Crisis, Austerity and Transnational Party Cooperation in Southern Europe: The Radical Left's Lost Decade [1 ed.] 9783031391507, 9783031391514

Citation preview

Crisis, Austerity and Transnational Party Cooperation in Southern Europe The Radical Left’s Lost Decade Vladimir Bortun

Crisis, Austerity and Transnational Party Cooperation in Southern Europe

Vladimir Bortun

Crisis, Austerity and Transnational Party Cooperation in Southern Europe The Radical Left’s Lost Decade

Vladimir Bortun Department of Social Policy and Intervention University of Oxford Oxford, UK

ISBN 978-3-031-39150-7 ISBN 978-3-031-39151-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39151-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Maram_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

To Leon and Rubi: another world is possible, another world is needed.

Acknowledgements

This book is a considerably revised and, hopefully, improved version of my Ph.D. thesis, which I submitted and defended in 2019 at the University of Portsmouth. Thus, I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Wolfram Kaiser for being the helpful, dedicated and open supervisor that he was in those three and a half years. His consistently thorough, insightful and prompt feedback made my research project incommensurably better than it would have been otherwise. I want to also thank Professor Karen Heard-Lauréote, Dr. Nora Siklodi and Dr. Angela Crack for their encouragement and support prior to and throughout my Ph.D., as well as my Ph.D. colleagues at the time Andy Waterman and Milan Kreuschitz-Markoviˇc for their friendship. I am also grateful to Ambra Finotello from Palgrave Macmillan for supporting the book proposal and the anonymous peer reviewer who endorsed it while making very insightful and helpful suggestions. Special thanks go also to Geetha Chockalingam from Springer Nature for her prompt communication and flexibility throughout the whole process of writing and editing this book. Last but not least, I wish to thank my family back home in Romania, my late mother Melania, my father Titi and my sister Ileana, for supporting me in more ways than I can think of. Most importantly, I am grateful to my wife and best friend Nicola, without whose love, support,

vii

viii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

trust and patience all this would have been an infinitely harder experience. Finally, many thanks to all my comrades from various places for the discussions and struggles that have informed many of the ideas that underlie this book.

Contents

1

Introduction Research Puzzle State of the Literature Transnational Party Cooperation in the EU Radical Left Parties in the EU Today Transnational Party Cooperation on the Radical Left Data, Methods, Case Selection Structure of the Book References

2

United We Stand? European Integration and Radical Left Transnational Cooperation Radical Left Party Cooperation Before 1989: Communist and Allies Group Renewed Party Cooperation in the EP After 1989: The Left Group Late at the Party: The European Left Party A Network of Networks: Transform Europe Disobedient Euroscepticism: Plan B for Europe References

1 6 10 10 15 18 20 23 25 37 37 43 45 51 53 56

ix

x

CONTENTS

3

The Storm After the Calm: Crisis, Austerity and Political Turmoil in Southern Europe Neoliberalism, the Eurozone Crisis and the “Austerity Consensus” The Crisis in Greece The Crisis in Portugal The Crisis in Spain Summary References

4

5

The Rise and Stagnation of the Radical Left in Southern Europe: SYRIZA, Bloco, Podemos SYRIZA Origins Organisation and Linkages Programme Strategy SYRIZA in Government Bloco Origins Organisation and Linkages Programme Strategy Podemos Origins Organisation and Linkages Programme Strategy Summary References “We Shall Overcome”: Transnational Party Cooperation in Times of Crisis “To Appear as Allied with Them”: Bilateral Party Relations SYRIZA-Bloco SYRIZA-Podemos Bloco-Podemos “The Influence … Doesn’t Go Outside”: The Left Group in the EP “It’s Purely Formal”: The European Left Party

61 62 67 70 72 75 76 83 84 84 86 88 91 94 101 101 102 104 107 109 109 111 114 116 119 121 131 132 133 144 154 158 165

CONTENTS

“It’s to Get Together and Discuss the Future”: Plan B for Europe Discussion References 6

7

Cooperation by Proxy: Political Foundations, Social Movements and Intellectual Networks “Not That Important”: Political Party Foundations and the Transform Network Nicos Poulantzas Institute (SYRIZA) CUL:TRA (Bloco) Republic and Democracy Institute (Podemos) Transform “More De-mobilised Than Ever”: The Role of Social Movements Before the Crisis: The Era of the Social Forums Times of Crisis: The Anti-Austerity Movement(s) and the AlterSummit “Only Personal Links”: Academic and Intellectual Networks SYRIZA’s Academics Bloco’s Academics Podemos’ Academics Transnational Connections Wider Cooperation Among Left Intellectuals Summary References A Lost Decade: Incentives and Challenges for Transnational Party Cooperation Incentives: Why Cooperation Did Increase Need for Publicity and Legitimacy Opposition to Neoliberalism & Similar Views of the EU and the Crisis Europeanisation of Politics & the EU’s Management of the Crisis Similar Economic Contexts Strategic Coordination Obstacles: Why Cooperation was Underwhelming Primacy of National Politics & Limited Influence Over EU Policy Lack of a Transnational Social Basis

xi

170 174 180 185 187 188 190 196 198 206 208 212 221 222 226 228 230 233 238 241 249 250 252 253 255 257 258 260 261 264

xii

CONTENTS

Different Views on the EU Lack of Resources Recommendations: What Is To Be Done? Summary References

266 269 270 274 276

Conclusion

281

Annex: List of Interviewees

289

Bibliography

293

Index

327

Abbreviations

AKEL ANEL CAG CUL:TRA DIMAR EC ECB ELP ENA EP ESF EU GJM GUE/NGL IMF IU KKE KKE-es LFI MEPs MPs ND NPI NPM PAH

Progressive Party of Working People (Cyprus) Independent Greeks Communist and Allies Group Cultural Cooperative of Labour and Socialism Democratic Left Party (Greece) European Commission European Central Bank European Left Party Institute for Alternative Policies (Greece) European Parliament European Social Forum European Union Global Justice Movement Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left International Monetary Fund Izquierda Unida [United Left] Greek Communist Party (Exterior) Greek Communist Party—Interior La France Insoumise [France Unbowed] Members of the European Parliament Members of (National) Parliament New Democracy Party (Greece) Nicos Poulantzas Institute “Now, the People!” Movement Platform for People Affected by Mortgages xiii

xiv

ABBREVIATIONS

PASOK PCE PCF PCI PCP PES PP PRC PS PSOE RDI RLPs RLS SGPs SYN TPC UCM UP USFI WSF YoB YoS

Panhellenic Socialist Party Communist Party of Spain French Communist Party Italian Communist Party Portuguese Communist Party Party of European Socialists Popular Party (Spain) Communist Refoundation Party Socialist Party (Portugal) Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party Republic and Democracy Institute Radical Left Parties Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Stability and Growth Programmes Synaspismos Transnational Party Cooperation Complutense University of Madrid Unidas Podemos [United We Can] United Secretariat of the Fourth International World Social Forum Youth of Bloco Youth of SYRIZA

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 5.1

Table 6.1 Table 6.2

Table 6.3

Table 6.4 Table 6.5 Table 6.6 Table 6.7 Table 6.8

Average electoral scores of RLPs in EU countries, 1980–2000 Overall average vote for main RLPs in the Eurozone before and after the start of the Eurozone crisis The Niedermayer model adapted to bilateral transnational relations among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos during the crisis, 2009–2019 International events with NPI as the main organiser between 2010 and 2019 Sessions from RDI summer/autumn schools with speaking guests from SYRIZA/NPI or Bloco/ CUL:TRA Transform events with participation from SYRIZA/NPI, Bloco/CUL:TRA or/and Podemos/RDI between 2009 and 2019 included Transform events with an explicit focus on Southern Europe during the 2010s SYRIZA academics in the 1st Tsipras cabinet with international academic experience SYRIZA academics in the 2nd Tsipras cabinet with international academic experience Bloco academics in prominent political positions Podemos academics with ties to UCM

3 6

179 191

198

201 204 224 225 227 229

xv

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

No political success in a single European country can be sustainable if it is not followed, within a short time, by similar successes in other countries. A progressive island in a reactionary archipelago is a thing of the past. Haris Golemis (2012), member of the SYRIZA Central Committee and former Director of the Nicos Poulantzas Institute

The history of socialist internationalism is also a history of splits and fragmentation. The First International succumbed after only a few years, primarily due to internal ideological differences between socialists and anarchists. The Second International (1889–1916) lasted a bit longer but eventually broke apart because of internal disagreement over the First World War: should socialists support their respective national governments in the war effort or undermine them and call instead for the international unity of workers from all belligerent countries? At the end of the war, several, competing international organisations would emerge, most prominent among them the Labour and Socialist International (1923–1940) and the Communist International (1919–1943), also known as the Third International. The former was the forerunner of today’s Socialist International, which reunites on a loose, federal basis most social democratic parties across the world. The latter would, after a promising first few years characterised by rich and largely democratic

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Bortun, Crisis, Austerity and Transnational Party Cooperation in Southern Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39151-4_1

1

2

V. BORTUN

internal debates, end up under the tight control of Stalin’s bureaucracy, who dissolved the organisation in 1943. A reincarnation of this would emerge at the end of the war as the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties (commonly known as Cominform), but that was dissolved in 1956 in the midst of the de-Stalinisation process. Finally, a Fourth International was established in 1938 by Trotsky and his supporters as an alternative to the Stalin-controlled Comintern; while less significant in terms of size and political power than its rival traditions and marred, ever since, by a seemingly never-ending series of splits, the Trotskyist movement would go on to play an influential role within the European radical left, including in the rise of the parties discussed in this book. If the need for transnational cooperation on the socialist left was already there in the mid-1800s, it has only enhanced ever since, mirroring the process of globalisation, which has steadily widened and deepened since the end of the Second World War. Part of this broader internationalisation of capitalism has been the process of European integration, which has seen the gradual “Europeanisation” of party politics. Parties have had to increasingly adapt their programme, strategy and structures to the economic and political developments brought about by integration (Hanf & Soetendorp, 1998; Hix et al., 2007; Ladrech, 2002). This process has entailed, among other things, an increase in transnational party cooperation (TPC) at the European Union (EU) level (Hanley, 2008; Lightfoot, 2006), as reflected by the emergence of new political groups in the European Parliament (EP), European political parties, European political foundations, and more. However, the transnational cooperation of what are commonly called today “radical left parties” (RLPs)—broadly defined, for now, as being to the left of social democracy and in opposition to capitalism—always tended to lag behind: in relation to both other political families in the EU and to their own constitutive internationalism (Dunphy, 2004; Dunphy & March, 2013; Holmes & Lightfoot, 2012). Thus, the first radical left group in the EP, the Communist and Allies Group (CAG), was formed only in 1973, two decades after those of the other main political families. Moreover, CAG was marred by internal divisions that eventually led to the group’s split in 1989, between the “orthodox” parties still loyal to the Soviet model of socialism and the “Eurocommunist” parties advocating for an alternative road to socialism, within the framework of liberal democracy and European integration (Jacobs & Corbett, 1990).

1

INTRODUCTION

3

Table 1.1 Average electoral scores of RLPs in EU countries, 1980–2000 Decade

National elections (%)

European elections (%)

1980s 1990s

10.5 6.6

9.4 5.8

Source Author’s calculations from www.parties-and-elections.eu and www.parlgov.org

A new radical left political group in the EP was established in 1995, as the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), today simply called The Left. But this too has since proved less cohesive compared to other political groups, remaining a rather loose and eclectic confederation of parties (Calossi, 2016; Dunphy, 2004; Raunio, 2001). Furthermore, the European Left Party (ELP) was established only in 2004, more than a decade after the other political families, which were quick to take advantage of the institutional framework provided by the Maastricht Treaty for the creation of European political parties. Despite continuous growth, the ELP has been a rather marginal and ineffective actor in EU politics, partly due to long-standing divisions among RLPs, particularly over the question of European integration (Dunphy & March, 2019). Hence, unlike the case of social democracy, the parliamentary group and the Euro-party of the radical left are far from overlapping, which has been hindering the political impact of both (Dunphy & March, 2013; Holmes & Lightfoot, 2016). As it will be explored later on, the RLPs’ limited transnational cooperation at the EU level after 1989 is related to various factors ranging from the aforementioned division on the question of the EU to the legacy of what Dunphy (2004, p. 28) called “the false internationalism of Soviet domination”. But they all came into play against the background of a wider ideological and electoral marginalisation of the non-social democratic left following the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe (Hudson, 2000; March, 2011). In other words, transnational cooperation among these parties was weak after 1989 largely because the parties themselves were weak after 1989. Their decline in the EU was reflected throughout the 1990s in both national and European elections, as shown in Table 1.1 below. However, as social democracy shifted rightwards by accepting the basic tenets of the dominant neoliberal paradigm, the radical left experienced a

4

V. BORTUN

relative resurgence in the late 1990s in several member states (Dunphy & Bale, 2011; Hudson, 2000, 2012; March, 2011; March & Mudde, 2005). That resurgence manifested itself in terms of both electoral results and participation in government, generally as junior partners of social democratic parties. Thus, at the end of the century, social democratic-led governments in France, Italy, Germany and Sweden depended for their parliamentary majorities on parties situated to their left (Hudson, 2000). Furthermore, in the first years of the new century new RLPs emerged in several countries, such as Die Linke [Left Party] in Germany, Parti de Gauche [Left Party] and Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste [New Anticapitalist Party] in France, Bloco de Esquerda [Left Bloc] in Portugal, SYRIZA [Coalition of the Radical Left] in Greece, or Vinstrihreyfingin—grænt framboð [Left-Green Movement] in Iceland.1 The Eurozone crisis that started in late 2009 arguably provided a favourable context for the electoral rise of this party family (Chiocchetti, 2014; Dunphy & March, 2013; March, 2011; Visser et al., 2014). The so-called “austerity consensus”2 that dominated the national and European policymaking in response to the crisis (Becker, 2014; Busch et al., 2013; Farnsworth & Irving, 2012; McNally, 2011) arguably created a fertile ground for RLPs with an anti-austerity agenda (Calossi, 2016; March, 2011) and, indeed, for their transnational cooperation. For the opposition against the transnational politics of austerity, as designed and enforced by what became known as “the Troika”—the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—could be most effectively mounted (also) on a transnational basis. To a certain extent, such parties did benefit electorally during the crisis, albeit perhaps not as soon and substantially as it might have been expected

1 It is worth pointing out early on that the absence of significant new RLPs in Eastern European countries is mainly explained by two factors: firstly, the monopoly on the left still exerted in most of those countries by social democratic parties, most of whom are the successors of the pre-1989 Communist ruling parties; secondly, the de-legitimization of radical left ideas during and following the communist period (March, 2011, pp. 112– 114). Even so, over the last decade or so new RLPs have emerged in this part of Europe too, albeit with limited success so far. The most notable exception in electoral terms is Levica [The Left] from Slovenia, founded in 2017 and which currently has 5 members of parliament (MPs) following the 2022 legislative elections. 2 Austerity is broadly understood from hereon as a set of policies aimed at reducing public deficit and debt primarily by cutting public spending (Blyth, 2013).

1

INTRODUCTION

5

(Keith & March, 2016). Their overall average vote in the member states of the Eurozone increased from 8.5% in the decade preceding the crisis to 11.3% in the post-2009 period, while The Left group increased its number of members of the EP (MEPs) from 35 in 2009 to 52 following the 2014 European elections. As pointed out by Keith (2016) and illustrated by Table 1.2 below, the electoral breakthrough of RLPs was most significant in Greece, Portugal and Spain—all countries where crisis and austerity had a particularly negative socio-economic impact (Knieling & Othengrafen, 2016; Matsaganis & Leventi, 2014; Matthijs, 2014; McKee et al., 2012; Schui, 2014; Semmler, 2013). That was also reflected at a political level, as those countries saw a sharp decline in the support for mainstream parties, as both the centre-right and centre-left implemented austerity measures with similar aplomb (Heilig, 2016; Lavelle, 2014; Moschonas, 2013). Crucially, that created a window of opportunity—wider in some countries than in others, as it will be shown—for anti-establishment parties on both the left and the right to enhance their profile (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; March & Rommerskirchen, 2015). Thus, in 2015 Podemos and Bloco became the third largest parties in Spain and Portugal respectively, with Bloco giving parliamentary support to the minority centre-left government of the Socialist Party (PS) up until 2022, while Podemos has been a junior partner in the centre-left government of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) since the end of 2019. Most prominently, in the Greek elections from January 2015, SYRIZA became the first left-of-social-democracy party to form the government in an EU member state apart from the sole exception of AKEL in Cyprus. SYRIZA won the elections based on an anti-austerity programme that promised to gradually reverse the austerity measures taken by previous governments and to achieve the write-off of most of Greece’s public debt via negotiations with the Troika (SYRIZA, 2014). At the same time, given the transnational character of austerity and the institutions enforcing it, it was reasonably expected that these forces of the radical left would enhance their transnational party cooperation (TPC) in order to oppose austerity more effectively (Calossi, 2016, p. 194; Holmes & Lightfoot, 2016, p. 333; Nikolakakis, 2016, p. 10). Indeed, throughout the 2010s, there were recurrent calls from many prominent voices on the European radical left to create a transnational united front as the only way to defeat austerity and the neoliberal EU establishment (see Besancenot et al., 2015; Gohlke & Wissler, 2015; Golemis, 2012; Iglesias,

6

V. BORTUN

Table 1.2 Overall average vote for main RLPs in the Eurozone before and after the start of the Eurozone crisis Country3

Average vote in the 2000s (%)

Average vote in the 2010s (%)

Austria Belgium Cyprus Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Overall

0.8 0.5 32.9 9.4 7.7 7.8 10.8 7.2 5.4 2.8 n/a 9.6 14.6 5.1 n/a 4.7 8.5

0.8 2.6 29.2 7.6 11.2 8.4 36.3 14.9 2.7 4.9 n/a 9.5 16.9 0.6 5.9 17.6 11.3

Key In bold, the member states most affected by the crisis and austerity policies. Source Author’s calculations from www.parties-and-elections.eu and www.parlgov.org

2015a; Laurent, 2016; Transform, 2016; Tsipras, 2015a). More generally, arguably all party families would have had strong reasons to increase their TPC as the EU-wide management of the crisis meant, especially in Southern European member states, an intensification of the broader process of Europeanisation that went beyond austerity (Meardi, 2011; Saurugger, 2014).

Research Puzzle Broadly speaking, this book tries to answer the following question: Did the European radical left take advantage of the opportunities provided by the Eurozone crisis of the previous decade to improve its historically underachieving transnational cooperation and, thereby, challenge the

3 This list does not include Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which adopted the euro after the start of the crisis.

1

INTRODUCTION

7

neoliberal paradigm that (still) dominates policymaking at both national and EU levels? The book starts with the assumption that the parties most likely to both seek and achieve such an improvement would have been those in member states from the “Southern periphery” (Tondl, 1998), where the crisis and the austerity measures had a particularly substantial socio-economic impact; in particular, parties with broadly similar features and, moreover, with realistic chances to participate in government. These parties would have arguably been SYRIZA in Greece, Bloco in Portugal and Podemos in Spain, which themselves called for increased transnational cooperation on the left as part of the struggle against austerity (see Bloco, 2013; Golemis, 2012; Iglesias, 2015a, p. 170; Tsipras, 2015a). Therefore, the main goal of the book is to see whether and, if so, how and why the transnational cooperation among Bloco, SYRIZA and Podemos increased during the 2010s—‘the crisis decade’ in Southern Europe. More specifically, the period covered here is from 2009, when the Eurozone crisis officially started, till 2019, when European and also legislative elections were held in all three countries, which presented these parties with one last window of opportunity to elevate their transnational cooperation on the back of the conditions engendered by years of crisis and austerity. For the Eurozone crisis arguably ended by 2019, with Greece—by far the country most affected by the crisis—officially leaving the bailout in August 2018 and austerity becoming less salient on the public agenda. Fresh new crises soon followed, most prominently the Covid-19 pandemic but also the ongoing war in Ukraine (although austerity may see a strong comeback as part of the post-Covid19 economic recovery). 2019 was, therefore, the end of a cycle, and that was also reflected in the aforementioned elections: all three parties regressed (SYRIZA and Podemos) or at best stagnated (Bloco), while their party family underperformed in the EP elections. More fundamentally, those elections arguably put an end to these parties’ claims to represent an alternative to mainstream parties: SYRIZA returned to opposition after implementing the same kind of austerity measures as its forerunners in government, while Bloco and Podemos, who had largely built their profile in contradistinction to the austerity-endorsing social democratic parties in their countries, ended up collaborating with those very same parties. Thus, particularly in Spain and Portugal, the general elections held in 2019 saw the rise of radical right-wing parties as the new “anti-establishment” choices. The rise of the radical left had come to an

8

V. BORTUN

end. For all these reasons the discussion here only covers the 2009–2019 period. The broad goal of the book can be broken up into three more specific objectives. Firstly, it will be determined whether the parties’ formal cooperation increased during the 2010s. For that purpose, four distinct channels of cooperation are considered: bilateral relations between the parties, including individual connections; The Left, the EP group and the only international structure that all the three parties belong to; the ELP, the Euro-party that SYRIZA and Bloco belong to as founding members; and the Plan B for Europe and its offshoot, the “Now, the People!” movement, the “Disobedient Eurosceptic” (Bortun, 2022b) transnational initiatives that Bloco and Podemos have been involved in. Thus, this discussion will also cover some of the prominent transnational organisations of the radical left today, some of which, such as Plan B for Europe, have been given very little attention in the literature so far. Overall, it will be shown that, while formal transnational party cooperation did increase around 2015, it never deepened beyond the bilateral exchanges between party elites and the common work in the EP, thus seeing a rather limited level of transnational coordination among the three parties. Conceptually, this chapter also contributes with a framework specifically aimed at measuring party-to-party transnational cooperation by building on an earlier attempt in that respect (Bortun, 2022a). It draws upon the three-stage framework (contact, cooperation and integration) commonly used in the literature to assess the interaction among parties via their Euro-parties, as proposed first by Niedermayer (1983). However, that model was initially meant to assess transnational party federations rather than direct transnational cooperation between two or more parties with each other. By building inductively on the findings presented here, the book therefore develops and adapts this model to the specifics of party-to-party (bilateral or multilateral) transnational relations. Secondly, the book looks at the parties’ informal networking and cooperation during the crisis, broadly understood here as taking place outside the official party channels and the EU’s institutional framework. The focus is on three types of channels: the parties’ political foundations as well as the pan-European network that all are, to various extents, associated with, Transform Europe, whose explicit aims include fostering transnational networking and cooperation among parties; social movements, which all three parties were strongly linked to—at least in their early years—at both national and transnational levels and which served as

1

INTRODUCTION

9

an essential hub for the establishment of the initial contacts between some of these parties; academic links and networks, given the significant prevalence of academics in prominent roles within all three parties. Thereby, the book also maps dimensions of TPC by proxy on the radical left that have been virtually unexplored so far. Most crucially, it finds that this “informal” cooperation was largely underwhelming, with political foundations playing a merely supporting, networking role in their parties’ TPC, while the nexus with the anti-austerity social movements at a transnational level proved remarkably weak, not the least due to those movements’ own focus on national politics. Thirdly, the book seeks to identify and critically discuss the main incentives of and obstacles to the TPC among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos during the crisis decade, in an attempt to show why that process might have enhanced but perhaps not as much as it could and should have done. As it will be shown, the key factors hindering transnational cooperation, in particular the persistent primacy of national politics as well as the diverging stances towards the EU, apply to the broader TPC on the radical left and beyond. Building on this, the discussion also touches upon what the representatives of the parties themselves believe ought to be done in the future to improve TPC among radical left forces. In bringing these suggestions and the key findings together, the book therefore provides a set of recommendations that parties, particularly but not necessarily of the radical left, might find relevant in their efforts to establish or enhance relations with like-minded forces from other countries. While these questions have received very limited attention in the current literature, as elaborated below, why is it nevertheless worth writing a whole book to answer them? On the one hand, the crisis opened up a significant window of opportunity for these three parties in particular, and the European radical left in general, to increase their historically limited transnational cooperation at EU level. As it will be shown, the relative failure of these parties to do so not only matters for their own political family but arguably reveals limitations and challenges that broader TPC faces in Europe today, irrespective of political family. On the other hand, the radical left’s relative failure in enhancing its transnational unity clearly undermined its potential to provide and defend an effective alternative to the neoliberal status quo, in their own countries and in the EU as a whole. This has important lessons for both those studying and those involved in emancipatory politics in a world seemingly divided between the persistence of neoliberal globalisation and the

10

V. BORTUN

resurgence of nationalist isolationism. Thus, perhaps the failure of the radical left has something to do with both the resilience of the neoliberal paradigm and the electoral resurgence of the radical right across Europe.

State of the Literature The book speaks to three main bodies of literature: on transnational party cooperation, on contemporary radical left parties and, at the intersection of these two, on the transnational cooperation among RLPs in the EU today. This section outlines in turn these three bodies of literature, underlining the gaps that the present book aims to address. Transnational Party Cooperation in the EU It has been widely acknowledged that the development of the EU has brought about the so-called “Europeanisation” of party politics (Hanf & Soetendorp, 1998; Hix et al., 2007; Kaiser & Starie, 2005; Ladrech, 2002). Europeanisation is understood as the “process in which Europe, and especially the European Union, becomes an increasingly more relevant and important part of political reference for the actors at the level of the member states” (Hanf & Soetendorp, 1998, p. 1). In other words, the gradual transfer of power from the national to the transnational level (Kaiser, Leucht & Gehler, 2010), which has seen a sharp intensification over the last three decades, determined political parties to increasingly transcend their national horizons and engage more and more with EU politics. This has influenced political parties both programmatically, by them having to develop policies in response to the numerous and evolving aspects of European integration (Holmes & Lightfoot, 2012), and organisationally, by them having to adapt their internal structures in order to engage with EU institutions and compete in the European political arena (Ladrech, 2002). In turn, this has increased parties’ need for transnational coordination and diffusion of ideas and policies, which has predictably seen a gradual intensification of transnational networking and cooperation among political parties in the EU (Hanley, 2008; Ladrech, 2002; Lightfoot, 2006). TPC in the EU has been defined by Pridham (1982, p. 318) as a process “whereby political parties of the same ideological tendency from different member countries seek to harmonise and present their European-policy positions”. However, Pridham understands TPC only

1

INTRODUCTION

11

in its formal dimensions, i.e. within the institutional framework of the EU. The present book also considers its informal dimensions, understood along the lines suggested by Salm (2016, p. 11): Formal dimensions of transnational party cooperation are characterised by structures, decision-making processes and functions that are codified in the statutes of partly or fully institutionalised transnational political networks of parties. Informal cooperation is not codified but, rather, is shaped by habits among and links between individuals.

The EU-wide TPC started with the creation, in the early 1950s, of political groups in what was then the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community, which from 1962 onwards became the EP. As pointed out by early observers such as Boisson (1959) and Kapteyn (1960), it was bound for the representatives of national parliaments to coagulate along ideological lines, given the pre-existing transnational structures of party cooperation and the different ideological stances on European integration. While not particularly influential over the EU’s policymaking in its earlier stages, these political groups played important roles in channelling communication (Murray, 2004, p. 114) that helped lay the basis for TPC at the EU level. As the EP increased in size and gained new prerogatives over the last three decades, the political groups became bigger, better organised and more dynamic (Calossi, 2016, pp. 28–31). Indeed, the allocation to political groups of material resources and positions on parliamentary committees provided new incentives for national party delegations and individual MEPs alike to join a group (Attinà, 1990). Today, political groups in the EP are seen as remarkably cohesive (Hix et al., 2007) and continue to represent “by far the most important institutional form that party politics takes at the EU level” (Calossi, 2016, p. 25). Furthermore, it has been recently shown that these political groups act as channels of policy diffusion, as incumbent parties within a group tend to influence other parties’ agenda in their own national arenas (Senninger, Bischof & Ezrow, 2022). In the mid-1970s, the three main political families in post-war Europe—the Christian democrats, the social democrats and the liberals— also established party federations, mainly in anticipation of the first direct European elections of 1979. According to Murray (2004), these organisations allowed parties to coordinate their policies, devise common political

12

V. BORTUN

programmes and carry out unified electoral campaigns. However, their role at the time should not be overestimated. Calossi (2016, p. 45) points out that their joint manifestos for the EP elections were “mild documents, which addressed few similarities, and were largely ignored by national parties during their electoral campaigns”. Nevertheless, by building up transnational links, these federations prepared the ground for the creation of European political parties in the 1990s. Largely to the pressure of national parliaments, but also to address accusations of democratic deficit aimed at the EU, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty emphasised the need for European political parties, or Euro-parties, in creating the conditions for a political union. Indeed, Euro-parties would receive funding from the EP, depending on the number of MEPs affiliated with them, which was supposed to enhance their autonomy from national parties. Thus, as Hanley (2008) points out, funding represented a strong incentive for the development of these transnational organisations, in correlation with the more structural need for coordination and information exchange (Lightfoot, 2005). Also, Euro-parties are important in terms of legitimacy, arguably enhancing national parties’ visibility and credibility in front of their own members and voters (Kaiser & Starie, 2005), particularly in the former Soviet-style socialist states from Eastern Europe (Pridham, 2005). The literature is somewhat divided over the influence of Euro-parties (cf. Dunphy & March, 2013, p. 521). The “pessimists” see them as mere loose and weak networks of national parties that are ultimately tributary to the interests of the latter (see Delwit et al., 2004; Seiler, 2011). For the “optimists”, they are increasingly relevant actors in EU politics, with the potential of becoming genuine transnational political parties (see Hanley, 2008; Hix & Lord, 1997; Lightfoot, 2005; Van Hecke, 2010). Finally, those adopting a middle ground acknowledge their limited impact while emphasising the potential for that impact to increase in light of institutional and financial incentives (see Dunphy & March, 2013). Despite these differences, it is broadly accepted that Euro-parties are fundamentally inhibited by the persistent primacy of national party politics (Bardi et al., 2010, 2014; Bressanelli, 2014; Ladrech, 2003, 2007; Poguntke et al., 2007). As Ladrech (2003, pp. 124–125) argues, that primacy is due to the fact that parties still derive much of their resources, power and legitimacy from the national arena, but also because, given the institutional design of the EU, they arguably have rather little influence over its actual policymaking.

1

INTRODUCTION

13

Hence, Euro-parties also bear limited influence over their constituent national parties, which control their internal organisation and decisionmaking process (Calossi, 2016; Ladrech, 2007). According to Ladrech (2007, p. 41), “the relationship between party members and Euro-parties is extremely weak”. The relationship with their voters and the wider public is arguably even weaker. Thus, Euro-parties are decidedly secondary in terms of both resources and influence to the EP political groups (Calossi, 2016, p. 62). In sum, as Bardi et al., (2014, p. 44) put it, Euro-parties “are still in a very early stage of organizational development and a truly European transnational party system is far from being institutionalized”. The Europeanisation entailed by the policy responses to the Eurozone crisis, which some dubbed “fast forward Europeanization” (Ladi & Graziano, 2014), clearly increased national actors’ need for transnational coordination. In turn, this might have seen Euro-parties occupy a more central role within the EU polity. However, the literature is yet to confirm that this happened for any political family at all. The aforementioned report by Bardi et al., (2014, p. 62) argues that “differences between the Northern and the Southern members of the EP Party Groups remain small and have not grown after the crisis”, thus “leading to optimistic conclusions about the EU party system’s political development in spite of the economic crisis”. By contrast, Dunphy and March (2019) seemed more reserved, arguing that the rise in nationalist and Eurosceptic parties during the crisis hampered the development of transnational political parties. As they conclude, “the wider context for the development of TNPs [transnational parties] shows them important but often relatively marginal actors” (Dunphy & March, 2019, p. 234). The EU framework also enabled and encouraged the establishment of European political foundations, which receive separate funding from the EP and whose role is to underpin and complement the activities of Europarties. More specifically, they are meant to help bridge the gap between the latter, on the one hand, and the members and voters of constituent national parties as well as the wider civil society, on the other (Bardi et al., 2014; Gagatek & Van Hecke, 2011; Ladrech, 2007). Indeed, these transnational foundations may act as sources of information, ideas and policies for Euro-parties, which—given their aforementioned weakness— sometimes lack the resources to follow thoroughly the developments of the EU policymaking process (Bardi et al., 2014; Gagatek & Van Hecke, 2011).

14

V. BORTUN

A significant gap in the literature, however, concerns the informal dimensions of TPC at the EU level, with very few exceptions (see Kaiser, 2013; Kaiser, Leucht & Gehler, 2010; Salm, 2016). Given the widely acknowledged role played by informality in the wider process of European integration (Christiansen & Piattoni, 2003; Heisenberg, 2005; Héritier, 2007; Mak & Van Tatenhove, 2006; Stacey, 2010), parties would presumably have an incentive to make use of and expand informal channels of transnational cooperation in order to influence that process. In one of the few studies dealing with this, Kaiser (2013, p. 16) argues that, throughout the process of European integration, “informal party cooperation was very intense and effective even in times when its formal organization was still very low”. It would be reasonable, therefore, to expect that SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos would cultivate their informal networking and cooperation to a significant degree during the period under study, thus potentially mirroring the informality that often characterised the management of the crisis (Christiansen & Neuhold, 2013; Schoeller et al., 2017). Put differently, if the powers to be in the EU relied extensively on channels outside of the EU’s formal framework, even more so parties with considerably less influence within that framework would seek to coordinate their opposition to that management of the crisis via informal channels of cooperation. Finally, a rather surprising gap in the literature is the lack of any standard framework or set of indicators to measure bilateral TPC. The framework proposed by Niedermayer (1983) and subsequently developed by Dietz (2000) distinguishes between three stages of transnational interaction among parties—contact, cooperation, and integration; it also provides a list of indicators corresponding to each of these stages (see Dietz, 2000, p. 203). However, some of them only apply to the study of transnational organisations, Euro-parties in particular (e.g. the option for individual membership or the internal structure). Hence, this list of indicators cannot be applied to bilateral or trilateral relations between parties. Therefore, this book builds on an earlier attempt (Bortun, 2022a, 2022b, pp. 556-559a) to adapt, inductively, Niedermayer’s three-stage model to the transnational interaction that parties engage in with each other directly, on a party-to-party basis, rather than mediated via a common transnational organisation (see the final section of Chapter 4).

1

INTRODUCTION

15

Radical Left Parties in the EU Today As mentioned at the beginning, the post-1989 context saw the European radical left become largely irrelevant, particularly in EU member states (Hudson, 2000; March, 2011; Sassoon, 1998). The rather unexpected and quick collapse of the only actually existing alternative to capitalism at the time entailed a massive drawback for anti-capitalist and socialist ideas. Organisationally speaking, the fall of Soviet-style socialism also deprived many European RLPs of the—albeit limited—international legitimacy and financial support from Moscow (Sassoon, 1998). This paved the way for the ideological and political hegemony of the neoliberal consensus (Cooper & Hardy, 2012; Harvey, 2010; Worth, 2013), broadly understood for now as a policy framework rooted in classic economic liberalism and defined by policies such as low taxation, de-regulation and privatisation (Gamble, 2009; Herman, 2007; Navarro, 2007). In the context of social democracy increasingly adopting such policies, the opposition to the neoliberal consensus was largely assumed by the new social movements rather than RLPs struggling to navigate their post-1989 decline. In particular, the anti-globalisation movement, also referred to as the Global Justice Movement, provided in the late 1990s and early 2000s the main challenge to the neoliberal paradigm, at least on a transnational level (March, 2011; March & Mudde, 2005; Heartfield, 2003). The decline of the European radical left throughout the 1990s was reflected not only in its decreasing average share of votes, as pointed out earlier, but also in the relative absence of studies on this party family, a handful of exceptions dealing with post-Communist parties in Western Europe notwithstanding (Bell, 1993; Bull & Heywood, 1994). However, the relative resurgence of RLPs at the turn of the century was mirrored, in the early and mid-2000s, by a slight increase in the academic interest in this type of party. Most studies, however, were focused on a single country, or on the fate of communist parties in either Western Europe (Botella & Ramiro, 2003) or, more frequently, the former Eastern Bloc (BozÒki & Ishiyama, 2002; Curry & Urban, 2003; Handl, 2002; Ishiyama, 1999; March, 2002; Racz & Bukowski, 1999). Other books dealt only with specific aspects of RLPs, such as their relation to European integration, which most had increasingly endorsed throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Dunphy, 2004). Thus, with the notable exception of Hudson (2000), the academic literature in the 2000s largely lacked works in tackling the European radical left as a party family.

16

V. BORTUN

That started to change, however, with the unravelling of the crisis, which brought RLPs with an anti-austerity agenda to the forefront in several countries (Dunphy & March, 2013, pp. 520–521; March, 2011, p. 1; Visser et al., 2014, p. 541). Thus, the 2010s and early 2020s have seen a new wave of literature dealing with the European radical left (Amini, 2016; Backes & Moreau, 2008; Bouma et al., 2021; Calossi, 2016; Charalambous, 2022; Charalambous & Ioannou, 2020; Chiocchetti, 2017; Damiani, 2020; Ducange et al., 2013; De Waele & Seiler, 2012; Daiber et al., 2011; Heilig, 2016; Hudson, 2012; Hildebrandt & Daiber, 2009; Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis, 2019; March et al., 2023; Wennerhag et al., 2016; March, 2011; March & Keith, 2016). As Keith and March (2016, p. 2) put it, “whereas a decade or so ago, there were barely any in-depth, up-to-date comparative studies, making RLPs [radical left parties] the poor relation of party politics fields, this is now decreasingly the case”. Nevertheless, they believe that significant gaps in the literature continue to exist, especially regarding those parties that have performed particularly well during the crisis (Keith & March, 2016, p. 3), such as SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos. There is a broad consensus among scholars about using the term “radical left” to label the parties to the left of social democracy today (Calossi, 2016, p. 86; Keith & March, 2016, p. 5). But what does it mean to be radical left? Fundamentally, whereas social democracy has gradually abandoned the project of replacing capitalism with a socialist society, those parties to its left have maintained faith in that project (Adams, 2001; Eley, 2002; Heywood, 2003). As Keith and March (2016, p. 6) put it, “the wish to radically transform and not just reform contemporary capitalism remains the key distinction between RLPs and social democratic … parties”. In other words, anti-capitalism is the specific difference of the radical left (see also Fagerholm, 2018). March (2011, pp. 7–12) makes the most compelling and influential (Calossi, 2016, p. 86) case for why the term “radical” would best capture the transformative ambition that essentially distinguishes these parties from social democracy. He points out that, etymologically speaking, “radical” stems from the Latin word for “root”, which in political terms would translate as the intention to change society from its roots, something that Marx and Engels (1975) themselves hinted at. Moreover, for March (2011, p. 9), “radical left” is preferable to more pejorative terms such as “hard left” or “far left”, which tend to inherently suggest marginality. Indeed, unlike the latter two, the term “radical left” is also employed by

1

INTRODUCTION

17

some of the parties themselves (Keith & March, 2016, p. 5), most prominently by SYRIZA, whose name stands, in Greek, for “Coalition of the Radical Left”. Most scholars in the field have adopted the term (Amini, 2015; Chiocchetti, 2017; Charalambous, 2011; Daiber et al., 2011; Dunphy & Bale, 2011; Ducange, et al., 2013; Fagerholm, 2018; Ramiro, 2016; Lisi, 2013; Moschonas, 2013; Visser et al., 2014; Sozzi, 2011), albeit not all. One exception has been Calossi (2016, pp. 86–89), who rejects the term for three main reasons: firstly, because “radical” may simply designate “the high degree of commitment and determination a political actor uses to achieve its goal” (Calossi, 2016, p. 86); secondly, because certain liberal parties are using this label too (e.g. Radical Party in France); thirdly, because “radical” too often has a pejorative meaning. However, Calossi’s first two reasons can be countered by simply adding “left” next to “radical”, which those using this label always do, precisely to make it clear that they refer to a type of left-wing parties, not liberal. While there may be some truth to the third reason, there is a slight contradiction between it and the first two reasons: if “radical” has a pejorative meaning and scholars should therefore abandon it, then why would even some liberal parties use it to identify themselves rather than avoid it? Indeed, is the term pejorative or it may simply designate “the high degree of commitment and determination” that parties of all orientations can display? Nevertheless, while agreeing with how the term “radical left” is defined above, the way it is applied is not entirely unproblematic. Many of the parties that are commonly seen as “radical left” today, including some of the ones studied here, are not fully radical in the sense laid out above. They rather put forward an agenda that is visibly less-than-radical, as already acknowledged in the literature (see Amini, 2015; Chiocchetti, 2017; Ferraresi, 2016; Keith, 2010; Keith & March, 2016; Markou, 2021; Moschonas, 2013; Taylor, 2009). More specifically, their economic agenda is fundamentally a modern-day rendition of post-WWII, Keynesian social democracy that has been gradually abandoned or diluted by social democracy itself (Moschonas, 2013, p. 7; March, 2011, p. 205). The main novelty concerns the addition of an environmental focus and, on cultural issues, of policies in favour of gender equality and LGBTQ + rights. Anti-capitalist or socialist policies such as public ownership, democratic control of the economy and economic planning are virtually absent from their electoral manifestos and day-to-day rhetoric, even more so—where applicable—from their practice in government.

18

V. BORTUN

In other words, some of the most important RLPs today are plainly rather anti-neoliberal than utterly anti-capitalist, rather social democratic than socialist (Keith & March, 2016, p. 6). Thus, as these parties have practically become, by and large, “the custodian of traditional social democratic values and policies” (March, 2011, p. 205), they might be better described as “neo-reformist” than “radical”. I make the case in this respect in a recent article (Bortun, 2023), not for the sake of analytical rigour alone, but because it matters politically whether we label as “radical” parties whose economic agenda was mainstream only a few decades ago. For, by doing so, we risk reinforcing the legitimacy of the current (neoliberal) mainstream agenda, given the pejorative connotations of the term, as noted by Calossi. More than that, we risk excluding from the conversation the actual radical, anti-capitalist agenda that increasing numbers of people seem to be open to across Western societies and beyond (Dahlgreen, 2016; Edelman Trust Barometer, 2020; Harvard IOP Survey, 2016; Institute of Economic Affairs, 2021; Survation, 2022). This is something that I come back to in the final chapter of the book. Nevertheless, for the sake of consistency with the rest of the current literature that the book engages with, the three parties under discussion will continue to be referred to as “radical left”, even though at least two of them—SYRIZA and Podemos—would arguably better qualify as “neo-reformist”. Transnational Party Cooperation on the Radical Left When it comes to the study of particular party families, almost all of them have received their fair share of attention in the academic literature. Thus, there have been several studies dealing with the TPC of Christian democracy (Johansson, 2002; Kaiser, 2004 2007 2013; Papini, 1997), social democracy (Holmes & Lightfoot, 2012; Ladrech, 2003; Lightfoot, 2005; Newman, 1996), the Greens (Bomberg, 2002; Bowler & Farrell, 1992; Dietz, 2000; O’Neill, 1997), radical right (Doˇcekalová, 2006; Durham & Power, 2010; Startin, 2010; Startin & Brack, 2016). The biggest gap in the literature concerns the radical left (Dunphy & March, 2013, p. 521): despite their increased relevance during the crisis, there still are rather few attempts to specifically deal with transnational cooperation among RLPs (see Bortun, 2022a; Dunphy & March, 2013, 2019; Holmes & Lightfoot, 2016; Sozzi, 2011).

1

INTRODUCTION

19

The broad consensus of this limited literature is that TPC on the radical left, at least within the framework of European integration, has historically been comparatively belated and limited. However, the establishment of the EP group, The Left, and later on of the ELP have been both widely deemed as significant leaps in advancing the transnational cooperation of this party family. As March (2011, p. 165) noted in the early stages of the Eurozone crisis, “the level of truly voluntary international radical left cooperation now achieved is impressive”. Nevertheless, he immediately admitted that “this ‘international’ party family’s transnational activity and organisation still lag behind the other main party families” (March, 2011, p. 166)—an assessment shared by the rest of the literature (e.g. Holmes & Lightfoot, 2016). This literature has remained limited even with the aforementioned rise in interest for RLPs and despite the expectation for their TPC to increase throughout the 2010s, on the background of the Eurozone crisis (Calossi, 2016, p. 194; Holmes & Lightfoot, 2016, p. 333; Nikolakakis, 2016, p. 10). As Calossi (2016, p. 194) put it halfway through the decade, “during the ‘age of austerity’ … expect the further improvement of relations between the different subfamilies of the Anti-Austerity Left parties”. One of the very few attempts to assess whether those expectations were met is a book chapter by Holmes and Lightfoot (2016). According to them, while the crisis might have created a more favourable context for the enhancement of radical left TPC, it largely did not turn out that way, as RLPs failed to present a cohesive alternative to the “current neoliberal nature of the European Union” (Holmes & Lightfoot, 2016, p. 333). The main reason for that lies with their divisions over whether the EU can be reformed or not, which only intensified during and because of the crisis (Holmes & Lightfoot, 2016, p. 347). This argument is also endorsed by Chiocchetti (2014) and Keith (2016); according to the latter, “the different approaches taken by RLPs towards European integration meant that they failed to unite to campaign against austerity” (Keith, 2016, p. 94). This cleavage will prove particularly salient throughout this book. The other notable, more recent, exception is the book by Dunphy and March (2019) on the ELP. However, the book’s focus is rather narrow, only dealing with the Euro-party of the radical left (with the partial example of Chapter 7), which not only lacks some of the most important RLPs today, including Podemos, but is widely considered as secondary in importance to the parliamentary group (Holmes & Lightfoot, 2016). Moreover, this book only briefly touches upon the less institutionalised

20

V. BORTUN

form of transnational cooperation on the radical left, such as the social movements, political foundations or intellectual networks. In sum, this book is—the focus on three RLPs notwithstanding—wider in scope by covering a wider range of formal and informal channels for TPC. On a conceptual level, the book also contributes with an analytical framework to measure bilateral TPC at EU level and beyond. Finally, with regards to the three parties studied here, there are a few recent comparative studies of SYRIZA and Podemos (Kioupkiolis & Katsambekis, 2018; Kouki & González, 2018; Porta et al., 2017; Segatti & Capuzzi, 2016) and only one of SYRIZA and Bloco (Tsakatika & Lisi, 2013). However, there is no comparative study of all three RLPs, despite their salient similarities, nor of just Bloco and Podemos, despite these two parties’ geographical proximity and more similar national political contexts, as described in Chapter 2. More importantly, apart from the aforementioned article on the relationship between SYRIZA and Podemos (Bortun, 2022a), the current literature lacks any study focusing on the transnational cooperation among these three RLPs, despite the widely held expectation—not just in the literature but among these parties themselves—that their similar features and broadly similar contexts throughout the 2010s would lead to ever closer relations between them.

Data, Methods, Case Selection The book’ focus on TPC is embedded in a comparative discussion of SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos in terms of their origins, programme, strategy, organisation, and developments in the post-2009 European and national contexts. These categories have been chosen not only because they tend to be the standard analytical comparators in the literature on political parties but also because of the assumption that the parties’ similarities and differences relative to these categories are particularly relevant for making sense of what has driven and hindered, respectively, their cooperation. To explore that process, particularly its key channels, incentives and obstacles, I have employed a qualitative approach, as most scholars recommend with such a research topic (see B˝ orzel, 1998, p. 255; Firestone, 1993, p. 12). Moreover, the choice for a qualitative approach is also rooted in the assumption that transnational networking and cooperation among political parties is best unpacked—particularly with respect to their informal, more diffuse dimensions—by exploring the perceptions

1

INTRODUCTION

21

of the actors involved in those processes. That is why the analysis in the core chapters of the book draws heavily on quotes from the qualitative interviews conducted as part of the research, as detailed below. The data the book draws upon was collected during my PhD at the University of Portsmouth between 2015 and 2019, through three different methods. First, I undertook documentary research and content analysis of electoral manifestos, statements, resolutions and other relevant party documents from SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos, as well as from their transnational organisations such as The Left, the ELP, Transform, and Plan B for Europe. Second, I conducted 23 semi-structured elite interviews with people who—at least during the time period under study—were either directly involved in the transnational work of SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos or had a relevant experience and close knowledge of those processes. More precisely, I conducted 16 interviews with people working for the three parties or their political foundations: 5 from SYRIZA, 5 from Bloco, and 6 from Podemos.4 While the elite character of the interviews provided rich first-hand insights into the processes at hand, it arguably also entailed a certain bias in terms of the positionality of the participants and their party loyalty. Hence, the remaining 7 interviews were conducted with people who, despite not being affiliated to any of the three parties, had a good understanding of them and the broader European left—a combination of people working for transnational organisations of the radical left, journalists and academics covering this party family, able to provide somewhat of a counter-balance to the inevitably partisan views of the party

4 The main weakness of the sample is the absence of MEPs, whose busy schedule and hierarchy of priorities prevented, despite repeated attempts, arranging interviewees with any of the nine MEPs that the three parties had, combined, following the 2014 European elections. Nevertheless, while most Podemos interviewees were MEP assistants, they were playing significant roles in the party. At the time it entered the EP following the 2014 European elections, only a few months after it had been created, Podemos had underdeveloped structures and limited staff, having therefore to fill in these positions—that in bigger and more established parties may be given to more junior staff—quickly with the rather small number of party cadre it had at the time. Some of them would go on to occupy high-profile roles in the party, which also applies to some of the interviewees from Bloco—an MEP assistant at the time of the research in 2017 became an MEP himself in 2019.

22

V. BORTUN

interviewees.5 All the interviews were conducted in English and then transcribed, with the transcriptions being available to other researchers upon request. Third, I undertook non-participatory observation research by attending two international events that saw the participation of people from the three parties and/or their political foundations: the conference held in Brussels in November 2016 by AlterSummit (a transnational initiative against austerity that involved representatives of trade unions, social movements and political parties) and the conference organised in Lisbon in October 2018 by the Transform Europe network (the political foundation of the ELP), suggestively entitled “Is Southern Europe the Weak Link of European Integration? Tracing Possible Areas of Cooperation among Movements and Parties”. While the reasons for looking at these three parties in particular have already been outlined, it is worth reiterating them more systematically, even if briefly. Firstly, for the last decade, SYRIZA, Podemos and Bloco have been the most successful RLPs in the EU alongside AKEL in Cyprus, in terms of both election results and proximity to power, with SYRIZA governing between 2015 and 2019, Podemos participating in a government coalition since 2019 and Bloco providing key parliamentary support to a minority government between 2015 and 2022. Secondly, these parties broadly shared several characteristics in terms of programme, strategy and organisational culture, as well as in terms of socio-economic and political contexts during the crisis, thus making them more comparable and more prone to transnational cooperation with each other. Thirdly, all three parties explicitly acknowledged and emphasised the importance of transnational cooperation in fighting austerity effectively, particularly in Southern Europe. That was quite famously epitomised by the Podemos’ leader at the time, Pablo Iglesias, joining a victorious Alexis Tsipras on the stage in central Athens during the celebrations of SYRIZA’s 5 In terms of research ethics, all of the participants to the interviews were fully informed about the nature of the interviews and of the research project. They all gave their consent to take part in the interviews and for the data they provided to be used for my PhD research project at the time or for similar purposes, such as the present book. Indeed, this data does not include any sensitive information, but only data regarding the networking and cooperation among contemporary political organisations. None of the interviewees requested to be anonymised, although in a couple of instances the interviewees asked to not be quoted on a particular thing they shared with me, and their wish was entirely respected.

1

INTRODUCTION

23

electoral win in January 2015. Therefore, under all these conditions, it would have been reasonable to expect that, of all European RLPs during the crisis, these parties’ transnational cooperation with each other was most likely to enhance. At the same time, while these parties’ commonalities warrant for a focus on the relations between them, they also display some notable differences that might have had—and they did have—a detrimental impact on their cooperation. For instance, while SYRIZA and Bloco selfidentified as “radical left” and had direct lineage to former radical left groups, Podemos has tried to avoid (largely unsuccessfully) such ideological labels and, partly for that reason, has declined to join the ELP, which the other two are founding members of. Most importantly though, while Bloco and Podemos at best gave parliamentary support to minority social democratic governments in the period under study, SYRIZA led the government for almost half of that period (2015–2019), which will be shown to have influenced to a great extent the trajectories of the three parties and, indeed, their relations with one another.

Structure of the Book Apart from this one, the book has six other chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 2 gives a historical background of the transnational cooperation among RLPs in the context of European integration by tracing the main organisational developments of that process and its key challenges over the decades. More specifically, the chapter has five core sections: the first one deals with the Communist & Allies Group, the radical left’s group in the European Parliament before 1989; the second section focuses on today’s parliamentary group of this party family, The Left (formerly known as GUE/NGL); the third section discusses the Euro-party of the radical left—the European Left Party (ELP); the fourth section deals with other, less institutionalised, party-based transnational initiatives, such as Plan B for Europe, which emerged as a direct reaction and challenge to how the EU handled the crisis; the final section gives an overview of the main non-party channels for transnational cooperation on the radical left today, the pan-European network Transform. Chapter 3 lays out the context of the processes that the books focuses on: the Eurozone crisis that started in 2009 and the ways in which it unravelled in the three countries at hand, Greece, Spain and Portugal. The chapter has four sections. The first one provides a brief outline of

24

V. BORTUN

the Eurozone crisis and its austerity-centred management, as broadly understood from the perspective of the European radical left as both a manifestation and reinforcement of the EU’s “embedded neoliberalism” (van Apeldoorn, 2001). The other three sections deal in turn with how the crisis developed in each of the three national contexts, with an emphasis on the economic, social and political impact of austerity policies. The conclusion of the chapter sums up the key similarities and differences between those national contexts. Chapter 4 introduces the RLPs under study—SYRIZA (Greece), Bloco (Portugal) and Podemos (Spain). Each of these three parties is dealt with in a separate section in terms of its origins, organisation, programme, and strategy. It is shown that, despite their different lineages, all three parties shared a salient anti-austerity outlook that, together with their strategy of mobilisation, enabled them to capitalise electorally on a context of growing dissatisfaction with austerity measures and the mainstream parties implementing them. However, as they became more electorally successful, all three parties underwent a process of programmatic moderation and strategic shift towards electoral and institutional politics, alongside an internal process of centralisation. The conclusion to the chapter sums up the main similarities and differences between the three parties. Chapter 5 maps the formal cooperation among the three RLPs throughout the 2010s. The chapter is divided into four sections, each corresponding to a different channel/structure that facilitated their cooperation. Thus, the first section deals with the direct bilateral relations between the parties; the second one, with their group in the EP, The Left; the third one, with the ELP; and the fourth section, with the Plan B for Europe initiative (subsequently revamped as “Now, the People!” movement). While largely descriptive, this chapter anticipates some of the key challenges for transnational cooperation discussed in the final chapter. More importantly, building on the findings from this chapter, the final section proposes an analytical framework—adapted from the model proposed by Niedermayer and then developed by Dietz—meant to measure and assess relations between parties from different countries. Chapter 6 explores the less institutionalised channels TPC. It has three sections that deal in turn with the parties’ political foundations and the pan-European network that they are affiliated to, Transform Europe; the looser intellectual/academic networks that some of the members of these parties (who all had, during the period at hand, a strikingly high number of academics among their elected representatives) might be involved in;

1

INTRODUCTION

25

and the broader social movements and non-party transnational initiatives that emerged during the crisis, such as the aforementioned AlterSummit. These dimensions of the contemporary transnational radical left have received little to no attention in the existing literature, making this chapter one of the book’s most original empirical contributions. Chapter 7 deals with the incentives and challenges for transnational cooperation. The first two sections discuss the key factors stimulating and hindering, respectively, the transnational cooperation among the three RLPs. In doing so, the chapter effectively addresses the overall puzzle of the book: why the radical left—namely, three of its most successful parties—largely failed to seize the opportunities provided by the crisis of the 2010s to enhance its coordination at EU level and thereby provide a significant challenge to the transnational neoliberal status quo. It is shown how both the ups and downs of party cooperation on the radical left largely boil down to the demands of national politics—a reflection that the European radical left is, after all, still international rather than transnational. Moreover, the crisis has deepened the long-standing cleavage on the radical left with regard to the EU, which adds a further burden to the transnational cooperation of this party family. The final section of the chapter explores policy recommendations for the new decade lying ahead of the European radical left. The conclusion to the book recapitulates the main findings and their implications for better understanding TPC in the EU today on the radical left and beyond.

References Adams, I. (2001). Political ideology today (2nd ed.). Manchester University Press. Attinà, F. (1990). The voting behaviour of the European Parliament members and the problem of the Europarties. European Journal of Political Research, 18(3), 557–579. Amini, B. (2015). Situating the radical left in contemporary Europe. Socialism and Democracy, 29(3), 7–24. Amini, B. (Ed.). (2016). The radical left in Europe in the age of austerity. Routledge. Backes, U., & Moreau, P. (Eds.). (2008). Communist and post-communist parties in Europe. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Bardi, L., Bressanelli, E., Calossi, E., Gagatek, W., Mair, P., & Pizzimenti, E. (2010). How to create a transnational party system (European Democracy Observatory Study). European Parliament.

26

V. BORTUN

Bardi, L., Bressanelli, E., Calossi, E., Gagatek, W., Mair, P., & Pizzimenti, E. (2014). Political parties and political foundations at European Level: Challenges and opportunities (European Democracy Observatory Report, 2014/ 08). European University Institute. Besancenot, O., Davanellos, A., & Urban Crespo, M. (2015). “Austerexit.”— Time for an exit from austerity—For the organization of a great Europeanwide conference of social and political resistance. http://www.europe-solida ire.org/spip.php?article35892 Bell, D. S. (Ed.). (1993). Western European communists and the collapse of communism. Berg. Becker, U. (2014). The heterogeneity of capitalism in crisis-ridden Europe. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 22(3), 261–275. Bloco. (2013). National Convention resolution: “The Left against the debt”. http://www.bloco.org/media/mocaoVIIIconvBEen.pdf Boisson, A. (1959). Les Partis politiques à l’Assemblée Commune de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier. European Yearbook. Bomberg, E. (2002). The Europeanisation of Green politics: Exploring the EU’s impact. West European Politics, 25(3), 25–50. Bortun, V. (2022a). ‘SYRIZA and Podemos, we shall overcome’? Left transnational cooperation in times of crisis. Capital & Class, 46(4), 543–565. Bortun, V. (2022b). Plan B for Europe: The birth of ‘Disobedient Euroscepticism’? Journal of Common Market Studies, 60(5), 1416–1431. Bortun, V. (2023). A reconceptualization of the party family: SYRIZA, Podemos, and the emergence of the neo-reformist left. New Political Science. https:// doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2023.2235213 Botella, J., & Ramiro, L. (Eds.). (2003). The crisis of communism and party change: The evolution of West European communist and post-communist parties. Institut de Ciències Politiques i Socials. Bouma, A., Hildebrandt, C., & Koltsida, D. (Eds.). (2021). Radical in Diversity: Europe’s Left (2010–2020). The Merlin Press Ltd. B˝ orzel, T. A. (1998). Organizing Babylon—On the different conceptions of policy networks. Public Administration, 76(2), 253–273. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/1467-9299.00100 Bowler, S., & Farrell, D. M. (1992). The greens at the European level. Environmental Politics, 1(1), 132–137. Blyth, M. (2013). Austerity: The history of a dangerous idea. Oxford University Press. Bull, M. J., & Heywood, P. (Eds.). (1994). West European communist parties after the revolutions of 1989. Palgrave Macmillan. Busch, K., Hermann, C., Hinrichs, K., & Schulten, T. (2013). Euro crisis, austerity policy and the European social model: How crisis policies in

1

INTRODUCTION

27

Southern Europe threaten the EU’s social dimension. Friedrich Ebert Foundation, International Policy Analysis. BozÒki, A., & Ishiyama, J. T. (Eds.). (2002). The Communist successor parties of Central and Eastern Europe. M.E. Sharpe. Calossi, E. (2016). Anti-austerity left parties in the European Union: Competition, coordination and integration. Pisa University Press. Charalambous, G. (2011). All the shades of red: Examining the radical left’s Euroscepticism. Contemporary Politics, 17 (3), 299–320. Charalambous, G. (2013). European integration and the communist dilemma. Communist party responses to Europe in Greece, Cyprus and Italy. Routledge. Charalambous, G., & Ioannou, G. (2020). Left radicalism and populism in Europe. Routledge. Charalambous, G. (2022). The European radical left: Movements and parties since the 1960s. Pluto Press. Chiocchetti, P. (2014). The radical left at the 2014 European Parliament election. In C. Hildebrandt (Ed.), The left in Europe after the EU elections: New challenges (pp. 7–14). Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Chiocchetti, P. (2017). The radical left party family in Western Europe, 1989– 2015. Routledge. Christiansen, T., & Neuhold, C. (2013). Informal politics in the EU. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(6), 1196–1206. Christiansen, T., & Piattoni, S. (Eds.). (2003). Informal governance in the European Union. Edward Elgar. Cooper, L., & Hardy, S. (2012). Beyond capitalism? The future of radical politics. Zero Books. Curry, J. L., & Urban, J. B. (Eds.). (2003). The left transformed in postcommunist societies. Rowman & Littlefield. Dahlgreen, W. (2016.) British people keener on socialism than capitalism. https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2016/02/ YouGov. 23/british-people-view-socialism-more-favourably-capi Daiber, B., Hildebrandt, C., & Striethorst, A. (Eds.). (2011). From revolution to coalition—radical left parties in Europe. Rosa-Luxemburg-Foundation. Damiani, M. (2016). La sinistra radicale in Europa: Italia, Spagna, Francia, Germania. Donzelli. Della Porta, D., Kouki, H., & Fernández, J. (2017). Left’s love and hate for Europe: Syriza, Podemos and critical visions of Europe during the crisis. In M. Caiani & S. Guerra (Eds.), Euroscepticism, democracy and the media: Communicating Europe, contesting Europe (pp. 219–240). Palgrave Macmillan. De Waele, J.-M., & Seiler, D.-L. (Eds.). (2012). Les partis de la gauche anticapitaliste en Europe. Economica.

28

V. BORTUN

Delwit, P., Kulahci, E., & Van Der Walle, C. (2004). The European party federations: Political players in the making? In P. Delwit, E. Kulahci, & C. Van Der Walle (Eds.), The Europarties: Organisation and influence (pp. 5–16). ULB. Dietz, T. M. (2000). Similar but different? The European Greens compared to other transnational party federations in Europe. Party Politics, 6(2), 199–210. Doˇcekalová, P. (2006). Radical right-wing parties in Central Europe: Mutual contacts and cooperation. Politics in Central Europe, 2(2), 7–23. Ducange, J-N., Marlière, P., & Weber, L. (2013). La gauche radicale en Europe. Editions du Croquant. Dunphy, R. (2004). Contesting capitalism? Left parties and European integration. Manchester University Press. Dunphy, R., & Bale, T. (2011). The radical left in coalition government: Towards a comparative measurement of success and failure. Party Politics, 17 (4), 488– 504. Dunphy, R., & March, L. (2013). Seven-year itch? The European Left Party: Struggling to transform the EU. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 14(4), 520–537. Dunphy, R., & March, L. (2019). The European Left Party. Manchester University Press. Durham, M., & Power, M. (Eds.). (2010). New perspectives on the transnational right. Palgrave. Edelman Trust Barometer. (2020). 20th Annual Edelman Trust Barometer. https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2020-01/2020% 20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Global%20Report.pdf Eley, G. (2002). Forging democracy: The history of the left in Europe, 1850–2000. Oxford University Press. Fagerholm, A. (2018). The radical right and the radical left in contemporary Europe: Two min–max definitions. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 26(4), 411–424. Farnsworth, K., & Irving, Z. (2012). Varieties of crisis, varieties of austerity: Social policy in challenging times. Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, 20(2), 133–147. Ferraresi, G. (2016). European populism in the 21st century: The ideological background of Syriza, Podemos and the 5 Star Movement. Biblioteca Della Libertà, 216, 49–68. Firestone, W. A. (1993). Alternative arguments for generalizing from data as applied to qualitative research. Educational Researcher, 22(4), 16–23. Foster, J. B. (2000). Marx and internationalism. Monthly Review, 52(3). Gagatek, W., & Van Hecke, S. (2011). Towards policy-seeking Europarties? The development of European political foundations (EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 2011/58). European University Institute.

1

INTRODUCTION

29

Gamble, A. (2009). The spectre at the feast: Capitalist crisis and the politics of recession. Palgrave. Gohlke, N., & Wissler, J. (2015, July 31). Escaping the Euro dream. Jacobin. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/07/germany-greece-austerity-grexit/ Golemis, H. (2012). Coping with the challenge posed by the crisis. The Transform website: https://www.transform-network.net/en/blog/article/copingwith-the-challenge-posed-by-the-crisis/ Hanf, K., & Soetendorp, B. (1998). Small states and the Europeanization of public policy. In K. Hanf & B. Soetendorp (Eds.), Adapting to European integration: Small states and the European Union (pp. 1–13). Longman. Hanley, D. (2008). Beyond the nation state: Parties in the era of European integration. Palgrave Macmillan. Handl, V. (2002). Die Tschechische Kommunistische Partei: orthodoxes Fossil oder erfolgreiche neokommunistische Protestpartei? FES Library. Harvard IOP Survey. (2016). Survey of Young Americans’ Attitudes toward Politics and Public Service 29th Edition. https://iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/ files/content/160423_Harvard%20IOP_Spring%202016_TOPLINE_u.pdf Harvey, D. (2010). The enigma of capital and the crises of capitalism. Profile. Heartfield, J. (2003). Postmodern desertions—capitalism and anti-capitalism. International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, 5(2), 271–289. Heilig, D. (2016). Mapping the European left: Socialist parties in the EU . Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Heisenberg, D. (2005). The institution of ‘consensus’ in the European Union: Formal versus informal decision-making in the Council. European Journal of Political Research, 44(1), 65–90. Héritier, A. (2007). Explaining institutional change in Europe. Oxford University Press. Hermann, C. (2007). Neoliberalism in the European Union. Studies in Political Economy, 79, 61–89. Heywood, A. (2003). Political ideologies: An introduction (3rd ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. Hildebrandt, C., & Daiber, B. (Eds.). (2009). The left in Europe: Political parties and party alliances between Norway and Turkey. Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. Hix, S., & Lord, C. (1997). Political Parties in the European Union. Macmillan. Hix, S., Noury, A. G., & Roland, G. (2007). Democratic politics in the European Parliament. Cambridge University Press. Holmes, M., & Lightfoot, S. (2012). Europeanisation of the Left: Cooperation or competition? In G. Strange & O. Worth (Eds.), European regionalism and the left (pp. 85–100). Manchester University Press. Holmes, M., & Lightfoot, S. (2016). To EU or not to EU? The transnational radical left and the crisis. In L. March & D. Keith (Eds.), Europe’s radical

30

V. BORTUN

left: From marginality to mainstream? (pp. 333–351). Rowman & Littlefield International. Holmes, M., & Roder, K. (Eds.). (2012). The left and the European constitution. From Laeken to Lisbon. Manchester University Press. Hudson, K. (2000). European communism since 1989. Macmillan. Hudson, K. (2012). The new European left: A socialism for the twenty-first century? Palgrave Macmillan. Iglesias, P. (2015a). Politics in a time of crisis. Podemos and the future of a democratic Europe. Verso. Institute of Economic Affairs. (2021). 67 per cent of young Brits want a socialist economic system, finds new poll. Institute of Economic Affairs website: https://iea.org.uk/media/67-per-cent-of-young-brits-want-a-social ist-economic-system-finds-new-poll/ Ishiyama, J. T. (Ed.). (1999). Communist successor parties in post-Communist politics. Nova Science. Jacobs, F., & Corbett, R. (1990). The European Parliament. Longman. Johansson, K. M. (2002). Party elites in multilevel Europe: The Christian Democrats and the Single European Act. Party Politics, 8(4), 423–439. Kaiser, W. (2004). Transnational Christian democracy: From the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales to the European People’s Party. In M. Gehler & W. Kaiser (Eds.), Christian democracy in Europe since 1945 (Vol. 2, pp. 194–208). Routledge. Kaiser, W. (2007). Christian democracy and the origins of the European Union. Cambridge University Press. Kaiser, W. (2013). Europeanization of Christian democracy? Negotiating organization, enlargement, policy and allegiance in the European People’s Party. In W. Kaiser & J.-H. Meyer (Eds.), Societal actors in European integration: Polity-building and policy-making, 1958–1992 (pp. 15–37). Palgrave Macmillan. Kaiser, W., & Starie, P. (Eds.). (2005). Transnational European Union: Towards a common political space. Routledge. Kaiser, W., Leucht, B., & Gehler, M. (2010). Transnational networks in European integration governance: Historical perspectives on an elusive phenomenon. In W. Kaiser, B. Leucht, & M. Gehler (Eds.), Transnational Networks in Regional Integration. Governing Europe, 1945–83 (pp. 1–17). Palgrave Macmillan. Katsambekis, G., & Kioupkiolis, A. (2019). The populist radical left in Europe. Routledge. Kapteyn, P. (1960). The Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community as a representative institution. In K. Lindsay (Ed.), European Assemblies: The experimental Period, 1949–1959. Stevens & Sons Limited.

1

INTRODUCTION

31

Keith, D. (2010). Ready to get their hands dirty. The Socialist Party and GroenLinks in the Netherlands. In J. Olsen, D. Hough, & M. Koß (Eds.), From pariahs to players? Left parties in national governments (pp. 155–172). Palgrave Macmillan. Keith, D., & March, L. (2016). Introduction. In L. March & D. Keith (Eds.), Europe’s radical left: From marginality to mainstream? (pp. 1–23). Rowman & Littlefield International. Kioupkiolis A., & Katsambekis, G. (2018). Radical left populism from the margins to the mainstream: A comparison of Syriza and Podemos. In Ó. García Agustín, M. Briziarelli (Eds.), Podemos and the new political cycle (pp. 201–226). Palgrave Macmillan. Knieling, J., & Othengrafen, F. (Eds.). (2016). Cities in crisis: Socio-spatial impacts of the economic crisis in Southern European cities. Routledge. Kouki, H., & González, J. F. (2018). Syriza, Podemos and mobilizations against austerity: Movements, parties or movement-parties? In J. Roose, M. Sommer, & F. Scholl (Eds.), Europas Zivilgesellschaft in der Wirtschafts-und Finanzkrise (pp. 123–140). Springer VS. Kriesi, H., & Pappas, T. S. (2015). Populism during crisis: An introduction. In H. Kriesi & T. S. Pappas (Eds.), European populism in the shadow of the Great Recession (pp. 9–18). ECPR Press. Ladi, S., & Graziano, P. (2014). ’Fast forward’ Europeanization: Welfare state reform in light of Eurozone crisis. In R. Coman, T. Kostera, & L. Tomini (Eds.), Europeanization and EU Integration: From incremental to structural change? (pp. 108–126). Palgrave. Ladrech, R. (2002). Europeanization and political parties: Towards a framework for analysis. Party Politics, 8(4), 389–403. Ladrech, R. (2003). The party of European socialists: Networking Europe’s social democrats. The Journal of Policy History, 15(1), 113–129. Ladrech, R. (2007). Supporting European political foundations affiliated with political parties at the European level. Europäisches Parlament, 2007 , 39–48. Laurent, P. (2016). Alliance for democracy—against austerity in Europe. The PCF website: http://international.pcf.fr/85230 Lavelle, A. (2014). Postface: Death by a thousand cuts. In D. J. Bailey, J.-M. De Waele, F. Escalona, & M. Vieira (Eds.), European social democracy during the global economic crisis: Renovation or resignation? (pp. 270–283). Manchester University Press. Lightfoot, S. (2005). The rise of the party of European socialists. Routledge. Lightfoot, S. (2006). The consolidation of Europarties? The “Party Regulation” and the development of political parties in the European Union. Representation, 42(4), 303–314. Lisi, M. (2013). Rediscovering civil society? Renewal and continuity in the Portuguese radical left. South European Society and Politics, 18(1), 21–39.

32

V. BORTUN

Mak, J., & Van Tatenhove, J. (2006). Introduction: Informality in a future EU. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 7 (1), 1–7. March, L. (2002). The Communist Party in post-Soviet Russia. Manchester University Press. March, L. (2011). Radical left parties in Europe. Routledge. March, L., & Mudde, C. (2005). What’s left of the radical left? The European radical left after 1989: Decline and mutation. Comparative European Politics, 3, 23–49. March, L., & Rommerskirchen, C. (2015). Out of left field? Explaining the variable electoral success of European radical left parties. Party Politics, 21(1), 40–53. March, L., Escalona, F., & Keith, D. (Eds.). (2023). The Palgrave Handbook of the Radical Left. Palgrave Macmillan. Markou, G. (2021). The systemic metamorphosis of Greece’s once radical left-wing SYRIZA party. openDemocracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/ en/rethinking-populism/the-systemic-metamorphosis-of-greeces-once-rad ical-left-wing-syriza-party/ Marx, K. (1864 [2000]). Inaugural Address of the International Working Men’s Association. In Inaugural Address and Provisional Rules of the International Working Men’s Association. The Marx & Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org): https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1864/10/27.htm Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1975). Critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right. Introduction. In K. Marx, Early writings (pp. 243–257). Penguin. Matsaganis, M., & Leventi, C. (2014). The distributional impact of austerity and the recession in Southern Europe. South European Society and Politics, 19(3), 393–412. Matthijs, M. (2014). Mediterranean blues: The crisis in Southern Europe. Journal of Democracy, 25(1), 101–115. McKee, M., Karanikolos, M., Belcher, P., & Stuckler, D. (2012). Austerity: A failed experiment on the people of Europe. Clinical Medicine, 12(4), 346– 350. McNally, D. (2011). Slump, austerity and resistance. In L. Panitch, G. Albo, & V. Chibber (Eds.), Socialist Register 2012: The crisis and the left (pp. 36–63). The Merlin Press. Meardi, G. (2011, September 7–10). Flexicurity & state traditions: The Europeanisation of employment policies before and after the economic crisis. Paper presented at the 2011 European Sociological Association’s Conference. https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/wbs/research/irru/public ations/recentconf/esa_gm.pdf Moschonas, G. (2013). The ‘broken equilibrium’ in European politics: The Europe factor and the weakening of mainstream parties (with an emphasis on centre-left and radical Left parties). In The Rise of Populism and Extremist

1

INTRODUCTION

33

Parties in Europe, The Spinelli Group (in collaboration with Bertelsmann Stiftung) (pp. 20–27). Murray, P. (2004). Factors for integration? Transnational Party Cooperation in the European Parliament, 1952–79. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 50(1), 102–115. Navarro, V. (2007). Neoliberalism as a class ideology; or, the political causes of the growth of inequalities. International Journal of Health Services, 37 (1), 47–62. Newman, M. (1996). Party of European socialists. London Metropolitan University. Niedermayer, O. (1983). Europdische Parteien? Zur grenziiberschreitenden Interaktion politischer Parteien im Rahmen der EG. Campus Verlag. Nikolakakis, N. (2016). SYRIZA’s stance vis-à-vis the European Union following the financial crisis: The persistence of left Europeanism and the role of the European Left Party. European Politics and Society. https://doi.org/10. 1080/23745118.2016.1196918 O’Neill, M. (1997). New politics, old predicaments: The case of the European Greens. The Political Quarterly, 68(1), 50–67. Papini, R. (1997). Christian Democrat International. Rowman & Littlefield. Poguntke, T., Aylott, N., Carter, E., Ladrech, R., & Luther, K. R. (2007). The Europeanization of National Political Parties: Power and organization adaption. Routledge. Pridham, G. (1982). Christian democrats, conservatives and transnational party cooperation in the European Community: Centre-forward or centre-right? In Z. Layton-Henry (Ed.), Conservative politics in Western Europe (pp. 318– 346). Palgrave Macmillan. Pridham, G. (2005). Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe. Palgrave. Racz, B., & Bukowski, C. J. (Eds.). (1999). The return of the left in postCommunist states: Current trends and future prospects. Edward Elgar. Ramiro, L. (2016). Support for radical left parties in Western Europe: Social background, ideology and political orientations. European Political Science Review, 8(1), 1–23. Raunio, T. (2001). The party system of the European Parliament after the 1999 elections. In J. Lodge (Ed.), The 1999 elections to the European Parliament (pp. 231–251). Palgrave. Salm, C. (2016). Transnational Socialist networks in the 1970s: European Community development aid and southern enlargement. Palgrave Macmillan. Sassoon, D. (Ed.). (1998). Looking left: European socialism after the Cold War. I. B. Tauris. Saurugger, S. (2014). Europeanisation in times of crisis. Political Studies Review, 12, 181–192.

34

V. BORTUN

Schoeller, M., Guidi, M., & Karagiannis, Y. (2017). Explaining informal policymaking patterns in the Eurozone crisis: Decentralized bargaining and the theory of EU institutions. International Journal of Public Administration, 40(14), 1211–1222. Schui, F. (2014). Austerity: The great failure. Yale University Press. Segatti, P., & Capuzzi, F. (2016). Five Stars Movement, Syriza and Podemos: A Mediterranean model? In A. Martinelli (Ed.), Beyond Trump. Populism on the Rise (pp. 47–72). ISPI. Seiler, D. L. (2011). Clivages et familles politiques en Europe. ULB. Semmler, W. (2013). The macroeconomics of austerity in the European Union. Social Research: An International Quarterly, 80(3), 883–914. Senninger, R., Bischof, D., & Ezrow, L. (2022). How transnational party alliances influence national parties’ policies. Political Science Research and Methods, 10(3). Sozzi, F. (2011). La sinistra radicale a livello europeo. Organizzazione e potere di un partito sovranazionale. Librerirauniversitaria.it. Stacey, J. (2010). Integrating Europe: Informal politics and institutional change. Oxford University Press. Startin, N. (2010). Where to for the radical right in the European parliament? The rise and fall of transnational political cooperation. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 11(4), 429–449. Startin, N., & Brack, N. (2016). To cooperation of not to cooperate? The European radical right and pan-European cooperation. In J. Fitzgibbon, B. Leruth, & N. Startin (Eds.), Euroscepticism as a transnational and pan-European phenomenon (pp. 28–45). Routledge. Survation. (2022). New poll: Public strongly backing public ownership of energy and key utilities. https://www.survation.com/new-poll-public-strongly-bac king-public-ownership-of-energy-and-key-utilities/ SYRIZA. (2014). The Thessaloniki Programme. http://www.SYRIZA.gr/art icle/id/59907/SYRIZA---THE-THESSALONIKI-PROGRAMME.html#. WdTC8FtSxII Taylor, R. (2009). Europe’s divided left. Dissent, 56(2), 5–9. Tondl, G. (1998). EU regional policy in the Southern periphery: Lessons for the future. South European Society and Politics, 3(1), 93–129. Transform. (2016). Tracing and alternative plan for Europe. The Transform website: http://www.transform-network.net/blog/blog-2016/news/detail/ Blog/tracing-an-alternative-plan-for-europe.html Tsakatika, M., & Eleftheriou, C. (2013). The radical left’s turn towards civil society in Greece: One strategy. South European Society and Politics. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2012.757455

1

INTRODUCTION

35

Tsipras, A. (2015a). Behind the compromise. Jacobin Magazine. https://www. jacobinmag.com/2015/08/greece-memorandum-austerity-coup-tsipras-SYR IZA-interview/ van Apeldoorn, B. (2001). The struggle over European order: Transnational class agency in the making of ‘embedded neo-liberalism’. In A. Bieler, & A. D. Morton (Eds.), Social forces in the making of the New Europe: The restructuring of European social relations in the global political economy (pp. 70–89). Palgrave. van Hecke, S. (2010). Do transnational party federations matter? (… Why should we care?). Journal of Contemporary European Research, 6(3), 395–411. Visser, M., Lubbers, M., Kraaykamp, G., & Jaspers, E. (2014). Support for radical left ideologies in Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 53, 541–558. Wennerhag, M., Frohlich, ¨ C., & Piotrowski, G. (Eds.). (2016). Radical left movements in Europe. Ashgate. Worth, O. (2013). Resistance in the age of austerity: Nationalism, the failure of the left and the return of God. Zed Books.

CHAPTER 2

United We Stand? European Integration and Radical Left Transnational Cooperation

This chapter undertakes a critical review of the existing literature to outline the evolution of transnational cooperation among RLPs in the context of European integration. It does so by tracing the main organisational developments of that process and its key challenges over the decades. Thus, the chapter’s five sections deal in turn with the Communist & Allies Group (the pre-1989 radical left group in the EP), The Left (the current EP group, also known as GUE/NGL), the European Left Party (the only Euro-party of the radical left), Plan B for Europe (transnational initiative involving, among others, Bloco and Podemos), and the Transform Europe network (the political foundation of the European Left Party). This chapter reveals the continuity of TPC on the radical left throughout the history of European integration, particularly in terms of the long-standing challenges faced by this cooperation, most prominent among them the parties’ various, often incompatible, stances towards the EU.

