward a Global Science. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Hamm, Bernd (Ed.). 2005. Devastating Society: The Neo-conservative Assault on Democracy and Social Justice. London: Pluto. International Social Science Journal. 2001. Indigenous Knowledge. Paris: UNESCO. Kates, R.W., et al. 2000: Sustainability Science. Available at . Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, George. 1996. Moral Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press Lindbeck, Assar, et al. 1994. Turning Sweden Around. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Lomborg, Bjorn. 2001. The Skeptical Environmentalist. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mannheim, Karl. 1964. Wissenssoziologie. Berlin: Luchterhand. Marcuse, Herbert. 1964. One-dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press. Marx, Karl. 1890. Das Kapital, Bd. 1. MEW Bd. 23. Berlin: Dietz 1986. Mills, C.W. 1956. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press. Nandy, Ashis. 1987. Traditions, Tyranny, and Utopias: Essays in the Politics of Awareness. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Nandy, Ashis. 1993. “State.” In The Development Dictionary, ed. W. Sachs. London: Zed Books. Popper, Karl. 1960. The Poverty of Historicism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Powell, B.A. 2003. How Right-Wing Conservatives Have Hijacked US Democracy. Available at . Sardar, Zia, Ashis Nandy, and Merryl Wyn Davies. 1993. Barbaric Others. A Manifesto on Western Racism. London: Pluto. Stiglitz, Joseph. 2002. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton. Studley, John. 1998. Dominant Knowledge Systems and Local Knowledge. Mountain Forum On-line Library Document. Available at . Ullrich, Otto. 1993. “Technology.” The Development Dictionary, ed. W. Sachs. London: Zed Books. Williamson, J. 2000. “What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington Consensus?” The World Bank Research Observer 15, 2: 251–64. World Wildlife Fund. 2000. Living Planet Report. Oakland, CA: Redefining Progress.

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PART 3

MEDIA IMPERIALISM AND CULTURAL POLITICS

Introduction Katharine Sarikakis, a political scientist and specialist in international communications and media policy, explores the relevance of the concept of cultural imperialism within the context of current international affairs and the opening of new spaces of cultural domination. In particular, Sarikakis explores the case of the European Union (EU) in its complex intersections of internationalized governance regime and the assumed role of representational politics against this background. According to Sarikakis, “the culture domain has been a contested object of policy in the European Union but has also been used as a major ideological component of the new European identity and the key in the development of the EU: a process of transformation from a strictly economic to a social and cultural organization.” This is shown by Sarikakis in her discussion of the successive efforts made by the European parliament since the mid-1980s to develop common EU cultural and media policies aimed at countering the dominance of American-originated media and media content and the dominance of private interests on the airwaves. While acknowledging the argument advanced by critics of the media and the cultural imperialism thesis that today’s complex, global “flow of discourses from North to South and West to East does not necessarily constitute domination,” Sarikakis maintains that systemic mechanisms continue to operate to “assure the propagation of capitalism in general and its major agents, the US and the West, in particular.” Among others, these mechanisms include the ongoing culturally homogenizing influence of powerful Western (and mainly American) cultural and media industries. According to Sarikakis, the existence of multiple (local, national, and global) cultural spheres does not quantify their equality in power, since the American-dominated global cultural and media industries have educated the world’s audiences into a certain form of media literacy “that recognizes the conventions of a musical, expects closure in sit-coms, understands news as information provided by elite circles and accepts new forms of entertainment and information that make references to those familiar forms.” In light of these developments Sarikakis concludes

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that the cultural imperialism thesis is of particular importance for Europeans for two reasons: first, because it contributes towards a deeper understanding of the extent of American market domination in Europe, despite proactive measures to slow it down; and secondly, because it also helps to identify similar practices of internal cultural domination within EU countries that operate at the expense of minorities. Christophe Germann, a Swiss-based international intellectual property lawyer and freelance journalist and short film producer, examines issues surrounding cultural diversity in the motion picture industry with a focus on the EU experience. As in the case of the media and cultural industries generally, Germann points out that the American film industry, and more specifically the oligopoly of the seven big Hollywood studios known as the “Majors,” dominates the audiovisual landscape in most countries of the world in terms of market shares. Germann highlights the “totalitarian threat” to the freedom of expression and opinion posed by “the fact that the most aggressively marketed audiovisual content and works derived from it (i.e., literature, music, etc.) come from one single, largely homogeneous cultural origin.” As part of his effort to develop more effective mechanisms to enhance cultural diversity in the motion picture industry, Germann offers a critical analysis of laws and policies that have been put into place in EU countries specifically to promote the production and distribution of local and national audiovisual content by way of public subsidies, quotas, and other means of state intervention in the market. He also outlines some of the problems that have resulted from the conflict between legislated national and regional cultural policies and global trade agreements such as the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In light of the problems associated with existing mechanisms, Germann explores a number of complementary and alternative approaches to fulfill cultural diversity policies in the audiovisual field. On-Kwok Lai, a comparative social policy specialist from Japan, examines the implications of the growth of information and communication technology (ICT) networks in Asia’s newly industrializing economies (NIEs). Lai offers a comparative analysis of ICT developments in different Asian countries, exploring questions about the effect that embracing new forms of ICT in Asian NIEs may have on national politics and political activism both in and beyond cyberspace. For example, he poses the question of what effect the increase in citizens’ access to the Internet will have in promoting pro-democratic, potentially subversive, forms of political cyber-activism in countries led traditionally by anti-democratic political regimes. At the same time, he explores the question of how current governments in Asian countries are making use of “E-Government” initiatives to undermine potentially threatening sources of political opposition, by either employing various subtle forms of propaganda or, more clearly repressively, through government-mandated censorship and ICT access control. According to Lai, the growth of ICT networks is having an important socio-cultural-political impact in East Asian economies while at the same time redrawing the contours of cultural imperialism and the struggles against it.

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Elvira Classen shows that, while perhaps opening new opportunities for political activism, the media also continues to be used to transmit dominant cultural values. This is illustrated in her examination of media-transmitted values transfer in the post-9/11, American-led “War Against Terrorism.” Writing from her vantage-point as a media researcher and freelance journalist based in Germany, Classen traces the global struggle for the “Hearts and Minds” of citizens that prevailed in the media between September 11, 2001, and the capture of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in late 2003. She argues that during this period the role played by the Western, and predominantly American, media outlets in transmitting dominant cultural values clearly served to promote Western cultural imperialism. According to Classen, the struggle for the hearts and minds of citizens occurred not only in both the US and other coalition countries, where people were reminded of their need for patriotism and a willingness to make sacrifices, but also even more intensely in the Arab and Islamic world, where the American government backed a media propaganda campaign aimed at convincing citizens of the need for a “War Against Terrorism” in order “to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace” (quoted from a speech by George W. Bush). Classen argues that after 9/11 the “radicalized shape of American-style global activism as a plan for cultural imperialism aims at the creation of an interpretative vacuum, by using, or threatening to use, military or other repressive means.” In turn, this vacuum is then filled with “a hyperaccelerated value transfer in which desired (in this case, American) interpretations of reality, interests, and ideals are relayed.” However, Classen does not conclude that it is hopeless in the future to try to counter effects like those of the American military-political propaganda machine used to control the media for the purpose of transferring desired values during the post-9/11 “War Against Terrorism.” Instead, she offers a number of recommendations aimed at providing a starting point for working toward the “demilitarization of information” in the future.

CHAPTER 6

Legitimating Domination: Notes on the Changing Faces of Cultural Imperialism Katharine Sarikakis

t would not be unreasonable to argue that the concept of “cultural imperialism” is one of the few powerful theories that has directly been incorporated into the world of international politics. It has been the ideological force behind one of the most daring, and most unsuccessful, attempts of the United Nations (UN) in the field of culture and communication, the New World Information and Communication Order, and has continued to hold a central position in the debates surrounding globalization. Despite criticisms, the term continues to express a profound imbalance in the processes of cultural production and consumption and maintains its presence in international and supranational politics. This chapter seeks to explore the relevance of the concept of cultural imperialism within the context of international affairs and in particular to locate the new spaces of cultural domination. Within this framework, new, intentional, or accidental strategies of legitimation of cultural imperialistic practices and policies are considered. In particular, the chapter will explore the case of the European Union (EU) in its complex intersections of internationalized governance regime and the assumed role of representational politics against this background. The culture domain has been a contested object of policy in the EU but has also been used as a major ideological component of the new European identity and the key in the development of the EU: a process of transformation from a strictly economic to a social and cultural organization.

I

Problems with Cultural Imperialism The concept of cultural imperialism is as complex and contested as the phenomenon it seeks to describe. With a history of over three decades, the thesis of cultural imperialism has sought to emphasize how power relations of economic and political dimensions infiltrate the cultural sphere. The profound interest of early cultural imperialism was in the effects of the imposition of core cultures over peripheral and semi-peripheral societies in their struggle to speak for and govern themselves. Media and cultural imperialism is used in this context as a more comprehensive term that addresses the role of the media in the symbolic construction

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and reproduction of cultural hegemony. As Stevenson (1999: 95) explains, the media imperialism thesis tried to provide an analysis of the relations of determination between economic, political, social, and cultural spheres. Media/cultural imperialism is often used in conjunction with globalization: colonial control through the “crude” means of military, administrative, and economic dominance has subsided significantly after the successful struggles for independence of the former world colonies. These methods of control, however, have been replaced by more subtle methods that nevertheless maintain and reproduce processes of domination. This time, it is through the use of media and cultural products or, as some scholars prefer to encompass them, communication processes (e.g., Hamelink 1994). Global communication systems serve two purposes, according to Schiller: to provide the ideological justification of capitalism and to act as transnational marketing devices for industries. Of course, it is also the case that global media constitute businesses themselves. The development of the theory of cultural imperialism in the late 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Schiller 1969) makes direct links between mainly American media dominance and the threat to cultural identities. The debate over cultural preservation and protection from imperialistic forces was particularly strong in world policy debates in the 1970s and 1980s, such as the MacBride Report and the efforts of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to establish a more equitable global communication order. The failure of UNESCO to establish equitable patterns of global communication systems is considered to be the outcome of the unwillingness of the US to comply with policies that would seek to restrain the corporate activities of American media (see Hamelink 1994; Vincent et al. 1999). Media/cultural imperialism is argued to be part of the intensification of globalization processes underway in the last two decades. Globalization is seen as predominantly the Westernization of the globe (Robins 1991). The expansion of late capitalism and its hegemonic position are processes materialized through the homogenization of the production and distribution processes, but also of the homogenization of the goods themselves, as the McDonaldization thesis supports (Ritzer 2000). These are also processes intensified and further integrated into local spheres and cultures through the flow of information. The latter is better understood as a consequence of the hegemonic position of powerful countries, but is also used to connote the imbalanced information flow between North and South. The media/cultural imperialism thesis implies that such imbalances occur due to the one-dimensional flow. Critique of this thesis claims that fragmentation and the multipolarity of cultural expression, living experiences, and subjectivities are factors not adequately acknowledged. Furthermore, cultural imperialism suggests that cultures are somehow “pure” and fails to account for processes of hybridity, evolution, and dialogue among cultures. Therefore, the thesis is thought to not effectively explain today’s world, whereby the flow of discourses from North to South and West to East does not necessarily constitute domination (Baker 2002).

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Although it is true that subjectivities have a potential for active resistance, the power of free interpretation and recreation—in other words, human agency—can only with difficulty be compared to systemic mechanisms that assure the propagation of capitalism in general and its major agents, the US and the West, in particular. Despite certain processes of decentralization in the EU countries, decision-making centres continue to be mainly situated in geographies of economic and military power that maintain their influence through indirect ways over national markets and resources. Such geographies are related but not limited to formerly dominant centres, such as the empires and colonial powers of the United Kingdom, Germany, and France as well as the US and military powers such as Japan. Considering the current processes of economic “integration,” cultural imperialism should not be misunderstood as a phenomenon exclusively linked to relations among nations. Wallerstein’s peripheries and semi-peripheries (1974) become now more relevant than ever to express not only relations among nations but also inner-national dynamics. Although some structures and practices have changed, global organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), or the G8 are controlled by a core group of nation-states. Similarly, organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or even the UN can be seriously compromised by the power of a few nation-states. Moreover, within the centres (cores), in their national or regional formations (such as the EU), there is a multiplicity of peripheries and semi-peripheries; socio-economic divisions of class, race, and gender; inequalities in access to decisionmaking processes; and restriction in self-determination. A world of peripheral entities constructed as cultural, ethnic, linguistic minorities constitutes further geographies of gender and generational inequality. The question arises: is national and local commodification of culture worth defending vis-à-vis imperial Hollywood? Does it offer space for resistance? Is resistance to American imperialism a matter of reversal into ideas of a homogenized, pure, local culture threatened by the impurities of American capital? On the one hand, local and national culture industries are directly colonized by core culture industries. The McDonaldization of the music industry finds expression in the transnational Music Television (MTV) that draws from local cultures to produce commercial goods saleable to local/national markets, directed from a centre not identical to their operation locus. Furthermore, local and national cultures copy, become part of, and propagate further commercialization by reverting into conservative, often reactionary, and easy consuming stereotypes of narratives about themselves (e.g., discourses of uniqueness) and constructed “others.” Appadurai (1991) points out the levels of this process: “others” in this globalized era become not the distant cultures (such as portrayed in American film) with which generations grew up but neighbours (the Russianization of former Soviet states is of more concern for their cultures than is their Americanization).

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The immediate special locality takes on new significance: images of intruders (refugees and asylum seekers) into the space of local culture coexist with images of exoticized cultures (holiday resorts, “foreign” cuisine) and images about “others” (ethnic minorities), who give a core its multiculturalist credentials. In the meantime, multicultures often have to lead lives parallel to the core and seldom as an integral part of it. (The decision to build a wall between Asian and white communities in Bradford, UK, after racial riots in 2001, signals that the global village is something we experience on television or the Internet but seldom in our streets where localisms, nationalisms, regionalisms, sexisms, and racisms stand at our door.) The extreme introvert and extrovert polarizations of the world (global capital, global communications, and ethnic wars) do not necessarily point to more cultural poles on the globe. The existence of multiple cultural spheres does not quantify their equality in power. Powerful cultural and media industries (in the US) have educated the world’s audiences into a certain form of media literacy that recognizes the conventions of a musical, expects closure in sit-coms, understands news as information provided by elite circles, and accepts new forms of entertainment and information that make references to those familiar forms. In that sense, the artificial polarization of local cultures versus globalization is an oversimplified assumption about the purity of local cultures. However, at the same time, overexcitement about the centrality of localities underestimates the extent of power imbalances. Some of the points made by dependency theorists (e.g., Wallerstein 1974) are particularly useful today to explain the dominance of specific forms of structures and content. The argument that neo-imperialist forces imposed their media forms and traditions on other societies can explain the dominance of certain values over others. One example is the Anglo-Saxon journalism style that derives directly from the dominance of British communication systems (Marconi cable) during both the era of the British Empire and the ascendancy of the US after World War II, and its values of objectivity (as defined by a male-dominated, Western-shaped journalism profession) and impartiality (rather than, for example, civic journalism and engagement). A second is how the individualistic and a-contextual nature of technologies promoted by the West have overtaken the communitarian and contextualized approach of African cultures (Mickunas and Pilotta 1998).

Representational Politics and Cultural Imperialism The wave of deregulation, which spread the American model of cultural industries throughout Europe and the world in the 1980s and 1990s, created spaces for further market expansion through the privatization of public service broadcasters and publicly owned telecommunication industries. Media conglomerates with experience and means benefited the most from the new markets, and the most familiar media cultures came to dominate to a large extent the direction of the production of meanings through the export of Western (particularly American) content. In this way, the media

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exemplify the processes whereby the world’s cultures/media try to fit into the cultural and economic parameters defined by the West. What is at stake in this process, according to Mattelart and Mattelart (1992), is the commercialization of public spaces. Commercialization, privatization, and ownership concentration—in fact, the feudalization—of public spaces are the dimensions most prominent at the beginning of the twenty-first century. However, what is important is that public spaces are now occupied by a few companies owned by the strongest Western media in the world.1 The commercialization of public spaces, whether by national or transnational capital, does not necessarily guarantee the enrichment of social debate. Difficult, uneasy social issues are often avoided, both in terms of content (stories not based on stereotypes) and objectives (access and participation by all), as they are unprofitable. Social change does not take place in the marketplace; rather, the market accommodates social change. Furthermore, the expansion of representation of private interests in public space reduces participation of citizens to increasingly confined spaces and their role to that of consumers. Increasingly, it is transnational corporations and governments of powerful states that organize the conditions of the economic and cultural life of the planet through a net of international organizations, agreements, and global regulation. The globalization of capital expansion is intensified by communications media in two major ways. First, media defeat spatial restrictions through the transmission of information software and remote control of corporate daughter companies. Second, communications media serve the commodification of the production and distribution of cultural products and increasingly act as shopping gateways for markets created by globalizing processes. Globalization depends on regulatory environments that harmonize national laws and provide legitimization of the specific nature of trade. International organizations and regional formations, such as the EU, are expressions of economic and administrative responses to this new environment. Milward (1992) suggests that the internationalization of trade was the main source for the restructuring of postwar Europe. The Europeanization process was a prerequisite if European domestic markets were to sustain income and growth. Although Milward locates the move toward European integration as a political inevitability if the nation-states were to justify their existence in postwar Europe, he also emphasizes the centrality of the role of international trade in this process. 1 Thirty out of 50 top advertising companies in the world and 24 out of the top 50 mergers/acquirers in the world are based in the US; 106 companies in the world are targeted by foreign investors, while the UK was the most aggressive acquirer in 1998 (Screen Digest 1998). The financial significance of media and cultural industries is also evident by the fact that they are the fastest growing industries in the US: predictions see an 8.6 per cent annual growth of advertising revenue while end-user spending has increased by 106 per cent since 1994 (Veronis Suhler 2002).

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The EU is predominantly an economic union: its most significant goal is the establishment of a single market and the free movement of goods, capital, and labour across borders. To achieve that, certain policy-related steps have been necessary, such as the harmonization of national laws, which often (but not necessarily) takes place under the principle of the common denominator. However, the EU is increasingly dealing with the social and political implications of economic integration: workers’ rights, health and safety, cultural/religious, and other social/cultural matters, a phenomenon that EU students call the spill-over of policies. The involvement of European institutions (Council of Ministers, Court of Justice, Commission, Parliament) in these processes is of particular interest not least because they constitute a microcosm not only of domestic (European) political systemic arrangements but also of features of the international system. In particular, the delegation of the administration of transnational matters, such as trans-border trade and services, by supranational agencies is one major component of the system of international and transnational commercialization of cultural goods. The main and most important difference from other international organizations is that the EU structure utilizes a form of democratic representation in its supranational politics. In this sense, the EU has fortified its democratic basis, but also has tried to address the legitimacy crisis by providing the European Parliament (EP) with legislative powers. The EP (voted directly by Europeans) acts as a citizens’ representative at this supranational level. Although decisions are taken at several levels—between nation-states at a regional level and also among institutions—that point out a rather dispersed system of policy-making, the main gatekeepers are the Council (representation of nation-states) and only recently the EP. Nentwich and Falkner (1997) nevertheless argue that where corporatist interests prevail, the EP is much less powerful than national parliaments. The institution is also a symbolic agent in that it aims to represent European cultures and societies and not nations. Its relation to the preservation of local cultures vis-à-vis the cultural imperialistic effects in Europe of domination by the American media of European markets has been a central idea in the development of media and cultural policy. Around this idea liberalists and protectionists have attempted to regulate matters of the market. The significance of a representational politics in the form of a supranational parliament in international trade and policy regimes can be appreciated in comparison to both the existing policy-making structures that are called upon to organize economic activities and the degree of grassroots political participation. In the process of the globalization of culture as industry, the EP constitutes a unique institution in international politics with the potential to influence global policy. International-level negotiations point out the increasing significance of cultural goods as economic factors but also the concern of smaller nations to maintain space for domestic productions (McChesney 2001). Cultural goods are included in the WTO negotiations, in the trilateral agreements of the North American Free Trade

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Agreement (NAFTA), the protectionist policy of the US towards its own media and cultural industries, and the revenue growth of the industry in countries that are strong exporters. Furthermore, the economic aspect of cultural and media technologies and information rights are of central importance in the deliberations of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). In this process, the significance of representation at a supra/international level is better appreciated when the role that organizations of civil society, such as the WSIS Gender Caucus, African Women’s Development and Communication Network (FEMNET), and the Communication Rights in the Information Society Campaign, Indigenous World Association, will play is still questionable. In top-level negotiations, such as the WSIS or the most recent World Summit on the Environment in Johannesburg, governments and the private sector barely welcomed the civil society at the table.

The Historical Context of Institutional Opposition to Cultural Domination In the globalized environment of international trade and information traffic, policy-making has adapted to the demands created by these forces. Policy is still not well-defined (see Bobrow et al. 1977). Against a fragmentist view of policy as distinctive moments and loci of political decision-making, I refer to the concept as an end-product of political decision-making, through a process closely interrelated to politics, taking into account historical development and a given institutional background, and involving negotiations among actors not necessarily transparent to the public or accountable to public scrutiny (e.g., Landau 1977). Drawing on the above as well as taking into account the administrative functions of policy, it is possible to argue that the direction of policy and the nature of decisions made in the cultural and media area are expressions of a broad and complex net of relations between forces with the power to influence the conditions within which cultural processes (production/creation, distribution, consumption, synthesis) take place. Media and cultural policies and policies destined to (at least) directly affect media and culture (such as competition policy regulating cultural industries) have a significant effect upon the spheres of cultural expression, representation of cultures and creativity, traditions and values, and the means for their dissemination and reproduction. Historically, the development of media and cultural policies in the EU has its roots in the political engagement of the EP. From very early on, agenda-setting strategies of a weak institution (EP 1982) provided not only the first comprehensive EU policy initiative specifically dedicated to the complexities of media but also constituted the basis on which policy debates about the field would be made in the following decades (Sarikakis 2004). Economic integration was the means to the political unification of Europe and the media were one of the most important tools for its achievement. The first proposals of the EP in the early to mid 1980s, under the statement that media and civil

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society are inseparable concepts (EP 1984a), contained at least two distinctive areas that would dominate media policy in the beginning of the twentyfirst century: new media and communications technologies and transnational broadcasting. Due to the effects of expanding markets and transnational capital, the project of the harmonization of national and regional policies was necessary for the provision of the relative predictability of markets and societies to enable capital activity. Regulation is a task vital for the transformation of market-state and market-market relations; in other words, intervention is necessary even for the aims of deregulation. The EU follows the logic of harmonization of laws and policies for the establishment and development of a common market, but increasingly intergovernmental, international, and supranational authorities assume the tasks of policy- and decision-making with very little communication to and with the citizens. This disconnection from the citizens and the centrality of culture and media in political participation were among the main concerns of the EP. Another main concern was the extent of private interests in the transnational media and cultural landscape and the role of powerful nations (e.g., EP 1984b, 1984c, 1985a, 1985b). In its efforts to democratize European media space, the EP has concentrated its policy proposals in three interlinked areas that also signify particular periods of the transformation of the character of the institution. These are the overall changing media and cultural climate in Europe, the character of public debate, and the position of strong actors and, in particular, industries. Respectively, the first period involves the introduction of the fundamentals of media and cultural policy discourses. It expands from the first EP initiative in 1982 to the establishment of the most important single policy for the realization of a single pan-European market in 1989, the Television Without Frontiers Directive (TVWF) (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 204–05). During this period, the liberalization of state-owned sectors took place, with the privatization of public spaces, such as the airwaves, and the establishment of trans-border broadcasting activities. The EP presented an overarching political goal in favour of a media model of social responsibility, similar to the aims of what had become known as the MacBride Report.1 At this time the EP’s status was no better than that of the civil society in general: it had a limited role in policy-making and a second-class standing among the powerful Commission and the Council of Ministers. Due to its own commitment to the ideas of public space and ownership and due to the policy and governance vacuum in the field, the EP created and inserted an agenda from which the future policy actors in the EU found it quite difficult to break away. Among others, it introduced the concept of pan-European spaces of culture and media and emphasized the political dimension of cultural expression. These initiatives were 1 For a timely discussion of the relevance of the MacBride Report and current international policy initiatives, see for example Raboy (2003).

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aimed at two parallel threats: the dominance both of American-originated media and media content and of private interests on the airwaves. In the second phase, which ended with the 1997 amendment of the TVWF, the major transactions that offered media moguls the opportunities to augment their market shares took place, and their expansion into national/linguistic markets was underway. The policies of content quota (both attempts failed to produce definitive and binding policy), proactive protection of media content pluralism (rather than media ownership), and the protection of public service broadcasters (PSBs) became central items. Not all of them were fruitful, as private interests proved too strong to be overcome by a non-united front of anxious PSBs, selfabsorbed national representatives, and local/regional conditions too fluid to agree on pluralism matters. More radical proposals (such as proactive measures for realistic representations of women and men based on principles of citizenship equality and a policy tackling pornography) were immediately rejected by the Council. In the current state of affairs of the European media and cultural market, the commercialization of cultural industries has not left much for the PSBs in most European countries. The commercialization of content in the public sector indicates the shift of cultural products towards easily consumable artifacts that imitate rather than innovate. The usual suspects here are the main beneficiaries: media and communications technology conglomerates dominate the market through vertical and horizontal integration of services and production (e.g., TVinsite 2002). Despite this gloomy picture, a significant boost in national and local production in the EU and an increase in the distribution and consuming of European works has held the domination of Hollywood at an all time low of 66 per cent (European Audiovisual Observatory 2002). This encouraging change (which cannot be taken for granted or as a permanent feature of audiovisual statistics) owes a great deal to policies establishing funds, space, and programs for the active development of the industry vis-à-vis the American domination of such products. Responding to the Commission’s monitoring report on the TVWF effect in European countries, the EP (2001) calls for further amendment to the Directive to include technological development despite the Commission’s suggestion for the opposite. A new amendment would be of particular interest, as it would demonstrate continuity or changes in the debates led by the EP.

Limits of Resistance to Cultural Imperialism In the EU but also in areas of “free” trade agreements, the trading in cultural goods is subject to a number of factors that influence the content of these goods. Marketability, which in turn depends on other factors such as language, accessibility, easiness of use, and consumption, is a major determinant in the production of cultural and media goods. Cultural domination is part of a constant process of negotiation that includes moments and spaces of resistance and that occasionally allows the creation of avenues

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for self-expression. In its current “struggle” to protect European cultural spaces, the EU (predominantly through the EP and not necessarily in its entirety) has concentrated on the threat coming from “across the ocean.” In that respect, so-called “protectionist” policies such as content quotas or support for indigenous production consider only the threat from outside. Inner-European expansions and forms of cultural and market domination are being shifted to the margins. The commercialization of cultural spaces through ownership concentration, market control through linguistic domination, and other imperatives of the cultural sphere of symbols and fashion (where trends may dictate what is acceptable or parochial) are aspects of forms of cultural domination that do not attract the attention of policymakers. For example, the political economic dimensions of gender-based inequalities in access, skills, and participation in cultural expression are similarly part of the generalized discourse of “social exclusion.” The harmonization of laws and the unification of the market in the inner-European space legitimate the dominance of economically privileged countries and actors, as well as those cultural and social elements that already have the benefit of pre-established dominance in the cultural and market spheres. The limits of resistance to processes of cultural imperialism are reflected in the degree to which national industries have been supported vis-à-vis “foreign” ones. In that respect then, the EP has certainly provided valuable advocacy for national PSBs and domestic productions. It has also mobilized training programs, achieved a very moderate but nonetheless secure funding system for European works, and intervened in matters of content provision. As its own raison d’être would assume, it continues to defend the political significance of the cultural sphere in the prospect of international agreements (WTO negotiations, position in the light of the WSIS, etc.). Cultural and media policies take into account future developments in the field of culture and communications. Even the policies of the allegedly most pro-free-market nation (US) are protectionist of its own domestic corporate products by imposing very strict controls over the import and distribution of European works in the US (European Audiovisual Observatory 2002). “Protectionist” policies of national cultural production are a direction often adopted by nation-states to protect national markets and capital. However, this is not identical to the proactive support of independent producers and grassroots authors from local or trans-local cultures and communities. Governments are subjected to pressures from stronger nations with stronger market forces and are more vulnerable to media commercial interests (Galperin 1999; Hoffmann-Riem 1996). Are policies in the EU designed to truly boost indigenous cultural creativity, therefore resisting the effects of monocultural domination through media or do they contribute through the unification of markets and political apathy on behalf of the citizens (low electoral turn-out for example) to the legitimization of cultural imperialistic practices? Does European cinema deserve supportive policies to produce reactionary, xenophobic, or sexist images any more than commercial channels such as Sky and RTL with

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their action-hero Hollywood bliss? Is the protection of the interests of Bertelsmann vis-à-vis those of Murdoch in any real question? And is the role of representational politics to support inward commercialization or a culture that would promote political participation? One of the roles that the EP is called upon to fulfill is to provide a degree of legitimation to the European project. With this role comes unintended consequences of legitimating practices that do not necessarily provide resistance to forms of domination. Yet, resistance is provided in the space given for the debates over citizenship issues, the role of citizens as not just consumers, cultural entities in Europe, expression, and diversity. In that sense, the thesis of cultural imperialism is of particular importance for Europeans because it contributes towards a deeper understanding of the extent of American market domination in Europe, despite proactive measures to slow it down. But it also helps to identify similar practices of internal cultural domination at the expense of internal minorities and not market-driven creative and other public spheres. The possibility of debating an alternative to media and cultural consumerism, be it in the review of the role of the PSBs as important vehicles of such expression, provides an oppositional discourse to market sovereignty.

References Appadurai, A. 1993. “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy.” In Colonial Discourse and Post Colonial Theory, ed. P. Williams and L. Chrisman. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 27–47. Baker, C. 2002. Making Sense of Cultural Studies. London: Sage. Bobrow, D.B., H. Eulau, M. Landau, C.O. Jones, and R. Axelrod. 1977. “The Place of Policy Analysis in Political Science: Five Perspectives.” American Journal of Political Science 21: 415–33. European Audiovisual Observatory. 2002. Focus 2002 World Film Market Trends. Strasbourg: European Audiovisual Observatory. European Parliament. 1982. “Resolution on Radio and Television Broadcasting in the European Community.” European Communities, Official Journal of the European Communities, OJ No C87/109–112, 05.04. European Parliament. 1984a. “Resolution on Broadcast Communication in the European Community (The Threat to Diversity of Opinion Posed by the Commercialization of New Media).” European Communities, Official Journal of the European Communities, OJ No C117/198–201, 30.4.84. European Parliament. 1984b. “Resolution on a Policy Commensurate with New Trends in European Television.” European Communities, Official Journal of the European Communities, OJ No C17/201–205, 30.4.84. European Parliament. 1984c. “Resolution on Broadcast Communication in the European Community (The Threat to Diversity of Opinion Posed by the Commercialization of New Media).” European Communities, Official Journal of the European Communities, OJ No C 117/198–201, 30.04.19841985b.

Legitimizing Domination ][ C H A P T E R 6 ][ 91 Europäisches Parlament. 1985a. Bericht im Namen des Ausschusses für Jugend, Kultur, Bildung, Information und Sport über eine Rahmenordnung für eine europäische Medienpolitik auf der Grundlage des Grünbuchs der Kommission über die Errichtung des gemeinsamen Marktes für den Rundfunk, insbesondere über Satellit und Kabel (KOM(84)300 endg.). PE 92 783/endg. [European Parliament. 1985. Report on Behalf of the European Parliament Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Information and Sport. COM(84)300 final] Europäisches Parlament. 1985b. Europäische Medienpolitik in Verhandlungen des Europäischen Parlaments Nr.2-329/272 12.09.1985 [European Parliament. 1985b. European Media Policy in Debates of the European Parliament. Nr 2-329/272 12.09.1985] European Parliament. 2001. Report on the Third Report of the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee on the Application of Directive 89/552/EEC “Television without Frontiers.” A50286/2001 Final. Galperin H. 1999. “Cultural Industries policy in regional trade agreements: The Cases of NAFTA, the European Union and MERCOSUR.” Media Culture and Society 21: 627–48. Hamelink, C. 1994. The Politics of World Communication. London: Sage. Hesmondhalgh, D. 2002. The Cultural Industries. London: Sage. Hoffmann-Riem, W. 1996. Regulating Media. The Licensing and Supervision of Broadcasting in Six Countries. New York: The Guilford Press. Landau, M. 1977. “The Proper Domain of Policy Analysis.” In D.B. Bobrow, H. Eulau, M. Landau, C.O. Jones, and R. Axelrod. “The Place of Policy Analysis in Political Science: Five Perspectives.” American Journal of Political Science 21: 415–33. Lees, T., S. Ralph, and J. Langham Brown (Eds.). 2000. Is Regulation Still an Option in a Digital Universe? Luton, UK: University of Luton Press. Mattelart, A., and M. Mattelart. 1992. Rethinking Media Theory. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. McChesney, B. 2001. “Policing the Unthinkable” in Open Democracy. Available at . Mickunas, A., and J. Pilotta. 1998. Technocracy vs. Democracy. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Milward, A.S. 1992. The European Rescue of the Nation State. London: Routledge. Nentwich, M., and G. Falkner. 1997. “The Treaty of Amsterdam: Towards a New Institutional Balance in European Integration.” Online Papers (EioP) 1(15). Available at . Peterson, J., and E. Bomberg. 1999. Decision-making in the European Union. London: Macmillan. Raboy, M. 2003. “Media and Democratization in the Information Society.” In Communicating in the Information Society, ed. B. Girard and S. O’Siochrú. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development Ritzer, G. 2000. The McDonaldization of Society. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge. Robins, K. 1991. “Tradition and Translation: National Culture in its Global Context.”

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In Enterprise and Heritage: Crosscurrents of National Culture, ed. J. Corner and S. Harvey. London: Routledge. 21–44. Sarikakis, K. 2002. “Supranational Governance and Paradigm Shift in Communications Policy-making: the case of the European Parliament.” In Global Media Policy in the New Millennium, ed. M. Raboy. Luton, UK: University of Luton Press. 77–91. Sarikakis, K. 2004. Powers in Media Policy. Bern: Peter Land Academic Publishers. Schiller, H. 1969. Mass Communications and the American Empire. New York: Augustus M. Kelly. Schiller, H.I. 1996. Information Inequality: The Deepening Social Crisis in America. New York: Routledge. Screen Digest. 1998. Mergers and Acquisitions. Focus on Distribution Channels. Available at . Stevenson, N. 1999. The Transformation of the Media: Globalisation, Morality and Ethics. London and New York: Pearson. TVinsite. 2002. “Top 25 media Companies.” Available at . Veronis Suhler Merchant Bank. 2002. Communications Industry Report. Available at . Vincent, R.C., K. Nordenstreng, and M. Traber. 1999. Towards Equity in Global Communication: MacBride Update. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Wallerstein, I. 1974. The Modern World System. New York: Academic Press.

CHAPTER 7

Content Industries and Cultural Diversity: The Case of Motion Pictures Christophe Germann

any governments today grant public aid to national and/or regional audiovisual content industries to support local cinema and television production and distribution. The rationale underlying this state intervention is twofold: to preserve or create employment as well as to promote filminduced cultural identity and diversity. Under the common understanding of modern, liberal, welfare states, these industrial and cultural policies can be considered legitimate in a market economy as long as they are in the public interest. There is today a consensus among many policy-makers in the world that the cultural diversity of audiovisual content is of value on its own merits. In addition, cultural diversity is a prerequisite for the human right of freedom of expression and opinion that is essential for the well-functioning of democracies based on the rule of law (Germann 2002). Currently, the American film industry—i.e., the oligopoly of seven big Hollywood studios known as the “Majors”—dominates the audiovisual landscape in most countries of the world in terms of market shares. The Majors’ oligopoly (“Corporate Hollywood”) includes Walt Disney Company, Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., Paramount Pictures Corporation, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, Universal Studios Inc., and Warner Brothers. The Majors’ movies fill up to 90 per cent of the screens in many European countries. At the same time, less than 3 per cent of foreign films are shown in the American cinema and television market. These alarming figures may be interpreted as an indicator for a totalitarian threat caused by the fact that most aggressively marketed audiovisual content and works derived from it (i.e., literature, music, etc.) come from one single, largely homogeneous cultural origin. The American mainstream cinema and television audience has almost no other vision of the world than that imposed by Hollywood. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the supply of content from Corporate Hollywood drives the demand for this same single vision in almost all markets of the world on a scale that has never been reached before. Regional and national legislators may be instrumental in the quest for cultural diversity in the audiovisual sector. However, film laws must be adapted to a very dynamic environment. The current hegemony of the

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Hollywood film industry is not merely content related, but heavily relies on historically conditioned distribution structures and investment mechanisms that, in fact, often preclude cinematographic works from other origins from reaching their audience. In modern market economies certain private actors are in similar power positions as states. This is particularly true in the media sector where there have been numerous mergers. The Council of Europe and UNESCO, as well as many countries and regions, have recognized a threat to culture and democracy from dominant film market players imposing their largely uniform vision on the world that may cause, in the worst case, a uniform way of thinking: what the French call “pensée unique.” There is an increasing consensus among stakeholders that audiovisual goods and services cannot be exclusively qualified as content neutral merchandise, but must also be considered as a vehicle to carry ideas, ideologies, opinions, and values peculiar to individuals and to collectivities that are generating and sharing them at a given period of their history. Diversity in the offerings of films, therefore, becomes a necessity to maintain and promote democracy. As a matter of fact, freedom of opinion may only materialize if, in the case of films, the audience is given a real choice between more than one dominant vision. This consequently implies that freedom of expression is preserved. In turn, this explains the important role of states promoting local film production and regulating distribution and television broadcasting when the market fails to achieve cultural diversity. Under the Swiss Constitution, for example, the state is entitled on the federal as well as on the cantonal and municipal level to encourage local film production as well as cultural diversity by way of subsidies. On the level of the European Union (EU), we can mention the directive “Television Without Frontiers,” which sets forth program quotas in favour of European audiovisual content. This interference with market forces relies on article 151 of the EU Treaty. At the same time the interference of the state with market forces may bear the risk of public censorship. To find a balance between the interests at stake and to implement safeguards against publicly as well as privately generated censorship constitutes a great challenge for law- and policy-makers in the information age. The first part of this chapter examines the value and loss of cultural diversity in the audiovisual sector in relation to the worldwide hegemony of the major Hollywood film producing and distributing corporations. It also raises the question of whether there is a totalitarian threat emanating from private players having a dominant market position when they abuse their power in order to exercise private censorship against audiovisual content that refuses to disseminate a largely uniform vision of the world. In addition, it highlights the damage that market economies can cause to civil societies in the so-called “infotainment age” in the absence of enforceable legal safeguards implementing cultural diversity. The second part of the chapter offers a critical analysis of laws and policies that specifically promote the production and distribution of audiovisual content by way of public subsidies, quotas, and other means of state intervention in the market. Here the

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author outlines the conflicts resulting between national and regional cultural policies and global trade agreements such as the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and explores the complementary and alternative approaches to fulfill cultural diversity policies in the audiovisual field.

Globalizing Market Economies and Audiovisual Industries Cultural Diversity and the “Blockbusters” Phenomenon Public policies to promote cultural diversity in cinema should be discussed in the specific context of the phenomenon of so-called “blockbusters.” In cinema, this category of motion pictures tells the stories one has arguably almost no choice to avoid. Blockbusters are the equivalent of “hits” in pop music and of “bestsellers” in contemporary literature. Blockbusters, hits, and bestsellers have at least one feature in common: huge investments in marketing. How else can we define “blockbusters”? In a report completed in 2000 addressing an anti-trust investigation in the national film market, the Swiss competition authorities provided a more complete, although also more arguable, definition. According to this definition, which was inspired by prior Austrian and German cartel case law, a blockbuster is a motion picture that succeeds in attracting more than 100,000 people to the film theatres of Switzerland, i.e., in a small country of around 7 million inhabitants. In addition to this objective criterion, and most interestingly, the Swiss competition agency implied that the blockbusters’ success and the other movies’ failure at the box office were essentially related to their respective contents or “genres.” In this sense, the authority distinguished between “mainstream” and “art house” films. It stated that the former type carry popular contents (comedy, action, etc.) whereas the latter type address particular themes that may trigger the interest of smaller parts of the population only. Based on this reasoning, the competition agency came to assimilate blockbusters with mainstream films and to exclude other films from the blockbusters’ market (Wettbewerbskommission 2000: 4). Contrary to the approach of Swiss competition authorities, the assertion that box office success is mainly or even exclusively conditional upon content must be rejected. Rather, the popularity of blockbusters is mainly, if not exclusively, the result of immense investments in marketing (print and advertisement or “p&a”). These investments drive other films that do not enjoy similar p&a monies out of competition. In 2003, the average p&a investments per Hollywood blockbuster amounted to US$3 million (see press releases on ; for previous years, see Motion Picture Association of America 2002). These figures do not include stars’ wages that can reach an additional cost of up to US$30 million. Stars’ salaries, which are accounted as so-called negative costs—i.e., production costs of US$63 million on average per film in 2003—are highly relevant for marketing purposes since the stars’ function and value may be compared

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to trademarks with respect to attracting the audience. As opposed to the Swiss competition authorities’ rather arbitrary definition of blockbusters that focuses on box office success ex post or on content, one can perhaps more adequately define blockbusters as films that enjoy on the worldwide level average investments in marketing of approximately US$60 million; that is, p&a expenditures of over US$40 million and additional star expenses of over US$20 million. The audiovisual markets of most countries of the world are today clearly dominated by the oligopoly of Majors. The pattern that ensures this domination is simple: each Major produces around 30 blockbusters per year and provides as distributor the investments in p&a, including star expenses, of over US$60 million in average per motion picture in order to induce the theatre exhibitors’ demand for these types of films. The investments in marketing are arguably the most decisive incentives for film exhibitors to program blockbusters. Consequently, moviegoers must consume the content that the Majors have imposed on theatre exhibitors through their powerful distribution structures and their marketing investments. This situation is even worse when distributors use the so-called “block booking” methods—when a distributor rents blockbusters to exhibitors on the condition that the latter also show other films of lower commercial value from the same distributor. The blockbuster is in this way licensed as part of a package deal to saturate the screens. In many jurisdictions, this practice violates competition rules. Arguably, the audience’s demand is therefore largely irrelevant since the market relationship takes place between the Majors as producers and distributors (supply) and film exhibitors (demand). The dominant market positions of the Majors’ oligopoly leaves almost no screens for other content than for blockbusters from one single cultural origin, unless governments intervene on national and regional levels by way of cultural laws and policies aimed at promoting diversity in the audiovisual offering (Germann 2004).

Trade Liberalization and the Meaning of Motion Pictures Trade liberalization has been a common and historic trait of federal structures. For example, the creation of a common market was one of the driving forces in the founding of the United States of America in the eighteenth century, the Swiss Confederation and Germany in the nineteenth century, and the European Communities and Union in the twentieth century. While constitutional programs dismantling interstate trade barriers can frequently be found at the beginning and early stages of developing federal structures, it is interesting to observe that such narrow functionalism eventually gives way to broader, and more extensive, policies. As time passes, federations turn increasingly to flanking policies accompanying the dismantling of trade barriers and the creation of appropriate conditions of competition (Cottier and Germann 2001). In today’s information age, flanking policies to maintain and promote cultural diversity have become

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a vital necessity for societies adhering to forms of liberal democracy based on the rule of law. However, state intervention aimed at encouraging the production and distribution of local audiovisual content is increasingly challenged in the context of the “rule of law induced globalization” process. As opposed to factual globalization mainly caused by technological development such as the Internet, the “rule of law induced globalization” means the removal of national borders relevant to trade by way of international agreements concluded between countries. This economic integration process usually starts with respect to tariff (custom duties) and non-tariff (quotas) barriers to trade. The rationale leading states to open their national markets to goods and services from abroad relies on economic grounds (theory of comparative advantages) as well as political ones (market integration as a peace maintenance tool). Today normative globalization in the audiovisual sector is being affected by the international trade rules of the WTO. Within this context, it is important to highlight the controversy over the terminology used in relation to motion pictures that has emerged during negotiations over the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the WTO agreement dealing with trade in services. A key question raised in GATS negotiations is whether cinema is “entertainment” or “culture.” In a nutshell, the Hollywood film industry has argued that motion pictures are entertainment and, thus, goods and services that should be fully subject to international trade liberalization rules. On the other hand, the EU and other regions and countries consider motion pictures also as cultural achievements that should enjoy a special treatment. Formally, audiovisual contents fall under the scope of application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—films traded as tangible goods, e.g., DVDs—and GATS—films traded as services, i.e., dissemination of films through theatrical release, broadcasting, or otherwise. In the context of an assessment of international trade in the audiovisual sector, the WTO Secretariat has stated: Audiovisual services typically reflect the social and cultural characteristics of nations and their peoples, and are consequently regarded as being of great social and political importance. For these reasons, government regulations and public support programs play a major role. The regulations on audiovisual services concern not only social and cultural issues, but also the promotion of domestic industry and foreign content restrictions. (WTO Secretariat 1998: 1)

On the regional level, the European Commission has described the special role of the audiovisual sector, noting: The audiovisual media play a central role in the functioning of modern democratic societies. Without the free flow of information, such societies cannot function. Moreover, the audiovisual media play a fundamental role in the development and transmission of social values. This is not simply because

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they influence to a large degree which facts about and which images of the world we encounter, but also because they provide concepts and categories— political, social, ethnic, geographical, psychological and so on—which we use to render these facts and images intelligible. They therefore help to determine not only what we see of the world but also how we see it. The audiovisual industry is therefore not an industry like any other and does not simply produce goods to be sold on the market like other goods. It is in fact a cultural industry par excellence. It has a major influence on what citizens know, believe and feel and plays a crucial role in the transmission, development and even construction of cultural identities. This is true above all with regard to children. (EC Commission 1999: 7–8)

To qualify, for example, Roberto Begnini’s “La vita e bella” or Steven Spielberg’s “Schindler’s List” as mere entertainment obviously lacks substance. Moreover, one cannot deny that audiovisual works are by far the most expressive and, thus, efficient goods and services to widely disseminate more complex content in the form of essentially subjective and relative values, ideas, ideologies, etc. During World War II the anti-Semitic motion picture “Jud Suess” by the German director Veit Herlan became a big blockbuster in the countries occupied by the Nazis and their allies. Millions of moviegoers saw this film, which was strongly promoted and efficiently distributed by Goebels’s propaganda ministry. Today, it is kept under lock and key in certain cinematheques that grant access only to a limited audience of researchers. In contrast, the car Volkswagen, another good that was heavily promoted by the Nazis, still enjoys a great popularity today. This example clearly illustrates the difference between films and other goods and services. In times of peace, motion pictures remain a carrier for stories that are never ideologically or politically neutral. This characteristic can be very harmful; for example, many Wild West movies produced by the Hollywood Majors half a century ago celebrated the genocide of Native Americans. One may remember hearing lines recited by cowboys such as: “The only good Indian is a dead Indian.” Some of this content is disseminated by televisions today. Audiovisual content is a source of substantial profit. This explains why the audiovisual sector is and remains a highly sensitive sector of international trade. The interests of the advocates of free trade are obvious. In the US, the content industry is the second most important exporter after the aviation industry. In addition, film can also be an efficient tool to advertise other goods and services from the domestic market to consumers in foreign markets. The meaning of a motion picture is to be seen and interpreted by an audience. When the audience cannot see a motion picture because dominant market players block access to it, the motion picture no longer has any meaning. This is the fate of a majority of motion pictures today. Ironically, to a large extent, this situation also renders Hollywood blockbusters rather meaningless (even if they have real artistic and entertaining qualities), since they do not compete against motion pictures from

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other cultural origins on a level playing field. Would the Mona Lisa smile the same way if she hung all alone in the Louvre? The motion picture “11/09/01 September 11” is a good example that illustrates the substantial value of cultural diversity in cinema. Eleven filmmakers, each from a different country (Samira Makhmalbaf, Claude Lelouch, Youssef Chahine, Danis Tanovic, Idrissa Ouedraogo, Ken Loach, Alejandro Gonzales, Innaritu, Amos Gitaï, Mira Nair, Sean Penn, and Shohei Imamura), were asked by French producer Alain Brigand to come up with a short film relating to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. The only artistic restriction was that each individual film must last precisely 11 minutes, 9 seconds, and 1 frame. The resulting collaboration offers diverse geographical, cultural, and artistic perspectives on those tragic events. This compilation of short films, however, was denied satisfactory commercial distribution in the US. One may argue that this gives the film the characteristic of being another example of market censorship stemming from the dominance of the Hollywood Majors. For the advocates of cultural diversity, the moment has come for an open debate on the totalitarian threat that homogeneous audiovisual content can cause to civil societies in a world that is no longer divided into two ideologically competing superpowers and is now facing new challenges on the global level. Among the specific questions that should be addressed, we can list the following: • If cinema, or music and literature are to be considered as mere “entertainment,” where are the frontiers with “infotainment” and, ultimately, “information” in today’s so-called “Information Age”? • What does it mean for a society to consume cinema, music, literature, and information of all kinds that come almost exclusively from one single cultural origin, the US one, and, beyond that, from one single largely like-minded oligopoly within this nation, the Hollywood Majors? • What are the implications of this situation for a society whose own identity is jeopardized by a dominant identity that seems to reject the idea of diversity of identities? • What does the extinction of the variety of audiovisual identities (“iconocide”) and, thus, of cultural diversity, mean for the various societies of this planet? • Can largely uniform content resulting from a lack of cultural diversity in the audiovisual sector harm freedom of speech and, eventually, damage the political decision-making process in liberal democracies based on the rule of law? It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide conclusive answers to this list of questions, which is anyway not exhaustive. An increasing number of international and regional organizations, countries, and NGOs in the world explicitly or implicitly fear that content industries having an overwhelmingly dominant position on the marketplace may constitute a threat for culture

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and democracy in the absence of safeguards ensuring cultural diversity. When certain content providers are able to impose their own vision in a way that drives almost all other providers of alternative visions out of business, the worst case scenario may happen: individuals ultimately start to perceive the world in a uniform way and to think, feel, and act accordingly. One should, however, critically question whether the overwhelming domination of content from Hollywood Majors in terms of market shares could eventually contribute to setting up a totalitarian type of regime. Up to now, there is no conclusive evidence that such a causal link exists. This assumption needs further investigation. For the time being, I suspect that the loss of cultural diversity in cinema has detrimental effects on democracy as well as on the non-material welfare of humanity. As such, it is my recommendation that cultural policy- and law-makers act without delay based on the precautionary principle. This concept is drawn from international environmental law, according to which states are entitled to take measures against a threat, even if there is no full scientific evidence as to the accuracy of such an assumption at the time when the contemplated measures are taken.

The Quest for a Definition of Cultural Diversity Based on several initiatives from countries and regional organizations, in the fall of 2003, the 32nd General Conference of UNESCO gave its directorgeneral the mandate to elaborate a first draft of an international agreement on cultural diversity within two years (for a detailed analysis of the early progress of this initiative, see Bernier 2004). Existing proposals of international legal instruments to promote and maintain cultural diversity have in common that they contain declarative statements rather than enforceable rules. In particular, they are weak with respect to dispute settlement and sanction mechanisms. Thus, if an international agreement on cultural diversity based on these drafts come into conflict with WTO agreements, contracting parties will be likely to comply with the rules of the latter instruments and violate their commitments to cultural diversity. This is the reason why it is important to explore complementary and alternative legal means to efficiently implement and enforce policies promoting cultural diversity. What type of goods and services should enjoy a special treatment under international trade rules? International trade of military equipment, for example, remains subject to the full sovereignty of states since they were kept outside of the scope of application of WTO law. Why is this not the case for films? One of several possible answers to this question is that the negotiating parties could not find a consensus on the meaning of motion pictures at the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994. The terminology used at that time is illustrative of the dichotomy of the approaches. The US qualified motion pictures as “entertainment,” whereas the European Community took the position that they are “culture.” Film is one of the most important items of export of the American economy, and, thus, this country required that all barriers to international trade of audiovisual goods

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and services should be removed. France, together with the European Community, first tried to negotiate a so-called “cultural exception” for films, i.e., to fully exclude them from the scope of application of WTO rules. This position was rejected mainly due to heavy pressure from the US, and the new body of WTO rules, in particular GATS, eventually included films. Based on GATS, the WTO members undertook to further liberalize the audiovisual sector at the latest by the end of a period of ten years that expires in 2005. These negotiations are currently underway (for a stocktaking of the negotiations, see Graber 2004). From the legal perspective, opponents to a special treatment of audiovisual goods and services based on their cultural specificity argue that the concept of culture is too vague for rules of law, which must be predictable. The main challenge for legislators is, therefore, to find a workable definition of culture in the specific context of international trade rules tailored to audiovisual goods and services. The attempt to come up with a definition of “culture” that is workable for the purposes of international trade rules requires that attention be focused in particular on the interrelationship of the concepts of “content for a mass audience,” “cultural origin,” and “market shares.” The following working definition I propose, which can serve hopefully as a basis for further discussion among all concerned stakeholders, shall be limited to cultural diversity in cinema, although one could also adapt the reasoning pertaining to this area to discuss cultural diversity in other fields such as literature and music. For our specific purposes, “content for a mass audience” can be defined as audiovisual goods and services that carry any kind of information (fiction or documentary) to a large public. Criteria to define the term “cultural origin” would include certain cultural classification criteria such as the national, ethnical, sociological, and religious circumstances of the creators (screenwriters, directors, actors, cameramen, sound engineers, set designers, musicians, editors, etc.) and of the investors, producers, and distributors; the film language; the stories and ideologies underlying the stories; and the original language of the dialogues and the shooting locations of the motion pictures at stake. In turn, “market shares” of content for a mass audience should be computed in terms of gross revenues from theatrical release, broadcasting (including ways of disseminating content by cable or wireless), home video (hard copy) sales, and new media such as the Internet, and should reflect diversity of cultural origin. Although space limitations prevent me from undertaking the detailed discussion required in order to flesh out such a definition, we can take the issue of language as a concrete example to explore a possible definition of cultural diversity in cinema. This example may also highlight the role of other so-called cultural industries in their relationship with cinema, i.e., the interaction between film, books, and music, as well as the role of media in general. Under the global marketing strategy patterns designed and followed by Hollywood Majors, a blockbuster (motion picture) often generates a bestseller (book) and a hit (music), and vice-versa. The predominant original language used in connection with content for a mass audience is

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English. Does the language influence the content for a mass audience? There is little doubt that the language drives creators through certain mental channels that will shape the contents they generate. Today, it is more likely that a novel originally written in English becomes a bestseller and will, as such, eventually be adapted to a screenplay. The same rule applies in the music business for songs. Screenwriters, directors, and actors have therefore better chances to reach a mass audience on the international level if they use English as their working language. Accordingly, the mass audience will consume films, books, and music originally created in English. This triggers consuming habits that eventually become very hard to overcome. Although local languages will always find a niche in their respective home markets, the demand for contents in original languages of countries other than English will decrease and, in the worst case, fully disappear. In this light, market shares of motion pictures and other contents become a reliable indicator with which to assess the degree of cultural diversity with respect to language and, consequently, to the whole media. This assessment takes on particular significance if we demonstrate that the box office success of blockbusters is marketing rather than content related and, accordingly, that the supply of blockbusters drives its demand. In a nutshell, this current market situation prevents content from other cultural origins, except the one dominating the market, to reach mass audiences. These mass audiences, in turn, are denied the right to freely choose contents from other cultural origins than the one dominating their market because another no longer exists. We call this “market censorship.” My hypothesis is that market censorship contributes to the destruction of the cultural wealth of humanity and violates the freedom of speech of individuals, i.e., creators and moviegoers, because I understand cultural diversity in cinema as a “global public good” and as a prerequisite for freedom of expression and opinion (Germann 2002). In the next section of this chapter, I offer a critical analysis of instruments that can be used to promote such cultural diversity.

Instruments to Promote Cultural Diversity in Cinema Are Subsidies and Quotas the Only Tools? The classical tools of states to promote cultural diversity in cinema are subsidies and quotas. Subsidies are typically granted for the production, distribution, and exhibition of local films. In order to accumulate more funds for single film projects, many countries have concluded so-called international co-production agreements that grant national treatment to these projects. In this way, the producers can apply for subsidies in all countries bound by such agreements. These agreements moreover require creative communities to work together across national borders. Television program quotas favour the broadcasting of local films. In addition, governments often also support film-related events and efforts such as festivals, archives, etc. There

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are two main systems for distributing public aid, one based on quality assessment of projects by “peer reviews” (so-called “selective aid”) and the other conditional upon box office success (so-called “automatic aid”). This aid is supposed to be used primarily to maintain and promote national identities with respect to cinema. In theory, supporting a multitude of such identities helps generate diversity. We can expect many policy-makers to suggest that a substantial increase in subsidies may generate more cultural diversity in cinema. The European Communities’ Airbus program in the 1970s illustrates this approach by analogy. Huge amounts of public monies were spent to build up an aviation industry in Europe capable of competing with Boeing. This program eventually succeeded so that Airbus registered in mid 2001 more orders than its American competitor. However, this model is an expensive undertaking and would contradict the binding rules of WTO law today. One can therefore be skeptical about whether a political consensus may be found on the level of the EU to reiterate this exercise in favour of European audiovisual industries. Moreover, on closer examination, this approach may turn out to be detrimental to the very cause of cultural diversity in cinema, as it would probably cause further inflation of marketing expenses. Last but not least, these types of instruments are out of reach for most economies in transition, developing countries, and least developed countries where scarce public monies must be committed to other priorities.

Intellectual Property Protection Standards As an alternative to costly public aid, one may envisage less intellectual property protection. Indeed, lower copyright and trademark protection standards are likely to reduce excessive investments in stars and p&a for blockbusters and, thus, provide more equal opportunities to audiovisual content providers from various cultural origins to reach a broader audience. For the time being, this line of reasoning is heretical in the audiovisual field. One can, however, draw parallels to the discussions taking place in the agricultural and pharmaceutical sectors with respect to the appropriate levels of intellectual property protection in relation to the fulfillment of policies pertaining to food security (biodiversity), public health (access to essential medicine), and cultural diversity (freedom of expression and opinion), respectively. Could big scale, Napster-like, private use over the Internet or, as the case may be, even systematical copyright and trademark infringements (i.e., piracy) of audiovisual works favour cultural diversity as it hurts media giants? One may come to the conclusion that some erosion of copyright and trademark protection may reduce excessive investments in advertisement by market-dominating content providers to the benefit of the dissemination of motion pictures from other origins that are now being precluded from reaching a broader audience (compare also Smiers 2001: 3). There is consensus among industrialized countries as well as many countries in transition and bigger developing countries like Brazil or India to

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protect intellectual property and to sanction certain forms of copyright violations even as criminal offences. In particular media corporations are eager to enforce strict copyright and trademark protection against pirates who infringe their exclusive rights in a commercial manner and to lobby governments to implement and enforce corresponding legal arsenals. One of the rationales underlying the grant of exclusive rights consists in providing incentives for qualified creative achievements. Authors and investors therefore advocate high standards of copyright protection. On the other hand, too much protection is detrimental to the interest of the users and, in certain instances, the society at large as it increases the price of the protected goods and services. This is particularly true with respect to the huge accumulation of capital fueling the production and distribution of blockbusters. These investments, which are protected by intellectual property laws and are channelled to marketing rather than creative efforts, drive most of Hollywood’s competitors out of the market. The following formula can be used to express the basic threat at stake: TMC = SPA = TMC (where “Trade Mark and Copyright” equals “Stars, p&a” equals “Total Mono Culture”). In this light, allowing the erosion of intellectual property rights could contribute to promoting diversity in audiovisual content offerings as it works against predatory competition. One may argue that copyright and trademark piracy might deter investors from spending a lot of money predominantly for marketing purposes. These investments would no longer be efficiently protected once exclusive rights systematically fail to work due to large-scale piracy. On the other hand, however, we do not deny the legitimacy of carefully designed authors’ rights as an incentive for creativity that is beneficial to creators as well as to society. As in other sectors such as agricultural and pharmaceuticals, legislators must find a new balance between private property and the public interest to fulfill legitimate policy goals. Concretely, one may, for example, advocate for shorter terms of copyright protection and international exhaustion for audiovisual works enjoying stars and p&a investments that exceed a determined amount. From the perspective of the public interest, one should recall that the purpose of authors’ rights is primarily to provide an incentive for creativity. This implies that copyright should not be abused to encourage excessive marketing investments that arguably damage cultural diversity in cinema. The same can be argued for trademark protection.

Competition Laws and Policies By granting subsidies, i.e., public monies dedicated to the achievement of certain tasks performed by private parties, the state can specifically encourage the production and dissemination of local audiovisual content. The rationale underlying competition laws, in contrast, is to foster economic efficiency within the market among producers for the benefit of consumers in particular and society in general. In many jurisdictions, including the European Community, regulations on subsidies are closely linked to

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competition law. It is indeed in the nature of subsidies to distort competition. On the other hand, subsidies are often the costly remedy against the anticompetitive behaviours of private parties abusing their dominant market position. Such dominant market positions are often reinforced by strong intellectual property protection granting monopolies in form of exclusive rights (e.g., copyright and trademark). The story of the American film industry in its domestic market is a sequel of such behaviours, starting with Edison at the very beginning of film history (Puttnam 1997) and culminating with the “Paramount decrees.” In the landmark case of United States v. Paramount Pictures, et al., U.S. 334 US 1. (1948), the Supreme Court found the five Majors (Paramount, Warner Brothers, 20th Century Fox, Loew’s, and Radio Keith Orpheum) guilty of restraint of trade, including vertical and horizontal price fixing. The courts ordered the vertical disintegration of the industry and, moreover, required the companies (who would have owned or controlled all but a handful of the first-run theatres in the largest 25 American cities) to divest themselves of approximately one-half of the over 3,000 theatres they owned at the time. Some provisions of the consent decrees have recently been relaxed. In most countries of the world, India being a remarkable exception, film distribution is largely dominated by the Hollywood Majors’ oligopoly. Governments that want to seriously take care of cultural diversity in cinema are well advised to closely scrutinize the Majors’ behaviour within their national markets, and, if necessary, adapt their competition laws accordingly. Any move in this direction should take into account the fact that genuine competition may itself be an efficient instrument to materialize the concept of cultural diversity in the audiovisual sector. True competition, in this context, would require implementing rules that provide a level playing field among competitors from different cultural origins. This level playing field is far from existing. Indeed, we can even draw parallels between the former Soviet Union distribution system and the Hollywood Majors’ centrally planned and globally effective motion picture economy of today (Germann 2002). If cultural policy-makers decide to activate competition law resources, they should explore the so-called “essential facilities doctrine” under American law. In a nutshell, this doctrine “imposes liability when one firm, which controls an essential facility, denies a second firm reasonable access to a product or service that the second firm must obtain in order to compete with the first.” The Supreme Court first articulated this doctrine in United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). A group of railroads controlling all railway bridges and switching yards into and out of St. Louis prevented competing railroad services from offering transportation to and through that destination. This, the court held, constituted both an illegal restraint of trade and an attempt to monopolize. Because it represents a divergence from the general rule that even a monopolist may choose with whom to deal, courts have established widely adopted tests that parties must meet before a court will require a monopolist to grant access to an

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essential asset to its competitors. Specifically, to establish antitrust liability under the essential facilities doctrine, a party must prove four factors: (1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility to competitors. This test for antitrust liability has been adopted by virtually every American court to consider an “essential facilities” claim. Opinions of these courts also suggest that antitrust liability under the essential facilities doctrine is particularly appropriate when denial of access is motivated by an anticompetitive animus—usually demonstrated by a change in existing business practices with the apparent intent of harming rivals. Given the varied contexts in which the essential facilities doctrine has been applied, courts have declined to impose any artificial limit on the kinds of products, services, or other assets to which the doctrine may appropriately be applied. As one court stated, the essential facilities doctrine does not unequivocally require that a facility be of a grand nature as suggested by the defendant, nor is the doctrine specifically inapplicable to tangibles such as a manufacturer’s spare parts. “The term ‘facility’ can apply to tangibles such as sports or entertainment venues, means of transportation, the transmission of energy or the transmission of information and to intangibles such as information itself” (Germann 2004: 104–06). Arguably, one could consider the Majors’ marketing and distribution oligopoly as an essential facility for content providers from other cultural origins to reach a broader audience on the world markets. In light of the market structure and mechanisms outlined above, the business practice known as “blockbuster strategy” in fact largely denies access to the audience by independent film producers and distributors. It would therefore be interesting to test before courts whether the current system that enables the Majors to concentrate total investments in marketing (stars, p&a) of yearly over US$10 billion (Motion Picture Association of America 2002) would qualify as an essential facility. An argument in support of this claim would be that the Majors’ oligopoly is able to attract these marketing funds because of its corporate and contract-based control of domestic and international film distribution. Obviously, one must expect that American courts will reject such a claim, most likely on protectionist grounds. Nevertheless, this line of reasoning may inspire legislators in other jurisdictions to elaborate competition rules based on the essential facilities doctrine, rules that are specifically aimed at enhancing a level playing field for audiovisual content providers of diversified cultural origins. Furthermore, this approach may substantially make cultural diversity in cinema economically viable without unduly relying on taxpayers’ monies.

