Crimen Obicere: Forensic Rhetoric and Augustine's anti-Donatist Correspondence [1 ed.] 9783666567223, 9783525567227

Citation preview

Rafał Toczko

Crimen Obicere Forensic Rhetoric and Augustine‘s anti-Donatist Correspondence

Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte Edited by Volker Henning Drecoll and Volker Leppin

Volume 120

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

Rafał Toczko

Crimen Obicere Forensic Rhetoric and Augustine’s anti-Donatist Correspondence

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek: The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data available online: https://dnb.de. © 2020, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission from the publisher. Typesetting: Satzpunkt Ursula Ewert GmbH, Bayreuth Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlage | www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht-verlage.com ISSN 2197-3237 ISBN 978-3-666-56722-3

Contents Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Part 1. Augustine’s Anti-Donatist letters in context Chapter 1. Approaching Augustine’s Anti-Donatist letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Ancient letters, early Christian letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Polemical letters, anti-Donatist letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Classifications of the anti-Donatist letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Classification by addressee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Classification based on letter function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Classification by chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Staging the dispute through correspondence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. Creating the audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17 17 20 22 22 24 27 32 40

Chapter 2. The forensic correspondence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Rhetorical genres and epistolary polemic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Forensic rhetoric and Augustine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Theory of status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 Status coniecturalis/coniecturae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 Status definitionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.3 Status qualitatis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.4 Status translationis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.5 Status legales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The ancient theories of argumentation: argumenta, loci, exempla . . . 2.3 Augustine and forensic rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Shaping the discourse in the anti-Donatist letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Genus deliberativum vs. genus iudiciale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Accusatio/intentio vs. defensio/depulsio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Causa apud Deum–creating the jury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Unum crimen: quaestio simplex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Causa honesta/manifesta vs. causa obscura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 Lex divina vs. Lex humana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49 49 52 52 54 55 56 57 58 60 64 68 68 71 74 76 79 80

6 Contents Part 2. Accusation Chapter 3. The charge of schism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. The pros and cons of being a Christian prosecutor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. The formulation of the charge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Arguments drawn from characters (Loci a persona) suitable for both status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Pars Donati . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The enemies of community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Pertinacy/persistency and arrogance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Status qualitatis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Wrong motive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1 Divina testimonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1.1 Confirmatio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1.2 Refutatio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2 Humana testimonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.3 Exempla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 False motive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1.1 Maximianists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1.2 Optatus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Impulsio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. Status definitionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Ubi est ecclesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Ecclesia catholica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 Confirmatio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 Refutatio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Ecclesia in meridie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Ecclesia Christi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Multi aut pauci Christiani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85 85 91 95 95 96 98 99 100 100 102 104 106 107 110 111 111 117 120 122 122 126 126 130 132 135 136

Chapter 4. The charge of rebaptism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Status definitionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Divina testimonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Humana testimonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Comparison: Maximianists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Status coniecturalis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

139 139 140 144 146 149

Contents

7

Part 3. Defence Chapter 5. The charge of persecution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Status qualitatis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Relatio criminis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.1 First ratio: violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.2 Second ratio: schism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Comparatio criminis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1 Testimonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1.1 Witnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1.2 Terence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2 Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2.1 Biblical exempla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2.2 Episcopacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2.3 Suicides on the cliff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3 Suicides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Status definitionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Status translationis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Donatists as persecutors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Donatists as collaborators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Testimonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Biblical Exempla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

157 157 157 159 164 167 168 168 170 171 171 176 176 176 180 186 186 188 188 191

Chapter 6. The charge of traditio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Status coniecturae. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Iudicatum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.1 Loci a persona iudicis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.2 Loci a persona accusatoris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Status translationis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Sylvanus as a traditor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Donatists as traditores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

193 194 194 197 202 206 206 207

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

Secondary literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

8 Contents Appendix 1. The List of the Anti-Donatist Letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Index of Ancient and Medieval Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 Index of Modern Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 Index of Augustine’s works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

Acknowledgements

This book is the product of a long process that started with the grant no. 2015/17/D/ HS2/01238 of the Polish National Science Centre, that was generously endowed to me. Thanks to this grant, opportunities to convey research outside of Poland were opened. In the course of writing this book I was often a beneficiary of the friendly, scholarly atmosphere of Maurits Sabbe Library in Leuven and Augustijns Historisch Instituut in nearby Heverlee. I am deeply thankful to the staff of these institutions. My gratitude for the great scholars from KU Leuven professors Mathijs Lamberigts and Anthony Dupont and their younger colleagues Joseph Grabau, András Handl and Matthew Knotts is hard to measure. Professors Christoph Müller and Christian Tornau from Würzburg and Volker Drecoll from Tübingen were not only an inspiration as the great scholars working on Augustine’s letters, but also enabled me to participate in two great workshops in Würzburg. The participants of these events improved much my understanding of more than a few issues. The decision of Volker Drecoll and Volker Leppin, the editors of this series, to accept my manuscript was welcomed with great joy and relief. The final form of this book owes much to the editorial acumen of Damian Jasiński, Tim Brombley and Miriam Espen­ hain. Finally, the colleagues from the Department of Classics at my alma mater in Toruń throughout the years have always been my mentors and friends, especially professors Marian Szarmach and Barbara Bibik; without the wisdom and friendship of Przemysław Nehring nothing would be possible. As is always the case with scholarly endeavours, much of the so-called free time, that in the perfect world I would have spent with my wife Kasia, son Franek and daughter Wanda, has been dedicated to the pursuit of the better understanding of Augustine and his rhetoric. In the end the least that a husband and a father can do is write these words: Thank you. 

Introduction1

It is generally known that Augustine first studied rhetoric and later taught it before becoming a priest. Most of us are familiar with the fact that he employed rhetoric in his writings and sermons as a presbyter and bishop, but it is not always clear what kind of rhetoric we mean when we use the term. Worse still, we tend to use our own prejudices concerning rhetoric without acknowledging it or asking ourselves whether our understanding of the term is at least close to Augustine’s. Therefore, on the one hand, scholars tend to talk about rhetorical bias or manipulation, about rhetorical claims as opposed to factual claims, and so on. But, even many years after retiring from the post of imperial rhetorician, as a bishop in debate with the Donatist Cresconius, Augustine would not allow rhetoric to be equated with manipulation. On the other hand, there is a vast number of studies on Augustine’s rhetoric (from which I have benefited widely) that narrow the understanding of rhetoric to a question of style. But style is not the only thing that Augustine taught as rhetoric. You could not have won a case in a Roman court by use of the right style alone. You needed to compose a speech in the right way, using the right elements, and presented in the right style. These three ingredients were called dispositio, inventio, and elocutio. As far as forensic rhetoric is concerned it is “invention” – the art of finding the right arguments – that devours most pages in the ancient handbooks. As Quentin Skinner observed in his study on Shakespeare:

The classical rhetoricians themselves [...] always treat the art of rhetoric essentially as a theory of argument, especially legal argument, and they like to stress its practical usefulness (Skinner: 2014, 4).

In an oft-quoted autobiographical passage, Augustine confesses that for years he used to teach rhetoric.2 With a considerable amount of self-deprecation he distances himself from this experience by presenting himself as a purveyor of the art he calls “victoriosa loquacitas” – “winning loquatiousness”. He claims to have taught tricks that his good students might have used in courts to defend guilty men, or – in a worse scenario – to accuse an innocent person. The modern translations easily overlook that in this passage Augustine reveals that in fact he used to teach 1 I was enabled to carry out the research for this book by grant no. 2015/17/D/HS2/01238 of the Polish National Science Centre. 2 Aug., conf. 4.2.2, J.J. O’Donnell web edition: http://www.stoa.org/hippo/text4.html# TB4C2S2: “docebam in illis annis artem rhetoricam, et victoriosam loquacitatem victus cupiditate vendebam. malebam tamen, domine, tu scis, bonos habere discipulos, sicut appellantur boni, et eos sine dolo docebam dolos, non quibus contra caput innocentis agerent sed aliquando pro capite nocentis.” 

12 Introduction forensic rhetoric. He uses technical terms for legal defence – “agere pro capite” and prosecution “agere contra caput.” Also, the adjective “victoriosa” is used to hint at the agonistic character of the rhetoric he taught, most vivid in legal cases. Although Augustine stopped teaching forensic rhetoric when he opted to become a Christian, it does not mean that he ever stopped shaping the polemical discourse according to its rules whenever he felt the need. Therefore I have started with a basic question: How did Augustine shape the discourse or present his arguments in the polemical context? To answer it I decided to proceed by literary analysis of Augustine’s thirty-six surviving anti-Donatist letters. Letters played a vital role in the early Christian controversies on account of their relatively quick propagation. In addition, the epistolary format allowed for less constrained and more variegated forms of persuasion, for the letters resembled a live conversation, which was well recognised in antiquity. At the same time, it has been noticed that Augustine’s anti-Donatist letters played a crucial role in the course of the Donatist controversy. Although a study of all Augustine’s polemical writings would certainly be the best way to answer my question, its scope was too large to fit into my humble project. For this reason I have concentrated on the anti-Donatist letters of Augustine as a case study to provide a comprehensive analysis and interpretation of the rhetorical strategies applied in these polemical texts. To date, this particular topic has not received the attention it deserves. My precise purpose in this study is to offer an insight into how Augustine used rhetorical tools inherited from classical theory in building and developing pole­ mical strategies in his anti-Donatist letters. Such a study should expand our knowledge on such various topics as history of rhetoric, ancient epistolography, polemical literature and Augustine’s art as a polemicist. In the first part of this book I approach Augustine’s anti-Donatist correspondence as a special genre of polemical literature and as a historical and literary phenomenon. By polemical letters I mean all the letters where the main task of the author is to argue against an individual or a group that is presented as procuring some actions, or voicing some ideas or propositions that in the author's view are wrong, if not outright dangerous for the community, institution, identity or idea the author stands for. I follow Possidius’ catalogue of Augustine’s works (Indiculum), and count among the anti-Donatist letters all those polemical letters where the deeds or concepts of the Donatists are discussed. The epistolary polemic can be direct when the letters are addressed to a member of the Donatist community, whether lay or clerical, or indirect when otherwise. The first chapter is dedicated to presenting the analysed selection of letters in the context of up-to-date scholarship. In the second chapter I present a very concise outline of ancient rhetoric with special emphasis on the Hermagorean theory of staseis/status. My central claim is presented there, namely that Augustine’s argumentation is based on the Hermagorean theory. The forensic frame of these letters (recently recognised by Adam Ployd: 2018), is not only what supplied both parties with arguments, but was also readily noticeable to contemporary audiences, who

Introduction

13

were familiar with legal procedures and oratory, not only owing to their education but also to their everyday life experience. I analyse comprehensively and in detail the various rhetorical strategies Augustine employed in his anti-Donatist letters in the second and third part of this book. The second part is dedicated to the charges with which he attacks the Donatists, namely schism (chapter 3) and rebaptism (chapter 4); the third part concentrates on the defensive strategies concerning the charges of persecution (chapter 5) and traditio (chapter 6). The formulations both of the charges and of the arguments are shaped precisely in keeping with the rules governing the different status. To give one example, Augustine defends his party against the charge of persecution, relying mostly on presenting their actions as justified or provoked by the Donatists, that is employing two types of status qualitatis. According to the rules of the first of these, relatio criminis, the persecution is presented as just punishment for schism or acts of violence. The second type, comparatio criminis, is based on the assumption that persecution is a lesser evil than letting the Donatists remain in schism. A thorough analysis of the use of the strategies and techniques discussed by Cicero, Rhetorica ad Herrenium and Quintilian in the text of Augustine can help us reveal the underlying matrix of the letters in question. For decades the works of Augustine have been of interest mostly to Church historians and theologians, and rightly so. It is worth noticing, however, that the people who read or listened to them at the time of their composition were alumni of rhetorical and law schools, where they had to read Cicero’s speeches and learn from rhetorical handbooks (some authored by Cicero himself, others written under his influence). Meanwhile, authors as diverse as Tertullian and Shakespeare have been recognised as weaving their works with an eye fixed on the pattern of forensic rhetoric (Sider: 1971; Skinner: 2014). The aim of my study is to prove that Augustine’s polemical correspon­ dence is teeming with examples of rhetorical tricks commonly used in courtroom argumentation. I argue that the backbone of Augustine’s anti-Donatist letters, that is, his patterns of argumentation and strategies of persuasion, is largely formed of the techniques of forensic rhetoric. Two technical remarks are due here. First of all I have decided to use the terms Catholic/Donatist instead of Caecilianist/Donatist. In the study where the arguments of Augustine are followed and analyzed it would be inconvenient and perplexing to do away with this tradition of labeling both parties. The other reason for this choice has already been stated by Brent D. Shaw: “Although both parties were Catholic, I have called the Aurelian–Augustinian church ‘Catholic’ because this was their success-in-power identification of themselves” (2011, 5). The second issue concerns the method of quoting Latin texts. Here my decision was to follow closely the form of every edition. As a result in some quotations, for instance from Cicero “the will” is spelled voluntas, whereas in others, e.g. from Augustine, it would be uoluntas.

Part 1. Augustine’s Anti-Donatist letters in context

Chapter 1. Approaching Augustine’s Anti-Donatist letters

1. Ancient letters, early Christian letters Ancient philosophers, wives, officials, lovers, Roman emperors, salesmen, literary figures, litigants, the apostles, officers and Christian bishops had at least one thing in common: they all wrote letters. Some were official, some private, but most were something in between, for even those most private were always written and sent with the anticipation or fear that something unexpected might happen. Even the most trustworthy and experienced letter carrier might be kidnapped or die, one unreliable or less loyal might open it and sell the information.1 Letters were thus always written in an atmosphere of “public intimacy” (Allen, Neil: 1997, 17), and many important messages or sensitive pieces of information were trusted only to the ear of a tried-and-tested messenger.2 A reliable carrier was always sought out, cared for and praised.3 If the letter was not confidential and came from a famous person, the addressee would more often than not be willing to publicly boast of having received it, read it to his friends, or hand it out to be copied. Letters were mostly written and copied on papyrus, parchment and tablets made of various, sometimes expensive materials, such as ivory (Bagnall: 2009, 72–90; Cavallo: 2010, 10–12; Zielinski Kinney: 2017, 310–317). Finally, it is worth noting that letters were more often dictated and read aloud than written and read in silence (Saenger: 1982, 372). Some late antique writers went to great lengths to compile and publish their own authorial collections, such as Ambrose of Milan,4 Quintus Aurelius Symmachus,5

1 This was a constant fear of Cicero in times of trouble, (cf. Nicholson: 1994, 33–63). 2 Aug., ep. 28.6, 86.1, 89.8. 3 In ep. 166.2 Augustine enumerates three virtues of the perfect letter carrier: fides agendi, alacritas obediendi, exercitatio peregrinandi. In the corpus of Augustine’s correspondence there are 28 letter carriers referred to by name and often praised: http://www.scrinium.umk.pl/search? q=carrier. See also Allen: 2016, 118–119, and Dalmon: 2015, 159–168. 4 Whether Ambrose has in fact himself organised the ten books of his correspondence is the subject of one of those perennial scholarly debates. For the last reasonable attempt to confirm this idea, see Nauroy: 2017, 146–160. 5 It is mostly agreed now that Symmachus composed the first book of the letters independently, and then designed the collection of the next six books, which were published after his death. See Michelle Renee Salzman’s introduction to Quintus Aurelius Symmachus, transl. by M.R. Salzman, M.J. Roberts. The Letters of Symmachus. Book 1, Atlanta 2011, p. liii-lxvi.

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and to some extent Jerome of Stridon.6 Others did not. Still others kept the letters they wrote and received in their archive, as did Augustine.7 It was not unusual to keep certain important correspondence by third parties there.8 Thanks to Possidius, Augustine’s friend, fellow bishop and biographer, we have a catalogue of his works preserved in the episcopal library at Hippo at about the time of Augustine’s death.9 Jennifer Ebbeler has recently pointed out two facts: around thirty percent of the letters enumerated by Possidius in his Indiculum are now lost, but the same percen­ tage of the extant letters is not to be found in the index (Ebbeler: 2017, 241). The former statement illustrates the sorry state of affairs known to anyone dealing with ancient texts: we would like to read much more than we are left with, because so much of the literary heritage of antiquity has been lost to war, fire, flood and human carelessness. The latter observation, however, is indeed striking and carries considerable weight. If so many of Augustine’s letters survived outside of his chancellery, it clearly means that they were cherished and treasured by the recipients (Ibid., 251). It also suggests that people circulated these letters, considering that the more copies existed in antiquity, the more probable it was for them to survive to this day. The ancients regarded the art of letter-writing as a distinct literary skill10 but only two ancient textbooks dedicated solely to that art are extant: Typoi Epistolikoi by Pseudo-Demetrius11 and Epistolimaioi Charakteres by Pseudo-Libanius.12 These works date to Late Antiquity and are written in Greek, but we know nothing of their authors. Brief and scarcely influential as they are, they nevertheless shed an interesting light on the perception of letter writing in antiquity. Pseudo-Demetrius focuses on the exemplary models of letters, referring to them as typoi and discussing as many as twenty such types.13 The approach of Pseudo-Libanius is slightly different, as he presents forty-one styles of letter-writing, which in fact are not “model letters but nuggets of reasoning” (Stowers: 1986, 53). These classifications were organised according to the function of the letter, the most popular types being: con-

6 That also might have been the plan for an old Augustine, but his death came before he could accomplish the task (De Bruyne: 1931, 284–295). As for Jerome, he listed his two smaller letter collections, each in one book, in De viris illustribus 135. 7 More on the realities of such archives, see Dalmon: 2015, 139–151. 8 ep. 28*.4 is a nice example of Augustine’s efforts to receive letters exchanged by the Catholic bishop and an official in a different province. 9 We should not think of Possidius as the creator of this catalogue, rather as someone who edited a previous Augustine’s version of it, see Hermanowicz: 2008, 57–60. 10 As demonstrated by the texts collated in Malherbe: 1988. 11 In the manuscripts, Demetrius, the author of De elocutione, is presented as its author, but the scholars believe this tradition to be false. 12 Some manuscripts presented the Antiochean rhetor Libanius as its author; in others figures Proclus, a neo-platonic philosopher; scholarship rejects these attributions. 13 Malherbe: 1988, 30–31: “friendly, commendatory, blaming, reproachful, consoling, censorious, admonishing, threatening, vituperative, praising, advisory, supplicatory, inquiring, responding, allegorical, accounting, accusing, apologetic, congratulatory, ironic, thankful.”



Ancient letters, early Christian letters

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gratulatory, consolatory, exhortatory, accusatory and advisory.14 These handbooks do not seem to distinguish “real” letters from “literary”, as proposed by Adolf Deissmann (1908, 157–160).15 In antiquity, letters dictated by members of the elite,16 even in the utmost haste, always bear traces of the rhetorical training of their authors and can be analysed as sophisticated literary works, even if their main function is to provide the addressee with some information.17 Carol Lanham suggested that epistolary skills were acquired through the standard rhetorical exercises, known as progymnasmata, which were reserved for the later stages of grammar schools (Lanham: 1992, 115–34). One of the most popular of these was ethopoeia, which involved writing a speech by some historical or mythological figure in given circumstances in order to characterise that figure through the style of speech.18 Although ethopoeia was a very common exercise, we do not have sufficient evidence to link it to the art of letter-writing.19 As a literary genre, epistolography had its own stylistic rules and conventional elements of composition: the actual form of a letter depended primarily on the occasion on which it was written. Letters were mostly exchanged between friends or people who wished to make an acquaintance and served as a substitute for conversation. As we learn from Cicero’s letters, amicitia was not reserved for the closest circle of friends. There was private friendship, but there was also another type, namely political or public. No matter how close the real connection between the correspondents was, their epistolary exchanges consisted of some standard formulas, expressions and metaphors pointing at the friendly character of their dialogue.20 These expressions of friendship, traditional for ancient epistolography, were well documented by Klaus Thraede (1970), who also demonstrated the considerable in14 Ps. Demetrius, Typoi Epistolokoi 1, transl. by A. Malherbe, op. cit., p. 31: “According to the theory of epistolary types, Heraclides, [letters] can be composed in a great number of styles, but are written in those that always fit the particular circumstance [to which they are addressed].” See also Stowers: 1986, 51–7. 15 Although this distinction has been influential for decades, in recent years scholars admit that it is of little use and hardly explains the idea of the late antique letter, see e.g. good criticism in J. Divjak: 1996, coll. 897–8. 16 Carol Poster (2002, 112–124) turns our attention to the commonly overlooked fact that there were different classes of letter-writers and letter-readers and that we should not expect the same quality and sophistication from every ancient letter. 17 This thought is further elaborated by Stowers: 1986, 19. Wilfrid Parsons not long after Deissmann published her analysis of lexis and style of Augustine’s letters, many of which would be understood as die Briefe in Deissmann’s categories. Her presentation of its results is full of praises for Augustine’s literary acumen, see Parsons (1923). 18 Björk: 2016, 88: “The challenge for the writer is to capture the words suited to the person speaking.” 19 Apart from Theon, Aphtonios – no other handbooks suggestes to link them. Obviously Ovid practised it in Heroides. 20 Lanham: 1992, 118: “The persistence, over hundreds of years, of epistolary formulas and conventional topics (such as expressions of friendship) in Latin letters implies a powerful, stable tradition and its transmission by teaching.”

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fluence of the classical models of letter-writing on Saint Paul and the Church Fathers. The early Christian writers, however, should also be acknowledged for their innovations in the art of letter-writing. For instance, Saint Paul’s letters circulating among Christian congregations gave rise to episcopal circular letters, which were written especially by the primates of dioceses and ultimately became instrumental in the ascendancy of the bishops of Rome and the subsequent emergence of the papacy. One other novelty of most interest to us here, is the polemical letter – a lite­ rary genre that developed during the religious controversies of the early Christian era.

2. Polemical letters, anti-Donatist letters First we have to face the most significant stumbling block: the ancient handbooks on the art of epistolography did not distinguish the polemical letter as an epistolary genre in its own right. Lately, Christian Tornau (2018, 5–8) reflected on the difficulty in explaining the apparent paradox: although we clearly discover various forms of polemical writing in Augustine’s letters, they cannot be classified according to an ancient or contemporary model, for the simple reason that no such model exists. My general approach to this problem is similar to that of Tornau: to discuss the polemical dimension of Augustine’s correspondence we have to turn to the rhetorical framework.21 In my discussion, I reserve the label “polemical” to all those letters where the main goal of the author is to argue against an individual or a group, i.e. against an adversary who is presented as responsible for some actions, ideas or propositions that the author regards as inaccurate at the very least, or (more often) outright wrong or dangerous. There is no telling what Possidius, Augustine’s bio­ grapher, would have made of this definition, but the fact remains that in his Indiculum, most of Augustine’s works, including the letters, were organised under pole­ mical labels: Contra Paganos, Contra Priscillianistas, Contra Donatistas, etc. In the polemical letters, Augustine argued that the ideas and actions of the Arians, Donatists, Manicheans, pagans and Pelagians were erroneous and dangerous. This is not to say that in all cases the addressee of the letter and the target of the polemical attack is one and the same person or group. As Tornau rightly observes, we are dealing here with two types of polemical discourse: direct and, less obvious, indirect.22 In the case of the latter, the addressees do not necessarily have to be directly involved on either side. Most often, however, there does exist some link between them and the issues under discussion. For instance, Eusebius, the addressee 21 Tornau: 2018, 5–8: “Briefliche Polemik […] ist dagegen gerade Polemik gegen den Adressaten womit eine Kommunikationssituation vorliegt, die in der antiken Theorie in der Regel unberücktsichtigt bleibt, ja geradezu deren System zuwiderläuft.” 22 Ibid., 26–27.



Polemical letters, anti-Donatist letters

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of ep. 34 and 35, who belonged to the class of viri clarissimi and whom Augustine wanted to be an intermediary between him and Proculeian, the Donatist bishop of Hippo, is considered by some as a Donatist and by others as a Catholic.23 The anti-Donatist letters of Augustine are by far the most numerous among his extant polemical letters and form a large corpus of texts within his correspondence, totalling thirty-six.24 Using the term “anti-Donatist letters”, I refer only to those polemical letters where the Donatists’ actions or ideas constitute an important subject matter. Thus, there are letters mentioning the Donatists (for instance, ep. 69, 78 or 245) which are not included in my analysis in the second part of this book, because their main interest lies beyond the scope of this study. Possidius did not count these among the epistulae contra Donatistas; the same applies to ep. 58, 86 or 133, whose contents are directly related to the Donatist controversy, but apart from labelling the schismatics with commonplace formulas offer no polemical arguments. As a result, they are not subject to my inquiry, because in these texts Augustine did not argue against the Donatists. On the other hand, letters 128 and 129 written to Marcellinus shortly before the Conference of Carthage, and so clearly connected to the Donatist controversy, are signed by Aurelius, the primate of Africa Proconsularis, Silvanus, the primate of Numidia, and other Catholic bishops. I see no reason to regard them as having been written by Augustine. It is indeed puzzling that neither cath. fr. nor the first book of c. litt. Pet. has been analysed by scholars as part of the anti-Donatist correspondence, although Augustine explicitly calls them “letters”. Finally, a word of justification is due for my choice concerning ep. 88, signed by the Catholic clergy of Hippo, and ep. 141, signed by the bishops gathered at the Conference of Carthage, which I regard as part of Augustine’s epistolary corpus, because Augustine refers to these in his later works as having been authored by himself.25 The earliest of the anti-Donatist letters, ep. 23, may be dated to as early as 391, but none was written later than 423: the latest extant letters are ep. 185, 204 and, ultimately, ep. 208.26 These polemical letters differ from one another (sometimes in a fairly evident manner) in a number of aspects, such as length, literary form, occasion and emotional timbre. Perhaps the most convenient method of classification is to divide them according to the addressee and the function of the given letter. 23 See “Eusebius 1,” Mandouze: 1982, 374–375. 24 Among the letters contra Donatistas Possidius’ Indiculum includes: first book of c. litt. Pet., ep. 93, 185, cath. fr., ep. 88, 106, 108, (again 93), 33 (and three other to Proculeian, now lost), 87 (and another one to Emeritus, now lost), 51, 66 (and two other to Proculeian, now lost), 34, 35, 43, 44, 144, 173, 89, 23, 142, 204, one lost to the Donatist bishop Gaudentius – in that order. This makes for 21 one extant and seven lost letters, see PL 46, coll. 7–8. To these I add ep. 49, 52, 53, 56, 57, 61, 70, 76, 97, 100, 105, 134, 139, 141, 208. 25 In case of ep. 88 the reference is in ep. 185.32; ep. 141 is referred to as Augustine’s own in Retractationes, 2.40 (67). 26 So for instance my list of the anti-Donatists letters does not comply with that of Matthew Gaumer’s entitled: “Epistulae Closely Connected with the Donatist Controversy,” in Gaumer, 2016, XX–XXII. It is somewhat puzzling that Gaumer omits the clearly anti-Donatist ep. 204.

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Approaching Augustine’s Anti-Donatist letters

3. Classifications of the anti-Donatist letters 3.1 Classification by addressee Individuals: Bishops/Leaders of his opponents: ep. 23, 33, 49, 51, 66, 87, 88, 93, 106, 108 Donatist individuals of lesser authority: ep. 52, 70, 173 Fellow Catholics: ep. 53, 61, 208, (56, 57?)27 Officials: ep. 34, 35, 89, 97, 100, 134, 139, 18528, 204 Groups: Ad nostros (in toto) (1 lib. c. litt. Pet., cath. fr.) Ad Donatistas (in toto): ep. 76, 105, 141 To smaller Donatist groups: ep. 43, 44 To smaller catholic groups: ep. 142, 144 This classification allows us to see that the largest group consists of letters sent to individuals. Among the addressees Augustine was trying to reach were especially the leaders of the Donatists (the Donatist bishops; 10 letters) and men of high rank (9 letters). There are a few remarks in his correspondence that attest that he also wrote other letters addressed to the Donatist bishops that have not been preserved. It is important to note that in writing to the leaders of the Donatists and Roman officials, Augustine adopted a certain strategy and would send his letters with the intention of reaching the largest possible audience. Correspondence between important public figures has always been interesting to the general reader. If Augustine was indeed trying to reach out to the Donatist laity through this medium, he was making a reasonable guess that ordinary Donatists would also be eager to read the exchange of arguments between their leaders and himself.29 It seems that it was somewhat unbecoming and unusual for a Catholic bishop to send letters to a non-Catholic bishop (and vice versa), as can be inferred from Augustine’s lengthy explanations on the subject included in his letters to Maximinus (ep. 23), Proculeian (ep. 33), and Emeritus (ep. 87), which I shall analyse below. 27 In case of the recipient of these two letters, ep. 56, 57, namely Celer, it is hard to unequivocally call him a Catholic. He seems to be a hestiant individual who is loosening bonds with the Donatism and considering the Catholic brand of Christianity. Morgenstern qualifies him as a Catholic (1993, 16), Mandouze (“Celer 1,” Mandouze: 1982, 202) underlines his Donatist origins. 28 C. Buenacasa Perez: 2013, 439–447, proposed a different classification of the letters ad Donatistas, using three categories: to bishops, to aristocrats, to plebeians. This classification is based on a premise that is visible in a remark claiming that “Augustine was completely convinced that the theological speculations would not be understood by most of the Donatist followers” (2013, 443). The author tries to convince us that the letters to plebeian people, by which he understands ep. 76, 105, 141 and 185, are less complicated than these directed to aristocrats, such as like ep. 34 and 35, which is debatable. 29 Letters in antiquity had this public aspect, so much so that one scholar was inclined to call them the first social medium in history, see Standage: 2013.



Classifications of the anti-Donatist letters

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In many of his letters to officials, Augustine tries to influence their decisions. Whether they start as congratulatory letters, as ep. 97 or 100, or are written in reaction to some illegal actions of the Donatists, as in ep. 34 or 35, Augustine’s goal seems to be to persuade men of high rank to become involved in the Donatist controversy. In these two letters the eventual positive reaction of the addressee, Eusebius, a local aristocrat, would only have repercussions in Hippo and its vicinity, but as ep. 97 to Olympius30 shows, Augustine tries to also exert influence on the most important men in the state, whose decision would be valid for the entire Roman empire.31 On the other hand, among the letters written to men of high rank, we can also find clear examples of episcopal intercession. In ep. 134 to proconsul Aprin­ gius, Augustine pleads for mercy for the Donatists, which enables him to present himself and his party as lenient and forgiving. In such letters, the polemical component may have been of lesser importance.32 There were also cases where Augustine replied to a letter of an official who had asked for clarification with regard to some aspects of the controversy, of which ep. 185 and ep. 204 are the quintessential examples. It is in these letters that the polemical argumentation is fully developed. The famous ep. 185, to which Augustine himself later referred as The book on the correction of the Donatists, is a showcase of such indirect polemic against Donatists. All in all, the letters to high officials were also meant to be widely distributed and, through the aura of celebrity of the correspondents, to attract the attention of all those who had even a passing interest in the Donatist controversy. These observations may be corroborated by a quick look at the letters addressed to the groups of Donatists and Catholics. These include especially the letters written in response to the writings of Petilian that later became known as the first book of c. litt. Pet., and cath. fr. Augustine does not limit himself to writing to his congregation, but oversteps the boundaries of his episcopal see to write to all Catholics on these two occasions. Augustine, like Petilian before him, directed his letter ad suos. In terms of institutional practice, the act of sending a letter to all Catholics is rather unique and transgressive, considering that Augustine did not hold the position of primate of Numidia, which might have legitimised his missives. And, finally, there are ep. 76, 105 and 141. The last two are certainly addressed to all Donatists, as we can tell from the salutatio and titulus. The first lacks these parts in manuscripts, but 30 Olympius, who outmanoeuvred Stilicho in 408, and took over his very high post of magister officiorum, had exchanged letters with Augustine even before ep. 96 and 97 – the first preserved letters of the two. See Adamiak: 2017, 28–29, with references. 31 Of course Augustine worked together with a team of skilled lobbysts well versed in law, such as Alypius or Possidius. We should never underestimate their input in the course of the Donatists and Pelagian controversies. 32 Two other letters directed to officials and concerning the Donatists (ep. 58 and 86) have no polemical edge whatsoever. They were, however, consciously shaped as weapons in the battle with the Donatists, which is especially noticeable in ep. 58, where Augustine congratulates Pammachius, a Roman senator, for converting the Donatists living in his estates in Africa. He shares his wish, in this letter, that other senators would follow in the steps of Pammachius.

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Approaching Augustine’s Anti-Donatist letters

from its content it might be inferred that it is of the same type as ep. 105 and 141. Ep. 105 is signed by Augustine exclusively, ep. 141 is signed by all the bishops gathered at the council of Cirta and incorporated into the acts of this council,33 whereas ep. 76 in its preserved state does not give us this information. The tone and direct remarks of these letters allow us to conclude that they were directed to Donatist laymen, and perhaps lesser clergy, rather than to the bishops. In fact, Augustine uses these letters to persuade the Donatists that they should not rely on their lea­ ders. Such public missives to schismatics should also be considered as elements of the original strategy of Augustine. As we can see, his attitude towards epistolary practice is far from conventional.34 Such an epistolary strategy might have been driven by the expectation that the less customary his epistolary efforts were, the more publicity they might gain.

3.2 Classification based on letter function Exhorting to a debate ep. 23, 33, 44, 49, 51, 66, 76, 87, 88, 105, 106, 108 Exhorting to correction/unity ep. 23, 33, 43, 44, 49, 51, 52, 70, 66, 76, 87, 88, 93, 105,106, 108, 173, 1 lib. c. litt. Pet., cath. fr. Exhorting an official to take a position or undertake an institutional action (lobbying) ep. 34, 35, 89, 97, 100, 134, 139, 185, 204, Exhorting/persuading to conversion ep. 43, 76, 93, 105, 173 Exhorting men of high standing to convert others ep. 57 Accusatory (blaming): ep. 23, 33, 34, 35, 51, c. litt. Pet., cath. fr., 52, 66, 70, 76, 87, 88, 93, 105, 106, 108, 141, 142 185, 208 Answering an accusation by the Donatists (defensive) ep. 43, 44, 51, c. litt. Pet., cath. fr., 87, 88, 89, 93,105,108, 141, 185, Praising the addressees for conversion (congratulatory) ep. 142, 144 Relating a debate ep. 44, 141, 142, Explaining his attitude towards the Donatists (on the issue of converting them) ep. 61, 89, 105, 185 Providing others with arguments against the Donatists in answer to a request: ep. 53, 57, 185 Responding to a specific letter/writing of the opponents ep. 53, 93, c. litt. Pet., cath. fr. The second classification of Augustine’s anti-Donatist letters given above allows us to see the specifics of the polemical letter as a medium for debating controversial 33 But it was written by Augustine himself. 34 Augustine’s liberal attitude to the epistolary norms is very clearly observed in his correspondence with Jerome. See Ebbeler: 2007, 316–324.



Classifications of the anti-Donatist letters

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issues. A polemical treatise is usually triggered by a single and simple circumstance: the act of publishing a text by an ideological or institutional opponent, or rather the fact of becoming acquainted with this text, which may have been published earlier. Polemic in sermons is mostly conditioned by either some events crucial to a given community or by the biblical passages present in the liturgy for a given day. Certainly Augustine digresses in his sermons a lot, and associates some biblical passages with issues only very loosely linked to them. The polemical letters are different in this respect, as they were written in all sorts of circumstances with various goals in mind. Perhaps the most significant difference lies in the fact that the letters are always directed to someone with the expectation that this person will reciprocate with a letter.35 None of the anti-Donatist letters can be regarded as having been written with a single, clearly stated purpose, which should make us cautious about the validity of any exclusive classification of Augustine’s polemical letters. For instance, in ep. 44, a letter of average length written to a lay Donatist after a public debate with the Donatist bishop Fortunius, Augustine aims at (1) presenting information about the debate with Fortunius, (2) praising Fortunius, (3) defending his party against the charges of persecution, (4) accusing the Donatists of schism and, finally, (5) exhorting them to debate. Even the very short congratulatory letter to the converts in Cirta (ep. 144) is simultaneously a deliberation on God’s role in conversion and an accusation of the crime of schism. The letters always bear a trace of the circumstances that allowed Augustine to develop a much more varied argumentation based on the three Aristotelian means of persuasion (pisteis) – ethos, pathos, and logos – than is the case with other polemical genres.36 Augustine’s polemical treatises are mostly (but not uniquely) concerned with rational, scriptural argumentation (as in De baptismo), whereas some sermons in which we find anti-Donatist passages are clearly focused on ethos (e.g. s. 4, 197) and pathos, (e.g. s. 359), although we can find passages in sermons (e.g. s. 88.37) that resemble the scriptural argumentation of the treatises or a few letters. The ancient practice and theory of letter writing and its relation to the art of rhetoric was most comprehensively treated by Stanley K. Stowers in the second part of his book Letter Writing in Graeco-Roman Antiquity. He observes that ancient letters quite often consisted of elements characteristic of the three main rhetorical classes: judicial, deliberative and epideictic. Thus, in all the long anti-Donatist letters we find passages that concern, firstly, “decisions about what was just or unjust in the past” (Stowers: 1986, 51) as is fitting for courtroom speeches; secondly, those 35 I am grateful to all the participants in a very long and fruitful discussion of this feature of the letters that took place during the workshop in ZAF in Würzburg in September 2018. 36 I discuss the theory of three genera dicendi in chapter two, on p. 51–52. 37 The characterisation of the Donatists in the sermons of Augustine has been studied by Ivonne Tholen. Although we find a lot of source material in this study it falls short of a thorough analysis, especially from the standpoint of the rhetorical strategies, see: Tholen: 2010.

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Approaching Augustine’s Anti-Donatist letters

concerning the question of “what course of action would be expedient or useful in the future” (Ibid.), the main interest of advisory or deliberative speech; and finally, those focused on administering praise or blame, making “clear what was honorable and what was shameful.” (Ibid.) However, when mentioning letters written during the religious controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries, Stowers ascribes to them three types of letters known from the handbook of Pseudo-Demetrius: kategorikai – accusing, apologetikai – apologetic, psektikai – vituperative letters, or letters of invective (Ibid., 173). The first two of these are directly related to forensic rhetoric (Ibid., 166). These letters “make use of rhetorical practices of prosecution and defence speeches,” (Ibid.) which means that they consist of clear formulation of the charge or charges and argumentation for or against each charge. According to Pseudo-Demetrius, the vituperative letter consists in “bring[ing] to light the badness of someone’s character or the offensiveness of (his) actions against someone” (Malherbe: 1988, 36–37). The elements of these three letter types can also be found in Augustine’s anti-Donatist correspondence. It is difficult, however, to find among these a letter which could fall into only one of these three categories. The last type discussed above, namely the vituperative (psektikos), belongs to the class of blaming letters. The other four types would be, in Pseudo-Demetrius’ handbook: the blaming letter (memptikos), reproaching (oneidistikos), admonishing (nouthetetikos), letter of censure or rebuke (epitimetikos). Pseudo-Libanius has a simpler, three-part division: reproaching, reproving, maligning (Stowers: 1986, 85–86). The ironic letter consisting of feigned praise, according to Stowers, was also linked by ancient theoreticians with this genre of letters (Ibid., 86). But the names may be misleading as, for instance, the blaming letter “is one that undertakes not to seem harsh” when criticising someone for their misbehaviour towards us, for breaching the code of conduct (Malherbe: 1988, 32–33). The reproachful letter should be written on a very specific occasion, when we want to reprimand someone “who had earlier benefited from us” for her/his ingratitude (Ibid., 34–35). It occurs that even the first four types of the letters of blame, according to ancient handbooks, should be addressed to people with whom we have already established posi­ tive contact. This is not true for most of the anti-Donatist letters, for Augustine wrote to only a few addressees whom he knew in person. For all these reasons we cannot qualify any of Augustine’s anti-Donatist letters as precisely matching these definitions. As I mentioned before, accusation is often hard to discern from rebuke or reprimand, while these two may often resemble some form of exhortation or advice. Thus, the three main genres of rhetoric – forensic, epideictic and deliberative – are hard to trace in these typologies.38 Stowers’ advice goes along the lines of the ancient 38 Pseudo-Demetrius discerns various types of letters that are embedded in the context of the deliberative oratory: “It is the advisory type, when by offering our own judgement, we exhort someone to something or dissuade him from something.” Even the admonishing type, i.e. one that



Classifications of the anti-Donatist letters

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handbook of letter writing written by Pseudo-Demetrius. The types of letters should always be categorised and discerned on the basis of the specific circumstances in which they were written and the language that they used. But even Stowers observes that, as T.S. Eliot would say, between the idea and reality falls the shadow: many letters are a mixture of different types of blame and exhortation. Maria Pia Ciccarese, who almost half a century ago made an attempt to establish a firm typology of Augustine’s friendly letters, also had to admit: “Nella maggior parte dei casi, comunque, non si può stabilire una netta separazione fra la parte propriamente esortatoria e quella intesa alla confutazione dell’errore” (Pia Ciccarese: 1971, 491). In fact, if we look at all the anti-Donatist letters, accusation and defence, praise and blame, exhortation and admonition concur. The very long ep. 185 starts with congratulation, ends with an exhortation, but in the 50 long paragraphs in between we experience an interchange of defence mixed with admonition, and accusation slightly tinged with invective. But the shorter letters, too, present us at times with a mixture of blame and accusation, such as ep. 34, 52, 88, or praise and advice, as in ep. 89 or 144. Jennifer Ebbeler presented Augustine’s polemical letters as being embedded mostly or solely within the deliberative genre. In this book, I am going to demonstrate that Augustine’s anti-Donatist correspondence is deeply pervaded with the characteristic features of the judicial genre. To achieve this aim, the ancient typologies of letters and their modern customisations are of little avail. We should rather aim at achieving a more complex view of the rhetorical dimension that Augustine’s polemical letters have to offer.

3.3 Classification by chronology39 There have been numerous attempts to establish a certain pattern in Augustine’s dealings with the Donatists. There is no denying that he adapted to changing poli­ tical and legal circumstances. What is more, as a prominent Catholic bishop he also tried to influence the imperial court and its decisions concerning the African schism. Along the way his thought would change, ideas would develop, some arguments were abandoned, some forms of polemic gained in importance. For instance, the shift in his attitude to the problem of state coercion of religious dissidents and forced conversion (compelle intrare) is well documented.40 In this part, I will discuss belongs to the category of letters of blame, clearly has this deliberative component, for in the words of Pseudo-Demetrius “admonition is the instilling of sense in the person who is being admonished, and teaching him what should and should not be done.” Quotations from Malherbe: 1988, 34–35. 39 For the most concise presentation of the chronology of the Donatist controversy in toto, see Lepelley: 1996, coll. 606–622. In this place I touch upon the most important events in the times of Augustine only. 40 Aug. ep. 93, 3–19; ep. 185.25–28; retract. 2.5. Secondary literature is abundant; the most popular choices would be: Brown: 1964, 107–116; Russell: 1999, 115–30.

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a few scholarly efforts to propose a chronological division of Augustine’s polemic against the Donatists. Geoffrey G. Willis proposed the most detailed, six-fold division. The first four periods distinguished by him are of roughly equal length: 1) 391–395, 2) 395–400, 3) 400–405, 4) 405–411. Then follows the Conference of Carthage, which constitutes its own, fifth phase, and the rest written after 411 belongs to the sixth period. According to Willis, in the first, Augustine merely probes into the Donatist ideas, actions and works. He seems to be interested solely in the pastoral care of the Christians in his diocese (Willis: 1950, 36–40). In the second period, after becoming the bishop of Hippo, his interventions only very rarely deal with events outside of his own diocese, but he is more actively involved in written polemic and in provoking public debates with Donatist leaders (Ibid., 40–49). There follows the third period, which is characterised by the development of the idea of state coercion of the heretics and of arguments based on historical documents (Ibid., 49–60). The fourth period is one of violence that broke out in the aftermath of the so-called Edict of Unity of 12 February 405, following the active cooperation of Catholics with the Roman imperial court and provincial officials. In the case of Augustine’s activities, this period is marked by his attempts to capitalise on the fact that the Maximianists re-entered the ranks of the Donatists without being rebaptized and his efforts in bringing the controversy to its culmination during the Conference of Carthage, which is described as the fifth period of Augustine’s correspondence (Ibid. 60–70). In the last phase, the bishop of Hippo tried to explain and justify what happened in Carthage in 411, and repeated mostly what he had already said in the previous phases (Ibid. 70–76). Émilien Lamirande (1998, 206–219) on the other hand suggests that Augustine’s polemics with the Donatists may be divided into two periods only: before and after 400. The earlier period is marked by his individual initiatives to force the Donatists to debate the troubling issues with him, which ended in disappointment, since most of his calls went unanswered. In the second period, according to Lamirande, Augustine first seeks to persuade the African bishops to follow his conciliatory stance in dealings with the Donatists and provoke debates with the Donatist leaders all through Africa. However, the renewed acts of violence and the unwillingness of the Donatist party to meet and debate with the “children of the persecutors” changed Augustine’s mind around the turn of the centuries. From now on, in solidarity with the Catholic bishops of Africa, he works towards resolving the controversy by calling on the emperor to take action and put an end to the schism (Ibid., 220–227).41 There have also been some attempts to establish a relative chronology based on analysis of the language used by Augustine. Most notably, Alfred Schindler (1980, 228–36) reflected on the use of the labels “schism” and “heresy” in the anti-Donatist works of the bishop of Hippo. His analysis allows him to propose the conclusion 41 A good source for this shift is the relation about the council of Carthage from 16 June 404, see Concilia Africae, 211–213.



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that around the year 399 Augustine started to perceive the Donatists not only as schismatics but also as heretics. This shift influences his polemical writings and the actions of the African bishops, and leads to a diplomatic and political offensive in the years 402 and 403, and finally, to the Edict of Union in February 405. Later, Carles Buenacasa Pérez used textual analysis to trace the shifts in Augustine’s labelling of the Donatists in his letters. At first, Buenacasa Pérez differentiates between two periods: before and after 405, which is when Honorius issued the Edict of Union (2011, 393–410). However, in a later paper, he discerned three phases: before 405 – the phase of exhortation, 405–411 – that of justification, and after 411 – the period of explanation (2013, 445). This brief presentation illustrates how difficult it is to establish a strict framework for the chronological development of Augustine’s anti-Donatist correspondence. It would be rash to reject all these attempts as futile by using the old sceptical argument, namely that the fact that there are so many disparate classifications proves that none of them can be seen as valid. Each of them has some merit, and the historical facts on which they are based – documented in legal, literary and epi­ graphical sources – are beyond doubt. Augustine came to be involved in the controversy in the period when the Donatists could virtually ignore the Catholics and rebaptize converts with no risk of punishment, because local officials were not interested in enforcing the existing laws against heretics, and the Catholics did not want the Donatists to pride themselves on new martyrs to their faith. The situation was complicated by terminological nuances, because even though there existed laws against heresies issued by Theodosius, the Donatists could safely claim that they were not heretics. When Augustine was ordained priest in 391, he continuously worked towards preparing a comprehensive response to change this state of affairs. He started with what seemed like a good choice: in 393, he composed a popular song as an instrument of anti-Donatist propaganda – Psalmus contra partem Donati (see van Reyn: 2015, 251–68). Later in the 390s, the Donatists were struggling with schism inside their community, and their decisions made at the council of Bagaï in 394 to excommunicate the Maximianists (revoked in 397 or 398) proved to be fatal for them.42 Another event that eventually presented itself as a gift of grace for the Catholics was the decision of the Donatist bishop Optatus of Thamugadi to side in the years 397–398 with the powerful rebel leader Gildo, whose attempt to overturn the Roman rule in North Africa ended in failure (See Shaw: 2011, 60). These two events are mirrored in Augustine’s correspondence and supply additional material to his inventio broadening the repertoire of his already developed argumentation. The acts of the successive councils of Carthage make it evident that the general level of activity of the African Catholic Church focused on resolving the controversy raised in the late 390s and remained very stable until the Conference of Carthage (See ibid., 140–5). We learn from them that what Augustine was practis42 The most detailed and up-to-date report on the events surrounding the election of Parmenian and resulting breaking of the Maximian schism is to be found in Gaumer: 2012, 292–310.

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ing in the 390s and in the initial years of the fifth century became obligatory for every Catholic bishop: they were all exhorted to provoke Donatist bishops to engage in public debates in the presence of magistrates or the Elders (see Shaw: 2011, 110– 111). This strategy is recommended by the decision of two councils of Carthage from September 401 and August 403.43 The Catholic bishops even petitioned Septimius, the proconsul of Africa, to involve Roman magistrates in the task of summoning the Donatists to these official hearings. The request was granted.44 It is plausibly suspected that the bishop of Hippo influenced these decisions of both councils. Before the first in particular, Augustine spent almost the whole summer in Carthage together with Aurelius, the Catholic primate of Africa, preparing the ground for this new strategy.45 And as we learn from the acts of the council of Carthage in 404, the Donatists reacted to all invitations to public debates just as they had reacted to the previous ones from Augustine himself: they rejected them. Their refusal was one of the factors (aside from acts of violence) that triggered a legal offensive and ultimately led to the Conference of Carthage. This was a cleverly chosen strategy. As far as we know, Augustine hoped for debates, but in any case, together with his colleagues, he was sending a message to the public opinion that his party was open to dialogue and their opponents remained isolated. We see how in the next years Augustine, Aurelius and Alypius were reaching out publicly and privately to the highest Roman officials with their agenda. If the Donatists tried to do the same, they were overpowered. W.H.C. Frend (1989, 117–118) suggested that in the first decade of the fifth century, contrary to the long periods of the fourth century, the Catholics had more intelligent and more energetic leaders who brought about the change. Such a picture may have been influenced by Augustine’s persuasive rhetoric, which forces us to perceive the Catholic leaders as the successful champions of a good cause. If we read for instance the Acts of the Conference of Carthage (Gesta Collationis Carthaginensis) we can recognise the rhetorical and legal skills of Donatist leaders, especially Petilian and Emeritus.46 It is nonetheless safe to state that the Catholic party was apparently much better in lobbying at the imperial court than the Donatists. The inner divisions of the Donatist Church, the friendship between Optatus of Thamugadi and Gildo, their reluctance to debate publicly with the Catholics bishops, the link between them and the oppressive acts of circumcelliones – all these circumstances were presented in the 43 We see that on two councils in Carthage in 13 September 401 and 25 August 403 Augustine’s point of view won and the bishops decided to seek the occasion for dialogue with the Donatists (see Concilia Africae, 198–200, 209–212; Lenski: 2016, 180–181, 211–212). 44 Gesta Collationis Carthaginensis 3.174. 45 This energetic leader of the African Church was elected as bishop of Carthage around 392, and, although we know him mostly through the lens of Augustine, he was a person to be reckoned with for another almost forty years, see “Aurelius 1,” Mandouze: 1982, 105–126. 46 The new analysis of this document brought Neil McLynn to the conclusion that in fact the Donatist leaders were at least as effective during the first day of the Conference as Augustine and the Catholic bishops, (2007, 187–189).



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Catholic agenda at the imperial court in a masterfully exaggerated persuasive fashion. What Noel Lenski said about the actions of Aurelius of Carthage in the first years of the fifth century also holds true for the other two figures, Augustine and Alypius: they were “stage-managing communications with the emperor and his officials, manipulating them like the marionettes on a string” (2016, 182). There is also no doubt that Augustine’s constant repetition of these themes in his polemics in this period played a role. In effect, the Catholic party won according to the Edict of Union from the early 405,47 and according to the verdict of Marcellinus at the Conference in Carthage in 411. Afterwards, Augustine was dealing with different problems than in the last decade of the fourth century. But even then some Donatist leaders, such as Emeritus as late as in 417,48 continued to ignore Augustine’s call for debates just as they had twenty years earlier. The new problems the Catholic leaders had to face after 411 were, at least in part, century-old problems: how to coerce the Donatists with the help of the state and still save the image of the Church of the merciful Christ. I agree with Paul Monceaux that Augustine established a plan or system of polemic with the Donatists in the last few years of the fourth century and that its core remained unmodified (1922, 195–199);49 I shall provide additional evidence for this in the later parts of this book. As for the letters themselves, notwithstanding the problems with the dating of some of them, and with the fact that we possess only a part of the actual body of Augustine’s correspondence, we can say on the basis of the extant texts that the two decades before the Conference of Carthage were equally productive, whereas after 412 we find that his anti-Donatist letters are far fewer. It is very noticeable that some types of letters are far better represented at the beginning of his engagement in the controversy. That is the case of the letters provoking to debate, such as ep. 23, 33, 49, 51. But the letter to Emeritus (ep. 87) written between 405 and 411, just as the letter to Proculeian (ep. 33) written before 395, is an invitation or a challenge to debate. And, as has been already mentioned, also after 411 Augustine was trying to get involved in debates with the Donatists if the circumstances were advantageous to him. In the eyes of many African Christians the case between the two parties was still undecided, in spite of the verdicts passed and laws promulgated.50 It is true, however, that around 410 and afterwards we find letters praising someone’s conversion or interceding with the officials for the convicted Donatists asking the officials 47 The edict was dated to 12 February 405. The text survived only in fragments, see CTh 16.5.38; 16.6.3. The Donatists just like the Manicheans were considered heretics and forbidden to gather. The practice of rebaptism was also forbidden. 48 In this year a famous debate took place between Augustine and Emeritus that is documented in Gesta cum Emerito. 49 However, as far as the epistolary polemic with the Donatists is concerned, Monceaux (1922, 131–132) proposed to divide it into five periods, 392–395, 396–400, 401–405, 405–410, 411–430. 50 On the perseverance of the Donatists in the 6th and even 7th century, see Conant: 2016, 37–54.

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for a merciful course of action, which was not the case in the last decade of the fourth century. Letters of average length and the longest, which gave me the most material for analysis, are spread throughout the whole period. All these letters had a variety of functions to fulfil: some of them directly exhort to unity, some consist of accusatory and defensive argumentation, some explain Augustine’s and Church’s attitude towards and understanding of Donatism, some are written in reaction to a certain danger posed by the heretics or even their crime, some urge an official to take position. It seems worthwhile therefore to study these thirty-six texts scattered over around four hundred pages in the CSEL edition as a corpus of texts, to see what, if any, patterns or regularities in terms of the construction of arguments occur in this substantial sample. My working hypothesis was that we can convincingly argue in favour of the coherence of the rhetorical strategies within these texts. From this point of view, as I am going to demonstrate, issues of chronology are only secondary to the structuring of the arguments in accordance with the principles of forensic rhetoric.

4. Staging the dispute through correspondence In terms of their composition, Augustine’s polemical treatises have a fairly stan­ dardised literary form. During numerous controversies with the pagans, Arians, Manicheans, Donatists, and Pelagians, Augustine brought this form of writing to a high degree of perfection. The technique was well known before him: the common practice was to refer to the respective writings of the opponent and discuss their arguments. Although Augustine at times makes suggestions that he is keen to engage in a face-to-face public debate with his Donatist counterparts just like the philosophers did,51 he is nonetheless fully aware that his polemical writings are going to be read aloud and considered in the context of judicial and philosophical controversies. As Anne-Marie La Bonnardière observed:

Such a method of debate presents some inconveniences which Augustine did not foresee and which tend to weaken his arguments. Furthermore, this method can give the illusion of a real disputation which is echoed in the written work[s].[…]Their ‘dialogue’ is fictional (La Bonnardière: 1999, 193).

The statement above holds true not only for the polemical treatises, but also, as we will see, for many of his letters. Quotations are rarely used, but sermocinationes, that is, feigned dialogues with his opponents, are frequent. Even in letters to people on his side, where the Donatists are initially referred to in the third person, Augustine tended to address the Donatists directly in the second person. For instance, in two 51 The philosophical agons were popular in late antiquity and sometimes turned into spectacular quarrels, see: Lim: 1995, 32–69.



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of his letters directed to a Catholic audience – c. litt. Pet and cath. fr. – the Donatists at first occur as “they”, but at a certain point Augustine engages in a dialogue with them without an intermediary: the personal pronoun “you” is expressly used. In c. litt. Pet. this shift appears suddenly in paragraph 23 and in the following four paragraphs the second person rings like an echo: praecidistis, separastis, maculamini, obicitis, communicate, often accompanied by the pronoun uos. That is exactly what gives “the illusion of a real disputation” as La Bonnardière noted. The same observation can be made on the basis of the chronologically first letter analysed here, namely ep. 23. We learn from it that Augustine, while being a presbyter in Hippo, wished to debate the recent case of rebaptism with Maximinus, the Donatist bishop of Siniti in Numidia. This was a fairly unusual proposition, for Augustine did not plan to meet Maximinus in person. On the contrary, he rejoices in the prospect of having these “peaceful conferences” (“pacificae conlationes”) through the letters first written by them and then read publicly in their churches.52 He seems to imply that in this way their congregations will be informed about the core issues of the controversy. Simultaneously, the public reading of the letters of two opposing parties one after another is exactly what creates the illusion of a real disputation.53 It seems, however, that from his very first involvement in the Donatist controversy, Augustine was open to the idea of having real public debates with his opponents. In August 392 a debate was held in Hippo between him and the Manichean Fortunatus. If we are to believe Possidius, Augustine was chosen by all the Christians of Hippo, including by the Donatists, as their representative.54 The audience gathered in the Baths of Sossius was predominantly Christian, so Augustine was confidently playing on home ground (See Lim: 1995, 93–94). As far as public disputes with the Donatists are concerned, the earliest mention of such a debate is found in ep. 33.1, written in or before 396 and addressed to Proculeian, the Donatist bishop of Hippo. Augustine informs us that it was Proculeian who invited him to a debate through his friend Evodius. Evodius met Proculeian by coincidence at a social gathering, which they disrupted by quarrelling. Augustine accepts the challenge, but he presents his conditions. He insists that the contents of their more peaceful and more orderly conversations (“tranquillius et ordinatius disseramus”) be put down in writing.55 It is impossible to determine the exact format of the debate that Augustine sketches next. It seems to me that Augustine’s expectation is to meet and in turns read aloud the sets of prepared answers to certain “quaestiones.” 52 ep. 23.6 (CSEL 34,1, 71): “quam conlationem mecum si libenti animo susceperis, ut concordibus nobis amborum litterae populis recitentur, ineffabili exultabo laetitia.” 53 ep. 23.6; see also Ebbeler: 2012, 69–75. 54 Possidius, Vita Augustini 6. 55 ep. 33.4 (CSEL 34,2, 20–21) and 33.6 (CSEL 34,2, 22): “pacifice conferendo”. This is not unusual, the debate with Fortunatus was also recorded by stenographers: retract. 1.15(16): “Quae disputatio, nobis altercantibus, excepta est a notariis, ueluti gesta conficerentur.” See also C. Fortunatum 1–3.

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However, before it takes place, he suggests that they start with what might be called a preliminary debate (“prius…conferamus”) and that they proceed with it in one of these two ways: either through letters (“per epistolas”), or through private conversations written down and read by both parties afterwards (“per collocutionem atque lectionem”).56 Accordingly, they would be able to proceed by adopting one of the two options. (1) The audience might gather during the reading of written records of their private debate, undisturbed by crowds. We should note that this is exactly what Augustine later expected of his fellow clergymen after the conference of 411 – to read aloud the acts of the conference every year during Lent.57 Only in ep. 33 do we hear about this idea for the first time. (2) If Proculeian chose the epistolary format for the discussion, both communities would have an opportunity to listen to these letters being read aloud in their churches, just as was proposed in ep. 23. Both solutions seem to be equally acceptable to Augustine at this time, for two specific reasons. The first is the possibility to reach a wider audience; the second is the avoidance of disturbances characteristic of traditional public controversies – Augustine fears that crowd’s reactions might negatively influence the speakers and sometimes even change the course of the debate. The disputants may be pressed to engage in quarrels when interrupted by invectives shouted towards them or applause for the opponent. This fear of crowd’s reactions and the intention to reach a wider audience has much to do with the relative numbers of the Donatists and Catholics in Numidia at this time: to use a sport metaphor, Augustine is reasonable in refraining from playing an important game on the field of the opponent, and chooses a more neutral ground. Very sadly, it seems that this debate, for unknown reasons, never came to fruition. It does not mean, however, that the bishop of Hippo did not take part in live debates with Donatists in places where they were in the majority. He did so at least once ca. 396 in Numidia.58 Ep. 44 is our only source for this debate and the best one for grasping the reality of such debates and Augustine’s model of them. In 396 or 397 Augustine writes a letter to Donatist laymen59 who seemed open to dialogue, in order to relate his debate with their bishop Fortunius of Thiave. The first two para56 ep. 33.4 (CSEL 34,2, 20–21): “si placet, nullo medio interposito prius nobiscum siue per epistulas siue per conlocutionem atque lectionem, ubi placuerit, conferamus, ne forte intemperantes nonnulli auditores malint quasi nostrum expectare certamen, quam de sua salute in nostra conlocutione cogitare, ut, quod inter nos fuerit terminatum, postea per nos populus nouerit, aut, si per epistulas agi placet, ipsae plebibus recitentur, ut aliquando non plebes sed plebs una dicatur.” Ebbeler: 2012, 170 is also not certain what kind of lectio is on Augustine’s mind. 57 ep. 28*. 58 Another debate documented by the sources was organised as late as in 417 with Emeritus. It proved to be inconclusive, as the opponent did attend the debate, but refused to say anything other than making some preliminary remarks. It should not go unnoticed that the event took place in front of a crowd of Catholics in a church taken back from the Donatists. See Possidius, Vita Augustini 72–73, Aug., Gesta cum Emerito. 59 The only knowledge we have of Glorius, Eleusius and two Felixes is what we find in ep. 43 and 44 of Augustine. They were Donatists, born of Donatist parents, and served as intermediaries



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graphs tell us about the circumstances of that meeting and Augustine’s irritation. After a brief exchange of salutations, Augustine visited Fortunius in his house and invited him for a debate. Both bishops had numerous members of their respective parties by their side, the crowd was large and loud. Augustine presents the behaviour of the audience without empathy or understanding. He complains that most spectators were improperly motivated and came to see an agon and behaved as if they were in a theatre, not at a serious and important theological dispute.60 Augustine grumbles that neither he nor the Donatist bishop could silence the gathered crowd, as they took no heed of their calls for order, yet somehow the two bishops managed to start the discussion that eventually lasted several hours.61 But before the exchange of arguments began, Augustine was able to enforce his model – the debate was to be taken down by stenographers and the transcript co­ pied for both parties. Unsurprisingly, we read in Augustine’s account that Fortunius and the Donatists were not happy with this solution, but he was able to persuade them.62 There were some problems with finding reliable stenographers, and the Donatists were not willing to undertake this task, but when some of Augustine’s companions volunteered to carry out the transcription, the debate eventually got underway. Further in the letter Augustine relates the content of the disputation, namely the sequence of arguments advanced by both parties, some of which are accompanied by his commentary. In order to present the advantages of his model of discussion and make it look perfectly reliable, Augustine asks his addressees to check the veracity of his account by reading it to Fortunius himself.63 What is especially interesting to us here is that Augustine presents his arguments for having the debate recorded in writing. Firstly, he wants to have a reliable aide-mémoire with a precise and exact record of the events as they unfolded and of the arguments used. He notes that it shall be useful not only for his own sake, but also for the sake of all the people whose salvation is at stake.64 Secondly, he believes that whenever a debate is re-

between Augustine and their Donatist Bishop, Fortunius, see also “Eleusius,” Mandouze: 1982, 336–7. 60 ep. 44.1 (CSEL 34,2, 110): “sed in tota illa multitudine perpauci apparebant, qui utiliter ac salubriter agi causam illam et tantam reique tantae quaestionem prudenter et pie discuti cuperent. ceteri uero magis ad spectaculum quasi altercationis nostrae prope theatrica consuetudine quam ad instructionem salutis christiana deuotione conuenerant.” 61 Which makes us reconsider Augustine’s bitterness – so much noise, such a bad audience and still a rather long discussion. 62 ep. 44.2 (CSEL 34,2, 110): “Diu ab illo uel ei consentientibus reluctatum est; postea tamen ipse concessit.” 63 ep. 44.2 (CSEL 34,2, 110): “Potestis enim ei litteras eas legere, ut uel adprobet me uera scripsisse uel ipse uobis, si quid melius recolit, incunctanter insinuet.” The whole situation resembles a much later debate with the Arian Pascentius, presented in the first two paragraphs of ep. 238. 64 ep. 44.2 (CSEL 34,2, 110): “sed in ipso disputationis exordio cum uideremus ea, quae dicebantur, subinde labi de memoria uel nostra uel eorum, quorum salutem maxime curabamus, et ut esset nobis cautior modestiorque tractatio, simul et uos atque alii fratres, qui absentes erant, quid

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corded in shorthand the speakers are more careful and moderate. Thirdly, a much wider audience can be reached through writing. The successive anti-Donatist letters in which Augustine reflects on the mode of the debate are directed to Donatist bishops: ep. 49 to Honoratus, bishop of an unknown see in Numidia, (ca. 398), and ep. 51 to Crispinus of Calama in Numidia (ca. 399) (Ebbeler: 2012, 169–172). Although here Augustine prefers to debate through letters, his reasons for doing so are virtually the same as with the live debates taken down by stenographers. In the opening lines of the first letter, we read that it was Honoratus who proposed to proceed with the debate through letters and that Augustine eagerly applauds. An artful sequence of alliterations (“nullus turbarum tumultus perturbare possit dispositionem nostrum”) explains the motives for such a choice – they can thus spare themselves the disturbing chaos and noise of the crowds. This same reason is repeated in the closing remarks of the letter:

Hoc autem ego Augustinus dictaui, quia olim uolo loqui inde tecum uidetur enim mihi uel propter ipsam uicinitatem posse nos per litteras de hac re colloqui sine aliquo tumultu adiuuante deo quantum ipsa necessitas postulat.65

Here is another motive for the choice of letters as a medium for debate: “propter ipsam uicinitatem” – “on account of our nearness”. This is somewhat puzzling, since the vicinity of the correspondents would logically invite live discussions. Jennifer Ebbeler points at Augustine’s odd take on the epistolary topos of discussion in absentia caused by the separation of long distance, but does not explain it (Ebbeler: 2012, 171–172). Is there any way to understand it at all? Firstly, it is possible that Augustine does not want to become involved in a live debate with Honoratus in order to avoid the trap that we discussed above: had Augustine challenged Honoratus to a public discussion, he and his party would have found themselves outnumbered by the opponents present at the event. As we have seen in ep. 44, Augustine was exasperated with the behaviour of the crowds during his debate with Fortunius.66 It is understandable that he preferred to discuss the heated issues in writing rather than in speech. But why did he write a letter instead of a treatise? That is something he would do on other occasions, but in different circumstances and with a different audience in mind. In this particular instance, he clearly decides to impact mostly the local stage. Apparently Honoratus had not written anything substantial enough to merit a treatise directed against his texts, which was a standard motive that triggered Augustine’s polemical writings, e.g. those against Parmenian, inter nos actum esset, legendo cognosceretis, postulauimus, ut a notariis uerba nostra exciperentur.” 65 ep. 49.3 (CSEL 34,2, 142). English transl. by R. Teske in WSA II/1, 196: “But I, Augustine, have dictated this because I have long wanted to speak with you about this. For I think that we can, on account of our nearness, discuss this issue by letters without any uproar, if God helps to the extent that necessity demands.” 66 See Ebbeler’s discussion of this chaotic and disorderly spectacle: (2012: 172–173).