Radical Left Party Cooperation Before 1989: Communist and Allies Group Initially, RLPs in Western Europe (but also some social democratic parties such as the British Labour Party) were united in their staunch opposition to European integration, chiefly seen as a project of international © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Bortun, Crisis, Austerity and Transnational Party Cooperation in Southern Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39151-4_2

37

38

V. BORTUN

capital (Butler, 1995). However, with the simultaneous decline of the industrial working class, of the Keynesian economic paradigm and of national self-sufficiency in the age of globalisation, by the end of 1980s most RLPs—except for a handful of orthodox communist and Trotskyist parties—had gradually endorsed the project of European integration (Dunphy, 2004, pp. 1–2). As neoliberalism established itself as the new dominant paradigm in most member states, the European Community came to be seen by the left as “a positive ground for a socialist alternative” (Castellina, 1988, p. 27). But because of their initial opposition to the European project, communist parties were not allowed representation in the EP until 1969, when the Italian Communist Party (PCI) was allocated seven MEPs following its endorsement of European integration (Murray, 2004, p. 112). This change of position was part of PCI’s Eurocommunist turn, rooted in the idea that each communist party should be able to follow its own path to socialism, free of any interference from Moscow. In the case of Western European communist parties, the distinct path to socialism would entail an acceptance of and engagement with liberal democracy at a national level and European integration at an international level. Thus, the Eurocommunist view was that the left had to reform the EU from within and develop it into a progressive, potentially socialist, alternative pole of power to both the US and the Soviet Union (Dunphy, 2004, pp 24–26). In the early 1970s, the other major Western European communist party, the French Communist Party (PCF), also adopted, more cautiously, a strategy of engagement with the EU as part of their temporary, halfhearted turn to Eurocommunism. Thus, in 1973 the PCF sent four deputies to the EP, together with the seven Italian MEPs and one Danish MEP representing the People’s Socialist Party enabled the formation of the first ever radical left group in the EP—the Communist and Allies Group (CAG). As the EU expanded in Southern Europe during the 1980s, the two Greek Communist parties—Exterior (KKE) and Interior (KKE-es), the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), and the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) joined the ranks of the CAG, which thereby became the fourth largest group in the EP. However, growing divisions between the PCI and the PCF from the late 1970s onwards steadily eroded the unity for the CAG in terms of both policy and voting (Murray, 2004, p. 112). Those divisions intensified throughout the 1980s, with the smaller parties aligning themselves

2

UNITED WE STAND? EUROPEAN INTEGRATION …

39

with either the PCI (i.e. KKE-Es and PCE) or the PCF (i.e. KKE and PCP), thus effectively creating two broad camps within the CAG—the Eurocommunists and the orthodox, pro-Moscow communists, respectively. The growing internal cleavage was reflected, for example, by the group’s conspicuous lack of a common programme for the 1984 European elections (Calossi, 2016, pp. 150–151), as well as by the broader failure to establish a transnational party federation as the other main political families had already done in the mid-1970s. This cleavage not only led to the split of the CAG but also of the wider Western European communist movement. This had lasting inhibiting effects on the transnational cooperation among RLPs at EU level well into the 1990s and beyond (Dunphy & March, 2013; Hudson, 2000). It is worth, therefore, elaborating on the main points of difference between the two camps of the Communist left.1 Firstly, the two biggest communist parties in Western Europe and their respective allies were divided over the question of the Soviet Union and the power dynamics within the international communist movement. As said earlier, the PCF went through a stage of relative distancing from Moscow, which started with the denunciation of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and then continued throughout most of the 1970s, mainly as part of its attempt to forge domestically a broad left electoral coalition with the Socialist Party. However, by the end of the decade, the PCF abandoned that strategy and restored its allegiance to what was, after all, the epicentre of “actually existing socialism” as well as one of its main funding sources (Bell, 2005, p. 49). Thus, the PCF supported the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as well as the 1981 imposition of martial law in Poland, both of which were openly condemned by Eurocommunist parties (Dunphy, 2004, pp. 40–41). The PCI, PCE and KKE-Es not only condemned Soviet interventions but increasingly distanced themselves from the rest of the European communist movement, as best illustrated by their refusal to attend the 1 It is worth noting though that none of these parties was perfectly homogeneous in its allegiance to one camp or the other. Each had its own internal divisions, which came to a conclusion with the fall of the USSR. Thus, the PCI’s own orthodox faction went on to establish the Communist Refoundation Party following the majority’s decision in 1991 to reconvert into a social democratic party. That same year, the orthodox KKE would also suffer a major split, with nearly 40% of its members—known as “renovators”, most of whom would later be found in SYRIZA—breaking away from the party after having failed to move it away from its Soviet-style positions and organisation.

40

V. BORTUN

1980 Paris conference of communist parties organised by the PCF. This was bound to happen given Eurocommunism’s ambition to be a ‘third way’ between Soviet communism and Western social democracy (despite the PCI receiving funding from Moscow till as late as 1984 (Drake, 2004)). Indeed, PCE’s creation of the broad electoral front United Left in 1986 and KKE-Es’ change of name that same year to Greek Left (later reorganised as the Coalition of Left and Progress, or Synaspismos, the future main component of SYRIZA) signalled these parties’ strategic shift towards working with other forces of the left, which would become a key feature of contemporary RLPs. The PCI would go even further than that and develop into a fully-fledged social democratic party after 1989, thus feeding into the argument that Eurocommunism was bound to end up as social democracy (Hudson, 2000, pp. 31–32). Secondly, and most crucially for today’s radical left, the two camps were divided over the question of the EU. The PCF reluctantly accepted engagement with European institutions largely as a necessary evil, having acknowledged that, despite being a fundamentally and irreversibly capitalist project, the EU was there to stay if not expand (Bardi & Ignazi, 1999). Thus, the PCF’s goal was not to try and reform the EU from within but rather to do its best to block any further transfer of power from the national to the European level (Calossi, 2016, p. 150). Indeed, the PCF opposed the EU’s enlargement to Southern Europe, which was obviously at odds with PCE’s and KKE-Es’ strong pro-integration stances, as they saw in European integration the best guarantee for the democratisation and development of their countries, which had recently emerged from right-wing dictatorships (Hudson, 2000, pp. 30–31). Moreover, as noted above, the PCI, PCE and KKE-Es believed that the EU could be reformed in a way that would prevent it from becoming just another pole of oppressive power alongside the US and the USSR, but on the contrary—develop it into a democratic and progressive, if not necessarily socialist, alternative to the two superpowers. As these parties took increasingly critical distance from the USSR, they placed more importance on the EU’s potential as a ground for developing an alternative model of socialism. However, given the international isolation of Eurocommunist parties— which lacked the support of a powerful state such as the USSR—as well as national electoral regress, their incapacity to deliver a coherent and credible strategy for a left-led transformation of the EU saw the demise of Eurocommunism in the early 1980s (Dunphy, 2004, p. 27). Nonetheless,

2

UNITED WE STAND? EUROPEAN INTEGRATION …

41

the Eurocommunist idea of reforming the EU from within survived in the following decades, at first under the name “Euro-Left” and later on as “left-Europeanism”, and ended up being endorsed by the PCF itself in the early 1990s, which marked the beginning of a relative consensus on the radical left on this matter (with the continuous exceptions of the KKE and PCP): critical support for European integration (March, 2011). That consensus would suffer visible cracks during the Eurozone crisis, though, as shown later on. Thirdly, largely because of their different views on the USSR and the EU, the orthodox and Eurocommunist parties were also divided on the question of transnational cooperation itself. On the one hand, while orthodox parties’ commitment to Soviet-style socialism involved some degree of cooperation with Moscow and other like-minded parties, both the PCF (even during its Eurocommunist phase) and the KKE were suspicious of too much transnational cooperation, which for them entailed the risk of having other parties interfering with their domestic affairs. Theoretically, that was rooted in the old Stalinist notion of “socialism in one country”, which did not see—in contrast to the ideas of Lenin or Trotsky—world revolution as crucial to the building process of socialism. Thus, the PCF refused throughout the 1970s to recognise the KKE-Es— who had emerged in 1968 as a split from the KKE following the latter’s endorsement of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia—in order not to interfere in what was seen as the business of another communist party. On the other hand, given their staunchly European orientation and aspiration to reform the EU from within (particularly against the background of renewed tensions between the US and USSR throughout the 1980s), Eurocommunist parties naturally favoured the enhancement of TPC. Initially, they tried to achieve that in the frame of their broader political family, but as they gradually distanced themselves from Moscow and the orthodox communist parties, Eurocommunist parties had to find new allies within the wider European left, particularly among social democratic parties. Thus, the failed Eurocommunist project made room for the new, broader project of the Euro-Left, with the PCI, PCE and KKEEs establishing communication links and holding summits with various social democratic parties, including the French Socialist Party, which only

42

V. BORTUN

further strained the relations between the PCI and the PCF.2 As Dunphy (2004, p. 40) puts it, “it was ultimately the European question that was to prove decisive in bringing the PCI and its allies to assist in the creation of a new Western European left”. As it will be shown in Chapter 3, it was an approach that SYRIZA would try, years later, to emulate following the events in July 2015. That broad front of the Western European left, however, never came about. The fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and, eventually, the collapse of the USSR itself brought a colossal blow to the radical left in terms of both domestic and international support and legitimacy (Sassoon, 1998)—a blow that did not discriminate between communist parties that had been critical of and those loyal to Moscow. With capitalism now “the only game in town”, mainstream social democracy moved to the right, further away from its communist wooers (Lavelle, 2008). Indeed, the leading party of the Euro-Left project itself, the PCI, joined the social democratic party family altogether in 1991 as the new Democratic Party of the Left, which resulted in the unsurprising demise of the Euro-Left. Nonetheless, while ending up in failure just like the Eurocommunism that it stemmed from, the Euro-Left helped set the ground for the post1989 TPC among the RLPs supportive of European integration, which would culminate in 2004 with the creation of the ELP. At the same time, the increased ideological flexibility and willingness to cooperate with other forces of the left, which characterised the Euro-Left project and were also reflected at the domestic level by the creation of the aforementioned broad left fronts in Spain and Greece, would become one of the distinctive features of the new RLPs that would emerge at the turn of the century (March, 2011). As regards to the CAG itself, considering the internal divisions discussed above, its breakup in 1989 came as no surprise. As a result, the Eurocommunist and orthodox parties reorganised in two separate groups in the EP, named—rather ironically—the European United Left (with 28 MEPs) and Left Unity (with 14 MEPs), respectively. Nevertheless, with all its limits and predictable demise, throughout its fifteen years of existence the CAG had managed to establish the first channels of 2 It is paradigmatic in that respect the 1989 visit to France of the PCI’s secretarygeneral, Achille Occhetto, during which he chose to meet with the leaders of the Socialist Party but not those of PCF (Hanley, 2008).

2

UNITED WE STAND? EUROPEAN INTEGRATION …

43

communication among communist parties in Western Europe that were not directly dependent on Moscow. The most notable moment of this “new diplomacy” (Dunphy, 2004, p. 30) was arguably the 1977 summit in Madrid between the PCE, the PCI, and the PCF, which did seem at the time to promise the emergence of “a dynamic unified bloc aimed at strengthening Communist influence on the policies of the European Community, and possibly at undermining the community over time” (Timmermann, 1979, p. 31). Although that “unified bloc” never materialised and transnational cooperation became increasingly problematic, as shown above, the CAG amounted to a historical step forward for the Western European radical left, in terms of networking if nothing else. Also, from the broader perspective of the EU institutions, the CAG did add, despite its lack of consistency, a radical dimension to a Parliament that had been rather monopolised by “centrist politics” (Murray, 2004, p. 112), thus arguably enhancing, even if symbolically, the political representativeness and legitimacy of the EP.

Renewed Party Cooperation in the EP After 1989: The Left Group As said above, the Western European RLPs did not fare well following the demise of actually existing communism in the East. Around that time, some of them changed their name (KKE-Es), some experienced significant splits (KKE, PCP and PCE), while others reinvented themselves altogether as new parties with a new ideological orientation (PCI). The decline was reflected electorally at both the national level, where the overall average vote of RLPs dropped from 11.26% in the period 1980– 1989 to 7.58% in the period 1990–1999 (March, 2011, pp. 2–3), and the European level, where between 1989 and 1994 the radical left went from 42 to 35 MEPs (Calossi, 2016, p. 153, 163). Indeed, the Eurocommunist group in the EP, the European United Left, disbanded in 1993 following PCI’s reconversion into a social democratic party and subsequent affiliation to the PES and its corresponding group in the EP, today’s Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D). The last institutional relic of Eurocommunism had crumbled. The orthodox communist Left Unity group in the EP also dissolved following the 1994 European elections, as the PCF, KKE and PCP combined fell six seats short of the eighteen needed in order to maintain the group in the new legislature.

44

V. BORTUN

This forced both camps to seek realignment with each other, not the least because of their broadly shared opposition to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Hudson, 2000, p. 70).3 There were also institutional incentives for that rapprochement, particularly the new legislative powers of the EP after Maastricht and its internal rules that allocated very few funds to non-inscrits MEPs, who also tend to be excluded from important positions in the structures of the EP (Calossi, 2016, p. 156). Thus, the Confederal Group of the European United Left (GUE) was established in 1994 as the new group of the radical left in the EP, comprising of the PCE-led United Left (IU), Synaspismos (formerly KKE-Es), PCP, KKE and a PCF that commenced that very same year a process of internal democratisation and critical distancing from Soviet-style socialism. With the EU’s 1995 enlargement, the Swedish Left Party and the Finnish Left Alliance also joined GUE, which was thus renamed—rather uninspiringly—as the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL). That change was meant to reflect the relative distinctiveness of the new Scandinavian component, which was both more Eurosceptic than the likes of IU and Synaspismos and much more critical of the former socialist regimes in Eastern Europe than the likes of PCP and KKE. The newcomers also added a strong environmentalist dimension to the group (Calossi, 2016, p. 157), which was still marginal on the agenda of most RLPs. Over the years, GUE/NGL—which since 2021 has been renamed simply The Left in the European Parliament (The Left from hereon)—expanded by including either left-wing MEPs who did not feel represented by other groups, or entire new parties such as Germany’s Die Linke or Portugal’s Bloco, or RLPs from the countries who joined the EU in 2004, such as the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Czech Republic) or the Progressive Party of Working People (Cyprus). Thus, the group—which is the only transnational structure that all three parties discussed here belong to—has clearly widened, hitting an alltime high of 52 MEPs from 14 member states during the 2014–2019 EP. That number decreased, however, to 38 following the 2019 elections, for reasons that will become apparent in the following chapters. Fundamentally, the group has not been able to become much more than a loose and eclectic confederation (Dunphy, 2004; Holmes & Lightfoot, 2016), with 3 That opposition was not homogenous though, with Synaspismos and KKE voting for and against, respectively, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (Nikolakakis, 2016, p. 5).

2

UNITED WE STAND? EUROPEAN INTEGRATION …

45

an executive body that has no binding power on the constituent parties (Calossi, 2016, p. 193). While this allows its members to “enjoy their own legitimacy and freedom within the group” (Calossi, 2016, p. 193), it also means the group has failed to achieve a common political programme going beyond broad goals such as “of a socially equitable and sustainable Europe based on international solidarity” (The Left, n.d.). While the group’s rather thin integration has something to do with the persisting second-order importance of the EP among EU’s power structures, it is fundamentally rooted in significant ideological differences, most relevant being precisely in relation to European integration. The literature tends to identify two broad camps in that respect, the “sovereignists” and the “Europeanists” (Dunphy & March, 2013, p. 523; see also Holmes & Lightfoot, 2016), where the former would favour, if not an outright exit, then at least a return of powers from the EU to the national level, while the latter aim to reform the EU from within by expanding integration in areas such as taxation or social rights. For instance, as one of the most prominent RLPs in the sovereignist camp, the KKE intensified its calls for the dissolution of the EU with the unravelling of the crisis and finally stepped out of The Left group in 2014, accusing the Europeanist camp of trying to hijack the group in service of its pro-EU agenda (KKE, 2014). As discussed further below, others in the literature have proposed more refined classifications of Euroscepticism on the radical left (Bortun, 2022; Charalambous, 2011; Keith, 2017) to mirror not only its intensification but also diversification in the context of the crisis and particularly in the light of SYRIZA’s experience in government.

Late at the Party: The European Left Party The 1992 Treaty on the European Union, commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty, provided new incentives for TPC—given the significant deepening of European integration it entailed—as well as the legal framework in that regard. Article 138a of the treaty stated that Euro-parties are “to contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union”. That same year, the two main pre-existing party federations, of the centre-right and the centreleft, reorganised as Euro-parties—in a total or nearly total overlap with their corresponding political groups in the European Parliament—namely the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Party of European Socialists

46

V. BORTUN

(PES), respectively. The liberal, Green and radical left party families would do so only in 2004. In the case of the radical left, the belated establishment of its own Euro-party was of course rooted in the main cleavages discussed earlier, particularly over European integration and the former Soviet-style regimes, coupled with some parties’ reluctance towards the very idea of TPC, which for some originated “in the increased Comintern-aversion of the immediate post-1989 era” (Dunphy & March, 2013, p. 523). All this came in the broader context of the radical left’s relative political and organisational weakness throughout the 1990s. One could argue that parties struggling to remain relevant in their own domestic political arena have little time, resources and incentives to pay much attention to transnational cooperation. One notable exception in that period was the creation, in 1991, of the New European Left Forum, which represented the first attempt of RLPs to realign at a transnational level after the fall of the Eastern Bloc (Hudson, 2000, p. 10). With biannual meetings till 2002, this forum harboured the kind of networking that would lead, two years later, to the establishment of the ELP (Dunphy & March, 2019, p. 69). The exact timing of ELP’s creation mostly had to do—just like in the case of the Euro-parties of the liberal and Green political families— with the EU introducing in 2004 specific funding for Euro-parties. But it was the outcome of prominent RLPs such as the German Party of Democratic Socialism (future Die Linke), the Communist Refoundation Party (PRC), the PCE, Synaspismos or the (reformed) PCF becoming increasingly aware that, in order to counter the EU’s neoliberal design and policymaking, they needed coordinated action at transnational level (Dunphy & March, 2013, p. 523). In other words, the transnationalisation of capitalism, embodied at a European level by an increasingly neoliberal EU, impelled the transnationalisation of the European radical left too. The latter process went beyond political parties as such. The impact of the privatisations and budgetary cuts required by the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, particularly by the convergence criteria related to the European Monetary Union (Hudson, 2000, p. 77), led to the emergence, in the early 2000s, of transnational social movements opposed to neoliberalism, such as the European Social Forum (Dunphy & March, 2013, p. 524). The greater ideological flexibility and strategic pragmatism that characterised these parties relative to their pre-1989 predecessors or incarnations

2

UNITED WE STAND? EUROPEAN INTEGRATION …

47

further facilitated their transnational networking and cooperation (Bale & Dunphy, 2011; Keith, 2010; March, 2011). Indeed, the main instigators of the meetings and discussions that would lead to the creation of the ELP were the Party of Democratic Socialism and Synaspismos, which would later become the main components of the broader formations Die Linke and SYRIZA, respectively (Calossi, 2016, p. 178). Thus, the ELP was launched in January 2004 in Berlin, with the second meeting taking place in Athens a few months afterwards. Apart from the two parties, its eleven founding members included most of the other prominent RLPs in the EU at the time, such as the PCF, PRC, PCE and Bloco. It is worth noting the prevalence of RLPs from Southern member states, arguably indicative not only of their greater relative strength but perhaps also of their greater need for transnational cooperation in the face of a European institutional architecture that arguably disadvantages their countries’ “peripheral” or “semi-peripheral” economies in favour of those from the Northern “core” (Palley, 2013). Even the German party seemed fully aware of this North– South divide, as illustrated by its leader, Lothar Bisky (later on chairman of the ELP), stating that his party strived “not for a German Europe, but for a European Germany” (cf. Dunphy & March, 2013, p. 523). As of early 2023, the ELP had 25 full member and 11 observer parties from a total of 24 countries, including SYRIZA and Bloco (but not Podemos), as well as parties as diverse as the democratic socialist and electorally relevant Red–Green Alliance from Denmark or the socially conservative and electorally insignificant Romanian Socialist Party. However, this eclectic membership has also hindered ELP’s potential for coordinated action (Dunphy & March, 2013, p. 522). That is further complicated by an internal decision-making process based on consensus rather than qualified majority voting, which means, for example, that attempts at creating a more cohesive European policy can be blocked by the more Eurosceptic or domestically oriented members (Dunphy & March, 2019, pp. 237–238). Even so, the ELP is more cohesive than the Left group, particularly over the big question of Europe. That cohesion was best reflected by their common manifesto in the 2009 European elections—the first one of its kind in almost four decades of radical left party cooperation at the EU level. This happened again in the 2014 and 2019 elections. At the same time, this fundamental endorsement of European integration has prevented the ELP from attracting within its ranks more Eurosceptic but yet significant RLPs, such as the Swedish Left Party, the Dutch Socialist

48

V. BORTUN

Party or the Workers’ Party of Belgium, not to mention the resolutely anti-Europeanist KKE and PCP. This has also meant that, unlike the social democratic family, the radical left’s Euro-party and EP group are far from overlapping (Holmes & Lightfoot, 2016, p. 335). Thus, following the 2019 European elections, only 17 out of The Left’s 38 MEPs came from parties fully affiliated to the ELP. Just like Eurocommunism and the Euro-Left before it, the ELP sees the EU as an important, if not the main, field of class struggle, which cannot be abandoned but rather transformed by the left (Nikolakakis, 2016, p. 3). Thus, in its first years, the ELP would call, for example, for “a reform of the current Economic and Monetary Union system by placing the European Central Bank under democratic control and replacing the current growth and stability pact” (ELP, 2007, p. 9). Its stance towards the EU became more critical, though, with the start of the crisis, which was described as “an opportunity for the neoliberals to push their reforms all the way with appalling violence and speed … aimed at undermining and destroying the social state” (ELP, 2013). Nevertheless, the ELP has maintained its fundamental endorsement of European integration (Holmes & Lightfoot, 2016, p. 340). Thus, ahead of the 2014 European elections, it opposed the idea of an exit from the EU and even from the Eurozone (ELP, 2013, p. 13), advocating instead, in rather generic terms, for the reformation of the European project. As it will be explored in detail throughout the book, the U-turn of the SYRIZA government in July 2015, when the Greek RLP backed down from its anti-austerity pledges to sign a new bailout with the country’s international creditors, had a major impact on the wider European left. That included the ELP, with prominent figures from one of its most important members, Bloco, talking plainly of the possibility of breaking with the eurozone if not the EU as a whole (De Jongh, 2017). Indeed, in early 2018, the French Parti de Gauche [Left Party], led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, issued an official statement demanding the exclusion of SYRIZA from the ELP, as it accused the Greek party of enforcing “the logic of austerity to the point of restricting the right to strike, thus responding in an increasingly submissive way to the orders of the European Commission” (Ekathimerini, 2018). The ELP leadership, predictably, defended its only member in government at the time, which led the French party to disaffiliate from the ELP a few months later (Soudais, 2018) and stand on a different platform in the 2019 European

2

UNITED WE STAND? EUROPEAN INTEGRATION …

49

elections (although Mélenchon’s new party, La France Insoumise (LFI), is currently an observer member of the ELP). SYRIZA’s experience in government did push, though, the ELP into a more combative position towards the EU and its commitment to European integration became less unequivocal than before. This was reflected in its manifesto for the 2019 European elections (ELP, 2019). On the one hand, it still put forward proposals for reforming the EU, such as holding the ECB democratically accountable and tasking it with “employment goals”, abolishing the Fiscal Compact, or imposing a financial transaction tax (ELP, 2019, p. 3). On the other hand, it called on the left to “confront and change the European treaties” (ELP, 2019, p. 1) and to build “Europe on a new basis of solidarity where the sovereignty of the people must be respected” (ELP, 2019, p. 2). Thus, while that did not necessarily imply support for an exit, it did not explicitly reject it either, unlike in previous manifestos. What was more striking though was the absence from that manifesto or any other ELP document of any clear pathway to fight for the proposed reforms and, indeed, to “confront and change” the European treaties—a long-standing shortcoming that seems to generally characterise left-wing calls for reforming the EU (Holmes & Lightfoot, 2016, p. 345). Thus, the ELP’s strategy has been limited to reasserting the need to increase transnational cooperation as a necessary condition for left governments to break with austerity (Laurent, 2016). Such cooperation, the argument goes, would have to go beyond RLPs and aim to draw in broader progressive forces, including social movements, trade unions and activist networks. The most concrete step taken by the ELP in that direction was the launch in 2017 of an annual European Forum of Left, Green and Progressive Forces, which has taken place six times so far. The final declaration of its most recent meeting in Athens in 2022 reiterated the rather vague call for “a new model of economic governance for the EU based on sustainable development and social and climate justice” (European Forum, 2022). Without any clear strategy about how that could be achieved given the EU’s institutional architecture (which, among other things, requires unanimity among all member states for any significant change to the treaties) and the current balance of political forces in Europe, such aspirations appear as little more than mere wishful thinking. All in all, the ELP has had certain merits as well as limits in its nearly two-decade existence. On the one hand, its very creation is widely acknowledged as the single most significant development of the

50

V. BORTUN

transnational cooperation among RLPs at the EU level (Calossi, 2016; Dunphy & March, 2019; Hudson, 2012). Its relative growth and internal stability run counter to the kind of in-fighting and fragmentation that have characterised for so long most transnational projects of the radical left, as illustrated in the first section of the chapter. As Dunphy and March (2013, p. 521) put it, “given the long-term fragmentation of the radical left, the ELP appears to have consolidated remarkably and has brought RLP co-operation at EU level to a historical high”. Thus, in their more recent book dedicated to it, they conclude that the ELP has fully reached the second stage in Niedermayer’s model, that of cooperation (Dunphy & March, 2019, p. 240). More than that, the ELP is a “networking party” that acts as a nexus in the interaction and coordination of the various movements and activist groups of the wider European radical left (see Dunphy & March, 2019, pp. 155–192). On the other hand, the ELP has had a rather limited political impact, which is due of course to the limited success of most of its constituent parties in both national and European elections. It also has to do with the continuous pre-eminence of national politics over European politics, a structural factor that affects all Euro-parties (Dunphy & March, 2013, p. 521). But it is certain problems specific to this Euro-party and the wider transnational cooperation on the radical left that has prevented the ELP from fully reaching Niedermayer’s integration stage (Dunphy & March, 2019, p. 241). First, the progress achieved in galvanising TPC on the radical left notwithstanding, some of its members are still divided between those actively pushing for more cooperation (particularly SYRIZA, Bloco and Die Linke) and those like the PCF who, despite its significant reformation, has maintained a certain reluctance in that regard (Dunphy & March, 2013, p. 535). Second, despite its early Europeanist commitment, the ELP is facing growing programmatic and strategic divergence over the question of Europe (Dunphy & March, 2019, pp. 148–153), as reflected in the involvement of one of its most prominent members, namely Bloco (Portugal) and Red–Green Alliance (Denmark), in the parallel and more Eurosceptic initiative(s) Plan B/Now the people, discussed in the final section of the chapter. Thus, the ELP is “not just a small actor, but a (perhaps existentially) divided one too” (Dunphy & March, 2019, p. 237). Third, largely linked to this is also the ELP’s failure to attract within its ranks important RLPs that are less supportive of the EU, which also explains the comparatively small overlap between the ELP and The Left group in the EP, which in turn hinders

2

UNITED WE STAND? EUROPEAN INTEGRATION …

51

the political impact of both organisations. Fourth, despite an international context of crisis and austerity that would have demanded it more than ever, the ELP did not initiate or engage in any significant mass campaign or protest movement over the last decade, which will be shown to be rather paradigmatic for the elite character of most of the radical left TPC in the EU today and party explain its underwhelming impact during the crisis.

A Network of Networks: Transform Europe According to Article 2, point 4(d) of Regulation No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations, one of the key tasks of these foundations is to be “a framework for national political foundations, academics, and other relevant actors to work together at European level”. They are also supposed to be generators and vehicles of information, ideas and policies for their corresponding Euro-parties, which sometimes may lack the capacity to keep up with all the developments of European integration (Bardi et al., 2014; Gagatek & Van Hecke, 2011), which—at least in the Eurozone—has only enhanced in reaction to the crisis (Parker & Pye, 2017). Established in 2009, the Transform! Europe network (Transform from hereon) became one year later the recognised political foundation of the ELP, bringing together the political foundations of its constituent national parties. However, Transform is not merely the sum of its parts but an entity of its own, with its own staff and activities; nor is its spread limited to these national party foundations, but describes itself as a “cooperative project of independent non-profit organisations, institutes, foundations, and individuals” that “intends to use its work in contributing to peaceful relations among peoples and a transformation of the present world” (Transform, n.d.). At the time of writing, in April 2023, Transform had 20 full members from 14 countries, including the political foundations of SYRIZA, Bloco, Die Linke or the PCF, as well as 17 observer members, including Podemos’ foundation, the Republic and Democracy Institute. Thus, Transform is broader than ELP, as it also includes the political foundation of parties like Podemos, La France Insoumise or the Swedish Left Party, which are not themselves members of the ELP. Among its ‘friends’, Transform lists not only the ELP and The Left group, but also non-party initiatives

52

V. BORTUN

such as the Right to Energy Coalition, the European Alliance for a Just Transition, ATTAC, AlterSummit, or the Transnational Institute. There has been no study so far dedicated to Transform, which has been only marginally discussed in the literature (see Calossi, 2016, pp. 185–188; Dunphy & March, 2019, pp. 122–123; Hudson, 2012, pp. 58–62). As expected, it generally follows the same political line as the ELP, exhibiting a critical yet firm commitment to European integration (Calossi, 2016, p. 188). More exactly, Transform (n.d.) believes “the noble and progressive idea of European unification cannot be asserted in the face of the ubiquitous and growing nationalisms and the far right by uncritically defending the status-quo of the existing European Union”, which is why it “aims at providing spaces for free and unprejudiced discussion of democratic alternatives to pave the way towards a democratically and peacefully united Europe”. At the core of the network’s activity lies the coordination and cooperation among its members, which primarily consists of “theoretical and educational events and discussions regarding key issues for the democratic left in Europe and the world” as well as “publications and educational materials aimed at an intercontinental dialogue of the left and its scientific and educational institutions” (Transform, n.d.). As it will be detailed in Chapter 5, the events organised by Transform—either on its own or with other organisations—represented, outside the common work in the EP and The Left group, one of the most significant hubs for the networking, albeit not that much the cooperation, among the three RLPs discussed in this book.4 Moreover, Transform’s events have been consciously targeted at a wider pool of participants, beyond the ELP membership, as an attempt to galvanise and coordinate the wider process of transnational networking and cooperation on the radical left.

4 One such event, organised in Lisbon in October 2018 under the name “Is Southern

Europe the Weak Link of European Integration? Tracing Possible Areas of Cooperation among Movements and Parties”, provided the opportunity for conducting the nonparticipatory research mentioned in the methodology section. It allowed for valuable insights into the challenges and limits of TPC on the radical left today, discussed in the final chapter of the book.

2

UNITED WE STAND? EUROPEAN INTEGRATION …

53

Disobedient Euroscepticism: Plan B for Europe As mentioned already, the aftermath of SYRIZA’s 2015 U-turn saw a certain degree of realignment on the European radical left (Sheehan, 2016, p. 198). In the light of the Greek government’s failure to obtain any significant concessions against austerity through top-level negotiations, a growing number of voices saw the need for the left to develop a new strategy towards the EU and its institutions. Part of that process of realignment was the emergence of two new transnational initiatives specifically focused on the question of the EU: the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25), led by the former SYRIZA finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, and the Plan B for Europe (Plan B) initiative, led by several prominent RLPs, including Bloco and Podemos. In what has been described as a paradigmatic example of ‘transnational populism’ (De Cleen et al., 2020), DiEM25 stressed the need for a transnational struggle of the European people against the EU establishment. Its initial goal was similar to that of the ELP—“to repair the EU” and transform it into “a realm of shared prosperity, peace and solidarity for all Europeans”. For that, they favoured a broad approach aimed at bringing together “diverse political traditions—Green, radical left, liberal” (DiEM25, n.d.). However, despite talks between the two sides (DiEM25, 2018), the ELP and DiEM25 failed to have a common list for the 2019 European elections, which triggered sharp criticisms from Varoufakis towards the ELP but also specifically against SYRIZA and Podemos (Schulz, 2019). Thus, DiEM25 has not managed to attract within its ranks any major RLP, which is why it is not discussed here in more detail. Nor has it been able to build any significant national branches, with the sole exception of the Greek section, led by Varoufakis itself and called European Realistic Disobedience Front (MeRA25), which entered the parliament after scoring 3.4% in the 2019 legislative elections, although it failed then to meet the threshold in the 2023 elections. This (partial) exception notwithstanding, DiEM25 has largely failed at even becoming the movement its name refers to, not to mention the more ambitious goal of ‘democratising the EU’. By contrast, Plan B has attracted several prominent RLPs, including two of the three that make the focus of this book—Bloco and Podemos. The initiative was launched in August 2015 with a call for an international summit in Paris on the question of the EU, which was eventually held in Paris in January 2016. As Agustín (2017, p. 326) puts it in one of the

54

V. BORTUN

few papers dealing with this initiative (see also Bortun, 2022; for a more subjective account, see Sheehan, 2016, pp. 200–203), Plan B emerged “as a consequence of the ‘failure’ of SYRIZA in its negotiations with the EU and what is understood as the imposition of neoliberalism as the only economic model and the exclusion of progressive political projects”. The launch call was signed by leading members of several RLPs: Bloco, Left Party (France), Die Linke, Red–Green Alliance (Denmark), PRC, IU, Socialist Party (Ireland), Initiative for Democratic Socialism (Slovenia). The text described the deal signed by the SYRIZA government with the Troika as a ‘financial coup’ by which “the democratic, elected Greek government of Alexis Tsipras was brought to its knees by the European Union” (Plan B, 2015). It is not surprising, therefore, that no member of SYRIZA was among the signatories. The core argument of that statement, which would then be developed in Plan B’s subsequent meetings, was that the left needs a two-fold approach in relation to the EU. First, a “plan A” aimed at “a complete renegotiation of the European Treaties” while pursuing “a campaign of Civil European disobedience toward arbitrary European practices and irrational ‘rules’ until that renegotiation is achieved” (Plan B, 2015). Second, a “plan B” that, in the eventuality of such renegotiation failing, would entail the exit from the Eurozone and the creation of a new monetary system. As argued somewhere else (Bortun, 2022), this two-folded approach transcends the long-standing dichotomy on the Eurosceptic left between “reform” and “exit” by calling for the former but preparing for the latter, all while disobeying those aspects of the EU treaties deemed as incompatible with left-wing policies. This represents a new type of Euroscepticism that can be best described as Disobedient Euroscepticism, and which has the potential to be adopted by other party families too. Four other Plan B summits took place in the following years, with the second one being organised by Podemos in Madrid in February 2016 (see Plan B, 2016a) and the last one by Bloco in Lisbon in November 2017 (see Plan B, 2017b). The other two summits were in Copenhagen in November 2016 (see Plan B, 2016b) and in Rome in March 2017 (see Plan B, 2017a). The statement that resulted from the Rome summit went the farthest in shedding light on what Plan B seeks to change about the EU:

2

UNITED WE STAND? EUROPEAN INTEGRATION …

55

A deep reform of the European Central Bank to ensure full employment and to allow for funding public investments and ecologically sustainable economic activity as mandatory goals. … The abolishment of the TSCG/ Fiscal Compact and a full stop to the institutions’ interference with national budgets … a European conference on debts with the aim to liberate the European peoples from unpayable debts … The re-orientation of the mercantilist policy agenda dominating the EU and, in particular, the Eurozone toward domestic aggregate demand to balance the current accounts. … The introduction of a principle of social non regression and social and ecological standards for the internal single market and for trade with nonEU partners … the introduction of minimum effective corporate taxation. … The adoption of a social protocol to protect social rights and collective bargaining against internal market freedoms … The preparation and the inclusion in the Treaties of the conditions to grant Member States wishing to do so an orderly exit from the Euro zone while stabilising exchange rates. (Plan B, 2017a)

Just like the initial statement from 2016, this one too recognised that its “plan A” to revise the existing EU treaties “can be blocked by just one Member State and will be met with fierce opposition by the European institutions”. That is why the left would need a “plan B” as a “leverage in negotiations with the EU”, which would entail “an ‘amicable divorce’ of [sic] the euro” (Plan B, 2017a). However, the ‘divorce’ from the Eurozone and, indeed, the EU as a whole does not entail, as with most Eurosceptic right-wing parties, the return to an autarchic nation state, but the creation of “a new system of European cooperation based on the restoration of economic, fiscal and monetary sovereignty” (Plan B, 2017b). It is this kind of alternative internationalism that, alongside its economic-based opposition to the current neoliberal design of the EU, fundamentally distinguishes this brand of left-wing Euroscepticism from that of the nationalist right. However, the economic complications likely to stem from an exit are barely addressed, with no vision of what kind of programme and strategy would be needed in that respect (for a more political take on that see Bortun, 2020). Before even doing that, Plan B never developed a clear strategy for building the kind of popular support in favour of its combative approach, especially given the high level of public approval enjoyed at the time by the Eurozone across the member states since surveys had begun in 2002 (European Commission, 2018). Just like DiEM25, Plan B failed to establish any links with the social groups it

56

V. BORTUN

aimed to represent, maintaining throughout its existence a rather elite character, limited to the leadership of a handful of RLPs. Indeed, even at this elite level, Plan B did not develop into anything more consistent and structured than a series of party summits (the last of which took place at the end of 2017), despite the Lisbon declaration calling for building an actual political alternative for the 2019 European elections. The main attempt to do so took place in April 2018, when the leaders of Bloco, Podemos and LFI met again in Lisbon, where they announced the creation of a new pan-European political movement that aims to “break from the straitjacket of EU treaties that impose austerity and promote fiscal and social dumping” and instead “build a new organisational project for Europe” (LFI, 2018). The new initiative—in effect, Plan B 2.0—was given the rather contrived and populist name “Now, the people!” Movement (NPM). It was subsequently also joined by the Swedish Left Party, Danish Red–Green Alliance and Finnish Left Alliance at a meeting in Brussels in June 2018. However, in contrast to DiEM25, the NPM failed to put forward a common, transnational list in the 2019 European elections and has not had any visible activity ever since, the last update on the official website—as of October 2023—dating back to July 2019 (Now, the people, 2019). Furthermore, the initiative was politically powerless at any given point, as none of the participating RLPs has been in government ever since Plan B was launched in 2015. The sole exception, Podemos, has been since the end of 2019 a junior partner to the decidedly pro-EU social democratic party ruling Spain and has shown no sign, in all this period, of pushing for a disobedient strategy towards the neoliberal aspects of the European treaties.

References Agustín, Ó. G. (2017). European counterpublics? DiEM25, Plan B and the agonistic European public sphere. Journal of Civil Society, 13(3), 323–336. Bale, T., & Dunphy, R. (2011). In from the cold? Left parties and government involvement since 1989. Comparative European Politics, 9(3), 269–291. Bell, D. (2005). French communism: An exceptional orthodoxy. In E. Godin & T. Chafer (Eds.), The French Exception, (pp. 47–60). Oxford: Berghahn Books. Bardi, L., & Ignazi, P. (1999). Il Parlamento Europeo. Bologna: il Mulino.

2

UNITED WE STAND? EUROPEAN INTEGRATION …

57

Bardi, L., Bressanelli, E., Calossi, E., Gagatek, W., Mair, P., & Pizzimenti, E. (2014). Political parties and political foundations at European Level: Challenges and opportunities (European Democracy Observatory Report, 2014/ 08). European University Institute. Bortun, V. (2020). Neither exit, nor reform: For a transitional approach to the EU. Brexit Blog, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. https://brexitblog-rosalux.eu/ 2020/05/27/neither-exit-nor-reform/now Bortun, V. (2022). Plan B for Europe: The birth of ‘Disobedient Euroscepticism’?. Journal of Common Market Studies, 60(5), 1416–1431. Butler, A. (1995). Transformative politics: The future of socialism in Western Europe. London: St. Martin’s Press. Calossi, E. (2016). Anti-austerity left parties in the European Union: Competition, coordination and integration. Pisa University Press. Castellina, L. (1988). The European Community: Opportunity or negative conditioning? The impact of the integration process on the left. Socialism in the World, 66, 26–33. Charalambous, G. (2011). All the shades of red: Examining the radical left’s Euroscepticism. Contemporary Politics, 17 (3), 299–320. De Cleen, B., Moffitt, B., Panayotu, P., & Stavrakakis, Y. (2020). The potentials and difficulties of transnational populism: The case of the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25). Political Studies, 68(1), 146–166. De Jongh, D. (2017, January 30). Portuguese Left Bloc Leader Catarina Martins: ‘Maastricht destroyed our democracy’. Spectrezine. http://spectr ezine.org/portuguese-left-bloc-leader-catarina-martins-%E2%80%98maastri cht-destroyed-our-democracy%E2%80%99 DiEM25. (2018). “European Spring”: The transnational list to present a progressive alternative in 2019 gathers pace. https://diem25.org/europeanspring-the-transnational-list-to-present-a-progressive-alternative-in-2019-gat hers-pace/ Drake, R. (2004). The Soviet dimension of Italian communism. Journal of Cold War Studies, 6(3), 115–119. Dunphy, R. (2004). Contesting capitalism? Manchester University Press. Dunphy, R., & March, L. (2013). Seven-year itch? The European Left Party: Struggling to transform the EU. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 14(4), 520–537. Dunphy, R., & March, L. (2019). The European Left Party. Manchester University Press. Ekathimerini, (2018, February 1). French leftist Mélenchon calls for SYRIZA’s dismissal from Party of European Left. http://www.ekathimerini.com/225 424/article/ekathimerini/news/french-leftist-melenchon-calls-for-syrizas-dis missal-from-party-of-european-left

58

V. BORTUN

ELP. (2007). “Political theses. The European Left: Building Alternatives”. Retrieved from https://www.european-left.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 12/political_theses_final_version_04.12.07_0-12.pdf ELP. (2013). “Final political document—4th EL Congress”. Retrieved from https://www.european-left.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/politi cal_doc_en.pdf ELP. (2019). Common Platform for the 2019 European elections. For a progressive exit from the crisis. https://www.european-left.org/wp-content/ uploads/2019/02/1.-EN-Electoral-Platform-2019-2.pdf European Commission. (2018). Eurobarometer: Support for the euro steady at all-time high levels. https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/eurobarometer-2018nov-20_en European Forum. (2022). Final Declaration. Athens. https://europeanforum. eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/EN-Final-declaration-1.pdf Gagatek, W., & Van Hecke, S. (2011). Towards policy-seeking Europarties? The development of European political foundations (EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 2011/58). European University Institute. Hanley, D. (2008). Beyond the nation state: Parties in the era of European integration. Palgrave Macmillan. Holmes, M., & Lightfoot, S. (2016). To EU or not to EU? The transnational radical left and the crisis. In L. March & D. Keith (Eds.), Europe’s radical left: From marginality to mainstream? (pp. 333–351). Rowman & Littlefield International. Hudson, K. (2000). European communism since 1989. Macmillan. Hudson, K. (2012). The new European left: A socialism for the twenty-first century? Palgrave Macmillan. Keith, D. (2010). Ready to get their hands dirty. The Socialist Party and GroenLinks in the Netherlands. In J. Olsen, D. Hough, & M. Koß (Eds.), From pariahs to players? Left parties in national governments (pp. 155–172). Palgrave Macmillan. Keith, D. (2017). Opposing Europe, opposing austerity: Radical left parties and the Eurosceptic debate. In B. Leruth, N. Startin, & S. Usherwood (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism (pp. 86–99). KKE. (2014). Statement of the Central Committee of the KKE on the stance of the KKE in the EU parliament. http://inter.kke.gr/en/articles/Statementof-the-Central-Committee-of-the-KKE-on-the-stance-of-the-KKE-in-the-EUparliament/ Laurent, P. (2016). Alliance for democracy—against austerity in Europe. The PCF website: http://international.pcf.fr/85230 LFI. (2018). Maintenant le people! Pour une revolution citoyenne en Europe [Now the people! For a citizens’ revolution in Europe]. https://lafranceinso umise.fr/2018/04/13/peuple-revolution-citoyenne-europe/

2

UNITED WE STAND? EUROPEAN INTEGRATION …

59

Lavelle, A. (2008). The death of social democracy: Political consequences in the 21st century. Aldershot: Ashgate. March, L. (2011). Radical left parties in Europe. Routledge. Murray, P. (2004). Factors for integration? Transnational Party Cooperation in the European Parliament, 1952–79. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 50(1), 102–115. Nikolakakis, N. (2016). SYRIZA’s stance vis-à-vis the European Union following the financial crisis: The persistence of left Europeanism and the role of the European Left Party. European Politics and Society. https://doi.org/10. 1080/23745118.2016.1196918 Now, the People. (2019). First Day at the Parliament, a New Beginning for the Alliance. https://nowthepeople.eu/a-new-beginning-for-the-alliance/ Palley, T. I. (2013). Europe’s crisis without end: The consequences of neoliberalism. Contributions to Political Economy, 32, 29–50. Parker, P., & Pye, R. (2017). Mobilising social rights in EU economic governance: A pragmatic challenge to neoliberal Europe. Comparative European Politics, 16(5), 805–824. Plan B. (2015). A Plan B in Europe. https://www.euro-planb.eu/?page_id=96& amp;lang=en Plan B. (2016a). Declaration for a democratic rebellion in Europe. http://pla nbeuropa.es/declaration-for-a-democratic-rebellion-in-europe/?lang=en Plan B. (2016b). Statement for a stranding Plan B in Europe. http://euro-pla nb.dk/ Plan B. (2017a). A Plan B for the EU and the Eurozone. http://www.cadtm. org/Summit-Statement-A-Plan-B-for-the-EU-and-the-Eurozone Plan B. (2017b). Lisbon Declaration: “Our Europe, for and by the people!”. https://www.esquerda.net/en/artigo/lisbon-declaration-our-europe-andpeople/51894 Sassoon, D. (Ed.). (1998). Looking left: European socialism after the Cold War. I. B. Tauris. Schulz, F. (2019, February 15). Varoufakis: There is no real European Left, I am running against them. Euractiv. https://www.euractiv.com/section/euelections-2019/news/varoufakis-there-is-no-real-european-left-i-am-runningagainst-them/?fbclid=IwAR2VcC0fT3vTHe3naamOmmAOV9Eiojclonnoe YO43uxw4nFAVj9rxHQ1GjU Sheehan, H. (2016). The SYRIZA wave: Surging and crashing with the Greek left. Monthly Review Press. Soudais, M. (2018, July 2). Le Parti de gauche quitte le Parti de la gauche européenne. Politis. https://www.politis.fr/articles/2018/07/leparti-de-gauche-quitte-le-parti-de-la-gauche-europeenne-39077/ The Left. (n.d.). “About”. Retrieved from https://left.eu/about-the-group/

60

V. BORTUN

Timmermann, H. (1979). Euro-communists and the West. Problems of communism, 28(3), 31–54. Transform. (n.d.). About transform! Europe. The Transform website: https:// www.transform-network.net/about-us/

CHAPTER 3

The Storm After the Calm: Crisis, Austerity and Political Turmoil in Southern Europe

This chapter provides, by building on existing literature, an overview of the impact of the Eurozone crisis in Greece, Portugal and Spain. The first section gives a brief and critical account of the Eurozone crisis and its austerity-centred management, understood by the European radical left as both a manifestation and reinforcement of the neoliberal paradigm that all three parties staunchly oppose. Of course, given the space limits, this outline will not do justice to the high complexity of the Eurozone crisis. It rather aims to sketch the broad perspective that much of the European radical left, including the three parties studied here, shared with respect to this crisis, its causes, the way it unfolded and was addressed by the powers to be. The following sections discuss in turn each national context by exploring the main economic, social and political ramifications of the crisis. The conclusion sums up the key similarities and differences between these three national contexts, in particular the significant but uneven political impact of the crisis across these countries, which saw varying degrees of opportunity for each of the three parties to capitalise electorally on the crisis.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Bortun, Crisis, Austerity and Transnational Party Cooperation in Southern Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39151-4_3

61

62

V. BORTUN

Neoliberalism, the Eurozone Crisis and the “Austerity Consensus” Both the Eurozone crisis and the broader 2007–2008 financial crisis which it was rooted in have been largely interpreted as crises of neoliberalism, both by scholars of various orientations (see van Apeldoorn, De Graaff & Overbeek, 2012; Flassbeck & Lapavitsas, 2015; Gamble, 2009; Harvey, 2010; Panitch et al., 2015; Palley, 2013; Turner, 2009; Stiglitz, 2010) and by much of the European radical left, including the three RLPs studied here (see Bloco, 2010; Iglesias, 2015a; Podemos, 2017; Tsipras, 2014). Thus, a brief account of neoliberalism seems appropriate. For starters, it is worth distinguishing between neoliberalism as an ideology and neoliberalism as an actual policy framework. Surely, the former has generally guided and tried to legitimise the latter, but the theory and the practice do not always necessarily match. As an ideology, despite its variegated manifestations and interpretations (Macartney, 2010), neoliberalism is commonly understood as having emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as the intellectual revival of nineteenth-century economic liberalism and its fundamental belief in the pre-eminence of the market over the state (see Friedman, 1962; Hayek, 1990), which had been largely discredited following the Great Depression. Navarro (2007, p. 48) identifies three core principles that stem from this belief in the supremacy of the free market: first, limited state intervention in economic and social affairs; second, deregulation of labour and financial markets; third, free movement of capital, labour, goods and services. More specifically, neoliberal policies generally entail privatisation of public assets and services; cutting public spending in the name of limiting public deficit; low taxation of businesses and high-income earners; relative stagnation of real wages; flexible labour markets (including anti-trade union legislation); free trade and capital mobility; stimulation of demand via monetary rather than fiscal policy; and growing financialisation of the economy via deregulation (see also Gamble, 2009, p. 86; Hermann, 2007, p. 62). After being first tried out in the mid-1970s in a “periphery” of global capitalism (Pinochet’s Chile), neoliberalism steadily rose to prominence the following decade in “core” countries such as the US, under Ronald Reagan, and the UK, under Margaret Thatcher. It then also spread to continental Europe through the process of European integration, in particular with the establishment of the Single European Market and the Economic and Monetary Union (see Hermann, 2007; Palley, 2013;

3

THE STORM AFTER THE CALM: CRISIS, AUSTERITY …

63

van Apeldoorn, 2001), as explained further below. Through the influence of international organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF (Panitch et al., 2015, pp. 114–115), neoliberal policies also proliferated throughout the Global South and the former Soviet Union, shaping their economic relations with more developed countries from the North. The fall of really existing socialism and social democracy’s endorsement of most of its core tenets ensured the triumph of the neoliberal paradigm over the post-war Keynesian consensus. The mantra coined by Thatcher that “There is no alternative” (TINA) became the ideological hallmark of the 1990s and all the way up to the financial crisis (Gamble, 2009; Harvey, 2010; Navarro, 2007). At the same time, neoliberal policymaking has not always been consistent with the ideology, nor has it been even across countries. That has been particularly the case in relation to the role of the state, as aptly pointed out by Harvey (2005, p. 64): “The practice of neoliberalization … evolved in such a way as to depart significantly from the template that theory provides. The somewhat chaotic evolution and uneven geographical development of state institutions, powers, and functions over the last thirty years suggests, furthermore, that the neoliberal state may be an unstable and contradictory form”. In other words, there never was a genuine “minimal state”, as the more purist advocates of the ideology contended. The state was pushed back mostly in areas such as welfare and public ownership but was strengthened in others. For instance, public spending in the US under Reagan—otherwise a champion of neoliberalism—actually increased, mostly due to the rise in military expenditure on the background of a heated Cold War, but also to the sizeable subsidies allocated to sectors such as agriculture or the biomedical industries (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2016). Like other types of capitalism, neoliberalism still needs the state, not only to maintain basic social order through the police, courts and other institutions of force, but also economically, even if that often runs counter to some of its own key tenets. Apart from subsidising privileged sectors of the economy, “neoliberal state intervention” may also mean bailing out financial institutions (seen as early as the US savings and loans crisis of 1989 and then most prominently in the 2007–8 crisis) or other companies deemed “essential” to a country’s economy. Indeed, a more literal form of state intervention takes place when powerful countries appeal to military means to secure their economic interests (i.e. resources or/and markets for sections of their capitalist classes).

64

V. BORTUN

A balance sheet of over four decades of neoliberalism is beyond the scope of this book. On the whole, during the neoliberal era, social inequalities both within and between countries increased (Navarro, 2007, p. 51), unemployment rose, real wages virtually stagnated (Hermann, 2007, p. 67) and—rather tellingly given the ideology’s self-professed economic efficiency—the annual rate of economic growth per capita dropped in most countries compared to the previous, post-WWII era (Navarro 2007, p. 52). Moreover, the stagnation of real wages led to the emergence of a credit culture meant to fuel consumption and demand, which also generated an ever-growing household and corporate debt (Harvey, 2010, p. 17). This laid the basis for the collapse of the US subprime mortgage sector and housing market in 2007, leading the following year to the implosion of the US banking system that had been heavily relying on mortgage-backed securities. In turn, that resulted in a worldwide recession largely seen as the most serious crisis of capitalism since the Great Depression (Gamble, 2009, p. 5). On the background of a high and complex integration between the US economy and the EU (see Panitch et al., 2015, pp. 120–121), the Eurozone crisis, also referred to as the European sovereign debt crisis, started as a banking crisis in late 2009. It saw several governments in the Eurozone bailing out banks affected by the ramifications of crisis in the US financial sector. In countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, those bailouts considerably increased their public debts. Lacking the means to finance that debt through either their central banks (given the transfer of monetary power to the ECB by joining the euro) or the ECB (given its “political independence” that prevents it from financing the debt of member states), these countries had to rely on the financial markets to service their debt. However, the financial markets had become wary of these countries’ capacity to pay back any further loans and therefore significantly increased interest rates while downgrading their credit ratings. Faced with the possibility of defaults that would undermine the stability of the entire Eurozone and of the financial sector in particular, the EU institutions advanced the solution of bailing out the countries themselves. In May 2010, the Eurozone member states and the IMF agreed to grant Greece a e110 billion loan, which was followed by bailouts for Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus through the newly created European Financial Stability Facility (incorporated since 2012 in the European Stability Mechanism). In exchange for the bailouts, these countries were

3

THE STORM AFTER THE CALM: CRISIS, AUSTERITY …

65

conditioned to implement austerity measures in order to reduce their public deficits, under the supervision of the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF—the so-called Troika. As Amini (2015, p. 17) defines it, austerity “means reduction of wages and public spending, and raising taxes to reduce government deficit and hope that it will raise labour productivity and improve competitiveness” (see also Blyth, 2013). The official rationale for austerity as a solution to the problem was that the problem lay exclusively with the indebted countries. According to this prevalent view, the Southern countries had been “fiscally irresponsible” and therefore the crisis was “rooted in a failure of political will” (Hall, 2012, p. 357) on behalf of successive governments. Moreover, as Petry (2013) points out, this type of explanation was framed in a wider narrative perpetrated by political leaders, media and high-profile commentators about the division of Europe between a “hard-working and prudent North” and the “lazy and irresponsible South” (see Joffe, 2011; Greenspan 2011). It was a narrative that creditor institutions were keen to endorse (Knight, 2013), with the IMF director at the time, Christine Lagarde (now ECB President), claiming that Southern Europe “had a good time … now it’s payback time” (Aitkenhead, 2012). Along similar lines, the Prime Minister of Germany (the single largest contributor to the European Stability Mechanism), Angela Merkel, stated that “it is also about not being able to retire earlier in countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal than in Germany, instead everyone should try a little bit to make the same efforts” (“Merkel tells southern Europeans”, 2011). However, that narrative arguably helped obscure the deeper, interdependent roots of the Eurozone crisis that several political economists have pointed out ever since (see Becker, 2014; Flassbeck & Lapavitsas, 2015; Hall, 2012; Panitch et al., 2015; Palley, 2013; Young & Semmler, 2011). Firstly, as mentioned earlier, the rise of neoliberalism entailed a break from the previous consensus that saw wages growing in line with productivity. The new policy of wage stagnation created a demand gap, which was temporarily filled by decreasing nominal interest rates to fuel credit-based consumption, which in turn led to, among other things, housing bubbles in countries like the US or Spain (Palley, 2013, p. 40). Secondly, as of the late 1990s, the German economy became characterised by a policy of capping real wages in order to boost its exports. Indeed, a similar approach was also adopted in Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Belgium or Austria (Bellofiore et al., 2010). That boost

66

V. BORTUN

in trade did occur, but at the expense of other Eurozone member states— not only those in the Southern periphery but also France and Italy—who did not adopt the same wage policy. Hence, the latter group of countries started to experience increasing trade and current account deficits and—in combination with rising trade competition from economies in South-East Asia—lose big chunks of their international market share. As Flassbeck and Lapavitsas (2015, p. 25) put it, “Germany has operated a policy of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ but only after ‘beggaring its own people’ by essentially freezing wages”. Indeed, this “beggar-thy-neighbour” policy can be seen in a range of areas across the EU, such as the “tax dumping” practised by Eastern member states in their competition to attract foreign investment (Tudor & Appel, 2016), which does raise more fundamental question marks over the prospects of a truly united Europe on the basis of capitalist economies inherently competing against each other. Thirdly, by joining the Economic and Monetary Union, member states ceded the monetary powers that had previously allowed them to reduce current account deficits, such as currency devaluation or money printing. Furthermore, the very architecture of the ECB prevents it from helping governments finance their budget deficits and manage the interest rates on their debt (Lanzavecchia & Pavarani, 2015). Palley (2013, pp. 42– 43) captures this key issue rather eloquently: “The old national banking systems made European governments masters of the bond market. The euro’s architecture makes bond markets masters of national governments”. At the same time, governments in Mediterranean countries often deemed Eurozone membership not just as a matter of prestige and retaining influence in the EU, but also saw it as an opportunity to facilitate and legitimise neoliberal policy adjustments that otherwise would have been harder to implement against domestic opposition from trade unions and other powerful actors. Fourthly, with growing deficits that surpassed the 3% limit of the GDP set by the Stability and Growth Pact, and lacking the monetary means to address them, Southern countries resorted to loans from banks in Northern, surplus-based economies. Thus, at the end of 2008, Eurozone countries excluding Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain held 67% of Spain’s debt, 65% of Portugal’s and 66% in the case of Greece (Lapavitsas et al., 2012, p. 82). Indeed, the aggregate exposure of German, French, Dutch and Belgian banks to the private and public debt of Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain amounted to more than 120% of those banks’

3

THE STORM AFTER THE CALM: CRISIS, AUSTERITY …

67

equity (Leblond, 2012, p. 60). Even so, most of these “peripheral” countries reached significantly higher debt levels than other member states only after the start of the crisis, namely after borrowing more money in order to bail out the banks (Palley, 2013, pp. 41–42; Young & Semmler, 2011, p. 17). This counter-narrative of the crisis was endorsed by much of the European radical left, including SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos, also receiving growing support among more critical scholars (Amini, 2015, p. 14; Laskos & Tsakalotos, 2014, p. 78). Indeed, while the Eurozone crisis itself “officially” ended towards the late 2010s, there is growing consensus that austerity policies have largely had a prolonged negative impact, both economically (see Blyth, 2013; Flassbeck & Lapavitsas, 2015; Schui, 2014; Semmler, 2013) and socially (see Knieling & Othengrafen, 2016; Matsaganis & Leventi, 2014; Matthijs, 2014; McKee et al., 2012). Even IMF economists ended up acknowledging, after a few years of austerity, that “increase in inequality engendered by financial openness and austerity might itself undercut growth, the very thing that the neoliberal agenda is intent on boosting” (Ostry et al., 2016, p. 41). At a political level, while austerity has been said to reinforce the neoliberal consensus (Parker & Pye, 2017; Worth, 2013), it has also led to substantial electoral losses for the mainstream parties implementing it, particularly in the countries most affected by it, such as Greece, Spain and Portugal. Thus, throughout the 2010s, these countries experienced multiple crises—economic, social and political—that engendered favourable opportunities for political parties with an anti-austerity agenda to enhance their profile and electoral support. The following sections provide an overview of how this multiple crisis unfolded in the three Southern member states over the first half of the 2010s.

The Crisis in Greece Greece was the first country to be hit by the Eurozone crisis and also the first to receive a bailout from the Troika, in May 2010. The deal, officially called a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), stipulated that Greece would receive a e110 billion loan over a period of three years, with e80 billion coming from the other Eurozone member states and e30 billion from the IMF. In exchange, Greece agreed to bring down its public deficit from the 2009 level of 10.6% to less than 3% by 2014. A second MoU was signed in March 2012, which gave Greece an additional e110 billion

68

V. BORTUN

for the period 2012–2014, with the new target of reaching a primary surplus of 4.5% of the GDP by 2016. Those targets were to be achieved, under the close supervision of the Troika, mainly through the introduction of austerity measures and privatisation of public assets, with a focus on reducing public expenditure over the period 2010–2012 and then on increasing taxes for the period 2013–2014. The two waves of austerity were implemented by the social democratic government of PASOK and after the 2012 elections by the government led by centre-right New Democracy (ND) in coalition with PASOK and—until 2013—the Democratic Left (DIMAR). Those measures entailed the slashing of 150,000 jobs and 20% of the wages in the public sector, a reduction of 22% in the minimum wage, the privatisation of e20 billion worth of public assets, the deregulation of the transport and energy sectors, as well as substantial cuts in public spending on healthcare, social services, pensions and education (Spourdalakis, 2013, pp. 105–106; Toloudis, 2014, p. 40). These policies did reduce the public deficit to only 2.4% by 2011 and even reached a primary surplus of 0.4% in 2014 (OECD, 2015). On the other hand, the two bailouts led to an increase in the public debt from 130% of the GDP in 2009 to 177% in 2014. That was not only due to the new loans taken by Greece but also to the fall in GDP, which contracted by 22% after the implementation of the first two waves of austerity (Flassbeck & Lapavitsas, 2015, pp. 89–90) and continued to do so, with an overall drop from $356 billion in 2008 to $188 billion in 2020 (Stamouli, 2022). As a result, the Greek people lost on average up to 50% of their pre-2009 incomes (Douzinas, 2017, p. 180). Overall, as Tsatsanis and Teperoglou (2016, p. 2) put it when writing after half of a decade of austerity, “even though other countries in the European periphery are still struggling to recover from the economic slump of the post-2008 period, none has experienced the economic devastation Greece has done during the same period and none maintains such bleak prospects for the future”. It is hard to overstate the social impact of that economic decline and the austerity measures that Greece experienced in the first half of the 2010s. The unemployment rate increased from less than 10% in 2009 to around 27% in 2014, only falling under 20% towards the end of the decade (Trading Economics, 2020). Youth unemployment scored much higher, reaching close to 50% in 2015 and still lingering at over 40% in 2019 (Trading Economics, 2023). Small enterprises were particularly affected, a quarter of them having declared bankruptcy by 2012. The number of people living in poverty rose by 50% (Spourdalakis, 2013,

3

THE STORM AFTER THE CALM: CRISIS, AUSTERITY …

69

p. 106) and the number of rough sleepers by 25% in the first two years of crisis (Flassbeck & Lapavitsas, 2015, p. 111). Furthermore, Greece experienced a demographic change, with 2015 being the first year after WWII when the number of deaths surpassed the number of births (Douzinas, 2017, p. 171). Such developments were met with mass mobilisations and protest movements, which peaked in the period between June 2011 and June 2012 (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 9). The trade unions organised no less than forty general strikes between 2010 and 2015. They were coupled with sectoral strikes and occupations of workplaces, some of which lasted for several months. According to Payiatsos (2017, p. 15), “in the autumn of 2011 there was hardly a governmental building in Athens that was not covered with huge banners saying ‘under occupation’”. Several social movements also emerged, the most prominent among them being the Aganaktismeni [Indignant] movement, which started in the central square of Athens in May 2011, having been inspired by the similar Indignados movement from Spain (Tsaliki, 2012). It protested against the austerity measures taken under the first MoU signed by the government but also against the two mainstream political parties, PASOK and ND, seen as responsible for the country’s dire socio-economic situation. The movement soon extended to other cities and towns across the country. The spring of 2011 also saw the beginning of the mass grassroots campaign of civil disobedience called Den Plirono [Won’t pay], where ordinary citizens refused to pay for road tolls, bus tickets or the e5 fees for doctors’ consultations introduced as part of the austerity measures. This campaign spread across the country and received support from more than half of the population and from most of the political left. Similarly to the Aganaktismeni movement, Den Plirono was targeted against both the harsh economic conditions and the political establishment (Chrisafis, 2011). Indeed, the anti-establishment mood grew to the extent that, by late 2011, Greece was in a “full-scale political crisis” (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, p. 13). The PASOK government was facing increasing opposition within the Parliament over the first wave of austerity measures, which had divided the political landscape and even the party itself across proMoU vs anti-MoU lines (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 17). This eventually led the PASOK Prime Minister George Papandreou to resign in November 2011. The snap elections that took place in May 2012 showed the scale of the legitimacy crisis faced by what had been for decades a de facto biparty

70

V. BORTUN

system that had ruled the country since its return to democracy in 1974 (Moschonas, 2013, p. 33). The aggregate vote scored by PASOK and ND fell from 77.4% in 2009 (which had been itself a post-1981 low) to only 32.1% in May 2012. Given that no party was able to form a government, a new round of elections was held the following month, when the two mainstream parties together scored 42% of the votes. This compelled them to form together a coalition government, for the first time ever – a true reinforcement of the political centre where any significant left–right divide had been blurred almost completely. Nevertheless, the verdict of the dual elections was clear: Greece’s post-1974 two-party system had just collapsed (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, p. 13). That political crisis opened up very propitious opportunities for marginal, anti-establishment parties such as SYRIZA and KKE on the left and the Independent Greeks (ANEL) and Golden Dawn on the right (Tsakatika, 2016). Indeed, the 2012 elections saw SYRIZA becoming the second party in the country and the main opposition party. Three years later, SYRIZA became—apart from AKEL in Cyprus—the first left-ofsocial-democracy party to win general elections and lead the government in an EU member state. While the main developments surrounding the SYRIZA-led government are covered in the next chapter, the 2019 elections saw the return of the government of ND, with SYRIZA becoming again the main opposition party, an outcome that was repeated in the 2023 elections.

The Crisis in Portugal After its accession to the EU in 1986, Portugal experienced sustained economic growth that saw it join the group of developed countries for the first time in a century (Cabral, 2013, p. 32). However, in the early 2000s, the country entered a period of economic decline following the adoption of the euro, which removed the traditional stabilisers employed by the state to contain the levels of external debt and balance of income deficit, as shown in the first section (Cabral, 2013, p. 27). Thus, the Eurozone crisis found Portugal already in an economic recession, with a growth of -3% in 2009, which led to an 8.6% budget deficit the following year. On top of that, the government bailed out two private banks, which resulted in the public debt rising from 68% in 2007 to 83% in 2009.

3

THE STORM AFTER THE CALM: CRISIS, AUSTERITY …

71

To tackle the growing levels of public deficit and debt, between 2009 and 2011 the centre-left government of the Socialist Party (PS) introduced, under the direct guidance of Brussels and with the parliamentary support of centre-right parties, three successive austerity packages known as Stability and Growth Programmes (SGPs). The third SGP, implemented in the autumn of 2010, was the most substantial, including 10% cuts in public sector wages, an increase in personal income tax and VAT, freezing of pensions and cuts to various social programmes (Freire & Santana-Pereira, 2012, p. 180). However, by the beginning of 2011, the three SGPs had failed to show any positive economic impact. Instead, the deficit decreased only to 9.1%, while the debt rose to 94% of the GDP. Indeed, unemployment increased to 12.4%, going beyond 40% among the youth by 2013 (Trading Economics, 2021). The worsening socio-economic circumstances led, in November 2010, to the first general strike of the two main trade union confederations since 1988. Then, in March 2011, 200,000 people took to the streets of Lisbon, Porto and other major cities to protest against austerity. In this context of social upheaval, that same month the entire parliamentary opposition rejected a fourth SGP that the government had negotiated with the Troika without consulting itself with either the President or the Parliament. As a result, the minority PS government led by José Sócrates resigned. Nevertheless, while snap elections were announced for June, in April the caretaker government of Sócrates requested, with the backing of the right-wing opposition, a e78 billion bailout from the Troika, despite the fact that the bailout entailed the same austerity measures as, if not worse than, the ones that had just been rejected in Parliament (Freire & Santana-Pereira, 2012, p. 182). Following the elections in June 2011, those measures were implemented by the new right-wing government coalition and included a rise in income and property taxes, in fees for public services such as healthcare and transport, and a freeze on any hiring or promotions in the public sector. The key objective was to reduce the public deficit to 3% by 2013 (Cabral, 2013, p 29). However, just like the previous packages of austerity, these measures largely failed to improve the economic situation as anticipated: between 2011 and 2012, the public debt rose from 108 to 124% of the GDP, while the deficit target of 3% was achieved only in 2017. Furthermore, the soaring unemployment rates resulted in mass emigration, particularly among the youth, with Portugal becoming the EU member state with the largest share of the population living abroad

72

V. BORTUN

(Eurofound, 2016). As Cabral (2013, p. 30) summed it up at the time, “after two years of ‘austerity’, the well-being (consumption and investment) of Portuguese families, businesses and government has regressed by more than the gains made in the previous 13 years”. The ongoing austerity measures and their social effects led to renewed protests and mass mobilisations. Inspired by the Spanish Indignados and the US Occupy movements, a similar movement started in the autumn of 2011. On 15 October, 100,000 people took to the streets of Lisbon calling for the unilateral cancellation of the public debt, the nationalisation of banks and another general strike. The strike took place in the following days and, for the first time ever in the country’s history, it was accompanied by mass street protests (Romeiro, 2018). Such turmoil continued until the summer of 2013, including five more one-day general strikes and two mass demonstrations of 1 million people each (this, in a country with a population of around 10 million, including the over half a million who had migrated after the start of the crisis). The popular mood against austerity was also reflected in the 2015 general elections, although they did not bring about a similar collapse of bipartidism as witnessed in Greece earlier that year. Thus, the main right-wing political force, the Social Democratic Party, won the elections with 38.6% but was short of a majority. The three main parties of the left, the PS, Bloco and the PCP, gained together over 50% of the votes, which allowed the former to establish a minority government with the parliamentary support of the latter two. That arrangement was renewed after the 2019 elections. However, on the background of slight but steady economic growth and a decrease in unemployment (Klein, 2018), the PS called early elections at the beginning of 2022, which it won comfortably—in contrast to the low fortunes of much of European social democracy—and was thereby able to stay in government without needing support from the parties to its left. That saw Bloco lose half of its electoral support, as detailed in the next chapter.

The Crisis in Spain Similar to the US or Ireland, the crisis in Spain was triggered by a real estate bubble, in a country where the construction sector had become twice as big as the average size in the rest of the Eurozone (Klotz et al., 2016). That was mainly enabled by malpractices in the banking sector that fuelled an unsustainable credit culture and a housing surplus that did

3

THE STORM AFTER THE CALM: CRISIS, AUSTERITY …

73

not match the real demand. When the property bubble burst in 2008, housing prices dropped dramatically, which meant that banks could no longer cover their losses from non-performing loans by simply repossessing people’s houses and then selling them on the market. This led to a financial crisis that saw the Spanish state bail out several banks, thus increasing the levels of public debt and deficit, from 40% and 4.4% in 2008 to 86% and 10.5% respectively in 2012. Despite the bailouts, in June 2012 the Spanish government agreed with the Troika for a e100 billion loan that would be used to recapitalise the Spanish banks and prevent further rise in the country’s deficit and debt, which resulted in the downgrading of the country’s credit rating. In exchange for that money, the government led by the right-wing Popular Party (PP) agreed to a new wave of austerity measures, on top of those it had already taken in answer to the crisis of the banking sector. The new measures included e10.7 billion worth of cuts in the healthcare and education sectors, the increase in VAT for certain products and services ranging from 8 to 21%, the increase of the retirement age from 65 to 67, the decrease in wages of public sector workers by 18% on average, as well as the reduction of unemployment and child benefits (Amini, 2015, p. 23). The financial crisis and the austerity measures that accompanied it saw Spain lose nearly 15% of its GDP between 2008 and 2013 (World Bank, 2014), with purchasing power dropping by 18% overall (Amini, 2015, p. 23). Furthermore, the unemployment rate went up from 8.2% in 2007 to 26.2% in 2013 at the peak of the crisis, with 55.5% unemployment among the youth (Eurostat, 2015). Despite some economic recovery in the second half of the decade, the unemployment rate was still nearly 15% at the end of 2018, almost double the Eurozone average (Eurostat, 2019), not accounting for the increasing precarity of existing or newly created jobs (see Stobart, 2016, p. 176). The worsening economic conditions resulted in increasing social unrest, which found its strongest expression in the 15-M/Indignados Movement that started in May 2011. Organised initially by the grassroots civic platform ¡Democracia Real YA! [Real Democracy Now!] and the youth movement Juventud Sin Futuro [Youth Without a Future], 15M developed into the largest protest movement in the country’s recent history, seeing the participation of between 6.5 and 8 million citizens, with 76% of the population endorsing the demands of the protesters (RTVE, 2011). The broader demands centred around the defence of

74

V. BORTUN

social rights to affordable housing, work, healthcare and education and the opposition to austerity measures, the two-party system and the banks. One of the key slogans on the first mass demonstration on 15 May was “We are not merchandise in the hands of politicians and bankers” (El País, 2011). As Stobart (2016, p. 176) points out, “These were protests against the failure of representation (expressed in the central slogan ‘they don’t represent us’) as much as against cuts and economic mismanagement”. Indeed, the hostility towards the political establishment engulfed even the traditional organisations of the radical left, such as the PCE-led Izquierda Unida (IU), to the extent that their activists were asked by protestors to leave the squares (Stobart, 2016, p. 180). Besides the 15-M, other movements against austerity developed over the following years, most prominently the so-called mareas (tides) of workers from various public sectors such as healthcare (“white tide”) and education (“green tide”). For example, the “white tide” of healthcare workers organised demonstrations, strikes and occupations against the government’s cuts to the sector and attempts to privatise it (Méndez de Andés, 2014). Also, the Platform for People Affected by Mortgages (PAH) emerged as early as 2009 in reaction to the thousands of evictions across the country, which they opposed through direct action, court appeals and legislative pressure (Méndez de Andés, 2014). PAH too attracted high rates of support among the population, varying between 70 and 90%, with its main spokesperson, Ada Colau, becoming in 2015 the first female mayor of Barcelona, a position which she retained up until the 2023 local elections. The popular disillusionment with the mainstream political parties was illustrated by the general elections held after the start of the crisis (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016, p. 6). The two main parties, PP and PSOE, which—similarly to Greece and Portugal—had dominated Spanish politics since the 1974 transition to liberal democracy, went from an aggregate vote share of 83.8% in 2008 to 73.4% in 2011 to 50.7% in 2015, the lowest share in the post-Franco era. This was mirrored by two newly formed parties, the left-wing Podemos and right-wing Ciudadanos [Citizens], gaining together over 34% in the 2015 elections. The vote in those elections was so fragmented that the PP was unable to form a government, requiring new elections in 2016. Yet again, the PP won but fell short of a majority once again, so it only managed to form a minority government after PSOE’s MPs abstained in the investiture vote of the new Rajoy government under the pretext of avoiding a third election in a

3

THE STORM AFTER THE CALM: CRISIS, AUSTERITY …

75

row. However, in June 2018, a corruption scandal led a regionalist party to withdraw its support for the PP government, which fell after losing a motion of confidence. This saw PSOE form a minority government with support from Podemos and other smaller, regionalist parties, but after failing to pass the budget at the beginning of 2019, new elections were held at the end of that year. Their outcome saw PSOE form a coalition government together with the alliance between Podemos and IU, called Unidas Podemos [United We Can], which is likey to remain in place following the 2023 elections.

Summary Greece, Spain and Portugal not only display geographical and cultural similarities but also a broadly similar political trajectory after the Second World War: coming out of right-wing dictatorships in the mid-1970s, they joined the European Community in the 1980s and experienced significant overall economic growth throughout the 1990s and 2000s. However, despite the latter, these countries that had historically had a comparatively late and uneven development of capitalism never managed to close the gap with the stronger economies from the north of the continent. When the Eurozone crisis developed on the background of the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, it hit these Southern member states the hardest, as they reached high levels of public debt after bailing out the banks. This led to the so-called Troika bailing out the countries themselves, in exchange for harsh austerity packages. The reckless fiscal policy and corruption of their successive governments were widely seen as the main if not sole cause for the crisis, all framed in a moralistic narrative about the cultural differences between Northern and Southern Europe. However, a counternarrative emerged among scholars of various strands, endorsed by and large by much of the European radical left, which pointed at the neoliberal architecture of the Eurozone and the EU more generally as the root cause of the crisis. This alternative narrative criticised the austerity-led management of the crisis, seen as an expression and, indeed, reinforcement of the EU’s embedded neoliberalism. As outlined above, austerity measures did little, at least initially, in terms of achieving their official goals, namely, to reduce the levels of public debt and deficit; but quite the contrary—those levels continued to rise well into the 2010s, severely undermining economic recovery,

76

V. BORTUN

with GDP growth failing by the middle of the decade to reach the precrisis rate. Furthermore, austerity had a substantial social impact in all three countries, as reflected for example in the rising unemployment rates, particularly among the youth, many of whom migrated abroad to find work. That impact was, however, significantly worse in Greece, which witnessed levels of poverty never seen since the end of the Second World War. The worsening socio-economic circumstances led in all three countries to a range of mass grassroots movements (most prominently in Spain) as well as general strikes (most prominently in Greece) against austerity and the wider political establishment. These movements emerged independently from existing organisations of the left and, often, in open hostility to them, although the next chapter will show how the three RLPs under study managed to link up with them to various extents. This social turmoil was also reflected politically, in the decline (in Portugal and Spain) or outright collapse (in Greece) of de facto biparty systems that had ruled these countries in their post-dictatorship era. New parties with an antiestablishment outlook on both the left and the right, but particularly on the left, emerged to challenge, with varying degrees of success, the mainstream parties of the centre-left and centre-right. On the left, the electoral peak of SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos was reached the same year, 2015, when the former came into government while the other two became the third most significant political forces in their countries. The temporal overlap of these parties’ electoral success would have only added to their incentives for seeking closer cooperation at the transnational level, already facilitated by their similarities in terms of programme, strategy and organisation. These similarities as well as the trajectory that saw them reach the 2015 electoral peak are explored in the following chapter.

References Aitkenhead, D. (2012, May 22). Christine Lagarde: Can the head of the IMF save the euro? The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/ may/25/christine-lagarde-imf-euro Amini, B. (2015). Situating the radical left in contemporary Europe. Socialism and Democracy, 29(3), 7–24. Becker, U. (2014). The heterogeneity of capitalism in crisis-ridden Europe. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 22(3), 261–275.

3

THE STORM AFTER THE CALM: CRISIS, AUSTERITY …

77

Bellofiore, R., Garibaldo, F., & Halevi, J. (2010). The global crisis and the crisis of European neomercantilism. In L. Panitch, G. Albo, & V. Chibber (Eds.), Socialist Register 2011: The crisis this time (pp. 129–146). The Merlin Press. Bloco. (2010). On the crisis and how to overcome it. The Bloco website: http:// www.bloco.org/media/cp_bloco_100523.pdf Blyth, M. (2013). Austerity: The history of a dangerous idea. Oxford University Press. Cabral, R. (2013). The Euro crisis and Portugal’s dilemma. Intereconomics/review of European Economic Policy, 48(1), 27–32. Chrisafis, A. (2011, July 31). Greece debt crisis: The ‘we won’t pay’ anti-austerity revolt. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/31/ greece-debt-crisis-anti-austerity Douzinas, C. (2017). SYRIZA in power. Reflections of an accidental politician. Polity Press. Eurofound. (2016, February 16). Portugal: High and rising emigration in a context of high, but decreasing, unemployment. The Eurofound website: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/2016/por tugal-high-and-rising-emigration-in-a-context-of-high-but-decreasing-unempl oyment Eurostat. (2015). Unemployment Rates by Sex and Age Groups—Monthly Average. http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_ a&lang=en Eurostat. (2019). Euro area unemployment at 7.9%. The European Commission website: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/9477410/309012019-AP-EN.pdf/1f232ebb-1dcc-4de2-85d1-5765fae86ea8 Flassbeck, H., & Lapavitsas, C. (2015). Against the Troika: Crisis and austerity in the Eurozone. Verso. Freire, A., & Santana-Pereira, J. (2012). Portugal 2011: The victory of the neoliberal right, the defeat of the left. Portuguese Journal of Social Science, 11(2), 179–187. Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago University Press. Gamble, A. (2009). The spectre at the feast: Capitalist crisis and the politics of recession. Palgrave. Greenspan, A. (2011, October 6). Europe’s crisis is all about the north-south split. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/678b163a-ef68-11e0bc88-00144feab49a Hall, P. A. (2012). The economics and politics of the Euro crisis. German Politics, 21(4), 355–371. Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press. Harvey, D. (2010). The enigma of capital and the crises of capitalism. Profile. Hayek, F. A. (1990). The constitution of liberty. Routledge.

78

V. BORTUN

Hermann, C. (2007). Neoliberalism in the European Union. Studies in Political Economy, 79, 61–89. Iglesias, P. (2015a). Politics in a time of crisis. Podemos and the future of a democratic Europe. Verso. Joffe, J. (2011, September 12). The Euro widens the culture gap. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/12/willculture-clash-splinter-the-european-union/the-euro-widened-the-culture-gap? scp=2&sq=josef%20joffe&st=cse Klein, M. C. (2018, April 4). What’s up with Portugal? Financial Times. https:// ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/04/04/2199417/whats-up-with-portugal/ Klotz, P., Lin, T. C., & Hsu, S. H. (2016). Modelling property bubble dynamics in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Journal of European Real Estate Research, 9(1), 52–75. Knieling, J., & Othengrafen, F. (Eds.). (2016). Cities in crisis: Socio-spatial impacts of the economic crisis in Southern European cities. Routledge. Knight, D. M. (2013, January 30). Greece is used to justify unpopular domestic reforms. Social Europe Journal. https://www.socialeurope.eu/greece-is-usedto-justify-unpopular-domestic-reforms Lanzavecchia, A., & Pavarani, E. (2015). Democracy of Euro: Who will surrender? Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance, 26(6), https://doi. org/10.1002/jcaf.22077. Lapavitsas, C., Kaltenbrunner, A., Labrinidis, G., Lindo, D., Meadway, J., Mitchell, J., Painceira, J. P., Pires, E., Powell, J., Stenfors, A., Teles, N., & Vatikiotis, L. (2012). Crisis in the Eurozone. Verso. Laskos, C., & Tsakalotos, E. (2014). Crucible of Resistance: Greece, the Eurozone & the World Economic Crisis. Pluto Press. Leblond, P. (2012). One for all and all for one: The global financial crisis and the European integration project. In L. Fioramonti (Ed.), Regions and crises: New challenges for contemporary regionalisms (pp. 50–66). Palgrave Macmillan. Macartney, H. (2010). Variegated neoliberalism: EU varieties of capitalism and international political economy. Routledge. “Merkel tells southern Europeans to work longer”. (2011, May 18). The Local. https://www.thelocal.de/20110518/35095 Matsaganis, M., & Leventi, C. (2014). The distributional impact of austerity and the recession in Southern Europe. South European Society and Politics, 19(3), 393–412. Matthijs, M. (2014). Mediterranean blues: The crisis in Southern Europe. Journal of Democracy, 25(1), 101–115. McKee, M., Karanikolos, M., Belcher, P., & Stuckler, D. (2012). Austerity: A failed experiment on the people of Europe. Clinical Medicine, 12(4), 346– 350.

