Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in the Mishnah and Talmud (Brill Reference Library of Judaism, 75) 9004681957, 9789004681958

Citation preview

23mm

Ben Zion Rosenfeld, Ph.D. (1982), Bar Ilan University, is Prof. (Em.) of Jewish History. He has published many monographs and articles on Social and Economic History of Rabbinic Literature of Roman Palestine, including research on Greco Roman culture and Early Christianity.

ISBN 978-90-04-68195-8

ISSN 1571-5000 brill.com/brlj

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in the Mishnah and Talmud

Credit is the oxygen of every society. In many cases we wonder why the rabbis prohibit certain business credit transactions considering them usury. The writer uses literary and epigraphic sources to decipher the rabbinic approach. This book shows how rabbinic legislation innovatively expand the Torah prohibition of usury in loans to all fields of credit. It is a pioneering inquiry regarding rabbinic literature compiled under Roman and Sasanid rule, helping to fill the void in research concerning credit. It also distinguishes various kinds of credit differentiating credit of money for money, or products, exposing the ramifications of the rabbinic legislation.

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in the Mishnah and Talmud

THE BRILL REFERENCE LIBR ARY OF JUDAISM

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in the Mishnah and Talmud

Ben Zion Rosenfeld

Ben Zion Rosenfeld

Ben Zion Rosenfeld

BRLJ 75

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in the Mishnah and Talmud

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

The Brill Reference Library of Judaism Editors Alan J. Avery-Peck (College of the Holy Cross) William Scott Green (University of Miami) Editorial Board Herbert Basser (Queen’s University) Bruce D. Chilton (Bard College) Mayer I. Gruber (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev) Ithamar Gruenwald (Tel Aviv University) Arkady Kovelman (Moscow State University) Baruch A. Levine (New York University) Allan Nadler (Drew University) Jacob Neusner Z”l (Bard College) Maren Niehoff (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Gary G. Porton (University of Illinois) Aviezer Ravitzky (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Dov Schwartz (Bar Ilan University) Günter Stemberger (University of Vienna) Michael E. Stone (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Elliot R. Wolfson (University of California, Santa Barbara)

volume 75

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/brlj

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in the Mishnah and Talmud By

Ben Zion Rosenfeld

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Rozenfeld, Ben Zion, author. Title: Credit and usury in Jewish society in the Mishnah and Talmud / by  Ben Zion Rosenfeld. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, [2024] | Series: The Brill reference  library of Judaism, 1571-5000 ; volume 75 | Includes bibliographical  references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2023032934 (print) | LCCN 2023032935 (ebook) | ISBN  9789004681958 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004681965 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Interest (Jewish law) | Jews—Palestine—Economic  conditions. | Talmud—Criticism, interpretation, etc. Classification: LCC KBM955.4 .R69 2024 (print) | LCC KBM955.4 (ebook) |  DDC 346.07/3095694—dc23/eng/20230906 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023032934 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023032935

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1571-5000 isbn 978-90-04-68195-8 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-68196-5 (e-book) doi 10.1163/9789004681965 Copyright 2024 by Ben Zion Rosenfeld. Published by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Brill Wageningen Academic, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau and V&R unipress. Koninklijke Brill NV reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Contents Preface ix Abbreviations x 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Aims and Structure 1 1.2 Credit: A Definition 3 1.3 Sources and Methods 12 1.4 Previous Research, Manuscripts, and Editions 23 1.5 The Structure of the Book 25 2 Credit in Rome and Persia 29 2.1 Credit in the Roman World 29 2.2 Credit in the Parthian and Sasanian Empires 50 3 Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon 57 3.1 Socio-historical Background 57 3.2 Lenders and Borrowers in Jewish Roman Palestine 61 3.3 The Economy of the Jewish Community of Babylon 63 3.4 Types of Credit in Palestine and Babylon 65 3.5 The Rabbis’ Considerations: Social Justice 67 3.6 Credit in Jewish Society: The Problem of Interest 69 3.6.1 The Prohibition of Usury from the Bible until the Mishnah 69 3.6.2 The Prohibition of Usury in Early Rabbinic Literature (Mishnah and Tosefta) 74 3.7 Expanding the Scope of Usury 80 3.7.1 Innovations of the Tosefta: “Dust of Interest” and “Deceiving Interest” 82 3.7.2 The Talmudic Period: Conceptualization 83 3.8 Jews and Non-Jews 85 4 “Money for Money” 93 4.1 Introduction 93 4.2 Lending “Money for Money” 94 4.3 Usury in Loans of “Money for Money” 97 4.4 Business Partnership (Iska) 100 4.4.1 The Revolutionary Definition of the Babylonian “Nehardeans” 104

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

vi

Contents

5 “Money for Fruit” 108 5.1 Introduction 108 5.2 “Money for Fruit”: Future Sales (Pesiqa) 109 5.3 Linking a Loan to the Price of a Commodity 115 5.4 Down Payments 118 5.5 Future Sales That Are Not Pesiqa 121 5.6 Loans against Deduction of Future Tithes from the Field 123 5.7 Summary 124 6 “Fruit for Money” 126 6.1 Introduction 126 6.2 Sale on Credit 127 6.3 Delayed Payment 128 6.4 A Cash Loan Presented as a Two-Sided Sale Transaction 133 6.5 Tarsha: A Talmudic Version of Delayed Payment 134 6.6 “Fruit for Money” in a Partnership 138 6.7 “Iron Flocks”: An Agreement to Ensure the Investor’s Capital 143 6.8 Transport of Merchandise Guaranteeing the “High Price” 147 6.9 Conclusion 153 7 “Fruit for Fruit” 154 7.1 Introduction: In the Roman World 154 7.2 “Fruit for Fruit” in Rabbinic Literature 158 7.2.1 “Wheat for Wheat”: The Time Factor 158 7.2.2 “Wheat for Wheat”: Issues of Quantity 161 7.2.3 “Wheat for Wheat”: The Location Factor 162 7.3 “Fruit for Fruit” for the Purchase of Seeds 163 7.4 Additional Cases of Usury in Sharecropping 167 7.5 Paying Back a Prohibited Loan of “Fruit for Fruit” 168 7.6 Exchange of Services 170 7.7 Loan of “Denars for Denars” 171 7.8 Conclusion 175 8 The Sages’ Attitude toward Those Involved in Usury 177 8.1 Introduction 177 8.2 Expanding the Prohibition 177 8.3 Combating Usury 179 8.4 Repentance from Usury 184 8.5 Permission to Lend for Interest in Special Cases 186

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Contents

vii

9 Conclusion 191 9.1 Contributions to Scholarship 191 9.2 Epilogue 192 Bibliography 197 Index of Authors 240 Index of Subjects 247

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Preface This book deals with the unique issue of credit in Jewish society in the times of the Mishnah and Talmud. Credit has been the oxygen of the economy throughout history. This volume is the fruit of thorough socio-economic and cultural research of the issue as can be derived from the legal legislation of the intellectual elite of the society at that time. There has not yet been research devoted to this topic analyzing the vast material available in rabbinic literature. The research expands the scope, including comparison to the surrounding society in Roman Palestine and Sassanid Babylon. It includes information gleaned from epigraphic findings and uses socio-anthropological measures to help understand how credit was approached in rabbinic literature. The chapters of the volume represent a division of forms of credit found in the rabbinic sources, between credit that involved loan of money or products and payment of money or products. The main issue that sets apart the rabbinic attitude to interest is the Torah prohibition of charging interest for loans and how the rabbis interpreted and expanded it. The research distinguishes ‘credit’ from ‘debt’ and shows how the two areas are in some ways the same and in others different. This comprehensive analysis of the world of credit in Jewish society can open new directions and avenues for understanding the economy and society of the Roman world. I wish to thank individuals who contributed significantly to this volume. Dr. Haim Perlmutter was my learning partner for this book. We examined every chapter and source together, and the result you see here has emerged through mutual brainstorming. He is also responsible for translating the original Hebrew manuscript into English. Dr. Joseph Menirav started this research with me and contributed much to its content and division of chapters. Miss Leah Namdar, a senior librarian in the central library at Bar Ilan University, supplied invaluable sources and studies that enhanced the research. Michael Helfield was the language editor and contributed much to its clarity. I wish to thank also all the workers at the Bar Ilan University central library that helped me whenever needed. I thank the anonymous reviewers who commented on the manuscript, the chief editor of this series, and the editorial staff at Brill Publications. Last but not least, my wife, Rivka Rosenfeld, assisted much in writing and editing this volume.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Abbreviations AEMA AJSR Anc. Soc. ANRW BAI BASP BJS BSOAS BTB CAH CHC CHI CHJ CPJ EMC GRBS HGPA HUCA HZAG IEJ JAH JAOS JBL JEH JEP JESHO JJP JJS JME JNES JQR JRA JRS JSHJ JSJ JSNT

Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi Association for Jewish Studies Review Ancient Society Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt Bulletin of the Asia Institute Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists British Journal of Sociology Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies Biblical Theology Bulletin The Cambridge Ancient History The Cambridge History of Christianity The Cambridge History of Iran The Cambridge History of Judaism Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum Echos du Monde Classique Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies Heidlberger Gesamtverzeichnis der griechischen Papyrusurkunden Ägyptens Hebrew Union College Annual Historia: Zeitschrift für alte Geschichte Israel Exploration Journal Journal of Ancient History Journal of the American Oriental Society Journal of Biblical Literature Journal of Economic History Journal of Economic Perspectives Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient Journal of Juristic Papyrology Journal of Jewish Studies Journal of Monetary Economics Journal of Near Eastern Studies Jewish Quarterly Review Journal of Roman Archaeology Journal of Roman Studies Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus Journal for the Study of Judaism Journal for the Study of the New Testament

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

xi

Abbreviations JSS JTS MBAH NP OCD PBSR PW, RE RRJ SCI SLR TDNT TSEG YCS ZPE

Journal of Semitic Studies Journal of Theological Studies Münstersche Beiträge zur Antiken Handelsgeschichte Brill’s Encyclopedia of the Ancient World/New Pauly Oxford Classical Dictionary, 4th ed. (2012) Papers of the British School at Rome A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, et al. (eds.), Paulys Realencyclopädie Review of Rabbinic Judaism Scripta Classica Israelica Stanford Law Review Theological Dictionary of the New Testament Tijdschrift voorSociale en Economische Geschiedenis Yale Classical Studies Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Chapter 1

Introduction 1.1

Aims and Structure

This volume discusses the complex rabbinic attitude to credit in the historical periods of the Mishnah and Talmud. Credit is the oxygen of socio-economic life, modern as well as ancient. And although there have been a few studies on particular aspects of credit in antiquity, nobody has yet undertaken a systematic study of credit as it is presented in rabbinic literature from Roman Palestine and Sasanid Babylon.1 And it is also the case that most studies that do treat the topic of credit in antiquity, especially in Roman Palestine and Sasanid

1 For the history of credit, see R. M. Gelpi and F. Julien-Labruyère, The History of Consumer Credit: Doctrines and Practices (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), esp. 3–29. On the ancient world, see M. Hudson, “How Interest Rates Were Set, 2500 BCE–AD 1000,” JESHO 43 (2) (2000): 132–161; idem, “Origins of Interest”; M. Van de Mieroop, “A History of Near Eastern Debt?” in Debt and Economic Renewal in the Ancient Near East: A Colloquium Held at Columbia University, ed. M. Hudson (Bethesda, MD: CDL Press, 2002), 59–94; A. M. Andreades, A History of Greek Public Finance, Vol. 1. (New York: Arno Press, 1979), 172–182 and index, s.v. “loans,” “public loans”; P. Millett, “Maritime Loans and the Structure of Credit in Fourth-Century Athens,” in Trade in the Ancient Economy, ed. P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins, and C. R. Whittaker (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 36–52; and MacDonald and Gastmann, Credit, esp. 19–30. On credit in Roman world, see, for example, A. H. M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire (284–602), 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964. Repr. 1971), 868–870; C. Katsari, The Roman Monetary System: The Eastern Provinces from the First to the Third Century AD (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), esp. 167–208; D. P. Kehoe, Law and the Rural Economy in the Roman Empire (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 145–154 and index, s.v. “debt”; and D. B. Hollander, “Credit,” in The Encyclopedia of Ancient History, ed. R. Bagnall et al. (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 4:1826–1829. On credit in Roman Palestine, see H. Lapin, Early Rabbinic Civil Law and the Social History of Roman Galilee: A Study of Mishnah Tractate Baba Mesia (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), 147–156, 186–201; and J. Menirav, Prakmatia: The Marketing System in the Jewish Community in Palestine during the Mishnaic and Talmudic Eras (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2009), 148 and n. 56, 170–210 [Hebrew]. On the Byzantine era, see A. E. Laiou-Thomadakis and C. Morrison, The Byzantine Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 18–19, 72. On Babylonian Jewry, see M. Beer, The Babylonian Amoraim: Aspects of Economic Life, 2nd ed. (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1982), 190–191 [Hebrew]. On recent generations, see C. L. Prather, Money and Banking (Homewood, IL: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1969), 517–568; and M. D. Bordo and J. G. Haubrich, “Credit Crises, Money and Contractions: An Historical View,” JME 57 (2010): 1–17, esp. 1, 2, 17. They describe the impact of credit on the economy of the United States, specifically in times of crisis.

© Ben Zion Rosenfeld, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004681965_002

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

2

Chapter 1

Babylon, do so as a part of a larger economic or historical focus.2 This volume, then, seeks to fill in this noticeable lacuna in scholarship and to thoroughly explore the nature and function of credit in the two aforementioned geographies and time periods. Credit and usury are present in rabbinic literature in many forms, and they possess several functions. By looking at what the rabbis had to say on these matters, we can gain insight into the workings of the credit market and its various manifestations in ancient Jewish society in the Roman and Sasanian worlds. The rabbis had a complex yet consistent approach, determining cases in which an individual was profiting from usury, and subsequently prohibiting it. They were operating within the Roman economy that Palestine was a part of (70–400 CE), and their discourse reflects that economy. Similarly, the Babylonian sages operated within the Sasanid economy (226–500 CE), reflecting the credit market in that milieu. This volume will discuss the forms of credit that appear in rabbinic literature in the context of the specific times and locations in which the rabbis’ laws were made. It will provide the reader with an overview and general understanding of the role that loans played in the Roman and Sasanid worlds.3 The issue of credit in rabbinic literature is unique. And what makes this issue so unique—and so complex—is the presence of interest. The sages of the Mishnah take a stringent approach to this matter. They implement the Torah prohibition of interest in a wide variety of credit transactions as well as in general commercial transactions, investments, and partnerships in which they detected the presence—or the possible presence—of interest-bearing loans. 2 In addition to the previous note on credit in Roman Palestine, see H. Lapin, Early Rabbinic Civil Law and the Social History of Roman Galilee: A Study of Mishnah Tractate Baba Mesia (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), 121–147, 201–235; and J. Menirav, Prakmatia: The Marketing System in the Jewish Community in Palestine during the Mishnaic and Talmudic Eras (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2009), 25–74, 124–169 [Hebrew]. On the Byzantine era, see A. E. Laiou-Thomadakis and C. Morrison, The Byzantine Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 18–19, 72. On Babylonian Jewry, see J. Neusner, A History of the Jews in Babylonia, Part 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1966), 92–125, 251–287; M. Beer, The Babylonian Amoraim: Aspects of Economic Life, 2nd ed. (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1982), 196–219 [Hebrew]. On recent generations, see C. L. Prather, Money and Banking (Homewood, IL: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1969), 517–568; and M. D. Bordo and J. G. Haubrich, “Credit Crises, Money and Contractions: An Historical View,” JME 57 (2010): 1–17. 3 For this volume, the dates for the Roman Empire are from 27 BCE, which is when Augustus Caesar gets de facto control, until it 476 CE when Romulus Augustus is forced to cede power after the defeat of his forces to Odoacer at the Battle of Ravenna. The Sasanid Empire existed from 224 CE until the Moslem conquest in 651 CE. This research covers a large temporal segment of both empires.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Introduction

3

This book samples the primary rabbinic sources that relate to credit from the perspective of the prohibition against usury, which is typically defined as the lending of money at excessively high-interest rates. And in fact, there is an entire chapter of the Mishnah and Talmud (Bava Metzia 5) that is devoted to the prohibition of usury. There is a vast amount of material in rabbinic literature that relates to the topic of loans and credit, and it is important to know that these topics are not merely discussed from the point of view of usury. Other ways of looking at credit include documentation and testimony, securities, Torah limitations on taking collateral, and the nature of sabbatical years and the cancellation of debts. During the Hellenistic and Roman periods, and the Sasanid period as well, commerce and investment was revolutionized. There was gradually an increase in the amount of money in circulation, in the volume of imported and exported goods, and in the complexity of economic interaction in the growing urban centers that filtered also to the periphery. In addition, Jews were becoming constantly more involved in commerce with non-Jews, and credit became increasingly prolific and complex, involving all strata of society: the rich, the middling groups, and the poor. The rabbis’ discussions of loans and credit reflect their perception of this economic development and how they perceived the moral aspects of economic activity. Following the sources from the early Roman Empire into the Talmudic period, one can see the dynamics of this issue slowly evolve within rabbinic circles. 1.2

Credit: A Definition

The term “credit” is more inclusive than the term “loan.” In a loan, the lender gives money to a borrower, who must return the value in cash or in kind at some later time agreed upon by both parties. Credit also includes transactions in which someone sells an object to another person and allows that person, the purchaser, to pay for the object at a later agreed-upon time.4 These 4 M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Vol. 1, ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 81, suggests similar definition. G. Peebles, “The Anthropology of Credit,” Annual Review of Anthropology 39 (2010): 225–240, esp. 226–228 and S. B. MacDonald and A. L. Gastmann, A History of Credit and Power in the Western World (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 7–9, 25–30, summarize anthropological research on the issue of credit. See also W. W. Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966); and G. Mousourakis, Roman Law and the Origins of the Civil Law Tradition (London: Springer, 2015), 68, ns. 119, 123–134. On the antiquity of credit and its importance in the

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

4

Chapter 1

English terms originate in the Latin word credere. The Roman jurist Ulpianus (ca. 170–225 CE), commenting on the rubric de rebus creditis in the Praetor’s Edict, an annual statement of legal principles made by the incoming praetor urbanus, observes that credere is a rather general term referring to any contract in which one puts trust ( fides) in someone else (omnes contractus, quos alienam fidem secuti instituimus). The logic is that one “gives credit” whenever they trust someone, accepting that they will only later receive something in return (cui cum que rei adsentiamur alienam fidem secuti mox recepturi quid). Credere is, in this large sense, equivalent to fidem sequi. It therefore includes the lending of money as well as the purchasing of goods and services on credit, and can therefore be considered the rough equivalent of the English word “credit.”5 The difference between a sale and the provision of credit is the time factor. With credit, there is a time gap between the transfer of goods or services from person to person b and the subsequent return of said goods or services to person a from person b. Primary sale transactions are “cash and carry.” The buyer pays for the object or service and then physically takes it into his possession or immediately receives the service. The payment can be in cash, which could take the form of gold, silver, or copper coins, or it could be in kind—objects or services that are bartered for other objects or services. A sale can incorporate credit, where the buyer can pay for the entire cost or part of the cost with a credit—a promise to pay the balance plus interest at a later date. In a typical loan, the lender gives money to the borrower, and the latter’s intention is to use that money to purchase merchandise or services elsewhere.6 He is to return the same value to the creditor at a designated time. However, if the money was given with an agreement that it be returned as is, it is not a loan but rather a deposit.7 In addition, when one supplies someone economy of the ancient Near East, see M. Hudson, “Origins of Money and Interest: Palatial Credit,” in Handbook of the History of Money and Currency, ed. S. Battilossi, Y. Cassis, and K. Yago (Singapore: Springer, 2020), 45–65. 5 Digest (D) 12.1.1.1; J. L. Alonso, “Πίστις in Loan Transactions: A New Interpretation of P. Dion. 11–12,” JJP 42 (2012): 9–30, here n. 55, cites Celsus’s definition of credit. 6 In today’s marketplace, there are stores (especially car dealerships) that will arrange to lend the consumer money to lease their objects. So both aspects of the loan are contracted in the same place and at the same time. 7 M Bava Metzia (BM) 3 discusses deposits. Deposits include objects, not only money; the recipient must guard them and is not allowed to use them. In M BM 11, an exception is mentioned. The shulchani (trapezitis, “banker”) may use the deposited money if given to him in the open. According to Rabbi Judah, this is true also concerning the storekeeper. The Tosefta follows the Mishnah regarding this point as well as the Jerusalem and Babylonian Talmuds. In contrast, early sources prohibited completely the use of deposits. See Philo, De Spec. Leg. 4.33. Josephus, Ant. 4.287, says that if the recipient of the deposit used part of the money and it

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Introduction

5

else with a manufactured object such as a plow, which the latter is to use and return as is, this is not an example of credit; rather, it is an example of sheela (‫—)שאלה‬borrowing. If the latter in this same situation pays for the use of the plow, it is an example of sekhirut (‫—)שכירות‬renting—and not one of credit.8 With credit, the recipient returns the value of the good and/or service to the creditor under all circumstances—even if he does not benefit from the loan in any way. Furthermore, even if the recipient were to lose the entire amount he received, he still must return the required sum to the creditor—in modern parlance, he is still liable for it. The concepts described above, namely loan, renting, borrowing, and sale, are fundamental for understanding the issue of credit throughout rabbinic literature and will be discussed at some length—and in various contexts—in this book. The primary sources that I draw on for the nature of ancient credit are contemporary rabbinic documents from the Mishnaic and Talmudic periods. The Hebrew word ‫“( אשראי‬credit,” originally from Aramaic) does not appear at all in Tannaitic literature or in the later Jerusalem Talmud. In rabbinic literature, the terms that are used most often are ‫“( הלוואה‬loan”), ‫“( לווה‬borrower”), and ‫מלווה‬ (“creditor”). However, the rabbis identified a feature of the loan in sale transactions when the money is not paid up front or when the merchandise is supplied at a later time. These transactions are in fact termed “sales” in the sources (‫ מקח‬,‫)מכר‬, but the rabbis say that such transactions have a loan component baked into them inasmuch as there is a delay in payment or in the supplying of the merchandise. And they forbid, as they do with credit transactions, the charging of interest. Therefore, when there is a transaction that features the lending of money or a returning of money, or merchandise exchanged for

was lost, he must pay for it even if it was taken from him by force, because he had ultimately betrayed someone’s trust. This law also appears in Josephus, Ag. Ap. 2.208 and 2.216. See also J. M. G. Barclay, Flavius Josephus: Against Apion (Leiden: Brill, 2006); A. Kasher, Josephus Flavius: Against Apion: A New Hebrew Translation with Introduction and Commentary, Vols. 1–2 (Jerusalem: Shazar Center, 1996), 2.503. The distinction between closed and open packages of money was known in the Roman Empire and was the basis for the development of banks. The prime source used by the banks for capital consisted of deposits. See M. Silver, “Finding the Roman Empire’s Disappeared Deposit Bankers,” Historia 60 (3) (2011): 301–327, here 302. However, according to Buckland, Roman Law, 467–470, the deposit is also a form of loan. See also B. Palme, “The Range of Documentary Texts: Types and Categories,” in R. Bagnall (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Papyrology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 358–394, here 369. 8 The sages had clear definitions for these issues. See T BM 4:2 (Lieberman, 81): “A loan is specified that you don’t receive in return what you give him. These are different, that what you give him you take from him.”

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

6

Chapter 1

merchandise9 it is termed a ‘loan.’ When merchandise is exchanged for money, or money for merchandise, they call such a transaction a “sale.” However, when the exchange is not instantaneous, it is all considered ‘credit’ and the prohibitions of interest may apply.10 Papyri in Egypt are worded in the same way. There are sale documents of various kinds that contain a loan component just like the various examples presented in Tannaitic literature.11 In the Babylonian Talmud, the original Aramaic term ashrai (‫)אשראי‬ mentioned above appears three times, all three appearances coming from statements of Amoraim of the fourth and fifth centuries CE. There is also one mention of a variation of ashrai, namely, asharta (‫)אשרתא‬.12 This term corresponds with the English term “credit.” The common use of the word is not found until the period of the Geonim (ca. 700–1100 CE), the great Talmudic sages of Sura and Pumbedita.13 In this volume, I will use the term “credit” because it includes the four kinds of transactions that the rabbis mention in the context of the prohibition against usury. Credit is a necessary component of every economic system. It has fueled commercial activity from the ancient world through to the modern era. Simply put, the availability of credit affects peoples’ standard of living and the strength of the overall economy.14 To start with antiquity, the Roman economy, 9 In rabbinic parlance would be translated as “merchandise for merchandise” (‫פירות‬ ‫)בפירות‬. See the Table of Contents for a variety of such abbreviated (translated) rabbinic expressions. They come from the Mekhilta de Rabbi Yishmael (see below). 10 This is based on analyses of the language of M BM 5 and T BM 4–5. It is a philological difference. 11 J. L. Alonso, “One En Pistei, Guarantee Sales, and Title-Transfer Security in the Papyrii,” in D. F. Leão and G. Thür (eds.), Symposion 2015: Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Coimbra, 1–4 September 2015). Akten der Gesellschaft für Griechische und Hellenistische Rechtsgeschichte (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2016), 121–192. In Roman law, there is a similar phenomenon. There are deposits that are actually regarded as loans. See, for example, D.16.3.1.15/24/25.1 (Papinianus); 26.1 (Paulus); 28 (Scaevola); and 29.1 (Paulus). 12 The word appears in BT Pesahim 113a with the same meaning that it has in Modern Hebrew. It is also used similarly in BT BM 63b and BT Bava Batra (BB) 22a and in BT Gittin 14a. In the latter source, the form is ‫אשרתא‬. 13 See also M. A. Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic of the Talmudic and Geonic Periods (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2002), 110ab. He added sources from the Geonic period. 14 See T. J. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 BC) (London: Routledge, 1995), 328. He emphasizes that “land and debt were constant issues in political struggles in the Greco-Roman world.” G. E. M. De Ste Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquest (London: Duckworth, 1981), gave this aspect of the struggle between the classes exaggerated importance.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Introduction

7

including that of Palestine, was primarily agricultural.15 In the agricultural world, credit was an important factor that enabled the farmer to plant his field though he had no means by which to purchase seeds. The expenses he incurred working his farm and feeding his family were spread throughout the year, but his income was concentrated in the harvest season. He often needed credit in order to feed his family until his produce was ready to be harvested. 15 L. De Ligt, Fairs and Markets in the Roman Empire (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1993), 149–154, states that in the ancient world 80%–90% of the population consisted of farmers. J. Edmondson, “Economic Life in the Roman Empire,” in The Oxford Handbook of Roman Epigraphy, ed. C. Bruun and J. Edmondson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 671–695, here 675, says: “At least 90 percent of the population of the Roman Empire were engaged in agriculture.” See also J. Manning, The Open Sea: The Economic Life of the Ancient Mediterranean World from the Iron Age to the Rise of Rome (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 109–134; P. Horden and N. Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000); W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. Saller (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), index, s.v. “agriculture”; K. Hopkins, “Economic Growth and Towns in Classical Antiquity,” in Towns in Societies: Essays in Economic History and Historical Sociology, ed. P. Abrams and E. A. Wrigley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 35–77, esp. 35–39; P. Garnsey and R. Saller, The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture (London: Duckworth, 1987), 43; I. Shatzman, History of the Roman Republic (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1990), 511–524; E. Margaritis and M. K. Jones, “Greek and Roman Agriculture,” in The Oxford Handbook of Engineering and Technology in the Classical World, ed. J. P. Oleson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 158–174; P. F. Bang, “Trade and Empire: In Search of Organizing Concepts for the Roman Economy,” Past and Present 195 (2007): 3–54, here 25; idem, The Roman Bazaar: A Comparative Study of Trade and Markets in a Tributary Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 61–127; N. Rosenstein, “Aristocrats and Agriculture in the Middle and Late Republic,” JRS 98 (2008): 1–26; and D. E. Oakman, “Jesus and Agrarian Palestine: The Factor of Debt,” in The Social World of the New Testament: Insights and Models, ed. J. H. Neyrey and E. C. Stewart (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2008), 62–85. D. E. Oakman, “Was Jesus a Peasant? Implications for Reading the Jesus Tradition,” in The Social World of the New Testament: Insights and Models, ed. J. H. Neyrey and E. C. Stewart (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2008), 125–140, concludes this for the third to fourth centuries based on the NT. See D. Sperber, Roman Palestine, 200–400: The Land (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1978), 174; B. Z. Rosenfeld, “The Galilean Valleys (Beqʾaoth) from the Bible to the Talmud,” Revue Biblique 109 (1) (2002): 66–100; and A. J. Avery-Peck, “The Division of Agriculture and Second Century Judaism: The Holiness of the Devastated Land,” in The Mishnah in Contemporary Perspective, ed. A. J. Avery-Peck and J. Neusner (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 41–90, which show that the rabbis attributed holiness to working the land. A. J. Avery-Peck, “Scripture and Mishnah: The Case of the Mishnaic Division of Agriculture,” JJS 38 (1) (1987): 56–71; and T. Novick, “‘Like an Expert Sharecropper’: Agricultural Halakhah and Agricultural Science in Rabbinic Palestine,” AJS Review 38 (2) (2014): 303–320, discuss it as an art and science. See also W. V. Harris, “Marginal Land and Population Pressure in the Ancient Mediterranean, 800 BC to 600 AD,” HZAG 67 (4) (2018): 390–417, on the challenges faced by agricultural entrepreneurs in that period.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

8

Chapter 1

There are also accounts of loans made to tenants for upgrading the fields, maintaining the water supply, purchasing agricultural equipment, and even supplementing their income. Some of these loans were long-term, and they often took years to pay back.16 These loans represent the mutual interest of both parties, since increasing the productive capacity and/or efficiency of farms provide more income to their owners as well as to the tenants who worked them. The authorities as well were interested in the success of the tenants’ agricultural endeavors, since the taxes they collected were from the latter’s produce. This common interest of government, landowners, and tenants enabled the tenants from time to time to ask for various benefits such as payment period extensions and even lower crop payments. Of course, tenants were sometimes forced to ask for lower crop payments as a result of natural disasters (drought, fire, flooding) or human-made disasters (battles, fires) ruined significant portions of their produce.17 The non-agricultural sectors of the ancient economy needed credit as well. The storekeeper gave his customers credit; otherwise, they were not likely to buy from him. He in turn needed to take credit to buy merchandise for his store that would be sold gradually over a long period. The importer and exporter would need credit in order to purchase merchandise that would bring income in only after it was transported and sold. People used credit in order to support themselves and their families when their incomes were relatively low or sporadic.18 16 D. P. Kehoe, The Economics of Agriculture on Roman Estates in North Africa (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 153–154. He describes a cash loan of 100 drachmas, which was to be paid back in yearly installments for eleven years. 17 Kehoe, Economics of Agriculture, 145–158, esp. 146 n. 59; idem, Law and the Rural Economy, 6–10, 105–119. An example of the close relations between landowners and tenants is found in the relationship between a landowner and a large tenant family—the Kronions. This family received a lot of land to cultivate in Tebtunis, a town in Egypt, and its surroundings. The Kronions depended on credit from the owners to cultivate the land, including credit for seeds to plant. See R. Takahashi, “The Kronion Family’s Loans: An Egyptian Peasant Family Declining under Roman Rule?” Anc. Soc. 42 (2012): 71–88, esp. 73–74. 18 On the importance of credit in the Roman world, see R. S. Bagnall, Egypt in Late Antiquity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 73, 75; Andreau, Banking and Business in the Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 146–147; idem, “Commerce and Finance,” CAH 11 (2000): 769–786; P. Temin, “Financial Intermediation in the Early Roman Empire,” JEH 64 (3) (2004): 705–733, here 705; S. Von Reden, Money in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 92–124; Millett, Maritime Loans, 1–23, 197–217; W. Broekaert and A. Zuiderhoek, “Society, the Market, or Actually Both? Networks and the Allocation of Credit and Capital Goods in the Roman Economy,” Cahiers du Centre Gustave Glotz 26 (2015): 141–190; and Beer, Babylonian Amoraim, 190–191. On the situation in Palestine, see Menirav, Prakmatia, 120–123. For

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Introduction

9

Looking at the status of the people that dealt in and with credit shows that they included not only the poor, sharecroppers, and small-scale farmers but also wealthy homeowners and merchants—people who had property. However, those who extended the credit were people with money that was not necessary for their everyday needs and that could be extended to others as credit. This surplus money could be lent to others directly or through an arbitrator.19 From the point of view of the borrower, there are two kinds of credit: (1) personal credit that is primarily for survival and consumption to keep himself and his family alive in cases of a lack of income; and (2) commercial credit needed to operate and develop a business. In the latter case, the borrower intends to accumulate financial gain because of the credit received. On the other hand, from the perspective of the side that is extending the loan the purpose in both cases is the same. Within the first category, credit taken for personal use is simply “consumption credit,” but if it is for survival and the purchase of daily necessities it is called “emergency credit.” Taking out a loan to buy a nice house is not the same as taking out a loan in order to pay for food. However, the sources do not distinguish between commercial and personal loans. They are permissible when they do not bear interest and prohibited when they do bear interest.20 The main motivation for the commercial credit transaction was the material profit that both sides hoped to gain from it. The recipient would gain the ability to purchase the seeds that he needed to plant his crops or to feed his more on the economy of Palestine during the Roman period, see B. Z. Rosenfeld and H. Perlmutter, Social Stratification of the Jewish Population of Roman Palestine in the Period of the Mishnah, 70–250 CE (Leiden: Brill, 2020). 19 Credit systems in the modern world are constructed according to the same rationale. See F. S. Mishkin, The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets, 6th ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley, 2003), 20–25 (on banking, see esp. 7–8, 37–40, 211–216, 229); and S. Meikle, “Modernism Economics and the Ancient Economy,” in The Ancient Economy, ed. W. Scheidel and S. Von Reden (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 233–250, esp. 233–234. 20 See C. Hawkins, Roman Artisans and the Urban Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 81, 84–86, 221–226; idem, “Artisans, Retailers, and Credit Transactions in the Roman World,” JAH 5 (1) (2017): 66–92; and idem, “Contracts, Coercion, and the Boundaries of the Roman Artisanal Firm,” in Work, Labour, and Professions in the Roman World, ed. K. Verboven and C. Laes (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 36–61, which all show that credit was essential for craftsmen, who constituted an important part of the Roman economy. The distinction between personal loans and commercial loans was already known in the classical Greek period. See Millett, Maritime Loans, 127–159, 160–178; P. Temin, “The Economy of the Early Roman Empire,” JEP 20 (1) (2006): 133–151; and Broekaert and Zuiderhoek, “Society, the Market.”

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

10

Chapter 1

family. Someone else would compensate the creditor for the use of his money. The justification for charging money for loans is that the lender would be lacking those funds for a period and that this period should be paid for. There also existed benevolent credit that was given without compensation; this too involved the creditor reaping benefits: he would have fulfilled an important religious obligation (mitzvah), would have been satisfied that he helped someone out, and would have strengthened his social standing within the community. However, when discussing commercial credit, it was rare in antiquity that the credit was extended without financial profit for the lender—and that is still the case today. Commercial credit is the engine of the economy, determining its development over time and down through numerous generations. Essentially, it was a local phenomenon between people who lived close to each other and who could trust that the loan would be paid back. However, it also catalyzed the economy in various ways. An example of such stimulus is when, for example, sea merchants, who dealt with import and export, received commercial credit to finance their journeys.21 My aim in this volume, as stated above, is to contribute to our understanding of how credit operated in the ancient world. Palestine was in the heart of the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea (Mare Nostrum) between Syria and Egypt; therefore, a better understanding of how credit operated in Palestine will doubtless contribute to our perception of how the economy functioned in the Middle East and in the Roman world.22 Similarly, large Jewish communities resided in the Sasanian Empire. The Amoraim operated in Babylonia, gradually creating the Babylonian Talmud (BT). The BT reflects the large-scale credit transactions conducted between Jews living in Persia and between Jews and their non-Jewish neighbors. And like with Palestine, the home of the Tannaim, a better understanding of how credit worked in Persia will help us get a clearer picture of the how the economy functioned in that region. 21

See Millett, Maritime Loans, 188–217; K. Greene, “Learning to Consume: Consumption and Consumerism in the Roman Empire,” JRA 21 (2008): 64–82. 22 T. Terpstra, Trade in the Ancient Mediterranean: Private Order and Public Institutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), 89–124, and index, s.v. “Syria-Palestine”; C. Routledge “Western Asia,” in The Oxford Handbook of Egyptology, ed. I. Shaw and E. Bloxam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 514–539, esp. map on 515, and index, s.v. “Syria-S yro Palestinian archaeology.” For a global picture of the contacts between Egypt and Syria, see Manning, The Open Sea, 102–108. T. Kaizer, “The Near East in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods between Local, Regional and Supra-Regional Approaches,” SCI 22 (2003): 283–295, emphasized the importance of particular research on the various provinces and the contribution of this research to understanding the economy and society of the Roman East.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Introduction

11

Many economic actions include social considerations. Extending credit could include social ramifications that upgrade the status of the recipient of the credit. On the other hand, sometimes extending credit upgraded the status of the creditor. This would happen when extending credit brought with it an appreciation of the creditor in society or provided him with the social support of those who benefited from it.23 This kind of credit with social considerations (“social credit”) is found in rabbinic literature as well. The rabbis viewed providing credit as a religious obligation, something that Jews are supposed to do for each other much like they are supposed to give charity to the poor. Rabbinic exegesis says: Thou Lend Money to Any of My People. R. Ishmael says: Every “if” in the Torah refers to a voluntary act except this and two others. “And if thou bring a meal-offering of first fruits” (Lev. 2.14) refers to an obligatory act. You interpret it to be obligatory. … And so also here you interpret: “If thou lend money,” as referring to an obligatory act. You interpret it to be obligatory. Perhaps this [is] not so, but it is merely voluntary? Scripture however says: “Thou shalt surely lend him” (Deut. 15.8)—it is obligatory and not voluntary.24 Similarly, the Tosefta compares money given as a loan to money given as charity: R. Meir says, “He who borrows money from his fellow to purchase produce with it should not purchase utensils with it. [If he borrowed money for the purchase of] utensils, he should not buy produce with it, for he thereby deceives the lender.” R. Simeon b. Eleazar says in the name of R. Meir, “He who borrows money from the fellow to buy a shirt should not buy a cloak. [If he borrowed money to buy] a cloak, he should not buy a shirt, for he thereby deceives the lender.”25 The Toseftan passage cites two statements attributed to Rabbi Meir (140– 170 CE). Both statements relate to a loan that was taken for a specific use in 23 N. Tran, “The Economics of Solidarity: Mutual Aid and Reciprocal Services between Workers in Roman Cities,” in The Extra mercantile Economies of Greek and Roman Cities: New Perspectives on the Economic History of Classical Antiquity, ed. D. B. Hollander, T. R. Blanton, and J. T. Fitzgerald (London: Routledge, 2019), 130–145; Millett, Maritime Loans, 93–126. 24 Mekhilta de Rabbi Yishmael, Masekhet Kaspa, 19 (Lauterbach, 3:148). The actual Torah passage then continues on to mention the prohibition of usury. 25 T Megillah 1:5 (Neusner, 2:280).

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

12

Chapter 1

which the borrower could only use the money for a specific purpose, which is the one he specified to the lender. The first statement relates to a loan restricted to the purchase of fruit. The borrower may not buy vessels with the money because he would be cheating the creditor by so doing. The opposite is also prohibited. In the second, Rabbi Simeon son of Eleazar, Rabbi Meir’s disciple, adds, in latter’s name, that even if both things are from the same category—clothing—the borrower is not allowed to change from one kind of clothing to another. According to this source, Rabbi Meir sees loans as a form of charity that the lender is giving to the borrower. When one receives charity to buy food for the Purim feast, he may not use it for something else. Therefore, when money is lent for the purchase of food, one may not buy vessels with it.26 This is the rabbinic rationale behind the Torah prohibition of interest. There is an obligation in the Torah to help people when they are in need of a loan. Therefore, one may not charge money for granting it. 1.3

Sources and Methods

Early rabbinic literature in Palestine is divided into two periods. The first is the Tannaitic or Mishnaic period (70–220 CE). It was at the very end of this period that the Mishnah was compiled. In the following generation, around the year 250 CE, the Tosefta and Halakhic Midrashim (midrash roughly translating to “exegesis”) were redacted.27 The second is the Talmudic period, which 26 See S. Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, 10 vols (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1955–1988), Nezikin, 5:1131, lines 22–23. 27 There are also Tannaitic sayings, called beraytot, that were preserved, sometimes with changes, in Talmudic literature and that may only be used to get at the past if used critically. Regarding the redacting of the Tannaitic literature, see, for example, H. L. Strack and G. Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, trans. M. Bockmuehl (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992), 149–156, 169–177, 269–273; J. Neusner, Introduction to Rabbinic Literature (New York: Anchor Books, 1994), 97–98, 124–131, 249–250, 271–272, 305–306, 328–329; A. Goldberg, “The Mishna: A Study Book of Halakha,” in The Literature of the Sages, Part One, ed. S. Safrai (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1987), 1:211–262; idem, “The Tosefta: Companion to the Mishna,” in The Literature of the Sages, Part One, ed. S. Safrai (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1987), 1:283–302; S. Y. Friedman, “The Primacy of Tosefta to Mishnah in Synoptic Parallels,” in Introducing Tosefta: Textual, Intertextual and Intertextual Studies, ed. H. Fox and T. Meacham (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav, 1999), 99–121; M. I. Kahana, “The Halakhic Midrashim,” in The Literature of the Sages, Part One, ed. S. Safrai (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1987), 2:3–105, esp. 2:60–64 [Hebrew]; D. Kraemer, “The Mishnah,” CHJ 4 (2006): 299–315; P. Mandel, “The Tosefta,” CHJ 4 (2006): 316–335; and J. M. Harris, “Midrash Halacha,” CHJ 4 (2006): 336–368 n. 1.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Introduction

13

was a time in which there was literature compiled in study centers in Palestine and Babylon. The Jerusalem Talmud (JT) was edited in Palestine sometime around 400 CE, and the main body of the Babylonian Talmud (BT) was compiled around 500 CE. The BT absorbed additional material in the period of the Savoraim, which was from 500 until around 750 CE. The material from the BT reflects the development of Jewish society in Babylon in relation to the general contemporary culture.28 The approach taken here when analyzing the sources is historical and chronological. It involves the critical examination of each source in its historical context—that is, the time in which it was compiled. The Mishnah and Talmud were created with an internal chronological order, and critical reading enables one to compare the sources with their respective contexts. I will start with the Tannaitic literature, which consists of the earliest rabbinic documents known to us; I will then proceed to the concatenation of the laws throughout the Talmudic period, as reflected in the JT and BT, that were redacted two to three hundred years later. Naturally, the JT, which was redacted in Tiberias in Palestine, is closer in its spirit to the Tannaitic literature, though it too contains expansion, changes, and new issues that came up in later generations. The BT, which is larger and more comprehensive, and which was created in a different economic and political environment, reflects differences in rabbinic approaches, expansions on the rules, and many other kinds of additional rules and discussions. 28 S. Safrai, ed., The Literature of the Sages, Part One (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1987); S. Safrai et al. (eds.), The Literature of the Sages, Part Two (Assen: Van Gorcum, 2007); J. Neusner, A History of the Jews in Babylonia, Vols. I–V (Leiden: Brill, 1963–1970); idem, Introduction; Strack and Stemberger, Introduction, esp. 182–207; Y. Sussmann, “Ve-shuv le-Yerushalmi Neziqin,” Mehqerei Talmud 1 (1990): 55–133, esp. 101–111 and n. 197; Y. Elman, “The Other in the Mirror: Iranians and Jews View One Another: Questions of Identity, Conversion, and Exogamy in the Fifth-Century Iranian Empire (Part One),” BAI 19 (1) (2005): 15–25; idem, “The Other in the Mirror: Iranians and Jews View One Another. Questions of Identity, Conversion, and Exogamy in the Fifth-Century Iranian Empire (Part Two),” BAI 20 (1) (2010): 25–46; idem, “Middle Persian Culture and Babylonian Sages: Accommodation and Resistance in the Shaping of Rabbinic Legal Tradition,” in The Talmud and Rabbinic Literature, ed. C. E. Fonrobert and M. S. Jaffee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 165–197); idem, “Marriage and Marital Property in Rabbinic and Sasanian Law,” in Rabbinic Law and Its Roman Context, ed. C. Hezser (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 227–276; idem, “Acculturation to Elite Persian Norms and Modes of Thought in the Babylonian Jewish Community of Late Antiquity,” in Netiʾot Ledavid: Jubilee Volume for David Weiss Halivni, ed. Y. Elman, E. B. Halivni, and Z. A. Steinfeld (Jerusalem: Orhot, 2004), 31–56 [Hebrew]; and idem, “Returnable Gifts in Rabbinic and Sasanian Law,” Irano-Judaica 6 (2008): 139–184. Elman emphasizes the connection between Talmudic and Sasanian law.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

14

Chapter 1

It is not always possible to follow the chronological development of Jewish society in general and credit transactions in particular according to the Talmudic sources. Sometimes scientific scrutiny can help us understand the setting of various passages, but at other times certain passages cannot be dated at all, as they contain insurmountable contradictions and/or obscurities. When the BT cites opinions attributed to Babylonian sages, a common practice among scholars is to attribute them to the economic and social reality of Babylon. This is true even when the same quote appears in the JT. Nevertheless, statements found in the JT that relate to Babylon and do not have a parallel source in the BT require much more scrutiny, since the compilers of the JT were not familiar with the Babylonian world. This is true also in cases where the BT seeks to describe the situation in Palestine.29 On the other hand, it is important to remember that there was close contact between the Torah centers of Palestine and Babylon from the beginning of the Talmudic period at least until the middle of the fourth century CE. There are well-known sages that constantly traveled back and forth between the study centers in the two regions. In addition, some statements of the Amoraim in Babylon explain the words of the sages in Palestine or cite their statements in order to use them as a legal precedent.30 Therefore, in some cases it is possible to use quotes found in one Talmud to understand statements or discussions presented in the other.31 Much of the material concerning credit is found in the Mishnah and Talmud in the fifth chapter of tractate Bava Metzia. Some additional material is found in the first and ninth chapters. The parallel passages in chapters 4–6 of tractate Bava Metzia in the Tosefta also concentrate on credit- and usury-related issues. There are additional sources that are scattered throughout the Mishnah, 29 See Z. Safrai, The Economy of Roman Palestine (London: Routledge, 1994), 14–15. 30 See J. Schwartz, “Babylonian Commoners in Amoraic Palestine,” JAOS 101 (1981): 317–322; idem, “Aliyah from Babylonia during the Amoraic Period,” Cathedra 21 (1981): 23–30 [Hebrew]; I. M. Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia in the Talmudic Era: A Social and Cultural History (Jerusalem: Shazar Center, 1990), 76–81 [Hebrew]; L. I. Levine, The Rabbinic Class of Roman Palestine in Late Antiquity (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary Press, 2012), 6–7; and R. Kalmin, “Problems in the Use of the Babylonian Talmud for the History of Late-Roman Palestine: The Example of Astrology,” in Rabbinic Texts and the History of Late-Roman Palestine, ed. M. Goodman and P. Alexander (Oxford: British Academy, 2010), 165–183, esp. 168–180. 31 See, for example, Levine, Rabbinic Class, 3–7; A. Oppenheimer, “Battei Midrash in Babylon Prior to the Completion of the Mishnah,” in Yeshivot and Battei Midrash, ed. I. Etkes (Jerusalem: Shazar Center, 2007), 19–29 [Hebrew]; Y. Elman, “How Should a Talmudic Intellectual History Be Written? A Response to David Kraemer’s Responses,” JQR 89 (3–4) (1999): 361–386; R. Kalmin, Jewish Babylonia between Persia and Roman Palestine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 12–17, 177–178; and B. S. Cohen, The Legal Methodology of Late Nehardean Sages in Sasanian Babylonia (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Introduction

15

Tosefta, the Jerusalem and Babylonian Talmuds, the Halakhic Midrashim, and, to a certain extent, the Aggadic Midrashim. Identifying the relevant materials was a matter of developing criteria that could be used to define a source as relating to the topic of credit. I also used other sources concerning credit in the Roman and Sasanid worlds as comparanda so as to better flesh out he rabbinic sources. Scientific inquiry demands caution when extracting information from ancient texts. First, the most accurate reading of the text must be obtained by checking the various versions and manuscripts. In addition, it has to be taken into account that the source is a religious text, not a historical one. Jacob Neusner has argued that it is impossible to extract history from rabbinic texts because the rabbis operated in an ivory tower surrounded by their followers and because their writing is biased and intended to educate rather than to describe.32 Other scholars, however, maintain the opposite—it is possible to learn about historical reality from rabbinic literature, albeit with sufficient scientific criticism.33 And yet still other scholar have favored a third, 32 J. Neusner, In Search of Talmudic Biography: The Problem of the Attributed Saying (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984); idem, Reading and Believing: Ancient Judaism and Contemporary Gullibility (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), 21; idem, The Economics of the Mishnah (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), esp. 13; and idem, Introduction, xix–xxxi, 8–29, 97–98, 129–131, 153–155, 182–189. He did not consider Palestinian archeological research that shows that there is a solid historical background for rabbinic traditions. See also his discussion in “Aristotle’s Economics and the Mishnah’s Economics: The Matter of Wealth and Usury,” JSJ 21 (1) (1990): 41–59, where he concludes that the rabbis intended their laws for the rich, and see, in contrast, W. S. Green, “What’s in a Name? The Problematic of Rabbinic ‘Biography,’” in Approaches to Ancient Judaism: Theory and Practice, ed. W. S. Green (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978), 77–96; D. Kraemer, “On the Reliability of Attributions in the Babylonian Talmud,” HUCA 60 (1989): 175–190; and idem, The Mind of the Talmud: An Intellectual History of the Bavli (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), esp. 20–25. 33 Levine, Rabbinic Class, 3–7; S. Lieberman, Studies in Palestinian Talmudic Literature (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1991), 12–23 [Hebrew]; Safrai, The Economy, 3–15; idem, “Halakhic Observance in the Judaean Desert Documents,” in Law in the Documents of the Judaean Desert, ed. R. Katzoff and D. Schaps (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 205–236, esp. 217–221; D. Bar, “The Third Century Crisis in the Roman Empire and Its Relevance to Palestine during the Late Roman Period,” Zion 66 (2) (2001): 143–170, esp. 150–153 [Hebrew]. See the similar approaches taken by various researchers of rabbinic texts: S. Friedman, “A Critical Study of Yevamot X with a Methodological Introduction,” in Texts and Studies: Analecta Judaica I, ed. H. Z. Dimitrovsky (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary Press, 1977), 275–441; D. W. Halivni, “Contemporary Methods of the Study of Talmud,” JJS 30 (2) (1979): 192–201; Ch. Milikowsky, “The Status Quaestionis of Research in Rabbinic Literature,” in Rabbinic Texts and the History of Late-Roman Palestine, ed. M. Goodman and P. Alexander (Oxford: British Academy, 2010), 67–78; S. Stern, “Attribution and Authorship in the Babylonian Talmud,” JJS 45 (1) (1994): 28–51, esp. ns. 1–2; idem, “The Concept of Authorship

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

16

Chapter 1

compromising approach, which posits that the rabbis indeed exaggerated their status and influence over their surroundings but did so only in areas that were related to their rabbinic status. However, in areas of rabbinic literature that have to do with day-to-day life—the mundane, if you will—it is in fact possible to get at historical information.34 Here in this volume, I essentially take “a little from column b and a little from column c”: I believe that it is indeed possible to analyze rabbinic literature with a view to discovering some aspects of the economic reality that existed in the societies in which the rabbis lived. Granted, many of the details concerning credit, usury, and commercial transactions are indeed considered “ordinary” aspects of daily life. The sages present specific cases from their life experience (or that of others) and do not typically make theoretical statements that have no bearing on reality. It is logical that they describe cases that they experienced; conversely, it would be a stretch to think that they imagined cases that never existed. In addition, archeological findings from Palestine and the Roman Empire and papyri from Egypt provide evidence of loans and commercial transactions very similar to those discussed by the rabbis. This evidence confirms that rabbinic literature can indeed be a source for the socioeconomic history of the two above-mentioned periods of antiquity along with Philo, Josephus, the New Testament (NT), Roman law, and Greco-Roman literature. My aim here is to compile information on credit in the Babylonian Talmud,” JJS 46 (1–2) (1995): 183–195; S. Fine, Art and Judaism in the Greco-Roman World: Toward a New Jewish Archaeology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); idem, “Archaeology and the Interpretation of Rabbinic Literature: Some Thoughts,” in How Should Rabbinic Literature Be Read in the Modern World?, ed. M. Kraus (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2006), 199–217; and V. Noam, “Lost Historical Traditions: Between Josephus and the Rabbis,” in Sybils, Scriptures, and Scrolls: John Collins at Seventy, ed. J. Baden, H. Najman, and E. Tigchelaar (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 991–1017. 34 D. Goodblatt, “Towards the Rehabilitation of Talmudic History,” in History of Judaism: The Next Ten Years, ed. B. M. Boxer (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981), 31–44; R. Kalmin, Sages, Stories, Authors, and Editors in Rabbinic Babylonia (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1994), esp. 21–23, and n. 1; idem, “Rabbinic Literature of Late Antiquity as a Source for Historical Study,” in Judaism in Late Antiquity, ed. J. Neusner and A. J. Avery-Peck (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 187–199; idem, “The Formation and Character of the Babylonian Talmud,” in CHJ 4 (2006): 840–876; P. Schäfer, “Research into Rabbinic Literature: An Attempt to Define the Status Quaestionis,” JJS 37 (1986): 139–152; P. Schäfer and Ch. Milikowsky, “Current Views on the Editing of the Rabbinic Texts of Late Antiquity,” in Rabbinic Texts and the History of Late-Roman Palestine, ed. M. Goodman and P. Alexander (Oxford: British Academy, 2010), 79–82; Lapin, Civil Law, esp. 29; idem, Rabbis as Romans: The Rabbinic Movement in Palestine, 100–400 CE (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); D. Instone-Brewer, Traditions of the Rabbis from the Era of the New Testament, Vol. 1: Prayer and Agriculture (Grand Rapids, MI: Erdmans, 2004), 28–40; and C. Hezser, The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement in Roman Palestine (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 1–44, summarize the variety of scholarly opinions on the subject.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Introduction

17

gleaned mainly from rabbinic sources and distill that information by placing it in the context of economic procedures that existed in Roman and Byzantine Palestine, namely, those procedures that took place between lenders and borrowers, and vendors and purchasers. The difficulty of extracting history from religious, legal, and literary sources applies to other texts from the periods under discussion as well.35 Take, for example, Roman law. Do Roman laws represent cases that actually took place or are they merely theoretical? Were they a specific response to a real problem, or just a matter of ensuring order and stability? To what extent is it possible to learn facts about Roman life and the Roman Empire from legal sources?36 The accepted approach to this issue is that even though Roman law consisted of texts compiled by jurists, and that as a body of texts formally developed independently of the latter’s immediate social, economic, religious, and cultural surroundings, it does indeed represent information that can be used with due caution. In order to make sure that the specific information can be understood to correspond with historical reality, it is necessary to compare it with other sources—that is, any available epigraphic, archeological, and literary evidence.37 35 P. Alexander, “Using Rabbinic Literature as a Source for the History of Late-Roman Palestine: Problems and Issues,” in Rabbinic Texts and the History of Late-Roman Palestine, ed. M. Goodman and P. Alexander (Oxford: British Academy, 2010), 7–24, esp. 17–20, briefly addresses the difficulty of extracting historical information from ancient literature such as Greco-Roman law, the New Testament, and rabbinic law. 36 See A. Watson, The Spirit of Roman Law (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995) and the deliberations of J. D’Arms, Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 97–120, regarding whether the released slave Trimalchio, who is mentioned in the Satyricon from the first century CE that is ascribed to the Roman author Petronius, was a real historical figure or whether he was simply made up. D’Arms is convinced that there was such a figure, attributing to the book a “historical nucleus,” and he uses it as an example in various contexts in his book. 37 See B. Sirks, “Conclusion: Some Reflections,” in SPECVLVM IVRIS: Roman Law as a Reflection of Social and Economic Life in Antiquity, ed. J. J. Aubert and B. Sirks (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 169–181; J. J. Aubert, “Conclusion: A Historian’s Point of View,” in Ibid, 182–191, esp. 182–186; B. W. Frier and D. P. Kehoe, “Law and Economic Institutions,” in The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, ed. W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. Saller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 113–143; D. P. Kehoe, “Roman Economic Policy and the Law of Contracts,” in Obligations in Roman Law: Past, Present, and Future, ed. T. A. J. McGinn (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012), 189–214; idem, “Contract Labor,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy, ed. W. Scheidel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 114–131 esp. 115–116; S. A. Stertz, “Appendix: Roman Legal Codification in the Second Century,” in The Mishnah in Contemporary Perspective, ed. A. J. Avery-Peck and J. Neusner (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 149–164; D. Johnston, Roman Law in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

18

Chapter 1

It is therefore necessary to differentiate between Roman law as it is presented in the various juridical texts and how it was actually implemented in the provinces (in our case, those of the Roman Near East). The Romans allowed the peoples in the provinces to continue to live according to their traditional law. However, as time passed Roman law and the power of the local governor influenced local practice and local law. When there were conflicts or contradictions between the local law and Roman law, the latter prevailed. Roman law was implemented differently in each province, depending on the people involved and the specific local circumstances.38 Niklas Luhmann has proposed a new sociological approach to defining the nature of law and its relation to the society in which it was compiled. He posits that legislation is a result of long-term processes that develop through several generations, which are responses to economic and social events that took place at various points during this long period. Therefore, Roman laws reflect the conditions in the Empire many years before they were written down

University Press, 1999), 131; O. F. Robinson, The Sources of Roman Law: Problems and Methods for Ancient Historians (London: Routledge, 1997), 102–130; R. Macmullen, Changes in the Roman Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 56–67; and R. Fiori, “Contracts, Commerce and Roman Society,” in The Oxford Handbook of Roman Law and Society, ed. P. J. Du Plessis, C. Ando, and K. Tuori (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 581–595, esp. 591–592. See also F. Schultz, Classical Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), esp. 404–405. One approach that limits the historical validity of Roman law is known as “cultural history” or the “history of ideas.” This approach posits that law reflects the approaches and ideas of the legislators and learned members of society and does not reflect the real situation of general society; see D. Johnston, The Cambridge Companion to Roman Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 9–17. A more expansive approach finds that ancient Eastern ideas had an influence on the foundations of Roman law. See R. Westbrook, Ex Oriente Lex: Near Eastern Influences on Ancient Greek and Roman Law, ed. D. Lyons and K. Raaflaub (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), esp. 146–180, and see Aubert, “Conclusion,” 188, who highlighted Roman edicts that applied specifically to conditions in each place and that therefore related only to that locale. 38 Bang, The Roman Bazaar, 175–190. This is seen in the local law that was uncovered in Spain. See J. Gonzales, “The Lex Irnitana: A New Copy of the Flavian Municipal Law,” JRS 76 (1986): 147–223; J. S. Richardson, “The Tabula Contrebiensis: Roman Law in Spain in the Early First Century B.C.,” JRS 73 (1983): 33–41; and F. B. Lloris, “An Irrigation Decree from Roman Spain: ‘The Lex Rivi Hiberiensis,’” JRS 96 (2006): 147–197, esp. 172, 184. A. Z. Bryen, Violence in Roman Egypt: A Study in Legal Interpretation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 44–48, 203–207, presents similar procedures in Egypt. See also J. Bauschatz, Law and Enforcement in Ptolemaic Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 43–46 and n. 149; and G. Mousourakis, The Historical and Institutional Context of Roman Law (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2003), 157–159, 237–278, 336–347.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Introduction

19

and promulgated. Laws, then, do reflect real-life conditions and are not merely theoretical constructions compiled by the jurists.39 The problem applies to the New Testament as well: it is theological and not a historical work. Here too one can ask whether the events mentioned in it are historical facts, and whether or not their retellings are accurate. There is a great of debate about these issues. Some scholars posit that one can learn history from the NT if the text is understood within its Roman context and other kinds of sources (like those mentioned above: epigraphic, archeological, and literary). The scholars involved in the various iterations of so-called “Quest for the Historical Jesus” espouse this approach (though they are not the only ones to do so and there are many other issues of historical reconstruction being debated).40 Other scholars, however, argue that little real history can be 39 N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, trans. E. King and M. Albrow, ed. M. Albrow (London: Routledge, 1985), esp. 236–243; H. L. E. Verhagen, “The Evolution of Pignus in Classical Roman Law Ius Honorarium and Ius Novum,” The Legal History Review 81 (2013): 51–79. This is also indicated in A. M. Riggsby, Roman Law and the Legal World of the Romans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Throughout the book, he emphasizes that Roman law was a result of precedents from public jurisdiction. On loans, see, for example, 133, 245–247, 251. See also F. Lerouxel and M. R. Greer, “The Private Credit Market, the Bibliotheke Enkteseon, and Public Services in Roman Egypt,” Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales 67 (4) (2012): 629–659, esp. 643–645 and ns. 40–42. 40 E. M. Meyers, “Jesus and His Galilean Context,” in Archaeology and the Galilee, ed. D. R. Edwards and C. T. McCollough (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 57–66; J. J. Meggitt, Paul, Poverty and Survival (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998); J. P. A. Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus, Vol. 1: The Roots of the Problem and the Person (New York: Doubleday, 1991); H. Moxnes, “The Construction of Galilee as a Place for the Historical Jesus, Part II,” BTB 3 (2001): 64–77; A. J. Levine, D. Allison, and J. D. Crossan, The Historical Jesus in Context (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); G. Theissen, “Historical Skepticism and the Criteria of Jesus Research: My Attempt to Leap Over Lessing’s Yawning Gulf,” JTS 49 (2) (1996): 146–175; G. Theissen and D. Winter, The Quest for the Plausible Jesus: The Question of Criteria, trans. M. E. Boring (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 2002); S. Porter, “Luke 17:11–19 and the Criteria for Authenticity Revisited,” JSHJ 1 (2) (2003): 201–224; P. Foster, “Educating Jesus: The Search for a Plausible Context,” 9 JSHJ 4 (1) (2006): 7–33; and J. H. Charlesworth, “The Historical Jesus and Christians Origins: Reflections on Methodologies for Future Jesus Research,” Henoch 27 (1–2) (2005): 35–51. See, for example, E. P. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism (London: SCM Press, 1985); F. Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles: A Sociological Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), esp. 177–181; J. D. Crossan, The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991); J. D. Crossan and J. L. Reed, Excavating Jesus: Beneath the Stones, Behind the Texts (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2001); M. A. Chancey, The Myth of a Gentile Galilee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); R. A. Horsley, Jesus and Empire: Kingdom of God and the New World Disorder (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003); S. Freyne, Jesus, a Jewish Galilean: A New Reading of the Jesus Story (London: T&T Clark International, 2004); J. H. Charlesworth, ed., Jesus and Archaeology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006); idem, “Background I: Jesus of History and the

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

20

Chapter 1

derived from the books of the NT, generally arguing that ideology, theology, and literary considerations make it nigh impossible to get “behind the text.”41 As with Roman law and rabbinic literature, I take an approach to early Christian literature that is premised on the possibility of recovering factual information from the past. In this volume, I look to various studies examining the social history of the early Christ movement as a launching point to examine the socioeconomic history of Jewish society in Roman Palestine and Sasanid Babylon.42 Since the early Christians movement was an outgrowth of Jewish society, studies of early Christian society can assist in the research of Jewish society in Roman Palestine.43 The essential social conditions that are Topography of the Holy Land,” in Handbook for the Study of the Historical Jesus, Vol. 3, ed. T. Holmén and S. Porter (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 2213–2242; and J. Marshall, Jesus, Patrons and Benefactors: Roman Palestine and the Gospel of Luke (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), esp. 11–23. Representative studies of the social context of early Christians are D. C. Duling, “The Jesus Movement and Social Network Analysis (Part I: The Spatial Network),” BTB 29 (4) (2000): 156–175; B. J. Malina, The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology, 3rd ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001); W. A. Meeks, “Social and Ecclesiastical Life of the Earliest Christians,” CHC 1 (2006): 146–150; D. G. Horrell, Social Scientific Approaches to New Testament Interpretation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999); S. Guijarro, “Domestic Space, Family Relationships and the Social Location of the Q People,” JSNT 27 (1) (2004): 69–81; W. Stegemann and B. J. Malina, The Social Setting of Jesus and the Gospels (Grand Rapids, MI: Fortress Press, 2002); F. D. M. Derret, Law in the New Testament (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2005); T. J. M. Ling, The Judaean Poor and the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Oakman, “Agrarian Palestine”; and idem, “Peasant.” 41 T. Holmén, “Doubts about Double Dissimilarity: Restructuring the Main Criterion of Jesus-of-History Research,” in Authenticating the Words of Jesus, ed. B. Chilton and C. A. Evans (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 47–80. For introductions to the New Testament, see H. Koester, Introduction to the New Testament, 2 vols (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975); J. M. G. Barclay and J. Sweet, Early Christian Thought in Its Jewish Context (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); B. D. Ehrman, The New Testament: A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); and A. E. Harvey, A Companion to the New Testament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). On Q, see L. Vaage, Galilean Upstarts: Jesus’ First Followers According to Q (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1994); B. L. Mack, The Lost Gospel: The Book of Q and Christian Origins (Shaftesbury, UK: Element, 1993); and R. E. Brown, The Gospel According to John (I–XII) (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1996). 42 Representative studies of the social context of early Christians are Duling, “The Jesus Movement”; Malina, New Testament World; Meeks, “Social and Ecclesiastical Life”; Horrell, Social Scientific Approaches; Guijarro, “Domestic Space”; Stegemann and Malina, Social Setting; Derret, Law; Ling, Judaean Poor; Oakman, “Agrarian Palestine”; and idem, “Peasant.” 43 S. Mason, Josephus and the New Testament, 2nd ed. (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003), esp. 85–150, 185–225; idem, Josephus, Judea, and Christian Origins—Methods and Categories, with the editorial assistance of M. W. Helfield (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Introduction

21

reflected in early Christian social research were similar after the destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE. The Jewish population in Galilee that supplies most of the data in this regard remained much the same during this period, since it was not affected to any great extent by the Great Revolt. Therefore, it is possible, with care, to use theories presented by researchers of early Christianity to explain and define Jewish society in Roman Galilee as well. In addition, Christian archeological research can assist in the effort to learn about Jewish society in the Roman Empire.44 The conclusion from the above discussion of the available sources is that these sources should be read carefully, avoiding the pitfall of logical positivism. Ancient authors had their own agendas, were often discussing or presenting theological or legal issues, and not engaged in historical writing: they did not have a modern journalistic duty to present the facts and divorce themselves as much as possible from applying an ideological frame on them. One cannot merely argue that prima facie the information reflects historical reality. However, researchers have not refrained from drawing historical knowledge from them using various methods. This book as well will study the ancient sources from the periods under discussion in order to retrieve the socioeconomic information that is embedded in them. In this volume, I will also draw comparisons and contrasts from additional sources from the Roman world that will help clarify the use of credit in the empire. There are also sources from the Sasanid world that will help make sense of the material found in the Babylonian Talmud. Archeological findings in the vast Roman and Byzantine Empires, especially epigraphic material, shed light on the practices of credit in these two periods and the market conditions that created them. Epigraphic findings contain authentic cases and scenarios Publishers, 2009), 283–373. On the geographical and religious aspects, see J. Schwartz, Jewish Settlement in Judaea: After the Bar-Kochba War until the Arab Conquest, 135 C.E.–640 C.E. (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1986); S. S. Miller, Sages and Commoners in Late Antique Erez Israel: A Philological Inquiry into Local Traditions in Talmud Yerushalmi (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), index, s.v. “commoners.” Throughout the book, he describes the various social groups in Roman Palestine primarily in the Galilee. See also G. W. E. Nickelsburg, George W. E. Nickelsburg in Perspective: An Ongoing Dialogue of Learning, Vol. 2, ed. J. Neusner and A. J. Avery-Peck (Leiden: Brill, 2003), esp. 687–722. 44 In addition to the sources cited above, see N. T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), esp. 85–86; D. R. Edwards and C. T. McCollough, eds., Archaeology and the Galilee: Texts and Contexts in the Graeco-Roman and Byzantine Periods (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997); M. Cromhout, Jesus and Identity: Reconstructing Judean Ethnicity in Q (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2007); and J. Zangenberg, H. W. Attridge, and D. B. Martin, eds., Religion, Ethnicity and Identity in Ancient Galilee: A Region in Transition (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007).

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

22

Chapter 1

that often are not found in contemporary literature. In other cases, they shed some light on obscure rabbinic and/or legal texts. The comparison of similar cases from epigraphic and literary findings shows that the functions of money and credit were similar throughout the region and changed little over long periods of time. Epigraphic material that deals with credit comes from many countries and spans hundreds of years. It is difficult to compile a clear overall picture from them about how credit worked. The main source for this evidence is Egypt, which was in the southeastern corner of the Roman Empire, bordering Palestine from the south. In particular, many papyri have been uncovered there from the hundreds of years of Roman rule in the region. These papyri supply a great deal of information about credit.45 Other locations in the Roman Empire supply information about credit. The port city of Puteoli, not far from Pompeii in southern Italy, produced banking documents. The Tolsum Tablet was uncovered along the northern extent of the Lower Rhine in the modern-day Netherlands. The synagogue of Dura Europos on the west bank of the Euphrates, which served as a Roman outpost against the Sasanids, and which was destroyed by them ca. 256 CE, contains many epigraphic findings. New excavations and findings are continually adding additional pieces to the puzzle.46 It is known that the Roman Empire differed greatly from region to region. On the other hand, the Roman administration tried to enforce uniform regulations throughout the Empire. It is therefore possible to use comparison from area to area to help understand phenomena that need clarification. This is also true when it comes to time. In the ancient world, changes to the economy and economic practice were slow, so it is possible to compare conditions in the early Roman period to that of the middle Roman period by assuming that common practices and social institutions continued from one period to the next more or less unchanged and by tracing any 45

46

For verification of the comparison between the two countries, see D. Sperber, “Costs of Living in Roman Palestine,” JESHO 8 (3) (1968): 248–271. He showed that, in the third and fourth centuries, the prices in Palestine and Egypt were similar. He posited that this was true for other countries in the Roman Near East as well. See De Ligt, Fairs and Markets, 3. On the epigraphic information, see E. A. Meyer, “Epigraphy and Communication,” in The Oxford Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World, ed. M. Peachin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 191–226, n. 2; and A. Jördens, “Communicating with Tablets and Papyri,” in The Oxford Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World, ed. M. Peachin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 227–247. On Tolsum, see A. K. Bowman, R. S. O. Tomlin, and K. A. Worp, “Emptio Bovis Frisica: The ‘Frisian Ox Sale’ Reconsidered,” JRS 99 (2009): 156–170; and W. J. Zwalve, “Exit Bos Frisica: The Tolsum Tablet and Roman Law,” The Legal History Review 77 (3–4) (2009): 355–366.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

23

Introduction

changes that did occur as they reported or recorded in the relevant sources.47 Sometimes, of course, it is difficult to bridge the gap between two or more sources from distant areas and or time periods.48 In addition to the variety of ancient sourced listed above, I also make use of insights from such modern disciplines as geography, sociology, and anthropology. My aim in so doing is to create a holistic a picture of how credit operated in the ancient Roman and Sasanian worlds. And by creating such a comprehensive picture, I believe it is possible to raise new research questions about the ancient economy and about daily life in antiquity. 1.4

Previous Research, Manuscripts, and Editions

As stated above, there is no significant research on credit in Jewish society in Roman Palestine.49 This study is comprehensive and expands the discussion to new points in time and space. In addition to the Mishnaic period in Roman Palestine, the volume includes the Talmudic period in Byzantine Palestine and Sasanid Babylon. Nevertheless, subjects such as banking, which are discussed in other studies, are not discussed here in detail.50 47 See L. De Ligt, “Demand, Supply, Distribution: The Roman Peasantry between Town and Countryside: Rural Monetization and Peasant Demand,” MBAH 9 (2) (1990): 24–56, esp. 25–26. Regarding the difference between the various areas on the Mediterranean Sea, see Horden and Purcell, The Corrupting Sea. 48 For an expanded discussion of this point, see M. H. Crawford, “Money and Exchange in the Roman World,” JRS 60 (1970), 40–48; De Ligt, “Demand, Supply, Distribution I,” 25, 32; idem, “Demand, Supply, Distribution: The Roman Peasantry between Town and Countryside: Supply, Distribution and Comparative Perspective,” MBAH 10 (1) (1991): 33–77; and idem, Fairs and Markets, esp. 2–3. 49 There is a chapter on the subject in Menirav, Prakmatia, 170–210. 50 On banks and banking in Roman Palestine (trapezitis; shulchani), see A. Gulak, “The Money-Changer in Talmudic Law,” Tarbiz 2 (1931): 154–171 [Hebrew]; M. Goodman, State and Society in Roman Galilee AD 132–212 (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), 57–58; Lapin, Civil Law, 147–155; M. Aberbach, Labor, Crafts and Commerce in Ancient Israel (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1994), 65–66; B. Z. Rosenfeld and J. Menirav, Markets and Marketing in Roman Palestine (Leiden: Brill, 2005), index, s.v. “money-changer”; A. Shlasky, “Private Finance and Banking among Palestinian Jewry during the Late Second Temple, Mishnaic and Talmudic Periods (30 BCE–395 CE),” PhD diss., Bar Ilan University, 2010 [Hebrew], 2–4, 19–63, 162–163; and idem, “Trends in the Financial Activity of Palestinian Jews during the First Four Centuries C.E.,” Zion 80 (2015): 309–341 [Hebrew]. On the Babylonian Jewish trapezitis (shulchani), see Beer, Babylonian Amoraim, 217–219. On the Roman world, see C. Howgego, “The Supply and Use of Money in the Roman World, 200 BC to AD 300,” JRS 82 (1992): 1–31, esp. 29; Andreau, Banking, vii, 3, 30–46; idem, “Money Lending and Elite Financial Life in Rome,” in Roman Law and Economics: Volume II: Exchange,

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

24

Chapter 1

An indispensable source for locating rabbinic passages and quotations is the Responsa Project of Bar Ilan University in Ramat Gan,51 which enables one to conduct a sophisticated search of relevant source texts according to key words and phrases. In addition, when necessary, the original manuscripts containing these passages and quotations were consulted. Literary sources cited in this volume were transcribed from the appropriate scientific editions. Papyri as well are cited according to their official numbering, and the place(s) in which they were published is cited. The main sources for this research are rabbinic documents that were transcribed from respected academic translations where available. The Mishnaic text follows Neusner’s translation excluding Mishnah Bava Metzia, which follows Hayim Lapin’s edition.52 The Tosefta as well follows Neusner’s translation. Halakhic exegesis is quoted according to the accepted translations for each individual source: for example, the Sifre to Deuteronomy (Sifre Devarim) passages follow Reuven Hammer’s edition, and the JT passages follow Heinrich Guggenheimer’s edition with occasional comparison to Neusner’s edition. The BT citations follow the Soncino edition. Some of the Aggadic exegesis has academic translations as well, and these are cited accordingly. However, when researching a specialized issue such as credit using texts in their original Hebrew, Aramaic, Latin, or Greek, one often discovers meaning in the text or nuances that are not contained in the existing translations. Therefore, when necessary, I will deviate from the translation cited in order to make it compatible with the exact meaning according to the original

Ownership, and Disputes, ed. G. Dari-Mattiacci and D. P. Kehoe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 81–111, esp. 88–98; Temin, “Financial Intermediation,” 705–711, 719–727; D. Jones, The Bankers of Puteoli: Finance, Trade, Industry in the Roman World (Gloucestershire, UK: Tempus Publishing, 2006); P. Van Minnen, “Money and Credit in Roman Egypt,” in The Monetary System of the Greeks and Romans, ed. W. V. Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 226–241, esp. 236; and Millett, Maritime Loans, 197–217 (the classical era). On Egypt, see Bagnall, Egypt, 58–59; W. V. Harris, “The Late Republic,” in The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, ed. W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. Saller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 511–539, esp. 513; S. Von Reden, Money in Ptolemaic Egypt: From the Macedonian Conquest to the End of the Third Century BC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 257–294; J. Bingen, Hellenistic Egypt: Monarchy, Society, Economy, Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 183–188, esp. 220; and B. Sirks, “Law, Commerce, and Finance in the Roman Empire,” in Trade, Commerce and the State in the Roman World, ed. A. I. Wilson and A. K. Bowman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 53–116, esp. 95–109. 51 The Responsa Project is available at https://www.biu.ac.il/en/about-bar-ilan/jewish-herit age/responsa-project. 52 Lapin, Civil Law, esp. 265–280, as well as all of chapters 4 and 5.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Introduction

25

source language. I made sure to pay special attention to possible different (i.e., variant) readings of the text and different manuscripts that have different wording, which of course changes the meaning. Comments concerning the possible readings of the text in translation or the various manuscript versions are provided in the notes and, when necessary, are incorporated into the text. When the translation from Neusner is changed, for example, it will say “after Neusner,” indicating that the translation had to be altered due to the considerations I just mentioned. Inasmuch as the translations come from various translators, there could not be uniformity in the transliteration of places, people, and terms of art, since the same word may be cited from one translator in one place, and from another in another place. One translator may understand a phrase in one way, and a translator of a different source may understand the same phrase differently. This is commonplace in the translation of rabbinic sources. Also, foreign terms (e.g., peruta, zuz, maneh, sela, seʾah, and kor) are presented in italics in source quotations for the purposes of readability and consistency with main text. Another caveat is in order. The terms “Mishnah” and “Tosefta” often refer to the respective collections of texts, but they can also be used to describe a specific passage or specific passages in these texts. M BM 1, for example, is a Mishnah, but it is also a passage located in the Mishnah. I am confident that the context will help the reader know in which sense I am using these terms. As can be seen from the bibliography, this volume makes extensive use of academic research. This is necessary because credit was an important part of the economy in all parts of the Roman Empire and the Sasanid Empire in which the Jewish sources were redacted. In order to understand the Jewish sources, it is necessary to use interdisciplinary methods from studies of Roman and Sasanid credit as well as adjacent issues in social and economic research. 1.5

The Structure of the Book

The chapters of this book are divided according to the general and specific aspects of the research topic. The present chapter, Chapter 1, is the introduction to the volume, and, as such, it deals with the historical background of the sources, the objectives of the volume, the methodology used in the volume, and the division of its chapters. Chapter 2 surveys the system of credit in the Roman and Sasanid worlds. It shows that credit was prevalent in all walks of society from the Caesar himself down to the slaves. It discusses interest rates, the wish to limit them, and the attempts made to prevent the collection of interest completely.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

26

Chapter 1

Chapter 3 discusses credit in Jewish society, tracing its evolution from the Torah prohibition against charging interest, through the Second Temple period, until the compilation of the Mishnah. This prohibition created innovative ways to extract benefits for creditors without blatantly transgressing the prohibition. Chapters 4–7 present four forms for issuing credit: “money for money,” “money for fruit,” “fruit for money,” and “fruit for fruit.” The basis for this division is the Mekhilta de Rabbi Yishmael, which presents the various types of credit and advises on whether one should engage in such transactions: “If you shall lend money for money, you lend, but you do not lend fruit for fruit. Money for money you lend, but you do not lend money for fruit and fruit for money.”53 The source mentions four kinds of loans: “money for money,” “money for fruit,” “fruit for money,” and “fruit for fruit.” The term “fruit” in rabbinic literature usually relates to the fruit of trees54 and sometimes wheat or grain,55 and, in rare cases, to other forms of food that do not come from the plant world, and more abstractly, they can refer to the profit or benefit (like when we say in modern parlance that something was “fruitful”).56 In the Talmudic period as well, the situation was similar. In rare cases, the word “fruit” may relate to items such as gold and silver, which are not food at all.57 Henceforth, the term “fruit” will be taken in the widest sense possible, because in exchanges of goods all objects can be involved. The essential cases for most of the categories do not appear in the sources. The discussions concern various details and developments that were examined in various generations. Generally, the basic case can be derived from 53 Mekhilta de Rabbi Yishmael, Masekhet Kaspa, 19 (Horowitz-Rabin ed., 315). There are small differences between the various manuscripts of this exegesis. See M. I. Kahana, The Geniza Fragments of the Halakhic Midrashim, Part One (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2005), 129–130 [Hebrew]. 54 S. Friedman, Talmud Arukh BT Bava Metzia VI, Vol. 1 (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1990), 295–297 [Hebrew], prefers to explain “fruit” as wheat. Statistically, however, the term “fruit” more often refers to the fruit of trees. 55 See, for example, M. BM 4:19, 5:1; T. Demai 6:5; and Mekhilta de Rabbi Yishmael, Masekhet Nezikin, 14 (Horowitz-Rabin, 296). 56 See, for example, M. Berakhot 6:1, where under the heading of “fruit” the Mishnah discusses vegetables, bread, and wine as well. See also M. BM 3:7; M. BB 5:3; and M. Shavuot 6:3. For the term “fruit” meaning “profit” or “benefit,” see M. Peah 1:1; M. BB 3:1; and T. Peah 1:3, 4:18. 57 BT BM 44a–46a, 109b. JT BM 4:1 (9c) reads “like fruit.” It is possible to derive that they are related to gold and silver as “fruit,” but this is doubtful. On “fruit for fruit,” see the last chapter of D. Sperber, Roman Palestine 200–400: Money and Prices, 2nd ed. (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1991).