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Petilian, Cresconius, Pelagius and Julian. Honoratus still was, after all, a Donatist bishop living somewhere at close quarters.67 As Augustine was on a mission to resolve the Donatist issue, to target a Donatist bishop directly was a better choice than to leave him alone. The letter as a medium for debate gives a certain sense of immediacy; letters are (or should be) relatively short, and may well have imitated a live exchange of arguments provided that they were penned by a skilled author – Augustine’s skill in this respect can hardly be doubted. It was not exactly a live debate, but bearing its dangers, a safer and close enough substitute. If we read Augustine’s allusion to the close distance between the two correspondents in this light, it may make more sense: a letter exchange could create a better impression of a disputation than a treatise. We find a very similar reasoning in Augustine’s letter to Crispinus, ep. 51: rumor ad me detulit adhuc te uelle mecum disputando experiri de quaestione, quae nostram dirimit communionem. uide, quam breuiter omnes auferantur ambages, ad hanc epistolam responde, si placet, et fortasse sufficiet, non solum nobis sed et eis, qui nos audire desiderant, aut, si non sufficient, scripta atque rescripta, donec sufficiant, repetentur. quid enim nobis commodius poterit exhibere urbium, quas incolimus, tanta uicinitas? ego enim statui nihil de hac re agere uobiscum nisi per litteras, uel ne cui nostrum de memoria, quod dicitur, elabatur uel ne fraudentur talium studiosi, qui forte interesse non possunt. soletis de praeteritis rebus gestis, qui uultis, falsa iactare forte non mentiendi studio sed errore.68

This letter is much more mordant than the previous one, seasoned with mockery. As was the case before, we hear that having the debate in letters allows a wider pu­ blic to be well informed of the course of the controversy. A new explanation for the choice of epistolary debate, one known from ep. 44, emerges here: memory.69 To keep a written track of the stenographed real debates or epistolary exchanges would force the Donatists to leave evidence of their ideas and arguments in writing. In other words, it would allow Augustine to keep an exact record of the controversy

67 See “Honoratus 6,” Mandouze: 1982, 566. 68 ep. 51.1 (CSEL 34,2, 144–145). English transl. by R. Teske in WSA II/1, 198: “Rumor has reached me that you still want to examine while debating with me the question that divides our communion. See how quickly all the evasions are removed; reply to this letter if you will, and perhaps it will suffice, not only for us, but also for those who desire to hear us. Or if it will not suffice, let us continue with letters and replies until it does suffice. What greater advantage, after all, could such great nearness of the cities we inhabit offer us? For I have decided to do nothing with you on this issue except by letters, so that what is said may not slip from the memory of either of us or so that interested persons, who perhaps cannot be present, may not be deprived of such information. You are accustomed to toss about false statements about past events, perhaps not because you want to lie, but because you are mistaken.” 69 This is a tricky word, and it points in a few directions, as Jennifer Ebbeler has observed (2012, 170, 172).

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instead of relying on subjective memory, and – even more importantly – to spread the Donatists’ words around the Christian world.70 This preference of the epistolary form of debate or stenographed disputations in front of a small audience in these years developed into a sort of habit, as can be seen in Augustine’s behaviour on later occasions (Caltabiano: 2006). We know for instance that he never held a live debate with Coelestius or Pelagius although he might have done so while they were staying in North Africa, but preferred writing letters and treatises addressed mostly to Pelagius’ supporters. These so-called anti-Pelagian writings are laden with quotations from works attributed to Pelagius and Coelestius, but also from the Acts of the Council of Diospolis. We also know from ep. 128 and ep. 129 that during preliminary negotiations before the decisive Conference of Carthage the Catholic party opted for a low-profile debate, without the crowds and all the bishops gathered, and recorded in writing.71 The Catholic bis­ hops even promised to Marcellinus that they would keep the numerous Catholic laymen away from the proceedings. There was only one condition – that the acts of the proceedings be published, so that the crowds could satisfy their craving for knowledge.72 This tendency to insist (without much success) on the epistolary form of debate continues after the Edict of Unity, as the opening passage from the letter to the Donatist bishop Emeritus (ep. 87, written at some point between 405 and 411) shows: Ego cum audio quemquam bono ingenio praeditum doctrinisque liberalibus eruditum, quamquam non ibi salus animae constituta sit, tamen in quaestione facillima sentire aliud quam ueritas postulat, quo magis miror, eo magis exardesco nosse hominem et cum eo colloqui uel, si id non possim, saltem litteris, quae longissime uolant, adtingere mentem eius, atque ab eo uicissim adtingi desidero.73

This passage and the letter in general deserves more comment. The very choice of the addressee is in itself an important strategic decision. Emeritus, bishop of Mauretania Caesarensis, lived far away from Hippo. We have seen that Honoratus and Crispinus were placed nearby, and their proximity was presented as a reason for starting the epistolary exchange. Why would Augustine want to provoke a debate in writing with a bishop from so far away? Emeritus was probably an aristocrat, certainly trained in the liberal arts, a person of authority among the Donatists and perhaps in the eyes of public opinion. He probably formulated the verdict of the 70 I agree here with Ebbeler, (2012, 181–184). 71 ep. 129.7. 72 ep. 128.1. 73 ep. 87.1 (CSEL, 34,2, 397). English transl. by R. Teske WSA II/1, 344: “When I hear that someone endowed with a good mind and educated in the liberal arts – though the salvation of the soul is not found in them – holds another view than the truth demands on a very easy question, the more I am surprised, the more I am eager to know the man and to converse with him or, if I am unable to do this, I desire to touch his mind and be touched in turn by him, at least by letters, which speed over long distances.”



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council of Bagaï in April 394 that reversed the excommunication of Primian, bishop of Carthage, and, even more consequentially, excommunicated Maximian and his splinter group.74 As soon as Augustine put his hands on the acts of this council, he relished in quoting the examples of the insulting and abusive tone that was unbecoming of any Christian, let alone a bishop.75 Later, Emeritus was the main speaker at the Conference of Carthage alongside Petilian. After the Conference Augustine dedicated to him the now lost work Ad Emeritum post Collationem,76 although he had previously written Ad Donatistas post Collationem, which may serve as a sign of Emeritus’ authority. It seems that the bishop of Hippo challenges the Donatist bishop in order to discredit one of his smartest and most famous opponents. W.H.C. Frend describes Emeritus as “a long-winded, pedantic and exasperating speaker” (Frend: 1971, 281), Paul Monceaux “capricieux et prétentieux”, “tour à tour muet et bavard” (1922, 144). Augustine must also have considered him a sophisticated author. Using a grandiose tone resembling his correspondence with Paulinus of Nola and Therasia, in the opening of the letter to Emeritus, Augustine exploits one of the epistolary topoi identified by Thraede, when he says that he wants to “touch the addressee’s mind” (Thraede: 1970, 146–151). This topos was reserved for correspondence between friends, and so highly unsuitable in a letter to this imposing and hostile bishop.77 Moreover, this is a letter that is supposed to start their epistolary exchange. Such a letter, especially bearing external signs of friendly correspondence, should always start with the customary greetings, compliments and presenting the motive for sending it. At first sight everything here looks entirely fitting, but when he states his reasons for writing the letter (again, in keeping with the custom) the meaning of his seemingly complimentary tone is exactly the opposite of what it purports to be: Augustine justifies his act of writing to Emeritus on the basis of his amazement (“mirror”) and disbelief (“nescio”), which relate to the crucial question of how that supposedly educated person, who was renowned for his wisdom, could be so foolish: only a fool could so stubbornly reject the right solution of a very simple case or overlook the true answer to a simple question. Augustine goes even further to claim that this is the reason why he is “set ablaze with the desire” to meet this man in person: the choice of the word “exardesco,” which appears only very rarely in the corpus of Augustine’s writings, especially in this particular context,78 is clearly a hyperbole. Taking into consideration the delusive compliment, and the abuse of the topos of friendly correspondence, we should 74 At least this is what Augustine claims that he heard, see Gesta cum Emerito, 10. 75 Out of many passages in which Augustine quotes these acts, see esp. ep. 108.13–14 and c. litt. Pet. 1.11. 76 See retract. 2.72. 77 See similar expressions of this topos in ep. 27.1 to Paulinus, 58.2 to Pammachius, 71.2. to Jerome. 78 The search in CAG gives 28 results. Half occur in biblical quotations. When Augustine uses the verb on its own he gives it either a negative meaning, linking it with nouns such as insania, cupiditas, odium, or a positive one, when he talks about the desire for heaven or for living a saintly

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conclude that we are dealing here with a textbook example of a letter of blame, one based on irony. If Augustine can prove in a debate that Emeritus, despite being a very wise person (sapiens Donatistarum), supports absolutely ridiculous ideas, then all the worse for the Donatists. The epistolary medium gives him another advantage here: if the addressee did not reply, the debate might not take place at all. Should that happen, Augustine would win without having to confront Emeritus in person. To sum it all up, Augustine is aware that letters are a special medium for debates situated in between the oral and the written modes of discussion. In his polemic with the Donatists there exists a noticeable tendency to hold the middle ground and debate either through letters read aloud to large audiences or to organise face-toface debates taken down by stenographers, reworked and published.79

5. Creating the audience In the last fifty years scholars interested in the theory and history of rhetoric clearly started to appreciate the character and role of audience far more than had previously been the case. As with so many other changes in this field, it started with the New Rhetoric:80 Perelman came back to the premise familiar to the ancient writers that

the techniques used in the argumentation need to be attuned to the audience’s frame of reference. To achieve this goal, the arguers must identify themselves as much as possible with the audience and build on the audience’s knowledge, experiences, expectations, opinions, and norms (van Eemeren: 2014, 260).

Augustine could not have agreed more. For Perelman an audience is “the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his argumentation” (Perelman: 1969, 19.), hence, as van Eemeren rightly concludes, “the audience is a construction of the arguer” (2014, 263). It was approximately at the same time that scholars working on Cicero’s oratory made an analogical shift, opening a new chapter of re-

life. Apart from ep. 87 he never uses this verb to describe a positive emotion toward a living person. See also the discussion of the use of mockery in this letter in Toczko: 2018, 99–100. 79 Not only at this early stage, and not only in the controversy with the Donatists did Augustine betray this tendency, as can be seen in his letters to Volusianus: ep. 132 and 137 written around 411. Nor at this point does he want to take part in “agons of words” (certamina linguarum) in the presence of those people who enjoy this kind of entertainment: his perfect model of polemic, this time with a pagan official, is a debate through letters. These letters, he explains in ep. 137, may slightly exceed the usual length, but Augustine refers to the authority of Saint Paul and other Christian writers who created a different epistolary tradition. On the other hand, as we learn from ep. 238 to the Arian Pascentius, he wished to avoid publicity during debates, which were necessarily to be accompanied by stenographers who would record the arguments in writing. 80 The movement started in the 1950s and 1960s with the works of Kenneth Burke, Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca that focused on the revitalisation of rhetoric and against its marginalisation by modern logic, philosophy and linguistics.



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search, now usually referred to as “persuasive process criticism”.81 Their interest lay in tracing the ways in which an orator shapes and manipulates his audience in order to achieve his goals. Scholars working within this paradigm focused mostly on the modes and goals of auto-presentation, on the uses and abuses of the ethos of the speaker. Their method allowed new questions to be asked about the relation of the studied texts to the audience. In the following pages I am indebted to this branch of rhetorical studies, as my most important question regarding this issue is this: Who was the true audience of the anti-Donatist letters? A prima facie look at our question here, namely “Who was the audience of Augustine’s letters?” triggers a rather straightforward answer – their addressees. It is hard to quarrel with that. In the next few paragraphs, however, I am going to propose a more nuanced/complex approach to argue that this is not the full answer. It seems that Rémi Crespin (1965, 147), who commented on c. litt. Pet. and C. Gaudentium,82 was the first to propose this idea, namely that Augustine is less interested in influencing the addressees of his polemic and tries to reach out more to the readers of his texts. I believe that this is a remark that applies not only to the polemical treatises but also to the anti-Donatist letters, for which we have evidence scattered throughout his correspondence (Monceaux: 1922, 200). Let us begin with the two letters directed to the Catholics. One is Epistula ad Catholicos de secta Donatistarum (cath. fr.), while the other is addressed to the inhabitants of his diocese, which later circulated as the first book of c. litt. Pet.83 In cath. fr. 1.1 Augustine admits that Petilian’s letter was receiving a wide audience and that Donatists memorised whole passages ready to use them against their opponents.84 Augustine wishes that his letter would reach all those who were familiar with Petilian’s writings. This is a very important testimony to the practice that we also find in Greek sources. The recipients of letters tend to circulate them among their friends, and copy or memorise them, especially if the sender is a renowned writer.85 In the polemical context, letters such as these served as the repertoires of ready-to-use arguments suitable for various occasions. If Petilian’s letter was used that way, we could assume that Augustine’s texts had a chance to achieve at least a 81 The concise historical outline of this paradigm of studies is given by Craig: 2002, 517–50. For a fine example of this kind of research, see Batstone: 1994, 211–266; May: 1988; Stroh: 1975. 82 See also Lamirande: 1998, 209: “Toutefois, force est de constater que, dans ses ouvrages, l’évêque s’adresse beaucoup moins aux auteurs des textes qu’il discute qu’à leurs lecteurs éventuels ou à ses propres fidèles.” 83 As we learn from Aug. retract. 25 (52) (CSEL 36, 161): “etiam ipsa epistula est ad nostros, sed ideo inter libros habetur, quia ceteri duo in eadem causa libri sunt.” 84 cath. fr. 1.1 (CSEL 52, 231): “in multorum enim manibus illam epistulam esse didicimus, qui etiam multa ex illa memoriter tenent, aliquid uerum aduersus nos eum dixisse arbitrantes. sed nunc si legere uoluerint quae respondimus, profecto intellegent quid sibi abiciendum et quid tenendum sit.” 85 Basilius Caesariensis ep. 338, London, 1961 (LCL 270, IV), 294–297; Gregorius Nyssenus, ep. 14.3–4, ed. by P. Maraval (SChr, 363), p. 202–205; Silvas, Gregory, 156–157. See also: Garzya: 1985, 371.

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Approaching Augustine’s Anti-Donatist letters

similar success. Possidius in Vita Augustini 9.1 claims that Augustine’s sermons were also popular among the Donatists. Having listened to the Catholic bishop’s arguments, they informed their bishops of Augustine’s ideas, and were eager to take on the role of messengers if their leaders had any comments.86 It is worth our while to check whether Possidius’ claim was anything more than a mere hagiographical exaggeration. Augustine in cath. fr. does the same thing as Petilian, who wrote a letter against him, but did not have it delivered to his opponent, but to his own Donatist community. Although he addresses the text to the Catholics, on two occasions he does provoke Petilian to write a reply. This first happens in the prooemium, where Augustine exhorts Petilian, mentioning him in the third person, to discuss in reply Augustine’s refutation of his letter. As this seems unlikely, he proposes an alternative: Petilian can do as Augustine did, that is fend off Augustine’s refutation in a letter addressed to his own community.87 Also, in paragraph 39, in the middle of a long argument based on the Bible he adds: “If they are ready to give response to this letter.”88 As we can see, Augustine’s intention is make this letter reach the hands of the Donatists, even though they are not indicated as the addressees. Also in c. litt. Pet. 1.27 he exhorts his diocesans not only to make copies of it available to those who ask them to do so, but also to ensure the letter reaches those who do not actively seek to know its content.89 As the addressees are the Catholics of his diocese, it is certain that he took care to send it out in multiple copies and expected the recipients to reproduce them and pass them on even further.90 Then, as was the case with cath. fr. 1.1, Augustine summons Petilian and his people to respond either to him directly or, at the very least, to write a response in the form of a letter addressed to their own people. The rest of the quotation is also interesting not only because we see yet another rhetorical trap Augustine sets for his opponent, 86 Possidius, Vita Augustini 9.1 (Vite dei santi 3, 150): “Et eius dicta atque excepta maxime Donatistae, in eadem Hipponiensi vel vicina manentes civitate, ad suos episcopos deferebant. Quae cum audissent et contra forte aliquid dicerent, aut a suis refellebantur, aut eadem responsa ad sanctum Augustinum deferebantur.” 87 cath. fr. 1.1 (CSEL 52, 232): “defendat ergo uerba epistulae suae et, si potest, ostendat responsionibus meis non ea fuisse refutata atque conuicta aut, si hoc non uult, faciat et ipse huic epistulae meae quod ego illi ipsius, cui iam respondi; illam quippe scripsit ad suos, sicut ego hanc ad uos. cui si uelit etiam ipse respondeat.” 88 Ibid., 283: “si respondere huic epistulae parant.” 89 c. litt. Pet. 1.27 (CSEL 52, 21): “haec autem, quae domino adiuuante respondimus, ammoneo caritatem uestram ut non solum petentibus detis, sed etiam non petentibus ingeratis. respondeant si quid uolunt, et si nobis nolunt, saltem ad suos litteras mittant, quas tamen nobis occultari non iubeant. quod si faciunt, apertissime fructus suos produnt, quibus lupi rapaces induti pellibus ouium demonstrentur, qui occulte insidiantur ouibus nostris et aperte pastoribus respondere formidant.” 90 Matilde Caltabiano (2005, 533–534) discerns these two manners of diffusion of Augustine’s texts – the one controlled by himself, the other spontaneous, worked out by his friends and admi­ rers.



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when he suggests that Petilian will not have enough courage to respond directly. Ironically, this argument may well have been used against him, as that was exactly what he himself was doing. Assuming that Petilian will write to his community instead and encourage them to share his letter with Catholics, Augustine portrays Petilian as a leader afraid of taking the challenge to debate with the leaders of the opposing party. He goes as far as presenting his opponent as a wolf lying in wait to attack his Catholic flock. It is interesting to read in Possidius’ Vita Augustini that the Donatist leaders mocked Augustine himself as a wolf preying on their sheep, and worthy of being killed.91 Reading Augustine’s writings we can sense his awareness of the fact that his letters are read by people other than the addressees themselves. On some occasions he even explicitly encourages the addressees to pass on his letters and make them accessible to others.92 As far as the letters linked with the Donatist controversy are concerned, Augustine explicitly urges the Catholic addressees to share the letters with their peers or even with the Donatists on other occasions. We can clearly observe this phenomenon in three letters: ep. 58, 61 and 89. The addressee of ep. 58 is the Roman senator Pammachius, while ep. 61 is addressed to a Catholic layman, Theodore, probably living in Africa,93 and ep. 89 to Festus,94 an official of unknown rank, presumably an aristocrat, who had estates in the region of Hippo. Among those three men, Pammachius seems to have been the most influential and so the letter to him is of particular interest. It is a well-deserved letter of congratulation, for Pammachius persuaded (or rather forced) his Numidian Donatist tenants to leave the ranks of the schismatics.95 In the final paragraph, Augustine states that he wishes other Roman senators with estates in Africa to follow suit. There follows a discussion of the possible ways of achieving this goal. Augustine fearfully rejects the 91 Possidius, Vita Augustini 9.3–4 (Vite dei Santi, 3, 152): “At illi causae diffidentia ne quidem umquam rescribere voluerunt, sed irati furiosa loquebantur atque seductorem et deceptorem animarum Augustinum esse et privatim et publice conclamabant, et ut lupum occidendum esse in defensionem gregis sui dicebant et tractabant, omnia que peccata a Deo indubitanter esse credendum posse dimitti his qui hoc facere ac perficere potuissent, nec Deum timentes nec hominibus erubescentes.” For more on the imagery of wild animals in the Donatist controversy, see Shaw: 2011, 332–339. Donatists are most often called wolves, frequently with scriptural references, e. g. c. litt. Pet. 1.22; 1.25; 2.36; 2.163164; C. Gaud. 1.18. Shaw (2011, 657) thinks that Augustine’s use of greges to describe the circumcellions (e.g. ep. 35,2) serves the same goal as likening them to animals. However Rossi (2013, 290–292), does not see any connection between greges and animals and reads it as a synonym of turba used negatively in reference to heretical groups. 92 ep. 235.1, 238.1, 248.2, 161.1, 162.1, 162.9. 93 “Theodorus 4,” Mandouze: 1982, 1108. Augustine mentions in this letter that they recently spoke with each other. Teske makes a clear mistake by naming him a deacon in Carthage in the summary on p. 245 (WSA II/1), whereas in a footnote to a salutation on the same page he calls him a Catholic layman of Hippo. 94 See “Festus 1,” Mandouze: 1982, 451. 95 As I said before, it is not a polemical letter, but it is closely linked with the Donatist controversy.

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very thought of trying to directly exhort the Roman elites, which is probably a sophisticated way of displaying his humility: “But it is dangerous to exhort those men; it is safe to congratulate you.”96 The best solution, he claims, would be to show that letter to Pammachius’ Christian friends. The authority of Pammachius, and his success, duly praised by Augustine in the letter, in converting the Donatists might motivate his friends to shrug off their laziness.97 It is interesting to note that in the very same letter that he would like to circulate among well-to-do Romans, he charges them with pigritia in fighting off the Donatist schism. The fact that Augustine formulates this charge so openly reveals one of the goals of his correspondence: to spur the leaders of public opinion to act towards the resolution of the problem (Monceaux: 1922, 137; Lancel: 2002, 275–277). If we side with Augustine, we may interpret this passage simply as an indication of his belief in the power of the old adage – “words instruct, illustrations lead.” On the other hand, one could take it as a sign of his confidence, as he seems to propose his own writing as an encouragement: other senators may hope to receive a similar letter from him, if they do what Pammachius did. In the two other letters analysed here Augustine states explicitly that his writings are to be of help to his addressees as first-hand testimonies of his opinion in their debates on such issues with friends or foes. In ep. 61 to Theodore, he even underscores the fact that he is writing with his own hand.98 In the second and final paragraph of this letter he goes further into detail, explaining who the intended addressees are. His intention is to reach the Donatists who consider crossing over to the Catholic side. They might be curious as to whether the Catholics would really receive them with honours and, in case they were clerics, if they would not be demoted. Should Theodore have an opportunity to debate with such hesitating Donatists, he might use Augustine’s handwritten letter as a proof of the sincerity of such a proposal.99 In the final paragraph of the letter to Festus (ep. 89), Augustine also reveals his goals, while excusing himself for having written a letter that is perhaps too long. Just as was the case with ep. 93, which is much longer than this one, he explains that he wishes to reach a wider audience, rather than his addressee alone. But, given that this time he is writing to a Catholic, he exhorts him to use the letter as a source of 96 English translation by R. Teske in WSA II/1, 240. 97 ep. 58.3 (CSEL 34,2, 218): “proinde sufficere uisum est, ut ipse, quibus christiano iure potueris, amica fiducia istam epistulam legas. sic enim ex tuo facto fieri posse in Africa credunt, quod forte dum putant fieri non posse, pigrescunt.” 98 ep. 61.1 (CSEL 34,2, 222–223): “placuit mihi illud, quod tibi respondi, etiam hac ad te data epistula et, si quis de hac re te interrogauerit, etiam manu mea prolata, quod de hac re sentiamus uel faciamus, ostendas.” 99 ep. 61.2 (CSEL 34,2, 224): “et ideo, dilectissime frater, quoscumque illorum uideris forte dubitantes, quo ordine suscipiantur a nobis, ostende illis istam, quam bene nosti, manum meam et, si eam habere uoluerint, habeant, quia testem deum facio super animam sic eos me suscepturum, ut non solum baptismum Christi, quem acceperunt, ipsum habeant sed etiam honorem pactimonii et continentiam.”



Creating the audience

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arguments for debates and thus to disseminate Augustine’s ideas.100 Festus, like Pammachius, tried to persuade his people in Numidia to cross over to the Catholic Church. Contrary to the Roman senator, however, he did not deserve a congratulatory letter from Augustine, as his efforts were futile. This turn of events is a reason for concern for Augustine, which forced him to write this letter. In the letter’s ending, Augustine mentions in passing some friends of Festus (who were most probably well-to-do) who might dissuade him from putting too much effort into converting his people. Augustine states that he is writing his letter firstly to motivate Festus to immediate action and secondly to give him ready-to-use arguments to persuade his friends of the importance of this cause.101 We should not think, however, that only his letters to the Catholics were written and sent with the intention of being widely disseminated to reach other audiences. The very straightforward message of ep. 93 presents itself as a perfect example, its addressee being Vincent, a Rogatian bishop102 whom Augustine met in his Carthage days. In the final paragraph we read:

habes epistolam prolixiorem fortasse quam uelles. esset autem multo breuior, si te tantum in respondendo cogitarem: nunc uero etiamsi tibi nihil prosit, non puto nihil eis profuturam, qui eam legere cum dei timore, et sine personarum acceptione curauerint. amen.103

One should bear in mind that this is a remarkably long letter. The ancients by default emphasised the virtue of brevitas, but this quality was especially appreciated in epistolary genre. We may have already heard Augustine exhort Volusianus104 to bear longer letters patiently as the Christianity refreshed also literary traditions: already Saint Paul demonstrated that a letter could be longer if needed. But even judging by 100 ep. 89.8 (CSEL 34,2, 425): “et hoc quidem breuiter scribere poteram; sed uolui te habere aliquid litterarum nostrarum, quo rationem curae meae non solum ipse cognosceres, sed etiam cuicumque dissuadenti, ne tuorum correctioni operam instanter inpendas, nobisque detrahenti, quod talia uelimus, habeas, quod respondeas.” 101 There is also an interesting and somewhat puzzling moment when he uses sermocinatio in par. 48 of cath. fr., a passage addressed to Catholics in general (CSEL 52, 249): “quisquis ergo huic epistulae respondere se praeparat, ante denuntio, ne mihi dicat: illi codices dominicos ignibus tradiderunt, illi simulacris gentium sacrificauerunt, illi nobis iniquissimam persecutionem fecerunt, et uos eis in omnibus consensistis.” Who are these vos? One possibility is that these are Catholic laymen and their leaders are marked as illi. The other solution, more plausible to me, is that the Catholics in general are called illi – they who did all these evil things to us. These uos are described as those who agreed with the Catholics in all these evil actions. I would assume that, although implicit, it is a fairly clear reference to the expected readership, that is the officials. Whether local or imperial, it is impossible to say. 102 In 364 Rogatus the Moor, the Donatist bishop of Cartenna, disagreed with the majority of Donatists on the issue of how to react to persecution, and eventually withdrew from the Donatist community with a few other bishops. Rogatus seemed to be against defence based on the rule “an eye for an eye”. He was the direct predecessor of Vincent. 103 ep. 93.53 (CSEL 34,2, 496). 104 ep. 137.19.

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these new, Christian standards, ep. 93 is still very long.105 The result is that the addressee plods through the contents of this lengthy piece of prose and listens to or – less probably – reads the letter only to find that remark in the final sentence that basically means: “If you did bother to read thus far, I can tell you now that my letter was only addressed to you, but I had a different audience in mind while writing it, because I have no illusions that it might influence you.” Of course, Augustine uses here the conditional phrase “si…cogitarem, etiamsi prosit”, and the mild remark “te tantum”, but these are hardly anything other than stylistycal devices allowing that bitter message to stay within the confines of decorum. Sometimes, as it happened with Augustine’s famous letter to Jerome,106 people copied and spread his letters without his apparent consent or even knowledge. These letters could circulate for a long time before reaching the addressee.107 He was for instance puzzled with how the Donatist grammarian Cresconius became familiar with his first book of c. litt. Pet. Even more disastrous was that fact that the Donatists got hold of his ep. 31 sent to Paulinus of Nola.108 Worse still, a letter from Megalius, primate of Numidia, sent in 395 or 396 to Valerius, the then bishop of Hippo, questioning the orthodoxy of Augustine (that is a former Manichean and soon-to-be bishop), also somehow made its way into the hands of the Donatists, who used that letter later on in their attacks on Augustine’s authority, portraying him as prima facie Catholic, but substantialiter a Manichean.109 Such unhappy outcomes nonetheless prove that letters were a medium of communication that was indeed public in nature. In the light of the above discussion, there is no risk involved in assuming that Augustine not only suspected that his anti-Donatist correspondence would be read, but that he also hoped for this to happen. Moreover, he shaped his letters with this hope in mind and put a fair deal of effort into making them circulate by encouraging others to copy them and disseminate them further. There were at least five

fr.

105 In the CSEL edition it covers 51 pages, which makes it the second longest letter after cath.

106 Paulus, the bearer of what we now know as ep. 40, travelled from Africa to Italy, where he stayed, together with Augustine’s letter to Jerome. Only after a few years did Jerome receive this letter in Bethlehem, but the fame of this Book against Jerome, as the letter was known in Rome, reached him more quickly. The letter consists of pointed criticism of Jerome’s biblical scholarship, see Ebbeler: 2012, 106–116. 107 ep. 82.32–33. 108 Augustine writes in this letter about sending a blessed bread to Paulinus and his wife Therasia, see ep. 31.9 (CSEL 34,2, 8): “Panis quem misimus, uberior benedictio fiet, dilectione accipientis uestrae benignitatis.” Based on this remark Petilian accused Augustine of sending a love potion to a married woman, see c. litt. Pet. 3.16 (CSEL 52, 177). For discussion of this charge and its Manichean context, see Courcelle: 1968, 239; Dyer: 1981, 97–8. 109 Augustine was not willing to refute them in c. litt. Pet. 1.28; nevertheless they are signaled there. See Courcelle: 1968, 239; Quinot: 1967, 769–771. In 401 or 403 in en. in Ps. s. 3.19 he speaks about a Donatist who started to say some bad things about him, which may also be connected to the charge of Manicheism; see Hombert: 2000, 12–16.



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groups that Augustine must have had in mind when writing his anti-Donatist letters: – groups of Donatists, especially the laity, composed of lesser figures – to make them reconsider their positions and allegiances (the premise of Jeniffer Ebbeler’s book is that this was his primary audience and primary goal); – Catholics in Africa – just as Cicero educated his audience, providing them with his published speeches as models of persuasion (see Stroh: 1975, 31–54), so did Augustine in educating Catholic leaders and ordinary people to have arguments at hand to use when meeting their relatives or acquaintances representing the other side of the controversy. There were, however, also other reasons, such as his insistence on keeping them within the Catholic community and dissuading them from converting to Donatism; also, he wished to create an impression that the whole issue ought to be resolved immediately in order to motivate the Catholic community to act against the division in the African Church – and his specific presentation of the Donatists served this purpose particularly well; – the Catholic bishops – to provide them with an incentive to challenge the Donatist leaders to debate and with models of arguing useful in such debates; – the officials, the elites – to present them with a portrayal of the Donatists that would encourage them to take action against the schismatics (desired by the Catholics); – audiences outside of Africa (but also all the groups above) – to shape the perception of the Donatist controversy in a light favourable to his party, to prove the crimes attributable to the Donatists and to defend his party against charges in the eyes of the broader public; In the third and last book of c. litt. Pet. Augustine dedicates the opening chapters to taking advantage of Petilian’s outburst of harsh and emotional personal criticism from his answer to Augustine’s first book of c. litt. Pet. Trying to shame Petilian and present him as too emotional to convey a meaningful discussion of controversial issues,110 Augustine betrays who his imagined or projected readership consist of. This passage is worth quoting at the end of this chapter: For if those who take into consideration what you have written have any feelings whatsoever, how did it serve you in the cause which is at issue between us respecting the Catholic communion and the party of Donatus, that, leaving a matter which was in a certain sense of public interest, you should have been led by private animosity to attack the life of an individual with malicious revilings, just as though that individual were the question in debate? Did you think so badly, I do not say of Christians, but of the whole human race, as not to suppose that your writings might come into the hands of some prudent men, who would lay aside all thoughts of individuals like us, and inquire rather into the question which was at issue between us, and pay heed, not to who 110 This is what Cicero always aimed at when talking about the furor and insania of Clodius, Catilina or Antonius.

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and what we were, but to what we might be able to advance in defense of the truth or against error? You should have paid respect to these men’s judgment, you should have guarded yourself against their censure, lest they should think that you could find nothing to say, unless you set before yourself some one whom you might abuse by any means within your power. But one may see by the thoughtlessness and foolishness of some men, who listen eagerly to the quarrels of any learned disputants, that while they take notice of the eloquence wherewith you lavish your abuse, they do not perceive with what truth you are refuted.111

111 c. litt. Pet. 3.2 (CSEL 52, 161–2): “si enim qualecumque cor habent qui ea quae scripsisti considerant, quid tibi profuit ad causam, quae inter nos de communione catholica uel de parte Donati agitur, quod relicto negotio quodammodo publico priuata quadam simultate hominis unius uitam maledicis obprobriis insectatus es, quasi homo ille sit causa quae inquiritur? tam male existimasti, non dicam de christianis, sed de ipso genere humano, ut non crederes posse tua scripta in manus aliquorum uenire prudentium, qui se a personis nostris tollerent et quaestionem potius quae inter nos uerteretur inquirerent nec qui uel quales essemus, sed quid pro ueritate uel contra errorem diceremus adtenderent? horum iudicium tibi reuerendum fuit, horum reprehensio praecauenda, ne te arbitrarentur nihil inuenisse quod diceres, nisi tibi proponeres cui quoquo modo malediceres. sed uidelicet quorundam leuitate atque uanitate, qui libenter audiunt lites iurgantium disertorum, ut, cum attendunt quam eloquenter conuicieris, non intueantur quam ueraciter conuincaris.”

Chapter 2. The forensic correspondence

1. Rhetorical genres and epistolary polemic If we answer ourselves a question: “What was Augustine trying to achieve through his polemical correspondence?” there exists a clear-cut frame through which scholars could answer it. This frame is built on the thesis that correspondence was generally used as a form of conversation between friends (Thraede: 1970; Rebillard: 1998, 127–52; Stowers: 1986, 58–70). Although it is most often a proper tool, it does not serve us well in all circumstances. Augustine’s anti-Donatist letters are so interesting because they are so diverse in both form and content that they allow research on them to be done from many different angles and various research methods to be used. If we look at them from the perspective of rhetorical theory, we can see that two genera dicendi: forensic and deliberative are very well represented. There is no doubt that in theory the distinction between them is very sharp and precise. In practice, especially in such an eclectic genre as the epistolary one, the borders between forensic and deliberative speech might become blurred. What is nonetheless (almost) always true is that the major difference between the two is based on the categories of time and value. Deliberatio is supposed to influence our future actions in that it gives us the material to reflect upon the advantages and disadvantages of our future choices. What counts here is the notion of utile understood in a variety of philosophical backgrounds; in terms of the Christian discourse the highest good would be salvation. It depends on the authors (or, within the writings of one author, on their circumstances) whether the salvation of the greater number of souls is more important than that of one lost sheep. What is characteristic for this genus dicendi is that the orator’s task is to persuade a person or a group to a certain decision or to dissuade them from one. In such a light, one method of reading the anti-Donatist letters would be focusing on the deliberative type – one aiming at suasio – persuading someone to do or think something: in this case, persuading the Donatists to “reconvert”. There are many passages in Augustine’s letters that prove such a take on the matter to be fruitful.1 I am not denying that the exhortation to the Donatist to leave the schism, so well presented by Ebbeler, was an important element of Augustine’s anti-Donatist 1 In a very persuasive chapter “Rebuke, Friendship and Community” Ebbeler (2012, 27­–62) argues that Augustine believed “correction to be a central feature of Christian friendship” (29) and “imagined that his epistolary rebukes would initiate a friendly, corrective correspondence during which he and his addressee would mutually emend each other’s errors as companions making progress in the vita Christiana” (56).

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correspondence. There is no doubt that on many occasions Augustine called to unity, even begging them to reconsider their positions and exhorting them to conversion. We would have to be utterly cynical to read it as purely an element in a strategy to create a positive image of himself. There is no disagreement that the overarching aim of all of his anti-Donatist writings, not only letters, was to create the impression that the schism should end, and that there is no other way to end it but that those who left the Church come back to it by correcting their error. The central claim of this study, however, is that a very important ingredient of this corpus of texts – its forensic rhetoric – has remained unaccounted for. Therefore, we need an interpretative model that takes into account important elements of the discourse that were left out outside of the popular interpretative frame. In the ep. 93 quoted above Augustine admits that he has changed his mind on the question of using political power to repress religious dissidents: Nam mea primitus sententia non erat, nisi neminem ad unitatem Christi esse cogendum; uerbo esse agendum, disputatione pugnandum, ratione uincendum, ne fictos catholicos haberemus, quos apertos haereticos noueramus.2

This quotation is well known,3 but we should pay attention to the words in which Augustine relates to his position on the preferred polemical strategies that were to be used against Donatists. The phrase “uerbo agere” is used in opposition to “cogere,” which is procured not through logos but by force, perhaps a reminiscence from Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen. Although Augustine never mentions Gorgias, and barely uses the word sophista, when he translates logos into Latin he says that it means both “ratio et uerbum”.4 However, the phrase “uerbo agere” refers to the agonistic context within the scheme of “disputatione pugnandum, ratione uincendum” – a clear reference to public philosophical debates but also to forensic rhetoric. In ep. 23, written as early as in 392, Augustine exhorts: “re agamus, ratione agamus, diuinarum scripturarum auctoritatibus agamus,”5 which should be understood with all its implicit allusions to the forensic reality: “Let us litigate based on the issue itself: not on the persons, but on rational arguments (logos, not pathos or ethos), let us litigate based on the authority of God’s written laws, [not the secular laws].” Agere was a standard word used in the judicial context, and it meant taking part in a judicial trial, which was itself called actio.6

2 ep. 93.17 (CSEL 34,2, 461). 3 There is a vast amount of literature that takes up this passage as a proof text, e.g. Russell: 2006, 137–46; Catapano: 2014, 472–486. 4 Div. Question. 83, quaestio 63, (CCL 44A, 136): “quod Graece logos dicitur Latine rationem et uerbum significat.” 5 ep. 23.6. 6 See also ep. 49.1 (CSEL 34,2, 140): “consilium tuum multum nobis placuit, quod fratrem Herotem, carissimum nobis et in Christo laudabilem uirum, mandare dignatus es, ut litteris inter nos agamus [...].” Augustine says not only that he wants to deal with the matter through letters, but

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Augustine was always eager to provoke debates with the Donatists, in one form or the other. It is hard to tell whether it had always been his wish that the Donatist rise to the challenge. For his case it was equally fruitful to leave audiences with the opinion that his side was open to debate, and the other was unwilling. In the letter provoking to debate that remained unanswered he still had the opportunity to present his arguments in the case – an opportunity that the opposing party chose not to seize. But when the opponents answered the call, Augustine, usually turned out to be quite successful. The acts of the African councils, the harsh writings of Petilian, Parmenian and Cresconius7 against Augustine, the words of Possidius quoted above, all prove that Augustine was a fearsome and successful polemicist. The situation after the climax of 411 can be described in the words of Mathew Gaumer as “the evident decline in the public role and prestige of Donatism throughout North Africa after the Council of 411” (Gaumer: 2008, 174). Richard Miles (2016, 266–80) proves in how many ways Augustine’s “assault on the Donatist textual community” was successful. W.H.C. Frend (1952, 273–5, 289) was not alone in believing that, at the Conference of Carthage, Augustine played a pivotal role.8 We should also remember that Augustine’s anti-Donatist letters are not only those directed to the Donatists themselves.9 Of thirty-six of the anti-Donatist letters only fifteen are directed to the Donatists. As we have seen, there are plenty of letters written to secular officials, as well as those sent to Catholic addressees, large or small. Although Augustine might have expected, and probably sometimes even wished, that someone might intercept them, it would be very strange to conclude that this was the medium that he chose to correct their error. It is more probable that in writing on many occasions to a number of various addressees, he was trying to instil a certain image of controversy, defend his case and accuse his opponents in the eyes of public opinion, the ultimate jury.10 also that he is acting as a lawyer or a philosopher from one school of thought during a clash with an adversary. 7 Unfortunately preserved only in fragments in Augustine’s polemical works. 8 See Monceaux: 1922, 271–2, S. Lancel: 2002, 298–300. For the recent attempt to overturn this prevailing view, see McLynn: 2016, 220–48. We should add that the state and papal decision concerning Pelagius and his followers were not only sympathetic to Augustine’s polemic but directly influenced by it. See Lamberigts: 2017, 203–23. 9 Also other groups of Augustine’s polemical letters consist of direct and indirect polemic as was aptly observed by Tornau: 2018, 26–8. 10 In part. orat. 10, Cicero proposes the category of audience as the basis of differentiation: “C. f. Quid habes igitur de causa dicere? C. p: Auditorum eam genere distingui. Nam aut auscultator modo est qui audit aut disceptator, id est, rei sententiaeque moderator: ita ut aut delectetur aut statuat aliquid. Statuit autem aut de praeteritis, ut iudex, aut de futuris, ut senatus. Sic tria sunt genera, iudicii, deliberationis, exornationis—quae, quia in laudationes maxime confertur, proprium iam habet ex eo nomen.” See also: Pepe: 2013, 143–4. In the majority of the anti-Donatist letters the audience (sometimes both the addressee and the projected audience) is put in the position of the judge (iudex) of past events (de praeteritis statuere). There are some variants of this tactic and later on in this chapter I will furnish the evidence from the sources and discuss them. The

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The judicial genre is interested in past deeds and in assessing them according to the category of iustum and the rules of law. This genre can be defined as “positum in controversia et quod habet accusationem aut petitionem cum defensione.”11 The prosecutor’s task is to define the crime, describe why, when, where and how it was committed, and to prove it all. He should also elaborate on the question of the proper punishment, based on legal precedents. In this context he will at times turn to talk about the future, for the punishment is yet to be decided. The advocate had even more tasks and choices at hand that I will discuss along with the theory of status. Below, I want to identify which elements of this genre are taken up by Augustine in the analysed texts. We will see that Augustine, whether he is launching an accusatio or preparing for defensio, is constantly trying to qualify the case to a certain status and to argue on the basis of it, complying with the technical rules found in the ancient rhetorical handbooks. After all, there was no better way of leading the Donatist masses back to the Christian communion than to clear the Catholic party of the charges and prove that the former and present Donatist leaders have been guilty of certain grave crimes.

2. Forensic rhetoric and Augustine 2.1 Theory of status Of the judicial cases emerged the most influential theory, which was codified (although rather not wholly invented) by Hermagoras of Temnos (Calboli Montefusco: 1986, 36–7) in the Hellenistic period, probably in the second century BC,12 and known as the theory of staseis. The Latin had two equivalents of this term – constitutio and status. The most important presentations and developments of this theory were contained in Cicero’s juvenile treatises De inventione (Inv.) and Partitiones oratoriae (part. orat.), the anonymous Rhetorica ad Herrenium (Rhet. Her.), which in the time of Augustine was still considered Cicero’s work, and in Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria (Inst.). The definitions and expositions found in these works are not always coherent, and there has been a long scholarly debate concerning these issues (Calboli Montefusco: 1986, 3–11). There is no doubt, however, that, as the Aristotelian theory of tria genera orationum was already widely accepted, the Hermagorean theory of staseis had to be adjusted to this all-encompassing system. Although later both Cicero and Quintilian were vocal about applying the status also to the deliberative and epideictic genres, the fact remains that the whole concept

other category that factored here was that of the fines, that is the goals or ends of a speech: Cicero, Top. 91: “In iudiciis quid aequum sit quaeritur, in demonstrationibus quid honestum, in deliberationibus, ut nos arbitramur, quid honestum sit et quid utile.” See also Pepe: 2013, 285–8. 11 Rhet. Her. 1.2.2. 12 See F. Woerther, Hermagoras. Fragments et témoignages, Paris 2012, p. XIII, and 1–5.



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started within the forensic context, as can clearly be seen from the very definition of status in Cicero’s Inv. 1.10:

Eam igitur quaestionem ex qua causa nascitur constitutionem appellamus. Constitutio est prima conflictio causarum ex depulsione intentionis profecta, hoc modo: ‘Fecisti’. ‘Non feci’, aut: ‘Iure feci’.13 

For the sake of terminological clarity we should note that intentio is synonymous with accusatio – the first formulation of the charges, whereas depulsio is just another term for the formulation of defence, defensio and negatio being two others. Another crucial term here is prima conflictio – the first clash between the two fighting parties that makes it possible for the status to emerge. One might also note that in Rhet. Her 2.27 the theory of status is discussed solely within the genus iudiciale.14 Lucia Calboli Montefusco reads the sources as pointing at the precedence of the defending party in formulating the status of a case in the light of De inventione 1.13: “placet autem ipsi constitutionem intentionis esse depulsionem” (Calboli Montefusco: 1986, 11). Cicero suggests that this was the original definition of Hermagoras, but Malcom Heath (1994, 116) rightly contests it. What is worse, as also Heath points out, Cicero is hardly consistent and already in De inventione he in fact proposes two other perspectives on the question of the sources of status. As we have already mentioned, in 1.10 he says: “constitutio est prima conflictio causarum ex depulsione intentionis profecta”, which for Heath establishes “the conflict of the initial propositions of prosecution and defence” (1994, 116) as the location of the initial status. In the same paragraph the famous rhetorician defines status somewhat differently again: “eam igitur quaestionem ex qua causa nascitur constitutionem appellamus”, hence not as the conflict but as the question arising from the conflicting propositions of the two parties involved. However puzzling it may be, especially if we want to uncover the original concepts of Hermagoras, Cicero does not seem to bother much when he relates the ideas of the Greek author in the same treatise 1.13: “sive constitutionem primam causae accusatoris confirmationem dixerit sive defensoris primam deprecationem.”15 Basing on the practice known from the court speeches of Cicero, I believe it is more prudent to agree that the two parties in combat would always – and should – try to establish a constitutio suitable to their needs, and to force the other party to accept that their formulation or rejection of the main charge, or of the quaestio, was to be treated as the status of the whole case.16 As we learn from Cicero and Quintilian, the case could be simple or complex, that is, consisting of many quaestiones. In such a case the choice of the status should 13 Cic., Inv. (LCL 386, 20). 14 Calboli Montefusco: 1986, 37: “I discorsi in tribunale rappresentassero l’area naturale di applicazione degli status.” 15 Cic., Inv. (LCL 386, 28). 16 See also De oratore 1.140.

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be dictated by the assessment of the gravity of each element of the case.17 Quintilian also notices that the status set at the start of the case does not have to remain unchanged throughout the actio, but that a cautious lawyer may shift it.18 At the outset he had to decide, however, which status to choose and the most fundamental division was between four status rationales and four legales. I will start with the former.

2.1.1 Status coniecturalis/coniecturae19 According to the clearest definition in Rhet. Her. 1.18, this particular status takes place when there is a controversy about the fact. The most basic question emerging from the case was “an fecerit”: “Did she or he do this?”. In other words, the accusation claims that the defendant committed a crime (“fecisti”: “You did this”), whereas the defence or the defendant states that she or he did not (“non feci”: “I did not do it”). This was the strongest type of defence, especially when one could make use of trustworthy witnesses or documents, that is, inartificial proofs. The theory divided this status into different subcategories, but these hardly applied to practical issues concerning us here.20 Apart from these discussions concerning the subdivisions within the first status, the handbooks of rhetoric provided its adepts with specific loci, that is, prescriptions on how “to select and develop those modes of argument that would be suitable for each kind of defence” (Sider: 1971, 16). Cicero presents the loci for this status in Inv. 2.16–51, and divides them into three general groups: ex causa, ex persona, ex ipso facto. Of these, the first is distinguished as the most important for this status.21 In part. orat. 110, when talking about the arguments specific for legal conjecture, he highlights loci ex causa et ex eventu. In Rhet. Her. 2.3–9, however, we find different divisions of artificial arguments, this time treated under six headings: probabile, conlatio, signum, argumentum, consecutio, approbatio, translated by Harry Caplan as “probability, comparison, sign, presumptive proof, subsequent behaviour, con17 Quint., Inst. 3.6.9, 3.6.21:, see also Calboli Montefusco: 1986, 51–3. 18 Quint., Inst., 7.1.6–7; Lausberg: 1998, 46–7. 19 This status was probably called stochasmos by Hermagoras, although we have a very late testimony on this from Pseudo-Augustinus, De rhetorica 9–10, 142, ed. by Halm. The most complete presentation of the ancient status theories, that I draw from here is to be found in Calboli Montefusco (1986). For the most precise and compact, see Lausberg: 1998, 63–96. 20 For instance, Cicero divided all the possible conjectural questions into four categories: what [in fact] exists? What is the origin of something? What is the cause or rationale of something? Can something change, and how? (De oratore 3.114.) Perhaps the only exception in this respect was Quintilian, who usefully divided juridical conjectural cases into four types: concerned with the fact and its perpetrator, with the fact only, with the perpetrator only, and the last one when the fact and perpetrator are known, in which case the question concerns the motive or intention (Inst. 7.2.7–11). 21 Inv. 2.19: “Hic locus sicut aliquod fundamentum est huius constitutionis. Nam nihil factum esse cuiquam probatur, nisi aliquid quare factum sit ostenditur.”



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firmatory proof ” (LCL 403, 63). Here argument based on the motive, which is crucial in Inv., is a mere subcategory of arguments based on probability. All these main loci in all these three texts have different variants suitable for a specific case, hence I will discuss them and assess their use if and when any of them appears in Augustine’s polemic in the next chapters of this book.

2.1.2 Status definitionis In this class of legal cases the foundational issue concerned the name, or in other words the verbal classification, the definition of a deed. That a certain crime occurred was obvious to both parties, and the responsibility for it was also clear enough: the question was how to label what has been done (“quaeritur id, quod factum est,” Cic. Inv. 1.11) or in most general formulation “quid fecerit?” (What has [the defendant] done?; Quint. Inst. 3.6.5) or even “quid sit?” (What is this [that has been done]?; Quint. Inst. 3.6.80; 5.10.54). The best choice for the defending party was obviously to base the defence on the first status, but Quintilian posits that relying on definition was the second-best choice: if you cannot deny committing an act, you can deny its legal qualification, that is deny that you have done what you are verbatim charged for (Inst. 7.3.1).22 Many subdivisions of this status were considered, as we learn, e.g. from De Oratore 3.115, where Cicero comes up with different classes along the philosophical discussions of the nature of definitions that could be conventional, essential, cumulative or descriptive. According to Quintilian (Inst. 7.3.8) there are three different types depending on whether we have to define one thing (“an hoc sit”), decide between two labels for a certain deed (“hoc an hoc”) or give one name to two different things (“an et hoc et hoc eodem modo sit apellandum”). What is more important to us here is that the rhetorical handbooks were more coherent in presenting the examples of argumentation strategies within this status. It was generally agreed that we should start by presenting as clearly as possible our understanding of the real sense of a given name in the way most suitable for our party, then discuss its application to the specific, debated deed, and finally destroy the rival understandings of the name and the deed as either false or dishonest or unsuitable (inv. 2.53–6, Rhet. Her. 2.17). Augustine uses this status e.g. in the case of the charges of persecution he has to defend his party against. Within this context his discussion of the Donatist alleged martyrdom is particularly the one in which his arguments based on definitions are best demonstrated, a fact that was recognised only lately in a paper by Adam Ployd (2018, 25–44).

22 Quint., Inst. 7.3.1 (LCL 126, 216): “nam qui non potest dicere nihil fecisse, proximum habebit ut dicat non id fecisse quod obiciatur.”

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2.1.3 Status qualitatis When the defence party cannot contradict the fact that something happened as in conjecture, or call into question the relation between the fact and its legal categorisation proposed by the prosecutor as in definition, they still could and should debate how to evaluate a given act: was it just or not, profitable or not. In a word, the quality of this act should be called into question (Cic. Inv. 1.10). However obvious this definition may seem, as Lucia Calboli Montefusco (1986, 93) rightly observes, this status is the most complex. There is no coherent treatment of this issue in the ancient handbooks, and Quintilian famously criticises Cicero for misrepresenting the Hermagorean tradition. I will follow, however, in the footsteps of Robert Sider, who judged that Cicero’s De inventione 1.11, 14–15, 2.69–96 has the clearest and most useful exposition of this status (1971, 74). There are in fact two classes within this status: negotialis and iuridicialis. Status negotialis, called stasis pragmatike by Hermagoras, has to do with the general assessment of the legal rule that is to be applied in the debated case: is it in accordance with the tradition of law or with justice itself (aequitas)? This class is more abstract and, according to Cicero, it was rather a field for the theorists of law than for its practitioners. As such it was directed towards the future and applied to correcting or developing the legal rules with an eye to natural or divine law. We may underline its resemblance to the further discussed status legales, and focus altogether on the second class that is much more common in Augustine’s letters. Status iuridicialis was focused on assessing the legal quality of past deeds, and divided according to levels of defensibility. The strongest case that the defence could make on these grounds was the one called qualitas iuridicialis absoluta. Cicero claims that here the moral or legal qualification of the debated deed is inherent in the case, and the charge is simply rejected on the basis of admitting: “hoc feci, sed iure feci” (“I did it, but it was legal,” or “it was righteous”). In such a case we have to refer to a higher rule of law or to justice itself. When this stronger option is not possible, the defence has a weaker position in qualitas assumptiva, which has five variants arranged from most to least defensible. The most basic difference between qualitas absoluta and assumptiva is that in the latter the defendant has to base the issue on something from outside the case. In the strongest version of qualitas assumptiva, called comparatio criminis, the defendant admits having committed the crime, but claims that because of the benefits arising from it, it was right or at least acceptable to commit it. Cicero gives an example (Inv. 2.72–3) that is fitting with some of the Augustine’s epistolary debates with the Donatists. Surrounded by the enemy, an army commander retreated from the battlefield with his soldiers unharmed for the price of surrendering arms and baggage. The commander defends himself against the charge of lese-majesty (accusatio) through comparatio criminis by claiming that although he lost the equipment, he saved the lives of the soldiers (defensio). In other words, the crime of leaving the arms and baggage behind him is a lesser one than that of losing all the soldiers,



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hence with everything included what he did was right or proper. Even so, the prose­ cutor still had two easier follow-up charges (infirmatio criminis) to choose based on status coniecturalis: 1) the soldiers would not have perished anyway, 2) that is not the true reason why you acted like that. Cicero also allows for the use of comparatio criminis – a type of qualitative issue – namely to argue that it was still better to lose the soldiers than leave the arms and baggage to the enemy. It is interesting to note that Cicero here suggests drawing arguments from the field of both other status, not only those loci specific for this case. He even exhorts the prosecutor to use as many arguments as possible and base them on as many status as possible (2.74). This flexible attitude of Cicero allows me not to treat these loci here but to analyse the specific use of them in the Augustine’s letters when occasion arises. After all, all the textbooks of rhetoric frequently claimed that talent and experience would dictate to the orator which arguments were suitable for a certain case. On the other hand, Cicero next (2.76) goes on to offer a different treatment of the same exemplary issue. He proposes cutting off all the arguments based on the other status, to focus only on comparatio criminis. In such a treatment the values decisive in assessing the moral and legal quality of the deed – in this case honestum, utile, and necessarium – would have to be widely discussed. In this way the whole tactic leads the parties to enter the field of deliberative speech, which also happens within the epistolary polemics of Augustine. In relatio criminis belonging to this qualitas assumptiva, the defendant claims that although he or she has committed the criminal act, it was the victim’s offence (peccatum) that had provoked it (Inv. 2.78) or the victim merited it (Inv. 1.11: “feci sed meruit” – “I did it, but the victim deserved it”). In terms of the topics, Cicero gives the same advice as in the comparatio criminis – to use arguments from other status, to exploit the comparison between the offence of the victim and the act the defen­dant is accused of, to present them vividly in order to give rise to indignatio based on the use of loci communes, to turn to deliberative speech concerning values (Inv. 2.79–86). At times Augustine also reaches for these methods and I will discuss them in the proper place. Offering, as they do, even weaker excuses, the other types of this issue, namely remotio criminis, concessio and purgatio are of no importance as they do not occur in the analysed material, as is also the case with deprecatio (i.e. the call to mercy).

2.1.4 Status translationis The autonomy and raison d’ être of the last of the status rationales was debated already in antiquity (Calboli Montefusco: 1986,139–52). Robert Sider (1971, 17) resigns from using it as a separate status in his analysis of the rhetoric of Tertullian’s polemical treatises. The problem is, as Lausberg (1998, 82–3) rightly points out, that it is logical to view the elements of translatio in every one of the three main status. To be historically precise, however, it is worth observing that this status was

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mostly used in the preliminary stage of the trial where it was possible to argue for the change of a jury or prosecutor as unsuitable for the specific case. This could result in the case being transferred to a different court or the prosecutor be switched. Understood as the status used in this pre-trial procedure, status translationis cannot be represented in my material. It is, nonetheless, valid to understand status translationis as the one applied by the defendant or his advocate during the trial itself. When the accusing party claims “fecisti” (“You did it”), the defendant can retort the charge by replying “tu fecisti” (“You did it”). This so called retorsion argument, or a counteraccusation (antikategoria), is not uncommon in the analysed material.

2.1.5 Status legales In the ancient rhetorical theory the presentation of the just discussed four status rationales: coniecturae, finitionis, qualitatis and translationis were often accompanied by the discussion of the so called status legales (dzetemata nomika) or status generales legales (nomikai staseis) (Calboli Montefusco: 1986, 153; Lausberg: 1998, 84). According to Cicero these categories were specifically connected with the status qualitatis where they served to assess the true meaning of the law and its proper application, because there was no easy consensus to be reached.23 The law is understood here, as Quintilian lays out, in its broadest sense: every law either gives or takes away, or penalizes, commands, forbids, or permits. It gives rise to a dispute either by itself or because of another law, and to a Question which turns either on the Letter or on the Spirit.24

In late antiquity the division of the status legales into four detailed questions discussed by Quintilian (Inst. 7.6–9) (letter and spirit,25 conflict of laws, syllogism, ambiguity) remained valid for the Christian writers.26 Already “Tertullian was quick to see that the written documents of the advocate’s world invited a ready comparison with the biblical documents of the Church, and that the rules provided by rhe­ toric for controversies over the former might well work for struggles arising out of the latter” (Sider: 1971, 85). Robert Sider proved that in his polemical treatises Tertullian mostly used the first and the last one, which is also true for Augustine. In the first dilemma scriptum et voluntas, which was also instrumental for Augustine, there was a controversy between the scriptum party (defending the literal, 23 Cic., De oratore 2.110; Calboli Montefusco: 1986, 154. 24 Quint. Inst. 7.5.5 (LCL 126, 265). See also Lausberg: 1998, 84. 25 Scriptum et voluntas in Quint. Inst. 3.3.61 and 7.6, but in Cicero, Or. 1.140: scriptum et sententia. See also Calboli Montefusco: 1986, 154–5. 26 Also Calboli Montefusco (1986) and Lausberg (1998, 92–97) divide status legales into these four types, which seem to be an original outline of Hermagoras. De inventione 2.153–4, however, adds the fifth mode – definition, and Rhetorica ad Herrenium 1.19–22 sixth – transference, but these resemble status definitionis and translationis that I have already discussed.



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most often narrow sense of the law/scriptural passage), and the voluntas party (who pressed on the idea of the same law or biblical quotation). We should add that Augustine is especially keen to present all such controversies as a genus ex iure manifesto. In this type, contrary to the genus ex iure obscuro, the uoluntas party presented its interpretation as absolutely self-evident and tried to ridicule the rival understanding. Cicero advised that on such occasion it should be pointed out that the true meaning of a discussed law (voluntas or sententia) was immutable and that the legislator always had one goal in mind (Inv. 2.122).27 We will see that Augustine is almost always carefully drawing examples and quotations from both Testaments; when he forms chains from these, they are often symmetrical. Such a procedure enables him to prove that there was always one intention in the mind of God, the lawgiver. To give one example, in ep. 108.7–13 Augustine accuses the Donatists of starting the schism. He reacts to their defence based on 1 Tim 5:22 (“Do not share in the sins of others”) to refute it according to the above discussed rules: sed si testimonia illa scripturarum, quae maiores uestri ad diuidendum populum dei uel intellegenda uel proferenda crediderunt, aliter, quam diuinorum eloquiorum sensus postulat, accipere conamini, iam desinite.28

As we can see, the legal vocabulary is here married with the Christian exegesis of the Bible. Scripture, however, consists of passages of different levels of clarity. The meaning of some of them was so dubious that controversies occurred over its interpretation. In the Hermagorean doctrine of status an important place was reserved for discussion of the situation when there was doubt as to what was really meant in a given obscure text. After Cicero this status legalis is called ambiguitas.29 The most important method in this case was to explain the ambiguous phrase by discussing the common usage of words it consists of, referring to the context of surrounding sentences, and, even further, to other writings by the same author. One could also show that his interpretation of the controversial passage was more congruent with values such as what is honourable, expedient or necessary.30 There were many loci communes connected to this status. It was advised, for instance, to juxtapose the interpretation of our opponents to the phrasing of the discussed passage by claiming that the one who had written it would never agree with it, or that if he wanted this passage to be interpreted in such a way, he would have phrased it differently.31 This technique, as we will see, is one of the favourite ones employed by Augustine in the analysed letters. On some occasions he also frames his exegetical polemics on 27 See also Calboli Montefusco: 1986, 155, 158. The other way proposed by Cicero was to show that this law was occasioned by some circumstances that were decisive in its formulation, and hence it was not necessarily relevant in other circumstances. 28 ep. 108.13. 29 Inv. 2.116–121. 30 Inv. 2.119. 31 Inv. 2.121.

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the third of these status: leges contrariae. That happens in his refutation of the arguments based on the writings of Cyprian of Carthage or Hilary of Poitiers. There, as we will see, he refers to the argument based on lex potentior, which was usual and powerful in this type of status legalis (Lausberg: 1998, 94–5).

2.2 The ancient theories of argumentation: argumenta, loci, exempla Although, as we have seen, Cicero, Quintilian and others prescribed specific topics of arguments for different status, one should remember that in other parts of their handbooks dedicated to inventio they simultaneously transmitted all-encompassing theories of argumentation. The oldest and most general was the Aristotelian theory of the three means of persuasion known as pisteis – ethos, pathos, logos – that was altered and reused by Cicero in De oratore. Cicero uses verbs instead of nouns: conciliare or delectare for ethos,32 movere for pathos, and probare for logos.33 In the Ciceronian system conciliare was best suited to garner the goodwill of the audience or the jury by argumentation based on the character of the defendant and his patronus – advocate. Movere was aimed at raising vehement emotions (contrary to conciliare, which was reserved for mild ones), mostly anger (indignatio) against the opposing party, and compassion (misericordia) for ourselves and those whom we represent. As we can see, both of these pisteis drew arguments mostly from persons and their characters, and according to many writers, were mostly used in the prologues and epilogues (Sider: 1971, 13–4). The third category of the means of persuasion – logos – was the most complex, and was discussed fervidly in the handbooks in the field of inventio, which were populated by different patterns of arguments, some of which I discuss below. Cicero introduced an interesting innovation in De Oratore, ending the discussion of pisteis with a long passage on ridiculum. In his opinion it was always suitable for the orator to provoke laughter by presenting something shameful or offensive in a non-offensive or non-shameful way.34 Thus, ridiculum should not be considered the fourth means of persuasion, 32 For discussion of the linguistic choices of Cicero, see May: 2014, 4–5. 33 Cicero, De oratore 2.201 (Kumaniecki, 188), where Antonius recalls his defence of Norbanus: “Sic in illa omni defensione atque causa, quod esse in arte positum videbatur, ut de lege Appuleia dicerem, ut quid esset minuere maiestatem explicarem, perquam breviter perstrinxi atque attigi; his duabus partibus orationis, quarum altera commendationem [= ēthos] habet, altera concitationem [= pathos], quae minime praeceptis artium sunt perpolitae, omnis est a me illa causa tractata, ut et acerrimus in Caepionis invidia renovanda et in meis moribus erga meos necessarios declarandis mansuetissimus viderer: ita magis adfectis animis iudicum quam doctis, tua, Sulpici, est a nobis tum accusatio victa.” See also Wisse: 1989, 269, and Leeman, Pinkster, Rabbie: 1989, vol. 2, 158. 34 Cicero, De oratore 2.236 (Kumaniecki, 204–205): “Locus autem et regio quasi ridiculi–nam id proxime quaeritur–turpitudine et deformitate quadam continetur. Haec enim ridentur vel sola vel maxime, quae notant et designant turpitudinem aliquam non turpiter. Est autem, ut ad illud tertium veniam, est plane oratoris movere risum, vel quod ipsa hilaritas benevolentiam conciliat



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but as an important persuasive mode linked especially to character-drawing and creating emotional distance rather than emotional involvement.35 The orator could choose to use humour when he had decided to present his opponents as utterly laughable, not scary. Such is at times the case of Augustine’s portrayal of the Donatists (Toczko: 2018, 91–109). The most developed general theory of rational argumentation was that of Quintilian in book V of Inst. The most basic division would be between the artificial (technoi) and inartificial (atechnoi) proofs. These labels may be somewhat misleading and go contrary to the modern use of the word. What is meant here is that artificial proofs are in fact those that require the art (techne) of rhetoric to find and formulate them, whereas the inartificial do not, as they are based on previous judgments, documents, witnesses, rumours, oaths etc. that are at hand (Inst. 5.2–5.7; Saiz Noeda: 2003, 100). The category of artificial proofs had many non-exclusive divisions. If we follow Quintilian, the two most basic ones would be based on the form and content of the argument. The form of the arguments is analysed under the heading ratiocinationes in Inst. 5.10.11–6. By ratiocinatio he means inference from a certain or at least probable claim that does not need further confirmation by proof, which is often also called simply argumentum. The best arguments are based on certainties (a certibus) such as (1) data perceived by the senses, which he calls signa,36 (2) unshaken common opinion, (3) laws, (4) accepted moral customs, (5) things agreed upon by both parties involved, (6) previously proven claims, and (7) claims not technically proven but not contradicted by the adversary. The arguments based on probable things (a credibilibus) have three classes: (1) those that most usually happen, called the

ei, per quem excitata est, vel quod admirantur omnes acumen, uno saepe in verbo positum, maxime respondentis, non numquam etiam lacessentis, vel quod frangit adversarium, quod impedit, quod elevat, quod deterret, quod refutat, vel quod ipsum oratorem politum esse hominem significat, quod eruditum, quod urbanum, maxime quod tristitiam ac severitatem mitigat et relaxat odiosasque res saepe, quas argumentis dilui non facile est, ioco risuque dissolvit.” 35 Wisse: 1989, 309: “Ethos and pathos as well as rational arguments are pisteis: they define what the orator should aim at to achieve persuasion. Humour only has a function subordinate to these aims: it may support the orator’s character-drawing of himself and of his opponents, and it may help in removing emotions. It would therefore be incorrect to say that its function may be compared to that of ethos or to that of pathos, since it operates on a different level: it contributes to ethos, and in some situations its effect is parallel to that of ethos and pathos.” 36 Quintilian is not coherent in his treatment of signa in book 5. Firstly, in 5.9.1 he divides all the artificial arguments into signa, argumenta, exempla. Later on, in 5.9.3–15 he discusses signa and divides them into two categories – necessary and unnecessary – by which he means that some signs so evidently and decisively point to the fact, are so conclusively linked with it, that one cannot make any mistake here. If there is smoke, there is a fire. These are the necessary signs. On the other hand, if we see someone with blood on his shirt at the place of a crime it does not necessa­rily make him a murderer. Such signs he calls unnecessary. In 5.10.12, however, he treats signs as a subcategory of the arguments drawn from things that are certain, and this is how I discuss them.