3

THE STORM AFTER THE CALM: CRISIS, AUSTERITY …

79

Méndez de Andés, A. (2014). Spain’s radical tide. Red Pepper. The Red Pepper website: https://www.redpepper.org.uk/spains-radical-tide/ Moschonas, G. (2013). The ‘broken equilibrium’ in European politics: The Europe factor and the weakening of mainstream parties (with an emphasis on centre-left and radical Left parties). In The Rise of Populism and Extremist Parties in Europe, The Spinelli Group (in collaboration with Bertelsmann Stiftung) (pp. 20–27). Navarro, V. (2007). Neoliberalism as a class ideology; or, the political causes of the growth of inequalities. International Journal of Health Services, 37 (1), 47–62. OECD. (2015). Country Fact Sheet: Greece. https://www.oecd.org/gov/Greece. pdf Ostry, J. D., Loungani, P., & Furceri, D. (2016). Neoliberalism: Oversold? Finance & Development, 53(2), 38–41. Ortiz-Ospina, E., & Roser, M. (2016). Government Spending. OurWorldInData.org. https://ourworldindata.org/government-spending El País. (2011, May 15). La manifestación de ‘indignados’ reúne a varios miles de personas en toda España. El País website: https://elpais.com/elpais/ 2011/05/15/actualidad/1305447428_850215.html Palley, T. I. (2013). Europe’s crisis without end: The consequences of neoliberalism. Contributions to Political Economy, 32, 29–50. Panitch, L., Gindin, S., & Aquanno, S. M. (2015). American empire and the relative autonomy of European capitalism. Competition & Change, 19(2), 113–128. Parker, P., & Pye, R. (2017). Mobilising social rights in EU economic governance: A pragmatic challenge to neoliberal Europe. Comparative European Politics, 16(5), 805–824. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-017-0102-1 Payiatsos, A. (2017). The rise and ‘fall’ of SYRIZA. The crisis of the Greek Left. Petry, J. (2013). From PIIGS and the drive towards austerity: The discursive construction of the Eurozone crisis & its impact on European welfare states. Paper presented at the DVPW, ÖGPW, SVPW Joint Conference “DreiLänder-Tagung: Politik der Vielfalt”, 19–21 September 2013, University of Innsbruck, Austria. Podemos. (2017). Documento politico. The Podemos website: https://files.pod emos.info/HihzerN5Ev.pdf Ramiro, L., & Gomez, R. (2016). Radical-left populism during the Great Recession: Podemos and its competition with the established radical left. Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321716647400 Romeiro, G. (2018). From the carnation to the contraption: The crisis of the Portuguese left. A Centelha, 1, 4–9.

80

V. BORTUN

RTVE. (2011, August 6). Más de seis millones de españoles han participado en el Movimiento 15M. The RTVE website: http://www.rtve.es/noticias/201 10806/mas-seis-millones-espanoles-han-participado-movimiento-15m/452 598.shtml Schui, F. (2014). Austerity: The great failure. Yale University Press. Semmler, W. (2013). The macroeconomics of austerity in the European Union. Social Research: An International Quarterly, 80(3), 883–914. Spourdalakis, M. (2013). Left strategy in the Greek cauldron: Explaining SYRIZA’s success. Socialist Register, 49, 98–119. Stamouli, N. (2022). Greece exits bailout monitoring, but austerity pain lingers. Politico.eu. https://www.politico.eu/article/greece-exit-bailout-mon itor-austerity-economy/ Stiglitz, J. (2010). Freefall: America, free markets, and the sinking of the world economy. W. W. Norton & Company. Stobart, L. (2016). From the Indignados to Podemos. Can Podemos reclaim its earlier momentum? In C. Príncipe & B. Sunkara (Eds.), Europe in revolt (pp. 175–190). Haymarket Books. Trading Economics. (2020). Greece unemployment rate. https://tradingecono mics.com/greece/unemployment-rate Trading Economics. (2021). Portugal unemployment rate. https://tradingecono mics.com/portugal/youth-unemployment-rate Trading Economics. (2023). Greece unemployment rate. https://tradingecono mics.com/greece/youth-unemployment-rate Toloudis, N. (2014). The Golden Dawn: The financial crisis and Greek fascism’s new day. New Labor Forum, 23(1), 38–43. https://doi.org/10.1177/109 5796013513566 Tsakatika, M., & Eleftheriou, C. (2013). The radical left’s turn towards civil society in Greece: One strategy. South European Society and Politics. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2012.757455 Tsakatika, M. (2016). Syriza’s electoral rise in Greece: Protest, trust and the art of political manipulation. South European Society and Politics, 1–22,. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2016.1239671 Tsaliki, L. (2012, February). The Greek ‘Indignados’: The Aganaktismeni as a case study of the ‘new repertoire of collective action’. Paper presented at the Transmediale Media Art Festival, Berlin. http://www2.media.uoa.gr/people/ tsaliki/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Tsaliki_The_Greek_Indignados.pdf Tsatsanis, E., & Teperoglou, E. (2016). Realignment under stress: The July 2015 referendum and the September parliamentary election in Greece. South European Society and Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2016.120 8906

3

THE STORM AFTER THE CALM: CRISIS, AUSTERITY …

81

Tsipras, A. (2014). Alexis Tsipras’ speech at the Die Linke Congress. https:// www.syriza.gr/article/Alexis-Tsipras%E2%80%99-speech-at-the-DIE-LINKECongress.html Tudor, C. L., & Appel, H. (2016). Is Eastern Europe to blame for falling corporate taxes in Europe? The politics of tax competition following EU enlargement. East European Politics and Societies, 30(4), 855–884. Turner, G. (2009). No way to run an economy. Pluto Press. van Apeldoorn, B. (2001). The struggle over European order: Transnational class agency in the making of ‘embedded neo-liberalism’. In A. Bieler, & A. D. Morton (Eds.), Social forces in the making of the New Europe: The restructuring of European social relations in the global political economy (pp. 70–89). Palgrave. van Apeldoorn, B., De Graaff, N., & Overbeek, H. (2012). The reconfiguration of the global state-capital nexus. Globalizations, 9(4), 471–486. Worth, O. (2013). Resistance in the age of austerity: Nationalism, the failure of the left and the return of God. Zed Books. World Bank. (2014). World Development Indicators. World Bank. http://data. worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. Young, B., & Semmler, W. (2011). The European sovereign debt crisis: Is Germany to blame? German Politics and Society, 29(1), 1–24.

CHAPTER 4

The Rise and Stagnation of the Radical Left in Southern Europe: SYRIZA, Bloco, Podemos

This chapter draws upon documentary research and the existing literature to provide a comparative discussion of SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos. It aims to introduce the three parties and establish the key similarities and differences among them in preparation for the core chapters of the book that tackle the networking and cooperation among them. The chapter’s three sections deal in turn with each of the three parties by looking at four standard analytical comparators commonly used in the literature—origins, organisation (including linkages), programme, and strategy. The section on SYRIZA has an additional subsection that deals with SYRIZA’s path to and performance in government, with a focus on the July 2015 U-turn, which will be shown as crucial to the party’s relations with its counterparts in Spain and Portugal. The chapter concludes with a summary of the relevant similarities between the three parties, namely their neo-reformist outlook, (initial) orientation towards social movements and emphasis on the need for transnational cooperation, as well as their differences— most prominent among them, SYRIZA’s accession to and trajectory in government.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Bortun, Crisis, Austerity and Transnational Party Cooperation in Southern Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39151-4_4

83

84

V. BORTUN

SYRIZA Origins As mentioned earlier, the Greek party’s origins go back to the 1968 split from the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), which would become known as the KKE-Es. While the KKE would remain a largely orthodox, unreformed communist party till the present day, KKE-Es soon adhered to the new Eurocommunist current (Spourdalakis, 2013, pp. 101–102). The party struggled, though, throughout the 1970s and early 1980s to become a significant actor in Greek politics, as it competed on the left with both KKE and the highly successful PASOK. Hence, in 1986 KKEEs became the Greek Left, in an explicit attempt to build a broader political force, similar to the Spanish IU established the same year by the similarly Eurocommunist PCE. According to Dunphy (2004, p. 35), this “marked the decisive move of the party into the post-communist phase”. Two years later, the party joined an electoral coalition with KKE, which had temporarily softened its approach on the background of Gorbachev’s “perestroika” in the Soviet Union (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, p. 3). The new coalition of former comrades was called Synaspismos [Coalition of the Left and Progress] (SYN) and gained over 10% in each of the three consecutive snap general elections it competed between 1989 and 1990; but in 1991 KKE left the coalition due to a deep internal crisis following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. The same year, SYN became a fully-fledged political party (including the non-hardliners who had been purged from KKE), defining itself as a pluralist left that supported a mixed economy and put more emphasis on “new issues” such as feminism and the environment (Kalyvas & Marantzidis, 2002). Also, it inherited from Eurocommunism the broad support for European integration and openness towards transnational cooperation with other left forces (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, p. 11). The 1990s and early 2000s represented a period of modest electoral results for SYN, with 5.1% in the 2000 general elections as its best achievement. Thus, it failed at the time to capitalise on the gradual “neoliberalisation” of PASOK, which won three consecutive general elections during that period largely by managing to present itself as the driving force of Greece’s modernisation (Spourdalakis & Tassis, 2006). Also, despite its orientation towards civil society, SYN did not manage to significantly challenge the KKE’s domination over the trade union movement (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, pp. 8–9). Moreover, the party’s

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

85

pluralist organisation came along with factionalism and protracted internal debates that led to a decline in membership by the end of the 1990s (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, p. 10). In that context, the party experienced a slight radicalisation after 2000, by placing more emphasis on class and economic issues (Eleftheriou, 2009). Moreover, the leadership came to the conclusion that, in an age of new social movements, such as the Global Justice Movement (GJM), a strong orientation towards these non-party actors would be the solution to the crisis of the Greek left. Thus, in 2001 SYN launched the Space for Dialogue and Common Action of the Left with the aim of unifying the Greek left and linking it up with social movements both nationally and transnationally (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 8). The “Space” proved to be the springboard for SYRIZA, which was born as an electoral coalition for the 2004 parliamentary elections. SYN was by far its largest and leading component, amounting for roughly 80% of its cadres and activists (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, p. 10). The other components of the very broad coalition were DIKKI (left social democratic party), New Fighter (group of PASOK dissidents), Active Citizens (movement led by the late Manolis Glezos, a towering figure of the antifascist resistance and post-war left), Movement for the Unity of Action of the Left (splinter group from KKE), Ecosocialists of Greece, Beginning (Trotskyist group), Red (Trotskyist group), Internationalist Workers’ Left (Trotskyist group), Communist Organisation of Greece (Maoist group), and the smaller organisations Rosa Group, Radicals and Anticapitalist Political Group (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, p. 17). Following the good result in the general elections of May 2012, when it gained almost 17% of the votes, for the elections one month later SYRIZA re-registered as an actual political party rather than a mere coalition. In those elections they jumped to almost 27% and became the main opposition party on the basis of an anti-austerity programme that focused on the defence of the welfare state. At the first party congress the following year, the decision was made to formally dissolve the constituent parties of SYRIZA into a unitary political organisation, although the various orientations formed platforms along doctrinal lines within the new party.

86

V. BORTUN

Organisation and Linkages According to its statute, SYRIZA is structured on three levels: individual members, territorial branches and national congress. The congress, which conveys every three years, is “the supreme body of the party” (SYRIZA, 2013, p. 12), as it votes on its programmatic and strategic course. It also elects the Central Committee, the highest political body of the party, responsible for implementing the decisions taken at the congress. In turn, the Central Committee coordinates various thematic departments, including an International Relations and Peace Affairs Department. Given its origins, SYRIZA had a confederated character before becoming a unified party in 2013. This entailed a “loose organizational structure … very far from most versions of the mass Leninist-inspired party model”, as favoured by most of its thirteen constituent groups (Spourdalakis, 2013, p. 111). Such a structure accommodated the ideological diversity of those groups and, indeed, created “a culture of tolerance among the previously competing left traditions” (Spourdalakis, 2013, p. 108). The pluralist character of SYRIZA, which morphed after 2013 into the creation of internal tendencies, came with certain downsides though, as the many different voices within the organisation often led to “a confusing polyphony” (Douzinas, 2017, p. 42). However, SYRIZA arguably became more homogenous following the split of the party’s more radical elements gathered under the banner of the Left Platform, who opposed the deal with the Troika in July 2015 and formed a new party, Popular Unity. Another tendency was formed in 2014, the so-called Group of 53+, described as “the left wing of the party’s mainstream” (Sheehan, 2016, p. 142). At the same time, SYRIZA claimed to be a more democratic and inclusive party than the traditional organisations of the radical left, a claim inherited from SYN, who had always tried to portray itself as a “party of its members” (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, p. 10). Indeed, SYRIZA’s statute emphasises that its members represent the social foundation of the party (SYRIZA, 2013, p. 8). However, the cooperation of SYRIZA’s constituent groups remained limited at the level of their leadership, with no genuine integration of the local branches (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, p. 11). The pre-eminence of the leadership was also reflected in the increased emphasis, after 2012, on the personality of the then-young leader, Alexis Tsipras (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 14).

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

87

Indeed, SYRIZA is said to have become increasingly top-down and centralised since 2013, a process that only enhanced after the 2015 electoral victory (Kouvelakis, 2016, p. 21). According to Stathis Kouvelakis, a former member of the SYRIZA’s Central Committee and of the Left Platform, “the high circles of the government and the key centers of political decision making acquired absolute autonomy from the party” (Kouvelakis, 2016, p. 22). Indeed, around the time of signing the deal with the Troika, the party’s leadership was accused by critics from the left and former comrades of the “evasion of internal democratic procedures” (Panayiotakis, 2015, p. 42). Indeed, similar criticisms of disempowering the membership had been made of SYRIZA’s forerunner, SYN, back in 1989 when it participated in the short-lived centre-right government of Tzannetakis (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, p. 4). Of course, this is not unique to RLPs such as SYRIZA but is rather characteristic of parties that get into government and face a trade-off between swift decision-making and internal democracy (Bolleyer, 2009). It is interesting to note, though, that RLPs do not escape this trend. In terms of linkages, SYRIZA’s relatively weak presence and influence in the labour movement, historically dominated by the KKE and PASOK, was also informed by the suspicion shared by many of SYRIZA’s younger activists towards trade unions, which they perceived as “too bureaucratic and dominated by mainstream political forces” (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, p. 11). Nonetheless, SYRIZA tried to overcome this disadvantage by setting up in 2007 the SYRIZA Network of Trade Unionists, meant to coordinate the party members who were active in trade unions but also to attract new people to its ranks, particularly from the newer unions. While that initiative did not manage to considerably strengthen SYRIZA’s influence in the labour movement, it did succeed in attracting trade unionists disillusioned with PASOK or KKE (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, p. 15). However, while in government and implementing further austerity measures, SYRIZA’s relation to the labour movement became weaker than ever when not openly confrontational, particularly following the government’s plan to limit the right to industrial action (Smith, 2018). Its relatively weak position in the trade union movement only reinforced SYRIZA’s attempt to appeal to the youth, with its youth organisation gaining a prominent profile in the wider movement. While following the general political line of the party, Youth of SYRIZA (YoS) “maintains complete organizational autonomy from the party” and “is responsible for

88

V. BORTUN

the development of its policy in relation to youth problems” (SYRIZA, 2013). Most importantly, YoS has a strong internationalist outlook, just like its predecessor, SYN’s youth organisation (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, p. 11). They believe that transnational cooperation of left-wing youth organisations is a key element of the struggle for “a new Europe on a completely different basis” (Youth of SYRIZA, 2016). As a party that also targets what it calls “the progressive intelligentsia” (SYRIZA, 2013, p. 1), SYRIZA has its own political foundation, the Nicos Poulantzas Institute (NPI). Established in 1997 as the political foundation of SYN, NPI’s declared aims are to provide theoretical and ideological support to the programme of “the renewed, radical and ecological Left” and to assist with the political education of SYRIZA’s cadres (Nicos Poulantzas Institute, 2018). Most importantly, NPI seeks to be linked to the “polymorphous social movements in many countries and the accompanying new forms of internationalism” and be part of “the dialogue that is unfolding all over the world” (Nicos Poulantzas Institute, 2018). As shown in Chapter 5, NPI plays some role in the party’s transnational networking and cooperation with the other two parties, although not as much as one might expect given its stated mission. Finally, in terms of international linkages, suffice to say for now that SYRIZA (2015a) describes itself as a “very active” and “influential” member of both The Left group and the PEL. At the same time, SYRIZA’s MEPs play a key role in the Progressive Caucus in the EP, established in 2017 together with social democratic and Green MEPs with the aim “to strengthen progressive voices in the European Parliament” (Progressive Caucus, 2018). All of this is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Programme As mentioned earlier, SYRIZA emerged as an alternative to both the social democracy of PASOK and the “orthodox” communism of KKE. One of SYRIZA’s founding members, political scientist Michalis Spourdalakis (2013, p. 108), notes that such an alternative aimed to “bridge the gap between reform and revolution and to define the radical transformation of capitalist society as a process of structural reforms directly connected to everyday struggles”. Thus, echoing its Eurocommunist roots, SYRIZA opted for a gradual and democratic path to socialism,

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

89

while openly rejecting, in stark contrast to the KKE, the legacy of Stalinism and the Soviet Union (Nikolakakis, 2016, p. 8). At a theoretical level, this approach was largely influenced by the ideas of Greek-French Marxist Nicos Poulantzas (as seen in the name of the party’s political institute), who believed that, while under capitalism the state fundamentally serves the interests of the capitalist class, its complexity and relative autonomy would allow the anti-capitalist left to struggle for hegemony and potentially make significant gains within its framework (see Martin, 2008). At the same time, SYRIZA aspired to be a plural and modern left campaigning also for “non-economic” causes such as gender equality and the protection of the environment. That plurality is expressed by the three flags making up the party emblem, with the red flag symbolising the socialist dimension, the green flag standing for ecologism and the purple one for feminism (Spourdalakis, 2013, p. 107). Thus, in accordance with its origins, SYRIZA’s 2004 electoral and founding manifesto had some radical elements. However, based on data from the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2017), the aggregate number of statements referring to “controlled economy”, “nationalisation”, “Marxist analysis”, “publicly-owned industry”, “socialist property” and/or “economic planning”—i.e. the categories used by the Manifesto Project that would indicate left radicalism according to the established definition of the latter—represented merely 6.3% of the manifesto. At the same time, statements expressing Keynesian or broadly reformist policies and goals, such as the strengthening of the welfare state, amounted to 3.8% of the manifesto (Volkens et al., 2017). Following the party’s change of leadership and shift to the left (Payiatsos, 2017, p. 14), the 2007 elections saw an even more radical manifesto from SYRIZA, with more than 16% of the text pointing to economic policies of an anticapitalist or socialist character, while the reformist elements were limited to 1.8% (Volkens et al., 2017). That remains, to the present day, the most radical SYRIZA manifesto. The one for the 2009 manifesto, however, was visibly less radical than the previous one, with merely 2.4% radical policies compared to 8.9% reformist elements (Volkens et al., 2017). That marked the beginning of SYRIZA’s programmatic moderation that only accelerated during and after the crisis. Given PASOK’s direct participation in the first wave of austerity policies (Moschonas, 2013), SYRIZA became the main opponent of those policies and defender of the welfare state, in the attempt to “capture

90

V. BORTUN

the middle ground in Greek politics” (Exadaktylos, 2012). Nevertheless, this was not a sudden but gradual process of de-radicalisation, as the manifestos for the elections in May and June 2012 still called for some anti-capitalist policies such as the nationalisation of banks, private hospitals and formerly public services or utility companies (SYRIZA, 2012). After 2012, although the radical aspiration to build socialism in a distant future was still present in the more theoretical (and obscure) party documents (Nikolakakis, 2016, p. 8), SYRIZA’s de-radicalisation in its day-to-day discursive practices and electoral manifestos enhanced steadily (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 12). SYRIZA’s manifesto for the victorious elections from January 2015, also known as the Thessaloniki Programme, made no reference to capitalism or socialism, to nationalisation or public ownership, to economic planning or democratic control of the economy. Instead, it explicitly pleaded for social democratic and neo-Keynesian aims such as the “rebuilding of the welfare state” and “a European New Deal of public investment financed by the European Investment Bank” (SYRIZA, 2014). The social democratic character of SYRIZA’s programme was reinforced in the snap elections held eight months later, when that balance was 5.5% to 2.6% in favour of social democratic economic policies (Volkens et al., 2017). The actual policies that SYRIZA pursued during its four years in government are discussed in the final subsection dedicated to this party, but they consolidated the shift towards the centre-left experienced by SYRIZA throughout the decade of crisis. Moschonas (2013, p. 37) observed as early as 2013 that SYRIZA’s “economic policy has changed gradually during the three years of the debt crisis, moving in a similar direction to the path taken during the 1930s by social democrats in Sweden and New Deal Democrats in the United States”. Thus, despite claims to the contrary by the party leadership (see Tsipras, 2013a, p. 41), from an alternative to social democracy SYRIZA arguably became the new social democracy, as hinted at even by some of its own, more reflective, members (see Douzinas, 2017, p. 67). Indeed, the party’s manifesto for the 2019 elections, when SYRIZA came second, lacked any transformative policies and merely called for more public investment and better-funded healthcare and education sectors. Also, the proposals regarding taxation mostly regarded the reduction or elimination of taxes for less advantaged categories rather than any increase in taxes on big business or the very rich (SYRIZA, 2019). It was SYRIZA’s most moderate manifesto ever, hardly

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

91

distinguishable from those of most European social democratic parties. It reinforced the case made by some scholars that the party completed the arch of a qualitative transition from left radicalism to “post-left managerialism” (Chatzistavrou, 2016) or “neo-reformist left” (Bortun, 2023). The recent election of an ex-banker as party leader will very likely consolidate SYRIZA’s move to the centre ground of the political spectrum (Smith, 2023). Finally, but particularly relevant to the present discussion, SYRIZA’s Eurocommunist legacy has also been reflected in its broad support for European integration and for Greece’s membership in both the EU and the eurozone (Chatzistavrou, 2016; Nikolakakis, 2016). At a deeper theoretical level, this ideological choice stems from the party’s core principle that there are no national roads to socialism and that this longterm goal can only be pursued at a pan-European level (and beyond). As put by Nikolakakis (2016, p. 10), “the party’s left Europeanism is a direct by-product of … the party’s negation of Stalin’s version of ‘socialism in one country’”. Although with the start of the crisis the party became increasingly critical of the EU and particularly of the Eurozone, SYRIZA remained unflinching in the belief that the EU can be reformed from within through the transnational cooperation of progressive forces (SYRIZA, 2017). At the same time, as it will be shown throughout the book, continuous allegiance to the EU has had a significant impact on SYRIZA’s relations with both Bloco and Podemos as well as other significant actors on the European left. Strategy Given its starting deficit in terms of influence in the trade union movement (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013), SYRIZA was from the very beginning, just like SYN before it, oriented towards the social movements, both nationally and internationally. In doing that, SYRIZA adopted a strategy of protest and social mobilisation (Spourdalakis, 2013; Tsakatika, 2016). According to Spourdalakis (2013, p. 103), that choice signalled “a clear departure from the traditional instrumentalism among parties on the left, completely preoccupied as they were with securing public office”. This was in contrast with RLPs such as the PCF or the PRC (otherwise, a pioneer among post-1989 RLPs in linking up with social movements) had sought throughout the 1990s and early 2000s respectively to strengthen

92

V. BORTUN

their influence by joining centre-left government coalitions as junior partners (Keith, 2010), only to then suffer considerable electoral setbacks as a result of it (March, 2011). Thus, SYRIZA started to participate in all relevant social and protest movements, without trying, in contrast with KKE, to take them over, but rather work alongside them (Douzinas, 2017, p. 41; Tsakatika, 2016, p. 8). Together with that strategy came a sustained effort to attract the youth, seen as “an autonomous social category that … can be converted from a ‘lost generation’ to the generation of social transformation” (Youth of SYRIZA, 2017). That was reflected not only in the aforementioned emphasis on building the youth organisation but also, among other things, by the election of a 34-year-old Tsipras as SYN’s president in 2008 (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 8), as part of a broader process of promoting younger members in key party positions (Spourdalakis, 2013, p. 102). In fact, Tsipras was the representative of the movement-oriented sections of the party that favoured an ever stronger focus on building the broader SYRIZA (Spourdalakis, 2013, p. 104), whose leader he also became in 2009. With the start of the crisis, SYRIZA’s orientation towards social movements enhanced, particularly during the 2010–2012 period of intense social mobilisation in reaction to the first wave of austerity measures (Rüdig & Karyotis, 2014). It was this participation in the various bottomup anti-austerity movements that contributed decisively to SYRIZA’s rising profile and eventual electoral breakthrough of 2012 (Spourdalakis, 2013, pp. 109–111). That active involvement included participation in the panel discussions organised in the squares (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, p. 15) as well as providing political, technical and legal assistance when protesters were confronted by the police. Furthermore, SYRIZA offered financial and logistical support to Solidarity 4 All (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 9), a network aimed at connecting and assisting the numerous grassroots initiatives of social solidarity that developed quite organically in reaction to the social impact of austerity—from networks distributing food and clothes to groups providing free healthcare and education (see Solidarity 4 All, 2013). The financial support came from the wages of SYRIZA MPs (Karitzis, 2017, p. 13), although that was also seen as a way for SYRIZA to control the movement from above (Font et al., 2021, p. 171). In parallel, the few SYRIZA MPs at the time acted as the only mouthpieces in the Parliament for the movements’ social demands. More than

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

93

that, SYRIZA started to articulate its own programme around those demands, which thus became “the linchpin between the active and militant presence of Syriza within and outside the public institutions and its claim to governmental power” (Spourdalakis, 2013, p. 110). In other words, SYRIZA managed to establish itself as the political arm of the anti-austerity movements and campaigns (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013). That was embedded in a broader populist discursive strategy that portrayed SYRIZA as representing “the people” against the “corrupt political elites” (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014), summed up in one of the party’s slogans for the elections in May 2012—“Us or them” (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 10). At the same time, the leadership adopted a “competence strategy” (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 11) meant to convince all social strata affected by austerity that SYRIZA had the best plan to take the country out of the crisis and that it was ready to govern in order to put that plan into practice (Spourdalakis, 2013, p. 111). According to Douzinas (2017, p. 42), who became himself an MP in the 2015 elections, that was “a key moment in the rise of SYRIZA”, aimed at “putting an end to a long period of defeat and marginalisation”. As part of that approach, SYRIZA wanted to persuade the public of its competence to form a “government of the Left” by attracting economists in key positions, as their expertise was meant to instil confidence in potential voters that SYRIZA had the right kind of people to govern the country (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 12). That new strategic focus led, particularly following the good electoral results in 2012, to a more fundamental reorientation away from protest and social mobilisation towards electoral and parliamentary politics (Eleftheriou, 2016; Kouki & González, 2018; Tsakatika, 2016). In other words, SYRIZA prioritised again the office-seeking strategy that it had previously side-lined and which typically entails lesser emphasis on civil society linkages (Tsakatika & Lisi, 2013, p. 8). While that did not mean a complete disengagement from the protest and social movements, SYRIZA subordinated its initial strategy of mobilisation to that of winning elections (Eleftheriou, 2016, p. 297). That trade-off also occurred, it has to be said, against the background of an objective decrease in the level of spontaneous social mobilisation against austerity (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 9). This strategic reorientation only enhanced after SYRIZA came into government in early 2015. Indeed, despite the Oxi referendum moment outlined below, SYRIZA moved further away from the strategy of protest

94

V. BORTUN

and mass mobilisation in favour of appeasing the domestic political establishment and negotiating with the EU establishment (Douzinas, 2017; Kouvelakis, 2016; Payiatsos, 2017; Sotiris, 2016). SYRIZA in Government SYRIZA went from a party of under 5% to one scoring nearly 27% in less than three years. This overlaps with the most severe period of crisis in Greece, whose social and political impact fundamentally explains the party’s “meteoric rise” (Moschonas, 2013, p. 36). SYRIZA opposed the austerity policies from the very beginning and called for their abolition. It also called for an end to “bipartisanism”, which it saw as responsible for Greece’s socio-economic distress (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 9; Spourdalakis, 2013, pp. 111–112). That responsibility was shared with the Troika. Endorsing the counter-narrative of the Eurozone crisis outlined in the previous chapter, SYRIZA’s leader Alexis Tsipras (2013b) argued that “the strategy of European Elites and the Greek government cannot provide a viable prospect of exit from the crisis. The only thing that austerity has accomplished is to plunge Europe into economic depression and to throw Greece in an unprecedented humanitarian crisis”. But, according to him and his party, austerity was not simply an uninspired economic solution to the crisis but a conscious political choice: “The neoliberal European establishment, Ms Merkel and her political allies have taken advantage of the crisis in order to rewrite Europe’s post-war political economy, and to impose the Anglo-Saxon neoliberal capitalism” (Tsipras, 2014). While the other significant radical left party in Greece, the KKE, displayed a similar anti-austerity and anti-establishment discourse, it failed to electorally capitalise on that favourable context as much as SYRIZA. That was mainly due to SYRIZA’s pluralist organisation and successful strategy of linking up with and drawing on the support of the anti-austerity social movements and campaigns (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013), coupled with parliamentary activism that gave voice to the movement’s demands. By contrast, in a manner rather characteristic of orthodox communist parties, the KKE initially focused on trade union mobilisation and initially dismissed the social movements, which in turn became relatively hostile towards the KKE (Spourdalakis, 2013, p. 107; Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, p. 15).

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

95

The electoral fruits of SYRIZA’s dual strategy were seen in 2012, when the party came second in both the May and June elections, with 16.8% and 26.9% of the votes respectively, thus seeing its share of votes increase by more than five times since the beginning of the crisis. The significant difference between the results from May and June was mainly explained by its refusal to join a New Democracy government (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 6) as well as by the sectarian attitude of the other two anti-establishment left-wing parties, KKE and DIMAR, who refused any possible collaboration with SYRIZA (Spourdalakis, 2013, p. 113). That breakthrough was consolidated in the 2014 European elections when SYRIZA gained 26.6% of the votes to become the first party other than PASOK or New Democracy to win a nationwide election in the post-1974 era. In parallel though, SYRIZA’s strategy was steadily tilting towards institutional and parliamentary politics, with many of the people who had participated in the previous movements and campaigns having become SYRIZA supporters, waiting for the party to get into power and implement the anti-austerity demands (Tsatsanis & Teperoglou, 2016). That waiting ended in January 2015, when SYRIZA won the snap general elections with 36.3% of the votes, a victory that triggered jubilation among the anti-austerity left forces across Europe and apprehension among the domestic and European political establishments (Tsatsanis & Teperoglou, 2016, p. 6). Being short by two seats of a parliamentary majority and facing continuous hostility from the KKE, SYRIZA formed a government coalition with the right-wing nationalist party ANEL, who loosely shared SYRIZA’s opposition to austerity and the Troika. While this marriage of convenience—which lasted for the subsequent four years—might be read as an expression of the partial convergence between the left- and right-wing populism (or Euroscepticism), it was primarily motivated by SYRIZA’s lack of options in forming a government. In other words, it was a case of political pragmatism prevailing over ideological coherence—one of the key features of contemporary RLPs (Keith, 2010). SYRIZA won those elections with a manifesto that promised to break with the politics of austerity and fuel economic growth via public investment (SYRIZA, 2014). For that, SYRIZA would engage in negotiations for a write-off of most of the public debt and an extension of the period for the payment of the remaining part of it, the ability to run a balanced budget rather than having to produce a primary surplus, quantitative easing provided by the ECB and, at a broader scale, a “European New

96

V. BORTUN

Deal” of public investment funded by the European Investment Bank (SYRIZA, 2014). At the same time, the possibility of an exit from the Eurozone was utterly excluded, despite being advocated as a backup plan by the members of the Left Platform and despite SYRIZA’s overall critical view of the “the current neoliberal and undemocratic Europe of fear and Memoranda” (Tsipras, 2014). For instance, the former slogan of “No sacrifice to the euro” from the 2012 electoral campaign was dropped (Kouvelakis, 2016, p. 20). SYRIZA’s hope to convince the Troika meet its demands while openly reasserting its intent to remain in the Eurozone regardless of Troika’s response to those demands soon proved rather misplaced. After several months of negotiations between the Greek side led by the larger-thanlife Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis and the other members of the Eurogroup (the informal body of the finance ministers of Eurozone member states) and despite channelling most public funds towards the repayment of the debt in order to prove its good faith (Payiatsos, 2017, p. 19), the Tsipras-led government obtained no significant concessions from the Troika. Instead, in late June 2015, the latter made an offer that broadly reasserted the existing provisions of the two Memoranda. The SYRIZA government declined it and announced a referendum over it, to which the ECB reacted by stopping the flow of liquidity to the Greek banks. That compelled the government to impose capital controls in order to prevent a full-scale bank run that would have likely paralysed the economy while refusing to pay a scheduled e1.6 billion instalment of the loan to the IMF (Tsatsanis & Teperoglou, 2016, p. 8). In that context, the referendum took place on 5 July, with 61.3% of the voters endorsing the government’s position and rejecting the Troika’s offer. However, in a dramatic U-turn, only one week later the SYRIZA government signed a deal with the Troika that entailed harsher conditions than those rejected in the referendum. That U-turn came after the Greek government was threatened with an exit from the Eurozone by prominent actors in the Eurogroup, most crucially Germany’s Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble (Hall, 2015). In exchange, the Greek government was offered a third bailout worth e86 billion and “a vague promise to revisit the topic of debt restructuring in the future” (Tsatsanis & Teperoglou, 2016, p. 12). By agreeing to this, the SYRIZA government accepted to not only abandon its electoral promise to reverse the austerity measures taken by previous governments but also implement further austerity measures, including widening the tax base, reforming

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

97

the pension system and cutting more public spending in order to achieve a primary surplus. The Tsipras government also pledged to privatise e50 billion worth of public assets under the direct supervision of the Troika, which was to approve any government economic policy over the duration of the bailout (Douzinas, 2017, p. 49). As Tsatsanis and Teperoglou (2016, p. 11) put it, “the exact decisionmaking process that led to the Greek government’s spectacular U-turn a few days after its resounding political victory in the referendum will probably never be fully ascertained”. Nevertheless, a prevailing, albeit speculative, explanation that circulated at the time was that the Tsipras government had come to realise before the referendum that, given its firm commitment to stay in the Eurozone, it would have to give in to Troika’s conditions. Tsipras thought that in a referendum the population—three quarters of which, according to most polls, wanted the country to stay in the Eurozone (Tsatsanis & Teperoglou, 2016, p. 9)—would back the Troika’s offer, thus giving the government the popular mandate to accept it and break with its own electoral promises (see Payiatsos, 2017; Tsebelis, 2015; Varoufakis, 2017). The referendum result begged to differ. SYRIZA’s Left Platform vocally opposed the deal and its MPs voted against it in the Parliament. They argued that there was an alternative to that U-turn: an exit from the Eurozone and the introduction of a national currency (whose initial devaluation would have arguably boosted exports), a democratic audit of the public debt resulting in a significant write-off, the introduction of quantitative easing to fund public services, infrastructure and job creation, debt relief for SMEs and households, nationalisation of banks under democratic control and a comprehensive development policy to rejuvenate the country’s industry (see Flassbeck & Lapavitsas, 2015, pp. 95–115; see also Payiatsos, 2017, pp. 20–21, for the sketch of a more radical alternative). However, these radical measures were at odds with the social democratic programmatic trajectory undergone by SYRIZA in the previous years. The Left Platform was, effectively, a radical left party inside a social democratic party and it eventually had to break away. While Tsipras secured the Parliament’s approval of the deal with, rather ironically, the help of MPs from PASOK and New Democracy, 25 SYRIZA MPs opposed it. Hence, he dissolved the Parliament and announced new elections for September. The crux of SYRIZA’s campaign was to warn against the return to power of the political forces that had “brought the country to its knees, and brought the memoranda” (Tsipras,

98

V. BORTUN

2015b), that is, the only political forces in the parliament that supported the Tsipras government’s deal with the Troika. Indeed, the latter was framed as, rather than being a genuine choice, the only way to avoid “national suicide”—a position echoing the very TINA mantra of neoliberalism. SYRIZA won with 35.5% of the votes and formed a second government with ANEL. The Left Platform and other radical elements in SYRIZA split to form the new party Popular Unity, which fell short of the 3% threshold for parliamentary representation. Over the four years that followed, the second Tsipras government introduced several austerity measures and privatisations, in contradiction to its initial anti-austerity programme and broadly in line with the stipulations of the deal agreed with the Troika. Overall, public spending decreased from 20.6% of the GDP in 2015 to 19.8% in 2018, only to increase to 20.1% in 2019. This allowed the country to meet the agreed primary surplus targets and exit its eight-year bailout programme in August 2018, although the Troika would maintain its supervision to ensure that the target of a 2.2% primary surplus by 2022 would be met (Brunsden & Khan, 2018). The bulk of those cuts came from a reduction in transfers to the social security system, hospitals and other public bodies. Also, the 2016 pension reform saw, among other things, a reduction of the pensions of the recently retired ranging between 15% and 30% and the gradual elimination of the social solidarity benefit for the most vulnerable pensioners. Also, even though SYRIZA’s own balance sheet claims to have “limited as much as possible the scope of privatizations” (SYRIZA, 2020a), its government did enact a significant range of privatisations, including the national gas company, the country’s two biggest ports and main airport, and the work-in-progress privatisation of Greece’s biggest oil refiner (Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund, 2018; Magginas et al., 2019). In parallel, the Tsipras government implemented various progressive policies, including measures to alleviate poverty or to provide the most vulnerable with access to healthcare. One of the most notable measures was the introduction of the Social Solidarity Income in 2016, which provided poor families with direct income support, access to social services and assistance for (re)integration into the labour market. Other social measures included the provision of food vouchers to poor families, subsidies for rent and free electricity to three hundred thousand families, free health care to two million uninsured people, free meals for school

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

99

children, and temporarily banning the seizure of family homes for nonserviced loans (Douzinas, 2017, p. 49). Even so, these welfare measures were deemed as falling short of what was needed to address the highest levels of poverty experienced by Greece in decades (Ziomas et al., 2017). On socio-cultural issues, however, the government was arguably more successful, granting citizenship to immigrants, legalising civil unions for same-sex couples and decriminalising conscientious objectors and draft evaders (Douzinas, 2017, p. 76). Another success came in the field of foreign affairs in January 2019, when the Greek Parliament approved an agreement over the long-standing dispute regarding the official name of the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, recognised from thereon as the Republic of Northern Macedonia. The agreement unblocked the Balkan country’s road to EU accession and was a diplomatic success that Tsipras tried to capitalise on in the perspective of the general elections later that year (BBC News, 2019). That did not pan out, as SYRIZA returned in opposition, albeit with a relatively high score of 31.5%. In the subsequent elections of 2023, SYRIZA’s electoral decline continued, to 20%, half of the score of the right-wing ND party that it had toppled down in 2015. Coming back to the key questions of the book, the “painful compromise” (Tsipras, 2015a) that the Tsipras government made in the summer of 2015 reinforced SYRIZA’s belief that the Troika could not be taken on by one left government alone. Hence, SYRIZA openly nurtured the hope that like-minded parties would win elections in other, particularly Southern, member states (SYRIZA, 2015b), as explored in detail in the next chapter. Of course, SYRIZA’s realisation of the need for transnational networking and cooperation with other left forces had come before 2015, in the first years of the crisis (Sheehan, 2016, p. 56). At a public meeting in London in 2013, for instance, Tsipras (2013b) made it clear that “We will not be able to achieve our aims without the solidarity and the help of the European Left. ... Our struggle is the same”. From early on, though, SYRIZA’s appeal to transnational cooperation was not limited to the radical left but also extended to some sections of the European centre-left (see Tsipras, 2013a, p. 45). Following the deal with the Troika in July 2015, the party increasingly focused on TPC with sections of the social democratic and Green party families that broadly shared SYRIZA’s vision of a reformed EU. In a speech from September 2018, the Secretary of SYRIZA’s Central Committee, Panos Skourletis (2018), said to the Executive Board of the ELP that they

100

V. BORTUN

have to “play a leading role in the battle for the unity of all progressive forces which currently pursue the implementation of an alternative, democratic and social model for Europe – forces from the Greens and European Socialists”. Thus, SYRIZA had bilateral meetings with prominent social democratic parties (Chatzistavrou, 2016, p. 39) and Tsipras started to attend as an observer the meetings of the PES (see Sideris, 2018). This fuelled the claim of SYRIZA’s social democratisation and even led to the short-lived speculation that SYRIZA might try to join the PES, which was however denied by leading figures in the latter (Michalopoulos, 2016). Moreover, at the 2018 Summit of the Southern European Union Countries, Tsipras signed together with the other prime ministers of Southern member states, including the right-wing Spanish prime minister at the time, Mariano Rajoy, a declaration that called on the EU to “to fully combine economic growth and social wellbeing” (“Bringing the EU forward”, 2018). That call, though, was not translated into more concrete coordination among those governments, despite the arrival in government in Spain of the social democratic PSOE in June that year. As Calossi (2016, p. 176) pointed out, SYRIZA’s rapprochement with sections of European social democracy “could be interpreted as the first steps towards a centre-left alliance (potentially with the inclusion of the green parties too), as an alternative to the grosse coalition style, which has long characterized the EU institutions”. However, that centre-left alliance did not come to fruition, neither in the perspective nor in the aftermath of the 2019 European elections. The most significant step in that direction was the creation in 2016 of the Progressive Caucus, which included SYRIZA’s MEPs and several social democratic and Green MEPs. Particularly relevant though, Bloco’s and Podemos’ MEPs at the time were not involved in that project; instead, they played a leading role in the “Plan B for Europe” initiative and the “Now, the people!” movement, all of which are discussed in the final sections of the next chapter.

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

101

Bloco Origins The emergence of the Left Bloc (Bloco) in Portugal at the turn of the century took place in a political context rooted in the 1974 Carnation Revolution that brought the end of almost fifty years of right-wing dictatorship. The revolutionary events back then pushed the political landscape to the left to the extent that even what would become the country’s main centre-right party named itself the Social Democratic Party. However, after decades of operating clandestinely, the radical left at the time was neither united and confident enough, nor sufficiently linked to the masses in order to capitalise on that favourable context and seize power. In particular, it did not seem capable of delivering the more immediate reforms that people were waiting for (Príncipe, 2016, pp. 159–161). That shortcoming only became cemented over time and, as Príncipe aptly notes (2016, p. 161), “the revolutionary left remained divided, squabbling for the cold comfort of ‘revolutionary purity’”. The main beneficiary of that context proved to be the centre-left Socialist Party (PS), which promised the expected reforms, and partly delivered them, as part of a broader “return to normality” following the decades of dictatorship and then the upheaval of 1974–1975 (Príncipe, 2016, p. 160). Together with the Social Democratic Party, the PS dominated the post-1974 political scene in Portugal (Lisi, 2009, para 7), the two parties alternating in government uninterruptedly till the present day. However, as the PS gradually moved to the right together with the rest of European social democracy (Freire, 2010), by the end of the 1990s a new gap on the left had emerged. The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), still weakened by the collapse of the Soviet Union, was too ossified to fill in that gap and to address the concrete challenges faced by Portugal after its 1986 accession to the EU (March, 2011, p. 107). It was in such circumstances that Bloco was established in 1999 through the merger of small radical left organisations from different ideological traditions, which had come to realise that they could not further develop their forces on their own (Lisi, 2009, para 9). The three founding organisations were the Revolutionary Socialist Party (Trotskyist group, affiliated to the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, USFI from now on), the People’s Democratic Union (Maoist group), and Politics XXI (former Eurocommunist dissidents from the PCP). The following year, the Left Revolutionary Front (another Trotskyist group, affiliated

102

V. BORTUN

to a different international organisation) also joined. While Bloco had a full party status from the start, its constituent groups retained a certain degree of autonomy as distinct political tendencies. From the very beginning, Bloco’s two-fold goal was to capitalise on PS’s move to the right and attract its disillusioned voters, while at the same time challenging PCP’s hegemony over the radical left electorate by attracting the new generation of voters (Lisi, 2009, para 10; Príncipe, 2016, p. 164). This approach proved very soon to be relatively successful, as the party gained parliamentary representation the same year it was created. Its vote in general elections steadily increased in subsequent elections (with the exception of a slump in the 2011 elections, discussed below): from 2.4% in 1999 to 6.4% in 2005 to 9.8% in 2009 to 10.2% in 2015. Organisation and Linkages The organisational structure of Bloco is highly stratified. The party is divided—from bottom to top—in nuclei (composed of at least five members), local coordinating committees, local assemblies, regional coordinating committees, regional assemblies, a political committee, a national committee and the national convention (Bloco, 2016). The latter is the highest body of the party, meeting biennially to vote for the political platform that will guide the party’s programme and strategy for the following two years. Any group of at least twenty party members has the right to put forward a platform up for discussion and voting. Each platform also proposes a slate for the National Committee, whose composition (roughly 80 members) reflects the votes scored by each platform. Thus, Bloco’s leadership is described as “shared hegemony” (Esquerda.net, 2015). The national board then elects the Political Committee (between 15 and 20 members), which takes the major political decisions in between the national conventions and thus represents the executive body of the party. The coordinator of the Political Committee, currently Catarina Martins, is considered the party’s leader (Esquerda.net, 2016). Initially though, Bloco adopted a looser internal structure, so that the three main founding organisations were able to maintain their ideological traditions, while allowing other individuals to join the new party without attaching themselves to any of those groups. Thus, similarly to SYRIZA, Bloco explicitly defined itself as a “pluralist organization” (Esquerda.net, 2015). Also, according to its statute, Bloco (2016a)

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

103

“defends and promotes a civic culture of democratic political participation and action”. Thus, Bloco aimed to foster strong links between the party’s leadership and its rank-and-file, which would allow for a decentralised, bottom-up decision-making process (Lisi, 2013, p. 25). Nevertheless, the life of the party has often been characterised by “factionalism” (Lisi, 2013, p. 26), with the founding groups much better represented in the internal structures of power than those who joined Bloco on an individual basis. While this factionalism has been less conflictual than in other comparable RLPs (Lourenço et al., 2023), at times it demoralised members and undermined the renewal of leadership and programme (Lisi, 2013, p. 26). Indeed, the relationship between the leadership and the rank-and-file became increasingly vertical and the decision-making process gradually more centralised, particularly following a good electoral result in 2005. It was then that the new party statute was adopted, which saw the creation of the powerful political committee and the position of coordinator. That strengthened the leadership’s control of the party and further contributed to the disillusionment of its rank-and-file members (Lisi, 2013, p. 25). In terms of linkages, in contrast to the PCP, Bloco had from the start a relatively poor presence in the labour movement, particularly in the General Confederation of the Portuguese Workers, the main labour confederation in Portugal (Lisi, 2013, pp. 30–32). While the party has managed over the last decade to attract young activists from campaigns against precarious work, such as FERVE, they are mostly non-unionised, so this has not changed the fact that Bloco’s influence among trade unions is rather modest (Príncipe, 2016, p. 167). Hence, Bloco cultivated strong links with other sections of the civil society, particularly social movements and student associations (Lisi, 2013, p. 27). The political committee includes a position specifically designed to handle the party’s relations with social movements, although those movements have no formal channels to influence the party’s programme and strategy (Lisi, 2013, pp. 28–29). To strengthen its links to the younger generations, Bloco has an auxiliary organisation called the Youth of Bloco (YoB). It describes itself as an anti-capitalist political organisation that wants to avoid the past “sectarianism” of similar organisations (Youth of Bloco, 2007). By encouraging its members to intervene in their schools, universities, workplaces, and local community groups, YoB hopes to act as a catalyst for social movements (Youth of Bloco, 2015a). Special attention is given to student work,

104

V. BORTUN

which is why in 2010 YoB established a separate organisation called Young Students of Bloco. YoB’s openness towards cooperation is also reflected at an international level, where it is an active member, together its Greek counterpart YoS, of the Youths of the European Left network (Youth of Bloco, 2017). At the same time, as of 2016, Bloco has an organisational structure for pensioners called Group +60. Another similarity with SYRIZA lies in Bloco’s strong ties with the academic world. This will be further explored in Chapter 5 but suffice to say for now that at the 2011 party convention a third of the members of the National Board were at the time teachers or university professors (Lisi, 2013, p. 31). However, unlike SYRIZA, Bloco does not have an official political foundation, but has instead developed a close relationship with the Cultural Cooperative of Labour and Socialism (CUL:TRA). The latter is part of the same Transform! Europe network as SYRIZA’s NPI, although it has less ambitious goals than the latter, mostly limited to the production of “research, training and publications in the fields of history, political science, economy, sociology and cultural issues related to the working classes” (Transform, n.d.b). More importantly, just like SYRIZA, Bloco is internationally affiliated to The Left in EP and the ELP, both discussed in the following chapter. At the same time, in 2016, the party joined, alongside Podemos and other prominent Eurosceptic RLPs, the Plan B for Europe initiative, which aims to offer “an alternative political program to break up with these [EU] treaties in favour of an area of peace, democratic cooperation and solidarity” (Esquerda.net, 2017). In 2018, Bloco and the other participants in Plan B launched the similarly Eurosceptic movement “Now, the people!”. Both these initiatives, which marked a clear divergence between Bloco and SYRIZA on the question of the EU, are too discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Last but not least, while the main Trotskyist tendency inside Bloco dissolved itself in 2013 in a new, broader current, it still maintains links to the Trotskyist international USFI, which will be shown to have had some influence over Bloco’s relations with Podemos. Programme Similarly to SYRIZA, Bloco emerged as an alternative to a “neoliberalised” social democracy and an ossified, orthodox communist party. In its founding manifesto, Bloco is presented as a party that “renews the legacy of socialism and includes the converging contributions of several

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

105

citizens, forces and movements that over the years committed themselves to the search for alternatives to capitalism” (Bloco, 1999, p. 18). Once again, the path to socialism would go through the institutions of liberal democracy, meaning that socialism “cannot be an immediate objective” (Louçã, 2007, para 6). Hence, from the beginning, Bloco rather focused on defending the welfare state by calling for higher taxation of big business and increased state intervention (Lisi, 2009, para 13). In other words, Bloco mirrored SYRIZA in reclaiming the classic social democratic policies abandoned by social democracy itself. Indeed, Manifesto Project data shows that, between 1999 and 2011, positive references to the welfare state amounted, on average, to more than 22% of Bloco’s electoral manifestos, compared to a bit over 15% in the case of the PS (Volkens et al., 2017). The classic social democratic agenda was combined with a strong emphasis on new left issues, such as gender equality and the protection of the environment, which had been largely marginal for the other two main left-wing parties (Lisi, 2009, para 13). Bloco pursued this left-libertarian agenda with considerable success given their small parliamentary representation, most notably by exerting pressure on the PS government to legalise abortion in 2007 following a referendum that had failed to meet the validation threshold. This programmatic dimension enabled Bloco to attract, from early on, support among white-collar and professional workers more concerned with the so-called “non-economic” issues (Lisi, 2009, para 15). After the 2002 elections, Bloco continued to gradually moderate its programme, in an attempt to become more “acceptable” in the political arena (Lisi, 2009, para 22). That was reflected by an even stronger emphasis on “cultural” rather than “economic” issues, with over half of the party’s legislative proposals having to do with women’s rights, LGBT rights, environment, bioethics or drug legislation. On the economic side, the party reinforced its commitments to increasing taxation of capital and strengthening public services. Indeed, the de-radicalisation process was boosted by the 2007 party convention, when Bloco tried to lose the “radical left” image by rebranding itself as an “eco-socialist” party. Fundamentally, the party’s anti-capitalism became limited to opposition towards neoliberal policies (Lisi, 2009, para 28). The Eurozone crisis brought about, initially, further de-radicalisation for Bloco. A party document from 2010, which specifically dealt with

106

V. BORTUN

the question of the economic crisis, raised criticisms of “finance globalisation” (Bloco, 2010), but made no reference to more systemic structures and policies of neoliberal capitalism that, arguably, had made possible the Eurozone crisis and informed the very management of that crisis. Instead, Bloco focused on denouncing austerity as a “vicious circle … a tool to enable transfers to finance capital” (Bloco, 2010) that only prolongs the crisis by undercutting consumption and demand. While the party stated to have “no trust whatsoever in the policies and institutions in charge of the Union, nor any expectations regarding its reform or aptitude to stand up to the crisis” (Bloco, 2010), the possibility of an exit was ruled out explicitly. Even the defence of state intervention seemed less ambitious than before—for instance, the idea of nationalising key utilities like water and energy was completely abandoned. However, after the electoral disappointment of 2011, when the party lost almost half of its vote share, Bloco slightly re-radicalised its programme and started calling, for the first time, for the complete rejection of austerity measures and the cancellation of most of the country’s debt (Bloco, 2012, para 10). Moreover, it proposed the nationalisation of two private banks that had been recapitalised by the state with over e5 billion (Bloco, 2012, para 25). This rhetorical turn towards more radical positions was also enabled by the more moderate elements within the party—gathered around the former Eurocommunist group Política XXI—splitting away to form a new, rather unsuccessful, centre-left party (Simões do Paço & Varela, 2015, p. 112). The re-radicalisation trend was strengthened with the 2015 electoral manifesto (Príncipe, 2016), which made a reference to capitalism’s inability to offer solutions to the question of climate change (Bloco, 2015, p. 49) and called, more broadly than before, for the nationalisation of the banking system (Bloco, 2015, p. 6) and of the energy sector (Bloco, 2015, p. 53). Indeed, the new party statute approved during the national convention in June 2016 asserted a commitment, albeit rather vague, to the prospect of socialism as “an expression of humanity’s emancipatory struggle against exploitation and oppression” (Bloco, 2016a, p. 3). Finally, with regard to the EU, Bloco went from total opposition in its early years to a “left-Europeanist” position that aimed to reform the EU in ways that would allow for structural policies promoting full employment, social justice and gender equality (March, 2011, p. 109). With the start of the crisis though, Bloco’s stance towards the EU steadily hardened, laying most of the blame on the latter for Portugal’s socio-economic

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

107

crisis (Bloco, 2012, para 8). Indeed, Bloco started to call on the rest of the left to put forward “a courageous political program to break with the IMF, ECB and EU policies and with austerity, and to recover our economy against the debt tyranny” (Bloco, 2012, para 28). The anti-EU discourse only enhanced following SYRIZA’s experience in government, as reflected in one of Bloco’s main campaign slogans for the 2015 elections: “No more sacrifices for the euro”. For Príncipe (2016, p. 172), the anti-EU discourse was one of the reasons for the Bloco’s best electoral result ever. Indeed, the party coordinator, Catarina Martins, stated around that period that the EU is “the greatest threat to people in Europe” and that the time has come to dismantle it (De Jongh, 2017, para 7). As explored in more detail below, this shift in the policy towards the EU represents one of the main obstacles to the wider transnational cooperation on the radical left in general and between Bloco and SYRIZA in particular. Strategy Once again, just like SYRIZA, Bloco was confronted not only with the lack of institutional resources generally characteristic of the radical left (Lisi, 2013, p. 23), but also with a trade union movement (the main confederation in particular) largely dominated by the PCP (Príncipe, 2016, p. 165). This led Bloco to adopt a strong orientation towards social movements as a key element of its strategy to gain legitimacy and electoral support (Lisi, 2013, 36). Thus, as mentioned above, Bloco built its profile by campaigning on mainly non-economic issues, such as domestic violence, abortion or LGBTQ+ rights (Lisi, 2009; Louçã, 2010). By doing that, the party secured significant support among the youth and white-collar professionals (Louçã, 2010), with students and teachers amounting to 40% of the membership in 2003 (Lisi, 2009). That orientation was coupled, just like in the case of SYRIZA, with a strong focus on electoral campaigning and parliamentary politics. As Príncipe (2016, p. 165) summed up this two-fold strategy, “the party has to function as an instrument of social struggle, a vehicle for coordinating between distinct movements and pursuing their goals at the parliamentary level”. The party’s success with regard to the 2007 legalisation of abortion is a case in point. Thus, Bloco managed to present itself as a left-wing alternative to the political mainstream not by merely putting forward an alternative agenda, but by showing that it is capable of enacting at least

108

V. BORTUN

some parts of that agenda. The electoral fruits of that strategy came about in 2009, when the party gained its best electoral score up to that point. Following the 2009 elections and the start of the economic crisis, however, Bloco started to put more emphasis on parliamentary politics rather than social mobilisation. For instance, while in parliament Bloco voted against the three packages of austerity measures implemented by the PS government between 2009 and 2011, the party did not mobilise its base against those measures, despite being involved in the anti-austerity protests that took place in that period. Bloco’s focus on parliamentary work in a period of substantial austerity measures and growing social upheaval against those measures—including the biggest general strike in a generation—may well have played a role in the party’s losses in the 2011 snap elections, which saw its score almost halved compared to 2009. At the same time, as the social impact of austerity and popular disillusionment with mainstream parties was not as deep in Portugal as in Greece around that time, an anti-establishment party like Bloco had a smaller window of opportunity than SYRIZA, which the following year saw its electoral score increase six-fold (Príncipe, 2018). However, what is certain is that following the 2011 elections, Bloco not only radicalised some aspects of its programme and discourse but also returned to the previous strategy of social mobilisation and active engagement with social movements. Thus, whereas the PCP was reluctant to get involved with such movements, Bloco offered them logistical and material support and, indeed, gave their demands a programmatic articulation and a platform on the mainstream political scene (Lisi, 2013, pp. 33–34). However, in a trajectory mirroring the situation in Greece, the anti-austerity movements gradually faded away after 2013, mainly due to certain mobilisation fatigue but also in the context of massive youth emigration, with 200,000 of 20-to-40-year-olds officially leaving the country between 2010 and 2014 (Simões do Paço & Varela, 2015, p. 112). Thus, the epicentre of the anti-austerity struggle moved back to parliamentary politics (Romeiro, 2018, p. 7). Nevertheless, in an increasingly polarised landscape around the question of austerity (Príncipe, 2016, pp. 170–171), Bloco’s programmatic and strategic radicalisation after 2011 led to its best electoral result ever in the 2015 elections. In the aftermath, Bloco agreed together with the PCP to lend parliamentary support to the new PS minority government, on the basis that the party could not allow the right to govern for another four years. However, that collaboration with the PS government arguably

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

109

hindered Bloco’s ability to significantly challenge the new government’s austerity measures (albeit less harsh than in previous years), the rising precarity of workers and the funding crisis confronting the healthcare and education sectors (Príncipe, 2018). Indeed, these sectors witnessed significant strikes and demonstrations during 2017 and 2018, but Bloco failed to link up with them and, thereby, consolidate its image as a left alternative to the PS (Romeiro, 2018). Thus, by legitimising the “left-wing aura” of the PS government (Romeiro, 2018), Bloco undermined its own potential for growth and, as summed up by Príncipe (2018), remained “hostage to the PS”. That was reflected in Bloco’s slight loss of votes in the 2019 general elections. Despite that, Bloco pursued the same strategy and renewed its parliamentary support to a minority PS government with little concessions in return, thus continuing to steadily decline in polls. In the autumn of 2021, though, both Bloco and the PCP rejected the government’s proposed budget, which led Prime Minister Antonio Costa to call for early elections, held in January 2022. Bloco received merely 4.4% of the votes, its worst score in twenty years, and was replaced as the third biggest party in parliament by the new populist radical right party Chega. Once again, the radical left would pay the price for becoming too closely associated with a centre-left government.

Podemos Origins Of all the three parties discussed in this book, Podemos is the newest both chronologically and genealogically. It was established in early 2014 as the political by-product of the social unrest that had shaken the Spanish state since the start of the economic crisis (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016, p. 4). The social impact of that crisis, only exacerbated by the austerity measures taken initially by a centre-left government, ignited on 15 May 2011 the biggest protest movement in the country’s recent history (Machuca, 2016). What would become known as the Indignados [The Outraged] or the 15-M Movement represented not just a reaction to the economic crisis but also a wholesale rejection of the political mainstream (Hughes, 2011; Stobart, 2016). That rejection was mainly targeted at the two big parties that had dominated Spanish politics since Franco’s death in 1975—the conservative People’s Party (PP) and the social democratic

110

V. BORTUN

Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), whose average combined vote in general elections had been 75% over the previous three decades. Other social movements followed, such as the mass campaigns against cuts and privatisations (the so-called mareas [tides]) and the anti-eviction movement PAH (Stobart, 2016, p. 177). However, that did not translate into a boost for the established “radical left”, the PCE-led IU, which too was perceived as part of the mainstream and thus failed to capitalise on the popular disillusionment channelled by those new social movements (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016, p. 15). This created a “window of opportunity” (Gilmartin, 2017) for the development of a left-wing political alternative, which came in the form of Podemos in January 2014, following a manifesto (Podemos, 2014) signed by several intellectuals and activists. Podemos’ explicit aim was to compete in the EP elections that May, in which it gained a remarkable 8% of the votes. The party presented itself as an alternative for all those feeling unrepresented by the existing political parties, an alternative in support of “popular sovereignty”, decent living standards and civil rights for all (Podemos, 2014). Indeed, in “a moment of deep crisis of legitimacy for the European Union”, Podemos opposed what it called the “financial coup d’état against the peoples of Southern Europe” (Podemos, 2014, p. 1). Thus, the new project had an intrinsic transnational dimension, as it framed its goals and very raison d’être partly in relation to the EU and its policies. The reference to Southern Europe itself displayed an awareness that Spain’s economic problems extended beyond its borders and so did, presumably, the solutions to them. Unlike SYRIZA and Bloco, Podemos was not born from the merger of pre-existing radical left organisations. The founders of Podemos mainly consisted of a group of former activists from the Indignados movement and academics from Madrid, including among the latter its two most prominent figures at the time, Pablo Iglesias and Íñigo Errejón. Moreover, while the two personally declared to be left-wing, they initially avoided that label for the party, as they argued that the “left vs right” divide was no longer truly relevant for contemporary Spanish politics (Iglesias, 2015a, pp. 198–199). The main lineage of Podemos was considered by all to be the 15-M Movement. However, Podemos’ radical left filiations were rather diluted than fully absent. Among the founders there also was the Anticapitalist Left, a Trotskyist group affiliated to the USFI, who had previously been part of the IU. Slightly rebranded as the Anticapitalistas, the grouping represented

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

111

the main radical tendency inside Podemos up until their departure in 2020 over the party’s decision to join the PSOE-led government. Indeed, Errejón himself had been a member of this group, while Iglesias had activated in the youth wing of the PCE during the 1990s. The Podemos’ MEPs affiliation to The Left group and the self-identification of a majority of its voters as left-wing (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016, p. 4) only came to confirm that this was indeed a left party, although arguably less so, at least in programmatic terms, than either SYRIZA or Bloco. Organisation and Linkages For a party with roots in a social movement that advocated “horizontality” (Flesher Fominaya, 2015), Podemos has a rather hierarchical structure. At the base, the party is made up of branches called “Circles”, which can be either territorial (covering a certain geographical area) or sectorial (covering a certain thematic or professional area). There are Circles all across the Spanish state as well as abroad, in several Latin American and European countries—not Greece or Portugal though but rather the Northern European countries where crisis-led migration from Spain tended to concentrate. Anybody can start a Circle, even non-party members, as long as they respect the documents approved by the Citizens’ Assembly (Podemos, 2018a). The Citizens’ Assembly is the party’s national congress, which takes place every two years to vote on the programmatic and strategic direction of the party. It also elects the 62 members of the Citizens’ Council, which constitutes the party’s executive body and whose key function is to implement the decisions from the Congress. The Council’s main body, which deals with the party’s day-to-day affairs, is the Coordination Council. Both councils are led by the general secretary, a position occupied by Pablo Iglesias since the party’s creation in 2014 up until his withdrawal from party politics in 2021. The Citizens’ Council also includes thematic departments, representatives of the circles, regional general secretaries, and the Commission of Democratic Safeguards, which ensures that members’ rights and internal regulations are complied with (Podemos, 2018b). The congresses are broadly similar to Bloco’s, with different tendencies within the party putting forward a programme and a slate for the Citizens’ Council. At the first party congress in the autumn of 2014, the winning tendency was Claro que Podemos [Of course we can], led by

112

V. BORTUN

Iglesias. Despite Iglesias’ (2015a, p. 18) claim that “from the start we wagered on processes that would allow popular participation in the most important decisions”, his platform adopted a decision-making process that would only take place online and not in a collective and deliberative way, rejecting the idea of mandatory regular assemblies. That attracted criticism from several party figures, including two MEPs, and alienated some of the party’s rank-and-file, as reflected in the declining numbers of participants in subsequent votes—from 120,000 during the congress to 53,000 during the primaries for the 2015 general elections (Stobart, 2016, p. 182). Arguably, roughly one year after its creation, Podemos was already becoming a “top-down party with a monolithic central leadership” that would “announce major changes without prior discussion” (Stobart, 2016, p. 182). In reaction to such accusations, the document resulting from the second congress in 2017 emphasises the importance of a decentralised, transparent and democratic decision-making process: “a big step in the direction of political decentralisation is one of the key objectives of the new phase of Podemos” (Podemos, 2017, p. 37). In that respect, the active participation of rank-and-file members is strongly encouraged, as well as the transfer of competencies and resources to regional and local branches (Podemos, 2017, pp. 35–38). Indeed, the party aimed to become a mass party of 100,000 militants and 1 million members, seen as “the only way we can progress” (Podemos, 2017, p. 36). That did not pan out in the years that followed. At the same time, the party attempted to avoid the internal divisions that characterised the party’s early period (see Stobart, 2016, pp. 181– 182) by opening up the debate within the Circles, fostering a culture of comradeship and not spilling the differences outside the party structures. That has not proven to always be the case, though, as the party continued to be marred by open competition between different factions, with the losing faction eventually leaving the party (Lourenço et al., 2023). Thus, Podemos went through several splits in recent years, most significantly in 2019, when the party’s second most prominent figure, Errejón, broke away to create a new, centre-left party called Mas País [More Country]. The following year, as already noted, the radical faction Anticapitalistas also left Podemos (Riveiro, 2020). In terms of party linkages, given the strong influence exerted by PCE and PSOE over the labour movement, Podemos has even weaker connections to the trade unions than SYRIZA and Bloco. Instead, the party

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

113

cultivated from the start links with several youth movements, including Juventud Sin Futuro [Youth Without a Future], which had played a key role in the emergence of the Indignados movement back in 2011. In 2016 Podemos also set up its own official youth wing, Marea Joven [Young Tide], aiming to “build a project for those who have been stripped of the ability to live a decent life” (Riveiro, 2016), in a country where unemployment for people under 25 was, throughout the 2010s, second only to Greece in whole of the EU (White & Rodríguez, 2017). However, the youth organisation never developed as much as those of SYRIZA and Bloco, being mostly concentrated around Madrid (Riveiro, 2016) and without any visible links to youth organisations in other countries. Since 2015, Podemos also has a political foundation, initially called the 25M Institute for Democracy (a self-reference to the party’s founding date), but renamed in 2021 as the Republic and Democracy Institute (RDI). The institute’s mission is framed in rather broad terms, namely to assist with “political and cultural analysis and formation” (Republic and Democracy Institute, n.d.a). At the same time, its own mission statement indicates a strong transnational orientation, particularly towards Southern Europe and Latin America: Our radically pro-European outlook seeks to unite efforts among the countries of Southern Europe as an instrument to curb the neoliberal policies that now carry more weight due to the European Union’s inclination towards the centre and north of the continent. Likewise, we understand that Spain is a bridgehead between Europe and the American world, especially Latin America, and our commitment to strengthening democracy in the region will be very important. (idem)

Apart from setting up regular workshops and seminars, RDI’s main activities include organising the party’s summer school and editing a book series on current political affairs entitled Argumenta. The institute is not a member of the Transform network, but an observer, which is largely due to Podemos itself not being a member of the ELP, where Spain is represented by the PCE and its front organisation IU. At a transnational level, Podemos’ MEPs are part of The Left. The other pan-European projects that Podemos has been involved in are the aforementioned Plan B and ‘Now, the people!’ movement, in the development of which the leader of the Anticapitalistas and two-time MEP

114

V. BORTUN

Miguel Urbán was particularly active. Finally, as noted above, Urbán’s radical grouping belongs to the same Trotskyist international organisation, USFI, as some of the prominent Trotskyist elements within Bloco and, for some time, SYRIZA. Hence, despite having left Podemos in the spring of 2020, this internal faction played, in the latter half of the 2010s, a key role in the party’s transnational relations with the other two parties and the broader European radical left. Programme Podemos is the newest of the three parties also ideologically. As pointed out in the previous section, the party leadership argued initially that the “old left” had been defeated over the last few decades of neoliberal hegemony, so what was needed was a new left with a new language. Iglesias, the party leader at the time and a political scientist by profession, argued that the task ahead was “to introduce new concepts and arguments that would help to define the political battlefield to our advantage” (Iglesias, 2015b, p. 17). That included abandoning the left–right divide, which the leadership believed had become irrelevant for Spanish politics and needed to be replaced by a new dichotomy—between “the establishment”, also referred to as la casta [the caste], and” the people” (Di Pietro, 2014; Iglesias, 2015b). Defining populism (Canovan, 2002; Mudde, 2007), the “elite vs people” dichotomy reflects, therefore, the party’s populist dimension (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016, pp. 4–6). Indeed, while such a dichotomy is employed by other left- and right-wing parties, in Podemos’ case it quickly became a core element (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016, p. 6). However, populism is understood here not as an ideology but rather as a strategy (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013; Weyland, 2001), in particular a discursive strategy (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Taguieff, 2003). Podemos is a left party, nevertheless. Not only their lineages, leaders and electorate are on the left, but most importantly their policies are leftwing too (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016, p. 4). The programmes put forward in the 2014 European elections and then during their founding congress later that year proposed, among other things, the restructuring of the country’s debt, free public healthcare for all, right to housing and an end to evictions, the introduction of a universal basic income, renationalisation of banks and energy companies, and even the exit from NATO (“Objetivos de Podemos”, 2014). That came along with a preoccupation

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

115

for New Left issues such as gender equality, protection of environment and citizen participation (Podemos, 2014). However, Podemos’ programme has never been radical but rather reformist, something that Iglesias was early on straightforward about: “we are not opposing a strategy for a transition to socialism, but we are being more modest and adopting a neo-Keynesian approach, like the European left, calling for higher investment, securing social rights and redistribution” (Iglesias, 2015c, p. 27). More concretely, that was reflected in the prevalence of social democratic over socialist proposals on economic issues in both manifestos for the 2015 and 2016 general elections—7.8% vs 1.7% (Volkens et al., 2017). Indeed, even that “neo-Keynesian approach” was visibly softened, with its more ambitious policies, like the renationalisation of energy companies and banks, having been dropped from its manifesto for the 2015 general elections (Stobart, 2016, p. 183). As Stobart (2016, p. 185) noted at the time, “this encouraged a process of social democratization and further alienated supporters on the left”. The party’s electoral coalition with the PCE-led IU created for the 2016 general elections and currently still in place, entitled Unidas Podemos [United We Can] (UP), indicated a certain shift to the left, including a broad call for “democratic control of the financial sector” (Podemos, 2017, p. 33). Nonetheless, the party’s programme retained an evident social democratic character, with the 2016 electoral manifesto proposing measures such as bringing the general corporate tax from 25% back to the 2014 level of 30% (Podemos, 2016, p. 186), introducing a temporary “solidarity tax” on financial entities that would last only as long as the latter would thereby pay back the state aid received during the crisis (Podemos, 2016, p. 136) and reversing the spending cuts to healthcare and education implemented after 2009 (Podemos, 2016, p. 184). Similarly, for the 2019 elections—first held in April and then repeated in November due to a parliamentary deadlock—the party’s 119-page manifesto called for boosting public spending for healthcare and education, increasing pensions and benefits, or cutting tax exemptions for big companies. Also, there was a call to prevent the privatisations of stateowned assets, such as the bank Bankia or the ports, but no call to nationalise any company or sector of the economy. The sole exception was the proposal to bring back under public ownership the hydroelectric plants and the entire water supply, of which nearly half is currently operated by private or public-private companies (Podemos, 2019, p. 11). Other than that, the manifesto mostly rehashed the socio-economic policy

116

V. BORTUN

proposals from 2016, thus placing Podemos firmly in the “neo-reformist left” that tries to recover social democracy’s classic values and policies. The party’s participation in the PSOE-led government since the end of 2019 as part of the UP alliance only consolidated the Podemos’ social democratic character. In its public communication regarding its track record in government, the party mentions a 30% increase in the minimum wage, the introduction of minimum basic income, a 15% increase in pensions, as well as the reform of the labour law (Podemos, 2022; Unidas Podemos, 2021). It has also been reported that UP successfully pressured PSOE to introduce, at the end of 2022, a new but temporary tax on big fortunes (Pérez, 2022). Finally, with regard to the EU, Podemos saw the latter as responsible for the austerity measures that affected Spain and Southern member states in general (Podemos, 2014, p. 1). The crisis itself was deemed as a consequence of the neoliberal project that started in the 1970s and which subsequently shaped the institutional structure of European integration, in particular of the Economic and Monetary Union (see Iglesias, 2015a, pp. 106–135). Not only that, but the very management of the crisis was dealt with in favour of international capital, or what Iglesias called the “Party of Wall Street”, by converting bank debt into sovereign debt, which ended up being paid for by ordinary people through austerity measures (Iglesias, 2015a, p. 119). Those measures were unevenly targeted at Southern member states, which were “forced to surrender historic social rights through austerity policies that Germany and its northern allies would never impose at home” (Iglesias, 2015b, p. 10). Even so, neither the EU nor the eurozone are to be abandoned, but democratised. According to a party declaration from 2016, Podemos stands for “a democratic Europe, a space for human rights, liberties, peace, and cooperation” (Podemos, 2016). Only the Anticapitalistas faction supported the eventuality of an exit from the eurozone and the EU, as reflected in Podemos’ involvement in the Plan B for Europe initiative. The participation in government since 2019 and the departure of Anticapitalistas in 2020, though, have significantly softened the party’s stance towards the EU. Strategy Of all three parties, Podemos’ links with social movements have arguably been the most salient, particularly with regards to its genealogy, earning

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

117

it the label of “party-movement” (see Agustín & Briziarelli, 2018, p. 10). Thus, Podemos placed an explicit emphasis on mass mobilisation, particularly in the first year of existence, when it encouraged its supporters (members and non-members alike) to get actively involved in the party building process through its local and sectorial “circles” (Stobart, 2016, p. 181). Furthermore, in early 2015, Podemos organised the March of Change, which, despite not raising any specific demands, attracted between 100,000 and 300,000 people, of whom Iglesias said “are the DNA of our party” (Dawber, 2015). Such an orientation towards the masses reflected the leadership’s strategy to “link the most advanced sectors of civil society into a broader project of political change” (Iglesias, 2015a, p. 19), so that Podemos can become a governing party. This was reflected in regional electoral coalitions with names like Let’s Win or Atlantic Tide (Stobart, 2016, p. 177). Thus, similarly to SYRIZA and Bloco around that time, Podemos combined mass mobilisation with a bold commitment to come into government or at least overtake PSOE as the main party on the Spanish left (Iglesias, 2015b, p. 21). That entailed a strong focus on electoral politics by building locally broad coalitions of progressive forces, which panned out in the local elections of 2015, when such coalitions gained control in the country’s biggest cities, including Madrid and Barcelona. Initially, that electoral strategy was supposed to be intertwined with that of mass mobilisation. Iglesias (2015b, p. 19) underlined at the time “the determination to end the disassociation between mass mobilizations and electoral politics”. In addition to that, Podemos stood out for its “careful and intensive use of media” (Agustín & Briziarelli, 2018, p. 7), in particular by Iglesias, who had already become a regular presence on Spanish television after the start of the crisis (Tremlett, 2015). Indeed, the party went as far as putting the candidate’s face on the ballot paper for elections (unprecedented in Spanish politics). As Iglesias (2015b, p. 17) himself explained that decision, “the TV nation, so to speak, didn’t know about a new political party called Podemos, but they knew about the guy with the pony-tail”. This multilateral strategy notwithstanding, electoral politics quickly became the main priority (Kouki & González, 2018), as openly acknowledged and rationalised already in the political document passed with over 86% at the party’s first congress in the autumn of 2014. Issued by the grouping gathered at the time around Iglesias and Errejón (before the two would become rivals), the document announced that the phase

118

V. BORTUN

of social mobilisation would make way for a new, institutional phase (Stobart, 2016, p. 183). The aforementioned March for Change from January 2015 was the only protest that the party intensely mobilised for in the run-up to the general elections that took place in December that year (Stobart, 2016, p. 175). This shift in the party’s strategy not only mirrors those of SYRIZA and Bloco but is particularly characteristic of the left-populist approach adopted by the leadership, which tends to assign social mobilisation with merely a supporting role (Stobart, 2016, p. 179). Podemos’ leadership admitted having been inspired by the Latin American left-populist regimes of Chávez (Venezuela), Morales (Bolivia) and Correa (Ecuador) (Iglesias, 2015b, p. 14), for whom both Iglesias and Errejón worked as consultants throughout the 2000s. At a more theoretical level, Podemos’ populist strategy was shaped by the theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Iglesias, 2015b, p. 14). For them, the fragmented nature of contemporary capitalism meant that a class-based socialist project had become implausible and that a new left would have to be built around charismatic leaders capable of embodying the common causes of “the people” against “the elites” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). However, following the two general elections in December 2015 and June 2016, when Podemos became the third biggest party but still failed to overtake PSOE, Iglesias signalled a relative and gradual return to social mobilisation in the party’s strategy (Stobart, 2016, pp. 187–188). At the second party congress in February 2017, Iglesias clashed with Errejón on what the future strategy of the party should be focusing on. While the latter favoured a continuous emphasis on parliamentary activity and, indeed, an alliance with PSOE rather than IU, Iglesias—who retained then the party leadership by a long margin—argued that Podemos needed to return to its roots and reclaim the streets (Izquierda Revolucionaria, 2017), and that the party’s MPs should see themselves as activists rather than mere politicians (The Economist, 2017). The party’s reorientation towards popular mobilisation, though, did not take place beyond the rhetorical level, with no major mass demonstrations led by Podemos in the subsequent period. Quite the contrary: during the political crisis in Catalonia around the question of independence, which peaked in the autumn of 2017, the Podemos leadership urged the pro-independence movement to abandon the street protests and engage in a “dialogue” with the then-still PP-led Spanish government, that is, within the existing constitutional framework of the state

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

119

that the movement was trying to break away from (La Vanguardia, 2017). Overall, and perhaps not surprisingly, Podemos’ shift from “the streets” towards “the institutions” correlated with the party’s steady decline in polls, which culminated with the last legislative elections in November 2019, when UP lost more than half of the votes and was replaced as the third parliamentary force by the populist radical right party Vox, which was repeated in the 2023 elections, for which Podemos stood as part of the broader Sumar alliance. Despite that, there are no signs that Podemos is returning to a more grassroots approach, which is only complicated by its ongoing participation in government.

Summary This chapter has provided a comparative analysis of SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos to set the ground for the discussion of their transnational networking and cooperation in the core chapters of the book. Each section discussed, in turn, the origins, organisation, programme, strategy of each party, in order to reveal the similarities between them that, on top of the broadly similar national contexts during the crisis, would have boosted their cooperation, but also the differences that might have hindered it. In terms of origins, each of the three parties came about in its respective country as a left alternative to both a hegemonic but increasingly neoliberal social democratic party and a communist party deeply rooted in the labour movement but unable to recover from the fall of the Eastern Bloc and capitalise on social democracy’s shift to the right. In other words, their emergence came to fill a gap on the left—in between a left that was not that much of a left anymore and a radical left that was not that much relevant anymore. Interestingly, these new parties, particularly Bloco and SYRIZA, came about as unity projects of groups from various currents of the radical left that were failing to escape political marginality on their own. Regardless of anything else, perhaps other similar groups can draw some lessons from this approach instead of waiting for the ideal revolutionary situation that would see the masses flock to their ranks. While being seen or even calling themselves “radical left”, the three parties adopted early on a rather social democratic agenda in defence of the welfare state, social rights and public services, with limited elements of anti-capitalism, which was coupled with a focus on New Left issues. If anything, their programme de-radicalised over time—albeit not in a sinuous way—as the parties became more electorally successful and sought

120

V. BORTUN

to further widen their pool of support. Indeed, since implementing austerity measures from a position of government, it is highly questionable whether SYRIZA can still be seen as a “radical left” party, which points to the key difference between the Greek party and the other two—the experience of leading a government, which will be shown as instrumental for the dynamics of the relations among them in the second half of the decade. As argued in a recent paper (Bortun, 2023), it would be perhaps more appropriate to deem SYRIZA as well as Podemos as neoreformist rather than radical left, since their socio-economic programme largely amounts to reclaiming the post-war agenda of Keynesian social democracy. That arguably matters not only for the sake of conceptual consistency—given the definition of the radical left prevalent in the literature, as discussed in the Introduction—but also has normative implications. First, given the often-pejorative connotations of the term “radical” (Downs, 2012), applying it to parties that simply display what was mainstream economic policy a few decades ago might reinforce the legitimacy of the neoliberal status quo. As Iglesias (2015b, pp. 15–16) remarked when he was still the leader of Podemos, “When our adversaries dub us the ‘radical left’ … they push us onto terrain where their victory is easier”. Second, by calling radical what in fact is not so, we risk excluding from the academic and broader public debate the actual radical left, i.e. anti-capitalist and socialist, ideas and policies, which in recent years have seen increasing appeal among the younger generations (Blasi & Kruse, 2018; IEA, 2021; John, 2020). The process of de-radicalisation was also reflected at the strategic level. All three parties started with a strong orientation towards social movements and popular mobilisation, partly explained by their weak links to the trade unions but also by the role of movements in the parties’ formation, particularly salient in the case of Podemos. However, all three parties gradually shifted towards a strategy prioritising electoral and parliamentary politics. While that shift took place against the background of a relative decrease in spontaneous popular mobilisation, it confirms the point made by Tsakatika and Lisi (2013, p. 8) that “when radical left parties pursue office, they tend to de-emphasise linkage”. Perhaps the reorientation towards an office-seeking approach also explains why SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos, which nominally cherish internal pluralism and democracy, became increasingly top-down and centralised over the years, drawing the criticism and disillusionment of their rank-and-file

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

121

members. We will see how both the de-mobilisation and top-down approach were also reflected in the parties’ transnational activity. The most directly relevant difference between the three parties regards their transnational linkages. While all three parties belong to The Left group in the EP, only SYRIZA and Bloco are members of the Euro-party, the ELP. Also, only their political institutes are full members of Transform, whereas Podemos’ RDI is only an observer. On the other hand, Bloco and Podemos are linked via the Plan B and “Now, the people!” initiatives, which SYRIZA is conspicuously absent from due to those initiatives’ marked Euroscepticism. In contrast, SYRIZA’s MEPs initiated the Progressive Caucus together with several social democratic and Green MEPs, but without the involvement of any MEPs from either Bloco or Podemos. This difference reflects the parties’ diverging stances towards the EU following SYRIZA’s U-turn from July 2015, although Podemos has significantly toned down its Eurosceptic rhetoric since participating in government and the departure of its most radical faction. To conclude, despite their differences, SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos shared a range of significant similarities, most crucially in terms of programme (including, more specifically, their analysis of the crisis and the austerity policies) and strategy (including their transnational orientation). Together with their broadly similar socio-economic and political contexts described in the previous chapter, those similarities warranted the expectation—explicitly shared by the parties themselves—that they would seek to engage in transnational networking and cooperation with each other as the crisis unfolded over the past decade. The next chapter kicks off the discussion that puts that assumption to the test.