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International Trade Rules From the perspective of neo-liberal hard-liners, national and regional subsidies as well as programming quotas are considered as obstacles to the international trade of audiovisual goods and services that have no legitimacy to remain in place. Typically, the state grants subsidies exclusively to its national producers. Audiovisual programming quotas typically favour the broadcasting of national content. Thus, the Majors argue that these subsidies are discriminatory against foreign producers and violate the socalled “national treatment” principle (also know under the abbreviation “NT”), one of the basic rules of WTO law. According to this principle, each state shall treat national and foreign products and services equally. Proponents of the free trade ideology allege that public aid in the form of subsidies and program quotas distort competition. As a consequence, they consider such intervention as detrimental to international trade in audiovisual goods and services. This is the Majors’ position: they want quotas removed and subsidies reduced to a minimum. In addition, they challenge so-called international co-production agreements, i.e., agreements between two or more states according to which a film is granted the nationality of all the states that are party to such an agreement. They argue that these co-production agreements violate another principle of WTO law, namely, the Most Favorite Nation (MFN) clause that prohibits economic discrimination between countries. The WTO agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) was and still is the source of profound controversy between industrialized and developing countries with respect to standards of protection (North-South conflict). GATS in turn caused and still causes severe tensions between the US on one side and the European Community and like-minded jurisdictions on the other with respect to the treatment of audiovisual services (East-West conflict). Although both agreements were formally concluded at the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994, they still contain substance for considerable disagreement. The main challenge for TRIPS is currently public health (patents for pharmaceutical inventions), and the one for GATS is cultural diversity (measures to promote diversified audiovisual content). In the latter case, the negotiating parties could not agree on a cultural exception. These negotiations are ongoing (for a detailed description of the 2003–04 round of negotiations, see Graber 2004). GATS qualifies as a personal minefield for the art of cinema. It is a bazaar where cultural services can be traded off against any kind of other services. For example, the Swiss government obtained from the American government landing authorization for Swissair during the Olympic Games in Atlanta in exchange for the removal of import quotas for Hollywood movies. The airline company, one of Switzerland’s prestige businesses, recently went bankrupt, while the arguably anticompetitive market access for Hollywood blockbusters still remains in place. This example, taken from the period prior to the entry into force of the WTO rules, illustrates the probable destiny of

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cinema under GATS. On the other hand, it is also possible that the applicability of GATS to the audiovisual sector could function as a defence shield against unilateral pressures such as American trade law weapons, specifically the Trade Act of 1974 addressing intellectual property. This piece of legislation grants to the American president the competency to use trade sanctions in retaliation against foreign countries that provide “unreasonable” or “unfair” trade measures. A positive feature of WTO law is that it sets limits to this type of law of the jungle. However, critical observers should question whether a further liberalization of international trade in audiovisual products and services, as contemplated by the currently ongoing GATS negotiations, can be justified without implementing a genuine level playing field for private parties engaged in the production and commercial exploitation of films. As a matter of fact, there is cultural discrimination in the valuable content between Hollywood and other cultural origins that is not addressed by international trade laws as they are now in force. The audience of cinema, television, and radio programs as well as readers of literature and newspapers should ideally enjoy the possibility to choose content from various cultural origins freely. WTO rules should therefore include multilateral rules on competition to promote cultural diversity on the global level. Alternatively, if such rules cannot be agreed upon within the WTO, its member countries will remain competent to legislate on the national level. For the time being, there is no multilateral agreement on competition in the WTO. Thus, the WTO member states remain fully sovereign to legislate in this area of law. States can adopt two approaches in order to promote cultural diversity laws and policies that are on an equal level with international trade rules when it comes to implementation and enforcement. The first one is to elaborate either on the national and regional or on the global level competition rules that are specifically tailored to address cultural diversity issues concerning content industries. The alternative or complementary approach is to reach a consensus within the WTO that “blockbusters” and films that do not enjoy the same marketing investment are not substitutable goods and services. In the former case, governments can induce and even oblige dominant market players to adapt their business behaviour in order to grant similar opportunities to audiovisual content from diverse cultural origins to reach a broad audience. In the latter case, a differential treatment between local motion pictures and foreign blockbusters would no longer be considered as infringing WTO law, in particular the NT and MFN principles, since these two categories of films would not constitute like products or services. In addition, governments may explore the possibility of taking advantage of the flexibility granted under the TRIPS agreement to adapt the standards of protection in a way that is more favourable to cultural diversity in cinema. Implementation and enforcement of intellectual property protection as provided by the TRIPS agreement is a costly undertaking for states (requiring revision of national laws, reform of judiciary and administrative

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institutions, “capacity building,” etc.). One can argue that these costs cannot be justified if they might harm legitimate cultural policies. Concretely, it appears absurd to protect the intellectual property of an oligopoly that practices cultural discrimination in a systematic way on a global level by abusing its dominant market position. Consequently, I suggest introducing two new principles into the discussion on culture and trade rules, namely, the principle of “Cultural Treatment” (CT) and the principle of the “Most Favourite Culture” (MFC). National legislators should require the strict application of these principles in exchange for enforcing intellectual property rights on their respective territories. These principles are inspired by the principles of National Treatment and the Most Favorite Nation clauses. Whereas the latter rules prohibit economic discrimination to supposedly promote material welfare (“comparative advantage theory”) through free trade, the former ones would prohibit cultural discrimination to promote immaterial welfare through cultural diversity, i.e., through the free exchange of contents (films, literature, music, etc.) from a diversity of cultural origins. In case of violation of the CT and MFC principles by public or private operators in the audiovisual sector, states may refuse to enforce the intellectual property of the infringers as an efficient sanction.

Introducing a Marketing Tax Based on statistical data from motion pictures released in the US and Canada, the economists De Vany and Walls (2002) come to the conclusion that the opening week is less critical for successful blockbusters than for unsuccessful films. Rather, they claim: “The movie-going audience cannot be manipulated and a movie will be a hit only if it engages a positive word-of-mouth information cascade” (quoted in Germann 2004: 85). These authors used the production costs (budget), stars, number of opening screens, sequels (“facsimiles of movies that people liked”), genre (action, adventure, comedy, drama, fantasy, horror, science fiction, etc.) and rating (admission age) as variables for their computation. However, they did not include advertising expenses. Accordingly, the conclusion that “movie-goers are able to break the information cascade when they share their private information through word-of-month information and review” may be accurate only for those motion pictures that enjoy comparable investments in their marketing. The producer Robert Evans said, in comparing a movie’s opening to a parachute jump, “If it doesn’t open, you are dead” (Litwak 1986: 84). One may add that you are dead anyway when jumping without a parachute—this being the case of all films that have not sufficient star and p&a power to open on a level playing field. Regulators could consider introducing a “marketing tax” on excessive marketing expenses. It may have a deterrent effect with respect to the blockbuster strategy and, thus, discipline the behaviour of market dominating corporations. It would contribute to rendering market mechanisms more transparent and, thus, inform moviegoers in an early stage about the

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real causes of the mass appeal of a blockbuster, i.e., marketing investments. Furthermore, it would contribute to stopping predatory competition induced by the blockbuster strategy. Monies raised by this tax could be redistributed to motion pictures of any cultural origin that do not enjoy reasonable advertisement budgets. In this way the marketing tax would not be discriminatory, and, accordingly, it should be considered as compliant with WTO principles. Tax considerations may be a strong incentive to materialize more cultural diversity in cinema. Since the size of marketing investments are closely related to the size of the territories in which films are first released, smaller markets are penalized as domestic opening places. As a matter of fact, a first release in the US and Canada is far more effective in terms of economies of scale in comparison to a large-scale premiere in Western Europe that is fragmented into various national languages. This factor is probably the main competitive advantage of the Hollywood film industry. In this sense, the marketing tax would also be a tribute to more equity on the global level since it would neutralize discrepancies in domestic market sizes.

Cultural Diversity as Enforceable Human Rights The human rights of freedom of expression and freedom of opinion are essential elements for democratic regimes based on the rule of law. Citizens need to enjoy these human rights in order to freely make up their minds and express their opinions. This freedom requires that citizens have access to a diversity of sources of information. Freedom of opinion may only materialize if, in the case of films, the audience is given a real choice between more than one single dominant vision. This consequently implies that freedom of expression is preserved. Here lies the important role of the state in subsidizing local film production and regulating distribution and television broadcasting. When producing films is no longer an economically viable activity, states should be entitled to intervene in order to preserve the freedom of expression. At the same time such state interference with market forces may bear the risk of public censorship. To find a balance between the interests at stake and to implement safeguards against publicly as well as privately generating forms of censorship constitutes a great challenge for today’s lawand policy-makers. As a matter of fact, as I stated at the beginning of this chapter, in modern market economies certain private actors hold similar power positions as states. This is particularly true in the media sector. Legal safeguards against censorship from public and private origins are thus necessary to preserve freedoms of expression and opinion. In light of the history of the American motion picture industry, one may question another aspect of human rights, that being whether talent or the colour of one’s skin determines success or failure in Hollywood. In 1996, the American human rights activist and Congressman Jesse Jackson asked the executives of Hollywood Majors to explain why no African American actors have ever received an Oscar in the entire history of the Hollywood film

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industry. Six years later, Denzel Washington became the first African American to win this prize. In this context, we will recall that the Oscar is one of the American film industry’s most efficient marketing tools. This example may inspire policy-makers to explore further routes, such as citizen empowerment initiatives, perhaps partly through the courts. One can think of granting a right to claim more cultural diversity to individuals. One can also imagine governments elaborating a system of class actions through which individuals and NGOs can challenge the policy of corporate content providers by using punitive damages against private corporations responsible for undermining cultural diversity. Here again one may draw from experiences gathered in other fields of public concern such as the protection of the environment or of public health.

Conclusion Cultural diversity in cinema is a complex matter, and the awareness of its full significance among citizens is still low. Cultural diversity is as important as biological diversity (see chapters by Dieter and Sauer and Hamm, Chapters 15 and 16, in this volume). Whereas biological diversity is essential to the physical existence of humankind, cultural diversity plays a comparable role with respect to the spiritual and emotional life of individuals and communities worldwide. There is a need to coordinate laws and policies on the national, regional, and global level in order to ensure cultural diversity. Market mechanisms have so far failed to preserve and promote cultural diversity in cinema, a diversity that is both a public good and a prerequisite of the freedom of expression and opinion. As a consequence, many states and supranational bodies such as the EU and the Council of Europe intervene today in the audiovisual sector by way of subsidies and other forms of public support. At the same time, the Majors seek to remove, or at least to reduce to a minimum, such intervention within the WTO, arguing that public aid distorts competition. In reality, however, one can argue that there is no level playing field in the audiovisual sector between the Majors’ films and motion pictures from other cultural origins. Overwhelming market domination by the Majors drives most competitors out of business. To avoid a “pensée unique” in cinema and, on the rebound, in literature and music, states must take action. I do not believe that international agreements containing mere programmatic clauses on cultural diversity will be sufficient. I therefore advocate further exploring the potential of competition and intellectual property laws and policies to improve the situation. Anti-trust legislation specifically designed for the audiovisual sector may also create a level playing field that grants equal opportunities to content producers from various cultural origins. For the time being, WTO member states remain fully competent to legislate in this area. When competition rules are set on the negotiation agenda of the WTO, states advocating cultural diversity in cinema should mobilize to draft an

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agreement that is specifically designed to encompass cultural concerns. With respect to content industries, such an agreement should work as a legal safeguard against abuses of dominant market positions that may damage freedom of speech and, eventually, the functioning of democracy. Legislators must also address the issue of intellectual property protection. High standards of intellectual property protection are incentives to proceed to excessive p&a expenditures for blockbusters, and, therefore, they are detrimental to films that do not enjoy comparable investments. In this sense, too much copyright may drive films from other cultural origins than the dominant one out of competition. On the other hand, certain standards of protection in the form of authors’ rights should exist as incentive for creativity and in order to guarantee to filmmakers more independence from subsidies granted by, and from corresponding control of, the state. Legislators who are eager to promote cultural diversity in cinema will therefore have the task of finding a new balance with respect to the standards of intellectual property protection. In addition, legislators should elaborate a new tax on excessive marketing, the receipts of which could be distributed in a non-discriminatory way to independent filmmakers to maintain and promote cultural diversity in cinema. This tool may turn out to be an effective mechanism for rendering transparent and countering the brain-homogenizing mass media influence on society caused by the current marketing dictatorship of the Majors. For instance, with 2 per cent of the average expenditures on stars and p&a of one single Hollywood blockbuster—i.e., US$1 million—an Arab film could be promoted in the US, thus ensuring that diversified contents find some access to the American domestic audience and providing American citizens with a less stilted picture of the world. Last but not least, the invocation of the human rights of freedom of expression and opinion may lead today’s dominant creative and entrepreneurial decision-makers in the film business to think about forms of self-regulation to create a level playing field among content providers from various cultural origins. There is a lot of intelligence and genuine passion for the art of motion pictures among artists in Hollywood that may overcome the private interests of short-sighted profit-makers in order to achieve a legitimate goal in the public interest: cultural diversity in cinema.

References Bernier, Ivan. 2004. “A UNESCO International Convention on Cultural Diversity.” In Free Trade versus Cultural Diversity: WTO Negotiations in the Field of Audiovisual Services, ed. C.B. Graber, M. Girsberger, and M. Nenova. Zurich: Schulthess. 65–76. Cottier, Thomas, and Christophe Germann. 2001. “The WTO and EU Distributive Policy.” In The Case of Regional Promotion and Assistance, in the EU and WTO: Legal and Constitutional Aspects, ed. G. de Bùrca and J. Scott. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 185–210.

Content Industries and Cultural Diversity ][ C H A P T E R 7 ][ 113 De Vany, Arthur, and W. David Walls. 2002. “Movie Stars, Big Budgets, and Wide Releases: Empirical Analysis of the Blockbuster Strategy.” Paper presented at the XIX Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society. Sao Paulo, July. EC Commission. 1999. Communication de la Commission au Conseil, au Parlement européen, au Comité économique et social et au Comité des régions, Principes et lignes directrices de la politique audiovisuelle de la Communauté à l’ère numérique, Bruxelles, 14 décembre. [COM (1999) 657]. Germann, Christophe. 2002. “Meinungsfreiheit in Zeiten der ‘Blockbusters.’ Das neue Filmgesetz und die kulturelle Vielfalt in der Informationsgesellschaft.” Zeitschrift für Immaterialgüter-, Informations- und Wettbewerbsrecht sic! 7 (8): 481–92. Germann, Christophe. 2004. “Diversité culturelle et cinéma: une vision pour un pays en voie de développement.” In Free Trade versus Cultural Diversity: WTO Negotiations in the Field of Audiovisual Services, ed. C.B. Graber, M. Girsberger, and M. Nenova. Zurich: Schulthess. 77–108. Graber, Beat Christoph. 2004. “Audiovisual Media and the Law of WTO.” In Free Trade versus Cultural Diversity: WTO Negotiations in the Field of Audiovisual Services, ed. C.B. Graber, M. Girsberger, and M. Nenova. Zurich: Schulthess. 15–64. Litwak, Mark. 1986. Reel Power: The Struggle for Influence and Success in the New Hollywood. New York: Morrow. Motion Picture Association of America. 2002. US Entertainment Industry: 2002 MPA Market Statistics. Available at: . Puttnam, David. 1997. The Undeclared War: The Struggle for Control of the World’s Film Industry. New York: HarperCollins. Smiers, Joost. 2001. “La propriété intellectuelle, c’est le vol!” Le Monde Diplomatique, October. Wettbewerbskommission. 2000. Schlussbericht vom 28. November 2000 in Sachen Vorabklärung gemäss Art. 26 KG betreffend Schweizerischer Filmverleih- und Kinomarkt (Reg. Nr. 32-0114) wegen angeblich unzulässiger Verhaltensweise gemäss Art. 7 KG und wegen angeblich unzulässiger Wettbewerbsabrede gemäss Art. 5 KG. WTO Secretariat. 1998. Background Note on Audiovisual Services, Geneva 15 June. S/C/W/40.

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CHAPTER 8

Cultural Imperialism, State’s Power, and Civic Activism In and Beyond Cyberspace: Asia’s Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) in Comparative Perspective On-Kwok Lai oinciding with the partial economic recovery of Asian economies, the so-called informational society is emerging (Castells 1996, 2000), in which the instrumental role of information and communication technology (ICT) in global capitalism is crucial. In this vein, Dan Schiller (1999) uses the term “digital capitalism” to describe how ICT networks are now directly affecting social, cultural, and economic change as never before on a global scale. At the other end of the Pacific rim (which forms a part of the global ICT chain), for instance, the US Commerce Department’s Third Annual Report (2000) on the Information Technology Revolution and its Impact on the Economy reveals, among other things, that information technology (IT) accounts for half or more of the improvement in productivity growth since 1995. Digital capitalism is predominantly a corporate-led market system globally transcended. For the first time since its emergence in the early twentieth century, the corporate-led market system no longer confronts a significant socialist adversary anywhere on the planet. Digital capitalism is also free to physically transcend territorial boundaries and, more importantly, to take economic advantage of the sudden absence of geopolitical constraints on its development (Schiller 1999: 205). More specifically for Asia is the experience of the boom and bust of its economic trajectory, which prompts nation-states and societies to reconsider their pro-growth development model (Drysdale 2000). Responding to the forces of globalization and the call for informational society, the state’s project of the planned development of “technopoles” or “technocities” becomes the iconography for futuristic high-tech society, particularly the ICT enhanced and intensive mode of production in the new millennium (Castells and Hall 1994; Downey and McGuigan 1999). These projects are being initiated in Asia to enhance national competitiveness in the global system and are

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1 This chapter is result of an on-going project funded by the Kwansei Gakuin University, Special Research Fund, School of Policy Studies Research Fund; and Research Fellowships at The University of Hong Kong, Centre of Urban Planning and Environmental Management, and the Department of Social Work and Social Administration. Special thanks to the editors of this volume as well.

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mostly initiated by the strong states: China, Japan, and Singapore (Singapore Government 1996; Olds 1997; Wu 2001).

Between Fantasy and Reality: The E-Government Initiatives Catching up to the real-time global competition, most East Asian economies, which have been supplying ICT equipment to the global advanced economies, are now attempting to make themselves more productive and efficient with the build-up of digital networking so as to be actively engaging in global e-commerce and e-government (Rao 2001). In spite of Japan’s undoubtedly most advanced system for high-tech production in the region, its ICT application in consumption and the governmental sector (except mobile communication) is lagging far behind the Scandinavian one. To change this, the government embarked on the project of “e-Japan” in 2001, aiming in five years to increase its domestic use of ICT for e-commerce and e-government to the level of that of other developed economies. Aided by government and corporate promotion, South Korea has its own e-government project: it wants to boost the country’s performance from the existing 30 million cell phone users, 22 million Internet users (half the total population), broadband access to 7 million households, IT exports worth US$51 billion (30 per cent of total exports), and an IT sector which accounts for over 50 per cent of the GDP, although it is currently number one in the world in terms of adoption of online stock trading, MP3 downloads, broadband access, and e-banking. South Korea mostly completed its e-government project by the end of year 2002. This project entailed: the “CyberKorea 21” plan for upgrading national information infrastructure (connectivity from 155 Mbps to 40 Gbps in 144 regions), an initiative to increase online government procurement (to save over $250 million), promoting the ICT sector, and providing affordable access and ICT training to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and marginalized sectors of society. A single website home page for e-government in South Korea has been created (www.egov.co.kr), over 65 per cent of government documents are now handled electronically, and more than 12 ministries have implemented knowledge-management systems. Furthermore, the government completed its 11 e-government projects in November 2002. At the society level, Korean citizens are also quite progressive in the use of online activism and have used the Internet to rally against corruption in government (www.NGOkorea.org). Taiwan, aided by its global strength in the ICT production sector (working as subcontractor or outsourcing agents for international personal computer [PC] brands), is also working hard towards e-government by boosting public and private demand with various e-initiatives, especially through the further liberalization of communication markets and promotion of e-communities at all levels of society (http://www/gov.tw).

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Similarly, postcolonial Hong Kong’s Digital 21 strategy, though belated, includes creation of e-business infrastructure via the “Cyberport” flagship project, liberalizing the telecom market, implementing e-government, and providing ICT literacy training for students. A one-stop website (www.ithk.gov.hk) and government-sponsored website (http://www.info. gov.hk) have also been launched, as well as community cyber points or telecentres for wider Internet access. All citizens will have smart cards for personal identification in the coming few years, which can also be used as an e-purse and for delivering government services. Further down the road, the Digital 21 agenda (www.digital21.gov.hk) aims to make Hong Kong a lucrative market for third-generation mobile services and an exemplar for the Internet2 initiative. Singapore is currently the top Asia-Pacific country in the implementation of e-government services. Its hardware and application set-up are mostly in place, and it is working toward creating a world-class government portal (http://www.gov.sg/), having evolved rapidly from basic Web presence and interaction features to transactions and full transformation. Its projected offerings include e-procurement, Customer Relations Management applications, personalization, polling, voting, and wireless services by 2005. China, though a latecomer, is in full run towards e-government for large cities. Three major cities (Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou) stand out as the ones who are taking the great leap forward, with the highest penetration rates for the Internet (over 30 per cent of households), and a ratio of 1 to 4.5 for mobile phone access versus fixed line.

The State’s Choreography of Cyber-Activism With the establishment of 3G mobile technology (led by the Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Company in Japan) and the further broadening of the bandwidth for wired communications in the East Asia region, more cyber-actions are possible and expected. And for the “Netizens” (or frequent Internet users), their behavioural repertoire will be further shaped in accordance with the information available on-time, real-time, just-in-time, and across the once geographically bound time-zone differences. In actuality, the foremost development of the informational mode in every aspect of society and economy can be represented by the round-the-clock global production, communication, and exchange regime (Castells 1996). This trend is being reinforced by a global regime of capital financing, supported by ICT, and its integration with the emergence of the so-called “informatic or telematic city” (Downey and McGuigan 1999; Graham and Marvin 1996). More challenging is the new demand for individuals and communities to react, with good interpretative power and judgement, to real-time global events, mediated by the ICT, with full and massive loads of information and representation. E-government initiatives are turning into mega-political projects as well. The fully integrated information and communications technologies, the wired and wireless communication, such as the Internet and World

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Wide Web, present officials in Asia with both opportunities and challenges. The Asian leadership is aware of its legitimacy question. To maintain its popularity and ideological governance the leadership can try to use the Internet to bolster crucial public support for even an undemocratic regime. Yet, by inviting public participation in and beyond cyberspace, it may be possible to create and maintain the political direction of the government. Hence, two-way communication between the ruling and ruled starts. For proof, witness the impassioned outpouring on Chinese websites following the American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. At that time, the People’s Daily newspaper—the central government’s official mouthpiece—established on its website a new bulletin board forum specifically designed to provide an outlet for patriotic fervour and anti-Western sentiment. Called the “Strong Country Forum,” it played a small but significant role in legitimizing among an elite, wired section of the population the Chinese government’s position that the bombing was deliberate (Kalathil 2002).

The Dynamics and New Opportunity Structure of Cyber-Activism Given socio-political conservatism in East Asia, the best scenario for e-mobilization might be that, like the case of the US, where 65 per cent of households have at least one computer and 43 per cent are connected to the Internet, the Internet today is a giant public library with a decidedly commercial tilt (Nie and Erbring 2000; Vogelsang and Compaine 2001). In the present administrative mode, ICT is being used more for processing hard information data and for conveying the outcome of government decisionmaking than for providing a forum for political dynamics and tests of political will or more soft, fluid data (Andersen 1995; Margetts 1999; Garson 2000). In other words, it is evidently clear that, up to now, ICT has not provided leverage for those who have been outside formal elitist politicking. This can be explained by the logic of the application of ICT in public-sector reform, that is, its administrative production/supply-side bias. E-government cannot replace the politicking in real life—making choices in bound conditions, at the individual level as well as in society at large (Alexander and Pal 1998). However, cyberspace does have the potential to open up new opportunities for political engagement of both the ruling and the ruled and for activism beyond traditional nation-state territorial boundaries.

The Ever-Expanding Cyber-Space: Embryo for Transplanted Cyber-Activism? The opportunity provided by the burgeoning development of the ICT market in Asia should be noted here. According to recent research (http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm) in 2003, Internet use continues to rise in Greater China (mainland China, Hong Kong, and

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Taiwan), with more than 65 million people aged five and above now connected to the Internet in mainland China. In 2003 Internet penetration was at 7 per cent of the Chinese urban population (22 million), which was less than that of Hong Kong at 67 per cent (4.5 million) and Taiwan at 49 per cent (11 million). Historically, another study shows that China has been slowly catching up with Hong Kong—during the six months between April to December 2000, the number of Internet users in China increased by 15.4 per cent, while Hong Kong recorded growth of just 9.7 per cent (http://www.iamasia.com). The same study shows that in mainland China, where many households do not have PCs, 39 per cent of Internet users surf the Web from work and 35 per cent log on from Internet cafés. In Hong Kong, the vast majority (85 per cent) of web users connect to the Internet from home, while only a quarter do so from work. Meanwhile, 40 per cent of Taiwanese Internet users go online from school. Far from the expected commercialization of the Internet, e-commerce penetration remains low across the region—only 20 per cent of Hong Kong Web users have purchased goods or services online, followed by mainland China and Taiwan at 15 per cent. This implies that, for individuals, the Internet is still informational and a communication space for the exchange of ideas, views, and knowledge no matter how serious/important/trivial they are. Hence, there is still ample room for the political articulation project to expand to cyberspace. More and more people from Asian countries are entering the borderless (wired and wireless) spaces of the cyberworld. For instance, the number of mobile Internet users in the Asia-Pacific region reached 34.4 million by the end of 2000, an increase of 29 per cent in three months (Dataquest, 18 April 2001). Yet, there is a geo-developmental difference: almost all of these users were Japanese or Korean. There were 26.8 million users of mobile Web services in Japan by the end 2000, and 7 million in South Korea. This is in line with the large increase in mobile phone use in the region: 52 per cent increase to 230 million in 2000, up from 151 million at the end of 1999. The region appears to be catching up to the US and Europe. Much of the growth in user numbers came in China where the number of mobile phone owners doubled in 2000 to 85.3 million, up from 43.3 million at the end of 1999. A similar sharp increase in mobile phone use was recorded during the same period in India (a 97 per cent increase to 3.1 million) and the Philippines (a 132 per cent increase to 6.3 million). More people are also hooked on the Internet: almost 17 per cent of China’s urban population now has Internet access, up from 5.9 per cent in March 2000 (China Daily, 26 June 2001), and a 2001 report from the China Internet Network Information Centre (18 July 2001) found that there were 26.5 million Internet users in China, up 17.7 per cent from the start of the year and up 56.8 per cent from July 2000. These are all signs of the increasing omnipresence of cyberspace (cf. Stefik 1999). Despite its incubating of individualism, profit, self-promotion, and greed, the increase of both wired and wireless communications in volume, bandwidth, and frequency terms

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can also help develop the size, power base, and influence to a critical mass for new, alternative politicking in cyberspace, which in turn can challenge the traditional political establishment. The present political systems in East Asia are highly problematic and can rarely resolve tensions and conflicts on issues of social development. The failure of the state to address social development issues has been criticized by political liberals inside and outside these countries, and this has often resulted in a form of transplanted activism with assistance from overseas. Apparent examples of such transplanted activism include the e-mobilization efforts of organizations such as the Association of Progressive Communications (APC, http://www.apc.org/) and the protest.net (http://www.Postest.net.org), which is now gaining a presence in East Asian countries. APC is a global network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) whose mission is to empower and support organizations, social movements, and individuals in and through the use of ICT to build strategic communities and initiatives for the purpose of making meaningful contributions to equitable human development, social justice, participatory political processes, and environmental sustainability. Their recent focus since the 1990s has been targeting newly industrializing economies in Asia. The Korean Progressive Network (Jinbonet), the mecca for the Internet information movement in South Korea, formally joined the APC in November 2001. The foundation of Jinbonet (http://www.jinbo.net/) has marked a great milestone in bridging international solidarity between progressive Koreans and the rest of the world. Jinbonet also has taken the lead in the operation of BASE21, a collective alternative media network created by a coalition of Korean civic and social groups. BASE21’s website (http://www.Base21.org/) was launched in August 2001. Internet activism can become very revolutionary in changing the modes of interplay between advocacy and empowerment, the power relationships between public service providers and users, and the governance structure (Alexander and Pal 1998; IDEA 2001; Walch 1999). The key issues here are the interactivity, active participation, and progressive agendasetting of the socio-political activists upon the political system they are in: virtual political communities could provide the opportunities for individuals to become instrumental in policy making. For the emerging political structure, electronic mobilization will be influential in broadening and deepening the scope and extent of democratic, participatory politics in and beyond cyberspace, including local and regional spaces. This development can be illustrated by the scheme outlined in Table 8.1. Obviously, the New Politics enjoys the comparative advantage of ICTenhanced media and strategies, and the organizational form of global NGOs tends to be cellular, networked, and mutually dependent with a more horizontal (as opposed to a traditional hierarchical) power structure. Some of the effects of the New Politics can be seen in the globalization (globalizationcum-localization) of sustainable development and ecological issues, which

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TABLE 8.1: Scheme of Traditional Mobilization and New Politics by E-Mobilization

Traditional Politics (territorially specific and rigid)

New Politics (transnational and flexible)

Traditional Mobilization

ICT-enhanced Mobilization

(person-to-person in real setting)

(in both real and virtual spaces)

Representative democracy captured by party politics

Public relations and media campaigns via mass media and Internet

New Social Movements (NSMs) before 1990s

Transnational activism E-democracy ICT-enhanced NSMs Cellularization of global NGOs* Globalization of the politics

Transnational activism organized by international NGOs

* Cellularization of global NGOs is the process of networking NGOs globally with mobile and cellular ICT.

are now articulated in multi-level, flexible time and spatial modalities and domains. These types of new political opportunity structures emerged in particular with the broadening of the extent, intensity, mode, and scope of political activities by e-mobilization (EM) (Cooke and Kothai 2001; Lai 2003).

The Abortive Mechanism: Content and Conduit Controls over Cyberspace Undoubtedly, the size and volume of cyberspace will develop on a progressive geometric scale. The latest estimates highlight that there will be 192 million Internet users in the Asia-Pacific region by 2005, up from 55 million in 2000. Internet access will rise at a compound annual growth rate of 28 per cent between 2001 and 2005 (Yankee Group, 28 June 2001). The main factors driving growth in the region will be deregulation and lowering of bandwidth prices, though these will occur at different rates across the region. Two of the main obstacles to growth will be poverty and illiteracy, while low PC penetration in India and China and various forms of censorship and barriers keeping people away from cyberspace (as in China) will also hinder growth. Perhaps the major threat to the healthy embryonic and transplanted growth of cyber activism and alternative forms of political participation (i.e., democratic e-mobilization) is from the censorship and counter-cyberactivism efforts adopted by undemocratic states in the region. There are various technological means of aborting cyber-activism, the main ones being content and conduit controls through various filtering and user-identifying mechanisms. There are several ways to prevent users from retrieving content that is deemed undesirable by a government blacklisting (not permitted) and white listing (permitted), as well as ongoing covert filtering and blocking. Below is a brief characterization of these in East Asian states.

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Singapore: Checking Contents in a Network Society The state of Singapore has experienced an uneasy encounter with ICT: despite its fervent promotion of the Internet and attaching an “e” to virtually all aspects of Singapore life—as in e-banking, e-commerce, e-government, and e-homes—e-political campaigns are strictly regulated (cf. Singapore Government 1996). Fearing that the Internet will become the platform for rumours to spread like wildfire during the election campaign in 2001, leaving the governing People’s Action Party (PAP) leaders little time to correct false impressions before people vote, the government proposed to introduce a new rule (separate from the existing Broadcasting Law) to control the content of “political” news (Associated Press, 15 July 2001). This example shows that the Internet is obviously a curse rather than a blessing for a political regime whose survival depends on controlling the media (Rodan 1998). In short, the liberating cyberspace of the Internet can have an impact in reshaping the political landscape, the redistribution of power and resources, and the culture of any nationstate—something that is obviously not wanted by undemocratic political regimes. The censorship rules proposed in 2001 were soon enacted into legislation. Bill 29 was introduced into the Singapore Parliament on July 25, and passed on August 13, 2001 (http://www.gov.sg/parliament/bills/data/ 010029.pdf ). The Singapore Broadcasting Authority’s official line on the legislation is that it “merely” requires registration of people engaged in online election advertising. Yet, critics claim that it will and has shut down newsgroups and the like that are discussing politics. The controversy lies in the way that the definition of election advertising is applied. Similar government censorship initiatives are being undertaken in Malaysia. A new Malaysian government agency, called the National Internet Advisory Committee, is being created to act as the highest authority for legislation and policy-making for the Internet. Officials intend to cut down the amounts of pornography that Malaysians can access, as well as curbing “slanderous lies or unsightly items” (CyberDigest, 31 May 2001). All forms of media are tightly controlled in Malaysia. Broadcasters and newspapers hold licences, which can be revoked at any time if “undesirable” reports or photographs are published (cf. Abbott 2001).

China: The Socialist Critical (Dis)Engagement with the Net Perhaps even more stringent than the situation in Singapore is China’s attempt to completely control data traffic, requiring all forms of registration and licensing with the authorities. Chinese authorities obviously see the same political need for securing overwhelming control over cyberspace (Clarke 1997; Lei 1997; Rodriguez 2000). Both content and conduit controls, licensing, and registration of users and providers of the Internet service, plus heavy penalties for unauthorized use are provided for. In October 2000,

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following a period of liberalization in the communications sector, the government put into place a regulatory framework with stricter controls on the operation and financing of Internet content and Internet service providers, through requiring a licence from the Ministry of Information Industry (MII). In February 2002, a government notice banned newspapers from downloading online stories for publication without censorship and urged them to promote social stability rather than observe objectivity in their reporting (http://www.ChinaOnline.com/). This censorship regime is uneasily positioned within the context of China’s online population in 2001 of 26.5 million Internet users (up 300 per cent from 8.9 million in 1999). Fifty-three per cent of these users were aged 18–30, 39 per cent were women, 33 per cent of use was for leisure, and 68 per cent had never made an online purchase (BBC News Report, 26 July 2001). In China, the wired (mostly elite) class has now expanded significantly, with official estimates in 2003 suggesting that more than 68 million people in China are now using the Internet, in addition to the 15 million using wireless (mobile phone) technology. The China case represents the default of an authoritarian regime on Internet control. For instance, Cuba has sought to limit the medium’s political effects by carefully circumscribing access to the Internet, while China has promoted widespread access and relied on content filtering, monitoring, deterrence, and self-censorship (Kalathil and Boas 2001). Stepping on the WTO platform for economic coupling with global markets, China has promoted widespread Internet access to capitalize on the economic potential of a booming information sector and technologically savvy workforce, while Cuba, less committed to a market economy, has been willing to forgo some of the Internet’s potential economic benefits.

Hong Kong: A Self-Regulatory or a Half Self-Censored Model? Under the “one country, two systems” formula, Hong Kong, vis-à-vis China, has a very different approach to regulating cyberspace. Before Hong Kong was returned to China by the UK on July 1, 1997, a rather sophisticated type of censorship already existed in Hong Kong’s Internet, particularly on the control of political mobilization in cyberspace under the Public Order Ordinance and other legislation enforced by the Police and Custom Services. The call for a more self-regulatory regime was mooted in 1996 for the printed and non-printed media with a self-regulatory scheme that would include an industry code of practice and a complaints handling system (Bryre 1998), but the proposal has not been fully adopted. Consequently, since 1997 the discretionary power of the state’s control over Internet content and conduits has been widely interpreted and enforced by different sectors of the state machinery. Instead of imposing a form of censorship, the Hong Kong Government “encourages” Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to come up with a code of practice and enforce it themselves (cf. Vito 2000). The exercise of self-censorship can be seen in the

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fact that there is more than one agency that maintains lists of socio-culturally objectionable websites and makes them available to the ISPs. Since July 1, 1997, the Telecommunications Ordinance has basically remained unchanged, and there has not been any direct censorship from the Beijing central government. However the phantom of self-censorship is creeping in. Perhaps an even more powerful censoring agent will be the forthcoming formal legislation to replace the existing “treason” clause with stringent controls on public media and publishing under Section 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law. In short, the Internet will be more closely monitored. Here, the China factor exerts both formal and informal influence on the contours of cyberspace; although the Hong Kong government does not restrict freedom of speech, the future of the Internet in Hong Kong is under the strong political influence of those personalities (like the Chief Executive’s pro-China nationalistic propaganda) who favour pro-Beijing voices and symbolisms in both the virtual and real environments which indirectly could still be influenced by Beijing’s political wind.

South Korea: A Democratic State’s Attempt for Content Censorship Despite its rapid (double digit) increase in broadband Internet and mobile phone users in 1999–2000, recently the Korean government tried to censor Internet content by legislating an act similar to the American Communication Decency Act (CDA) passed in 1996 in which the government and ISPs can officially control Internet content. The Korean act, however, has a different justification. While the CDA focuses on generally harmful content, the Korean act clearly specifies content harmful to minors. In reality, the scope for banning and control is much wider. The Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) has in effect implemented a policy that will require Internet content control software at all public PC centres, schools, and public libraries, implying that it can ban any of the more than 108,000 so-called “bad” sites run by software corporations making piracy software. The most problematic aspect of this is that the list of bad sites is subject to the discretion of the MIC (http://www.safenet.ne.kr). In response to this content censorship, a progressive network called the Collaboration Action Group Against Information and Communication Censorship (CAG), formed in the spring of 2000, led 65 progressive groups in Korea in lodging a protest against the ordinance. They fought against the proposal through various forms of on- and off-line demonstrations (for details, see http://www.jinbo.net). Because of these, the articles relating to a proposed Internet content rating system were deleted from the act that was finally passed. In short, the attempted content censorship was undermined by cyber-activism. The most active collective for Internetbased advocacy is the Korean Progressive Net (and its related website Base21, http://www.base21.org/). This organization led a 60-day hunger strike campaign (which ended on December 20, 2001) against the newly implemented Internet Contents Rating System, and CAG demanded the

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resignation of the Secretary of the MIC. Protests were also organized against the Internet and Communication Ethics Committee (ICEC), a questionable NGO reporting to MIC.

Japan: E-Government for Global Competition The e-Japan policy, started in early 2000, aimed to make full scale e-government services available in 2003 and to make Japan the world’s most advanced e-government nation by 2005 (http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/ it/network/priority/slide1.html). At the end of 2003, a 60 per cent Internet penetration and ICT literacy rate, with full scale e-commerce and e-business and a single portal for e-government service was established (http://www.e-gov.go.jp/). By the same token, improving online public debate is recognized by the ruling government as a big issue, but there are potential problems, like e-mail overload, that have yet to be overcome. The challenge is how Japanese society can get an all-party debate going on politics and policy, when most current public policy consultation is bilateral—the government seeks feedback and takes views into account, but it is not an ongoing debate as such. Despite various modes that exist in Japan to limit access and censor the content of the Internet, some initiatives are now being undertaken to embrace cyberspace for political purposes. Capturing the support of voters on the Internet is obviously a new project for the politically powerful agencies and elites, as well as a strategy for their survival in an e-politics era. In June 2001, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who at one time had a popularity rating of over 80 per cent, launched an e-mail newsletter and received over one million subscribers in less than a week. Although designed mainly as a one-way mode of communication (obviously, there is no way to react to over a million political questions individually in anything near real time), it does demonstrate the popularity, if not over-expectations, of the use of the Internet for political purposes. How far this e-politics can go remains to be seen; obviously, it will be a challenge for Koizumi to keep his promise “to work interactively with readers who send him their opinions.” More recently, the 2003 general election in Japan also provided evidence of the partial success of e-politicking. As it is almost impossible to deal with the numerous (say, 5 per cent of the one million subscribers) political opinions and requests, if and when enabled in the Koizumian Net, using public relations (PR) strategies and gimmicks seems to be part of the new, responsive, politicking process in and beyond cyberspace. Yet, as the saga of the resignation of Japan’s foreign minister, Makiko Tanaka, in February 2002, showed, advanced Internetbased PR communication networks between government officials and citizens can backfire. In this case, the resignation of Tanaka due to party in-fighting also contributed to a decline in the popularity rating of Prime Minister Koizumi to less than 50 per cent. In other words, e-politicking cannot and will not replace the blood and flesh of real politicking.

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On the other hand, though limited by funds, vis-à-vis the state’s project on e-Japan (another technopolis project for the informational society), Japan’s NGOs, inside and outside cyberspace, are also fighting against further governmental control and censorship of the Internet. Progressive groups have recently become critically engaged in cyberspace-NGO activism on Internet issues including privacy infringement and wire-tapping by the police. Like the Korean Jinbonet, the JCA-NET provides communication tools and a place for communication/information exchange for Japanese NGOs and unions. These Japanese non-governmental cyber-agencies promote social activism of various forms and modes, ranging from dealing with general social issues like the right-wing revision of history textbooks to lending support to antiglobalization protest movements.

Taiwan: Open, Anarchic, and Chaotic Cyberspace Until 1987 Taiwan (Republic of China) had a top-down, authoritarian regime like its counterpart in mainland China to control the media and the press. With the abolition of military governance in the late 1980s and the liberalization of the political regime in the early 1990s through numerous elections at all levels of government, it has now become the country with the only fully democratically elected government in the Greater China region. The democratization of the political regime opened up press and broadcasting freedom with numerous media suppliers in both wired and wireless modes. Since the 1990s, the media and cyberspace have been developing at quantum speed and expanding endlessly, while displaying idiosyncratic diversity and the complexity of freedom of expression and communication. The pace of development is almost anarchic, as some observers have put it (Chun 2000; Hsiao 1997). There are two forces shaping the post-1987 openness of Taiwan society in general and the communication sector in particular. First, gifted by its global production of ICT parts and subcontracts for global brands, and because of its state project of making Taiwan another Silicon Valley in the Pacific West, the government has been liberalizing the economy and especially the communication sector. A second force is the political liberalization project since 1987, followed by the end of the ruling era of the Kuomintang in 1990s. Together these forces have engendered a quantum increase in supply and demand for information, and hence also sociopolitical mobilization. In short, Taiwan has become the most liberated virtual and real space in the East Asia region.

Why Controls on the Internet Will Fail For different reasons, Asian states have adopted differential modes of censorship, as illustrated in Table 8.2. The most extreme forms exist in China and Singapore. Beijing, for instance, has responded harshly to the Falun Gong’s use of the Internet with a series of technological measures, restrictive laws,

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and well-publicized crackdowns, making it more difficult for followers to communicate and for anyone to access the Falun Gong’s website. On the other hand, the Internet has been so instrumental for economic development, even the socialist state has to keep it open. A further result is China’s attempt to promote its major cities as places for economic development and tourism (cf. Wu 2001), and the state’s obvious attempt to promote internationalism (i.e., through its bid for the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing). But occasionally, the Internet is shut down. News reports stated that China shut down nearly 2,000 Internet cafés across the country in July 2001 and that it ordered 6,000 to suspend operations and make changes (Reuter News, 23 July 2001). Perhaps because of the state’s control over the Internet, more anonymous cyber-cafés and cyber-stations are in operation, enabling people to evade tough content laws. In spite of this tight regime of control, a recent study on Internet users in five major cities in mainland China conducted by the Chinese Academy TABLE 8.2: Comparison of Cyber-Activism, Censorship, and Political Regime Economies

Cyber-Activism

Censorship

Political Regime

China

Minimally active: underground and illegal

Very tight content/ conduit controls by central and regional government

Chinese Socialist Authoritarian Low democratization

Singapore

Minimally active: underground and partially open

Very tight content/ conduit controls by ministries

Singaporean (Asian) Democracy Low democratization

Hong Kong

Emerging active: partially open

Tight content/ conduit controls with self-governed guidelines and self-censorship by ISPs

China’s appointed Chief Executive with minimal election Low democratization

Japan

Active Open

Tight content/ conduit controls by ministries

Democratic election in the Japanese way Democratization with apathy

South Korea

Highly active Open

Not-so-tight content/conduit controls by ministries

Democratic elected government Highly charged democratization

Taiwan

Highly active Very open Chaotic

Very loose and anarchic

Democratic elected minority government Highly charged democratization and liberalization

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of Social Sciences (CASS) in Beijing showed that users rely on the Internet as a primary source of information: more than half those surveyed said they used the Internet to find alternative political news. In contrast to the widely held belief that the Internet is more entertainment than politics, the study confirmed that users regard it as a political instrument. The study found that, in a quasi-authoritarian society, perhaps because of this political control, users regard the Internet as a political instrument, and 67 per cent of adult users agreed that it allows people the opportunity to comment on government policies. Moreover, more than 70 per cent agreed that the Internet allows people to “express their political views” and to learn about politics. Not surprisingly, the Internet won out over other media as a forum to express opinions of any kind. These figures confirm that the Internet can and will play a role in China’s political liberalization (South China Morning Post, 23 July 2001). Therefore, a perfect form of regulation does not seem to exist, as each regulatory method suffers from some difficulties (Hong 2001; Rodriguez 2000). The dynamism of economic development and the volatility of Internet communication, like the case in China, are incompatible with attempts to create a tight straightjacket of Internet control. The effectiveness of censorship is questionable, since such control itself creates a barrier against national economic development (Slevin 2000; Wu 1997).

E-Mobilization for Asian Democratization? Thanks to e-mobilization (i.e., using e-mail and mobile phone text messaging), anti-globalization movements emerged all over the world and paralyzed the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999, after about 1500 NGOs signed the anti-WTO declaration using e-mails and text mail (Brecher 2000: 83). Since then, the threat of social activists organizing through the Internet has affected the location decision for WTO and other international meetings. The Internet gives the leverage for ordinary people and social movements to fight with governments, big businesses, and the mass media. The information and ideas in cyberspace, bypassing the mass media, enable social activism to happen in global real time and create hope for the success of global engagements of civic forces with corporate and state influences (Goldstein and O’Connor 2000). But the Internet backbone is still controlled by developed economies: 50 per cent of the Internet communications among Asian countries are routed through the US because of infrastructure. The ratio of the Internet population in Asia Pacific and South East Asia compared with the total of the population in this area is about 0.5 per cent; East Asia is 0.4 per cent and South Asia is 0.04 per cent. The Internet population for OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries except the US is 6.9 per cent, while in the US itself, it is 26.3 per cent (UNDP 1999). The gap within Asian countries is also very deep: around 20 per cent of adults in the rich part of Asia are online, but less than 1 per cent of people in the poor part are using the Internet (ITU 2000). These figures confirm

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the digital divides inside and between countries in Asia. An overwhelming majority, and especially poor people in poor countries, who are the victims of globalization, do not receive the same benefit from the Internet as their rich counterparts. The appropriate use of ICT in social development is critical. Two reports released by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 2001 noted the important role of ICT in solving some of the social and economic ills of developing economies. The first report, in the ICT chapter of the UNDP Annual Report of 2001, noted that ICT can help solve poverty worldwide. The second report, released in July 2001 under the Digital Opportunity Initiative of the G8 Dot Force thrust, further noted that ICT can help solve the social ills of poor health care, education, and the environment (http://itmatters.bworldonline.com/news/news_07242001b.html; Waller et al. 2001). How to build up linkages between ICT and better political governance is arguably critical for sustainable human and social development (cf. Kenny et al. 2000). In the rest of this chapter, I address five different yet interrelated issues that need to be examined as part of any attempt to use ICT to promote such development. These include: the conditions for sustainable development, a specific agenda for Asian democratic development, prospects for e-mobilization and e-democracy synergy, the quest for new political culture and praxis, and the question of social equity and justice.

Cyber-Activism against Global Imperial Domination Undoubtedly, the path towards e-democracy is a long, winding, and rocky one. Recent decades have seen a shift toward a more flexible global production regime with a higher velocity and volume of capital flows across different economies. This has occurred alongside global economic restructuring, regional economic crises, and the rise of the “New Economy” built on basic theoretical assumptions of neo-liberalism (see Chapter 10 by Schui in this volume for a more detailed discussion of these assumptions). These have in turn reinforced powerful socio-economic transformations at the local level that are leading to a more divided, fragmented, and socially exclusionary society, which features both high-paid jobs and permanent unemployment. Hence, social inequality and social exclusion are two of the serious consequences of pro-economic growth and non-reflective, high-tech development carried out in the absence of considering the polarization of social life chances that is an inevitable product of widening poverty and the growing affluence of the few in a “divided society” (Castells 1996, 2000; Patterson and Wilson 2000; Wyatt et al. 2000). Recent militant protests at the venues of summits of the EU, the G8, the WTO, the International Monetary Fund, and World Bank have been forcefully articulating the fundamental contradictions between the haves and have-nots and visually exposing socio-economic fault-lines between the rich and poor, the developed and underdeveloped worlds. Operating at a global level with local activism, these violent scenes have become

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routine at international summits of the rich and powerful supranational agencies that control global capital. Though the potential success of these “anarchist-like” campaigns in obstructing global capitalism is questionable, they do show that those actively engaged in debates on the issue of the equitable share of benefits to be derived from economic liberalization and globalization projects can be rejuvenated through cyber-activism and e-mobilization. Obviously, e-mobilization also has a communicative role in facilitating “the speak up and act out” alliance formation in socio-eco-movements by those being victimized by the mainstream pro-growth development model. Representing the victims, and potential victims, as well as advocating for nature at large, environmental NGOs have sharpened the demands for global sustainability. Whether cyber-activism can be used successfully as a tool for promoting sustainable development, however, remains to be seen (for more detailed discussions of the issues surrounding the earth’s ecological crisis, see Chapters 15 and 16 by Dieter and Sauer and Hamm in this volume).

Prospects of Asian Cyberspace Activism and E-Democracy Synergy E-democratic initiatives and mobilization are intertwined with socio-civic liberalization—like the case of Taiwan, they reinforce each other. Yet, two facets of e-mobilization in Asia should be stressed. On the one hand, the future prospect for the e-mobilization project seems to be promising, because there is still enormous room for expansion. So far, the e-mobilization project is anchored on various sectors in civil society and in certain localities and regions, with sporadic and cyclic social protests/movements. This project can spread to other developing countries as their economies develop and allow for the further penetration of the Internet and ICT into household and civic sectors (Held 1999; Luke 2000). On the other hand, there are powerful forces to slow down the scope of e-mobilization. Asian states are deeply divided along religious lines (Confucianism, Buddhism, Hindu, and Muslim), political ideologies (democracy, authoritarianism, and market socialism), colonial heritages (British, Japanese, and American), boundary disputes (between China and the Philippines and between South Korea and Japan), and security tensions (Chinese military exercises in the Taiwan strait and military alerts along the North Korea-South Korea border). All of these provide the pretext for the state’s control over civil forces, more often than not under the hegemonic banner of nationalism and cultural-political correctness. In reality, many Asian states have been launching government monitoring bodies to “coordinate and supervise” their citizens’ use of the World Wide Web, while at the same time mobilizing “cyber-activism” in ways that benefit ruling political regimes (Kalathil 2002). Furthermore, there are always supranational institutional attempts to challenge local civic forces, like the call for economic liberalization from

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the organization of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the WTO. Consequently, although the prospect for e-mobilization is bright, there will be many problems that stand in the way of the emergence of full-fledged e-democracy, not the least of which are the ICT content and conduit controlling mechanisms that may be set up to bar people’s access to the Internet. Most likely, Asian civic forces will be gradually integrated into some form of cellular e-mobilization in the midst of conflict and rivalry between Asian states in and beyond cyberspace. Finally, it is important to note that, whatever its prospects for the future, e-mobilization in East Asia will be very different from that in North America and Europe. In Asia there are two polarizing ICT regions: the more developed and less-developed countries. South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore are advanced, but South Asia, including India and Bangladesh and the Western/Inner part of mainland China, are less developed. Many regions do not have a public Internet infrastructure. Also, there are many problems related to digital divides, even within the same locality, which are further complicated by the discriminatory forces anchored on the fault-lines of language, religion, gender, and region, which prevent many people from accessing and using the Internet.

The Quest for Cultural Praxis The logic of Internet enhanced e-mobilization is that it is a bottom-up process: communities and interest groups create and facilitate it themselves. We need to enable the deliberative skills (informational personality) people may possess and look into what actually happens in public debate spaces. The Internet is instrumental in various stages of social mobilization. More often than not, individual chat rooms and discussion lists are the main vehicle that enables people to communicate and learn from each other. Obviously, this can involve the discovery of new knowledge on socio-environmental issues, and the building up of group shared meaning—the capacity-building process for social agency. However, the problem of cyber-imperialism and cultural domination should be noted in this context (Ebo 2001; Main 2001). Of the online language population, totalling 529 million in December 2001, English accounted for 43 per cent. In East Asia, Japan contributed 8.9 per cent, Greater China 8.8 per cent, and Korea 4.6 per cent (source: http://www.glreach.com/globstats/). In terms of Web pages’ language coverage, out of 313 billion Web pages surveyed, English accounted for 68.4 per cent, Japanese 5.9 per cent, German 5.8 per cent, Chinese 3.9 per cent, French 3.0 per cent, Spanish 2.4 per cent, Russian 1.9 per cent, Italian 1.6 per cent, Portuguese 1.4 per cent, Korean 1.3 per cent, and Other 4.6 per cent (Vilaweb.com, as quoted by eMarketer). Since English is the de facto standard language on the Internet, the domination effects of the English language on global communication brings about a serious crisis to the existence of minority languages (for more detailed discussions of linguistic imperialism, see Chapters 14 and 15 by

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Vilmar and Dieter in this volume). Furthermore, other than language itself, the contents and messages for communication are highly charged for commercial and political purposes. Moreover, in many ways the Internet fosters a sense of the superiority of the world’s only remaining superpower, with its attention to US lifestyles, movies, music, and other aspects of popular culture, as well as news and documentaries (the US version of the “War Against Terrorism” represents such a case). All of these are manifestations of the celebration of often US-defined and promoted Western cultural and global capitalism. In short, as long as the Internet is based on existing dominant socio-economic structures, it will also work to reinforcement cultural imperialism (Ogura 2001).

Social (In)E-quality, Justice, and E-quity For the twentieth century, the predominant development model was the unsustainable pro-economic growth model that reigned throughout the Cold War, regardless of the political regime in power, whether capitalist, socialist, or right-authoritarian. But for the twenty-first century, the real challenge for government and society is not just fair global economic development but also socio-ecological sustainable development. Fuelled by market and state forces, ICT development by default brings about the necessity for all people to have access to the Internet. Yet, the same process shapes the inevitability of digital divides along the existing social contours of various fragmentations, segmentations, and stratifications such as income, gender, ethnicity, and language (Loader 1997). Emobilization projects making use of the Internet and ICT can be a facilitative agent for reinventing participatory communicative politics, promoting social equity, and enhancing public participation in the cause of working toward global sustainable development. It is needless to note that there is a normative dimension to this line of development, which, in essence, amounts to the desire to promote equal opportunity and democratic social justice on a global scale through making use of new forms of ICT and e-mobilization (Bucy and D’Angelo 1999; Barnett 1997; Wright 1995; McChesney et al. 1998). ICTs enhance flexible production regimes, generating more wealth. Yet, far from developing an equitable and better society, our ICT-driven, postmaterial society has produced more social inequality than ever: the digital divide and the formation of an almost permanent under-class; the social acceptance of inevitable high levels of unemployment; and for some fortunate few, early retirement in their forties as a result of profits made within the realm of the advanced high tech and knowledge-based new corporate and managerial sector (Luke 2000; Menzies 1996; NTIA 1999). The current trend toward the “informationization” of work and societal (-virtual) encounters has reinforced a divided-cum-dual society: the informational-based formal economy exists alongside a down-graded, labour-based, informal economy resulting in a new “network society” that combines segregation,

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diversity, and hierarchy (Castells 1996, 2000). East Asia has been integrated into the global system of capitalism, and this process of integration has widened gaps and divides among communities, countries, and regions. By exploiting these socio-economic gaps, global corporations and developed countries promote their further domination over Asian localities and cause the destruction of cultural diversity and identity based on community. Given this state of world affairs, there is urgency for a normative development agenda that can capture the power of e-mobilization to enhance social equality, democratic politics, and social justice in different world systems of global and local governance.

References Abbott, Jason. 2001. “[email protected]? The Challenges to the Emancipatory Potential of the Net: Lessons from China and Malaysia.” Third World Quarterly 22: 99–114. Alexander, Cynthia, and Leslie Pal (Eds.). 1998. Digital Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Andersen, K.V. (Ed.). 1995. Information Systems in the Political World. Amsterdam: IOS Press. Associated Press. 15 July 2001. Online News Release. Barnett, S. 1997. “New Media, Old Problems: New Technology and the Political Process.” European Journal of Communication 12: 193–218. Brecher, Jeremy. 2000. Globalization from Below: Power of Solidarity. Cambridge, MA: South End Press. Bryre, T.M. 1998. “Internet Regulation in Hong Kong.” Media Digest (December). Available at: . Bucy, Erik, and Paul D’Angelo. 1999. “The Crisis of Political Communication: Normative Critique of News and Democratic Processes.” In Communication Yearbook, Vol. 22, ed. M. Roloff. London: Sage. 301–40. Castells, Manuel. 1996. The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell. Castells, Manuel. 2000. “Materials for an Exploratory Theory of the Network Society.” British Journal of Sociology 51: 5–24. Castells, Manuel, and Peter Hall. 1994. Technopoles of the World. Oxford: Blackwell. Chun, A. 2000. “Democracy as Hegemony, Globalization as Indigenization, or the ‘Culture’ in Taiwanese National Politics.” In Taiwan in Perspective, ed. W.C. Lee. Boston, MA: Brill. 7–28. Clarke, R. 1997. “Regulating the Net.” Australian National University, Department of Computer Science Website. Available at: . Cooke, Bill, and U. Kothai (Eds.). 2001. Participation: The New Tyranny? London: Zed Books. CyberDigest. 31 May 2001. Electronic Discussion List: CyberDigest@Yahoo!Groups. Downey, John, and Jim McGuigan (Eds.). 1999. Technocities. London: Sage.

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Cultural Imperialism, State’s Power, and Civic Activism ][ C H A P T E R 8 ][ 133 Drysdale, Peter. 2000. Reform and Recovery in East Asia. London: Routledge. Ebo, Bosah (Ed.). 2001. Cyberimperialism? Global Relations in the New Electronic Frontier. Westport, CT: Praeger Press. Garson, D.G. 2000. Handbook of Public Information Systems. New York: Marcel Dekker. Goldstein, Andrea, and D. O’Connor. 2000. E-Commerce for Development: Prospects and Policy Issues. OECD Development Centre Technical Paper No. 164. September. Paris: OECD. Graham, Stephen, and Stephen Marvin. 1996. Telecommunications and the City. London: Routledge. Held, David. 1999. “The Transformation of Political Community: Rethinking Democracy in the Context of Globalization.” In Democracy’s Edges, ed. I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Codon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 84–111. Hong, J. 2001. “The Control of the Internet in Chinese Societies: Similarities, Differences, and Implications of the Internet Policies in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore.” Conference Paper, Asia Internet Rights Conference, 8–10 November. Seoul, South Korea. Hsiao, H.H. Michael. 1997. “Social Movements and Civil Society in Taiwan: A Typological Analysis of Social Movement and Public Acceptance.” The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 11: 7–26. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). 2001. Democracy and the Information Revolution. Background Paper for Democracy Forum, Stockholm, 27–29 June. International Telecommunication Union (ITU). 2000. Asia-Pacific Telecommunication Indicator. Hawaii: ITU. Kalathil, Shanthi. 2002. “Nationalism on the Net.” The Asian Wall Street Journal 22 February. Kalathil, Shanthi, and Taylor C. Boas. 2001. The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba, and the Counterrevolution. Working Paper No. 21. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Kenny, Charles, Juan Navas-Sabater, and Christine Z. Qiang. 2000. Information and Communication Technologies and Poverty. Discussion (Mimeo) Paper, 29. August. Washington, DC: World Bank. Lai, On-Kwok. 2003. “Transnational Activism and Electronic Communication: Cyber-Rainbow Warriors in Action.” In Transnational Activism in Asia, ed. N. Piper and A. Uhlin. London: Routledge. 94–108. Lei, W. 1997. “Economic Boom or Regulatory Bane? The Emergence of the Internet in Modern China.” Rutgers Law Record 22 (October). Available at: . Loader, Brian (Ed.). 1997. The Governance of Cyberspace. London: Routledge. Luke, Timothy. 2000. The “Net” Effects of E-Publicanism. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, March. Main, Linda. 2001. “The Global Information Infrastructure: Empowerment or Imperialism.” Third World Quarterly 22: 83–97. Margetts, Helen. 1999. Information Technology in Government. London: Routledge.

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McChesney, Robert, Ellen Wood, and John Foster. (Eds.). 1998. Capitalism and the Informational Age. New York: Monthly Review Press. Menzies, Heath. 1996. Whose Brave New World? The Information Highway and the New Economy. Toronto: Between the Lines. Nie, Norman, and Lutz Erbring. 2000. Internet and Society: A Preliminary Report. Stanford, CA: Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of Society. Ogura, Toshimaru. 2001. General Situation of the Internet and Communication Rights Issues in Asia. Paper presented at Asia Internet Rights Conference, 8–10 November. Seoul, South Korea. Olds, Kris. 1997. “Globalizing Shanghai: The Global Intelligence Corps and the Building of Pudong.” Cities 14: 9–124. Patterson, Rubin, and E.J. Wilson. 2000. “New IT and Social Inequality: Resetting the Research and Policy Agenda.” The Information Society 16: 77–86. Rao, M. 2001. “Asia-Pacific Gears up for E-government Opportunities.” Available at: . Reuter News. 23 July 2001. News Release: “China Shuts Down Net-Café.” Rodan, G. 1998. “The Internet and Political Control in Singapore.” Political Science Quarterly 113: 63–75. Rodriguez, J.C. 2000. “A Comparative Study of Internet Content Regulations in the United States and Singapore: The Invincibility of Cyberporn.” University of Hawaii Website. Available at: . Schiller, Dan. 1999. Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Singapore Government. 1996. Information Technology Development Towards 2000. Singapore: Government Printer. Slevin, J. 2000. The Internet and Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. South China Morning Post. 23 July 2001. China Web Politics. Available at: . Stefik, Mark. 1999. The Internet Edge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 1999. Human Development Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press. US Commerce Department. 2000. Third Annual Report (2000) on the InformationTechnology Revolution and its Impact on the Economy. Washington, DC: US Commerce Department, June. Available at: . US National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). 1999. Falling Through the Net—Third Report. Washington, DC, November. Available at: . Vito, E. 2000. Internet Use and Its Uncertain Future in Hong Kong. Westport, CT: Mecklermedia Corporation. Vogelsang, Ingo, and Benjamin Compaine (Eds.). 2001. The Internet Upheaval. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Walch, Jim. 1999. In the Net: An Internet Guide for Activists. London: Zed Books. Waller, Paul, P. Livesey, and K. Karin. 2001. E-Government in the Service of Democracy. International Council for Information Technology in Government Administration (ICA) Information, No.74: General Issue. June.

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CHAPTER 9

Media Transmitted Values Transfer: The US at “War Against Terrorism” and Its Implications for the Information Society Elvira Classen This is a call to arms—to arm ourselves with knowledge, content and context generated from open and diverse channels of communication. White House news conferences and CNN should not be watched in a vacuum separated from the world’s people. If so, then the world belongs to the war propagandists. Nancy Snow/The Media Channel, October 2001

he terror attacks at New York and Washington in September 2001 caused a clash of societal perceptions of institutionalized norms such as “security,” “freedom,” and “national supremacy.” The unthinkable did happen: thousands of innocent people were killed; symbols of the economic and military potency of the US as a world power, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, were ruined. In a mutually affirmative process over several months, society, the mass media, and politics came to terms with these incidents, thereby producing an atmosphere of unconditional preparedness for war. It was only under these circumstances and in a very short time period that it became possible by major financial and personnel expenditures to establish a new “war against terror” front in addition to the conventional military one.

T

The Global Struggle for “Hearts and Minds” Partly determined by the actual situation and oriented along current or planned interventions by the military forces, but mainly not related to a fixed timetable or particular geographical considerations, the American government called for a global struggle for the “hearts and minds” of civil societies. Roughly, this struggle took place at three levels at the same time: within the US; toward European countries and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states; and at the Arab and Islamic world. Within the US, patriotism and a willingness for retaliation, as well as willingness to make sacrifices, had to be maintained against the growing distance to the criminal attacks of 9/11 in terms of time and emotions. This was closely

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linked with the need to constantly provide the combat forces with the underlying idea of why, where, and how the war was to be continued. As for the European countries, and NATO member states in particular, it was necessary to promote the further existence of the “Anti-Terror Coalition” on a basis as broad as possible in order to put down doubts and objections concerning any expansion of the war, for example, into Iraq. The utmost intensity of the struggle for “hearts and minds,” however, was put forward when it came to the Arab and Islamic world. Here, the protagonists did not only intend to explain the distinction between anti-Islamic and pro-Islamic American politics in order to prevent or allay anti-American resentments or alliances, but, in a medium- and long-term campaign, the “war against terror” was to be used as an ideological attack for implementing American interests, values, and ideals as universal goods into the social and political discourses of these regions. “Women and young persons” were mentioned explicitly as target groups of this campaign (Satloff 2001). In January 2002, George W. Bush stated in his speech about the “axis of evil” that: We have a great opportunity during this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace.... America will take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values around the world, including the Islamic world, because we have a greater objective than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror.... In every region, free markets and free trade and free societies are proving their power to lift lives. Together with friends and allies ... we will demonstrate that the forces of terror cannot stop the momentum of freedom.... We have known freedom’s price. We have shown freedom’s power. And in this great conflict, my fellow Americans, we will see freedom’s victory. (United States, Office of the Press Secretary, 29 January 2002)

More idealistically minded people might argue that it is better to use interpretations of values and meanings permitted by the government, rather than using tanks or bombs. But this issue is long gone by now. The theory of cultural scientist Richard Münch about “American style activism” says that missionary bigotry and cultural intervention are not only forceful functions to dominate and oppress “groups, nations and cultures,” but they are also always embedded in a concept of free competition with reformist and opposition movements (Münch 1986: 272ff). This theory, however, is obsolete in a context in which the offensive struggle for cultural dominance ostensibly “lead[s] the world towards the values that will bring lasting peace.” As such, attention directed at “winning the hearts and minds” of “civilized peoples” becomes the most powerful tool for winning a war. In this sense the “war against terror” also questions the notion that war is a key cause of cultural or social shift, as, for instance, Habermas (1962) and Giddens (1985) have proposed. This is because actual struggles reveal instead that cultural or social shift—perhaps the notion “rupture” fits better in this case—is a key cause of war. And this war still makes only one distinction: between ally

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and adversary, between “good” and “evil.” Everyone who questions or refuses this leadership is exposed to danger, as, once again, George W. Bush warned: “Every nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril” (United States, Office of the Press Secretary, 6 November 2001). This radicalized shape of American-style global activism as a plan for cultural imperialism aims at the creation of an interpretative vacuum by using, or threatening to use, military or other repressive means. In turn, this vacuum is intended to be filled by way of a hyper-accelerated value transfer in which desired (in this case, American) interpretations of reality, interests, and ideals are relayed. The issue is no longer one of influencing individual opinions; rather, it is to control and dominate them.