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strongest, (2) that which is very likely to happen, and (3) that which can hardly be contradicted (Saiz Noeda: 2003, 103). It is important to notice that argumenta based on certain and probable things are the ones in which the method of drawing the conclusions is based on deduction or syllogistic reasoning. Although Quintilian discusses it in Inst. 5.14., it is worth briefly noting that he discerns between syllogism (syllogismus, but Cicero often uses the Latin term ratiocinatio in a narrow sense) and enthymeme (enthymema). It is enough for our purpose to say that syllogism is a complete form of reasoning with a major and minor premise and a conclusion. The latter should be coherent with the proposition that we want to prove. This form of argument is much more customary for philosophers, whereas rhetoricians used mostly enthymeme, hence its name: “a rhetorical syllogism” (oratorius syllogismus, Inst. 5.14.24.). The orator is usually omitting one of the premises or does not consider it necessary to present a conclusion, if it is obvious enough what he is trying to prove. As I said, apart from the formal division within the field of artificial arguments, there is the class of loci argumentorum where the rule of differentiation is based on the content not the form. We should repeat after Belén Saiz Noeda that loci argumentorum are not the same thing as loci communes. The former “are a sort of moulds or empty spaces that the orator fills with the particular contents favourable to his case according to utilitas (his opponent might use the same place with a different content, from an opposing view, commonplaces [sc. loci communes] have turned into recurring themes by common usage […] for instance, speaking against lust, adultery or similar things” (2003, 106–107). I use the term loci for loci argumentorum and refer to loci communes always by the full name. In ancient theory the loci were most generally divided into two groups: arguments drawn from persons and their characters (a persona) and those drawn from the act itself (a re) (Inst. 5.8.4). It is worth noting that the motive of the person (causa) was discussed among the arguments a re. In the most standard exposition of Quintilian (Inst. 5.10.23–31), places regarding the person were arranged according to a recurring pattern: birth, nationality, country, sex, age, education, physique, financial status, social status (condicio), personality or character (animi natura), occupation, personal ambition (quid adfectet quisque), deeds and utterances from the past, sudden affections or emotions, intentions and mental attitudes (but Quintilian admits that for him this class should be discussed under arguments a re, just as arguments a causa). A brief caveat is needed here. Our contemporary culture tends to view references to personal traits in the public context as improper, especially if they are meant to denigrate the opponent, but not so much if they are to present the speaker in a favourable light. From Arthur Schopenhauer on, we classify personal references to opponent as eristic arguments ad personam – the worst of all. Schopenhauer suggests that we should only reach for those weapons if we feel that we are completely losing the duel (2008, 38). Although the German philosopher is known as a fierce defender of the Latin language and classical education, the ancient Greeks and Romans were of a different opinion concerning these kind of arguments. In the an-



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cient handbooks of rhetoric it was a given that one could and should use different personae in argumentation. They were used in all rhetorical genres, perhaps most vividly in epideictic oratory: in panegyrics, biographies and hagiographies. In judicial oratory one could create arguments from the person of a prosecutor, advocate, defendant, judge or even audience. Polemical literature used this scheme mostly to present the adversaries as villains or evil-doers, or as enemies of the state, God and true values. It also helped to sketch oneself or one’s party as the righteous men, unjustly persecuted, and defenders of the state, God and true values. Early Christian writers were no different, although there were clear discrepancies in the limits to invective that the authors set themselves. Aeschines portrayed Timarchos as a scandalous troublemaker lacking self-control,37 while in the Second Philippic Cicero painted Marcus Antonius as an erotically insatiable, drinking thug.38 Cyprian attacked Novatians,39 Jerome – Jovinian along similar lines.40 Jerome also loved focusing on the appearances of the opponent, e.g. he described a monk, now identified most often as Pelagius, as a fat man fed on Scottish porridge,41 where he not only alludes to physique but also to barbaric origins – both elements very often used in ancient invective.42 Augustine, for whatever reason, mostly avoids this kind of aggressive language and satirical commonplaces;43 he almost never casts a shadow on the appearance or origins of his opponents, although he likes to focus on their intellectual deficiencies (Toczko: 2011, 211–31). A very important part of his line of argumentation based on personae was to present oneself in a profitable way. Such a creation of the orator’s persona has for the last three decades been a popular theme in research on Cicero.44 It is well known to Andrew Cain, who stressed this aspect of Jerome’s letters in his exemplary study (Cain: 2009). I will discuss Augustine’s uses of this technique in the later chapters of this book. The loci based on the debated issue (a re) are treated within a very intuitive scheme, but their discussion is much longer (Inst. 5.10.32–118) than that concerning loci a persona. The most important category here is that of the motive (causa). Quintilian distinguishes first between positive and negative motives for right ac37 Aeschines, Against Timarchos, transl. by N.R.E. Fisher, Oxford 2001. 38 Cic., Phil. 2.3, 2.6; 2.44–7; 2.105. 39 Cyprian, ep. 43.4.3;43.5.2; 59.12.1. This was observed already by Jacques: 1982, 939–40. 40 Hieronymus, Adversus Iovinianum 1.40, 2.37. See also Kahlos: 2010, 621–49. 41 Hieronymus, In Hieremiam prophetam. Prologus 4 (CCL 74, 2): stolidissimus et Scottorum pultibus praegravatus. For the discussion of portrayal of Pelagius by Jerome, see Jeanjean: 1999, 390–403. 42 See the list and discussion of the invective loci in Craig: 2007, 335–9. 43 For a nice comparison of the rhetorical techniques in the opening passages of the polemical treatises of Augustine and Jerome, see Viellard: 2010, 128–30. 44 Leading to some very sharp statements: “The First Catilinarian is, I conclude, finally about Cicero. It is about interpreting Cicero, about who he is and what it means to have and to have had him as consul; it is about what he has done, what he plans, what he knows, and what he has said. In rhetorical terms, this speech constructs and presents Cicero’s version of his consular ethos” (Batstone: 1994, 216).

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tions. According to him people tend to wish to gain, increase, preserve or use some kind of good, or they wish to avoid, liberate themselves from, decrease or bear something bad. Meanwhile, bad actions are triggered by false opinions that lead to erroneous actions and bad emotions. The other obvious loci here are those regarding the place (a loco) and time (a tempore) of a discussed act, of the defendant’s means to commit it (a facultate), and the manner in which it was committed (a modo). In status coniecturalis and qualitatis one could also use arguments based on the definition (locus a finitione) of an act without making it the most important part of argumentation, as was the case with status finitionis. In the next step Quintilian discusses loci: a similibus, dissimilibus, et contrariis (Inst. 5.10.73–4) and a comparatione (5.10.87–93). One could also turn to more dialectical loci and refer to the categories of logical consequences and antecedents, causes and effects (5.10–74–86), but, as Quintilian observes, they are better suited for deliberative oratory. Finally, Quintilian observes that there is a special locus based on fictional suppositions (a fictione 5.10.95–99) that helps especially when we fight the literal understanding of the law, which sends us to the discussion of status legales. It should be noted that the treatment of the loci a similibus, dissimilibus and contrariis overlaps with his treatment of the last group of artificial arguments, called exempla, in 5.11. Exempla could be talked about in a broader sense as ideas, values, actions or persons similar, dissimilar or contrary to the subject under discussion. We could make comparisons of things larger or lesser than our subject or equal to it.45 According to the second tradition exemplum had the additional narrower sense of mentioning a certain person’s exemplary deed drawn from history or literature/legend, which exactly means that even if it was not real it should be presented as though it was.46

2.3 Augustine and forensic rhetoric It is important to note that there is no possibility whatsoever that Augustine as the teacher of rhetoric in the late fourth century would have not known or cared about the theory of staseis and the argumentative loci connected to them. Certainly the most authoritative handbooks of rhetoric which Augustine was undoubtedly familiar with were those by Cicero and Quintilian, and it is in particular these two authors that I shall refer to below. Written centuries before Augustine’s birth, their works constituted much of his rhetorical arsenal, although he may well have availed himself of later textbooks, some of them dating back to his lifetime or thereabouts

45 Quint. Inst. 5.11.1–4. 46 Ibid., 5.11.6: “Quod proprie vocamus exemplum - rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad persuadendum in quod intenderis commemoratio.” More on this see chapter 3.4.1.3.



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and surviving to the present day.47 Before I briefly comment on them, it should be stressed that whatever the literary genre of De doctrina Christiana is, it is not a handbook of rhetoric.48 Augustine himself is very honest about this, as seen in his statement in the second paragraph of book four: “At the outset, I must curb the expectations of any readers who think that I am going to present the rhetorical rules which I learned and taught in pagan schools, and warn them in this preamble not to expect that sort of thing from me.”49 The literary nature of De doctrina Christiana is threefold: on the one hand, it is a highly sophisticated attempt to vindicate the literary form of the Bible in the eyes of those educated in the art of rhetoric (who regarded it as fairly crude in comparison to Virgil, Sallust or Cicero) and, on the other, a handbook of exegesis (the first three books). The fourth and final book is a Christian variation on the second part of Plato’s Phaedrus with a view to resolving the dilemma of the relation between wisdom and eloquence. As my goal in this book is to analyse how Augustine employed rhetorical rules taught in pagan schools in his polemical writings, De doctrina Christiana will be of little use here, if any at all. In the fourth and fifth century, the theory of staseis was an important element of the rhetorical teaching in the West. It re-emerged together with De inventione of Cicero, which overshadowed his other, more complex theoretical works, only gaining in popularity with the passage of the centuries (Ward: 2006, 10–11). The other frequently used texts were Rhet. Her. and part. orat., which were treated as Cicero’s juvenile works. Throughout these two centuries, De inventione was widely commented on and imitated by such authors as Marius Victorinus,50 Fortuna47 See Murphy: 1974, 44: “Parroting as they do the familiar Roman rhetorical doctrines, these works present nothing new. In fact, their only importance lies in their absolute acceptance of the ancient system.” Although the assessment of James. J. Murphy may be a bit too harsh, it explains very well why I decided to use the authoritative formulations of Cicero and Quintilian instead of focusing on their echoes in Fortunatianus or Grillius. 48 At least, not in the same way as De rhetorica of Pseudo-Augustine is. Despite some well argued endeavours by Aubin (2013, 117–34), the prevalent opinion is that Augustine did not author this work, but that some clever and somewhat cunning writer put Augustine’s famous name on top of his volume in order to gain wider publicity. 49 Doctr. christ. 4.1.2, ed. Simonetti, 252: “primo itaque exspectationem legentium, qui forte me putant rhetorica daturum esse praecepta, quae in scholis saecularibus et didici et docui, ista praelocutione cohibeo atque, ut a me non exspectentur, admoneo, non quod nihil habeant utilitatis, sed si quid habent, seorsum discendum est, si cui fortassis bono uiro etiam haec uacat discere, non autem a me uel in hoc opere uel in aliquo alio requirendum.” English translation by R.P.H. Green, in Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, Oxford 1995, 197. 50 C. Marius Victorinus, Explanationes in Ciceronis rhetoricam, ed. A. Ippolito (CCSL 132), C. Marius Victorinus,  Commenta in Ciceronis Rhetorica. Accedit incerti auctoris tractatus de attributis personae et negotio, ed. Th. Riesenweber, Berlin–Boston 2013. Marius Victorinus’ conversion is famously mentioned by Augustine in book eight of the Confessiones and his Latin translation of the Neoplatonic books were the source of Augustine’s philosophical conversion. Victorinus, born c. 290, died certainly before Augustine arrived in Rome, but as he was a former rhetor of Rome, and Augustine was a teacher of rhetoric in this city and then in Milan, it is very probable

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tianus51 (whose work later came to be attributed to Augustine), Julius Victor,52 Sulpitius Victor53 and Grillius54. In their works, the theory of status was the most prominent one.55 It is also noteworthy that most of these textbooks are primarily focused on the discussion of forensic speeches, with numerous references to Cicero and Quintilian. In particular, a sizeable portion of the handbooks by Fortunianus and Julius Victor consists of mere paraphrases of selected passages from De inventione and Inst., and both Marius Victorinus and Grillius wrote nothing more than a commentary to the former. All this proves that Latin rhetoricians who lived in or around the times of Augustine considered the Hermagorean and Ciceronian frameworks of the art of rhetoric still to be relevant. Harald Hagendahl has demonstrated how much Augustine was indebted to classical writers. We learn from his book that Augustine quoted from and alluded to three of Cicero’s rhetorical works (Inv., De oratore, Orator) and, less frequently, to Quintilian’s Inst.56 One must admit, however, that Augustine quotes from them rather sparingly and with reference to very general issues. Based on this type of evidence it is difficult to prove a direct influence of classical rhetorical handbooks on De doctrina Christiana. Nevertheless, we can and even should search for their influence in his rhetorical practice. The first thing to mention in this context is the role of the judge that Augustine had to play as a Christian bishop in the Christianized empire.57 Both imperial and ecclesiastical laws obliged bishops to adjudicate on all transgressions by their clergy. Possidius wrote that Augustine would examine cases and pass judgments all day that he knew Victorinus’ commentaries on De inventione that were published a few decades before his arrival in Italy. 51 Consultus Fortunatianus, Ars Rhetorica, ed. L. Calboli Montefusca, Bologna 1979. Fortunatianus is called a new author by Cassiodorus, Inst. 2.2.10, and praised for brevity and precision. L. Calboli Montefusca, in Fortunatianus, Ars Rhetorica, p. 6–8, presents a hypothesis that he may have been a Christian rhetor from Africa active after 363, but the arguments are speculative. His work was very popular in the Middle Ages. 52 Julius Victor, Ars Rhetorica, ed. R. Giomini and M. S. Celentano, Leipzig 1980. The editors establish fourth century as the time of his activity, based on one remark from Rufin of Antioch, see ibid., v–vi. 53 Sulpitius Victor, Institutiones oratoriae, ed. C. Halm, Rhetores Latini Minores, Lipsiae 1863, 311–52. He is usually – although hypothetically – dated to the fourth century. 54 Grillius, Commentum in Ciceronis Rhetorica, ed. R. Jakobi, Leipzig 2002. The dating of his lifetime is very hypothetical; stylistic analysis points to the early fifth century, but some see him as a Greek rhetorician from the time of Priscian (sixth century), see Jakobi: 2005, 4–5. 55 Kennedy: 1994, 277: “it is remarkable how important stasis theory remained in the study of rhetoric in late antiquity and the Middle Ages, second in importance only to figures of speech and sometimes overshadowing even that.” 56 Hagendahl: 1967, vol. I, 156–67 (for Cicero) and 224–225 (for Quintilian). It is worth noting, however, that in the extant works of Augustine, we find a sum total of only 14 lines from these three rhetorical treatises by Cicero—a fact that was observed by O’Donnell: 1980, 170. 57 I am indebted here to the works of Eva-Maria Kuhn: 2007, 71–104 and Humfress: 2007, 154–195.



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long without even taking time for meals, which is certainly an exaggeration,58 but the duties of audientia episcopalis must have devoured a large portion of his time. In his episcopal tribunal he had to proceed in keeping with the laws and regulations of the state. He had his own legal advisers, who helped him develop his knowledge of the law, as can be seen in ep. 24*. The rich material concerning the misbehaviour of the clergy that is found in his correspondence has been examined by Przemysław Nehring, whose analysis demonstrates that Augustine “was well versed in the imperial legislation and able to evaluate the misdeeds and the respective sanctions” (2017, 112). In his capacity as judge in the episcopal tribunal and as a former teacher of rhetoric, he must have been familiar not only with the rudiments but also with the sophisticated intricacies of forensic oratory. Furthermore, as Nello Cipriani (1975; 1991) has proved, the use of school rhetoric—and its forensic variety in particular—lay at the core of the Pelagian controversy, Christian Tornau (2006) meti­ culously documented the influence of rhetorical tradition on De civitate Dei. Finally, Augustine himself denounced Pelagius as an incompetent and deplorably unskilled rhetorician (Toczko: 2011). One may therefore legitimately claim that Augustine and his educated audiences received a fairly homogeneous rhetorical training in their schooldays. We are in no position, however, to presume that Augustine or his contemporaries used one and the same textbook. For this reason, in investigating Augustine’s rhetorical strategies we cannot limit ourselves to considering a system extracted from only one (e.g. to take exclusively De inventione as the point of reference). Every professor of rhetoric, whether in Madaura, Carthage, Rome or Milan, had his own particular method of teaching rhetoric deeply rooted in the works of Cicero59 and Quintilian. As Augustine was himself a professor, he must have had his own idiosyncrasies in this respect. In this book, I am going to discuss the rhetorical strategies which he used in his anti-Donatist letters. In this discussion, I shall argue that Augustine was not only interested in the intricate details of the art of rhetoric, but also highly competent in using them in practice. In doing so, I will counter the claims proposed recently by Mark Clavier that “Augustine has no interest in the civic role of oratory” (2014, 81) or that “what he did reject was […] the usefulness of rhetorical theory itself ” (2014, 58). Neither of these claims appears to be substantiated with convincing evidence.

58 In Possidius, Vita Augustini 19.6, Augustine is described as examining and arbitrating all day long without any brunch or lunch breaks. For a good discussion of Augustine acting in the manner of ancient orators, see also Humfress: 2012, 325–30. 59 Among them, Rhet. Her., which at that time was considered to have been authored by Cicero.

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3. Shaping the discourse in the anti-Donatist letters 3.1 Genus deliberativum vs. genus iudiciale The controversy between the Donatist and the Catholic Churches as presented in Augustine’s letters is not only deliberative in character: even if it may seem to be one, Augustine intentionally presents the subject as a matter for a legal case, as may best be seen in ep. 87, which is directed to the Donatist bishop Emeritus. In its epilogue, we find an interesting formulation: Quaeritur autem utrum uestra, an nostra sit Ecclesia Dei. Quapropter illud quaerendum est a capite, cur schisma feceritis. Si non rescripseris, ego apud Deum, quantum credo, facilem causam habeo.60

Taking this as the starting point, I should like to discuss several phaenomena of Augustine’s shaping the letters as a form of forensic discourse.61 First, one has to note the two formulations of the status and their linking to the causa generum. In the formulation of Quintilian, status is the chief question: “summa illa quaestio in qua causa uertitur” (Inst. 3.11.2). Instead of saying summa, Augustine uses the expression a capite, consistently with his earlier remarks that read: “hinc enim caput est ordinatissimae inquisitionis, cur schisma factum sit” (ep. 87.6) and “neque enim uobis obicimus nisi schismatis crimen, quam etiam haeresem male perseuerando fecistis. quanti autem diuino iudicio pendatur hoc facinus […](87.4)” “Caput inquistionis” may be understood casually as the beginning of an inquiry or the main topic for research, but the word “inquisitio” was used in legal contexts as the seeking for arguments in support of the accusation, judicial inquiry or examination leading to the formulation of the question underlying the legal case. It is worth noting that the letter is interspersed with phrases that were customarily viewed as technical legal terms: causa, quaestio, inquisitio, declarare, intendere, quaerere. The formulation from the final paragraph of the letter quoted above (ep. 87.10) suggests that the proposed question – that is, “Is it your Church or ours that is truly the Church of God?” – would naturally be disputed on the grounds of genus deli­ berativum. Augustine could have easily gone further in this direction in the subsequent passage by alluding, for instance, to the consequences of the discussed issue, namely, which Church should be regarded as the true one by the state and those who were undecided on the issue, but this is not the case. Instead, Augustine contends that the main issue is legal in character. This can easily be observed in the closing two sentences of the letter (ep. 87.10) and in the two other passages quoted above (87.4 and 87.6); Augustine explicitly brings a charge of schism and heresy against the Donatists. Thus, the schism is presented as a crime and the controversy 60 ep. 87.10 (CSEL 34,2, 406). 61 It ought to be noted that in a recent analysis of the argumentation in this letter, a scholar well versed in the ancient rhetoric, does not mention the theory of status, see Dunn: 2018, 7–24.



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as a legal case, with Emeritus and his party as the defendants, Augustine as the prosecutor, and God as the judge. To see the status on which Augustine wants to establish the debate, we need to refer to one more passage from the same letter, namely ep. 87.7: tota igitur quaestio est, utrum nihil mali sit schisma aut utrum schisma non feceritis [...] si ergo iustitia est, quam operati estis in illa dissensione, in qua etiam permanetis [...]; si autem iniquitas est orbem christianum damnare inauditum [...].62

For Emeritus, who was well versed in law, it must have been an absolutely clear message. Augustine presents the issue as complex (causa iuxta) and as one that can be discussed under two different headings. He says that the opening question is “whether schism is nothing bad,” and that there are two possible answers: either the Donatists have done rightly/justly in separating themselves, or not. This is a classic issue discussed under the heading of qualitative issue – qualitas absoluta. The accuser says, “You should not have done it, it was wrong,” while the defendant claims that it was not the case—that he had done something recte/iuste. Thus, the question arises: was it right to do so, or was it not? The repetition of the questions starting with “why” clearly links the whole case to this status: “cur schisma feceritis” (ep. 87.10), “cur schisma factum sit” (ep. 87.6). The second possibility that Augustine sees and suggests here is to discuss the topic under the heading status definitionis. The question: “utrum schisma non feceritis?” should be read as the reverse of the seemingly deliberative “utrum uestra, an nostra sit Ecclesia Dei?”. Exactly the same sequence can be find in cath. fr. 2–3, where the question “Where is the Church of God?” is repeated twice: “quaestio certe inter nos uersatur ubi sit ecclesia, utrum apud nos an apud illos.[...] inter nos autem et Donatistas quaestio est ubi sit hoc corpus, id est ubi sit ecclesia.”63 These formulations suggest that this is a deliberative question. In the next paragraph, Augustine turns to the forensic language and talks about mutual accusations, crimes and litigations. In one instance he observes: “nullam uideo litis causam, nisi quia est causa ut illi se corrigant, qui se sine causa separauerunt.”64 That should inform us that the question “Where is the Church of God?” is purely rhetorical. Augustine does not leave much time for the jury to ponder the question. For him there could be no doubt that the Donatists were schismatics, as they had separated themselves from the Church without any valid reason. To this accusation the Donatists must have replied more than once saying that they were not the schismatics but the true Church, and hence emerged the question to be adjudicated: “utrum uestra, an nostra sit Ecclesia Dei”, or, in other words, the question of whether the Donatists had committed the crime of schism, or was it not schism, which is a classic case of status definitionis. 62 ep. 87.7 (CSEL 34,2, 403). 63 cath. fr. 2 (CSEL 52, 232). 64 cath. fr. 3 (CSEL 52, 233).

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The legal terms and phrases such as uertitur quaestio, aeque postulare, litigare, iudicium, poena, testis also occur in ep. 43. Both in the prologue and in the epilogue to this letter, Augustine masterfully builds his case on the ambiguity of genus orationis. One has to bear in mind that Augustine is writing to a group of lay Donatists. Curiously, he presents them not as heretics, but as seekers of the truth who are far removed from partiality and stubborn tenacity. These qualities were the desired virtues of the perfect jury. On the other hand, he admits that his addressees are simply defending their opinion (“sententiam suam defendunt”) and presents them as erring not by their own fault, but by that of their parents, to whom he refers as “lapsi in errorem”. There is a nice pun based on the use of the word lapsi. It stemmed from the verb labor (to slip, slide, fall down) and was used to label the opponents of the early Donatists—the clergy who morally slipped during the Great Persecution. In fact, the very problem of the lapsi or traditores was the reason why the Donatists conflicted themselves with Caecilian and his party at the beginning of the fourth century. Augustine takes this term and reverses its use to label the Donatists as those who had slipped into heresy. Apart from that, the language he uses here is characteristic of the deliberative genre, since the error of their parents (and effectively the opinion they defend) is cognitive or intellectual in nature.65 Augustine claims in the prologue that he aims to fight their false and perverse opinion through this letter in the interest of their souls (“hoc modo uobiscum de negotio animae uestrae aliquid agere”).66 Thus, the prologue would incline the readers to qualify this letter as belonging to the deliberative genre, especially since Augustine refers to his constant effort to correct the Donatists. What follows is a narratio in three paragraphs. Augustine recalls a debate he had with Donatists in the Numidian Thiave, during which his party was accused of traditio. The remaining part of the main body of the letter up to the epilogue (par. 26–27) is filled by argumentatio. We are dealing here with an example of legal defence based on status translationis. Augustine agrees that although the crime of traditio had in fact been committed, the accusation in question should be reversed and levelled at the accusing party. He simultaneously proceeds with the legal defence based on status coniecturae to prove that Caecilian was in fact not a traditor. Augustine proceeds in a way which suits well the occasion and is based mostly on the most powerful inartificial arguments, that is testimonies and documents, but also on biblical exempla and other methods of persuasion. He finishes the argumentation part in ep. 43.25 on a high note, with a brief resumé of the history of their criminal record of fomenting division in the Church. The section culminates in indicating the inconsistencies revealed in their treatment of the Maximianists and ends with two 65 Error in Christian rhetoric is almost synonymous with heresy, see Aug., De haeresibus, praef. 7 (CCL 46, 289): “non enim omnis error haeresis est, quamuis omnis haeresis quae in uitio ponitur nisi errore aliquo haeresis esse non possit.” We should also remember that Quintilian presented mistaken opinions as the motives for evil actions. 66 ep. 43.2, (CSEL 34,2, 86).



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rhetorical questions: “quid apertius cernitur? quid aequius postulatur?,” which places the whole case in a forensic setting. The epilogue in paragraphs 26–27 is worthy of our attention in its entirety, as it presents a masterful blend of the deliberative and judicial genres. Drawing on the framework of Ebbeler’s proposition to read it as a piece of corrective (and hence deliberative) correspondence, it is worthwhile to discuss a few characteristic features of this genre presented in this passage. Augustine posits that the Donatist addressees do not have to remain in the deadly schism. Next, he exhorts them to think about the future, and make a choice based on their estimation of possible gains and losses: they will experience everlasting punishments for the “virtue” of remaining faithful to their contemporary friends and carnal desires.67 One has to acknowledge the characteristic markers of the deliberative genre: references to the future, the discussion focused on the moral evaluation of the possible choices of actions, the oppositions of the bodily versus the spiritual, the temporary versus the everlasting, and the emphasis on the advantage they can gain (“adipiscere spiritale regnum”). But in the final sentence of the letter Augustine shows that it would be rash to categorize this letter as unequivocally deliberative. In the case of this particular letter, the qualification to the judicial or deliberative genre depends directly on the actions of its addressees. If they accept Augustine’s advice, it means that they have received an exhortation (“erit uobis hic sermo correctio si uelitis”); if they fail to do so, the letter will accuse them as a witness during God’s judgment68 (“erit uobis hic sermo testis, si nolitis”). There can be no doubt that he is trying to correct them (as Ebbeler rightly claims), but he suspects his attempts will prove to be in vain, as had been the case with most of his earlier letters addressed to them. Thus, this letter is, in Augustine’s own words, a testimony—a witness not only before God, but also before the eyes of public opinion, given that it is inevitably going to circulate in Africa and around the Mediterranean.

3.2 Accusatio/intentio vs. defensio/depulsio Maureen A. Tilley observed with regard to the legal status of the Conference of Carthage in 411 that “the roles of plaintiff and defendant were not clearly defined” (Tilley 1991, 11). That is not astonishing, if we consider that for almost a century before the conference the two parties had been making mutual accusations, and had had to find arguments to defend themselves. In classic examples of courtroom rhe­ toric, such as the forensic speeches of Cicero, we can trace the sequence of steps leading to the establishing of the status of a case, (known as the krinomenon scheme). This pattern consisted in the first statement of the charge (intentio), the opening formulation of the defence (negatio/depulsio), the emerging issue (quaestio), the 67 See also ep. 56.2. 68 See also ep. 89.1, where the two categories of what is advantageous and what is just/right are also linked.

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main arguments supporting the defence (ratio/continens) the accusation (infirmatio rationis), and iudicatio (de quo contenditur), i.e. the crucial question for the jury to answer, the so-called “point to adjudicate.”69 I shall discuss in greater detail the question of whether and where it is possible to discern these elements of that pattern in Augustine’s letters in due course, while in this section I should like to focus on two other problems. First of all, it is advisable to briefly analyse the passages where Augustine most explicitly refers to the charges formulated by both sides in the conflict. Secondly, I shall indicate the model formulations of both the accusation (intentiones) and the defence (depulsiones/negationes) in order to find out in which cases he acts as the prosecutor and in which he takes on the role of the advocate. If we search for such technical forensic terms as accusatio, accusor, obicere, defensio, defendere and crimen in Augustine’s correspondence, we will discover that the vast majority of the occurrences is found in the anti-Donatist letters. As they are too numerous to comment on each separately, I will only present a selection of the most telling ones and formulate several conclusions resulting from my analysis. The difficulty in making the distinction between the accusation and the defence signalled by Tilley may have more to do with a lack of rhetorical competence on the part of modern readers than with the ambiguity of ancient texts. For instance, when Augustine writes in c. litt. Pet. 1.23: “obicitis traditionem: hanc ipsam multo probabilius nos uobis obicimus,”70 the subsequent legal steps are by no means puzzling. The Donatists accuse Catholics of traditio and Augustine uses status translationis to make a retorsion argument: “we have much more credible arguments for charging you with the same crime.” In the analysed material we also see other passages, where Augustine refers to this charge and to the ways in which it was formulated.71 Not surprisingly, one of the two main accusations levelled by the Donatists at the Catholics at the Conference of Carthage in 411 is that of traditio. The formulation of the next charge is found a few paragraphs further (c. litt. Pet. 1.25): “obicitis persecutionem: respondent uobis frumenta dominica: aut iuste factum est aut palea nostra fecit. quid ad haec dicitis?”.72 It is clear that we are dealing here with a formulation of the charge (intentio), two alternative basic formulations of defence (depulsiones), and a question provoking the adversaries to prepare a rebuttal of defence (intentio rationis). What is also clear is that Augustine bases his defence on status qualitatis; in the case of the first formulation of defence (depulsio)—qualitas absoluta (it was justly/rightly done), in the second—qualitas assumptiva in which one admits to having committed a crime and asks for forgiveness— concessio criminis (the more impatient, evil element of our Christian community, 69 It was neatly done by L. van Gils in her dissertation Argument and Narrative. A Discourse analysis of ten Ciceronian speeches. For the presentation of the scheme and discussion of the pro­ blems with its interpretation see Braet: 1988, 299–317; see also Heath: 1994. 70 c. litt. Pet. 1.23 (CSEL 52, 18). 71 The same charge is repeated expressis verbis in ep. 76.4: “crimen traditionis nobis obicitis.” 72 c. litt. Pet. 1.25 (CSEL 52, 19).



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did it).73 The charge against Augustine and his party is most precisely formulated in ep. 51.3: “item soletis nobis obicere, quod uos per potestates terrenas persequamur” for here also the modus of the crime is signalled – persecution through the secular powers. Sometimes, the focus is not on the act of persecution but on the fact that the Catholic Church is cooperating with the state. When it suits Augustine’s purposes, the cooperation with the state is presented and discussed as a separate charge in its own right. In most cases, however, when referring to the charges of the Donatists against his party, Augustine mentions only these two: traditio and persecutio innocentium,74 as is the case with cath. fr. 3. It is more difficult to extract the exact krinomenon sequence in the case of yet another accusation, which follows the above quotation from c. litt. Pet. 1.25: “obicitis quod baptismum non habeamus.” As this is the only mention of this charge in Augustine’s correspondence, I propose reading it as the response of the Donatists to the charge of rebaptism formulated within status qualitatis. Augustine accused the Donatists of the crime of rebaptism of an individual or a certain group already in ep. 23.2, where rebaptism of a Catholic is called “immanissimum scelus”, and later in ep. 34, 35, 66, 106, 108. This accusation is often formulated as the exsufflation75 of Christ (ep. 52.3; 105.7; 108.3), his sacrament (ep. 43.21, 25; 51.5; 185.8; 48) or his grace (ep. 34.3), and is at times called “sacrilegium”, as in ep. 43.21. Defending themselves against this charge the Donatists answered that they had not committed such a crime, given that the Catholics had not been validly baptized. In the same passage, the two main charges levelled at the Donatists are briefly summarized (ep. 43.21): “nos eis obicimus furorem schismatis, rebaptizationis insaniam, ab hereditate Christi, quae per omnes gentes diffusa est, nefariam separationem.” For rhetorical effect, the first charge is given in two formulations: “furor schismatis” and “nefaria separatio ab hereditate Christi”. The second charge is referred to as “insania rebaptizationis”. These two nouns, insania and furor, are reminiscent not only of the language used by Christians in their invectives against heretics, but also of forensic rhetoric, indicating that the actions of the accused were utterly irrational, caused by negative emotions, or procured by severely disturbed

73 We should note, however, that he does not take the guilt onto his whole party, only onto some bad elements within it. A very similar presentation of the defence against the charge of persecution is in ep. 108.16–17. Here, Augustine mostly uses the biblical image of weeds or straw to put the blame on the unworthy Christians from his community, see also Dunn: 2017, 371–401. 74 But he also observes here that his party may accuse the Donatists of the same crimes: cath. fr. 3 (CSEL, 52, 233): “si autem utraque falsa sunt, siue quae nos illis siue quae illi nobis obiciunt uel de traditione uel de persecutione innocentium, nullam uideo litis causam, nisi quia est causa ut illi se corrigant, qui se sine causa separauerunt.” 75 Exsufflation was an exorcistic rite that took place in the early stages of baptismal ceremony. It consisted in blowing in the face of a candidate for baptism, in order to chase away any demons and evil spirits or—as some interpret it—to insult these spirits, where its exorcistic character would be less evident. See Young: 2016, 33.

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minds.76 As I have already demonstrated, Augustine often presents the charge of schism as the sole accusation, one they cannot defend themselves against. To once again use c. litt. Pet. 1.27: nos eis tantummodo schismatis crimen obicimus, quo penitus omnes inuoluti sunt, non quorundam eorum crimina, quae sibi quidam eorum displicere respondeant. ipsi uero si nobis aliena crimina non obiciant, non habent quod obiciant, et ideo se ab scelere schismatis defendere omnino non possunt.77

There is also a list of charges that Augustine formulates as if only in passing (the figure of praeteritio),78 concerning such crimes and misdemeanours as violence, murder, suicide and drunkenness.79 He uses them mostly to draw from them arguments in the discussion of the other main charges. For instance, he presents reports on violent crimes of the Donatists mostly in the context of defending his party against the accusation of persecution. The violence of the sectarians is presented in the relatio criminis pattern as the reason for their coercion by the state. It is worth noting that in most of his anti-Donatist letters Augustine switches between the role of prosecutor of the Donatists and that of an advocate fighting off their accusations. Thus, except for a few letters that are clearly accusatory (such as ep. 34, 35, 66 and 88), in most of them, and especially in the longer ones (43, 44, 93, 105, 108, 185), the strands of defence and accusation are closely entwined. In all, there are basically four cases: schism and rebaptism on the one hand (with Augustine accusing the Donatists of these two counts), and persecution and traditio on the other (with regard to these, Augustine is an advocate defending his party from these two charges). This will also be the order of the chapters in the next two parts of this book.

3.3 Causa apud Deum—creating the jury The same passages from ep. 87 may serve as the starting point for discussing another layer of the forensic language developed by Augustine in his anti-Donatist correspondence. This concerns the reference to God as the judge in their case (ep. 87.10) and the crime of the Donatists (ep. 87.4). Augustine inserts it here within what is known as divisio—one of his favourite forms of argument. According to Quintilian (Inst. 5.10.63–70), this figure belongs mostly to arguments based on definition. Quintilian’s summary and the examples of divisio found in Cicero’s speeches allow for a more liberal use. Of special importance is the type of divisio which recur in the material under discussion. It is the one called complexio (in Greek: dilemma) by 76 See also ep. 87.8 (CSEL 34,2, 404) for a similar formulation: “ecclesiam […] et praecisione laniare ausi estis et rebaptizare pertinaciter audetis.” 77 c. litt. Pet. 1.27 (CSEL 52, 21). 78 On the use of this figure in Augustine’s letters, see Parsons: 1923, 223. 79 See for example c. litt. Pet. 1.26 and ep. 87.44.



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Cicero (Inv. 1.45), that presents the adversary with two alternatives for further action (Calboli Montefusco: 2010). After a short discussion, one should conclude that both are advantageous for his/her party and disastrous for our opponents.80 In the words of Cicero, “whatever you choose is judged as wrong.” In this letter, Augustine presents Emeritus with two choices: either he will or will not reply to his letter. To my mind, it seems that Augustine was not particularly concerned about receiving an answer from Emeritus; nor did he believe that his arguments would convince his addressee. The way the case between them is presented is so evidently advantageous to the Catholic party that Emeritus’ answer along the proposed lines would have to be unconvincing. But a failure to answer would prove the weakness of the Donatists’ argument even better, given that the context is reminiscent of a legal case concerning the responsibility for the crime of schism. This complexio is exactly the same as in ep. 23, where Augustine also exhorts Maximinus to answer his letter. He admits that he is going to read his letter to his Church together with the bishop’s answer if it comes. Should there be no response, Augustine will read his letter nonetheless. In such case people will, he writes to Maximinus, “recognize your lack of confidence” and “may at least be ashamed to be rebaptized.”81 In ep. 23 the question is also of a legal nature belonging to the status coniecturalis: Have you rebaptized a certain Catholic? Unlike in ep. 87, however, Augustine does not put God in the position of the judge: instead, it is the audience who is supposed to listen to the defence of Maximinus and pass judgment. The theme of the origins of the schism also pervades the legal vocabulary and judicial context of the short ep. 52. Here, as in ep. 87, by presenting the same charge of schism in status qualitatis, Augustine refers to God as the judge. He refers to the earliest stages of the schism, mentioning documents proving that the schism occurred through the Donatists’ fault, and presents them as hypocrites who wrongly accused Caecilian of alleged traditio, although they themselves had committed it (leaving aside other, even graver trespasses). The fourth and final paragraph, is directed to Severinus.82 Augustine warns him in the closing remark that staying stubbornly on the side of those criminals who hold the church of Christ in contempt, he shall be facing God as the ultimate judge, who should be considered the real driving force behind Augustine’s letter. On other occasions he foists the role of judge upon his neutral or almost neutral addressees, as is famously the case with ep. 34 to the layman Eusebius, who was clearly impermeable to Augustine’s insistent demands, and was possibly irritated by his rhetorical tour de force. Eusebius’ response has not been preserved, but we are in possession of Augustine’s answer to that letter, where he paraphrases Eusebius’ anxiety:

80 The second, which was also often used by Augustine, is the one in which two alternatives lead to the same conclusion, Inst. 5.10.70. 81 ep. 23.6. I follow here the translations of R. Teske in WSA II/1, 67. 82 He was a Donatist and a relative of Augustine, see “Severinus 1,” Mandouze: 1982, 1070.

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Non ego recusanti uoluntati tuae iudicium, sicut dicis, inter episcopos subeundum molestus exhortator aut deprecator imposui. Quod quidem etiamsi suadere uoluissem, possem fortasse facile ostendere quam ualeas iudicare inter nos in tam manifesta atque aperta causa.83

The case on which Augustine wanted Eusebius to pass judgment was a specific case of rebaptism in Hippo.84 It is fairly obvious from Augustine’s paraphrase that Eusebius must have felt uneasy about being thrust in the midst of this heated controversy. This uneasiness is yet further proof that Augustine actually shaped the controversy as an agon, trying to make it look as if he was acting as a prosecutor in a legal case against criminals. When provoking his opponents to an epistolary or live debate, he was fully aware that they might not answer his letters or might not want to meet with him. At times Augustine underlined that awareness in the endings of his letters. In doing so, he portrayed his opponents as unreasonable people unwilling to debate. As Rémi Crespin rightly observes, Augustine did want people to judge, but for Crespin this referred only to judging the value of theological ideas.85 If, however, we read Aristotle and Cicero, we learn that people also–or mainly–passed their judgements on the basis of the character of the opposing parties, regardless of whether the controversy in question was political, judicial or religious in nature. Augustine himself comments on his intentions, saying that he wanted the Donatists to manifest publicly their perverted ideas in their own words, not his (note especially his remarks in the first book of c. litt. Pet.).86 However, should they fail to respond to his provocations replete with rhetorical tricks and traps set for them, it would mean that they were as cowardly as Verres, who did not appear before the court. Augustine, on a par with Cicero, would win the case without even entering the ranks of the agon–there would be only one party present and ready for debate. We are thus undeniably dealing with a conscious strategy on the part of Augustine to impose the role of the judge on his audience.

3.4 Unum crimen: quaestio simplex The third observation concerning ep. 87 as an example of the use of the judicial genre in polemical letters has to do with Augustine’s insistence on reducing the matter of the controversy to a single issue. In other words, he insists that it should 83 ep. 35.1 (CSEL 34,2, 27). 84 See chapter below Chapter 4.2. and also Toczko: 2018, 91–109. 85 Crespin: 1965, 151: “Il poursuit un but sembable en souhaitant la publication des échanges épistolaires: joindre aux avantages propres à ceux-ci les bienfaits d’un débat public, permettre aux chrétiens de juger sur pièces, de reconnaître enfin le camp de la vérité […].” 86 c. litt. Pet. 1.1 (CSEL 52, 3): “nostis nos saepe uoluisse Donatistarum haereticorum sacrilegum errorem in notitiam manifestam non tam ex nostro quam ex ipsorum ore producere atque conuincere. unde factum est, ut ad nonnullos etiam primates eorum litteras daremus […] illi espuerunt litteras meas, sicut ipsam pacem, cui per eas consulebatur, oderunt.”



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be regarded as causa/quaestio simplex, although he is clearly aware of the problem of legal qualification of the Donatists’ crime (87.4), as he writes: “neque enim uobis obicimus nisi schismatis crimen, quam etiam haeresem male perseuerando fecistis.” In paragraph 6 of the same letter, he states that in order to determine whether it is right or wrong to persecute the Donatists, one has to address the qualitas of their separation first. In doing so, he follows the counsel given by Quintilian with regard to judicial speeches: to point constantly at that one main question.87 This approach was especially useful when discussing other topics less favourable to their case. It is also noteworthy that Augustine expresses this idea in words similar to the fully-fledged courtroom peroratio.88 The prosecutor was obliged to state the legal qualification of the crime to the judges, and this is exactly what Augustine does in this letter. At the time, according to the later testimony of Augustine himself, the Catholic bishops tried to use the anti-heretical laws against the Donatists.89 As the judge in his episcopal tribunal, Augustine was operating as subject to Roman law, and consequently this form of accusation (“We charge you with the crime of he­ resy,” which he defines as a prolonged, stubborn schism) summoned the civil authorities to take legal action against the Donatists.90 This tactic of avoiding discussion of other charges either against the Donatists or his party is also noticeable in other places, particularly in book 1 of c. litt. Pet. 1., where Augustine admits that there are two reasons for taking this course. Just as in ep. 87 he wants the whole case to be reduced to a single charge (that of a schism) as the root cause of all other problems. When guilt is decided, the verdict is ready and both parties can proceed with re-establishing the communion, without having to resolve all remaining issues, especially that of traditio. This is clearly the easiest way for him to end the discussion, but this pattern of argumentation was designed exactly for this purpose, as we learn from handbooks of rhetoric, and Augustine seems to be aware of it: nos eis tantummodo schismatis crimen obicimus, quo penitus omnes inuoluti sunt, non quorundam eorum crimina, quae sibi quidam eorum displicere respondeant. ipsi uero si nobis aliena crimina non obiciant, non habent quod obiciant, et ideo se ab scelere schismatis defendere omnino non possunt.91 87 Quint., Inst. 3.11.1: “Quaestio latius intellegitur omnis de qua in utramque partem vel in plures dici credibiliter potest. In iudiciali autem materia dupliciter accipienda est: altero modo quo dicimus multas quaestiones habere controversiam, quo etiam minores omnis complectimur, altero quo significamus summam illam [sc. quaestionem – R.T.] in qua causa vertitur.” 88 Compare Cicero’s Pro Quinctio 92: “ea res nunc enim in discrimine versatur, utrum […].” 89 ep. 185.25. 90 As Noel Lenski (2016, 180–1) showed, the imperial officials adapted to this qualification. 91 c. litt. Pet. 1.27 (CSEL 52, 21); see also ibid 1.30 (CSEL 52, 23): “ita ergo tota causa concluditur uicta in illis, inuicta pro nobis, quia, si nomen pacis ad tolerandos in schismate malos in qualemcumque umbram defensionis assumitur, procul dubio cum horrendo scelere et sine ulla defensione per unitatem orbis terrarum uera pax ipsa uiolatur.” See c. litt. Pet. 1.25 and 2.20 for a similar argumentation.

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Also, in ep. 43.25 Augustine uses the judicial phrase and forensic method known from Quintilian’s discussion of status: certe de traditione diuinorum librorum uertitur quaestio, ubi hereditas ista promissa est. ille ergo credatur testamentum tradidisse flammis, qui contra uoluntatem litigat testatoris.92

In this letter presenting a lengthy defence against the charge of traditio, he admits that he is also willing to bring the case (causa) as a whole to a single question (quaestio), namely that of giving away the holy books. I believe that his use of certe attests to the fact that he agreed with the Donatist proposal of the main question in the causa. And it is indeed in line with his own proposal stated in the beginning of the same letter, that the case is about the beginnings of the schism. In judicial terms this means that he admits to his accusers that “id crimen factum est” – such a crime was really committed – but claims that it was they who had committed it (“uos fecistis”). Hence, we are dealing here with the status translationis resulting in a mutual accusation, known as antikategoria and discussed by Quintilian. Augustine’s argument follows exactly this pattern. To emphasize the judicial context even further, he chooses to use the word testamentum, which in its legal meaning refers to “the last will.” The French editors of the text in the Bibliothèque augustinienne (BA) series recognize this as a play on words based on the two Christian meanings of testamentum: as God’s promise of universal covenant with humankind, and as the document of this covenant, that is the Bible.93 But in this passage there seems to be yet another context that has not been mentioned so far. For contemporary readers, who must have had some experience with the legal system or rhetorical education, it was probably clear that Augustine was also referring to legal cases concerning inheritance. The most popular handbooks of rhetoric were packed with examples concerning inheritance cases, which may reflect the actual court practice where such cases were commonplace. Out of 74 extant Controversiae of Seneca the Elder, 23 concern the cases of inheri­ tance. This context allows us to read the passage differently: the one who is contesting (“qui litigant contra”) the last will (“uoluntantem”) of the person who made it (“testatoris”) cannot have any claims to inheritance. Augustine admits therefore that traditio occurred, but he proposes to define the traditor (“ille ergo credatur testamentum tradidisse flammis”) – addressed here metonymically as the one who set the last will on fire – as precisely the one who is contesting the last will. This is a classic example of an argument based on definition, ideally suited to this type of legal defense.

92 ep. 43.25 (CSEL 34,2, 107). 93 See Augustin d’Hippone, Traités anti-Donatistes III. Contra litteras Petiliani libri tres, ed. G. Finaert and B. Quinot, Paris 1967; BA 30, 176, n. 1.



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3.5 Causa honesta/manifesta vs. causa obscura One of the fundamental elements of the theory of genus iudiciale was to establish the genera, species or modi causarum, which Lausberg calls “die Vertretbarkeitsrangstufen”—“levels of defensibility of the case” (1998, 63). The ancient authors were not in total agreement as regards the number of these levels, as some distinguished five—honest, dubious, shocking or ugly (admirabile, turpe), shallow (humile), and obscure—while others recognized only four (omitting the last, see Lausberg: 1998, 64).94 For both the accuser and the defence it was easiest to proceed with the first genus causae—the honest one. If the defendant presented his case to belong to this type, the favour of the jury would be on his side from the very beginning, because both the person and the issue would be widely perceived as honest. The ability to distinguish genera causarum was a core part of rhetorical training in forensic oratory, so it is indeed little wonder that Augustine availed himself of this knowledge in his anti-Donatist letters. I have already mentioned the form of argument where Augustine claims that his case against the Donatists is favoured by God-the-judge as in ep. 23 and ep. 87. Every such claim is creating the impression that he stands on the right side of causa honesta. To use the exemplary ep. 87.10 once again, when Augustine says that he will have an easy case before God – causa facilis – in the ears of the ancients it sounded like a reference to the levels of defensibility and to causa honesta. There are many instances in a number of letters emphasizing that the case is plain, that the verdict can be reached easily, and that the arguments of the Catholic side are strong and true, while those of the Donatists are simply invalid.95 All this aimed to present one’s case as exhibiting the highest level of defensibility and that of the opponent as completely untenable. In ep. 105.13 Augustine creates a brief narrative on the arrogant Donatist bishops who refuse to discuss with their Catholic counterparts. Then follows the argument based on exempla of Paul and Jesus, who did not shy away from sinners, but talked to them; 94 See also long comments of Grillius, Commenta 1.20–22; Martianus Capella, De Rhetorica 5.547. 95 See, for instance, ep. 23.2 (CSEL 34,1, 65): “noui etenim, quae sit ecclesia catholica. gentes sunt hereditas Christi et possessio Christi termini terrae. nostis et uos aut, si non nostis, aduertite; facillime a uolentibus sciri potest.”; ep. 43.26 (CSEL 34,2, 108): “rogo, fratres mei, quid magnum peto? quid difficile a uobis intellegi cupio?”; ep. 56.2 (CSEL 34,2, 214): “quam inconcussis enim documentorum firmamentis error ille conuincatur, non magnum est etiam tardis ingenio, si tantum patienter atque intente audierint, peruidere.”; ep. 89.6 (CSEL 34,2, 423): “et tamen cum tam perspicua ueritas aures et corda hominum feriat, tanta quosdam malae consuetudinis uorago submersit, ut omnibus auctoritatibus rationibusque resistere quam consentire malint.”; ep. 93.15 (CSEL 34,2, 470): “facile erat ista cogitare, ut uobis ipsis aliquando diceretis: si Caecilianus uel innocens fuit uel nocens conuinci non potuit, quid in hoc negotio tam longe lateque diffusa societas christiana peccauit? [...] haec facillime cogitare possetis aut fortasse etiam cogitatis.”; ep. 93.37 (CSEL 34,2, 481): “qua in re, sicut ingenium tuum noui, facillime perspicis totam causam uestram penitus euersam et extinctam.”

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moreover, the Lord lowered himself to answer even the devil. The closing sentence leaves no doubt as to the level of defensibility of the Donatists’ case: the fact that their bishops refused to debate with the Catholics proved that their case was utterly unwinnable.96 It is worth commenting on one other example where the reference to defensibility is openly stated and accompanied by a fairly sophisticated emotive amplificatio in ep. 43.6.97 The wording is also important, for it employs technical forensic terms. Augustine is addressing lay Donatists not only as judges, but also as those whose salus (and the salus of their community) is at stake. This procedure was very commonly practised in the courtroom, and was often used and recommended by Cicero himself.98 Then Augustine uses exclamatio to call on the Donatist to wake up. A series of symmetrical periods follows with anaphors and epiphors artfully woven into the narrative – a characteristic feature of amplificatio: (1) (a1) non in aliqua obscura quaestione uersamur, (a2) non recondita secreta rimamur, (b) quibus penetrandis uel nulla uel rara humana corda sufficiant. (2) (a) res in aperto est. (b1) quid eminet clarius? (b2) quid cernitur citius? (3) (a1) dicimus temerario concilio quamlibet numerosissimo innocentes absentesque fuisse damnatos. (b1) probamus hoc proconsularibus gestis... (a2) dicimus a traditoribus confessis in eos, qui traditores dicerentur, dictas fuisse sententias. probamus hoc ecclesiasticis gestis […] The expression quaestio obscura is clearly used on purpose and should be understood as indicating the lowest level of defensibility. Quaestio obscura implies that either the judge (or the audience) is dull-witted, or that it is difficult to say which party has an honest cause. By using the term here Augustine claims that this is not the case of the discussion concerning the charge of traditio. His confidence that the case is self-evident (res in aperto est) is based on the fact that he used most convincing, inartificial proofs, that is, state and ecclesiastical documents. If he had been charged with traditio and obliged to defend himself in a courtroom, his defence would have been based on exactly the same pattern.

3.6 Lex divina vs. Lex humana The problem that the Donatist controversy proposes for modern scholarship is that a theologian in particular would expect a controversy to have some theological burden, as was the case with the Arian, Nestorian or Pelagian debates. These controversies have advanced the religious ideas in many departments. However, this is hardly 96 ep. 105.13 (CSEL 34,2, 605): “ut intellegatis istos ideo nobiscum nolle conferre, quia causam suam perditam norunt.” 97 To end prooemium with amplificatio in this type of case is suggested by Martianus Capella, De Rhetorica 5.547. 98 Cic., In Catilinam 1.7, 2.7, 3.1, 4.9.



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the case with the Donatist controversy. The theological weight of most of the Donatist polemics is comparably light, and apart for some advances in sacramentology and ecclesiology, an ironist might say it was not worth the toil.99 This perplexity may lead (or have led) to some serious efforts to present this controversy as in fact an epiphenomenon of class and social clashes. Without the conviction that these perspectives should be downplayed or dispensed with I would argue, however, that if the rhetorical dimension of it remains unnoticed we will not be able to see the whole issue in its true context. The forensic frame is invisible to almost all scholars, although the legal rhetoric is not only what fed the arguments of both parties but what also stuck out for the contemporary audiences most familiar with this context. It is always worth repeating that the people who read or listened to Augustine’s anti-Donatist letters owe their education not to theological seminars but to schools of rhetoric and law. We should nonetheless observe that, when Augustine enters the stakes, the decades of Christian polemic have already influenced and changed the legal language. This phenomenon is represented in the order of this book. The mutual accusations concern crimes hardly found in the classical periods. For the Roman jurists of old the crimes of traditio, schism, rebaptism, religious persecution, toleration of evildoers within the Christian community, cooperation with the state, and forced conversions would not have been familiar terms. Even the term “heresy,” denoting the worst of “Christian crimes,” was shorn of its different pre-Christian meaning. In Augustine’s times, in terms of its content, the tradition of Roman law no longer supplied the contending parties with material for argumentation, or at least did not constitute the primary frame of reference. The very form of argument, on the other hand, is still fuelled by the old tradition of judicial oratory, but the burden of proof rests now on the Bible, the tradition of the Church and the authority of the Christian writers. For Christian litigants, the Bible was more than just the law, understood as the detailed code of conduct of Old Testament times. From the perspective of history of rhetoric it is worth observing that for Christians the Bible had become the most reliable and authoritative collection of rules and norms to be used in inartificial argumentation, as divina testimonia, but also, and perhaps more importantly, a collection of truths: it had become the Scripture.100 The truths contained therein served as the basis for argumentation in deduction and a source of examples for inductive reasoning. 99 Mark Edwards writes of such a perspective with reproach: “For much of the twentieth century it was possible to write a bulky history of the development of doctrine in the early church without making any allusion to the Donatists” (2016, 101). In the years since the publication of Maureen A. Tilley’s The Bible in Christian North Africa, these developments in theology were well documented and discussed in the books of Dupont: 2014; Gaumer: 2016; Hoover: 2018. 100 ep. 43.25 (CSEL 34,2,107): “Certe non chartis ueteribus, non archiuis publicis, non gestis forensibus aut ecclesiasticis agamus. maior liber noster orbis terrarum est.”; cath. fr. 31 (CSEL 52, 270): “has enim accepimus non ex conciliis contendentium episcoporum, non ex disputationibus nouiciis, non ex forensibus uel municipalibus gestis, sed ex litteris sanctis canonicis.” 

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It is all too easy to ask anachronistic questions to ancient texts. This also applies to our approaches to categorizing late antique polemics, as can be seen, for instance, in the question of whether Augustine’s letters were to be read as statements in civil or ecclesiastical process? I find it difficult to agree with Maureen A. Tilley, who posed that question and went as far as to suggest that in 411 at Carthage the bishop of Hippo “had a firm grasp on what the choice between civil and divine law meant” (1991, 14). Firstly, I do not think that he really had a choice. As far as the legal procedures are concerned, it was only imperial law, and no other, that provided the basis for condemning heretics. Both parties exaggerated the difference in Carthage, and both proved how well versed in the legal procedures and rhetoric they were, as Peter van Nuffelen has demonstrated.101 Secondly, even if we admit that he had a choice, his anti-Donatist letters from before and after the Conference would consist of a perfect mixture of the argumentation based on civil and divine laws. The difference, according to Tilley, lay mostly in the source of evidence produced in court. In a civil case: it would be drawn from state archives, official documents, and testimonies of witnesses; while before an ecclesiastical tribunal the case “would be argued with evidence from the Bible” (1991 14). If we consider Augustine’s anti-Donatist letters as a whole, we will see that he was arguing on both levels, trying to prove Donatists guilty of crimes against both secular and divine law and exonerate his party of all charges. Thirdly, we should remember that sacrilege had been recognized as a crime since ancient times. When Augustine is calling schism or rebaptism a sacrilegium, he sees it as an act of rejecting the divine law, and hence one that should be rejected by secular legislation. There is no doubt that Augustine’s argumentation against the Donatists also has this performative aspect. Augustine aims to demonstrate that schism and rebaptism are criminal charges to be judged and punished by secular authorities.102 The fact that the argumentation on which these decisions were made was often based on the Bible was not objectionable to either party involved in the controversy.

101 Van Nuffelen: 2016, 151: “The dual competence of the bishops at Carthage is, thus, a testimony to the depths of traditional learning and the extent to chich the social role player by bishops in the later Roman Empire made such education unavoidable. For all the emphasis put on the distinction between two modes of pleading in the Acts of Conference, we should not forget that it remains a polemical one: it cannot be seen as an accurate description of the real difference between a secular and an ecclesiastical trial.” 102 Or as Noel Lenski put it: “Because law is ultimately a peculiarly efficacious speech act and is thus discursively regulated through language, adepts at rhetoric such as Augustine and Aurelius were able to convince the emperor to create and enforce laws that punished their dissident opponents while benefiting their own Catholic cause” (2016, 196). As the Pelagian controversy had later shown, the argumentation of Augustine against Pelagius, which is mostly theological in character, provided the basis for the condemnation of Pelagius by Church councils in Africa, Pope Innocent and, finally, emperor Honorius. See e.g. Lamberigts: 2017, 203–23.

Part 2. Accusation

Chapter 3. The charge of schism 1. The pros and cons of being a Christian prosecutor The fourth century began with the Great Persecution of Christians, started by Diocletian in 303. Although in North Africa it ended around 306, so earlier than in many other regions, the African Christian community ever since was deeply divided in two camps, the ones we have learned to call Donatist and Catholic. These religious tensions were not the sole sources of violence in the African society of that time. There were many political, social and ethnic issues that resulted in cyclical outbursts of aggression, typical for the history of Roman provinces of that time (Rossi: 2013, 47–83). Brent Shaw argued in an admirable fashion that we should not believe the distorted picture presented by Catholic sources, where every major act of violence is linked to the Donatists (2011, passim, e.g. 54–65, 149–50, 631–3). Complementarily, the Catholics leave us with the impression that should the Donatist controversy end (with the return of the schismatics to the mother Church), Africa would be united and peaceful again. From the secondary literature it appears that at least some scholars take Augustine’s numerous remarks about his interest in the Donatist schism at face value. Paul Monceaux notes that the main goal of Augustine was to restore the Christian unity of religious peace (1922, 198, 203–4). Geoffrey Willis concludes his discussion on the omnipresence of the word pax in Augustine’s anti-Donatist writings and sermons with the following statement: “Peace is the principle of saint Augustine’s conduct of the whole controversy” (1950, 173–4). For Willis, ep. 23, in which Augustine charges his addressee with the insanissimum scelus of rebaptism, is written “in a very conciliatory tone” (1950, 38). The problem is that because we mostly read the Catholic version of the story we are inclined to think of the Donatists as a furious, violent and aggressive lot, although, as far as we know, they unfailingly presented themselves as genuine peace-lovers persecuted by the bloodthirsty Caecilianists. It is in the writings of their opponents, who ultimately won the controversy, that they are portrayed as being the opposite. Apart from some crucial periods in the history of public life it has always been an advantage to present oneself in debate as having a conciliatory attitude rather than an aggressive one, as one who aims at peace and unity rather than disruption and havoc. Obviously there have always been such polemical pro­ digies as Jerome, who distort this picture. As a controversialist Augustine was nothing like him.1 Hence, we can cautiously posit, without getting into the debate on 1 There is a great book comparing the style of polemics concerning the debate between Jovinian, Ambrose, Jerome and Augustine about the value of virginity and marriage: Nehring: 2004.

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Augustine’s attitude towards coercion, that he deliberately chose to present himself and his party as advocates of peace and unity. What interests me in the next few paragraphs is how he managed to create this image, which, as we have seen, proved to be long-lasting. One of Augustine’s important strategic concerns during his polemics was to avoid appearing to harass (see La Bonnardière: 1986, 341). This trait is apparent from the very first polemical letter. Writing while still a presbyter between 391 and 395 to Maximinus, the bishop of Siniti in Numidia, Augustine had to explain himself for provoking Maximinus’ answer and for writing what in legal terms would have been called an accusation, a libellus of sorts. Not long before, Maximinus had allegedly committed something that Augustine calls “a most evident crime” by slipping into the “lamentable and deplorable custom” of rebaptism. The fact is that at the time rebaptism was a crime, and punished by imperial law.2 In the letter he presents his options – the army is present at the place, ready to act if he reports Maximinus to the officials. This eventuality is presented as a remote threat that Augustine would be reluctant to put into action. Instead, he takes a conciliatory line.3 First of all, he calls Maximinus dominus dilectissimus and honorabilis frater in the address line, which is uncommon for an open accusation. The whole of the first paragraph is spent on explaining these dedicatory formulas, the nouns and the accompanying, equally controversial adjectives. There has been a debate concerning this entire passage, for it is not easy, nor indeed possible to ultimately resolve the question of the irony or its lack here (see Duval: 2002, 357–8).4 In its final sentence Augustine calls his addressee to listen most calmly to what he has to say (“audi placidissime”), using an elegant alliteration (“ratione reddita”) and a slightly exaggerated metaphor (“cur epistulae talem ianuam fecerim”).5 One thing cannot be doubted: the whole lengthy introduction allows Augustine to present himself as a person open to dialogue and practising brotherly love in the spirit of the Gospel. Put short, he makes a display of goodwill towards the fiercest of enemies in order to win the goodwill of the public (the Ciceronian conciliare) towards himself and his party. He starts the narrative part by admitting two things, namely that he has a strong aversion to the rebaptizers and that he used to consider his addressee to be one. Then he goes on to describe how a number of reliable testimonies changed his mind about Maximinus, apparently to build towards creating a shock effect: for the next thing we read is that it was Maximinus himself who had just rebaptized a former Catholic deacon in Mutugenna – something that Augustine refers to as an “unex2 From the 377, see CTh 16.6.2. Erika Hermanowicz (2008, 106; 144) observes that Augustine and the Catholics were unwilling to refer to this law and preferred the 392 laws against heresy. 3 ep. 23.7; see also Kaufmann: 2009, 140–1. 4 For Jennifer Ebbeler (2012, 163), these explanatory remarks are rather a sign of Augustine’s fear that this letter “would be cited as evidence of his approval of Maximinus’s Donatist beliefs and practices.” 5 ep. 23.1 (CSEL 34,1, 64).



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pected crime” (“inopinatum scelus”) – and, to take it even further, claims that he doubted the veracity of the report, even after he had gone to the place where the crime was committed and spoken to the parents of the convert (23.2). Yet the explanation is resumed further in the letter, in paragraph 6 (of 8), and it is indeed worth a closer look:

(1) ego rebaptizato diacono nostro silere non possum; scio enim, quam mihi silentium perniciosum sit. (2a) non enim cogito in ecclesiasticis honoribus tempora uentosa transigere, sed (2b) cogito me principi pastorum omnium rationem de commissis ouibus redditurum. (3a) si forte nolles, ut haec tibi scriberem, (3b) oportet te, frater, ignoscere timori meo; multum enim timeo, ne me tacente et dissimulante alii quoque rebaptizentur a uobis. (4) decreui ergo, quantum uires et facultatem dominus praebere dignatur, causam istam sic agere, ut pacificis conlationibus nostris omnes, qui nobis communicant, nouerint, ab haeresibus aut schismatibus quantum catholica distet ecclesia et quantum sit cauenda pernicies uel zizaniorum uel praecisorum de uite domini sarmentorum. quam conlationem mecum si libenti animo susceperis, ut concordibus nobis amborum litterae populis recitentur, ineffabili exultabo laetitia. si autem id aequo animo non accipis, quid faciam, nisi ut te quoque inuito epistulas nostras populo catholico legam, quo esse possit instructior? quod si rescribere dignatus non fueris, uel meas solas legere decreui, ut saltem diffidentia uestra cognita rebaptizari erubescant.6

The theory of rhetoric normally recommended including explanatory remarks such as these in the prooemium, which Augustine did. But his decision to return to this towards the end of the letter is indeed extraordinary and requires attention.7 He decides to refer to his own person while giving the explanation about why he had decided to address the issue at all. As we know from Quintilian, to take but one example, the orator who decided to use arguments from his own person in order to win the benevolence of the jury was expected to provide important moral reasons justifying his decision to enter the controversy.8 Augustine thus proceeds with elegance and a handbook-like series of images: he had to speak up about this alleged crime of Maximinus because his silence would be harmful to himself (1). After all, it was also his salvation that was at stake, since God would not condone this silence, but would take it for a failure to carry out the duties of a bishop (2b). To point this self-description even more evidently at important moral values, he uses the figure of antithesis to say what he is not: it would have been different if he had been a mediocre ecclesiastical official caring only (is that what he suggests?) about his career (2a), but he is committed to biblical values (2b). Thus, there was a patently important moral reason. He adds another layer to this moral contextualization, claiming 6 ep. 23.6 (CSEL 34,1, 70–1). 7 Although it should be noted that he does the same trick in ep. 34 and s. 348A. 8 Quint., Inst. 4.1.7: “Quare in primis existimetur venisse ad agendum ductus officio vel cognationis vel amicitiae maximeque, si fieri poterit, reipublicae aut alicuius certe non mediocris exempli. quod sine dubio multo magis ipsis litigatoribus faciendum est, ut ad agendum magna atque honesta ratione autetiam necessitate accessisse videantur.”