References Agustín, Ó. G., & Briziarelli, M. (2018). Introduction: Wind of change: Podemos, its dreams and its politics. In Ó. García Agustín, M. Briziarelli (Eds.), Podemos and the new political cycle (pp. 3–22). Palgrave Macmillan. BBC News. (2019, January 25). Macedonia and Greece: Vote settles 27-year name dispute. The BBC website: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-eur ope-47002865 Blasi, J., & Kruse, D. L. (2018). Today’s youth reject capitalism, but what do they want to replace it? The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/tod ays-youth-reject-capitalism-but-what-do-they-want-to-replace-it-94247 Bloco. (1999). Começar de Novo. The Bloco website: http://www.bloco.org/ media/comecardenovo.pdf

122

V. BORTUN

Bloco. (2010). On the crisis and how to overcome it. The Bloco website: http:// www.bloco.org/media/cp_bloco_100523.pdf Bloco. (2012). A program against the debt tyranny. The Bloco website: http:// www.bloco.org/media/resolmesanacional7jul12EN.pdf Bloco. (2015). Manifesto eleitoral. The Bloco website http://www.bloco.org/ media/manifestolegislativas2015.pdf Bloco. (2016). Estatutos. The Bloco website: http://www.bloco.org/media/est atutos_Xconv.pdf Bolleyer, N. (2009). Inside the cartel party: Party organisation in government and opposition. Political Studies, 57 (3), 559–579. Bortun, V. (2023). A reconceptualization of the party family: SYRIZA, Podemos, and the emergence of the neo-reformist left. New Political Science. https:// doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2023.2235213 Brunsden, J., & Khan, M. (2018, August 20). Eurozone hails Greece’s exit from bailout as end of crisis. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/aeb 930e0-a475-11e8-926a-7342fe5e173f Calossi, E. (2016). Anti-austerity left parties in the European Union: Competition, coordination and integration. Pisa University Press. Canovan, M. (2002). Taking politics to the people: Populism as the ideology of democracy. In Y. Meny and Y. Surel (Eds.), Democracies and the populist challenge (pp. 25–44). Palgrave. Chatzistavrou, F. (2016). The politics of SYRIZA in Europe: From left-wing radicalism to post-left managerialism. CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs). http://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/monografias/grecia/ the_politics_of_syriza_in_europe_from_left_wing_radicalism_to_post_left_ managerialism Dawber, A. (2015, January 31). Podemos march for change: Huge crowds rally in Madrid to support Spanish leftist party. http://www.independent.co. uk/news/world/europe/huge-crowds-in-madrid-as-spanish-leftist-party-pod emos-calls-march-for-change-10015622.html De Jongh, D. (2017, January 30). Portuguese Left Bloc Leader Catarina Martins: ‘Maastricht destroyed our democracy’. Spectrezine. http://spectr ezine.org/portuguese-left-bloc-leader-catarina-martins-%E2%80%98maastri cht-destroyed-our-democracy%E2%80%99 Di Pietro, T. (2014). Entrevista a Íñigo Errejón. Vice. https://www.vice.com/ es/article/qb9d7m/entrevista-inigo-errejon-podemos Douzinas, C. (2017). SYRIZA in power. Reflections of an accidental politician. Polity Press. Downs, W. M. (2012). Political Extremism in Democracies: Combating Intolerance. Springer. Dunphy, R. (2004). Contesting capitalism? Left parties and European integration. Manchester University Press.

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

123

Eleftheriou, C. (2009, June). The ‘uneasy symbiosis’. Factionalism and radical politics in Synaspismos. Paper presented at the 4th PhD Symposium of the LSE Hellenic Observatory. http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/res earch/hellenicObservatory/pdf/4th_%20Symposium/PAPERS_PPS/POL ITICAL%20PARTIES%20II/ELEFTHERIOU.pdf Eleftheriou, C. (2016). Greek radical left responses to the crisis: Three types of political mobilisation, one winner. In L. March & D. Keith (Eds.), Europe’s radical left: from marginality to mainstream? (pp. 289–309). Rowman & Littlefield International. Esquerda.net. (2015). What is the Left Bloc. https://www.esquerda.net/en/art igo/what-left-bloc/39448 Esquerda.net. (2016). Left Bloc’s 10th National Convention approves motion and elects national leadership. https://www.esquerda.net/en/artigo/leftblocs-10th-national-convention-approves-motion-and-elects-national-direct ion/43428 Esquerda.net. (2017). Lisbon declaration: ‘Our Europe, for and by the people! https://www.esquerda.net/node/51894 Exadaktylos, T. (2012). A fragmented and polarised political system. In R. Gerodimos (Ed.), First thoughts on the 17 June 2012 election in Greece. http://www.gpsg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/GPSG-Ele ction-June-2012-Pamphlet.pdf Flassbeck, H., & Lapavitsas, C. (2015). Against the Troika: Crisis and austerity in the Eurozone. Verso. Flesher Fominaya, C. F. (2015). Debunking Spontaneity: Spain’s 15-M/ Indignados as Autonomous Movement. Social Movement Studies, 14(2), 142–163. Font, N., Graziano, P., & Tsakatika, M. (2021). Varieties of inclusionary populism? SYRIZA, Podemos and the Five Star Movement. Government and Opposition, 56(1), 163–183. Freire, A. (2010). A new era in democratic Portugal? The 2009 European, legislative and local elections. South European Society and Politics, 15(4), 593–613. Gilmartin, E. (2017, September 30). Only the beginning: An interview with Miguel Urbán. Jacobin. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/09/only-thebeginning Hall, M. (2015, July 4). Greek exit from euro “could be temporary”, says Germany. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ europe/greece/11718152/Greek-exit-from-euro-could-be-temporary-saysGermany.html

124

V. BORTUN

Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund. (2018). Press release: The transfer of the 66% of DESFA’ shares to SENFLUGA Energy Infrastructure Holdings S.A. is completed. https://hradf.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ complete-transfer-DESFA.pdf Hughes, N. (2011). Young people took to the streets and all of a sudden all of the political parties got old: The 15M Movement in Spain. Social Movement Studies, 10(4), 407–413. IEA. (2021). 67 Per cent of Young Brits Want a Socialist Economic System, Finds New Poll. https://iea.org.uk/media/67-per-cent-of-young-brits-wanta-socialist-economic-system-finds-new-poll/ Iglesias, P. (2015a). Politics in a time of crisis. Podemos and the future of a democratic Europe. Verso. Iglesias, P. (2015b). Understanding Podemos. New Left Review, 93, 7–22. Iglesias, P. (2015c). Spain on edge. New Left Review, 93, 23–42. Izquierda Revolucionaria. (2017). Spain: Pablo Iglesias wins clear victory in Podemos congress. http://www.socialistworld.net/index.php/international/ europe/28-spain/7884-spain-pablo-iglesias-wins-clear-victory-in-podemoscongress Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties. Discourse in Belgium. European Journal of Political Research, 46, 319–345. John, M. (2020). Capitalism seen doing ‘more harm than good’ in global survey. Reuters website: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-davos-meetingtrust-idUSKBN1ZJ0CW Kalyvas, S., & Marantzidis, N. (2002). Greek communism, 1968–2001. East European Politics and Societies, 16(3), 665–690. Karitzis, A. (2017). The European left in times of crisis: Lessons from Greece. Transnational Institute (TNI). Keith, D. (2010). Ready to get their hands dirty. The Socialist Party and GroenLinks in the Netherlands. In J. Olsen, D. Hough, & M. Koß (Eds.), From pariahs to players? Left parties in national governments (pp. 155–172). Palgrave Macmillan. Kouki, H., & González, J. F. (2018). Syriza, Podemos and mobilizations against austerity: Movements, parties or movement-parties? In J. Roose, M. Sommer, & F. Scholl (Eds.), Europas Zivilgesellschaft in der Wirtschafts-und Finanzkrise (pp. 123–140). Springer VS. Kouvelakis, S. (2016). Greece: Turning ‘No’ into a political front. In C. Príncipe & B. Sunkara (Eds.), Europe in Revolt (pp. 9–15). Haymarket Books. La Vanguardia. (2017, October 27). Iglesias considera “ilegal” e “ilegítima” la declaración de independencia. The La Vanguardia website: https://www. lavanguardia.com/politica/20171027/432387702182/pablo-iglesias-ilegalilegitima-declaracion-de-independencia.html

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

125

Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (1985). Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics. Verso. Lisi, M. (2009). New politics in Portugal: The rise and success of the Left Bloc. Po“le Sud, 1(30). http://www.cairn.info/revue-pole-sud-2009-1-page127.htm Lisi, M. (2013). Rediscovering civil society? Renewal and continuity in the Portuguese radical left. South European Society and Politics, 18(1), 21–39. Louçã, F. (2007). Where is the Left Bloc going? http://www.internationalviewp oint.org/spip.php?article1420 Louçã, F. (2010). Somehow, we filled a space that did not exist, a political space that had not yet been recognized. www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php? article1923 Lourenço, P., Conceição, T., & Jalali, C. (2023). Dealing with the facts of life: The management of intra-party factionalism in the Iberian radical left parties. Government and Opposition, 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2023.9 Machuca, P. (2016, May 19). Voices from the anti-austerity movement that changed Spain. The Huffington Post. www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/spain15m-activists-los-indignados_us_573ca5c8e4b0aee7b8e8a76f Magginas, N. S., Alevizopoulou, E., Gouveli, A., Balikou, E., & Murphy, G. (2019). Greece: Macro Outlook 2019. National Bank of Greece website. https://www.nbg.gr/en/group/studies-and-economic-analysis/rep orts/taseis-stin-elliniki-oikonomia---ianouarios-2019 March, L. (2011). Radical left parties in Europe. Routledge. Martin, J. (Ed.). (2008). The Poulantzas reader: Marxism, law and the state. Verso. Michalopoulos, S. (2016, May 4). S&D: PASOK is ‘completely isolated’ in our group. Euractiv. https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/sdpasok-is-completely-isolated-in-our-group/ Moffitt, B., & Tormey, S. (2013). Rethinking populism: Politics, mediatisation and political style. Political Studies, 62(2), 381–397. Moschonas, G. (2013). The ‘broken equilibrium’ in European politics: The Europe factor and the weakening of mainstream parties (with an emphasis on centre-left and radical Left parties). In The Rise of Populism and Extremist Parties in Europe, The Spinelli Group (in collaboration with Bertelsmann Stiftung) (pp. 20–27). Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. Nicos Poulantzas Institute. (2018). About Nicos Poulantzas Institute. Retrieved from https://poulantzas.gr/about-nicos-poulantzas-institute-npi/ Nikolakakis, N. (2016). SYRIZA’s stance vis-à-vis the European Union following the financial crisis: the persistence of left Europeanism and the role of

126

V. BORTUN

the European Left Party. European Politics and Society. https://doi.org/10. 1080/23745118.2016.1196918 Panayiotakis, M. (2015). The radical left in Greece. Socialism and Democracy, 29(3), 25–43. Payiatsos, A. (2017). The rise and ‘fall’ of SYRIZA. The crisis of the Greek Left. Pérez, C. (2022, November 25). Las claves sobre el impuesto a las grandes fortunas: ¿a quién afecta? ¿cuánto se espera recaudar? RTVE. https://www. rtve.es/noticias/20221125/todo-sobre-nuevo-impuesto-grandes-fortunas-afe ctados-recaudacion-comunidades/2409955.shtml Podemos. (2014). Mover ficha: convertir la indignación en cambio político. http://tratarde.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Manifiesto-MoverFicha-enero-de-2014.pdf Podemos. (2016). Declaration of Bilbao for the International Democracy. Retrieved from https://lasonrisadeunpais.es/en/declaracion-de-bilbao-porla-democracia-internacional/ Podemos. (2017). Documento politico. The Podemos website: https://files.pod emos.info/HihzerN5Ev.pdf Podemos. (2018a). Círculos. The Podemos website: https://podemos.info/cir culos/ Podemos. (2018b). Organos estatales. The Podemos website: https://podemos. info/organos-estatales/ Podemos. (2019). Cargos Públicos. Retrieved from https://transparencia.pod emos.info/ cargos-publicos/ Podemos. (2022). ¿Qué hemos hecho en el Gobierno? https://www.instagram. com/p/ChRveZDKD4a/ Príncipe, C. (2016). The Deferred Portuguese Revolution. In C. Príncipe & B. Sunkara (Eds.), Europe in revolt (pp. 159–174). Haymarket Books. Príncipe, C. (2018). The Portuguese myth. Jacobin. https://www.jacobinmag. com/2018/06/portugal-left-bloc-socialist-party-austerity Progressive Caucus. (2018, March 19). Progressive Caucus at the Progressive Forum in Athens. http://www.progressivecaucus.eu/progressive-caucus-pro gressive-forum-athens/ Ramiro, L., & Gomez, R. (2016). Radical-left populism during the Great Recession: Podemos and its competition with the established radical left. Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321716647400 Republic and Democracy Institute. (n.d.a). Quiénes somos. The Republic and Democracy Institute website: https://instituto25m.info/que-es/ Riveiro, A. (2016, June 3). Podemos lanza su primera organización juvenil oficial (y otra oficiosa). El Diario. https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Podemos-organi zacion-juvenil-oficial-oficiosa_0_522848454.html Riveiro, A. (2020, May 14). Anticapitalistas certifica su salida de Podemos y busca redefinirse para el mundo después de la pandemia. El

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

127

Diario. https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Anticapitalistas-certifica-Podemosredefinirse-pandemia_0_1026798043.html Romeiro, G. (2018). From the carnation to the contraption: The crisis of the Portuguese left. A Centelha, 1, 4–9. Rüdig, W., & Karyotis, G. (2014). Who protests in Greece? Mass opposition to austerity. British Journal of Political Science, 44(3), 487–513. Sheehan, H. (2016). The SYRIZA wave: Surging and crashing with the Greek left. Monthly Review Press. Sideris, S. (2018, June 28). Party of European Socialists congratulates Alexis Tsipras. The Independent Balkan News Agency website: http://www.bal kaneu.com/party-of-european-socialists-congratulates-alexis-tsipras/ Skourletis, P. (2018). Speech of the Secretary of the Central Committee of SYRIZA, Panos Skourletis, to the Executive Board of the Party of the European Left. The Transform website: https://www.transform-network. net/focus/overview/article/ep-2019-the-european-left-one-mouth-many-voi ces/speech-of-the-secretary-of-the-central-committee-of-syriza-panos-skourl etis-to-the-executive-board/ Smith, H. (2018, January 14). Greece braced for strikes over planned moved to limit industrial action. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2018/jan/14/greece-braced-for-strikes-over-planned-move-to-limitindustrial-action Smith, H. (2023, September 25). Stefanos Kasselakis: ex-banker who lit up Greek politics to lead Syriza. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2023/sep/25/stefanos-kasselakis-ex-banker-who-lit-up-greek-politicsto-lead-syriza Solidarity 4 All. (2013). Solidarity is people’s power. Towards an international campaign of solidarity to the Greek people. http://www.solidarity4all.gr/ sites/www.solidarity4all.gr/files/aggliko.pdf Sotiris, P. (2016). Syriza: The dream that became a nightmare. In C. Príncipe & B. Sunkara (Eds.), Europe in Revolt (pp. 9–15). Haymarket Books. Spourdalakis, M., & Tassis, C. (2006). Party change in Greece and the vanguard role of PASOK. South European Society & Politics, 11(3–4), 497–512. Spourdalakis, M. (2013). Left strategy in the Greek cauldron: Explaining SYRIZA’s success. Socialist Register, 49, 98–119. Stavrakakis, Y., & Katsambekis, G. (2014). Left-wing populism in the European periphery: The case of SYRIZA. Journal of Political Ideologies, 19(2), 119– 142. Stobart, L. (2016). From the Indignados to Podemos. Can Podemos reclaim its earlier momentum? In C. Príncipe & B. Sunkara (Eds.), Europe in revolt (pp. 175–190). Haymarket Books. SYRIZA. (2012). Electoral manifesto. http://www.greanvillepost.com/2012/ 05/27/the-european-situation-syrizas-program

128

V. BORTUN

SYRIZA. (2013). The statute of SYRIZA. http://politike.al/wp-content/upl oads/2016/03/Statuti-i-SYRIZA-ne-Greqi.pdf SYRIZA. (2014). The Thessaloniki Programme. http://www.SYRIZA.gr/art icle/id/59907/SYRIZA---THE-THESSALONIKI-PROGRAMME.html#. WdTC8FtSxII SYRIZA. (2015a). Who we are. Retrieved from https://www.syriza.gr/page/ who-we-are.html SYRIZA. (2015b). SYRIZA statement on Spanish Elections: Let’s widen the road of hope! https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/63625/SYRIZA-statementon-Spanish-Elections.html SYRIZA. (2017). A social Europe is the proposal of progressive forces (Article on the 60th anniversary since the Rome Treaty). https://www.syriza.gr/art icle/id/69048/SYRIZA-MEPs:-A-Social-Europe-is-the-proposal-of-progre ssive-forces.html SYRIZA. (2020a). Aπ oλoγ ισ μ´oς ΣΥ PIZA 2012–2019 [Self-explanation, SYRIZA 2012–2019]. https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/94170/Apolog ismos-SYRIZA-2012-2019.html Taguieff, P. A. (2003). L’illusione populista: Dall’arcaico al mediatico. Bruno Mondadori. The Economist. (2017, February 13). Podemos retreats to the hard left. The Economist website: https://www.economist.com/europe/2017/02/13/pod emos-retreats-to-the-hard-left Tremlett, G. (2015, March 31). The Podemos revolution: How a small group of radical academics changed European politics. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/31/podemosrevolution-radical-academics-changed-european-politics Tsakatika, M., & Eleftheriou, C. (2013). The radical left’s turn towards civil society in Greece: One strategy. South European Society and Politics. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2012.757455 Tsakatika, M., & Lisi, M. (2013). ‘Zippin’ up My Boots, Goin’ Back to My Roots’: Radical left parties in Southern Europe. South European Society and Politics, 18(1), 1–19. Tsakatika, M. (2016). Syriza’s electoral rise in Greece: Protest, trust and the art of political manipulation. South European Society and Politics, 1–22. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2016.1239671 Tsatsanis, E., & Teperoglou, E. (2016). Realignment under stress: The July 2015 referendum and the September parliamentary election in Greece. South European Society and Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2016.120 8906 Tsebelis, G. (2015, June 2). Why Greece will cave—and how. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/greece/2015-06-02/whygreece-will-cave-and-how

4

THE RISE AND STAGNATION OF THE RADICAL LEFT …

129

Tsipras, A. (2013a). What SYRIZA will propose to Europe. Transform! European Journal for Alternative Thinking and Political Dialogue, 13, 41–48. Tsipras, A. (2013b). SYRIZA London: Public talk by Alexis Tsipras. The SYRIZA website: https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/54628/SYRIZA-London:-Publictalk-by-Alexis-Tsipras.html Tsipras, A. (2014). Alexis Tsipras’ speech at the Die Linke Congress. https:// www.syriza.gr/article/Alexis-Tsipras%E2%80%99-speech-at-the-DIE-LINKECongress.html Tsipras, A. (2015a). Behind the compromise. Jacobin Magazine. https://www. jacobinmag.com/2015/08/greece-memorandum-austerity-coup-tsipras-SYR IZA-interview/ Tsipras, A. (2015b). Speech at the nationwide SYRIZA conference. The SYRIZA website: https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/62211/Alexis-Tsiprasspeech-at-the-nationwide-SYRIZA-conference-.html Unidas Podemos. (2021). Principales logros de Unidas Podemos en el gobierno de coalición hasta octubre 2021. https://www.docdroid.net/tf2FGbY/log ros-de-up-en-el-gobierno-de-coalicion-octubre-2021-pdf (Accessed February 5, 2023). Varoufakis, Y. (2017). Adults in the room: My battle with Europe’s deep establishment. Random House. Volkens, A., Lehmann, P., Matthieß, T., Merz, N., Regel, S., & Weßels, B. (2017). The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/ MARPOR). Version 2017. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpds.2017 Weyland, K. (2001). Clarifying a contested concept: Populism in the study of Latin American politics. Comparative Politics, 34(1), 1–22. White, S., & Rodríguez, B. (2017, September 20). Spain on the backfoot in bid to tackle youth unemployment. The Reuters UK website: https://uk.reuters. com/article/uk-spain-europe-unemployment/spain-on-the-backfoot-in-bidto-tackle-youth-unemployment-idUKKCN1BV0GU Youth of Bloco. (2010). I Conferência de Jovens Estudantes do Bloco. The Bloco website: http://www.bloco.org/jovens/not%C3%ADcias/item/2177i-confer%C3%AAncia-de-jovens-estudantes-do-bloco.html Youth of Bloco. (2015a). Para que serve uma coordenadora de jovens? The Bloco website: http://www.bloco.org/jovens/not%C3%ADcias/item/2934para-que-serve-uma-coordenadora-de-jovens.html Youth of Bloco. (2017). Reunião da Coordenadora de Jovens: apelo a contributos. http://www.bloco.org/jovens/not%C3%ADcias/item/3133reuni%C3%A3o-da-coordenadora-de-jovens-apelo-a-contributos.html Youth of SYRIZA. (2016). Statement for the meeting of Youths of the European Left network. http://international.neolaiasyriza.gr/announcement-forthe-meeting-of-youths-of-the-european-left-network/ Youth of SYRIZA. (2017). About us. Retrieved from the Youth of SYRIZA website: http://international.neolaiasyriza.gr/about-us/

130

V. BORTUN

Ziomas, D., Antoinetta, C., & Danai, K. (2017). The national roll-out of the ‘Social Solidarity Income’ scheme in Greece. ESPN Flash Report 2017/68. https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=18246&langId=en

CHAPTER 5

“We Shall Overcome”: Transnational Party Cooperation in Times of Crisis

This chapter builds on documentary research and semi-structured elite interviews to map and unpack the formal, party-based dimensions of the transnational networking and cooperation among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos. That designates the interaction taking place via formalised structures or frameworks, such as party-to-party channels, the EP group (The Left), the European political party (ELP), and any other international party-based initiatives (Plan B). While this side of RLPs’ transnational cooperation has received more attention than the informal one, it still represents an under-researched topic in the literature. This gap is particularly striking in relation to the Southern European RLPs, who during the crisis shared—as shown in the previous two chapters—objective and subjective similarities significant enough to warrant ever closer relations with each other. Thus, the chapter has two main aims: firstly, to map the formal transnational networking and cooperation among three of the most successful RLPs in the past decade; secondly, by adapting the three-stage model coined by Niedermayer (contact, cooperation, integration), to establish whether and how it enhanced on the background of the Eurozone crisis. The focus on these three parties that were more prone than any other RLPs to tighten their coordination can also help us get a better picture of the wider process of TPC on the European radical left today.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Bortun, Crisis, Austerity and Transnational Party Cooperation in Southern Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39151-4_5

131

132

V. BORTUN

The chapter is divided in four sections. The first discusses bilateral relations between the parties: SYRIZA-Bloco, SYRIZA-Podemos and Bloco-Podemos. This discussion also touches upon the relations between ideologically akin internal factions as well as particular individuals among the party elites. It is shown that, although the crisis had started several years later, the parties significantly tightened their relations only after SYRIZA won the general elections in early 2015, only for those relations to significantly cool down after SYRIZA’s U-turn in government. The second section deals with The Left group in the EP—the only international structure that all three parties belong to and, as argued here, the only one fostering TPC linked to European rather than national politics. The third section tackles the TPC via the ELP, which only SYRIZA and Bloco are members of, and where the cooperation between the two parties is relatively limited due to their divergent stances towards the EU. Linked to that, the fourth section discusses the Plan B for Europe and “Now, the People!” initiatives, which only Bloco and Podemos have been involved in due to their shared “Disobedient Euroscepticism”, albeit less so in recent years, which have seen no visible activity from either of those two initiatives. The chapter’s final section summaries the key findings from these four sections and, based on them, advances an improved version of Niedermayer’s three-stage framework to capture transnational party-to-party relations.

“To Appear as Allied with Them”: Bilateral Party Relations For starters, a spoiler alert: despite the conditions that favoured TPC among these three parties taken together, it was striking to find that any form of trilateral relations or channels was completely absent during the crisis. Neither the documentary research nor the interviews revealed any attempts by SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos to build a united front of the Southern European radical left. Instead, each party developed its own bilateral relations with each of the other two. In the interview with the author, Christos Kanellopoulos from SYRIZA’s Secretariat of the Department of International Relations and Foreign Policy left no room for interpretation in this regard:

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

133

There is not a triangle between SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos; there are relationships with Bloco and relationships with Podemos … we don’t know the level of relationship between Bloco and Podemos; of course there is, but we’re not interfering with that, they have their own channels of communication. It doesn’t work as a triangle, we don’t meet as a triangle. (C. Kanellopoulos, personal communication, September 2017)1

The reasons for the lack of trilateral relations will unfold throughout the following chapters and become plainly clear in the final one. The bilateral relations, however, were deemed highly significant by most interviewees from all three parties. Through the lenses of the three-stage analytic framework proposed by Niedermayer and developed by Dietz, this section first explores the relationship between SYRIZA and Bloco, the oldest two parties of the three, and then deals in turn with their relationship with Podemos.

SYRIZA-Bloco For these two parties, what in Niedermayer’s model is called the “contact stage” practically started before SYRIZA even existed. SYN, the main organisation responsible for setting it up, had already established contacts with Bloco via their participation in the European Social Forum in the early 2000s (discussed in the next chapter), as both parties shared a strong orientation towards both social movements and transnational cooperation. Indeed, in an interview given to the author, Angelina Giannopoulou from SYRIZA’s political foundation NPI emphasised that “comrades from Bloco are traditional comrades—we went together in all the European demonstrations, the European campaigns” (A. Giannopoulou, personal communication, May 2017). Giorgos Karatsioubanis, who was active in those days as a member of SYN’s Central Committee and later became a prominent figure in SYRIZA’s Department of International and European Affairs, shed more light onto the channels that facilitated the birth of the relationship between SYN/SYRIZA and Bloco at the beginning of the century. First, it was the New European Left Forum, mentioned in Chapter 2—a series

1 Given the high number of quotes from the semi-structured interviews conducted as part of the research, the interviews are referenced only once, when they are quoted for the first time.

134

V. BORTUN

of annual international meetings of a wide range of European RLPs that would form the basis for the foundation of the ELP (Hudson, 2012) and thus withered as a result of that. Second, it was the European AntiCapitalist Left—a network of RLPs that also met once a year (for the last time in 2009) and which, according to Karatsioubanis, was “a bit more radical, a bit more Trotskyist than the other” (see also Calossi, 2016, p. 137). While this initiative ceased any distinct activity by the early 2010s (Calossi, 2016, p. 189), the Trotskyist connection between certain factions inside the two parties was maintained. Greek journalist Nikos Sverkos, who has been covering SYRIZA since 2006, emphasised the role of those ideologically based connections, rooted in distinct, and often rival, traditions of the radical left: SYRIZA used to have tendencies from different ideological spaces of the left, from the renewal current of the left of the KKE, also some tendencies from the Trotskyist current, and also some others that were in general anti-capitalist or even Maoist. SYRIZA kind of looked like Bloco. The similarities of the ideological level were really helpful. These two parties also built some connections between the tendencies: the Trotskyist tendency of SYRIZA had connections with the Trotskyist tendency of Bloco. (N. Sverkos, personal communication, September 2017)

From Bloco’s side, Luís Fazenda, a founding member and former parliamentary leader of the party, mentioned the Maoist link in this respect: “we had a good channel of communication with KOE [ex-Maoist group] and when SYRIZA was formed as a coalition, we transferred our comradeship from SYN and KOE to SYRIZA—it was a natural process” (L. Fazenda, personal communication, September 2017). This illustrates well how long-standing ideological affinity still plays a role in the relations between parties even when those parties go through various organisational transformations. It also shows how what is commonly called “the revolutionary left” may have a greater level of influence over party politics than is usually attributed to them (see Keith & March, 2016, p. 9). In terms of concrete bilateral interactions, Fazenda singled out the importance of summer camps and electoral campaigns: “10-15 years ago we visited each other’s summer camps. We have MPs now who were familiar with SYRIZA’s summer camps … they used to come to our electoral campaigns and we went to theirs”. The summer camps were particularly important for forging links between the rank-and-file,

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

135

particularly younger, members of the two parties. Indeed, the youth organisations of Bloco and SYN had a bilateral meeting in Athens in early 2009, a few months before the start of the Eurozone crisis, in order to share experiences and “look at the possibilities for joint struggles at the European level” (Esquerda.net, 2009). Despite that, none of the interviewees ascribed any significant role to the youth organisations in the post-2009 TPC between the two parties, which arguably says less about the youth organisations than the party elites’ approach to TPC, as elaborated in the final chapter. Indeed, apart from the specific links between distinct ideological currents and the links forged via The Left group and the ELP (dealt with in the following two sections), the relation between Bloco and SYN/ SYRIZA largely rested on individual connections between party elites. From Bloco’s side, the latter included the late Miguel Portas (Bloco’s first ever MEP in 2004), Marisa Matias (Bloco’s current MEP since 2009), and Francisco Louçã (former party coordinator). On the other side, Sverkos pointed out that “some of the executives of SYN’s foreign department travelled a lot. They used to have many meetings with Bloco in Lisbon. … Yannis Bournous—he is the one that has the best connections with the Portuguese people”. What motivated these early bilateral contacts though, years before the start of the Eurozone crisis? Interviewees from both Bloco and SYRIZA indicated the constitutive similarity between their organisations. Thus, according to Pedrosa, “SYRIZA was considered a brother-party, not only because we shared the Southern [European] aspects but also in terms of our views”, with Kanellopoulos going further to say that “Bloco is a kind of SYRIZA in Portugal—it’s the same party”. Fazenda expanded on this political kinship, confirming the parallel drawn in the previous chapter between the two parties: “we established a natural relationship— left, non-dogmatic parties, worried about capitalist exploitation but also sexist oppression, environment and different fields of political concern. It was a natural process”. He also mentioned the orthodox communist parties in their respective countries as a factor in bringing SYRIZA and Bloco closer: “they had KKE, and the KKE put pressure on the PCP to not recognise them [SYRIZA] and they didn’t”, and one can reasonably assume that the converse was also true, with the PCP probably not wanting the KKE to recognise Bloco. Thus, not just the ideological differences with the traditional communist parties in their countries but also

136

V. BORTUN

those parties’ sectarianism facilitated even more the “natural” relationship between SYRIZA and Bloco. With the start of the crisis, the similarities between the two parties became more salient. According to Giannopoulou, in the context of the bailout programmes and austerity policies experienced by Greece and Portugal, SYRIZA and Bloco “were called to deal with the same difficulties, same dangers for the people, same political juncture”. Dimitris Rapidis, who worked for SYRIZA’s Secretariat of Foreign Affairs at the time of the interview, also pointed out that, more generally, RLPs in Southern Europe “are closer because they have similar problems and similar challenges to face” (D. Rapidis, personal communication, May 2017). This enhanced similarity between the two parties following the start of the crisis was also confirmed by the Bloco interviewees. An MEP assistant at the time and MEP himself since 2019, José Gusmão said that SYRIZA, at one point, was our main partner in Europe, especially because we were in very similar positions regarding the European problems, the crisis and so on. ... Our relationship with them became more and more intense from the financial crisis onward. … At one point, our relation with SYRIZA was very strong, to the point that the media would describe SYRIZA in Portugal as the Greek Bloc. (J. Gusmão, personal communication, September 2017)

The key event that brought the parties closer to one another was not the actual outbreak of the crisis and not even of austerity, nor the advent of social movements in reaction to that, but SYRIZA’s electoral breakthrough in 2012; that is, in Giannopoulou’s words, “when SYRIZA started rising as a more hegemonic party in the Greek politics”. Sverkos too pointed out that after those elections, “all the European lights turned to SYRIZA” and, as a result, its international relations “intensified very, very much”. Moreover, an Athens-based Spanish journalist covering SYRIZA at the time, Hibai Arbide Aza, pointed out that, after coming a close second in the 2012 elections, SYRIZA became much more aware of the need for transnational cooperation: In 2012, there was the second memorandum, and both social and party activists realised that the memorandum was unstoppable at the national level—it was a very pragmatical decision, not theoretical: ‘We cannot stop the memorandum by ourselves, we need to break the European power relations’. (H. Aza, personal communication, August 2017)

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

137

Bloco interviewees acknowledged the impact that SYRIZA’s increased electoral profile had on their relationship. Fazenda also admitted that between 2012 and 2015, SYRIZA “were the only chance of the radical left in Europe to change the European course, so they were the focus of all the attention. … We weren’t near to getting the power; they were”. Thus, as he recalled, “we invited Tsipras to come to Portugal and we were several times to Athens, in electoral campaigns—the ones they lost, the ones they won”. Pedrosa also developed on how the electoral rise of SYRIZA was seen in Portugal: Nobody knew SYRIZA and who Alexis [Tsipras] was; if he came to Portugal it was irrelevant. … After 2009, especially after 2012, when you had the elections in Greece, Alexis becomes more famous, so then you intensify the networks because you use the success of others. … Even in 2012, when SYRIZA lost the elections, the interest and the possibility to have a left government in Greece was huge, so you wanted to know more about it, to appear as allied with them: ‘We are with SYRIZA, SYRIZA is with us’.

Rapidis from SYRIZA also underlined the role played by Tsipras, especially after becoming the ELP’s Spitzenkandidat for the 2014 European elections, while Sverkos claimed that “Tsipras was the one who boosted this [relation], because he was young and most executives of Bloco were young too”. As Tatiana Moutinho, President of CUL:TRA (the political foundation close to Bloco), summed it up, the individual connections are mostly between “MEPs, the leaders of the parties and possibly, of course, the international departments” (T. Moutinho, personal communication, October 2018). Thus, in contrast to both parties’ self-professed emphasis on the role and empowerment of ordinary members, the bilateral TPC between SYRIZA and Bloco had a predominantly elite character, even after the start of the crisis. At the same time, Giannopoulou made a longer, interesting point about the role played by those from the lower echelons of the parties: people from the executive board of the PEL, who are from the second level in the hierarchy, have also personal connections with the comrades throughout Europe. And these connections play a significant role in many things that the European left organises. If you want to have a conference that would like to answer strategic questions for the left, these are the

138

V. BORTUN

people who do all this job, it’s not the presidents of the parties or the MEPs. These are the people that know our comrades in Spain, in Ireland, in Germany, that know who is responsible for what, who is a key player in his or her field. These are the people that always try to keep balances. … All these things are things that these people from the second, the third and the bottom levels of the parties run; it’s difficult, it’s hard, it’s the dirty job.

Even so, the number of people on the executive board of the ELP and involved behind the scenes in coordinating international events is relatively small; also, these people may not be party leaders or elected representatives but still can hardly qualify as rank-and-file members. This view of members of ELP’s Executive Board as an example of rank-and-file party members is in itself rather telling of how the party elite construes and relates to the rank-and-file. As indicated by the documentary research and most of the interviews, the intensification of the post-2009 cooperation between SYRIZA and Bloco culminated around the former’s electoral victory in January 2015. For example, Gusmão talked about how his party and himself personally were “very much involved in the solidarity movement here in Portugal to Greece. I actually created a blog in Portuguese—with people from Bloco, the PCP and the PS—of solidarity with Greece”. Another instance of TPC from those first months of the new SYRIZA government was the visit to Lisbon in May 2015 by Zoe Konstantopoulou, SYRIZA MP and President of the Greek Parliament at the time. She met with leaders from Bloco, including the aforementioned Francisco Louçã, and the main topic of discussion was the debt audit that the SYRIZA government was trying to undertake. At the end of the meeting, Konstantopoulou held a press conference together with Louçã, where the former pointed out the similarities between the two countries: I asked for his support in this procedure, which is very important not only for the Greek people but also for the Portuguese people and the European people in general. Portugal has big public debt as well. The people of Portugal do have an interest in following this discussion and this procedure very closely because we have a very good reason to believe that decodifying and auditing the Greek debt will reveal aspects of the creation and the blowing out of proportion of debt in Europe in general. (Louça & Konstantopoulou, 2015)

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

139

She went on to invite Louçã—a professor of economics by profession— to visit Athens in order to share with the Greek people his insights on the question of debt. Louçã took the opportunity to emphasise the importance of the developments in Greece for the rest of the European left fighting against austerity: Greece is the capital of Europe nowadays. If there is a fight against austerity with the social authority of democracy, that’s what’s happening in Greece. So Greece is helping Europe to look to the core elements of democracy: responsibility, contract; and clarifying the financial pressure and blackmail against the countries. … In Portugal there was a very enthusiastic reception of the victory of the new government in Greece, and I believe the same happened in Spain, or in Italy, or in France. And, of course, we follow very attentively what’s happening with all the negotiations and all the dealing with Europe. We feel the difficulties, we feel the pressure, we feel the need for a solution. (Louça & Konstantopoulou, 2015)

Louçã went on to underscore the importance of transnational diffusion between the two countries and their respective RLPs: So I got from the President [of the Greek Parliament] a lot of very useful information and sense of the reality of what’s happening in Greece. … The memoranda of the Troika, which were almost had the same writing in Greece and in Portugal … and the same social and economic intentions. … with different levels, but we have all been losing a lot, because the countries are poorer, they have much more unemployment. … That’s why the debt investigation in Greece, the first one in Europe, is so important. It’s so important to have the concrete details, the technical authority of this sort of investigation and to have the example of what a state concerned about the citizens can do, should do and is doing in the case of Greece. … I believe democracy is again living in Athens through this work.

Thus, SYRIZA and Bloco did clearly engage in diffusion, in this case in exchange of information regarding the question of public debt. However, the two parties never went as far as signing any kind of official bilateral agreement. The strengthening of their relation notwithstanding, it was not translated into any significant instances of coordinated action at transnational level. Despite the fact that Portugal was also competing in general elections that year (as did Spain) and it would have been in the interest of all parties to ensure further electoral success for the radical

140

V. BORTUN

left across Southern Europe and beyond. Thus, while the two parties undoubtedly reached the cooperation stage as per Niedermayer’s model, the actual cooperation was rather modest in scope and depth, not to mention the integration stage. Apart from being in the same EP group and Euro-party, Bloco and SYRIZA did not develop any joint policy, campaign or any other kind of transnational initiative/activity. Also interesting to note is that Bloco sought stronger bilateral cooperation with SYRIZA in the aftermath of the latter’s electoral victory in an attempt for Bloco to gain more legitimacy in the domestic arena by “appearing as allied with them”. But that victory had not come overnight and had been anticipated by the electoral breakthrough experienced by SYRIZA three years previously, when it had become the second political force in Greece. While that did make Bloco more interested in SYRIZA, there was no systematic attempt at diffusion and exchange up until 2015. In other words, the data does not indicate that Bloco—or any other RLP for that matter—actively tried, between 2012 and 2015, to learn more about what it was that SYRIZA was doing in terms of programmatic demands, strategy, tactics and internal organisation that might have been responsible for its spectacular rise. In hindsight, that seems to have been a lost opportunity. There was much less scope for diffusion and coordination following the U-turn of the Tsipras government in July 2015. The relationship between the two parties changed dramatically and has never recovered since. Bloco interviewees were particularly aware of that change. For example, Moutinho admitted that “with what happened in the Greek case in 2015, there was a clear distancing between Bloco and SYRIZA”. Moreover, as developed later on in this chapter, SYRIZA’s U-turn also led Bloco to substantially reframe its stance on the EU in a more Eurosceptic and confrontational direction. Other Bloco interviewees talked at some length about their critical view of SYRIZA and the degradation of the relationship between the two parties. Clearly hinting at the diverging positions on the EU, Gusmão said in rather firm terms that After the ultimatum on Greece, our relationship with them cooled down significantly. … It’s not as if we’re looking down at the choices they made, but right now we are in perfectly opposing paths, so I think—and some people in Bloco would disagree with me—that we should keep open communication and connections, and we do, but there isn’t much room for more than that with the current political positions.

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

141

José Manuel Pureza, at the time an MP and member of the party’s National Board, outlined his view along similar lines—partly diplomatic but mostly imputative: We really respect the autonomy and the capacity of SYRIZA to analyse the concrete conditions. … We do realise, of course, that there are desperate conditions, but the fact is that most of us expected, in that moment after the referendum, with those concrete results, that a confrontation between the Greek government and the Troika was assumed as the next step, and that did not occur at all. … The fact is that austerity policies have been upgraded after that, so it’s obviously a nightmare for the Greeks, it’s obviously a nightmare for SYRIZA, and I’m sure it’s seen like that. In the contacts that I have from time to time with Greek politicians from SYRIZA I realise that it’s something not easy for them to assume, but the fact is that we really have a critical perspective on that situation. (J. M. Pureza, personal communication, September 2017)

A more balanced view was espoused by Pedrosa. On the one hand, he claimed that “it is disappointing to see how this SYRIZA is going. … It’s not that we will attack SYRIZA, we need to be prudent, but we publicly assume that it was a failure, a disappointment”. Hence, “cooperating more with them would be approving of their politics”. On the other hand, Pedrosa acknowledged that “there is a difference between this government and what is the general basis of SYRIZA—I know many people from SYRIZA that are often not happy with the way the government is going” and that “if I was in Greece and you’d ask me which party I would vote for, I would still vote SYRIZA, because I don’t know what the alternative is”. By contrast, Fazenda was, as the head of the party’s international department, most unreservedly critical of SYRIZA. According to him, “we had a rupture in our relations” because of the Tsipras government’s U-turn, which he described as “a very bad deal, something not comprehensive to our minds, because it’s the opposite of the programme of SYRIZA. … It’s quite difficult for us to encourage that line of action”. Thus, describing the current state of Bloco’s relationship with SYRIZA, Fazenda said that “it’s more formal now: good morning and good night”. Indeed, he explicitly said that the two parties have “no bilateral relationship anymore after the referendum … we have no cooperation with SYRIZA, period”. Instead, according to him, Bloco developed relations with other forces of the Greek left, particularly those that split from

142

V. BORTUN

SYRIZA, such as Popular Unity. The latter included the Trotskyist and Maoist currents that Bloco had entertained relations with before the creation of SYRIZA, which shows that ideological affinity must have played a role in Bloco transferring, at least partly, its loyalty to the new organisations emerged from SYRIZA. This was corroborated by Sverkos: In the summer of 2015, there was a split in SYRIZA and the biggest portion of the tendencies that were Trotskyist or Maoist left the party, so this also had some impact on the internal talks in parties like Bloco. What will they say about SYRIZA now that their comrades, their ideological twins have left SYRIZA?

At the same time, just like the intensification of the parties’ relationship that preceded it, this distancing can also be seen through the lens of the demands of domestic politics. Gusmão, in particular, developed on this apparently crucial factor: SYRIZA was a party similar to the Bloco and, in some sense, when Greek politics was discussed in Portugal, and it was a lot after the Greek elections when SYRIZA took power, criticism towards SYRIZA was made equivalent to the criticism of Bloco—same organisation with different national branches. And of course, to this day, it can happen in a political debate for Bloco to be attacked and for the Greek tragedy to be presented as an example of what could happen to our country if Bloco ever came to have any responsibility. For example, when the PS government was formed, the fact that the radical left parties were supporting the government was one of the items of propaganda from the right-wing, that we were going in the same direction as the Greeks.

More concisely, Pedrosa made exactly the same point: “We tried to sell SYRIZA as what we could do in the future in Portugal … in Portugal now, the right, if they want to attack Bloco, they bring up SYRIZA”. Fazenda too maintained that “we said in the last elections here, when we were very, very pressured by the action of SYRIZA, that we wouldn’t do what SYRIZA did; we said it publicly in the TV debates and elsewhere”. This points to the logics of domestic politics that fundamentally guides, and arguably hinders, TPC on the radical left, as discussed more in the final chapter. However, it is interesting that such a clear decline in the relationship between SYRIZA and Bloco was not echoed at all in the interviews

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

143

with people from the Greek side. Perhaps such an admission would have brought the discussion to the sensitive question of the Tsipras government’s U-turn, which most SYRIZA interviewees tended to avoid rather diplomatically during the interviews. This does not mean that SYRIZA is not aware of what their counterparts from Portugal and other countries felt about that U-turn. Indeed, the Secretary of the Central Committee, Panos Skourletis (2018), acknowledged in front of his colleagues from the ELP that “in this path of conflict and compromise, we lost quite many good friends in our European political family”. As said, however, none of the interviewees from SYRIZA seemed willing to develop on that. Only Sverkos, the journalist close to but not a member of SYRIZA, made a broader critical comment about the dynamics between SYRIZA and the other European RLPs: In the summer of 2015, when the new austerity programme was agreed between the Eurozone and the Tsipras government, in general, the European left parties were absent from these struggles. OK, there were some demonstrations organised around Europe in support of the Greek government, but they didn’t help in the end. And SYRIZA was left alone. … We can say that on the institutional level and on the political level, these years of cooperation were fruitless.

Thus, while Bloco might be disappointed by SYRIZA’s U-turn after six months in government, people from SYRIZA might feel the same way with regard to the level or effectiveness of the political support received from the rest of the European left, including Bloco, during those troubled months of heated negotiations with the Troika, despite claims to the contrary from some European leftists (see Sheehan, 2016, p. 147). The relatively “fruitless” cooperation with like-minded parties may help explain why ever since July 2015 SYRIZA has tried to find transnational allies among European social democrats. When it comes to Portugal, the second SYRIZA government—although not necessarily SYRIZA as a party—seemed more interested in cooperating with the centre-left minority government of the PS than with Bloco. According to Hibai Arbide Aza, “The cooperation between the Portuguese government and the Greek government is really strong. … When there’s a Eurogroup [meeting], at the end, Tsipras has a friend there, they trust each other, but the relationship is not with Bloco, it’s with Costa”. Indeed, it was Costa, the Portuguese Prime Minister and PS leader, who invited Tsipras

144

V. BORTUN

to attend the PES meeting in Lisbon in December 2017. After all, SYRIZA needed allies in government in other member states, particularly from Southern Europe, although it is not clear to what extent that rapprochement with European social democracy did benefit the SYRIZA government.

SYRIZA-Podemos SYRIZA and Podemos have been the subject of a few comparative studies, which focus on either their populist features (Ferraresi, 2016; Kioupkiolis & Katsambekis, 2018; Segatti & Capuzzi, 2016) or their views on the EU (Della Porta et al., 2017). However, apart from an earlier article (Bortun, 2022) that the discussion here expands on, there is still very little known about the actual relationship between the two parties, despite the prominence of both parties and their relatively publicised connection in the media (e.g. Tremlett, 2015; Velasco, 2015). The contact stage between SYRIZA and Podemos started right after the 2014 European elections, when the latter gained five seats in the EP only a few months after it had been created as a party. Thus, much of Podemos’ TPC has taken place via The Left group, as discussed in the following section, but the party also developed bilateral relations with other like-minded parties, SYRIZA in particular. That happened largely via individual connections, especially as Podemos was a very young organisation with no properly developed internal structures. Amelia Martinez Lobo, an MEP assistant at the time of the interview, summed it up aptly when saying that, for a while, Podemos was “a European delegation with no party” (A. Martinez Lobo, personal communication, November 2016). By far, the most significant individual connection developed between the two leaders, Tsipras and Iglesias, as indicated by several interviewees from both parties. Indeed, in his book Politics in a time of crisis, Iglesias (2015a, pp. 168–169) writes of how his relationship with Tsipras started, the same night the results of the 2014 EP elections were announced: I wanted to talk to Alexis Tsipras before talking to anyone else. SYRIZA had just won the European elections in Greece. … here was a man not drunk on euphoria or optimism, one who plainly saw that the real difficulties only kick in when you have won the election. After we’d talked that night … we met up in Brussels, and he later invited us to visit him

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

145

in Athens. I went with Pablo Bustinduy and Íñigo Errejón, and we threw ourselves into long, intense discussions with Tsipras and other SYRIZA members… We talked a lot about … the work that awaited us in Brussels and Strasbourg. We talked politics with all the sobriety that came with the realisation that the playing field we were on had not been chosen by us, and would not work in our favour.

This excerpt shows rather clearly how important it was for Podemos’ leadership and Iglesias in particular to establish links with SYRIZA’s leadership. At the same time, it somewhat anticipated the retreat that the Tsipras-led government would make one year later in front of the Troika. Obviously, the individual connections were not limited to Iglesias and Tsipras, with Pablo Bustinduy from Podemos being mentioned not only in the excerpt above but also by several interviewees. Bustinduy was for years in charge of the party’s international affairs (infoLibre, 2018) before retiring from party politics in 2019, with Martinez Lobo describing him, half-jokingly, as “the guru for the international relations”. Another name frequently mentioned was that of MEP Miguel Urbán, re-elected in 2019 and considered at the time to be the party’s key spokesperson in Europe (infoLibre, 2018). Indeed, Urbán is one of the leaders of Anticapitalistas, who despite having been in minority among Podemos’ internal factions, had a significant influence over the party’s European affairs. According to Alex Merlo, one of the group’s leading figures and Urbán’s assistant during his first MEP mandate, the Anticapitalistas were “in charge of the European Secretariat in Podemos” (A. Merlo, personal communication, May 2017), that is, before breaking away in 2020. Part of the Trotskyist international USFI, the Anticapitalistas sought to establish links mainly with some of the Trotskyist elements within SYRIZA. Merlo gave an insight into this connection: There’s an observer group in USFI, DEA… During the first Tsipras government, we started to build very close links with them—me, Miguel and Daniel Albarracín. We’ve been many times to Greece—six or seven trips during the first Tsipras government. They had a similar position to ours: a revolutionary group within a new party. Then they left SYRIZA and co-founded Popular Unity.

Martinez Lobo, also a member of Anticapitalistas, made the point that “Anticapitalistas is much, much older than Podemos, so the international networking was already there”. Thus, even a very new party like Podemos,

146

V. BORTUN

which was at pains to present itself, at least initially, as transcending the classical left-right cleavage, inherited older patterns of transnational cooperation on the radical left. Indeed, if the figure given above by Merlo is accurate, that means a rate of about one visit per month paid by Anticapitalistas to their Trotskyist counterparts inside SYRIZA between the elections of January 2015 and those from September that year. By contrast, Iglesias only went twice to Athens in that same period—the first time to celebrate the electoral victory in January, the second time to campaign for the one in September, as detailed further below. At the other end, for some of the SYRIZA interviewees, such as Karatsioubanis, the cooperation with Podemos soon became even stronger than with Bloco, “as Podemos was more visible, also in Greece”. For Rapidis too, given the fact that Podemos was also trying to win the Spanish election, to be more antagonistic, more competitive on the national scene in Spain, we could say that we might have had for a certain period of time closer relations because we were also trying to push them to win. It wasn’t the case for Bloco, because they weren’t on that stage, they were not that competitive.

Kanellopoulos was a bit more nuanced on this: while claiming that “with Bloco the cooperation in daily matters is closer”, and despite the fact that “Podemos keeps a certain distance from the European RLPs”, he also admitted that “Podemos is a bit more important, because it’s a Spanish party and a larger party”. It is interesting to note, therefore, how in the process of TPC the size and success of a party may compete with, if not outweigh, other factors such as ideological proximity or the history of the connections. Nevertheless, one still has to balance between all these factors, as pointed out by Kanellopoulos: Our sister party in Spain are IU and the PCE, and we need to respect that. Of course, with Podemos relations are fully friendly, no problem with that. But people are mindful of keeping a certain balance. When somebody meets a guy from Podemos, the same day or the next day they should also meet with a guy from IU. There has to be a balance between Garzón [IU leader] and Iglesias.

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

147

Of course, SYRIZA has had perhaps an easier task in balancing between the IU and Podemos as the two Spanish left parties have been in the UP alliance ever since the 2016 elections. The idea that SYRIZA had something to gain by forging a close relationship with this new successful RLP from a big member state was also entertained by one of the Podemos interviewees. Merlo claimed that, at some point, the cooperation with SYRIZA was much more intense, as “Podemos was very popular among SYRIZA supporters, because it meant they had a big brother somewhere … also trying to get into power”. Indeed, Podemos was perceived as a promise of success across the European left. As Sheehan (2016, p. 162) put it, “Podemos was next, after SYRIZA, in the hierarchy of hopes”. This pragmatic reasoning worked both ways, as illustrated by the earlier quote from Iglesias and also pointed out by Arbide Aza: They [Podemos] thought that Tsipras and SYRIZA represent the left that can win in Europe, so they started to work more often and more strongly with SYRIZA than with the other European parties. … It wasn’t that much that they used the same language, the same practices or the same approaches, but it was the possibility of ruling.

Thus, one of the main examples of the cooperation between the two parties saw Tsipras being one of the three European leftist leaders invited to give a speech at the mass rally held by Podemos in Madrid at the end of its first congress in November 2014 (Seguín & Faber, 2015). Just as with the SYRIZA-Bloco relationship, the peak of Podemos’ cooperation with SYRIZA was reached in the first months of the newly elected Tsipras government, although the two parties never signed an official bilateral agreement either. The most obvious and often-quoted instance of cooperation between the two parties was Iglesias joining Tsipras on stage, in central Athens, to celebrate SYRIZA’s first electoral victory. As recalled by Karatsioubanis, in the last central rally we had in Athens in January 2015, we had Tsipras and Iglesias. OK, we had others, but the strong [presence] was Iglesias. And then we had people chanting “SYRIZA, Podemos, venceremos!” [SYRIZA, Podemos, we shall overcome!]. With Bloco we don’t have that; OK, we have very good relations, but not this extra [camaraderie].

148

V. BORTUN

The same episode was also recollected by Arbide Aza, who covered as a journalist on the ground those events in Athens: There is a very symbolic moment, when Iglesias was an MEP and his party weren’t even in the Spanish parliament, and he was invited by Tsipras to close the meeting at the end of the elections. … It is significant because all the European left leaders were present in the first row of the meeting, but they weren’t invited to go up on the stage, only Iglesias was invited … this new boy that nobody knew. … Until then the relations between them were very formal, very protocolary.

The point made earlier about the importance of associating oneself with a new successful akin party in a big country like Spain, a party that at the time was scoring 25% in polls, may explain why it was Iglesias, “this new boy that nobody knew”, that Tsipras invited on stage rather than any other leader of the European left present in Athens that night. The hope that Podemos will replicate their electoral success was best reflected in the statement they issued on the eve of the Spanish elections later that year: “What is at stake is whether … the Spanish people will choose to side with the Greek and Portuguese people, in a path of containment of austerity and riddance from another conservative government and ally of the German and European conservative leadership” (SYRIZA, 2015). On the other hand, Tremlett (2015) somewhat downplays the importance that SYRIZA, or at least Tsipras, was assigning to Podemos’ electoral fortunes: Iglesias was energised by his Athens visit, but Tsipras had been less effusive the night before, when, at a party on the terrace of a nightclub with spectacular views of the Parthenon, I asked him whether a future Podemos victory was key to Syriza. Not really, he answered. ‘Their elections are not for a while,’ said the man who, three days later, became Europe’s lone austerity rebel. ‘I think we will open roads for them.’

In any case, the point remains that, as Martinez Lobo put it, in those days “the relation was very, very close—we supported SYRIZA”, with her colleague, Enrique Maestu (among Podemos’ early members and an MEP assistant too) even saying that “in 2015 the relation with SYRIZA was stronger than ever before or since” (E. Maestu, personal communication, May 2017). Thus, Podemos also sent representatives to Athens during the referendum week, albeit in a way that reflected the internal composition

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

149

of Podemos, as outlined above. Arbide Aza provided some detail in this respect: During the referendum, the three internal families of Podemos came here and had their contacts here. The Anticapitalistas side had their own relationship with the people from one of the families of SYRIZA. Pablo [Iglesias] and his people had their relations with the Central Committee of SYRIZA, while the people of Errejón, especially Pablo Bustinduy, had very good relationship with people that were working in the European Parliament.

Moreover, the support given by Podemos to SYRIZA during those months was also manifested in third countries such as the UK, where both parties had then at least one branch, with the SYRIZA branch in London organising a victory rally following the January elections (Quinn, 2015). Shortly afterwards, in February 2015, the Podemos circle in London took part, together with several British left-wing organisations and trade unions, in a demonstration of “solidarity with the Greek people” (Podemos Londres, 2015a), which was implicitly an expression of solidarity with the SYRIZA government. Later on, in June, a representative of the Podemos circle in London, Sirio Canos, attended an event organised by SYRIZA Scotland in Edinburgh, entitled “Europe is changing: The challenge for the radical left”, where she shared a panel with three SYRIZA representatives (Podemos Londres, 2015b). However, as in the case of the SYRIZA-Bloco relationship, the U-turn of the Tsipras government from July 2015 significantly affected the relationship between SYRIZA and Podemos, at least from the perspective of the latter or, more precisely, a significant portion of the latter. According to Jorge Conesa de Lara (also an MEP assistant), the cooperation with SYRIZA decreased after 2015, adding that “I wouldn’t see ourselves going now to Greece as we went in 2014” (J. Conesa de Lara, personal communication, November 2016). Lilith Verstrynge was somewhat more balanced in her assessment. On the one hand, she confirmed that “we are less supportive of them … now it’s different: [in the EP] we work on reports, we work on subjects together, but it’s not like Podemos is supporting SYRIZA”. On the other hand, she seemed rather sympathetic towards the Greek party, saying that Tsipras “was in a hard position” and that “we have always understood SYRIZA’s situation” (L. Verstrynge, personal communication, May 2017).

150

V. BORTUN

The interviewees belonging to Anticapitalistas were, as expected, much more critical of SYRIZA’s U-turn, which is significant given their influence over Podemos’ international relations at the time. According to Martinez Lobo, “after the Memorandum, the relationship is not the same”, although she qualified that by adding that “it also depends on the MEPs from Podemos and SYRIZA, because Podemos is a very plural organisation so we have different points of views”. In her point of view, the problem wasn’t in July, but in January when they won the elections, when they didn’t take the proper measures, like the National Bank, capital control. … They didn’t prepare … they were quite naïve and thought they could change somehow the policies sent by the Troika.

But she too found attenuating circumstances to SYRIZA’s defeat: We have to take into account that Greece was alone and even if the path was prepared from January… it would’ve been very hard for citizens. … It’s going to be very hard to have two currencies. … We have no alliances, who are your allies? China, Venezuela?! So the international situation was also complicated.

More sharply critical, Daniel Albarracín, political advisor for The Left group, said that “I disagree with Syriza, who failed on its Thessaloniki Programme—all factions in Podemos agree that we need to avoid the mistakes of Syriza” (D. Albarracín, November 2016). Indeed, he admitted that “Anticapitalistas supports now Popular Unity in Greece; we have links with DEA and other smaller groups who are outside of SYRIZA now”. Even harsher were the comments made by Merlo, who described SYRIZA’s deal with the Troika as follows: an outright disaster for the livelihood of Greeks, and the social rights, and the public goods, and the sovereignty of Greece. It’s even a treason, because they did the opposite of their mandate, but going to that kind of moral terms is not useful, so publicly I would call it a ‘defeat’ rather than a capitulation.

Therefore, in Merlo’s view, Podemos should “draw a big separation from their strategy and their tactics, and really isolate them internationally because I think their strategy takes the left to defeat and discredit all around Europe. … Whatever they do, we should have nothing to do

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

151

with it”. He confirmed that his grouping, Anticapitalistas, did switch their support from SYRIZA to Popular Unity in the September elections. That was illustrated by Jesús Romero, a member of the grouping and also of the Andalusian regional parliament for Podemos, giving a speech at a Popular Unity electoral rally (Gil, 2015; Sheehan, 2016, p. 154). Just as in the case of Bloco, the distancing from SYRIZA was also linked to the dynamics of domestic politics. As Merlo put it rather bluntly, “the defeat of SYRIZA made it much more difficult for us in the elections, because we had no successful story [to reference] and we had to say that it would be very different in Spain [than in Greece]”. Another member of Anticapitalistas, Josep Maria Antentas, made a similar point in an interview for left-wing magazine Jacobin: “Podemos made a big mistake in offering its support to Tsipras, and so it found itself without arguments when political adversaries pointed at the SYRIZA example and said ‘See? It is not possible to rule in a different way.’ The Greek situation was not easy for Podemos” (Souvlis, 2016). At the same time, echoing the comment by Sverkos regarding the failure of the European left to coordinate any significant form of support for the SYRIZA government, Antentas also emphasised the limits of Podemos’ own approach to the developments in Greece: First, the lack of a practical and concrete internationalism in the everyday practice of the main organizations of the Spanish left, whose leaderships are not projected towards what’s going on in other European countries. Second, the focus on domestic tasks hampers their ability to address nonimmediate issues. The intensity of the Spanish political crisis and the concatenation of elections ensures that the urgent always prevails over the necessary. (Souvlis, 2016)

These pressures of domestic politics that Antentas refers to are discussed at length in the final chapter as the single most important factor shaping the dynamics of TPC on the radical left (and arguably on any side of political spectrum). Despite the comments above, Podemos’ public positioning towards SYRIZA after July 2015 was more ambiguous. In fact, explicit criticisms of SYRIZA were rather limited in public, with the exception of a couple of interviews given by members of Anticapitalistas such as the one mentioned above or that given by Miguel Urbán to García (2016)

152

V. BORTUN

for the Spanish magazine Contexto, where he stated that “Tsipras disappointed me” and that, indeed, “there are people from SYRIZA in the European Parliament to whom I don’t speak anymore”. By contrast, the party leadership, Iglesias in particular, defended the deal signed by the Tsipras government with the Troika, which he dubbed as “realistic” (Economakis, 2015). As mentioned earlier, he even attended the final rally of SYRIZA’s campaign for the post-referendum elections in September (Foster, 2015; Sheehan, 2016, p. 153), with Podemos MEP Tania González Peñas (2015) also voicing her support for SYRIZA ahead of those elections. At the same time, Iglesias (2015b) was keen to point out that Spain is different from Greece and that, thereby, Podemos would be faced with more favourable circumstances than SYRIZA: Our strategy would be different, because it would start from the acknowledgement that Spain constitutes 13 per cent of the Eurozone’s GDP, whereas Greece makes up between 3 and 4 per cent. We would take as our point of departure the fact that our margin for action would be bigger.

Overall, the intensity of relations between SYRIZA and Podemos declined after July 2015. According to Merlo, “even if Iglesias defended what Tsipras did, the cooperation decreased between the two parties”. An interesting indicator in that regard is that, unlike the 2014–2015 period, between the Greek elections in September 2015 and the Greek elections in July 2019, there is no record of any instances of bilateral cooperation on Podemos’ website; not even, which is all the more revealing, in relation to the 2019 European elections. The latter can only be understood through the lenses of the two parties’ divergence on the question of the EU, as reflected in their involvement in distinct transnational initiatives with very different stances and strategies towards that EU: Plan B for Podemos and Progressive Caucus for SYRIZA. The decline in relations is mirrored on SYRIZA’s website, where there is no evidence of any bilateral cooperation between the Spanish elections in June 2016, when SYRIZA MEP Dimitris Papadimoulis did send a public message of support for Podemos (SYRIZA, 2016), and June 2020, when SYRIZA held a videoconference with representatives of Podemos and IU about the political developments in the two countries and internationally (SYRIZA, 2020). Not much else apart from that over that four-year period and not much since either. The interviewees from SYRIZA were, predictably, more diplomatic about the decline in

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

153

their relation with what they once deemed a sister-party. Kanellopoulos, for example, limited his assessment by saying that after July 2015 the cooperation became more institutionalised. … Whenever there is a chance—a meeting, a congress—we participate and we talk to them. There have been some institutional channels of cooperation established and phone calls, and it works like that. The situation is not that urgent after the summer of 2015.

The choice of language here is somewhat revealing, though: rather than specifically and purposefully creating opportunities for transnational cooperation, the two parties interact when “there is a chance”, that is, when they invite each other to events that they organise anyway, such as SYRIZA’s own congress in the autumn of 2016, where Podemos sent a few representatives, including Pablo Bustinduy. However, an interviewee who did not want to be named in this instance recalled an awkward moment from that congress, which sums up rather well Podemos’ ambiguity towards SYRIZA and their inconsistent relationship after July 2015: Podemos was invited on the stage to show that this relationship remained strong, and the people from Podemos refused to speak to the crowd. … All left forces that are allies of SYRIZA were there but [with them] it wasn’t the same level friendship that they wanted to show [to their members], and Podemos refused. … They didn’t really know what to say, they didn’t know what their stance on the agreement with the Troika was. … Officially, they would say, 100% of the times, ‘we support the difficult choice of our friend Tsipras and we understand he didn’t want to’, but if you speak to them without a microphone, they say ‘we don’t understand shit, we don’t know why he did that and [what he did] after that we understand even less’.

Such a reaction from leading members of Podemos is due to the party genuinely not having a coherent position on SYRIZA’s capitulation (Sheehan, 2016, p. 135; Souvlis, 2016) but also to, once again, the ever-present pressures of domestic politics, as pointed out by the same anonymous source: “[that episode] was before the Spanish elections, and that was important for why they didn’t want to go on stage”. Moreover, that was not the case only with the Spanish or Portuguese left but also in other European countries such as Ireland, where, in the words of

154

V. BORTUN

veteran radical left academic and activist Sheehan (2016, p. 205), “after July, SYRIZA was an embarrassment for the left here and elsewhere”. That ‘embarrassment’ never fully went away and neither the 2019 European elections nor the legislative elections held in both Greece and Spain that same year saw any noteworthy rapprochement between the two most prominent RLPs of the past decade. And there are no indications that it might happen any time soon.

Bloco-Podemos When Podemos emerged, Bloco already had—just like SYRIZA—links in Spain to the IU/PCE. Nevertheless, that did not prevent them from quickly establishing a relationship with the new party from across the border. As Pedrosa put it, “With Greece, OK, we share a lot of stuff, but in terms of culture, Portugal and Spain are much closer”. Thus, according to him, “from the very early beginning of Podemos, the relation between Bloco and Podemos was very close”. For Podemos, Bloco was the natural partner on the Portuguese left, as pointed out by Fazenda: “Podemos had immediately relationships with us and not so easily with the PCP. … The PCP think they are too social democratic”. As a matter of fact, the connections between Bloco and Podemos predated the creation of the latter and revolved around the affiliation to the same Trotskyist international organisation of both the Anticapitalistas and one of the founding organisations of Bloco (which has since dissolved inside Bloco). Merlo pointed out this link, while also mentioning some of the individual connections between the two parties: Anticapitalistas has long-standing international relations via the USFI with the latter’s sections in Greece and Portugal. … In Portugal they’re in the leadership of Bloco, although they don’t exist as a structured organisation. People like Francisco Louçã and Jorge Costa are close comrades and friends of ours and we’ve been collaborating with them for many years.

It is worth noting here that Merlo answered as a member of Anticapitalistas to a question about Podemos, which reflects the strategy of entryism that Trotskyist organisations have traditionally employed. Albarracín too emphasised the importance of the Trotskyist links in their relationship with Bloco: “We have excellent relations with Bloco, we work together in the USFI, where Bloco is represented by the current

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

155

led by Francisco Louçã”. Even Fazenda from Bloco, despite coming from a Maoist background, said that “we are closer to the Anticapitalistas” than to the other currents within Podemos, while adding that they also have links to “some people in the Iglesias tendency” but “no friends in the Errejón tendency”, as “Errejón wants a full alliance with the Socialists” (Errejón has since left Podemos in 2019 and formed the same year a new, centre-left party). Largely because of this ideological connection, Miguel Urbán is mentioned by several interviewees as one of the Podemos people close to Bloco. Verstrynge said, for example, that “Miguel did a lot, because he has good relations … with Bloco as well”. Apart from that, Iglesias was mentioned as someone in touch with key figures from Bloco, such as the party’s coordinator, Catarina Martins, and its MEP, Marisa Matias. Other individual connections were established through the common work in the EP, which is dealt with in the following section. Therefore, like in the previous two cases, the individual connections seem rather limited to the top layers of the parties. According to most interviewees from Bloco and Podemos, their relationship enhanced over the years. As Albarracín put it, “Podemos has a permanent relation with Bloco, as we’re paying a lot of attention to what happens in Portugal”. Martinez Lobo also was of the opinion that the relationship with Bloco has “intensified somewhat … also because of the new situation in Portugal—they’re not in government but they’re supporting the social democratic government”. The same point was made by Enrique Maestu: “We always study the Portuguese case now, when they have a Socialist [Party] government; it’s a really interesting experiment, so now we can say it’s stronger”. In hindsight, it is rather obvious why Podemos was so interested in Bloco’s collaboration with the social democratic government in Portugal, as Podemos has been playing the same role in Spain, lending parliamentary support to the minority government of PSOE between 2018 and 2019 and then joining the PSOE-led government coalition following the 2019 elections. Once again, it is the importance of and similarity in national contexts that seems to be the key factor in the dynamics of transnational relations between parties. However, that has not necessarily entailed a particularly intense or systematic cooperation between Bloco and Podemos, which have no official bilateral agreement. According to Gusmão, their “cooperation doesn’t happen on a daily basis; it happens on specific instances or movements”. Such a specific instance was the campaign against a nuclear

156

V. BORTUN

power plant on the Spanish-Portuguese border, touched upon in the next chapter and which brought about, according to Pureza from Bloco “intense contacts between Bloco and Podemos”. Another instance of cooperation was the closing rally of Podemos’ first congress in 2014, which was also addressed, besides Tsipras and Mélenchon, by Bloco’s MEP, Marisa Matias. In front of over 100,000 people, she then avowed, speaking in a first-person plural that revealed a transnational mindset, “we have a message for the marionettes and the faceless powers: if you threaten our lives, we will take the power” (Seguín & Faber, 2015). Rather unsurprisingly, most of the Bloco and Podemos interviewees believed that, after 2015, they had a closer relationship with each other than either of them with SYRIZA, although prior to that the Greek party was the main partner on the European radical left for each of the two parties. As Gusmão put it, “we are closer to Podemos now”, albeit “not in the same way” as they used to be to SYRIZA, with which, generally, they are more similar from an ideological point of view. Indeed, in his view, “Now we don’t have one [particular] political party with which we have very good relationships”. Similarly, Fazenda claimed that, unlike with SYRIZA after the 2015 U-turn, “with Podemos we have bilateral relations”, but that there is a “lower scale cooperation with them than we used to have with SYRIZA”. This state of affairs is also reflected from Podemos’ point of view, with Merlo saying that “now we’re closer to Bloco” that to SYRIZA, although on the whole the relation with Bloco had not necessarily increased. However, as shown in the following section, this perception may differ when it comes to the cooperation in the EP, where people’s particular roles ultimately determine which people from which party they work more closely with. Overall, it seems that Bloco and Podemos are now closer to each other not as much due to the intensification of their relationship as to the decrease in both of their relationships with SYRIZA. Indeed, some Bloco interviewees made several comments that help explain why the relationship between them and Podemos has not taken off as much as one might have expected given their geographical proximity and similarity in their national political contexts. Thus, according to Pedrosa, the bitter experience of associating itself so closely with SYRIZA has left Bloco rather wary of seeking that level of interaction with another RLP any time soon: If you have a very bad love experience, you don’t want to repeat it; you are more conscious of the relations with other parties. Like with Podemos:

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

157

let’s calm down, see what they will do, because we don’t want to repeat the same mistake that we did with SYRIZA, to share the party as our own and then answer for that. … It changed a lot how you look at transnational cooperation because it’s like you can trust no-one.

Furthermore, while he praised Podemos for “the way they communicate”, Pedrosa was quite critical of the Spanish party, albeit in rather vague terms: “Podemos is still trying to find what they are, they are still a mess … and they make a lot of mistakes”. Fazenda made a more specific and interesting criticism of Podemos though: “They reproduce some self-centring that Spanish have always had about the Portuguese or other oppressed minorities”. It is interesting, therefore, that historical power relations between countries that may also be reproduced, or perceived as such, within the left are not merely confined along the classic North–South axis. One of the Bloco interviewees made much sharper criticisms of Podemos, in particular of its programme and ideology, but declined to be quoted on them: Podemos has no position on NATO, on monarchy or republic, they want to democratise the EU, they don’t even say how. You can read hundreds of pages of programmes of Podemos, they don’t develop their position. They don’t want public sector in the economy. They want to make public things that are already public. They don’t want to interfere in private banking, in private industry. They don’t even have a radical tax programme against rich people, the capital. So when Pablo [Iglesias] said ‘We are social democrats’, a lot of people were surprised, even the bourgeois people, who say that ‘They are the radicals!’. But ‘the radicals’ have the most moderate programme I have ever seen in radical [left parties] … not even Keynes!

Furthermore, the same interviewee also talked of Podemos’ flaws in terms of internal democracy: They are very authoritarian inside the party … big personalisation of the internal life of the party … lots of obstacles in the real internal debate. … Even if you vote on the Internet, you vote what? Who put the cards on the table? … Any possibility of discussing that? No. … [they] can change the decisions that are taken at the congress. So what is the congress for?

158

V. BORTUN

What such sharp criticisms—which were not reciprocated by Podemos’ interviewees though—indicate is that, at least from the point of view of Bloco, the relationship between the two parties has been motivated rather by pragmatic and circumstantial considerations than by a genuine ideological/programmatic affinity (apart from, of course, the aforementioned Trotskyist connection). Nevertheless, as discussed in the final chapter, it is not necessarily the ideological/programmatic divergence that primarily impedes the transnational cooperation between these parties. In fact, divergence over principles and ideas bears little influence in that respect.

“The Influence … Doesn’t Go Outside”: The Left Group in the EP While the bilateral relations discussed in the previous section have never been properly formalised, they have been feeding into the formalised cooperation among the three parties. The most extensive and important form of such cooperation has been via the EP and the political group of the left there, officially called European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) but more commonly known today as simply The Left.2 This is the only transnational organisation that all three parties belong to as full members and, more generally, the most politically relevant transnational organisation of the European radical left today (Calossi, 2016, p. 25; Holmes & Lightfoot, 2016, p. 334). It is no surprise then that, of all pan-European organisations, The Left was generally rated by the interviewees as the most significant in the process of TPC among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos. Building on the introductory discussion of this group in Chapter 2, this section explores its role in the networking and cooperation among the three parties. Before 2009, SYN/SYRIZA and Bloco only had one MEP each before, Dimitris Papadimoulis and Miguel Portas respectively. Pedrosa credited the latter as “one of the three founders of Bloco … a big personality in Bloco and in GUE/NGL”, who “helped increase the relations between Bloco and GUE/NGL”. Thus, in the absence of any formalised bilateral channels, the group in the EP was, according to Pureza, “the formal platform for dialogue”. And it would stay so throughout the decade of crisis. 2 The two names, “GUE/NGL” and “The Left” are used interchangeably from hereon, although the former mostly used in the quotes from the interviews, as this is how most interviewees referred to the group as.

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

159

With the 2009 European elections taking place before the start of the crisis, SYN/SYRIZA did not increase their number of MEPs, with Nikolaos Chountis (now in Popular Unity) replacing Papadimoulis as their sole elected representative in Brussels. By the next European elections though, in 2014, SYRIZA had become the main opposition party in Greece and gained six seats in the EP (out of which only three remained members of SYRIZA following July 2015), while Bloco got only one. Interviewees from both SYRIZA and Bloco rated the importance of The Left for their TPC as slightly higher than for the pre-2009 period. Vasileios Katsardis, the press officer for SYRIZA MEPs at the time, said he sees the links between them and MEPs from the other two parties “every day at the GUE/NGL level—I see that there is a good relationship, as they are very close”. In his view, the group is “where the MEPs meet and also where there is a European approach, to an extent” (V. Katsardis, personal communication, May 2017). His colleague from SYRIZA’s Department of International Relations, Kanellopoulos, went further and claimed that “We work together in the European Parliament, [so] there is no need for extra institutions for cooperation”. This nearly exclusive reliance on the organisational framework provided by the very entity—i.e. the EU—that the European radical left aims to at least challenge if not openly confront is an important limitation of TPC on the radical left today, which the final chapter will expand on. Katsardis also gave a concrete example of cooperation via The Left group, namely with an MEP from Podemos, Pablo Echenique: “In the elections of January 2015, we made a visit together in Greece. He doesn’t speak Greek himself, but I taught him how to pronounce every word and he gave a message in Greek to the Greek people about how to vote”. While this illustrates once again the intensification of cooperation around the election of the first SYRIZA government, Katsardis claimed this kind of stuff happens regularly: It’s part of my work, calling an MEP— ‘Would you like to give a message for SYRIZA?’. And they did, for the elections or the referendum in 2015. … And very often there would be very good relations. An MEP would not say ‘Oh, I’m going to tell you this’; they would be like, ‘What did the others tell you so I don’t tell you the same, so it’s good for the media?’. They are more and more media aware, and Podemos, as you know, is very good at these things.

160

V. BORTUN

Indeed, in the run-up to those elections, 21 MEPs from The Left group, including Matias from Bloco and Iglesias from Podemos, encouraged the Greek voters to vote for SYRIZA in a video compiled by the Greek party’s delegation to the EP and posted on YouTube (SYRIZA European Parliament, 2015). However, the less than three thousand views that the video managed to gather are a testimony to the limited impact of such actions but perhaps also of the low profile of MEPs in general, particularly when it comes to national elections. The Left also officially backed SYRIZA after its government’s U-turn, with the group’s chair at the time, Gabi Zimmer from Die Linke, attending the party’s final rally ahead of the elections in September 2015 (Sheehan, 2016, p. 153). The answers of Bloco interviewees also confirmed the importance of The Left group for their party’s cooperation with the other two. Echoing the findings from the previous section, Gusmão said “we don’t really have permanent structures to coordinate our intervention, for instance, in European institutions, aside from GUE/NGL”. Pureza too said that, “despite all the differences between different parties, starting with the differences between the PCP and Bloco, [The Left] is a platform in which the dynamics of exchange and of networking has become very important”. Moreover, for him the group is the most important channel for networking and cooperation on the European radical left today, because after the start of the crisis “the enemy were mainly the EU institutions, so it’s understandable that the EP, being another institution, was the basic framework of this kind of networking”. Interestingly, Pureza—nor other interviewees for that matter—saw the slight contradiction in fighting “the enemy” through the very institutional framework provided by that enemy. From Podemos’ perspective, The Left was the first formal context where the new party engaged with other RLPs. As Merlo explained, “Podemos started its international relations once it got in the European Parliament … it integrated in GUE/NGL immediately”. Thus, it was “mainly through this parliamentarian platform that we got in contact with other parties”. In fact, Martinez Lobo pointed out that Podemos had a presence in the EP before its party structure had properly developed: The first representatives were the 5 MEPs here, so we started to build both formal and informal relationships without [having] a party in Spain, because we had no party yet, but we had a delegation here in the EP. … We were a European delegation with no party.

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

161

According to Arbide Aza, Podemos and SYRIZA “were speaking [to each other] before but the strong relationship was developed in the European Parliament”, while Jim O’Donnell, a staff member of The Left at the time, ascertained the group was a “very important introductory point for Podemos to the others” (J. O’Donnell, personal communication, May 2017). Indeed, Conesa de Lara went as far as claiming that “if tomorrow Podemos stops being in the EP, I don’t think we would keep having a collaboration with any of the parties with which we’re collaborating right now”. This again reinforces the perceived importance of the EP, especially for parties like Bloco and Podemos which did not have any governmental power at the time. Verstrynge gave some concrete details on how TPC works in the EP: If we have some event and we need an MEP and we don’t have anybody, we can call Marisa [Matias] or we can call somebody from SYRIZA, because it’s easier for them to say yes. We know it would be more complicated to get someone from Die Linke if we want because we don’t work as much with them, but it would be very easy to have Marisa, to have someone from SYRIZA. … In this office, we work much more with Bloco than with SYRIZA. … Estefanía [Torres Martínez] is friends with Marisa Matias because they work together. … Miguel [Urbán] works with Marisa as well. I don’t know if they are friends too, but they have direct contact and they can say to each other ‘I won’t help you here because I don’t agree with you’, and it’s not a problem.

This points again to the crucial importance of certain high-profile individuals for party cooperation, who act as key brokers of this process, especially when the other party has only one MEP. Merlo too illustrated this when mentioning Pablo Bustinduy as someone who “worked on this integration” of Podemos in The Left group. The individual connections, of course, are not limited to the party elite but also emerge among the group’s staff members and the assistants to MEPs. According to Merlo, “in GUE/NGL, the cooperation among staff is not the same as the one between parties: people [here] have established informal links”. Thus, the socialisation that inevitably takes place by working in the same institution brings people closer to each other than their parties might be. Arbide Aza illustrated how this socialisation may sometimes develop: They make very often common trips to the Greek islands, about the refugees, to Kurdistan etc. They strengthen very, very much the personal

162

V. BORTUN

relationships between them. They are four days together [there], sleeping in the same hotel, drinking beers in the evening—they are really important. … I’ve seen it, I’ve been with them, we’ve been to Kurdistan together. … The relationships are very tight, very strong.

However, individual connections, at least between SYRIZA and some people from Podemos, were affected substantially by the U-turn of the Tsipras government in July 2015. Thus, Miguel Urbán declared in a press interview that “there are people from SYRIZA in the European Parliament to whom I don’t speak anymore” (García, 2016). Despite such sharp criticisms of SYRIZA, the level of cooperation with the Greek party via The Left group is still relatively high. In the view of Martinez Lobo, herself a member of Anticapitalistas like Merlo, “even though I am very critical of SYRIZA, I think I work more with SYRIZA than with Bloco, also because SYRIZA have more MEPs, [while] Bloco has one MEP”. That perception was also shared by Conesa de Lara: There would be more collaboration and closer contact with Popular Unity if we were militants on the street in Spain, but given that here we are in the framework of GUE/NGL, there is contact [with the Popular Unity MEPs], but there is much more contact with the Tsipras side of SYRIZA. … In my case, there is a lot of networking with SYRIZA, not so much with other delegations. … There’s no Bloco members in the trade committee … we had two members in that committee and SYRIZA had members there as well, so we were working with them.

Thus, when it comes to cooperation in the EP, requirements of day-to-day parliamentary work, mainly linked to the MEPs’ roles on various parliamentary committees, may prevail over ideological affinity or programmatic convergence. More importantly, the quotes above point to a significant distinction between two kinds of TPC: first, the kind of cooperation whereby a party supports the other in its domestic political endeavours, particularly around election time—this is a form of TPC where the “national” in “transnational” is clearly dominant; second, the kind of cooperation at EU level, whereby parties aim to coordinate with regard to a certain topic or policy of transnational relevance. As seen in the previous section, the parties could somewhat “afford” toning down the first kind of TPC in the aftermath of SYRIZA’s U-turn; indeed, they had to do so in order to not be tainted by it ahead of general elections in their own countries.