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Introduction

27

the complex cases discussed by the sources. Exposing the basic cases shows that the rabbis extended the prohibition against lending for interest to any form of “profit from waiting,” which is when the lender of money profits from letting someone else hold on to his money. This includes also forms of silent partnerships in which someone is investing money and the other his labor, as well as sales in which the exchange is delayed and is therefore not an example of the above-mentioned “cash and carry” transaction. It seems that the sages assumed that their audiences did not require instruction on the basic cases because they were familiar with them. Some of the cases occupied the rabbis in some generations and were omitted in others, while others were discussed and developed in the Talmudic period as well as in the Mishnaic period in Babylon and in Palestine. In effect, most of the cases discussed in the context of interest in the fifth chapter of Bava Metzia involve the forms “fruit for money,” “money for fruit,” and “fruit for fruit.” There is little discussion of money for money because when money (cash) is involved it is very clear whether there is interest or not. The price of merchandise fluctuates, however, and therefore there are many cases where the presence of interest in uncertain. In order to simplify the decision of whether or not a given transaction falls under the prohibition of interest, the rabbis wished to convert all loans to “money for money,” so as to be able to decide whether an interest component was present. Chapter 4 deals with the most common form of credit, “money for money,” which is lending money against a proposed date for the return of the loan. It deals with the topic of usury—namely, excessive interest in money loans—and continues to show how creditors found ways to derive benefit from extending the loan without the profit they stood to gain being defined as interest. It also discusses the important issue of currency devaluation. Chapter 5 deals with “money for fruit.” This kind of transaction occurs when money is paid in cash in exchange for goods that will be supplied in the future. The parties involved usually consider this a “sale” and not a “loan.” The sources call this transaction pesiqa: the buyer pays the entire sum in advance to be supplied with the merchandise at an agreed-upon time in the future. The chapter discusses a number of cases in which the rabbis consider this kind of transaction as containing prohibited interest, and it looks at the importance of the official rate (shaar) as a means of allowing such transactions to take place. Chapter 6 deals with “fruit for money”; this is the opposite case. The merchandise is provided immediately, but the money is paid later. This is also known as “sale on credit.” These are small transactions like buying food at the local store and paying later, as well as large ones like buying a field or a house.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

28

Chapter 1

In this form, the two sides tried to present the transaction as a partnership to avoid being blamed for the payment of interest. Nevertheless, the rabbis imposed limitations on these kinds of transactions as well. Chapter 7 deals with “fruit for fruit”; this is an exchange transaction in which goods are supplied at the time of the transaction in return for goods of an equivalent value of goods to be provided at some later point in time. Such transactions happened (and still happen) all the time: one neighbor supplied an object needed by the other in order to receive in the future an object he would need at that time. There are also large-scale transactions in which one party supplies the other with harvest from their field in return for a similar amount of fruit in the future.58 In the sources, these transactions are called seʾah beseʾah or hittin behittin (‫ חיטין בחיטין‬,‫)סאה בסאה‬: “wheat for wheat” or “a measure (of wheat) for a measure (of wheat).” Chapter 8 discusses rabbinic attitudes toward those engaged in lending for interest. It cites statements and warnings issues by the rabbis to the parties involved, especially to those who are most responsible—be they the lenders, borrowers, scribes, or witnesses. It then discusses the legal sanctions that the rabbis imposed on those who lent for interest, disqualifying their testimony in rabbinic courts. Finally, it examines the rulings of the rabbinical courts when loan documents containing interest were brought before them, and how they related to the requests of borrowers who paid interest to have their money returned. Chapter 9 presents my conclusions about the nature of credit as well as the conceptual and cultural insights that one can glean therefrom. These conclusions are relevant to researchers of antiquity, as they impact other social and economic aspects of Jewish society in particular and the Roman world more broadly. Following the conclusions, there is an epilogue that raises some additional issues that can be learned from the above research into the nature of credit, loans, and usury in antiquity that can help us better understand the rabbis’ view of the economies in which they operated. 58

In this case, the object given is to be consumed and a different object returned. This is not sheela (‫)שאלה‬, in which the object itself is returned to the lender.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Chapter 2

Credit in Rome and Persia 2.1

Credit in the Roman World

Credit transactions were prolific in the Roman economy. Romans were constantly taking out loans, both short-term and long-term, and both commercial and domestic. They were the fuel, as it were, of survival, progress, and enterprise. The Roman historian Tacitus wrote the following on the importance of loans and interest in Roman society: “In truth, the practice of making loans at interest was a perennial problem in Rome, and a frequent cause of sedition and strife” (Sane vetus urbi faenebre malum et seditionum discordiarumque creberrima causa; Tacitus, Annales 6.16.1). Many surveys of the economic history of the Greek and Roman world have painted a picture of slow economic development. The use of coins that began in Athens in the sixth century BCE catalyzed the gradual expansion of the economy.1 The conquest of the East by Alexander the Great in the last third of the fourth century BCE enabled the deepening of contacts between the various provinces of his Macedonian empire. A continuation of this phenomenon of communication and commerce resulted from the gradual Roman conquest of the area from the second half of the second century BCE to the middle of the first century BCE. Later, after the establishment of the Roman Empire in the time of Augustus (27 BCE), the Roman Empire would reach its zenith in terms of its geographic reach. Its economic and commercial activities involved the entire civilized world at that time, from England in the west, through the entire Mediterranean basin, to India, and China in the east and from Germany in the north, through Greece and the Balkans, to North Africa and Egypt in the south.2 1 See Manning, The Open Sea, 109–134; Harris, “The Late Republic,” 513; and Von Reden, Money in Classical Antiquity, 6, 102–104. 2 For the geography of Roman economic trade, see A. Kolb and M. A. Speidel, “Perceptions from Beyond: Some Observations on Non-Roman Assessments of the Roman Empire from the Great Eastern Trade Routes,” Journal of Ancient Civilizations 30 (2015): 117–149. For additional aspects of the varied economic contacts, see, for example, Z. Yavetz, The Common People (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1958), 63–78, 97–127 [Hebrew]; E. Lo Cascio, “State and Coinage in the Late Republic and Early Empire,” JRS 71 (1981): 76–86; idem, “Market Regulation and Transaction Costs in the Roman Empire,” in Trade, Commerce, and the State in the Roman World, ed. A. I. Wilson and A. K. Bowman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 117–132; Shatzman, History, 178–213, 268–281, 334–455, 502–534; Howgego, “Supply and Use of

© Ben Zion Rosenfeld, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004681965_003

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

30

Chapter 2

The development of the various branches of the economy created an increasing need for commercial credit to finance the growing volume of production and marketing; on the other hand, the expanding use of credit enabled the further growth of the economy through investments and the development of various parts of the ancient world.3 When the population in a specific geographic area grows, the size and number of production processes, the amount and size of businesses, and the volume of local monetary transactions all grow as well. Perpendicularly, the need also grows in such a situation for credit to enable the needed investment in raw materials and proper equipment, to transfer merchandise from the place of manufacture to the place of their sale, and to help consumers be able to afford to purchase various products. Nevertheless, the chain of vendors was simpler than it is nowadays.4 David Reece posits that the production capabilities of countries ancient and modern depend on their awareness of the importance of advancing manufacture and on the will of their rulers or governments to invest tax money in advancing said production. On the other hand, it is important that there be workers that can use the available technology and equipment, and consumers who will buy the products.5 The need for credit arises also when a region or country is small or relatively underdeveloped such that it is not capable of manufacturing enough resources to meet the needs of its population and needs to import the necessary materials from other countries or regions. In this case, the credit is needed to finance Money”; C. Rosillo López, La Corruption à la fin de la République romaine (IIeme–Ier s. av. J.-C.): Aspects politiques et financiers (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2010), esp. 87–106, 207–226; E. Stein-Hölkeskamp, “Essen ohne Grenzen: Transfer und Transgression in Imperium Romanum,” Hermes 142 (2) (2014): 162–180; C. Holleran, Shopping in Ancient Rome: The Retail Trade in the Late Republic and the Principate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), index, s.v. “credit” (on the city of Rome); and B. Fischer Genz, “Roman Rule in the Near East,” in A Companion to the Archaeology of the Ancient Near East, ed. D. T. Potts (Oxford: Blackwell, 2012), 1021–1040. 3 W. V. Harris, “Credit-Money in the Roman Economy,” Klio 101 (1) (2019): 158–189; Andreau, “Money Lending.” See also G. Hamel, Poverty and Charity in Roman Palestine: First Three Centuries CE (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 156–161; W. V. Harris, Rome’s Imperial Economy: Twelve Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 155–187, 257–287; idem, “Credit-Money”; and Menirav, Prakmatia, 9–10. 4 K. L. Reyerson, Business, Banking and Finance in Medieval Montpellier (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1985), 40. She discusses the Middle Ages, but the situation was similar in the ancient world. 5 D. W. Reece, “The Technological Weakness of the Ancient World,” Greece and Rome 16 (1) (1969): 32–47, esp. 33–34; F. Schneider, “Technology,” in The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, ed. W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. Saller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 144–171.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit in Rome and Persia

31

the purchase of the needed goods and the land and/or sea transport of the merchandise across to the various markets. The availability of credit attracted merchants that needed to borrow in order to finance their transactions. In short, credit would speed up the economic growth in those locations where it was readily available.6 However, the case of the Roman Empire is somewhat unclear as there was a rather complex debate among scholars concerning the size and vitality of the Roman economy. One approach is that taken by Michael Rostovtzeff, who stated that the Roman economy had complex modes of manufacture compared to the level of technology of the time. He posited that there was economic interaction between manufacturers, marketers, and consumers on a local, regional, and international basis. The economy developed and increasingly became vibrant in the first centuries CE.7 Moses Finley and other researchers disagreed, claiming that economic activity in the Roman period was primitive and restricted. It was primarily agricultural and rural with small-scale manufacture and commerce, and commerce in any given product was largely restricted to the region in which the product originated.8 6 The island Delos was situated close to the Greek coast. It became a banking center, and many bankers and merchants settled there, representing their home countries and regions and conducting trade with their place of origin. These individuals used two languages: the language of their place of origin and that of the local Greeks. See J. N. Adams, Bilingualism and the Latin Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), esp., 642–645, 687–691 (on La Graufesenque in Gaul); N. K. Raugh, The Sacred Bonds of Commerce: Religion, Economy, and Trade Society at Hellenistic Roman Delos 166–87 BC (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1993), 254, 270, 277–283; P. Millett, Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 188–196; and L. P. Eberle and E. Le Quéré, “Landed Traders, Trading Agriculturalists? Land in the Economy of the Italian Diaspora in the Greek East,” JRS 107 (2017): 27–59, esp. 27–37. See also Harris, “Credit-Money” (the Roman Empire). 7 See M. I. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), esp. 1276–1288. 8 See M. I. Finley, “The Ancient City from Fustel de Coulanges to Max Weber and Beyond,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 19 (3) (1977): 305–327. His approach was developed in later versions of his book The Ancient Economy (2nd ed. [London: Chatto and Windus, 1985. Repr. With addendum and update, and a foreword by Ian Morris (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999)]), in which he responded to his critics. His theory relies on that of earlier sociologists, who suggested similar theories though not as developed. It is likely that he relied on Reece, “Technological Weakness,” 32–35, who stated that Roman manufacture was less developed than that of the Hellenistic period. Recently, A. Launaro, Peasants and Slaves: The Rural Population of Roman Italy (200 BC–100 AD) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 177–183, claimed there was a decrease in the percentage of cultivated land in Italy, especially in rural areas, from the second century BCE through the first centuries CE, and that this certainly affected manufacture and commerce. However, see K. Greene, “Technological Innovation and Economic Progress in the Ancient World:

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

32

Chapter 2

New evidence from archeology and papyrology that has accumulated in the last generation from various locations in the Roman Empire seems to contradict Finley’s model. This new evidence complements recent interdisciplinary research that used innovative methods to assess the size of the Roman economy based on calculations from the data that is currently available. It is still accepted that the Roman economy was “primitive” compared to our modern economy, but there is ample proof now that there was extensive manufacture and commerce in the Roman period—much more than any time previously.9 M. I. Finley Re-Considered,” Economic History Review 53 (1) (2000): 29–50. For a balanced summary of the issue, see Shatzman, History, 40–150. See also Verboven, “Attitudes to Work and Workers in Classical Greece and Rome,” TSEG 11 (1) (2014): 67–87, who shows that the debate on this subject started as early as the eighteenth century. 9 Hopkins, “Economic Growth”; idem, “Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire (200 BC–AD 400),” JRS 70 (1980): 101–125; K. Greene, The Archaeology of the Roman Economy (London: Batsford), 19; J. R. Love, Antiquity and Capitalism: Max Weber and the Sociological Foundation of Roman Civilization (London: Routledge, 1991), 93–98, 110–153; M. Corbier, “Coinage, Society and Economy,” CAH 12 (2005): 393–439; P. Temin, “A Market Economy in the Early Roman Empire,” JRS 91 (2001): 169–181; idem, “The Economy” (against Finley). See also P. Temin, The Roman Market Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), esp. ix–xi, 193–242. For criticism of Temin, see S. Von Reden, “The Roman Market Economy by Peter Temin (Review),” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 44 (4) (2014): 535–536; W. Scheidel and S. Von Reden, The Ancient Economy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002); W. Scheidel, “Approaching the Roman Economy,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy, ed. W. Scheidel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1–23, esp. ns. 1, 15, 16, 27; idem, “In Search of Roman Economic Growth,” JRA 22 (2009): 46–71; and Holleran, Shopping. The dispute relates to the question of whether there was significant growth in the Roman economy. However, the objection to Finley’s position is gaining support on the basis of archeological findings. See A. I. Wilson, “Indicators for Roman Economic Growth: A Response to Walter Scheidel,” JRA 22 (2009): 71–82; idem, “Saharan Trade in the Roman Period: Short-, Mediumand Long-Distance Trade Networks,” Azania: Archaeological Research in Africa 47 (4) (2013): 409–449; M. Silver, “Historical Otherness, the Roman Bazaar and Primitivism: P. F. Bang on the Roman Economy,” JRA 22 (2) (2009): 21–43; C. Lis and H. Soly, Worthy Efforts: Attitudes to Work and Workers in Pre-Industrial Europe (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 54–98; G. Poitras and M. Geranio, “Trading of Shares in the Societates Publicanorum?” Explorations in Economic History 61 (2016): 95–118; B. Arruñada, “How Rome Enabled Impersonal Markets,” Explorations in Economic History 61 (2016): 68–84; P. Erdkamp, “Economic Growth in the Roman Mediterranean World: An Early Good-Bye to Malthus?” Exploration in Economic History 60 (2016): 1–20; M. Flohr and A. I. Wilson, “Introduction,” in Urban Craftsmen and Traders in the Roman World, ed. A. I. Wilson and M. Flohr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1–22; idem, “Roman Craftsmen and Traders: Towards an Intellectual History,” in Urban Craftsmen and Traders in the Roman World, ed. A. I. Wilson and M. Flohr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 23–54, esp. 34–37, 43–44; A. I. Wilson and A. K. Bowman, “Introduction: Trade, Commerce, and the State,” in Trade, Commerce and the State in the Roman World, ed. A. I. Wilson and A. K. Bowman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 1–26; and X. Rubio-Campillo et al., “The Ecology of Roman Trade: Reconstructing Provincial Connectivity with Similarity Measures,” Journal

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit in Rome and Persia

33

Trade between the various regions of the Mediterranean Sea expanded consistently during the period under discussion, as well as the mobility of individuals and families, and the extension of credit was more frequent than previously thought and involved large sums of money.10 The Romans built many roads, and thereby created advanced infrastructure for commerce and transport compared to previous times. This spurred of Archaeological Science 92 (2018): 37–47. Regarding the fundamental differences between the ancient and modern economies, see N. Morley, Antiquity and Modernity (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 21–47. Additional insight can be found in Frier and Kehoe, “Law”; Schneider, “Technology”; and D. J. Mattingly, Imperialism, Power and Identity: Experiencing the Roman Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), esp. 125–141. 10 On various aspects of the integration of the Roman economy, see, for example, Temin, Roman Market Economy; idem, “The Contribution of Economics,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy, ed. W. Scheidel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 45–70; A. K. Bowman and A. I. Wilson, “Quantifying the Roman Economy: Integration, Growth, Decline?” in Quantifying the Roman Economy: Methods and Problems, ed. A. K. Bowman and A. I. Wilson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3–84; R. M. Geraghty, “The Impact of Globalization in the Roman Empire, 200 BC–AD 100,” JEH 67 (2007): 1036–1061, esp. 1053–1054; G. Bransbourg, “Rome and the Economic Integration of Empire,” Institution for the Study of the Ancient World (ISAW) Paper No. 3, 2012, http://doi.org/2333.1/280gb73f; P. Van Minnen, “Agriculture and the ‘Taxes-and-Trade’ Model in Roman Egypt,” ZPE 133 (2000): 205–220; J. C. M. Oliva, “Monetary Integration in the Roman Empire.” In P. L. Cottrell et al. (eds.), From the Athenian Tetradrachm to the Euro: Studies in European Monetary Integration. second printing. (London: Routledge, 2017), 7–23. Lerouxel and Greer, “Private Credit Market”; M. Flückiger et al., “Roman Transport Network Connectivity and Economic Integration,” Review of Economic Studies 89 (2) (2022): 774–810; and T. Brughmans, “Evaluating the Potential of Computational Modelling for Informing Debates on Roman Economic Integration,” in Complexity Economics: Building a New Approach to Ancient Economic History, ed. K. Verboven (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2021), 105–123. See also W. Scheidel, “ORBIS: The Stanford Geospatial Network Model of the Roman World,” Princeton Working Papers in Classics, 2015, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2609654. Among the 55,000 papyri that are recorded in the Heidlberger Gesamtverzeichnis der griechischen Papyrusurkunden Ägyptens (HGPA; see http://aquila.zaw.uni-heidelberg.de/start), there are about 2,000 that relate primarily to loans. See Palme, “Documentary Texts,” 388 and n. 28; R. Knapp, Invisible Romans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 22–23; B. Kelly, Petitions, Litigation, and Social Control in Roman Egypt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 123–127; R. Bogaert, Banques et banquiers dans les cités grecques (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1968); R. Bogaert, “Les documents bancaires de l’Égypte gréco-romaine et byzantine,” Anc. Soc. 31 (2001): 173–288. For credit in Roman Europe and Africa, see S. Mrozek, “Le fonctionnement des fondations dans les provinces occidentales et l’économie de credit á l’époque du Haut-Empire romain,” Latomus 59 (2) (2000): 327–345. For mobility in the Roman East, including Roman Palestine, see A. Zerbini, “Human Mobility in the Roman Near East: Patterns and Motives,” in Migration and Mobility in the Early Roman Empire, ed. L. De Ligt and L. E. Tacoma (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 305–344, esp. 317–321.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

34

Chapter 2

interregional and international commerce, and enabled the transport of various and varied products that could not be profitably transported previously. This new infrastructure led to a rise in the number of merchants and traders, which in turn brought about a phase of urbanization in which markets increased and became a focal point for commerce between cities and villages, cities and other cities, and cities and regions and foreign states. Merchants were able to specialize in a specific trade, since there was a large volume of manufacture and of commerce in many individual products.11 In this period, the credit industry also grew immensely even though not all the lenders would consider lending for interest to be their main occupation. Creditors in the Roman world included people of all levels of society from the emperor himself and down to the common worker. They not only lent money, but they borrowed money as well. In the Sasanid world as well, agriculture was the main industry and farmer the main occupation, but there were also many professions that existed and that were an inseparable part of the overall economy.12 11

12

See Finley, Ancient Economy, index, s.v. “debt,” “loan,” “money-lending”; D. Rathbone and P. Temin, “Financial Intermediation in First Century AD Rome and Eighteenth-Century England,” in Pistoi dia tèn technèn: Bankers, Loans and Archives in the Ancient World, ed. K. Verboven, K. Vandorpe, and V. Chankowski (Leuven: Peeters, 2008), 371–419; K. Verboven, K. Vandorpe, and V. Chankowski (eds.), Pistoi dia tèn technèn: Bankers, Loans and Archives in the Ancient World (Leuven: Peeters, 2008); D. B. Hollander, Money in the Late Republic (Leiden: Brill, 2007), index, s.v. “credit,” “debt,” “loan”; and Holleran, Shopping, 45–46. For a similar approach regarding the Roman world and Palestine, see Hamel, Poverty and Charity, 156–163. Hamel characterizes the Roman world as one in which most people were poor. The corollary to that conclusion would be that most peoples’ need for credit was minimal. See Rosenfeld and Perlmutter, Social Stratification, 91–115. For interest-bearing loans in the Roman Republic, see D’Arms, Commerce, 43–44, 102–108; S. Oakley, “The Roman Conquest of Italy,” in War and Society in the Roman World, ed. J. Rich and G. Shipley (London: Routledge, 1993), 9–38, esp. 19, 22, 26. Regarding additional provinces, see R. S. Bagnall, Hellenistic and Roman Egypt: Sources and Approaches (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006), chapter 6, no. 5; and H. E. Finckh, Das Zinsrecht der gräko-Ägyptischen Papyri (Nürnberg: W. Staudacher, 1962); and Temin, “The Economy.” Regarding professions in the Roman world, see Holleran, Shopping, 23–51, 194–231, index, s.v. “craftsman”; A. I. Wilson, “Urban Production in the Roman World: The View from North Africa,” PBSR 70 (2002): 231–273; and K. Ruffing, “Driving Forces for Specialization: Market, Local Factors, Productivity Improvements,” in Urban Craftsmen and Traders in the Roman World, ed. A. I. Wilson and M. Flohr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 115–131. On Roman roads, see B. Isaac, The Limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 427–435, index, s.v. “roads”; M. Rathmann, “Roads,” NP 12 (2008): 622–647; C. Hӧcker, “Roads and Bridges, Construction of,” NP 12 (2008): 647–653; L. Quilici, “Land Transport, Part I: Roads and Bridges,” in The Oxford Handbook of Engineering and Technology in the Classical World, ed. J. P. Oleson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 551–579; Bransbourg, “Economic Integration”; B. R. Hitchner,

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit in Rome and Persia

35

The Roman government itself was involved in large-scale import, specifically of wheat from Egypt, despite the healthy yields generated by local Italian farms.13 Most of the wheat was imported to Rome by ship. The Roman government did not own the ships that brought the wheat. Independent shipowners and wealthy investors signed agreements with the government every year for the transport of the wheat. It was a large, expensive, and risky enterprise; in the first century CE, there were annual celebrations when the fleet of ships with wheat arrived safely in Rome.14 Some scholars argue that the wheat shipped from Egypt in the first two centuries CE were in effect taxes on the Egyptian population that were paid in kind rather than in cash.15 Many types of merchandise “Roads, Integration, Connectivity, and Economic Performance in the Roman Empire,” in Highways, Byways, and Road Systems in the Pre-Modern World, ed. S. E. Alcock, J. Bodel, and R. J. A. Talbert (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2012), 222–234. On roads in Roman Palestine, see B. Isaac, “Infrastructure,” in The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine, ed. C. Hezser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 145–164. On professions in the Sasanid Empire, see R. N. Frye, “Commerce III: In the Parthian and Sasanian Periods,” in Encyclopedia Iranica VI.1, ed. E. Yarshater (London: Routledge, 1993); A. Panaino, “Commerce and Conflicts of Religions in Sasanian Iran between Social Identity and Political Ideology,” in Commerce and Monetary Systems in the Ancient World: Means of Transmission and Cultural Interaction, ed. R. Rollinger, C. Ulf, and K. Schnegg (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004), 385–401; T. Daryaee, Sasanian Empire: The Rise and Fall of an Empire (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 133–149; and Y. Elman, “Babylonian Jews at the Intersection of the Iranian Economy and Sasanian Law,” in The Oxford Handbook of Judaism and Economics, ed. A. Levine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 545–563. Some have posited that loans and interest were an important component in the fall of the Roman Empire. See M. S. Bozik, H. Tunali, and M. Ustaoglu, “Debt and Politics in Ancient Rome,” in A History of Interest and Debt: Ancient Civilizations, ed. M. Ustaoğlu and A. Incekara (London: Routledge, 2020), 59–69. 13 Reece, “Technological Weakness.” 14 Jones, The Bankers, 26–28. On financing sea commerce in the Mediterranean basin and the extensive use of credit from classical Greece through the Roman period, see V. Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 157–169; and E. E. Cohen, Athenian Economy and Society: A Banking Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), esp. 47. Cohen shows that the first author to distinguish maritime loans from land-based loans was the Greek philosopher Xenophon, who lived a generation before Aristotle. From his writing, it seems that the maritime interest rate was 1% a month, which was higher than the regular rate. See also P. Garnsey, Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 69–76, 139–140. 15 L. De Ligt, Peasants, Citizens, and Soldiers: Studies in the Demographic History of Roman Italy 225 BC–AD 100 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 30–31, index, s.v. “grain imports”; Holleran, Shopping, 23–24, 32–41; W. V. Harris, “Trade,” CAH 11 (2000): 710–740; Temin, Roman Market Economy, 97–113; A. Tchernia, The Romans and Trade, trans. J. Grieve with E. Minchin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), index, s.v. “trade,” regarding the importing of grain by Rome.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

36

Chapter 2

were transported by sea. A papyrus from the mid-second century CE mentions various goods shipped from Ashkelon (in Palestine) to Alexandria.16 Another papyrus describes the transport of various products including perfumes, ivory, and textiles from India to Alexandria.17 These sea merchants had to rely on a system of credit through which they could invest in renting or building ships, supply them with sailors, and pay for the merchandise purchased for transport. Since the capital needed for sea commerce was immense, partnerships were created that sometimes involved a number of merchants; sometimes the government was involved as well. In addition, the government lowered the risk by giving compensation to shipowners in the case of a shipwreck.18 Essentially, the responsibility for the cargo carried overseas belonged to the shipowner. However, he could share the responsibility and reduce his risks by taking a special loan that was referred to as “naval” or “shipping credit.” In the Roman East, it was called nautikos tokos (ναυτικὸς τόκος) and nautikon daneion (ναυτικὸν δάνειον). This type of loan can be traced to classical Greece.19 In the Roman period, its use expanded and proliferated. In the Latin Roman West, it was called pecunia traiecticia and, at a later stage nauticum faenus. Roman law recognized the importance of maritime trade, separating it from the rules and regulations pertaining to regular trade, specifically with regard to interest.20 The law stated that if a ship were lost at sea, the owner would not have to return the loan and could use it toward covering some of his losses 16 L. Casson, “New Light on Maritime Loans: P. Vindob G 19792 (= SB VI 9571),” in Studies in Roman Law in Memory of A. Arthur Schiller, ed. R. S. Bagnall and W. V. Harris (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 11–17. 17 L. Casson, “New Light on Maritime Loans: P. Vindob G 40822,” ZPE 84 (1990): 195–206, esp. 195, 202–206. 18 Jones, The Bankers, 170–171; Bang, The Roman Bazaar, 270–273, 280–282. 19 Cohen, Athenian Economy, 136–189; Millett, “Maritime Loans”; C. M. Reed, Maritime Traders in the Ancient Greek World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 34–46, 89–92; G. Thür, “Daneion,” NP 4 (2004): 77–78; S. Schuster, Das Seedarlehen in den Gerichtsreden des Demosthenes: mit einem Ausblick auf die weitere historische Entwicklung des Rechtsinstitutes: dáneion nautikón, fenus nauticum und Bodmerei (Berlin, Germany: Duncker und Humblot, 2005), esp. 24–43, 68–85, 175–202. 20 See D.22.2.1–6; D.14.1.4.pr-1 (Ulpianus); A. I. Wilson, “Developments in Mediterranean Shipping and Maritime Trade,” in Maritime Archaeology and Ancient Trade in the Mediterranean, ed. D. Robinson and A. I. Wilson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 33–59; C. Rice, “Mercantile Specialization and Trading Communities: Economic Strategies in Roman Maritime Trade,” in Urban Craftsmen and Traders in the Roman World, ed. A. I. Wilson and M. Flohr (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 97–114; and D. Rathbone, “Maritime Loans,” in OCD (2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199381135.013.3965; and F. De Romanis, The Indo-Roman Pepper Trade and the Muziris Papyrus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 193–206, 298–320.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit in Rome and Persia

37

on the lost cargo. If the ship docked safely, the loan would be returned to the investors even if the cargo arrived damaged or had to be sold at a lower price than anticipated (ut salva nave sortem cum certis usuris recipiam). Since these loans were high-risk, the interest rate was higher than regular loans, and the return of the loan was quick, usually about twenty days.21 Another kind of maritime loan defined the obligation of the owner to return the ship 200 days from the day of departure. When this period was over, he had to pay interest (post diem praestitutum et condicionem impletam). The reason for the 200-day wait was that the “sea was closed” between November and March due to the hazards of storms during these months (mare clausum).22 There were also loans that were given to a number of borrowers at the same time, as is shown in several Egyptian papyri. There were small groups of borrowers, two to five people, and large groups of ten to twenty. It seems that the former received private loans while the latter received loans from the government. An example is that sharecroppers working on government land were granted seeds for planting that would be returned when the new crop was 21 W. Ashburner, The Rhodian Sea-Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909. Repr. 2001), ccxiv; J. Rouge, Ships and Fleets of the Ancient Mediterranean (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1981), 17, 161–162, 185–186, 189; Hopkins, “Taxes”; D’Arms, Commerce, 105 and n. 39; H. Honsell, Quod Interest Im Bonae-fidei-iudicium: Studien Zum Römischen Schadensersatzrecht (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1969), 169–170; A. Watson and T. Mommsen, The Digest of Justinian, Vol. 2 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 643–644; H. W. Pleket, “Urban Elites and Business in the Greek Part of the Roman Empire,” in Trade in the Ancient Economy, ed. P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins, and C. R. Whittaker (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 131–144; J. P. Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 BC–AD 235) (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 180; D. Rathbone, “The Financing of Maritime Commerce in the Roman Empire, I–II AD,” in E. Lo Cascio (ed.), Credito e moneta nel mondo romano: atti degli Incontri capresi di storia dell’economia antica, Capri, 12–14 ottobre 2000 (Bari: Edipuglia, 2003, 197–229); C. Hezser, Jewish Travel in Antiquity (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 189–193; Jones, The Bankers, 92, 166, 180; N. Morley, “The Early Roman Empire: Distribution,” in The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, ed. W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. Saller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 570–591, esp. 587–588; G. Thür, “Hypotheken—Urkunde eines Seedarlehens für eine Reise nach Muziris und Apographe für die Tetarte in Alexandria (zu P.Vindob.G.40822),” Tyche 2 (1987): 229–245; Tchernia, Romans and Trade, index, s.v. “loans”; P. Candy, “Parallel Developments in Roman Law and Maritime Trade during the Late Republic and Early Principate,” JRA 33 (2020): 53–72, esp. 61 (development of Roman law). 22 The first is mentioned by Paulus (160–240 CE) in D.22.2.7 (see also C.4.33.2); the second is mentioned by Papinianus in D.22.2.4 and Cervidius Scaevola (second century) in D.45.1.122 pr., 122. There is an example of a maritime loan executed near Palestine in D.45.1.122 in the name of Roman jurist Cervidius Scaevola. It gives an example of a voyage from Beirut to Brindisi and the return trip to Beirut: “mercibus a Beryto comparatis et Brentesium perferendis et quas Brentesio empturus esset et per navem Beryto invecturus” (see also C.4.33.4, Salona to Africa).

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

38

Chapter 2

harvested.23 This category included loans to colonies that worked the emperor’s lands in the provinces. Although most credit in the Roman world involved males, there is evidence of women giving and receiving loans, and even of credit transactions in which both sides were women.24 Legally, the young Roman woman was under the authority of her father and, after marriage, her husband. The women’s prime occupation aside from running the household was spinning wool.25 Nevertheless, many sources portray women performing various occupations: weaving, dyeing, and commercial baking.26 There were also women involved 23 See, for example, U. Yiftach-Firanko, “P. Col. Inv. 131 Recto: A Loan Contract with ‘Paramone’ Provision from Mid-First Century CE Theadelphia,” JJP 40 (2010): 267–282, esp. 276–282; D. Rathbone, Economic Rationalism and Rural Society in the Third Century AD Egypt: The Heroninos Archive and the Eppianus Estate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 318–330, index, s.v. “credit.” Rathbone describes credit to groups in kind (mostly wine) as well as cash. For private commercial loans, see B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt (eds.), The Amherst Papyri: Being an Account of the Greek Papyri in the Collection of Lord Amherst of Hackney, Vol. 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1901), 60–61, P. No. L (two borrowers); 182, Pap. No. CL (five farmers paid two solidi, and were to supply fodder six months later); W. E. A. Cokle, “Repayment of Loan,” in Papyri Greek and Egyptian, ed. P. Turner (London: Egypt Exploration Society, 1981), 83–88; J. S. Kloppenborg and R. S. Ascough, Greco-Roman Associations Texts, Translations, and Commentary: Attica, Central Greece, Macedonia, Thrace (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 7–8; and P. Harland, Greco-Roman Associations. North Coast of the Black Sea, Asia Minor: Texts, Translations and Commentary (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), index, s.v. “debt,” “interest,” “loans.” On government loans to farmers for the purchase of seeds, see D. H. Samuel, “Application for a Loan of Seed,” in Collectanea Papyrologica: Texts Published in Honor of H. C. Youtie, I–II, ed. A. E. Hanson (Bonn: R. Habelt, 1976), 231–242; and M. Sharp, “The Village of Theadelphia in the Fayyum: Land and Population in the Second Century,” in Agriculture in Egypt from Pharaonic to Modern Times, ed. A. K. Bowman and E. Rogan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 159–192, esp. 159–172. 24 See, for example, J. Rowlandson, Women and Society in Greek and Roman Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 131–133, Pap. No. 17 (P. Kron.), from Tebtunis, September 140 CE; and Yiftach-Firanko, “Loan Contract,” 276–282. 25 Y. Thebert, “The Slave,” in The Romans, ed. A. Giardina (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 138–174, esp. 140; J. Andreau, “The Freedman,” in The Romans, ed. A. Giardina, 175–198, esp. 181–182; P. Jones and K. Sidwell, The World of Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 214–215, 227–229. 26 On the status of women in Egypt and their occupations from Hellenistic times onward, see Rowlandson, Women; J. P. Morel, “The Craftsman,” in The Romans, ed. A. Giardina, 214–244, 223–225; and De Ste Croix, Class Struggle, 98–101, 180–181, 234. S. Joshel, Work, Identity, and Legal Status at Rome: A Study of the Occupational Inscriptions (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 142, presents a list of professions of women primarily according to inscriptions on epitaphs. Sometimes they are partners with a man (husband?). See also S. Treggiari, “Lower-Class Women in the Roman Economy,” Florilegium 1 (1979): 65–86. This phenomenon can be seen in the Mishnah as well. See M Yevamot 15:2;

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit in Rome and Persia

39

in marketing: poor women and slaves would be involved in small-scale marketing, and wealthy women could be involved in initiating marketing and sales on a large scale. There were also middle-class or middling women that dealt with commerce, but it was not a commonplace occurrence.27 From epigraphic sources, one can see that, although commerce and credit were primarily male fields of activity, when women were involved, they were treated equally. However, the law required that these women have a man along with them, usually a relative, to act as a protector. Credit existed also within the domestic space. There were loans given by husbands to wives and vice versa. One papyrus from Egypt says that a husband borrowed seventy-two drachmas from his wife and promised to return the sum in five months.28 A document states that a Nabatean man borrowed money from his wife.29 Roman law as well devotes attention to women as lenders, and S. Safrai, “Home and Family,” in The Jewish People in the First Century, ed. S. Safrai and M. Stern (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1976), 728–792, esp. 761–764. 27 Regarding the occupations of women in Rome and other cities, see Holleran, Shopping, 227–228; Rowlandson, Women, 130–131, 231, 241, 259–260, 264–265; and L. Larsson-Lovén, “Women, Trade, and Production in Urban Centers of Roman Italy,” in Urban Craftsmen and Traders in the Roman World, ed. A. I. Wilson and M. Flohr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 200–221. There is an important cache of more than 120 wax tablets that was found recently, which contains financial contracts; among them were many promissory notes. The tablets are mostly from the first half of the first century CE, and some are from a later period. They belonged to the Sulpicii banker family of the middle class, which operated in Puteoli. See G. Camodeca, Tabulae Pompeianae Sulpiciorum: Edizione critica dell’archivio puteolano dei Sulpicii, 2 vols (Rome: Quasar, 1999), 1; K. Verboven, “The Sulpicii from Puteoli and Usury in the Early Roman Empire,” Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 71 (1–2) (2003): 7–28; and Jones, The Bankers, esp. 7. Some 24% of the documents involve females in the transactions. See E. Jakab, “Financial Transactions by Women in Puteoli,” in New Frontiers: Law and Society in the Roman World, ed. P. J. du Plessis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 123–150; and T. Terpstra, Trading Communities in the Roman World: A Micro-Economic and Institutional Perspective (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 11–23, 59–65, index, s.v. “murecine tablets.” See also S. B. Pomeroy, Women in Hellenistic Egypt: From Alexander to Cleopatra (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990), 113–114. She cites testimony from Hellenistic Egypt from 135 BCE of a woman involved in money-lending. 28 P. Oxy. II, 267; U. Yiftach-Firanko, Marriage and Marital Arrangements: A History of the Greek Marriage Documents in Egypt, 4th Century BCE–4th Century CE (Munich: Beck, 2003), 14–18, 55, 119, index, s.v. “daneion”; D. Sperber, A Dictionary of Greek and Latin Legal Terms in Rabbinic Literature (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1984), 56–60; and, esp., M. Thoma, “Material Aspects of Marriage: Economic Transactions between Spouses in Roman Egypt,” in Married Life in Greco-Roman Antiquity, ed. C.-E. Centlivres Challet (London: Routledge, 2022), 168–184. 29 Y. Yadin, N. Lewis, and J. Greenfield, The Documents from the Bar Kokhba Period in the Cave of Letters, Hebrew, Aramaic and Nabatean-Aramaic Papyri (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 2002), 170–190.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

40

Chapter 2

borrowers, and guarantors. There is a long chapter in the Digest (D) citing the opinions of various jurists relating to the position of the woman in credit transactions, which was inferior to that of the man, as she was dependent on him.30 Her presence, however, was not in doubt. There were also credit transactions carried out by parents for the sake of their children. Special attention in the law is devoted to orphans who inherited estates that included loans and debts. The court would appoint a guardian who would take care of the estate and make sure the children received a proper education. He would also invest the inheritance on behalf of the minors. Sometimes there were no real estate investments available or the money inherited was not sufficient for such a large investment; the guardian would then be obligated to invest the money via credit transactions that bore interest. If he did not do so within a reasonable amount of time, the guardian could be liable to pay the missing interest from his own pocket. There were also special laws that prevented the guardians from pocketing the profit from credit though a certain fee that was given to them for their efforts.31 There are also documents about boys and girls who borrowed money to pay debts they inherited from their parents.32 Slaves as well were involved in providing credit or receiving it. Often, their masters enabled them to conduct semi-independent economic activity, to hold property and money, and to invest.33 The main source of income for wealthy Romans was real estate investments; however, credit was a common additional source of income.34 The Roman elite, even the emperor himself (his private money), as well as the senators and other aristocratic families,35 loaned and borrowed money from each other regularly, 30 D.16.1.1–32. 31 See D. P. Kehoe, Investment, Profit, and Tenancy: The Jurists and the Roman Agrarian Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 49–55. 32 See Rowlandson, Women, 255–256, 263–264; and J. Liu, “Urban Poverty in the Roman Empire: Material Conditions,” in Paul and Economics: A Handbook, ed. R. Pickett and T. R. Blanton (Minneapolis: Fortress Publishers, 2017), 23–56, esp. 48, regarding loans within the family and to members of the collegia. 33 R. Gamauf, “Slaves Doing Business: The Role of Roman Law in the Economy of a Roman Household,” European Review of History 16 (3) (2009): 331–346, and see ns. 30, 75. 34 Kehoe, Investment, Profit, and Tenancy, 46–49; S. Mrozek, Faenus: Studien zu Zinsproblemen zur Zeit des Prinzipats (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2001); Verboven, “The Sulpicii”; idem, “Friendship among the Romans,” in The Oxford Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World, ed. M. Peachin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 404–421; idem, “Attitudes to Work and Workers,” 77, and n. 42; Jones, The Bankers, 173–174, 184–186; Rosenstein, “Aristocrats,” 23; P. Kay, Rome’s Economic Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 107–135, 327–334. 35 Andreau, Banking, 2–29, 74–75, 118–119; idem, “Markets, Fairs and Monetary Loans: Cultural History and Economic History in Roman Italy and Hellenistic Greece,” in Money,

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit in Rome and Persia

41

and they also lent to people of lower social standing for profit. When lending to people outside their social circle, they charged higher interest than they did when lending to their peers.36 Tax collectors as well borrowed money to pay for purchasing tax collection rights, and would return the taxes after reaping a handsome profit from the collection.37 Wealthy merchants, artisans, and small peasants also lent money for interest as an additional source of income for their households.38 Temples and organizations did so as well.39 Sometimes, agents took money from the creditor and supplied it to the borrowers, taking part of the profit for themselves. Borrowers from the lower strata of society would seek loans to enable them to pay for necessities.40 The government also needed to borrow money when tax revenues were not sufficient or, more commonly, when they needed sums to finance special projects like military campaigns or to deal with natural disasters such as droughts

36

37 38

39

40

Labour and Land: Approaches to the Economics of Ancient Greece, ed. P. Cartledge, E. E. Cohen, and L. Foxhall (London: Routledge, 2002), 113–129. He emphasizes the symbiotic relationship between the social and economic aspects of the Roman world. See also W. V. Harris, “A Revisionist View of Roman Money,” JRS 96 (2006): 1–24; and Tchernia, Romans and Trade, 161–187, index, s.v. “senators,” “fortunes.” Alternative financial establishments exist today as well: see Mishkin, The Economics of Money, 313–328. Andreau, “Money Lending.” Regarding loans to acquaintances in the Roman world, see also R. Duncan-Jones, Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 46–47, 193–194; Kehoe, Investment, Profit, and Tenancy, 45–54; Harris, “The Nature of Roman Money,” in The Monetary System of the Greeks and Romans, ed. W. V. Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 174–207, esp. 186; and Millett, Lending and Borrowing, 109–126 (on the classical world). Bagnall, Egypt, 76–77. Andreau, Banking, 50–63, 141; N. Morley, Metropolis and Hinterland: The City of Rome and the Italian Economy, 200 BC–AD 200 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 163–164; Jones, The Bankers, 78. There is evidence of this phenomenon as early as classical Athens. See Garnsey, Famine and Food Supply, 69–76, 139–140; and Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet, 115–116. On loans extended by successful farmers and estate owners in Roman Egypt, see Van Minnen, “Money and Credit,” 234–235. D. Hoyer, Money, Culture, and Well-Being in Rome’s Economic Development, 0–275 (Leiden: Brill, 2018), esp. 30–79, 158–161, index, s.v. “credit,” “interest”; N. Q. Hamilton, “Temple Cleansing and Temple Bank Author(s),” JBL 83 (4) (1964): 365–372; Temin, “Financial Intermediation,” 725; Harris, “The Nature of Roman Money,” 186. In Egypt, all strata of society were involved in credit. See B. Tenger, Die Verschuldung im römischen Ägypten (1–2 jh. N. Chr) (St. Katarinen: Scripta Mercaturae Verlag, 1993), 141–230; J. J. Aubert, Business Managers in Ancient Rome: A Social and Economic Study of Institutors, 200 BC–AD 250 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), index, s.v. “mensae,” “moneylender”; and A. S. Hunt and C. C. Edgar, Select Papyri 2: Official Documents (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 464–466, 471. This form of credit was already found in the classical period. See Andreades, Greek Public Finance, 172–182. See, for example, Bagnall, Egypt, 77.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

42

Chapter 2

or famines.41 This need catalyzed the development of a large and complex network of credit services. Furthermore, when the government had extra capital in the royal treasury, they would lend money to Roman citizens for interest and thus become a player in the field of credit.42 It was sometimes essential for the economy that the central government supplied capital to the private business sector in order to fuel economic activity.43 Banks played an important part in the extension of credit in the Roman world. They are well documented in literature and epigraphic findings from the third century BCE until the seventh century CE. The ancient banks were involved in money-changing, receiving deposits, identifying forgeries, and acting as mediators for business transactions. It seems that there were provinces in which banks landed money for interest, while in Egypt, the banks at most served as mediators between borrowers and lenders and did not lend money directly.44 The Greek term in use in the East was τραπεζίτης (trapezites), and

41

On the involvement of local and central governments in consumption and credit, see Jones, Economy, 118–124; Andreau, Banking, 112–126; B. Sirks, “The Management of Public Loans of Towns (the Cura Kalendarii) and of Their Finances in General,” in Atti dell’Accademia Romanistica C ostantiniana, XII Convegno Internazionale (in onore di Manlio Sargenti), Pubblicazioni dell’Universita degli Studi di Perugia (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1998), 377–386; Broekaert and Zuiderhoek, “Society, the Market,” 156–167; Greene, “Learning to Consume”; and A. Trisciuoglio, “Actividad bancaria de las ciudades en la época clásica (siglos I–III d. C.),” Revista Internacional de Derecho Romano 14 (2015): 80–110. 42 Temin, “Financial Intermediation,” 726–727; K. Verboven, “Faeneratores, Negotiatores and Financial Intermediation in the Roman World (Late Republic and Early Empire),” in Pistoi dia tèn technèn: Bankers, Loans and Archives in the Ancient World, ed. K. Verboven, K. Vandorpe, and V. Chankowski (Leuven: Peeters, 2008), 211–229. 43 This happened in the crisis that took place in the year 33 CE. Tiberius Caesar allotted one hundred million sesterces for loans to the public through the banking system. See Harris, “Nature of Roman Money,” 188. Regarding the government’s attitude toward transactions through the banking system, see Kay, Rome’s Economic Revolution, 235–265. 44 For the situation in Egypt, see F. Lerouxel, “The βιβλιοθήκη ἐγκτήσεων and Transaction Costs in the Credit Market of Roman Egypt (30 BCE–ca. 170 CE),” in Law and Transaction Costs in the Ancient Economy, ed. D. P. Kehoe, D. Ratzan, and U. Yiftach (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015), 162–184; and M. Haklai, “Credit and Financial Capital in Roman Egypt,” in Capital, Investment, and Innovation in the Roman World, ed. P. Erdkamp, K. Verboven, and A. Zuiderhoek (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 437–459. K. Verboven, “Capital Markets and Financial Entrepreneurs,” in Capital, Investment, and Innovation in the Roman World, ed. P. Erdkamp, K. Verboven, and A. Zuiderhoek (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 381–416, agrees with them concerning Egypt, but shows that in other provinces the banks engaged in granting loans for interest. Andreau, “Money Lending,” agrees as well. See N. Coffee, Gift and Gain: How Money Transformed Ancient Rome (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), esp. index, s.v. “banks.”

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit in Rome and Persia

43

in the Latin West, it was argentarius or the less used variations coactor and numolarius.45 Information concerning Roman banking dating from the second century BCE is prolific due to the extensive conquests of the Roman republic and the subsequent expansion of the use of credit.46 Loans granted by Roman banks were usually short-term and usually involved small amounts of money. Clerks from the upper echelons of the government sometimes took loans from the banks.47 A significant amount in loan capital was granted to allow creditors to finance themselves until they could auction off property to pay their debts. Documents show that the banking system was very diligent regarding the return of loans on time; fines of up to 50% of the principal were often charged for a delay in payment, in addition to a higher interest rate on the additional time that the borrower delayed the payment. Roman banks were oftentimes private establishments run by families for generations. For example, the Serapion bank in Oxyrhynchus (Egypt) operated as a family establishment for 250 years starting in the Hellenistic period, though eventually the government 45 Regarding the early period, see Raugh, Sacred Bonds, esp. 154, 270, 277–283; Von Reden, Money in Ptolemaic Egypt, 257–294; Millett, Lending and Borrowing, 197–217; and Reed, Maritime Traders, index, s.v. “bankers.” On the Roman period, see Jones, The Bankers; Harris, “Nature of Roman Money,” 187–188; Verboven, “Faeneratores”; and E. Ziebarth, “Trapeza,” PW, RE 6 (2) (1937): 2194–2207. See also R. Bogaert, Epigraphical Texts on Bankers, Banking and Credit in the Greek World, Vol. 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1976). V. A. Tcherikover, “Prolegomena,” CPJ 1 (1954): 1–111, esp. 11, 16, states that in Ptolemaic Egypt the banks were mostly under a government monopoly. Terpstra, Trade, 113–118, agrees. See also R. Bogaert, “Les operations des banques de l’Égypte ptolémaïque,” Anc. Soc. 29 (1998–1999): 49–145; K. Vandorpe, “A Greek Register from Pathyris: Notarial Office Loans and Sales from the Pathyrite and Latopolite Nomes,” ZPE 150 (2004): 161–186; idem, “Archives and Dossiers,” in The Oxford Handbook of Papyrology, ed. R. S. Bagnall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 216–255; K. Vandorpe and W. Clarysse, “Egyptian Bankers and Bank Receipts in Hellenistic and Early Roman Egypt,” in Pistoi dia tèn technèn: Bankers, Loans and Archives in the Ancient World, ed. K. Verboven, K. Vandorpe, and V. Chankowski (Leuven: Peeters, 2008), 153–168; T. Terpstra, “Roman Law, Transaction Costs and Roman Economy: Evidence from the Sulpicii Archive,” in Pistoi dia tèn technèn: Bankers, Loans and Archives in the Ancient World, ed. K. Verboven, K. Vandorpe, and V. Chankowski (Leuven: Peeters, 2008), 345–369; Harris, “Nature of Roman Money”; and Bingen, Hellenistic Egypt, 183–188, 220. 46 Finckh, Das Zinsrecht, esp. 27–38, 72–75; Vandorpe, “Greek Register,” docs. 6, 8, 24, 25; A. S. Hunt and C. C. Edgar, Select Papyri 1: Private Affairs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), 185–187 P. 62, 192–197 P. 66, 199–201 P. 66, 201–203 P. 67, 203–207 P. 69; Grenfell and Hunt, The Amherst Papyri, 60–61 P. L; Eberle and Le Quéré, “Landed Traders,” 37, 50 (concerning the Greek East). On the various banks and their location in the city of Rome, see Holleran, Shopping, 45–46 and n. 164, index, s.v. “bankers”; and Kay, Rome’s Economic Revolution, 107–128, 235–236. 47 Jones, The Bankers, 49, 77, 89, 165.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

44

Chapter 2

confiscated it in the middle of the second century CE.48 William Harris argues that some banks were connected to the aristocracy of Roman society as well.49 Jean Andreau adds that these big banks were responsible for most of the long-term commercial loans in Rome.50 The aristocrats looked down on the bankers, even though they borrowed large sums from them.51 Greek and Roman literature portrays creditors in a negative light.52 The senator Cato the Elder, who operated in the second century BCE, stated that lending for interest is theft and is comparable even to murder. Cicero, the famous philosopher and senator, stated a similar opinion in the middle of the first century BCE. Toward the end of the first century BCE, Caesar Augustus criticized aristocrats who utilized their high status to borrow money for low interest and then proceeded to lend it to others for high interest.53 The banks primarily made their money from investments. Some 20% of their funds came from their own savings and the remaining 80% came from deposits.54 The deposits were of two kinds: one was cash placed into private accounts that were somewhat like regular checking accounts today, for which no interest was paid, and the second was a deposit for a given period on which the owners received interest. The banks also lent money to others at higher interest rates creditor and borrower, assuming responsibility for the return of the debt.55 The sources from Roman Palestine discuss lenders and table operators separately without indication that the table operator was also a lender. They discuss 48 See A. E. Hanson, “Three Papyri from the University of Michigan Collection,” ZPE 9 (1972): 227–236, P. 3, P. 19. 49 Harris, “Nature of Roman Money,” 187–188. 50 Andreau, “Money Lending,” esp. 100. 51 Howgego, “Supply and Use of Money,” 29; Jones, The Bankers, 48. There are exceptions. See Harris, “Revisionist View,” 11; C. P. Elliott, Economic Theory and the Roman Monetary Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 92–94, and index, s.v. “banks.” 52 Millett, Lending and Borrowing, 179–188. 53 Harris, “Nature of Roman Money,” 185. 54 Harris, “Revisionist View,” 11. 55 The bank was an arbitrator between the creditor and the borrower. See J. A. Sheridan, “Loan through a Bank,” BASP 23 (1985): 149–153, n. 5; a papyrus cited there describes a loan of 120 drachmas, probably in Arsinoe in Egypt, for a period of up to two-and-a-half months, brokered and guaranteed by the Serapion bank of the Stoa of Athens. J. A. Sheridan, Columbia Papyri IX: The Vestis Militaris Codex (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), 83–84, quotes an inscription in which an army unit demands that a bank in Philadelphia in Egypt pay for clothing supplied to them. See also Hunt and Edgar, Select Papyri 1, 203–207, P. 69; 207, P. 70; 213–217, P. 74; Cokle, “Repayment”; Jones, The Bankers, 50; and Sirks, “Law, Commerce, and Finance,” 95–100.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit in Rome and Persia

45

lenders without describing any specific qualifications or characteristics, indicating that anyone could be a lender. This information is compatible with the opinion that Roman banks were not heavily involved with credit. Private moneylenders, professional and non-professional, were responsible for most of the credit provided.56 Paradoxically, loans given by non-professional lenders tended to involve larger sums and were given for longer periods of time.57 The investment of capital in loans and interest often yielded a higher profit margin than investment in agriculture, but it involved the risk of a total loss if the borrower did not pay the sum back.58 This now brings us to the terms used to define loans and interest, which ought to be carefully analyzed to ensure clarity about what is being described in the sources. These terms appear thousands of times in the literature and epigraphy of the Greco-Roman world, showing that loans were a common phenomenon.59 Two main words were used in the Greek language. The more common ancient Greek word was δάνειον (daneion), which means “loan,” and its prime inflection was δανείζειν (daneizen), which means “to lend.” Use of daneizen and its various inflections began in the eighth century BCE. Originally, the word referred to an interest-free loan; later, it was used to refer to loans with interest as well.60 The second word that was used was τόκος (tokos), which meant “credit,” and its primary inflection was the verb τοκίζειν (tokizein), which meant, “to extend credit.” This word is later than the previous one and is found from the end of the classical period (the fourth century BCE) and onward. These two terms are mentioned hundreds of times in Egyptian papyri from the beginning of the Hellenistic period in the third century BCE through the Roman and Byzantine periods until the Moslem conquest. These words are often mentioned in the literature and epigraphy of the other parts of

56 Lapin, Civil Law, 147–150, n. 56. 57 Andreau, Banking, 39, 149–150. On the periphery, the Roman elite were less involved in the extension of credit, which was supplied instead by local banks. See also Silver, “Disappeared Deposit Bankers.” 58 Van Minnen, “Money and Credit,” 235. On the banks in the Byzantine period, see M. Hendy, Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy, c. 300–1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 239–253. 59 When there is much use of a word on a subject in a given text or inscription, it indicates that it was likely widely used. For a summary of this issue, see R. J. D. Knauth, “Debts, Loans, and Surety,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Bible and Law, Vol. 1, ed. B. A. Strawn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 154–164, esp. 155–156. 60 The preferred term varied from period to period. In first-century Egypt, this word was used often. In the second century CE, the situation reversed and the word chrêsis was preferred. See Yiftach-Firanko, “Loan Contract,” 172, n. 8; and Haklai, “Credit,” 443–445.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

46

Chapter 2

the Greco-Roman world as well.61 There were additional words in Greek that defined a loan with interest, but these were seldom used.62 The Romans had the Latin word mutuum from the fourth century BCE for loans without interest. Later, in the last two centuries BCE the term changed to relate to loans that bore interest. In addition, the word usurae refers to interest. At first, it was a separate agreement parallel to the loan contract, but later on it came also to refer to the loan agreement itself, with the mutuum pertaining to the interest component of the loan.63 In addition, the word faenus referred to an interest-bearing loan, and its inflection feneratores and the term toculliones related to creditors who were not particularly popular.64 Another 61 H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek–English Lexicon, 9th ed., ed. H. S. Jones and R. McKenzie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 369a; F. Montanari, The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 454b, 454c. 62 See J. Korver, De terminologie van het crediet-wezen en het Grieksch (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1934. Repr. New York: Arno Press, 1979), esp. 73–119; and Millett, Lending and Borrowing, 28–32, 42–46, 153–159. See, for example, in the New Testament that the word tokos is a common as well as a rare form: (ὀφειλή, ofeile) for loan and (ὀφειλέτης, ofeiletes) for “borrower.” See this entry in C. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961); and F. W. Danker, The Concise Greek–English Lexicon of the New Testament, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). For an extensive discussion of this subject, see TDNT 5:564–566, 8:209–215. 63 See Mousourakis, Roman Law, 129–130; Schultz, Classical Roman Law, 508–517 (mutuum, commodatum); and A. Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1953), 591 (mutuum), 753–754 (usurae). There were various types of usury. One example is usurae centesimae (753) that carried the 1% interest per month that was customary in Roman loans. 64 Mrozek, Faenus, esp. 60–71 (on the influence of credit on the Roman economy). Another word, versura, was used for “loan” (D’Arms, Commerce, 43, 100–108). There were words used to describe debts that were also loans, such as debitum and fides (“obligation”). You also have such phrases as “pledged by debt is the solution” and “the borrowers who have committed” and “[they] are the debtors,” and sometimes “they gave a guarantee that served as collateral” (pignus). See Yavetz, Common People, 63–78, 99–127; Honsell, Quod Interest, 46–47, 169–173, and elsewhere; H. Kreller, “Mutuum” PW, RE, Suppl. 6 (1935): 571–584; M. Kaser, Römische Rechtsquellen und angewandte Juristenmethode (Vienna: Böhlau, 1986), 160–161, index, s.v. “Darlehen,” “pecunia”; P. G. W. Glare, Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968–1982), 1151c (mutuus 1); and M. De Vaan, Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the Other Italic Languages (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 398. The term commodatum is often mentioned in the context of mutuum but relates to objects that are returned intact, which is parallel to the Hebrew shoel and is not in the scope of this research. On this topic, see B. Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 167–171, 192, 197–199, index, s.v. “mutuum,” “commodatum”; A. Watson, Roman Law and Comparative Law. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991, 59–60; P. Birks, The Roman Law of Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 97–110, index, s.v. “contracts”; R. A. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 153–229; P. Gröschler, “The Concept of mutuum

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit in Rome and Persia

47

word in Roman law was creditum, which referred to commitment. In effect, it referred to credit, but its meaning extended to the lender, who was the one who gave the credit and who was considered committed to the transaction.65 There were also words in Greek and Latin that referred to loans in some contexts but not in others, their meanings changing over time. Indeed, there are also many testimonies of loans that did not bear interest in the city of Rome and in other places in the Empire as well; however, these loans were primarily in the private sector, among friends, or loans of patrons to clients, which sometimes included interest and sometimes did not.66 In this kind of loan, there was often a stipulation that if the borrowers were late in paying, they would have to pay a large fine.67 Interest rates in Rome and the provinces during the Principate were not static and varied according to the rules of supply and demand and the level of risk of the particular investment. Interest rates went up during times of war or economic crisis and went down in times of calm.68 At the same time, there are many loans recorded in which the interest rate was 1% a month, which accumulates to 12% a year (centesimae per annum). It is assumed that this was

65

66

67

68

cum stipulatione,” Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 74 (3–4) (2006): 261–287; and Sirks, “Law, Commerce, and Finance,” 78, 82. R. Leonard, “Creditor,” PW, RE 4 Suppl. 2 (1935): 1699–1700; A. D’ors, “Creditum,” PW, RE, Suppl. 10 (1965): 1151–1168; OCD 391, “credit”; 418, “debt”; 899, mutuum; D. P. Tompkins, “Debt,” in The Encyclopedia of Ancient History, ed. R. S. Bagnall et al. (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 4:1942–1945. Tran, “Economics of Solidarity”; P. W. Pestman, “Loans Bearing No Interest?” JJP 16 (1971): 7–29; S. Dixon, “The Meaning of Gift and Debt in the Roman Elite,” EMC, n.s., 37 (1993): 451–464; K. Verboven, The Economy of Friends: Economic Aspects of Amicitia and Patronage in the Late Republic (Brussels: Latomus, 2002), 120–125; idem, “Friendship,” 416–417; Kay, Rome’s Economic Revolution, 134–136. Jones, The Bankers, 79–80. For example, see CPJ 3:186–188, P. 417, which describes a loan (called a “deposit”) of 600 denars that a Roman horseman gave three Jews for a period of two months, without interest. However, if the loan were not paid on time, they would be fined 120 drachmas, that is, 20%, which amounts to 120% a year. To the principal and fine there was added an unstated amount of additional interest. See T. Frank, An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, Vol. 2. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1940. Repr. Paterson, NJ: Pageant Books, 1959), 450, 460, 488; and S. Lieberman, Texts and Studies (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1974), 209. For a summary of interest rates in the Greco-Roman world, see S. Somer and R. E. Sylla, A History of Interest Rates, 3rd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1996), 32–56; M. Gibbs, “Interest Rate,” in The Encyclopedia of Ancient History, ed. R. S. Bagnall et al. (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 6:3471–3473; and C. Rovira-Guardiola, “Loan, Greek and Roman,” in The Encyclopedia of Ancient History, ed. R. S. Bagnall et al. (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 8:4129–4131.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

48

Chapter 2

the official accepted interest rate.69 However, this interest rate was far from uniform and varied according to the circumstances of the loan. During the Republic and through the first century CE, not all the provinces were included in the Empire’s credit system. In that period, the aristocrats of Rome lent money to cities or individuals in the provinces for a much higher rate. This caused economic strife in the provinces, and the central authorities had to interfere so that the borrowers’ finances would not collapse.70 On the other hand, there are credit agreements that record interest rates that were much lower—between 1% and 12% a year, according to the economic or political conditions that influenced the supply and demand of credit.71 Agricultural loans are a great example of this. The interest rate for these loans was seldom more than 5%–6%, which was also the common rate for loans that private people paid when borrowing from the government. Pliny the Younger testifies that he received permission from the emperor Trajan to offer loans to the public at an interest rate lower than 12% to encourage the use of funds from which they intended to make a profit for the imperial treasury.72 In the sixth century, during the reign of Justinian, there was a reform in interest rates. The emperor limited the annual interest rate to 6% for regular loans, 8% for commercial loans, 12% for maritime loans, and 4% for loans to senators. However, it is doubtful whether the public actually implemented these new instructions.73 On the other hand, people who lacked contacts and recognition would have difficulty receiving loans: what choice did they have? These individuals did not have access to government loans and had to go to

69 Buckland, Roman Law, 465; Somer and Sylla, Interest Rates, 53–54 (table); R. P. Maloney, “The Teaching of the Fathers on Usury: An Historical Study on the Development of Christian Thinking,” Vigiliae Christianae 27 (4) (1973): 241–265, esp. 80, 88, 91, 95 (Greek influence); Johnston, Roman Law in Context, 85; Glare, Latin Dictionary, 299a, s.v. “centesima,” 136c, s.v. “annuum,” 2110b, s.v. “usura”; J. Andreau, “Interest,” NP 6 (2005): 851–854. 70 Andreau, “Interest.” The Edict of Diocletian of 301 CE limited interest rates to 12%. Similar legislation is found in earlier and later edicts, showing that it was difficult to enforce this limit. See Silver, “Disappeared Deposit Bankers.” In D.19.2.24 (Africanus, c.170 CE), there is an indication that the official interest rate was 6%. 71 R. P. Maloney, “Usury in Greek, Roman and Rabbinic Thought,” Traditio 27 (1971): 79–109; Mrozek, Faenus, 332–334, 341; Harris, “Nature of Roman Money,” 191–192. This issue may occur in any economic structure. See Mishkin, The Economics of Money, 92–95, 121–123. 72 Pliny, Epist. 10.54–55; A. N. Sherwin-White, The Letters of Pliny: A Historical and Social Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 635; R. Duncan-Jones, The Economy of the Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 135, 306–308. 73 Buckland, Roman Law, 465; Watson and Mommsen, Justinian, 185. Senators were able to obtain low-interest loans that they could lend to the lower classes for a higher interest rate.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit in Rome and Persia

49

the private market that charged a higher interest.74 Another way to charge high interest in the Roman world when there was a high demand for credit was to use an arbitrator who was not a citizen of Rome and therefore was not subject to the prevailing regulations on interest.75 According to Egyptian papyri, annual interest during the Hellenistic period was 24%. During Roman rule, the interest rate went down to 12% a year.76 Nevertheless, there are papyri that contain interest rates as high as double the regulated one.77 In Asia Minor, the common interest rate was 12% a year.78 It is possible to say that, overall, the interest rates in the Roman world were mostly between 4% and 12% a year.79 74 Jones, The Bankers, 49; B. W. Frier, “Interest and Usury,” in The Anchor Bible Dictionary, Vol. 3, ed. D. N. Freedman (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 423–424; Duncan-Jones, The Economy, 20–21. 75 See Reece, “The Technological”; Temin, “Financial Intermediation,” 720–721. 76 On the duration of loans, see Tenger, Die Verschuldung, 8–42. Most of the loans were short-term, coinciding with planting and harvesting seasons. See also Maloney, “Usury,” 80, 88; Van Minnen, “Money and Credit,” 235; Frank, Economic Survey, 448–460, n. 56; Tcherikover, “Prolegomena,” 35–36; and Lieberman, Texts and Studies, 13–14. 77 On the Hellenistic and Roman periods, see H. Kühnert, “Zum Kreditgeschäft in den hellenistischen Papyri Ägyptens bis Diokletian,” PhD diss., University of Freiburg, 1965; H. A. Rupprecht, Untersuchungen zum Darlehen im Recht der graeco-aegyptischen Papyri der Ptolemäerzeit (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1967), esp. 73–74; idem, Einführung in die Papyruskunde (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994), 115–127; Tenger, Die Verschuldung, 43–47, 235–265; Lerouxel and Greer, “Private Credit Market”; Lerouxel, “Transaction Costs”; and Von Reden, Money in Ptolemaic Egypt, 128–129, index, s.v. “contracts,” “debt.” On the Roman period, see Buckland, Roman Law, 465; Frank, Economic Survey; N. Lewis, Life in Egypt under Roman Rule (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 2; and H. J. Drexhage, Preise, Mieten/Pachten, Kosten und Löhne im römischen Ägypten bis zum regierungsantritt Diocletians (St. Katarinen: Scripta Mercaturae, 1991), 402–439. On the legal aspect, see P. M. Meyer, Juristische Papyri: Erklärung von Urkunden zur Einführung in die Juristische Papyruskund (Chicago: Ares Publishers, 1976), 141–165. Lieberman mentions a loan (document) with 12% interest that a Jew borrowed from a Roman centurion. He also mentions a letter from Babatha in which her steward's lent money for 6% interest and in which and she claims that she could receive much more. See Lieberman, Texts and Studies, 208–209. On the Byzantine period, see A. C. Johnson and L. C. West, Byzantine Egypt: Economic Studies (Amsterdam: M. Hakkert, 1967), 167–175; K. A. Worp (ed.), Greek Papyri from Kellis: I (P. Kel. G.) (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 1995), 49, P. 18; 115–130, P. 40–47; H. F. Von Soden, Untersuchungen zur Homologie in den griechischen Papyri Ägyptens bis Diokletian (Cologne: Böhlau, 1973), 118–121, and index, s.v. “daneion”; and Palme, “Documentary Texts,” 368–370. It should be mentioned that similar interest was found being charged in documents of the Middle Ages found in the Cairo Genizah. See S. D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, Vol. 1. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 250–262. 78 D. Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), 252, and index, s.v. “interest rate,” “moneylender.” 79 On interest rates in the Roman Empire, see Somer and Sylla, Interest Rates, 44–56; Jones, Economy, 118–124; idem, The Bankers, 253–254; and Duncan-Jones, The Economy,

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

50

Chapter 2

There were, also, loans with high risk, such as those given to seafarers, in which case the borrowers were charged 67%–100% a year.80 This information on credit will help us better understand its uses in Jewish society. 2.2

Credit in the Parthian and Sasanian Empires

The Neo-Iranian Empire was Rome’s counterpart and enemy to the east, and many Jews lived there. The Parthian dynasty initially ruled it (238 BCE–224 CE). The Sasanids succeeded the Parthians, ruling Iran until the Moslem occupation (224–651 CE). The Empire covered vast territory from Mesopotamia in Iraq to modern-day Pakistan and from Central Asia to the Arabian Peninsula. There were extensive economic and commercial ties between the two empires.81 Due to its size, and international contacts, the Iranian Empire had an economy that was of similar magnitude, and credit activity was likely to have been as common and prolific as it was in the Roman world.82 33, 288–319. On the city of Rome, see Andreau, Banking, 90–99; and idem, “Commerce and Finance.” For interest calculations in the modern era, see Mishkin, The Economics of Money, 67–75. 80 See M. Broshi, “Commerce in Antiquity: Some Methodological Remarks,” in Commerce in Palestine throughout the Ages: Studies, ed. B. Z. Kedar, T. Dothan, and S. Safrai (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1990), 195–201, esp. 199 [Hebrew]. 81 See, for example, G. Widengren, “Iran, der grosse Gegner Roms: Königsgewalt, Feudalismus, Militärwesen,” in ANRW II, 9 (1) (1976): 219–306; J. W. Drijvers, “Rome and the Sasanid Empire: Confrontation and Coexistence,” in A Companion to Late Antiquity, ed. P. Rousseau (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 441–454; B. Dignas and E. Winter, Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity: Neighbours and Rivals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); P. Edwell, Rome and Persia at War: Imperial Competition and Contact, 193–363 CE (London: Routledge, 2021), esp. 25–56; N. Di Cosmo and M. Mass (eds.), Empires and Exchanges in Eurasian Late Antiquity: Rome, China, Iran, and the Steppe, ca. 250–750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); M. P. Canepa, Two Eyes of Earth: Art and Ritual of Kingship between Rome and Sasanian Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 1–33; idem, “The Parthian and Sasanian Empires,” in The Oxford World History of Empire, Vol. 2: The History of Empires, ed. P. F. Bang, C. A. Bayly, and W. Scheidel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 290–324; L. Fabian, “The Arsakid Empire,” in Handbook of Ancient Eurasian Economies, Vol. 1: Contexts, ed. S. Von Reden (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2020), 205–240, esp. 205–208; and T. Daryaee and K. Rezakhani, “The Sasanian Empire,” in King of the Seven Climes: A History of the Ancient Iranian World (3000 BCE–651 CE), ed. T. Daryaee (Irvine: University of California Press, 2017), 155–198. 82 See, for example, V. G. Lukonin, “Political, Social and Administrative Institutions: Taxes and Trade,” CHI 3 (1) (1983): 681–746; C. Brunner, “Geographical and Administrative Division: Settlements and Economy,” CHI 3 (2) (1983): 747–777; Frye, “Commerce,” 161–164; Panaino, “Commerce and Conflicts”; B. Badiyi, “Cities and Mint Centers Founded by the Sasanians,” in Ancient Iranian Numismatics, ed. M. Faghfoury (Leiden: Brill, 2021), 203–232; and M. Jursa, Aspects of the Economic History of Babylonia in the First Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit in Rome and Persia

51

However, research into the Iranian economy lacks ample archeological and literary sources, and therefore it is hard to estimate the extent of credit activity in that realm.83 Nevertheless, documents from various places shed some light Millennium BC—Economic Geography, Economic Mentalities, Agriculture, The Use of Money, and Problem of Economic Growth (Münster: Alter Orient und Altes Testament, 2010), esp. 240–245 (on old Babylonian times). On the geography, administration, and location of the Jewish communities of Iran in the Parthian and Sasanid periods, see R. Gyselen, “Les données de géographie administrative dans le Sahrestânîhâ-T Ërân,” Studia Iranica 17 (1988): 191–206; idem, La géographie administrative de l’Empire sassanide: Les temoignages sigiliographiques (Paris: Groupe pour l’étude de la civilisation du Moyen-Orient, 1989), 38–40, 57, 77–78, 91–92; R. N. Frye, The History of Ancient Iran. (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1984); idem, “Parthian and Sasanian History of Iran,” in Mesopotamia and Iran in the Parthian and Sasanian Periods: Rejection and Revival c. 238 CE–AD 642, ed. J. Curtis (London: British Museum, 2000), 17–23; Z. Rubin, “The Sasanid Monarchy,” CAH 14 (2000): 638–661; idem, “Eastern Neighbours: Persia and the Sasanian Monarchy (224– 651),” in The Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire, c. 500–1492, ed. J. Shepard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 130–155, esp. 132–133; Daryaee, Sasanian Empire, 123–149; L. Gregoratti, “The Arsacid Empire,” in King of the Seven Climes: A History of the Ancient Iranian World (3000 BCE–651 CE), ed. T. Daryaee (Irvine: University of California Press, 2017), 125–153; Canepa, “Parthian and Sasanian Empires”; Fabian, “The Arsakid Empire”; M. Brosius, The Persians: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2006), 79–138 (Parthians), 139–200 (Sasanians). On Iranian agriculture, see R. J. Van der Spek, “The Hellenistic Near East,” in The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, ed. W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. Saller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 409–433, esp. 412–422; K. Rezakhani, “Markets for Land, Labour and Capital in Late Antique Iraq, AD 200–700,” JESHO 57 (2) (2014): 231–261; H. Borjian, “A Persian View of Steppe Iranians,” Anabasis 5 (2014): 155–173; Y. Elman, “‘Up to the Ears’ in Horse’s Necks (BM 108a): On Sasanian Agricultural Policy and Private Eminent Domain,” Jewish Studies: An Internet Journal 3 (2004): 95–149, esp. 111, n. 79; T. Hartnell, “Agriculture in Sasanian Persis: Ideology and Practice,” JAH 2 (2) (2014): 182–208; and D. Lawrence and T. J. Wilkinson, “The Northern and Western Borderlands of the Sasanian Empire: Contextualizing the Roman/Byzantine and Sasanian Frontier,” in Sasanian Persia: Between Rome and the Steppes of Eurasia, ed. E. W. Sauer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 99–125. On the cultural contacts between the Jews and their neighbors, see Y. Elman, “Contrasting Intellectual Trajectories: Iran and Israel in Mesopotamia,” in Encounters by the Rivers of Babylon: Scholarly Conversations between Jews, Iranian and Babylonians in Antiquity, ed. U. Gabbay and S. Secunda (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 7–105; R. Payne, “Iranian Cosmopolitanism: World Religions at the Sasanian Court,” in Cosmopolitanism and Empire: Universal Rulers, Local Elites, and Cultural Integration in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean, ed. M. Lavan, R. Payne, and J. Weisweiler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 209–230; and St. J. Simpson, “The Land behind Ctesiphon: The Archaeology of Babylonia during the Period of the Babylonian Talmud,” in The Archaeology and Material Culture of the Babylonian Talmud, ed. M. J. Geller (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 6–38. 83 A. Perikhanian, “Iranian Society and Law,” CHI 3 (2) (1983): 627–680, esp. 655–676; C. Cereti, “Primary Sources for the History of Inner and Outer Iran in the Sasanian Period (Third–Seventh Centuries),” AEMA 9 (1997): 17–70; Daryaee, Sasanian Empire, 133–149; Daryaee and Rezakhani, “The Sasanian Empire,” esp. 155–157; L. Gregoratti, “Legendary and Real Wealth in the Arsacid Kingdom,” in Studies on Wealth in the Ancient World, ed. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

52

Chapter 2

on this issue.84 In the town of Dura-Europos, a number of documents concerning the Parthian period have been uncovered. Several documents dated to the second half of the first century CE and the beginning of the second century CE dealt with loans.85 There is more information about credit in the Sasanid Empire, in which the Babylonian rabbis were active. In that period, interest rates were between 13% and 20%, depending on the circumstances of the transaction.86 It seems that, as in Rome, the Persian priests adapted the prevalent religious attitude to loans to the changing circumstances of the economy. The Persian priests did so with regard to other economic issues as well; they allowed women to inherit their husbands’ assets and to run the family estate. In addition, they allowed women to partake in religious rites. They also agreed that priests should devote time to administering their property at the expense of the study of religious texts. These changes were completed in the sixth century CE, which is later than the period covered in this book. However, the processes that brought about these changes began as early as the tenth century BCE and were already well advanced in the beginning of the Sasanid period in the third century CE.87 The tendency to adapt religious laws F. Santangelo and E. Bissa (London: University of London, 2016), 83–92; R. Payne, “The Silk Road and the Iranian Political Economy in Late Antiquity: Iran, the Silk Road, and the Problem of Aristocratic Empire,” BSOAS 81 (2) (2018): 227–250; and J. Weisehofer, “Evidence for Arsakid Economic History,” in Handbook of Ancient Afro-Eurasian Economies Volume 1: Contexts, ed. S. Von Reden (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 477–496. 84 R. J. Van der Spek, “Factor Markets in Hellenistic and Parthian Babylonia (331 BCE– 224 CE),” JESHO 57 (2) (2014): 203–230; K. Farrokh, “An Overview of the Artistic, Architectural, Engineering and Culinary Exchanges between Ancient Iran and the Greco-Roman World,” AGON: Rivista Internazionale di Studi Culturali, Linguistici e Letterari 7 (2015): 64–124, esp. 86–87, ns. 2, 86 (sociocultural view); N. Sims-Williams, Bactrian Documents— From Northern Afghanistan: I: Legal and Economic Documents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) (northern Afghanistan). 85 See a list of the documents in H. M. Cotton, W. E. H. Cockle, and F. G. B. Millar, “The Papyrology of the Roman Near East: A Survey,” JRS 85 (1995): 214–235, nos. 34, 41–43, 166; F. Millar, Rome, the Greek World, and the East. Ed. H. M. Cotton and G. M. Rogers (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 413–414; and M. I. Rostovtzeff and C. B. Welles, “A Parchment Contract of Loan from Dura-Europos on the Euphrates,” YCS 2 (1931): 1–78. 86 On the credit system in Babylon from the perspective of laws and legal documentation, see J. K. Choksy, “Loan and Sales Contracts in Ancient and Early Medieval Iran,” Indo-Iranian Journal 31 (1988): 191–218; and Elman, “Contrasting Intellectual Trajectories,” 45–47. On the involvement of Babylonian Jews in credit transactions, see Beer, Babylonian Amoraim, 196–219; and L. Schiffman, “Talmudic Monetary Theory: Currency in Rabbinic Halakhah,” in The Oxford Handbook of Judaism and Economics, ed. A. Levine (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 605–624. 87 Y. Elman, “Scripture versus Contemporary Needs: A Sasanian/Zoroastrian Example,” Cardozo Law Review 28 (1) (2006): 153–169; idem, “Contrasting Intellectual Trajectories,” 45–47. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit in Rome and Persia

53

to changing life circumstances was also the basis for the reciprocal relations between Sasanid society and Babylonian Jews.88 Aphrahat was a Church Father from Nisibis (Nezivin). It so happened that one of the heads of the Christians in Seleucia, the capital of the former Seleucid Empire and important city during the reign of the Sasanids, lent money for interest regularly. Aphrahat attacked him severely for this and for other aspects of economic and social corruption that he attributed to him.89 This shows that Christian officials were involved in profiting from the offering of credit in this period; it is therefore likely that lay Christians as well were involved in the same practice. Jews as well lived in this city in that period and must have known about the practices of their Christian neighbors. Aphrahat’s admonition seems to represent the attitude to loans and interest of the Church Fathers in this period. The New Testament mentions loans, but there is some obscurity as to whether or not they involve interest.90 The Church Fathers from the second to the fourth centuries CE followed the NT and gradually sharpened their objection to interest, though they did not state it as a clear law. From the end of the fourth century, the prohibition was stated clearly and explicitly, but it is unclear whether it was actually enforced. Only in the Middle Ages did the Church leaders combat interest vehemently, and their followers conducted themselves accordingly.91 It seems that there was an important source for loans in Iran long before the Sasanid period. In the Hymns of Avesta, a man makes an agreement with the God Ahura Mazda that he will extend credit to him and that he must reciprocate within days or months. This metaphor probably reflects the way its author grasped the relationship between men—that is, as one of lending and 88

For their complex aspects, see J. S. Mokhtarian, Rabbis, Sorcerers, Kings, and Priests: The Culture of the Talmud in Ancient Iran (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015), 22–42, 94–144. 89 J. Parisot (ed.), Aphraatis Sapientis Persae Demonstrationes (Paris: Tomus Primus, 1894), 577–588; J. M. Fiey, Jalons pour une histoire de l’Église en Iraq (Louvain: Peeters, 1970), 70; G. Nedungatt, “The Authenticity of Aphrahat’s Synodal Letter,” Orientalia Christiana Periodica 46 (1) (1980): 62–88; T. D. Barnes, “Constantine and the Christians of Persia,” JRS 75 (1985): 126–136. 90 Matthew 5:42; Luke 6:34–35; and Luke 11:5 are the main sources. See also the following note. 91 See B. N. Nelson, The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 35–97; Maloney, “Usury”; S. L. Buckley, Teachings on Usury in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000); H. Frost, “Usury,” in The Encyclopedia of Christianity, Vol. 5, ed. E. Fahlbush, et al. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008), 651; and A. Samellas, “The Anti-Usury Arguments of the Church Fathers of the East in their Historical Context and the Accommodation of the Church to the Prevailing Credit Economy in Late Antiquity,” JAH 5 (1) (2017): 134–178. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

54

Chapter 2

borrowing. This shows that credit was an important part of economic life long before the Sasanid Empire.92 Credit legislation in the Sasinid Empire can be found in the Sasanian lawbook Mādiyān ī Hazār Dādestān or Book of a Thousand Decisions. The contents of the book reveal Sasanian jurists’ attempt to cope with this important issue. A number of chapters relate to issues related to loans and collateral.93 One important principal found there is that the lender must return the document to the borrower once the loan is paid. If the document is not available, the borrower can refrain from repaying the funds until it is produced.94 The book is also a good source for the philology of the terms used in the Persian language. The word for loan was vaxt. When the loan was interest-free, it was a-vaxt, and when it bore interest, it was pat-vaxt. An interest-bearing loan was called vatxaŕu, vaxsakar was the creditor, and a group of creditors was hamxvāstak. Additional words for loans or debts were apāmdān and apām. The collateral was graβ, and the creditor who held the collateral was graβākandār.95 The systematic structure of the words indicating the components of credit, which includes collective lending and borrowing as well as collateral and guarantees, indicates that loans were prolific in Iranian society. 92 J. Jany, “Criminal Justice in Sasanian Persia,” Iranica Antiqua 42 (2007): 347–386. 93 See A. Perikhanian (ed.), The Book of a Thousand Judgements: A Sassanian Law-Book, trans. N. Garsoian (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 1997), 108–109, no. 40.1–4, and 29.13–17; and Y. Elman, “Law in the Crisis of Empire: A Sasanian Example,” Journal of Persianate Studies 6 (1–2) (2013): 101–114. 94 Perikhanian, Thousand Judgements, 104–105, no. 38.7–9. 95 See these entries and yām (“collateral”) in the index of Perikhanian, Thousand Judgements; idem, “Iranian Society,” 673–675; and M. Macuch, Das Sasanidische Rechtsbuch “Matakdan i hazar Datistan,” Vol. 2. (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1981), index, s.v. “darlehen,” “zinsen,” “apam,” and “schuld.” The Iranian literary sources are problematic because they are late (i.e., not before the sixth century CE, which is later than the period under discussion). However, it is customary in research to use these sources for comparison while stating that they are late. See, for example, S. Secunda, “On the Age of the Zoroastrian Sages of the Zand,” Iranica Antiqua 47 (2012): 317–349; idem, “The Sasanian ‘Stam’: Orality and the Composition of Babylonian Rabbinic and Zoroastrian Legal Literature,” in C. Bakhos and R. Shayegan (eds.), The Talmud in Its Iranian Context (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 140–160, esp. 42–43; Y. Kiel, “The Authority of the Sages in the Babylonian Talmud: A Zoroastrian Perspective,” Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri 27 (2013): 131–174, esp. 136–137 [Hebrew]; S. Corcoran, “Observations on the Sasanian Law-Book in the Light of Roman Legal Writing,” in Law, Custom, and Justice in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages: Proceedings of the 2008 Byzantine Colloquium, ed. A. Rio (London: King’s College Centre for Hellenic Studies, 2011), 77–113; and T. Daryaee, “Middle Persian (Pahlavi),” in A Companion to Late Antique Literature, ed. S. McGill and E. Watts (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018), 103–121.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

55

Credit in Rome and Persia figure 1

Table of credit relationships in the Roman and Persian worlds

Credit in Families

Credit in Society

Caesar and Family Father-and Motherin-law

Senators Wealthy/ Equestarian

Husband-Wife (Parents)

Bankers Merchants

Credit in Government and Organizations

Imperial Treasury Provincial Government Temples Roman Army City Authorities (Polis) Guilds

Midde Class Children

Communities Poor Clients

The inverse pyramids in the above figure show the various circles in which loans were provided and received: the higher ones at the top of the pyramids give the credit to the one below, which in most cases has less assets and less economic purchasing power. Sometimes the credit transactions are conducted between levels that are far apart or from below upward. Senators lent to the Caesar, and bankers lent to all strata of society. The following briefly explains the three inverse pyramids in the figure above. a. Families: Our sources mention loans given by parents to children and by children to their young children. This is also the way society perceived the status of the family. The elders were most important, and the young were the least important. b. Society: The various strata borrowed usually from their superiors or equals. On the top of the hierarchy was the emperor and his family. Below them were the senatorial families, the equestrian stratum, the bankers who lent primarily to the middle class, and the merchants, who both borrowed from banks and aristocrats and lended to other merchants and to the middle class. On the bottom were the poor, who borrowed for favors or from their patrons in return for their loyalty and their client status.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

56

Chapter 2

c.