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further on that he was acting for fear that this crime would be repeated if he chose to keep silent (3b). Also in line with Quintilian’s counsels9 the explanation includes the topos of feigned modesty (“quantum uires…”) (4), which is presented as asking his addressee for forgiveness should he be upset with this letter (3a). After all, the letter is an accusation. But it is not Augustine’s intention to accuse him or the Donatists before the secular authorities, i.e. to denounce them to the imperial judges, as he explains in the final two paragraphs of the letter. His real aim is to accuse the Donatists in the eyes of public opinion, but at the same time he aims to make it look as if all he wanted was a peaceful conversation about the issue of rebaptism. Hence he underlines that he would be extremely happy to discuss this awful crime with its perpetrator, even if the addressee should be reluctant to engage in the conversation.10 After all, it is not Augustine who is forcing the debate, but the circumstances and God himself (or at least so the claim goes). He is clearly aware of the manipulative character of this tour de force. At one point he fears that Maximinus would take the letter for an insult rather than a manifest sign of Christian love.11 Such digital tools as the Corpus Augustinianum Gissense (CAG) help us verify the impression that one gets from close reading of Augustine’s letters by providing us with statistical proof. Throughout his epistolary corpus Augustine uses the mode of persuasion based on ethos while aiming to gain the benevolence of the audience or the jury. In doing so, he constantly evokes the image of two opposing parties by using the same technique: through repeated use of two important words (referring to the shared values) – unity and peace, where the Catholics defend, the Donatists oppose them.12 If we consider the occurrences of these terms in the corpus of all Augustine’s letters, we inevitably notice that the lemma unitas appears 247 times, and 212 of these instances are found in the 24 out of 36 anti-Donatist letters analysed by me in this study. A different result comes with the lemma pax. It occurs 122 times in 28 anti-Donatist letters, and 129 times in all the others. What is interesting is that Augustine used the word pax in 28 of 36 anti-Donatist letters, that is in 78%. In eighteen of those 28 (64 %) it occurs already at the very beginning of the letter 9 Ibid., 4.1.8–10: “Sed ut praecipua in hoc dicentis auctoritas, si omnis in subeundo negotio suspicio sordium aut odiorum aut ambitionis afuerit, ita quaedam in his quoque commendatio tacita, si nos infirmos, imparatos, impares agentium contra ingeniis dixerimus, qualia sunt ple­ raque Messalae prooemia. [9] est enim naturalis favor pro laborantibus, et iudex religiosus libentissime patronum audit, quem iustitiae suae minime timet. inde illa veterum circa occultandam eloquentiam simulatio multum ab hac nostrorum temporum iactatione diversa. [10] vitandum etiam, ne contumeliosi, maligni, superbi, maledici in quemquam hominem ordinemve videamur praecipueque eorum, qui laedi nisi adversa iudicum voluntate non possunt.” 10 ep. 23.6 (CSEL 34,1, 71). 11 ep. 23.5 (CSEL 34,1, 70): “quam uereor, quoniam cor meum uidere non potes, ne tibi cum insultatione potius quam cum dilectione loqui uidear.” See also ep. 33.3. 12 It was recognized already by Ebbeler (2012b, 122–4) Augustine follows here the example of Cyprian who shaped the discourse against the schismatic Novatus in a similar fashion, see Cyprian, ep. 50.2. Jacques (1982, 921–49) convincingly argues that Cyprian himself is much indebted to Cicero and Pliny in his rhetoric.



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(the salutatio) or in the first two paragraphs. In 21 of these 28 texts it occurs more than once, most often (26 times) in c. litt. Pet. 1 of average length, 22 times in the long ep. 185 and ep. 43, seventeen times in the very long ep. 93; it is most frequent in the two-paragraph long ep. 61, where we count five instances. There are passages where Augustine links both lemmas in one phrase. That happens for instance when Augustine presents the Donatist party as opposed to, or attacking, or staying outside of the Church, but also when the stress is put on presenting his own Church as living by these two values. These lemmas come subordinated, as in pax unitatis (but only twice: ep. 43.7 and 44.11) or stand on the same level (fifteen times) with a synonymous or closely related meaning as in the salutatio of ep. 142 (“conuersi ad unitatem Christi pacemque”), ep. 185.15 (“doctrina pacis atque unitatis Christi”), ep. 141.13 (“paci Christi et unitati consentire”). In these examples, the Christ’s peace and unity are bywords for the Christian universal community. These two words also occur without the genitive Christi, as in 105.17 (“ad bonum pacis et unitatis compellere”), but even here they implicitly relate to the religious community from which the Donatists had allegedly excluded themselves. The Church is defined in the following words in ep. 93.46: “in spiritu autem unitatis et uinculo pacis, in ipsa denique catholica ecclesia nobiscum non estis.” A strikingly similar phrase occurs in ep. 61.2, where Augustine says that the converts from Donatism may find “the root of love” only in the Catholic Church: “hic enim radicem caritatis in uinculo pacis et in societate unitatis.” Caritas – the fundamental virtue of brotherly love – can only be attained and sustained in an undivided and peaceful religious community. This phrase should be considered not only as an expression of Augustine’s ecclesiological ideas, but as an argument a personis aimed at picturing both parties in a very black-and-white manner. In ep. 93.14 Augustine mentions that the Donatists themselves would have liked to be called “defensores pacis et unitatis” if only Constantine had judged Caecilian to be guilty. This remark reveals that the controversy between the two parties also directly concerns the issue of which side is considered to be breaking the unity and peace and which is defending it. Hence, consequently, in ep. 89.1, the members of the Catholic community in Africa are presented as being those sticking to the Christian peace and unity (“pacis et unitatis christianae adserunt”). Also in ep. 43.14, the care for preserving and bringing back peace and unity (“cura pacis atque unitatis conseruandae uel restituendae”) is ascribed to the Catholics. In ep. 76.2 Augustine exhorts the Donatists to love peace and return to unity: (“euigilate ad salutem, amate pacem, redite ad unitatem”). In ep. 52.4 the Donatists are presented as responsible for the act of breaking the peace and unity of Christ (“pacem Christi unitatemque disrumpere”). Likewise, in ep. 43.11, Augustine strives to prove that Secundus of Tigisi really cared not about peace and unity (“pax et unitas”) but about himself.13 In paragraph 24 of that letter Augustine laments that peace has been violated and unity divided (“uiolatam pacem, conscissam unitatem”) by the Do13 More on this in chapter six.

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natists. Of 18 occurrences of these two lemmas combined in a single phrase only two fall beyond the anti-Donatist context. All these occurrences may be discussed with regard to the goal that they serve. First of all, they aim at presenting the Donatists as the violators of peace and disrupters of unity. Secondly, they create the image of the Catholics as living in peace and unity. Finally, they point out that the Catholic party is the one trying to bring the Donatists back to peace and unity. Ep. 61 is by far the clearest example of the way in which Augustine built group images using that semantic. We should also note that he himself held this particular letter as an especially suitable exemplar of how to influence public opinion. This is stated both at the beginning and at the end of this very brief text.14 After the introduction, Augustine starts to outline the rules for receiving the Donatists back into the Catholic community. This presentation is structured on the pattern of compa­ rison. Most sentences have the first person plural (we) or the third person plural (they) as their subjects. The passage is framed by references to two feelings – it begins with hatred and ends with love. Every sentence of the first paragraph (except for the introduction) includes a refined antithesis, forming a pleasing amplificatio towards the end of the paragraph.15 The first sentence labels the Donatists as schismatics or heretics, without differentiating between these two charges. The root source of their schism or heresy is dissensio, which is explained as a state of remaining outside of the Catholic unity and truth. To be precise, they do not share in the peace of the worldwide community and do not recognise the baptism of all Christians as valid. The theme of the baptism is here framed in the discussion on the value of peace, for it is the peace of the Church that stands for the salutary quality of the sacrament. Those who stay away from the Christian unity will, conversely, not experience this salvific function. Augustine adds that a prerequisite for the validity of all sacraments is God’s love, the proof of which is Christian unity. He also rephrases the same thought for the third time: hic enim radicem caritatis in uinculo pacis et in societate unitatis, ut non ad damnationem sed ad liberationem illis ualeant omnia, quae habent, sacramenta ueritatis.16 14 ep. 61.1, quoted in chapter 1. 15 ep. 61.1 (CSEL 34,2, 223): “scias ergo nos non in eis detestari nisi dissensionem ipsorum, per quam schismatici uel haeretici facti sunt, quia ecclesiae catholicae unitatem et ueritatem non tenent in eo, quod pacem cum populo dei non habent, qui toto terrarum orbe diffunditur, et in eo, quod in hominibus baptismum Christi non agnoscunt. inprobamus ergo malum errorem, quia suum habent; bonum autem nomen quod dei habent et sacramentum eius agnoscimus in eis et ueneramur et amplectimur. sed propterea dolemus errantes et eos per caritatem Christi lucrari deo cupimus, ut sanctum sacramentum, quod foris ab ecclesia habent ad perniciem, in pace ecclesiae habeant ad salutem. si ergo tollantur de medio mala hominum et honorentur in hominibus bona dei, erit fraterna concordia et amabilis pax, ut in cordibus hominum uincat persuasionem diaboli caritas Christi.” 16 ep. 61.2 (CSEL 34,2, 224).



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In both paragraphs Augustine presents himself and his community as eager to welcome those misguided dissidents back into brotherly unity and peace, for only in this way may the love of Christ triumph in the hearts of men over the devil’s persuasion that had led them astray. Thus, Augustine fashions himself as the representative of the true Christian community. Hence, apart from providing generations of scholars with insights concerning sacramental theology, he leaves his audience with a set of ready-made images of two opposing groups: one gathered around the respectable values of peace, unity and truth, and the other that epitomises dissensio and error. It is they, the “errantes,” who oppose these values: “non tenant […] non habent […] non agnoscunt”. Augustine’s party, by contrast, is full of good will (“amplectimur […], veneramur […], cupimus lucrari Deo […]”) and compassion (“dolemus errantes”). The same technique of associating peace and unity with one group and the marking of his opponents as rejecting these two values (or at least not sharing them) appears in numerous instances in other letters, particularly ep. 89 and ep. 105. The persistent use of this argument could not have been accidental. Augustine clearly aimed to refer to the shared values of the society of his day. While assuming the role of the prosecutor who accused the Donatists of schism and rebaptism, he consciously fashioned himself as the defender of the peace and unity of not only the Church, but also society at large. Just as Cicero had done when creating the consular ethos in his orations against Catilina (Batstone: 1994; Craig, 2014), so too Augustine took on the persona of a virtuous and powerful leader protecting his community and state against enemies who posed a threat to the unity and peace of his society.

2. The formulation of the charge As I have noted previously, the charge of utmost importance that Augustine levelled against the Donatists was that of schism. Before discussing the patterns of forensic argumentation within the different status employed in this accusation, I shall reflect on the ways in which Augustine formulated that charge, as these applied to all the patterns of argumentation. As a rule, the representative of either party in a court room would put much effort into formulating the charges in the best possible way. This means carving out a form that would suit their positions best. We can observe Augustine’s tremendous rhetorical skill in achieving this goal. It is important to remember that Augustine and his party very often shape the discourse so as to suggest that all the other accusations made by the Donatists, especially those having to do with traditio, are irrelevant or unimportant. Thus, it is suggested that the legal case in question boils down to just this one charge: that of schism. This is done using numerous techniques.17 For instance, in ep. 44.4 Augustine defends himself against the charge of persecution. He claims that in order to 17 For instances other than those discussed here, see ep. 23.6, 87.7.

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ascertain whether the Donatists are suffering persecution or not, a more fundamental question should first be answered, namely, whether they have cut themselves off from the universal Church in a lawful/just/right manner (recte).18 If they have not, then the charge of persecution is clearly unwarranted. The same justification was used in ep. 87.6–7, which I have already discussed. Not only is the charge of schism more important, but also, according to Augustine, the verdict passed on the case brings up solutions to other minor issues of the controversy. This allows him to shape the discourse in the following way: if there is only one issue at stake, and the Donatists are declared guilty on this count, the case is resolved without referring to all the other charges. We may observe how the Donatists countered this move during the Conference in Carthage by their insistence on discussing the charges of traditio and persecution.19 Augustine proposed another skilful, contrived justification to persist in reducing the case to just this one charge. As we have learnt from Maureen Tilley and Jesse A. Hoover, the Donatists relied on the Bible in shaping their identity, referring to it as the most authoritative set of rules for a Christian way of life. I think that this is the fundamental cause of Augustine’s insistence on debating the mutual charges only on the basis of Divine testimonies.20 On many occasions he challenged the Donatists to substantiate their accusations (such as that of Caecilian being a traditor) with arguments from Scripture, and at the same time warns them that he can prove on the same basis that what they did was schism and that schism is unconditionally wrong. In the opening passages of cath. fr., he observes that all the charges issued by either group, except for that of schism, are based on their own words, not on the words of God, and secondly, that the only charge that cannot be reciprocated is that of schism. Then he uses a complex divisio to present four logical options concerning all the other accusations except for that of schism; 1) both parties’ accusations are simultaneously true; 2) both parties’ accusations are false; 3) the Donatists’ accusations are true, while those of his party are false; 4) the Donatists’ are false and theirs are true. Having considered all these possibilities one by one, Augustine uses an epiphoric structure to conclude that in any of these cases there was no reason for the separation (nulla fuit causa separationis).21 He is also willing to suppress all the 18 ep. 44.4 (CSEL 34,2, 112): “qui uidere uellent, utrum propter iustitiam persecutionem passi fuerint, id potius adtenderent, utrum se recte a totius orbis unitate praeciderint.” 19 Gesta Collationis Carthaginensis 3.14., 3.22, 3.155–6; 3.183, 3.186–7. 20 Matteo Dalvit (2013, 181; 184) names this strategy somewhat anachronistically “sola Scriptura”. 21 cath. fr. 5 (CSEL 52, 236–7): “et si utraque uera sunt, nulla fuit causa separationis illorum, ut eos fugerent quos habebant, et si utraque falsa sunt, nulla fuit causa separationis illorum, ut eos fugerent quos in nullo crimine repperiebant, et si nostra uera, illa autem falsa sunt, nulla fuit causa separationis illorum, quia potius se corrigere atque in unitate permanere debebant, et si nostra falsa sunt et illa uera sunt, nulla fuit causa separationis illorum, quia innocentem orbem terrarum, cui haec demonstrare uel noluerunt uel non potuerunt, deserere non debebant.” Similar technique was used in ep. 52.3.



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other accusations as concerning only some Donatists, because not all of them practised rebaptism and not all were aggressive and furious (cath. fr. 3). As we can see, for Augustine the most pending conflicting quaestio that could be and ought to be discussed based on the authority of the Bible came down to the crime of schism. How did he propose to understand this issue? There were many formulations of the accusation suitable for his purposes and the context of the status within which he chose to discuss them. The most frequent label is that of schism (separation, cutting off, etc.), often accompanied by various legal terms, starting with the most general:22 “Schismatis crimen”: cath. fr. 3; 4; ep. 51.1, 87.4; “Crimen separationis et schismatis”: ibid., cath. fr. 3; “Error schismatis”: ep. 33.1; “Perniciosa dissensio”: ep. 33.5; “Scelus schismatis”: c. litt. Pet. 1.27; ep. 51.2; 51.4; 51.5; 76.3; “Nefario schisma se separare”: ep. 53.6; “Dissensio et error”: ep. 61.2; “Nefas schismatis”: ep. 87.8; “Vana et diabolica dissensio”: ep. 88.3; “Error et damnabilis dissensio”: ep. 89.1; “Diabolica separatio”: ep. 93.16; “Praua dissensio”: ep. 93.46; “Nefaria dissensio”: ep. 173.9; to more specific: “Sacrilegium schismatis”: ep. 51.5; 53.3; 76.4; 141.13; “Sacrilegum schisma”: ep. 87.2; “Sacrilega dissensio”: ep. 105.9, 204.2; “Sacrilega praecisio”: ep. 43.27, 76.2; “Sacrilegus error”: c. litt. Pet 1.1. What stands out in these very brief labels is that in most of them we see a legal qualification of the act, whether it is crimen, scelus, sacrilegium or the most vague but also very powerful and morally loaded term nefas. Sometimes he uses the term haeresis or haereticus instead of, or alongside schisma: “Dissensio per quam schismatici uel haeretici facti sunt”: ep. 61.1; “Schisma uel haeresem”: cath. fr. 33; “Haeretica separatio”: ep. 76.1; “Praua dissensio facit te haereticum”: ep. 93.46.

22 But obviously at times Augustine leaves it without company, mostly with the verb facere or fieri as in ep. 43.3, 43.18, 43.21, 44.8, 44.11, 52.3, 87.6, 88.11.

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Only once does he distinguish between the two meanings, where heresy is understood as prolonged schism: “Neque enim uobis obicimus nisi schismatis crimen, quam etiam haeresem male perseuerando fecistis”: ep. 87.4.23 All these texts where the label of “heresy” is present were written between 400 and 411, in a period when the Catholic clergy was more active and cooperating more closely with secular powers, when they tried to present the Donatists as heretics in order to provoke legal actions based on anti-heresy laws that were already in force.24 Where Augustine describes the crime using more descriptive and longer forms, he focuses either on the act of separation or on the fact of persisting in that state of division, or he discusses both: “Discindere unitatem”: c. litt. Pet. 1.26; “In dissensione indigne atque impie perseuerare”: ep. 34.1; “In dissensione permanere”: ep. 87.7; “Conscindere unitatem Christi”: ep. 43.21; “Se ab eclesiis orientalibus nefaria dissensione disiungere”: ep. 87.5; “Se a christiana unitate, quae toto orbe diffunditur, sacrilego schismate separare”: cath. fr. 55; “Se ab unitate Christi sceleratissimo schismate praecidere”: ep. 52.3; “Vos a totius orbis unitate nefario schismatis sacrilegio diuisistis”: ep. 76.1; “A communione orbis […] sacrilego schismate se separare”: ep. 87.2; “In pertinacia scelestissimi schismatis permanere”: ep. 43.4; “Ita magnum scandalum schismatis in unitate Christi iam pacatis temporibus oriatur”: ep. 43.8; “Separatio ab hereditate Christi toto orbe diffusa”: ep. 43.21; “A totius orbis unitate se praecidere”: ep. 44.4; “Cum tolerantiam pacificam didicerimus dicente apostolo: sufferentes inuicem in dilectione, studentes seruare unitatem spiritus in uinculo pacis. quam pacem atque tolerantiam illos non tenuisse dicebamus, qui schisma fecerunt”: ep. 44.11; “Se ab ecclesia catholica, hoc est ab unitate omnium gentium diuiserunt”: ep. 185.4. As we see quite often in these longer descriptions of the charge, Augustine underlines the fact that this was a separation from the universal Church or, more specifically, from long-established Apostolic Eastern Churches. As we will see, this feature occurs especially in the context of the status definitionis, concerning the question “Ubi est ecclesia?” or “Is what the Donatists have done in fact schism?”

23 ep. 87.4 (CSEL 34,2, 400). 24 The laws from CTh 16.5.21 – that Augustine quotes in ep. 185.27.

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3. Arguments drawn from characters (Loci a persona) suitable for both status 3.1 Pars Donati As Cicero says in Inv. 2.28, the first thing that the persecutor should consider in this strand of arguments is the name of the person facing the charge. As laid out by Anthony Corbeill, Cicero as orator would also make puns on names, especially the cognomina, and use them in his argumentation schemes (2015, 57–98). Apart from the classical theory and practice of rhetoric, there was the powerful tradition of heresiology and early Christian polemics, where the very name of a heresiarch served as a label to name his “followers.”25 This is an argument in its own right. Statistical analysis shows that when Augustine refers to the Donatists he does so in such a way as to highlight the dissident character of their community and their divisive nature. Hence the most common name by which he calls his opponents is “pars Donati,” where the noun pars – that embraces the meaning of the English “part” and “party” – stems from the verb partire, meaning “to share” but also “to divide.”26 This label performs at least two roles in the persuasion process. Firstly, it rejects all the adversaries’ claims to be the Church of God. Availing himself of the classical anti-heretical repertory of arguments, Augustine insinuates that they take more pride in the name of Donatus than in that of Christ,27 or that they praise their own name in place of Christ’s.28 The Donatists did not give up without retaliation, as they would call the Catholic party “ecclesia Macariana”29 to create an association with the infamous proconsul who persecuted the Donatists in the 350s, the period that later allowed them to claim the identity of the Church of martyrs. Augustine treats the term “pars Donati” as their name proper. As he scoffingly challenges them in ep. 88.1: “You must very well know that you were called pars Maiorini before receiving the name pars Donati”,30 as it was this name that was recorded in the proconsular acts. In ep. 49.3 he claims that wherever they live, they are customarily referred 25 In fact such a label strongly suggests that there have been followers, although this may be a purely polemical construct. That probably was the case with the followers of Pelagius, the so-called Pelagians, in the light of the recent findings, see A. Bonner, The Myth of Pelagianism, Oxford 2018, p. 197–217. 26 17 times in cath. fr.; 11 in ep. 93; 4 in ep. 87; 3 – ep. 34; 105; 185; twice in ep. 49; 52; 61; 141; 173; and once in ep. 43; 44; 57; 88; 89; 208. 27 cath. fr. 42 (CSEL 52, 287): “isti enim de huius magis quam de Dei nomine gloriantur.” 28 c. litt. Pet. 1.31 (CSEL 52, 23): “ita enim nomen domini quaerere poterunt, a quo perniciosissime auersi sunt, dum pro eo suum nomen extollunt.” 29 ep. 49.3 (CSEL 34,2, 142): “sed ne dicatis non uocari ecclesiam nostram catholicam sed Macarianam, sicuti eam uos appellatis.” 30 ep. 88.1 (CSEL 34,2, 407): “nam cum sis in tam grandi constitutus aetate, arbitramur te optime nosse quod pars Donati, quae primo apud Carthaginem pars Maiorini dicebatur.”

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to as “pars Donati” and that this is something they cannot deny.31 The message is clear: it was an official usus, they took their name from the first schismatic bishop of Carthage. When Maiorinus soon died, they were labelled after his successor, Donatus, who lasted long enough in office32 for the label to stick. The Donatists would totally reject those labels, arguing that they were not a “Church of Donatus” or “Donatists”, but the Church of Christ. Secondly, the label “pars” suggests their divisive character. To convey that message he would often call them schismatics, or simply address them as “schism,” a Greek word that points at the same vice and literally means “cutting off ” or “the cutting of a part.” Even though there is evidence in the letters that corroborates the observations of Alfred Schindler that Augustine only started labelling the Donatists as heretics or heresy c. 400,33 this term does not begin to dominate from then on, but is used next to the previous labels.34 This is not so strange when we consider the fact that “schisma” or “pars Donati” serves the above suggested goals well enough.

3.2 The enemies of community The focus on presenting the Donatists as divisive by nature is the main feature of their portrayal in Augustine’s letters in general, not only when he discusses the charge of schism. Several techniques are used to paint such an image of his opponents. First of all, the Donatists are schismatics, as they had severed ties with the Catholic Church and refused to obey the verdicts of Church councils held overseas. As such, they had become isolated from the universal Christian community. We see in numerous instances that Augustine complains that they leave his letters unanswered, refuse to meet with him for debate and refrain from meeting the African Catholic bishops in public. All these complaints serve a similar goal. The Donatists reject any sort of affinity to their adversaries, the Catholics in Africa, and when it comes to a meeting, they abstain from discussing the hotly contested issues and carry on boasting and acting like madmen.35 In doing so, they fail to follow the example of Christ, who talked even to the Devil.36 It seems to me that the strategy of the African Catholic clergy adopted in 403 which consisted in forcing the Donatists 31 ep. 49.3 (CSEL 34,2, 142): “uestra autem quia Donati pars dicitur, nec uos negare potestis et omnibus notum est, ubicumque est uestra communio.” 32 From c. 313 to c. 355. 33 With one exception, ep. 23.6. 34 To give some data: In c. litt. Pet., the terms “schism/schismatic” occur 16 times, whereas “heresy/ haeretic” appear only three times. In cath. fr. the opposite is the case: “heretic” and “he­ resy” occur 37 times, “schism” or “schismatic” ten times. One of the last letters, ep. 185, counts “schisma” or “schismatic” eight times, “heresy” or “heretic” six times. 35 ep. 105.2 (CSEL 34,2, 596): “quando uobis dicimus, ut causam nostram et uestram patienter audiatis, non nostis nisi superbire et insanire?” 36 See ep. 88.10.

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to debate was meant to prove to the secular officials that the Donatists were absolutely isolated and completely unwilling to engage in any sort of debate. Equally important is Augustine’s depiction of their ambivalent attitude towards the state. He presents them mostly as people who openly disregard imperial or proconsular verdicts,37 despite having been the first to repeatedly appeal to the secular power to adjudicate on the dispute. This characterisation is sometimes accompanied by wry comments, as in ep. 89.3 where Augustine ironically labels them as persisting in their error with a stubbornness greater than that of the Devil, who would have probably given up appealing to the state after having been snubbed so many times38 by the tribunals he had chosen himself. The person of the bishop Optatus of Thamugadi and the repeated references to the circumcelliones create the impression that the Donatists side with those who disrupt public order, are ready to isolate Africa from the Roman Empire, and have no regard for the law. The emphasis on their affinity with Julian the Apostate, the only emperor to have taken their side, serves a similar goal: to present them as enemies of the Christian state. The portrayal of the Donatists as people who obsessively reject all social bonds other than those of their sect becomes even more unfavourable with repeated references to the “schisms” that pestered their own community: the Maximianists and, to a lesser extent, the Rogatists. These passages play various roles in Augustine’s argumentation strategies, as we will see later, but depicting the Donatists as being divided within their own fold should be considered as one such strategy.39 Finally, the most evocative pictures illustrate how disruptive these division are to families and monastic communities (in a showing-off of rhetorical pathos in ep. 34 and 35). The strategy reaches its climax in ep. 108.17–19 with the anaphora “fugitur unitas”, starting with the startling images of a community disrupted on all these levels: fugitur unitas, ut huc maritus illuc uxor conueniat, dicat ille: mecum tene unitatem, quia ego sum uir tuus, respondeat illa: ibi moror, ubi est pater meus, ut in uno lecto diuidant Christum, quos detestaremur, si diuiderent lectum. fugitur unitas, ut propinqui et ciues et amici et hospites et quicumque sibi humana necessitudine conligati utrique christiani in conuiuiis ineundis, in matrimoniis tradendis et accipiendis, in emendo ac uendendo, in pactis et placitis, in salutationibus, in consensionibus, in conlocutionibus, in omnibus suis rebus negotiisque concordes sint et ad dei altare discordes.40

37 E.g. ep. 100.2 (CSEL 34,2, 538): “cito interim per edicta excellentiae tuae nouerint haeretici Donatistae manere leges contra errorem suum latas, quas iam nihil ualere arbitrantur et iactant, ne uel sic nobis parcere aliquatenus possint.” 38 ep. 89.3 (CSEL 34,2, 421): “puto, quod ipse diabolus, si auctoritate iudicis, quem ultro elegerat, totiens uinceretur, non esset tam inpudens, ut in ea causa persisteret.” 39 This argument was used by early apologists against the philosophical schools and is still heard in Catholic polemics against the Protestants. 40 ep. 108.17 (CSEL 34,2, 631).

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3.3 Pertinacy/persistency and arrogance It is on many occasions that Augustine uses standard epithets or Schimpfwörter (see Opelt: 1965; Tholen, 2010, 124–7) to discredit and ridicule the Donatists as being utterly stubborn and arrogant.41 In his view, to defy the universal community of Christians, to opt for and persist in self-imposed isolation in spite of renewed invitations to re-establish unity, one has to have not only temerity but also a well-developed sense of self-importance. Obstinacy and stubbornness are highlighted as the reasons for remaining isolated and as the main obstacles to repairing the broken African Church. These remarks are scattered in his texts mostly in the form of short phrases like: “remanserunt turbae durae et in illa peste infelici animositate sistentes” (ep. 185.30); “illi omnes in pertinacia scelestissimi schismatis permanerent” (ep. 43.4); “facinora eorum atque insana pertinacia” (ep. 139.1). Unsurprisingly, of sixteen occurrences of “pertinax, -acis” and “pertinacia, -aciae” in Augustine’s letters, thirteen are found in those dedicated to the polemics with the Donatists. At times, Augustine adds a sort of playful use of locus finitionis and explains that pertinacia is not the same thing as constantia. These places provide his readers with an example of his propensity towards dialectic.42 It has to be noted that presenting heretics or schismatics as being vain and boastful was a norm in Christian polemic. It started with mocking the names of the sects taken after their founders. The orthodox writers did not bother to reveal that these labels were their own inventions. Augustine is no different in this respect. Enormous arrogance (superbia) from classical times, was being linked in the polemical contexts with such words as “to swell” (intumesco) “a swellling” (tumor) or “inflated, swollen” (tumidus).43 Augustine uses these metaphors, for instance when he notes that the Donatists would become capable of breathing in the air of peace, if only they did away with the “swelling of their arrogance and the madness of their stubbornness.”44 In ep. 93.19, the mountains and hills of the region where the Rogatists live are referred to as “the swellings of their arrogance.”45 In ep. 43.1 he contends that all heretics are swollen with arrogance (“superbia tumidus”). Instead of “superbia,” “uanitas” could also aptly be inserted, as in ep. 86.1.46 Arrogance nicely links with madness, as in the phrase “Donatistarum uesana superbia” (ep. 69.1; 43.1). For Augustine, even the fact that his opponents reject the label of Donatists and insist on 41 But sometimes he does so in the context of rebaptism. These instances I shall discuss later. 42 ep. 57.2, ep. 89.1 43 Tacitus, Annales 1.38; Seneca, De beneficiis 2.16.2. 44 c. litt. Pet. 1.12 (CSEL 52, 12): “utique deberent et animi sanitate recepta in pace catholica respirare, si tumore superbiae posito et peruicaciae furore superato uellent attendere[…]” 45 ep. 93.19 (CSEL 34,2, 463): “in montibus et collibus uestris, id est in tumoribus superbiae uestrae Christi oues errantes.” 46 ep. 86.1 (CSEL 34,2, 396): “quantum etiam in campo Hipponiensi haeretica praesumat audacia, si ex fratribus et collegis meis, qui haec tuae sublimitati narrare potuerint […] procul dubio prouidebis, ut tumor sacrilegae uanitatis terrendo sanetur potius, quam ulciscendo resecetur.”

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being called Christians is a sign of their overweening arrogance on account of which they contradict Christ’s words.47 Finally, in ep. 100.2, Augustine writes them off as “a vain and most full of godless arrogance sect” (“uanissimam et impiae superbiae plenissimam sectam”).

4. Status qualitatis The main recurring question in ep. 87 is “cur schisma feceritis” – why have you created a schism? The fact that this question is repeated several times in this and other letters makes it possible to reconstruct the krinomenon pattern of this case. Accusatio: You have created a schism through your unjustified separation from Caecilian and the Catholic Church.48 Defensio: No, we have not created schism, we are the Catholic Church.49 Quaestio: Have the Donatists created a schism from the Christian Church? Ratio: We have separated ourselves from the evil Christians, because they can defile the good ones.50 Infirmatio rationis 1: It was not just, because you cannot be defiled by the good ones.51 Infirmatio rationis 2: That is not why you did it. (relatio criminis) (your motive is false)52 Iudicatio 1: Were the Donatists justified in separating themselves from the evil Christians because one could not tolerate wrongdoers in the Church? Was their motive just or unjust? Iudicatio 2: Why have the Donatist separated themselves from the Christian community? In other words, Augustine’s argumentation and refutation of the arguments of the Donatists concerning the charge of schism are mostly aimed at attacking the justification of defence. He insists that the Donatists’ motivation in separating themselves from Caecilian and his fellow bishops was either wrong or false. In the first case, he will discuss the validity of this justification in the light of justice, law and custom. In the second case he will try to undermine the truthfulness of this justification based on their conduct and character, in keeping with one of the general precepts of Quintilian, that rhetorical mastery can be proved by finding out the real 47 cath. fr. 28. 48 ep. 57.1 (CSEL 34,2, 215): “Nullam fuisse iustam causam, cur ab orbe terrarum, quo ecclesia catholica secundum prophetica et euangelica promissa diffunditur, se pars Donati dirimeret,” credo. See also Gesta Collationis Carthaginensis 3.82; 98; ep. 76.1; 185.4. 49 Gesta Collationis Carthaginensis 3.91: “Catholicos nos esse acta contineant”. 50 ep. 76.2, 108.7, Gesta Collationis Carthaginensis 3.235; 249. 51 cath. fr. 35; ep. 87.2–3; ep. 43.21–2. 52 ep. 51.2, 76.3, c. litt. Pet. 1.13; ep. 185.17.

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or apparent inconsistencies in the argumentation of the adversary.53 Thus, in the second case he will not refute their motive as being wrong. He may, for instance, conditionally allow its validity in order to show that throughout their history they have not been consistent in acting according to the rule they use in their self-justification. Using slightly different tactics, he can also suggest that there are other, more probable reasons for their actions. In rhetorical theory, arguments based on motives (a causis) were usually discussed according to the rules of the status coniecturae as the most effective in proving the defendant’s guilt if more direct proof is lacking. The treatment of this line of argumentation, however, is also valid for other status. The theory differentiates between these two basic types of motives (causa): affect/impulse/emotion (impulsio) and reasoning (ratiocinatio). The good motives, according to Quintilian, are those concerned with gaining and/or sustaining some good, avoiding and/or rejecting some evil. Quintilian also notes that these are basically motives for good actions, whereas bad deeds are caused by false opinions.54 In case of the charge of schism, Augustine presents the motives of the Donatists mostly as an effect of flawed reasoning, for they argued that they wanted to avoid being defiled by the sinners in their community. At times, however, he also posits that their behaviour was not motivated by reasoning but by negative emotions or vices,55 such as greed or fear. All in all, the strategy of Augustine within qualitative issue consisted in proving that the motive for separation presented by the Donatist, namely their conviction that one can be contaminated by the sins of others was either erroneous or false.

4.1 Wrong motive 4.1.1 Divina testimonia In the opening passage of ep. 76, as if acting on behalf of the Catholic Church, Augustine asks the Donatists a familiar question – why have you separated yourselves from the worldwide Christian community through the sacrilege of schism? Augustine lets the figure of the Church answer this question on behalf of the schismatics with a series of antitheses, followed by a chain of scriptural testimonies. The ques53 Quint., Inst. 5.13.30: “artificis autem est invenire in actione adversarii quae inter semet pug­ nent aut pugnare videantur.” 54 Cicero frames it a bit differently when he suggests that the accusation should discuss not only the real effect of the action but much more abruptly focus on the imagined or wished effect, i.e. on the expectation of the defendant (opinio). This expectation may fail in two ways – when it is futile and when it is errorenous, which means that one takes a bad effect for a good one, or vice versa; see inv. 2.21–2. 55 It is at times extremely difficult to qualify e.g. greed as a vice, an emotion or a sin – something that we have learned while working on the Scrinium Augustini search engine (www.scrinium.umk.pl).

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tion and the answers place the discussion within the framework of qualitative issue, and, to be precise, qualitas absoluta. The first response explains that the Donatists made their decision based on gossip and hearsay about Caecilian instead of relying first on the divine testimonies concerning the nature of the Church, as is expected of genuine Christians.56 That means that they have made a serious mistake in the reasoning that led to their separation. The same antithesis, albeit slightly differently phrased, is used in ep. 185.4–5, where the unwarranted accusations against Caecilian are juxtaposed with the quotations from the Bible concerning the universal character of the Church. Augustine refers to the Donatists’ own justification of their actions: they separated themselves from Caecilian’s party because they regarded these people as traditores. Rejecting this motive as unreasonable, Augustine observes that the accusations against Caecilian have never been proven by his accusers. The underlying premise in this reasoning is that prudence, both a Roman and a Christian virtue, advises not to proceed with any actions motivated by incomplete information or unverified facts. Further on, he notes that even if Caecilian was in fact a traditor, no one is allowed to break up with the whole Church because of the crimes of one man. In the conclusion of the argument in ep. 185.5 Augustine reveals the more general premise of his reasoning. There is no use in the Donatists furnishing human testimonies against Caecilian, for the Divine testimonies which they opposed by their actions have stripped such arguments of all weight: “qui enim diuina testimonia non sequuntur, pondus humani testimonii perdiderunt.”57 The use of the term testimonium allows him to play on its different meanings: an eyewitness account, an attestation, anything that may serve as proof, and of a God’s decree found in Scripture. The wording of the premise provides an opportunity to join two different orders of discourse. In the first place, this is a clear reference to Cicero’s part. orat. 6: “C.f.: Testimoniorum quae sunt genera? C.p.: Divinum et humanum.”58 We know from Cicero that divine laws were considered more authoritative than human. Augustine not only alludes here to the vocabulary of forensic rhetoric, but also makes a point in a fashion similar to that of a prosecutor speaking in court: “your inartificial arguments based on human documents lack any weight, for you do not keep up with divine testimonies, that are of higher authority.” The other tradition, that of the Bible, becomes apparent when we consider that the premise under discussion also refers to a line of Ps 117 (118): “bonum est confidere in do­ mino, quam confidere in homine.” This quotation is used by Augustine at the very beginning of this line of argumentation. This illustrates that Augustine could relate 56 This is obviously a manipulation. Both Petilian and Emeritus at the Conference of Carthage defend this thesis based on the lex diuina, see Gesta Collationis Carthaginensis, 3.75; 249. 57 ep. 185.5 (CSEL 57, 5). 58 part. orat. 6: “divinum, ut oracula, ut auspicia, ut vaticinationes, ut responsa sacerdotum, haruspicum, coniectorum, humanum, quod spectatur ex auctoritate et ex voluntate et ex oratione aut libera aut expressa: in quo insunt scripta, pacta, promissa, iurata, quaesita.”

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in a masterly fashion to both Roman and Christian frames of reference when proving that the Donatists act of separation could not be considered just and that the reasoning behind their decision was plainly wrong. As we can see, Augustine presented the flaws in the Donatists’ reasoning as stemming from their neglect of the divine testimonies, which made them rely solely on human opinion. The main reason, however, for the Donatists’ flawed ratiocinatio is their wrong understanding of the divine testimonies. These were treated as the laws of the highest authority and used as premises in deductive reasoning a certibus. As I have suggested in the krimonenon pattern for this status, the Donatists confirmed their defence claiming that it was imperative to all Christians to refuse communion with wrongdoers. The most straightforward attack on this argument was to prove that the exact opposite was true. As both parties of the controversy grounded their theses in the divine testimonies and the authority of Cyprian of Carthage, Augustine applied status legales to prove his interpretation of those (and reject theirs), supplying this interpretation with arguments based on exempla.59 It is in this context that he develops what modern scholarship commonly reads as a theological argument about the Church being a community of both good and bad Christians, rather than as a piece of rhetoric conditioned by the pattern of infirmatio rationis. It can be seen both in the confirmatio and in the refutatio. We should take note, however, not only of the logic of forensic oratory working in the background, but also of the formal markers of this argumentation that originate from the theory and practice of litigation. This will help us distinguish between the passages that present Augustine’s own arguments (confirmatio) from those that were aimed to disprove the arguments used by the Donatists (refutatio).

4.1.1.1 Confirmatio The passages dedicated to this mode of accusation are found in cath. fr. 35, ep. 76.2–3, 87.2–3, 108.7, 141.5, 185.41–42. There he acts according to the rules of status legales and firstly admits that there are such numerous testimonies on this subject that he has to be selective for the sake of brevity.60 Also, in line with these precepts, he reiterates the quotations from the Bible that were best suited to serving his argument (such as Ezek 9:4, Matt 13:30–9, and Matt 24:12–3). These are often seasoned with provocative comments, following the advice of Cicero:

59 As Rhet. Her. 4.3 explains: “hoc interest inter exemplum et testimonium: exemplo demonstratur, id quod dicimus cuiusmodi sit: testimonio, esse illud ita, ut nos dicimus, confirmatur.” 60 cath. fr. 35 (CSEL 52, 277): “habemus innumerabilia testimonia et de commixtione malorum cum bonis in eadem communione sacramenti, […] et de bonorum paucitate propter malorum plurium comparationem et rursus de bonorum multitudine per se ipsam considerata. ex quibus, ne longum faciam, pauca commemoro.” Cf. ep. 87.3.

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Quare hoc genere magnopere talibus in causis uti oportebit: ‘Hoc modo scripsisset, isto verbo usus non esset, non isto loco verbum istud conlocasset’. Nam ex his sententia scriptoris maxime perspicitur.61

This method is on full display in Augustine’s ep. 76.2, where he claims that the Donatists contradict Christ, while calling themselves Christians. There follow four quotations from Matt 13:30–39, all introduced with the formulaic phrase “Ipse dixit”, which are then juxtaposed with phrases beginning with “non dixit” that present how (in Augustine’s view) the Donatists would paraphrase those passages of the Gospel: Ipse dixit: sinite utraque crescere usque ad messem [Matt 13,30], non dixit: crescant zizania, decrescant frumenta; ipse dixit: ager est hic mundus [Matt 13,38], non dixit: ager est Africa; ipse dixit: messis est finis saeculi [Matt 13,39], non dixit: messis est tempus Donati; ipse dixit: messores angeli sunt [Matt 13,39], non dixit: messores principes Circumcellionum sunt. sed quia pro zizaniis triticum accusastis, uos esse zizania demonstrastis et, quod est grauius, ante tempus uos a tritico separastis.62

In cath. fr. 35 the same biblical passages are also central to the argument. Augustine insists there that there can be no controversy concerning either the letter or the sense of God’s law, for Christ himself explained his own words “Let them both grow until harvest” (Matt 13:30) “the field is the world” (13:38) and “the harvest is the end of the world” (13:39). The Donatists, Augustine claims, are trying in vain to alter the sense of these clear messages. The conclusion of all this is that good Christians should tolerate bad Christians until the Day of Judgment. Those who presume to decide on who can be rightly referred to as “grain” and whether the harvest time had come are challenging God’s authority. Such an evaluation of fellow human beings is not only arrogant, but – before the end of times – always premature. In ep. 87.2–3, Augustine engages in rejecting the main argument of defence (ratio) in this status, namely that one can be contaminated by sins of other members of a religious community.63 The passage opens with the claim that “no one can be contaminated by the unknown crimes of unknown people,” which is reiterated a few lines below in a stronger version “even evil persons we know cause no harm to the good people in the Church.” To prove that the coexistence of good and evil members in one people of God has always been normal and cannot be harmful to the former group, Augustine reaches for biblical testimonies.64 This reasoning allows him to conclude that the Donatists committed a sacrilege by separating themselves from the universal Christian community, even if Caecilian had been guilty of

61 Inv. 2.121. See also ibid., 2.126. 62 ep. 76.2, (CSEL 34,2, 326–7). 63 See the krinomenon scheme above. 64 He quotes from Phil 2:21, Neh 9:26, but refers also to Ezek 9:4–6, Gal 2:4, and 2 Cor 11:26, and underlines that there are many others that he omits for the sake of brevity.

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traditio. What is more, he insists that even known sinners should be tolerated, since caring for peace and unity is more righteous than being restrictive.65 In ep. 185.41–2 he adds another feature that had clearly developed in connection with the Pelagian controversy. Only in the end of times will it be revealed who is righteous – no person, however, can claim to be righteous through their own righteousness. Based on Rom 12:3–5, Augustine asserts that there can be no doubt that only those who stay within the Christian community will stand a chance of proving righteous, in contrast to those who remain outside. Hence, according to the divine law the Donatists’ reason for separation is not only not just, but also contradictory.

4.1.1.2 Refutatio In ep. 108.7 Augustine makes use of the very same divine testimonies that the Donatists themselves used to justify their motive within status qualitatis: causa uero separationis uestrae his solet non intellectis testimoniis colorari. Scriptum est: ne communices peccatis alienis [1 Tim 5:22]; […] exite inde et inmundum ne tetigeritis [Isa 52:11] et: qui tetigerit pollutum [Lev 22:4], pollutus est [Lev 22:6]… modicum fermentum totam massam corrumpit [1 Cor 5:6].66

These are legitimate arguments based on interpretation of the law, but Augustine rejects them by claiming that these passages, if properly understood, can only superficially support the Donatist position. In keeping with the classic arguments based on ambiguitas, his comments on each of these biblical passages provide clearcut definitions of “communicating with the sins of the other”, “touching the unclean” and “the polluted”, “leavening the whole lump”. When pondering this argument based on definition, Augustine notes that the key issue to resolve, if we want to arrive at a good interpretation of these passages, is the notion of consent. It is only through the consent of the will – the spiritual, not material contact – that one can communicate with the sins of others, or touch the unclean. Adam became involved in the sin of Eve not through touching the fruit but through consenting with her sin, just like the kiss of Judas did not make Christ a sinner. Hence all the good Christians who deplore the bad deeds of their fellow members, but do not separate themselves from them and tolerate them in the spirit of brotherly love, remain unpolluted.67 In ep. 141.5 Augustine reports that at the Conference of Carthage his party used a different set of biblical references (Gal 6:5; 1 Cor 11:19). The reason for using them, however, remained the same – to prove that it is by consenting with the sinner in his evil deed that one may become his accomplice, and certainly not through “sharing with him in the sacraments”. Hence, even if traditores were guilty, 65 See also ep. 43.21–2. 66 ep. 108.7 (CSEL 34,2, 619). 67 See also ep. 76.2.

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no one who simply tolerated them, according to the divine testimonies, became a sinner. This proves that the Donatist justification for their separation is not just in the light of God’s law. Likewise, in cath. fr. 3 the interpretation of the act of becoming contaminated by the sins of others is of fundamental importance. Augustine here uses a dialectical reasoning, based on the procedure of a truly Socratean diairesis rather than on the divine testimonies. Instead of emphasizing consent, the category of time serves as the basis for the first division.68 When does one become polluted by the sin of another person – is it the moment when the evil deed is committed or only at the time when that deed comes to light? Augustine suggests that the Donatists would opt for the latter so as to evade the charge of being tolerant towards evildoers within their own community. If, however, in accordance with this understanding, one can only be contaminated by crimes committed by another person with whom one is familiar, then the universal community of Christians could not be defiled by the sin of Caecilian. That Caecilian was a traditor is not even an established fact – it has never been proven – but what is equally important is that his case is hardly known in the Christian world outside Africa. In this state of affairs, the overseas Churches do not share in the guilt of the African traditores, even if Caecilian was one. This allows Augustine to conclude that the Donatists have separated themselves from the community of innocent Christians, not from evildoers, which is something that cannot be justified by any means.69 This line of reasoning appears in a number of passages involving the use of amplificatio with a view to ridiculing the Donatist way of thinking as absurd, as can be seen in cath. fr. 3170 and ep. 89.4. In the latter passage Augustine concludes, with a touch of irony, by explicitly referring to the most important term in qualitas absoluta: justice. The justification proposed by the Donatists is only possible because they rely on their wicked understanding of justice: o magnum crimen omnium gentium, quas in semine Abrahae benedicendas promisit deus et, sicut promisit, exhibuit! quae cum uoce una dixerunt: quare nos uultis rebaptizare, respondetur eis: quia nescitis, qui fuerint in Africa sanctorum codicum traditores, et in eo, quod nesciebatis, iudicibus magis quam accusatoribus credere uoluistis.… haec est haeretica iustitia, ut, quia orbis terrarum non damnat crimen incognitum, pars Donati damnet orbem terrarum inauditum?71

68 Augustine confesses reading the Categories of Aristotle, see Aug., conf. 4.16.28. 69 A similar argument: ep. 44.5. 70 cath. fr. 31 (CSEL 52, 272): “fortasse ubi sit Achaia nescitis et de tam incognita prouincia tanta caecitate iudicatis, ut eam criminibus Afrorum perisse dicatis. […] cognoscite ergo etiam quam longe ab Africa remotae sunt, et dicite nobis, cur eas omnino uobis incognitas et in apostolicis litteris manifestatas tam sacrilega temeritate accusetis et tanta dementia criminibus Afrorum perisse dicatis.” 71 ep. 89.4 (CSEL 34,2, 421–2).

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4.1.2 Humana testimonia In addition, while developing this strand of argument, Augustine turns to human testimonies, mainly to the authority of Cyprian of Carthage, and employs what is now called patristic argumentation (Maschio: 1986, Rebillard: 2001, Chronister: 2014). He does so because the Donatists referred to Cyprian as a rebaptizer and tried to employ his authority for their cause, as he was considered “the most revered martyr-hero of all Africa.”72 In ep. 93.36–7, 41–2 Augustine refutes the arguments of the addressee based on the authority of Cyprian. In doing so, he employs the rules of status legales – leges contrariae yet again: he starts by distinguishing between the authority of Scripture and that of the writings of Cyprian; he attacks his opponents for the biased selection of the quoted passages; he asks a series of rhetorical questions proving that his addressee does not follow Cyprian’s teaching and actions concerning schismatics. Augustine first refers to ep. 73 of Cyprian, then quotes from his ep. 55. He chooses the first of these, because the Donatists quoted from it to argue in favour of their position on the question of rebaptism. The other letter consists of passages directly supporting Augustine’s tolerant stance towards sinners in a community. In it, Cyprian describes the controversy between the rigorous and tolerant African bishops concerning the treatment of adulterers, emphasising the fact that the rigorists did not force their own ideas on the tolerant bishops, nor separated themselves from them, but remained in communion. These arguments based on references to authority serve two goals. Augustine strives to present Cyprian as an exemplary Christian leader who always puts more value on unity than on moral strictures and tolerates various sinners. This course of action was prescribed by the rhetorical handbooks.73 Secondly, it allows him to insist that no Christian can be defiled by the sin of another person from his community simply by sharing in the sacraments with him, and that all those who separate themselves from communion with other Christians under this pretence are acting prematurely, and therefore unjustly. As we can see, Augustine uses testimonies from Cyprian – just as he did with the testimonies from Scripture – in order to prove that the Donatists did not have a valid reason to separate themselves from Caecilian or to persist in this separation even after 315, when it was tantamount to separation from the Apostolic Churches.

72 Of course, there were more reasons, see Gaumer: 2016, 58–79, the quotation used here is from p. 68. 73 In fact, it is one of the alternative choices to proceed, as is demonstrated by Inv. 2.122: “Scriptoris autem sententia ab eo qui sententia se defendet tum semper ad idem spectare et idem velle demonstrabitur; tum ex facto aut ex eventu aliquot ad tempus id quod instituit accomodabitur.”

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4.1.3 Exempla The Roman handbooks of rhetoric left us with a diverse presentation of the concept of exemplum. For some writers exemplum was just a figure of thought, hence was discussed in chapters on style rather than invention.74 For the most part however, exemplum was viewed as a kind of proof and discussed within the topic of argumentation. For Cicero there were three types of arguments based on comparisons: imago, collatio and exemplum.75 The last used an appeal to authority or the case of a person or some event from the past.76 In Topica Cicero adds that we may draw example from historical figures or events, but also from fictitious ones – although these are less useful in the judicial context.77 The most detailed exposition of the concept of exemplum in Latin rhetorical theory and at the same time the one that apparently matches Augustine’s practice is found in Book 5 of Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria.78 Here, exemplum is understood as referring to some real event from the past, or to something that seems like a real event, in order to succeed in our persuasion.79 Exempla were, in Quintilian’s own words, considered to be the most powerful proofs among those based on probability. There could have existed different relations between the event we discuss and the one we draw comparison from. For Quintilian these relations are of three types: comparison can be between two similar, dissimilar or contrary events or things. Whichever of the three one chooses, the comparison may be built using a pattern of from greater to lesser (a maiore ad minus) or from lesser to greater (a minore ad maius). In these patterns one usually referred to the same quality, e.g. the authority of a past person or deed that we induce as the example. We can compare the actions of the Apostles to our actions or our opponent’s actions (a maiore ad minus) or a decision of some small council of dissidents to the big, universal council (a minore ad maius). Augustine has a particular predilection for such devices. In ep. 43 the section dedicated to the biblical argumentation consists of only four paragraphs (21–23 and 25) of twenty-seven (except for the prooemium, where bi­ blical quotations are used to justify the letter itself). Augustine draws on the biblical exempla solely to build an anaphoric chain proving that a number of righteous figures from Old and New Testaments alike did tolerate wrongdoers. The series starts in the middle of paragraph 21 where Augustine evokes the parable of the straw (or the weed) mixed with the wheat. It serves him, first of all, to defend his Church against the charge levelled by the Donatists of being in communion with sinners. Augustine underlines that his Church, like the Donatists, recognises the wrongdo74 Rhet. Her. 4.62, see also van der Poel: 2009, 335. 75 Inv. 1.49, see also Marius Victorinus, Commenta, 116–22. 76 More on Cicero’s concept of exemplum, see van der Bloom: 2010, 65–72. 77 Cic., Topica 44–45. 78 Quint. Inst. 5.11.1–4. 79 Ibid., 5.1.6: “Quod proprie vocamus exemplum – rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad persuadendum in quod intenderis commemoratio.”

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ing, but – by contrast – refuses to exclude the wrongdoers from their community “for fear that they might also uproot the wheat” (Matt 13:23–4). Secondly, we can see here Augustine writing against the Donatist understanding of pollution by evildoers that I have presented above. Unlike consenting to their actions, being tolerant towards sinners does not lead to pollution. This time Augustine decides to prove this using biblical examples. In paragraph 22 he adds an exemplum that constitutes a compositional frame for the whole section. Augustine draws from Rev 2:1–7, where the Spirit praises “the angel of the Church of Ephesus” that Augustine interprets as “the head” or “the ruler of the Church.”80 That spiritual leader of the Ephesian community proved to be worthy of this praise on account of the tolerance and patience he showed towards the wrongdoers in his community. Later on (ep. 43.23) there follows a series of exempla, all starting with the verb “tolerat” followed by the name of a biblical figure. Augustine seems to observe chronological order as he reels off tolerant Jewish patriarchs: firstly Aaron tolerated idol worshippers, then Moses tolerated many who opposed the true God, David tolerated Saul, Samuel – the sons of Eli (among others), Isaiah – people contemptuous of God, Jeremiah – his persecutors, and Zechariah – the Pharisees. Then he takes a pause for the figure of praeteritio81, suggesting that there must have been many others who behaved in the same manner after Christ’s coming. According to the rules of rhetorical induction,82 the argument may now conclude with stating what all these characters had in common. As is often seen in such instances, Augustine likes to quote a passage from the Bible. In this case he chose to quote from the Letter to the Ephesians, which was frequently used in this context as it alluded to the pericope from the Revelation mentioning the angel of the Church of Ephesus. All these biblical figures were not only tolerant of and understanding towards the wrongdoers in their communities, but also shared in the sacraments with them, motivated by eagerness “to preserve the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace” (Eph 4:3). After this, Augustine turns to the New Testament yet again and mentions Jesus’ tolerant attitude towards Judas – “a devil, a thief, and a man who betrays him for money”,83 the Apostles, who tolerated false apostles, Saint Paul, the epitome of tolerance, and concludes with the ruler of the Church of Ephesus, gracefully bringing this section of the argument to completion. In ep. 44.10–11, written at about the same time, Augustine discusses this topic in a similar fashion. In his debate with the Donatist bishop Fortunius, which is related in this letter, he quotes that passage from the Letter to the Ephesians, but begins one verse earlier (4:2–3). He used this quotation to accentuate that the Donatists were 80 ep. 43.25, English transl. by R. Teske, WSA II/1, 169. 81 Greek: paralepsis, was a way to mention some arguments or issues just in passing by saying that we are omitting them, see Rhet. Her. 4.37. 82 Inductio (Greek: epagoge) was a method to link the exemplum to the disputed issue, see: Cic. Inv. 1.51. 83 ep. 43.23, English transl. by R. Teske in WSA II/1, 169.

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contradicting themselves. They caused the schism by not acting according to the rule presented in Eph 4:3, but over time they came to tolerate more serious crimes committed within their own sectarian community so as to maintain its unity. We cannot tell whether during the actual debate the argument was more elaborate, but in the brief report contained in the letter, Augustine does not mention any specific biblical characters. He only makes a general observation that the virtues of patience and tolerance were highlighted in the New Testament with more strength than they had been in the Old, although the prophets and righteous people who lived before Christ did not accept rigorist attitudes either. It is worth noting that in comparison with the analysed passage in ep. 43 the argument is formulated in a more succinct manner, although it also mentions the case of Judas. Augustine stresses here that – even though Jesus knew that he was a thief and his future betrayer – Judas was nevertheless admitted to take part in the Last Supper. What is more, it was in his presence that Jesus established the Eucharist. According to Augustine, this particular example made the greatest impact on the audience gathered at the debate between him and Fortunius. The example of Judas is placed in the same context more than ten years later in ep. 108.7–8. This time Augustine focuses on the Apostles, not Jesus, as being tolerant of Judas, whom they knew to be a thief. Thus, it is stressed that the Apostles were aware of his wrongdoings; it was not ignorance but patience and tolerance that made them keep his company. In fact, the juxtaposition of the Apostles to Judas are central to the analysed passage. The underlying image here is that of ecclesia permixta, expressed in the biblical metaphors of the leaven of dough (1 Cor 5:6) and the net full of fish (Matt 13:47–9). It starts with a short discussion of such troublesome passages as 1 Tim 5:22 (“Do not share in sins of others”), clearly used by the Donatists to refute the Catholic positions. Augustine’s repeatedly states that only those who consent to evildoing share in the sins of others, as opposed to those who tolerate them, i.e. remain in communion with sinners, but disapprove of their evildoing nonetheless. The Bible commands us to separate ourselves from the bad elements of our groups not physically, but morally. After discussing a few testimonies, Augustine briefly provides some examples: he mentions Daniel and the three men in the furnace from the Book of Daniel. Then there is Judas and Saint Paul from the New Testament, who is yet again portrayed as the epitome of Christian tolerance. He separated himself from the evil ones by the purity of his heart, and so the phy­ sical contact with them could not defile him, Augustine concludes. There is a noticeable symmetry in this treatment of the two Testaments, where we see one individual from each (Daniel and Paul) and one group subject (the three men and the Apostles). In ep. 108.20 he uses the example of Noah’s ark to observe that there were both clean and unclean animals on the ark. The clean animals, however, stayed on the ark until the end, the only animal to leave it before time was a raven. Augustine refers to Gn 8:6 to claim that this particular raven was from the group of four unclean ravens, not the fourteen clean ones that had been taken into the ark. In that way, by the rule of comparison, the raven proves that the Donatists are also unclean.

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In the conclusion, it is pointed out that the very act of leaving the ark, that is a community consisting of clean and unclean animals alike, would have made this raven unclean. The same rule holds true against anyone separating himself from the community before time “on account of the uncleanness of certain people.”84 Yet another decade on, we may observe Augustine employing biblical exempla in his argumentation for the tolerance of evil persons in a Christian community. In ep. 185.32 he reaches for a different set of characters. In this case he builds his argument, once again setting it in the metaphorical context. It starts with a short narrative on Absalom’s rebellion against father that ended with his death; in the next move, the Catholic Church is presented as the mother of all Christians. The Donatists are thus similar to Absalom, the evil son who rebelled against his righteous parent. In making this comparison, Augustine focuses on the parents as those who want to save their children from any harm, almost as if they were unmoved by the rebellious attitude of their offspring who started a war and wanted to kill them. Once again the metaphor is used of the Church as a tree whose branches expand to embrace the entire world, while the Donatists are only a small twig that has come apart in Africa. The Church is seeking them with love so as to bring them back to life, that is, to restore them to the root of the tree. In doing so, the Church is similar to David telling his soldiers to save his son. But nonetheless Absalom died, and the Donatists are dying, too. Here, however, Augustine points out the only difference85: while Absalom’s death was caused by a misfortune of war, the Donatists seem to be taking their own lives. The Church, like David, not only tolerates evildoers, but also wishes for their correction, an attitude that was alien to the Donatists and went contrary to the justification of their separation based on status qualitatis.

4.2 False motive As we have seen, there are many passages in Augustine’s letters where we find arguments based on the qualitative issue which aim to disprove the justification offered by the Donatists. Thus, the brunt of the argument focuses accordingly on the inconsistency of the Donatists, who took the particular line of defence: “We did it because it is just to separate oneself from the evil Christians to avoid pollution.” The task that Augustine sets himself is basically the same as that presented by Quintilian in Inst. 5.13.30, namely to highlight inconsistencies in the opponent’s actions. To accomplish this, he concentrates on the most recent actions of the Donatists that illustrate that their acts are out of tune with their claims, but also insinuates that they may have been propelled by other motives.

84 Augustine, Letters 1–99, trans. R. Teske, WSA II/1, 82. 85 That makes it exemplum dissimile.

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4.2.1 Comparisons The general technique that Augustine uses here is treated in the handbooks of rhe­ toric within the discussion of arguments based on comparison (loci a comparatione). Whether we appreciate the remarkable polemical talent of Augustine or not, we must note that he was tremendously helped by a stroke of luck (or Grace, if you like). Many of his arguments used material that occurred to him in the wake of the tumultuous events of the 390s: Gildo’s revolt, the cooperation of at least one (but one is enough) Donatist bishop with Gildo, namely Optatus of Thamugadi, and the short-lived but eventful Maximianist schism. The arguments based on comparison applied to this specific material were especially powerful. Augustine did not need to look any further for comparative material to use as exempla. The material he had obtained86 was not only contemporary, and so known to his audience at least from hearsay, but, even more importantly, was substantiated by the best proofs one could produce in court – official documents pertaining to the matter, as Augustine himself pointed out (ep. 108.16). As for Optatus, Gildo and the circumcelliones, he could appeal to common knowledge, and so in all these cases he had the best possible material at hand to build his argumentation a certibus.

4.2.1.1 Maximianists Soon after becoming the Donatist bishop of Carthage in 391 or 392,87 Primian came in to conflict with at least a considerable part of the clergy of Carthage. After he excommunicated four deacons, including Maximian, who allegedly was a relative of Donatus the Great, there followed a chain reaction of events. Fifty-four bishops gathered in Cebarsussa on 24 June 393 to condemn Primian and elect Maximian as the new bishop of Carthage. Within less than a year, on 24 April 394, attended by the majority of Donatist bishops (as many as 310), the Council of Bagaï condemned the followers of Maximian as heretics and established the date by which they would be able to recant and return to communion without any consequences. Those who persisted in the schism were repeatedly denounced as heretics to the proconsuls. Although the petitioned officials, Theodorus, and later Seranus, ruled in favour of Primian, some Maximianist bishops, including Felician of Civitas Musitana (Musti) and Praetextatus of Civitas Assuritana (Assuras), ignored the decision of the Council of Bagaï and refused to come back to the Donatist fold. During the revolt of Gildo (c. 397–398) they were nevertheless compelled to do so by Optatus, the [Donatist] bishop of Thamugadi, who acted in collusion with the secular authori86 On the chronology of Augustine’s gaining knowledge about the Maximianist schism, see de Veer, 1965, 221–3. 87 On the lack of reliable documents and the reconstruction of the events leading to the schism, see Gaumer: 2012, 292–300; de Veer: 1968, 825–7.

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ties and gathered an army to threaten the die-hard Maximianists who were persisting in their schism. To rely on the secular power by invoking the laws against heretics seemed at first to be a cunning move, but in the long run the venture turned out badly for the Donatists. By appealing to Roman officials for help in dealing with the Maximianists, who were then being deprived of their basilicas and other pro­ perty, the Donatist party made the case public, which allowed the Catholics to access official documents and develop arguments based on their findings. As a result, Augustine could read at least excerpts from the acts of the council of Bagaï, which turned out to be immensely important. The events related to the Maximianist schism and its suppression are very well documented in Augustine’s writings and as such have been thoroughly studied.88 We should start by noting that Augustine cannot refrain from underlining the deadly effectiveness of the argument based on the case of the Maximianists. In c. litt. Pet. 1.13 he observes that through their decision to receive the schismatics back into their community the Donatists simply jab at their own throats (“suo se iudicio iugulant”). Later on, in 1.15, he triumphantly announces that there is no more any need for documents from long ago or far away, for he has found the best of all proofs: their well documented actions against the Maximianists.89 This letter also ends (1.31) with the remark to the Maximianists as those through whom God has fulfilled the prophecy to “fill their faces with shame” (Ps 83:16). In the short ep. 51 the argumentation concerning the charges of rebaptism, schism and persecution is based on this particular exemplum of inconsistency on the part of the Donatists. In a few other places, too (such as ep. 53.6, 70.1, 76.3, 43.26), the Maximianists are like the icing on the cake to his arguments, not only to those concerning schism. In ep. 108 he starts two passages – one dealing with rebaptism (108.6–12) and the other with schism (108.13–16) – with the same metaphor. In the first instance the image is presented in more detail:

88 He concisely reports these events in ep. 108.5, 185.17. I am indebted to the findings published in de Veer 1965; Lamirande: 1965, 691–3; Gaumer: 2012; especially to de Veer, who is worth quoting (1965, 219): “Dans sa polémique contre les Donatistes saint Augustin mentionne souvent le schisme maximianiste, non pour le combattre, mais pour s’en servir comme d’un argument, à ses yeux, sans réplique contre ses adversaires.” 89 c. litt. Pet. 1.15 (CSEL 52,13): “Itaque nobis, fratres, hoc unum, quod de Maximianistis apud eos factum est, ad eos ammonendos corrigendosque sufficiat. non uetera archiua discutimus, non antiqua armaria uentilamus, non in longinquas terras nostram probationem transmittimus, sed sequestramus omnia nostrorum documenta maiorum, differimus testimonia toto terrarum orbe clamantia.” Ibid. 1.26 (CSEL 52,20): “propter hos ergo, qui se manifesta ignorare confingunt, exorti sunt Maximianistae, in quibus eis oculi pateant et ora claudantur.” And later, 1.29 (CSEL 52,22): “hoc unum Maximianistarum factum tenete, hoc in eorum fronte configite, hoc eis ad comprimendas dolosas linguas in ora coartate, hoc tamquam tridenti telo uelut tricipitem bestiam eorum calumniam trucidate. traditionem obiciunt, persecutionem obiciunt, falsum baptisma obiciunt: de solis Maximianistis ad omnia respondete.” See also de Veer: 1965, 226–7; Gronewoller: 2013, 414–7.

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finita est causa, frater Macrobi; deus hoc egit, deus hoc uoluit; occultae illius prouidentiae fuit, ut in causa Maximiani speculum uobis correctionis propinaretur, ut omnis aduersum nos, immo aduersus Christi ecclesiam toto orbe crescentem non dico uestra, ne in te uidear contumeliosus, sed certe uestrorum criminosa calumnia finiretur.90

The mirror (“speculum correctionis”) mentioned here clearly indicates argumentation based on comparisons.91 We know from Retractationes that in the years 409–410 Augustine wrote two separate works to expand the arguments analysed here, dedicated solely – as the titles suggests – to the inconsistency of the Donatists in their dealings with the Maximianists. Neither work has survived and it seems that their goals were different, as Admonitio Donatistarum de Maximianistis was shorter and written for a wider audience, whereas De Maximianistis contra Donatistas offered a more thorough discussion of the subject. Finally, the argument from comparison is clearly to Augustine’s advantage at the Conference of Carthage, which provokes the Donatists to formulate their famous claim that “one case does not prejudice another, nor does one person prejudice another.” References to the conference and this particular phrase recur in his later works, where he demonstrates that the Donatists, who claimed that the case of Maximian was not prejudicial to their sect, had to admit that neither could the case of Caecilian be prejudicial to Christians in Africa and beyond.92 This means precisely this: their professed motive explaining the separation was false. What is also interesting is the explicit character of the comments concerning the basis of the Donatists’ defence. Augustine says that considering the case of the Maximianists, their traditional defence against the charge of schism based on qualitas absoluta cannot hold. In ep. 51.2 he reveals that he has had access to a document recording the Donatists’ actions against the Maximianists and suggests to his addressee Crispinus that he should prepare new arguments to defend himself instead of questioning the evidence. I do not agree with de Veer (1965, 227–8), that this remark was merely a manifestation of his triumphant mood after he laid his hands on the acts of the synod of Bagaï, because only a few lines further, continuing along the same line of argumentation, he says:

90 ep. 108.6 (CSEL 34,2, 617). 91 So does the remark in ep. 43.26 in which Augustine insists on the weight of the arguments related to the Maximianist schism: “tandem sentiant, quod fecerunt; merito certo annorum interuallo in oculos eorum reuolutum est opus ipsorum.” (ep. 43.26, CSEL 34,2, 108). Another example is the following phrase from ep. 185.17 (CSEL 57, 16): “coepit hoc eorum factum contra illos pro catholica multum ualere, ut ora eorum penitus clauderentur.” 92 This quotation occurs twelve times in Ad Don. post collat., four times in ep. 173.7–8 and three times in ep. 141.6–7.