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

163

At the same time, though, they had to carry on with the second type of TPC, where representatives of national parties at the EU level cannot have much impact on their own, without coordinating with colleagues from other member states. Even so, while their TPC with Bloco and Podemos did not necessarily decrease in the framework of The Left group, SYRIZA nevertheless undertook a strategic shift by trying—echoing the project of the EuroLeft from the 1980s—to forge broader alliances in the EP with the more progressive sections of other political families such as the social democrats and the Greens (see Michalopoulos, 2018a; Papadimoulis, 2017). Apart from Tsipras’ participation in conferences and bilateral meetings with key European social democratic parties, such as the German SPD (Michalopoulos, 2018b), the most concrete articulation of this strategic reorientation was the Progressive Caucus, introduced in Chapter 2. The initiative “aims at analysing differences and building bridges between progressive allies in the European Parliament and across Europe … [who] are convinced that it’s time to change the neoliberal, unsustainable and unfair Europe” (Progressive Caucus, n.d.). At an event organised in 2018 in Athens by the Progressive Caucus (important enough to close with a keynote speech by Tsipras), SYRIZA MEP Dimitris Papadimoulis, who was on the Caucus’ Steering Committee, posed the question of such an alliance emerging in the perspective of the European elections the following year: “Why not proceed to a large, leftist progressive group in the European Parliament that will be itself, and not the far right, the rival against neoliberalism?” (Progressive Caucus, 2018). However, the only other members of The Left who were involved at any point in the Progressive Caucus seemed to be from Die Linke (Progressive Caucus, 2018), with no participation from either Bloco or Podemos MEPs. Indeed, in reference to SYRIZA’s new approach to transnational cooperation, Merlo said “that’s not the kind of international relations that we intend to build”. The limited reception from the other parties represented in The Left group, but seemingly also from the other EP groups that SYRIZA courted, meant that the Progressive Caucus never really took off. A reflection of that is its inactive website and social media, where—as of May 2023—the last post is from 2020. Instead, both Podemos and Bloco got involved in a markedly different (but equally inactive) transnational initiative, Plan B for Europe, discussed in the last section of the chapter.

164

V. BORTUN

Beyond the more specific obstacles hampering the TPC inside The Left, some interviewees also indicated more generic issues with the group (if not the EP in general). For example, Albarracín from Podemos, despite working for the group, confessed that “the influence of the debate happening here is very low, it doesn’t go outside, and the quality is low too. It gives a space to create opinions and policies, but it doesn’t do anything else”. Katsardis, press officer for SYRIZA MEPs at the time, was also rather sceptical of how effective some of the group’s activities were: It’s like everybody has their own opinion; it’s a bit like a party conference: when somebody speaks, nobody listens. Only if 20 or 30 different people mention the same thing, then this might become an issue. … In the end, there are things that are happening just because they have to happen— doing things just to do them. This is a little bit boring, so I’m bored of these things. And, again, it’s not about the left, Podemos, SYRIZA or Bloco. In the world where we make one-minute videos for Facebook and we feel that it’s too long, a three and half-hour discussion, where it’s not a discussion but mainly monologues, is something of the previous century.

Pablo Garcia, a Spanish journalist who covers EU affairs in Brussels for El Diario, but who is also on the left and supports Podemos, talked of the group’s lack of cohesion: GUE/NGL is doing well but the cooperation is not super-high. … When I talk to people working in the EP, they always tell me they are trying to coordinate what Podemos does with what SYRIZA does etc. and they complained, off the record, about the anarchy in the parliamentary group. … They act by themselves because they believe they are the best because they have a very good score … but I don’t think it is an exception. (P. Garcia, personal communication, August 2017)

Finally, even someone who had worked for The Left for many years, like Jim O’Donnell, made a point about the limitations of the group’s impact on fostering TPC: GUE/NGL doesn’t do much: the personalities get to meet each other, but there’s not much of party-based cooperation, also because GUE/NGL has other strands, the Nordic parties, then the communist parties etc. It has basically concentrated on the small number of things they could do in

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

165

order to get a consensus. Now the governing rule of the GUE/NGL is that everything has to be decided by consensus.

This confirms the prevailing view in the literature regarding the group’s relative lack of cohesion and effectiveness (Dunphy, 2004; Dunphy & March, 2019), which seems to have only worsened during the crisis (Holmes & Lightfoot, 2016). As discussed in the following two sections, the long-standing cleavage over the question of European integration was central to the further divergence across this party family.

“It’s Purely Formal”: The European Left Party The European Left Party (ELP), also called the Party of the European Left or simply the European Left, is the only Euro-party of the radical left recognised and funded by the EU. Hence, of all transnational organisations of the radical left today, the ELP has received the largest share of attention in the current literature (see Calossi, 2011; Dunphy & March, 2013, 2019; Hudson, 2012; Nikolakakis, 2016; Sozzi, 2011). While both SYRIZA and Bloco are members, Podemos is not even taking part as an observer (although its foundation RDI is an observer member of the ELP’s foundation Transform). This is reflected in the contrasting evaluations of its importance to TPC given by the interviewees from SYRIZA and Podemos, with those from Bloco somewhere in the middle. This section, therefore, focuses on the ELP’s role in the TPC between SYRIZA and Bloco before and during the crisis. As regards the pre-2009 period, both SYRIZA and Bloco interviewees acknowledged the role played by the Euro-party in bringing them closer. As Rapidis underlined, “Bloco and SYRIZA were two of the founding parties, so it goes without saying that they had close ties [via the ELP]”, while Karatsioubanis claimed that the cooperation with Bloco was stronger in the ELP than via EP group, as both parties only had one MEP each at the time. From Bloco, Pedrosa pointed out that “We are not very old parties, we joined the ELP in 2004, both of us”, so “being in the PEL helped”. As a semi-outsider observer, journalist Sverkos had something more interesting to say about how the two parties related to the ELP during those years: As far as I remember, the [cooperation via] ELP actually played an instrumental role in radicalising the leaderships of the two parties but also the

166

V. BORTUN

actions of the European left. Just imagine that the European left at that point consisted of SYN, Bloco and other really dynamic parties; but, at the same time, Die Linke or the PCF were [also] participating, which are more traditional—they have a different way of making politics, not in an activist way. SYN and Bloco at that point were really activist. … Around the European left, these two parties made some initiatives and they were having some joint declarations on things in order for the ELP to adopt them. … SYN/SYRIZA and Bloco were pushing things for making the ELP more homogenous and more radical.

However, he did not give any examples of such declarations or of any other instances of cooperation in that period and neither did any of the other interviewees. The ELP’s website did not prove of any help in that regard either, with little to no information regarding the organisation’s activity prior to 2009. Nevertheless, Sverkos’ recollection does fit with the widely held idea in the literature that new RLPs like SYRIZA and Bloco shared an activism-oriented profile that set them apart from more traditional RLPs. Interestingly, SYRIZA and Bloco interviewees diverged significantly in how they assessed the ELP’s importance for TPC during the crisis. On the one hand, Kanellopoulos argued that the ELP is “much more significant now”, while for Giannopoulou the ELP is “a very institutionalised space of dialogue and cooperation … it is the way that we can network, we can make new contacts”. Thus, when SYRIZA won the January 2015 elections, the ELP sent a delegation to Athens, including its President and two Vice Presidents, one of which was Marisa Matias from Bloco. As noted by Nikolakakis (2015) at the time, that was “a clear indication of the importance that the Greek elections had for the wider European left”. Moreover, in May that year, the ELP and its foundation Transform organised in Paris the European Forum for Alternatives, as an anticipation of the European Forum launched in Marseille two years later. The closing plenary of the event, which was attended by representatives of both SYRIZA and Bloco among other parties (albeit not Podemos), was suggestively entitled “After the victory of Syriza, an alliance to win the European showdown?”. However, the ELP did not do much more than that in terms of concrete mobilisation in support of the SYRIZA government that was battling the Troika at the time. On the other hand, despite their party’s 2013 resolution calling for “a more dense [sic] collaboration with our allies of the European Left Party”

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

167

(Bloco, 2013), the Bloco interviewees rated the importance of the Europarty as lower than for the pre-2009 period. Fazenda claimed that ELP is, apart from The Left, the only remaining channel of communication with SYRIZA after the July 2015 moment: “no bilateral relationship anymore after the referendum and we meet in the ELP. We are displeased with that but it’s a fact. … It’s purely formal”. Indeed, from what Fazenda said, sharing the same Euro-party with SYRIZA in the ELP appears to almost be a burden for Bloco: We had an incident here, because we had to invite SYRIZA to our last congress, because we have to invite all the parties of the ELP—it’s a rule, not an option. And they were whistled in the congress; it was embarrassing, even for us. … They invited us as well to their congress; it was a very strange congress, because Tsipras made a long speech, criticising the left [for not understanding] his policies. … He only attacked the left. New Democracy is on top but he only attacked the left.

Furthermore, the divergence is not only with SYRIZA but also with other members of the ELP, most crucially over the question of the EU: Now in the ELP you have two tendencies: the majority, for the reform of the EU, and the minority, [for] confrontation and changing [it] and, if not, exit. … We voted against [Gregor] Gysi [from Die Linke] in the last ELP congress in Berlin, because he is passionate for the EU. … I spoke in the last congress of the ELP, in December [2016], and I said to the comrades of Die Linke and the PCF and some others that ‘Ten years ago we were proposing what you are proposing now’, so we lost the time and the opportunity. If I go to Portugal now saying that I am again proposing the same thing that I was proposing ten years ago about the public debt and about public expenditure in the budget, they say ‘What the hell are they talking about? It’s old news!’.

This lends further support to the idea that the key division within the wider European radical left today is over the question of the EU, even within a Euro-party that was set up in the first place by the more Euroenthusiastic sections of this party family. Linked to this is the broader, and ever-present, tension between national and European politics, as pointed out by Pedrosa:

168

V. BORTUN

Parties like Bloco, Podemos, SYRIZA always focus on national politics first. … In the ELP you have a bunch of parties, like the Communist Party of Austria, a bunch of small parties that, because they don’t have big structures in their countries, they focus on Europe. … Where we are now, we are focused on our national politics.

While this hints once again at the primacy of national over European politics, Pedrosa wondered whether that might also be due to the weak engagement with the latter: “the lack of a movement or structure, and the ELP is not that. … Maybe we are in this position because there is no European project [of the left]”. Even Moutinho, who otherwise rated the role of the ELP as very significant for the process of TPC, admitted that “there are tensions inside” the organisation, with “Bloco looking not really to break but not agreeing with all the things that are going on inside”. Thus, the Bloco interviewees’ rather cynical view of the ELP was summed up by one of them (who did not want to be quoted on this) saying quite bluntly that “Bloco doesn’t care about the ELP”. That was clearly reflected, in the second half of the decade, in Bloco seeming to be more invested in the parallel transnational initiative, Plan B for Europe. Rather tellingly, the latter also saw the prominent involvement of LFI, the then-new French party led by Mélenchon, whose previous party, the Left Party, had come out of the ELP in protest of SYRIZA’s U-turn from July 2015. Given the ELP’s lower perceived importance on behalf of Bloco interviewees, what perhaps explains the higher level of importance attributed by their SYRIZA counterparts is the influence and support that their party seems to enjoy in the ELP, at least at the leadership level if not in the ranks of the national party organisations. That was reflected, for example, in Tsipras being nominated as the ELP’s Spitzenkandidat for the European Commission in the 2014 European elections. Karatsioubanis, who was heavily involved in that campaign, gave an interesting insight into how that worked out: One of my tasks was, in the last period when I was working for the ELP, the candidacy of Tsipras for the European Commission. So from September 2013 to the European elections, it was the team from Athens and me from here coordinating the ELP for the Tsipras campaign. The idea was to have a team in Greece and a responsible in each country. It didn’t work, so in the end it was team in Athens and me coordinating the ELP.

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

169

This does not only reflect the status enjoyed by SYRIZA within the ELP, but also the limited coordination of the latter’s member parties for an electoral campaign that was supposed to represent all of them and not merely SYRIZA. It indicates that the verdict given by Ladrech before the start of the crisis (2007, p. 41), that “the relationship between party members and Euro-parties is extremely weak”, largely held true—at least in relation to this party family—even at the height of the crisis, as its social and political impact was peaking in several key member states represented in the ELP. The convergence between SYRIZA and the ELP was also displayed in their shared strategy of orientation towards broader progressive forces in the late 2010s. In the case of the ELP, that strategy was best illustrated by the launch of the European Forum, “a very important project” according to Giannopoulou, as it “would not be only a space for political parties but also provide a space for individual activists, for people from the movement, from trade unions or from workers organisation in general”. However, as pointed out earlier, this Forum has failed so far to develop into anything more than that—a space for networking and discussions. Finally, a note on Podemos’ refusal to join the ELP. As explained by Merlo, Podemos “didn’t want to be perceived as close to the traditional communist parties, and that is basically the composition of the ELP”. Conesa de Lara too made this point about not being associated with the old left: We don’t want to reform the left, we want to break the playing board, and the European Left [Party] parties are part of that playing board. … The left uses the same words and it forces itself to be marginalised. We didn’t want to be a new Izquierda Unida. Already being part of GUE/ NGL does raise contradictions, but it’s not too radical, so we can be part of it, but not of the ELP.

Of course, that approach was not entirely consistent. On the domestic level, Podemos has been in a coalition with IU since May 2016, six months before the date of the interview above, while at the international level, they have been involved in transnational initiatives arguably more radical than The Left group, such as Plan B and the “Now the People!” movement. Indeed, Karatsioubanis claimed that within a few months after being established Podemos “supported the candidacy of Tsipras for the European Commission even if that was part of the ELP”. But any kind of

170

V. BORTUN

support for the ELP and its candidates ceased following Tsipras’ U-turn in government and was not replicated for the 2019 European elections. According to Merlo, “because SYRIZA is a member of that, it means that the ELP is influenced by the strategy of SYRIZA and we don’t want to have anything to do with that”. Instead, just like Bloco, Podemos became involved in the Plan B project, which this chapter ends with. At the same time, the departure of the Anticapitalistas from Podemos in 2020 means the latter will be more flexible in its transnational orientation. That was seen in the participation in the 2022 European Forum held in Athens, under SYRIZA’s organisation, of one of the Podemos interviewees, Lilith Verstrynge, who became the party’s organisation secretary in 2021. Even so, a significant rapprochement between Podemos and SYRIZA and the ELP is yet to take place.

“It’s to Get Together and Discuss the Future”: Plan B for Europe The aftermath of SYRIZA’s 2015 U-turn saw a certain degree of realignment on the European radical left (Sheehan, 2016, p. 198). An increasing number of voices started to call for a new strategy towards the EU and its institutions in the light the Greek government’s failure to obtain any significant concessions through mere negotiations. Part of that process of realignment was the emergence of two new transnational initiatives specifically focused on the question of the EU, both introduced in Chapter 2: the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25), led by the former SYRIZA finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, and the party-based Plan B for Europe (Plan B). None of the three parties discussed here was ever involved with DiEM25, as reflected in interviewees’ unflattering opinion of this initiative, which one of them characterised as “an army with a general but no soldiers”. By contrast, both Bloco and Podemos were prominently involved in Plan B, which the interviewees from these two parties rated as very significant for their TPC. The prominent role played by Bloco in this transnational initiative was perhaps best seen in the party organising the last Plan B summit in November 2017. As Pureza put it a couple of months before the event, “the fact that the summit will occur in Portugal is proof of our commitment, of the importance we give to the emergence of this [initiative]”. Indeed, Pedrosa claimed that “in Bloco everyone is focused on Plan B”, although he also admitted that “I don’t know where Plan B is going”

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

171

(as shown in Chapter 2, it did not go very far). More balanced, Gusmão said that “we have GUE/NGL and that’s on a daily basis, that’s the most important connection, but Plan B encounters are helping us to form a network of organisations that share the core of our views towards Europe, which is one of our points of connection”. At the same time, Plan B has arguably become more important than ELP for Bloco, with Pureza stating that Plan B “is a form of overcoming certain fragilities that previous platforms had or have, namely the ELP”. There is little doubt that those “certain fragilities” are related to the relentless Europeanist commitment of the ELP. Fazenda too explained the involvement in Plan B along those lines: We cannot agree with the undemocratic structure of the EU and we disagree with some left parties that the problem is in the software of the EU, and we say no, no, no, the problem is in the hardware of the EU; you can’t change it from within, you have to build another kind of structure.

Therefore, it is Bloco’s more critical view of the EU that accounts for its shift of focus from the ELP to Plan B. Adopting such a view though is not merely explained by ideological choices but also by pragmatic considerations linked to the dynamics of Portuguese politics, just as in the case of Bloco’s distancing from SYRIZA following its capitulation, as analysed in more depth in the final chapter. The interviewees from Podemos also rated Plan B’s importance quite highly. Martinez Lobo went as far as saying that “we are Plan B … the summit in Madrid … we organised it”. However, Podemos interviewees did not seem particularly enthusiastic about its prospects. Merlo made it clear that Plan B is “not a formal organisation… it’s not a mass thing”, which was true at the time and has not changed since. Introducing an important nuance, Maestu pointed out, Podemos is “not quite involved, but Miguel Urbán … is really involved. … This does not mean that it should be the political line of the entire party”. Fazenda from Bloco also remarked that not all currents of Podemos are equally committed to the Plan B project: “part of Podemos is neutral about Plan B—Errejón but even the tendency of Pablo Iglesias. They are friendly, but not very attached to Plan B”. While that could have changed with Errejón’s departure from Podemos in 2019, with Anticapitalistas potentially gaining more influence over the party’s foreign affairs, but that group also left one year later.

172

V. BORTUN

Podemos’ rather inconsistent involvement in Plan B might partly explain why the initiative did not develop into a “mass thing”, as Merlo put it. Pedrosa from Bloco also admitted that “it’s not a movement, it’s to get together and discuss the future”, which nevertheless contrasts with Plan B’s combative and ambitious statements. Perhaps that is why the “Now, the People!” movement (NPM) was launched, largely by the same parties also involved in Plan B, above all Bloco and Podemos, who together with Mélenchon’s LFI were the main instigators of this new project. As Moutinho from Bloco confirmed, “it’s the same thing—NPM started as Plan B”. Indeed, according to her, “Bloco is more focused on this now”. However, NPM did not manage either to develop into a genuine political actor, having failed for example to put forward its own list of candidates in the 2019 EP elections. The NPM even lacks its own website or Facebook page and has received extremely limited attention in the mass media and even less so in the academic literature. Most importantly, there is no clear sign of activity on behalf of this “movement”, particularly in terms of mass campaigning, arguably the key attribute of a political movement. The interviewees mentioned some of the more specific reasons for Plan B/NPM’s lack of traction. Thus, according to Martinez Lobo from Podemos, “in Plan B there’s an ongoing debate … the debate about the currency is the hardest one and we have the most conflictual debates on this”. This might explain the relative lack of proposals around the currency in Plan B’s statements. Therefore, the key issue of European integration is proving quite divisive even in a staunch Eurosceptic initiative like Plan B that calls for disobedience with European treaties and openly considers the possibility of an exit. Furthermore, as Moutinho confessed, there are differences with regard to the strategy towards other political families, social democracy in particular: There’s a clear approach shared by Bloco, Podemos and Mélenchon, but not all the way through. There are some differences: they came last week with this proposal to defend an approach to social democrats; this was said by Mélenchon and Iglesias together, and Catarina Martins was not there. Bloco wouldn’t want to form some sort of alliance with the social democrats.

All in all, though, both Bloco and Podemos interviewees attached a high degree of importance to Plan B. While their individual or joint

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

173

contribution to this initiative is hard to disentangle, their participation in devising a common policy towards the EU and joint public statements displaying that policy would indicate that the two Iberian parties did enter the integration stage from Niedermayer’s model, at least while Plan B and its successor project NPM were active. At the same time, their involvement in Plan B says less about their relationship with each other than about how their relationship with SYRIZA deteriorated after 2015. As vague as it is, Plan B’s call for disobedience with EU treaties and, if necessary, the break from them represents a thinly veiled condemnation of the first SYRIZA government’s strategy to negotiate with the Troika while dutifully complying with the treaties and without preparing any backup solution for a potential exit (from the Eurozone, at least, if not the EU as a whole). As Fazenda summed it up, “Plan B was born because of the capitulation of SYRIZA”. Last, but not least, it is quite telling that both Bloco and Podemos are happy to cooperate with parties like Popular Unity, the left split from SYRIZA, or figures like Mélenchon, whose previous party left the ELP precisely because of SYRIZA. Indeed, according to Fazenda, Bloco now has “very close relation with Parti de Gauche, with La France Insoumise” (where the latter has virtually incorporated the former under Mélenchon’s towering leadership). As a reflection of the above, the SYRIZA interviewees unsurprisingly rated Plan B as rather insignificant for TPC. That is not simply due to SYRIZA not being involved in this initiative, but has to do with a certain hostility on behalf of the latter towards the Greek party, as pointed out by Giannopoulou: “I don’t know what exactly the Plan B does with Podemos and Bloco, but Plan B does not want to have a relationship with SYRIZA”. Also, Kanellopoulos claimed that “certain people, Zoe Konstantopoulou, for example, participate in that and we do not have very good relations with them”. Moreover, according to him, Plan B’s relevance is generally rather limited: “We don’t think it’s very important now in Europe. I think it’s relatively marginal”. While that verdict may be well biased, it has been largely vindicated by the sheer inactivity of Plan B and its successor NPM since the 2019 European elections. Its failure to provide an alternative candidature in those elections meant a transition from cooperation to competition between these two parties, on the one hand, and SYRIZA, on the other, did not fully take place, despite the obvious strain on their relations.

174

V. BORTUN

Discussion This chapter has dealt with the formal networking and cooperation among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos. In the absence of any trilateral relations, the analysis started with the parties’ bilateral relations, which were never properly formalised through any official agreements but nevertheless fed into the parties’ more institutionalised cooperation in the EP or, in the case of Bloco and SYRIZA, within the ELP. These bilateral relations were mainly built through personal connections between party elites (party leaders, MEPs) but also via previous ideological affinities between internal currents of a Trotskyist or Maoist extraction. However, these bilateral relations never really went deeper than the top levels of the parties, despite the parties’ avowed emphasis on the central role of rank-and-file and bottom-up activism. In the case of SYRIZA and Bloco, on the background of their programmatic and strategic similarities, what facilitated the establishment of their relation was their participation in the transnational social movements of the late 1990s and early 2000s centred around the Global Justice Movement. Their relations intensified after the start of the crisis, although that did not happen straight away on the basis of a shared understanding of the need to coordinate in the face of similar challenges (as per the core hypothesis of the book), but mostly after SYRIZA’s electoral breakthrough in 2012 and even more so after its outright victory in early 2015. Bloco and, later on, Podemos used that success story of a like-minded party to increase their own profile and legitimacy at home, each becoming closer to SYRIZA than to each other despite their geographical proximity and more similar national contexts. This reveals quite plainly how determining national politics is for TPC, even in the case of professed internationalist parties such as these ones. Thus, the peak of the cooperation among the three parties was reached in the run-up and aftermath of SYRIZA’s electoral victory in January 2015. It saw various expressions of solidarity from the other two RLPs towards the new left Greek government, including public messages of support from prominent party members or participation in public events held in third countries (such as the Podemos members attending meetings organised by the UK branch of SYRIZA). In that period, the relationship between SYRIZA and Podemos tended to take precedence, given Spain’s importance within the EU (at least when compared to Portugal) and Podemos’ better odds of coming into government later that year. This

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

175

was best illustrated by Iglesias being the only European left leader invited to address the crowd at SYRIZA’s celebratory electoral rally. However, there was no sign of actual diffusion between the electorally successful SYRIZA and either Bloco or Podemos. Despite the fact that there were three years between SYRIZA’s breakthrough in 2012 and its victory in 2015, there was hardly any exchange of policy ideas, strategic insights or repertoires of action among the three parties. Thus, their bilateral cooperation (as there was no trilateral cooperation at any given point) was largely limited to voicing public support for each other in their domestic endeavours, most notably in national electoral campaigns. Arguably, that was a form of international rather than transnational cooperation, at least on behalf of Podemos and Bloco, who wanted to capitalise on SYRIZA’s success, whereas SYRIZA was more acutely aware of the need for actual transnational, i.e. pan-European, coordination as it waged its (short-lived and ill-fated) battle against the Troika.3 Either way, even that international public support faded away significantly following SYRIZA’s U-turn in July 2015, when it agreed to a deal contradicting its own anti-austerity commitments. It was a seminal moment for the European radical left of the past decade that deepened long-standing divisions and affected SYRIZA’s cooperation with the other two parties, Bloco in particular. The latter seems to have ceased any bilateral relations with SYRIZA ever since, developing instead new relations with other forces of the Greek left, mainly Popular Unity, the party formed around the left split from SYRIZA. This change was mainly fuelled by pre-existing Trotskyist connections, thus proving the continuous importance of old ideological affinities on the radical left. The position of Podemos was more balanced due to the different stances of its internal factions: whereas Iglesias defended SYRIZA’s “difficult choice”, the Anticapitalistas, quite influential over Podemos’ international affairs before leaving the party, were openly critical of SYRIZA and built relations with Popular Unity. 3 I use the terms “international” and “transnational” slightly differently from the widely held distinction coined by Tarrow (2001), for whom “international” had to do with state-led/based action/interaction across borders, whereas “transnational” designated cross-border action/interaction among non-state actors. Instead, I conceive here of “international” more broadly, to refer to action/interaction that is fundamentally guided by factors linked to the nation-state, in this particular case demands related to national elections. It is an inductive distinction stemming from the findings presented here and it will be elaborated in the concluding section of the book.

176

V. BORTUN

The decline in the relations between SYRIZA, on the one hand, and Bloco and Podemos, on the other, was best reflected in the involvement of the two Iberian parties in the staunchly Eurosceptic initiative Plan B for Europe, which called for disobedience towards those aspects of the EU treaties seen as incompatible with left-wing policies. That was an implicit criticism of SYRIZA, who had abandoned most of those policies in favour of remaining in the Eurozone. In parallel, SYRIZA sought to build broader alliances at the European level, as seen in its participation in the Progressive Caucus together with social democratic and Green MEPs, aimed at altering the balance of forces in favour of a progressive reformation of the EU—an initiative which neither Bloco nor Podemos MEPs were ever involved with. This approach contrasted with the more belligerent approach of Plan B and its offshoot, NPM. However, all these initiatives have failed so far to develop into anything more than an irregular series of summits among top party officials. While the distancing between the two Iberian parties from SYRIZA was determined by their disapproval of the latter’s U-turn with regards to austerity, that was once again fuelled by pragmatic considerations linked to national politics. Both Bloco and Podemos had to argue against domestic adversaries and critics ahead of general elections in their countries that they would not follow the same path as the SYRIZA government. Indeed, the instrumentalisation of SYRIZA’s bitter experience in the government went beyond Spain and Portugal, with even Sinn Féin finding it necessary to clarify in the 2016 electoral campaign in Ireland that “we are not SYRIZA” (cf. Sheehan, 2016, p. 204). Thus, the ups and downs of formal transnational cooperation seem to be determined, to a significant extent, by the demands that parties face in their national political arenas, which feeds into the widely held view in the literature that national politics overrides European politics—a key question that is unpacked in the final chapter. Hence, after 2015, the formal cooperation among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos was largely limited to The Left group in the EP, which is the only transnational organisation that all three parties belong to. Here, the relations are less ideologically driven and more pragmatic. Interviewees working in the EP said they were closer to colleagues from one party or the other on the basis of their common work on parliamentary committees rather than how their own party office relates to the other two parties. Thus, despite some of the weaknesses pointed out by the current literature

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

177

and by several interviewees, The Left group was by far the most significant vehicle for formal TPC during the crisis, not just among these three parties but on the radical left more generally. Indeed, while the bilateral relations between parties were mostly animated by the logic of national politics, The Left was the only vehicle for formal transnational coordination at the EU level, and in relation to EU policy matters, among the three parties. The ELP and Plan B also played a more transnational role that went beyond the framework of national politics—namely, for the relation between SYRIZA and Bloco and the relation between Bloco and Podemos respectively—but carried less weight than the EP group. Thus, the ELP was deemed as less important mostly due to SYRIZA’ and Bloco’s divergent views on the question of the EU. Indeed, given that the ELP’s leadership mirrored, in the latter half of the decade, SYRIZA’s aim to reform the EU by forging a broad alliance of progressive European forces (although such an alliance has not taken any concrete shape ever since), Bloco interviewees seemed rather critical of and alienated from the ELP as a whole, which further explains their involvement in the Plan B initiative. However, while the latter did see Bloco and Podemos produce, together with a few other RLPs, joint statements on the crucial question of the EU, it failed to develop further and, together with its offshoot the NPM, has been inactive for the last few years. To sum up, the formal TPC among the three parties increased during the crisis but only around the electoral victory of one of them, followed by a decline in TPC in reaction to SYRIZA’s U-turn a few months later, with both the increase and declined being rooted in pragmatic considerations linked to each party’s domestic politics. A few intriguing aspects of their TPC have emerged in this chapter that are worth recapitulating now at the end. First, perhaps most intriguing was the absence of any trilateral relations, despite the parties themselves acknowledging the need for a transnational united front against the austerity consensus and the Troika. Such trilateral cooperation would have made even more sense in 2015, when all three parties faced general elections, with each hoping that the other two would do well in order to improve their own leverage against their national establishment and the Troika alike. Second, as noted repeatedly, the bilateral transnational cooperation that did take place displayed the dominance of the “national” in “transnational”. The parties mostly coordinated—always on a bilateral basis—in relation to developments in each other’s domestic arena rather than at

178

V. BORTUN

the actual transnational, pan-European level in relation to the Troika and the EU more generally. The latter mostly occurred via The Left group in the EP, that is, in one of the institutions of the very supranational hegemon that these parties were challenging. The other two vehicles for EU-focused formal TPC, the ELP (for SYRIZA and Bloco) and Plan B (Bloco and Podemos), had a rather limited impact, to say the least. We can, therefore, induce a distinction between national-focused TPC and transnational/EU-focused TPC, which arguably correspond to Niedermayer’s cooperation and integration stages respectively, as captured in Table 5.1. The integration stage inherently entails a common form of action, which can only happen in a transnational frame of reference; put differently, parties from different countries cannot have the same programme, for example, in their national elections. Third, neither the national- nor the transnational-focused TPC translated into any concrete example of programmatic, strategic or tactical diffusion between the three parties. Although both Podemos and Bloco wanted to associate themselves with the success story of SYRIZA, they did not seem to be eager to learn some of the things that SYRIZA had been doing to make that success possible in the first place. Any such diffusion did not take place between Bloco and Podemos either, despite their geographical proximity, cultural affinities and more similar national contexts. Thus, the absence of diffusion, which otherwise is a standard incentive for and manifestation of TPC, indicates that none of the bilateral relations between the three parties fully completed the cooperation stage, not to mention the integration stage. Fourth, the formal TPC among the three parties had a pronounced elite character, being mostly limited to party leadership and MEPs (and, by extension, their assistants). This contrasted to these RLPs’ claim to be “parties of their members” and, indeed, reflected their strategic shift from social mobilisation and grassroots activism, which characterised their early days, towards a more top-down institutionalist approach as they became more successful electorally. Despite the fact that it was that kind of grassroots orientation that contributed decisively to the parties’ success in the first place, it was not reproduced at all at transnational level. Thus, even at the peak of their cooperation in the first half of 2015, during the “honeymoon” of the SYRIZA government, these RLPs failed to instigate or engage in any transnational mass demonstrations or campaigns in support of the Greek government. That failure cannot be divorced from the lack of involvement of the rank-and-file members in the process of

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

179

Table 5.1 The Niedermayer model adapted to bilateral transnational relations among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos during the crisis, 2009–2019 Stage of interaction Indicator

SYRIZABloco

SYRIZAPodemos

Bloco-Podemos

1. Contact

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No No

No No

No No

No

No

Yes

2. Cooperation

3. Integration

Bilateral meetings Participation in events of the other party Official bilateral agreements Links between the parties’ rank-and-file Public display of support for the other party Diffusion of policy, strategy, methods etc. Nationalfocused coordination Noncooperation with rivals of the other party Membership of the same EP group Membership of the same Euro-party Common list of candidates in European elections Joint manifestos/ statements Joint events Joint campaigns Common policy (e.g. on the EU)

180

V. BORTUN

TPC, a lack that further confirms that these parties did not fully reach the integration stage. All the above is illustrated in Table 5.1, which summarises the assessment of each bilateral relation among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos during the crisis according to the three-stage model coined by Niedermayer. Thus, this model that was initially meant to assess transnational party federations rather than bilateral TPC is developed and adapted to the specifics of the latter, although there is no reason why it could not be applied to multilateral TPC among more than two parties. The indicators that correspond to each of the three stages have been determined inductively, on the basis of the findings presented in this chapter and developing on an earlier version of this framework put forward in Bortun (2022a). This is one of the main theoretical contributions of the book, albeit it would perhaps benefit from more empirically informed refinement, particularly in relation to other party families, which might reveal other relevant indicators.

References Bloco. (2013). National convention resolution: “The left against the debt”. http:// www.bloco.org/media/mocaoVIIIconvBEen.pdf Bortun, V. (2022). ‘SYRIZA and Podemos, we shall overcome’? Left transnational cooperation in times of crisis. Capital & Class, 46(4), 543–565. Calossi, E. (2011). Organizzazione e funzioni degli Europartiti. Il caso di Sinistra Europea. PLUS. Calossi, E. (2016). Anti-austerity left parties in the European Union: Competition, coordination and integration. Pisa University Press. Della Porta, D., Kouki, H., & Fernández, J. (2017). Left’s love and hate for Europe: Syriza, Podemos and critical visions of Europe during the crisis. In M. Caiani & S. Guerra (Eds.), Euroscepticism, democracy and the media: Communicating Europe, contesting Europe (pp. 219–240). Palgrave Macmillan. Dunphy, R. (2004). Contesting capitalism? Left parties and European integration. Manchester University Press. Dunphy, R., & March, L. (2013). Seven-year itch? The European Left Party: Struggling to transform the EU. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 14(4), 520–537. Dunphy, R., & March, L. (2019). The European Left Party. Manchester University Press.

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

181

Economakis, E. (2015, July 22). A view from Athens: Greece’s shell-shocked left. New Statesman. https://www.newstatesman.com/economics/2015/07/ view-athens-greece-s-shell-shocked-left Esquerda.net. (2009). Jovens do Bloco e do Synaspismos partilham experiencias de luta. https://www.bloco.org/jovens/not%C3%ADcias/item/1468-jovensdo-bloco-e-do-synaspismos-partilham-experiencias-de-luta.html Ferraresi, G. (2016). European populism in the 21st century: The ideological background of Syriza, Podemos and the 5 Star Movement. Biblioteca della libertà, 216, 49–68. Foster, P. (2015, September 18). Greek elections: Embattled Alexis Tsipras asks country for second chance. The Daily Telegraph. https://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/11875937/Greek-elections-Embatt led-Alexis-Tsipras-asks-country-for-second-chance.html García, P. (2016, August 3). Hay gente de Syriza con la que ya no me hablo. Revista Contexto. http://ctxt.es/es/20160803/Politica/7601/parlamentoeuropeo-politica-izquierda-escepticismo.htm Gil, A. (2015, September 14). Dos diputados autonómicos de Podemos viajan a Atenas para apoyar a Unidad Popular, la escisión de Syriza. eldiario.es. https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Podemos-Atenas-Unidad-Popular-Syriza_ 0_430807554.html González Peñas, T. (2015). Podemos supports SYRIZA. https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=-odmhOJI7zM Holmes, M., & Lightfoot, S. (2016). To EU or not to EU? The transnational radical left and the crisis. In L. March & D. Keith (Eds.), Europe’s radical left: From marginality to mainstream? (pp. 333–351). Rowman & Littlefield International. Hudson, K. (2012). The new European Left: A socialism for the twenty-first century? Palgrave Macmillan. infoLibre. (2018, November 27). Pablo Bustinduy será el cabeza de lista de Podemos para las elecciones europeas de 2019. https://www.infolibre.es/not icias/politica/2018/11/27/pablo_bustinduy_sera_cabeza_lista_podemos_p ara_las_elecciones_europeas_2019_89257_1012.html Iglesias, P. (2015a). Politics in a time of crisis. Podemos and the future of a democratic Europe. Verso. Iglesias, P. (2015b). Spain on edge. New Left Review, 93, 23–42. Keith, D., & March, L. (2016). Introduction. In L. March & D. Keith (Eds.), Europe’s radical left: From marginality to mainstream? (pp. 1–23). Rowman & Littlefield International. Kioupkiolis A., & Katsambekis, G. (2018). Radical left populism from the margins to the mainstream: A comparison of Syriza and Podemos. In Ó. García Agustín, & M. Briziarelli (Eds.), Podemos and the new political cycle (pp. 201–226). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

182

V. BORTUN

Louça, F., & Konstantopoulou, Z. (2015). 20150516 Lisbon. Video retrieved from YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ISujPYkXA4 Ladrech, R. (2007). Supporting European political foundations affiliated with political parties at the European level. Europäisches Parlament, 2007 , 39–48. Michalopoulos, S. (2018a, November 8). Syriza in quest to unite progressive forces ahead of EU elections. Euractiv. https://www.euractiv.com/section/ eu-elections-2019/news/hold-syriza-in-quest-to-unite-progressive-forcesahead-of-eu-elections/ Michalopoulos, S. (2018b, November 12). EU progressives sow seeds to ‘save’ Europe. Euractiv. https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-elections2019/news/eu-progressives-sow-seeds-to-walk-together-to-save-europe/ Nikolakakis, N. (2015). Venceremos? SYRIZA and the European Left Live to Fight another Day. Greek Politics Specialist Group (Political Studies Association), Pamphlet No 5. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282337669_Ven ceremos_Syriza_and_the_European_Left_Live_to_Fight_another_Day Nikolakakis, N. (2016). SYRIZA’s stance vis-à-vis the European Union following the financial crisis: The persistence of left Europeanism and the role of the European Left Party. European Politics and Society. https://doi.org/10. 1080/23745118.2016.1196918 Papadimoulis, D. (2017, June 23). Three strategic priorities for the progressive political forces in the EU. European Post. http://europeanpost.co/three-str ategic-priorities-for-the-progressive-political-forces-in-the-eu/ Progressive Caucus. (n.d.). About. http://www.progressivecaucus.eu/ Podemos Londres. (2015a). 15F: Podemos Londres en solidaridad con el pueblo griego. https://podemoslondres.com/2015/02/15/15f-podemos-lon dres-en-solidaridad-con-el-pueblo-griego/ Podemos Londres. (2015b). Europe is Changing: Video del evento. https://pod emoslondres.com/2015/06/10/europe-is-changing-video-del-evento/ Progressive Caucus. (2018, March 19). Progressive Caucus at the progressive forum in Athens. http://www.progressivecaucus.eu/progressive-caucus-pro gressive-forum-athens/ Quinn, B. (2015). Syriza Victory Rally—London [Video file]. https://www.you tube.com/watch?time_continue=24&v=OZIilafeFlY Segatti, P., & Capuzzi, F. (2016). Five stars movement, Syriza and Podemos: A Mediterranean model? In A. Martinelli (Ed.), Beyond Trump. Populism on the rise (pp. 47–72). ISPI. Seguín, B., & Faber, S. (2015, January 14). Can Podemos win in Spain? The Nation. https://www.thenation.com/article/can-podemos-win-spain/ Sheehan, H. (2016). The SYRIZA wave: Surging and crashing with the Greek left. Monthly Review Press. Skourletis, P. (2018). Speech of the Secretary of the Central Committee of SYRIZA, Panos Skourletis, to the Executive Board of the Party of the

5

“WE SHALL OVERCOME”: TRANSNATIONAL PARTY …

183

European Left. Retrieved from the Transform website: https://www.transf orm-network.net/focus/overview/article/ep-2019-the-european-left-onemouth-many-voices/speech-of-the-secretary-of-the-central-committee-of-syr iza-panos-skourletis-to-the-executive-board/ Souvlis, G. (2016). The European Challenge: An interview with Josep Maria Antentas. Jacobin. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/08/podemoseuropean-union-syriza-catalan-independence/ Sozzi, F. (2011). La sinistra radicale a livello europeo. Organizzazione e potere di un partito sovranazionale. Librerirauniversitaria.it. SYRIZA. (2015). SYRIZA statement on Spanish Elections: Let’s widen the road of hope! https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/63625/SYRIZA-statement-on-Spa nish-Elections.html SYRIZA. (2016). Papadimoulis for Spanish elections: Together we can—Unidos https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/65704/Dhm.-Papadhmoylhs:Podemos! O-SYRIZA-sthrizei-toys-Unidos-Podemos.-Epeidh-mazi-%E2%80%98enwm enoi-mporoyme%E2%80%99-na-teleiwsoyme-me-th-monomerh-litothta-kaina-afhsoyme-pisw-mas-thn-krish-egkataleipontas-to-neofileleythero-montelo. html SYRIZA. (2020). SYRIZA teleconferences with the United Left and Podemos. https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/93800/Thlediaskepseis-toy-SYR IZA-me-thn-Enwmenh-Aristera-kai-toys-Podemos.html SYRIZA European Parliament. (2015, January 22). GUE/NGL MEPs messages on the Greek elections & SYRIZA [Video file]. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Vd-x7qZJ0vE Tarrow, S. (2001). Transnational politics: Contention and institutions in international politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 4, 1–20. Tremlett, G. (2015, March 31). The Podemos revolution: how a small group of radical academics changed European politics. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/31/podemosrevolution-radical-academics-changed-european-politics Velasco I. H. (2015, September 18). Pablo Iglesias cierra la campaña griega: “Tsipras es un león. Podemos está con él”. El Mundo. https://www.elmundo. es/internacional/2015/09/18/55fc522522601d305b8b45bb.html

CHAPTER 6

Cooperation by Proxy: Political Foundations, Social Movements and Intellectual Networks

This chapter builds on documentary research and semi-structured elite interviews to explore and unpack the informal transnational networking and cooperation among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos. As defined in the introduction, “informal” broadly refers to the networking and cooperation that “is not codified but, rather, is shaped by habits among and links between individuals” (Salm, 2016, p. 11). In other words, informal networking and cooperation are understood here as taking place outside the official, formalised party channels, the EU’s institutional framework and other transnational party-based initiatives, all discussed in the previous chapter. In short, it is about the cooperation by proxy, via the parties’ auxiliary organisations or third-party channels. The substantial role of informality in the process of European integration has been widely acknowledged, particularly starting with the early 2000s (see Stacey, 2010; Kaiser, 2008; Héritier, 2007; Mak & Van Tatenhove, 2006; Heisenberg, 2005; Christiansen & Piattoni, 2003). Indeed, informal channels may sometimes play a more important role than the formal ones, as Salm (2016) proved with regards to the social democratic family in the 1970s. More recently, and directly relevant to the present discussion, the management of the Eurozone crisis has been characterised by a high level of informality (Christiansen & Neuhold, 2013; Schoeller et al., 2017). The Eurogroup itself, where the bulk of negotiations between the first SYRIZA government and the Troika took place, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Bortun, Crisis, Austerity and Transnational Party Cooperation in Southern Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39151-4_6

185

186

V. BORTUN

is an informal entity that played a hugely influential role in how both EU and national policymaking addressed the crisis. However, the literature on informal TPC in the EU is still rather scarce (see Salm, 2016; Kaiser, Leucht & Gehler, 2010; Kaiser, 2007, 2013) and virtually absent in the particular case of RLPs. This gap in the literature persists despite the reasonable expectation that, given this party family’s limited influence over the EU’s policymaking through the existing formalised channels, RLPs would find informality and extra-institutional coordination particularly important. Thus, the discussion in this chapter represents one of the book’s most original empirical contributions to the literature. The chapter deals in turn with three types of channels or actors that were likely to facilitate informal networking and cooperation among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos during the crisis: their political foundations and the Transform network these foundations are affiliated to; transnational social movements and initiatives; and the intellectual networks that the significant number of academics in their ranks might be expected to be part of. The traditional social partners of RLPs, the trade unions, have been left out because the data revealed no connection between them and the TPC among the three parties, which is most likely down to the parties’ own weak linkages to the labour movement in their countries but also to a more general disconnection between transnational trade unionism and TPC on the radical left. Thus, interviewees had little to nothing to say about the role of trade unions—a significant shortcoming of TPC on the radical left today that is touched upon again in the final chapter. Each section starts by outlining the respective type of channel in relation to RLPs in general and to SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos in particular. It then maps and assesses informal networking and cooperation among the three parties via that type of channel, comparing—where possible— the periods before and after the start of the Eurozone crisis. In the first section, the most substantial, the transnational networking and cooperation among the parties’ political foundations are measured by looking at the number and frequency of events organised by each foundation and also by Transform that saw the participation of any of the other two foundations or parties. The second and third sections revert to a predominantly qualitative approach that builds on the interviews to unpack the role of social movements and party academics respectively in the TPC of the three parties. The chapter ends with a discussion drawing out and summing up the main findings.

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

187

Thus, the aims of this chapter reflect the two-fold goal of the book: to establish whether this informal process of networking and cooperation has increased in the propitious context provided by the crisis and, at the same time, to fill a gap in the literature on TPC by mapping— albeit not exhaustively—the informal networking and cooperation among three of the most prominent RLPs in Europe today. As it will be shown, this process was even less developed than the formal TPC discussed in the previous chapter: party foundations and academics played, at best, a supporting role mainly aimed at networking rather than actual cooperation, while the linkages with transnational anti-austerity initiatives were surprisingly weak, not the least because of the weakness of those initiatives themselves.

“Not That Important”: Political Party Foundations and the Transform Network As outlined in Chapter 4, the three parties have either political foundations of their own, namely the Nicos Poulantzas Institute for SYRIZA and the Republic and Democracy Institute for Podemos, or a political foundation close to the party, namely CUL:TRA in the case of Bloco. All these three foundations are affiliated, to different degrees, to the Transform Europe network (Transform from here on), the political foundation of the ELP. Regardless of the differences in the degree of autonomy from their respective parties, all these foundations (including Transform) are distinct organisations, which is why they are discussed in this chapter rather than the previous one. This section aims to establish whether and how these organisations played a role in the networking and cooperation among the three parties during the 2010s. For that purpose, the discussion builds on the interviews and documentary research of the foundations’ online archives to reveal which events and activities they might have participated in together—conferences, workshops, summits, summer schools, forums, book launches etc. For it was these kinds of events that the interviewees indicated as the most important vehicle for their parties’ informal transnational networking and cooperation.

188

V. BORTUN

Nicos Poulantzas Institute (SYRIZA) Just like the party, the Nicos Poulantzas Institute (NPI) has a salient transnational orientation. It aims to build links with the “polymorphous social movements in many countries and the accompanying new forms of internationalism” and, thereby, take part in “the dialogue that is unfolding all over the world” (Nicos Poulantzas Institute, 2018). Thus, among its key activities, NPI organises – either autonomously or in collaboration with other institutions in Greece or abroad – research, seminars, conferences, lectures, workshops, festivals … Collaboration and coordination of activities with other institutes in Greece and abroad – research foundations, universities, political organisations, cultural institutions etc. – for the development of common activities, exchange of documentation and ideas, participation in common research or other programmes on issues that relate to Institute’s aims. (Nicos Poulantzas Institute, 2018)

Transnationally, NPI is a founding member of Transform, whose board included from the beginning Haris Golemis, an economist who served as NPI director between 1999 and 2017 and then as Scientific and Strategic Advisor to the Board of Transform. Angelina Giannopoulou, who works for Transform from the NPI headquarters in Athens, stressed that NPI “is a key member organisation of Transform … we have a close cooperation”. On its website, NPI also highlights its links with the ELP and The Left group via Transform rather than via SYRIZA itself, which might indicate a certain degree of autonomy from the party in terms of transnational linkage (although, as one would expect, most NPI members are also SYRIZA members). That relative autonomy is arguably reflected in NPI’s willingness to engage with organisations that do not necessarily see eye to eye with the party, but quite the contrary. At SYRIZA’s 2nd Congress in October 2016, Golemis (2016) called for the party to engage with both “groups and initiatives friendly to or tolerating SYRIZA (i.e. the Party of European Left, GUE/NGL, Transform, AlterSummit, even the proEuropean DiEM25 of Yanis Varoufakis) or/and hostile to it (i.e. PLAN B)”. Indeed, further illustrating the awareness of actors on the Southern European radical left of the need to prioritise coordination with likeminded forces across the region, in that same speech Golemis (2016) argued for SYRIZA to seek

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

189

alliances at a geographic level (with the countries of Southern Europe) … [and] pursue a policy of ‘enhanced cooperation” with the Southern Europe’s parties of the radical Left, aiming to promote common policy proposals and coordinated interventions at EU Councils of Ministers (mainly at ECOFIN), at the Eurogroup, but also within the European movements.

Hence, it would have not been far-fetched to expect that the NPI—which Golemis was still director of at the time of the speech—would pursue this strategic recommendation in its own activities, orientating towards “parties of the radical Left” in Southern Europe and/or, presumably, also their respective political foundations. Giannopoulou expanded on this strategic orientation: Not only me, [but] Transform and also Haris Golemis, as director of NPI, strongly believe that we have to create a strategy for regional cooperation of the South of Europe. And these parties, SYRIZA, Podemos, IU and Bloco should have a key role in this. The European South shares similarities: economic, political, societal etc. The left is quite strong in the South. We have to optimise all these factors in order to create in the South a regional cooperation within the European one, maybe take lessons from the integration process in the Latin American countries. But we have to do something so our countries can survive but also to transform the European politics; and we know for sure that Greece cannot do it by itself, Spain cannot do it by itself etc.

Indeed, according to her, after the crisis started in 2009, the NPI “took many initiatives, they organised many events where they invited many international speakers, European leaders of the left”. That was also confirmed by Yiannis Balabanidis, a left-leaning political scientist working for the Minister of Economy under the second Tsipras government: “the NPI has organised [debates] here in Greece all these years. They’ve done a really nice work in gathering intellectuals from different radical left parties here in Athens and discussing the Greek crisis and the crisis in the European South” (Y. Balabanidis, personal communication, September 2017). However, that orientation did not seem to be particularly reflected in the events organised by the NPI—at least not given the information available online. As shown in Table 6.1, between 2010 and 2019, of the 14

190

V. BORTUN

events with the NPI as a main organiser that had international participants (all held in Athens), 8 involved SYRIZA members and of those only 2 of those also involved members from Bloco and/or Podemos or/ and their respective foundations. Overall, only one event (number 10 in the table), which was co-organised by the NPI together with SYRIZA, Transform and ELP, featured participants from all three parties or/and respective foundations. In that conference, suggestively entitled “Building Alliances to Fight Austerity and Reclaim Democracy in Europe”, there were no less than 19 participants from SYRIZA/NPI and only one each from Bloco/CUL:TRA and Podemos/RDI. The other event (number 2), which involved someone from Bloco but not Podemos, was also a joint endeavour with SYRIZA, Transform and ELP. The information in Table 6.1 only covers the period since 2010, so a comparison with the pre-crisis period was not possible in this particular case. Nevertheless, it is still rather striking that, in contrast with its rhetoric about the need for Southern European coordination, during the crisis NPI (co-)organised in Athens only two events where anybody from any of the other two most significant Southern RLPs or their political foundations took part in as speakers and only one event attended by representatives of both Bloco/CUL:TRA and Podemos/RDI. Even those two events were not organised by the NPI alone but in collaboration with SYRIZA, the ELP and Transform. Thus, there is a notable gap between words and deeds in terms of NPI’s orientation towards transnational cooperation across Southern Europe. This observation is also supported by the SYRIZA interviewees having virtually nothing to say about the transnational role played, formally or informally, by their own political foundation (Giannopoulou and Balabanidis, quoted above, were not party members at the time of the interviews). Kanellopoulos summed up rather bluntly this view of political foundations in this particular regard: “for the European political arena, [they have] zero significance”.

CUL:TRA (Bloco) Unlike SYRIZA, Bloco does not have an official political foundation. Nevertheless, the party has developed a tight relation with the Cultural Cooperative of Labour and Socialism (CUL:TRA), with several members of the latter being also party members, such as MP José Soeiro or the foundation’s director, Tatiana Moutinho. As the latter explained, CUL:TRA is “not the political foundation of Bloco, but engages [with]

5th Annual Nicos Poulantzas Lecture: Erik Olin Wright—December 2011, Athens 6th Annual Lecture in Memory of Nicos Poulantzas: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak on “Europe and the Bull Market”—December 2012, Athens A Series of History Talks in Athens: “First World War: The Beginning of a New World”—January-March 2014, Athens International Workshop: “Left Strategy Project 2014: Police Democratisation in Europe”—November 2014, Athens

3

6

5

4

Conference: “The Past of Three PIGS”—June 2010, Athens Conference: “Public Debt and Austerity Policies in Europe”—February–March 2011, Athens

1 2

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

(continued)

Haris Golemis (SYRIZA&NPI), Theofanis Papageorgiou (SYRIZA), Dimosthenis Papadatos Anagnostopoulos (SYRIZA), Tasos Mavropoulos (SYRIZA), Andreas Karitzis (SYRIZA), Dimitris Tsoukalas (SYRIZA), Tasia Christodoulopoulou (SYRIZA), Athina Athanasiou (NPI), Aristidis Baltas (SYRIZA&NPI), Vasiliki Katrivanou (SYRIZA)

Sia Anagnostopoulou (SYRIZA)

–

– Rena Dourou (SYN), Dimitris Vitsas (SYN), Yiannis Dragasakis (SYN), Panos Trigazis (SYN), George Stathakis (SYN), Euclid Tsakalotos (SYN), Theodore Paraskevopoulos (SYRIZA), Yiannis Banias (SYRIZA), Panagiotis Lafazanis (SYRIZA), Yianis Milios (SYN), Dimitris Papadimoulis (SYN), Yiannis Tolios (SYN), Yiannis Bournous (SYN), Nasos Iliopoulos (SYN), Natasa Theodorakopoulou (SYN), Nicos Houndis (SYRIZA), Yianis Varoufakis (SYRIZA), Nikos Kotzias (SYRIZA&NPI), Gabriel Sakellaridis (SYN&NPI), Nikos Petralias (NPI), Maria Karamessini (NPI), Elena Papadopoulou (NPI), Sissy Velissariou (NPI), Haris Golemis (SYRIZA&NPI); Mariana Mortágua (Bloco) Euclid Tsakalotos (SYRIZA)

Relevant participantsa

International events with NPI as the main organiser between 2010 and 2019

International events

Table 6.1

6

191

(continued)

11

10

Workshop: “Copyright Against Community”—April 2016, Athens

Series of panel discussions: “From Debt and Austerity to a Reclaim of Democracy”—April-June 2015, Athens Conference: “Building Alliances to Fight Austerity and Reclaim Democracy in Europe”—March 2016, Athens

9

8

Visit of Michel Bauwens in Athens: Applied Policies and the Concept of “Commons”—November 2014, Athens International Poulantzas Conference: “Crisis, State and Democracy. Working with Nicos Poulantzas’ theory to confront authoritarian capitalism”—December 2014, Athens

7

International events

Table 6.1

Konstantinos Tsoukalas (SYRIZA), Georgios Daremas (NPI), Haris Golemis (SYRIZA&NPI), Makis Kouzelis (NPI), Aristidis Baltas (NPI), Marica Frangakis (NPI), Eleni Portaliou (SYRIZA) Athena Athanasiou (NPI), Haris Golemis (SYRIZA/NPI), Tasos Koronakis (SYRIZA) Panos Rigas (SYRIZA), Rania Antonopoulou (SYRIZA), Fotini Vaki (SYRIZA), Kostas Chrysogonos (SYRIZA), Yiannis Dragasakis (SYRIZA), Euclid Tsakalotos (SYRIZA), Dimitris Papadimoulis (SYRIZA), George Ververis (SYRIZA), Marika Frangaki (SYRIZA), Chara Kafantari (SYRIZA), Giorgos Chondros (SYRIZA), Yiannis Mouzalas (SYRIZA), Costas Douzinas (SYRIZA), Haris Golemis (SYRIZA&NPI), Vassiliki Katrivanou (SYRIZA), Nasos Iliopoulos (SYRIZA), Athina Athanasiou (NPI), Maria Karamesini (NPI); Alexis Tsipras (SYRIZA); Marisa Matias (Bloco), Renato Soeiro (Bloco & ELP); Tania Gonzalez Peñas (Podemos) –

–

Relevant participantsa

192 V. BORTUN

11th Annual Nicos Poulantzas Memorial Lecture. “Angela Davis: Abolition Feminism, Theories & Practices”—December 2017, Athens 12th Annual Nicos Poulantzas Memorial Lecture: “Rosa Luxemburg’s open-ended future: Socialism or Barbarism, Internationalism or Nationalism”—December 2018, Athens

13

–

Maria Karamessini (NPI), Marica Frangakis (NPI), Yannis Dragasakis (SYRIZA), Nasos Iliopoulos (SYRIZA), Effie Achtsioglou (SYRIZA), Natasa Theodorakopoulou (SYRIZA&NPI), Kostadinka Kuneva (SYRIZA), Jason Schinas-Papadopoulos (YoS), Panos Lambrou (SYRIZA), Anna Vouyioukas (SYRIZA), Yiannis Bournous (SYRIZA), Dimitris Papadimoulis (SYRIZA), Elena Papadopoulou (SYRIZA), Theano Fotiou (SYRIZA), Euclid Tsakalotos (SYRIZA), Alexis Tsipras (SYRIZA) –

Relevant participantsa

bold

a Representatives of any of the three parties or related political foundations, with the names of those from Bloco/CUL:TRA and/or Podemos/RDI in

14

Conference: “Inequalities, Neoliberalism and European Integration: Progressive Answers”—November 2017, Athens

12

International events

6 COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

193

194

V. BORTUN

many people from Bloco, because Bloco had several tendencies, so it’s the political foundation of one of those tendencies that includes the current leadership”. The strong link between the two organisations is also reflected in CUL:TRA being the only Portuguese political foundation affiliated to Transform. According to the Transform (n.d.-a) website, CUL:TRA’s mission is to promote research, training and publications in the fields of history, political science, economy, sociology and cultural issues related to the working classes. It focuses on the state of society in Portugal and beyond, and, in collaboration with similar organizations in other countries, produces analyses of the new reality.

However, CUL:TRA does not have its own website, which hindered the collection of data regarding the institute’s activity. Google searches of its name in both Portuguese and English did not reveal much relevant information apart from one, largely academic, event organised by CUL:TRA back in 2008, entitled the Karl Marx International Congress, which nobody from SYN/SYRIZA/NPI or the future Podemos attended. The “Events” section of CUL:TRA’s (2023) Facebook page, lists 42 events organised or co-organised by the institute ever since the creation of the page in January 2012 and up until the end of 2019. However, only five of them seem to have had international speaking guests, of which only one had a guest from any of the other two parties or their respective foundations—a debate on feminism that had, among its speakers, Patri Amaya from Podemos. She was introduced as the Secretary for Feminism in Anticapitalistas rather than as a member of Podemos, which hints at the USFI Trotskyist connection that might have facilitated her invitation and that—as also shown in the previous chapter—guided much of the relation between the two Iberian parties. Apart from that, a roundtable discussion organised in November 2017 under the title “Portugal-Spain: So far, so close—building bridges between the Portuguese left and the Spanish left” had two representatives of Bloco and two representatives of IU rather than Podemos. Of all events organised by CUL:TRA, this was the most directly relevant to the topic at hand. However, it is telling that it occurred almost eight years after the crisis had started in Southern Europe. One would have expected that the anti-austerity left in the two neighbouring countries would have already built “bridges” by then.

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

195

In sum, CUL:TRA did not organise any event attended by anyone from either SYRIZA/NPI or Podemos/RDI. That apparent lack of involvement with the other two parties and/or their political foundations was also reflected in the answers of the Bloco interviewees. Not dissimilar from their SYRIZA counterparts, they did not attribute much significance to the political foundations’ role in the process of TPC. As Fazenda pointed out, while CUL:TRA does cooperate with NPI via Transform, that does not bear any impact on the cooperation between the two parties as such. Indeed, according to him, “in Bloco they [CUL:TRA] are not so influential on the political guidance; they never were”. Pureza, who attended several events organised by CUL:TRA, also acknowledged the limited role played by the institute in Bloco’s transnational relations, which he contrasts with the case of other political foundations, such as Die Linke’s Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung (RLS): CUL:TRA is different from NPI or Rosa, it’s less attached to the party. … We rely on the capacity of organising things of entities like RLS or Transform or GUE/NGL … parties themselves don’t have that much capacity. … The capacity of Rosa is an important one, it’s completely different from CUL:TRA’s, and it has been at the heart of improving the channels of dialogue and organising thematic meetings; I’ve been to one in Italy and another one in Spain.

Such contrast may be explained not only by CUL:TRA not being the official foundation of Bloco, but also by the smaller size of Bloco compared to SYRIZA. However, this might also have something to do with the less generous public funding for political foundations in Portugal compared to Germany (see Sieker, 2016), which is arguably in itself yet another manifestation of the economic gap between Northern and Southern Europe.1

1 Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (RLS) was mentioned by several interviewees as influential

in the broader process of transnational networking and cooperation on the radical left today. With a head office in Berlin and regional offices in 22 other countries spread across Europe, Africa, Asia, South and North America (Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, n.d.), RLS is in all likelihood the largest political foundation of the radical left in the world today but has received virtually no attention in the current literature.

196

V. BORTUN

Republic and Democracy Institute (Podemos) The political foundation of Podemos was established shortly after the 2014 European elections, so not long after the creation of the party itself. The rather broad founding goal of the Republic and Democracy Institute (RDI) was to harbour “political and cultural analysis and formation” (Republic and Democracy Institute, n.d.-a), as part of the party’s broader communication strategy to try and convey its messages to wider audiences (Cabanillas, 2017). For that purpose, RDI’s main activities include publishing the magazine La Circular [The Circular] and the book series Argumenta [Argues] as well as, more importantly, organising Podemos’ summer and autumn schools. While Podemos is not a member of the ELP, the RDI is an observer participant to its political foundation Transform. As the former director of the institute, Federico Severino, said in a press interview, “we are now collaborating with the Transform network, which is the network where many of the foundations of the traditional left-wing parties are involved, which is the space we have encountered in Europe through the GUE/NGL” (Riveiro, 2017). In terms of international links, Severino also mentions the “municipalist axis” between some cities in Italy and cities in Spain where Podemos was in local government, which represents “a fundamental connection vector to know what is happening and to continue working to recover a democratic Europe of the peoples” (Riveiro, 2017). (This municipalist approach, which is absent from the other two parties/foundations, is touched upon in the final chapter, when discussing possible recommendations for improving TPC on the radical left.) The institute’s transnational orientation has a clear regional focus, as indicated in its mission statement: “Our radically pro-European outlook seeks to unite efforts among the countries of Southern Europe as an instrument to curb the neoliberal policies that now carry more weight due to the European Union’s inclination towards the centre and north of the continent”. More specifically, a newspaper article from 2017 included a quote from Severino mentioning the left-wing parliamentary majority in Portugal backing the PS minority government as a potential model for the Spanish left (Cabanillas, 2017), a model that would indeed be replicated in June 2018, when PSOE became a minority government with the parliamentary support of the Podemos-IU alliance. This similarity would

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

197

make it even more plausible for RDI to cultivate and facilitate a relation with CUL:TRA and, by extension, Bloco. Between its creation and October 2018 (when this part of the documentary research was conducted), the RDI organised four summer/ autumn schools: in July 2015, September 2016, July 2017 and October 2018 (Republic and Democracy Institute, n.d.-b). Overall, as shown in Table 6.2, in these four annual events, each comprising of varying number of sessions, 8 sessions included as speakers representatives of SYRIZA/ NPI or Bloco/CUL:TRA: 5 of these sessions had speakers from Bloco, 3 from SYRIZA, but none from both. The more frequent and consistent presence of people from Bloco, who have participated in all those four schools as well as the most recent one from November 2022,2 arguably reflects both the more similar political context mentioned above and— as shown in the previous chapter—the decline of Podemos’ relationship with SYRIZA after July 2015. Indeed, it is quite revealing that the last of these events that saw the participation of a SYRIZA or NPI representative was the one from September 2016. Instead, the subsequent schools from 2017 to 2018 had among their speakers members of the LFI, a party led by Mélenchon, who was at the time one of the most outspoken critics of SYRIZA within the ranks of the European radical left (see Soudais, 2018). Other than that, the RDI Facebook page lists 79 events organised or co-organised by the institute since October 2017 (when the chronology starts) up until the end of 2019 (excluding the 2018 Autumn School mentioned above). However, only one of these was attended by a representative of RLPs from outside Spain. It was Francisco Louçã from Bloco, who was invited in May 2018 to speak in a conference entitled “Is another Europe possible?”, where he was also joined among others, by one of the Podemos MEPs, Miguel Urbán, who has since left Podemos. On the other hand, a conference from the same month suggestively entitled “Greece in the air” did not have any speaking guests from SYRIZA or NPI. It is telling that only two of the six interviewees from Podemos explicitly mentioned RDI when asked about the role of political foundations, although neither of them developed on its role. On the contrary, when 2 At the time of writing this, in May 2023, there was no information available online regarding the schools organised by RDI between November 2018 and November 2022, although they probably were not held in some of these missing years due to the Covid-19 pandemic, which saw particularly strict and prolonged restrictions in Spain.

198

V. BORTUN

Table 6.2 Sessions from RDI summer/autumn schools with speaking guests from SYRIZA/NPI or Bloco/CUL:TRA 2015 summer school 2016 autumn school

2017 summer school

2018 autumn school

“The anatomy of debt and the ECB”—Francisco Louçã (Bloco)

“To the Portuguese! Alternatives of government”— Marisa Matias (Bloco)

“South or not South. In the face of Europe of lobbies, democracy”—Catarina Martins (Bloco)

“The Lepenisation of the spirits and the Macronisation of European politics”—Marisa Matias (Bloco) –

–

“Correlation of forces in Europe”—Yiannis Bournous (SYRIZA) “The Greek experience”— Marica Frangakis (NPI)

“Female precarity and employment: The forgotten workers (houseworkers and carers)”— Kostadinka Kuneva (SYRIZA) “The future of Europe”—Jorge Costa (Bloco)

–

–

thinking of influential foundations on the transnational radical left, Albarracín mentioned RLS (Die Linke’s foundation) before RDI. Only the Spanish journalist Arbide Aza made a point with respect to the limited role played by RDI, saying “they can have wider theoretical work, but they are too busy in their daily life”. This perception of party political foundations as bearing little impact on TPC proved one of the strongest points of consensus among the interviewees from the three parties.

Transform As noted in Chapter 2, Transform has been only marginally discussed in the current literature (see Calossi, 2016, pp. 185–188; Dunphy & March, 2019, pp. 122–123; Hudson, 2012, pp. 58–62), with no study specifically focusing on it. As the official foundation of the ELP, Transform generally follows the same political line. More than that though, it does have an impact on that political line, according to Giannopoulou:

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

199

I think that Transform influenced and influences, in a way that maybe sometimes is not very obvious, the strategic guidelines of the ELP or the initiatives that the party thinks are important, or maybe issues that have to be analysed and the party does not have the tools and the methodology to do it—it’s the ideological reservoir of the ELP.

Thus, just like the ELP but perhaps in a more homogenous way, Transform asserts an equally firm and critical commitment to European integration (Calossi, 2016, p. 188). More exactly, Transform (n.d.-b) believes “the noble and progressive idea of European unification cannot be asserted in the face of the ubiquitous and growing nationalisms and the far right by uncritically defending the status-quo of the existing European Union”. Hence, at the core of the network’s activity lies the coordination and cooperation among its members: “The members of the transform! network coordinate their scientific and educational work, cooperatively organise theoretical and educational events and discussions regarding key issues for the democratic left in Europe and the world, and work together on publications and educational materials aimed at an intercontinental dialogue of the left and its scientific and educational institutions.” (Transform, n.d.-b)

A thorough examination of the archive of events on the Transform (2019) website revealed that between 2009 and the end of 2019 there were 151 events that were either organised or co-organised (and not merely “supported”) by Transform, either as stand-alone events or as part of larger events such as the ELP Congresses, the European Forum, or the annual US-based Left Forum, where Transform organised its own seminars and workshops. Representatives of NPI participated, as speakers or/ and co-organisers, in 55 of these events (i.e. more than a third), with 2016 by far the busiest year (10 events). In addition to that, members of SYN/SYRIZA who were not also members of NPI (although it was not possible to establish that with precise certainty in every single case) attended 42 Transform events, most of which overlapped with those attended by NPI people. In total, people from NPI and/or SYRIZA took part in 73 distinct events of the 151 (co)organised by Transform over the previous decade. However, it is interesting to note that of all SYRIZA’s MEPs, only two of them attended merely one event each. This suggests that MEPs might be focused rather on formal TPC via The Left group, and more broadly the EP, although the purpose of European political

200

V. BORTUN

foundations is precisely to aid and cross-fertilise with that institutionalised process of cooperation rather than run parallel to it. By contrast, representatives of CUL:TRA and Bloco attended 37 Transform events over the same period of time. That contrast may primarily be explained by CUL:TRA not being Bloco’s official foundation but also by both CUL:TRA and Bloco simply being smaller than NPI and SYRIZA respectively. For example, the only time when Bloco had more MPs than SYRIZA was between 2009 and 2012; but even in that period the Greeks attended double the number of Transform events as the Portuguese. Another factor in their different degrees of participation might be related to SYRIZA/NPI’s greater need of and thus emphasis on transnational networking and cooperation (just) before and after coming into government, with their highest level of participation occurring in the two years following their electoral triumph. In the Spanish case, the numbers are much lower, as both the party and its foundation were created in 2014 but also because the RDI is only an observer member of Transform. Nevertheless, Podemos sent representatives to Transform events early on, at one of the four workshops organised by Transform as part of the ATTAC European Summer University for Social Movements in August 2014. Overall, though, Podemos had representatives among the guest speakers at only 8 Transform events between the establishment of the party and the end of 2019, with Federico Severino, the director of RDI up until 2020, being the only one who attended more than one event. Interestingly enough, none of the party’s five MEPs participated in any of these events—a lack of involvement in Transform-mediated networking and cooperation similar to the case of SYRIZA. More importantly, out of the 151 events organised or co-organised by Transform throughout the 2010s, more than half were attended by someone from at least one of the three parties or their respective foundations. As detailed in Table 6.3, out of these 79 events, 32 were attended by representatives of both SYRIZA/NPI and Bloco/CUL:TRA. When zooming in and considering only the post-2014 period, after the creation of Podemos, Transform organised or co-organised 104 events, of which more than half were attended by representatives of any of the three parties and their foundations. However, of these 55 events, members of Podemos or/and RDI participated in only 8 of them, as mentioned already, of which 7 were also attended by members of either of the other two parties or/and their foundations. Thus, overall, of the total

Number of Transform events Attended by any of the three parties/ foundations Attended by SYRIZA/NPI Attended by Bloco/CUL:TRA Attended by Podemos/RDI Attended by SYRIZA/NPI and Bloco/ CUL:TRA Attended by SYRIZA/NPI and Podemos/ RDI Attended by Bloco/CUL:TRA and Podemos/RDI Attended by all three parties or/and their foundations

8 4 3 3 – 2 – – –

2 2 – 1 – – –

2010

7 3

2009

–

–

–

4 – – –

10 4

2011

–

–

–

7 3 – 3

11 7

2012

–

–

–

6 5 – 5

11 6

2013

–

–

1

9 5 1 5

15 9

2014

–

–

1

7 4 1 2

16 9

2015

1

1

1

14 2 2 2

21 15

2016

2

2

2

10 3 2 3

21 10

2017

2

2

2

3 4 2 3

18 4

2018

0

0

0

8 6 0 6

13 8

2019

5

5

7

73 37 8 32

151 79

Total

Table 6.3 Transform events with participation from SYRIZA/NPI, Bloco/CUL:TRA or/and Podemos/RDI between 2009 and 2019 included

6 COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

201

202

V. BORTUN

of 104 Transform events since 2014 and up until the end of 2019, only 5 included representatives of all three parties or respective foundations, at a time when these three were the most prominent RLPs in the whole of the EU. Hence, it would appear that during the 2010s Transform played a much stronger role in the networking between SYRIZA/NPI and Bloco/CUL:TRA than in the one between any of these two parties and Podemos/RDI. While Podemos was only created half-way through the decade, its participation in Transform events after 2014 was still very limited, not entirely unexpected given that, with Podemos not being a member of the ELP, its foundation is only an observer member of the network. This contrast is to some extent confirmed by the interviewees. On the one hand, for Pureza from Bloco, Transform has a “very clear importance in this process of bringing together perspectives, bringing people to debates, trying to mobilise networking for different topics”. Also, Moutinho, who works for Transform via CUL:TRA, said she “met them [people from SYRIZA and Podemos] through Transform”. Walter Baier, the coordinator of Transform for a number of years and ELP president since the end of 2022, acknowledged the role this network played in the relations between SYRIZA and Bloco and their respective foundations: “Particularly in the Transform frame they organise discussions and exchanges of opinions, so structurally and personally they are connected. … The political foundation to which both parties refer is Transform” (W. Baier, personal communication, May 2017). With regards to informal networking and cooperation in particular, Baier believed— understandably given his position at the time—Transform played a key role, as “it’s an informal frame, meaning you can discuss the issues here without necessarily having to come to conclusions, which allows people to change opinions or to forward ideas in an experimental way”. Of course, the reverse side of this is that, not having that pressure “to come to conclusions” might render Transform as less cohesive and impactful as it should arguably be, particularly so during a period of EU-wide crisis that demanded coordination among the forces of the radical left. Furthermore, the publications of Transform—be it its website or its yearbook, which was launched in 2015 to succeed its biannual journal— were also mentioned as playing a role in the parties’ networking and diffusion. When asked whether there are any media outlets that play a role in informal party cooperation, Gusmão from Bloco mentioned the

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

203

Transform website, while Kanellopoulos from SYRIZA mentioned “certain Transform publications” too, only to add though that Transform in general “is not that important”. Pedrosa was also quite sceptical about the influence of these publications: “We do write stuff for Transform, and the Greeks did that too, but it’s not significant, because Bloco doesn’t share or promote it”. Among the Podemos interviewees, while noting that “we have informal connections with Transform”, Martinez Lobo was of the opinion that Transform is “limited to the academic world, with no communication with the social basis”. Interviewees from outside the three parties or their foundations but with a good knowledge of Transform reiterated the same assessment of the network: present in the process of transnational networking and cooperation but not particularly influential. As Arbide Aza put it, “they [the parties] do look to Transform more often than before, but it’s not something that determines their relationship”. British left-wing academic and activist Hilary Wainwright, who attended several Transform events and contributed to its publications, elaborated on this point, making the link between the role of Transform and that of the national party foundations: I think probably Transform [is the most important for the informal cooperation among these parties]; it also draws in GUE/NGL. I think Transform is the most activist. But it doesn’t have resources and it’s quite weak in each country, maybe reflecting the political weaknesses of Eurocommunism, I don’t know. … I think it’s limited by the limits of its own national bodies – they’re not very influential, so it’s limited by that. They are good people and they do their best, but I wouldn’t call them influential. (H. Wainwright, personal communication, October 2017)

Indeed, even Baier was aware of the limits of the role played by the network he was heading at the time: “measured by the urgency of the situation or if you ask me if I am satisfied by the level of coordination, then I would be more critical”. More importantly, Baier believed that regional cooperation, particularly in Southern Europe, had to increase, with Transform trying to contribute to that. According to him, “we have intensified our work regarding the European South after the crisis … we have a particular agenda on this, we work on this, and I think we are proceeding, but the pace in which we are doing this is far from being sufficient”.

204

V. BORTUN

His critical assessment was not off the mark: of all the 151 Transform events during the decade of crisis, only 5 of them had an explicit focus on Southern Europe, 4 of which were attended by representatives of any of the three parties or/and their respective foundations, as detailed in Table 6.4. The last event in the table, “Is Southern Europe the Weak Link of European Integration? Tracing Possible Areas of Cooperation among Movements and Parties”, was co-organised by Transform in October 2018 in Lisbon together with the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung Liaison Office in Madrid. It was part of a broader project that Transform had just kicked off, entitled “Cooperation, strategies for Southern Europe” and coordinated by Moutinho from CUL:TRA. Table 6.4 Transform events with an explicit focus on Southern Europe during the 2010s

1

2

3

4

5

Event

Participants from the three parties/ foundations

“What future for the PIGS? The Case of Greece, the Response of the EU and Alternative Solutions”—April 2010, Brussels “A Mediterranean Alternative for a Renewed Europe”—co-organised with Transform Italy—February 2014, Rome “Syriza, Podemos—How the Left Addresses the Issue of Power in Greece and in Spain”—panel organised as part of the Left Forum, May 2015, New York “Bloco – Podemos – SYRIZA – IU – Linke: Unite! Towards a progressive European strategy” – co-organised with NPI and RLS, March 2016, Vienna “Is Southern Europe the Weak Link of European Integration? Tracing Possible Areas of Cooperation among Movements and Parties”—October 2018, Lisbon

Nicos Chountis (SYRIZA), Haris Golemis (NPI & SYRIZA)

–

Stelios Foteinopoulos (NPI)

Nasos Iliopoulos (SYRIZA), Maria Manuel Rola (Bloco), Francisco Orozco (Podemos) Haris Golemis (NPI), Angelina Giannopoulou (NPI), Nasos Iliopoulos (SYRIZA), Eftychia Achtsioglou (SYRIZA), Tatiana Moutinho (CUL:TRA & Bloco), José Soeiro (Bloco), José Gusmão (Bloco) [Federico Severino (RDI & Podemos) was invited to speak but could not make it for personal reasons.]

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

205

In the opening statement of the event—which I attended for nonparticipatory observation—Moutinho said that the aim of the conference was to share “experiences, tackle concrete alternatives and, importantly, address future prospects and perspectives that may cooperatively be used by the left, not only in Southern countries but also Europe-wide”. Speaking after her, Golemis also stressed the similarities among countries in Southern Europe, which despite the 2015 U-turn of the SYRIZA government, “still remains a region where radical transformation of societies could be feasible”. At the same time, he emphasised that the conference was not merely academic in character. Echoing the view of Martinez Lobo quoted above, Golemis argued that As we said at the beginning, we don’t consider this to be an academic seminar. … Just saying what the German government should do… OK, we’ve made this kind of wishful thoughts thousands of times and what is the result of it? Nothing happens. What we need is that the German comrades, whom we have represented here, really push forward these demands to the German parties first and governments second, and that especially those who are the worst affected, the Southerners, do that with their own governments. The idea is that we don’t leave this place with one more workshop, we’ve had enough.

Thus, the aim of the event and Transform’s wider Southern European project was to bring together “progressive political and social actors of Southern Europe” and beyond, as those actors needed the support of their counterparts in Northern Europe in order to be effective in their struggle against what they see as a Germany-dominated EU. That kind of support would have to be materialised in more concrete coordination. As Moutinho also put it, “we may have very good theory, but if the people working on the field are not aware of it, then it has no practical value”. Thus, Golemis indicated several ways in which that cooperation could take place or enhance: by creating networks for the exchange of information regarding social and political developments in their countries, including best practices but also glorious or dishonourable defeats in various fields; by assisting the networking of trade unions at various levels (company, sectoral, national levels), of social movements (especially in the field of supporting immigrants and refugees), and of rebel cities; by promoting cultural activities

206

V. BORTUN

in order to show that the South is an indispensable part of the European cultural identity and that there is a need to fight against the racist stereotypes which have reached their climax with the zoomorphic metaphor PIGS.

These words, coming from someone with a rich experience and comprehension of left networking and cooperation in Europe, further suggest that Transform had not done enough in terms of enabling the cooperation among left forces in Southern Europe (and beyond). More than that, they also suggest that this cooperation was rather lagging behind if some of the proposals he put forward, such as the basic feature of having a constant exchange of information, had not yet been put in place almost a decade after the start of the crisis.

“More De-mobilised Than Ever”: The Role of Social Movements The major setback suffered by RLPs following the downfall of Sovietstyle socialist states has already been noted. However, it came on the background of a broader trend of party decline across Europe (and beyond) that had started before 1989 (Biezen, et al., 2012; Scarrow, 1996; Katz et al., 1992). That process created space for social movements, understood here following Diani (1992, p. 1), as “networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities”. In particular, the Global Justice Movement (GJM), also referred to as the anti-globalisation or alter-globalisation movement (used interchangeably hereon), became in that context an increasingly significant framework for channelling popular dissatisfaction with the globalising neoliberal consensus (Heartfield, 2003; March & Mudde, 2005). Thus, the 1990s saw the emergence of a plethora of progressive social movements, or a “network of networks” (Della Porta et al., 2006), concerned not only with opposing and finding alternatives to neoliberal globalisation but also with issues such as anti-racism, animal rights or environmentalism (Mudde, 2002). The pronounced transnational character and orientation of these new social movements came as no surprise. Firstly, transnationalism had always been a feature of previous social movements, from the nineteenth-century campaigns against slavery or for women’s suffrage (Keck & Sikkink, 1998)

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

207

up to the anti-missile movement of the 1980s (Hudson, 2000, pp. 28– 29). Secondly, that feature intensified over the last few decades, as the acceleration of globalisation compelled social movements to become more transnational themselves in order to challenge the increasingly transnational sources of power (Castells, 2010) and also facilitated that process through the spread of new technologies and affordable long-distance travel (Alston, 2014). Most crucially to the present discussion, in a period when RLPs were still struggling to find a pan-European replacement for Communist-led internationalism, the GJM provided not only the first significant challenge to the neoliberal consensus (March, 2011, p. 6) but also some of the first and most prominent instances of radical left transnational networking and cooperation in post-1989 Europe (March & Mudde, 2005, p. 42). RLPs themselves became increasingly aware of the need for transnational cooperation in a globalising world shaped by neoliberal policies, particularly so the new wave of parties that emerged at the turn of the century (Moschonas, 2013, p. 8). As their traditional civil society partners, the trade unions, were also in decline (March, 2011, p. 167), these parties came to realise that they needed to engage in cross-border cooperation with the GJM in order to build a broad opposition to the transnational neoliberal status quo (March & Mudde, 2005, p. 41). The Communist Refoundation Party (PRC) was one of the RLPs to take the lead on building links with the new social movements and was followed in that respect by other new RLPs, including SYN (SYRIZA’s forerunner) and Bloco (March, 2011, p. 178). The then leader of the PRC, Fausto Bertinotti (2003), was warning back in 2003 that “An alternative European left can find its strategy only within the anti-globalisation movement. … Unless they move in this direction, the European anti-capitalist left-wing parties risk disappearing in terms of political representation.” However, the interaction between parties and the GJM was never smooth, given the latter’s pronounced “anti-party, anti-political, neoanarchist sentiment” (March, 2011, p. 167). As Bertinotti (2003) himself acknowledged, the rise of the anti-globalisation movement “challenged the model of a party leading the movement, proposing instead the notion of networks and links among groups, associations, parties and newspapers”. Furthermore, while the GJM’s broad left-wing character could hardly be denied, its explicit aim to avoid ideological uniformity also contributed to a deep suspicion towards political parties, despite some

208

V. BORTUN

parties eventually managing to build good relations with certain sections of the GJM in their own countries, such as the PRC in Italy (see Della Porta et al., 2006, pp. 41–43). Thus, both the World and the European Social Forums, arguably the main organisational articulations of the GJM, excluded party officials from their organisation and programme (March, 2011, p. 177). Nevertheless, that did not prevent members of RLPs from participating in these annual summits (March & Mudde, 2005, p. 41), even though they tended to do it via the youth wings or political foundations of their parties (Della Porta et al, 2006, p. 43; March, 2011, p. 178). Indeed, despite the social movements’ wary attitude vis-à-vis parties, the relatively limited literature on the relation between the two finds that social movements that strive for political change will sooner or later also interact with political parties (see Piccio, 2016; Rucht, 2004). That interaction naturally enables, in turn, the interaction between various parties as well, in what Della Porta et al., (2006, p. 46) call “interorganisational exchanges”. As shown in the following subsection, the GJM and its offshoots provided several frameworks where such interaction did take place, where members of SYN and Bloco were able to meet each other and establish enduring contacts between their parties.