Government and Organizations: The Roman government also borrowed from merchants and wealthy individuals and lent money to municipal and regional governments. The Roman army borrowed money for salaries and provisions but also lent to officers and soldiers. The local polis authorities borrowed from the central government and from wealthy aristocrats. Guilds and communities borrowed money and extended loans to their members. Thus, it can be seen that there were many and varied credit contacts in the Roman world. The Sasanid world had, generally speaking, similar circles of credit, though the differences in the organization of government and society in the Sasanid world likely affected the latter in various ways.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Chapter 3

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon 3.1

Socio-historical Background

Jewish society underwent many changes in the last centuries of the Second Temple period. The Hasmoneans (140–63 BCE) expanded the territory of Judea, which led to the growth and expansion of the Jewish population there and in the Galilee and the Perea. The economic activity of the area increased as well, and therefore credit was used more extensively than before. Researchers have shown that one of the social developments of this period was the nuclear family; in prior periods, people tended to live in extended patriarchal multigenerational families.1 This process continued after the Roman conquest of Palestine in 63 BCE. Roman rule limited the territory the Jews were in control of, but the latter continued to be the majority in Judea, the Galilee, and the Perea. During the reign of King Herod (37–4 BCE), economic activity expanded. After that time, and especially after the Great Revolt (66–74 CE), there was a 1 N. Rubin, “For Whom Does One Mourn? A Sociological Analysis of Talmudic Sources,” Shenaton Bar Ilan 10 (1972): 111–122 [Hebrew]; idem, “The End of Life: Rites of Burial and Mourning in the Talmud and Midrash” (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1997), esp. 92–102, and index, s.v. “family–nuclear” [Hebrew]; idem, The Joy of Life: Rites of Betrothal and Marriage in the Talmud and Midrash (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2004), index, s.v. “family–nuclear” [Hebrew]; idem, Time and Life Cycle in Talmud and Midrash: Socio-Anthropological Perspectives (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2008), index, s.v. “family–nuclear”; D. A. Fiensy, The Social History of Palestine in the Herodian Period: The Land Is Mine (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991), 121–146. A different opinion is that of A. Tropper, “The Economics of Jewish Childhood in Late Antiquity,” HUCA 76 (2005): 189–233, esp. 200–203; and idem, “Children and Childhood in Light of the Demographics of the Jewish Family in Late Antiquity,” JSJ 37 (3) (2006): 299–343, who posits that the families were nuclear before the Hasmoneans as well. It is possible that his opinion is valid for the Galilee, in which the Jewish population was mostly comprised of immigrants from Judea. See M. Aviam, “The Transformation from Galil Ha-Goyim to Jewish Galilee: The Archaeological Testimony of an Ethnic Change,” in Galilee in the Late Second Temple and Mishnaic Periods, Vol. 2: The Archaeological Record from Cities, Towns, and Villages, ed. D. A. Fiensy and J. R. Strange (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 9–21. However, in Judea and Samaria there is archeological proof for patriarchal organizations such as farms. See S. Dar, Landscape and Pattern: An Archeological Survey of Samaria 800 BCE–636 CE (Oxford: BAR, 1986), 21–87; and O. Tal, “Eretz-Israel during the Hellenistic Period: An Archaeological Perspective,” Qadmoniot: A Journal for the Antiquities of Eretz-Israel and Bible Lands 133 (2007): 2–14, esp. 7.

© Ben Zion Rosenfeld, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004681965_004

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

58

Chapter 3

distinct change: Jewish economic activity declined and then recovered, but it was then subsequently subdued in the wake of the failed Bar Kokhba Revolt (132–135 CE).2 Judea and the Perea were damaged, and the Jewish presence there was much depleted. The Jewish population was now concentrated in the Galilee and the Golan Heights. Following the events of 70 CE, the Jewish population became increasingly dependent on the non-Jewish population of the land. In addition, Roman rule intensified a process of urbanization of the eastern Mediterranean that began in the Hellenistic period and continued into the first centuries CE. This process contributed to the development of the economy, including local and international commerce. Urbanization in Jewish areas was slower and developed primarily in the first century and second centuries CE. 2 S. J. D. Cohen, From the Maccabees to the Mishnah, 2nd ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006); J. Pastor, Land and Economic Life in Jewish Society in the Land of Israel During the Persian, Hellenistic, and Roman Period (538 Bce–135 Ce), (Haifa, Israel: University of Haifa Press, 1994); A. Kasher, Jews and Hellenistic Cities in Eretz-Israel: Relations of the Jews in Eretz-Israel with the Hellenistic Cities during the Second Temple Period (332 BCE–70 CE) (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990); E. Schürer, The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 BC–AD 135), Vol. I–II (rev. ed.), ed. G. Vermes et al. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1979); E. Gabba, “The Social, Economic and Political History of Palestine 63 BCE–CE 70,” CHJ 3 (1993): 94–167; P. Schäfer, The History of the Jews in the Greco-Roman World (London: Routledge, 2003), 23–52; S. Schwartz, “Political, Social and Economic Life in the Land of Israel 66–235 CE,” CHJ 4 (2006): 23–52; J. J. Collins, Jewish Cult and Hellenistic Culture: Essays on the Jewish Encounter with Hellenism and Roman Rule (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 202–215; G. E. Sterling, “Judaism between Jerusalem and Alexandria,” in Hellenism in the Land of Israel, ed. J. J. Collins and G. E. Sterling (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 263–301, esp. 278; F. E. Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 BCE–70 CE (Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2005), esp. 279–287; A. Keddie, Class and Power in Roman Palestine: The Socioeconomic Setting of Judaism and Christian Origins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 17–60, 249–254. On the Roman influence after the destruction, see M. Avi-Yonah, The Jews of Palestine: A Political History from the Bar Kokhba War to the Arab Conquest (Oxford: Blackwell, 1976); H. Eshel, “The Bar Kochba Revolt, 132–135,” CHJ 4 (2006): 105–127; H. Eshel and B. Zissu, The Bar Kokhba Revolt: The Archaeological Evidence (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 2015), 10–25, 90–99 [Hebrew]; M. Mor, The Second Jewish Revolt: The Bar Kokhba War, 132–136 CE (Leiden: Brill, 2016); J. P. Roth, “The Army and the Economy in Judaea and Palaestina,” in The Roman Army and tha Economy, ed. P. Erdkamp (Amsterdam: Gieben, 2002), 375–397; H. M. Cotton, “The Impact of the Roman Army in the Province of Judaea/Syria Palaestina,” in The Impact of the Roman Army (200 BC–AD 476): Economic, Social, Political, Religious, and Cultural Aspects, ed. L. de Blois and E. Lo Cascio (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 393–407; C. B. Zeichmann, “Loanwords or Code-Switching? Latin Transliteration and the Setting of Mark’s Composition,” Journal of the Jesus Movement in Its Jewish Setting 4 (2017): 42–64, n. 21; Sperber, The Land, esp. 160–176; and M. Ben Zeev, “New Insights into Roman Policy in Judea on the Eve of the Bar Kokhba Revolt,” JSJ 49 (1) (2018): 84–107. On the Roman government’s attitude toward the locals and its massive presence, see, for example, Bang, The Roman Bazaar, 3–5, 173–190, 212–282.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

59

Large cities that provided services and opportunities developed in the outskirts of the Jewish areas. These financial opportunities attracted Jews to the cities and brought increased interaction between cities and the surrounding villages, between Jews and non-Jews. Perpendicularly, the Romans constructed roads and developed maritime shipping lanes to and from the coastal ports: this increased the mobility of individuals, groups, and products, which in turn helped increase business and investment that incorporated various forms of credit.3 The reorganization of the family from an extended multigenerational unit to a nuclear unit took place in the Greco-Roman world as well and was prevalent as early as the first century CE.4 Jewish society in Palestine was also organized around the nuclear family consisting of parents and children. Sometimes, a grandparent was also present and/or slaves. This structure worked well for the farmer, and farming was the Jewish population’s primary occupation in this period. This can be seen from the New Testament, rabbinic literature, and epigraphic and archeological findings.5 During the second and third centuries CE, many Jews relocated to the pagan polis cities such as Caesarea, the land’s capital, where there were many 3 G. Alon, The Jews in Their Land in the Talmudic Age, 70–640 CE, ed. and trans. Gershon Levi (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); Avi-Yonah, The Jews of Palestine; E. E. Urbach, “The Rabbinic Laws of Idolatry in the Second and Third Centuries in the Light of Archaeological and Historical Facts,” IEJ 9 (4) (1959): 229–245; Eshel, “Bar Kochba”; Eshel and Zissu, Bar Kokhba, 10–25, 90–99; Mor, Bar Kokhba, 146–288, 468–485; Roth, “The Army”; Cotton, “The Impact”; Sperber, The Land, esp. 160–176; Ben Zeev, “New Insights.” For more on urbanization, see A. M. H. Jones, “The Urbanization of Palestine,” JRS 21 (1931): 78–85; idem, The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1971. Repr. 2004), 259–274; Rosenfeld and Perlmutter, Social Stratification, 16, 113, n. 118; and Fischer Genz, “Roman Rule.” On mobility in the Roman East, see Zerbini, “Human Mobility,” esp. 317–321. 4 On Egypt, see R. S. Bagnall and B. W. Frier, The Demography of Roman Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 58–66, 171–173). On the transition from multigenerational families to nuclear families in the Roman Empire, see R. MacMullen, Roman Social Relations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), 24; Garnsey and Saller, Roman Empire, 126–147; and Tropper, “Economics of Jewish Childhood,” n. 133. 5 Safrai, “Home and Family”; Z. Safrai, “Family Structure during the Period of the Mishnah and the Talmud,” Milet 1 (1983): 129–156 [Hebrew]; M. Satlow, Jewish Marriage in Antiquity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 20–21, 105–109. See extensively Miller, Sages and Commoners, index, s.v. “commoners,” “countryside,” “households,” “rabbanan,” “settlement,” “urbanization.” The documents from the Judean Desert depict primarily nuclear families. See, for example, N. Lewis, The Documents from the Bar Kokhba Period in the Cave of Letters (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1989); H. M. Cotton, “The Guardianship of Jesus son of Babatha: Roman and Local Law in the Province of Arabia,” JRS 83 (1993): 94–108; and Safrai, “Halakhic Observance.”

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

60

Chapter 3

economic possibilities. Jewish cultivated land was deserted and taken over by non-Jews, while Jewish farmers changed their vocation and became artisans and businesspersons.6 The economic crisis in the Roman Empire (235–284 CE) caused much damage in Palestine as well and increased the number of people choosing or being essentially forced to leave the land.7 During the fourth century, the Jewish population of Palestine experienced many difficulties primarily because the Roman Empire became Christian and the government’s attitude toward the Jews became increasingly worse. However, economic activity continued, and credit was part of it.8 At the end of the fourth century, the Roman Empire was divided into an Eastern part 6 Urbach, “Rabbinic Laws of Idolatry”; M. Avi-Yonah, The Jews under Roman and Byzantine Rule: A Political History of Palestine from the Bar Kokhba War to the Arab Conquest (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1984); D. Sperber, “On Social and Economic Conditions in 3rd Century Palestine,” Archív Orientální 38 (1970): 1–25; idem, Money and Prices; idem, The Land; L. I. Levine, “Palestine in the Third Century CE,” in Eretz Israel from the Destruction of the Second Temple to the Muslim Conquest, Vol. 1, ed. Z. Baras, S. Safrai, Y. Tsafrir, and M. Stern (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1982), 119–143 [Hebrew]. Bar posits that dimensions of the crisis were not as climactic. See D. Bar, “Rabbinic Sources for the Study of Settlement Reality in Late Roman Palestine,” RRJ 9 (1–2) (2006): 92–113. 7 On the economic crisis of the Roman Empire and its results, see D. Philipson, “Development of Roman Law of Debt Security,” SLR 20 (1969): 1230–1248, esp. 1243–1246; Howgego, “Supply and Use of Money,” 9; Van Minnen, “Money and Credit,” 227–228; P. Southern, The Roman Empire from Severus to Constantine (London: Routledge, 2004), 50–133, 257–268; and L. de Blois, Image and Reality of Roman Imperial Power in the Third Century AD: The Impact of War (London: Routledge, 2018), 54–162, esp. 93–95. 8 Avi-Yonah, Roman and Byzantine Rule; G. Alon, Jews, Judaism, and the Classical World: Studies in Jewish History in the Times of the Second Temple and Talmud, trans. I. Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1977); idem, The Jews in Their Land; D. Sperber, “Aspects of Agrarian Life in Roman Palestine I: Agricultural Decline in Palestine during the Later Principate,” ANRW 2 (8) (1977): 397–443; idem, The Land; Z. Baras et al. (eds.), Eretz Israel from the Destruction of the Second Temple to the Muslim Conquest, Vol. 1. (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1982) [Hebrew]; Goodblatt, “Rehabilitation.” For additional social and economic aspects, see Safrai, The Economy; Rosenfeld and Menirav, Markets and Marketing; S. Schwartz, Were the Jews A Mediterranean Society? Reciprocity and Solidarity in Ancient Judaism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Y. Dan, The City in Eretz-Israel during the Late Roman and the Byzantine Periods (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1984), esp. 13–50 [Hebrew]; and Lapin, Rabbis as Romans, 8–36. On the structure of Jewish settlements and their economy in Palestine, see Y. Feliks, Agriculture in Palestine in the Period of the Bible, Mishna and Talmud, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1990) [Hebrew]; C. Haensch, “The Roman Provincial Administration,” in The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine, ed. C. Hezser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 71–84; D. Goodblatt, “Population Structure and Jewish Identity,” in The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine, ed. C. Hezser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 102–121; Z. Safrai, “Agriculture and Farming,” in The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine, ed. C. Hezser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 246–263; Bar, “Rabbinic Sources”; and Sperber, The Land, 12, 27.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

61

called “Byzantium” and a Western part that was still called “Rome.” This change indicated the beginning of a new era.9 The Jerusalem Talmud was edited around 400 CE, terminating the Talmudic period in Palestine.10 Therefore, this narrative will end at this point in regard to Palestine, which was a time of simultaneous change in the Roman Empire and in Jewish culture and society. 3.2

Lenders and Borrowers in Jewish Roman Palestine

In the last century before the destruction of the Second Temple, King Herod (37–4 BCE) took the treasury assets and invested money on the scale of the Roman nobility and local rulers. The historian Josephus, for example, tells of a very large loan that Herod gave Obodas, King of the Nabateans, and his protégé Syllaeus.11 It is possible that Herod’s loans were not an ongoing occurrence and that they were out in circulation only periodically. Herod also did much construction such as the renovation of the Temple in Jerusalem, and he probably used credit to finance his enormous building projects. His descendants operated on a smaller scale but also undertook construction projects that probably involved the issuing and receiving of credit. In the New Testament, there is a long parable where there was a description of a loan given by a table operator with interest to be paid. The details of the parable seem to be taken from everyday life in Palestine in the second half of the first century CE—the period in which the Synoptic Gospels were edited.12 9

A. Cameron, The Mediterranean World in Late Antiquity, 395–600 AD (London: Routledge, 1993), 1–19, 86–88, 146–147; idem, The Later Roman Empire, AD 284–430 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 113–132. In addition, during that period and in the decades that followed, the Christian revolution reached its peak. See P. Brown, Poverty and Leadership in the Later Roman Empire (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2002), esp. 40–86. These events also affected the Jews of Palestine. See Avi-Yonah, Roman and Byzantine Rule, 178–199. 10 J. N. Epstein, Introduction to Amoraitic Literature, Babylonian Talmud and Yerushalmi, ed. E. Z. Melamed (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1962), 273–275, 290 [Hebrew]; I. M. Gafni, “The Historical Background,” in The Literature of the Sages, Part One, ed. S. Safrai (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1987), 1–34; Strack and Stemberger, Introduction, 182–207; S. Stern, “The Talmud Yerushalmi,” in Rabbinic Texts and the History of Late-Roman Palestine, ed. M. Goodman and P. Alexander (Oxford: British Academy, 2010), 143–164; and L. Moscovitz, “The Formation and Character of the Jerusalem Talmud,” CHJ 4 (2006): 663–677. 11 Josephus, Ant. 16.279–295, 343–349. See also Udoh, To Caesar, 192–193. 12 Matthew 25:14–28 (the parable); 6:12. For discussion of these quotes, see TDNT 5:564–566; 8:209–215. On the subject as a whole in the first century, see J. E. Stambaugh and D. L. Balch, The New Testament in Its Social Environment (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986), 72–73, 91–92, index, s.v. “money-changers”; and Hamel, Poverty and Charity, 156–161.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

62

Chapter 3

The only institution that is mentioned in connection with credit transactions in Palestine in the sources is the Temple. However, they emphasize that the Temple officials did not interfere with the credit transactions and sent the people interested in credit to the professional table operators that were active near the Temple.13 After the destruction, there was no one in the Jewish population in Palestine that had such wealth or constructed expensive buildings such as Herod’s palaces.14 The only significant construction following the destruction of the Temple was the synagogue. Little information is available regarding the synagogues of the Roman period. There are only a few structures dated prior to the Bar Kokhba Revolt, and they are not monumental. In addition, there are a few additional structures that were built from the middle of the second century until the middle of the third century CE.15 13 T Shekalim 2:12; JT Shekalim 4:1 (48a). See B. D. Gordon, Land and Temple: Field Sacralization and the Agrarian Priesthood of Second Temple Judaism (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2020), 61–72, and index, s.v. “credit,” “agrarian.” 14 This is what emerges from the research on the topic. See Y. Tzafrir Eretz Israel from the Destruction of the Second Temple to the Muslim Conquest, Vol. 2: Archaeology and Art. ( Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1984 (Hebrew)), 29–30, 133–142; Y. Hirschfeld, The Palestinian Dwelling in the Roman-Byzantine Period (Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1995), 21–107, esp. 99–103; E. M. Meyers, “The Problems of Gendered Space in Syro-Palestinian Domestic Architecture,” in Early Christian Families in Context, ed. D. Balch and C. Osiek (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 44–70; M. Sartre, The Middle East under Rome (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 225–229; Rosenfeld and Perlmutter, Social Stratification, 144–180; E. Baruch, “Adapted Roman Rituals in Second Century CE Jewish Houses.” In J. Schwartz and P. Tomson (eds.), Jews and Christians in the First and Second Centuries: The Interbellum 70–132 CE (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 50–74, esp. 68–74; and B. Zissu, “Interbellum Judea 70–132 CE: An Archaeological Perspective,” in Jews and Christians in the First and Second Centuries: The Interbellum 70–132 CE, ed. J. Schwartz and P. Tomson (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 19–49, esp. 37–39. This does not include construction in the Greek poleis of Palestine or Roman government construction that peaked especially in the third century. On this issue, see Tsafrir, Eretz Yisrael, 40–41, 59–73, 305–332; and A. Oppenheimer, “Urbanisation and City Territories in Roman Palestine,” in Between Rome and Babylon, ed. N. Oppenheimer and A. Oppenheimer (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 30–46. On the monumental construction in Greek and mixed Greek and Jewish cities in Palestine, see R. Arav, Hellenistic Palestine: Settlement Pattern and City Planning 331–37 BC (Oxford: BAR, 1989); D. Sperber, The City in Roman Palestine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 73–102, 188–189; Z. Weiss, Public Spectacles in Roman and Late Antique Palestine (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 1–9, 42–81, 195–208; and J. Patrich, Studies in the Archaeology and History of Caesarea Maritima: Caput Judaeae, Metropolis Palaestinae (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 5–40, 205–224 (Herod’s palace, the governor’s palace [praetorium]), 259–269. 15 Tsafrir, Eretz Yisrael, 165–189; L. I. Levine, The Ancient Synagogue: The First Thousand Years (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 45–80, 174–209; Zissu, “Interbellum

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

63

Most recorded credit transactions were conducted between people of nonelite, for investment in agriculture or for developing commercial activity. A frequent reason for seeking credit was economic strife and the need for credit to supply vital necessities. In Jewish society, there is no evidence of credit given by organizations such as those found in the Roman world, where temples and other organizations were involved in the world of credit. Similarly, there is no evidence of loans given to groups of people as is found in Egypt. In Jewish society, the bankers were known as shulchani (‫שולחני‬: “table operator”). In the Mishnah and similar literature, the shulchani fulfilled the position of banker receiving deposits and providing credit. It seems that one person conducted the entire operation. The shulchani is mentioned also in a Greek inscription found in Beth Shearim that dates from the second half of the third century CE. It mentions a certain Leontis of Palmyra the “table operator”—τραπεζίτου Λεοντιίου Πολμυρηνου.16 3.3

The Economy of the Jewish Community of Babylon

There is little information about Babylonian Jewry before the Talmudic period in comparison to the information that we have for the Talmudic period (200–500 CE) itself. The economic situation of Babylonian Jewry during the Talmudic period was better than that of their brethren in Palestine. However, the sources show that they were primarily farmers and small-scale businesspersons. There is mention of a small number of wealthy Jews, some of them sages. However, there is no indication that they were involved in construction projects or international commercial activity that required large-scale credit.17

Judea,” 37–39; Z. Weiss, “Houses of the Wealthy in Roman Galilee,” in Roman Villas in the Mediterranean Basin, ed. G. P. R. Métraux and A. Marzano (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 317–327. 16 J. B. Frey, Corpus Inscriptionum Iudaicarum, Vol. 2: Asie-Afrique (Rome: Pontificio istituto di archeologia Cristiana, 1952), no. 1010; M. Schwabe and B. Lifshitz, Beth Sheʾarim, Vol. 2: The Greek Inscriptions (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974), 33, no. 92; L. Roth-Gerson, The Jews of Syria as Reflected in the Greek Inscriptions (Jerusalem: The Zalman Shazar Center, 2001), 210, 224, 295–299 [Hebrew]. On table operators in Palestine, see above, Chapter 2. 17 L. Jacobs, “The Economic Conditions of the Jews in Babylonia in Talmudic Times Compared with Palestine,” JSS 2 (1957): 349–359; Beer, Babylonian Amoraim, 35–58, 156–221; Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia, 126–133; D. Goodblatt, “The Jews in the Parthian Empire: What We Don’t Know,” in Judaea-Palaestina, Babylon and Rome: Jews in Antiquity, ed. B. Isaac and Y. Shahar (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 263–278.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

64

Chapter 3

The Babylonian Talmud was compiled in the Torah centers of the Babylonian sages that developed in this period. Eventually, the Babylonian Torah centers reached equal status and competed successfully with the centers in Palestine.18 It is likely that in early times the family was arranged according to a multigenerational structure and that there was a gradual change in the nuclear family. The Talmud already portrays Babylonian families as nuclear, inasmuch as the examples cited for the laws discussed by this source involve nuclear families.19 Citations from the BT discussed in the following chapters show that credit was in common use in the Jewish population of Babylon; it assumed various forms and was involved various kinds of transactions. And it had a significant effect on Jewish society.20 However, there is no indication in the various 18 See, for example, Neusner, History of the Jews in Babylonia 2:251–287, 3:91–338, 4:279–402, 5:315–318; D. Goodblatt, “The Babylonian Talmud,” ANRW II, 19 (2) (1979): 257–336; idem, “The History of the Babylonian Academies,” CHJ 4 (2006): 821–839; J. L. Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Beer, Babylonian Amoraim, 15–38, 50–58; Gafni, “Historical Background”; Elman, “Intersection”; and E. E. Urbach, Hahalakha-Mekoroteʾa Vehitpatkhuta (Givataim: Yad Latalmud, 1984), 200–235. On Sasanid policy, see, for example, E. Yarshater, “Introduction,” CHI 3 (1) (1983): xvii–lxxv; Lukonin, “Institutions”; R. N. Frye, “The Political History of Iran under the Sasanians,” CHI 3 (1) (1983): 116–180; idem, History; J. Weisehofer, Ancient Persia from 550 to 650 AD, trans. A. Azodi (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1996); Rubin, “The Sassanid Monarchy”; and Simpson, “Land behind Ctesiphon.” On the legal status of Babylonian Jewry, see, for example, G. Widengren, “The Status of Jews in the Sasanian Empire,” Iranica Antiqua 1 (1961): 117–157; D. Goodblatt, “The Poll Tax in Sasanian Babylonia: The Talmudic Evidence,” JESHO 22 (1979): 233–295; J. Neusner, “Jews in Iran,” CHI 3 (2) (1983): 909–923; Beer, Babylonian Amoraim, 15–24, 51–58; Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia, 26–54; and idem, “The Political, Social and Economic History of Babylonian Jewry, 224–638 CE,” CHJ 4 (2006): 792–820. On the connection between the two centers, see I. M. Gafni, Land, Center, Diaspora (Shefield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 96–120. On the lack of information on the pre-Talmudic period, see Goodblatt, “The Jews.” 19 Rubin, The End of Life, esp. 92–102, and index, s.v. “family–nuclear”; idem, The Joy of Life, index, s.v. “family–nuclear”; idem, Time and Life Cycle, index, s.v. “family–nuclear.” His main sources are derived from the Babylonian Talmud. See also Safrai, “Family Structure”; Satlow, Jewish Marriage; Tropper, “Economics of Jewish Childhood,” esp. 200–203; and idem, “Children and Childhood.” In contrast, in the Parthian and Sasanid Empires the patriarchal family structure prevailed. See M. Dezhamkhooy and L. Papoli Yazdi, “Heaven for Me, Hell for the Others: An Agenda on Sex and Body from Sassanid Persia,” in Archaeologies of Gender and Violence, ed. U. Matic and B. Jensen (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2017), 179–197; and A. Hintze, “Maria Macuch and Iranian Studies,” in A Thousand Judgements: Festschrift for Maria Macuch, ed. A. Hintze, D. Durkin-Meisterernst, and C. Naumann (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2019), 175–192. 20 Sages as well were involved in credit. See, for example, BT Moed Katan 10b; BT BM 73b: Ravina lends money to the people of Akra di Shanwatha. See also BT Gittin 14a: Rav Sheshet provides clothing as a loan in Mehoza; BT Gittin 37b: Rabbi Abba son of Manyumi lends money to Rabba; BT BK 104b–Rabbi Abba lends money to Rav Yosef son of Hama,

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

65

sources from Babylon of large-scale credit as there is in the sources for the Roman world. 3.4

Types of Credit in Palestine and Babylon

The many occurrences of credit transactions, as well as the lengthy discussions devoted to them in rabbinic sources, indicate that the rabbis were operating in an economically vibrant society. In addition, it seems that though there were loans that were given to the poor, many of the loans mentioned refer to significantly complex commercial transactions. Rich and poor could find themselves borrowing or lending money in various situations. Rabbinic sources define someone as “poor” if he did not have 200 zuz.21 At the same time, these same sources define minor transactions between friends as involving credit.22 The sources mention several cases of loans given to a Levite in exchange for future tithes that will be coming to him. This is a clear example of the poor receiving subsistence loans as well.23 There are also examples of transactions involving larger sums such as a loan of 1,000 zuz24 and a ketubah of 1,000 zuz.25 However, the value of a field,26 the price of an ox,27 and even the value of a vessel:28 these cases all relate to commercial and not subsistence loans. There was also credit received “from the King.” This seems to indicate that the Roman authorities would extend credit when they thought it would serve their interests. Those loans consisted of large-scale transactions. Sifre Devarim (26; Finkelstein, 38), a third-century compilation of rabbinic commentaries on Deuteronomy, tells of a person who borrowed from the King 100 kor of wheat

21

22 23 24 25 26 27 28

and Rav Pappa lends large sums of money in Mehoza; and BT BB 170a, 171b: Rav Yitzhak son of Yosef lends money to Rabbi Abba. For sages involved in interest and issues of aid for the poor through loans, see Beer, Babylonian Amoraim, 203–207, 211–212. M. Peah 8:8; G. Hamel, “Poverty,” in The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine, ed. C. Hezser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 308–324. There were various levels of poverty. See B. Z. Rosenfeld and H. Perlmutter, “The Poor as a Stratum of Jewish Society in Roman Palestine 70–250 CE: An Analysis,” Historia 60 (3) (2011): 273–300. M BM 5:9 attributes it to the ancient sage Hillel saying that a woman should not lend a loaf of bread to her friend without appraising its monetary value to avoid interest. M Gittin 3:7; T Gittin 3:1; BT Gittin 30a. M Makkot 1:1; T BM 1:20. M Ketubbot 6:3, 9:8; T. Ketubbot 6:6, 9:4. M BM 5:2. M Hulin 8:4; T Yoma 1:14; Rosenfeld and Perlmutter, Social Stratification, 43–44. M BM 3:8.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

66

Chapter 3

per year. In addition, in the Mekhilta de Rabbi Simeon (20:5; Epstein-Melamed, 148), a halakhic commentary on Exdous, there is mention of an individual who borrowed from the King 100 maneh, which translates to 10,000 zuz (denars). Though caution must be taken, these sources seem to indicate that there were loans of high cash sums in Jewish society as well. It is likely that Jews were involved to some extent in import and export, because the Jewish population exported its produce of wine and oil through the ports on the Mediterranean coast and used imported products such as fish salad as well.29 Rabbinic sources sometimes refer to international commerce, seafaring, and naval enterprises.30 Findings from Roman Italy show that import and export involved the use of credit to fund the enterprises involved in such trade. However, there is no mentioning of this large-scale credit in rabbinic literature. Perhaps it is because the international business was in the hands of non-Jewish entrepreneurs, or perhaps it was because the businesses were partnerships of Jews and non-Jews and they resolved any legal problems they may have had before the Roman courts and not before the rabbis. Later, in the Byzantine period, there is information about commercial activity in Palestine as goods were moved from the Near East to Europe.31 29 On transport by ships, see S. Kraus, Talmüdische Archäologie, Vol. 2 (Leipzig: G. Fock, 1911. Repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1966), 328; R. Patai, The Children of Noah: Jewish Seafaring in Ancient Times (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 41–59, 73–100; F. M. Heichelheim, “Roman Syria,” in An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, Vol. 1, ed. T. Frank (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933–1940), 123–257, esp. 201; and D. Sperber, Nautica Talmudica (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1986); idem, “Nautica in Talmudic Palestine,” Mediterranean Historical Review 15 (1) (2000): 29–32; S. A. Kingsley, Shipwreck Archaeolgy of the Holy Land: Processes and Parameters (London: Duckworth, 2004), 23–33, 74–92; N. Kashtan, “Seafaring and Jews in Graeco-Roman Palestine: Realistic and Symbolic Dimensions,” Mediterranean Historical Review 15 (1) (2000): 16–28; A. Linder, The Jews in Roman Imperial Legislation (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987), no. 19; Broshi, “Commerce in Antiquity”; and Rosenfeld and Menirav, Markets and Marketing, 127–133, n. 210. 30 See M Avodah Zarah 5, 4; T Demai 1: 11 (Lieberman, 64); T. Sheviit 5:2 (Lieberman, 186); T BM 7:14 (Lieberman, 101, 149–152); T Avodah Zarah 4:12; JT Taanit 4:5 (69a); and JT Avodah Zarah 2:10 (42b). See also Schwartz, Jewish Settlement in Judaea, 171–172; L. I. Levine, Caesarea under Roman Rule (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 49–50; Rouge, Ships and Fleets, 121–123; A. Kushnir-Stein, “On the Visit of Agrippa I to Alexandria in AD 38,” JJS 51 (2) (2000): 241–253, esp. 18; and L. Casson, The Ancient Mariners, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 166–169, 188, 191, 198–218; R. L. Hohlfelder, “Beyond Coincidence? Marcus Agrippa and King Herod’s Harbor,” JNES 59 (4) (2000): 241–253, esp. 245–246; and B. Z. Rosenfeld, “Innkeeping in Jewish Society in Roman Palestine,” JESHO 41 (2) (1998): 133–158. 31 Y. Dan, “Economic Life in Eretz Israel in the Byzantine Period in the Sixth and Seventh Centuries,” in Commerce in Palestine throughout the Ages: Studies, ed. B. Z. Kedar, T. Dothan, and S. Safrai (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1990), 181–194, esp. 185–186 [Hebrew]. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

67

There are also credit transactions in the sources in which women are involved. The most common example is the woman’s ketubah, a marriage contract that was considered by the sages as an economic agreement and a guarantee. There are also explicit loans such as the case in which Rabbi Hiya’s daughter lent money to the sage Rav.32 Regarding credit, the rabbis treated women as they treated men. The ketubah was identical to any other legal document. The only difference was that the minimum obligation of the husband toward his wife was 200 zuz even if stated otherwise. Protections are provided for the widow against seizure of collateral from her belongings. This protection was afforded by the rabbis to women, not to men.33 In all other areas, the obligations of a woman who borrows money were identical to those of a man. 3.5

The Rabbis’ Considerations: Social Justice

The rabbis’ considerations were primarily legal and moral. They usually refrained from interfering with the economy, business agreements, and loan contracts, if there was no religious issue in play. As the generations passed by, the rabbis’ legislation increasingly involved commercial activity. The Mishnaic laws contain a combination of moral and legal considerations with attitudes and rules that prevailed in previous generations. The Talmudic sages had Tannaitic traditions as precedents, but they operated in a different social and economic environment. Therefore, their discussions related to commentary on the Tannaitic material in addition to dealing with evolving financial arrangements that prevailed in the Sasanid economy. The sages maintained a balanced approach to lenders and borrowers, holding both parties equally responsible to act according to Torah law.34 An early case in rabbinic literature representing this approach is the wellknown prozbul amendment attributed to Hillel the Elder, who operated in the late Second Temple period (ca. 20 BCE–20 CE). This document indirectly bypassed the Torah requirement from the creditors to forfeit loans owed during the Sabbatical year. The source shows that Hillel’s considerations for doing so were purely social ones. M. Sheviit 10:3 (Neusner, 91) states the following:

32 JT BM 4:1 (9c); BT BM 44b. 33 M BM 9:13; T BM 10:10 (Lieberman, 119). 34 This idea is expressed in a legal statement from the end of the Talmudic period indicating that this was the rabbi’s intention. BT BB 172b (Soncino, 752): “The Rabbis have made the necessary provision. Whosoever acts [accordingly] reaps the benefit; he who does not act [accordingly] has himself to blame, for any loss suffered.” Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

68

Chapter 3

[A loan against which] a prozbol [has been written] is not cancelled [by the Sabbatical year]. This is one of the things which Hillel the Elder ordained. When he saw that people refrained from lending one another money [on the eve of the Sabbatical year] and [thereby] transgressed that which is written in the Torah, “Beware lest you harbor the base thought […] and so you are mean to your kinsman and give him nothing” (Dt. 15:9), Hillel ordained the prozbol [whereby the court, on behalf of the creditor, may collect unpaid debts otherwise cancelled by the Sabbatical year]. The prozbul was discussed after the destruction as well in the Mishnah and Talmud.35 Despite the religious guise of the reason for the amendment—the bad intentions of the lenders—the reason behind this amendment is clearly socioeconomic. When the Sabbatical year came close, the wealthy would stop giving loans out of a fear of losing the principal when the Torah decree would cancel the obligation to pay it back at the end of the year. Hillel amended the prozbul so the lenders could lend freely, knowing that they would be able to recoup principal despite the arrival of the Sabbatical year. On one level, the prozbul helped the poor receive subsistence loans prior to the Sabbatical year.36 On the other hand, it protected the creditor’s money, and seemed de facto to cancel the Torah-ordained gift to the poor. Later, the Mishnah (Sheviit 10: 6) says that the prozbul is applicable only to a lender who owns land. This condition would exclude many of the poor borrowers from utilizing the prozbul in order to receive subsistence loans close to the Sabbatical year, yet it would grant to the neediest the chance to have their debts cancelled.37 The rabbis recognized the importance of an efficient credit system as a tool to advance and develop the economy and stimulate commercial activity. One important area of credit was the lending of money to farmers to purchase

35 In the same chapter (Mishnah 7), Rabbi Eliezer (ca. 70–120 CE) discusses the prozbul. 36 See M. Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1994), 2:504, 511–513, 561–562; and A. Gulak, Yesodei ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri, Seder Dinei Mamonot be-Israel Al Pi Mekorot ha-Talmud, Vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1967), 115–116. T Gittin 4:10 mentions another unusual act of Hillel in favor of the poor. 37 See also BT Gittin 36a; and Y. Feliks, Talmud Yerushalmi: Tractate Sheviit, Critically Edited, Part Two. (Jerusalem: Rubin Mass Publishers, 1986), 313, n. 82 [Hebrew]. On the economic reality of the prozbul, see S. R. Llewelyn and R. A. Kearsley, New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity, Vol. 7 (North Ryde, Australia: Macquarie University Press, 1994), 225– 232; Hamel, Poverty and Charity, 156–201, and index, s.v. “charity”; Sperber, Dictionary, 154–156; H. Gamoran, “The Prozbul: Accommodation to Reality,” Jewish Law Association Studies 22 (2012): 103–111; and Y. Elman, “Hercules within the Halakhic Tradition,” Dine Israel 25 (2008): 7–41, 13*–14*.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

69

seed to plant the fields.38 Another involved the marketing of the agricultural produce of the farms for future consumption. There was a need to encourage people with capital to invest it through lending money, which would thereby fuel the economy. There are statements and amendments made by the rabbis that are meant to create an environment whereby borrowers would feel motivated to pay back their loans. When the rabbis mentioned the possibility of bad conduct, Rabbi Simeon [HaCohen] added: “He who borrows and does not pay; He that borrows from man is as one that borrows from God” (M Avot 2:9). This Rabbi Simeon (60–80 CE) was a disciple of Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai. The rabbis also ensured that the borrowers would return the loan in the proper setting, one that would not inconvenience the creditor. M Bava Kamma (BK) 10:6 (Neusner, 527) states: He who stole something from his fellow, or borrowed something from him, or with whom the latter deposited something, in a settled area may not return it to him in the wilderness. [If it was] on the stipulation that he was going to go forth to the wilderness, he may return it to him in the wilderness. The Mishnah says that when credit was given in a settlement, it is prohibited to return it in the desert because of the delicate security situation in the desert and the danger that thieves or highwaymen would take the money. However, if it was prearranged that they go out to the desert to take the loan, then they may return it in the desert too. This case is expanded in T BK 10:30 (Neusner, 4:67), which adds that the individual may return the loan in a caravan that provides protection even when traveling in the desert.39 3.6

Credit in Jewish Society: The Problem of Interest

3.6.1 The Prohibition of Usury from the Bible until the Mishnah The Jewish economy had a unique obstacle regarding credit, and that was the Torah prohibition against charging interest. The Torah prohibits receiving or giving any benefit in addition to the principal of the loan in any form. It repeats 38 See M BM 5:8. 39 See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:128–129. See also T BM 10:31 for a similar ruling. Babylonian sages as well made sure to protect the creditor and the credit market. See Y. Elman, “Samuel’s Scythe-Handle: Sasanian Mortgage Law in the Bavli,” IranoJudaica 7 (2019): 129–143.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

70

Chapter 3

this prohibition in three places. In Exodus 22:24, it says: “If you lend money to my people, to the poor among you, do not act toward them as a creditor; exact no interest from them.” In Leviticus 25:35–38, it elaborates: “If your kinsman, being in stairs, comes under your authority, and you hold him as though a resident alien, let him live by your side: do not exact from him advance or accrued interest, but fear your god. Let him live by your side as your relative. Do not lend him your money at advance interest, or give him your food at accrued interest. I the Lord am your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, to give you the land of Canaan, to be your God.” In Deuteronomy 23:20–21, the prohibition is repeated: “You shall not charge interest on your loans to your countryman, whether in money or food or anything else that can be charged as interest; but you may charge interest on loans to foreigners. Do not charge interest on loans to your fellow citizen, so that the Lord your God may bless you in all your undertakings in the land that you are about to enter and possess.” The recurring word concerning interest is “no.” In its explanation and rationalization of the prohibition, the Torah highlights the social aspect and that the ordinance is protecting the poor, who need the loan in order to survive. The first two sources state it explicitly. The quote from Deuteronomy does not state it explicitly, but it uses similar words—“your countryman” (constructed form of ach, lit. “brother”) and “charge interest” (lit. “to bite,” a verbal form of neshekh)—and this indicates that it too is referring to loans to the poor (e.g., crisis or subsistence loans).40 40 See J. J. Rabinowitz, “Interest,” Encyclopedia Biblica 2:813–816 [Hebrew]; S. L. Lowenstam, “Neshech ve-Tarbit,” in Encyclopedia Biblica (1968): 5:929–930; and J. Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 2209–2211. Milgrom explains that neshekh is monetary interest determined at the time of the loan, while tarbit is produce that grows after the loan. See R. Wakely, “lwh, II,” in New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis, Vol. 2, ed. W. A. VanGemeren (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1997), 768–770; idem, “nsk,” in New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis, Vol. 3, ed. W. A. VanGemeren (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1997), 185–189; A. E. Hill, “rbh,” in New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis, Vol. 3, ed. W. A. VanGemeren (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1997), 1037–1040; E. Neufeld, “The Prohibitions against Loans at Interest in Ancient Hebrew Laws,” HUCA 26 (1955): 355–412, collects a lot of research on this subject. See also B. Z. Eliash, “Ideological Roots of the Halakhah: A Chapter in the Laws of Interest,” Shenaton Ha-Mishpat Ha-Ivri 5 (1978): 7–78, esp. 8–17, 49–75 [Hebrew]; G. Langer, “Der Gerechte, er leiht nicht gegen Zinsen und treibt keinen Profit ein’ (Ez. 18.8): zum biblischen und rabbinischen Zinsverbot,” Aschkenas 20 (2) (2010): 189–213; Frier, “Interest and Usury”; H. Gamoran, “Talmudic Usury Laws and Business Loans,” JSJ 7 (2) (1976): 129–142; A. Weingort, Intérêt et crédit dans le droit talmudique (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1979), xxxi–xxxii; A. Cohen, “The Development of the Prohibition against Usury in Jewish Law during the Mishnaic and Talmudic Periods,” MA thesis, Concordia University, 1974, 20–40,

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

71

It is also possible to claim that the Torah does not categorically prohibit all forms of benefit to the creditor. The prohibition applies only to transactions in which the benefit is agreed upon when the loan is given. Later, in the Talmudic period, the rabbis called this ribit ketzutzah (“interest proper”; see below). The Torah, in this case, using the terms neshekh (“biting”) and tarbit (“increase”), calls it “interest.” This form of interest can apply to loans of goods and merchandise in addition to cash loans. The biblical attitude to interest continues in Jewish sources dating to the Hellenistic period.41 The Septuagint (LXX) translates the words neshekh and tarbit as follows: Septuagint: Lev. 25:36: Thou shalt not receive from him interest (-τόκον), nor increase (-πλήθει) (-οὐ λήψῃ παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ τόκον, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ πλήθει). Thou shalt not lend thy money (-ἀργύριόν) to him at interest (-τόκῳ), and thou shalt not lend thy meat to him to be returned with increase (-πλεονασμῷ) (-37 τὸ ἀργύριόν σου οὐ δώσεις αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τόκῳ καὶ ἐπὶ πλεονασμῷ οὐ δώσεις αὐτῷ τὰ βρώματά σου).42 The LXX commentates on the biblical passage by presenting neshekh as interest in money and tarbit as interest in food (i.e., meat). Philo (ca. 20 BCE–50 CE) takes a similar approach. When mentioning the Torah prohibition of interest, he adds: “The borrower is not living with plenty, and clearly he [the lender] is under stress.”43 Two generations later, Josephus, who operated at the time of the destruction of the Temple, writes as follows: Let it not be permitted to lend either meat or drink to any one of the Hebrews at interest, for it is not just to profit from the misfortunes of one’s compatriot; but in helping his needs you should consider as a gain the gratitude of those men and the reward that will come from God for this generosity.44

41 42 43 44

89–92; D. L. Baker, Tight Fists or Open Hands: Wealth and Poverty in Old Testament Law (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 252–266, 275–285. He showed that there were Jews who loaned for interest, but on the other hand other nations also limited credit for interest in various forms. See Millett, Lending and Borrowing, 100–102. Regarding the Jews in Egypt, for example, see Tcherikover, “Prolegomena,” 49–51, n. 10; Neufeld, “Prohibitions,” 411–412; and Baker, Tight Fists, 264–266, n. 61. In Deut. 23:20, the Septuagint provides a similar translation. Philo, De Spec. Leg. 2.74–78; idem, De Virt. 82–85. Josephus, Ant. 4.266. See also L. Feldman, Flavius Josephus: Translation and Commentary, Vol. 3: Judean Antiquities 1–4 (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2000), 436–437, n. 872.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

72

Chapter 3

In the next paragraph, Josephus emphasizes that the prohibition includes lending money and other products as well.45 It can be inferred from the words of Josephus that he is talking about “crisis loans” whether in cash or in various other edible (meat) or non-edible products (seeds). After the above-quoted paragraph, Josephus writes concerning the taking of collateral; he mentions loans to the wealthy in addition to the poor, indicating that the prohibition of charging interest applies to loans to the wealthy as well as the poor. Meanwhile, a number of papyri from Egypt from 200 BCE until 200 CE mention loans with interest (of 24%) involving Jewish lenders and borrowers.46 It is difficult to determine whether the loans were business loans or crisis loans, but the interest charged indicates the possibility that they applied the Torah prohibition only to crisis loans and not to business ones, and that they were therefore able to charge interest on these loans. Loan documents recovered in the Judean Desert from the collection known as the “Babatha Documents” or Babatha Archive, dated to c.100–130 CE, describe loans without mention of interest to be paid. However, two of the documents contain transactions in which Jews were charging other Jews interest. One of these documents mentions that the guardians of Joshua son of Joshua lent his money for 6% interest. Babatha, his mother and the holder of the papyri, suggested charging 9% interest instead.47 45 See Josephus, Ant. 4.267. 46 See Tcherikover, Prolegomena, 35–36, and ns. 92, 96 (including loans without interest); CPJ 1:23–24, 34–36, 48–49, 51 n. 10; 2:142 (7), 411 (179–181), index, technical terms, s.v. “tokos,” 3:488 (66–77); and J. M. Modrzejewski, The Jews of Egypt: From Rameses II to Emperor Hadrian. Trans. R. Cornman. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1995, 113–119, 252–259. Two new documents mentioned in CPJ, 4, No. 557, 564, from the second half of the second century BCE during the Ptolemean dynasty mention loans. One does not mention interest but if the loan is not paid in full on time there will be a high penalty and interest added. In the other the interest was 24%. If the loan was not returned on time the interest would be increased. Although, M. Broshi and E. Kimron, “A Hebrew I.O.U. Note from the Second Year of the Bar-Kokhba Revolt,” JJS 45 (1994): 286–294, here 287, n. 6 (from 133 CE), say: “Like all ancient Jewish promissory notes (not including those from Elephantine), no interest is mentioned.” In Elephantine, loans—both in cash and in natura (grain)—carried exorbitant rates of interest. 47 Lewis, The Documents, 58–64, nos. 11, 13. See also P. Benoit, “Textes Grecs et Latins,” in Discoveries in the Judaean Desert: Les Grottes de Murabba‌ʾat, ed. P. Benoit, J. T. Milik, and R. de Vaux (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 209–280, esp. 240–241, no. 114; M. Broshi, “Agriculture and Economy in Roman Palestine: Seven Notes on the Babatha Archive,” IEJ 42 (3–4) (1992): 230–240; H. Eshel and E. Eshel, “Fragments of Two Aramaic Documents Which Were Brought to Abʾior Cave during the Bar-Kokhba Revolt,” Eretz-Israel 23 (1992): 276–285, esp. 280 [Hebrew]; H. Eshel, E. Eshel, and G. Geiger, “Mur 174: A Hebrew IOU Document from Wadi Murabba‌ʾat,” Liber Annuus 58 (2008): 313–326; Safrai, “Halakhic

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

73

However, even if the Torah prohibition was understood during the Second Temple period to apply only to crisis loans, it is hard to define in day-to-day life which loans were “crisis” loans and which were business ones. For example, when a landowner needs cash and takes a loan so as not to have to sell real estate, is that a business loan or a crisis one? When a client pays for the construction of his house, who is the poor person—the homeowner paying for the house or the contractor? These issues probably came up all the time, but there is no clear indication from the sources regarding how they were treated. In post-Second Temple rabbinic literature, there is a drastic change in the prevailing attitude toward the issue of interest. The rabbis present a law prohibiting interest focused primarily on commercial loans as well as crisis loans.48 The prolific discussions of the rabbis in the Mishnah were possibly accelerated by the complex economic situation following the destruction of the Second Temple and even more so with the failure of the Bar Kokhba Revolt.49

48

49

Observance,” 234–236; J. S. Kloppenborg, “The Growth and Impact of Agricultural Tenancy in Jewish Palestine (III BC–1CE),” JESHO 51 (1) (2008): 31–66, esp. 38, n. 26; and H. Eshel, “On the Use of the Hebrew Language in Economic Documents from the Judean Desert,” in Jesus’s Last Week, ed. R. S. Notley (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 245–258. There is a loan document from the fifth to sixth century CE that seems to include interest. See M. Mishor, “A New Edition of a Hebrew Letter: Oxford Ms. Heb. d. 69 (P),” Leshonenu 53 (1989): 215–264, esp. 223 [Hebrew]. This was part of a set of innovations in halakhah after the destruction of the Second Temple. See Y. Sussmann, “The History of Halakha and the Dead Sea Scrolls: Preliminary Observations of Miqsat Ma‌ʾase Ha-Torah (4QMMT),” Tarbiz 59 (1990): 11–76 [Hebrew] [English: “The History of Halakha and the Dead Sea Scrolls: Preliminary Observations of Miqsat Ma‌ʾase Ha-Torah (4QMMT),” in Qumran Cave 4.V: Miqsat Ma‌ʾase Ha-Torah (4QMMT), ed. E. Qimron and J. Strugnell (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 179–200]; V. Noam, “The Emergence of Rabbinic Culture from the Perspective of Qumran,” JAJ 6 (2) (2015): 253–274, n. 6; and J. Neusner, The Mishnah (Leiden: Brill, 1993), esp. 1–44. Regarding economic problems following the destruction, see Alon, The Jews, 56–85, 152–175; E. Smallwood, Smallwood, The Jews under Roman Rule, 2nd ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 363–368; Schürer, The History of the Jewish People, 1:514–534; Schwartz, “Political, Social and Economic Life,” esp. 23–25, 38–45; M. Goodman, Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash of Ancient Civilizations (London: Penguin, 2007), 445–468; and W. Horbury, Jewish War under Trajan and Hadrian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 109–128, 147–163. For the literary aspect, see J. N. Epstein, Introduction to Tanaitic Literature: Mishna, Tosefta and Halakhic Midrashim (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1957), 15–87, 508–510 [Hebrew]; Gafni, “Historical Background”; J. Neusner, The Mishnah: Religious Perspectives (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 187–245; idem, The Mishnah: Social Perspectives (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 166–184; and Cohen, The Maccabees, 32, 214–231.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

74

Chapter 3

The Prohibition of Usury in Early Rabbinic Literature (Mishnah and Tosefta) The fifth chapter of Bava Metzia discusses issues of credit and interest. The Mishnah contains a different, more stringent understanding of the prohibition of interest compared to the sources cited above, including Josephus. The Mishnah (BM 5:9; Lapin, 278) states:

3.6.2

Let a person not say to his fellow: “Lend me a kor and I will give it to you [at the time of] the threshing floor,” but he says to him: “[Lend] … until my son comes,” [or] “… until I find the key.” Hillel prohibits. For thus Hillel used to say: “Let a woman not lend a loaf to her fellow until she has calculated monetary value, lest wheat become more expensive and they will come to commit usury.”50 The first anonymous opinion prohibits lending a measure of agricultural produce during the year and to return an identical amount of the same product at harvest. The reason for this stance is that the product may rise in price at harvest time, and that would give profit to the lender. This loan is termed seʾah beseʾah in a later Mishnah and could have been either a crisis or a commercial loan. The Mishnah permits a short-term loan of seʾah beseʾah “until my son will come or I bring the key” because in a short time it is unlikely that the product’s price will change. The second opinion is attributed to Hillel (the Elder), who lived approximately three generations before the Second Temple’s destruction (contemporary with Philo and prior to Josephus).51 Hillel prohibited loans of “produce for produce” even for a short amount of time. This shows that the Mishnah attributed prohibition of all kinds of interest even during the late Second Temple period. Another source, which is rather stringent, is attributed to Rabban Gamaliel, who operated in the Yavneh period after the Second Temple’s destruction (85–115 CE).52 The Mishnah (BM 5:10; Lapin, 280) states: Rabban Gamaliel says: “There is interest (ribit) in advance, and there is interest delayed.” How? He wanted (lit. “set his eyes”) to borrow from him; he would send [gifts] to him, and said to him: “So that he will lend 50 Instone-Brewer, Traditions, 24, 248–249, and index, s.v. “Hillel.” 51 It is unlikely that the Hillel mentioned here was Hillel the second son of Rabbi Judah the Prince, since he operated after the editing of the Mishnah. 52 On his status, see D. Goodblatt, The Monarchic Principle: Studies in Jewish Self-Government in Antiquity (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1994), esp. 211–256.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

75

to me”: this is interest in advance. He borrowed from him and returned his money to him; he would send [gifts] to him, and say to him: “For his money, which was idle with me”; this is interest delayed. According to this source, Rabban Gamaliel is making a general statement that expands the prohibition of interest. The assumption is that entering interest into a loan agreement is prohibited. He adds that “early interest” is also prohibited—that is, interest charged prior to the actual loan. He also adds that late interest is prohibited—that is, interest charged after the loan was paid back. It also says “he would send him” and does not say what he sent. This shows that it is prohibited to give products as interest just as it is prohibited to give money. He does not relate to Hillel’s case of “fruit for fruit,” in which he disagreed with the anonymous opinion. Both sources share a stringent approach to the prohibition of interest, expanding it beyond the explicit prohibition in the Torah. Indeed, sages from Rabban Gamaliel’s time and thereafter are quoted as making statements with a similar message, showing that the stringent approach to the law of interest was prevalent in rabbinic circles back then.53 The first Mishnah in the fifth chapter of Bava Metzia summarizes the fundamental definition of usury: M BM 5:1: Which is nesekh and which is tarbit? Which is nesekh? One who lends a sela for five dinarim, two sain of wheat for three, because he bites (noshekh). And which is tarbit? One who increases (ha-marbeh) by means of produce. The Mishnah clarifies the definition of interest with respect to two concepts: neshekh and tarbit. Neshekh refers to interest specified at the time of the loan. Two examples were offered. The first one was in coin—a sela worth four denars was supplied for a return of five denars. The second was kind: Two seʾah of wheat were loaned for the return of three seʾahs. Tarbit means multiplication and growth. The example involves late interest. Someone purchased a measure of wheat and paid a golden denar per kor, which was the official rate. Afterward, before the wheat was supplied, the price of wheat went up. The buyer asked for 53

For example, the Tosefta (BM 6:17; Neusner, 4:109) says: “Rabbi Aqiva says interest is difficult; even saying ‘Shalom’ is prohibited.” Rabbi Akiva was a student of Rabban Gamaliel. His statement prohibits all forms of benefit for the lender, even saying to him: “Hello!” Rabbi Simon, his disciple, prohibits “verbal interest” (M BM 5:10), thus adding stringency to the words of his rabbi. And see M BM 5:5. It is therefore preferable to assume that the interest law was known in rabbinic circles at the time of Rabban Gamaliel (85–115 CE) and perhaps preceded it.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

76

Chapter 3

his wheat, saying that he wanted to sell it and buy wine. The seller said that he would pay buyer with wine according to the new rate of the wheat. On the other hand, the rabbis permitted borrowing money for the mutual profit of both parties: One may enrich (in Hebrew: mafrin, ‫ )מפרין‬his field, and he ought not hesitate because of interest.54 An individual rented a field, committing to work the field all year round and give a portion of the produce to the owner. The owner gave the renter a sum of money to invest in the field in a way that was expected to improve it (e.g., fertilization). The source states that there is no issue of interest here. The increase in the product received by the owner at the end of the year is a result of his investment. The Tosefta expounds on the above ruling on what happens when the tenant works the field all year round and reaps the fruit, giving the owner of the field a set quantity of produce. T BM 5:13 (Neusner, 4:102) states: Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, “They pay increased rent [in exchange for a loan for the improvement of] one’s field” [M BM 5:5]. How so? [If] one has accepted the tending of a field in exchange for ten kors of wheat, and then said to him, “Give me two hundred denars, and I shall fertilize it, and then I’ll pay you twelve kors [of wheat] in a year’s time”—it is permitted. But they may not pay increased rent [in exchange for a loan for the improvement of] one’s ship, shop, or anything which does not earn its keep. In this specific case, the renter suggests that the owner add a sum of money to invest in the field and that in return he would pay the owner a higher amount in rent: two more kors of wheat. The owner would earn back his investment and even make a profit. This is permissible because the investment would improve the field, which that would produce more produce. The source does not determine how it can be insured that the money is exclusively invested in the field. The Tosefta concludes that this permission is restricted to things that “do and eat,” which include animals and fields. However, ships or stores, which

54 BM 5:5 (Lapin, 275). On the term mafrin and for an explanation of the issue raised in this source, see Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:216, lines 30–33.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

77

do that do not improve the product as a direct result of the investment, are not included in this category.55 Another important issue is the definition of lending for interest verses renting out an object for pay (M. BM Lapin, 272): One may increase (marbiʾm) upon the [rental] fee but one may not increase upon the sale [price]. How? He leased a courtyard to him. He said to him: “If you give me [payment] now, lo, it is yours for ten sela’in per year, but if monthly, for a sela per month”—it is permitted. He sold him a field. He said to him: “If you give me [payment] now, lo, it is yours for one thousand zuz, but if at the threshing floor, twelve maneh”—it is prohibited. The Mishnah differentiates between rental and payment for purchase. When one purchases a property, the money should be paid up front. If there is an increase in payment because the buyer wants to pay later, this is a form of interest. However, when renting an object or property, the time of payment is at the end. It is therefore permissible to give a discount for payment in advance and the “regular” high price for payment at the end of the rental period.56 This Mishnah includes sale on credit in the prohibition of interest but excludes rental payment from this prohibition, thus placing a limit on the prohibition of interest. The Tosefta explains and defines this limit or exception further by bringing up an example of rental concerning coins (T BM 4:2, Neusner, 4:94): Just as a loan is distinctive in that it is not that which you give to the other party which you take back from him. So these are excluded, for that which you give to the other party is precisely which you take back from him. This passage then proceeds to show that it is possible even to rent someone coins. As long as the coins themselves are returned to the lender, it is not a loan but a rental and it is permitted. Thus, the Tosefta continues:

55

Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with the Tosefta and allows it. See JT BM 5:6 (10c) (Guggenheimer, 399). The Amora Resh Lakish prohibits it like the Tosefta does. This issue is further discussed in BT BM 69b. 56 See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:192, lines 2–4; B. Cohen, “Antichresis in Jewish and Roman Law,” in Jewish and Roman Law: A Comparative Study, Vol. 2 (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1966), 433–456, esp. 434–440.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

78

Chapter 3

A man rents out his coins to a money changer to beautify himself with them, to study them, and to decorate with them. This creates a rule. When the same object is returned to the lender, it is a case of rental and not a loan. It is therefore permissible even to take “rent” for coins that are needed in order for a banker to show that he has money so people will feel safe to deposit their coins with him. Since the same coins are to be returned, it is not interest: it is rental. Similarly, it is permissible to rent coins to the banker in order to learn about the currency or to have them displayed. The banker is in these cases a “paid watchman” for these objects just like anyone who is renting an object. However, if the banker (as borrower) uses those coins intending to return others, then it is a loan and considered to be interest-bearing.57 Another Mishnah that limits the prohibition of interest is M BM 5:3 (Lapin, 273): He lent him [money] against his field. And he said to him: “If you don’t give me [payment] from now until three years [from now], lo, it is mine”—lo, it is his. So Boethos b. Zenon used to do in accordance with the sages. This Mishnah states that the rabbis gave permission for the practice of Boethus ben Zonin, which could have been seen as generating interest. It does not specify the details of Boethus’s practice. The Tosefta (BM 4:2; Neusner, 4:95) expounds on this issue, and it seems that even a generation later there was disagreement regarding the specifics of the practice: [If] one had a debt of ready cash and wrote over his field, or if he sold it when the seller has the right to the usufruct, it is permitted. But if the purchaser has the usufruct, it is prohibited. R. Judah says, “One way or the other it is permitted.” Said Rabbi Judah, “Thus was the practice of Boethus b. Zonin on the instruction of Eleazar b. Azariah.” They said to him, “How is there proof from that fact? But the seller enjoys the usufruct.” According to this passage, there was a dispute between Rabbi Judah and his colleagues about how to understand the permission given to Boethus ben Zonin. Rabbi Judah said that eating fruit from a field that is collateral is not 57 Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:192–194, line 7, explains this case in the Tosefta differently. However, this distinction is certainly included in the rule, which the Tosefta states, that if the object itself is not returned it becomes a loan not a rental.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

79

a form of interest, while the majority opinion defined this as a form of interest. Both opinions agree that the sages granted Boethus permission to keep a field if the loan was not paid, thus limiting the prohibition of interest; however, there is a dispute regarding the details.58 The rabbis prohibited benefits to the lender even when it was not at the expense of the borrower. The rabbis prohibited other forms of compensation for the lender as well. Mishnah BM 5:2 (Lapin, 272) states: One who lends to his fellow—let him not live in his courtyard for free, and let him not lease from him for less, because it is interest (ribit). One may increase (marbim) upon the [rental] fee but one may not increase upon the sale [price]. This Mishnah prohibits the lender from receiving benefit from the borrower even if it is not a present. The prohibition is general. Even if the lender did not demand it, and there was no direct relationship between the grant of the loan and the benefit, and even if the benefit already existed at the time of the loan, it is nonetheless prohibited. A similar contract between borrower and lender is found in a significant collection of Egyptian papyri. These contracts contain a clause that enables the lender to use a property of the borrower such as a house (ἐνοίκησις, right of habitation) in lieu of the interest due to him. This arrangement was called antichresis in the papyri from the Hellenistic and Roman periods.59 This indicates that the case mentioned in the Mishnah is not 58

It seems that the value of the field was higher than the loan. Otherwise, Boethus did not need rabbinic permission for his practice. For examples of loans in which the collateral (fields) is more expensive than the loans themselves, see M Shavuot 6:7; T Sheviit 8:5 (Lieberman, 201); T Ketubbot 4:12 (69); T BM 4:6 (82); and JT Yevamot 15:3 (14d). See also Cohen, “Antichresis,” esp. 442–444, 454–456. 59 G. M. Browne (ed.), Documentary Papyri from the Michigan Collection (Toronto: A. M. Hakkert Ltd., 1970), 33–36 (P. 585) and the notes. The contract he cites is from 87 CE. There was a similar papyrus from 120 CE (P. Mich. Inv. 108). The term antichresis was in use in Hellenistic times, and continued to be used into the Roman era, especially in the first and second centuries CE. See also P. Van Minnen, “An Antichretic Loan from Early Roman Alexandria Revisited (BGU IV 1053),” ZPE 199 (2016): 144–154, esp. 145. The antichresis is used by the state as well when owed money by individuals. See A. C. T. Coughlan, “Antichresis and Dioikesis: Negotiating Public and Private Debt in the Egyptian Delta,” ZPE 205 (2018): 217–227, esp. n. 6. In Italy, the concept of antichresis appears only in the third century CE, but the right of habitation was a component in contracts earlier than that. See R. Bobbink and Q. Mauer, “Antichresis: A Comparative Study of Classical Roman Law and the Contractual Praxis from Roman Egypt,” Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 87 (4) (2019): 356–383, esp. 3.2, 4. See also J. F. Healey, “Some Lexical and Legal Notes on a Syriac Loan Transfer of 240 CE,” in “Malphono w-Rabo d-Malphone”: Studies in Honor

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

80

Chapter 3

random. The sages were likely aware of antichresis contracts that were in use in the Greco-Roman world. Jewish law does not allow payment of interest, and therefore would prohibit including an antichresis clause in a loan contract. The Mishnah prohibits granting right of habitation to the lender even if it is a “present” from the lender and not part of the loan contract itself—it is considered de facto interest and is therefore prohibited.60 3.7

Expanding the Scope of Usury

The giving of a present by the borrower to the lender is another phenomenon found in the world of credit. One of the ways people used to bypass the prohibition of interest and to compensate the lender for the use of his money was to define the interest as a “present” from the borrower to the lender. This present could be given in cash or any other form that benefits the lender such as merchandise, work, or even honor. It could be used to bypass limitations on the amount of interest one may charge. Sometimes these presents were hidden, and sometimes they were considered an obligation just like returning the loan itself. These presents were given within the same social circles and from clients to patrons, and within collegia and families.61 Rabbinic sources also contain discussions about these presents, which talked about how they were often used to persuade the lender to lend the money, or to compensate him for lending without interest. Rabban Gamaliel, who was a prominent leader between 85 and 115 CE, was cited as stating that such a present is defined as interest. Mishnah BM 5:10 states (Lapin, 278): Rabban Gamaliel says: “There is interest (ribit) in advance, and there is interest delayed.” How? He wanted (lit. “set his eyes”) to borrow from him; he would send [gifts] to him, and said to him ‘So that he will lend to me’; this is interest in advance. He borrowed from him and returned his money to him; he would send [gifts] to him, and said to him: “For his money, which was idle with me; this is interest delayed.”

of Sebastian P. Brock, ed. G. A. Kiraz (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2008), 211–226, esp. 214–215, who cites documents from Syria and the surroundings that contain antichresis contracts. 60 On this Mishnah, see also its expansion in T BM 4:2; 4:5; JT BM 5:1 (10a, line 71); BT BM 64b–65a. 61 Coffee, Gift and Gain, esp. 3–6, 92–94, and index, s.v. “credit,” “debt,” “loan”; Dixon, “The Meaning of Gift”; Verboven, “Friendship.”

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

81

Rabban Gamaliel regards such a present as interest even when the present was given before the loan was issued in anticipation of asking for it, or after the loan was paid back and concluded. He states that the borrower is connecting in his words the present to the future loan or to the past loan. This leaves room for commentary that if the borrower does not verbally connect the present to the loan then it could be permissible.62 The Tosefta (BM 6:17; Neusner, 4:109) states: Rabbi Aqiva says: usury is hard for even a very greeting is a matter of usury. How so? This one never greeted the other in his entire life until he had to borrow money from him. Now he rushes to greet him. So this is a kind of greeting which is a matter of usury.63 The borrower starts to greet the lender every time he sees him, changing his previous behavior. Rabbi Akiva sees this as interest even though it is not part of the loan agreement and the loan was returned already. This Tosefta shows Rabbi Akiva’s extreme approach to interest, expanding the prohibition to a behavior that is not monetary. There is another relevant statement attributed to Rabbi Akiva in the JT (BM 5:13 (10b); Guggenheimer, 417–418) that runs as follows: Rabbi Aqiva says interest is difficult since even a favor can be interest. If one told him to buy vegetables on the market for him even though he gave him the money this is interest. Rabbi Akiva states that even if the borrower benefits the lender after the return of the money it is considered interest. He thus prevents the lender from using his economic power to attain privileges. Another example of this type of interest was attributed to Rabbi Akiva’s disciple, and appears in the Mishnah (BM 5:10; Lapin, 278–279): R. Simeon says: “There is verbal interest”; let him not say to him: “Know that a certain man is coming from a certain place [to borrow].”

62

The source does not limit this ruling only to cash: the same is true if the gift was given in kind. See also BT BM 75a. 63 See also JT BM 5:8 (10d), which attributes this statement to Rabbi Simeon son of Rabbi Eleazar.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

82

Chapter 3

This case is an example in which the lender can supply the creditor with information that can benefit the lender. If the information was supplied at the time of the return of the loan, it is likely that it was connected to the loan itself. It seems that the reason why the rabbis followed this extreme approach was that allowing “presents” from the borrower to the lender after the return of the loan money would provide ways to bypass the prohibition of interest. 3.7.1 Innovations of the Tosefta: “Dust of Interest” and “Deceiving Interest” In contrast to the Mishnah, which does not distinguish between different levels of prohibition of interest, the Tosefta, which was compiled later, coins terms referring to “semi-interest” and apparently these forms of interest are less prohibited than are the typical above-mentioned forms of interest. However, it does not give a clear definition for these forms of interest, nor does it differentiate between the various kinds of interest in practical terms—that is, in terms of consequences and/or punishment (e.g., taking offender to court or punishing them forthwith)—thus indicating that there is no difference. The Tosefta (Avodah Zarah 1:11; Neusner, 4:311) states: As to the shade of usury: a man should not do business with the loan of his fellow, because it smacks of usury (lit. “is dust of interest”). This case discusses the sale of a loan containing interest to a third party. The buyer did not charge interest. He merely bought a loan that contained it. The Tosefta calls this kind of sale “dust of interest (‫)אבק ריבית‬.”64 There is another term in the Tosefta, “deceiving interest” (‫)ערמת ריבית‬. This term as well is found twice in the same segment of the Tosefta and in no other place.65 The meaning of both terms is that there is a form of interest that is not considered interest proper; rather, it is marginal interest. The Tosefta is more lenient toward these forms of interest than the Mishnah. In contrast to “fixed interest,” which is easy to define—a stipulation at the time of the loan to pay more than is received—these other forms of interest proliferated and were challenging to define and understand, as can be seen in the complex discussions of these issues in the sources and the many 64

This term appears twice in T Avodah Zarah 1:10–11 (Zuckermandel, 461). It also appears in BT BM 61b (= BT Temura 6a–b) and BT BM 67a. 65 T BM 4:3 (Lieberman, 82). It is also found in JT BM 5:1 (10b); BT BM 62b; and BT Kiddushin 6b (ha-aramat ribit). However, see Lieberman there (ns. 14–15), who says, based on the BT, that this case is not usury at all and that it just looks like interest. According to this, these cases are even less stringent than the “dust of interest” cases. In BT BK 92a and BT BM 68a, 69a, “it looks like interest” (‫)מחזי כריבית‬.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

83

disagreements therein. The Mishnah had drawn the line between prohibited and permissible loans, while the Tosefta adds a third kind—a grey area of “semi-interest” that is situated between the two extremes. The following Tosefta cites a case in which a transaction could be seen as containing interest, but is permissible nonetheless because it is not interest proper. The Tosefta (BM 4:3; Neusner, 4:95) states: There are practices which are both usurious and not usurious. One purchased the [right to collect the] loans of his fellow at a discount and his writs of indebtedness [owed to him by others] at a discount. This source allows purchase of a loan when the buyer pays a lower price than the loan itself. It could look like interest because the buyer seemingly pays less than the value of the loan, since he must wait until the date of termination before he can collect the money. However, it is not interest. The buyer is allowed this benefit or profit because of the effort it takes to collect the debt and because there is the risk that the borrower will not have the assets with which to pay, in which case the buyer of the loan may lose all his money. This shows that, when the profit that accrues to the party extending the credit can be attributed factors other than the delay in being paid back, it is permitted. 3.7.2 The Talmudic Period: Conceptualization A definition for usury is attributed to Rav Nahman, one of the leading sages of the third generation of Babylonian Amoraim. He states (BM 63b; Soncino, 378): The general principle of usury is: All payment for waiting [for one’s money] is forbidden. He is defining the usury prohibited by the Torah—the kind where the benefits from waiting to receive money that they lent out.66 His statement is innovative, inasmuch as, for the first time, he defines conceptually the cases that the rabbis that preceded him ruled as being usurious. He does not contradict the Mishnah’s definition but seems to provide it with a practical definition that can be used to define interest in borderline cases. He also does not say clearly whether his definition applies to the Torah law or whether it includes what the Tosefta defined as “dust of interest.” 66

This concept also includes advanced payments because there too the buyer is benefiting from a lower price because he gives money and is waiting before it is returned in the form of a product.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

84

Chapter 3

Later, in the second half of the Talmudic period in Babylon, a clearer distinction between interest that is prohibited according to the Torah and interest that is prohibited according to rabbinic law was formulated. Even later still, the term ribit ketzutzah (‫)ריבית קצוצה‬, “interest proper,” was used for Torah interest, and the term avak ribit (‫ )אבק ריבית‬was used for the rabbinic prohibition.67 These terms and distinctions clarified the legal status of the various forms of interest and were part of a general tendency of the time to distinguish between Torah (de-Oraita) and rabbinic prohibitions (de-Rabbanan, ‫ )דרבנן‬mentioned in previous sources.68 To summarize, the Mishnah expanded the Torah prohibition of usury to include not only crisis loans but business loans and passive investments as well. Most cases dealt with in the Mishnah are actually business loans. The Mishnah also prohibits interest charged prior to issuing the loan and interest that is collected after the loan is returned. However, the Mishnah also specifies limits and permits some transactions that could be seen as usury, stating that they are not. The Tosefta expands the halakha of the Mishnah in two directions. It adds a grey area between the prohibited and permitted transactions, terming them “dust of interest” or “deceiving interest.” These transactions are prohibited, but are not quite as bad as “fixed interest” or “interest proper.” It also adds cases that are exceptions, as it were, when it comes to the prohibition against charging interest. In the Talmud, there are additional legal definitions 67

68

For the distinction between Torah interest and rabbinic interest, see BT BM 60b, 61b (= BT Temura 6a), 67a. It is attributed to sages that operated in the third and fourth Amoraic generations in Babylon and Palestine. The term “interest proper” (‫)ריבית קצוצה‬ is found in BT BM 61b (= BT Temura 6a) from Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Eleazar from the second generation of Amoraim in Palestine. However, in the parallel JT BM 5:1 (10b) the word ‫ קצוצה‬is missing and it says “interest that is taken back by the judges.” Therefore, it is doubtful whether these early Amoraim used the term ‫ריבית קצוצה‬. In the other sources mentioned above, the anonymous author of the Talmud uses the term. It is therefore likely that it belongs to the end of the Talmudic period or later. Nevertheless, for convenience the term will be used below to define Torah-prohibited interest. In the Tosefta (BM 3:21; Lieberman, 78), there is the term ‫( קצץ עמו‬katzatz imo), meaning “he set the interest.” Maybe this source was the inspiration for the BT to use the term ‫ריבית קצוצה‬ (ribit ketzutzah). On this phenomenon, see B. De Vries, Studies in the Development of the Talmudic Halakah: Selected Papers (Tel Aviv: Abraham Zioni Publishing, 1966), 69–95 [Hebrew]; Y. D. Gilat, Studies in the Development of the Halakha (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1992), 239–280; Katz, “Reflections on the Relationship between Religion and the Economy,” Tarbiz 60 (1) (1990): 99–111 [Hebrew]; Urbach, Hahalakha, 123–138; and J. L. Rubenstein, “Explanations of Tannaitic Sources by Abstract and General Principles,” in Netiot Ledavid: Jubilee Volume for David Weiss Halivni, ed. Y. Elman, E. B. Halivni, and Z. A. Steinfeld (Jerusalem: Arahot Publishing, 2005), 275–304.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

85

for usury. Also, the distinction between Torah and rabbinic interest prohibition is further clarified, and sanctions for transgression of the various kinds of interest-prohibiting laws are specified. It can therefore be seen that the laws of interest developed as time passed with clearer definitions being made, grey areas being drawn, increasingly complex cases being addressed, and methods of enforcement being specified. 3.8

Jews and Non-Jews

The Torah prohibition to lend money for interest was limited to lending to your “brother” or “countryman”—a fellow Jew.69 When lending to non-Jews, it was permissible, perhaps even advisable to charge interest.70 This distinction is based on an explicit passage in the Torah—“To a non-Jew you shall lend for interest”—and is stated by the Mishnah (BM 5:6; Lapin, 275): And one borrows from them and lends to them at interest and so too with a resident alien. This law created a possible lacuna in the prohibition of lending for interest. The Jew could lend money for interest to another Jew with a non-Jew as an intermediary. This could also take place when a non-Jew’s money was lent to a Jew through another Jew serving as an agent, or when a Jew’s money was lent to a non-Jew with a Jew in between.71 The Tosefta in effect prohibits both loopholes (BM 5:18; Neusner, 4:103): 69 Deut. 23:20. On the attitude of Jewish sources from biblical times to rabbinic times toward the term goy, see A. Ophir and I. Rosen-Zvi, Goy: Israel’s Multiple Others and the Birth of the Gentiles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). They distinguish between the Bible, in which it means “nation,” and rabbinic literature, which uses the term to define anyone who is not Jewish. C. Hayes, “Complicated Goy in Classical Rabbinic Sources,” in Perceiving the Other in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, ed. M. Bar-Asher Siegal, W. Grünstäudl, and Matthew Thiessen (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017), 147–167, showed that alongside the term goy there is differentiation and that there were various kinds of goy. 70 Deut. 23:20. The words of the passage permitting lending to a non-Jew can be interpreted not as permission but even as an order—a positive rule (mitzvah). See Maimonides, Malweh and Loweh, 5:2. 71 On the general attitude of the Tannaim to the non-Jews, see Ophir and Rosen-Zvi, Goy, 214–263; and Hayes, “Complicated Goy.” This situation developed more in the Middle Ages, like in France and Germany. See H. Soloveitchik, Collected Essays, Vol. 1. (Oxford: Littman Library, 2013), 57–166.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

86

Chapter 3

An Israelite who said to a gentile: “Here’s your salary, now go and lend out my money on interest”—it is prohibited. And a gentile who said to an Israelite: “Here’s your salary, now go and lend out my money on interest”—it is permitted. But it truly is prohibited for appearance’s sake. On the other hand, the Tosefta was lenient regarding the possibility of depositing money with a non-Jew (perhaps for interest) and the non-Jew lending it out (for a greater amount of interest). The Tosefta (BM 5:19; Neusner, 4:103) states: Money belonging to an Israelite left as a bailment with a gentile—it is permitted—[for the latter] to lend out the money on interest. But that of a gentile left as a bailment with an Israelite it is prohibited to lend the money out on interest. This is the governing principle: in any case in which the money falls under the responsibility of an Israelite [to be made up should it be lost]—it is prohibited. And [in] any case in which the deposited money falls under the responsibility of a gentile [to be made up should it be lost]—it is permitted.72 The difference between the two sources is that using a non-Jewish agent to lend money for interest is in effect like lending it yourself: since the money is owned by the Jew and he will enjoy the interest. In the second source, the rabbis were lenient because the Jew deposited the money with a non-Jew. It becomes non-Jewish money and may be lent to a Jew.73 The Tosefta devotes much attention to loans that involved non-Jews (T BM 4:16–21). This shows that in that period the issue was more pressing than in the time of the Mishnah. In the period after the destruction, and especially after the failure of the Bar Kokhba Revolt (132–135/136 CE), there was a fundamental change in the Jewish population in Palestine. Many of the farmers were dispossessed of their land, the Jewish community in Judea was severely damaged (and likewise in the Transjordan), and Jews remained only in the lowlands (the Shephelah) and the southern slopes of the Judean Mountains. The Galilee became the center of Jewish settlement. The dependence of Jews on the non-Jewish economy grew. Some formerly Jewish cities absorbed significant numbers of non-Jews, and Jews immigrated to Hellenistic cities primarily

72 JT BM 5:4 (10c) discusses this issue as well as BT BM 71a, b. See, for example, Urbach, “Rabbinic Laws of Idolatry”; and Rosenfeld, “Innkeeping.” 73 See Weingort, Intérêt et crédit, 32–33, 139–143, 193–196, 266–273.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

87

on the coast such as Caesarea and Akko.74 The day-to-day relations between Jews and non-Jews strengthened, and regional and international commercial ties became more common. The economic life of both communities became intertwined.75 Providing credit to one another was one of the forms in which the two groups interacted. This interaction between Jews and non-Jews created a new situation for Jewish society. The rabbis somewhat segregated Jewish commercial contacts with non-Jews by prohibiting commerce with them three days before and three days after their festivals.76 The JT does not change the approach found in the Tosefta and states: When it is the responsibility of the Jew it is prohibited and if it is the responsibility of the gentile it is permissible.77 However, Babylonian sages present approaches that are more varied. There are serious disagreements in the text. Some sages tend to be lenient, and others are stringent. The Talmud (BM 70b–71a; Soncino, 408–410) states: R. Nahman observed: Huna told me that [this verse] is needed to show that usury [taken] even from a heathen [leads to loss of one’s wealth]. 74 Schwartz, Jewish Settlement in Judaea, 22–27, 42–46; Eshel, “Bar Kochba”; S. Schwartz, “The Political Geography of Rabbinic Texts,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Talmud and Rabbinic Literature, ed. C. E. Fonrobert and M. S. Jaffee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 75–87; Mor, Bar Kokhba, 468–492, index, s.v. “caesarea maritima.” On Jewish segregation prior to the destruction of the Second Temple, and the subsequent changes, see Urbach, “Rabbinic Laws of Idolatry”; Schürer, The History of the Jewish People, 2:13–20, 52–53, 81–87; M. Goodman, “Judea,” CAH 10 (1996): 737–781; Rosenfeld, “Innkeeping,” 149–152; S. J. D. Cohen, The Beginning of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), esp. 25–68, 198–238; and M. F. Bird, An Anomalous Jew: Paul among Jews, Greeks, and Romans (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2016), 1–30, and ns. 1, 95. On the growing financial dependence on non-Jews following the destruction, see, for example, Urbach, “Rabbinic Laws of Idolatry”; and Sperber, The Land. On Babylonian Jewry, see Elman, “The Other in the Mirror” (2005 and 2010); idem, “Middle Persian Culture”; idem, “Acculturation”; and idem, “The Babylonian Yeshivot in the Amoraic and Post-Amoraic Era,” in Yeshivot and Battei Midrash, ed. I. Etkes (Jerusalem: Shazar Center, 2006), 31–55 [Hebrew]. 75 Sperber, The Land; A. Oppenheimer, Galilee in the Mishnaic Period (Jerusalem: Shazar Center, 1991), 138 [Hebrew]; idem, “Politics and Administration,” in Rabbinic Texts and the History of Late-Roman Palestine, ed. M. Goodman and P. Alexander (Oxford: British Academy, 2010), 377–388 (on the third and fourth centuries CE). 76 M Avodah Zarah 1:1; T Avodah Zarah 1:1. S. Stern, Jewish Identity in Early Rabbinic Writings (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 141–146, n. 14, index, s.v. “non-Jews.” 77 JT BM 5:7 (10c).