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si autem probaueris [sc. Maximianistas] recte fuisse damnatos, quae restat defensio, cur in eodem episcopatu recepti sint, nisi ut exaggerans utilitatem salubritatemque pacis ostendas etiam ista pro unitatis uinculo toleranda?93

Augustine refers here to the forensic framework of the theory of status, and claims that the only possible defence that the Donatists can offer in the case of the Maximianists is to construct their argumentation by drawing on qualitative issue and appeal to the worthy end of an action, known as comparatio criminis. Cicero treats the argumentation within this status mostly from the standpoint of the accuser not the defendant, which enables us to see clearly how his remarks work in Augustine’s argument against the schismatics. Two things ought to stand in comparison: the crime of schism committed by the Maximianists (this element of comparison was referred to as maleficium) is juxtaposed with the unity of the Donatist community (beneficium). Cicero claimed that it was the task of the prosecutor to present the thing compared to the criminal act, i.e. the beneficium, as being one of the following: “aut non honestum, aut non utile, aut non necessarium fuisse aut non tantopere utile, aut non tantopere honestum, aut non tantopere necessarium fuisse” (inv. 2.75); and to diminish the very thing that is praised by the defence (“hoc extenuando quod a defensore laudatur”). In turn, the task of the defence was to provide arguments to the contrary (“defensor autem […] omnes locos […] ex contrario tractabit”, inv. 2.76), which in this particular case meant that they had to demonstrate that the beneficium was in fact useful, noble or necessary, and exaggerate94 the gains (or usefulness), nobleness and necessity of the beneficium. This is exactly what Augustine tells us in the passage quoted above. As far as the form of the argument is concerned, we can make a few observations. Firstly, the Donatists’ treatment of the Maximianists is invoked as an exemplum or, to use Augustine’s metaphor, as the mirror of their actions that gave rise to their own schism.95 These are mostly exempla contraria. This kind of argument works in the pattern of induction: “You claim that you were acting in accordance with a certain rule while separating yourselves from Caecilian and persisting in your separation. You did not, however, obey this rule, but did the opposite, separating yourselves from the Maximianists and then taking them back.” Augustine often expli­citly says in concluding this comparison that in becoming reconciled with such Maximianists as Felician of Musti and Praetextatus of Assuras,96 the Donatists explained 93 ep. 51.2 (CSEL 34,2, 146). 94 Exagerrare is the opposite of extenuare. 95 In en. Ps. 36.2.19 (CCL 38, 360–1), he uses such expressions as “mira similitudo” and “quod ergo tunc factum est, uidetur ante oculos miro et manifesto exemplo reuolutum.” 96 It is worth quoting B. Gronewoller’s (2013, 413) remarks: “A close examination of Augustine’s letters […] reveals that it was Felicianus, and not Maximianus or Praetextatus, who stood at the center of Augustine’s exploitation of the Maximianist schism in his anti-Donatist rhetoric. […] Augustine only mentioned Praetextatus half as many times as Felicianus, and always chose to use Felicianus when focusing on one of the two.”

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their actions as being directed at the greater good or the lesser evil: they tolerated the crimes of the Maximianists to make sure that their schismatic community remained united (ep. 51.2). In ep. 76.3, Augustine concludes that they did accept Felician of Musti back to their fold bearing in mind the peace of pars Donati, but refused to receive Caecilian back, finding fault with the peace of Christ.97 In the latter example, we can sense the antithesis that employs the argumentation based on the person. The depiction of heretics as being against the Church, peace or God’s Grace is commonplace in Christian invective. Such a label almost automatically aroused negative emotions towards them. In a similar vein, ep. 185.17, written in 417, describes in retrospect how that argument made many Donatists “blush in embarrassment” and return to Catholic unity.98 Secondly, we can witness Augustine’s rhetorical skill in that, although the same theme recurs in so many arguments, each time he introduces some new elements. From the rhetorical standpoint the most developed pieces are those found in c. litt. Pet 1.1399 and ep. 108.13. In ep. 108.7 Augustine starts a seven-paragraph-long re­ futation of the Donatist defence based on qualitas absoluta. The argumentation there is based mostly on divine testimonies, but at the very end of this strand of arguments (in ep. 108.13) he employs the crucial exemplum of the Maximianists. Even here, however, he embeds this comparison within the biblical language of the previous paragraphs. Amplificatio according to Cicero was a vivid type of argumentation “which leads to persuasion exploiting emotions” (Calboli Montefusco: 2004, 75) 100 best suited for the conclusion of an argument, where something has already been proved or disproved.101 This is what Augustine aims at here by using direct

97 (CSEL 34,2, 328): “quid uos offendit pax Christi, contra quam uos diuiditis ab eis, quos infamatis? et quid uos promeruit pax Donati, pro qua suscipitis, quos damnatis?” 98 The verb that often accompanies this argument is erubescere, through which Augustine aims at indignatio. 99 (CSEL 52,12): “ipsi uero fratres nostri, memoratarum ecclesiarum filii, quid ante tot annos in Africa gestum sit et tunc nescierunt et modo nesciunt; unde illos crimina, quae ab eorum parte Afris obiecta sunt, etiamsi uera essent, ignorantes contaminare non possent. isti autem palam separati atque diuisi, cum Primiani ordinationi etiam interfuisse dicantur, Primianum damnauerunt, alium episcopum contra Primianum ordinauerunt, extra Primianum baptizauerunt, post Primianum rebaptizauerunt cumque suis foris a se baptizatis et intus a nullo rebaptizatis ad Primi­ anum redierunt. si tanta Maximianistarum coniunctio Donatistas non maculat, quomodo Afrorum fama potuit maculare peregrinos? si in pacis osculo sine crimine coeunt labia quae se inuicem damnauerunt, cur in ecclesiis ualde eorum iudicio remotissimis trans mare ab eis quisque damnatus non ut fidelis catholicus osculatur, sed ut paganus impius exsufflatur? quodsi pacem receptis Maximianistis pro sua unitate fecerunt, ecce non reprehendimus, nisi quod suo se iudicio iugulant, ut, cum pro unitate concisionis suae a se rursus concisa recolligant, ipsam concisionem suam uerae unitati resarcire contemnant.” 100 It is a paraphrase of part. orat. 27. 101 See Topica 98, part. orat. 27.

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address to the addressees,102 rhetorical questions, incrementa,103 exclamatio104 – figures typical for amplificatio. The pattern of argument from comparison a maiore ad minus remains, nonetheless, the same. Augustine evokes the person of Felician of Musti and quotes from the verdict on him given by the council of Bagaï in very harsh words as the “enemy of faith and adulterer of truth”.105 The Donatists were not defiled by taking back their own schismatics, whom they perfectly knew because they lived close to each other; how then could the world be defiled by Caecilian, who remained largely unknown – even by name – to other Christians, especially those who lived in faraway regions?106 Augustine proves here not only that their motive for separation was false, but that they were not in position to use the testimonies they quoted in their defence. These texts about being defiled by the sins of others were out of tune with their own attitude towards the Maximianist schisma­ tics.107 In c. litt. Pet. 1.13 the argument is built on the same pattern:108 a maiore ad minus. Augustine concludes by claiming that the Catholic party does not criticise the Donatists for their actions undertaken in the interest of their own peace and unity. On the contrary – these actions are justified, but, at the same time, by the decision to receive the Maximianists back his opponents have in fact “jabbed at their own throats”.109 Now he no longer needs to juxtapose pax Christi and pax Donati: the only thing that remains is to point out that what the Donatist managed to do for the unity of their sect (“unitas concisionis suae”) was something that they refused to do for the real unity (“uera unitas”). Whenever Augustine tries to be brief, the argument is developed in division (complexio).110 This allows him to build the argumentation dealing with two different charges on one-and-the-same basis. We are thus presented with two logical possibilities: either Maximian and his fellow bishops were guilty of schism, or they were 102 ep. 108.13: desinite, attendite. 103 Ibid., notissimos, amicissimos, coniunctissimos. 104 Ibid., (CSEL 34,2, 626): “unitatis diuisio a separatione funesta defenditur, a praeciso ramo tamquam inmundus ramus, qui in uerae matris radice manserit, accusatur!” 105 Ibid., (CSEL 34,2, 625): “fidei aemulum, ueritatis adulterum, ecclesiae matris inimicum, Dathan, Core et Abiron ministrum de quo amplius addiderunt, quod eum aperta terra non absorbuit, ad maius supplicium super his reseruasse; raptus enim, inquiunt, poenam suam compendio lucrauerat funeris; usuras nunc grauioris colligit funeris, cum mortuus interest uiuis.” See also Cresc. 3.22; 4.5; Emer. 10. 106 See also ep. 141.6. 107 ep. 108.16 (CSEL 34,2, 630): “nec illa rursus de non communicando peccatis alienis, de separatione a malis, de non tangendo inmundo atque polluto, de cauenda modici fermenti corruptione et cetera talia, sicut soletis, accepturus es, ne uos in Maximiani causa inexplicabiliter implicetis.” 108 c. litt. Pet. 1.13 (CSEL 52, 12): “si tanta Maximianistarum coniunctio Donatistas non maculat, quomodo Afrorum fama potuit maculare peregrinos?” 109 Ibid.: “ut, cum pro unitate concisionis suae a se rursus concisa recolligant, ipsam concisionem suam uerae unitati resarcire contemnant.” 110 ep. 51.2, 70.1.

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not. The latter possibility sends the argument in the direction of the charge of traditio, and will be discussed later. The former eventuality allows Augustine to tackle either the charge of schism or that of rebaptism, or both. In ep. 51.2 he solves the second part of the complexio by asking a rhetorical question. If the Donatists rely on this only possible defence, they will see that now their motive (“pro pace Donati”) is contrary to what they did in the case of Caecilian, when they violated pax Christi because of being strict towards lesser crimes than those of the Maximianists. In this conclusion we see a clear comparison in the form a minore ad maius: if for the peace of Donatus they were able to receive back the schismatics, they should remain in communion with the alleged traditores for the peace of Christ. This proves that their motive was not true, since it did not hold in the case of the Maximianists. A very similar argument is found in ep. 53.6, although it is does not employ the figure of complexio. Here Augustine claims that when the Donatists justify the separation from Caecilian based on the motive of the avoidance of pollution (maculatio),111 they make a false move.

4.2.1.2 Optatus Another comparison used to discredit the Donatist justification of their motives for separation from Caecilian is also related to the current state of affairs. It concerns Optatus, the bishop of Thamugadi in the years 388–398. Numidia was a rich, rural province predominantly inhabited by Donatists, mostly of Berberic origin. Thamugadi was an important centre of fervent religious life in Numidia, which boasted a massive cathedral complex (Patout Burns, Jensen: 2014, 160–162; Frend: 1997, 615). If we are to believe Augustine (c. litt. Pet. 2.53), the city was also thronged by pilgrims to mark Optatus’ birthdays. Already the linguistic form in which Augustine introduces this remarkable Donatist bishop is noteworthy. He is mostly called “Optatus Gildonianus”. This epithet would have had the most persuasive effect on the imperial officials, for it creates the simple association between the Donatists and the revolt of Gildo (Shaw: 2011, 48–50, 58–60).112 Obviously, it could also evoke the sensitivities of those who suffered most from the Gildonian revolt, among whom we can safely count e.g. Roman aristocrats owning estates in Africa sympathetic to the Catholic cause. Secondly, Augustine uses emotionally-laden language within the short descriptions of Optatus, which serve as labels. For instance, in ep. 76.3 we read: “Optatum inter uos in apertissima iniquitate uiuentem per tot annos”; in c. litt. 111 ep. 53.6 (CSEL 34,2, 157): “quod si ab eis, quos ore proprio tamquam sceleratos et sacrilegos damnauerunt […] non maculantur, cum eis rursus in honore suo receptis communicant, euigilent aliquando, cogitent, quanta caecitate et quanta insania dicant orbem terrarum ignotis Afrorum criminibus esse maculatum et hereditatem Christi, quae promissa exhibita est in omnibus gentibus, peccatis Afrorum per contagionem communicationis fuisse deletam.” 112 Such a connection between the schismatic and usurper was already present in Cyprian of Carthage, see F. Jacques: 1982.

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Pet. 1.11: “Gildonianus Optatus incedens cum agmine militari tamquam rabidus fluctus”; in 1.10 “sceleratus”; in 1.26 Augustine mentions by way of a praeteritio: “omitto […] sub uno Optato Gildoniano decennalem totius Africae gemitum”; simi­larily, in ep. 43.24: “sub incredibilibus malis unius Optati per tot annos totius Africae gemitus”; and in ep. 87.4: “uesana potentia furere iactabatur Optatus, cum eius accusator esset totius Africae gemitus”. In ep. 51.3 he is called the “tribune of the Donatists.” As we clearly see from this material, Optatus is consequently presented as a violent man of the military rather than as an ecclesiastic, and also as at least partly responsible for many sufferings in Africa in the times of Gildo and before. The person of Optatus is used in the same previously discussed pattern of argumentation as the Maximianists are – mostly a minore ad maius: if you separated yourselves from Caecilian, why did you not separate yourselves from Optatus? He is the perfect fit for the exemplum: contemporary, known to all, treated by the Roman authorities as the enemy of the state, remembered as a violent man with an evident military record. The most precious feature of all: he was not only tolerated, but celebrated by the Donatists. Optatus and his crimes are here presented as totally opposite to those of Caecilian, which – had he committed any – would have been only known to a few, and those few would have been unable even to prove that they had been committed.113 Through this comparison Augustine strives to prove that the alleged motive of the Donatists when they separated themselves from Caecilian was not valid. Optatus is used less frequently than the Maximianists are, and often literally as the representative of a larger group to prove a more general and more powerful claim, as in the concise closing formula of ep. 108.20:

neque enim re uera uos habetis propria quaedam priuilegia sanctitatis, ut nos polluant mali nostri et uos non polluant mali uestri, ut nos antiqua contaminet, quam nescimus, timiditas traditorum et uos non contaminet praesens, quam uidetis, audacia perditorum.114

The circumcelliones and Optatus become the epitome of the violence of the Donatists in ep. 43.24.115 In ep. 52.3, Augustine satisfies himself with mentioning some crimes of some unnamed violators whom the majority of the Donatists tolerated for fear of “sundering the sect of Donatus.” But the goal of introducing these figures into discourse is not to press on the issue of the criminal aggressions of the sectarians. On the contrary, he expresses his admiration for their tolerant attitude towards these atrocities, while simultaneously bemoaning their lack of tolerance towards

113 See ep. 87.5. 114 (CSEL 34,2, 633). 115 There the circumcellions are discussed with a direct link to the biblical metaphor of harvest. For Brent Shaw this is one of the proofs that circumcellions were a workforce used as harvesters, see (2011, 640–1).

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Caecilian and the Catholics in general. In that way he points at their inconsistency and the lack of excuse for their separation (“non habent, quod excusent”).116 That Augustine aims at undermining their defence based on the claim that they have justly separated from Caecilian (as one cannot tolerate evildoers in the Christian community) is also clear from ep. 76.3 and 87.3–5. In the first passage, he doubts that the fear of mingling with evildoers was their real motive for separation. If it had been real, they would have not kept Optatus in their community, living as he did the life of a public villain (“in apertissima iniquitate”), and after his death they would not have revered him as a martyr. Augustine ends with a bitter mockery that Gildo should be regarded as the new Christ, for Optatus was “martyred” for him.117 The argument of ep. 87 to Emeritus is more developed. Also here Augustine repeats the formula from ep. 43.24: he introduces the exemplum of Optatus so as not to criticise the Donatists’ violence. He just needs Emeritus to answer him how it is that they could tolerate the crimes of Optatus that were so obvious and known to all Africans in order to preserve the unity of pars Donati, but they divided the Church of Christ and have remained in this division ever since for the exact opposite reasons. He uses forensic language here, when he says that their tolerance towards Optatus is exactly what accuses them before God’s tribunal (“quod uos arguit in iudicio dei”).118 Using the form of prolepsis, he anticipates the defence of the Donatist bishop: he would claim ignorance. That would be his only choice, for lack of other options (“angustia respondendi”), but a very disadvantageous one. Augustine wastes no time and promptly demonstrates that such a claim is false: Optatus and his crimes were known to everyone in Africa and beyond, the African traditores remained largely unknown, and yet the Donatists urged the worldwide Church to excommunicate them, while they themselves tolerated Optatus. This allows Augustine to turn to pathos to raise the feeling of disdain (indignatio) towards the Donatists, which he himself signals in the Ciceronian-like conclusion:

quid dicam? quid querar? aut quid exclamem? si cum homine cordato loquor, indignationis huius aculeos tecum participo; nam uides profecto, quae dicerem, si uellem dicere.119

116 ep. 52.3. 117 ep. 76.3 (CSEL 34,2, 327): “ille communicat malis, qui consentit factis malorum, non qui tolerat in agro dominico zizania usque ad messem uel paleam usque ad ultimam uentilationem. si malos odistis, uos ipsi mutamini ab scelere schismatis; si malorum permixtionem timeretis, Optatum inter uos in apertissima iniquitate uiuentem per tot annos non teneretis. quem cum modo martyrem dicitis, superest, ut eum, propter quem mortuus est, Christum dicatis.” 118 ep. 87.4 (CSEL 34,2, 400). 119 ep. 87.5 (CSEL 34,2, 402).

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4.2.2 Impulsio As we can see, in this mode of defence Augustine focuses on proving that the intent of the Donatist separation from Caecilian was either wrong or false. To prove the latter it was customary to suggest a real motive behind their decision. When the defendant presented a just motive to vindicate themselves, the opposing party could always claim that they were lying, because there was a different, less noble reason for what they had done. As the Donatists proposed to defend their case arguing that they have a reasoned honourable motive to keep away from Augustine’s party, it was possible to counter their claim by saying that their choice was not reasonable at all, but totally irrational. Thus Augustine decided to explore the possibility that the Donatists made the erroneous decision not by ratiocinatio, but by impulsio. This line of accusation draws from loci a persona that zero in on the suitable character traits of his opponents and deal with all these one by one. Outrageous though it may sound today, in antiquity women were considered to be driven more by emotion than reason. Owing to these and other allegedly inferior traits, they had a special, albeit modest place in the theories of argumentation.120 Optatus of Milevis used this general perception when talking about the woman behind the scenes of the Caecilian–Maiorinus drama in Carthage,121 making use of numerous misogynistic clichés in his narrative:122 even before the Great Persecution, Lucilla123 had been rebuked by the archdeacon Caecilian for a minor ritual error,124 and henceforth she planned to take revenge on him. The occasion occurred when Caecilian was elected bishop of Carthage. She stirred the opposition against him claiming that he had been baptised by a traditor and offered bribes to bishops to elect Maiorinus instead. In his letters Augustine never presents as detailed narrative of these events as Optatus does, but he does adopt the same argumentative frame of it.125 The more the Donatists claim that they had a just motive for attacking 120 In Inst. 5.11.10 Quintilian says, for instance, that an exemplum of the courage of a woman is more remarkable than that of a man – so Lucretia is better than Cato or Scipio if we urge someone to meet death. In the early-Christian rhetoric women were presented as prone to heresies or even as instigating them, see Eyl: 2015, 159–62. 121 I talk more of this in chapter 6. 122 For many scholars such a stereotypical use of Lucilla in Optatus’s rhetoric is a sign that he made up the whole story. The widest and most detailed argumentation is to be found in Wiśniewski: 2011, 157–61. Lately, J. Eyl: 2015, 162 observes: “[...] female vengeance triggers the conflict, rendering Donatism simultaneously flawed and feminized. This trope is something scholars ought to take seriously, since the figure of a problematic woman is simply too obvious a rhetorical strategy.” See also Dalvit: 2015, 240: “The picture provided by Optatus is too much of a parody to be true.” 123 See “Lucilla 1,” Mandouze: 1982, 649. 124 Optatus, De schismate Donatistarum 1.16, informs us that she kissed a bone of a martyr before receiving eucharist. On the bone of a martyr as the detail undermining the veracity of Optatus’ report, see Wiśniewski: 2011, 157–161. 125 cath. fr. 46 and 73; ep. 43.17, 25–6. There is, however, a long passage in Cresc. 3.28.32, where Augustine is very faithful to the version of Optatus as observed by Dalvit: 2015, 241.

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Caecilian, the more one can suspect that they are trying to cover up the greediness of their bishops and the fact that they were under the sway of a woman; a very rich,126 noble,127 and thus influential woman, who was – Augustine insists – rightly rebuked by Caecilian.128 Augustine goes out of his way to underline that he bases the knowledge about her actions not on mere hearsay, but the written testimony of the deacon Nundinarius, given in the presence of the governor (consularis) Zenophilus.129 Thus, the Donatist schism had started not only because the first schismatic bishops were bribed, but was also all the more abominable for the fact that the bribes were offered by a frenzied woman acting out of personal resentment. At times Augustine also suggests that a substantial number of the bishops gathered at the council that took place in Carthage under Secundus of Tigisi and condemned Caecilian were themselves traditores trying to cover up their own trespasses.130 Thus, their hostile attitude towards traditores resulted from their fear that their own misdemeanours would be revealed. He also uses the traditional ways of portraying a heretic and suggests that they were driven by such vices as pride, vanity and the diabolical spirit of dissension, all of which continue to affect the contemporary situation and make them persist in the schism.131 In the epilogues of two letters, ep. 52 and ep. 43, Augustine goes as far as to say that his Donatist addressees remain in their schism since they are ensnared by their carnal habits and profound attachment to the community they had been born into.132 We are dealing here with evident rhetorical manipulations as we could imagine many good reasons to remain a Donatist in the times of Augustine. The task of the orator, however, was to find the vices most closely linked to the actions that the defendant was accused of. In the best possible scenario, these vices could have eventually motivated the accused to commit the wrongful act and this is what Augustine was trying to achieve while demonstrating that their motive for separation was false.

126 ep. 43.17. 127 cath. fr. 73. 128 cath. fr. 46, ep. 43.17 and 25. 129 More on this Acta apud Zenophilium and the way Augustine used them in his anti-Donatist writings, see Hogrefe: 2009, 247–56. 130 See chapter 6 in this book. 131 See chapter 3.1. 132 That the bad habit causes them to remain in the schism is also seen in ep. 89.6.

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5. Status definitionis 5.1 Ubi est ecclesia In at least seven of the analysed letters, in one way or another, Augustine poses the question that is most precisely formulated on two occasions: cath. fr. 2: “quaestio certe inter nos uersatur ubi sit ecclesia, utrum apud nos an apud illos.”133 ep. 87.10: “quaeritur autem utrum uestra an nostra sit ecclesia Dei.”134

With regard to the question “Where is the Church of Christ?” Augustine claims that the Donatists’ answer is profoundly wrong: ep. 185.3: “Eius ecclesia non in sola Africa, sicut isti inpudentissima uanitate deliriant, sed toto orbe terrarum diffusa”135 cath. fr. 43: “Deficientibus a fide christiana ceteris gentibus in sola Africa ecclesia remansura [...] ecclesia mundo perdito ad solos Afros redacta.”136

Introducing this issue in such a context opens several options. Firstly, it lets Augustine put forward his own definition of the Church as the Catholic (i.e., “universal”, worldwide) community that forms the mystical body of Christ: “inter nos autem et Donatistas quaestio est ubi sit hoc corpus, id est ubi sit ecclesia.”137 Secondly, it allows him to identify his own religious community as part of the Catholic Church, which is based on the decisions made by Constantine the Great and by the councils of Rome and Arles in the years 313–315 as well as all the later imperial decisions concerning the division in Africa that treated the Donatists as dissidents.138 As he sums it up in one of the (earlier) letters,139 it is commonly known that his party remains in communion with all the Apostolic Churches, which he duly enumerates, as is his wont. Thirdly, together with arguments drawn from persons, it lets him polarise the whole discussion as one between his group, which defends unity, peace and order within the borders of the Christian Roman state, and the Donatists, who hate and fight these values. These questions and answers clearly demonstrate that the conflict plays out between two rival understandings or definitions of the Church. Augustine suggests 133 (CSEL 52, 232). 134 (CSEL 34,2, 406). 135 (CSEL 57, 3). Similar formulations in ep. 52.1–2 (CSEL 34,2, 150): “Ipsa est enim ecclesia catholica, unde καθολική Graece appellatur, quod per totum orbem terrarum diffunditur […] pars autem Donati in solis Afris calumniatur orbi terrarum et non considerat ea sterilitate, qua fructus pacis et caritatis adferre noluit, ab illa radice orientalium ecclesiarum se esse praecisam.” 136 (CSEL 52, 288). 137 cath. fr. 2 (CSEL 52, 232). 138 Also ep. 144.3. 139 ep. 49.2.

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that the true definition of the Church, the one based on the Bible, must take into account geographical or spatial categories. In this vein (in ep. 185.3) he manipulates the Donatist answer to this question. In fact, it was not in their interest to discuss the nature of the Church along the lines of the map.140 Pressed by the Catholic party, however, the Donatists had to defend themselves on these grounds also. If they were to formulate their definition, they would perhaps refer to other terms than that of territorial spread. When asked the question “Ubi est ecclesia?,” they would probably have answered that the Church is where the martyrs and the holy ministers of sacraments are (Hoover: 2018, 99–111). For all we know, they considered themselves to be the Catholic Church, as is clear from e.g. The Acts of the Conference in Carthage.141 The Donatists suggested the answer based on the morality of Christians, and sometimes Augustine also takes up this theme, as we will see. It would be wrong, however, to assume that this question is asked merely for the purpose of a rhetorical exercise in a deliberative type of speech. To begin within the deliberative context was indeed advantageous to Augustine: it helped him establish the case and formulate charges. The shifts from the deliberative genre to the forensic are swift, however. In ep. 87.10 he suggests that to answer the question “utrum uestra an nostra sit ecclesia Dei?” one must first answer a different question: “Why have you separated yourselves from the universal Church?”142 As we have seen, Augustine defined schism as unjustified separation from the universal Church. Thus, beneath the seemingly deliberative issue (“Where is the Church?”) lurks the charge of schism. When placed in a forensic setting, the question “Ubi est ecclesia?” is the ultimate issue (adiudicatio) to be judged by the jury within the case concerning the accusation of schism based on status definitionis. If we were to reconstruct the krinomenon scheme of this case, it would closely resemble those found in rhetorical handbooks: Intentio: You are schismatics/You have created a schism. Depulsio: No, we are not/We have not created a schism.143 Quaestio: Have the Donatists created a schism or not? (ep. 87.7: “utrum schisma non feceritis”)144

140 As Tilley (1997, 145–6) observes: “At the Conference of Carthage, Donatists opposed the indiscriminate mixing of the Church with the sinful world. To counter the Catholic association of the Church and the world, they used the most positive biblical language about the Church and the most derogatory about the world.” 141 Gesta Collationis Carthaginensis 3.22; 75; 90–93; 221; 227. 142 ep. 87.10 (CSEL 34,2, 406): “quapropter illud quaerendum est a capite, cur schisma feceritis.” 143 S. Denis 19.7 (MA 1, 104): “illi erant aliquando in unitate. praecisi sunt. unde praecisi sunt? ab unitate. sed uos estis, inquiunt, praecisi. quid facimus? ego dico: uos estis praecisi; uos dicitis: uos estis praecisi. Iudicet deus. distulimus itaque quaestionem, et ad iudicium dei misimus? non plane. in multis rebus facimus hoc, ubi nondum apparet sententia dei: ubi autem apparet, utamur, non differamus. scripturam profero, et uideo quis unde praecisus sit.” 144 see ch. 2.3.1.

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Ratio: We have preserved the true Church in our community, because it is the holy community of martyrs and saints that keeps all Christ’s commandments. Infirmatio rationis: You have not preserved the true Church, because the only true Church is the universal community of the Catholic Church of which we are part – unlike you. Iudicatio: Which party belongs to the true Church? Where is the true Church? (ep. 87.10, cath. fr. 2) To leave aside the technical jargon: if the Donatist definition of the Church is valid, it follows that they are not schismatics, but they have preserved the true Church by separating themselves from evildoers. If Augustine’s definition of the Church is valid, then the Donatists are guilty of schism. Hence, “Where is the Church?” is not really a question opening a theological or deliberative issue, but one arising within a legal issue. The legal qualification of the Donatists’ actions is hinged on how this question is answered, as is, in consequence, the ultimate verdict to be passed on the issue. Have they committed the crime of schism in their dealings with Caecilian or were these actions not of criminal nature? Have they separated from the Church or have they preserved the Church? Thus, the core of the issue is to define the Church instead of defining the schism, for this definition is crucial to the whole case. The rhetorical handbooks suggested various argumentation strategies for this status, but the most common was this: present a clear and precise definition suitable for your goals (“definitio”), prove that it is right (“adprobatio propriae definitionis”), link your definition to the issue discussed (“deductio in speciem definitionis propriae”), attack the rival definition (“destructio definitionis alienae”).145 Cicero advises to refer to the common usage of the word that had to be defined for the stra­ tegy to take off.146 In the case of Christian polemicists, the common usage would most often be identical with the biblical usage, and so endowed with great authority. Both parties of the Donatist controversy used the Bible to argue in favour of their own definition of the Church. As a result, most of the discussions within this status regarding the charge of schism entailed status legales. Among the legal questions used here, Augustine is especially keen to exploit three: ambiguitas, scriptum et vo­ luntas and leges contrariae. In all these status legales, not only in that of ambiguity, one had to proceed from the certain to the uncertain, in keeping with the general rhetorical rule established by Quintilian in Inst. 5.10.8, known by Tertullian (Sider, 1971, 50), and frequently repeated by Augustine.147 The bishop of Hippo proposes there to do away with all the ambiguous, obscure and allegorical passages from the Bible and focus the debate exclusively on those of the clearest meaning. He sees it as the only way to escape the danger of the never-ending squabbles over the mutually exclusive interpre145 Marius Victorinus, Commenta in Ciceronis Rhetorica 2.55–56, 170. 146 Cicero, Inv. 2.53–4. 147 Augustine’s usage, see esp. cath. fr. 8,9,10,14,25,47,67, ep. 93.24.

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tations of ambiguous passages of the Bible or the equally tiresome quarrels over whether the literal or the projected sense is the right one, in the case of scriptum et voluntas. By referring to the clearer scriptural passages the conflicting parties would also potentially be able to shed light on the more obscure fragments concerning similar topics. Augustine betrays full confidence that Scripture is so rich in clear passages on all the important subjects that there is no possibility that one would have to rely only on the ambiguous citations in any situation. Hoc etiam praedico et propono, ut quaeque aperta et manifesta deligamus; quae si in sanctis Scripturis non inuenirentur, nullo modo esset unde aperirentur clausa et illustrarentur obscura.148

We may also infer from his remarks in cath. fr. that whenever one party came up with a scriptural passage to corroborate their definition of the Church, the other party tried to dismiss it as unclear. To quote but one example, when Augustine mentions the ark of Noah as a prefiguration of the universal Church (given that it included all animal species), he concludes that the Donatists will certainly reject this interpretation. Hence, the richness of the Bible treated as the set of divine laws could also be problematic. One can find so many ambiguous and unclear passages that both parties could employ the same argument in mutual accusations. In fact, the ambiguity of these places could allow such discussion concerning their meaning to go on without end.149 It is striking that on such occasions Augustine uses direct references to the language of the relevant chapters in the rhetorical textbooks dealing with scriptum et sententia and ambiguitas.150 The Christian polemical literature of the early centuries suggests that we are dealing with a larger phenomenon that might be called the “Christianisation of the status legales.”151 Augustine is just one of the many Christian writers who found the rules of legal questions appealing. Hence, in the passages of cath. fr. that we have discussed above, he equates the ambiguous or unclear passages with those where the Bible communicates through images: “obscure uel ambigue uel figurate dicta, quae quisque sicut uoluerit interpretetur secundum sensum suum.”152 In this context every biblical allegory furnished in the conflict was treated as an ambiguous law. Even though Augustine claims that he prefers to interpret only the most evident passages, he still engages in the interpretation of ambiguous allegories. The discussion of scriptural testimonies within status legales at times turned into a battle of allegorical interpretations of the true sense (sententia) behind the image. In the 148 cath. fr. 8 (CSEL 52, 239). 149 cath. fr. 9 (CSEL 52, 240): “fortasse Donatistis aliud uideatur et aliter hoc interpretari uelint. Similter et ipsi aliud obscure uel ambigue positum si pro sua sententia interpretentur, si nobis pateat aliud inde dicere quod pro nobis sonat, quis erit finis.” 150 In the similar fashion to Tertullian, see the brilliant analysis of Sider: 1971, 86–100. 151 See ibid., and lately Harris: 2018, 405–20. 152 cath. fr. 47 (CSEL 52, 249). Compare: cath. fr. 8 (CSEL 52, 239): “[...] figurate atque obscure posita per aenigmatis imaginem uel ambiguitatis ancipitem [...].”

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case of Augustine it looks as if he could not help himself showing off his grasp of the hermeneutical rules of allegorical exegesis. After another methodological rant in which he proposed to remove all the allegorical passages from the discussion he tells a story about a certain Donatist bishop who preached in Hippo and was given a round of applause when delving into one particular detail for the story of Noah’s ark, namely on why its walls were tarred on both sides (cath. fr. 9). For this Donatist the sealing of the ark with tar (“bitumen”) meant that the Church should be a small, closed community of the selected few. To counter this claim, Augustine uses praeteritio, one of his favourite techniques in holding things up to ridicule. He has just claimed that his aim is to avoid the endless rivalry of interpretations of allegories, yet he allows himself to do just that when poking fun at that Donatist preacher. The “bitumen” according to him is not a symbol of the exclusivist character of the Church, but of love. To corroborate his interpretation, as was always advisable while dealing with ambiguitas, he furnishes other scriptural passages (Ps 62:9; 1 Cor 13:7) to support his understanding. But after this brief interlude, he sternly returns to his solemn tone. It is better not to play games in which everyone can seem to be right. A few paragraphs later Augustine admits that there are times when allegorical interpretation is permissible, but only when the world is at peace, not in times when godless contradictors are using the dubious passages as weapons for their cause.153

5.2 Ecclesia catholica 5.2.1 Confirmatio As Maureen Tilley showed, the Donatists had experienced a long period of growth in the second half of the fourth century, one of their advantages in the clash with the Catholics being their clear-cut identity. This identity had a few aspects. Tilley names four: they considered themselves (1) good people persecuted by evil ones, (2) absolutely faithful to the Bible as to the Law, (3) people who formed an Old Testament collecta – the community of Israel who had received and preserved the Law, and (4) clearly separated from the sinners.154 The most important of these aspects for us now is certainly the second. The Donatists followed the Scriptural rules of conduct very strictly. They considered themselves to be those who had preserved the Word of God – as opposed to the Catholics who had put it to flames – and were prepared to die for it and, even more so, live according to it. They styled themselves as the prophets of the Word and the Catholics as their persecutors,155 which implicates 153 cath. fr. 14 (CSEL 52, 245): obstrepat improba contradictio, de obscuritate sacramenti et aenigmate lectionis armans impudentiam suam. 154 Tilley: 1997, 155–7, 177–9; Hoover: 2018, 101–9, 137–9. 155 c. litt. Pet. 1.21 (CSEL 52, 16): “quid igitur sibi uult, quod iste in epistula sua posuit dicentem dominum Iudaeis: ideoque mitto ad uos prophetas et sapientes et scribas, et ex illis occidetis et crucifigetis et flagellabitis [Matt 23:24]? nam si se ipsos intellegi uolunt sapientes et scribas et

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that they knew Scripture well and understood it properly. For all these reasons, it was reasonable to use arguments based on multiple Biblical quotations in polemic with the Donatists. Augustine used such chains of biblical quotations with admirable gusto while discussing the definition of the Church. The most developed line of argumentation using this method within the discussion of the definition of the Church may be found in cath. fr. 6–32. The whole structure of argument is based on the general premise that the Scripture, from the first book to the last, is replete with passages where God says that the Church is a worldwide community with roots in the Holy Land. Had God wanted so, the Bible would describe the Church as a community located only in Africa, in which case the Donatists might be right in calling their Church the true one. But what if God had restricted the geographical scope of the Church to the province of Mauretania Caesarensis? Then the Rogatists would be the only group to claim this name? But if it were confined to Byzacena, then the Maximianists would win the case. These remarks are tongue-in-cheek only to a certain extent, as in fact the issue is serious (cath. fr. 6). The divine testimonies are presented as available to anyone as sufficient material to formulate an opinion on the matter. This considerable collection of quotes forms a long chain of related passages. He starts by quoting from the Pentateuch (paragraphs 11–14), moves to the Prophets (15–19), Psalms (20–23), Gospels (24–28) and Acts of the Apostles (29–31), and ends with the Apostolic Letters and the Apocalypse (31–32). In all these cases, Augustine consistently draws parallels between the Old and the New Testament with regard to the matter. The topics of status legales is fully displayed throughout these paragraphs. Augustine proceeds in a systematic manner conscientiously selecting quotations and exempla from both Testaments. In keeping with the rules of status legales, he insists that the discussion should be based only on the clearest passages so as the contentious matter of disparate interpretations of ambiguous testimonies can be avoided (cath. fr. 8–10). We read here that even the most insane heretics cannot contradict the passages he has chosen, that even the slowest brains can understand testimonies that are so many and so manifest, and that the Donatists persist in rejecting these truths. What is perhaps even more important is that he aims to prove that the Donatist are selective: even though they do accept all that the Bible says about Christ, they pay no attention to biblical passages defining the Church as a worldwide community (cath. fr. 7). In terms of the formal pattern of argumentation, these paragraphs are loaded with rhetorical questions, exclamations and made-up dialogues (sermocinationes). While introducing the quotes, he frequently uses the imperative or coniunctivus iussivus: “legite, legant, audite”. The quotations end with challenging the opponents (“Quid ad haec dicitis?” or similar) and dismissing the Donatists as deaf or blind and/or dim-witted, given that they contradict themselves or simply reject these truths. All these rhetorical figures are used to affect the emotions of the prophetas, nos autem tamquam persecutores sapientium et prophetarum, quare nobiscum loqui nolunt, cum ad nos missi sint?” See also Tilley: 1997, 68–9 for these depictions in the earlier times.

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audience and of the jury and were among the most popular loci communes commonly used in argumentation based on the legal questions. A highly interesting series of biblical quotations is found in Cresc. 3.72, ep. 105.14–15 and, for the last time, in ep. 185.3. All these passages are built according to the same scheme, but they differ in form and in the number of quotations, just as the contexts of these three are different. To start with the similarities, we find there the recurrent use of the verb agnoscere that accompany two quotations from the same biblical passage. Each time there are also two objects linked to the verb: “Christum”, “ecclesiam”, where “Christ” always comes first and “the Church” follows. After each such utterance follows the biblical passage. Thus, the scheme may be presented in such a form: Agnoscere (in some form) Christum in [quotation], non agnoscere ecclesiam in eo quod seqitur/quod paulo post dicit [quotation].

The three passages differ in the formal sense as to the subject accompanying the verb. In Cresc. 3.72, the most polemical and scathing of the three, the form itself sounds like an accusation, as we can see in the direct polemic in the second person:

Agnoscis Christum in eo quod scriptum est: (e.g. exaltare super caelos, deus [Ps 107:6] et non agnoscis ecclesiam in eo quod sequitur: (e.g. et super omnem terram gloria tua [Ps 107:6])156

Here the pairs of quotations are drawn mostly from the Old Testament: Ps 107:6, 21:17–19, 21:28–29, 71:2–11, Mal 1:10–11, Isa 53:7–54:5. They are all introduced in the previous paragraph with a derogatory exclamation: “O uesana peruersitas hominum.” We can also find here an allusion to the blindness of the Donatists, who worship Christ – whom they do not see – and fail to notice his visible Church.157 This argument lacks any conclusion, it simply ends with the long quotation from Isa 53:7–54:5. Out of the two later instances of this pattern, the passage from ep. 185.3 shows closer affinity to the one analysed above. First of all, the introduction is very similar, referring as it does to the blindness of the Donatists, who make up a false Church, founded on slander rather than on Scripture.158 As Letter 185 is addressed to Boniface, the tribune of Africa, the Donatists are referred to in the third person. Therefore, the pattern of the argument is adjusted accordingly:

Agnoscunt nobiscum Christum in eo, quod legitur … et nolunt agnoscere ecclesiam in eo, quod post paululum sequitur […].159

156 (CSEL 52, 477–8). 157 Cresc. 3.71 (CSEL 52, 477). 158 ep. 185.2 (CSEL 57,2): “isti autem mirabili caecitate, cum ipsum Christum praeter scripturas nesciant, eius tamen ecclesiam non diuinarum litterarum auctoritate cognoscunt, sed humanarum calumniarum uanitate confingunt.” The Donatists used exactly the same locus communis at the Conference of Carthage, see Gesta Collationis Carthaginensis 3.75; 89. 159 ep. 185.3 (CSEL 57, 2–3).

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The choice of the verb nolere (“to be unwilling”) suits well the general purpose of this letter, which aims to present the stubbornness of the heretics, who still in 417 are not complying with imperial orders. The pairs of quotations are not the same as in Cresc. 3.72, however, as Augustine adds some passages from the New Testament and omits a few from the OT. What is gained is symmetry, as there are two sets of quotations from the OT (Ps 22:17–19 and 28–29, Ps 2:7–8) and two fairly well known ones from the NT (Luke 24:46–47, John 1:1 and 1:14). That makes the argument more persuasive and more accessible to the Roman official as well as to the wider audience. It is also congruent with the rules of status legales. According to them, it was preferable to either party to prove that the lawgiver had a coherent, unwavering view on the certain issue. Augustine achieves it by quoting from both Testaments. In the conclusion of this argument in ep. 185.3 the language of invective emerges – the Donatists are presented as those who contradict the Bible because they are deranged by shameless arrogance.160 The longest of the three is the argument from ep. 105.14–15. The form of this particular passage differs from the two above in that here Augustine uses the first person: Ubi agnouimus Christum in eo, quod scriptum est[…] ibi agnouimus et ecclesiam in eo, quod sequitur[…].161

Augustine introduces the whole passage by mentioning the quarrelsome tendency of the Donatist leaders. Even more, he presents them as taking pleasure in “slanderous disagreements” (“calumniosis dissensionibus gaudent”). The conclusion of this argument is quite similar to those analysed above, but more confrontational: ecce scripturae communes, ecce ubi nouimus Christum, ecce ubi nouimus ecclesiam. si Christum ipsum tenetis, ipsam ecclesiam quare non tenetis?162

Once again, Augustine expresses his astonishment that the Donatists recognise what they read about but do not see, i.e. Christ (“quem legitis et non uidetis”), while they fail to recognise what they both read about and perceive (“quam et legitis et uidetis”), i.e. the Church. The technique is the same: the biblical quotations are organised into corresponding pairs. Here Augustine starts with the New Testament,163 but later draws the material only from the Old Testament.164 Also in ep. 76.1 Augustine points at the unwillingness of his opponents to understand the Bible (“You refuse to understand this”) in the same context. This time he 160 ep. 185.3 (CSEL 57,3): “sic apparet etiam eius ecclesia non in sola Africa, sicut isti inpudentissima uanitate delirant, sed toto terrarum orbe diffusa.” 161 ep. 105.14 (CSEL 34,2, 605–6). 162 ep. 105.17 (CSEL 34,2, 610). 163 Gal 3:16 coupled with Gn 22:18. 164 Ps 2:7–8, Ps 50:1, Ps 19:5–6, Ps 22:17–19 and 28–29, Ps 57:6, Ps 72:2 and 8–11, Zep 2:11, Hb 3:3, Is 53:7 and 54:1–5.

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changes the order of the passages and starts with Ps 2:7 to add Gal 3:16 and Gen 22:18. The quotations are followed by a comment using the familiar argument concerning the visible nature of the Church. Abraham believed in it, although he did not see it, whereas the Donatists simultaneously have sight of, and hate the sight of it (“uos iam uidetis et adhuc inuidetis”). Next come Ps 22:17–19 accompanied, as usual, by Ps 22:28–29, then Ps 50:1–2 and Luke 24:44–47.165 These last two are presented one after another to underline the correspondence between the two Testaments, as is so often the case in Augustine’s exegetical writings against the Manicheans.166

5.2.2 Refutatio In the analysed material we see two attempts made by the Donatists to counter this argument of Augustine that consists in proving the universal character of the Church insisting on the parallel between the world and the Church. The first attempt is based on inartificial arguments, that is documents proving that the Donatists have been in communion with the Church overseas. In ep. 44.6, Fortunius presents Augustine with a letter from the Council of Serdica to a certain Donatus, using it as an argument to prove this. Augustine refutes this argument in two stages. First, he observes that Donatus is a common personal name and so the Donatus to whom the conciliar letter was addressed need not have belonged to the Donatist sect. Secondly, instigated by Alypius he reveals that in fact the letter was written by the Arian bishops who condemned Pope Julius and Athanasius of Alexandria. According to Augustine’s report that was enough to discredit the authority of this do­ cument and refute the argument. The second argument is proposed by the Rogatian bishop Vincent of Cartenna, whose case is discussed by Augustine in ep. 93.23. It is structured as a locus a definitione. Vincent tries to force his interpretation of the term “Catholic” by referring to its Greek etymology, where the adjective katholikos meant “universal,” “all-encompassing,” “whole,”167 Vincent skilfully claims that when linked with the noun “Church” the adjective “catholica” should be understood as relating to the community that keeps all the commandments and sacraments of God. He probably also claimed that Augustine’s definition of the term “Catholic” as referring to the worldwide, universal Church was the only argument that the Catholics used in favour of 165 Similar sequence of quotations can be found around the same time in c .litt. Pet. 2.19–2.20. Ps 22:17–9 and 28–29, Ps 2:8, Gal 3:29, Rm 8:17, Gn 22:18, Luke 24:46–7. Similar chains may also be found in c. litt. Pet. 2.33. 166 See also util. cred. 3.5, where he mentions four senses of exegesis: historical, aetiological, analogical and figurative or allegorical. Here Augustine clearly moves within the third type of exegesis. See also Evans: 2001, 147. 167 See Petlian’s remarks during the Conference of Carthage, Gesta Collationis Carthaginensis 2.90: “catholicos illud est quod graece dicitur unicum siue totum.”

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their own understanding of the Church. Augustine observes that his definition of the Church is not only based on the standard usage of the word katholikos, but on such numerous and self-evident scriptural passages that are consistent in defining the Church as worldwide that any idea contrary to this should be considered heretical. In the same letter Augustine refutes the Donatist that simply rejected the pre­ mise that the Church was really ubiquitous (ep. 93.31–35). In order to prove his point, Vincent referred to the authority of a famous Christian writer and to a “statistical” argument. An authoritative testimony about the popularity of Christian worship in Asian provinces was found in the following remark of Hilary of Poitiers in De Synodis 65: With the exception of Eleusius and the few with him, the ten provinces of Asia, where I find myself, do not really for the most part know God.168

One of Augustine’s strategies in refuting such claims was to refer to the Bible as a superior, more authoritative testimony than those of Christian bishops, as he explicitly observes in ep. 93.35.169 Even when the discussion concerns the number of Christians in a given province, Augustine believes that it is better to refer to biblical prophecies. Additionally, this trick allows him to explain the remark of Hilary in the light of scriptural testimonies (93.31–2) and attack Vincent for trying to use the authority of that famous bishop against the biblical truth. Vincent’s argument was evidently weak and made it possible for Augustine to attack him according to the lines of ambiguitas for being selective and taking Hilary’s words out of context. According to Augustine, the words of Hilary that Vincent quoted are not descriptive but were written in the form of a rebuke or reprimand. He points out the important literary feature of this literary genre by referring to Paul’s Letter to the Galatians: the greater the rebuke and the more exaggerated the moral danger hinted at in it, the more the eventual gain for the rebuked. Augustine claims that Vincent did not pay any attention to that literary context of the quoted passage. What is more, it is a general truth that if one selects a single quotation and separates it from its wider context, what we get is a distorted picture. Along with attacking the opponent’s interpretation, Augustine presents his own understanding of the given passage. He observes that Hilary may have been referring to the popularity of Arianism in Asia Minor at the time (93.31) and reprimanded those who sympathised with it (32), or that he reprimanded the Catholics in order to make them vigilant and ultimately prevent them from becoming heretics (32). Whichever motive is true, Augustine insists that this quotation from Hilary adds even more weight to the many biblical passages that employ the image of the wheat and the chaff, that is the good and the bad among the Christians (32–34).

168 English transl. by R. Teske in WSA II/1, 395. 169 See also cath. fr. 50.

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5.3 Ecclesia in meridie Augustine insists that the attempts of the Donatists to define their community as the Church were nothing more than acts of substituting themselves for the Church of God (“se pro ecclesia Christi opponere”),170 which is to say, pure fantasy.171 He constantly creates the impression that the burden of proof is on his opponents. It is they who ought to prove that the Church is confined to Africa and that this state of affairs follows from the Bible.172 On some occasions the very formulation of the issue can spark off Augustine’s irony and compel him to make a display of his mordant sense of humour. In ep. 49.3 he asks the Donatists to explain – because they may have the knowledge – how Christ had lost His inheritance in the whole world and what was left of it is now situated only in Africa, and even there, only in some places. A few lines later he reformulates this question. He asks them to explain how it was possible that Christ, having lost His Church in the whole world started to have it only among the Donatists.173 Reacting to the accusations of schism and to such provocations, the Donatists tried to prove that their status as the true Church was rooted in the Bible.174 Augustine very frequently suggests that one of their favourite verses in this context was Song of Songs 1:6: “Ubi pascis, ubi cubas in meridie,” “Where do you pasture your flocks, where you lie down in the south?” Jesse A. Hoover believes Maureen Tilley, who believed Augustine’s claim that this passage was widely used by the Donatists themselves, despite the fact that only one extant Donatist source (Tychonius) used it to that end (Tilley: 1997, 148–149, Hoover: 2018, 156). In such a case the rhetorical analysis would advise scepticism. We could safely claim that Augustine was suggesting that they use it widely precisely because he had a very good refutation of this scriptural argument. Most of his audience did not know the Donatist writings better than we do, so he could have safely “presented” the statistical regularities concerning their texts, even if he made them up. Nobody would have cared to verify Augustine’s claims. Hoover soberly notes that Augustine’s introduction of this passage is based on manipulation: the claim that Cant 1:6 is their only testimony to validate their definition of the Church is simply invalid.175 What Hoover does not 170 See ep. 93.24 (CSEL 34,2, 469): “Donatistas non audimus se pro ecclesia Christi opponentes, quia nullum pro se testimonium de diuinis libris proferunt.” 171 See ep. 185.2 (CSEL 57, 2): “eius tamen ecclesiam non diuinarum litterarum auctoritate cognoscunt, sed humanarum calumniarum uanitate confingunt.” 172 cath. fr. 39. 173 ep. 49.3 (CSEL 34,2, 142): “quaerimus ergo, ut nobis respondere non graueris, quam causam forte noueris, qua factum est, ut Christus amitteret hereditatem suam per orbem terrarum diffusam et subito in solis Afris nec ipsis omnibus remaneret. […] Dignare ergo rescribere nobis, ut sciamus, quo modo fieri possit, ut ecclesiam suam Christus de toto orbe perdiderit et in uobis solis habere coeperit.” 174 It is well presented by Hoover: 2018, 116–60. 175 Hoover: 2018, 156–7.

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notice is that Augustine highlighted that this is “the only testimony” (“unicum testimonium”) in cath. fr. 40. He used precisely these words because for the previous thirty paragraphs or more he had been presenting multiple testimonies to prove that the Church was spread throughout the whole world. In cath. fr. 39 he had neatly summarised this argumentation and moved on to the refutation of the Donatist testimonies.176 There was clearly a rhetorical logic working in the background. The same holds true for Augustine’s “observation” that Cant 1:6 was used widely by the Donatists. That claim was probable: if it were true, then the rhetorical effect would appear even stronger. Hence his argument that the Donatists used this biblical passage widely was probably just as exaggerated as the one that this was the only passage they could refer to.177 Whatever the truth was, in the analysed corpus Augustine dedicates some space to discussing this argument in cath. fr. 40–1, 51 and in ep. 93.24–5, 28.178 In cath. fr. 40 Augustine posits that the Donatists see in Song of Songs a conversation, in which the bride, that is the Church, asks the groom (i.e. to Christ): “Tell me, whom my soul has beloved, where do you graze [your flocks], where do you lie down?” and he answers: “In the south.”179 As the textbooks dictated, Augustine focuses on formal analysis and highlights two things. First, the Donatists propose to read this line as a dialogue. However, we cannot be dealing here with the question of the bride “Ubi pascis, ubi cubas?,” while the answer of the groom is “In meridie.” To prove his point, Augustine introduces a discussion of the rest of verse 6 and the first part of verse 7 verbatim to show where the question of the Church ends and the question of Christ begins:

ne forte fiam sicut operta super greges sodalium tuorum [Ct 1:6]. iam uero ille respondet: nisi cognoueris temet ipsam, o decora inter mulieres [Ct 1:7] et cetera.180

Hence, based on the basic hermeneutical rules there is no possibility whatsoever to treat the phrase “In meridie” as the bride’s interruption. The other thing of importance for him is to ridicule the understanding of the Donatists. If it was in fact the Church asking Christ where the Church was, we would then have to assume that 176 It would be also worth noting that in ep. 93.24 Augustine claims that the Donatists do not present a single testimony from Scripture to present themselves as the Church. 177 Dalvit, Dupont: 2014, 22–4, present a well argumented hypothesis that the Donatist exegesis of Cant 1:6 that Augustine refutes here is his own fabrication. Hoover does not refer to this very good paper. 178 A strikingly similar passage is to be found in the famous sermon On the shepherds (s. 46.35– 7). It is even more evidently using the arguments and loci communes prescribed for status legales. The detailed analyses of it found in Dalvit, Dupont: 2014, 9–19; Cameron: 2001, 108–13; Shaw: 2011, 104–5 lack, however, any reference to the forensic rhetoric. 179 cath. fr. 40 (CSEL 52, 283–4): “scriptum est, inquiunt, in canticis canticorum sponsa, id est ecclesia, dicente ad sponsum: ‘annuntia mihi, quem dilexit anima mea, ubi pascis, ubi cubas in meridie?’ […] Neque enim interrogat: ‘Ubi pascis, ubi cubas’, et ei respondetur: ‘In meridie’.”  180 cath. fr. 40 (CSEL 52, 284).

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the Church does not know it – which is absurd – or that one Church is asking about some other Church, which is equally ridiculous, for there is only one Church. Now he is ready to present the true meaning of the passage, that is his own understanding of it. The Church is thus asking Christ: What belongs to me in those southern regions? Where are Christ’s flocks in Africa? This is a question that a fo­ reigner coming from overseas might have asked, “out of fear of falling into the hands of some rebaptiser.” Because the greges sodalium are to be understood as the flocks of Christ’s former companions who no longer pasture His flocks but their own, which means that they are schismatics.181 Then he uses other Scriptural passages to corroborate his understanding of the quoted lines, just as Cicero advised. In the next paragraph Augustine provides us with two possible interpretations of the passage, this time focusing solely on semantic analysis. Firstly, he furnishes other biblical passages to interpret meridies as midday, noon. In this case the Donatist interpretation of Cant 1:6–7 would make no sense. Secondly, if we are to understand meridies geographically, he claims that Egypt suits the definition better than Africa. The reason is that the true south is where the south wind (auster) blows, not the south-west wind (africus). Hence, the true south is more to the east, like Egypt. Egypt is also a much better place for repose, because there live Christians striving for perfection in monasteries. In Africa, by contrast, there swarm the frenzied circumcelliones, who ravage the province. The passage ends with rhetorical devices to stir up emotions (pathos). The classical chain of three rhetorical questions, each new one longer than the last, starts with the textbook phrase: “Quid ad haec dicunt?”. As we can see, Augustine masterfully adds loci a persona and can not only operate on the level of rational argumentation, but can also whip up the emotions of his audience. The argument returns ten paragraphs later, where Augustine opts for ridicule rather than pathos. If the Donatists insist on the geographical understanding of meridies, then they must admit that it is the Maximianist Church, not their own, that is referred to in the passage from Song of Songs. The Maximianists lived mostly in Byzacena and Tripoli, so, farther south than the Donatists, who were most numerous in Numidia. A similar derisive tone underlies another passage (ep. 93.24). Augustine mocks the Rogatists, a Donatist splinter group, that they refuse to refer to this passage from Song of Songs in their defence, although they are more entitled than the Donatists to it given their respective geographical positions.182

181 Also in ep. 93.28 Augustine claims that this passage may relate to the Church in Africa exactly because it is talked of as a veiled woman, unknown and hidden and surrounded by a flock of companions, that is, by the heretics. 182 See Henry: 1996, 255–66.

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5.4 Ecclesia Christi The Donatists relied on rhetoric just as much as Augustine did in trying to prove that they were not schismatics but true Christians. One Donatist priest sent a letter to Generosus, consul of Numidia and himself a Catholic. The priest claims to be the sole medium to pass on the message of an angel who requested that he write a letter to inform Generosus of the right way to practise Christianity in Cirta. Angels as the messengers of God were credited with enough authority for such an argument to be counted among the strongest proofs (a certibus). The seven paragraphs of Augustine’s response183 present different modes of refutation of that supposedly angelic message. Augustine starts and ends the letter with arguments based on the pattern of leges contrariae, another one from the repertoire of legal questions. First of all, in the beginning of the letter he diminishes the authority of the source of the whole story by claiming that the dream was made up (ep. 53.1). In its final paragraph (ep. 53.7), he also upholds the primary version that the Donatist priest was lying as “a minister of Satan,” but supplies it with a different hypothesis: the angel may have been a messenger of Satan. He took on the form of an angel of light to deceive the Donatist priest, who was clearly oblivious of the warning of Saint Paul (in 2 Cor 11:14–5). In the next move within this pattern, Augustine discusses the message as if coming from a real angel, only to set the angel’s words against a series of suitable passages from the Bible. He starts with Paul’s warning (Gal 1:8) that even angels proclaiming a different gospel should be anathema to Christians. Then, he only needs to prove that the angel’s gospel is false. He achieves that goal by observing that the real Gospel tells us about global Christianity and the Catholic Church as of the descendants of Abraham, whereas the angel talked about Christianity in Cirta only, hence he ought to be anathema. The second paragraph takes up the theme of Abraham’s descendants to discredit the angel’s idea of Cirtian Christianity. Augustine inserts the list of the successors of Saint Peter to the see in Rome, where not a single Donatist can be found. Then there follows an insult, when he observes that for these couple of Africans there came a Donatist priest to Rome, and that this community had the strangest names, Montenses184 and Cutzupitani.185 183 Alypius and Fortunatus bishop of Cirta have also signed the letter. 184 The term was first used by Optatus of Milevis in De schismate Donatistarum 2.4 to mock the Donatists residing in Rome. He claimed that they were not allowed to meet in many Roman Churches, so they were meeting in a cave somewhere in the hills outside of the city. This term was picked up by Jerome and Augustine. Rossi in Muscae moriturae, p. 193–200 proposes a hypothesis that the Donatists themselves used this label because of its connotation with the Holy Mountain of Sion. This hypothesis is further developed by Dalvit: 2013, 173–188. In this very good paper, Dalvit convincingly argues that the Donatists referring to Hab 3:3 called Donatus “sanctus de monte” and also considered themselves to be “montes sancti” which is evident from the testimony of en. Ps. 10.1. 185 The word of Greek, Punic or Coptic etymology was used as the synonym of circumcelliones. As we learn form Isidore of Sevilla, Etymologiae 8.5.53. Lorenz: 1971, 54–9 posits that Augustine uses this derogatory term in reference to the Roman Donatists in order to mock them.

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5.5 Multi aut pauci Christiani One of the defensive lines of arguments the Donatists developed in defending against the charge of schism was based on the divine testimonies and exempla proving that there had always been only a few faithful who formed the true, holy community of God’s people. They evoked Enoch as a righteous biblical figure, along with Noah and his family, Lot and his daughters, and the ten tribes of Israel who betrayed Rehoboam, Solomon’s son, while only two of the twelve tribes remained faithful, and, in similar proportions, seventy-two apostles left Christ and only twelve stayed with him.186 Hence, they concluded, there would be nothing extraordinary if the whole Christian world had betrayed and left Christ and only a few remained righteous and faithful. In a word, as Maureen Tilley observed, the Donatists pictured themselves as the collecta of Israel (1997: 177–179; Hoover: 2018, 137– 139). Augustine responds to this claim according to the rules of status legales called scriptum et voluntas. In doing so, Augustine concedes that the passages mentioned by the Donatists were indeed written (scripta sunt) in the Bible. Then, he moves on to discuss just one exemplum of division after Solomon’s death. He points to other biblical passages concerning the same events, some of which say that the part of the community that stayed with Solomon’s slave was in fact called Israel, while the smaller one that took the side of Solomon’s son was called Judah. In line with these observations, Augustine refers to the passages where the tribe of Judah is presented as more sinful than Israel, and also indicates that there were prophets among the Israelites, such as Elijah. In the conclusion of the argument we hear that it could never have been God’s intention to instigate a schism. The Donatists must have clearly misunderstood the passage, as it refers exclusively to political, not religious divisions. He finishes by aptly introducing the topic discussed in the next two pa­ ragraphs concerning the mixed nature of the Christian community by highlighting the evil and good people in both Judah and Israel. In paragraph 36 of cath. fr. Augustine yet again takes up the argument that the righteous have always been few. He especially mocks the Donatists’ tendency to conceive of themselves as elite.187 This time his refutation is slightly different, as it is based on leges contrariae, where two parties relied on contradicting laws. Both shared the same purpose: to defend one law or one group of testimonies against the other.188 Already in the classical times it was problematic to undermine the authority of any law. In the realm of the Christian polemic, however, this issue was even more contentious. Nevertheless, Augustine starts with outright mockery, by claiming that his opponents misuse the testimonies, when they emphasise that the true followers of Christ were only few and far between. After all, the Donatist splinter groups – the Rogatists and the Maximianists – were even less numerous. If indeed 186 cath. fr. 33. 187 See also Hoover: 2018, 137–9. 188 Which is clear from e.g. part. orat. 138.

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the smaller the community was, the more virtuous their members were, then the Donatists’ claim turned against themselves, which was inevitably ridiculous, given that it was they who had formulated that argument. Then, he posits that the passage quoted by the Donatists (Matt 7:13–4) should be considered in the context of other, more numerous passages that even more evidently emphasise that the Church is a very large community. He makes a clear reference to leges contrariae by stating that he cannot dismiss the scriptural exempla – even if they are used by heretics – as untrue. He then takes advantage of this concession by inviting the Donatists to read all the testimonies that he furnished and admit that they had misinterpreted those biblical passages.

Chapter 4. The charge of rebaptism

1. Status definitionis The longest uninterrupted passage concerning the charge of rebaptism is found in c. litt. Pet. 1.1–11. Based on quotations from Petilian’s letter inserted there one can draw conclusions concerning the krinomenon pattern of this case. Petilian claims that their opponents accuse them of “double baptism” or “rebaptism” (bis baptisma). In what follows he clearly relies on the definition of this act to reject the charge. He argues that the Donatists cannot be committing double baptism, because none of those whom they baptize has had a valid baptism. Even if the Catholics had earlier received what they called baptism, it was void of power, for the power of the sacrament is rooted in the innocence of the person administering it.1 Briefly: the Donatist claim that they do not rebaptize, but simply baptize. At times, Augustine is willing to destroy such arguments of his opponents and engage in a discussion of this charge within this status. Hence, the scheme of argumentation can be reconstructed as follows: Accusatio: You commit the crime of rebaptism.2 Depulsio: We do not, for the Catholics do not have a valid baptism.3 Quaestio: Is the act of the Donatists a baptism or rebaptism? Ratio: Baptism is valid only if the dispenser was innocent – and the Catholic bis­ hops were guilty of traditio or polluted by traditores remaining in communion with them.4 1 At least this is how Augustine presents Petilian’s argument. 2 c. litt. Pet. 1.2 (CSEL 52, 4): “quod eis obiciamus bis baptisma, qui sub nomine baptismi animas nostras reo lauacro polluimus.” In ep. 23.2 rebaptism is called the most wicked of crimes: “rebaptizare autem catholicum, immanissimum scelus est.” This charge found its way to the Edict of Union, published in February 405 – CTh 16.6.4: “In tantum enim sceleris progressi dicuntur hi, quos donatistas vocant, ut baptisma sacrosanctum mysteriis recalcatis temeritate noxia iterarint et homines semel, ut traditum est, munere divinitatis ablutos contagione profanae repetitionis infecerint. Ita contigit, ut haeresis ex schismate nasceretur.” According to this narrative, the heretical nature of their schism lay precisely in the crime of rebaptism. 3 c. litt. Pet. 1.2: “demonstrare uoluerit nos baptismum non habere, et ideo se non repetere quod iam erat, sed dare quod non erat.” Ibid., 2.58: “nam cum reus falsa committas, bis baptisma ego non facio quod semel ipse non facis.” 4 c. litt. Pet 1.2 (CSEL 52, 4): “conscientia dantis attenditur, quae abluat accipientis;” ep. 89.5 (CSEL 34,2, 422): “de baptismo solent dicere, tunc esse uerum baptismum Christi, cum ab homine iusto datur.” c. litt. Pet. 2.4 CSEL 52, 24): “bis baptisma nobis obiciunt hi qui sub nomine baptismi

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Infirmatio rationis: The quality of the baptism’s minister does not relate to its vali­ dity, which is wholly dependent on Christ’s action in the sacrament.5 Iudicatio: What constitutes the validity of baptism: God’s hidden action or the innocence of its minister? Within the status definitionis there is one main goal that Augustine sets for his persuasion: to reject the defence of the Donatists by proving that the Catholics have a valid baptism. This he achieves by undermining the ratio, that is, by arguing that the idea of the validity of baptism presented by the Donatists is contrary to God’s decree that one finds in the Bible and Church tradition. To prove this he would mainly have to cross over into the field of status legales, as the discussion is based on the frequently quoted divine and human testimonies. The other popular means of persuasion used here are syllogistic or deductive argumentation (ratiocinatio), arguments from comparison (locus a comparatione) and ridicule.

1.1 Divina testimonia Augustine uses scriptural quotations to prove that the Donatist definition of valid baptism contradicts the rules established by God. In c. litt. Pet., in accordance with the procedures of leges contrariae, he focuses on such commonplace moral principles as: “It is good to place one’s trust in the Lord, not in man (Ps 118:8),” “Cursed is everyone who places his hope in a human being (Jer 17:5).”6 In addition, this move enables Augustine to present the Donatists as arrogant men who put themselves above God. In ep. 89.5 he uses the latter quotation to start with a general moral rule and praise the value of humility. He then quotes from John 1:33: “It is Christ who baptizes,” to present a specific rule concerning baptism: the humble Catholic Church entrusts the sacraments to God, not to man.7 In ep. 108.3 this Johannine quotation is linked with Eph 5:25–26. Paul claims in this passage that Christ has

animas suas reo lauacro polluerunt, quibus equidem obscenis sordes cunctae mundiores sunt, quos peruersa munditia aqua sua contigit inquinari.” 5 c. litt. Pet 1.8 (CSEL 52, 8): “non enim in ministrum per quem baptizor credo, sed in eum qui iustificat impium, ut deputetur mihi fides ad iustitiam.” ep. 89.5 (CSEL 34,2, 422), [John 1:33]: “ipse est qui baptizat in spiritu sancto.” ep. 51.5 (CSEL 34,2, 149): “baptismus [...] est [...] illius, de quo dictum est: his est qui baptizat.” 6 c. litt. Pet 1.4 (CSEL 52,5): “contra scripturas sanctas, quae dicunt: bonum est confidere in domino quam confidere in homine [Ps 118,8] et: maledictus omnis qui spem suam ponit in homine [Ier 17,5], spem baptizandorum auferunt a domino deo et in homine ponendam esse persuadent.” 7 ep. 89.5 (CSEL 34,2, 422). Augustine quotes the whole passage: “qui me misit baptizare in aqua, ipse mihi dixit: super quem uideris spiritum descendentem quasi columbam et manentem super eum, ipse est, qui baptizat in spiritu sancto.” See also ep. 51.5, where he gives only the short quotation: “hic est, qui baptizat.”