Before the Crisis: The Era of the Social Forums The European Social Forum (ESF) was arguably the most significant transnational articulation of the GJM in Europe (Della Porta et al., 2006; March, 2011). It was launched in 2002 as a series of summits that initially took place annually and, later on, biannually up until 2010, with the six summits being held in Florence (2002), Paris (2003), London (2004), Athens (2006), Malm˝ o (2008) and Istanbul (2010). Emulating the World Social Forum (WSF) that had started in 2001 in Porto Alegre (Brazil) as an alternative to the World Economic Forum (WSF, 2001), the ESF aimed to enable the networking, exchange of ideas and potential strategic coordination among social movements, NGOs, trade unions and other activist networks sharing a broad opposition to neoliberal globalisation (Tormey, 2004). Despite many participants’ hostility towards political parties (Candeias, 2004; Tormey, 2004), the latter did become involved in the ESF from the very first summit in Florence, particularly the PRC and the British

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

209

Socialist Workers’ Party through its front organisation Globalise Resistance (Della Porta et al., 2006, pp. 42–43). That was reflected in the relatively high share of the total participants who declared to belong to a political party—over 42% (Della Porta et al., 2006, p. 45). Moreover, the finding of Della Porta et al., (2006, p. 48) that the ESF in Florence was marked by “the creation of channels of interorganisational communication” indicates the likelihood that members of various political parties present at the summit also interacted with one another. The interviews with the people from Bloco and SYRIZA (as Podemos did not exist before 2009) seemed to indicate that the ESF was one of the main spaces to harbour the initial interaction between members of the two parties. For example, according to Karatsioubanis, who was in SYN at the time, “We were [active in the ESF] from the first moment, but they were there through other organisations, not Bloco as such”, thus referring to the ideologically defined groups composing Bloco at the time. A leader of one of those groups and founding member of Bloco, Luís Fazenda, stated to have attended a meeting in Florence in preparation of the first ESF, where he did meet people from SYN. This was at a time, 2003, when the ELP had not yet been established and Bloco did not have any representation in the EP (their first seat in the EP came with the 2004 elections). As Arbide Aza summed up the importance of the ESF for the relations between the parties concerned here, “this is where they met for the first time”, including some of Podemos’ later leaders, particularly Iglesias, who “was there … at the beginning of the anti-globalisation movement in 1999 and 2000”. However, while the ESF clearly was a space that allowed people from SYN/SYRIZA, Bloco and even Podemos to meet each other, it does not seem to have necessarily enabled any concrete form of cooperation or even diffusion among these people and, by extension, among their parties. That was reflected in the rather low level of significance that Bloco interviewees attached to this framework. By contrast, SYRIZA interviewees deemed it as more important, which might be accounted for by two things. Firstly, the participation in the ESF was rooted in SYN’s key strategic orientation to social movements, at both national and transnational levels, as shown in Chapter 4. Giannopoulou claimed that the ESF “was a very significant political development because it brought all these forces of the European left together and it gave us the opportunity to influence

210

V. BORTUN

the anti-globalisation movement and to create a new basis of cooperating with the movements”. Furthermore, according to her, the ESF also enhanced the parties’ transnational outlook in a period when the institutional framework for TPC on the radical left was very limited: “The ESF made the Italian left, the Spanish left, the Greek left etc. to think European”. Indeed, in an interview given back in 2010 to Dunphy and March (2013, p. 524), Karatsioubanis stressed the importance of the ESF in galvanising the broader pan-European cooperation of RLPs, particularly the process that culminated in the formation of the PEL: “the anti-neoliberal social movements strengthening after the 2002 European Social Forum in Florence, growing opposition to US militarism in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Eastern EU enlargement increased the sense of momentum (Karatsioubanis, 2010)”. Secondly, as mentioned already, the ESF and social movements more broadly represented a key factor in SYN setting up SYRIZA as a coalition in 2004. According to Katsardis, former member of SYN Youth, “there were 37 Greek left-wing parties; 10 of them, including SYN, decided to come together in the Greek Social Forum, which was part of the European Social Forum, which was part of the World Social Forum”. His colleague, Karatsioubanis, elaborated on this point about the relevance of the ESF for the process that led to the creation of SYRIZA but also on the key role played by the youth organisation of SYN in linking the party to the emerging transnational social movements: The youth organisation played an important role starting with 1999 by pressuring the party on many things, like the participation in the WSF, ESF. … In 2004, as a result of the participation of the Greeks in the new social movements and mainly in the ESF, there was a network that was called International Action, a network of the different smaller or bigger [Greek] left forces that were going to these European events. They said ‘we’ll go as one, each one of us with their own flags, identities and so on, but we have coordination’ – that was the first step of the Greek Social Forum. … The cooperation through the Greek Social Forum of these forces was the beginning point of SYRIZA, because it was through the cooperation in the movements that we said we have to make another step.

Bloco’s own creation also took place in the context of the rise of the GJM and particularly of the ESF, as already acknowledged in the literature (see Lisi, 2013, p. 35; Príncipe, 2016, p. 162). This was also pointed out by José Manuel Pureza:

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

211

Bloco was born at a time when the Social Forum was at the heart of this search for alternatives and, at that time, we had the perspective … of a strong social movement at the national level, at the European level, conducing to political entities able to bring their voice to the institutions and to the political decisions.

Even the broader World Social Forum (WSF) was seen as relevant to the interaction between European RLPs, particularly by the SYRIZA interviewees. For Giannopoulou, “the WSF brought together many European leftists”, while Karatsioubanis even recalled the participation of Bloco in the WSF: “they were active through different networks; not that active as we were from Greece, but they were active”. Arbide Aza also underlined the importance of the WSF, which was at the time the “only thing that would take place every year, only constant framework”. However, he pointed out that this framework did not necessarily entail any coordination among the RLPs concerned here, as “the Europeans had no clear agenda when going there”. At the same time, just like the ESF, the WSF too is acknowledged as playing some role in the process that led to the formation of SYRIZA. Kanellopoulos believes that participation in the WSF shaped the very identity of the party: [it] was a formative experience for SYRIZA. That’s why we became what we are today: we changed from a post-communist party to a new left socialist party with a hegemonic vision. We learned from the experience of Chavismo, of Kirchner, Lula, but today it has declined in importance.

Bloco interviewees, on the other hand, acknowledged the WSF but ascribed less importance to its role, as summed up by Pedrosa: “We participated, but it wasn’t a huge thing”. Even so, the WSF and ESF did play a pioneering role in bringing together people from different, especially new, RLPs as well as people from parties and social movements, which further contributed to these parties’ transnational orientation towards social movements. That cannot be said as much about the transnational initiatives that emerged during the crisis, as shown in the next subsection. Before dealing with the post-2009 period, though, it is worth mentioning the role in TPC played by certain mass demonstrations linked to the wider GJM and which both SYRIZA and Bloco sent representatives. For example, Fazenda from Bloco recalled meeting people from

212

V. BORTUN

SYN “in Spain, in a march against globalisation in the early 2000s – so we’ve been meeting many times”. On a more general note, Karatsioubanis mentioned the 2001 anti-G8 protest in Genoa, Italy: “we’ve had a very big participation from Greece, fourteen or fifteen buses going there”. The role of that particular protest as one of the catalysts for the emergence of a new European radical left markedly oriented towards social movements and popular mobilisation has already been noted in the literature (see Hudson, 2012, pp. 108–109; March & Mudde, 2005, p. 39). Even some in Podemos—a party created more than a decade later—ascertained the relevance of that protest in Genoa for linking party activists from different countries. According to Maestu, “the leaders of Bloco, SYRIZA and Podemos were there, they were struggling together against neoliberalism, capitalism”. Thus, within the broader anti-globalisation movement, it was not only relatively formalised and durable frameworks like the WSF and the ESF but also one-off events that allowed activists of new (or future) RLPs, their youth organisations in particular, to meet each other. Starting with the mid-to-late-2000s, however, the GJM began to decline, particularly in Europe, as reflected by the termination of the ESF in 2010 (March, 2011, pp. 174–175). As Maestu from Podemos summed it up, the anti-globalisation movement and particularly the ESF failed to develop because “every summit was at the same point of the debate”.

Times of Crisis: The Anti-Austerity Movement(s) and the AlterSummit As detailed already in Chapter 3, the Eurozone crisis that started in late 2009 and the austerity measures that followed led to the emergence of new social movements opposing austerity and the political establishments seen as responsible for it. The biggest movements developed over the first half of 2011 in two of the three countries concerned here, most prominently the movements of the Indignants in Spain and Greece (Flesher Fominaya & Hayes, 2017). While not as consistent, significant anti-austerity movements also emerged in Portugal. The assumption that, given the transnational character of the crisis and of the austerity policies, anti-austerity political parties would seek to cooperate across borders would also apply to anti-austerity social movements, particularly as social movements in general tend to see transnational cooperation as a way to escape their marginality at national level (Tarrow, 2001). Furthermore, such cooperation could potentially spill over into

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

213

the cooperation among the parties themselves, particularly in the light of their links to these movements, as documented in Chapter 4. To a certain extent, there were some obvious connections between the anti-austerity movements from different countries and particularly between the Indignants [Indignados ] movement from Spain and the eponymous movement [Aganaktismeni] that started around the same time in Greece (Tsaliki, 2012), which had a particularly salient transnational orientation (Kousis, 2014). However, with the notable exception of activist-led solidarity networks aimed at tackling specific issues exacerbated by the crisis (Bonfert, 2020), the anti-austerity movements in Southern Europe proved on the whole to be of a less transnational character than one might have expected. In this respect, Della Porta (2014) contrasted them with the earlier GJM, arguing that, if “at the start of the millennium the work of movements for global justice concentrated on the elaboration of a critical perspective on Europe, today anti-austerity protests appear to be marked by the defence of what remains of national sovereignty, at least in the weakest economies”—that is, precisely in countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal. Despite the links between GJM and the anti-austerity movements (Calossi, 2016, p. 94), the former faded away in Europe just as the crisis was unravelling, with the last edition of the ESF taking place in 2010. The main initiative that emerged during the crisis and tried, to some extent, to fill the vacuum left by the termination of the ESF was AlterSummit . A network of trade unions, social movements, NGOs, research networks and political foundations, AlterSummit aimed to build “more convergence between movements opposed to the current anti-social and anti-ecological policies promoted by European governments and institutions” (AlterSummit, 2013d). According to Sheehan (2016, p. 68), who participated to its first summit in Athens, AlterSummit was primarily “a convergence of forces from the European Social Forum”. The Athens summit took place in June 2013 and called for things such as an end to “debt slavery”, the cancellation of austerity measures, restoration of wages and social rights, increased regulation of the banking sector (AlterSummit, 2013c). More importantly, AlterSummit’s manifesto had an explicitly transnational dimension, as “the struggle of the Greek social movements is a European struggle”, thus aiming to draw in “a large variety of organizations and movements” (AlterSummit, 2013d) from across the continent.

214

V. BORTUN

In terms of linking up with political parties, the organisers had a more ambiguous position, as parties “may not be members – even if we actively seek the support of political personalities from various groups and dialogue with them – we ask them to share our struggle, but not to represent us” (AlterSummit, 2013a). Even so, representatives of many European RLPs attended the summit in Athens, including SYRIZA, Die Linke and IU, as well as NPI, CUL:TRA and Transform (AlterSummit, 2013b). Indeed, the finale of that summit consisted of a speech by Tsipras (Sheehan, 2016, p. 70). That was followed by a march in the centre of Athens, somewhat confirming the social movement credentials of AlterSummit. Sheehan’s (2016, p. 70) assessment of the summit is mixed, though: Overall, I found the experience of the AlterSummit a bit underwhelming … others found it a bit disappointing too, as attendance from abroad was not what was expected, and attendance from Greece, despite posters all over town, was far less than hoped. This was attributed to a sense of downturn on the Greek left. Nevertheless, it did strengthen the bonds between the different sections of the European left and built networks for ongoing practical initiatives.

One concrete example of such practical initiatives came two years later, ahead of the referendum called by the SYRIZA government in July 2015 over the deal offered by the Troika, when AlterSummit launched a petition of solidarity with “the citizens of Greece” and endorsed the Oxi vote against the deal (AlterSummit, 2015). The Greek government’s U-turn following that referendum might explain why at the AlterSummit held the following year, in Brussels, there were no representatives from SYRIZA. In general, that event—which I attended for non-participatory observation—saw very few RLP representatives, with the exception of Daniel Albarracín from Podemos, who spoke on the topic of left-wing Euroscepticism. The crowd was mostly composed of people from trade unions, social movements and grassroots activist networks, although it was not very clear how much that was due to the anti-party mood reminiscent of the earlier ESF summits and how much due to the RLPs’ lack of interest in the event and the initiative as a whole. Overall, the AlterSummit’s importance in fostering transnational networking and cooperation among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos was seen as somewhat significant across the three sets of interviewees, albeit

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

215

not as significant as the ESF used to be. According to Kanellopoulos, AlterSummit’s focus on non-institutionalised civil society actors meant that, “because of the general retreat of the movements, it has retreated in importance too”. Pedrosa from Bloco confirmed AlterSummit’s relative lack of relevance for the process of TPC: “Haven’t heard much of AlterSummit lately … it was more in Greece”. Such underwhelming assessment of this transnational initiative’s impact was corroborated in a recent paper by Bonfert (2022), who argues that AlterSummit, just like Varoufakis’ DiEM25, failed to create bridges between its transnational leadership and the activist bases in the different national arenas. The only other broad transnational initiative centred around social movements that emerged during the crisis and which some of the parties studied here participated was Blockupy. Self-described as “part of a European wide network of various social movement activists, altermondialists, migrants, jobless, precarious and industry workers, party members and unionists … from many different European countries”, Blockupy aimed to “create a common European movement, united in diversity, which can break the rule of austerity and will start to build democracy and solidarity from below” (Blockupy, n.d.). Between 2012 and 2015, it organised several mass demonstrations in Frankfurt, where the headquarters of the ECB is located. Despite being largely German-based, the initiative had a marked transnational orientation, largely explained by the comparatively less dramatic impact of the crisis in Germany. As Bonfert (2020, pp. 191–195) argues, that prevented the emergence there of mass anti-austerity movements as in Spain or Greece and saw, therefore, the anti-establishment dissatisfaction channelled towards transnational actors such as the ECB. In the Blockupy protest from March 2015, high-profile representatives of both SYRIZA and Podemos took part, such as MEP Miguel Urbán (BBC, 2015). That same year, in July, Blockupy sent a few people to Athens to meet and interview people from SYRIZA and the local social movements, the videos of which were then uploaded on a dedicated YouTube channel called “Blockupy goes Athens”. However, the videos had extremely low visibility, especially for a supposed grassroots movement, ranging between 53 and 394 views per video as of November 2018. It is no surprise then that only one interviewee, Giannopoulou, mentioned Blockupy as a notable framework for the cooperation among the three parties. Indeed, the initiative seems to have ceased any visible

216

V. BORTUN

activity after 2016, when its last statement was published on its nowinactive website. Nevertheless, the Blockupy protest from 2015, held in the midst of the heated negotiations between the first SYRIZA government and the Troika, was one of the few instances of transnational mass mobilisation during the crisis that saw the participation of social movements, parties and activists from different countries. The other notable exception was the European Day of Action organised by the European Trade Union Confederation in November 2012, which entailed, for the first time in the history of the confederation, simultaneous strikes in four different countries, all from Southern Europe—Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy. However, the action failed to get much traction in any of these countries, with a very low level of mobilisation on behalf of the national trade unions (Vogiatzoglou, 2015). The RLPs in these countries were also detached from this initiative, which can be seen simultaneously as a reflection of their broader turn away from social mobilisation, of their own weak linkages with the trade unions, and of the more general gap between the transnational cooperation among RLPs and transnational cooperation among trade unions—a significant shortcoming of both processes that will be revisited in the final chapter. There were, of course, more thematic transnational activist networks that individual party members, rather than the parties per se, were involved in, such as the European Action Coalition for the Right to Housing and to the City. According to Moutinho from Bloco, that initiative organised an action camp in Lisbon in September 2018 (Demony & Almeida, 2018), which was attended by Bloco activists involved in housing campaign groups in Portugal (e.g. Habita). However, the European Action Coalition, despite having member organisations also in Spain and Greece, was not mentioned by neither Podemos nor SYRIZA interviewees, which means that it is unlikely to have played any role in these parties’ transnational networking and cooperation. The only concrete instance of social movement-based transnational cooperation that has been mentioned by interviewees from at least two parties was the campaign against the decision of the Spanish government in 2017 to extend the life of the Almaraz Nuclear Power Plant, located very close to the Portuguese border. Activist groups from both countries were involved in that campaign, including members of Podemos and Bloco, as revealed by both Merlo and Pureza respectively. It was not clear, though, whether the two parties coordinated their interventions in this campaign. In any

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

217

case, it is likely that such thematic campaigns can potentially open new opportunities for interaction and cooperation among parties, particularly between geographically close parties such as Bloco and Podemos; and it is indeed rather surprising that it did not happen more often in the case of the two Iberian parties. Generally, the social movements that emerged during the crisis, either at national or transnational level, had a limited impact on TPC. Kanellopoulos from SYRIZA stated that “the development of social movements was a formative experience for both of us, and Podemos actually was born out of that, but I don’t think that they’ve played a role in our cooperation”. And, as Albarracín from Podemos remarked, that was a failure on behalf of the parties, especially given the similarities between the national contexts: “We had austerity measures in Greece and Spain at the same time, the living standards and labour rights deteriorated – conditions for triggering social movements, but the parties didn’t understand that well”. Balabanidis made a broader point in this regard, underlining how the parties’ orientation towards social movements domestically was not reflected at a transnational level: There is no transnational cooperation of these parties at the level of social movements. Especially SYRIZA and Podemos are parties based on social movements, but I can’t recall an event of social mobilisation where the two parties joined together. Not in Greece, not in Spain, not even at a European level, like a manifestation in Brussels. … and that is quite impressive given that, for these parties, social movements are a fundamental element.

Thus, it is not only that SYRIZA and Podemos have not worked together via the social movements, but they did not employ at a European level the strategy of social mobilisation that previously proved so instrumental to their rise in their domestic political arenas. Some of the more general obstacles to the transnational cooperation among the three parties, discussed in the next chapter, may also help explain the relatively marginal role played by social movements in that process and the wider TPC on the radical left during the crisis. However, the key specific reason seems to lie with the already mentioned decline of social movements themselves. That is how Karatsioubanis, for example, explained why SYRIZA did not strengthen its ties with Podemos via this channel, which he basically boils down to bad timing: “If we talk of the level of social movements, it’s different, because after 2014, when

218

V. BORTUN

Podemos was created, the European social movements were declining, so it was not so [significant]”. In fact, his colleague, Kanellopoulos, made the interesting point that the very birth of Podemos and rise of SYRIZA were to a great extent made possible by the decline of social movements: They had failed. The Indignados movement and the squares movement [in Greece] actually failed to stop austerity, so we passed on to the other level, to the institutional level. It’s like they assigned SYRIZA and the other parties to work now at the institutional level, because they failed to stop austerity; but, of course, they [social movements] succeeded to change party systems in Europe, both in Spain and Greece. They’ve had a huge success in reshaping the political scene, but they’ve failed in their main target, which was to stop austerity.

Pureza from Bloco argued along the same lines, that social movements had entrusted the parties to enact the social change they had been campaigning for. However, for him, that was not necessarily a positive development: It is one of the dramas in Portugal – the inexistence or the fragility of social movements, both classic and new social movements; for example, one of the most puzzling situations that I find at this moment is that this kind of political situation would hopefully be an incentive for the creation of social movements, to press the political decision, but on the contrary, people are calmly waiting for the government, for you – I mean you Bloco, PCP etc. – to solve things as they should be solved; they are more de-mobilised than ever, which is completely dramatic.

This finding, which connects the decline of social movements to the rise of RLPs, touches upon a gap in the current literature signalled by Treré et al. (2017, p. 417), who call for further research to establish “whether the emergence of political parties out of broad-based social movements provides a voice for the movement, or conversely demobilizes it … perhaps risking further co-optation by the top-down political process”. The decline of social movements was also acknowledged by the interviewees from Podemos. According to Albarracín, “Podemos was a political instrument for a social movement, when the 15M [Indignados ] movement was going down”. Also, in the aforementioned interview for Jacobin, Josep Maria Antentas argued that “the strategic hypotheses

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

219

prevalent in the 1990s and the 2000s—changing the world without taking the power, creating free spaces, engaging in social activism while ignoring party and electoral politics, engaging in NGO institutional lobbying—simply got suddenly old” (Souvlis, 2016). At the same time, other Podemos interviewees resisted this verdict on social movements, perhaps because their party’s very emergence was so directly linked to the anti-austerity movements. As Conesa de Lara put it when speaking of Podemos’ presence in the EP, “we are a delegation of a social movement”. He had little to say, however, on how the said social movement was still influencing or at least informing the activity of the party. At the same time, it has to be emphasised that even at the peak of those anti-austerity movements in Spain and Greece, i.e. 2011–2012, they not only had very limited impact on bringing RLPs closer to each other but they were limited in coming themselves closer to one another. As Bonfert (2020, p. 282) concludes his PhD research on this very question, At the transnational level, the anti-austerity movement did not develop a comparable mass mobilising capacity or institutional consolidation, but its new coalitions provide a way for activist struggles to remain interconnected long after the movement itself has become dormant. To a large extent, the relative weakness of the anti-austerity movement’s transnational dimension was a result of the predominantly national focus of the movement’s most momentous struggles in Spain and Greece, which left most transnational coalitions in the hands of activists without a strong domestic social base underneath them.

The predominantly national focus of the anti-austerity movements has also been noted by Della Porta (2014), according to whom “increasing regional inequalities and the asymmetry of the effects of the global crisis make coordination at the European level more difficult”. Thus, at least at the level of social movements, the economic crisis seemed to have had rather the opposite effect than expected: instead of joining forces at a panEuropean level, social movements opposing austerity tended to be rather nationally oriented. Not the least important in this respect was the more mundane but crucial financial factor, as the crisis undermined the material possibilities for transnational cooperation among social movements, with many of them relying on the younger age groups that were particularly hit by the economic crisis and unemployment.

220

V. BORTUN

There was no clear consensus among the interviewees, though, regarding the way parties ought to react to the decline of social movements. On the one hand, Merlo suggested that parties should “invest resources to support social movements coordinate themselves”, while Maestu stated that the left needs to “set up a European movement, involving the parties and the social movements, to coordinate the strategy towards Europe”. Also, Pureza from Bloco, in line with his previous comments, argued that a crucial component of building a left alternative to the status is “the capacity to develop social movements, both at the national and the European level”. On the other hand, Kanellopoulos from SYRIZA seemed more sceptical of the need for parties to help developing or coordinating social movements: There is also a tradition in our parties of being involved in the social movements but not trying to lead them, to manipulate them. SYRIZA and probably Bloco are not that powerful in civil society structures and there is a certain apprehension, ambivalent feelings towards SYRIZA in the civil society: ‘What are these people trying to do? Are they trying to manipulate us?’. Because behind us there is the communist tradition of not participating in anything that you cannot control, so SYN and SYRIZA tried to change that tradition and to respect the independence of social movements. It is unconceivable that the leadership of SYRIZA would discuss with the leadership of Podemos to lead a movement or to organise a movement; it just encourages others to participate.

Thus, parties like SYRIZA may be reluctant to take the lead in the development and mobilisation of social movements given the latter’s own reluctance to engage with political parties. At the same time, it is worth stressing what has been noted in the previous chapter: all three parties discussed here, albeit at various degrees, moved away from their initial orientation towards social movements and strategy of social mobilisation as they became more electorally successful. That would be particularly the case for a party like SYRIZA, which not only was in government at the time, having therefore different strategic priorities from a party in opposition, but ended up implementing the very kind of austerity measures that the concerned social movements had been born against. Indeed, since the return to opposition there has been little indication that SYRIZA is actively seeking a revival of its linkage with the movements, although the other two parties do not seem to be making much progress in that regard either.

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

221

“Only Personal Links”: Academic and Intellectual Networks The involvement of intellectuals in left-wing politics is a well-researched topic in the wider humanities and social sciences literature, be it critical essays that have become classic points of reference on the subject (e.g. Aron, 1955/2017; Benda, 1928/2017) or more specific studies focused on the relation between intellectuals and particular parties (e.g. Hazareesingh, 1991). Indeed, the transnational networking of left-wing intellectuals, which goes as back as the mid-nineteenth century and the correspondence between Marx and Proudhon, has also received its share of attention: from books on the links between Western intellectuals and their Soviet counterparts in the interwar period (e.g. Stern, 2007) to studies on the influence of Western European Marxism on the Latin American intellectual left in the post-WWII era (e.g. Harris, 1979). However, there is virtually no research specifically dealing with transnational networking and cooperation among left-wing intellectuals in Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall. That comes in spite of the fact that the vacuum on the radical left after 1989 was partly filled not only by social movements, as pointed out in the previous section, but also by broader intellectual networks (Daiber & Hildebrandt, 2010, p. 1; Löwy & Stanley, 2002, pp. 128–129). Furthermore, some personal and highly anecdotical accounts (e.g. Sheehan, 2016) notwithstanding, there is no published research on the linkage between contemporary RLPs and intellectuals. That gap is particularly interesting in the case of the three parties studied here, which all have a salient presence of academics within their higher ranks. At the same time, the need for exchange and diffusion of ideas is one of the key incentives of TPC (Macklin, 2013). The crisis would have seen that need increase for these three RLPs and the European radical left as a whole, as their shared opposition to austerity would have compelled them to exchange information and ideas—not only in terms of analysing the crisis and criticising austerity but also in terms of providing alternatives to the latter and the wider neoliberal paradigm underlying it. Indeed, the interviewees generally saw the need to exchange ideas as a quite significant incentive for their post-2009 TPC. Academics would be, arguably, particularly prone to such transnational networking and diffusion relative to other members of the party elite due to preexisting transnational networks rooted in the internationalising character

222

V. BORTUN

of modern-day academia. Last but not least, their presumably better foreign language skills would be an additional factor in facilitating their involvement in their parties’ networking. In this context, it would be reasonable to expect that the informal cooperation among these parties would also take place via the academic or wider intellectual networks that these party academics might be involved in. Such a nexus can be conceived of in two directions: parties asking or encouraging their academics to cooperate with each other and academics putting pressure on their parties to cooperate with each other. Both approaches are illustrated in this section. The discussion draws upon the backgrounds of the academics prominently involved with SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos, where an academic is understood as someone with a teaching- or research-based career in academia. The aim is to identify whether there was any networking among them and, if so, whether it played any role in their parties’ TPC during the crisis.

SYRIZA’s Academics In contrast to the more working-class social background of the KKE cadre, SYN was often seen as the party of “urban bourgeois intellectuals” (Kalyvas & Marantzidis, 2002, p. 681), not only in terms of membership but also of the voting base. That was passed on to SYRIZA, as illustrated by a 2012 study identifying its voters as having the highest number of PhD holders among the Greek electorate (cf. Quinn & Gani, 2015). That was also confirmed by Balabanidis, a left-wing intellectual himself, according to whom “from the era of Eurocommunism and the KKEInterior, there is a tradition of intellectuals joining the party, because it was always a pole of attraction for academics, authors, actors and stuff like that”. At the same time, he was sceptical that this played a role in the party’s strategy until the 2012 electoral breakthrough; on the contrary: “until 2009, left academics were like some funny people that are stuck with Marx. But after the rise of SYRIZA, after 2012, left-wing academics became really fashionable”. It was then when SYRIZA decided to tactically exploit this profile in order to persuade voters that it had the kind of experts needed to govern the country. As Balabanidis added, “SYRIZA used all this tradition of [having] academics to form a strong team of economists so as to show, ‘yes, we have the competence to govern the country, we have the know-how’”.

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

223

According to Wainwright though, it was not just about SYRIZA attempting to enhance its public credibility. The strategy of putting its academics to work, some of whom had no previous political experience (e.g. Costas Douzinas, elected as an MP in the September 2015 snap elections, after the party had lost a sizeable part of its cadre), also stemmed from the sheer need to fill in many public positions once coming into government. A British left-wing academic herself, Wainwright pointed out that “they needed expertise, so maybe the people with expertise were given fast track. Maybe they didn’t do enough – and this is a wider problem – to identify the skills within their own ranks”. Concretely, of the 12 members of the first Tsipras cabinet who were also members of or close to SYRIZA (as the rest of the cabinet was made of independents or members of ANEL, SYRIZA’s junior partner in the government coalition), half of them were academics with some kind of academic experience in a higher education institution from abroad (see Table 6.5). Similarly, out of the 17 SYRIZA members who served at some point in the second Tsipras cabinet (some of whom were also in the previous cabinet), 7 of them had international academic background (see Table 6.6). This is relevant for transnational networking for obvious reasons. And what stands out when looking at the last column in both tables is that, despite belonging to different generations, almost all SYRIZA academics who were part of the two Tsipras-led governments studied and/or taught in one or several UK universities: five out of six in the first cabinet and seven out of seven in the second cabinet. Most of them have an expertise in economics or political science, which reflects SYRIZA’s strategic choice at the time to present itself as a party of experts suited to run the country. Outside the government, there were several other prominent SYRIZA members with a background in British universities, such as MPs Costas Douzinas (LSE and Birkbeck), Costas Lapavitsas (Birkbeck and SOAS), Theano Fotiou (UCL) and Fotini Vaki (University of Essex), the Regional Governor of Attica, Rena Dourou (University of Essex), or ex-member of Central Committee Stathis Kouvelakis (King’s College London). This striking feature has been noted in a couple of articles in the British press (Howarth, 2015; Quinn & Gani, 2015) but has not yet been discussed in the academic literature. As a result, there is only rather anecdotic evidence as to what explains it, most substantially in The Guardian piece by Quinn and Gani. One of the Greek academics living in the UK at the time—although not affiliated to SYRIZA—whom they questioned,

224

V. BORTUN

Table 6.5 SYRIZA academics in the 1st Tsipras cabinet with international academic experience3 Name

Governmental role

Giannis Dragasakis Giorgos Stathakis Yanis Varoufakis

Deputy Prime Minister

Nikolaos Kotzias

Minister Affairs

Aristides Baltas Nikos Pappas

Minister Sports Minister

Minister Minister

International academic experience

Political science and economics studies at LSE (late 1960s) of Economy PhD in economics at Newcastle University (1983) of Finance PhD in economics at the University of Essex (1987); taught economics at the University of Essex, University of East Anglia, University of Cambridge (1982–1988) for Foreign PhD in European studies at the University of Giessen (Germany); taught politics at the University of Oxford and University of Cambridge of Culture and PhD in theoretical physics at the University of Paris XI (1971) of State PhD in economics at the University of Strathclyde (2013)

Vassilios Paipais (lecturer in international relations at the University of St. Andrews), suggested that the lack of job opportunities in Greece had forced many Greek intellectuals to complete their studies and pursue academic careers in the UK. That differed from the older generations of Greek intelligentsia, who used to go to France to study or/and teach, from Nicos Poulantzas to the aforementioned minister Baltas. A factor that facilitated such a cultural reorientation is, according to Paipais, that English is now taught in Greek schools from an early age: “You rarely find a Greek nowadays that doesn’t learn English in school” (Quinn & Gani, 2015). Elli Siapkidou, another Greek intellectual living in London quoted in that article, claimed that the higher degree of pluralism in British society and particularly London also explained the influx of left-wing

3 The data on the academic background of the SYRIZA academics was collected from

the website of the Greek Parliament (n.d.) and, where available, the Wikipedia pages and personal websites of the people concerned, as well as the websites of their (previous or current) academic institutions. However, the information is not perfectly homogenous because of the limits of what was available online. The same goes for the data on the academics from the other two parties.

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

225

Table 6.6 SYRIZA academics in the 2nd Tsipras cabinet with international academic experience Name

Governmental role

Giannis Deputy Prime Dragasakis Minister Giorgos Stathakis Minister of Environment and Energy Euclid Tsakalotos Minister of Finance

Nikolaos Kotzias

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Konstantinos Gavroglou

Minister of Education, Research and Religious Affairs Minister of Digital Policy, Telecommunications and Information Minister of State and Government Spokesperson

Nikos Pappas

Dimitris Tzanakopoulos

International academic background Political science and economics studies at LSE (late 1960s) PhD in economics at Newcastle University (1983) PhD in economics at Oxford University (1989); taught economics at the University of Kent (1989–1993) PhD in European studies at the University of Giessen (Germany); taught politics at the University of Oxford and University of Cambridge PhD in physics at Imperial College

PhD in economics at the University of Strathclyde (2013)

PhD in law at the University of Oxford; taught law at UCL, Glasgow University, King’s College London and Oxford University

Greek academics: “There is more room for different voices in the UK compared to other places. Marx used to live in London for example. I think it is a quite liberal society in terms of political view, so their work is objectively appreciated and not stigmatized” (Quinn & Gani, 2015). For example, among other things, London hosts every autumn the Historical Materialism Conference, one of the key events gathering radical left academics and intellectuals from around the world, where several SYRIZA academics, such as Michalis Spourdalakis or Panagiotis Sotiris (now in Popular Unity), attended over the time (Sheehan, 2016, pp. 54–55, p. 167). The links between SYRIZA and the UK were strong enough for the party to open a branch there in June 2012. Besides establishing links with the British left and activist groups like the Greek Solidarity Campaign, SYRIZA UK focused on recruiting among the substantial Greek student

226

V. BORTUN

community there. The branch’s membership was “peppered with PhD students and academics, including some with tenure and others with PhDs through working in other sectors” (Quinn & Gani, 2015). Some forged links with British left-wing academics and intellectuals. In the aforementioned interview, Wainwright mentioned her own experience as an example of how the networking between SYRIZA academics and British left-wing academics led to a more concrete form of cooperation: I worked once in the Greater London Council with an economist who had been Euclid’s [Tsakalotos] teacher, Robin Murray; and he sent me and Murray papers about what the Troika were trying to do, just to see if we had any comments and if we could advise on how to combat the Troika. Obviously, we were limited in what we could do, but we went over once and talked to him and his officials about what criticisms were of the Troika; but I wouldn’t want to say it was terribly important – maybe about a year ago, 2016, after the referendum.

In conclusion, most of SYRIZA’s prominent academics have ties with the UK universities, with a few others linked to German and French universities, and the rest to academic institutions in their own country. However, none of them seems to have any experience in either Spanish or Portuguese universities, although that does not mean that networking among academics from the three parties could have not happened in third countries such as the UK or France.

Bloco’s Academics A salient presence of academics could also be noticed in the case of Bloco. Francisco Louçã, one of the party’s co-founders and its former coordinator (1999–2011), is also a Full Professor of Economics at the Higher Institute of Economics and Management at the University of Lisbon, where he also completed his studies. Even his successor at the head of the party, Catarina Martins, although coming from a career in acting, still has a PhD in Languages and Modern Literatures from the Open University in Lisbon. Bloco’s only MEP since 2014, Marisa Matias, gained a PhD in Sociology in 2009 at the University of Coimbra, where she also taught and did research as part of the Centre for Social Studies. Furthermore, five of Bloco’s nineteen MPs elected in 2015 had, by all accounts, a professional background in academia. As shown in Table 6.7, the

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

227

backgrounds of Bloco’s academics are overwhelmingly centred around domestic universities, in particular the Technical University of Lisbon/ University of Lisbon and the University of Coimbra. Thus, they seem to have no significant connections to Greek or Spanish academia, with the sole exception of José Manuel Pureza, who had brief teaching spells at several universities in Spain. Bloco’s academics have no links to the UK either, apart from Mariana Mortágua, who before becoming an MP in 2013 had started a PhD in Economics at SOAS in London. That is the same higher education institution where former SYRIZA MP Costas Lapavitsas teaches economics. However, no link between the two could be established in the light of the online documentary research, although both Mortágua and Lapavitsas attended, on different occasions, events hosted by SYRIZA and Bloco respectively. Of the people in the Table 6.7, only Pureza was interviewed for this book. He said his international academic contacts are “mainly from Spain; I don’t think I have had contact before with Greek scholars”. Thus, he took part in “the development of networks with Spanish people and Table 6.7 Bloco academics in prominent political positions Name

Key political role

Academic background

Francisco Louçã

Former party leader, currently a member of the Council of State MEP

Professor of Economics at the University of Lisbon

Marisa Matias Heitor de Sousa José Manuel Pureza

MP

José Soeiro

MP

Mariana Mortágua

MP

Pedro Soares

MP

Sandra Cunha

MP

MP

PhD in Sociology and taught sociology at the University of Coimbra Economist, BA in Economics at the University of Lisbon Sociologist and author, professor of international relations at the University of Coimbra; visiting lecturer in Spain at the University of Seville and the University of the Basque Country Sociologist and author, PhD in Sociology at the University of Coimbra Economist and author, MA in economics at ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon; started PhD in economics at SOAS Professor of Geography at the University of Lisbon Taught sociology at ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon

228

V. BORTUN

an important part of them are now involved in or close to Podemos”. However, during the interview he was not able to remember any name in particular, but only mentioned “an important group around the University of Seville, where there’s a more heterogenous group, but some of them are involved in Podemos”. More importantly, there was nothing in Pureza’s answers to indicate that this networking spilled over in any way into the networking between his party and its Spanish counterpart.

Podemos’ Academics A more homogenous pattern in terms of institutional affiliation could be detected in the academic backgrounds of people prominent in Podemos at the time of the research. The party leader at the time, Iglesias, spent the bulk of his relatively rich academic career (see Iglesias, 2013) at the Complutense University of Madrid (UCM), where he completed most of his studies and was a lecturer in political science from 2008 until being elected to the European Parliament in 2014. The second most important figure of the party until his departure in 2019, Errejón, also tied his academic career mostly to the UCM, as shown in Table 6.8. A generation older than Iglesias and Errejón, Juan Carlos Monedero, one of Podemos’ co-founders and its number-three man up until his resignation in April 2015 (Manetto, 2015), also developed his academic career around UCM, and so did the party’s third co-founder, Carolina Bescansa, at the time of the research the general secretary of Podemos’ group in the Congress of Deputies. Also, Pablo Bustinduy, who led the party’s international secretariat before being elected to the Spanish parliament studied political science at the UCM (2001–2006). Indeed, the list of party academics linked to the UCM goes on. Overall, of all the party’s 61 MPs following the 2016 elections (including those already mentioned) and 5 MEPs following the 2014 elections, 16 came to politics from academic careers, out of which 6 studied and/or taught at the UCM. Other 5 of them (three MPs and two MEPs), without having had an academic career as such, also studied at UCM. Most other academics in the party were linked to other Spanish universities. Very few of them studied or/and taught in academic institutions abroad, most of them in the USA, but none in Greece or Portugal, nor in the UK (apart from Federico Severino and the short research stays

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

229

Table 6.8 Podemos academics with ties to UCM Name

Political roles

Pablo Iglesias

Podemos’ Secretary-General; MP

Íñigo Errejón

Juan Carlos Monedero

Carolina Bescansa

Pablo Bustinduy

Eduardo Maura

Txema Guijarro García

Federico Severino

Relevant academic affiliation(s)

MA in communication (2011) at the European Graduate School in Switzerland (2011); PhD in political science at UCM (2008); taught political science at UCM (2008–2014) Podemos’ secretary for PhD in political science at UCM policy and strategy and (2011); research visit at the University campaigning; MP of California (2007–08) Co-founder of Podemos; Doctoral studies at the Heidelberg leading figure up until University in Germany (1989–1992); April 2015 but still PhD in political science at UCM involved with the party (1996); professor of political science and administration at UCM Co-founder of Podemos; Predoctoral course at the San Diego MP University of California (1999–2000); PhD in political science at UCM (2005); professor with the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology at UCM Former head of Podemos’ BA in political science at UCM international secretariat; (2006); MA in history and political MP thought at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris (2007); started PhD in philosophy at the New School for Social Research in New York Responsible with culture in Started PhD in philosophy at UCM in Podemos; member of the 2011; taught and researched in the board of the 25M fields of critical theory and political Institute; MP philosophy at UCM and School of Visual Arts in New York MP; General Secretary of Expert in sociology of consumption at the parliamentary the UCM; member of the Center for confederal group of Unidos Political and Social Studies Foundation Podemos Director of Podemos’ BA in philosophy and sociology at the political foundation, the UCM; postgraduate studies at the LSE 25M Democracy Institute

of a couple of others), which so many SYRIZA academics are linked to. The sole notable exception in this regard was Nacho Álvarez Peralta, the party’s secretary for the economy, who had a research fellowship at the University of Lisbon in 2014—a connection that is discussed below. The only other pattern, although not strictly linked to their academic careers,

230

V. BORTUN

had to do with the party leaders’ work as consultants for several left-wing governments in Latin America, a connection that neither SYRIZA’s nor Bloco’s intellectuals displayed.

Transnational Connections As shown above, apart from Pureza’s rather generic connections with Spanish academics from the University of Seville, some of whom allegedly linked to Podemos, there are no visible connections between the academics of any of the three parties and the higher education sector from any of the other two countries. The other exception to this is the aforementioned case of Nacho Álvarez Peralta, whose academic career took him to Lisbon in 2014. Indeed, although this cannot be confirmed from the information available online about him, according to one of the Podemos interviewees, Alejandro Merlo, Peralta “is a close alumni/disciple of Louçã”, one of Bloco’s leading figures and academics. However, Merlo did not develop on that, nor did the online research reveal anything in this respect, so it cannot be determined with any certainty whether their academic connection had any impact at all on the relationship between their respective parties. Furthermore, while many of SYRIZA’s academics were or still are linked to the UK, where they studied and/or taught at the university level, no such links were found in the case of either Bloco’s or Podemos’ academics, with some very few and transient exceptions. Indeed, the backgrounds of the academics from the two Iberian parties are mainly linked to their respective countries, with a concentration of Podemos academics around the UCM and with most Bloco academics connected to either the University of Lisbon or the University of Coimbra (the Centre for Social Studies in particular). However, none of these three universities are connected to any academic from the other two parties. Also, while some of Podemos’ academics had connections to universities in the USA, such links are not noticeable in the case of SYRIZA and Bloco academics. In any case, it is interesting to note that where any of these academics have links to universities abroad, it is not somewhere else in Southern Europe but rather in Northern Europe (or North America)—perhaps another manifestation of the North–South cleavage that might deserve a research project of its own. Indeed, it would be worth investigating to what extent the crisis might have affected the transnational mobility and networking of academics in Southern Europe. To go even further, it

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

231

would be worth investigating to what extent the Europe-wide marketisation of higher education (see Lynch, 2006) might have undermined academics’ capacity to engage in public life, including party activism. Finally, language might also be a factor in the relative lack of links among the academics from the three parties, as it was indicated a couple of interviewees to be hindering party networking itself, although mostly in the case of party members from older generations. Of course, the absence of direct links between the academics from any of the three parties and the universities from any of the other two countries is not enough to firmly conclude that there is no networking among them, as they might have established contact at international conferences or through various research networks. However, evidence of such contact has not been found, neither in the existing literature, party documents, media materials and the biographical information available online, nor in the interview data. The only academically rooted connection among these parties relates to the ideas of left populism elaborated by Laclau and Mouffe, which both Podemos and SYRIZA tried, to differences extents, to put into practice (Ferraresi, 2016; Kioupkiolis & Katsambekis, 2018; Segatti & Capuzzi, 2016). It is worth saying a few things about this ideational connection. In the case of Podemos, the influence of those ideas was explicitly acknowledged, both by Iglesias (2015a, p. 14; 2015b, pp. 23–28) and, in particular, by Errejón Galván (2014). Indeed, Errejón Galván and Mouffe (2016) co-authored an article for the Soundings journal, with Mouffe (2018, p. 95) also mentioning Errejón in the acknowledgements of her book For a left populism. As Ferraresi (2016, p. 55) points out, Podemos “is the most consistent with Laclau’s ideas, being the one where the link with the philosopher is strongest and most evident” (although that link may have well weakened since Podemos’ participation in government). In the case of SYRIZA, the influence of Laclau and Mouffe is not as manifest. Ferraresi (2016, p. 58) shows that “none of Syriza’s members explicitly mentions him [Laclau] as intellectual mentor of the party, and there is no document, like Errejon’s doctoral thesis, that can testify their deliberate intention to follow his thought”. Nevertheless, the link between SYRIZA and Laclau and/or Mouffe was not only displayed by the party’s populist rhetorical style during the crisis but is also suggested by the connection of several former or current SYRIZA academics to Essex University, where almost 4,000 Greeks studied over the last few decades (Quinn & Gani, 2015). For this

232

V. BORTUN

is also the institution that, starting with the 1980s, hosted Laclau and Mouffe, where they established the so-called Essex School of discourse analysis. For example, MP Fotini Vaki, Regional Governor of Attica Rena Dourou, and ex-Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis (not a member of SYRIZA any longer) studied or/and taught at Essex in the period when Laclau (who died in 2014) and Mouffe (who now teaches at the University of Westminster) were also there. Indeed, according to Howarth (2015), the Co-Director of the Centre for Ideology and Discourse Analysis at the University of Essex, “the ideas that Dourou was exposed to while studying at Essex have had a clear influence on herself and Syriza. Her MA course was inspired by the late Professor Ernesto Laclau”. However, there is no evidence that Podemos’ intellectuals influenced by Laclau and/or Mouffe, such as Errejón, had any contact with likeminded academics from SYRIZA, such as Dourou, at least not via Essex University. There is only one member of Podemos who works full-time for the party and who also studied at the Essex University, where he specialised in discourse analysis and theory of hegemony and populism— Adrià Porta Caballé. But there are no apparent links between him and any of the SYRIZA intellectuals who have been associated with the Essex University. Errejón, on the other hand, who has no visible connection to Essex, got in touch with Laclau’ and Mouffe’s ideas during a seminar in the last undergraduate year at UCM, as stated in the obituary he wrote following Laclau’s death (Errejón Galván, 2014). Later on, during a oneyear research stay in Bolivia, he read Laclau’s 2005 book On populist reason, which significantly influenced his own PhD thesis about the left populist government of Bolivia (Errejón Galván, 2014). Thus, it was the concrete application of the populist strategy by the left-wing governments in Latin American countries like Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador—for which Errejón, Iglesias and Monedero worked as consultants—that won Errejón over to left populism, subsequently also adopted, at various degrees, by the rest of the Podemos leadership (Ferraresi, 2016, p. 56; Tremlett, 2015). It is, therefore, the Latin American connection (which is not present in the case of SYRIZA) rather than the UK/Essex connection that explains the ideational influence of Laclau and Mouffe over Podemos. At the same time, according to Hibai Arbide Aza, Podemos’ leading intellectuals, inspired as they were by the example of those governments in Latin America, would have tried to help SYRIZA apply a similar populist strategy in Greece, but rather in vain:

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

233

Many intellectuals from Podemos started trying – because they worked as councillors in Venezuela or Ecuador – to do the same in Greece, come here and say, ‘we are the specialists and we have a plan for you’, but they realised that SYRIZA had their own plan so they didn’t need the Spanish specialists.

However, that interesting claim was not corroborated by any other interviewee or by the documentary research. Thus, despite sharing a populist influence, there are no concrete examples of intellectual networking or diffusion between the academics of SYRIZA and those of Podemos. In the light of the above, it was not too surprising that interviewees deemed the role of academics in the informal networking and cooperation among their parties as of little significance, quite contrary to the initial expectations. That was best captured by Giannopoulou from NPI, who said that “as a left we don’t have academic networks or what we have is not so active”. Gusmão from Bloco gave a more specific example in this regard: “Louçã has a world-wide network of Marxist academics, but it didn’t play a role in the relations with these two parties” (although Louçã himself did play a role, as mentioned earlier). From Podemos, Albarracín admitted that among the academics from the three parties there are “only personal links in the academic environment”.

Wider Cooperation Among Left Intellectuals The lack of any visible or significant links among the academics from these three parties does not mean that other European left-wing academics did not play a role at all in the wider transnational networking and cooperation of the parties concerned here. SYRIZA in particular came to the forefront of much of the international left’s attention and solidarity in the run up to and the aftermath of its electoral victory in January 2015. For example, during the referendum week in Greece in the summer of 2015, SYRIZA asked Costas Douzinas (who was not an MP at the time but still teaching in London) to coordinate a petition (see “Greeks, don’t give in”, 2015) to be signed by international academics and intellectuals in support of the Oxi [No] vote in the referendum. Douzinas, whom Balabanidis identified as one of those “who work and intervene in the transnational networks of intellectuals” recalls this moment in his 2017 book, SYRIZA in power:

234

V. BORTUN

On the Tuesday morning [of the week of the referendum], I received in London a worried phone-call from SYRIZA headquarters in Athens. I was asked to draft and circulate among international academics and intellectuals a petition supporting Oxi. … It was published on the Guardian website the same afternoon and in its pages the following day. By Wednesday morning, when I flew to Athens, close to one thousand prominent academics had signed the petition. Moving messages of support and solidarity accompanied the signatures. A well-known Italian Law professor wrote that ‘it would be important to have available Greek flags to hang on the balconies of the people through Europe in solidarity as we did with the Rainbow flags during the Iraq assault’. … While the European establishment was going all out in an attempt to cow the Greeks into submission, academics the world over saw the referendum as an opportunity for democracy. (Douzinas, 2017, p. 157)

The idea of such a petition reflected SYRIZA’s strategy to present itself as a party of experts that, moreover, was supported by international experts from various fields. Such an appeal came on the background of the party’s relative political isolation at the EU level at the time of its negotiations with the Troika and of sustained attacks from the political opposition and much of the mainstream media at home. This need to evade political isolation was in itself, as discussed in the final chapter, one of the key incentives for SYRIZA’s transnational cooperation. The petition was signed by famous left-wing academics and intellectuals like Étienne Balibar, Immanuel Wallerstein, Slavoj Žižek, Judith Butler, Alain Badiou, Tariq Ali and, indeed, Chantal Mouffe (some of whom continued to publicly defend the SYRIZA government even after its U-turn in July 2015 – see Žižek, 2015). However, out of the 85 names available on the Guardian website, there was only one Spanish intellectual (Sandra Gonzalez-Bailon), who has no identifiable connection to Podemos though, and no Portuguese intellectuals at all. This example supports, therefore, the earlier conclusion regarding the lack of networking among the academics from the three parties. It also reflects, perhaps, the comparatively limited international mobility of Spanish and Portuguese academics more generally (see Cruz-Castro & Sanz-Menéndez, 2010). By contrast, during the campaign for the 2016 Spanish elections, 177 economists from universities all around the world signed a manifesto in support of UP (Podemos’ electoral alliance with IU). The signatories included Francisco Louçã from Bloco, who was presented simply

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

235

as a professor at the University of Lisbon, and Marica Frangakis from SYRIZA, who was presented merely as a member of the Board of the NPI, SYRIZA’s political foundation (Europa Press, 2016). Avoiding their party affiliations while emphasising their academic or intellectual affiliations might indicate that, similarly to SYRIZA, UP wanted to show it had the support of experts rather than mere members of other RLPs. However, it cannot be established whether the support given by Louçã and Frangakis was due to their links to Podemos or to IU, which also has its own, older, links with Bloco and SYRIZA respectively, as shown in the previous chapter (which Podemos is not a member of). Furthermore, it is rather telling that none of the SYRIZA’s prominent economists, such as Giorgos Stathakis, Yiannis Milios or Euclid Tsakalotos, was among the 177 signatories. That might be explained, yet again, by the decline in the parties’ bilateral relationship after July 2015. Helena Sheehan (2016) provides a personal account of her interaction with SYRIZA and the wider Greek left between 2012 and 2016, in what constitutes one of the very few primary sources on networking and cooperation among left-wing intellectuals in Europe today. Sheehan, Professor Emerita in philosophy at Dublin City University and a well-known figure of the Irish left, recollects several instances where international intellectuals engaged in solidarity with SYRIZA or people from SYRIZA sought such solidarity. For instance, in a conversation from the autumn of 2012 with Costas Lapavitsas (the SOAS-based academic and at the time a member of SYRIZA’s Left Platform), “he stressed the need to build international solidarity. He put a proposition to me, asking me to be part of an international network of political thinkers that they were forming. I said that I would be honoured” (Sheehan, 2016, p. 28). That idea did not come to fruition, though, not the least because Lapavitsas himself was part of the group that split from SYRIZA after the July U-turn. What SYRIZA did do was to help establish, in 2016, the Institute for Alternative Policies (ENA). It was presented as “an initiative of social, economic, political and legal scientists operating democratically”, whose “critical research activity aims at finding and promoting responses to critical economic, social, environmental and cultural problems in Greece and Europe” (ENA, n.d.). Interestingly, it had an explicit focus on the possibilities of social change in Southern Europe: “A new model could thus be created in Greece and the other countries of the European South, combining advanced forms of democracy, social self-interest and social justice on a strong economy of needs and a broad base of

236

V. BORTUN

common goods” (ENA, n.d.). Balabanidis was the only interviewee to have anything to say about ENA: It is mostly an independent network of intellectuals and policy makers … a quite interesting effort to gather intellectuals, not only from Greece, but also from the European level, and it is quite close to SYRIZA and it is something parallel to the NPI; but it is more focused on the policymaking, which is something that SYRIZA never had, and now that they are in government they try to make networks not generally of intellectuals but specialists in public policy and policy-making.

Despite what Balabanidis said and despite ENA’s own claims that its “Advisory Council [is] formed through the participation of distinguished members of the academic community and of Greek and international citizens”, that Council only consisted of Greek academics, including some of the SYRIZA academics mentioned above, such as Costas Douzinas and Aristidis Baltas. In other words, Lapavitsas’ idea was implemented in some way but mostly at a national level. In fact, Sheehan (2016, p. 172) makes the very interesting claim that Lapavitsas’ own “internationally respected” economic expertise was ignored by his government while he served as a SYRIZA MP between January and September 2015. Most likely, that was due to Lapavitsas being one of the few high-profile SYRIZA politicians at the time advocating the need for an exit from the Eurozone (see Flassbeck & Lapavitsas, 2015). That would suggest that SYRIZA sought expertise in a rather instrumentalist way, to the extent that it suited and legitimised its programmatic and strategic choices; in that case, its staunch commitment to Eurozone membership. The most explicit international initiative aimed at bringing left-wing academics together and make use of their expertise came from Transform, which in 2013 launched the Akademia Network. Self-described as “a network of left-wing academics contributing to counter hegemonic thinking” (Transform, 2014a), it was made of several working groups corresponding to the fields of history, economics and sciences. The network was established on the same assumption that broadly informs this section of the book: “there are new potentialities of cooperation between critical researchers and the European Left, as well as an emergency to build political and intellectual dynamics – not only in favor of a breach with the neoliberal logic, but also to contribute in providing alternatives” (Transform, 2014b). The coordinating team had four members, including

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

237

Elena Papadopoulou from the NPI, who at the time was also a scientific advisor to SYRIZA’s parliamentary group. According to the archive of events on Transform’s website (Transform, 2019), the Akademia Network organised only five events, all between January 2014 and May 2015, out of which one was attended by a SYRIZA academic, one by a Bloco academic and one by academics from both parties. The latter was a conference that took place in Madrid in January 2014 under the title “University, Science and Research: European Resistances and Alternatives”, in which Sissy Velissariou from SYRIZA and Irina Castro from Bloco participated as guest speakers. However, there was no sign of activity from the Akademia Network after May 2015, that is, in the midst of SYRIZA’s negotiations with the Troika that, otherwise, saw radical left TPC reach its height during the crisis. Few things could probably illustrate better the marginal role played by party academics and their networks in the TPC among their parties. Finally, two interviewees, Baier and Wainwright, although not members of any of the three parties, mentioned European Economists for an Alternative Economic Policy in Europe, also known as the EuroMemo Group, as influential for wider TPC on the radical left today. Established in 1995, the EuroMemo Group (n.d.) “is a network of European economists committed to promoting full employment with good work, social justice with an eradication of poverty and social exclusion, ecological sustainability, and international solidarity”. One of its key activities is an annual conference, which is promoted by Transform and has been attended by people linked to the three parties, such as Maria Karamessini from NPI (Transform, 2017). Indeed, a 2012 newspaper article about the architects of SYRIZA’s economic policy claimed the EuroMemo Group “affects to some extent the economic positions of SYRIZA leadership” (“Who is hiding”, 2012). Also, Baier said of the EuroMemo Group that is “always played an important role in discussions among the leftists … it’s becoming more and more important”. Wainwright went further than that and stated that this network “is maybe as important as Transform, because it’s producing a real thing that has a real impact”. However, it is not too clear what that real impact was, at least not in terms of facilitating the convergence of RLPs on economic policy, which is what one would expect this kind of network to strive for.

238

V. BORTUN

Summary This chapter has dealt with the informal dimensions of the transnational networking and cooperation among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos during the crisis. It started by discussing their links via their political foundations (NPI, CUL:TRA and RDI respectively) and the transnational network Transform, which all three are affiliated to. The discussion has revealed that, despite their orientation towards transnational cooperation in Southern Europe, especially in the case of the NPI and RDI, each of the three foundations organised only a small number of events with participation of representatives from the other two foundations or respective parties (or from any other political foundations or RLPs from Southern Europe for that matter). That is reflected in the rather limited level of importance assigned by the interviewees to these actors in the process of TPC. The situation was only partly different with the events organised or co-organised by Transform during the decade of crisis. On the one hand, NPI/SYRIZA and Bloco/CUL:TRA had a relatively high rate of participation in those events, particularly the former, thus arguably reflecting SYRIZA’s greater need for transnational support and coordination after coming into government. Hence, the interviewees from the two parties rated Transform as more significant for TPC than their own foundations. On the other hand, Podemos engaged much less with Transform, perhaps due to RDI being only an observer member of network, which was reflected in how interviewees from this party assessed its importance. All in all, Transform’s role in facilitating TPC during the crisis was rather underwhelming. That was displayed, for example, by the very limited involvement of the parties’ MEPs—particularly those from SYRIZA— in the activity of Transform, thus indicating that formal and informal TPC run rather parallel to than cross-fertilising each other. In turn, this arguably shows how the parties’ electoralist and institutionalist strategic focus was also reflected at a transnational level. Even the interviewees working for Transform acknowledged its limitations in the given political context at the time, particularly with regards to the demands for transnational cooperation among radical left forces in Southern Europe. The main initiative in that direction was the launch in October 2018 of the project “Cooperation, strategies for Southern Europe”, coordinated by one of the interviewees. However, the fact that such a project was born almost a decade after the start of the Eurozone

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

239

crisis in Southern Europe lends support to the assessment that the role of Transform and of the parties’ foundations in the transnational cooperation of RLPs, at least in Southern Europe, lagged behind the demands of the objective situation, as ascertained by the network’s coordinator at the time. Even less impactful was the role of transnational social movements in facilitating TPC during the crisis, even compared to the previous era. At the turn of the century, the anti-globalisation movement allowed for Bloco and SYN (the forerunner of SYRIZA) to establish their first contacts, as both took part in the summits of WSF and ESF as well as oneoff mass mobilisations like the anti-G8 protest in Genoa in 2001. In the case of SYN, the participation in those movements was more consequential, as it fed into the dynamics that resulted in the creation of SYRIZA. After 2009, though, the new social movements emerged in opposition to austerity, particularly strong in Spain and Greece, proved to be less transnational in character than the GJM. As already noted in the literature, that was due to these movements’ focus on opposing the more immediate sources of power responsible for the austerity measures and their social impact, i.e. national establishments and mainstream parties. Indeed, that impact undermined the material capacity for transnational activism. It would perhaps be worth investigating to what extent the downfall in living standards and economic emigration in countries like Greece, Spain or Portugal, particularly prevalent among the youth, might have undermined the capacity of social movements to operate transnationally. Thus, no mobilisation as sizeable and significant as the anti-G8 demo in Genoa in 2001 took place in Europe during the crisis, with the partial exception of Blockupy demos, which did not gain a momentum, however, and certainly did not have any visible impact on TPC. The findings confirmed the perceived decline in the importance of transnational social movements, as reflected in the low significance—both in relation to TPC and in more general terms—attributed by interviewees to the AlterSummit initiative, in somewhat of a contrast to the ESF, whose boots it tried to fill without much success. According to some interviewees, the wider decline of social movements was due to RLPs having been delegated by them to take the lead in fighting austerity, which opens an interesting avenue for addressing one of the existing gaps in the current literature, on the relation between social movements and political parties. That relation is also clearly mediated by factors specific to each national context, with SYRIZA having had to carefully navigate its approach to

240

V. BORTUN

social movements in Greece, traditionally suspicious of political parties— the KKE in particular—trying to hijack them for their own purposes. At the same time, the parties themselves side-lined their orientation to social movements in favour of electoralism and parliamentarism, with the interviewees having mixed views about how their parties should (re)engage with the movements. Finally, despite the relatively high number of academics prominently involved in the three parties, their role in their parties’ transnational networking and cooperation proved to have been surprisingly modest. Indeed, any signs of networking among these academics themselves were very scarce, if any at all. It was revealed that many of SYRIZA’s academics have been linked to universities in the UK, which seems to have become the main country of destination for the Greek intelligentsia in search for better opportunities. Given the lack of connections between academics from any of the three parties and any of the other two countries, the academic environment in a country like the UK could have served as a locus for any networking among them. However, that did not turn out to not be the case, as academics from both Bloco or Podemos are largely linked to institutions in their own countries. Furthermore, initiatives specifically aimed at addressing this gap and facilitating political networking and cooperation among academics, such as SYRIZA’s ENA or Transform’s Akademia Network, have faded away before they were able to properly take off. Thus, they too failed to galvanise the interaction among RLP-affiliated academics, not to mention the one among the parties as such. At the end of the day, though, it was up to RLPs to understand and seize on the cultural and social capital provided by their own academics and the transnational networks they are involved in. Although more specific research would be needed on this nexus, it seems today that RLPs are largely disconnected from radical left academics and that any overlap is on an individual, contingent basis. It is a potentially useful resource that RLPs are failing to tap into, especially for the benefit of their transnational cooperation, both in terms of diffusion of ideas and expertise and, arguably, in terms of greater international legitimacy. To sum up, the informal TPC among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos during the crisis was underwhelming, to say the least (although more research in this direction is clearly needed, and not merely in relation to the radical left party family). If any significant enhancement in their

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

241

cooperation did occur, then it most likely occurred via the formal channels discussed in the previous chapter. That contrasts with the initial expectation that RLPs would particularly seek to enhance their informal transnational cooperation in order to oppose austerity, given their limited access to the sources of power that shape the policy- and decision-making processes in the EU. The virtual lack of any consistent attempts on behalf of RLPs to support and engage with transnational social movements is perhaps the most striking, especially so considering these parties’ call for a transnational united front. How would such a transnational front of the radical left—which never came about—be feasible or even possible without mass mobilisation and grassroots activism at transnational level? This and other limitations of these parties’ TPC during the crisis are spelled out and discussed in the following and final chapter.

References Alston, C. (2014). Transnational solidarities and the politics of the left, 1890–1990—Introduction. European Review of History: Revue Européenne D’histoire, 21(4), 447–450. AlterSummit. (2013a). Functioning. The AlterSummit website: http://www.alt ersummit.eu/alter-sommet/article/functionning AlterSummit. (2013b). Members. The AlterSummit website: http://www.alters ummit.eu/alter-sommet/article/members AlterSummit. (2013c). The Manifesto. The AlterSummit website: http://www. altersummit.eu/manifeste/article/the-manifesto AlterSummit. (2013d). What is the AlterSummit? The AlterSummit website: http://www.altersummit.eu/alter-sommet/article/what-is-the-alter-summit AlterSummit. (2015). Petition: No to austerity! Yes to democracy! http://www. altersummit.eu/accueil/article/no-to-austerity-yes-to-democracy Aron, R. (2017). The opium of the intellectuals (T. Kilmartin, Trans.). Routledge (Original work published 1955). BBC News. (2015, March 18). Germany riot targets new ECB headquarters in Frankfurt. The BBC website: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe31938592 Benda, J. (2017). The treason of the intellectuals (R. Aldington, Trans.). Routledge (Original work published 1928). Bertinotti, F. (2003, August 11). Reformist social democracy is no longer on the agenda. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/aug/ 11/globalisation.world

242

V. BORTUN

van Biezen, I., Mair, P., & Poguntke, T. (2012). Going, going, gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 51, 24–56. Blockupy. (n.d.). What is Blockupy? The Blockupy website: https://blockupy. org/en/blockupy-2/ Bonfert, B. (2020). Allied against austerity: Transnational cooperation in the European Anti-Austerity Movement. Doctoral thesis, Roskilde University. https://repository.ubn.ru.nl/bitstream/handle/2066/220551/220551.pdf Bonfert, B. (2022). We need to organise millions of people’—How Alter Summit and DiEM25 struggle to create a European ‘modern prince.’ Globalizations, 19(1), 102–117. Cabanillas, A. (2017, July 6). Instituto 25M, la FAES de Podemos. El Independiente. https://www.elindependiente.com/politica/2017/07/06/ins tituto-25m-faes-de-podemos/ Calossi, E. (2016). Anti-austerity left parties in the European Union: Competition, coordination and integration. Pisa University Press. Candeias, M. (2004). Antinomies: Relations between social movements, left political parties and state. The Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung website: https://www. rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/engl/ESF_Candeias.pdf Castells, M. (2010). The rise of the network society (Vol. 1, 2nd ed.). WileyBlackwell. Christiansen, T., & Neuhold, C. (2013). Informal politics in the EU. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(6), 1196–1206. Christiansen, T., & Piattoni, S. (Eds.). (2003). Informal governance in the European Union. Edward Elgar. Cruz-Castro, L., & Sanz-Menéndez, L. (2010). Mobility versus job stability: Assessing tenure and productivity outcomes. Research Policy, 39(1), 27–38. Daiber, B. & Hildebrandt, C. (2010). For a continued emancipation of the left. https://www.rosalux.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/policy.pdf Della Porta, D. (2014). Anti-austerity movements and the European Union. https://socialistproject.ca/2014/05/b987/ Della Porta, D., Andretta, M., Mosca, L., & Reiter, H. (2006). Globalization from below: Transnational activists and protest networks. University of Minnesota Press. Demony, C., & Almeida, G. (2018, September 22). Protesters denounce gentrification in Lisbon as housing prices soar. Reuters. https://www.reuters. com/article/portugal-protests-housing/protesters-denounce-gentrificationin-lisbon-as-housing-prices-soar-idUSL8N1W80OR Diani, M. (1992). The concept of social movement. The Sociological Review, 40(1), 1–25. Douzinas, C. (2017). SYRIZA in power. Reflections of an accidental politician. Polity Press.

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

243

Dunphy, R., & March, L. (2013). Seven-year itch? The European Left Party: Struggling to transform the EU. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 14(4), 520–537. Dunphy, R., & March, L. (2019). The European Left Party. Manchester University Press. ENA. (n.d.). About ENA. https://www.enainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2016/09/Declaration_ENA.pdf Errejón Galván, Í., & Mouffe, C. (2016). Constructing a new politics. Soundings, 63, 43–55. Errejón Galván, Í. (2014, April 14). Muere Ernesto Laclau, teórico de la hegemonía. Público. https://www.publico.es/actualidad/muere-ernesto-laclau-teo rico-hegemonia.html EuroMemo Group. (n.d.). About us. http://www.euromemo.eu/about/index. html Europa Press. (2016, June 20). Unos 200 economistas firman un manifiesto de apoyo a Unidos Podemos. https://www.eleconomista.es/economia/not icias/7649685/06/16/Unos-200-economistas-firman-un-manifiesto-apoyoa-Unidos-Podemos.html Ferraresi, G. (2016). European populism in the 21st century: The ideological background of Syriza, Podemos and the 5 Star Movement. Biblioteca Della Libertà, 216, 49–68. Flassbeck, H., & Lapavitsas, C. (2015). Against the Troika: Crisis and austerity in the Eurozone. Verso. Flesher Fominaya, C., & Hayes, G. (Eds.). (2017). Resisting austerity: Collective action in Europe in the wake of the global financial crisis. Social Movement Studies, 16(1), 1–151. Golemis, H. (2016). To tell the truth is revolutionary (Speech of Haris Golemis at the SYRIZA 2nd Congress in October 2016). http://www.kommunisten. de/attachments/6397_Golemis_To_tell_the_truth_is_revolutionary.pdf Greek Parliament. (n.d.). CVs. https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Voulef tes/Viografika-Stoicheia/ Greeks, don’t give in to the EU’s austerity ultimatum. (2015, June 29). The Guardian. The Guardian website: https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2015/jun/29/greeks-dont-give-in-to-eu-ultimatum Harris, R. L. (1979). The influence of Marxist structuralism on the intellectual left in Latin America. Critical Sociology, 9(1), 62–73. Hazareesingh, S. (1991). Intellectuals and the French Communist Party: Disillusion and decline. Clarendon Press. Heartfield, J. (2003). Postmodern desertions—Capitalism and anti-capitalism. International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, 5(2), 271–289.

244

V. BORTUN

Heisenberg, D. (2005). The institution of ‘consensus’ in the European Union: Formal versus informal decision-making in the Council. European Journal of Political Research, 44(1), 65–90. Héritier, A. (2007). Explaining institutional change in Europe. Oxford University Press. Howarth, D. (2015, January 29). The success of Syriza in Greece has been driven by Marxism, populism and yes, Essex University. Independent. https:// www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-success-of-syriza-in-greecehas-been-driven-by-marxism-populism-and-yes-essex-university-10010806. html Hudson, K. (2000). European communism since 1989. Macmillan. Hudson, K. (2012). The new European Left: A socialism for the twenty-first century? Palgrave Macmillan. Iglesias, P. (2013). Curriculum Vitae. https://web.archive.org/web/201410 30234532; http://sindominio.net/~pablo/trabajos/cv_08.pdf Iglesias, P. (2015a). Understanding Podemos. New Left Review, 93, 7–22. Iglesias, P. (2015b). Spain on edge. New Left Review, 93, 23–42. Kaiser, W. (2007). Christian democracy and the origins of the European Union. Cambridge University Press. Kaiser, W. (2008). Transnational networks in European governance: The informal politics of integration. In W. Kaiser, B. Leucht, & M. Rasmussen (Eds.), The history of the European Union (pp. 24–45). Routledge. Kaiser, W. (2013). Europeanization of Christian democracy? Negotiating organization, enlargement, policy and allegiance in the European People’s Party. In W. Kaiser & J.-H. Meyer (Eds.), Societal actors in European integration: Polity-building and policy-making, 1958–1992 (pp. 15–37). Palgrave Macmillan. Kaiser, W., Leucht, B., & Gehler, M. (2010). Transnational networks in European integration governance: Historical perspectives on an elusive phenomenon. In W. Kaiser, B. Leucht, & M. Gehler (Eds.), Transnational Networks in Regional Integration. Governing Europe, 1945–83 (pp. 1–17). Palgrave Macmillan. Kalyvas, S., & Marantzidis, N. (2002). Greek communism, 1968–2001. East European Politics and Societies, 16(3), 665–690. Katz, R. S., Mair, P., Bardi, L., Bille, L., Deschouwer, K., Farrell, D., Koole, R., Morlino, L., Müller, W., Pierre, J., Poguntke, T., Sundberg, J., Svasand, L., van de Velde, H., Webb, P., & Widfeldt, A. (1992). The membership of political parties in European democracies, 1960–1990. European Journal of Political Research, 22(3), 329–345. Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Cornell University Press.

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

245

Kioupkiolis A., & Katsambekis, G. (2018). Radical left populism from the margins to the mainstream: A comparison of Syriza and Podemos. In Ó. García Agustín, M. Briziarelli (Eds.), Podemos and the new political cycle (pp. 201–226). Palgrave Macmillan. Kousis, M. (2014). The transnational dimension of the Greek protest campaign against Troika memoranda and austerity policies, 2010–2012. In D. della Porta & A. Mattoni (Eds.), Spreading protest: Social movements in times of crisis (pp. 137–170). ECPR Press. Lisi, M. (2013). Rediscovering civil society? Renewal and continuity in the Portuguese radical left. South European Society and Politics, 18(1), 21–39. Löwy, M., & Stanley, C. S. (2002). Towards an international of resistance against capitalist globalisation. Latin American Perspectives, 29(6), 127–131. Lynch, K. (2006). Neo-liberalism and marketisation: The implications for higher education. European Educational Research Journal, 5(1), 1–17. Macklin, G. (2013). Transnational networking on the far right: The case of Britain and Germany. West European Politics, 36(1), 176–198. Mak, J., & Van Tatenhove, J. (2006). Introduction: Informality in a future EU. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 7 (1), 1–7. Manetto, F. (2015, April 30). Podemos co-founder criticizes mainstream drift in his own party. El País. https://elpais.com/elpais/2015/04/30/inenglish/ 1430403454_148415.html?rel=mas March, L. (2011). Radical left parties in Europe. Routledge. March, L., & Mudde, C. (2005). What’s left of the radical left? The European radical left after 1989: Decline and mutation. Comparative European Politics, 3, 23–49. Moschonas, G. (2013). The ‘broken equilibrium’ in European politics: The Europe factor and the weakening of mainstream parties (with an emphasis on centre-left and radical Left parties). In The Rise of Populism and Extremist Parties in Europe, The Spinelli Group (in collaboration with Bertelsmann Stiftung) (pp. 20–27). Mouffe, C. (2018). For a left populism. Verso. Mudde, C. (2002). Extremist movements. In P. Heywood, E. Jones & M. Rhodes (Eds.), Developments in West European Politics 2 (pp. 135–148). Palgrave. Nicos Poulantzas Institute. (2018). About Nicos Poulantzas Institute. https:// poulantzas.gr/about-nicos-poulantzas-institute-npi/ Piccio, D. (2016). The impact of social movements on Parties. In L. Bosi, M. Giugni, & K. Uba (Eds.), The consequences of social movements (pp. 263–284). Cambridge University Press. Príncipe, C. (2016). The deferred Portuguese revolution. In C. Príncipe & B. Sunkara (Eds.), Europe in revolt (pp. 159–174). Haymarket Books.

246

V. BORTUN

Quinn, B., & Gani, A. (2015, January 30). How British universities helped mould Syriza’s political elite. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2015/jan/30/how-british-universities-helped-mould-syriza-politicalelite Republic and Democracy Institute. (n.d.a). Quiénes somos. Retrieved from the Republic and Democracy Institute website: https://www.institutorepublica. info/quienes-somos/i25m/ Republic and Democracy Institute. (n.d.b). Formación. Retrieved from the Republic and Democracy Institute website: https://www.institutorepublica. info/formacion/ Riveiro, A. (2017, April 15). Entervista: Federico Severin. El Diario. https:// www.eldiario.es/politica/Federico-Severino-Podemos_0_630637815.html Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. (n.d.). About us. https://rosalux-ba.org/en/start/ Rucht, D. (2004). Movement allies, adversaries, and third parties. In D. Snow, S. Soule & H. Kriesi. (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to social movements (pp. 197–216). Blackwell Publishing. Salm, C. (2016). Transnational Socialist networks in the 1970s: European Community development aid and southern enlargement. Palgrave Macmillan. Scarrow, S. E. (1996). Parties and their members. Oxford University Press. Schoeller, M., Guidi, M., & Karagiannis, Y. (2017). Explaining informal policymaking patterns in the Eurozone crisis: Decentralized bargaining and the theory of EU institutions. International Journal of Public Administration, 40(14), 1211–1222. Segatti, P., & Capuzzi, F. (2016). Five Stars Movement, Syriza and Podemos: A Mediterranean model? In A. Martinelli (Ed.), Beyond Trump. Populism on the Rise (pp. 47–72). ISPI. Sheehan, H. (2016). The SYRIZA wave: Surging and crashing with the Greek left. Monthly Review Press. Sieker, M. (2016). The role of the German political foundations in international relations: transnational actors in public diplomacy (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Nottingham, Nottingham. http://eprints.nottingham. ac.uk/31455/ Soudais, M. (2018, July 2). Le Parti de gauche quitte le Parti de la gauche européenne. Politis. https://www.politis.fr/articles/2018/07/leparti-de-gauche-quitte-le-parti-de-la-gauche-europeenne-39077/ Souvlis, G. (2016). The European challenge: An interview with Josep Maria Antentas. Jacobin. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/08/podemoseuropean-union-syriza-catalan-independence/ Stacey, J. (2010). Integrating Europe: Informal politics and institutional change. Oxford University Press. Stern, L. (2007). Western intellectuals and the Soviet Union, 1920–40: From Red Square to the Left Bank. Routledge.

6

COOPERATION BY PROXY: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS …

247

Tormey, S. (2004). The 2003 European Social Forum: Where next for the anticapitalist movement? Capital & Class, 28(3), 149–157. Transform. (2014a). Akademia Network. https://www.transform-network.net/ en/blog/article/akademia-network/ Transform. (2014b). An initiative of Transform! Europe for a Network of Critical Researchers. https://www.transform-network.net/fileadmin/_migrated/ news_uploads/akademia_newsletter__1.pdf Transform. (2017). Call for papers (Deadline: 14 May). 23rd Annual Conference of the EuroMemo Group. https://www.transform-network.net/calendar/ event/23rd-annual-conference-of-the-euromemo-group/ Transform. (2019). Calendar: Archive. https://www.transform-network.net/cal endar/ Transform. (n.d.-a). Transform! Members. The Transform website: https://www. transform-network.net/en/network/organizations/ Transform. (n.d.-b). About transform! Europe. The Transform website: https:// www.transform-network.net/about-us/ Tremlett, G. (2015, March 31). The Podemos revolution: How a small group of radical academics changed European politics. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/31/podemosrevolution-radical-academics-changed-european-politics Treré, E., Jeppesen, S., & Mattoni, A. (2017). Comparing digital protest media imaginaries: Anti-austerity movements in Greece, Italy & Spain. tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique, 15(2), 404–422. Tsaliki, L. (2012, February). The Greek ‘Indignados’: The Aganaktismeni as a case study of the ‘new repertoire of collective action’. Paper presented at the Transmediale Media Art Festival, Berlin. http://www2.media.uoa.gr/people/ tsaliki/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Tsaliki_The_Greek_Indignados.pdf Vogiatzoglou, M. (2015). Workers’ transnational networks in times of austerity: Italy and Greece. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 21(2), 215–228. ““Who is hiding behind the economic programme of SYRIZA”. (2012, June 5). GRReporter. http://www.grreporter.info/en/who_hiding_behind_ economic_programme_syriza/7063 WSF. (2001). World Social Forum Charter of Principles. http://ciranda.net/ World-Social-Forum-Charter-of?lang=pt_br Žižek, S. (2015, July 23). How Alexis Tsipras and SYRIZA outmaneuvered Angela Merkel and the Eurocrats. In These Times. http://inthesetimes.com/ article/18229/slavoj-zizek-syriza-tsipras-merkel

CHAPTER 7

A Lost Decade: Incentives and Challenges for Transnational Party Cooperation

The previous two chapters mapped the formal and informal TPC among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos and its evolution during the decade of crisis. That discussion has already revealed some of the key features of these processes. This chapter aims to identify and unpack them more thoroughly. Thus, the first section discusses the incentives for the TPC among the three parties, most important among them their shared opposition to the austerity-centred management of the crisis, rooted in their more fundamental opposition to neoliberalism and coupled with the more pragmatic need for transnational coordination in face of the further Europeanisation entailed by the management of the crisis. The second section, by contrast, deals with the main obstacles to the parties’ TPC, in particular the persistent primacy of national over European politics and their divergent views on the EU itself—both obstacles substantially documented throughout the book so far. In effect, these two sections of the chapter answer the main puzzle of the book of whether, and why, TPC among RLPs in Southern Europe increased during the crisis. The chapter ends on a prescriptive note, with the third section outlining recommendations for the improvement of TPC, mostly by drawing on the insights provided in that respect by the interviewees from the three parties. As it will be shown, most of those recommendations, centred around rather basic forms of coordination that one would have expected to have already

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Bortun, Crisis, Austerity and Transnational Party Cooperation in Southern Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39151-4_7

249

250

V. BORTUN

been in place nearly a decade after the start of the crisis, are by themselves an indictment of the state of this party family’s transnational cooperation.

Incentives: Why Cooperation Did Increase In the light of the findings from the previous two chapters, it is hard to dispute that TPC among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos—the three most successful RLPs of the 2010s—enhanced during the crisis. When posed directly with this question, all of the interviewees concurred that cooperation intensified very much after 2009. While some of the key reasons behind that intensification have already been revealed throughout the book, the interviewees were also prompted to identify and discuss the factors they perceived as the most significant in that regard. Before discussing these factors though, it is worth touching upon two factors that interviewees were specifically asked about but which they deemed as not significant at all—arguably, a finding interesting in itself. One of those two factors was the transnational cooperation among trade unions, which is not particularly surprising considering the weak linkages between these parties and the trade unions in their own countries. As Rapidis from SYRIZA confirmed, “the strongest relations are between the trade unions and the KKE”, while Pedrosa from Bloco said something similar about his party: “Bloco has no links to European trade unions, except for specific one-off collaboration, but you don’t keep that collaboration”. More generally, the transnational cooperation of trade unions is itself rather weak (Bieler et al., 2014), as illustrated by the case of the underwhelming European Day of Action mentioned in the previous chapter. According to Albarracín, “transnational cooperation of unions is very low—just an exchange of views, with no influence outside”. This is partly rooted in the broader and deeper decline in the role and strength of unions in European societies in recent decades, against the background of de-industrialisation, unfavourable changes in legislation and relative failure to draw in new layers of workers from less traditional sectors (Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 2013; Upchurch et al., 2009). This latter aspect is particularly prevalent in Southern Europe, as underlined also by Giannopoulou: after 2009, especially, during the financial crisis, we are talking about … people who may work but under precarious conditions, so they don’t belong to trade unions; and all these people are a very big factor in the

7

A LOST DECADE: INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES …

251

Greek society, the Spanish society, the Portuguese [society], the European society in general—and they have no position in the trade unions.