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

88

Chapter 3

Raba objected to R. Nahman: Unto a stranger tashshik [‫( ]תשיך‬Deut. 23:21): now, what is meant by “tashshik”: surely that “thou mayest receive usury?” No: “thou mayest give usury.” [What!] Cannot one do without? It is to exclude “thy brother” [to whom thou mayest] not [give usury]. As for thy brother, is it not explicitly stated, but unto thy brother thou shalt not give usury? [To intimate] that both a positive and negative injunction are violated. He [further] raised an objection: One may borrow from and lend money to them on interest, and the same applies to a resident alien!— R. Hiyya, the son of R. Huna, said: This [permission] is granted only [up to] the [minimum] requirements of a livelihood. Rabina said: Here [in the Mishnah] the reference is to scholars. For why did the Rabbis enact this precautionary measure? Lest he learn of his ways. But being a scholar, he will [certainly] not learn of his ways. The above sources show two contradicting traditions in the name of Rav Huna, who operated in the second half of the third century. According to the first version, Rav Huna as cited by his contemporary Rav Nahman maintained that one should not collect interest from a non-Jew as well as from a Jew. Rava, the leading figure in the next generation, quotes a seemingly contradictory source. Rav Hiya son of Rav Huna of the fifth generation explains that Rav Huna intended to limit lending to a non-Jew for interest to cases in which the Jew needed the interest for sustenance. Ravina, who operated in the sixth and seventh generations, posits that it is prohibited to lend money for interest to a non-Jew. Only someone who knows a great deal of Torah may do so (talmid hakham). This distinction was explained that Jews should refrain from lending money to non-Jews “lest he learn of his ways,” but someone learned will not learn foreign ways from a non-Jew.78 The words of Rav Huna and the extensive discussion show that the issue of loans from Jews to non-Jews became a problem. It was profitable for a wealthy Jew to lend money to a non-Jew and receive permissible interest. Rav Huna was quoted as prohibiting interest to non-Jews, allowing only the opposite, which is 78

The Hamburg manuscript and the Genizah version have minor differences in the reading of this text. See M. A. Friedman, “Mi-Teshuvot ha-Geonim min ha-Genizah be-Hilchot Ribbit,” in Atara L’Haim: Studies in the Talmud and Medieval Rabbinic Literature in Honor of Professor Haim Zalman Dimitrovsky, ed. D. Boyarin, S. Friedman, M. Hirshman, M. Schmelzer, and I. M. Tashma (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000), 460–472, esp. 460–461, n. 2. On page 468 and in the notes, he shows that the reason for this prohibition cited by the Talmud “so that he should not learn from his deeds” did not appear in the texts that were studied by some of the Geonim, who were even more stringent on this issue than the Talmud.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

89

to borrow for interest from a non-Jew. He reinterprets the passages in the Torah that explicitly allow charging interest to a non-Jew to refer to paying rather than charging. He also reinterprets the Tannaitic sources that allow lending to a non-Jew for interest. He does not explain why he is doing this; however, it seems that the continuation of the discourse explains the issue: Others referred this statement of R. Huna to [the barayta] which R. Joseph taught:79 If though lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee: [this teaches, if the choice lies between] my people and a heathen “my people” has preference; the poor or the rich—the “poor” takes precedence; thy poor [sc. Thy relatives] and the [general] poor of thy town—thy poor come first; the poor of thy city and the poor of another town—the poor of thine own town have prior rights. The master said: “[If the choice lies between] my people and a heathen—‘my people’ has preference.” But is it not obvious?—R. Nahman answered: Huna told me it means that even if [money is lent] to the heathen on interest, and to the Israelite without [the latter should take precedence]. The discourse that cites an alternative version of the words of Rav Huna does not contradict the first version in the practical sense. The common denominator is that Rav Huna wished to encourage lending money to poor Jews rather than to non-Jews for interest. This shows that he is confronting a problem that the wealthy prefer to lend their money to non-Jews for interest rather than to Jews, and to rich people that can certainly repay the loan, rather than to poor people who may not be able to repay the loan. According to the first version, Rav Huna legislates prohibiting the taking of interest from non-Jews, and 79

The expression ika de-matnei la aha presents the second tradition—there are those who apply the words of Rav Nahman in the name of Rav Huna to a different context. It is an example of uncertain traditions that were a result of the oral nature of the Talmudic discourse. See, for example, Y. Sussmann, “Torah She-Beʾal Peh—Literally: The Power of the Jot and Tittle,” in Mehqerei Talmud III: Talmudic Studies Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Ephraim E. Urbach, ed. D. Rosenthal and Y. Sussmann (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2005), 209–384, esp. 274–275 [Hebrew]; D. Rosenthal, “Al Ha-kizur Ve-hashlamato: Perek Be-Arichat Hatalmud Ha-Bavli,” in Mehqerei Talmud III: Talmudic Studies Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Ephraim E. Urbach, ed. D. Rosenthal and Y. Sussmann (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2005), 791–863, esp. 792–802 [Hebrew]; and Cohen, Legal Methodology, 172 and notes. Indeed, according to D. W. Halivni, Introductions to Sources and Traditions: Studies in the Formation of the Talmud, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2012), 206–221 [Hebrew], the anonymous sages (“Stamaim”) operated immediately after the Amoraim, from the middle of the sixth century until the beginning of the eighth century. According to his approach, the second tradition is from the same time.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

90

Chapter 3

according to the second version he tries to use moral suasion to influence the lenders without applying a halakhic ruling. Analyzing the second version of the words of Rav Huna shows that the Talmud omits the statements attributed to the other sages mentioned above. Rav Yosef of the third generation is mentioned as one of the opinion-givers in this discourse.80 This version does not contain legislation against lending money to a non-Jew for interest, but it tries to make sure that there is money lent to poor Jews as well.81 These sayings can be understood in light of the general relationship between Jews and their neighbors in Babylon. Hundreds of years of living together brought a deepening of the contacts between the Jewish and non-Jewish populations. Jews and non-Jews were business partners, bought and sold from each other, and had various other interactions with mutual respect.82 Indeed, rabbis as well as Sasanid priests saw the other group as the evil and impure one, and prohibited social and economic mingling between the faiths; however, on a day-to-day basis there was much interaction and mutual influence, and this was primarily in the fourth century CE.83 Nevertheless, research tends to limit this positive relationship to the fourth century CE. The third and fifth centuries are seen as periods in which the Mazda priests, who represented the official religion of the empire, had much influence over the rulers, resulting in restrictions and limitations inflicted on the other religious groups therein. When the emperor was stronger than the 80

This exegesis attributed to Rav Yoseph is ancient. See Mekhilta de Rabbi Yishmael, Masekhet Nezikin, 19 (Horowitz-Rabin, 315). Indeed, Rav Yoseph, the third-generation Amora, tended to cite Tannaitic material. 81 A similar problem confronted Jewish society in the Middle Ages. See A. Grossman, The Early Sages of Ashkenaz (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1981. Repr. 2001), 127–129, 335–336 [Hebrew]; I. M. Ta-shma, Ritual, Custom and Reality in Franco-Germany, 1000–1350 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1996), esp. 249 [Hebrew]; J. Rivlin, Bills and Contracts from Lucena (1020–1025) (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1994), 46–64 (Sefarad) [Hebrew]; and Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, 197–200, 241–262 (in the East). 82 Elman, “The Other in the Mirror,” 15–16 (2005), 21; idem, “The Other in the Mirror,” 34, 43 (2010); I. M. Gafni, “Babylonian Rabbinic Culture,” in Culture of the Jews: A New History, ed. D. Biale (New York: Schocken, 2002), 223–265; J. R. Labendz, Socratic Torah: Non-Jews in Rabbinic Intellectual Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 191–211; Mokhtarian, Rabbis, Sorcerers, Kings, and Priests, 22–42, 94–144. 83 Elman, “The Other in the Mirror,” 15 (2005); idem, “The Other in the Mirror,” 25–30, 38–42 (2010). M. Macuch, “Jewish Jurisdiction within the Framework of the Sasanian Legal System,” in Encounters by the Rivers of Babylon: Scholarly Conversations between Jews, Iranian and Babylonians in Antiquity, ed. U. Gabbay and S. Secunda (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 147–160, indicates that Sasanid practical law was tolerant of minorities, although there was discrimination against minorities in various areas.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in Palestine and Babylon

91

priests, the prevailing attitude toward the minorities improved.84 The attitude of the priests, however, was even more critical of the Christians, especially after the Roman Empire, the primary enemy of Persia, embraced Christianity. The Christians in the Sasanid Empire were suspected of supporting the enemy.85 Possibly, the opposed opinions on whether Rav Huna prohibited lending to non-Jews for interest reflects the different approaches to cooperation with non-Jews among the Amoraim. It has been suggested that rabbis in Mahoza, which was a suburb of the capital Ctesiphon, were more likely to support cooperation with non-Jews than those from Nehardea or Pumbedita. Rava, who was mentioned in the above BT passage, was more inclined to cooperate with non-Jews, as was Rav Ashi and other rabbis from Mata Mahesya.86 Another aspect of the relationship between Jews and non-Jews regarding credit is the attitude toward the “resident alien” (‫גר תושב‬, ger toshav). The rabbis interpreted this term found in the Torah as relating to non-Jews who accepted to observe the seven Noahide commandments.87 The Mishnah (BM 5:6) includes the “resident alien” among non-Jews and allows lending to them just as it allows lending to all non-Jews. The Jerusalem and Babylonian talmuds attribute to Rabbi Judah the Prince a statement connected to the issue of lending to non-Jews for interest. The JT (BM 5:6) cites the statement:

84 Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia, 36–51; idem, “Babylonian Rabbinic Culture,” 233–253. 85 Elman, “The Other in the Mirror,” 38 (2010); idem, “Contrasting Intellectual Trajectories,” 45. 86 G. Herman, A Prince without a Kingdom: The Exilarch in the Sasanian Era (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 154–158; Elman, “The Other in the Mirror,” 15 (2005); idem, “The Other in the Mirror,” 25–36, 41–42 (2010); A. Oppenheimer (in collaboration with B. Isaac and M. Lecker), Babylonia Judaica in the Talmudic Period (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1983), 179–193, 226–234 (Mahoza), 415–422 (Mata Mahesya), 276–293 (Nehardea); Y. Elman, “A Tale of Two Cities: Mahoza and Pumbedita,” in Torah Lishma: Essays in Jewish Studies in Honor of Professor Shamma Friedman, ed. D. Golinkin, M. Benovitz, M. A. Friedman, M. Schmelzer, and D. Sperber (Jerusalem: Bar Ilan University Press, 2007), 3–38 [Hebrew]. 87 There are differences of opinion about what these commandments actually are. See T Avodah Zarah 8:4; E. E. Urbach, The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs, trans. I. Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1987), 533, n. 31; L. H. Feldman, Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World: Attitudes and Interactions from Alexander to Justinian (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 126–128; Cohen, The Beginning of Jewishness, 140–174, and index, s.v. “conversion,” “gentile”; J. M. Lieu, “The Race of the God-Fearers,” JTS 46 (1995): 483–501; idem, Neither Jew Nor Greek? Constructing Early Christianity (London: T&T Clark, 2002), 31–68; idem, Christian Identity in the Jewish and Greco-Roman World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 122–126; and Stern, Jewish Identity, 95–96, 200–207.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

92

Chapter 3

Rebbi said: I do not know the definition of “sojourner” quoted in reference to the Hebrew slave. I do not know the definition of “proselyte” quoted in reference to interest.88 Another version is in the BT (BM 71a; Soncino, 410): It has been taught: Rabbi said: The righteous proselyte who is mentioned in connection with the sale [of oneself for a slave], and the resident alien who is mentioned with reference to usury—I know not their purpose. The JT seems to say that Rabbi Judah the Prince wanted to be lenient even with a full convert concerning interest. Perhaps, he is relating to transactions that were agreed upon prior to his conversion. This indicates that, according to the JT, interest transactions with semi-converts were permitted, a ruling that disagreed with opinions quoted in the BT. On the other hand, the Babylonian Talmud seems to be more stringent than the Mishnah. Rabbi was hesitant concerning an alien who was close to Judaism, and it is not clear whether it is permissible to lend to him for interest. Certainly, it is prohibited to lend to a convert who completed his conversion. This opinion corresponds with the opinion of the sages from Babylon that wanted to prohibit lending for interest even to non-Jews. The statement concerning righteous aliens reflects the deliberation of the rabbis concerning non-Jews more than it reflects a problem involving righteous aliens. The Babylonian Talmud mentions various occasions of friction between halakha and reality concerning credit from the third to sixth century CE. Babylonian Jewry enjoyed stable conditions in this period, and this likely contributed to the complex and prolific cases that were discussed. In contrast, the JT contains much less material on the subject corresponding to the various difficulties that hampered the economic life of Palestinian Jewry. The fourth century brought a further decrease in the economic status of the Jews due to the rise of Christianity and legal restrictions imposed on the Jews by Rome.89 88 Guggenheimer, 402–403, n. 127. 89 S. W. Baron, Social and Religious History of The Jews, 2 vols. 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), 102–128, 176–214; Neusner, History of the Jews in Babylonia, 3:1–94, 4:124, 5:1–132; Beer, Babylonian Amoraim, 157–159; Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia, 129–133. On Roman legislation against the Jews in the fourth century, see Linder, The Jews; and idem, “The Legal Status of the Jews in the Roman Empire,” CHJ 4 (2006): 128–173.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Chapter 4

“Money for Money” 4.1

Introduction

The introduction of money to human commerce was one of the pivotal changes from primitive to advanced human economics. So long as there was only barter exchange, it was impossible to accumulate wealth and to invest. Trade was limited to the near vicinity of the place of production and to necessities for short-term consumption.1 The introduction of money not only developed exchange possibilities, it also became a culture in and of itself. Man was now measured according to the amount of money he had, and people devoted their lives to accumulating it. The use of money and currency in society began around 600 BCE and gradually replaced barter as the main form for transactions.2 Lending “money for money” became gradually more common from the beginning of the Hellenistic period in the third century BCE. It was then as common as lending “products for products.” Most loans were short term—up to a year—but there were also long-term loans, most of which were in the form of money and were returned in the form of money.3 In the Roman world, money was a determinator of status and a precondition for appointment to many offices. Gradually, the Roman government monetized the entire economic system in the empire, including Palestine.4 1 This historical analysis appears in D.18.1.1 (based on Paulus, Edicts 33, which is from the third century CE). See J. J. Aubert, “For Swap or Sale? The Roman Law of Barter,” in Annales. Histoire, Les affaires de Monsieur Flandreau: économie et société du monde romain, ed. C. Apicella, M.-L. Haack, and F. Lerouxel (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2014), 109–121, esp. 113–117. 2 See D. Graeber, Debt: The First Five Thousand Years (New York: Melville House), esp. chs. 3, 5. He argues that debt and credit started long before the invention of currency. 3 C. P. Elliott, “The Role of Money in the Economies of Ancient Greece and Rome,” in Handbook of the History of Money and Currency, ed. S. Battilossi, S. Cassis, and K. Yago (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2020), 67–86; Von Reden, Money in Ptolemaic Egypt; idem, Money in Classical Antiquity, 92–120. The use of money alongside products had gradually developed already prior to this period. See L. Ristvet, Ritual, Performance, and Politics in the Ancient Near East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 179–181. 4 Harl, Coinage; J. K. Davies, “Temples, Credit, and the Circulation Money,” in Money and Its Uses in the Ancient Greek World, ed. A. Meadows and K. Shipton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 117–128; E. Lo Cascio, “The Early Roman Empire: The State and the Economy,” in The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, ed. W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. Saller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 619–647, esp. 627–630; Kehoe, Law and the

© Ben Zion Rosenfeld, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004681965_005

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

94

Chapter 4

There is evidence that as early as the second half of the first century CE Jewish society used coins on a large scale.5 This indicates that although it was primarily an agricultural society, Jewish society did see a significant use of currency in the economy. Consequently, it is not surprising to find that money was an important commodity in Jewish law compiled at the end of the second century. For example, the sages determined who was considered poor, and was therefore entitled to communal assistance, based on the amount of money he had in his possession.6 4.2

Lending “Money for Money”

In the Hellenistic period, loans of “money for money” started becoming common. This process intensified in the Roman period, in which such loans became the most common form of lending. Money was a currency that society was familiar with; it was used for government functions, religious donations, and economic and social transactions.7 Despite this growth in monetary Rural Economy, 145–154; Hollander, Money, esp. 5–11, 59–86; Von Reden, Money in Classical Antiquity, 3–6, 27, 92–124. On Egypt, see Bagnall, Egypt, 73–75; and D. Rathbone, “Roman Egypt,” in The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, ed. W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. Saller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 698–719, esp. 714–716. On the use of currency in economic activity, see Mishkin, The Economics of Money, 48–49. On Roman Palestine, see A. Yardeni, Textbook of Aramaic, Hebrew and Nabataean Documentary Texts from the Judaean Desert and Related Material, Vol. A: The Documents (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Press, 2000), 15–21 [Hebrew]. There, she cites four loan documents. The first is from 55 CE and the others from the days of Bar Kokhba (132–135 CE). See also pages 276–277 on a Nabatean loan document from 94 CE discussing a “money for money” loan. On the socio-anthropological aspect of the use of currency in markets, see V. A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 71–119 (= V. A. Zelizer, Economic Lives [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011], 93–123). 5 Y. Arbel, “The Gamla Coin—A New Perspective on the Circumstances and Date of Its Minting,” in Milk and Honey: Essays on Ancient Israel and the Bible in Appreciation of the Judaic Studies Program at the University of California, ed. S. Malena and D. Miano (San Diego: Eisenbrauns, 2007), 257–275; Y. A. Meshorer, Ancient Jewish Coinage, Vol. 2 (New York: Amphora Books, 1982), 96–165. The rebels invested effort into minting coins because it is a means of ruling, and also because currency was an important part of the economy. See also Josephus, Jewish War 2.427 on the rebels who “burned contracts of those who lent money and to cut off the collection of the debts.” See Feldman, Judean War, 325. 6 See Rosenfeld and Perlmutter, Social Stratification, 42–45, and index, s.v. “borders,” “poverty.” 7 K. Verboven, “Currency and Credit in the Bay of Naples in the First Century AD,” in The Economy of Pompeii, ed. M. Flohr and A.I. Wilson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 363–383. See C. Haselgrove and S. Krmnicek, “Archaeology of Money: From Electrum Rings to Mobile Money,” in The Archaeology of Money, ed. C. Haselgrove and S. Krmnicek

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Money for Money ”

95

loans, credit transactions involving products continued to exist. There is a theory among scholars that 60% of all known credit transactions in the Roman Empire were in money, 20% were in products, and another 20% were a combination of the two.8 The use of money for credit versus other products differed in different parts of the empire,9 since the level of monetization in the various corners of the Roman world were not uniform and varied from location to location.10 In contrast to the situation in Rome and in the large commercial cities, rabbinic sources from the Mishnah and Talmudic periods discussed here reflect primarily the situation within and among the Jewish populations of Palestine and Persia. They indicate that transactions in goods were relatively common and assumed various forms, although money was the main tool for exchange, credit, and debt.

 (Leicester: University of Leicester Press, 2016), 1–18, for combined archeological and anthropological research on the development of the use of money from the ancient world through to the Roman period. See also B. Maurer, “The Anthropology of Money,” Annual Review of Anthropology 35 (2006): 15–36; T. Newton, “Credit and Civilization,” BJS 54 (2008): 347–371; Harris, Rome’s Imperial Economy, 223–287; and idem, “Credit-Money.” The main Latin word for loan was mutuum, and it related primarily to monetary loans. See Sirks, “Law, Commerce, and Finance,” 78, 82. 8 Howgego, “Supply and Use of Money,” 27; Morley, Metropolis and Hinterland, 78–79; Hopkins, “Taxes”; Duncan-Jones, Structure and Scale, 30–47; idem, The Economy, 20–32; P. Veyne, La Société Romaine (Paris: Le Seuil, 1990), 131–172; S. L. Dyson, Community and Society in Roman Italy (Baltimore MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 167, 228, 234. The importance of money lending is also evident through archeological finds. See E. Christiansen, Coinage in Roman Egypt: The Hoard Evidence (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2004), 20, 35, 45, and index, s.v. “credit,” for money caches in Egyptian cities that served their owners as a source of credit for profit. 9 An extensive discussion of this point can be found in Horden and Purcell, The Corrupting Sea. For analyses of the Roman East and its various regions, see F. Millar, The Roman Near East (31 BC–AD 337) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); K. Butcher, Roman Syria and the Near East (London: British Museum, 2003); Sartre, The Middle East, 206–318; Shatzman, History, 40–150; and H. U. Von Freyberg, Kapitalverkehr und Handel im. Römischen Kaiserreich (27 v. Chr.–235 n. Chr.) (Freiburg: Haufe, 1989). Regarding currency and its distribution, see, for example, Howgego, “Supply and Use of Money”; Lo Cascio, “State and Coinage,” 2 (on the denar); and Mattingly, Imperialism, 125–145; Harl, Coinage. 10 See J. Weatherford, “Money: Anthropological Aspects,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 15, ed. N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes (Oxford: Elsevier, 2001), 9988–9991. He states that there were two main uses of money in antiquity; the primary use was for various business and investment purposes. In addition, money was used for religious purposes. See Von Reden, Money in Classical Antiquity; J. Baron, and J. Millhauser. “A place for archaeology in the study of money, finance, and debt.” Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 62 (2021): 101278, on the uses of money and its influence on society in the ancient world.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

96

Chapter 4

Any loan whose principal was extended in currency and whose return was also in currency is considered here “money for money.” There were several variations of “money for money” loans in rabbinic literature. The chapters that follow will categorize the various cases of loan transactions, analyzing rabbinic legislation pertaining to each type and portraying the socio-historical context that influenced their various rulings. The exegesis of Mekhilta de Rabbi Yishmael allows lending only “money for money.” Taken literally, it first prohibits lending “fruit for fruit” and then prohibits “fruit for money” and “money for fruit.” This approach follows the rabbinic position that silver coins are the stable currency in the economy and in order to guarantee that the lender will not profit from the loan at the expense of the borrower it has to be “money for money.” When evaluated in money, it is more likely that a clear document will be written, the rabbis think they that will be involved, and there is less possibility of putting into the agreement a factor of gain for the lender of which the borrower is unaware or unable to refuse because he desperately needs the loan. “Fruit for fruit” is the worst because it is easy to camouflage benefit for the lender, but even “fruit for money” and “money for fruit” transactions are prohibited. This ruling would prohibit any form of future sales or delayed payment. In the Roman world as well, there were transactions that involved the exchange of money for products, products for money, and products for products.11 The documents state the payment in monetary terms even when the payments are actually in kind. It is possible that the author of the Mekhilta de Rabbi Yishmael was aware of this. It is also possible that the author of the statement reflected an opinion of the house of Rabbi Yishmael that differed from the mainstream and was more stringent. The approach of the Mekhilta de Rabbi Yishmael seems nevertheless to be novel. The parallel Mekhilta de Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai says that all forms of loans are permissible.12 The Mishnah is more lenient and allows lending “fruit for fruit” as long as the fruit is evaluated in monetary terms.13 Also, many laws that appear in the Tosefta and Talmud mention permissible exchanges 11 See D.44.7.1–2; 50.16.222 (based on the words of the Roman jurist Gaius [130–180 CE]). 12 The Mekhilta de Rabbi Shimon, Masekhet Mishpatim 22:24 (Epstein-Melamed, 211–212); T BM 4: 2; and BT BM 71a also do not mention the above limitation. In a later exegesis (Midrash Tanhuma, Mishpatim 8 [Buber, 85]), there is an approach that opposes that of Mekhilta de Rabbi Yishmael: “Everything—including wheat.” On the other hand, late collections of exegesis do quote this Mekhilta, confirming that it is not a mistake. See Pesikta Zutra (Lekah Tov), Shemot 22:24; and Yalkut Shimoni, Masekhet Mishpatim 247, 350. On the authorship the Mekhilta exegeses, see Kahana, “The Halakhic Midrashim”; and Harris, “Midrash Halacha.” For the latest on the Midrash Tanhuma literature, see R. Nikolsky and A. Atzmon, Studies in the Tanhuma-Yelammedenu Literature (Leiden: Brill, 2022). 13 See M BM 5:1, 7–9.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

97

“ Money for Money ”

of credit involving fruit and other products with a monetary payment later, of payment for fruit that will be supplied later, and loans of “fruit for fruit.” 4.3

Usury in Loans of “Money for Money”

The fifth chapter of Bava Metzia is devoted to the prohibition of interest. The first passage contains a classic case of “money for money”: “Which is nesekh? One who lends a sela for five dinarim” (M BM 5:1). The loan was a sela, which equals four denars. The contract stipulated that five denars should be returned. This is a 20% interest rate and is of course prohibited, as it is usurious. The parallel Toseftan passage (T BM 4:2; after Neusner, 4:94) comes in the fourth chapter of Bava Metzia. It distinguishes loans from rentals: They increase the rent-charge but not the purchase price. Since it is said: “If you lend money to any of my people with you who is poor, [you shall] not be to him as a creditor, and you shall not exact interest from him” (Ex. 22:25). Just as a loan is distinctive in that it is not that which you give to the other party which you take back from him, so these are excluded, for that which you give to the other party is precisely that which you take back from him. How so? A man rents out his coins to a money-changer to show them, to practise [learning his trade], with them, and to adorn [his table] with them. [If] they were stolen or lost, he is liable to make them up. [If] they were taken from him by force, lo, he is in the position of a paid bailee. As to receiving compensation on their account, it is prohibited by reason of interest.14 This source discusses definitions for loans of “money for money.” It has two parts. The first is the difference between a loan and rental. Rental is defined by the return of the same exact object at the end of the contract. Coins can be rented out as well if the coins themselves will be returned. If the borrower uses the coins and returns other coins, then paying “rent” is prohibited as it is a loan not a rental and the rent is interest. The second is an example of the rental of coins in which the table operator rents coins to show that he has capital, or for educational purposes to become familiar with the currency. He is to return 14

The reading of this last sentence is unclear. See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshuta, Nezikin, 9:193–194.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

98

Chapter 4

them at the time they decided upon. In this case, it is rental and not a loan. It is also the case that if the money was stolen or lost the borrower must pay, but in the case of armed robbery he is not liable because he is a paid bailiff for the coins. However, if the table operator used the coins to make money, even if somehow he intended to return the same exact coins to the lender, he would have full responsibility for the coins even in the case of armed robbery, because the transaction would then no longer be a rental but a loan, and the initial rental payment is considered interest.15 Another source presents a case of “money for money” that is permissible. The Tosefta (BM 4:3, after Neusner 4:95) says: There are practices which seem usurious but are not. One purchases the [right to collect the] loans of his fellow at a discount, and his writs of indebtedness [owed to him by others] at a discount. In this case, the “buyer” is taking out the loan and will make money for giving the seller cash now instead of the seller waiting to collect the debt when it becomes due. It is permissible because it is a sale of the debt which is worth less when it is not yet ready to collect. In this case, the buyer is purchasing a document that may be difficult to collect. It is therefore a market transaction. The following example shows that there is a fine line between changing money and a credit transaction. This is found in T BM 4:9 (after Neusner, 4:96): If ass-drivers and workers were insistent in the market [awaiting payment], and he said to the money-changer, “Give me copper coins for a denar, so that I can provide for these, and I’ll pay you a denar and tressis from money which I have in my pouch”—if he actually has it in the pouch, it is permitted to do so. And if not, it is prohibited. The homeowner asks the banker to give his workers their salary in coins of ma‌ʾah that accumulate to the value of a denar. He promises to pay from his pouch a denar plus a tressis, which is one-eighth of a denar. In such a case, it is merely a fee for changing the large coin to smaller coins, and is not considered credit at all.16 When the homeowner has the denar in his pouch, there is no credit involved; rather, there is a regular exchange of coins for change for 15 16

See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshuta, Nezikin, 9:193–194. The average fee for changing money in the Roman Empire was 5%. Here, the fee is 12.5% and that seems very high. See Andreau, Banking, 37–38.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Money for Money ”

99

which the banker is entitled to be paid. However, when the homeowner does not have the money and must go get it, the rabbis identify a component of credit, attribute part of the payment of the tressis to the delay in the exchange, and prohibit it because of the prohibition of interest. Rav Ashi, the famous sage of the sixth generation, concludes that even if the exchange of the denar for the copper coins is not legal until the denar is handed over, it is permissible because the time that evolves is very short and it is like “lend me until my son comes (with the money) or until I find the key.”17 A late Talmudic Stama raises an important issue of loans In currency when there is a change in the value of one coin in comparison to the principal coins in the realm. The BT (BM 60b; Soncino, 362) says: How might there be neshekh without tarbith? If he lent him a hundred [peruthas] for one hundred and twenty [peruthas], at first [when the loan is made] a danka being valued at a hundred [peruthas], and subsequently [when the loan was repaid] at a hundred and twenty, there is neshekh, for he “bites” him [the debtor] by taking from him something which he [the creditor] did not give; yet there is no tarbith [to the creditor], for there is no profit, since he lent him a danka and received back a danka! … how is tarbith [profit to the creditor] conceivable without neshekh [loss to the debtor]? If he lent him a hundred [peruthas] for a hundred, the hundred being worth a danka at first, and now a fifth. The later anonymous Talmudic scholar is discussing a case in which a loan of 100 copper coins (perutas) was issued and the agreement was that 120 would be paid back. This is a classic example of fixed interest that is prohibited by the Torah. However, in the time that ensued after the giving of the loan and its repayment, the value of the peruta in respect to the smallest silver coin, the danka (dang, dānak, dānaka), which was a sixth of a denar (drachma) in the Sasanid period, had gone down and now 120 of them bought one danka.18 17

Conclusion of the late Amora Rav Ashi in BT 46a. He disagrees with the previous opinion of Rabbi Abba, which says it is not interest only if we say that the coins can be legally exchanged via barter, and the opinion of Ulla, which interprets the above Tosefta by referring to blank metal discs, which certainly can be exchanged immediately. These two opinions posit that in Torah interest of “money for money” even a short time is prohibited. 18 R. Göbl, Sasanian Numismatics, trans. P. Severin (Braunschweig: Klinkhardt & Biermann, 1971), 27–30; idem, “Sasanian Coins,” CHI 3 (1) (1971): 322–339, esp. 333; P. Gignoux, “Dinar,” in Encyclopedia Iranica Online, retrieved from http://www.iranicaonline.org. Daryaee, The Sasanian Empire, 168, says: “The most common type of Sasanian coins were silver drahm (denar), one-sixth silver dang (danka), and copper coins, pashiz (peruta), made of copper and used for local daily transactions. Gold was only minted ceremonially and does not

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

100

Chapter 4

The Talmud defines this as neshekh because the borrower is paying back more than he received, but it is not a tarbit because the lender is not making a profit. In the opposite example, the loan was 100 perutas to be returned in the same amount. When it was given, the 100 perutas were worth one-sixth of a danka. When the loan was to be returned, the peruta went up in value and was then worth one-fifth of a danka.19 This the Talmud considers tarbit and not neshekh because the borrower does not add anything to the loan but the lender gains. The Talmud then concludes that either it is both neshekh and tarbit or it is neither. This source is important because it is the only one that addresses changes in the relative value of coins. It is unclear whether the Talmud posits that these forms are prohibited or not. It seems to mean that the rabbis were lenient on this issue and allowed lending coins of all kinds for payment of the same amount of the same coin even though the relative value of the coin might differ. This is in contrast to produce: the rabbis prohibited lending a “measure” of wheat for a “measure” of wheat in case the price of wheat was to up (M BM 5:9).20 The above sources show various aspects of the transactions that were carried out in the economy of the Mishnah and the Talmud. Although the rabbis had extended the prohibitions of usury beyond what is stated in the Torah, they allowed transactions that could seem to the average person as interest-bearing as long as they felt that the interest was not benefiting the lender for the time his money spent with the borrower. They also addressed the issue of changing large coins for small ones and changes in relative currency, allowing these transactions if they were straightforward and did not contain a loan factor. 4.4

Business Partnership (Iska)

Investment and silent partnerships were a relatively advanced form of conducting business. One partner has money, purchases inventory, and establishes a appear to have been in circulation for trade and exchange. While the increase in the use of copper and bronze coinage in certain parts of the empire assets to the increase in trade and governmental control, silver coinage was much more prevalent.” 19 Regarding the old currency, see Frye, “Political History of Iran.” W. Eilars, “Iran and Mesopotamia,” CHI 3 (1) (1983): 481–504, esp. 503–504, notes that the danka also served as a quantitative unit of assets, indicating one-sixth of the asset or property. This is indeed the case in BT BM 39b and 109b. In any case, here danka represents the coin. See also Sokoloff, Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 344. 20 We also see from this that the rabbis in the later Talmudic period were discussing loans of very low sums such as 100 perutas, indicating that those sums were important to the local Jewish population. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Money for Money ”

101

store. He then hires a worker to operate the store and sell the merchandise. The partners will equally divide the profit. Seemingly, it is merely a partnership, no loans were given. The rabbis, however, saw the money invested as a loan to be returned with profit, and consequently prohibited this partnership unless the worker was paid for his efforts. Thus says the Mishnah (BM 5:4; Lapin, 273): One does not set up (lit., “seat”) a shopkeeper [to sell merchandise] at half profit (sakhar); let him not give him money with which to purchase produce for half profit; unless he gave him his wage (sakhar) as an idle laborer. The Mishnah presents two situations that the rabbis prohibited. The first is a situation in which the investor opens a store with inventory and hires the worker to operate it, and the second is a situation in which he gives the worker money to buy the merchandise and sell it. In both cases, he is giving the worker half the profit. The Mishnah seems not to differentiate between the two cases even though in the second case the worker is investing much more labor. The Tosefta does differentiate between them, requiring in the second case payment for the time invested by the worker to buy and sell products (T BM 4:14). It also requires compensation for the use of the worker’s house.21 T BM 4:14 (Neusner, 4:97) states: He who hands over money to his fellow to buy produce with them for half the profit—lo, this one reckons with him a wage for time lost. And what is a wage for time lost? It is to cover the time in which he does the purchasing and the time in which he does the selling.22 It seems that the rabbis saw the situation as follows. The investor gives the worker a certain amount of money and at the end of the arrangement receives that same amount plus half the profit. He is earning from the time his money was in the possession of the worker. It is equivalent to receiving interest for a loan. They said that to avoid the prohibition of usury, he must pay a salary to the worker so that the portion of profit given to the investor is from the labor 21

22

The Tosefta devotes many laws to the case of giving money to the partner to purchase merchandise from T BM 4:14–22 (excluding 21) (Lieberman, 84–86; Neusner, 4:97–99). The Tosefta has in total eight cases that begin with the words “He who hands over money to his fellow.” This seems to indicate that these arrangements were common and that the various details in the agreements intrigued the rabbis, who wished to make sure that the worker was not being exploited and giving unjustified profit to the investor. See Lieberman, 84. He reads “wage for house and wage for time lost” based on the Vienna Ms. It is missing in the other versions. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

102

Chapter 4

of the worker, who is a paid agent of the investor. The pay is to be like an “idle worker” because minding a store is much easier than toiling in the field. This kind of partnership was found also in Egyptian papyri,23 in the Roman World, and in Sasanid Babylon.24 In Rome, an additional purpose of this arrangement was to cover the involvement of the aristocracy in commerce and banking, which social norm regarded as taboo: it was “beneath” them.25 The system existed in Palestine from ancient times, and priests invested in silent partnerships as well.26 However, the Tosefta (BM 4:11; Neusner, 4:96) mentions a disagreement concerning the wages that the investor must pay the worker: He who sets up his fellow as a storekeeper for half the profit “lo, this one pays him a wage calculated at the wage rate for an unemployed worker,” the words of R. Meir. R. Judah says: “Even if he dipped his bread with him in brine, or even if he ate with him two dried figs, this constitutes the wage for the time lost [in the running of the shop].” Rabbi Simeon says: He pays him a full and proper wage. For one who actually does work is not equivalent to one who sits and does nothing, and one who sits in the sun is not equivalent to one who sits in the shade. The three sages agree that the storekeeper should be paid; they differ about what the payment should be. Rabbi Meir says that the payment should be assuming that the storekeeper is unemployed and is willing to take a low wage in order to survive. Rabbi Judah posits that a minimal payment is all that is required such as a common meal sponsored by the lender. Rabbi Shimon says that the partner will receive full compensation for his work. The Mishnah cited only the opinion of Rabbi Meir anonymously. The Mishnaic editor who was active in the generation following these sages preferred his opinion to the others.27 Rabbi Judah’s minimalistic opinion seems to show that not all sages saw actual usury in this arrangement, only one that appeared to have usury in it. Therefore, the symbolic participation of the investor is sufficient to

23 24 25

Van Minnen, “Money and Credit,” 237. See Elman, “Intersection,” 558. For example, see D.17.2.18; and Sirks, “Law, Commerce, and Finance,” 73–74; Andreau, Banking, 150–151; and Jones, The Bankers, 169–171. 26 See M Demai 6:5; T Demai 7:7 (a Jew receiving a loan from a priest); T Demai 7:8 (a priest receiving a loan from a Jew); and JT Demai 6:4 (25c). 27 See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:200, lines 31–34. See below.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

103

“ Money for Money ”

allow the partnership to operate without the latter having to pay a real wage to the worker.28 The following source discusses special arrangements between investor and worker, and reveals also the common practice regarding the division of losses. Tosefta BM 4:16 (Neusner, 4:98) says: He who hands over money to his fellow to buy produce for half the profits, and said to him, “Near [a small share] for loss and far [a large share] for profit”—it is permitted in regard to usury. And this is the practice of truly righteous men. [If he said], “Near for profit and far for loss,” it is prohibited by reason of usury. And this is the practice of truly wicked men. “Near for one thing and for the other,” “Far for one thing and far and for the other,” it is permitted in regard to usury. And that is the practice of everybody. This Tosefta is very important because it reveals an important part of this partnership agreement that is not said explicitly elsewhere. When there are losses to the business, both the worker and the investor share them equally. This means that if the investment was 1,000 denars worth of products and the “store” sold only 800 of them, the worker would have to suffer half the loss and pay the investor 100 denars. This legal detail helps us understand the rabbis’ claim. A worker does not share in losses of the merchandise. He shares in the loss because he is an owner, meaning that he borrowed the merchandise and then is to return it to the investor with profit. The conclusion of this whole discussion is that it is permissible—even charitable—to give the money to a worker close to profit and far from loss. However, if it is the opposite, it is prohibited because it is interest. This shows that the sages saw smaller responsibility for losses for the investor as an advantage in the partnership that renders the labor of the worker into interest. If it is “half and half,” it is permissible, assuming (probably) that the worker is also paid a wage. The JT presents a case that is reminiscent of the above Tosefta. The Amora Rabbi Eleazar (Palestinian Amora of the second generation) is stringent with himself and does not accept profit that he considered close to profit and far from loss (JT BM 5:8 [10c]; Guggenheimer, 14:412). The case was as follows: Rebbi Eleazar invested a denar with a person and told him, what it earns between now and Hanukkah is mine [and yours], afterwards I do not have any part with you, whether they earn or lose it is yours. He wanted 28

See below. The BT preferred the lenient opinion of Rabbi Judah.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

104

Chapter 4

to give to him after Hanukkah but he did not accept.29 Rebbi Eleazar had misgivings because of “close to gain and far from loss.” In this case, the sage used a time component to pay for the labor of the worker. Until Hanukkah, the profit was to be shared equally, and after that time the money would be used exclusively by the worker. The business provided generous profit after Hanukkah. The salesperson wanted to give a part to Rabbi Eleazar, but he refused to take it presumably because he did not want it to be considered interest.30 His sensitivity to this issue was because after Hanukkah the risk was entirely the worker’s. If he was to enjoy the profit, it would be “close to gain and far from loss” as was seen in the above-mentioned Tosefta. The JT also mentions a number of cases, real or hypothetical, in which the investor pays the worker for his labor. The cases show that there were various ways to pay the worker. One was to give him a wage at the beginning of the partnership; another was to reinvest the portion of the investor in the principal, thus giving the worker additional profit.31 4.4.1 The Revolutionary Definition of the Babylonian “Nehardeans” The Babylonian Talmud presents a complex, innovative approach to this issue of partnership. BT BM 104b [= BB 70b] (after Soncino, 598) says: The Nehardeans said: An iska is a half loan and half deposit, the Rabbis having made an enactment which is satisfactory to both the debtor and the creditor. Now that we say that it is half loan and half deposit, if he [the trader] wishes to drink beer therewith [i.e. for the loan part] he can do so. Rava said: [No.] it is therefore called iska [“business”] because he can say to him, “I gave it to you for trading, not for drinking beer.”

29 Neusner, 29:132 has a different reading of this source. 30 See E. S. . Rosenthal and S. Lieberman, Yerushalmi Neziqin (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1983), 161. There, it is suggested that Rabbi Eleazar had given the salesperson a bit more than an equal share until Hanukkah, so it would not be considered interest. 31 The first case is in JT BM 5:5 (10b) (Guggenheimer, 14:389–390). There are various manuscripts of this case. See Y. Sussman, Ginze Yerushalmi (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 2020), 563; and Rosenthal and Lieberman, Yerushalmi Neqikin, 157–158, lines 45–46. The second is BM 5:6 (Guggenheimer, 14:396).

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Money for Money ”

105

The term iska is mentioned 25 times in the BT. It seems that the term was a general one applying to various kinds of business,32 the sale of merchandise,33 and various other commercial activities.34 Most mentions are from the Stamaim. However, the earliest mention by Amoraim appears here. The first is from the Nehardeans, then from Rava (fourth generation), and finally from Rav Papa (fifth generation). The Nehardeans present an innovative definition for iska of the type mentioned in the Mishnah. The term iska is not found in Palestinian sources.35 The Palestinian sources did not divide the seed money or define who owns it at the time of the partnership. It seems that since the agreement makes them equally responsible for gain and loss, it did not need to be defined. The Nehardeans wished to define the status of the seed merchandise in these partnerships. However, it was difficult. If the merchandise belongs to the investor, he should enjoy the profit and suffer the losses; if it is owned by the worker who is borrowing it and must return it at the end of the partnership, the worker should enjoy all the profit and suffer all the losses. They therefore define that, when this arrangement is made, the principal is “half and half.” The worker is a paid guard for the half that continues to belong to the investor, while his proper half is a loan that he will return when he pays back the principal. This approach is innovative because it is not stated anywhere in the agreement. However, it explains why they each get half of the profit and half of the losses. According to this passage, the interest problem the Mishnah identified in this arrangement is not the money that the investor receives as his portion of the profit. That profit is a result of the increase of the value of his portion of the seed merchandise. Rather, it is the labor that the salesman puts into the part of the investor in return for receiving his half of the merchandise as a loan. The worker puts in labor to compensate the investor for lending him half the seed merchandise. The solution to this problem, namely, that a salary should be given to the active partner for his work, was already stated by the Mishnah. The Nehardeans provide a new explanation for this. The worker is compensated for the labor he puts into the investor’s half of the principal, and thus the labor is not considered interest.

32 See BT Shabbat 19b; BT Beitza 32b; BT Eruvin 64b; BT Yoma 9b; BT Taanit 21a; BT Moed Katan 10b; and more. 33 BT BB 77b; 78a. 34 BT Horayot 12a. 35 BT BM 104b–105a. See Beer, Babylonian Amoraim, 212–217; and Katz, “Religion and the Economy,” 38. The term iska is mentioned in the JT once in JT Taanit 3:9 (66d) but not in the context of a business partnership.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

106

Chapter 4

The Nehardeans were a distinct school of thought in the third generation of Babylonian sages. It is unclear if their definition for this iska was universally agreed upon or disputed. The Talmud then states that, since half is a loan, the worker could use it for himself and not invest. Rava, a prominent fourth-generation sage, states that since it is called an iska and not a loan the “borrower” must use the money for the investment and may not spend it for himself; he limits the principle of the Nahardeans.36 Rav Idi bar Avin posited that, since it is a loan, if the worker dies it will be considered a loan of portable items taken by the “father of the orphans” that does not have to be returned. Rava continued his train of thought, stating that it is an iska that is to be returned even if the worker dies.37 Regarding the salary of the active partner, it seems that the Babylonian sages limited it to the more minimalistic opinions in the Mishnah. Rav Nahman states in BT BM 68b (Soncino, 400): R. Nahman said: The halachah is as R. Judah; the halachah is as R. Jose son of R. Judah; and the halachah is as R. Simon b. Gamaliel. Rabbi Judah’s opinion was stated above. His son Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Judah agreed with him.38 Rav Nahman was a prominent sage of the second and third generations of Babylonian rabbis. The Talmud states that he was an official judge for monetary issues and therefore had the authority to enforce the ruling that he advocated.39 However, immediately afterward the Talmud cites a case in which Rabbah, who was a contemporary of Rav Nahman’s, ruled that the salary or wage paid to the worker must be significant, and the anonymous editors 36

Rava also ruled that one does not collect debts from orphans. See BT Arachin 22b (and 22a). 37 BT BM 104b. Below, in BT BM 105a, Rava adds that there must be complete coordination between the partners. This too differentiates the iska from a regular loan or deposit. Indeed, the Nehardean approach prevailed, and later Jewish legislation saw it as the only explanation for the issue of investment in the Mishnah. 38 The words of Rabban Gamaliel were said in the passages M BM 5:5 and T BM 5:5 and 5:6 in the context of animal husbandry. Rabbi Yossi son of Judah also discusses that issue, giving a special status to goats and sheep in T BM 5:4. 39 See Ch. Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud, Babli and Jerushalmi (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1969), 298–302 [Hebrew]; Neusner, History of the Jews in Babylonia, 3:61–75, and index, s.v. “Nahman, R.” and “Nahman b. Jacob, R.”; ibid 4:73, and index, s.v. “Nahman b. Jacob” and “Nahman R.”; D. Goodblatt, Rabbinic Instruction in Sasanian Babylonia (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 275–277, and index, s.v. “R. Nahman (b. Ya‌ʾaqov)”; M. Beer, The Babylonian Exilarchate in the Arsacid and Sassanian Periods, 2nd ed. (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1976), 78–79, 88–93, and index, s.v. “Rav Nahman” [Hebrew]; and idem, Babylonian Amoraim, index–names, s.v. “Nahman.”

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Money for Money ”

107

of the Talmud (Stamaim) concluded that Rav Nahman did not intend to rule like Rabbi Judah that a symbolic salary is enough; rather, he advocated the opposite—namely, that we do not follow Rabbi Judah. The BT (BM 68b–69a) mentions another arrangement of iska that the rabbis sanctified as an alternative to giving a salary or a wage to the worker. It is possible to make the iska in such a way that the worker would receive two-thirds of the profit and incur half of any losses, or half of the profit and a third of any losses. In this way, the worker would receive compensation for his labor and it would not considered usury.40 The above-mentioned sources show that in the Talmudic period Babylonian sages understood the iska arrangement in a new way that is not found in Palestinian sources. Also, various applications of the partnership arrangement were implemented, making it more diverse and flexible. The rabbis developed these variations with the intention of further enabling business investment and thereby enhancing the number of—in their eyes—legitimate commercial loans and partnerships. 40

This source also involves Rava. He assumes that a committed Jew like his contemporary Rav Ilish would certainly intend to make an agreement that would coincide with rabbinic requirements. Therefore, he interprets the contract differently than stated.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Chapter 5

“Money for Fruit” 5.1

Introduction

Another way to give credit was to advance cash when the return payment was to comprise various goods. These transactions are termed here “money for fruit.” Future sales of products were commonly used in the Roman period and the beginning of the Byzantine period.1 The money would be evaluated against a commodity when it was loaned and was to be returned in goods or the money that could buy those same goods on the date on which the loan was paid back.2 The Mishnah mentions these transactions (BM 4:2; Lapin, 265): [If] he gave money but did not draw produce, he can withdraw. The case is that someone bought produce, paid for it, but did not take it out of the seller’s domain. The rabbis rule that the sale is not complete and that both sides can still change their mind. However, it will be seen that the payment creates a moral obligation to supply the merchandise, which was usually honored by the parties. Cases in which the money was paid up front and the merchandise supplied later are cases of futures. Despite their title as “sales,” the rabbis saw the money 1 This method of sale would have been used intensely in crisis situations such as between the years 235 and 284 CE. At that time, the Roman Empire suffered a serious economic crisis, which resulted in sharp inflation and the devaluation of the currency. The trust in money eroded, and citizens preferred to use goods as a secure measure for value. See, for example, D. H. Mattingly, Roman Coins: From the Earliest Times to the Fall of the Western Empire, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962), 120–129; R. A. G. Carson, Coins of the Roman Empire (London: Routledge, 1990), 220–246; K. Butcher, Roman Provincial Coins: An Introduction to “Greek Imperials” (London: Seaby, 1988), 31–39; idem, Roman Syria, 212–222; Sartre, The Middle East, 249–258; and Elliott, Economic Theory, 48, 150–172. 2 Silver, “Disappeared Deposit Bankers”; J. Nicols, “Mapping the Crisis of the Third Century,” in Crises and the Roman Empire: Proceedings of the Seventh Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Nijmegen, June 20–24, 2006), ed. O. Hekster, G. De Kleijn, and D. Slootjes (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 429–437, esp. 433, and other articles there. See also P. V. Kelly, “Third-Century Price Inflation Reassessed,” Theoretical Roman Archaeology Journal 4 (1) (2021): 1–2, esp. fig. 14, who posits that the inflation crisis affected the prices of most products but not wheat. The price of wheat remained stable. On the situation in Roman Palestine, see Sperber, Money and Prices.

© Ben Zion Rosenfeld, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004681965_006

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

109

“ Money for Fruit ”

paid in these transactions as in effect being loans to the sellers until they were supply the goods. They applied the prohibition of interest to these cases. If in the interim the price of the produce should go up, then there could be an issue of interest or usury. “Money for fruit” is the essence of market economics. However, delayed transactions contained a potential for profit for the buyer who pays cash for delayed supply. The sages compiled hairline differences between cases in which they allowed the transaction and the profit for the buyer and cases in which they called it tarbit, which is one of the words used in the Torah for usury.3 5.2

“Money for Fruit”: Future Sales ( Pesiqa)

When discussing credit and usury, the sources often use the concept of pesiqa. In this context, pesiqa is an agreement between two parties fixing a price per unit of the merchandise. The word ‫פסק‬, referring to transactions, is not found in biblical literature. The earliest use is possibly found in the New Testament in Matthew 20:2 and 20:13 with the words συμφωνέω and συνεφωνησάϛ, respectively. It appears there in the context of a price that is agreed upon between an employer and a laborer.4 It is possible that Matthew, who came from the Greek-speaking population of Palestine, or the surrounding areas, picked up the word from the speech of the local villagers. During the first centuries CE, in which Matthew was active, the Greek cities in Roman Palestine were increasingly playing a role in Jewish economic life.5 The term refers to advance payments and is found in Egyptian papyri from the third century BCE onward.6 3 This is found in M BM 5:1, which will be quoted below. 4 Matthew 20:2: “He agreed to pay (συμφωνήσας) them a denarius for the day and sent them into his vineyard.” Matthew 20:13: “Didn’t you agree (συνεφώνησάς) to work for a denarius?” (NIV). 5 Leei I. Levine, Judaism and Hellenism in Antiquity: Conflict or Confluence (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998). 6 See Liddell and Scott, Greek–English Lexicon, 1689b, s.v. “Συμφων-έω”; and Danker, Greek– English Lexicon, 960–961j, s.v. “Συμφωνέω.” On future transactions in Egypt, see A. Gulak, Legal Documents in the Talmud in Light of Greek Papyri and Greek and Roman Law, ed. R. Katzoff (Jerusalem: Rubin Mass Publishers, 1994), 125–126 [Hebrew]; and Montanari, Brill Dictionary, 2015b and c. See also G. W. Bromiley (ed.), Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (TDNT) (Grand Rapids, MI: Erdmans, 1974), 9:304–309. These transactions sometimes involved a pre-agreed-upon price for the products but often did not. This is explained by the fact that the parties wanted to ensure the supply of the product and to give security to the seller that his merchandise would sell. The issue of the price was secondary and was agreed upon at the time of supply.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

110

Chapter 5

Transactions of advanced sales are found in Egyptian papyri throughout the Roman and Byzantine periods up to the fifth century CE.7 The root of this word—pasaq (‫—)פסק‬appears first in Hebrew in the Mishnah and then in all subsequent rabbinic literature. Its meaning has three components: (a) to stop, to cut, and/or to separate (similar to the modern use);8 (b) to apportion, to ration, to dole out, or to set a price per quantity of something sold (‫)קצב‬, usually per unit, or according to volume or weight;9 and (c) to be obligated. When someone obligates himself to do something or to give money to a cause, it is referred to in rabbinic sources as pasaq.10 The most common future transaction in the Mishnah, and in subsequent Tannaitic sources, is called pesiqa. In the pesiqa transaction, the sides agree on a price per unit of merchandise that is to be supplied at a later time.11 The later time can be a few minutes, days, or even months, but not more than a year. The concept pesiqa is discussed in the Mishnah twenty-four times, in the Tosefta forty-seven times, and in Halakhic Midrash just three times. It is the only term in rabbinic literature for advance payment and future transaction agreements. In addition, there are mentions that do not use the word pesiqa. For example, the first ten halakhot in T BM 6 all deal with future and forward pesiqa transactions, but in some of these the word pesiqa is not mentioned. However, the sources discuss pesiqa extensively, indicating that the sages were occupied with this form of transaction. In the following discussion, pesiqa is a derivative of all three meanings given above. A pesiqa transaction is an advance payment for commodities, in which the parties establish a price per quantity. The buyer pays for the merchandise according to the pesiqa price and the amount of the commodity order; the 7

See R. Taubenschlag, The Law of Graeco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri (Milan: Cisalpino-Goliardica, 1972), 337; and R. S. Bagnall, “Price in ‘Sales of Delivery,’” GRBS 18 (1) (1977): 85–96. See also Lapin, Civil Law, 194–196. On the purchase of futures from farmers by traders in Babylon, see Beer, Babylonian Amoraim, 189. 8 See M Yoma 5:7; M Sotah 9:15; M Hulin 2:4; M Mikva‌ʾot 3:4; T Yoma 3:5; T BK 5:7; JT Berakhot 5:3 (9c); JT Megillah 1:1 (72c); JT Nedarim 8:1 (40d); BT Berakhot 25a; BT Sabbath 30b; BT Hagigah 15b; and BT BB 133a. 9 See M Ketubbot 5:8; 13:8; 13:5; M BM 5:7; 7:1; M Avodah Zarah 5:7; T Sabbath 13:13; T Megillah 2:15; T Ketubbot 4:7; T BM 6:1, 4, 5, 10; JT Terumot 6:2 (42b); JT Sukkah 4:6 (54d); JT Sotah 9:16 (23b); JT Ketubbot 11:2 (34b); JT BM 5:6 (10c); BT Yoma 76a; BT Ketubbot 64b–65a; and BT BM 86a. 10 M Ketubbot 5:8, 6:2–6, 12:1, 13:5. Usually the commitment is financial. However, there are cases where there are other kinds of commitments. 11 In Roman law as well, the price and quantity determined the contract. Without establishing a price, there was no sale. See Gaius, Institutes 3.139 (mentioned above); 141 (“The price must be in money”).

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Money for Fruit ”

111

merchandise is to be supplied later. The price is stable even if there is a change in price from the time of pesiqa until the supply time. The parties are morally obligated to carry out the transaction, even though, as shown above, they can back out of it so long as the merchandise has not been supplied. When the product is supplied, the deal is concluded. English translations of the Mishnah have several options when it comes to supplying phrases to capture the meaning of pesiqa: “fix a price,” “strike a bargain,” “make a contract.” This is because the original form incorporates the above three definitions.12 The sources discuss cases in which the buyer pays for the merchandise according to the pesiqa price and the merchandise is to be supplied later, even if there is change in the market price from the time of pesiqa until the supply time. There is evidence for similar transactions as early as the Hellenistic period.13 Transactions of this kind continued into the Roman period, and it is likely that they were practiced in other parts of the Roman Empire as well.14 There is an Egyptian papyrus from Oxyrhynchus that describes an advance payment of ten solidi (sg. solidus), a third of the price in gold, against the provision of wine that was to be paid for in two subsequent installments at the time of the harvest. One payment was to be a seven solidi loan according to a price of 105 sekomata-sextarii per solidus. Therefore, it must be that the first part of the transaction was priced according to the lower price of wine and that the difference in the subsequent payments was to compensate the buyer for the advance payment.15

12 Mishnah translators: Danby, M BM 5:7, translates: “bargain may be made”; Neusner, M BM 5:7, translates: “strike a bargain”; Lapin, Civil Law, 277, translates: “make a bargain”; 286: “agreed on.” Dictionaries: M. Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature, Vol. 2 (London: Luzac 1903), 1199, translates: “to apportion, assign, provide, promise”; M. A. Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic of the Byzantine Period, 3rd ed. (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2017), 499, translates: “to fix a price, to make a charitable pledge”; Sokoloff, Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 892, translates: “to contract to do (if you contracted at the lowest price).” 13 A document was found about a loan that was to be returned in fruit according to the market price at the time of the loan. Fruit paid part of the loan from two orchards. See Taubenschlag, Law of Graeco-Roman Egypt, 337; Gulak, Legal Documents, 125–126; Van Minnen, “Money and Credit,” 236–237. 14 Palme, “Documentary Texts,” 368; K. Blouin, “An Arsinoite Loan of Money with Interest in Kind,” BASP 47 (2010): 93–109, esp. 101. 15 R. S. Bagnall, T. T. Renner, and K. A. Worp, Columbia Papyri VIII (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 177–178, Papyrus 245, and notes for line 8. See also Johnson and West, Byzantine Egypt, 179. For a more detailed list of “money for fruit” transactions in Roman Egypt, see Worp, Kellis, 116. A sekomata was probably a vessel used for transporting and selling

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

112

Chapter 5

Similar to the above papyrus, the rabbis saw the advance payment for future merchandise as a loan that the buyer gives to the seller. Therefore, they extended the limitations of interest to pesiqa transactions as well. The Mishnah (BM 5:7; Lapin 276) says: One may not make a bargain [‫ ]פוסקין‬for produce until the market price has gone out [shaar/‫]שער‬. This Mishnah is the primary source for the expansion of the prohibition of usury from the realm of loans to the realm of commerce. The source prohibits selling future wheat before there is an official rate [shaar/‫]שער‬.16 The rabbis saw in the purchase of futures an element of credit. The buyer pays money in advance for produce and enjoys a big discount. Thus, when the transaction is completed, he earns a handsome profit because of his having extended credit to the farmer. The rabbis prohibited this form of future sales, saying it is in effect a loan that the buyer is extending to the seller. However, the Tosefta shows that on the other hand the rabbis allowed such a transaction once the official price was issued: the Tosefta (BM 6:1; Neusner, 4:105) says: They do not strike a bargain for the price of produce before the market price is announced … [When] the market price is announced for others [that already have the produce], even though [the seller] does not have, it is permitted to come to an agreement with him. Under what circumstances? When [the seller] is able to find produce for purchase at the same price.17 This source says that future sales are permitted when there is an official rate. If the future wheat is sold according to the official rate, there is no discount for early payment, so even though it is a loan, there is no distinct interest. wine. It came in a number of sizes. This one was 105 sextarii. Each sextarius was one pint or 546 ml. 16 On the shaar, see Rosenfeld and Menirav, Markets and Marketing, 137–169. There is a sale document from the beginning of the second century CE in which the word ‫( שער‬shaar) is written regarding pricing. This shows that the shaar for merchandise was a common phenomenon that people used. It answers the doubts raised by P. Erdkamp, The Grain Market in the Roman Empire: A Social, Political and economic Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 302–305. 17 T BM 6:1 (Lieberman, 93). The translation follows Neusner, 4:105 with changes. See also Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshuta, Nezikin, 9:233, lines 2–3.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Money for Fruit ”

113

However, if the price of wheat subsequently rises, then the buyer benefits from this change. This lenient ruling allows future sales once the wheat market is in operation.18 However, it is not consistent with the above-mentioned rabbinic decree that when someone pays for merchandise it is not his until he physically removes it from the domain of the seller. Therefore, in this case this lenient ruling cannot stand because the buyer already possesses the wheat. When the logic for leniency is not clear, it seems that it results from a practical consideration and not from simple logic. The rabbis felt that they could not handicap the farmer whose produce is late. They therefore use the official rate to change the status of the advanced payment from a loan to a purchase. A further leniency is found in the second half of the above-cited Mishnah (BM 5:7): [If] he was the first of the reapers, he may make a bargain for [the grain on] the threshing floor. And [he may make a bargain] for a basket of grapes, and for the vat of olives, and for the clay lumps of the potter, and for lime, from the time that his oven is filled, and he may make a bargain with him for dung all year round. R. Yose says: “he may not make a bargain with him for dung until he has dung in the dung heaps,” and the sages permit. Here there is permission to carry out pesiqa transactions without an official rate when the seller is the “first of the harvesters,” the produce is already in existence, and it is not a loan. This permission was expanded to cases in which the product was in the process of production but not quite ready. This includes grapes that were picked but not pressed, olives that were in the basket and not yet ripe, or “eggs” of clay that were prepared to be made into pots. The Mishnah also mentions whitewash and fertilizer.19 In the parallel Tosefta passage, there are additional examples: sheaves of wool, eggs, fish, birds, chicks, garnish hens,

18

On future transactions in Egypt, see Gulak, Legal Documents, 125–126. These transactions sometimes involved a pre-agreed-upon price for the products but often did not. This is explained by the fact that the parties wanted to ensure the supply of the product and to give security to the seller that his merchandise will sell. The issue of the price was secondary and was agreed upon at the time of supply. See Taubenschlag, Law of Graeco-Roman Egypt, 337. See also Lapin, Civil Law, 194–196. On the purchase of futures from farmers by traders in Babylon, see Beer, Babylonian Amoraim, 189. 19 M BM 5:7, which is in the same Mishnah that discusses pesiqa.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

114

Chapter 5

packages of straw, and twigs.20 The Tosefta adds that once one starts milking the cow it is considered a sale and there is no problem to determine a price per gallon.21 The reason for this is that the supplier has the raw material and can surely supply the finished product soon. The rabbis considered this a sale and not a loan; it is the “way people sell.” From these sources, it can be seen that the “fruit” the Mishnah discusses is not merely agricultural produce; it comprises all products including clay, whitewash, and fertilizer. The following Tosefta mentions a number of products that one has to be careful with when doing pesiqa. It is from T BM 6:5 (Neusner, 4:106): They do not strike a price for chicks, young poultry, fish at Tiberias, or bundles of straw. But they strike a price for eggs, birds, fish at all other locations [but Tiberias], and bundles of wood. This is the governing principle: In the case of anything which has a “season,” they strike a price concerning that thing in accord with its price when it is in season [M BM 5:7]. And in the case of anything which has no season, they strike a price concerning that thing anytime that one wants. Chicks, young doves, and fish from Tiberias had a “rate” that was set in the markets. Tiberias was one of the main sources for the supply of fish in the Roman period, and therefore its market determined the rate for fish. The rate cannot apply to fish that will be caught in the future, because it is liable to change due to the various aspects of caring for the fish that affect the quality of the merchandise.22 Therefore, one should not sell them in advance, lest the prices go up significantly and the buyer will benefit from paying in advance, which is “dust of interest” (as discussed in Chapter 3). In contrast, the source mentions various products which one may sell in advance. These products do not have a going rate at all, and therefore their price is always a result of negotiation between the seller and the buyer. Therefore, the parties may agree upon a price and carry out a pesiqa transaction.

20 T BM 6:1–5 (Neusner, 4:105–106). JT BM 5:6 (10c) adds to the list in the name of the house of Rabbi Yanai animal fodder, and Rabbi Yose son of Hanina adds honeycombs. 21 T BM 6:4 (Neusner, 4:106) The prohibition to do pesiqa on the milk or wool until the farmer starts to manufacture it is similar to the law of “first of the harvesters.” It seems that there was no permanent rate for these products, and therefore the sages prohibited future sales per measure lest the buyer gain from the advance payment. However, once the farmer starts manufacturing the product, he is allowed to make a price for the sale: it is no longer a future sale. It is a current sale—like any other sale. 22 See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:236, lines 14–16.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

115

“ Money for Fruit ”

The above analysis concludes that the rabbis prohibited only future sales at a time when there was no produce yet. It is logical that such early sales involved a large discount for the buyer who was taking a chance that the wheat would fail and was waiting a long time. The farmer was losing a big percentage of his profit because of his need for cash flow. The rabbis wished to prevent the farmer from selling prematurely and taking a heavy loss, and they prohibited this form, considering it a loan not a sale. However, in order not to hinder the market too much they allowed sale of futures once existing merchandise was involved, or, alternatively that the market price was out so that the product could officially be sold. Consequently, the discount for the sale of futures would not be such a great loss.23 The Babylonian Talmud expands this rule to cases in which the merchandise was not available in the current location of the parties, but could be obtained in a nearby market.24 5.3

Linking a Loan to the Price of a Commodity

The first Mishnah in BM chapter 5 builds on the principle of the above Mishnah (BM 5:7), discussing a case in which the transaction starts with a sale according to market price and ends with a loan that the lender wishes to link to the price of wine. The Mishnah (BM 5:1; Lapin, 272) says that usury includes neshekh and tarbit following the words of the Torah. After discussing neshekh that is “money for money” or “fruit for fruit,” it then presents an example for tarbit that is “money for fruit.” The case is a complex transaction in which the first half is permissible and the second prohibited: And which is tarbit? One who increases [ha-marbeh] by means of produce. How? He bought wheat from him at a golden dinar [25 denars] to the kor and such was the market price. Wheat [later] stood at thirty dinarim [to the kor]. He said to him: “Give me my wheat, for I am going to sell it and buy wine with it for myself.” He said to him, “But lo, your wheat is valued with me at thirty dinarim! And lo, you have a claim with me against them for wine”—But he does not have wine. 23 On the agricultural aspects, see Feliks, Agriculture, 119–138, and especially 224, 235, 238. 24 BT BM 72b: “Wheat may be procured in Hini and Shili.” JT BM 5:8 (10:3) attributes a similar view to R. Yose of the fourth generation of Talmudic Palestine.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

116

Chapter 5

The purchaser bought wheat for a golden denar (twenty-five denars) per kor and paid for it.25 The wheat was to be supplied at a later time. When the price of wheat went up to thirty denars per kor, the buyer says to the seller: “Give me my wheat because I want to buy wine with it.”26 The seller says “I am accepting your wheat at thirty denars a kor and owe you wine instead.”27 Originally, this was a sale transaction for the purchase of wheat. Since the borrower did not supply the wheat, he changed it into a loan. The loan is monetarily more than the original purchase price because of the increase of the price of wheat. It seems that there was no problem supplying the wheat at 30 denars per kor because there was a market price for wheat; it was therefore as if the buyer had it in his possession when the price went up. The problem is that he did not supply wheat. He asked to link it to the price of wine, and he did not have wine. The Mishnah states that this final twist in the deal is tarbit and is prohibited. It does not explain why the wheat transaction is legal while the wine transaction is prohibited. The Tosefta (BM 4:23; Neusner, 4:99) clarifies the previous Mishnah and continues to define the reason for the prohibition, from which a leniency can be derived. It states: [If] one owed [to another] money and came to buy from him produce at the threshing floor, and he [the borrower] said to him [the lender], “Go and calculate the amount for me following the prevailing market price [‫]השער‬, and I’ll provide it for you over the next twelve months—lo this is usury because he did not come with his issar.”28

25

It seems that the purchaser must have also taken possession of the wheat in one of the forms of acquisition because the rabbinic law maintains that when money is paid for merchandise the buyer does not own it until he physically takes it out of the salesperson’s domain. See M BM 4:1–2. If the buyer had only paid for the wheat, the salesperson could have refunded the money and held on to the merchandise. 26 Lieberman, Studies, 13–16, discusses this Mishnah in detail. He posits, that the increase in price from twenty-five denars per kor to thirty denars was not a result of time that passed, but rather because the seller was allowed to resell his merchandise even immediately for a sixth more than its original price (adding to it the price of transporting the merchandise). However, the standard explanation according to which the rise in price was seasonal and took place after some time elapsed seems better. See Ch. Albeck, Shisha Sidrei Mishnah, 6 vols. (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1957–1959), Neziqin, 424. 27 See T BM 4:18 (Lieberman, 85) for the best and worst times for the sale of seeds and wine. 28 Translation follows T BM 4:23 (Lieberman, 86, line 73). BT BM 62b cites a parallel barayta that presents the first case of the Tosefta with additional information.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Money for Fruit ”

117

The case involves a loan that was given from one person to another. The creditor asks for the return of his money at the threshing floor. The borrower offers to convert the debt to wheat that he will supply in the future. If the borrower would have supplied the wheat immediately or if the creditor would have come with cash to buy the wheat, he could have done so. However, since he is buying future wheat with debt, it is not a sale; rather it is linking the monetary debt to the price of wheat, which is expected to go up. The famous fourth-generation Babylonian sage, Abaye, uses this Tosefta to explain the Mishnah (BT BM 62b). In the first part of the transaction, the buyer paid cash for wheat to be supplied later. That is permissible because there was a market price for wheat and the buyer could have bought it immediately in the market. When it rose in price, it was the buyer’s wheat that went up and was therefore not usury. However, when the parties exchanged the wheat for wine there was no cash. The buyer could not buy wine in the market. It was therefore merely a way of linking a loan to the price of a product in order to give profit to the lender, which was prohibited. The conclusion from this is that the sages allowed the sale of futures even though it involved profit for the person with the money, but they prohibited linking loans to the cost of products, seeing that as a form of usury. The leniency regarding the sale of futures was innovative because it could be seen as usury as well. According to this explanation, the sages recognized the agricultural need for future sales, but on the other hand did not refrain from prohibiting such a transaction when they thought it was not a sale but a way to award profit to the lender. However, Rava, Abaye’s adversary, shows that the Mishnah concluded the case of wine with the words “but he has no wine” (BT BM 63a). This indicates that if the seller had wine in his possession the parties could link the money owed for the wheat to the wine. This too is a leniency that does not appear in the Tosefta. Rava concludes that the two sources disagree on this issue. He cites a barayta of Rabbi Oshaya that agrees with the leniency of the Mishnah and differs from the Tosefta. According to Rava’s lenient opinion, the sages allowed linking a loan to the price of a product as long as the product existed and was not theoretical. This provides protection for a lender in a situation of inflation. He can link the loan to the price of an existing product (though not to a theoretical one that is not in the possession of the borrower). The practice of linking loans to the price of products is found in Roman Egypt as well.29 29

This practice was used in many of the leasing and rental contracts in Roman Egypt. See Harris, “Revisionist View,” 7, 17. On the economic crisis and its influence on credit in the Roman world, see Sperber, Money and Prices, esp. 69–97, 128–131, 169–173; D. Hollard, “La crise de la monnaie dans l’Empire romain au IIIe siècle aprés J.-C. Synthèse des

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

118

Chapter 5

Rava (BT BM 63b) concludes from all the above that one may sell future produce according to market price, even if he does not have the product in his possession, since he can buy it. His disciples Rav Papa and Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua contradicted this ruling based from the previous barayta of Rabbi Oshaya that permits only when the seller has the product. The answer is that a sale is permissible but a loan is prohibited, meaning that he also accepts the distinction that Abaye had made previously. The above-mentioned sources show how the market that was essentially monetary; farmers would seek financing in monetary loans to be paid in cash. However, the agricultural background comes into play when money is scarce: the borrower reverts to barter economics in order to pay his debts with products and to create new inroads for complex transactions. The rabbis allowed it as long as it was a sale, not a linkage of a loan to the price of a product. The border between the two was often blurred. Hairline differentiation distinguishes the permissible from the prohibited.30 5.4

Down Payments

The rabbis also interfered in sale transactions of real estate, seeing down payments, or partial payments, as credit given from the buyer to the seller or vice versa. The Mishnah (BM 5:3; Neusner, 541) states: He sold him a field, and he [the buyer] gave him part of the money. He said to him, “Whenever you wish, bring money, and take what is yours”—it is prohibited. The buyer paid part of the price for the field. The seller declares that the field will be sold retroactively once the buyer completes the payment and not before. In the meantime, the seller benefits from the fruit of the field. The parties probably saw this as a simple sale procedure without a factor of a loan. However, the Mishnah prohibits this transaction because it interprets the

30

recherches et résultats nouveaux,” Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales 50 (5) (1995): 1045–1078; A. Wassink, “Inflation and Financial Policy under the Roman Empire to the Price Edict of 301 AD,” Historia 40 (4) (1991): 465–493; and Harris, “Revisionist View,” 23. This phenomenon is found in Roman Egypt as well. The Roman monetary system was mixed with the local agricultural barter market. See C. P. Elliott, “The Ecology of Exchange: The Monetization of Roman Egypt,” The American Historical Review 126 (3) (2021): 900–921.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Money for Fruit ”

119

down payment the buyer gave as a loan to the seller, and the seller eats the fruit of the field to compensate for waiting for the full payment for the field by the buyer.31 The BT concludes that in the above case the fruit should be deposited with an escrow. In a case where the sale is to take place only once the entire sum is paid, the seller may eat the fruit and it is not interest, since the land is his until the buyer completes the payment.32 An important case of rabbinic interference in business transactions is found in the context of maritime trade. JT BM 5:6 (10c) (Guggenheimer, 412–413) states: Rebbi wanted to permit the ocean’s absorption but Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose did not admit it; some say that Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose wanted to permit but Rebbi did not admit it. What is the ocean’s absorption? A person gave 100 denars to another. [He tells him], my yield is 20 denars. If it is less, it is on your account, if it is more, it is for your account. If it is lost, it is of both. Two sages from the end of the period of the Tannaim argue regarding the issue of kluto shel yam. It is unclear what the case was, but it seems that the investor would give money to shippers in order that they purchase for them merchandise cheaply and pay in advance. Here too we see that the rabbis interfere and have a dispute about whether this transaction has elements of credit or not.33 31

32 33

Defining the borrower and lender depends on the intricate details of the agreement. A similar situation in which there is lending and borrowing between two parties where sometimes one is borrower and sometimes one is creditor is found in Egyptian papyri. There too, there were workers who would borrow from the employers either money or products, and in other cases the workers would have credit with the employer and could draw products against the money owed to them. See Rathbone, Economic Rationalism, 318–330. Statements by the Amoraim Rav Huna and Rav Anan in BT BM 65b. See also the barayta of Rabbi Hiya cited by the Amora Rav Safra. On the meaning of the words kluto shel yam, see S. Lieberman, Talmuda shel Keisarin: Yerushalmi Masechet Nezikin (Jerusalem: Azriel, 1931), 14–15 [Hebrew]; Rosenthal and Lieberman, Yerushalmi Neziqin, 162; Levine, Caesarea, 54. They say it is a long-term business partnership between investors and travelers. Hezser, Travel, 189–190, and A. Gevaryahu, “Coining Terms: Tarsha and Qeluto Shel Yam,” Leshonenu 79 (2017): 247–267 [Hebrew], add a maritime background to this partnership in which the investor gives money to seafarers in order that they bring merchandise on their ship. There is a source for maritime loans and investments in the Muziris Papyrus. See Rathbone, “Financing”; idem, “Muziris Papyrus,” OCD (2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199381135.013.3965; F. De Romanis, “Structural Aspects of a Commercial Enterprise to Muziris: On SB XVIII 13167 Again,” Topoi (Supplément 15) 32 (2017): 83–100; idem, Indo-Roman Pepper Trade, 159–205, 312–316. The interest rates for maritime loans were very high because of the

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

120

Chapter 5

In contrast, there are cases of advanced payment that the rabbis permitted. The following law in the Tosefta was placed in the chapter dealing with laws of interest but seems to be out of place, as it deals with establishing the proper pricing for the merchandise: it does not seem to be an issue of credit. However, it will be seen that it is a case of advanced payment. T BM 6:13 (Neusner, 4:108) states: He who [upon being paid in advance] sells wine or oil to his fellow all year long is liable to provide it for him just as he would charge at retail. And he should not sell the jar at three different prices.34 The Tosefta seems to allow a discount for early payment. The buyer paid in advance for wine or oil for the year. The Tosefta is warning that the seller should not give him inferior quality wine from the bottom or top of the barrel and do it because of the discount he gave the buyer for the advance payment. This is fraud, because he was obligated to supply him what he supplies all his other clients that come to the store.35 Another ruling on wine and advance payment comes from BT BM 73b (Soncino, 425):

34

35

danger involved. See Feliks, Agriculture, 142–155, 187–203, 234–240. He deals with sowing and reaping seasons, and compares them to those of Roman Egypt (in the context of papyri). See also Sperber, “Costs of Living.” According to the practice that had prevailed in Jerusalem in the Second Temple period, wine was sold at three prices. T BM 6:14 says: “When a jar of wine was sold in Jerusalem, it was sold at three different prices, covering the wine at the mouth, the sides, and the middle [of the jar].” Our Tosefta is stating that one who sells wine (or oil) should mix the wine in the barrel and sell it for a uniform price rather than charge differently for the top, middle, and bottom of the barrel, as was the practice in Jerusalem. The original term used was katalazon. On the meaning of the word, see Lieberman, Texts and Studies, 1–10. Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:240, lines 34–35, explains that the seller is not allowed to give the buyer a better price than he charges at his store when selling small amounts unless it was stipulated at the time of sale. The reason for this is that it would be compensating him for paying in advance, which is a form of interest. This differs from the opinion of the previous Tosefta, which allows a discount for early payment since the merchandise will be supplied later. Lieberman’s explanation for this Tosefta is problematic, as the language “is liable to provide,” which indicates that it is a warning against supplying too little not too much. Furthermore, since the buyer and seller had agreed upon a price and quantity, why should the seller give him a better price and cut his profit unnecessarily? On fraud, see B. Z. Rosenfeld and J. Menirav, “Fraud: From the Biblical Basis to General Commercial Law in Roman Palestine,” JSJ 37 (4) (2006): 594–627. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Money for Fruit ”

121

Ravina gave money [for wine] to the residents of Akra di-Shanwatha, and they supplied a liberal addition.36 So he went to Rav Ashi and asked him: Is it permitted? “Yes,” he replied, “they but forego [their rights] in your favour.” This source is from the sixth generation of the BT; it allows the seller to throw in extra merchandise as a present to the buyer. Ravina paid in advance for wine, and they supplied it together with an extra barrel. Ravina asked Rav Ashi if he should refuse to accept the extra barrel because of “dust of interest.” Rav Ashi answered that it is permissible, because it is a present the sellers decided to give. It is not necessarily because of the advanced payment: it could just be that they wanted to entice him to buy from them in the future. 5.5

Future Sales That Are Not Pesiqa

The following source is a futures transaction that is permitted because the buyer is making a global deal for the entire amount of the produce at once. On the other hand, when the buyer insists on paying per quantity, it is credit and could be prohibited. In other words, pesiqa transactions are considered credit, but when there is no n pesiqa the future sale is permitted. In T BM 6:6–7 (Neusner, 4:106), it says: [If] there were before him a hundred sheep, and he said to him, “Lo, the fleece of these [sheep] are made over to you for a hundred denars of gold”—it is permitted. [If he said] “For such and such per litra of fleece,” it is prohibited. But if he has it in hand, it is permitted to shear the sheep and to hand it over to him. If there were before him a hundred kor of wheat, and he said to him, “Lo, this standing grain is made over to you for a hundred golden denars”—it is permitted. [If he said,] “It is sold to you for such and such,” it is prohibited. But if he has it in hand, it is permitted to cut it and hand it over to him. A man may say to his fellow, “Here is two hundred zuz for what your field produces,” on condition that he not say to him, “At a price of four to a sela,” or, “two seahs to a sela.”37 36

The village of Shanwatha was probably near the fortress called the “Akra” of Shanwatha. See Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica, 465–466. 37 Cf. M BM 5:8. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

122

Chapter 5

In the first case, the sale involves wool. Here too the rabbis prohibited pesiqa before there is a market price, interfering with future sales of wool not only wheat. In the second case, there is a field of 100 kors planted with wheat that is not yet ready to harvest. The seller offers to sell it as is for 100 denars, and the wheat will be supplied to the buyer when it is harvested and processed. This is permissible because there is no guarantee that the wheat will not be damaged, and the buyer has the discount for the risk rather than for the advance payment. However, when they make up a price per quantity this is like pesiqa where there is yet no market price and it is prohibited. The second case has two innovations: the first is that the field does not have a specific size, and the second is that the buyer is offering to pay a fixed sum for whatever the field produces. This is permissible also because it is not clear how much he will receive. If they made a price per quantity, it is prohibited because it is pesiqa. The buyer pays a lower price because he is paying in advance and thus benefiting from the credit that he is extending to the seller. The Tosefta says that if he has the product, he may harvest it and give it to him. This means that in the previous case the wheat was not ready to be harvested. Therefore, the sale is to be completed in the future and has an element of a loan. However, if the seller can harvest the wheat and give it to the buyer right away, the buyer may purchase it per quantity for a low price because it is a pure sale with no loan element whatsoever.38 BT BM 73a (Soncino, 423) cites a similar case but approaches the issue differently: An orchard: Rav forbade it; Samuel permitted it: Rav forbade it: Since it is worth more later on, it looks like payment for waiting. Samuel permitted it: Since there may be cause for regret, it does not look like payment for waiting. Rav Shimi b. Hiyya said: But Rav agrees [where the plugging is done] with [the aid of] oxen, since great loss is caused. The famous first-generation Babylonian Amora Rav prohibited the future sale of the fruit of an orchard. There are various possibilities to explain the details of this transaction. One possibility is that buyer pays a global sum for all the fruit that the orchard will produce. Rav posits that there is an element of interest here, since the buyer enjoys a lower price because he is paying in advance. If so, he seems to be prohibiting even global sale without pesiqa, 38 BT BM 64a (Soncino, 379–380) expanded the above Tosefta with additional examples of wool and milk from the cow and honey from the beehive. The principle is the same. A global price regardless of quantity is permissible; a low price per quantity is prohibited.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

123

“ Money for Fruit ”

contradicting the Tosefta. It is also possible that Rav prohibited making up a price per quantity as in a pesiqa transaction before there is an official rate. Samuel said that, since it is possible that the merchandise will be damaged by the time of supply, it is permissible because, though the buyer enjoys a lower price, he is risking the possibility that at the harvest the produce will be of low quality or quantity (“one-sided interest”). Rav Shimi son of Hiya, who operated in the second generation, after Rav and Samuel, clarifies that even Rav agrees that it is permissible in the case of “bulls” being used to harvest the crop because much risk is taken by the purchaser; after all, the bulls tend to cause damage. The Talmud provides further explanation for Rav’s position. In the case of buying the fruit of an orchard, the discount is great because the fruit is far from being harvested. The likelihood of loss was considered by Rav to be unlikely and therefore the buyer would benefit from advancing the money: it is usury. This strengthens the notion that the rabbis applied the laws of interest to commercial transactions in order to prevent farmers from the pre-sale of their produce at a great discount to the buyer because they need the cash quickly. The problem of advanced payment applied also to wages for work in which the money was paid in advance for work that was to be done later. T BM 6:15 (Neusner, 4:108) states: He who says to a worker, “Here’s this maneh, and let it be in your hand, so you’ll work with me at the harvest time at the rate of a denar a day,” while “the work is worth a sela a day—it is prohibited.” “… [charge] against it at the rate of a denar a day,” while the work is worth a sela a day—it is permitted. The source permits hiring a worker and paying him in advance if the work is to begin at once. However, if the work is to be “at the threshing time,” then it could be prohibited if the anticipated wage at that time would be higher: the employer would be saving money because he would be paying in advance. This is an example of interest. 5.6

Loans against Deduction of Future Tithes from the Field

Another type of a cash loan to be returned in fruit has to do with lending money to people who have a right to receive tithes from the produce of fields. The future tithes were to be deducted from the debt as they were harvested. The rabbis permitted this. M. Gittin 3:7 (Neusner, 471) states:

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

124

Chapter 5

He who lends money to a priest or to Levite or to a poor man so that he may set apart [what would be] their share separates the produce in their behalf in the assumption that they are alive. And he does not take account of the possibility that the priest has died, or the Levite, or that the poor man has gotten rich. [If] they died, he has to get permission from [their] heirs [to continue in this way to collect what is owing]. If he lent them this money in the presence of a court, he does not have to get permission from the heirs. The source describes a loan, given to a priest or a Levite or a poor man, against future tithes from the fields of the creditor. In the case of the poor tithe, and the tenth given to the Levite, the owner will be able to separate the tithe and consume it himself. In the case of the priest, where the lender may not eat the tithe, he can sell it to any priest he wants. The tithes are the payment for the loan. The Mishnah’s interest in this case regards the question of whether the lender is allowed to assume that the borrower is still alive at the time that he is separating the tithes and whether he has to take into account that the poor man may have become rich. The rule of hazaka (halakhic inertia) is that, so long as the case is not known to be otherwise, the lender may assume that no change is preventing the continuation of the transaction.39 In the case of the priest, the intention is to assist the priest financially and to ensure the return of the loan. However, in the case of the Levite and poor man, it is beneficial also for the lender because he will be able to keep future tithes and will not have to search for someone to receive them. On the other hand, the borrower benefits a lot from this loan as he receives cash against future tithes that the owner could have given to someone else. He is guaranteeing that the tithes will in effect be his. 5.7

Summary

This chapter dealt with transactions of “money for fruit,” which is primarily when money is paid in advance and the products are supplied later. In today’s 39

For a more elaborate discussion of this issue, see T Gittin 3:1; and Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nashim, 8:820–826. The idea is further developed in BT Gittin 30a (Soncino, 124); and Beer, Babylonian Amoraim, 350–361. On the Tannaitic period, see A. Shemesh, “The Term ‘Mitzvah Ha-Teluyah Ba-Aaretz’ Reexamined,” Sidra: A Journal for the Study of Rabbinic Literature 16 (2000): 151–177 [Hebrew]. In general, see Z. Safrai and S. Safrai, Mishnat Eretz Israel: Tractate Sheviit (Zraim 5) (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2008), 353–398 [Hebrew].