Cultural Dominance as a New Paradigm of Information Warfare The particular importance of this struggle for cultural supremacy is that it is part and parcel of the American military strategy of “Information Warfare,” which itself is binding for the “war against terror.” In analogy to the build-up of information societies since the mid-1990s, “Information Warfare” describes “information superiority” as a prioritized objective of war. In the words of General Ronald R. Fogleman (1998): “Dominating the information spectrum today is as critical to conflict as occupying countries or controlling air space had been in the past.” From a military perspective the “information spectrum” includes military and civilian communication both at times of war and about war. For example, if someone intends to build a consensus within society as to the “legality and inevitability” of armament and military intervention, it appears to be crucial to gain control over the “war imagery” being delivered by the mass media. The US Army handbook for “Information Operations” declares: “Activities that affect how operations are seen and perceived by different audiences are an increasingly prevalent and required calculation of battle command and a prerequisite for effectively visualizing battle space. The requirement to identify the critical audiences, messages, and communications means is not new to leaders. However, it is gaining major significance for successful operations” (United States, Department of the Army 1996: 11). After the war in Kosovo in 1999, which military circles call the “first case of info war,” the political and military institutions, which had had the responsibility for creating the desired description of this war for allies and adversaries, partly revised their structures and increased their staff. At the time, NATO public relations work had failed to counter the war reporting of the Serb media and NGOs via the World Wide Web. Their news about civilian casualties and the devastation of civil facilities caused by allied attacks challenged NATO’s elaborate and expensive imagery of the war as

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a “humanitarian operation.” The consensus within the alliance about the legitimacy of the war was seriously endangered, as then-NATO spokesperson Jamie Shea later admitted: “The individual incident is played up, and the general trend is played down ... a series of individual newsworthy events, some of which are decisive to the outcome of the conflict, others of which are totally irrelevant. ... The 0.1% of failure [became] ... the central drama of the conflict and the yardstick for judging NATO’s military and moral effectiveness” (Shea, 15 June 1999, as cited in Pounder 2000). Major Gary Pounder, the US Air Force’s expert on info war, drew the following conclusion for the future: “Everyone—commanders, Information Operation specialists, and public affairs officers—needs to understand public information is a battle space that must be contested and controlled like any other” (Pounder 2000). After 9/11 institutional rearrangements of political and military public relations were again intensified and their contents were focused at the peculiarities of the “war against terror.” Generally speaking, this revision referred to the following functional levels: 1.

Public Affairs (PA): the term for a rather journalistically oriented “public relations work.” As far as the government is concerned, PA means to aggressively transmit one’s own points of view and information about governmental and military activities as well as beating back contradictory news aimed not only at the public media at home but also the international one. Formally, the following definition is binding on the American military: “Joint public affairs has the critical task of advancing consistent and credible information about US joint forces to the American public and our allies via the news media and military journalists covering the operation” (United States, Joint Publication 1997: v). 2. Psychological Operations (PsyOps): a genuine part of info war strategy similar to PA. In contrast to PA, however, PsyOps explicitly provide for the deception and manipulation of the public as a means of warfare. According to the US Air Force, “[PsyOps are ...] planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives” (United States, Air Force 1998: s 43). 3. Public Diplomacy: evolved as a concept of political behaviour during the Cold War Era. During and after the Kosovo War, it was recovered as a tool still useful to promote American interests. A short definition, articulated by the US Overseas Presence Advisory Panel in 1999, states: “Public Diplomacy is needed to help clarify the American position and viewpoint, to explain why the United States favors a particular course of action, and why that course of action would benefit both US interests and that of another nation” (United States, Overseas Presence Advisory Panel 1999: 32).

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In order to make practical use of it as part of the “war against terror,” the intentions and techniques of PA and PsyOps are intertwined under the generic term of public diplomacy without any scruple or resistance worth mentioning. The objective is to win the “struggle for the hearts and minds” of the European and especially Islamic public. “Get the message out,” Richard Holbrooke, former American ambassador to the UN, urged in 2001: “Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or—if you really want to be blunt—propaganda. But whatever it is called, defining what this war is really about in the minds of the 1 billion Muslims in the world will be of decisive and historic importance” (Holbrooke 2001: B07). The use of PA and PsyOps had been a matter of theoretical controversy within the military since the mid-1990s and had been put into practice more recently during the Kosovo War (although somewhat unofficially), but has now been officially turned into the maxim of the “war against terror.” The distinction between information and propaganda is abolished. Aggressive political and military public relations work and the systematic suppression, distortion, and abusing of information are now being integrated, producing for the first time a straight line of confrontation between “friendly and hostile” publics, a frontline no longer liaised with a military frontline but oriented only to the contradictive potential of what is being communicated. The imagery of war in which various “public forces”—i.e., the public at home, friendly publics abroad, and the need for “homeland security”—are aiding the war effort against an unfriendly civilian public as well as against “terrorists,” has become dominant after 9/11 and was intensified even further after the US and its “Coalition Allies” went to war against Iraq. Concerning the Arab-Islamic World the premises of info war shape the struggle for “hearts and minds” in terms of a new cultural imperialism aimed at pushing ahead with political polarization and promoting cultural destabilization. In spite of the basic acknowledgement that a widespread anti-Americanism would damage American foreign interests, the “containment” of extremist trends is one of the stated main objectives of American ideological intervention in Islamic countries. This was clearly part of the thinking of the US Committee on Foreign Relations, when it stated in July 2002 that: In countries of predominantly Muslim population, opinions of the United States and American foreign policy among the general public and select audiences are significantly distorted by highly negative and hostile beliefs and images.... These negative opinions and images are highly prejudicial to the interests of the United States and to its foreign policy.... As part of a broad and long-term effort to enhance a positive image of the United States in the Muslim world, a key element should be the establishment of programs to promote a greater familiarity with American society and values among the general public and select audiences in countries of predominantly Muslim

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population. (United States, Committee on Foreign Relations. “Freedom Promotion Act,” 23 July 2002)

Earlier in 2002, Senator Joseph Lieberman outlined a similar long-term strategy to deal with terrorism, in which he explained: “It is still not too late for us to stop this theological iron curtain from falling. We must act now, proactively and aggressively, to help the millions of moderate Muslims in the world who are being besieged by isolation and intolerance. Because if the curtain should someday fall, it would be a great and grave danger to our own security ... and could bring awful repression to the hundreds of millions of Muslims trapped behind it” (Senator Joseph Lieberman; cited in United States, Department of State 2002).

The “Hearts and Minds” Campaign Between 9/11 and the eve of the War on Iraq the American government flooded the Islamic World with propaganda activities. Some of these included: 1. After September 2001, Charlotte Beers, the Under-Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, began developing image campaigns to establish the US “as a [marketable] brand” in the Islamic World as a symbol of freedom, prosperity, and progress (Becker 2001; Klein 2002). Beers, a former chief executive officer of the public relations company Ogilvy & Mather, earlier promoted products such as Uncle Ben’s Rice, Head & Shoulders, and Gillette razors. 2. The Advertising Council of America, founded by President Roosevelt in World War II as the War Advertising Council, began producing TV ads for the White House. One spot featured Muhammad Ali, the former boxing champion and active Muslim, who characterized the American foreign policy as not waging war against Islam (Cozens 2001). 3. In November 2001 the American government established “Coalition Information Centers” (CICs) in Washington, London, Kabul, and Islamabad. These were governmental press agencies aimed at spreading official statements and countering “lies, myths and rumours” about the allied “war against terror.” The stimulus to establish the CICs came from Alistair Campbell, the former spin doctor for the British Labour Party and NATO’s chief advisor for media affairs during the Kosovo War (Beers 2002; DeYoung 2001; Macintyre 2002). 4. The Broadcasting Board of Governors, which is associated with the State Department, supported the radio networks “Radio Free Iraq,” “Radio Free Afghanistan,” and Voice of America, among others. Voice of America greatly expanded its schedules in Arabic, Pashto, Farsi, and Urdu to reach out especially to people under the age of 25, who were thought to have an “enormous distrust of the United States” (Miller and Rampton 2001). At the time, it was believed that the Middle Eastbased “Radio Sawa” (sawa means “together”), also a station supported

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by the Broadcasting Board (Smith 2002), was coming closer to this objective, as the White House chief advisor for Public Diplomacy, Herbert Pachios, reported: “Radio Sawa is already the number one station in Kuwait and Jordan. By combining a mix of pop music and news, Radio Sawa is attracting the important youth masses who the US needs to connect with in the critical Arab market” (H.C. Pachios, 8 October 2002; cited in United States, Committee on Government Reform 2002). In December 2001 the US Congress agreed to establish a TV network budgeted at $1.1 billion. The network, temporarily called “911” and intended to be a competitor for the Islamic news network Al Jazeera, would broadcast a 24-hour schedule in 26 languages reaching audiences from Northern Africa to Indonesia (Jentzsch 2001; Schön 2002). The Department of Defense hired the public relations agency The Rendon Group to boost its PA activities. Rendon began collecting foreign news reports from 79 countries in order to shape responses for the Pentagon to issue to the global media. They also designed schedules for foreign state-owned radio stations and leaflets for PsyOps (Hedges 2002). Rendon, perhaps not coincidentally, was one of the founders of the Pentagon’s “Office of Strategic Influence.” Its task was to influence both hostile and allied publics not only with “true” but also with “faked” news. However, it was shut down soon after both American and foreign mass media reacted to its missives with outrage (Dao and Schmitt 2002). In the field of PsyOps the 4th Psychological Operations Group of the US Army worked with military-owned radio programs and spread leaflets from airplanes flying over the war zone. In Afghanistan the messages ranged from appeals to hand over Osama bin Laden to the presentation of the US as the liberator and benefactor of the Afghan population (Labash 2001). In October 2002, the 4th Psychological Operations Group released its first leaflet over Iraq. It contained a warning that the Iraqi air defence should not target coalition warplanes, or “You could be next” (CNN, 3 October 2002). It goes without saying that the 4th Psychological Operations Group was right. In the aftermath of 9/11 the American government also began constructing a White House-based “Office of Global Communications” (OGC), which was given the overall task of coordinating info war activities in cooperation with the Pentagon, State Department, CIA, National Security Council, and so on (Corn 2002). With an initial budget of US$200 million, OGC started an anti-Saddam Campaign, aimed at promoting a consensus within the American, European, and Arabic public that the Iraqi dictator must be overthrown (Reid 2002).

These are only a few examples of the huge engagement of the US in the fight for supremacy over the control of information in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Even now, with subsequent pivotal events such as the American occupation of Iraq and the capture of Saddam Hussein, it is too early to assess whether and how these efforts will work out in the longer

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term. At the beginning of the occupation of Iraq the American military eliminated the Iraqi media system as one of its first administrative actions. Like an exercise from a handbook for info war, in April and May 2003, the US Department of Defense took strict control first of Iraqi radio and then its television stations, replacing them with the so-called “Al Iraqiya’ Network” (Cotts 2003). Meanwhile, the State Department’s Broadcasting Board of Governors planned to launch the new Middle East network, called 911, which “will be on satellite across the Middle East, but will also provide a targeted product that will be available terrestrially only within Iraq, which will focus on Iraq” (Chatterjee 2004). First tried during and after the war in Kosovo in 1999, although less successfully, the destruction of the enemy’s civil media and the long-term substitution of the protagonist’s own media and desired content have become a new key element of modern war, by trying to link information transfer and values transfer within a largely closed and tightly controlled communication system. However, even at this point, or perhaps especially because we have reached this point, in American cultural and military dominance, it is important to assess the chances for “demilitarizing information” in the future.

Chances for Demilitarizing Information In my opinion, the battle for “power over the interpretation of reality” (Schlesinger 1979: 81) needs to be revealed and reflected consistently, so as to give space for debating the following question: how can the misuse of the civilian infosphere for defending and expanding political power be prevented? Taking into account the urgent and long-term effects of info war on the cultural and informational integrity of civil societies, it appears to me of great importance to define a societal, interdisciplinary, and scientific elaboration of this problem. Hence, I would like to conclude by offering some proposals that might be used as a starting point in working toward the demilitarization of information. These include: 1. the drafting of international rules and conventions aiming at protecting the global infosphere from being instrumentalized in favour of preparing for or waging war; 2. establishing independent institutions at the national and international level which would carefully monitor and evaluate civilian and military communication with regard to crises and eventual war, in order to prevent bias, self-censorship, and “blind spots” in the mass media, as well as to uncover war propaganda; 3. the strengthening of anti-war critics and public opposition in terms of examining structures of conflict in their historical and contextual significance, of disproving censorship, of inquiring into the motives of all groups involved, and of demanding non-military prevention of and solutions concerning war-type conflicts; and

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4. elaborating concepts which would contribute to the demilitarization of civilian communication about war, as well as in times of war; for example, peace researchers might design programs to educate journalists and support them in becoming more independent from “official influence and infiltration.” Also, the media itself can play a role in this, for example by creating policy guidelines for the behaviour of journalists in wartime and perhaps even by having journalists and civilian public relations workers agree on a kind of Hippocratic oath, requiring, among other things, that they not be enlisted in political and military information campaigns. Global civil societies, especially in areas of conflict, have a claim to independent and open information and communication structures. Only a free flow of information can guarantee that enlightenment and the exchange of views will promote opportunities of nonviolent de-escalation. In 1917, US Senator Hiram Johnson delivered his well-known phrase that at times of war, truth is always the first casualty. These words sound too fatalistic to me, as if it is an inescapable destiny that at times of war, truth must disappear automatically. My feeling is that, first of all, truth is an opponent of war. Whether or not truth falls victim to war depends on the power of those who attempt to protect and disclose it.

References Becker, E. 2001. “The Campaign: In the War on Terrorism, a Battle to Shape Public Opinion.” The New York Times 11 November. Available at: . Beers, C. 2002. “US Expands Dialogue, Exchanges with Muslim World.” Available at Washington File: . Chatterjee, P. 2004. “Information Warfare or Yesterday’s News? Pentagon Media Contractor Loses Battle for Iraqi Audiences.” 6 January. Available at: . Cotts, C. 2003. “US ‘News’: Is Anyone Watching the Iraqi Media Network?” 12–18 November. Available at: . CNN. 2002. “US Drops Leaflets Warning Iraq of Counterattack.” 3 October. Available at: . Cozens, C. 2001. “Ali Promotes US to Muslims.” The Guardian 21 December. Available at: . Corn, D. 2002. “The Loyal Opposition: Brand America—Now With Extra Hype! New Office of Image Consultants To Give The Hard Sell Abroad.” TomPaine, 8 August. Available at: . Dao, J., and E. Schmitt. 2002. “Pentagon Readies Efforts to Sway Sentiment Abroad.”

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Media Transmitted Values Transfer ][ C H A P T E R 9 ][ 145 The New York Times 19 February. Available at . DeYoung, K. 2001. “US, Britain Step up War for Public Opinion.” Washington Post 1 November. Available at: . Fogleman, General Ronald R. 1998. Cited in US Air Force, Information Operations. Air Force Doctrine Document 2–5. Available at: . Giddens, A. 1985. The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, J. 1962. Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand. Hedges, S.J. 2002. “US pays PR guru to make its points.” The Chicago Tribune 12 May. Available at: . Holbrooke, R. 2001. “Get the Message Out.” The Washington Post 28 October. Available at: . Jentzsch, B. 2001. “Um Herzen und Hirne.” Der Freitag 14 December. Available at: . Klein, N. 2002. “Brand USA.” The Los Angeles Times 13 March. Available at: . Labash, M. 2001. “Psyching Out the Taliban: The Army Plans Mind Games at Fort Bragg.” The Weekly Standard 24 December. Available at: . Macintyre, D. 2002. “Tucker Eskew: American Spin Doctor in London.” The Independent 22 March. Available at: . Miller, L., and S. Rampton. 2001. “The Pentagon’s Information Warrior: Rendon to the Rescue.” Center for Media and Democracy. PR Watch. Available at: . Münch, R. 1986. Die Kultur der Moderne. Vol. 1: Ihre Grundlagen und ihre Entwicklung in England und Amerika. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Pounder, Major Gary. 2000. “Opportunity Lost: Public Affairs, Information Operations, and the Air War against Serbia.” Aerospace Power Journal 2. Available at: . Reid, T. 2002. “America Plans PR Blitz On Saddam.” The London Times 17 September. Satloff, R. 2001. “Devising a Public Diplomacy Campaign Toward the Middle East: Part I—Basic Principles.” Policywatch 579 (30 October). As cited in “The Message Is America: Rethinking US Public Diplomacy. Hearing before the Committee on International Relations.” The White House. 14 November. Available at: . Schlesinger, P. 1979. “The Sociology of Knowledge” (unpublished paper). Cited in H.J. Gans, Deciding What’s News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time. New York: Pantheon Books.

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Schön, G. 2002. “Das Pentagon will nicht lügen. US-Militärs sagen, sie hätten nicht vor, ausländische Medien gezielt falsch zu informieren—die Mittel dazu hätten sie.” Frankfurter Rundschau 21 February. Smith, T. 2002. “Reaching Out: Examining US Government Efforts to Counter AntiAmerican Sentiment in the Arab World through Broadcasts and Ad Campaigns.” PBS Transcript 18 February. Available at: . United States. Air Force. 1998. Information Operations. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5. Available at: . United States. Committee on Foreign Relations. 23 July 2002. “Freedom Promotion Act of 2002.” [“To enhance United States Public Diplomacy, To Reorganize US International Broadcasting ...”]. The White House. Available at: . United States. Committee on Government Reform. 8 October 2002. “Hearing to Examine US Understanding of Arab Social and Political Thought.” Testimony before the Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations. Washington, DC. Available at: . United States. Department of the Army. 1996. Field Manual “Information Operations” No. 100-6, Information Operations, Washington, DC. 27 August. Chapter 1. United States. Department of State. 2002. Office of International Information Programs. “[Senator Joseph I. Lieberman] Outlines Long-Term Strategy to Deal with Terrorism. Says Moderation and Modernity Must be Supported in Muslim World.” 14 January. Available at: . United States. Joint Publication 3-61. 1997. Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations. Washington, DC. Available at: . United States. Office of the Press Secretary. 6 November 2001. “No Nation Can Be Neutral in This Conflict. Remarks by the President to the Warsaw Conference on Combatting Terrorism.” The White House. Available at: . United States. Office of the Press Secretary. 29 January 2002. “The President’s State of the Union Address.” The White House. Available at: . United States. Overseas Presence Advisory Panel. 1999. America’s Overseas Presence in the 21st Century. Report (November). Available at: .

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PART 4

NEO-LIBERALISM, GLOBALIZATION, AND CULTURAL IMPERIALISM

Introduction Herbert Schui, a German professor of economics, illustrates that it is impossible to separate cultural imperialism from modern-day neo-liberalism. He does this, in part, by undertaking a critical reexamination of the ideas and influence of another German economist, and Nobel Prize winner, Friedrich Hayek, the modern-day father of neo-liberal economic theory. Schui notes that neo-liberalism is the first economic theory to claim that maximizing output or realizing the highest possible level of want satisfaction is not the purpose of a free market economy. In this vein, Friedrich Hayek (1969) wrote that Keynesian welfare economics made a fundamental mistake with its preoccupation for analyzing the degree to which common welfare is realized. In the past 30 years, neo-liberalism, as an economic and also socio-political theory of governance, has attracted numerous adherents and advocates, who endorse the view that the opportunity to make “free individual decisions” creates an open society and by this a cultural evolution, which allows for the survival of mankind. Of critical importance, however, Schui raises the questions of whose interests neo-liberalism serves, which economic powers it is carried by, and what classes it is forced upon. He answers with the argument that if, contrary to the claim of neo-liberalism, pressure and coercion are in fact used to prevent certain classes from realizing or pursuing their own interest, then we can speak of imperialism. In this sense, he argues, neo-liberalism can be seen to function as cultural imperialism in several ways: in the shape of a methodological individualism, neo-liberalism attempts to limit the capacity of the social sciences to gain insight into the reality of social relations by insinuating economic rationality where it cannot exist; as a blueprint for a social order, neo-liberalism aims at establishing an internalization of coercion or, in other words, a reactionary social society; and as a form of global economic imperialism, neo-liberalism extends a global reach by enforcing free trade and free capital movements with unlimited property rights in the developing—or now euphemistically called “new emerging economy”—countries. Schui notes that there is a sad irony to this aspect of neo-liberalism, in that it has set out to abolish the develop-

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ment state in these nations without even promising the benign effects of classic imperialism, i.e., economic development. The remaining chapters in Part 4 provide specific case studies that highlight the confluence between neo-liberalism, globalization, and cultural imperialism. In Chapter 11, Christoph Scherrer examines the role of GATS (the WTO framework of the General Agreement on Trade in Services) in the commodification of education in EU countries, arguing that “in line with the spread of neo-liberal constitutionalism, GATS provides a political and legal framework for deregulation and privatization of education.” Scherrer reasons that, given that under GATS it can be expected that English-language-based education providers will especially use constantly improving technological capabilities for the cross-border provision of education services, GATS will likely serve in the future as an enabling structure for cultural imperialism. D. Parthasarathy examines effects stemming from the manner in which elements of neo-liberal theory are being applied in India in connection with economic liberalization and the commodification of law and ethics. Importantly, Parthasarathy provides a critique of neo-liberal-based theoretical and policy models of “good governance” and examines the implications of governance reforms for poverty, equity, and human rights through an analysis of changes in selected governance systems and institutions in the developing world. His central argument is that a focus on political, administrative, and economic reforms in developing countries ignores social structures and divisions with crucial implications for poverty and equity dimensions of development programs and policies. Sheilfa B. Alojamiento examines the defeat of the feminist movement in the Philippines in the 1990s in a post-authoritarian and emerging liberaldemocratic political climate characterized as consisting of “a cooptation with neo-liberalism.” According to Alojamiento, the defeat of the feminist movement in the Philippines was tied to broader cultural and ideological shifts that occurred in the mid-1990s following the end of the Marcos period of authoritarian military rule. Specifically, she argues that the end of authoritarian rule also led to “the crumbling of the solid Left that once controlled and defined the social transformation project,” which was in turn replaced by “a flowering of people’s initiatives and independent formations” that reflected a more neo-liberal and neo-conservative middle-class reformist influence on politics. Although Alojamiento admits that one should not discredit all of the post-authoritarian political changes that have occurred in the Philippines since the 1990s, she concludes that “for the feminist movement that always rallied behind the national democratic cause, the defeat of the once solid Left in the 1990s led to political disarticulation” of the radical-left women’s movement. Alojamiento shows that this has now been replaced with state- and foreign-driven pluralist politics (i.e., one encouraged by the state and funded by churches and governments abroad eager to sponsor political democratization and economic development in the country), in which feminist dissent has been reined in.

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CHAPTER 10

Neo-Liberalism and the Attack on the Humanities: The New Social Science of Cultural Imperialism Herbert Schui

ince the seventeenth century the concept of culture has been extended considerably to include all that humanity has added to its environment and to itself in the attempt to overcome the natural stage and achieve ever greater perfection. The concept of culture thus unites all forms of human intervention regarding the condition of its existence. Culture is commonly defined as the sum of what has been created by human agency in a definite period and geographic area in response to the existing environment. This includes the corresponding individual and social modes of agency and conditions of life. Social modes of agency must be included in the concept of culture because the material base of human life—production and the economy—is characterized by the division of labour and mutual interdependence. In other words, the material base of life takes necessarily the shape of a social phenomenon and also defines the interaction of humanity as a collective. Consequently, cultural development expresses the extent to which humanity has worked its way out of the natural stage. At the same time this development expresses the degree to which humanity has mastered the process of its own socialization. Considering this collective aspect, it can certainly not be maintained that culture as developed in the process of interaction with the condition of human existence constitutes necessarily a progress for humanity. (Social reality stubbornly teaches us this lesson.) In order not to get stuck in subjectivism or relativism, a necessary part of existence must be remembered: the freedom of hardship as precondition for the development of a personality. To mention freedom from hardship is not only important because subjectivity and objectivity tend to diverge little in the consideration of this aspect. It is also worth mentioning because it is an important aspect of neo-liberalism to maintain that this freedom must not be a conscious and collective goal: this would mean the end of freedom, the road to serfdom, the prevention of “cultural evolution.” Neo-liberalism is the first economic theory to claim that maximizing output or realizing the highest possible level of want satisfaction is not the purpose of a free market economy. In his “Principles of a Liberal Social Order,” Hayek (1969: 121, thesis 45) writes that welfare economics makes a

S

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fundamental mistake with its preoccupation with analyzing the degree to which common welfare is realized. The basic idea of maximizing want satisfaction or output is only appropriate for an economic unit such as a household or a monastery economy (an economic organization); it is not appropriate for the spontaneous order of a “katallaxie,” as he calls it, i.e., the whole of a free market society. What only matters are self-determined decisions in the market place, i.e., the freedom from physical coercion in economic exchange. These free individual decisions constitute an open society and by this a cultural evolution, which allows for the survival of mankind. This means a radical change compared to common textbook wisdom where we learn that free markets and free competition are the best institutions and procedures to satisfy human wants.1 In light of this, one needs to consider whose interests neo-liberalism serves, which economic powers it is carried by, and what classes it is forced upon. If pressure and coercion are used to prevent certain classes from realizing or pursuing their own interest, we can speak of imperialism. Neoliberalism functions as cultural imperialism in several ways. First, in the shape of a methodological individualism neo-liberalism attempts to limit the capacity of the social sciences to gain insight into the reality of social relations by insinuating economic rationality where it cannot exist. This methodological individualism thus deforms the heuristic value of the social sciences by trying to ensure that the quest for truth in these disciplines is severely limited. Second, as a blueprint for a social order, neo-liberalism aims at establishing an internalization of coercion or, in other words, a reactionary social society. The solidity of this social order (“the spontaneous order”) requires that individuals voluntarily accept whatever the result of the market is. While using these means, neo-liberalism also includes the option of an open exercise of coercion. It is in this context that the concept of a “lean state” is to be understood. This state knows no scruples when the core of the established social order is threatened. (This concept can be found in Hayek’s “Great Society” and in neo-liberal social contract theories.) Finally, neo-liberalism also entails a form of global economic imperialism. It aims outside Western developed countries by enforcing free trade and free capital movements with unlimited property rights in developing countries. Thus, it has set about to abolish the development state in these nations without promising even the benign effects of classic imperialism, i.e., economic development. The neo-liberal counter-revolution of today originated as a counterreaction to strategies set into place in the 1930s to establish the modern welfare state step-by-step first by overcoming the Great Depression and then directed later at achieving the objective of full employment after World War II. Consequently, neo-liberalism defines itself more by its antagonism toward earlier Keynesian welfare economics and less by a well-elaborated 1 For recent biographical accounts of F.A. Hayek, the theoretical guru of neo-liberalism, see Caldwell (2004) and Ebenstein (2003).

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and coherent theoretical system. Thus, an understanding of neo-liberalism and its contemporary global effects can be gained only by developing knowledge of this antagonist position. A better understanding of neo-liberalism also requires us to characterize the relation between the idea of the welfare state and its theoretical foundation on the one hand and enlightenment on the other. In this context, I argue that the concept of the welfare state and enlightenment have to be comprehended as a cultural achievement—and neo-liberalism as its denial. As the humanities are deeply involved in the analysis and advancement of the human condition, it is easy to understand why in fact neo-liberalism is an attack on them. Specifically, it can be argued that neo-liberalism in effect eliminates the core of the humanities and replaces it with an economic barter model in which individual reaction patterns are based on relative utilities—in an analogy to economics, where relative prices are the variables determining utility maximizing behaviour.

Enlightenment, Reformism, and the Modern Welfare State The essential characteristic of the modern welfare state is that the state is directly responsible for the well-being of its citizens. This conception of the role of the state has its ancestor in absolutist systems of government. The absolutist state did not confine itself to setting the rules for a self-controlled laissez-faire system, but interfered instead directly in the economy to foster trade and industry. It is widely accepted that absolutism was a necessary precondition for the formation and development of capitalism. However, as time passed, early liberal economists, like Adam Smith, began to argue that economic liberalism provided a better foundation for the growth of capitalism. The main feature of economic liberalism is to increase social surplus not only by common coercion (as previous social formations also did), but by systematically improving production techniques and enhancing labour productivity and, further, by using this surplus for capital accumulation. This mode of production has an inherent tendency to keep wages and mass consumption down. Low consumption in turn leaves physical resources available for the production of capital goods, and this fosters accumulation and increases labour productivity and, thus, a surplus, which accelerates accumulation still further. The economic depression of the 1930s showed, however, that the theory of economic liberalism has limitations. Specifically, it showed that economic growth can slacken off and that this can have serious human consequences. As the production of capital goods (that is, the stock of fixed capital) grows faster than that of consumer goods, the ratio of intermediary output (capital goods) to final output (consumer goods) increases. In other words, the stock of fixed capital grows faster than final output. But there is an upper limit to this ratio. This input-output coefficient is technically determined, and once the upper limit is reached investment is not profitable. Thus, a

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contradiction arises between factors that keep wages down and other factors, which determine the upper level for investment.1 Or, as Joan Robinson (1975: 71) puts it: “If in reality the distribution of income between workers and capitalists and the propensity to save of capitalists, are such as to require a rate of accumulation which exceeds the rate of increase in the stock of capital appropriate to technical conditions, then there is a chronic excess of the potential supply of real capital over the demand for it and the system must fall into a chronic depression. (This is the ‘stagnation thesis’ thrown out by Keynes and elaborated by modern American economists, notably Alvin Hansen.)” The historical background for this statement was the Great Depression of the 1930s, but it should be emphasized that stagnation in the form of zero growth is not always necessarily the only outcome. Sluggish growth, as it prevails at present, is even more likely. According to Keynes’s counter-argument to economic liberalism, crises and unemployment are a result of insufficient demand. Potential full employment output cannot be absorbed either in the form of consumption or in the form of investment. The market cannot increase demand by decreasing prices and wages. It took time in the 1930s to learn this, until finally (after a long period of quackery) the doctrines of Keynes were adopted as guidelines by social democratic parties, such as the American Democratic Party, which carried out Roosevelt’s “New Deal” social and public welfare reforms. The outlines of this different paradigm are easy to show. At the heart of Keynesian theory is the assumption that state deficits can be used to start economic activity and that social and economic policies that work to redistribute wealth can be used to maintain an optimum level of economic growth. The lines of Keynes’s reasoning are the following: “[a] relatively weak propensity to consume helps to cause unemployment by requiring and not receiving the accompaniment of a compensating volume of new investment....” The propensity to consume in turn depends, among others, on “the principles on which the income is divided between” the community (Keynes 1973, CW VII: 370 and 91). Keynes insisted on this point in his famous 1937 essay “The General Theory of Employment,” where he argued: “People’s propensity to spend (as I call it) is influenced by many factors such as the distribution of income, their normal attitude to the future and—the probability in a minor degree—by the rate of interest” (Keynes 1937: 219). Moreover, Keynes argued that to come to higher consumption expenditures “[t]he State will have to exercise a guiding influence on the propensity to consume partly through a scheme of taxation,” and that to stabilize investment expenditures required “a somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment,” because it was “unlikely that the influence of banking policy on the rate of interest will be sufficient by itself to determine an optimum rate of investment” (Keynes 1973, CW VII: 378). 1 Marx understood this as a fundamental contradiction: the need for capital goods is limited by the state of development of productive forces, while consumption is limited by the mode of production. The more productive forces develop, the more they come in contradiction to the small basis, upon which the mode of consumption is founded (Marx 1970: 255).

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These quotations from Keynes characterize the theoretical and practical basis of the modern welfare state that took hold in developed western countries following World War II. High taxes on profit income enabled the state to finance its welfare programs such as better education, national health systems, housing, and the like. The whole of this public consumption increased global demand in many aspects, including spending of those employed in the public sector. A policy of low interest rates was supposed to foster investment expenditures. But this was not the only reason for reaching full employment: under these general political conditions trade unions had a better chance to increase wages by successful collective wage agreements, which by their redistribution effect have contributed significantly to increase overall demand and employment. This large-scale suspension of the “free market” order and its replacement by what has been called “mixed economy” was without any doubt successful in the interest of “the many.” However, the consequence for business was a political interference in the property rights of income flows and a marked loss of autonomy in general. This was caused not only by the actions of parliaments and trade unions, which now determined the level of profit and the interest income of the rentiers, but full employment also entailed less discipline on the shop floor in the sense that under these conditions the social position of the boss could be questioned.1 Keynesianism and its reformism can thus be understood as a new ambition of enlightenment. It attempted to implement new social and economic rules which would enable the use of technical progress and increasing labour productivity for the common good. The salient point is that to confide in the market and in competition is rational and appropriate in order to increase surplus and to foster industrialization, but then the following stage of demand restraint requires other proceedings. Both proceedings are aspects of enlightenment, and, consequently, the dialectics of enlightenment in the area of economic theory are at stake, because capitalists are interested in maintaining the market and in the competition solution, which secures their social power, even if the rules are outdated and not suitable to maximize common wealth. It is not surprising that there have been many colourful attempts to show that the Keynesian model is flawed, for instance, neo-classical theory. In principle, this theory disregards everything but the mere process of exchange and the individual’s desire to maximize utility, and thus it casts itself as an explicitly unhistorical approach. But under the aspect of legitimizing the rule of capitalists, neo-classical theory, in itself, has some severe flaws. First, it does not perfectly eradicate the idea of the state as a subject that influences more than the rules of the market games; thus, neo-classics admit market failure. A lot of goods and services escape the logic of the model; public goods are defined as a borderline for the private sector and for 1 Kalecki (1990: 347ff ) discusses this in more detail in his famous article on the political consequences of full employment.

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privatization. In the last instance politics has to grant common wealth. Second, neo-classical theory failed to give advice on how to overcome the Great Depression. This showed that it was more an apologetics than a scientific theory. (Keynesian theory was successful at explaining reality and giving advice on how to cope with the crises.) Third, neo-classical theory does not provide for social development, thus abandoning the possibility of penetrating the humanities to revise them as legitimization for capitalism. Fourth—except the cases of market failure, where the state has to play its role—it undertook to show that a free market and free competition guarantee the most efficient allocation of economic resources. By this, neo-classical theory formulated a welfare goal as a measurable criterion of efficiency. Here neo-classical theory and neo-liberalism differ fundamentally.

Neo-Liberalism as Counter-Enlightenment Neo-liberalism is concerned with the fact that the welfare goal of capitalism—the common good of “the many”—cannot be achieved by a free market and competition. In contrast Keynesianism kept the promise of public welfare intact even with economic development. But even if Keynes’s intention was to remove economic crises and by this to save capitalism by reforms, this necessarily restricted the autonomy of capitalists extensively, and, more than that, the policy inspired by Keynes tended to eliminate unfettered capitalism. As a consequence, neither neo-classical theory with its efficiency criterion (and its other flaws) nor Keynesianism with its far-reaching ambitions are appropriate theories for the interest of capitalists. This is the objective reason for the formation of neo-liberalism. It aims to reconcile human beings with hardship under capitalism (even if labour productivity is very high) and to prevent the humanities from developing theories which question this alleged necessity. The prefix “neo” correctly indicates that there is no going back for capitalism to the stage of capital restraint in which the old liberal economic regime restricted mass consumption to use it for industrialization. Thus, it is not surprising that Keynes’s theoretical insights and the politics they inspired have been extremely worrying for capitalists. And from their standpoint their worry is certainly justified. Even if Keynes did not aim to interfere with the property rights of economic stocks (the means of production), the politics of traditional social democrats and of many trade unions, all profoundly inspired by Keynes, went beyond the ideas of their spiritus rector and (in many countries) claimed the nationalization of the financial sector and of key industries.1 Objectively, the main characteristic of this reformist movement was to harmonize the mode of production with the state of productive forces. And as capitalism per se 1 The “Programme commun de gouvernement” of the French communist PCF and of the socialist party PS, signed on June 26, 1972, is for the time being the last attempt for such a solution. This program became the government program when the left coalition won the elections in 1981.

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was not able to accomplish this task, it became a matter for politics, or conscious collective action, which implied the formation of a social preference function, as economists call it. A shift of power in society is necessary in order to put economic resources to use, which otherwise lie idle; i.e., a shift of power may maximize welfare at a given level of economic endowment. But the task of reformism is not limited to the question of insufficient demand in industrialized countries, but also has implications for developing countries. If developing countries need more physical capital to increase accumulation and by this employment and production, and if industrialized countries could produce more than they do, then demand restraint in industrialized countries and capital restraint in developing countries could be solved at one stroke. The solution is trade balance surpluses for the former and trade balance deficits for the latter. To settle the question, in the 1960s developing countries held the view that the IMF (International Monetary Fund) should create special drawing rights not only for the sake of supplying international liquidity in general, but to provide these special drawing rights as international means of payment for developing countries so that they can import more capital goods. Under the technical aspect of money creation, the essence of this proposition is very common: balance of trade deficits cause credit, and as credit creates money, these deficits enhance the supply of international money. The striking point simply was that this money was not created by those countries whose currency serves as international money (such as the American dollar), but by developing countries. Evidently, this proposition could not be accepted by the leading industrial countries and their international banks and industries. Under conditions of free capital markets the strategy now is that additional capital formation in developing countries takes the form of direct investment. Then the investors themselves finance the trade balance deficit of developing countries without creating international indebtedness. But as evidence shows, this neo-liberal arrangement fails: free choice in the market as directed by rational decisions of individual firms does not produce rational results on the whole. Despite this failure, neo-liberalism began to rid itself of the need to be concerned with the state of the Third World with its aspirations of sovereignty and self-determination, at the same time that it has successfully proceeded in removing the welfare state in the industrialized countries. Neo-liberalism, consequently, can be most accurately viewed as a modern form of counter-enlightenment. In economic matters, enlightenment can be understood as having the intention of continuously reviewing whether the organization of the system is suitable for using and developing the economic endowment towards wealth creation and to question whether “[t]he conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them” (Marx and Engels 1977: 468). As already emphasized, this continuous review is necessary, because forms of organization which were expedient historically may become obsolete in the face of a new stage of development. To have tackled this question is the enlightening achievement

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of Keynesianism. Or, to put it in more general terms, the concern of enlightenment is that mankind betters its overall condition by freeing itself from tradition, institutions, norms, and conventions which cannot, or can no longer, be explained reasonably. The background to this idea of progress is the conviction that mankind is not only able to recognize natural laws and apply them, but also to form social circumstances as general human circumstances to the benefit of all (Schröder 1990: 279). The notion of enlightenment is, in its broadest sense, as Horkheimer and Adorno put it to introduce their “Dialectic of Enlightenment” (1998: 9), ongoing thought that has followed the aim of taking away fear from human beings and establishing them as masters of their own fate. Neo-liberalism is an advocate of the opposite of enlightenment, and the counter-enlightenment endorsed by the business world is a necessary and compulsive reflex against reformism. It has to find evidence that reformist theory and attempts are wrong, are against human nature and cultural evolution. But it is not only the interior situation of the industrialized countries that must be purged of reformism, but the economic and political development of the less advanced countries must also be reconfigured along neo-liberal lines (for specific examples of this, see Chapters 12 and 13 by Parthasarathy and Alojamiento respectively, in this volume). Reformism in all these fields means a shift of power from the private to the political sphere. Reformist principles hold also that the range of individual effort is limited and that collective action is required. This explains the extremely critical position of neo-liberalism towards collective institutions such as parliaments, trade unions, and so forth. The hard core of the theory is to redefine the individual and to point it out as the decisive unit under biological and economic rules.

Reduction of the Humanities on Bio-Economics: The New Personality What is most striking in the mass of neo-liberal writing is the abundance of its facets and differences. It is not easy to comprehend neo-liberalism as a consistent and coherent theory, endowed with a clear-cut explicative and prognostic function. Rather, it gives the impression of being a coherent paradigm only in its agitating logic, in its sharing of common slogans, i.e., in its antagonism towards Keynesian reformism. In fact, neo-liberal statements get their clearest outline in the context of their political objectives. This may explain why the fight against these objectives dominates public discussion. Thus, the analysis by which neo-liberalism has tried to substantiate these objectives is often thrust into the background. However, there is something we can call neo-liberal theory. Objectively, its main characteristic is not an interest in cognition and knowledge, but the unconditional plan to furnish the fight against reformism with a pseudo-scientific basis. Consequently, the theory argues that reformism is directed against the nature of men and that it jeopardizes the survival

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of mankind. This requires a rigorism which pre-forms and restricts the explicative pretensions of the theory. All theoretically based insights which are not consistent with what is necessary for the theoretic basis of neoliberal political objectives are strictly rejected or modified. Thus, the humanities have to be completely changed. As noted at the outset of this chapter, the essential basis of neo-liberal theorizing is methodological individualism. It is claimed that the laws of the more complex case—i.e., the society—are deducible by laws of the less complex cases—i.e., the individuals. The underlying “eternal” law is that of ends, which humans seek, and scarce means, which have alternative uses, and this involves the notion of opportunity costs as the basis for decisions. Humans live and behave under the condition of scarcity of goods. It is important here to note that in contrast to traditional economic theory, the ends are defined in a very broad sense. In the conventional understanding ends are the produced commodities which one can seek; here, they include all that humans might desire, including friendship, reputation, beauty, kindness, and so on. Alchian and Allen (1969: 18) have portrayed all this in an accurate text book manner in their “Exchange and production, theory in use.” Humans are understood as beings who in the process of their survival have developed specific biological properties: they are selfish and acquisitive– and, in this sense, keen on learning. This constitutes a “universal bio-economic process of competition and selection, which will always remain valid for analyzing and predicting the course of human behavior and social organization” (Hirshlifer 1985: 66). Given scarcity, decisions about opportunity costs, and the broad definition of all human attributes (psychological, moral, mental, intellectual) as economic goods with different utilities, and add to this the bio-economic process of competition and selection, then any human behaviour and decision has to be understood within the realm of a system of relative prices.1 The weighing up of goods and of their utility and—motivated and determined by this—the exchange of goods is the basic and only momentum both of individual behaviour and—as individual actions coordinated on the market by competition—of the society. These characteristics of the individual are said to have enabled the survival of the “acquisitive” species in the bio-economic evolutionary process of selection. Only the acquisitive, profit-seeking, and, in a behaviourist sense, receptive society has a chance to survive in the “struggle for existence.” In the sense of survival, capitalism is the perfection of humanity: capitalism is life. Hayek illustrates this with the following reference: “For the science of anthropology all cultures ... might be equally good, but for the maintenance of our social order we have to regard the others as less good” (Hayek 1980: 232). In an interview he continues along this line and argues: “Against overpopulation there is 1 The “Economics of Suicide” (Hamermesh and Soss 1974) provides a particularly good example for this: a person commits suicide if the (subjectively evaluated) terror of life exceeds the terror of death.

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only one brake, namely that only these people keep themselves alive and multiply, who are able to provide for themselves.” Hayek emphasizes that this is “no social Darwinism.” Instead, he is “concerned with the social process of evolution” (Hayek 1981). It should be noted that the ideas and notions of genetic determination, selection, and survival of the fittest find their way into the programs of the extreme right. This can easily be shown by analyzing the programs of right-wing political parties in France, Austria, or Italy (Schui et al. 1997; Christen 2001). The process of selection—the Siebungsvorgang (process of filtration or elimination) as Hayek calls it—constitutes the evolution of a society with an open end, with an a priori, undetermined result. The logic is that the behaviour of the individuals along the line of scarcity and biological determination has no predictable social, common results. This “open” or “great” society in the sense of Popper or Hayek is in harmony with human nature. There would be no harmony between society and human nature, if, as is the case under reformism, politics set an objective in advance, such as full employment of all resources, common welfare, and the like. If such common, collective objectives are imposed, then the freedom of individuals is restricted; their individual patterns of behaviour, as described by biologic and economic factors, are in conflict with externally-imposed preferences. It follows that freedom has to be negative freedom—the individual is left free of interference from others—not positive freedom, within which the individual has the chance of self-determination. Positive freedom, as freedom from hardship, can either be promised by the classics of Adam Smith, by neo-classical scholars with their idea of the maximization of allocation efficiency (all productive factors are under use in the most efficient way)—or, in the later stage of development, by Keynesianism with its political interference. But if, on the one hand, empirical experience shows that the promises of classical and neo-classical theories cannot come true— see, for instance, the Great Depression of the 1930s—and if, on the other hand, reformism may objectively endanger the system as a whole, then in economic theory the material promise of happiness as a characteristic trait of modern times has to be obliterated. That is what the notion of the “great” or the “open” society does. Welfare under these conditions can only be a matter of private, individual responsibility and efficiency. (Life is what you make of it.) If welfare were a matter of public, political responsibility, the result would be the already mentioned disharmony; it would be, to use neoliberal slogans, serfdom and coercion, the end of personal liberty. By the notion of the “great” society and its underlying conjectures on the nature of man the motives of neo-liberal theorizing can easily be understood. Social power should be conserved even if the price for that is widespread hardship; it is the fear of “the masses,” of democratic policies, of any attempt at collective self-determination that would endanger the distribution of power. Methodologically, the understanding of reformism as the road to serfdom is in the last instance based upon methodological individualism. But even this requires further explanation. As methodological individualism

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“asserts the primacy of facts about individuals over facts about social entities, ... i.e., that all higher level phenomena and regularities—including social phenomena—are ultimately reducible to physical entities and laws that govern them” (Little 1995: 615), the conjecture should be that the predisposition of individuals to maximize their wealth leads to the maximization of output. Neo-classical theory argued in this way. But as neo-liberalism has to avoid such a statement, it must leave the social result of individual efforts open. There is only the rather unspecified promise of survival. What is true for the individual—namely, that the individual prefers the acquisition of more goods to the acquisition of fewer goods—is not valid for the society as a whole. But the unsettled question of neo-liberalism is why does the preference of each individual appear to differ from what is said to be the preference of the whole of individuals, the society? If the preferences of the individual (preferring more goods to fewer goods) has a higher likelihood to be realized in the case of collective political action, i.e., in the case of the existence of a social preference, then rational and informed individuals come necessarily to a social preference on the basis of individual preferences. It seems that Hayek has understood better than many other neo-liberals that the interpretation of the social result of individual efforts is an unsettled question. His solution is submissiveness. Thus, he emphasizes the subjective difficulties to explain why we have to submit by logical reason to forces, the results of which we cannot follow or influence in detail. But nevertheless we have to do so with “humble respect,” which “religion” or even only the “esteem of the doctrines of economics” instill (Hayek 1991: 254). For Hayek, the system works under the condition that the individual, when participating in social processes, has to be willing to adapt to changes and to submit to conventions which are not the result of reasonable planning. The individual has to be ready to submit in general to the results of social processes, which nobody has planned and the reasons of which perhaps nobody understands (Hayek 1948: 38). Hayek underlines very often that this is the free society he has in mind and that only such a society is able to survive. But people, Hayek deplores, begin to rebel and are full of hate against the anonymous forces to which they have submitted in the past, especially if these forces have thwarted their personal efforts. This rebellion is an example of a much more general phenomenon, namely a resolution, never known in the past, to submit to any rule or necessity, the logical reason of which one cannot see. But there are spheres, as Hayek continues, where the desire for reasonable understanding cannot entirely be satisfied and where our refusal to submit to things we cannot understand leads necessarily to the destruction of our culture (Hayek 1991: 253). Any alternative, which aims to steer the social process on the basis of rational-collective planning, must fail, because knowledge is scattered among different individuals and because there is no other procedure than free-individual competition to make use of this knowledge on the social level (Hayek 1959). An interesting task for sociologists and psychologists would be to elaborate further how humans will operate in the neo-liberal social order, whose

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guiding principles for the individual are submissiveness and the economically rational weighing up of opportunities. Some brief remarks will help to complete the picture. In the neo-liberal world human behaviour is determined by the exchange of utility units as a matter of simple arithmetic. The motive for relationships between people is reciprocity in the reduced sense of taking advantage of somebody and to be used in turn. And because methodological individualism deduces the complex structure from the simple one, the society as a whole is seen as a system of mutual use of its members. It is obvious that this view is not compatible with the fundamental tenets of the humanities. Many social scientists reject neo-liberal statements about human behaviour, probably understanding this theorizing as a symptom of massive psychical deformation. This can give a clue about why neoliberalism has become popular. Its theory describes the frame of self-realization of a person depraved by capitalist socialization. She recognizes herself in the basic statements of this theory. This is equally true for the theoretician and her object. The more social reality is formed by neoliberal theory, the more it addresses individuals as its adherents. By this, as Marx and Engels (1977: 464) wrote in the Communist Manifesto in 1848, the bourgeoisie definitively “has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment’ ... It has resolved personal worth into exchange value”—and this despite all individualism, which neo-liberalism pretends to defend against “collectivism.” The basic problem of neo-liberal theorizing is that it implicitly admits a market inequality in the distribution of power, which cannot be based on reasonable grounds and which therefore is difficult to justify. Hence, legitimization makes necessary the creation of a new theoretical world, and this explains the violence and aggressiveness of neo-liberalism towards the humanities. The salient point is that capitalists’ autonomy stands against the production of the entire potential wealth of a society and its use for common welfare. Hence autonomy has to legitimize hardship, which requires the creation of a “bio-economic nature of man,” not only with unlimited needs and scarce ends with respect to all entities one could desire, but a person who only uses individual action to meet any challenge, who never tries to interfere with the frame within which he or she operates, and who accepts without complaint any failure. Conscious awareness of this would be fatal. Cognitive progress needs an open debate and not neo-liberalism as a moral corset for intellectual control over the admittance of axioms and methods. A lack of self-confidence cannot be observed within the milieu of the economic right: the notion of “imperialism,” of the “expanding domain of economics” is positively used in neo-liberal literature (Radnitzky and Bernholz 1985). Hirshlifer (1985: 53) writes: “economics really does constitute the universal grammar of social science.”1 1 These outlines of neo-liberalism are surely incomplete. For a more detailed analysis, see Schui and Blankenburg 2002.

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Considering these features of a personality that correspond to the neoliberal scheme, it is not surprising that the political parties of the extreme right—but not only these—adopt neo-liberal theory in their programs. Analyzing this fact, meaningful results will not be obtained by identifying the new extreme right with traditional fascism: the situation and the problems to solve have changed significantly. The adversary of traditional fascism of the 1920s and 1930s was not Keynesianism and reformism, but communism. Or, as von Mises, Hayek’s teacher, put it, fascism, as a stopgap against communism, saved European civilization for a short time (Mises 1927: 45). Following the traditional thesis that the extreme right supports the interest of capitalism, the actual problems of capitalism today differ from that of the pre-war period. But a certain set of basic ideas remains unchanged within this political movement. The biological foundation of human personality, now less by race and more by bio-economic determination, the struggle for life, the selection of the superior—all these are principles of traditional fascism (Schui et al. 1997) and contemporary extreme right parties. But not only this; even if neo-liberalism pretended to establish a free society and to reduce the tyrannical state (as it is called) to the minimum, the resulting neo-liberal state would be a powerfully coercive state.

The Neo-Liberal Coercive State Until now the cultural imperialism of neo-liberalism has been presented as a project of extensive revision of the social sciences and as a project of a culture of humility and submission under behaviour that individuals have unintentionally carried out on the social level. A further aspect has to be added: how to make sure that individual liberty finds its limits in the realm of negative liberty, that individuals do not associate and claim what the market refuses to provide them. Hayek’s submission and devotion indicate already where the limits are. How can this be made a general social practice? Two variants are proposed. Hayek trusts in the internalization of compulsion, in, as he calls it, a moral corset of the society, whereas the neo-liberal social contract approach emphasizes the state as last enforcer. But it should be emphasized that these views do not exclude each other. Hayek prefers a civil-society solution, i.e., the absence of political coercion. His solution has collectivist traits, even if this contrasts with the individualist view of neo-liberalism. He writes: That the behavior within the private area should not be the object of statecoercion does not necessarily mean that in a free society private behavior should be free of pressure of public opinion and of disapproval ... In any case it promotes clearness if the pressure, which public consent or rejection exercises in order to secure the acceptance of moral rules and conventions is not called compulsion ... On the whole conventions and norms of social interaction and of personal behavior are no serious limitation of personal freedom but ensure a certain minimal standard of equality of

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behavior that presumably rather supports than hinders the personal efforts. (Hayek 1971: 176)

The neo-liberal concept of social contract consequently maintains an individualist approach (Buchanan 1975). The existence of the state is explained within an extensive barter system: if individuals understand selfinterest well, they will exchange a part of their individual freedom for the guarantee of the remaining part of freedom. Within this frame, the state is legitimated as the last enforcer of the acceptance of given rules. This legitimization stems from the fact that all members of the society take an individual interest in the guarantee of objects such as private property, competition, and contractual liabilities. If coercion is exercised by the state, it can be sure of general agreement that this compulsion only refers to individuals who incidentally violate the rules. A matter of interest is whether such a model of social contract may imply coercion not only by randomness, but systematically upon social classes. The basis is Hobbes’s contractarianism: what is valuable is what a person desires or prefers, not what he ought to desire or prefer. Rational actions are those that achieve these desires or preferences. Only these actions are moral. The social existence of this morality and rationality implies reciprocity by which voluntary exchange is set up. It enables individuals to realize their personal preferences and to maximize their individual utility on the basis of their personal endowment such as their capacity for work. A workable, peaceful society can form if each person is willing to cooperate and expects cooperation and if nobody interferes by aggression with the personal endowment, the property, of others. Whether this is the case is again a question of rationality: the fear of becoming an object of aggression prevents an individual from acting aggressively himself. The likelihood of such conduct is greater if all individuals rationally expect that they can increase their utility by exchange. This likelihood is enhanced by equally distributed property; it is minimized if large social groups have no property to lose or if they are excluded from exchange. Hence, harmony in a neo-liberal sense implies that all individuals are integrated in this barter society. This requires that they are all endowed with economic assets (in the extensive definition of neo-liberalism) as the precondition for exchange and that they all have the possibility to earn their livelihood by participating in exchange. Even if Hayek does not number among Buchanan’s social contract theoreticians, his central notion of katallattein (to carry on commerce, to adopt into the society) describes the conditions of existence of a barter society. For, if a sufficiently large group is kept from carrying on commerce, then this society cannot be universal. This is an obstacle for its stability. What counts is not only the existence of endowment, such as the capacity to work—the human capital, as the economic right calls it—but the access to exchange. Because of the importance of this access, labour market theories are developed to show that in an unregulated labour market there is no involuntary unemployment. But if, in contrast to this, it is not possible for objective reasons to sell labour, perhaps because there is

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no demand for labour or the wage rate in an unregulated labour market is too low for survival, or the lack of real capital limits employment, then a large part of the population is not adopted by the barter society. At the same time, others are permanently threatened by exclusion from the society, and a significant number of labour suppliers may realize that the price for their labour is not the result of a free agreement, but of extortion by hunger. What can the perfect barter society provide for them? How can the model be reconciled with the objection that work, exclusively understood as an economic good, implies the destruction of excessive goods in the case where supply exceeds demand? The reproach of extortion is met by the statement that in this society any exchange is characterized by procedural justice (Nozick 1974). An insufficient wage or other reasons of hardship are met by the affirmation that the state as a consensual part of the social contract has the right to grant subsidies. Strictly speaking however, subsidies do not conform to the neo-liberal understanding of the social contract. Rather, the theory assumes that the social contract is based on exchange, i.e., on reciprocity, and not on benevolence or humanism. By its own logic it suggests that all are adopted by the society and that no subsidies are required to prevent a well-defined, non-adopted group from fomenting social unrest. In contrast to this suggestion it is very likely that coercion is not only occasionally exercised by the last enforcer against a random sample of persons who disregard the rules of the system, but that there will be systematic actions of the state against those whose only endowment is the capacity to work. But despite this market likelihood of systematic coercion, the fiction of a peaceful pure barter society is extremely attractive: it makes believe that in this contractarian society the prevailing moral is not a matter of coercion, but the expression of individual freedom. Ideologically, Buchanan’s social contract outclasses Hayek’s draft: the social contract does not require a collective moral, nor any humility and submissiveness vis-à-vis the final social result of individual actions and cultural evolution. It is purely based on self-interest and individual morality. If the system needs a last enforcer against those who collectively may disregard the rules in their interest, and if this opposing group within the community is characterized by a specific endowment (such as only labour), then in contrast to the basic conjectures of the ideology there is an inherent tendency to force a group with specific property characteristics into happiness, i.e., the barter society. This means to acknowledge the existence of social classes. By this the whole plan of neo-liberalism with universal freedom, rationality, and morality as its main features becomes contradictory. This society cannot claim universality. It is, rather, an instrument of dominance for the owners of tangible and monetary wealth (Schui 2002: 413). Hence, the lack of universality is based on the fact that the rules of the barter society can voluntarily only be observed by those who can better their situation by exchange. Objectively the excluded segment has nothing to lose if the system breaks down. They will not support it. Their capacity to work does not perish if the barter society with its property rights does. This lack

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of universality constitutes the neo-liberal coercive state. Universality, in contrast, would only be possible in an idyllic world of farmers and craftsmen, where everyone has tangible wealth. It is the idyll of the Swiss Bern Mittelland, which served Roepke (1947: 25) as model for his draft society. Both variants mean a culture of political apathy and coercion. This follows for Hayek from the necessity to prevent the end of civilization by his “moral corset,” for Buchanan to thwart all that which could constitute social action beyond exchange. Political participation is denounced in both cases. It is a disturbance of harmony, there of cultural evolution, here of market rules.

Conclusion To understand neo-liberalism as cultural imperialism calls for establishing a link between culture and economic theory and the policy it inspires. As noted at the outset of this chapter, culture is commonly defined as the sum of what has been created by human agency in a definite period and geographic area in response to the existing environment. This includes the corresponding individual and social modes of agency and conditions of life. Neo-liberalism is hostile to culture as I have defined it in this chapter; it is obscurant and uncivilized, because it maintains that freedom from hardship is not the purpose of economy. Instead, it claims that freedom has to be understood as “free” individual decision-making in the marketplace, which includes the obliging acceptance of unequally distributed economic endowment and hence unequally distributed social power. If, in contrast to this, society aims to determine the social result of individual economic action by collective political power, which means to restrict the individual freedom by law and collective bargaining, then “the road to serfdom” (the title of Hayek’s famous book of 1944) is pursued and will prevent cultural evolution, which alone can enable mankind to survive. Notions such as “voluntarily accept” or “last enforcer” indicate immediately that a neo-liberal order is not likely to be universal. An order (or a culture) may be called universal if its dominance expresses the best interest of all or if a general consent can be assumed with good reason. But if the solidity of an order requires collective unconsciousness as outlined above, along with humility and submissiveness, the renunciation of forming a social preference and of acting jointly and consciously for a common goal, then there is no universality. Such an order must be hostile to science, which defines conflicts and unsettled questions within the society. Under these conditions the task of science then is to deny, hide, cover up, or oppress what it should help to solve. In this sense, the ambition of neo-liberal theory is negatively defined. This is where the coherence of the diverging neoliberal writings can be found. In all its diversity, culture expresses the state of society. This society is decadent and so is its science if it does not seriously tackle the question of how to use productive forces for common welfare and if it is paralyzed intellectually by socialization and open coercion. Neo-liberal theory is intel-

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lectual decay as it dismisses knowledge, the results of the history of intellectual efforts. This theory does not enlarge the understanding of our social environment, it only rubs out human knowledge1 and consciousness. It proudly praises its imperialism when fighting against the humanities. Thus, neo-liberal theory is more than a cultural slip, it is barbarism. It is the culture of submissiveness, of humility, of the reduction of humans to a set of alleged biological features, selected for political reasons in order to maintain the status quo. Its neo-Darwinism is eclectic. Its scientific output as a contribution to culture, to the tools to face existence, implies coercion, internalized or open, in a neo-liberal coercive state—not dissimilar to the coercive state as a feature of the decay of late antiquity. Neo-liberalism means a violent and forcible adherence to a structure that has lost its suitability. This is one side of decay. The other aspect is that decay is a necessary stage of development in the epochs of history. However, it must be remembered that genuine human and social progress requires, among other things, that decay and decline are perceived as decay and decline.

References Alchian, A.A., and W.R. Allen. 1969. Exchange and Production, Theory in Use. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Buchanan, J. 1975. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Caldwell, B. 2004. Hayek’s Challenge: An Intellectual Biography of F.A. Hayek. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Christen, C. 2001. Italiens Modernisierung von Rechts. Berlusconi, Bossi, Fini oder die Zerschlagung des Wohlfahrtsstaates. Berlin: Karl Dietz Verlag. Ebenstein, Alan. 2003. Friedrich Hayek: A Biography. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Hamermesh, D.S., and N.M. Soss. 1974. “An Economic Theory of Suicide.” Journal of Political Economy 82: 83–98. Hayek, F. von. 1948. Wahrer und falscher Individualismus, ORDO-Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Band I: 1955, Stuttgart: Lucius and Lucius. Hayek, F. von. 1959. Mißbrauch und Verfall der Vernunft. Ein Fragment. Frankfurt a.M.: Knapp Verlag. Hayek, F. A. von. 1969. Grundsätze einer liberalen Gesellschaftsordnung, Hayek, Freiburger Studien, Gesammelte Aufsätze von F. A. von Hayek. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (formerly Paul Siebeck). 1 The neo-liberal project to transform the humanities is not unlike what the Catholic party attempted in France in the nineteenth century. Victor Hugo, then a member of the French parliament, reproached the clerical party in his speech on the Assemblé Nationale (15 January 1850): “Et tout ce qui a été écrit, trouvé, rêvé, déduit, illuminé, imaginé, inventé par les génies, le trésor de la civilisation, l’héritage séculaire des générations, le patrimoine commun des intelligences, vous le rejetez! Si le cerveau de l’humanité était là devant vos yeux, à votre discrétion, ouvert comme la page d’un livre, vous y ferriez des ratures! Convenez-en!” (Hugo 1964: 67).

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Hayek, F. von. 1971. Die Verfassung der Freiheit. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (formerly Paul Siebeck). Hayek, F. von. 1980. Recht, Gesetzgebung und Freiheit, Band 3, Die Verfassung einer Gesellschaft freier Menschen. München: Verlag Moderne Industrie. Hayek, F. von. 1981. “Ungleichheit ist nötig. Interview mit Stefan Baron.” Wirtschaftswoche (weekly) Nr 11. Hayek, F. von. 1991. Der Weg zur Knechtschaft. München: Verlag Moderne Industrie. Hirshlifer, J. 1985. “The Expanding Domain of Economics.” American Economic Review 75: 53–68. Horkheimer, M., and T.W. Adorno. 1998. Dialektik der Aufklärung. Frankfurt: Fischer. Hugo, V. 1964. Oeuvres Politiques Complètes, Oeuvres Divers. Paris: Jean-Jaques Pauvert. Kalecki, M., 1990 [1943]. “Political Aspects of Full Employment.” In Collected Works of Michal Kalecki,Volume I,Capitalism.Business Cycles and Full Employment, ed. Jerzy Osiatinski. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Keynes, J.M. 1937. “The General Theory of Employment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 14: 109–23. Keynes, J.M. 1973. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Collected Works,Volume VII. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan and St. Martins Press. Little, D.E. 1995. “Philosophy of the Social Sciences.” In Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. R. Audi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marx, K. 1970. Das Kapital. Bd. III, MEW 25. Berlin: Dietz Verlag. Marx, K., and F. Engels. 1977. Manifest der kommunistischen Partei. MEW 4. Berlin: Dietz Verlag. Mises, L. von. 1927. Liberalismus. Jena: Fischer Verlag. Myrdal, G. 1965. The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. Radnitzky, G., and P. Bernholz. 1985. Economic Imperialism: The Economic Approach Applied Outside the Traditional Areas of Economics. New York: Paragon House. Robinson, J. 1975. “Rosa Luxemburg’s Accumulation of Capital.” In Collected Economic Papers, Vol. II. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Röpke, W. 1947. Das Kulturideal des Neo-liberalismus. Frankfurt: Verlag SchulteBulmke. Schröder, W. 1990. “Aufklärung.” In Europäische Enzyklopädie zu Philosophie und Wissenschaften, ed. H.J. Sandküher. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. Schui, H., R. Ptak, S. Blankenburg, G. Bachmann, and D. Kotzur, D. 1997. Wollt ihr den totalen Markt? Der Neo-liberalismus und die extreme Rechte. München: Knaur. Schui, H. 2002. “Die Moral ist politisch.” Erwägen, Wissen, Ethik (EWE), Heft 3: 413–16. Schui, H., and S. Blankenburg. 2002. Neo-liberalismus: Theorie, Gegner, Praxis. Hamburg: VSA-Verlag.

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CHAPTER 11

The Role of GATS in the Commodification of Education Christoph Scherrer

he World Trade Organization (WTO) ought to be far removed from schools, yet it is already influencing the framework parameters of this everyday aspect of life. Since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, crossborder services and, hence, education services have fallen under its competence. A year prior to this, in 1994, the European Union (EU) and its member states signed an undertaking vis-à-vis the other WTO member states to guarantee free market access and equal treatment for most domestic and non-domestic providers in most areas of education (primary, secondary, and tertiary education services and adult education). Essentially, the only right the EU reserved was to subsidize education and/or education providers in any way it saw fit. A new round of negotiations is currently underway to liberalize the international provision of education services. Within the framework of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), additional liberalization of the cross-border provision of services is to be agreed on by 2005, and education is one of the scheduled topics in this new round. As I attempt to show in this chapter, giving up the EU’s reserved right to subsidize education as it sees fit would bring about drastic changes to the educational landscape. In line with the spread of neo-liberal constitutionalism, GATS provides a political and legal framework for the deregulation and privatization of education. It is to be expected that English-language providers especially will use constantly improving technological capabilities for the crossborder provision of education services, above all in the higher education sector (“virtual universities”) and in adult education. Thus, GATS is an enabling structure for cultural imperialism. This chapter will first describe the strategies that allowed education to be seen as a tradable commodity. Second, it will analyze the specific role of GATS procedures and of already existing GATS commitments in the process of the commodification of education. Finally, it will examine GATS in relation to other processes in education (especially the Bologna process of creating a common European education market) in order to assess the receptiveness for the idea of education as a commodity. The aim of this analysis is to expose the neo-liberal assumptions underlying the GATS approach to the commodification of

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education and to highlight problem areas for current and perhaps future international negotiations concerning educational service provision.

The GATS Agreement on Trade in Services In 1995, three agreements came under the responsibility of the WTO: (1) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), expanded in numerous rounds of negotiations since 1947; (2) the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which was agreed to only with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994; and (3) the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), also recent. GATS created a framework for the progressive liberalization of international trade in services. At the same time a renegotiation of the agreement began in February 2000 and, in line with expectations, will extend over several years.

Important Provisions of GATS What has been agreed on so far? First, the GATS classification scheme was developed, based on the previous United Nations (UN) product classification scheme (Preliminary CPC),1 which divided services into 12 sectors. The fifth sector contains educational services (CPC 920), which is in turn divided into five categories: 1. primary education services (in the pre-school sector, e.g., kindergartens/nurseries; but not childcare); 2. secondary education services (school and vocational services at the level below higher education); 3. higher (tertiary) education services (e.g., vocational and university education); 4. adult education (general education and vocational education), in so far as the regular higher education system does not offer it; and 5. other education services (also relating to special education services in the primary and secondary sectors, in so far as they are not included there). Modes of Supply Furthermore, in Article I of GATS, four modes of supply of trade in services were distinguished: 1. Mode 1, Cross-Border Supply: A service that “originates in one Member’s territory and is provided in the territory of another Member”; i.e., the supply of a service from one country into another (e.g., e-learning over the Internet). 1 The scheme adopted from the UN in 1997 differs from the preceding 1991 scheme only insignificantly in the education sector (WTO, Guide to the GATS, 2001a: 246).