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cleansed the Church and made her holy “by the bath of water.”8 The Donatists are presented as taking the baptism away from Christ, to whom it belongs, and substituting Christ with man as the one who sanctifies the baptized. Augustine supplies this argument with the persuasive image of the rite of rebaptism, where a Donatist priest expels God from the convert in the rite of exsufflation. Normally this rite served to expel demons, but in the case of rebaptism, Augustine claimed, the only spirit that inhabited the soul of the baptized person was the Holy Spirit.9 Petilian also prepared the Donatist defence by arguing on the basis of divine testimonies mixed with syllogistic reasoning. Burris, who analyzed the fragments of Petilian’s works, observed that his polemics concerning baptism focus on two key terms – conscientia, which can be translated as both “conscience” and “conscientiousness”, and origo – the “beginning” or “root” (2012, 114–17). Hence, in the case of baptism, one needs to search for its validity in the “conscientia” of its dispenser, by which the “conscientia” of the recipient is cleansed.10 Petilian insisted that everything draws its essence from its source or root – that everything needs a head (or a beginning – “caput”), without which it does not exist: “omnis enim res origine et radice consistit, et si caput non habet aliquid, nihil est.”11 This observation was used as a premise to justify the claim that whoever receives faith from the faithless, in fact receives not faith but guilt: “nam qui fidem a perfido sumpserit non fidem percipit sed reatum.”12 Petilian supplied this reasoning with a very indirect refe­ rence to the biblical image of the seed that dies (John 12:24), simultaneously alluding to the regenerative character of baptism:13 “nec quicquam bene regenerat, nisi bono semine regeneretur.”14 These quotations from Petilian that Augustine repeats throughout the first eight paragraphs of his letter are cleverly selected. The very reason for the choice and constant repeating of the quotations is primarily to qualify his religious opponent as relying on syllogistic reasoning. The main premise of Petilian’s thinking would thus belong to the most firm basis of reasoning according to Quintilian: indeed, everyone can agree that “everything consists of an origin and root.”15 As such it was a

8 ep. 108.3 (CSEL 34,2, 614): “numquid Christus exsufflaretur in baptismo suo, de quo dictum est: hic est, qui baptizat [John 1,33], de quo dictum est: Christus dilexit ecclesiam suam et tradidit se ipsum pro ea, ut eam sanctificaret mundans eam lauacro aquae in uerbo [Eph 5,25sq.]? numquid ergo in ipso suo lauacro exsufflaretur, si nomen domini esset iucundius, cuius est ipse baptismus, quam nomen hominum, de quibus dicitis: sanctum est, quod ille dat, non quod ille?” 9 This argument had already been used by Optatus of Milevis in De schismate Donatistarum 4.6.4. 10 See footnote 4 above. c. litt. Pet 1.2 (CSEL 52, 4): “conscientia dantis attenditur, quae abluat accipientis,” and also c. litt. Pet. 2.6. 11 c. litt. Pet. 1.6 (CSEL 52, 6). 12 Ibid.. 13 It was common to call it a sacrament of regeneration. 14 c. litt. Pet. 1.8 (CSEL 52, 8). 15 Inst. 5.10.11–12, see also Lausberg: 1998, 167.

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distorted and manipulated presentation, for the Donatists in general, and Petilian in particular, were known for their arguing on the basis of the Bible. In response to this secular approach to argumentation Augustine developed a twofold tactic. On the one hand, he picked quotations from the Bible where Christ was presented as the source or head. This enabled him to present the Donatists as substituting Christ with a human being, in keeping with his earlier statements. Equally importantly, he was also able to create the impression that Petilian’s sophisticated reasoning was simply poor. In the context of the sacrament of baptism, any use of the metaphors of “head”, “source” or “root” to apply to the human minister of the sacrament was hardly justifiable. Augustine argues on the basis of the definition of “origo” and “caput” to show that Saint Paul in his letters coherently saves this name for God, and that one cannot receive faith from anyone else but God. In 1 Cor 3:6–7 Paul observes that he only planted, Apollos only watered, but God gave growth, and in John 15:5 Christ calls himself “the vine” and all his followers “branches.”16 Now Augustine can rhetorically ask if it was Paul who was the head or source or Apollos the root of those whom he watered. Through the passage from Rom 4:5 Augustine shows next that God is the source of justification of the ungodly, through Gal 3:26 that Christ is the dispenser of faith, through Tit 3:5 that Christ has saved us through the washing of regeneration.17 To drive the point home, Augustine refers to saint Paul’s claim in Eph 5:23 that Christ is the head of the Church. If we read Petilian’s theses in the context of all these and similar biblical images we would have to understand that in the sacrament of baptism only God can be called “caput” or “origo”. It is in the same vein that Augustine finally quotes Petilian’s clearly biblical argument, which he is able to reject using similar tactics. When Petilian (c. litt. Pet. 9) was comparing the dispensers of baptism to the biblical good and bad trees (Matt 7:16–17), Augustine would present this comparison as erroneous, because it neglected the fact that it is God who gives growth (1 Cor 3:7). When Petilian claimed that a baptism received from someone dead will not do anyone any good (Sir 34:30), Augustine answered that it is Christ who baptizes with the Holy Spirit (John 1:33), and that Christ lives and never dies (Rom 6:9). As we can see, Augustine again rejects the more specific scriptural rule by a more general one, operating within one of the suggested patterns of leges contrariae. Augustine attacks the reasoning of Petilian using other tactics, too; he meets him on the common ground of syllogistic argumentation. The reasoning of the Donatists may be presented in the syllogistic scheme: 16 c. litt. Pet. 1.6 (CSEL 52, 7): “aut uero apostolus Paulus caput est et origo eorum quos plantauerat aut Apollo radix est eorum quos rigauerat ac non ille, qui eis incrementum dederat, cum idem dicat: ego plantaui, Apollo rigauit, sed deus incrementum dedit; itaque neque qui plantat est aliquid neque qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat deus [1 Cor 3:6 f.]; nec radix eorum erat ipse, sed potius ille qui ait: ego sum uitis, uos estis sarmenta [John 15,5].” 17 c. litt. Pet. 1.8 (CSEL 52, 8): “semper enim Christus iustificat impium faciendo ex impio christianum, semper a Christo percipitur fides, semper Christus est origo regeneratorum et caput ecclesiae.”

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The righteousness/lack of guilt of the baptizer makes the sacrament valid. Bishop X is righteous/lacks guilt. The baptism dispensed by bishop X is valid. Augustine introduces a dialectical complication into this scheme by making a division within the definition of the middle term in this syllogism – “How do we know who is righteous?” he asks.18 We ought to accept that our knowledge of the innocence of any person is vulnerable to error. What if someone who seems completely righteous is in fact a sinner? Augustine wants to discuss the specific case: does the apparent lack of a baptizer’s guilt make the sacrament valid as well, or only true lack of guilt?19 The argument is shaped in the form of complexio: if Petilian gave the first answer, he would have to either admit that baptism by a sinner is also valid, or rebaptize people from his own community who had been baptized by men whose guilt was only later revealed. It would create unending complications, as no one is beyond suspicion. Thus Augustine suggests that the Donatists would choose the second answer.20 In that case they would have to somehow demonstrate the validity of the baptism dispensed by a man who appeared innocent but was in fact sinful. He claims that the Donatists would answer that, in such a case, God enters and makes the baptism holy. On this particular occasion Augustine is happy to use an exclamation highlighting the absurdity of this sort of explanation, because it allows him to bring their reasoning ad absurdum.21 He also comes out with a joke: according to this reasoning we should all strive only to be baptized by actual sinners who appear innocent, for in this case it is Christ who baptizes; in all other cases it is only a man, who, however innocent, will always be worse than Christ.22 This argument is also nicely linked with locus a persona in c. litt. Pet. 10. Augustine quotes from Petilian to prove that the Donatists used to call sinners “dead” and 18 I base my discussion here on c. litt. Pet. 1.2–6 and 10, ep. 89.5 and ep. 105.12. 19 c. litt. Pet. 1.6 (CSEL 52, 6): “quaerimus itaque nos, cum ille baptizator perfidus latet, si tunc ille quem baptizat fidem percipit, non reatum, si tunc ei non est baptizator eius origo et radix et caput: quis est a quo accipit fidem, ubi est origo de qua oritur, ubi radix unde germinat, ubi caput unde incipit?” 20 ep. 89.5 (CSEL 34,2, 423): “illos autem uana sentientes tanta absurditas sequitur, ut, quo ab ea fugiant, non inueniant. cum enim fateantur ratum et uerum esse baptismum, quando baptizat apud eos aliquis criminosus, cuius crimina latent, dicimus eis: quis tunc baptizat? nec habent, quid respondeant, nisi: deus, neque enim possunt dicere, quod homo adulter quemquam sanctificat. quibus respondemus: si ergo, cum baptizat homo iustus manifestus, ipse sanctificat, cum autem baptizat homo iniquus occultus, tunc non ipse sed deus sanctificat, optare debent, qui baptizantur, ab occultis malis hominibus potius baptizari quam a manifestis bonis; multum enim eos melius deus quam quilibet homo iustus sanctificat. quod si absurdum est, ut quisque baptizandus optet ab occulto adultero potius baptizari quam a manifesto casto, restat utique, ut, quilibet ministrorum hominum accesserit, ideo ratus sit baptismus, quia, super quem columba descendit, ipse baptizat.” 21 ep. 89.5. 22 c. litt. Pet. 1.7 (CSEL 52, 7): “laborandum est omnibus qui baptizantur, ut baptizatores perfidos habeant et ignorent eos. quamlibet enim bonos habuerint, Christus est utique incomparabiliter melior, qui tunc erit baptizati caput, si perfidus lateat baptizator.”

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innocent people “alive”. If we allow the possibility that there exist secretly sinful administers of baptism, we would have to admit the great arrogance of the Donatists, for when a sinner is known only to God he still passes as alive; only when they establish his guilt does he become dead. This arrogance is also mocked in ep. 185.8: They go so far as to say that someone whom they baptize is made righteous by them; here there only remains for them to say that someone who is baptized by them should believe in the one who baptizes him.23

1.2 Humana testimonia Apart from one brief quotation from the Edict of Unity of 405 issued by the emperor Theodosius on the sacrilegious character of rebaptism, which is clearly used as an artificial proof in ep. 105.12, the most interesting discussion concerns Cyprian of Carthage. As Mathew Gaumer put it “rebaptism was traditional North African praxis, with Donatists considering it to be rooted in their earliest history and ratified by their martyr-hero Cyprian.”24 G. Bavaud presents in detail that the Donatists had a better hand than Augustine in this game of winning the authority of Cyprian on account of their understanding of the validity of baptism.25 The words of the Carthaginian bishop and martyr bore the weight of a sanctified tradition, of a law. In a long treatise De baptismo, Augustine tackles this issue in the most complete form; among the letters, only ep. 93.35–42 and ep. 108.9–12 discuss the authority of Cyprian in the context of rebaptism. Augustine seems to confront himself with an impossible task: he could not simply omit Cyprian or dismiss his authority, but he also could not have let the Donatists use Cyprian’s authority to refute the Catholic charge of rebaptism. In the two analyzed letters we can sense how puzzled and undecided he is. Within the space of two paragraphs he can make two contradictory claims, namely that he does not dismiss the words of Cyprian concerning baptism as false and that he does (ep. 93.39–40). We could however clearly observe the presence of status legales patterns (here: leges contrariae) throughout these paragraphs that enable us to understand what is in fact happening. In ep. 93 Augustine plainly states that his opponents claim to follow Cyprian’s authority in rebaptizing.26 He commences his argument with a comparison between Saint Peter and Cyprian. This is an argument 23 ep. 185.37 (CSEL 57, 33): scimus quidem illos tantam sibi adrogare iustitiam, ut eam se iactent non solum habere sed etiam aliis hominibus dare. a se quipped dicunt iustificari eum, quem baptizauerint, ubi nihil eis restat nisi dicere illi, qui baptizatur ab eis, ut in baptizatorem suum credat. English translation after Teske WSA II/3, 200. 24 Gaumer: 2016, 93. 25 Bavaud: 1964, 9–30. 26 ep. 93.36 (CSEL 34,2, 481): “cuius auctoritatem ad rebaptizandum sequi uos dicitis.”

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based on partial similarity (dissimile)27: both men voiced erroneous ideas, but, unlike Cyprian, Peter is known to have corrected his. Here we find a clear statement: that Cyprian in his own letters and in the letters of Church councils (that are not canonical, Augustine hastens to observe) presented an opinion concerning baptism that is contrary to the practice (consuetudo) and idea or essence (forma) of the Church.28 Augustine also admits that there are no traces of change in Cyprian’s opinion on this issue (something, dare I say, he craved to find).29 For Augustine, however, this does not mean that Cyprian did not ultimately change it.30 But even if he did, the Donatists would never allow such writings of his to surface, because their content would condemn the practice of rebaptism as erroneous. Hence, Cyprian might have corrected it and we may have not even known it.31 This was the first locus a fictione – “the fictitious application of a locus”32 used in this passage. In the words of Quintilian one was supposed to make a fictional hypothesis: “that, if true, would solve or help to solve our problem.”33 The second was even better developed and consisted of some points of interest to philologists. Augustine refers to a hypothesis of some unnamed men who suggested that Cyprian never wrote any such erroneous statements about baptism, that, quite to the contrary, all these texts where he is found to do so were written in his name by some evil liars.34 Augustine carries on with the comparison of Cyprian with Peter, and congruently compares the textual history of his manuscripts and the biblical ones. The comparison is presented in the mode a maiore ad minus: even the Bible, which had been copied so many times with such a well documented history of textual transmission, was in danger of being contaminated by interpolations and additions, numerous were evil authors who wrote their erroneous ideas under the names of the Apostles.35 In the case of the relatively less familiar texts of Cyprian this was perhaps even more probable, given that their manuscripts were less numerous and not as commonly known. In the next move, Augustine himself rejects the reasoning presented above. By referring to the works of Cyprian in which we find his ideas concerning rebaptism, the Catholic party can even more easily win the more important argument with the 27 Inst. 5.10.73–4. 28 ep. 93.38 (CSEL 34,2, 482): “Cyprianus autem sensisse aliter de baptismo, quam forma et consuetudo habebat ecclesiae, non in canonicis sed in suis et in concilii litteris inuenitur.” 29 Ibid.: “correxisse autem istam sententiam non inuenitur.” 30 Here he definitely tries to make his comparison of Cyprian with Saint Peter fully similar. 31 Ibid.: “non incongruenter tamen de tali uiro existimandum est, quod correxerit et fortasse suppressum sit ab eis, qui hoc errore nimium delectati sunt et tanto uelut patrocinio carere noluerunt.” 32 This is the definition Lausberg: 1998, 189. 33 Inst. 5.10.95: “nam fingere hoc loco hoc est: proponere aliquid, quod, si verum sit, aut solvat quaestionem aut adiuvet; deinde id, de quo quaeritur, facere illi simile.” 34 ep. 93.38 (CSEL 34,2, 482–3): “quamquam non desint, qui hoc Cyprianum prorsus non sensisse contendant, sed sub eius nomine a praesumptoribus atque mendacibus fuisse confictum.” 35 Ibid.

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Donatists concerning schism.36 The certainty of Augustine is, I presume, based mostly on rhetoric. In the handbooks of rhetoric, the discussion on the hierarchy of different laws presented those more general, and more frequently repeated as bearing more authority. Every educated person knew this rule. Hence, even if it is true that Cyprian believed in the necessity of rebaptizing heretics, it does not matter, because his rules concerning schism and the unity of Church are more important and speak against the Donatists. In the same texts that they quote to support their understanding of baptism, Cyprian presents himself as the constant defender of the unity of the Church and rejects all motives for creating schism. Augustine allows himself a tinge of mockery: although the Donatists try to hide behind the authority of Cyprian, escaping from danger as ships moored in a harbour, the rocks that are hidden beneath the water guarantee that they will ultimately sink. Even if Cyprian made a mistake, he covered it with his love for truth and unity, for “Love covers over a multitude of sins” (1 Pt 4:8); thus, we should consider him to have been corrected.37 The other reason is that he died a martyr, and martyrdom is only valid if the reason for it is love38 and because one is “killed for the name of Christ in the bosom of unity.”39

1.3 Comparison: Maximianists As we have already seen, when the Maximianist schism broke out, the Donatists excommunicated all the bishops staying in communion with Maximian in 394 in Bagaï. Later on they welcomed back many of them, even though during their time outside of the Donatist community such bishops as Praetextatus of Assuras and Felician of Musti were baptizing and ordaining bishops in their schismatic community. All these people were accepted by the Donatists without any mention of invalidity of the baptism procured by the schismatic Maximianists while they were excommunicated. These actions became the source of the frequently employed argument in Augustine’s accusations based on status definitionis.40 He presents it as an exemplum contrarium not only to refute their own definition of the validity of the baptism, but also to easily reject all the divine testimonies that they reached for to corroborate it.

36 ep. 93.39 (CSEL 34,2, 483): “nos tamen duas ob res non negamus illud sensisse Cyprianum, quod et stilus eius habet quandam propriam faciem, qua possit agnosci, et quod ibi magis contra uos causa nostra demonstratur inuictior uestraeque separationis praesumptio, uidelicet ne macularemini peccatis alienis, tota facilitate subuertitur.” On the references to Cyprian in the argument concerning schism, see above, ch. 3. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 ep. 108.9. 40 ep. 108.1–6, 70.2, 51.5, 76.4, c. litt. Pet. 1.11–12, 17–18.

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In ep. 108.1 Augustine begins by accusing his Donatist counterpart in Hippo, Bishop Macrobius, of rebaptism. Macrobius had heard this charge before, and through third parties answered that he was basically doing what he had been asked by people who wanted to be baptized.41 This is a clear example of defence based on status qualitatis – shifting of responsibility – remotio criminis. Augustine, however, does not allow the conflict to rest within this status, and he states a more general problem (quaestio): how is it possible that a person baptized by a Catholic does not have a baptism and wants to receive it from Macrobius? To this, he suggests, the Donatists, who do not understand what was written (scriptum), would quote Prov 9:18: “Keep away from the water of another, and do not drink from the font of another.” Instead of discussing this question on the basis of the status legalis called “letter and meaning” (scriptum et voluntas) and presenting a different interpretation, Augustine prefers to introduce first the argument based on the exemplum of the Maximianists. Dialectical reasoning, suggests Augustine, allows for only two solutions, either Felician and his like took the baptismal font away from the Donatists, or they did not. If the former, it necessarily follows that the Donatists’ baptism became void of power; if the latter, Felician should have been baptized again on coming back, but he was not.42 The same quotation is repeated later in the same letter to start the passage where Augustine refutes the Donatist interpretations of a few biblical testimonies. This time Augustine turns to status legales to clarify the sense (voluntas) of Prov 9:18 – the water is always God’s, even if it is in the hands of someone unworthy. He claims that the Donatists de facto agreed with this understanding when they did not rebaptize Maximian.43 In refutation of the other biblical passages furnished by the Donatists, Augustine is mostly interested here in showing that the fact that they did not rebaptize Maximianists undermines their understanding of those passages. They did not practice what they preached. It is worth noting that Augustine underlines his belief that their practice was praiseworthy – it was only their definition of validity of baptism that was false. Thus, although he points out that he does not agree with their interpretation of Jer 15:18 (“They have become for me like deceitful water that has no faith”), Sir 34:30 (“If one is baptized by someone dead, what good does his bath do?”), Ps 141:5 (“Let not the oil of a sinner anoint my head”), it does not really matter. For even if their understanding of them was right, they still acted contrary to them when they received the Maximianists back without rebaptism.44 41 ep. 108.1 (CSEL 34,2, 612): “carissimi filii mei, honorabiles uiri, cum ad tuam beniuolen­ tiam adtulissent litteras meas, quibus admonui rogauique te, ne subdiaconum nostrum rebaptizares, rescripserunt mihi te respondisse: non possum nisi ad me uenientes suscipere et eis fidem, quam postulauerint, dare.” 42 ep. 108.1; 70.2. 43 ep. 108.6. 44 Ibid., (CSEL 34,2, 618–19): “sed quo modo libet hoc intellegatis, certe in eis, quos in sacrilegio Maximiani Felicianus et Praetextatus baptizauerunt, aut peccatorum oleum suscepistis aut etiam peccatoribus ministrantibus datum Christi esse oleum cognouistis; neque enim non erant

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Sometimes this reference to the exemplum of Maximianists is tightly linked with the argumentation concerning the charge of schism. On such occasions Augustine may build his persuasion on either pathos or logos. In the dialectical mode he uses a figure called complexio, which consists in posing the question of whether the Maxi­ mianists themselves, after breaking away from the Donatist community, administered true or false baptism. If their baptism was true, the Catholic baptism must also necessarily be true, and practising rebaptism is wrong. If it was false, then also the Maximianists ought to have been rebaptized when received back to communion.45 A beautiful example of amplificatio is found in the ending of ep. 51. Already in its introduction Augustine states that there will not be enough tears to deplore the fact that the Donatists accept the baptism of their schismatics and tend to exsufflate the sacrament of the universal Church, and specifically of the named apostolic Churches.46 The power of the “Maximianist argument” is so strong that, once again, although Augustine quotes from John 1:33, he does not follow it with any further discussion of his interpretation, but immediately moves on to talk about the Maxi­ mianists. He says: “their case strikes even blind eyes.”47 Then, he goes on to provide equally exaggerated short comparisons of the Maximianists with the whole world that conform to the a minore ad maius pattern: If the Maximianists were worthy of being received back without rebaptism, then even more so were the adherents of the Catholic Church. A particularly well crafted comparison of a different kind is introduced in ep. 23. In this letter Augustine, while still being a priest, deals with the case of a rebaptized former Catholic deacon in Mutugenna in Numidia. Despite the conciliatory tone of the letter, Augustine presents his addressee with the accusation of rebaptism, that he calls “imanissimum scelus.” Sensing some hesitation on the part of Maximinus, who later in fact returned to the Catholic party, Augustine inserts a feigned dialogue (sermocinatio) in which his addressee is put in the role of hypothetical defender of the Catholic understanding of baptism. After this strange rhetorical exercise Augustine goes on with a very long passage in which baptism is compared to peccatores, quando de illis in Bagaiensi concilio dicebatur: famosi criminis reos, qui funesto opere perditionis uas sordidum collecta faculentia glutinarunt, damnatos esse cognoscite.” 45 ep. 70.2 (CSEL 34,2, 247): “si uerum baptismum dabat, qui cum Maximiano communicabat, quare accusatur baptismus orbis terrarum? si autem falsum baptismum dabat, quando cum Maximiano communicabat, quare sic sunt recepti cum illo, quos in schismate Maximiani baptizauit, et nemo eos in parte uestra rebaptizauit?” See also ep. 76.4; c. litt. Pet. 1.17–18. 46 ep. 51,5 (CSEL 34,2, 148): “quibus igitur sufficimus lacrimis plangere recipi baptismum Maximianistarum et exsufflari baptismum orbis terrarum? siue auditos siue inauditos siue iuste siue iniuste damnastis Felicianum, damnastis Praetextatum, dic mihi: quem Corinthiorum episcopum audiuit aut damnauit aliquis uestrum? quem Galatarum, quem Ephesiorum, quem Colossensium, Philippensium, Thessalonicensium ceterarumque omnium ciuitatum.” The Donatists would revere the soil brought from these Churches, but people coming from them would be exsufflated, see ep. 52.2. See also c. litt. Pet. 1.12. 47 ep. 51.5 (CSEL 34,2, 148): “ad illa, quae praesto sunt, aduerte; ea, quae oculos etiam caecos feriunt, intuere.”

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circumcision. Actually, circumcision is presented as a sacrament that Jesus had also received. It is also interpreted as being the predecessor of baptism, as its equivalent, before the coming of Christ made it devoid of sense. Augustine even admits that he himself would have been glad to have been a Jew in those times, and that he would most certainly have received circumcision. But if a hypothetical Samaritan had come to the Jew Augustine and asked to be admitted to the Jewish community, there would be no physical possibility to circumcise him, because Samaritans also practised circumcision as a rite of initiation. Augustine concludes that just as there is no place for another circumcision on the only member of the body where it is possible, so there is no place in the heart for a repeated baptism, unless someone has “duplicia corda.” We might call it the argument from the impossibility of re-circumcision.

2. Status coniecturalis In documenting various cases of rebaptism in his letters Augustine seems to develop a special preference for employing pathos and ridicule as means of persuasion. Cicero claims in Inv. 2.47–51 that although loci communes can be used in all cases, few orators use them, for they need to be handled properly by masters of rhetoric only – but even they use them only rarely, because only then can they bring the intended effect. They should be used with caution and only as an addition to an already-formulated argument. The passages where loci communes were used are easily discernible because of the relative abundance of various figures of style and a more sophisticated vocabulary: in a word, they contain amplificatio. There were several aims of using loci communes, the most important being: stirring up a feeling of hatred (indignatio) towards the opponent and mercy (misericordia) towards one’ own party. One should not overlook the fact that in Cicero’s rhetorical terminology indignatio is either the feeling of vehement hatred or the rhetorical structure that arouses that feeling among the jury or the audience. The specific rules related to indignatio in the latter sense are presented in Inv. 1.100–105. They consist of the list of fifteen loci to be exploited on such occasions. In the example of this kind of persuasion discussed below, taken from ep. 34 and 35, Augustine used eight of them (The numbering below reflects the sequential order adopted by Cicero in inv. 1.101–105): 1. Invoking Gods, kings or sages as authorities who have opposed such acts; 2. Showing the status of the afflicted by means of amplification; 6. Proving that the action was done on purpose; 7. Labelling the act as foul, cruel or nefarious, conveyed through force, violence or the use of money; 8. Presenting the act as exceptional and unlikely to be committed even by inhumane beasts, for instance by presenting the actions as directed against one’s biological or foster parents, or against the defenceless – children, old men and

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women, “quibus ex omnibus acriter excitata indignatio summum in eum qui violarit horum aliquid odium commovere poterit.”48. 9. comparing to other crimes; 10. using evidentia49 – a detailed narrative of the act – so that the jury could almost see the actions with their own eyes; 11. showing how unbecoming this act was, especially for this man who should instead have been the first to defend the victim against such an act; Cicero concludes that one of these is enough to arouse hatred, but, obviously, it was not forbidden to use more. Ep. 34 is a very peculiar literary piece. It was written when Augustine was already a bishop, ca. 396–397, to Eusebius, a local high official probably of senatorial rank, in reaction to a recent case of rebaptism in Hippo. A young Catholic from Augustine’s congregation has just been rebaptized by the Donatist presbyter Victor, acting on the order of the Donatist bishop of the city, Proculeian. Augustine has already taken care to report the case to the city officials, who investigated Victor.50 Augustine claims that he did so to avoid being accused of slander. From the vague remarks in the letter itself it can be inferred that Victor testified that he had been ordered by his bishop to rebaptize the man, but Proculeian later dismissed that claim as a lie. Proculeian might have been afraid that Augustine, a new energetic force in Hippo,51 would want to denounce him as a rebaptizer to the local authorities on the basis of the imperial rescripts of Valentinian (CTh 16.6.1) of 373 or those of Gratian (CTh 16.6.2) of 377. In accordance with these laws, a rebaptizer might have been expelled from clergy and his Church should be returned to the Catholics. I use “might have” because there was a serious obstacle, namely “the resistance of local officials who did not wish to become entangled in internal Christians disputes” (Shaw: 2011, 507). For Brent Shaw, this very letter is the perfect example of the problems with the local enforcement of imperial laws. But is this really the main reason why Augustine

48 Cic., Inv. 1.103, (LCL 386, 154). 49 This rhetorical form is most often understood as a description of an artwork, but in anti­ quity it served the purpose of describing events as well as objects. The ancient orators used this emotive figure to influence the feelings of the audience. As a rule, through the use of evidentia one ought to aim at (1) creating a bond with the audience by alluding and/or referring to it in the se­ cond person, (2) making things interesting to the audience by using present tense for past events and/or introducing direct speech, and (3) making the story appear as credible as possible by focusing on details and presenting oneself as an eyewitness. See Serafim: 2015, 96–108. 50 ep. 34.4 (CSEL 34,2, 25): “quod enim publicis gestis haerere volui tam sacrilegum nefas, ad hoc utique uolui, ne me quisquam maxime in aliis ciuitatibus, ubi opportunum fuerit, ista deplorantem fingere aliquid arbitretur, quando etiam apud ipsam Hipponem iam dicitur non hoc Proculianum mandasse, quod publicum renuntiauit officium.” 51 In ep. 34.6 Augustine calls himself a beginner in the episcopacy (“tiro”) and bishop Samsucius as his “frater et collega.” This means that Augustine was already a bishop at the time of its composition, but this does not exclude the possibility that Valerius was still alive. This letter is dated usually between 395 and 397, thus both before and after Valerius’ death.

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writes to Eusebius: to pressure him into enforcing these laws? We may need to take a closer look at the rhetorical layers of the letter to answer this question. The letter consists of six paragraphs, of which two and a half contain a showcase narratio in the form of evidentia (Greek ekphrasis).52 There, Augustine presents the young man’s story. As it happens, the young rebaptized Catholic was not a virtuous man. In fact, he used to beat his mother, even during the Holy Week, and Easter was a time of amnesty even for criminals.53 When the Catholic bishop of Hippo learnt of the young man’s actions, he rebuked him (Augustine does not state whether he himself is meant here, or Valerius, who may well have still been alive). The reprimand from the bishop is presented as the young man’s main reason for switching sides. The example is so evidently picked for its inherent scandalous nature and so convenient for Augustine’s case against the Donatists that it must have raised the utmost suspicion among the contemporaries. As a good rhetorician, Augustine begins by assuring his addressee that he was driven to write the letter by the sacrilegious character of the reported deeds and his adamant wish is to serve only the truth and peace.54 Coming back to the letter’s narrative, after the bishop reprimands him, the young man threatens to flee to the Donatists and then to kill his mother (the latter, however, remained only a threat). To heighten the dramatic effect, Augustine tells the story in the present tense.55 He then uses brilliant acceleration and presents the villain as a newly rebaptized Donatist convert standing beneath the altar among the congregation dressed in white garments, but at the same time howling for his mother’s blood:

minatur eidem matri se in partem Donati translaturum et eam, quam incredibili furore solet caedere, perempturum; minatur ei, transit ad partem Donati, rebaptizatur furens et in maternum sanguine fremens albis uestibus candidatur; constituitur intra cancellos eminens atque conspicuus et omnium gementium oculis matricidii meditator tamquam renouatus opponitur.56

We can see here that Augustine really aims at evidentia – telling the story with all the graphic details. Firstly, he underlines the contrast of the white colour of the 52 The following analysis of ep. 34 and 35 is an enhanced version of a passage from my recent paper, Toczko: 2018. 53 CTh 9.39.1–8, see also Adamiak: 2015, 106. 54 ep. 34.1(CSEL 34,2, 23): “Scit deus, cui manifesta sunt arcana cordis humani, quantum pacem diligo Christianam, tantum me moueri sacrilegis eorum factis, qui in eius dissensione indigne atque impie perseverant, eumque motum animi mei esse pacificum neque me id agere, ut ad communionem catholicam quisquam cogatur inuitus, sed ut omnibus errantibus aperta ueritas decla­ retur.” 55 ep. 34.2 (CSEL 34,2, 23): “quid enim execrabilius, quaeso te, ut alia taceam, quam id, quod nunc accidit? Corripitur ab episcopo suo iuuenis crebris caedibus matris insanus et impias manus nec illis diebus, cum etiam seueritas legum sceleratissimis parcit, a uisceribus, unde natus est, reuocans.” 56 Ibid., (CSEL 34,2, 24).

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convert’s dress with the red colour of the blood of his mother. This plays nicely with the opposition of the pure Church of Donatist martyrs and the defiled Church of traditores characteristic of the Donatist propaganda. Secondly, using the phrase “in maternum sanguinem fremens” to refer to a person dressed in white as a sheep of Christ evokes the image of a wolf in disguise. Augustine now turns to Eusebius to ask him an ironical question – “Do you really approve of this?” – which is immediately given the response: “I would never believe that you do.”57 After this brief interlude the same story is repeated from the perspective of the blood-thirsty son, in a sophisticated sermocinatio that starts with an expolitio.58 Above, the son was characterised by Augustine as “clamouring for his mother’s blood” (“maternum sanguinem fremens”); now he himself bursts into a tirade “grinding his teeth like the parricides do” (“parricidaliter frendens”), which helps establish the image of the young man as resembling a wolf in nature. In the feigned monologue of the young man Augustine uses the rhetorical form called deliberation; in some ancient handbooks this term was reserved for a speech designed for consulting oneself in a monologue.59 The question that the wolf-like ex-Catholic asks himself for this deliberation is this: “What shall I do to the Church that did not allow me to kill my mother?” And he decides that he will quit it for the Church of the Donatists, for the latter will allow him to torture both of his mothers: the spiritual mother Church and the carnal. After this reported fictional monologue, Augustine bursts into two more rhetorical questions congruently exploiting the scheme of indignatio presented above: quid aliud expectamus, uir honorabilis Eusebi, nisi ut in miseram mulierem senectute decrepitam, uiduitate destitutam, a cuius caedibus in catholica prohibebatur, iam Donatista securus armetur? quid enim aliud furibundo corde concepit, cum diceret matri: transferam me in partem Donati et bibam sanguinem tuum? ecce iam conscientia cruentus, ueste dealbatus perficit partem pollicitationis suae; restat pars altera, ut matris sanguinem bibat.60

In this climax of the story the white and red colours attract our attention once again. Augustine uses an open ending – the young convert may well drink his mother’s blood, (who was “a poor woman, worn down by old age and all alone as a widow”). There is no denying that the handbook pattern of indignatio underpins the story as a whole. But why does Augustine use it at all, and what does he want from Eusebius?

57 ep. 34.3 (CSEL 34,2, 24): “haecine tandem tibi placent, uir grauissime? nequaquam hoc de te crediderim; noui considerationem tuam.” 58 It is a figure consisting of repeating an idea or a phrase throughout a given passage, see Lausberg: 1998, 372–7. 59 Isidorus Hispalensis, Etymologiarum sive Originum libri XX, 2.4.4: “suasoria eget alteram personam, deliberativa interdum et apud se agit.” 60 ep. 34.3 (CSEL 34,2, 24).

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After concluding the narrative Augustine asks Eusebius, who is apparently in good relations with Proculeian (but not so with Augustine61) to find out the truth about the responsibility of the Donatist bishop in this very act of rebaptism. Having presented him a report drafted in keeping with the methods of status coniecturalis, Augustine wants the Roman official to give a verdict – has the crime of rebaptism been committed, one that involved a wretched ex-Catholic who would deserve imprisonment as a parricide? But the message seems to have another layer. Given that Proculeian does not answer Augustine’s calls, Eusebius may prove to be so kind as to invite the Donatist bishop of Hippo for a debate on the schism with Augustine. This twist reveals, I assume, that Augustine did not in fact count on Eusebius to pass a verdict on Proculeian. Therefore he ventures to make the accusation, but even if the opening bid is rejected, he expects that Eusebius might at least be willing to mediate between the two Churches. But Eusebius refuses to take action and, speci­ fically, he absolutely rejects the possibility of becoming a judge between the two bishops. This means that Eusebius sees Augustine’s letter as a piece of forensic rhe­ toric, and rightly so. At the same time, we may find more than that in this particular letter. By evoking the story of the young convert, Augustine can ridicule the Donatist Church – the self-proclaimed Church of the pure – as a sectarian movement eager to accept obvious lunatics into its ranks along with sinners who left the Catholic Church because her leaders had opposed their criminal acts. The same strategy is used in ep. 35 and 108. In the former, which is a follow-up of ep. 34, Augustine has another interesting story to tell. It is about one Primus, a Catholic subdeacon in Spanianum, a womaniser who paid too frequent visits to nuns. Having been told by his superiors to stop doing so, he crossed over to the Donatist community, and two nuns went with him. Augustine asks himself whether those women followed him spontaneously or had been forced to do so, only to reach the inevitable and familiar conclusion: now, as a Donatist, Primus can finally indulge in the orgies that the Catholic Church had forbidden.62 In ep. 108, two other examples of conversion are mocked: one is a country deacon called Rusticianus who, after having been excommunicated by a Catholic priest “because of his wicked and perverse behaviour”,63 incurred huge debts; the other is an anonymous deacon from Hippo, excommunicated for unknown offences, who, allegedly, joined the circumcellions and died during one of their raids soon after becoming a Donatist deacon.

61 Augustine reveals in paragraph 5 that he had already tried to reach Eusebius through his friends to bring this very story to his attention – without any success, it seems. 62 ep. 35.2 (CSEL 34,2, 28). 63 ep. 108,19 (CSEL 34,2, 632): “sicut iste de agro subdiaconus Rusticianus, cuius causa haec ad te scribere magno sum dolore ac timore compulsus, propter reprobos et perversos mores excommunicatus a presbytero suo, multorum etiam in illa regione debitor factus et contra ecclesiasticum vigorem et contra creditores suos aliud praesidium non quaesivit, nisi ut abs te iterum plagaretur et ab ipsis quasi mundissimus amaretur.” English trans. by R.J. Teske, WSA II/2, 81.

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Through these stories about specific cases of rebaptism in Hippo or its vicinity, Augustine was able to document them. He could also hope that thanks to his rhetorical craft the crime of rebaptism might be recognised as even more outrageous. This result is obtained by means of seasoning the stories with pathos and ridicule. We ought to remember that to rebaptize a Catholic was a crime punished by imperial laws. However, if Augustine had managed to leave a lasting impression that the only Catholics who changed sides and were rebaptized were wicked and evil ones, the wider audience, especially outside of Africa, would have viewed the Donatists even more negatively. These narratives also enabled him to link the discussion of rebaptism with the main charge of schism. The Donatists split from the Church of Caecilian, presenting their motive for separation as being the fear of being defiled by evildoers. Now, they welcomed outright sinners into their community, which meant that their claim was a lie.

Part 3. Defence

Chapter 5. The charge of persecution

The act of persecution – the fact of a religious group being persecuted by the state – was always used in polemical writings during controversies. As Robin Flower observed, “opposition to a figure of great power, particularly an emperor, opened up rhetorical possibilities” (2013, 130). The Donatists knew this, and hence repeatedly claimed not only that they were being persecuted by the Church of traditores, but also that this group was collaborating in the persecution with the emperors and their officials. Augustine goes to great lengths to dismiss this charge in his correspondence, developing a multifaceted defensive strategy. First of all, he grounds his argument in the qualitative issue to prove that the punitive measures falling on the Donatist Church have been provoked by themselves (relatio criminis) or are in fact advantageous to them (comparatio criminis). Secondly, he enters into the discussion of the definition of persecution and martyrdom to prove that, according to the proper understanding of these terms, the Catholic Church is not persecuting the Donatists and so they cannot claim to be martyrs (status finitionis). Finally, he reaches for the retorsion argument (status translationis) to show that the Donatists have no right to accuse the Catholic Church of persecution through earthly powers, since they were guilty of the same trespass and had committed the same crime before. In his defence, Augustine focuses sometimes solely on the coercive and punitive aspect of persecution, and on other occasions highlights the cooperation with state representatives in persecuting the Donatists, which is mirrored in the argument of this chapter.

1. Status qualitatis 1.1 Relatio criminis In relatio criminis, a type of qualitative issue, the defendant was supposed to shift the blame for an evil deed on the actions of the victim: “A retort of the charge occurs when the defendant admits the act of which he is accused but shows that he was justified in doing it because he was influenced by an offence committed by the other party.”1 The example presented by Cicero concerns Horatius, who came back home after having killed the Curiatii and having lost two brothers, only to find out that his

1 Cic. Inv. 2.78 (LCL 386, 242–4): “Relatio criminis est cum reus id quod arguitur confessus, alterius se inductum peccato, iure fecisse demonstrat.”

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sister mourns one of Curiatii more than her two brothers. In response to this, Ho­ ratius kills his sister. The following krinomenon scheme emerges from this case:2 Intentio – “Iniuria sororem occidisti” Depulsio – “Iure occidi” Qaestio – “Iurene occiderit?” Ratio – “Illa enim hostium mortem lugebat, fratrum neglegebat; me et populum Romanum vicisse moleste ferebat” Infirmatio rationis – “Tamen a fratre indamnatam necari non oportuit” Adiudicatio – “Oportuitne eam a fratre indamnatam necari ?” In a similar fashion, Augustine reaches for this pattern in defending his community against the charge of persecution. When the Donatists accuse the Catholics of forcing them to unity through the orders of emperors (“per imperatorum iussiones ad unitatem cogimini” – intentio), Augustine presents the main argument of defence (ratio) in a straightforward manner: “You have caused it yourselves,” (“hoc uos fecistis”).3 On two occasions Augustine coins a catch-phrase, a sort of heading summarising this argumentative pattern: “They do not feel responsible for what they do to us, but they make us responsible for what they do to themselves.”4 In this way he simultaneously uses the pattern of status translationis joined with relatio criminis: the violence of the circumcellions and the Donatists directed at the Catholics may be seen as persecution in itself – an observation that enables him to employ mutual accusation. But the main defence is qualitative in nature: their acts of violence deserved to be punished, their perpetrators were in fact bringing the punitive measures on themselves, as was the case with Horatius’ sister. To be precise, there are two paths that Augustine takes in presenting reasons behind this defence (ratio). Most often he claims that the violence of the Donatists towards the Catholics has risen to such a degree that the state simply had to intervene. The second pattern of defence within this status presents not the violence but the schism itself as the act that provoked the forced correction: forced though it was, it was well-deserved and, consequently, just.5 It is only on one occasion that Augustine hints as to how the Donatists might have refuted such a defence. In this case (ep. 87) their infirmatio rationis referred to the general rule that Christians should never persecute anyone, even the evil. This resembles the example from Cicero’s De inventione, when the prosecutor claims that Horatius, even though the behaviour of his sister was inappropriate, should not have killed her without legal condemnation. In his answer to this reasoning, Augustine follows the precept of 2 Taken from Cic. Inv. 2.79 (LCL 386, 244). 3 ep. 105.3. 4 ep. 88.8 and 185.32 (CSEL 57, 29): “quod nobis faciunt, sibi non inputant et, quod sibi faciunt, nobis inputant”. A stylistycally pleasing formulation can be also found in ep. 173.1. 5 This pattern occurs only twice, in ep. 87.7–8 and cath. fr. 55–56.

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Cicero to show which of these offences is more serious: the one that his party is charged with or the one that has provoked it.6

1.1.1 First ratio: violence In accordance to the rules of this type of qualitative issue, Augustine admits that the emperors’ decisions worked to bring the schismatics back to the unity by instilling fear and imposing force (“ad unitatem catholicam terrendo et cohercendo redi­ gere”).7 In these words he concedes that the laws that allow such extreme measures to be reached for are not good per se. These harsh laws, however, were caused by the far more violent actions of the Donatists, and hence were necessary. It was the main line of argument of relatio criminis to compare “the punishment which the defen­ dant incurred with the crime that he had committed.”8 Within this mode of defence one clear argumentative pattern emerges that fits directly the advice of Cicero: The defendant will support his attempt to lay the blame on someone else, first, by magnifying the culpability and audacity of the person on whom he lays the blame, and by placing the scene vividly before the eyes of the jury with an intense display of indignation, if opportunity presents, coupled with vehement complaint, secondly, by proving that he punished the offence more lightly than the offender deserved.9

Hence, most frequently, Augustine puts to the fore the narratives on violent crimes of the Donatists aimed at Catholics.10 The main means of persuasion is pathos, whether the focus is on the detailed presentation of the sufferings of certain characters: Maximian of Bagaï,11 Possidius,12 Restitutus,13 Mark of Casfaliano, Marcion of Urga,14 or on the generalisation and less detailed enumeration of their criminal acts.15 Augustine does not neglect arguments based on ethos that are aimed at gaining the goodwill of the audience. Whenever he can, he underlines that the Catholic Church has always mediated with the state to mitigate the punishments for the Donatists, even though they were indeed responsible for the crimes in question. In February 405 Honorius decided to issue laws against the Donatists known as the Edict of Unity. The impression that one draws from Augustine’s anti-Donatist writings is that in the months preceding the emperor’s decision the volume of vio6 Inv. 2.80. 7 ep. 185.28. 8 Inv. 2.83 (LCL 386, 249). 9 Ibid., 2.83, (LCL 386, 249). 10 In ep. 88.6–8, 105.3, 185.15, 18, 26–8, 30, cath. fr. 54–5. 11 ep. 88.7, 105.4, 185.26–8. 12 ep. 105.4. 13 ep. 88.6, 105.3. 14 Both in ep. 105.3. 15 ep. 88.8, 185.15, 18 and 30, cath. fr. 54–5.

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lent attacks by the heretics on the Catholic clergy had increased to such an extent that they had become a daily routine. In 403 or 404 there was even an ambush on Augustine himself, which he avoided by a fortunate detour.16 In ep. 185.25–28, when Augustine reflects on the events predating and conditioning the severe imperial laws against the Donatists issued in 405, he underlines that the Catholic clergy, nevertheless, did not lobby or wish for them to be introduced. They did not even expect that.17 In fact, he claims, the bishops of his party simply wanted the anti-heretical laws from the 390s to be used against the Donatist bishops on whose territory the Catholics were being attacked (ep. 185.25, 88.7).18 They even sent an embassy to the emperor to achieve just that (ep. 185.26, 88.7) This is where Augustine relates the story about Maximian of Bagaï,19 which he presents as the main reason behind the emperor’s angry turn against the Donatists.20 As we learn from the following narrative, Maximian, a former Donatist, now the Catholic bishop of Bagaï, lawfully reclaimed the former Catholic basilica from the Donatists.21 But the verdict of the court that enabled him to take action enraged those who had lost the case and, in effect, their church. They decided to take it back by force. Augustine shows good rhetorical skills in the narrative technique called evidentia, which served to depict the scenes of special importance in full detail. Rhetorical handbooks presented three main virtues of narratio – brevity, clarity and probability.22 In part. orat. 31–32 Cicero adds a quality of “suavitas” – delightfulness, sweetness, pleasantness. “Suavis narratio”, as we learn, should involve surprises, suspense, unexpected outcomes, grief, anger, fear and passion. The narratio on Maximian meets all these criteria. Augustine aims at raising indignatio towards the violent Donatist, who are directly responsible for the laws promulgated in Fe­ bruary 405 against them. Thus we hear about the enraged mob storming the church during holy mass, beating the bishop Maximian with clubs and sticks and the wooden legs of the altar. The attackers did not neglect sharp weapons, as we hear of a dagger landing in his groin. The bishop would have died from loss of blood, had it not been for their cruelty that saved him (sic!). For unknown reasons, except for the literary, dramatic effect of the story, the Donatists left Maximian’s body and the Catholics tried to take him back while singing Psalms. Whatever it was, the singing 16 Hermanowicz: 2008, 137. 17 The same can be said of a passage from ep. 88.6–7 that I discuss below. 18 They relied on the antiheretical laws of Theodosius from 15 June 392 (CTh 16.5.21), see Hermanowicz: 2008, 103–4 for the discussion. 19 A very similar narrative can be found in Cresc. 3.47 of approximately 15 years earlier. 20 As such, this narratio belongs to the second type discerned by Rhet. Her. 1.8.12, (LCL 403, 22): “Unum est cum exponimus rem gestam et unum quidque trahimus ad utilitatem nostram vincendi causa, quod pertinet ad eas causas de quibus iudicium futurum est. Alterum genus est narrationis, quod intercurrit nonnumquam aut fidei aut criminationis aut transitionis aut alicuius apparationis causa.” 21 A common feat in these years, according to Hermanowicz: 2008, 137–8. 22 Rhet. Her. 1.9.14, Inv. 1.28.

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or the perspective of losing the prized victim enraged the savage and more numerous Donatists, who retook possession of Maximian’s body. Again, for unknown reasons except for the congruency with the virtue of suavitas of that narrative – the Donatists took him to some tower and pushed him off it, after making sure he was dead. But dead he was not, even after he fell from the tower, because he landed on soft soil or a heap of dung.23 This night of miracles did not end in the dark, however, for soon some people carrying a lamp brought the wounded bishop to the house of a Catholic family, who took good care of him. After a few months Maximian – considered by many, if not all, to be dead – arrived out of the blue at the emperor’s court presenting his recent scars and telling his story.24 And he did not do this, Augustine insists, to take revenge for his sufferings, but with only this one goal: to protect his Catholic community from such terrible crimes. “As a result […] the devout and pious emperor preferred to correct the error of that impiety completely by most pious laws.”25 Scholars interested in the history of the Donatist controversy as Frend (1971, 262–3) or Hermanowicz (2008, 134–50) try to answer the questions concerning the truthfulness of Augustine’s report. They also view such stories as being the ones that created a rationale for asking for imperial intervention. Brent Shaw observes additionally that this function was not the primary one. Such stories started to circulate very early on “to counter the dissident claims that they were suffering persecution and suffering martyrdom at the hands of the Catholics”(Shaw: 2011, 669).26 Without having much to disagree with these views, I would add that we should see more precisely the rhetorical context of this particular letter. Ep. 185 had been written more than a decade after the Edict of Union. Writing to the tribune of Africa, Au23 This detail is added in a narrative on the same event from Cresc. 3.47: “de excelsa turri noctu praecipitatus subter cinere stercoris molliter iacebat exceptus.” 24 It is probable that Augustine is hinting here at the story of Jesus Christ after resurrection, who, being considered dead by many, arrives unexpected at some place and demonstrates his scars to Thomas. 25 ep. 185.28, English transl. by R. Teske, WSA II/3, 196. 26 See also Shaw: 2011, 670: “One of the critical functions that circumcellion stories played in the Catholic–dissident struggle was to incite public authorities (in the end, the court at Ravenna) to action through fear of an apprehended rural insurgency. But this function tended to come to the fore later in the conflict. The original function of the stories was internal to the religious struggle: it was to counter the dissident claims that they were suffering persecution and suffering martyrdom at the hands of the Catholics. The narratives of circumcellion violence were a dramatic way of showing that it is we, the Catholics, who are really suffering persecution.” And ibid., 714: “Statements like these deliberately contrasted the violent acts of the circumcellions with the probity and stability of the state and its public laws. This line of persuasion was developed very early. It became an ongoing part of the repertoire of appeals to the imperial government, emphasized at certain moments in the struggle, but soft-pedaled, downplayed, or avoided at others. It started with brev. Collat. but to have this beneficial effect with officials of the state, in their rhetoric Catholic leaders had to blind themselves to the widespread existence of their own enforcers whose presence and actions would have cancelled out the apparent uniqueness of the threat of dissident men of violence.”

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gustine did not have to persuade the state powers to issue laws against the Donatist anymore, but rather had to counter the repeated accusations of the Donatists who viewed the Catholic party as persecutors.27 It is also in this context that the narrative on Maximian’s many sufferings occurs, and it is told according to the rules of art. It is probable and abundantly detailed, hence immensely persuasive. In the logic of this dramatic exposition, the good and pious king reacts to the scars and wounds of the Catholic bishop as a good Christian should – with pity and compassion. The same story embedded in a similar rhetoric was used also before: iam cicatrices episcopi catholici Bagaitani horrendae ac recentissimae imperatorem commouerant, ut leges tales mitterentur, quales et missae sunt.28

This sentence sums up the passage dedicated to the defence against the charge of persecution in ep. 88.6–7 along the lines of relatio criminis. It starts with the depiction of circumcellions’ and Donatist clerics’ madness and fury, which is shown in their violent acts against the Catholic bishops, lower clergy and lay people. Augustine mentions the case of Restitutus of Victoriano29 there without revealing his name. This priest came over to the Catholic side, an act for which he was punished by some unforgiving members of his former religious community: kidnapped, beaten and made to lie naked in mud for twelve days.30 Although his oppressors finally released him, Augustine suggests that this was not an act of mercy, but a tactical move caused by the fact that Proculeian, the Donatist bishop of Hippo, was summoned to stand before the municipal council in this town.31 In ep. 88.6 the people responsible for this act are presented as Donatist priests who were left unpunished. Augustine uses this occasion to claim that all the acts of Donatist violence, together with the mistreatment of Restitutus, still did not force the Catholic bishops to ask the emperor for intervention.32 On the contrary, they interceded with the emperor on behalf of the Donatist bishops Crispinus of Calama and Proculeian 27 But the introductory formula of the stories of Maximian and Servus in much earlier cresc. 3.47 also proves that Augustine was justifying the punitive measures, rather than asking for them: “Omitto ante quanta comisserint, quibus easdem leges adversus errorem uestrum consitui coegerunt […].” 28 ep. 88.7 (CSEL 34,2, 414). 29 His story is also told for the same purpose in cresc. 3.53, and even better developed in ep. 105.3. 30 This number is given in ep. 88.6, while in ep. 105.3 Augustine does not include this detail. 31 ep. 133 and 139 are intercessions on behalf of the murderers of another Restitutus. Augustine asks Marcellinus and Apringius not to punish them with death. Although one cannot reject the possibility that this is a sincere act, the argument of these letters serves exactly the purpose to present the Catholic party as lenient and merciful. See also Hermanowicz: 2008, 106–8, who calls the act of violence exposed in ep. 88 and 105 “a ritualistic humiliation.” 32 He underlines the fact that the Catholics always first appeal to the leaders of the Donatist community of a given region, but also that their patientce is exhausted if these appeals lead to no effect, see ep. 88.7–10. It is important to note that this very letter is such an appeal to the Donatist bishop of Hippo to stop violent actions aganist the Catholics.

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of Hippo, who were found guilty of heresy, in order to help them evade the fine of ten pounds of gold. The legation sent to the emperor ended in fiasco, because of the scars of Maximian of Bagaï that moved the emperor to issue the Edict of Unity. In the next part of the same letter,33 Augustine insists that the rage and violence of the Donatists in Numidia did not abate and that the circumcellions were still committing crimes, for which they were being rightly punished. Thus, the anti-Donatist laws should be seen as appropriate and continue to be used against the murderers and thugs who do not cease to attack and oppress the Catholics. In a similar passage in ep. 105.3–4, the case of Maximian is mentioned only in passing. In the main light stands Possidius and the Donatist ambush set on him.34 Before he comes to the stage however, three other cases are mentioned: Mark of Casfaliano (a converted Donatist priest), Restitutus of Victoriano (already discussed above) and Marcian of Urga. The events concerning these personalities, Augustine calls recent. In every case, he underlines the fact that the converts made their choice to cross from one religious community to another without being forced to do so: they converted of their own free will,35 for which they were violently pu­ nished by the ferocious Donatists. He suggests that it was only by accident, interpreted as God’s intervention, that they avoided death. Here, too, the focus is not only on pathos (i.e. generating indignation towards the furious and aggressive he­ retics and compassion for the Catholic victims), but also on ethos – presenting the Catholic party as merciful. It is best exemplified by the narrative on Possidius’ ordeal. Possidius was on a standard trip to Figulina, an estate near his episcopal see of Calama, to visit the few Catholics who lived there and exhort all others to become Catholics. When he was on his way, the Donatists set an ambush for him.36 He ma­ naged to flee and found shelter in an estate in nearby Oliveta, where his oppressors tried three times to set the buildings on fire and burn him alive. Unexpected help came from the local farm workers, who extinguished the fire because they feared for their own lives (as Augustine claims).37 In the aftermath of these events, bishop Crispinus was convicted as a heretic in the provincial court and required to pay a fine of ten pounds of gold. Possidius, however, interceded with the proconsul to annul the punishment, which was eventually granted. Crispinus felt that the conviction had nonetheless been unjust in itself, and so appealed to emperor Honorius. Augustine closes the narrative by linking the conclusion to the opening sentence: 33 ep. 88.8–9. 34 His story is developed in more detail in Cresc. 3.50–52. 35 The same feature is observed in ep. 88.6. 36 It is probable that the ambush was organised in order to repay Possidius for embarrasing the Donatist bishop of Calama, Crispinus, in a public debate a few days before, see E. Hermanowicz’s reconstruction of the events (2008, 112–113). 37 In Cresc. 3.50 we find a far more detailed narrrative of the events, where Possidius goes through similar ordeals as Maximian. In this version the tenants from Oliveta are afraid of the consequences of a bishop’s violent death at their estate.

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the Donatists clearly provoked the emperors to issue the just laws against them.38 These imperial decisions may be interpreted – he adds – as signs of God’s anger.39 It is important to note that, in this narrative, Augustine is as selective as the handbooks advised and as the probability of the stories allowed. He omits, for instance, the fact that it was Possidius who had pressed the charges against Crispinus in front of the proconsul. This definitely did not match his purpose to present the Catholic party as being merciful and reluctant to cooperate with the state in fighting off the Donatists. He does not mention the fact that the proconsul judged in favour of Crispinus at first: had Augustine done so it would have made it impossible to shape the case as causa manifesta. The narrator also “forgets” to say that emperor Honorius, who ultimately rejected the appeal of Crispinus, ordered him to pay the fine, but also ruled that the same amount should be paid by the proconsul, whom Honorius saw as neglecting his judicial duties and failing to enforce just punishments.40 These facts would negatively affect the image of a merciful emperor, an instrument of God. Whatever Augustine chose to say was directed towards precisely one goal – proving that the imperial laws forced the Donatists to convert only because they had provoked that legislation themselves through their violent actions.

1.1.2 Second ratio: schism The concise formula of this mode of defence can be found in ep. 87.8, where Augustine does not concede to the Donatists’ claim that it was the Catholics who provoked the emperors against them, but posits that they themselves did so by tearing the Church apart and remaining in the schism: sed a uobis, inquies, ‘Romani principes aduersum nos prouocantur’. immo a uobis aduersum uos ipsos, qui ecclesiam […] et praecisione laniare ausi estis et rebaptizare pertinaciter audetis.41

In the previous paragraph Augustine explained that the persecution of schismatics by state powers is justified on the basis of the rule established in Rom 13:2–4. God is thus presented as sanctioning earthly authorities to punish evil-doers; in fact, it enables them to view themselves as “God’s servants,” who “carry out his wrath in punishing the wrongdoer.”42 In the next move Augustine poses the question of the moral qualification of schism, and proves that to separate from the Church is nei38 ep. 105.3: “But if you are displeased with us because you are being forced into unity by the orders of the emperor, you caused this yourselves.” English transl. by Teske in WSA II/2, 55. 39 ep. 105.4. 40 Hermanowicz: 2008, 116—118. 41 ep. 87.8 (CSEL 34,2, 404). 42 ep. 87.7, English transl. by R. Teske, WSA II/1, 348.

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ther just nor justifiable. The Donatists, guilty of schism as they are, cannot therefore complain about the state laws directed against them without interfering with the biblical rule. Augustine labels their claim that they are being persecuted by the state with a single word: “peruersitas”.43 On yet another occasion, Augustine protests against the very use of the word “persecution” in this context.44 Those who raised an altar against an altar, who cut themselves off from the universal Christian unity by way of that sacrilegious schism, are rightly punished as “impii et sacrilegii”. Augustine does not neglect the opportunity to highlight and praise the leniency of the earthly authorities and to insist that these aim at correcting the heretics and salvaging them from error through the coercive measures. Hence, the emperors ought not in any circumstance to be called “persecutores”, but rather “rectores diligentissimi et consultores piissimi”, for it is God who is working through them. This last passage, as we will see, is closely related to arguments drawn from status definitionis, but at its core it still functions to justify the actions of emperors as having been provoked by the evil deeds of the Donatists.45 Augustine often reaches for biblical argumentation, mostly based on exempla, with a view to simultaneously rejecting the label of persecutors given to the state powers and defending the Catholic party against the charge of cooperating with the emperors within the discussed status. Sometimes this is not his choice, but a necessity caused by the modes of accusations developed by the Donatists. Such is the case in ep. 185.19–20, where Augustine rejects the argument of the Donatists who claim that the Apostles did not reach out for help to worldly rulers. Firstly, Augustine dismisses this argument by stating that it is of great importance to differentiate between the present times of Christian rulers and the past, when Christianity was not so widespread. But then he takes a step back and observes that, no matter the times, it has always been a regal duty to protect religion from blasphemy by issuing appropriate laws and punishing impiety. To corroborate his thesis, Augustine reels off a series of chronologically ordered examples of such a policy: Josiah, king of the Ninevites, Darius, Nebuchadnezzar. They all did just this, which allows for an inductive conclusion: in hoc ergo seruiunt domino reges, in quantum sunt reges, cum ea faciunt ad seruiendum illi, quae non possunt facere nisi reges.46

For Augustine, however, it is obvious that this standard of behaviour was not achievable in the times of the Apostles. In that abnormal era, kings were more prone 43 ep. 87.7 (CSEL 34,2, 403): “quae tanta est peruersitas amplecti suam iniquitatem et potestatum accusare seueritatem?” 44 cath. fr. 55. 45 Especially that further in this paragraph Augustine talks about various violent acts by the Donatists and circumcellions without any details. 46 ep. 185.19 (CSEL 57,18).

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to commit impiety than to punish it, so that the Old Testament prophesies might be fulfilled. But later on the situation was normalised: the Christian religion – again, in accordance with the words of the prophets – has prevailed. Hence, it would be absurd not to ask them to do their duty now that times have changed and they rule to protect, rather than destroy, Christian worship. Augustine points at this absurdity with a series of sermocinationes and rhetorical questions that were frequently used on such occasions. Augustine seems to develop a special predilection for using the figure of Nebuchadnezzar to illustrate this point. This was a good choice, since this king could simultaneously exemplify either group of rulers: the wicked (before the revelation he obtained) and the righteous (when he obeyed God’s admonishment). The most elaborate and instructive passage is found as late as in 406 in ep. 105.7 (and later reused in ep. 185.8). The rule of differentiation in this comparatio is the same as in the above analyzed passages from ep. 185.19–20. Bad rulers are those who persist in error and “pro errore suo contra ueritatem leges darent,”47 or, as he states a few years later: “pro falsitate contra ueritatem constituunt malas leges.”48 Good rulers are those who take heed of the truth and “pro ipsa ueritate contra errorem iubent,”49 “pro ueritate contra falsitatem constituunt bonas leges.”50 For the sake of logical simplification, what makes a good king depends entirely on his religious legislation. Now, if the king establishes a sacrilegious law, to refuse to obey is a hallmark of piety and may lead to martyrdom. That is the case of Nebuchadnezzar’s law forcing his subjects to worship idols. Conversely, if the law is pious and praiseworthy, failing to comply is an error and a sin. That is the case of Nebuchadnezzar’s ruling in favour of Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego and forbidding his subjects to blaspheme the God of those three men. In ep. 105.7 Augustine observes that this edict of the Ba­ bylonian king is still valid, or even more so: the Donatists validate it themselves by saying “Amen” during a liturgy that included this reading from the Bible. But iro­ nically, the Donatists are those who by their practice of rebaptism are rebelling against the similar law of contemporary rulers. In ep. 185.8 Augustine moves in a slightly different direction, making the argument a similitudine more coherent. Using a conditional phrase, he suggests that there might have been people who did not subdue to the just and pious law of Nebuchadnezzar, although the Bible does not mention them. If there had been, however, such crazy people, they would have been blaspheming God and seeking the crown of martyrdom under the pretence of disobeying earthly law, just as the Donatists were doing now.

47 48 49 50

ep. 105.7 (CSEL 34,2, 599). ep. 185.8 (CSEL 57, 7). ep. 105.7 (CSEL 34,2, 600). ep. 185.8 (CSEL 57, 7).

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1.2 Comparatio criminis In comparatio criminis, the type of qualitative issue, the conflict concerns the question of what is more advantageous (utilius): that which the defendant did, or that which should have been done according to the prosecutor, as we learn from Rhet. Her. 2.14.51 In his multifaceted strategy of defence against the charge of persecution, Augustine also developed this line of argumentation. On many occasions in his depulsio he claimed that the advantages of forcing the Donatists out of their error are far greater than the evil of leaving them to eternal death. As regards the ratio of the defence, Augustine seems to have relied on a general premise that there are simply situations in which it is beneficial for some people to be forced to do something good, or that it is permissible to produce moderate fear with the intention of correcting evildoers. The closest we can get to the formulation of that ratio is in ep. 93.7, where Paul the Apostle is presented as the one who judged “that it was a good deed to correct evil, even by means of evil” (“malos etiam per malum emendare bonum opus esse iudicauit”).52 The coercion of the Donatists is just another example of this approach. The Donatists would probably have tried various strategies, but our knowledge about these is very limited. In ep. 87.8 Augustine puts in their mouth one such claim (infirmatio rationis): “It is not permitted that Christians persecute even bad people,”53 which is rephrased elsewhere in his correspondence in a more general tone as “No one ought to be forced into righteousness,”54 “No one should be forced to what is good,”55 or “No one can justly persecute anyone.”56 In this krinomenon scheme the ultimate question to be judged (adiudicatio) is thus, seemingly, “Can there be a just persecution or just coercion?”. Here Augustine would also sometimes employ status definitionis,57 especially when joining the topic of persecution with the focus on the Donatists’ claims to martyrdom, which he finds completely unfounded. I will be dealing with these arguments separately. A different attack on the Catholic defence’s ratio is found in ep. 93.3: “These measures

51 Rhet. Her. 2.14 (LCL 403, 96): “Cum ex conparatione quaeretur utrum satius fuerit facere id quod reus dicat se fecisse, an id quod accusator dicat oportuisse fieri, primum quaeri conveniet utrum fuerit itilius ex contentione, hoc est utrum honestius facilius conducibilius.” 52 ep. 93.7 (CSEL 34,2, 452). English transl. by R. Teske in WSA II/1, 381. 53 ep. 87.8 (CSEL 34,2, 403): “at enim et malos christianis non licet persequi.” English transl. by R. Teske in WSA II/1, 348. 54 ep. 93.5, “putas neminem debere cogi ad iustitiam” English transl. by R. Teske in WSA II/1, 380. 55 ep. 173.2 (CSEL 44, 640): “neminem aestimas cogendum esse ad bonum”. English transl. by R. Teske in WSA II/3, 124. 56 ep. 185.10 (CSEL 57, 9): “si autem putant, quod nemo possit iuste aliquem persequi”. English transl. by R. Teske in WSA II/3, 185. 57 This was not out of the ordinary. In the outline of the comparatio criminis in Inv. 2.72–73, Cicero presents an exemplary case that he says might also be treated through status definitionis.

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do not benefit certain ones.”58 This is where the problem of the much-discussed suicides of the Donatists occurs. When facing the choice between being forced into the Catholic Church or dying, some Donatists chose the latter, which caused a serious threat to the argument based on presenting the persecution as beneficial to its victims in the long run.