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Money for Fruit ”

125

parlance, it is called “advanced payment,” or “forward” or “future” sales. The rabbis saw a loan component in these transactions, as the buyer secures a low price for the product because the seller is not ready to supply it. On the other hand, they allowed future sales when there was an official market rate or when the product was almost ready to be supplied. In the first case, the rationale is that the buyer could have bought the product for the same price and could have had it supplied immediately. Therefore, he would not be gaining from his advance payment. In the case of a product that was almost ready, it seems that the leniency granted by the rabbis was based on the small discount given as the delay was small. It was therefore due to the inconvenience that leniency was granted: it did not fall under the category of “payment for waiting” (agar natar). The Mishnah, Tosefta, and BT devote much discussion to various examples of these transactions. This indicates that they were common in the times and places in which these texts were being written and revised. The farmers were eager to have cash after a long growing season, and the manufacturers wanted to have their products sold. The purchasers wanted to guarantee themselves the products in a shortage economy where such products were finite and their availability was not to be taken for granted.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Chapter 6

“Fruit for Money” 6.1

Introduction

This chapter treats the reverse case: the credit involves giving merchandise against return of money. This form of transaction was practiced daily between residents and shopkeepers, the latter supplying products to their clients and allowing them to pay later. It was probably common as well in larger-scale transactions between wholesalers and importers who had difficulty paying cash before they sold the merchandise. It also applied to the payment of taxes. For example, in Egypt the tax for renting land from the government was paid at the end of every half-year, giving the farmer a half-year credit on his taxes.1 There are also several Egyptian papyri that are categorized as sale transactions but the money payment for the sale is delayed and interest is added to the price.2 Credit in the form of late payment for merchandise was common in the cities of the Roman world, a necessary component of the complex economic activities of Rome’s urban society.3 The primary need for sale on credit was that merchants often had a shortage of cash due to delays in receiving payment from their clients. They needed money to replenish their stock of merchandise for sale. They therefore used credit. Often, the merchant who required credit did not turn to official institutions such as banks, fearing that the high interest rate and strict payment terms would be too difficult for him. Instead, he would turn to neighbors, relatives, and/or colleagues, who would be more understanding if there were a delay in payment. In this way, the merchant had a source of cash flow that enabled him to buy, sell, and give credit to those that bought from him as well.4

1 See B. W. Frier, “The Rental Market in Early Imperial Rome,” JRS 67 (1977): 27–37, esp. 29–30. In these cases, the farmers were required to provide security against their debt. 2 Alonso, “One En Pistei.” He also cites cases of “fruit for fruit” where the delayed payment is in kind not in coin. 3 For an interesting example of a “fruit for money” transaction from Londonium between the years 53 and 60/61 CE, see R. S. O. Tomlin, “Roman Britain in 2015: Inscriptions,” Britannia 47 (2016): 389–415, esp. 401, n. 32. 4 See Hawkins, Roman Artisans, 81, 84–86, 221–226; idem, “Artisans, Retailers, and Credit Transactions”; and idem, “Contracts.”

© Ben Zion Rosenfeld, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004681965_007

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Money ”

127

The majority of the information about this practice comes from the large cities in the Roman Empire. Jewish society in Roman Palestine, which is a large part of the focus of this volume, resided primarily in small towns and villages in which the economy was smaller and less complex. However, here too similar forces operated, causing a need for the extensive use of credit between suppliers and consumers. Often, the end consumers—the farmers or day laborers—bought first and paid when they earned money. That in turn forced the storekeepers to buy merchandise on credit and this affected their suppliers. Therefore, these credit transactions were an integral part of the economy. 6.2

Sale on Credit

The Mishnah (Avot 3:16; after Neusner, 681) mentions sale on credit in a statement attributed to Rabbi Akiva (90–135 CE): He (R. Akiba) would say, “All is handed over as a pledge. And a net is cast over all the living. The store is open, the storekeeper gives credit (makif, ‫)מקיף‬, the account book (pinkas, ‫)פנקס‬5 is open, and the hand is writing. Whoever wants to borrow may come and borrow. The collectors go around every day and collect from man whether he knows it or not.” The message is primarily a moral one and not intended to teach anything about storekeeping. However, the saying contains a vivid description of the process of sale on credit that shows day-to-day situations in which proprietors sold merchandise and instead of receiving money wrote down the amount owed for later payment. It also describes the difficulty involved in collecting the money that was owed. The collectors had to “go around every day.” This description likely reflects a common phenomenon that was familiar to all, and therefore is a good parable about man consuming in this world and paying in the next.6 M. Shavuot 7:5 (Neusner, 635–636) describes the storekeeper’s account book (pinkas), and adds a complex case in which three parties are involved in a credit transaction: 5 On the Greek origin and the meaning of the word pinkas, see Y. Kutcher, Milim veToledoteihen (Jerusalem: Kiriat Sefer, 1965), 56–57; and Sperber, Dictionary, 21, 202. 6 See S. Sharvit, Language and Style of Tractate Avoth through the Ages (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2006), 135, 233–237. Compare also M Sheviit 10:1, which says that the Sabbatical year does not cancel debts of the storekeeper. See also T Sheviit 8:3. On credit in stores, see Goodman, State amd Society, 55; and Lapin, Civil Law, 141.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

128

Chapter 6

A storekeeper concerning [what is written in his] account book—how so? It is not that he may say to him, “It is written in my account book that you owe me two hundred zuz.” But [if the householder] said to him, “Give my son two seahs of wheat, [or] Give my worker change for a sela” and he says, “I already gave it to him,” and they say, “We never got it”—[the storekeeper] takes an oath and collects what is owing to him, and [the workers] take an oath and collect what they claim from the householder.7 In addition to the regular store credit described here, there is an additional account of credit that involves three parties: the storekeeper, the purchaser, and a recipient of the merchandise who is either an employee of the purchaser or his son. This is an arrangement between a storekeeper and an employer, according to which the storekeeper supplies the workers (or the son) with food and perhaps other products and the employer pays for it periodically rather than after each transaction. This arrangement is convenient for both sides. The storekeeper receives returning clients and a large sum of money at once, and the employer does not have to be bothered with small sums of money every week. The source considers the listing of the storekeeper as partial proof that the merchandise was supplied when the workers claim they did not receive the products.8 6.3

Delayed Payment

Another form of “fruit for money” is delayed payment. This type is similar to “sale on credit” discussed above but differs from it in two respects. First, it is a singular transaction, while “sale on credit” involves an ongoing process; second, when a storekeeper sells on credit it is also convenient that he receives a large sum in one payment, instead of receiving many small payments. In the case of postponed payment, the only reason is that the buyer cannot pay at the agreed-upon time and the seller is doing him a favor by letting him pay later. When there is a price to pay immediately and the parties delay the payment and raise the price, the sages define it as interest and prohibit it. This Mishnah (BM 5:2; Lapin, 272–273), establishes this principle:

7 This Mishnah explains the previous Mishnah, Shavuot 7:1, that mentions the records of the storekeeper and considers them a basis for the collection of the credit listed in them. 8 On the various levels of the marketing chain, see Rosenfeld and Menirav, Markets and Marketing, 71–136.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Money ”

129

One may increase (marbim) upon the rental fee but one may not increase upon the sale [price]. How? He leased a courtyard to him. He said to him: “If you give me [payment] now, lo, it is yours for ten selain per year, but if monthly, for a sela per month—it is permitted.” He sold him a field. He said to him: “If you give me [payment] now, lo, it is yours for one thousand zuz, but if at the treshing floor, twelve maneh [1,200 zuz]”—it is prohibited. The Mishnah distinguishes between rental transactions in which the practice is to pay at the end of the period and purchases in which the practice is to pay when the transaction is to take place. In the case of rental, one is required to pay at the end. If the renter pays in advance, it is a discounted price and is permissible. However, in the event of a sale the money is usually paid up-front. If the parties agree to postpone payment to a future date such as after the first harvest, the seller is extending credit to the buyer, and it is prohibited to charge extra for the delay.9 This is “fruit for money” because the buyer receives the field, which is in this case the merchandise, immediately, while the money is to be paid later. This prohibition applies not only to the sale of real estate but to the sale of any object as well. This phenomenon of fining the buyer for late payment is found in papyri from Egypt and the Judean Desert.10 There are additional cases, based on this Mishnah, in which it is permissible to give a discount for advanced payment for sale transactions. T BM 6:11–12 (Neusner, 4:107) states: If one purchased from him logs, half-logs, quarter- and eight-logs, he is permitted to say to him, “Pay now for less,” and he does not have to scruple that he is violating the laws against usury. Similarly: He who makes a purchase from his fellow on condition that he pay him between that point and the next twelve months has the right to say to him, “Pay me forthwith at a lower price,” and he does not have to scruple that he is violating the laws against usury.

9

This is the explanation offered by Albeck, M. Neziqin, in his commentary for this Mishnah. However, Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:239–240, says that it is permitted in rental because the credit is being extended from the renter to the owner. That is the opposite of the usual rules of credit where the owner extends the credit. 10 Alonso, “One En Pistei.”

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

130

Chapter 6

In this case, the phrase “between that point and the next twelve months” is unclear. It can mean that the buyer may pay at any time within the next twelve months, or that the buyer is paying in monthly installments that are paid for twelve months. In either case, the buyer offers to pay early and receives a discount for early payment.11 The first case discusses a client that regularly bought various quantities of wine or oil from a storekeeper and paid him each time. The buyer may offer to pay in advance and receive a discount because technically he is not obligated to pay anything until the merchandise is supplied and therefore it is a discount not interest. In the second case, the seller supplied the merchandise immediately, but both sides agreed to divide the payment into twelve monthly installments without interest. The seller is extending credit to the buyer without charging interest. Here, too, the seller may offer a discount if the money is paid upfront, since the price of the transaction was established already and agreed upon, and so he is not charging for delaying the payment. Another source in the Tosefta attributes this permissible ruling to the times of the Temple. In T Shekalim 2:12 (Neusner, 2:175), it states: Once every thirty days they fix prices for the heave-offering of the [shekel] chamber [M Shekalim 4:9]. Whoever sold wine, oil, and flour and said, “Pay me my money in the coins which circulate in my country”—he goes to the revenuer and the revenuer brings him to the money-changer. If he wants, he says to him, “Pay me off immediately at a discount for cash” [“for less right now”]. This is not prohibited by reason of interest, nor because it is a matter involving the sanctuary. But anyone who sells something to his fellow on condition that he pay him any time in the next twelve months, if he wanted, may say to him, “Pay me for less right now.” [And] this is not prohibited as interest. The Temple paid its suppliers once a month. The money came from the cash that was donated by the Jews once a year in the form of a half-shekel. This money was stored in the Temple treasury, and once a month they would take a box of money and use it for buying the sacrifices. If the suppliers needed the money earlier, the source says that the treasurer of the Temple would send the supplier to a “table operator” or a banker. The banker advances the money to the supplier, deducting a discount for the Temple. The banker then charges the Temple for his service. The discount is permissible according to the 11

According to the explanation Lieberman gives for this source. See Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:239, lines 32–34.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Money ”

131

principle stated above that it is a discount for advanced payment. The Temple may pay the banker even though it is interest on a loan because the Temple is not “your brother” and is not subject to the biblical prohibition against charging interest. The Tosefta then states that a discount for advanced payment is permissible to regular people also. It seems that the Tosefta in Shekalim is the source for the ruling cited in Bava Metzia. Another example that presents a discount for advanced payment is found in the Tosefta in BM 4:23 (Neusner, 4:100). It says: But if he came to him and said to him, “Lend me a kor of wheat, and I’ll pay you back in accord with the price prevailing at the time at which you sell it,” it is permitted [and is not deemed to smack of usury].12 The buyer wishes to receive a kor of wheat from the seller and offers to pay later when the price of wheat is higher. This is the opposite of the pesiqa transactions, where the money is paid against a later supply of the merchandise. Here, the buyer receives the merchandise first, and the money is paid later.13 In this case, there is an additional component implied by the words “according to the price you will sell it for.” The merchandise is not for sale now. The seller is planning to put it up for sale in the future when the price is high. The buyer, in order to obtain the merchandise now, is willing to pay a higher price. The increased price can be interpreted as interest for delaying the payment, or as a price to pay for the release of merchandise that is not yet for sale. This seems to be the reason that the Tosefta allows it, since even if the real reason for the higher price is the late payment, it is not considered Torah-prohibited interest; rather, it is “dust of interest,” as it is a sale and not a loan. It seems that the buyer is offering to “borrow” the wheat until it is up for sale and then to pay for it at the rate that prevails when it is for sale.14 Rabbi Judah the Prince seems to be stringent on this very lenient ruling of the Tosefta. JT BM 5:7 (10c) (after Guggenheimer, 411), relates that: 12 Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:208, lines 72–73, cites Ramba‌ʾʾn, who claims it should read “prohibited” instead of “permissible.” This is because the JT (cited below) brings a similar case in which Rabbi Judah the Prince prohibited and Rabbi Hiya put it into his barayta. Since the Tosefta is attributed to Rabbi Hiya, Ramba‌ʾʾn said it must read “prohibited.” Lieberman points out that all manuscripts read “permissible,” and posits that this is the reading in the Tosefta, contrary to the barayta cited by the JT. However, it is possible that this case is different from the case Rabbi Judah prohibited. Here, the rate is not yet determined and may go down. Therefore, it is permissible. The case in the JT is that the seller is promised a higher rate in advance, which is prohibited. 13 On pesiqa transactions, see Chapter 5. 14 See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:208, lines 72–73.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

132

Chapter 6

Rebbi Hiyya the Great had flax. The donkey drivers wanted to buy from him. He told them, it is not my intention to sell this before Purim. They said to him, sell it to us now at the price which you would sell it for at Purim. He went to ask Rebbi, who told him it is forbidden. The story is attributed to Rabbi Hiya “the great,” who was a close disciple of Rabbi Judah the Prince. He had a large amount of flax, and donkey drivers, who were in effect traveling salespersons, wanted to buy it from him.15 It seems that the buyers wanted to receive the merchandise immediately and to pay according to the current rate in cash. However, Rabbi Hiya said that he does not want to sell until Purim probably because he expects the price to be higher then. The buyers suggested he sell them the flax now for the anticipated price of Purim. It is unclear, however, when the flax was to be supplied and when they were planning to pay. It seems that this case must be that of a loan. They want to be supplied now with the flax, and they will pay according to the price on Purim, after they sell it. According to this passage, Rabbi Judah the Prince prohibited the transaction because it was in effect a loan of flax until Purim and because the payment would increase because Rabbi Hiya lent the flax to the merchants.16 Rabbi Hiya thought it would be permissible because the higher price can be a fee for convincing him to sell now rather than holding on to the merchandise until Purim. The JT then states that Rabbi Hiya accepted Rebbi’s prohibition and put it into his barayta. It then quotes Rabbi Hiya’s nephew Rav, who summarizes the rules for such transactions (BM 5:7 [10c]): Rav said, my uncle Rebbi Hiyya will agree that if they paid him and he immediately acquired, then it is permitted. If he paid beforehand and acquired afterwards, it is permitted; if he acquired earlier, and paid afterwards, it is forbidden. Rav, Rabbi Hiya’s nephew, explains Rabbi Hiya’s position. He presents three possibilities. One is that the payment and the handing over of the merchandise are done at the same time. There is no subsequent problem of interest 15 On donkey drivers, see Rosenfeld and Menirav, Markets and Marketing, 124–133, and index, s.v. “donkey.” 16 Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin 9:208, lines 72–73; and, following him, Googenheimer JT BM 5:7 (10c), 411, n. 161. He says that the donkey drivers planned to sell the merchandise for a high price somewhere else. Some commentators say that the payment by the donkey drivers was immediate. According to this scenario, it is not a case of “fruit for money” but an issue of overcharging.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

133

“ Fruit for Money ”

because there is no component of a loan in the transaction. The second is that the payment could be in advance and the supply later. That too is permissible when there is a market rate for the product at the time of sale (pesiqa). The sale is final according to the current rate and is not a loan. The third possibility is prohibited; the merchandise is handed over and the payment will take place in the future according to a higher price. The seller is getting a higher price for his wares because the money is being paid later. The conclusion from the above discussion is that the sources cited present a complex case in which there is credit and benefit for the lender, but the benefit could be explained as compensation to him for agreeing to sell merchandise that was not yet for sale. This duality explains why Rabbi Hiya thought it would be permissible but Rabbi Judah the Prince did not think that releasing merchandise early takes the profit out of the category of interest. Rav follows Rabbi Judah the Prince’s approach and states that his uncle Rabbi Hiya would admit to it. 6.4

A Cash Loan Presented as a Two-Sided Sale Transaction

A Tannaitic source shows another method to grant an advantage to the lender without directly violating the Torah prohibition of interest. The Tosefta (BM 4:3; after Neusner, 4:95) states: There are matters which are not regarded as usurious but are nonetheless prohibited because of the possibility of deception for the practice of usury. How so? [If] he said to him: Lend me a maneh [and the other] said to him: I don’t have a maneh but take twenty seahs of grain. Even though the other went and purchased twenty four this does not constitute usury. But such a practice is prohibited because of the possibility of deception for the practice of usury.17 The case was that the borrower asked someone to lend him one maneh (100 denars = 25 selas) in cash. The creditor said he does not have cash and suggested giving him a hundred seʾahs of wheat at one sela per seʾah (sela = four 17 The JT (BM 5:1 [10b]) cites the source, but it is distorted. The JT adds that the transaction also saves money for the borrower because he does not have to spend money to transport the produce to the market. The source is also cited by the BT (BM 62b) including additional examples. The explanation of the Tosefta presented below relies on Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:196–197, lines 14–15.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

134

Chapter 6

denars = four seʾahs), which amounts to the same sum. After they agreed, the lender then “sold” the wheat back to the borrower for twenty-four selas—one sela less to save the effort of taking the wheat to the market and selling it. Now the borrower owes twenty-five selas, though he received only twenty-four, which looks like usury. The Tosefta concludes that though it is not direct usury because it is achieved through buying and selling a product, it nevertheless is prohibited because of “deception of usury.” It seems that the wheat transaction was in effect a method to collect interest on the loan. The lender had the entire sum or close to it. However, in order to collect interest on his loan in a legitimate way, he is turning it into a transaction of wheat in which buying and selling can be high or low as agreed between the parties. The gap between the high and low price is the interest from which the lender benefits. The rabbis were aware of this and prohibited it as aramat ribit (‫ערמת ריבית‬, “deceiving interest”), thus preventing this form of interest. 6.5

Tarsha: A Talmudic Version of Delayed Payment

From the middle of the Talmudic period, there was discussion concerning the concept of tarsha. The term appears three times in the Babylonian Talmud, and its literal meaning is “deaf.” It seems to refer to a quite obscure form of profit gained by the lender from the loan.18 The Talmud discusses it as follows (BT BM 65a; Soncino, 383): But if at harvest time, for twelve manehs—that is forbidden. R. Nahman said: An increased credit price (tarsha, “silent usury”) is permitted. Rami b. Hama, others say, R. Ukba b. Hama, refuted R. Nahman: But if at harvest time, for twelve manehs—that is forbidden? He replied: There [the increase] was stipulated; here no stipulation is made. Rav Nahman, one of the prominent rabbinic authorities of the third generation, who often dealt with monetary issues, stated that tarsha is permissible. He does not explain what tarsha is. Rav Nahman is asked by his disciple about the Mishnaic passage that prohibits charging extra for delayed payment. He answers that in the Mishnaic case the increase in price is defined—the buyer pays an extra 200 zuz for the delay, while in tarsha the increase is not defined. From this, it is possible to conclude that the tarsha discussed here involves a 18

Rosenthal and Lieberman, Yerushalmi Neziqin, 162, n. 34. On the tarsha, see Cohen, Legal Methodology, 142–144; and Gevaryahu, “Coining Terms.”

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Money ”

135

transaction in which the merchandise is supplied immediately but the payment is delayed. The price will be determined according to the market price prevailing in the future. The seller assumes that the price will go up and that he will profit from the increase in price. Rav Nahman posited that since the increase in price would be not certain and not be fixed it would not be considered interest.19 The BT resumes the discussion, citing two cases in which Amoraim said that “their” tarsha is permissible. This indicates that they did not allow all tarsha like Rav Nahman; they wanted to permit only their own form of tarsha. The first is Rav Papa (Soncino, 383–384): R. Papa said: The increased credit price which I take is permitted. Why? Because my beer will not deteriorate [if I keep it until Nisan], [and] I am in no need of money; hence, I merely confer a benefit upon the purchaser [by letting him have it earlier]. But R. Shesheth the son of R. Idi said to R. Papa: Why should you merely consider yourself? Consider them [the purchasers]: had they money, they would purchase at present prices; lacking it, they must buy it at the higher future prices. Rav Papa of the fifth generation was wealthy and had a factory to produce beer. He loaned high sums of money to Jews and to non-Jews.20 He says that when he does tarsha it is permissible. He would sell beer to his clients. They were to pay him in the future according to the future price. His claim is that he is merely doing the buyers a favor. He does not need the money, and his beer will not spoil, so he could keep it and sell it for the high price anyway. Rav Papa is hinting that for someone who is not so wealthy, or merchandise that could spoil by the time of payment, it would be prohibited. Rav Shisha son of Rav Idi contested Rav Papa’s logic. He said that, from the point of view of the buyer, it is interest because had they paid now they would have gotten the beer for a lower price. They are paying a higher price because they do not have the money now, and that is interest. The Talmud proceeds to Rav Hama’s tarsha. TB BM 65 a–b (Soncino, 384) states:

19 20

An alternative understanding of the words of Rav Nahman is that in the Mishnah the current price is defined: 1,000 zuz and the future price. In tarsha, the future is defined according to the price that will be paid, but the current price is left obscure. On Rav Papa, see Beer, Babylonian Amoraim, 197–202, n. 148.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

136

Chapter 6

R. Hama said: My increased credit price is certainly permitted. Why? They are pleased that it shall remain in my ownership, so that wherever they go they are released from taxation and the market is held up for them. Now, the law is as R. Hama; and the law is as R. Eleazar; and the law is as R. Jannai, who said: What is the difference between them themselves [sc. the provisions] and the value thereof? Rav Hama was of the same generation of Rav Papa (second half of the fourth century). Since there is no explanation of the pricing of the transaction, it should be assumed that it is the same arrangement discussed above in which the buyer will be supplied now and will pay according to the price that will prevail at the time of payment. The difference is that here Rav Hama takes responsibility for the merchandise when the buyers transport it. That gives an advantage to the buyers, since they do not have to pay taxes and they have the right to sell first as representatives of Rav Hama the sage.21 Rashi adds that if a portion of the merchandise did not sell, it would have been returned to Rav Hama.22 The anonymous editors of the Talmud ruled like Rav Hama. By ruling this way, they negated the opinions of Rav Nahman, who allowed all tarsha, and those of Rav Papa, who thought that his tarsha was not interest. The term tarsha appears also once in JT BM 5:8 (10c). The context is shel yam, which deals with financing ships that bring merchandise from overseas.23 The Talmud then states (Guggenheimer, 413): Rebbi Huna said, for instance those who give merchandise to those who depart overseas to the stadia for two or three xestwn (-ξεστῶν) (xistwn). That is not interest but property.24

21 22

23 24

This right of “grabbing the market” for the sage and selling his merchandise before the others was a practice in Jewish society for many generations. See Beer, Babylonian Amoraim, 221–226. This kind of sale is called today “consignment.” It is unclear from the wording whether Rav Hama accepted responsibility for loss of the merchandise or whether he just gave his name to it, giving the merchants that carried the merchandise the benefit of representing him. There is a case of consignation in the ledger of a banker from Pompeii in the first century CE. The banker extended credit to merchants who paid back the loan after they sold their merchandise. See Temin, “Financial Intermediation,” 722–723. This topic appears in the previous chapter, which discusses payment in advance. The quote is based on the Escorial manuscript and Lieberman’s corrections. See Rosenthal and Lieberman, Yerushalmi Neziqin, 162–163. See also Leiden Ms. Col. 1230. In the Venice print, a slightly different reading is less clear.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Money ”

137

The sage Rav Huna was active in the fifth generation in Palestine.25 The transaction discussed by Rav Huna is unclear from the source. According to the Arukh, the case involved credit that was given for merchandise supplied immediately in order to receive payment later: “He gives the fruit in the month of Cheshvan and pays back in Iyar according to the price in Iyar that is more expensive.”26 According to this explanation, it is the same as the tarsha of Rav Nahman in the BT with the JT assuming the lenient approach of Rav Nahman. The commentator Pnei Moshe offers the opposite explanation: “They gave an amount of money to supply him with cheap merchandise at a later time.” According to this explanation, the investor advanced money to the shipowner in order that he should bring back merchandise later. The above JT passage, on this logic, is describing a case of “money for fruit” with advanced payment.27 The term xestwn (ξεστῶν) is unique in the Jerusalem Talmud. According to Lieberman, it is the plural form of the Greek word ξέστιον, which comes from the Latin word sextarius, which is a liquid measurement of about half a log (200 sq. cm); it was known in Egypt as a currency in weight.28 Therefore, it seems that the lenders were supplying the merchants with measured merchandise not money.29 This places the case under discussion in the category of “fruit for money,” where the product is supplied and the money is paid later. Lieberman describes the business transaction mentioned in the above source as a partnership between the shippers and the landed supplier to carry the merchandise and sell it for mutual profit with shared risks. The profit is a result of the difference in the value of the currency from the port of landing to the destination port.30 According to this interpretation, there should not be a question of interest since the case is a partnership not a loan. Furthermore, maritime commerce in the Roman Empire involved credit and investment, but partnerships between shippers and merchants were not common.31

25 See Beer, Babylonian Amoraim, 175, n. 56. 26 A. Kohut, Arukh Hashalem, 8 vols (New York: Pardes Publishing House, 1955), 4:99. The Aruch was written in Italy in the 11th century. 27 The commentator Pnei Moshe used the standard printed edition, not the manuscripts cited by Rosenthal and Lieberman. 28 See Liddell and Scott, Greek–English Lexicon, 1189; E. A. Sophocles, Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods (From B.C. 146 to A.D. 1100), Vol. 2 (New York: Ungar, 1957), 790; and Glare, Latin Dictionary, 1751. 29 Lieberman, Talmuda shel Keisarin, 14–15; Rosenthal and Lieberman, Yerushalmi Neziqin, 162. 30 Rosenthal and Lieberman, Yerushalmi Neziqin, 162, lines 151–152. 31 See Sperber, Nautica Talmudica, 10–11, 30–31, on sources from the Roman world considering maritime commercial activity.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

138

Chapter 6

The explanation should be modified. The merchant is selling the merchandise to the shipper at the price of two to three sextarii to the denar.32 The source does not relate the precise amount, only the price per unit. The merchandise is supplied at the home port without payment. The payment will be based on the price at the target port while the expectation is that the price there will be higher. The reason for this arrangement may be that the shipper does not have the cash to pay now and wants to pay the supplier from the money of the future sale. Basing the price given to the merchant on the future sale enables both the supplier and the shipper to make a profit without defining a clear amount of interest for the money loaned. This is called tarsha and is permitted according to the JT. According to this explanation, it is possible to derive that the “responsibility” for the merchandise while it is being transported is the supplier’s because the shipper has not yet paid for the merchandise. If that is the case, this tarsha is similar to the ruling of Rav Hama in that the profit for the lender is not only for the delay of payment but because the merchandise itself still belongs to him when it is sold at the higher price. The profit for the shipper is a salary that the merchant on shore is giving to him for the work he puts into the transport and sale.33 In conclusion, the sources speak of a number of forms of tarsha. Some are permitted and some are not, depending on the specific details of the tarsha, and the reason the lender receives profit. Interestingly, the Babylonian Talmud discusses the term in a landed context that reflected the commercial activity of the Jews in Babylon in this period. On the other hand, the Jerusalem Talmud discusses naval commercial activity in which Jews were becoming involved in this period.34 6.6

“Fruit for Money” in a Partnership

The transaction of “fruit for money” can assume a form of a partnership between the investor and a worker who generates the income and shares part of the profits. The Mishnah (BM 5:4) that mentions this has been cited above,

32 G. Reger, Regionalism and Change in the Economy of Independent Delos (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 351. 33 This explanation works well with Guggenheimer’s (413) translation of the word tarsha to “property.” 34 See above, Chapter 3, Section 4 and n. 29.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Money ”

139

when transactions involved “money for money.” The same Mishnah involves a case of “fruit for money.” The Mishnah states: One does not set up (lit., “seat”) a shopkeeper [to sell merchandise] at half profit (sakhar); let him not give him money with which to purchase produce for half profit; unless he gave him his wage (sakhar) as an idle laborer.35 The second case is “money for money” and was discussed above (Chapter 4). The first case is “fruit for money.” An investor buys merchandise and sets up a store, paying the worker half the profits for his labor. The Mishnah seems to rationalize that the investor is lending the merchandise to the worker and the worker is to return the principal price from the sales and take for himself half the profit. The Mishnah prohibits this because the investor receives half the profit as payment for lending the merchandise to the worker. It is considered lending and not the payment of a wage because the worker shares responsibility for loss of the merchandise as well as the possible depreciation in its value. This arrangement can be permissible if the investor pays for the labor of the worker and thus his work to sell the produce is not considered to be interest. The rationale of this solution was discussed above in the chapter about “money for money.” The second part of the Mishnah (BM 5:4) and additional cases cited afterward discuss a partnership for the husbandry of animals. Animal husbandry was a flourishing business in the Roman Empire and assumed various forms in which a farmer would raise animals both for house consumption and for commercial purposes.36 Here too, the investor and workers were partners in 35

This is the reading in the good manuscripts: Kaufmann, Lowe (Cambridge), De Rossi (138, 984), Parma, and Paris. However, Albeck, M. Neziqin, on this Mishnah reads only “worker.” In his additions to his commentary (424), he notes that some read “unemployed worker.” 36 G. Kron, “Comparative Perspectives on Nutrition and Social Inequality in the Roman World,” in Diet and Nutrition in the Roman World, ed. P. Erdkamp and C. Holleran (London: Routledge, 2019), 156–181, esp. 167–169; M. Groot, Livestock for Sale: Animal Husbandry in a Roman Frontier Zone (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016), 11–21, 146, 158–164, 195–203, and index, s.v. “surplus”; F. Pigière, “The Evolution of Cattle Husbandry Practices in the Roman Period in Gallia Belgica and Western Germania Inferior,” European Journal of Archaeology 20 (3) (2017): 472–493; R. W. Redding, “The Pig and Chicken in the Middle East: Modeling Human Subsistence Behavior in the Archaeological Record Using Historical and Animal Husbandry Data,” Journal of Archaeological Research 23 (2015): 325–368; Edmondson, “Economic Life,”681–682. On animal husbandry in Roman Palestine, see Sperber, The Land, esp. 27. On animal husbandry in the Sasanian Empire, see M. Mashkour, et al., “Animal Exploitation and Subsistence on Borders of the Sasanian

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

140

Chapter 6

the animals and the Mishnah required compensating the worker so his labor on behalf of the investor would not be interest on his monetary contribution to the partnership. In this category, the Mishnah presents two forms of partnership. One involves “fruit for money,” and the other involves “fruit for fruit” (BM 5:4, after Lapin, 274): One does not set up chickens for half [profit]. And one does not assess the value of calves and foals for half unless he gives him the fee (sakhar) for his labor and food. The first case involves investing in chickens and dividing the offspring. This is a case of “fruit for fruit,” which will be discussed in the following chapter. The second case involves “evaluating calves and foals for half.” The investor will give young cows or horses to the livestock expert, after evaluating how much they are worth.37 The expert raises them, and when they are fully grown, the worker will sell them and split the increase in their value. Similar to the case of the storekeeper, the Mishnah allows this only if the investor pays the cost of the labor of the worker and the cost of half the food. Otherwise, the worker is investing time and money that raises the value of the part of the investor just because he is loaning the animals from which he will benefit.38 The salary paid to the worker is the price for his effort and expertise. Therefore, he is paid a full salary not just like an unemployed worker, as stated in the case of the storekeeper. The sources do not mention expenses other than the food for the animals. It is possible that if the animals require medical attention the investor is to participate in the expense or that, since it is not a periodical expense and can be a factor in the quality of the care given to the animals, the worker must take this expense upon himself. Empire: From the Gorgan Wall (-Iran) to the Gates of Alans (Gorgia),” in Sasanian Persia: between Rome and the Steppes of Eurasia, ed. E. W. Saur (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 74–95; and T. Daryaee and Kh. Rezakhani, From Oxus to Euphrates (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 57–62. On Babylonian Jewry, see Beer, Babylonian Amoraim, 116–155, and index, s.v. “bakar.” 37 Later, regarding “iron sheep” the worker assumes full responsibility for loss of the animals by illness or armed robbery. That is prohibited. Here, it seems that the evaluation is necessary to determine the increase in value over time or in raising the foals, but if the animals die or are taken by force, then the partners split the loss. 38 Albeck, M. Neziqin, 85. The rabbis use here the term “evaluate” in contrast to “iron flock,” which the rabbis completely prohibited because the investor does not share losses. In this case, it seems that the investor shared the potential losses as well.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Money ”

141

The following Mishnah (BM 5:5) says that if the animals supply consistent profits from milk or animal labor (like pulling a plow), given to the worker, it can replace the need to pay a salary. The Mishnah mentions also that there were variations in this kind of partnership according to location. In some locations, the investor and worker shared the offspring immediately, and in others they would first raise the animals for a while and then share the profit. Rabban Simeon son of Gamaliel, who operated around 150 CE, goes further and says that when investing in a mother and calf the profit gained from the mother’s milk can feed the calf as well and that the labor for mother and son is the same as for mother alone. The last case of the previous Mishnah (BM 5:4) states that it is permissible to “receive” young calves and colts for half profit. This case is permissible because there is no “evaluation” and the worker is not committed to the value of the animals, which would currently be low. Possibly, the reason for this ruling is that the animals are so young that they may not survive. Therefore, any profit the individual receives is payment for his work with the animals, for which he is not responsible.39 In the first generation of the Babylonian Talmud, an innovative way to compensate the active partner is disputed. The Talmud analyzes whether this arrangement settles the possibility that the worker’s labor would be considered interest on lending him the animals. In BT BM 69a (Soncino, 400–401), it says: Rab said: [If one stipulates, “Receive] the excess above a third as your remuneration,” it is permitted. But Samuel said: And if there was no excess above a third, shall he go home empty handed? Hence, said Samuel, he must stipulate a denar [for his labour]. The investor is offering to pay the husbandman all the profit beyond an increase of a third in the value of the animal. Profit that is up to a third of the principal is to be equally divided between the partners. The uniqueness of this case is that the salary for the worker is not fixed. He may earn a lot if the value of the animal increases way beyond a third, and he may earn a little or nothing at all if the value remains close to a third. Rav accepts this kind of partnership because usually the increase in the value of the animal as it grows up is more than a third. Samuel disagrees. He says that, since it is possible that the worker 39

The Mishnah states clearly that in this case you do not have to pay for the work of the laborer. However, it is unclear why. Albeck, M. Neziqin, presents another possible explanation that the owner gives the worker half the current value of the animals, and that this is the compensation given to the worker for his work in addition to feed for the animals.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

142

Chapter 6

will end up with no profit whatsoever for working for the part of the investor, it is not a sufficient arrangement. He suggests that the investor promise a minimum of a denar for the work of the husbandman and that the rest of the worker’s profit can come from the increase in value beyond a third. Of course, they continue to divide the first third of the profit. The later anonymous author of the Talmud then continues (Ibid, Soncino, 401): Now, is it Rab’s opinion that a denar need not be fixed? But Rab said: The calf’s head is the breeder’s. Surely that means that he said to him, “Receive the excess above a third as your payment?”—No. It means that he said to him, “Either the excess above a third, or the calf’s head for the breeder.” Alternatively, when did Rab rule that [a stipulation], “Receive the excess above a third as your payment,” is permitted, when he [the breeder] has a cow of his own, for people say, “It is the same whether one mixes fodder for an ox or for oxen.” The above statement seems to say that only Samuel requires that something beyond half the profit should be added to the worker’s pay. However, the Amora Rav is quoted as demanding that the person who raised the animal receive the head as compensation for his labor. We see that Rav also requires that the worker receive a symbolic portion beyond half the profit. The Talmud offers two answers to this issue. One is that Rav requires giving the head to the worker when they are equally dividing all other aspects of the animal, not when the worker receives all the profit above a third. Another answer is that normally Rav actually requires not only giving the worker the profit above a third but also an additional advantage such as an extra denar or the head. The case in which he differs with Samuel is one in which the worker has in addition to the animal of the investor another animal of his own. Therefore, since his expenses on food and labor are relatively small, it is enough that he is given the profit above a third. Interestingly, the Babylonian Talmud proceeds to explain how this advantage for the worker is a result of the restriction of interest. If the worker was to invest, becoming a partner of the investor in the principal, he would actually lose because then it would be permissible to divide equally without the issue of interest (Ibid, Soncino, 401): R. Eleazar of Hagrunia (near Nehardea) bought a cow and gave it to his aris. The latter fattened it, and received the head in payment and also

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

143

“ Fruit for Money ”

half the profit. Said his [the aris’s] wife to him, “Had you been in partnership with him, he would have given you the tail too [as your share].” So he went and bought [a cow] in partnership with him, but he [R. Eleazar] divided the tail, and then said: “Come, let us divide the head too.” “What! Shall I not receive even as much as before?” exclaimed him. “Until now,” he [R. Eleazar] replied, “the money was [altogether] mine; had I not given you a little more [than half], it would have looked like usury. Now, however, we are partners: what will you plead? I have worked rather more?” But people say “The average aris binds himself to the landowner to find him pasture.” In the above story, Rabbi Eleazar of Hagrunia, a sage from the fifth generation in Babylon, bought an animal, probably a sheep. He gave it to his sharecropper based on the standard agreement of dividing the profit and giving the head to the worker. The wife of the sharecropper suggests to her husband to invest with the sage in purchasing the next animal, assuming that it would improve his situation and not only that he would get the head he would get the tail as well. However, when it was time to divide, the sage shared everything with him including the head and tail. He explained to the sharecropper that he gave him the head when he was an investor and the sharecropper was the worker. It was necessary to pay him for his work, so it would not be interest. Now that the sharecropper participated in buying the animal, they are partners and they can divide everything equally. This story shows that despite the rabbis’ good intentions to help the workers, the general rural population did not know the nuances of the halakha and did not understand intuitively the consideration that formulated their conduct. The difference between those partnerships that the rabbis considered loans with a need to pay for the worker and those that were strictly partnerships was small and intricate, leaving much room for mistakes. It is therefore likely that, when they conducted business that did not involve sages, they did not follow the halakha cited in the sources. 6.7

“Iron Flocks”: An Agreement to Ensure the Investor’s Capital

“Iron flock” in rabbinic literature refers to a certain kind of investment in which one party supplies the money to purchase the product and the other guarantees the principal investment, cares for the product, and shares the profit with the investor. This form of investment originated in animal husbandry. The

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

144

Chapter 6

investor buys young sheep. The worker takes care of the sheep until they grow up. The sheep are sold, and the parties split the profit equally.40 The difference between this animal husbandry and what was mentioned before is that the worker takes upon himself responsibility for the safety of the entire flock. The owner does not lose at all if something happens to the investment. The rabbis prohibited this form of partnership completely as is stated in M BM 5:6 (after Lapin, 275): One may not receive “iron sheep” from an Israelite, because it is interest (ribit). But one may receive “iron sheep” from the non-Jews. The reason for the prohibition is that, since the worker assumes all responsibility for the animals, he is “borrowing” them. The profit he gives to the owner is interest. If it were a real partnership, the investor would share the risk with the worker, so if the sheep died they would split the loss as well. In contrast to the case of the storekeeper, in this case the rabbis prohibit the partnership completely and do not allow paying a salary to the worker. The reason for that in the case of the storekeeper is that they both share responsibility for the merchandise and the loan is only for the labor put into the half belonging to the investor. Here, since the entire responsibility falls on the worker, the entire flock of sheep is a loan to the worker and the profit received by the investor is interest. A nominal salary for the worker will not solve the issue of his responsibility for all losses to the principal. The Tosefta (BM 5:14; Neusner, 4:102–103), however, continues to say that in the context of family it is permissible, and then proceeds to explain what “iron flock” is: A man accepts from his wife a flock on “iron terms” and the offspring and the shearing of the sheep belong to him. And if they die he is liable to make them good. Now what is the meaning of an “iron flock” contract? [If] there were a hundred sheep and he said to him Lo they are counted against your account for a hundred golden denars the offspring and the

40 The “iron flock” concept appears in other contexts as well, such as the property a woman brings with her into marriage. There, it is not interest because the husband guarantees the principal for the wife in the case of his death or their divorce. However, as long as they are married, he works the land and reaps all the fruit. See M Yevamot 7:1–2; T Yevamot 9:1–2; JT Yevamot 7:1 (8b); BT Yevamot 66a–67a; BT Ketubbot 101a; and BT BK 89a.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Money ”

145

shearing belong to you and you must pay over to me a sela for each and every one at the end it is permissible [prohibited].41 The structure of the Tosefta in this passage raises a number of difficulties. The first is the ruling at the end that “iron flock” is “permissible.” The above-cited Mishnah had said that it is not permissible. The second difficulty is to define the exact division of the profits between the investor and worker. What is the sela from each one, and why is it necessary given that the worker is receiving only “half, a third, or a quarter”? Neusner assumed that it is profit for the investor, which is 16% of the principal. This is difficult because it is interest. The investor invested one gold coin and received an additional sela per head! Lieberman posited that the reading in the Tosefta was corrupted and should say: “prohibited” like the Mishnah. He claimed that the Tosefta has two cases and that words are missing. The first is an “iron flock” partnership where the worker guarantees the value of the sheep, taking full responsibility for anything that happens to them and receiving a portion of the profit. On that, it says: “prohibited.” The second is a case in which the worker does not guarantee the value of the animals. He rents the animals for a sela per month and that is permissible because “they are just getting old and their value is going down.”42 Lieberman’s explanation completely rewrites the Tosefta. Furthermore, it seems that renting the animals should be worse than sharing the profit because the worker is in effect borrowing them and paying interest. At the end of the partnership, he will return the sheep and the owner will have made money from the time that the sheep were in the hands of the worker. A closer examination of the Tosefta shows that Lieberman assumed that the opening “A person may receive ‘iron flock’ from his wife” has nothing to do with the continuation about what an “iron flock” is. The latter is an explanation of the concept mentioned in the Mishnah. However, the entire difficulty will disappear if we say that the Tosefta said “permissible” because it is still talking about receiving an “iron flock” from one’s wife. That is permissible for the husband but prohibited between strangers who are not family members. According to this explanation, the Tosefta is mentioning two forms of division of profit. One opinion regards dividing the increase of the value between the partners, and 41 42

The text of the Tosefta in two manuscripts reads “permissible.” Neusner read “prohibited” following Lieberman, who said that it is impossible to read “permissible,” which will be discussed below. Lieberman suggests that the animals lose value because of aging. The sources never mention this consideration in cases of animal husbandry. It is likely that they would slaughter the animals at their prime and not wait for them to age.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

146

Chapter 6

the other a monthly fee. Both are prohibited between strangers but permissible between a husband and wife. The solution to the second issue seems to be that the sela has to do with the children and the shearing of wool. It was common to measure wool by its weight, and the investor expects to receive a sela of wool from each sheep per year or even a sela in money against all the wool that stays with the worker. The worker guarantees the value of the sheep at one hundred gold coins, and he will receive a half, third, or quarter of the increase in the value of the sheep as they grow up. The owner will not profit too much because the sheep are expected to produce an average of 150 denars of wool per season (sela = four denars).43 However, the Babylonian Talmud has a reading of “a sela per month,” which would be money. That seems like an exorbitant amount of interest.44 Perhaps it is because the BT also mentions milk. If the sheep produce milk regularly, a sum of a sela per month is not so high. In the Erfurt manuscript, the words “half, a third, a quarter” do not exist. However, since it is an investment, it must have a division of profit as part of the agreement. Another difficulty arises when we compare the reading of the Tosefta to the parallel JT that cites it (BM 5:5 [10c]; Guggenheimer, 401): “One may not receive mortmain property from a Jew,” etc. “What is mortmain property?” He had 100 sheep and told another: They are valued for you at 100 gold [denars]; their young, their milk, and their shearings are yours, but if they die you are liable for them and you pay me a tetradrachm for every one of them at the end of the year (16% interest rate). This is forbidden. The distinct difference between the JT and the Tosefta here is that in the case of the JT the investor receives only money as profit and the worker receives all the offspring, milk, and sheerings. It is prohibited because the worker is liable for loss of the principal, making him a borrower of the sheep and the payment interest. In the Tosefta, it is a partnership in which they divide the offspring. Furthermore, the JT says “prohibited” like the Mishnah does.45 In light of the above analyses, it can be seen that the sages saw the arrangement of “iron flock” as beneficial for the investor because it guaranteed the principal he invested and gave him possible profit on top of that. On the other 43 See M Eduyot 3:3. 44 BT BM 69b. If the value of the sheep is 100 gold coins, that is 2,500 silver denars. A sela is four silver denars. One per sheep is 400 denars per month, which is 4,800 denars per year. That is more than the value of the sheep themselves! 45 Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:217–219, lines 34–38. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

147

“ Fruit for Money ”

hand, the worker takes all the risk only because he does not have the capital to invest. The BT has a different, more complicated view of the above issue. The BT is not sure that in such transactions all the responsibility lies with the worker. BT BM 70b (Soncino, 407–408) states: Shall we say that it stands under the ownership of the contractor? But the following is opposed thereto: If one undertakes [to breed sheep] on “iron flock” terms for a heathen, the young are exempt from [the law of] firstlings!—Abaye answered: There is no difficulty; in the one case he [the owner] accepted [the risk of] unpreventable accident and depreciation; in the other, he did not. Said Raba to him: If the owner accepts the risk of depreciation and [unpreventable] accidents do you designate it “iron flock”? The Babylonian Talmud assumes that the reason “iron flock” is prohibited is that, since the worker takes responsibility for all the sheep, it is all a loan that the investor gives him and therefore any profit given to the investor is interest. The Mishnah (Bekhorot 2:4) states that if someone receives “iron sheep” from a non-Jew the offspring is not liable to the tithe of the firstborn. The BT (Bekhorot 16b) derives from this that the non-Jew owns a portion in “iron sheep” and their offspring. This contradicts the prohibition to receive “iron sheep” from a Jew, because the prohibition is based on it being a loan that the investor lends to the worker with the animal being owned completely by the worker. Why is it not liable to the tithe of the firstborn? The Talmudic sage Abaye wants to establish the Mishnah in Bekhorot as a case in which the worker did not receive all the responsibility for the animals. If they are stolen or lost, he is responsible, but if they die or are seized by force or their value in the market decreases, the owner shares the responsibility. Rava argues that in that case it cannot be called “iron sheep.” He concludes that the reason the worker does not have to give the firstborn to the priest is that the non-Jew may confiscate the sheep if the Jew does not supply profit. If the sheep are not available, he may confiscate the offspring. Therefore, the non-Jew has a lean on the animals “and whenever a gentile has a hand in an animal it is absolved from giving the firstborn.” 6.8

Transport of Merchandise Guaranteeing the “High Price”

There is testimony for a unique kind of transaction in which a person who transported goods from place to place is willing to pay his supplier a high Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

148

Chapter 6

price that equals the price in the destination location even though the price in the place of purchase is lower. The Tosefta states that this is permissible if the seller takes responsibility for the product during transport. If the transporter is taking responsibility, it is prohibited (T BM 4:7; Neusner, 4:96): [If] One was bringing cargo46 from one place to another, and he said to him, “Hand it over to me, and I shall hand it over to her just as you hand it over to me in such and such a place,” in a case in which he does this accepting responsibility to replace the cargo if it is lost, the [debtor] who hands it over is permitted to do so. But [the debtor] one who receives it from him is prohibited to do so.47 The “cargo” described in this source is probably a name for various items of merchandise.48 An individual is transporting goods from place to place; the assumption is that he intends to profit from buying it cheaply here and selling it at the destination for a profit. Another person offered to take the package from him, bring it to the destination, and when he returns pay the higher value of the merchandise at the target destination.49 The profit for the worker will be the use of the money at the destination market until he returns. The original transporter definitely gains from transferring the package to the other person. It is unclear why the buyer is offering it. Perhaps the buyer is merely interested in accumulating much merchandise so it will seem that he is running a large enterprise. Another explanation is that he is planning to buy and sell other merchandise with the money he earns at the destination point when he sells the merchandise. The source states that if the buyer assumes responsibility for the merchandise immediately it is The word havila (‫ )חבילה‬is translated here as “cargo.” Guggenheimer, cited below, translates it as “package.” 47 The beginning of the Tosefta addresses a similar case, which is “fruit for fruit” and not “fruit for money”: “[If] one was bringing produce from a place in which it was expensive to a place in which it was cheap, and one said to him, ‘Hand them over to me, and I’ll put them up [for sale] for you in the place in which they are expensive, in accord with the lower price, out of the produce which I have’—if he has [produce] in that place, it is permitted. But if he does not have, it is prohibited” (T BM 4:8; Neusner, 4:96). The JT cites the same case, but there it seems that the payment for the fruit is money. It is therefore “fruit for money” and is discussed below. 48 See T Avodah Zarah 1:21; and JT Avodah Zarah 1:5 (39d). 49 The Tosefta does not clarify whether the payment that the “buyer” is proposing is to come from the sale of the merchandise in the target location, or whether the payment will be in kind. The previous case cited mentions a “fruit for fruit” transaction. Therefore, it makes sense that this example is “fruit for money,” so there likely is a difference. 46

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Money ”

149

prohibited because he is paying off the seller with the effort of transporting the merchandise to the other location, and selling it, for the loan of the merchandise that starts now and is returned when he comes back. If the owner takes responsibility for the merchandise when it is in transition, it is permissible because the transport is work that the receiver is doing for the owner, and not a loan. According to one explanation, the recipient does not borrow the money for the sale and is planning to return it as is. According to the other explanation, he borrows the money when the merchandise is sold, uses it to buy and sell, and then returns it without interest when he comes back.50 The same case is raised in the JT but with different words. JT BM 5:3 (10b) (Guggenheimer, 392) states: A person was transporting fruit51 from a low-price place to a high-price one. Another said to him, give it to me, I shall pay you what you would charge at place X. If the responsibility is the giver’s, it is forbidden, but the buyer’s is permitted. A person was transporting a package from place to place. Another said to him, give it to me, I shall pay you what you would charge at place X. If the responsibility is the giver’s, it is forbidden, but the buyer’s is permitted. In the first case of the fruit, it seems that the payment is to be in money and not in kind (as in the parallel Tosefta). The language is also identical to the next case of the “package.” It is possible that both cases are cited to show that this rule applies to fruit that has seasons in which the price is low and other seasons in which the price is high, and for a “package” that is undefined and a market for it that can fluctuate randomly. The JT seems to be saying the opposite of the Tosefta. It states that if it is the responsibility of the seller, it is prohibited, but if it is under the responsibility of the buyer, it is permissible. It is unclear whether the JT views “receiver” and “giver” in the same way as the Tosefta does. Many of the commentaries on the JT state that it is impossible to accept the reading as it is, and correct it so

50

51

See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:198, lines 21–24. He cites commentators that say that the owner must compensate the worker for taking the merchandise and selling it even though the loan begins at the destination place because otherwise it is “early interest.” The recipient is working for the giver in order to be granted a monetary loan when the merchandise is sold. The word “fruit” from the source is missing in Guggenheimer.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

150

Chapter 6

it will match the Tosefta.52 It is, however, possible to suggest an understanding of the JT that the buyer is paying the money up-front. Therefore, if the “seller” assumes responsibility it is prohibited, because the money is a loan to the seller. The interest is the effort of taking the merchandise elsewhere. If the “buyer” accepts responsibility, it is a sale transaction; the “buyer” agrees to overpay for the merchandise. Therefore, it is permissible. Concisely speaking, the Tosefta is relating a case in which the buyer was to pay when he returned, and the JT is discussing a case in which the payment was up-front. However, the JT then cites a third case in which the ruling is more lenient. It is also originally from the Tosefta; however, the JT reads slightly differently (T BM 4:8; Neusner, 4: 96): But ass-drivers accept produce from a householder and put it up for sale in a place in which it is expensive, paying the cheaper price [to the householder], and they do not have to scruple [by reason of violating the prohibition against price-gouging]. The JT cites the last line with a slight but important change: But donkey drivers who receive from householders obtain produce for a high price place at low price rates.53 It seems that “donkey drivers” are different from the previous case because they traffic merchandise all the time back and forth. Normally, they buy wheat from the “landowners” who raise it and sell it in the city, where it is more expensive.54 The ruling concerning the donkey drivers is lenient. However, it is unclear why someone would accept low payment in an expensive location. Lieberman corrects the reading according to some manuscripts that read “to the expensive place from the cheap location.” According to this reading, the case is the same. The donkey drivers transport merchandise from the cheap location to where it is sold for a higher price. It seems that in this case it is permitted even though the donkey drivers are accepting responsibility for the 52 See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:198. He cites an interpretation that the “giver” refers to the one giving money and not merchandise. 53 Guggenheimer, 392, n. 76. It says: “In Tosefta and Babli: ‘They do not have to worry about interest prohibitions.’” This has to be understood here also. 54 On the landowner in Roman Palestine, see Rosenfeld and Perlmutter, Social Stratification, 116–140.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Money ”

151

merchandise on the road—an identical case to that of the “package” mentioned above. The source does not clarify why it is permissible. Perhaps it is because the donkey drivers are a transportation company that make money from transportation.55 They either bought the merchandise or charged for transporting the merchandise of the owner. They are emissaries for the owner. In order to earn their transportation fee, they take responsibility for the merchandise and are willing to guarantee the high price anticipated at the destination. However, The BT (BM 73a; Soncino, 422) raises this issue, assuming the donkey or ass drivers buy and sell merchandise, and cites explanations offered a number of generations later by two Amoraim of the fifth generation; these explanations provide a revolutionary approach to the topic that opens possibilities for leniency in this case: R. Papa said: They are satisfied by being informed of the market price. R. Aha the son of R. Ika said: They are satisfied with the extra discount they receive. Wherein do they differ?—In respect of a new trader. Rashi understood that the donkey drivers indeed take merchandise from the farmers to sell in town on credit without paying up-front. The higher pay and effort to transport the merchandise consist of profit for the farmer, who is extending the credit. It is nevertheless permissible because the donkey drivers receive a benefit that balances the interest. Rav Papa says that their advantage is that since they seem to have much merchandise and money the merchants in the city sell them products for the farmers on credit. Rav Aha son of Rav Ika explains that the donkey drivers gain inasmuch as the merchants sell them products in the city at wholesale price because they know they are not making money on the merchandise that they are bringing into town. They discount the merchandise they buy in the city so that they may make a profit on the products they are bringing from the town to the farm. The Talmud then says that the difference between the two opinions is when the donkey drivers are new to the business. There still is the consideration that they appear to be a large enterprise to the merchants in the city, but on the other hand they will not believe them that they have no profit and will not lower the price of what they sell them.

55

Donkey drivers were a professional group that dealt with transporting merchandise. See T BM 11:25 (Lieberman, 126). See Rosenfeld and Menirav, Markets and Marketing, index, s.v. “donkey.”

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

152

Chapter 6

The outcome of this discussion is that the rabbis were lenient in the case of the donkey drivers because, although there is an aspect of profit for the party who extended the credit, it can be attributed to other aspects of the transaction and not only to the delay of payment. This is a distinct case of leniency, but it is not clear why it does not apply to the other cases. Perhaps in the other cases, it is a one-time arrangement and therefore the mentioned benefits do not apply. Another approach accepts the reading “from the low price to the high price” and explains that the donkey drivers took money from the wealthy homeowners in the city, where the wheat was expensive, in order to purchase for them wheat in the country, where it is cheap, guaranteeing them the low price because of the credit extended to them. Therefore, even if they take upon themselves the responsibility for the merchandise on the road and are not merely messengers of the city people to buy the wheat, it is permissible for the reasons stated by Rav Papa and Rav Aha.56 The JT (BM 5: 5, 10: 2) cites opinions that limit this leniency: Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi: At a place where usually they can go and return the same day. Rav Huna said he becomes his agent. Rabbi Judah bar Pazi seems to learn that the permission is only for a short excursion. Therefore, the assumption of responsibility by the donkey drivers is a negligent benefit. Rav Huna seems to be more lenient and allow a longer time for transportation because “he is like his messenger.” Even though the donkey drivers are taking responsibility for the merchandise, they are considered the emissaries of the person they are representing (whether the buyer or seller it is unclear), and they may take responsibility without considering the product theirs and the money a loan. This seems to be a different approach than the BT, allowing the practice of the donkey drivers in all cases because since they are not interested in owning the merchandise it is not considered theirs despite the extra responsibility given to them. The conclusion from the above sources is that the leniency concerning donkey drivers was ancient. However, Rabbi Judah bar Pazi, a sage from fourth generation in Talmudic Palestine, wished to limit the permission given to the donkey drivers, while Rav Huna, his younger fellow, expanded it. Rav Papa and Rav Aha son of Ika of the fifth generation tried to explain the leniency but did not use the sweeping permission of Rav Huna.

56

This is Rashi’s commentary.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Money ”

6.9

153

Conclusion

The loaning of products against monetary return was common in the Mishnaic and Talmudic periods. “Fruit for money” presented the sages with challenges concerning the possibility of profit for the lender, which the sages considered interest. There were four kinds of “fruit for money” transactions: 1. Purchase of products on credit, tarsha, which guarantees the seller a future high price. 2. Business partnerships in which one party invests the capital, the other works, and the profits are shared. 3. The “iron flock” (“sheep”) partnership, in which the worker takes full responsibility, guaranteeing the investor that he will not lose even if the sheep dies or depreciates in value, while both share the profits. 4. Transport of products from a cheap location to an expensive location guaranteeing the owner the future expensive price. The Tosefta allows it when the owner takes responsibility for the merchandise when in transit. The case of donkey drivers is permissible even when they take responsibility. When possible, the rabbis enable commercial endeavors that instituted conditions that mitigate the aspect of interest benefiting the investor, rather than prohibiting the market practice completely. This was accomplished by demanding payment for the labor of the borrower in the case of passive partnership, or when the transaction could be seen as an immediate sale and not a loan, such as tarsha. However, they prohibited completely “iron flock” because the investor is taking no part in the risks—only in the profit. He is therefore a lender rather than an investor. From a social perspective, the chapter deals with the relationship between a supplier and consumer, or a capitalist and an agent. It relates to commercial market activity and not to personal loans. It reflects the efforts of the lower class to use their efforts in order to compensate for their lack of wealth. The rabbis use the prohibition of usury to demand better conditions for the agent such as salary for his effort or assuming part of the responsibility for the merchandise.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Chapter 7

“Fruit for Fruit” 7.1

Introduction: In the Roman World

The concept “fruit for fruit” relates to credit given in kind that is to be returned in the future in kind. It was mentioned above that only 20% of credit transactions in the Roman world involved an exchange of products for a later supply of products.1 These barter transactions were frequent in rural areas where farmers would exchange surplus products for other commodities they needed. Credit as well would often be extended in kind. Papyri from Egypt indicate that the lenders favored this method because the yield in this kind of loan was higher than in a monetary loan. The borrower also preferred to pay in products that he produced because it saved him the effort of selling them first to pay cash. It seems, therefore, that in terms of the number of transactions in fruit, and not necessarily in terms of the total financial volume, this form of credit was quite common.2 The form of credit in kind is ancient. It is found as early as the Hellenistic period and as late as the Byzantine Empire. It is found in the Sasanid Empire as well as in the Roman world. A papyrus from Oxyrhynchus in Middle Egypt from 251 BCE contains an order issued by a certain Diogenes to a man named Tresimedes to transfer to two other people barley or a mixture of wheat and barley. To one, he is to give fifty artabas, and to the other he is to give ten (one artaba = forty liters), which were to be returned a few months later. The papyrus does not note the interest to be paid or the type of merchandise to be returned. That was probably recorded in a separate document; or the return was not written down because it was identical to the loan: the same merchandise in the same quantity was to be returned later. The profit for the lender would be the increase in price. Similar documents are more common as history progresses. Another papyrus from Oxyrhynchus dating to the end of 225 BCE3—and even more papyri from the first century until the last third of the fourth century CE—describes loans of “wheat for wheat.”4 Indeed, at 1 Elliott, “Ecology of Exchange,” 910–911. 2 Perhaps it was more common in rural areas due to its simple and accessible nature. 3 R. S. Bagnall and D. D. Obbink, eds., Columbia Papyri X (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996), 127–130, Papyrus 280. 4 R. S. Bagnall and N. Lewis, Columbia Papyri VII: Fourth Century Documents from Karanis (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1980), 186, Papyrus 176 (190), Papyrus 178 (192), Papyrus

© Ben Zion Rosenfeld, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004681965_008

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Fruit ”

155

the same time, there is a consistent increase in the circulation of coins and currency; however, the farmers, especially in the peripheral areas, continued to use the exchange of products for other products and to loan products for other products. The difference between the exchange of products and the loaning of products is the payment date. In exchanges, the return of the equivalent merchandise was soon after the transaction, while in loans it was later. Sometimes it is hard to distinguish between an exchange of products and a loan of products. An example of this is found in a papyrus written around the beginning of the first century CE in which a certain Nikephoros, agent of Alexander, confirms to Pasoknopaios, associate of Harphaesis, that he received four artabas of grain out of nine-and-a half that the latter owed him probably from the sale of wine.5 This could be an exchange of wine for wheat or a loan of wine to be paid later in wheat. Sometimes, the parties assumed the monetary value of the merchandise even though the loan and return were in kind.6 Dominic Rathbone suggested that we regard these transactions as monetary loans and not examples of the bartering of goods. However, he too notes that many of these transactions did not involve the use of hard currency only as a measure of value.7 In this research, these transactions will be seen as “fruit for fruit” because the actual transfer of goods was for other goods, even though in the document they were appraised monetarily. Many transactions that involved sale of wheat were meant to provide for the purchase of seeds. Every farmer had to devote between a third and a quarter of the produce of the previous year for planting the following year. Many reasons could cause a shortage of seeds: drought or other natural hazards, wars, or taxation. In the case of a shortage of seeds, the farmers borrowed from rich individuals or from the government in order to be able to plant their fields. These loans would be executed in the planting season in the beginning of the winter to be returned at harvest in the beginning of the summer. Many papyri record 178A (203), Papyrus 182. See Bagnall and Obbink, Columbia Papyri X, 127, Papyrus 277; 156, Papyrus 283; 175, Papyrus 287. See also P. W. Pestman, The New Papyrological Primer (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 87, P. Grenf. 2.24, a loan of wine; 262, P. Cairo Isidor 95; 126, P. SX Athen 28, a loan from the municipal treasury to buy seeds. Regarding the conduct of commerce and credit in Egypt in products in the Hellenistic and Roman periods along with the use of monetary exchange, see Bingen, Hellenistic Egypt, 216–228. 5 See Hanson, “Three Papyri,” First Papyrus, 227–229. 6 This issue is very important concerning loans in Jewish society due to the aspect of hidden interest when exchanging goods that have different monetary values. See the words of Hillel in M BM 5:9 and later in this chapter. 7 Rathbone, Economic Rationalism, 318–330.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

156

Chapter 7

these transactions from Egypt, Roman Africa, Italy, and other locations.8 These loans would be good for the farmer when paid in kind, because the value of the seeds when he returned them during the harvest would be lower than when he borrowed them. However, if the harvest was damaged because of one of the above-mentioned hazards, the value of the seeds might actually be higher at the time of return. Many of the fields that were used for growing wheat were owned by the state and worked by sharecroppers. In some countries, a year of cultivation had to be followed by a year or two of leaving the field barren. This could cause a shortage in seeds as well.9 One of the ways in which the Roman authorities utilized the land they owned for agricultural production was to establish a colony (colonia) in the area in which tenant farmers would work the land. In effect, the tenants who enabled the cultivation of land that was previously not used worked the colonies collectively. On the one hand, the cooperation was an opportunity for increased prosperity for all, but in the case of drought or low yield, on the other, it would be necessary to provide for the colony and all the families. The colony therefore tended to use more credit than the individual farmer in addition to the traditional seed loans. The authorities supplied some of it.10 Sometimes the colonies had to use their slaves as guarantees for the return of the debt they took on.11 One phenomenon in agricultural loans that is found in many of the relevant ancient documents is the calculation of the interest for the benefit of the

8

See above, Chapter 2. Regarding loans for seeds, see Bagnall, Egypt, 73; Hunt and Edgar, Select Papyri 2, 496–498; Kehoe, Economics of Agriculture, 159–177; idem, Management and Investment on Estates in Roman Egypt during the Early Empire (Bonn: Habelt, 1992), 150–152; idem, Law and the Rural Economy, 148–150; Rupprecht, Einführung, 128–129; and the research works of C. Krampe, “Der Seedarlehensstreit des Callimachus: D. 45,1,122,1 Scaevola 28 digestorum,” in Collatio Iuris Romani: Études dédiées à Hans Ankum à l’occasion de son 65e anniversaire, Vol. 1, ed. R. Feenstra, A. S. Hartkamp, J. E. S. Pruit, P. J. Sijpestein, and L. C. Winkel (Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1995), 207–222; Erdkamp, Grain Market, 120–123; and Hamel, Poverty and Charity, 160–161, regarding Roman Palestine. 9 See Bagnall, Egypt, 73; and Samuel, “Application.” On large landowners that employed sharecroppers who frequently needed loans for seeds, see Kehoe, Economics of Agriculture. See Kehoe, Management and Investment, 125, n. 17 regarding the Bagradas Valley in Roman North Africa southwest of Carthage. 10 D. J. Mattingly, “Africa, a Landscape of Opportunity?” in Dialogues in Roman Imperialism: Power, Discourse, and Discrepant Experience in the Roman Empire, ed. D. J. Mattingly (Portsmouth, RI: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 1997), 117–142, esp. 118–126; idem, Imperialism, Power, and Identity, 151–155; Kehoe, Economics of Agriculture, 101–103, n. 65. 11 See Kehoe, Economics of Agriculture, 171–172 and index, s.v. “debt.”

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Fruit ”

157

lender. In most cases, it was from planting season to harvest, which was less than a year, putting the interest at 50% in kind.12 It is likely that the increase in the payment of wheat should not be seen merely as interest. Monetarily, the loans of wheat were in the planting season in the beginning of the winter (November–December). At that time, the price of wheat was high because much time had passed since the harvest. The return was during the harvest period—in the summer (June–July)—when the price was low because there was much wheat in the market. Therefore, the increase in payment reflects not only the interest on the loan but also the gap in prices.13 There are records of “fruit for fruit” transactions among Jews as well. A papyrus from the city of Philadelphia in the Fayum in Middle Egypt describes a loan of six artabas of barley that includes a 50% increase on a previous loan. Though it is possible that the increase is a fine for not paying the first loan and not fixed interest that is prohibited for Jews, it is impossible to rule out the possibility that the Jews loaned to each other under the same conditions their neighbors lent to each other.14 There was a difference between the urban and rural settings regarding credit. In urban areas, especially during the Roman period, most credit was in coin, and there is credit in the exchange of many products besides wheat. In agricultural areas, there still was much credit in “fruit for fruit” transactions, primarily involving wheat.15 The background for credit in the Roman Empire that was surveyed in this section will help us understand the phenomenon in rabbinic literature, which will be discussed below.

12 See, for example, Bagnall and Lewis, Columbia Papyri VII, 186, Papyrus 176, 178A (the latter only 33%); and Bagnall and Obbink, Columbia Papyri X, 127, Papyrus 277; 156, Papyrus 283; 175, Papyrus 287. All these documents mention 50% interest rates from planting to harvest, establishing an annual interest that exceeded that. An additional papyrus, P. Cairo Isidor 95, denotes a similar interest rate coming from the city of Karanis, and it is emphasized that the loan is for the purchase of seeds. See Pestman, Papyrological, 262. 13 On the high-interest rates in the economic sector, see G. Thür, “Daneion,” NP 4 (2004), 77–78; P. Sijpesteijn, “A Pawnbroker’s Accounts,” Anc. Soc. 24 (1993): 51–62, n. 1. 14 See CPJ 3:179–181, Papyrus 411. In CPJ 4: 82–85, Papyrus 556, n. 15, dated to 111 BCE, there is a loan that a Jew gave to a non-Jew. The loan was twenty-four artabas of wheat that was to be returned without interest. However, if it was not returned on time, the borrower would pay a fine of 3,000 bronze drachmas for each artaba, and a fine of 50% on the entire loan. Part of the fine was money, but the loan itself was “fruit for fruit.” This procedure was common in Ptolemaic Egypt and is not uniquely Jewish. 15 See Bagnall, Egypt, 73.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

158 7.2

Chapter 7

“Fruit for Fruit” in Rabbinic Literature

The rabbis had an original approach to loans of “fruit for fruit,” starting from the Second Temple period. The examples included agricultural exchanges as well as private loans of household items. They grappled with an issue that was a derivative of the prohibition of interest. How to understand and give a ruling on a loan given in fruit and returned in the same amount of fruit when the monetary value of the fruit changes from the time of the loan to the time of the return? These loans are referred to according to the product involved, “wheat for wheat,” or the amount involved, “seʾah for a seʾah.” They innovatively instructed that fruit loans should be evaluated in monetary terms and returned according to their monetary value and not loaned and returned in quantity.16 7.2.1 “Wheat for Wheat”: The Time Factor The rabbis prohibited loans according to measure because if the value of the fruit rises between the loan time and the payment time, the lender gains money from the transaction. They considered this “dust of interest” and required evaluating the produce in money to prevent this situation. Mishnah BM 5:9 (after Lapin, 278) states: Let a person not say to his fellow: “Lend me a kor of wheat, and I will give it to you [at the time of] the threshing floor,” but he says to him: “[Lend] … until my son comes,” [or] “… until I find the key.” Hillel prohibits. For thus Hillel used to say: “Let a woman not lend a loaf to her fellow until she has calculated its monetary value, lest wheat become more expensive, and they will come to commit usury.” The Mishnah prohibits across the board loans of seʾah beseʾah whenever a significant amount of time would pass between the loan and its repayment. The rabbis did not prohibit the exchange of merchandise. Therefore, they also allowed a certain delay in the exchange when the borrower has the merchandise and all he must do is get the key or another technical issue. Hillel prohibited this as well, lest the merchandise go up in value even in a short amount of time. The Mishnah cites a ruling of Hillel that a woman who borrows a loaf of bread 16 “Wheat for wheat” is found in M BM 5:8 and BT BM 74b. See also T BM 9:10 (Lieberman, 112), though there it has a different meaning. Seʾah beseʾah is found in BT BM 15a, 44b, 62a, and 63b. The JT does not use the quantity but uses the concept “wheat for wheat” on two occasions that do not involve credit. See JT Terumot 4:8 (43a); and JT Hala 1:4 (57d). In order to simplify the term, seʾah beseʾah, which is more common, will represent all cases in which the supply is a product and the return is the same amount of that product.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Fruit ”

159

from her friend should assess it in monetary value so that if it becomes more expensive at payment time she will return only the original value and the lender will not gain anything. The sage mentioned here is Hillel. When the Mishnah mentions this sage, it is usually referring to Hillel the Elder, who operated about one hundred years before the destruction of the Second Temple during the reign of King Herod.17 It is known that Hillel legislated concerning loans and instituted the prozbul in order to enable the payment of loans after the Sabbatical year that the Torah decreed would make all loans obsolete.18 If indeed it is Hillel the Elder, it shows that the prohibition on lending in kind without monetary assessment is ancient and began in the time of the Temple. Hillel intended to promote the importance of lending without interest to help people in need. His creation of the prozbul as said by the sources shows that he took extreme measures so that the rich would continue to lend money to the poor despite the approaching Sabbatical year. He created the prozbul, which cancelled the effect of the Sabbatical year on loans. The temporal measures of “until I find a key” and “until my son comes” are found frequently in rabbinic literature to indicate the quick supply of the product or produce. The Tosefta (BM 6:10; Neusner, 4:107) develops this issue further: A man may say to his fellow, “Lend me a jar of wine until my son comes,” or, “… until I open the keg” [M BM 5:9]. If he had a jug in his keg, and the keg was opened, and [the jug] fell and broke, even though he is liable to make it up—it is permitted. And Hillel prohibits. To what is the matter comparable? To one who gives money to his fellow to give him produce at the threshing season, and the money was stolen or lost—he is liable to make them up. If it proved to be too little or too much [for the required purchase], he is liable to make it up to him.