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2. Mode 2, Consumption Abroad: A service that “is provided in the territory of one Member for a consumer of services from another Member”; i.e., the supply of a service within a country for consumers from another country (e.g., for students from abroad). 3. Mode 3, Commercial Presence: A service that “is provided by a service provider of one Member via a business or professional establishment in the territory of another Member”; i.e., the supplying of a service through commercial presence in another country (e.g., a Berlitz language school). 4. Mode 4, Presence of Natural Persons: A service that “is provided by a service provider of one Member through the presence of a natural person of a Member in the territory of another Member”; i.e., the supplying of a service by persons who are temporarily resident in another country for this purpose (e.g., native speaker teaching staff at a language school). These classifications allow a highly differentiated liberalization of services. Thus, for example, a country can limit its liberalization commitments in the education field specifically to Mode 2, Consumption Abroad for adult education. For good measure it could also demand additional exceptions for itself, e.g., limiting to its own citizens the group of people whom it permits to teach in adult education. The specific commitments are incorporated into GATS as schedules for each country. The flexible liberalization concept of GATS in principle allows members to open up their market only in those sectors in which they consider it opportune to do so. But once they have signed an undertaking they are permanently bound by it, unless, that is, they provide compensation in the form of money or liberalization in a different sector (including the goods sector) to those trading partners for whom the reversal will incur losses (Article XXI).

Most-Favoured Nation Treatment, National Treatment, and Transparency When they enter individual sectors and modes of supply in the country schedules, countries commit themselves to upholding the central principles of GATS, particularly those of most-favoured nation treatment and national treatment. The most-favoured nation principle (Article II) requires that trade concessions granted to one country must automatically be granted to all other WTO members. This principle is seen as the essential motor for the worldwide propagation of trade liberalization. However, GATS does contain some general exceptions to most-favoured nation treatment, e.g., for regional integration treaties (Article V). This exception is important for the EU, for example, as it prevents the trade advantages of the common market having to be granted automatically to countries outside the EU. Accordingly, the freedom of establishment applicable within the EU does not have to be granted to “third-party countries” such as the US. However, if the EU

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commits itself under the terms of GATS to liberalize Mode 3, Commercial Presence in the primary, secondary, and tertiary education fields (which it did do in 1994), then it has to grant market access to companies from the US, which is a WTO member state, just as it does to companies from India, another WTO member state. The principle of national treatment (Article XVII) says that there must be no discrimination between one’s own nationals and foreigners in any given market. This is intended to ensure a level playing field for all. Consequently, the licensing procedure for recognition as an education provider needs to be the same for non-domestic providers as for domestic providers. The GATS agreement additionally demands transparency in state regulation of the services sector. Article III includes a commitment to make all measures public that affect trade in services. Once a year, the WTO must be informed of changes to laws, regulations, and administrative guidelines that are relevant in this regard.

Dispute Settlement Understanding A breach of commitments between member governments as laid down in the GATS agreement will not automatically lead to the implementation of a sanctions mechanism. Instead it requires the government of a member country to hold the view that another member has not met its obligations under GATS and to demand that that member fulfill its obligations. If the country that the accusation is made against does not recognize any need for change, then the member levelling the complaint can call upon the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure. The “WTO Agreement on Rules and Dispute Settlement Understanding” applies to all disputes arising in connection with GATS (Articles XXII and XXIII). Private companies have no direct access to this dispute settlement system. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding lays down precise rules of procedure and schedules for the individual steps of the dispute settlement. If, at the end of this procedure, the recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB, consisting of all WTO members) are not implemented within a “reasonable period” as determined by the DSB, the parties are obliged to negotiate mutually acceptable compensation (Trebilock and Howse 1999). Concessions can also be suspended in another sector (known as “cross-retaliation”). For example, if a country D is not meeting its GATS commitments in the education sector, and at the same time makes little use of the liberalization of the education sector in country U, and would, therefore, hardly be affected by a suspension of concessions in the education sector of country U, then country U could instead suspend concessions in a different sector in which country D has strong exports (e.g., chemical products). Admittedly, the dispute settlement process has been made use of in only a very few cases under GATS, with no cases in the education sector, and only one of these cases went as far as requiring the formation of a special panel (WTO 2001c). Because it is also precisely in the large trading nations

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that the liberalization of the provision of services in the public services sector is a matter of domestic dispute, there is little interest on the part of those governments to burden the dispute settlement process with politically controversial issues.

Public Services Services that are “supplied in the exercise of governmental authority”—GATS Article I:3(b)—are excluded from the field of application of the GATS agreement. Which services are included under “governmental” is not specified in more detail. Article I:3(c) makes only a negative definition: “For the purposes of this agreement ... the term ‘a service supplied in the exercise of governmental authority’ is any kind of service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis nor in competition with one or more service suppliers.” The extent to which it is permitted to protect public services that serve to satisfy the fundamental needs of society (health care provision, education, infrastructure services) with trade-related measures is, therefore, dependent on the mode of supply and prevailing competitive conditions. All sectors that are partially privatized, that are moving towards privatization, or in which quasi-state or private operators are administering public tasks (e.g., in respect of certain welfare commitments) potentially fall outside the protection of the sovereignty clause. In the case of social services and hospital services, the WTO Secretariat itself doubted in a background paper that these fall under the exception of GATS Article I:3. According to the WTO, in most countries the hospitals sector consists of “government- and privately owned entities which both operate on a commercial basis, charging the patient or his insurance for the treatment provided” (WTO 1998b: 11). Thus, it would be unrealistic to argue for application of Article I:3. The WTO concludes: “in scheduled sectors, this suggests that subsidies and any similar economic benefits conferred on one group would be subject to the national treatment obligation ...” ( WTO 1998b: 11). It can be seen from the minutes of a meeting of the Council for Trade in Services that during a discussion of this subject, the members present spoke in favour of a narrow interpretation of Article I:3 (WTO 1998d). According to this interpretation, non-domestic hospital services providers are to be granted full access to all state assistance that is otherwise granted only to hospital services providers that are public or acting on behalf of public authorities. In charging fees, providers of public health services are at risk of being interpreted as private providers and thus coming under the GATS rules (Waghorne 2000: Annex 4). Responding to public criticism, the WTO Secretariat has recently reversed its stance and now states “it seems clear that the existence of private health services, for example, in parallel with public services could not be held to invalidate the status of the latter as ‘governmental services’” (WTO 2001e: 124; on the unclear definition of governmental authority, see also Colas and Gottlieb 2001: 10–13).

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In Germany, private operators are active alongside public operators in all segments of education. Hence, the German education sector cannot be excluded by appealing to the sovereignty clause of the GATS rules, the more so because at the same time Germany, as a member of the EU, has made specific commitments in the countries’ schedule in favour of national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment in the education sector. Theoretically, therefore, non-domestic providers should on principle receive equal treatment (WTO 1996: 8). If, for example, the state of Hesse wanted to set up a new degree program in information technology, then all existing universities, including foreign ones, and other education providers would be able to apply for the public funds available for this purpose.

The EU’s “Vertical” Commitments With the signing of GATS, the European Community and its member states have already made equality of treatment commitments towards nondomestic educational service providers in all categories except the “other educational services” category in the fifth sector, i.e., “privately financed educational services” in primary, secondary, and tertiary educational services and adult education. They entered these commitments on the socalled sectoral countries schedule, in other words, on a list that is differentiated, among other things, by sector and mode of supply. Here, too, the EU member states guarantee universal market access and national treatment for Mode 2, Consumption Abroad. They also grant market access for foreign subsidiaries providing educational services in the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors. The adult education sector, which includes both general adult education and further vocational training, is the most extensively liberalized. On the whole, comparatively minor liberalization commitments have been taken on for Mode 4, Presence of Natural Persons. While individual member states of the EU have registered certain restrictions for specific categories—e.g., Italy in respect of the Italian citizenship requirement for service providers—Germany has not exercised this right. For the temporary residence of natural persons, the EU undertook only limited market access obligations with the exception of the following, expressly named categories: (1) internal company personnel transfers; (2) persons in higher positions with management functions in a subsidiary; (3) persons having specific knowledge or skills for providing the services of a subsidiary; (4) representatives of foreign companies entering the country to initiate business; and (5) persons responsible for setting up a subsidiary in the EU. After energy services, the education sector is the one in which the fewest countries have taken on GATS commitments. Currently, 41 WTO member states have made entries in their schedules of specific commitments in this sector, including—as mentioned—the EU and its member states. In the “kindergarten/nursery/primary school” sub-sector, 32 member states have entered into commitments; in “school education” 34; in “vocational/

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university education” 32; and in “adult education” 31. In the “other education services” segment, only 12 member states registered commitments.

The EU’s “Horizontal” Exceptions As well as the sectoral commitments, the countries’ schedule also contains the “horizontal commitments” rubric. These extend to all sectors listed under the specific commitments rubric. Consequently, in the education sector only the “other education services” category is unaffected by the EU’s horizontal commitments. Nevertheless, the EU has registered an exception under “horizontal commitments” that is particularly important for the education system, namely, in respect of public services. It was mentioned above that once private operators are active in an education segment alongside public operators, then this segment may not be exempted by appealing to the sovereignty clause of the GATS regulations. But in order for the public education system to remain protected, the EU entered it in the countries’ schedule under the “horizontal obligations” rubric, stating that in all EU member states, “services considered as public utilities at a national or local level may be subject to public monopolies or to exclusive rights granted to private operators” (WTO 1994: 2). In other words, the EU reserves the right to restrict market access in the public utilities sector. At the same time, the EU paints a truly broad definition of public utilities. These exist, it says, in sectors “such as related scientific and technical consulting services, R&D services on social sciences and humanities, technical testing and analysis services, environmental services, health services, transport services and services auxiliary to all modes of transport. Exclusive rights on such services are often granted to private operators, for instance operators with concessions from public authorities, subject to specific service obligations. Given that public utilities often also exist at the sub-central level, detailed and exhaustive sector-specific scheduling is not practical” (WTO 1994: 2, fn. 1). However, teaching activities are not explicitly included in this list of exceptions. Teaching, of course, takes place in all segments of education. But the EU additionally reserved the right to exclude subsidiaries of companies from non-EU states that have not been established in accordance with the law of a member state from the principle of national treatment. In the case of subsidies, even for subsidiaries that have been set up in accordance with the laws of member states, there is no right to national treatment: “Eligibility for subsidies from the Communities or Member States may be limited to juridical persons established within the territory of a Member State or a particular geographical sub-division thereof.” It continues: “To the extent that any subsidies are made available to natural persons, their availability may be limited to nationals of a Member State of the Communities” (WTO 1994: 5). In the current round of negotiations, the EU will be under pressure to justify itself if it wishes to maintain these exceptions. Article XV of the GATS

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agreement names subsidies as potential causes of distortion in trade in services and provides for the opening of negotiations to decide on the necessary multilateral disciplines. However, GATS prescribes no deadlines for these negotiations, with the result that, although negotiations opened in March 1996, they have not yet led to any concrete results. Yet the possibility cannot be excluded that in the course of the extensive trade round now underway (and perhaps in future rounds of negotiations), agreements will be reached to limit state subsidy activity in the services sector. A further source of pressure to limit the range of exceptions that the EU has hitherto claimed is Article VI concerning territorial regulation of the GATS agreement. It is true that in its preamble and in Article VI, GATS does acknowledge in principle the right of member states to regulate the provision of services according to their political aims and also to introduce new rules. But in so doing they must not limit or vitiate the liberalization commitments they have entered into. Article VI authorizes the Council for Trade in Services to develop disciplines that guarantee that national qualification requirements, technical standards, and licensing procedures do not constitute any unnecessary burden on trade in services. These disciplines are intended to ensure that such requirements are based on objective and transparent criteria and that they are no more burdensome than is necessary to ensure the quality of a service. What political goals can legitimize measures to restrict trade remains unclear. It is an open question whether a service’s social compatibility, and its compatibility with employment or structural policy, can be counted as part of its quality. GATS appointed a “Working Party for Domestic Regulation” to develop cross-sector disciplines for national regulation. This working party primarily negotiates on the following points: 1. transparency with respect to the political aims of state regulation, including international consultation in the preliminary stages of plans for national legislation; 2. criteria for determining the necessity of a state measure for achieving its aims, the so-called “necessity test”; here, attention should also be paid to ensuring that a measure interferes with trade as little as possible; and 3. mutual recognition of qualification and licensing requirements and the application of international standards. Consequently GATS creates pressure to enter into an international consultation process with interested parties concerning domestic regulations, starting even in the planning stage and going right through to proposals for legislation (OECD 2000). At the same time it is an open question how far national policy preferences—legitimized by Parliament—will take a back seat if individual trading partners exert pressure. If the EU were to give up these “horizontal” exceptions, then the EU Member States would indeed either have to forego the subsidization of

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education or allow foreign providers to enjoy these subsidies as well. Public subsidies for the private International University Bremen would then no longer be the result of a special, politically motivated, discretionary decision. Instead, its operator, the Texan Rice University, would have an entitlement to these funds.

GATS and the EU Single Market Program To make an assessment on the question of how the GATS negotiations could affect, for example, the German education system, it is necessary to distinguish between the different levels of the regulation of services. Thus the GATS agreement is part of the global, multilateral level of regulation. In no way do all, nor even a majority, of changes originate from this level. The strongest deregulation pressure originates in the European Single Market Program. Step-by-step implementation of the four basic freedoms of the common market (freedom of movement for goods, services, people, and capital) has been taking place since 1985 (European Commission 2001). The Bologna Declaration of 1999 formulated the common goal of the creation of a European Learning Area. The promotion of mobility, the introduction of comparable final qualifications, the introduction of a credit point system, and cooperation in quality assurance were named as working perspectives. At the meeting of European education ministers in May 2001 in Prague, further steps for extending cooperation between European higher education institutions were agreed in the form of the Prague Communiqué.1 GATS opens up the opportunity to exporters outside the EU to insist on access to the European market. At the same time, there is no obligation to extend the single market privileges generally to providers from third-party countries—this rule is contained in the GATS Article V on economic integration treaties. As described previously, however, the EU has already taken on numerous liberalization commitments that can be expanded in the course of further GATS negotiations. Here third-party countries can challenge sectors that are not yet or only partially liberalized in the European single market. The example of audiovisual services illustrates this well. During the Uruguay Round of GATS negotiations, the US vehemently criticized European countries’ minimum quota for domestic media products. At the time, the EU undertook no commitments, thus protecting local film industry subsidies and the authority of the Länder (such as Bavaria, Hessia, etc.) over radio legislation in Germany. Furthermore, this example illustrates that particular pressure at the national level originates from those third-party country operators who are more competitive than European providers. The opening up of the market for educational services that GATS enables can also take place independently of single market regulations. Within the EU, basic freedoms and rules of competition are not applicable to state education systems provided that no economic purpose is pursued in the 1 Available at: .

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provision of educational services (European Commission 2000: 13). But this does not mean that it is not possible for EU members to increasingly allow private providers (e.g., of adult education or further vocational training) from third-party countries onto the market. It is highly possible that this kind of market-opening proposal will be brought into the GATS negotiations by the Federal Republic of Germany via the European Commission. Furthermore, the multilateral level of GATS can be used strategically by national stakeholders to challenge national rules. The requests of German, European, American, and Japanese service companies concerning the cross-border movement of people are alike to a large extent. Hence, German service companies, together with international lobby networks, can challenge national restrictions on the cross-border movement of people. At the same time they can also make use of all levels of regulation: the bilateral or transatlantic level (e.g., by lobbying for mutual recognition agreements), the regional level of the European single market (e.g., by advocating an extension of the freedom of movement to acceding and other associated countries), and the multilateral level of GATS. The service industry is present with specific organizational structures at all of these levels. In addition, any conflict of interests unresolvable at the national and EU level (e.g., desires on the part of the government to relax existing employment standards) can be “solved” by entering into suitable liberalization commitments under the GATS agreement. The following example from the agricultural sector shows how reference to the WTO level is used as justification for further liberalization of the EU single market. The Dutch government recently justified its demands for a stop to direct payments to farmers by pointing to the WTO’s decisions on the liberalization of the global agricultural market (Handelsblatt 31 January 2001: 5). To this extent, GATS and the liberalization of services within the EU can be understood as self-complementing levels of liberalization. Thus, gaps in the liberalization of the single market (i.e., sectors with stronger state regulation) can come under pressure by way of the GATS negotiations. Any national requests to retract liberalizations, even if only for a limited duration, can be rejected in future by pointing to GATS commitments. Hence, one can also see an essential function of this agreement as being to multilateralize and to codify advances in liberalization that have been generated at the bilateral or regional level. In principle, no provision is made for the winning back of state regulation competencies once codification has taken place. On the contrary, the GATS concept of progressive liberalization envisages the successive extension of commitments to open up markets. As the European Services Forum was established in connection with the liberalization of the cross-border movement of people, it would be possible for the relevant GATS regulations to regulate the mutual control processes between the WTO members “and thereby reduce the scope for politically charged debates on a domestic level” (ESF 2000). In fact, a significant danger of the GATS provisions is that of stimulating mutual “peer

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pressure,” thereby restricting domestic room for manoeuvre. An important mechanism in this connection is the GATS requirement for transparency in domestic regulations. A first significant step in this direction was taken with the countries’ schedules of specific commitments, as these expose each respective national foreign trade regime, if only rudimentarily. Furthermore, the countries’ schedules are “standstill” commitments that are binding under international law. If a national foreign trade regime becomes more restrictive (e.g., through amendments to legislation), then this constitutes a breach of binding international law (Koehler 1999: 236). In addition to this come the GATS notification requirements, which could lead to new national policies, including proposed legislation having to be discussed with interested WTO members even in the draft stages. It is doubtful whether WTO disciplines for domestic regulation can be prevented with specific protection mechanisms. Whether, for example, the safeguard clause in case of disturbance to the market or employment market, which trade unions also demanded and which is intended to enable the suspension of commitments for a limited period, would actually be applied if a conflict arose depends on various conditions. Firstly, the market disturbances would have to create enough pressure at the domestic level. Secondly, national application of this kind of protection clause requires the agreement of the other EU states. There is a special, additional problem for the EU member states, which is that the high degree of single market liberalization of many sectors in the GATS negotiations can prove to be an added risk. If the EU Commission makes high demands of third-party states with reference to its own advances in liberalization, then they will formulate a similarly extensive list of items they wish the EU to implement, which, if this leads to the concessions, may increase the competition pressure even in previously protected sectors. GATS further represents a framework for negotiations that allows a group of WTO members to agree upon more encompassing liberalization. The agreements on basic telecommunications and financial services that have been agreed only among a smaller number of WTO members have been pushed ahead primarily by the more strongly competitive countries such as the EU members. They have come into being in an astonishingly short time, some in just one or two years. Hence, the EU Commission propagates this approach. Besides these agreements, whose signatory parties have nevertheless yet to extend to other WTO members the benefits of the obligations they have assumed under them (most-favoured-nation principle), under GATS exclusive agreements are also allowed. Subject to certain requirements, Article VII provides for bi- and plurilateral agreements on “standards or criteria for the authorization, licensing or certification of services suppliers.” These agreements do not have to be opened to other WTO members.

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Developing International Education Markets The great economic significance of the education sector can be seen in the fact that in the mid-1990s, the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries on average spent 5.9 per cent of gross domestic product on education, 80 per cent of these funds being direct public spending for financing educational institutions (WTO 1998a: 3). Services offered by private education operators have been present and steadily growing for years. The privatization of the education sector is particularly far advanced in countries such as the UK, Australia, New Zealand, the US, and Chile (Lohmann 2001). But in Germany, too, there are private providers for all modes of supply (Nagel and Jaich 2001). The range of cross-border educational services on offer is developing particularly dynamically and is presented briefly below by mode of supply. 1. Mode 1, Cross-Border Supply: This mode of supply for a service takes place from the territory of one member into the territory of another member state. It is gaining importance especially with the development and spread of the Internet (e-learning, cyber universities, etc.; WTO 1998a). In the year 2000, 6 per cent of all students studying abroad took part in distance learning programs (Larsen, Morris, and Martin 2001: 13). It is true that most open universities today still involve an attendance phase, but already, before the introduction of high-performance broadband networks, a few distance-learning universities are offering courses solely over the Internet (e.g., the University of Phoenix Online). The concept of the virtual university, whether as partial virtualization of an existing university, the virtualization of an association of partner universities, or as the foundation of a new virtual university existing only in cyberspace, is rapidly spreading. 2. Mode 2, Consumption Abroad: International trade in educational services is growing strongly, above all in the tertiary sector where the largest portion is made up of students studying abroad. This makes the GATS Consumption Abroad mode of supply the dominant form of the international exchange of services in the education sector. Because of its high numbers of foreign students, the US is the leading “exporter” of this type of education services. In 1999, this “export” generated more than US$9 billion. That meant that this sector achieved fifth place among US service exports. Measured by revenue, the UK, Australia, and Canada follow. By the number of students, however, after the UK come countries in which study is by and large freely open to all: France and Germany. Revenues in this sector came to 3 per cent of the total trading volume in the services sector of the OECD countries (Larsen, Morris, and Martin 2001: 8–14). 3. Mode 3, Commercial Presence: Universities from English-speaking countries increasingly have a presence with subsidiaries in other countries. In the year 2000, 35 Australian universities offered 750 offshore

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programs that were taken up by 31,850 students in Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and China. Seventy-five per cent of all universities in the UK ran study programs abroad in the year 1996–97 (Larsen, Morris, and Martin 2001: 13). For several years, German universities have also been involved in overseas projects, with the support of the DAAD (the German Academic Exchange Service). Scarcely any data has been collected on the extent of Mode 4, Presence of Natural Persons.

Liberalization Requests Private operators, the governments of the US, Australia, and New Zealand, and international organizations such as the OECD see great potential in cross-border trade in educational services. As an example, this is how the Australian government summarizes the positive effects of a free international education market: mobility of people, exchange of academic knowledge, richness of variety, and a strengthening of economic-political and socio-cultural alliances through networks supported by education. The New Zealand government adds to the list by pointing out the positive contribution of cross-border educational programs to the development of human capital (WTO 2000b). The OECD expects the opening of markets to bring worldwide increases in prosperity, especially for developing countries (OECD 2001).

Existing Impediments to Trade The above-noted bodies all see this potential restricted by a multitude of existing state regulations. Accordingly, they call for the elimination of rules that intentionally or unintentionally discriminate against foreign education providers. These types of rules include limitations on the number of service providers, the volume of services supplied, and the proportion of foreign involvement in companies. In addition, the authorization and licensing of service providers, especially where there are conditions in respect of qualifications or technical standards, are seen as impediments to trade (Reichert and Schaub 2001). The Australian position paper for the new GATS round pillories the following concrete examples of national measures for the education sector as trade impediments: 1. Mode 1, Cross-Border Supply: Erection of new barriers as governments respond to growing use of the Internet for delivering education services; restrictions on the use/import of educational materials (academic tools of trade). 2. Mode 2, Consumption Abroad: Visa requirements regulating the free flow of international students; foreign exchange requirements regulating the

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free flow of international students; qualification recognition issues which act as a deterrent to gaining qualifications at overseas institutions. 3. Mode 3, Commercial Presence: Limits on ownership/foreign equity; rules on twinning arrangements which restrict the development of these institution-to-institution arrangements; lack of transparency of government regulatory, policy, and funding frameworks. 4. Mode 4, Presence of Natural Persons: Visa issues regulating the free flow of academics; employment rules regulating the free flow of academics; restrictions on the use/import of educational materials (academic tools of trade) (WTO 2001c).

Private-Sector Requests Industrial associations traditionally have a strong influence on trade negotiations. Lobbying for a multilateral services agreement began in the US as early as the start of the 1980s, when the companies who had joined forces in the Coalition of Services Industries (CSI) were able to put the subject on the agenda of the Uruguay Round (Fritz and Scherrer 2002: 46–48). Alongside this, American trade representatives and the American economics ministry are being advised by so-called Industrial Sector Advisory Committees (ISAs). During the last world trade round, the European Commission was advised by the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) and UNICE, the European employer’s union. At the beginning of 1999, the European Services Forum (ESF) was founded for the specific purpose of renegotiating GATS. As the expert analyst at the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission, Dietrich Barth writes that the ESF is “a privately funded organization for the services sector that works in close cooperation with the European Commission to define the offensive and potential defensive trade interests of the Community and to advise the Commission” (Barth 2000: 290). The extensive consistency of the general demands in the service sector by American and European industry representatives is conspicuous; moreover, they can coordinate directly with one another as part of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD). The core demands relate to, among other things: 1. an extension of the scope of commitments in all service sectors and all modes of supply; 2. complete freedom of establishment abroad and a guarantee of majority ownership and national treatment; 3. the development of competition-promoting principles for domestic regulation as a focus of GATS negotiations; 4. facilitation measures for electronic trade; 5. freedom of mobility for key personnel within companies and also for supplying contracts without a foreign subsidiary; 6. security clauses for emergencies with tightly defined conditions and accelerated dispute settlement procedures;

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7. state procurement functions, which multilateral WTO rules should open to foreign providers; and 8. investigations into the extent of subsidies in the services sector and an assessment of a possible need for GATS regulation (Cf. CSI 2000; ESF 1999; UNICE 2000; Global Services Network 2002). American educational company groups are making the following concrete demands for the education sector in the new GATS round: 1. facilitation measures for foreign subsidiaries; short-term employment migration of teaching persons; and cross-border supply by video, CDROM, and Internet; 2. easier access for students to American education and further training programs in their home countries; 3. recognition by the authorities in other countries of qualifications and certificates from American institutions; and 4. international implementation of intellectual property rights on American education materials, with a relaxation of customs restrictions, currency controls, and investment conditions (see CSI 2000: 27). The main interest is focused on tertiary and adult education, with companies wanting to see a new “training” category included in the GATS classification scheme. This is essentially intended for the lucrative market in company-related technical training organized either by the company’s own employees or by external providers. GATS-related requests from German businesses in the education sector have not yet been established. But Gerhard Cromme, chairman of the board at ThyssenKrupp, a member of the ERT, expects the opening of the education sector to bring the advantage of being able to put an end to the “culture of laziness which continues in the European education system” (Cromme 2002).

Requests by the Governments of the US, Australia, and New Zealand So far the WTO Secretariat has received only four position papers for the new GATS round, from the US, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. The American government has included the requirements catalogue mentioned above into its proposal for the GATS negotiations and has even added to it; it wants to include an additional category in GATS, concerning providers of education-related test procedures (WTO 2002). The New Zealand government also states that the “other education services” category has not been sufficiently specified to adequately capture current changes in the education market. It suggests supplementing this segment with an “illustrative list,” stating that: “All other education services [are] not defined by level. These include short-term training courses, language training and practical/vocational courses in a range of subjects,

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for example computing, hospitality, resource management and primary production, together with education services offered by non-traditional providers, such as driver education programmes and corporate training services” (WTO 2000b: 2). New Zealand additionally calls for expansion of the “adult education” segment with a “community education” category (WTO 2000b). Beyond this, New Zealand suggests the introduction of a new “education agency services” category that would be defined by the following functions: “Education agency services including the advertising and marketing of education services, the processing and payment of applications, etc., provided by agencies on behalf of education institutions or directly to students, on a fee or contract basis” (WTO 2000b: 3). Finally, New Zealand suggests including “services primarily concerned with recreational matters” under the “other education services” category. These are currently classified under sporting services. The academic study and teaching of sport and recreational activities would fit more appropriately into the education services category (WTO 2000b). In its position paper the Australian government does not suggest any change to the classification of education services. It principally calls on its trading partners to do as it has done and commit themselves to upholding the GATS principles in the secondary, tertiary, and other subcategories of education services. Interestingly, it draws attention to the “significant link” between the prevailing rules in the education sector and the rules for other service sectors (e.g., the telecommunications or audiovisual sector, and Mode of Supply 4), pleading on that account for a comprehensive round of GATS negotiations (WTO 2001c). Moreover, these three position papers additionally contain a list of trade impediments, with the help of which WTO members are supposed to orient their future market-opening offers. These lists denounce, among others, economic needs tests, tax discrimination against foreign providers, and the non-transparency of state subsidies for tertiary education services, adult education, and further vocational qualification programs (WTO 2000a; 2001b,c). The Japanese paper only expresses general concern about maintaining quality standards in education. The position papers of the US, Australia, and New Zealand define a horizon of requests that, on the one hand, is certainly not exhaustive, but on the other also does not have to be implemented in this form. That all three governments are expecting strong domestic opposition to the aspired-to liberalization of the education system is reflected in these position papers. They repeatedly stress the importance of the state in the provision of education. The US, for example, sees the private education sector as a supplement to the state education system (WTO 2000a). Australia goes a step further and states that “governments must retain their sovereign right to determine their own domestic funding and regulatory policies/measures” (WTO 2001c: 1). New Zealand considers it necessary to achieve “a balance between pursuing domestic education priorities and exploring ways in which trade in education services can be further liberalized” (WTO 2000b: 1).

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In comparison with the EU, but also with Japan and Poland, these successful education-exporting nations have entered commitments in GATS in only a few subsectors of the education services: the US in the adult education and other education services sectors and Australia in the secondary, tertiary, and other education services sectors. New Zealand has not entered any commitments in the adult learning or other education services sectors (WTO 1998c: 21). Therefore, these countries, which have now taken a prominent stance with their requests, have yet to reach the level of the EU. Accordingly, their concrete requests, primarily for reclassifications, also turn out to be rather modest. The call for greater differentiation arises from the tactical calculation that resistance in niche segments of the education sector will turn out weaker than if there were a broad liberalization involving many more segments. New Zealand’s position paper openly cites this calculation: New Zealand believes that certain education services subsectors may be less subject to the sensitivities relating to the divide between public policy and commercial activity than others. The possibility of making commitments on these subsectors should be given due consideration by Members. This process may be facilitated by discussion of how the current education classifications might more accurately reflect the realities of education delivery, to give Members greater certainty about the precise nature of commitments sought and offered, and assist them in determining where domestic sensitivities lie. (WTO 2000b: 2)

Competitive Position As mentioned above, GATS primarily affects the relation of EU member states towards so-called third-party countries, states outside the EU. It is only secondarily that GATS affects the relationships of EU member states to each other, because the effect of GATS is mediated via the strategic mutual playoffs between the levels of the EU and WTO (as described earlier in this chapter). For this reason, the effects of GATS are principally determined by the competitive position of German and European education operators vis-à-vis education service providers from non-EU countries. However, to my knowledge, the competitive position of domestic providers has not yet been systematically investigated, with the result that here I present only some preliminary considerations, differentiated by mode of supply and education segments. 1.

Mode 1, Cross-Border Supply: In this mode of supply for services, the content of educational materials is exported worldwide via information and communications channels. Up to now, this mode of supply has existed to any significant extent only in the universities, adult education, and other education services segments. Compared to international

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providers in the virtual universities sector, such as the Western Governors University and the University of Phoenix Online, German providers, with the exception of the Hagen Open University, are still in the construction phase. Currently there are 16 virtual universities in Germany, predominantly financed by the public, supported in cooperation with foundations, universities, and technical colleges and for the time being designed for customers in Germany. The English-language providers have a head start in reputation on the international markets and a clear language advantage. Moreover, because of the larger English-speaking market they are able to enjoy the advantages of scale, favourably affecting the costs for producing educational materials. In addition, a larger pool of specialist information technology personnel is available to them, and they are positioned closer to the leading companies (not just geographically) in the IT and Internet services sectors. German universities and researchers are perceived internationally as leaders in some specific fields, yet reputation would seem to play a lesser role for the attractiveness of distance studying than it does for traditional courses. In the “other services” sector, it is also possible to carry out crossborder performance tests, using multiple choice forms. The market leader is the American-based Educational Testing Services (ETS 2002). 2. Mode 2, Consumption Abroad: This mode of supply is also restricted principally to universities and adult education. As mentioned above, English-language providers dominate this market. While internationally mobile students are prepared to pay for a course of study in Englishspeaking countries, the majority of foreign students in Germany not only receive access to courses free of charge, they also receive subsidies in the form of language courses and—in smaller numbers—direct maintenance grants. Hence, under purely market-economic conditions, the number of foreign students deciding to come to German universities would be significantly fewer. Because of Germany’s own smaller language area it can be assumed that even with stronger differentiation of the German university landscape, with the formation of internationally known, market-oriented universities, there will not be any drastic changes to this situation. Apart from language courses, participation in further education courses abroad will concentrate on in-company or company-sponsored courses for the respective internationally active employees. 3. Mode 3, Commercial Presence: This mode includes the opening of a subsidiary by a service provider in another member state. In the case of education, this chiefly means the establishment of language schools or career-oriented education institutions specializing in particular subjects, as well as university campuses, in another WTO member state. English-language providers are clearly more successful in both

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sectors. For example, the presence of German universities abroad currently still requires significant sponsorship by the DAAD. German universities lack international reputation (in particular as a “brand” in the education market), their own financial power from endowments, and knowledge in business management and the marketing of university teaching courses. Conversely, because of public sponsorship of universities in Germany, to date only a few foreign providers are represented with subsidiaries in the German education system. Their feepaying courses are in competition with free courses at German universities. Accordingly, they are attempting to secure state subsidies for themselves, as for example the Rice University for its International University Bremen location. 4. Mode 4, Presence of Natural Persons: This mode includes temporary migration into another member state for the purposes of taking up employment. The primary education sector also comes into question for this mode of supply. International wage differentials could lead to the temporary employment of foreign kindergarten workers, although admittedly the necessary language competence could be an impediment. The latter largely precludes the secondary educational services sector. In the vocational training and university education subsegment one can expect a differentiation by subject areas, namely, in dependency on the significance of the local national language (e.g., German or French) for the acquisition and application of the contents of each respective subject area. Overall, specialized personnel from abroad are likely to be less active in the relaying of information than in activities that support teaching and research. The largest operational area is likely to be adult/further education, since the teaching courses offered here generally have significantly shorter participation times.

Potential Consequences Assessing the future is always a risky business. This chapter lacks the extensive empirical basis that would be required to draw bolder predictions, with the result that the following notes on the potential consequences of existing and future GATS obligations consist rather more of informed guesses than rigorous prognoses. They are primarily intended to serve to name potential problem areas.

Consequences of “Vertical” Commitments As noted earlier in the chapter, the EU has undertaken to maintain the GATS principles in respect of modes of supply 1 through 3 in the primary, secondary, and tertiary education services and adult education sectors. Existing public subsidies for secondary and tertiary education services will

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continue to keep the supply of services from non-EU states low in the Consumption Abroad and Commercial Presence modes of supply. But it can be expected that non-domestic providers will use constantly improving technological capabilities for the cross-border provision of education services, above all in the higher education field (university/college) and in adult education. American providers in particular have a head start in respect of know-how and reputation in the virtual universities sector. To what extent qualifications offered by these providers will enter into competition with qualifications from public universities essentially depends on developments in the area of recognition of university final qualifications. If in future there is to be a market in the certification of courses of study, then this could lead to more intense competition with current certificates from traditional universities. Owing to the commitments that it has already made, in the current GATS round the EU would essentially be able only to enter into additional commitments for the “other education services” segment and in respect of Mode 4, Presence of Natural Persons. In fact there are demands from third-party countries in the “other education services” segment. These are not aimed at the entire segment, particularly since the countries making these demands have committed themselves to date to the opening of markets to a lesser extent than has the EU. Rather, they are aiming for a further differentiation of this segment, where they want to designate education agency services and education testing services separately so that these can be liberalized. The market leader in carrying out performance tests on students and on the educational material used is the American company called Educational Testing Services. It is a member of the National Committee for International Trade in Education (NCITE), which is represented on the American side in the GATS negotiations (NCITE 2002). Liberalization of this sector throws up the question of to what extent the standards of such companies in respect of educational content will assert themselves internationally and thus limit the autonomy of universities and the democratic control over schools that has existed up to now.

Consequences of Abandoning the “Horizontal” Exceptions To date, the EU has maintained the right to restrict market access in the public-service sector and to subsidize the education sector in any way it sees fit. These exceptions constitute effective protection for the educational establishments run under public sponsorship. The position papers thus far presented to the new GATS round by the US, Australia, and New Zealand do not explicitly call for the abandonment of these exceptions, particularly since the governments of these countries themselves subsidize significant portions of their education systems. But the American government does demand that the practice of subsidization be made transparent. Transparency would certainly restrict discretionary scope in subsidization

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decisions. And recently it became known that other countries have requested the elimination of the EU’s horizontal exceptions in respect of subsidies. Nonetheless, the EU is under pressure to give up the exceptions it has had up to now or at least to restrict them. As already stated, negotiations on the mode and extent of subsidies are prescribed, and the Council for Trade in Services is instructed to negotiate rules for increasing the transparency of state regulation and criteria for determining the necessity of state measures. Even if these negotiations have somewhat stagnated to date, one cannot exclude the possibility of an agreement being reached in connection with other topics (packet solution) or that a group of countries will push ahead and sign an agreement. The multitude of negotiating arenas for the areas of governmental services and subsidies will not make it easier for stakeholders in society to keep an overview of the progress and results of negotiations.

The Negotiations Have Opened: The Danger of the Instrumentalization of Education for other Sectors In the run-up to the new world trade round, the EU pressed to make it as broad as possible, i.e., to include as many industrial and service sectors as possible, as well as trade policy topics (regulation of competition, public procurement functions, etc.). Its motive is easy to see through. In agricultural policy, the EU is being pilloried by the international community. Most developing countries, the large cereal exporters (Canada, for example), and also the US are demanding the opening of the European market for their respective agricultural products. However, since the protectionist Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is one of the founding pillars of the European unification process, and since this will in any case be exposed to considerable strains in the coming years through the expansion of the EU, the EU Commission, which conducts the negotiations, is not willing to make any concessions in the agricultural sector toward its trading partners. From this perspective, a great deal has been invested in bringing in as many other sectors as possible into the negotiations as exchange objects. Experiences from past negotiation rounds have shown that in the most important disputes between the trading partners, agreements were not reached until literally the last minute and then as what are called packet solutions. The compromises that are achieved for the prioritized subjects of negotiation include a great many additional sectors and segments, thus forming a “packet.” For representatives of a sector that is included in this packet and who do not agree with the agreements made concerning them, there are scarcely any possibilities for taking back the concessions that have been granted. This is because by taking them back, the entire packet of agreements would be “undone,” which the negotiators and the more relevant sectors involved have no interest in doing. Consequently, an enormous pressure comes to bear on the dissatisfied sector to comply with the packet solution.

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The commitments in the area of education that the EU agreed to at the conclusion of GATS in 1994 are highly likely to have been the result of this kind of packet solution, as those who were politically responsible for education were generally not informed of the GATS commitments until afterwards. The course of the current GATS round to date gives reason to suspect that, as in 1994, education is going to be used as an object of exchange for politically more powerful sectors. Specifically, no requests from the area of education have been made toward the trading partners. In the EU 133 Committee, only the Netherlands brought in the idea, at a very late stage, of asking the US to match the EU’s GATS commitments in the university sector. However, no Dutch universities have evinced any concrete interest in opening subsidiaries in the US. Nevertheless, the EU Commission immediately seized hold of this request. After all, any sector that raises a request within the framework of GATS must be clear that this request will only be met in exchange for a concession. Thus, at the same time, the willingness to grant liberalization concessions was signalled. With distinguishing between “marketable” and “non-marketable” education services, German policy, which I am most familiar with, has already stated in which sectors it is prepared to make concessions: adult education, educational testing services, education agency services, etc. If a similar position should be taken up in the other European countries, then the European negotiators in the WTO round will be laden with flexible options to offer the negotiation partners. If no one in Europe is really interested in establishing subsidiaries in the US in the university sector, and therefore will not stand up for this request in the negotiations, the negotiators will be able to drop this request in favour of other sectors. Thus, the European education sector might end up with new commitments without obtaining reciprocal ones. Herein lies the most serious potential threat to the EU control of education posed by the current forces of globalization and linguistic-linked (i.e., English-language) cultural imperialism. If nonEnglish-based education systems in EU countries wish to avoid being instrumentalized as a manoeuvreable mass (and potentially sacrificed on the bargaining table), then in the run-up to WTO negotiations opponents must make clear, in public, the limits of their willingness for liberalization and find a suitable alliance of partners.

References Barth, D. 2000. “Die GATS 2000-Verhandlungen zur Liberalisierung des internationalen Dienstleistungshandels.” ZEUS, Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien, Heft 3, S. 273–93. Colas, Bernard, and Richard Gottlieb. 2001. Legal Opinion: GATS Impact on Education in Canada, commissioned by the British Columbia Teachers Federation, the Canadian Union of Public Employees (British Columbia), the Canadian Association of University Teachers, and the Canadian Federation of Students. Montreal/Toronto: Gottlieb and Pearson, October 29.

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The Role of GATS in the Commodification of Education ][ C H A P T E R 11 ][ 189 Cromme, Gerhard. 2002. Available at: 11 February. CSI. 2000. Coalition of Service Industries Response to Federal Register Notice of March 28, 2000. Washington, DC. Educational Testing Services. 2002. Available at: 12 April. ESF. 1999. “Declaration of the European Service Industries towards the Millennium Round.” European Services Forum 25 (October). Available at . ESF. 2000. “The Temporary Movement of Key Business Personnel: Second Position Paper.” European Services Forum 24 (October). Available at . Europäische Kommission [European Commission]. 2000. Leistungen der Daseinsvorsorge in Europa. Mitteilung der Kommission. KOM (2000) 580, 20 (September). Brüssels. European Commission. 2001. Review of the Internal Market Strategy. COM(2001) 198 final (11 April). Brüssels. Fritz, Thomas, and Christoph Scherrer. 2002. GATS 2000. Arbeitnehmerinteressen und die Liberalisierung des Dienstleistungshandels. Düsseldorf: Edition der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. Global Services Network. 2002. Available at: . Koehler, Matthias. 1999. Das Allgemeine Übereinkommen über den Handel mit Dienstleistungen (GATS): Rahmenregelung zur Liberalisierung des internationalen Dienstleistungsverkehrs unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des grenzüberschreitenden Personenverkehrs von Dienstleistungsanbietern. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot. Larsen, Kurt, Rosemary Morris, and John Martin. 2001. Trade in Education Services: Trends and Emerging Issues. Working Paper. OECD. Lohmann, Ingrid. 2000. “Bildung und Eigentum. Über zwei Kategorien der kapitalistischen Moderne.” In “Was es bedeutet, verletzbarer Mensch zu sein”: Erziehungswissenschaft im Gespräch mit Theologie, Philosophie und Gesellschaftstheorie. Mainz: Mathias-Grünwaldt-Verlag. 267–76. Nagel, Bernhard, and Roman Jaich. 2001. Endbericht des Max-Träger-Projekts “Bildungsfinanzierung.” Kassel. National Committee for International Trade in Education (NCITE). 2002. Available at: March. OECD. 2000. “Strengthening Regulatory Transparency: Insights for the GATS from the Regulatory Reform Country Reviews, Working Party of the Trade Committee.” TD/TC/WP(99)43/FINAL. Paris. OECD. 2001. Kein Wohlstand ohne offene Dienstleistungsmärkte. Policy Brief Observer. Paris. Reichert, Tobias, and Martina Schaub. 2001. “Liberalisierung, Regulierung und Demokratie—Der internationale Handel mit Dienstleistungen im Rahmen des GATS.” Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung. Available at: .

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Trebilcock, Michael, and Robert House. 1999. The Regulation of International Trade. 2nd edition. London: Routledge. UNICE. 2000. “UNICE Strategy on WTO Service Negotiations (GATS 2000).” Brüssels: Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (24 November). Waghorne, Mike. 2000. “Health Services for Trade, Public Services International,” Ferney-Voltaire Cedex (18 April). Available at: .

WTO Reports WTO. 1994. European Communities and Their Member States, Schedule of Specific Commitments General Agreement on Trade in Services. GATS/SC/31 (94–1029). 15 April 1994. Geneva. WTO. 1996. Subsidies and Trade in Services. Note by the Secretariat, S/WPGR/W9. Geneva. WTO. 1998a. Economic Effects of Services Liberalization: Overview of Empirical Studies, Council for Trade in Services, Background Note by the Secretariat Addendum. Geneva. WTO. 1998b. Health and Social Services. Background Note by the Secretariat. 18 September, S/C/W/50. Geneva. WTO. 1998c. Education Services. Background Note by the Secretariat. 13 September, S/C/W/49. Geneva. WTO. 1998d. Report on the Meeting held on 14 October 1998—Note by the Secretariat. Council for Trade in Services, 12 November, S/C/M/30. Geneva. WTO. 2000a. Higher (Tertiary) Education, Adult Education, and Training. Communication from the United States. 18 December, S/CSS/W23. Geneva. WTO. 2000b. Negotiating Proposal for Education Services. Communication from New Zealand. 26 June, S/CSS/W93. Geneva. WTO. 2001a. Guide to the GATS. An Overview of Issues for Further Liberalization of Trade in Services. London/The Hague/Boston: WTO Secretariat. WTO. 2001b. GATS 2000: Temporary Movement of Service Suppliers. Communication from the European Union and their Member States. 14 March, S/CSS/W/45. Geneva. WTO. 2001c. Negotiating Proposal for Education Services. Communication from Australia. 1 October, S/CSS/W110. Geneva. WTO. 2001d. Ministerial Declaration. Adopted on 14 November 2001. WT/Min(01)DEC/1. Doha. WTO. 2001e. “Market Access: Unfinished Business. Post-Uruguay Round Inventory and Issues.” Special Studies 6. Geneva. WTO. 2002. Negotiating Proposal for Education Services. Communication from Japan. 15 March, S/CSS/W137. Geneva.

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CHAPTER 12

From White Man’s Burden to Good Governance: Economic Liberalization and the Commodification of Law and Ethics D. Parthasarathy Take up the White Man’s burden— The savage wars of peace— Fill full the mouth of Famine And bid the sickness cease; And when your goal is nearest The end for others sought, Watch sloth and heathen Folly Bring all your hopes to nought. —Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden,” 1899 The White Man’s Burden has been sung. Who will sing the Brown Man’s? —Mark Twain, 1901a

his chapter provides a critique of theoretical and policy models of “good governance” and examines the implications of governance reforms for poverty, equity, and human rights through an analysis of changes in selected governance systems and institutions in the developing world. A central argument is that a focus on political, administrative, and economic reforms ignores social structures and divisions with crucial implications for poverty and equity dimensions of development programs and policies. Specifically, hierarchical dimensions of the social structure and discriminatory and exclusionary tendencies inherent within traditional structures and unwittingly engendered in “modern” institutional practices are seen to result in forms of governance that lead to unsustainable and iniquitous forms of development. More importantly, governance reforms and changes with a narrow focus on development promote legal and administrative changes that are biased towards certain sections of society or that directly and indirectly deny basic human rights to citizens. In part the failures and limitations of “governance for development” reforms are rooted in an imperfect understanding of civil society and in the failure to consider the different

T

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levels of capabilities of diverse social groups to actively participate and contribute to processes of social regulation, development, and change. The existence and functioning of well-managed community-based governance systems are rarely acknowledged by those who argue for economic liberalization and “good governance.” What is often neglected in dominant discussions and frameworks is that good governance approaches to development also need to focus both on the processes, mechanisms, and institutions through which societies collectively make decisions and implement them and on the ways in which individuals, groups, and communities articulate their interests and exercise their rights. In theory, “good governance” approaches focus on the exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority to effectively manage a society’s affairs. As such, these approaches seek to advance the rule of law, promote accountability and transparency, and enhance consensus with references to social and economic priorities and the means of achieving development objectives. Good governance approaches are thus also supposed to encompass civil society and its groups and organizations and the ways in which these are structured. However, this is not so in recent theorizing on economic liberalization and good governance. Rather, a key argument advanced in this chapter is that institutions and mechanisms of governance have shifted from being methods of social regulation and control to having become tools for profit-making and economic efficiency. To phrase it somewhat differently, in Althuserian terms, what has happened in developing countries is a shift from “good governance” as an ideological means of securing social relations and conditions of production to it becoming one of the direct instruments of capitalist production. This shift can be seen perhaps most clearly in the current trend toward the commodification of law and ethics in developing countries such as India. The term commodification is used in this chapter to refer to the fact that laws and ethics have emerged as objects of exchange and trade. Increasingly, laws and ethical norms are being judged on the basis of their potential to generate profits. Like all commodities, “good governance” and its baggage of mechanisms—including legal rules, ethical standards, and enforcement agencies—are now being “fetishized,” in a Marxian sense, to appear to have intrinsic value while actually concealing the power relationships involved in their production and distribution. Consequently, it is ironic that even while the thrust towards “good governance” takes place to advance the mainly Western goals of globalization and economic liberalization, even good Samaritans who may not agree with the objectives and process of global economic integration defend a universal model of good governance based on specific ways of approaching issues of democracy, freedom, development, and human rights. Such Samaritans have been referred to as the members of the Blessingsof-Civilization Trust1 who, uncritically and in ways typical of orientalism (Said 1 A term used by Mark Twain around the turn of the twentieth century in response to Kiplingesque arguments regarding the White Man’s Burden (see Twain 1901b).

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1978), attempt to push models of good governance in many of the developing countries. This chapter offers a critique of current good governance models from a “cultural imperialism” perspective that focuses attention specifically on the commodification of law and ethics as an important agent of Western cultural imperialism in developing countries.

Economic Liberalization and “Good Governance” The Blessings-of-Civilization Trust, wisely and cautiously administered, is a Daisy. There is more money in it, more territory, more sovereignty, and other kinds of emolument, than there is in any other game that is played. —Mark Twain, 1901b

In stating that laws and ethics have been commodified and have become instruments of production, with a concomitant decline in their social regulation function, one is not arguing that they have had only regulatory functions in the past. For a long time, societies and communities have integrated the functions of state, economic exchange institutions (market), and civil society bodies in norms, traditions, customs, practices, and institutions that did not have distinct functions but which incorporated several aspects of social, cultural, economic, and political tasks. Colonialism, imperialism, and capitalism split up institutions or created new ones with distinct functions for different sectors of social life. What many “good governance” models attempt to do is to (re)link political/social structures with a specific form of economic structure in order to achieve a particular kind of economic efficiency for specific economic actors. In addition, as we shall see, many aid agencies and development institutions completely fail to perceive the arbitrary nature of the linkages that are being made between new social/political governance structures and existing/changing economic structures. Entities such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), multilateral financial institutions including the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, aid agencies such as USAID (United States Agency for International Development) and DFID (Department for International Development of the Government of United Kingdom), and neo-liberal academics have over the last decade or so stressed the virtues of governance reforms in developing countries for economic growth and poverty reduction, as well as the importance of such reforms for the success of economic liberalization and structural adjustment programs. In part, the focus on “good governance” emerged from strong criticism of these bodies for supporting or neglecting to oppose authoritarian governments in their implementation of economic reforms packages. In addition, in identifying the causes of the failure of economic reform to reduce poverty in any significant manner, social scientists—independently and working for these institutions—came up with the theory that poor governance, by leading to leakages and “state capture,” was a major factor in the failure of structural adjustment programs.

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The World Bank has played a leading role in the development of good governance models and imposing them on developing countries through “political conditionalities” (for more detail on this, see Neerja Gopal Jayal, 1997). Other multilateral lending agencies and development institutions such as ADB (Asian Development Bank) and DFID have adopted these models wholesale as reflected in their definitions and approaches towards good governance. The approach of UNDP and UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) is somewhat different in that it aims to be more politically correct, giving importance to participation, human rights, etc., and has comparatively less emphasis on the merits of privatization, but on the whole these organizations adopt a similar structural approach to good governance in terms of identifying its components and the actors who will implement “good governance” practices. The British DFID is providing nearly £6 million over a period of three years to support the Centre for Good Governance recently set up in India, and for the wider governance reform program in India (see British High Commission in India 2002). The assistance is for a number of “strategic” areas including improving policy-making and performance management and supporting a range of measures to increase “accountability,” “responsiveness,” and “transparency” in government. The ADB focuses almost entirely on the exercise of authority in equating good governance with good government. Moreover, it is also very explicit in identifying the role of good governance in development by defining governance “as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s social and economic resources for development.” However, by not focusing on sources of legitimacy, it leaves the way open for authoritarian, but efficient, ways of governance for development by, for instance, stating that “governance means the way those with power use that power” (ADB 1999). The decentralized mechanisms of the exercise of power, especially through traditional as well as modern institutions that evolved through people’s efforts, is thus entirely outside the ken of the ADB. In its actual work, the ADB is more involved with what it calls economic governance or “sound development management.” The World Bank, for long a proponent of the minimalist state, now seeks to promote effective states, a concept that finds support even from economists like Amartya Sen who are not completely pro-market and who perceive a role for the state in developing countries. The Bank identifies five fundamental tasks of a government: 1. establishing law and order and securing private property rights; 2. maintaining macro-economic stability while not interfering with private markets; 3. investing in basic services and infrastructure; 4. maintaining social safety nets; and 5. safeguarding the environment (World Bank 1997).

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In essence, the Bank is focusing entirely on the functioning of the state in its approach towards good governance and its role in enabling the private sector to flourish. In the Human Development Report of 2002, which focuses on the role of governance on development, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has been quoted as saying that “good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.” The UNDP defines governance as “the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country’s affairs at all levels” (UNDP 2002). However, as mentioned earlier, the UNDP recognizes the multifaceted nature of governance by stating that “governance comprises the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations.” It very specifically takes into account the role of the private sector and civil society in the governance process, something that is done by other institutions in only a limited manner. The UNDP goes further in defining and accepting a role for civil society, but ultimately fails by leaving out of its definition vast sectors and communities which are not represented through formal, recognized, or accepted civil society bodies. A key manner in which the UNDP’s approach differs from that of multilateral funding institutions is that it focuses on expansion of choice, rather than only on market mechanisms for bringing about development. UNESCO firmly identifies the source of good governance approaches in the structural adjustment programs promoted by the World Bank and mentions an “ideological risk” in debates about “who governs, how and on behalf of whom” (UNESCO 2002). Perhaps because UNESCO is more of an academic and advocacy body, and less of a development institution, it is able to provide a critique of the discourse on good governance by delineating its ideological roots, by linking it very clearly to market reforms, and by identifying the discourse itself as a “new strategic top-down and hegemonic speech.” Many of the good governance approaches clearly reflect a neo-liberal economic discourse by stressing the importance of institutions, institutional reform, and institutional development for economic growth and development. While the new institutional economics and the work of economists such as the Nobel Prize-winning Douglass North (1993, 2000) have had an important bearing on this, it is significant to note that even neoliberals like Thomas Friedman now are of the opinion that “countries that come at it [globalization] with the right institutions and governance can get the best out of it and cushion the worst” (Friedman 2002). In a strategy paper on governance, the World Bank expands the notion of institutional development beyond the public sector to all sectors of the economy. With respect to the public sector the economic functions are identified as policy-making, service delivery, and oversight and accountability. Almost all Bank loans now have institution-building components. Many loans focus on reforming what are called core institutions in the public sector—civil service, public expenditure and financial management

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institutions, revenue collection systems, and legal and judicial institutions. Thus, in spite of its claim to expand institutional reform beyond the public sector, the focus seems to be primarily on public or governmental institutions. The World Bank is also building a data bank on institutional indicators, which mainly refer to “Public Sector Institutional Performance” (PSIP). Some specific indicators of PSIP include budget volatility (from year to year, across functional classifications), waiting time for telephone lines, merit-based civil service or not, numbers of civil servants in comparison with international practice, civil service pay (comparisons with the private sector and other countries), percentage of political appointees in the civil service, tax and public expenditure management, delays in auditing of public accounts, and the extent of central government financial “bail outs” of local governments. The UNDP aims to provide assistance and “build core competencies” (UNDP 1997) in areas relating to governing institutions such as legislatures, judiciaries, and electoral bodies; public- and private-sector management; decentralization and support to local governance; and civil society organizations. It takes a formal institutional view of governance, stressing the importance of “efficient institutions and rules that promote development by making markets work and ensuring that public services live up to their name” (UNDP 2002). However, again, it is quite different from the World Bank approach in that the UNDP also emphasizes protection of human rights, and “promoting wider participation in the institutions and rules that affect people’s lives.” For this, it seeks to achieve not just efficient or equitable outcomes but also concerns itself with “fair processes” (UNDP 2002). This leads to raising questions regarding what makes institutions and rules more effective. The answers, according to the UNDP, include transparency, participation, responsiveness, accountability, and the rule of law. To these key components of governance DFID adds predictability. DFID and others usually define participation in a state centric manner as the ability to “operate political systems which provide opportunities for all people, including disadvantaged, to organize and influence state policy and practice.” From this to emphasizing the building of state capability and therefore making the state more powerful is but one short step. Indeed, the term governance and its institutions is restricted to the state by DFID which defines it as “how the institutions, rules and systems of the state—the executive, legislature, judiciary and military—operate at central and local level and how the state relates to individual citizens, civil society and the private sector” (DFID Strategy Paper, n.d). The ADB, following the World Bank definition of governance, pursues an approach that “encompasses the functioning and capability of the public sector, as well as the rules and institutions that create the framework for the conduct of both public and private business, including accountability for economic and financial performance, and regulatory frameworks relating to companies, corporations, and partnerships” (ADB 1999). As is

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clearly evident, the institutional approach is entirely geared to enhancing private-sector performance through public-sector institutional reform. In the next section of this chapter I elaborate upon these approaches and develop a critique with special reference to the developing country context. In addition, I critically assess the views of scholars who are sympathetic to the situation of developing countries, but who fail to consider unique social and cultural features, owing to a focus on certain “universal” cultural attributes such as freedom and choice. Illustrations of the way in which governance models are being implemented and celebrated are also adduced to support the main arguments of this chapter on the orientalist and cultural imperialist nature of the good governance ideals that are currently being propagated.

Commodification of Laws, Ethics, and Institutions Large questions are no longer political, religious or ideological. They are ethical but in a healthy capitalist sense of ethics. —Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of Hope, 1998

The process of economic liberalization is now a given in most of those countries of the world that were earlier under socialist, communist, or mixed economy regimes. Structural adjustment programs implemented under the aegis and guidance of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as other multilateral institutions, have led to deregulation of import and export markets, increased competitiveness in all spheres of economic activity, fiscal austerity, and winding up of all kinds of licences and controls. In liberalizing economies, these changes have paralleled changes in the powers of the state, which no longer performs the earlier role in terms of economic and social development and power as non-state actors have increasingly gained a more vital say in these processes. These changes are clearly consistent with both the fundamental assumptions underlying neo-liberal economic theories (see Schui, Chapter 10 in this volume) and changes in economic and state policy that have occurred in many Western developed countries over the past few decades. However, partly in response to the widespread criticism of the economic liberalization and structural adjustment programs which have had wide-ranging impoverishment and welfare-reducing effects in developing countries, multilateral agencies and academics supportive of their policies have come to identify institutional failures or poor governance as factors to be blamed for the failure of these programs. The need for more transparency and accountability in governance is felt due to what World Bank officials euphemistically refer to as “state capture” of economic and development initiatives and funds by elites. In this context widespread corruption leading to misuse of multilateral funding was also recognized as a major problem obstructing the success of economic (market) reforms. While

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governance reforms in institutions, laws, and fiscal management can thus be very clearly linked to the economic liberalization process and articulated as “political” conditionalities, it is important to note also that much of the initiative for good governance comes from Western institutions and scholars who posit a direct relationship between democracy (always Western-style) and development (always represented in terms of economic growth and efficiency). There are also a large number of academic and research institutions, consultancies, international and regional agencies, and other organizations proffering free and paid advice and services to transform developing country societies into “Western”-style democracies and offering assistance in institutional and legal reform. For instance, an Australian university centre working on governance and ethics provides a very good example of “ethical imperialism” and the attempt to commodify ethics globally.1 In its opposition to all non-Western governance systems, and its failure to perceive reasons for rejection of Western-style democracies in many countries, there lies an inability among associates of this centre to acknowledge that it is impossible to impose an ethical regime unless one also recognizes the law of a said society. Despite the fact that norms, mores, customs, and traditions derived from the nonlegal social field influence people’s views on what is morally acceptable, in many developing countries where law has been an important mechanism for social engineering, the law to a great extent defines and sets standards for morality and ethics, what is viewed as a crime and what is not. Hence, the law is obeyed owing to its exalted position in society even if not in the hearts and minds of the people, and obedience to the law is extracted by the ruling classes in terms of the moral standards and standards of behaviour set by the legal system. Thus, there exists an inextricable link between ethics and law. It follows that a commodified approach of packaging law and ethics and imposing one or the other or both without considering the social, cultural, and economic context is likely to be unviable, unsuccessful in its aims, and therefore opposed by the people affected. The ethical and cultural imperialist nature of such approaches and interventions comes out even more clearly in the work of Australian Legal Resources International (ALRI), a non-profit NGO “dedicated to the support of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in developing countries.”2 Its definition of governance “as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good” is quite broad, perhaps reflecting its work among Aborigines and indigenous peoples in Asia-Pacific and South East Asia. The definition not only includes “the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced,” but also “the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 1 This is the Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance, Griffith University. The comments below are based on personal interaction with important persons at the centre. 2 The arguments below are partly based on personal interaction with a key figure of the ALRI and partly on material accessed from their website.

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and social interactions among them.” However, the work of the ALRI in the areas of legal literacy and legal capacity-building and institutional strengthening betrays a Western ethnocentric approach that could be dismissed as being inane if it did not have quite serious implications for the populations affected. In Indonesia, where the ALRI provided such assistance after the fall of the Suharto regime, despite “a pre-feasibility study” and “wide consultations with key stakeholders and preliminary assessment of the critical needs to assist with the legal reform process,” neither traditional laws nor the Adat which emerged under Dutch colonialism have been considered or taken into account in the process of legal and judicial reform. An interesting sidelight of the “design mission” for legal reform and institutional strengthening in Indonesia was that it was supported by Australian business interests. In order for Indonesians to get better training in law, they were also provided Intensive English Language Training! A review of the training program themes indicates that they were focused on Australian judicial systems, laws, and procedures. An early and influential definition of governance by the World Bank was provided in its 1992 report Governance and Development,where it was defined as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources.” A later report (the 1994 report Governance: The World Bank’s Experience), elaborating on the importance of governance and specifically focusing on “good governance,” states that it “is epitomized by predictable, open, and enlightened policy-making (that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law.” Nirja Gopal Jayal, in commenting on such approaches to governance remarks that “good governance” for the World Bank is essentially a technical instrument (Jayal 1997). Its focus on sound development management as the objective of good governance, even while including components such as transparency and participation, is essentially a reductionist view of the role of the state. This is best exemplified in the technique it has adopted to support good governance, for example, through political conditionalities for sanction of loans. The commodification of governance is facilitated by measuring the proportion of lending operations with governance content, by actually fixing a monetary value to good governance rather than assessing its quality or outcome. Vandana Desai (1998) argues similarly when she states that governance reforms are essentially concerned with managerialization of government. The new managerialism is involved with sound development management as mentioned before and thus focuses primarily on economic aspects. UNESCO, describing the greater emphasis on civil society in modern times, states that this can be “described as a shift from ‘supply-side’ to ‘demandside’ development strategies” (UNESCO 2002). The focus on participation is similarly considered in instrumental terms rather than addressing its intrinsic value.

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The ADB, in identifying common features of high-performing economies, distinguishes “flexibility in responding to market signals” as a hallmark of good governance. In addition it specifies establishing “an enabling environment for private sector growth” as a vital function of governments (ADB 1995). Both the ADB and DFID lay primary stress on predictability deriving from formal laws and rules. It is, in fact, quite evident that more than ensuring the success of economic liberalization, it was necessary to have laws and rules ensuring predictability and transparency to better facilitate the entry of outside firms in a nation’s economy. This becomes more obvious in the importance given to issues such as public/private interface, privatization, and corporatization “as priority public governance themes” (ADB 2004). Thus, despite the rhetoric about minimal government and a greater role for the market, through a stress on predictability and the way in which it is defined in terms of “laws, regulations, and policies to regulate society,” the attempt is to ensure regulation for “the orderly existence of citizens and institutions,” that is, the prevention of opposition to unpopular policies and creating mechanisms for “settling disputes in an impartial manner.” Thus, the safeguarding of the interests of foreign capital and creating an “environment within which economic actors plan and take investment decisions” are major objectives of governance reforms (ADB 1995). The need to promote accountability and transparency arises then from an inability on the part of foreign capital to compete, and function efficiently, where local capital is able to do so due to a better understanding of the rules of the game and their membership in networks which include political and bureaucratic elites. As mentioned in the introductory section, this has been one reason for relinking administrative and state bodies with civil society and market institutions. From a Weberian perspective, these emerging linkages have been criticized on the basis of the argument that the blurring of boundaries between state and civil society reduce the “scope of democratic accountability,” making it “difficult to pin down responsibility in the case of shared decision-making” (Joseph 2001). Such an argument is distinctly orientalist in that it assumes the efficiency of, and valorizes the separation of, state from civil society,1 while at the same time it totally misses out on the history of community structures which have successfully fused the different functions while not sacrificing accountability. Why procedures cannot be devised to pin down responsibility in the case of shared decision-making is difficult to understand. There is a failure in such arguments to perceive the dynamics of the exercise of power and the ways in which it is regulated and constrained in groups, communities, and social structures where economic, social, and political functions are fused in common customary practices and traditional institutions. Such arguments are also reflected in critiques of good governance models which emphasize the failure to make a separation between the public and the private in such models. While the advantages of their separation are quite 1 This separation originated in the West and has reached the greatest level there.

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debatable, and are contingent upon an active civil society as well as low levels of inequality and stratification, such perspectives miss out on the changing nature of the public realm, which even as it articulates the state and civil society in new ways, also distinguishes the public from the private. The nuances of the changes that are taking place are well captured in an analysis in a UNESCO document.1 New kinds of integrative strategies, collective action, social capital development, and joint management strategies are emerging, which, despite their limitations and distortion by being part of top-down development packages, have inherent possibilities that are not being tapped owing to a focus on the state as the primary agent of development and the strict separation of public and private for reasons of accountability. It is ironic that liberal scholars critical of social engineering approaches have little qualms regarding supporting externally imposed governance structures. Just as multilateral aid agencies and financial institutions commodify norms, institutions, and legal regimes which have emerged under historically specific conditions, so also liberal, neo-liberal, and radical scholars fetishize certain values by universalizing associated, historically contingent norms, practices, and institutions, which include accountability, transparency, private/public separation, etc. The theme of participation, on the surface, seems to be a welcome change in the approach of multilateral finance and development agencies. However as Jensen (2000: 4) has noted, themes of “good governance,” “institution building,” “empowerment,” “participation,” “gender,” etc. “are currently fashionable Western concerns to promote desirable social and political change” and are “clearly linked to ... particular Western epistemologies.” While definitions of participation outline stakeholder influence and control over “development initiatives, decisions and resources that affect them,” Jensen observes that in reality agendas of development programs continue to be set in a non-participatory manner. “Beneficiaries” of programs “function merely as legitimizers of the project already planned by powerful outsiders.” Krishna Reddy (2002) also makes this argument in the context of governance reforms in Andhra Pradesh in India. Populist programs, he says, are designed to garner legitimacy for the neo-liberal project and the process of state withdrawal from the economic sector. The idea of participation is also critiqued in that it is usually employed in the notion of “making people participate; help them be empowered; raise their consciousness, implicitly assuming that they themselves don’t have any power to act and need outsiders help to reach these goals” (Jensen 2000: 10). Jensen quotes Majid Rahnema (1992) as saying: “When A considers it essential for B to be empowered, A assumes not only that B has no power— or does not have the right kind of power[!]—but also that A has a secret formula of a power to which B has to be initiated” (Jensen 2000: 13). He also 1 UNESCO, “Governance, New Public Realm, and Civil Society Organizations,” Statement of UNESCO available at (2002).