Nevertheless, it is quite telling for the state of wider TPC on the radical left that the traditional organisations of the working class—the main social group that RLPs aim to represent—are so weak and disconnected from these parties today that their transnational cooperation was perceived as utterly insignificant in the TPC among these three LPs. The other factor noteworthy for its perceived lack of importance was the Europe-wide resurgence of the populist and far right. That is particularly intriguing given that this political family has rivalled the radical left in trying to capitalise on the anti-establishment mood caused by the crisis, and more successfully so, at least in electoral terms. In the 2019 European elections, the right-wing nationalist group Identity and Democracy gained 76 MEP seats, almost double than The Left group. The main reason why interviewees did not assign any importance to this factor was that, as Karatsioubanis put it, “in Portugal and Spain you don’t have a parliamentary extreme right”, with Merlo from Podemos also pointing out that “only Greece has a significant far right force”. However, one would expect the radical left to mobilise transnationally against the rise of the nationalist and populist right regardless of the latter’s different degrees of strength from country to country. In any case, those differences in national contexts have decreased since the interviews were conducted in 2017, as populist radical right-wing parties like Vox and Chega have risen to prominence in Spain and Portugal respectively, where each is currently the third parliamentary force. Perhaps it will once again be the demands of domestic politics that might push RLPs into cooperating over this rather pressing matter, as urged by Albarracín, the only interviewee to ascertain the need for the European left to come up with “a new project of a united front against the far right”. A few years later and such a front has failed to take shape, despite the ongoing growth of the far right across the EU. To bring the discussion back to the most significant incentives for TPC, the interviewees most commonly identified the following factors, mirroring what has been said so far in the previous chapters: need for publicity and legitimacy; shared opposition to neoliberalism; the EU’s management of the crisis; similar economic contexts; similar views on the

252

V. BORTUN

EU and the crisis; Europeanisation of politics; need for strategic coordination. While all these factors relate to each other in various ways, some of them partly overlap and are therefore discussed together.

Need for Publicity and Legitimacy Parties seeking to gain legitimacy and publicity by cooperating with likeminded political forces from other countries is often seen as one of the key incentives for TPC (see Kaiser & Starie, 2005). This incentive should be all the more prominent in the case of RLPs, which usually tend to find themselves isolated in their national arenas, often under the attack of mainstream parties and media alike, as pointed out throughout the book. Giannopoulou from SYRIZA put it quite succinctly when saying “you feel more powerful if you know you have allies and partners throughout Europe and you’re not just a party that fights only in a national context”. Also, Pureza from Bloco stated that “we wanted, and the Greeks wanted, and the Spanish wanted to show that we were not alone, that this was an international struggle”, while for Verstrynge from Podemos “we needed to work together, because we wanted to show that we … were not so ‘communist’, that there were other similar parties in the rest of countries”. Fazenda was somewhat blunter about the pragmatic reasoning behind associating oneself with RLPs from other countries: We need foreign allies in order to say to our people, to the working class in Portugal, ‘Look, we have a lot of allies in many, many countries, it’s not something that was born here’. … It’s a surplus of popularity for us, because the right-wing parties and the PS are always saying ‘We are in Europe, we have strong allies in Europe’. We must fight back and say ‘We have important allies in Europe as well: look, this party is the second party in Greece, and now the first party in Greece’.

Thus, forging relations with other parties is a political tool used to both reassure the party’s members and supporters of the feasibility of its politics and match the political rivals’ international credentials. Of course, the other side of the coin to this is that when the like-minded party fails, then the relationship may become a burden, as illustrated in Chapter 4 and discussed more in the following section. At the same time, Kanellopoulos from SYRIZA toned down the importance of being seen as close to similar parties from other countries:

7

A LOST DECADE: INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES …

253

Cooperation with Podemos and Bloco, especially with Podemos, was very important especially regarding our voters and our party members and the people of the left, the left electorate. … But in the media and the general public opinion it is not that important. People do not really care about what Bloco is and who Pablo Iglesias is. … If Tsipras meets with Merkel or Macron, that is important, yes. A meeting with a leftist leader from Portugal or Spain seems more like an intra-party issue.

That is part of the reason why SYRIZA tried in recent years to forge relations with more prominent political forces, beyond its traditional political family, as pointed out by Rapidis: “we still have this feeling [of isolation] and … this is why we also want to make alliances with the social democrats, because it’s not enough with the left-wing parties”. Such alliances, however, have failed so far to materialise beyond the rather symbolic and inactive Progressive Caucus in the European Parliament, which “people do not really care about” much either. Perhaps it is the social democratic parties that do not want to be seen as associated with the radical left, despite the former’s sharp decline in electoral fortunes over the last decade.

Opposition to Neoliberalism & Similar Views of the EU and the Crisis One of the strongest points of consensus among the interviewees was the instrumental role played by the parties’ shared opposition to neoliberalism in bringing them closer to each other. This opposition only enhanced during the crisis and found a concrete articulation in the RLPs’ common understanding of this crisis and of the role played by the EU in both its outbreak and management. As shown in Chapter 2, all three parties interpreted the Eurozone crisis and the austerity policies as a manifestation and, indeed, reinforcement of the neoliberal character of the EU (see Iglesias, 2015; Tsipras, 2014; Bloco, 2010). Therefore, as put by Albarracín from Podemos, “there’s a coincidence on opposing austerity and neoliberalism”. According to Karatsioubanis from SYRIZA, the three parties’ views of the crisis and the EU converged the most between 2011 and 2015, with Maestu from Podemos adding that this convergence consisted not only of the opposition to austerity but also of “the will to create another Europe”.

254

V. BORTUN

However, as already pointed out and reiterated by several interviewees, their parties’ views of the EU diverged after July 2015. Karatsioubanis acknowledged that, since then, “a part of Bloco would have … a different analysis on the EU”, which was confirmed by Bloco interviewees, with Pureza saying that “since the aftermath of the Greek referendum and the position adopted then by SYRIZA’s government … the view and the discourse about the EU has been more different between SYRIZA and the other two parties than it was before”. In other words, after July 2015 the parties started to understand their opposition to neoliberalism, and particularly to the EU’s “embedded neoliberalism” in different terms. Indeed, as discussed in the following subsection, this divergence has been one of the main obstacles to the parties’ cooperation. It is worth noting that, apart from their anti-neoliberalism and the secondary Trotskyist connections mentioned in the previous chapter, the parties’ ideology was not seen as a prominent factor in their transnational cooperation. That may be primarily explained by Podemos’ explicit attempts to avoid any standard ideological identification, although there are also differences between SYRIZA and Bloco. Karatsioubanis developed on this aspect: We are in the same bloc, but in terms of origins, theoreticians and so on, we are different. From SYN and SYRIZA till today, we have been influenced by the Western critics of Marxism in the ‘70s: Althusser, Poulantzas etc. … Podemos is more Laclau, more Latin America. Bloco is a mix of Trotskyist organisations, Maoists and so and so.

Fazenda made a more critical point in terms of his party’s differences with SYRIZA: “it’s difficult to tell what the ideology of SYRIZA is. SYN had some formula, all the other small parties were in general ex-Maoist, ex-Trotskyist, or still Trotskyist … but now SYRIZA is a salad, it’s not clear what they [stand for]”. Moreover, he expressed doubts on whether SYRIZA still displayed any kind of opposition to neoliberalism: I read almost everything that Tsipras says and in general he stresses the idea of an anti-neoliberal front in Europe. OK, he wants a front. What is the contribution of his party to that front? What is his idea? We don’t know anymore? Is it democratic socialism? We don’t know. It’s an anomaly because they’re making anomalous policies.

7

A LOST DECADE: INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES …

255

One could argue that perhaps ideology would be a more significant incentive to their cooperation if they would share more substantive ideas and policy proposals than mere opposition to austerity and neoliberalism; perhaps this is an illustration of Bobbio’s (1988) idea that the left has always been clearer about what it opposes rather than what it proposes. At the same time, the ideological differences among these parties were not seen as one of the key obstacles to the parties’ TPC. As Albarracín aptly summed it up, “ideology is less important than material conditions”. This confirms the widely held view in the current literature that, at least when compared to more traditional parties of their ilk, the newer RLPs are more pragmatic and less ideologically purist (Bale & Dunphy, 2011; Hudson, 2012; Keith, 2010; Keith & March, 2016; March, 2011). What they might be missing, though, is precisely the rediscovery of ideology in the form of a societal project posed as an alternative to the capitalism that they theoretically oppose. Perhaps mere opposition to neoliberalism is no longer enough for RLPs, neither in their domestic political arena, nor in terms of their transnational cooperation.

Europeanisation of Politics & the EU’s Management of the Crisis The relatively coordinated way in which the EU reacted to the Eurozone crisis, with unprecedented bailouts given to several member states and strict conditionalities attached to them, shaped the economic and social policies of the governments in those states. In turn, that led to substantial reshufflings of their party systems. Thus, the reaction of the EU to the crisis can be seen not only as an expression of the EU’s embedded neoliberalism, but also as both a manifestation and acceleration of the Europeanisation of politics, hence why both factors are grouped together. Confirming the point made above about ideology, Kanellopoulos from SYRIZA claimed that the increase in TPC after the start of the crisis was not ideological, it came as a necessity: we have to cooperate because alone we are very weak, all three countries, both at domestic level and also at the European level, because these countries are very vulnerable to the financial crisis, to the attacks by the stronger countries in the EU.

As Pedrosa from Bloco also noted, “the EU issues were much more present in our politics than ever before [the crisis]”. What this indicates is

256

V. BORTUN

that it was the sheer pressure of the changes in the economic and political situations, rather than any programmatic commitment to the transformation of the EU, that pushed these parties into paying more attention to EU affairs. Maestu from Podemos went further than that, explicitly linking the RLPs’ electoral success to the reaction of the EU to the crisis, without which “probably Podemos and SYRIZA wouldn’t have [had] these results”. At the same time, according to Karatsioubanis, there was a delay in how the left outside of Greece, particularly in Spain and Portugal, reacted to the Europeanisation of politics brought about by the crisis: “It took one or two years—not Podemos, but Bloco and IU and other parties in the ELP—to understand that it was not just a national Greek problem but something bigger”. Such a belated realisation on behalf of RLPs with roots in the anti-globalisation movement, that the Eurozone crisis did not concern Greece alone, is intriguing to say the least. Karatsioubanis shed some light on why that might have been the case: “They were not in the same conditions as Greece at the time; it was before the PIGS and everything. … In Spain and Portugal all this wave of austerity came later”. This suggests that RLPs came to see the crisis as important to them mainly when it hit their own countries, which reflects again the primacy of national politics, as elaborated on in the following section, in contrast to this party family’s avowed internationalism. At the same time, a couple of the interviewees questioned how European was in fact the Europeanisation entailed by the management of the crisis. Kanellopoulos believed that “there has been Europeanisation but also reinforcement of German hegemony”. Indeed, according to him, the Europeanisation was manifested mostly in how the radical left reacted to the German-led management of the crisis: “There has been a Europeanisation of the opposition against the German hegemony”. Interestingly, though, for Fazenda from Bloco, even the reaction of the radical left was not fully European, as he criticised the German president of the ELP at the time, Gregor Gysi, “for Germanising everything”. While Fazenda did not develop this point, such a perception indicates that the North–South cleavage that has defined the Eurozone crisis and its management might also be present within a European radical left that, perhaps more so than any other party family, should aim to bridge that cleavage. On a more general note, the idea that the crisis might have actually had a detrimental impact on the cohesion of the European left was also

7

A LOST DECADE: INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES …

257

implied by Merlo from Podemos, who said that the dynamics of the crisis saw a fragmentation of politics, which is paradoxical, because at the same time there is a bigger presence of European issues, but these issues are very conflictive, and they make it more difficult to a have a European dynamics … the need is much greater but for some reason it’s more difficult.

In a similar vein, the director of NPI, Danai Koltsida (2019), claimed ahead of the 2019 European elections that following the official end of the third bailout in August 2018, “the EU is now less central to the internal political debate in Greece”. Similarly, Tatiana Moutinho (2019) from Bloco wrote at the time that “it is expected that voters will tend to focus … more on the perspective of the impacts that EU policies and treaties have in Portugal, rather than on discussion about the European Union project itself”. The same trend was identified in the case of Spain, where those European elections were “not a question of the current political agenda” (Moreno, 2019). This suggests that the Europeanisation of politics accelerated by the crisis had entered a phase of reflux by the end of the decade. That trend might be reversed, though. The EU’s e800 billion NextGenerationEU fund, aimed at boosting economic recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic, can be seen as a return or Europeanisation. It remains to be seen if this time TPC on the radical left will be better prepared to engage with and react to it.

Similar Economic Contexts As expected, the similarities in the economic situations in Greece, Portugal and Spain during the crisis was seen as one of the most significant factors in boosting the TPC of the three parties. It is a factor that links back to the EU’s management of the crisis, as the parties accounted for the worsening of the economic conditions in their countries mainly by blaming the austerity policies imposed by the EU institutions in collaboration with national establishments. Fazenda from Bloco aptly captured the importance of the similar economic contexts: “we were in the same boat, sinking … we had been close for many, many years, but [the crisis] made us even closer because we were facing exactly the same problems – the bankruptcy of our countries”.

258

V. BORTUN

At the same time, some of the SYRIZA interviewees were keen to highlight some of the differences among Mediterranean countries that are commonly grouped together. According to Kanellopoulos, “in Greece there are much worse conditions than in Spain and also Portugal. Portugal did not face that kind of debt crisis and budget crisis”. Karatsioubanis made the same point, arguing that “we all suffered but [with] different levels of austerity. It helped us in putting us closer, but the conditions were different”. The differences between Greece and Portugal were also acknowledged by Bloco interviewees, with Fazenda pointing out how the structure of the economy is not the same in the two countries: we don’t have similar economic contexts, we have a stronger economy than them. … The EU destroyed a lot of the industrial sector in Portugal, but we have some different industries, factories, and that’s not the case of Greece. … They [also] have poor agriculture, ours is more developed. They have the shipping and the tourism and the geopolitical situation and not much more [than that].

Pureza too, while conceding that these countries “shared and share the same kind of features in what concerns the relation between core and periphery”, also stated that “too many singularities have been forgotten” and that “the acronym PIGS was a kind of strategy to put together things that in fact were different”. The differences within this group of countries have been signalled in the literature (see Lapavitsas et al, 2012, pp. 13–41, pp. 79–98), but were arguably obscured with the help of crude acronyms precisely in order to enhance the perceived legitimacy of one-size-fits-all solution of austerity (Petry, 2013). While the interviewees did not see these national differences as an obstacle to TPC, one may wonder whether the less dramatic impact of austerity and quicker economic recovery in Portugal or the bigger size of the economy in Spain when compared to Greece did not affect in different ways the parties’ sense of urgency regarding the need to tighten their transnational cooperation.

Strategic Coordination The need for parties to coordinate their strategy and policy at transnational level is one of the standard reasons for which parties engage in transnational cooperation in the first place. That is especially the case in a

7

A LOST DECADE: INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES …

259

relatively highly integrated polity such as the EU, where the stronger the inter-party coordination, the better the chances for parties to have a say in the agenda-setting and policymaking processes. While most interviewees seemed aware of the importance for their parties to coordinate their strategies at the European level, the previous chapters revealed rather limited attempts in that respect during crisis. The one notable development that was specifically born out of the crisis was— apart from DiEM25, which was not strongly linked to existing RLPs—the Plan B/NPM initiative, through which Bloco, Podemos and other prominent RLPs tried to coordinate their strategy towards the EU institutions following the defeat of the first SYRIZA government. The severe shortcomings of this initiative that, in recent years, has been on stand-by have already been discussed in Chapter 4: while achieving some policy and strategic convergence among its participants on the crucial question of the EU, that convergence never translated into anything more concrete or impactful than the joint statements that concluded the Plan B/NPM summits. If anything, Podemos displayed very little, if at all, of Plan B’s Disobedient Euroscepticism since taking part in Spain’s centre-left government. Thus, while the need for strategic coordination was perceived as significant in bringing their parties closer, some interviewees commented on the scarcity of such coordination among their parties and within the European left more generally, with Pedrosa stating briefly that “we try but we fail to [coordinate]”. His party colleague Fazenda actually claimed “we never had strategic coordination”, but only “a tacit convergence”, as reflected in the absence of any formal bilateral, not to mention trilateral, agreements among these parties. Thus, as Maestu from Podemos put it, “the other side is coordinating their strategy” better than the radical left (where ‘the other side’ presumably refers to the European political right or perhaps the Troika itself). Indeed, Kanellopoulos made the interesting claim that the right-wing parties and media alike cooperate transnationally to try and undermine these RLPs: The same arguments in Portugal, the same arguments in Spain. We are beginning to have a suspicion that it is more organised than we think, it’s not just a coincidence. We begin to have the suspicion that these people have met and they have cooperated, trying to find the same arguments. … For example, especially relating to Venezuela, it came to our knowledge that the opposition against Maduro cooperates with

260

V. BORTUN

Rajoy and the Spanish conservatives to try and find arguments to hit at Podemos. There are people travelling, even from Greece, journalists for example, making contacts with conservative journalists from Spain, maybe exchanging materials.

If RLPs are aware of facing forces that work together transnationally against them, that arguably makes their lack of or limited strategic coordination all the more puzzling. The reasons for that and for other shortcomings of their wider cooperation are identified and discussed in the following section.

Obstacles: Why Cooperation was Underwhelming While there is a strong consensus among the interviewees that the TPC among their parties increased during the crisis, a majority of them also believed that the state of that cooperation at the time of the interviews was not good enough. Pureza from Bloco, for instance, said that “we should be able to find more adequate platforms and more adequate processes for improving this level of commonness between our parties”. Also, Merlo from Podemos argued that “the others, the bourgeoisie, cooperate internationally much better”, while his colleague Conesa de Lara was more specific and bemoaned that “if we would want to do a campaign on, for example, access to medicine with Bloco, we wouldn’t know who to talk to”. Some of the key reasons for why most interviewees found the state of their parties’ cooperation rather wanting have already surfaced in the previous chapters, particularly when discussing the post-2015 decline in the relationship of both Bloco and Podemos with SYRIZA. Indeed, for some Bloco interviewees, such as Pedrosa, “with SYRIZA [there] is not much cooperation and it’s not the moment to increase the cooperation”. This section discusses the factors that, in line with what the rest of the data has revealed, the interviewees specifically identified as hindering TPC: primacy of national politics; different views on the EU; lack of a transnational social basis; lack of resources; and limited influence over EU policy. The first two factors are discussed together as they are arguably two sides of the same coin.

7

A LOST DECADE: INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES …

261

Primacy of National Politics & Limited Influence Over EU Policy The Europeanisation of politics notwithstanding, the persistent primacy of national over European politics is a constant feature in the wider literature on TPC (Bardi et al., 2010, 2014; Bressanelli, 2014; Crouch, 2013; Ladrech, 2007; Poguntke et al., 2007; Seiler, 2011). According to Ladrech (2003, pp. 124–125), this structural feature is mainly due to parties still deriving much of their resources, power and legitimacy from the domestic political arena. The crisis did not change that in any substantial way. As Crouch (2013, p. 232) sharply put it when assessing the political impact of the first years of the crisis, “parties and political systems remain doggedly national; they are defined by the nation-state and are dedicated to pursuing the interests of that nation-state”. This argument was reinforced particularly by the interviewees from Bloco, with Pedrosa saying that “national politics are always before everything, especially in countries where you can have some real representation”, while Fazenda stated, in his by-now-familiar dry style that “we don’t live on international cooperation here—we live from the approval of our people”. Bloco is perceived as more focused on national politics also by Karatsioubanis from SYRIZA, who claimed that, at least at the beginning of the crisis, Bloco was “looking towards Portugal a bit more, even though they were part of ELP, GUE/NGL”. The interviewees from Podemos shared the same view as those from Bloco, although in a more descriptive rather than normative key. Merlo admitted that “national realities are more important” and Albarracín that “national politics prevails”, despite the fact that “we had austerity measures in Greece and Spain at the same time … but the parties didn’t understand that well”. Echoing Fazenda’s comment, Conesa de Lara summed it up by saying that “when it comes to the real moment … each one is with their own electorate”.1 All the above was well illustrated in Chapter 4 when discussing the bilateral relations between the three parties. Both Bloco and Podemos became more invested in their relationship with SYRIZA once they could parade it in their respective domestic arenas as a success story of the left; similarly, they cooled down that relationship when it became a tool in 1 As a sidenote, perhaps this explains why the Anticapitalistas group was able to hold more sway over Podemos’ foreign affairs than their actual strength inside the party, if the majority current around Iglesias was indeed mostly concerned with domestic politics.

262

V. BORTUN

the hands of its critics and competitors in national elections. In other words, the major fluctuations in the TPC among these parties during a transnational crisis were fundamentally guided by the logic of national politics rather than genuine internationalism. Even at the peak of their relations, these parties’ transnational cooperation was mostly limited to actions related to events in the national arena, such as giving support to the other party during their electoral campaign ahead of legislative elections. It was, in short, what has been earlier dubbed as nationally focused transnational cooperation, as opposed to the kind of cooperation focused on the transnational, shared framework of EU policymaking, which was mainly left to the workings inside the EP and—in the case of Bloco and Podemos—the short-lived Plan B/NPM initiative(s). The SYRIZA interviewees, by contrast, seemed less convinced of the importance of this factor in hindering TPC. Kanellopoulos pointed out that, at least in Greece, the primacy of national politics “declined, subsided … because European policies are very decisive for domestic policies now”. However, as pointed out in the previous section, that seemed to change towards the end of the decade, with the 2019 European elections being very much framed in terms of domestic politics (Koltsida, 2019). That was reflected in SYRIZA itself focusing ever since less and less on European politics and, by extension, transnational cooperation with like-minded parties. While the primacy of national politics is a general characteristic of TPC, regardless of the party family, what might add to that in the case of RLPs, and perhaps other relatively marginal political forces, is their limited influence over EU’s policymaking. For that may well discourage them from placing more emphasis on transnational cooperation. Thus, Bloco’s Pedrosa admitted that “we have very limited influence, [and] there’s not much we can do, so sometimes you see cooperation for nothing”—an issue which he attributed not only to electoral performances but also to the ELP’s lack of cohesion and the wider absence of a “European project” of the left. Also, Verstrynge from Podemos said that “we all know the limits of the European Union so that could be one of the reasons why our cooperation is not that fluid”. However, O’Donnell made the interesting amendment that “those who do have influence don’t seem to collaborate that more either”, thus reinforcing the consensus in the literature that parties of all political strands are—albeit at various degrees—primarily focused on domestic politics.

7

A LOST DECADE: INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES …

263

By contrast, interviewees from SYRIZA saw in the left’s limited influence over EU policies an incentive for transnational cooperation. Giannopoulou illustrated this difference between SYRIZA and the other two parties: SYRIZA thinks the exact opposite, that we have to cooperate in order to influence. I heard Mariana Mortágua from Bloco (she’s an MP) three months ago in a public event in Madrid. She, as many other people from Bloco, are very nationally focused, and they think that we cannot influence Brussels and we have to give our fight as much as we can here, in our country, so they are not so European-focused. … I’ve had a discussion with a Spanish comrade and she told me that Spaniards are not that much interested in European politics and that they don’t feel much European. We are more European...

What might explain this contrast, more than anything, is that SYRIZA led the government for four years, unlike the other two parties at the time. This obviously gave the Greek party more of a say in EU affairs, having a seat on the Council, but also a stronger sense of urgency in dealing with EU affairs, which parties without governmental responsibility do not have to worry about to the same extent. Indeed, both Bloco and Podemos were then still striving to get into government (with Podemos succeeding to do so at the end of 2019), hence their stronger emphasis on domestic politics. At the same time, while greater transnational cooperation might somewhat increase the influence of these parties over EU policymaking, one cannot escape the fact that the best way to do that is by winning elections, which are still of a largely national character, including those for the European Parliament. As the journalist Garcia also remarked, “MEPs are more interested in what happens in their own countries, where they get elected”. Fazenda concurred, saying that “on the international field, we are constrained by the results we have in our own country”. Therefore, parties and RLPs in particular appear to be stuck in a vicious circle: they would focus more on transnational cooperation and European politics if they would have a greater influence over European politics, but they can only achieve such influence by performing well in, and thereby focusing more on, national politics. Perhaps they can escape this vicious circle only provided that European elections become more transnational in character and, most crucially, more politically significant. However,

264

V. BORTUN

that would require the kind of acceleration and deepening of European integration that does not seem particularly likely to happen in the near future.

Lack of a Transnational Social Basis Scholars of European integration have long addressed the question of the absence of a European demos and the possibilities, or lack thereof, to build one (e.g. Jolly, 2005; Scharpf, 1999; Weiler, 1996). While that absence obviously undermines all parties’ capacity for mobilisation at a transnational level, it particularly affects parties that rely heavily on mass mobilisation to gain support for their demands, such as the three RLPs discussed here. Thus, while these parties might build on such a mobilisation strategy to put pressure on governments in their countries, they find it much harder when dealing with the EU institutions, precisely— but not exclusively—due to the absence of a transnational mass of people to mobilise. This has been reflected in the generally limited transnational mass mobilisation during the crisis, with “any solidary action being of very marginal importance and existing mainly at very formal diplomatic levels, remote from civil society” (Crouch, 2013, p. 232). De Cleen et al. (2020, p. 162) attribute this to the persistent primacy of the national framework, as discussed above: Establishment forces already seem to be able to function at the transnational level, even through ad hoc institutions like the Eurogroup, in which the acceptable degrees of legitimacy and accountability are quite low and flexible, reflecting a pre-existing agreement on commonly accepted policies. Such a transnational coordination cannot simply be replicated by anti-establishment forces to the extent that resistance is still mostly framed at the level of national community. As we have seen, the enjoyment and the defence of rights remain largely tied to the membership of a nationstate; and the discursive and affective investment of oppositional demands and identities also seem to remain largely attached to the nation-state.

The interviewees too were aware of this structural limitation on TPC but had surprisingly little to say about it. Those who did, were rather divided over this issue. While Merlo from Podemos stated briefly that “we’re working on building it [a transnational social basis]”, Gusmão from Bloco was more sceptical in this regard:

7

A LOST DECADE: INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES …

265

As in the case of the trade unions, I think we’re not going to find a solution. The kind of social basis that we can build at the European level is the kind of solidarity-based movements, not really movements that are acting with the kind of unity that we could see in a national trade union. Actually, that’s one of the things that makes me sceptical about the possibility of a Europe-wide change. … I don’t think that there is European workers’ solidarity and actually I think it’s becoming more and more difficult to build one. And even if one existed, you would have a very hard time having a common agenda between different working classes.

That points to a significant challenge for TPC on the left: if the social classes from different member states, which the RLPs appeal to and claim to represent, do not identify with each other transnationally and thus fail to build cross-border class solidarity, then how are these parties to build the kind of critical mass they would need in order effect the changes at EU level that they advocate? Moreover, how can these parties converge over the kind of changes they want to see if they (try to) represent social groups that might perceive their interests as different, if not incompatible? For instance, the former Chairperson of the Dutch Socialist Party, Jan Marijnissen, stated in a press interview in the early years of the crisis that it had been “a major mistake of other left parties in Europe to constantly demand European solidarity” and that “most Frisians don’t give a damn about the Greeks” (apud Janssen, 2013, p. 33). This illustrates strikingly well the challenges in building transnational class solidarity. It also illustrates how the cleavage between Northern and Southern Europe can be replicated within the radical left, despite its internationalist credentials, which can also be seen within the labour movement itself (Bieler & Erne, 2014). Of course, national divisions undermining international cooperation— which reveal yet again the pre-eminence of the national—is not a recent issue but has confronted the left as early as the outbreak of the First World War that led to the collapse of the Second International. But just like then, perhaps the key issue here lies not as much with the differences between the social groups that RLPs represent domestically as with the RLPs’ failure to de-construct and bridge over these differences, rather than merely reflect and reinforce them. Perhaps the social groups they represent have more in common than some parties seem to believe. Perhaps, objectively speaking, they already constitute an international, if not transnational, social class, just like there already is an emerging

266

V. BORTUN

transnational capitalist class (van Apeldoorn, 2004). But, unlike the latter, the international/European working class has not yet become aware of its own existence and shared interests. And, arguably, the European left, including the three RLPs analysed in this book, as well as the workers’ own organisations themselves, the trade unions, have been failing to do enough in that regard. More than that, European RLPs seem to have also failed in the more modest task of enabling transnational networking and cooperation among their own activists, as their TPC during the crisis maintained a pronounced elite character. The parties did not manage to activate their militants and supporters in order to embolden any significant transnational mass mobilisation, which was surprisingly scarce in the mass opposition to austerity, as noted already (see also Keith, 2017). Albarracín aptly captured this shortcoming when saying that “we have … our militants, but we’re not using them; that’s our main force, the people, but we’re not using it”.

Different Views on the EU While initially the three parties shared broadly similar views on the EU, which contributed to the enhancement of their TPC during the first half of the decade, those views started to diverge after SYRIZA’s U-turn in July 2015. Indeed, this divergence was often mentioned by the interviewees as the main cleavage between their parties and is seen in the current literature as the key dividing line of the wider European radical left today (see Holmes & Lightfoot, 2016, p. 346; Keith, 2017, p. 94; Nikolakakis, 2016, p. 17). Kanellopoulos from SYRIZA went as far as saying that “whenever there is a disagreement, it has to do with different views on the EU”. Moutinho from Bloco elaborated on these differences: If we try to come up with a coherent narrative, we cannot say inside [the party] that Europe is the problem and then go to European elections with forces that say let’s try to reform Europe from within, because for us it is not possible: these treaties are not reformable; either you confront them or you propose new treaties if the correlation of forces is different and you have the strength to change this. … We cannot be inside the institutions thinking that we are going to be able to change them – that is the lesson that we got from the Greek case and Bloco understood it very clearly.

7

A LOST DECADE: INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES …

267

Moreover, Pureza believes that, in the light of the Greek case, an exit from the Eurozone “is a scenario not to be discarded … if nothing is transformed in the Eurozone”, although that should not be “a banner to use to go out on the streets [with]”. Finally, Fazenda believed that “if Schäuble wanted to put Greece out of the single currency, they had to do it and to get some sovereignty”. This indicates clear differences between Bloco and SYRIZA in relation to the EU and the Eurozone in particular. However, while Bloco’s increased Euroscepticism clearly stems from their realisation, in the light of the “Greek case”, that a realistic strategy towards the EU institutions should go beyond mere negotiations, there were also more pragmatic calculations behind it, once again linked to the dynamics of domestic politics. Firstly, the more confrontational attitude towards the EU might have been a tactical choice ahead of the general elections in October 2015, on the background of a growing mistrust in European institutions among the Portuguese electorate (see GómezReino Cachafeiro & Plaza-Colodro, 2018, p. 346). Secondly, given the Europeanist stance of the centre-left PS, Bloco increased its criticisms of the EU as a way to distinguish itself from its main competitor over the left-wing electorate (Príncipe, 2016, p. 172). Indeed, as Bloco lent parliamentary support to the PS government from 2015 till 2021, the stance on the EU was arguably one of the few political positions still clearly distinguished Bloco from its social democratic partner in the eyes of the electorate. Thirdly, Bloco might have used its more critical stance on the EU as a tool to pressure the government into resisting some of the demands made by the European institutions. Fourthly, as pointed out already, Bloco decided to distance themselves from SYRIZA following the latter’s failure to respect its electoral promises, as the events in Greece had significant reverberations in the domestic politics of Portugal throughout 2015 (Fernandes & Carvalhais, 2016, p. 54). Gusmão claimed that “criticism towards SYRIZA was made equivalent to the criticism of Bloco—same organisation with different national branches”. This led Bloco to adopt, ahead of the elections in Portugal, the slogan “No more sacrifices to the Euro”. Thus, once again, the demands of national politics played a key role in how parties relate to their partners across the EU and to the EU itself. For Podemos interviewees too, particularly those associated with Anticapitalistas, the differences over the EU increased and, in turn, affected the cooperation with SYRIZA, although Podemos had less of a coherent

268

V. BORTUN

approach to the question of the EU than Bloco. Merlo had the most to say about this: Now we have the biggest differences. … You need a strategy, which Podemos hasn’t established. In Anticapitalistas we’ve elaborated that strategy. We’re in charge of the European Secretariat in Podemos so we’ll have to see how much of our strategy will be adopted or not. … The institutions need to be challenged at a European level. We, Anticapitalistas, believe that we need to defend the possibility of an exit.

That was in clear contrast to what SYRIZA was calling for, namely, to build a broader progressive alliance capable of tilting the balance of forces against the current neoliberal design of the EU. Indeed, in contrast to Plan B’s idea of disobedience towards the EU treaties, SYRIZA believes these treaties provide at least some space of manoeuvre for left-wing policies (see Parker & Pye, 2017, for a similar argument made in the literature). Thus, at the previously discussed Transform event in Lisbon from October 2018, Effie Achtsioglou, Minister of Labour, Social Security and Social Solidarity in the SYRIZA government at the time, said that “We stand much behind what the treaties ask for: the Founding Treaty for the EU says that solidarity and social cohesion are main goals. It’s supposed to be legal text. First, we need to demand that the treaties are respected, because they are not”. As pointed out already, throughout the crisis, the European radical left focused more on denouncing the austerity measures and the neoliberal agenda underpinning them but less on how they might be opposed concretely within the current legal framework of the EU. However, even if left-wing policies would be in principle possible within the existing legal framework of the EU, it is apparent that the current balance of forces at the level of the EU is not favourable in that regard; and it is unlikely to shift any time soon. One needs to keep in mind that any significant revision of the treaties requires unanimity on the Council, that is, for 27 different governments to agree on such revision. Even in the late 1990s, when out of the 15 member states at the time, 13 were run by social democratic governments, there was no major advancement of left-wing policies at the EU level and the ideal of a “social Europe” remained a distant promise. Thus, the Euro-reformist approach favoured by SYRIZA and other RLPs seems to be rather unrealistic in the current context of power relations at the EU level. At the same time, the

7

A LOST DECADE: INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES …

269

Disobedient Eurosceptic approach favoured by Bloco and Anticapitalistas is rather underdeveloped in several key aspects: how to attract popular support, how to run the economy outside of the Eurozone and how to rethink European cooperation in a way that their calls for sovereignty are not conflated with those coming from the other side of the political spectrum (see Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2012). At the same time, the differences among the three parties over the European question are not entirely straightforward. As Walter Baier pointed out, “all of the three [parties] are internally divided on the issue”. Indeed, according to him, “Euroscepticism in SYRIZA is growing”, although that was not confirmed by anybody or anything else ever since. Nevertheless, the different views proved significant enough for the three parties to not engage in any significant form of cooperation for the 2019 European elections. The departure from the party of its most Eurosceptic current (Anticapitalistas) might bring Podemos closer to SYRIZA once again, although the domestic demands of government participation have seen the Spanish party engaging very little with this question in recent years. The period running up to the 2024 European elections will show more clearly how salient the cleavage among RLPs over the question of the EU still is and to what extent it still undermines the transnational cooperation of this party family. As things stand though, there is little reason for optimism.

Lack of Resources The obvious need for material resources to engage in any kind of transnational political activity was signalled by interviewees from all three parties. According to Kanellopoulos, “there is a lack of resources to organise more meetings, to have a magazine”, while his colleague Karatsioubanis claimed that “the three of us don’t have resources”. Also, Pureza from Bloco pointed out that “we rely on the capacity of entities like Rosa [Luxemburg Foundation] … parties themselves don’t have that much capacity”, illustrating once again how the North–South economic gap is also reflected on the radical left. Further confirming the primacy of national politics, Pedrosa from Bloco said that “there’s a lack of resources for transnational cooperation, yes, because if you have resources, you spend them on national politics”. Finally, Verstrynge from Podemos acknowledged that “you need resources to cooperate with other parties, to travel and so on, and we are from the left”, implying that RLPs start with an almost

270

V. BORTUN

inherent disadvantage in terms of financial capacity, as their generally modest political representation gives them limited access to state funds while their brand of politics tends to keep big donors away. At the same time, Merlo from Podemos was less convinced that there is an issue: “We get enough resources here, in the EP, for international stuff”. Interestingly, though, this reveals a rather narrow understanding of the process of TPC, limited to party elites such as the MEPs and the framework of an EU institution. Pedrosa also pointed out that the lack of resources does not affect the cooperation at the upper levels of the parties but only among “the militants”, which links back to the lack of transnational mobilisation; at least of the kind seen during the GJM era, such as the anti-G8 protest in Genoa in 2001 that allowed for the establishment of initial contacts between RLPs. Thus, as Wainwright aptly summed it up, “the crisis has meant a lack of resources, of cutting public money … people’s own personal resources to spend time and money on politics. So the crisis has meant a more beleaguered left, even though the issues have become more urgent”. It seems, therefore, that the crisis had the paradoxical double effect of increasing the left’s need for transnational cooperation while also undermining its material capacity for it.

Recommendations: What Is To Be Done? Given the consensus among the interviewees that the level of TPC—not just among their parties but on the radical left in general—is rather underwhelming, it was only natural that they would have a range of ideas about what should be done in order to improve that. Beyond vague banalities like the “need to draw conclusions from each other’s experiences”, several interviewees provided some concrete recommendations in terms of both the formal and informal networking and cooperation among RLPs. Concerning formal cooperation, Merlo claimed “we should agree on a common strategy on the European Union … we should coordinate ourselves at the institutional level”. For a start, logistics has to improve, as pointed out by Martinez Lobo, who proposed that parties have a common database, because at the time “people working at the local level in Spain have no way to contact the person who is in charge of the same field at the local level in Athens”. Conesa de Lara made a similar point, arguing there is a lack of “sharing information, what is happening in each country, what initiatives are being taken, who is taking them”. His colleague from Podemos, Verstrynge, also suggested that parties should

7

A LOST DECADE: INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES …

271

coordinate more on specific issues that are prevalent in their countries: “if the corruption is almost the same in Portugal, France and Greece, because we know it’s almost the same, why not do a press conference about this corruption and speak to all the media from all these countries?”. From a strategic point of view, Katsardis from SYRIZA advocated the idea that “in the EU elections we should not run as parties in each country but as the ELP”, ascertaining though the difficulty in doing that, as “this was not accepted by the majority of the European parties that consider themselves even more federalist than the ELP”. At the aforementioned Transform event in Lisbon from October 2018, “Is Southern Europe the Weak Link of European Integration? Tracing Possible Areas of Cooperation among Movements and Parties”, Haris Golemis from SYRIZA/NPI also suggested more political coordination at the level of EU institutions: Left political forces of Southern Europe, after agreeing among themselves on certain crucial issues which are scheduled to be discussed in European decision-making structures, should put pressure on their respective governments to adopt a common stance. I don’t know what the Greek government, the Spanish government, which is now cooperating with Podemos or supported by Podemos, or the Portuguese government do in such cases. Have they ever thought, have you Maria2 thought that you could ever discuss with your counterpart in these countries and see that you promote some common action in the European field? And the same question goes for Effie,3 the minister, whom we will have tomorrow. I think we should urge our people to put pressure on governments to promote this kind of actions.

Speaking on the following day of the conference, the minister mentioned in the quote above, Effie Achtsioglou, gave a concrete example along the lines suggested by Golemis: In two months from now, I invited the labour ministers of Portugal and Spain to discuss a common proposal on minimum wage and precariousness to then put forward to the European Council. Tsipras can put more pressure on it if he knows there is a consensus between these three ministers. 2 Maria Karamessini, member of the Board of NPI and also Director of Greece’s Manpower Employment Organization (OAED) at the time. 3 Effie Achtsioglou, Labour Minister in the SYRIZA government at the time.

272

V. BORTUN

… Ending precarity in the labour market and fighting tax evasion – if we focus on these priorities, we can build an alliance.

If anything, though, this reveals the underdeveloped character of the radical left’s cooperation in Southern Europe. For such channels of communication and coordination as those suggested by Conesa de Lara, Verstrynge or Golemis should have arguably been in place by then, almost a decade after the start of the crisis and more than three years into SYRIZA’s time in government! At the same time, the kind of intergovernmental coordination suggested by Achtsioglou obviously required that RLPs other than SYRIZA would get into government. That never happened during the crisis, with Podemos becoming a junior partner in the Spanish government at the beginning of 2020, when SYRIZA was already back in opposition. Arguably, a likelier route to power for RLPs would be through local elections. However, there has not been much talk of transnational cooperation among left-controlled municipal authorities. Only Tatiana Moutinho from Bloco made an interesting comment in that regard at the same conference in Lisbon: Since next year we have local elections in Greece and Spain, one of the things we’d like to do is around the issue of municipalism. There are many battles on the field, with success, when it comes to water rights, housing, migrants, even healthcare. It’s at the local level where concrete changes for people’s lives are being implemented. We should also maybe write a handbook on municipalism. Municipalism in the South is something different and we should discuss it as a possible alternative.

Severino, the director of Podemos’ RDI at the time, also touched upon this in an interview given to the Spanish media. He talked of a “municipalist axis” between some cities in Italy and cities in Spain where Podemos was in government, which represents “a fundamental connection vector to know what is happening and to continue working to recover a democratic Europe of the peoples” (Riveiro, 2017). Perhaps municipal, local politics is indeed a potential area of TPC that the radical left in Southern Europe, and beyond, has not explored enough. In terms of the more informal networking and cooperation, Kanellopoulos would want the parties to “make our think tanks, academics, journals, publications work together”. Indeed, the European left seems

7

A LOST DECADE: INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES …

273

to be lacking its own mass-media. The magazines mentioned most often were Jacobin and the New Left Review, whose role in keeping people on the left up to date with developments in Southern Europe is also confirmed by Sheehan (2016, p. 171). Neither of these outlets, however, has a specific Southern European focus that would help fermenting an exchange of information and opinion across the region, thereby boosting the potential for Southern European networking and cooperation. Thus, apart from a couple of websites with rather limited audience, such as the Transform website and the English sections on Bloco’s and SYRIZA’s websites, there is no online hub of the Southern European radical left on a par with, for example, social democracy’s Social Europe website. The importance of material resources notwithstanding, in this day and age, the absence of such a hub says less of the left’s lack of resources than about its lack of cohesion. Linked to the point above, several interviewees also stressed the need for a more bottom-up approach to transnational cooperation. Rapidis called for “building stronger networks in society, social movements, investing more in summer schools” and for a “more often exchange of ideas outside the GUE/NGL and the ELP”. Fazenda argued, vaguely, that “we have to put people in motion”, while his colleague in Bloco, Pureza, called for improving “the capacity to develop social movements, both at the national and the European level, that would be at the heart of resistance and [the] alternative”. The need for more popular mobilisation was also acknowledged by people from Podemos, with Merlo contending that “we should do European campaigns” and “invest resources to support social movements coordinate themselves”, while Albarracín stressed that “we need to get the support of the popular classes and build campaigns on common issues”. Thus, as the left-wing Greek academic Balabanidis aptly summed it up, I think it’s a two-level question – the one at the top, at the EU level, and the other at the bottom, the social mobilisation level. … There is already a cooperation … at the level of party representatives or leaders. That’s why I believe it is most crucial to elaborate cooperation networks … at the level of social movements.

However, none of the interviewees made any concrete proposals of how this broader kind of cooperation should improve. Overall, their recommendations seem rather limited and generic, with a few exceptions

274

V. BORTUN

such as the suggestions made by Golemis at the Transform event in Lisbon. This relative poverty of ideas has been reflected in the lack of any significant development of TPC on the radical left since the bulk of the interviews was conducted (2016–2017). In any case, following on Balabanidis’ point, perhaps these parties should try to employ at a European level the same approach that brought them success at home: an orientation towards the activist layers of the popular classes and a strategy of developing and (re)engaging with initiatives aimed at transnational social mobilisation. For example, this could entail, among other things, empowering the youth organisations in playing a more central role in TPC, similar to the role they played in the early 2000s, when their involvement in transnational social movements allowed for the first contacts between SYRIZA and Bloco. This bottom-up approach to TPC would not have to replace the elite level relations but complement them. More generally, such a strategic shift would not require abandoning electoral and parliamentary politics but striking a balance between that and grassroots activism, between the institutions and the streets—a delicate and challenging task that not many RLPs throughout history have managed to live up to.

Summary If the previous chapters anticipated it, this final chapter has provided an answer to the key puzzle of the book: TPC among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos did increase during the Eurozone crisis, at least according to nearly all the sixteen interviewees from the three parties, although most of them also claimed that process of cooperation to be, at the time, rather inadequate. This ambivalence is largely explained by the significant increase in networking and cooperation immediately before and after SYRIZA’s electoral victory in January 2015, which was followed, after the U-turn from July that year, by an equally significant decrease in the relations between SYRIZA and the other two parties. In short, and in corroboration with the findings from the previous two chapters, it seems therefore that the TPC among the most successful RLPs in Southern Europe increased in the first half of the decade and decreased in the second one. On the whole, it was a lost decade for this party family to qualitatively improve its historically underdeveloped TPC at the level of the EU.

7

A LOST DECADE: INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES …

275

Why did it increase though when it did so? In line with the assumption of the book, that came as a result of the three parties opposing austerity—a transnational solution to a transnational crisis. Thus, as part of this broader Europeanisation of politics, SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos realised they could best oppose austerity at a transnational level too, although—as it has been shown—mainly by supporting each other and less by coordinating their strategy and engaging in common actions. That was also facilitated by their similar views on the EU, at least up until July 2015, particularly by the presupposition that they could fight effectively against austerity and the Troika within the institutional framework of the EU, hence why their actual transnational cooperation at European level mostly went through their group in the EP. However, these parties’ shared opposition to austerity, embedded in a wider opposition to neoliberalism, was less motivated by international solidarity but by the partial convergence between their national economic contexts. They started to intensify their cooperation once the socioeconomic impact of austerity started to be felt in their own countries. But that mostly happened when one of them, SYRIZA, performed well in and eventually won elections, as it could thereby serve as a success story that the other two RLPs could parade in order to enhance their own credibility and perceived legitimacy at home. It was the dynamics of domestic politics, therefore, that guided to a large extent the intensification of these parties’ transnational relations. It was that dynamics that has also chiefly hindered their cooperation after July 2015, as the primacy of national over European politics was identified as the most significant obstacle to TPC. As discussed in the previous chapter, when SYRIZA ceased to be a success story, both Bloco and Podemos took distance from their Greek counterparts in order to avoid being “guilty by association” in their domestic political arenas. That came along with diverging views on the EU following the U-turn of the Tsipras government, which generally deepened this long-standing cleavage on the radical left. At a more structural level, the limited influence that these parties exert at the EU level also compels them to focus on their domestic politics, where they have better odds to make an impact. Indeed, as hinted by several interviewees, only by winning elections at home they would be able to gain more influence at the EU level and thus be more motivated to invest in transnational cooperation. At the same time, the underdeveloped character of TPC among these parties throughout the crisis, even at its peak, would suggest that

276

V. BORTUN

investing in TPC should maybe come before winning elections in order to already have in place strong strategic and policy coordination when a member of the party family comes into government. As the case of SYRIZA showed, its government was in need for transnational solidarity and support from the rest of the radical left, but that failed to live up to the expectations. Rather basic channels of communication, diffusion and coordination were still missing towards the end of the decade, as reflected in the recommendations discussed in the final section. Another structural factor, the absence of a transnational social basis, also hindered the cooperation among these parties, as they found it more difficult to employ at the European level the strategy of social mobilisation that they used, successfully, in their domestic arenas. Indeed, the impact of the crisis on living standards further undermined that capacity for mobilisation, in a period when the left arguably needed it more than ever. At the same time, that was also a failure on behalf of the parties themselves, which did not seem to do much in terms of involving their militants and supporters in the process of transnational cooperation. That process remained, therefore, limited to the higher echelons of the parties throughout the crisis. Thus, the parties’ strategic reorientation from popular mobilisation towards institutional activity displayed in their national politics was, and still is, even more pronounced at a transnational level. Finally, when asked how their parties’ transnational networking and cooperation could improve, some of the interviewees called for increasing formal coordination at the European level, for example ahead of Council meetings, but also to create more channels for communication and networking, not just at the top levels of the parties but also among the rank-and-file activists. However, most proposals proved rather generic, which suggests that increasing their transnational cooperation perhaps was not a priority for any of these parties at that time and, for the matter, ever since then.

References Bale, T., & Dunphy, R. (2011). In from the cold? Left parties and government involvement since 1989. Comparative European Politics, 9(3), 269–291. Bardi, L., Bressanelli, E., Calossi, E., Gagatek, W., Mair, P., & Pizzimenti, E. (2010). How to create a transnational party system (European Democracy Observatory Study). European Parliament.

7

A LOST DECADE: INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES …

277

Bardi, L., Bressanelli, E., Calossi, E., Gagatek, W., Mair, P., & Pizzimenti, E. (2014). Political parties and political foundations at European Level: Challenges and opportunities (European Democracy Observatory Report, 2014/ 08). European University Institute. Bieler, A., & Erne, R. (2014). Transnational solidarity? The European working class in the Eurozone crisis. Socialist Register, 51(1). Bieler, A., Hilary, J., & Lindberg, I. (2014). Trade unions, ‘free trade’, and the problem of transnational solidarity: An introduction. Globalizations, 11(1), 1–9. Bloco. (2010). On the crisis and how to overcome it. The Bloco website: http:// www.bloco.org/media/cp_bloco_100523.pdf Bobbio, N. (1988). Which socialism? Marxism, socialism and democracy. Polity. Bressanelli, E. (2014). Europarties after enlargement. Organization, ideology and competition. Palgrave Macmillan. Crouch, C. (2013). From markets versus states to corporations versus civil society? In A. Schäfer & W. Streeck (Eds.), Politics in the age of austerity (pp. 219–238). Polity Press. De Cleen, B., Moffitt, B., Panayotu, P., & Stavrakakis, Y. (2020). The potentials and difficulties of transnational populism: The case of the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25). Political Studies, 68(1), 146–166. Fernandes, S., & Carvalhais, I. E. (2016). Portugal: A weak case for Euroscepticism. In K. Bukovskis (Ed.), Euroscepticism in small EU member states (pp. 47–60). Latvian Institute of International Affairs. Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, M., & Plaza-Colodro, C. (2018). Populist Euroscepticism in Iberian party systems. Politics, 38(3), 344–360. Gumbrell-McCormick, R., & Hyman, R. (2013). Trade unions in Western Europe: Hard times, hard choices. Oxford University Press. Halikiopoulou, N., & Vasilopoulou, S. (2012). The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical right and radical left Euroscepticism. European Journal of Political Research, 51(4), 504–539. Holmes, M., & Lightfoot, S. (2016). To EU or not to EU? The transnational radical left and the crisis. In L. March & D. Keith (Eds.), Europe’s radical left: From marginality to mainstream? (pp. 333–351). Rowman & Littlefield International. Hudson, K. (2012). The new European left: A socialism for the twenty-first century? Palgrave Macmillan. Iglesias, P. (2015). Politics in a time of crisis. Verso. Janssen, T. (2013). The parties of the left in Europe: A comparison of their positions on European policy leading into the 2014 European elections. Rosa-LuxemburgStiftung. Jolly, M. (2005). A demos for the European Union? Politics, 25(1), 12–18.

278

V. BORTUN

Kaiser, W., & Starie, P. (Eds.). (2005). Transnational European Union: Towards a common political space. Routledge. Keith, D. (2010). Ready to get their hands dirty. The Socialist Party and GroenLinks in the Netherlands. In J. Olsen, D. Hough, & M. Koß (Eds.), From pariahs to players? Left parties in national governments (pp. 155–172). Palgrave Macmillan. Keith, D. (2017). Opposing Europe, opposing austerity: Radical left parties and the Eurosceptic debate. In B. Leruth, N. Startin, & S. Usherwood (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism (pp. 86–99). Keith, D., & March, L. (2016). Introduction. In L. March & D. Keith (Eds.), Europe’s radical left: From marginality to mainstream? (pp. 1–23). Rowman & Littlefield International. Koltsida, D. (2019). The Greek Left before 2019 EU election. The Transform website: https://www.transform-network.net/en/focus/overview/article/ ep-2019-the-european-left-one-mouth-many-voices/the-greek-left-before2019-eu-election/ Ladrech, R. (2003). The party of European socialists: Networking Europe’s social democrats. The Journal of Policy History, 15(1), 113–129. Ladrech, R. (2007). Supporting European political foundations affiliated with political parties at the European level. Europäisches Parlament, 2007 , 39–48. Lapavitsas, C., Kaltenbrunner, A., Labrinidis, G., Lindo, D., Meadway, J., Mitchell, J., Painceira, J. P., Pires, E., Powell, J., Stenfors, A., Teles, N., & Vatikiotis, L. (2012). Crisis in the Eurozone. Verso. March, L. (2011). Radical left parties in Europe. Routledge. Moreno, J. (2019). Spanish turmoil. The Transform website: https://www.tra nsform-network.net/en/focus/overview/article/ep-2019-the-european-leftone-mouth-many-voices/spanish-turmoil/ Moutinho, T. (2019). The Left in the aftermath of the Geringonça experience, the crisis within the Neoliberal Right and the populist threat. The Transform website: https://www.transform-network.net/en/focus/overview/article/ ep-2019-the-european-left-one-mouth-many-voices/the-left-in-the-afterm ath-of-the-geringonca-experience-the-crisis-within-the-neoliberal-right-and-t/ Nikolakakis, N. (2016). SYRIZA’s stance vis-à-vis the European Union following the financial crisis: The persistence of left Europeanism and the role of the European Left Party. European Politics and Society. https://doi.org/10. 1080/23745118.2016.1196918 Parker, P., & Pye, R. (2017). Mobilising social rights in EU economic governance: A pragmatic challenge to neoliberal Europe. Comparative European Politics, 16(5), 805–824. Petry, J. (2013). From PIIGS and the drive towards austerity: The discursive construction of the Eurozone crisis & its impact on European welfare

7

A LOST DECADE: INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES …

279

states. Paper presented at the DVPW, ÖGPW, SVPW Joint Conference “DreiLänder-Tagung: Politik der Vielfalt”, 19–21 September 2013, University of Innsbruck, Austria. Poguntke, T., Aylott, N., Carter, E., Ladrech, R., & Luther, K. R. (2007). The Europeanization of National Political Parties: Power and organization adaption. Routledge. Príncipe, C. (2016). The Deferred Portuguese Revolution. In C. Príncipe & B. Sunkara (Eds.), Europe in revolt (pp. 159–174). Haymarket Books. Riveiro, A. (2017, April 15). Entervista: Federico Severin. El Diario. https:// www.eldiario.es/politica/Federico-Severino-Podemos_0_630637815.html Scharpf, F. W. (1999). Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic? Oxford University Press. Seiler, D. L. (2011). Clivages et familles politiques en Europe. ULB. Sheehan, H. (2016). The SYRIZA wave: Surging and crashing with the Greek left. Monthly Review Press. Tsipras, A. (2014). Alexis Tsipras’ speech at the Die Linke Congress. https:// www.syriza.gr/article/Alexis-Tsipras%E2%80%99-speech-at-the-DIE-LINKECongress.html Upchurch, M., Taylor, G., & Mathers, A. (2009). The crisis of social democratic trade unionism in Western Europe: The search for alternatives. Ashgate. van Apeldoorn, B. (2004). Theorizing the transnational: A historical materialist approach. Journal of International Relations and Development, 7 , 142–176. Weiler, J. H. (1996). “European Union: Democracy without a demos?” Sussex Papers in International Relations, University of Sussex.

Conclusion

Despite its self-professed and sometimes proven internationalism, the radical left in the EU has always lagged behind the transnational cooperation of other political families. As shown in Chapter 1, this has been partly due to its own weakness after 1989 and partly due to deeply rooted divisions among RLPs, particularly over the crucial question of European integration. This book stemmed from the assumption that the markedly transnational character of the Eurozone crisis and its austeritybased management would have seen a remarkable boost in the TPC among RLPs. In this sense, the crisis was arguably a historic opportunity for this party family to overcome its long-standing, and paradoxical, deficit of transnational cooperation at the EU level. For several reasons, such a boost would have been most likely to happen in the countries most affected by the crisis, namely (semiperipheral) Southern member states like Greece, Spain and Portugal. Indeed, as Chapter 2 laid out, all three countries experienced substantial austerity measures under the supervision of the so-called Troika, which framed its management of the crisis in a moralistic narrative about the supposed cultural differences between Northern and Southern Europe. However, austerity largely failed to reboot these countries’ economies, having instead worsened the socio-economic situation, with lingering effects for years to come. In turn, this led to the emergence of significant anti-austerity social movements and the decreasing popularity of mainstream parties, punished in elections for the implementation of austerity © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Bortun, Crisis, Austerity and Transnational Party Cooperation in Southern Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39151-4

281

282

CONCLUSION

measures. The latter development proved most dramatic in Greece, where the social democratic party PASOK nearly collapsed into irrelevance, allowing for SYRIZA’s spectacular electoral rise, culminating in its victory in January 2015 (and then repeated in September of that same year). While the social democratic parties in Portugal and Spain also suffered sizeable losses in elections held that year, they were not sizeable enough for Bloco and Podemos respectively to replicate SYRIZA’s success to the same extent. Hence, in the years that followed, they had to be content with providing parliamentary support to minority social democratic governments, with Podemos joining such a PSOE-led government at the end of the decade. These three parties also broadly shared, as shown in Chapter 3, several programmatic and strategic features that would have facilitated even more the enhancement of their transnational networking and cooperation during the crisis. All parties had emerged in reaction to a gap on the left in their countries: in between a neoliberalised social democracy and an ossified communist party. That was also reflected in their neo-reformist programme that, in contrast to the “radical” label commonly attached to these parties, advocates for what is more or less a classic social democratic agenda focused on the defence of social rights, public services and the welfare state, coupled with New Left themes such as gender equality and the environment. The key programmatic feature that, as revealed in Chapter 5, turned out to be particularly significant in fuelling the parties’ cooperation during the crisis was their shared opposition to neoliberalism, which in the context of the crisis took the form of opposition to austerity. Their similar views over the EU also played a role in that regard, as they blamed the neoliberal architecture of the Eurozone for the crisis and the EU institutions for the way they reacted to it. However, the opposition to austerity was not accompanied by policy or even strategic convergence in terms of an alternative to austerity and neoliberalism more generally. The TPC among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos did increase during the crisis but not to that extent. Perhaps that was never the goal of any of the three parties. Indeed, what proved most crucial in boosting their cooperation was the need for publicity and legitimacy in the domestic arena. In other words, both Bloco and Podemos wanted to capitalise on SYRIZA’s electoral success from early 2015 ahead of their own general elections later that year, while SYRIZA needed them to perform well as it would have enhanced its own strength against the Troika. That is why the TPC among these three parties reached its peak

CONCLUSION

283

just before and during the six months of the first SYRIZA government (January–July 2015). Thus, the increase in TPC was fuelled by pragmatic considerations linked to national politics rather than by sheer international solidarity or the need for transnational coordination at the EU level. Indeed, there was no such significant increase at the beginning of the crisis, when the social impact of austerity was still largely felt in Greece only. Even at their peak though, the bilateral relations between the parties remained rather underdeveloped considering the context, mainly limited to previous but relatively marginal ideological affinities and the individual connections between party elites. Most intriguingly, there was no attempt to build any trilateral relations, despite the similarities between these parties, between their national contexts and the fact that 2015 (and then again 2019) was an electoral year in all three countries. This is at odds, at least partly, with the book’s core intuition that these parties would have sought to build a transnational front in order to oppose the Troika and its austerity policies more effectively, as called for explicitly by some of their leaders. Indeed, not only was there no policy and strategic convergence that would have seen the relations between the three parties fully reach the integration stage but there was also no diffusion of policy, strategy or methods (a dimension which ought to be added to Niedermayer’s model). Their bilateral cooperation was fundamentally limited to offering each other support when campaigning for national elections. Therefore, the “national” in the “transnational cooperation” among these parties was dominant throughout the whole period, with genuinely transnational cooperation being limited to the institutional framework of the EP, that is, the institutional framework of the very transnational hegemon (the EU) they were trying to fight against or at least challenge. This pre-eminence of “the national” surfaced even more conspicuously following the U-turn of the SYRIZA government in July 2015, which saw the Greek party commit to implementing the kind of austerity measures and privatisations it had pledged to scrap. That made both Bloco and Podemos (as well as other prominent RLPs) take distance from SYRIZA, causing damage to their relations that has not been mended ever since. That was exacerbated by their diverging positions and strategies towards the crucial question of Europe, the long-standing cleavage on the radical left that has only deepened during the crisis. While SYRIZA has maintained a reformist position and embraced a broader approach to TPC, to include progressive forces from other party families that strive for

284

CONCLUSION

a more “social Europe”, Podemos and particularly Bloco have become more combative in relation to the EU, proposing instead what can be best described as Disobedient Euroscepticism. This divergence was articulated in the parallel transnational initiatives that these parties engaged in after 2015—the broader Progressive Caucus instigated by SYRIZA in collaboration with some social democratic and Green MEPs and the Plan B for Europe (later replaced by Now the People Movement) led by Bloco and Podemos together with La France Insoumise. Both initiatives, however, have seemingly run out of steam before they could leave their mark on policymaking at any level. The underwhelming state of TPC among these parties during the crisis was not only down to the primacy of national politics and the divisions over the question of Europe but also the sheer lack of resources to engage in transnational activities. Perhaps with the exception of SYRIZA during its time in government, generally these parties do not enjoy the same access to state resources that more mainstream parties do— neither do they attract the kind of big donors as the latter. They tend to rely, instead, on their members’ voluntary contributions, and the socioeconomic impact of the crisis, particularly substantial in Southern Europe, clearly undermined that—not just for Southern RLPs but the radical left in general, including social movements. That was best reflected in the limited level and rare instances of transnational mobilisation against the transnational policies of austerity. Thus, the broader European antiausterity movement lacked its own Seattle or Genova moment and proved to be of a more pronounced national character than the previous anti-globalisation movement. The material difficulties and decline of transnational social movements notwithstanding, the parties also failed to fully employ the resources they did have. First, despite the relatively high prevalence of academics within their ranks, presumably embedded in a range of transnational academic and intellectual networks, there was no conscious attempt to get them involved in the process of TPC (apart from the rather ephemeral Akademia Network initiated by Transform). Indeed, the networking among these party academics themselves seems rather limited, where there is any at all. There are almost no cross-Mediterranean links among them, as they are tied to universities either in their own countries (mostly in the case of Bloco and Podemos) or in a Northern European country (such as the UK in the case of SYRIZA). At the same time, more objective factors, such as the historically reduced mobility of academics from the

CONCLUSION

285

region most affected by the crisis coupled with the more structural effect of higher education marketisation on the public engagement of academics might also explain their limited role in party networking and cooperation—perhaps an avenue worth exploring in future research. Either way, a more active and structured involvement of academics in TPC could have engendered, for example, informed debate on and diffusion of policy ideas in a period when the radical left largely failed to provide a common and concrete alternative to austerity and neoliberalism more generally. The same goes for the parties’ political foundations, which, despite their selfprofessed aim to facilitate precisely this kind of exchange, played at best a supporting role in their parties’ transnational cooperation. Even the pan-European network Transform, which all three parties are associated with to various degrees, was seen as having lagged behind its mission to enhance transnational cooperation on the radical left. Most strikingly, the informal networking and cooperation facilitated by these organisations seemed to run parallel to the more formal TPC, as reflected in the limited involvement of MEPs in the former. Second, and more importantly, RLPs have largely failed to involve their own activists and supporters in TPC, despite them being—as aptly put by one of the interviewees—these parties’ most valuable resource. Instead, their TPC was mostly an elite-driven and elite-based process, limited to party leaderships, MEPs (and their assistants), and a handful of other high-ranking party officials. That may well have to do with the lack of material resources, but it is also rooted in all these three parties shifting their broader strategy, as their popularity increased, from one of social mobilisation to a focus on electoral and parliamentary politics, or what Podemos’ former number two, Errejón, called “the institutional phase”. It was also a reflection of the increasingly top-down character of how these parties organised and operated internally, moving away from their initial claims of being “parties of their members”. At a deeper level, the move away from social mobilisation and disempowering of their own members was part of the same process of deradicalisation that was also reflected in the programme of these parties as they advanced on their path to electoral success. However, the overemphasis on winning seats in national parliaments and relying almost entirely on them to push for change not only undermined TPC but had the opposite effect than intended, as all three parties steadily lost electoral support after 2015, most recently witnessed in the 2023 general elections in Greece and Spain. For what arguably had brought about their

286

CONCLUSION

electoral rise in the first place had been precisely the kind of grassroot activism, social mobilisation strategy and internal democracy that allowed them to look like an alternative to the mainstream parties, eager to change the status quo. Instead, SYRIZA ended up implementing austerity, Bloco propped up a centre-left government only to see its voting base halved, while Podemos’ participation in a centre-left government allowed the radical right-wing party Vox to become the main “anti-establishment” choice in Spain today. To sum this up in a provocative way, it is the status quo that has changed these parties rather than the other way around. All in all, it was a lost decade for RLPs in Southern Europe—and across the EU more generally—to improve their historically underdeveloped transnational cooperation. In turn, this was a missed opportunity to significantly challenge the embedded neoliberalism of the EU. The crisis provided the opening for putting forward and fighting for different kinds of policies that would, among other things, alter the balance of forces between capital and labour in each country and between the North and the South, between the West and the East at the EU level. This paradigm shift did not happen and today most of the structural inequalities and the neoliberal architecture underlying it are still in place. The limits and shortcomings of TPC on the radical left, as evidenced in this book, were a key factor in this failure. The interdependence between the national and the transnational requires changes in policymaking to take place on both levels, in a simultaneous and symbiotic way. There is little room for optimism about this changing any time soon. The actors involved in TPC seem rather vague and generic in thinking about and suggesting how to improve the transnational cooperation of the left. One of the few concrete suggestions, to coordinate ahead of Council meetings, would really make sense if more RLPs would come into government across the EU. However, that seems quite implausible at the moment, with Podemos alone currently being in government but as a junior partner to a centre-left party and without exerting much influence over Spain’s policy towards the EU. Perhaps thinking of more bottomup and grassroots forms of transnational cooperation, going beyond mere TPC, would be a better avenue for these parties claiming to represent the interest of the popular classes. Perhaps paying more attention to municipal politics could also be a fruitful avenue. In any case, their poverty of ideas in terms of what is to be done suggests that increasing the transnational cooperation among them is not a priority for these parties.

CONCLUSION

287

Thus, while in the short-to-medium term, the left can only do so much to address some of the obstacles identified above, it could certainly do more about at least two of its key shortcomings. Firstly, it should address the top-down character of its transnational cooperation and strive more to build transnational mobilisation in support of its policies. This would include mobilising its rank-and-file and wider social base while also engaging and coordinating more with trade unions, social movements and other grassroots groups. That would not have to entail an abandonment of the work through institutions such as the EP, which currently monopolises the RLPs’ transnational activity, but reaching a balance where the two fields of work would feed upon each other, as two sides of the same coin. Secondly, the left needs to address its lack of a coherent and inspiring vision of Europe, capable of galvanising that kind of transnational mobilisation. While the views over the question of the EU diverge within most political families (see Bomberg, 2005, for the case of the Greens), they seem to be more significant and damaging in the case of the radical left, which has been increasingly divided between defending the EU in the name of internationalism and calling for a return to national sovereignty in the name of anti-neoliberalism. Perhaps the way forward for the left is to overcome this false dichotomy and put forward an alternative vision of democratic and bottom-up European (and global) cooperation. Such a vision would require these parties to also go beyond the confines of their neo-reformist outlook and propose systemic alternatives to the current framework of capitalism, which is perhaps inherently unable to deliver a truly united Europe.

Annex: List of Interviewees1

SYRIZA Angelina Giannopoulou—Researcher at SYRIZA’s Nicos Poulantzas Institute and facilitator of the “European Integration and the strategic perspectives of the radical Left” project of Transform. Christos Kanellopoulos—Member on SYRIZA’s Secretariat of the Department of International Relations and Foreign Policy. Giorgos Karatsioubanis—Former member of the Central Committee of SYN and, since 2015, of SYRIZA; also a member of the party’s departments for international and European affairs. Vasileios Katsardis—Former member of SYN Youth and current press officer for SYRIZA MEPs. Dimitris Rapidis—Member of the party’s Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, working for the SYRIZA delegation to the EP.

1 This lists the interviewees’ roles at the time of the research, 2016–2017.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Bortun, Crisis, Austerity and Transnational Party Cooperation in Southern Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39151-4

289

290

ANNEX: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Bloco Luís Fazenda—Founding member and former parliamentary leader of Bloco, long-standing member of its Political Committee and currently the head of the party’s department of international affairs. José Gusmão—Former MP between 2009 and 2011, current assistant of Bloco’s MEP Marisa Matias, member of the Political Bureau, and second on the list for the up-coming European elections. Tatiana Moutinho—President of CUL:TRA and facilitator of the “Strategies for the European South” project of Transform. Nuno Pedrosa—Assistant of Bloco’s MEP Marisa Matias. José Manuel Pureza—Current MP, member of the party’s National Board and academic. Podemos Daniel Albarracín—Leading member of Anticapitalistas, political advisor for GUE/NGL and in the EP for the Committee on Budget and the Committee on Panama Papers, economist. Jorge Conesa de Lara—Assistant to Podemos MEP Lola Sánchez Caldentey. Enrique Maestu—Assistant to Podemos MEP Tania Gonzáles Peñas and one of the party’s initial members. Amelia Martinez Lobo—Assistant to Podemos MEP Lola Sánchez Caldentey and member of Anticapitalistas. Alejandro Merlo—Member of the International Secretariat of Anticapitalistas and current assistant to Podemos MEP Miguel Urbán. Lilith Verstrynge—Assistant to Podemos MEP Estefanía Torres Martínez. Others Hibai Arbide Aza—Spanish journalist with left-wing leanings, close to people in Podemos, and currently working in Athens for the television network teleSUR. Walter Baier—Former National Chairman of the Communist Party of Austria (1994–2006) and Coordinator of Transform ever since the establishment of the network.

ANNEX: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

291

Yiannis Balabanidis—Greek political scientist with left-wing leanings, who also works at the Minister of Economy. Pablo Garcia—Spanish journalist with left-wing leanings, who covers EU affairs in Brussels for El Diario. Jim O’Donnell—Irish left-wing activist and long-standing staff member of GUE/NGL. Nikos Sverkos—Greek journalist with left-wing leanings who has been covering SYRIZA since 2006. Hilary Wainwright—Left-wing academic and activist from the UK, research fellow of the Transnational Institute and contributor to Transform’s website and yearbook.

Bibliography

Adams, I. (2001). Political ideology today (2nd ed.). Manchester University Press. Agustín, Ó. G. (2017). European counterpublics? DiEM25, Plan B and the agonistic European public sphere. Journal of Civil Society, 13(3), 323–336. Agustín, Ó. G., & Briziarelli, M. (2018). Introduction: Wind of change: Podemos, its dreams and its politics. In Ó. García Agustín, M. Briziarelli (Eds.), Podemos and the new political cycle (pp. 3–22). Palgrave Macmillan. Aitkenhead, D. (2012, May 22). Christine Lagarde: Can the head of the IMF save the euro? The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/ may/25/christine-lagarde-imf-euro Alston, C. (2014). Transnational solidarities and the politics of the left, 1890–1990—Introduction. European Review of History: Revue Européenne D’histoire, 21(4), 447–450. AlterSummit. (2013a). Functioning. The AlterSummit website: http://www.alt ersummit.eu/alter-sommet/article/functionning AlterSummit. (2013b). Members. The AlterSummit website: http://www.alters ummit.eu/alter-sommet/article/members AlterSummit. (2013c). The Manifesto. The AlterSummit website: http://www. altersummit.eu/manifeste/article/the-manifesto AlterSummit. (2013d). What is the AlterSummit? The AlterSummit website: http://www.altersummit.eu/alter-sommet/article/what-is-the-alter-summit AlterSummit. (2015). Petition: No to austerity! Yes to democracy! http://www. altersummit.eu/accueil/article/no-to-austerity-yes-to-democracy Amini, B. (2015). Situating the radical left in contemporary Europe. Socialism and Democracy, 29(3), 7–24.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Bortun, Crisis, Austerity and Transnational Party Cooperation in Southern Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39151-4

293

294

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Amini, B. (Ed.). (2016). The radical left in Europe in the age of austerity. Routledge. Aron, R. (2017). The opium of the intellectuals (T. Kilmartin, Trans.). Routledge (Original work published 1955). Arter, D. (2002). ‘Communists we are no longer, social democrats we can never be’: The evolution of the leftist parties in Finland and Sweden. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 18(3), 1–28. Asuar Gallego, B. (2019, January 4). Irene Montero: los retos a los que se enfrenta la ‘nueva’ líder de Podemos. Público. https://www.publico.es/pol itica/irene-montero-retos-enfrenta-nueva-lider.html ATTAC. (n.d.). Overview. https://www.attac.org/en/overview ATTAC. (1998). Platform of the international movement ATTAC. https://www. attac.org/en/whatisattac/international-platform Attinà, F. (1990). The voting behaviour of the European Parliament members and the problem of the Europarties. European Journal of Political Research, 18(3), 557–579. Austerity driving Greeks to commit suicide. (2014). The EurActiv website: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/health-consumers/study-austerity-dri ving-greeks-commit-suicide-301677?utm_source=EurActiv+Newsletter& utm_campaign=4081613f47-newsletter_social_europe__jobs&utm_medium= email&utm_term=0_bab5f0ea4e-4081613f47-245761689 Backes, U., & Moreau, P. (Eds.). (2008). Communist and post-communist parties in Europe. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Bailey, D. J., De Waele, J.-M., Escalona, F., & Vieira, M. (Eds.). (2014). European social democracy during the global economic crisis: Renovation or resignation? Manchester University Press. Bale, T. &, Dunphy, R. (2007, September). In from the cold? Left parties as normal rather than niche players in the game of government. Paper presented at the PSA-sponsored conference on radical left parties, University of Sussex. Bale, T., & Dunphy, R. (2011). In from the cold? Left parties and government involvement since 1989. Comparative European Politics, 9(3), 269–291. Bardi, L., Bressanelli, E., Calossi, E., Gagatek, W., Mair, P., & Pizzimenti, E. (2010). How to create a transnational party system (European Democracy Observatory Study). European Parliament. Bardi, L., Bressanelli, E., Calossi, E., Gagatek, W., Mair, P., & Pizzimenti, E. (2014). Political parties and political foundations at European Level: Challenges and opportunities (European Democracy Observatory Report, 2014/ 08). European University Institute. BBC News. (2015, March 18). Germany riot targets new ECB headquarters in Frankfurt. The BBC website: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe31938592

BIBLIOGRAPHY

295

BBC News. (2019, January 25). Macedonia and Greece: Vote settles 27-year name dispute. The BBC website: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-eur ope-47002865 Becker, U. (2014). The heterogeneity of capitalism in crisis-ridden Europe. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 22(3), 261–275. Bell, D. S. (Ed.). (1993). Western European communists and the collapse of communism. Berg. Bellofiore, R., Garibaldo, F., & Halevi, J. (2010). The global crisis and the crisis of European neomercantilism. In L. Panitch, G. Albo, & V. Chibber (Eds.), Socialist Register 2011: The crisis this time (pp. 129–146). The Merlin Press. Benatouil, M. (2014). Transform! Europe at the ATTAC Summer University. https://www.transform-network.net/en/blog/article/transform-europe-atthe-attac-summer-university/ Benda, J. (2017). The treason of the intellectuals (R. Aldington, Trans.). Routledge (Original work published 1928). Bensaïd, D., Sousa, A., Thornett, A., & Leplat, F. (2011). New parties of the left: Experiences from Europe. International Institute for Research and Education, (IIRE). IMG publications. Bertinotti, F. (2003, August 11). Reformist social democracy is no longer on the agenda. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/aug/ 11/globalisation.world Besancenot, O., Davanellos, A., & Urban Crespo, M. (2015). “Austerexit.”— Time for an exit from austerity—For the organization of a great Europeanwide conference of social and political resistance. http://www.europe-solida ire.org/spip.php?article35892 Bieler, A. (2018, November 16). Bilbao European Forum: The European left re-grouping towards another Europe? [Blog post]. http://andreasbieler.blo gspot.com/2018/11/bilbao-european-forum-european-left-re.html Bieler, A., & Erne, R. (2014). Transnational solidarity? The European working class in the Eurozone crisis. Socialist Register, 51(1). https://socialistregister. com/index.php/srv/article/view/22099 Bieler, A., Hilary, J., & Lindberg, I. (2014). Trade unions, ‘free trade’, and the problem of transnational solidarity: An introduction. Globalizations, 11(1), 1–9. van Biezen, I., Mair, P., & Poguntke, T. (2012). Going, going, gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 51, 24–56. Blasi, J., & Kruse, D. L. (2018). Today’s youth reject capitalism, but what do they want to replace it? The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/tod ays-youth-reject-capitalism-but-what-do-they-want-to-replace-it-94247 Blockupy. (n.d.). What is Blockupy? The Blockupy website: https://blockupy. org/en/blockupy-2/

296

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bloco. (1999). Começar de Novo. The Bloco website: http://www.bloco.org/ media/comecardenovo.pdf Bloco. (2010). On the crisis and how to overcome it. The Bloco website: http:// www.bloco.org/media/cp_bloco_100523.pdf Bloco. (2011). Unite for jobs against bankruptcy. The Bloco website: http:// www.esquerda.net/sites/default/files/files/mocaoengversion11.pdf Bloco. (2012). A program against the debt tyranny. The Bloco website: http:// www.bloco.org/media/resolmesanacional7jul12EN.pdf Bloco. (2013). National Convention resolution: “The Left against the debt”. http://www.bloco.org/media/mocaoVIIIconvBEen.pdf Bloco. (2015). Manifesto eleitoral. The Bloco website http://www.bloco.org/ media/manifestolegislativas2015.pdf Bloco. (2016a). Estatutos. The Bloco website: http://www.bloco.org/media/ estatutos_Xconv.pdf Bloco. (2016b). Motion R—Growing from the root, the radicality of inventing politics. http://www.esquerda.net/en/artigo/motion-r-growing-root-radica lity-reinventing-politics/43262 Bloco. (2016c). Motion A—The strength of hope, Left Bloc aiming for majority. http://www.esquerda.net/en/artigo/motion-strength-hopeleft-bloc-aiming-majority/43261 Bloco. (2018). Agora, a esquerda. The Bloco website: https://bloco.org/ media/deBaTes1_XIConv.pdf Bloco. (n.d.). Grupo Parlamentar. http://www.beparlamento.net/Deputados Blyth, M. (2013). Austerity: The history of a dangerous idea. Oxford University Press. Bobbio, N. (1988). Which socialism? Marxism, socialism and democracy. Polity. Bobbio, N. (1996). Left and right: The significance of a political distinction (A. Cameron, Trans.). Polity Press. Boisson, A. (1959). Les Partis politiques à l’Assemblée Commune de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier. European Yearbook. Bolleyer, N. (2009). Inside the cartel party: Party organisation in government and opposition. Political Studies, 57 (3), 559–579. Bomberg, E. (2002). The Europeanisation of Green politics: Exploring the EU’s impact. West European Politics, 25(3), 25–50. Bonfert, B. (2020). Allied against austerity: Transnational cooperation in the European Anti-Austerity Movement. Doctoral thesis, Roskilde University. https://repository.ubn.ru.nl/bitstream/handle/2066/220551/220551.pdf Bonfert, B. (2022). We need to organise millions of people’—how Alter Summit and DiEM25 struggle to create a European ‘modern prince. Globalizations, 19(1), 102–117.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

297

Bortun, V. (2020). Neither exit, nor reform: For a transitional approach to the EU. Brexit Blog, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. https://brexitblog-rosalux.eu/ 2020/05/27/neither-exit-nor-reform/now Bortun, V. (2022a). ‘SYRIZA and Podemos, we shall overcome’? Left transnational cooperation in times of crisis. Capital & Class, 46(4), 543–565. Bortun, V. (2022b). Plan B for Europe: The birth of ‘Disobedient Euroscepticism’? Journal of Common Market Studies, 60(5), 1416–1431. Bortun, V. (2023). A reconceptualization of the party family: SYRIZA, Podemos, and the emergence of the neo-reformist left. New Political Science. https:// doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2023.2235213 Botella, J., & Ramiro, L. (Eds.). (2003). The crisis of communism and party change: The evolution of West European communist and post-communist parties. Institut de Ciències Politiques i Socials. Bouma, A., Hildebrandt, C., & Koltsida, D. (Eds.). (2021). Radical in Diversity: Europe’s Left (2010–2020). The Merlin Press Ltd. Bowler, S., & Farrell, D. M. (1992). The greens at the European level. Environmental Politics, 1(1), 132–137. BozÒki, A., & Ishiyama, J. T. (Eds.). (2002). The Communist successor parties of Central and Eastern Europe. M.E. Sharpe. B˝ orzel, T. A. (1998). Organizing Babylon—On the different conceptions of policy networks. Public Administration, 76(2), 253–273. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/1467-9299.00100 Bressanelli, E. (2014). Europarties after enlargement. Organization, ideology and competition. Palgrave Macmillan. “Bringing the EU forward in 2018”. (2018). Declaration of the Summit of the Southern European Union Countries. http://www.governo.it/sites/gov erno.it/files/documenti/documenti/Notizie-allegati/governo/DeclarationI VEUSouthSummit.pdf Brunsden, J., & Khan, M. (2018, August 20). Eurozone hails Greece’s exit from bailout as end of crisis. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/aeb 930e0-a475-11e8-926a-7342fe5e173f Bull, M. J., & Heywood, P. (Eds.). (1994). West European communist parties after the revolutions of 1989. Palgrave Macmillan. Busch, K., Hermann, C., Hinrichs, K., & Schulten, T. (2013). Euro crisis, austerity policy and the European social model: How crisis policies in Southern Europe threaten the EU’s social dimension. Friedrich Ebert Foundation, International Policy Analysis. Byrne, D. (2016). Left parties turning against bosses’ Europe. Socialist World. http://www.socialistworld.net/doc/7619 Cabanillas, A. (2017, July 6). Instituto 25M, la FAES de Podemos. El Independiente. https://www.elindependiente.com/politica/2017/07/06/ins tituto-25m-faes-de-podemos/

298

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cabral, R. (2013). The Euro crisis and Portugal’s dilemma. Intereconomics/review of European Economic Policy, 48(1), 27–32. Calossi, E. (2011). Organizzazione e funzioni degli Europartiti. Il caso di Sinistra Europea. PLUS. Calossi, E. (2016). Anti-austerity left parties in the European Union: Competition, coordination and integration. Pisa University Press. Candeias, M. (2004). Antinomies: Relations between social movements, left political parties and state. The Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung website: https:// www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/engl/ESF_Candeias.pdf Canovan, M. (2002). Taking politics to the people: Populism as the ideology of democracy. In Y. Meny and Y. Surel (Eds.), Democracies and the populist challenge (pp. 25–44). Palgrave. Castellina, L. (1988). The European Community: Opportunity or negative conditioning? The impact of the integration process on the left. Socialism in the World, 66, 26–33. Castells, M. (2010). The rise of the network society (Vol. 1, 2nd ed.). WileyBlackwell. Charalambous, G. (2011). All the shades of red: Examining the radical left’s Euroscepticism. Contemporary Politics, 17 (3), 299–320. Charalambous, G. (2013). European integration and the communist dilemma. Communist party responses to Europe in Greece, Cyprus and Italy. Routledge. Charalambous, G. (2022). The European radical left: Movements and parties since the 1960s. Pluto Press. Charalambous, G., & Lamprianou, I. (2016, April). The (non) particularities of West European radical left party supporters: Comparing left party families. European Political Science Review, 1–26. Charalambous, G., & Ioannou, G. (2020). Left radicalism and populism in Europe. Routledge. Chatzistavrou, F. (2016). The politics of SYRIZA in Europe: From left-wing radicalism to post-left managerialism. CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs). http://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/monografias/grecia/ the_politics_of_syriza_in_europe_from_left_wing_radicalism_to_post_left_ managerialism Chiocchetti, P. (2014). The radical left at the 2014 European Parliament election. In C. Hildebrandt (Ed.), The left in Europe after the EU elections: New challenges (pp. 7–14). Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Chiocchetti, P. (2017). The radical left party family in Western Europe, 1989– 2015. Routledge. Chrisafis, A. (2011, July 31). Greece debt crisis: The ‘we won’t pay’ anti-austerity revolt. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/31/ greece-debt-crisis-anti-austerity

BIBLIOGRAPHY

299

Christiansen, T., & Piattoni, S. (Eds.). (2003). Informal governance in the European Union. Edward Elgar. Christiansen, T., & Neuhold, C. (2013). Informal politics in the EU. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(6), 1196–1206. Cooper, L., & Hardy, S. (2012). Beyond capitalism? The future of radical politics. Zero Books. Crouch, C. (2011). The strange non-death of neoliberalism. Polity. Crouch, C. (2013). From markets versus states to corporations versus civil society? In A. Schäfer & W. Streeck (Eds.), Politics in the age of austerity (pp. 219–238). Polity Press. Cruz-Castro, L., & Sanz-Menéndez, L. (2010). Mobility versus job stability: Assessing tenure and productivity outcomes. Research Policy, 39(1), 27–38. CUL:TRA. (2019, January 17). Past events. https://www.facebook.com/pg/ Cultra-298163613568774/events/?ref=page_internal Curry, J. L., & Urban, J. B. (Eds.). (2003). The left transformed in postcommunist societies. Rowman & Littlefield. Dahlgreen, W. (2016.) British people keener on socialism than capitalism. https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2016/02/ YouGov. 23/british-people-view-socialism-more-favourably-capi Daiber, B. & Hildebrandt, C. (2010). For a continued emancipation of the left. https://www.rosalux.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/policy.pdf Daiber, B., Hildebrandt, C., & Striethorst, A. (Eds.). (2011). From revolution to coalition—radical left parties in Europe. Rosa-Luxemburg-Foundation. Damiani, M. (2016). La sinistra radicale in Europa: Italia, Spagna, Francia, Germania. Donzelli. Damiani, M. (2020). Populist radical left parties in Western Europe. Routledge. Dawber, A. (2015, January 31). Podemos march for change: Huge crowds rally in Madrid to support Spanish leftist party. http://www.independent.co. uk/news/world/europe/huge-crowds-in-madrid-as-spanish-leftist-party-pod emos-calls-march-for-change-10015622.html De Beus, J., & Mak, J. (2005). European integration without Europeanization: Assets and limits of economism as a pragmatic frame of European politics. Acta Politica, 40, 440–458. De Cleen, B., Moffitt, B., Panayotu, P., & Stavrakakis, Y. (2020). The potentials and difficulties of transnational populism: The case of the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25). Political Studies, 68(1), 146–166. De Jongh, D. (2017, January 30). Portuguese Left Bloc Leader Catarina Martins: ‘Maastricht destroyed our democracy’. Spectrezine. http://spectr ezine.org/portuguese-left-bloc-leader-catarina-martins-%E2%80%98maastri cht-destroyed-our-democracy%E2%80%99 De Waele, J.-M., & Seiler, D.-L. (Eds.). (2012). Les partis de la gauche anticapitaliste en Europe. Economica.