1.2.1 Testimonia 1.2.1.1 Witnesses To prove that the forced conversions were necessary and advantageous to the Donatists, it was good to evoke the direct testimonies of those who had already converted. In fact, Augustine seems to give this argument a priority. When he admits in ep. 93.16–17 that it was precisely the many testimonies of converts that had forced him to accept the necessity and fruitfulness of state coercion in the controversy, it lends this proof authority and persuasiveness. Sometimes Augustine presents himself as witness to a change in their conduct, sometimes he refers to their own words. In this strand of argumentation he discerns between different groups of converts. In ep. 93.2 for instance, he talks about the circumcellions, whom he presents as the most fierce and active opponents of the Church. They serve for the comparison a maiore a minus: if the circumcellions were able to convert and see clearly the error they had been in before, it is even more possible for the average Donatists. Another group consists of those who did not have sufficient energy to reject the opinions of their parents and friends.59 These people also admit after conversion, Augustine claims, that the use of force was salutary for them. Later in the same letter the picture is more nuanced.60 In addition to these groups, others are also mentioned. One of them is characterised by a very modern sensitivity: there existed Donatists who thought that it really did not matter in which Church one was a Christian, and so they decided to remain in the community they had been born into. Another consisted of people who had rejected the Catholic faith based on false rumours they had believed to be true. Forced conversion had enabled them – in their own words – to see that their previous opinions had been unfounded. In ep. 185.32 Augustine pictures this group as being full of anger and hatred towards their former teachers who had fed them such lies. A few paragraphs earlier in this letter a different group is described: those who had never heard about the case of Caecilian, or in fact had never given a thought to the controversial issues dividing the Church in Africa.61 58 ep. 93.3 (CSEL 34,2, 447): “at enim quibusdam ista non prosunt. numquid ideo neglegenda est medicina, quia nonnullorum est insanabilis pestilentia?” English transl. by R. Teske in WSA II/1, 379. 59 ep. 93.2. 60 ep. 93.17–18. 61 ep. 185.29.

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For them the coercive laws had presented the first real incentive to reflect upon the matter and assess the arguments of both parties. We saw Augustine’s constant insistence that the controversy was causa manifesta/honesta, no wonder then that, in his narrative, such a reflection had led these Donatists to become Catholics. The language of the converts’ testimonies fits the pattern of comparatio criminis. Some admit that the decision had been hard for them because they had not been certain of whether, by crossing to the Catholic party, they would in fact gain eternal reward: quite the contrary – it had seemed probable that they would lose worldly goods.62 Augustine presents a prayer from those converts, thanking God for having broken their chains (“vincula”) and brought them to the bond of peace (“pacis uinculum”).63 Others thanked Him for having taken them away from the separated group and brought them into the unity only befitting of the worship of one God.64 Although they present themselves as having been forced to change sides, they appreciate the use of force for this goal. One of the reasons is that they had previously been bullied by the Donatists into staying within their ranks.65 For them the difficult decision to cross to the Catholic community opened the opportunity to become free of this daily fear. There can be no doubt that the main purpose of presenting this direct “evidence” is to prove that the use of force should be justified by the beneficial effect it brings about according to the very “victims” of religious coercion. At times Augustine deploys a slightly different argument and mentions that the Donatists who are absolutely certain that the Catholics are right and that the Catholic Church is the true one were paralysed by fear and did not dare to cross to the side of good in the conflict.66 In ep. 185.13 Augustine echoes the voices of those who feared to convert because showing even the slightest signs of sympathy towards the Catholics was punished with physical harm to their houses and themselves.67 In this line of argumentation the pattern of comparatio criminis is supplied by the retorsion argument: the Donatists can be accused of instilling fear in their own community. 62 ep. 93.18 (CSEL 34,2, 463): “timuimus, ne forte sine ullis rerum aeternarum lucris damno rerum temporalium feriremur.” 63 In this paragraph Augustine in fact presents the thanksgiving prayers of five different groups of converts, introduced by “alii dicant” with the repeating refrain of “gratias domino.” Because of the coherence of style binding all these fragments it is very hard to treat them as the factual quotations of real people. They must, however, have seemed probable enough to be persuasive. 64 ep. 93.18 (CSEL 34,2, 463): “gratias domino, qui nos a diuisione collegit et hoc uni deo congruere, ut in unitate colatur, ostendit.” 65 ep. 105.5 (CSEL 34,2, 598): “nam quos a nobis nolentes dicitis cogi, multi etiam cogi se uolunt, quod nobis antea et postea confitentur, ut uel sic euadant oppressiones uestras.” 66 In ep. 93.17. 67 ep. 185.13 (CSEL 57,12): “quid de illis dicamus, qui nobis cotidie confitentur, quod iam olim uolebant esse catholici, sed inter eos habitabant, inter quos id, quod uolebant, esse non poterant per infirmitatem timoris, ubi, si unum uerbum pro catholica dicerent, et ipsi et domus eorum funditus euerterentur?”. See also ep. 185.32.

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This fear in fact forces some to stay within their ranks against their will. Hence, both parties create an atmosphere of fear, but one fear is presented as salutary even by the converts themselves; the other is just wicked. The Donatists probably tried to downplay these examples by saying that the conversions were mostly superficial and that those who crossed over to the Catholic Church were in fact pretending for fear of state punishments.68 Augustine concedes that this may initially have been true. But he himself has witnessed that very soon those “pretenders” were morally even more advanced than long-standing Catholics. The heretics turned into “high-quality” Christians. Quality alone, however, does not form the basis of the answer to this charge, but also quantity. Augustine admits that among these masses of newly arrived converts “there remained obdurate multitudes which persisted in that plague with sorry stubbornness.”69 This group, however, exposed to the words of truth was soon largely corrected. Only those who persisted in opposition to the truth were helplessly stubborn and utterly violent.

1.2.1.2 Terence The Donatists used the testimony of Terence from the play Adelphoi to corroborate their thesis that the use of force cannot be beneficial in correcting someone’s behaviour, as we learn from ep. 185.21: pudore et liberalitate liberos retinere satius esse credo quam metu Augustine hastens to answer with the quotation from the same comedy by the same author: Nisi malo coactus recte facere nescis. In fact the verse Augustine uses does not exist in Terence, but is a contamination of parts of verses 69 and 75 created by Cicero in Verrines 2.3.62.70 It is brought here to prove that there are two different groups of people – those who may be corrected by words alone, and those who are unable to react to words of correction in a sufficient manner. They can understand or apply the corrective advice only when forced by fear or pain. Augustine is thus able to downplay the quotation used by the Donatist 68 As we learn from ep. 89.7. 69 ep. 185.30 (CSEL 57,28): “ita cum magna agmina populorum uera mater in sinum gaudens reciperet, remanserunt turbae durae et in illa peste infelici animositate sistentes. ex his quoque plurimi simulando communicauerunt, alii paucitate latuerunt. sed illi, qui simulabant, paulatim adsuescendo et praedicationem ueritatis audiendo […] ex magna parte correcti sunt.” English trans. by R. Teske in WSA II/3, 196. 70 See Shanzer: 2012, 171.

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and apply it only to the first group. He next proves, respecting the rules of status legales, that the scriptural testimonies are congruent with Terence in discerning between the two groups. For instance, the first letter of John (1 John 4:18) dismisses fear as a didactic tool for correcting those few who answer to love and words only, whereas Prv 29:19 explicitly states that a “stubborn servant will not be corrected by words.” On two further occasions, the Book of Proverbs advises the use of physical punishment to correct even sons, and not only servants (Prv 23:14 and 13:24). Based on these divine testimonies and on his own experience he is able to claim that this latter group is more numerous, and that temporal floggings are beneficial to it. Hence, given the object of the action and the intention of the agent, persecution may be seen as justified in some cases.

1.2.2 Comparisons 1.2.2.1 Biblical exempla That a Christian should sometimes use force and fear for good ends cannot be proven by any better example than by that of God. Dedicated as He is to the love of man, in Augustine’s view, He constantly compounds His teaching with fear and tribulation. For instance, His prophets are often put to the test by Himself with suffering, such as famine.71 Apostles and rebels alike are given to trials and sufferings by God with the intention of bringing about their correction and leading them to perfection.72 There are direct proofs of God’s use of religious coercion that Augustine finds in Luke 14:21–23. It is the famous parable of the lord who first invites guests and then forces those who rejected his invitation to his banquet with the proverbial quotation compelle/cogite intrare. Augustine uses it in ep. 93, 173 and 185 in a strand of argumentation dedicated to the defence within status qualitatis. The head of the household in this parable sends an invitation to his banquet, to which a parallel can be drawn with God’s invitation to the banquet of salvation.73 This comparison is also congruent with Augustine’s insistence within this defence that there are two groups of people: those who answer God’s calling correctly and of their own will (i.e. the invitees who arrived at the banquet), and those who do not and have to be later forced to come. In the parable, after the first group is seated, many places remain empty, because many of the invitees were reluctant to answer positively to words alone.74 These refused to come to the banquet and ought to be coerced to come and thus, in a way, punished for their disobedience.

71 ep. 93.4. 72 Ibid. 73 As in ep. 173.10. 74 ep. 185.24.

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Augustine supplies this image with what he calls a most obvious example. In this exemplum we see Saul turned into Paul by what Augustine names Christ’s “magna uiolentia.”75 Making reference to a common sentiment he suggests that in the hierarchy of goods, healthy sight ranks higher than possessions or money. He is careful to remind us that Saul was inflicted with blindness by God himself. The suffering lasted until Saul joined the Church, compelled to believe in her truth, which proves that the suffering caused by God was temporary and meant to bring a beneficial outcome. This argument has the structure of a maiore ad minus, which is obvious from the concluding remark starting with: “And you think that one should employ no force upon a man […] although you see that God himself does that in the most obvious examples.”76 The language of comparatio criminis comes to the surface when Augustine emphasises God’s quality as one who loves us more to our own benefit than anyone else (“quo nemo nos utilius diligit”). Such a God will always have our benefit in mind, even if the action he undertakes seems to be directed against our freedom or welfare. The same exemplum occurs in ep. 185.22–23. The whole passage begins with the pleasing rhythm of the rhetorical question: “quis enim nos potest amplius amare quam Christus, qui animam suam posuit pro ouibus suis?”77 Although the use of amplius is not as evident as utilius in ep. 93.5, the supplementary explication presents God as sacrificing Himself to our benefit. In the next step Augustine underlines a difference between the callings of Peter (and other Apostles) and of Paul. The latter was not called by words only, as was the case of the former group. God used his power to lay him down and afflict him with bodily blindness. From among the alliterations and rhetorical questions, the sermocinatio stands out, presenting the “usual cry” of the Donatists in which they insist not to be forced to believe: “cui uim Christus intulit? quem coegit?,” they seem to be asking.78 Now Augustine can answer this question triumphantly: “ecce habent apostolum Paulum; agnoscant in eo prius cogentem Christum et postea docentem, prius ferientem et postea consolantem.”79 This would perhaps be enough to prove this point, but that is not enough for Augustine, since he follows this conclusion with another layer of comparison. Saint Paul is once again compared to the Twelve. Here, his blindness is fittingly interpreted as the “poena corporis” that forced him to become a Christian. Augustine observes that the other Apostles who were called by words alone were less effective in preaching the Gospel than Paul was, driven as he was by fear and bodily punishment. The analogy works to show that religious coercion may bring about even better result than a gentle call to conversion, that the person forced to convert may 75 ep. 93.5. 76 ep. 93.5 (CSEL 34,2, 449–450): “et putas nullam uim adhibendam esse homini, ut ab erroris pernicie liberetur, cum ipsum deum […]certissimis exemplis hoc facere uideas.” English transl. by R. Teske in WSA II/1, 380. 77 ep. 185.22 (CSEL 57, 20). 78 Ibid., (CSEL 57, 21). 79 Ibid.

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eventually become a Christian of higher quality than those who listened to the mild call of God.80 In this way a foundation is laid for the comparison of the Catholic Church with God. The Donatists are positioned here as the harassers and persecutors forced like saint Paul to correction. In the next lines the Church is pictured as a shepherd and the schismatics become the lost sheep. In Ez 34:4 God presents a rule that the good shepherd should always search for the lost sheep. This command is confirmed by Christ himself in the famous parable from Matt 18:12–14 and Luke 15:3–7. Augustine develops this image by depicting some lost sheep as reluctant to come back to the flock. By using syllogistic reasoning he broadens the sense of this parable to also include the Donatists who resist the call of the shepherds: First premise: The good shepherd (S) should bring back the lost sheep (M). Second premise: The lost sheep (M) is the one that refuses to be brought back (P). Conclusion: The good shepherd (S) should bring back the sheep that refuses to be brought back (P) Augustine adds that even if a rod and beatings are needed to accomplish this task, they should not be rejected as evil measures, for they lead to a good outcome, namely to correction of the sheep. The whole passage finishes with the return to the starting theme, when Augustine explicitly explains what he has done here: “sed a Christo coactum ostendimus Paulum; imitatur itaque ecclesia in istis cogendis dominum suum.”81 Thus Augustine is able to prove that the Church is not doing anything wrong; on the contrary, she is simply following the example of Christ; he simultaneously suggests that the fruits of the policy of forced conversion may exceed all expectations, as was the case with Paul.82 In ep. 105.13, dated after August 406, Augustine touts the providential nature of his and his party’s activities in the controversy with the Donatists, to whom this letter is addressed. In a very straightforward and emotional amplificatio, the bishop of Hippo hints at the changed circumstances after the publication of the Edict of Union. Augustine starts with the imperative “concordate nobiscum fratres,” supple80 This feature surfaced also in ep. 89.7. 81 ep. 185.23 (CSEL 57,22). 82 The example of the shepherds and errant sheep is also used in ep. 173.3 for the same purpose. The language of comparatio criminis surfaces here as well. In a short span of time Augustine twice observes that the Catholics do better (“melius”) when they bring them back to the fold obeying God’s commands than if they let them perish, obeying the will of the lost sheep. It is better not to let them wander off (“errare”) and perish, whatever measures that may entail ep. 173.3 (CSEL 44, 642): “non ideo uobis displiceamus, quia reuocamus errantes et quaerimus perditos; melius enim facimus uoluntatem domini monentis, ut uos ad eius ouile redire cogamus, quam consentimus uoluntati ouium errantium, ut perire uos permittamus. Noli ergo iam dicere, quod te assidue audio dicere: sic uolo errare, sic uolo perire; melius enim nos hoc omnino non permittimus, quantum possumus.”

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mented by the confession of brotherly love (“diligimus uos”), which sets the tone for the next few lines full of nos–uos interplay. He presents now uos as the brothersturned-sheep who are lost and have gone astray (“perire, errare”) to make it congruent with the account of Ez 34:4: “quod errauerat, non reuocastis et, quod perierat, non inquisistis,” through which nos are shaped into shepherds. As is so often the case with Augustine’s use of amplificatio, he highlights it with enumeratio, which is of crucial importance for us here: hoc uobis per nos deus ipse facit siue obsecrando siue minando siue corripiendo siue damnis siue laboribus siue per suas occultas admonitiones uel uisitationes siue per potestatum temporalium leges. intellegite, quid uobiscum agatur; perire uos non uult deus in sacrilega discordia alienatos a matre uestra catholica.83

As we see, the Catholics have turned from brothers and shepherds into a mother. It occurs that the Donatists have to be seen as children lacking the traditional virtue of pietas, and are indeed presented as sacrilegiously averse to both their parent and to God. God works through the Catholic mother, whose actions are depicted with verbs and nouns associated with the process of castigating naughty children: obsecrare-minare-corripere. God does not rely exclusively on the Church, but also acts in secret (“per suas occultas admonitiones uel uisitationes”). But as mentioned above Augustine also admits that God stands behind the legal actions of the state. All these actions serve one purpose: to bring those who have gone astray and may soon perish back to God’s community. As regards asking the representatives of secular power to help the Church in fighting her enemies, Augustine admits that he lacks clear examples from the Bible.84 Therefore, pushed by adversaries to discuss the subject, he has to reach for the allegorical interpretation to talk about what was prophesied and what is now being fulfilled. Augustine uses the situation described in Christ’s parable of the Lord’s banquet from Luke 14 as an exemplum.85 In this figurative exegesis the Lord’s banquet is understood as “unitas corporis Christi.” The servants in the parable receive an order to force whomever they find on the roads and pathways to come to the banquet, for although some of the invited guests have come, there was still enough room in the banquet hall for the others still wandering on the roads and pathways. Augustine reads “qui inueniuntur in uiis et in saepibus” as “in haeresibus et schismatibus.”86 In this simile the true Christians are those who answered the first call, and were already seated at the banquet. The heretics and schismatics are those who did not hear, listen to or pay attention to the invitation and by consequence they have to be forced to enter by the power granted to the Church by the Christian ru­

83 ep. 105.13 (CSEL 34,2, 604). 84 ep. 93.9. 85 In ep. 185.24. 86 ep. 185.24 (CSEL 57,23).

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lers. It is also interesting that the occurrence of Christian emperors in history is interpreted by Augustine as God’s gift (“diuinus munus”). However, it is also in the discussion of the charge of cooperation with the state that Augustine finds a way to use an argument based on a proper historical exemplum. In order to do this, he has to restate the issue under discussion. Thus, in ep. 87.8, he presents the Church as asking for protection from earthly authorities, for, in all cases of self-defence, reaching out to the secular power would be justified. To prove this claim Augustine refers to the example of Paul, who asked the Roman authorities for armed guards to protect him from the aggression of the Jews. By comparing the situation of Paul to that of the Church endangered by the alleged atrocities of the Donatists, he can use the structure a maiore ad minus: if Paul acted in that manner, we too can do so. It should not go unnoticed that whereas the Apostle asked pagan authorities, the Church is asking Christian officials and emperors for help. At this juncture, the Church appears to be even more justified than Paul was (which makes it simultaneously argument a minore ad maius). In like manner, Augustine exploits the same example years later, but this time he compares Paul to an individual – Maximian, the Catholic bishop of Bagaï.87 This argument is much more elaborate in its narrative layer. First, Augustine describes the horrible details of an assault by the Donatists on Maximian. He retook the basilica in Bagaï from the schismatics, an action that complied with the earlier decision of the secular court. During the liturgy in this church he was attacked by a mob. There follows the miraculous history of his hiding, the healing of his wounds and his travelling to Rome to seek justice from the emperor.88 In the next paragraph Augustine compares his situation to that of Paul. He stresses that in both cases the agents are acting not only in self-defence, but with the aim of protecting the communities entrusted to them. This time Augustine is also more elaborate in his treatment of Paul’s adventures. He singles out three different situations, the ones narrated in Acts 23:12–32, 22:24–29 and 25:11. The first recalls Paul’s hardships in Jerusalem, where more than forty Jews planned to kill him in an ambush, while he was about to be taken to the Sanhedrin. In the second passage, while in Jerusalem, Paul escaped flogging at the hands of the Roman soldiers by claiming his Roman citizenship. In the last, imprisoned in Caesarea, he declined to be judged by Jewish priests, and appealed directly to the emperor. After concisely retelling these cases Augustine is able to conclude: “ubi satis ostendit, quid facere postea deberent Christi dispensatores, quando imperatores christianos periclitante ecclesia reperirent.”89 With this conclusion he can swiftly move away from the discussion of the peculiar case of Maximian of Bagaï and continue with more general issues. It is clear to him that Paul established an example not merely for one persecuted priest, but for 87 In ep. 185.27. 88 See above, p. 160–61. 89 ep. 185.28 (CSEL 57, 27).

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the whole class of God’s servants (“Christi dispensatores”) in the times when Church is in danger (“periclitans ecclesia”).

1.2.2.2 Episcopacy Augustine dismisses the general claim that the Donatists used as infirmatio rationis – that no one should be forced to what is good – by using an argument based on the exemplum of episcopacy.90 In the first move he quotes from Saint Paul (1 Tim 1:31) to establish unequivocally that episcopacy is indeed something good: “He who desires episcopacy desires a good work.” Next he observes that there are many people who reject the honour of becoming a bishop of their own will and have to be forced to accept it. Following the pattern a minore ad maius, he concludes that the use of force is much more justified in the case of heretics who harm themselves and are standing in the way of their own salvation.

1.2.2.3 Suicides on the cliff Augustine tries to prove that enforcing a change in belief is not really so very paradoxical. He highlights his understanding of the religious coercion in the image of madman running towards a cliff to jump off it.91 Augustine claims that although using physical force to stop and bind this person might superficially seem cruel, and would almost certainly be met with the anger of this crazed man, such an action would in fact not be hostile towards him at all. On the contrary, it would be cruel to leave him to his own whims and erroneous decisions. In the same manner, neglecting the use of force in stopping the Donatists from running headlong to hell would be evil. After a while, the one who wanted to commit suicide would be most thankful to his saviour for the use of force, just like the Donatists forced to convert are indeed grateful to the Catholics.

1.2.3 Suicides The main rule in a defence organised according to the pattern of comparatio criminis was to present one’s morally controversial action as the only possible way of avoiding even worse evil. Both sides were supposed to use loci communes to highlight the links between the discussed actions with emotions. The accusing party had to “bring out the baseness of the deed with great indignation,” whereas the defence ought to sustain that “no deed should be judged inexpedient or base [...] unless it is 90 ep. 173.2. 91 ep. 93.2.

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known with what intent, at what time and for what reason it was done.”92 This is where the problem of the much-discussed suicides of the Donatists occurs. When facing the choice between being forced into the Catholic Church or dying, some Donatists chose the latter. This practice was justified by reference to Marculus and other martyrs from the time of the Great Persecution, who jumped off a cliff and killed themselves (see Rossi: 2013, 171–7). It was thus a phenomenon known well enough to make its way into Augustine’s polemic. When Augustine claimed that the Donatists were being forced back to join the Catholic unity for it was a choice of the lesser evil, one might refute this reasoning by pointing to the numerous cases of suicidal deaths. The actions of the Catholic bishops and the state officials supporting them in religious coercion were leading directly to many deaths of die-hard Donatists. In this light the whole pattern of defence could be undermined because of the emotive power of this image. Martyrdom has spread an aura of sanctity and authority. If one decides to sacrifice one’s life for some conviction, this conviction will almost always gain some recognition. Augustine had to counter this argument. In ep. 185.32, after briefly presenting the testimonies of different groups of former Donatists who express how they benefited from being forced to join the Catholic community, Augustine presents the main line of his refutation. Even if some desperate men decided to self-immolate in the face of forced conversion, it would be a real cruelty to leave the incomparably larger group of happy converts for the sake of those few and in effect to let the majority burn in the everlasting fires.93 The salvation of the many is more important than the self-damnation of the few. The most popular answer formulated in accordance with this pattern to the issue of suicides, however, employs loci a persona and aims at raising emotions (pathos) or laughter (ridiculum). The main idea is to present the Donatist “martyrdom” as an effect of their faulty character and to mock their definition of martyrdom. At one point in ep. 185 Augustine starts a narrative on the suicidal deaths of the Donatists.94 It is introduced at the end of paragraph 11 with a pointed remark that the Donatists love homicide so much that they even go as far as to murder themselves if they do not find anyone else to kill. The Catholics are not to be perceived as responsible for the suicides of their opponents, because the suicidal deaths have nothing to do with the religious coercion. Instead, they should be seen as proof of the Donatists’ pro92 Cic., Inv. 2.77–78 (LCL 386, 242–3): “Loci communes autem erunt: accusatoris, in eum qui, cum de facto turpi aliquo aut inutili aut utroque fateatur, quaerat tamen aliquam defensionem, et facti inutilitatem aut turpitudinem cum indignatione proferre; defensoris est, nullum factum inutile neque turpe neque item utile neque honestum putari oportere, nisi quo animo, quo tempore, qua de causa factum sit intellegatur.” 93 ep. 185.32 (CSEL 57, 30): “tunc diceres nimiae fuisse crudelitatis, si, dum timeretur, ne homines desperati et istorum innumerabili multitudini nulla aestimatione comparandi suis et uoluntariis ignibus cremarentur, isti in aeternum perdendi et sempiternis ignibus cruciandi relinquerentur.” 94 In the discussion of this passage I present an enhanced passage from my paper Toczko: 2018, 100–102.

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pensity for violence, which in this case is self-inflicted. Paragraph 12 as a whole is structured in the form of rhetorical amplificatio, a figure usually used with the purpose of raising emotions in the audience. It starts with the claim that getting killed is the long-established habit of the Donatists, dating back to the earlier times of opposing paganism. They were as eager to throw themselves into the hands of their pagan opponents as they are now, when facing the decisive clash with the Catholics. There follows a short narrative on their suicidal actions in those times. Here, Augustine ridicules both their intention and the outcome of their actions: instead of really fighting paganism they merely wanted to die. Instead of destroying idols, he claims, they just surrendered to be put to death during pagan feasts. Thus, these suicides were not an effect of their brave Christian rejection of pagan rituals and the confirmation of their martyr-like qualities but, rather, the goal itself. In Augustine’s view, they were unsuccessful and clumsy defenders of the Christian faith. Then he goes on to enumerate other examples of suicidal deaths that produce a mocking image of clumsy criminals. The first story concerns some Donatists attacking armed caravans. Contrary to the expectations of the readers, after the successful ambush, the oppressors present their victims an awkward alternative that Augustine introduces with the ironical phrase “terribiliter comminantes”: you either kill us or you are dead.95 In the next anecdote we hear about other Donatists who forced judges to sentence them to death and to execute them immediately. Once again Augustine builds on the crimi­ nal nature of their acts and on the popular image of criminals who escaped justice and evaded trials. The enumeration of examples of Donatists’ clumsiness comes to its climax in the anecdote about an assaulted man who used their eagerness to die to make them an object of ridicule. The man was ambushed by a group of Donatists and, apparently, confronted with the above-mentioned alternative. He preferred to choose the first option, and ordered that the attackers be bound, which they willingly, or even eagerly, obeyed. After it was done he went away with his companions leaving the bound Donatists all alone. To sum it all up, Augustine adds that the Donatists’ daily sport (“ludus”) was to find an opportunity to commit suicide by one of the following: by falling headlong off a cliff, by drowning in water or by being consumed by flames. In the concluding remarks of this paragraph Augustine aims to explain this strange behaviour. He reaches for a standard weapon used to bring ridicule on the opponent – a proof from Scripture and an allegation stating that their actions are motivated by the Devil. To add to the mockery, Augustine uses the biblical image of the pigs possessed by demons who throw themselves into the water from a cliff.96 Comparisons with animals are also a standard tool of ridicule used

95 ep. 185.11 (CSEL 57, 11): “quidam etiam se trucidandos armatis uiatoribus ingerebant percussuros eos se, nisi ab eis perimerentur, terribiliter comminantes.” 96 Matt 8:32; Mark 5:13; Luke 8:33.

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by Augustine97 and other Christian writers on such occasions (Opelt: 1980, 244– 246). And here they are all the more persuasive that they comply with scriptural passages. One famous and unsuccessful suicide was attempted by the Donatist priest Donatus to whom Augustine wrote ep. 173. Donatus tried to avoid forced conversion by throwing himself into a well. Augustine discusses his attempt along the lines of comparatio criminis in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the letter. The passage starts with a biting remark that his addressee obviously used his own will when he threw himself into the well, which serves to mockingly underline the fact that the Donatists lack reason to such an extent that they cannot be left on their own. Then Augustine goes on to use the loci communes recommended in Rhet. Her. 2.14. Two rhetorical questions and an exclamation suggest that the monks who accompanied the seized Donatus would rightly be judged cruel and wicked if they had allowed him to act out of his free will and cause harm to himself. On the contrary, their goal should be seen as worthy, for not only did they want to save his earthly life, but, what is much more important in this deliberative context, they saved him from eternal death. Augustine concludes this passage with an enthymeme that could be resolved into fullfledged syllogistic reasoning. Premise: Every suicidal death is punished by eternal damnation. Premise: Saving from the punishment of eternal damnation is always justified regardless of the circumstances. Conclusion: Saving from suicidal death is justified no matter the circumstances. Hence, it would always be more beneficial to hamper one’s suicidal attempt, not only in the case of the Donatists. By establishing this rule through reasoning, Augustine can more easily refute the Donatist argument based on the authority of 1 Cor 13:3 where suicide is described as pointless without the spirit of love (“Even if I hand over my body to be burnt …”) Augustine here employs one of the status legales and speaks from the position of the defender of the sense (voluntas) of the texts against its literal meaning (scriptum). According to his interpretation, in this passage Paul speaks of suicide in the stan­ dard way for Scripture, as something morally justified only in a specific situation: when one is confronted with the dilemma – to commit evil or to suffer evil.98 Augustine finds this standard meaning in Deuteronomy 3:13–21 and 3:95; suicide serves there only as a means to avoid worshipping idols, hence the motive behind the suicidal attempt can be justified. The characters from Deut 3:13–21 do not want to die, but they do not want to commit evil even more, and choose death. The sui97 Donatists are most often called wolves, frequently with scriptural references, e. g. c. litt. Pet. 1.22, 1.25, 2.164, C. Gaud. 1.18. Shaw (2011: 657) suggests that Augustine’s frequent use of greges to describe the circumcellions (e. g. ep. 35.2) serves the same goal of likening them to animals. However Alessandro Rossi (2013, 290–292), does not see any connection between “greges” and animals and reads it as a synonym of “turba” used negatively in reference to heretical groups. 98 ep. 173.5.

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cidal attempts of the Donatists not only fail to comply with this understanding, but they contradict it. The schismatics commit suicide not in order to avoid something evil, but to avoid living in the Christian community imbued with the spirit of love, and hence he calls them “enemies of love.” Dying with such a motive, Augustine concludes, would not be beneficial even if it were not a suicide but a death procured by a third party. After all, 1 Cor 13:3 explicitly says that without love there is no gain in handing oneself over to be burnt.99 After closing this exegetical frame, Augustine dedicates a few lines to exhort his addressee to refrain from suicidal attempts.

2. Status definitionis As I mentioned earlier, in the krinomenon pattern of defence against the charge of persecution Augustine sometimes supplies argumentation based on qualitative issue with that drawn from status definitionis. It was a standard procedure, allowed by rhetorical handbooks and practice. We have already seen how it worked with regard to the accusation of schism. There are two basic contexts in which the issue concerning the definition occurs in Augustine’s defence against the charge of persecution: one when the focus is on the victims and their claims and a second when the motives of the agents are discussed. I will start with the first: discourse on martyrdom. When the Donatists accused their opponents of persecution they tried to refer to the long-standing identity of the Christian Church in North Africa as a community of the persecuted, of martyrs (See Burris: 2012, 7–29, Ployd: 2018, 28–32). We see this for instance in the case of Fortunius, the Donatist bishop of Thiave, who in a debate with Augustine employed this charge to present his community as one that had been subject to persecutions. For him it directly proves that his community is Christian.100 He seems to rely on the premise according to which the Christians were defined as a persecuted group. As Petilian put it in his letter: “those who are persecuted are more righteous than those who persecute,”101 and later rephrased it during the Conference of Carthage in a most clear-cut form: “With us is found the true Catholic Church that suffers persecution, not the one that inflicts it.”102 Adam Ployd, who has recently explored this context in an original study, observes that what is at stake here is the prize of being perceived as the Church of

99 ep. 173.6. 100 ep. 44.4. 101 c. litt. Pet. 1.20 (CSEL 52, 15): “iustiores sunt qui patiuntur persecutionem, quam illi qui faciunt.” 102 See Gesta Collationis Carthaginensis 3.22; and Augustine’s paraphrasing of it in ep. 185.10 (CSEL 57, 9): “sicut in conlatione dixerunt illam esse ueram ecclesiam, quae persecutionem patitur, non quae facit […].”

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martyrs.103 According to Augustine, the Donatists felt entitled to be perceived as a community of martyrs solely on the basis of being the target of state-led persecution instigated by the Catholic party. Answering this argument Augustine attacks their definition of being subject to persecution and suffering martyrdom. For some reason, be it blindness or hypocrisy, the Donatists reject the blatant truth: what enables one to expect reward for martyrdom is not the punishment itself, but the reason behind it – “martyres ueros non faciat poena sed causa.”104 This reward is not received for being persecuted, Augustine insists, but for being persecuted on account of justice. The image of parenthood, as so often in this controversy, supplies the argument with an apt simile. In the situation where children are harshly rebuked by their parents for living recklessly, those who suffer real persecution, pro­ perly defined, are the parents, not the children. This is explained by the fact that although both sides inflict suffering on one another, the parents have a just motive (“causa”), whereas the children do not. In the debate with Fortunius, related in ep. 44, Augustine took up the biblical argument of his adversary and answered in the same vein. According to his later report he was happy that his opponent had referred to the quotation he himself would frequently use: “beati, qui persecutionem patiuntur propter iustitiam, quoniam ipsorum est regnum caelorum” – “Blessed are those who suffer persecution on the account of justice/righteousness, for they possess the heavenly kingdom” (Matt 5:10). By making reference to this passage Augustine could move onto a familiar field and pose the important question of whether the Donatists were being persecuted on account of justice. In the answer he claims that this persecution is simply a punishment for schism.105 Schism is a crime and cannot be perceived as just, justified or justifiable, and as a result the Donatists fail to meet their own criteria of the blessed Christian community, because they suffer persecution on account of injustice, not justice.106 The same quotation from the Gospel of Matthew also opens an important passage in ep. 185.9–11. Here the two aspects of the same theme are most clearly connected: active (acting as a persecutor) and passive (suffering persecution). The premise of

103 See Ployd: 2018, 37–39; in particular it is worth quoting the following: “When we read these Donatist uses of Matt. 5:10 in the context of North African martyrdom tradition, which, since Tertullian, has been steeped in the imagery of the martyr’s crown and other praemia given to those who remain faithful in persecution we see the weight of Petilian’s and Forunatius’s claims here. The true church is the church of the martyrs. Only they can lay claim to Christ’s promised reward of the kingdom. To support their claim to be the true church, the Donatists appeal to Matt. 5:10 as the lex that entitles them to the praemium of the kingdom.” (Ibid. 38–39). 104 ep. 89.2. 105 Just like in ep. 87.7, where he also also refers to Matt 5:10. See also cath. fr. 55. See above relatio criminis. 106 So, in agreement with Adam Ployd, I observe that in this case Augustine proves that the Donatists are bad readers of scripture, and their definition is too broad (2018, 41–2), or to put it otherwise, they use a proper quotation contrary to their interests.

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the argument is that whichever we aim to define, persecuting or suffering persecution, we ought to involve the motives of both: “causas, quare quisque faciat persecutionem uel quare patiatur.” For Augustine, this comes down, literally, to stating whether the persecution was inflicted or suffered on account of justice or not. This is exactly what the Donatists omit in their respective definition.107 For Augustine to define someone as “iustus” because he or she suffers persecution is not only wrong in the light of the biblical definitnion of the term, but is not useful even for the Donatists. If they relied on it, in consequence they would have to recognise Caecilian as a martyr, for he suffered persecution at the hands of the Donatists. This brings the reasoning onto the field of status translationis.108 The bulk of the argumentation in status definitionis, however, is grounded in biblical testimonia and exempla. Augustine at times starts by focusing on the passive and then shifts to the active aspect of persecution.109 Based on Matt 5:10 he insists that only those who suffer persecution on account of justice should be regarded as true martyrs (“ueri martyres”), not those who are persecuted on “account of the impious division of Christian unity.”110 He then proceeds to show how the Bible weaves into the narratives the pairs of true and false martyrs: Sarah and Hagar, David and Saul, Christ and the thieves crucified along with him. All those people suffered persecution, but in each pair only one suffered on account of justice; thus Sarah, David and Christ are examples of true martyrs. The definition of martyrdom where the reason matters (not the punishment) is further corroborated by two testimonies from the Book of Psalms: Ps 43:1 “Judge me, O God, and distinguish my cause from that of an unholy people,” and Ps 119:86 “They have persecuted me unjustly, help me.” Both true and false martyrs may be perceived as alike in the similarity of punishment, as was the case with Christ and the thieves, but the true martyr suffers for a righteous reason. Only that enables him to ask God for help, as David did in Ps 119. We can observe here, that Augustine allows for the possibility that just like there exists an unjust persecution we may also talk about a just one. To prove this point Augustine evokes Paul’s interpretation of Gn 16:6 from Gal 4:21–31. According to Paul Sarah, presented in Gn 16:6 as persecuting Hagar, a serving maid and the mother of Ishmael, is in fact an allegory of the mother Church. From this parallel, endowed with the exegetical authority of Paul, it should be clear 107 See also Ployd: 2018, 37: “Augustine’s emphasis on causa as the delineating factor for true martyrdom is an explicit application of the locus a causa to a definitional issue. Moreover, Augustine repeatedly mocks the Donatists’ claim to martyrdom by showing that their definition is parum plena, incomplete, because it includes too wide a range of deaths within its scope.” 108 It also happens in ep. 76.4, ep. 108.14–16 and c. litt. Pet. 1.20. All these instances I discuss in the part dedicated to status translationis below. 109 ep. 185.9–11. 110 ep. 185.9 (CSEL 57, 8): “ueri autem martyres illi sunt, de quibus dominus ait: beati, qui persecutionem patiuntur propter iustitiam [Matt 5,10]. non ergo qui propter iniquitatem et propter christianae unitatis impiam diuisionem, sed qui propter iustitiam persecutionem patiuntur [Matt 5,10], hi martyres ueri sunt.”

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that there exists persecution of a kind that we might call just, and that it was prefigured in the Old Testament. Augustine adds an additional note, similar to that of ep. 89.2, where he compared the relation between parents and children to claim that children may persecute their parents far worse through their wickedness than parents do through punishments. In this letter, he simply substitutes these pairs with Sarah and Hagar – it is Hagar who persecuted Sarah with her arrogance more severely than Sarah persecuted Hagar by instilling discipline in her.111 The motive (“causa”) of the actions qualifies the deed. Just like in par. 9, the exemplum is corro­ borated by the testimony from the Book of Psalms. Ps 18:37 states: “I shall persecute my enemies and seize them and I shall not turn back until they collapse.” This allows Augustine to ultimately define the just and unjust persecution in an emphatic epiphoric sequence: est persecutio iniusta, quam faciunt impii ecclesiae Christi, et est persecutio iusta, quam faciunt impiis ecclesiae Christi.112

The passage concludes with a comparison of the Church and the Donatists (who are presented as the just and unjust persecutors, respectively) organised in an anaphoric chain. In this comparison Augustine once again reaches for the category of “causa”: the Church aims at correcting errors, while the Donatists focus on spreading them. He also adds a supplementary one of “modus”, namely that the Church persecutes by loving, Donatists by raging. The analysis of this passage enables us to swiftly move to other texts where the focus is mainly on the persecutors and not on the martyrs. In fact, in ep. 185.11 Augustine recycles arguments from ep. 93.6–10 and cath. fr. 53, 56. In the latter text the tendency to define every act of persecution as criminal (“culpabile”) is questioned. In keeping with advice found in the rhetorical handbooks, examples of the standard use of the word “persecutor” are provided. Augustine observes that this is a loaded term, abused by those who have a lower standing in society against those who are above them. Children, wives, servants, soldiers, etc. are sometimes pu­ nished by parents, husbands, masters, generals or kings. When such a person is punished or rebuked, he or she would more often than not view this act as unjust and present it as persecution, even if the punitive measures are light; even if the persecutor in fact aims at correction and turns such a person away from committing more serious mistakes or crimes. But, Augustine concludes, we should not approve of this use of the word “persecutor”, for it is clearly used as an emotive label, not a descriptive term. A person who resorts to punishment with a view to correcting someone under his command or care is not a persecutor, but a “corrector” or 111 The same analogy within the same argument is to be found in cath. fr. 56 (CSEL 52, 305): “grauius enim persequitur filius patrem male uiuendo quam pater filium castigando, et grauius ancilla Sarram persecuta est per iniquam superbiam quam eam Sarra per debitam disciplinam […]”. 112 ep. 185.11 (CSEL 57, 10).

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“consultor” if he dissuades from something evil. A real “persecutor” or “oppressor” is someone who uses punishment to dissuade someone from something good and agreeable. By consequence, as the Catholic Church aims at correcting the Donatists, she cannot be treated as a “persecutor” according to the descriptive/normative use of the word, even though the Donatists will present her as such by referring to the subjective/emotive use of that term.113 In ep. 93.6 Augustine’s main purpose is the same – to dismiss the superficial definition of persecution that levels all punitive acts regardless of the crucial nuances: “cum boni et mali eadem faciunt eademque patiuntur, non factis et poenis sed causis utique discernendi sunt.”114 All punitive acts may bring about the suffering of people experiencing them, but that is not the point. Some of them are motivated by the hateful will of doing harm (“odium nocendi”), others by the loving will of healing (“dilectio sanandi”).115 To prove this point Augustine invokes a number of biblical exempla. First, enter Sarah and Hagar with their sons, respectively, Isaac and Ishmael. Sarah is presented as the righteous person punishing the rebellious Hagar without hatred or cruelty, but with salutary intention. Drawing on the passage from the Letter to Galatians 4:29 Augustine picks up the Pauline interpretation of the relation between Ishmael and Isaac: “the one who was born according to the flesh [sc. Ishmael] persecuted the one who was born according to the Spirit [sc. Isaac].” Drawing on these two carefully selected pairs of biblical figures he can also refer to the allegorical understanding of the present events. If Sarah and Isaac re­ present the spiritual persons and Hagar and Ishmael stand for carnal ones, it follows that the Donatists are the carnal persons fighting with and rejecting help from the representative of spiritual reality, namely the Catholic Church. But Augustine admits that this foray into the realm of allegorical interpretation is only meant for those who are able to understand it (“qui possunt, intellegant”). For all the others he enumerates various examples from both Testaments in nicely selected pairs of persecutors, which offers the readers an insight regarding the validity of his stance: Moses and Pharaoh, Jezebel and Elijah, the Jews beating Paul, the Greeks beating the Jew Sosthenes to defend Paul. As is the case with his use of the chains of biblical exempla, Augustine sticks to chronological order. In every pair there is one example of a righteous person, and one of a wicked persecutor who can be discerned by the motives guiding their actions: “Nonne similitudo facti quasi utrosque coniungit et tamen eos causae dissimilitudo discernit?”116 Later on, Augustine tries to prove an even more general claim – in every action, not only in the case of persecution, one should evaluate the motives of the agents: 113 Augustine comes back to this reasoning later by reaching for the biblical example of Sarah and Hagar, which he supplements with a reference to the relation between parents and children cath. fr. 56, see previous page. 114 ep. 93.6 (CSEL 34,2, 450). 115 Ibid. 116 ep. 93.7 (CSEL 34,2, 451).

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“discamus, fratres, in similitudine operum discernere animos operantium, ne clausis oculis calumniemur et beniuolos pro nocentibus accusemus.”117 Here he reaches for a slightly differently structured example: God the father handed over his Son for death, but Judas, too, did the same to his Lord. As a result, there were three men hanging on three crosses. Although the crosses were similar, their occupants were not. At the end of this passage Augustine claims that there have always occurred persecutions procured by both parties, the wicked and the righteous. He then proceeds to reformulate his main thesis – that the motives, not the external appearances of actions, are what counts – and again enumerates biblical examples in an anaphoric chain of short comparationes: occiderunt impii prophetas, occiderunt impios et prophetae; flagellauerunt Iudaei Christum, Iudaeos flagellauit et Christus; traditi sunt apostoli ab hominibus potestati humanae, tradiderunt et apostoli homines potestati satanae.118

In this way Augustine presents us with a wide array of actions procured by opposing parties: killing, whipping, denouncing. At first sight they appear to be obvious crimes. In the argumentative mode of status definitionis however, it is always the intention not the outward appearance of a deed that serves as the moral qualifier necessary to define persecution precisely. Augustine is able to defend his party against the charge of persecution simply by arguing that what they do only looks like persecution, but is in fact something completely different. This general rule concerning the motivation of a deed (“causa”) serves Augustine also to build an argument a similtudinibus concerning the future, not the past. In ep. 185.41 Augustine presents his exegesis of Wis 5:1: “Then the righteous will stand with great constancy over against those who oppressed them and carried off the fruits of their labors.” He debated the interpretation of this verse years earlier, when provoked by Gaudentius, who proposed that the passage in its entirety (Wis 5:1–9) could serve as a justification for the Donatists’ reluctance to recant and their readiness to receive martyrdom. For Gaudentius, as for Augustine, it was obvious that their own group should be identified as “iusti”. Here, Augustine provides a series of biblical exempla to solve the problem. Just as righteous Israel stood against wicked Canaan, and Naboth against Ahab, so too will the Christians stand against the pagans and the Catholics against the heretics. For these are not Catholics that “carried off the fruits’ of heretics’ labours” (“abstulerunt labores”) by the power of the laws of Catholic emperors. On the contrary, it was the frenzied circumcellions who carried off the fruits of the labours of the Catholics. In this simile we can observe a handbook-like semantic and syntactic symmetry:

117 ep. 93.7 (CSEL 34,2, 452). 118 ep. 93.8 (CSEL 34,2, 452–3).

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sic ergo non stabit haereticus aduersus catholicum, qui accepit labores eius, quando praeualuerunt leges catholicorum imperatorum, sed stabit catholicus aduersus haereticum, qui abstulit labores eius, quando praeualebant furores impiorum circumcellionum.119

3. Status translationis 3.1 Donatists as persecutors The retorsion arguments drawn by Augustine on the basis of status translationis occur mostly to supplement the defence based on status definitionis. The core issue here was how to precisely define a martyr and a persecutor. For Augustine a martyr is not merely one that suffers some punitive actions and a persecutor is not one who acts to establish punitive measures or put them into effect. This is as the Donatists would have it, but Augustine insists that we always have to include the motive behind actions. He takes up the Donatist understanding of persecution to formulate arguments drawn from comparison (locus a comparatione) with the Maximanists frequently appearing also in the discussion of other charges. si iustiores sunt qui patiuntur persecutionem quam illi qui faciunt, idem Maximianistae iustiores sunt.120 si propterea iusti estis, quia persecutionem per imperatores passi estis, iustiores uobis sunt ipsi Maximianistae, quos per iudices ab imperatoribus catholicis missos uos ipsi persecuti estis.121

In these sentences the Donatists’ claim to be the Church of martyrs is rejected. As such, this claim is linked with the accusation that the Catholics are allied with the oppressive state powers in persecuting a rival religious community. Here, Augustine taps into this context. The Donatists have no right to issue such a charge, because they would have to accuse themselves of the same trespass in their actions against the Maximianists. During these trying times they resorted to violence and destroyed a Maximianist basilica, relied on the military power of Optatus of Thamu­ gadi to threaten and keep their opponents in check, and successfully appealed to the proconsul to regain the basilicas in Membressa, Assuras and Musti.122 Augustine employs this mutual accusation only in defence to refute this type of charges once and for all. He assures the Donatists that they rightly appealed to the state, to the proconsular court to correct the schismatics, just as the Catholics are justified in 119 ep. 185.41 (CSEL 57,36). 120 c. litt. Pet. 1.20 (CSEL 52, 15). 121 ep. 76.4 (CSEL 34,2, 328). 122 Such is his explanation in c. litt. Pet. 1.20. For the details of these actions and analysis of Augustine’s reports on them with the special focus on the spatial rhetoric, see Lander: 2017, 150– 153; Shaw: 2011, 131–141.

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doing so against the Donatists. The only difference is that of scale, which is proven with the help of the pattern a minore ad maius. If the Donatists were justified in reaching for punitive measures against their small splinter group, which was relatively not too harmful to the Christian community, as they were a schism within a schism, all the more so the Church is justified in applying similar measures to correct the much more populous schismatic community of the Donatists, who are trying to rebaptize the whole world. In ep. 108.14, too, Augustine introduces the retorsion argument based on a comparison of Donatists with Maximianists within status definitionis. As we have seen, the precise definition of persecution would have to also involve the motive of the action. In accordance with the claim of Matt 5:10, only those who suffer persecution on account of justice (“propter iustitiam”) can in fact be labelled “persecuted.” The Donatists, Augustine says, did not want to add this qualification to their definition of persecution. In ep. 185.9 Augustine observes that by rejecting such an addition to their definition of persecution the Donatists would have to include Caecilian in the group of the persecuted and consider themselves to be persecutors. In ep. 108.14 the logic of the argument is the same, but there Augustine mentions the Maximianists instead of Caecilian. This group would have a better founded claim to be called martyrs than the Donatists, since they were persecuted earlier123 and more fiercely – a claim that Augustine tries to prove here by referring to official documents, such as municipal and ecclesial records. In ep. 108.16 he comes back to this line of argumentation to underline the fact that his party perceives the Donatist persecution of the Maximianists through measures imposed by the state as justified, for it is just to try to dissuade the schismatics from error, because the intention to correct an evildoer is good. The same reasoning characteristic for status qualitatis lies behind the similar argument of cath. fr. 54. There, it is supported by the divine testimony of Rom 13:2–3, which helps Augustine to claim that if the Maximianists opposed the joint punitive actions of the Donatists and the state, they would be in the wrong, for resisting the secular authority means opposing what God has appointed. In this way the retorsion argument is linked with the more general pattern of status qualitatis – both our punitive actions against you, and yours against the Maximianists were justified by their motive – the will to correct those who are in error. One passage in ep. 51.3 reveals particularly well Augustine’s thought process leading to the choice of the status to be employed in this discussion:

item soletis nobis obicere, quod uos per potestates terrenas persequamur. qua in re non disputo, uel quid uos pro immanitate tanti sacrilegii mereamini uel quantum nos christiana temperet mansuetudo; illud dico: si hoc crimen est, cur eosdem Maximianistas per iudices ab eis imperatoribus missos[…] grauiter insectati de basilicis, quas tenebant, in quibus eos inuenit ipsa conscissio, et controuersiarum strepitu et iussio-

123 That means that Augustine does not see the persecution of the Donatists during Macarian age as valid.

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num potentatu et auxiliorum impetu proturbastis? in qua conflictatione quae passi sint per loca singula, recentia rerum uestigia contestantur; quae iussa sint, chartae indicant; quae facta sint, terrae clamant, in quibus etiam Optati illius tribuni uestri sancta memoria praedicatur.124

In the standard formula of praeteritio with which Augustine starts the discussion of the charge, he admits to resigning from using status qualitatis of the type comparatio criminis – he will not say what they deserve for their outrageous sacrilege. He also resigns from developing arguments based on persons, to point out the leniency and mercy that the Catholic party showed to the violent schismatics. Instead, he treads the path of status definitionis to reverse the charge – if persecuting through the secular powers is a crime, then it can be proven through material signs, documents and the “lament of the regions” where Optatus operated with his army that this is exactly what the Donatists did in their actions against the Maximianists. In this passage Augustine aims at raising pathos as he talks about the sufferings of the Maximianists, but he does not refrain from fine irony in the last sentence. There Augustine labels the Donatist bishop as a military officer, and very ironically refers to the late Optatus as being of holy memory (“sancta memoria”) although he has always accused him of the worst acts of violence.

3.2 Donatists as collaborators 3.2.1 Testimonia As we have already seen, in the different formulations of the charge of persecution there was often an important factor connected with the role of the secular power. The most precise formulation of the charge and its rejection (repulsio) suitable for the currently analysed pattern of defence is found in ep. 88.5: quid est quod nobis de imperatorum iussionibus, quae contra uos constituuntur, inuidiam concitatis, cum hoc totum uos potius antea feceritis?125

It is clear from that passage that Augustine’s main interest in this reversal of charge lies in proving that those who accuse his party are not only guilty of the same crime, if this is a crime at all, but that they committed this crime earlier and thus created a precedent.126 Two main strands of argument in this scheme are inartificial and based on the testimonia, namely official state and Church documents and examples 124 ep. 51.3 (CSEL 34,2, 146–7). 125 ep. 88.5 (CSEL 34,2, 411). It is worth reading the whole passage. 126 From ep. 141.8 it is clear that during the Conference in Carthage, Augustine connected status translationis with the defence based on status qualitatis. By proving that the Donatists were the first to incite secular powers against the other Church faction, he undemined their claim that it was unjust that they be persecuted through imperial laws.

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of the Donatists’ personal vices. It is worth noting that this line of argument is often introduced or accompanied by remarks in which Augustine underlines that his case is of the highest level of defensibility, that is causa manifesta. Hence, he calls on his addressee in ep 89.3 to read the available public and absolutely trustworthy documents (“firmissima documenta”) that prove beyond any doubt that the predecessors of the schismatics (“maiores eorum”) have dared to submit an internal Church affair to the secular imperial court for consideration.127 In ep. 105.8 he even challenges the Donatist addressees to ask him for proofs and offers his life as a warrant, that based on their evidence everyone can be persuaded as to the truth of the issue.128 As for the documents that he uses to prove the appeals of the first generation of Donatists to the secular powers, he either quotes them,129 or only refers to them without quoting.130 The dossier consists of two official letters – the report of consul Anulinus to the emperor Constantine and the letter of Constantine to proconsul Probian (which formed part of the Acta apud Zenophilum, which I am going to discuss later). The letter of Anulinus accompanied the libelli – the formal accusations against Caecilian written by the Donatists and given to the proconsul so that they could be passed on directly to the emperor. The second letter is at its core a command to send to the imperial court a minor figure, Ingentius, the decurion in Zicca, in order that his testimonies against Caecilian may be thoroughly (i.e. by torture) verified. The tenor of the letter betrays that the emperor is absolutely certain of Caecilian’s innocence. Augustine, however, uses this text mostly, he claims, to prove that the predecessors of the Donatists were repeatedly sending appeals to the imperial court.131 The quotations from these documents make it possible for Augustine to triumphantly conclude in ep. 88.5 with a long chain of rhetorical questions, crowned by the final one: “If you are dissatisfied with the imperial judgements, who first forced the emperors to issue them against you?”132 Augustine portrays the first generation of Donatists as being responsible for exactly the same action that is raised as an objection to his generation of Catholics, namely inviting the state to interfere in ecclesiastical affairs. He goes to great lengths

127 ep. 89.3 (CSEL 34,2, 420): “Extant publicorum monumentorum firmissima documenta, quae potes legere, si uolueris, immo peto et hortor, ut legas, quibus probatur, quod maiores eorum, qui primi se ab ecclesiae pace diuiserunt, ultro per Anulinum tunc proconsulem apud Constantinum imperatorem accusare ausi sunt Caecilianum.” 128 ep. 105.8 (CSEL 34,2, 600–601): “scitote: primi maiores uestri causam Caeciliani ad imperatorem Constantinum detulerunt. exigite hoc a nobis, probemus uobis et, si non probauerimus, facite de nobis, quicquid potueritis.” But compare also ep. 88.1. 129 As in ep. 88.2 and 88.4. 130 As in ep. 88.3., 89.3, 105.8–10. He for instance never inserts any excerpts of the councils of Rome or Arles in these letters, although he refers to them. 131 ep. 88.3. 132 ep. 88.5 (CSEL 34,2, 410): “si displicent imperialia iudicia, qui primitus imperatores ad ea uobis excitanda coegerunt?” English transl. by R. Teske, WSA II/1, 354.

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to point out how utterly stubborn they were in their renewed appeals to the empe­ ror.133 This type of argumentation is best represented by the very witty locus a finitione concluding the passage in ep. 89.3. There Augustine assumes that even the Devil would give up repeating his accusations if he had lost so many cases in front of the judges that he himself had chosen.134 On another occasion, he builds his argument on the persons of the emperors to ridicule the Donatists even further.135 There Augustine carefully retells the history of the Donatists’ appeals to the empe­ rors by referring to the official documents. This time, apart from the arrogance and obstinacy of the prosecutors, Augustine focuses on using the persons of the empe­ rors to create arguments that mock the Donatists. In this narrative, all the documented attitudes towards the Donatists on the part of the Christian emperors from Constantine onward were negative.136 The only emperor who openly reversed this policy and clearly warmed to their case was Julian – in Augustine’s eyes – the villain, the apostate, called “desertor Christi et inimicus.” He gave the Catholic basilicas back to the Donatists at the same time that he gave the temples back to pagan demons. In Augustine’s interpretation, Julian’s agenda was wicked but purposeful, as he clearly wanted to benefit the heretics and pagans and destroy the power of the Catholic Church. But all his Christian successors stuck to the policy adopted by Constantine in their rulings concerning the African controversy. In the conclusion of the letter Augustine turns to the fictitious argument (locus a fictione): “if you were permitted, you would not, of course, appeal against us to the Christian Constantine because he favoured the truth; rather, you would summon Julian, the apostate, back from hell.”137 A very similar passage is to be found in ep. 93.12, where Augustine suggests that the Donatists applauded Julian for his just ruling. It is summed up by a smart word play enclosed in the form of a rhetorical question: “si nihil iustum ab imperatore petendum est, cur a Iuliano petitum est, quod iustum putatum est?”.138 In this way he not only proves that they did appeal to the emperors, but also uses the classical tool of anti-heretical polemics by exploring the affinities between them and the pagans. In this strand of arguments Augustine also tries to cast a shadow on the circumstantial character of the Donatist arguments by a type of locus a fictione. He suggests on two occasions that the Donatists press the charges of collaborating with the state only because their appeals to the emperor Constantine turned out to be utterly unsuccessful. Had the whole issue ended otherwise (he uses modus irrealis), Augustine 133 As is clear from ep. 88.1–5 or cath. fr. 46. But also when Augustine narrates the same events in the contexts of the charge of traditio, as in ep. 43.4. 53.5, 76.2, cath. fr. 50 he underlines their obstinacy in appealing to emperor Constantine, see next chapter, p. 202. 134 ep. 89.3 (CSEL 34,2, 421): “puto, quod ipse diabolus, si auctoritate iudicis, quem ultro elegerat, totiens uinceretur, non esset tam inpudens, ut in ea causa persisteret.” 135 ep. 105.8–9. 136 Except for Jovian, who, according to Augustine, ruled too briefly to take up this case at all. 137 English transl. by R. Teske in WSA/II, 59. 138 ep. 93.12 (CSEL 34,2, 456).

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would be unable even to imagine their reaction;139 they would probably keep boasting about how providential and well-intentioned their care of the Church affairs had been.140

3.2.2 Biblical Exempla As we have already seen, Augustine uses these facts to underline the hypocrisy of the Donatists: they are accusing the Catholics of referring to secular tribunals, although they previously did the very same thing. But on occasions he also complements this persuasive strategy with biblical argumentation. His favourite tactic here is to present Caecilian as the innocent Daniel, and the Donatists as his accusers. This comparison does not come to the surface before the year 405 and occurs in three letters: ep. 88, 93 and 185. The classic example of the concise form of such a comparison may be found in the last of these three letters: hoc enim contigit Donatistis, quod accusatoribus sancti Danihelis. sicut enim in illos leones, sic in istos conuersae sunt leges, quibus innocentem opprimere uoluerunt […]141

Here, Augustine compares one contemporary event with one event from the sacred history of Israel: Caecilian was accused by the Donatists, just as Daniel was by his accusers. In both cases, the intention of the accusers was the same: that accused fall from favour with the rulers. “Leones” – lions and “leges” – laws are the alleged tools in the destruction of the innocent. Thanks to the intervention of God, who influenced the rulers’ minds, these tools turned into the measures of punishment for the impious accusers. In the conclusion of this comparison, Augustine observes one difference – lions in fact devoured the enemies of Daniel, but the laws established by Christian emperors against the heretics are more like tools of grace, and are welcomed with gratitude by some of the Donatists.142 The similar argument in ep. 88.5 takes a more emotive form. Augustine turns there to the Donatists with a series of rhetorical questions that denounce their hypocrisy. The message is simple and devastating: you are criticising us for cooperating with the state; you are whining at imperial laws issued in favour of the Catholics, but it is precisely you who are responsible: after all, these laws were issued because you appealed to the emperor. This comparison is more elaborate than in ep. 185 and reveals new features. Firstly, Augustine is focused here as much on comparing Da­ 139 ep. 105.7. 140 ep. 89.3. 141 ep. 185.7 (CSEL 57, 6). 142 Which points at Augustine’s awareness that every simile also has something dissimilar which creates tension and makes the comparison more attractive – see Quint., Inst. 5.11.30; Lausberg: 1998, 199.

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niel and Caecilian as on their accusers. Daniel and Caecilian are described as sharing the same virtue – “innocentia”, and the same fate – unjust accusation, fatal danger, miraculous liberation. The story of the accusers also varies slightly from that analysed above. The accusers of Daniel are labelled as “calumniosi”, whereas the Donatists who accused Caecilian lack any such negative qualifier. Augustine presents the similarity of their situation by quoting from Prov 19:12: “There is no difference between the threats of a king and the anger of a lion,” and toying with this citation in what follows. The accusers of Daniel, who wanted him to be consumed by lions, ended up being consumed by them. The Donatists wished for Caecilian to be consumed by the king’s anger, and eventually it turns out that they are those who are suffering it. The passage concludes with a quotation from Sir 27:29: “The one who prepares a pit for his neighbour will himself fall into it.” The third variation of this exemplum is found at the end of paragraph 19 in ep. 93. Preceded by a series of rhetorical questions and an exclamation, this comparison moves swiftly from the situation of Caecilian to that of Daniel: maiores uestri Caecilianum et socios eius regibus terrae puniendos falsis criminibus obiecerunt; conuertantur leones ad comminuenda ossa calumniantium nec Danihel ipse intercedat innocens comprobatus et de lacu, quo illi pereunt, liberatus; qui enim parat proximo suo foueam, ipse iustius cadet in eam.143

Clearly, without pointing it out expressis verbis, Augustine identifies Caecilian with the innocent Daniel and suggests a parallel in the fates of their accusers, who fall into the pit they prepared for the innocent. For Augustine it seems more than fair that the Donatists are persecuted as a result of the imperial decision. He exhorts the lions (the allegory of laws) to crush the bones of the slanderers of Daniel (Caecilian). The story of Daniel had simply repeated itself in the life of Caecilian.

143 ep. 93.19 (CSEL 34,2, 464).

Chapter 6. The charge of traditio In most modern languages we do not have the precise equivalent for the term traditio. Although it is properly translated as “betrayal” or “treason,” and the one who commits it is called a “traitor” (traditor), in terms of etymology and semantics there is a deeper level and graver charge hiding in traditio. To borrow a precise and concise remark from Brent Shaw: The betrayal was permanently branded by the handing over or traditio of the Holy Scriptures, the Words of God Himself, to secular authorities by Christian collaborators during the Great Persecution of 303–05 (2011, 66).

As Bernhard Kriegbaum proved long ago this label was not invented at the beginning of the fourth century in the times of the Great Persecution, but was deeply rooted back in earlier periods (1986, 165–166). It was a crucial category for creating Christian identities throughout the fourth century in North Africa, one that drew its power from the never-ending hatred between those who suffered persecution and their former coreligionists who cooperated with the oppressors.1 The charge of traditio sparked off the whole Donatist controversy, and throughout the fourth century it was always at hand when Parmenian, Petilian, Emeritus and others wanted to attack or mock their Christian opponents in Africa. At the crucial moment of early summer 411 in Carthage, when Marcellinus asked the Donatist party what they had against the Catholics, they answered: “We have two charges – one of traditio and the other of persecutio.”2 Hence, two things are obvious: firstly, the Catholic side had to stand up to these accusations long before Augustine; secondly, it was a suitable topic for forensic rhetoric. Augustine in his letters applies varied strategies to dismiss the accusation by choosing two different status. First of all, he rejects the whole charge within status coniecturalis: the Donatists posit that Caecilian, Felix of Abthugni and others were traditores; Augustine answers that they were not. That is a classic pattern of conjecture: “an fecisti? non feci.” At times, however, Augustine admits the possibility that they were guilty of the deed they were charged with, which he always does in a conditional mode. In that case, he argues on the basis of status translationis by employing a mutual accusation: granted there were traditores within our party, there are proofs that the creators of schism had traditores in their ranks. In the following

1 A story masterfully told by Shaw: 2011, 66–106. 2 Gesta Collationis Carthaginensis, 3.14 (CSEL 104, 192): “Duo in mandato suo obiecisse monstratur pars adversa, traditionem et persecutionem.”

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pages I will briefly present Augustine’s argumentative tactics within this strategic pattern.3

1. Status coniecturae 1.1 Iudicatum The whole of ep. 43 is built in accordance with the rules of composition (dispositio) for a forensic speech.4 After the interesting, two-paragraph exordium5 it consists mostly of discussion of one argument used by the Donatists in the accusation of traditio.6 The three sections following the exordium technically belong to the narratio – Augustine presents crucial moments of his debate in the city of Thiave that must have happened not long before the composition of the letter itself. On the yetdeeper level within this narrative, the story of the beginnings of the schism is related. As a result, we are dealing here with an example of a so-called box composition or a story within a story. During the debate, which seemed to be based mostly on inartificial arguments (i.e. on such documents as previous verdicts and laws), the Donatist adversaries presented the acts of the council that was held in Carthage not long after Caecilian’s election.7 The council gathered seventy Numidian bishops, who were either late for the election of Caecilian or summoned by the Carthaginian opposition to Caecilian led by Maiorinus.8 Secundus of Tigisi, the Numidian primate, presided over this council. The verdict was reached that Caecilian himself and the bishops who had ordained him, especially Felix of Abthugni, were guilty of traditio and condemned as traditores. Neither Caecilian, nor Felix, nor any of the condemned were present at the council. In that way the Donatist debaters based their argument on the category of iudicatum, neatly presented in Rhet. Her. 2.13.19–20: iudicatum est id de quo sententia lata est aut decretum interpositum. Ea saepe diversa sunt, ut aliud alio iudici aut praetori aut consuli aut tribuno plebis placitum sit; et fit ut 3 A complementary note may be due. Augustine is eager to present arguments based on these two status within one passage in the form of divisio/complexio. Nevertheless, I have decided to sustain my own rule of composition and to discuss argumentation based on different status separately, for the sake of clarity. 4 As presented by Cicero in Inv. 1.19–109. 5 Already discussed, see above p. 70. 6 Paragraphs from 3 to 20 are dedicated solely to that purpose. 7 ep. 43.3, see also Hogrefe: 2009, 109–112, 135–145. 8 Kriegbaum (1986) suggests as the date 309/310. We posses differing accounts of Optatus, De schismate Donatistarum 1.19, and Breu. Coll. 3.29–30. For Brent Shaw (2011, 818) it is clear that these events took place in 306 and that the seniores of the Church of Carthage invited the Numidian bishops. The question of this trial was also raised in the Conference of Carthage in 411, see Cap. conl. Carth. 372 (CCL 149A, 39).