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notes that “No matter how firm the commitment to good intentions, the notion of ‘powerful outsiders’ helping ‘powerless insiders’ slips constantly in” (Jensen 2000: 10). Recent literature has also brought out the “tyranny of participation.” For instance, Ute Bühler (2002: 2) discusses the “depoliticization of participation that accompanies the valorization of the personal, the local, and the community at the expense of an analysis of and challenge to the power structures that suffuse both the local and the wider context in which it is embedded.” In the Indian context, participatory development initiatives have completely bypassed elected local government bodies, which have recently been made more inclusive by making provision for reservation of a substantial proportion of local government bodies for women, lower caste, and tribal people (see Reddy 2002, for a description of this process in Andhra Pradesh). An emphasis on formal procedures and techniques in good governance models has led to a consequent neglect of the unseen and invisible aspects of participation and social exclusion deriving from social structure and the distribution of power, status, and assets. Depoliticization, of course, is a larger effect of good governance models with a major stress on formal institutions. Despite democracy, as development initiatives are increasingly routed through a development bureaucracy and non-accountable NGOs (see also, Goonatilake, Chapter 3 in this volume), citizens are less and less able to put pressure on elected leaders and bodies on development issues and to hold them responsible. Shalini Randeria (2001), for instance, points out that both the entry of project law and legal changes enforced as part of structural adjustment programs, and becoming a member of WTO (World Trade Organization) and other international treaties and conventions, have created a situation wherein even governments plead inability to implement their own laws owing to their having signed various agreements, contracts, and treaties. More and more citizens’ political action is barred as an option or is dealt with in a violent manner by the state, which only recognizes action that is channelled through formal institutions. For many groups such action is outside the realm of possibility owing to ignorance of rules, lack of power, etc. Laws and institutional rules are framed in such a way that for many groups there is little hope of securing justice through institutional means, as is attested by the experiences of groups struggling against developmentrelated displacement. An emerging model of good governance in India has been the state of Madhya Pradesh, where the government’s program for people displaced by the construction of a large dam project has been anything but transparent and efficient, and movements for justice have been put down with force. In the state of Andhra Pradesh in India, a popular model of “good governance,”1 extra-judicial deaths of those opposing 1 The press and media as well as sections of the intelligentsia often project Andhra Pradesh as a model of good governance owing to its pro-economic liberalization and administrative reforms.

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state policies are routine, and protests against major power sector reforms were put down violently by the state, even as an entire range of participatory development initiatives are being implemented outside the jurisdiction and authority of elected local government bodies. The Chief Minister of the state in fact views politics as an impediment to development. Paralleling the destruction of the powers of local democratic bodies, a centralization of governance has occurred which has not been much criticized because it is a model of good governance! Thus, despite the rhetoric regarding participation and human rights, in fact rights issues have rarely been a part of actual good governance, and funding institutions have rarely imposed human rights conditionalities or criticized models which fail on this count but which otherwise implement all other procedures of good governance. Work done at the Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM) in Manchester (Cooke and Kothari 2001) also shows how participatory development often ignores the political and cultural context in which it takes place, primarily because participatory processes are viewed and treated as technical or management solutions to what are actually political or political economy issues and problems. Like participation, the term civil society, apart from becoming a buzzword in development, has acquired a formalistic character and is defined in a very limited manner in good governance models. The UNDP approach, for instance, like most other models, gives distinct and separate roles for the state, market, and civil society. “The state creates a conducive political and legal environment. The private sector generates jobs and income. And civil society facilitates political and social interaction—mobilizing groups to participate in economic, social and political activities” (UNDP 1997: 1). While the need to promote interaction between the three is acknowledged, the overlapping and the performance of different functions by civil society organizations or by communities themselves through customs and practices is ignored. These have crucial implications for the well-being of individuals and groups, since in many cases access to certain functions, facilities, or services may be easier and better if they come through informal bodies embedded in community structures rather than through formal, specialized, distinct state or private-sector entities. That communities may have authority structures of their own is not even considered. Only economic, political, and administrative authority is given formal recognition. Even if community structures may be authoritarian and nonegalitarian, the possibility of their reform or their integration into formal political and administrative structures is not contemplated. An important example of these issues can be found in the difference between local responses and the response of the international community to the coups in Fiji. Marxists and liberals alike have been united in condemning the coups against democratically elected governments in Fiji. However, there was complete failure in understanding that the democratically elected, labour-supported government there was rooted in a profit and exportoriented economy based on land alienation and impoverishment of the

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“indigenous” Fijians. The coups enjoyed popular support, therefore, because they promised a return to a different kind of (non-capitalist) economy,1 in which authority rested in traditional chiefs and systems of production and exchange were non-exploitative, non-disruptive, and geared more to local needs and skills. As we shall see in more detail below, and related to the earlier line of reasoning regarding accountability and private/public separation, economic autonomy or democracy does not follow as a matter of logical progression from political/electoral democracy. The logic of modern bureaucracies and institutional separation functions in such a way that, in the best of circumstances with full political freedom, citizens cannot participate in economic decision-making which is usually the preserve of elected and officially appointed elites, who are influenced by economic elites. In the case of economic liberalization and structural adjustment programs, decisions are in fact taken by smaller groups of elites with advice from international experts and financial institutions. Popular support or the absence of large-scale opposition to authoritarian governments in many developing countries then must be seen in terms of other forms of autonomy which are not available in political democracies. Likewise, the functions of the state are conceptualized in a narrow framework as a facilitator of private-sector development through its roles in “creating a stable macroeconomic environment, maintaining competitive markets, ensuring that the poor (especially women) have easy access to credit, nurturing enterprises that generate the most jobs and opportunities, attracting investment and helping to transfer knowledge and technologies, particularly to the poor, enforcing the rule of law, providing incentives for human resource development, and protecting the environment and natural resources” (UNDP 1997). An analysis of social science literature would reveal that many of these functions are carried out at a community level without the intervention of the state, and if they were allowed to perform these functions well, there would actually be little role for the state, especially in performing the first two functions. While there are problems with a “communitarian” approach to development, and admitting that all community structures are by no means democratic and choice enhancing, the debate needs to move beyond universalism and relativism or communitarianism and individualism. As Penna and Campbell (1998) argue in an interesting paper, cultural factors, norms, practices, and indigenous institutions are of value in the everyday lives of people in non-Western societies. Rather than dismissing non-Western cultures as anti-democratic and authoritarian, there is a need to engage and work with existing institutions and practices to promote development and enhance choice and freedom for individuals and groups. In this context the Asian Values debate has thrown little light while generating much noise. While politicians like Mahathir Mohammed and Lee Kuan Yew have argued in favour of order and discipline for developmental prospects and economic 1 I am thankful to Christine Morris for this particular insight.

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growth, their critics, like Amartya Sen, even while unearthing traditions of freedom and tolerance in Asian societies, do not generally go beyond pointing out the utility of freedom and democracy in a general sense. Sen’s (1997) analysis is not rooted in an understanding of institutions and norms. His support for democracy and freedom is grounded in a discourse on human rights that has its foundation in Western political history and culture. Debates both in developing countries and in the developed West are grappling with complex issues such positive discrimination, entitlements, gender, and ethnic/communal/racial violence. One therefore needs to go beyond the functions of the state and market to focus on social relations, cultures, and practices in addressing such issues. Sen’s discussion on this issue and on freedom and development in general seems to be quite divorced from his work on entitlements and cooperative behaviour. This is perhaps because he is unable to visualize alternative views of development and development process beyond market and state-mediated processes. There is a general failure on the part of good governance advocates like Sen to question, “whether cultural specificity also demands different ways of conceptualizing development” (Jayal 1997: 412). Even if one is simply discussing the role of the state in development, it is important not to think of the role of the state as a mere facilitator, which is what most multilateral institutions seem to project. The UNDP identifies the private sector as the primary source of opportunities for productive employment, and the role of the state is to facilitate this process. Here the private sector is viewed simply as the private corporate sector. Selfdependent and self-reliant communities of workers are completely outside this definition. States therefore see little contradiction in facilitating privatesector growth even as it decimates the vast informal sector which provides employment and sources of livelihood to millions in countries like India. Policies that deprive vast numbers from sources of livelihood through enclosure, displacement, and contracting out of natural resources, thus destroying sources of employment, are inconsistent with policies that identify the private sector as the primary source of employment. These problems emerge from inadequate definitions of the nature and scope of the state and civil society, which exclude semi-autonomous and autonomous self-governing communities with their own institutional structures, laws, and social security mechanisms. Also, as mentioned earlier, there is a tendency to look upon politics, participation, governance, and economics as autonomous social fields. Most governance models follow the approach that, if a governance model is not in consonance with the market economy, it needs to be reformed. If the economic model does not fit well with the governance model, leading to market failure, both are deliberately forged together through reforms. In the case of participation, governance reforms usually take place outside of existing democratic structures with the involvement of a development bureaucracy and NGOs; local participation is rarely allowed in determining the larger economic structure and governance structure and reforms in these areas. These are given

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and decided at national and international levels, and participation is usually allowed only in predetermined programs at local levels, usually at the stage of implementation. Vandana Shiva (2002), in a critique of Sen’s arguments, questions his views on democracy and economic growth, stating that “trade liberalization and globalization policies empty democracy of economic content, and remove basic decisions from the democratic influence of a country’s people.” Good governance projects in effect divorce political democracy from economic democracy. In such a situation, in conditions of inequality and stratification, participation has led to the appropriation of control, leadership, and benefits from development initiatives by local elites, as documented by development writers like P. Sainath (1996) and in other studies. In the state of Andhra Pradesh in India, Shramdan—a program of labour donation for village infrastructure development—has degenerated into a program of free labour by the poor for infrastructural projects suggested by the rich and which benefit them. Ironically, scholars who recognize these effects and critique such approaches end up arguing for a stronger role for the state, despite evidence of “state capture” by elites before and after economic and political reforms (see Harriss 2001 and Jayal 1997 for examples of this type of analysis). Such arguments are based on the logic of redistribution facilitated by the state. Quite apart from the fact that redistribution systems are present in many communities, what is significant is that such arguments detract from a movement to endow the poor with productive assets as a long-term solution to destitution. The World Bank in essence provides a reductionist view of the role of the state in promoting equity. In one of its reports asset redistribution is mentioned as a possible focus of state action, but measures to bring this about deal only with mechanisms such as “better sectoral allocation of public expenditure,” “investment in health and education,” and “anti-poverty programs” (World Bank 1997: 54–59). Not only is there little mention of issues such as land reform, but the report says nothing about the need to offer “broadly equal economic opportunities to all,” which can be achieved not only by “redistributing assets, increasing access to markets, skills and credit,” but also by “removing those cultural biases (including gender bias) which exclude large number of citizens from the production and exchange process” (Cornia 1998: 35). Participation, therefore, has to be conceptualized in political terms, rather than override existing institutions and marginalize democratic bodies. Similarly, governance has to move away from outlawing and eliminating politics, from the strong Weberian approach of emphasizing rules and formal institutions. Again, radical scholars like John Harriss (2002) who have critiqued the depoliticization involved in development models which use buzzwords like social capital, empowerment, and civil society, ultimately end up supporting a greater role for the state in bringing about development under conditions of social inequality. Such an approach ignores both the fact that quite often the state colludes with imperial, feudal, and capitalist interests and the many examples of genuine participatory experiments having to work against government barriers.

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It is not necessary, however, that an apolitical approach towards governance derives directly from an emphasis on institutions and institutional reform. Important work in the area of new institutional economics by economists such as Douglass North (2000, n.d.) has demonstrated the role of politics in economic processes through defining and enforcing the “rules of the game.” Not all proponents of new institutional economics give importance to politics. Ha-Joon Chang (2002), in his historical study, attempts to show that in fact institutional development was fairly limited in developed countries at the stage of development that developing countries are currently in and that, comparatively, “contemporary developing countries actually have much higher levels of institutional development than the (developed countries) did at comparable stages of development” (Chang 2002: 111). However, a close reading of the text reveals a very narrow and formal interpretation of governance, institutions, and development—definitions that are economistic. While Chang does mention the importance of social welfare and labour issues, his discussion of property rights actually justifies violation of communal property rights from the perspective of economic growth and progress. Also, while there is recognition of the form and quality of institutions, there is no recognition of a different type of institution that may be indigenous to particular societies and that may be appropriate to them. The inability to broaden the scope of institutions stems from the transaction costs approach, which is integral to new institutional economics.

Conclusion Good governance as propounded by development institutions is mostly linked to market forms of development. These approaches are signified by their inability to consider non-market economic models and by an unquestioning attitude towards economic liberalization. No distinction is made between form and content; certain forms of governance are condemned as unethical and undemocratic, while at the same time demands for economic sovereignty are rejected. Ethical and legal notions tied to specific institutional and economic contexts are celebrated and imposed in a hegemonic fashion over developing countries. Ethics and law are commodified, branded, packaged, and sold to countries “affected” by crises in governance. The good governance debates of the 1990s and beyond echo both the modernization debate of the 1960s as well as the nineteenth-century civilization mission of colonizers encapsulated in the rhetoric about the “white man’s burden” (See also Chapters 3, 4 and 17 by Goonatilake, Nandy, and Smandych, in this volume). Just as the basis for superiority earlier was the gap in science and technology between Europe and the newly discovered areas (Adas 1989), in recent times efforts to explain the lack of progress of non-European societies has led to the identification of lack of good governance, and the taking up of good governance as a civilizing mission. Most good governance projects are “couched in terms of charity, and are not rooted

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in rights claims,” as Jayal (1997: 407) and Mahajan (1999) argue. Efficiency considerations deviate from normative concerns, even as indigenous initiatives for democracy are suppressed in the name of good governance. Contrary to what many liberals and neo-liberals believe, it is the strengthening of civil society institutions and not their erosion that is leading to the “politics of retribution and revenge” and the “shrinking of space for dissent” (as argued for instance, by scholars such as Guha 2001: 4670), fuelled in part by the delegitimization of political action and the closure of economic and political pathways of development to citizens of many countries. “Impartial rulebased procedures” (Guha 2001: 4664) have excluded those who could not access them due to reasons of illiteracy and powerlessness or even just the inability to see a “fit” in terms of their social structures, cultural practices, and livelihood strategies. There can be little scope for dissent on the need for governance reforms in many post-colonial, developing countries. Despite the modernization debate being problematic from several points of view, its chief merit has been the contribution of serious scholarship to the development of the arguments and their basis in the actual conditions prevalent in post-colonial societies. The “new agenda for change” (Joseph 2001), however, seems to be driven by economic imperatives and guided by suspect scholarship. What is required is for scholars to develop a new epistemology of good governance that is guided by an awareness of diverse world views.

References Adas, Michael. 1989. Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology and Ideologies of Western Dominance. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ADB [Asian Development Bank]. 1995. Governance: Sound Development Management. Asian Development Bank Policy Papers, WP1-95. Manila: ADB. ADB. 1999. Governance in Asia: From Crisis to Opportunity. Reprinted from the Asian Development Bank Annual Report 1998. 22 pages. Office of External Relations. Manila: ADB. ADB. 2004. “Governance Initiatives.” Available at: . British High Commission in India. 2002. “Education and Governance Reforms Key to Poverty Elimination.” Available at: . Bühler, Ute. 2002. “Participation with Justice and Dignity: Beyond ‘the New Tyranny.’” Peace, Conflict and Development (online open access journal) 1: 1–16. Chang, Ha-Joon. 2002. Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. London: Anthem Press. Cooke, B., and Uma Kothari (Eds.). 2001. Participation: The New Tyranny? London: Zed Books. Cornia, G.A. 1998. “Convergence on Governance Issues, Dissent on Economic Policies.” Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Bulletin 29: 32–38.

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From White Man’s Burden to Good Governance ][ C H A P T E R 12 ][ 209 Desai, Vandana. 1998. “The New Managerialism in Local Governance: North-South Dimensions.” Third World Quarterly 19: 635–50. DFID [Department for International Development]. 2001. “Making Government Work for Poor People: Building State Capability, A DFID Strategy Paper.” Strategies for Achieving the International Development Targets Series. London: Department for International Development. Freire, Paulo. 1998. Pedagogy of Hope. New York: Continuum. Friedman, Thomas L. 2002. “Globalization, Alive and Well.” The New York Times, 22 September. Guha, Ramachandra. 2001. “The Absent Liberal: An Essay on Political and Intellectual Life.” Economic and Political Weekly 36(50): 4663–70. Harriss, John. 2001. Depoliticising Development: The World Bank and Social Capital. New Delhi: LeftWord Books. Jayal, Neerja Gopal. 1997. “The Governance Agenda: Making Democratic Development Dispensable.” Economic and Political Weekly 32(8): 407–12. Jensen, Majken Juhl. 2000. “Participation and Empowerment: Rational Realities: Whose Knowledge Counts? The Importance of Anthropology as Anthropology in Development.” Unpublished Paper, University of Aarhus, Denmark. Joseph, Sarah. 2001. “Democratic Good Governance: New Agenda for Change.” Economic and Political Weekly 36(12): 1011–14. Mahajan, Gurpreet. 1999. “Civil Society, State, and Democracy.” Economic and Political Weekly 34(49): 3471–72. North, Douglass. 1993. “Douglass C. North—Autobiography.” Available at: . North, Douglass. 2000. “Institutions and the Performance of Economies over Time.” Plenary address at the conference “Beyond Economics: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Development.” GDN 2000: Tokyo, Japan, 11–13 December. North, Douglass. n.d. The New Institutional Economics and Development. Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL (RePEc:wpa:wuwpeh:9309002). Available at: . Penna, David, and Patricia Campbell. 1998. “Human Rights and Culture: Beyond Universality and Relativism.” Third World Quarterly 19: 7–27. Rahnema, Majid. 1992: “Participation.” In The Development Dictionary. A Guide to Knowledge as Power, ed. W. Sachs. London: Zed Books. 116–31. Randeria, Shalini. 2003. “Cunning States and Unaccountable International Institutions: Legal Plurality, Social Movements, and the Rights of Local Communities to Common Property Resources.” European Journal of Sociology 44: 27–60. Reddy, Krishna. 2002. “New Populism and Liberalization: Regime Shift under Chandrababu Naidu in AP.” Economic and Political Weekly 37(9): 871–83. Said, Edward. 1978. Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books. Sainath, P. 1996. Everybody Loves a Good Drought: Stories from India’s Poorest Districts. New Delhi: Penguin India. Sen, Amartya. 1997. “Human Rights and Asian Values: What Lee Kuan Yew and Le Peng don’t Understand about Asia.” The New Republic 217(2–3): 33–40.

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Shiva, Vandana. 2002. “The Real Reasons for Hunger.” Guardian Unlimited, 23 June. Available at: . Twain, Mark. 1901a. “The Stupendous Procession.” In Fables of Man, ed. John S. Tuckey. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972. 415. Twain, Mark. 1901b “To the Person Sitting in Darkness.” In Mark Twain’s Weapons of Satire: Anti-Imperialist Writings on the Philippine-American War, ed. J. Zwick. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992. Available at: . UNDP. 1995. Reconceptualizing Governance. Discussion Paper 2, Management Development and Governance Division, Bureau for Policy and Program Support. UNDP. 1997. “Governance for Sustainable Human Development: A UNDP Policy Document.” Available at: . UNDP. 2002. Human Development Report, 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World. New York: UNDP and Oxford University Press. UNESCO. 2002. “Governance, the New Public Realm and Civil Society Organizations.” Paper prepared for the Management of Social Transformations (MOST) Programme of the United Nations. Available at: . World Bank. 1997. World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World. New York: Oxford University Press and World Bank. World Bank. 2000. Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World Bank Strategy. Public Sector Group, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Network.

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CHAPTER 13

Deradicalization and the Defeat of the Feminist Movement: The Case of the Philippines Sheilfa B. Alojamiento ast paradigms associate radical politics with waging a revolution that is class-based, armed, and thoroughgoing. In the Philippines this was represented by the national democratic liberation movement led by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) over the past few decades. After the fall of the socialist regime and a split in the local leftist movement in the early 1990s, radical politics has become anyone’s claim. The national democrats, for instance, are now judged by their critics as stuck in the past, reduced from vanguard to rearguard of radical politics (Weekley 2001: 259). This viewpoint goes with the current civil society movement that debunks statism and class struggle. On the other hand, staunch proponents of revolutionary change regard civil society engagement as reformist, a cooptation with neo-liberalism. It is so much harder to speak today about feminism. While many women identify with feminist thought and live out in their personal lives what could be construed as feminist practice, a greater number are reluctant to be identified with feminism. Others outrightly reject the label. This can be attributed to an absence of a cohesive mass movement that engages the support and interests of women and an attendant lack of feminist theorizing to inform everyday politics. A difficult question to ask in discussing feminist politics in the Philippines is whether the feminists of the 1980s and early 1990s fought, and were defeated, as feminists or as the female contingent of the nationalist democratic forces. This chapter argues for the latter and reiterates that there is no longer a feminist movement in the Philippines today. The feminist and proto-feminist consciousness of the 1980s has been superseded by other competing cultures and ideologies that invaded in the aftermath of the 1990s political upheaval. Those who choose to carry on a radical position are in danger of being extinguished.

P

Feminism and the Nationalist Democratic Struggle Organizing women in the national democratic revolution had been the task of the Malayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan (Independent Movement

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of New Women). From a Women’s Bureau of the Kabataang Makabayan (Patriotic Youth) in 1969, the nationalist democratic organization’s women department grew into the MAKIBAKA or Independent Movement of New Women, in 1970, which later became the nationwide organization of mostly young and student women. In 1972 it changed its name to Makabayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan (Patriotic Movement of New Women) to emphasize the nationalist democratic intent of the organization. During the years of martial law MAKIBAKA activists were deployed all over the country to build a basic alliance of women across all sectors of society, specifically among the workers, peasants, and lower petty bourgeoisie, to support the goals of the revolution. MAKIBAKA women became the progenitors of the national democratic feminism that laid great stress on the need to unify. One of the oldest calls of this tradition is to combat wrong ideas that work against solidifying the unity of the oppressed class. Many women writers trace the beginnings of the women’s movement in the Philippines to the anti-colonial struggle of the 1890s when the revolutionary movement Katipunan produced heroes such as Gregoria de Jesus, Teresa Magbanua, Melchora Aquino, and Gabriela Silang (Pagaduan 1993: 106). While there had been various movements pushing for the advancement of women’s rights since 1891 when the fight for the right to vote was first waged by middle-class women, in contemporary times, the women’s movement was strongest from the mid-1980s to the beginning of the 1990s. Feminist critic Delia Aguilar (1993: 94) ascribed this to the declining influence of the Left as well as the macho stance of the revolutionary movement at its height. At the time autonomous1 organizations were sprouting, and GABRIELA, then claiming a 100-member national federation of women’s organizations, was leading the mobilization of grassroots women and making women’s issues out of national issues such as the American bases, human rights, foreign debt, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, etc. GABRIELA held sole claim to pursuing a “Third World feminism” that assigns gender oppression to problems of poverty and underdevelopment. Guided as it was by the national democratic project, GABRIELA sought to bridge head-on the inherently tense relations between women’s distinct concerns and pressing national interests (Aguilar 1993: 92). As a federation of women’s organizations, GABRIELA has always been criticized as primarily a nationalist democratic formation, rather than a feminist organization. As a movement it had no autonomous agenda but was anchored to the program of the national democrats. That GABRIELA’s mass organizations dispersed following the demise of the nationalist democratic agenda in 1993 must lend credence to this. While there were independent women’s movements that surfaced in the 1980s, these did not have GABRIELA’s number and mass character. These groups were easily dismissed by the national democrats as Western-influenced bourgeois feminist formations. 1 Autonomous here refers to those feminist groups formed outside the rein of the hegemonic nationalist democratic formation.

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In the Philippines, women’s training in political struggles has always been in support of broader movements for freedom and democracy. The most intensive and extensive training took place during the nationalist democratic struggle of the 1970s and 1980s. As enlistees to this cause, their first commitment was to the advancement of the revolution. As Aguilar asserts, “tied as it was to the orthodox Marxism guiding Party praxis,” feminism did not find a friendly home in the nationalist democratic revolution, and in MAKIBAKA in particular (Aguilar 1993: 92), as it always subordinated all other axes of oppression (gender, ethnicity, environment) to class struggle. If a feminist consciousness did not fully develop in the women’s movement, a good part of the blame can probably be laid on this continuing alliance with the male-dominated leadership of the national democratic movement (Angeles, cited in Poethig 1993: 133). Despite its hostility to feminism, the culture of radicalism fomented by the nationalist democratic revolution brought on tremendous changes in the lives of people who were involved in the struggle. Relationships were restructured as the needs of the revolution came first. Comradeship replaced other bonds based on bourgeois institutions, and the nuclear patriarchal family, although still regarded even by revolutionists as a site for reproduction (and women seen as bearers of sons who would carry on the struggle), was being complemented by the bigger family—the collective.1 A proletarian worldview was being developed, denigrating middleclass values and institutions and condemning bourgeois consumerism and other tendencies friendly to multinational corporations.

Retrenchments in the Camp: From Feminism to Genderism The post-revolutionary era following the defeat of the national democratic program in the 1990s was a period of vigorous searching for alternatives to past paradigms. While activists looked for “interstices and spaces within the political system to advance the progressive agenda” (FOPA, 1993: 7), the Ramos government was hastening the country’s integration into the intensifying neo-liberal world marketplace. Development aid poured in, a big bulk of which was rechannelled through non-government organizations (NGOs). Activists were getting new money for development work, and a whole new set of NGO jargon developed along with the new formations and relationships.2 Gender projects likewise proliferated, redeploying feminist 1 In most cases the family functioned as a support structure for the underground movements. Wives, mothers, and sisters who did not join the clandestine struggle were particularly most useful in cases of arrest, death, and disappearance, since comrades could not surface to help. Of course, in areas where the underground movement was strong, the family network always covered the tracks of the rebel activists and actually participated in the revolutionary activities. 2 See comparable critical discussions of the role of NGOs in chapters by Goonatilake and Parthasarathy (Chapters 3 and 12, respectively) in this volume.

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energies into new programs. This signalled the absorption of feminist activists into aid agency structures. With adequate support from funding agencies abroad, activist women’s enterprises branched out into several directions: peace advocacy (later dubbed gender and peace), eco-feminism (gender and environment), children’s concerns, women’s spirituality, gender and micro-enterprise development, Violence Against Women (VAW), and so on. This broadening of perspective worked in two ways: it opened up more avenues to coalesce and work with other groups on important social issues, and it further diffused, if it did not finish off, the unconsolidated feminist agenda. This shift in political practice fell in line with the reform and renewal program being pursued by the broader progressive movement that now encouraged heterogeneity and pluralism via participatory politics, legislation, community-based self-help projects, micro-enterprises, etc., in development practice—in lieu of hegemonic social transformation projects. There was adequate financial support coming in this direction as traditional funding agencies1 were themselves reacting to what they felt to be a mistake they made in the past: backing up organizations that sought to destabilize government while being incapable of responding to popular sentiments and not directly serving the socio-economic needs of the poor. With no overarching national or class struggle to hem them in, women’s projects expanded, from women’s studies to socio-economic initiatives. Basic services likewise improved as more health centres, reproductive health clinics, and crisis centres were built. Women’s desks, committees, and GAD (gender and development)2 focal points were installed in both government and non-government offices—a landmark in the women’s struggle that was welcomed by many, but bothered some. Feminist social theorist Aguilar (1993: 94) expressed concern, saying while it boded well for the women’s movement, it could also take an inauspicious turn, creating a (feminist) bureaucracy dependent on dole-outs from foreign sources. As a strategy in development practice, GAD moves away from a feminist stance that questions existing social relations (gender inequality, for one) to an accommodationist gender approach that tries to live within a given social order. A feminist approach is basically a political demand, while GAD is essentially an economic strategy which seeks to find relevance within the economic development regime of the neo-liberalist era of the 1990s and onward. In other words, GAD works within the interstices of the dominant capitalist system and serves to support Western cultural imperialism. In place of a feminist movement, what we now have in the Philippines today is a scattering of women’s causes and projects that serve women’s welfare without really affecting the free market and neo-liberal regime on 1 These included church-based organizations and networks abroad that supported the anti-Marcos struggle of the previous decades. 2 GAD, or the gender and development framework, is a development policy framework meant to sensitize development processes to the needs and specific circumstances of women.

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one hand and male hegemony on the other. A real harm that many wellfunded gender projects do is siphoning off the political energies and resources of the women’s movement, contributing to a culture of indifference that is hostile to radical politics.1 With the rise of multifarious gender interests, feminism has become one of the older branches of political action one need not hold on to. It is not surprising that many women activists now express queasiness over being called feminist, others even preferring to call themselves “genderist.” Feminism is so associated with the confrontational politics of the 1980s and is seen as so blatantly anti-male, that it is perceived as having no place in the supposedly all-inclusive, enlightened, gender-sensitized civil society movement of the 1990s and 2000s.

Getting Rich on the Home Front? The dismissal of the class struggle of the previous decades following the triumph of elite politics and the rise of the civil society movement in the 1990s likewise brought changes in the lifestyles of erstwhile proletarian practitioners. For one, the collective life withered away, as bourgeois institutions of old (the nuclear family, the conservative church, government) gained new ascendancy in the lives of former rebel activists. For another, the deluge of development money created an NGO bureaucracy living under the employ of development aid, producing in turn a new middle class composed of activists formerly trained in the proletarian ethic of simple living and hard struggle. Joining them are young university graduates with varying political persuasions and vague ideas about previous social transformation projects. The 1990s was also the time when people were trying to live down the upheaval of the previous decade. The anti-fascist struggle that claimed the lives of family and friends, the discovery of the mass purges—all the aftermath of a failed revolution gave people a sense of disillusionment and a desire to withdraw from political action. Self-transformation projects and spirituality quests, deemed to be what the last transformation project lacked, attracted a number of ex-activists. There was also a sense among many that the post-conflict climate (i.e., post-adversarial politics) might be their one opportunity to compensate for “lost time,” to go back to a forsaken career or to children and family. Guilt-tripped over past parental or filial neglect, these women now saw the home as a site of new importance. Plans for housing, education, health insurance, and cars became basics as family life normalized. Under this arguably more peaceful and more affluent regime, a new (political) attitude has developed: one that attunes to, even embraces, 1 Galbraith (cited in Epstein 2002: 32) calls it “culture of contentment,” in referring to the 1980s and 1990s in the United States. In the Philippines, a similar culture of contentment may be said to have set in among the ranks of middle-class women activists who found in the new political climate of the 1990s plenty of opportunities to peacefully pursue empowerment projects that do not necessarily put their lives on the line.

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capitalist neo-liberal modernity. Proletarian austerity is thus exiled, superseded by middle-class consumerism.

The Hegemony of the Happy Family and Feminist Politics In the Philippines, the family is decidedly a very powerful institution. It is also the Catholic Right’s strongest argument against feminist politics. In its fight against pro-choice, for instance, it portrays the recently passed House Bill 4110 (Reproductive Health Care Act, which legalizes all forms of contraception, including safe abortion) as the gravest threat in present time to the sanctity of the Filipino family. While Third World feminism has been always concerned with family welfare and reproductive rights, sexual rights remains a thorny area that puts it in a direct collision course with the Church. The Catholic Right, in particular, shows great aversion to what it calls the sexual revolution ushered by the invasion of Western products and information via advances in telecommunications technology. In the past, the Catholic Church had ironically been GABRIELA’s moral ally, particularly in campaigns that had to do with the sexual exploitation of women. Though each employed a different language,1 both the women’s groups and the Catholic Church support the elimination of prostitution.2 The present dominance of the Catholic Right and the conservative view that looks at feminism or the idea of female independence as a toxic substance from the West has much to do with present-day retreats and disavowals on the women’s front: there is no longer a coherent and strong voice—nor a mass movement—to challenge misogyny and patriarchy. Besides, the broadening civil society movement draws forces from the multiplicity of voices from various classes and segments (including the religious and the generally middle-class based and conservative civic groups) such that if one wanted to productively pursue the advancement of equally worthy causes (e.g., anti-corporate, anti-globalization, peace, environmental protection, etc.), one has to be careful in treading the alliance ground. Feminism being a less attractive fight (since it also fights at home and fights men and bishops), practising women advocates must resort to some dissemblance and a little compliance.

1 Church language is cloaked in “sin” and “moral decadence,” GABRIELA in problems that have to do with poverty and survival. 2 In the radical politics of the 1980s, a strong feminist demand was the legalization of prostitution and the recognition of the unionization of sex workers so that they could be protected from abuses. At present, the official and widely held view (at least as voiced by women in Davao City affiliated with GABRIELA) is that prostitution can never be considered, and the sex workers themselves never consider it, as a profession, because it is sexual exploitation of women, period. What is little realized of course is that workers in other industries do get exploited as well, so that it can be said that sexual exploitation among the prostitutes is what capitalist exploitation is to workers.

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Conclusion Following the crumbling of the solid Left that once controlled and defined the social transformation project, a flowering of people’s initiatives and independent formations occurred in the Philippines. Abetted by a series of political reforms on the side of government (e.g., decentralization with the enactment of the Local Government Code and a system of representation that accommodated in Congress erstwhile state opponents and critics; the absorption of Left personalities in the cabinet and strategic government agencies; and the pouring of money into official development aid that has transferred billions of dollars of development money into the hands of NGOs), the face of dissent changed to what I now call deradicalization: the defeat of adversarial politics in favour of an accommodationist, even cooptative, reformist politics. Taking place in an atmosphere of an expanding job market and a flow of cheaper consumer goods (both thanks to trade liberalization), not to mention a climate of peace and greater political freedom (barring class politics), a better life seems to be “on sale.” Erstwhile activists—a good number of them, anyway—having left class politics and the trenches and having now joined the ranks of the middle class are inevitably trapped into reproducing a way of life that maintains middle-classness. Needless to say, they contribute to the creation of a neoliberal and neo-conservative political climate.1 For the feminist movement that always rallied behind the national democratic cause, the defeat of the once solid Left in the 1990s led to political disarticulation which disorganized their forces, demobilizing them for a while. With the loss of the Left hegemony and with the emergence of pluralist politics (as encouraged by the state and adequately funded by churches and governments abroad eager to sponsor political democratization and economic development in the country), new opportunities have been opened for their specific agenda to be heard. However, the sponsorship of gender by development organizations (and the concomitant resources allotted to it) and its adoption by government (and the policies and laws enacted to support it), while helping to boost women’s chances to be accommodated in the male structures of development discourse and processes, also coopted them. Feminist dissent has been reined in—chastened and placated into complacency and compliance by the laws and institutions that in the first place are responsible for their subordination. So that even as these women’s formations struggle to advance their gender interests, their own (feminist) energies are diffused in supposedly more encompassing projects: in the anti-corporate and anti-globalization movement; in “more compassionate” projects (read as not anti-male), such as the peace movement; in the gender and environment movement; in chil1 This is not to discredit the achievements they have made, especially in bringing “to the centre” their agenda and making this agenda part of the language and consciousness of the mass audience.

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dren’s rights; and in welfare projects and socio-economic endeavours that do not carry a specifically feminist agenda. All these help to align women with, rather than question and challenge, traditional roles that spell their oppression. As feminist causes become institutionalized and the women’s movement relocated to the academe, government offices, and other such safe places, adversarial politics and the equality project it seeks to install are demolished. Anyone who insists on standing by this oppositional politics stands to be isolated.

References Aguilar, D. 1993. “Feminism in the ‘New World Order.’” In Reexamining and Renewing the Philippine Progressive Vision, ed. J. Gershman and W. Bello. Quezon City: Forum for Philippine Alternatives. 89–105. Epstein, Barbara. 2002. “Feminist Consciousness after the Women’s Movement.” Monthly Review 54: 31–37. FOPA (Forum for Philippine Alternatives). 1993. “The Dual Crisis of the Philippine Progressive Movement.” In Reexamining and Renewing the Philippine Progressive Vision, ed. J. Gershman and W. Bello. Quezon City: Forum for Philippine Alternatives. Pagaduan, M. 1993. “The Feminist Movement in the Philippines: A History of Searching.” In Reexamining and Renewing the Philippine Progressive Vision, ed. J. Gershman and W. Bello. Quezon City: Forum for Philippine Alternatives. 106–11. Poethig, K. 1993. “Sisters in the Struggle: Philippine Prostitution and Two Feminist Theologies in the 1980s.” In Reexamining and Renewing the Philippine Progressive Vision, ed. J. Gershman and W. Bello. Quezon City: Forum for Philippine Alternatives. 126–40. Weekley, K. 2001. The Communist Party of the Philippines 1968–1993: A Story of Its Theory and Practice. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press.

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PART 5

LINGUISTIC AND ECOLOGICAL IMPERIALISM

Introduction The worldwide dominance of the English language as part of cultural imperialism is a concern addressed in a number of chapters in this book, including in particular the chapters by Germann (Chapter 7) and Scherrer (Chapter 11), which have already been discussed. Concerns and issues surrounding the preservation of language are also addressed in the final chapter of the book by Biyot Tripathy (Chapter 19) in the context of discussing the fate of the Orissan tribal peoples in India whose language and culture is now being threatened by outsiders. While these chapters deal with language in relation to issues of cultural diversity, education, and postcolonial Indigenous peoples, the chapters included in Part 5 help us to better understand linguistic imperialism from an historical perspective and to more clearly appreciate how language preservation, as part of an attempt to protect cultural diversity, is as important to the survival of human societies as is the protection of biological diversity. Fritz Vilmar, a German sociologist and member of the “German Language Association/Citizens for Cultural Diversity,” examines the debate over linguistic imperialism in Europe from an historical perspective. According to Vilmar, European history over the past 500 years shows that national languages became increasingly a means of exercising political power over growing territories and different ethnic groups. Throughout this period, subjugated groups were frequently forbidden to use their own languages. From the seventeenth century on, French was the predominant language of the European upper classes who used it to mark their social superiority. In the course of the twentieth century, English supplanted French in this function; at the same time, however, learning and using one’s national language became basic to higher education and better chances for a respected position in civil society. Regrettably, Vilmar argues, in recent years Basic Simple English (BSE) has increasingly displaced non-English languages in the workplace and in German society generally because of the worldwide economic predominance of the US, especially in the culture industry. Vilmar notes that whereas in France, Finland, Poland, Hungary, and

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Portugal a resistance against the displacement process has begun to be organized (by language legislation, among other measures), Germany still shows an extreme submissiveness or laissez-faire attitude towards American linguistic imperialism. Vilmar’s chapter uses Germany as a case study to highlight the complex nature of the issues involved in attempting to recognize and address the issue of linguistic imperialism. Although resistance is now beginning to emerge, Vilmar speculates that in all probability the longterm outcome of this resistance will be fatefully tied to other national and global efforts that are now being undertaken to hold back the current sweeping tide of American cultural imperialism. Hermann Dieter, a Berlin-based toxicologist and biochemist, who is also a member of the “German Language Association/Citizens for Cultural Diversity,” develops an argument in favour of the equal importance of the protection of linguistic/cultural and ecological diversity. Although Dieter, like Vilmar, uses Germany as an example of a country whose language is being threatened by the increasing use of English, his argument about the need to view the protection of the world’s linguistic diversity as being as important as the protection of its ecological diversity has much broader implications. Most problematically, Dieter argues, “From a global point of view, the pressure on the worldwide linguistic and cultural diversity, as exerted by almost one ‘single’ culture and its language, seems to be accepted like a Darwinian law—although this is not a natural process, but a linguistic-cultural one.” According to Dieter, however, words and languages are “not only natural-acoustic products of human voice,” but “each single word of any language is also a cultural monument or witness in pocket format,” and as such, “the obvious parallelism between the world’s linguistic and natural diversity is in fact not (only) a relationship by analogy, but (also) one by content.” Dieter argues that “To reduce and extinguish the multiplicity of human’s perception of nature is very much the same as to destroy its (perceived) diversity and to sell for cheap our capacity to understand and to take care of the natural universe in future.” Bernd Hamm and Gustav Sauer, a German nuclear physicist and member of the German Major Hazard Commission under the federal minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, provide a critical examination of the disastrous ecological consequences of global neo-liberal economic policy. In this respect, the chapter shares much in common with the earlier chapters in Part 4 of this book. Sauer and Hamm argue that while neo-liberal ideology may not necessarily be the cause of the current global problématique (as the Club of Rome called the syndrome of combined ecological, economic, and social global crises), it is currently indeed its major and most powerful engine. In their chapter, the authors concisely summarize a vast body of research literature covering current global problems including population, mega-cities, migration and refugees, debt crisis and poverty, climate change, water shortage and water conflicts, soil degradation and desertification, nutrition and hunger, and biodiversity and recurrent medically related epidemics. In

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doing so, they point to the overwhelming evidence that the world’s ecology diversity and, in turn, vast numbers of the world’s population, especially in “Third World” countries, are suffering from possibly irreparable crisis. According to Sauer and Hamm, much of the blame for this crisis, at least as it has been exacerbated over the last few decades, can be placed on globalized neo-liberal economic and social policies; that is, by rhetorically favouring the “market” to regulate all spheres of society, neo-liberals hide not only the fact that this market works like a fox in a henhouse, but also that the state is complicit in this enterprise. Consequently, Sauer and Hamm conclude that one way to work against eco-imperialism as an aspect of cultural imperialism is through engaging in a more conscious and direct global campaign of resistance to neo-liberalism.

CHAPTER 14

Analyzing and Resisting Linguistic Imperialism Fritz Vilmar

his chapter examines the debate over linguistic imperialism in Europe from an historical perspective. European history over the past 500 years shows that national languages became increasingly a means of exercising political power over growing territories and different ethnic groups. During the same period, the subjugated groups were frequently forbidden to use their own languages. From the seventeenth century on, French became the predominant language of the upper classes, who used it to mark their social superiority. In the course of the twentieth century, English has supplanted French in this function. At the same time, however, learning and using one’s national language became basic to higher education and better chances for a respected position in civil society. Since the end of the twentieth century Basic Simple English (BSE) has increasingly displaced non-English languages because of the worldwide economic predominance of the US, especially in the culture industry. Whereas in France, Finland, Poland, Hungary, and Portugal a resistance against the displacement process has begun to be organized (by language legislation, among other measures), Germany still shows an extreme submissiveness or laissez-faire attitude towards American linguistic imperialism. In this chapter, I summarize some still very marginal initiatives towards a defence of the German language that are occurring in the public sphere. This analysis shows that current controversy between linguistic submissiveness and self-consciousness is part of an ongoing struggle within the leading bureaucracy and institutions of the European Union (EU) as to whether or not English shall become the sole official language.

T

Some History The naivety of the current German discussion on the Americanization of the German language consists in the assumption that language is outside of the structures of social dominance—as if it evolved in a vacuum. In reality, language is to a high degree an instrument of social organization, in many different ways. First, historically, language has been developed as an instrument of economic and administrative integration. Second, at the

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same time, it has been used as an instrument for exercising power over other ethnic groups and peoples, and hence is a tool for forcefully integrating ethnic groups into the national community. Thus, a language enforced to suppress indigenous speech becomes a fetter, a means of chaining other peoples into an empire. A classic case is the dominance of the colonists’ language in colonies. Third, language in class-ordered societies has been used as a tool for securing rank, i.e., superiority and supremacy over the “people.” Only at the stage of development of a civil society which has been democratized—at least at the intellectual level—does language become the medium of civil self-development of a cultural nation. In the standard national language, the nation finds itself as a nation or a culture.

Analysis of the Present Situation: Americanization and Surrender The Linguistic Power Struggle Shifted to the EU Anglo-American linguistic imperialism is not a problem unique to Germany, but is manifested worldwide and not least in the EU. The drastic efforts to establish English increasingly as a predominant language of communication in the EU, and attempts by the French to maintain the French language on at least the same level, are the best contemporary evidence of language as an instrument of power. Those who are set on supporting Anglo-American world domination and the French who cling to the idea of the Grande nation struggle tacitly for socio-cultural dominance in the hope that those who dominate the official EU language will also rule Europe. The Germans, in turn, are fighting harder than before, not wanting to be completely routed in this EU language struggle. Der Spiegel reported on August 13, 2001: “A bitter linguistic struggle is brewing between Paris and Berlin. The German government is determined to oppose the French moves to abolish German as an official language at the working level of the EU Council, the committee of the representatives of the member states.” In Paris, Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine advocated the use of only French and English, arguing that, up to now, these have been by far the most commonly used languages. Joschka Fischer’s Foreign Ministry in Berlin argued on the other hand that German is spoken by far more EU citizens than French. The Germans, however, have shown a willingness to increase the number of official languages in the council to five, adding Italian and Spanish. If Paris insists on a two-language rule, however, the Germans favour English as the only official language—a demand unacceptable to the Grande nation. Der Spiegel (2001) goes on to report the German answer to the resulting question of how multilingualism is to be financed, noting that: Berlin has also had an idea to deal with the anticipated cost boom for language services after the eastward extension of the EU. With 15 languages

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in the present Union, these services already cost over 1.3 billion deutschmarks annually. In a Union that will soon number 27 member states—whose joint conferences, with 21 official languages, will present interpreters with 210 language pairs—the costs are expected almost to double. To stem the costs of this Babylonian tangle of languages, Berlin proposes that each state cover its own costs for making itself understood by the others. Brussels would continue to finance the translation of official EU documents into all languages of the Union, however.

In the meantime, the English expect the French to surrender gradually to the linguistic consequences of worldwide Anglo-American dominance. The Economist (as reported in Le Monde of June 29, 1999) applauded the progress of Americanization in France, while recommending discretion in order not to disturb the welcome development. This is where linguistic surrender is taking place in Europe and especially in West Germany.

American Hegemony: Economic, Linguistic, and Cultural In various leadership or elite spheres in Germany today, faultless German is becoming less a condition of entry than is a more or less heavy use of anglicisms—like the use of gallicisms two or three centuries ago. In some companies, management has completely taken leave of the national plane and communicates only “globally”—speaking American English—a manifestation of a new class society. This brings us to the process of linguistic imperialism that has increasingly taken over the German language, particularly since the end of World War II and especially in the past two or three decades. The full complexity of this process cannot be detailed here. Fundamentally, however, we can point to the quite understandable self-effacement of Germans after the Nazi catastrophe: the widespread flight from the German language by many Germans who wanted to “belong,” to be somebody, is not only the consequence of American socio-economic dominance, but also a consequence of Germans’ seldom-admitted guilty conscience and inferiority complex after the ravages of the Nazi regime in Europe. In their flight from their identity, these Germans have been transformed into submissive vassals of the triumphant power, the US—politically, economically, and culturally. There were and are good reasons for this, especially for younger Germans: the libertarian, consumerist American way of life and the prestige of the US in the world, its economic power and its scientific and technological advantage. One can distinguish three phases or qualities of the process of American cultural and hence linguistic dominance in Germany. First were the elements of democratic re-education that were eagerly absorbed, especially by a large proportion of the younger generation after 1945, as well as the exciting fashions and literature and boisterous, hedonistic dance styles, all of which offered an internationally oriented counterculture, an air of worldliness and

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freedom, in contrast to the stuffy, authoritarian nationalism of Nazi “culture.” Second, the flood of American commodities, films, and other products of the entertainment industry; the growing influence of American science, through studies in the US; and most of all the increased penetration of American businesses in the West German economy—thanks to a longstanding exchange rate of four marks to the dollar—anchored the “American way of life” as well as the academic and economic supremacy of the US in West Germany, with momentous linguistic consequences. Third has been the change from this decades-long process of Americanization into a new quality of systematic Americanization of the German language on a broad front in the areas of advertising, data processing, business administration, and entertainment, primarily through processes of globalization in general and computerization and internetworking in particular. The business magazine Wirtschaftswoche (May 20, 1999) summed up the extent of this Americanization as follows: English owes its worldwide triumph to the rise of the USA as a superpower. American supremacy in business, science, culture and politics has advanced the idiom of the Commonwealth to a world language in the late 20th century—with far-reaching consequences: some 85 per cent of international organizations use English as a working language. In Europe, the figure is as high as 99 per cent. Moreover, the Internet is driving the dominance of the world language still further. This affects not only our business, consumer and leisure society.

Denglish: Language of the Elite This new quality of linguistic domination culminates in the refusal by American (and international) companies to take the trouble to translate into German their internal communications, product presentations (including film titles), and correspondence with German partners, customers, and subsidiaries. This degree of colonization is not inevitable. Yet, in Germany the advertising agencies of multinational companies, which address Spanish and French customers in their respective languages, often stick to their English-language slogans. A crass example of this is the Dutch company Philips, which uses the mottos “Miglioriamo il tuo mondo” in Italy, “Juntos hacemos tu vida mejor” in Spain, and “Faisons toujours mieux” in France, but “Let’s make things better” in Germany. This tendency was described in concentrated form in a report in Die Welt (December 21, 1999): “Hermann Simon, director of an advertising agency, leads his employees into the brave new world: in his company— as in a growing number of big businesses—texts are written in English first. ‘English is the new model language.’” In the former Hoechst concern, employees receive instructions from German colleagues in bad English. At Bertelsmann and Allianz, English is already the company language in certain areas. Mr. Simon declares:

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“Everything that is intended to be read by all must be in English.” Domestic markets are less and less important to large companies. What counts is the global marketplace. “The Internet is a global distribution system. It requires the use of the worldwide language, English.” Simon has a popular vision: “English for business, German for personal use” (Die Welt, December 21, 1999). Michael Fuchs, president of the foreign trade association, quoted by Simon, goes one better: he wants complete bilingualism, arguing that: “Germany should make English the second official language by 2010.” The same tendency can be observed in countless German scientific publications and symposia. Wirtschaftswoche (May 29, 1999) notes that: “About 90 per cent of all scientific texts appear in the modem lingua academica, according to the linguist Ulrich Ammon of Duisburg: ‘German, which was indubitably the most important language of research in the first third of this century, leads a rather miserable existence today.’” Some time ago the chairman of Deutsche Bank, Rolf Breuer, proffered a sample of the language of the elite on German television. Appearing on the program Nachtcafé (SDR, April 21, 2001), he said in his very bad Denglish: “Sobald wir das Logo von den Aufsichtsräten bekommen haben, werden die Businesse zusammengebracht, dann wird ein gemeinsamer BusinessPlan entwickelt, ein Jobprofile verabschiedet, und dann wird entschieden: wer macht den Job.” Billboards and department store catalogues are also becoming more and more thoroughly anglicized. Peek & Cloppenburg advertise Troyer, Classic-Cabane, Basic, Gum-Rib-Stop-Nylon,Worker-Pants, Composé-Look, Pull-up-Struktur, Designer-Sweats, Color-Blocking-Look, Stone-Blue, and Bleached-Blue, and dozens upon dozens of similar incomprehensibilities. The cosmetics industry speaks a similar Denglish. The once eloquent Beiersdorf concern advertises: Millennium Party, Promotion by NIVEA, einfach galaktisch, machen den Look spacig, Nail-Design, Eyeshadows, Orion Styling, Cosmic Shine, Deep Night, Spacy Eyes, nicht shiny genug, and sexy gepflegte Haare sind ein Must. Throughout the entertainment industry the German language is foundering. In the highly Americanized film industry, producers seldom bother to translate titles: German audiences are supposed to understand the American ones, or not, as the case may be. In sports programs, reporters increasingly consider themselves “cool” when they use only Anglo-American terminology. And not only Open-air-Veranstaltungen are advertised mainly in Denglish: aside from a modicum of Deutschrock, all the popular music has English lyrics; anyway, no one in entertainment produces Veranstaltungen any more, only Events.

“Linguistic Imperialism”: The Politics of the Global Spread of English In recent years the British socio-linguist Robert Phillipson has researched and coherently reported all of the policies—mainly English—which have led to the high degree of linguistic and cultural world domination that the

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English language enjoys (Phillipson 1992, 1997, 1998; Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas 1996). Phillipson (1992: 47) defines “linguistic imperialism” as meaning “that the dominance of English is asserted and maintained by the establishment and continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between English and other languages.” The structural inequalities are material and, in particular, financial, while the cultural inequalities refer to the relative ideological and pedagogical dominance of Anglo-American speech. According to Phillipson (1992: 109), English has prevailed mainly due to the “colonial linguistic inheritance,” i.e., the fact that Anglo-Americans had subjected the inhabitants of the enormous regions of the world which they had conquered since the sixteenth century to a massive process of linguistic conversion, as a result of which the original languages and civilizations of these colonies were largely marginalized, and the English and later the Anglo-American language and way of life became the norm. The growing dominance of English was due, at least in part, to worldwide strategies of English-language teaching (ELT) which were developed in connection with this colonization at great organizational expense—largely financed and coordinated by the British Council— and which continue to the present. The result: whereas 400 years ago an estimated five to seven million people spoke English, there are now a relatively constant 315 million native speakers of English, while the number of people who speak English as a second language is estimated as high as 1.5 billion (Phillipson 1992: 24). Of course, these very significant studies and their classification of language policies as a form of imperialism must be considered alongside the documentation of economic imperialism, mainly on the part of the US since World War II, as mentioned above. This economic imperialism resulted in the extensive adoption of English (or “Denglish”), mainly through the market domination of American products, especially those of the cultural industry and the sciences, but also, as we have seen, through the globally anglicized “corporate culture.” Although Phillipson does not focus on this point, he is aware of it: “The English language inevitably accompanied the American scientific, military and political hegemony, behind the screen of international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank” (Phillipson 1992: 49).

The Policy of Linguistic Disengagement in Germany Specious Arguments against a Language Preservation Law Many irresponsible decision-makers in business and politics, and sadly in broad areas of linguistics as well, thoughtlessly sweep aside demands for preservation of the language and dismiss those who would warn against its decline. Even the German Minister of Culture, Julian Nida-Rümelin, speaking fashionably of “grosse Events” that he refused to subsidize (Frankfurter

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Rundschau, May 30, 2001), descends to the level of the man in the street with populist objections to the idea of a law for the preservation of the language: “We don’t need language police” (“Wir brauchen kein Sprachpolizei”; reported by Welt am Sonntag, February 11, 2001). NidaRümelin was very well aware that none of the proponents of language preservation legislation has anything like police measures in mind. One might just as well accuse trade supervision officials of industrial espionage. In fact, the discussion has for the most part stagnated at the level of populist rhetoric. The analysis presented next attempts to dispel only the most common of the pseudo-arguments, which as a whole tend to reflect monotonously repetitive prejudices against those who would preserve the language. Afterward, I will deal in more detail with the central cliché that a “living language” does not need preservation. With monotonous regularity over the past number of years, during which it has grown to over 14,000 members, the association Verein Deutsche Sprache (VDS) is accused of promoting Germanic-chauvinistic purism. “No one would suggest that the word ‘Demokratie’ [democracy] be replaced with ‘Volksherrschaft’ [people domination] ... or ‘Nase’ [nose] with ‘Gesichtserker’ [Face oriel]” (Nida-Rümelin, again, in a letter to VDS). The rhetoric reveals that Nida-Rümelin is decrying measures that no serious language-preservationist intends. The accusation that VDS and similar organizations intend to punish citizens with fines for incorrect speech is equally shallow. “That’s nonsense, that’s complete nonsense. Something like that cannot be done with money.” Ruth Reiher, Professor of German, who made this incisive judgement on Radio Kultur, has apparently never heard of the French language preservation law known as the loi Toubon, under which not individual citizens, but, for example, cosmetics suppliers are dissuaded by substantial fines from marketing products whose labels list their ingredients only in English. Other half-truths include the ideas that “It’s just a youth jargon; let the kids have their fun; English is more concise and cool; we’re living in the age of globalization and English is a global language, whether we like it or not.” Moreover, criticism against the Americanization of the German language is attributed to the political right wing. A “courageously” anonymous “anti-Fascist” group attempted to prevent a seminar on the issue at Freie Universität, Berlin and sprayed its arguments on the walls of the Political Science Department: Fuck deutsche Sprache [Fuck German language] and Deutsch nix wichtig [German nix important]. Yet the most fatal slogan on the street (and in the talk shows) is: the language doesn’t need preservation—to say nothing of a preservation law— because it is a living organism that will free itself of superfluous English fads, as it has dropped French borrowings in the past, “because the language is really self-regulating. Yes, actually I have great confidence in the language ...” (Professor Ruth Reiher, 26 May 2001, on Radio Kultur where opinions are voiced by the majority of academic linguists). This is a completely inappropriate “liberal” justification of inaction, modelled after the “self-regulating power of the market,” which as we know only works

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within strict limits. In reality, the flood of gallicisms in German and the degradation of German in over 200 years of French predominance, disappeared not of their own accord, but through the self-assured art of classic German literature, as well as through the work of language associations and, finally, through the regulations of language-conscious government officials. For example, Meissner (2002) recounts the achievements of German translation since the seventeenth century. Many successful Germanizations were the work of Joachim Heinrich Campe (1746–1818), whom Goethe unjustly satirized and Wieland respected highly. It is much less probable that Americanisms infecting major areas of the German language will disappear by themselves. The opportunistic optimists on this point, foremost among them the GeselIschaft für deutsche Sprache, which is largely inactive as far as language policy is concerned in spite of its ample state funding, refuse to recognize the enormous economic power behind the phenomenon.

The Attitude of Government: Official Downplaying and Abstention Unlike France and more recently Poland, Germany has taken practically no political steps to confront the danger of Americanization. The coalition government of the Social Democratic (SPD) and Green parties has provided a truly scandalous example of this inactivity in its response to the question put by the CDU-CSU (Christian Democratic Party; in Bavaria, the Christian Social Party) parliamentary group (Bundestag publication 14/0, March 1, 2001). The CDU-CSU sketched an active approach to language policy in the form of no less than 75 specific questions. The CDU, not surprisingly, was called upon to explain why it undertook none of the tasks described in its document during its own 16 years in government when, in fact, the irresponsible dismantling of the Goethe Institutes began. The SPD and the Green Party followed suit with a much less precise parliamentary inquiry of their own. The following discussion will be limited to the core issue of increasing anglicization which is raised in the CDU’s catalogue. In its written response of October 31, 2001 (Bundestag publication 14/7250) and its oral statements in January 2002, the German government showed an incomparable disengagement from the critical issues. The full extent of state irresponsibility in the face of the creeping marginalization of the German language is evident in the “Red-Green” government’s downplaying and evasive answers to the CDU-CSU’s important and welcome questions. In particular, the government’s response to the question about the anglicization of the German language is entirely in line with the trivializing policy of the semiofficial language associations. The government disclaimed all initiative and even any acknowledgement of danger (Bundestag publication 14/7250, January 31, 2001). To those who warn that “an excessive use of anglicisms could result in certain segments of the population feeling excluded from public communication” and could deform the German language, the government answered:

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“The fact must be considered that German has never been a ‘pure’ language, but has borrowed words from numerous languages over the course of its history, mainly from Latin, Greek, French and now English. Our language, like any other living language, has changed constantly. It must be able to change in order fittingly to express the constantly changing reality.” The government repeated the convenient cliché, long since refuted, about the natural “vitality” of linguistic change without an inkling of recognition that the current changes in German are the result of the massive AngloAmerican dominance in the fields of corporate policy in general and the media, computer, and entertainment industries in particular, as English is submissively adopted by German subsidiaries and advertising firms, as well as by globalizing German competitors. There is no cause for alarm, we are told: the 49 per cent of Germans (and 71 per cent of East Germans) who do not understand English should simply skip over the anglicisms. Instead, we are told: “The concern that people might be excluded from public life due to their lack of English skills is unfounded. General familiarity with a foreign language is usually not necessary for an understanding of individual borrowings that are used repeatedly in certain factual and linguistic contexts.” In short: do nothing. “Hence the Federal Government considers ... a protective regulation for the German language, comparable with the laws in France and Poland, to be unnecessary. A living language is subject to constant change which should not be influenced by acts of the state.” Even for the language of administration, the policy is inaction: “For these reasons, the Federal Ministry of the Interior does not plan to direct agencies of the Federal administration to replace borrowed words with German terms.” The government’s inaction, its escapism in regard to language policy, naturally suits Germany’s similarly disengaged academic language associations, the Institut für Deutsche Sprache und Dichtung (IDS) and the Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache (GfdS), extremely well. Perhaps their apolitical stance was and is influential in the markedly passive attitude of the government and the governing parties. This is clear from the government’s references to the laissez-faire position of the academic language associations (Bundestag publication 14/7250, January 31, 2001). I have referred above to numerous facts from the world of business which reduce ad absurdum, as pure ideologies behind state and social inaction, both the thesis of natural language evolution and the argument of individual freedom of choice. The German government cannot be entirely unaware that the linguistic behaviour of most Germans—and in any case that of the elite who set the tone—is determined not by individual linguistic responsibility and freedom of choice, but by the dominant socioeconomic structures. Nonetheless, it holds the flag of free enterprise high in protection of this Americanized elite. The government likewise dodges the question regarding its assessment of “the increase in foreign words” in the world of merchandise and advertising: “The foreign words and explanations used in the descriptions of goods and services and in advertising is ... a component of the entrepreneur’s sales-oriented communication,

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and falls entirely under his entrepreneurial freedom. The use of foreign designations ... is permissible as long as they cannot result in a deception of the customer being addressed regarding the origin or quality of the offering” (Ebenfalls aus der Regierungsantwort auf die “Grosse Anfrage”: Bundestag publication 14/7250). It is no wonder then that the German government closes its policy of inaction with a defamation of the French language preservation policy. Without offering evidence, the government alludes to an overestimation “of the positive potential of state influence on the language.” And with defamatory intent the government goes a step further, declaring again without a shred of empirical evidence: “The more extensive the effect of a language preservation law, the greater the dangers associated with it. If such laws attempt to define and rigorously enforce a correct usage, then they bring with them the risk of favouring a stagnation of usage.” These remarks close with a threat aimed at the French course: “In any case, language preservation laws are limited by the law of the European Community” (Bundestag publication 14/7250).

Activities of the Verein Deutsche Sprache Association Thus, the German language can expect no help from German politicians unless citizens in future sound an unmistakable alarm. The beginnings of such an alarm can already be heard. Due in part to the tireless educational work of the association Verein Deutsche Sprache (VDS), 70 to 80 per cent of Germans polled in opinion polls oppose the use and proliferation of Denglish (Gawlitta and Vilmar 2002). A political discussion of the English epidemic in the Cologne Express (July 31-August 4, 2001) was exemplary and culminated in a vehement plea by Marcel Reich-Ranicki against anglicization. In a reader survey, 87 per cent of the respondents supported the call for a language preservation law. Since its founding in 1997, VDS has carried out a considerable number of activities and campaigns. Major activities have included hundreds of informational events and stands; a petition against the use of English, presented to the German president and other political leaders in fall of 2002 with over 100,000 signatures; publicity in many major media and in televised discussions; a major photography exhibit, Deutsch ist out; and efforts to introduce a generally acceptable draft language law into public debate, to name a few (Gawlitta and Vilmar 2002). The result has been that these VDS activities have helped significantly both to draw public attention to the dreadful state of language in Germany, Europe, and the world and to expose public inaction as a social policy and cultural scandal.

Conclusion This chapter has used Germany as a case study to highlight the complex nature of the issues involved in attempting to recognize and address the

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issue of linguistic imperialism. It has shown that linguistic imperialism cannot be understood without attention to history, economics, and current national and global cultural politics. In particular, the chapter has pointed to the effects of American linguistic imperialism in Germany and Europe and at how the leading classes and the political actors in Germany have capitulated in the face of this imperialism. Unlike France, where language preservation has been an ongoing issue, vocal resistance to American linguistic imperialism in German has only recently begun to develop. In all probability, the long-term outcome of this resistance will be fatefully tied to other national and global efforts that are now being undertaken to hold back the current sweeping tide of American cultural imperialism.

References Gawlitta, K., and F. Vilmar (Eds.). 2002. “Deutsch nix wichtig”? Engagement für die deutsche Sprache. Paderborn: IFB-Verlag. German Academy for Language and Literature. 2002. Stellungnahme zur Debatte ü(fi)ber den zunehmenden Einfluss des Englischen auf die deutsche Sprache. Darmstadt: Memorandum of the Academy. Meissner, Gernot. 2002 “Wortschöpferisches Engagement in der deutschen Sprachgeschichte seit dem Barock.” In “Deutsch nix wichtig”? Engagement für die deutsche Sprache, ed. G. Gawlitta and F. Vilmar. Paderborn: IFB Verlag. 35–64. Phillipson, Robert. 1992. Linguistic Imperialism. New York: Oxford University Press. Phillipson, Robert. 1997. “Sprachenpolitik in Europa—Sprachenpolitik für Europa.” In Materialien zum Internationalen Kulturaustausch 36. Stuttgart: Institut fuer Auslandsbeziehungen. 46–51. Phillipson, Robert. 1998. “Globalizing English: Are Linguistic Human Rights an Alternative to Linguistic Imperialism?” Language Science 20: 101–12. Phillipson, Robert, and Tove Skutnabb-Kangas. 1996. “English Only Worldwide or Language Ecology?” Tesol Quarterly 30: 429–552.