300

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Della Porta, D., Andretta, M., Mosca, L., & Reiter, H. (2006). Globalization from below: Transnational activists and protest networks. University of Minnesota Press. Della Porta, D. (2014). Anti-austerity movements and the European Union. https://socialistproject.ca/2014/05/b987/ Della Porta, D., Kouki, H., & Fernández, J. (2017). Left’s love and hate for Europe: Syriza, Podemos and critical visions of Europe during the crisis. In M. Caiani & S. Guerra (Eds.), Euroscepticism, democracy and the media: Communicating Europe, contesting Europe (pp. 219–240). Palgrave Macmillan. Delwit, P., Kulahci, E., & Van Der Walle, C. (2004). The European party federations: Political players in the making? In P. Delwit, E. Kulahci, & C. Van Der Walle (Eds.), The Europarties: Organisation and influence (pp. 5–16). ULB. Demony, C., & Almeida, G. (2018, September 22). Protesters denounce gentrification in Lisbon as housing prices soar. Reuters. https://www.reuters. com/article/portugal-protests-housing/protesters-denounce-gentrificationin-lisbon-as-housing-prices-soar-idUSL8N1W80OR Di Pietro, T. (2014). Entrevista a Íñigo Errejón. Vice. https://www.vice.com/ es/article/qb9d7m/entrevista-inigo-errejon-podemos Diani, M. (1992). The concept of social movement. The Sociological Review, 40(1), 1–25. DiEM25. (n.d.). What is DiEM25? https://diem25.org/what-is-diem25/ DiEM25. (2018). “European Spring”: The transnational list to present a progressive alternative in 2019 gathers pace. https://diem25.org/europeanspring-the-transnational-list-to-present-a-progressive-alternative-in-2019-gat hers-pace/ Dietz, T. M. (2000). Similar but different? The European Greens compared to other transnational party federations in Europe. Party Politics, 6(2), 199–210. Doˇcekalová, P. (2006). Radical right-wing parties in Central Europe: Mutual contacts and cooperation. Politics in Central Europe, 2(2), 7–23. Douzinas, C. (2017). SYRIZA in power. Reflections of an accidental politician. Polity Press. Downs, W. M. (2012). Political Extremism in Democracies: Combating Intolerance. Springer. Ducange, J-N., Marlière, P., & Weber, L. (2013). La gauche radicale en Europe. Editions du Croquant. Dunphy, R. (2004). Contesting capitalism? Left parties and European integration. Manchester University Press. Dunphy, R., & Bale, T. (2011). The radical left in coalition government: Towards a comparative measurement of success and failure. Party Politics, 17 (4), 488– 504.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

301

Dunphy, R., & March, L. (2013). Seven-year itch? The European Left Party: Struggling to transform the EU. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 14(4), 520–537. Dunphy, R., & March, L. (2019). The European Left Party. Manchester University Press. Durham, M., & Power, M. (Eds.). (2010). New perspectives on the transnational right. Palgrave. Economakis, E. (2015, July 22). A view from Athens: Greece’s shell-shocked left. New Statesman. https://www.newstatesman.com/economics/2015/07/ view-athens-greece-s-shell-shocked-left Edelman Trust Barometer. (2020). 20th Annual Edelman Trust Barometer. https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2020-01/2020% 20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Global%20Report.pdf Ekathimerini, (2018, February 1). French leftist Mélenchon calls for SYRIZA’s dismissal from Party of European Left. http://www.ekathimerini.com/225 424/article/ekathimerini/news/french-leftist-melenchon-calls-for-syrizas-dis missal-from-party-of-european-left El País. (2011, May 15). La manifestación de ‘indignados’ reúne a varios miles de personas en toda España. El País website: https://elpais.com/elpais/ 2011/05/15/actualidad/1305447428_850215.html Eleftheriou, C. (2009, June). The ‘uneasy symbiosis’. Factionalism and radical politics in Synaspismos. Paper presented at the 4th PhD Symposium of the LSE Hellenic Observatory. http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/res earch/hellenicObservatory/pdf/4th_%20Symposium/PAPERS_PPS/POL ITICAL%20PARTIES%20II/ELEFTHERIOU.pdf Eleftheriou, C. (2016). Greek radical left responses to the crisis: Three types of political mobilisation, one winner. In L. March & D. Keith (Eds.), Europe’s radical left: From marginality to mainstream? (pp. 289–309). Rowman & Littlefield International. Eley, G. (2002). Forging democracy: The history of the left in Europe, 1850–2000. Oxford University Press. ENA. (n.d.). About ENA. https://www.enainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2016/09/Declaration_ENA.pdf Errejón Galván, Í. (2014, April 14). Muere Ernesto Laclau, teórico de la hegemonía. Público. https://www.publico.es/actualidad/muere-ernesto-laclau-teo rico-hegemonia.html Errejón Galván, Í., & Mouffe, C. (2016). Constructing a new politics. Soundings, 63, 43–55. Escalona, F., & Vieira, M. (2013). The radical left in Europe: Thoughts about the emergence of a family (Observatoire de la Vie Politique No. 2). Fondation Jean-Jaurès.

302

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Esquerda.net. (2009). Jovens do Bloco e do Synaspismos partilham experiencias de luta. https://www.bloco.org/jovens/not%C3%ADcias/item/1468-jovensdo-bloco-e-do-synaspismos-partilham-experiencias-de-luta.html Esquerda.net. (2015). What is the Left Bloc. https://www.esquerda.net/en/art igo/what-left-bloc/39448 Esquerda.net. (2016). Left Bloc’s 10th National Convention approves motion and elects national leadership. https://www.esquerda.net/en/artigo/leftblocs-10th-national-convention-approves-motion-and-elects-national-direct ion/43428 Esquerda.net. (2017). Lisbon declaration: ‘Our Europe, for and by the people! https://www.esquerda.net/node/51894 Eurofound. (2016, February 16). Portugal: High and rising emigration in a context of high, but decreasing, unemployment. The Eurofound website: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/2016/por tugal-high-and-rising-emigration-in-a-context-of-high-but-decreasing-unempl oyment EuroMemo Group. (n.d.). About us. http://www.euromemo.eu/about/index. html Europa Press. (2016, June 20). Unos 200 economistas firman un manifiesto de apoyo a Unidos Podemos. https://www.eleconomista.es/economia/not icias/7649685/06/16/Unos-200-economistas-firman-un-manifiesto-apoyoa-Unidos-Podemos.html European Commission. (2018). Eurobarometer: Support for the euro steady at all-time high levels. https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/eurobarometer-2018nov-20_en European Forum. (2022). Final Declaration. Athens. https://europeanforum. eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/EN-Final-declaration-1.pdf European Parliament. (2019). Projections of seats of next Parliament. http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/elections-press-kit/5/projec tions-of-seats-of-next-parliament Eurostat. (2015). Unemployment Rates by Sex and Age Groups—Monthly Average. http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_ a&lang=en Eurostat. (2018). Unemployment statistics. The European Commission website: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemploym ent_statistics#Youth_unemployment Eurostat. (2019). Euro area unemployment at 7.9%. The European Commission website: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/9477410/309012019-AP-EN.pdf/1f232ebb-1dcc-4de2-85d1-5765fae86ea8 Exadaktylos, T. (2012). A fragmented and polarised political system. In R. Gerodimos (Ed.), First thoughts on the 17 June 2012 election in

BIBLIOGRAPHY

303

Greece. http://www.gpsg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/GPSG-Ele ction-June-2012-Pamphlet.pdf Fagerholm, A. (2018). The radical right and the radical left in contemporary Europe: Two min–max definitions. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 26(4), 411–424. Farnsworth, K., & Irving, Z. (2012). Varieties of crisis, varieties of austerity: Social policy in challenging times. Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, 20(2), 133–147. Fernandes, S. & Carvalhais, I. E. (2016). Portugal: A weak case for Euroscepticism. In K. Bukovskis (Ed.), Euroscepticism in small EU member states (pp. 47–60). Latvian Institute of International Affairs. Ferraresi, G. (2016). European populism in the 21st century: The ideological background of Syriza, Podemos and the 5 Star Movement. Biblioteca Della Libertà, 216, 49–68. Firestone, W. A. (1993). Alternative arguments for generalizing from data as applied to qualitative research. Educational Researcher, 22(4), 16–23. Flassbeck, H., & Lapavitsas, C. (2015). Against the Troika: Crisis and austerity in the Eurozone. Verso. Flesher Fominaya, C. F. (2015). Debunking Spontaneity: Spain’s 15-M/ Indignados as Autonomous Movement. Social Movement Studies, 14(2), 142–163. Flesher Fominaya, C., & Hayes, G. (Eds.). (2017). Resisting austerity: Collective action in Europe in the wake of the global financial crisis. Social Movement Studies, 16(1), 1–151. Font, N., Graziano, P., & Tsakatika, M. (2021). Varieties of inclusionary populism? SYRIZA, Podemos and the Five Star Movement. Government and Opposition, 56(1), 163–183. Foster, J. B. (2000). Marx and internationalism. Monthly Review, 52(3). Foster, P. (2015, September 18). Greek elections: Embattled Alexis Tsipras asks country for second chance. The Daily Telegraph. https://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/11875937/Greek-elections-Embatt led-Alexis-Tsipras-asks-country-for-second-chance.html Freire, A. (2010). A new era in democratic Portugal? The 2009 European, legislative and local elections. South European Society and Politics, 15(4), 593–613. Freire, A., & Santana-Pereira, J. (2012). Portugal 2011: The victory of the neoliberal right, the defeat of the left. Portuguese Journal of Social Science, 11(2), 179–187. Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago University Press. Fukuyama, F. (1992). The end of history and the last man. Free Press.

304

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gagatek, W. (2010). Campaigning in the European Parliament elections. In W. Gagatek (Ed.), The 2009 Elections to the European Parliament: Country reports (pp. 13–19). European University Institute. Gagatek, W., & Van Hecke, S. (2011). Towards policy-seeking Europarties? The development of European political foundations (EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 2011/58). European University Institute. Gamble, A. (2009). The spectre at the feast: Capitalist crisis and the politics of recession. Palgrave. García, P. (2016, August 3). “Hay gente de Syriza con la que ya no me hablo”. Revista Contexto. http://ctxt.es/es/20160803/Politica/7601/parlamentoeuropeo-politica-izquierda-escepticismo.htm Gemenis, K., & Dinas, E. (2010). Confrontation still? Examining parties’ policy positions in Greece. Comparative European Politics, 18(1), 179–201. Giddens, A. (1994). Beyond left and right: The future of radical politics. Stanford University Press. Gil, A. (2015, September 14). Dos diputados autonómicos de Podemos viajan a Atenas para apoyar a Unidad Popular, la escisión de Syriza. eldiario.es. https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Podemos-Atenas-Unidad-Popular-Syriza_ 0_430807554.html Gil, I. (2016, September 25). Pablo Iglesias ‘Khaleesi’ replica a Errejón: “Ser transversal no es parecerse al PSOE”. El Confidencial. https://www.elconf idencial.com/espana/2016-09-25/pablo-iglesias-khaleesi-debate-podemos_1 265374/ Gilmartin, E. (2017, September 30). Only the beginning: An interview with Miguel Urbán. Jacobin. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/09/only-thebeginning Gohlke, N., & Wissler, J. (2015, July 31). Escaping the Euro dream. Jacobin. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/07/germany-greece-austerity-grexit/ Golemis, H. (2012). Coping with the challenge posed by the crisis. The Transform website: https://www.transform-network.net/en/blog/article/copingwith-the-challenge-posed-by-the-crisis/ Golemis, H. (2016). To tell the truth is revolutionary (Speech of Haris Golemis at the SYRIZA 2nd Congress in October 2016). http://www.kommunisten. de/attachments/6397_Golemis_To_tell_the_truth_is_revolutionary.pdf González Peñas, T. (2015). Podemos supports SYRIZA. https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=-odmhOJI7zM Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, M., & Plaza-Colodro, C. (2018). Populist Euroscepticism in Iberian party systems. Politics, 38(3), 344–360. Greek Parliament. (n.d.). CVs. https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Voulef tes/Viografika-Stoicheia/

BIBLIOGRAPHY

305

Greeks, don’t give in to the EU’s austerity ultimatum. (2015, June 29). The Guardian. The Guardian website: https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2015/jun/29/greeks-dont-give-in-to-eu-ultimatum Greenspan, A. (2011, October 6). Europe’s crisis is all about the north-south split. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/678b163a-ef68-11e0bc88-00144feab49a GUE/NGL. (n.d.). “About”. http://www.guengl.eu/group/about GUE/NGL. (1994). Constitutive Declaration of the Confederal Group Gauche Unitaire Européenne/Nordic Green Left. Guiat, C. (2003). The French and Italian Communist Parties: Comrades and culture. Frank Cass. Gumbrell-McCormick, R., & Hyman, R. (2013). Trade unions in Western Europe: Hard times, hard choices. Oxford University Press. Halikiopoulou, N., & Vasilopoulou, S. (2012). The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical right and radical left Euroscepticism. European Journal of Political Research, 51(4), 504–539. Hall, P. A. (2012). The economics and politics of the Euro crisis. German Politics, 21(4), 355–371. Hall, M. (2015, July 4). Greek exit from euro “could be temporary”, says Germany. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ europe/greece/11718152/Greek-exit-from-euro-could-be-temporary-saysGermany.html Handl, V. (2002). Die Tschechische Kommunistische Partei: orthodoxes Fossil oder erfolgreiche neokommunistische Protestpartei? FES Library. Hanf, K., & Soetendorp, B. (1998). Small states and the Europeanization of public policy. In K. Hanf & B. Soetendorp (Eds.), Adapting to European integration: Small states and the European Union (pp. 1–13). Longman. Hanley, D. (2008). Beyond the nation state: Parties in the era of European integration. Palgrave Macmillan. Harris, R. L. (1979). The influence of Marxist structuralism on the intellectual left in Latin America. Critical Sociology, 9(1), 62–73. Harvard IOP Survey. (2016). Survey of Young Americans’ Attitudes toward Politics and Public Service 29th Edition. https://iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/ files/content/160423_Harvard%20IOP_Spring%202016_TOPLINE_u.pdf Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press. Harvey, D. (2010). The enigma of capital and the crises of capitalism. Profile. Hayek, F. A. (1990). The constitution of liberty. Routledge. Hazareesingh, S. (1991). Intellectuals and the French Communist Party: Disillusion and decline. Clarendon Press. Heartfield, J. (2003). Postmodern desertions—capitalism and anti-capitalism. International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, 5(2), 271–289.

306

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Heilig, D. (2016). Mapping the European left: Socialist parties in the EU . Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Heisenberg, D. (2005). The institution of ‘consensus’ in the European Union: Formal versus informal decision-making in the Council. European Journal of Political Research, 44(1), 65–90. Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund. (2018). Press release: The transfer of the 66% of DESFA’ shares to SENFLUGA Energy Infrastructure Holdings S.A. is completed. https://hradf.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ complete-transfer-DESFA.pdf Henley, J., Boffey, D., & Smith, H. (2018, June 22). Greece ‘turning a page’ as Eurozone agrees deal to end financial crisis. The Guardian. https://www.the guardian.com/world/2018/jun/22/eurozone-greece-financial-crisis-deal Héritier, A. (2007). Explaining institutional change in Europe. Oxford University Press. Hermann, C. (2007). Neoliberalism in the European Union. Studies in Political Economy, 79, 61–89. Heywood, A. (2003). Political ideologies: An introduction (3rd ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. Hildebrandt, C., & Daiber, B. (Eds.). (2009). The left in Europe: Political parties and party alliances between Norway and Turkey. Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. Hix, S., & Lord, C. (1997). Political Parties in the European Union. Macmillan. Hix, S., Noury, A. G., & Roland, G. (2007). Democratic politics in the European Parliament. Cambridge University Press. Holmes, M., & Lightfoot, S. (2012). Europeanisation of the Left: Cooperation or competition? In G. Strange & O. Worth (Eds.), European regionalism and the left (pp. 85–100). Manchester University Press. Holmes, M., & Lightfoot, S. (2016). To EU or not to EU? The transnational radical left and the crisis. In L. March & D. Keith (Eds.), Europe’s radical left: From marginality to mainstream? (pp. 333–351). Rowman & Littlefield International. Holmes, M., & Roder, K. (Eds.). (2012). The left and the European constitution. From Laeken to Lisbon. Manchester University Press. Hough, D., & Verge, T. (2009). A sheep in wolf’s clothing or a gift from Heaven? Left-left coalitions in comparative perspective. Regional and Federal Studies, 19, 37–55. Howarth, D. (2015, January 29). The success of Syriza in Greece has been driven by Marxism, populism and yes, Essex University. Independent. https:// www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-success-of-syriza-in-greecehas-been-driven-by-marxism-populism-and-yes-essex-university-10010806. html Hudson, K. (2000). European communism since 1989. Macmillan.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

307

Hudson, K. (2012). The new European left: A socialism for the twenty-first century? Palgrave Macmillan. Hughes, N. (2011). Young people took to the streets and all of a sudden all of the political parties got old: The 15M Movement in Spain. Social Movement Studies, 10(4), 407–413. infoLibre. (2018, November 27). Pablo Bustinduy será el cabeza de lista de Podemos para las elecciones europeas de 2019. https://www.infolibre.es/not icias/politica/2018/11/27/pablo_bustinduy_sera_cabeza_lista_podemos_p ara_las_elecciones_europeas_2019_89257_1012.html IEA. (2021). 67 per cent of young Brits want a socialist economic system, finds new poll. Institute of Economic Affairs website: https://iea.org.uk/media/ 67-per-cent-of-young-brits-want-a-socialist-economic-system-finds-new-poll/ Iglesias, P. (2013). Curriculum Vitae. https://web.archive.org/web/201410302 34532/; http://sindominio.net/~pablo/trabajos/cv_08.pdf Iglesias, P. (2015a). Politics in a time of crisis. Podemos and the future of a democratic Europe. Verso. Iglesias, P. (2015b). Understanding Podemos. New Left Review, 93, 7–22. Iglesias, P. (2015c). Spain on edge. New Left Review, 93, 23–42. Institute of Economic Affairs. (2021). 67 per cent of young Brits want a socialist economic system, finds new poll. Institute of Economic Affairs website: https://iea.org.uk/media/67-per-cent-of-young-brits-want-a-social ist-economic-system-finds-new-poll/ Ishiyama, J. T. (Ed.). (1999). Communist successor parties in post-Communist politics. Nova Science. Izquierda Revolucionaria. (2017). Spain: Pablo Iglesias wins clear victory in Podemos congress. http://www.socialistworld.net/index.php/international/ europe/28-spain/7884-spain-pablo-iglesias-wins-clear-victory-in-podemoscongress Jacobs, F., & Corbett, R. (1990). The European Parliament. Longman. Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties. Discourse in Belgium. European Journal of Political Research, 46, 319–345. Janssen, T. (2013). The parties of the left in Europe: A comparison of their positions on European policy leading into the 2014 European elections. Rosa-LuxemburgStiftung. Joffe, J. (2011, September 12). The Euro widens the culture gap. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/12/willculture-clash-splinter-the-european-union/the-euro-widened-the-culture-gap? scp=2&sq=josef%20joffe&st=cse Johansson, K. M. (2002). Party elites in multilevel Europe: The Christian Democrats and the Single European Act. Party Politics, 8(4), 423–439.

308

BIBLIOGRAPHY

John, M. (2020). Capitalism seen doing ‘more harm than good’ in global survey. Reuters website: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-davos-meetingtrust-idUSKBN1ZJ0CW Jolly, M. (2005). A demos for the European Union? Politics, 25(1), 12–18. Kaiser, W. (2004). Transnational Christian democracy: From the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales to the European People’s Party. In M. Gehler & W. Kaiser (Eds.), Christian democracy in Europe since 1945 (Vol. 2, pp. 194–208). Routledge. Kaiser, W., & Starie, P. (Eds.). (2005). Transnational European Union: Towards a common political space. Routledge. Kaiser, W. (2007). Christian democracy and the origins of the European Union. Cambridge University Press. Kaiser, W. (2008). Transnational networks in European governance: The informal politics of integration. In W. Kaiser, B. Leucht, & M. Rasmussen (Eds.), The history of the European Union (pp. 24–45). Routledge. Kaiser, W., Leucht, B., & Gehler, M. (2010). Transnational networks in European integration governance: Historical perspectives on an elusive phenomenon. In W. Kaiser, B. Leucht, & M. Gehler (Eds.), Transnational Networks in Regional Integration. Governing Europe, 1945–83 (pp. 1–17). Palgrave Macmillan. Kaiser, W. (2013). Europeanization of Christian democracy? Negotiating organization, enlargement, policy and allegiance in the European People’s Party. In W. Kaiser & J.-H. Meyer (Eds.), Societal actors in European integration: Polity-building and policy-making, 1958–1992 (pp. 15–37). Palgrave Macmillan. Kalyvas, S., & Marantzidis, N. (2002). Greek communism, 1968–2001. East European Politics and Societies, 16(3), 665–690. Kapteyn, P. (1960). The Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community as a representative institution. In K. Lindsay (Ed.), European Assemblies: The experimental Period, 1949–1959. Stevens & Sons Limited. Karitzis, A. (2017). The European left in times of crisis: Lessons from Greece. Transnational Institute (TNI). Katsambekis, G., & Kioupkiolis, A. (2019). The populist radical left in Europe. Routledge. Katz, R. S., Mair, P., Bardi, L., Bille, L., Deschouwer, K., Farrell, D., Koole, R., Morlino, L., Müller, W., Pierre, J., Poguntke, T., Sundberg, J., Svasand, L., van de Velde, H., Webb, P., & Widfeldt, A. (1992). The membership of political parties in European democracies, 1960–1990. European Journal of Political Research, 22(3), 329–345. Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (1995). Changing models of party organization and party democracy: The emergence of the cartel party. Party Politics, 1(1), 5–28.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

309

Keating, M., & McCrone, D. (2013). The crisis of social democracy in Europe. Edinburgh University Press. Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Cornell University Press. Keith, D. (2010). Ready to get their hands dirty. The Socialist Party and GroenLinks in the Netherlands. In J. Olsen, D. Hough, & M. Koß (Eds.), From pariahs to players? Left parties in national governments (pp. 155–172). Palgrave Macmillan. Keith, D. (2017). Opposing Europe, opposing austerity: Radical left parties and the Eurosceptic debate. In B. Leruth, N. Startin, & S. Usherwood (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism (pp. 86–99). Keith, D., & March, L. (2016). Introduction. In L. March & D. Keith (Eds.), Europe’s radical left: From marginality to mainstream? (pp. 1–23). Rowman & Littlefield International. Kioupkiolis, A. (2016). Podemos: The ambiguous promises of left-wing populism in contemporary Spain. Journal of Political Ideologies, 21(2), 99–120. Kioupkiolis A., & Katsambekis, G. (2018). Radical left populism from the margins to the mainstream: A comparison of Syriza and Podemos. In Ó. García Agustín, M. Briziarelli (Eds.), Podemos and the new political cycle (pp. 201–226). Palgrave Macmillan. KKE. (2014). Statement of the Central Committee of the KKE on the stance of the KKE in the EU parliament. http://inter.kke.gr/en/articles/Statementof-the-Central-Committee-of-the-KKE-on-the-stance-of-the-KKE-in-the-EUparliament/ Klein, M. C. (2018, April 4). What’s up with Portugal? Financial Times. https:// ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/04/04/2199417/whats-up-with-portugal/ Klotz, P., Lin, T. C., & Hsu, S. H. (2016). Modelling property bubble dynamics in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Journal of European Real Estate Research, 9(1), 52–75. Knieling, J., & Othengrafen, F. (Eds.). (2016). Cities in crisis: Socio-spatial impacts of the economic crisis in Southern European cities. Routledge. Knight, D. M. (2013, January 30). Greece is used to justify unpopular domestic reforms. Social Europe Journal. https://www.socialeurope.eu/greece-is-usedto-justify-unpopular-domestic-reforms Koltsida, D. (2019). The Greek Left before 2019 EU election. The Transform website: https://www.transform-network.net/en/focus/overview/article/ ep-2019-the-european-left-one-mouth-many-voices/the-greek-left-before2019-eu-election/ Kouki, H., & González, J. F. (2018). Syriza, Podemos and mobilizations against austerity: Movements, parties or movement-parties? In J. Roose, M. Sommer, & F. Scholl (Eds.), Europas Zivilgesellschaft in der Wirtschafts-und Finanzkrise (pp. 123–140). Springer VS.

310

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kousis, M. (2014). The transnational dimension of the Greek protest campaign against Troika memoranda and austerity policies, 2010–2012. In D. della Porta & A. Mattoni (Eds.), Spreading protest: Social movements in times of crisis (pp. 137–170). ECPR Press. Kouvelakis, S. (2016). Greece: Turning ‘No’ into a political front. In C. Príncipe & B. Sunkara (Eds.), Europe in Revolt (pp. 9–15). Haymarket Books. Kriesi, H., & Pappas, T. S. (2015). Populism during crisis: An introduction. In H. Kriesi & T. S. Pappas (Eds.), European populism in the shadow of the Great Recession (pp. 9–18). ECPR Press. La Vanguardia. (2017, October 27). Iglesias considera “ilegal” e “ilegítima” la declaración de independencia. The La Vanguardia website: https://www. lavanguardia.com/politica/20171027/432387702182/pablo-iglesias-ilegalilegitima-declaracion-de-independencia.html Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (1985). Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics. Verso. Ladi, S., & Graziano, P. (2014). ’Fast forward’ Europeanization: Welfare state reform in light of Eurozone crisis. In R. Coman, T. Kostera, & L. Tomini (Eds.), Europeanization and EU Integration: From incremental to structural change? (pp. 108–126). Palgrave. Ladrech, R. (2002). Europeanization and political parties: Towards a framework for analysis. Party Politics, 8(4), 389–403. Ladrech, R. (2003). The party of European socialists: Networking Europe’s social democrats. The Journal of Policy History, 15(1), 113–129. Ladrech, R. (2007). Supporting European political foundations affiliated with political parties at the European level. Europäisches Parlament, 2007 , 39–48. Lanzavecchia, A., & Pavarani, E. (2015). Democracy of Euro: Who will surrender? Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance, 26(6), https://doi. org/10.1002/jcaf.22077. Lapavitsas, C., Kaltenbrunner, A., Labrinidis, G., Lindo, D., Meadway, J., Mitchell, J., Painceira, J. P., Pires, E., Powell, J., Stenfors, A., Teles, N., & Vatikiotis, L. (2012). Crisis in the Eurozone. Verso. Laskos, C., & Tsakalotos, E. (2014). Crucible of Resistance: Greece, the Eurozone & the World Economic Crisis. Pluto Press. Laurent, P. (2016). Alliance for democracy—against austerity in Europe. The PCF website: http://international.pcf.fr/85230 Laursen, F. (Ed.). (2013). The EU and the eurozone crisis: Policy challenges and strategic choices. Ashgate. Lavelle, A. (2013). The death of social democracy: Political consequences in the 21st century. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Lavelle, A. (2014). Postface: Death by a thousand cuts. In D. J. Bailey, J.-M. De Waele, F. Escalona, & M. Vieira (Eds.), European social democracy during the

BIBLIOGRAPHY

311

global economic crisis: Renovation or resignation? (pp. 270–283). Manchester University Press. Leblond, P. (2012). One for all and all for one: The global financial crisis and the European integration project. In L. Fioramonti (Ed.), Regions and crises: New challenges for contemporary regionalisms (pp. 50–66). Palgrave Macmillan. LFI. (2018). Maintenant le people! Pour une revolution citoyenne en Europe [Now the people! For a citizens’ revolution in Europe]. https://lafranceinso umise.fr/2018/04/13/peuple-revolution-citoyenne-europe/ Lightfoot, S. (2005). The rise of the party of European socialists. Routledge. Lightfoot, S. (2006). The consolidation of Europarties? The “Party Regulation” and the development of political parties in the European Union. Representation, 42(4), 303–314. Lisi, M. (2009). New politics in Portugal: The rise and success of the Left Bloc. Po“le Sud, 1(30). http://www.cairn.info/revue-pole-sud-2009-1-page127.htm Lisi, M. (2013). Rediscovering civil society? Renewal and continuity in the Portuguese radical left. South European Society and Politics, 18(1), 21–39. Lisi, M., & Cancela, J. (2017). Types of party members and their implications: Results from a survey of Portuguese party members. Party Politics, 20(10), 1–11. López de Miguel, A. (2014, October 23). Vamos a construir una maquina de guerra electoral. Público. http://www.publico.es/actualidad/construir-maq uinaria-guerra-electoral.html Louçã, F. (2007). Where is the Left Bloc going? http://www.internationalviewp oint.org/spip.php?article1420 Louçã, F. (2010). Somehow, we filled a space that did not exist, a political space that had not yet been recognized. www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php? article1923 Louça, F., & Konstantopoulou, Z. (2015). 20150516 Lisbon. Video retrieved from YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ISujPYkXA4 Lourenço, P., Conceição, T., & Jalali, C. (2023). Dealing with the facts of life: The management of intra-party factionalism in the Iberian radical left parties. Government and Opposition, 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2023.9 Löwy, M., & Stanley, C. S. (2002). Towards an international of resistance against capitalist globalisation. Latin American Perspectives, 29(6), 127–131. Lynch, K. (2006). Neo-liberalism and marketisation: The implications for higher education. European Educational Research Journal, 5(1), 1–17. Macartney, H. (2010). Variegated neoliberalism: EU varieties of capitalism and international political economy. Routledge. Machuca, P. (2016, May 19). Voices from the anti-austerity movement that changed Spain. The Huffington Post. www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/spain15m-activists-los-indignados_us_573ca5c8e4b0aee7b8e8a76f

312

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Magginas, N. S., Alevizopoulou, E., Gouveli, A., Balikou, E., & Murphy, G. (2019). Greece: Macro Outlook 2019. National Bank of Greece website. https://www.nbg.gr/en/group/studies-and-economic-analysis/rep orts/taseis-stin-elliniki-oikonomia---ianouarios-2019 Mak, J., & Van Tatenhove, J. (2006). Introduction: Informality in a future EU. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 7 (1), 1–7. Manetto, F. (2015, April 30). Podemos co-founder criticizes mainstream drift in his own party. El País. https://elpais.com/elpais/2015/04/30/inenglish/ 1430403454_148415.html?rel=mas March, L. (2002). The Communist Party in post-Soviet Russia. Manchester University Press. March, L., & Mudde, C. (2005). What’s left of the radical left? The European radical left after 1989: Decline and mutation. Comparative European Politics, 3, 23–49. March, L. (2011). Radical left parties in Europe. Routledge. March, L., & Rommerskirchen, C. (2015). Out of left field? Explaining the variable electoral success of European radical left parties. Party Politics, 21(1), 40–53. March, L., & Keith, D. (Eds.). (2016). Europe’s radical left: From marginality to mainstream? Rowman & Littlefield International. March, L. (2016). Radical left ‘success’ before and after the Great Recession: Still waiting for the great leap forwards? In L. March & D. Keith (Eds.), Europe’s radical left: From marginality to mainstream? (pp. 27–50). Rowman & Littlefield International. March, L., Escalona, F., & Keith, D. (Eds.). (2023). The Palgrave Handbook of the Radical Left. Palgrave Macmillan. Markou, G. (2021). The systemic metamorphosis of Greece’s once radical left-wing SYRIZA party. openDemocracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/ en/rethinking-populism/the-systemic-metamorphosis-of-greeces-once-rad ical-left-wing-syriza-party/ Martell, L. (2013). Social democracy after the crisis in Europe and the crisis of social democracy. Renewal: A Journal of Labour Politics, 21(4), 31–38. Martin, J. (Ed.). (2008). The Poulantzas reader: Marxism, law and the state. Verso. Marx, K. (1864 [2000]). Inaugural Address of the International Working Men’s Association. In Inaugural Address and Provisional Rules of the International Working Men’s Association. The Marx & Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org): https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1864/10/27.htm Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1975). Critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right. Introduction. In K. Marx, Early writings (pp. 243–257). Penguin.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

313

Matsaganis, M., & Leventi, C. (2014). The distributional impact of austerity and the recession in Southern Europe. South European Society and Politics, 19(3), 393–412. Matthijs, M. (2014). Mediterranean blues: The crisis in Southern Europe. Journal of Democracy, 25(1), 101–115. McKee, M., Karanikolos, M., Belcher, P., & Stuckler, D. (2012). Austerity: A failed experiment on the people of Europe. Clinical Medicine, 12(4), 346– 350. McNally, D. (2011). Slump, austerity and resistance. In L. Panitch, G. Albo, & V. Chibber (Eds.), Socialist Register 2012: The crisis and the left (pp. 36–63). The Merlin Press. Meardi, G. (2011, September 7–10). Flexicurity & state traditions: The Europeanisation of employment policies before and after the economic crisis. Paper presented at the 2011 European Sociological Association’s Conference. https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/wbs/research/irru/public ations/recentconf/esa_gm.pdf Méndez de Andés, A. (2014). Spain’s radical tide. Red Pepper. The Red Pepper website: https://www.redpepper.org.uk/spains-radical-tide/ “Merkel tells southern Europeans to work longer”. (2011, May 18). The Local. https://www.thelocal.de/20110518/35095 Michalopoulos, S. (2016, May 4). S&D: PASOK is ‘completely isolated’ in our group. Euractiv. https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/sdpasok-is-completely-isolated-in-our-group/ Michalopoulos, S. (2018a, November 8). Syriza in quest to unite progressive forces ahead of EU elections. Euractiv. https://www.euractiv.com/section/ eu-elections-2019/news/hold-syriza-in-quest-to-unite-progressive-forcesahead-of-eu-elections/ Michalopoulos, S. (2018b, November 12). EU progressives sow seeds to ‘save’ Europe. Euractiv. https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-elections2019/news/eu-progressives-sow-seeds-to-walk-together-to-save-europe/ Moffitt, B., & Tormey, S. (2013). Rethinking populism: Politics, mediatisation and political style. Political Studies, 62(2), 381–397. Moreau, P., Courtois, S., & Hirscher, G. (Eds.). (1998). Der Kommunismus in Westeuropa: Niedergang oder Mutation? Olzog. Moreno, J. (2019). Spanish turmoil. The Transform website: https://www.tra nsform-network.net/en/focus/overview/article/ep-2019-the-european-leftone-mouth-many-voices/spanish-turmoil/ Moschonas, G. (2013). The ‘broken equilibrium’ in European politics: The Europe factor and the weakening of mainstream parties (with an emphasis on centre-left and radical Left parties). In The Rise of Populism and Extremist Parties in Europe, The Spinelli Group (in collaboration with Bertelsmann Stiftung) (pp. 20–27).

314

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Mouffe, C. (2018). For a left populism. Verso. Moutinho, T. (2019). The Left in the aftermath of the Geringonça experience, the crisis within the Neoliberal Right and the populist threat. The Transform website: https://www.transform-network.net/en/focus/overview/article/ ep-2019-the-european-left-one-mouth-many-voices/the-left-in-the-afterm ath-of-the-geringonca-experience-the-crisis-within-the-neoliberal-right-and-t/ Mudde, C. (2002). Extremist movements. In P. Heywood, E. Jones & M. Rhodes (Eds.), Developments in West European Politics 2 (pp. 135–148). Palgrave. Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. Mudde, C. (2017). SYRIZA: The failure of the populist promise. Palgrave Macmillan. Murray, P. (2004). Factors for integration? Transnational Party Cooperation in the European Parliament, 1952–79. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 50(1), 102–115. Navarro, V. (2007). Neoliberalism as a class ideology; or, the political causes of the growth of inequalities. International Journal of Health Services, 37 (1), 47–62. Newman, M. (1996). Party of European socialists. London Metropolitan University. Nicos Poulantzas Institute. (n.d.). About Nicos Poulantzas Institute. https:// poulantzas.gr/about-nicos-poulantzas-institute-npi/ Niedermayer, O. (1983). Europdische Parteien? Zur grenziiberschreitenden Interaktion politischer Parteien im Rahmen der EG. Campus Verlag. Nikolakakis, N. (2015). Venceremos? SYRIZA and the European Left Live to Fight another Day. Greek Politics Specialist Group (Political Studies Association), Pamphlet No 5. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 282337669_Venceremos_Syriza_and_the_European_Left_Live_to_Fight_ano ther_Day Nikolakakis, N. (2016). SYRIZA’s stance vis-à-vis the European Union following the financial crisis: The persistence of left Europeanism and the role of the European Left Party. European Politics and Society. https://doi.org/10. 1080/23745118.2016.1196918 Now, the People. (2019). First Day at the Parliament, a New Beginning for the Alliance. https://nowthepeople.eu/a-new-beginning-for-the-alliance/ O’Neill, M. (1997). New politics, old predicaments: The case of the European Greens. The Political Quarterly, 68(1), 50–67. Objetivos de Podemos: Reestructuración de la deuda y paralización de los desahucios. (2014, October 19). Público. http://www.publico.es/politica/ objetivos-reestructuracion-deuda-y-paralizacion.html

BIBLIOGRAPHY

315

OECD. (2015). Country Fact Sheet: Greece. https://www.oecd.org/gov/Greece. pdf Olsen, J., Hough, D., & Koß, M. (Eds.). (2010). From pariahs to players? Left parties in national governments. Palgrave Macmillan. Ortiz-Ospina, E., & Roser, M. (2016). Government Spending. OurWorldInData.org. https://ourworldindata.org/government-spending Ostry, J. D., Loungani, P., & Furceri, D. (2016). Neoliberalism: Oversold? Finance & Development, 53(2), 38–41. Palley, T. I. (2013). Europe’s crisis without end: The consequences of neoliberalism. Contributions to Political Economy, 32, 29–50. Panayiotakis, M. (2015). The radical left in Greece. Socialism and Democracy, 29(3), 25–43. Panebianco, A. (1988). Political parties. Organisation and power. Oxford University Press. Panitch, L., Gindin, S., & Aquanno, S. M. (2015). American empire and the relative autonomy of European capitalism. Competition & Change, 19(2), 113–128. Papadimoulis, D. (2017, June 23). Three strategic priorities for the progressive political forces in the EU. European Post. http://europeanpost.co/three-str ategic-priorities-for-the-progressive-political-forces-in-the-eu/ Papini, R. (1997). Christian Democrat International. Rowman & Littlefield. Parker, P., & Pye, R. (2017). Mobilising social rights in EU economic governance: A pragmatic challenge to neoliberal Europe. Comparative European Politics, 16(5), 805–824. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-017-0102-1 Payiatsos, A. (2017). The rise and ‘fall’ of SYRIZA. The crisis of the Greek Left. PEL. (2013). Congress draft political document. https://www.european-left. org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/political_doc_en.pdf PEL. (2018). Statute. https://www.european-left.org/statute/ PEL. (2019). Common Platform for the 2019 European elections. For a progressive exit from the crisis. https://www.european-left.org/wp-content/ uploads/2019/02/1.-EN-Electoral-Platform-2019-2.pdf PES. (2015). PES Statutes. https://www.pes.eu/export/sites/default/Dow nloads/PES-Documents/FINAL_amended_PES_Statutes_EN_clean.pdf_646 45215.pdf PES. (2017). Progressive prime ministers emphasise need for European unity. The PES website: https://www.pes.eu/en/news-events/news/detail/Progre ssive-prime-ministers-emphasise-need-for-European-unity/ Petry, J. (2013). From PIIGS and the drive towards austerity: The discursive construction of the Eurozone crisis & its impact on European welfare states. Paper presented at the DVPW, ÖGPW, SVPW Joint Conference “DreiLänder-Tagung: Politik der Vielfalt”, 19–21 September 2013, University of Innsbruck, Austria.

316

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Pérez, C. (2022, November 25). Las claves sobre el impuesto a las grandes fortunas: ¿a quién afecta? ¿cuánto se espera recaudar? RTVE. https://www. rtve.es/noticias/20221125/todo-sobre-nuevo-impuesto-grandes-fortunas-afe ctados-recaudacion-comunidades/2409955.shtml Piccio, D. (2016). The impact of social movements on Parties. In L. Bosi, M. Giugni, & K. Uba (Eds.), The consequences of social movements (pp. 263–284). Cambridge University Press. Plan B. (2015). A Plan B in Europe. https://www.euro-planb.eu/?page_id=96& lang=en Plan B. (2016a). Declaration for a democratic rebellion in Europe. http://pla nbeuropa.es/declaration-for-a-democratic-rebellion-in-europe/?lang=en Plan B. (2016b). Statement for a stranding Plan B in Europe. http://euro-pla nb.dk/ Plan B. (2017a). A Plan B for the EU and the Eurozone. http://www.cadtm. org/Summit-Statement-A-Plan-B-for-the-EU-and-the-Eurozone Plan B. (2017b). Lisbon Declaration: “Our Europe, for and by the people!”. https://www.esquerda.net/en/artigo/lisbon-declaration-our-europe-andpeople/51894 PM Tsipras: “Tactical retreat or a disorderly default and Grexit” (2015, July 30). To Vima. http://www.tovima.gr/en/article/?aid=726448 Podemos. (2014). Mover ficha: convertir la indignación en cambio político. http://tratarde.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Manifiesto-MoverFicha-enero-de-2014.pdf Podemos. (2016). Declaration of Bilbao for the International Democracy. https://lasonrisadeunpais.es/en/declaracion-de-bilbao-por-la-democracia-int ernacional/ Podemos. (2017). Documento politico. The Podemos website: https://files.pod emos.info/HihzerN5Ev.pdf Podemos. (2018a). Círculos. The Podemos website: https://podemos.info/cir culos/ Podemos. (2018b). Organos estatales. The Podemos website: https://podemos. info/organos-estatales/ Podemos. (2018c). Ahora, el pueblo: Declaración de Lisboa por una revolución democrática en Europa. The Podemos website: https://podemos.info/ahorael-pueblo/ Podemos. (2019). Cargos Públicos. https://transparencia.podemos.info/cargospublicos/ Podemos. (2022). ¿Qué hemos hecho en el Gobierno? https://www.instagram. com/p/ChRveZDKD4a/ Podemos Londres. (2015a). 15F: Podemos Londres en solidaridad con el pueblo griego. https://podemoslondres.com/2015/02/15/15f-podemoslondres-en-solidaridad-con-el-pueblo-griego/

BIBLIOGRAPHY

317

Podemos Londres. (2015b). Europe is Changing: video del evento. https://pod emoslondres.com/2015/06/10/europe-is-changing-video-del-evento/ Poguntke, T., Aylott, N., Carter, E., Ladrech, R., & Luther, K. R. (2007). The Europeanization of National Political Parties: Power and organization adaption. Routledge. Poll of polls. (2019). First successful vote of no confidence in Spain, Rajoy ousted. Sánchez new PM. Snap Election in April. https://pollofpolls.eu/ES Post, C. (2012). What is left of Leninism? New European left parties in historical perspective. The Question of Strategy: Socialist Register 2013. Pridham, G. (1982). Christian democrats, conservatives and transnational party cooperation in the European Community: Centre-forward or centre-right? In Z. Layton-Henry (Ed.), Conservative politics in Western Europe (pp. 318– 346). Palgrave Macmillan. Pridham, G. (2005). Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe. Palgrave. Pridham, G. (2008). European party cooperation and post-communist politics: Euroscepticism in transnational perspective. Comparative and theoretical perspectives. In A. Szczerbiak & P. Taggart (Eds.), Opposing Europe? The comparative party politics of Euroscepticism (Vol. II, pp. 76–103). Oxford University Press. Príncipe, C. (2016). The Deferred Portuguese Revolution. In C. Príncipe & B. Sunkara (Eds.), Europe in revolt (pp. 159–174). Haymarket Books. Príncipe, C. (2018). The Portuguese myth. Jacobin. https://www.jacobinmag. com/2018/06/portugal-left-bloc-socialist-party-austerity Progressive Caucus. (n.d.). About. http://www.progressivecaucus.eu/ Progressive Caucus. (2018, March 19). Progressive Caucus at the Progressive Forum in Athens. http://www.progressivecaucus.eu/progressive-caucus-pro gressive-forum-athens/ Quinn, B. (2015). Syriza Victory Rally—London [Video file]. https://www.you tube.com/watch?time_continue=24&v=OZIilafeFlY Quinn, B., & Gani, A. (2015, January 30). How British universities helped mould Syriza’s political elite. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2015/jan/30/how-british-universities-helped-mould-syriza-politicalelite Racz, B., & Bukowski, C. J. (Eds.). (1999). The return of the left in postCommunist states: Current trends and future prospects. Edward Elgar. Ramiro, L. (2016). Support for radical left parties in Western Europe: Social background, ideology and political orientations. European Political Science Review, 8(1), 1–23. Ramiro, L., & Gomez, R. (2016). Radical-left populism during the Great Recession: Podemos and its competition with the established radical left. Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321716647400

318

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ramonet, I. (1997, December). Désarmer les marches. Le Monde Diplomatique. https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1997/12/RAMONET/5102 Raunio, T. (2001). The party system of the European Parliament after the 1999 elections. In J. Lodge (Ed.), The 1999 elections to the European Parliament (pp. 231–251). Palgrave. Republic and Democracy Institute. (n.d.a). Quiénes somos. The Republic and Democracy Institute website: https://instituto25m.info/que-es/ Republic and Democracy Institute. (n.d.b). Formación. The Republic and Democracy Institute website: https://instituto25m.info Riveiro, A. (2016, June 3). Podemos lanza su primera organización juvenil oficial (y otra oficiosa). El Diario. https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Podemos-organi zacion-juvenil-oficial-oficiosa_0_522848454.html Riveiro, A. (2017, April 15). Entervista: Federico Severin. El Diario. https:// www.eldiario.es/politica/Federico-Severino-Podemos_0_630637815.html Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. (n.d.). About us. https://rosalux-ba.org/en/start/ Romeiro, G. (2018). From the carnation to the contraption: The crisis of the Portuguese left. A Centelha, 1, 4–9. Romero, M. (2016, June 21). Tras la brecha generacional. El País. The El País website: https://elpais.com/politica/2016/06/16/actualidad/146602 9855_280830.html RTVE. (2011, August 6). Más de seis millones de españoles han participado en el Movimiento 15M. The RTVE website: http://www.rtve.es/noticias/201 10806/mas-seis-millones-espanoles-han-participado-movimiento-15m/452 598.shtml Rucht, D. (2004). Movement allies, adversaries, and third parties. In D. Snow, S. Soule, S and H. Kriesi. (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to social movements (pp. 197–216). Blackwell Publishing. Rüdig, W., & Karyotis, G. (2014). Who protests in Greece? Mass opposition to austerity. British Journal of Political Science, 44(3), 487–513. Ryner, M. (2010). An obituary for the Third Way: The financial crisis and social democracy in Europe. The Political Quarterly, 81(4), 554–563. Salm, C. (2016). Transnational Socialist networks in the 1970s: European Community development aid and southern enlargement. Palgrave Macmillan. Salvador, S. (2019, March 8). PS longe da maioria absoluta, mas à frente de toda a direita junta. Diário de Notícias. https://www.dn.pt/poder/interior/ ps-longe-da-maioria-absoluta-mas-a-frente-de-toda-a-direita-junta-10659926. html#media-1 Sassoon, D. (Ed.). (1998). Looking left: European socialism after the Cold War. I. B. Tauris. Sassoon, D. (1999). The New European Left. Fabian Society. Saurugger, S. (2014). Europeanisation in times of crisis. Political Studies Review, 12, 181–192.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

319

Scarrow, S. E. (1996). Parties and their members. Oxford University Press. Scharpf, F. W. (1999). Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic? Oxford University Press. Schoeller, M., Guidi, M., & Karagiannis, Y. (2017). Explaining informal policymaking patterns in the Eurozone crisis: Decentralized bargaining and the theory of EU institutions. International Journal of Public Administration, 40(14), 1211–1222. Schreuer, M., & Kitsantonis, N. (2018, June 21). Greece prepares to stagger back from crisis, the end of bailouts in sight. The New York Times. https://www. nytimes.com/2018/06/21/business/economy/greece-europe-bailout.html Schui, F. (2014). Austerity: The great failure. Yale University Press. Schulz, F. (2019, February 15). Varoufakis: There is no real European Left, I am running against them. Euractiv. https://www.euractiv.com/section/euelections-2019/news/varoufakis-there-is-no-real-european-left-i-am-runningagainst-them/?fbclid=IwAR2VcC0fT3vTHe3naamOmmAOV9Eiojclonnoe YO43uxw4nFAVj9rxHQ1GjU Segatti, P., & Capuzzi, F. (2016). Five Stars Movement, Syriza and Podemos: A Mediterranean model? In A. Martinelli (Ed.), Beyond Trump. Populism on the Rise (pp. 47–72). ISPI. Seguín, B. & Faber, S. (2015, January 14). Can Podemos win in Spain? The Nation. https://www.thenation.com/article/can-podemos-win-spain/ Seiler, D. L. (2011). Clivages et familles politiques en Europe. ULB. Semmler, W. (2013). The macroeconomics of austerity in the European Union. Social Research: An International Quarterly, 80(3), 883–914. Senninger, R., Bischof, D., & Ezrow, L. (2022). How transnational party alliances influence national parties’ policies. Political Science Research and Methods, 10(3). Sheehan, H. (2016). The SYRIZA wave: Surging and crashing with the Greek left. Monthly Review Press. Sideris, S. (2018, June 28). Party of European Socialists congratulates Alexis Tsipras. The Independent Balkan News Agency website: http://www.bal kaneu.com/party-of-european-socialists-congratulates-alexis-tsipras/ Sieker, M. (2016). The role of the German political foundations in international relations: transnational actors in public diplomacy (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Nottingham, Nottingham. http://eprints.nottingham. ac.uk/31455/ Simões do Paço, A., & Varela, R. (2015). The “Memorandum of Understanding” in Portugal and the Portuguese Left. Socialism and Democracy, 29(3), 104– 114. Skourletis, P. (2018). Speech of the Secretary of the Central Committee of SYRIZA, Panos Skourletis, to the Executive Board of the Party of the

320

BIBLIOGRAPHY

European Left. The Transform website: https://www.transform-network. net/focus/overview/article/ep-2019-the-european-left-one-mouth-many-voi ces/speech-of-the-secretary-of-the-central-committee-of-syriza-panos-skourl etis-to-the-executive-board/ Smith, H. (2018, January 14). Greece braced for strikes over planned moved to limit industrial action. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2018/jan/14/greece-braced-for-strikes-over-planned-move-to-limitindustrial-action Solidarity 4 All. (2013). Solidarity is people’s power. Towards an international campaign of solidarity to the Greek people. http://www.solidarity4all.gr/ sites/www.solidarity4all.gr/files/aggliko.pdf Sotiris, P. (2016). Syriza: The dream that became a nightmare. In C. Príncipe & B. Sunkara (Eds.), Europe in Revolt (pp. 9–15). Haymarket Books. Soudais, M. (2018, July 2). Le Parti de gauche quitte le Parti de la gauche européenne. Politis. https://www.politis.fr/articles/2018/07/leparti-de-gauche-quitte-le-parti-de-la-gauche-europeenne-39077/ Souvlis, G. (2016). The European challenge: An interview with Josep Maria Antentas. Jacobin. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/08/podemoseuropean-union-syriza-catalan-independence/ Sozzi, F. (2011). La sinistra radicale a livello europeo. Organizzazione e potere di un partito sovranazionale. Librerirauniversitaria.it. Spourdalakis, M., & Tassis, C. (2006). Party change in Greece and the vanguard role of PASOK. South European Society & Politics, 11(3–4), 497–512. Spourdalakis, M. (2013). Left strategy in the Greek cauldron: Explaining SYRIZA’s success. Socialist Register, 49, 98–119. Stacey, J. (2010). Integrating Europe: Informal politics and institutional change. Oxford University Press. Stamouli, N. (2022). Greece exits bailout monitoring, but austerity pain lingers. Politico.eu. https://www.politico.eu/article/greece-exit-bailout-mon itor-austerity-economy/ Startin, N. (2010). Where to for the radical right in the European parliament? The rise and fall of transnational political cooperation. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 11(4), 429–449. Startin, N., & Brack, N. (2016). To cooperation of not to cooperate? The European radical right and pan-European cooperation. In J. Fitzgibbon, B. Leruth, & N. Startin (Eds.), Euroscepticism as a transnational and pan-European phenomenon (pp. 28–45). Routledge. Stavrakakis, Y., & Katsambekis, G. (2014). Left-wing populism in the European periphery: The case of SYRIZA. Journal of Political Ideologies, 19(2), 119– 142. Steger, M. B. (2008). The rise of the global imaginary: Political ideologies from the French Revolution to the War on Terror. Oxford University Press.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

321

Stern, L. (2007). Western intellectuals and the Soviet Union, 1920–40: From Red Square to the Left Bank. Routledge. Stiglitz, J. (2010). Freefall: America, free markets, and the sinking of the world economy. W. W. Norton & Company. Stobart, L. (2016). From the Indignados to Podemos. Can Podemos reclaim its earlier momentum? In C. Príncipe & B. Sunkara (Eds.), Europe in revolt (pp. 175–190). Haymarket Books. Survation. (2022). New poll: Public strongly backing public ownership of energy and key utilities. https://www.survation.com/new-poll-public-strongly-bac king-public-ownership-of-energy-and-key-utilities/ SYRIZA. (2012). Electoral manifesto. http://www.greanvillepost.com/2012/ 05/27/the-european-situation-syrizas-program SYRIZA. (2013). The statute of SYRIZA. http://politike.al/wp-content/upl oads/2016/03/Statuti-i-SYRIZA-ne-Greqi.pdf SYRIZA. (2014). The Thessaloniki Programme. http://www.SYRIZA.gr/art icle/id/59907/SYRIZA---THE-THESSALONIKI-PROGRAMME.html#. WdTC8FtSxII SYRIZA. (2015a). Who we are. Retrieved from https://www.syriza.gr/page/ who-we-are.html SYRIZA. (2015b). SYRIZA statement on Spanish Elections: Let’s widen the road of hope! https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/63625/SYRIZA-statementon-Spanish-Elections.html SYRIZA. (2016). Papadimoulis for Spanish elections: Together we can—Unidos Podemos! https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/65704/Dhm.-Papadhmoylhs:O-SYRIZA-sthrizei-toys-Unidos-Podemos.-Epeidh-mazi-%E2%80%98enwm enoi-mporoyme%E2%80%99-na-teleiwsoyme-me-th-monomerh-litothta-kaina-afhsoyme-pisw-mas-thn-krish-egkataleipontas-to-neofileleythero-montelo. html SYRIZA. (2017). A social Europe is the proposal of progressive forces (Article on the 60th anniversary since the Rome Treaty). https://www.syriza.gr/art icle/id/69048/SYRIZA-MEPs:-A-Social-Europe-is-the-proposal-of-progre ssive-forces.html SYRIZA. (2020a). Aπ oλoγ ισ μ´oς ΣΥ PIZA 2012–2019 [Self-explanation, SYRIZA 2012–2019]. https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/94170/Apolog ismos-SYRIZA-2012-2019.html SYRIZA. (2020b). SYRIZA teleconferences with the United Left and Podemos. https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/93800/Thlediaskepseis-toy-SYR IZA-me-thn-Enwmenh-Aristera-kai-toys-Podemos.html SYRIZA European Parliament. (2015, January 22). GUE/NGL MEPs messages on the Greek elections & SYRIZA [Video file]. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Vd-x7qZJ0vE

322

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Taguieff, P. A. (2003). L’illusione populista: Dall’arcaico al mediatico. Bruno Mondadori. Tarrow, S. (2001). Transnational politics: Contention and institutions in international politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 4, 1–20. Taylor, R. (2009). Europe’s divided left. Dissent, 56(2), 5–9. The Economist. (2017, February 13). Podemos retreats to the hard left. The Economist website: https://www.economist.com/europe/2017/02/13/pod emos-retreats-to-the-hard-left Tondl, G. (1998). EU regional policy in the Southern periphery: Lessons for the future. South European Society and Politics, 3(1), 93–129. Toloudis, N. (2014). The Golden Dawn: The financial crisis and Greek fascism’s new day. New Labor Forum, 23(1), 38–43. https://doi.org/10.1177/109 5796013513566 Tormey, S. (2004). The 2003 European Social Forum: Where next for the anticapitalist movement? Capital & Class, 28(3), 149–157. Trading Economics. (2020). Greece unemployment rate. https://tradingecono mics.com/greece/unemployment-rate Trading Economics. (2021). Portugal unemployment rate. https://tradingecono mics.com/portugal/youth-unemployment-rate Trading Economics. (2023). Greece unemployment rate. https://tradingecono mics.com/greece/youth-unemployment-rate Transform. (n.d.a). Transform! Members. The Transform website: https://www. transform-network.net/en/network/organizations/ Transform. (n.d.b). About transform! europe. The Transform website: https:// www.transform-network.net/about-us/ Transform. (2014a). Akademia Network. https://www.transform-network.net/ en/blog/article/akademia-network/ Transform. (2014b). An initiative of Transform! Europe for a Network of Critical Researchers. https://www.transform-network.net/fileadmin/_migrated/ news_uploads/akademia_newsletter__1.pdf Transform. (2016). Tracing and alternative plan for Europe. The Transform website: http://www.transform-network.net/blog/blog-2016/news/detail/ Blog/tracing-an-alternative-plan-for-europe.html Transform. (2017). Call for Papers (Deadline: 14 May). 23rd Annual Conference of the EuroMemo Group. https://www.transform-network.net/calendar/ event/23rd-annual-conference-of-the-euromemo-group/ Transform. (2019). Calendar: Archive. https://www.transform-network.net/cal endar/ Transnational Institute. (n.d.). Introduction. https://www.tni.org/en/page/int roduction Tremlett, G. (2015, March 31). The Podemos revolution: How a small group of radical academics changed European politics. The

BIBLIOGRAPHY

323

Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/31/podemosrevolution-radical-academics-changed-european-politics Treré, E., Jeppesen, S., & Mattoni, A. (2017). Comparing digital protest media imaginaries: Anti-austerity movements in Greece, Italy & Spain. tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique, 15(2), 404–422. Tsakatika, M., & Eleftheriou, C. (2013). The radical left’s turn towards civil society in Greece: One strategy. South European Society and Politics. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2012.757455 Tsakatika, M., & Lisi, M. (2013). ‘Zippin’ up My Boots, Goin’ Back to My Roots’: Radical left parties in Southern Europe. South European Society and Politics, 18(1), 1–19. Tsakatika, M. (2016). Syriza’s electoral rise in Greece: Protest, trust and the art of political manipulation. South European Society and Politics, 1–22. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2016.1239671 Tsaliki, L. (2012, February). The Greek ‘Indignados’: The Aganaktismeni as a case study of the ‘new repertoire of collective action’. Paper presented at the Transmediale Media Art Festival, Berlin. http://www2.media.uoa.gr/people/ tsaliki/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Tsaliki_The_Greek_Indignados.pdf Tsatsanis, E., & Teperoglou, E. (2016). Realignment under stress: The July 2015 referendum and the September parliamentary election in Greece. South European Society and Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2016.120 8906 Tsebelis, G. (2015, June 2). Why Greece will cave—and how. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/greece/2015-06-02/whygreece-will-cave-and-how Tsipras, A. (2013a). What SYRIZA will propose to Europe. Transform! European Journal for Alternative Thinking and Political Dialogue, 13, 41–48. Tsipras, A. (2013b). SYRIZA London: Public talk by Alexis Tsipras. The SYRIZA website: https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/54628/SYRIZA-London:-Publictalk-by-Alexis-Tsipras.html Tsipras, A. (2014). Alexis Tsipras’ speech at the Die Linke Congress. https:// www.syriza.gr/article/Alexis-Tsipras%E2%80%99-speech-at-the-DIE-LINKECongress.html Tsipras, A. (2015a). Behind the compromise. Jacobin Magazine. https://www. jacobinmag.com/2015/08/greece-memorandum-austerity-coup-tsipras-SYR IZA-interview/ Tsipras, A. (2015b). Speech at the nationwide SYRIZA conference. The SYRIZA website: https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/62211/Alexis-Tsiprasspeech-at-the-nationwide-SYRIZA-conference-.html Tudor, C. L., & Appel, H. (2016). Is Eastern Europe to blame for falling corporate taxes in Europe? The politics of tax competition following EU enlargement. East European Politics and Societies, 30(4), 855–884.

324

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Turner, G. (2009). No way to run an economy. Pluto Press. Unidas Podemos. (2021). Principales logros de Unidas Podemos en el gobierno de coalición hasta octubre 2021. https://www.docdroid.net/tf2FGbY/log ros-de-up-en-el-gobierno-de-coalicion-octubre-2021-pdf (Accessed February 5, 2023). Upchurch, M., Taylor, G., & Mathers, A. (2009). The crisis of social democratic trade unionism in Western Europe: The search for alternatives. Ashgate. van Apeldoorn, B. (2001). The struggle over European order: Transnational class agency in the making of ‘embedded neo-liberalism’. In A. Bieler, & A. D. Morton (Eds.), Social forces in the making of the New Europe: The restructuring of European social relations in the global political economy (pp. 70–89). Palgrave. van Apeldoorn, B. (2004). Theorizing the transnational: A historical materialist approach. Journal of International Relations and Development, 7 , 142–176. van Apeldoorn, B., De Graaff, N., & Overbeek, H. (2012). The reconfiguration of the global state-capital nexus. Globalizations, 9(4), 471–486. van Hecke, S. (2010). Do transnational party federations matter? (… Why should we care?). Journal of Contemporary European Research, 6(3), 395–411. Varoufakis, Y. (2017). Adults in the room: My battle with Europe’s deep establishment. Random House. Velasco I. H. (2015, September 18). Pablo Iglesias cierra la campaña griega: “Tsipras es un león. Podemos está con él”. El Mundo. https://www.elmundo. es/internacional/2015/09/18/55fc522522601d305b8b45bb.html Visser, M., Lubbers, M., Kraaykamp, G., & Jaspers, E. (2014). Support for radical left ideologies in Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 53, 541–558. Vogiatzoglou, M. (2015). Workers’ transnational networks in times of austerity: Italy and Greece. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 21(2), 215–228. Volkens, A., Lehmann, P., Matthieß, T., Merz, N., Regel, S., & Weßels, B. (2017). The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/ MARPOR). Version 2017. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpds.2017 Weiler, J. H. (1996). “European Union: Democracy without a demos?” Sussex Papers in International Relations, University of Sussex. Wennerhag, M., Frohlich, ¨ C., & Piotrowski, G. (Eds.). (2016). Radical left movements in Europe. Ashgate. Weyland, K. (2001). Clarifying a contested concept: Populism in the study of Latin American politics. Comparative Politics, 34(1), 1–22.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

325

White, S., & Rodríguez, B. (2017, September 20). Spain on the backfoot in bid to tackle youth unemployment. The Reuters UK website: https://uk.reuters. com/article/uk-spain-europe-unemployment/spain-on-the-backfoot-in-bidto-tackle-youth-unemployment-idUKKCN1BV0GU “Who is hiding behind the economic programme of SYRIZA”. (2012, June 5). GRReporter. http://www.grreporter.info/en/who_hiding_behind_ economic_programme_syriza/7063 World Bank. (2014). World Development Indicators. World Bank. http://data. worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. WSF. (2001). World Social Forum Charter of Principles. http://ciranda.net/ World-Social-Forum-Charter-of?lang=pt_br Worth, O. (2013). Resistance in the age of austerity: Nationalism, the failure of the left and the return of God. Zed Books. www.parlgov.org www.parties-and-elections.eu Young, B., & Semmler, W. (2011). The European sovereign debt crisis: Is Germany to blame? German Politics and Society, 29(1), 1–24. Youth of Bloco. (2007). Conferência de Jovens do Bloco. The Bloco website: http://www.bloco.org/jovens/not%C3%ADcias/item/644-confer% C3%AAncia-de-jovens-do-bloco.html Youth of Bloco. (2010). I Conferência de Jovens Estudantes do Bloco. The Bloco website: http://www.bloco.org/jovens/not%C3%ADcias/item/2177i-confer%C3%AAncia-de-jovens-estudantes-do-bloco.html Youth of Bloco. (2015a). Para que serve uma coordenadora de jovens? The Bloco website: http://www.bloco.org/jovens/not%C3%ADcias/item/2934para-que-serve-uma-coordenadora-de-jovens.html Youth of Bloco. (2015b). Para a institucionalização do movimento estudantil. The Bloco website: http://www.bloco.org/jovens/not%C3%ADcias/item/ 2932-para-a-institucionaliza%C3%A7%C3%A3o-do-movimento-estudantil. html Youth of Bloco. (2017). Reunião da Coordenadora de Jovens: apelo a contributos. http://www.bloco.org/jovens/not%C3%ADcias/item/3133reuni%C3%A3o-da-coordenadora-de-jovens-apelo-a-contributos.html Youth of SYRIZA. (2016). Statement for the meeting of Youths of the European Left network. http://international.neolaiasyriza.gr/announcement-forthe-meeting-of-youths-of-the-european-left-network/ Youth of SYRIZA. (2017). About us. The Youth of SYRIZA website: http://int ernational.neolaiasyriza.gr/about-us/ Ziomas, D., Antoinetta, C., & Danai, K. (2017). The national roll-out of the ‘Social Solidarity Income’ scheme in Greece. ESPN Flash Report 2017/68. https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=18246&langId=en Žižek, S. (2015, July 23). How Alexis Tsipras and SYRIZA outmaneuvered Angela Merkel and the Eurocrats. In These Times. http://inthesetimes.com/ article/18229/slavoj-zizek-syriza-tsipras-merkel

Index

A academics affiliations, 228, 229, 235 in Bloco, 104, 222, 226, 227, 230, 237 in Podemos, 222, 228–230 in SYRIZA, 222–226, 229–232, 236, 237, 240 networking, 24, 186, 187, 222, 223, 226, 230, 233, 234, 240, 284 role in TPC, 221, 222, 237, 285 AlterSummit, 22, 25, 52, 188, 212–215, 239 Anticapitalistas (Podemos) role in TPC, 151 split from Podemos, 112 Trotskyist connections, 175, 194 Urbán, Miguel, 145 austerity anti-austerity movements, 92, 93, 108, 212, 213, 215, 219, 284 anti-austerity programme, 5, 85, 98

impact of, 5, 7, 24, 68, 76, 92, 108, 109, 239, 258, 275, 283 implementation of, 68, 281 B bilateral relations Bloco-Podemos, 132 Bloco-SYRIZA, 132, 133 Podemos-SYRIZA, 132, 144 Blockupy, 215, 216, 239 Bloco (Left Bloc) electoral performance, 262 ideology, 157 MEPs, 100, 121, 160, 162, 176 national context, 20, 119, 155, 174, 178, 252 organisation, 20, 24, 102, 103, 135, 154, 168 origins, 20, 24, 83, 101 political foundation of, 137, 190, 195 position on the EU, 106–107 programme, 20, 104–106 relation with Podemos, 154–158

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Bortun, Crisis, Austerity and Transnational Party Cooperation in Southern Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39151-4

327

328

INDEX

relation with SYRIZA, 144–154 relation with social democracy, 72, 104, 105 relation with social movements, 103, 107, 218, 274 relation with trade unions, 103, 107, 112, 250 strategy, 20, 107, 109 transnational orientation, 121, 170, 211 youth organisation of, 113, 135

relation with NPI/SYRIZA, 238 relation with RDI/Podemos, 190, 193

D DiEM25, 53, 55, 56, 170, 188, 215, 259 diffusion, 10, 11, 139, 140, 175, 178, 202, 209, 221, 233, 240, 276, 283, 285

C Communist parties Communist Party of Italy (PCI), 38–43 differences with new RLPs, 42 French Communist Party (PCF), 38–44, 46, 47, 50, 51, 91, 166, 167 Greek Communist Party (KKE), 38, 39, 41, 43–45, 48, 70, 84, 85, 87–89, 92, 94, 95, 134, 135, 222, 240, 250 Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), 38, 39, 41, 43, 44, 48, 72, 101–103, 107–109, 135, 138, 154, 160, 218 Spanish Communist Party (PCE), 38–41, 43, 46, 47, 74, 84, 110–113, 115, 146, 154 Communists and Allies Group (CAG), 2, 38, 39, 42, 43 coordination, 8, 10, 12, 13, 25, 50, 52, 100, 131, 140, 169, 175, 177, 186, 188, 190, 199, 202, 203, 205, 208, 211, 219, 238, 249, 252, 258–260, 271, 272, 276, 283 CUL:TRA, 104, 137, 187, 190, 194, 195, 197, 200, 202, 204, 214, 238

E electoralism, 238, 240 Errejón, Íñigo, 110–112, 117, 118, 145, 149, 155, 171, 228, 229, 231, 232, 285 Eurocommunism, 38, 40, 42, 43, 48, 84, 203, 222 Eurogroup, 96, 143, 185, 189, 264 European Central Bank (ECB), 4, 48, 49, 55, 64–66, 95, 96, 107, 215 European Commission (EC), 4, 48, 55, 65, 168, 169 European Forum, 49, 166, 169, 170, 199 Europeanisation, 2, 6, 10, 13, 249, 252, 255–257, 261, 275 European Left Party (ELP) origins, 46 position on the EU, 46, 48, 49 relation with Bloco, 47, 104, 165, 166, 177 relation with SYRIZA, 47, 104, 165, 166, 177 European Parliament (EP), 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11–13, 19, 23, 24, 37, 38, 42–45, 48, 50–52, 88, 104, 110, 121, 131, 132, 140, 144, 149, 152, 155, 156, 158–165, 172, 174, 176–178, 199, 209, 219,

INDEX

329

228, 253, 262, 263, 270, 275, 283, 287 European Social Forum (ESF), 46, 133, 208–215, 239 Euroscepticism Disobedient, 8, 53, 54, 132, 259, 269, 284 impact on TPC, 170–173, 260

Indignants (Greece), 212, 213 Internal party democracy, 86–88 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 4, 63–65, 67, 96, 107 Ireland, 54, 64, 66, 72, 138, 153, 176 Italy, 4, 64, 66, 139, 195, 196, 208, 212, 216, 272

F far right, 52, 163, 199, 251

L La France Insoumise, 49, 51, 173, 284 language, 114, 147, 153, 222, 231 The Left (also known as GUE/NGL) origins, 83, 101 position on the EU, 45, 164, 178 relation with Bloco, 21, 101, 104, 158–160 relation with SYRIZA, 121, 159 relations with Podemos, 111, 160, 164 Left-wing media, 202–203, 272–273

G Germany, 4, 44, 65, 66, 116, 138, 195, 205, 215 Global Justice Movement (GJM), 15, 85, 174, 206–208, 210–213, 239, 270 Golemis, Haris, 5, 7, 188, 189, 205, 271, 272, 274 Greece austerity measures, 5, 7, 65, 68, 69, 217, 261 economic context, 257, 258 Eurozone crisis in, 7, 23, 61, 67 political context, 239 relation to the EU, 67–68, 94–100 relation to the rest of Southern Europe, 216, 235 social movements, 85, 212, 217, 239, 240 GUE/NGL. See The Left

I Iglesias, Pablo, 5, 7, 22, 62, 110–112, 114–118, 120, 144–149, 152, 155, 160, 171, 172, 175, 209, 228, 229, 231, 232, 253 Indignados (Spain), 69, 72, 109, 213, 218

M Martins, Catarina, 102, 107, 155, 172, 226 material resources, 11, 269, 273, 285 Matias, Marisa, 135, 155, 156, 160, 161, 166, 226 Mélenchon, Jean-Luc, 48, 49, 156, 168, 172, 173, 197 Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), 67, 69

N national politics primacy, 9, 256, 260–262, 269, 284 neoliberalism, 24, 38, 46, 54, 62–65, 75, 98, 163, 212, 249, 251, 253–255, 275, 282, 285–287

330

INDEX

neo-reformism, 18, 83, 120, 282, 287 New European Left Forum, 46, 133 Nicos Poulantzas Institute (NPI) relation with CUL TRA/Bloco, 190, 197, 202, 238 relation with RDI/Podemos, 190, 195 Northern Europe, 205, 230 “Now, the people!” movement (NPM), 8, 24, 56, 100, 104, 113, 121, 132, 172, 173, 176, 177 P Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), 68–70, 84, 85, 87–89, 95, 97, 282 participation in government Bloco, 231 Podemos, 231 SYRIZA, 231 party elites Bloco, 135, 174 Podemos, 132, 161, 270 role in TPC, 135, 221, 270 SYRIZA, 132, 135, 174 Plan B origins, 54, 55, 100 position on the EU, 54, 55, 116, 132, 152, 173, 268 relation with Bloco, 8, 21, 37, 54, 121, 168, 170, 172, 173, 178, 262 relation with Podemos, 21, 54, 56, 104, 113, 116, 121, 170–173, 178, 262 relation with SYRIZA, 8, 21, 53, 54, 132, 173 Podemos electoral performance, 262 ideology, 114, 157

MEPs, 100, 111, 113, 150, 176, 197 national context, 20, 174, 178 organisation, 21, 76, 111, 144, 150, 171 origins, 20, 24, 109 political foundation of, 21, 51, 113, 187, 196 position on the EU, 22, 53, 116, 121, 132, 152, 164, 253, 256, 286 programme, 111, 114, 115, 150, 157 relation with Bloco, 5, 7–9, 14, 16, 20–24, 53, 67, 76, 83, 91, 100, 110, 117, 119, 121, 131, 132, 146, 147, 149, 154–156, 158, 161, 163, 172, 173, 176–178, 180, 185, 189, 212, 216, 222, 230, 238, 240, 250, 260, 274, 275, 282–284, 286 relation with social democracy, 116, 120 relation with social movements, 110, 111, 116, 120, 212, 214, 217, 218 relation with SYRIZA, 7, 16, 18, 20–22, 53, 67, 83, 114, 117, 119, 120, 132, 144, 149, 152, 161, 173, 174, 186, 202, 233 relation with trade unions, 120, 149 strategy, 116, 154 transnational orientation, 170 youth organisation of, 212 Portugal austerity measures, 5, 7, 239 economic context, 257, 258 Eurozone crisis in, 23, 61, 64, 70 political context, 101 relation to the EU, 64, 70, 71, 101, 174

INDEX

relation to the rest of Southern Europe, 65, 196, 216 social movements, 212, 216, 239 programme, 2, 5, 12, 20, 22, 24, 39, 45, 55, 71, 76, 83, 85, 88, 90, 93, 98, 102–106, 108, 111, 114, 115, 119–121, 136, 141, 143, 150, 157, 178, 188, 208, 282, 285 Progressive Caucus, 88, 100, 121, 152, 163, 176, 253, 284 R radical left parties (RLPs) definition of, 2, 17, 120 differences with other party families, 24, 255 divisions between, 3, 281 electoral performance, 262 history of, 274 North-South axis, 157 position on the EU, 3, 10, 22, 39, 47, 50, 186, 202 post-1989 decline, 15, 91 transnational cooperation, 2, 3, 10, 18, 20, 23, 25, 37, 39, 50, 131, 216, 239, 255 transnational organisations, 14, 21 rank-and-file members, 103, 112, 121, 138, 178 Republic and Democracy Institute (RDI) relation with CUL TRA/Bloco, 190, 197, 202 relation with NPI/SYRIZA, 190, 195, 197 Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (RLS), 195, 198 S social democracy

331

decline, 3, 15 differences with, 172 neoliberalisation, 15, 63, 84, 104, 282 relation with Bloco, 72, 105, 143 relation with Podemos, 16, 18, 104, 116, 120 relation with SYRIZA, 88, 90, 104, 105, 144 transnational cooperation with, 2 Socialist Party, Portugal (PS), 5, 71, 101 social movements anti-austerity, 9, 94, 212, 281 anti-globalisation, 15, 206, 207, 210, 239, 284 relation with parties, 8, 9, 22, 94, 116 role in TPC, 9, 186, 217, 239 transnational cooperation between, 20, 212, 216, 219 Spain austerity measures, 5, 7, 24, 65, 72, 73, 116, 217, 261 economic context, 257 Eurozone crisis in, 6, 23, 61, 64, 65 political context, 238 relation to the EU, 24, 174 relation to the rest of Southern Europe, 38, 65, 110, 216 social movements, 69, 212 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), 5, 74, 75, 100, 110–112, 116–118, 155, 196, 282 strategy nationally, 91 transnationally, 259, 260 SYRIZA electoral performance, 262 ideology, 254, 255

332

INDEX

MEPs, 88, 100, 121, 159, 162, 164 national context, 239 organisation, 85, 86, 94, 142, 170 origins, 84, 86, 89 political foundation, 21, 51, 88, 133, 186, 190, 235 position on the EU, 22, 54, 70, 91, 99, 104, 177, 254, 263, 267 programme, 83, 85, 88, 90, 141 relation with Bloco, 7, 8, 14, 16, 20, 21, 23, 24, 47, 50, 67, 76, 91, 104, 107, 135, 140, 154, 166, 180, 195, 202, 238 relation with Podemos, 7, 16, 18, 20, 21, 53, 67, 110, 117, 119, 120, 144, 149, 170, 176, 222 relation with social democracy, 16, 40, 88, 90, 104, 144 relation with social movements, 83, 85, 91–93, 136 relation with trade unions, 87, 112 strategy, 83, 91 transnational orientation, 170 youth organisation, 87, 113, 274

T trade unions relations to parties, 22 transnational cooperation, 49, 207, 216, 250 Transform Europe origins, 24 position on the EU, 52

relations with Podemos/RDI, 190, 193, 195 relation with Bloco/CUL TRA, 187 relation with SYRIZA/NPI, 190, 194, 197 transnational mobilisation, 270, 284, 287 Troika, 4, 5, 54, 65, 67, 68, 71, 73, 75, 86, 87, 94–99, 139, 141, 143, 145, 150, 152, 166, 173, 175, 177, 178, 185, 214, 216, 226, 234, 237, 259, 275, 281–283 Trotskyist, 2, 38, 85, 101, 104, 110, 114, 134, 142, 145, 146, 154, 158, 174, 175, 194, 254 Tsipras, Alexis, 6, 7, 22, 54, 62, 86, 90, 92, 94, 96–100, 137, 140, 141, 143–145, 147–149, 151, 156, 162, 163, 167–170, 189, 192, 214, 253, 271, 275 U Urbán, Miguel, 114, 145, 151, 155, 161, 162, 171, 197, 215 U-turn, of SYRIZA, 48, 53, 83, 96, 121, 132, 140, 143, 150, 156, 160, 162, 168, 170, 175, 177, 205, 235, 266, 283 W World Social Forum (WSF), 208, 210–212, 239