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de eadem re saepe alius aliud decreverit aut iudicarit [...]Ergo, quia possunt res simili de causa dissimiliter iudicatae proferri, cum id usu venerit, iudicem cum iudice, tempus cum tempore, numerum cum numero iudiciorum conferemus.9

Although the Donatists were referring to the number of judges (“numerus iudicum”), and not to the number of judgements (“iudiciorum”), their motive is simi­lar – to prove that Caecilian was condemned by a large and legitimate jury, and that consequently Augustine and his community, as the heirs of Caecilian, are the Church of traditores.10 Augustine ridicules the poor rhetoric of his disputants by claiming that they had used this number as the argument of weightiest authority, whereas it is far from being a decisive proof.11 In the next three paragraphs Augustine presents his immediate response given during a public debate and also during its follow-up, three days after the documents he asked for had reached Thiave.12 In this response he uses the same strategy of referring to the iudicatum, firstly to undermine the authority of said council, and secondly to counter the Donatists’ claim by presenting verdicts from the years 313– 316 that declared Caecilian innocent,13 and the proconsular judgement concerning the innocence of Felix of Abthugni.14 The sixth paragraph of ep. 43 is a textbook example of partitio.15 It starts with the exact phrase that Cicero used in some partitiones and summaries of his speeches:

9 Rhet. Her. op. cit., p. 92–94. In Cic., Inv. 1.47–48 among the arguments based on what is probable, which were considered to be weaker than those referring to what is certain, Cicero pre­ sents four categories of probable bases for arguments – signum, credibile, iudicatum, comparabile. Iudicatum is explained as an issue that has already been settled by some trial during which a verdict was reached. In case of the Christian controversies the trials concerning the same crimes of the same persons were repeated and diverging verdicts were reached. Eusebius of Nicomedia or Pelagius were among those who suffered from these shifting attitudes of the jury. Thus the argument developed here was not dealing with some similar case but exactly the same one being discussed at present, which would make the basis of this argument not probable but certain. 10 See Hogrefe: 2009, 134. 11 ep. 43.16 (CSEL 34,2, 97): “de numero autem septuaginta episcoporum cum quasi grauissima opponeretur auctoritas, quae fuerint dicta, meministis.” We can sketch the structure of the enthymeme-reasoning behind the charge: Premise: A large council of seventy bishops held right after the debated events found Caecilian and his colleagues guilty. (Hidden premise – A large council is a trustworthy council) Conclusion: It follows that Caecilian and his colleagues were really guilty. 12 ep. 43.3–5. 13 Two given by bishops (Lateran, Arles) and one by an emperor (Milan). 14 The so called Acta purgationis Felicis can be found in Maier: 1987, 171–87, and Optatus, Against the Donatists, Appendix II, see also the discussion of this document and of Felix in Hogrefe: 2009, 237–40. 15 A part of the speech that enabled transition from the narration to argumentation, or more seldom from introduction to the narration, by presenting concisely the main debated issues. See, Quint. Inst. 4.5.1–28.

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“Quid uultis amplius?”16 Such a phrase suggests the qualification of the defensibility of the case as causa manifesta. Next, Augustine concisely enumerates all the charges and proofs used to confirm those charges17 in an anaphoric pattern.18 He underlines the fact that his defence is based on the documents of ecclesiastical and proconsular proceedings, which is to say, on the most powerful inartificial arguments: dicimus temerario concilio quamlibet numerosissimo innocentes absentesque fuisse damnatos. probamus hoc proconsularibus gestis […]dicimus a traditoribus confessis in eos, qui traditores dicerentur, dictas fuisse sententias. probamus hoc ecclesiasticis gestis.19

Simultaneously, this sentence presents a plan for the next fourteen chapters20 dedicated to the detailed refutation of the Donatist argument based on the iudicatum that was introduced during the debate in Thiave.21 Just as was later the case after Pelagius’ acquittal in Diospolis in 415, Augustine focused on the feature of sincerity. In Diospolis, he claimed, the defendant was insincere; here he attacks the sincerity of the judges. That means that Augustine chose to refute the argument along the lines presented by Cicero, who advised talking about the common opinion of the judges and searching for their procedural errors,22 and these from Rhet. Her. quoted above, that advised discussing the persons of the judges, the circumstances of the trial and the number of verdicts on the same or similar issues. Augustine tries to prove the insincerity of the judges by qualifying that ecclesiastical trial as hasty and by proving that some of the judges were traditores themselves. To make the first point this qualification would be good enough, as it was based on a textbook argument from manner (locus a modo). Cicero observes that the chief question here is whether the person acted reasonably or not. Augustine develops this argument more when he focuses on the other meaning of the word “temera­ rius” – superficial. This is supported by the constant highlighting of the procedural error – the bishops under trial were not present at the council (“absentes”). But most of his argumentation is based on arguments drawn from persons (loci a per16 In fact also in other aspects, (like the anaphoric enumeration of charges, mentions of the types od proofs – in both cases documents) this passage resembles Actio Secunda in Verrem 3.62. See also ibid., 3.152; Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino 32; Pro A. Cluentio, 82 (here this phrase is also preceded by an anaphoric chain); similar phrase: “quid loquar amplius” is used in Pro A. Caecina, 25. 17 As advised by Cicero in Inv. 1.32. 18 This anaphoric partitio is later paraphrased in the summary in ep. 43.25. 19 ep. 43.6 (CSEL 34,2, 89). 20 For a more historically oriented analysis of the same passages, see Hogrefe: 2009, 134–44. 21 If we ask ourselves why he cared to write down this refutation we might come up with two probable answers. It may suggest that he was not happy with the outcome of the actual debate, and hence, like Cicero in the case of Pro Milone, he rewrites his arguments, or, equally possible, he was so happy with his exposition that he decided to write it down in order to circulate it for the benefit of the Catholic case. 22 Cic., Inv. 1.44.

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sona) to prove that what guided the judges (causa) was neither valid and well thought-out reasoning, nor a noble intention of preserving the peace.

1.1.1 Loci a persona iudicis The pattern of locus a persona of the judge, advised in this context by the handbooks, becomes more visible if we consider the fact that from the middle of paragraph 6 until the beginning of paragraph 10 in ep. 44 Augustine casts the limelight on just one actor – Secundus of Tigisi, the head of the jury and primate of Numidia. Augustine uses excerpts from the protocols of the council of Cirta23 to show that Secundus of Tigisi had himself been found guilty of traditio. Another Donatist bishop, Purpuratus of Limata, had accused him of buying his way out of the arrest by handing over the scriptures to an officer during the Great Persecution.24 The Donatists presented Secundus of Tigisi as a person whose main interest was to maintain peace. That is why in the crucial time after the deposition of Caecilian Secundus proposed and established an interventor who was supposed to negotiate between two groups of Christians in Carthage around the year 306.25 Augustine himself also tells us that according to the acts of Council of Cirta,26 Secundus of Tigisi presided over the election of bishop Sylvanus with twelve bishops accompanying him. According to these acts some of these bishops were traditores. Secundus, however, pardoned them for the sake of peace.27 A few of these pardoned bishops later formed the jury in Caecilian’s trial in Carthage together with Secundus. Hence in ep. 43.6 Augustine’s first move is to throw a shadow on the motivation of Secundus: in reality, he did not care about peace, he only acted out of fear for his own fate.28 In Cirta, Augustine claims, Secundus pardoned his colleagues because, knowing his own guilt, he thought that he might thus better hide it. If in Carthage he had really had an eye on peace he would not have condemned an absent suspect 23 The Donatists at the Conference in Carthage called this protocol a forgery, and questioned the possibility of gathering a bishop’s council during the Great Persecution, see Gesta Collationis Carthaginensis 3.425–431. There is also an unresolved problem of dating the council. The date given by Augustine in Cresc. 3.30 (4th March 303) was untenable already in Carthage in 411, but all the other propositions are only hypothetical, see Kriegbaum (1986, 131–135), which opts for 307 or even later, and Hogrefe (2009, 355–361), which proposes the years 305 or 306, and Shaw (2011, 816–818) 13 May 306. 24 ep. 43.6. 25 Fortunius in a debate with Augustine (ep. 44) suggests that this interventor was killed by the pars Caecliani. This tradition is, however, unaccounted for by other sources. Were this charge true, common sense dictates we would hear of it much more often. 26 The lone excerpt from them is to be found in Cresc. 3.30, reproduced and discussed by Maier, Le Dossier v. I, p. 112–118. See also discussion of it in Hogrefe: 2009, 84–97. 27 ep. 43.6, Cresc. 3.30–31. 28 ep. 43.6 (CSEL 34,2, 89): “unde apparuit eum etiam primo non paci consuluisse, sed sibi timuisse.”

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together with a group of proven traditores. Secondly, he shows the inconsequence on the part of Secundus: he pardoned some of his fellow bishops in Cirta for the sake of peace, why did he not pardon Caecilian and his colleagues later in Carthage? Now Augustine moves on to discuss the circumstances of the trial. Firstly, he reaches for the argument from place29 in the structure a minore ad maius: if Secundus was indulgent in Cirta, he had all the more reason to act mercifully in Carthage, a larger and more famous city closely linked to Rome and other Apostolic Churches, with the episcopal seat of the greatest authority in the whole of Africa.30 Secondly, Caecilian also enjoyed the highest authority as the primate of Africa, which required the judge to act with the utmost prudence.31 And the time was special, too – the persecution had just ceased, so an act of reconciliation was especially advised so that the Church, which had only just become immune to external evils, did not slide into internal strife.32 As we know also from Optatus of Milevis, Caecilian did not want to go to the trial, but rather invited his colleagues from Numidia to come to his Church to ordain him again.33 Such a reluctance was seen by the Donatists as proof of Caecilian’s guilt; for Augustine, on the contrary, it proves that the judges were strongly biased and Caecilian, who stood before that jury, was aware of that. According to Augustine the role of a chief juror who really cared about peace would have been to respect this decision and persuade all the impetuous enemies of Caecilian not to start a quarrel at a time when the persecutions had just ceased. Secundus should also have relegated this case to the courts in Rome, where it would have been heard by a truly impartial jury. In paragraph eight Augustine uses the figure of sermocinatio to put into the mouth of Secundus an exemplary speech he might have used to achieve this goal, consisting of the above mentioned arguments. He would have said something of that kind, if he had truly cared for peace (“si propterea concilium regebat, ut paci consuleret”). But he did not care. Through the standard argument ab effectibus/insequentibus34 Augustine proves that Secundus and the judges knew full well that the accusations were too weak to hold up before a real, just court overseas, so ultimately he did condemn Caecilian in his absence and did not even bother to relate these events to Rome afterwards.35 29 Quint. Inst. 5.10. 37–42. For other examples of it, see Toczko: 2013. 30 ep. 43.7. 31 That argumenta ex loco are linked to these a persona is clear from Quintilian’s remarks in Inst. 5.10.38–39. 32 Augustine is here using a category of tempus speciale., see Quint. Inst. 5.10.42–44. This was also used by Constantine in his letters concerning Arius, see. Eusebius, Vita Constantini 2.66–8. 33 Optatus, De schismate Donatistarum 1.19. Augustine later tried to turn it into a joke, for it was potentially dangerous for him to acknowledge that Caecilian was open to repeating the sacramental ritual in times of heated discussion over rebaptism. 34 See Quint. Inst. 5.10.45–48. As we see in this passage Augustine’s arguments are organised according to the same sequence as in Quintilian’s handbook, book 5 chapter 10. 35 Augustine seems to present here arguments in support of the long chronology of e.g. Shaw – a long period between the events and the appeals to Constantine are presented here as arguments against the sincerity of Secundus and other judges.

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In paragraph ten light is shed mostly on the seventy judges as a group, and Secundus recedes to the background. In the first step Augustine repeats, using strong language, that the jury consisted of traditores who wanted to dodge the accusation by blaming others. Here he evokes the common opinion to build a plausible argument: someone guilty of traditio who sits on a jury judging others charged with the same crime would treat them with greater severity in order to conceal his own guilt. Augustine also supports his reasoning with a passage from Rom 2:1: “For this reason you are without excuse, every one of you who judges. For in that act by which you judge another you condemn yourself. For you do the same things that you condemn.”36 At this point, at the beginning of paragraph 11, Augustine concludes the line of argumentation dedicated to Secundus of Tigisi by claiming once again that in fact he did not care for peace or unity (“non […] paci unitatique consuluit”). Augustine then refutes the possible defence of the Carthaginian judges based on the fact that they must have known the crimes of Caecilian, Felix of Abthugni and others.37 Here he uses the pattern of complexio again. Even if the judges had known the crimes, the law of Sir 11:7 commands that anyone be questioned before being blamed and rebuked. This law concerned rebuking and blaming, and hence ought to be applied with even greater diligence to the situation of condemning someone without a hearing. However, it is much more probable, Augustine claims, that the judges did not know the crimes of the suspects. They had most severely treated Felix of Abthugni, who was later found completely innocent by the proconsular trial. In keeping with the advised rhetorical procedures, Augustine highlights the professional character of this trial in comparison to the one presided over by Secundus. The emperor himself delegated this case to the proconsular court, the proconsul was very diligent, he dismissed some witnesses, and for questioning others he used the standard method of extracting information under torture. The application of the handbook rules concerning the iudicatum proceeds in paragraphs 14–20 where the trials of the years 313–316 are compared to that of 306. Special attention is paid to the judicial investigation run in Rome in 313, supervised by Pope Melchiades, also with direct comparisons of Melchiades and Secundus. Augustine plays the strongest card, used also in the discussion of the charge of persecution, by underlining the fact that it was the Donatists who had kept appealing to the emperor with all the previous verdicts. They had not only deferred internal issues of the Church to the secular jurisdiction, but also accused the bishops of the highest authority (as the bishop of Rome) of “male iudicare” – judging wrongly.38 In this comparison, using various figures of style and thought, Augustine triumphantly applauds the virtues of the overseas judges (emperor included): their care for peace 36 ep. 43.10 (CSEL 34,2, 93), English transl. by R. Teske, WSA II/1, 162. 37 ep. 43.11–13. 38 ep. 43.20 (CSEL 34,2, 101): “iudices enim ecclesiasticos tantae auctoritatis episcopos, quorum iudicio et Caeciliani innocentia et eorum inprobitas declarata est, non apud alios collegas sed apud imperatorem accusare ausi sunt, quod male iudicarint.”

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and unity (ep. 43.14), the proper use of legal procedures (43.14), impartiality and seriousness (43.15 and 16), seriousness (43.16), all in spite of the fact, as he sarcastically concludes, that they were not as numerous as the seventy Donatists who condemned Caecilian. On the other hand, we hear that this large group of Donatist bishops was acting under the influence of “an angry mob who drank from the cup of error and corruption” (43.14), and, blinded by “temeritas” (43.16), condemned the suspects in their absence without a hearing (43.16). Augustine adds that these bishops were divided into two groups, one smaller but of greater authority and consisting of traditores trying to hide their crimes, and the other, larger one, consisting of bishops motivated by bribes from Lucilla, who hated Caecilian (43.17). The climax of this passage, when Melchiades’ jury is compared to that of Secundus, is worth quoting in full: o uirum optimum! o filium christianae pacis et patrem christianae plebis! conferte nunc istam paucitatem cum illa multitudine episcoporum neque numerum numero sed pondus ponderi comparate: hinc modestiam, inde temeritatem; hinc uigilantiam, inde caecitatem; hic nec mansuetudo integritatem corrupit nec integritas mansuetudini repugnauit, ibi autem et furore timor tegebatur et timore furor incitabatur; isti enim conuenerant cognitione uerorum criminum falsa respuere, illi falsorum damnatione uera celare.39

The handbook theme of the number of verdicts and judges also appears here. Augustine shows that although the seventy Numidian bishops had ruled against Caecilian, more courts, and more important ones at that, had decided in his favour. This is the crystal clear logic of an argument based on a previous verdict (iudicatum). On other occasions of building arguments from the persons of judges, Augustine draws parallels between the Donatists of his day and those of the first generation. As I said in the chapter on schism, when Augustine takes up the case of the Maximianists he frequently uses the form called complexio. If the Maximanists were guilty and the Donatists received them back regardless of their guilt, then their reason for schism was false. If, on the other hand, the Maximianists were innocent, then the Donatists may have made a similar mistake in judging Caecilian, which enables Augustine to discuss the charge of traditio. The Maximianists were found guilty by a council of three hundred and ten bishops. In ep. 51.2 Augustine uses this number and suggests that there exists a link between the Donatist judges of Maximian from the Council of Bagaï (394) with the Donatist judges of Caecilian from the council of Cirta (ca. 306).40 The conclusion is structured as a comparison a maiore ad minus – if as many as 310 Donatist bishops could condemn innocent people for the alleged 39 ep. 43.16 (CSEL 34,2, 98). 40 ep. 51.2 (CSEL 34,2, 146): “cur non credamus a multo paucioribus maioribus uestris falso crimine traditionis innocentes potuisse damnari, si a trecentis decem successoribus eorum, ubi etiam pro magno scriptum est plenarii concilii ore ueridico, in falso crimine schismatis innocentes damnari potuerunt.”

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(but false) crime of schism, how much more probable is it that those fewer Donatist bishops could have done so with Caecilian, who was falsely accused of traditio. The hidden premise of this reasoning is that the nature of the Donatist bishops as judges is immune to change. The same dilemma is employed in ep. 70 to Naucelio, a Donatist layman. It was not the first letter in a series of their correspondence. There must have been at least one letter before in which Augustine and Alypius had encouraged Naucelio, their addressee, to challenge his bishop Clarence on the subject of the case of the Maxi­ mianist bishop Felcian of Musti. He was condemned in absence by the council of Bagaï in 394 and then received back in 397. Naucelio followed the advice of Augustine and then reported Clarence’s answer in the letter to which ep. 70 is a response. The Donatist bishop simply admitted that Felician of Musti was innocent and given the opportunity, was able to prove it. As a result he was received back to the Donatist community. There comes Augustine’s counterargument in the form of a complexio – an innocent person should not have been condemned, or a person found guilty should not have been taken back. The parallel between the councils of Bagaï and Cirta is even more evident here in that both Felicianus and Caecilian were condemned without a hearing and in absentia. This time Augustine does not label the Donatists of his day as the “successores” of the Donatist bishops of the early fourth century; he simply refers to both groups with the word “ipsi,” putting them on an equal footing. If “ipsi” could have condemned an innocent man, “ipsi” could have blamed innocent people who had not given away anything to the prosecutors with the charge of traditio.41 Augustine adds that the same hastiness/superficiality (“eadem temeritas”) can be seen in both groups of judges. The short history of the Maximianist controversy, however, did not start with the council of Bagaï, but with the gathering of ca. 100 bishops who rejected the choice of Primian for the bishop of Carthage and ultimately separated themselves from the much larger group of Donatists who stayed in communion with Primian. In two letters Augustine uses exactly this council as the material for comparison with the Numidian council of seventy bishops who condemned Caecilian.42 The parallels Augustine draws are almost too striking to be true. Just as Lucilla incited Maiorinus against Caecilian, so a certain woman talked Maximian into acting against Primian. In both cases the defendants were condemned in absentia. The only difference is that of scale: the council of Maiorinus is much smaller relative to the whole Christian world than the council of Maximian is relative to the number of the Donatist bishops. In the conclusion of the passage in ep. 43.6 Augustine asks the Donatists to 41 ep. 70.1 (CSEL 34,2, 246): “si nesciebant, qui illum damnauerunt, utrum innocens fuerit, arguendi sunt temeritatis, quia inauditum innocentem, de quo nesciebant, damnare ausi sunt, et de praesenti facto intellegimus eadem temeritate illos damnasse etiam superiores, quos traditionis crimine infamauerunt. si enim potuit ab ipsis innocens damnari, potuerunt ab ipsis traditores etiam dici, qui non erant traditores.” 42 ep. 43.26, 141.6.

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treat the council of Maximian, instigated as it was by a woman, as equally valid as the council instigated by Lucilla against Caecilian. During the Conference in Carthage, too, the Donatist pressed charges against Caecilian based on the acts of the council of seventy Numidian bishops from 306. As we learn from ep. 141.6, Augustine simply answered that the verdict of seventy bishops had as much validity against Caecilian as the decision of around one hundred Maximianist bishops had against Primian. As we can see, numbers always matter.43

1.1.2 Loci a persona accusatoris On many occasions Augustine retells the story of the repeated appeals of the Donatists to the emperor with the accusations of Caecilian in the years 313–316. Sometimes44 these events are recalled within the discussion of the charge of persecution and cooperation with the state; sometimes they are used as an argument in defence against the charge of traditio.45 In referring to the previous verdicts it is convenient for Augustine not only to draw arguments from the persons of judges but also to focus on those who hurled accusations. In order to do so, he takes three steps. He focuses firstly on the arrogance and stubbornness of the Donatists, secondly on the wickedness of their motivation to appeal to the emperor, and thirdly on the falsity of the accusations and the Donatists’ propensity to lie (or lack of legal skills).46 The Donatists were stubborn because, among other things, they dared to undermine the verdict of bishop Melchiades and other bishops gathered in Rome, and later they did the same with the decision of the Council of Arles, where they also lost. In their arrogance they dared to defer the case to the secular court.47 The question Augustine poses is why they waited so long after rescinding communion with Caecilian to denounce him to the Churches overseas.48 For Augustine a reasonable guess is that they waited for the rumour to spread, because they knew that they could not bribe or deceive the impartial Christian courts outside Africa. But even after they finally decided to file the case against Caecilian in those courts, Augustine claims, they did so without a real faith in success. But that did not matter to 43 A similar argument with reference to the same events, albeit in a more concise form, omitting for instance all the “women issues” is repeated in ep. 87.6. This time in the form of interrogatio, within which we find a clear pattern a minore ad maius. We should note however that it is used in the context of the charge of schism here rather than that of traditio. The rhetorical question is followed by a commentary aimed at arousing either laughter or indignation, or both: “miror, si habet in corpore sanguinem, qui de hac re non erubescit.” (CSEL 34,2, 402) 44 As in ep. 89.3 or 93.13–14, see also Hogrefe: 2009, 146–52. 45 As in ep. 43.19–20. 46 In all this he is clearly inspired by Optatus of Milevis De schismate Donatistarum 1.20–25. 47 ep. 43.19–20. 48 In ep. 43.17.

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them, for even if they were to lose, which they themselves (Augustine says) considered most probable, they could claim that they had been deceived by biased judges. This would allow them to spread conspiracy theories thanks to which they could save some prestige. The most important and best developed arguments in this group are those in which the Donatist accusers of Caecilian are presented as liars or bad lawyers. As we have seen, Augustine focuses on demonstrating how weak their case against Caecilian was. There are, however, places where he decides to introduce an argument in the form of dilemma. In ep. 52.3 he dismisses at first the possibility that the Donatists’ accusations were true: if they had had a good case, they would have won it under the impartial overseas judges, but they failed. In the next move, however, he allows for the possibility that they had a good case. But if the truth was on their side and we know that they had lost three trials in the span of three years, who can they blame for this failure but themselves?49 Augustine highlights the weak qualities of the Donatists in legal actions on other occasions also: ep. 89.3: ea, quae intendebant, probare minime potuerunt; ep. 76.4: quo modo ergo crimen traditionis nobis obicitis, quod non probatis; ep. 105.2: dicitis nos traditores, quod nec maiores uestri in maiores nostros potuerunt nec uos in nos probare ullo modo poteritis; ep. 93.13: qui cum ultro accusassent nec ea, quae intendebant, probare potuissent; ep. 141.7: ut etiam ibi calumniae manifestarentur ipsorum, apertissime uicti sunt, nihil eorum, quae in Caecilianum intendebant, probare potuerunt.

Augustine often presents the Donatist accusations as lies simply by insinuating that lies have always been a standard modus operandi of Donatist bishops. As he observes in ep. 105.6: “semper de mendacio praesumens pars Donati.” Apart from ep. 141, a large part of which is dedicated to the narrative on the lies of Donatists during the Conference of Carthage, the charge of lying mostly occurs in passing, but is closely connected to the theme of their accusations against Caecilian. In this context, Augustine seems to be aiming more at holding them up to ridicule rather than at provoking indignation.50 As we read in a short passage in ep. 76.4, the repeated accusations and trials in the years 313–316 ended in the imperial verdict of Milan, where emperor Constantine realised that the prosecutors were liars. In ep. 87.2, for instance, Augustine dedicates only half a sentence to mentioning by way of praete­ ritio – a form particularly suitable for conveying ironical remarks51 – that their ac-

49 ep. 52.3 (CSEL 34,2, 141): “qui si uera crimina obiecissent collegis suis, maiores eorum, quando schisma fecerunt, ipsi obtinuissent causam suam apud ecclesiam transmarinam [...] aut si causam bonam habebant et eam transmarinis ecclesiis probare non potuerunt, quid illos laesit orbis terrarum, ubi episcopi collegas suos, qui apud eos obiectis criminibus conuicti non erant, temere damnare non possent?” 50 The interpretation of ep. 141 presented here is an enhanced version of Toczko: 2018, 97–98. 51 See Lausberg: 1998, 393–4.

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cusations against Caecilian were false.52 Ep. 105.6, a passage loaded with invectives untypical of Augustine, is intrinsically connected to the arguments within the charge of schism: the Donatists lied about the guilt of Caecilian and filled the whole of Africa with this lie, precisely because they needed some sort of pretence to pre­ sent as the reason for their separation.53 The real problem is that the Donatists listened to the calumnies of their fathers concerning Caecilian instead of listening to the Bible. As a result, they ended up in the error of schism in which they stubbornly persisted.54 We can see that Augustine makes a clear distinction between the lay Donatists who are eager (for whatever reason) to believe these lies and the fabricators of those lies, that is, the bishops who had accused Caecilian and their followers. In ep. 141.7–11 Augustine discusses the lies and the intellectual and professional deficiencies of the Donatist bishops gathered at the Conference of Carthage. He shares his astonishment at hearing their claim that Caecilian was condemned by the emperor Constantine.55 According to his report the Donatist side informed Marcellinus that their predecessors had pressed charges against Caecilian for traditio to the imperial tribunal and lied that this accusation was successful.56 They tried to prove it through inartificial arguments, hence in a spectacular move they brought a codex of Adversus Donatistas by Optatus of Milevis. It would have been a strong argument in favour of their case, had they proved their claim by drawing on the writings of their opponent. However, the text of Optatus was a testimony to the contrary, namely that Caecilian had been acquitted of all the charges. Augustine insists that this apparent bluff failed spectacularly and provoked outbursts of laughter and mockery. To take the mockery even further, he presents them as having been so offended by the laughter that they insisted on putting it down in the minutes of these proceedings. The blatant lack of legal skills was later confirmed by their other arguments, which they tried to corroborate by reading a selection of the letters of the Donatists to the emperor Constantine, the letter of the emperor to the vicar Verinus, and the letter of the emperor to the proconsul Probian. In all these cases 52 ep. 87.2 (CSEL 34,2, 398): “alia enim quaestio est, utrum illa uera dicatis, quae quidem nos multo probabilioribus documentis falsa esse conuincimus et in uestris magis ea ipsa, quae obicitis, tunc probata declaramus. sed haec, ut dixi, alia quaestio est tunc adgredienda et discutienda, cum opus fuerit.” 53 ep. 105.6 (CSEL 34,2, 599): “et tamen quid est melius, proferre ueras imperatorum iussiones pro unitate an falsas indulgentias pro peruersitate, quod uos fecistis et mendacio uestro subito totam Africam implestis? in quo facto nihil aliud ostendistis nisi partem Donati semper de mendacio praesumentem omni uento iactari et circumferri, sicut scriptum est: qui fidit in falsis, hic pascit uentos [Prov 10,4].” 54 ep. 105.2. 55 ep. 141.7–8; 185.6. 56 ep. 141.8 (CSEL 44,241): “insuper etiam confessi sunt uel potius pro magna gloria professi sunt Caecilianum apud Constantinum imperatorem a suis praecessoribus accusatum et addiderunt mendacium, quod illis accusantibus fuerit ab imperatore damnatus.” This argument was not new, but Augustine has already refuted a similar one presented by Cresconius in more detail in Cresc. 3.83, where he also quotes from the documents that he only mentions in ep. 141.

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the documents that were intended to work in favour of those who presented them proved something contrary to their case, namely that Rome was constant in seeing Caecilian and Felix of Abthugni as innocent. As Augustine puts it, they read those documents against themselves and in defence of Caecilian.57 He also underlines the fact that the document they provided against Felix was referring to the testimony of a certain Ingentius, who later, during interrogation at a trial supervised by Anulinus confessed that he had forged the accusation against Felix. Augustine ridicules these deplorably flawed attempts at making an accusation at the Conference in Carthage by concluding that their actions were so absurd that they had to be a result of some divine intervention, especially that they finally signed the acts of the proceedings that proved their failures.58 Thus, they were not only bad liars, but also bad lawyers. To take the mockery even further, he takes up the charge that the Donatists spread after the Conference of Carthage claiming that the judges had been bribed. He first dismisses it as locus communis: the losing parties always hurl this kind of argument, then asks how much money the representatives of the Donatists had taken from the Catholics to act so clumsily as to offer testimonies in favour of Caecilian and against themselves. In fact, he adds, they defended Caecilian better than Augustine and his colleagues did, for they presented twice as many testimonies in Caecilian’s defence than the Catholics!59 As we can see, Augustine tries to pick at the intellectual or professional weaknesses of the Donatist bishops in making their accusations, but in ep. 141 he states that their most important vice is still mendacity. He starts the letter by focusing on just one example in order to use it with reference to the case of traditio. In the first paragraph of the letter, Augustine narrates the first difficult stages of the Conference of Carthage, when both parties tried to present themselves as being more numerous. Augustine accuses the Donatist bishops of falsifying their mandate for the Conference. It occurs that one of the bishops they have included as present was not only absent, but actually dead.60 That opened up the possibility to challenge the veracity of the Donatist accusations of Caecilian in the conclusion framed in the scheme of a maiore ad minus: ecce quibus creditis uel de antiqua traditione uel de cognitoris corruptione, qui mandatum suum, ubi nobis obiecerunt crimen traditionis, non potuerunt conscribere sine crimine falsitatis.61

57 ep. 141.10 (CSEL 44, 244): “contra se ipsos pro Caeciliano recitauerunt.” 58 ep. 141.11 (CSEL 44, 244): “quis eos crederet contra se ista recitasse pro nobis, nisi dei omnipotentis nutu factum esset, ut non solum uerba eorum gestis tenerentur, sed etiam manus subscribentium legerentur?” 59 ep. 141.12. 60 For more on this, see Toczko: 2018, 97. 61 ep. 141.1 (CSEL 44, 236).

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The charge of traditio

2. Status translationis The most brief formulation of the charge and the defence in this very short krino­ menon scheme is to be found in a line of the earliest extant text by Augustine written against the Donatists, namely in the popular song Psalmus contra partem Donati, 143: “obicitis traditionem: respondemus uos fecisse.” Almost as brief is the remark in c. litt. Pet. 1.23: “obicitis traditionem: hanc ipsam multo probabilius nos uobis obicimus.” Here Augustine underlined the fact that so many decades after the fact it is difficult for either side to prove the charge of traditio, but that nevertheless his party has stronger evidence.62 To make his case plausible, he used a twofold strategy, which I will discuss directly below. Firstly, he exposed the case of Sylvanus of Cirta. Secondly, he presented the whole group of Caecilian’s enemies from a century ago as the predecessors of the Donatists of his present day.

2.1 Sylvanus as a traditor Once Augustine had reversed the charge of traditio, he had to prove his accusation according to the rules of status coniecturae. In order to do so, Augustine turned to documentary evidence as the most persuasive arguments to be used in court. Augustine picked the case of Sylvanus probably because he could use the rich material found in the proconsular acts from the proceedings before Zenophilus in 320.63 In that curious interrogation the main witness was Nundinarius, a former Donatist deacon who, according to Augustine, became understandably angry with his bishop Sylvanus of Cirta, when he was excommunicated by his superior.64 This anger moved him to denounce Sylvanus and Paul, his predecessor on the see of Cirta. Luckily, Augustine could avail himself of the Gesta apud Zenophilum. We learn from them that Nundinarius had diligently held on to some documents in case events turned sour, such as the acta Munati Felicis65 i.e. the proceedings from May 22, 303 before the curator civitatis and perpetual priest in Cirta.66 During this hearing Sylvanus, who back then was only a deacon, confessed that he gave away two 62 Cresconius used this passage and the comparative grade of probabilius to make an interesting argument – if Augustine says that his party proved those charges more credibly it means that he assumes that the Donatists proved theirs credibly, see. Cresc. 3.85. 63 The other reason was that the letter that has the most developed narrative on Sylvanus is ep. 53, directed to the citizen of Cirta as a response to the letter of one Donatist who mentioned Sylvanus as a figure of authority in his letter, see ep. 53.4. 64 ep. 53.4. 65 For a thorough analysis of them, see Hogrefe: 2009, 253–256. They were usually transmitted together with the manuscripts of De schismate Donatistarum of Optatus of Milevis and Augustine may have received them together with the work of Optatus. He quotes from them in Cresc. 3.33, and uses them in ep. 53.4. 66 “Munatius Felix,” Mandouze: 1982, 407.

Status translationis 207

silver objects, a lamp and a casket, to persecutors. According to Augustine’s version of the story Sylvanus handed away liturgical vessels to the prosecutors, a lamp and a casket among them. Afterwards Augustine moves to Secundus of Tigisi, who ordained Sylvanus. Based on the acts of the Council of Cirta, he proves that Secundus heard the confession of other Donatist leaders of the region, Donatus of Masculi, Marinus of Aquae Tibilitanae and Donatus of Calama, who had confessed that they were traditores as well. Based on these documents Augustine exhorts the Donatists to stop the madness of accusing others of their own crimes: “quiescat ergo superba eorum lingua et cognoscat crimina sua, ne delirans loquatur aliena.”67 In c. litt. Pet. 23, the very brief mention of Sylvanus, who was ordained as bishop at the beginning of the controversy, even though he was a traditor while still a deacon, ends with a similar conclusion: “non est discutiendum quam penitus uestra ora claudantur.”68

2.2 Donatists as traditores When accusing the first generation of Donatists as a group of traditores, Augustine frequently labels them “maiores uestros,”69 “maiores eorum”70 or “principes eorum.”71 In this way he simply turned the Donatist way of expressing their charges around, because they had always eagerly highlighted the lineage of the Church of traditores.72 Augustine was, as we can see, not only reversing the charges, but also using a similar form of the same charge. This practice clearly irritated the Donatists.73 Cresconius used the Greek word from the handbooks of rhetoric (antika­ tegoria) to describe this stratagem and suggested that Augustine was merely paying attention to the formal aspect of the status of the case, just as if he were still in a rhetorical school.74 In so doing, Cresconius was probably trying to dismiss the reversed accusation as a mere rhetorical trick. In antiquity, just as now, rhetorical tricks did not have good press. On this occasion Augustine simply reached for a biblical exemplum and showed that the prophet Elijah had also used this form of reversed charge (“non ego feci, sed tu fecisti”).75 Thus, if Elijah could use it, than it was a legitimate instrument in the Christian polemic.

67 ep. 53.4 (CSEL 34,2, 155). 68 (CSEL 52, 18). 69 cath. fr. 46. 70 c. litt. Pet. 1.29. 71 ep. 44.4. 72 See e.g. Gesta Collationis Carthaginensis 2.221, 227, 231, and Hogrefe: 2009, 172. 73 As we learn from Cresc. 3.29. 74 Cresc. 3.29 (CSEL 52, 434–435): “quod autem me de traditione in uestros maiores dicis quasi per anticategoriam quod a nostris maioribus factum est retorquere uoluisse, culpans quod hoc fecerim, quasi in schola de causae generibus uel quaestionibus ageretur.” 75 Ibid.

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The charge of traditio

It is very often that Augustine satisfies himself with reversing the charge without discussing it in further detail. It happens, for instance, in ep. 51.2, where Augustine mocks the Donatists for hurling at him and his party accusations that are not only unsubstantiated when levelled at Catholics, but proven true with regard to the Donatists, who for fear of being persecuted had given away the scripture.76 This mode of arguing was not reserved for treatises or letters. In debate with the Donatist bishop Fortunius of Thiave, Augustine says that Fortunius reached for the charge of traditio. In his report of the debate in ep. 44.4 Augustine dismisses this charge as “more popular than certain.”77 His party simply responded that it was the ancestors of their opponents who were guilty of traditio, to which the Donatists replied by changing the subject.78 It is slightly different in the case of cath. fr. 46,79 where the argument is stated in a more developed form. There, Augustine makes reference to the ecclesiastical and proconsular documents he possesses. He invites the Donatists to read them to find out that there were confessed traditores among the seventy judges of Caecilian in Carthage. The testimony of Nundinarius, presented in Gesta apud Zenophilum is directly mentioned, but the acts of the Council of Cirta are referred to as well. His main point here is to prove that the Donatists are absolutely inconsistent in terms of giving verdicts concerning evildoers. A result of their lack of consequence is that they had forgiven many traditores, but not Caecilian or his colleagues. With regard to the Maximianists, such as Felician and Praetextatus, they first condemned them, only to annul their verdicts afterwards. This line of argumentation, presented in a nice amplificatio replete with anaphors, rhetorical questions and exclamations underlining the absurd inconsistency of the Donatists,80 is only subsidiary to the main argument in the discussion there, which focuses on the charge of schism. The handbooks of rhetoric discerned between the two types of mutual or reversed accusation (antikategoria): one when the accused of a certain crime charges his prosecutor with the same crime, and the other where the accused pressed a different charge against the prosecutor.81 These charges had to be logically related though, by way of either similarity or causality. In his anti-Donatist letters, Augustine also uses this pattern in his defence against the charge of traditio, when he connects it with the accusation of schism directed against the Donatists. As we have seen, he clearly understands the beginning of the schism as the moment when the Donatist party separated themselves from the bishop Caecilian and his peers on account of their alleged crime of surrendering the holy books to persecutors. How76 But the same observation holds true in case of ep. 87.2, 105.2, 141.7, c. litt. Pet. 1.19 where the accusations are very briefly reversed and the argument flows to different themes. 77 ep. 44.4 (CSEL 34,2, 112): “ibi commemorata est famosior quam certior codicum illa traditio.” 78 Ibid.,: “sed respondebatur a partibus nostris principes illorum potius fuisse traditores.” 79 And a very similar passage in ep. 76.2. 80 cath. fr. 46 (CSEL 52, 292): “O regula iuris Numidici, o priuilegia Bagaitana!” 81 Quint. Inst. 3.10.4, see also Lausberg: 1998, 83.

Status translationis 209

ever, if we agree that both traditio and schism are crimes, as Augustine argues in ep. 76.4, we should also consider which of these two is graver. Both there and in ep. 51.1 the answer to this question follows the same pattern. In both cases Augustine argues with reference to biblical exempla, in both cases he relies on an argument from comparison, and finally in both cases the logic of the argument rests on the premise that the quality of God’s punishment for a sin relates directly to the quality of the sin: quo utroque crimine schismatis malum non puniretur atrocius, nisi grauius penderetur,82

and: si traditio codicum scelerata est, quia deus in regem, qui Hieremiae librum incendit, morte bellica uindicauit, quanto sceleratius est sacrilegium schismatis, cuius auctores, quibus Maximianistas comparastis, aperta terra uiuos absorbuit.83

The brief comparatio is based on the two events from the history of Israel. Jehoiakim, a king of Judah, ordered the books dictated by the prophet Jeremiah to Baruch to be burnt, and God punished him by letting him die in battle (Jer 36:23). On the other hand The Book of Numbers (16:31–35) tells the story of Dathan and Abiram who started a schism, a sin that was punished by God by opening the earth and making them fall into the abyss. This story was used before by Optatus of Milevis against the Donatists, and by the Donatists against the Maximianists.84 What is left unsaid is that God had punished Jehoiakim with other very serious punishments.85 We do not know whether the Donatists ever exploited the apparent weakness of this argument against Augustine, but it can nonetheless be easily seen that the argument in question was vulnerable.

82 ep. 51.1 (CSEL 34,2, 145). 83 ep. 76.4 (CSEL 34,2, 328). 84 In the anti-Donatist letters Augustine referred to the case of Dathan and Abiram on two other occasions without, however, comparing them to the fate of king Jehoiakim. Both instances are similar in that they are very brief. In ep. 87.4 Augustine ironically observes that Emeritus, the addressee of this letter, should know that the person responsible for a schism will be severely pu­ nished by God, a fact that we know from Nm 16:31–35. Augustine focuses here once again on the severity and immediacy of God’s punishment. He does not name the flames that consumed Dathan and Abiram as coming up from hell. That they were swallowed to hell he suggests in the shortest possible form of similitudo with which he illustrates his point in ep. 93.28. He evokes the line from Ps 55:16: “May death come upon them, and may they descend alive into hell’ as referring to the heretics. He supplies this quotation with a final, brief remark that this descending alive into hell is exactly what happened to Dathan and Abiram”: “ueniat mors super illos et descendant in infernum uiuentes sicut Dathan et Abiron, impiae separationis auctores,” after ep. 93.28 (CSEL 34,2, 473). 85 Jer 36,29–31.

Conclusion

Now is the time to make the honest admission that this study of Augustine’s polemic is fully rooted in the polemical context. On the most general level I planned to counter the claim that classical rhetoric mostly provided “a stimulus to stylistic ornamentation” (Sider: 1971, 126). If we are to discuss the rhetoric of any author, it is not enough to study the language or style (elocutio) of the author’s works. What I have learnt from Przemysław Nehring, and the works of Quentin Skinner and Ro­ bert D. Sider, is that the ancient theory and practice of rhetoric placed far more stress on the structure and quality of argumentation. The second polemical level of this study is embedded in the discussion of the exact uses of secular rhetoric by Augustine. Mark Clavier has claimed that, after having pursued a clerical career, Augustine no longer had an interest in it. In this book I have presented a detailed argument for rejecting such claims. Thirdly, I have tried to supplement the thesis of Jennifer Ebbeler concerning Augustine’s model of friendly corrective correspon­ dence with some additional observations. Ebbeler has read the polemical correspondence of Augustine in the context of ancient epistolary theory and practice. Her study has demonstrated how the bishop of Hippo innovated the ancient tradition of treating correspondents as friends or partners. Although I do not reject this thesis, I have tried to prove that in order to comprehensively understand Augustine’s anti-Donatist correspondence we need to take under consideration that it was shaped in direct relation to the tradition of classical rhetoric. Operating on these three polemical levels, this book documents to what extent the art of rhetorical invention shaped Augustine’s polemical discourse. First of all, we can observe how the theory of status, developed for and employed mostly by ancient lawyers, emerges from the analysis. Each time the bishop of Hippo writes in a polemical mode in his letters, he either attacks the Donatists with accusations of the crimes of schism and rebaptism or defends the Catholic party against the accusations of persecution of traditio. The arguments fostered in the discussion of each of these charges are also structured according to the rules known from the classical handbooks on rhetoric. When Augustine accuses the Donatists of schism, he mostly employs status qualitatis. The arguments created within this mode serve the purpose of discrediting the Donatists as having acted with an evil or false motive in separating themselves from Caecilian and his followers in the first years of Constantine the Great’s rule in the West. The second basis of his arguments concerning the charge of schism is status definitionis. Within this status, Augustine argues that the Donatists have cut themselves off from the true Christian Church and that their definition of ecclesia is invalid. He claims that the only possible way to understand the Catholic Church is as the universal, worldwide community of believers who represent different levels of moral perfection.

212 Conclusion In the anti-Donatist correspondence Augustine dedicates less space to accusing the Donatists of rebaptism, but also in these less frequent passages we can see the clear emergence of patterns of argumentation based on the theory of status. First of all, one can observe that Augustine refutes the Donatists’ defence based on the definition of baptism. The Donatists claimed that the converts that they baptize have never previously received a proper sacrament, because the Catholic ministers of the sacrament are impure. Secondly, he tries to document individual scandalous cases of rebaptism along the rules of status coniecturae. On the occasion of defending his party against the charges issued by the Donatists, Augustine develops a threefold strategy concerning the accusation of persecution in cooperation with the state. Most often he employs arguments drawn from the qualitative issue to claim that the persecution is just or justifiable. One of the ways to justify the persecution according to this status was to prove that the Donatists had provoked it with their crimes (relatio criminis), the other was to claim that it was in fact more beneficial to the Donatists and the Christian community to engage in a persecution than not to, which fits the pattern of comparatio criminis. The second status employed in the defence against this charge was based on the definition of persecution and martyrdom. Here the goal was to prove that the Donatists can only hurl such accusations because they do not use these terms properly. At times Augustine dismisses the accusation solely by claiming that the Donatists themselves were persecuting others in cooperation with the Roman officials, which I label as an argument based on status translationis. The same status is used in refutation of the charge of traditio together with status coniecturae. Augustine argues that Caecilian was not in fact a traditor and that the Donatists have never proven it, although they have tried; on the contrary, it may be proven that in the ranks of the first generation of these schismatics there were traditores, e.g. Sylvanus of Cirta. We can observe that in discussing all these charges Augustine prefers certain forms of arguments and rarely employs certain others. Complying with the advice of the classical rhetorical handbooks, he most often searches for the most solid proofs, called inartificial arguments. That term was used in the handbooks to label arguments lying outside of the case itself – those based on documents, laws, witnesses, etc. Passages from scripture are brought into the discourse as divine testimonies and are most often treated as direct arguments in the debates or as premises in enthymematic reasoning. What is very clear is that Augustine shapes arguments drawn from biblical passages on the pattern of the disputes concerning laws described in the rhetorical handbook as status legales. On such occasions we observe how the Christian tradition of exegesis merged with the longstanding practice of Roman legal argument. The second most popular group of arguments employed by Augustine in polemic with the Donatists are arguments based on comparison. Here he uses the whole range of patterns, be it exemplum, simile, and that based on moving from the lesser to the larger (a minore ad maius) or in the opposite direction.

Conclusion

213

Among those one finds the prevalence of arguments drawn from the short history of the Maximanist schism and of the varied biblical exempla. We should also point to the fact that Augustine does not refrain from evoking emotions or arousing laughter in his audiences. He employs pathos as well as ethos alongside rational arguments. He finds many ways in which he persuades the audience that the Catholics are endowed with Christian virtues. In his texts, the Catholics are always interested in reinstating peace and unity in the African Christian community. The converts who have crossed over to the Donatist community are presented as being guilty of some scandalous behaviour before converting. The Donatist leaders are arrogant liars, and so on. We notice, however, that contrary to, for example, Cicero or Jerome, Augustine very seldom uses the language of invective and refrains from employing the (most vulgar) arguments drawn from the appearances or social backgrounds of his opponents. If he turns to arguments a personis he exposes just a few vices of his opponents, such as mendacity, arrogance, divisiveness and intellectual weakness. As far as figures of thought are concerned, I have highlighted frequent use of emotive figures such as exclamationes, sermocinationes, evidentia and expolitio. On the whole, we observe that although Augustine does not neglect any of the three traditional means of persuasion (logos, ethos, pathos) he most often tries to refer to reason by building certain, or at least probable proofs according to the rules and best practice of classical rhetoricians. There is no denying that Augustine’s rhetorical strategies in his anti-Donatist letters are deeply influenced by the handbooks of rhetoric that are mostly interested in its forensic form, such as Cicero’s De inventione and the anonymous Rhetorica ad Herrenium.

Abbreviations AL Augustinus Lexikon, ed. C. Mayer, Basel 1996– BA Bibliothèque Augustinienne. OEuvres de S. Augustin, Paris 1949– CTh Codex Theodosianus, ed. Th. Mommsen-M. Meyer, Berlin 1905. CSEL Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, Vienna 1865– WSA The Works of St. Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, Brooklyn/New York 1990– Rhet. Herr. Ps. Cicero, Rhetorica ad Herrenium Cic., Inv. Cicero, De Inventione Quint., Inst. Quintilian, Institutio oratoria ep. Augustinus, Epistulae, ed. by A. Goldbacher, Vienna 1895–1911. All other abbreviations of journals and the abbreviations of Augustine’s work given after Augustinus Lexikon: https://www.augustinus.de/images/WerkeverzeichnisAL3. pdf.

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Appendix 1. The List of the Anti-Donatist Letters Letter Date 1. ep. 23 – 391–395 2. ep. 33 – 391–396 3. ep. 34 – 396–397 4. ep. 35 – 396–397 5. ep. 43 – 396–397 6. ep. 44 – 396–397 7. ep. 49 – 396–410 8. ep. 51 – 399–400 9. c.litt.Pet I-399–400 10. ep. 52 – 399–400 11. cath. fr. – 401–402 12. ep. 53 – 400 13. ep. 56 – 396–410 14. ep. 57 – 396–410 15. ep. 61 – 401–402 16. ep. 66 – 400–401 17. ep. 70 – 397–400 18. ep. 76 – 403 19. ep. 87 – 405–411 20. ep. 88 – 406–411 21. ep. 89 – 405–411 22. ep. 93 – 407–408 23. ep. 97 – 408 24. ep. 100 – 408 25. ep. 105 – 409–410 26. ep. 106 – 409 27. ep. 108 – 409–410 28. ep. 134 – 411 29. ep. 139 – 411 30. ep. 141 – 412 31. ep. 142 – after 411 32. ep. 144 – after 411 33. ep. 173 – 411–414 34. ep. 185 – 417 35. ep. 204 – 417 36. ep. 208 – 422–3

Addressees Donatist bishop, Siniti, Numidia, Maximinus Donatist bishop, Hippo, Numidia, Proculeian Catholic laymen, Roman official, Hippo Numidia, Eusebius Catholic laymen, Roman official, Hippo Numidia, Eusebius group of elite Donatist laymen, Thiave, Numidia group of elite Donatist laymen, Thiave, Numidia Donatist bishop, Numidia, Honoratus Donatist bishop, Calama, Numidia, Crispinus Catholics Donatist layman, relative of Augustine, Severinus Catholics Catholic layman, Constantina, Numidia, Generosus Donatist (?) layman, Hippo, Numidia, Celer Donatist (?) layman, Hippo, Numidia, Celer Catholic deacon/layman, Hippo/Carthage, Theodore Donatist bishop, Calama, Numidia, Crispinus Donatist laymen, Thabraca, Africa Proconsularis, Naucelio Donatists Donatist bishop, Caesarea, Maureatania Caesarensis, Emeritus Donatist Bishop, Casae Nigrae, Numidia, Januarius Catholic layman, Roman official, Festus Rogatist Bishop, Cartenna, Mauretania Caesarensis, Vincent Catholic layman, magister officiorum, Ravenna, Olympius Catholic layman, proconsul of Africa, Hippo, Donatus Donatists Donatist bishop, Hippo, Numidia, Macrobius Donatist bishop, Hippo, Numidia, Macrobius Catholic laymen, proconsul, Apringius Catholic laymen, imperial commissioner, Marcellinus Donatist laymen Donatists converted to Catholicism Donatists of Cirta converted to Catholicism Donatist priest, Donatus Catholic layman, tribune of Africa, Carthage, Boniface Catholic layman, tribune of Africa, Dulcitius Catholic laywoman, Felicia

Index of Ancient and Medieval Persons

Alypius, bishop of Thagaste 23, 30–1, 130, 135, 201 Ambrose, bishop of Milan 17, 85 Antonius, Marcus 47, 63 Antonius, from De oratore 60 Anulinus, governor of Africa 189, 205 Aphtonios, rhetorician 19 Apollonius, of Tyana 281 Apringius, proconsul of Africa 23, 162 Aurelius, bishop of Carthage 21, 30–1, 82 Basil, bishop of Caesarea 41 Boniface (Bonifatius), comes of Africa 128 Caecilian, bishop of Carthage 70, 75, 79, 92, 99, 101, 103, 105–6, 113–21, 124, 154, 168, 182, 187, 189, 191–5, 197–205, 208, 211 Capella, Martianus 79–80 Catilina, Sergius 47 Celer, Augustine’s correspondent 22 Cicero, Marcus Tullius 13, 17, 19, 40, 47, 51–67, 71–2, 74–7, 80, 86, 88, 91, 95, 100–2, 107, 114–5, 119,124, 134, 149, 150, 157–60, 167, 170, 194–6, 213 Clarence, Donatist bishop 201 Clodius, Publius 47, 91 Coelestius, Pelagian 38 Constantine I, emperor 89, 122, 189–90, 198, 203–4, 211 Cresconius, Donatist 11, 37, 46, 51, 204, 206, 207 Crispinus, Donatist bishop of Calama 36–8, 113, 162–4 Curiatii 157–8 Cyprian, bishop of Carthage 60, 63, 88, 102, 106, 117, 144–6 Demetrius, writer, rhetorician 18 Diocletian, emperor 85 Donatus of Calama 207 Donatus of Casae Nigrae 47, 95–6, 111, 117–8, 135 Donatus of Masculi 207 Donatus, Donatist priest 179 Eleusius, correspondent of Augustine 34–5 Eleusius, mentioned by Hilary of Poitiers 131 Emeritus, Donatist bishop 21–2, 30–1, 34, 38–40, 68–9, 75, 101, 119, 193, 209

Eusebius, Roman official from Hippo 20–1, 23, 75–6, 150–3 Eusebius of Nicomedia 195 Eusebius of Caesarea 198 Evodius, bishop of Uzalis 33 Felician of Musti, Maximianist 111, 114–6, 146–8, 208 Felix of Abthugni 193–5, 199, 205 Felix, correspondent of Augustine 34 Fortunatianus, Consultus, rhetorician 65–6 Fortunatus, Catholic bishop of Cirta 135 Fortunatus, Manichean 33 Fortunius, Donatist bishop 25, 34–6, 108–9, 130, 180–1, 197, 208 Gaudentius, Donatist bishop of Thamugadi 21, 185 Generosus, the governor of Numidia 135 Gildo, comes of Africa 29–30, 111, 117–9 Glorius, correspondent of Augustine 34 Gorgias, sophist 50 Gratian, emperor 150 Gregory of Nyssa 41 Grillius 65–6, 79 Hermagoras, rhetorician 12, 52–4, 56, 58–9, 66, Heros, letter bearer 50 Hilary, bishop of Poitiers 60, 131 Honoratus, Donatist bishop 36–8 Honorius, emperor 29, 82, 159, 163–4 Horatius, 157–8 Ingentius, decurion in Zicca 189, 205 Innocent I, pope 82 Isidore of Seville 152 Jerome of Stridon 18, 24, 39, 46, 63, 85, 135, 213 Jovian, emperor 190 Jovinian 63, 85 Judas 104, 108–9, 185 Julian, bishop of Eclanum 37 Julian, emperor 97, 190 Libanius, rhetorician 18 Lucilla 120, 200–2 Macrobius, Donatist bishop of Hippo 113, 147 Maiorinus, Donatist bishop 96, 120, 194 Marcellinus, tribune 21, 31, 38, 162, 193, 204

228

Index of Ancient and Medieval Persons

Marcion of Urga 159 Marculus, Donatist martyr 177 Marinus of Aquae Tibilitanae 207 Mark of Casfaliano 159, 163 Maximian, the leader of Maximianists 39, 111, 113, 116, 146–7 Maximian of Bagai 159–63, 175 Maximinus, Donatist bishop converted to Catholicism 22, 33, 75, 86–8, 148, 200–2 Megalius, Catholic bishop 46 Melchiades, pope 199–200, 202 Messala, M. Valerius Corvinus 88 Naucelio, Donatist layman 201 Norbanus, from De Oratore 60 Novatus, schismatic 88 Nundinarius, deacon 121, 206, 208 Olympius, magister officiorum 23 Optatus, Donatist bishop of Thamugadi (Timgad) 29–30, 97, 111, 117–9, 186, 188 Optatus, bishop of Milevis 120, 135, 141, 194–5, 198, 202, 204, 206, 209 Ovid (Publius Ovidius Naso), poet 19 Pammachius, Roman senator 23, 39, 43–5 Parmenian, Donatist bishop of Carthage 29, 36, 51, 193 Pascentius, Arian comes 35, 40 Paul, the Apostle 20, 40, 45, 79, 108–9, 135, 140, 142, 167, 172–3, 175–6, 179, 182, 184 Paul, Donatist bishop 206 Paulinus, bishop of Nola 39, 46 Paulus, letter bearer 46 Pelagius, heretic 37–8, 51, 63, 67, 82, 95, 195–6 Peter, the Apostle 135, 144–5, 172 Petilian, Donatist bishop 23, 30, 37, 39, 42–3, 46–7, 51, 139, 141–3, 180, 193 Plato, philosopher 65 Pliny the Younger (Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus), writer 88 Possidius, bishop of Calama, 12, 18, 20–1, 23, 33–4, 42–3, 51, 66–7,159, 163–4 Praetextatus of Assuras, Maximianist 111, 114, 146–8 Primian, Donatist bishop 39, 111, 115, 201–2 Primus, subdeacon of Spama 153 Priscian 66 Probian, proconsul 189, 204

Proculeian (Proculeianus), Donatist bishop of Hippo 21–2, 31, 33–4, 150, 153, 162 Pseudo–Demetrius, author of Typoi Epistolikoi 18–9, 26–7 Pseudo–Libanius, author of Epistolimaioi Charakteres 18, 26 Quintilian, = Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, rhetorician 13, 52–6, 58, 60–8, 70, 74, 77–8, 87, 99–100, 107, 110, 120, 124, 141, 145 Restitutus of Victoriano, 159, 162–3 Rogatus, the Moor 45 Rufin of Antioch 66 Rusticianus, subdeacon 153 Secundus of Tigisi, Donatist bishop 89, 121, 194, 197–200, 207 Seneca, the Elder, rhetorician 78 Seneca, Lucius Annaeus (the Younger), philosopher 98 Seranus, official 111 Severinus, Augustine’s correspondent 75 Socrates, philosopher 105 Stilicho, magister officiorum 23 Silvanus, Catholic bishop 21 Sylvanus of Cirta, Donatist bishop 197, 206–7, 212 Symmachus, Quintus Aurelius, Roman writer 17 Tacitus, Publius Cornelius, historian 98 Terence (Terentius), Roman tragic poet 170–1 Tertullian, Quintus Septimius Florens, Christian writer 13, 57–8, 124–5, 181 Theodore, African catholic 43–4 Theodorus, official 111 Theodosius I, emperor 29, 144, 160 Theon, rhetorician 19 Therasia, wife of Paulinus of Nola 39, 46 Valentinian, emperor 150 Valerius, bishop of Hippo 46, 150–1 Verinus, vicar of Africa 204 Verres, 76 Victor, Julius, rhetorician 66 Victor, Sulpitius, rhetorician 66 Victor, Donatist presbyter 150 Victorinus, Marius 65–6, 107, 124 Vincent, Rogatian bishop 45, 130–1 Volusianus, Roman official 40, 45 Zenophilus, governor of Africa 121, 206

Index of Modern Authors

Adamiak, S. 23, 151 Allen, P. 17 Aubin, J. 65 Bagnall, R.S. 17 Batstone, W.W. 41, 63, 91 Bibik, B. 9 Björk, M. 19 Bloom van der, H. 107 Bonnardière La, A.–M. 32–3, 86 Bonner, A. 95 Braet, A.C. 72 Brown, P.R.L. 27  Bruyne De, D. 18 Buenacasa Pérez, C. 22, 29 Burris, R.D. 141, 180 Cain, A. 63 Calboli Montefusco, L. 52–4, 56–9, 66, 75, 115 Caltabiano M. 38, 42 Cameron, M. 133 Catapano, G. 50 Chronister, A.C. 106 Ciccarese, M.P. 27 Cipriani, N. 67  Clavier, M.F.M. 67, 211 Conant, J. 31 Corbeill, A. 95 Courcelle, P. 46 Craig, C.P. 41, 63, 91 Crespin, R. 41, 76 Dalmon, L. 17–8 Dalvit, M. 92, 120, 133, 135 Deissmann, A. 19 Divjak, J. 19 Dunn, G.D. 68, 73 Dupont, A. 9, 81, 133, Duval, Y.-M. 86 Dyer, J. 46 Ebbeler, J. 18, 24, 27, 33–4, 36–8, 46–7, 49, 71, 86, 88, 211 Eemeren van, F.H. 40 Evans, G.R. 130 Eyl, J. 120 Frend, W.H.C. 30, 39, 51, 117, 161 Garzya, A. 41 Gaumer, M.A. 21, 29, 51, 81, 106, 111–2, 144

Gronewoller, B. 112, 114 Hagendahl, H. 66 Harris, B. 125 Heath, M. 53, 72 Henry, N. 134 Hermanowicz, E. 18, 86, 160–2, 164 Hogrefe, A. 121, 194–7, 202, 206–7 Hombert, P.–M. 46 Hoover, J.A. 81, 92, 123, 126, 132–3, 136 Humfress, C. 66–7 Jacques, F. 63, 88, 117 Jeanjean, B. 63  Jakobi, R. 66 Kahlos, M. 63 Kaufmann, P. 86 Kennedy, G.A. 66 Kriegbaum, B. 193–4, 197 Kuhn, E.–M. 66 Lamberigts, M. 9, 51, 82 Lamirande, É. 28, 41, 112 Lancel, S. 44, 51 Lander, Shira L. 186 Lanham, C.D. 19 Lausberg, H. 54, 57–8, 60, 79, 141, 145, 152 Lenski, N. 30–1, 77, 82 Lepelley, C. 27 Lim, R.  32–3 Lorenz, R. 135 Malherbe, A.J. 18–19, 26–7 Mandouze, A. 21–2, 30, 35, 37, 43, 75, 120, 206 Maschio, G. 106 May, J.J. 41, 60 McLynn, N. 30, 51 Miles, R. 51 Monceaux, P. 31, 39, 41, 44, 51, 85 Morgenstern, F. 22  Murphy, J.J. 65 Müller, Ch. 9 Nauroy, G. 17 Nehring, P. 9, 67, 85, 211 Neil, B. 17 Nicholson, J. 17 Nuffelen van, P. 82 O’Donnell, J.J. 11, 66 Opelt, I. 98, 179 

230

Index of Modern Authors

Parsons, W. 19, 74 Pepe, C. 51–2 Perelman, Ch. 40 Ployd, A. 12, 55, 180–2 Poel van der, M. 107 Poster, C. 19 Quinot, B. 46, 78, Rebillard, É., 49, 106 Reyn van, G. 29 Rossi, A. 43, 85, 135, 177, 179 Russell, F.H. 27, 50 Saenger, P. 17 Saiz Noeda, B. 61–2 Schindler, A. 28, 96 Shaw, B.D. 13, 29–30, 43, 85, 117–8, 133, 150, 161, 179, 186, 193–4, 197–8 Shanzer, D. 170 Sider, R. 13, 54, 56–8, 60, 124–5, 211 Skinner, Q. 11, 13, 211

Standage, T. 22 Stroh, W. 41, 47 Stowers, S. 18–19, 25–7, 49 Szarmach, M. 9 Teske, R.J. 36–8, 43–4, 75, 108, 110, 131, 144, 153, 161, 164, 167–8, 170, 172, 189–90, 199 Thraede, K. 19, 39, 49 Tholen, Y. 25, 98 Tilley, M.A. 71–2, 82, 92, 123, 126–7, 132, 136 Toczko, R. 40, 61, 63, 67, 76, 151, 177, 198, 203, 205 Tornau, C. 9, 20, 51, 67 Veer De, A.C. 111–3 Viellard, D. 63 Ward, J.O. 65 Willis, G.G. 28, 85 Wisse, J. 60–1 Wiśniewski, R. 185 Young, F. 73

Index of Augustine’s works Ad Donatistas post Collationem 39 Ad Emeritum post Collationem 39 Admonitio Donatistarum de Maximianistis 113 Confessiones, conf. 11, 65, 105 Contra Cresconium, Cresc. 116, 120, 128–9, 160–3, 197, 204, 206–7 Contra Gaudentium, c. Gaudentium 41 Contra litteras Petiliani, c. litt. Pet. 21–4, 33, 39, 41–3, 46–8, 72–4, 76–7, 89, 93–6, 98–9, 112, 115–7, 126, 130, 139–43, 146, 148, 179–80, 182, 186, 206–8 De ciuitate Dei, ciu. 67 De doctrina Christiana, doctr. chr. 65–6 De Maximianistis contra Donatistas 113 Enarrationes in Psalmos, en. Ps. 46, 114, 135 Epistula ad Catholicos de secta donatistarum, cath. fr. 21–4, 33, 41–2, 45–6, 69, 73, 81, 92–6, 99, 102–3, 105, 120–2, 124–7, 131–3, 136, 158–9, 165, 181, 183–4, 187, 190, 207–8 Epistulae: ep. 23 21–2, 24, 31, 33–4, 50, 73, 75, 79, 85–8, 91, 96, 139, 148 ep. 27 39 ep. 28 17 ep. 30 64 ep. 33 21–2, 24, 31, 33–4, 88, 93, 150, 166, 178 ep. 34 21–4, 27, 73–5, 87, 94–5, 97, 149–53 ep. 35 21–4, 73–4, 97, 149, 151, 153 ep. 40 46 ep. 43 21–2, 24, 34, 70, 73–4, 78–81, 89, 93–5, 98–9, 104, 107–9, 112–3, 118–21, 190, 194–202 ep. 44 21–2, 24–5, 34–7, 74, 89, 91–5, 105, 108, 130, 180–1, 197, 207–8 ep. 49 21–2, 24, 31, 36, 50, 95–6, 122, 132 ep. 51 21–2, 24, 31, 36–7, 39, 73, 93, 99, 112–8, 140, 146, 148, 187–8, 200, 208–9 ep. 52 21–2, 24, 73, 75, 89, 92–5, 118–9, 121–2, 148, 203 ep. 53 21–2, 24, 93, 112, 117, 135, 190, 206–7 ep. 56 21–2, 71, 79 ep. 57 21–2, 24, 95, 98, 99 ep. 58 21, 23, 43–4 ep. 61 21–2, 24, 43–4, 89–90, 93, 95 ep. 66 21–2, 24, 73–4 ep. 69 21, 98 ep. 70 21–2, 24, 112, 116, 146–8, 201 ep. 71 39 ep. 76 21–4, 72, 89, 93–4, 99–100, 102–4, 112, 115, 117, 119, 129, 146, 148, 182, 186, 190, 203, 208–9 ep. 78 21 ep. 82 46 ep. 86 17, 21, 98 ep. 87 21–2, 24, 31, 38, 40, 68–9, 74–7, 79, 91–5, 99, 102–3, 118–9, 122–4, 158, 164–5, 167, 175, 181, 202–4, 208–9

232

Index of Augustine’s works

ep. 88 21–2, 24, 27, 74, 93, 95–6, 158–60, 162–3, 188–91 ep. 89 17, 27, 43–5, 71–9, 89, 91, 93, 97–8, 105, 121, 139–40, 143, 170, 173, 181, 183, 189–91, 202–3 ep. 93 21–2, 24, 27, 44–6, 50, 74, 79, 89, 93, 95, 98, 106, 124, 130–4, 144–6, 167–9, 171–2, 174, 176, 183–5, 190–2, 202–3, 209 ep. 96 23 ep. 97 21–24 ep. 100 21–4, 97, 99, ep. 105 21–4, 73–5, 79–80, 89, 91, 93, 95–6, 128–9, 143–4, 158–9, 162–4, 166, 169, 173–4, 189–91, 203–4, 208 ep. 106 21–2, 24, 73 ep. 108 21–2, 24, 39, 59, 73–4, 97, 99, 102, 104, 109, 111–3, 115–6, 118, 140–1, 144, 146–7, 153, 182, 187 ep. 128 21, 38 ep. 129 21, 38 ep. 132 40 ep. 133 21, 162 ep. 134 21–24 ep. 137 40, 45 ep. 139 98, 162 ep. 141 21–4, 89, 93, 95, 102, 104, 113, 116, 188, 201–5, 208 ep. 142 21–2, 24, 89 ep. 144 21–2, 24–5, 27, 122 ep. 161 43 ep. 162 43 ep. 166 17 ep. 185 21–4, 27, 73–4, 77, 89, 94–6, 98–9, 101–2, 104, 110, 1123, 115, 122–3, 128–9, 132, 144, 158–61, 165–75, 177–8, 180–3, 185–7, 191, 204 ep. 204 21–4, 93 ep. 208 21–2, 24, 95 ep. 235 43 ep. 238 35, 40, 43 ep. 245 21 ep. 24* 67 ep. 28* 18, 34 Gesta cum Emerito 31, 34, 39 Psalmus contra partem Donati 29, 206 Retractationes, retract. 21, 27, 33, 39, 41, 113 Sermones: s. 4 25 s. 46 133 s. 88 25 s. 197 25 s. 348A 87 s. 359 25 s. Denis 19 123