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CHAPTER 15

Protection of the World’s Linguistic and Ecological Diversity: Two Sides of the Same Coin Hermann H. Dieter he vocabulary of a language is the genocultural code of that culture which created and uses it. Too many “code mutations” at once may destroy the phenotype of a language. This is the way in which the German language is in the process of being transformed in the mouth of many of its leading speakers into a German/English mishmash, popularly called “Denglish,” an undifferentiated crossing between German (Deutsch) and English words. Both Indigenous and those foreign words that have been assimilated and successfully used for a long time in Germany, are being incessantly pushed out of the country. New German words are rarely formed and the imported ones, instead of helping to form differentiated phrases, appear only in the form of inflexible scraps. From a global point of view, the pressure on worldwide linguistic and cultural diversity, as exerted by one “single” culture and its language— British and American English—seems to be accepted as if it were a Darwinian law (in fact, it has been for over a century; see Schleicher 1873), although it is not a natural process, but a linguistic-cultural one. Words and languages are, however, not only natural acoustic products of the human voice. Each single word of any language is also a cultural monument or witness in pocket format. This is true especially for the denotation and “cultivation” of natural phenomena. The obvious parallelism between the world’s linguistic and natural diversity is in fact not only a relationship by analogy, but also one by content. Today, we have to safeguard the world’s thousands of genocultural codes from the linguistic pressure of a worldwide monolingualism. This is not only a human rights issue, but also an essential precondition for perceiving and hence saving the genetic and phenomenologic diversity of nature. Destroying a language is the same as destroying a specific way of perceiving certain aspects of nature or human environments. To reduce and extinguish the multiplicity of human perception of nature is very much the

T

1 Translation from the German by Klaus Sticker, text + design (Bonn).

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same as to destroy its perceived diversity and to sell for cheap our capacity to understand and to take care of the natural universe in the future. Under the pressure of a worldwide English monolingualism, the worldwide net of relations between nature, civilizations, and languages is under threat of being transformed to serve exclusively the interests of the economic power(s) speaking that language. Taking care of and paying attention to the world’s linguistic diversity should be a central principle not only of cultural policy and language education, but also of environmental protection. Global organizations such as the World Wildlife Federation (WWF) or Greenpeace would be well advised not to speak in the monolingualism of their economic antagonists, the multinationals, but to respect local cultures and their languages by speaking them properly. They should not mix English words into other languages to create mishmashes like Denglish in Germany or similar instances of Englishlanguage linguistic imperialism that are occurring elsewhere. In this chapter, I offer a critical discussion of the interconnected global issues of linguistic and ecological imperialism, using Germany as a case example of one country that is currently experiencing their effects.

Environmental Destruction and Cultural Breaches “There is a close relationship between environmental destruction and cultural breaches.” This observation was made in 2000 in the BUNDmagazin, an important forum and stimulus for nature conservation, by its former chief editor Jürgen Räuschel (Räuschel 2000: 5). It corresponds to “the unspecific feeling that in spite of the economic boom and the global advance of democracy, something is going on that is fundamentally wrong ..., from the global increase in pollution [to the] sometimes devastating consequences of globalization for indigenous peoples and their cultures [and] to the loss of a marketing-free living environment here in the west.... Every interpersonal emotion, every locality is transformed into merchandise. For many this has become alarming” (Klein 2001). Unfortunately, only acts of terrorism that claim to save the world from all this are more alarming. Increasingly uninhibited neo-capitalism (or turbo-capitalism) is environmentally destructive. And its coupling to the one, indeed “single,” turbolanguage is culturally destructive. Not necessarily English, but BSE—“Bad Simple English”—has become the language of global marketing madness. Not only in Europe, but all over the world, it stands for the erosion of cultures. Can they be protected only by criminal acts? It does not do justice to the English language to caricature it as the language of turbo-capitalism, but the fact that its apologists propagate exclusively “their” English and in Germany their “Denglish” is indisputable. Linguistic diversity is not dear to them, but too dear. Today 5,000 to 7,000 languages are still spoken around the world. Of these, 2,500 are threatened with extinction and by the year 2025 more than half may have disappeared. They will not have the chance to pass on the cultural

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heritage they bear within them to coming generations. From the standpoint of promoting cultural diversity, this is far from a positive sign of progress. Would a linguistic-cultural contract between generations help? “If these cultures disappear they and their intimate relationship with nature will be lost forever. We must do all we can to protect these people,” said Klaus Toepfer, Executive Director of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) during the 21st session of that organization’s Governing Council in early February 2001 in Nairobi. The lexicon, or the spoken and written vocabulary of a language, could, with regard to its function and developmental capability, “be described as the [genocultural] code of that culture ... which uses it” (Kerckhove 1994: 158). Put simply, one root word equals one gene. The decoding, linking, regulation, content-related interpretation, and modification of the words follow the differently developed linguistic/historical phonetic, grammatical, and syntactical system of rules of the relevant language. Too many mutations at once, especially if they are arbitrarily set and not adaptable to the respective system of rules, destroy the phenotype. This is how a linguistic breach is occurring at present. Despite this extinction of languages, there are often more positive euphemisms used to describe the growing world dominance of English. These include the fashionable ideas that language-blending promotes “cultural exchange” and that it is an inevitable aspect of increasing “globalization.” Some argue that it helps to overcome “chauvinism and provincialism” in politics; others play down its historical importance, saying that “we have seen all this before”; others dress it up as scientific fact with the platitude that “languages evolve”; and still others trivialize it, saying that “language is very alive.” But an exchange between linguistically dead cultures would be just as lifeless as the globally uniform language is undifferentiated, while chauvinism and provincialism meet the least resistance and thrive best where the linguistic and cultural identity of a people is disregarded or where an identity not their own is imposed on them. Historically speaking, the present state is primarily characterized by the global displacement of cultures and languages under the pressure of one “single” de facto protected common language. Abandoned and unprotected, the others lose any chance to evolve.

Species Conservation and Linguistic Diversity Today, language conservation is considered backward, while nature conservation is something forward-looking, stimulating, and interesting. The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 introduced a positive awareness of the benefits of a friendly nature conservation involving everyone (see Chapter 16 by Sauer and Hamm in this volume). The connection between species conservation and natural diversity has reached the minds of the decisionmakers at least. In contrast, the connection between language conservation and natural diversity must still be brought to their awareness.

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Words are not merely acoustic articulations. They are also miniature cultural monuments. Organized with rules in the form of languages, they are complex cultural and “social” products. In the cultural sense, German President Johannes Rau, in his “Gutenberg speech” of November 23, 2000, in Mainz, wished for more loyalty to the German mother tongue (Rau 2003). The Minister for Internal Affairs, Eckart Werthebach, by contrast emphasized the socially integrative function of using the German language in Germany and considered it necessary to protect it through law (Werthebach 2000). Additionally, the European Year of Languages proclaimed by the European Commission and the Strasbourg Parliament in 2001 was intended to increase the awareness of the advantages of multilingualism, which allows us to change viewpoints with never-ending variety. Therefore, the connection between language conservation and cultural diversity is more than a mere analogy to species conservation. It is a direct element of natural diversity, the protection and utilization of nature and joy in nature. For this reason “culture” means not only cultivating the soil, but also cultivating education, language, aesthetics, and interpersonal relations: “a garden ... is the purest of human pleasures” (Francis Bacon 1625). The idea of a garden links the biblical order given to humankind to have dominion over nature with the pleasure of cultivating nature, but not with work, worries, and plagues (Makowski und Buderath 1983). Nature was cultivated for centuries by Europeans through uncultivated— i.e., “careless”—exploitation of natural resources. Today we speak of precaution, meaning that nature can only remain permanently cultivatable through careful scientific use of the wilderness (which equals uncultivated nature or “non-culture”), for example, through circumspect recourse to chemical or genetic resources.

De-differentiation and the Loss of Language In the transitional stage between non-culture and culture we break up and dissect unspeakable, complex reality into culturally specific patterns of perception or concepts. These broken concepts become ideas that are described in words and in turn expressed in language (“put into words”) for the purpose of communication. But a word can only express in language a few real or sometimes only one real aspect of the concept described and can never do so completely. For this reason, thought and the world, the world and language, are never structurally congruent. The complexity of the linguistic means of a culture, hence of its lexicon (vocabulary) and structure (grammar), with which its speakers internally communicate about the reality they break into concepts, is a measure of the differentiation with which they consider reality. The finer their linguistic perception is, the less broken is their relationship with reality and the less broken the transition. For example, the more elaborated our concepts of environment, nature, and wilderness are, the more careful consideration we can use in shaping the environment through targeted interventions

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and permanently cultivate nature through recourse to wilderness (see above), rather than taking it into permanent custody. For example, in the Andes Mountains of South America an ancient, very differentiated, and equally efficient form of land cultivation using canals, terraces, and fields at an altitude of 4,000 feet above sea level has endured for over 3,000 years. In central Africa the Aka pygmies possess highly differentiated knowledge of the healing powers of certain plants. For centuries the Dai have lived in the Chinese province of Yunnan in the “Holy Hills” in harmony with a genetically extremely diverse flora and fauna. The basket weaving art of the Tlingit people in the northwest US is unsurpassed. The baskets, made from cedar bark fibres, can even hold water (UNEP 2001). Of course, such differentiated cultural exchanges between nature and humans are reflected as well in their respective “cultural” languages and would, therefore, disappear along with the disappearance of these languages. Many more examples of non-industrialized ways of thinking and speaking of and about nature are contained in a 1999 report by UNEP (Posey 1999). It shows, for instance, how closely language, speech, and knowledge determine the genocultural “code” (Kerckhove 1994), hence the structure and content of the knowledge of so-called primitive societies. The preservation of as many languages as possible and their speakers is essential for the preservation, indeed the cultivation, of biodiversity (other topics are the social, health, and intellectual aspects of the unity of linguistic and natural biodiversity). Now let us take a look at the “picture of our way of thinking and perceiving,” as portrayed in the painting La condition humaine, by René Magritte (see reprint in Makowski and Buderath 1983).1 It illustrates well what is behind the assessment of the different nature of the lexicon and of the structure of languages. Is there not something else behind this easel, hence in front of Magritte’s personal eyepiece and his field of projection for his concept of landscape and nature (differentiated or less differentiated) than what we, in this case, can see only on his easel? Is the window, even the picture itself, merely an easel, an accessory? What could be hidden behind it? We do not know, for here we see everything “only” from a special viewpoint, through the eyepiece of Magritte. Every language breaks with all others in its particular idea of reality, by subjecting reality to, and describing it from, its own viewpoint. The “literal” ability to describe, focus, and refract reality is inherent in all the many languages that we have not used from birth and they represent many alternative concepts of the “world.” Only through such diverse linguistic refractions do reason, sensual perception, and the subconscious make it possible for individuals to experience, see, and communicate within their own culture. Magritte’s painting is an allegory of this. 1 René Magritte, a leading Belgian surrealist painter, lived from 1898–1967. A digital reproduction of Magritte’s La condition humaine can be viewed at: .

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Language refracts and breaks reality: this is not only inescapable, but also the beginning of cultural history and cultural diversity. Every language refracts reality with different shades, through different accentuations, in different angles of light. Therefore, the linguistic-conceptual refraction and breaking of perceptions in the area of transition between nature and culture is both inescapable and unavoidably complex. Today, this complex refraction threatens to degenerate into a simple “predetermined breaking point” of the connection between species protection and natural diversity. This break will come if the connection between language protection and cultural diversity does not finally receive the same global environmental policy attention as species conservation, as was demanded by UNEP in February 2001 (UNEP 2001) and by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in November 2001 (UNESCO 2001). Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that along with every linguistic eyepiece that is unfocused, devalued, and eventually replaced by one ostensibly more focused, we will lose irrevocably culturally specific knowledge about differentiated dealings with nature, differentiated perceptions of it, and differentiated use. Linguistic de-differentiation under the pressure of the one more favoured language (English) thus leads to a de-differentiation of our perception of “nature” and of our possibilities to sustainably protect and cultivate it.

Case Study: German Language, Denglish, and BSE In the meantime Germans are already breaking away easily from their mother tongue. The result is more unpleasant than merely breaking one’s word—it is a break with our specific culture and perception of reality. Our linguistic eyepiece is becoming unfocused and cloudy under the pressure of the “prefabricated words” (Dieter 2000) of the “single” other language. Words for concepts originating in the German language and/or that have been long assimilated in it are being expelled from the country en masse. Hardly any new words are being formed, and those let in as replacements are often only available in the form of broken words, rather than strung together in complete sentences. In brief, in Germany in the fields of music, sport, fashion, everyday computing, and many others the deformation of the German “language of culture” to Denglish has progressed very far. Is even the language of nature conservation threatened by this de-differentiation? Three examples can help provide an answer to this question. First, in the summer of 2000 the Federal Agency for Nature Conservation— Bundesamt für Naturschutz, or BfN—invented the English interpretation Busy for Nature for its abbreviation. “Begeistert für Natur” (Enthusiastic about Nature) would have been just as suitable, but instead our native language was pushed aside as de facto old-fashioned, not ready for tomorrow, backward, and outdated in favour of bad English, or Denglish (Doppelpunkt 2000). But, in contrast to the English motto, the German not

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only expresses busyness for nature, but also the huge semantic field related to “Geist” (“mind” or “spirit”), which is loaded with associations and, indeed, related to culture in a narrower sense. Hence, the German motto would—in the spirit of this chapter—refer with complete ease to the mutual contextual dependencies of the terms “nature” and “culture.” Should this context really be lost to the more important but mindless advertising purpose? The BfN’s press office asserted that the (D)English motto was only developed with a view to the “youth” target group—and that it is only three words! But do we really have to explain to an organization like the BfN that today’s youth is the creator of tomorrow’s language and its semantic fields and that “many a mickle makes a muckle” also applies analogously to the diffuse overloading of a language with bits of words that can be neither added to nor expanded on in these fields? This careless attitude towards Germany’s most important cultural asset by the BfN unfortunately has a systemic background, as is demonstrated by the title it gave its competition in 2002 for particularly impressive photos and films on nature: spots for nature. A second example is the linguistically careless sentence Greening our children’s future that appeared on a carefully designed invitation from the Berlin BUND (German Association for the Protection of Environment and Nature) to attend its twentieth anniversary celebration in October 2000. However, the message would be much more vivid if it had used a play on words with the German words begrünen (to green) and begrüssen (to greet) by saying “Die Zukunft begrünen—für unsere Kinder” (Green the future— for our children). A third example can be seen in a booklet produced by NABU (German Association for the Conservation of Natural Wildlife) in 2000 that discusses “Birding for Kids” and “Fit for Birding” in conjunction with bird watching. One young person asked his local group what birding meant. The reply was: “Well, bird is Vogel, so birding must mean vögeln (slang German for sexual intercourse).” This is for children? Who is going to build such Denglish bits into German structured sentences? Is this perhaps not even desired? How is “busy” declined? What is its semantic field in German—with the connotations so important for a precise, expressive, and graphic way of speaking (its nuances)? What does the verb “to green” actually mean? Its meaning intended here (“to make green” as a transitive verb) does not exist in the formal English language. Hence, the “creators” of such expressions force us into a Germanized, false, emotionally charged English (Doppelpunkt 2000), unless we are able to patiently overlook the problems of using it. The BfN with its “spots” and its “Busy for Nature,” the Berlin BUND’s greening slogan, and the unsuspecting sexual connotation of the NABU’s slogan “birding for kids” create a vague conceptual nebula for the sake of short-term effects. They aim “roughly precisely” towards where the “busy mainstream Denglish” of fast profit-seekers and trendsetters have long

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been swimming—from fast food chains to big tourist companies all the way to the true global (gambling) players. From all of their perspectives, the cultural asset of linguistic diversity has begun its march off into the museum, i.e., into the cultural deepfreeze. Hence, the vision of the global village threatens to degenerate into a worldwide village of merchandise. In some parts of the world it has already become a nightmare. The only “cultured” village language is Bad Simple English, whose worldwide variations hardly differ one from another any more than the dog breeds Airedale and Yorkshire terrier in the gardens of the culturally unsophisticated villagers. Perhaps for a time one or another non-English language may remain in fashion as the after-work and athome dialect.

The Future: Simple-Minded Diversity? Oh, simple-minded diversity! The powerful ADAC (the German automobile association), for example, not only opposes nature conservation and environmental protection but has long made full use of Denglish in its member magazine. If its opponents—like the BUND (German Association for the Protection of Man and Nature), the ecologically oriented VCD (Traffic Club of Germany), Greenpeace, etc., as well as the government agencies dedicated to environmental protection and nature conservation—are also drawn into such a poor linguistic style (which already appears to be the case for the BfN), they will lose their linguistic profiles and their credibility as advocates of the environmentally and socially proper utilization of the term “sustainability.” This term has not only an ecological and economical, but also a socio-cultural component. Only those who also take this into consideration can expect to motivate people globally and lastingly for the model of “sustainability.” Creative utilization of our national and mother tongue not only requires cultural imagination, but also creates it for the future. Only institutions such as the military or international air traffic can (and must) function without imagination. Imagination pays, both intellectually and conceptually, through the creation of added value as regards content. It cannot be produced through the blind adoption and cloning of prefabricated words from other language “species” (Dieter 2000). According to Benjamin Whorf (1971: 58) the same applies to the language of conceptions of nature. Similar to W. von Humboldt, he says of thinking that it follows “a network of rails that are set down in the respective language.” According to him, the culture of the Native American Hopi, whose language has no expression for “time” as we know it in IndoEuropean languages, would have been able to develop a physical conception of the world without the factor of time, a conception which for them would have the same power of explanation as Newton’s conception of the world in which the time factor plays a constitutive role. Hence, even in natural sciences, language conveys more than just univocal ideas. One

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“single” global language eyepiece, even highly praised as “scientifically essential,” would allow us to perceive only one single, rationalized reality. Next to it, all other languages would soon be obsolete. What a prospect! If we do not handle language ecologically—i.e., with care—we cannot expect to understand how to treat nature with care (Dieter 1994). When languages die, ways of thinking, perspectives, perception patterns, conceptual categories of reality, and their different respective renderings and content weighting die along with them. Compare the content of the “trivial” names from only a few languages for one single insect family (e.g., for “butterflies”) or a simple plant species (e.g., for “lily of the valley”).1 Each language illuminates an entirely different aspect of what we perceive of the insect or plant and keeps it alive in the cultural and scientific memory of humankind. Therefore, through “application of reason,” to come back to the interpretation of the painting by Magritte, “the world can only be seemingly clarified in its different levels of reality” (Makowski und Buderath 1983: 40). Today, under the pressure of one dominant mode of economic reasoning (global capitalism) and its one-dimensional dominant language (English), the interlaced relationships between humans, nature, and the environment are coming under the economically expedient constraint of the one power that uses this language all too eagerly. This cannot be aligned with making the concept of sustainability concrete in a way that is diverse as regards content, neither from an ecological nor an economical, much less from a socio-cultural or political point of view. The connection between language protection and cultural diversity, therefore, is more than merely analogous, i.e., it is not only in an indirect proportion to the relationship between species conservation and natural diversity. In addition there are also direct connections between language protection and natural diversity and between species protection and cultural diversity, for the destruction of species is also always the destruction of human culture (cultural history) and the ability to cultivate nature, while the destruction of a language is also the destruction of the perceptibility of nature in the broader, and of the human environment in a narrower, sense. The destruction of language results not only in the destruction of cultural, but also of natural functional potentials. This is the destruction of future possibilities for living and shaping life, in the same way as is the destruction of natural resources, thus revoking the contract between the generations. Therefore, language cultivation is not only a matter of cultural policy, but also of environmental protection and nature conservation policy. 1 Butterfly: papillon (French), Schmetterling (German). The German “Schmetter” comes from the Slavic smetana for “butter”; thus, Schmetterling is similar to the English word, butterfly. In the Middle Ages this word was also used for witches who came at night in a flying form to steal the butter. Lily of the Valley: le muguet (French; from the Latin muscus, meaning odour, scent), Maiglöckchen (German, literally “May bell”).

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One can argue that the response to linguistic levelling in a global mono “culture” should be multifaceted and ideally should include four essential ingredients: 1. loyalty to one’s own and openness to other languages, and an exchange between all of them, based on the intensive cultivation of terminologies; 2. critical, functionally circumspect use of words that are foreign to one’s own linguistic code, rather than using anglicisms, both among experts and ordinary people, so that grünen should be used rather than “greening,” Begeistert für Natur rather than “Busy for Nature,” Vögel schauen rather than “birding”; 3. making preferential use of, and further developing the linguistic resources of, the closest language, hence the national or mother tongue; as well as 4. actively speaking at least two foreign languages, one of which is a direct neighbour, and understanding others so that an ever larger part of international communication is made possible on the basis of fluency and possibly soon even electronically on the basis of acoustic language recognition programs (Hilberg 2000). Think global, speak local: this motto briefly and concisely summarizes all four responses. It should be adhered to by the BUND, Greenpeace, and other organizations, as well as by public institutions that work for sustainable species protection and nature conservation in the sense of the UNEP (2001). They should do so for the linguistically and culturally sustainable future of our children.

References Bacon, Francis. 1625. Cited in German in Makowski und Buderath 1983, 9. Dieter, H.H. 1994. “Okologie als Sprachkritik” (Ecology as criticism of language use). UWSF -Z. Umweltchem 6: 121–22 Dieter, H.H. 2000. “Fertigwörter—Fertigkost” (Fast words—fast fooderman). ERNOZ. Ernährungsökol 1: 125–27. Available at: . Doppelpunkt. 2000. “Deutsch-Jahresthema: Es gibt kein richtiges Deutsch im falschen Englisch” (There is no correct German within a wrong English). Doppelpunkt (Magazin für den Deutschunterricht) II. Hilberg, W. 2000. “Hat Deutsch als Wissenschaftssprache wirklich keine Zukunft?” (Is there a real future for German as a language of science). Forschung & Lehre/Zeitschrift des deutschen Hochschulverbandes 12: 628–30. Kerckhove, D. de. 1994. “‘Kunst und Natur’: Ökologische Ästhetik” (‘Art and nature’: ecological esthetics). In Ethik der Ästhetik, ed. C. Wulf, D. Kamper, and H.U. Gumbrecht. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag GmbH. 153–72.

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Protection of the World’s Linguistic and Ecological Diversity ][ C H A P T E R 15 ][ 243 Klein, N. 2001. “Hier läuft etwas falsch” (Something is going wrong here). Interview with R. Honigstein in Greenpeace Magazin (German edition) 2: 18. Makowski, H., and B. Buderath. 1983. Die Natur dem Menschen untertan: Ökologie im Spiegel der Landschaftsmalerei (Nature subjected to man: Ecology in the mirror of landscape painting). München: Kindler. Posey, D.A. (Ed.). 1999. Cultural and Spiritual Values of Biodiversity: A Complementary Contribution to the Global Biodiversity Assessment. Earth Print. Available from UNEP Publications at: . Rau, Johannes. 2003. “Gutenbergs Folgen. Von der ersten Medienrevolution zur Wissensgesellschaft” (“Gutenberg’s consequences: From the first medial revolution to the society of knowledge”).” Available at: . Räuschel, J. 2000. “Korrespondenz in Sachen Rechtschreibung.” BUNDmagazin (Magazine for the members of the Bund für Natur und Umweltschutz Deutschland) 4:5 Schleicher, August. 1873. Die Darwinsche Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft. Offens sendschreiben an herrn Ernst Häckel, von Aug. Schleicher. Weimar: Böhlau. UNEP (United Nations Environment Program). 2001. Press release on the 21st session of the UNEP Council. Available at: 8 February. UNESCO. 2001. Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. A Resolution Adopted on the Report of Commission IV at the 20th Plenary Meeting, on 2nd of November. Records of the General Conference, 31st session, Paris, 15 October to 3 November. Available at: . Werthebach, E. 2000. “Die deutsche Sprache braucht gesetzlichen Schutz!” (The German language needs legal protection!) Berliner Morgenpost 31 December: 6. Whorf, B.L. 1971. Sprache, Denken,Wirklichkeit (Language, thinking, reality). Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.

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CHAPTER 16

Eco-Imperialism as an Aspect of Cultural Imperialism Gustav W. Sauer and Bernd Hamm

How goes the world, Sir, now? Why, see you not? Macbeth, II.4.20

nderstanding all human action as culture, cultural imperialism also embraces eco-imperialism. It is a modern continuation of the colonial imperialism of the nineteenth century and earlier. By way of this history of imperialism, the “Old World” became the First World (World-I) and left the remainder, as Second (World-II) and Third (World-III), behind. These terms reflect the reality, in contrast to the noble definitions of “developed” and “developing” countries, which imply a chance of evolving from WorldIII to World-I. Eco-imperialism is also “world-intrinsic,” when socioeconomic and traditional hurdles prevent rational and national action. Today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, World-I is caught up in its ecological, social, and economic cycles with their creeping intricacies. The closer these problems become, the further away the solutions seem. Eco-imperialism emerges as a text of a modern Cassandra who warns of disaster once more, but cannot help. And similar to Apollon’s curse that, although telling the truth, nobody will believe her, cultural imperialism covers up the threats. Meanwhile, we in World-I are “amusing ourselves to death” (Postman 1985), while World-III watches daily via real time communication how well World-I is doing. So World-I has more and more to lose and World-III less and less. The “One World” (that is, all of humanity) thus risks choosing one of two evils, either apathy or violence. So the counter project to eco-imperialism, the Agenda-21 of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro 1992, falls into the hands of its stepsister, Apocalypse-21, 10 years later. The distinction we make here is intended to focus attention on the fact that the very first aim of the Earth Summit, namely, guiding World-III to World-I’s level, has not been achieved. As a result, World-III’s mega-cities are growing rapidly; access to energy, water, education, and health care has deteriorated, while illiteracy, malnutrition, hunger, and soil erosion have become dramatically worse. And the

U

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hopeful vision of the 1980s of a peaceful century after the end of the Cold War has been stamped out by terrorism, regional wars, and sub-continental conflicts. This chapter attempts to show the disastrous ecological consequences of global neo-liberal economic policy. In this respect, it shares much in common with the chapters in Part 4 of this book. While neo-liberal ideology may not necessarily be the cause of the current global problématique (as the Club of Rome called the syndrome of combined ecological, economic and social global crises), it is certainly its major and powerful engine.1 Susan George (1997) notes that neo-liberalism, as a school of thought, can be traced back to the end of World War II, but it only gained momentum in the early 1980s with the Washington Consensus, the standard recipe imposed by the IMF on indebted countries for “structural adjustment,” and represents the coming into power of neo-conservatives in some important Western countries and the liberalization of capital markets (Hamm 2005, Introduction). In the most general terms, neoliberal ideology calls for the dismantling of state regulation and for pure market rule not only for the economy but for all spheres of social organization. As Schui (Chapter 10 in this volume) demonstrates, it is not so much based on rigorous economic theorizing or on sound empirical research but rather is an ideology related to vulgar social Darwinism serving the interests of those in power. Our argument takes the form of first listing ten major aspects of the global problématique and giving a short account of the world’s ecological and social situation. We then turn to demonstrating how this syndrome is related to neo-liberal corporate and governmental policies in hegemonic Western countries. From this analysis we conclude that the global crisis predicted by the Club of Rome to appear before 2100 is well underway. Poverty, diseases, and wars are mere symptoms of it. Until now, however, World-I has been relatively successful in exporting its own share of the crisis to World-II and World-III, but there are clear signs that this is changing. The reason is not that we do not know what to do in order to prevent the crisis, or that we lack the means to do so. All the necessary scientific, technical, and social science knowledge is there to be used. Indeed, it would not be difficult to design a world able to house some nine or ten billion human beings in a sustainable way or to sketch out the process of how we could get from here to there. The real obstacle is global power distribution and the ways our institutions are designed to produce the necessary decisions. That is, they have increasingly been brought under the influence of neoliberalism since the late 1970s with the substantive support of Western 1 “The Club of Rome” is a non-profit, non-governmental organization (NGO) think-tank on global issues. According to its website Home Page mission statement, “it brings together scientists, economists, businessmen, international high civil servants, heads of state and former heads of state from all five continents who are convinced that the future of humankind is not determined once and for all and that each human being can contribute to the improvement of our societies.” Available at: .

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governments, exemplified, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, in the Thatcher, Reagan, and Kohl regimes.

The Global Problématique The impressive message, “Think globally, act locally,” coined at the Futurology Congress in Toronto in 1989, has turned into its opposite: “Act globally, split locally!”—a well-known effect of globalization. The resulting misery of World-III is demonstrated by 36 relevant indicators identified by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA 1999) of which we will mention only the most important. • More than four-fifths of all natural resources are consumed by WorldI, which consists of only one-sixth of the population of the world, although three-quarters of these resources belong to World-III. The resulting ecological costs are either globally distributed or confined to World-III. • Together with increasing productivity in agro-industries, the destruction of subsistence economies forces migration from rural regions into mega-cities and from World-III to World-I. • High population growth in World-III brings with it an increase in the workable cohorts and, therefore, an increase in unemployment and emigration. Maternal mortality, as well as mortality of both infants and children under the age of 5, is the highest. Those unable to emigrate are threatened by spreading diseases. • The debt crisis of World-III forces large parts of their own gross national product (GNP), especially their income from exports, into servicing debt. Structural adjustment is a major reason for environmental degradation, poverty, and social unrest. • A majority of people in World-III must struggle for their nutrition day by day. The hunger syndrome has become a major obstacle to development. Malnutrition and shortages in safe drinking water cause widespread diseases. • Most of World-III does not have “good governance” (which can be defined as including parliamentarism, corruption-resistant administration, independent judiciary, human rights, social justice, and openness for citizen participation and NGOs).1 • Public expenditures for education and health in World-III are exceeded by military ones. The degree of illiteracy is often more than 50 per cent, in particular for women. These deficits in education, health, and the economy lead to a hunger-driven over-exploitation of land use, followed by soil erosion, desertification, and water shortage. 1 See, however, Parthasarathy (Chapter 12 in this volume) for an analysis of problems surrounding “good governance” initiatives in World-III countries. It is also important to note that severe deficits in good governance can also be observed in World-I countries.

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In view of this, we can argue that the ecological and socio-economic situation is critical, as aptly headlined in an article in the New Scientist entitled “Time to rethink everything!” (New Scientist 2002: 31). Some individual trends within particular indicators are illustrated in more detail below.

Population, Mega-Cities, Migration, and Refugees In December 2000, the world’s population exceeded the threshold of 6 billion (=10)1 with a boy born in Sarajevo and godfathered by the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN). Today the population increases by some 80 million people per year (1.35 per cent per annum). Out of 100, this means that 12 are born in the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries (World-I), 52 in Asia, 12 in Africa, seven in Latin America, and three in the Middle East; on the level of nationstates, we have 21 in the People’s Republic of China (PR China), 18 in India, four in the US, one in Germany, and five in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS; i.e., the former Soviet Union). By 2050 with a total population of some 10 billion, this will shift to OECD 13, Africa 16, Asia 48,1 Latin America 10 and the Middle East four; or, on the national level, PR China 18, India 16, US less than four, Germany less than one, and CIS six. Population growth is concentrated in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Some 20 mega-cities already have more than 12 million inhabitants, a further 100 cities already have 5 million inhabitants. These mega-cities— not comparable with their “Western” equivalents of New York, Los Angeles, London, Paris, Moscow, Tokyo, and Osaka—cannot be administrated any longer. Cultural imperialism expresses itself in euphemistic language when the “slums” of those mega-cities are renamed as “informal cities,” as done by the conference Urban 21 (URBAN 21, 2000)—so now there are “informal citizens” living in “informal municipalities” and with “informal mayors” and “informal economies” which semantically conceal the misery and desolation of people barely surviving in mud and garbage. While World-I exhibits a child rate of 1.57 per mother (aged 15–49 years), the rate in World-II and World-III is 3.0 and 5.05. Thus World-I cannot reproduce itself in the long run, although life expectancy at birth for male/female is 71:79 years, while in World-II and III it is 62:65 and 50:52 years. At the same time, children dying under the age of five (per 1000 live births a year) in World-I, II, and III is 13, 87, and 160 respectively (UNFPA 1999). The resulting higher proportion of young adults (age 20 to 30) in World-III, however, is not met by an adequate number of available jobs. The deficit is highest in rural areas, generating migration to the urban agglomerations where peoples’ expectations are disappointed; thereupon, they move on towards the promised lands somewhere in Western Europe and North America. Shock therapy towards capitalism in World-II had similar effects. 1 For instance, 52 in 2000 AD in Asia mean some 3 billion people, but 48 in 2050 AD will mean 4.8 billion people.

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In addition to this, refugee movement increases due to environmental degradation and catastrophes, war and expulsion (there is a trend for expulsion becoming no longer the consequence but the actual aim of wars), hunger, and economic crisis. In 2001 up to 20 million people were registered as refugees; half of them crossed international borders, the others were so-called internally displaced persons, returning or unregistered refugees (UNHCR 2002). Additionally, there are a further 100 million people worldwide without a state’s passport.

Debt Crisis and Poverty Today 1.3 billion people live on less than $1 per day—a figure which says nothing if one does not take into account the price of goods, which is often very close to World-I standards. Including these people, the number of people living on less than $2 per day has increased, up to 2.5 billion people. The difference between rich and poor is increasing. While by 1960 the distribution of income between the 20 per cent poorest to 20 per cent richest countries was 1:30, it is now somewhere in the 1:90 range. Meanwhile, today, in World-I we can find some hypocrites blaming World-III for its own situation, arguing that “in many cases the poverty of World-III is increasing because these countries did not participate in globalization” (Mosdorf 2001: 7). But is this really the fault of World-III? The foreign debt of World-III amounts today to approximately $2,500 billion over all. It is rising and highly dependent on the fever and speculation of the American dollar, the decay of raw material prizes, and unfavourable terms of trade. The 40 poorest states—referred to as Severely Indebted Low Income Countries (SILIC 2000)—have debts of about $250 billion. Their debt servicing amounts to 80 per cent of the GNP or 220 per cent of their export income by a given GNP of less than $200 per capita. The next up—called HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries)— also have $200 billion in foreign debt. This global disparity of wealth is exacerbated by the fact that the daily flow on the world stock market rose from $80 billion in 1980 to some estimated $1.5 trillion (=1012) in 2000, 97 per cent of it in speculative stocks (WEED 2000). At the same time, about 400 families and/or persons are known to have as much fortune as 2.5 billion people (Forbes 2000). In addition, military expenditures are rising, even though the 1990s was a decade of demobilization after the end of the Cold War. Of total worldwide defence expenditures of $681 billion in 1997, World-I spent $517 billion alone; European countries spent $203 billion and the US $262 billion (BICC 1999). In 2004, the American military budget went up to $401 billion. The roots of the global debt crisis dates back to the 1970s when many World-II and World-III governments were granted credits from World-I on favourable conditions, thus absorbing much of the money accumulated during the boom war years. The two oil price shocks (1973 and 1979) not only exploded their energy import bills but brought rapidly increasing inter-

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est rates in their aftermath. As they could no longer service their debts, World-III countries had to raise new credits until, in the early 1980s, a number of Latin American countries declared insolvency. They appealed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help. The IMF, together with the World Bank, an instrument of American foreign policy (Brzezinski 1997: 49) conceded such help only under certain conditions, the most important being the acceptance of a structural adjustment program. Debtor countries henceforth had no alternative because the IMF was considered the gatekeeper to other financial markets. The structural adjustment package, although negotiated secretively on a country-by-country basis, has a standard set of components firmly rooted in neo-liberal ideology: devaluation of the country’s currency, sharp reduction of public spending (except for the military), increased production for export markets, opening of the national economy and its assets to transnational corporations, and deregulation and privatization. Since the early 1980s, this explosive cocktail has had to be swallowed by some 90 governments, Argentina, Venezuela, and Bolivia being only the last in a long row of cases. Essential components of physical and social infrastructure were privatized, like energy and water supply, but also health care, old age pension systems, and education. Thus, structural adjustment led to rapid unemployment and poverty as well as to environmental degradation, accompanied by the buy-out of the national economies by transnational corporations (TNCs). Most foreign direct investment in World-II and WorldIII countries is portfolio investment and does not create but rather destroys employment. Without solving the debt problem, deteriorating terms of trade negatively affected the trade balance, and the debtor countries found themselves in a vicious circle (former World Bank chief economist and Nobel prize laureate Joseph Stiglitz described the system in his 2002 book; see also Chossudovsky 2001). Consequently, it is clear that structural adjustment is nothing but the enforced redistribution of the hard work of millions of people in favour of a small number of international shareholders. Of course, in many cases, this redistribution of wealth from the many to the few requires, and can only be fully explained by, the open or covert collusion between national elites in the indebted countries and international financial institutions. Poverty in World-III inhibits health and education—excluding the leading cliques or clans. Therefore, dictatorships are stabilized. This effect is quite clear in worldwide figures on illiteracy, recorded in percentage terms for children under 15 years and by gender (percentage of male to female). By continent, the figures are: North America 7:8; South America 12:11; Europe 1:2; Asia 17:33; and Africa 31:49. On a country basis, for selected non-Western countries, the figures are: India 35:62; Saudi Arabia 20:41; Yemen 38:82; Algeria 29:55; Egypt 37:62; Mozambique 46:77; and Ethiopia 60:74. High illiteracy is correlated also with ignorance of contraception (medically, mechanically, naturally, traditionally) by 15- to 49-year-old women. As such, poverty and illiteracy—in other words, World I-created forms of worldwide misery—are

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disproportionately a problem suffered by women. In this context World-I must therefore proceed with a general debt relief strategy, releasing the 38–40 SILICs from debts of approximately $250 billion. This single act would cost slightly more than 1 per cent of the annual GNP of $24 trillion, or only half of the annual defence expenditure of $500 billion of the OECD countries. As long as only lip-service is being paid to this goal, indebted countries have no other way than to export at least part of their unemployment to World-I.

Climate Change Because of a natural greenhouse effect of +33 Kelvin (K), biological life at an average global temperature of higher than 10˚C is possible. Therefore, our global concerns on climate change are focused on an additional greenhouse effect, one that is stimulated by burning fossil energy sources. Industrialization in the West since the nineteenth century has increased the demand for energy in World-I more and more, while its emissions have been globalized. As a result, the earth has warmed up in the twentieth century about 1 Kelvin (K) to 15.3˚C, while the time series from 1000 to 1900 AD shows a decrease of the average global temperature of 0.3 K, leaving the remainder of 0.7 K.1 The increase in the twentieth century is therefore significant, as the concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) has increased to more than 370 ppm (part per million) from 280 ppm in 1850. This additional greenhouse effect is accompanied by four other greenhouse gases: methane (CH4) from natural gas production and agriculture (animal husbandry, cultivation of rice), “laughing gas” (N2O) from nitrogen fertilization and both the artificial fluoro-chloro-hydrocarbons (CFCs) and sulphurhexafluoride (SF6), which come from industrial use. Each of these five gases have a different greenhouse potential, caused by their specific infra-red absorption spectra and lifetime in the atmosphere more than 10 kilometres (km) from the surface of the earth. So, for example, the release of 1 kilogram (kg) of CFC from the air conditioning system of a Western S-class sedan caused by an accident is equivalent to the emission of 13,000 kg CO2. Or burning 1 kg CH4 (e.g., natural gas) produces some 2.3 kg CO2, although its release unfolds a greenhouse equivalent of 35 kg CO2. The problem in climate politics as well as in national egoistic policies is that there will always be winners and losers. If there were only losers, we would already have globally working conventions and negotiations, but because contradictory energy predictions disagree with climatic prognoses, we are confronted by a standstill. And both sides have serious arguments.

1 This is only less than 0.8 K of the well-known highest global temperature of 16.1˚C during the Eem-Age about 120,000 years ago.

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• Energy analysts—as a condition for growth and democratization of World-III—predict a doubling of the power demand. • However, the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC 2001) fights for a halving of the CO2 emissions in the year 2050 based on that of 1990–2000, scaling all five greenhouse gases. • This is the well-known “Factor 4”: cutting emissions by half while at the same time doubling human well-being belongs to the standard toolbox of “ecological modernization.” Today about 24 billion tons “scaled” CO2 are emitted. Normalized on 100, therefore, the OECD emits 50 parts, Asia (without China) 10, and Africa and Latin America about 3; on the state’s level, emissions are: US 24, PR China 13, Japan 5, CIS 12, and Germany 4. Converted to emissions per capita and year, each citizen in the US emits about 20 tons, in the OECD 11, in Africa less than 1, in Asia 1.2; again, on the state’s level, a citizen of PR China emits 2.4 and of France 6, while, in contrast to this, a German emits 10. The figures for China hide its extraordinary future energy demand because of its predicted development and estimated population growth—while today, one out of six of the world’s population lives in China, by 2050 it will be one out of five. On the other hand, the high emission level of the US with its lower population—only one out of twenty-five lives there—indicates their tremendous waste of energy. In comparison, Europe’s energy efficiency is double, although its energy demand is still 100 times higher than the average for World-III; for instance, Eritrea has less than 0.1 ton CO2 per capita per year. However the CO2 emissions have to be reduced by the year 2050 to an absolute level of 12 billion tons, which means an average emission of about 1 ton per capita per year. Therefore, the US will have to reduce its CO2 emissions by the factor of 20 (–95 per cent), and many OECD countries, including Germany, must reduce by 10 (–90 per cent), while France because of its high use of nuclear energy will need to reduce by only 5 (–80 per cent). Only Africa and Asia would be allowed to raise their emissions by the factor of 2.5 (+150 per cent) and 1.8 (+80 per cent) respectively; by 2050 China will have to save the factor of 0.7 (–30 per cent). Then and only then, will “the earth get a soft landing” (Grassl 1996: 3). It is obvious that this will be a political, technological, and technical challenge such as has never been seen before, especially taking into account the population figures involved and the history and mentalities of the various states. So it is not surprising that the US acts as the hard-liner against climate agreements, although everyone can see clearly that climate change is on the way. The US is gambling with the One World, forgetting that it is inevitably part of the gamble because of the population and economic growth in China and India. It is certainly disastrous that the American government pulled out of the negotiations under the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change; however, even earlier, by introducing tradeable greenhouse gas emission rights into the Kyoto Protocol in 1997,

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it laid the ground for a convention which can never reach its goal. While the protocol in its present version is condemned to be useless, it will still support an immense bureaucracy. Nevertheless, many individuals in World-I and even individual states are refusing to accept this situation because of the creeping changes in the climate indicators. As a result, the opposite of climate stabilization is likely to take place, namely, a climate change acceleration, estimating the carbonbased emissions up to 20.4 Gt C (nearly 50 Gt CO2)1 for 2100 AD, leading to more than 700 ppm and CO2 emissions of 5 tons per capita per year, whereas the ceiling should be at 550 ppm and nearly 1 ton per capita per year. Even in this case 45 per cent of the emissions are due to China and South and East Asia alone (Marlay 2000). Therefore, it has long been necessary in World-I’s own interest to give India and China—in fact, to the whole World-II—the best energy technology available, namely solar technology. Meanwhile, with climate change will come an inevitable rise in the sea level and threats from violent storms, strengthening in frequency and devastation will occur. So, for the first time, the accumulated average property and wealth in the OECD, both industrial and individual, run great risks as well. In fact, we remember a certain Cassandra: the Club of Rome (1971), which stated very impressively that the earth is going to destroy itself if there is no change in our behaviour (Meadows et al. 1972). Today, after 31 years, insurance companies are concerned about the growing rates of damage caused to property by “natural” disasters such as floods and tornadoes (Munich Re Group 1999). Recently a few narrow-minded meteorologists have been carping at the IPCC, referring to similar historical events based on natural weather cycles. They refuse to see the increasing average global temperature, which pumps more and more water into the atmosphere, whose condensation energy is more strongly concentrated and leads to serious and more frequent damage (Sauer 2001: 78).2

Water Shortage and Water Conflicts On the earth there is a total of 1,360 million km3 of water, of which only 37 million km3 is fresh water, 29 million km3 in the form of ice and groundwater and only 0.13 million km3 in lakes. In the global water cycle 425,000 km3 circulates via evaporation and precipitation every year. Therefore, there is actually enough water for everyone; it cannot physically disappear, but it can become contaminated or dirty. The “annual basis freshwater amount”—defined on the minimum statistic of precipitation—is 1 The tonnage given in CO is 3.66 times more than in C; scaled on all five greenhouse gases 2 it is nearly by the factor of 2.5. 2 The stored condensation energy is equivalent to 1.7 kg TNT per second and km3. After one week with fine weather 10 kilotons TNT (similar to the Hiroshima bomb) are accumulated in the first 10 km column with a base of 1 km2 ( 1 km2 = 0,386 sq mile).

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about 14,000 km3. In the year 2000 18,000 km3 was used (World Bank 1999: 206), resulting in an irreversible overuse of groundwater. Out of 100 units, in settlements water was used up to 7 parts, in industry 24, for dams (hydro power) 4, and in agriculture 65. This enormous water demand in agriculture is due to ineffective and unadapted irrigation systems and concepts. Usually only 40 per cent of the water reaches the roots of plants or the needs of animals. The World-I demand requires 300 litres for a single orange from Israel, 50,000 litres for 1 kg steak from Argentina, and 685,000 litres for 1.4 kg of cotton for a suit (Pearce 2002: 18). If 10 per cent of the water consumption in agriculture were saved, it would be double the entire domestic consumption. Here we see again the wellknown World-I to World-III divergence: while in India about 25 litres per capita per day are used, in Europe this is 150 and in the US 300 litres, threequarters of the latter for body hygiene and most of the remainder for gardens and car washes. In contrast to this only 3 to 5 litres per day is used for nutrition. The household water demand in World-I climbed six times from 1950 to 1990 to 300 km3 per year. The so-called “Aral Sea Syndrome” is synonymous for this water overexploitation (Vieser 1997; Klötzli 1997: 209). The Aral Sea was originally 70,000 km2 in size, but in the 1950s Stalin condemned the area to a brutal cotton monoculture. Today the water surface has been lowered by onethird, the volume by one-fifth, the sea-level to 20 metres, and the coastlines have retreated on average by up to 66 km, in some cases up to 100 km. The Aral seawater has always contained some salt (1 per cent); today it contains 3.4 per cent, equivalent to the North Atlantic Ocean. And today the Aral Sea is divided by a spit of land, accelerating evaporation. In addition, the two tributaries, Syr Darja and Amu Darja, have been drained totally for the cotton fields. From the latter a further 20 km3/year of water is taken, because in Turkmenistan the Kara Kum Channel is built straight on to the Caspian Sea, irrigating more cotton fields. The need for water to irrigate the cotton monoculture is the highest of all. The simple evaporation of irrigated lands, for an average yield of 1 ton of cotton per hectare per year, needs 1.25 m3/m2/year. In other words, the fields are flooded up to 1.25 metres each year. Apart from that, although cotton needs the highest water demand, droplet irrigation can reduce this need to at least 0.5 m3/m2/year (Dargie 2000). Evaporation increases the salinization of soils and aquifers. Spaciously distributed by winds, a salt content of 2 kg/m2 in soils can be found at still 300 g/m2 some 200 kilometres away and in the nearby Pamir glaciers as well (Pearce 1999). It is well-known that salt is hygroscopic, so it is not surprising that some glaciers show an accelerated melting from 1 up to 12 metres per year. For Turkmenistan this additional water in the Amu Darja seems to be good luck as its decision in 1997 to extend the Kara Kum channel by 300 km further on, of course for new cotton fields, shows. The regional climate has already changed. Frost-free days have decreased by one month to 180 days, obstructing cotton cultivation. Therefore, more water, increased

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fertilization, and new fields are needed to meet the export targets. Thus, these negative cycles are accelerating. The UN Environmental Program (UNEP) declared the Aral Sea region in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan covering 430,000 km2 with a population of 4 million a crisis area. Over all, the Aral Sea syndrome is primarily based on a domestic eco-imperialism, but it is also international, because even today every third cotton staple originates there. Therefore, the production of “white gold” leads to the “white death,” also called “dumb Chernobyl” (Reller and Gerstenberg 1997). In 2000, 26 countries announced national water emergencies, and it is predicted that this will double by 2025 (Edinger 1997: 52). A major contributor to these water shortages is the inappropriate use of water in monoagriculture, which leads directly to local hunger, starting the irreversible spiral of water over-exploitation (Sauer 2001: 91). The short-term alternative to this spiral is migration from rural regions into the mega-cities or simply higher local death rates linked to water shortages. However, in general, it is not inconceivable that water shortages could be solved. This could be done, for instance, by using the concept of “virtual water”: cultivating grain in places where water exists and exporting it in a fair manner by sharing profits. Unfortunately, the direction the world seems to be headed in is toward international water conflicts. Water access also contains security risks (EcoSec 2000), especially in the typical upper-lower course constellations. This is shown, for example, in the smoldering Euphrates-Tigris conflict between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Here is a brief synopsis of the conflict. • Turkey is pursuing its Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP), in line with Sueleyman Demirel’s1 dictate that: “We have the right to do what we like with our water. The snow, which falls on our mountains, does not belong to the Arabs. This water is our water. The oil belongs to whoever has oil, and the water belongs to whoever has the water” (Barandat 1997a: 158; Barandat 1997b: 108). In the GAP at the Euphrates River, 21 dams, 17 hydroelectric power plants, 1,000 km of channels, and about 10,000 km2 of irrigation areas are planned; at the Tigris plans call for eight dams with 6,000 km2 irrigation areas. Therefore, the discharge of the Euphrates was lowered from 1,200 m3/sec to 350 m3/sec in the 1970s. In 1978 about 500 m3/sec was agreed upon; nevertheless, in 1991 water was reduced to 300 m3/sec from Turkey alone for “technical reasons,” presumably to avoid the Turkish government having to justify delays in the GAP planning. • For Syria, which is 90 per cent dependent on the Euphrates water, a war was almost fought with Iraq in 1975 over the building of the Assad Dam. • The water which finally arrives in Iraq is therefore already critically overloaded, on the one hand as salted drainage water because it has been used several times for field irrigation, on the other hand by industries 1 Sueleyman Demirel, Turkish Prime Minister (1965–71, 1975–80), said this in 1924.

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and faeces. In addition, each throttled discharge decreases the counterpressure against the Persian Gulf in the delta, so that sea water additionally penetrates as brackish water into the traditional agricultural areas of the delta. This conflict has not yet escalated too far, probably due to the fact that a solution was delegated to regional and local waters commissions. This spatial decoupling from the political power in Ankara, Damascus, and Baghdad with their “hawks” leaves the formalities of sovereignty aside. Altogether there are nearly 200 similar upper-lower constellations on water access worldwide. The former Nile conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s, in which ten states were involved, seem to have de-escalated (Mandel 1992); the same number of states are affected by the Danube River in Europe. Thus, Europe is not completely free of water conflicts. The Danube dam project by Hungary, for example, is virulently opposed by Slovakia. Thus it remains to be seen whether Boutros Ghali’s prognosis, on leaving office as UN Secretary-General, that “The next war in the Near East will be dealing with water access, not with policy,” will materialize. So far, he is wrong. The 1998 UN Water Convention may de-escalate such conflicts in the future within a framework of international law. Surprisingly, however, some European countries, specifically France and Switzerland, have crucially diluted this convention.1 It cannot be predicted how many other countries will adopt a similar approach to these countries.

Soil Degradation and Desertification Eco-imperialism against air, climate, and water extends inevitably to the soil. For biological life, soil is the most important and at the same time the most vulnerable part in our biological chain because it acts as a buffer as well as a temporary storage space for organic and inorganic processes in the transformation cycles of the entire mineral-nutrient and water cycle. Depending on average temperatures, precipitation, and groundwater connection the extreme landscape types are tundras and cold and hot deserts. At the end of water over-exploitation and soil erosion a regeneration of soils is usually quite impossible. Erosion takes place most significantly in rainforest clearances, when the thin humus layer dries out and is washed away. Soils are also critically overloaded by “acid rain” (SO2, NOx), which especially affects large areas in the US, Europe, and China. The land surface of the earth without lakes amounts to about 130 million 1 The French objection may have two reasons. First, because there is no flood management at the Upper Mosel River, every year the valley of the Lower Mosel in Germany is flooded severely. The second may be more speculative. French banks are deeply involved in the Turkish GAP, and they have another foot in the door of a similar future project in Ethiopia at the Blue Nile. So France wants to avoid restrictions by any convention. Switzerland is also known for its egoism in opposing international conventions.

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km2. Of these, nearly 20 million km2 are hot and 30 million km2 are cold deserts; a further 20 million km2 have been degraded, either by erosion (water, wind) or have been physically or chemically degraded. Physical degradation is a result of intensive agriculture with high power and heavy machines and/or by erosion due to deep-ploughing and/or soil compaction. Chemical degradation takes place through the overuse of chemical fertilizers and/or chemical plant protection. And this overuse continues, for instance, as chemical run-off from fields results in exploding algae growth and lack of oxygen in lakes and seas with the concomitant death of fish and biological systems. The risk of soil degradation applies in the wheat belt of the US to the east of Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, where 5 per cent of the land is already called “bad lands.” Deep-ploughing is not possible there any longer, because wind and soil erosion will be accelerated in the “tornado channel” that stretches from Hudson Bay to the Gulf of Mexico. The US will probably forfeit its leading position in grain trading because of these particular effects triggered by the greenhouse effect, while in Middle Siberia an additional 10 per cent of the world cultivation of winter grain is being developed (Schedrowa 2000). Thus, the typical situation in the Cold War due to the most-favoured-nation clause on grain may be reversed. This is a catastrophe for the average American farmer, although it has been called a case of national security (thus arousing the “good old fear” of Russia). Moreover, many soils are at risk of desertification. Today 250 million people are directly threatened by extending desertification; the figure will rise to more than one billion in the next 20 years. In Asia today 850 million people live on approximately 900,000 km2 arid soils; a further 400 million people live in 65 per cent of the arid areas of Africa.

Nutrition and Hunger Down through the ages hunger has been an historical experience. In 2500 BC the first famine was recorded in Egypt. From 1000 AD up to now, the number of victims amounts to a few hundred million. There is about 32 million km2 cultivated area worldwide; 6 million km2 in World-I, 9 million km2 in World-III, and 17 million km2 are free nature, in the form of meadows, forests, and bushlands. But the cultivated areas are stagnating, their quality declining. While in World-I there is an area of 0.2 hectares per capita, this is constantly decreasing in World-III; in 2025 it will probably be down to 0.07 hectares per capita. The “green revolution” begun in the 1960s with high yield plants, technical cultivation, and irrigation techniques, as well as the use of chemical fertilizers, has only relatively reduced the hunger in World-III at the price of leached soils, overused, salted and contaminated water, and decreasing bio-diversity as well. Moreover, the extinction of subsistence agriculture and the forced commodification of farming has resulted in forced rural flight. Thus, our One World faces widespread malnutrition in World-III. In 1990

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as well as today about 840 million people are suffering from malnutrition, among them 180 million children. Concerning the average daily calorie intake, an average person in World-I gets 3,350 kilocalories per day [kcal/day]; in World-II 2,520; and in World-III 2,040. So in World-III there is a daily lack of one-and-a-half meals (von Braun 1996a). Less than 1,500 kcal/day results in starving to death. These circumstances create the equation hunger=poverty. Even today every two seconds a child dies somewhere of starvation or related diseases, adding up to 17 million children each year! And if they do not die, their only future is as a street urchin, in hard labour, and/or in prostitution (Schaper 1994; World Nourishing Day 1998). Apart from this primary hunger due to lack of calories, the so-called “hidden hunger”—the lack of vitamins, minerals, and trace elements in the diet—is also highly relevant (von Braun 1996b). From the lack of VitaminA, 40 million children worldwide are at risk of going blind, about 1.2 billion humans suffer from lack of iodine, and 2 billion humans, especially women, lack enough iron. However, since the 1970s the absolute poverty in World-III has relatively decreased, for instance, in India from 40 to 19 per cent and in Bangladesh from 65 to 38 per cent. But this decrease is correlated to countries with a traditionally high portion of rural population nourishing itself; otherwise, there is a high migration from rural areas into mega-cities in Latin America, India, and China. The starvation problem will become worse if the tendency of World-I to prefer meat instead of vegetables causes an increase in using food plants for feeding animals in World-III. This contrast is quite clear: compare the American consumption at the extreme of 112 kg of meat per capita per year with that of India with 2 kg; India uses 97 per cent of its grain for its own nutrition, while an American citizen uses only 30 per cent. The International Food Policy Research Institute in Washington, DC, examined two scenarios in its 2020 Vision Initiative. Even with high nourishing investments by World-I, the number of starving people cannot be eliminated; for instance, there will be 108 million as opposed to the stagnation model of 205 million starving children. After 2025 with 8 to 9 billion people in the world, the yearly calorie need will increase from 5 up to 11x1015 kcal. In that case even “green” genetic plant engineering is said to be inevitable, by a portion up to 25 per cent. The other 75 per cent will be covered by conventional plant protection, irrigation compression, and fertilization. Meanwhile approximately 400,000 km2 (compared to Germany with 330,000 km2) are cultivated with genetically modified plants. Nevertheless, by 2020 World-III will have to import at least one-third of their grain needs from World-I (Rosegrant 1995). Last but not least, the main cause of the equation hunger=poverty is that the mass of starving people are always landless, with no chance of entering world markets or getting yield-increasing techniques. “Poverty is therefore the most poisonous substance” (Töpfer 2000). Nevertheless, World-I diplo-

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mats roam around international conferences, soothing World-I’s bad conscience with their diplomatic lullaby or sitting out arrogantly (Galbraith 1958). Hunger perpetuates hunger and poverty again and again (von Braun 1996b). In sustainable development (SD) debates it is not important what is theoretically most suitable but what can actually work until 2030 and beyond, otherwise the opposite will become true: DS or developed stagnation.

Biodiversity Biodiversity covers all living organisms. Today about 1022 organisms possibly exist. The number of species is estimated to be at least 50 million (some suspect 200 million), although only 1.7 million have been described. Also the number of species is not related to their specific extent. For instance, there are 9,500 species of the total of about 1016 ants in the world, whereas there are 3,500 ethnicities of the 6ϫ109 total of human beings. One hundred years ago the extinction rate by evolution was 1:100,000 per year, apart from so-called flora and fauna cuts caused, for example, by meteorite impacts. Today, due to industrialization, the rate of extermination has increased to 1:400 per year, in World-III primarily of vertebrates (birds), in World-I of plants. In the context of the current climatic change, forests play a crucial role. In the nineteenth century there were still about 60 million km2; this had decreased by 1980 to 50 million km2, and today is down to 34 million km2. Between 1980 and 1995 rainforest areas of 650,000 km2 per year were cleared in World-III, while about 8,000 km2 were deforested in World-I. If this destruction of rainforests progresses in World-III—mostly to increase imports to World-I or for domestic agriculture or even speculative reasons— only 6 million km2 of tropical rainforests will remain worldwide by 2050. But all kinds of forests are at risk not only from clearing, but also from climate change. An increase of the global temperature of 1 K will shift the climate belt up to 400 km northwards. Such a shift within 50 years will require excessive adjustment on the part of the plants of the coniferous forests. With increasing average or extreme temperatures, and given their low spreading velocity of only 1.5 km per year (caused by squirrels forgetting the place of their acorn deposits, etc.), the climate-stressed tree species will die or disappear. In addition, the higher the global temperatures the more parasites, bacteria, and microbes will proliferate. In this situation, when forests are already stressed, vegetation becomes an easy prey (Beckmann 1990). Moreover, biodiversity is subjected to eco-imperialism when the hot spots of diversity of species and quality in World-III become of interest to WorldI. The discovery of “green pharmacy” and the traditional herb medicine of Africa and Asia has become the target of big pharmaceutical companies. That is why in some regions which are rich in genes, “gene scouts” have been sent out to screen various pharmaceutically active substances with bioprospecting programs (Albrecht 2000). Because such species are growing

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wild, they are always collected and not cultivated. So decimation and/or extermination of such species can be foreseen. Whether and to what extent the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD)— and, based on it, the so-called Cartagena Protocol for Biological Safety— is able to control these activities remains to be seen, particularly since the CBD intends to protect the gene-pools of World-III; this aspect, however, is not explicitly mentioned in the Cartagena Protocol (CBD 2000). As far as place and control over this gene pool is concerned, this classic imperialist constellation repeats itself as usual: biodiversity in WorldIII is the largest, in World-I the smallest, but there it is most indispensable and most desired. Is the goal of World-I to obtain strategic access to these gene-pools of World-III, just as it tries to obtain oil and strategic metals, if necessary even by using military support?

Epidemics The basic equation in development policy, hunger=poverty, results in the proliferation of epidemics too. The AIDS pandemic plays a particular role here. On the basis of chaos characteristics, one can easily estimate from the simple epidemic formula—following the incubation period of seven years with five infectious contacts—that every ten years the number of infected people increases by the factor 210 (Seifritz 1989: 140). This corresponds quite well to the propagation of the disease since the 1970s. By the end of 2001 about 40 million people were living with HIV/AIDS, 5 million in 2001 were newly infected (i.e., 14,000 per day), and 3 million died. Altogether HIV/AIDS has already cost 26 million lives, among them about 5 million children under 15 years (UNAIDS 2001). As is to be expected, cultural imperialism even diminished the interest in AIDS research just at the time when, in 1998, a more or less promising multiple medicine was found in World-I. This medicine is not only very expensive but requires also a high discipline of intake by the patient. As a result, the politics of AIDS has exacerbated relations between World-I and the people of World-III, who have no option except dying. Particularly unworthy is the fate of the current 12 to 13 million AIDS orphans, who are used by dictators as child soldiers, some 300,000 child soldiers being recorded by the United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) in 2002 (UNICEF 2002). In sub-Sahara Africa and South/Southeast-Asia there are 28.1 and 6.1 million HIV-carriers respectively. This affects the estimate of the world population up to 2050, which has been recently estimated at only 8.5 billion. If this is the case, then this means there will be 1-billion AIDS-related deaths within the next 50 years. Compared to AIDS the medieval epidemic diseases—at the time believed to be ordained by God, but due simply to lack of hygiene—seem to be regional or continental events. Some were very severe; the plague, or Black Death, began in 1347 AD and claimed 25 million victims within four years. Today, a terrible toll is taken by refugee-camp diseases such as cholera, smallpox,

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typhoid fever, tuberculosis, etc. These diseases, however, were and are not apocalyptic. Even the irregularly arising outbreaks of viruses such as LCM (lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus), ebola, marburg, hanta, latino, and lassa, as well as hemorrhage fever in which the blood vessels completely dissolve, are extremely aggressive and usually deadly but in their proliferation rather short-lived. About 40 per cent of the world’s population lives with a daily malaria risk, which costs up to 2 to 3 million lives each year. Since the first report in 1600 BC half of the world population may have died of malaria. It generates an extremely serious negative feedback, as more chemical prophylactics are used the more resistance to antibiotics grows. Finally, flu viruses are not by any means harmless. During the Spanish flu epidemic (1918–20) more than 20 million people died. The next “century flu” is already foreseeable. A new Hong Kong virus is developing in Hong Kong and South-China, which is so aggressive it kills immediately the chicken embryo needed to produce the vaccines that will combat it (Kutter 2002). With a foreseeable increase of more than 1 K in the greenhouse effect, many of these tropical diseases will of course move northwards. Because viruses show mutation cycles substantially faster than ours, humans cannot develop resistance in time (Beckmann 1990). Maybe—and biology is always very brutal—these viruses will cause the same severe troubles in World-I as they have caused in World-III since 1492 AD.

The Perception of Death in the TV Age: The Single Zoomed vs. the Massive Distant Death The Western media reminds us almost everyday about the death of millions of children by starvation in World-III countries. This everyday death by starvation in World-III is generally accepted by World-I. But large accidents with comparatively few deaths in Europe— like Chernobyl (Ukraine, 1986), the sinking of the ferry Estonia in the Baltic Sea (1994), the crash of the high-speed train ICE in Eschede (Germany, 1999) and the fate of the supersonic aircraft Concorde in Paris (2000)—consume a great deal more of our attention. On September 11, 2001 (9/11), 2,995 people were killed in New York City and Washington, DC, as a result of terrorist attacks in a span of 111 minutes. Although not downplaying the terrible loss of innocent lives that these terrorist attacks caused, it is important to recognize that these deaths are less than the 3,330 deaths of children caused by starvation in World-III in the simultaneous 111 minutes. There is also one other quite obvious difference in these two cases. The victims of 9/11 are known by name and have been memorialized, while the dead starved children are spread out anonymously over 45 million km2 in Asia, Africa, or South America without any memorial, and the numbers continue to mount. This reminds us of Adam Smith’s essay in 1759. In view of earthquake victims in China, he raised the questions of whether a humanistic-minded European contemporary after a certain time of mourning will put those

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victims out of mind and whether not much later a small personal misfortune—like the loss of a finger—will concern him much more than those victims whom he had never seen first-hand (FAZ-Feuilleton 2002). Today, Smith’s missing first-hand view has been realized by global real-time communication. Even as the TV camera “zooms” into the spectacle of a singular death in World-I, the Western viewer uses the remote to switch channels away from the ordinary daily deaths of starving children in WorldIII as they are repeated over and over again. But each lost human life—in its dignity and demand to be mourned for—is the same loss. There are no first- and second-class victims. Therefore, there is an absolute need for values—for life, for the individual human being, and for humankind. WorldI accepts the death that happens elsewhere somewhat easily, instead of fighting to eradicate the cause of it. Nevertheless, we can learn from the 9/11 disaster. In three of the four aircrafts the shocked passengers seemed to resign themselves to their fate. But in United Airlines 93 the passengers resisted their hijackers (“Let’s roll!”). The fourth target in Washington, DC, was missed due to this permissible militancy in self-defence by the victims. Perhaps such brave resistance is also needed to fight the destructive forces responsible for the worldwide tragedy being caused by the effects of cultural and eco-imperialism.

Conclusion: Thoughts on the Role of Neo-Liberalism The ecological facts reported in this chapter are not new. Easily accessible as it is, the information known for decades seems to have little effect on decision-makers. If we look at the world conference series of the 1990s and their declarations and action plans signed by heads of state, we see much verbal rhetoric and solemnly declared intention but little practical action. Causal analyses fall short. Such analysis would reveal how an economic system that perceives natural resources and humans only as costs to be minimized in order to foster global competition and to generate maximum profit must produce lethal damages for the many to benefit the few. Neoliberals have run amok since the fall of the socialist regimes in the early 1990s. As if in an induced historical amnesia, they try to wipe out knowledge of the dependence of humanity on its biological life-support system; of mutual interdependence in the global ecosystem; and of equality, fundamental human rights, social and ecological justice, and the rule of law. They want to replace all this with a deadly medicine of vulgar social Darwinism. They favour the “market” to regulate all spheres of society. They hide not only the fact that this market works like a fox in a henhouse, but also that the state is complicit in this (arguably murderous) enterprise. The simple lesson learned in the Great Depression of the 1930s that the economy needs rules to work for the benefit of society is being dismissed, and democracy as the way to find consensus and legitimacy over these rules is disregarded. Primitive short-sighted egoism is applauded even by much of the public. In their fierce struggle for circulation rates, the media have become part of

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that deadly game. The consciousness industry is being paid in the service of the profiteers. Neo-liberalism betrays the major achievements of human civilization. Resistance is desperately needed. It will come from the grassroots, from bottom up, and will work with empathy, solidarity, knowledge, and sensitivity. But time is running out.