17

There is one mention of another sage Hillel, who was the grandson of Rabbi Judah the Prince, in Avot 2:4. There is no evidence of a third Hillel mentioned in the Mishnah. See Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud, 164, who mentions a Rabbi Hillel bei Rabbi Vallas from the disciples of Rabbi Judah the Prince, who is never mentioned in Tannaitic literature. See also Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud, 167, concerning Rabbi Judah Nesiah. In addition, his disciple Rav Nahman, who ruled like Hillel, quotes Samuel of the first generation of Babylonian Amoraim. It is unlikely that Samuel would rule after Hillel II, from the third generation Amoraim, who was younger than he was. See also Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia, 68–76; and Strack and Stemberger, Introduction, 71–72. 18 See M Sheviit 10:3–4.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

160

Chapter 7

The example in the Tosefta relates to a loan of a barrel of wine for a very short time. The borrower had such a barrel, but it broke when he was about to give it to the lender. Indeed, this transaction should not be considered a loan at all, only an exchange of one barrel of wine for another. It becomes a loan because the borrower is assuming responsibility for the barrel. Had it been an exchange, the barrel in the possession of the borrower would have been considered owned by the lender from the first minute, and the loss would have been the lender’s when the barrel broke. Even in this case, the rabbis permitted the transaction, but Hillel prohibited it. Nevertheless, the rabbis were not worried that the barrel would go up in value in the short amount of time between the loan and the payment, and they therefore allowed this kind of transaction. There are various opinions commenting on the position of Hillel. The JT (BM 5:10 [10d]; Guggenheimer, 416) states the following: A person may not say to another, etc. It was stated: “A person may not say to another, lend me a kor of wheat and I shall return it to you from the threshing-floor,” therefore for two or three weeks it is permitted; but Hillel forbids. Samuel said, practice follows Hillel. The first opinion is more lenient than what is found in the Mishnah. It allows loans in kind for two–three weeks probably under the assumption that there will not be a significant change in price in a short time. However, Hillel prohibits even “until I find the key.” It concludes that the famous sage Samuel rules like him. This conclusion indicates that it was the accepted decision. However, the BT (BM 75a; Soncino, 433) also cites the words of Rav Nahman in the name of Samuel, stating a rule like Hillel’s, but concludes: R. Nahman said in Samuel’s name: The halakhah agrees with Hillel’s ruling. The law is nevertheless not in accordance with him. It then cites a ruling of Samuel against Hillel in the second case he mentions regarding the loan of a loaf of bread. Rav Judah in the name of Samuel says that Hillel prohibits lending a loaf of bread without assessing its monetary value, but the majority opinion allows lending without specifying the monetary value. In this case, Samuel is ruling against Hillel seemingly because the loan is short-term and the potential of a price change is negligible. According to the above discussion, the anonymous editor of the BT sides with the lenient opinion of the rabbis that allow loans of a measure of produce for a measure of produce for a short time, while the editor of the JT concludes that it is prohibited like Hillel ruled. However, it is possible that both would

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Fruit ”

161

agree that it is permissible in the form of sale when the buyer is responsible for the item.19 7.2.2 “Wheat for Wheat”: Issues of Quantity The above Mishnah seems to allow loans and payments in kind only if two conditions are met: a. The borrower has the exchange in his possession; and b. He can soon provide the merchandise in exchange. In the BT (BM 75a; Soncino, 432), there is an opinion that allows for flexibility concerning the amount of fruit that needs to be in the possession of the borrower in order to allow a loan of “wheat for wheat.” This flexibility was controversial: R. Huna said: If he possesses a seʾah, he may borrow a seʾah; two seʾahs, he may borrow two seʾahs. R. Isaac said: Even if he has only a seʾah, he may borrow many kors against it. The disagreement is not directly connected to the Mishnah. Both Amoraim require that the borrower have the product in his possession and be able to produce it quickly. However, Rav Huna (of the second generation of Amoraim in Babylon) demands that the borrower have the same amount of the product that he wishes to borrow. That is logical because then the exchange is not a loan but a simple exchange of merchandise. Therefore, even if the price goes up the product is sold, not borrowed. However, Rabbi Yitzhak allows borrowing a number of seʾahs even if the borrower has only one in his possession. Rabbi Yitzhak in effect limits the prohibition of loaning and returning merchandise to cases in which the borrower does not have any amount of the product he needs.20 However, both Amoraim did not mention the time factor. This seems to mean that they understand that when the borrower has the merchandise the transaction is permissible no matter how long the loan is to last.21 The Talmud 19 As in M BM 5:1 and T BM 6:6 cited above. 20 On Rabbi Yitzhak (Palestine and Babylon, ca. 300 CE), see Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud, 252–253. See also Eliash, “Ideological Roots of the Halakhah,” 45–49. 21 They will interpret the Mishnah’s “lend to me now and I will give you back at the threshing floor” to indicate that the borrower does not have wheat and that he anticipates that he will have it when he harvests his field. The permissible case “until my son comes” is not a time factor, as the JT said there is only an indication that he has the product. Furthermore, the discourse of the BT regarding the first Mishnah indicates that the rabbis understand that if the borrower has the product one may borrow “fruit for fruit” and, if not, it is prohibited even if the participants call it a “sale.”

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

162

Chapter 7

cites a barayta of Rabbi Hiya from the disciples of Rabbi Judah the Prince that supports the opinion of Rabbi Yitzhak. (Rav Huna may reflect the opinion of his rabbi, Rav): R. Hiyya taught the following, which is in support of R. Issaac: [One may not borrow wine or oil for the same quantity to be returned, because] he has not a drop of wine or oil. Surely then, if he has, he may borrow a large quantity against it.22 This indicates that Rabbi Yitzhak’s approach was prevalent in Palestine as early as the beginning of the third century. The anonymous editor of the BT seems to favor the lenient opinion.23 The lenient opinion seems to indicate that in Babylon there were rabbis that felt that the prohibition of lending “seʾah for seʾah” is difficult to implement in an agricultural context where products were constantly being exchanged. Instead of directly disagreeing with the early authoritative source, they interpret it in such a way that makes it easy to meet with the requirement that the borrower have some of the product in his possession. 7.2.3 “Wheat for Wheat”: The Location Factor There is another example of the loan and the payment of “fruit for fruit” in the Tosefta (BM 4:8; Neusner, 96): [If] one was bringing produce from a place in which it was expensive to a place in which it was cheap, and one said to him, “Hand them over to me, and I’ll put them up [for sale] for you in the place in which they are expensive, in accord with the lower price, out of the produce which I have”—if he has [produce] in that place, it is permitted. But if he does not have, it is prohibited. The Tosefta here describes a situation in which a person (the giver) is transporting a product from a location in which it is cheap to a location where it is expensive, intending to sell the merchandise at the destination for a profit. Another person (the taker) suggests taking the merchandise here and replacing 22 BT BM 75a (Soncino, 432–433). 23 The anonymous editor of the JT seemed to be unaware of this barayta of Rabbi Hiya and understood the Mishnah to be stating that only a short amount of time is permissible. In addition, the JT rules are like Hillel’s, which are more stringent than those of both Amoraim cited in the BT.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

163

“ Fruit for Fruit ”

it with identical merchandise that he has in the other location. The source allows it if indeed the taker has the merchandise; he says he does. It does not stipulate a time factor. The profit for “the giver” is that he saves the effort of transporting the product to the destination. It could seem that the giver is gaining. He is lending fruit to the taker here where it is cheap and receiving it in another location where it is expensive, thus gaining from the loan. However, it is permissible because the taker immediately owns the fruit in the other location so it is not a loan but an exchange. The difference between the case of the Mishnah and that of the Tosefta seems to be that in the Mishnah it is a “loan.” This means that the borrower continues to be responsible for the fruit he is to return to the lender until the actual payment is made. Therefore, it is only permissible for a short time. However, in this case he just says “give me” and “I will give you.” The giver bought the wheat in another location.24 This case also shows the difficulty of implementing the prohibition of lending seʾah beseʾah. The exchange of produce is permissible even if the value is different. 7.3

“Fruit for Fruit” for the Purchase of Seeds

Jewish farmers needed to borrow for the purchase of seeds just as farmers did all over the world. On the one hand, the sages were sensitive to the possibility of gain for the lender against Jewish law, utilizing the acute need of the farmer to profit. On the other hand, a law that is too stringent would prevent the farmers from obtaining seeds. The rabbis therefore worked out ways to enable the loan to be executed anyway with minimal loss to the farmer. This might be the reason that the authors of M BM 5:8 cite rulings considering this issue that are attributed to sages that operated as early as the times when the Second Temple was still standing (M BM 5:8; Lapin, 277): A person may lend his tenants (arisav) wheat against wheat for seed, but not for food. For R. Gamaliel would lend his tenants wheat—when expensive, and they became cheaper, [or] when cheap and they became more expensive—and he would take [repayment] from them according to the lower market price. Not because such is the law (halakha), but because he wanted to be strict with himself.

24

See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:198, lines 24–25. See also BT 73a.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

164

Chapter 7

The rabbis allow a loan of “wheat for wheat” for planting, although, as we saw above, they usually required assessment in money lest the wheat go up in price. The Mishnah also relates that Rabban Gamaliel (85–115 CE) lent his sharecroppers seeds to plant and was stringent that they pay him back according to the cheap rate so he would not gain profit from the loan because of changes in the price of wheat from the planting season to the harvest. Rabban Gamaliel’s practice can be understood as utilizing knowledge from the Roman world that often tenants had difficulty paying their loans to the field-owners. As a result, the owners would waive part of the loan so the tenants would not desert the fields and there would be no one to work them. One of the causes of debt was the need to finance the seeds at the planting season when the harvest of the spring was consumed. If the harvest was not plentiful, the debt would not be paid and it would accumulate from year to year.25 Two questions regarding the above Mishnah are evident: (a) Why the differentiation between loans for seeds and a loan for food? (b) In addition, what is the benevolent act of Rabban Gamaliel? Lieberman explained that the rabbis permitted the transaction because it was not a loan but a change in the conditions of renting the land by the sharecropper. The usual arrangement with sharecroppers was that they give a portion of the fruit to the landowner. In crops grown in a field, such as wheat, there was much labor; usually a third or a quarter was given to the owner (Trees require little care, and half the fruit would be given to the owner.) The rationale was that if the landowner supplies the seed, he can ask that his portion in the future produce be increased by the quantity of seed that he supplied. Instead of receiving a quarter of the produce, he would receive a quarter plus seed. It therefore is not interest because it is just a stipulation in the tenancy contract. This is why it is permissible only to do so with the landowner’s own tenants and not with someone who is renting his field or with someone else’s tenants.26 According to the above rationale, Lieberman explains the Tosefta that limits this law (T BM 6:8; Neusner, 4:106–107): A man may lend his tenant-farmers four to a sela or two seahs to a sela. Under what circumstances? When [the tenant] has not yet gone down to 25

26

See Pliny, Epistulae 9.37.14 (letters from 108/109 CE); Kloppenborg, “Growth and Impact,” 57–62, n. 69; J. K. Goodrich, “Voluntary Debt Remission and the Parable of the Unjust Steward (Luke 16: 1–13),” JBL 131 (3) (2012): 547–566. On seed loans, see A. Monson, From the Ptolemies to the Romans: Political and Economic Change in Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), s.v. “seeds.” See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:237–238, lines 22–23.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

165

“ Fruit for Fruit ”

[work] his field. But if he has gone down to his field, lo, he is equivalent to any other person [who is prohibited]. The words of this Tosefta are cryptic. The first part of the Tosefta is explained by the idea that one may lend his sharecroppers wheat at a time in which four seʾahs are bought for a sela, and they return the same amount of wheat even at a time when the price is double and they are sold for two for a sela. The owner gains, but, as mentioned above, it is just an increase in the rent. The end of the Tosefta limits the permission to lend seeds to a situation in which it is a new tenant starting his tenancy. This is in contrast to the above-quoted Mishnah, which did not state that requirement.27 BT BM 74b (Soncino, 431) explains this in a way that the Mishnah and barayta reflect diverse practices for agreements between owners and tenants regarding the supply of seed. Our Rabbis taught: A man may lend his tenants grain for grain for sowing. That is only if he [the tenant] has not entered therein; but if he has entered therein, it is forbidden. This barayta, in BT BM 74b (Soncino, 431–432), similar to the Tosefta, does not explain the difference between a new tenant and a continuing tenant. The BT asks why the Mishnah did not make this distinction. Rava (third-generation Babylonian Amora) explains: Raba replied; R. Idi explained the matter to me: In the locality of our Tanna the aris provided the seed, and whether he has yet entered therein or not, as long as he has not provided the seed, he [the landlord] can make him quit; hence, when he enters therein [and the owner provided the seed] it is [straightway] for a lower return. But in the locality of the Tanna of the Baraitha the landowner provided the seed; hence, if he [the aris] has not yet entered therein, so that he [the landlord] can make him quit, when he does enter, it is for a lower return; but if he has already entered, so that he cannot force him to quit, it is forbidden. Rava explains in the name of Rav Idi that the Tosefta is discussing a location in which the common practice was that the owner of the field provided the seed for the year. If the owner wishes to lend the seed to the tenant and have it returned, he can do so only if it is a new tenant that has not begun his tenancy. He can stipulate that on top of the regular rent the tenant will return seed as 27

See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:237–238, lines 21–23.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

166

Chapter 7

well. However, if the tenant already started work, the owner owes him the seed and cannot ask for the return at the harvest. The Mishnah did not differentiate because it was discussing a place in which the tenant had to obtain the seed for himself. Therefore, even after the beginning of the partnership the owner may lend seeds to the tenants and then add it to the rent that is to be paid after the harvest. The Tosefta (BM 6:9–10; Neusner, 4:107, mentioned above) continues: A man may strike a bargain with his tenant-farmers for seed [= M BM 5:8]. But as to expenses, lo, this is prohibited. And not only so, but even if he planted and the field yielded for a seah of seed two seahs of grain, he should not make a payment in the middle of the growing season in his field, unless he converts the [grain] into money for him. [If] he made a deal with him for wheat and handed over to him barley, or for barley and handed over to him wheat—it is prohibited. He may not say to him, “Here is a maneh for you, so go and buy it for yourself from the market.” But he purchases it and hands it over to him. Here, the Tosefta adds a number of limitations to the permission to loan seeds to tenants. The loan is to be used only for seeds and not for other expenses. Lieberman states that this applies to expenses that the tenant is required to invest in the field as mentioned in BT BM 104b, since the permission is only for seeds.28 In addition, even if the loan was for seeds and there were leftovers, they must be appraised for money and not used for other expenses in the field and then returned in the form of seeds. Furthermore, the Tosefta demands that the owner supply seeds and not money with which to buy seeds. It also states that if the owner gave him wheat seeds, he may not pay in barley seeds and vice versa. If the rabbis allowed it because it is merely a change in the tenancy agreement, all the above cases should also be permissible. All these limitations to the permission for the loaning of seeds lead to the conclusion that the seeds that are planted grow into plants and produce many seeds. One of the seeds in each new plant was the exact equivalent of the original seed planted. The very seeds that are planted are then returned to the owner. Therefore, this permission relates only to the seeds and not to any other expense. It is only to be handed over in seeds and returned in seeds of the same species. It is not because the seeds are added to the portion of the owner but that the seeds are returned from the plant generated by the seeds themselves. This approach does not seem convincing. However, this is to be seen as a loophole that the rabbis put into a rabbinic prohibition because of a necessity that tenants have seeds to plant. On the other hand, they did not want 28 Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:238. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

167

“ Fruit for Fruit ”

this permission to be extended and expanded to other areas and to undermine the rabbinic rule to lend “wheat for wheat.” They therefore created a special arrangement in which the spectator sees kernels of wheat handed over to the farmer to plant and the “same” kernels given back after they grow into a plant and have multiplied. The farmer too sees this as a return of the identical product. This also provided a limit on the permission given in a very specific case. The reason for the need for this loophole can be learned from the Roman world. As seen above, there is much evidence for the loaning of seeds in the Roman world. It was common, but the lenders demanded high interest.29 Therefore, the rabbis searched for a mechanism in which they could allow this loan without the farmer confusing it with a regular loan of “fruit for fruit” that was prohibited without evaluating the loan in monetary terms. Furthermore, most of these loans were extended in the fall, when the wheat was scarce and expensive, and paid in the spring, when there was plenty from the harvest and therefore the price was lower. Nevertheless, there was also the possibility that the wheat would go up in price in the case of a small harvest. The rabbis therefore allowed this loan, not worrying that the sharecropper would pay more than he received, but limited it strictly to the case in which the same seeds given were returned in order that it would not spread to other kinds of loans as well.30 The end of the above-quoted Mishnah mentions that Rabban Gamaliel would lend his tenants seeds but would give them the benefit that if the price went up at payment he would take only the value of the original loan. If the price went down, he would accept the return of the same amount of seeds. The practice of Rabban Gamaliel includes stringency in the laws of interest. The rabbis allowed the lending of seeds for seeds without appraising the value, though Rabban Gamaliel appraised the value. Once the value was appraised, the rule allowed Rabban Gamaliel to receive in return seeds for the value that was loaned: if the price of seeds went down, he was entitled to a return of more seeds than he gave. Nevertheless, Rabban Gamaliel let his tenants return the same amount that he had given them, thus letting them benefit from the transaction. 7.4

Additional Cases of Usury in Sharecropping

The BT mentions another aspect of credit that resulted from the share of the owner collected from the sharecropper who worked the field during the year. 29 30

As discussed above in the first section of this chapter (7.1). See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:232, lines 1–2. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

168

Chapter 7

BT BM 73a cites a debate between Rava (ca. 320–350 CE) and the sages that were his contemporaries. BT BM 73a (Soncino, 423–424) states: The Rabbis protested to Raba: You enjoy usury. For everyone [who leases a farm] accepts four [kor as annual rent] and dismisses the tenant in Nisan; whilst you wait until Iyar and receive six. He retorted: It is you who act contrary to the law; the land is in bond to the tenant; if you make him quit in Nisan [before the crops are ripened], you cause him much loss. Whereas I wait until Iyar, thus greatly enhancing his profits. The practice in that location was that sharecroppers worked the land until the first of Nisan, which is in the spring, after which it seems their work was not essential for the produce. It seems there was no specific contract with the sharecroppers and that the parties assumed that the common practice would apply to them as well. Probably, day laborers harvested the produce in May or June. The sharecroppers would pay four kors to the owner for the period. Rava behaved differently. He left the sharecroppers in the land until Iyar—a month later—but then charged six kors, which was two kors more. The sages claimed that it was interest, since he took more produce to put off the dismissal of the sharecroppers. Rava disagreed. He claimed that the sharecroppers gain from the delay because in the extra month the produce ripens and increases its value more than the extra two kors they pay. The extra payment is not for the delay like interest, but it is the portion given to the owner from the extra income of the sharecroppers. The other owners stop the work in Nisan, which is unfavorable for their sharecroppers. The Babylonian practice to release the sharecroppers in Nisan (April) closely after the harvest shows that the status of sharecroppers in Bablyon at the time was very low. They were fired every year and were not expected to see the land as a long-term occupation that would encourage them to invest energy in improving the land for the future. One can also see that it depended on the instructions of the field-owner. Rava was able to extend the stay of his sharecroppers even though his colleagues did not do so. 7.5

Paying Back a Prohibited Loan of “Fruit for Fruit”

The following source cited as Tannaitic describes a permissible loan of a product—wheat—but the future payment is in money or wheat. However, the Babylonian Talmud rejects the simple reading of the source and reinterprets

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Fruit ”

169

it, dividing it into two cases, the second one being a case of “fruit for fruit” (BM 75a; Soncino, 43): Our Rabbis taught: A man may propose to his neighbor, “Lend me a kor of wheat,” and stipulate a monetary return: if it depreciates, he returns wheat; if it advances, he repays its value [as at the time of borrowing]. But did he not stipulate?—R. Shesheth answered: It is thus meant: if no stipulation is made, and it depreciates, he takes wheat; if it advances, he repays its [original] value.31 Since the request is “loan me a kor,” that means that it is supplied immediately. The source then says that we (rabbis) must be stringent and that, if the price of wheat rises then the buyer must pay the monetary value and not return expensive wheat of the same price. The Talmud does not understand the reason for the stringency that contradicts the rule that when the wheat is supplied immediately and the transactors make up a price in advance there is no interest involved. Rav Sheshet says that the barayta must have been missing. There are two cases. The first is that if a person borrowed a kor of wheat and a price is set, then the payment is according to what was agreed upon regardless of the change in the current price of wheat. This is a case of “fruit for money.” The second case is when the price was not set, and the borrower was to return the same amount of wheat even though the sages prohibited it. This is a case of “fruit for fruit.” The source instructs how to return the loan without further transgressing the prohibition against the payment of interest. If the price remains the same or goes down, the lender will receive the amount of wheat that was borrowed. If the price goes up, the borrower will pay the original low monetary value of the wheat either in money or in kind and the lender will lose the difference.32 According to this, the barayta cited is an expansion of the rabbinic prohibition of lending a “seʾah for a seʾah.” It instructs the borrower how to repay such a loan in order not to transgress further the prohibition of interest, and the lender will not gain from this illegal loan. 31 32

For the exact reading of the quote, see N. N. Rabinowitz, Dikdukei Sofrim, Bava Metzia (Jerusalem: Maaian Ha-Chohmah, 1960), 75a, ns. a, b. For another use of the expression “and stipulate a monetary return,” see BT Shabbat 19a. This interpretation follows Ritba’s (Rabbi Yom Tov Ishbili) explanation (Hidushei Ha-Ritba, Mossad Harav Kook edition, 631), which corresponds to the ruling of Maimonides’s Laws of Lenders and Borrowers 10:4.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

170 7.6

Chapter 7

Exchange of Services

M BM 5:10 (Lapin, 278) cites another type of credit for the borrowing and returning services that is similar to the exchange of fruit mentioned above: A person may say to his fellow: “Weed with me and I will weed with you” [or] “hoe with me and I will hoe with you,” but let him not say to him: “Weed with me and I will hoe with you”; “hoe with me and I will weed with you.” All the days of the dry season are one, and all the days of the wet season are one. Let him not say to him: “Plow with me in the dry season, and I with you in the wet season.” The Mishnah presents loans and payments for labor such as weeding. The requirement is that the return should be identical to the input. If it is not identical, it may be considered interest because the payment might be more valuable in the labor market than the loan. Furthermore, the Mishnah requires that it should be at the same time of the year. There is no comparison between the difficulty of plowing in the summer and the difficulty of plowing in the winter. Interestingly, the Mishnah is not worried about the fluctuation of labor prices and does not require evaluating the service given in monetary value as in fruit. It also does not limit the time for the loan and payment. This seems to indicate that the labor prices were fixed and that the rabbis did not suspect a change from the loan to the payment. This is strange because there is evidence for the fluctuation of labor prices in various seasons and also because of the balance between supply and demand.33 The issue of comparing the value of different versions of service and the price of the versions of service is discussed in T BM 6:14: A man may say to his fellow: “Let my ass go with you today and yours with me tomorrow”; but he should not say to him: “Let my ass go with you today to the east and yours with me tomorrow to the west.” Let my cow plough with you today in the east and yours with me tomorrow in the west. But if the cost of doing so is the same this is permitted. R. Judah says “All the days of the dry season are deemed equivalent to one another and all the days of the rainy season are equivalent to one another.”34

33 34

Rosenfeld and Perlmutter, Social Stratification, 71–90. Following Neusner, 4:108. See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:241, lines 38–41.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

171

“ Fruit for Fruit ”

The principal idea is the same, in that when exchanging labor, the exchange must be identical. The passage even differentiates the directions in which one is taking his friend’s donkey. However, the Tosefta allows this if both services are equal in price—possibly because in that case it means that people see the effort as identical. It is unclear whether the Mishnah agrees with this or not. There is an important difference between the Mishnah and the Tosefta. The former is dealing with work that one performs by himself, whereas the latter is dealing with sharing a person’s property with someone else, and it is therefore more similar to a loan. The Mishnah teaches that a person’s labor can also be considered a loan when there is a condition to return it. It has value in the market of hiring day laborers. In addition, the two sources relate to different types of enterprises. The Mishnah deals with the actions necessary to work a field such as weeding and hoeing. The Tosefta deals with moving merchandise from place to place with animals of burden, whether it is a field-owner who is bringing his produce to the market, or a professional donkey driver who is transporting merchandise for others for a fee and needs additional animals for one trip. From the social point of view, both sources seem to describe professionals who work on their own without help in the form of workers or slaves, and through exchange with their neighbors or colleagues they supplement and increase their work ability. Other sources also show that this was the most common scenario of agricultural endeavor of the Jewish population of Roman Palestine in the period here under discussion. The village scene, in which the small landowner or sharecropper works the land with his family, or hired seasonal workers, was the commonplace situation among the Jews of Roman Palestine, although there were also cases of landowners working large portions of land through managers and bailiffs.35 7.7

Loan of “Denars for Denars”

An example of the difficulty caused by the prohibition of loaning a “measure for a measure” for people wanting to carry out business transactions is the issue of the loaning and returning of gold coins. The question was whether to consider them money and whether then they could be loaned and returned, or, since the value of the gold coins fluctuated compared to the silver currency, they should be seen as commodities and then be required to have their value translated to silver and the return based on that value just like with “fruit.” 35

See Rosenfeld and Perlmutter, Social Stratification, 118–140.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

172

Chapter 7

Gold coins are found in Roman currency as early as the time of Julius Caesar, dating to the year 46 BCE. In Pompeii, for example, 69% of the coins that were found were gold coins.36 Prior to the use of gold coins, the government approved of gold bars that it in turn weighed and confirmed. According to Christopher Howgego, bullion was used by the government to pay suppliers, as well as for stockpiling in the national treasury.37 Wiliam Harris disagrees and says that the bullion was used only for stockpiling and not for payment. Payment in gold began with the issuing of gold coins in the days of Julius Caesar. Nevertheless, Harris concedes that wealthy individuals had bullion in their possession and that bullion was used for large international transactions even before the use of gold coins primarily with the East and Egypt.38 As time went on, gold coins spread to the various corners of the empire. However, they were used primarily for large import and export transactions and for amassing wealth. As a result, there was less storage of silver coins and the latter were available for use in most transactions.39 In the third century, Rome received less gold from the gold mines in the empire, making gold coins relatively scarce. However, in the second half of the fourth century the quantities of gold were replenished, and silver was in shortage. This phenomenon lowered the price of gold coins in comparison to silver ones. The changes in the supply of these precious metals caused fluctuation of the compared value of gold to silver throughout this period. This instability continued into the fifth century, though now silver went down in value and gold coins became more expensive.40 The fluctuation of the value of gold coins compared to the staple silver coins explains the ambivalent position of and the disagreements between the rabbis regarding the gold currency. It seems that in the times and locations that the gold coins were used widely the rabbis tended to see them as a form of currency, while when they were rarely used and expensive the rabbis saw them as “fruit.” The ambivalence concerning the status of gold currency is reflected in different readings of the Mishnah that discuss the issue. M BM 4:1, according to the Jerusalem Talmud tradition, reads: Silver acquires gold but gold does not acquire silver. Brass acquires silver but silver does not acquire brass. Bad coins acquire good ones, but good 36 Howgego, “Supply and Use of Money,” 10; Harris, “Nature of Roman Money,” 199, n. 10. 37 Howgego, “Supply and Use of Money,” 9–10. 38 Harris, “Revisionist View,” 3–4. In Egypt (Alexandria), the Romans issued primarily silver currency, though gold coins are mentioned in inscriptions (11). 39 Howgego, “Supply and Use of Money,” 11–12, 30. 40 Van Minnen, “Money and Credit,” 227–228.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

173

“ Fruit for Fruit ”

ones do not acquire bad ones. A blank acquires a coin but a coin does not acquire a blank. Movables acquire coins but coins do not acquire movables. This is the rule: all movables acquire one another.41 The Mishnah uses the word “acquires” in its legal sense. It refers to an action that finalizes a transaction between two sides, and neither side can pull out of it. The rabbis decreed that when merchandise is sold only physical removal of the object from the premises of the seller (meshiha, “pulling”) will finalize the deal, not the payment of the money. The Mishnah states that a “pulling” of a lower value of money concludes the exchange for the higher metal because the lower metal is considered the merchandise and the higher is the currency. It is the merchandise that must be possessed not the currency. That is the conclusion of the Mishnah: “Movables acquire coins,” and “all movables acquire each other.” Regarding coins relating to each other, the JT (BM 4:1 [9c]; Guggenheimer, 350) summarizes the cases of the Mishnah by stating: This is summary of the matter: Anything worth less than the other acquires the other. The JT applies a law that originates in the law of transactions to issues of loans. Since the gold coin is considered, currency compared to silver coins and all cheaper metals, it is permissible to lend a golden denar for the return of a golden denar and the concept of seʾah beseʾah that prohibits lending merchandise for the return of identical merchandise does not apply because the denar is currency. Indeed, the JT says: The word of Rebbi implies that gold is like produce. The Mishnah implies that silver is like produce.42 It later goes on to say: Rabbi Idi said, also Abba, Samuel’s father, asked before Rebbi: May one lend dinars against dinars? He answered him it is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aha said: also Rebbi Yohanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both instruct it is permitted to lend dinars against dinars.43

41 JT BM 4:1 (9b) (Guggenheimer, 348). See also Lapin, Civil Law, 265. 42 Based on Guggenheimer, 350, n. 9. 43 Based on Guggenheimer, 351.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

174

Chapter 7

Rav Idi says in the name of Abba, father of Samuel, that he asked Rabbi Judah the Prince (Rabbi) whether it is permissible to lend gold denars for gold denars, and Rabbi said it is permissible. Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish, who were prominent sages of the second generation of the Jerusalem Talmud and founders of the Torah center in Tiberias, also said so. The Talmud also cites a case in which Rabbi Hiya also loaned golden denars for golden denars though the Talmud states that it was within the family and is not absolute proof that it is permissible for everyone.44 The Mishnah (BM 4:1) cited in the BT has an opposite ruling regarding the gold coins. It says: “Gold acquires silver, but silver does not acquire gold.”45 Important manuscripts such as Kaufman, Lowe (Cambridge), and Parma have the reading like the JT—“The silver buys gold”—and only some manuscripts have the Babylonian reading: “The gold buys silver.” However, there is basis to say that it is an ancient tradition that originated in the Land of Israel, not a reading from a later period. The Tosefta (BM 3:13) as well reads like the Babylonian version: Gold acquires silver, how so? If one handed over a golden dinar for twenty-five pieces of silver, this one has made acquisition [of the silver] no matter where it is. But if he handed over twenty-five pieces of silver for a single golden dinar, this one has made acquisition only at the moment at which he actually will draw [the gold coin].46 This reading refers to gold as a commodity not a currency. The silver coin is the currency and therefore acquiring the gold concludes the transaction as explained above. According to this scenario, it is prohibited to lend gold denars for the return of gold denars just as it is prohibited to lend “fruit for fruit.” Both the JT and BT explain the different readings as results of the change in the opinion of Rabbi Judah the Prince over several years. In his youth, he ruled that the silver buys the gold as stated in the JT, but in his later years he switched it to gold buying silver as in the BT.47

44 The JT discusses also other types of coins. See Sperber, Money and Prices, 349; Rosenthal and Lieberman, Yerushalmi Neziqin, 55; and Guggenheimer 352, n. 16. See also Sperber, Money and Prices, 92–93, 237–238. 45 Soncino, 262. See also Lapin, Civil Law, 265. 46 After Neusner, 4:89. 47 JT BM 4a (9c) and BT BM 44b mention the opinion of Rabbi Simeon son of Rebbi and discuss it. The BT also connects this issue to the issue of redeeming the second tithe on gold. See T Maaser Sheni 2:6–7 and BT BM 44b. See also Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Zeraim, 2:734, line 30; and 2:735, line 6. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

“ Fruit for Fruit ”

175

Regarding the change of Rabbi’s opinion from his younger years to his older years, it is possible to explain that it was caused by the drastic changes in the value of gold in the Roman world in the third century CE, as was described at the beginning of this chapter. The shortage of gold and the practice to collect gold and hold on to it could have brought Rabbi to the conclusion that it is not a currency but a commodity. Nevertheless, those who posited that gold coins are a product probably prohibited loans of gold coins for gold coins because it was “dust of interest.”48 There seems to be also a social consideration that affected the disputes over the status of gold coins. The wealthy preferred to use gold coins in their transactions and hoards. It took up less space and was lighter. On the other hand, the poor and middle class rarely used gold coins, and all their dealings were in silver or bronze. Along these lines, it is said that in his youth Rabbi taught that gold is a currency that was compatible with the needs of the wealthy segment of society. In his later years, he said that silver was the currency, not gold, that was compatible with the needs of the middle class.49 To conclude, the JT and BT differ regarding loans of gold denars for gold denars. In the JT, the majority of the sages allowed it, but in the BT the Amora Rabbi Yohanan, a prominent sage of the second generation, prohibits and no disagreeing opinion is cited. The reason for this is that the rabbis see gold coins as products regarding transactions and loans. 7.8

Conclusion

It is unclear how common transactions of “fruit for fruit” were. However, since most of the population of the Roman world was rural, it is logical that many 48 J. N. Epstein, Mavo le-Nusah ha-Mishnah (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1948. Repr. 1964), 19–22, posits that the wording of the Mishnah in the BT is late, perhaps even after the Talmudic period. Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:176–177, lines 42–48, is not convinced that the economic consideration changed Rabbi’s opinion. However, it is hard to disregard the economic events that took place in the empire at the time. Regarding these issues, see also Sperber, Money and Prices, 335–386; and Shlasky, “Trends,” 316–322. Later, in the Geonic period, the Talmudic approach was continued and even expanded due to various historical changes. See B. Z. Eliash, “Non-Monetary Loans: Tradition and Innovation in the Geonic Period,” Dine Israel 18 (1995–1966): 205–253; Dine Israel 19 (1997–1998): 41–86 [Hebrew]. 49 Elliott, Economic Theory, 150–172, index, s.v. “currency–gold”; E. Lo Cascio, “The Function of Gold Coinage in the Monetary Economy of the Roman Empire,” in The Monetary Systems of the Greeks and Romans, ed. W. V. Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 160–173; R. Bland, “What Happened to Gold Coinage in the 3rd c. AD?” JRA 26 (2013): 263–280. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

176

Chapter 7

“fruit for fruit” transactions took place. The rabbis prohibited lending a measure of fruit against a future measure of the same fruit to prevent lenders from utilizing the fluctuation of prices of fruit from harvest time in which it was cheap to planting time when it was scarce and expensive in order to generate profit. If the borrower had the product that he was to return to the lender at the time of the loan, the rabbis considered it an exchange not a loan and allowed it. The rabbis did not even require an equal amount of produce in existence, and debated how much was required. Hillel is presented as having a singular stringent opinion, prohibiting even lending a loaf of bread for a loaf of bread. The JT and BT extend the prohibition of lending “fruit for fruit” to the loaning of various precious metals and currencies that some rabbis defined as produce, and thus defined the lending and return of this currency as “fruit for fruit.” Another leniency was the loan of seeds for planting. The rabbis allowed lending seeds for seeds for planting, enabling the sharecroppers to obtain seeds to plan without restrictions.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Chapter 8

The Sages’ Attitude toward Those Involved in Usury 8.1

Introduction

One aspect of the issue of credit and usury in Jewish society of Roman Palestine is the attitude of the rabbis to people who transgressed the prohibition of interest. In general, the rabbis defined a hierarchy of the prohibitions of the Torah in which the worst transgressions were those for which the Torah prescribed the death penalty. A lesser level is those that the Torah punished with karet (cutting off). Usury belongs to the category of regular negative commandments which are not as offensive as the other two. However, it will be seen that the rabbis used strong rhetoric trying to frighten people away from practicing usury. 8.2

Expanding the Prohibition

The rabbis were personally involved in economic activities and were aware of the importance of credit for conducting business.1 A chain of halakhot in the Tosefta shows that the rabbis realized that there were Jews involved in lending for interest.2 The two main parties in interest-bearing loans were the lender and the borrower. The natural feeling is to relate to the borrower with compassion as he is borrowing for interest because he is in dire need of money. This seems to be the approach of the biblical scriptures on the subject, which speak to the lender harshly and not to the borrower. The Mishnah expands the prohibition of interest not only to the lender but also to all those who are involved in the transaction, including the borrower, the witnesses, the scribe, and the guarantor. M BM 5:11 (Lapin, 279) states: And these transgress a negative commandment: the lender, and the borrower and the surety, and the witnesses. And the sages say: “Even the 1 See M. Ayali, “Labor as a Value in the Talmudic and Midrashic Literature,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 1 (2) (1982): 7–59 [Hebrew]; idem, A Nomencalture of Workers and Artisans in the Talmudic and Midrashic Literature (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2001) [Hebrew]; Aberbach, Labor, Crafts, and Commerce; and B. Z. Rosenfeld, Lod and Its Sages in the Period of the Mishnah and the Talmud (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1997), 25–40 [Hebrew]. 2 See T BM 5:21–26.

© Ben Zion Rosenfeld, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004681965_009

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

178

Chapter 8

scribe.” They transgress on: “You shall not give him …” and “… You shall not take from him; and You shall not be as a creditor to him” … and “You shall not put interest on him.”3 The Mishnah continues to cite passages from the Torah deploring the actions of those involved in usury, stressing the severity with which it saw the phenomenon. However, the Tosefta cites an opinion that the scribe is not liable to the prohibition and an opinion that the borrower is punished with lashes but not the lender because the latter is required to return the interest to the borrower and fix his transgression.4 T BM 6:16 (Neusner, 4:109) states: R. Nehemiah and R. Eliezer b. Jacob declare exempt in the case of a scribe [cf. M BM 5:11]. And they declared the lender exempt from being given stripes, because he is subject to the requirement of effecting an affirmative action. Nevertheless, the Tannaim in a halakhic exegesis emphasize the transgression of the borrower more than the lender. Sifre to Deuteronomy 262 states: Thou shalt not lend upon interest to thy brother (Deut. 23:20): This refers to the borrower. Whence do we learn that it refers also to the lender? From the verse, Take thou no interest of him or increase (Lev. 25:36).5 The source emphasizes the borrower’s wrongdoing more than the lenders. It interprets the words of the Torah to be referring to the borrower, while the prohibition of lending for interest is learned only from the continuation of the passage: “Do not take from him neshekh.”

3 The passages mentioned in this source according to order of appearance are Lev. 25:37; 25:36; Exod. 22:24; and Lev. 19:14. See also Mekhilta de Rabbi Yishmael, Masekhet Kaspa, 19 (Horowitz-Rabin, 316 and note to line 10). 4 See T BM 6:16 (Lieberman, 96). The first opinion includes the scribe in the prohibition, but two sages posit that he is not responsible. On the scribes in this period, see C. Hezser, “Jewish Scribes in the Late Second Temple Period: Differences between the Composition, Writing, and Interpretation of Texts,” in Scriptures in the Making: Texts and Their Transmission in Late Second Temple Judaism, ed. R. Hakola, J. Orpana, and P. Hakola (Leuven: Peeters, 2021), 149–172. 5 Hammer, 259; Mekhilta de Rabbi Yishmael, Masekhet Kaspa, 19 (Horowitz-Rabin, 316).

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

The Sages ’ Attitude toward Those Involved in Usury

8.3

179

Combating Usury

The Tosefta also contains sharp rebuke of those involved in usury, calling them “wicked men.”6 This is a statement on the nature of the person involved in usury, scorning him with a mark of disgrace. Two chapters later, there are harsher words for people who practice usury. T BM 6:17–18 (Neusner, 4:109–110) states: Said R. Yose, “Come and see how blind are the eyes of those who lend at usurious rates. A man calls to his fellow to serve an idol, have unlawful sexual relations, or shed blood, [For] he wants him to fall [into sin] with him. But this one brings a scribe, pen, ink, document, and witnesses, and says to them, ‘Come and write concerning him that he has no share in the One who commanded concerning usury. And he writes the documents and registers it in the archives, and so denies Him who spoke and thereby brought the world into being, blessed be He. Thus, you have learned that these who lend at usurious rates deny the principle [of divine authority].’” R. Simeon b. Eleazar says, “More than they make, they lose. For they treat the Torah like a fraud, and Moses like a fool. They say, ‘Now if Moses knew how much money we would make, he would never have written [the prohibition of usury].’” R. Aqiba says, “Usury is hard, for even a very greeting is a matter of usury. How so? This one never greeted the other in his entire life, until he had to borrow money from him. Now he rushes to greet him. So this is a kind of greeting which is a matter of usury. … Thus you have learned that those who lend money at usurious rates tremble and pass away from the world.” The statements cited in the Tosefta compare lenders for interest to deniers of the Law of Moses who make a mockery of the Torah. Further, “they will collapse financially, they will not see a blessing from the money they make”; they will “tremble and pass away from the world.” T. Sheviit adds: “They are thieves and deserve to die.”7 These harsh statements were a rabbinic attempt to combat the practice of lending for interest and to minimize it as much as possible.8 6 T BM 4:16 (Neusner, 498). 7 T Sheviit 8:11 (Lieberman, 202); BT BM 62b elaborates. 8 Y. Elman, “Commercial Law in Rome and Ctesiphon: Roman Jurisconsults, Rabbis and Sasanian Dastwars on Risk,” in Rabbinic Traditions between Palestine and Babylonia, ed. R. Kolsky and T. Ilan (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 250–283, shows that the sages from the Mishnaic period onward and more in the Talmudic days, as well as Sasanid law, tended to protect the purchasers of land from borrowers more than in Roman law.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

180

Chapter 8

The harsh attitude to those who were involved in usury is found also in another area of Halakha—testimony. The Mishnah (Sanhedrin 3:3) states: And these are those who are invalid [to serve as witnesses or judges] … he who loans money on interest. According to the Mishnah, the lender for interest is disqualified for being a judge and for testimony in court. This sanction degrades the creditor socially. The Tosefta (Sanhedrin 5:2; Neusner, 4:211) adds an additional stringency: One who lends on interest [M Sanhedrin 3:3] does not have the power to reform himself unless he tears up bonds of indebtedness owing to him and carries out a complete reformation. The status of the lender will be restored only when he completely abstains from lending for interest. Both sources do not mention the borrower, which seems to indicate that the above sanction does not apply to him. However, in a later period, in the middle of the Talmudic period in Babylon, a change in the matter was recalled. Rava, a prominent Babylonian Amora (ca. 320–350), states that the borrower is also excluded from testimony (BT Sanhedrin 25a; Soncino, 144): Rava said: A borrower on interest is unfit to act as witness. But have we not learnt: A lender (malweh) on interest [is disqualified]?—[It means] a loan [milweh] on interest [disqualifies the parties to the transaction]. Rava explains that when the Mishnah spoke about the creditor it was referring to the entire issue of borrowing for interest on both sides. It is surprising that the rabbis showed no compassion toward the borrower who was borrowing because of great necessity and treated him equally harshly as the lender who was making money against the Torah decree. This can be explained from a social perspective. The economic pressures to lend and borrow for interest were great. The rabbis did not have a way to force the public to comply with the Torah instruction. The lenders were often wealthy members of society who did not fear the rabbis and who could withstand rabbinic sanctions. The rabbis therefore put pressure on the borrowers, who needed social approval and may head the rabbis’ demands. Through the borrowers, the rabbis hoped to minimize the phenomenon of lending for profit. There were also loans in which the borrowers were wealthy, and therefore the rabbis wanted to prevent them from borrowing at interest as well.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

The Sages ’ Attitude toward Those Involved in Usury

181

However, the civil aspect of the right of the borrower to demand a return of the interest he paid on the pretense that interest was illegal in Jewish law is described in the sources as a dilemma having to do with whether or not interest “can be extracted through the judges.” In the Tannaitic period, the sages maintained sanctions against those who lent money for interest as is cited by the Tosefta in BM 5:22 (Neusner, 4:104): He who lends money to his fellow on interest and the case came before the court—they impose a fine on him so that he does not collect either the principal or the interest—the words of Rabbi Meir. For R. Meir maintained a writ of indebtedness which covers payments of interest; they impose a fine on him so that he does not collect either the principal or the interest. The rabbis say he collects the principal not the interest.9 Both opinions in the Mishnah fine the lender and do not let him collect the interest specified in the loan document. Rabbi Meir fines the lender so that cannot receive the principal of the loan as well; the majority opinion is more lenient and fines only the interest and not the principal.10 The following halakha (T BM 5:23; after Neusner, 4:104) complements it, looking at the issue from an additional perspective: He who happens to find a writ on indebtedness [containing interest] should tear it up. [If] it should come to a court, they tear it up. Rabban Simeon ben Gamaliel says, all procedure follows the accepted practice of the province [in which the matter comes to court] [‫]הכל כמנהג המדינה‬. This halakhah discusses the status of a loan document that contains interest. Tearing up a loan document means that the creditor cannot collect the loan or any part of it, absolving the borrower of the obligation to return the money. The first opinion that demands tearing up the document follows Rabbi Meir’s opinion from the previous halakhah.11 The opinion of Rabban Simeon son of Gamaliel is that the court should follow “the accepted practice of the province,” which means that if the tradition of the local court is to tear up the document of a loan that contains interest, it should be done; however, in places that 9

The last sentence is missing in Neusner’s translation (4:104) but is present in Lieberman’s edition (92). See also JT BM 5:6 (10c); BT BK 30b; and BT BM 72a. 10 BT BK 30b; BT BM 72a. 11 Rabbi Meir’s opinion is not completely clear. See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:230, lines 58–59.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

182

Chapter 8

follow the majority opinion the document is not torn up. The document will be used to collect the principal but not the interest. This seems to be a compromise between the opinion of Rabbi Meir and that of the sages. It should be noted that Rabban Simeon son of Gamaliel’s opinion is cited only once in rabbinic sources, while the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the sages is cited three times in the JT and once in the BT, as Lieberman wrote in his notes. JT BM 5:1 (10a) (Guggenheimer, 14:380) states: What is biting, etc. Rebbi Yannai said this is interest, which is taken away by the Judges. They asked before Rebbi Johanan, “Can interest be taken away by the judges?” He said, if it were so, nothing would be left for the great people of the Land of Israel. The issue in the source is whether one can demand through the court the return of interest money after it was paid. According to Rabbi Yanai, the answer is “yes.” Since interest is prohibited, if someone borrowed money for interest and paid it, he would be able to go to the Jewish court and sue for the return of the interest. Rabbi Yanai’s student, Rabbi Yohanan, was the leading rabbinic figure in Palestine in the second half of the third century CE. He states that if it would be possible to demand return of the interest, then the “great” (prominent) people of the Jewish community in Palestine would be left “without anything,” showing that they were heavily involved in usury.12 The BT (BM 61b; Soncino, 368) ascribes the disagreement to Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Eleazar, his disciple and colleague: 12

In the continuation of the discussion in the JT, Rabbi Abba son of Zemina and Rabbi Ami deal with two concrete cases. The sage Shmuel (= Samuel) also says the same statement concerning the involvement of the wealthy Jews of Palestine in the charging of interest. See JT BB 3:3 (Rosenthal and Lieberman, Yerushalmi Neziqin, 87, and in the commentary 187–188 for line 57). The “great people” mentioned in the above source refer to the lay leadership. See, for example, Sifre to Deuteronomy 344 (Finkelstein ed., 400)—“the leaders of the Jewish people that devote themselves to their welfare” and “the leaders of the Jewish people that mortgage themselves for the people” (Finkelstein, 401). In Sifre Zuta, Numbers 27:19 (Horowitz ed., 321), the religious leader is sitting at the head and lecturing to “all the great of Israel.” It is possible that this term includes religious leadership as well. In Sifre Zuta (Lieberman, 87–88) and Midrash Vayikra Rabbah 34:8 (Margaliot ed., 787), Moses is mentioned as one of “the great.” See A. Büchler, The Political and Social Leaders of the Jewish Community of Sepphoris in the Second and Third Centuries (Oxford: H. Hart at the University Press, 1909), 9–31; Hezser, Social Structure, 303–305; and S. Friedman, “The Transformation of Olam,” in Sha‌ʾarei Lashon : Studies in Hebrew, Aramaic and Jewish Languages Presented to Moshe Bar-Asher, Vol. 2: Rabbinic Hebrew and Aramaic, ed. A. Maman, S. E. Fassberg, and Y. Breuer (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 2007), 272–285, ns. 30, 44.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

The Sages ’ Attitude toward Those Involved in Usury

183

R. Eleazar said: Direct interest can be reclaimed in court, but not indirect interest. R. Johanan ruled: Even direct interest cannot be reclaimed in court R. Isaac said: What is R. Johanan’s reason? The Writ saith He hath given forth upon usury, and hath taken increase: shall he then live? He shall not live: he hath done all these abominations: For it [this transgression] death is prescribed, but not return [of the money]. Rabbi Eleazar posits that Torah-prohibited interest is subject to a court edict to return it to the borrower, while Rabbi Yohanan posits that it is not returned. Rabbi Yitzhak interprets the words of Rabbi Yohanan to mean that interest is so severe that the prophet stated that the lender is to be killed by God, but the money is not to be returned.13 The BT discusses this disagreement (BM 61b–62a). It raises a few suggestions with a common denominator that there are two opinions concerning the possibility that the borrower will sue for the return of the interest he paid. One opinion follows Rabbi Yohanan that the interest that was paid was paid. The other follows Rabbi Eleazar, stating that after reaching a rabbinic court the latter would rule that the interest should be returned. Much later at BM 65b, the Talmud states: “The halakha is like Rabbi Eleazar.” According to research, the phrase “the halakha” in the BT is a late addition to the Talmudic text, perhaps from the eighth century CE.14 Therefore, we can see that the Talmud did not reach a conclusion on this issue. The later Stamaim ruled to have the interest returned to the borrower. The topic is brought up again in BT BM 67a. The mainstream opinion is like that of Rabbi Eleazar that fixed interest should be returned to the borrower 13 See Rosenthal and Lieberman, Yerushalmi Neziqin, 153, for the argument that Rabbi Yohanan disagreed with Rabbi Eleazar. E. Shochetman, Ma‌ʾAseh Haba Ba‌ʾAverah (Illegal Act in Jewish Law) (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1981), 229 [Hebrew], suggested that Rabbi Yohanan agreed with Rabbi Eleazar that interest should be returned. His position was a result of the difficult economic conditions of his times during the economic crisis in the Roman Empire in the third century CE that prevented taking the interest from the creditor. He is following G. Alon, Studies in Jewish History, Vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1958), 156 [Hebrew]. He cites the JT that ascribes to Rabbi Yohanan the explanation that if the interest were to be returned it would damage “the great people” of Palestine. This can be understood to mean that the rich relied on interest to maintain their wealth and that without their financial help the Jewish communities would collapse. 14 See Shochetman, Ma‌ʾAseh, 236, n. 267. He notes that this sentence does not appear in the “Rome” Talmudic manuscript. Therefore, it is possible that some of the first Geonim did not have this sentence in their Talmudic text. On the phrase “the halakha” concluding some Talmudic discourse, see B. S. Cohen, “Was There Really a Rava II? (A Re-Examination of the Talmudic Evidence),” JQR 103 (3) (2013): 273–297, esp. 276–277, n. 39.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

184

Chapter 8

by the Jewish court. The discussion cited there relates to a specific case in which the Amoraim did not agree whether it was Torah-prohibited interest or not, but both sides agreed that if it was Torah-prohibited interest it would be returned when the court ruled so. The sages mentioned in the discussion belong to the second half of the Talmudic period and include Rabba son of Rav Huna from the third generation, Rava from the fourth generation, Rav Pappi who is quoting a sage from the fourth generation, and Ravina from the sixth generation. This source strengthens the conclusion that the rabbis in the Amoraic period sharpened the distinction between Torah-prohibited interest and other kinds of interest. This tendency continued into the post-Amoraic literature as seen in the previous source.15 Consequently, the Talmud cites another disagreement between Abaye and Rava that at first glance seems identical but is in effect different (BM 65a; Soncino 382): Abaye also said: If a man has a claim of four zuz in interest upon his neighbor, and he gave him a garment for it, when we compel repayment we make him repay four zuz but not the garment. Rava said: We compel him to return the garment. Why so that people may not say: The garment he wears is a garment of usury. In both cases, the principal of the loan was money, and the return was money. The interest was paid in kind. The sages both agree that the interest must be returned to the borrower. They differ on whether the lender must return the garment itself, or whether it is sufficient to give its cash value instead. 8.4

Repentance from Usury

A similar issue involves the return of the interest by the lender himself by his own initiative in the process of repenting. There is a Tannaitic source, 15

This conclusion emerges also from the continuation of the Talmudic discourse on page 67a. The Talmud discusses a case where the lender ate extra fruit from the land of the borrower, which was the collateral for the loan. It was stated that the extra fruit eaten illegally would not be extracted by the court. Rav Ashi, a sixth-generation Amora, adds that, even if the lender ate fruit that equals the entire loan, the court should order that the loan be paid anyway. The reason given, probably by the later “anonymous” Talmudic editor, is that since it is rabbinic interest it cannot be collected from the lender by the court. This means that, had it been Torah-prohibited, the court would have taken the money from the lender and returned it to the borrower.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

The Sages ’ Attitude toward Those Involved in Usury

185

mentioned above, that requires that the act be irreversible. T Sanhedrin 5:2 (Neusner, 4:211) states: One who lends on interest [M Sanhedrin 3:3] does not have the power to reform himself unless he tears up bonds of indebtedness owing to him, and to carry out a complete reformation. This source demands that in order to show that he repented from lending for interest the lender must tear up the loan document. This source seems to indicate that the repenting lender must forfeit collecting the principal—and not only the interest—following the above-stated opinion of Rabbi Meir that fines the person who lends for interest and does not allow collection of the loan or the interest. The Tosefta (Sheviit 8:11; Neusner, 1:246–247) takes it a step further: A. [As regards] a thief, one who lends money at interest [in violation of the law], or [robbers] who repented and returned that which they improperly had acquired—anyone [among the original owners] who accepts [such money or goods] from them [any of the offenders listed at A]—the sages are not pleased with him. The BT (BK 94b; Soncino, 548) cites this source and explains it: R. Johanan said: It was in the days of Rabbi that this teaching was enunciated, as taught: “It once happened with a certain man who was desirous of making restitution that his wife said to him, Raca, if you are going to make restitution, even the girdle [you are wearing] would not remain yours, and he thus refrained altogether from making repentance. It was at that time that it was declared that if robbers or usurers are prepared to make restitution it is not right to accept [the misappropriated articles] from them, and he who accepts from them does not obtain the approval of the Sages.” Rabbi Yohanan posits that this rule was stated a generation earlier in the days of Rabbi Judah the Prince. An individual wanted to repent, but his wife convinced him not to, for if he would return all the interest he charged, he would be poor and destitute.16 From this, it can be deduced that prior to that, returning the interest was accepted, as stated by the other source in the Tosefta. The 16

See Feliks, Tractate Yerushalmi, 332.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

186

Chapter 8

BT, following the words of Rabbi Yohanan, cites a series of baraytot that state that interest was to be returned. That seems to indicate that Rabbi’s decree was temporary, only for his generation, and discontinued later. However, the Stam Talmudic authors also suggest that interest that still exists should be returned and interest that was consumed by the lender should not be returned.17 8.5

Permission to Lend for Interest in Special Cases

The Tosefta mentions a special case concerning the Temple, which was allowed to lend money for “dust of interest.” The Tosefta (BM 4:2; Neusner, 4:94) states: They increase the rent-charge but not the purchase-price [M BM 5:2] … Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, “Also: They increase the purchase-price in the case of that which has been consecrated.” The Tosefta starts with the words of the Mishnah in BM 5:2, citing the rule that it is permissible to give a renter a discount for paying the rent in advance because most rent is paid at the end of the year or at the end of every month. In contrast, when selling an item, it is prohibited to charge more for paying late because normally the purchase price is paid up-front. Charging more for late payment is “dust of interest.” Rabban Simeon son of Gamaliel (c.150 CE) allows doing this when holy money is involved.18 In the Roman period as well as the classical and Hellenistic periods that preceded it, temples served as banks in which people deposited their savings for safekeeping. The sanctity of the temples gave the depositors a feeling of security that their money was safe. The temples made money by lending the money deposited in their coffers for interest.19 It seems that the Temple in Jerusalem as well, despite its unique religious doctrine, served as a bank. People deposited money in the Temple for safekeeping. We have evidence of this from the early Seleucid conquest and from as late as the last days of the Temple.20 A similar anonymous statement is found in T BK 4:3 (Neusner, 4:19) that states explicitly:

17 See the continuation of the discourse in BT BK 94b–95a. 18 T Shekalim 2:12 (Neusner, 2:175) also discusses the method of payment to the suppliers of the Temple. 19 See Bogaert, Banques et banquiers, 279–304; and Hamilton, “Temple Cleansing.” See also Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History, 622, n. 46, 623, n. 48. 20 Josephus, War 6.282. D. R. Schwartz, Maccabees 2 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 191, 194 (on 2 Macc 3:10), mentions deposits in the Temple of wealthy people and for orphans Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

The Sages ’ Attitude toward Those Involved in Usury

187

The laws against usury and fraud by overcharging apply to an ordinary person [who may lay claim to injury thereby], but the laws against usury and fraud by overcharging do not apply to the Most High. This statement follows the opinion of Rabban Simeon son of Gamaliel cited above that the Temple could benefit from loans for interest and possibly is even more lenient in allowing all forms of interest for the Temple.21 However, there is no evidence that the Temple was indeed involved in loans to individuals, certainly not interest-bearing loans.22 The BT concludes that the sanctuary authorities did not give loans for explicit interest and that they only benefitted from changes in prices that normally were considered by the rabbis “dust of interest” (BT BM 57b). The Babylonian Talmud mentions additional special cases, in which it is permissible for laypeople to lend for interest or “dust of interest,” that do not appear in the Tannaitic sources or even in the Jerusalem Talmud. These cases show that the later generations of rabbis in Babylon were open to leniency on this issue. One case allows orphans, or their guardians, to lend money for “dust of interest.” The rabbis of the second generation of Amoraim deliberated on how to help orphans that inherited a sum of money to live off the money they inherited. It was necessary to invest it in such a way that it could produce steady income, because if the money would be used to support the orphans, it would be used up. Buying and selling merchandise was not an option because the orphans were too young to engage in this kind of transaction, and the guardian could not be expected to devote his time to it. BT BM 70a (Soncino, 405–406) states:

21

22

and widows. See also Gordon, Land and Temple, esp. 150–182, and index, s.v. “temple,” “Jerusalem–economy.” See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Nezikin, 9:36–37, lines 12–13, 16–17. The Tosefta posits that in every transaction between the Temple and regular people it must be arranged such that the Temple gains and does not lose. In M Shekalim 1:6–7, it states that, in order to donate the half-shekel that the individual was obligated to give to the Temple every year, the donor had to pay the kalbon (low-value currency) for changing the money if he did not have exact change. See T Shekalim 1:8 (Lieberman, 202–203); Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Moed, 4:664– 666, lines 27–34; M Shekalim 4:3–4, 4:9, 5:4; and T Shekalim 2:11–13 (Lieberman, 209–210). It also states at 1:3 that the Temple took collateral from those who did not donate the half-shekel. See Schürer, The History of the Jewish People, 2:281–291. See also S. Lieberman, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, 2nd ed. (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1962), 169–172. The only kind of loan that is found in the sources relates to suppliers to the Temple that wish to receive early the money that is coming to them. See T Shekalim 2:12 (Neusner, 2:175). See the opinion of Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, Moed, 4:688, lines 56–57. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

188

Chapter 8

Rav Anan said in Samuel’s name: Orphans’ money may be lent out at interest. This statement could be interpreted as meaning that Rav Anan allows lending the money of orphans for interest, which is prohibited by the Torah. Rav Nahman from the second to third generation dismissed the words of Rav Anan, exclaiming: Because they are orphans, we are to feed them with forbidden food! Orphans, who eat what is not rightfully theirs, may follow their testator! He dismissed Rav Anan’s tradition in the name of Samuel and showed that it is wrong. It is possible that Rav Nahman would allow the money to be lent in a situation of “dust of interest.” The Talmud then cites the opinions of Rabbah son of Shilah in the name of Rav Hisda and Rabbah son of Rav Yosef in the name of Rav Sheshet. Both sources are from the third generation and rule that it is permissible to lend the money of orphans “near to profit and far from loss.” Regarding regular people who do that, the barayta quoted by the BT states that they are “evil.”23 There is another kind of rabbinic interest that was ruled as being permissible (BT BM 75a): Rav Judah also said in Samuel’s name: Scholars may borrow from each other on interest. Why? Fully knowing that usury is forbidden, they merely present gifts to each other. Samuel said to Abbuha b. Ihi: Lend me a hundred peppercorns for a hundred and twenty. And this is well. Rav Judah’s statement in the name of Samuel allows a group of sages to lend and receive interest-bearing loans among themselves. The rationale for this was that since they are all learned and know that interest is prohibited, they are giving the interest as a present and not as a condition of the loan. The Talmud then proceeds to mention that Samuel actually acted on his lenient ruling and borrowed 100 peppers from Abbuha son of Ihi, promising to pay back 120 peppers. This action is hard to understand, as it contrasts with the rabbinic stringencies on “dust of interest” and sets an example for others.

23

Rabbah and Rav Yoseph were primary sages from the third generation that allow investing orphans’ money “close to profit and far from loss.” Rav Ashi of the sixth generation also suggests a similar solution. This term “close to profit and far from loss” is originally found in T BM 4:16 (Lieberman, 85). This barayta is cited also by JT BM 5:6 (10c) as well as by the words of Rabbi Mana in JT Shekalim, which is cited below. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

The Sages ’ Attitude toward Those Involved in Usury

189

Rav Judah was a disciple of both Rav and Samuel (= Shmuel), who were the leaders of the first generation of Babylonian Amoraim. He also allowed interest within the family of the household for educational purposes: Rav Judah said in Rab’s name: One may lend to his sons and household on interest, in order to give them experience thereof. This, nevertheless, is incorrect, because he will come to cling thereto. Indeed, according to the late Stam of the Talmud, the halakhah is not the same as Rav Judah’s ruling because the children will get used to giving and receiving interest. However, the proposition of Rav Judah seems to indicate that such situations actually existed. Rava from the fourth generation in Babylon presented a way to compensate the lender of money through a third party. He says (BT BM 69b): Rava said: One may say to his neighbor, “Take these four zuz and lend money to so-and-so,” [because] the Torah forbade only usury which comes from the borrower to the lender. Rava also said: One may say to his neighbor, “Here are four zuz, and persuade so-and-so to lend me money.” Why so? He merely receives a fee for his talking. In both cases, the four zuz are an addition to the principal of the loan. Rava allows it because it is not given from the lender to the creditor. In the first case, the third party is giving four zuz to the creditor so that he will lend the money to the borrower. This could be a loophole that would be used to charge interest indirectly. The second case is that the borrower pays a third party four zuz to convince the creditor to lend the money. If indeed, Rava made it possible to pass money from the borrower to the lender through a third party, it bypasses the prohibition of interest, making the prohibition theoretical. Therefore, it is unlikely that Rava intended to allow this. In the first case, the third party is not to collect his investment from the borrower, and in the second the money was to stay with the third party, who would talk to the lender but not give him the money as interest. Perhaps the loan involved was the typical sum of 200 zuz. The four zuz, even if given to the lender, were far below the interest rate range of 6%–12% that was common in the Roman world and therefore were merely a payment for the efforts of the third party. The Talmud brings an occurrence to strengthen the words of Rava (BT BM 69b): Just as Abba Mar, the son of Rav Papa, used to take balls of wax from wax dealers, and then persuade his father to lend them money. But the Rabbis Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

190

Chapter 8

protested to Rav Papa: Your son enjoys usury. He replied: Such interest we may enjoy: the Torah forbade only interest that comes from the borrower [direct] to the lender; but here he receives a fee for his talking, which is permitted. Abba Mar son of Rav Papa received some wax from wax manufacturers, and he in turn convinced his father to lend them money. Rav Papa agreed with the act of his son possibly because the money remained with the son, who must have had an independent household, and not paid to the lender. The rabbis did not consider this “dust of interest” because it is part of their lenient approach to allow the borrower to pay an intermediary to help obtain the loan. These leniencies from the later generations indicate that the rabbis faced the difficulty that lenders refused to lend money to those who needed loans. They therefore allowed using a third party to help convince the lender. It shows that there were financial difficulties in this period and that the rich were careful about lending money. They technically claim it is not interest because the borrower is not paying the lender, but it should at least be considered “dust of interest.” The leniency can only be explained as a necessity.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Chapter 9

Conclusion 9.1

Contributions to Scholarship

This volume has explored the rabbinic legislation following the Torah prohibition of interest, and illustrated the impact that it had on Jewish society and economy. It started by defining loans and credit from a legal perspective. It surveyed the characteristics of loans, banking, and investment in the Roman and Sasanid worlds, and proceeded to show how early rabbinic interpretations of the prohibition of usury in Jewish law permeated all aspects of the economy, limiting not only money loans for interest, but also future sales and partnerships between workers and investors. The average person would not realize that there is a loan component in contracts for future sales, barter, partnerships, or investments, but the rabbis did. Sometimes they completely prohibited the enterprise such as in the case of “iron sheep,” and sometimes they offered solutions to the usury problem: paying a salary to the worker in the partnership. The following table can describe this extent of the prohibitions of interest. Loans

Sales

Partnerships

Investments

Money for Money Fruit for Fruit

Money for Fruit Fruit for Money

Sharing Risks Not Sharing Risks

Guaranteed Profit Sharing Risks

The above table shows in modern terms the scope of rabbinic legislation on interest. It involves loans of “fruit for fruit” even if the amount returned is the same as the amount loaned and the intrinsic value changed. It affects sales of futures and credit and the fluctuation in prices over time. It demands that in partnerships the silent partner share the risks with the worker and in investment that the investors share the risk and do not guarantee profit for themselves. From an economic perspective, the rabbis interfered with market activity. However, from a social perspective we see an attempt to give the less fortunate people in Jewish society an opportunity to make a living under fair conditions.

© Ben Zion Rosenfeld, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004681965_010

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

192

Chapter 9

To conclude this volume, I will present in point form the various findings of this research and therefore its contributions to scholarship on the ancient Jewish economy: a. Defining “loans” and “credit.” Describing the functions of credit in the Roman Palestinian and Talmudic Babylonian economies as depicted by early rabbinic literature. b. Presenting the issue of rabbinic legislation and expansive interpretation of the Torah prohibition of interest. c. Analyzing the difference between credit in all its economic manifestations: “money for money,” “fruit for money,” “money for fruit,” and “fruit for fruit.” “Money for money” is primarily the straightforward loan for interest. “Fruit for money” is sale on credit. “Money for fruit” refers to advance payment and future sales. And “fruit for fruit” refers to barter sales. All these areas of commerce are subject, according to the rabbis, to the prohibition of interest. d. Showing how rabbinic legislation provides insight into practices of lending, investment, barter, and business partnership formation in the Roman and Sasanid societies in which the Jewish economy operated. e. Examining rabbinic propaganda against usury and social sanctions against usurers. f. Discussing the attitude to interest that was paid and the lenient position adopted by some rabbis in the Babylonian Talmudic period. g. Exploring loopholes that were used in order to bypass the prohibition of interest and attempts to stop them. h. Presenting the socioeconomic insight that can be derived from the legislation and implementation of the prohibition of interest. 9.2

Epilogue

This panoramic research discusses credit and usury according to rabbinic sources of the Mishnaic and Talmudic periods. Credit is a general term that includes loans, investments, and delayed sales. Loans involve giving the borrower money that is to be returned at a later date in the form of cash or products. Delayed sales include various economic transactions in which time passes from one stage of the transaction to another. This form includes investments where one partner invests money, and the other labor. Credit is the oxygen of every economy and an important factor in all societies. This topic has not been comprehensively studied as of yet, and this research creates

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Conclusion

193

pioneering and innovative methods that help us understand the economic aspects of rabbinic literature. Rabbinic literature is religious and legalistic, and its focus was on the prohibition of interest that was prescribed by the Torah. It does not comprehensively describe the economy and society of the times in which the rabbis lived. Despite this fact, it is a genuine window into commercial practices of the population at certain times and places, as can be seen comparing the cases mentioned in rabbinic sources with cases cited in the surrounding literature and in contemporary inscriptions and papyri. When compared with the economic knowledge of the Roman and Sasanid Empires, these sources contribute to our understanding of the phenomenon of credit and the way it was practiced. This research presents a comprehensive picture of the various areas in which the rabbinic sources see credit transactions. The first two chapters of this volume dealt with the historical background of credit and its importance in the society of the states in which the large Jewish communities existed during the times of the Mishnah and Talmud. Chapter 3 focuses on credit in Jewish society specifically. Chapters 4–7 describe the various types of credit. A component of credit was present in many agricultural transactions such as the sale of futures, as well as in commercial operations and silent partnerships. The material was organized according to the nature of the transaction, that is, whether it dealt with “money for money,” which was like modern loans and banking, “money for fruit,” “fruit for money,” and “fruit for fruit.” These latter aspects were characteristic of the agricultural sector. These two avenues of exchange—money and produce—were the main “stuff” of commercial exchanges that were carried out between people. Money was the main commodity in the Roman and Sassanid worlds, but agricultural produce and other products were also exchanged and loaned. “Money for money” transactions found in rabbinic texts were a major part of the finances of agricultural enterprises, showing further the centrality of agriculture in the rabbinic worldview. The research follows the historic evolution of credit through the periods examined here. A central theme that dominates the outlook of the sages is the prohibition of lending to one another for interest, as stated in the Torah. Jewish law was unique that it prohibited interest completely, though Roman legislation aimed to control interest rates such that they should not be too exorbitant. The prohibition of interest brought the rabbis to be interested in the world of commerce and to record and analyze transactions that were not of interest to other religious groups. The Jewish prohibition of interest has been researched.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

194

Chapter 9

However, this research examines these issues from a socioeconomic perspective rather than from a purely legal and religious perspective and develops our understanding of the economic activities of the Roman and Sasanid Empires. It shows that the rabbis analyzed commercial transactions and reached the conclusion that they included an aspect of credit, even though the parties may not have seen it that way. This brought the rabbis to legislate limitations on commercial credit and not only on loans that were mentioned in the relevant Torah passages. Systematic examination of the cases cited by the sources provides insight into the commercial activity that the rabbis were aware of. Rabbinic sources dealing with credit discuss primarily loans of individuals that involved small sums of money, mostly 100–200 zuz. Of course, there is mention of smaller coins up to the peruta, which was the smallest unit of bronze currency at the time. There is rare mention of higher sums of a few thousand denars up to one hundred manehs (10,000 zuz).1 In Roman and Sasanid sources, there are loans of much higher sums, as well as loans given and taken by partners, communities, poleis, and collegia. It shows that the sages focused on the poor and the lower middle class.2 Another aspect is the economic ties between Jews 1 Most of the loan cases in the Mishnah and all Tannaitic literature involve sums of 100 to 200 denars (maneh-maataim), such as the woman’s ketubbah of 200 zuz. See, for example, M. A. Friedman, Jewish Marriage in Palestine: A Cairo Genizah Study. 2 vols. (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1980–1981), 1:244–257, 311; and T. Ilan, “Another Ketubbah on Papyrus frm Byzantine Egypt,” Eretz-Israel 34 (2020): 23–30, esp. 27 [Hebrew]. The word maneh is mentioned in Tannaitic literature about 250 times. See also Sperber, Money and Prices, 31–37. Below is a list of examples for sums of loans mentioned in Tannaitic literature: M BM 5:2 (1,000 zuz/12 manehs); T BM 1:20 (1,000/800 denars); T BM 3:5, 4:3, 4:17, 6:10, 15; M Shavuot, all of chapter 5 (maneh); T BM 5:11, 13, 6:7, T BB 9:9, 10:4 (200 denars); T Makkot 1:2; T Shavuot 2:5, 12, 13, 14, 6:5 (200 zuz); and Mekhilta de Rabbi Yishmael, Mishpatim, Kaspa 19, 20 (200 manehs). The highest loan mentioned was taken from the king. The Sifre to Deuteronomy, piska 26 (Hammer, 47), mentioned a loan from the king, who commits himself to pay 1,000 kors of wheat per year, which people think is impossible to pay. Similarily, Mekhilta de Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai (20:5) cites a parable of someone who borrowed 100 manehs (10,000 denars) from the king. When the rabbis wish to mention a tremendously large sum, the amount of money is still small compared to Roman sources. Sifre to Deuteronomy, piska 305, mentions that the ketubbah of the daughter of Naqdimon son of Gurion was 1,000 times 1,000 golden denars, and in the parallel Tosefta (Ketubbot 5:9; Lieberman, 74), 500 golden denars per day for fragrance. M Arakhin 4:3 states that someone owned 10,000 ships in the sea. These are extraordinary cases, while the usual sums are one to two manehs up to 1,000 denars. 2 When comparing the sums in rabbinic loan cases to documents of loan contracts from Puteoli, the Puteoli sums are higher though they belong primarily to middle-class loans. See, for example, Camodeca, Tabulae Pompeianae Sulpiciorum, 1, TPSulp 31, 50–79; Verboven, “The Sulpicii”; and Jones, The Bankers, 77–78. On credit used between partners, poleis, and

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Conclusion

195

and non-Jews that developed in this period as the Jewish population dwindled after the Temple was destroyed in 70 CE and more so after the failed Bar Kokhba Revolt. Jews became a minority in their own country, and economic interaction with their neighbors was a necessity. The rabbis tried to limit credit transactions with non-Jews, but the market was unstoppable. To conclude, this book opens the topic of individual and commercial credit to the world of research. It enables a multidisciplinary view of the world of the sages and the societies in which they operated. It exposes the practices of credit that fueled the economy and serves as another story in the structure of our understanding of Jewish existence in the shadow of foreign empires such as Sasanid Persia and Rome. companies in the Roman world, see Hoyer, Money, 30–79, 158–161, index, s.v. “elites,” “collegia,” “loans.”