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Eco-Imperialism as an Aspect of Cultural Imperialism ][ C H A P T E R 16 ][ 263 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change). 2001. Working Group (WG) I: Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis; Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability; WG III: Climate Change 2001: Mitigation; Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report; The Task Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. Current state available at: . Klötzli, St. 1997. “Das‚ ‘Aral-See-Syndrom’ in Zentralasien: Hindernis oder Chance regionaler Kooperation?” In Wasser: Konfrontation oder Kooperation, ed. J. Barandat. 1997. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 209–33. Kutter, S. 2002. “Noch völlig hilflos: ein tödlicher Grippevirus schlummert in Hongkong und Südchina, jederzeit bereit zum Ausbruch. Erst ab 2004 gibt es geeignete Impfstoffe.” Wirtschaftswoche 4 July: 86. Mandel, R. 1992. “Sources of International River Basin Disputes.” Conflict Quarterly 4: 25–56. Marley, R.C. (US-DOE). 2000. “The Technology Implications of Meeting Long-Term Climate Stabilization.” Paper presented in Experts Group on R&D Priority Setting and Evaluation Committee on Energy Research and Technology (CERT). Paris: International Energy Agency. Meadows, D., E. Zahn, and P. Milling. 1972. The Limits to Growth. New York: Universe. Mosdorf, S. 2001. “Die Globalisierung bietet Entwicklungsländern enorme Chancen.” Frankfurter Rundschau-Dokumentation 18 October: 7. Munich Re Group. 1999. Topics 2000: Supplement Millennium. Munich. New Scientist. 2002. “Rethink: Part 4.” New Scientist 12 May: 31–47. Pearce, F. 1999. “Flooded Out.” New Scientist 5 June: 18. Postman, N. 1985. Amusing Ourselves to Death. New York: Viking-Penguin. Reller, A., and J. Gerstenberg. 1997. “Weisses Gold wohin? Stand der Aussichten der Baumwollnutzung.” GAiA 6: 35. Rosegrant, M.W., et al. 1995. Global Food Projections to 2020: Implications for Investment, Food, Agriculture and the Environment: Discussion Paper No. 5. October. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. Sauer, G.W. 2001. Die ökologische Herausforderung: Umweltzerstörung als sicherheitspolitische Determinante. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverlag (DUV). Schaper, M. 1994. “Die Qual der frühen Jahre: Kinderarbeit.” GEO 3: 106. Schedrowa, I. 2000. “Der Norden taut auf.” Der Spiegel 18: 230. Seifritz, W. 1989. Wachstum, Rückkopplung und Chaos: Eine Einführung in die Nichtlinearität und des Chaos. München/Wien: Hanser. SILIC (Severely Indebted Low Income Countries). 2000. Available at: . Stiglitz, J. 2002. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: Norton. Töpfer, K. 2002. “Interview: Wohin geht die Reise, Herr Töpfer.” Lufthansa-Magazin 7: 33. UNAIDS (Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS). 2001. Status December 2001. Available at: . UNFPA (UN Population Fund). 1999. Six Billion: The State of the World Population 1999. Available at: .

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UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees). 2002. Status 2002-09-20. Available at: . UNICEF (UN Children’s Fund). 2002. Optional protocols to the Conversion on the Rights of the Child. Available at: . URBAN-21. 2000. Global Conference on the Urban Future: Conference-reader 200007-04. Berlin: Bundesministerium für Verkehr; Bau- und Wohnungswesen. Vieser, H. 1997. “Doswidanja Aralskoje More.” bild der wissenschaft 6: 14. von Braun, J. 1996a. “Food Security and Nutrition.” Background Documents 1–5. FAO-World Food Summit Technical. Rome: UN-Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). von Braun, J. 1996b. “Hunger und Armut in den Entwicklungsländern.” Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 24–25: 27. WEED (Wirtschaft Ökologie und Entwicklung). 2000. Regulierung der internationalen Finanzmärkte für eine sozial gerechte und ökologische tragfähige Entwicklung (2000-01-22). Available at: . World Nourishing Day. 1998. “Frauen ernähren die Welt.” Proceedings. 16 October. Bonn: Arbeitsgemeinschaft für tropische und subtropische Agrarforschung und Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten. World Bank. 1999. World Development Report: Knowledge for Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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PART 6

POSTCOLONIALISM AND CULTURAL IMPERIALISM

Introduction The chapters in Part 6 deal with connections linking postcolonialism and cultural imperialism, while at the same time illustrating the value of a more explicit post-colonial-informed study of cultural imperialism. More specifically, they contribute to exploring specific ways in which the values of colonialism seep into general local or “Indigenous” cultures and at how colonized peoples can respond to, accommodate, and/or resist specific agencies of cultural imperialism. Russell Smandych, a Canadian historical-sociologist and criminologist, examines the value of postcolonial theory in developing a theoretical framework for the study of law as an agent of cultural imperialism. He shows that although law is arguably a crucial factor in cultural imperialism, there are few adequately theorized contemporary or historical studies of how law is used by the powerful to colonize less powerful peoples and, in turn, how local or Indigenous peoples cope with externally imposed law. As a point of departure for the development of a more adequate heuristic theoretical framework, Smandych offers a synthesis of recent postcolonial and Foucauldian theoretical insights on law and colonial governmentality. The value of such a theoretical approach for guiding research on the cultural imperialism of law is illustrated briefly with data drawn from ongoing comparative-historical research on British colonial criminal law and Indigenous peoples in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Abbas Manoochehri, a leading Iranian professor of politics and Western political thought, examines the theoretical insights on cultural imperialism offered in the works of two postcolonial thinkers inspired by the early work of Frantz Fanon (1963): Enrique Dussel and Ali Shari’ati. Manoochehri notes that Fanon analyzed the deepest felt injuries inflicted on the native colonized by the European colonizer, and that, in turn, Fanon’s genre has then been extended by postcolonial discourse as a written response to colonial discourse. Following Fanon, therefore, one can speak of discrepant discourses by comparing postcolonial discourse with that of colonial discourse, the colonial discourse being a negating discourse, whereas the

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postcolonial discourse is a challenging and resisting discourse. Manoochehri identifies Enrique Dussel (1934-), a contemporary Mexican philosopher of liberation theology, and Ali Shari’ati (1933–77), a contemporary Iranian scholar and reformer, as postcolonial thinkers whose writings contain a “message” to be read as an “exteriorized intention.” As such, their writings are “the illocutionary act of resistance against cultural imperialism,” and the expression of “the felt experience of the local”; or “autoethnographies.” According to Manoochehri, the ideas of Dussell and Shari’ati could also be identified as emanating from “the pathos of double enchantment.” Specifically, Dussel’s critique of modern European selfconception and its “geopolitics of domination” and Shari’ati’s notion of Machinism and Third World modernization are expressions of such a predicament, in response to which Shari’ati proposed the notion of “Return to the Self” and Dussel proposed the idea of a “Return to the Subjugated Other.” Manoochehri concludes that the writings of Dussel and Shari’ati are “textual discourses of the colonized” that embody acts “of resistance against the cultural domination of colonialism.” Biyot K. Tripathy, a professor of English and a prominent scholar and fiction writer from India, describes the research he has carried out in collecting and documenting folktales of the tribal people of Orissa. In the process of doing this, he seeks to separate the dynamics of culture contacts from those of political relationships driven by power and domination. Tripathy draws critically on recent postcolonial literature to argue that, rather than colonialization representing a one-way, top-down imposition of the cultureforming institutions of the more powerful colonizers on the less powerful colonized, “even when a nation is colonizing another, the colonized may carnivalize the colonizer’s culture products and drive them out of use or create new products of its own.” Indeed, Tripathy evocatively argues that the “dynamics of culture contacts are entirely different from those of political contacts.” Although Tripathy’s argument shares much in common with those advanced in earlier chapters, especially those by Goonatilake, Nandy and Manoochehri (in Chapters 3, 4, and 18), he clearly goes furthest in challenging the conventional cultural imperialism thesis that views the colonized mainly as passive recipients and victims of the one-way transmission of externally imposed dominant cultural values and culture-forming institutions.

CHAPTER 17

The Cultural Imperialism of Law Russell Smandych

ultural imperialism, consistent with Schiller’s (1976) definition, can be viewed as including the imposition of the culture-forming social institutions of a dominant imperial power or nation-state over those of a less powerful colonial population. In turn, attempts at cultural domination can work through a wide variety of social institutions that colonizers bring to bear on the colonized. In this chapter, I examine the role of “law” as a factor in cultural imperialism and attempt to move toward developing a more adequate perspective for understanding laws’ imperializing effects. The perspective I outline is at once theoretical and normative, in that it is concerned with both better understanding how law works as an agent of cultural imperialism and with providing a vision of what we, as concerned citizens and public intellectuals, should do with the knowledge we gain about the role of law and its imperializing effects. This endeavour involves, first, a brief examination of the work of legal anthropologists and comparative law scholars who have made use of the concept of “legal pluralism” to study the development of colonial legal systems and their superimposition on Indigenous legal customs or customary law (cf. Merry 1988, 2003a; Moore 2001; Rouland 1994). It also involves examining more recent critical and comparative studies that have begun to offer insight into how the formal legal systems of mainly European imperialist countries have come to be superimposed on the traditional legal institutions and practices of non-European colonial populations and Indigenous peoples (Benton 2002; Fitzpatrick 2001a, 2001b; Karsten 2002; Kirkby and Coleborne 2001; Merry 2000; Purdy 1997). A notable common feature of some of these recent more critical and explicitly comparative legalhistorical studies is the extent to which they profess to address issues deriving from both “postcolonial theory” or the postcolonial studies movement (Kumar 2003), and the Foucauldian-inspired field of governmentality studies. The one author who has perhaps had the greatest influence in moving social-legal scholars in this theoretical direction is Peter Fitzpatrick. Foundationally, Fitzpatrick (2001a: 146) observes that “occidental (or Western) law” is and always has been “imperial ‘in itself’ and not only in some remote or passing application of it in the colonies, ‘out there.’” In addition to recognizing the intimate connection between occidental law and imperialism,

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Fitzpatrick (2001a: 178–79) identifies law as a key mechanism of imperial rule, noting that, historically, “the violence of imperialism was legitimated in its being exercised through law.” Fitzpatrick and other Foucauldian-influenced legal-historical researchers also appear to recognize that law and governmentality (or administration) often work together to bring about imperializing effects, which include among them the effects of both cultural domination and resistance.

Legal Pluralism Until the 1990s, the study of law and colonialism was intimately tied to the historical and anthropological literature on legal pluralism. In an article she published in 1988, Sally Merry elaborated on the distinction between what she referred to as “classical legal pluralism” and the then “new legal pluralism” reflected in recent critical work. As Merry described it, studies that fell under the rubric of “classical legal pluralism” were typically concerned with describing and explaining how new (usually European) legal systems and laws brought by colonizers were superimposed on Indigenous customary laws and pre-existing methods of dispute settlement and social control. According to Merry (1988: 873), the “new legal pluralism,” exemplified in the work of such authors as Stuart Henry (1983), Bonaventura De Sousa Santos (1987), and Peter Fitzpatrick (1983), was important in that it moved “away from questions about the effect of law on society or even the effect of society on law toward conceptualizing a more complex and interactive relationship between official and unofficial forms of ordering.” Key concepts coined by the authors of the new legal pluralism literature included the notions of “interlegality,” “plural legal orders,” and “private justice.” Proponents of the new legal pluralism used these to study the different ways in which state and non-state forms of legal ordering and social control interacted to produce social order. According to Santos (1987: 297–99), the concept of legal pluralism was “the key concept in a postmodern view of law,” because it required that researchers shift attention from “engaging exclusively in the critique of the existing state legality” to also attempting to “uncover the (more) latent or suppressed forms of legality in which more insidious and damaging forms of social and personal oppression frequently occur.” The versions of legal pluralism advocated in the 1980s by writers like Santos came to have a direct influence on the writing of histories of law and colonialism in the 1990s (cf. Knafla and Binnie 1995), and legal historians and other law and society scholars are still using the concept of legal pluralism today as a conceptual tool for studying legal change (cf. Benton 2002). At the same time, however, the concept of legal pluralism has been subjected to scrutiny by critics like Brian Tamanaha (1993, 2000), who argues that it suffers from numerous analytical and instrumental problems linked to its inherent ambiguity. Specifically, Tamanaha (2000: 321) claims that “(p)revailing versions of legal pluralism that are built upon essentialist concepts of law ... lead to hopeless confusions and complexities, and flatten out diverse

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phenomena in ways which obscure important differences between diverse normative regimes.” While a more detailed discussion of the debate over the use of the concept of legal pluralism in law and society studies is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important, within the context of attempting to develop a more adequate theoretical and normative perspective on the cultural imperialism of law, to examine studies conducted within the framework of classical legal pluralism, written up until the 1990s, that examined the role of law as a tool of colonialism. One focus of this research was the attention given to the role of law in imperial domination (Merry 1991; Greenberg 1980; Snyder and Hay 1987). Early studies of law and colonialism attempted to demonstrate “the power of the state to reshape the social order, suggesting the dominance of this form of law over other normative orders” (Merry 1991: 879). Besides showing how externally imposed state law often served as an effective and powerful tool for controlling colonial populations (Kennedy 1989), some researchers attempted to show how European colonizers sought to exert control over Indigenous populations through co-opting local elites and undertaking to formalize pre-existing customary methods of dispute settlement and social control (Gordon 1989; Snyder 1981). In particular, several researchers studying different colonial settings showed that, rather than previously existing on its own, “the creation of customary law ... was an ongoing, collaborative process in which power was clearly unequal, but subordinate groups were hardly passive or powerless” (Merry 1991: 880; Merry 2003a). Consequently, in the 1980s, attention shifted from studying the deceptive and coercive imposition of European law to exploring the manner in which Indigenous peoples attempted to resist and/or adapt to and accommodate such laws (Kidder 1989; Snyder and Hay 1987). Another central research theme that began to gain prominence in the 1980s was the question of the role of gender and gender relations in mediating the effects of colonialism. For example, in the Australian context, the work of Ann McGrath (1987) showed that gender played a fundamental role in affecting the nature and outcome of the early relations that developed between Europeans and Australian Aborigines. Similarly, in the Canadian context, Carol Devens (1992) combined the themes of “gender” and “resistance” in her study of Countering Colonization: Native American Women and the Great Lakes Missions, 1630–1900. There is now a flourishing literature on the importance of gender and gender relations in colonial societies (cf. Perry 2001). However, even today, few researchers, with the recent notable exception of Sally Merry (2000), have explicitly connected the themes of law, colonialism, gender and resistance. It is also important that in both her book on Colonizing Hawai’i: The Cultural Power of Law and in her other recent studies, Merry (1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003b) draws on elements of both postcolonialism and Foucauldian-inspired governmentality theory to develop her guiding theoretical framework. In the remaining parts of this chapter, we turn to examining the recent trend—reflected in the work of Sally Merry and other authors—toward postcolonialism and

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governmentality theory and its implications for knowledge and political action regarding the cultural imperialism of law.

Postcolonial Theory and Law One of the most significant recent trends in Anglo-American socio-legal research is the attention given in recent years to incorporating postcolonial theory in the study of law. In order to better appreciate the potential value of this approach it is necessary to describe the key concepts and ideas that inform the work of postcolonial writers, particularly the concepts of imperialism, colonialism, and postcolonialism. In her effort to disentangle the first two concepts, Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999: 21–23) argues that the concepts of imperialism and colonialism are interconnected and that it is generally agreed “colonialism is but one expression of imperialism.” According to Smith, who is a self-identified Maori writer and researcher, the term imperialism has been used in at least four different ways when describing the form of European imperialism that historians believe started in the fifteenth century: “(1) imperialism as economic expansion; (2) imperialism as the subjugation of ‘others’; (3) imperialism as an idea or spirit with many forms of realization; and (4) imperialism as a discursive field of knowledge.” Rather than contradicting one another, Smith argues that these usages of the term are linked to analyses that “focus on different layers of imperialism.” In addition, she argues that while the first three types of analyses of imperialism have tended to reflect “a view from the imperial center of Europe,” the fourth use of the term has been generated by postcolonial writers “whose understandings of imperialism and colonialism have been based either on their membership of and experience within colonized societies, or on their interest in understanding imperialism from the perspective of local contexts.” Although two or more of these types of analyses may be found to overlap in specific works, Smith points out that in the postcolonial literature—in which authors claim to be concerned with “postcolonial discourse,” the “empire writes back,” and/or “writing from the margins”—authors display “a greater and more immediate need to understand the complex ways in which people were brought within the imperial system, because its impact is still being felt, despite the apparent independence gained by former colonial territories.” She argues that: “Colonialism became imperialism’s outpost, the fort and the port of imperial outreach.” Specifically, while the concept of imperialism highlights events associated with “the ‘discovery,’ conquest, and exploitation” of land and resources outside the European imperial centre, colonialism refers to the complex processes associated with the settlement of colonizers on land that has been acquired from the colonized. Robert Young (2001: 16–17) makes a similar distinction between imperialism and colonialism, noting that “Colonization was pragmatic and until the nineteenth century generally developed locally in a haphazard way [for example, the occupation of islands in the West Indies], while imperialism

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was typically driven by ideology from the metropolitan centre and concerned with the assertion and expansion of state power” [for example, the French invasion of Algeria]. He also offers a detailed and critical discussion of the concept of postcolonialism and related terms, including “postcolonial cultural critique” and “postcolonial theory.” According to Young, the postcolonial cultural critique involves a reconsideration of the history of colonialism, “particularly from the perspectives of those who suffered its effects, together with the defining of its contemporary social and cultural impact.” He notes, “This is why postcolonial theory always intermingles the past with the present, why it is directed towards the active transformations of the present out of the clutches of the past... The postcolonial [or postcolonial critique or critic] does not privilege the colonial. It is concerned with colonial history only to the extent that that history has determined the configurations and power structures of the present ...” (Young 2001: 4). Although Young refers specifically to “postcolonial theory,” he, like other observers of the postcolonial studies movement (cf. Eriksen and Nielson 2001; Kumar 2003), recognizes the eclectic nature of the various theoretical perspectives that inform the work of postcolonial writers. At the same time, however, Young (2001: 5–6) argues that what makes the postcolonial critique distinctive “is the comprehensiveness of its research into the continuing cultural and political ramifications of colonialism in both colonizing and colonized societies.” According to Young, such research is important in that it “reveals that the values of colonialism seeped much more widely into the general culture, including academic culture, than had ever been assumed” and, in turn, that this “archeological retrieval and revaluation is central to much activity in the postcolonial field.” The influence of postcolonial theory on Anglo-American socio-legal research is reflected most notably in the overlapping collections of essays edited by Eve Darian-Smith and Peter Fitzpatrick for Social and Legal Studies in 1996 and Laws of the Postcolonial in 1999. It is also reflected in a significant and growing collection of related literature in which postcolonial theory has been applied to the study of law and race difference (through being incorporated with critical race theory), human rights, and problems of globalization and international law (cf. Anghie 2000; Baxi 2000; Fitzpatrick 2001a; Gathii 2000a, 2000b; Hasian 2002; Mahmud 1999; Mamdani 2001; Richardson 2000; Thomas 1999, 2000), as well as in a recent special (2003) issue of and recent articles (Kumar 2003) in the on-line refereed journal, Law, Social Justice and Global Development. Writing in her introduction to the special issue of Social and Legal Studies on “Law and Postcolonialism,” Darian-Smith (1996: 294) highlights the importance of postcolonial theory for the study of law, arguing that one of the themes that unites the papers included in the collection is the manner in which they push Bhabha’s (1990, 1994) concern with analyzing the “in between space” between the West and non-West “through which the meanings of cultural and political authority can be negotiated” or the process that nurtures cultural “hybridity.” She (1996: 295) goes on to highlight the

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significance of this specific postcolonial insight for the study of law, noting that: “In recognizing how a minority within the state critically defines the identity of what that state is, [postcolonial studies of law] also acknowledge the collapsing and conflating of spatial distances between ‘us’ and ‘them.’” Thus far postcolonial-informed socio-legal scholars have focused predominately on issues surrounding race, human rights, and international law in the contemporary context, while relatively less attention has been given to historical research on the role of Western “occidental” law as an agent of cultural imperialism. However, a small number of leading authors have made significant attempts to use postcolonial theory to guide historical research on law and colonialism. Indicatively, in his book on Fish, Law and Colonialism: The Legal Capture of Salmon in British Columbia, Douglas Harris (2001) examines the relevance of postcolonial theory for the study of law and colonialism in the North American historical context, noting that North American legal historians, with the notable exception of Sally Merry (2000), have largely neglected the postcolonial studies literature. In turn, drawing on key concepts associated with postcolonialism, Harris attempts to show that state law historically has been crucial to colonial rule. For example, he (2001: 186–96) draws on and cites the classic postcolonial works of Frantz Fanon (1963) and Edward Said (1978), as well that of postcolonial “Subaltern Studies” scholars who set an important example by challenging the elitism of Indian historiography (specifically, Guha 1997), to back his argument that state law played a key role in mediating relationships that developed between colonizers and the colonized. Specifically, he argues that the law of the “colonial state” not only “reproduced an indigenous society in the image of its own elite or in that of the colonizer,” but “also created unintended spaces of resistance, forced compromise, and was a source of power at least to certain members of the indigenous society.” While Harris’s work is informed by insights drawn from postcolonial theory, he also recognizes that “historical studies of law and colonialism in North America have paid little attention to the extensive work on law and colonial processes in Africa and Asia, principal sites of postcolonial study” (Harris 2001: 198). The one exception he notes to this is Sally Merry’s (2000) book on Colonizing Hawai’i: The Cultural Power of Law. Thus it is important to examine the manner in which Merry makes use of postcolonial theory. For Merry (2000: 6), “Colonialism is made up of both: chance conjunctures of particular individuals and broad economic, political, and cultural forces.” In turn, she notes: “The colonial transformation of Hawai’i was a fragment of global processes of imperialism, capitalist expansion, and transition to modernity but it was also the product of the actions of particular people who found themselves there at the time: bodies cast up on distant shores carrying with them the civilizing mission.” Merry argues that law played a crucial role in the colonial transformation of Hawai’i, and provides extensive historical documentation to support this argument. In addition, like Harris (2000), she moves beyond the specific findings of her study to remark on the many different and

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complex ways in which law intervenes in relationships between the colonizer and the colonized. Merry’s book reflects her impressive grasp of postcolonial theory and its relevance to the study of law, colonialism, and imperialism. In addition, she makes a good argument that the findings of colonial and postcolonial studies of Africa and Asia can provide insight to help guide the study of law and colonialism in other historical settings. In her own analysis of law and colonial transformation in Hawai’i, Merry (2000: 15) draws in particular on what she refers to as: “Some of the most creative work in postcolonialism [that] has focused on gender and sexuality; on the ways in which the colonizing process entailed new ways of managing the body, of presenting and displaying it, and of regulating sexuality.” As well as helping her to theorize the role of the legal regulation of sexuality and “the centrality of gender to creating the borders and boundaries of colonialism,” Merry gives credit to “postcolonial scholarship” for helping to focus attention on analyzing divergent “cultural meanings produced by the colonial experience.” According to Merry, postcolonial scholarship has done this in two ways, or through two approaches: first, by “The exposure of the discourses by which the West understood the rest of the world”; and secondly, by exploring “the effects of the expanding European capitalist system on the rest of the world.” While acknowledging her indebtedness to postcolonial scholarship, Merry’s recent work (1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003b) also reflects her debt to some of the ideas of Foucault (1991) and his followers who have argued that much of the surveillance and control that occurs in society occurs outside of the state and the application of formal state law. For example, Merry (2000: 16–17) notes that while law “is both a system of meaning and an institutional structure backed by the political power of the state ... The vast majority of law-abiding behavior occurs without sanction and is the product of general acceptance of a legal regime and its system of meaning.” Merry further observes that: “At the same time, the state engages in a continual process of surveillance, judgment, and punishment in order to produce compliance with its laws and categories,” while “The subjects of surveillance and correction learn to comply or to conceal their behavior from the law.” Before we turn to a discussion of the literature on Foucault and the study of “governmentality” that also informs Merry’s recent work, however, it is important to discuss the perspectives offered by two other authors, Jeannine Purdy and Vidya Kumar, who have identified specific problems associated with attempting to adapt postcolonial theory to law and society studies or, in other words, with any attempt to create a new specialized field of “postcolonial legal studies” (PLT). In a series of articles and a book published since the mid-1990s, Jeannine Purdy (1996, 1997, 1999) has challenged the manner in which other writers have moved uncritically toward adopting postcolonialism as their favoured theoretical perspective. Interestingly, one of her most frequently cited critical essays (cf. Finnane and McGuire 2001; Harris 2000, 2001; Hogg 2001) is the one entitled “Postcolonialism: The Emperor’s New Clothes?” published

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originally in the 1996 special issue of Social and Legal Studies and republished in Darian-Smith and Fitzpatrick’s (1999) Laws of the Postcolonial. In this essay, Purdy (1999: 204) comments that “While it is undoubtedly true that ‘postcolonial’ studies is a far from unified field, it is my contention that within the play of colonial discourse analysis, psychoanalysis, deconstruction, feminism, and ‘other forms of Marxism’ that constitute the postcolonial terrain, what may have been intended to do no more than give recognition to the changing circumstances of colonialism ... has perhaps proved far more ‘dangerous’ than intended.” In his discussion of Purdy’s essay in his review of Laws of the Postcolonial, Douglas Harris (2000) captures the essence of Purdy’s more developed critique of postcolonialism, noting that she “grapples with the conundrum of postcolonial theory in states where the colonizer has not left, where there has been no ‘Independence Day,’ and where the settler society is numerically, economically and socially dominant. She argues, following Frantz Fanon, that the violence of law depends on ‘which side of the colonial divide one stood,’ and, importantly, one stands. She writes of a nominally postcolonial relationship that is not so post, at least not in the lived experience of Aboriginals in Western Australia and Trinidadians in their island nation.” Thus, according to Purdy, although postcolonial rhetoric is persuasive to many academics, the most marginalized (racially, ethnically, and economically) do not necessarily agree. For example, Australian Aborigines who continue to feel the effects of colonialism more than two centuries after Europeans arrived in 1788, probably see little that is “post” colonial. Through her comparative work on Trinidad and Tobago, Purdy (1999: 205) similarly points to “the resilience of colonialism in the late twentieth century” as illustrated in the continuing marginalization and oppression of the poor through coercive measures of the state imposed against a background of dire economic conditions created through International Monetary Fund intervention. She argues that issues of class and violence receive only cursory acknowledgement, if any, in many postcolonial writings, which, in turn, has the effect of disguising the inherent violence of law and its ongoing role as a coercive instrument of colonialism. The crux of her argument is that treating colonialism as something that existed in the past can lead us to ignore present problems—like “militarization, the de-development of the Third World, the spread of corporate capitalism, the continuing seizure of indigenous peoples’ lands and the adulteration of their spirituality and culture”— that continue to inflict untold harm on Indigenous peoples (Purdy 1999: 206). It is significant, however, that Purdy also directs this line of criticism at researchers who have followed the theoretical path carved by Foucault toward viewing law “as an (increasingly) administrative and/or discursive process,” concerned more with individual and group self-regulation than coercive state punishment (Purdy 1999: 217). In order to understand the basis of this specific concern expressed by Purdy, it is important to look more closely at the key ideas of Foucault and his followers that are beginning to enter into the study of law and colonialism. First, however, it is necessary to address

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the fundamental issues raised by Vidya Kumar concerning the recent development of PLT as a specialized field of socio-legal inquiry. A special 2003 issue of the on-line refereed journal Law, Social Justice and Global Development features the work of several current leading authors in the proclaimed emerging field of critical postcolonial legal studies (Aginam 2003; Duncanson 2003; Findlay 2003; Hanafin 2003; Harris 2003; Mawani 2003; Paliwala 2003; Pue 2003; van der Walt 2003; Woo 2003). In his introductory editorial, Wesley Pue accounts for the eclectic and “diffuse” nature of the articles written by the contributing authors, invoking the view that: “The spirit of the intellectual encounter between law and colonialism is of necessity interdisciplinary, diverse in perspective, and unbounded. Scholarship in the field does not—should not—fit into overly-neat disciplinary or perspective-bound categories” and that “Individuals drawn to postcolonial legal studies come to the enquiry with variety of motivations and an array of interests.” In addition, according to Pue, some individuals “seek primarily theoretical understanding, others encounter the postcolonial as part of sustained historical research, and others still feel a compelling sense of urgency to develop practical strategies by which to confront the legacies of colonialism ‘on the ground,’” while many “pursue a more or less mixed method of enquiry and do so from multiple motivations.” In his follow-up article, which he wrote partly in reaction to the contributions that appeared in this special issue, Vidya Kumar (2003) raises serious questions stemming from what he views to be the uncritical adoption of “postcolonial theory” by socio-legal researchers, the two most important of which he refers to as the “nomenclature question” and the “complicity question.” Concerning the issue of nomenclature, Kumar, in line with Purdy (1999), argues that one of the most contentious debates surrounding postcolonial studies has been that around the precise meaning and use of the term “postcolonial” itself. In essence, Kumar argues that “the nomenclature debate can be reduced to a debate about acceptance and denial”: those who accept and make use of the term “post-” colonial can be accused of denial; that is, of denying—“at some level or in some important way— that colonialism persists.” On the other hand, by using terms like “neo-” colonialism or simply “‘colonialism’ to describe contemporary social relations between groups or among nations,” one, by implication, voices acceptance of the view of colonialism as a continuing “unbroken, temporally intact episode or event.” Thus, Kumar warns, by adopting the use of the term in an uncritical and unreflexive manner, new adherents to the PLT movement, may be simply perpetuating conceptual difficulties that have yet to be resolved in the more general field of postcolonial studies. Kumar’s views on the “complicity question” go even more directly to the heart of the purpose and viability of a postcolonial-informed study of law. According to Kumar, the complicity question, which has also been raised repeatedly in the general field of postcolonial studies, involves “the question of the extent to which both postcolonial theorists and postcolonial theory collude with the reproduction of ‘relations of domination.’” Kumar

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re-examines the arguments of specific critics who have claimed “that postcolonial theorists (and postcolonial theory generally) reproduce both cultural and material inequities between the west and non-west,” and, in doing so, he identifies three essential ways in which postcolonial theory can be seen to reproduce such inequalities. These include, first, the obfuscation which results from privileging the “nation” as the primary unit of analysis, at the expense of overlooking and marginalizing “other salient analytical units of social relations, specifically that of class but also that of gender.” Secondly, critics have argued that “postcolonial theorists” themselves “benefit from the fetishisation of ‘nation,’” in that “national identity is logically privileged as the main locus of meaning ... which is, in turn, particularly attractive to the growing number of ‘Third World intellectuals’ who are based in the metropolitan university” (Kumar 2003; citing Ahmad 1993: 93–94). Thirdly, related to this, is the criticism that has been raised about the role of postcolonial theorists “as potential agents for social change.” According to Kumar, the charge “that postcolonial intellectuals obscure not only their complicity but also their stake” in the reproduction of “relations of domination,” has caused critics to raise questions about “postcolonial theory’s political valence—whether it is because their views have tended to be conservative or reactionary, or because they often do not speak from positions in solidarity with activists/social movements.” Thus, Kumar further warns, by not acknowledging and addressing the complicity question, new adherents to the PLT movement may similarly end up being accused of these downfalls. Although Kumar does not profess to offer a recipe that new PLT scholars can follow to escape these criticisms, he does raise a number of key questions that he says must be addressed, including: “Do postcolonial legal theorists have [a] personal stake in the conceptualization of PLT they advance, or a responsibility to investigate the possibility that they do?” and “Is PLT disconnected from contemporary anti-colonial struggles (ought it to be connected?), and does it offer, even attempt to offer, anything at all in support of such struggles (e.g., pledges of political solidarity, subversive (re)interpretative instruments, legal roadmaps to further de-colonialisational and anti-colonialisational projects, and so on)?” In the concluding section of this chapter, I attempt a response to these questions by laying out a normative argument of the value of developing a theoretical framework for approaching the study of the cultural imperialism of law formed from a synthesis of critical insights derived from recent postcolonial and Foucauldian governmentality perspectives.

Governmentality Theory and Law Partly as a result of Foucault’s articulation of the need to de-centre the state from social analysis, over the past 20 years researchers from numerous disciplines have directed attention to investigating the development of various forms of non-state or extra-state governance. In particular, Foucault’s (1991) essay on “Governmentality” has generated a huge amount of theo-

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retical and empirical research across a wide range of social science and humanities disciplines (cf. Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996; Davidson 1997; Dean 1999; O’Farrell 1997; Perry and Maurer 2003; Wickham and Pavlich 2001). Hunt and Wickham (1994: 52) among others, point out that Foucault “uses the term ‘government’ in a way that is very different from the conventional sense of state executives and legislatures” and in a way that is “consistent with his downgrading of the importance of the state.” In essence, Foucault (1991: 95) argues that government is “not a matter of imposing laws on men, but rather of disposing things, that is to say, to employ tactics rather than laws, and if need be to use the laws themselves as tactics.” In turn, Foucault developed “the neologism ‘governmentality’ to capture the dramatic changes in techniques of government developed in the western world from the eighteenth century onwards” (Hunt and Wickham 1994: 75). According to Foucault (1991: 95, 101) these changes included the development of “a range of multiform tactics” for the government of populations outside the state, as well as “the governmentalisation of the state” itself. In recent years Foucault’s ideas on governmentality have been applied specifically to historical research on European colonialism, with several authors extending Foucault’s insights to the study of “colonial governmentality” (cf. Hogeveen 1999; Kalpagam 2000a, 2000b, 2002; Neu 1999, 2000a, 2000b; Peikoff 2000, Pels 1997; Scott 1995, 1999; Thomas 1994). A good example of this is Bryan Hogeveen’s (1999) historical analysis of the governance of Plains Aboriginal peoples in western Canada from 1870 to 1890. Central to Hogeveen’s study is the question of how “governable populations” can be created and controlled “at a distance” from the centre of state power. Empirically, he focuses on how the overlapping duties of the Canadian federal Department of Indian Affairs and the North West Mounted Police in the late nineteenth century worked to create a system of intrusive and knowledgeable government that sought to shape the lives of the Indigenous peoples. This state control was backed by prevailing nineteenthcentury modes of liberal rationality and was achieved through employing a range of invented governmental technologies and practices—including the collection of records and statistics and the strategic use of pass and ration systems and the criminal law. Theoretically, Hogeveen, draws on Foucault’s argument that liberal governance rationalities presuppose the existence of “free will” and “choice.” Discourses left to the colonial archive by Indian agents and police, who were given the task of “governing at a distance,” show that Indigenous peoples were frequently given a “choice” about whether they wanted to continue with their traditional mode of life or take up the more sedentary reservation-based life being prescribed by the government in Ottawa. While the nineteenth-century discourse of liberalism stressed freedom and non-intrusion into individuals’ lives, Hogeveen points out that this same rationality provided a way of intruding into the lives of Indigenous peoples, reshaping them as a spatially isolated “governable population.” More recently, Renisa Mawani (2001) has offered a similar analysis of the spatial strategies used to separate Indigenous peoples

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from Euro-Canadian colonizers in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Canada. The theoretical implications of Hogeveen’s research, along with that of other recent “colonial governmentality” researchers, run contrary to the argument advanced by Purdy (1999) in that it suggests much of the work of governing colonized peoples is accomplished without resorting to coercive state law. Another author who has adopted a similar explicitly Foucauldian approach to the study of colonialism is U. Kalpagam in her work on the history of accounting in India (Kalpagam 2000a) and the colonial state and statistical knowledge (Kalpagam 2000b). She provides trenchant insights into the manner in which colonialism took hold in India, but says little directly about the role of colonial law. Using Foucault’s notion of governmentality, she argues that colonial governmentality in India effected a new relationship between resources, population, and discipline. Specifically, Kalpagam (2000a) shows how the discursive practices of colonial governance, in particular the modalities of measurement, accounting, and classification, enabled the constitution of the “economy.” In turn, she argues that the discursive constitution of the “economy” through the generation of statistical data as part of colonial administration opened up the possibility of the broad exploitation of India through colonial power. Her study of the development of colonial accounting in India reflects both her specific debt to Foucault and the broader theoretical implications of Foucault’s ideas on government for the study of colonialism and cultural imperialism. Specifically, Kalpagam (2000a: 419–420) articulates the perspective that colonial governmentality “was not merely governance from a distance but was fundamentally one in which governance by the modern State sought to supplant earlier forms of pre-modern rule through the autonomous rationality of government... Colonial governmentality, with its singular aim of augmenting the economic strength of the State, performed its extractive and regulatory functions on individual and mass bodies not directly with force but through modern forms of regulatory discipline.” Thus, “‘Normalizing’ the colonized terrain was done through the dual techniques of disciplinary power and risk-based or actuarial power,” and the “[s]tandardization of units of measurement was an important part of the normalizing process.” In contrast again to Purdy (1999), Kalpagam suggests that much of the work of governing colonized peoples is accomplished without resorting to coercive state law. In a broader context, this type of thought-provoking, Foucauldian-inspired research on colonial governmentality is tied at least in part to the more general current questioning of, and debate on, the importance of law as a technique of liberal government being undertaken by contemporary socio-legal theorists like Fitzpatrick (2001b), Hunt (1997), and Rose and Valverde (1998). Within this debate, authors have addressed fundamental questions, including: “What is the role of law in the encoding of power in modern societies?” and “What does law govern?” (Rose and Valverde 1998: 543, 545); “What part does law play in modern governmental rationality?”

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(Hunt 1997: 111); and, do “governnmentality and law subsist in a relation of compatibility ... [or] putative antimony?” (Fitzpatrick 2001b: 4). It is not possible within the confines of this chapter to offer a detailed overview of this debate. However, since my main focus is on the connection between law and governmentality and their potential combined role as agents of cultural imperialism, it is essential to outline Peter Fitzpatrick’s contribution to this debate, which resides mainly in his questioning of whether it is useful to view law and governmentality as antithetical. According to Fitzpatrick (2001b: 4), “The very division between law and governmentality, the construction of them as separate and separating entities, have all served to insulate law and the operative forms of governmentality from certain ethical demands of responsibility.” Through his re-reading of Foucault, Fitzpatrick (2001b: 9; quoting Foucault) draws out the opposite argument; that “with governmentality ... the question of sovereignty becomes ‘all the more acute’, and sovereignty persists along with ‘government’.” Fitzpatrick extends this Foucauldian argument, noting that: “The disciplines which characterize administration [or the development which displaces law] in the modern period ‘effect a suspension of the law that is never total’ even if it is ‘never annulled either’; even whilst accounting for the penetration of law by administration, Foucault does ‘not mean to say that the law fades into the background or that the institutions of justice tend to disappear.’” He also points out that: “for Foucault, disciplinary administration and modern legality are intriguingly coeval, and even now ‘the powers of modern society are exercised through, on the basis of, and by virtue of, this very heterogeneity between a public right of sovereignty and a polymorphous disciplinary mechanism.’ Instead of the comprehensive subordination of law, then, what seems to be forming here is something of a ‘scientific-legal complex.’” Consequently, we see that for Fitzpatrick law and administration—or governmentality—coexist and mutually reinforce one another. In essence, the importance of Fitzpatrick’s insights and those of others who have contributed to the discussion of the connection between law and governmentality resides in the warning it provides on the need to be critical of assuming that the imposition of formal state law is the most important way of promoting cultural imperialism. Specifically, the insights of Foucauldian-influenced legal theorists and the work of noted recent “colonial governmentality” researchers suggest that formal state law is only one of the many, and perhaps itself relatively minor, techniques of government that have been applied to populations who have been at the receiving end of projects of European imperialism and colonialism. In the following section of this chapter, I illustrate the usefulness of adopting a critical postcolonial and Foucauldian governmentality-informed perspective for guiding research on the role of law as an agent of cultural imperialism. I do this, in part, through making brief reference to my current ongoing comparative historical research on colonial criminal law and Indigenous peoples in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

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Cultural Imperialism and Law In her edited book on Cultures of Empire: Colonizers in Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Catherine Hall (2000: 2–3) notes the role that postcolonial studies have played in redirecting attention to the study of connections linking “race, nation, and empire.” According to Hall, although the term “postcolonial” is itself contentious, it is nevertheless a useful term that “draws attention to the systems of colonialism and the relations between colonizer and colonized which operated” (and arguably continue to operate) in the early modern and modern worlds. At the same time, as we have learned from Foucault (1991) and his followers, in any comparative historical work, one needs to remain critical of assuming that the imposition of formal state law is the most important way of promoting cultural imperialism. My ongoing research on colonial criminal law and Indigenous peoples in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Canada, Australia, and New Zealand is based on a critical synthesis of these theoretical and empirical insights (see, generally, Smandych and Lee 1995; Smandych and Linden 1995; Smandych and Sacca 1996; Smandych 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). In essence, this ongoing research is attempting to make sense of the role that colonial criminal law played in the systems of colonialism and the relations that existed between British colonizers and the Indigenous peoples they colonized on three similar colonial frontiers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nineteenth-century British “settler societies,” or colonized territories, provide an ideal historical context for undertaking research that can add to our understanding of the role of law as a mechanism of cultural imperialism. In their edited book on Law, History, Colonialism: The Reach of Empire, Diane Kirkby and Catharine Coleborne (2001: 2) note the fact that by 1820 “the British Empire had already absorbed one-quarter of the world’s population.” Kirkby and Coleborne, in line with other recent critical postcolonial theoretically informed legal historians, argue further that “(L)aw has never been a marginal player in imperialism” and that “in some specific instances it has been legal codes alone that have created boundaries and empowered the enforcement of differentiation.” According to Kirkby and Coleborne, the “rule of law” was “at the heart of the English colonial enterprise,” and evidence in support of this can be seen in the operation of colonial common law legal systems that were put into place in a number of British colonized territories including Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada and the American east coast, India, and parts of the Pacific. In her important comparative historical study of Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900, Lauren Benton (2002: 3) notes in a related manner that throughout European history “law worked both to tie disparate parts of empires and to lay the basis for exchanges of all sorts between politically and culturally separate imperial or colonial powers.” Benton argues the need to study legal history within the context of the general study of world history, and toward this end she undertakes

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a broadly based comparative analysis of the growth and interconnection of a number of different legal regimes that co-existed at different points in the period from 1400 to 1900. While Benton’s research covers legal regimes ranging from those that existed in early Catholic and Islamic empires to those put into place by European colonizers in Bengal, West Africa, the Cape Colony, New South Wales, and Uruguay, she nevertheless manages to offer a number of intriguing generalizations, the most important of these being her underlying thesis that world history witnessed a shift from the “multicentric law of early modern empires to the state-centered law of high colonialism” (Benton 2002: Preface). In addition, according to Benton, whereas in the early modern world “the special legal status of cultural and religious minorities provided institutional continuity across empires,” the development of colonial and postcolonial states in the nineteenth century occurred at least “in part as a response to conflicts over the legal status of indigenous subjects and cultural others.” In essence, Benton argues that the articulation and acceptance (at least among European administrators) of a more state-centred view of law in the nineteenth century was an inherent and indispensable part of the “success” of European colonialism—and, indeed, part of European nationstate building itself. This insight is not unlike Peter Fitzpatrick’s (2001a: 146) claim that “occidental (or Western) law” is and always has been “imperial ‘in itself’ and not only in some remote or passing application of it in the colonies, ‘out there.’” The perhaps unintended point made by each of these authors, and the one I try to illustrate further with examples from my own ongoing research, is that much can be learned about how the cultural imperialism of law works today by examining how it worked in the past. In addition, the recent work of Benton and Fitzpatrick highlights the manner in which today’s widespread contemporary sensibility of the cultural superiority of modern Western law emerged importantly out of nineteenth-century debates about the legal status of Indigenous peoples and the manner in which Indigenous people were to be brought within the grasp of formal state-enacted colonial law. One of the values of postcolonial theory is the manner in which it prods one to try to imagine how imperialism and colonialism were experienced and perceived both from the centre of the empire—the metropole—and its margins, or local contexts (Smith 1999). Part of my current research has entailed examining the parallel and sometimes intimately connected instances of debate over the legal status of Indigenous people that took place in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and other British settler societies between the 1820s and 1840s (Smandych 2005a, 2005b). This research also attempts to better understand legal developments that affected Indigenous peoples by investigating how they were likely perceived and understood in England by colonial law-makers, humanitarians, and reformers who for one reason or another displayed a concern about their situation. This has required collecting information from both primary and secondary sources on the broad range of factors that likely helped shape the sensibility colonial administrators and

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reformers shared about English law and Indigenous peoples. It has also required attempting to document what British Colonial Office officials and humanitarian reformers based in England wrote about whether, or under what circumstances, colonial criminal law should be applied to Indigenous people in the different British colonies. In the course of this research I have found that one of the most significant connections linking developments that occurred in Canada and Australia is the coincidental timing of the emergence of concern about the need for clarifying the status of Indigenous peoples as witnesses and accused in criminal trials (Smandych 2005a, 2005b). Another significant fact I have examined in considerable depth is the intimate connection that existed between the campaign for the abolition of slavery across the British Empire to 1833 and later efforts undertaken by Colonial Office officials to try to “protect” Aboriginal peoples throughout the British Empire through the more uniform, but at times necessarily modified, application of fundamental principles of British jurisprudence and criminal law (Smandych 2005c). Writing in the Canadian Indian in March 1891, an author under the pseudonym of “Fair Play” commented on the way in which Europeans belittled the traditional laws and legal customs of Indians, noting: And is it altogether just to treat the Indian in the way we are doing? Is it altogether fair to deprive them of their nationality, to laugh at their old laws and customs and traditions, to force upon them our own laws and customs as though there could be no two questions as to their superiority in every way, and that they must, of course, be just as suitable and applicable to the Indian as they are to ourselves. Is there nothing—nothing whatever—in the past history of this ancient people to merit our esteem, or to call forth our praise? Were their laws in the past all mere childishness?

This type of degrading of Indigenous customary law was something that happened throughout British settler societies in the nineteenth century. Although the process occurred in many ways, one of the most important was through decisions made by colonial judges, either on their own or with legal advice received from the British Colonial Office. Colonial judges across all British settler societies in the nineteenth century articulated forms of legal reasoning and created legal fictions that ultimately resulted in Indigenous peoples coming to be viewed as rightful “legal subjects” of the British Crown. Unfortunately, as the history of many British colonial and postcolonial societies has shown since the nineteenth century, this has rarely led to Indigenous peoples and other colonial “others” being granted the same legal rights and protections as those won by colonizers themselves.

Conclusion This chapter has argued the need for research on the role of law as an agent of cultural imperialism. As part of this effort, an attempt was also made to suggest a heuristic theoretical framework and specific line of historical

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research that one might use to begin undertaking work in this field. Specifically, by way of a critical review of relevant literatures, I have argued that the most fruitful theoretical starting point for such work exists in a critical synthesis of recent postcolonial and Foucauldian governmentality perspectives. In addition, through reference to my own ongoing research on the nineteenth-century British colonial experience, I have attempted to illustrate the value of undertaking comparative legal-historical research on the application of European law to Indigenous peoples as one area of study related to the role of law as an agent of cultural imperialism. Legitimately, one might ask, what can this research tell us about cultural imperialism today, and how can it guide us, normatively, in the political struggles we may chose to become part of against the current forces of cultural imperialism in the West, and especially those emanating from the US? First, as I have tried to show in this chapter, and as other contributing authors of this book have also helped to illustrate, it is crucial to become more aware of how law has been used historically as an agent of cultural imperialism and of how it continues to be used as such today (see in particular, Chapters 7, 11, and 12 in this volume by Germann, Scherrer, and Parthasarathy). Secondly, as I have attempted to show through my attention to the insights offered by Foucault and his followers on law and governmentality, it is also crucial to recognize that formal state law is only one of the many, and perhaps itself relatively minor, techniques of government that have been applied to populations who have been at the receiving end of projects of European imperialism and colonialism. A comparative historical study of the cultural imperialism of law that is informed by a synthesis of postcolonial and governmentality theory can help us both to better understand how formal state law has been, and continues to be, imposed on colonized peoples, while at the same time to see how those who have been colonized can continue to resist. Knowledge generated from research of this type can be used strategically in current debates and power struggles around law and Indigenous peoples in modern colonial and postcolonial societies as a way of countering the long-term destructive effects of European cultural imperialism.

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CHAPTER 18

Enrique Dussel and Ali Shari’ati on Cultural Imperialism Abbas Manoochehri

n Culture and Imperialism Edward Said uses the notion of “discrepant experiences” and compares the writings of a colonizing French scholar with that of a colonized Egyptian scholar (Said 1993; 2001: 30–34). At the time of Napoleonic conquest, the two scholars viewed and understood “the situation” they were experiencing very differently. These “experiences” were formulated and expressed through two different textual genres, one exemplifying a “colonial discourse” and the other the discourse of the colonized. According to Said (1978), in the colonial discourse the non-European is portrayed as the “other” of the European civilization. As such, this discourse has been the product of the European “will to power,” which is implemented in relation to the colonized by making it “the other” of itself. Frantz Fanon (1963), on the other hand, has analyzed the deepest felt injuries inflicted on the native colonized by the European colonizer. Fanon’s genre has then been extended by postcolonial discourse as a written response to colonial discourse (Castle 2001: 3). Hence, one can speak of discrepant discourses by comparing postcolonial discourse with that of colonial discourse, the colonial discourse being a negating discourse, whereas the postcolonial discourse is a challenging and resisting discourse.

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Discourses on Colonialism But how can such discrepancy, challenge, and resistance be read? Edward Said has applied the Foucauldian genealogy to detect the “will to power” inherent in colonial discourse (Said 1978: 3, 14, 22). The colonized discourse, however, can be understood hermeneutically. According to Ricoeur (1988), a written text has both common and particular characteristics when compared with spoken discourse. Specifically, Ricoeur (1988: 79) argues: “As a speech act-event, the act of discourse is constituted by the hierarchy of three levels: (1) the level of locutionary or propositional act, the act of saying; (2) the level of the illocutionary act (or force), what we do in saying; (3) the level of the perlocutionary act, what we do by the fact that we speak.” Regarding a text as a “fixation” of “intentional exteriorization,” however, Ricoeur (1988: 146) states that one should distinguish between what is

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“spoken” in a speech and what is “said” in a text. Accordingly, in effect what writing fixes “is not the event of speaking but the ‘said’ of speaking, where we understand by the ‘said’ of speaking that intentional exteriorization constitutive of the aim of discourse thanks to which the sagen, the saying, wants to become Aus-Sage, the enunciation, the enunciated. In short what we write, what we inscribe, is the noema of the speaking, it is the meaning of the speech event, not the event as event.” Such “exteriorization” also “opens up a world,” the world which is no longer a reference situation in a discourse, but the world of the text which is not confined to the situational reference-point within which a speaking discourse takes place (Ricoeur 1988: 109, 149). Applying such method to the written discourse of postcolonialism, it can be said that it opens up a world of double disenchantment. Postcolonial discourse is a discourse emanating and exteriorizing the pathos of double disenchantment. (The word pathos here is taken to mean preoccupation, as it was originally meant by the Greeks.) This is a pathos resulting from the colonial experience, an experience which in the first instance is similar to what Max Weber refers to as disenchantment, but it goes even further than that. Weber (1979) has referred to disenchantment (Entzauberung) in the modern era as the sense of intellectual and cultural disassociation with what had formed and saturated the way of living and thinking in the pre-modern era. Weber argued that such intellectual and cultural reorientation has had an essential association with “calculative rationality” (Zweekrationalitat) through which the modern European’s conception of the world has changed. Economy, politics, and culture were recreated through the rationalization of life and the life-world. Capitalist economy, the bureaucratic system, and secular culture were the three fundamental dimensions of the new “disenchanted world” (Weber 1979: 105, 221). Weber, however, did not say anything about the geocultural extension of disenchantment, but, in a unique historical conjuncture, the experience of disenchantment was imposed on the non-Western world. Whereas in Europe “calculative rationality” replaced whatever had been disassociated through disenchantment, the phenomenon of acculturation and self-dispossession resulted in a double disenchantment. This is the experience of simultaneously being disenchanted and becoming a disenchanted being. Being disenchanted means to disassociate oneself from what belongs to one as one’s beliefs, way of living, etc. Becoming a disenchanted being, on the other hand, is a loss of one’s self, it is withdrawing from one’s own selfhood and becoming an absence, a lack, a void. This happens when one is negated and deprived of any original identity. The experience of double disenchantment seems to be the predicament of the colonized world and, as such, one of the most fundamental preoccupations of postcolonial thinking. As a genre, postcolonial theory owes much to Frantz Fanon’s (1963) The Wretched of the Earth. Among the postcolonial thinkers inspired by Fanon’s thought are Enrique Dussel and Ali Shari’ati. Shari’ati and Dussel can be identified as postcolonial thinkers

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whose writings relate a “message” to be read as an exteriorized intention. As such, their writings are the illocutionary act of resistance against cultural imperialism. They are, in Homi Bahbah’s words, an expression of “the felt experience of the local,” or, as Mary Louise Pratt would put it, they are “autoethnographies” (Castle 2001: xii-xiii). They could also be identified as emanating from the pathos of double enchantment. Dussel’s critique of modern European self-conception and its “geopolitics of domination” and Shari’ati’s notion of machinism and Third World modernization are expressions of such a predicament, in response to which Shari’ati proposes the notion of “Return to the Self,” and Dussel proposes a “Return to the Subjugated Other.”

Dussel on Culture and Colonialism Dussel has analyzed domination both in its actual and symbolic moments. The “geopolitics of domination,” the “hermeneutics of reality,” and the “return to the subjugated other” are the three fundamental notions in Dussel’s challenge to cultural colonialism.

Colonialism and the Geopolitics of Domination Unlike both the Newtonian notion of “physical space” and the phenomenological notion of “existential space,” Dussel refers to “geopolitical space.” In this “space” there is a tenuous relationship between centre and periphery, where the centre is the core of power and the periphery is the space of the application of such power. In Dussel’s view, what has happened in the past 500 years in Latin America is the historical manifestation of the geopolitics of domination (Dussel 1985: 8). According to Dussel, modern philosophy, beginning with Descartes’s cogito, has been thought in the centre of power, and modern cogito has turned out to be the dominant selfhood of the European “I.” The modern ego cogito has actually been the historical outcome of the ego conquistadore, the ego of conquering the Aztecs and Incas, enslaving Africans, and vanquishing Chinese. Hence: “From the ‘I conquer,’ applied to the Aztec and Inca world and all America, from the ‘I enslave,’ applied to Africans sold for the gold and silver acquired at the cost of the death of Amerindians working at the depths of the earth, from the ‘I vanquish’ of the wars of India and China to the shameful ‘opium war’—from this ‘I’ appears the Cartesian ego cogito” (Dussel 1985: 4, 6). This “I” has been the manifestation of a being for which the “other” is “not-being.” Ontology, hence, has taken a geopolitical characteristic in which domination is experienced. According to Dussel (1985: 17), domination is the act by which others are forced to participate in the system that alienates them. This is how the modern European has approached the non-European. The cogito of the centre has exercised power over the peripheral other in the geopolitical space created by colonialism. The actualization of the modern European

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self through the proyecto, “the striving to achieve,” has created “the wretched of the earth” (Dussel 1985: 10, 24, 43–44). This historical fact has not, however, been heeded by modern thought. Therefore, modern philosophical reflections over the notions of “the meaning of being,” “the truth,” “the right method,” “ethics,” “modernity,” “justice,” and “freedom” are self-deceptive. Hence, the concept of “truth” in philosophical discussions only has meaning in a geopolitical duality of dominant and dominated poles and can be apprehended by the hermeneutics of reality.

Hermeneutics of Reality For Dussel, hermeneutics does not merely mean the discovery of the meaning of what can be observed, but actually “the discovery of the hidden reality.” When one speaks of the hidden dimension, it means that something might be upholding a reality contrary to the fact that the colonized masses have been driven to the periphery through domination. The reality, in Dussel’s view, is not merely the development in political and economic fields in one part of the world that is justified and explained in the framework of the dominant view. Through the discovery of the reality by hermeneutics, what becomes more understandable than anything else is the life of “the wretched of the earth.” Such a discovery of a reality which happens beyond the dominant horizon actually looks into what rules over our minds, namely, into the symbols. This means that the truth is in the understanding of the reality of the domination of one part of the world over the other. “Imperialist culture” or “culture of the centre” is “the culture that is dominant in the present order”; it is the refined culture of European and North American elites against which all other cultures are measured (Dussel 1985: 74–102). Therefore, through symbols we can reach a better understanding of a culture and the meaning of life in it. Dominant symbols in the modern world have been self-defeating, because they ignore what has occurred between the European and the non-European world. We should, therefore, not confine our understanding of symbols to a particular culture and ignore what has happened between cultures and civilizations throughout the past five centuries (Dussel 1985: 4–10). Any hermeneutic of symbols needs to go beyond the hermeneutics “of a culture” and must take into consideration “the asymmetrical confrontation between several cultures (one dominating, the others dominated)” (Dussel 1985: 3).

Colonialism and Assimilation According to Dussel, the colonial culture also has functioned in another way, namely, through the process of “assimilation.” The effort of a certain part of the colonized community to “become like Europeans” has led to the formation of a culture that was neither the original native culture nor the culture of the colonizing Europeans, but a fabricated culture made by the local elites in the image of the imperial culture. This process was

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“particularly refracted in the oligarchic culture of dominant groups within dependent nations of the periphery. It is the culture that they admire and imitate, fascinated by the artistic, scientific, and technological program of the center ... On the masks of these local elites the face of the center is duplicated. They ignore their national culture, they despise their skin color, they pretend to be white ... and live as if they were in the center. They are the outcasts of history” (Dussel 1996: 79). Such cultural alienation, however, does not remain confined to the elites and, when extended to the colonized masses, plays an instrumental role for the imperialist economy. Therefore, “The culture of the oppressed, not as a people but as repressed, is the culture of the masses. It is the reproduction and Nausom, the kitsch vulgarization of imperialist culture refracted by oligarchical culture and passed on for consumption. It is by means of the culture of the masses that ideology propagates imperialist enterprise and produces a market for its product” (Dussel 1985: 91).

Return to the Subjugated Other Drawing from Levinas’s discussion about the priority of “the other,” Dussel argues for a trans-cultural otherness. According to him, although Levinas has severely criticized modern subjectivism, he has not been able to go far enough in his attention to the “ethics of otherness.” In Levinas’s critique, the modern selfhood’s domination over “the other” is traced to the understanding of self as an “autonomous self.” However, Dussel argues, Levinas speaks of such a relationship in the context of a particular culture and has not paid attention to the domination of “cultural other” by the modern “cultural self.” In fact, “The other is the alterity of all possible systems, beyond ‘the same’, which totality always is. ‘Being is, and non-Being is,’ or can be, the other, we could say, contrary to Parmenides and classical ontology” (Dussel 1985: 43). As a response to such predicaments, Dussel (1985: 92) suggests the notion of “the return to the subjugated other.” He discusses the need for return to the other who in his view is on the periphery of the geopolitical divide created by colonialism.

Shari’ati and Colonial Experience: A Challenging Discourse Shari’ati’s writings consist of three interrelated moments: a genealogy of colonial discourse; a hermeneutic of the assimilated discourse; and, finally, the moment of challenging these two. As such, and in its interconnected totality, Shari’ati’s writings tend to be an insurgent type of discourse.

Machinism and the Modern Problematic Shari’ati analyzes imperialism by discussing modernity. In his view, in modern imperialism, cultural and economic dimensions are inseparable and their interconnectedness can be represented through the notion of

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machinism. In his analysis of modernity, Shari’ati presents a thesis regarding the genesis and historical development of modern problems, which in his view are rooted in the emergence of private ownership. According to Shari’ati, human history is composed of two stages: the stage of collectivity and the stage of private ownership. Unlike the first stage, which was an era of social equality and spiritual oneness, the second stage, in which we now live, is that of social domination and exploitation. As a turning point in history, private ownership has been the starting point for social domination. However, although this new formation has private ownership as its founding element, the forms that it has taken at different points in history include slavery, serfdom, feudalism, and capitalism. Hence, Shari’ati, having the Marxist view on social formation in mind, says, “There is no more than one foundation, and this is neither bourgeoisie nor feudal, capitalist nor communist, serfdom nor slavery. It is ownership which is of two kinds: Private (monopoly) and Social (public)” (Shariati 1980: 37). Unlike the stage of social ownership when all material and spiritual resources were accessible to everyone, the emergence of private ownership polarized the human community and created “new ills, changing men’s brotherhood and love to duplicity, deceit, hatred, exploitation, colonialization, and massacre” (Shariati 1980: 37). This polarization has been manifested historically in various forms, from ancient slave economies to modern capitalist society up to its latest stage of machinism. According to Shari’ati, the emergence of the machine in modern times has been the second most fundamental change in the human condition, the first one being the emergence of private ownership. Both of these changes, which Shari’ati calls “the two curves of history,” belong to the second stage of human history. “As a new social order, Machinism began to emerge in the nineteenth century. By then handicrafts were being left behind and the emerging Machine age was creating new anxieties and myriads of new problems” (Shariati 1980: 35). The machine, however, is not a marketable commodity but in fact the foundation for the modern social formation of machinism: “Machinism is a sociological phenomenon. It is a particular social order, not a marketable, consumable, or technical product or commodity” (Shariati 1980: 35). Machinism has come to dominate all spheres of modern life. In a sense it is a sophisticated version of the social formation created by the emergence of private ownership. Just as private ownership formulated a new world vision, a new conception of the world began to develop with the machine (Shariati 1980: 39–45). As such, one of the characteristics of Machinism is the negation of originalism, i.e., the negation of authenticities for the sake of uniformity of people and cultures, the result of which is general submission before machinism’s imposed consuming schemes. By replacing “value” with “profit,” machinism has created a hollow life and a phony man. Such a phony individual is trapped in a vicious cycle of “existing to consume and consuming to exist.” The Western bourgeois vision of absurdité also reveals this hollowness, this sense of loss within the

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consume/exist cycle that has resulted from the cultural domination of the machine. A founding principle of this whole operation was, and continues to be, “the need for production and the production of needs” (Shariati 1989: 339): “From a philosophical standpoint, Machinism leads to the domination of the Machine over human life and substitution of the Machine for creative and determining man. Hence man becomes absent from himself.” The notion of the machine has also been used in a metaphoric sense in Robert Young’s (2001: 80) analysis of the colonial discourse: “It was indeed as a Machine that the colonialists themselves often envisaged the operation of colonial power.” Edward Said also refers to the usage of the machine as “the scat of power in the West ruling over the subjected race in the East,” employed by Lord Cormer, according to whom: “What the machine’s branches feed into it in the East—human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you—is preceded by the machine, then converted into more power” (Said 1978: 44; 2001: 30). As the result of these developments, in Shari’ati’s view, new problems have been introduced to the human community. In the industrial world, automation, consumerism, and technocracy have caused anxiety, alienation, and distress. These in turn have led to the creation of an atmosphere in which destructive trends like fascism have taken root and grown rapidly. This new social order, Shari’ati further argues, has extended itself within various spheres of Western life and also beyond its geographical borders.

Civilization versus Modernization Relating modern technological developments to the realities of the nonWestern world, Shari’ati makes a distinction between civilization and modernization. According to him, civilization involves a long process of development within a community; modernization of contemporary Third World societies, however, has been an apocryphal form of progress. In fact such modernization is symptomatic of a fundamentally destructive tendency within the contemporary non-Western world, which is suffering from the various internal and external forces of domination and exploitation of the past two centuries. Imperialism (Iste’mar), tyranny (Istebdad), economic exploitation (Istesmar), and cultural colonization (Istehmar), which have been justified by the alleged necessity for modernization, have together inflicted deep wounds on the peoples of the Third World. Third World modernization is simply an historical extension of the process which began with the emergence of private ownership and was then intensified by machinism. Having already gained control over a vast part of the world by colonial domination, Europe now has more reasons to sustain its economic grip over these areas. Therefore, parallel to the developments within the European world following the emergence of the machine, other parts of the world have also been greatly influenced by the expansion of the machine. The penetration in other societies could not, however, be successful without the eventual

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reorientation of their cultures. To be attracted to western commodities, nonWestern peoples had to be “modernized.” Non-Westerners had to be “Westernized,” that is, they had to develop a “modern taste” for Western products. As an essential component of imperialism, therefore, acculturation of the traditional societies of the non-European world became an imperative for the economic interests of Europe. The necessity of finding markets for the vast surplus of industrial products, which now complemented the European need for cheap raw material, forced the industrial world to penetrate the non-European world of Africa and Asia. This historical penetration then led to the formation of the socio-political realities of the postcolonial world up to our own time (Castle 2001: 45). In Shari’ati’s words: “The problem was to make people in Asia and Africa consumers of European products. Their societies had to be restructured so that they would buy European products. Literally, this meant changing a nation ... to accept new clothing, new consumption patterns, and adornments. Now, what part has to change first? Obviously one’s morale and thinking” (Shariati 1989: 339).

Assimilation In Shari’ati’s view, the theoretical and historical mediation between modernity and modernization of the Third World consists of colonialization, assimilation, and comprador bourgeoisie. Colonialism came as the result of the need for markets. To reach new markets in turn necessitated political and military manoeuvering. This in turn brought about its functionaries, namely, the comprador bourgeoisie, who are the ones who benefit from the exchange of consumer products with the resources of the Third World countries. All this, however, could not proceed unless the cultural sphere provided the opportunity. This happened through “assimilation”: the non-European becoming, or pretending to be, like a European. This “applies to the conduct of the one who, intentionally or unintentionally, starts imitating the manners of someone else. Obsessively, and with no reservations he denies himself in order to transform his identity. Hoping to attain the goals and the grandeur, which he sees in another, the assimilated attempts to rid himself of perceived shameful associations with his original society and culture” (Shariati 1979a: 12, 2). Assimilation is, in fact, an historical product of the process of monoculturalization. This is the essential path in the type of cultural imperialism exercised by the modern European colonial powers. “Monoculture is a colonial phenomenon-notion [which] ... goes along with monoculturalization of civilizations. All civilizational lands, with their centuries of various aesthetic and historical experience should be harvested by the colonial combine, left bare and in need of what the colonizer can give it” (Shariati 1979b: 6–15). The point, however, is that “the assimilated pretends to be more modern than the European whom s/he has imitated. A European knows her historical past and heritage, the assimilated, however, disassociates from his past, destroys it and runs away from it” (Shariati 1978a: 257).

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This is what one can call identity disenchantment, disenchantment not with what one has always lived with but with one’s ontological sense of existence. In this regard, Shari’ati was highly critical of those intellectuals in modernizing societies who identified themselves with Western culture. To him this was as much a consequence of colonialism as was economic exploitation. He criticized these intellectuals for their failure to understand these developments in the context of the peculiarities of their own societies. He believed that they had lost their sense of protest and creativity. Instead, Shari’ati proposed the need for a methodological leap towards a more concrete perspective and the courage to search for and find new ways and fresh possibilities to deal with the problems of Third World societies. As a possibility he proposed the idea of the “return to the self.”