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography Aberbach, M. Labor, Crafts and Commerce in Ancient Israel. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1994. Adams, J. N. Bilingualism and the Latin Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Albeck, Ch. Shisha Sidrei Mishnah, 6 vols. Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1957–1959. [Hebrew]. Albeck, Ch. Introduction to the Talmud, Babli and Jerushalmi, Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1969 [Hebrew]. Alexander, P. “Using Rabbinic Literature as a Source for the History of Late-Roman Palestine: Problems and Issues,” in M. Goodman and P. Alexander (eds.), Rabbinic Texts and the History of Late-Roman Palestine. Oxford: British Academy, 2010, 7–24. Alon, G. Studies in Jewish History, Vol. 2. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1958. [Hebrew]. Alon, G. Jews, Judaism, and the Classical World: Studies in Jewish History in the Times of the Second Temple and Talmud. Translated by I. Abrahams. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1977. Alon, G. The Jews in Their Land in the Talmudic Age, 70–640 CE. Edited and Translated by Gershon Levi. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989. Alonso, J. L. “Πίστις in Loan Transactions: A New Interpretation of P. Dion. 11–12.” JJP 42 (2012): 9–30. Alonso, J. L. “One En Pistei, Guarantee Sales, and Title-Transfer Security in the Papyrii.” In D. F. Leão and G. Thür (eds.), Symposion 2015: Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Coimbra, 1–4 September 2015). Akten der Gesellschaft für Griechische und Hellenistische Rechtsgeschichte, 121–192. Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2016. Andreades, A. M. A History of Greek Public Finance, Vol. 1. New York: Arno Press, 1979. Andreau, J. “The Freedman.” In A. Giardina (ed.) and L. G. Cochrane (trans.), The Romans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, 175–198. Andreau, J. Banking and Business in the Roman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Andreau, J. “Commerce and Finance.” CAH 11 (2000): 769–786. Andreau, J. “Markets, Fairs and Monetary Loans: Cultural History and Economic History in Roman Italy and Hellenistic Greece.” In P. Cartledge, E. E. Cohen, and L. Foxhall (eds.), Money, Labour and Land: Approaches to the Economics of Ancient Greece. London: Routledge, 2002, 113–129. Andreau, J. “Interest,” NP 6 (2005): 851–854.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

198

Bibliography

Andreau, J. “Money Lending and Elite Financial Life in Rome,” in G. Dari-Mattiacci and D. P. Kehoe (eds.), Roman Law and Economics: Volume II: Exchange, Ownership, and Disputes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, 81–111. Arav, R. Hellenistic Palestine: Settlement Pattern and City Planning 331–37 BC. Oxford: BAR, 1989. Arbel, Y. “The Gamla Coin—A New Perspective on the Circumstances and Date of Its Minting.” In S. Malena and D. Miano (eds.), Milk and Honey: Essays on Ancient Israel and the Bible in Appreciation of the Judaic Studies Program at the University of California. San Diego: Eisenbrauns, 2007, 257–275. Arruñada, B. “How Rome Enabled Impersonal Markets,” Explorations in Economic History 61 (2016): 68–84. Ashburner, W. The Rhodian Sea-Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909. Repr. 2001. Aubert, J. J. Business Managers in Ancient Rome: A Social and Economic Study of Institutors, 200 BC–AD 250. Leiden: Brill, 1994. Aubert, J. J. “Conclusion: A Historian’s Point of View.” In Aubert and Sirks (eds.), SPECVLVM IVRIS, 2005, 182–191. Aubert, J. J. “For Swap or Sale? The Roman Law of Barter.” In C. Apicella, M.-L. Haack, and F. Lerouxel (eds.), Annales. Histoire, Les affaires de Monsieur Flandreau: économie et société du monde romain. Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2014, 109–121. Aubert, J. J. and B. Sirks (eds.). SPECVLVM IVRIS: Roman Law as a Reflection of Social and Economic Life in Antiquity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005. Avery-Peck, A. J. “Scripture and Mishnah: The Case of the Mishnaic Division of Agriculture,” JJS 38 (1) (1987): 56–71. Avery-Peck, A. J. “The Division of Agriculture and Second Century Judaism: The Holiness of the Devastated Land.” In A. J. Avery-Peck and J. Neusner (eds.), The Mishnah in Contemporary Perspective. Leiden: Brill, 2002, 41–90. Avi-Yonah, M. The Jews of Palestine: A Political History from the Bar Kokhba War to the Arab Conquest. Oxford: Blackwell, 1976. Avi-Yonah, M. The Jews under Roman and Byzantine Rule: A Political History of Palestine from the Bar Kokhba War to the Arab Conquest. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1984. Aviam, M. “The Transformation from Galil Ha-Goyim to Jewish Galilee: The Archaeological Testimony of an Ethnic Change,” in D. A. Fiensy and J. R. Strange (eds.), Galilee in the Late Second Temple and Mishnaic Periods, Vol. 2: The Archaeological Record from Cities, Towns, and Villages. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015, 9–21. Ayali, M. “Labor as a Value in the Talmudic and Midrashic Literature,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 1 (2) (1982): 7–59. [Hebrew]. Ayali, M. A Nomencalture of Workers and Artisans in the Talmudic and Midrashic Literature. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2001. [Hebrew]. Badiyi, B. “Cities and Mint Centers Founded by the Sasanians.” In M. Faghfoury (ed.), Ancient Iranian Numismatics. Leiden: Brill, 2021, 203–232.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

199

Bagnall, R. S. “Price in ‘Sales of Delivery,’” GRBS 18 (1) (1977): 85–96. Bagnall, R. S. Egypt in Late Antiquity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985. Bagnall, R. S. Hellenistic and Roman Egypt: Sources and Approaches. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006. Bagnall, R. S. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Papyrology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Bagnall, R. S. and B. W. Frier. The Demography of Roman Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Bagnall, R. S. and D. D. Obbink (eds.). Columbia Papyri X. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996. Bagnall, R. S. and N. Lewis (eds.). Columbia Papyri VII: Fourth Century Documents from Karanis. Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1980. Bagnall, R. S., T. T. Renner, and K. A. Worp (eds.). Columbia Papyri VIII. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990. Bagnall, R. S. et al. (eds.). The Encyclopedia of Ancient History. Chichester, UK: WileyBlackwell, 2013. Baker, D. L. Tight Fists or Open Hands: Wealth and Poverty in Old Testament Law. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009. Bang, P. F. “Trade and Empire: In Search of Organizing Concepts for the Roman Economy,” Past and Present 195 (2007): 3–54. Bang, P. F. The Roman Bazaar: A Comparative Study of Trade and Markets in a Tributary Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Bar, D. “The Third Century Crisis in the Roman Empire and Its Relevance to Palestine during the Late Roman Period,” Zion 66 (2) (2001): 143–170. [Hebrew]. Bar, D. “Rabbinic Sources for the Study of Settlement Reality in Late Roman Palestine,” RRJ 9 (1–2) (2006): 92–113. Baras, Z., S. Safrai, Y. Tsafrir, and M. Stern (eds.). Eretz Israel from the Destruction of the Second Temple to the Muslim Conquest, Vol. 1. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1982. [Hebrew]. Barclay, J. M. G. Flavius Josephus: Against Apion. Leiden: Brill, 2006. Barclay, J. M. G. and J. Sweet. Early Christian Thought in Its Jewish Context. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Barnes, T. D. “Constantine and the Christians of Persia,” JRS 75 (1985): 126–136. Baron, J. and Millhauser J. “A Place for Archaeology in the Study of Money, Finance, and Debt.” Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 62 (2021), 101,278. Baron, S. W. A Social and Religious History of The Jews, 2 vols. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. Baruch, E. “Adapted Roman Rituals in Second Century CE Jewish Houses.” In J. Schwartz and P. Tomson (eds.), Jews and Christians in the First and Second Centuries: The Interbellum 70–132 CE. Leiden: Brill, 2018, 50–74.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

200

Bibliography

Bauschatz, J. Law and Enforcement in Ptolemaic Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Beer, M. The Babylonian Exilarchate in the Arsacid and Sassanian Periods, 2nd ed. Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1976. [Hebrew]. Beer, M. The Babylonian Amoraim: Aspects of Economic Life, 2nd ed. Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1982. [Hebrew]. Ben Zeev, M. “New Insights into Roman Policy in Judea on the Eve of the Bar Kokhba Revolt,” JSJ 49 (1) (2018): 84–107. Benoit, P. “Textes Grecs et Latins.” In P. Benoit, J. T. Milik, and R. de Vaux (eds.), Discoveries in the Judaean Desert: Les Grottes de Murabba‌ʾat. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961, 209–280. Berger, A. Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1953. Bingen, J. Hellenistic Egypt: Monarchy, Society, Economy, Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007. Bird, M. F. An Anomalous Jew: Paul among Jews, Greeks, and Romans. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2016. Birks, P. The Roman Law of Obligations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Bland, R. “What Happened to Gold Coinage in the 3rd c. AD?” JRA 26 (2013): 263–280. Blouin, K. “An Arsinoite Loan of Money with Interest in Kind,” BASP 47 (2010): 93–109. Bobbink, R. and Q. Mauer. “Antichresis: A Comparative Study of Classical Roman Law and the Contractual Praxis from Roman Egypt,” Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 87 (4) (2019): 356–383. Bogaert, R. Banques et banquiers dans les cités grecques. Leiden: Sijthoff, 1968. Bogaert, R. Epigraphical Texts on Bankers, Banking and Credit in the Greek World, Vol. 3. Leiden: Brill, 1976. Bogaert, R. “Les operations des banques de l’Égypte ptolémaïque,” Anc. Soc. 29 (1998– 1999), 49–145. Bogaert, R. “Les operations des banques de l’Égypte romaine,” Anc. Soc. 30 (2000), 135–269. Bogaert, R. “Les documents bancaires de l’Égypte gréco-romaine et byzantine,” Anc. Soc. 31 (2001): 173–288. Bordo, M. D. and J. G. Haubrich. “Credit Crises, Money and Contractions: An Historical View,” JME 57 (2010): 1–17. Borjian, H. “A Persian View of Steppe Iranians,” Anabasis 5 (2014): 155–173. Bowman, A. K. and A. I. Wilson. “Quantifying the Roman Economy: Integration, Growth, Decline?” In A. K. Bowman and A. I. Wilson (eds.), Quantifying the Roman Economy: Methods and Problems. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 3–84. Bowman, A. K., R. S. O. Tomlin, and K. A. Worp, “Emptio Bovis Frisica: The ‘Frisian Ox Sale’ Reconsidered,” JRS 99 (2009): 156–170.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

201

Bozik, M. S., H. Tunali, and M. Ustaoğlu. “Debt and Politics in Ancient Rome.” In M. Ustaoğlu and A. Incekara (eds.), A History of Interest and Debt: Ancient Civilizations. London: Routledge, 2020, 59–69. Bransbourg, G. “Rome and the Economic Integration of Empire.” Institution for the Study of the Ancient World (ISAW) Paper No. 3, 2012. http://doi.org/2333.1/280gb73f. Broekaert, W. and A. Zuiderhoek. “Society, the Market, or Actually Both? Networks and the Allocation of Credit and Capital Goods in the Roman Economy,” Cahiers du Centre Gustave Glotz 26 (2015): 141–190. Broshi, M. “Commerce in Antiquity: Some Methodological Remarks.” In B. Z. Kedar, T. Dothan, and S. Safrai (eds.), Commerce in Palestine throughout the Ages: Studies. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1990, 195–201. [Hebrew]. Broshi, M. “Agriculture and Economy in Roman Palestine: Seven Notes on the Babatha Archive,” IEJ 42 (3–4) (1992): 230–240. Broshi, M. and E. Kimron, “A Hebrew I.O.U. Note from the Second Year of the BarKokhba Revolt,” JJS 45 (1994): 286–294. Brosius, M. The Persians: An Introduction. London: Routledge, 2006. Brown, P. Poverty and Leadership in the Later Roman Empire. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2002. Brown, R. E. The Gospel According to John (I–XII). Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1996. Browne, G. M. (ed.). Documentary Papyri from the Michigan Collection. Toronto: A. M. Hakkert Ltd., 1970. Brughmans, T. “Evaluating the Potential of Computational Modelling for Informing Debates on Roman Economic Integration.” In K. Verboven (ed.), Complexity Economics: Building a New Approach to Ancient Economic History. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2021, 105–123. Brunner, C. “Geographical and Administrative Division: Settlements and Economy,” CHI 3 (2) (1983): 747–777. Bryen, A. Z. Violence in Roman Egypt: A Study in Legal Interpretation. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. Büchler, A. The Political and Social Leaders of the Jewish Community of Sepphoris in the Second and Third Centuries. Oxford: H. Hart at the University Press, 1909. Buckland, W. W. A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966. Buckley, S. L. Teachings on Usury in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000. Butcher, K. Roman Provincial Coins: An Introduction to “Greek Imperials.” London: Seaby, 1988. Butcher, K. Roman Syria and the Near East. London: British Museum, 2003. Cameron, A. The Later Roman Empire, AD 284–430. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

202

Bibliography

Cameron, A. The Mediterranean World in Late Antiquity, 395–600 AD. London: Routledge, 1993. Camodeca, G. Tabulae Pompeianae Sulpiciorum: Edizione critica dell’archivio puteolano dei Sulpicii, 2 vols. Rome: Quasar, 1999. Candy, P. “Parallel Developments in Roman Law and Maritime Trade during the Late Republic and Early Principate,” JRA 33 (2020): 53–72. Canepa, M. P. Two Eyes of Earth: Art and Ritual of Kingship between Rome and Sasanian Iran. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009. Canepa, M. P. “The Parthian and Sasanian Empires.” In P. F. Bang, C. A. Bayly, and W. Scheidel (eds.), The Oxford World History of Empire, Vol. 2: The History of Empires. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021, 290–324. Carson, R. A. G. Coins of the Roman Empire. London: Routledge, 1990. Casson, L. “New Light on Maritime Loans: P. Vindob G 19792 (= SB VI 9571),” in R. S. Bagnall and W. V. Harris (eds.), Studies in Roman Law in Memory of A. Arthur Schiller. Leiden: Brill, 1986, 11–17. Casson, L. “New Light on Maritime Loans: P. Vindob G 40822,” ZPE 84 (1990): 195–206. Casson, L. The Ancient Mariners, 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991. Cereti, C. “Primary Sources for the History of Inner and Outer Iran in the Sasanian Period (Third–Seventh Centuries),” AEMA 9 (1997): 17–70. Chancey, M. A. The Myth of a Gentile Galilee. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Charlesworth, J. H. “The Historical Jesus and Christians Origins: Reflections on Methodologies for Future Jesus Research,” Henoch 27 (1–2) (2005): 35–51. Charlesworth, J. H. (ed.). Jesus and Archaeology. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006. Charlesworth, J. H. “Background I: Jesus of History and the Topography of the Holy Land.” In T. Holmén and S. Porter (eds.), Handbook for the Study of the Historical Jesus, Vol. 3. Leiden: Brill, 2011, 2213–2242. Choksy, J. K. “Loan and Sales Contracts in Ancient and Early Medieval Iran,” IndoIranian Journal 31 (1988): 191–218. Christiansen, E. Coinage in Roman Egypt: The Hoard Evidence. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2004. Coffee, N. Gift and Gain: How Money Transformed Ancient Rome. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Cohen, A. “The Development of the Prohibition against Usury in Jewish Law during the Mishnaic and Talmudic Periods.” MA thesis, Concordia University, 1974. Cohen, B. “Antichresis in Jewish and Roman Law.” In Boaz Cohen (ed.), Jewish and Roman Law: A Comparative Study, Vol. 2. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1966, 433–456. Cohen, B. S. The Legal Methodology of Late Nehardean Sages in Sasanian Babylonia. Leiden: Brill, 2011. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

203

Cohen, B. S. “Was There Really a Rava II? (A Re-Examination of the Talmudic Evidence),” JQR 103 (3) (2013): 273–297. Cohen, E. E. Athenian Economy and Society: A Banking Perspective. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. Cohen, S. J. D. The Beginning of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Cohen, S. J. D. From the Maccabees to the Mishnah, 2nd ed. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006. Cokle, W. E. A. “Repayment of Loan.” In P. Turner (ed.), Papyri Greek and Egyptian. London: Egypt Exploration Society, 1981, 83–88. Collins, J. J. Jewish Cult and Hellenistic Culture: Essays on the Jewish Encounter with Hellenism and Roman Rule. Leiden: Brill, 2005. Corbier, M. “Coinage, Society and Economy,” CAH 12 (2005): 393–439. Corcoran, S. “Observations on the Sasanian Law-Book in the Light of Roman Legal Writing.” In A. Rio (ed.), Law, Custom, and Justice in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages: Proceedings of the 2008 Byzantine Colloquium. London: King’s College Centre for Hellenic Studies, 2011, 77–113. Cornell, T. J. The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 BC). London: Routledge, 1995. Cotton, H. M. “The Guardianship of Jesus son of Babatha: Roman and Local Law in the Province of Arabia,” JRS 83 (1993): 94–108. Cotton, H. M. “The Impact of the Roman Army in the Province of Judaea/Syria Palaestina.” In L. de Blois and E. Lo Cascio (eds.), The Impact of the Roman Army (200 BC–AD 476): Economic, Social, Political, Religious, and Cultural Aspects. Leiden: Brill, 2007, 393–407. Cotton, H. M, W. E. H. Cockle, and F. G. B. Millar, “The Papyrology of the Roman Near East: A Survey,” JRS 85 (1995): 214–235. Coughlan, A. C. T. “Antichresis and Dioikesis: Negotiating Public and Private Debt in the Egyptian Delta,” ZPE 205 (2018): 217–227. Crawford, M. H. “Money and Exchange in the Roman World,” JRS 60 (1970), 40–48. Cromhout, M. Jesus and Identity: Reconstructing Judean Ethnicity in Q. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2007. Crossan, J. D. The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991. Crossan, J. D. and J. L. Reed. Excavating Jesus: Beneath the Stones, Behind the Texts. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2001. D’Arms, J. Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981. D’ors, A. “Creditum,” PW, RE, Suppl. 10 (1965): 1151–1168. Dan, Y. The City in Eretz-Israel during the Late Roman and the Byzantine Periods. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1984. [Hebrew]. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

204

Bibliography

Dan, Y. “Economic Life in Eretz Israel in the Byzantine Period in the Sixth and Seventh Centuries.” In B. Z. Kedar, T. Dothan, and S. Safrai (eds.), Commerce in Palestine throughout the Ages: Studies. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1990, 181–194. [Hebrew]. Danker, F. W. The Concise Greek–English Lexicon of the New Testament, 3rd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. Dar, S. Landscape and Pattern: An Archeological Survey of Samaria 800 BCE–636 CE. Oxford: BAR, 1986. Daryaee, T. Sasanian Empire: The Rise and Fall of an Empire. London: I. B. Tauris, 2010. Daryaee, T. “Middle Persian (Pahlavi).” In S. McGill and E. Watts (eds.), A Companion to Late Antique Literature. New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018, 103–121. Daryaee, T. and K. Rezakhani. From Oxus to Euphrates. Leiden: Brill, 2016. Daryaee, T. and K. Rezakhani. “The Sasanian Empire.” In T. Daryaea (ed.), King of the Seven Climes: A History of the Ancient Iranian World (3000 BCE–651 CE). Irvine: University of California Press, 2017, 155–198. Davies, J. K. “Temples, Credit, and the Circulation Money.” In A. Meadows and K. Shipton (eds.), Money and Its Uses in the Ancient Greek World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 117–128. De Blois, L. Image and Reality of Roman Imperial Power in the Third Century AD: The Impact of War. London: Routledge, 2018. De Ligt, L. “Demand, Supply, Distribution: The Roman Peasantry between Town and Countryside: Rural Monetization and Peasant Demand,” MBAH 9 (2) (1990): 24–56. De Ligt, L. “Demand, Supply, Distribution: The Roman Peasantry between Town and Countryside: Supply, Distribution and Comparative Perspective,” MBAH 10 (1) (1991): 33–77. De Ligt, L. Fairs and Markets in the Roman Empire. Amsterdam: Gieben, 1993. De Ligt, L. Peasants, Citizens, and Soldiers: Studies in the Demographic History of Roman Italy 225 BC–AD 100. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. De Romanis, F. “Structural Aspects of a Commercial Entreprise to Muziris: On SB XVIII 13167 Again,” Topoi (Supplément 15) 32 (2017): 83–100. De Romanis, F. The Indo-Roman Pepper Trade and the Muziris Papyrus. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. De Ste Croix, G. E. M. The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquest. London: Duckworth, 1981. De Vaan, M. Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the Other Italic Languages. Leiden: Brill, 2008. De Vries, B. Studies in the Development of the Talmudic Halakah: Selected Papers. Tel Aviv: Abraham Zioni Publishing, 1966. [Hebrew]. Derret, F. D. M. Law in the New Testament. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2005. Dezhamkhooy, M. and L. Papoli Yazdi. “Heaven for Me, Hell for the Others: An Agenda on Sex and Body from Sassanid Persia.” In U. Matic and B. Jensen (eds.), Archaeologies of Gender and Violence. Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2017, 179–197. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

205

Di Cosmo, N. and M. Maas (eds.), Empires and Exchanges in Eurasian Late Antiquity: Rome, China, Iran, and the Steppe, ca. 250–750. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Dignas, B. and E. Winter. Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity: Neighbours and Rivals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Dixon, S. “The Meaning of Gift and Debt in the Roman Elite,” EMC, n.s., 37 (1993): 451–464. Drexhage, H. J. Preise, Mieten/Pachten, Kosten und Löhne im römischen Ägypten bis zum regierungsantritt Diocletians. St. Katarinen: Scripta Mercaturae, 1991. Drijvers, J. W. “Rome and the Sasanid Empire: Confrontation and Coexistence.” In P. Rousseau (ed.), A Companion to Late Antiquity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009, 441–454. Duling, D. C. “The Jesus Movement and Social Network Analysis (Part I: The Spatial Network),” BTB 29 (4) (2000): 156–175. Duncan-Jones, R. The Economy of the Roman Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Duncan-Jones, R. Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Dyson, S. L. Community and Society in Roman Italy, Baltimore MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. Eberle, L. P. and E. Le Quéré. “Landed Traders, Trading Agriculturalists? Land in the Economy of the Italian Diaspora in the Greek East,” JRS 107 (2017): 27–59. Edmondson, J. “Economic Life in the Roman Empire.” In C. Bruun, J. Edmondson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Roman Epigraphy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 671–695. Edwards, D. R. and C. T. McCollough (eds.). Archaeology and the Galilee: Texts and Contexts in the Graeco-Roman and Byzantine Periods. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997. Edwell, P. Rome and Persia at War: Imperial Competition and Contact, 193–363 CE. London: Routledge, 2021. Ehrman, B. D. The New Testament: A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Eilars, W. “Iran and Mesopotamia,” CHI 3 (1) (1983): 481–504. Eliash, B. Z. “Ideological Roots of the Halakhah: A Chapter in the Laws of Interest,” Shenaton Ha-Mishpat Ha-Ivri 5 (1978): 7–78. [Hebrew]. Eliash, B. Z. “Non-Monetary Loans: Tradition and Innovation in the Geonic Period,” Dine Israel 18 (1995–1966): 205–253; Dine Israel 19 (1997–1998): 41–86. [Hebrew]. Elliott, C. P. Economic Theory and the Roman Monetary Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Elliott, C. P. “The Role of Money in the Economies of Ancient Greece and Rome.” In S. Battilossi, S. Cassis, and K. Yago (eds.), Handbook of the History of Money and Currency. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2020, 67–86. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

206

Bibliography

Elliott, C. P. “The Ecology of Exchange: The Monetization of Roman Egypt,” The American Historical Review 126 (3) (2021): 900–921. Elman, Y. “How Should a Talmudic Intellectual History Be Written? A Response to David Kraemer’s Responses,” JQR 89 (3–4) (1999): 361–386. Elman, Y. “Marriage and Marital Property in Rabbinic and Sasanian Law.” In C. Hezser (ed.), Rabbinic Law and Its Roman Context. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003, 227–276. Elman, Y. “Acculturation to Elite Persian Norms and Modes of Thought in the Babylonian Jewish Community of Late Antiquity.” In Y. Elman, E. B. Halivni, and Z. A. Steinfeld (eds.), Netiʾot Ledavid: Jubilee Volume for David Weiss Halivni. Jerusalem: Orhot, 2004, 31–56. [Hebrew]. Elman, Y. “‘Up to the Ears’ in Horse’s Necks (BM 108a): On Sasanian Agricultural Policy and Private Eminent Domain,” Jewish Studies: An Internet Journal 3 (2004): 95–149. Elman, Y. “The Other in the Mirror: Iranians and Jews View One Another: Questions of Identity, Conversion, and Exogamy in the Fifth-Century Iranian Empire (Part One),” BAI 19 (1) (2005): 15–25. Elman, Y. “Scripture versus Contemporary Needs: A Sasanian/Zoroastrian Example,” Cardozo Law Review 28 (1) (2006): 153–169. Elman, Y. “The Babylonian Yeshivot in the Amoraic and Post-Amoraic Era.” In I. Etkes (ed.), Yeshivot and Battei Midrash. Jerusalem: Shazar Center, 2006, 31–55. [Hebrew]. Elman, Y. “A Tale of Two Cities: Mahoza and Pumbedita.” In D. Golinkin, M. Benovitz, M. A. Friedman, M. Schmelzer, and D. Sperber (eds.), Torah Lishma: Essays in Jewish Studies in Honor of Professor Shamma Friedman. Jerusalem: Bar Ilan University Press, 2007, 3–38. [Hebrew]. Elman, Y. “Middle Persian Culture and Babylonian Sages: Accommodation and Resistance in the Shaping of Rabbinic Legal Tradition,” in C. E. Fonrobert and M. S. Jaffee (eds.), The Talmud and Rabbinic Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 165–197. Elman, Y. “Hercules within the Halakhic Tradition,” Dine Israel 25 (2008): 7–41. Elman, Y. “Returnable Gifts in Rabbinic and Sasanian Law,” Irano-Judaica 6 (2008): 139–184. Elman, Y. “Babylonian Jews at the Intersection of the Iranian Economy and Sasanian Law.” In A. Levine, The Oxford Handbook of Judaism and Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 545–563. Elman, Y. “The Other in the Mirror: Iranians and Jews View One Another. Questions of Identity, Conversion, and Exogamy in the Fifth-Century Iranian Empire (Part Two),” BAI 20 (1) (2010): 25–46. Elman, Y. “Law in the Crisis of Empire: A Sasanian Example,” Journal of Persianate Studies 6 (1–2) (2013): 101–114. Elman, Y. “Commercial Law in Rome and Ctesiphon: Roman Jurisconsults, Rabbis and Sasanian Dastwars on Risk.” In R. Kolsky and T. Ilan (eds.), Rabbinic Traditions between Palestine and Babylonia. Leiden: Brill, 2014, 250–283. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

207

Elman, Y. “Contrasting Intellectual Trajectories: Iran and Israel in Mesopotamia.” In U. Gabbay and S. Secunda (eds.), Encounters by the Rivers of Babylon: Scholarly Conversations between Jews, Iranian and Babylonians in Antiquity. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014, 7–105. Elman, Y. “Samuel’s Scythe-Handle: Sasanian Mortgage Law in the Bavli,” IranoJudaica 7 (2019): 129–143. Elon, M. Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles. 4 vols. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1994. Epstein, J. N. Mavo le-Nusah ha-Mishnah. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1948. Repr. 1964. Epstein, J. N. Introduction to Tanaitic Literature: Mishna, Tosefta and Halakhic Midrashim. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1957. [Hebrew]. Epstein, J. N. Introduction to Amoraitic Literature, Babylonian Talmud and Yerushalmi. Edited by E. Z. Melamed. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1962. [Hebrew]. Erdkamp, P. The Grain Market in the Roman Empire: A Social, Political and Economic Study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Erdkamp, P. “Economic Growth in the Roman Mediterranean World: An Early GoodBye to Malthus?” Exploration in Economic History 60 (2016): 1–20. Eshel, E., H. Eshel, and G. Geiger. “Mur 174: A Hebrew IOU Document from Wadi Murabba‌ʾat,” Liber Annuus 58 (2008): 313–326. Eshel, H. “On the Use of the Hebrew Language in Economic Documents from the Judean Desert,” in R. S. Notley (ed.), Jesus’s Last Week. Leiden: Brill, 2006, 245–258. Eshel, H. “The Bar Kochba Revolt, 132–135,” CHJ 4 (2006): 105–127. Eshel, H. and B. Zissu. The Bar Kokhba Revolt: The Archaeological Evidence. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 2015. [Hebrew]. Eshel, H. and E. Eshel. “Fragments of Two Aramaic Documents Which Were Brought to Abʾior Cave during the Bar-Kokhba Revolt,” Eretz-Israel 23 (1992): 276–285. [Hebrew]. Fabian, L. “The Arsakid Empire.” In S. Von Reden (ed.), Handbook of Ancient Eurasian Economies, Vol. 1: Contexts. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2020, 205–240. Farrokh, K. “An Overview of the Artistic, Architectural, Engineering and Culinary Exchanges between Ancient Iran and the Greco-Roman World,” AGON: Rivista Internazionale di Studi Culturali, Linguistici e Letterari 7 (2015): 64–124. Feldman, L. H. Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World: Attitudes and Interactions from Alexander to Justinian. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. Feldman, L. H. Flavius Josephus: Translation and Commentary: Vol. 3: Judean Antiquities 1–4. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2000. Feliks, Y. Talmud Yerushalmi: Tractate Sheviit, Critically Edited, Part Two. Jerusalem: Rubin Mass Publishers, 1986. [Hebrew]. Feliks, Y. Agriculture in Palestine in the Period of the Bible, Mishna and Talmud, 2nd ed. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1990. [Hebrew].

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

208

Bibliography

Fiensy, D. A. The Social History of Palestine in the Herodian Period: The Land Is Mine. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991. Fiey, J. M. Jalons pour une histoire de l’Église en Iraq. Louvain: Peeters, 1970. Finckh, H. E. Das Zinsrecht der gräko-Ägyptischen Papyri. Nürnberg: W. Staudacher, 1962. Fine, S. Art and Judaism in the Greco-Roman World: Toward a New Jewish Archaeology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Fine, S. “Archaeology and the Interpretation of Rabbinic Literature: Some Thoughts,” in M. Kraus (ed.), How Should Rabbinic Literature Be Read in the Modern World? Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2006, 199–217. Finley, M. I. “The Ancient City from Fustel de Coulanges to Max Weber and Beyond,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 19 (3) (1977): 305–327. Finley, M. I. The Ancient Economy, 2nd ed. London: Chatto and Windus, 1985. Repr. with addendum and update, and a foreword by Ian Morris. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Fiori, R. “Contracts, Commerce and Roman Society,” in P. J. Du Plessis, C. Ando, and K. Tuori (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Roman Law and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 581–595. Fischer Genz, B. “Roman Rule in the Near East.” In D. T. Potts (ed.), A Companion to the Archaeology of the Ancient Near East. Oxford: Blackwell, 2012, 1021–1040. Flohr, M. and A. I. Wilson. “Introduction.” In A. I. Wilson and M. Flohr (eds.), Urban Craftsmen and Traders in the Roman World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 1–22. Flohr, M. and A. I. Wilson. “Roman Craftsmen and Traders: Towards an Intellectual History.” In A. I. Wilson and M. Flohr (eds.), Urban Craftsmen and Traders in the Roman World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 23–54. Flückiger, M. et al. “Roman Transport Network Connectivity and Economic Integration.” Review of Economic Studies 89 (2) (2022): 774–810. Foster, P. “Educating Jesus: The Search for a Plausible Context,” JSHJ 4 (1) (2006): 7–33. Frank, T. An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, Vol. 2. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1940. Repr. Paterson, NJ: Pageant Books, 1959. Frey, J. B. Corpus Inscriptionum Iudaicarum, Vol. 2: Asie-Afrique. Rome: Pontificio istituto di archeologia Cristiana, 1952. Freyne, S. Jesus, a Jewish Galilean: A New Reading of the Jesus Story. London: T&T Clark International, 2004. Friedman, M. A. Jewish Marriage in Palestine: A Cairo Genizah Study. 2 vols. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1980–1981. Friedman, M. A. “Mi-Teshuvot ha-Geonim min ha-Genizah be-Hilchot Ribbit.” In D. Boyarin, S. Friedman, M. Hirshman, M. Schmelzer, and I. M. Tashma (eds.),

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

209

Atara L’Haim: Studies in the Talmud and Medieval Rabbinic Literature in Honor of Professor Haim Zalman Dimitrovsky. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000, 460–472. Friedman, S. “A Critical Study of Yevamot X with a Methodological Introduction.” In H. Z. Dimitrovsky (ed.), Texts and Studies: Analecta Judaica I. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary Press, 1977, 275–441. Friedman, S. Talmud Arukh BT Bava Metzia VI, Vol. 1. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary Press, 1990. [Hebrew]. Friedman, S. Y. “The Primacy of Tosefta to Mishnah in Synoptic Parallels.” In H. Fox and T. Meacham (eds.), Introducing Tosefta: Textual, Intertextual and Intertextual Studies. Hoboken, NJ: Ktav, 1999, 99–121. Friedman, S. “The Transformation of Olam.” In A. Maman, S. E. Fassberg, and Y. Breuer (eds.), Sha‌ʾarei Lashona: Studies in Hebrew, Aramaic and Jewish Languages Presented to Moshe Bar-Asher, Vol. 2: Rabbinic Hebrew and Aramaic. Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 2007, 272–285. Frier, B. W. “The Rental Market in Early Imperial Rome,” JRS 67 (1977): 27–37. Frier, B. W. “Interest and Usury.” In D. N. Freedman (ed.), The Anchor Bible Dictionary, Vol. 3. New York: Doubleday, 1992, 423–424. Frier, B. W. and D. P. Kehoe. “Law and Economic Institutions,” in W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. Saller (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 113–143. Frost, H. “Usury.” In E. Fahlbush, et al. (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Christianity, Vol. 5. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008, 651. Frye, R. N. “The Political History of Iran under the Sasanians,” CHI 3 (1) (1983): 116–180. Frye, R. N. The History of Ancient Iran. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1984. Frye, R. N. “Commerce III: In the Parthian and Sasanian Periods.” In E. Yarshater (ed.), Encyclopedia Iranica VI.1. London: Routledge, 1993. Frye, R. N. “Parthian and Sasanian History of Iran.” In J. Curtis (ed.), Mesopotamia and Iran in the Parthian and Sasanian Periods: Rejection and Revival c. 238 CE–AD 642. London: British Museum, 2000, 17–23. Gabba, E. “The Social, Economic and Political History of Palestine 63 BCE–CE 70,” CHJ 3 (1993): 94–167. Gabrielsen, V. Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. Gafni, I. M. “The Historical Background.” In S. Safrai (ed.), The Literature of the Sages, Part One. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1987, 1–34. Gafni, I. M. The Jews of Babylonia in the Talmudic Era: A Social and Cultural History. Jerusalem: Shazar Center, 1990. [Hebrew]. Gafni, I. M. Land, Center, Diaspora. Shefield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

210

Bibliography

Gafni, I. M. “Babylonian Rabbinic Culture.” In D. Biale (ed.), Culture of the Jews: A New History. New York: Schocken, 2002, 223–265. Gafni, I. M. “The Political, Social and Economic History of Babylonian Jewry, 224– 638 CE,” CHJ 4 (2006): 792–820. Gamauf, R. “Slaves Doing Business: The Role of Roman Law in the Economy of a Roman Household,” European Review of History 16 (3) (2009): 331–346. Gamoran, H. “Talmudic Usury Laws and Business Loans,” JSJ 7 (2) (1976): 129–142. Gamoran, H. “The Prozbul: Accommodation to Reality,” Jewish Law Association Studies 22 (2012): 103–111. Garnsey, P. Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Garnsey, P. and R. Saller. The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture. London: Duckworth, 1987. Gelpi, R. M. and F. Julien-Labruyère. The History of Consumer Credit: Doctrines and Practices. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000. Geraghty, R. M. “The Impact of Globalization in the Roman Empire, 200 BC–AD 100,” JEH 67 (2007): 1036–1061. Gevaryahu, A. “Coining Terms: Tarsha and Qeluto Shel Yam,” Leshonenu 79 (2017): 247–267. [Hebrew]. Giardina, A. (ed.). The Romans, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. Gibbs, M. “Interest Rate.” In R. S. Bagnall et al. (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Ancient History Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 6:3471–3473. Gignoux, P. “Dinar.” In Encyclopedia Iranica Online, retrieved from http://www.irani caonline.org/. Gilat, Y. D. Studies in the Development of the Halakha. Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1992. Glare, P. G. W. Oxford Latin Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968–1982. Göbl, R. “Sasanian Coins,” CHI 3 (1) (1971): 322–339. Göbl, R. Sasanian Numismatics. Translated by P. Severin. Braunschweig: Klinkhardt & Biermann, 1971. Goitein, S. D. A Mediterranean Society, Vol. 1. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Goldberg, A. “The Mishna: A Study Book of Halakha.” In S. Safrai (ed.), The Literature of the Sages, Part One. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1987, 1:211–262. Goldberg, A. “The Tosefta: Companion to the Mishna.” In S. Safrai (ed.), The Literature of the Sages, Part One. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1987, 1:283–302. Gonzales, J. “The Lex Irnitana: A New Copy of the Flavian Municipal Law,” JRS 76 (1986): 147–223. Goodblatt, D. Rabbinic Instruction in Sasanian Babylonia. Leiden: Brill, 1975.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

211

Goodblatt, D. “The Babylonian Talmud,” ANRW II, 19 (2) (1979): 257–336. Goodblatt, D. “The Poll Tax in Sasanian Babylonia: The Talmudic Evidence,” JESHO 22 (1979): 233–295. Goodblatt, D. “Towards the Rehabilitation of Talmudic History.” In B. M. Boxer (ed.), History of Judaism: The Next Ten Years. Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981, 31–44. Goodblatt, D. The Monarchic Principle: Studies in Jewish Self-Government in Antiquity. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1994. Goodblatt, D. “The History of the Babylonian Academies,” CHJ 4 (2006): 821–839. Goodblatt, D. “Population Structure and Jewish Identity.” In C. Hezser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 102–121. Goodblatt, D. “The Jews in the Parthian Empire: What We Don’t Know.” In B. Isaac and Y. Shahar (eds.), Judaea-Palaestina, Babylon and Rome: Jews in Antiquity. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012, 263–278. Goodman, M. State and Society in Roman Galilee AD 132–212. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983. Goodman, M. “Judea,” CAH 10 (1996): 737–781. Goodman, M. Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash of Ancient Civilizations. London: Penguin, 2007. Goodman, M. and P. Alexander (eds.). Rabbinic Texts and the History of Late-Roman Palestine. Oxford: British Academy, 2010. Goodrich, J. K. “Voluntary Debt Remission and the Parable of the Unjust Steward (Luke 16: 1–13),” JBL 131 (3) (2012): 547–566. Gordon, B. D. Land and Temple: Field Sacralization and the Agrarian Priesthood of Second Temple Judaism. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2020. Graeber, D. Debt: The First Five Thousand Years. New York: Melville House, 2011. Green, W. S. “What’s in a Name? The Problematic of Rabbinic ‘Biography,’” in W. S. Green (ed.), Approaches to Ancient Judaism: Theory and Practice. Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978, 77–96. Greene, K. The Archaeology of the Roman Economy. London: Batsford, 1986. Greene, K. “Technological Innovation and Economic Progress in the Ancient World: M. I. Finley Re-Considered,” Economic History Review 53 (1) (2000): 29–50. Greene, K. “Learning to Consume: Consumption and Consumerism in the Roman Empire,” JRA 21 (2008): 64–82. Gregoratti, L. “Legendary and Real Wealth in the Arsacid Kingdom.” In F. Santangelo and E. Bissa (eds.), Studies on Wealth in the Ancient World. London: University of London, 2016, 83–92.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

212

Bibliography

Gregoratti, L. “The Arsacid Empire.” In T. Daryaee (ed.), King of the Seven Climes: A History of the Ancient Iranian World (3000 BCE–651 CE). Irvine: University of California Press, 2017, 125–153. Grenfell, B. P. and A. S. Hunt (eds.). The Amherst Papyri: Being an Account of the Greek Papyri in the Collection of Lord Amherst of Hackney, Vol. 2. London: Oxford University Press, 1901. Groot, M. Livestock for Sale: Animal Husbandry in a Roman Frontier Zone. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univerity Press, 2016. Gröschler, P. “The Concept of mutuum cum stipulatione,” Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 74 (3–4) (2006): 261–287. Grossman, A. The Early Sages of Ashkenaz. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1981. Repr. 2001. [Hebrew]. Guijarro, S. “Domestic Space, Family Relationships and the Social Location of the Q People,” JSNT 27 (1) (2004): 69–81. Gulak, A. “The Money-Changer in Talmudic Law,” Tarbiz 2 (1931): 154–171. [Hebrew]. Gulak, A. Yesodei ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri, Seder Dinei Mamonot be-Israel Al Pi Mekorot ha-Talmud, Vol. 2. Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1967. Gulak, A. Legal Documents in the Talmud in Light of Greek Papyri and Greek and Roman Law. Edited by R. Katzoff. Jerusalem: Rubin Mass Publishers, 1994. [Hebrew]. Gyselen, R. “Les données de géographie administrative dans le Sahrestânîhâ-T Ërân,” Studia Iranica 17 (1988): 191–206. Gyselen, R. La géographie administrative de l’Empire sassanide: Les temoignages sigiliographiques. Paris: Groupe pour l’étude de la civilisation du Moyen-Orient, 1989. Haensch, C. “The Roman Provincial Administration.” In C. Hezser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 71–84. Haklai, M. “Credit and Financial Capital in Roman Egypt.” In P. Erdkamp, K. Verboven, and A. Zuiderhoek (eds.), Capital, Investment, and Innovation in the Roman World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, 437–459. Halivni, D. W. “Contemporary Methods of the Study of Talmud,” JJS 30 (2) (1979): 192–201. Halivni, D. W. Introductions to Sources and Traditions: Studies in the Formation of the Talmud, 2nd ed. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2012. [Hebrew]. Hamel, G. Poverty and Charity in Roman Palestine: First Three Centuries CE. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. Hamel, G. “Poverty.” In C. Hezser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 308–324. Hamilton, N. Q. “Temple Cleansing and Temple Bank Author(s),” JBL 83 (4) (1964): 365–372.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

213

Hanson, A. E. “Three Papyri from the University of Michigan Collection,” ZPE 9 (1972): 227–236. Harl, K. W. Coinage in the Roman Economy, 300 BC to AD 700. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Harland, P. A. Greco-Roman Associations. North Coast of the Black Sea, Asia Minor: Texts, Translations and Commentary. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014. Harris, J. M. “Midrash Halacha,” CHJ 4 (2006): 336–368. Harris, W. V. “Trade,” CAH 11 (2000): 710–740. Harris, W. V. “A Revisionist View of Roman Money,” JRS 96 (2006): 1–24. Harris, W. V. “The Late Republic.” In W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. Saller (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 511–539. Harris, W. V. “The Nature of Roman Money,” in W. V. Harris (ed.), The Monetary System of the Greeks and Romans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 174–207. Harris, W. V. Rome’s Imperial Economy: Twelve Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Harris, W. V. “Marginal Land and Population Pressure in the Ancient Mediterranean, 800 BC to 600 AD,” HZAG 67 (4) (2018): 390–417. Harris, W. V. “Credit-Money in the Roman Economy,” Klio 101 (1) (2019): 158–189. Hartnell, T. “Agriculture in Sasanian Persis: Ideology and Practice,” JAH 2 (2) (2014): 182–208. Harvey, A. E. A Companion to the New Testament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Haselgrove, C. and S. Krmnicek. “Archaeology of Money: From Electrum Rings to Mobile Money.” In C. Haselgrove and S. Krmnicek (eds.), The Archaeology of Money. Leicester: University of Leicester Press, 2016, 1–18. Hawkins, C. Roman Artisans and the Urban Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Hawkins, C. “Artisans, Retailers, and Credit Transactions in the Roman World,” JAH 5 (1) (2017): 66–92. Hawkins, C. “Contracts, Coercion, and the Boundaries of the Roman Artisanal Firm.” In K. Verboven and C. Laes (eds.), Work, Labour, and Professions in the Roman World. Leiden: Brill, 2017, 36–61. Hayes, C. “Complicated Goy in Classical Rabbinic Sources.” In M. Bar-Asher Siegal, W. Grünstäudl, and Matthew Thiessen (eds.), Perceiving the Other in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017, 147–167. Healey, J. F. “Some Lexical and Legal Notes on a Syriac Loan Transfer of 240 CE.” In G. A. Kiraz (ed.), “Malphono w-Rabo d-Malphone”: Studies in Honor of Sebastian P. Brock. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2008, 211–226. Heichelheim, F. M. “Roman Syria.” In T. Frank (ed.), An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, Vol. 1. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933–1940, 123–257. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

214

Bibliography

Hendy, M. Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy, c. 300–1450. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Herman, G. A Prince without a Kingdom: The Exilarch in the Sasanian Era. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012. Hezser, C. The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement in Roman Palestine. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997. Hezser, C. (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Hezser, C. Jewish Travel in Antiquity. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010. Hezser, C. “Jewish Scribes in the Late Second Temple Period: Differences between the Composition, Writing, and Interpretation of Texts.” In R. Hakola, J. Orpana, and P. Hakola (eds.), Scriptures in the Making: Texts and Their Transmission in Late Second Temple Judaism. Leuven: Peeters, 2021, 149–172. Hill, A. E. “rbh.” In W. A. VanGemeren (ed.), New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis, Vol. 3. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1997, 1037–1040. Hintze, A. “Maria Macuch and Iranian Studies.” In A. Hintze, D. Durkin-Meisterernst, and C. Naumann (eds.), A Thousand Judgements: Festschrift for Maria Macuch. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2019, 175–192. Hirschfeld, Y. The Palestinian Dwelling in the Roman-Byzantine Period. Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1995. Hitchner, R. B. “Roads, Integration, Connectivity, and Economic Performance in the Roman Empire.” In S. E. Alcock, J. Bodel, and R. J. A. Talbert (eds.), Highways, Byways, and Road Systems in the Pre-Modern World. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2012, 222–234. Höcker, C. “Roads and Bridges, Construction of,” NP 12 (2008): 647–653. Hohlfelder, R. L. “Beyond Coincidence? Marcus Agrippa and King Herod’s Harbor,” JNES 59 (4) (2000): 241–253. Hollander, D. B. Money in the Late Republic. Leiden: Brill, 2007. Hollander, D. B. “Credit.” In R. S. Bagnall et al. (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Ancient History. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 4:1826–1829. Hollard, D. “La crise de la monnaie dans l’Empire romain au IIIe siècle aprés J.-C. Synthèse des recherches et résultats nouveaux,” Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales 50 (5) (1995): 1045–1078. Holleran, C. Shopping in Ancient Rome: The Retail Trade in the Late Republic and the Principate. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Holmén, T. “Doubts about Double Dissimilarity: Restructuring the Main Criterion of Jesus-of-History Research,” in B. Chilton and C. A. Evans (eds.), Authenticating the Words of Jesus. Leiden: Brill, 1999, 47–80. Honsell, H. Quod Interest Im Bonae-fidei-iudicium: Studien Zum Römischen Schadensersatzrecht. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1969.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

215

Hopkins, K. “Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire (200 BC–AD 400),” JRS 70 (1980): 101–125. Hopkins, K. “Economic Growth and Towns in Classical Antiquity.” In P. Abrams and E. A. Wrigley (eds.), Towns in Societies: Essays in Economic History and Historical Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 35–77. Horbury, W. Jewish War under Trajan and Hadrian. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Horden, P. and N. Purcell. The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000. Horrell, D. G. Social Scientific Approaches to New Testament Interpretation. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999. Horsley, R. A. Jesus and Empire: Kingdom of God and the New World Disorder. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003. Howgego, C. “The Supply and Use of Money in the Roman World, 200 BC to AD 300,” JRS 82 (1992): 1–31. Howgego, C. Ancient History from Coinage. London: Routledge, 1995. Hoyer, D. Money, Culture, and Well-Being in Rome’s Economic Development, 0–275. Leiden: Brill, 2018. Hudson, M. “How Interest Rates Were Set, 2500 BCE–AD 1000,” JESHO 43 (2) (2000): 132–161. Hudson, M. “Reconstructing the Origins of Interest-Bearing Debt and the Logic of Clean Slates,” in M. Hudson and M. Van De Mieroop (eds.), Debt and Economic Renewal in the Ancient Near East. Bethesda, MD: CDL Press, 2002, 7–58. Hudson, M. “Origins of Money and Interest: Palatial Credit.” In S. Battilossi, Y. Cassis, and K. Yago (eds.), Handbook of the History of Money and Currency, 45–65. Singapore: Springer, 2020. Hunt, A. S. and C. C. Edgar. Select Papyri 1: Private Affairs. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932. Hunt, A. S. and C. C. Edgar. Select Papyri 2: Official Documents. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934. Ilan, T. “Another Ketubbah on Papyrus frm Byzantine Egypt,” Eretz-Israel 34 (2020): 23–30. [Hebrew]. Instone-Brewer, D. Traditions of the Rabbis from the Era of the New Testament, Vol. 1: Prayer and Agriculture. Grand Rapids, MI: Erdmans, 2004. Isaac, B. The Limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East, rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Isaac, B. “Infrastructure.” In C. Hezser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 145–164. Jacobs, L. “The Economic Conditions of the Jews in Babylonia in Talmudic Times Compared with Palestine,” JSS 2 (1957): 349–359.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

216

Bibliography

Jakab, E. “Financial Transactions by Women in Puteoli.” In P. J. du Plessis (ed.), New Frontiers: Law and Society in the Roman World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 123–150. Jany, J. “Criminal Justice in Sasanian Persia,” Iranica Antiqua 42 (2007): 347–386. Jastrow, M. A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli, and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature, Vol. 2. London: Luzac, 1903. Johnson, A. C. and L. C. West. Byzantine Egypt: Economic Studies. Amsterdam: M. Hakkert, 1967. Johnston, D. Roman Law in Context. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Johnston, D. (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Roman Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Jones, A. H. M. “The Urbanization of Palestine,” JRS 21 (1931): 78–85. Jones, A. H. M. The Later Roman Empire (284–602), 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964. Repr. 1971. Jones, A. H. M. The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1971. Repr. 2004. Jones, A. H. M. The Roman Economy. Ed. P. A. Brunt. Oxford: Blackwell, 1974. Jones, D. The Bankers of Puteoli: Finance, Trade, Industry in the Roman World. Gloucestershire, UK: Tempus Publishing, 2006. Jones, P. and K. Sidwell (eds.). The World of Rome. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Jördens, A. “Communicating with Tablets and Papyri,” In M. Peachin (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 227–247. Joshel, S. Work, Identity, and Legal Status at Rome: A Study of the Occupational Inscriptions. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992. Jursa, M. Aspects of the Economic History of Babylonia in the First Millennium BC— Economic Geography, Economic Mentalities, Agriculture, The Use of Money, and Problem of Economic Growth. Münster: Alter Orient und Altes Testament, 2010. Kahana, M. I. “The Halakhic Midrashim,” In S. Safrai (ed.), The Literature of the Sages, Part One. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1987, 2:3–105. Kahana, M. I. The Geniza Fragments of the Halakhic Midrashim, Part One. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2005. [Hebrew]. Kaizer, T. “The Near East in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods between Local, Regional and Supra-Regional Approaches,” SCI 22 (2003): 283–295. Kalmin, R. Sages, Stories, Authors, and Editors in Rabbinic Babylonia. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1994. Kalmin, R. “Rabbinic Literature of Late Antiquity as a Source for Historical Study.” In J. Neusner and A. J. Avery-Peck (eds.), Judaism in Late Antiquity. Leiden: Brill, 1999, 187–199.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

217

Kalmin, R. Jewish Babylonia between Persia and Roman Palestine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Kalmin, R. “The Formation and Character of the Babylonian Talmud,” in CHJ 4 (2006): 840–876. Kalmin, R. “Problems in the Use of the Babylonian Talmud for the History of LateRoman Palestine: The Example of Astrology.” In M. Goodman and P. Alexander (eds.), Rabbinic Texts and the History of Late-Roman Palestine. Oxford: British Academy, 2010, 165–183. Kaser, M. Römische Rechtsquellen und angewandte Juristenmethode. Vienna: Böhlau, 1986. Kasher, A. Jews and Hellenistic Cities in Eretz-Israel: Relations of the Jews in Eretz-Israel with the Hellenistic Cities during the Second Temple Period (332 BCE–70 CE). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990. Kasher, A. Josephus Flavius: Against Apion: A New Hebrew Translation with Introduction and Commentary, Vols. 1–2. Jerusalem: Shazar Center, 1996. Kashtan, N. “Seafaring and Jews in Graeco-Roman Palestine: Realistic and Symbolic Dimensions,” Mediterranean Historical Review 15 (1) (2000): 16–28. Katsari, C. The Roman Monetary System: The Eastern Provinces from the First to the Third Century AD. Canbridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Katz, J. “Reflections on the Relationship between Religion and the Economy,” Tarbiz 60 (1) (1990): 99–111. [Hebrew]. Kay, P. Rome’s Economic Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Kedar, B. Z., T. Dothan, and S. Safrai (eds.). Commerce in Palestine throughout the Ages: Studies. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1990. [Hebrew]. Keddie, A. Class and Power in Roman Palestine: The Socioeconomic Setting of Judaism and Christian Origins, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, 17–60, 249–254. Kehoe, D. P. The Economics of Agriculture on Roman Estates in North Africa. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988. Kehoe, D. P. Management and Investment on Estates in Roman Egypt during the Early Empire. Bonn: Habelt, 1992. Kehoe, D. P. Investment, Profit, and Tenancy: The Jurists and the Roman Agrarian Economy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997. Kehoe, D. P. Law and the Rural Economy in the Roman Empire. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007. Kehoe, D. P. “Roman Economic Policy and the Law of Contracts.” In T. A. J. McGinn (ed.), Obligations in Roman Law: Past, Present, and Future. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012, 189–214. Kehoe, D. “Contract Labor.” In W. Scheidel (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 114–131.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

218

Bibliography

Kelly, B. Petitions, Litigation, and Social Control in Roman Egypt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 123–127. Kelly, P. V. “Third-Century Price Inflation Reassessed,” Theoretical Roman Archaeology Journal 4 (1) (2021): 1–22. Kiel, Y. “The Authority of the Sages in the Babylonian Talmud: A Zoroastrian Perspective,” Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri 27 (2013): 131–174 [Hebrew]. Kingsley, S. A. Shipwreck Archaeolgy of the Holy Land: Processes and Parameters. London: Duckworth, 2004. Kloppenborg, J. S. “The Growth and Impact of Agricultural Tenancy in Jewish Palestine (III BC–1CE),” JESHO 51 (1) (2008): 31–66. Kloppenborg, J. S. and R. S. Ascough. Greco-Roman Associations Texts, Translations, and Commentary: Attica, Central Greece, Macedonia, Thrace. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011. Knapp, R. Invisible Romans. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011. Knauth, R. J. D. “Debts, Loans, and Surety.” In B. A. Strawn (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Bible and Law, Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 154–164. Koester, H. Introduction to the New Testament, 2 vols. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975. Kohut, A. Arukh Hashalem, 8 vols. New York: Pardes Publishing House, 1955. Kolb, A. and M. A. Speidel. “Perceptions from Beyond: Some Observations on NonRoman Assessments of the Roman Empire from the Great Eastern Trade Routes,” Journal of Ancient Civilizations 30 (2015): 117–149. Korver, J. De terminologie van het crediet-wezen en het Grieksch. Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1934. Repr. New York: Arno Press, 1979. Kraemer, D. “On the Reliability of Attributions in the Babylonian Talmud,” HUCA 60 (1989): 175–190. Kraemer, D. The Mind of the Talmud: An Intellectual History of the Bavli. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Kraemer, D. “The Mishnah,” CHJ 4 (2006): 299–315. Krampe, C. “Der Seedarlehensstreit des Callimachus: D. 45,1,122,1 Scaevola 28 digestorum.” In R. Feenstra, A. S. Hartkamp, J. E. S. Pruit, P. J. Sijpestein, and L. C. Winkel (eds.), Collatio Iuris Romani: Études dédiées à Hans Ankum à l’occasion de son 65e anniversaire, Vol. 1. Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1995, 207–222. Kraus, S. Talmüdische Archäologie, Vol. 2. Leipzig: G. Fock, 1911. Repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1966. Kreller, H. “Mutuum,” PW, RE, Suppl. 6 (1935): 571–584. Kron, G. “Comparative Perspectives on Nutrition and Social Inequality in the Roman World.” In P. Erdkamp and C. Holleran (eds.), Diet and Nutrition in the Roman World. London: Routledge, 2019, 156–181. Kühnert, H. “Papyri Ägyptens bis Diokletian.” PhD diss., University of Freiburg, 1965. Kushnir-Stein, A. “On the Visit of Agrippa I to Alexandria in AD 38,” JJS 51 (2) (2000): 241–253.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

219

Kutcher, Y. Milim veToledoteihen. Jerusalem: Kiriat Sefer, 1965. Labendz, J. R. Socratic Torah: Non-Jews in Rabbinic Intellectual Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Laiou-Thomadakis, A. E. and C. Morrison. The Byzantine Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Lampe, C. W. H. A Patristic Greek Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961. Langer, G. “‘Der Gerechte, er leiht nicht gegen Zinsen und treibt keinen Profit ein’ (Ez. 18.8): zum biblischen und rabbinischen Zinsverbot,” Aschkenas 20 (2) (2010): 189–213. Lapin, H. Early Rabbinic Civil Law and the Social History of Roman Galilee: A Study of Mishnah Tractate Baba Mesia. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995. Lapin, H. Rabbis as Romans: The Rabbinic Movement in Palestine, 100–400 CE. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Larsson-Lovén, L. “Women, Trade, and Production in Urban Centers of Roman Italy.” In A. I. Wilson and M. Flohr (eds.), Urban Craftsmen and Traders in the Roman World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 200–221. Launaro, A. Peasants and Slaves: The Rural Population of Roman Italy (200 BC–100 AD). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Lawrence, D. and Wilkinson, T. J. “The Northern and Western Borderlands of the Sasanian Empire: Contextualizing the Roman/Byzantine and Sasanian Frontier.” In E. W. Sauer (ed.), Sasanian Persia: Between Rome and the Steppes of Eurasia. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017, 99–125. Leonard, R. “Creditor,” PW, RE 4 Suppl. 2 (1935): 1699–1700. Lerouxel, F. “The βιβλιοθήκη ἐγκτήσεων and Transaction Costs in the Credit Market of Roman Egypt (30 BCE–ca. 170 CE).” In D. P. Kehoe, D. Ratzan, and U. Yiftach (eds.), Law and Transaction Costs in the Ancient Economy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015, 162–184. Lerouxel, F. and M. R. Greer. “The Private Credit Market, the Bibliotheke Enkteseon, and Public Services in Roman Egypt,” Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales 67 (4) (2012): 629–659. Levine, A. (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Judaism and Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Levine, A. J., D. C. Allison, and J. D. Crossan (eds.). The Historical Jesus in Context. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. Levine, L. I. Caesarea under Roman Rule. Leiden: Brill, 1975. Levine, L. I. “Palestine in the Third Century CE,” in Z. Baras, S. Safrai, Y. Tsafrir, and M. Stern (eds.), Eretz Israel from the Destruction of the Second Temple to the Muslim Conquest, Vol. 1. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1982, 119–143. [Hebrew]. Levine, L. I. Judaism and Hellenism in Antiquity: Conflict or Confluence. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

220

Bibliography

Levine, L. I. The Ancient Synagogue: The First Thousand Years. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005. Levine, L. I. The Rabbinic Class of Roman Palestine in Late Antiquity. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary Press, 2012. Lewis, N. Life in Egypt under Roman Rule. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. Lewis, N. The Documents from the Bar Kokhba Period in the Cave of Letters. Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1989. Liddell, H. G. and R. Scott. A Greek–English Lexicon, 9th ed. Ed. H. S. Jones and R. McKenzie. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Lieberman, S. Talmuda shel Keisarin: Yerushalmi Masechet Nezikin. Jerusalem: Azriel, 1931. [Hebrew]. Lieberman, S. Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, 2nd ed. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1962. Lieberman, S. Sifre Zuta (The Midrash of Lydda). New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1968. [Hebrew]. Lieberman, S. Texts and Studies. New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1974. Lieberman, S. Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, 10 vols. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1955–1988. Lieberman, S. Studies in Palestinian Talmudic Literature. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1991. [Hebrew]. Lieu, J. M. “The Race of the God-Fearers,” JTS 46 (1995): 483–501. Lieu, J. M. Neither Jew Nor Greek? Constructing Early Christianity. London: T&T Clark, 2002. Lieu, J. M. Christian Identity in the Jewish and Greco-Roman World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Linder, A. The Jews in Roman Imperial Legislation. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987. Linder, A. “The Legal Status of the Jews in the Roman Empire,” CHJ 4 (2006): 128–173. Ling, T. J. M. The Judaean Poor and the Fourth Gospel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Lis, C. and H. Soly. Worthy Efforts: Attitudes to Work and Workers in Pre-Industrial Europe. Leiden: Brill, 2012. Liu, J. “Urban Poverty in the Roman Empire: Material Conditions.” In R. Pickett and T. R. Blanton (eds.), Paul and Economics: A Handbook. Minneapolis: Fortress Publishers, 2017, 23–56. Llewelyn, S. R. and R. A. Kearsley. New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity, Vol. 7. North Ryde, Australia: Macquarie University Press, 1994. Lloris, F. B. “An Irrigation Decree from Roman Spain: ‘The Lex Rivi Hiberiensis,’” JRS 96 (2006): 147–197.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

221

Lo Cascio, E. “State and Coinage in the Late Republic and Early Empire,” JRS 71 (1981): 76–86. Lo Cascio, E. “The Early Roman Empire: The State and the Economy.” In W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. Saller (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 619–647. Lo Cascio, E. “The Function of Gold Coinage in the Monetary Economy of the Roman Empire.” In W. V. Harris (ed.), The Monetary Systems of the Greeks and Romans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 160–173. Lo Cascio, E. “Market Regulation and Transaction Costs in the Roman Empire.” In A. I. Wilson and A. K. Bowman (eds.), Trade, Commerce, and the State in the Roman World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017: 117–132. Love, J. R. Antiquity and Capitalism: Max Weber and the Sociological Foundation of Roman Civilization. London: Routledge, 1991. Lowenstam, S. L. “Neshech ve-Tarbit.” In Encyclopedia Biblica (1968): 5:929–930. Luhmann, N. A Sociological Theory of Law. Translated by E. King and M. Albrow. Edited by M. Albrow. London: Routledge, 1985. Lukonin, V. G. “Political, Social and Administrative Institutions: Taxes and Trade,” CHI 3 (1) (1983): 681–746. MacDonald, S. B. and A. L. Gastmann. A History of Credit and Power in the Western World. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001. Mack, B. L. The Lost Gospel: The Book of Q and Christian Origins. Shaftesbury, UK: Element, 1993. MacMullen, R. Roman Social Relations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974. MacMullen, R. Changes in the Roman Empire. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990. Macuch, M. Das Sasanidische Rechtsbuch “Matakdan i hazar Datistan,” Vol. 2. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1981. Macuch, M. “Jewish Jurisdiction within the Framework of the Sasanian Legal System.” In U. Gabbay and S. Secunda (eds.), Encounters by the Rivers of Babylon: Scholarly Conversations between Jews, Iranian and Babylonians in Antiquity. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014, 147–160. Magie, D. Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950. Malina, B. J. The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology, 3rd ed. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001. Maloney, R. P. “Usury in Greek, Roman and Rabbinic Thought,” Traditio 27 (1971): 79–109. Maloney, R. P. “The Teaching of the Fathers on Usury: An Historical Study on the Development of Christian Thinking,” Vigiliae Christianae 27 (4) (1973): 241–265.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

222

Bibliography

Mandel, P. “The Tosefta,” CHJ 4 (2006): 316–335. Manning, J. The Open Sea: The Economic Life of the Ancient Mediterranean World from the Iron Age to the Rise of Rome. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018. Margaritis, E. and M. K. Jones. “Greek and Roman Agriculture.” In J. P. Oleson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Engineering and Technology in the Classical World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 158–174. Marshall, J. Jesus, Patrons and Benefactors: Roman Palestine and the Gospel of Luke. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008. Mashkour, M. et al. “Animal Exploitation and Subsistence on Borders of the Sasanian Empire: From the Gorgan Wall (-Iran) to the Gates of Alans (Gorgia).” In E. W. Sauer (ed.), Sasanian Persia: between Rome and the Steppes of Eurasia. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017, 74–95. Mason, S. Josephus and the New Testament, 2nd ed. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003. Mason, S. Josephus, Judea, and Christian Origins—Methods and Categories, with the editorial assistance of M. W. Helfield, Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2009. Mattingly, D. H. Roman Coins: From the Earliest Times to the Fall of the Western Empire, 3rd ed. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962. Mattingly, D. J. “Africa, a Landscape of Opportunity?” In D. J. Mattingly (ed.), Dialogues in Roman Imperialism: Power, Discourse, and Discrepant Experience in the Roman Empire. Portsmouth, RI: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 1997, 117–142. Mattingly, D. J. Imperialism, Power and Identity: Experiencing the Roman Empire. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011. Maurer, B. “The Anthropology of Money,” Annual Review of Anthropology 35 (2006): 15–36. Meeks, W. A. “Social and Ecclesiastical Life of the Earliest Christians,” CHC 1 (2006): 146–150. Meggitt, J. J. Paul, Poverty and Survival. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998. Meier, J. P. A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus, Vol. 1: The Roots of the Problem and the Person. New York: Doubleday, 1991. Meikle, S. “Modernism Economics and the Ancient Economy,” in W. Scheidel and S. Von Reden, The Ancient Economy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002, 233–250. Melamed, E. Z. Talmud Bavli, Tractate Bava Kama. Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1952. [Hebrew]. Menirav, J. Prakmatia: The Marketing System in the Jewish Community in Palestine during the Mishnaic and Talmudic Eras. Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2009. [Hebrew]. Meshorer, Y. A. Ancient Jewish Coinage, Vol. 2. New York: Amphora Books, 1982.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

223

Meyer, E. A. “Epigraphy and Communication.” In M. Peachin (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 191–226. Meyer, P. M. Juristische Papyri: Erklärung von Urkunden zur Einführung in die Juristische Papyruskund. Chicago: Ares Publishers, 1976. Meyers, E. M. “Jesus and His Galilean Context.” In D. R. Edwards and C. T. McCollough (eds.), Archaeology and the Galilee. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997, 57–66. Meyers, E. M. “The Problems of Gendered Space in Syro-Palestinian Domestic Architecture.” In D. Balch and C. Osiek (eds.), Early Christian Families in Context. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003, 44–70. Milgrom, J. Leviticus 23–27. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001. Milikowsky, Ch. “The Status Quaestionis of Research in Rabbinic Literature.” In M. Goodman and P. Alexander (eds.), Rabbinic Texts and the History of Late-Roman Palestine. Oxford: British Academy, 2010, 67–78. Millar, F. The Roman Near East (31 BC–AD 337). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993. Millar, F. Rome, the Greek World, and the East, Vol. 3. Edited by H. M. Cotton and G. M. Rogers. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. Miller, S. S. Sages and Commoners in Late Antique Erez Israel: A Philological Inquiry into Local Traditions in Talmud Yerushalmi. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006. Millett, P. “Maritime Loans and the Structure of Credit in Fourth-Century Athens.” In P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins, and C. R. Whittaker (eds.), Trade in the Ancient Economy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, 36–52. Millett, P. Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Mishkin, F. S. The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets, 6th ed. New York: Addison-Wesley, 2003. Mishor, M. “A New Edition of a Hebrew Letter: Oxford Ms. Heb. d. 69 (P),” Leshonenu 53 (1989): 215–264. [Hebrew]. Modrzejewski, J. M. The Jews of Egypt: From Rameses II to Emperor Hadrian. Trans. R. Cornman. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1995. Mokhtarian, J. S. Rabbis, Sorcerers, Kings, and Priests: The Culture of the Talmud in Ancient Iran. Oakland: University of California Press, 2015. Monson, A. From the Ptolemies to the Romans: Political and Economic Change in Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Montanari, F. The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek. Leiden: Brill, 2015. Mor, M. The Second Jewish Revolt: The Bar Kokhba War, 132–136 CE. Leiden: Brill, 2016. Morel, J. P. “The Craftsman.” In A. Giardina (ed.), The Romans, 214–244.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

224

Bibliography

Morley, N. Metropolis and Hinterland: The City of Rome and the Italian Economy, 200 BC–AD 200. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Morley, N. “The Early Roman Empire: Distribution.” In W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. Saller (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 570–591. Morley, N. Antiquity and Modernity. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Moscovitz, L. “The Formation and Character of the Jerusalem Talmud,” CHJ 4 (2006): 663–677. Mousourakis, G. The Historical and Institutional Context of Roman Law. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2003. Mousourakis, G. Roman Law and the Origins of the Civil Law Tradition. London: Springer, 2015. Moxnes, H. “The Construction of Galilee as a Place for the Historical Jesus, Part II,” BTB 3 (2001): 64–77. Mrozek, S. “Le fonctionnement des fondations dans les provinces occidentales et l’économie de credit á l’époque du Haut-Empire romain,” Latomus 59 (2) (2000): 327–345. Mrozek, S. Faenus: Studien zu Zinsproblemen zur Zeit des Prinzipats. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2001. Nedungatt, G. “The Authenticity of Aphrahat’s Synodal Letter,” Orientalia Christiana Periodica 46 (1) (1980): 62–88. Nelson, B. N. The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. Neufeld, E. “The Prohibitions against Loans at Interest in Ancient Hebrew Laws,” HUCA 26 (1955): 355–412. Neusner, J. A History of the Jews in Babylonia, 4 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1963–1970. Neusner, J. “Jews in Iran,” CHI 3 (2) (1983): 909–923. Neusner, J. In Search of Talmudic Biography: The Problem of the Attributed Saying. Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984. Neusner, J. Reading and Believing: Ancient Judaism and Contemporary Gullibility. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986. Neusner, J. “Aristotle’s Economics and the Mishnah’s Economics: The Matter of Wealth and Usury,” JSJ 21 (1) (1990): 41–59. Neusner, J. The Economics of the Mishnah. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. Neusner, J. The Mishnah. Leiden: Brill, 1993. Neusner, J. Introduction to Rabbinic Literature. New York: Anchor Books, 1994. Neusner, J. The Mishnah: Religious Perspectives. Leiden: Brill, 1999. Neusner, J. The Mishnah: Social Perspectives. Leiden: Brill, 1999. Newton, T. “Credit and Civilization,” BJS 54 (2008): 347–371.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

225

Nicholas, B. An Introduction to Roman Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962. Nickelsburg, G. W. E. George W. E. Nickelsburg in Perspective: An Ongoing Dialogue of Learning, Vol. 2. Edited by J. Neusner and A. J. Avery-Peck. Leiden: Brill, 2003. Nicols, J. “Mapping the Crisis of the Third Century.” In O. Hekster, G. De Kleijn, and D. Slootjes (eds.), Crises and the Roman Empire: Proceedings of the Seventh Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Nijmegen, June 20–24, 2006). Leiden: Brill, 2007, 429–437. Nikolsky, R. and A. Atzmon. Studies in the Tanhuma-Yelammedenu Literature. Leiden: Brill, 2022. Noam, V. “The Emergence of Rabbinic Culture from the Perspective of Qumran,” JAJ 6 (2) (2015): 253–274. Noam, V. “Lost Historical Traditions: Between Josephus and the Rabbis.” In J. Baden, H. Najman, and E. Tigchelaar (eds.), Sybils, Scriptures, and Scrolls: John Collins at Seventy. Leiden: Brill, 2017, 991–1017. Novick, T. “‘Like an Expert Sharecropper’: Agricultural Halakhah and Agricultural Science in Rabbinic Palestine,” AJS Review 38 (2) (2014): 303–320. Oakley, S. “The Roman Conquest of Italy.” In J. Rich and G. Shipley (eds.), War and Society in the Roman World. London: Routledge, 1993, 9–38. Oakman, D. E. “Jesus and Agrarian Palestine: The Factor of Debt.” In J. H. Neyrey and E. C. Stewart (eds.), The Social World of the New Testament: Insights and Models. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2008, 62–85. Oakman, D. E. “Was Jesus a Peasant? Implications for Reading the Jesus Tradition.” In J. H. Neyrey and E. C. Stewart (eds.), The Social World of the New Testament: Insights and Models. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2008, 125–140. Oliva, J. C. M. “Monetary Integration in the Roman Empire.” In P. L. Cottrell et al. (eds.), From the Athenian Tetradrachm to the Euro: Studies in European Monetary Integration. second printing. London: Routledge, 2017, 7–23. Ophir, A. and I. Rosen-Zvi. Goy: Israel’s Multiple Others and the Birth of the Gentiles. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Oppenheimer, A. (in collaboration with B. Isaac and M. Lecker). Babylonia Judaica in the Talmudic Period. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1983. Oppenheimer, A. Galilee in the Mishnaic Period. Jerusalem: Shazar Center, 1991 [Hebrew]. Oppenheimer, A. “Urbanisation and City Territories in Roman Palestine.” In N. Oppenheimer and A. Oppenheimer (eds.), Between Rome and Babylon. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005, 30–46. Oppenheimer, A. “Battei Midrash in Babylon Prior to the Completion of the Mishnah.” In I. Etkes (ed.), Yeshivot and Battei Midrash. Jerusalem: Shazar Center, 2007, 19–29. [Hebrew].

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

226

Bibliography

Oppenheimer, A. “Politics and Administration.” In M. Goodman and P. Alexander (eds.), Rabbinic Texts and the History of Late-Roman Palestine. Oxford: British Academy, 2010, 377–388. Palme, B. “The Range of Documentary Texts: Types and Categories,” in R. Bagnall (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Papyrology, 358–394. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Panaino, A. “Commerce and Conflicts of Religions in Sasanian Iran between Social Identity and Political Ideology,” in R. Rollinger, C. Ulf, and K. Schnegg (eds.), Commerce and Monetary Systems in the Ancient World: Means of Transmission and Cultural Interaction. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004, 385–401. Parisot, J. (ed.). Aphraatis Sapientis Persae Demonstrationes. Paris: Tomus Primus, 1894. Patai, R. The Children of Noah: Jewish Seafaring in Ancient Times. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. Patrich, J. Studies in the Archaeology and History of Caesarea Maritima: Caput Judaeae, Metropolis Palaestinae. Leiden: Brill, 2011. Payne, R. “Iranian Cosmopolitanism: World Religions at the Sasanian Court.” In M. Lavan, R. Payne, and J. Weisweiler (eds.), Cosmopolitanism and Empire: Universal Rulers, Local Elites, and Cultural Integration in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 209–230. Payne, R. “The Silk Road and the Iranian Political Economy in Late Antiquity: Iran, the Silk Road, and the Problem of Aristocratic Empire,” BSOAS 81 (2) (2018): 227–250. Peebles, G. “The Anthropology of Credit and Debt,” Annual Review of Anthropology 39 (2010): 225–240. Perikhanian, A. “Iranian Society and Law,” CHI 3 (2) (1983): 627–680. Perikhanian, A. The Book of a Thousand Judgements: A Sassanian Law-Book. Translated by N. Garsoian. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 1997. Pestman, P. W. “Loans Bearing No Interest?” JJP 16 (1971): 7–29. Pestman, P. W. The New Papyrological Primer, Leiden: Brill, 1990. Philipson, D. “Development of Roman Law of Debt Security,” SLR 20 (1969): 1230–1248. Pigière, F. “The Evolution of Cattle Husbandry Practices in the Roman Period in Gallia Belgica and Western Germania Inferior,” European Journal of Archaeology 20 (3) (2017): 472–493. Pleket, H. W. “Urban Elites and Business in the Greek Part of the Roman Empire.” In P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins, and C. R. Whittaker (eds.), Trade in the Ancient Economy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, 131–144. Poitras, G. and M. Geranio. “Trading of Shares in the Societates Publicanorum?” Explorations in Economic History 61 (2016): 95–118. Pomeroy, S. B. Women in Hellenistic Egypt: From Alexander to Cleopatra. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990. Porter, S. “Luke 17:11–19 and the Criteria for Authenticity Revisited,” JSHJ 1 (2) (2003): 201–224.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

227

Prather, C. L. Money and Banking. Homewood, IL: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1969. Quilici, L. “Land Transport, Part I: Roads and Bridges.” In J. P. Oleson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Engineering and Technology in the Classical World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 551–579. Rabinowitz, J. J. “Interest,” Encyclopedia Biblica 2:813–816. [Hebrew]. Rabinowitz, N. N. Dikdukei Sofrim, Bava Metzia. Jerusalem: Maaian Ha-Chohmah, 1960. Rathbone, D. Economic Rationalism and Rural Society in the Third Century AD Egypt: The Heroninos Archive and the Eppianus Estate. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Rathbone, D. “The Financing of Maritime Commerce in the Roman Empire, I–II AD.” In E. Lo Cascio (ed.), Credito e moneta nel mondo romano: atti degli Incontri capresi di storia dell’economia antica, Capri, 12–14 ottobre 2000. Bari: Edipuglia, 2003, 197–229. Rathbone, D. “Roman Egypt.” In W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. Saller (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 698–719. Rathbone, D. “Maritime Loans,” OCD (2019). https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/978019 9381135.013.3965. Rathbone, D. “Muziris Papyrus,” OCD (2019). https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/978019 9381135.013.3965. Rathbone, D. and P. Temin. “Financial Intermediation in First Century AD Rome and Eighteenth-Century England.” In K. Verboven, K. Vandorpe, and V. Chankowski (eds.), Pistoi dia tèn technèn: Bankers, Loans and Archives in the Ancient World. Leuven: Peeters, 2008, 371–419. Rathmann, M. “Roads,” NP 12 (2008): 622–647. Raugh, N. K. The Sacred Bonds of Commerce: Religion, Economy, and Trade Society at Hellenistic Roman Delos 166–87 BC. Amsterdam: Gieben, 1993. Redding, R. W. “The Pig and Chicken in the Middle East: Modeling Human Subsistence Behavior in the Archaeological Record Using Historical and Animal Husbandry Data,” Journal of Archaeological Research 23 (2015): 325–368. Reece, D. W. “The Technological Weakness of the Ancient World,” Greece and Rome 16 (1) (1969): 32–47. Reed, C. M. Maritime Traders in the Ancient Greek World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Reger, G. Regionalism and Change in the Economy of Independent Delos. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. Reyerson, K. L. Business, Banking and Finance in Medieval Montpellier. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1985. Rezakhani, K. “Markets for Land, Labour and Capital in Late Antique Iraq, AD 200– 700,” JESHO 57 (2) (2014): 231–261.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

228

Bibliography

Rice, C. “Mercantile Specialization and Trading Communities: Economic Strategies in Roman Maritime Trade.” In A. I. Wilson and M. Flohr (eds.), Urban Craftsmen and Traders in the Roman World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 97–114. Richardson, J. S. “The Tabula Contrebiensis: Roman Law in Spain in the Early First Century B.C.” JRS 73 (1983): 33–41. Riggsby, A. M. Roman Law and the Legal World of the Romans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Ristvet, L. Ritual, Performance, and Politics in the Ancient Near East. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Rivlin, J. Bills and Contracts from Lucena (1020–1025). Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1994. [Hebrew]. Robinson, O. F. The Sources of Roman Law: Problems and Methods for Ancient Historians. London: Routledge, 1997. Rosenfeld, B. Z. Lod and Its Sages in the Period of the Mishnah and the Talmud. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1997. [Hebrew]. Rosenfeld, B. Z. “Innkeeping in Jewish Society in Roman Palestine,” JESHO 41 (2) (1998): 133–158. Rosenfeld, B. Z. “The Galilean Valleys (Beqʾaoth) from the Bible to the Talmud,” Revue Biblique 109 (1) (2002): 66–100. Rosenfeld, B. Z. and J. Menirav. Markets and Marketing in Roman Palestine. Leiden: Brill, 2005. Rosenfeld, B. Z. and J. Menirav. “Fraud: From the Biblical Basis to General Commercial Law in Roman Palestine,” JSJ 37 (4) (2006): 594–627. Rosenfeld, B. Z. and H. Perlmutter. “The Poor as a Stratum of Jewish Society in Roman Palestine 70–250 CE: An Analysis,” Historia 60 (3) (2011): 273–300. Rosenfeld, B. Z. and H. Perlmutter. Social Stratification of the Jewish Population of Roman Palestine in the Period of the Mishnah, 70–250 CE. Leiden: Brill, 2020. Rosenstein, N. “Aristocrats and Agriculture in the Middle and Late Republic,” JRS 98 (2008): 1–26. Rosenthal, D. “Al Ha-kizur Ve-hashlamato: Perek Be-Arichat Hatalmud Ha-Bavli.” In D. Rosenthal and Y. Sussmann (eds.), Mehqerei Talmud III: Talmudic Studies Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Ephraim E. Urbach. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2005, 791–863. [Hebrew]. Rosenthal, E. S. . and S. Lieberman. Yerushalmi Neziqin. Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1983. Rosillo López, C. La Corruption à la fin de la République romaine (IIeme–Ier s. av. J.-C.): Aspects politiques et financiers. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2010. Rostovtzeff, M. I. The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957. Rostovtzeff, M. I. and C. B. Welles. “A Parchment Contract of Loan from Dura-Europos on the Euphrates,” YCS 2 (1931): 1–78. Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

229

Roth, J. P. The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 BC–AD 235). Leiden: Brill, 1999. Roth, J. P. “The Army and the Economy in Judaea and Palaestina.” In P. Erdkamp (ed.), The Roman Army and tha Economy. Amsterdam: Gieben, 2002, 375–397. Roth-Gerson, L. The Jews of Syria as Reflected in the Greek Inscriptions. Jerusalem: The Zalman Shazar Center, 2001. [Hebrew]. Rouge, J. Ships and Fleets of the Ancient Mediterranean. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1981. Routledge, C. “Western Asia.” In I. Shaw and E. Bloxam (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Egyptology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, 514–539. Rovira-Guardiola, C. “Loan, Greek and Roman.” In R. S. Bagnall et al. (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Ancient History. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 8:4129–4131. Rowlandson, J. Women and Society in Greek and Roman Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Rubenstein, J. L. The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. Rubenstein, J. L. “Explanations of Tannaitic Sources by Abstract and General Principles.” In Y. Elman, E. B. Halivni, and Z. A. Steinfeld (eds.), Netiot Ledavid: Jubilee Volume for David Weiss Halivni. Jerusalem: Arahot Publishing, 2005, 275–304. Rubin, N. “For Whom Does One Mourn? A Sociological Analysis of Talmudic Sources,” Shenaton Bar Ilan 10 (1972): 111–122. [Hebrew]. Rubin, N. The End of Life: Rites of Burial and Mourning in the Talmud and Midrash. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1997. [Hebrew]. Rubin, N. The Joy of Life: Rites of Betrothal and Marriage in the Talmud and Midrash. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2004. [Hebrew]. Rubin, N. Time and Life Cycle in Talmud and Midrash: Socio-Anthropological Perspectives. Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2008. Rubin, Z. “The Sasanid Monarchy,” CAH 14 (2000): 638–661. Rubin, Z. “Eastern Neighbours: Persia and the Sasanian Monarchy (224–651).” In J. Shepard (ed.), The Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire, c. 500–1492. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 130–155. Rubio-Campillo, X. et al. “The Ecology of Roman Trade: Reconstructing Provincial Connectivity with Similarity Measures,” Journal of Archaeological Science 92 (2018): 37–47. Ruffing, K. “Driving Forces for Specialization: Market, Local Factors, Productivity Improvements.” In A. I. Wilson and M. Flohr (eds.), Urban Craftsmen and Traders in the Roman World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 115–131. Rupprecht, H. A. Untersuchungen zum Darlehen im Recht der graeco-aegyptischen Papyri der Ptolemäerzeit. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1967. Rupprecht, H. A. Einführung in die Papyruskunde. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

230

Bibliography

Safrai, S. “Home and Family.” In S. Safrai and M. Stern (eds.), The Jewish People in the First Century. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1976, 728–792. Safrai, S. (ed.), The Literature of the Sages, Part One. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1987. Safrai, S. et al. (eds.). The Literature of the Sages, Part Two. Assen: Van Gorcum, 2007. Safrai, Z. “Family Structure during the Period of the Mishnah and the Talmud,” Milet 1 (1983): 129–156. [Hebrew]. Safrai, Z. The Economy of Roman Palestine. London: Routledge, 1994. Safrai, Z. “Halakhic Observance in the Judaean Desert Documents.” In R. Katzoff and D. Schaps (eds.), Law in the Documents of the Judaean Desert. Leiden: Brill, 2005, 205–236. Safrai, Z. “Agriculture and Farming.” In C. Hezser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 246–263. Safrai, Z. and S. Safrai. Mishnat Eretz Israel: Tractate Sheviit (Zraim 5). Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2008. [Hebrew]. Samellas, A. “The Anti-Usury Arguments of the Church Fathers of the East in their Historical Context and the Accommodation of the Church to the Prevailing Credit Economy in Late Antiquity,” JAH 5 (1) (2017): 134–178. Samuel, D. H. “Application for a Loan of Seed.” In A. E. Hanson (ed.), Collectanea Papyrologica: Texts Published in Honor of H. C. Youtie, I–II. Bonn: R. Habelt, 1976, 231–242. Sanders, E. P. Jesus and Judaism. London: SCM Press, 1985. Sartre, M. The Middle East under Rome. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005. Satlow, M. L. Jewish Marriage in Antiquity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. Schäfer, P. “Research into Rabbinic Literature: An Attempt to Define the Status Quaestionis,” JJS 37 (1986): 139–152. Schäfer, P. The History of the Jews in the Greco-Roman World. London: Routledge, 2003. Schäfer, P. and Ch. Milikowsky. “Current Views on the Editing of the Rabbinic Texts of Late Antiquity,” in M. Goodman and P. Alexander (eds.), Rabbinic Texts and the History of Late-Roman Palestine. Oxford: British Academy, 2010, 79–82. Scheidel, W. “In Search of Roman Economic Growth,” JRA 22 (2009): 46–71. Scheidel, W. “Approaching the Roman Economy.” In W. Scheidel (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 1–23. Scheidel, W. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Scheidel, W. “ORBIS: The Stanford Geospatial Network Model of the Roman World.” Princeton Working Papers in Classics, 2015. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers .cfm?abstract_id=2609654.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

231

Scheidel, W., I. Morris, and R. Saller (eds.). The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Scheidel, W. and S. Von Reden. The Ancient Economy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002. Schiffman, L. “Talmudic Monetary Theory: Currency in Rabbinic Halakhah.” In A. Levine (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Judaism and Economics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, 605–624. Schneider, F. “Technology.” In W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. Saller (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 144–171. Schultz, F. Classical Roman Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951. Schürer, E. The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 BC–AD 135), Vol. I–II, rev. ed. Edited by G. Vermes et al. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1979. Schuster, S. Das Seedarlehen in den Gerichtsreden des Demosthenes: mit einem Ausblick auf die weitere historische Entwicklung des Rechtsinstitutes: dáneion nautikón, fenus nauticum und Bodmerei. Berlin, Germany: Duncker und Humbolt, 2005. Schwabe, M. and B. Lifshitz. Beth Sheʾarim, Vol. 2: The Greek Inscriptions. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974. Schwartz, D. R. Maccabees 2. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008. Schwartz, J. “Aliyah from Babylonia during the Amoraic Period,” Cathedra 21 (1981): 23–30. [Hebrew]. Schwartz, J. “Babylonian Commoners in Amoraic Palestine,” JAOS 101 (1981): 317–322. Schwartz, J. Jewish Settlement in Judaea: After the Bar-Kochba War until the Arab Conquest, 135 C.E.–640 C.E. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1986 [Hebrew]. Schwartz, J. and P. Tomson (eds.). Jews and Christians in the First and Second Centuries: The Interbellum 70–132 CE. Leiden: Brill, 2018. Schwartz, S. “Political, Social and Economic Life in the Land of Israel 66–235 CE,” CHJ 4 (2006): 23–52. Schwartz, S. “The Political Geography of Rabbinic Texts.” In C. E. Fonrobert and M. S. Jaffee (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Talmud and Rabbinic Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 75–87. Schwartz, S. Were the Jews A Mediterranean Society? Reciprocity and Solidarity in Ancient Judaism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Secunda, S. “On the Age of the Zoroastrian Sages of the Zand,” Iranica Antiqua 47 (2012): 317–349. Sharp, M. “The Village of Theadelphia in the Fayyum: Land and Population in the Second Century.” In A. K. Bowman and E. Rogan (eds.), Agriculture in Egypt from Pharaonic to Modern Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 159–192. Sharvit, S. Language and Style of Tractate Avoth through the Ages. Beer-Sheva: BenGurion University of the Negev Press, 2006.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

232

Bibliography

Shatzman, I. History of the Roman Republic. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1990. Shemesh, A. “The Term ‘Mitzvah Ha-Teluyah Ba-Aaretz’ Reexamined,” Sidra: A Journal for the Study of Rabbinic Literature 16 (2000): 151–177 [Hebrew]. Sheridan, J. A. “Loan through a Bank,” BASP 23 (1985): 149–153. Sheridan, J. A. (ed.). Columbia Papyri IX: The Vestis Militaris Codex. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998. Sherwin-White, A. N. The Letters of Pliny: A Historical and Social Commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966. Shlasky, A. “Private Finance and Banking among Palestinian Jewry during the Late Second Temple, Mishnaic and Talmudic Periods (30 BCE–395 CE).” PhD diss., Bar Ilan University, 2010. [Hebrew]. Shlasky, A. “Trends in the Financial Activity of Palestinian Jews during the First Four Centuries C.E.,” Zion 80 (2015): 309–341. [Hebrew]. Shochetman, E. Ma‌ʾAseh Haba Ba‌ʾAverah (Illegal Act in Jewish Law). Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1981 [Hebrew]. Sijpesteijn, P. “A Pawnbroker’s Accounts,” Anc. Soc. 24 (1993): 51–62. Silver, M. “Historical Otherness, the Roman Bazaar and Primitivism: P. F. Bang on the Roman Economy,” JRA 22 (2) (2009): 21–43. Silver, M. “Finding the Roman Empire’s Disappeared Deposit Bankers,” Historia 60 (3) (2011): 301–327. Simpson, St. J. “The Land behind Ctesiphon: The Archaeology of Babylonia during the Period of the Babylonian Talmud.” In M. J. Geller (ed.), The Archaeology and Material Culture of the Babylonian Talmud. Leiden: Brill, 2015, 6–38. Sims-Williams, N. Bactrian Documents—From Northern Afghanistan: I: Legal and Economic Documents. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Sirks, B. “The Management of Public Loans of Towns (the Cura Kalendarii) and of Their Finances in General.” In Atti dell’Accademia Romanistica C ostantiniana, XII Convegno Internazionale (in onore di Manlio Sargenti), Pubblicazioni dell’Universita degli Studi di Perugia. Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1998, 377–386. Sirks, B. “Conclusion: Some Reflections.” In Aubert and Sirks, SPECVLVM IVRIS, 169–181. Sirks, B. “Law, Commerce, and Finance in the Roman Empire.” In A. Wilson and A. K. Bowman (eds.), Trade, Commerce and the State in the Roman World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 53–116. Smallwood, E. The Jews under Roman Rule, 2nd ed. Leiden: Brill, 1981. Sokoloff, M. A Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic of the Byzantine Period. Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1990. Sokoloff, M. A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic of the Talmudic and Geonic Periods. Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2002. Soloveitchik, H. Collected Essays, Vol. 1. Oxford: Littman Library, 2013.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