Return to the Self If we were told, says Shari’ati, that we have never had civilization, we could disprove such a claim by returning to what we have had. But, what can or should we do when our past is metamorphosized and misrepresented? What can be done when colonizers have not necessarily negated Eastern culture and its history (see Chapter 3 by Goonatilake in this volume for more evidence on this point), but try to convince the colonized that they are “negative,” “of the second ontic rank,” and “unable to think.” So, Shari’ati asks, what are we to do? Should we let ourselves be dissolved in notions such as “internationalism,” which would mean becoming the second-rank ontic partners of capitalism? If we lack culture, what would be our status in such a partnership? Would it be anything other than cultural annihilation? As long as there is such a dichotomy as local (native) versus human, how can we be in a partnership with the colonizer? To answer these questions, Shari’ati speaks of “a difficult moment of a great choice” between two poles: “a pole which we have inherited from the past and the pole which we have imitated from the West.... The first pole is a unique Weltanschauung, philosophy of life ... and a set of certain social relations. The second one is a new Weltanschauung, a new school and a new philosophy of life, [a] new way of being and moving forward, though in various and even contradictory schools” (Shariati 1978a: 306). What is common for the followers of these two poles is that they both are imitative. The task of both sets of followers, Shari’ati says, is easy, because a traditionalist does not have the difficulty and the anxiety of choosing; for it is chosen for him and he only follows. The follower of the second pole too “does not have the responsibility and preoccupation for choosing. For, as packages of the technical and consumer goods come from the West to be opened and consumed, various schools too come in ready packages and known standards” (Shariati 1979a: 2–15). As a point of departure, Shari’ati attempted first to redefine the concept of “the intellectual.” He argued that an intellectual is anybody who is aware

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of his or her human condition and whose awareness gives him or her a sense of responsibility. Such a person knows his or her own society, understands its pains, its spirit, and its heritage; he or she is a person who can choose consciously and responsibly. Such a person should seek intellectual leadership in his or her own society. Hence, an intellectual does not necessarily need to be highly educated. In fact, Shari’ati believed, a worker might be more of an intellectual than might a highly distinguished scholar (Shariati 1979b: 21). Historical self-discovery and cultural self-reliance are other dimensions of Shari’ati’s definition of “the intellectual.” He introduced these by way of the idea of the “return to the self.” This idea, he says, does not relate to a nostalgic romanticization of the forgotten past. Rather, it is an attempt at the creative incorporation of the repressed historical origin of a cultural self, not sought as an end in itself but as the beginning of a challenging self-assertion by an alienated and disillusioned generation. This can, in turn, reinforce an historical self-recognition capable of confronting the forces of domination and oppression. “Returning to the self” means that those people whose historical and cultural heritage and identity have been either denied or misrepresented “restore history to themselves.” This notion is a part of a challenging discourse versus colonial discourse. Unlike the locus of the colonial discourse which negates, misrepresents, and then draws into assimilation, the illocutionary act of textual resistance reverses this process in three moments of cultural archaeology, the refinement of cultural discourse, and finally self-historical restoring (Shariati 1978b: 27). “The return to the self” then means recovering one’s own human identity and cultural-historical authenticity: it means self-consciousness and liberation from the illness of cultural alienation and spiritual colonialization (Shariati 1989: 305).

Conclusion The encounter between colonial Europe and the colonized world has been expressed by two particular textual genres of “colonial discourse” and “postcolonial discourse.” These two genres are distinguishable by the discrepancy between the two experiences they express. These two types of writing, however, pertain to two sides of the same experience, one side being the colonial experience and the other side being that of the colonized. The textual discourse of the colonized reveals the illocutionary act of resistance against the cultural domination of colonialism. The writings of Enrique Dussel and Ali Shari’ati are noticeable examples of postcolonial discourse. They both express a preoccupation with a long process of the annihilating experience of double disenchantment. They have both analyzed and challenged the colonial act of subjugation and cultural negation. Their literal work is oriented towards a liberating self-resurgence and self-reassertion. Thereby, they have brought to light

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the impact of cultural colonialism in the creation of the subjugated “other” and, at the same time, the process of the reemergence of the selfhood which has been negated and annihilated. The “turn” from subjugated otherness to that of assertive selfhood in postcolonial discourse, however, takes place exactly at the historical juncture in a “postmodern turn” when the European sense of selfhood is being negated by a disillusioned generation. In other words, while the colonized tends to assert its negated selfhood, the colonizing European turns to the negation of “selfhood” per se. This, however, does not necessarily deter the postcolonial discourse from its historical task of developing a new selfhood. This is the essence of the postcolonial discourse exercised by Dussel and Shari’ati.

References Castle, Gregory (Ed.). 2001. Postcolonial Discourses: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. Dussel, Enrique. 1985. The Philosophy of Liberation. New York: Orbis. Dussel, Enrique. 1996. The Underside of Modernity. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press. Fanon, Franz. 1963. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Weidenfeld. Ricouer, Paul. 1988. From Text to Action. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Said, Edward. 1978. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books. Said, Edward. 1993. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage Books. Said Edward. 2001. “Discrepant Experiences.” In Postcolonial Discourses: An Anthology, ed. G. Castle. Oxford: Blackwell. 26–38. Shari’ati, Ali. 1978a. Collected Works. Vol. 14: History of Religion (1). Tehran: Ershad. Shari’ati, Ali. 1978b. Collected Works. Vol. 12: The History of Civilization (2). Tehran: Ershad. Shari’ati, Ali. 1979a. Civilization and Modernization. Houston. TX: Free Press. Shari’ati, Ali. 1979b. Collected Works. Vol. 4: Return to Self. Tehran: Ershad. Shari’ati, Ali. 1980. Machine in the Captivity of Machinism. Houston, TX: Free Press. Shari’ati, Ali. 1989. Collected Works. Vol. 31: Peculiarities of Modem Times. Tehran: Chapakhsh. Weber, Max. 1979. The Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press. Young, Robert. 2001. “Colonialism and the Desiring Machine.” In Postcolonial Discourses: An Anthology, ed. G. Castle. Oxford: Blackwell. 73–99.

CHAPTER 19

Redefining Cultural Imperialism and the Dynamics of Culture Contacts Biyot K. Tripathy

Carnivalization, Textuality, and the Pundits of Imperialism his chapter seeks to separate the dynamics of culture contacts from those of political relationships driven by power and domination. Theories of cultural imperialism are unfortunately founded on theories of political imperialism, which, based on Marxist and other fundamentalist ideologies, visualize society as fractured and postulate militancy as the way to protect those who are perceived as wronged or “colonized.” This is an entirely erroneous perception and needs to be reversed. Such a reversal of accumulated historical inequalities must be done by protective rather than destructive measures, by inclusion rather than exclusion, by promoting diversity rather than insularity. And in this the rights of the minority are as important as the rights of the majority communities. Achiever nations, communities, organizations, or individuals are seen as imperialists or colonizers, irrespective of the historical process and vision of human progress through which they have grown. We must decide what the objective goals should be: achieving, growing, and expanding or stagnancy, insularity, and isolation. Although internationalism has been seen as imperialism, we must decide whether we should have localism or permit nations, businesses, and individuals to have open access to the world. If the latter path is chosen, the modalities of protecting the small and weak must be worked out. A major problem today is the existence of insular fundamentalist states alongside free multicultural societies, with the former constantly evoking the bogey of imperialism against multicultural states while they feel free to enter and manipulate the latter. Powerful states, on their part, often develop a propensity to dominate others for their selfish interests. Such are some of the basic factors governing political imperialism and counter-imperialism. Unfortunately, these perceptions have invaded all the social and cultural fields and related academic disciplines. This error must be corrected because culture has its own distinct modes of operation, which must not be strangled in the clutches of politics. Culture is not governed by power relationships; its dynamics are entirely different from political imperialism. Even when a nation is colonizing another,

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the colonized may carnivalize the colonizer’s culture products and drive them out of use or create new products of its own. Cultures are gregarious. They are not virgins, but promiscuous. That is the way they have grown, by absorbing, mixing, creating, and carnivalizing. A culture that fears that the McDonald’s sign will knock it over is actually responding to the fear of political and economic domination. In culture the dynamics of growth and change must be accepted. Cultures must be encouraged not to be insular and inbred. Otherwise, they will stagnate. Power and wealth may seek to influence, but do not determine the dynamics of culture contacts. This is what this chapter seeks to establish and will do so by looking at the tribal people of Orissa in the historical context of their political domination by the Indo-Aryans. There are 62 tribes in the state of Orissa (Tribes 1990), belonging to four racial groups1 and speaking 62 different languages or dialects of three language families.2 Theirs is a culture that, unlike minority cultures of recent origin,3 can be conceptualized in terms of beauty and intelligence (Arnold 1882/1993) and wholesomeness (Anderson 1991). During my extensive fieldwork among the tribal people, I have had the privilege of not only recording their myths, legends, tales, and lore but also of observing the rich and distinct lifestyles they have developed with pride and dignity in their isolation and which they are trying to maintain with sporadic renaissance fervour in this age of increasing and invasive culture contacts. Tribal people are those who have lived in the forests and hills far away from the dominant culture and without depending on it in any way. They were the dominant or rather the lone culture until the Deko (the outsider) came. After that they withdrew into the forests and hills. They have been self-sufficient, living off their forests, hills, and rivers without destroying them so that they and the environment have remained pristine. Now the Dekos have moved closer to them, have destroyed their forests, have dug up their hills, and have even questioned their title to land. They are, thus, besieged. The Deko now is not only the Orissan culture which is the immediately impinging circle, but comprises a middle circle of Indian and an outer 1 The four belong to Austro-Asiatic, Mongoloid, Dravidian, and Indo-Aryan groups. Like the rest of mankind there has been a fair deal of mixing among them too. In India, the Mongoloid inhabit the northeast and are supposedly endemic to that region, but there is evidence of their strain in Orissan tribes. 2 The three language families are Mundari (Austro-Asiatic), Dravidian, and Indo-Aryan. The tribes that speak these languages are not distributed in regional confines but are spread diversely, showing that tribal movements or migrations have been of diverse kinds under different pressures and aspirations. 3 Recent minority cultures are a product of (1) people moving, largely out of economic reasons, into territories inhabited by a different and affluent majority culture—e.g., Asians and Mexicans moving into the US; (2) people brought into a different territory forcibly for economic reasons—e.g., Africans brought as slaves to the US; (3) large-scale migration of alien people into the land of native inhabitants who are reduced to a minority, as Europeans moved into North and South America, dislodging the Native Americans; (4) settlers of a dominant colonial culture who become minorities in the postcolonial era, such as the British Whites in Zimbabwe, the French Whites in Algeria, and the Anglo-Indians and Portuguese in India.

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circle of Western culture. The tribal people have to adopt the others’ ways. They have to go into agriculture if they can afford it, uproot themselves and move out as labourers, or sit idle. Deko education separates them from their linguistic roots, Deko music disrupts their ancient rhythms, Deko myths overwhelm their own. They are bereft economically and invaded culturally. To postulate that they be left alone is to authorize ghettoization. To stop media invasion (TV, radio, etc.) is to ensure their isolation. Their tunes and rhythms had developed by listening to the birds, animals, winds, and streams of their environment. Must they now be stopped from listening to the new environment? Must we design minority aesthetics for them and condemn them within it? Or should the Deko receive tribal art and culture into itself aggressively? If so, will it bring the tribal people to the centre from the margin or will it vandalize their culture and kill it? Do the pundits of cultural imperialism and colonialism see the right things and have the right answers, designed at their study tables?

Language and the Colonial Bogey Let us see what options the tribal people have and what direction they would like to take rather than looking at them with our theoretical “designs.” For this purpose we shall concentrate on the problem of some culture products. First, let us look at language, for language is the key to the textuality of a person, group, or nation, which is configured largely through language into individualities and marks out definitive cultural identities. An assault on language is an assault on the roots of a culture. The Kandha tribe (called Kondh in Hindi-speaking states), inhabiting the district of Phulbani and a few other southern districts, is a major tribe with a population of over 1.2 million people. They speak a language called Kui with a few dialects used in different areas. Nearly 20 years ago a movement started among them to bolster their language. Toward this end they invented a Kui script and started publishing some literary, cultural, and historical material. The movement has not, however, picked up, largely because schools use Oriya or English as the medium of instruction, and the script used is Oriya and Roman. But the real reason is that they have to function increasingly among Oriya-speaking people. They have to deal with the Oriyas in most transactions and must conduct all official business in Oriya or English. Under the circumstances, the will among the people to study Kui script in a self-taught way is weakened. Recently, the Santals, who are also a major tribe inhabiting three states of the country (with a population of over 700,000 in Orissa alone and a total population of over 2 million), have voiced a demand for the inclusion of Santali in the language schedule of the Indian constitution where the “major” Indian languages are listed.1 If this is done, some national pride can be salvaged for them. 1 Even as I write, Santali has been accepted into the language schedule of the Indian Constitution (January 2004).

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Needless to say that other tribes, major or minor, will follow suit. Nothing will be lost for the nation in listing them, for it will give the tribes a sense of recognition and equality. Language is the key to the identity of a people and the keeper of the discourse of their culture. Let us now see what is happening to tribal languages under the present circumstances. The language immediately impinging upon and enclosing tribal languages is Oriya, which is the language of the state of Orissa. Oriya is surrounded by Hindi, which our constitution makers have offered as the national language. This is surrounded by English, which has been retained as a parallel national language or language of official transactions. It is also seen as the language of access to the world. All these languages keep the tribal language trapped in the nation’s political construction. Let us now see how much these languages have infiltrated into tribal languages and the natural response of the victim language to this process. Here, it must be noted that the location of the tribal person or group is important. In very remote villages to which access is difficult, infiltration of Hindi and English is minimal. Roadside villages through which buses ply and villages that have been electrified so that access to TV and video is obtained show a fair deal of penetration. Christian villages show a slightly different profile than non-Christian ones, because of the presence of mission schools. Those who have moved out of their villages and are working in towns and those who have completed high school education show far greater infiltration. Making an average of this we can describe the infiltration as follows. First, let us look at English, which forms the outer enclosure. A few words and phrases that have been acquired by Oriya have entered the tribal languages along with Oriya. Their presence is proportionate to the amount of Oriya acquired. Next comes Hindi, which forms the middle enclosure. A few words and phrases acquired by Oriya have also entered tribal languages along with Oriya, with direct inputs from Hindi films, which are seen occasionally in journeys to town. Last comes Oriya, which forms the inner enclosure. A fair bit of Oriya has been acquired and mixed with tribal languages to form a mixed language called Deshia (varying slightly in the different border regions of the state because of inputs from the languages of neighbouring states) with which the tribal people converse with outsiders, while they use their own language among themselves. Deshia has thus grown as a natural response of the tribal people to their environment. Yet, such are the nuances or mechanisms of the spread of languages that Deshia has infiltrated and substantially modified the colonizer’s language to the extent that the people of the region have begun deriving a distinct identity from it. This is the current situation. Let us now understand the dynamics of this acquisition or infiltration of alien languages. The terminology (acquisition or infiltration) depends upon which end we are viewing it from and what ideology we are carrying into the process. Whatever the terminology, the activity must be recognized as part of the process of diffusion. But this diffusion has complex inputs. In order to acquire something alien for which one has not only a basic or identity-driven resistance, but also a desire or

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compulsion, a complex process must be in operation. This process is driven through (1) propensities or desires (which are informed by need); (2) opportunity; and (3) the absence or presence of inhibitors in absorption or acquisition of the other’s culture, which may be politically described as colonial or imperialist overpowering or infiltration. I am here suggesting that political and cultural processes are entirely different and need radically different perceptions to unveil reality. To begin with, political readings are the application of set systems with predetermined dynamics, modalities, and goals, based on Marxist or other fundamentalist perceptions of society as fractured and of the modes of recovery as militant, whereas cultural processes are open-ended and ongoing exchanges where each juncture is a node of possibilities where directions are indeterminate. I see a culture as a text that is being written. To suggest that its textuality is a myth or is irrelevant is erroneous. To reduce a culture to a materialistic entity and then place it in the context of other such entities and dynamics is to truncate and then cannibalize it as Raymond Williams and the British cultural materialists have done (Williams 1980). The recognition of a culture in terms only of the play of power and discourse in the Foucauldian New Historicist way energized by Clifford Geertz’s inputs from social anthropology (1973: 4–5), or its placement in the context of other similar cultures or texts contemporaneous to it, in the manner of American New Historicism or Multiculturalism, is to ghettoize minority culture and its literature through minority aesthetics and other separatist/protective procedures. This is neo-imperialism in its most insidious form, denying minorities their rights in the mainstream. To return to language, we see that the tribal people’s propensity to acquire Oriya has been based on need, both cultural and economic. As the environment of the tribal people was being destroyed, survival was impossible without contact with the outer world. The dominant community had the tribal people in its economic and political power, setting them clearly apart with a perception of “us” and “them.” This brought in identity- and pride-driven inhibitors. However, the tribal people were drawn to those aspects of Deko culture that reached them, such as movies and music, even sharing the same enthusiasm for the same cult figures and the same box-office hits, using the same dialogue fragments and singing the same songs. This has nothing to do with economics, political aggrandizement, or materiality, nor does it set the tribe apart. On the other hand the tribe is integrated into the mainstream. Thus, the tribe’s acquisition of the Deko language here is a desired act in the integrative processes of culture. The divisive ideological perception may be that bourgeois pop art entrances the victim culture to forget its rightful material goals as a separate class and thus forgets the path of militancy. This is erroneous. Politico-economic goals are pursued separately and are in no way abandoned because of “bourgeois” or “capitalist” popular art. To assume that they are is to consider some people to be especially foolish and naïve. And to assume that materiality is the only quest of life would be insulting to humankind. I would

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go so far as to say that the different lifestyle our tribal people have developed is a powerful alternative to our own materialistic one. To impose ideology on them would be the worst form of neo-colonialism.

The Cultural Genetic Pool Here it may be necessary to distinguish the operational modalities of cultural from those of politico-economic processes. Let us take the case of the creation of Deshia by the tribal people as a response to the dominant group’s Oriya language. Over the years this Deshia has transformed Oriya in different regions into such distinct forms that the dominant groups of southern, northern, and western Orissa have begun speaking three distinct languages, which vehemently resist being described as dialects of Oriya. In other words tribal languages have taken over the Deko language, modified it, and given the region’s culture a separate identity. The overflow of this into the state’s political life is that the people of western Orissa (Sambalpur) not only want their language (Sambalpuri) to be recognized as separate, but also have started speaking of a separate state. They have stopped short of agitation in this matter only with the realization of the irony of the situation in that the separate state will have a tribal majority and their hegemony will be lost. Yet the basis on which they recognize their separate identity—their language—is a gift of the tribal people. It is, thus, clear to see the differences between political and cultural processes. Let me, here, give a more radical example of how a colonized culture can carnivalize the dominant group’s language out of use at the very time the dominant culture is colonizing it. By carnivalization I mean a process by which cultural materials are mixed in a creative cocktail that is acceptable to the people as their natural cultural growth. We shall take the example of a major Indo-European language of the ancient world, Sanskrit, with which the Indo-Aryans had marched into India 5,000 years ago and had started invading native cultures with the instruments of that powerful language and its products. As Sanskrit began spreading among a diversity of people, each culture group grabbed it, modified it, and created new languages of their own (Oriya, Assamese, Bengali, Hindi, etc.), which the colonizer was forced to use in that region. Soon Sanskrit ceased to be the colonizer’s language of parlance because everywhere he went there was another language in place. Thus, Sanskrit was reduced to the status of a classical language through the pathway of court language, language of scholarship, and the language of religious ritual. What happened to Latin as it spread through Europe is no different. One could describe this process in high-sounding phrases like “the empire writes back,”1 but that would be too political and too inappropriate to 1 I refer to the book edited by Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin (1989). Excellent as it is, it is too political in an old-fashioned way and therefore dated, along with its models, Marx, Foucault, Gramsci, etc. Moreover, the book has very little understanding of cultural processes.

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describe a natural cultural process, which may be described as feedback. When a loudspeaker is turned towards the microphone there is a hum that drowns the source input. That is feedback. In other words when the source language, instead of targeting the audience, begins addressing itself, the feedback will cut it out from the communication process. The audience will start its own noises and conversations. In the present situation the colonized people carnivalized and fed back the language to deaden the dominant group’s voice. In other words, even as the Indo-Aryan was establishing political hegemony, the colonized people were appropriating and carnivalizing its language. I do not choose to use “hybridity” because Bhabha uses it to describe a condition rather than a process (Bhabha 1985, 1994a, 1994b). In sociological terms it signifies a “black skin/white mask” situation. Bennett and Collits (1995) reinforce this concept in their interview with Bhabha. Other writers, like Ania Loomba (1998: 176–178), also use it in this manner. This is entirely different from what I mean by carnivalizaton. Moreover, Bhabha suggests that distortions in transmission are hybridizations peculiar to the colonial situation. For example, he says that the Bible is hybridized in the process of being transmitted to the natives of colonial India (Bhabha 1985). What he seems to forget is that any communication involves individual distortions. This has nothing to do with colonial discourse. What one says and what another understands have differences because of the inadequacies of the transference of the contents of the teller’s mind into language and the presences in the receiver’s mind. If this is hybridization, it is universal and is in no way endemic to the colonial situation. Moreover, to totalize these into “Indian,” “Chinese,” or “native” is an illogical exercise. There are many American and British hybridizations of the Bible, as there are Christian hybridizations. Such reading differences have produced many variant practices and faiths in Calvinism, Puritanism, Protestantism, Catholicism, etc. These have nothing to do with colonialism. Furthermore, to totalize them into national or ethnic quanta is political and racial, ultimately derived from divisive Marxist social philosophy or other such fundamentalist perceptions. Such practices are based on the nullification of the individual or the text that he is. Edward Said, on his part, uses hybridity in the sense of racial and cultural mix in a “mongrelized society” where “they are hybrids, they are impure” (Rajnath 2000: 84). Let me not comment on his use of “they.” Its import is self-evident. Nor is Spivak’s catachresis (Spivak 1987; Bal 1996) adequate to explain the process. Processes triggered by culture contacts have a kinetic procedure of their own which is determined by the situation independently of political and economic processes, rendering material goals irrelevant. They are not hegemony-directed but based on open interactions, depending on factors like numbers (taker-giver ratio), area of spread, diversity of linguistic presence in the area of spread and perceived future convenience, vibrancy of receiving cultures, tolerance of the colonizer, etc., leading to new formations. The politics of warfare do not operate here. Colonial perceptions may stand reversed.

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Even within a language changes take place so that it is rendered unrecognizable. The Old English of AD 600, in 500 years radically transformed itself into Middle English, which changed itself to the modern English of the sixteenth century. Now in the twenty-first century the “englishes” of the world are beginning to be articulated. This is true not only of language but of other aspects of culture as well. The Indo-Aryans came into India with a small pantheon of Vedic gods with Indra and Agni as the leading figures. The colonized people have given them several dozens more, with Indra now reduced to the position of a minor mythic figure and Agni no longer a god, with a religion ranging from animism and polytheism through monotheism to atheism. All these are now the simultaneous presences of Indian culture and the Indian mind. And all these have come from the colonized culture as a counter-flow to the IndoAryan cultural invasion. Inter-cultural transactions defy the paradigms of hegemony, colonialism, imperialism, power, and materiality. They take place in what may be called cultural genetic pools. Just as a gene released into the biological genetic pool, with its millions of years of encoding, plays with another of like complexity to create new forms from their many possibilities, so does a culture gene. Once injected into an interactive field it engages itself with the creative factors of another culture to generate new forms and paradigms. There is no politics here, no power play, and no preset material goal. Let us look at what happened to Marxism as it spread across the world into the midst of cultural polysemy. As it entered the political systems of many cultures, it was grabbed and modified into diverse forms of democratic socialism and thus was drained of both its modality and goal, so that it collapsed. Cultures can thus play the genetic game with politics.

Mythology and Counter-Colonialism Let us now look at cultural invasion in the field of mythology. The legends of the origin of these tribes reveal an “oeuvre” or task that is different and distinct from Judeo-Christian or Hindu models. Levinas suggests: “Instead of [the] Odyssey of Homer, in which Ulysses starts out in Ithaca and ends up in Ithaca, Levinas offers the story of Abraham who leaves his native land forever and travels towards a land yet unknown. The movement from the Self to the Other is what Levinas calls ‘l’oeuvre’—the task” (Valevicius 1988: 41). In the same way, Adam’s progeny, expelled from Eden, must forever wander to recover it. Rama, banished from his kingdom, must come back to it (the Ramayana). That is the enclosed claustrophobic oeuvre or task that defines them. But the vision of the Orissan tribes (especially of the Santals) is different. Their legends depict their tribe as moving forever into unknown territories, looking for new vistas, under nature’s compulsions or pressures of desire, through floods and fires of early times and the pursuing

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“Dekos”1 of the middle past up to the present times when they cannot move any farther. There are still small tribes like the Malhara, which refuse homesteading and continue to wander in the forests and hills in pursuit of nature’s vanishing bounties in fulfillment of their oeuvre. Their creation myths (especially that of the Santals) have an ancient semantic perfection unavailable to either the Judeo-Christian or Hindu myths, which, I suspect, are later formations and have borrowed from the former. Or, perhaps, they had all shared from a common ancient culture or information source. Even questions of sexual morality, the problem of incest of the primal pair and their children, have been tackled in the Santal myth with far greater ease, grace, and sense of humour, with nothing of the violence of the Greeks or the shame-culture glosses of the biblical story. The Saunties, endemic to the district of Keonjhar, tell a story of creation that is refreshingly original and different from the Santal story, tackling the same problems with equal ease, while using a snake in an entirely different way from the biblical one. The Saoras of southern Orissa tell the story of survival through a flood in an innovative way, far more rational and primitive than Noah’s ark. All these tribes describe an open-ended journey of which we shall take the Santal story as the prime model, since the rendering of this myth-legend is copious and well-preserved in the tribe’s ritual. Their story depicts the long, arduous journey of the tribe as the pursuit of their open destiny. Myths inform the very roots of consciousness: they inform the structures of complexes (Freud), they form the racial unconscious (Jung), they are the basic structures of experience (Campbell), and the primary nodes of cognition (Frye). Invading or infiltrating myths is an assault at the roots of a culture or consciousness. For our purpose we shall take the Santal creation myth and study it vis-à-vis Hindu and Christian creation myths to see if the double colonial infiltration has affected them. The story is as follows.2 At the beginning the earth was covered with water. No land was visible. Thakur Jiu (God) was lonely and wanted to create some creatures. So he 1 “Deko” is the word with which the Santals describe the non-tribal community which is depicted as pursuing them in the later phases of their eastward migration and taking over their new habitat, or at least breathing down their neck, which broke the isolation they cherished, thus compelling them to move into newer forests and hills to create their new world all over again. At the beginning it was peaceful: “They were living in the plains and we in the forests and on the hills. But afterwards we got very much fighting with the Dekos, until this day we have no happy relations with them. As soon as we have cleared the jungle in any country, the Dekos come and rob us of it” (Bodding 1925–29: 53). 2 I derive the story from Skrefsrud’s (1887) and Bodding’s (1925–29) depictions and from several recordings of mine made 120 years after Skrefsrud. Bodding’s collection was from the southern part of the state of Bihar, from the Ranchi region, using one main teller and one minor one. My collections from the northern districts of Orissa—Mayurbhanj and Keonjhar—are given by shamans as well as village narrators. I have also collected, from Keonjhar, a manuscript in Bengali script depicting in Santali language the entire narrative in its ritual presentation form. This ritual narrative or mantra is called “binti” by the Santals and is recited in important rituals like marriage.

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created fish, turtles, and other water creatures. Then he tried creating man but did not succeed, as the Day Horse (the Sun) trampled on them. So he created Hansa and Hansuli (a swan couple). But the swan couple complained that they had nowhere to sit or nest. Thakur Jiu thought the complaint to be valid and wanted to create land by bringing it up from the bottom of the ocean. So he called the water creatures and asked them (the fish, the tortoise, the lobster, etc.), in turn, if they could bring up the earth from the bottom of the ocean. Each one said, “If you say so, I’ll certainly try.” Each one dove to the bottom and brought up some earth in its mouth or on its back, but by the time it reached the surface the earth had washed off. Finally, these creatures suggested that jhilmoli, the earthworm, could do the trick. Thakur Jiu asked the earthworm, who said it could suck the earth and void it on the surface, but it first needed a firm surface to void it on. If the tortoise could be held steady on the surface, it could void the earth on its back. This was done, and soon earth started piling on the turtle’s back to form a solid land mass. Thakur Jiu then planted some trees. The swan pair now nested in the bushes and soon laid two eggs. When the eggs hatched, lo and behold, a man and a woman came out. These were the primal pair, Pilchu Budhi and Pilchu Budha. Thakur Jiu now said that these two must be taken to a more suitable place than this marshy land. The swan couple found such a place in Hihiri Pipiri and carried the two children there. Pilchu Budhi and Pilchu Budha grew up there in innocence. Thakur Jiu thought it was time to visit his people and see how things were working out. He taught them about cultivation and about certain wild grains. Then he gave them detailed instructions on how to prepare wine and stayed with them until the wine was made. Tasting it with satisfaction he left them in the evening. Pilchu Budhi and Pilchu Budha got drunk that night and went off to sleep together in their hut. Next morning when Thakur Jiu visited them they looked shamefaced and had covered parts of their bodies. Thakur Jiu reassured them and left happily. To Pilchu Budhi and Pilchu Budha were born seven girls and seven boys. To avoid their error, they separated the boys from the girls. The boys went hunting with the father, while the girls went gathering with the mother. Many days passed this way. One day, however, the parents let the children go by themselves. The 14 went out in their separate groups in different directions, but on their way back home in the evening they met in a grove and stopped to play a while. Soon they had paired off and had sex. Pilchu Budha and Pilchu Budhi forgave them, but now put them in seven separate rooms they built for them. They laid out exogamous rules for the future so that no marriages could take place within a family. Thus came into existence the seven septs or clans of the Santals. Another version of the narrative, recorded by me but not available in Bodding’s versions, handles the problem of incest slightly differently. The version runs like this. Pilchu Budhi and Pilchu Budha had kept the boys and girls separate with great care. But when they had grown up, finding that maintaining constant watch was not possible, they said, “You are big

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boys and girls now. It is time that you went out and explored the world and made out a life for yourselves. But since you are brothers and sisters you must go in opposite directions.” Next morning the children left in two groups and went away in different directions. Many years passed, but one day they met. But by then they had grown and changed. They could not recognize one another, but were delighted at finding human company after so many years. There was no stopping them now in their exuberant fulfillment. They now formed the seven families that became the original seven clans or septs. From this point in the story, in either version, the myth starts yielding to the legends of the tribe, its wanderings eastward, its devastation through a fire-storm, its resurgence into 12 clans, its eastward pursuit through mountainous country, its crossing a high mountain range and movement into the valleys and forests of India. With this the legend moves closer to history until it brings them to their present habitat pursued by the Dekos, Muslims, and Sahibs. It is the most complete myth-legend-history preserved through oral traditions to the present times that I have found to date. The Old and the New Testaments, in their broken way, or the genealogies of Indian epics or Puranas, in their fantasized ways, may be acceptable as poor seconds. The preservation of this myth-legend has been possible because the Santals have built this narrative into a quasidramatic form recited as the mantra at the main rituals of the tribe, on occasions like marriage and other cardinal functions. Expert shamans accompanied by a small chorus of refrain-singers do the reciting. My purpose in offering a summary of the myth segment of this narrative is to show two things. First, we see that, despite living among the IndoAryans for over 2,000 years as a “colonized” social group, the Santali mind has not been colonized by the Indo-Aryan myths of creation. There are several reasons for this, but the primary one seems to be an aesthetic or narrative or cultural one. A strong or good narrative is not distorted by a weak one, irrespective of the political power of the latter’s creators or advocates. There is no good, consistent, or interesting narrative of creation in Indian mythology. There are some philosophical-scientific ones in the Upanishads, the Mahabharata, Manu Sanghita, and the Samkhya Karika, but since they are not narrative they cannot compete in a battle of stories. The narrative ones are fragmentary and begin appearing later, in the Puranas. The strongest one among them is the Dasa Avatara,1 which strings together ten Puranic stories of the earth or mankind being saved by ten incarnations of God. And in this story the first incarnation of God is as fish to recover the Veda—the sacred book of human knowledge—from the bottom of the ocean where it had been thrown by a demon, and the second is an incarnation as turtle to hold up the earth when it was stolen and sunk 1 The best rendering of this dasa avatara (the ten incarnations of God to save mankind or the Indo-Aryan society) is in medieval poet Jayadeva’s rendering of it in his Sanskrit saga of Krishna’s loves, in Gita Govinda. The section of ten verses, dealing with dasa avataras, has become memorable as it is a part of the repertoire of every Odissi dancer.

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in the ocean by two demons. As we have seen, the fish and the turtle appear in the Santal myth of creation as the primary creatures that attempt to create the earth, and the turtle actually holds up the earth-mass. The story has the rugged natural logic of the primitive mind. The colonizer’s myth has not been able to distort the natural logic of the Santal myth. Nothing of the Vedas, the demon who stole it or the two demons who threw the earth in the ocean, has found entry. On the other hand, since the Dasa Avatara makes its appearance during medieval times, when stories are known to have travelled across regional and cultural boundaries, it is more than likely that segments of the Santal myth migrated to the dominant culture’s myth, which was rendered complex with the kind of Greco-Roman and Indo-Aryan mythic presences like demons, gods, and sundry other creatures including human beings who are involved in all sorts of situations. But the story has a thin narrative line, and, even today, educated Indians cannot tell it with any detail. In other words, the natural narrative logic of the Santal myth is stronger than that of the Indo-Aryan myth. That is why it has not been infiltrated. Likewise, despite 200 years of heavy missionary work among tribal people with a fair number of conversions in this area, nothing of the biblical myth of creation has penetrated the Santal story. Thakur Jiu does not create the world in six days. The entire narrative grid is different. The concept of a watery world is available in some North African myths, prominently available in Egyptian mythology, with Atum rising out of the water as the first landmass, and in the Indo-Aryan mythology, with the description of the original state of the earth as “pralaya prayodhi jala.”1 It is possible that these cultures shared the same source as the Santal. In biblical mythology the flood comes much later, in Noah’s time, perhaps inserted when the source was accessed, at a time when that community had conceptualized a cosmic moral order of crime and punishment. There is, however, a reference in Santal mythology to the proliferation of population and to society becoming corrupt, which become paradigms for certain kinds of results. In IndoAryan mythology it becomes the point at which God is reincarnated to save the world, similar to the New Testament concept of the birth of the Son of God for the same purpose. In terms of the Old Testament, however, this becomes the time when God destroys the world or parts of it through flood or fire. The Santals are closer to the Old Testament when they depict the earth being destroyed through a rain of fire. Here, however, unlike in Sodom and Gomorrah, a primal pair is saved (like Noah’s family) in a cave on Mount Harata (perhaps Mount Herat in present western Afghanistan). Clearly, while there was sharing of some source, there is no displacement of a formed mythic segment in the Santal myth by the biblical myths. Even the concept of sin is only marginally available. The point is that the political colonizer 1 It means: “post-‘end of the world’ primal water.” Ancient Indian thought postulates creation and destruction as cyclic. After every cycle, the universe or the earth is reduced to a watery plasma stage from which creation begins again.

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cannot colonize a culture. The modalities of cultural interactions are entirely different from the modalities and directions of political interactions or pathways of power and materiality. And when a myth gets encased in ritual, as in this case, it becomes especially invulnerable to arbitrary modifications.

Noah, Noah, Where Is Noah? Let me offer one little segment of one other creation story, coming this time from the Saora tribe living in the southern district of Gajapati.1 The segment we shall take is from the beginning. The Saoras also speak of a watery world at the beginning, but it is more like the biblical flood, because there are human survivors. Mankind must have been already created. Isar (God) was there and he had a bird (a crow in one tradition and a hawk in another). Isar was looking for survivors or visible land, so he kept sending out the bird every day (like Noah, from the Ark) to survey the expanse of water. The bird reported every evening that he had found nothing. Finally, one evening, the bird reported, “I saw nothing. No land, no men. But I found a floating sack of hide and you know what? Some sound was coming from inside it.” God became excited and asked the bird to go and look for it first thing the next morning. This was done, and the sack was towed to Isar. When Isar opened it, out came a boy and a girl, brother and sister. Apparently, when the earth was flooded the two thought it best to pack themselves into a watertight sack of hides, perhaps something like a Native American canoe with a skin of hide. This primal pair became the progenitor of mankind. It is clear to see that the Saora negotiates the flood in his own kind of ark, ignoring the invitation from the huge Ark of Noah, which was veering down on him. It is a rule of myths and folk-tales that they grow by addition of material borrowed from elsewhere, but never grow backward from a complex structure to a simple one. The complex biblical story could not have been stripped and then used in the form in which it exists among the Saora. It must have sailed its independent course. As stated before, there is no imperialism or colonialism in culture and no hegemony. Imperialism is the political condition of keeping alien territory and its populace under control with the use of military and other powers, so as to gain some military or economic advantage or to enjoy the satisfaction of expansionism or world domination. Colonialism, Marxism, and now Islamic fundamentalism tread the same path. Colonialism is slightly different from imperialism in that colonialism sees material or economic gain as the chief end and uses military, political, and other hegemonic procedures to maintain its advantage. Hegemony is supposedly the procedure by which a dominant group persuades a dominated group that something it suggests to be good 1 My collection. (Recorded in the field by me, my associate, Dr E. Raja Rao, professor of English, Berhampur University, and other members of my team; the collection, both tapes and their 17,000-page transcripts, rest with me and the Archives of Traditional Music of the University of Indiana at Bloomington, Indiana, US.)

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for them is actually good for them. Edward Said (1983: 12) suggests, quoting Gramsci, that hegemony “is the exercise of power through the consent of the ruled by incorporating and transforming their ideologies.” If that is hegemony, then all cultural exchange is hegemonic—in fact, all learning will be hegemonic. The modalities of power and politics are unavailable in natural cultural development, and their entry should be resisted. But let us also record emphatically that cultures exchange products; they assimilate concepts, lifestyles, and grow by that process. In the weekly barter market, called hata, at the foot of the Bonda hills in the Malkangiri district, the Bondas come from the hills with their roots, berries, hill vegetables, and herbs to exchange them for rice. Barter was our ancient system of exchange of culture products, and the hatas were the markets that gave us multicultural exposure, leading to recognition of worth, acceptance, and exchange. The 14-inch Bonda skirt now parades the streets of the metropolises of the world, and saris are beginning to appear in Bonda villages.1 This is as it should be. There is no imperialism in this and no hegemony. We have already seen how languages have grown by such received material, and the reception does not follow the dictates or directions of power exercises. Language learning is not “colonial,” “imperial,” or “hegemonic,” nor is it “mimicry.”2

Conclusion What I have been trying to say is that the time has come to cut us away from the bondage to materiality, ideology, and theory and to put our feet down on the earth. Cultures have inbuilt mechanisms and strengths to protect their essence, if they choose to do that. The choice must be theirs. It is they who must decide the path of their growth. Marx’s cry, “They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented,” fondly quoted by Said (1978, xiii), is an entirely erroneous concept. What can be done for those whom we think have been marginalized is to empower them to decide and act for themselves. Unless these minority groups are taken into confidence by the world bodies in terms of their dignity and difference, more and more social upheaval is bound to take place, and instead of a creative interaction between different cultures (Fukuyama 1999), there will be merely a clash of civilizations (Huntington 1998). Politics vandalizes the problem with divisive and disruptive philosophy. Aided by politics and abetted by ideology and fundamentalism, terrorist groups are beginning to appear among our tribal people, forcing them into patterns of behaviour alien to them. This is the worst form of neo-colonialism that not only disrupts but 1 The Bonda women even today wear their skirt and only beads on the upper part of their body; they are dignified and beautiful. 2 I have put these words in quotation marks in order to indicate the distortion they have undergone at the hands of ideology and theory.

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also destroys cultures, and it certainly will destroy them and render them unrecognizable, if it remains unchecked. What is obvious is that tribal people must be empowered to deal with the situation as they would think fit, according to their genius and in terms of their identity. Their empowerment, therefore, must involve the recovery of their identity, or what I have called earlier their textuality. This recovery of the text must involve the recovery of their myths, tales, legends, and lore into their memory, as much as they can afford or like to give competitive space to. This will facilitate the recovery of the knowledge and wisdom acquired through thousands of years of experience. It must also involve the revival of as much of their ritual, customs, ceremonies, festivals, songs, and dances as they would want to revive in their present circumstances, without feeling ashamed or abashed. The Deko can help by giving space and participating, rather than by marking that space off. Equally important as the recovery of the text is the reconstruction of the text in the contemporary environment. In other words, with recovered identity and pride, the tribes must re-enter the cultural genetic pool of the world and mate with lifestyles, customs, behaviour, practices, and languages of the world, as they would choose individuals. This pool, which has been dammed up and cut off from the world, must be reconnected with it so that cultural choices can recover their vibrancy, novelty, and play in a global field. These decisions may cut out new paths, provide bypasses, or turn directions. Take, for example, the problem of language as it makes a transition from the oral to written stage. The tribal language is hedged in by Oriya, Hindi, and English, in a country where English is the achiever’s language with which Indians make their way in the world. Now, instead of going to the state government’s Oriya schools where little English is taught, the tribal people may choose to access English medium schools, so that they can directly move into the empowered group. These are not impossible dreams and can be easily achieved by native resolve with the help of philanthropic groups and the government. In ten years’ time tribal teenagers will be on their way into the world, ahead of the Deko of their region. That would not be colonial enslavement, hegemony, or some such fine term. That would be empowerment. But the choice must be of the tribal people, or rather, of the individual. It is clear that the tribal people should be allowed to grow in their own ways, in the environment of their choice (perhaps their own natural one), and to cultivate their own cultural identity. Their civilization, rich in simplicity, thoughtfulness, and spontaneity, should be allowed to develop its own norms and values to contribute to the richness of global civilization through their difference. Perhaps we should listen to their hearts, step out to dance a jig with them, and let them grow whichever way they want to, living out their openended oeuvre. And then, perhaps, they can lead us out of our claustrophobic enclosure in consumerism and materiality, divisive politics, and violence.

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References Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Theory and Practice in Postcolonial Literatures. London: Verso. Arnold, Matthew. 1882; 1993. Culture and Anarchy and Other Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. 1989. The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Postcolonial Literatures. London: Routledge. Bal, Mieke. 1996. “Semiotic Elements in Academic Practices.” Critical Inquiry 22,3 (Spring): 583–84. Bennett, David, and Terry Collits. 1995. “Postcolonial Critic: Homi K. Bhabha interviewed by David Bennett and Terry Collits.” In Literary India: Comparative Studies in Aesthetics, Colonialism and Culture, ed. Patrick Colm Hogan and Lalita Pandit. Albany, NY: Sate University of New York Press. 237–53. Bhabha, Homi K. 1985. “Signs Taken for Wonders: Question of Ambivalence and Authority Under a Tree outside Delhi, May 1817.” Critical Inquiry 12: 144–65. Bhabha, Homi K. 1994a. The Location of Culture. New York: Routledge. Bhabha, Homi K. 1994b. “Remembering Fanon; Self, Psyche and the Colonial Condition.” In Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory, ed. P. Williams and L. Chrisman. New York: Columbia University Press. 112–23. “Binti: Santal Story of Creation and Legend of their History.” Manuscript acquired by author from Keonjhar in Orissa, 1999. Bodding, Paul Olaf. 1925–29. Santal Folktales. Oslo: Institututtet for Sammenlignende for Skring. Fukuyama, Francis. 1999. The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order. New York: Free Press. Geertz, Clifford. 1973. Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. Huntington, Samuel P. 1998. Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster. Loomba, Ania. 1998. Colonialism/Postcolonialism. London: Routledge. Rajnath. 2000. “Edward Said and Postcolonial Theory.” Journal of Literary Criticism 9: 73–87. Said, Edward. 1978. Orientalism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Said, Edward. 1983. The World, the Test and the Critic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Skrefsrud (Rev.). 1887. “Hor Koren Mare Hapram Ko Reak Katha” (Tales of Ancestors). Oslo: Oslo University Ethnographic Museum. Spivak, Gayatri C. 1987. “Sex and History in The Prelude (1805): Books IX to XIII.” In Post-Structuralist Readings of English Poetry, ed. Richard Machin and Christopher Norris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 193–226. The Tribes of Orissa. 1990. Bhubaneswar, Harijan and Tribal Welfare Department, Government of Orissa. Valevicius, Andreus. 1988. From the Other to the Totally Other: The Religious Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. New York: Peter Lang. Williams, Raymond. 1980. Problems of Materialism and Culture: Selected Essays. London: Verso.

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Index

A Aguilar, Delia, 212–14 Alojamiento, Sheilfa B., ix, 12, 148 American film industry. See motion picture industry anti-globalization protest movements, 4, 9, 22, 127–28 Asia. See also East Asian countries; South Asia cyber-activism, 129 ICT market, 78, 117 Internet, 118, 120, 125, 127, 129 Asian Development Bank (ADB), 193–94, 196, 200 Asian Values debate, 56–57, 204 assimilation, 293–94, 297 Association of Progressive Communications (APC). See cyber-activism audiovisual goods and services, 94, 96–97. See also motion picture industry importance to US economy, 98 international trade rules, 101, 107 Australia, 23, 179, 181–82, 186 Indigenous people, 279–81 Australian Resources International (ALRI), 198–99 autoethnographies, 266, 292 B Basic Simple English (BSE) Bad Simple English, 234, 240 Benton, Lauren, 280–81 biodiversity, 258–59 blockbusters. See under motion picture industry Bologna Declaration, 60, 68, 167, 175 Bourdieu, Pierre, 4–5, 26 brainwashing, 20, 27 Britain. See United Kingdom Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 8 Grand Chessboard, The, 7, 23 Buddhism, 31, 35–37, 39, 41–42 challenge to Christianity, 40 influence in the West, 44 BUND (German Association for the Protection of Man and Nature), 240, 242 Bush, George W., 21–23, 66, 137–38

C Canada, 23, 277 Indigenous people, 279–81 capitalism, 25–27, 38, 75, 81, 154, 157, 160–61 capital financing, 116 industrial, 38, 53 propagation of, 77, 82 carnivalization, 14, 266, 302, 306–7 Carus, Paul, 42, 44 Catholicism, 31, 33–36, 216 censorship, 102, 126 Internet, 120–23, 125, 127, 129 children’s rights, 217–18 AIDS orphans, 259 starvation, 260–61 China, 57, 115, 120 e-government, 116 Internet, 117–18, 121–22, 126 Christianity, 33–34, 40, 44–46, 73. See also Catholicism evangelism, 45–46, 52 fundamentalist, 31 post-Christian society, 45 Protestants, 38 cinema. See motion picture industry civil society, 86, 144, 191, 205, 208 civil society movement, 211, 215–16 Classen, Elvira, ix, 12, 79 climate change, 250–52, 258 Club of Rome, 13, 245 colonialism, 270, 280, 297, 313 and assimilation, 293–94 British “settler societies,” 280–82 counter-colonialsim, 308 cultural inheritance of, 27, 54 discourses on, 190, 290–92, 299 and the geopolitics of domination, 292 modern, 52 neo-colonialism, 306, 314 NGO colonialism, 47 nineteenth century colonialism, 52, 58 persistence of, 274–75 commercial presence (GATS regulation), 169–70, 178, 180, 184, 186

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318 ][ Cultural Imperialism commodification of education, 12, 68, 148, 167–88 of farming, 257 of governance, 199 of law and ethics, 12, 148, 192, 197–207 common good, 65 European legacy of, 26 communism, 20, 161, 211 competition laws, 104 “essential facilities doctrine,” 105–6 computer industries. See information and communication technology (ICT) consumption abroad (GATS regulation), 169, 172, 178–79, 184, 186 content industries. See audiovisual goods and services; motion picture industry copyright and trademark protection. See intellectual property protection standards creation myths, 309–13 cross-border educational services. See under education cultural diversity, 93, 101, 107, 220, 233, 235 motion picture industry, 11, 78, 102–3, 106, 111 cultural imperialism, 5–9 consciousness industry, 2, 23, 262 definitions, 3–4, 25, 267 historical development, 11, 31–49 and law, 280–82 “Cultural Treatment” (proposed), 109 culture, 305 commercialization of, 85, 88–89 cultural genetic pool, 306–8, 315 fabricated, 293–94 hierarchy of, 53, 58 inbuilt mechanisms to protect essence, 301, 313–14 local, 82–83 multicultures, 83 reverse cultural flows, 31, 39–45 Culture and Imperialism (Said), 13, 290 cyber-activism, 78, 117, 119–20, 123, 127–30, 132 censorship, 120–22, 125–26 cyber universities, 178 D Dalai Lama, 57 death (different perceptions of), 260–61 debt crisis. See under World-III democracy, 22, 54, 56, 70, 100, 192 current concepts of, 32 e-democracy, 128, 130 suppression of indigenous initiatives, 208 Denglish, 225–27, 231, 233–34, 238–40 deregulation, 25, 83, 120, 148, 167, 197, 249 Deshia (mixed language), 304, 306 developing countries, 54, 56, 147, 155. See also Third World; World-III governance systems, 191, 193 structural adjustment programs, 74, 193, 195, 197, 202, 204, 245–46, 249 development, 32, 55, 57–58, 195, 198 communitarian approach, 204

role of the state, 205 DFID (Department for International development of the Government of the United Kingdom), 193–94, 196, 200 Dieter, Hermann H., ix, 12–13, 220 “digital capitalism,” 11, 114 discourses on colonialism, 290–92 D’Orta, Garcia, 37, 39 Dussel, Enrique, 13, 265–66, 291 on culture and colonialism, 292–94 E e-democracy, 128, 130 e-government, 78, 115–17 e-mobilization efforts. See cyber-activism Earth Summit (Rio de Janeiro), 235, 244 East Asian countries, 115, 119 eco-imperialism, 12, 244–62 ecological crisis. See global problématique economic liberalization, 193, 197, 200, 204, 207 education, 24, 26, 47, 153, 171, 244, 249 commodification of, 12, 68, 148, 167–88 cross-border educational services, 68, 167–68, 178–79, 181–84, 186 deregulation, 148, 167, 178 subsidies, 167 university reform (Germany), 32, 60, 67 virtual university, 178 vocational training and university education, 185 Western cultural dominance, 5, 68, 75 employment, full, 150, 152–53 English language, 102, 223, 234, 303–4 dominance of, 12, 219, 227, 235 educational services, 178, 184 Internet, 130, 225–26 Enlightenment, 32–33, 53, 57, 151, 156 entertainment industries, 226, 230. See also motion picture industry environmental destruction, 25, 249. See also global problématique close relationship with cultural erosion, 234 ethical imperialism, 198 European Learning Area. See Bologna Declaration European Parliament (EP), 77, 86–87, 89–90 European Union (EU), 11, 82, 84–85, 87, 175, 223 Common Agricultural Policy, 187 cultural exchange with Muslim countries, 24 educational services, 148, 167 GATS commitments, 172, 174, 185, 188 “Horizontal” exceptions to GATS commitments, 173–74, 186–87 internal cultural domination, 78, 89–90 media and cultural policies, 86–87, 89, 175 regional integration treaties, 169 representational politics, 77, 80, 85, 90 as social and cultural organization, 77, 80, 85 Television Without Frontiers, 94 treatment of third-party countries, 169, 175, 177, 183

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Index ][ 319 F Falun Gong, 125–26 Fanon, Frantz, 24, 265, 272, 274, 290 Wretched of the Earth, The, 13, 291 feminism, 12, 148, 211–12, 215–17. See also gender; women Fischer, Joschka, 22, 223 Fitzpatrick, Peter, 267–68, 271, 279, 281 flattening of identities, 55–56 Foucauldian New Historicist way, 305 Foucauldian notion of governmentality, 267–69, 273–74, 276–79, 290 France, 22–23, 82 “cultural exception” for films, 101 French language preservation law, 228, 231 Fraser, Matthew, 5–7 G G8 countries, 23, 82, 128 GABRIELA, 212, 216 Galtung, Johan, 1, 4, 27–28, 73 GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services), 12, 97, 167 cinema under, 107–8 dispute settlement understanding, 170 educational services under, 68, 148, 167–68, 175–76, 181–82, 186 modes of supply, 168–69 most-favoured nation treatment, 107–8, 169, 172 national treatment, 107–8, 169–70, 172 public services under, 171 sovereignty clause, 171–73 Working Party for Domestic Regulation, 174 GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), 82 gender, 89, 213–14, 276. See also feminism; women in colonial societies, 269, 273 and environment movement, 217 German language, 224, 230, 236, 238–39 Americanization of, 222, 225, 228–29 in EU, 223 Germann, Christophe, ix, 11–12, 78 Germany, 22–23, 25, 82, 234 American cultural imperialism, 1, 18–20, 225 education sector, 32, 60, 67, 172, 175 linguistic disengagement, 227–30 university reform, 32, 60, 67 university services abroad, 179, 185 global problématique, 13, 75, 220, 245–46 globalization, 1, 3–5, 12, 33, 52, 57, 70, 84, 97, 148, 227 mainly Western goals of, 81, 192 GMOs (genetically modified organizations), 70 good governance, 25, 191, 194, 198, 201, 206, 246 as civilizing mission, 207 cultural imperialist nature of, 192–93, 197, 202–3, 208 foreign capital and, 200 linked to market forms of development, 207 neo-liberal models of, 148, 195 Western conceptions of, 5, 26

Goonatilake, Susantha, x, 11, 25, 28, 31 governmentality, 267–69, 273, 276–79 Grand Chessboard, The (Brzezinski), 7, 23 Great Depression, 150, 152, 154, 158, 261 “green revolution,” 74, 256 greenhouse effect, 250, 256, 260 H Hamm, Bernd, x, 11, 13, 32, 220 Harris, Douglas, 272, 274 Hayek, Friedrich, 12, 147, 149–50, 157–59, 162–63 collectivist traits, 161 health, 24, 47, 171, 244, 249, 259 national health systems, 153 “hearts and minds” campaign, 79, 136–37 in Arab and Islamic World, 136–37, 140–43 Hindi language, 304 Hinduism, 31, 40, 44 Hollywood. See motion picture industry Hong Kong e-government, 116 ICT literacy training, 116 Internet control, 122–23 human rights, 53–54, 70, 191–92, 203, 205, 233 Asian values and, 56–57 freedom of expression and opinion, 93, 110, 112 Western conceptions of, 5, 26, 32 humanities. See also social sciences cultural development and, 149–50 neo-liberal attack on, 151, 154, 160–61, 165n1 hunger, 244, 246, 256–57, 259 Hussein, Saddam, 12, 19, 142 I ICT. See information and communication technology (ICT) illiteracy, 120, 244, 246, 250 IMF. See International Monetary Fund (IMF) imperialism, 24, 32, 54, 270, 294, 301, 313 American, 19 counter-imperialism, 301 cyber-imperialism, 130 eco-imperialism, 12, 244–62 ethical, 198 European, 270 neo-imperialism, 305 India, 120, 202, 206, 280 Centre for Good Governance, 194 commodification of law and ethics, 148, 192 film distribution, 105 poverty, 257 Indigenous peoples, 265, 277, 279–80 customary laws, 268, 282 debate over legal status, 281–82 individualism, 26, 159–60, 162–63 information and communication technology (ICT), 3, 11, 78, 114–17, 121, 131, 230 use in social development, 128 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), 86, 89 information warfare, 138–39, 142 demilitarization, 79, 143–44 intellectual property protection standards, 103–5, 108, 112

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320 ][ Cultural Imperialism International Monetary Fund (IMF), 25, 82, 128, 155, 197, 274 structural adjustment policy (SAP), 24, 74, 193, 195, 197, 202, 204, 245–46, 249 international trade rules. See GATS; World Trade Organization Internet, 3, 7, 78, 116, 131, 178. See also information and communication technology (ICT) control, 120–23, 125, 127, 129 English language dominance, 130, 225–26 as political instrument, 127 social mobilization, 130 users, 117–18, 120, 124, 131 Internet activism. See cyber-activism Iraq, 12 media, 143 war against, 3, 21–23, 140, 142 Islam, 22–23, 33, 57, 73 J Japan, 23, 55–56, 82, 115, 181 e-government, 124–25 e-politics, 124 Internet use, 124 K Keynesian economic policies, 25, 147, 150, 152, 154, 156 Kosova War, 138–40, 143 Kumar, Vidya, 273, 275–76 Kyoto Protocol, 252 L Lai, On-Kwok, x, 11, 78 language, 5, 26–27, 101, 184, 304, 314–15. See also linguistic diversity; linguistic imperialism blending, 235 changes, 307–8 complex cultural and “social” products, 222, 236 entertainment industry, 226 extinction, 234–35, 241 as genocultural code, 235, 237 as instrument of power, 223 key to identity of a people, 304 monolingualism, 13, 233 multilingualism, 236 natural language evolution, 230 Pali language, 36, 40, 42 philology, 37, 40 Sanskrit, 40, 42, 306 as self-regulating, 228 Sinhalese language, 40 suppression of indigenous speech, 223 tribal languages, 303–5 language preservation laws, 227–28, 230–31 language protection, 235–37, 241, 303 Latin America, 33, 292 law, 198, 270 as agent of cultural imperialism, 265, 267–83 competition law, 104–6 and governmentality, 279 and Indigenous people, 279–80

international (See GATS; World Trade Organization) post 9/11, 21–22 postcolonial legal studies (PLT), 273, 275–76 postmodern view of, 268 rule of law, 97, 192, 196, 280 law and ethics, 13 commodification, 12, 148, 192, 197–207 legal pluralism, 268–70 linguistic diversity, 13, 233 connection with ecological diversity, 220, 234 linguistic imperialism, 12, 130, 222, 225–32 Anglo-American, 223–24, 227, 230 literacy, 36, 120, 244, 246, 250 M Mach, Ernst, 43–44 machinism, 296 replacing “value” with “profit,” 295 mainstream pro-growth model, 128–29 Majors. See under motion picture industry MAKIBAKA, 212–13 Manoochehri, Abbas, xi, 13, 73, 265–66 market economies, 25–26, 94, 102, 205 marketing tax (proposed), 109–10, 112 Marshall Plan, 19–20 media, 2, 5, 26–27, 56, 58, 61, 79, 84, 86–87, 260, 262 American dominance, 77, 81, 85, 88, 90, 230 conglomerates, 83, 88 destruction of enemy’s, 143 private interests in, 83, 87–88, 94, 110 propaganda, 23, 25 public service broadcasters (PSBs), 88, 90 radio, 46, 141–42 state intervention, 93 treatment of science, 65 “war imagery,” 138 media imperialism, 4, 10–11, 80–81, 136–44, 303 Merry, Sally, 268–69, 272–73 methodological individualism, 147, 150, 157–58 modernity, 294–95 modernization, 27, 58, 296–97 Mohammed, Mahathir, 56–57, 204 most-favoured nation treatment (GATS regulation), 108, 169, 172 “Most Favourite Culture” (proposed), 109 motion picture industry, 11, 175 American, 78, 93, 100, 105, 110 blockbusters, 95–96, 98, 102, 104, 106, 108, 110 co-production agreements, 107 cultural diversity, 78, 95, 99–103, 111 distribution structures, 96, 101, 111 entertainment or culture?, 97–98, 100 international trade rules, 97, 101, 108 language, 101–2 local production, 94 Majors, 93, 96, 100–101, 105–7, 111 marketing tax (proposed), 109–10 state intervention, 93 MusicTelevision (MTV), 82

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Index ][ 321 Muslims, 4, 38, 141 mythology and counter-colonialism, 308–13 N NAFTA cultural goods under, 85–86 Nandy, Ashis, xi, 11, 28, 32 national treatment (GATS regulation), 107, 169–70, 172 natural resources, 205, 246. See also ecoimperialism; environmental destruction neo-classical theory, 153–54, 158–59 neo-colonialism, 54, 306, 314 neo-conservatism. See neo-liberalism neo-Darwinism, 165 neo-imperialism, 305 neo-liberal coercive state, 161–65 neo-liberalism, 3, 5, 12, 25–26, 32, 71, 128, 147–51, 154, 159–60, 261–62 as counter-enlightenment, 155–56 as cultural imperialism, 164 ecological consequences, 220, 245 neo-liberal social contract, 161–62 New Politics, 119–20 New Zealand, 179, 181–82, 186 Indigenous people, 279–81 NGOs, 205 colonialism, 47 e-mobilization efforts, 119 environmental, 129 foreign-funded, 31, 45, 47–48 non-accountability, 202 Philippines, 213, 215, 217 9/11 attack, 3, 12, 23, 79, 136, 142, 260 oppressive legislation following, 21–22 O OECD countries, 127, 178–79 oil, 21 P Parthasarathy, D., xi, 12, 148 participation, 196, 199, 201–3, 205–6 pharmaceutical industries, 70, 258 Philippines family, 216 Iberian invasion, 34 national democratic liberation movement, 211 post revolutionary era, 213, 215, 217 women’s movement, 128, 148, 211–17 Phillipson, Robert, 226–27 political activism, 117–18. See also cyber-activism political imperialism, 24, 301 Popper, Karl, 61, 158 postcolonial legal studies (PLT), 273, 275–76 postcolonial theory, 13, 28, 265, 267, 269–70, 280–81, 291, 299 double disenchantment, 291–92 North American historical context, 272 postmodernism, 33, 45, 268 poverty, 24, 120, 191, 193, 195, 197, 248–49 precautionary principle, 100 presence of natural persons (GATS regulation), 169, 172, 180, 185–86 private property, 162, 295–96

private/public separation, 200–201 private sector, 5, 86, 205 media, 87–88, 94, 110 privatization, 25, 83–84, 167, 249 propaganda, 19, 22–23, 25, 28–29, 73, 140–41 Psychological Operations (PsyOps), 139–40, 142 Public Affairs (PA), 139–40, 142 public censorship, 94, 110 Public Diplomacy, 139–40 Purdy, Jeannine, 273–74 R Reagan, Ronald, 246 redistribution, 25, 206 reformism, 154, 156, 158 return to the self, 298–99 reverse cultural flows, 31, 39–44 shift toward Asia, 45 S Said, Edward, 28, 40, 272, 296, 307 Culture and Imperialism, 13, 290 Sarikakis, Katharine, xi, 11, 77 Sauer, Gustav W., xii, 13, 220 Scherrer, Christoph, xii, 12, 148 Schiller, Herbert, 1, 3–6, 8, 10, 81, 267 Schui, Herbert, xii, 12, 147, 245 science, 11, 26, 71–73 Americanization of, 32, 60, 67 association with power, 60, 64–65, 70 as identical to technology, 69 ideology of, 61–69 knowledge and, 61, 74 manipulation of public opinion, 72 nature and, 72–74 as objective and value-free, 60, 62–63, 65, 74 as a social institution, 64 in universities, 64 Western cultural dominance, 5, 32, 69, 74 Sen, Amarta, 194, 205–6 Shari’ati, Ali, 14, 265–66, 291, 294–99 concept of “the intellectual,” 298–99 Singapore, 115 e-government, 116 Internet control, 121 Smandych, Russell, xii, 13, 265 Smith, Adam, 151, 158, 261 social classes, 162–63 permanent underclass, 131 Social Darwinism, 26–27, 245, 261 social sciences, 2, 32, 71, 150. See also humanities soil degradation and desertification, 244, 255–56 South Asia, 39, 43–44, 57 HIV, 259 South Asian medicine, 37, 44 South East Asia HIV, 259 Internet users, 127 South Korea, 119 e-government, 115 Internet control, 123 Internet users, 115

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322 ][ Cultural Imperialism Spain, 24, 33, 38 Sri Lanka, 34–36, 39, 41, 43 Christianization, 46 cultural richness, 37 foreign funded NGOs, 47–48 Protestant-Catholic clash, 38 “state capture” by elites, 193, 197, 206 statistical analyses, 61–62, 66, 71–72 structural adjustment programs. See under developing countries subsidies and quotas, 94, 102, 104–5, 163, 173–75, 186–87 sustainability, 60, 66, 119, 129, 258 socio-cultural component, 240 socio-ecological, 131 T Taiwan ICT production sector, 115 Internet use, 125 technology, 69–70. See also information and communication technology; science Television Without Frontiers Directive (TVWF), 87–88, 94 terrorism, 4, 21–22, 245. See also “war against terror” Thatcher, Margaret, 25, 246 Theosophy, 41–42 Think global, speak local, 242, 246 Third World, 274, 296–97. See also developing countries; World-III trade unions, 25, 53, 153–54 transnational corporations, 24, 33, 84, 249 transparency, 170, 174, 177, 186, 192, 194, 196, 199 Tripathy, Biyot K., xiii, 14, 266 TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), 107–8, 168 U unemployment, 24, 131, 249 UNESCO, 81, 100, 194–95, 199, 238 United Kingdom, 11, 25, 38, 82 anti-war sentiments, 24 university study programs abroad, 179 United Nations, 80, 255 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 193–96 United States, 6, 11, 25, 82, 179, 181–83, 186 anti-war sentiments, 24 brave hero image, 20 disrespect for other cultures, 21 hard-liner against climate agreements, 251–52 Internet users, 127 Marshall Plan, 19–20 National Security Strategy, 22–23 positive image in postwar Germany, 18–19 protectionism (media and cultural industries), 86, 89 as Rogue State, 2, 20 “soft power,” 1, 5–7 wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, 3, 21–23, 140, 142 university reform, 32, 60, 67 Uruguay Round, 68, 107, 168, 175, 180

V Verein Deutsche Sprache (VDS), 228, 231 Vilmar, Fritz, xiii, 12, 219–20 Voice of America (radio), 46, 141 voluntary sector, 53. See also NGOs W Wacquant, Loic, 4–5 “war against terror,” 12, 21, 28–29, 74–75, 79, 136–37, 139–41 Washington Consensus, 24, 245 water shortage and water conflicts, 244, 252–55 welfare state, 25, 150–51, 153 White Man’s Burden, 38–39, 207 women, 36, 122, 137, 202, 250. See also feminism; gender women’s movement of the Philippines, 12, 148, 214–17 historical background, 212 in Nationalist democratic struggle, 211–13 World Bank, 193, 195–97, 206, 249 good governance models, 194, 199 World-I, 244–45 World-II, 244–45 World-III, 245, 256, 259. See also developing countries; Third World debt crisis, 246, 248–50 mega-cities, 244, 247, 254 poverty, 249, 257 World Trade Organization (WTO), 78, 82, 95, 130, 168, 202 cultural goods negotiations, 85, 89, 97, 101 World Wide Web, 117, 129 Wretched of the Earth, The (Fanon), 13, 291 Y Yew, Lee Kuan, 57, 204 Young, Robert, 270–71, 296