233

Somer, S. and R. E. Sylla. A History of Interest Rates, 3rd ed. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1996. Sophocles, E. A. Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods (From B.C. 146 to A.D. 1100), Vol. 2. New York: Ungar, 1957. Southern, P. The Roman Empire from Severus to Constantine. London: Routledge, 2004. Sperber, D. “Costs of Living in Roman Palestine,” JESHO 8 (3) (1968): 248–271. Sperber, D. “On Social and Economic Conditions in 3rd Century Palestine,” Archív Orientální 38 (1970): 1–25. Sperber, D. “Aspects of Agrarian Life in Roman Palestine I: Agricultural Decline in Palestine during the Later Principate,” ANRW 2 (8) (1977): 397–443. Sperber, D. Roman Palestine, 200–400: The Land. Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1978. Sperber, D. A Dictionary of Greek and Latin Legal Terms in Rabbinic Literature. Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1984. Sperber, D. Nautica Talmudica. Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1986. Sperber, D. Roman Palestine 200–400: Money and Prices, 2nd ed. Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1991. Sperber, D. The City in Roman Palestine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Sperber, D. “Nautica in Talmudic Palestine,” Mediterranean Historical Review 15 (1) (2000): 29–32. Stambaugh, J. E. and D. L. Balch. The New Testament in Its Social Environment. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986. Stegemann, W. and B. J. Malina. The Social Setting of Jesus and the Gospels. Grand Rapids, MI: Fortress Press, 2002. Stein-Hölkeskamp, E. “Essen ohne Grenzen: Transfer und Transgression in Imperium Romanum,” Hermes 142 (2) (2014): 162–180. Sterling, G. E. “Judaism between Jerusalem and Alexandria,” in J. J. Collins and G. E. Sterling (eds.), Hellenism in the Land of Israel. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001, 263–301. Stern, S. “Attribution and Authorship in the Babylonian Talmud,” JJS 45 (1) (1994): 28–51. Stern, S. “The Concept of Authorship in the Babylonian Talmud,” JJS 46 (1–2) (1995): 183–195. Stern, S. “The Talmud Yerushalmi.” In M. Goodman and P. Alexander (eds.), Rabbinic Texts and the History of Late-Roman Palestine. Oxford: British Academy, 2010, 143–164. Stern, S. Jewish Identity in Early Rabbinic Writings. Leiden: Brill, 2020. Stertz, S. A. “Appendix: Roman Legal Codification in the Second Century,” in A. J. Avery-Peck and J. Neusner (eds.), The Mishnah in Contemporary Perspective. Leiden: Brill, 2002, 149–164.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

234

Bibliography

Strack, H. L. and G. Stemberger (eds.). Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash. Translated by M. Bockmuehl. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992. Sussmann, Y. “The History of Halakha and the Dead Sea Scrolls: Preliminary Observations of Miqsat Ma‌ʾase Ha-Torah (4QMMT),” Tarbiz 59 (1990): 11–76 [Hebrew] [English: “The History of Halakha and the Dead Sea Scrolls: Preliminary Observations of Miqsat Ma‌ʾase Ha-Torah (4QMMT).” In E. Qimron and J. Strugnell (eds.), Qumran Cave 4.V: Miqsat Ma‌ʾase Ha-Torah (4QMMT). Oxford: Clarendon, 1994, 179–200]. Sussmann, Y. “Ve-shuv le-Yerushalmi Neziqin,” Mehqerei Talmud 1 (1990): 55–133. Sussmann, Y. “Torah She-Beʾal Peh—Literally: The Power of the Jot and Tittle.” In D. Rosenthal and Y. Sussmann (eds.), Mehqerei Talmud III: Talmudic Studies Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Ephraim E. Urbach. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2005, 209–384. [Hebrew]. Sussman, Y. Ginze Yerushalmi. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 2020. Ta-shma, I. M. Ritual, Custom and Reality in Franco-Germany, 1000–1350. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1996. [Hebrew]. Takahashi, R. “The Kronion Family’s Loans: An Egyptian Peasant Family Declining under Roman Rule?” Anc. Soc. 42 (2012): 71–88. Tal, O. “Eretz-Israel during the Hellenistic Period: An Archaeological Perspective,” Qadmoniot: A Journal for the Antiquities of Eretz-Israel and Bible Lands 133 (2007): 2–14. Taubenschlag, R. The Law of Graeco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri. Milan: Cisalpino-Goliardica, 1972. Tcherikover, V. A. “Prolegomena,” CPJ 1 (1954), 1–111. Tchernia, A. The Romans and Trade. Trans. J. Grieve with E. Minchin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Temin, P. “A Market Economy in the Early Roman Empire,” JRS 91 (2001): 169–181. Temin, P. “Financial Intermediation in the Early Roman Empire,” JEH 64 (3) (2004): 705–733. Temin, P. “The Economy of the Early Roman Empire,” JEP 20 (1) (2006): 133–151. Temin, P. “The Contribution of Economics.” In W. Scheidel (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 45–70. Temin, P. The Roman Market Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. Temin, P. “Statistics in Ancient History.” In G. Dari-Mattiacci and D. P. Kehoe (eds.), Roman Law and Economics Volume I: Institutions and Organizations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, 137–162. Tenger, B. Die Verschuldung im römischen Ägypten (1–2 jh. N. Chr). St. Katarinen: Scripta Mercaturae Verlag, 1993. Terpstra, T. “Roman Law, Transaction Costs and Roman Economy: Evidence from the Sulpicii Archive.” In K. Verboven, K. Vandorpe, and V. Chankowski (eds.), Pistoi dia

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

235

tèn technèn: Bankers, Loans and Archives in the Ancient World. Leuven: Peeters, 2008, 345–369. Terpstra, T. Trading Communities in the Roman World: A Micro-Economic and Institutional Perspective. Leiden: Brill, 2013. Terpstra, T. Trade in the Ancient Mediterranean: Private Order and Public Institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019. Thebert, Y. “The Slave.” In A. Giardina (ed.), The Romans, 138–174. Theissen, G. “Historical Skepticism and the Criteria of Jesus Research: My Attempt to Leap Over Lessing’s Yawning Gulf,” JTS 49 (2) (1996): 146–175. Theissen, G. and D. Winter. The Quest for the Plausible Jesus: The Question of Criteria. Translated by M. E. Boring. Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 2002. Thoma, M. “Material Aspects of Marriage: Economic Transactions between Spouses in Roman Egypt.” In C.-E. Centlivres Challet (ed.), Married Life in Greco-Roman Antiquity. London: Routledge, 2022, 168–184. Thür, G. “Hypotheken—Urkunde eines Seedarlehens für eine Reise nach Muziris und Apographe für die Tetarte in Alexandria (zu P.Vindob.G.40822),” Tyche 2 (1987): 229–245. Thür, G. “Daneion,” NP 4 (2004): 77–78. Tomlin, R. S. O. “Roman Britain in 2015: Inscriptions,” Britannia 47 (2016): 389–415. Tompkins, D. P. “Debt.” In R. S. Bagnall et al. (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Ancient History. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 4:1942–1945. Tran, N. “The Economics of Solidarity: Mutual Aid and Reciprocal Services between Workers in Roman Cities,” in D. B. Hollander, T. R. Blanton, and J. T. Fitzgerald (eds.), The Extramercantile Economies of Greek and Roman Cities: New Perspectives on the Economic History of Classical Antiquity. London: Routledge, 2019, 130–145. Treggiari, S. “Lower-Class Women in the Roman Economy,” Florilegium 1 (1979): 65–86. Trisciuoglio, A. “Actividad bancaria de las ciudades en la época clásica (siglos I–III d. C.),” Revista Internacional de Derecho Romano 14 (2015): 80–110. Tropper, A. “The Economics of Jewish Childhood in Late Antiquity,” HUCA 76 (2005): 189–233. Tropper, A. “Children and Childhood in Light of the Demographics of the Jewish Family in Late Antiquity,” JSJ 37 (3) (2006): 299–343. Tzafrir, Y. Eretz Israel from the Destruction of the Second Temple to the Muslim Conquest, Vol. 2: Archaeology and Art. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1984. (Hebrew). Udoh, F. E. To Caesar What Is Caesar’s: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 BCE–70 CE. Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2005. Urbach, E. E. “The Rabbinic Laws of Idolatry in the Second and Third Centuries in the Light of Archaeological and Historical Facts,” IEJ 9 (4) (1959): 229–245. Urbach, E. E. Hahalakha-Mekoroteʾa Vehitpatkhuta. Givataim: Yad Latalmud, 1984.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

236

Bibliography

Urbach, E. E. The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs. Translated by I. Abrahams. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1987. Vaage, L. Galilean Upstarts: Jesus’ First Followers According to Q. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1994. Van de Mieroop, M. “A History of Near Eastern Debt?” In M. Hudson (ed.), Debt and Economic Renewal in the Ancient Near East: A Colloquium Held at Columbia University. Bethesda, MD: CDL Press, 2002, 59–94. Van der Spek, R. J. “The Hellenistic Near East.” In W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. Saller (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 409–433. Van der Spek, R. J. “Factor Markets in Hellenistic and Parthian Babylonia (331 BCE– 224 CE),” JESHO 57 (2) (2014): 203–230. Van Minnen, P. “Agriculture and the ‘Taxes-and-Trade’ Model in Roman Egypt,” ZPE 133 (2000): 205–220. Van Minnen, P. “Money and Credit in Roman Egypt.” In W. V. Harris (ed.), The Monetary System of the Greeks and Romans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 226–241. Van Minnen, P. “An Antichretic Loan from Early Roman Alexandria Revisited (BGU IV 1053),” ZPE 199 (2016): 144–154. Vandorpe, K. “A Greek Register from Pathyris: Notarial Office Loans and Sales from the Pathyrite and Latopolite Nomes,” ZPE 150 (2004): 161–186. Vandorpe, K. “Archives and Dossiers.” In R. S. Bagnall (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Papyrology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 216–255. Vandorpe, K. and W. Clarysse. “Egyptian Bankers and Bank Receipts in Hellenistic and Early Roman Egypt.” In K. Verboven, K. Vandorpe, and V. Chankowski (eds.), Pistoi dia tèn technèn: Bankers, Loans and Archives in the Ancient World. Leuven: Peeters, 2008, 153–168. Verboven, K. The Economy of Friends: Economic Aspects of Amicitia and Patronage in the Late Republic. Brussels: Latomus, 2002. Verboven, K. “The Sulpicii from Puteoli and Usury in the Early Roman Empire,” Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 71 (1–2) (2003): 7–28. Verboven, K. “Faeneratores, Negotiatores and Financial Intermediation in the Roman World (Late Republic and Early Empire).” In K. Verboven, K. Vandorpe, and V. Chankowski (eds.), Pistoi dia tèn technèn: Bankers, Loans and Archives in the Ancient World. Leuven: Peeters, 2008, 211–229. Verboven, K. “Friendship among the Romans.” In M. Peachin (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 404–421. Verboven, K. “Attitudes to Work and Workers in Classical Greece and Rome,” TSEG 11 (1) (2014): 67–87.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

237

Verboven, K. “Currency and Credit in the Bay of Naples in the First Century AD.” In M. Flohr and A. Wilson (eds.), The Economy of Pompeii. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, 363–383. Verboven, K. “Capital Markets and Financial Entrepreneurs.” In P. Erdkamp, K. Verboven, and A. Zuiderhoek (eds.), Capital, Investment, and Innovation in the Roman World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, 381–416. Verboven, K., K. Vandrope, and V. Chankowski (eds.). Pistoi dia tèn technèn: Bankers, Loans and Archives in the Ancient World. Leuven: Peeters, 2008. Verhagen, H. L. E. “The Evolution of Pignus in Classical Roman Law Ius Honorarium and Ius Novum,” The Legal History Review 81 (2013): 51–79. Veyne, P. La Société Romaine. Paris: Le Seuil, 1990. Von Freyberg, H. U. Kapitalverkehr und Handel im. Römischen Kaiserreich (27 v. Chr.– 235 n. Chr.). Freiburg: Haufe, 1989. Von Reden, S. Money in Ptolemaic Egypt: From the Macedonian Conquest to the End of the Third Century BC. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Von Reden, S. Money in Classical Antiquity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Von Reden, S. “The Roman Market Economy by Peter Temin (Review),” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 44 (4) (2014): 535–536. Von Soden, H. F. Untersuchungen zur Homologie in den griechischen Papyri Ägyptens bis Diokletian. Cologne: Böhlau, 1973. Wakely, R. “lwh, II.” In W. A. VanGemeren (ed.), New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis, Vol. 2. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1997, 768–770. Wakely, R. “nsk.” In W. A. VanGemeren (ed.), New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis, Vol. 3. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1997, 185–189. Wassink, A. “Inflation and Financial Policy under the Roman Empire to the Price Edict of 301 AD,” Historia 40 (4) (1991): 465–493. Watson, A. Roman Law and Comparative Law. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991. Watson, A. The Spirit of Roman Law. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995. Watson, A. and T. Mommsen. The Digest of Justinian, Vol. 2. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998. Watson, F. Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles: A Sociological Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Weatherford, J. “Money: Anthropological Aspects.” In N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 15. Oxford: Elsevier, 2001, 9988–9991. Weber, M. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Vol. 1. Edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

238

Bibliography

Weingort, A. Intérêt et crédit dans le droit talmudique. Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1979. Weisehofer, J. Ancient Persia from 550 to 650 AD. Translated by A. Azodi. London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1996. Weisehofer, J. “Evidence for Arsakid Economic History.” In S. Von Reden (ed.), Handbook of Ancient Afro-Eurasian Economies Volume 1: Contexts. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020, 477–496. Weiss, Z. Public Spectacles in Roman and Late Antique Palestine. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014. Weiss, Z. “Houses of the Wealthy in Roman Galilee.” In G. P. R. Métraux and A. Marzano (eds.), Roman Villas in the Mediterranean Basin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, 317–327. Westbrook, R. Ex Oriente Lex: Near Eastern Influences on Ancient Greek and Roman Law. Edited by D. Lyons and K. Raaflaub. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015. Widengren, G. “The Status of Jews in the Sasanian Empire,” Iranica Antiqua 1 (1961): 117–157. Widengren, G. “Iran, der grosse Gegner Roms: Königsgewalt, Feudalismus, Militärwesen.” In ANRW II, 9 (1) (1976): 219–306. Wilson, A. I. “Urban Production in the Roman World: The View from North Africa,” PBSR 70 (2002): 231–273. Wilson, A. I. “Indicators for Roman Economic Growth: A Response to Walter Scheidel,” JRA 22 (2009): 71–82. Wilson, A. I. “Developments in Mediterranean Shipping and Maritime Trade.” In D. Robinson and A. I. Wilson (eds.), Maritime Archaeology and Ancient Trade in the Mediterranean. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 33–59. Wilson, A. I. “Saharan Trade in the Roman Period: Short-, Medium- and Long-Distance Trade Networks,” Azania: Archaeological Research in Africa 47 (4) (2013): 409–449. Wilson, A. I. and A. K. Bowman, “Introduction: Trade, Commerce, and the State.” In A. I. Wilson and A. K. Bowman (eds.), Trade, Commerce and the State in the Roman World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 1–26. Wilson, A. I. and M. Flohr (eds.). Urban Craftsmen and Traders in the Roman World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Worp, K. A. (ed.). Greek Papyri from Kellis: I (P. Kel. G.). Oxford: Oxbow Books, 1995. Wright, N. T. Jesus and the Victory of God. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996. Yadin, Y., N. Lewis, and J. Greenfield. The Documents from the Bar Kokhba Period in the Cave of Letters, Hebrew, Aramaic and Nabatean-Aramaic Papyri. Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 2002. Yardeni, A. Textbook of Aramaic, Hebrew and Nabataean Documentary Texts from the Judaean Desert and Related Material, Vol. A: The Documents. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Press, 2000. [Hebrew].

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bibliography

239

Yarshater, E. “Introduction,” CHI 3 (1) (1983): xvii–lxxv. Yavetz, Z. The Common People. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1958. [Hebrew]. Yiftach-Firanko, U. Marriage and Marital Arrangements: A History of the Greek Marriage Documents in Egypt, 4th Century BCE–4th Century CE. Munich: Beck, 2003. Yiftach-Firanko, U. “P. Col. Inv. 131 Recto: A Loan Contract with ‘Paramone’ Provision from Mid-First Century CE Theadelphia,” JJP 40 (2010): 267–282. Zangenberg, J., H. W. Attridge, and D. B. Martin (eds.), Religion, Ethnicity and Identity in Ancient Galilee: A Region in Transition. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007. Zeichmann, C. B. “Loanwords or Code-Switching? Latin Transliteration and the Setting of Mark’s Composition,” Journal of the Jesus Movement in Its Jewish Setting 4 (2017): 42–64. Zelizer, V. A. The Social Meaning of Money. New York: Basic Books, 1994. Zelizer, V. A. Economic Lives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011. Zerbini, A. “Human Mobility in the Roman Near East: Patterns and Motives.” In L. De Ligt and L. E. Tacoma (eds.), Migration and Mobility in the Early Roman Empire. Leiden: Brill, 2016, 305–344. Ziebarth, E. “Trapeza,” PW, RE 6 (2) (1937): 2194–2207. Zimmermann, R. A. The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Zissu, B. “Interbellum Judea 70–132 CE: An Archaeological Perspective.” In J. Schwartz and P. Tomson (eds.), Jews and Christians in the First and Second Centuries: The Interbellum 70–132 CE. Leiden: Brill, 2018, 19–49. Zwalve, W. J. “Exit Bos Frisica: The Tolsum Tablet and Roman Law,” The Legal History Review 77 (3–4) (2009): 355–366.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Index of Authors Aberbach, M. 23n50, 177n1 Adams, J. N. 31n6 Albeck, Ch. 106n39, 116n26, 129n9, 139n35, 140n38, 141n39, 159n17, 161n20 Alexander, P. 14n30, 15n33, 16n34, 17n35, 87n75 Allison, D. C. 19n40 Alon, G. 59n3, 60n8, 73n49, 183n13 Alonso, J. L. 4n5, 6n11, 126n2, 129n10 Andreades, A. M. 1n1, 41n39 Andreau, J. 8n18, 23n50, 30n3, 38n25, 40n35, 41n36, 42n41, 42n44, 44, 45n57, 48n69, 50n79, 98n16, 102n25 Arav, R. 62n15 Arbel, Y. 94n5 Arruñada, B. 32n9 Ascough, R. S. 38n23 Ashburner, W. 37n21 Atzmon, A. 96n12 Aubert, J. J. 17n37, 41n39, 93n1 Avery-Peck, A. J. 7n15, 16n34, 17n37, 21n43 Aviam, M. 57n1 Avi-Yonah, M. 58n2, 59n3, 60n6;8, 61n9 Ayali, M. 177n1 Badiyi, B. 50n82 Bagnall, R. S. 8n18, 24n50, 34n12, 41n37;40, 43n45, 59n4, 94n4, 110n7, 111n15, 154n3, 155n4, 156n8:9, 157n12;15 Baker, D. L. 71n40;41 Balch, D. L. 61n12 Bang, P. F. 7n15, 18n38, 32n9, 36n18, 58n2 Bar, D. 15n3, 60n6 Baras, Z. 60n8 Barclay, J. M. G. 5n7, 20n41 Barnes, T. D. 53n89 Baron, J. 95n10 Baron, S. W. 92n89 Baruch, E. 62n14 Bauschatz, J. 18n38 Beer, M. 1n1, 2n2, 8n18, 23n50, 52n86, 63n17, 64n18, 65n20, 92n89, 105n35, 106n39, 110n7, 113n18, 124n39, 135n20, 136n21, 137n25, 140n36 Ben Zeev, M. 58n2, 59n3

Benoit, P. 72n47 Berger, A. 46n63 Bingen, J. 24n50, 43n45, 155n4 Bird, M. F 87n74 Birks, P. 46n64 Bland, R. 175n49 Blouin, K 111n14 Bobbink, R. 79n59 Bogaert, R. 33n10, 43n45, 186n19 Bordo, M. D. 1n1, 2n2 Borjian, H. 51n82 Bowman, A. K. 22n46, 24n50, 29n2, 32n9, 33n10, 38n23 Bozik, M. S. 35n12 Bransbourg, G. 33n10, 34n12 Broekaert, W. 8n18, 9n20, 42n41 Broshi, M. 50n80, 66n29, 72n46;47 Brosius, M. 51n82 Brown, P. 61n9 Brown, R. E. 20n41 Browne, G. M. 79n59 Brughmans, T. 33n10 Brunner, C. 50n82 Bryen, A. Z. 18n38 Büchler, A. 182n12 Buckland, W. W. 3n4, 5n7, 48n69, 49n77 Buckley, S. L. 53n91 Butcher, K. 95n9, 108n1 Cameron, A. 61n9 Camodeca, G. 39, 194 Candy, P. 37n21 Canepa, M. P. 50n81, 51n82 Carson, R. A. G. 108n1 Casson, L 36n16;17, 66n30 Cereti, C. 51n83 Chancey, M. A. 19n40 Chankowski, V. 34n11, 42n42, 43n45 Charlesworth, J. H. 19n40 Choksy, J. K. 52n86 Christiansen, E. 95n8 Clarysse, W. 43n45 Cockle, W. E. H. 52n85 Coffee, N. 42n44, 80n61 Cohen, A. 70n40

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Index of Authors Cohen, B. 77n56, 79n58 Cohen, B. S. 14n31, 134n18, 183n14 Cohen, E. E. 35n14, 36n19 Cohen, S. J. D. 58n2, 79n49, 87n74, 89n79, 91n87 Cokle, W. E. A. 38n23, 44n55 Collins, J. J. 58n2 Corbier, M. 32n9 Corcoran, S. 54n95 Cornell, T. J. 6n14 Cotton, H. M 52n85, 52n8, 59n3 Coughlan, A. C. T. 79n59 Crawford, M. H. 23n48 Cromhout, M. 21n44 Crossan, J. D. 19n40 D’Arms, J. 17n36, 34n12, 37n21, 46n64 D’ors, A. 47n65 Dan, Y. 60n8, 66n31 Danker, F. W. 46n62, 109n6 Dar, S. 57n1 Daryaee, T. 35n12, 50n81, 51n82:83, 54n95, 99n18, 140n36 Davies, J. K. 93n4 De Blois, L. 60n7 De Ligt, L. 7n15, 22n46, 23n47;48, 33n10, 35n15 De Romanis, F. 36n20, 119n33 De Ste Croix, G. E. M. 6n14, 38n26 De Vaan, M. 46n64 De Vries, B. 84n68 Derret, F. D. M. 20n40;42 Dezhamkhooy, M. 64n19 Di Cosmo, N. 50n81 Dignas, B. 50n81 Dixon, S. 47n66, 80n61 Dothan, T. 50n80, 66n31 Drexhage, H. J. 49n77 Drijvers, J. W. 50n81 Duling, D. C. 20n40;42 Duncan-Jones, R. 41n36, 48n72, 49n74;79, 95n8 Dyson, S. L. 95n8 Eberle, L. P. 31n6, 43n46 Edgar, C. C. 41n39, 43n46, 44n55, 156n8 Edmondson, J. 7n15, 139n36 Edwards, D. R. 19n40, 21n44 Edwell, P. 50n81

241 Ehrman, B. D. 20n41 Eilars, W. 100n19 Eliash, B. Z. 70n40, 161n20, 175n48 Elliott, C. P. 44n51, 108n1, 118n30, 154n1, 175n49 Elman, Y. 13n28, 14n31, 35n12, 52n86;87, 54n93, 64n18, 68n37, 69n39, 87n74, 90n82;83, 91n85;86, 102n24, 179n8 Elon, M. 68n36 Epstein, J. N. 61n10, 73n49, 175n48 Erdkamp, P. 32n9, 112n16, 156n8 Eshel, E. 72n47 Eshel, H. 58n2, 59n3, 72n47, 73n47, 87n74 Fabian, L. 50n81, 51n82 Farrokh, K. 52n84 Feldman, L. H. 71n44, 91n87, 94n5, 207 Feliks, Y. 60n8, 68n37, 115n23, 120n33, 185n16 Fiensy, D. A. 57n1 Fiey, J. M. 53n89 Finckh, H. E. 34n12, 43n46 Fine, S. 16n33 Finley, M. I. 31, 32, 34n11 Fiori, R. 18n37 Fischer Genz, B. 30n2, 59n3 Flohr, M. 32n9 Flückiger, M. 33n10 Foster, P. 19n40 Frank, T. 47n68, 49n76, 66n29 Frey, J. B. 63n16 Freyne, S. 19n40 Friedman, M. A. 88n78, 194n1 Friedman, S. 15n33, 26n54, 182 Friedman, S. Y. 12n27 Frier, B. W. 17n37, 33n9, 49n74, 59n4, 70n40, 126n1 Frost, H. 53n91 Frye, R. N. 35n12, 50n82, 51n82, 64n18, 100n19 Gabba, E. 58n2 Gabrielsen, V. 35n14, 41n38 Gafni, I. M. 14n30, 61n10, 63n17, 64n18, 73n49, 90n82, 91n84, 92n89, 159n17 Gamauf, R. 40n33 Gamoran, H. 68n37, 70n40 Garnsey, P. 1n1, 7n15, 35n14, 37n21, 41n38, 59n4

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

242 Gastmann, A. L. 1n1, 3n4 Geiger, G. 72n47 Gelpi, R. M. 1n1 Geraghty, R. M. 33n10 Geranio, M. 32n9 Gevaryahu, A. 119n33, 134n18 Giardina, A. 38n25 Gibbs, M. 47n68 Gignoux, P. 99n18 Gilat, Y. D. 84n68 Glare, P. G. 46n64, 48n69, 137n28 Göbl, R. 99n18 Goitein, S. D. 49n77, 90n81 Goldberg, A. 12n27 Gonzales, J. 18n38 Goodblatt, D. 16n34, 60n8, 63n17, 64n18, 74n52, 106n39 Goodman, M. 14n30, 15n33, 16n34, 17n35, 23n50, 73n49, 87n74, 87n75, 127n6 Goodrich, J. K. 164n25 Gordon, B. D. 62n13, 187n20 Graeber, D. 93n2 Green, W. S. 15n32 Greene, K. 10n21, 31n8, 32n9, 39n29, 42n41 Greenfield, J. 39n29 Greer, M. R. 19n39, 33n10, 49n77 Gregoratti, L. 51n82;83 Grenfell, B. P. 38n23, 43n46 Groot, M. 139n36 Gröschler, P. 46n64 Grossman, A. 90n81 Guijarro, S. 20n40;42 Gulak, A. 23n49, 68n36, 109n6, 111n13 Gyselen, R. 51n82 Haensch, C. 60n8 Haklai, M. 42n44, 46n60 Halivni, D. W. 15n33, 89n79 Hamel, G. 30n3, 34n11, 61n12, 65n21, 68n37, 156n8 Hamilton, N. Q. 41n39, 186n19 Hanson, A. E. 44n48, 155n5 Harl, K. W. 93n4, 95n9 Harland, P. A. 38n23 Harris, J. M. 12n27, 96n12 Harris, W. V. 7n15, 24n50, 29n1, 30n3, 31n6, 35n15, 41n35;36;39, 42n43, 43n45, 44, 48n71, 95n7, 117n29, 172, 175n49 Hartnell, T. 51n82

Index of Authors Harvey, A. E. 20n41 Haselgrove, C. 94n7 Haubrich, J. G. 1n1, 2n2 Hawkins, C. 9n20, 126n4 Hayes, C. 85n69;71 Healey, J. F. 79n59 Heichelheim, F. M. 66n29 Hendy, M. 45n58 Herman, G. 91n86 Hezser, C. 16n34, 37n21, 119n33, 178n4, 182n12 Hill, A. E. 70n40 Hintze, A. 64n19 Hirschfeld, Y. 62n14 Hitchner, R. B. 34n12 Höcker, C. 34n12 Hohlfelder, R. L. 66n30 Hollander, D. B. 1n1, 34n11, 94n4 Hollard, D. 117n29 Holleran, C. 30n2, 32n9, 34n12, 35n15, 39n27, 43n46 Holmén, T. 20n41 Honsell, H. 37n21, 46n64 Hopkins, K. 7n15, 32n9, 37n21, 95n8 Horbury, W. 73n49 Horden, P. 7n15, 23n47, 95n9 Horrell, D. G. 20n40;42 Horsley, R. A. 19n40 Howgego, C. 23n50, 29n2, 44n51, 60n7, 95n8;9, 172 Hoyer, D. 41n39, 195n2 Hudson, M. 1n1, 4n4 Hunt, A. S. 38n23, 41n39, 43n46, 44n55, 156n8 Ilan, T. 194n1 Instone-Brewer, D. 16n34, 74n50 Isaac, B. 34n12, 63n17, 91n86 Jacobs, L. 63n17 Jakab, E. 39n27 Jany, J. 54n92 Jastrow, M. 111n12 Johnson, A. C. 49n77, 111n15 Johnston, D. 17n37, 48n69 Jones, A. H. M. 1n1, 42n41, 49n79, 59n3 Jones, D. 24n50, 35n14, 36n18, 37n21, 39n27, 40n34, 41n38, 43n45;47, 44n51;55, 47n67, 49n74, 102n25, 194n2 Jones, M. K. 7n15

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

243

Index of Authors Jones, P. 38n25 Jördens, A. 22n4 Joshel, S. 38n26 Julien-Labruyère, F. 1n1 Jursa, M. 50n82 Kahana, M. I. 12n27, 26n53, 96n1 Kaizer, T. 10n22 Kalmin, R. 14n30;31, 16n34, Kaser, M. 46n64 Kasher, A. 5n7, 58n2 Katsari, C. 1n1 Katz, J. 84n68, 105n35 Kay, P. 40n34, 43n46, 47n66 Kearsley, R. A. 68n37 Kedar, B. Z. 50n80, 66n31 Keddie, A. 58n2 Kehoe, D. P. 1n1, 8n16:17, 17n37, 24n50, 33n9, 40n31;34, 41n36, 93n4, 156n8–11 Kelly, B. 33n10 Kelly, P. V. 110n2 Kiel, Y. 54n95 Kimron, E. 72n46 Kingsley, S. A. 66n29 Kloppenborg, J. S. 38n23, 73n47, 164n25 Knapp, R. 33n10 Knauth, R. J. D. 45n59 Koester, H. 20n41 Kohut, A. 137n26 Kolb, A. 29n2 Korver, J. 46n62 Kraemer, D. 12n27, 15n32 Krampe, C. 156n8 Kraus, S. 66n29 Kreller, H. 46n64 Krmnicek, S. 94n7 Kron, G. 139n36 Kühnert, H. 49n77 Kushnir-Stein, A. 66n30 Kutcher, Y. 127n5 Labendz, J. R. 90n82 Laiou-Thomadakis, A. E. 1n1, 2n2 Lampe, C. W. H. 46n62 Langer, G. 70n40 Lapin, H. 1n1, 2n2, 16n34, 24, 45n56, 60n8, 74, 76n54, 78–81, 85, 101, 108, 110n7, 111n12, 112, 113n18, 115, 127n6, 128, 140, 144, 158, 163, 170, 173n41, 174n45, 177

Larsson-Lovén, L. 39n27 Launaro, A. 31n8 Lawrence, D. 51n82 Le Quéré, E. 31n6, 43n46 Leonard, R. 47n65 Lerouxel, F. 19n39, 33n10, 42n44, 49n77 Levine, A. 35n12, 52n86 Levine, A. J. 19n40 Levine, L. I. 14n30;31, 15n33, 60n6, 62n15, 66n30, 109n5, 119n33 Lewis, N. 39n29, 49n77, 59n5, 72n47, 154n4, 156n8, 157n12 Liddell, H. G. 46n61, 109n6, 137n28 Lieberman, S. 5n8, 12n26, 15n33, 47n68, 49n76;77, 66n30, 67n33, 69n39, 76n54, 77n56, 78n57, 79n58, 82n65, 84n67, 97n14, 98n15, 101n21;22, 102n27, 104n30;31, 112n17, 114n22, 116n26–28, 119n33, 120n35, 124n39, 129n9, 130n11, 131n12;14, 132n16, 133n17, 134n18, 136n24, 137, 145, 146n45, 149n50, 150, 151n55, 158n16, 163n24, 164, 165n27, 166, 167n30, 170n34, 174n44;47, 175n48, 178n4, 179n7, 181n9;11, 182, 183n13, 187n21;22, 188n23, 194n1 Lieu, J. M. 91n87 Lifshitz, B. 63n16 Linder, A. 66n29, 92n89 Ling, T. J. M. 20n40;42 Lis, C. 32n9 Liu, J. 40n32 Llewelyn, S. R. 68n37 Lloris, F. B. 18n38 Lo Cascio, E. 29n2, 37n21, 58n2, 93n4, 95n9, 175n49 Love, J. R. 32n9 Lowenstam, S. L. 70n40 Luhmann, N. 18, 19n39 Lukonin, V. G. 50n82, 64n18 Maas, M. 50n81 MacDonald, S. B. 1n1, 3n4 Mack, B. L. 20n41 MacMullen, R. 18n37, 59n4 Macuch, M. 54n95, 90n83 Magie, D. 49n78 Malina, B. J. 20n41;42 Maloney, R. P. 48n69;71, 49n76, 53n91 Mandel, P. 12n27

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

244 Manning, J. 7n15, 10n22, 29n1 Margaritis, E. 7n15 Marshall, J. 20n40 Mashkour, M. 139n36 Mason, S. 20n43 Mattingly, D. H. 108n1 Mattingly, D. J. 33n9, 95n10, 156n10 Mauer, Q. 79n59 Maurer, B. 95n7 McCollough, C. T. 19n40, 21n44 Meeks, W. A. 20n40;42 Meggitt, J. J. 19n40 Meier, J. P. 19n40 Meikle, S. 9n19 Melamed, E. Z. 61n10 Menirav, J. 1n1, 2n2, 8n18, 23n49;50, 30n3, 60n8, 66n29, 112n16, 120n35, 128n8, 132n15, 151n55 Meshorer, Y. A. 94n5 Meyer, E. A. 22n46 Meyer, P. M. 49n77 Meyers, E. M. 19n40, 62n14 Milgrom, J. 70n40 Milikowsky, Ch. 15n33, 16n34 Millar, F. 52n85, 95n9 Millar. F. G. B. 52n85 Miller, S. S. 21n43, 59n5 Millett, P. 1n1, 8n18, 9n20, 10n21, 11n23, 24n50, 31n6, 36n19, 41n36, 43n45, 44n52, 46n62, 71n40 Millhauser J. 95n10 Mishkin, F. S. 9n19, 41n35, 48n71, 50n79, 94n4 Mishor, M. 73n47 Modrzejewski, J. M. 72n46 Mokhtarian, J. S. 53n88, 90n82 Mommsen, T. 37n21, 48n73 Monson, A. 164n25 Montanari, F. 46n61, 109n6 Mor, M. 58n2, 59n3 Morel, J. P. 38n26 Morley, N. 33n9, 37n21, 41n38, 95n8 Morris, I. 7n15, 17n37, 24n50, 30n5, 37n21, 51n82, 93n4 Morrison, C. 1n1, 2n2 Moscovitz, L. 61n10 Mousourakis, G. 3n4, 18n38, 46n63 Moxnes, H. 19n40 Mrozek, S. 33b10, 40n34, 46n64, 48n71

Index of Authors Nedungatt, G. 53n89 Nelson, B. N. 53n91 Neufeld, E. 70n40, 71n41 Neusner, J. 11n25, 12n27, 13n28, 15, 24, 25, 64n18, 67, 69, 73n48;49, 75n53, 76–78, 81–83, 85, 86, 92n89, 97, 98, 101–103, 104n29, 106n39, 111n12, 112, 114, 116, 118, 120, 121, 123, 127, 129–131, 133, 144, 145, 148, 150, 159, 162, 164, 166, 170n34, 174n46, 178–181, 185, 186, 187n22 Newton, T. 95n7 Nicholas, B. 46n64 Nickelsburg, G. W. E. 21n43 Nicols, J. 2n2 Nikolsky, R. 96n12 Noam, V. 16n33, 73n48 Novick, T. 7n15 Oakley, S. 34n12 Oakman, D. E. 7n15, 20n40;42 Obbink, D. D. 154n3, 155n4, 157n12 Oliva, J. C. M. 33n10 Ophir, A. 85n69:71 Oppenheimer, A. 14n31, 62n14, 87n75, 91n86, 121n36 Palme, B. 5n7, 33n10, 49n77, 111n14 Panaino, A. 35n12, 50n82 Papoli Yazdi, L. 64n19 Parisot, J. 53n89 Patai, R. 66n29 Patrich, J. 62n14 Payne, R. 51n82, 52n83 Peebles, G. 3n4 Perikhanian, A. 51n83, 54n93;94;95 Perlmutter, H. 9n18, 34n12, 59n3, 62n14, 65n21:27, 94n6, 170n33, 171n35 Pestman, P. W. 47n66, 155n4, 157n12 Philipson, D. 60n7 Pigière, F. 139n36 Pleket, H. W. 37n21 Poitras, G. 32n9 Pomeroy, S. B. 39n27 Porter, S. 19n40 Prather, C. L. 1n1, 2n2 Purcell, N. 7n15, 23n47, 95n9 Quilici, L. 34n12

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Index of Authors Rabinowitz, J. J. 70n40 Rabinowitz, N. N. 169n31 Rathbone, D. 34n11, 36n20, 37n21, 38n23, 94n4, 119n31;33, 155 Rathmann, M. 34n12 Raugh, N. K. 31n6, 43n45 Redding, R. W. 139n36 Reece, D. W. 30, 31n8, 35n13, 49n75 Reed, C. M. 36n19, 43n45 Reed, J. L. 19n40 Reger, G. 138n32 Renner, T. T. 111n15 Reyerson, K. L. 30n4 Rezakhani, K. 50n81, 51n83, 140n36 Rice, C. 36n20 Richardson, J. S. 18n38 Riggsby, A. M. 19n39 Ristvet, L. 93n3 Rivlin, J. 90n81 Robinson, O. F. 18n37 Rosenfeld, B. Z. 7n15, 9n18, 23n50, 34n12, 59n3, 60n8, 62n14, 65n21:27, 66n29:30, 86n72, 87n74, 94n6, 112n16, 120n35, 128n8, 132n15, 150n54, 151n55, 170n33, 171n35 Rosenstein, N. 7n15, 40n34 Rosenthal, D. 89n79, 104n30:31:33, 134n18, 136n24, 137n27;29;30, 174n44, 182n12, 183n13 Rosen-Zvi, I. 85n69:71 Rosillo López, C. 30n2 Rostovtzeff, M. I. 31, 52n85, 186n19 Roth, J. P. 37n21, 58n2, 59n3 Roth-Gerson, L. 63n16 Rouge, J. 37n21, 66n30 Routledge, C. 10n22 Rovira-Guardiola, C. 47n68 Rowlandson, J. 38n24;26, 39n27, 40n32 Rubenstein, J. L. 64n18, 84n68 Rubin, N. 57n1, 64n19 Rubin, Z. 51n82, 64n18 Rubio-Campillo, X. 32n9 Ruffing, K. 34n12 Rupprecht, H. A. 49n77, 156n8 Safrai, S. 13n28, 39n26, 50n80, 59n5, 124n39 Safrai Z. 14n29, 15n33, 59n5, 60n8, 64n19, 73n47, 124n39

245 Saller, R. 7n15, 17n37, 24n50, 30n5, 37n21, 51n82, 93n4 Samellas, A. 53n91 Samuel, D. H. 38n23, 69n39, 156n9 Sanders, E. P. 19n40 Sartre, M. 62n14, 95n9, 108n1 Satlow, M. L. 59n5, 64n19 Schäfer, P. 16n34, 58n2 Scheidel, W. 7n15, 17n37, 24n50, 30n5, 32n9, 37n21, 51n82, 93n4 Schiffman, L. 52n86 Schneider, F. 30n5, 33n9 Schultz, F. 18n37, 46n63 Schürer, E. 58n2, 73n49, 87n74, 187n21 Schuster, S. 36n19 Schwabe, M. 63n16 Schwartz, D. R. 186n20 Schwartz, J. 14n30, 21n43, 62n14, 66n30, 87n74 Schwartz, S. 58n2, 60n8, 73n49, 87n74 Scott, R. 46n61, 109n6, 137n28 Secunda, S. 54n95 Sharp, M. 38n23 Sharvit, S. 127n6 Shatzman, I. 7n15, 29n2, 32n8, 95n9 Shemesh, A. 124n39 Sheridan, J. A. 44n55 Sherwin-White, A. N. 48n72 Shlasky, A. 23n50, 175n48 Shochetman, E. 183n13;14 Sidwell, K. 38n25 Sijpesteijn, P. 157n13 Silver, M. 5n7, 32n9, 45n57, 48n70, 108n2 Simpson, St. J. 51n82, 64n18 Sims-Williams, N. 52n84 Sirks, B. 17n37, 24n50, 42n41, 44n55, 47n64, 95n7, 102n25 Smallwood, E. 73n49 Sokoloff, M. 6n13, 100n19, 111n12 Soloveitchik, H. 85n71 Soly, H. 32n9 Somer, S. 47n68, 48n69, 49n79 Sophocles, E. A. 137n28 Southern, P. 60n7 Speidel, M. A. 29n2 Sperber, D. 7n15, 22n45, 26n57, 39n28, 58n2, 59n3, 60n6;8, 62n14, 66n29, 68n37, 87n74;75, 91n86, 108n2, 117n29, 120n33, 127n5, 137n31, 139n36, 174n44, 175n48, 194n1

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

246

Index of Authors

Stambaugh, J. E. 61n12 Stegemann, W. 20n40;42 Stein-Hölkeskamp, E. 30n2 Stemberger, G. 12n27, 13n28, 61n10, 159n17 Sterling, G. E. 58n2 Stern, S. 15n33, 39n26, 60n6, 61n10, 87n76, 91n87 Stertz, S. A. 17n37 Strack, H. L. 12n27, 13n28, 61n10, 159n17 Sussmann, Y. 13n28, 73n48, 89n79 Sweet, J. 20n41 Sylla, R. E. 47n68, 48n69, 49n79

Van Minnen, P. 24n50, 33n10, 41n38, 45n58, 49n76, 60n7, 79n59, 102n23, 111n13, 172n40 Vandorpe, K. 34n11, 42n42, 43n45;46 Verboven, K. 32n8, 33n10, 34n11, 39n27, 40n34, 42n42, 43n45, 47n66, 80n61, 94n7, 194n2 Verhagen, H. L. E. 19n39 Veyne, P. 95n8 Von Freyberg, H. U. 95n9 Von Reden, S. 8n18, 24n50, 29n1, 32n9, 43n45, 49n77, 93n3, 94n4, 94n10 Von Soden, H. F. 49n77

Takahashi, R. 8n17 Tal, O. 57n1 Ta-shma, I. M. 90n81 Taubenschlag, R. 110n7, 111n13, 113n18 Tcherikover, V. A. 43n45, 49n76, 71n41, 72n46 Tchernia, A. 35n15, 37n21, 41n35 Temin, P. 34n11 Temin, P. 8n18, 9n20, 24n50, 32n9, 33n10, 34n11;12, 35n15, 41n39, 42n42, 49n75, 136n22 Tenger, B. 41n39, 49n76;77 Terpstra, T. 10n22, 39n27, 43n45 Thebert, Y. 38n25 Theissen, G. 19n40 Thoma, M. 39n28 Thür, G. 36n19, 37n21, 157n13 Tomlin, R. S. O. 22n46, 126n3 Tompkins, D. P. 47n65 Tomson, P. 62n14 Tran, N. 11n23 Treggiari, S. 38n26 Trisciuoglio, A. 42n41 Tropper, A. 57n1, 59n4, 64n19 Tsafrir, Y. 62n14;15 Tunali, H. 35n12 Tzafrir, Y. 62n14

Wakely, R. 70n40 Wassink, A. 118n29 Watson, A. 29n36, 37n21, 48n73 Watson, F. 19n40 Weatherford, J. 95n10 Weber, M. 3n4 Weingort, A. 70n40, 86n73 Weisehofer, J. 52n83, 64n18 Weiss, Z. 62n14, 63n15 Welles, C. B. 52n85 West, L. C. 49n77, 111n15 Westbrook, R. 18n37 Widengren, G. 50n81, 64n18 Wilkinson, T. J. 51n82 Wilson, A. I. 24n50, 29n2, 32n9, 33n10, 34n12, 36n20, 94n7 Winter, D. 19n40 Winter, E. 50n81 Worp, K. A. 22n46, 49n77, 111n15 Wright, N. T. 21n4

Udoh, F. E. 58n2, 61n10 Urbach, E. E. 59n3, 60n6, 64n18, 84n68, 86n72, 87n74, 89n79, 91n87 Ustaoğlu, M. 35n12 Vaage, L. 20n41 Van de Mieroop, M. 1n1 Van der Spek, R. J. 51n82, 52n84

Yadin, Y. 39n29 Yardeni, A. 94n5 Yarshater, E. 64n18 Yavetz, Z. 29n2, 46n64 Yiftach-Firanko, U. 38n23;24, 39n28, 45n60 Zangenberg, J. H. W. 21n44 Zeichmann, C. B. 58n2 Zelizer, V. A. 94n4 Zerbini, A. 33n10, 59n3 Ziebarth, E. 43n45 Zimmermann, R. A. 46n64 Zissu, B. 58n2, 59n3 Zuiderhoek, A. 8n18, 9n20, 42n41 Zwalve, W. J. 22n46 Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Index of Subjects Abaye 117, 118, 147, 184 Abba 173 Abba Mar, the son of Rav Papa 189, 190 Abba son of Manyumi, Rabbi 64n20 Abba son of Zemina, Rabbi 182n12 agriculture, agricultural 7, 8n16, 16n34, 33n10, 34, 38n23, 45, 51n82, 60n8, 63, 72n47, 115n23, 120n33, 156n8–11, 193 Aha, Rav 152 Aha son of Ika, Rav 152 Akko 87 Akiva, Aqiva, Rabbi 75, 81, 127 Alexandria 36, 37n21, 58n2, 66n30, 79n59, 172n38 Ami, Rabbi 182n12 Anan, Rav 119n32, 188 antichresis 77n56, 79, 80 Aphrahat 53 artisan 9n20, 41, 60, 126n4, 177n1 Ashi, Rav 91, 99, 121, 184n15, 188n23 Ashkelon 36 ashrai, asharta 6 a-vaxt 54 Babylon, Babylonia (place) 1, 2, 10, 13, 14, 16n34, 23n50, 27, 52n86, 57, 62n14, 63, 64, 65, 90, 91n84, 92, 106n39, 110, 113n18, 138, 143, 159n17, 161, 162, 179n8, 180, 187, 189 Babylonian Aramaic 6n13, 100n19, 11n12 Babylonian Amoraim 1n1, 2n2, 8n18, 23n50, 50n82, 51n82, 52n86, 63n17, 64n18, 65n20, 83, 84, 84n67, 92n89, 105n35, 106n39, 110n7, 113n18, 124n39, 135n20, 136n21, 137n25, 140n36, 159n17, 165, 180, 189 Babylonian Jewry, Babylonian Jews 1n1, 2n2, 35n12, 52n86, 53, 63, 64n18, 84n74, 92, 140n36 Babylon, Sasanid 20, 23, 34, 102, 106n39 Babylonia, Parthian 35n12, 50, 51n82, 52, 63n17, 64n19 Babylonian Nehardeans 104 Babylonian Rabbis 52, 106

Babylonian Sages 13n28, 14, 64, 69n39, 87, 106, 107, 117 Babylonian Yeshivot 87n74 Bank, banking, banker 1n1, 2n2, 4n7, 8n18, 9n19, 22, 23, 30n4, 31n6, 34n11, 35n14, 36n18, 37n21, 39n27, 40n34;35, 41n38;39, 42–46, 48–50, 55, 63, 78, 98, 99, 102, 108n2, 126, 130, 131, 136n22, 186, 191, 193, 194n2 See also shulchani, table operator bargain 111–113, 166 Bar Kokhba Revolt 58, 62, 73, 86, 195 barter 4, 93, 99, 118, 154, 155, 191, 192 beer 104, 135 benevolent credit 10 Boethus bZonin 78 borrow, borrowing 4, 5, 11, 31, 34, 39–41, 44, 46n46, 54, 55, 65, 69, 71n40, 74–76, 81, 88, 89, 96, 103, 105, 119n31, 127, 131, 144, 145, 149, 155, 156, 158, 161–163, 169, 170, 177, 179, 180, 182, 188, 194n1 borrower 3–5, 9, 12, 17, 28, 37, 38n23, 40, 41, 43–45, 46n62, 47, 48, 49n77, 50, 54–56, 61, 67–69, 71, 72, 78–83, 85, 96–98, 100, 106, 116–118, 119n31, 124, 133, 134, 146, 153, 154, 157n14, 158, 160–163, 169, 176–178, 180, 181, 183, 184, 189, 190, 192 Byzantium, Byzantine 1n1, 2n2, 17, 21, 23, 33n10, 51n82, 54n95, 60n6, 61, 111n15, 154, 194n1 Byzantine period 45, 49n77, 60n8, 62n14, 66, 108, 110, 111n12, 137n28 businesspersons 60, 63 Caesarea 59, 62n14, 66n30, 87, 119n33 cash 3, 4, 27, 38n23, 44, 66, 72, 73, 78, 80, 81n62, 98, 108, 109, 115, 117, 118, 123–126, 130, 132, 133, 138, 154, 184, 192 “Cash and carry” 4, 27, 35 See also cash loan child, children 40, 55, 57, 59, 64n19, 66n29, 146, 189 Christian 19n40, 20, 21, 48n69, 53, 58n2, 60, 61n9, 62n14, 68n37, 91, 92, 95n8

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

248 Church Father(s) 53 coin 4, 29, 32n9, 75, 77, 78, 82, 94, 95n9, 96–101, 108, 119n33, 126n2, 130, 134n18, 145, 145, 155, 157, 171–175, 194 collateral 3, 46n64, 54, 67, 72, 78, 79, 184, 187 commerce 3, 8n18, 17n36, 18n37, 23n50, 29, 31–34, 35n12, 36, 37n21, 39, 44n55, 46n64, 50n79, 58, 66, 87, 93, 95n7, 102, 112, 137, 155n4, 177n1, 192, 193 commercial credit 9, 10, 30, 194, 195 consumption 9, 10n21, 42n41, 69, 93, 139 consumption credit 9 copper 4, 98, 99, 100n18 credere 4 credit activity 50, 51 credit contact 56 credit industry 34 credit market 2, 19n39, 33n10, 42n44, 49n77, 69n39 credit services 42 credit system 9, 48, 52n86, 68 credit transaction 2, 5, 9, 10, 14, 29, 38, 40, 52n86, 55, 62, 63, 65, 67, 95, 98, 126n4, 127, 154, 193, 195 creditor 4, 5, 10, 11, 26, 27, 34, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47n65, 54, 67–71, 82, 97, 99, 104, 117, 119n31, 124, 133, 178, 180, 181, 183n13, 189 creditum 47 crops 9, 164, 168 daneion 45 daneizen 45 dang 99 danka 99, 100 drachma 8n16, 39, 44, 47, 99, 157n14 day-today life, everyday life 16, 61, 73 Deal  debt 1n1, 3, 6n14, 7n15, 34n11, 35n12, 38n23, 40, 43, 44, 45n59, 46n64, 47n65, 49n77, 54, 60n7, 68, 78, 79n59, 80n61, 83, 93n2, 94n5, 95, 98, 106n36, 117, 118, 123, 126, 127n6, 156n11, 164 debtor 46n64, 99, 104, 148 indebtedness 83, 98, 180, 181, 185 de-Oraita 84 See also Torah prohibition deposit, deposited 4, 5n7, 6n11, 42, 44, 45n57, 47n67, 48n70, 63, 69, 78, 86, 104, 106n37, 108n2, 119, 186

Index of Subjects de-Rabbanan 84 See also rabbinic prohibition Denar (=Dinar) 75, 76, 95n9, 97–99, 103, 115, 116, 119, 121–123, 133, 134, 138, 141, 142, 144, 146, 171, 174, 175, 196 denarius 109n4 Dinar (=Denar), dinarim 47, 66, 75, 99n18, 115, 116, 173, 174 Dioikesis 79n59 discount 77, 83, 98, 112, 115, 120, 122, 123, 125, 129–131, 151, 186 Economy, economic 2, 4n4, 6, 7n15, 8, 9n18, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15n32, 16–18, 22, 23, 24n50, 25, 28, 29, 30–32, 33n9, 34, 35n12, 36n19, 37n21, 38n23, 39n27, 40n34, 41n35, 41n39, 42n45, 43n46, 44n51, 45n58, 46n64, 47n66, 48, 49n74, 50–54, 58, 59n4, 60, 63, 64n18, 65, 66n29, 67–69, 72n47, 73, 81, 84n68, 86, 87, 90, 92–94, 94n7, 96, 100, 105n34, 109, 112n16, 118, 119n31, 125, 139n36, 155n7, 156n8, 157n13, 164n25, 175n48, 180, 183n13, 186n19, 187n20, 191–195 economic activity 3, 40, 42, 57, 58, 60, 126, 127, 138n32, 177, 194 economic crisis 47, 60, 108n1, 117n29 economic development 3, 29 economic interaction 3, 195 economic system 6 Egypt, Egyptian 6, 8n17, 10, 16, 18n38, 19n39, 22, 22n45, 24n50, 29, 33n10, 34n12, 35, 37, 38n23;26, 39, 41n37;39, 42, 43, 44n55, 45, 49, 59n4, 63, 70, 71n41, 72, 79, 93n3, 94n4, 95n8, 102, 109, 110, 111, 113n18, 117, 118n30, 119n31, 120n33, 126, 129, 137, 154, 155n4, 156, 156n8, 157, 157n14, 164n25, 172, 194n1 Eleazar, Rabbi 84n67, 103, 104, 136, 182, 183 Eleazar bAzariah 78 Eleazar of Hagrunia, Rabbi 142, 143 emergency credit 9 export 3, 10, 66, 172 exporter 8 faenus 46 family 7–10, 14, 20n40, 33, 39n26, 40, 43, 52, 55, 57, 59, 62n14, 64, 80, 144, 145, 156, 171, 174, 189

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Index of Subjects farm, farming 7, 8, 35, 57n1, 59, 69, 151 farmer 7, 9, 34, 38n23, 41n38, 59, 60, 63, 68, 86, 110n7, 112–115, 123, 125–127, 139, 151, 154–156, 163, 164, 166–168 fine 43, 47, 157n14, 181, 185 forgeries 42 fruit 11, 1226, 76, 78, 111n13, 114, 118, 119, 122, 123, 137, 144n40, 149, 154, 158, 161, 163, 164, 172, 176, 184n15 money for fruit 26, 27, 96, 97, 108, 111n15, 115, 124, 137, 191–193 fruit for money 26, 27, 96, 126, 128, 129, 132n16, 137–140, 147n47, 153, 169, 170, 171, 191–193 fruit for fruit 26–28, 75, 96, 97, 115, 126n2, 140, 148n47, 153, 155, 157, 158, 161n21, 163, 167–169, 174–176, 191–193 gain (n.) 9, 71, 80n61, 96, 100, 104, 105 Galilee 1n1, 2n2, 19n40, 21, 23n50, 57, 58, 63n15, 86, 87n75 Gamaliel, Rabban 74, 75, 80, 81, 106n38, 164, 167 Geonim 6, 88n78, 183n14 gold, golden 4, 26, 75, 99, 111, 115, 116, 121, 144–146, 171–175, 176n49, 194n1 goy, goyim 57n1, 85n69 group 3, 21, 37, 38, 51, 54, 59, 63, 87, 90, 151, 188, 193 half-shekel 130, 187n21 Hama, Rav 134–136, 138 harvest, harvesting, harvester 7, 28, 49n76, 74, 111, 113, 114n21, 122, 123, 129, 134, 155–157, 161, 164, 166–168, 176 hazaka 124 Hellenistic 3, 10n22, 24n50, 31n6, 34n12, 38n26, 39n27, 40n35, 43, 45, 49, 51n82, 52n84, 57n1, 58, 62n14, 71, 79, 86, 93, 94, 111, 154, 155n4, 186 Hillel 65, 67, 68n36, 74, 75, 155, 158, 159, 160, 162n23, 176 Hillel II 159n17 Hillel the Elder (see Hillel) 67, 68, 74, 159 Hillel bei Rabbi Vallas, Rabbi 159n17 Hiyya (Hiya), Rav 88, 119n32, 122, 162 Hiyya the Great, Rabbi (= Hiyya) 132 Hiyya, son of RHuna, Rabbi 88 Hisda, Rav 188

249 Huna, Rav 87–91, 119n32, 136, 137, 152, 161, 162 Huna son of Rabbi Yehoshua, Rav 118 husband 38, 39, 52, 67, 143 husbandman 141, 142, 144n40, 145, 146 Idi, Rabbi 165, 173, 174 Idi bar Avin, Rav 106, 174 illegal 169, 181, 183n13, 189n15 Ilish, Rav 107n40 interest 2, 4, 8, 9, 12, 36, 40–47, 49, 50n79, 53, 54, 61, 65n20, 69–86, 88, 90, 92, 97, 100, 101, 103–105, 109, 112, 119–124, 126, 128–136, 138–147, 149, 153–159, 164, 167–170, 177–193 interest-bearing loan 2, 34n12, 46, 54, 77, 100, 177, 187, 188 interest delayed 74, 75, 80 interest in advance 80 interest proper 71, 82–84 interest rate 1n1, 3, 25, 34, 35n14, 37, 43, 44, 47–49, 52, 119, 126, 146, 157, 189, 193 direct interest 183 early interest 75, 149n50 indirect interest 183 late interest, 75, 80 deceiving interest 82, 84, 134 dust of interest 82–84, 114, 121, 131, 158, 175, 186–188, 190 fixed interest 82, 84, 99, 157, 183 one sided interest 123 prohibition(s) of interest, interest prohibiting 2, 6, 12, 27, 71, 74, 75, 77–80, 82, 85, 97, 99, 109, 133, 158, 169, 177, 189, 191–193 rabbinic interest 84n67, 85, 184, 188 semi-interest 82, 83 Torah-prohibited interest 84, 131, 183, 184 verbal interest 75n53, 81 import 3, 10, 35, 66, 172 importer 8, 126 income 7, 8, 9, 40, 41, 138, 168, 187 inflation 108, 117, 118n29 investment 2, 3, 30, 40, 41n36, 42n44, 44, 45, 47, 59, 63, 76, 77, 84, 95n10, 100, 103, 106, 107, 119n33, 137, 143, 144, 146, 156n8, 189, 191, 192 Iran, Iranian 13n28, 35n12, 50, 51, 52n83, 53, 54, 64n18, 90n83, 100n19, 140n36

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

250 iron sheep 140, 144, 147, 191 Isaac, Rabbi (= Ytzhak, Rabbi) 161, 183 Ishmael, Rabbi 11, 96 iska 100, 104, 105, 107 Jannai (=Yannai), Rabbi 136, 182 Jehudah bar Pazi, Rabbi 152 Jerusalem 4n7, 15, 21, 58n2, 61, 73n49, 120n34, 186 Jerusalem Talmud 5, 13, 61, 91, 137, 138, 172, 174, 187 Jesus 7n15, 19, 20n40, 21n44, 58n2, 59n5, 73n47 Jews, Jewry 1n1, 3, 6n13, 9n18, 10, 11, 13n28, 16n34, 19n40, 21, 23n50, 25, 35n12, 39n26, 47n67, 49n77, 50–53, 57n1, 58, 59–64, 66, 68n36, 69, 70n40, 71n40, 72, 73n47;49, 74n52, 80, 85–92, 94, 95, 100n19, 102n26, 106n37;39, 107, 109, 111n12, 130, 135, 138, 140, 146, 147, 157, 159n17, 163, 171, 177, 178n4, 181, 182, 183n13, 184, 187n21, 191–193, 194, 195 Jewish society, Jewish community 2, 2n2, 10, 13, 14, 20, 21, 23, 26, 28, 37n21, 50, 51n82, 53, 59–67, 69, 77n56, 87, 92, 94, 127, 136n21, 155n6, 177, 182, 183n13, 191, 193 non-Jews, non-Jewish 3, 10, 58, 59, 66, 85–92, 135, 144, 147, 157n14, 195 Johanan, Rabbi (=Yohanan, Rabbi) 182, 183, 185 Judah, Rabbi 4n7, 78, 102, 103n28, 106, 107, 170, 174, 188, 189 Judah the Prince, Rabbi 74n51, 91, 92, 131–133, 159n17, 162, 185 Judah Nesiah, Rabbi 159n17 Judah, Rav 160, 188, 189 ketubah 65, 67 kluto shel yam 119 kor 25, 65, 74–76, 115, 116, 121, 122, 131, 158, 160, 161, 168, 169, 194n1 legal 4, 13n28, 14, 17, 18n38, 19n39, 21, 22, 28, 38, 39n28, 49n77, 52n84, 54n95, 64n18, 66, 67, 79n59, 84, 89n79, 90n83, 92, 99, 103, 109n6, 111n13, 113n18, 116, 134n18, 173, 191, 194

Index of Subjects Lend, lending 3–5, 10, 11, 12, 17, 23n50, 26–28, 39n27, 41, 42, 43n45, 44, 45n62, 53–55, 64n20, 65, 68–72, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 85, 86, 8–93, 95n8, 96–100, 102, 105, 119n31, 123, 131, 133, 139, 141, 147, 158, 160, 161n21, 162–179, 173, 174, 176–181, 185–190, 192, 193 Lender, moneylender 3, 10, 11, 12, 17, 27, 30, 31n6, 34, 39, 41n39, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48n73, 49n78, 54, 61, 67, 68, 72, 75n53, 77–82, 90, 96, 99, 100, 115–117, 119n31, 124, 133, 134, 137, 138, 153, 154, 157–160, 163, 167, 176–181, 183–186, 189, 190 Levite 65, 124 Link, linking 115–118 livestock 140 loan 1n1, 2–6, 8–12, 16, 19n39, 24n50, 26–29, 33n10, 34n11, 35n12, 36–50, 52–56, 58n2, 61, 63, 64n20, 65–109, 111–119, 122–125, 131–138, 140, 143, 144, 147, 149n50, 150, 152–164, 166–171,173–181, 184, 185, 187–195 loan agreement 46, 75, 81 loan capital 43 loan contract 45n60, 46, 67, 80, 194 loan document 28, 72, 73n47, 94n4, 181, 185 loan transaction 96 business loan 70n40, 72, 73, 84 cash loan 8, 71, 123, 133 commercial loan 9n20, 38n23, 44, 48, 73, 74, 107 crisis loan 72, 73, 84 Interest-bearing loans See interest  monetary (money) loan 40n35, 94, 95n7, 118, 149, 154, 155, 175 personal loan 9, 153, 158, 168, 175 prohibited loan 74, 83, 168, 175 permissible loan 83, 168 solidi (loan) 38n23, 111 log 129, 137 loss 36, 45, 67n34, 87, 99, 103–105,107, 115, 122, 123, 136n22, 139, 140n37, 144, 146, 160, 163, 168, 188 mafrin ‫ מפרין‬76 malweh 85n70, 180 Mana, Rabbi 188n23

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

251

Index of Subjects maneh 25, 66, 77, 85n70, 123, 129, 133, 134, 166, 194 market price 111, 112, 115–118, 122, 135, 151, 163 Mediterranean 7n15, 10, 19n40, 23n47, 29, 32n9, 33, 35n14, 36n20, 37n21, 49n77, 51n82, 58, 60n8, 61n9, 63n15, 66, 90n81 Meir, Rabbi 11, 12, 102, 181, 182, 185 Mekhilta de Rabbi Yishmael 6n9, 26, 90n80, 96, 178n3, 194n1 merchandise 5, 6, 8, 27, 30, 31, 35, 36, 71, 80, 101, 103, 105, 108–115, 116n25, 119–121, 123, 126–133, 135–139, 144, 147–155, 158, 161–163, 171, 173, 187 merchant 9, 10, 31, 34, 36, 41, 55, 56, 126, 132, 136n22, 137, 138, 151 Meshiha 173 See pulling middling group 3 middle class 39n27, 55, 175, 194 Midrash/Midrashim 12n27, 57n1, 96, 111n12, 117n1, 182n12 Halakhic 12, 15, 26n53, 73n49, 96n12, 110 Aggadic 15 milweh 180 money 1n1, 2n2, 3–6, 9–12, 22, 23n48, 24n50, 26–28, 29n1, 30, 31n6, 33, 34, 39–45, 48, 49n76, 50n79, 51n82, 53, 56, 60n6, 61, 64n20, 65, 67–72, 75–78, 79n59, 80–83, 85, 86, 88–90, 93–101, 102n21, 103–110, 111n13, 112, 115–120, 123, 124, 126–131, 132n16, 133, 135, 137–140, 143, 145, 146, 148–153, 157n14, 158, 159, 164, 166, 168, 169, 171, 172n36, 173, 174n44, 175n48, 177, 179–187, 188n23, 189–194 money-changing 42 monetary 1n1, 30, 33n10, 35n12, 40n35, 41n36, 44n31, 46n58, 52n86, 65n22, 70n40, 74, 81, 94, 95n7, 96, 97, 106, 117, 118, 134, 140, 149, 153–155, 158–160, 167, 169, 170, 175 moral 3, 67, 90, 108, 111, 127 mortgage 69n39, 182 mortmain 146 mutuum 46 Nahman, Rav 83, 87, 88, 89, 106, 107, 134–137, 159n17, 170, 188 nautikon daneion 36 nauticum faenus 36

nautikos tokos 36 Nehardea, Nehardean, Nehardeai 14n31, 91, 104–106, 142 neshekh 70, 71, 75, 99, 100, 115, 178 New Testament 7n15, 16, 17n35, 19, 20n40– 43, 46n62, 53, 59, 61, 109 oil 66, 120, 130, 162 Oshaya, Rabbi 117, 118 Oxyrhynchus 43, 111, 154 Palestine 2, 7, 8, 9n18, 10, 12–14, 15n33, 16, 22, 27, 34n11, 36, 37n22, 50n80, 57, 58n2, 59–66, 84n67, 85, 93, 95, 102, 109, 137, 161, 162, 179, 182, 183n13, 194n1 Agrarian Palestine 7n15, 20n40;42 Byzantine Palestine 17, 23 Jewish Palestine 73n47, 187n21 Rabbinic Palestine 7n15 Roman Palestine 1, 7n15, 9n18, 14n29–31, 15n33, 16n34, 17, 20, 21n43, 22n45, 23, 26n57, 30n3, 33n10, 35n12, 44, 58n2, 60n6, 61, 62n14, 65n21, 66n29;30, 72n47, 87n75, 94n4, 108n2, 109, 120n35, 127, 139n36, 150n54, 156n8, 171, 177 Syria-Palestine 10n22 Talmudic Palestine 66n29, 115n24, 152 Papa, Rabbi 105, 118, 135, 136, 152, 190 Pappi, Rav 184 papyri, papyrus 5n7, 6, 16, 22, 24, 33n10, 34n12, 36, 37, 38n23, 39, 41n39, 43n46, 44, 45, 49, 72, 79, 102, 109–112, 119n31, 120, 126, 129, 154–157, 194 Papyrology 32, 43n45, 52n85 Parents 40, 55, 59 Partnership 2, 27, 28, 36, 66, 100–105, 107, 119n33, 137–141, 143–146, 153, 166, 191–193 Pashiz 99n100 pat-vaxt 54 Payment 4, 5, 8, 28, 43, 77, 78, 80, 83, 97–102, 108, 111, 112, 118, 119, 122, 124–133, 135–139, 141, 146, 148n47, 149, 150, 153, 155, 157–163, 166–170, 172, 173, 181, 186, 189 delayed payment, delay of payment 96, 126n2, 128, 134, 138, 152 down payment 118, 119 payment in advance, advance payment 77, 109–113, 119, 121, 123, 125, 129, 131, 137, 192

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

252 Peasant 7n15, 8n17, 19n40, 20n42, 23n47, 31n8, 35n15, 41 Persia, Persian 10, 13n28, 14n31, 29, 50n81, 51n82, 52, 53n89, 54, 55, 58n2, 64n18, 87n74, 91, 95, 140n36, 195 personal credit 9 peruta 25, 99, 100, 194 pesiqa 27, 109–114, 121–123, 131, 133 poor 3, 9, 11, 20n40, 34n11, 39, 55, 65, 68, 70, 72, 73, 89, 90, 94, 97, 124, 159, 175, 185, 194 poverty 19n40, 30n3, 34n11, 40n32, 61n9, 65n21, 68n37, 71n40, 94n6, 156n8 price 22n45, 26n57, 27, 37, 60n60, 65, 74, 76, 77, 79, 83, 97, 100, 108n2, 109–118, 120, 121–123, 125, 126, 129–140, 147–154, 157, 160–165, 167, 169–171, 174, 175n48, 176, 186, 187, 191, 194n1 produce 7, 8, 11, 66, 69, 70n40, 74–76, 100, 101, 103, 108, 109, 112–116, 118, 121–123, 133n17, 139, 148n47, 150, 155, 158–164, 166, 168, 171, 173, 176, 193 proselyte 92 prozbul 67, 68, 159 pulling 173 purchaser 3, 17, 78, 116, 123, 125, 128, 135, 179n8 Rab 141, 142, 189 Raba 88, 147, 165, 168 Rabba(h) 64n20, 106, 188n23 Rabba son of Rav Huna 184 Rabbah son of Rav Yosef 188 Rabbah son of Shilah 188 Rabbi 92, 174, 175 See Rabbi Judah the Prince Rabina 88 rabbinic prohibition 84, 166, 169 Rami bHama 134 Rav 67, 132, 189, 122, 123, 132, 133, 141, 142, 162 Rava 88, 91, 104–106, 107n40, 117, 118, 147, 162, 165, 168, 180, 183, 184, 189 Ravina 64n20, 88, 121, 184 rent, rental, renting 5, 36, 76–79, 97, 117n29, 126, 129, 145, 164–166, 168, 186 Resh Lakish 77n55, 174 ribit ketzutzah 71, 84 See also interest proper rich 3, 15n32, 65, 89, 124, 155, 159, 183n13, 190

Index of Subjects Rome, Roman 3, 4, 6n14, 8n16:17, 9, 10n22, 11n23, 13n28, 16–18, 21n4, 22, 23n47, 25, 29, 30n2, 31–33, 34n11;12, 35, 37n21, 38, 39n27, 40, 41n35, 42–50, 51n82, 52, 54n95, 55–61, 62n14, 65, 66, 73n49, 87n74, 92, 93, 95, 96n11, 102, 126n1, 140n36, 156, 164n25, 172, 179n8, 183n14, 192, 193, 194n1, 195 Roman artisans 9n20, 126n4 Roman economy 2, 6, 7n15, 8n18, 9n20, 17n37, 29, 30n3, 31, 32, 33n10, 35n15, 38n26, 41n36, 43n45, 46n64 Roman East 10n22, 33n10, 36, 59n3, 95n9 Roman Egypt 18n38, 19n39, 24n50, 33n10, 34n12, 38n24, 39n28, 41n38, 42n44, 43n45, 59n4, 79n58, 94n4, 95n8, 110n7, 111n13;15, 113n18, 117, 120n33 Roman Empire  1n1, 2n3, 3, 5n7, 8n18, 10n21, 16, 17, 18n37, 21, 22, 25, 29, 31, 32n9, 33n10, 35n12, 37n21, 39n27, 40n32, 48n72, 49n79, 59n4, 61, 91, 92n89, 93n4, 95, 98n16, 108n1, 111, 112n16, 118n29, 127, 137, 139, 156n10, 157, 175n49, 183n13, 193, 194 Roman Galilee 1n1, 2n2, 21, 23n50, 24n50, 63n15 Roman Italy 31n8, 35n15, 39n27, 40n35, 66, 95n8 Roman law 3n4, 5n7,16–18, 19n39, 22n46, 23n50, 36, 37n21, 39, 40n33, 43n45, 46n63, 47, 48n69, 49n77, 60n17, 77n56, 93n1, 109n6 Roman Near East 18, 22n45, 52n85 Roman Palestine See Palestine Roman period 3, 9n18, 10n22, 15n33, 31, 22, 32, 35n14, 36, 43n45, 45, 46, 49n77, 58n2, 60n8, 62, 79n58, 94, 95n7, 108, 110, 111, 114, 137, 139n36, 155n4, 157, 186 Roman West 36 Roman world 1n1, 2, 7n15, 7n18, 9n20, 10, 15, 16n33, 21, 22n46, 23, 24n50, 25, 28, 29, 30n5, 32n9, 33n10, 34, 35n14, 36n20, 37n21, 38, 39n27, 40n34, 41n35;36, 42, 45, 47n68, 49, 50, 51n82, 52n84, 56, 58n2, 59, 63, 65, 80, 91n87, 93, 95, 96, 102, 126, 137n31, 139n36, 154, 164, 167, 175, 189, 191, 193

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Index of Subjects Sabbatical year 3, 67, 68, 127n6, 159 Safra, Rav 119n32 sale 5, 6, 22n46, 27, 30, 39, 43n45, 52, 77, 79, 82, 92, 93n1, 96, 98, 105–110, 112–119, 120n35, 121–123, 125–129, 131, 133, 136n22, 138, 139, 148n47, 149, 150, 153, 155, 161, 162, 191–193 sale on credit 27, 77, 126–128, 192 salesman, salesperson 104, 105, 108, 116n25, 132 Samuel (Shmuel) 69n39, 122, 123, 141, 142, 159n17, 160, 173, 174, 182n12, 188, 189 Sasanian 10, 13n28, 14n31, 23, 35, 50, 51n82, 52n87, 54, 64n18, 69n39, 90n83, 91n86, 99n18, 106n39, 139n36, 179n8 Sasanid world 2, 15, 21, 25, 34, 56, 191 See also Babylon, Sasanid seʾah 25, 28, 74, 75, 133, 134, 158, 161–163, 165, 169, 173 seed 7, 8n17, 9, 37, 38n23, 69, 72, 105, 116n27, 155, 156, 157n12, 163–167, 176 sela(h), selain 25, 75, 77, 97, 121, 123, 128, 129, 133, 134, 145, 146, 164, 165 sell, selling 3, 73, 76, 101, 111n15, 112, 113n18, 114, 115, 118, 120, 122, 124, 126, 128, 131–140, 148–151, 154, 162, 186, 187 seller 78, 98, 108, 109, 112–114, 116–122, 125, 128–131, 133, 135, 148–150, 152, 153, 173 sekhirut 5 See also rent, renting Septuagint 71 sextarii 138 Shaar 27, 112 See also market place sharecropper 7n15, 9, 37, 143, 156, 164, 165, 167, 168, 171, 176 Sheela 5, 28n58 See also borrow, borrowing sheep 106n38, 121, 143–147, 153 Sheshet, Rav 64n20, 169, 188 shipping credit 36 Shisha son of Rav Idi, Rav 135 Shulchani (trapezitis) 4n7, 23n50, 63 See also table operator Simeon ben Eleazar, Rabbi 11, 12, 81n63, 179 Simeon [HaCohen], Rabbi 69, 81, 102

253 Simeon ben Laqish, Rabbi 173 Simeon son of Gamaliel/bGamaliel, Rabban 76, 141, 181, 182, 186, 187 Simeon son of Rebbi, Rabbi 174n47 slave 17n36, 25, 31n8, 38n25, 39, 40, 59, 92, 156, 171 silver 4, 26, 26n57, 96, 99, 100n18, 146n44, 171–174 social 1n1, 2n2, 7n15, 9n18, 10, 11, 16n34, 17, 18, 19n39, 20–22, 25, 31, 33n10, 34n12, 35n14, 40n34, 41, 42n72, 50n82, 53, 57, 58n2, 59n3, 60n6, 61n12, 62n14, 64n18, 65n27, 67, 70, 73n49, 80, 90, 92n89, 94, 95n10, 102, 112n16, 119n36, 150n54, 153, 170n33, 171, 175, 180, 182n12, 186n19, 191, 192 social credit 11 society 3, 7n15, 8n18, 9n20, 10n22, 11, 18, 20, 24n50, 25, 29, 31n6, 32n9, 34, 35n14, 38n38, 39n27, 41, 42n41, 44, 46n63, 49n77, 50, 51n83, 53–59, 60n8, 61, 63–66, 68n36, 69, 72n46, 87, 90n81, 93, 94, 95n8, 127n6, 175, 180, 193 See also Jewish society socioeconomic 16, 20, 21, 58n2, 68, 192, 194 sojourner 92 stock 126 stockpiling 172 storekeeper 4n7, 8, 102, 127, 128, 130, 140, 144 Syria 10, 58n2, 63n16, 66n29, 79n59, 80n59, 95n9, 108n1 Table operator 44, 61–63, 97, 98, 130 See also shulchani Tarbit(h) 70n40, 71, 99, 100, 109, 115, 116 tarsha 119, 134–136, 138, 153 Temple 87n74, 93n4, 120n34, 130, 131, 158, 159, 163, 178n4, 186, 187, 195 tenant 8, 76, 156, 163–168 thief, thieves 69, 179, 185 transaction 2–6, 9, 10, 14, 16, 26–31, 38, 39n27, 40, 42, 43n45, 47, 49n77, 52, 55, 62–65, 67, 71, 72, 83, 84, 92–96, 98, 99n18, 100, 108–119, 121–139, 147, 148n49, 150, 152–158, 160, 161, 164, 167, 171–177, 180, 187, 192–195 market transaction 98

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

254

Index of Subjects wealthy 9, 35, 39–41, 55, 56 wheat 26, 28, 35, 65, 74–76, 96, 100, 108n2, 112, 113, 115–117, 121, 122, 128, 131, 133, 134, 150, 152, 154–158, 160–169, 194 wholesaler 126 wife 39, 67, 143–146, 185 wine 26n56, 38n23, 66, 76, 111, 112n15, 115, 116n27, 117, 120, 121, 130, 155, 159, 160, 162 wool 38 woman, women 38–40, 52, 65n22, 67, 74, 144n40, 158, 194n1

toculliones 46 tokizein 45 tokos 45 Torah prohibition 2, 12, 26, 69, 71–73, 84, 85, 133, 192 Tosefta 4n7, 11, 12, 14, 15, 24, 25, 69n39, 73n49, 74, 75n53, 76–78, 81–87, 96–99, 101–104, 110, 112–114, 116, 117, 120, 122–125, 129n9, 130, 131, 132n16, 133, 134, 144–146, 148–150, 153, 159, 160, 162–165, 170n34, 171, 174, 175n48, 177–181, 185, 186, 187n21, 194n1 trade 1n1, 7n15, 10n22, 24n50, 29n2, 31n6, 33, 32n9, 34, 35n15, 36, 37n21, 39n27, 41n35, 43n45, 50n82, 66, 93, 97, 100, 104, 110, 113, 119, 151 trapezites 42 tressis 98, 99   Ukba bHama, Rav 134 Ulla 99n17 usurae 46 usury 2, 3, 6, 11, 14–16, 27, 28, 39, 39n27, 46, 48, 49n74;76, 53n91, 57, 69, 70n40, 74, 75, 80–85, 87, 88, 92, 97, 100–103, 107, 109, 112, 115–117, 123, 129, 131, 133, 134, 143, 153, 158, 167, 168, 177–185, 187–192

Yan(n)ai, Rabbi (=See Jannai, Rabbi) 114n20, 159n17, 182 Yavneh 74 Yehoshua, Rav 118 Yitzhak (Isaac), Rabbi 161, 162, 183 Yitzhak son of Yosef, Rav 65n20 Yohanan, Rabbi (See Johanan, Rabbi) 77n55, 84n67, 174–175, 182, 183, 185, 186 Yohanan ben Zakkai, Rabbi 69 Yose, Rebbi 113, 114, 115n24, 119, 179 Yossi (Jose) son of Rabbi Judah, Rabbi 106 Yoseph, Rav 90, 188n23 Yosef son of Hama, Rav 64n20

vatxaŕu, vaxsakar 54 vendor 17, 30

zuz 25, 65–67, 77, 121, 128, 129, 134, 135n19, 184, 189, 194

xestwn 136, 137

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

23mm

Ben Zion Rosenfeld, Ph.D. (1982), Bar Ilan University, is Prof. (Em.) of Jewish History. He has published many monographs and articles on Social and Economic History of Rabbinic Literature of Roman Palestine, including research on Greco Roman culture and Early Christianity.

Ben Zion Rosenfeld

ISBN 978-90-04-68195-8

ISSN 1571-5000 brill.com/brlj

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in the Mishnah and Talmud

Credit is the oxygen of every society. In many cases we wonder why the rabbis prohibit certain business credit transactions considering them usury. The writer uses literary and epigraphic sources to decipher the rabbinic approach. This book shows how rabbinic legislation innovatively expand the Torah prohibition of usury in loans to all fields of credit. It is a pioneering inquiry regarding rabbinic literature compiled under Roman and Sasanid rule, helping to fill the void in research concerning credit. It also distinguishes various kinds of credit differentiating credit of money for money, or products, exposing the ramifications of the rabbinic legislation.

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in the Mishnah and Talmud

THE BRILL REFERENCE LIBR ARY OF JUDAISM

Credit and Usury in Jewish Society in the Mishnah and Talmud

Ben Zion Rosenfeld

Ben Zion Rosenfeld

Ben Zion Rosenfeld - 978-90-04-68196-5 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/07/2024 09:59:14PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

BRLJ 75